A defence of the constitutions of government of the United States of America : against the attack of M. Turgot in his letter to Dr. Price, dated the twenty-second day of March, 1778.

•"1

LIBRARY

OF Till

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

GIFT OF

Received
Accession No.

3 6'7 • Class No. '••

—L -/

University of California • Berkeley

Pir

A

D E F E N C E

• ' - x'

OF THE

CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

• OF THE '

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
AGAINST THE ATTACK OF M. TURGOT

I N 'H I S

LETTER TO DR. PRICE,

DATED THE TWENTY-SECOND DAY OF MARCH, 177^»

BY JOHN ADAMS, L. L. D.

PRESIDENT O$ iffl* i*tiPr$D STATES*

M-T*. AIN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. III.
'THE THIRD EDITION.

Some philofophers have been fooliih enough to imagine, that
improvements might be made in the fyftem of the univerfe,
by a different arrangement of the orbs of heaven ; and politi-
cians, equally ignorant, and ecmally prefumptuous, may eafily
be led to fuppofe, that the happinefs of our world would
be promoted by a different tendency of the human mind.
JOHNSON'S ADVENTURER, No. 45.

PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTED BY WILLIAM YOUNG,

, OPPOSITE CHRIST'S CHURCH.
1797.

V

V

7

A

DEFENCE

OF THE

CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

P I S T O I A.

My dear Sir, Oftober 4, 1787.

THE Roman republic, according to its cuf-
tom * of placing judges in all places under
its dominion, fent to Piftoia a pretor who had
the whole jurifdi&ion, civil and criminal, over the
city ; referving always, according to the tenor of
the Roman laws, the obedience to the magiftrates
of that commonwealth. This jurifdi&ion, acqui-
red by the Roman Republic over the city of Pif-
toia, patTed to the Roman emperors, and from
fthefe into the power of the Goths and the Lom-
bards, and fucceffively in thofe who, from time to
time, were the Lords (fignore) of Tufcany ; and
has continued, down to our times, under the fame
tie and obligation of dependence. It is very true,
that the province being liberated from the govern-
ment of foreign nations, and its governors (domi-
natori) having permitted the people to make laws

* Memorie Storiche della citta di Piftoia, raccolte da Jaco-
po Maria Fioravanti, nobile Patrizio Piftorefe. Edit. Lucca,
1 758, cap. ii. p. 15,

VOL. III. B and

2 Piftoia.

and create magiftrates, the authority became di-
vided : hence when the conceffion was made to
the Piftoians to create magiftrates, take the name
of confuls, and form the general council of the
people, they were permitted to expedite, by the
authority of thefe, many things in their city; re-
ferving always, neverthelefs, the fovereignty to
their lords. This coriceffion of governing them-
ielves by their own laws, obtained by the pro-
vinces of Italy, was the mere liberality of Charle-
main*, at a time when, having delivered them
entirely from the government of the barbarians, he
placed them under the command of one of his
royal minifters, with the title of marquis, or of
duke. Under this fyftem of government was
comprehended Tufcany, which had its dukes and
marquiffes, who governed it. But as it was the
cuftom of Charlemain, and, long after him, of
his fuccefTors, to fend to the cities of this pro-
vince two fubaltern minifters, one with the name
of caftaldo, or governor, and the other with that
of count, which is as much as to fay, judge of the
city, who held his courts of juftice either alone,
or in conjunction with the caftaldo, and very often
with the bifhop of the place, as the bifhops were
afiTeflbrs and officers, deputed as vaffals of the
king or the emperor ; fo the city of Piftoia was
a long time ruled and governed by this order of
caftaldi and counts. Otto the fecond, having
afcended the imperial throne, and -having conduct-
ed, with little good fortune, 'the affairs of Italy,
the people began to think it lawful to lofe their
refpecl, and to fail in their veneration, for the im-
perial commands, and the cities advancing in their
inclination for liberty, many of them began to

. * Sigonius, de Regno Italic, lib. iv.

re-affume

Fioravanti. 3

re-aHume the title of confuls, which had been ex-
tinct under the Longobards ; and if thefe had
fomewhat of a greater authority, they were not,
neverthelefs, exempt from the jurifdittion of the
dukes and marquifles, or from the fovereignty of
the kings and emperors.

A greater fpirit of independence arifing in the
minds of the Italians, in the time of thofe great
difcords between the empire and the church, di-
minimed to fuch a degree the efteem of the people
towards the emperors, folemnly excommunicated
by the pontiffs, that a great part of the cities of
Italy, eftranging themfelves by little and little
from their obedience, began to conduct themfelves
like independent flates, in entire freedom. This
happened in the time of Henry the Fourth and
the Fifth ; and the difobedience increafed ftill
more, when all the Tedefque forces were engaged
to fuftain, in Germany, the competition between
Lothario the Second and Conrod the Swede for
the throne of Casfar. Then the cities, taking-ad-
vantage of the diftance of thofe who had power to
bridle their arrogance, began to be infolent* : then
they began to lift up their heads, and to do what-
ever feemed good in their own eyes : then they
thought it lawful to appropriate to themfelves
many of the regalia belonging to their fovereign ;
and believing themfelves able to make off the
yoke of fuperiority, they attended to nothing but
to their prefent advantage, and to .dilate the limits
of their ufurped liberty. But with all this, they
were never able to extinguifh the quality of their
fubjedion, nor the obligation of dependence ; for
Frederick the Firil pafled over to eftablifh and re-

* His diebus, propter abfentiam regis, Italiae urbibus, in
infolentiam decedentibus. Ottone Frifmgenfe.

gulate,

4 ' Pi/tola.

gulate, in the convention of Conftance, their pri-
vileges, and the regalia which were then ufurped :
and the people were held to an annual cenfus*,
and obliged to perform certain royal and perfonal
fervices.

In the twelfth century, the cities, after the fimi-
litude of ancient Rome, all re-aflumed the title
of confuls, and began, fome fooner and others
later, to make their proper ftatutes, and eftablifli
their popular government. Though it is not pof-
fible to afcertain the precife time when the infti-
tution of confuls was firft made in Piftoia, they
are, neverthelefs, found named in the flatutes of
1107; and of thefe there were two, called the
Conful of the Soldiers, and the Conful of Juftice,
taken from the nobility of the place, and were
called the Greater Confuis, to diftinguifli them
from the plebeian confuls* of the fecond clafs, call-
ed the Lefler Confuls, or Confuls of the Mer-
chants, taken from the common people. Their
authority, and fometimes their numbers were va-
rious ; but there ought ever to be one more of
the popular than of the greater confuls f . The
election of thefe magiftrates was made every year
by the people, with the intervention of all the go-
vernors, (rettori) of the arts of the city ; and they
governed, with the council of an hundred of the
better fort of citizens, adminiftering juftice both
to the laity and the ecclefiaftics. This council,
befides its extraordinary affemblies, was obliged to
meet in the months of March, May, July, and
September, after a previous intimation given by
the confuls, of the bufmefs to be done ; and for
the refult of this affembly all determinations,
» *.• .

* Sigonius, lib. xiii. de Regno Italic*

f Unus plus de popularibus quam de majoribus.

upon

Fhravanti. 5

upon things of moil importance, muft wait ;
and all laws, refolutions, and deliberations,
firft propofed and digefted in the fmaller coun-
cil, by the few, muft be here confirmed or re-

Here again is a conftitution of all authority in
one afiembly. The council of an hundred was
fovereign. The confuls, though they had the
command of the army, and the judgment of caufes,
could do nothing in adminiflration by themfelves,
or with advice of their little council. They had
no negative upon any deliberation or refolution of
the great council : and, on the other hand, the
people had no negative, not even the poor protec-
tion of a tribunitian veto. Accordingly *^e read,
in the next paragraph, that the power of the
people having fo greatly increafed, by means of
their ufurped liberty, fo many factions had arifen,
and feparated intofo numerous divifions, and all
had become fo much the more intractable and fedi-
tious, and the ftimulus of power was become the
greater, that the emperor Frederick the Firft, in
1155, after having reduced to his obedience Mi-
lan, and received the oaths of fidelity from all the
other cities of Italy, and, among the reft, from
all thofe of Tufcany, judged it necefTary, to ob-
viate the continual tumults which arofe, to infti-
tute the office and dignity of podefta, and to fend
to the government <?f thofe cities gentlemen, from
among the foreign nobility, with that title. This
commiffion of podefta operated to the damage and
diminution of the influence of the confuls, be-
caufe in this magiftrate was veiled the whole ju-
dicial power, both in private and civil caufes, and
in thofe which were public and criminal; and
therefore the podefta was the ordinary judge in the

city.

6 ', Pijhia.

city*, with full power, dominion, and authority
to govern, command, and chaftife, granted to him
by the emperor, to whom, as their legitimate fo-
vereign, the people had recourfe in cafes of appeal,
and in all denials of juflice.

From its fubjection to this minifter, in the ear-
Heft times of the inftitution of his office, the city
of Piftoia was ftill more irritated and opprefied ;
and, as the nomination was referved directly to
the fovereign, the officer was changed as often as
the times feemed to him to require. The rigour
of this inftitution was foftened by length of time
and continual difcords and difienfions, till the city
of Piftoia acquired the right of the election of this
minifter, who obliged himfelf in many things, to .
follow the various ordinances and refolutions of
the confuls. This election of the podefta was
made by the Piftoians in virtue of a municipal
law confented to by the fovereign ; the perfon
elected flood in office only fix months, and was
chofen by the council of the people, as it was
called, that is, the council of an hundred, with the
intervention of all the rectors of the chapels, and all
the rectors of the arts. The podefta was bound
to conduct witlrhim, judges fkilful in the laws,
notaries, two companies of militia, horfes, and fer-
vants, and other followers ; and in all things were
thefe officers obliged to render their accounts. It
was cuftomary to confer this dignity of podefta
upon the primary citizens. Neither the confuls
nor podefta, jointly or feverally, had authority to
impofe taxes, confent to war, peace, truce, or al-
liance, without the council of the people, which

* Con tutta la balia, impero, e potefta di governare, co-
mandare, e caftigare. Fioravanti, p. 18.

confided

Fioravanti. >j

confifted of an hundred citizens, elected in the
proportion of five and twenty for each of the four
gates or quarters of the city, with the intervention
of all the rectors of the chapels, and rectors of the
arts : or, in other words, the podefta, confuls,
council of an hundred, and rectors of the chapels
and arts, were all collected in one affembly, to de-
tefmine on grants for money, peace, war, truce,
alliance, &c. and all queftions were determined
by the vote of the majority, which rieceflarily made
that tempeftuous and capricious government in
one centre, againft which we contend.

And to the podefta, for his regulation in the
exercife of his office, were given by the city four-
teen counfellors, and two judges ; one de lege,
that is to fay, a doctor of law ; the other ex ufu,
or de ufu, which fignified, as they interpreted the
words, a protector of the commons ; and two ad-
vocates for arguing each caufe : and by the opi-
nion of all thefe he decided upon thofe things which
affected the honour or utility of the public, as he
himfelf, after having made his election of thefe at-
tendants, was obliged to ftand by their advice*.
This Podefta, in early times, fuperintended not
only the fecular government, but the ecclefiafti-
cal : but in procefs of time the city became go-
verned by three, namely, the confuls, the podefta,
and the bifhops ; for the bifhops had profited of
the violent dilfenfions that prevailed in the city,
to draw to themfelves Various rights and jurifdic-
tions, as has happened in other nations. The
lordfliip of the podefta, therefore, having thrown
down the authority of the confuls ; thefe were no

* His oath was, Et petam a confiliariis toto tempore mei
dominii de rebus, quae mihi videbuntur expe&are ad commu-
nem honorem et utilitatem, noftraa civitatis JPiftorii. Fiora-
vanti, p. 1 8, 19.

longer

8 Piftoia.

longer appointed, at lead are not found in the re-
cords, till the time when the office of captain of
the people was created. This inftitution in Pif-
toia happened when the Guelph party, by an in-
creafe of their numbers and ftrength, acquired the
fuperiority of the Ghibellines; at which time, with
a great concourfe and tumult of the people, the
lordfhip was taken from the podefta, nothing w*as
left him but the burden of hearing and determin-
ing civil caufes, and the twelve anziani of the
people were inftituted, and the authority of the
confuls was transferred to them.

The lafl appearance of the confuls in the re-
cords of Piftoia is in 1248, and the firft of the
captain of the people in 1267 ; when it is faid in
the ftatue, that the captain of the people was the
fir (I ruler of the city, and the primary defender of
its rights, and that he ought chiefly to watch over
the confervation of the peace ; that he was the
judge of appeals, and of all caufes in the fecond
inftance ; that he had cognizance of crimes ;
that he governed with fupreme authority, united
with that of the anziani ; that he kept a court, of
the fame kind as that of the podefta, but more
numerous ; and that the city gave him, for orna-
ment and defence, three hundred of the beft and
ableft men, who, taking an oath of fidelity to*
him, flood continually in his fervice*. The elec-
tion of this ruler was to be made by the anziani,
in the perfon of fome foreigner, and not of any
citizen of Piftoia. Notwithftanding that fome of
the primary citizens did in fact obtain this office,
as appears by the records, the anziani were

* Volumus quod eligaritur 300 boni homines 'de popolo
Piilorienfe, de melioribus et potentioribus, pro manutentione
et defenfione capitanei. Rubrica cento delle Legge del 1274*

fworn

fworn not to elecl: any man of Tufcany, or Pif-
toia, its diftridt, or other place adjoining to the
city or its bifhoprick. The words of the law, in
the twelfth rubrick of 1267, are, " Nos anthiani
populi Piftorienfis, juramus, fine aliquo intelledu
nobis dato, vel dando eligi, vel eligi facere nobis,
ob Pift. unum bonura et virum prudentem ma-
jore 30 ann. in noftrum capitaneum populi devo-
tum, et fidelem ecclefias, qui non fit de civitate
Piftorii, vel diftri&u, et qui non fit de Tufcia ....
Vel de aliqua terra, quas confinet cum civitate, vel
epifcopatu, vel diflridu Piftorii." And this dig-
nity of captain of the people was in fuch reputa-
tion, that, in many places, princes were chofen,
and fometimes even the pontiffs ; and fuch per-
fonages, by means of their vicars, often exercifed
ir. The captain of the people, therefore, being
the confervator of the peace, and the defender of
the rights of the city, the Piftoians, to give hini
a ftrong arm to bridle thofe who had unquiet and
reftlefs brains, thought it neceflary to create cer-
tain companies of armed men, who, at the found
of a bell, mould be obliged to run together into
the piazza, there to receive and execute the orders
which fhould be given them by this officer and
the anziani, without whofe permiflion they were
not allowed to depart. Thefe companies were
called by the name of the Equeftrian and Pedef-
trian Orders, becaufe they were compofed both of
horfemen and footmen. Thefe companies were
afterwards augmented to twelve, in the proportion
of three for each quarter, which embraced an in-
finite number of people ; and every company had
two captains, one gonfalonier, whofe office was to
carry the ftandard of his company, and four coun-
fellors : and it was the duty of the captain of the
people to procure the election of thefe officers, as

C is

io Piftoia.

is afTerted in the ftatute of 1267, rubrick 19:
" Teneatur capitaneus del popolo, primo menfe
fui regiminis, eligi facere duos capitaneos, unum
gonfalonerium, et quatuor confiliarios pro quali-
bet compagnia civil. Pifh pro fa&is ipfms com-
pagniae." _And in the additional laws of 1286,
eight priors were added to thefe companies, two
for each quarter ; and other orders were made for
the good regulation of this militia.

The twelve anziani were created with the fame
authority and full power which the confuls had
held ; but the precife year when the former were
appointed and the latter laid afide, cannot be af-
certained. The laft memorial on record of the
confuls is in 1 248 ; the firft of the anziani in 1 263 ;
fo that the change muft have been made in the
courfe of thefe fifteen years. The number of
members of which the new magiftrature was com-
pofed, appears by a law of 1267 : " Ordinamus
quod 1 2 anthiani populi civit. Pift. fint et efle de-
beant in civitate Piftoria," Thefe twelve magif-
trates were renewed every two months ; and after-
wards, as appears by a. law of 1277, it was efta-
blimed, that the anzianate fhould not continue
longer than one month ; and this magiflrature of
the anziani was elected by a council of the people
of two hundred, by the rectors of the arts, and by
their counfellors, and by the captains, gonfalo-
niers, and counfellors of the companies of the
people, and by the anziani pro tempore. The
head of the anziani was, in the primitive times,
called prior, and not gonfalonier. The prior
being the firft dignity among the anziani, each
member enjoyed it in rotation for an equal number
of days, as the prefident's chair of the States Ge-
neral is filled by all the members in turn for one
week, at the Hague. This prior had great autho-
rity,

Fioravami. ci i

iity, as appears by a law of 1267, written in the
37thrubrick: " Anthiani teneantur facere, etfa-
ciant inter fe, unum priorem de ipfis anthianis ad-
jecturn ipfis, ficut eis videbitur de tempore, cui
cseteri anthiani pareant, et parere debeant, et obe-
dire ; et qui contrafecerit puniatur a priore anthi-
anorum." Although the name of gonfalonier ap-
pears in the records of fome of thefe years, yet
certainly he was not the head of the anziani, but
of the arts : thus, in the law of 1283. " Item ca-
pitaneus debeat fpendere et affignare gonfalonem
gonfaloneriis electis, vel eligendis, ab unaquaque
arte et populo . . . . ita quod unaquseque.ars fuos
gonfalonerios et officiates habeat." From this it
clearly appears, that thefe gonfaloniers were the
heads of the arts, and not of the fupreme magif-
trature of the anziani ; which gonfaloniers were
elected by the council of the people of two hun-
dred, by the rectors of the arts, and by their coun-
fellors, and by the captains, gonfaloniers, and
counfellors of the companies of the people, and by
the anziani for the time being. Thefe anziani,
fitting together with the captain of the people,
and the general council of the people, promul-
gated laws and ftatutes, gave execution to all
the laws, civil and criminal, performed and con-
dueled all the mofl important affairs' relating
to the government, and reftrained the nobles and
plebeians with the fear of punifhment, within the
limits of refpeft and obedience * : that is to fay,
all authority, legifiative, executive, and judicial,
was collected together in one firigle affembly. But
how they reftrained the nobles and plebeians to
obedience we fhallfooh fee.

In the year 1329, thefe anziani are called in
the records Imperial Counfellors (Gonfiglieri Im-

* Fioravanti, p. 21.

periali,)

is Piftoia.

periali,) a remarkable title, obtained probably
from the emperor Louis of Bavaria, when, after
the death of Caftruccio, he placed one of his im-
perial vicars ever the cuflody of the city of Pif-
toia.

The dignity of gonfalonier of juftice was pro-
bably inflituted in the year 1295, becaufe in the
next year, 1296, in the ads of council it is re-
corded, " De confilio et confenfu et audoritate
dominorum anthianorum et vexilliferi juftitioe po-
puli, et audoritate ducentorum confiliarorum."

The new laws of 1330 name a gonfalonier of
juftice, and eight anziani. It is refolved, that the
anziani of the commons, and people of the city of
Piltoia, are and ought to be eight only, viz. two
for each gate or quarter, and one gonfalonier of
juftice for the whole city .... The faid lords, the
anziani and the gonfalonier of juftice, and their
notaries, are and ought to be of the beft popular
men and artificers of the city, and not of any
houfe of the grandees*. And the authority of
the gonfalonier of juftice was placed upon an
equality with that of the anziani. The law or-
dained, that whenever, in the ftatutes of the com-
mons and people, mention is made of the anziani,
the fame mall be underftood of the gonfalonier of
juftice, although he be not written; and in all
things, and every where, he mail have the fame
authority, and full power (balia) as has one of the
anziani, befides his proper office. And to mow
that the gonfalonier of juftice was not, in the be-
ginning, fuperior to the anziani, it appears that,

* Di6ti domini anthiani, et vexilliferi juftitias, et eorum
jiotarii, fint et efle debeant de melioribus popularibus et ar-
tificibus didlae civitatis, et non de aliqua domo magnata.
Tioravanti, p. 21.

after

Fioravanii. i 3

after the introduction of that office, they conti-
nued to appoint, in the ufual manner, a prior of
the anziani, with the fame authority and pre-emi-
nence before defcribed. The law of 1330 fays,
" And the anziani and ganfalonier of juftice, after
they fhall be congregated in their palace, and mail
have taken their ufual oaths, ought to conftitute
one prior from among themfelves, for fuch time as
they pleafe, to whom all the others ought to obey,
under the penalty, &c. So that each of the an-
ziani and gonfaloniers of juftice mail be prior, ac-
cording to the proportion of time they mail be in
office."

The gonfalonier, by the duty of his office, was
bound to fend out, with the confent and partici-
pation of the anziani, the ftandard of juftice, to
affemble together the armed militia, and go out
to do execution againft any of the grandees (mag-
nati) ; which gonfalonier of juftice, fays the law,
fliall be bound by the obligation of an oath, and
under the penalty of five hundred pounds, upon
the commiflion of any homicide, to draw forth the
ftandard of juftice, and, together with the captain
of the people, to go to the houfe of the grandee
committing fuch homicide, or caufmg. it to be
committed, and to caufe his goods to be deftroy-
ed, and not to fuffer the faid ftandard to repofe,
until all the property of fuch delinquent fhall be
totally deftroyed and laid wafte, both in the city
and the country ; and to caufe the bell of the
people to be rung, if to the lords, the anziana and
the gonfalonier of juftice, it mail feem expedient,
or the major part of them ; and all the mops,
ftores, and warehoufes, fhall be fhut immediately
upon the commiflion of fuch homicide, and mall
not be opened till execution fhall be done as
aforefaid. But in all other offences perpetrated
, I againft

14 Piftoia.

againfl the perfon of any popular man by any
grandee, it fhall be in the difcretion of the faid
lords, the anziani and the ganfalonier of juftice, or
the major part of them, to draw out the faid ftand-
ard or not. Such a rigorous kind of juftice, as it
regarded the grandees, who gave themfelves a li-
cence to commit exceflive diforders againft the
popular men, was thought to be the bed adapted to
their infolence. And to undeceive thofe who may
imagine that in Piftoia, at that time, the title of
grandees was a refpe&able title, and diftinctive of
the true nobility of the place, it is neceffary to
have recourfe to the ufual municipal laws, which
fay, that the magnati (grandees) were all thofe, of
whatever condition, who, abandoned to an ill Hfe,
offended the popular men, and held the city and
country in inquietude ; and for this reafon were
called Magnates, became feparated from all public
affairs, and excluded entirely from all magistracies
and offices, and fubje&ed to penalties ftill more
rigorous. By the laws of the years 1330 and
1344, to be declared a grandee was rather an in-
famy than an honour. The words of the law are
thefe, viz. ** But if it fhall happen that men of
any race* or noble houfe, or any one of them from
fuch a noble houfe or (lock, born of the male line,
or any others, live wickedly andflagitioufly againfl
the people, hurt the popular men, and terrify and
difturb the peaceful ftate of the people, or fhall
endeavour to do fo by himfelf or by others, and this
mall be made known by public fame to the captain
of the people, and the anziani and gonfalonier of
juitice 'for the time being j thefe magiflrates, at
the petition of any of the people of Piftoia, fhall
be obliged to propofe to the council of the people,
that fuch a noble houfe or progeny, fuch a man
or number of men, thus defamed, be written and

placed

FioravantL I 5

placed in the number of grandees, and as fuch be
accounted*." And as the Piftoians were driven
to great perplexities to maintain, in peace and
quiet, their popular government, and in order to
punifh feverely all thofe who mould take the li-
cence to difturb the pacific ftate of their city, they
proclaimed this penalty on all delinquents, by a
law of the year 1418, rubrick 9. " But if it (hall
happen that any one of any noble houfe or race,
or any one of any other condition, (hall live wick-
edly and profligately, or (hall commit or attempt
to commit any fuch crime or mifdemeanor againft
the people, and the pacific ftate of the people of
the city of Pifloia, they mail be recorded in the
number of grandees and accounted as fuch." To
fuch extremes of caprice and violence, deftructive
of all liberty and fafety, are fuch governments na-
turally and neceffarily reduced f .

The city of Piftoia had alfo in its regimen a
fyndick. This was an officer who was called an
Elder, or Syndick General, who mufl be forty
years of age, and live forty miles from the city.
His duty was to look over the accounts of the
podefta, the captain of the people, the anziani,
and all the magiftrates and officers of the city and
its diftricl:, when they refigned or were difmifled

* Sciibantur et ponantur in mimero magnatum et poten-
tum, et pro magnatibus et potentibus habeantur. Fioravanti,
p. 22.

f The devices on the ftandards, feals, and coins of the re-
"public, as well as all other antiquities, are not within the
defign of this cflay ; but there was on one of jitheir ftandards
an idea that contained the tnleft emblem of their govern-
ment— a lamb purfued by a wolf, with the motto, Pace, ri-
chezza, fuperbia ; guerra, poveiia, umilta : Peace, riches, and
pride ; war, poverty and humility. If the wolf is conftrued
to fignify the majority, and the lamb the minority, as there
was neither a fhepherd nor fhepherd's dog to interpofe between
them, the rcfemblan.ce is. perfect

from

16 Piftoia.

from their charges. There were, moreover, ac-
cording to the law of 1402, judges of appeals in
all caufes, civil, criminal, and mixed; and to them
belonged the cognizance of all difputes and regu-
lations concerning provifions : they alfo fuperin-
tended the fumptuary laws, againft all luxurious
excefles in the drefs and ornaments of the ladies ;
and they entertained a number of notaries, and a
numerous family and court, for the execution of
all fervices appertaining to their offices.

The city of Piftoia being in this ftate of go-
vernment, in 1355, the emperor Charles the
Fourth arrived at Pifa, and the citizens appeared
before his Imperial majefty, and gave him the de-
monftrations of vaiTallage and obedience due to
the fovereignty which he held over their city.
The emperor confirmed to them all the privile-
ges granted by his auguft predeceflbrs ; and de-
firous of fixing the reputation and reverence for
the dignity of the gonfaloniers of juftice, he en-
larged their authority, as well as that of the an-
ziani ; and wifhing to make the Piftoians enjoy,
quietly, fome fpecies of liberty, he gave thejn, by
a diploma of the 26th of May, the faculty of liv-
ing and governing themfelves, according to their
laws and laudable cuftoms, in a free, popular ftate,
under the regency of the anziani and the gonfalo-
niers of juftice, declaring both the anziani and the
gonfaloniers, for the affairs of Piftoia and its do-
minion, his vicars, and vicars of the empire, for, the
whole term of his own life. " The anziani," fays
the diploma, u and the gonfalonier of juftice of
the people, and commons of Piftoia, who now are,
and for the time to come fhall be, in office, and
no others, we conftitute our general and irrevo-
cable vicars, for the whole term of our life, with
the full adminiftration in the city, country, and

diftrid

Fioravanti. 17

diftri&of Piftoia, and in all its lands, cafties, and
places." Piftoia maintained itfelf in this ftate of
a republic as long as Charles the Fourth lived ;
and, taking advantage of the diftance and negli-
gence of his fuccefibrs, they perfevered in the
fame government until the year 1401, when the
emperor Robert, by his charter, declared the gon-
falonier and priors of the arts of the city of Flo-
rence his vicars, and vicars of the empire, and
gave them the government of Arezzo, Volterra,
Piftoia, and the other places of Tufcany. But in
the interval between thefe periods, the Piftoians
were never quiet ; for governing themfelves in
what they called a free popular ftate, they were
for reducing all to a level, and thought, or pre-
tended, to make all the citizens enjoy equally the
public honours and offices of their city. In this
ftate of things, the rebellion of Sambuca was fo*
mented by fome of the citizens of Piftoia, at the
head of whom was Riccardo Cancellieri, who had
made himfelf mafter of feveral cafties in the moun-
tains ; from whence he made inroads on the whole
territory of Piftoia, and kept the inhabitants in
continual alarms, with the defignof delivering his
country into the hands of John Galeazzo Vifconti,
duke of Milan. Upon this occafion the imperial
vicars in Florence fent, for the protection of Pif-
toia, two thoufand infantry, fome cavalry, and
three commirTaries, who calling together the ge-
neral council, impofed upon the counfellors the
neceffityof doing whatever was required of them,
that they might not incur (till greater miferies. In
the firft place, they required that every refolution
and ftatuteof liberty, and every condition, article,
and confederation, which the city had, mould be
annulled ; and then, by another refolution, that
they fhould fubject themfelves to the people of
VOL. III. D Florence,

1 8 Piftoia.

Florence, with liberal authority to govern Piftoia
at their discretion. This proportion of the Flo-
rentines was ill relifhed by the Piftoians; and
while the council was debating on it, the foldiery
took pofieflion of the piazza and palace of the an-
ziani ; and having underltood that no resolution
had palled, they began, with drawn fwords in
their hands, to cry, ct Florence for ever I" (Viva
Firenze!) and to threaten the counfellors, who,
thus intimidated, by an ample refolution Suddenly
Surrendered the liberty of their city to the Floren-
tines, from that day, the loth of September i4oi>
to the calends of January 1402, to the end that
they might apply a Summary remedy to the evils
with which they were agitated and opprefSed,
as Say the books of reformations in Florence :
and then were painted the lions, the enSigns of
Florence, upon the palace of the Syndick of the
city of Piftoia. It was not long before thefe im-
perial vicars, availing themSelves of the authority
given them by the emperor, and of that given
them by the Piftoians themfelves, fent to Pifloia
four commifTaries to reform the public offices ;
who, deSirous, as they Said, of discovering the in-
clinations of their principals to raife the dignity of
the city of Piftoia, propofed that the forms and
orders of the city of Florence mould, as much as
poifible, be imitated ; and that the twelve buon-
homini mould be called the Twelve of the Col-
lege ; and that the Supreme magiftracy oS the an-
ziani mould be no longer denominated the Anziani
of the People, but the Priors of the People ; and,
not making any innovation in the gonfalonier of
juftice, that he fhould retain the Same name.
The prior of the anziani was to be called Provoft
or Prefident of the Priori, according to the words
of the reform, " And the priors mall have among

themSelves

Fforavanti. iq

thernfelves one prefident continually, who (hall;
continue three days in this manner. After the
oaths of office /ball be taken, they (hall caufe nine
votes, with their names, to be put into a purfe by
a notary, one of which fhall be drawn out for a
prefident, rand fo fuccefftvely during the term of
their office."

The Florentines having thus limited and re-
ftrained the privileges of the Piftoians, or made the
election of the anziani, and given them the name of
priors, they made eight purfes, in the proportion
of two for each gate, and regulated themfelves ac-
cording to the plan in 1376; in which year, to
take away the fcandalous names of the two fac-
tions of Bianchi and Neri, Whites and Blacks,
were inftituted two companies, one called the
Company of St. John, and the other St. Paul,
and one prior was drawn for the gate of one com-
pany, and another for the other ; and the gonfa-
lonier of juftice was drawn, at one time from the
company of St. John, and at another from that
of St. Paul. This manner of drawing the magif-
tracy of the priori was changed in 1417, when the
priori began to be drawn from two purles, the firft
and the fecond.

In 1417 the Piftoians, confidering that in fo
great a change of affairs they ought to make fome
advancement of the dignity of the gonfalonier of
juftice, ordained that the firft place in rank fhould
no longer be held by the prefident and rector of
the city, but by the gonfalonier. Thus fays the
law, " That the gonfalonier of juftice fhall always
hold the more dignified place, and after him the
prefident: and in like manner, in going out, with
the reftor and other officers of the city of Piftoia."
This law was ratified by the law of 1437; and
from this it followed, that in 1463 they began to

make

so Piftola.

make for the prefident, who was to continue and
refide in that office, a purfe by itfelf, as it was de-
termined by the other officers, in 1471, that from
that purfe mould be drawn two, and the oldeft
man of them mould be the firft to occupy the
prefident's place, unlefs the younger were a doclor
of laws : and this was called the purfe of the prefi-
dent, the firfl of whom had the faculty of fpeak-
ing and anfwering firft in all congrefles ; which
faculty however ceafed, in the firft prefident, in
the year 1492, when it was determined, that the
right of fitting and fpeaking firft mould, in all oc-
currences, be enioyed by the gonfalonier of juftice :
and thus this office of gonfalonier of juftice, rifing
continually in dignity, began by little and little to
be defired by the nobles, and, by common confent
and a public decree, to be confined to the nobles
alone. The fupreme magiftracy of the priori be-
coming a little civilized, it grew into a cuftom,
that the purfe of the prefident was confidered as
the firft after that of the gonfalonier of juftice,
and that which was the firft of the priors became
the fecond ; but, becaufe from this were drawn
four fubje&s, it was called the Purfe of Four ; and
the other, which was called the Second of the
Priori, became the third, and was called, from this
time .the Common Purfe, in which all citizens
qualified for offices ought to remain, at leaft for the
period of one reform, although by his condition
of birth, merit, and age, he was qualified for a
purfe of higher rank. When afterwards it was
eftablifhed, that the defcendants of men of rank
and diftin£tion, by the male line, fhould no longer
begin to enjoy the priori by that purfe, but by
that of four, the fame was called no longer the
Common Purfe, but the Third ; whence, by vir-
tue of this new order of magiftrature, we read, in

Fioravanti.

* of one gonfalonier of juftice, two prefidents,
four of the firft, and two of the fecond purfe, and
one notary, with the preference to the gonfalonier
of fitting firft, given him by the law of 1474,
which fays, " The gonfalonier (hall obtain the firft
and mod dignified place."

By the few memorials that remain in the ar-
chives of Piftoia it appears, that there have been
many and various councils of citizens, for the re-
gulation of the public affairs of the city, in which
councils refided the fupreme authority of govern-
ment ; and before the conftrudion of the public
palace, all thefe councils were aflembled in a
church, at the election of the head of the fupreme
magiflracy of the anziani. The council of the
people, from the year in which the anziani were
inftituted, had, until 1477, the preference to make
the reforms of the magiftrates and public officers
of the city ; in which year it was ordained, that
fuch reforms mould be made by thofe who had
been drawn gonfaloniers of juftice, and workmen
of St. James. Thefe reformers began to be called
men of rank (graduati) for being arrived at the
firft degrees and honours of the city, which at that
time were the offices of gonfalonier of juftice, and
that of a labourer of St. James ; and,*for the firft
time, they are found thus named in the reform of
1483 : and afterwards it was eftablimed by law,
that two of a family mould intervene, to make the
reform of public offices, and that the number of
thirty-three mould be fufficient to make the re-
form with validity. And this order of the gra-
duati, or men of diftindion, is that by which, at
this day, is moft clearly diftinguimed the no-
bility of the city of Piftoia. — In the year 1521,
the number of the graduati deftined to make the
reform of the public officers failing, there were

elected

22 Piftoia.

elected certain citizens, of the other noble and
popular families, and the name of Arruoti ; and
it was eftablifhed as the duty of thefe to intervene
in making the reform ; and this lafted till 1580.

In the times of theconfuls we read, that there
was a counfel of an hundred citizens, who were
chofen by four men of good fame, twenty-five for
each of the four gates of the city : without this
counfel, neither the confuls nor the podefta could
determine any thing ; and when there arofe a
queftion of peace, war, or taxes, befides the coun-
cil of an hundred, all the rectors of the chapels
and arts intervened ; and as upon thefe occafions
the confuls, podefta, counfellors of the hundred,
and rectors of chapels and arts, all met in one af-
fembly, and determined all things by a majority
of vote, which, as has been before obferved, made
it a government in one centre (an ariftocracy in
reality, though a popular ftate in name) and con-
fequently fome two or three families muft always
be at the head of it, and conftantly contending for
the fuperiority, kept the people in perpetual con-
tention.

There was another council, as appears by the
records, formed of fourteen citizens, and of all the
doctors and . advocates, which was deftined to
counfel the podefta ; as he himfelf, after having
made his election of them, was obliged to go-
vern by their advice : fuch was his oath ; "And
I will fubmit to my counfellors, through the whole
time of my dominion, in things which fhall ap-
pear to me to regard the common honour and uti-
lity of our city of Piftoia." As neither the po-
defta nor this council had any negative on the
legiflative council of an hundred, but, fince the
podefta had the choice of its members, was no
doubt compofed of his friends in the counfel of

an

Fioravanti. £3

an hundred, it is plain that the fame perfons and
families mud have the chief influence and direc-
tion of affairs in both ; fo that this executive
council had the fame centre with the legiflative
council.

It is further found, that in the firft times of the
government of the twelve anziani, viz. in 1267,
there were two councils, one of forty counsellors
of the captain of the people .and of the anziani,
who ought to be of an age above forty years, and
their office continued fix months ; and they re-
folved upon all propofitions which by the captain
of the people and the anziani were propofed to
them, provided they were not contrary to the laws
and the reform of the commons and people. The
other council was called the Council of Two Hun-
dred Counfellors of the People ; and in the af-
femblies of this council intervened all the afore-
faid forty, and, moreover, all the captains, gonfa-
loniers, and counfellors of the companies of the
people, and all the rectors and counfellors of the
arts, and all thofe who had been anziani. The
fabric of this government, and its fpirit, was the
fame with the former, only the name of captain of
the people was fubftituted for that of podefta, and
a council of forty was fubftituted to that of four-
teen, and a council of two hundred to that of one.
The alteration therefore was not at all for the
better.

After 1330 there was one council, called the
General Council ; this was formed of an hundred
citizens, viz. fifty popular men, and fifty grandees
(magnati.J In this council intervened all the
members of the council of the people, all the che-
valiers, all the doclors of law, and all the phyfi-
cians of Piftoia, matriculated in the college of
phyficians. But this council had of itfelf no au-
thority,

24 Piftoia.

thority, and could do nothing without the council
of the people. In like manner, after the fame
year 1330, the principal council of Piftoia was
that of the people, in which intervened all the an-
ziaiii, gonfaloniers of juflice, and their notaries,
and two hundred popular citizens ; and none of
the grandees could be of this council. They were
eleded fifty for each gate. The authority of this
council was fupreme and fovereign, to make and
repeal laws, impofe and take off taxes, &c. In
more ancient times, as appears by the rubrick 62,
of the law of 1267, the council of the people had
confided of fix hundred citizens ; but becaufe fuch
a multitude generated confufion, it was reduced to
two hundred in 1270.

But the government of longeft duration in Pif-
toia was that of the eight priors of the people, and
one gonfalonier of juftice ; and this body was call-
ed the Supreme Magiftracy of the City, and was
renewed every two months, from the four purfes,
in the palace of its refidence. When they pro-
ceeded to draw thefe magiftrates, with folemn
pomp was raifed up, from the treafury of St.
James, the box, within which were locked up,
with four keys, all the votes of the magiftrates of
the city, and was carried in proceflion, accompanied
by the magiftrates of all the colleges, with the
trumpets founding, into the public palace ; where,
from the firft purfe, was drawn the gonfalonier of
juftice, who was the head of this magiftracy, and
not only enjoyed the fupreme dignity, and the pre-
eminence in place, robes, habitation, and in all
other refpe&s, but anfwered in the name of the
public : and although in public affairs he could not
rule alone, there was always allowed him a right of
freely entering when he would into the greater coun-
cil, and into all other councils and colleges where

any

any matters of importance were under deliberation,
and there give his opinion, his reafons, and his
vote. This gonfalonier was a man of gravity from
his age ; and that he might be refpe&able in all
points, it was required that he mould be of an an-
cient family* : and he who enjoyed this fupreme
poft enjoyed a jewel, held in veneration by the
people, and in great efteem by the nobility. There
were then drawn from the other purfe two fub-
je&s who were called prefidents ; and thefe were
fometimes of a middle age, and fometimes old
men, and for the moil part, after giving proofs of
their wifdom in thisflation, they afcended, either by
means of their birth or their merit, to the rank of
the gonfalonierate. From the other purfe, called
the purfe of four, were fucceflively drawn four fub-
jects of the prime nobility, or at leaft of middling
condition, who, for the moft part, were in younger
2ge ; and from this purfe, fome by their birth,
and fome by their merit and their age, patted up
to the more dignified purfe of the prefidents,
and fometimes to the rank of graduati, or men
of diftinction. In the lad place were drawn
two perfons from the third purfe, in which were
contained all the citizens who had not made any
advancement in the other purfes, or had been of
families worthy only of the purfe of four, and
among thefe were found thofe who exercifed civil
and liberal arts ; and thefe did not diminifti the
dignity of the magiftracy, but rather gave occa-
fion to maintain the union between the plebeians
and the nobility ; for with this confolation, the
former remained long quiet, without any infurrec-
tion. This magiftracy had in the fervice of its
miniftry a chancellor, who was a notary public, and

* Si richiede lunga, c continovatachiarezza di fangue.

E was

26 Ptftoia.

was drawn from a purfe deftined for that porpofe.
This magiftracy began their offices on the morn-
ing of the firft day of the month, in their fenato-
rial robes. Each of the priors wore a robe of
fcarlet lined with red damafk, vulgarly called a
gowri*(lucco,) with a hat or bonnet lined with a
cloth of black filk, with its ribbon and taflel of
black crape, and upon the left moulder a large
-knot of crimfon fatin, which was commonly call-
ed la becca ; and the chancellor wore a gown of
black cloth, lined with red cloth, without the knot
upon the moulder, but with a hat fimilar to thofe
of the priori, whofe duty it is to draw up and fign
the ath of this magiftracy ; but the gonfalonier of
juftke is clothed with a robe of red velvet, with a
limilar moulder-knot, and his head is covered with
'a boad hat, of a noble appearance, the name of
which is tocco, a bonnet. This magiftracy, thus
clothed and ornamented, before the fyndick of
the old magiftracy took the oaths of their offices,
in the public view of trie people, in the larger
piazza, and under the ample covering of it, built
in 1332 with the revenues of the excife, or ga-
belles, of the four quarters of the city ; and, after
having taken their oaths, they went in proceffion,
with the ftandard of juftice, to the chapel of St.
James the apoftle, protector of the city, and thence
to the palace of their refidence, which was fpa-
cious enough to receive, in the year 1536, the em-
peror Charles the Fifth, in all the forms of ma-
jefty. None of the component members of that
magiftracy could go out privately ; but only in
fome determined function was it permitted to the
whole body of the magiftracy' to go out of their
palace with folemn pomp. This magiftracy re-
fided with their chancellor, night and day, in the
palace, to the end that all public bufinefs might

be

Fioravanti. %j

be difpatched and attended to with the greater vi-
gilance, for the good government of the city ; and
they drew from the commons a fufficient appoint?
rnent, both for the maintenance of their tables,
and of fix and twenty perfons deftined to their
fervice, and for the honourable management of
the furniture of their palace, the linen for^their
perfons and houfeholds, and of their plate, and
all other things neceflary for their ufe in the time
of the government. This maglftracy alfo enter-,
tained a chaplain, with a handfome falary. We may
pafs over the tedious defcription of feafts and pub-
lic proceflions, and return to the former difcourfe,
and fay, that the gonfalonier of juftice was the
head, not only of the fupreme magiftracy, but alfo
of all other fubaltern magiftracies which were in
the commonwealth, and without him there could
not be convened any council of the citizens, to
engage in any public deliberation. This magif-
trate, while the public refidence continued, was
attended, whenever he went out of the palace, by
a retinue confifting of one perfon, who, with the
title of fifcal, refided in Piftoia, by one afieffor
verfed in the profeflion of the law, by the captain
of infantry, by two architects of the palace, by the
fteward of provifions, by the chancellor del danno
dato, by the mafter of the hpufe, and by fix and
twenty fervants : and in the performance of reli-
gious ceremonies, and in fome of the principal
afiemblies, this magiftrate had a retinue of magik
trates and nobility, which gave him more fpleri-.
dour than a crown.

The magiftrates, upon whom depended the right
government of the city of Piftoia, are, befides thofe
already named, all thefe which follow : fome de-
termine upon public affairs, others prefide in ju^
dicature, others fuperintend the common interefts,

others

2 8 P ijl oia.

Others private; thefe watch over health, thofeover
plenty ; fome attend to the confervation of the
peace, and others to politics. Thefe magiftrates are
the twelve colleges ; fix for petitions ; two for the
works in the palace of the fupreme magiflrates ;
the two companions ; the captain of infantry, who
in ancient times was called by the name captain
of the families of the anziani, and who, in primi-
tive times, was called by the name of votalarche —
the inilitution of this office was mod ancient ;
the fix labourers of St. James, who, befides other
commiffions, held that of provifions, and are,
exclufively of all other magiftrates, lawgivers,
judges, and overfeers of all the tranfgreffions de^
pendent upon matters of provifions, and is the firft
magiftracy of the nobles, becaufe he who is de^
nominated a labourer of St. James enjoys the noble
rank of the graduati, a dignity and charge of equal
nobility, although of different function and com-
mand, with that of gonfalonier of juflice, as this
office confers the character and diftin&ion of nobi-
lity both upon the perfon and the family. There
are alfo the four officers of the pious and charitable
houfe of wifdom ; the four workmen of the holy
virgin of humility ; the magiftrates over the rivers
and roads ; the labourers of St. John and St. Ze-
none ; the magiftracy of buonhomini over the
prifons ; the minifters of the mount of piety ; the
miniflers of fait ; the minifters of pledges depo-
fited ; the approvers of the excifes ; the purveyors
for the commons ; the four over civil contefts ;
the two over the reftitutions of gabelles ; the two
over the public fchools ; the deputies fuperintend-
Jng the poor ; the deputies for the affeffment of
taxes ; the magiftrates of abundance ; the magif-
trates of health ; the judges of controverfies rela-
tive to beafts 5 the four peace makers ; the minif-
ters

Fioravanti. . 29

ters of the trumpet ; the eight reformers ; the
minifters of the commons ; the minifters of the
cuftom-houfe ; the fyndicks of the re&ors ; the
deputies over the work-houfe of the poor ; the pri-
fon keepers ; the college of judges ; the notaries ;
the rectors of arts ; the tribunal of damages done ;
the regifters who affifted in civil contefts ; the ma-
giftracy of tkree judges, who are foreigners : but
at prefent, as the public revenues are farmed out,
thefe are fufpended, and in their place the fifcal of
the city is introduced to decide the controverfies
of the people, with the liberty of recurring to the
grand ducal chamber at Florence, in cafes of ap-
peals and denials of juftice. The appeal from ci-
vil caufes, determined by thefe magiftrates, is
fometimes to the fupreme magiftracy of the priori
and the gonfalonier of juftice of the city, in the
name of whom the public decrees are difpatched,
and under the impreffion of his feal.

There is, moreover, a council general of the
people, formed of fixty citizens, and their office
continues fix months ; into this council intervene
the priors of the people, the gonfalonier of juftice,
the twelve colleges, and the fix for petitions. This
council holds the fupreme authority of the city,
and has jurifdiction over all the magiftrates who
trangrefs their offices, and has the faculty to treat
and difpatch the moft important affairs of the
ftate of Piftoia, to make and repeal laws, name
ambafladors, difpenfe offices, lay on arid take off
taxes, and to give all affiftance to the other magif-
trates, who all have their peculiar incumbent du-
ties ; and each member may oppofe a decifion on
any queftion under deliberation, that it may be
referred to another feffion, to be approved or re-
jefted on mature confideration.

For the mod weighty bufmefs of the govern-
ment.

jo Piftoia.

ment, there is a council compofed of the old and
new council of the people, the priors of the people,
the gonfalonier of juftice, the twelve of the col-
leges, the fix of petitions, all the graduati, the
refident officers of the pious houfe of wifdom, and
all the refident gonfaloniers, and refolve as to the
majority appears moft ufeful and advantageous for
the public good, where all the moft momentous
affairs and caufes moft interefting to the public
are digefted.

There is alfo a council of graduati, which had
its beginning in 1483, and is compofed of two
perfons for each family, of thofe perfons, however,
who actually enjoy the dignity of thegraduati, which
is the firft of the honours of the city ; and three
and thirty members are fufficient to form a valid
council, to which it belongs to promote perfons and
families to the citizenlhip of Piftoia, and to public
offices and honours. Every five years this council,
together with the gonfalonier of juftice, and the
eight reformers, put to afecretvote all the perfons
who enjoy the citizenmip of Piftoia, iind reward or
condemn them as juftice requires. They renew the
imborfations of public offices and honours, and
give or take away from all as they pleafe ; examin-
ing well the ranks of the citizens, the nobility,
antiquity, merits and demerits of all perfons and
families, over whom they keep a watchful eye, in
order to prevent all occafion of confufion, diforder,
and difturbance, which might happen through the
difcordant pretenfions of the citizens ; and thus
guarded and eftablifhed, they come from time to
time to the diftribution of thofe offices for which
there is occafion.

Piftoia has alfo its dipenfer of laws (giufdi-
cente), the duty of whom is to procure the peace
and tranquillity of the citizens, and to diftribute

juftice,

Fioravanti. 3 1

juftice, both according to the municipal laws, and
conformably to the will of the fovereign ; and
from ancient times his pod was occupied by the
podefta, introduced by the emperors into all the
cities of Italy ; and becaufe that, in the leaguethat
was called the confederation of Tufcany, conclud-
ed in 1 197 between many places and cities of that
province, for their common defence againft the
rights, or at lead claims, of the emperor, to dilate
the limits of their liberty, Piftoia had her place,
and elected, according to the tenor of the afibcia-
tion, her head, with the title of captain, to whom
were confided, as the law required, all their affairs
and pretenfions, therefore, in 1200, it is faid that
Piftoia had for her captain one by the name of
Gualdaccio ; from which year, until 1529, there
was always elected by the Piftoians, and bythofe
wjio had the government of Piftoia, a rector, to-
gether with the podefta, for the good direction of
the affairs of that city. It happened afterwards,
that in the great tumults between the factions of
the Panchiatica and the Cancelliera, there were
elected by the Florentines thirteen commiflaries,
to eftablilh the peace between thofe factions ; and
they annulled, among the multitude of things which
they did in 1502, the office of captain, and created
that of commifiary ; and thus in fome years he was
called commiflary, and in others captain commif-
fary, and in others they returned to the old name
of captain. In 1529 the Piftoians, finding them-
felves in great difficulties, doubtful whether they
fhould be able to govern themfelves, and dreading
the devaftations of the army of the emperorCharles
the Fifth, which was near their confines, fent am-
bafladors to Bologna, to fupplicate Clement the
Seventh, who was then in that city, that he would
condefcend to defend their city from the imminent

danger,

3 1 Pi/loia.

danger, and take it under his protection, and de-
livered him the keys of it ; which the pontiff, in
his own name, and in the name of the emperor,
who fought for the obedience of the Florentines
and the other cities of Tufcany, having vyith great
alacrity accepted, he fent fuddenly, for the go-
vernment and cuftody of Pifloia, Alexander di
Gerardo Corfmi, with the title of coinmiffary ; and
therefore it followed that no podefta or captain
was elected afterwards, excepting for three years,
but one magiftrate alone, with the title of com-
miiTary general, as was ever after the cuftom.

The emperor Charles the Fifth having, in 1530,
reduced by force the Florentines, and their confe-
derates, to fubmiflion to the empire, and reftored
in Florence "the houfe of Medici, who had been
banifhed by their fellow-citizens, configned to
them the government and dominion of Tufcany.
Piftoia did not hefitate a moment from its obedi-
ence to the new regent of the province, by which
ready fubmiflion they obtained from him the fa-
culty of continuing to govern themfelves accord-
ing to their own laws and laudable cuftoms ; and
they continued to receive, in place of a podefta and
captain, a commiflary general for their defender
and governor ; for all the time that the govern-
ment of the houfe of Medici lafted, to maintain
the government in fuitable dignity, it was their
cuftom always to confer it on fome fenator of Flo-
rence.

The government of the houfe of Medici termi-
nating in the year 1737, by the failure of the fuc-
cefilon, it was conferred, by the emperor Charles
the Sixth, on Francis, the third duke of Lorraine
and Bar. This new lord of Tufcany, purfuing
the fame fyftem of government of the houfe of
Medici, has continued to furnifh the city of Piftoia

with

with a commilfary general, if not a fenatof , at leaft
refpectable for his nobility, who, regulating the
government by the laws of the city, has always
enabled it to enjoy a perfect tranquillity.

Francis, the fecond grand duke of Tufcany, in
1749, conceiving a good opinion of Piftoia, as a
city of merit, and in all things refpedable, wifhing
to raife its dignity and honour, as he pretended,
annulled the office of commiflary general, and
confided the government to a "minifter, with the
title of governor*.

In a city, where every intereft feemed to be
guarded by particular magiftrates, where fo many
changes were made in their form of government,
in order to find one which would pleafe and fatisfy
the people, one might expeft to find happinefs, if
it were poilible that it mould exift where le>-
giflative and executive powers were confounded
together in one aflfembly. But if we go over again
the feveral periods of the hiftory of Piftoia, we
{hall find that fimilar caufes had the fame effects.

At the end of the eleventh and beginning of the
twelfth century, civil difcords in Piftoia generated
much mifery ; and many families fearing that they
mould have ftill greater evils to fuffer, determined
to abandon their country ; and, as a leflbn to
their mad and cruel fellow-citizens whom they
left behind them, they caufed an infcription to be
engraved on the gates, " Habbi pazienzia" (have
patience), a motto that ought to be written over
the door, and engraven on the heart, of every ci-
tizen in fuch a government, an.d went to inhabit
other countries.

Italy beginning, in i u 2, to be infected with the
contagious difeafe of the factions of the Guelphs

* Fioravanti, p. 38.

VOL. III. F and

34 Pi/lota.

and Ghibellines, deftru&ive infurre&ions and tm-
mults were raifed in Piftoia ; and the citizens, in-
feded with a fpirit of cruelty againft each other,
without fear of human or divine chaftifement, at-
tended to nothing but party quarrels, and mutual
ilaughter and murder : and thefe contefts involved
the city in continual wars, foreign and domeftic,
till the year 1235, when the podefta, a wife man
and a nobleman of high rank, exerted all his pru-
dence, vigilance, and folicitude, to reprefs and
compofe the tumults of the nobles and popu-
lar party, who, on account of the government,
were grown unufually fierce and infolent ; but not
being able to reconcile differences fo inveterate,
nor prevent the cruelties which both parties, re-
gardlefs of his menaces and punifhments, daily
committed, the city was thought to be in evident
danger of total defolation. As fome of the citi-
zens had given afliftance to the Conte Guido de
Conti Guidi, who was become odious to other ci-
tizens as the fautor of Ghibellines, tumults were
increafed and multiplied, till the city was at length
divided into two, came to a fierce battle, and, as
one party would not mix with or depend upon the
other, each one elected its podefta and confuls, as
if they had been two feparate cities and indepen-
dent governments ; and a war was maintained be-
tween them for years with fuch fury, as fet all laws,
human and divine, at defiance, till, exhaufted and
humbled on both fides, they were forced to have
recourfeto Rubaconte, podefta of Florence, under
whofe mediation a peace between them was con-
cluded, with a detail of articles, to the perform-
ance of which Florence became warrantee. In
confequence of this mediation and peace, Piftoia
returned for a fhort time, to her flouriming con-
dition j fo that not only the greater powers ad-
mired

Ftoravanti. 35

mired her felicity, but the mod formidable of the
other cities flood in awe of her. But, oh mifera-
ble viciffitudes of ill conftituted governments * !
to the confufion of the citizens of Pifloia, the
other cities, by fome intervals of peace and union,
grew more powerful, and Piftoia alone, by the
continuance of quarrels, factions, and civil wars,
was meanly reduced in command, honour, and
fortune. It was not long before the old difputes
revived, and continued till 1251, when the pope
was obliged to interpofe, and negociate a new
peace between the parties in Piftoia. But this
peace could not be effe&ed.till long wars, a great
d$ftru£tion of lives, and a general defolation of the
lands and cities, by the various leagues and alter-
nate confifeations of the rich and the poor, the
nobles and commons, Guelphs and Ghibellines,
had fatigued and exhaufted all parties.

In 1 260 the Ghibellines of Piftoia, Florence,
Volterra and Prato, could no longer bear the in-
folence and impertinence of the contrary fa&ion :
they therefore formed an union with their friends
in the other cities, raifed armies, and renewed the
wars ; and, after many fharp conflicts, and at
length the fanguinary battle of Montaperto, they
turned the tide of fortune and the torrent of po-
pular paffions in their favour, till all Tufcany be-
came Ghibelline, excepting Lucca and the Floren-
tine exiles. At the inftigation of the Conte No-
vello, vicar of the king Manfred, Piftoia, Florence,
Siena, Pifa, Volterra, Samminiato, Colle, Prato,
and Poggibonfi, raifed a ftanding army to make
war upon Lucca, becaufe this city was the afylum
of their fugitives. This army was maintained only
by the impofition of univerfal and very heavy

* Ma oh mifere vicende del mondo ! Fioravanti, p. 219.

taxes.

j 6 P'iftoia.

taxes, did infinite damage in the country, and at
laft, in 1267, obtained a peace between Piftoia and
Lucca, upon conditions, one of which was, that
each city mould pardon the other all the injuries,
moleftations, difcords, offences, damages, rapines,
homicides, devaluations, and conflagrations, that
had been committed.

In 1268 the Guelphs in Piftoia were much dif-
pleafed that the heads of the Ghibellines, banifhed
and driven out from their city, fhould, under Af-
tancollo Panciatichi, have fortified themfelves at
Lucciano, a caftle under the eyes of Piftoia ; there-
fore they ordered Cialdo Cancellieri, their podefta,
to go out with an armed force and diflodge them.
Panciatichi, having penetrated the defigns of the
Guelphs in Piftoia, fearing that he could not rcfift
the affault of his enemies, becaufe he was inferior
in force, and without hopes of fuccour, abandoned
thepoft, and went to Pifa, where he united himfelf
with his confederates : fo that Cancellieri, finding
the caftle empty of inhabitants, plundered and
demolimed it, and caufed the Panciatichi to be
banifhed as the heads of that fadion, whofe eftates
were all confiscated.

The partialities of the citizens of Piftoia having,
in 1 270, in fome meafure fubfided, by means of the
government of the Univerfal Pacificators of Tuf-
cany, they fet about a reformation of their magif-
trates ; and confidering that a multitude always
generated confufion, they reduced to tw© hundred
their general council, which had been compofed
before of fix hundred members, and created many
new magiftracies and jurisdictions, in order to
bring into order the affairs of their government*.
But in 1 284 there arofe again moft grievous dif~

* Fioravanti, p. 330.

orders,

Fioravanti. 37

orders, by reafon of the ill adminiftration of juf-
lice ; and the general council elected the wiieft
citizens, to make another reformation and new
laws, and to bring about a reconciliation among
the principal citizens who difturbed the public
tranquillity. But all their regulations were inef-
fectual; for in the next year, 1285, frefh diflur-
bances were perceived in the city of Piftoia, occa-
fioned by certain families, who by means of co-
pious wealth, and the adherence of numerous
friends, followers, and relations, afpired, at their
difcretion, to govern the city : but as the wifeft
men exerted themfelves, that their public affairs
jhould depend only on law and juftice, not upon
the paflions and caprice of individuals, they call-
ed together the general council. Thefe endeavoured
to render thofe families odious and unpopular, as
well as the title by which they were diftinguimed ;
and to this end ordered, that thofe families mould
be declared " grandees" (magnati,) who by their
influence and power diilurbed the public tranquil-
lity : and to be declared a grandee became equi-
valent to being declared a feditious perfon, an
arrogant, an impertinent, and feparated from the
government of the commons of the city.

The dominant party ruled fo arbitrarily the
Guelphs, committed fo many robberies upon
them, and burnt and deftroyed fo much of their
property, that thefe became defperate, and the
exiles from many cities raifed an army, which ob-
liged the Piftoians, and the governors of other
cities, to raife another to oppofe it, at an expence
of an univerfal impofition of taxes upon all the
neceffaries of life. The two armies met in the
plain of Campaldino, and a memorable victory
was gained by the Guelphs ; and fire and fword
again fcattered wide in confequence of this.

In

38 Pijloia.

In 1290 another fierce tumult arofe in Piftoia,
between the moft illuftrious families, occafioned
by a ftroke of a fword, given by Mone Sinibaldi,
upon the face of Gio. Vergiolefi. Upon this fig-
nal there was a general infurre&ion ; and it cofl
all the art and resolution of the government, to do
juftice, to prevent another general battle ; for ci-
vil difcords were beyond meafure increafed, and
the people, without any bridle, were in the utmoft
danger of defolating the city, and leaving it empty
of inhabitants. The exiles in the mean time took
their ftations among the mountains, where they
fortified themfelves, and made incurfions from
time to time, robbing, plundering, burning, and
murdering, without controul.

Another infurre&ion, in 1296, came very near
to accomplifh the final ruin of Piftoia ; it ended
in a bloody battle, in which many perfons loft
their lives, and the parties remained as inveterate
and cruel after as they had been before it. In-
furre&ions and tumults continued fo frequent, that
the bifhop fled for fear, the merchants could do
no bufinefs, and revolutions, infolence, robberies,
affafiinations, daily happened* ; and fuch diffidence
and diftruft was fixed in the minds of all men,
that all lived in continual fear and fufpicion.
Thefe apprehenfions were carried to fuch a length,
that each one fhut himfelf up in his houfe, with
the friends he could colled, where he fortified him-
felf; and thofe who had not towers to their habi-
tations erected themf. Sixty towers were*ere6led
in this fingle city, fome of which (till remain ele-

* Le rivoluzioni, le infolenze, le rubberie, li afiaffinamenti,
die giornalmente accadevano, &c. Fioravauti, p. 243.
f Fioravanti, p. 244.

vate4

Fioravanti. 29

vated on the roofs of the houfes, fome are now
covered with roofs, others fmce included in
the buildings as they have been enlarged, and
others from time to time, have been ruined and
deftroyed in the fubfequent wars. It is to be
noted, that, by law or by cuftom, towers might
not be ereded but by the nobility, and thefe had
their meafure ; fo that, to avoid envy, they could
not exceed a limited height. But at this time
the infurredions of the citizens and of the people
of the caftles in the high lands increafmg, feditious
and perverfe people were found every where,which
gave occafion and motives to all the citizens to
think of their houfes ; and they began, through
the whole ftate, to proceed to exemplary punifh-
ments, without regard to the age, condition, or
fex of the perfons, and thus, in a Ihort time, to
fo many evils and tumults : and befides the quiet
that refulted to the city, the ftimulus had an effecl:
on the caftles irf the mountains, viz. Cavinano,
Lizzano, Popillio, Piteglio, St. Marcello, Mam-
miano, and others, to make that univerfal peace
which is mentioned in the archives of the city.

But the diforder was not confined to the com-
mon citizens in town or country, it originated in
the divifions among the men of birth, fortune,
and abilities, in the government ; and contefts for
fuperiority among the anziani themfelves, in 1 298,
arofe to fuch a degree, that from argument, in-
trigue, and oratory, they proceeded to blows, and,
after a rude encounter, the weaker party fled to
the public archives, andfhutandfecured the door in
the faces of their purfuers : thofe without, finding
it impoflibJe to purfue the affray, determined to
take their vengeance by fire ; accordingly, fettiiig
fire to the archives, thofe within remained, toge-
ther with all the papers, files, and records^ a prey

and

4« Piftoia.

and a triumph to devouring flames. This terrible
event, as may well be believed, produced flill
greater tumults and confufions, which were ter-
minated at laft by a calamity of another kind,
more terrible, if not more deftru&ive, a continu-
ance of earthquakes for eight days together, which
fhook down houfes and towers more effectually
than the inhabitants were able to do. This event,
which was believed by fome to be a judgment of
Heaven for the animofities of the citizens, it was
hoped would promote peace and benevolence
among them ; but they foon revived, with more
wickednefs than ever, their ancient diffenfions. The
family of Cancellieri, at this time having moft in-
fluence,, both by the riches they poffeffed, and by
their great numbers, amounting to an hundred
men in arms, as brave as they were haughty, were
become formidable to all the other families in Pif-
toia, to fuch a degree that all, both in the city
&nd country flood in fear of them. It happened
that Carlino di Gualfredi, and Dore, or Amadore,
the fon of William Cancellieri, being together in
a cellar, where they had drank too freely, fell into
a fquabble, in which Dore was beaten, and infulted
with outrageous language, which offended him fo
highly that he meditated a cruel revenge. Going
out of the wine cellar in this temper of mind,
Dore went, late as it was at night, and laid him-
ielf down in a corner of the ftreet by which Car-
lino was ufed to pafs, and there happening to fee
Vanni, the brother of Carlino, on horfeback,
without thinking of his innocence, gafhed him
in the face by a blow with a target, and by another
ftroke cut off part of his left hand. In this de-
plorable condition Vanni was carried to his fa-
ther, who, feeing his fon fo barbaroufly treated,
was fo inflamed with refentment, that, difregard-

FioravaniL 41

ing all laws divine and human, he began to medi-
tate his revenge. At this moment the extravagance
of his fon was reported to William, and affefted
him with fuch grief and difguft, that he thought
of averting any unfortunate confequences by an
a£t of fubmiilion ; and he fends his guilty fon to
the father and brothers of the man he had injured,
to afk their pardon in his own name and in that of
his affli&ed father* But all in vain ; for fcarcely
had Gualfredi caft his eyes on Dore, when he
feized him, and, without regard to the goodnefs
of his father, cut off one of His hands upon a horfe
manger, and gamed him in the face, in the fame
manner as he had done to Vanni his fon. By this
atrocious deed, done in cool blood and a fober
hour, the father and brothers of Dore were fa
exasperated, that in order to obtain fome fignal
revenge, they united the force of their friends and
relations, filled the city with brawls, difcords, and
murder, and divided not only the family of Can-
cellieri, but the whole city, into two parties.
The Cancellieri were at that time very numerous,
very rich, and in near degrees of blood related and
allied ; fome of them were derived from the lady
Nera, and others from the lady Bianca, both of
them wives of M. Cancelliero, the firft author of
the furname of this family ; but now, no longer re-
garding their confanguinity, they became fo per-
verfe as to attend to nothing but the deftrudion
of each other ; and reviving the memory of the
ladies, from whom the anceftors of Carlino and
Dore had their original, the followers of Carlino
took the name of Bianchi, and the followers of
Dore thatofNeri ; and the people being already
infe&ed with diabolical paffions, the Ghibellines
took the part of the Bianchi, and the Guelphs that
of the Neri : and from this time the two factions
VOL. III. •/' G of

42 Piftoia.

of the city began to be called Bianchi and Neri,
and frequent bloody battles were fought in the
city between them.

* The whole people in the city and country be-
came divided into Bianchi and Neri, and the mu-
tual {laughters of men, and burnings of houfes,
came very near to ruin the country. There was
not a perfonwho was not obliged to afiurne one
ofthefe names, and fide with one of the parties.
Recourfe at laft was had to Florence, to aflift the
magistrates in controuling thefe parties ; and the
heads of the parties were banifhed, all except Ber-
tacca, far advanced in age, and one of the knights
of St. Mary, an order which had been inftituted
by Urban the Fourth to pacify the factions. It
was confined to the nobility, inverted with white
robes with a red crofs, and two red ftars in a
white field ; but, with all its pomp and fandtity,
had very little influence to correct the errors of an
imperfect government. The Caucellieri took re-
fuge in Florence, thofe of the Neri in the houfe of
the Donati, and thofe of theBianehi in that of the
Cerchi ; and infected Florence at laft to fuch a
degree, that thofe party diftindtions became as
common and as michievous in that city as in Pif-
toia. At this time the Tufkans, holding them-
felves free from all fubjection to the empire, and
regulating all things according to the caprice of
parties unbalanced in their governments, the pef-
tiferous venom fpreading wider every day in the
minds of the people, the two factions aiming at
nothing lefs than each others total deftruction,
had for their object the ambitious defire of do-

* Vid. Ferreti Vicentino, lib. ii. apud Muratori, torn. ix. —
Rerum Italicarum- Scriptores, Muratori Anrial. torn. viii.
p. -2, 3.T-Cofi le rnaledette Sette, fi andavano dilatando per
tutta la Tofcana.

mineering

Fioravanti. 43

imneering without controul. With this maxim,
which is chara&eriftic of the feditious, 'thefe fac-
tions joined in the city of Florence to trample on
the laws ; and the party Bianchi fucceeded to drive
out by force the party Neri, and affumed the do-
minion of the city.

But before the end of the year, another revolu-
tion was effected both in Florence and Piftoia,
and the houfes of many of the principal people
levelled with the ground. The Florentines,
among whom the party Neri governed, in 1302,
fufpeding that the Bianchi, now banimed from
their city, would, with the afliftance of the Bian-
chi who ruled in Paftoia, raife again with new force,
entered into a combination with Lucca for the
total deftru&ion of Piftoia ; and a war fucceeded,
which lafted many years, and extended to all the
cities of Tufcany, introducing the diftindtions of
Neri and Bianchi, and feveral revolutions, in all of
them. But the war agaift Piftoia was maintained
by Florence and Lucca in concert, till Piftoia was
taken, its country divided, and its people perfe-
cuted and oppreffed, when', finally, they refufed to
receive a podefta from Lucca and Florence. This
occafioned another army to be fent againfl them.
The Piftoians thfcn called in the mediation of
Siena ; by whofe decifion it was ordained, that the
podefta and captain of the people for Piftoia mould
not be chofen by the Lucchefe and Florentines,
but by the Piftoians themfelves, provided that the
ele&ion mould always fall upon fome citizen of
Florence or Lucca. This award was fapported
by the Tedici, Ricciardi, Rofli, Lazzari, and Sini-
baldi, and others their followers, againft the will
of the Taviani, Ughi, and Cancellieri, and their
adherents both among the grandees and po-
pular citizens. This difference of opinion occa-
fioned

44 Piftoia.

fioned quarrels and diflentions. The three fa-
milies could not bear that the five families mould
*lord if over the city ; each of thefe parties there-
fore, flriving to drive out the other, without re-
garding the expence or inconvenience, aflembled
their friends and forces, marched through th'e
country, laid wafte, combated, and affaflinated, in
defiance of all government. But in the end, the
Taviani having fallen into an ambufeade in the
midfl of their enemies, near a river, fome w^re
killed, others made prifoners, and the reft difperf-
ed as fugitives ; and their fortrefs delle Piere di
Montecuccoli, now called Valdibura, and the
church of St. Simon, where they had been ufed to
retreat, were facked and burnt.

In 13 i6,the Piftoians conceived a jealoufy of the
profperous fortune of Uguccione, not only qn ac-
count of a fignal victory he had obtained againft the
Guelphs, but becaufe he had been made lord of
Pifa and Lucca, and had it in contemplation to
reduce Piftoia to his power. But dilfimulating
their fears, and to make him friendly and bene-
volent to their city, the Piftoians chofe him for
their podefta. Coming to Piftoia, he reftored the
Cancellieri, the Taviani, the Ughi, and Sini-
baldi.

In 1317, the Piftoians, by reafon of the turbu-
lence in Tufcany, put themfelves under the pro-
tection of Robert king of Naples. Caftruccio
Antelminelii, captain general of the wars of the
Lucchefe, having conducted to a happy iflue many
enterprizes for that community, thought of redu-
cing to its dominion the city of Piftoia, by the
means of its Bianchi exiles : but, after many fkir-
mifhes arid mutual ravages of each others terri*

* SignoreggiafTero la citta.

tory,

Fioravanti. 45

tory, a battle fought between him and Giulione,
who commanded the Pifloian forces againft him,
in which a decifive victory was obtained by the lat-
ter, produced a treaty of peace between them, one
article of which was, that the exiles mould be re-
flored ; the N«ri confenting to this rather than
rifk a renewal of the war.

In 1321, Uberto Cancellieri executed the office
of podefta in the city of Padua, to the greateft fa-
tisfadion of that people. And the fame year,
Gio. Panciatichi gave clear proofs of fidelity and
courage in the office of commiflary of Romagna,
under Clement the Fifth and the people of Flo-
rence.

From 1321 to 1330, the hiftory of this repub-
lic is filled with wars, feditions, and intrigues, all
fet on foot by the different contending parties, in
order to elevate fome individual, a favourite, or a
tool of their own, for the fovereign of the ftate.
The fimple heads of the ftory muft fuffice. — Caf-
truccio commences a deftructive war upon the
frontiers, to obtain the fovereignty of Piftoia for
himfelf. Pittecciani betrays many caftles into his
hands to favour his defigns, being probably in-
clined to that party ; Pittecciani, however, is be^
headed for treafon by the Piftoians. Amidfl thefe
calamities, Ormanno Tedici, conceives the delign
of making himfelf the fovereign of Piftoia. The
want of rain for eight months, and the devaftations
of war, had occafioned a famine in Pifa, Lucca, and
Piftoia. Upon this occafion Tedici, and Vanni Laz-
zari, both rich and powerful, as well as proud and
ambitious men, and confequently jealous of each
other as rivals, appear upon the ftage : their in-
trigues are full of all that duplicity and hypocrify,
which is univerfal on fuch occasions*. Tedici

* Fioravanti, lib. xix.

perfuades

46" Pi/lota.

perfuades the Piftoians to a truce with Caftruccio,
and feizes the piazza and pakce of the anziani
with his partizans ; is made lord of Piftoia, and
reforms the magiflrates of the city, and concludes
the truce with Caftrucco, much againft the will
of the other party. Having gone through all the
ceremonies of a revolution, that is to fay, reverfed
every thing, recalled exiles, &c. and governed the
city fourteen months, his nephew, Philip di For-
tebraccio Tedici, a youth full of ambition, con-
fpired to take away the fovereignty from his uncle,
and affume it to himfelf. To this end he began by
correfponding with the Guelphs in exile, and by in-
fufing into them a belief that his uncle entertained
a fecret correfpondence with Caftruccio, to deliver
Piftoia into his hands. The nephew, by other ar-
tificial difcourfes and fimulated manners, exerted
himfelf with the Guelphs to depofe his uncle, and
reftore all the banifhed and fcattered members of
the Guelph party. His fictions were credited, the
refolution was taken with alacrity, they united
themfelves with the impoftor, and, the better to
obtain their defires, communicated their intentions
to Neruccio Conte de Sarteano, a Guelph gentle-
man of prudence and fagacity, and requefted his
counfel and afiiftance ; who, deceived by the re-
lation of facts, fo well invented and coloured by
Philip, acknowledged, that if remedy was not im-
mediately provided, Piftoia would fall into the
hands of Caftruccio ; and offered them his cavalry,
and promifed to exert all his force to obtain the
ends they defirecL The uncle discovering the
confpiracy, complained to his nephew, who roundly
aflerted it to be a fiction of malice ; arid went
immediately to the heads of the plot, told them
that the abbe his uncle was informed of all, held
a ftiort confutation with them, in which it was re-

folved

Fioravanfi. 47

folved to rife at once, and carry into execution
what they had intended. The confpirators af-
fembling in the morning, and taking arms in fea-
fon, rufhed with Philip to the piazza, fcattered
the guards, by putting to death all who refitted,
took the place, ran through the city, aflaulted the
palace of the anziani, occupied the gates, and
garnimed the walls with their people, and Philip
remained lord and fovereign of Piftoia. This
done, Philip called together the council of the
people, obtained the title of captain, and taking
the fovereignty of the eity on himfelf, reformed
it with new anziani and magiftrates, and, govern-
ing feverely, made himfelf feared by all men. The
abbe Tedici, having loll the lordmip of Piftoia,
and eager to regain the pofleflion of it, machi-
nated with his other nephews and adherents to
throw out of the window of the public palace his
nephew Philip ; and going with his followers to
the palace, he was introduced alone to a confe-
rence with the artful Philip, by his exprefs order,
who immediately ordered the gates to be fhut
againft the other confpirators, and with a very
few words again impofed on his uncle, and made
him prifoner. Philip, thus liberated from the
fnares of his uncle, fuddenly renewed the truce
with Caftruccio. He conducted his negociations,
both with Florence and Caftruccio, with fo much
duplicity, that he deceived both : there are few
examples of deeper fimulation, more exquifite ad-
drefs, or of felfifh knavery of a blacker dye, than
he praftifed with his uncle, with the Florentines,
and Caftruccio. After obtaining of the Florentines
the creation of his fon a knight of the golden fpur,
three thoufand golden florins for himfelf, and noble
matches and rich dowries for his two daughters,
of the Florentines, he married himfelf to Dialta,

the

48 .Piftoia.

the daughter of Caftruccio, and delivered Piftoia
into his hands. Caftruccio immediately informs
the emperor Louis of Bavaria of his new acquifi-
tion : and Louis fends to this great man, fo faith-
ful and ardent in his fervice, a commiflion to go-
vern Piftoia as his imperial vicar. Florence makes
war to recover the city ; but are beaten by Caf-
truccio, who receives the emperor afterwards in
Piftoia, and is made by him duke both of Lucca
and Piftoia, and foon after dies. If he had lived,
the example would probably have here been com-
plete ; the continual altercations of the .principal
families having completely overturned the confti-
tution^ and introduced an abfolute monarchy.
But his death opened a door for ftill further con-
tentions. M. Vinciguerra di Aftancallo Pancia-
tica, prefect of the royal militia of France, and a
general in the wars of Normandy, came into the
fervice of the Florentines at this time, with the
character of general, and rendered himfelf memo-
rable to pofterity, and moft grateful to his family,
by having built, in four years, his fuperb palace
in Piftoia, in the parifh of St. Matthew. The
foils of the deceafed Caftruccio thought, by the
favour of the Vergiolefi, Chiarenti, Tedici, and
other powerful families in Piftoia, to get them-
felves acknowledged as fovereigns of that city j
and to this end procured an armed force to take
pofleffion of the piazza and palace of the anziani :
but the imperial vicar, with his 400 German
guards, and by the favour of the Muli, Gualfre-
ducci, and Panciatichi, families fufficiently power r
ful, gave battle to theYons of Caftruccio, and drove
them out of Piftoia, into the mountains of Lucca.
The Florentines, taking advantage of the divifions
and confufions in Piftoia, excited their people fud-
denly to war, and went and laid fiege to Carmi-

gnano ;

FioravantL 4.9

gnano ; and after many fierce battles for fifteen
days it furrendered, which made the Florentines,,
with the Guelph exiles, very infolent, ravaging
the country, preventing the farmers from fowing
their grounds, and threatening even the walls of
Piftoia.

In this ftate of things, there arofe in Piftoia two
potent factions ; one denominated from the houfe
of Vergiolefi, and the other from that of Pancia-
tichi. The Vergiolefians, adhering to the govern-
ment of the imperial vicar, by means of the fear
of the 400 Germans who were in Piftoia, induced
a good part of the people to refufe their confent
to a peace with the Florentines and Guelphs.
The Panciatichans, with their followers, not
judging good and ufeful for the city the fentiment
of the Vergiolefians, efteemed it more advantageous
to make peace, than to maintain the country in
fubje&ion to the avidity of the Bavarian and his
minifters. But the other party determined to in-
terrupt the treaty, by exciting the city to an uproar,
and by parading the ftreets with their Germans,
by whom many of the people were aflfaflinated.
The people, finding themfelves thus ill-treated,
collecting together, fell upon thefe Germans : there
followed a ikirmifh, fo ferious, that many were
killed, many furrendered prifoners, and thofe who
efcaped were obliged to fly with their vicar to
Lucca. In the mean time Ricciardo di Lazzaro
Cancellieri, a Guelph exile from Piftoia, fecretly
affifted by the Florentines, and rendered powerful,
both by the money and the bravery of his Guelphs,
underftanding the difunion in Piftoia, marched in-
to the mountains of Piftoia with great terror, to
acquire poffeffion of fome confifcated cafties of his
party. This occafioned great difguft and alarm
to all in the city, and occafioned Giovanni Pan-
.VoL. III. H ciatichi

50 Plftola.

ciatichi to go out with his fa&ion to oppofe him ;
who attacking his enemy with great fpirit, pre-
vented him from making himfelfthe Lord of that
extenfive country. The Panciatichi, then, the
Muli, and the Gualfreducci, pufhing the advan-
tage they had gained, and fufpe&ing fome treafon
from the Vergiolefi, applying themfelves at once to
cut off all the means to fuch defigns, with all di-
ligence applied to the anziani to aflemble the ge-
neral council, by whom were banifhed and impri-
foned out of-Piftoia, all the fons and relations of
Caftruccio, Philip Tedici, Charles his fon, with
all their families, and confifcated all their goods
and eftates ; and to make fure of the imprifon-
ment or the deaths of the Tedici, a reward was
offered of five hundred florins of gold. This
done, they made the peace with Florence, and
four knights of the golden fpur were made by the
Florentines, two of the family of Panciatichi, one
of the family of Muli, and one of the Gualfreducci,
in gratitude for their important fervices ; and
both cities fubmitted to the church, and banifhed
the emperor.

The common people about this time began to
be weary of the cabals of the principal families,
but were too ignorant to contrive any method to
reftrain them, but that which always renders them
ftili more defperate and deftruclive to the commu-
nity, an attempt to bring all upon a level.

The fafhion at funerals had become fo expenfive,
that every one exceeded his proper abilities in
making a mow ; and the Piftoians, not without
giving occafion for ridicule, attempted to regu-
late the expence upon fuch occafions, by decreeing
a rigorous uniform for the ufe of all. At the fame
time, confidering the bleffings and advantages of
uniform and clear laws, and that the people by

the

Fiordvanti. 5 1

the means of them are rendered tractable, and lefs
haughty and audacious, they prepared certain fta-
tutes and provifions for the good government of
their city. And as it appeared to them, that fome
of the principal families arrogated to themfelves
an undue ftiarg in the management of public af-
fairs, and were difpofed by force to opprefs the po-
pular men, they determined that all offences
againft the popular men ihould be feverely pu-
nilhed, and that the next noble relation of any
grandee mould be obliged to pay any pecuniary
mulct which mould be inflicted, in cafe his eftate
was not fufficient to difcharge it ; and in cafe the
delinquent was fentenced to a capital punifhment,
and efcaped by any means from juftice, his next
relation among the grandees mould pay a thoufand
pounds. Although nothing can be conceived
more inconfiftent with liberty, equity, or humani-
ty, than thele laws, yet the terror of them is faid
to have procured a momentary tranquillity ; efpe-
cially as certain companies of armed militia of the
popular party were inftituted in the four quarters
of the city, to force them, abitrary, oppreflive,
and cruel as they were, into execution. But this
militia was not long able to controul the fpirit of
diforder, and it became neceffary to provide a
ftronger bridle for unquiet and feditious fpirits,
and a new and mod rigorous law mult be made to
beat down their arrogance and infolence. The
plebeians at this time feeling themfelves the true
and real grandees, and at the higheft fummit of
power, ordained by a law, that all thofe, of what-
ever condition they might be, who mould give
themfelves up to an evil life, and give offence to
the popular party, and diflurb the quiet of the
city or country, mould be, as a punilhment for
their actions, denominated " grandees" (grandi, e

magnati),

52 Piftoia.

tnagnati), and excluded from the magiftracies,
and all management of public affairs, and be fub-
jected to other punimments. It is true that the
gentlemen had ftill fome (hare in the government,
becaufe the plebeians, that they might not make
too many enemies at once, did not feek to exclude
from public offices all the nobles, but felefted
from the number divers houfes of the mod pacific,
and the greateft lovers of juftice, as it was pre-
tended, and placed them among the popular men,
to take away their power from the others, and fe-
cure it to themfelves. No gentleman however of
the popular party was permitted to make any of-
tentation of his nobility ; fo that if any one of the
popular men was made a knight by any prince or
republic, he was fuddenly deprived of his office :
whence many of the nobles, who wifhed to enjoy
all the benefits of the popular men, were obliged,
by a fimulated refpect to the plebeians, to lay afide
their arms and furnames, to diftinguifh themfelves
from their peers recorded for grandees. Other
nobles there were, who chofe rather to be exclud-
ed from all public offices, and live expofed to the
rigorous laws of the grandees, than to lay afide
their arms or furnames, jealous of obfcuring the
ancient hereditary fplendour of their anceflors.
In this however they were deceived, for the prin-
cipal popular men took care to preferve their dif-
tindion, by a law, " That if by a ftatute nobles
were made populars, they do not lofe by that their
nobility ;" and by another law, declaring many to
be magnati, it is fubjoined, " the reft we under-
ftand to be populars, although born of noble race
and progeny." From this it was contended, that
thofe were deceived who meafured the antiquity
and nobility of their own or other families by

the

fioravanti. 53

the rule of the enjoyment of the principal ma-
giftracies.

In 1332 feveral of the mpft powerful families,
arrogating too much authority in public affairs,
or, in other words, being found by the plebeians to
have too much influence for them to be able to
controul, fuch diflenfions and difturbances arofe,
that it was thought neeefiary to declare them in
the number of the grandees : and accordingly it
appears by the records, that the Cancellieri, Gual-
freducci, Muli, Ughi, Panciatichi, Taviani, Ric-
ciardi, Tedici, Sinibaldi, Zebertelli, Vergiolefi,
Roffi, Lazzari, Forteguerri, Vifconti, Forefi, and
others, that is, all the principal families in the na-
tion, were declared to be magnati, ftigmatized
with that odious appellation, and excluded from
all fhare in public offices. In this year fevere
fumptuary laws againft effeminate luxury were
made by the council, the folemnities and expences
of weddings were regulated, and the cloathing of
men. Extravagant fafhions in thefe things had
tempted mofl people to exceed their revenues,
had multiplied debtors, and rendered dubious and
difficult the credit of merchants : certain wife ci-
tizens were authorized td prepare regulations of
this kind ; and they fucceeded to make fuch wife
Jaws, that frauds and abufes became lefs common.
Yet the caprice and inflability of this government
appears very remarkable at this time ; for although
the Cancellieri were the year before recorded for
grandees, yet in 1333 Ricciardo Cancellieri was
declared a knight by the council of the people of
Pifloia, and was feafled at the public expence.
When any one was made a knight by any fove-
reign, or any city, he became fuddenly noble, al-
though he had not been fo by birth ; for birth, at
*hat time, was neither necefiary to nobility nor to'

knighthood.

54 Piftoia.

knighthood. The ceremony of arming the knight
was made with great folemnity, receiving the mi-
litary girdle from the other knights*.

In 1336 the Piftoians lamented the death of
their moft beloved citizen Cino, their greateft
lawyer and judge, the mafter of Bartolo and Pe-
trach.

In 1342 Piftoia was obliged to capitulate with
the duke of Athens, who held the government of
it three years, and ruled it as tyrannically as he
did Florence.

In 1344 the government was recovered from
the duke of Athens ; and, to remedy the infinite
tumults which were daily excited by the power
of the families of the magnati, who by their
riches and adherents made their authority and in-
fluence prevail, it was ordained, that in time of any
rumour or uproar it mould not be lawful for any
popular man to enter the houfe of any grandee,
and if by chance any one mould be in fuch a houfe
at fuch a time, he mould immediately quit it, that
he might not be under the temptation to affift the
grandee, upon pain of the lofs of all public offices,
and confiscation of all his goods. And none of
thefe powerful families, whom they branded with
the name of grandees, could go into the fervice of
any prince, city or republic, if he had not firft
obtained the permiffion of the general council, on
pain of being declared rebels : and that the fami-
lies of the grandees might be known to all, the
following defcription and declaration of them was
made and publimed by authority ; viz. " Omnes
de domo Cancellariorum, omnes de domo Guafre-
ducciorum, Tediciorum, Lazarorum, Vifconto-
j Panciaticorum, Ugorum, Mulorum, Ta-

* Fioravanti, p. 301.

vianorum?

Fioravanti. 55

vianorum, Sinibaldorum, Vergiolenfium, Rubeo-
rum, Ricciardorum ;" which grandees, in time of
any rumour or ftrife, may not go out of their
houfes, unlefs called by the captain gonfalonier
and anziani.

The Piftoians, informed of the robberies, aflafli-
nations, and havock, which were daily committed
by certain rebels in the fuperior mountains, and of
the treafons plotting by thofe of Serravalle againft
the peace and quiet of the commons of Piftoia,
they did not negleft to ufe the neceflary expedi-
tion to chaftife the infolence of the former, and
to divert the malignity of the latter : againft the
former they fent out a body of foldiers, who put
the rebels to flight, and pulled down their houfes ;
againft the latter they promulgated fevere laws,
with a promife of a thoufand pounds reward to
any one who would accufe an accomplice of trea-
fon.

To fbow the inefficacy of all fuch democra-
tical defpotifm againft the principal families in a
community, as the declarations of grandeeifm were,
Frederick Cancellieri, furnamed for his great va-
lour Barbarofla, had influence enough to obtain
fo great a diftin&ion and fo popular and honour-
able a poft as the command of the troops, raifed
and paid by Piftoia, to go upon the expedition for
the conqueft of the Holy Land ; Angiolo Cancel-
lieri was made a bifhop, and rofe faft in the
church ; and Nicolo Cancellieri, as captain of the
Florentines, acquired immortal glory by befteging
in his own palace, and depofingfrom the govern-
ment of Florence, Walter duke of Athens ; and
Marcello Cancellieii alfo made himfelf illuftrious
as a divine, and obtained the place of auditor of
the tower at Rome.

So much of the time of the hufbandman, the

artizan?

5 6 Piftoia.

artizan, and the people in general, was taken up
in war at home and abroad, and the fields were fo
often laid wafte, that it was impoflible to obtain
a conftant and certain fupply of provifions for the
people. The confequence of this was famine and
the plague, two other evils in thofe days fpring-
ing with innumerable others, from their imper-
fect government. The plague and famine, which,
in the courfe of the pad year, had nearly deprived
Piftoia of inhabitants, at length ceafmg, and the
few that remained were fo grieved and aftonifhed at
fuch a calamity, that one would have thought their
minds too much foftened and humbled to engage
again for fome time in their nefarious tumults :
but the few furviving citizens found as much dif-
union and animofity among them as ever. Frefh
diforders arofe, and there was no poflibility of re-
ilraining the indignation and fury of the two fa-
milies of Panciatica and Cancellieri, who, upon
fome diflatisfaclion arifing among them, fell into
fuch quarrels, that, as each party had many adhe-
rents, many murders and much flaughter followed ;
and much greater would have enfued, if the people
had not run together to feparate the combatants,
and compelled them to retire to their houfes.
To prevent the prevalence and increafe of thefe
diforders, the citizens called together the general
council, by whom it was ordered that diligent in-
quifition mould be made after the heads of the
tumult, and a rigorous profecution was commenced
againft Richard Cancelliero and Gio. Panciatichi,
the heads of the two families ; who, although
they humbled themfelves, and afked pardon for
the error they had committed, and made an entire
reconciliation with each other, were condemned
in a fine of 500 pounds each, to be paid to the
commons of Piftoia, and were obliged to ratify by

an

Fioravanti. 57

an oath, in full council, the peace they had made
betv/een them. But notwithstanding all this, nei-
ther of the families really laid afide their envy, jea-
loufy, hatred, and malice againft the other; for their
principals having, rather from the fear of juftice
than a defire of tranquillity, made their peace be-
tween them, they applied themfelves daily to pro-
vide arms and men, and finally proclaimed them-
felves openly to be mortal enemies to each other,
and gave rife to the factions of the Panciatichi and
Cancellieri, from whence arofe fuch actions and
events as brought a final ruin on themfelves, their
relations, their friends, and the city itfelf.

" I reflect, with aftoniihment and ftupefa&ion,"
fays Fioravanti, *« that the Piftoians, abandoning,
without caufe or reafon, their native fagacity, and
becoming fa&ionaries, mould have fomented the
paffions of thofe two particular families ; have con-
tended for the vanity of pre-eminence, atanexpence
of fo many crimes againft the public peace; and
have employed all their forces againft the tranquil-
lity of liberty in that city, celebrated through the
whole world for men illuftnous in arms, in letters,
in fanclity, and wifdom ; prudent in her laws and
in her government to fuch a degree, that foreign
republics had followed her example in their laws.
Neverthelefs, thus it was, for giving themfelves up
a prey to their griefs and afflictions, they deprived
themfelves of all repofe, and making the paffions
of a few common to them all, loft their liberty
and their government ; bleflings which till this
time had been preferved not without the envy of
their rival cities!" This writer needed not, however,
have been fo much furprifed, if he had confidered
the nature of man, and compared it with the na-
ture of a government in which all authority is
collected into one centre. An attentive reader

VOL. III. I

5 8 fiftoia.

will be furprifed at the boaft of that tranquillity
and liberty hitherto enjoyed ; and will be at a lofs
to find one moment in the whole hiftory where
there could have been any degree of either.

Arbitrary laws of exclufion and difqualification,
and awkward attempts to expofe to popular odi-
um the principal families, made without the lead
modefty or equity by a popular majority, will ne-
ver have weight enough with the people to an-
Iwer thedefignof them. Thofe families will ftili
retain an influence with the people, and have a
party at their command, very nearly equal to that
of the majority ; and being juftly irritated and
provoked at the injuftice done them, will never
want a difpofition to attempt dangerous enter-
prizes. The family of the Cancellieri, though
ftigmatized and difqualified as grandees, were ftill
held in great efteem, among all ranks, for their
riches and numerous adherents. Richard, the
head of the family, ftimulated by his own refent-
ment and ambition, and no doubt excited by his
partizans, had the prefumption to entertain
thoughts of making himfelf fovereign lord of his
country. Courting the people to this end by his
liberality, affability, and courtefy, he waited only
for a favourable opportunity to acquire it. Hav-
ing filled his houfe with a large number of per-
fons, his countrymen and foreigners, heiuddenly
marched out with thefe and his relations to af-
fault the piazza and the palace of the ajiziani : but
being met by the captain of the families of the
anziani, with his rnen, and with thefe many of the
grandees, and a multitude of the little people, ad-
herents of the Panciatichi, the Cancellieri were
repulfed with great fpirit, and perceiving their
lives in great danger, they fled and fhut thern-
felves up in the houfe of the Bonducci their

friends.

Fioravanti. $g

friends. Their fa&ionaries, feeing themfelves
\vithout an head, in diforder and defeated, fled
in defpair out of the city by the gate of St.
Mark. The Panciatichi, having thus conquered
Richard, proceeded with great violence to burn
the houfes of the CancellierL Richard was out-
rageous at the deftruclion of his houfes and the
flight of his followers : but being informed that
they were waiting for him in the country, he
fcaled the walls in the night, went out to meet
them, took the cattle of Mariana, and there
fortified himfelf. With the Cancellieri on their
flank, and Gio. Vifconti of Milan, and lord of
Bologna and all Lombardy, in their neighbour-
hood, each with a party defirous of making
them lords of Piftoia, the Piftoians were ob-
liged to put themfelves under the protection of
Florence, upon certain conditions. Richard Can-
cellieri hearing of this, went to Florence, and with
plaufible reafons made it there believed that the
Panciatichi held a fecret correfpondence with Vif-
conti, to deliver Piftoia into his hands. The
Florentines thought they might as well govern
Piftoia themfelves, and have it wholly at their de-
votion, and immediately gave Richard the com-
mand of horfe and foot, to go and fubdue it. The
attack was made in the night, and would pro-
bably have fucceeded, if the enfigns of Florence
had not been imprudently difplayed, which fo en-
raged the Piftoians, that refolving to die rather
than fubmit, they repulfed their invaders. The
Florentines fent a formidable reinforcement ; but
the Piftoians defended themfelves with intripidity
till they aflembled their general council ; and al-
though Gio. Panciatichi was an infamous grandee,
he was (till the foul of the republic, and no other
ma n had enough of the confidence of his fellow-
citizens

6o Piftoia.

citizens to be fent ambafTador and entrufted with
their falvation. He executed his commiflion,
convinced the Florentines that they had been de-
ceived by Cancellieri, and made an honourable
peace ; and in 1352 the Piftoians afllfled Florence
effectually in defending itfelf againft the army of
Vifconti of Milan.

In 1353 the attention of all parties was turned
to peace, to put an end for once to all the troubles
of Italy, and it was finally concluded between all
the Guelph cities of Tufcany, viz. Jlorence, Siena,
Pifloia, Peragia, Arezzo, city of Caftello, and
others of one fide, 'and Gio. Vifconti on the other,
with certain pacts and conditions ; among which
Vifconti releafed freely into the hands of Piftoia
the caftles and fortrefles of Piteccio, Torri, Trep-
pio, Fofifato, Montecelli, and Sambuca ; and on
all fides were releafed all the exiles. By virtue of
which article were reflored to Piftoia the families
of the Ammanati, Tedici, Vergiolefi, Gualfreduc-
ci, and others, and all their property was reftored
to them.

RichardCancellieri, neverthelefs, in 1 354,being
flill obnoxious to the Panciatichi, did not ceafe to
flrengthen his party, by foliciting the friendfhip
of thofe who might be ufeful to his views. To
this end he formed an intimate friendfhip with
the captain of the guards at Florence, of whom
he expected to make an eflential ufe in all occur-
rences. But the Panciatichi, jealous of this inti-
macy, complained of it bitterly to the Florentines,
who, to pleafe them, difmiffed their officer, but at
the fame time exhorted the complainants to live
quietly, and lay down their arms ; for that at all
events, and at any expence, as authors of the peace
between the two families, they were determined to
maintain it. At this time fbme difquiet arofe be-
tween

Fioravanti. 6 £

tween the different members of the Cancellieri
family, one of whom, Pievano, joined the Pancia^
tichi, and brought an accufation before the Floren-
tines againft Richard, that he meditated againft
them fome great treafon. A procefs was inftituted,
Richard was found innocent, and the accufer and
the heads of the infurredtion were feverely punifh-
ed, while Richard was honourably acquitted.

The emperor Charles the Fourth made a grant
to the Piftoians to govern themfelves by their own
laws and laubablecuftoms, in a free popular ftate,
under the guidance of the anziani and gonfalonier
of juftice, whom he made perpetual vicars of the
holy Roman empire. That this iketch may not
be protracted to an immeafurable length, we may
pafs over the rebellions and wars between 1355
and 1376, when the diffatisfa&ions among the ci-
tizens of Piftoia were fo increafed by the reform
of officers in 1373, that tumults arofe to fuch a
height, that the Florentines, who defired nothing
more than to become lords of Piftoia, or to fee it
deftroyed, becaufe it was rich, noble' and power-
ful, thought it a favourable opportunity to infinu-
ate themfelves with their meditated 'defigns. Un-
der the fpecious colour of peace and quiet, 'they
annulled the late reform ; and by new laws, under
pretence of taking away the fcandalpus names of
the two factions of the Panciatichi and Cancellieri,
divided the offices into two orders, called one the
company of St. John, and the other the company
of St. Paul ; fo that the moiety of the citizens,
exclufively of the grandees, who could not enjoy
before the benefit of the imborfation, were now
imborfed in the purfe of the company of St. John,
and the other moiety in the purfe of the company
of St. Paul ; and to obtain the fupreme magiftrate
there were drawn four, one for the quarter of the

purfe

6 a Piftola.

purfe of St. John, and four, in the proportion of
one for each quarter, for the purfe of St. Paul ; and
the gonfalonier was to be drawn alternately, once
from one purfe, and another time from the other.
And becaufe the company of St. John was pro-
tected by the Cancellieri, it immediately followed
that it declared itfeif of that faction ; and that of
St. Paul, protected by the Panciatichi, declared
itfeif openly of the faction of Panciatichi : and in
this manner, inflead of extinguiming the fire, it in-
creafed to fuch a degree, that it fpread not only in
the city, but through all its teritory ; and Piftoia
was reduced to a condition fo deplorable, as to be
obliged to abandon all domeftic fociety and fami-
liarity, every one being fufpicious not only of his
neighbours and relations, but of his bofom friends.

In 1383 all ranks of people exceeded their abi-
lities in expences at funerals, and in other effemi-
nate luxury : fumptuary laws were made againft
extravagant expences ; but the hiftorian confeflcs,
that although he thought there was reafon for
them, yet, as he could not read them himfelf with-
out laughing, he feared he mould do no good by
relating them.

The Piftoians having beftowed all their endea-
vours and ftudies to obtain a peace with Belogna,
with whom they had long been at war on account
of boundaries, now hoped to live happily ; but
they were again tormented with infurrections, at-
tended with rapine, burnings, and murders innu-
merable.

The news arrived in Piftoia, in 1390, that John
Galeazzo Vifconti had fent againft the Florentines
an army of twenty thoufand men, under the com-
mand of Jacopo de Verme. This war laded fe-
veral years, and was brought upon the city by its
divifions.

The

Fioravanti. 63

The Piftoians had now been eight and thirty
years in fome fenfe dependent on Florence ; for
in 1350, after the great commotions, they had en-
tered into a ftipulation, by Richard Cancellieri
their fellow-citizen, with the people of Florence,
tdTkeep forever a purfe of fix popular Florentine
citizens, from which mould be drawn their captain
of the people. In this year, 1 398, for the fake of a
more intimate connection and familiarity with the
commons of Florence, it was farther ftipulated,
that for the future the podefla of Piftoia mould
be a Florentine.

Continual animofities had occafioned in the
minds of the citizens fuch wearinefs, grief, and
compunction, that it is impoflible to read, without
commiferation, their awkward attempts to reconcile
themfelves with one another, and to extirpate their
civil difcords, with which Piftoia was furioufly
agitated. The whole people, of every age, fex,
and condition, were perfuaded to go in proceilion
through the city, clothed in white facks, to afk
mutually each others pardon, and to cry " Miferi-
cordia e pace !" (mercy and peace !) and there
can be no doubt that a momentary benevolence,
and many a£ts of Chriftian charity, mud have been
produced by a pilgrimage fo folernn and affefting ;
but the defects in the conftitution of their govern-
ment were not amended by it, and the troubles of
the people foon revived.

The jealoufies of the Cancellieri and Panciati-
chi revived, and proceeded to fuch lengths, that in
1401 Richard Cancellieri, to revenge himfelf, be-
gan a fecret treaty with Vifconti duke of Milan, to
deliver the City of Piftoia into his hands, that he
might govern it with his abfolute power, and ex-
terminate the faction of the Panciatichi. The
plot was difcovered, and Richard and all his chil-
dren

64 Pi/lota.

dren declared rebels, and their houfes reduced to
afhes. Richard in the country joined with other
exiles, and burned the houfes of the Panciatichi.
The Piftoians were now alarmed with the danger,
from the Vifconti and Cancellieri in concert, that
they were obliged to put themfelves into the hands
of the Florentines. The Canceilieri carried on
the war however with fo much fpirit and fuccefs,
that, although the duke of Milan died in 1402,
Richard was able, in 1403, to obtain a peace, by
which the (late of Piftoia was obliged to reftore
his family to all their eftates, and make good all
their lofles. The Panciatichi agreed to this, that
the confent of all the leaders might be obtained
to lay this burden on the people, by whom the
damages done to the Panciatichi too were to be re-
paired.

In 1420 it was ordained, that in the new reform
of magiftrates and public officers, the families who
had been ftigmatized with the opprobrious name
of grandees mould be reftored to the rights of ci-
tizens, and (hare in the management of public
affairs. But thefe beginning, with their j|fual im-
pertinence, to procure that every thing (hould be
done as they would have it, and all offices difpofed
by their influence, quarrels and diflentions among
the citizens arofe, by which the whole city fell in-
to the greateft agitation : whence it was neceflary,
for the maintenance of the public peace, to ex-
clude them afrefh from public affairs. Thefe fa-
milies were the Panciatichi, Roffi, Sinibaldi, Ughi,
Taviani, Vergiolefi, Lazari, Cancellieri, Ricciar-
di, Vifconti, Gualfreducci, and Tedici.

The ladies indulged in great expences in the
furniture of their houfes, and in the fuperfluous
ornaments of their perfons and families. The ge-
neral council thought it neceflary to interpofe, and

prohibit

Fioravanti. 6$

prohibit all clothes to be lined with foregin furs,
or to be embroidered with pearls, gold, or filver,
or other expenfive and fuperfluous decorations j
and becaufe that all former laws for the fame pur-
pofe had been found ineffe&ual, they were now
renewed with moft rigorous penalties.

In 1455 a civil war broke out in the territory of
Piftoia, called Alliani, between the Caneellieri and
Panciatichi, which fpread into the city, and went
to fuch furious lengths, that the ladies themfelves
took arms, and fought with as much bravery as
the gentlemen, to revenge the {laughter of their
relations ; and before this commotion was ended,
the flaves or what they call the vaffals or villains,
took arms* And no method to reftore peace
could be devifed, till Florence was requefted to
fend four commifiaries, who compelled the Can-
eellieri and Panciatichi to take an oath to be
peaceable, and who feafted the villains till they
were quieted.

Infurre&ions, tumults and civil wars, continued
in 1476, and indeed, with very little intermiffion,
till 1485.

In 1485 Baldinotto Baldinotti, forefeeing that
Lorenzo de Medici might poflibly arrive at the
Sovereignty of Piftoia, confidering the great- repu-
tation, influence, and authority, which he enjoyed
in that city, laid a plot to take him off. As a
lover of the liberty of his country, he thought it
juft and honourable to go with his own fon, and
lie in wait in the way*between Poggio and Cajario,
by which he knew Lorenzo was to pafs, in his
journey to Piftoia, to the feaft of St. James. But
the confidants of Lorenzo having difcovered the
defign, the confpirators were without delay appre-
hended, carried prifoners to Florence, and there
punifhed with death.

VOL. IIL K Another

66

Pi/lota.

Another civil war between the Cancellieri and
Panciatichi, attended with its cuftomary cruelty and
devaftation,occurred, and was not compofed till the
Florentines fummoned four of each party 5and com-
pelled them to give fecurity, that for the future no
quarrels, murders, burnings, or robberies, mould
be committed in Piftoia. But this anfwered the
end only in part, for the parties went out of the
limits of the ftate, and there committed all forts of
cruelties on one another ; and in 1490 the civil
war was renewed in the city.

On the death of the emperor Frederick the
Third, Maximilian his fon fucceeded to the throne
of the empire ; but delaying his entry into Italy,
gave occafion to Louis Sforza, tutor of the duke
of Milan, to invite Charles the Eighth, king of
France, to come to the conqueft of Naples. Upon
this occafion the Piftoians threw off their fubjec-
tion to Florence, or rather broke off the connec-
tion. But this acquifition of liberty and inde-
pendence, had a fhort duration ; for the Piftoians
knew they could enjoy no tranquillity under their
own government, and with their own parties : af-
ter two years negociation, they agreed to a new
convention in 1496.

The families of the grandees, or impertinents,'
as they were called, revived their pretenfions to
be admitted to the honours and public offices of
the commonwealth, but as this was contrary to
the popular will, and the pafiions and intereft of
their leaders, tumults enfiiEd. The pretenfions
of thefe families were countenanced by the Flo-
rentines, but the popular men, -in the plenitude of
their power, oppofed it with fo much refolution,
that nothing new was effected.

Plague and famine raged in Piftoia to fuch a
degree, that fome were in tiopes that the citizens

would

FioravantL 67

would put an end to difcqrd and fedition, and at
ieait endeavour to enjoy peace ; but the people,
trampling under foot ail laws, human and divine,
began to renew, both in the city and the country,
their oppositions and enmities, which proceeded
to fuch feats of arms and mutual (laughter, that
they were again obliged to have recourfe to the
Imperial vicars in Florence, to interpofe and put
an end to thofe ftrange accidents which threatened
the total deitruction of the country.

The diffenfions of parties in the city and its
territory, being fomewhat abated, the citizens .be-
gan to flatter themfelves with the hopes of quiet ;
but neglecting to provide a remedy againfl the
emulations of private intereft, in individuals and fa-
milies, by feparating the executive power from the
legiflative, rivalries arofe, which produced fuch
ruin, both to the country and the contending fa-
milies, as has been deplored by all fubfequent ge-
nerations. The fact was, that by the death of
Buonaccorfi, a director of an hofpital of St. Gre-
gory, it was neceflary to proceed to the election
of a fucceflbr. On the loth of October, 1499,
had been balloted for, and approved as fuit-
able, by the general council, four fubjects or per-
fons, among whom one, who fhould be con-
firmed and approved by the bifhop of Pifloia ac-
cording to the law, fhould obtain the office. The
council having difcharged their duty in the nomi-
nation of the four, the ordinary proceeded to re-
ject two of them, one after another, and left the
competition undecided between Piero Terchio and
Bernardo Nutini, each of whom endeavoured to
intereft his friends in his favour. Terchio was
protected by the Panciatichi, and Nutini by
the Cancellieri. The bifhop was at Florence,
whence it happened that Salimbene Panciati-
chi

68 Pifloia.

chi caufed to be confirmed, as director of the
hofpital, his friend Terchio, by the canonical Jacob
Panciatichi, under colour of his being the apoflo-
lical legate ; and fending to Florence for the appro-
bation of the bifhop, the good prelate promifed to
comply. The Cancellieri hearing of this, went
alfo to Florence to fupplicate the bifhop not to
approve the election ; but the bifhop who was
determined to keep his word, would not liften to
them. Seeing that they could not move him from
his promife, they applied themfelves to obtain the
felicitations of his friends and relations, with fuch
afliduity and importunity, that the irrefolute pre-
late was at laft induced to comply with their
requeft. The Panciatichi, understanding the
ftrange refolution of the prelate, had recourfe to
the priori of the people and the gonfalonier of
juflice of their country, and obtained an order,
that to Nutini, who had the fmaller number of
votes, the pofleflion of the hofpital fhould not be
given, but to Terchio, who. for good reafons
ought to have k ; and Terchio, accompanied by
fome of the Panciatichi, was placed in the govern-
ment of the hofpital. The Cancellieri, returning
from Florence with the confirmation of the bifhop
In the perfon of Nutini, carried him to the hofpi-
tal to give him pofleflion, but found .the place
occupied ; whereupon, returning to Florence, they
carried their complaint to the rector > and after
much altercation between the parties, it was de*
termined that the affair mould be decided in a
court of juftiee, and the caufe committed to two
lawyers. The judges determined that Nutini had
been elected and canonically confirmed, and he
was accordingly put into the office, againft all that
could be {aid or done by the Panciatichi, who,
ppon pain of being declared rebels, were obliged

Jtp

Fioravanti. 69

to abandon the hofpital, which they had held well
guarded, and give way to the execution of the
fentence. The Cancellieri were made infolent by
their victory, and fometimes by their words, and
fometimes by their actions, affumed an haughty
fuperiority over the contrary party ; who, finding
themfelves deceived, offended, and derided, not
only by the Cancellieri but by the bifhop, went
about venting and propagating their paflions
among the people : whence it happened, that hof-
tilities beginning between thefe two families, they
never ceafed till they ruined the city of Piftoia.

The Panciatichi could not cancel from their
minds the many and enormous injuries they had
received from the Cancellieri, and now meditated a
cruel revenge. On the 5th of February, 1 500, they
unexpectedly afiaulted, in the piazza, BaccinoNu-
tini and others, and having mortally wounded
Georgio Tonti, they ran haftily through the city,
and murdered all the Cancellieri, excepting fome
who had taken refuge in the palace of the lords
priors. The Cancellieri who furvived were not
at all intimidated, becaufe, having many adherents,
it was eafy for them toftir up againlt the Panciatichi
the plebeians, who, alert at their inftigation, mew-
ed themfelves fuch fierce perfecutors of the faction
of the Panciatichi, that, appearing in arms, they
all cried, " Vengeance ! vengeance !" and in the
tumult a multitude of the Panciatichi and their
fautors were killed upon the fpot ; and the fpirits
became fo exafperated, that both parties thought
of nothing but making profelytes, and gaining
followers. In May the Panciatichi aflembled a
great body of men, and feized the piazza, and
more than half the city fortified themfelves in the
balconies, fteeples, and towers, and devoted their
whole time and attention to preparations for war.

The

7<5 Pifloia.

The Cancellieri on their part, equally numerous in
followers, fortified themfelves in the other fide of
the city, and were affifted by fuch numbers of men,
who came in from the mountains and plains in the
country, that they compofed a large army. In
fuch a fcene of turbulence, fufpicions were fo fre-
quent and dangerous, that it became neceffary for
every man to declare himfelf : for both parties
adopted the fame maxim towards the moderate
men and neutrals, ' " If you don't (hew yourfelf
our friend, we will fhew ourfelves your enemy."
There was not a man finally, who did not infert
himfelf into all the injuries and infolence of a
party ; and frequent battles, fometimes in one
ftreet, and fometimes in another, both by night
and by day, tormented the whole city, fo that
there was no time for the people to take any re-
pofe.

In this (late of things arrived at Piftoia two
commiflaries, with five hundred men, fent by the
Imperial vicars in Florence to put a check to the
impetuofity of faction, who entered by the gate of
Caldatica, and taking pofleflion of the mofl im-
portant and advantageous pods, they gave orders
to all to retreat and abandon their arms. Thefe
orders were fcarcely promulgated, when there un-
expectedly appeared a large body of armed men
to the affiftance of the Cancellieri, which by their
adherents in Bologna had been fent ; and, on the
other fide, a number of men from St. Marcello,
and other neighbouring countries, to the fuccour
of the Panciatichi ; and neither party being will-
ing to give way to the other, they -began, in the
face of the Florentine guards, to ftrike each other
fo cruelly, that the fader their forces increafed, the
more were multiplied their infults, arfons, mur-
ders, and ilaughters. The commiflaries feeing all

things

FioravamL j i

things rufhing to deflruction, ordered the heads
of both parties to appear at Florence, and that the
foldiers, both foreign and domeftic, fhould go out
of the city upon pain of rebellion, and extending
the fame threat to all who ihould entertain them
in their houfes. The Panciatichi were difpofed to
obey ; but the Cancellieri, who were favoured by
one of the commilTaries, proceeded in their info-
lence, and making a jeft of the orders, would not
move : whence thofe mirrifters, feeing themfelves
little refpected, and lefs obeyed, returned to Flo-
rence. The foldiers were gone out of the city,
and the heads of the factions feeing themfelves de-
prived of their ftrength, they fet themfelves to
collecting the plebeians to their fide, and ftudious
of ilaughter, a great body of people ftood ready to
begin a new affray. As the death of Georgio
Tonti had been difpleafmg to the Cancellieri, they
could not forget it, nor conquer their defire of re-
venge; with this view they occupied, with all
their people, the piazza della Sala, and leaving a
number to guard it, went with the reft to the little
fquare of the Trinity, to pull down the houfes of
theCollefi, and then' one of the Panciatichi ; then
they laid fiege to the palace of Gualtieri Panc^iti-
chi : running through the ftreets, they killed
Francis Nutini, and plundered his houfe, with
that of Gabriel Vifconti, Bernard Collefi,Matthew
Collefi, and fetting fire to all of them, they ran to
attack the houfe of Aftorre Panciatichi, from
whence thofe of its faction having fkd, this houfe
remained in the power of its enemies, wjio (tripped
and robbed it. They then burned the houfes of
the Conti, thofe of Francifco Thomas Balduc-
ci, and that of Gori, archdeacon of St. Zenone,
arid auditor of the biihop Pandolfmi. After .fo
many pillage?, burnings, and demolitions, they re-
turned

72

turned to the piazza, and rifled all the (hops arid
ftores of the Panciatichi, with whom coming to a
cruel conflict, a large number on both fides pe-
rifhed. At this inftant a powerful reinforcement
of men arrived to the Panciatichi, who without
lofs of time renewed the attack upon the Cancel-
lieri, and both parties fought in the parifh of Our
Lady of the Lily, .and in that of St. Michael., with
fuch defperation, that a great number on both
iides were killed and wounded, and if a great rain
had not parted the combatants, it feemed as if the
whole race would have been here exterminated*
But upon this occafion a truce was concluded.
The heads of thefe factions were now fummoned
to Florence : thirty of them went, and were fud-
denly thrown into prifon. A rigorous profecution,
as it is called, was commenced againft them.
Some were acquitted without any conditions of
peace or truce ; others were punifhed by imprifon-
ment ; fome by fequeftration of their property, and
ibme were banifhed. This decifion extinguifhed
no part of the flames of revenge ; on the contrary,
the rigour praftifed againft fome, and the lenity
to others, gave rife to ftill greater infolence ; and
in the face of the Florentines themfelves,, and in
their own city, fome of the acquitted Cancellieri
committed excefles as outrageous as the former.
Introduced by their friends, the malignants in'
Florence, fecretly, at the (hutting of the gates,
fet themfelves to fearch for Andrew and Sa-
limbe Panciatichi, to aflaflinate them ; and fa-
voured by the obfcurity of a foggy air, after two
o'clock at night, they found it eafy to put Salirnbe
to death, though Andrew had the good fortune
to efcape, by hiding himfelf in a joiner's mop.
For this atrocions delinquency the faction was-
banifhed : but having returned, and reinftated
&:-;li4 themfelves

Fhravantl.

themfelves in Piftoia, in defiance of jufticc, the
factionaries foon came to another rupture : they
confounded all things in fuch a manner, that there
no longer remained any who dreaded any juftice,
divine or human ; but fcattering through the plains
and mountains their execrable factions, nothing
was heard of but quarrels, treafons, conflagrations,
and murders. The two factions were at length
weary of fuch inconveniences and fatigues, and,
to prepare themfelves to combat with frefh breath,
they made for a Ihort time, and with common
confent, a truce, each party providing themfelves
with arms, men, and provifions ; and the Pan-
ciatichi, defirous of overcoming their enemies by
any means, invented feveral new inflruments and
machines of war, and fortifying themfelves with
thefe, thought themfelves invincible.

The Cancellieri fortified themfelves, as well as
the Panciatichi, with forts and baflions of timber,
and machines of war, (landing well upon their
guard in their pofts. The Panciatichi, no longer
able to contain themfelves, put in order all their
people, made Palamidefie Panciatichi, and Barto-
lomeo Collefi, their leaders, and arranged all their
pofts, officers, and foldiers. But while they were
occupied in thefe difpofitions, they unexpectedly
found the oppofite faction ready to meet them :
the battle was fought, and the Cancellieri obtained
a bloody victory, becaufe the Panciatichi were
abandoned by a large body of Lombards, whom
they had hired for their defence. They did not,
however, lofe there courage, but re-aflembling
their partizans, and rallying their foldiers, they
appeared again in a fhort time, with greater num-
bers and ferocity than ever ; and the engagement
being renewed, for the (hort time that it lafted
was fo terrible and fatiguing, that both parties

VOL. III. L were

74

Piftoia.

were fo exhaufted and weakened, that they were
conftrained to retire with their wounded men to
their ports. The Cancellierf having taken fome
repofe, and, confidering that they had the protec-
tion, or at lead the countenance, of the new Flo-
rentine commiflaries, by whofe advice their afibci-
ates had been reftored to Piftoia, inftead of being
banifhed for the murder of Salimbe Panciatichi in
Florence, they affumed frefh courage to attempt
every means for the deftru&ion of the Panciatichi.
On the 9th of Auguft they fcoured all the ftreets
and fquares of the city, and wherever they found
a Panciatichi they murdered him. They put to
death alfo Bernardino Gai,and mortally wounded
the Comte di Rigolo Bifconti ; but many thinking
it their duty to vindicate the Panciatichi, they fell
with fuch impetuofity upon the rear of the Can-
cellieri, as obliged them to retire. In this ftate of
things the Florentine commifTaries cited to ap-
pear before them ten perfons of each party ; who,
though they made their appearance, were detained
in the palace 'of juftice, and exhorted to peace,
or at lead to a temporary truce, would not accept
of any of thefe propofals ; and therefore the com-
mifiaries, not knowing what to do with them, dif-
mified them. Animated, rather than terrified by
this weaknefs of authority and the judicial power,
they demanded all their followers confined in va-
rious places, and providing themfelves again with
arms and afMants, renewed the war. Such was
the ardour, violence,and the force of theCancellieri
and their party, that they excited great terror, not
only in the country parts, but in all the city.
Not content to have taken poffefiion of all the
councils., and afTembled them to govern as they
pleafed, and rendered their people . difobedient
to all law, but they alfo fent them, with the

utmoft

Fioravanti. 75

utmofl licence, through the country, to ravage,
plunder, and burn the villages and habitations.
The men of prudence and reflection feeing fo
many precipicies and fo much ruin, and forefeeing
more, exerted themfelves to obtain an election of
eight citizens, to whom were given the whole
authority of the general council, or, in other
words, were made dictators, that they might find
a remedy for fo great confufions, and do whatever
mould be neceeffary or convenient for refloring the
public tanquillity. On this opportunity the
clergy were aroufed, and with uncommon zeal
exhorted the people in private converfation, and
fulminated from the pulpit againft ail this ungod-
linefs and unrighteoufnefs of men ; but all this
apoltolical benevolence, added to the unlimited
power of the eight dictators, were inefficient :
men's ears were deaf, and their eyes blind, to every
thing but the malignity of their own paflions, and
every one continued to do whatever feemed right
in his own eyes. They recalled into Piftoia all
the banifhed men, with numerous troops of their
adherents : thefe filling the city with bad men,
and bringing freih force and vigour to the refpec-
tive parties, they prepared to commit new ex*
cefles. The Panciatichi, finding themfelves at
liberty, and loofened from all restraint, went, on
the i3th of Auguft, unexpectedly, to batter down
the houfes of William Fioravanti, thofe of Jacob
Peri, thofe of Antonio Popolefchi, and many
others, upon which occafion many were wounded,
and Francis Panciatichi, and John Aftefi, with
many others of inferior condition, were killed. On
the 1 5th of Auguft they went to batter down the
houfe of Biagio Odaldi, but thefe making-a refo-
lute refinance, many were wounded, and the refl
obliged to retreat : but returning the next day,

with

76 Piftoia.

with a reinforcement of people under the influence
of the family of Brunozzi, they laboured to fuch
purpofe, that partly with fbi ce,and partly with fire,
they took pofieflion of the houfe. They went
next to the palaces of the Neri and Fioravanti,
and finding no refiftance, they took them, and fill-
ed them with their men. They aflaulted too the
houfes oftheColate, Salincerni, and Curradi, and
not being able to take them, fet fire to them, and
burnt five warehoufes of the Ambragi : they en-
tered into the houfes of the Gattefchi, but there
they were obliged to fight a long time, and the
engagements became general, fo that it was im-
poffible to afcertain the number of the killed and
wounded of the two factions, but there was not
a ftreet in the city which was not incumbered with
dead bodies, and polluted with human blood.

Intelligence of the ftrength of the Panciatichi
had been communicated by the Cancellieri to their
friends, who, on the morning of the i7th of Au-
guft, with an hundred cavalry and two hundred in^
fantry, appeared fuddenly at the houfes of the Col-
lefi, by whom fo brave a defence was made, that
they were repulfed ; but after taking a fhort repofe,
returned to the aflault, took the houfe, plundered
it, and left it on fire. They went next to the
houfes of Antonio Ambrogi, to the two houfes of
the Cioci, to that of Vincenco Mati, and burned
them, with many others, and retook thofe which
had been hitherto occupied by the Panciatichi,
who finding thernfelves obliged to abandon the
houfes of Andrea Fioravanti, and Antonio Popo-
iefchi, configned them, in a fit of defpair, to the
flames. But while the party of the Cancellieri
were attentive to the mifchief they were doing,
they were attacked, in two places at once, by the
Panciatichi j and fcarcely was the adion begun,

when,

Fioravanti. 77

when, perceiving their difadvantage, they retreated
behind the church of St. Anthony, and fet fire to
the houfe of Niccolas Godemini : from thence
they went to the Old Gate, and attacked the
houies of the Bracciatini in the piazza, where,
meeting with a bold refiftance, they went with
great folicitude to find the commiflaries, and de-
manded of them the pofleflion of the hofpital del
Ceppo, which was then governed by one of the
Panciatichi, otherwife they would have fet fire to
it. The Paneiatichi had already two hundred
countrymen of the Rain, under the command of
Michelino Jozzeli, and that of Lifca, who, pofted
for the guard of the hofpital, were determined to
perifli rather than abandon it. The commiflaries
feeing fo many people aflifting the Panciatichi,
would not openly efpoufe the requeil and attempt
of the Cancellieri, but pacifying them with footh-
ing words, they gave orders to M. Criaco, the
captain, who, in behalf of the Florentine Imperial
yicars, with 500 foldiers guarded the piazza, that
in their name he mould take pofleflion of the
hofpital, under the pretence of preferving it from
fo much fury. The captain, with one hundred of
his foldiers, marched to the hofpital, and employ-
ed all his art to obtain pofleflion of it, but was
anfwered by the Panciatichi, that they would not
go out of the place alive. Upon this the com-
miflaries in perfon went to the hofpital, and
acknowledging that it muft require great feats of
arms to take it, gave good words to the Panciati-
chi, who delivered up to them the hofpital, which
was, however, unexpectedly pillaged by the Can-
cellieri, but left, by the orders of the commiflaries,
in the power of the fupreme magiftrate of the city,
by whom pofleflion being taken, regulations were

made

78 Piftoia.

made for the good government of it, and the
adminiftration given to four prudent citizens.

A little afterwards the commiflaries and the
bifhop undertook to perfuade the party of the
Panciatichi, not only to infift upon the direc-
tion of the hofpital, but alfo to abfent themfelves
fome time from the city, and in that manner to
remove the caufe of fo many diforders, and endlefs
evils which threatened to fucceed. Thefe orders,
or this recommendation, were given to Baftiano
and Vincenzo Bracciolini, of that faction, who
held immediately a conference with Andrew and
Antonio Panciatichi, their leaders, who thought
fit to obey, firft demanding fecurity for their
houfes and other property, which was promifed
them by the commiflaries. They made hafte to
communicate thefe particulars to all their fadion-
aries, who, adhering to the opinions of their prin-
cipals, collected together all their property of
value, and carried it towards the church of St.
Paul, arid there filled up the whole ftreet which-
leads to the gate Caldatica, and ftood well upon
their guard. The Cancellieri were in the conti-
guous ftreet, with four hundred foldiers from
Bologna ; and fearing to rifquea battle, the Pan-
ciatichi marched out of Piftoia without receiv-
ing injury or infult from the inhabitants, followed
by the Collefi, Rofli, Franchini, Forteguerri, Fa-
broni, Bifconti, Bracciolini, Brunozzi, and many
Others of equal rank and condition. The gates
were inftantly (hut, and the walls lined with men
by the Cancellieri, who infulted and ridiculed,
from that eminence, the retreating faction, with
impunity and without danger.

The Cancellieri remained in Piftoia, and it is
not poffible to relate the abominable iniquities
and cruelties committed by them in the height of

their

Fioravanti* 79

their triumph, infolence, and power : ranging the
whole city without controul, they attended no
other bufmefs or amufement but to ruin, burn,
plunder, and ravifh, whatever of the Panciatichi
they could find, and he who could commit the
mod atrocious deeds was the mod efteemed,
admired and applauded. In this manner was the
public faith, and the fplemn promife made to the
Panciatichi, fulfilled and performed ! To the prin-
cipal palace of the Panciatichi they fet fire ; the
houfes of the Brunozzi, Collefi, and many others
contiguous to them, were difmantled : the beauti-
ful habitations of John, Oliver, and Virgil Pan-
ciatichi, with many other places and houfes filled
with grain, corn, wine, oil, and timber, were
burned ; and all the fummer-houfes, mops, and
ftores, and every other building which belonged
to the Panciatichi ; in one of which was found in,
bed the Count di Rigolo Bifconti, ill of the
wounds he had received in fome of the late
engagements : the count was, without ceremony,
thrown out of the windowinto the ftreet, not by a
commmon rabble, but by Ceccone Beccano%nd
Gio. Taviani, men of diftin&ion and confequence.
They afterwards made fearch in all the fteeples
and towers, as well as through all the churches,
for refugees of the other faction, and wherever they
found any they drove them out, robbed them, and
fent them to their houfes ; and fo enormous was
the evil committed by the Cancellieri fa&ionaries,
that by the end of the 2oth of Auguft they had
burned more than two hundred houfes and ftctres,
and all the principal fort, contrary to the pro-
mifes and folemn faith to the Panciatichi by the
commiflaries ; and thus a beautiful and charming
city was become a receptacle of aflaffins, of rob-
bers.

So Pi/iota.

bers, of murderers, and labourers in every evil
work.

While the faction of the Cancellieri thus tyran-
nically domineered in Piftoia, that of the Pan-
ciatichi would have done the fame if they had
been in the city, equally without controul. In
their ftate of banifhment, they ftill meditated the
oppreffion and deftrudion of their rivals, and to
this purpofe collected men, and fortified them-
felves on the plains in the country. Not being
able to obtain the countenance and afliftance of
the Florentines, but rather being threatened by
them with their difpleafure and chaflifement, they
fet themfelves, with all their forces, to ill treat the
country with their robberies, arfons, homicides,
and imprifonments, in fuch a manner, that making
frequent excurfions into the mountains, they foon
reduced all the territory of the Pifloians to a
miferable and deplorable ftate. At the fame
time the Cancellieri, no longer knowing what to
fteal, or whom to rob, proceeded in inventing
new infults for the Panciatichi, or thofe whom
they*fufpe£ted to favour that party, who remained
in Piftoia. As the city was full of malicious peo-
ple, who could not contain themfelves, they went
frequently out of the gates, and ftole cattle and
other property from the Panciatichi in the coun-
try, till all the Panciatichi, who were near the
bounds of the city, were obliged to retreat into
the plain, and unite with their affociates : here
they began to think of checking the power of
their enemies ; and all being eager to return to
their houfes, they thought it a duty to reftrain by
force the arrogance of their adverfaries, and re-
duce them, once for all, to fubjeclion. To this
purpofe they erected a ftrong baftion near the

bridge

Fioravanti* 81

bridge a Bonelle, and another in the neighbour-
hood of the bridge alia Pergola, and fortified
thernfelves at St. Angiolo, at St. Baftiano, at the
great houfes of the Forteguerri, at Zenuta, at
Magia, at St. Nuovo, at Tizzana, and made
other fortifications, with preparations of muni-
tions of arms, provifions, and men, from the
mountains and from Lucca, who came to lend
them affiftance : and by thefe means held in fub-
jection all the country, and in terror all the con-
trary faction. The Cancellieri feeing the prepara-
tions made by the Panciatichi, and apprehending
fome unexpected afiaulf, made, without delay,
preparations neceffary to remove thefe factionaries
effectually from the country. Collecting toge-
ther a body of 4000 men, of their own and the
Bolognefe, they went out to attack, at the fame
time, the two baflions near the bridges. The
Panciatichi were aftonimed and panic-ftruck at
the fight of fo many men, and giving thernfelves
up moft fhamefully to flight, the aflailants, in
lefs than one hour, had complete pofleffion of
both bridges, and difmantled both the baftions.
Proceeding to St. Angiolo, which was guarded by
Bartolemeo Collefi, an intrepid officer, and experi-
enced in arms, they fought a mod bloody battle,
in which Collefi himfelf was killed under his horfe ;
for this brave commander falling from his horfe,
was afTaffinated, and his head, fevered from his
body, was fixed on the bow of a faddle, and car-
ried to Piftoia, there to be expofed to mockery
and infult : at the found of the trumpets it was
placed upon the architrave of the well of the
great market, that the people might demonftrate
their joy and triumph over it, and there it was
kept three days. This inhuman exultation was
the beginning of ill fortune to the Cancellieri :
VOL. III. M the

82 Piftoia.

'the .indignation of the Panciaticbi was excited
by the feoffs and taunts offered to their Collefi,
and by the fhameful repulfe in the aifault of
an enemy's baftion near the river Brana. At this
action the Cancellieri were fo confident, that they
cried out, " Victory !" and returned without order
through the ftreets, with a great booty, to Piftoia.
The Panciatichi made a commander of Meo Gori,
of a very numerous family in Terruccia, proud
and terrible, but fortunate, who, with four of his
brothers, and other relations, who in all were
about an hundred perfons, in the rear of thofe
who thought themfelves victorious, followed them
to the grove of elms,, and retaking the plun-
der, routed the party. Many were flain, more
made prifoners, and the reft, fcattered in various
places, returned late and in diforder to Piftoia.
The Panciatichi having obtained fo fignal a
victory, they proceeded, under their glorious cap-
tain Franco, to Tizzana and Magia, and there
fummoned to arms all the people of the party, and
flood night and day in good order ana1 well guarded.
The Cancelleiri, feeing the increafing force of the
Panciatichi, defpaired of difpoffeffmg them of the
plain, and therefore employed all their craft to
effect a feparation between the Panciatichi in the
country, and the Panciatichi in the city, in order
to weaken the faction : in the courfe of two
months they accomplifhed their defign, and a
truce was concluded between the Panciatichi in
the country and the Cancellieri in the country,
which occafioned great feafts and rejoicings in
Piftoia. This truce, however, had but a fhort
duration ; parties began again to rage, and mutual
flaughters were renewed ; and although the Flo-
rentines knew that the territory of the Piftoians
was no longer practicable, on account of the con-
tinual

• N Fioravanti. , 83

tinual murders and aflamnations committed in il
by night and by day, yet they would not, or knew
not how to put their hands co any effectual re-
medy : and although they ordered into confine-
ment for three years, upon pain of rebellion for
returning to Piftoia, all the families of Bifconti,
Panciatichi, Collifi (except Bernardo), Fabbroni,
Brunozzi, RofTi, Forteguerri, Bracciolini, Cioci,
and Gherardi, and many others, fpecified to the
number of two hundred, yet it was not poflibie
that this banifhment mould have any effect ; be-
caufe that many Florentines, their friends, befides
favouring and aflifting them, with money and
other effects, obftru&ed the execution of it, which
was the principal caufe that the Panciatichi con-
folidated themfelves on the plain, with the firm
refolution not to depart from it. The Panciati-
chi, neverthelefs, were not a little anxious, when
they knew that the commons of Florence were
againft them ; and the Cancellieri were not lefs
difturbed with fears when they faw their enemies
in pofieffion of the dominion of the country ; fo
that the); were obliged to confider themfelves as
befieged in Piftoia, rather than as lords of it :
wherefore, reflecting that there was no blefling
more neceflary than peace, it was determined by
the general council, that they ought to have
recourfe to the Mod High in holinefs and good
works, and to this end orders were given to the
labourers of St. James the apoftle, that adequate
alms mould be given to all the religious orders,
that they might by their prayers fupplicate
Heaven to fend peace and union among the
citizens. All this was very commendable and
proper ; but to depend upon thefe prayers alpne,
without changing their conftitution, was as irra-
tional and prefumptuous, as for the crew of a

finking

84 Piftoia.

finking fhip to pray for prefer vation, without
working the pumps or flopping the leaks.

Accordingly, in 1501, they were found to have
been inefficacious ; for the execrable factions, in a
ftill greater eifervefcence of cruelty, made ufe of
every cunning ftratagem, and attempted every
means, to deftroy themfelves and their country.
The Cancellieri, dreading that the Panciatichi
might return to Piftoia, determined not only to
hold them at a diftance from the city, but to chafe
them with all the force they could poflibly afiem-
ble, quite out of the country ; and to this purpofe,
having taken into their pay three thoufand foot,
drawn from the country, the mountains, from
Valdinievole, from Prato, and other places, and
fifty cavalry, early in the morning of the 5th of
February they fallied out with thefe forces, well
armed, from the gate Caldatica, and went, one
thoufand men towards Montemagno, and two
thoufand towards St. Angiolo. Thefe laft arrived
at St. Angiolo, entered the church, fpoiled it of
every thing valuable, and fet it on fire ; and
becaufe thirty of the Panciatichi, who were ported
as guards in the fteeple, knew it was impoflible in
any manner to defend it, they gave the fignal of
their being befieged by a flag, as had been pre-
vioufly concerted with their friends in the neigh-
bourhood. Suddenly three hundred Panciatichi,
compacted to gather in the form of a fquadron,
under the command of their captain, Franco
Gori, ufmg every artifice to avoid being difco-
vered by the enemy, threw themfelves by furprife
into the middle of the Cancellieri, and in a fhort
time broke anddefeated to the number of two thou-
fand perfons. This victory was fo advantageous
to the Panciatichi, that three of them only were
wounded, and one killed, while the Cancellieii loft

more

Fioravanti. 85

more than three hundred and fifty killed, and a
proportionable number wounded, and many were
made prifoners ; and thofe few who efcaped, threw
down their arms, and in fmall numbers an<J
great diforder fled towards Piftoia. This fplen-
did victory, with the acquifition of a great booty,
obtained by the Panciatichi, animated them not
to mrink from any inconvenience or fatigue to
profecute the abafement of their enemies : where-
fore, without lofs of time, taking, to deceive their
antagonifts, a pair of colours which had been
feized in the laft battle, they paraded with this on
their march, and went to attack the other Cancel-
lieri, who, at Santo Nuvo, had befieged their
afibciates, the Panciatichi who guarded it ; but
the Cancellieri, advertifed of the artifice by
means of a lady, fled with the enemy, almofl
moulder to moulder, and coafling along by the
cliffs of Cafale, took the road towards Collina
Fontana, and routed, difbanded, and covered
over with mire, arrived at Piftoia. This retreat
took up the whole night. This flight of the
Cancellieri occafioned no fmall damage to the
innocent Panciatichi who had remained in fecurity
in Piftoia ; becaufe, returned as were the fugitive
Cancellieri to their country, they had no other
thoughts than to revenge themfelves wherever
they could, by fcouring the city, with their arms in
their hands, and falling upon thofe unhappy peo*
pie : they aflaflinated in the piazza a country
gentleman, and Velice di Mareo, who were of
the Panciatick faction, and the others, wounded
and beaten, by flying into the fortrefles and palace
of the rectors, efcaped their fury, and faved their
lives.

The Panciatichi upon the plain in the country,
having been informed of the treachery committed

upon

86 Plftoia.

upon their companions in Piftoia by the Cancel-
lieri, conceived againfl that faction an indignation
beyond all credibility greater than ordinary ; fo
that, after a little repofe from the fatigues lately
fuffered, they prepared to perfecute their enemies
with greater ferocity. Hearing that fome of them
had built a ftrong baflion on the common at
Cafale, from which fortification they daily made
inroads among the inhabitants, and committed
much mifchief, they went on the 24th of March,
and took the baftion, the Cancellieri who guarded
it (hamefully flying. Others of the Cancellieri, in
Cafale itfelf, taking poft in the church and in the
balcony, after a fharp conflict were overcome by
Michelino Jozzelli and Charles Nicolai, many of
them cut to pieces, many others wounded, and the
reft purfued over the mountains, where they left
their arms, and fled with precipitation : others, in
the meadows of Vignole and of Agliana, were
pillaged and totally difperfed : others, at the bridge
of Bonelle, fuffered a perfect defeat, in which
many were affaflinated, and the reft fled in diforder.
The Panciatichi feeing their affairs fucceed fo
happily, prepared themfelves for greater enter-
prizes, and calling together all their people, they
went againft the caftle of Morriigno, took it, and
fet it on fire. They then took Vinacciano, and
burnt all the houfes of the Cancellieri ; and the
houfes of the Panciatichi having been a little
before burnt by the Cancellieri, this place by the
laft conflagration became entirely defolate and
deftroyed. Nor was the damage lefs that was
done at Montegaftoli, the country of Fontana,
Collina, and Gabbiano. The Panciatichi then
fortified themfelves at Montebuono, and did infi-
nite damage from thence to the party of the
Cancellieri, who taking Giaccherino, built by the

families

Fioravanti. 87

families of the Panciatichi, made a (land againft
their enemies, and there followed in this neigh-
bourhood burnings of houfes and murders of
people. At length the two factions defcended
towards the long bridge, and came to battle,
which was continued for fome time with obftinacy ;
but the Cancellieri having the word of it, at laft
fled.

The few good and wife men who remained,
confidering the miferies and deftru&ion which
.refulted to the city of Piftoia and its territory
from the two unbridled factions, exerted them-
felves to aflemble the general council, by whom
were elected two citizens, to fee that all malefac-
tors ihould be chaftifed and punifhed. But a
provifion of this fort could never be fufficient
to intimidate a number of fa&ionaries fo power-
ful : it accordingly only animated them to greater
fury ; for the perfons elected being poorly attend-
ed, and provided with little power or force, how
could they be able to reftrain a defperate people,
who required extraordinary rigour, and much
greater energy, to render them quiet, pacific, and
obedient ? This was fo well known to thofe ungo-
vernable people, that it rendered them more fierce,
proud, and infatiable of revenge, fo that the Can-
cellieri, feeing themfelves overcome in battle, de-
termined to accumulate a great quantity of money,
in order to provide men to conquer the force of
their enemies. To this end they burthened the
city of Pifloia with the payment of twenty thou-
fand ducats of gold ; they fold the effects of St.
James to the amount of four thoufand crowns;
they pawned, for eighteen thoufand crowns more3
at Bologna, the chalices of gold of the chapel of
St. James, which weighed -twenty-two pounds ;
they fold two golden angels, a fathom and an half

88 Piftoia.

in height, and 'a pair of candlefticks which were
worth five hundred crowns ; they took a mod
beautiful bafon, and an ewer of filver, of the value
of four hundred crowns : moreover, they coined
into money other filver bafons, and ari image of
the Virgin, and another of St. John, of pure filver,
which were of St. Zeno, and all the dimes and
bafons of filver which were in the palace of the
fupreme ifiagiftrate ; they took from the Monte
di Pieta fix; thoufand ducats, and one thoufand five
hundred from the Houfe of Wifdom, and made up a
fum of forty thoufand crowns. In the age and coun-
try where thefe things were done, this robbery of
churches, of faints, and angels, this plunder of holy
relicks, was facrilege and impiety of the deepeft
dye, enough to have (hocked and revolted the whole
city in any other circumftances ; but the fpirit of
party made it all lawful to the Cancellieri and their
followers, who made Mancino of Bologna their
captain, one of the braveft foldiers of thofe times,
hired fifteen hundred foreigners, of infantry and
cavalry, and called in all their friends from the
mountains and country, fo that Piftoia was fo full
of foldiers, that all the houfes could fcarcely hold
them.

In the mean time the party Panciatichi ne-
glecled not to procure all the advantages in their
power ; and animated by one Pazzaglio, of Ser-
ravalle, they attempted to take that caftle, and by
means of that traitor fucceeded, fortified them-
felves in the poft which guarded Valdinievole, and
in the fleeples of the churches of St. Stephen and
St. Michael; and being in want of provifions, made
excurfions to the adjacent country, reaped the
grain, pillaged cattle, and fometimes burnt houfes
and killed inhabitants, till they reduced the place
to a moil milerable and deplorable flate. The

parties

Fioravanti. 89

parties having in this manner provided themfelves
with men, arms, and provifions, the Cancellieri
were anxious to undertake iome enterprize with
that body of men, which they had hitherto kept
in pay at fo great an expence, and with fo little
effect. After a confultation, part remained as a
guard in the city, and part went out to the moun-
tains. Six hundred infantry and fifty cavalry went
out, well armed and in good order, and attempted
an aflault, in two divifions, upon Brandeglio and
Caftellaccio, but were difcouraged by a brave
defence. They advanced towards Cireglio, and
making a fierce attack, they eafily carried it,
plundered it of all that was valuable, arrd deftroy-
ed the reft by fire. They then went to the church,
which, with its fteeples, was full of people and of
property ; they laid fiege to it in fuch a manner,
that thofe who guarded it defpaired of defending
it ; but, encouraged by the women who had taken
refuge there, who, like generous amazons, took
arms, repulfed the enemy, and having placed in
fecurity the goods, regained in a fhort time thofe
places which by the men had been abandoned.
The Cancellieri, covered with blufhes and dif-
grace, returned to their main body, and advifed
their companions to return to Piftoia : but when
they began their march, they were fo perfecuted by
the Panciatichi, that the killed and wounded ex-
ceeded by far thofe who in confufion returned to
the city. Then it was that the Panciatichi haf-
tened to Berrignardo, Borghetto, and Piazza, and
burnt all the houfes of the Cancellieri: and fuch
were the damages done that day by the faftion-
aries, that more than one hundred and fifty houfes
of both parties were burnt down.

Thofe of the party Panciatichi, who had entered
into the caftie of Serravalie, thinking themfelves

VOL. III. N in

9« PiJIoia.

in fecurity, flood negligently on their guard in
thatpoft; intelligence of which being fent to the
contrary party, they fent, with great hafte, fix hun-
dred foldiers upon an enterprize againfl it. Two
hundred furrounded it, and the four hundred
others, introduced into fome places about the
caftle, began to rufh without controul into all the
apartments, fo that the Panciatichi, taken by fur-
prife, retired into fome other forts in the neigh-
bourhood. Early in the morning the Cancellieri
approached the fteeple of St. Michael, and took
it by a vigorous aflault. They battered afterwards
that of the church of St. Stephen ; but perceiving
that it was not to be carried without fome delay,
they fet fire to the church, from whence the flames-
afcencling to the balcony ,lbon burnt thofe who held
it. They intended, moreover, to have attempted
the acquifition of the fortrefs, in which the greater
part of the Panciatichi were (hut up ; but a rein-
forcement of five hundred infantry, and one hun-
dred cavalry, arriving to thofe in the fort, and
reinforced farther with three hundred men from
the mountains, and two hundred from Lucca,
conducted by Michael Jozzelli, who had taken
the mod important pofts without the walls, the
caflle was befieged in fuch a formidable manner,
that the Cancellieri loft all hopes of expelling the
contrary faction from that .place. The Cancellieri
in Piftoia, however, hearing the fituation of their
companions in the caftle of Serravalle, fent, at the
approach of evening, three hundred infantry and
fifty cavalry, with plenty of provifions, to reinforce
and refrefli them ; but fcarcely had thefe foldiers
met the others at the foot of the mountajn, when,
repulfed and purfued by the Panciatichi as far as
the long bridge, they were obliged to fubmit to
the lofs of twenty perfons, many arms, and all

their

Fioravanti. g i

their provifions. In the mean time came to the
afliftance of the Panciatichi, Martino Ciuti with
two hundred men, and the captain Franco Gori
with three hundred, and many others, who uniting
with thofe already there, amounted to three thou-
fand, who attacked that caftle on the fide of the fort
in which the companies had taken refuge ; but
feeing all their attempts were rendered vain, one
hundred of the moft alert approached to the gate
with fuch impetuofity, that they made a breach,
and let four hundred men into the caftle, who
attacking the Cancellieri in the rear, in kfs than
an hour killed more than three hundred, and made
more than one hundred prifoners, and permitting
the foreigners to efcape by a fhameful flight,
gained a large booty of goods, money, arms, and
horfes. The Panciatichi having obtained this
noble victory, the citizens of that faction began to
think of endeavouring to return to Pifloia ; but
were difluaded by the Panciatichi who were inha-
bitants of the country, and would not confent.
They went therefore all together to their ufualpofts
upon the plain, with their prifoners and rich plun-
der. If they had attempted to return to Piftoia,
they would not have been oppofed, for the fac-
tionaries in the city were fo impoverifhed and dif-
couraged, that many had gone out of the place ;
and although the bells of the people were rung
that day, not one perfon appeared in the piazza.

There fucceeded many more affrays and flaugh-
ters, burnings and depredation?, to relate all of
which in detail would be endlefs. Great were the
damages done the fame day by the Panciatichi in
Alliana ; but by the treacherous mifcondud of
their captain, Martino Francefe, they were dif-
gracefully repulfed, had many killed and many
wounded ; r.nd, what was more to be dreaded, the

Cancellieri

92 Piftoia.

Cancellieri carried thirteen of their heads in tri-
umph to Piftoia, and by that means revived the
courage of their companions, almoft funk in terror
and defpair. Great was the (laughter of their ene-
mies, and numerous the burnings of houfes com-
mitted by the Panciatichi of Montagnana, the 7th
of July, at Momigno. The loth of July the Pan-
ciatichi of Brandeglio collected a large number of
men from the plain and the mountains, and burnt
all the houfes of the Cancellieri which were at Sa-
tornana, at St. Felice, and there plundered all the
property and all the cattle. The 2oth of July
the Cancellieri burnt in Piftoia eight houfes and
fix ftores of the Bracciolini, and fet fire to three
houfes of M. Gio. di Franco, and demolimed the
houfe of Francifco Collefi, near to St. Profpero.
The 28th of July the Cancellieri went to Monte-
buono, a town of the Panciatichi, took it by ftra-
tagem, and burnt it, after having made twelve
prifoners ; whom they conducted to Piftoia, led
into the hall of an houfe inhabited by Giuliano
Dragucci, where they ftrangled them, and threw
them out of the window. This, which they call-
ed juftice, they compelled to be executed by the
hands of a prieft, who was in the number of the
prifoners, and then they put the prieft to death in
the fame manner. Much deftrudion was made
by fire, on the 3oth of July, in the commons be-
longing to the houfes of the bifhop, and in other
places, by the Panciatichi ; but no lefs were the
evils committed the fame day by fire by the Can-
cellieri in the commons of Borelle : and in fo
many other places were fuch exceffes committed
by the two factions, that they had reduced Piftoia
to be the moft unhappy among all the miferable
cities of Italy ; its whole territory was one fcene
of burnings, murders, and captivity of men, and

the

FioravantL 93

the citizens themfelves were become the fable and
the fcorn of the whole world. The Florentines,
who, as Imperial vicars, had fome pretenfions to
interfere in the government of Piftoia, derived
from the emperor Robert, had neglected, till they
reproached themfelves, to attempt any falutary re-
medy to fo many evils. In the beginning of Au-
guft the Cancellieri, the faction which had now
the dominion in Piftoia, confidering that the Pan-
ciatichi were mafters of the country, and were
well furnimed with provifions, while the city was
in danger of famine, aflembled in the public pa-
lace to deliberate ; and they concluded it would
be for the advantage of their country, and of both
parties, to make peace with the Panciatichi, This
refolution was foon communicated to the Pancia-
tichi, who fuddenly confented to treat. At this
time the Florentines offered their mediation, pro-
pofed articles, and fent troops to keep order, &c.
The particulars of this negociation were curious
enough, but this eflay is already too long. The
wifeft and mod prudent men in the city held fe-
cret communications, fometimes with one party,
fometimes with the other, and then with the Flo-
rentines, till at laft they prevailed to have a gene-
ral council called. This confifted wholly of Can-
cellieri, for thePanciatichi were ftill in the country,
and confequently the demands of the latter were
thought too confiderable. Such controversies arofe,
even among the Cancellieri, that it was feared no-
thing would ever be concluded. Some juggling
monkifn trick at laft fucceeded : a dove, white
and black (bianca & neri), after the fimilitude of
the arms of the Panciatichi family, flew down
upon the feat of the fupreme magiftrate, and gave
manifeft figns that the Moft High was in favour
of peace j the hard hearts of the Cancellieri re-
lented,

94 • Piftola.

lented, and peace was made. The great affair of
the appointment of a director of the hofpital was
fettled, by giving each party alternately the ap-
pointment. The Panciatichi were reftored to the
city ; all crimes and atrocities were pardoned, and
to be forgotten. Eight citizens were to reform
the government in fuch a manner, that the gonfa-
lonier, and all the other officers, mould be equally
drawn from each faction ; and the families inlifted
under the Panciatichi on one fide, and under the
Cancellieri on the other, were all named and re-
corded.

Rumours and tumults were ceafed ; the two
factions enjoyed in Piftoia a tranquillity that they
believed would be lading ; but the habits of dif-
cord were not eradicated, paflions were not extin-
guifhed, and the parties were not balanced. Ac-
cordingly, in 1502, the fymptoms were difcovered
of an hidden gangrene : the Cancellieri pre-
tended to have been, by the general council, ex-
empted from accounting for what they had taken
from the commons and from pious places ; and
the Panciatichi demanded to be refunded in part,
if not in the whole, of the damages done by fire to
their houfes ; but as the general council, and
the other offices of the city, were compofed of an
equal number of fubjects of the two factions, one
party refufed to approve of the petition of the
other. This exafperated their minds to fuch a
degree, that the ufual factions arofe, and proceeded
to blows and to arms. They were feparated foon
by the Florentine troops of cavalry and infantry,
who were pofted as guards in Piftoia, and obliged,
without difcharging their hatred, indignation, and
rancour, to return to their houfes : there they pre-
pared to give a frefh fcope to their paflions ; and
the Cancellieri, as the moft powerful, caufing to

be

Fioravanti. 95

be taken out of the hands of the Panciatichi the
fortrefies they held, began anew to prepare for
driving them altogether out of the ftate of
Piftoia. The Panciatichi, penetrating the defigns
of the Cancellieri, did not delay to provide men,
and each party, introducing men in the night,
flood in hourly expectation of a favourable Oppor-
tunity. On the 24th of February the Cancellieri,
in three divifions, fortified themfelves, with 300
men at the gate of Guidi, with 250 on the
hill in the ftreet of St. John, and with 250
in the ftreet near St. Dominick. A party of the
Panciatichi coming in from the country, occa-
fioned the battle to begin ; but the Panciatichi
out-numbered, and almoft furrounded by their
enemies, were compelled again to abandon the
town with precipitation and diforder. The pari-
ciatichi, thus expelled a fecond time from the city,
difperfed in diverfe places on the plain ; and the
Cancellieri remaining as lords of Piftoia, fuddenly
{hut the gates and went with unbridled rage to
plundering, burning, and deftroying all the re-
maining houfes and fubftance of the Panciatichi.
They robbed and burned the houfes of the Rofli,
Forteguerri, Collefi, Radda, Bambolino, Doffo,
Gualfreducci, as well as the Panciatichi, and many
others. Meditating ftill greater cruelties, they
ran in great fury to the public palace, and all
thofe of the magistracy who were of the party of
the Panciatichi, whom they could find, they moft
cruelly put to death. In this ftate of things, thofe
who prefided over the adminiftration of juftice,
fupported by the Florentines, attempted to pro-
vide a remedy againft new combinations, and
made the tumultuous lay down their arms. To
make an example, they hanged Puccino Puccini,
whom they found guilty of the murder of the

fupreme

fupreme magiftrates ; and declared rebels thir-
teen others, whom they condemned for high trea-
fon, for the contempt fhewn to the fupreme autho-
rity : thefe were driven out of Piftoia, and fled to
Montale. This rigour of juftice, however, in-
ftead of reftoring quiet to Piftoia, ferved rather to
haften its ruin ; becaufe the Panciatichi fortified
themfelves with baftions of wood, well furnifhed
with arms and men, near the bridge di Bonelle,
by means of which they domineered over the
whole city, and kept the minds of the Cancellieri
in conftant agitation, till the pride and ferocity of
the two parties fuflfered not a day to pafs in the
city or the country without rencounters, burnings,
and flaughter. The Panciatichi being fortified at
Bonelle, and other places of the plain, deliberated
to make an exertion of all their pomble ftrength
to deftroy totally the contrary party : to this pur-
pofe, early one morning they feparated into feveral
divifions, traverfed that extenfive country by dif-
ferent routs, and after a few hours met all together
at the affault of fixteen h.oufes belonging to the
Tefi, Matia and other Cancellieri families, ftrip-
ped them of the mod valuable effects, and burnt
the reft to the ground. The Cancellieri haftened
in great numbers to prevent or repair fo great a
misfortune ; but the fury and the ftrength of the
Panciatichi was fuch, that, after having killed and
waunded many, they obliged the reft to fly. Their
flight animated the Panciatichi to fet fire without
delay to all the houfes in that vaft plain, and pro-
due^ a conflagration, which the hiftorian could
cpiiipare to nothing better than the opening of

one of the mouths of hell *,

f'f^i"'-ti:iJT ^t**rfw'^l;-$!

^^Sembrava eflerfi aperta in quelle parti, vma bocca di infer-
qo. F.) 394.

Piftoia

filer av anil. <)7

Piftoia being in this deplorable condition, de-
prived of all fuccour and affiftance, was full of
people given up to a licentious way of living,
without fear of divine, and much lefs of human
juftice, who committed continual infoleiice and
wickednefs of every kind : wherefore many, know-
ing the" great damage which refulted to their
country, inftigated the general council to elect
one of the wifeft and moft learned citizens to ad-
minifter, with fupreme authority,full and fummary
juftice, to the end to find a remedy for fo great
diforders, to extinguifli fo great a fire by punifti^
ing every fault, and reducing the people to the
necefliry of embracing peace and tranquillity.
The council complied with the petition of the
principal citizens of the place, and taking, all
authority from the podefta and captain, gave the
title of doge to Mariotto di Peraccino del Guida,
a doctor of laws living at Porta Guidi, and gave
him all the authority of the council itfelf. Mari-
otto afliimed the government of the city, and con-
ducted with fo much rectitude, that no man could
complain of his partialty, and introduced as much
tranquillity into the city as he excited jealoufy in
Florence. But the Cancellieri, as thofe who had
been the occafion of the exaltation of Mariotto,
defirous of demonftrating their fuperiority in every
affair, foon gave occafion to the general council to
apprehend frefh evils. They therefore appointed
for the doge three of the wifeft and moft prudent
citizens for his counfellors, that, amidft fuch dan-
gers, he might be animated and afiifted not to
relax in repreffing the pride of reftlefs fpirits, and
that he might be more ardent in reducing the
people to order and quiet. All thete endeavours,
however, availed but little ; for Jacopo Savello
VOL. III. O coming

9$ Pi Ma.

coming to Piftoia with an hundred men in arms,
on foot and on horfeback, in aid of the Cancellieri,
thefe determined to go out in fearch of the Pan-
ciatichi. Uniting three hundred men to the fol-
diers of Savello, they iflfued out of the city in two
fquadrons, one of which went to afiault the houfes
of the Giacomelli, and the other went towards
Badia a Pacciana, where having routed an hundred
cavalry of the Panciatichi, they returned to unite
with the other divifion, and both went to work to
rob the houfes of all that was good for any thing,
and then to fet them on fire, and put the in-
habitants to the fword. In the mean time the
party of the Panciatichi, numerous in armed men,
marching fuddenly in front of the enemy, thought
to revenge themfelves for their paft defeat, by the
total extermination of the Cancellieri : but be-
caufe the river Ombrone, which lay between,
hindered the two parties from coming cruelly to a
battle, there enfued frequent fkirmifhes on its
banks, which by length of time terminated to the
difadvantage of the Cancellieri, and was the rea-
fon that, intimidated by the force of the contrary
party, they haftily retired, with Jacopo Savello,
towards Ailiana, and in the confufion abandoned
the greateft part of their arms. The general de-
predation had ruined the crops, and the country
was afflicted with a fevere famine, which obliged
Savello to leave Piftoia.

The Cancellieri of Cavinana, defirous of reftor-
ing to Igno the Canceliieri their companions, who
had been banimed from thence, aflembled a body
of men, who united with two hundred andfixtyper-
fons, on horfeback and on foot, who came out to
their afiiftance from the city, advanced to make
trial of their ftrength ; but meeting with their

fellow

„ FioravantL 99

fellow fa&ionaries from the mountains, and mak-
ing up five hundred foot, and one hundred horfe,
they all directed their march towards Pitellio, and
encamped near the old parifh church, where they
waited two days the arrival of other forces, to make
an united aflault upon the caftle : but not feeing
them arrive, and fearing that fuccour might come
to the Pitellians from their friends in St. Mar-
cello, they laid afide their meditated enterprize,
and returned to their places.

The Panciaiichi of the mountains, finding
themfelves difturbed by the Cancellieri, thought it
a duty to revenge themfelves ; and collecting for
that purpofe one hundred and fifty men at Cutig-
liano, began to fcour the country and commit de-
predations. They were encountered with a great
booty, and a (harp engagement enfued, and, after
three hours, the Panciatichi thought it convenient
to leave their prey, and retreat, to fave their lives,
to Lizzano. The Cancellieri having recovered
their property, and obferving the retreat of the
Panciatichi into certain houfes of Lizzano, march-
ed into it. Then the Panciatichi of Lizzano, for
fear of the contrary party, who were increafed to
five hundred perfons, and thinking to fave their
property and the furniture of their houfes, depo-
iited them in the church and its fteeple, to which
alfo the women and the men retired. The Can-
cellieri arriving in Lizzano, and finding all the
houfes abandoned, pillaged all that was left in
them, and then burnt them. They then laid fiege
to the church and fteepk in fo clofe a manner,
that there was no fpace left for the Panciatichi to
efcape. The Caneellieri fent notice to their con-
forts in the city, country, and mountains, to fend
them immediate fuccour, that they might have
dead, or prifoners, their confined enemies. One

thoufand

ico Piftola.

thoufand five hundred men appeared, and took
away from the befieged all hope of afliftance. In
this defperate fituation there was no propofal of
furrender or capitulation. The Cancellieri, re-
peatedly aflaulted their enemy ; but thefe ob-
flinately defended themfelves, and often wounded
the aflailants. Thefe at length renewed the en-
terprize by fire, and attacked both the church
and fteeple in that manner. Thofe in the church
could no longer endure the raging flames, and all
retired into the fteeple. This place not being
capacious enough for all, many were fuffbcated
with the heat and fmoke. The Panciatichi, reduc-
ed to this ftate of mifery, were by fome of the
Cancellieri promifed their lives, if they would fur-
render. Eighteen of the befieged took advantage
of thefe fair words ; but fcarcely were they in the
power of their enemies, when they were perfidionfly
put to death : none of the reft would furrender,
but refolved to perifh in the balcony. The be-
fiegers, feeing this courageous refolution, increafed
the fire under the balcony in fuch a degree, that
the flames arifing around and above it, many
of the poor wretches within it, tormented with
fmoke, and heat, and pain, funk under their
mifery ; and the more they deafened the fquare
below with their cries ; the more their inhuman
enemies exerted themfelves to diftrefs them.

The party of the Panciatichi of the plain, ad-
vifed of thefe miferies in which their friends of the
mountains were involved, and not able to endure
the horrid excefles which were committed, expe-
dited under the command of Tofo, the brother of
the captain Franco Gori, at once to Pupillio four
Jiundred infantry, and one hundred cavalry, who
giving notice to all the faclionaries of the moun-
tains, that they might come to the relief of their

friends

Fioravanti. i b i

friends, in a fhort time had an army of a thou-
fand men and more, befides a large number of
cavalry. Taking pofiefiion of proper pofts, and
making fuitable fortifications, Tofo, by a great
fhout, gave a fignal of the fuccour arrived to
the poor \ic~tims befieged in the balcony. The
Cancellieri, when they difcovered this reinforce-
ment, fent parties fuddenly to repulfe them,
who found them fo well fortified, that any at-
tempt againft them muft be ineffectual. Suc-
cours from all parts arriving to the Panciatichi,
the Cancellieri found it neceflary to raife the
fiege, and retire without rilking a battle. The
befieged who furvived the pain, hunger, and
other miferies, came out of that fteeple and bal-
cony, where more than one hundred and twenty
were found dead by the heat, thirft, and hunger ;
and their liberators not caring to purfue their fugi-
tive enemies, only fet fire to their houfes, by
which new conflagration there was not an houfe
left in thefe two beautiful villages which was not
burnt and demolifhed.

The Panciatichi having vindicated the wrongs
done to their conforts, took the road of St. Mar-
cello, to return to the plain ; but one hundred
and fifty of them deviating without military order,
they were unexpectedly attacked by the people of
Calamecca, and not being able to defend them-
felves, they found it convenient to fave their lives
by taking their flight in the night. This event
inftigated the Panciatichi to multiply their forces,
to deftroy entirely the contrary party, and to this
purpofe hiring troops from Ferrara, Modena, and
Lucca, brought together four hundred infantry,
and one hundred cavalry, and thefe increafing
daily, gave occafion to the Cancellieri to prepare
for new battles, and the whole country was fo ex-
cited,

IQ2 Piftola.

cited, that both parties making great preparations
for war, nothing remained to be hoped lor but to
fee the utter ruin of thofe places. In this miferable
flate of things, Louis king of France excited the
Florentines to interpofe. They elected thirteen
commiflaries, and gave them full power. Thefe
prohibited all to wear arms, and cited all the
heads of the factions, both of the Panciatichi and
Cancellieri, in the city, country, and mountains,
to appear at Florence on the 2oth of Auguft. Of
the heads of the Panciatick faction, who appeared
at Florence in obedience to the order, were fix of
the principal men of the Panciatichi family, four
of the Collefi, four of the Bifconti, feven of the
Brunozzi, three of the Gherardi, and four of the
Rofli : Bartolomeo Panciatichi, M. Goro Ghieri,
and captain Guiliano Gherardi, with feven others
refufed to go, and incurred the penalty of banifh-
ment as rebels. Of the heads of the Cancellieri
party, appeared in Florence in obedience to the
citation, two of the Cancellieri, three of the Gat-
tefchi, three of the Ambrogi, eight of the Perrac-
cino, three of the Melocchi, three of the Tonti, and
five of the Odaldi : nine refufed to go, and were
declared rebels. Six of the heads of the Panciati-
chi on the plan appeared, and four of thofe on the
mountains, and an equal number of the Cancel-
lieri from each. As foon as they appeared in
Florence, feven of the Cancellieri, and fix of the
Panciatichi, were committed to prifon, and all the
reft forbidden to leave Florence on pain ofbanifh-
ment as rebels. The Florentine commifTaries then
took all public offices, and the public revenue, out
of the hands of the Piftoians, and impofed heavy
fines on the leaders for breaking the peace. Upon
examination it was found, that more than four

hundred

Fioravantl. 103

hundred houfes had been burnt in the city, and
more than lixteen hundred in the country.

The rigour of the Florentines preferved the
peace but a Ihort time, for in the next year the
two factions of the Cancellieri and Panciatichi
broke out into another civil war, as violent and
deftru&ive as ever. But let us pafs over the par-
ticulars, and mention only a few circumftances.

The Florentines again made peace in Piftoia by
their commiflaries, imprifonments, fines and other
feverities, Which the Piftoians were too much
exhaufted to refift. In 1505 the Piftoians petiti-
oned Florence to be reftoredto the honours, offices,
and revenues of the city; and it was granted.

The Piftoians were fuch friends of the houfe of
Medici, that they had the addrefs to efcape, at
the time when the Spanifh army invaded Prato,
and committed fuch cruelties and devaftations
there.

John di Medici was made pope, and 'aiiumed
the name of Leo the Tenth, and the Piftoians made
fuch rejoicings upon this occafion, and fent fuch
congratulations by their ambafiadors to the pope,
and to Julian his brother, and Lorenzo his nephew,
as recommended them to favour.

In 1514 the families of Panciatchi, Cancellieri,
Ricciardi, Gualfreducci and Vergioleft, who in
1369 had been prohibited to have, obtain, or ex-
ercife the offices and dignities of the city of
Piftoia, its country, or mountains, fupplicated,
with others, to be admitted tp public offices and
honours. Their petition was repeatedly rejected
by the council : but at length, by the influence
and interceffion of the people, Leo the Tenth, they,
their children, and defcendants, were reftored and
admitted to all the honours demanded. Is there
in hiftory a more curious fact ? Thefe families

were,

104 Piftoia.

were, by an oftinate, arbitrary, and ftupid
excluded from all offices and (hare in government ;
yet it was impofiibFe to eftablifh a government
that could controul them, and they difpofed of all
offices, and the whole government, divided as they
were into two parties, flruggling for the whole
time, and butchering each other, that one of them
might rule the whole*

Some fparks of malignity remained concealed
in the minds of the fa&ionaries, the Panciatichi
and Cancellieri, which in 1515 broke out in a
furions flame, and extended into the plain and the
mountains. From tumults and murders both
parties proceeded to make preparations of men
and arms, to revive the civil wars in all their
horrors. But the Florentines, that is to fay the
Medici family, interpofed with fuch energy, as
reftored the public tranquillity ; in order to pre-
ferve which they drew off many of the turbulent
fpirits, by taking them into their fervice as
guards, &c.

After the death of the emperor Maximilian,
Charles of Auftria, king of Spain, was elevated to
the throne of Csefar, and was called Charles the
Fifth. Upon this event the Piftoians expected
iome innovations, but the emperor was prevailed
upon, by Leo the Tenth, to make no change in the
government of Tufcany : on the contrary the em-
peror confirmed to the Florentines the privileges
of their ftate, authority, and lands, which they
were in pofTeflion of.

Guilio de Medici was feated on the pontifical
throne, and called Clement the Seventh. The
Piftoians did honour to his elevation by great re-
joicings, and by an embafly of congratulation ;
which produced a letter from the pope full of pa-
ternal

Fiofavanti. 105

ternal affe&ion for the city of Pifloia, and abound-
ing in praifes of the citizers who compofed it.

The afendency of the Medici family was not,
however, fufficiently eftablifhed to prevent a civil
war from breaking out again in Piftoia between
the Cancellieri and Panciatichi : an obftinate bat-
tle was fought between them, which lafted feven
hours, and the Panciatichi were again obliged to
leave the city, and go into the country to their
ufual mifchief. They returned in a (hort time
with additional force, fought the Cancellieri again,
and obtained a viclory, not without a multitude
of killed and wounded on both fides. After this
new tumult many orations were inftituted in
Piftoia, to obtain the extirpation of civil difcords.
The infurre&ion was foon heard of in Florence,
and Niccolo Capponi, whofe prudence was efteem-
ed equal to his valour, was fent as commifiTary,
with an army to fupprefs it. With great diffi-
culty, and much feverity, he fucceeded to make a
peace, or a truce, between the two parties.

But in 1527 the fame factions revived their
hoftilities, but the leaders were feized and fent to
Florence, and imprifoned, and mulcted in fines fo
fevere as intimidated others. Charles, duke of
Bourbon, with a large army of Spaniards and Ger-
mans, approached the Alps ofTufcany, and threw
the Piftoians into an uncommon agitation ; but a
great fall of fnow obliged him to divert his courfe
from Pifloia to Rome.

The Florentines having, in 1527, bani/hed the
Medici, and taken down, with great impetuofity,
the arms of that family from every place in the
city, Charles the Fifth, in 1529, took upon him-
felf the obligation of re-eftablifhing entirely that
family in that city : and to this end he commif-
fioned Filibert, prince of Orange, to lay fiege to

VOL. III. P Florence

io6 . Ptftoia.

Florence with a large army of Italians and Ger-
mans. The Florentines made great preparations
for defence, not only of their city, but alfo of
iPiftoia. They fent into it five companies of
infantry, and placed each gate of the city under a
company, and the piazza under the fifth, all under
commanders in whom they had confidence. ' But
all thefe exertions of the Florentines for the fecu-
curity of the city of Piftoia, and to maintain it at
their devotion, appeared, even to themfejves, to
be vain and of little moment, if the good-will of
the two factions of the Panciatichi and Cancellieri
could not be obtained : and as the Cancellieri were
already naturally inclined to their views, they
courted and complimented the Panciatichi as the
m oft powerful, and as the adherents to the Me-
dici ; and to accomplifh their purpofe, they called
to Florence fome of the heads of that party, and
admitting them into their council of war, affected
a great efteem for their judgments and opinions in
things of the greateft importance. The Pancia-
tichi in Piftoia, however, having the greateft fhare
of influence, by the favour of the pope and the
Medici family, placed little confidence in thofe
who at this time had the fway in Florence ; they
therefore created a new magiftrate over all affairs
of the war, and gave him ample authority to do
every thing for the advantage of the city. This
magiftrate efteemed the five companies inefficient
for the defence of the city, and fent to Florence
for more ; but he was anfwered that the troops of
Charles the Fifth were approaching to lay feige to
Florence, and that the forces of their enemies
increafed every day, fo that they had enough to
think and to do for their own defence ; that the
Piftoians muft therefore make ufe of the means
they had for their own falvation : and to this

end

Fioravanti. .107

end they gave orders to their commiflary, who
refided in Piftoia in behalf of the commons of
Florence, that he mould releafe freely into the
hands of tire Piftoians the balia of their city, that
they might both govern and defend themfelves ;
and to their foldiers, ported as guards, to return
with all poflible expedition to Florenee. Thefe
orders of their principals were fuddenly executed
by the commiflary and podefta. Piftoia remained
free from the yoke of the Imperial vicars, provid-
ed itfelf with men, arms, and provifions : but
dreading the army of Charles the Fifth on one fide,
and the Panciatichi at lead courting the Medici,
they fent four amdafladors of the Panciatichi
party to offer the keys of the city to the pope,
and pray his interceflion with the emperor that
his army might not enter their territory. Many
of the citizens, intimidated by the uncertainty of
the times, abfented themfelves. The oppofite
party prevailed too in another meafure, the ap-
pointment of ambafladors to Florence to obtain a
re-confideration of their refolution. This pro-
duced fuch a rage in the Panciatichi party, that
•one of the ambafladors, Tonti, was aflaffinated,
and a riot inftantly enfued, in which eighteen of
the Cancellieri loft their lives, and the whole
party was driven out of the city, and their houfes
plundered and burnt, particularly the celebrated
palace of that family near St. Luke's. The prin-
cipal aftors in this mifchief made a rich booty of
money and jewels, fled to Bologna, where they
were moft gracioufly received and pardoned by the
pope.

At this time followed the real extinction of the
faction of the Cancellieri ; becaufe the Panciatichi,
favourites of the pontiff,as adherents of the houfe'of
Medici, aflumed fuch vigour, that enraged not only

again (I

io8 Piftoia.

againfl the Cancellieri of the city, but of the coun-
try, both on the plain and in the mountains, they
facked, burnt, and deftroyed, the greater part of
their houfes,fpreading ruin and devaftation as they
went, in Cavinana, Lanciole, Caftigliano, Spig-
nano, and all the other caftles and pofieflions of
the Cancellieri. The people of Serra, followers
of the Panciatichi, burnt the caftieof Calamecca,
which held for the party of the Cancellieri ; thefe
were fo inflamed with refentment, that, with the
help of fome companies of Lombards, they com-
pelled their enemy to fly, fome of whom retreat-
ing, to fecure the church of Crefpole, were there
belieged, and finally ail put to death : others re-
tired to the balcony, and there fortified themfelves,
fo as to hope to efcape the fury of their perfecu-
tors, but in vain, for the afiailanls, difappointed
of their vengeance by the fword, refolved to ob-
tain it by famine. The Panciatichi being reduced
to this ftate, one of their moil daring foldiers,
named Appollonio di Dante, to deliver his compa-
nions from the hands of their enemies, precipi-
tated himfelf from the tower, and his cloak taking
the wind, he defcended with no other injury than
a flight hurt in one of his arms. Running firft to
Serra, and then to Piftoia, he excited one of the
Collefi to march, with a good body of foldiers, to
the relief of the befieged. After this, Pitellio,
Pupillio, and Mammiano, by revolting to the
party of the Panciatichi, fuffered no other damage
than the lofs of a multitude of their inhabitants,
who were chafed from their habitations as adhe-
rents to the Cancellieri.

The pope, Clement the Seventh, accepted the
gift of the city, and by a letter or charter, directed
to his beloved fons the priors, gonfalonier, and
people of the city of Piftoia, fent his pontifical

com-

Fioravanti. 1 09

commiflary to take poiTefiion. The Panciatichi had
now exterminated the Cancellieri, and obtained
the power of governing ; but it was at the expence
of fubjedting both themfelves and their country to
a foreign power and another rival family.

Charles the Fifth, the 28th of October, 1530,
confdtuted Alexander de Medici governor, not
only of Florence, but of all Tufcany, to the ex-
treme joy and fatisfaclion of Clement the Seventh.
Thus pope and emperor, Guelphs and Ghibellines,
Bianci and Neri, Panciatichi and Cancellieri, were
at laft all brought to unite, as all fuch conftituti-
ons of government ever have united, at laft, in a
government of all authority in one centre, but
that centre aworthlefs, however artful, defpot.

The Piftoians were in hopes, that at leaft under
an abfolute prince they might enjoy a little tran-
quillity: but in 1531 the ufual difgufts between
the two factions of Panciatichi and Cancellieri
began to fpring up. Although the former, by
the partiality of the houfe of Medici, were in-
dulged in all their caprices, yet finding then>
felves now increafmg in ftrength, nothing would
fatisfy them but the total expulfion from the city,
and the complete deftru&ion, of all that belonged
to the Cancellieri. Tumults and daughter arofe,
and no man had the knowledge or the will to pro-
vide a remedy.

Alexander de Medici took poffeflion of his
principality in Florence, and great rejoicings were
made in Piftoia,- and four ambafladors tent to
prefent the congratulations of their city, and
recommend it as having been always faithful
lovers of his family. The forty-eight ienators,
inftituted in Florence this year under Alexander,
pacified the two factions of Panciatichi and Can-
cellieri, and thofe perfons and families who re-
mained

no, Piftoia.

mained of the latter fa&ion returned to the city^
to the joy of all.

Alexander diftinguifhed Pifloia from all other
places under his dominion, for its great affedion
and fweet love to his family, by giving orders
that all the bufmefs of Piftoia mould be addrefled
immediately to himfelf in perfon.

Charles the Fifth having determined the un-
truth of the accufations of tyranny brought againft
Alexander de Medici by the Florentine exiles,
made a vifit to Piftoia, where he was received and
entertained in the public palace.

Alexander took it into his head that commif-
faries and governors were deftructive to a (late,
and therefore abolifhing the office, he difarmed
the inhabitants as inclined to tumults, and def-
tined ten noble Piftoians to govern their city. On
the 6th of January, this year, Alexander was aflaf-
finated by Lorenzo, and Cofimo fucceeded. When
the news of this afiaflination arrived in Piftoia,
the heads of the Panciatichi party affembled, and,
after mature deliberation, concluded that the pre-
fent was a convenient opportunity for deftroying
totally all remnants of the Cancellierian party. To
this purpofe they excited an infurreclion of all
their fadionaries, under colour of maintaining the
city of Piftoia in its devotion to the houfe of
Medici. They made leaders of Gio. Collefi and
fome others, and with a great multitude fcoured
the city, and in a very fhort time aflaffinated fif-
teen. Many others, hoping to fecure themfelves,
took poft in the fortreffes, but, betrayed by the
commanders, who let in the Panciatichi, they
were miferably deprived of their lives. The par-
tifans of the Cancellieri, feeing that they could not
refift the fierce aflaults of the contrary faction,
went to hide themfelves, fome in the towns, fome

in

Fioravanti. 1 1 1

in the monafteries, and others in fubterraneous
places ; others went out of the city, found a
leader, and hazarded a battle with their enemies,
in which many were killed, and others afterwards
burnt in fteeples. Many, who had forefeen fuch
an event, had before retired to Montale and Mon-
tenurlo, places of their faction : fo that the Pan-
ciatichi remaining dominators without controul in
Piftoia, facked, burnt, and deftroyed all the houfes,
{hops, and (lores, which remained of the contrary
party in the city.

Cofimo the Firfl had afcended the throne of
Tufcany, and ambafladors were fent from Piftoia
to congratulate him. At the fame time the fac-
tionaries of the Cancellieri, who had taken refuge
in Montale, conflituting their leader the captain
Guidotto Pazzaglia, their compatriot, and a head
of the Cancellierian faction (whom, though aged,
and weakened by fo many military fatigues,
was retired to his eftate called the Houfe in the
Wood*, fortified by a thick and high wall, and de-
fended by a high and ftrong tower) they intreat-
ed him to engage in their defence, and obftrucl:
the approaches of the Panciatichi. Pazzaglia took
under his command all the fa&ionaries of his
party, and, by a fecret correfpondence which he
had with Philip Strozzi, increafed his numbers to
four hundred men, whom he quartered in his own
habitation. From this poft they took the licence
to go out frequently to the annoyance of the Pan-
ciatichi, and gave them much difturbance and
many apprehenfions. The Panciatichi, to make
a diversion and a divifion of the forces of the
country party, which every day increafed in
power, went and commenced a cruel warfare with

* La Cafa al Bofco.

the

'112 fiftola.

the Cancellieri of Cavinana. Thefe were made
uneafy, and retired to their fleeples, where they
made a brave defence. At this time the com-
mitTarytook the refolution of bridling the parties
by authority and with rigour : but the Panciatichi,
who were more than a thoufand men in number,
in contempt of juftice, and fparing neither age,
nor condition, nor fex, executed in a fhort time a
cruel vengeance on their adverfaries by fire and
fword ; and going on every day increafmg in fero-
city, they increased their murders, rapines, and
fires, till they reduced Cavinana, St. Marcello,
Crefpole, Calamecca, Lanciole, Pupillio, and other
places, to horrid fpe&acles of defolation. Many
of the Cancellieri, perceiving that fortune was
not favourable to them, retired to the parifh
church of Cutigliano, and there fortified, flood
upon their defence, without lofing their prefence
of mind, waiting from the brave captain Luca
Giacomelli fome convenient fuccour, by which
they might once attempt an attack upon the rear
of the Panciatichi, who, to increafe their power
both in numbers and fituation, had taken a pod
very near them. Thefe diforders were very dif-
pleafing to the duke Cofimo de Medici, and he
took great pains, by means of his commiflary, to
reftore quiet to the Cancellieri, to which the Pan-
ciatichi at length confented. Neverthelefs the
church was fcarcely opened, when they fell into
fuch a furious rage, that they fell upon every one
of the Cancellieri, and cut them to pieces. Co-
flino was not difcouraged, even by this outrage,
from ufing other means to reftore quiet to Piftoia,
and at laft reduced fome part of it to good order.
But the fadion of the Panciatichi, having no
longer any of the Cancellieri on whom to vent
their rage, turned all their hatred and indignation

againft

fioravafiti.

one another. The fa£tio*n became divid-
ed into two, which rufhed into fuch perfecutions
of each other, that innumerable quarrels and
murders fucceeded. The example was followed
among their connexions in Florence, which gave
occafion to the rectors of that city, who dreaded
greater diforders, to draw the two parties to a.
truce. At the fame time the duke Cofimo was
exactly informed, that the captain Pazzaglia re-
ceived daily additions to the numbers in his
houfe : by the affiftance of Philip Strozzi, and the
other exiles, many were induced daily to go into
his fervice, and increafed the terror which they
had of this great captain. Defirous of providing
againft every fmifter event, which he forefaw might
occur, not only from the great number of men
•who were aflembled at the Houfe in the Wood, but
from the thoufands of men which Pazzaglia at'the
found of a bell was able to raife, the duke, after
having in vain attempted to gain him by means of
fome friends, fent Otta da Montauto, with a thou-
fand infantry, to attack the Houfe in the Wood,
and make prifoners of its garrifon. Montauto
by forced marches fat down before the place, but
difcovered early by Pazzaglia, who, always vjgi-
lant, faw every thing, and thought of every dan-
ger, he was fiercely repulfed. Montauto preceiv-
ing the enterprize to be difficult which he had
thought fo eafy, fent to his brother Frederick,
who commanded the guards in Piftoia, for imme-
diate fuccour. The prompt arrival of this aid
alarmed Pazzaglia, who finding himfelf befieged
by a great number of foldiers, and not hearing the
bell of Montale, which he had ordered one of his
officers to ring, to aflemble the affiftance he ex-
pected from that and other places, he ventured out
of his habitation, clothed and armed like a fol-
VOL. III. ( dier

H4 Pijloia.

dier, and with a joyful countenance went to meet
his befieger, and demanding fafety for himfelf and
his foldiers, put himfelf into his hands. Montauto
received Pazzaglia with a fmiling countenance*
and knowing him to be humane, generous, and
polite, he knew not how to refufe his command.
1 hey both entered the Houfe in the Wood, where
they reirefhed thenifelves fo fplendidly, that
Montauto, admiring ftill more the gr.eatnefs of
foul of Pazzaglia, could not without tears conduct
him to the prefence of the duke. Cofimo had
enough of policy as well as generofity to receive
him like an intimate and confidential friend. He
took him to his moil confidential confultations,
and decided on no affair of ft ate without his
advice. The duke, perceiving that the ten noble
Piftoians, deftined to govern the city, had not
fulfilled the obligations enjoined upon them, nor
preferved good order, reftored the ufe of the
ancient offices of Podefta and commiflary. He
promoted to thefe offices men of moderation as
well as of fpirit, and thought by their means to
remedy all diforders ; but there flill remained
enough of the citizens inclined to quarrel, to keep
the city in tumults, and to vilify all juftice.

Niccolo Braccioli had infmuated himfelf into
favour with the duke, by having revealed to him a
confpiracy of the Salviati, Rodolfi, Strozzi, and
Valori, and was appointed to the command of
certain companies of infantry which were in gar-
rifon there. This officer, recollecting that Fran-
cefco Brunozzi had been averfe to include him
in the lad. truce made between the factions by the
mediation of the Florentines, conceived the defign
of taking a rough revenge of all the Brunozzi
family. For this purpofe he put himfelf at the
head of his adherents, collected a confiderable

body

Fioravanti. 115

body of armed men, befides thofe which Gio.
Collefi held concealed in his houfe ready for any
orders of Braccciolini, went through the city in
fearch of Brunozzi, and having found him, de-
prived him of his life. He proceeded to fet fire
to his houfe, and all the other houfes of the fami-
ly, but was obliged to get porTeflion of them at
the point of the fword. The Brunozzi made a
brave defence, but were inferior in numbers, and
three fons of Francefco were left dead, and the reft
fled to fome obfcure place. Not fatisfied with
this, Bracciolini proceeded to the country houfes
of the family, with a foldiery as tyrannical as him-
felf, and there committed all imaginable cruelty,
burning and deflroying every thing. For this
cruel revenge he was afterwards condemned to pay
to the furviving Brunozzi only two thoufand five
hundred ducats for damages. At the fame time
many exiles from Florence, defirous of depofing
from the throne of Tufcany the duke Cofimo de
Medici, in ordrr, as they pretended, to fet their
country at liberty, collected together at Miran-
dola four thoufand infantry, and three hundred
cavalry, and gave the command of them to Piero
Strozzi, who took for his colleague Baccio Va-
lori, and came with one divifion towards Piftoia,
and halting at Montemurlo, waited for the reft of
the army. The party of the Cancellieri, who
there expected them, received them with tranf-
ports of joy ; and having repaired the fortifica-
tions, and furnifhed the cattle with every neceflary,
they all, being fifteen hundred men in number,
thought of nothing elfe but doing infinite rhif-
chief to the party of the Panciatichi. They
burned Satornana, Valdibura, Uzzo, and Capo di
Strada, carrying off from all places a rich booty.
Making no account of the government of Flo-
rence,

n 6 Piftoia.

rence, the Cancellieri made all their efforts to re-
enter Piftoia, and the exiles from Florence had no
other view than to deliver their country from the
government of the Medici ; fo that all were
agreed to aflemble men, provide arms, and col-
lect money, that they might be able by force to
wreft the command from the duke Cafimo. That
fovereign informed of this, and that thofe in rebel-
lion againft him were with much folicitude forti-
fied, every day increafed in force, and did very
great damage, ordered Alexander Vitelli, Otto
da Montauto, and Piero Pipicciano, that in the
night they mould depart from Florence with their
troops, with three thoufand Spaniards, and two
regiments of Germans, and go to the afTault of
Montemurlo : and that the force of the enemy
might be diverted and difunited, he ordered the
captain Frederick da Montauto, then in Piftoia,
to unite the force of his companies with thofe of
the party of the Panciatichi ; and the fame night,
with cries and fires fpread terror in the neighbour-
hood of Montemurlo, that the party of the Can-
cellieri might be neceflitated to abandon it. The
party of the Panciatichi, adhering in all things to
the will of the duke, united with the forces of Fre-
derick da Montauto, and in a dark night fet all in
an uproar the country of Alliana, and from thence
went to burn the houfes of the abbey of Pacciana.
* Setting fire to a multitude of ricks of hay and flacks
of corn belonging to the common people, they
•con ft rained the captain Bati Rofpigliofi, the cap-
tain Francefco Gattefchi, the captain Francefco
Arferuoli, the captain Luca<jiacomeltt, with many
others of the exiles, to abandon Montemurlo and
the neighbouring places, to go and fuccour their
factionaries of the abbey at Pacciana. A fevere
obftinate battle enfued, in which, in the end,

the

*

Fioravantt. 1 1 7

the Panciatichi were fuperior, with the death of
fixty perfons of both parties, among whom were
numbered the captain Mattana, with five foldiers
of Cutigliano, who were enough to put in. doubt
the vi&ory. The head of Mattana was carried to
Piftoia, and, amidft the exultations and rejoicings
of his adverfaries, carried to the piazza as a fpec-
tacle to all. This detachment of the exiles being
at break of day, the id of Auguft, 1537, defeated,
Vitelli and Montauto, knowing that the principal
heads of the rebels were in the caftle, went to the
attack of Montemurlo, and finding it in all parts ill
manned, they animated their people, and afiaulted
the fortrefs, which, after a refiftance of five hours,
was carried. Pietro Strozzi, attempting to make
his efcape, fell into the hands of the befiegers ; a
thoufand men of both parties were flain, and Phil-
lip Strdzzi, Baccio Valori, Francefco degli Al-
bizzi, and many others, were conducted prifoners
to Florence, where, as rebels both to the date and
the empire, they were put to death. This was
the eftablifhment and the bafis of the grandeur of
Cofimo the Firfl de Medici, who afterwards, on
the 3oth of September, obtained a mod ample
diploma of the emperor Charles the Fifth. Upon
this memorable viclory the Pifloians congratulated
the duke with an excefs of joy by their ambaffa-
dors ; and the party of the Panciatichi, who had
rendered all poflible affiftance, recollecting that the
Cancellieri of the Houfe in the Wood had taken
refuge in the parifli church of Cutigliano, when
that place was facked by the captain Vincenzo di
Poggio, and the proud towers which were there
were ruined to the foundation, they now haf-
tened with fuch ferocity to the afiault of that
church, that, after a long and good defence, the
befieged, without hope of fuccour, furrendered at

difcretion

tiS . Plftma.

difcretion to their enemie«, who uniting with thofe
of Valdibura, of Cireglio, and of Uzzo, their ad-
herents, burned of the Cancellieri more than thir-
teen hundred houfes in the commons of Bigiano,
in the abbey of Pacciana,in Chiazzano, Satornana,
Calamecca, Crefpole, and Lanciole.

The, emperor preparing in Lombardy for bat-
tle againft Francis the Firft, king of France, and
relying on the valour of Piero Strozzi, general of
the Italian infantry, the Pifloians were agitated
with fears, and made great preparations for de-
fence.

The controverfy between Piftoia and Lucca,
about the boundary between them near Pupillio,
being adjufted, the duke Cofimo was defirous of
eftablifhing the peace of the city ; and for this
object, with menaces and efficacious admonitions,
he did not ceafe to prefs the obftinate citizens to
fubmit to a regular life, and reduced their affairs
for once to good order and a ftate of tranquillity :
but as the Piftoians, in their unbalanced ftate,
had no other confolation than to (land immerfed
in diffentions, quarrels, and difcords, they gave no
attention to the fovereign councils, but went on
more tumultuous, wicked, and feditious, deftroy-
ing the good order of government, reducing every
fhing without controul, to the advantage of their
private interefts, and the wantonnefs of their wild
caprices*. The indignation of the duke was at
laft excited againft thefe obftinate brains, whom
he thought it his duty to tame, by taking from
them all the honours, public offices, and reve-
nues of the city, as well as the inftitutions of
charity, and to fhut up the palace, the refidence of

* Sempre piu tumultuanti, e facinorofi, e feditiofi, qucf-
tando il buon ordin£ del governo, riducevano quello, fanza
freno, ai vantaggi dei propri intereffi, e difordinati capricci.

the

Fioravanti 119

the fupreme magistrates. With this view he
ele&ed four commifiaries for the affairs of Piftoia,
and gave them full authority to fulfil his determi-
nation. All this was ordained and eftablifhed at
the inftigation of certain citizens of Piftoia, and
rendered vain all the efforts of the people : fmce,
by the tenor of the fovereign command, all the
magistracies and offices of the citywerefupprefled,
and the adminiftration of all the revenues and in-
ftitutions of charity was configned to Taddeo
Guiducci, and Chriftopher Ranieri, with the title
of Proveditors General, who received into their
poffeffion all the moveables of the bublic palace,
and the fupreme magistrates who had refided in it
were difmifled. Six citizens were deputed, with
the title of Proveditors of the Commons, to whom
the palace was committed : thefe, with the red-
dent commiflary, and not otherwife, aflembled to
treat of the affairs of their city. Thefe having
held the office a certain time, it was permitted to
the Pifloians to draw fix fubje&s from a purfe
deftined to that ufe ; but the duke apprehending
that thefe new regulations would excite infurrec-
tions, he fent a body of foldiers only three hun-
dred and fifty in number, to difarm the citizens,
and rein-in the feditious and the wicked ; ampli-
fied the fortifications, and furnifhed them with
every neceflary. — Many of the Piftoians now con-
fidered themfelves as flaves, and thought their
nobility debafed by the privation of all the ho-
nours, public offices, and revenues : they thought
it inconfiftent with the dignity of their blood to
lead a life fo obfcure and inglorious : many
therefore retired from the city, and went to inha-
bit in other places ; hence the city was in dan-
ger of depopulation, became defective in many
arts of convenience and neceffity, and nothing

was

Piftoia.

was beared but fighs, groans, and lamentation^
The few inhabitants who remained, knowing the
great damage which had refulted to their coun-
try from this refolution of the duke, were never
fatislied with venting their reproaches and curfes
againft thole who had advifed it ; and they would
have attempted more fuch great things as com-
pofe the whofe hiftory of their country, if many
had not been difheartened by the rigour of the
new government.

' All the foldiers in garrifon at Piftoia being,
in obedience to the orders of the fovereign, gone,
with all thofe in the flate of Florence, to make
their honours and acclamations on the happy
marriage of the duke Cofimo with Leonora, the
daughter of don Peter of Toledo, marquis of
Villa Franca, and viceroy of Naples, the Cancel-
lieri efteemed the opportunity convenient to rife
and take vengeance on the Panciatichi. As all
the foldiers and many of the citizens, were gone
to Florence, the Cancellieri, refolved to enter the
city in the night, and kill all the Panciaitchi*
without pardoning or fparing one,' that there
might not remain the lead memorial of them.
They hired people from various places, of every
quality, and fome of the moft brave, intrepid, and
defperate ; and having gained over to their party
many in the city, that they might, at a critical
.moment, open the gates, they introduced, in
fmali numbers at «a time, many of their moft def-
perate men, and quartered them, in perfect fecrecy,
in the houfcs of their adherents and partifans.
They elected for their captain Gio. Tonti, who
entered the fervice in the night of the ifth of
June, and put in order more than four hundred
foldiers, and marched with them to the gate of
St.;Mark5 at Piftoia, where the walls were loweft.

gave

Fioravanti. 121

gave the concerted fignal to thofe within, that
with their knowledge he might enter the city
unknown to their enemies. At the fignal of
Tonti, thofe who were upon" the walls let down
fuddenly one of their men, with orders to fay to
thofe without, that they had waited for hours, and
becaufe day approached, many had retired to their
houfes for fear of a difcovery ; and that therefore
it would be advifable to delay the enterprize till
the next night. Hearing this, Tonti fent imme-
diately one of his aids to defire thofe upon the
walls not to depart, and inftantly confulting his
colleagues, he found but one for waiting till the
next night. Tranfported with impatience, Tonti
at once cried out to his foldiers, " Now is the
" time to mew our courage !" and placing a
ladder againfl the wall, mounted to the top, and
haftily moving his ladder to come near a certain
ftone, in order to leap out upon the wall, he fell
with it into the ditch. His people hearing the
noife of his fall, but not feeing, by reafon of the
thicknefs of the air, what had happened, they
fufpected that they were difcovered, and that
Tonti had been repulfed by the contrary party.
Thofe therefore who, had afcended on other lad-
ders turned back, and gave themfelves to flight,
very few remaining for the defence of Tonti ;
among thefe the mod fpirited and the mod faith-
ful prefled to fee what had happened, and difco-
vered Tonti, with one thigh broken, halfdea'din
the ditch': understanding the truth from him,
they placed him on a ladder, and with the aflift-
ance of his brother, carried him to a houfe in the
neighbourhood as a place of fecurity. In this
unfortunate circumftance, Simon Gattefchi, and
Philip Ghelardini, perfons of great zeal and
activity, prepared to carry on the enterprize.
R Confiding

122 Piftoia.-

Confiding much in the afliftance of thofe in the
city, they haftened early, with thirty followers, to
the gage of St. Mark, and rinding it open, entered
the city, and marched to the piazza. As many
of the Panciatichi as they found they killed,
which raifed a great uproar in the city, and inti-
midated the people fo much, that all retired to
their habitations. The heads of the Panciatichi
obferving that the rioters were very few, and that
none in the city gave them affiftance, took cou-
rage, and making, by order of the commiffary, a
hafty collection of men, they began with thefe to
purfue the others with fo much fpirit, that fome of
them fled out of the city, went towards Cireglio
and Cavinana, there made a rich prey, and efcap-
<rd into Lombardy. Others were taken and fe-
verely punilhed, and afterwuads all the accom-
plices of the confpiracy were by a public procla-
mation declared rebels : thus ended the tumult.
The commiflary afterwards ordered to be arrefted
many of the Cancellieri party, which was about
fifty in number, held them three months in prifon,
put fome of them to the torture, by which he
difcovered the truth of the fact, and then fet all
at liberty, without condemning any.'

All contradiction and opposition being fuppref-
fed, and the harveft being plentiful, the Piftoians
thought no felicity fuperior to theirs, and they
thought it lawful to forget the paft by immerfing
themfelves in a lea of pleafures, by the allurements
of which they were feduced into a very vicious and
expenfive life.

Cofimo acknowledged that the privation of
honours and offices had decreafed the population
of the city,diminimed commerce and the revenue,
and therefore efteemed it his intereft, as well as
that of the public, that the .city mould be reftored

to

Fioravanti. 123

to its primitive ftate. On the 3<Dth of March,
1547, he granted in favour of the Piftoians, all
the honours and public offices, and all the pri-
vileges, which were eitablifhed in the year 1496,
in the convention with the Florentines. The
purfes were foon formed of the ufual magiftrates,
and all the perfons worthy of that pre-eminence
and thofe honours had their names imborfed, and
the fubjects were drawn with univerfal rejoicings.

The reprefentatives of the factions of Cancel-
lieri, under the name of Dormentoni, and thofe
of the Panciatichi, under that of Rifoluti, made by
fome among the fports and (hows of the Carnival,
•with habits and ornaments proper to that age,
excited fome injurious words and confufions, of
fo ferious a nature, that there was great danger of
reviving the ancient animofities and infurreclions :
but the duke Cofimo caufed to be arrefted the in-
ventors of thofe mafquerades, intimidated their
followers, and reftored the public tranquillity ;
and, to make the greater impreflion on the people,
and fecure their quiet for the future, he puniftied
the prifoners in an exemplary manner.

The government continued abfolute in the fa-
mily of Dedici till the year 1737, when, upon the
death of John Gafton the Firft, the laft grand
duke of that family, without iflue, the family
became extinct. Don Carlos, king of Naples, in
his own name, and Philip the Fifth,king of Spain,
not only in his own name, but alfo in the name of
the infant don Philip, and don Louis, and the other
fons whom he might have by the queen of Spain,
renounced all right and pretence, which they or
their defcendants might have, to the fucceflion of
the grand dukedom of Tufcany, and transferred
all fuch rights, actions, or pretences, to Francefco
di Leopoldo, duke of Lorrain and Bar, his heirs

and

124 Plftola.

and fucceffors ; and Piftoia foon fwore allegiance
to the new fovereign. And here ends another
mofl fplendid example of the bleflings and feli-
cities of a republic without three orders forming
a mutual balance ! — It is quite unneceflary to
excite the reientment, or flatter the Vanity, of any
individuals or families in America, by mentioning
their names : but if you begin at New-Hampihire,
and proceed through all the ftates to Georgia, you
will at once be able to fix your thoughts upon
fome five or fix families in each (late, fome two
of whom will, in the courfe of fifty years, perhaps
of five (unlefs they are retrained by an indepen-
dent executive power, three independent branches
in the legislature, and an independent judicial
department) be able to divide the ftate into two
parties, one generally at the head of the gentle-
men, the other of the fimplemen, tear one another
to pieces, and rend the vitals of their country with
as ferocious animofity, as unrelenting rancour and
cruelty, as ever actuated the Cancellieri and the-
Panciatichi in Piftoia. And it will not be the
fault ofthefe individuals or. families ; they will
not be able to avoid it, let their talents or virtues
be what they may : their friends, connections, and
dependents, will Simulate and urge them forward,
by every provocation of flattery, ridicule and me-
naces, until they plunge them into an abyfs, out of
which they can never rife : — It will be entirely the
fault of the conftitution, and of the people who will
not now adopt a good one : it will be the misfor-
tune of thofe individuals and families as much as
of the public ; for what confolation can it be to a
man, to think that his whole life, and that of his
ion and grandfoh, mud be fpent in unceafing
mifery and warfare, for the fake only of a poflibi-
lity that his great grandfon may become a defpot !

LETTER

C 135 ']

LETTER $'

CREMONA.

Dear Sir,

/CREMONA had preferved under the go-
V_v4 vernment of confuls until 1180, when (he
changed the form of her government, reducing all
the authority of the confuls to one perfon alone,
who, from the fupreme power which was given
him, was denominated a podefta. The elections
of confuls had occafioned fuch contefts among the
principal families (as none could be elected to
that dignity who were not citizens) that it was
now ordained by law, that none mould be elected
to the office of podefta who was not a foreigner,
and a citizen of any other city, a,s mould be
agreeable to the council, provided he was not
related by blood to any of the electors, had a
real eftate in the city or country, and was. arrived
at leaft to thirty-fix years of age : and, above all
things, they fought for men of prudence and moft
eminent reputation, to whom, as foon as they
were elected, they fent letters by a public order,
praying them to accept the dignity offered them ;
and on the day when they made their entry into
the city, with a public concourfe and acclamations,
they -were by the whole people fotemnly met and
received. They carried in ceremony the enfigns
of their authority, the furred cap, the long fword,
the rod, and the fceptre* : and becaufe for the

* II capello, et il ftovo, et la verga, o fcettro,

mod

126 Cremona.

moft part they were men of military talents, as
\vell as fkilful in the laws, they concluded with
them judges expert in the legal fcience, by whofe
means they heard and tried all caufes civil and
criminal,, and affembled the council when it was
neceffary. After this change of magiftracy from
confuls to a podefta, which, however, was of fhort
duration and little (lability, fuch was their in-
conftancy, that they created fometimes a podefta,
fometimes confuls, and at other times both con-
fuls and a podefta together ; and there occurred
to the ilate and republic of Cremona many and
very great difturbances.

Cremona, in 1183, fent her ambafifadors to
Placentia, where were aflembled all the ambaf-
fadors of the other cities of Lombardy, Marca,
and Romagna, together with the ambaffadors of
the emperor, and king Henry his fon, in May.
At this afiembly it was concluded, that all the
cities mould fend their ambafladors to the diet of
Conftance, a principal city of Germany, to eftablifh
the peace negociated between the emperor and
the cities. The twenty-fifth of June, 1183, was
eftablimed, ratified, and confirmed, that peace,
fo folemn and fo celebrated, which, from the
name of the city where it was made, was called
the peace of Conftance ; a correft copy of which
treaty is to be found at the end of the fourteenth
book of Sigonius, of the kingdom of Italy*.

Such was the inftability of the government, that
the city returned, in 1190, to the adminiftmtion
of confuls.

They in the next year elected a podefta again,
who led them out to war, but was unfortunate,
and this made them weary of a podefta ; and the

* Muratori, Annal. anno 1183.

next

.

Campo. 127

next year they created confuls, and confuls were
annually elected until 1195, when they returned
to a podefta. All this is perfectly natural : the
people were diftrefled<by the conteft of the prin-
cipal families when they had confuls,, and there-
fore wi fried to* have a foreigner as a podefta to
keep them in order. The principal families,
however, ftruggled for confuls, that they might
have the rule ; and one party prevailed this year,
and the other the next.

The confuls, in 1198, to fupply the city with
water, dug a well, and built a conduit of water,
which was afterwards called the Murmur, from
the complaints of the people againft the expence
of it, which were fo great, that they rofe in tu-
mults, and infifted in choofing a podefta. Cre-
mofmo Oldrino was accordingly appointed, and
governed jointly with the confuls to the end of the
year.

Any one may purfue at his leifure the particu-
lars of the changes from confuls to podefta, and
from podefta to confuls, till the year 1 209, when,
upon the appointment of confuls, there arofe dif-
cords and civil feditions, which brought the re-
public to the brink of ruin. The city became
divided as it were into two, by a rivulet that
paflfes through it ; on one fide it was called the
New City, and on the other the Old, though all the
popular men of the old city joined with the new :
in fhort, the divifion was between the gentlemen
and the populars at bottom. The new city arofe
in tumults, and were joined by all but the gentle-
men in the old, made new magistrates and go-
vernors, and congregated together to conftitute a
new general council at Sant' Agata.

The old city and the new, each, made its
podefta, and many quarrels and civil wars fol-
lowed

Cremona.

lowed ; and the hatred between perfons and par-
ties increafing, as if they had not been born in,
the fame city, but had been mod cruel enemies,
they foaked the bofom of* their common mother '
with blood, and had no mercy on her houfes or
riches, which they confumed by fire. But with
much pains and interceflions of the biihop, a
peace was made, by which the podefta of the new
city fubmitted to the podefta of the old, and
fwore obedience to him, with this refervation, how-
ever, that he was to be podefta of the people.

The civil war was renewed in 1211, between
the citizens of the old and the new city. The
two factions proceeded to a fharp conflict, and
after having killed an infinite number of citizens,
thofe of the old city fet fire to the houfes in the
neighbourhood of the fcene of action, and con-
furned every thing in them. The year before
Otto had been excommunicated by Innocent,"
the pope, and deprived of the empire, and Frede-
rigo Rogerio, was elected in his place : for this
reafon the Cremonefe went this year in favour of
the marquis of Efte, and drove out of Ferrara
Uguccione de Guarnefi, who was podefta there in
the name of Otto.

In 1 2 1 2 civil difcords were fomewhat appeafed,
and confuls were appointed. The wars between
Cremona, and Milan, and Piacentia, may be read
by thofe who are curious, but are not to our pur-
pofe. They lafted till 1217, in the beginning of
which year civil difcords and feditions increafed,
becaufe the people could not agree in creating the
magiftrates ; and it was not till after a long
delay, and the interpolation of the pope, with
apoftolical exhortations by letter, that they were
perfuaded to lay afide their hatreds and difcords,
fo far as to appoint a podefta.

In

Campc. 129

In £221 the mod terrible difcords and civil
wars, between the gentlemen and the common
people in Placentia, were accommodated for a
time, tinder the mediation of Sozzo Coglioni,
podefta of Cremofla. The fubftance of the peace,
to which each party fwore, was to lay afide their
difcords and contentions, and forgive the injuries,
damages, and mifchiefs, mutually committed
and received. But of what avail are oaths and
treaties, which the nature of man and the form of
the government will not permit to be obferved ?

This year two noble citizens of Cremona were
made, one after the other, podeftas of Placentia.

In the beginning of the year 1229 the difcords
among the citizens prevailed fo far, that they creat-
ed confulSj and thofe only for fix months ; and
this year there was a confederacy of Verona, Mo-
dena, and Parma, againfl Cremona.

There arofe, in 1232, in the city of Cremona,
feditions and civil wars.

The Cremonefe united with the popular party
in Placentia, in favour of whom Uberto Pallavi-
cino, from Cremona, went with an hundred light-
horfe, to oppofe the noble exiles.

The Milanefe and Brefcians, joining the noble
exiles from Placentia, went with a powerful army
againft Cremona, and deformed the whole coun-
try with blood and fire.

In the year 1 242 began to take root in Cre-
mona thofe abominable and pernicious factions of
Guelphs and Ghibellines, and infected it to fuch
a degree, as occafioned an infinite expence of the
blood of the citizens, an ineftimable deftrudion
of wealth, an unfpeakable perdition of families,
and a moft melancholy and miferable ruin of the
country.

VOL. III. S The

130 , Cremona,

The city was, in 1246, divided between the two
factions ; but the Ghibellines had the majority, and
obtained the appointment of a podeita. This
year the emperor Frederick was excommunicated
by the pope and council at Lyons, in France, and
Henry duke of 1 huringia was elected.

The two factions daily increafed in violence.
The old city, that is the gentlemen, were favour-
ers of the Ghibellines, and adherents of Frederick,
the fchifmatical emperor ; and the new city, that
is the common people, were partifans of the
Guelphs, who adhered to the holy fee. The
bloody wars occafioned by this divifion, between
Frederick and Innocent, and their refpe&ed fol-
lowers, you will read at your leifure, and you
will laugh at the terrible difgrace of Cremona in
the lofs of their triumphial chariot, an infamy
which none but the gentlemen could obliterate*
The marquis Uberto, Pallavicino, a mod powerful
man, and of great reputation, but a zealous Ghi-
belline and old-city-man, was appointed podefta :
he fought a memorable battle, made two thoufand
prifoners, retook the carroccio, and returned in
triumph to Cremona.

Campo begins his third book in the manner of
Machiavel, with deep, grave, and formal reflec-
tions, as if a diverfity of fentiments, contradictory
principles, inconfiftent interefls, and oppofite paf-
lions among the citizens, could be reconciled and
united by declamations againft difcord and pane-
gyrics upon unanimity, without a balance, in a
government pofieffed of fufficient force. Difunion
of the citizens is, indeed, according to him, the
worft evil in a city ; for what mortal peftilence
can bring upon them greater damage than dif-
cord ? This not only precipitate* noble and illuf-

trious

Camps. 131

trious families to ruin, but exterminates powerful
and famous cities : nor is there any principality or
kingdom fo (table or well founded that it may not
be torn up by fa&ions. If this is true, it is (till an
argument againft constituting a city in fuch a man-
ner that it muft neceffarily be deftroyed by factions.
All things are maintained and increafed by concord,
and go to ruin by difunion ; union brings vi&ory,
and difcord defeat : enemies are eafily refifted
when you agree among yourfelves ; when the
members are difunited from the body, the perfon
lofes both ftrength and beauty. When Cyrus
divided the Euphrates into three hundred rivulets,
a child might ford the largeft of them, though
his favourite had been drowned in attempting the
united water. Italy, the lady and the queen of
the world, after infinite conflagrations, facks,
flaughters, pillages, fubverfions, and ruins, has
finally been degraded, by the difcords of her fons,
into a fervant and a handmaid. All this may be
true ; but how long will republicans be the dupes
of their own fimplicity i how long will they
depend upon fermons, prayers, orations, declama-
tions, in honour of brotherly love, and againft dif-
cords,when they know that,without human means,
it is but tempting and infulting Providence, to
depend upon them for the happinefs of life, or the
liberty of fociety !-— ^The city of Cremona, to come
to the prefent point, by its difcords and divifions,
fuffered intolerable evils, and ultimately loft her
liberty, falling under the power and domination of
Uberto Pallavicino : who, taking the opportunity
from the controverfies, which went on every day
increafing among citizens, difunited and divided
into divers factions of new city and old, gentle-
men and common people, Guelphs and Ghibellines,

of

132 Cremona.

of Capelletti, of Barbarafi, and of Maltraverfi, in
the year 1251, from podefta, made himfelf abfolute
lord, patron, and mailer, of the commonwealth,
by the affiftance of the Ghibellines, who in the
old city were very numerous and powerful.

Sozzo Viftarino, a principal nobleman of the
city of Lodi, maintained, as a guard of his perfon,
a company of foldiers from Cremona : but the
whole family of Viftarino being foon afterwards
banifhed and expelled by the people of Lodi,
pope Innocent endeavoured to negociate their
reiteration. But the people would accept of no
conditions of peace until Milan and Cremona
made war upon them, and unitedly compelled the
people of Lodi to receive the Viftarino into their
city. At the end of the fame year the marquis
Pillavicino, at the requifition of the people of
Placentia againft their noble exiles, went, with
many ceremonies, to the fiege of Rivergaro, to
which thofe nobles had retired.

The Cremonians about Rivergaro, in 1252,
compelled the noble exiles of Placentia to fur-
render, and their caftles and lands were deftroyed.
Pellavicino, not content with having made himfelf
mafter of Cremona, or rather or the old city,
afpired to the dominion of Placentia, and to this
end gave trouble enough to the podefta of that
city. While Pallavicino was mafter of the old
city, his rivals Boflio Dovara, firft, and Azzolno
Dovara, of the fame family, were fucceffively
made lords of the' new city.

Uberto Pallavicino, in 1253, was by the Pla-
centians created podefta of that city : but as the
affairs of Cremona were in a critical and fluc-
tuating pofture, he left a vice-prodefta at Pla-
centia.

The

Campo. 133

The marquis Pallavicino, having arranged af-
fairs as he would in Crimona, returned to Placen-
tia in 1254, and, by favour of the Ghibellines,
was created perpetual governor and lord of that
city.

Uberto Pallavicino, with the Ghibellines of
Cremona and Placentia, went to the afliftance of
Ezelino of Romagna, the mod cruel of tyrants,
and confederating with him againft the Man-
touans, configned to fire and Iword the whole
territory, and laid fiege to the city for three
weeks, and would have taken it, if the marquis of
Efte, and the Bolognefe, had not come to its
relief.

A kind of triumvirate was formed between Ez-
zelino, Pallavicino, and Dovara, who afpired at
the domination of Lombardy.

The triumvirate difagfeed, and a new league
was formed between Palavicino, Dovara, Azzone
marquis of Efte and Ancona, Louis count of
Verona, Ferrara, and Padoua, on the one part,
againft Ezzelino. The particulars of the war,
and the fuccefs of Pallavicino againft Ezzelino,
the conqueft of Breffia, and the fubfequent perfe-
cutions of the Guelph party in that kingdom, may
be omitted; but in the year 1260 the rage of
factions and feditions were fo diftrelfing to all
the cities, that there arofe a new fpecies of pilgri-
mage and penitence, whofe object was to reftore
peace among the parties, and obtain the return of
the exiles to their -proper cities. The number of
thefe pious and charitable people grew to be pro-
digious in Tufcany, Romagna, and Lombardy,
and very auftere were there penitence, and very
affecting their cries of " Mercy! mercy!" Palla-
vicino was alarmed, and prohibited, under fevere
penalties, thefe kind of pilgrimages in Cremona

and

134 Cremona.

and Breflia, becaufe he feared they would prove
the ruin of thofe feditions and divifions by which
he maintained the domination of thefe cities. He
grew proud and infolent, plundered the biihopric,
and drove the bifliop into exile.

Palavicino having recovered the city of Placen-
tia by means of the Ghibellines, went with a no-
ble company of Cremonians, and eftablifhed a
government, making podefta, Vifconte Pallavicina,
a fon of one of his brothers.

Gandione Dovara, a noble Cremonefe, was, in
the name of Pallavicino, podefta of Placentia ;
but the Guelph exiles making an infurrection, he
was driven out with his garrifon. Pallavicino be-
gan at this time to be uncommonly jealous of Boflio
Dovara.

Pallavicino fell into a controverfy with Philip
della Torre, and detained in Cremona all the
merchants of Milan, with their effects, pretending
that Philip was his debtor, for having given him
affiftance, with his Cremonefe foldiers, to recover
the caftle of Arona, occupied by Ottone Vifconte,
archbifhop of Milan.

Pallavicina, in 1266, grew odious, and the
factions of the Barbarafi, as well as the Ghibel-
lines, had plundered the church, fo that the city
was laid under an interdict ; and the pope's nun-
cios had influence enough with the people to pro-
duce a revolution, a depofition of Pallavicino,
and a reftoration of all the exiles, by the general
council.

After the depofition of Pallavicino, Boflio Do-
vara occupied the dominion of Cremona; for,upon
the return of Amatino Amati, the proper head of
the contrary faction, from exile, Dovara, with his
followers, were driyen out of the city ; but he
went only to Placentia, and there held the domi-
nion*

Campo.

nion, and appointed to the government a podefta,
Gerardino Dovara, a relation.

Uberto Pallavicino having loft the lordfhip of
the principal cities of Lombardy, died miferably
in his Sifalgio caftle, in which he was befieged by
the Parmefans and Placentians.

Boflio Dovara, with the Ghibelline exiles from
Cremona, went in favour of Napoleone della
Torre, againft his enemies at Lodi. This year
they began in Cremona to create captains of the
people.

Pontio Amato, a citizen of Cremona, being
podefta of Milan, was killed in a battle between
the Torriani, and Ottone Vifconte, archbifhop of
Milan.

The Torriani having taken Crema, fet fire to
it. The Cremonefe of the Guelph faction gave
affiftance to thofe of Torre, againft Ottone and
the other Vifconti, with whom were Boflio Dova-
ra of the Ghibelline faction, who prepared em-
ployment enough to the Torriani.

The Cremonefe and Parmefans, defirous of ef-
facing the memory of the injuries done them in
times paft, reftored their triumphal chariot of
the podefta, which had been laid afide. Great
joy was difcovered upon this occafion, and the
two cities entered into a ftric~t confederation with
the Modenefe and Reggians, and the marquis of
Efte. The principal article of this league was,
that they mould affift the inhabitants of Lodi, who
were molefted by the Milanefe, who favoured the
party of the Vifconti, of which the marquis of
Monferrato was captain. Boflio Dovara, and
Gabrino di Monza, who were alfo of the faction of
the Vifconti, entered into Crema with four hun-
dred foldiers on horfeback, and as many on foot,
the Guelphs having fled.

The

136 Cremona.

The Torriani being exiled from Lodi, took
refuge in Cremona, and at the fame time Bofiio
Dovara, fallying out from Crema, took by ftrata-
gem Soncino and Romanengo, caflles in the ju-
rifdi&ion of Cremona. The Cremonefe of the
Gueiph faction, then dominant, fearing that their
affairs would grow worfe, alfembled their army,
and called a diet of the cities their confederates.
The ambaffadors therefore of Placentia, Reggio,
Parma, Modena, Brefcia, Bologna, and Ferrara,
affembled at Cremona ; and the marquis of Efle
came in perfon. Florence, and the other cities of
Tufcany, offered to lend their aid : the fame offer
was made by John Appiano, procurator of Ro-
maga. They fent alfo a noble embaffy to the
pope, to inform him of the fttuation of affairs in
Lombardy, and in how much danger were the
cities affectionate to his highnefs. Ottone Vif-
conte perceiving thefe movements, entered into a
clofer league with the marquis of Monferrato, and
collecting as many armed men as they could,
marched out with the triumphal chariot of Milan,
and united with Bofiio Dovara. The Cremonefe
conducted their army, now very powerful by the
additions of the confederates, partly to Caflellione,
and partly to Paderno, caftles of Cremona ; and
while the two armies flood fronting each other,
they began to treat of peace, which was finally
concluded, by means of the ambaffadors of Pla-
centia and Brefcia. The conditions of this peace
were, that all the cities mould expel each others
exiles. Ottone Vifconte eafily complied with the
conditions of this convention, becaufe he had
already conceived no fmall jealoufy of the marquis
of Monferrato, and a mod violent hatred againft
Bofiio Dovara, who, being excluded from this
confederation and peace, and having too much

confidence

Campo* \yj

confidence in himfelf, refufed to furrender Soncino
and Romanengo. The Cremonefe therefore call-
ed another diet, who fent an army and expelled
him, not only from thofe two caftles, but from
Crema. William and Ugoliao Rofli, noble and
moll powerful citizens of Perma, having contract-
ed marriage, the firft with Donella Carrara, of the
fignori of Padoua, and the other with Elena Ca-
valcabo, of the family of the marquis of Viadana,
thefe cities had made peace, and were full of re-
joicings on the union.

William, marquis of Monferrato, having made
war upon Ottone Vifconte, archbifhop of Milan,
the Cremonefe fent fome companies of foldiers to
his affiftance. At this time the triumphal chariot
began to be difufed, as very inconvenient in bat-
tle: they retained only the general ftandard in
white, with a red crofs, to which Ottone, who
was the firft to ufe it, added the image of St.
Ambrofe.

A peace was concluded, in 1286, between the
Vifconte, the archbiftiop, and the exiles of Milan.

The numerous family of Sommi had a con-
firmation of certain rights, anciently granted to the
family by the bifhop of Cremona*

A new confederation was formed, in 1288, be-
tween Ottone Vifconte, archbilhop of Milan, and
the cities of Cremona, Pavia, Placentia, Brefcia,
Genoa, and Afto, againft the marquis of Monfer-
rato : but the marquis of Monferrato having
made himfelf fovereign lord of Pavia, a new diet
was aflfembled at Cremona, and another confedera-
tion formed.

Matthew Vifconte, who by Adolphus, king of
the Romans, had been declared Imperial vicar of
the city of Milan, called a diet in that city, to
deliberate on a war againft the Torriani. The am-

VOL. III. T baffadors

13$ Cremona.

bafladors of Cremona were there, and promifed tc*
fend their forces to the aid of Vifconte : but the
Torriani made no movement, and Vifconte did
not long hefitate to break with Cremona and
Lodi ; for, impatient to enrich his followers, he
began to difcover an intention to impofe taxes on
thofe cities. The Torriani too began to com-
plain, and were fupported by the patriarch of
Aquileia : the Torriani came to Cremona, and
began to prepare war againft Matthew Vifconte.

The Torriani removed from Cremona to Lodi,
where they met many of their friends, and foon
received the news that Matthew Vifconte had taken
Caftellione from the Gremonefe : the Torriani,
with fome foldiers from Cremona and Lodi, and a
grofs multitude of Milanefe exiles, their adherents,
went to meet Vifconte, but were attacked and
routed by him.

The ambafladors of Cremona, of the marquis of
Monferrato, of the marquis d'Efte, of Novara,
of Cafale, of Bergamo, and of Vercelli, all con-
gregated at Pavia, and made a league againft
Matthew Vifconte* The Cremonefe, not long
afterwards, with the marquis d'Efte, were routed
by Vifconte. This year, however, a peace was
concluded between Milan and Cremona, in which
no mention is made of Vifconte.

A league was made, in 1 302, between Cremona,
Placentia, and Pavia, and they chofe for their cap-
tain-general Alberto Scotto, then lord of Placen-
tia : thefe having hired a good body of foldiers,
and united with the Torriani, went under the walls
of Milan. Matthew Vifconte, feeing that he was
hated by his fellow-citizens, went out of Milan,
arid renounced all his authority to Scotto ; and
while they were treating of peace, the Torriani
entered Milan, and drove off Matthew and all his

partifans

Camfo. 1 39

partifans. After having expelled the Vifconti from
Milan, a new congrefs met at Placentia, of ambaf-
fadors from Cremona, Milan, Pavia, Lodi, Conio,
Novara, Vercelli, Tortona, Crema, Cafale, and
Bergamo, and concluded to hire, at the common
expence, and* for the common defence, a thoufand
horfe and a thoufand foot.

A tumult in Parma, in 1303, was occafioned by
an attempt of Giberto di Correggio to reftore the
Parmefan exiles. Giacopo Cavalcabo, lord of
Viadana, Amato, Perfcio, and Sommo, all noble
citizens of Cremona, and old friends of Correg-
gio, tranfported themfelves to Parma, were elected
arbitrators, and foon decided the controverfy in
favour of their friend Correggio. This year con-
troVerfies and enmity arofe between the Cremo-
nefe, and Alberto Scotto, lord of Placentia.

There was adietofconfederrate cities, in 1304,
againft Alberto Scotto. A powerful army was
collected, and the marquis of Monferrato, and the
inarquis of Saluzzo, were created captains ; and
having patted the Po, and taken many caflles
in the neighbourhood, laid fiege to Placentia :
but the Cremonians and Lodians, confidering the
danger they might be expofed to if that noble
and powerful -city mould fall into the hands of
the marquis of Monferrato, they began to with-
draw their troops. They were followed by thofe
of Pavia, and the others, and the army was dif-
perfed, and Placentia delivered from the fiege. A
new league was made againft Scotto, the head of
which was Vifconte Pallavicino; and the next
year the Torriani made themfelves mafters of Pla-
centia.

Giacopo Cavalcabo, a moft noble citizen of
Cremona, and lord of Viadana, a man of ingenui-
ty, and an elevated fpirit, was created podefta of

Milan .

\

Ir"

140 Creinona*

Milan. The Fulgofi, Scotti,and Palaflrelli, no-
ble families of Placentia, with the alliftance of
William Cavalcabo and the Cremonians, expelled
Lando and Vifconte Pallavicino from Placentia.

Guido della Torre, lord of Milan, made Perfico,
a noble Cremonian, podefta of that* city. This
year a controverfy arifmg between the Parmefans
and Giberto di Correggio, the Roffi, the Lupi,
and other noble exiles, who had taken refuge in
Cremona, were fummoned by their countrymen
to return ; and they inftantly obeyed, and carried
with them the afliflance of Tignaca Pallavicino,
who at that time was podefta of Cremona, and
the Cremonian foldiers, and having driven Cor-
reggio from Parma, Giacobo Cavalcabo was cre-
ated podefta of that city. A confederation was
alfo made between Guido della Torra and the
city of Cremona, to which Lodi, Bergama, Pla-
centia, and Crema, acceded.

Guiliano Sommo, a noble Cremonian, was made
podefta, and captain of the commons and people
of Placentia, for fix months, according to the c uf-
tom of thofe times.

Henry the Seventh, the emperor, came, at the
end of 1 3 1 o, into Italy to be crowned, and he called
together all the Ghibellines of Lombardy, among
whom Matthew Vifconte held the firft place. At
that time the authority and influence of William
Cavalcabo, brother of Giacopo, was fo great in
Cremona, that all public affairs were adminiftered
according to his will ; but as thefe brothers were
the heads of the Guelph faction, they were little
friendly to the emperor.

Cremona* in 1311, tafted more than ever the
bitter fruits of faclion, civil difcord, and unba-
lanced government, with which however, it had
been vexed and diftrefled for many years : it was

now,

Campo. 141

now, befides infinite profcriptions of property and
Daughter of citizens, upon the brink of total ruin
from Henry. Fachetto, marquis of CanoiTa, had
been fent with the title of Imperial vicar, but had
been refufed and expelled by the Guelphs, who
then had the dominion in Cremona : the em-
peror's indignation was excited, and he gave orders
to Matthew Vifconte to pafs the Adda, and aflault
Cremona with an army of Ghibellines, who col-
lecting together from every quarter, were increaf-
ed to a great number. The emperor himfelf,
with the emprefs his confort, departing from
Milan, removed to Lodi. Gulielmo Cavalcabo,
to whom had been given by the Guelphs the
abfolute dominion of Cremona, perceiving fuch
formidable preparations for war, knowing his own
city to be nearly divided into equal parties, and
having little confidence in his own faction, quitted
the city, and went to Viadana, followed by the
',Picenardi, Sommi, and Perfichi, with many others,
nobles and populars, his adherents : and the city
would have been wholly evacuated and abandoned,
if the citizens had not been diffuaded by Sopra-
monte Amato, who went into the middle of the
multitude, exhorted them to (lay, and throw
themfelves on the mercy of the emperor, whom he
painted as pious and clement, and offered himfelf
as one of the principal intercefibrs. The people
being comforted by his fpeech, it was ordered,
that two hundred of the principal men Ihould go
to meet Henry, who, hearing of the flight of Ca-
valcabo and his adherents, removed towards Cre-
mona, and was already arrived at Paderno, eight
miles diftant from that city ; there he was found
by the Cremonians, who had been fent with
Sopramonte Amato, who, in miferable habits, with
their heads uncovered, with naked feet, and cords

about

Cremona.

about theirnecks, when they came before theempe-
ror, fell upon their knees, and cried out, "Mercy!"
(mifericordia !) and, with tears and lamentations,
endeavoured to recommend themfelves and their
country to the clemency of the conquerer. Such
a fpeclacle of mifery might have moved to com-
panion the heart of cruelty itfelf : it had not,
however, the force to move in the fmalleft degree
to mercy the mod inhuman foul of Henry, who,
with a cruelty more than barbarous, rolling his
eyes another way, that he might not fee them,
commanded, with a voice of ferocity, that they
fhould be all fent to prifon ; which was inftantly
executed by his minifters, and they were foon
after put to death. Henry entered Cremona,
aflembled the council, and ordered that the walls
of the city mould be thrown down. This order
was executed : and Henry defired to have the
houfes demolifhed ; but at the prayer of fome
of his lords and barons, he was diverted from this
malicious purpofe ; but they could not hinder
many from being burned by Cremonian citizens,
who had been exiles for being of the Ghibelline
faction, and who fought every cruel method of
revenge for the injuries they had received. The
city was therefore filled with mifery ; the Te-
defques and Italians all robbed alike ; and nothing
was heard but violence, murder, rapine, and ex-
tortion. The mod rich were fure to be declared
guilty, and their eftates to be confifcated. — The
emperor at lad came to the public palace, and
caufed to be publimed a mod fevere fentence, in
which he condemned the Cremonians to pay an
hundred thoufand golden florins, confifcated the
public revenue, and ordered that the walls and
bulwarks of the city fbould be ruined, and the
ditches filled up. Thefe hard conditions were

accepted,

Campo. 1 43

accepted, and the obfervations of them fworn to by
Frederick Artezaga, fyndick of the commons of
Cremona, in whom was left the government of
the faction of Ghibellines, favoured and exalted
by the emperor, who now left one of his vicars,
and departed. The Guelphs, thus ill treated,
now concerted another confederation, and called
in to their aid Robert, king of Puglia : into this
league entered all the cities of Romagna and
Tufcany. The principal were Florence, Lucca, and
Siena ; and of thofe Lombardy, Bologna, Reg-
gio, and Parma, whofe fovereign Lord was Giberto
di Corregio. The Torriani, and the Cavalcabos,
with the reft of the Milanefe and Cremonian ex-
iles, joined the confederacy ; and all thefe uaited,
after having made themfelves mafters of the bridge
of Dofiblo over the Po, took alfo Cafalmaggiore,
driving out the Ghibellines*

William Cavalcabo, having learned that John
i-Caftiglione, podefta of Cremona, in the name of
the emperor, was gone with the militia to Pozzo-
boronzo, a place fubject to the Cremonians, in
which were fome Guelphs, taking advantage of this
opportunity, flies with admirable rapidity to Cre-
mona, and entering the city by the gate della
Mofa, arrived without oppofition to the Piazza,
where he was encountered by Galeazzo Vifconte,
and Manfredino Pallavicino ; but thefe not being
able to fuflain the impetuofity of the foldiers of
Cavalcabo, not without a great (laughter of Ghi-
bellines, among whom was flain Giacomo Rede-
nafco, they refigned themfelves to flight, and Ga-
leazzo faved himfeif in Crema. Soon afterwards,
as an infurre&ion was expe&ed in Cremona, Gi-
berto di Reggio went thither from Parma, where
he was received with tokens of the greatelt joy j
and having quieted with great prudence the con-

troverfies,

144

Cremona.

troverfies, he eftablifhed Cavalcabo in the lordfhip
of the city, making Quirico Sanvitale, his fon-in-
law, podefta. The inhabitants of Soncino having
alfo expelled the Imperial governor, furrendered to
Cavalcabo, who fearing that the enemy would
encamp at that poft, went thither fuddenly with
Venturino Benzone,head of the Guelphs of Crema,
and with Venturino Fondulo, one of the principal
men of Sqncino. The Barbufi, and other families
of Soncino, of the oppofite faction, having con-
veyed intelligence of this to the emperor, he gave
Soncino to the count Guarnero, his general in
Lombardy, who went and laid liege to the place.
There were in Soncino, befides trie Terrazzani,
the Guelphs of Cremona, Crema, and Bergamo ;
and with the count Guarnero, befides the Tedefque
troops, were the Ghibellines of Cremona, Berga-
mo, and Crema. The inhabitants of Soncino de-
fended themfelves on the firft aflault with great
activity, encouraged by the valour of Cavalcabo,. •
Benzone, and Fondulo ; but feized with a panic,
upon fome advantage gained by Galeazzo Vif-
conte, the foldiers, who came to their afliftance
from Cremona, abandoned fhamefully their de-
fence, and retreated into the houfes. Cavalcabo,
feeing fuch cowardice or treachery, confulted with
Benzone to get out of that place as foon as pof-
fible : collecting their foldiers in a compact body,
they rufhed into the midft of the enemy, combat-
ing with wonderful intrepidity ; but Cavalcabo
being killed, and Benzone, and Venturino Fon-
dulo, with his two fons, made prifoners, the Ghi-
bellines remained victorious. Benzone, falling
into the hands of the Ghibellines of Crema, was
miferably alfaflinated ; and Fondolo, with his two
fons, by the orders of Guarnero, were hanged
before the gate of Soncino. The news of this

defeat

Carnpo. 145

defeat filled Cremona with terror and confufion :
but Giberto Correggio, with a* company of Par-
mefans, coming in, their fears fubfided, and the
enemy having intelligence of this fuccour, had not
the courage to approach the walls. The Cremo-
nians, to recompenfe the benefit received from
Corregio, gave him the dominion of the city
for five years. The Guelphs took*Caftellione, in
which was Manfredino P^llavicino, who was made
prifoner : and Caftemovo, the mouth of the Adda i
to the Guelphs, was taken by the Ghibellines.

Paflarino della Torre had the government off
Cremona in 1313, with the title of vicar of Ro-
bert, ^ing of Puglia.

Giacopo Cavalcabo, marquis of Viadana, was, in
J3f5> by the common confent of the people,
elected to the dominion of Cremona. Ponzino de
Ponzoni, his brother-in-law, whether from private
envy or republican jealoufy, was enraged beyond
all meafure at this, and he ftirred up infurre&ions
againft Cavalcabo, many other noble families,
the Ponzoni, the Guazoni, the Amati, and the
Picenardi, who went out of Cremona, and made a
league with the Vifconte, and occafioned much
mifchief and ruin to their country, againft which
they took up arms.

Ponzino Ponzone, and all his adherents, having
made a league with Cane della Scalla, lord of
Verona, and with Paflarino Buona Com*, lord of
Mantoua, came to Cremona, and laid fiege to it ;
but by the valour of thofe within were repulfed ;
yet they 'did much damage in the territory. A
peace, or the appearance of a peace, between thofe
in the city and the exiles, was then made 5 and*by
common confent was deputed to the government
of the city Egidiolo Pipeiano, with the title of

VOL. III. U abbate

146

Cremona.

abbate of the people : and then the Ponzoni, with
their partifans, returned to the city.

The whole city, in 1317, arofe in arms, excited
by Giacopo and Luigi Cavalcabo, and Gregorio
Sommo, and others their partifans of the Guelph
faftion, with whom were the Brufati, lords of
Brefcia, with all their followers : thefe, entering
the great piazza of Cremona, aflaflinated Egidiolo
Piperano, who had mounted the roftrum to ftill
'the tumult. Leonard and Baccanino Picenardi,
though one of them was a brother-in-law of Louis
Cavalcabo, were both aflafTinated ; the Pedecani,
. Malombra, Alemanni, and others innumerable,
both of the noble and popular families .of the
Ghibelline faction, were murdered ; and the whole
faction was in fact driven out of the city, Ponzone
taking his flight with fome others of the princi-
pal citizens whotield with him. He was received
into Soncino by Philip Barbuo, and foon obtained
Cafteliione, and all the Guelphs were chafed out
of both thefe places. Ponzone, who had firft
holden with the Guelph party, now conjured up
another faction, by the name of the Maltraverfi,
of whom he was the head (for every faction has
its podefta, little council, and great council, its
king, lords, and commons), and in a fhort time
made himfelf matter of almofl all the Cremonefe
territories in the country. Finally, the Ghibel-
lines and Maltraverfi made a coalition, andconfti-
tuting Ponzino their head, entered into clofe alli-
ance with Cane della Scala, lord of Verona, and
Pafiarino Buonacoffi, lord of Mantoua, and with
Matthew Vifconte, vicar-genera-1 of Milan : there
came, therefore, to the afli (lance of the Ghibel-
lines and Maltraverfi, againfl the Guelphs, in
Cremona, Cane and Paflarino, with their people,
and Matthew fent them Luchino, his fon, with the

Miianefe

Campo. 1 47

Milanefe cavalry and infantry, with whom were
fome companies of Pavians, Placentians, Panne-
fans, Bergamans, and others from Coma, Novara,
Vercella, Crema, and Montferrato. All thefe peo-
ple uniting together, encamped againft Cremona.
The fiege -continued twenty-eight days, without
any event of confequence, excepting their depre-
dations upon the territory in the country, and
deftruction of all the eftates of, the Guelphs.

Ponzone, having made a breach in the wall,
entered- the city with his Ghibellines and Makra-
verfi, and reached the piazza without being difco-
vered." The Guelphs when they faw him were
aftonifhed and fled, and with them Giacopo Ca-
valcabo and Gregorio Sommo. Ponzone was
proclaimed lord of Cremona by the Ghibellines
and Maltraverfi. At the fame time the partifans
of Cavalcabo took Robecpo, and went to Olme-
neta, eight miles from Cremona, and ruined cer-
tain towers of the Zucchelli, in which was Nicolo
Borgo, with fome others of the faction of Pon-
zone, who, upon hearing of the destruction of his
friends, went with a body of foldiers to thofe
places, and made much havoc among the people
of Cavalcabo.

Giberto Correggio, captain-general of the
Guelph league, with Cavalcabo, and all thofe of
their faction, broke down the walls of the city in
1319, entered, and by force of arms drove out
the Ghibellines, and Ponzino Ponzone with his
league of Maltraverfi Guelphs.

This Ponzone appears to have joined any fide,
as his circumftances gave him opportunity ; for in
1319 he made a coalition with Galeazzo Vifconte,
fon^of Matthew, and lord of Placentia, wjth the
Ghibelline faction entered by force of arms into
Cremona,and chafed away the Cavalcabos,with all

* the

148

Cremona.

the real Guelphs their partifans. There was
afterwards publiftied a proclamation in the name
of Galeazzo, that it mould be lawful for all, of
whatever faction, to inhabit the cfity of Cremona,
excepting the Cavalcabos, and certain other citi-
zens, fufpe&ed of having concerted a plot againft
Galeazzo and his partifans.

Alberto Scotto, of Placentia, head of the
Guelphs, was killed, amidft three hundred Ghibel-
lines, in taking the caftle of Malamorte. Rai-
niondo Cordona was fent byv the pope, John XXII.
•with a powerful army, td the affiftance of the
Guelphs, who aflembling all of his fadion in
Lombardy, went againft Galeazzo Vifconte, and
fhutting him up in Milan, laid fiege to it.

Louis the Fourth, of Bavaria, fet up an anti-
pope againft John.

Louis confirmed to the Cremonians all the
privileges granted to them by his predecefibrs.

Guido de Camilla, Imperial vicar, had the
government of the city, and a truce was eftablifhed
between the community of Cremona and Gregory
de Sommi, by which it appears, that Cremona
was not at that time fubjeded to the Vifconte.
The city was governed by Ghibellines, who were
the majority or predominant party, and Gregory
Sommo was one of the principal heads ^f the
Guelph party.

Azzo Vifconte, fon of Galeazzo, having made a
peace with the Cremonians, gave them the domi-
nion of Crema, which after the death of pope
John, had fubjecled itfelf to the Vi-fconti. This
year according to fome hiftorians, the lordfhip of
Cremona was given by its inhabitants to the fame
Azzo Vifconte.

Azzo Vifconte, lord of Cremona, died without
<ons? and to him fucceeded in the dominion of

Milan

Campo. 149

Milan and of Cremona, Luchmo Vifconte, and
John his brother, who, from bifhop of Novara,
was a little afterwards made archbifhop of Milan,
fo that he became in that city lord both in fpi-
ritual and temporal affairs. Cremona enjoyed a
{late of tranquillity under the joint lordfhip of
Luchino, and John the archbifhop.

Luchino Vifconte died in 1338, and for his rare
and excellent qualities very much regretted by the
people his fubjeds : he left no fon, and therefore
the archbifhop obtained the fole.Jordfhip of Milan
and Cremona, and of many other cities acquired
by the virtue of Luchino. John and Luchino had
obtained from Benedict the Twelfth, pope, the
title of vijars of the holy apoflolical fee.

Bernabo and Galeazzo, brothers of the Vifconti,
nephews of John, the archbifhop and lord of Milan
and Cremona, both married ; the firft to Regina
della Scala, daughter of the lord of Verona and
Vicenza ;vand Galeazzo married a filler of the
duke of Savoy, named Bianca.

John Vifconte, archbifhop and lord of Milan,
after having greatly amplified his dominions, died
in 1354, leaving as his heirs Matthew, Bernabo,
and Galeazzo, fons of Stephen his brother. *The
extent of abfolute dominion, already acquired by
this family over the ruins of fo many common-
wealths, ruined by their unbalanced factions, ap-
pears by the divifion made upon this occafion :
To Matthew were affigned Placentia, Lodi, Bo-
logna, Mafia, Lugo, Bobio, Pontremelo, and
Borgo San Donino ; to Galeazzo, the cities of
Coma, Novaro, Vercelli, Afli, Alba, Aleflandria,
Tortona, Caftelnuovo di Scrivia, Baflignana, Vige-
vano, St. Angelo, Montebuono, and Mairano ;
to Barnabo were given Cremona, Bergamo,
Brefcia, Crema, Valeamonica, Lonato, with all
the river dal Lago di Garda, and other places.

The

1 50 Cremona.

The lordfhip of Milan and Genoa remained to
them all united.

The emperor, Charles the Fourth, came into
Italy to receive the Imperial crown, and was
crowned with the crown of iron at*Milan, by Ro-
bert Vifconte, archbifhop of that city, and he
there created knights, John Caleazzo, a boy of
two years old, who was afterwards the firfl duke
of Milan ; and Marco, who was not two months
old, both fons of Galeazzo Vifconte : the empe-
ror gave alfo the title of Imperial vicars in Italy
to thethreebrothers, Galeazzo, Matthew, and Ber-
nabo.' The dominion of Cremona remained alone
in Bernabo.

Bernabo married Verde, his daughter, to Lupol-
do, brother of the archduke of Auftria* and the
wedding was celebrated in Milan, before a con-
grefs of ambafladors from Cremona, and all the
ocher cities fubject to him ; and he gave his
daughter a dower of an hundred thoufand florins,

Violante, daughter of Galeazzo, was married to
a fon of the king of England, with another dower
of an hundred thoufand florins, and an annual
penfion of twenty-four thoufand more, affigned
upon fonae city of Piedmont.

Ifabella, the firft wife of John Galeazzo, conte
di Virtu, the firft-born fon of Galeazzo Vifconte
before mentioned, died, and left an only daughter,
called Valentina. At this time Bernabo gave
great figns of an inhuman and cruel nature.

La Verde, daughter of Galeazzo, was married
to a fon of the marquis of Monferrato, who was
aflafTmated by his fubje&s. She was then married
by her father, with a difpenfation from the pope,
to a fon of Barnabo.

Galeazzo died, and left two fons, John Gale-
azzo conte di Virtu, and Azzo. John Galeazzo,

who

Campti. 151

who was the eldeft, fucceeded his father in the
dominion of the (late.

Catharine Vifconte, daughter of Bernabo, was
by her father married to John Galeazzo, conte di
Virtu, her coufin, with a difpenfation from the
pope.

Azzo died, brother of John Galeazzo, to whom
alone remained the government of their paternal
(late.

Cremona gave itfelf voluntarily to John Ga-
leazzo Vifconte, conte di Virtu, under whofe do-
minion came all the other cities and places fub-
jec"t to Bernabo, his uncle and father-in-law, Ber-
nabo having been made a prifoner, with Lodovico
and Rodolfo his fons, by the fame John Galeazzo,
who having learned from his wife, the daughter
of Bernabo, that her father had feveral times at-
tempted to put him to death in order to rule
alone, refolved to relieve himfelf from anxiety and
fufpicion. To this end he went to Pavia, and
affected a retired life, and pretended to go a pil-
grimage to St. Mary del Monte. Bernabo, with
his two fons, went to meet him, and were all three
taken by the foldiers of John Galeazzo, and con-
fined in the caftle of Trezzo, where they all died
of poifon, as it is fuppofed, fent them by his ne-
phew and fon-in-law. John* Galeazzo was *m-
mediately accepted by the Milanefe as their lord ;
and the Cremonians fpontaneoufly gave them-
felves up to Giacopo Virino, the captain and
counfellor of the fame John Galeazzo, and foon
after, fent fixteen ambafladors to Milan with a
capitulation, which was accepted and confirmed'
by him, article by article, with fome limitations.
The firft article was, that the city of Cremona
gave itfelf voluntarily and by a common concord
of all the people.

152 Cremona.

Bianca, mother of John Galeazzo, died, and Va-
lentina his daughter, by Ifabella his firft wife,
f was married to Louis duke of Orleans, brother of
Charles the Sixth king of France ; and this year
was born Gio. Maria, fon of John Galeazzo by
Catherine his confort.

Philippo Maria, fecond fon of John Galeazzo,
•was born in Milan, in 1392.

John* Galeazzo, conte di Virtu, obtained the
title of duke of Milan, of Vencilaus the emperor.
He received all the enfigns of the ducal dignity,
and that with admirable pomp before a congrefs
of the ambafladors from all the cities iubject to
him, among whom were thofe from Cremona,
thofe from Venice, Florence, the marquis di Fer-
rato, the lords of Forli and Urbino, and the fons
of the lords of Padoua, with a multitude of others.
He gave to the emperor an hundred thoufand
ducats for the ducal dignity.

In 1399 the duke* obtained the dominion of
thp city of Pifa ; in 1400 that of Perugia j and
in 1402 Bologna..

Factions arofe again in this province, out of
which were engendered feditions, civil difcordsj
and rebellions, by which Gio. Maria, fecond duke
of Milan, loft fo ample a dominion as was left him
by jjis father. Seditions arofe in Milan, in which
they chafed away the ducal lieutenant ; which
being underftood by the other cities, they all arofe,
driving off the ducal officers. John Caftiglione,
a Milanefe, was' then in Cremona, with the title
@f ducal vicar, but he was now expelled by the
fury of the people : and at the fame time Jofrn
Ponzone, and Ugolino Cavalcabo, marquis of Via-
dana, mod noble and powerful citizens, and heads
of the factions of Guelphs and Maltraverfi, drove
the Ghibellines from the city and made them-

felves

Campd. 153

felves matters of it. Their followed at this
time innumerable homicides and burnings of
houfes, both in the city and country, there not
being a village in which there were not the two
parties.

But paffing over the horrid detail of particulars,
we may pafs to the year 1404, when Ugo-
lino Cayalcabo, having feized the dominion of
Cremona, conceived fufpicions of fome of the
principal citizens, and caufed their heads to be
(truck off, as guilty of plotting againft him, and
endeavouring to reftore the city to the duke.
Tyranny and cruelty are always the effecl: of fuch
a ftate of affairs in all parties ; and the duke
John Maria grew every day more cruel : he im-
prifoned his own mother, Catharine Vifconte, in
the cattle of Monza, and caufed her to be there
flrangled. Ugolino, coming to battle near Bref-
cia with Eftore Vifconte, was taken prifoner,
with Marfilio and Csefar Cavalcabo, and many
other citizens of their faction. Ugolino was con-
ducted to Soncino, and then to Milan, where he.
remained many months in prifon ; and Cabrino
Fondulo, his captain, faved himfelf in that con-
flict by flight to Cremona. The captivity of
Ugolino being known, Charles Cavalcabo, of the-
fame family, feized the dominion of Cremona.

Francefco Gafoni, a knight, and heretofore po-
defta of Cremona for Ugolino Cavalcabo, and
afterwards* by Charles, his fuccefibr, made captain-
general in that city, was beheaded, for being fuf-
pe&ed of holding a correfpondence and concert-
ing a confpiracy with Eftore Vifconte. A league
was published this year between Charles Caval-
cabo, Pandolfo Malatefta, Vignati lord of Lodi,
and Bartolomeo and Paolo Benzoi, lords of Cre-
ma ; and Charles took Piadena, whofe fortrefs was
furrendered to him by William Picenardo.

VOL. III. X Tie

.' * W

154 Cremona.

The Vifconte cattle was this year fortified by
Charles Cavalcabo, and Ugolino efcaping from
priion, went to Mancaftorma to find Cabrino Fon-
dulo, who came with him to Cremona, to enter
into the caftle, in which was Charles7, who had an
underftanding with Fondulo : Ugolino was there-
fore received into the caftle, but his foot was
fcarcely within the gate before he was made pri-
foner ; for thefe people were not*much more in-
clined to furrender their power to their own fami-
lies than to ftrangers. A little afterwards Fon-
dulo having fraudulently invited to fupper with
him, in the caftle of Mancaftorma, Charles and
Andreafo Cavalcabo, made them both prifoners,
and cruelly murdered them. He came foon after
to Cremona with many armed men, entered the
caftle and the other foruefles, and made himfelf
mailer of the city, and of all the lands and caftles
polTefled by Cavalcabo, except Viadana, which
would jiot fubmit to him. Cabrino, little grateful
to that family by whom he had been elevated to
.an honorable rank, defaced all the arms of the
Cavalcabos which appeared in public places, and
miferably murdered Ugolino,by whom he had been
made captain.

Fondulo, in 1407, caufed to be beheaded two
fons of Picenardo, in the piazza of Cremona, and
caft cruelly from the ruins of a tower two of the
family of Barbuo. This year Pandolfo, the foil
of Fondulo, was born. A truce macte between the
duke of Milan, and Cabrino Fondulo, lord of Cre-
mona, was renewed for four months.

John Maria, duke of Milan, married, in the
city of Brefcia, Antonia Malatefta, daughter of
Malatefta, lord of Rimini. Cabrino Fondulo
caufed to be burned John de Sefto, for having
made falfe money ; and buried alive John Lante-
ro, for having ilandered Cabrino j and hanged Lo-
renzo

Campo. *55

renzo, Guazzone, and beheaded Rubertino of the
fame family, for having been feen on the land of
Gazzo, which had rebelled againft him.

Another fon was born to Cabrino Fondulo, lord
of Cremona. He had taken Gazzo, which had
rebelled againft him, and deftroyed it : and was
this year made a knight in the city of Milan, by
Bucicaldo Francefe, governor of Genoa for the
king of France.

John da Terfo, lord of Soncjno, was taken and
aflfaffinated by the people of Cabrino near Brefcia ;
and Cabrino obtained from the inahabifants of
Soncino the land and fort.

John Maria Vifconte, duke of Milan, while he
was at mafs, was murdered by l*rivulcio, Guer-
rino, and Baruchino, and other confpirators of
feveral confpicuous families, and Eftore Vifconte,
fon of Barnabo, maternal grandfather of John
Maria, was proclaimed by the confpiritors lord of
.Milan ; but thefe were driven out by Philip
Maria, lord of Pavia, brother of the deceafed
duke, who entered Milan with the forces of Fa-
cino Cane, and Eftore being fled to ^lonza, was
purfued by Philip, befieged, fought, and flain :
whereupon Philip Maria was proclaimed duke of
Milan, and married Beatrice, formerly wife of
Facino Cane, and availed himfelf of her dower,
and of the foldiers of her late hufband, to recover
the ftate from the hands of the tyrants who, from
the death of his father, had poflefled it. At
ttie end of this year a truce was made between
the duke Philip Maria and Cabrino Fondulo.

A confederation was made between Fondulo,
Malatefta, the marquis of Ferrara, and Philip
Arcelli, lord of Placentia, on one part, and Philip
Maria, duke of Milan, and his adherents, on the
other. The friends of the duke were Vignati
lord of Lqdij Rufca lord of Como, Benzone lord

of

156 Cremona.

of Crema and Orlando marquis Pallavicino.
This convention lafted not long, though it was
made for two years.

The duke Philip Maria, having broken the
truce and confederation, fent his forces, under
Carmagnuola, his captain general, to commit de-
predations on the Cremonians. Going afterwards
to Placentia with part of his people, he was met
by Cabrino, lord of Cremona, with a few infantry
of Malatefta, and defeated.

! Philip Maria, duke of Milan, caufed to be be-
headed' Beatrice his wife, for no other reafon but
becaufe (he was grown old and he was weary of
her, although he propagated againft her fufpicions
of adultery.

The count Carmagnuola returned to the Cre-
monian territory with the ducal army, took Caftel-
lione and all the other caftles, deftroyed the vines
and corn, and laid feige to the city. Cabrino
Fondulo, feeing that he could not refift the forces,
of the duke, endeavoured to fell the city of Cre-
mona to Pandolfo Malatefta : but the duke fent
Carmagnugla upon the territory of Brefcia, and
foon had all its fortrefies in his poiTeflion. Ca-
brino, feeing that the afiiftance of Malatefta would
fail him, began, by the means of Carmagnuola,
to treat of an agreement with Philip Maria, who
knowing the difficulty of taking the city from fo
powerful and fagacious a man as Fondulo, finally
agreed with him.

Cabrino agreed with the duke to furrender Cre-
mona and all its country, referving only Caftel-
lione, of which he was inverted in fee, with the
title of marquis, by the duke, for which he paid
forty thoufand ducats.

The duke recovered Genoa, Albenga, Savona,
and Brefcia.

Fondulo, defirous of regaining the domination,

made

Campo. 157

made an agreement with the Florentines againil
the duke.

The duke condemned to death Cabrino Fon-
dulo, and beheaded him.

The reft of this hiftory you will eonfult at your
leifure. It was at this time, and had been long,
an abfolute monarchy. While it was a repub-
lic it was a continual ftruggle between the fami-
lies of Pallavicini and Dovara, Cavalcabo and
Vifconte, Ponzoni and Cavalcabo, Vifconte and
Fondulo. The family of Vifconti acquired in
Lombardy a fovereignty like that of the Medici
in Tufcany, and by the fame means : and both
becaufe there was no balance in the governments,
and becaufe the executive power and judiciary
power were ele&ed in the legiflative aflembly ;
that is precifely, becaufe all authority was attempt-
ed to be placed in the fame centre. Is it worth
while, merely for the whittling of the name of a
republic, to undergp all the miferies and horrors,
cruelties, tyrannies, and crimes, which are the na-
tural and inevitable fruits of fuch a conftitution ?.

•LETTER 'III.

P A D O U A*

Dear Sir, • •

THE elements and definitions in mod of the
arts and fciences are underftood alike, by
men of education, in all the nations of Europe;
but in the fcience of legiflation, which is not of
the leaft importance to be underftood, there is
a confufion of languages, as if men were but

lately

1 58 Padoua.

lately come from Babel. Scarcely any two writ-
ers, much lefs nations, agree in ufing words in the
fame fenfe. Such a latitude, it is true, allows a
fcope for politicians to fpeculate, like merchants
with falfe weights, artificial credit, or bafe money,
and to deceive the people, by making the fame
word adored by one party, and execrated by ano-
ther. The union of the people,in any principle,rule,
or fyftem, is thus rendered impoflible ; becaufe
fuperftition, prejudice, habit, and paflions, are fo
differently attached to words, that you can fcarcely
make any nation underftand itfelf. The words mo-
narchy, ariftocracy, democracy, king, prince, lords,
commons, nobles, patricians, plebeians, if care-
fully attended to, will be found to be ufed in dif-
ferent fenfes, perpetually by different nations, by
different writers in the fame nation, and even by
the fame writers in different pages. The word
king for example : Afk a Frenchmen what is a
king, his anfwer will be, A man with a crown and
fceptre, throne and footftool, anointed at Rheims,
who has the making, executing, and interpreting
of all laws. Afk an Englimman ; his idea will
comprehend the throne, footftool, crown, fceptre,
and anointing, with one third of the legiflative
power and the«whole of the executive, with an
eftate in his office to him and his heirs. A(k a
Pole ; and he tells you, It is a magidrate cbofen
for life, with fcarcely any power at all. Afk an
inhabitant of Liege, and he tells you, It is a bifhop,
and his office ii only for life. The word prince
is another remarkable initance : In Venice it means-
the fenate, and fometimes by courtefy, the doge,
whom fome of the Italian writers call a mere tefta
di legno : in France, the eldrft Tons of dukes are
princes, as well as the defcendants of the blood
royal : in Germany, even the rhingravers are prin-
ces j and in Ruffia,feveral families^who were not de-

fcended

Portenari.

fcended from nor allied to royal blood, anciently
obtained, by grant of the fovereign, the title of
prince, defcendible to all their pofterity ; the con*
fequence of which has been, that the number of
princes in that country is at this day prodigious ;
and the philofppher of Geneva, in imitation of the
Venetians, profeffedly calls the executive power,
wherever lodged, The Prince. — How is it poffible
that whole nations mould be made to comprehend
the principles and rules of government, until they
{hall learn to underftand one anothers meanings
by words ? But of all the words, in all languages,
perhaps there has been none fo much abufed in this
way as the words republick, commonwealth, and po-
pular ftate. In the Rerum Publicaf urn Colleclio, of
which there are fifty and odd volumes, and many
of them very incorre&,France,Spain and Portugal,*
the four great empires, the Babylonian, Perfian,
Greek, and Roman, and even the Ottoman, are all
denominated republics. If, indeed, a republic
fignifies nothing but public affairs, it is equally
applicable to all nations ; and 'every kind of go-
vernment, defpotifms, "monarchies, ariftocracies,
democracies, and every poffible or imaginable
compofition of them, are all republics : there is,
no doubt, a public good and evil, a common
wealth 4and a common impoverimment, in all
of them. Others define a republic to be a
government of more than one : this will ex-
clude only the defpotifms ; for a monarchy ad-
miniftered by laws, requires at leaft magiftrates
to regifter them, and confequently more than
one perfon in the government. Some compre-
hend under the term only ariftocracies and de-
mocracies, and mixtures of thefe, without any
diftinft executive power. Others again, more
rationally, define a republic to fignify only a go-.
vernment, in which all men, rich and poor? magif-

trates,

160 Padoua.

trates and fubjects, officers and people, mafters
and fervants, the firft citizen and the laft, are
equally fubject to the laws. This indeed ap-
pears to be the true, and only true definition of
a republic. The word res, every one knows,
iignified, in the Roman language, wealth, riches,
property ; the word publicus, quafi populicus,
and per Sync, poplicus, fignified public, common,
belonging to the people ; res publica therefore
was publica res, the wealth, riches, or property
of the people*. Res populi, and the original
meaning of the word republic, could be no other
than a government in which the property of the
peoplepredominatedand governed: and ithad more
relation to property than liberty : it fignified a go-
vernment, in which the property of the public, or
people, and of every one of them, was fecured and
protected by law. This idea, indeed, implies liberty;
becaufe property cannot be fecure, unlefs the man
be at .liberty to acquire, ufe, or part with it, at his
difcretion, and unlefs he have his perfonal liberty
of life and limb, motion and reft, for that purpofe :
it implies, moreover, that fhe property and liberty
of ail men, not merely of a majority, mould be
fafe ; for the people, or public, comprehends
more than a majority, it comprehends all and
every individual : and the property of every
citizen is a part of the public property, as each
citizen is apart of the public, people, or commu-
nity. The property, therefore, of every man has
a mare in government, and is more powerful than
any citizen, or party of citizens ; it is governed
only by the law. There is, however, a peculiar
fenfe in which the words republic, common-
wealth, popular (late, are ufed by Englifh and

* See any cf the common di&ionarks, Soranus, Stephens,
Ainfworth.

French

PortenarL 1 6 1

French writers ; who mean by them a democracy,
or rather a repreientative democracy : a govern-
ment in one centre, and that centre the nation ; "
that is to fay, that centre a fmgle aflembly, chofen*
at dated periods by the people, and inverted with
the whole fovereignty ; the whole legiflative, exe-
cutive, and judicial power, to be exercifed in a
body, or by committees, as they (hall think pro-
per. This is the fenfe in which it was ufed by
Marchament Nedham, and in this fenfe it has
been condantly ufed from his time to ours, even
by writers of the mod mathematical precifion, the
mod claffical purity, and extenfive learning.
What other authority |here may be for this ufe of
thofe words is. not known : none ^as been found,
except in the following obfervations of Portinari,
in which there arefeveral other inaccuracies ; but
they are here inferted, chiefly becaufe they employ
the words republic, commonwealth, and popular
ftate, in the fame fenfe with the Englifh and
French writers.

" We may fay with the philofopher*, that fix
things are fo neceflary to a city, that without
them it cannot (land. i. The firft is provifions,
without which its inhabitants cannot live. 2.
The fecond is clothes, habitations, houfes, and
other things which depend upon the arts, without
which civil and political life cannot fubfid. 3.
The third is arms, which are neceflary to defend
the city from its enemies, and to reprefs the bold-
nefs of thofe who rebel againft the laws. 4. The
fourth is money, mod neceflary to a city in peace
and in war. 5. The fifth is the care of divine

* Delia Felicita di Padova, di Angelo Portenari Pa'dovano
Augoft. edit, in Padova per Pletro Paolo Tozzi, 1623, p.
115.

VOL. III. Y wormip.

1 62 Padoua.

worihip. 6. The fixth is the adminiftration of
juftice, and the government of the people. — For
the firfl are neceflary, cultivators of the land ; for
the fecond, artificers ; for the third, foldiers ; for
the fourth merchants and capitalifts ; for the
fifth, priefts ; and for the fixth judges and magif-
trates. Seven forts of ment therefore, are necef-
fary to a city, hulbandmen, artificers, foldiers,
merchants, rich men, priefts, and judges*. — But,
according to the fame philofopher|, as in the
body natural not all thofe things, without which
it is never found, are parts of it, but only
inftruments fubfervient to feme ufes, as in ani-
mals the^horns, the nails, the hair, fo not all thofe
feven forts of men are parts*of the city ; but fome
of them, viz. ftie hufbaridmen, the artificers, and
the merchants, are only inflruments ufeful to civil
life, as is thus demonflrated : — -A city is con-
flituted for felicity, as to its ultimate end ; and
human felicity, here below, is repofed, according
to the fame philofopher, in the operations of
virtue, aad chiefly in the exertions of wifdom and
prudence : thofe men, therefore, are not parts of
a city, the operations of whom are not directed to
thofe virtues ; fuch are the hufbandmen, who are
occupied, not in wifdom and prudence, but in
labouring the earth ; fuch are the ^rtifans, who
fatigue themfelves night and day to gain a liveli-
hood for themfelves and their poor families ; fuch,
finally, are the merchants, who watch and labour
continually, not in wifdom and prudence, but in
theacquifition of gold. It is therefore clear, that
neither hufhandmen, artificers, nor merchants,, are
parts of a city, nor ought to 'be numbered among
the citizens, but only as inftruments which fub-

v Arift. Polit. lib. vii. c. 8. f Aria. Polit. lib. vii. c. 9.

ferve

Porienari. 163

ferve to certain ufes and conveniences of the city."
— We muft paufe here and admire ! The foregoing
are not only the grave fentiments of Portenari and
of Ariftotle, tout it is the doctrine almoft of the
whole earth, and of all mankind : not only every
defpotifm, empire, and monarchy, in Afia, Africa,
and Europe, but every ariftocratical republic, has
adopted it in all its latitude. There are only two
or three of the fmalleft cantons in Switzerland,
befides England, who allow hufbandrnen, arti-
ficers, and merchants, to be citizens, or to have
any voice or fhare in the government of the (late,
or in the choice or appointment of any who have.
There is no doctrine, and no fact, which goes fo
far as this towards forfeiting to the human fpecies
the character of rational creatures. Is it not
amazing, that nations fhould have thus tam'ely fur-
rendered themfelves, like fo many flocks of meep,
into the hands of fhepherds, whole great folicitude
to devour the Iambs, the wool, and the flefh,
fcarcely leave them time to provide water or paf-
ture for the animals, or even fhelter againft the
weather and the wolves !

It is indeed impoffible that the feveral defcrip-
tions of men, laft enumerated, fliould, in a great
nation and extenfive territory,* ever aifemble in a
body to act in concert ; and the ancient method
of taking the fenfe of an aflembly of citizens in the
capital, as in Rome for example, for the fenfe of
all the citizens of an whole republic, or a large
empire, was very imperfect, and extremely expof-
ed to corruption : but, fince the invention of repre-
fentative aflemblies, much of that objection is re-
moved, though even that was no fufficient reafon
for excluding farmers, merchants, and artificers,
from the rights of citizens. At prefent an huf-
bantlman, merchant, or artificer, provided he has

any

1 64 Padoua.

any fmall property, by which he may be fuppofed
to have a judgment and will of his own, indead of
depending for his daily bread on fome patron or
mader, is a fufficient judge of the qualifications
of a perfon to reprefent him in the legiflature.
A- reprefentative affembly, fairly condituted, and
made an integral part of the fovereignty, has
power for ever to controul the rich and illudrious
in another aflembly, and a court and king where
there is a king ; this too is the only inftrument
by which the body of the people can aft; -the
only way in which their opinions can be known
and collected ; the only means by which their
wills can be united, and their drength exerted,
according to any principle or continued fyftem.
It is fometimes faid, that mobs are a good mode
of exprefiing the fenfe, the refentments, and feel-
ings of the people. Whig mobs to be fure are
meant ! But if the principle is once admitted,
liberty and the rights of mankind will infallibly
be betrayed ; for it is giving liberty to Tories
and courtiers to excite mobs as well as patriots :
and all hidory and experience fhews, that mobs
are more eafily excited by courtiers and princes,
than by more virtuous men, and more honed
friends of liberty: It is often faid tbo, that farm-
ers, merchants, and mechanics, are too inattentive
to public affairs, and too patient under oppreflion.
This is undoubtedly true, and will for ever be fo ;
and, what is worfe, the mod fober, induflrious,
and peaceable of them, will for ever be the lead
attentive, and the lead difpofed to exert themfelves
in hazardous and difagreeable efforts of refidance.
The only practicable method therefore of giving
to farmers, &c. the equal right of citizens, and
their proper weight and influence in fociety, is by
ekflions, frequently repeated, of an h6ufe of com-
mons

Portenari. 165

mons. an aflembly which fhall be an eflential part
of the fovereignty. The meaneft understanding
is equal to the duty of faying who is the man in
his neighborhood whom he moft efteems, and
loves beft, for his knowledge, integrity, and bene-
volence. The underftandings, however, of huf-
bandmen, merchants, and mechanics, are not
always the meaneft : there arife, in the courfe of
human life, many among them of the mod fplen-
did geniufes, the moft adive and benevolent dif-
pofitions, and moft undaunted bravery. The
moral equality that Nature has unalterably efta-
blifhed among men 'give thefe an undoubted
right to have every road opened to them for ad-
vancement in life and in power that is open to
any others. Thefe are the characters which will
be difcovered in popular election's, and brought
forward upon the ftage, where they may exert all
their faculties, and enjoy all the honours, offices,
and commands, both in peace and war, of which
they are capable. The dogma of Ariftotle, and
the practice of the world, is the moft unphilofo-
phical, the moft inhuman and cruel, that can be
conceived. Until this wicked pofition, which is
worfe than the flavery of the ancient republics, or
modern Weft Indies, ihall be held up to the de-
rifion and contempt, the execration and horror of
mankind, it will be to little purpofe to talk or
write about liberty. This doctrine of Ariftotle is
the more extraordinary, as it feems to be incon-
fiftent with his great and common principles*,
" that an happy life muft arife from a courfe of
virtue ; that virtue confifts ki a medium ;* and
that the middle life is the happieft. In every city

* Ariftot. Pol. lib. iv. c. II.

the

1 66 Padoua.

the people are divided into three forts, the very
rich, the very poor, and the middle fort. If it is
admitted that the medium is the beft, it follows
that, even in point of fortune, a mediocrity is pre-
ferable. The middle ftate is mod compliant to
reafon : thofe who are very beautiful, or ftrong,
or noble, or rich ; or, on the contrary, thofe who
are very poor, weak, or mean ; with difficulty obey
reafon. The former are capricious and flagitious ;
the latter, rafcally and mean ; the crimes of each
arifmg from their different excefles. Thofe who
excel in riches, friends, and influence, are not
willing to fubmit to command or law : this be-
gins at home, were they are brought up too
delicately, when boys, to obey their preceptors.
The conftant want of what the rich enjoy makes
the poor too mean: the poor know not how to
command, but are in the habit of being com-
manded, too often as flaves. The rich know not
how to fubmit to any command ; nor do they
know how to rule over freemen, or to command
others, but defpotically. A city compofed only of
the rich and the poor, but confifts of maftersand
flaves, not freemen ; where one party muft defpife,
and the other hate ; where there is no poflibility
of friendfhip, or equality, or community, which
fuppofes affection. It is the genius of a free
city to be compofed, as much as pofiible, of
equals ; and equality will be beft preferved when
the greateft part of the inhabitants are in the
middle ftate. Thefe will be beft allured of fafety
as well as equality : they will not covet nor fteal,
as the poor do, what belongs to the rich ; nor will
what they have be coveted or fto^en : without
plotting againft any one, or have any one plot
againft them, they will live free from danger.

For

Porienari. « ' 167

For which reafon Phocilides* wifely wifhes for the
middle date, as being mod productive of happi-
nefs. It is plain then that the mod perfect com-
munity muft be among thofe who are in the mid-
dle rank ; and thofe dates are beft inftituted
wherein thefe are a larger and more refpe&able
part if poflible, than both the other : or, if that
cannot be, at leaft than either of them feparate :
fo that, being thrown into the balance, it may pre-
vent either fcale from preponderating. It is there-
fore the greateft happinefs which the citizen can
enjoy, to poflefs a moderate and convenient for-
tune* When fome poflefs too much, and others
nothing at all, the government muft either be in
the hands of the meaneft rabble, or elfe a pure
oligarchy. The middle flate is bed, as being
leaft liable to thofe feditions and infurrections
which difturb the community ; and for the fame
reafon extenfive governments are leaft liable to
thefe inconveniences : for there thofe in the mid-
dle date are very numerous ; whereas, in fmali
ones, it is eafy to pafs to the two extremes, fo as
hardly to have atty medium remaining, but the one
half rich, and the other poor. We ought to con-
fider, as a proof of this, that the bed lawgivers
were thofe in the middle rank of life, ainong
whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems,
and Lycurgus, for he was not a king, sfrid Cha-
rondas, and indeed mod others. Hence fo many
free dates have changed either to democracies or
oligarchies ; for whenever the number of thofe in
the middle date has been too fmall, thofe who
were the more numerous, whether the rich or the
poor, always overpowered them, and aflumed to
themfelves the adminidration. When, in confe-

* After Agur.

^quence _

1 68 Padoua*

quence of their difputes and quarrels with each
other, either the rich get the better of the poor,
or the poor of the rich, neither of them will efta-
blifh a free ftate, but, as a record of their victory,
one which inclines to their own principles, and
form either a democracy or an oligarchy. It is
indeed an eftabJifhed cuftom of cities not to defire
an equality, but either to afpire to govern, or,
when they are conquered, to fubmit," — Thefe are
fome of the wifeft fentiments of Ariftotle ; but.
can you reconcile them with his other arbitrary
doctrine, and tyrannical exclufion of hufbandmen,
merchants, and tradefmen, from the rank and
rights of citizens ? Thefe, or at lead thofe of
them who have acquired property ^enough to be
exempt from daily dependence on others, are the
real middling people, and generally as honed and
independent as any : thefe, however, it mud be
confefied, are too inattentive to public and na-
tional affairs, and too apt to fubmit to oppreflion j
when they have been provoked beyond all bearing,
they have aimed at demolifhing the government,
and when they have done that, th£y have funk into
their ufual inattention, and left others to erect a
new one as rude and ill-modelled as the former.
A reprefentative aflembly, elected by them, is the
only way in which they can act in concert ; but
they have always allowed thernfelves to be cheat-
ed by falfe, imperfect, partial, and inadequate
reprefentations of themfelves, and have never had
their full and proper mare of power in a ftate. —
But to proceed with Portenari. " The other kinds
'of men," fays he, " viz. the'rich, the foldiers, the
priefts, and the judges, are parts of the city, and
properly citizens. The firft, becaufe riches are
inuTumems for generating and conferving virtue
in the citizens. The fecond, becaufe it is necef-

fary

Portenari. l6g(

m

fary that military men, befides the virtue of forti-
tude, mould be adorned with prudence, to know
the times and occafions proper for undertaking an
enterprize. The third, becaufe the priefts ought
to be examples of every virtue to the people, and
give themfelves to the contemplation of divine
things. The fourth, becaufe the judges and rec-
tors of a city, to judge and govern rightly, have
occafion more than all the others for fcience and
prudence, which are the true lights and guides of
human actions/' — If thefe are proper arguments
for admitting thefe defcriptions of men into -the
order of citizens, inftead of being reafons for ex-
cluding merchants, &c. they are of proportional
weight for admitting them. — " As to the form of
government, which is the othfir part of the animat-
ed city, let us fay with thofe wife men who have
written of civil dominion and public adminiftra*
tton, as Plato*, Ariftotlef, Polybius|, Plu-
tarch§, and others||, that the fimple forrgs of
good government are three, to which are oppofed
three other forms of bad government. The fir ft
form of good government is monarchy, or king-
dom, and is the abfolute and independent domi-
nion of one man alone$ who has for the ultimate
end of his operations the public good, and the
beft ftate of the<city, and who has the fame re-
lation to his fubjech that the ihepherd has to his
.flock, and the father to his children. Such were
the monarchies of the Aflyrians, Medes, Perfians,
Macedonians, Scythians, Egyptians, and Romans,
from the beginning of their reign to the c'r cation

••». * 4 & 8 de Leg. & in Civili, feu de Regno.
f 3 Polit. c. 7, 8. & 8 Eth. c. 10.
j Lib. vi. § De Unius in Repub. Domin.

|j Sigon. de Ant. Jur. Civ. Rom. lib, i. c. I.
VOL. III. Z of

Pafoua.

of the confuls, and, after the extinction of the
Roman republic, under the empire of the Csefars.
To monarchy is oppofed* that form of govern-
ment which is called tyranny, in which one alone
domineers, who has no thoughts of the public
good, but whofe fcope is to deprefs and extermi-
nate the citizens, to whom he fhows himfelf a ra-
pacious monfter after their property, and a cruel
beaft of prey after their lives ; fuch as were
Phalaris in Agrigentumf, Dionyfms in Syracufe|r
and(Nero in Rome§. The fecond form of good
government is ariltocracy, according to which
the dominion is held by thofe who, above all
others^ are adorned with virtue, prudence, and be-
nevolence ; who directing all their actions to the
utility and common dignity of the city, procure
it an happy and blefled ftate. This fpecies of
government is called alfo, the regimen of the
better fort (optimates), either becaufe the beft meft
of the city bear rule,' or becaufe they look, in all
their operations, to the bed and mofl perfect ftate
of the city. This manner of government was
ufed by the Spartans. To this form of govern-
ment is oppofed oligarchy, which is a principality
of the rnoft rich and powerful, who, for the mofl
part, are few ; who, deprefling and robbing of
their property the lefs rich, anH crufhing with
intolerable weight the poor, make a regimen full
of arrogance and of violence, and are like wolves
among lambs. Such was the dominion of the
Triumyirs in Rome who having opprefled the

* Plutar. Loc. Cit. Berof, lib. iv. Piodor. lib. i. 3.
10. Juftin. lib. i. 2. 3. Orof. lib. i. & feq. Herod, lib. i. 2.*
Liv. et alii jfcript. Rom. Hift.

f Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 2. Cic. Verr. 5.
' t Cic. 2 de Offic. Plat. Epift. vii. Diodor. lib. xiv.

§ Suet, in Neron. Tacit. 14 Annal.

republic,

PortenaH.

republic, profcribed and put to death many good
citizens, and plundered their property : exalting
the feditious and perverfe, and abafing good men,
they diftempered Rom£ with their contagious
wickednefs; and of a city, the capital of the world,
they made it a den of robbers*. The third form of
good government, not having a proper name, was
called by the Greeks politia, and by the Latins, ref-
publica, a name common to every fpecies of govern-
ment. This is the dominion of the multitude, viz. of
the whole body of the city, compofed of all forts of citi-
zens, rich and poor, nobles and plebeians, wife and
foolifh, which is alfo called a popular government. All
this body, which contains men, fome endowed with
prudence and wifdom, fome inclined to virtue and
perfuadable to all good works, by the converfa-
tion and familiarity which they have with the pru-
dent and learned, employ all their care, labour,
and induftry, to the end that the city flourim in all
thofe things which are neceflary and convenient
for living well and happily, fuch as was at one
one time the government of the Atheniansf . To
this fpecies of good government is oppofed de-
mocracy ; according to which the mod abject ple-
beians, and the vileft vulgar, hold the^omination
for their own private intereft, by which they op-
prefs the rich and the noble, and aggrandize and
enrich the poor and the ignoble, as the two bro-
thers, the Gracchi, began to do in Rome|.

" Three, therefore, are the fimple forms of good
government, monarchy, ariftocracy, and that
which by a common name is called* a republic ;

* Appian. 4 de Bel. Civ. Plut. in Ant.
•f Plut. de Unius in Rep. Dominio. Thucid. lib. ii. in
Orat. Periclis. Sig. de Repub. Athen. lib. i. c. 5.
t Appian. i de Bel. Civ. Plutarch in Gracchis.

from

172

'Padotta.

from which, mixed together,four others may refult.
The firft is of the three all compounded, as was that
of the Lacedemonians, inftituted by Lycurgus*,
which, feletting the good from the three former ', com-
pofes one of the moft perfcfl kind. Such alfo was
the Roman Republicf, in which the power of the
confuls was like the regal authority ; that of the
fenate was ariflocratical ; and that of the people
refembled the popular ftate. The fecond form of
mixed government is compofed of monarchy and
ariftocracy, fuch as, according to fome, is4 the
moft ferene republic of Venice J, in which the
annual podeftas have a power fimilar to a regal
authority, and the fenate are an affembly or collec-
tion of the op.timates ; although others contend
that it is a perfect ariftocracy. The third is mix-
ed of a monarchy and a republic ; and the fourth
of a republic and an ariftocracy : of which two
fpecies of mixed government we have no examples
to alledge.

" But to return to the three fimple forms ; it is
the commqn opinion of the learned §, that monarchy
holds the firft rank above all others, refembling
the power of God Almighty, who alone governs
the worldly refembling the heart, which alone
vivifies all the parts of the animal ; and refem-
bling the fun, which alone illuminates the celeftial
bodies, as well as the lower world. It is very true,
that to a monarchy ought to be elevated only

* Polyb. lib. vi. Sigon. de Ant. Jure Civ. Rom. lib.
i.e. i.

f Bellarm. de Roma.

i Boter. Relat. Venet. p. I. Sabellrc. lib. iii. lee. 2.

§ Plat, in Civili vel de Reg? Afift. 8. Ethic, c. 10. &
3 Polit. c. 10. Philo. lib. de Conf. Linguar. Sencc. 2 de
Benef. Herod, lib. iii. Horn. 2 Iliad, v. 204.

that

Pontenari. 173

that citizen, according to the philofopher*, wKo;
exceeding the others in the ordinary courfe, in*
'riches, wifdom, prudence, anft benevolence, is like
a god upon earth ; fuch as would be the man who
fhould be adorned with heroic virtue, according
to which, performing all the labours of virtue
in the utmoft perfection- and fupreme excellency,
he would appear to be not the fon of a mortal f ,
but of God. But it being impoflible, or at leaft
mod difficult, to find a man fo rare, hence it has
happened, that laying afide monarchy, the philo-
fophers have difputed which of the other two
forms of good government is better accommodat-
ed, more practicable, and more profitable, for the
regimen of cities and of peoples. Some were of
opinion that this praife was due to an ariftocra*cy :
neverthelefs Ariftotle confutes them, becaufe in
the ariftocratical government the magiflracies and
the honours being always in the hands of a few,
there is great danger that the multitude, perpe-
tually excluded from public management, mould
be tumultuous, and confpire againft the lives of
the principal men, to the great damage of the
whole city ; becaufe in thefe revolts the force
and violence of the people regards neither
friends nor enemies ; it is mad, and moft hor-
ribly pillages, murders, and abufes,all that comes
in its way. It remains then, that the third fpecies
of good government, which is the popular go-
vernment, in which alternately the citizens com-
mand and obey, is the moft ufeful, and better ad-
jufted to the nature of man, in whpfe foul the
Divinity has (lamped the defire of dominion ;
with fuch limitations and temperaments, however,
as, fays the fame philofopher ., that the vile plebeians

* 3 Polit. c. ii. f 7 Eth.c. i.

may

1 74 Padoua.

may not have magiftrates appointed for their ig-
norance and imprudence, which are the two
fountains of all crVil calamities ; but that the
plebeians may not be totally defpifed, and that all
occafion of infurrections may be taken away, that
the faculty be given them of joining with the
other citizens in the election of magiftrates, and
in calling them to account for their adminiftra-
tion." — All thefe opinions appear to be not unbe-
coming; for although the plebeians be not quali-
fied of themfelves to judge who are fit for the
adminiftration of the affairs of the city, and to
know the failings of thofe who have governed,
neverthelefs, by the converfation and practice
which they have in fuch things with the wife men,
it is prefumed that, from daily intercourse with
thefe, and from common fame and public repu-
tation, which daily circulates concerning men
who are wife and good in government, they may
have fo much light, that they- may difcern the apt
from the inapt, and good behaviour from bad. —
This may fuffice to have faid concerning the dif-
ferent forms of government, according to the
writers before cited, in order to explain the fol-
lowing account of the form of government in Pa-
doua, and the various changes it pafled through.

In the four hundred and fifty-fecond year of
the Chriflian aera, Padoua was miferably deftroyed
by Attila, king of the' Huns.

The Padouans, who then fled for fafety to the
iilands in the Adriatic, could not for fifty years re-
turn to rebuild their city, for the many armies of
barbarians who infefled Italy till 493, when Theo-
doric, king o£ the Oftrogoths, killed Odoacer,
king of the Heruli, and remained unrivalled in the
dominion of Italy. But Juflinian, the emperor,

having,

Portenari.

having, in 535? fent Belifarius, and afterwards, in
552, Narfitte, to drive away the Goths from
Italy, Padoua, in that war, which, with alternate
vi&ories and defeats of the Goths and the Greeks,
lafted eighteen years, was fometimes by one and
fometimes by the other fubje&ed. Afterwards,
under the government of exarchs, till 60 1, it
was a fecond time burned and deftroyed by Agi-
nulphus, king of the Longobards. It was after-
wards reflpred by the Padouans, aflifted by the
Venetians, and remained under the dominion of the
* Longobards, till they were exterminated by Char-
lemain, king of France, in 774. It continued
fubjeft to the kings of. France of the race of Char-
lemain, and after them to the Berengarii, and
finally to the emperors of Germany, from Otto the
Firft to Henry the Fourth, according to the
German, and the Third according to the Italian
hiftorians. In a word, Padoua lived under foreign
laws fix hundred and twenty-nine years, viz. from
452 to 10815 thirty-three years before which
period, viz. in 1048, began to dawn a few rays of
liberty, fmce the emperor, Henry the Third, as
appears by public inftrumerits preferved in the
archives of the cathedral of Padoua, granted, for
the repofe of his foul, and that of Agnefe his wife,
to Bernard Maltraverfe,bifhop of Padoua, the pre-
rogative of coining money, building fortrefles and
caftles with towers and ramparts, erecting mills,
and, to be as it were prince of the city. After-
wards Henry the Fourth, his fon, at the folicita-
tion of the queen Bertha, his wife, and for the
prayers of Milo, bifhop of Padoua, his relation, in
jo8i, gave liberty to the Padouans, with this
coriceflion, that for the future they Nmight live
according to their owp laws, and have a trium-
phal

176 Padoua*

phal chariot (carroccio), which was the principal
fign of a free city*.

This carroccio, for a perpetual memorial of
the benefit received by the inter ceffi on of queen
Bertha, was by the Padouans called by her name.
Henry alfo granted them the faculty of making of
the body of their nobility a fenate, who, for the
government of tfie city, created annually two con-
fulsf .. There was therefore formed a govern-
ment mixed of monarchy and ariflocracy, fays
the hiftorian ; of monarchy, becaufe the confuls,
according to the manner of kings, had the
power of life and death ; and of ariftocracy,
becaufe the fenate, exclufively of the plebeians,
was compofed only of patricians or nobles. —
Thefe, as the defire of enlarging dominion is
infatiable, not contented to have the government
of the city, procured, partly by imperial grants,
and partly by other means, to have jurifdidion of
blood in their caftles fituated in the country of
Padoua, afiuming the titles of proceri, peers or
barons, and a little afterwards of marquifles,
counts, and caftellans. Padoua was ruled by this
form of government about eighty years, in peace
and tranquillity : but peace being the nurfe of
riches, and riches of ambition, the confular dig-
nity began to be ardently defired by all men, and
caballed for by every artifice. In the progrefs of
thefe contefts, as one would not give way to
another, and the whole depending on a few of
the mod powerful, the city became divided 'into
factions, which finally, in 1177, came to arms,
and civil wars enfued, which for fome years filled

* See a defeription and {lamp of the Padouan carroccio, in
Portenari, lib. v. c. 5 and 6.

•(• Sigonius, de Reg. ItaL lib. ix, an. 1081.

the

Porteyiari. 177

the city with mutual flaughter, burnings, revolt,
and conftifion ; fo that the confulate becoming
feeble, was now intermitted, and then exerciied,
according as me power of different parties pre-
vailed. But, finally, this magiftracy ferving no
longer for the maintenance of the public good,
but merely as an inftrument of revenge againfl
enemies, and having become mod pernicious, not
only to the plebeians, but to the patricians, it was,
in 1 194, abrogated and totally extinguifhed.

The good government, compofed of monarchy
and ariftocracy (as our author calls it, though
nobody will agree with him in opinion at this
day), being changed, by the malice of men, into
the bad one of oligarchy, and this by its noxious
qualities being in a fhort time annihilated, there
arofe another fpecies of government, mixed of
monarchy and a republic, in this form : — The Pa-
douans inftituted four councils ; the firft was of
eighteen, whom they called the Anciani, .three of
whom were drawn by lot every three months :
they were afterwards reduced to the number of
fixteen,and then drawn to the number of four every
four months* The office of thefe magiftrates was,
together with the podefta, to exert themfelves with
all their influence and power to conciliate and
appeafe all difcords and diffenfions among the,
citizens, not only in civil affairs, but in criminal
profecutions ; to fee that the decrees of the fenate
regarding the public utility were obferved ; that
the buildings going to decay mould be rebuilt
or repaired ; that the ftreets, public roads, and
walks, mould be kept adjufted, free, and unincum-
bered with obftru&ions ; that in the principal
quarters of the city mould be provided engines
for extinguishing or preventing the progrefs of
fire, as calks, vafes for drawing water, cordage for
VOL. III. A a making

.73

Padoua.

making ladders, pickaxes, iron bars, &c ; and,
finally, to fugged to the other councils all thofe
things which might be of public utility : and that
they might be enabled to do this, all public letters
from foreign princes, and from all magiftrates
within the dominion of Padoua, were read in their
prefence. No man was admitted to this council
of the anciani who was not a Padouan by birth,
and an inhabitant of the city, for at leaft thirty
years, without interruption, and who had not a
foundation of property among his fellow-citizens
of at leaft two hundred pounds a year. — The
fecond council was called the Leffer Council,
which at firft confided of forty citizens, partly
noble and partly plebeian, but afterwards was in-
creafed to the number of fixty. The authority
of this council was fuch, that nothing could be
treated in the greater council if it were not firft
difcufTed and agitated here, and from hence pro-
pofed to the greater council. The mode of dif-
cufling and confulting upon bufmefs was by the
way of orations or harangues made by the fena^
tors, after which they proceeded to a vote, and
two thirds of the fuffrages determined the quef-
tion. This rule was alfo obferved in the greater
council. This council was changed every four
months, and the fenators who had once been in it
muft be excluded for eight months. Father and
fon, brothers, and uncle and nephew, were not
permitted to fit together in it. To be of this
council it was neceflfary to be a Padouan by ori-
gin, to have a father who was a Padouan by
birth, to have inhabited in Padoua with a family
at leaft far - forty years continually, to have an
eftate of fifty pounds income, and to have fubmit-
ted to the offices of the commons of the city. —

The

Porienari. 179

The third council was called the Greater Coun-
cil, or Parliament : it was at firft of three hundred
fenators, one moiety nobles, arid the other moiety
plebeians ; it was afterwards increafed to the
number of fix hundred, and finally, in 1277, to
a thoufand, in which were chofen the magistrates,
and all affairs relative to peace and war were deli-
berated. By thefe two councils, the greater and
the lefs were made, at divers times, various mu-
nicipal laws and ftatutes, of which, by a determi-
nation of 1263, were made four copies. The firft
was dopofited in the monaftery of St. j&enedicfc, the
fecond in that of St. John, the third in that of St.
Mary, and" the fourth in that of the fathers of
St. Mary di Porfiglia. — The fourth, and laft
council was common to all the people of the city,
into which, the doors being open, every one
might enter : but this council was very feldom
aiTembled, and never but for things of the utaiofl
importance. — The Padouans, defirous of provid-
ing a remedy againft the diforders arid mifchiefs
bccafioned by the confulate, and to extinguish in
the citizens all occafions of ambition to enjoy the
government of the city, invented the annual ma-
giftrate of the podefla, which was the bed medf-
cine that could be thought of by them to cure the
diforders already felt, and prevent the greater that
were apprehended. They created, therefore, for
ruler of the city, a foreign perfonage, of noble
blood, and excellent reputation for virtue, who, by
the weight and eminence -of his authority in
cafes of life and death, and from his fuperin-
tendence over all the judicial authority, civil
and criminal, from the more abfolute obedi-
ence paid him as the fupreme head of all the
other magiftfiacies, of the patricians, of the
plebians, and of the ruftics, and, in a word,

from.

i8c Padoua.

from his abfolute power, as it is called, over the city
and its territory, was called by way of eminence,
by the name of Podeda.— This mannerof Govern-
ment continued happily enough, as it is faid, till,
1237, when the city was fubjected by Ezzleino, of
Romagna, who mod terribly afflicted and mod
cruelly tormented it forthe fpace of nineteenyears ;
in which time there was no fort of torment, inhu-
manity, or cruelty, which it did not fufier from
that infernal monder, under whofe tyranny that
mod malignant peftilence, the factions of Guelphs
and Ghibellines, which, under the name of the
Imperial party, and. the party of the Church, had
infected many cities of Italy, and among others
didempered Piftoia, and did ineflimable mifchief.
— Before we pafs on, it may be well, for the more
complete information concerning this magiftrate
of the podefta, to relate a few particulars. The
po4efta was obliged, three months before the end
of his government, which lafted one year, to aflem-
ble the greater council, and caufe to be elected
eight citizens, four noble and four plebeian, of
more than thirty years of age : thefe elected
twelve fenators of the fame council, and of the
fame age, fix of the patricians and fix ple-
beians ; who'in like manner elected eight others
of the fame council, age, and condition, the office
of whom was to elecl: the new -podefta. Thefe
were (hut up together in one apartment, and could
not f peak* to any one, or have more than one
repaft a day, that .they might the fooner agree
in the nomination of three perfonages, who were
afterwards carried to the greater council, who pro-
ceeded to the election in this manner : All three
were feparately ballotted for, and he who had the
mod fuffraees was the new podeda : he who had
the next number of votes held the fecond place ;

and

Portenari.

and he whohadfeweftthelaft,infuch election. The
fyndick of the city was fent in hade with public
letters to him who had been honoured with mod
votes, who, if he accepted the charge, was under-
flood to be podefta ; but if in four days he did
not accept it, the fyndick was' fent to the fecond ;
and if he refufed, the third was fent to ; and if he
declined, a new election was made of other three
perfons : and of the acceptance or refufal of thefe
a record was made by a notary.

This method of electing the podefta was chang-
ed in 1257, fmce the examination of the fubjects
fit for the podeftarate was committed to the lefler
council, the election of whom afterwards was made
by the greater council, with this condition, how-
ever, that the electors of the prefent podefta
could not have a vote in the election of the fubfe-
quent podefta, by virtue of a ftatute made in 1 236.
No man could be elected podefta who had in Fa-
doua relations, by confanguinity or affinity, within
the fourth degree, nor who had been baniihed
from his country For forgery or treafon ; and this
was alfo underftood of the court or retinue which
the podefta brought with him, which confifted of
four judges or afiefibrs, two lieutenants of police,
and fome other fatellites. The office of the firft
judge was to aflift the podcfta in all things be-
longing to the government of the city ; the other
three judges had the charge of hearing and trying
the criminal caufes, e^ch one for three months,
which was ordained .to remove all occafion of fuf-
picipn that the accufed by length of time might
poflibly corrupt the judges : but thefe orders were
afterwards changed, and it was refolved that the
firft judge, who mud be an eminent doctor of
laws, mould be the vicar of the podefta, that the
fecond mould judge criminal caufes, the third

fhould

Padoua.

Iho-uld have the charge of the provifions, and that
the fourth mould be queflor and receiver of the
public money. The podefta, judges, and lieute-
nants, could not have with them in Padoua their
\vives, nor other ladies their relations, unlefs for
fifteen days, on occafion of infirmity, nor even
their brothers, fons, or nephews, more than twelve
years of age, nor fervants who mould be Pa-
douans. The podefla was obliged to bring with
him his two lieutenants, twelve fatellites, twelve
horfes, twelve valets and fervants, and all this
family and thefe horfes maintained at his expence,
for the public ferviceof the city. His falary was
two thoufand five hundred pounds a year, and was
afterwards increafed to four thoufand. The po-
defla was required to come to Padoua eight days
at leaft before pofleffion was given him of the
podeflarate, in which time he was obliged to take
the oath of office, vi±. to fwear that he, with his
judges, would govern without ambition, and
juftly, and that they would give the greateft atten-
tion to the affairs of the public, and with all their
power would conciliate and pacify the controver-
fies and difcords of the citizens. The podeflarate
began on the firfl of July ; but in 1280 it was
decreed to begin the firfl of January. This ma>
giftracy at firfl contmued for a year ; but in 1294
a law was made that it mould endure only fix
months, and that two podeflas mould be created
each year, one of whom- mould begin his admi-
niflration with January, the other with July ;
which law was obferved as long as the republic of
Padoua remained : but after that Padoua became
fubje6l, now to the emperor Henry the Seventh,
now to Frederic duke of Auflria, now to his bro-
ther Henry duke of Carinthia, now to the Scali-
gers lords of Verona, and then to the duke of

Milan,

Portenari. 183

Milan, and finally to the Carrarefi, this cuftom of
two podeftas went into defuetude. 1 he podefta,
when once in poffeflion of his office, was bound to
execute the. following orders : — Firft, in the fpace
of three days, to caufe to be read, and afterwards
to caufe to be punctually obferved, the papal con-
fiitutions againft heritics. Secondly, to refide
continually in the city, and rule it until the arrival
of a fucceffbr. Thirdly, during the whole time of
his adminiftration to hear the caufes of all perfons
indifferently, to which end the gates of the palace,
except at the hour of dinner, fhould always fland
open. Fourthly, that, together with the anciani, he
fhould ufe all his endeavours that the canonicates,
and the other ecclefiaftical benefices, of the bi-
mopric and diocefs of Padoua, fhould be confer-
red on citizens of Padoua, or of her diftrici.
Fifthly, to ele£t eight citizens, men of prudence
and experience, two for each quarter, who fhould
make choke of four or five hundred able men,
who, when they mould hear the found of the palace
bells, fhould come armed, under their ftandards, to
the palace of the pretor, and to the piazza del
Vino, for the defence of the podefta. Sixthly, to
give orders that, at the found of the great bell of
the tower of the palace, all the citizens and inha-
bitants of Padoua, from fixteen to fixty years of
age, mould run armed'to the piazza to defend the
common liberty. Seventhly, to create a captain,
who with fome foldiers, mould have the cuftody of
the city and its fuburbs. Eighthly, to hold, night
and day, guards at the gates of the city. Ninthly,
to give orders that in the city and in the fuburbs
mould be kept crofs-bows, and other weapons, to
exercife thg foldiers. Tenthly, to caufe to be
enrolled in the militia many men of the villages*
who, according to occurrences, mould come armed

to

184 Padoua.

to the city. Eleventhly, in all great tumults to
order into the piazza the ftandards of the commu-
nity ; in which cafe ftandard-bearers of the arts, at
the found of the bells of the palace, were held to
go to the piazza del Vino, with the men under
their command, armed, ready to obey whatever
orders the podefta mould ifiue? and there aflem-
ble, to be formed into a body, under the enfigns
of the- community, which could not depart from
the piazza without the exprefs command of the
podefta himfelf, for whofe guard there were al-
ways five hundred foldiers elected, one hundred
from the body of the patricians, and four hundred
from the plebians, diftinguifhed into four fqua-
drons, under four ftandards. • Twelfthly, that for
eight days before the arrival of a fuccefibr, the
podefta cannot give fentence in civil or criminal
caufes. Thirteenthly, that having finiflied his
podeftarate, he, his affeflbrs, and courtiers, mould
remain fourteen days in Padoua, to render an ac-
count before the fyndick of their adminiftration,
which is done in this manner : For the three firft
days it was lawful to every one to accufe the po-
defta, affeflbrs, and courtiers, before the fyndicks,
of any wrongs or injuries done them : in the eight
following days thefe complaints were determined
by the votes of the major part of the fyndicks ; and
if, by the multitude of complaints, or by dif-
ferences of opinions among the fyndicks, or
through other reafons, the. bufinefs could not be
fmifhed, three other days were added, in which
the fyndicks were obliged to determine it. From
the defence againft the complaints made againft
thepodefta were excluded all his favourites, friends,
and relations, and all advocates ; his own judges
and alfeflfors were alone admitted, and were
thought fufficient for his defence. At the end of

the

Portendrt. 185

the fourteenth day the podefla might depart with
his family. He could not be confirmed in the
podefterate for the next year, nor for the five
following years ; neither himfelf, nor any of his
relations, could hold any office, dignity, or ho-
nours, in the cityofPadoua ; and this was under-
itood of the aflefibrs, lieutenants of police, and
other officers : but this flatute was very often not
obferved. As population augmented, and caufes
and controverfies multiplied, and therefore the
podefta and his afleflbrs could not determine the
whole, certain other judges were inftituted, and
called Judges of the Lower Courts, and were diftin-
guifhed from each other by the names of animals,
for the mod part, as the bear, the horfe, the
leopard, and others. For the fuits arifmg be-
tween relations, two judges were inftituted as
arbitrators, who in the fpace of two months,
were to give fentence, and terminate the con-
troverfy : and if they could not agree, they called
in ten jurors for each party ; and if thefe difagreed,
the podefta himfelf, in the fpace of fifteen days,
&t in judgment with the reft, and decided the
caufe.

As to the* government of the territory, it is to
be obferved, that fomeof the moft rich and pow-
erful citizens of Padouahad the name of proceres,
noblemen or barons, and in fome of their landed
eftates and places they exercifed the jurifdi&ionof
blood, that is the power of life and death ; and to
ennoble their dominions, manors,or lordfhips, with
the magnificence of titles, in the year 1196 they
diftinguifhed themfelves into marquifles, counts,
and caftellans. The lords of Efte were entitled mar-
quifles ; the lords of Anguillara, Abano, Argua,
Baone,Bibano, Borgoricco^Calaone^RuftayCerro,
Calcinara, Caldenazzo,Candiana,Carturo^Caftel-

VOL. III. B b nubvo,

1 86 Padoua.

nuovo, Cortaloro, Fontaniva, Honara, Limena,
Lozzo, Montebello, Montebuto, Montemerlo,
Manchia,Nono, and Piazzola, were called counts ;
the lords of Carrara,Campbfanpiero,Montagnone,
Peraga, Pievedifacco, Publica, Revolone, Ronchide
Campanili, Stra, Selvazzano, Tortula, Villa Rapa,
Tribano, Galzignano, Noventa, Treville, and
Villa Nova, were denominated caftellans. But the
caflellan of Selvazzano having caufed to be cut
out the eyes of a certain woman for theft, who
afterwards came, deprived of her eyes, to Padoua,
the cruelty of this action difpleafed the republic
of Padoua fo much, that, in the year 1200, a law
was made, that under pain of death, no man
mould, for the future, exlercife any jurifdiction in
the territory of Padona, which law was re-enacted
and confirmed in 1205. The jurifdiction of life
and death, and all other jurifdiction, being taken
away from thefe grandees (magnati), the whole
territory was governed by the podefta of Padoua ;
and afterwards, in the courfe of time, the repub-
lic of Padoua fent a podefta into the following
diftrith of land, viz. Confelve, Lonino, Montag-
nana, and twenty-four other diftricts. The cuf-
tom of fending podeftas into thofe diftri&s con-
tinued till 1290, when a ftatute was made, that
places which were not walled mould not have
a podefta, but that into fome of them vicars
only (hould be fent. Such, then, was the go-
vernment of Padoua, from the year 1194 to the
tyranny of Ezzelino, mixed of monarchy and a
republic, and this conftitution was reftored after
the delivery of the city from that fierce and cruel
bppreffion, and lafted happily for fifty years, with
a remarkable increafe of the city in riches and
power ; and would have lafted much longer, if
the curfed factions of Ghibellines and Guelphs

had

Portenari.

had not difturbed the peace of the citizens, which
afterwards, by little and little, by means of the
poifon of thofe factions creeping in their hearts,
afflicted the city to fuch a degree, that, finally, in
the year 13 r 8, it took away their vital fpirits,
depriving them of their beloved liberty.

The parties of Ghibellines and Guelphs," under
the names of the Empire and the Church, fown in
the hearts of men by the enemy of the human
race, had intoxicated Italy, and contaminated the
city of Padoua. So fays the hiftorian ; and without
denying to the devil his (hare in the inftigation of
all fuch party diftinctions and animofities,it muft be
ftill infilled on, that the efTential defect in thecon-
flitution of every Italian republic was the greater!
caufe, and the inftrument with which the infernal
agent wrought. The parties of rich and poor, of
gentlemen and fimplemen, unbalanced by fome
third power, will always look out for foreign aid,
and never be at a lofsfor names, pretexts, and dif-
tinctions. Whig and Tory, Conftitutionalift and
Republican, Anglomane and Francornane, Athe-
nian and Spartan, will ferve the purpofe as well as
Guelph and Ghibelline. The great defideratum
in a government is a diftinct executive power, of
fufficient ftrcngth and weight to compel both
thefe parties, in turn, to fubmit to the laws* The
mifchiefs of thefe contagious parties were greateft
under the tyranny of Ezzelino, who, being {land- •
ard-bearer and head of the Imperial or Ghibelline
party, exerted all his force to extirpate the Guelph
party, followed by the people, and a great part of
the patricians. After his death the Guelph party
rofe, and with all their power perfecuted the Ghi-
bellines, driving them from the city, and fpoiling
them of all their goods ; and as the plebeians of
Padoua were devoted to the Guelph party, whether

from

iS8

Padoua.

from their natural inclinations, or becaufe the
, Guelphs had delivered the city from the empire of
Ezzelino, upon this occafion certain profligate
popular men became, by the favour of the ple-
beians, heads of the Guelph faction, became proud,
arrogant and prefumptuous, defiring that all the
affairs of the republic mould depend upon their
•will ; but fufpefting that fome of the principal
gentlemen, to whom fo much pride of the
Guelphs had become difgufting, would oppofe
their ambitious enterprizes, gave the plebeians to
underfland, that thofe gentlemen intended to
make themfelves fole maflers of the government ;
and excited fo great a commotion, that the ple-
beians, who, as in adverfe fortune they are fervile,
fo in profperity are infolent, demanded in a tur-
bulent manner, and obtained by threats and by
force, the inftitution of a magiflrate, according
to the ufage of the Roman republic, like a tribune
of the people, (the Padouans called thefe magif-
trates Gaftaldi delly Arti), ? who mould defend the
rights of the plebeians, and have authority to
refcind all thofe determinations of the fenate, as
was the cuftom in Rome, which could occafion
any prejudice to the jurifdi&ion of the plebeians.
Wherefore, in teftimony of the power granted to
the tribunes, it was, by a decree of the fenate, in
1293, ordained, that every podefta, in the begin-
** .rring of his adminiftration, mould confign to each
of the gaftaldi of the arts the ftandard of that
art : and this tribunian magiftracy advancing
every day in power, caufed to be made in its
favour, in the year j 296, a ftatute, that on the
" firft Sunday in every month the gaftaldi mould all
afTemble in the church of the palace of the com-
mons, and treat fully of all things that belonged
to the ftate of the city. The whole government

• of

Portenan. . 189

of the city, by this alteration, devolved into the
hands of the tribunes, becaufe, as has been faid
before, they annulled or confirmed, at their plea-
fare, the determinations of the greater council,
and becaufe they carried up to the council what-
ever they had concluded among themfelves, with
a certainty of obtaining their concurrence, by the
dependence which they had upon the popular fena-
tors, and alfo upon the lefs powerful of the no-
ble fenators, whom they had drawn to their devo-
tion by electing them to the honours of the city,
and by alTuming fome of them into the number of
the tribunes, from which magiftracy, and univer-
fally from all the greater honours, they always
moil arbitrarily excluded the moft powerful of the
nobles. From this diforderly and violent domi-
nation of the tribunes, who had for the moft part
greatly enriched themfelves, grew inteftine ha-
treds and terrible feditions between the primary
perfons and the heads of the popular party, of
whom the patricians of middling power, exalted
by the people to honours, became the factors ;
and, finally, fome of the primary gentlemen and
moft powerful patricians, not being able any
longer to bear to be neglected by the tribunian
power, took up arms, killed the principal heads
and defenders of the plebeians, and in fuch a man-
ner intimidated th'ofe patricians who adhered to
the plebeians, that, after many engagements, and
a profufe effufiion of blood, the tribunefhip of the
people was abolifhed in the year 1314, and the
government and the public authority was tranf-
ferred to the patricians, excluding totally the ple-
beians. Thefe, in order to keep down the Ghi-
bellines, increased the fenate (which, from the time
of the extinction of the houfe of Honora, had
been only of three hundred members) to the num.
. ber of a thoufand, incorporating feven hundred

Guelphs ;

Padoua.

Guclphs ; and wifhing that all queftions and mat-
ters relative to peace or war mould depend wholly
on the Guelph faction, and the better to eftablifh
the fuperiority of their party, they inftituted ano-
ther council, wholly of Guelphs, which had autho-
rity to approve or reject the decrees of the greater
lenate : from the body of this letter council were
created the four anciani confervators of the liberty,
and eight fecretaries for the cuftody of the city. This
mode of government continued till the year 1318,
when Padoua began to lofe her liberty, which me
afterwards wholly loft, remaining fubjecl: fometimes
to the Germans, fometimes to the Scaligers, fome-
times to the Carrefi, until, finally, after infinite
calamities, me was benignly received into the pious
bofom of the moft ferene republic of Venice, in the
year 1405*. Such as have been related, were the
viciflitudes of the governmentof the city of Padoua
after the tyranny of Ezzelino, which may be reca-
pitulated thus : According to the hiftorian, at firft
it was a mixture of monarchy and a republic ; af-
terwards it was changed into a democracy, for fuch
he denominates the tribunefhip of the plebeians,
in which the people attempted the abafement and
annihilation of the grandees ; and finally it termi-
nated in a government mixed of monarchy and
ariftocracy, haying the fenate of the optimates,
and creating the podefta annually : for the major
part of the the time from 1 08 1 to 1 3 1 8, it was go-
verned by one or other of the two bed fpecies of
mixed government, as our hiftorian thought,
which are compofed of monarchy and ariftocracy,
and of monarchy and republic.

This fovereignty of Padoua was, for the moft
part, in one affembly, for although a check was
aimed at by the law, that nothing mould be done

* Laugier, vol. v. p. 236. ,

in

Porteriari.

in the great council, which had not been pre-
vioufly debated in the little council, yet, when any
thing was propofed by the latter to the former,
they fat together and voted as one aflembly. At
fome times the fovereignty was clearly in one
aflembly of optimates or patricians ; at another,
in one aflembly of plebeians, as that of the tri-
bunes was : at laft two aflemblies are formed,
with each a negative ; but their being no third
power to mediate between them, no balance could
be formed or maintained between them. At no
time had the rnonarchial power, either under
the confuls, anciani, or podeftas, a negative ; for
though the podefta was an office of great dignity
and fplendor, he never had the whole executive
power, nor a negative on the legiflative. The
nobles and commons were mixed together in both
councils; and the executive power, the appoint-
ment of offices, &c. was always in one or other of
the aflemblies : and the confequence was inftabi-
lity to the laws, infecurity to life, liberty, and
property, conftant rivalry between the principal
families, particularly the Scalligeri and Carrarefi,
which ended in conqueft and fubjedion to Venice.
From 1103 to 1194 the government of confuls
continued. From 1 195 to 1236 the government
of podeftas under the republic of Padoua. From
1237 to 1256 the tyranny of Ezzelinowas fup-
ported. From 1257 to 1294 the government of
podeftas, under the republic, was revived and
maintained. From 1295 to 1311 they had two
podeftas. In 1312 Gerardo de gl* Inzola da
Parma was Imperial vicar for the emperor Henry
the Seventh, to whom the padouans began ta
yield obedience ; though they rebelled again this
year againft his authority, and the podeftas an4
republic were revived and continued till 1318, in

which

192

Padoua.

which year Giacomo Grande da Carrara was
made the firft lord of Padoua : he governed
one year and three months, and then renounced
the dominion, and died in 1324. In 1319 a po-
defta again for one year. In 1320 the city of
Padoua, to deliver itfelf from the fiege of Cane
Scaligero, lord of Verona, gave itfelf to Frederick
the Third, emperor and duke of Auftria, 'who
afterwards gave it to his brother Henry, duke of
Carinthia, under whom they were governed by
podeftas, who were at the fame time Imperial
vicars, till 1328. The podefla of this year was
difmified by Marfilio da Carrara, who had been
elected by the people lord of Padoua, who, how-
ever, made Pietro de i Rofli, of Parma, podefta j
but he not being able longer to refift in the war
with Cane della Scala, married Tadea, daughter
of Giacomo Grande de Carrara, firft lord of Pa-
doua, to Maftinq dalla Scala, nephew of Cane,
giving him Padoua in dower.. From 1329 to
1337 Padoua was governed by podeftas, under
the dominion of the Scalligers. In 1337 Marfilio
da Carrara having expelled the Scaligers, was made
the fecond lord of Padoua, and governed in 1338.
In 1338 Marfilio da Carrara, fecond lord of Pa-
doua, died, and to him fucceeded Ubertino da
Carrara, third lord of Padoua. From 1339 to
1345 the government of podeftas continued under
the princes Carrareli. In 1345 Ubertino da Car-
rara, third lord of Padoua, being fick, caufed to
be elected for his fuccefibr Marfilietto Papa fava
da Carrara, who was the fourth lord of Padoua,
and dbd ; but the fame year Marfilietto was
killed by Giacomo da Carrara, who became the
iifth lord of Padoua, and under him the govern-
ment of podeftas continued till 1350, when Gia-
como da Carrara, the fifth lord of Padoua, was

afTaffinated

PortenafL 193

affaflinated by William da Carrara, a natural fon
of Giacomo Grande, the firft lord ; to whom fuo
ceeded Giacobino da Carrara his brother, the
fixth lord, and Francefco da Carrara, furnamed
the Old, his fon, and feventh lord of Padoua : un-
der thefe the government by podeftas continued
till 1362, when Francefco da Carrara the Oldim-
prifoned his uncle Giacobino da Carrara, becaufe
he had confpired his death, and reigned lord
alone till 13,88, when Francefco da Carrara re-
nounced the dominion of this city to his fon
Francefco da Carrara, called the New, eighth and
laft lord of Padoua. The fame year, in November,
both the father and the fon were deprived of the
government of this (late by John Galeazzo Vif-
conte, firft duke of Milan, who governed it by
podeftas for the years 1388 and 1389, when Fran-
cefco da Carrara, called the New, drove out the
people of the duke of Milan, and recovered Pa-
doua and its diftricl:, except Boflano. From
1390 podeftas were continued till 1405, when the
Carrara were conquered, and Padoua admitted
into the republic of Venice. In 1393 Francefco
da Carrara, furnamed the Old, feventh lord of
Padoua, died in a prifon in Monza, to which he
had been fent by John Galeazzo Vifconte, duke of
Milan.

VOL. Ill, C c LETTER

[ '94 ]

LETTER VI.

M A N T O U A.

Dear Sir,

EQUICOLA concurs with Leonardo Arc-
tino, and all the other Italian writers, in his
account of the antiquity, riches, and power of
the Tufcans, Etrufcans, Etrurians, Tyrrhenians,
or Dodicapoli (for by all thefe names they were
known), their original emigration from Lydia,
their government of Lucumoni, their twelve
confederated peoples, their fubejection in a courfe
of time to the Romans, Goths, Longobards, and
Charlemaign, who for his merit was, in the year
§00, created emperor, with the titles of Csefar and
Auguftus, by the pope Leo the Third, who un-
derftood the effects upon the minds of the people of
words and titles fo anciently beloved as well as
dreaded in Italy. He gave him alfo the title of
Great, which had been before given only to three
princes, Alexander, Pompey, and Conflantine.
The authority which the Roman fenate and people
had anciently exercifed, of electing and confirming
the emperors, was now by Charlemain transfer-
red to the Roman pontificate ; and to prevent fedi-
tions, the power of confirming the pontiff was
given to the emperor : — a promifing alliance 1
Afterwards, in 1002, Gregory the Fifth ordained
a conflitution, which continues to this time,
that the election of future emperors mould be
free in the power of the Germans, and the ec-

clefiallcal

Equkola. 195

clefiaftical and temporal electorates were then
created*.

In 1 1 1 1 Mantoua fell into difcords, threw off
her fubjedtion to Matilda, and aflumed an indepen-
dence; but being befieged and reduced to great dif-
trefs, was obliged to fubmit again to that princefs.

In ii 14 Sigibert, an enterprizing man, took
the opportunity of the troubles in Italy to ag-
grandize himfelf, and going from Lucca, he made
himfelf lord of Parma and Reggie. He was a
Lombard by defcent, and was prefect or lord of
thofe cities. Sigibert had three fons, Sigibert the
Second, Atto, and Gerardo ; two of them died,
and Atto alone remained, who by the change of
the letters was afterwards called Azzo. He for-
tified Canofla, in Reggiano, and there inhabited as
his principal feat, whence his defcendants were
called da Canoffa, He had two fons, the firft of
whom was named Tedaldo, and the other, uniting
the names of his grandfather and father, was call-
ed Sigibertazzo, although it was afterwards cor-
ruptly called Albertazzo. This perfon was fent
into Germany, and recommended himfelf to Otto,
the emperor, fo effectually, as to obtain a grant
for his fervices of Calaone, Monfelice, Montag-
nana, Arqui, and EJle, with the title of marquis.
He married Alda, a natural daughter of the em-
peror. From this match there iflued two fons,
Ugo and Falco : the latter remained in Germany
with his mother ; Ugo came into Italy with his
father, and fucceeded to the lands above mentioned,
and to the marquifate of Efte. From this Ugo
are defcended the illuftrious lords of the houfe of
Efte, who reigned fo long in Ferrara ; and from
them were defcended the family that was called
the Canofli of Verona.

* Equieola, p. .25. Commentari Mantouani.

There

196 Mantoua.

There was in Mantoua, in 1265, four moft
powerful families, and four others their adherents,
of fomewhat lefs influence. The Bonacolfi and
GrofTolani inhabited one quarter j the Arlotti and
the Poltroni another : thefe not long before had
driven out the Calorofi. In a third quarter were
the Cafalodi and thofe of Riva ; and in the
fourth, the Zenacalli and the Gaffari.

The government was, as in all the other cities of
Italy, in one centre, a general council, who^firft
appointed confuls, then podeftas, then gonfa-
loniers, captains of the people, &c. which pro-
duced the ufual ftruggles for power ; and in
the year 1266 the Gaffari entered into a fecret
confpiracy to deliver the city of Mantoua into
the hands of the Eftenfi, lords of Ferrara. The
treafon was difcovered, and thofe who faved their
lives by flight were banifhed for ever, and the
others inftantlyput to death, and the houfes of
all who were accomplices or privy to the crime
were burnt and demolifhed. The power of indi-
vidual citizens increafed every day, and parties
and factions in confequence. The podefla, though
a foreigner was ufually created to that office, ad-
miniftered its functions according to the will and
pleafure of a fmall number of the principal men.
The juftice of power, or the right of the ffrongeft,
was inculcated, and equity gave way to violence*.
In fuch a tumult of the factions, the prudent
men called a convention, to deliberate on a new
form of government. Some were for ephori, as

* Crefceva ogni di. piu la potenza de particolari, £ augu-
wentavanii le.fattfoni & parti. II podeila, quale foreftiere fi
foleva creare, ad arbitrio di alcuni pochi amminiftrava, il fuo
officio : la giiis titia dalla forza era conculcata, & Pequita
cedeva alia violenza. Commentari Mantouani, di Equicola,
p. 47, 48,

III

Equicola. 197

in Sparta ; others for cofmi, as in Crete ; others
for fuffetes, as in Carthage : but the mod were
for hipati, as in Greece, or rather for two confuls,
as in Rome. Two magiftrates were therefore
created ; and that they might be fure to guard
againft ambition, they rnufl be chofen in rotation
every fix months, two at a time, from each of the
four quarters of the city. Thefe were to be
called captains of the people, and were to be the
protectors of the plebeians, and defenders of their
liberties. Two magiftrates, therefore from the
body of the nobility, were appointed, in the na-
ture of tribunes of the people, and thofe were
Pinamonte, of the family of Bonacolfi, and Otto-
nello, of that of Zenecalli, in the year 1274.
Thefe had not continued one month in office to-
gether, before fuch animofities arofe between the
two families, that Zenecallo was treacheroufly
called in the night into the palace, under pretence
of confulting upon fome fudden affair of the laft
importance, and there murdered by the Bonacolfi.
The next morning the Bonacolfi called together
the principal nobility, and, with fictitious grief
and pharifaical tears, communicated the fa£t, and
exhorted the people to revenge, wiihing that every
one might believe that the deceafed magiftrate had
been alfaulted and put to death by fome private
enemy. An inquiry was ordered, which engaged
fo much attention, and took up fo much time,
that no man fpoke of any fucceffbr, and therefore
Pinamonte governed alone. The fcramble for
power was as yet altogether among the gentle-
men. Benvenuta da Imola, in his commentaries
upon Dante, where he reafons of Mantoua, writes,
that this city had been inhabited by gentlemen
of Riva, of Mercaria, and of Cafaloldi ; and that
Bonacolfo had agreed with thefe houfes to expel

from

1

198 Mantoua.

from the city every other nobleman ; and that
afterwards, forming a particular agreement with
two of them, he drove out the third ; and then
uniting with the Cafaloldi, he banifhed the fe-
cond ; and, finally, driving out the Cafaloldi, he
remained alone, and by artifice, affifted with force,
continued without a colleague in the magiftracy ;
and taking for his podefta Alberto della Scala,
for a ftri&er union he obtained the place of
podefta in Verona for Giannino de Bonacolfi, not
failing to maintain a good intelligence with the
marquis of Efte. By all thefe arrangements he
eafily obtained from his followers the prolonga-
tion of his own power for another fix months ; and
when he had thus laid his foundations fufficiently
ftrong to fupport any edifice, he aflumed the title of
captain-general. Thefe encroachments were very
uneafily fupported by the nobles, who perceived
that from free citizens they were became, by little
and little, the fubje&s of a tyrant. Whereupon
the Arlotti, the Cafaloldi, the Agnelli, and the .
Grofiblani, confpired together to throw off the
yoke : but Pinamonte being informed of the
plot on the very day on which it was to have
been executed, and being well prepared, he fell
unexpectedly on the confpirators, one after ano-
ther, fome of whom he took prifoners, others
were killed, many wounded, and the great multi-
tude faved themfelves by flight ; many fufpe&ed
perfons were fent out of their beloved home, and
confined in various places. Pinamonte did not
ceafeto perfecute his adverfaries, until all things
in the city appeared to be quieted under his do-
minion. The miferable Mantouans were difperf-
ed in various places, and particularly in Gonzaga :
but the tyrant had the art to hold out temptations
of lands, reftitution of property, and reftoration

to

Equicola.

to their country, to thefe, till they furrendered to
him that Gonzaga, which had often defended itfelf
both againft popes and emperors. Pinamonte
then eftablifhed a friendfhip with Venice and Pa-
doua, but was interrupted in his career in 1289 by
death. The family of Bonacolfi, with Pinamonte
at their head, had, by forming a popularity among
the vileft plebeians, been able to expel the other
noble families, and make themfelves abfolute. So
complete was their afcendency over the minds of
the rabble, that, upon the death of Pinamonte, the
minority were not able to obtain any regular election
or rational reform of thegovernment ;but Bardellone
Bonacolfi was fet up by his party for a fucceflbr, a
man univerfally hated, a rnonfter without virtue,
abfurd in the conduct of his whole life, unfkil-
ful, infolent, without judgment or experience ;
equally ignorant and arrogant, vile and fufpicious,
yet credulous, and a flave to adulation ;* devoted
to cruelty and luft. This peftiferous tyrant go-
verned in Mantua five years, according to Plantina;
but the plebeians themfelves could bear him no
longer, and fet up another of the fame family
againft him. Bottigella Bonacolfi with little
difficulty was able to expel him, and Tamo his
brother, one of whom died miferably at Padoua,
and the other at Ferrara. We pafs over the
a&ions of Bottigella, and his wars with Cremona
and with Azzo 1 ilenfe, &c.

In 1308 Bottigella died, as well as his enemy
Azzo : to the latter fucceeded his fon Flifco, and
to the former Paflarino, his brother ; for this ple-
beian tyranny was already become hereditafy in
the family. Although the government of Pafla-
rino was not remarkable for folly or feverity, yet
Luigi Gonzaghi, who had connected Jiimfelf in
marriage with the Bonacolfi, being *a man of

abilities,

2oo Mantoua.

abilities, and knowing the general difcontent of the
people, and the univerfal hatred of the nobility
againfl that family, entered into a concert with
fome of the neighbouring lords, as Cane della
Scala, &c. found little difficulty to depofe and
expel PofTarino, put him to death, and reign in
his (lead. The family of the Gonzaghi were
named from the place of their ancient refidence,
which was Gonzaga. A multitude of conjectures
atid fables, collected from various authors, con-
cerning the origin of this family, we pafs over.
Guido Gonzaga, who fought againfl Manfred
king of Naples, had five fons, the firft of whom
was Luigi, the author and founder of the lord-
fhip and marquifate of Mantoua.

In 1328, it is faid, that by the confent of the
people, according to the laws, and good cuftoms,
one was Delected, after the death of PaiTarino in
1328, to whom, and to his fucceflbrs, was given
for perpetuity the whole empire, as was ufual in
the heroic times. The Mantouans reafoned irt
this manner : — The mode of making a common-
wealth perpetual, or of any long duration, is by
prudence, which difpofes and rules with manly
energy, as well as with wife difcernment. This
can alone be performed in a date by means of
juftice, which diflributes to every one his deferts ;
to the good, rewards and honours ; to the wicked,
punifhment and infamy. As the virtue of cle-
mency is the daughter of magnanimity, and par-
ticipates of divinity, we always applaud it when
it expends only to offences committed againfl
ourfelves ; and it is commended in princes when-
ever pardon and mercy cannot caufe an injury to
the public, and give infolence to the daring to
rife againfl the laws. It fhould be a pleafure to
princes to remit private injuries j but, fldlful in

the

Equicola. 201

the healing art, they fhould not be fo partially
compaffionate as to heal one wound at the hazard
of deftroying the whole body. The liberty of
the people confifts in two things, in the laws and
the tribunals : when thefe prevail in a city, without
favour, refpeft, or partiality, that city and its citi-
zens are free. — Upon thefe principles the Man-
touans, finding that liberty never had been enjoy-
ed by them under their uncouth government of a
republic, ftrange to relate! adopted voluntarily
an abfolute monarchy. Louis was elected and
conftituted upon thefe principles and for thefe
reafons, and began his reign by an ailiduous at-
tention to the revival of laws which had been
trampled under foot, and by a diligent folicitude
that all the good cuftoms mould be obferved with
equality. And this is fufficient for another ex-
ample of the ilruggles of a few families, in an
unbalanced government, for pre-eminence, and of
the final triumph of the Gonzaghi over the Bo-
nacolfi, in a monarchy creeled on the ruins of a
republic.

VOL. III. D d LETTER

LETTER V.

MONTEPULCIANO.

Dear Sir,

CHIUCI, the country and refidence of Por-
fenna, the ancient king to whom Tarquin
fled for hofpitality, was one of the moft ancient
and powerful cities of Tufcany or Etruria. As
Chiufi was in a low fituation and a bad air,
Porfenna chofe, for his pleafure and his health, a
mountain in the neighbourhood, where was a
falubrious atmofphere and an admirable profped ;
an ample plain, the lake of Thrafimene., and the
river of Chiane, with hills and vallies loaded with
every production of the earth, in -grapes, grains,
snd fruits, in the mod perfect elegance and abund-
ance, were around it.

In after ages, upon a civil war in Chiufi between
the gentlemen and plebeians, in which the former
were expelled, they retired to this mountain, and
gave it the name of Mons Politicus, which was
corrupted afterwards, in the vulgar pronunciation,
into Monfpolitianus, and fmce into Montepul-
ciario. The plebeians of the fame city paffed the
river, took poffeflion of another elevated fituation,
where they built a cattle, and called it Caftrum
Plebis,

Though Florence and Siena have, at different
times, pretended that Montepulciano was in their
dominion : yet it is certain that, for three hun-
dred years tit leaft, it was an independent fove-

reign

Spinello Bend. 203

reign republic. At an expence of continual wars
it maintained its liberty. Its government was by
podeflas and general councils, like all the other
cities ; and its whole hiftory is made up of revo-
lutions, from nobles to plebeians, and from ple-
beians to nobles, Florence and Siena taking the
parties of oppofite factions. Even in this little
village there were great families as well as little
ones, the Guidos, Ugolinos, the Rulgnellos, and
Rinieri, Continually flruggling for prefidence.
In the year 1328 the Rinieri, or rather the family
del Pecora, were accounted noble, becaufe they
were rich, and powerful in followers, adherents,
and relations : they had increafed in reputation
and power to fuch a degree, that they domineered
at their difcretion, over all their compatriots.
The heads of the houfe were Jacob and Niccolas
de Cavalieri, who governed in concurrence, with
prudence and good order^ till 1352, when diflen-
fions and difcords began to arife between them.
Jocob concerted with Peter Sacconi, who govern-
ed in Arezzo, a project to make himfelf mafter
of Montipulciano ; but Niccolas, his colleague,
revealed it to the governor of the people, who ex-
cited an infurrection, and expelled Jacob, with
twenty of his followers ; and afterwards, with the
influence and councils of Niccolas, the govern-
ment was reformed, and all the friends of Jacob
were excluded from any (hare in it, according to
the cuftom and the nature of all majorities, when
there is no power but a minority to rebuff their
pretenfions*. . Jacob, in his turn, had intrigued
with Vifconti, archbifhop of Milan, and his allies,
and corrupting a notary, an officer on guard,
broke down a gate in the night, entered with all

* Matt. ViJl. lib. iii. c. 10. f, 146. an. 1352.

his

2 04 Montep ulclano.

his men, and excited an uproar. Niccolas, a
knight of great fpirit, feized his arms, and with a
few of his companions, mounting his horfe, with-
out waiting for further help, attacked the enemy
with fuch impetuofity that they fled in a panic*
Jacob, with twenty-five horfemen, efcaped ; the
others were taken, to the number of twenty- five,
together with the notary and the guard. The
governors of the people hanged thirty, and releaf-
ed the reft, having firft marked them for ever, by
flitting their nofes and cutting of their ears.

Jacob then fled to Siena, and there attempted
to form connexions and obtain auxiliaries ; and
Niccolas, and the governors of the people of
Montepulciano, applied to Perugia, and a war was
excited between thofe two cities, which was ter-
minated by ambafladors, upon thefe conditions,
that Montepulciano fhould remain under the go-
vernment of the people, under the protection of
the commons of Siena, for twenty years ; Jacob
and Niccolas were to be indemnified for the ex-
pences, and their eftates roftored, and the com-
mons of Florence and Perugia were to be gua-
rantees. Tommafi adds, that another condition
was the reftoration of all the refugees*. The
next year the peace was broken, and Niccolas fent
into banifhment ; but collecting friends without,
and concerting meafures with his partifans within,
he found means to enter Montepulciano, with
two hundred horfe and five hundred foot : but
he met with fuch a refiftance from his enemies in
the place, and their Sienefe allies, that he perceiv-
ed he could not overcome them. He therefore
took the barbarous refolution to burn the town,
and retire : his party fet fire to as many houfes as

* Tom. lib. x. fo. 319. an. 1353.

poffible.

Splnello Benei. 205

poffible, and while the people and foldiers were
intent upon preventing the progrefs of the flames
he retreated. Niecolas and Jacob, at length
rinding that they gained nothing and loft much
by continual quarrels, came to an agreement, and
folicited the emperor to hold the government of
Montepulciano as Imperial vicars : but the people
would not admit them, becaufe the Sienefe would
not receive fuch vicars. This occafioned a frefli
war between the commons of Montepulciano
and thofe of Siena on one fide, and the Perugians,
in conjunction with the Pecora family and their
adherents, on the other. In this war a memora-
ble battle was fought, and the Montepulcians
diftinguifhed themfelves by fo much valour, that
the Perugians created four of them cavaliers, viz,
John the fon of Niecolas, and Gherard, the fon
of Jacob, and two of their nephews, Berthbldo and
Corrado, all of the family del Pecora : and the
Perugian conquerors, with their Montepulcian
cavaliers, committed the cuftomary depredations
and devaftations. -

The government of the land being in the hands
of the people, for the fake of the public tranquil-
lity Jacob and Niecolas del Pecora remained
abroad in banifhment, inhabiting Valiano, a flrong
place, and a plentiful fituation. The latter, know-
ing the nature of the citizens of Montepulciano.,
accuftomed to hope more than they ought, and
to tolerate lefs than was necefiary, discontented
and prone to novelties, vacillating between the
commons of Siena and thofe of Perugia through
alternate envy, jealoufy, and refentment, and being
never at reft, entered into a fecret correfpondence
with them , in order to return to his country. His
purpofe was in time accomplifhed, and he was
joyfully received by the people, and mutual for-

givenefs

206

Montepulciano.

givenefs of injuries and affronts was flipulatecL
Recollecting that the rupture between him and
Jacob had been the caufe of all the evils, he fent
a melfenger to him, and a reconciliation was ef-
fected between them for the common benefit of
their country. All was now joy, friendmip, and
feflivity, in appearance, but the fecret caufes of dif-
cord were ftill at work, and before the year 1363
produced another revolution, and Niccolas and his
friends were again exiled.

Five years afterwards the exiles from Montepulr
ciano, with fome afliftance from the grandees of
Siena, entered and conquered their country, and
fent Jacob, who had made himfelf lord and maf-
ter, to prifon. But the plebeians, and others,
who had been oppreffed by him, and mortally
hated him, could not fatiate their vengeance
merely by burning and plundering all his pro-
perty : they broke open his prifon, and tore him
into pieces fo fmali, that no part of his body could
ever be collected for fepulture. The grandees
were fo tranfported with indignation at this infa-
mous barbarity, that they put to death a great
part of the plebeians, and banimed the remainder.
They reformed the government of the land, how-
ever, into a popular ftate, and banimed the Ca-
valieri as rebels. Not to purfue this relation to
any greater length, it may be obferved in general,
that this little hill maintained its independence for
three hundred years, by the mutual jealoufies of
Florence, Seina, and Perugia ; but it was by un-
interrupted wars with one or the other of them,
all in their turns feeking its alliance or fubjuga-
tion, and all in their turns taking its part when
in danger qf being fubdued by any one. This
occafioned a continual vacillation of its friendmip
and enmity with thofe cities, and conftant revolu-
tions

Spinello Bend. 207

tions of government at home upon every change.
There was no balance in their government by
which parties or powerful individuals might be
reftrained, and a few families were continually
fcrambling for fuperiority. There were no no-
bles by name, that is, there were no marquifies,
counts, or barons ; but there were gentlemen and
common people, and the gentlemen were called
cavaliers, becaufe they could afford to keep a
horfe, or at moft three horfes to each man. The
family del Pecora was the principal one of thefe
cavaliers, and theyenflaved their country of courfe,
as the Medici did in Florence. — Perhaps it may
be faid, that in America we have no diftinctions of
ranks, and therefore (hall not be liable to thofe
divifions and difcords which fpring from them ;
but have we not laborious yeomen, gentlemen,
efquires, honourable gentlepien, and excellent
gentlemen ? and are not thefe diftinftions eftab-
lifhed by law ? have they not been eftablifhed by
our anceftors from the firil plantation of the coun-
try ? and are not thofe diftindions as earneftly de-
fired and fought, as titles, garters, and ribbons
£re in any nation of Europe ? We may look as
wife, and moralize as gravely as we will ; we may
call this defire of diftin&iori childifh and filly ;
but we cannot alter the nature of men : human*
nature is thus childifh and filly ; and its Author
has made it fo, undoubtedly for wife purpofes ;
and it is fetting ourfelves up to be wifer than
Nature, and more philosophical than Providence,
to cenfure it. All that we can fay in America is,
that legal diftinctions, titles, powers, and privi-
leges, are not hereditary ; but that the difpofition
to artificial diftin&ions, to titles, and ribbons, and
to the hereditary defcent of them, is ardent in
America, we may fee by the inftitution.of the

Cincinnati.

208

Montepulciano.

Cincinnati. There is not a more remarkable
phenomenon in univerfal hiftory, nor in uni-
verfal human nature, than this order. The
officers of an army, who had voluntarily engag-
ed in a fervice under the authority of the peo-
ple5 whofe creation and prefervation was upon
the principle that the body of the people were
the only fountain of power and of honour ;
officers too as enlightened and as virtuous as ever
ferved in any army ; the moment they had
anfwered the end of their creation, inftituted
titles and ribbons, and hereditary defcents, by
their own authority only, without the confent or
knowledge of the people, or their reprefentatives
or legiflatures. If thefe gentlemen had been of
opinion that titles and ribbons were neceflary in
fociety to have been confident, they mould have
taken meafures for calling conventions of the
people, where it mould have been determined,
firft, whether any fuch diftin&ion mould be intro-
duced ; fecondly how many fuch orders ; thirdly,
what number of individuals of each ; and laftly,
there mould have been in convention a general
election of noblemen for each of the thirteen flates*
As great injuftice may be done by given too much
honour to one, and too little to another, as by
committing trefpafies upon property, or flanders
upon reputations, the public good requires juf-
tice in the diftribution of fame as well as fortune ;
and the public, or fome tribunal erected by
the public, can be alone competent to the de-
cifion.-

As there is no inftance more parallel than this
of Montepulciano, where the people who owned
horfes agreed together to call themfelves cavaliers,
and thus created a dlftincl: order in the (late, this
opportunity has beea taken to make an obferva-

tion

Spine llo Bcnci. 209

tion upon an inftitution, which ought not to be
patted over in confidering the fubject of thefe
letters. It is greatly to be wiihed that the officers
would voluntarily difcontinue their focieties, and
lay afide their eagles, which will do them, as well
as the community, much more hurt than good :
they have already excluded many excellent men
from places in civil life, to which their merit in
other refpeds entitled them ; they have excited
difputes which are very pernicious j they arc
founded on no principle of morals, true policy, or
our own conftitution.

LETTER VI,

The right Conftitution of a Commonwealth- examined.

Dear Sir,

THE Englifh nation, for their improvements
in the theory of government, has, at leaft,
more merit with the human race than any other
among the moderns. The late mod beautiful
and liberal fpeculations of many writers, in va-
rious parts of Europe, are manifeftly derived
from Englifh fources. Americans too ought for
*ever to acknowledge their obligations to Englifh
writers, or rather have as good a right to in-
dulge a pride in the recollection of them as the
inh abitants of the three kingdoms. The original
plantation of our country was occafioned, her
continual growth has been promoted, and her
VOL. III. E e prefent

2 1 o The right Conjlitution of a

prefent liberties have been eftablifhed, by thefe
generous theories. There have been three pe-
riods in thehiftory of England, in which the prin-
ciples of government have been anxiouily ftudied,
and very valuable productions published, which
at this day, if they are not wholly forgotten in their
native country are perhaps more frequently read
abroad than at home. — The firft of thefe ^periods
was that of the Reformation, as early as the writ-
ings of Machiavel himfelf, who is called the great
reftorer of the true politics. " The Shorte Treatife
" of Polticke Power, and of the true Obedience
" which Subje&s owe to Kyngs and other civile
" Governors, with an exhortation to all true natu-
" ra! Englishmen, compyled by John Ponnet,D.D."
was printed in 1556, and contains all the eflential
principles of liberty which were afterwards dilat-
ed on by Sidney and Locke. This writer is clearly
for a mixed government, in three equiponderant
branches, as appears by thefe words, p. 7. " In
" fome countreyes they were content to be go-
" verned, and have the laws executed, by one
" king or judge ; in fome places by many of the
" belt forte ; in fome places by the people of the
ec lowed forte ; arid in fome places alfo by the
" king, nobilitie, and the people all together.
",And thefe diverfe kyndes of ftates, or policies
" had their diftindte names ; as where one ruled a
" manarchie ; where many of the beft, arido-
" cratie ; and where the multitude, democratic ;
" and where ail together, that is a king, the no-
•" bilitie, and commons, a mixture (late ; and which
" men by long continuance have judged to be the
" bell fort of all : for where that mixture ftate was
<c exercifed, there did the commonwealthe longed
4C continue." — The fecond period was the Inter-
regnum, and indeed the whole interval between

1640

• • ; < .'. *\

Commonwealth, examined. 2 1 1

1640 and 1660. In the'courfe of thofe twenty
years, not only Ponnet and others were reprinted,
but Harrington, Milton, the Vindiciae contra
Tyrannos, and a multitude of others, came upon
the flage. — The third period was the Revolution in
1688, which produced Sidney, Locke, Hoadley,
Trenchard Gordon, Plato Redivivus, who is alfo
clear for three equipollent branches in the mixture,
and others without number. The difcourfes of
Sidney were indeed written before, but the fame
caufes produced his writings and the Revolution. —
Americans mould make collections of all thefe
fpeculations, to be preferved as the mod precious
relics of antiquity, both for curiofity and ufe.
There is one indifpenfabie rule to be obferved in
the perufal of all of them ; and that is, to confider
the period in which they were written, the circurn-
flances of the times, and the perfonal character as
well as the political fituation of the writer. Such
a precaution as this deferves particular attention
in examining a work, printed firft in the Mercu-
rius Politicus, a periodical paper publifhed in
defence of the commonwealth, and reprinted in
1656, by Marchamont Nedham, under the title
of " The Excellency of a free State, or the right
" Conflitution of a Commonwealth." The na-
tion had not only a numerous nobility and clergy
at that time difgufted, and a vaft body of the
other gentlemen, as well as of the common peo-
ple, defirous of the reftoration of the exiled
royal family, but many writers explicitly efpouf-
ed the caufe of fimple monarchy and abfolute
power : among whom was Hobbes, a man, how-
ever unhappy in his temper, or deteftable for his
principles, equal in genius and learning to any of
his contemporaries. Others were employed .in
ridiculing the do&rine, that laws, and not men,

fhould

212 . The right Conftitution of a

fhould govern. It was contended, that to fay
" that laws do or can govern, is to amufe our-
*e felves with a form of fpecch, as when we fay
" time, or age, or death, does fuch a thing.
<c That the government is not in the law, but in
c< the perfon whofe will gives a being to that law.
" That the perfection of monarchy confifts in go-
" verningby a nobility, weighty enough to keep
" the people under, yet not tall enough, in any
" particular perfon, to meafure with the prince ;
cc and by a moderate army, kept up under the
cc notion of guards and. garrifons, which may be
cc fufficient to (bangle all feditions in the cradle ;
by councils, not fuch as are co-ordinate with
the prince, but purely of advice and difpatch,
with power only to perfuade, not limit, the
prince's will*-" In fuch a fituation, writers on
the fide of liberty thought themfelves obliged to
confider what was then practicable, not abftracted-
ly what was the beft : they felt the neceffity of
leaving the monarchical and ariftocratical orders
out of their fchemes of government, becaufe all
the friends of thofe orders were their enemies, and
pf addrefling themfelves wholly to the democra-
tical party, becaufe they alone were their friends ;
at leaft there appears no other hypothecs on
which to acconnt for the crude conceptions of
Milton and Nedham. The latter, in his preface,
difcovers his apprehenfions and feelings, too
clearly to be miftaken, in thefe words : " I be-
66 lieve none will be offended with this following
" difcourfe, but thofe that are enemies to public
" welfare : let fuch be offended ftill ; it is not for
" their fakes that I publiih this enfuing treatife,

** See the political pamphlets of that day, written on the
fide of monarchy.

"but

Commonwealth, examined. 2,1 ft

" but for your fakes that have been noble patriots 9
" felhiV'foldiers and fufferers for the liberties and
" freedoms of your country." As Mr. Turgot's
idea. of a commonwealth, in which all authority
is to be collected into one centre, and that
centre the nation, is fuppofed to be precifely the
project of Marchamont Nedham, and probably
derived from his book, and as " The Excellency of
" a free State" is a valuable morfel of antiquity well
known in America, where it has many partifans,
it may be worth while to examine it, efpecially as
it contains every femblance of argument which
can poffibly be urged in favour of the fyftem, as it
is not only the popular idea of a republic both in
France and England, but is generally intended by
the words republic ', commonwealth, and popular Jlate,
when ufed by Englifh writers, even thofe of the
moft'fenfe, tafte, and learning.

Marchamont Nedham lays it down as a funda-
mental principle, and an undeniable rule, " that
" the people, that is, fuch as mail be fucceffively
" chofen to reprefent the people, are the beft
" keepers of their own liberties, and that for
" many reafons : Firft, becaufe they never think
" of ufurping over other men's rights, but mind
" which way to preferve their own."

Our firft attention mould be turned to the pro-
pofition itfelf, " The people are the beft keepers
" of their own liberties." But who are the peo-
ple ? " Such as mall be fucceffively chofen to re-
" prefent them." — Here is a confufion both of
words and ideas, which, though it may pafs with
the generality of readers in a fugitive pamphlet,
or with a majority of auditors in a popular ha-
rangue, ought, for that very reafoii, 'to be as
carefully avoided in politics as it is in philofophy
or mathematics. Jf by the people is meant the

whole

214 T&e right Conftitution of a

whole body of a great nation, it fhould never be
forgotten, that they can never aft, confult, or rea-
fon together, becaufe they cannot march- five
hundred miles, nor fpare the time, nor find a fpace
to meet ; and therefore the propofition, that they
are the beffc keepers t)f their own liberties, is not
true. They are the worft conceiveable ; they are
no keepers at all : they can neither ad:, judge,
think, or will, as a body politic or corporation.
If by the people is meant all the inhabitants of
a fmgle city, they are not in a general afiembly,
at all times, the beft keepers of their own liberties,
nor perhaps at any time, unlefs you feparate
from them the executive and judicial power, and
temper their authority in legiilation with the ma-
turer councils of the one and the few. If it is
meant by the people, as our author explains him-
felf, a reprefentative affembly, " fuch as (hall be
" fucceflively chofen to reprefent the people,"
they are not ftill the beft keepers of the people's
liberties, or their own, if you give them all the
power, legiflative, executive, and judicial : they
would invade the liberties of the people, at leaft
the majority of them would invade the liberties of
the minority, fooner and oftener than an abfolute
monarchy, fuch as that of France, Spain, or Ruf-
fia, or than a well-checked arifbocracy, like Ve-
nice, Bern, or Holland. An excellent writer has
faid, fomewhat incautioufly, .that " a people will
" never opprefs themfelves, or invade their own
" rights/' This compliment, if applied to hu-
man nature, or to mankind, or to any nation or
people in being or in memory, is more than has
been merited. If it mould be admitted, that a
people will not unanimoufly agree to opprefs
themfelves, it is as much as is ever, and more
than is always, true. All kinds of experience

mew,

Commonwealth, examined. 215

fhew, that great numbers of individuals do opprefs
great numbers of other individuals ; that parties
often, if not always, opprefs other parties ; and
majorities almoft univerfally minorities. AH
that this obfervation can mean then, confidently
with any colour of fact, is, that the people will
never unanimoufly agree to opprefs themfelves :
but if one party agrees to opprefs another, or the
majority the minority, the people (till opprefs
themfelves, for one part of them opprefs another.
— " The people never think of ufurping over
" other men's rights. " What can this mean ?
Does it mean that the people never unanimoufly
think of ufurping over other men's rights ? This
would be trifling, for there would, by the fuppo-
iition, be no other men's rights to ufurp. But
if the people never jointly, nor feverally, think o,f
ufurping the rights of others, what occafion can
there be for any government at all ? Are there no
robberies, burglaries, murders, adulteries, thefts,
nor cheats ? Is not every crime an ufurpation
over other men's rights ? Is not a great part, I
will not fay the greateft part, of men detected
every day in fome difpofition or other, ftronger or
weaker, more or lefs, to ufurp over other men's
rights ? There are fome few, indeed, whofe whole
lives and conversations fhow, that in every
thought, word, and action, they confcientiouily
refpect the rights of others : there is a larger
body (till, who, in the general tenor of their
thoughts and actions, difcover fimilar principles
and feelings, yet frequently err. If we fliould
extend our candour fo far as to own that the ma-
jority of men are generally under the dominion of
benevolence and good intentions, yet it muft be
confefled that a vaft majority frequently tranfgrefs ;
and, what is more directly to the point, not only a

majority.

216 The right Conftitutiort of a

majority, but almoft all, confine their benevolence"
to their families, relations, perfonal friends, parifh,
village, city, county, province, and that very few
indeed extend it impartially to the whole commu-
nity. Now grant but this truth, and the queftion
is decided : if a majority are capable of preferring
their own private intereft, or that of their families,
counties, and party, to that of the nation collec-
tively, fome provifion muft be made in the con-
flitution, in favour of juftice, to compel all to
refpect the common right, the public good, the
univerfal law, in preference to all private and par-
tial confiderations.

The propofition of our author then mould be
reverfed, and it mould have been faid, that they
mind fo much their own, that they never think
enough of others. Suppofe a nation, rich and
poor, high and low, ten millions in number, all
affembled together ; not more than one or two
millions will have lands, houfes, or any perfonal
property : if we take into the account the women
and children, or even if we leave them out of the
queftion, a great majority of every nation is
wholly deftitute of property, except a fmall quan-
tity of clothes, and a few trifles of other move-
ables. Would Mr. Nedham be refponfible that,
if all were to be decided by a vote of the majority,
the eight or nine millions who have no property,
would not think of ufurping over the rights of
the one or two millions who have ? Property is
furely a right of mankind as really as liberty.
Perhaps, at firft, prejudice, habit, fhame, or fear,
principle or religion, would reftrain the poor from
attacking the rich, and the idle from ufurping on
the induilrious ; but the time would not be long
before courage and enterprize would come, and
pretexts be invented by degrees, to countenance

the

Commonwealth, examined. 217

the majority in dividing all the property among
them, or at leaft in fharing it equally with, its pfe*
fent polfeflbrs. Debts would be aboliflied firft ;
taxes laid heavy on the rich, and not at all on the
others ; and at laft a downright equal divifion of
every thing be demandeda and voted. What
would be the confequence of this ? The idle, the
vicious, the intemperate, would rufh into the
utmoft extravagance of debauchery, fell and fpend
all their fhare, and then demand a new diyifion of
thofe who purchafed from them. The moment
the idea is admitted into fociety^ that property is
not as facred as the laws of God, and that there is
not a force of law and public juftice to protect it,
anarchy and tyranny commence. If " THOU

M SHALT NOT COVET," and " THOU SHALT NOT

" STEAL," were not commandments- of Heaven,
they muft be made inviolable precepts in every
fociety before it can be civilized or made free.
If the firft part of the proportion, viz. that " the
" people never think of ufurping over other
" men's rights," cannot be admitted, is the fe-
cond, viz. that " they mind which way to pre-
" ferve their own," better founded ? — -There is
in every nation and people under heaven a large
proportion of perfons who take no rational and
prudent precautions to preferve what they have,
much lefs to acquire more. Indolence is the
natural character of man, to fuch a degree,, that
nothing but the neceffities of hunger, thirft, and
other wants equally prefling, can ftimulate him
to action, until education is introduced in civili-
zed focieties, and the ftrongeft motives of ambi-
tion to excel- in arts, trades and profeffions,
are eftablifhed in the minds of all men : until this
emulation is introduced, the lazy favage holds
property in tpo little eftiination to give himfelf
VOL. III. F f trouble

gffi. — u

ft 4

2i 8 The right Conftitution of a

trouble for the prefervation or acquifition of it.
In focieties the mod cultivated and polifhed,
vanity, fafhion, and folly, prevail over every
thought of ways to preferve their own : they feem
rather chiefly to ftudy what means of luxury, dif-
fipation and extravagance, they can invent to get
rid of it. " The cafe is far otherwife among
" kings and grandees," fays our author, " as all
" nations in the world have felt to fome purpofe ;"
that is, in other words, kings and grandees think
of ufurping over other men's rights, but do not
mind which way to preferve their own. It is
very eafy to flatter the democratical portion of
fociety, by making fuch 'diflindlions between them
an'd the monarchical and ariftocratical ; but flat-
tery is as bafe an artifice, and as pernicious a vice,
when offered to the people, as when given to the
others. There is no reafon to believe the one much
honefter or wifer than the other ; they are all of
the fame clay, their minds and bodies are alike.
The two latter have more knowledge and fagacity
derived from education, and more advantages for
acquiring wifdom and virtue. As to ufurping
others rights, they are all three equally guilty
when unlimited in power : no wife man will truft
either with an opportunity ; and every judicious
legiflator will fet ail three to watch and controul
each other. We may appeal to every page of
hiftory we have hitherto turned over, for proofs
irrefragable, that the people when they have been
unchecked, have been as unjuft, tyrannical, brutal,
barbarous, and cruel, as any king or fenate pof-
feffed of uncontroulable power : the majority
has eternally, and without one exception, ufurped
over the rights of the minority. " They naturally
" move," fays Nedham, " within the circle of
" domination as in their proper centre." When

writers

Commonwealth i examined. 219

writers on legiflation have recourfe to poetry, their
images may be beautiful, but they prove nothing.
This, however, has neither the merit of a brilliant
figure, nor of a convincing argument : the popu-
lace, the rabble, the canaille, move as naturally in
the circle of domination, whenever they dare, as
the nobles or a king ; nay, although it may give
pain, truth and experience force us to add, that
even the middling people, when uncontrouled,
have moved in the fame circle, and have not only
tyrannized over all above and all below, bufc
the majority among themfelves has tyrannized
over the minority. " And count it no lefs
ct fecurity, than wifdom and policy, to brave it
*c over the people." Declamatory flourimes,
although they may furnifh a mob with watch-
words, aiFord no reafonable conviction to the
underftanding. What is meant by braving it ? In
the hiftory of Holland you will fee the people
braving it over the De Witts ; and in that of Flo-
rence, Siena, Bologna, Pifloia, and the reft", over
many others*. " Csefar, CrafTus, and another,
" made a contract with each other, that nothing
" fhould be done without the concurrence of all
<c three ; Societatem iniere, nequid ageretur in
<c republica, quod difplicuiflet ulli, e tribus."
Nedham could not have felected a lefs fortunate
example for his purpofe,' fmce there never was a
more arrant creature of the people than Csefar ;
no, not even Catiline, Wat Tyler, Maffianello, or
Shafe. The people created Csefar on the ruins of
the fenate, and on purpofe to ufurp over the
rights of others. But this example, among innu-
merable others, is very appofite for our purpofe.
It happens univerfally, when the people i,n a body,

* Read the Harangue, vol. ii. p. 67.

or

220 The right Conjlitutlon of a

or by a fingle representative aflembly, attempt to
exercife all the powers of government, they always
create three or four idols, who make a bargain
with each other firft, to do nothing which fhall
difpleafe any one : thefe hold this agreement, until
one thinks himfelf able to difembarrafs himfelf of
the other two ; then they quarrel, and the ftrongeft
becomes fingle tyrant. But why is the name of
Pompey omitted, who was the third of this trium-
virate ? Becaufe it would have been too unpopu-
lar ; it would have too eafily confuted his argu-
ment, and have turned it againft himfelf, to have
faid that this aflbciation was between Pompey,
Cadar, and Craiius, againft Cato, the fenate, the
conftitution and liberty, which was thefacl:. Can
you find a people who will never be divided in
opinion ? who will be always unanimous ? The
people of Rome were divided, as all other people
ever have been and will be, into a variety of par-
ties and factions. Pompey, CrafTus, and Caefar,
at the head of different parties, were jealous of
each other : their divifions ilrengthened the fenate
and its friends, and furni/hed means and oppor-
tunities of defeating many of their ambitious
defigns. Caefar perceived it, and paid his court
both to Pompey and CrarTus, in order to hinder
them from joining the fenate againft him. He
feparately reprefented the advantage which their
enemies derived from their mifunderftandings,
and the eafe with which, if united, they might
concert among themfelves all affairs of the repub-
lic, gratify every friend, and difappoint every
enemy*. The other example, of Auguftus, Le-
pidus, and Antony, is equally unfortunate : both

* Dio. Caff. lib. xxxvii. c. 54, 55. Plutarch in Pomp,
Csefar, & Craffus.

are

Commonwealth, examined. 221

are deinonftrations that the peopk did think of
ufurping others rights, and that they did not
mind any way to preferve their own. The fenate
was now annihilated, many of them murdered :
Auguftus, Lepidus, and Antony, were popular
demagogues, who agreed together to fleece the
flock between them, until the moft cunning of
the three deftroyed the other two, fleeced the
fheep alone, and tranfmitted the (hears to a line of
tyrants. How can this writer fay then, that,
u while the government remained untouched in
" the people's hands, every particular man liv~d
66 iafe ?" The dired contrary is true. Every
man lived fafe, only while the fenate remained as
a check and balance to the people : the moment
that controul was deftroyed, no man was fafe.
While the government remained untouched in the '
various orders, the confuls, fenate, and people,
mutually balancing each other, it might be faid,
with fome truth, that no man could be undone,
unlefs a true and fatisfadory reafon was rendered
to the world for his deftrudion : but as foon as the
fenate was deftroyed, and the government came
untouched into the people's hands, no man lived
fafe but the triumvirs and their tools ; any man
might be, and multitudes of the beft men were,
undone, without rendering any reafon to the
world for their deftrudion, but the will, the fear,
or the revenge of fome tyrant. Thefe popular
leaders, in our author's own language, " laved
" and deftroyed, depreffed and" advanced, whom
" they pleafed, with a wet finger/ '<

The fecond argument to prove that the people,
in their fucceflive fmgle afiemblies, are the beft
keepers of their own liberties, is, " becaufe it is
" ever the people's care to fee that authority be

"fo

222 The right Conflltutlon of a

" fo constituted, that it mould be rather a burthen
" than profit to thofe that undertake it ; and
" be qualified with fuch flender advantages of
" profit or pleafure, that men mall reap little
*c by the enjoyment. The happy confequence
" whereof is this, that none but honeft, generous,
" and public fpirits, will then defire to be in au-
" thority, and that only for the common good.
" Hence it was, that in the infancy of the Roman
" liberty there was no canvafling for voices ; but
" fmgle and plain-hearted men were called, in-
" treated, and in a manner forced with impor-
" tunity to the helm of government, in regard
" of that great trouble and pains that followed
<c, the employment. Thus Cincinnatus was fetch-
<c ed out of the field from his plow, and placed,
<c much againft his will, in the fublime dignity of
"dictator: fo the noble Camillus, and Fabius,
" and Curius, were, with much ado, drawn from
<c the recreation of gardening to the trouble of
<c governing ; and the conful year being over,
tc they returned with much gladnefs again to
" their private employment."

The firft queftion which would arife in the mind
of an intelligent and attentive reader would
be, whether this were burlefque, and a republic
travefty ? But as the principle of this fecond
reafon is very pleafing to a large body of narrow
fpirits in every fociety, and as it has been adopt-
ed by fome refpe&able authorities, without fuffi-
cient confideration, it may be proper to give it a
ferious investigation.

The people have, in fome countries and feafons,
made their (ervices irkfome ; and it is popular
with fome to make authority a burthen. But
what has been the confequence to the people ?
Their fervice has been defeated, and they have

been

Commonwealth , examined. 223

been betrayed. Thofe very perfons who have
flattered the meannefs of the ftingy, by offering
to ferve them gratis, and by purchasing their
fuffrages, have carried the liberties and proper-
ties of their conftituents to market, and fold them,
for very handfome private profit to the mo-
narchical and ariftocratical portions of fociety :
and fo long as the rule of making their fervice a
burthen is perfifted in, fo long will the people be
ferved with the fame kind of addrefs and fidelity,
by hypocritical pretences to difinterefted benevo-
lence and patriotifm, until their confidence is
gained, their affections fecured, and their enthu-
iiafm excited, and by knavifh bargains and fales
of their caufe and intereft afterwards. But al-
though there is always among the people a party
who are juftly chargeable with meannefs and .ava-
rice, envy and ingratitude, and this party has
fometimes been a majority, who have literally
made their fervice burthenfome, yet this is not
the general character of the people ; a more
univerfal fault is, too much affection, confidence,
and gratitude, not to fuch as really ferve them,
whether with or againfl their inclinations, but to
thofa who flatter their inclinations, and gain their
hearts. Honed and generous fpirits will difdain
to deceive the people. ; and if the public fervice
is wilfully rendered burthenfome, they will really
be averfe to be in it : but hypocrites enough
will be found, who will pretend to be alfo loath
.to ferve, and feign a reluctant confent for the
public good, while they mean to plunder in every
way they can. conceal. There are conjunctures
when it is the duty of a good citizen to hazard
and facrifice all for his country : but, in ordinary
times, it is equally the duty and intereft of the
community not to fuffer it. Every wife and free

people,

224

The right Conjiitution of a

people, like the Romans, will eftablifti the
maxim, to fufier no generous a&ion for the public
to go unrewarded. Can our author be fuppofed
to be fincere, in recommending it as a principle of
policy to any nation to render her fervice in the
army, navy, or in council, a burthen, an un-
pleafant employment, to all her citizens ? Would
he depend upon finding human fpirits enough to
fill public offices, who would be fufficiently
elevated in patriotifm an.d general benevolence to
facrifice their eafe, health, time, parents, wives,
children, and every comfort, convenience, and
elegance of life, for the public good ? Is there any
religion or morality that requires this ? which
permits the many to live in affluence and eafe,
while it obliges a few to live in mifery for their
fakes ? The people are fond of calling public men
their fervants, and foine are not able to conceive
them to be fervants, without making them flaves,
and treating them as planters treat their negroes.
But, good mafters, have a care how you ufe your
power : you may be tyrants as well as public
officers. It feems, according to our author him-
felf, that honefly and generofity of fpirit, and the
paffion of the public good, were not motives
ftrong enough to induce his heroes to defire to be
in public life : they muft be called, intreated, and
forced by fmgle and plain-hearted men, he
means the fame, no doubt, with thofe defcribed by
.the other expreffions, honeft, generous, and pub-
lic fpirits. Cincinnatus, Cammillus, Fabiu?, and
Curius, were men as fimple and as generous as
any ; and thefe all, by his own account, had a
ftrong averfion to the public fervice. Either
thefe great characters mud be fuppofed to have
.pra&ifed the Nolo Epifcopari, to have held up a
fi&itious averfion for what they really defired, or

we

Commonwealth, examined* ' 225

we muft allow their reluctance to have been fin-
cere. If counterfeit, thefe examples do not de-
ferve our imitation ; if fmcere, they will never be
followed by men enough to carry on the bufmefs
of the world. The glory of thefe Roman charac-
ters cannot be obfcured, nor ought the admora-
tion of their fublime virtues to be diminimed ;
but fuch examples are as rare among ftatefmen, as
Homers and Miltons among poets. A free peo-
ple of common fenfe will not depend upon rinding
a fufficient number of fuch characters at any one
time, but lefs a fucceflion of them for any long
duration, for the fupport of their liberties. To
make a law, that armies mould be led, fenates
counselled, negociations conducted, by none but
fuch characters, would be to decree that the bufl-
nefs of the world mould come to a full (land :
and it muft have flood as ftill in thofe periods of
the Roman hiftory as at this hour ; for fuch cha-
racters were nearly as fcarce then as they are now.
The parallels of Lyfander, Pericles, Themifto-
cles, and Csefar, are much eafier to find in hiftory,
than thofe of Camillus, Fabius, and Curius. If
the latter were with much difficulty drawn from
their gardens to government, and returned with
pleafure at the end of the confular year to their
rural amufements ; the former are as ardent to
continue in the public fervice, and if the public
will not legally reward them, they plunder the
public to reward themfelves. The father of
Themiftocles had more averfion to public life
than Cincinnatus ; and, to moderate the propen-
fity of his fon, who ardently afpired to the higheft
offices of the (tare, pointed to the old gallies roll-
ing in the docks — " There," fays he, " fee the
" old ftatefmen, worn out in the fervice of their
" country, thus always neglected when no longer
VOL. III. G g "of

226 The right Conftitution of a

" of ufe* !" Yet the fon's ardour was not abated,
though he was not one of thofe honeft fpirits that
aimed only at the public good. Pericles too,
though his fortune was fmall, and the honeft emo-
luments of his office very moderate, difcovered no
fuch averfion to the fervice : on the contrary, he
entered into an emulation in prodigality with
Cimon, who was rich, in order equally to dazzle
the eyes of the multitude. To make himfelf the
foul of the republic, and mafter of the affedions
of the populace, to enable the.m to attend the pub-
lic aflemblies and theatrical reprefentations
for his purpofes, he lavifhed his donations : yet
he was fo far from being honeft and generous,
and aiming folely at the public good, that he
availed himfelf of the riches of the ftate to fupply
his extravagance of expence, and made it au
invariable maxim to . facrifice every thing to his
own ambition. When the public finances were
exhaufted, to avoid accounting for the public
money, he involved his country in a war with
Sparta. •;•

But we muft not rely upon thefe general ob-
fervations alone : let us defcend to a particular
confideration of our author's examples, in every
one of which he is very unfortunate. The re-
tirement of Cincinnatus to the country was not his
choice, but his neceffity : Csefo, his fon, had
offended the people by an outrageous oppofition
to their honeft ftruggles for liberty, and had
been fined for a crime ; the father, rather than
let his bondfmen fuffer, paid the forfeiture of his
recognizance, reduced himfelf to poverty, and the
neeelTity of retiring to his fpade or plough. Did
the people intreat and force him back to Rome ?

* Plutarch.

No ;

Commonwealth, examined. 227

No ; it was the fenatein oppofition to the people,
who dreaded his high ariftocraticr-1 principles, his
powerful connections, and perfonal refentments.
Nor did he difcover the lead reludance to the
fervice ordained him by the fenate, but accepted
it without hefitation. All this appears in Livy,
clearly contradictory to every fentiment of our
author*. At another time, when difputes ran fo
high between the tribunes and the fenate that
feditions were apprehended, the fenators exerted
themfelves in the centuries for the election of
Cincinnatus, to the great alarm and terror of the
people f. Cincinnatus, in fhort, although his
moral character and private life were irreproach-
able among the plebeians, appears to have owed
his appointments to office, not to them, but
the fenate ; and not for popular qualities, but
for ariftocratic ones, and the determined op-
pofitions of himfelf and his whole family to the
people. He appears to have been forced into
fervice by no party ; but to have been as wil-
ling, as he was an able, inftrument of the fenate.
In order to fee the inaptitude of this' example
in another point of view, let the queftion be
afked, What would have been the fortune of
Cincinnatus, if Nedham's " right conftitution"
had then been the government of Rome ? The
anfwer muft be, that he would have loft his
election, moft probably even into the repre-
fentative afiembly : moft certainly he would

* Plebis concurfus ingens fuit : fed ea nequaquam, tarn
laeta Quintium vidit ; et imperil nimirum, et virum, in Jpfo
imperio vehementiorem rata. Liv. lib. iii. c. 1 6.
. f Summo patrum ftudio, L. Quintius Cincinnatus, pater
Caefonis, conful creatur, qui magiitratum ftatim acciperet,
perculfa erat plebs confulem habitura, iratum, potentem
favore patrum, virtute fua, tribus liberis, &c.

never

228 The right Conftitution of a

never have been^conful, dictator, or commander
of armies, becarule he was unpopular. This ex-
ample, then, is no argument in favour of our au^
thor, but a ftrong one againft him.

If we recoiled the charader and actions of
Curius, we mail find them equally conclufive in
favour of balanced government, and againft our
authors plan. M. Curius Dentatus, in the year
of Rome 462, obtained as conful a double tri*
umph, for forcing the Samnites to fue for peace.
This nation, having their country laid wafte, fent
their principal men as ambaffadors, to offer pre-
fents to Curius for his credit with the fenate,
in order to their obtaining favourable terms of
peace. They found him fitting on a' ftool before
the fire, in his little houfe ih the country, and
eating his dinner out of a wooden dim. They
opened .their deputation, and offered him the
gold and filver. He anfwered them politely, but
refufed the prefents*. He then added fomewhat,
•which at this day does not appear fo very polifhed :
" I think it glorious to command the owners of
" gold, riot to poffefs it myfelf." And which
pailion do you think is the wprft, the love of
gold, or this pride and ambition ? His whole
eftate was feven acres of land, and he faid'once in
affembly, " that a man who was not contented
" with feven acres of land, was a pernicious citi-
" zen." As we pafs, it may be proper to remark
the difference of times and circumftances. How
few in Ajnerica could efcape the cenfure of per-
nicious citizens if Curius's rule were eftablifhed.
Is there one of our yeomen contented with feven
acres ? How many are difcontented with feventy

* Val. Max. iv. i., Cic de Senec. 55. Senec. Epift. v.
Cic. pro Flacco, 28. Plin. Nat. xviii. 2.

times

Commonwealth, examined. 229

times feven ! Examples, then, drawn from times of
extreme poverty, and a ftate of a very narrow ter-
ritory, mould be applied to our circumftances
with great difcretion. As long as the ariftocra-
cy lafted, a few of thofe rigid chara&ers appear-
ed from time to time in the Roman fenate.
Cato was one to the laft, and went exprefsly to
vifit the houfe of Curius, in the country of the
Sabines : was never weary of viewing it, contemp-
lating the virtues of its ancient owner, and defiring
warmly to imitate them. But though declamatory
•writings might call the conduct of Curius " exac-
" tiffima Romanse frugalitatis norma," it was not
the general character, even of the fenators, at that •
time : avarice raged like a fiery furnace in the
minds of creditors, mod of whom were patricians ;
and equal avarice and injuftice in the minds of
plebeians, who, inftead of aiming at moderating
the laws againfl debtors, would be content with
nothing mort of a total abolition of debts. Only
two years after this, viz. in 465, fo tenacious
were the patricians and fenators of all the ri-
gour of their power over debtors, that Veturius,
the fon of a conful, who had been reduced by
poverty to borrow money at an exhorbitant in-
tereft, was delivered up to his creditor ; and that
infamous ufurer, C. Plodus, exacted from him all
the fervices of a flave, and the fenate would grant
no relief : and when he attempted to fubjecl: his
flave to a brutal paflion, which the laws did not
tolerate, and fcourged him with rods becaufe he
would not fubmit, all the punifhment which the
confuls and fenate would impofe on Plotius was
imprifonment. This anecdote proves that the
indifference to wealth was far from being general,
either among patricians or plebeians ; and that it
was confined to a few patrician families, whofe

tenacioufnefs

23° The right Conftltutlon of a

tenacioufnefs of the maxims and manners of their
anceftors proudly tranfmitted it from age to age.
In 477 Curius was conful a fecond time, when
the plague, and a war with Pyrrhus, had lafted fo
long as to threaten the final ruin of the nation,
and obliged the centuries to choofe a fevere charac-
ter, not becaufe he was beloved, but becaufe his
virtues and abilities alone could fave the Hate.
The auftere character of the conful was accompa-
nied by correfpondent aufterities, in this time of
calamity, in the cenfors, who degraded feveral
knights and fenators, and among the reft Rufinus,
•who had been twice conful and once dictator,
for extravagance and luxury. Pyrrhus was de-
feated, and Curius again triumphed : and becaufe
a continuance of the war with Pyrrhus was expect-
ed, again elected conful, in 478. In 480 he was
cenfor. After all, he was fo little beloved, that an
accufation was brought againft him for having
converted the public fpoils to his own ufe ; and
he was not acquited till he had fworn that no
part of them had entered his houfe but a wooden
bowl, which he ufed in facrifice. — All thefe
fublime virtues, and magnanimous actions of
Curius, make nothing in favour of Nedham. He
•was a patrician, a fenator, and a conful ; he had
been taught by ariftocratical anceftors, formed in
an ariftocratical fchool, and was full of ariftocra-
tical pride. He does not appear to have been a
popular man, either among the fenators in gene-
ral, or the plebeians. Rufinus, his rival, with
his plate and luxury, appears to have been more
beloved, by his being appointed dictator : not-
withftanding that the cenfors, on the prevalence
of Curius's party, in a time of diftrefs, were able
to difgrace Tiim.

It

Commonwealth , examined. 231

*

It was in 479 that the fenate received an em-
bafiy from Ptolemy Philadelphia, king of Egypt,
and fent four of the principal men in Rome, (^
Fabius Gurges, C. Fabius Piftor, Numer.Fabius
Piftor, and (^ Ogulnius, ambafiadors to Egypt,
to return the compliment. (^ Fabius, who was
at the head of the embafiy, was prince of the
fenate, and on his return reported their commif-
fion to the fenate : faid that the king had received
them in the moft obliging and honourable man-
ner : that he had fent them magnificent prefents
on their arrival, which they had defired him to
excufe them from accepting : that at a feaft,
before they took leave, the king had ordered
crowns of gold to be given them, which they
placed upon his ftatues the next day : that on the
day of their departure the king had given them
prefents far more magnificent than the former,
reproaching them, in a moft obliging manner, for
not having accepted them : thefe they had ac-
cepted, with moft profound refpect, not to of-
fend the king, but that, on their arrival in
Rome, they had depofited them in the public
treafury : that Ptolemy had received the alliance
of the Roman people with joy. — The fenate were
much pleafed, and gave thanks to the ambafla-
dors for having rendered the manners of the Ro-
mans venerable to foreigners by their fmcere difin-
tereftednefs : but decreed that the rich prefents de-
pofited in the' treafury Jhould be reft or ed to them^ and
the people exprefled their fatisfa&ion in this de-
cree. Thefe prefents were undoubtedly immenfe-
ly rich ; but where was the people's care to make
the fervice a burthen ? Thanks of the fenate are no
burthens ; immenfe prefents in gold and filver,
voted out of the treafury into the hands of the
ambafladors, were no " flender advantages of pro-

" fit

232 The right Conftitutlon of a

" fit or pleafure," at a time when the nation was
extremely poor, and no individual in it very rich.
But, moreover, three of thefe ambaffadors were
Fabii, of one of thofe few fimple, frugal, ariftocra-
tical families, who neither made advantage of the
law in favour of creditors, to make great profits
out of the people by exorbitant ufury on one
hand, nor gave lar-geifes to the people to bribe
their affections on the other : fo that, although they
were refpected and efteemed by all, they were not
hated nor much beloved by any ; and fuch is
the fate of men of fuch fimple manners at this day
in all countries. Our author's great miftake lies
in his quoting examples from a balanced govern-
ment, as proofs in favour of a government with-
out a balance. The fenate and people were at
this time checks on each others avarice : the
people were the electors in office, but none, till
very lately, could be chofen but patricians ; none
of the fenators, who enriched themfelves by plun-
dering the public of lands or goods, or by extra-
vagant ufury from the people, could expect their
votes to be confuls or other magiftrates ; and
there was no commerce or other means of enrich-
ing themfelves : all, therefore, who were ambi-
tious of ferving-in magiflracies, were obliged to
be poor. To this conftant check and balance
between the fenate and people the production
and the continuance of thefe frugal and fimpie
patrician characters and families appear to be
owing.

If our author meant another affair of 453, it is
ftill lefs to his purpofe, or rather ftill more con-
clufively againft him. It was fo far from being
true in the year 454, the mod fimple and frugal
period of Roman hiltory, that " none but honed,
" generous, and public fpirits defired to be in au-

" thority,

Commonwealth, axamined, 233

" thority,and thai only for the common good," and
that there " was no canvailing for voices," that the
mod illuftrious Romans offered themfelves as
candidates for the confulfhip ; and it was only the
diftrefs and imminent danger of the city from the
Etrurians and Samnites, and an univerfal alarm,
that induced the citizens to caft their eyes on
Fabius, who did not ftand. When he faw the
fuffrages run for him, he arofe and fpoke : "Why
" fhould he be folicited, an old man, exhaufted
" with labours and fatiated with rewards, to take
" the command I That neither the flrength of
*c his body or mind were the fame. He dreaded
" the caprice of fortune. Some divinity might
" think his fuccefs too great, too conftant, too
u much for any mortal. He had fucceeded to
" the glory of his anceftors, and he faw himfelf
" with joy fucceeded by others. That great
" honours were not wanting at Rome to valour,
" nor valour to honours*." It was extreme age,
not the " flender advantages of honours," that oc-
cafioned Fabius's difmclination, as it did that of
Cincinnatus on another occafion. This refufal,
however, only augmented the defire of having
him. Fabius then required the law to be read,
which forbad the re-eledion of a conful before
ten years. The tribunes propofed that it fhould
be difpenfed with, as all fuch laws in favour of
rotations ever are when the people wifh it. Fa-
bius afked why laws were made, if they were to

* Quid fe jam fenem, ac perfun&um laboribus, laborunv-
quc pracmiis, folicitarent ? Nee corporis, rvec anitni vigorem
remanere eundem, et fortunam fpfam vereri, nc cui deorum
tiimia jam in fe fortuna, et conftantior, quam velint humanse
res, videatur. Et fe gloriae feniorum fuccreviffe, et ad glo-
riam fuam confurgentes alios lastum adfpicere. Nee honorex
magnosviris fortiffimis, Romse, nee honoribus deeffe fortes viros.
Liv.

VOL. III. H h be

234 The right Conftitution of a

be broken or difpenfed with by thofe who make
them ; and declared that the laws governed no
longer, but were governed by men*. The centu-
ries, however, per fevered, and Fabius was chofen.
" May the gods make your choice fuccefsful 1"
fays the old hero ; difpofe of me as you will,
Ct but grant me one favour, Decius for my col-
•*c league, a perfon worthy of his father and of
" you, and one who will live in per f eft harmony
" with me." There is no fuch flinginefs of ho-
nours on the part of the people, nor any fuch re-
luctance to the fervice for want of them, as our
author pretends ; it was old age, and refpeft to the
laws only : and one would think the fentiments and
language of Fabius fufficiently ariftocratical ; his
glory, and the glory of his anceftors and pofterity,
feem to be uppermoft in his thoughts : and that
difmtereft was not fo prevalent in general appears
this very year, for a great number of citizens
were cited by the JEdiles to take their trials for
poflefling more land than the law permitted. All
this rigour was neceflary to check the avidity of
the citizens. But do you fuppofe Americans
would make or futmit to a law to limit to
a fmall number, or to any number, the acres
of land which a man might poflefs ? Fabius
fought, conquered, and returned to Rome to
prefide in the election of the new confuls, and
there appear circumftances which (how, that the
great zeal for him was chiefly ariftocratical. The
firft centuries, all ariftocratics, continued him.
Appius Claudius, of confular dignity, and furely
not one of our author's " honeft, generous, and
" public fpirits," nor one of his " fingie and
" plain-hearted men," but a warm, interefled, and

* Jam regi leges, non regere.

ambitious

Commonwealth examined. . . 235

ambitious man, offered himfelf a candidate, and em-
ployed all his credit, and that of all the nobility, to
be chofen conful withFabius,lefs,as he faid, for his
private intereft, than for the honour of the whole
body of the patricians, whom he was determined
to re-eftabliih in the pofleflion of both confulfhips.
Fabius declined, as the year before : but all the
nobility furrounded his feat, and intreated him, to
befure; but to do what? Why, to refcue the
confulfiiip from the drugs and filth of the people,
to reftore the dignity of conful, and the order
of patricians, to their ancient ariftocratical fplen-
dor« Fabius appears indeed to have been urged
into the office of conful ; but by whom ? By the
patricians, and to keep out a plebeian. The
lenate and people were checking each other :
flruggling together for a point, which the patri-
cians could carry in no way but by violating
the laws, and forcing old Fabius into power.
The tribunes had once given way, from the
danger of -the times ; but this year they were
not fo difpofed. The patricians were (till eager
to repeat the irregularity ; but Fabius, although
he declared he fhould be glad to aflift them in ob-
taining two patrician confuls, yet he would not
violate the law fo far as to nominate himfelf ; and
no other patrician had intereft enough to keep out
L. Volumnius the plebeian, who was chofen with
Appius Claudius. Thus fa&s and events, which
were evidently created by aftruggle between two
orders in a balanced government, are adduced as
proofs in favour of a government with only one
order, and without a balance.

Such fevere frugality, fuch perfect difmterefted-
nefs in public characters, appears only, or at lead
mod frequently, in ariftocratical governments,
Whenever the conftitution becomes democratical,

fuch

236 The right Conftitution of a

fuch aufterities difappear entirely, or at lead lofe
their influence, and the fuffrages of the people ;
and if an unmixed and unchecked people ever
choofe fuch men, it is only in times of diftrefs and
danger, when they think no others can fave them :
as foon as the danger is over they neglect thefe,
and choofe others more plaufible and indulgent.

There is fo much pleaiure in the contemplation
of thefe characters, that we ought by no means to
forget Camiilus. This great character was never
a popular one : to the fenate and the patricians he
owed his great employments, and feems to have
been felected for the purpofe of oppofing the
people.

1 he popular leaders had no averfion, for them-
felves or their families, to public honours and
offices, with all their burthens. In 358 P. Lici-
nius Calvus, the firft of the plebeian order who
had ever been elected military tribune, was about
to be re-elected, when he arofeand faid, " Ro-
** mans, you behold only the fhadowof Licinius ;
fic my flrength, hearing, memory, are all gone,
** and the energy of my mind is no more ; fuffer
" me to prefent my fon to you (and he held him
<e by the hand) the living image of him whom
fc you honoured firfl of all the plebeians with the
*e office of military tribune. I devote him, edu-
*? cated in my principles, to the commonwealth,
•" and mail be much obliged to you if you will
" grant him the honour iri my ftead." Accord-
ingly the fon was elected. The military tribunes
conducted with great ardour and bravery, but
were defeated, and Rome was in a panic, very
artfully augmented by the patricians, to give a
pretext for taking the command out of plebeian
hands . Camiilus was created dictator by the fenate,
and carried pn the war with fuch gtucjence, abili-
ty

Commonwealth, examined. 237

ty, and fuccefs, that he faw the richeft city of
Italy, that of Veil, was upon the point of falling
into his hands with immenfe fpoils. He now felt
himfelf embarrafied : if he divided the fpoils with
a fparing hand among the foldiery, he would
draw upon himfelf their indignation, and that of
the plebeians in general ; if he diftributed them
too generoufly, he mould offend the fenate : for,
with all the boafted love of poverty of thofe times,
the fenate and people, the patricians and ple-
beians, as bodies, were perpetually wrangling
about fpoils-, booty, and conquered lands ; which
further (hews, that the real moderation was con-
fined to a very few individuals or families. Ca-
millus, to fpare himfelf reproach and envy, dic-
tator as he was, wrote to the fenate, " that by the
" favour of the gods, his own exertions, and the
" patience of the foldiers, Veil would foon be in
" his hands, and therefore he defired their direc-
" tions what to do with the fpoils." The fenate
were of two opinions : Licinius was for giving
notice to all the citizens that they might go and
fhare in the plunder ; Appius Claudius would
have it all brought into the public treafury, or
appropriated to the payment of the foldiers, which
would eafe the people of taxes. Licinius replied,
that if that money mould be brought to the trea-
fury, it would be the caufe of eternal complaints,
murmurs, and feditions. The latter advice pre-
vailed, and the plunder was indifcriminate, for the
city of Veii, after a ten years fiege, in which many
commanders had been employed, was at lad taken
by Camillus by ftratagem ; and the opulence of
it appeared fo great, that the dictator was terrified
at his own good fortune, and that of his country.
He prayed the gods, if it muft be qualified with
any difgrace, that it might fall upon him, not
the commonwealth. This piety and patriotifm,

however,

238 The right Conftitution of a

however, did not always govern Camillus : his tri-
umph betrayed an extravagance of vanity more
than bordering on profanenefs ; he had the arro-
gance and prefumption to harnefs four whice
horfes in his chariot, a colour peculiar to Jupiter
and the Sun, an ambition more than Roman,
more than human. Here the people were very
angry with Camillus for having too little reverence
for religion : the next moment they were ftill more
incenfed againfl him for having too much, for he
reminded them of the vow he had made to confe-
crate a tenth part of the fpoils to Apollo. The
people, in fhort, did not love Camillus ; and the
fenate adored him becaufe he oppofed the multi-
tude on all occafions, without any referve, and
appeared the moft ardent and active in refitting
their caprices. It was eafier to conquer enemies
than to pleafe citizens*. This mighty ariftocra-
tic grew fo unpopular, that one of the tribunes,
accufed him before the jjeople of applying part of
the fpoils of Veii to his own ufe ; and finding,
upon confulting his friends, that he had no chance
of acquittal, he went into voluntary banifhment
at Ardea : but he prayed to the gods to make his
ungrateful country regret his abfence. He was tried
in his abfence, and condemned in a fine. — Had Ned-
ham's conftitution exifted at Rome,would Camillus
have taken Veii, or been made dictator, or employed
at all? Certainly not. Characters much nore plau-
fible would have run him down, or have obliged
him to imitate all their indulgences.

In all thefe examples of Cincinnatus, Curius,
Fabius, and Camiilus, &c. our author quotes
examples of virtues which grew up only in a
few ariftocratical families, were cultivated by the

* Excellentibus ingenfis citius defuerit ars qua civem regant,
tfuam qua hoilem fuperent. Liv. ii. 43.

emulation

Commonwealth) examined. 239

emulation between the two orders in the ftate,
and by their druggies to check and balance each
other, to prove the excellence of a ftate where
there is but one order, no emulation, and no ba-
lance. This is like the conduct of a poet, who
Ihould enumerate the cheerful rays and refulgent
glories of the fun in a defcription of the beauties
of midnight.

Whether fucceffion is, or is not, the grand pre-
fervative againft corruption, the United States of
America have adopted this author's idea in this
" Reafon," fo far as to make the governor and
fenate, as well as the houfe of reprefentatives,
annually ele&ive. They have therefore a clear
claim to his congratulations. They are that
happy nation : they ought to rejoice in the wif-
dom and juftice of their truftees ; for certaia
limits and bounds are fixed to the powers in be-
ing, by a declared fucceffion of the fupreme autho-
rity annually in the hands of the people.

It is (till, however, problematical, whether this
fucceffion will be the grand prefervative againfl
corruption, or the grand inlet to it. The elec-
tions of governors and fenators are fo guarded,
that there is room to hope ; bu$ if we recollect
the experience of paft ages and other nations,
there are grounds to fear. The experiment is
made, and will have fair play. If corruption
breaks in, a remedy muft be provided ; and what
that remedy muft be is well enough known to
every man who thinks.

Our author's examples are taken from the Ro-
mans, after the abolition of monarchy, while the
government was an ariftocracy, in the hands of a
fenate, balanced only by the tribunes. It is moft
certainly true, that a {landing authority in the

hands

240 The right Conjlitution of a

hands of one, the few, or the many, has an impe-
tuous propenfity to corruption ; and it is to con-
troul this tendency that three orders, equal
and independent of each other, are contended for
in the legiflature. While power was in the hands
of a fenatej according to our author, the people
were ever in danger of lofmg their liberty. It
would be nearer the truth to fay, that the people
had no liberty, or a very imperfect and uncertain
liberty ; none at all before the inftitution of the
tribunes, and but an imperfect mare afterwards ;
becaufe the tribunes were an unequal balance to
the fenate, and fo on the other fide were the con-
fuls. " Sometimes in danger from kingly afpi-
rers." But whofe fault was that ? The fenate had a
fufficient abhorrence of fuch confpiracies : it was
the people who encouraged the ambition of par-
ticular perfons to afpire, and who became their
partifans. Melius would have been made a king
by the people, if they had not been checked by
the fenate ; and fo would Manlius : to be con-
vinced of this, it is neceflary only to recollect the
flory. — Spurius Melius, a rich citizen of the
Equeftrian order, in the year before Chrift 437,
and of Rome the 31 5th, a time of fcarcity and
famine, afpire<f to the confulftiip. He bought
a large quantity of corn in Etruria, and diftri-
buted it among the people. Becoming by his
liberality the darling of the populace, they attend-
ed his train wherever he went, and promifed him
the confulihip. Senfible, however, that the fena-
tors, with, the whole Quintian family at their
head, would oppofe him, he mult ufe force; and as.
ambition is infatiable, and cannot be contented
with what is attainable, he conceived that to ob-
tain the fovereignty would cod him no more trou-
ble than the confulfhip. The election came on,

and.

Commonwealth examined. 241

and as he had not concerted all his meafures,
T. Quintius Capitolinus and Agrippa Menonius
Lanatus were chofen by the influence of the
fenate. L. Minutius was continued prgefe&us
annonse, or fuperintendent of provifions : his
office obliged him to io in public the fame that
Melius affected to do in private ; fo that the fame
kind of people frequented the houfes of both.
From them he learned the tranfactions at Me-
lius's, and informed the fenate that arms were
carried into his houfe, where he held afifem-
blies, made harangues, and was taking meafures
to make himfelf king ; and that the tribunes, cor-
rupted by money, had divided among them the
meafures neceifary to fecure the fuccefs of the
enterprize. Quintius Capitolinus propofed a
dictator, and Quintius Cincinnatus (for the Quin-
tian family were omnipotent) was appointed. The
earneft entreaties and warm remonftrances of the
whole fenate prevailed on him to accept the truft,
after having long refufed it, not from any re-
luctance to public fervice, but on account of his
great age, which made him believe himfelf inca-
pable of it. Imploring the gods not to fuffer his
age to be a detriment to the public, heconfented
to be nominated, and immediately appointed
Ahala mafler of the horfe, appeared fuddenly in
the forum with his lictors, rods, and axes, afcend-
ed the tribunal with all the enfigns of the fove- 9
reign authority, and fent his matter of horfe to
fummon Melius before him. Melius endeavour-
ed in his firft furprize to efcape : a lictor feiz-
ed him. Melius complained that he was to be
facrificed to the intrigues of the fenate, for the
good he had done the people. The people grew
tumultuous : his partifans encouraged each other,
and took him by force from the liclor. Melius,threw
VOL. III. 1 i himfelf

242 The right Conjlitution of a

hitnfelf into the crowd : Servius followed him, run
him threw with his fword, and returned, covered
with his blood, to give an account to the dictator
of what he had done. " You have done well," faid
Cincinnatus ; " continue to defend your country
" with the fame courage as you have now delivered
" it — Macle virtute efto liberata republica."

The people being in great commotion, the dic-
tator calls an aflembly, and pronounces Melius
juftly killed. With all our admiration for the
moderation and modefty, the fimplicity and fubli-
mity of his character, it muft be confefled that
there is in the harangue of Cincinnatus more of
the ariftocratical jealoufy of kings and oligarchies,
and even more of contempt to the people, than of
a foul devoted to equal liberty, or poiTeffed of
underilanding to comprehend it : it is the fpeech
of a fimple ariftocratic, poflefled of a great foul.
It was a city in which, fuch was its ariftocratical
jealoufy of monarchy and oligarchy, Brutus had
puniihed his fon ; Collatinus Tarquinius, in mere
hatred of his name, had been obliged to abdicate
the confullhip and banifh himfelf ; Spurius Caflius
had been put to death for intending to be king ; and
the decemvirs had beenpunifhed with confifcation,
exile, and death, for their oligarchy. In fuch a
city of ariftocratics, Melius had conceived a hope
of being a king. " Et quis homo ?" fays Cinciri-
. natus; and who was Melius ? " quanquam nullam
" nobilitatem, nullos honores, nulla merita, cui-
" quam ad dominationem pandere viani ; fed
" tamen Claudios, Caflios, confulatibus, decem-
" viratibus, fuis majorumque honoribus fplendore
" familiarum fuftuliire animos, quonefas fueritV*

Melius
t

* " Who is this man ? without nobility, without honours,
" without merit, to open for him a way to the monarchy !

« Claudius,

Commonwealth, examined. 243

Melius, therefore, was not only a traitor but a
monfter ; his eftate muft be confiscated, his houfe
pulled down, and the fpot called ^Equimelium, as
a monument of the crime and the punifhment,
(Liv. lib. iv. c. 13, 14, 1 5, 1 6.) and his corn diftri-
buted to the populace, very cheap, in order to
appeafe them. This whole ftory is a demonftrati-
on of the oppreflion of the people under theariflo-
cracy ; of the extreme jealoufy of that ariftocracy
of kings, of an oligarchy, and of popular power ;
of the conftant fecret wifhes of the people to fet
up a king to defend them againft the nobles, and
of their readinefs to fall in with the views of any
rich man who flattered them, and fet him up as a
monarch : but it is a moft unfortunatey inftance
for Nedham. It was not the people wfft> defend-
ed the republic againil the defign of Melius, bu^;
the fenate, who defended it againft both Melius
and the people. Had Rome been then governed
by a Marchamont Nedham's right Conftitution of

" Claudius, indeed, and Cafllus, had their fouls elevated to
" ambition by their confalfhips and deccmvirates, by the
" honours of their anceftors, and the fplendour of their fa-
milies."— Is there an old maiden aunt Eleanor, of feventy
years of age, in any family, whofe brain is more replete with
the haughty ideas of blood, than that of the magnanimous
Cincinnatus appears in this fpeech ? Riches are held in vaft
contempt ! The equeftrian order is no honour nor nobility ;
that too is held in fovereign difdain ! Beneficence and
charity, in a moil exalted degree, at a time when his brother
ariftocrats were griping the people to death by the molt cruel
fe verities, and the moft fordid and avaricious ufury, was
no merit in Melius ; but confulfhips, decemvirates, ho-
nours, and the fplendour of family, has his moft profound
admiration and veneration ! Every circumftance of this ap-
pears in this fpeech, and fuch was the real character of the
man : and whoever celebrates or commemorates Cincinnatus
as a patron of liberty, either knows not his character, or un-
derftands not the nature of liberty.

" a Com-

244 5Tfo right Conjlltution of a

u a Commonwealth," Melius would infallibly
have been made a king, and have tranfmitted his
crown to his heirs. The neceflity of an indepen-
dent fenate, as a check upon the people, is mod
apparent in this inftance. If the people had been
unchecked, or if they had only had the right of
choofing an houfe of reprefentatives unchecked,
they would in either cafe have crowned Melius.

At the critical moment, when the Gauls had
approached the capital with fuch filence as not to
awaken the centinels, or even the dogs, M. Man-
lius, who had been conful three years before, was
awakened by the cry of the geefe which, by the
fanctity of their confecration to Juno, had efcaped
with their lives in an extreme fcarcity of provi-
fions. rife haftened to the wall, and beat down
one of the enemy who had already laid hold of
the battlement, and whofe fall from the preci-
pice carried down feveral others who followed
him. With ftones and darts the Romans precipi-
tated all the reft to the bottom of the rock.
Manlius the next day received in a public aflem-
bly his praifes and rewards. Officers and foldiers,
to teftify their gratitude, gave him their rations for
one day, both in corn and wine, half a pound of
corn, and a quarter of a pint of wine. " Ingens
u caritatis argumentum, cum fe vi&u fuo fraudans,
" detra&um corpori & ufibus neceflariis ad hono-
" rem unius viri conferre," fays Livy ; and in
the year of Rome 365, the commonwealth gave to
Manlius an houfe upon the capital, as a monu-
ment of his valour and his country's gratitude.

In the year of Rome 370, fifty-five years after
the execution of Melius, and five years after the
defence of the capital from the attack of Brennus,
Manlius is fufpeded of ambition. Thofe who
had hitherto excited, or been excited by the people

to

Commonwealth , examined. 245

to faction, had been plebeians. Manlius was a
patrician of one of the moft illuftrious families :
he had been conful, and acquired immortal glory
by his military exploits, and by faving the capital :
he was, in fhort, the rival of Cammillus, who
had obtained two fignal victories over the Gauls,
and from the new birth of the city had been
always in office, either as dictator or military
tribune ; and even, when he was only tribune, his
colleagues confidered him as their iuperior, and
held it an honour to receive his orders as their
chief. In fhort, by his own reputation, the fupport
of the Quintian family, and the enthufiaftic attach-
ment to him he had infpired into the nation, he
was, in fact, and effect, to all intents ana purpofes
king in Rome, without the name, but under the
various titles of conful, dictator, or military tribune.
" He treats," faid Manlius, " even thofe created
<c with powers equal to his own, not as his col-
" leagues, but officers and fubftitutes to execute
" his orders." The ariftocratical Livy, and all the
other ariftocrats of Rome,accufe Manlius of envy.
They fay he could not bear fuch glory in a man
whom he believed no worthier than himfelf : he
defpifed all the reft of the nobility : the virtues,
fervices and honours of Camillus, alone excited
his haughtinefs and felf-fufficiency, and tortured
his jealoufy and pride : he was enraged to fee
him always at the head of affairs, and command-
ing armies. It is certain that this practice of con-
tinuing Camillus always at the head was incon-
fiftent with the fpirit of the constitution, by which
a rotation was eftablilhed, and the confuls who
had the command of armies could remain in office
but one year. But this is the nature of an arifto-
cratical afiembly as well as of a democratical one :
fome eminent fpirit, affifted by three or four

families

246 The right Conflltutlon of a

families connected with him, gains an afcendency,
and excites an enthufiafm, and then the fpirit and
letter too of the conftitution is made to give way
to him. In the cafe before us, when Camillus
could not be conful, he muft be military tribune ;
and when he could not be military tribune, he muft
be dictator.

Maniius is charged with envy, and with vain
fpeeches. " Camillus could not have recovered
" Rome from the Gauls if I had not faved the ca-
" pital and citadel." This was literally true ; but
ariflocratical hiflorians muft brand the character of
Maniius in order to deprefs the people, and extol
and adore that of Camillus in order to elevate the
fenate ana the nobles. But there is no folid rea-
fon to believe that Maniius envied Camillus, more
than Camillus and the Quintian family were both
envious and jealous of Maniius. The houfe upon
the capital was what the Quintian family could
not bear.

The truth is, an ariftocratical defpotifm then
ruled in Rome, and opprefled the people to a cruel
degree ; and one is tempted to fay, that Man-
iius was a better man than Camillus or Cincinna-
tus, though not fo feeret, defigning, and profound
a politician, let the torrent of ariftocratical hif-
tory and philofophy roll as it will. There were
two parties, one of the nobles, and another of the
people : Maniius, from fuperior humanity and
equity, embraced the weaker ; Camillus and the
Quintii, from family pride like that of Lycurgus,
domineered over the ftronger party, of which
they were in full poffeffion. Maniius threw him-
felf into the fcale of the people ; he entered into
clofe intimacy and ftricl: union with the tribunes ;,
he fpoke contemptuoufly of the fenate, and flat-
tered the multitude. c< Jam aura, non confillio

"ferri,

Commonwealth^ examined. 247

<c ferri, famseque magnse malle quam bonac efle,"
fays the ariftocrat Livy. But let us examine his
actions, not receive implicitly the epithets of par-
tial hiftorians. — The Roman laws allowed exorbi-
tant intereft for the loan of money : an infolvent
debtor, by the decree of the judge, was put into
the hands of his creditor as his flave, and might
be fcourged, pinched, or put to death, at difcretion:
the moft execrable ariftocratical law that ever
exifted among men ; a law fo diabolical, that an
attempt to get rid of it at almoft any rate was
a virtue. The city had been burnt, and every
man obliged to rebuild his houfe. Not only -
the*pooreft citizen, but perfons in middle life,
had been obliged to contract debts. Manlius,
feeing the rigour with which debts were exact-
ed, felt more commiferation than his peers for
the people. Seeing a centurion, who had dif-
tinguifhed himfelf by a great number of gallant
actions in the field, adjudged as a Have to his
creditor, his indignation as well as his compaf-
fion were aroufed ; he inveighed againft the pride
of the patricians, cruelty of the ufurers, deplored
the mifery of the people, and expatiated on the
merit of his brave companion in war ; — furely no
public oration was ever better founded ; he paid
the centurion's debt, and fet him at liberty, with
much oftentation to be fure, a^nd ftrong expref-
fions of vanity, but this was allowable by the
cuftom and manners of the age. The centurion
too difplayed his own merit and fervices, as well as
his gratitude to his deliverer. Manlius went
further : he caufed the principal part of his own
patrimony to be fold, " in order, Romans," faid
he, " that I may not fuffer any of you, whilft I
u have any thing left to be adjudged to your
" creditors, and made flaves." This, no doubt,

made

248 The right Conftitution of a

made him very popular : but, in the warmth of
his democratical zeal, he had been tranfported
upon fome occafion to fay in his own houfe, that
the fenators had concealed, or appropriated to
their own ufe, the gold intended for the ranfom
of the city from the Gauls : alluding, probably,
to the fact, for that gold had been depofited under
the pedeftal of Jupiter's ftatue. Manlius per-
haps thought that this gold would be better em-
ployed to pay the debts of the people. The fe-
nate recalled the dictator, who repaired to the
forum, attended by all the fenators, afcended his
tribunal, and ordered his lictor to cite Manlius
before him. Manlius advanced with the people :
on one fide was the fenate with their clients, and
Camillus at their head ; and on the other the peo-
ple, headed by Manlius ; and each party ready for
battle at the word of command. And fuch a war
will,fooner or later, be kindled in every ftate, where
the two parties of poor and rich, patricians and ple-
beians, nobles and commons, fenate and people,
call them by what names you will, have not a third
power in an independent executive, to intervene,
moderate, and balance them. The artful dicta-
tor interrogated Manlius only on the ftory of the
gold. Manlius was embarrafled, for the fuper-
ftition of the people would have approved of the
apparent piety of* the fenate in dedicating that
treafure to Jupiter, though it was probably only
policy to hide it. He evaded the queftion, and
defcanted on the artifice of the fenate in making a
war the pretext for creating a dictator, while their
real defign was to employ that terrible authority
againft him and the people. The dictator ordered
him to prifon. The people were deeply affected ;
but the authority was thought to be legal, and
the Romans had prefcribed bounds to themfelves,

through

Cemfnonivealth, examined.

through which they dare not break. The autho-
rity of the dictator and fenate held them in fuch
refpeft, that neither the tribunes nor the people
ventured to raife their eyes or open their mouths.
They put on mourning, however, and let their
hair and beards grow, and furrounded the prifon
with continual crowds, manifefting every fign of
grief and affliction. They publicly faid, that the
di&ator's triumph was over the people, not the
Volfci, and that all that was wanting was to have
Manlius dragged before his chariot. Every thing
difcovered fymptoms of an immediate revolt.
Here comes in a trait of ariftocratical cunning, ad
cantandum vulgus, much more grofs than any
that had been practifed by Manlius. To foften
the people, the fenate became generous all at
once, ordered a colony of two thoufand citizens
to be fent out, afllgning each of them two
acres and an half of land. Though this was a
largefs, it was confined to too fmall a number,
and was too moderate to take off all Manlius's
friends. The artifice was perceived, and when
the abdication of the dictatormip of Coffus had
removed the fears of the people and fet their
tongues at liberty, it had fmall effect in appeafmg
the people, who reproached one another with
ingratitude to their defenders, for whom they
expreffed great zeal at firft, but always abandoned
in time of danger ; witnefs Caflius and Melius.
The people paffed whole nights round the prifon,
and threatened to break down the gates. The
fenate fet Manlius at liberty, to prevent the people
from doing it. The next year, 371, diffentions
were renewed with more acrimony than ever.
Manlius, whofe fpirit was not accuftomed to hu-
miliation, was exafperated at his -imprifonment,
CoiTus having not dared to proceed with the
VOL. III. ' K k decifion

250 The right Conftitution of a

decifion of Cincinnatus againft Melius, and even
the fenate having been compelled to give way to
the difcontent of the people, waa. animated to at-
tempt a reformation of the conftitution. "How
" long," faid he to the people, " will you be
i6 ignorant of your own ftrength, of which Nature
" has not thought fit that beads themfelves mould
" be ignorant ? Count yournmnber, and that of
" your adverfaries ; mew the war, and you will
" have peace : let them fee that you are prepared,
" and they will immediately grant what you afk ;
" determine to be bold in undertaking, or refolve
tc to fuffer the utmoft injuries. How long will
" you fix your eyes upon me ? Muft I repeat the
" fate of Caflius and Melius ? I hope the gods
** will avert fuch a misfortune from me : but
" thofegods will notdefcend ftpm heaven to defend
" me. You mud remove the danger from me.
*' Shall your refiftance to the fenate always end in
" fubmiffion to the yoke ? That difpofition is not
" natural to you ; it is the habit of fuffering them
" to ride you, which they have made their right
" and inheritance. Why are you fo courageous
" againft your enemies abroad, and fo foft and
•" timorous in defence of your liberty at home ?
" Yet you have hitherto always obtained what
" you demanded. It is now time to undertake
" greater things. You will find lefs difficulty in
" giving the fenators a mafter, than it has coft
^ you to defend yourfelves againft them, while
" they have had the power and the will to lord it
-" over you. Dictators and confuls muftbe abolijhed
u if you would have the people ralfe their heads.
" Unite with me ; prevent debtors from the ri-
4C gours of thofe odious laws. I declare myfelf
" the patron and protector of the people : if you
" are for exalting your chief by any more fplen-

"did

Commonwealth, examined. 25.1

'* did title, or illuftrious dignity, you will only
" augment his power for your fupport, and to
" obtain your defires. — Ego me patronum pro-
" fueor plebis : vos, fi, quo infigni magis imperil
" honorifve nomine veftrum appellabitis ducem,
" eo utemini potentiore ad obtinenda ea quos
" vultis." Liv. This is a manifeft intention of
introducing a balance of three branches.

In this oration are all the principles of the
Englifh conftitution. The authority and power
of the people to demolifh one form of government
and erect another, according to their own judg-
ment or will, is clearly aflerted. The neceflity of
aboliming the dictators and confuls, and giving to
one chief magiftrate the power to controul the
fenate, and protect the people, is pointed out.
The fenate is not propofed to be abolimed, nor the
aflemblies of the people, nor their tribunes ; but
the abolition of cruel debtors laws, and redrefs of
all the people's grievances, is to be the confe-
quence. The ariftocracy was at that time a cruel
tyranny ; the people felt it ; Manlius acknow-
ledged it : both faw the neceflity of new model-
ling the conftitution, and introducing the three
branches of Romulus and Lycurgus, with better
and clearer limitations ; and both were defirous of
attempting it.

If, in reading hiftory, the gloffes and reflections
of hiftorians are taken implicitly, a miftaken judg-
ment will often be formed. Rome was an arifto-
cracy, and Livy an ariftocratical writer. The
conftitution of government, the principles, preju-
dices, and manners of the times, fhould never be a
moment out of fight. If we believe the Romans,
Manlius was actuated only by envy and ambition ;
but if we confider his actions, >and the form of go-
vernment at the time, we (hould be very apt to

pronounce

25 2 The right Conjlitution of a

pronounce him both a greater and a better man
than Camillus. To fpeak candidly, there was a
rivalry between the Manlian and the Quintian
families, and the ftruggle was which Ihould be the
firft family, and who the firft man : and fuch a
flruggle exifts, not only in every empire, mo-
narchy, republic, but in every city, town, and
village, in the world. But a philofopher might
find as good reafon to fay that Manlius was fa-
crificed to the envy, jealoufy, and ambition of
Camillus and the Quintii, as that his popu-
lar endeavours for the plebeians fprung from
envy of Camillus, and ambition to be the firft
man. Both were heads of parties, and had all the
paflions incident to fuch a fituation : but if a
judgment muft be pronounced which was the beft
man and citizen, there are very ftrong arguments
in favo'ur of Manlius. The name of king was
abhorred by the Romans. But who and what
had made it fo ? Brutus, and his brother arifto-
crats, at the expulfion of Tarquin, by appointing
religious execrations to be pronounced in the name
of the whole ft ate, and for all fucceeding ages,
againft fuch as mould dare to afpire to the throne.
In this way any word or any thing may be made
unpopular, at any time and in any nation. The
fenate were now able to fet up the popular cry,
that Manb'us afpired to the throne ; this revived
all the religious horror which their eftablifhed exe-
crations had made an habitual part of their na-
tures,and turned an ignorant fuperftitious populace
againft the beft friend, andthe only friend they
had in the republic. The fenate firft talked of
aiTafrmation and another Ahala ; but, to be very
gentle, they ordered " the magiftrates to take
" care that the commonwealth fuftained no preju-
" dice from the pernicious defigns of Manlius."

This

Commonwealth^ examined. 253

This was worfe than private affaflination ; it
was an afTaffi nation by the fenate ; it was judg-
ment, fentence, and execution, without trial. The
timid flaring people were intimidated, and even
the tribunes caught the panic, and offered to take
the odium off the fenate, and cite Manlius before
the tribunal of the people themfelves, and accufe
him in form. It is impoffible not to fufpect, nay
fully to believe, that thefe tribunes were bribed
fecretly by the fenators. They not only abandon-
ed him with whom they had co-operated, but
they betrayed the people, their conftituents, in the
mod infamous manner. They faid, that in the
prefent difpofition Manlius could not be openly
attacked without interefting the people in his de-
fence ; that violent meafures would excite a civil
war ; that it was neceflary to feparatc the interefts
of Manlius from thofe of the people ; they them-
felves would cite him before the tribunal of the
people, and accufe him in form. Nothing faid
the tribunes, is lefs agreeable to the people than a
king : as foon as the multitude fees that your aim
is not againft them ; that from protectors they are
become judges ; that their tribunes are the accu-
fers, and that a patrician is accufed for having
afpired at the tyranny, no intereft will be fo dear
to them as that of their liberty. Their liberty!
The liberty of plebeians at that time ! What a
proftitution of facred terms ! Yet, grofs as was
this artifice, it laid faft hold of thofe blind preju-
dices which patricians and ariftocrats had infpir^
ed, and duped effectually a ftupid populace.
Manlius was cited by the tribunes before the peo-
ple : in a mourning habit he appeared, without
a fingle fenator, relation, or friend, or even his
own brothers, to exprefs concern for his fate : and
no wonder ; a fenator, and a perfon of confular

dignity,

254 The right Conftltutlon of a

dignity, was never known to have been fo univer-
fally abandoned. But nothing can be more falfe
than the refle&ions of hiftorians upon this occa-
fion : So much did the love of liberty, and the
" fear of being enilaved, prevail in the hearts of
"the Romans over all the ties of blood and
" nature !" It was not love of liberty, but abfo-
lute fear which feized the people. The fenate had
already condemned him by their vote, and given
their confuls dictatorial power againfl Manlius
and his friends : the tribunes themfelves were cor-
rupted with bribes or fear ; and no man dared
expofe himfelf to ariftocratical vengeance, un-
protected by the tribunes. To prove that it
was fear, and not patriotifm, that reftrained his
relations and friends, we need only recoiled:
another inftance. When Appius Claudius, the
decemvir, was imprifoned for treafon, much
more clear than that of Manlius, and for conduct
as wicked, brutal, and cruel, as Manlius's appears
virtuous, generous, and humane, the whole Clau-
dian family, even C. Claudius, his profefled ene-
my, appeared as fuppliants before the judges,
imploring mercy for their relation. His friends
were not afraid. Why ? Becaufe Claudius was an
enemy and hater of the people, and therefore po-
pular with moft of the partricians. His crimes
were ariftocratical crimes, therefore not only almoft
venial, but almoft virtues. Manlius's offence was
love of the people ; and democratical mifde-
meanors are the moft unpardonable of all that
can be committed or conceived in a government
where the daemon of ariftocracy domineers. Livy
himfelf betrays a confciouinefs of the infufficiency
of the evidence to prove Manlius's guilt : he fays
he can difcover no proof, nor any other charge of
any crime of treafon, " regni crirnen," except

fome

Commonwealth, examined. 255

fome aflemblies of people, feditious fpeeches, ge-
nerofity to debtors, and the falfe infmuation of
the concealment of the gold. But here we fee
what the people are when they meet in one afiem-
bly with the fenators : they dare not vote againft
the opinion or will of the nobles and patricians.
The ariftocratical part of mankind ever did, and
ever will, overawe the people and carry what
votes they pleafe in general, when they meet
together with the democratical part, either in a
collective or reprefentative affembly. Thus it
happened here : fuperftition decided. While in
fight of the capital, their religious reverence for
the abode of Jupiter^ faved and inhabited by
Manlius, was a counterbalance to their fears and
veneration for the fenators defcended from the
gods. The people could not condemn him in
fight of the capital. The tribunes knowing what
was in them, adjourned to another place the next
day. The capital out of fight, and the fenators
prefent, condemned their deliverer, and he died a
facrifice to the rancorous envy of his peers in the
fenate,the confulate, and patrician order, who
could not bear the fight of fo fpiendid a diftinc-
tion and elevation above themfelves, in any one of
their order, as Manlius's houfe upon the capital,
and his title of Capitolinus. " Homines prope
" quadringentos produxifle dicitur, quibus fine fce-
" nore expenfas pecunias tuliflet, quorum bona ve-
" nire, quos duci, addictos prohibuiflet. Ad hsec,
" decora quoque belli non commemorafle tantum,
" fed protulifle etiam confpicienda ; fpolia hoflium
" cseforum ad triginta, dona imperatorurn ad qua-
" draginta, in quibus infiges duas murales coronas,
*' civicas o&o. Ad hasc fervatos ex hoftibus cives
" produxifle, inter quos, C. Servillium magiftrum
" equitum, abfentem nominatum : et, quum ea

" quoque

256 The right Conftitution of a

cc quoque quae bello gefta efient, pro faftigio re*
" rum,oratione etiam magnifica fada didis ssquan-
" do, memoraflet, nudafle pedus infigne cicatrici-
ct bus bello acceptis ; et indentidem capitolium
" fpedans Jovem, deofpue alios devocafle ad auxi-
cc Hum forlunarumfuarum : precatufque effe, ut,
cc quam mentem fibi Capitolinam arcem protegenti
u ad falutem populi Romani dedifTent, earn po-
cc pulo Romano in fuo difcrimine darent : et orafle
" fingulos univerfofque, ut capitolium atque ar-
" cem intuentes, ut ad deos immortales verfi, de
" fe judicarent."

By removing the aflembly from the Campus
Martius, where the people were aflfembled in
centuries (centuriatim), to the Grove (Petelinum
Lucum), from whence the capital could not be
feen, obftinatis animis trifle judicium, with
gloomy obftinacy the fatal fentence was pafled,
and the tribunes cad him down from the Tarpeian
rock. " Such was the cataftrophe," fays Livy,
'* of a man who, if he had not lived in a free city,
" would have merited fame." He mould have
faid, if he had not lived in a fimple ariftocracy,
and alarmed the envy of his fellow ariftocrats by
fuperior merit, fervices, and rewards, efpecially
that moft confpicuous mark, his houfe upon the
capital, and his new title, or agnomen, Capitoli-
nus, which mortal envy could not bear.

He was no fooner dead than the people repent-
ed and regretted him ; a fudden plague that broke
out was confidered as a judgment from Heaven
upon the nation for having polluted the capital
with the blood of its deliverer.

The hiftory of Manlius is an unanfwerable argu-
ment againft a fimple ariftocracy ; it is a proof
that no man's liberty or life is fafe in fuch a go-
v-ernment : the more virtue and merit he has, the

more

Commonwealth, examined. 257

more in danger, the more certain his deftru&ion.
It is a good argument againft a (landing fovereign
and fupreme authority in an hereditary ariftocracy ;
fo far Nedham quotes it pertinently, and applies
it juftly : but when the fame example is cited to
prove that the people in one fupreme afiembly,
fucceflively chofen, are the bed keepers of their
liberty, fo far from proving the propofition, it
proves the contrary, becaufe that Camillus the
Quintii, and Manlius, will all be chofen into that
one aifembly by the people ; the fame emulation
and rivalry, the fame jealoufy and envy, the fame
ftruggles of families and individuals for the firft
place, will arife betweenthem. One of them will
have the rich and great for his followers, another
the poor ; hence will arife two, or three, or more
parties, which will never ceafe to ftruggle till war
and bloodfhed decides which is the ftrongeft.
Whilft the ftruggle continues, the laws are tram-
pled on, and the rights of the citizens invaded by
all parties in turn ; and when it is decided, the
leader of the victorious army is emperor and def-
pot.

Nedham had forgotten the example of Caflius,
which would have been equally appofite to prove
a fimple ariftocracy a bad government, and equally
improper to prove that the people in their fu-
preme aflemblies, fucceflively chofen, are the bell
keepers of their liberty. It is alfo equally pro-
per to prove the contrary, and to mew that fuch a
fimple democracy is as dangerous as a fimple
ariftocracy. Thefe examples all (how that the
natural principles of the Englifli conftitution were
conftantly at work among the Roman peo-
ple : that nature herfelf was conilantly calling out
for two mafters to controul the fenate, one in a

VOL. III. L 1 kmg

258 The Right Conftitution of a

king or fingle perfon poflefied of the executive
power, and the other in an equal repi efentation of
the people poffefied of a negative on all the laws,
and efpecially on the difpofal of the public mo-
ney. As thefe examples are great illuilrations of
our argument, and illuilrious proofs of the fupe-
rior excellence of the American conftitutions,
we will examine the ftory of Caflius before we
come to that of the decemvirs.

The firfl notice that is taken of Caflius is in the
year 252, when he was. conful, gained confider-
able advantage over the Sabines, and received
the honour of a triumph. In 256 he was cho-
fen by Lartius the firft dictator, general of the
horfe, and commanded a divifion of the army with
fuccefs againft the Latines. In the year 261,
when difputes ran fo high between patricians and
plebeians, that no candidate appeared for the con-
fulfhip, and ferveral refufed, theveflel was in fuch
a dorm that nobody would accept the helm.
The people who remained in the city at lad
nominated Pofthumius Cominius, A. R. 261,
and Spurius Caflius, who were believed equally
agreeable to plebeians and patricians. The firft
thing they did was to propofe the affair of the
debts to the fenate, : a violent oppofitibn enfued,
headed by Appius, who conftantly infifled that all
the favour fhewn the populace only made them
the more infolent, and that nothing but inflexible
feverity could reduce them to vtheir duty. The
younger fenators all blindly adopted this opinion :
nothing palled, in feveral tumultuous aflemblies,
but altercations and mutual reproaches. The
ancient fenators were all inclined to peace. Agrip-
pa, who had obferved a fagacious medium, neither
flattering the pride of the great, nor favouring
the licence of the people, being one of the new

fenators

Commonwealth, examined. 259

fenators whom Brutus had chofen after the ex-
pulfion of Tarquin, fupported the opinion that
the good of the ftate required the re-eftablilh-
ment of concord among the citizens. Sent by
the fenate on a committee to treat with the people
retired to the facred mountain, he fpoke his cele-
brated fable of the Belly and the Members. The
people at this conference, which was in 261, in-
lifted, that as, by the creation of dictators with
unlimited authority, the law which admitted ap-
peals to the people from the decrees of any magif-
trate whatever, was eluded, and in a manner
made void, tribunes mould be created, a new fpe-
cies of magiftrates, whofe fole duty mould be the
confervation of their rights. The affair of Corio-
lanus happened in this interval, between the firft
confulate of Sp. Caffius in 261, and the fecond
in 268 ; in which, probably, he had a&ed in fa-
vour of the people in eftabliming the tribunate,
and in defending them againft Coriolanus, Appius
Claudius, and the other oligarchic fenators. This
year, 268, he marched againft the Volfci and
Hernici, who made peace, and the conful obtain-
ed the honour of a triumph.

Caffius, after his triumph, reprefented to the
fenate, that " the people merited fome reward for
" the fervices they had rendered the common-
cc wealth, for defending the public liberty, and
" fubjec~hng new countries to the Roman power :
<c that the lands acquired by their arms belonged

c to the public, though fome patricians had ap-
" propriated them to themfelves : that an equita-
" ble diftribution of thefe lands would enable the

6 poor plebeians to bring up children for the
" benefit of the commonwealth ; and that fuch a
" divifion alone could eftablifh that equality which

" ought to fubfift between the citizens of the

" fame

7 he right Con/tifution of a

" fame ftate." He aflbciated in this privilege
the Latines fettled at Rome, who had obtained the
freedom of the city. — Turn primum lex Agraria
promulgata eft. Liv. 1. ii. 41. This law, which
had at lead a great appearance of equity, would
have relieved the mifery of the people, and no
doubt rendered Caflius popular. The Romans
never granted peace to their enemies until they
had taken fome of their territory from them. Part
of fuch conquefts were fold to defray the expence
of the war : another portion was diftributed among
the poor plebeians. Some cantons were farmed
out for the public : rapacious patricians, folely
intent upon enriching themfelves, took pofleflion
of fome; and thefe lands, unjuftly ufurped by the
rich, Caflius was for having diftributed anew in
favour of the plebeians.

The ariftocratical pride, avarice, and ambition,
were all incenfed, and the fenators greatly alarm-
ed. The people discovered fymptoms that they
begun to think themfelves of the fame fpecies with
their rulers, and one patrician of confular dignity
dared to encourage them in fuch prefumptuous
and afpiring thoughts.

Some device or other muft be invented to dupe
the people, and ruin their leader : Verginus the
conful foon hit upon an expedient. Rabuleius the
tribune afked him in aflembly, what he thought
of this law ? He anfwered, he would willingly
confent that the lands mould be diftributed
among the Roman people, provided the Latines
had no {hare ; divide et impera. This diftin&ion,
without the leaft appearance of equity, was ad-
drefled fimply to the popular hatred between the
Romans and Latines, and, the bait was greedily
fwallowed. The people were highly pleafed with
the conful, and began to defpife Caflius, and to

fufped

Commonwealth, examined.

fufpeft him of ambition to be king. He conti-
nued his friendly intentions towards the people,
and propofed in fenate to reimburfe, as it was but
juft, out of the public treafury, the money which
the poorer citizens had paid for the corn of which
Gelo, king of Syracufe, had made the common-
wealth a prefent during the fcarcity. But even
this was now reprefented by the fenate, and fuf-
pecled by the people, to be only foliciting popu-
lar favour ; and although the people felt every
hour the neceflity of a king to protect them
againft the tyranny of the fenate, yet they had
been gulled by patrician artifice into an oath
againft kings, and although they felt the want of
fuch a magiftrate, they had not fenfe enough to
fee it. The Agrarian law was oppofed in fenate
by Appius and Sempronius, and evaded by the
apppointment of ten commiffoners to furvey the
lands.

The next year Caflius was cited before the
people, and accufed by the quseftors of having
taken fecret meafures for opening a way to the
fovereignty ; of having provided arms, and re-
ceived money from the Latines and Hernici ; and
of having made a very great party among the moft
robuft of their youth, who were continually feen
in his train.

The people heard the quseftors, but gave no at-
tention to Caffius's anfwer and defence. N-o con-
fideration for his children, his relations, and friends,
who appeared in great numbers to fupport him ;
no remembrance of his great actions, by which he
had raifed himfelf to the firft dignities ; nor three
confulfhips and two triumphs, which had rendered
him very illuftrious, could delay his condemna-
tion ; fo unpardonable a crime with the Romans
was the ilighteft fufpicion of afpiring at regal

power !

262 The right Conflitutlon of a

power ! fo ignorant fo unjuft, fo ungrateful, and
ib ftupid were that very body of plebeians,who
were continually fuffering the cruel tyranny of
patricians, and continually foliciting protectors
againfl it ! Without regarding any moderation or
proportion, the blind tools of the hatred and ven-
geance of their enemies, they condemned Caflius
to die, and the quaeftors inftantly carried him to
the Tarpeian rock, which fronted the forum, and
threw him down, in the prefence of the whole
people. His houfe was demolifhed, and his eftate
fold, to purchafe a ftatue to Ceres ; and the fac-
tion of the great grew more powerful and haugh-
ty, and rofe in their contempt for the plebeians,
who loft courage in proportion, and foon re-
proached themfelves with injuflice, as well as im-
prudence, in the condemnation of the zealous de-
fender of their interefts. They found themfelves
cheated in all things. The confuls neither exe-
cuted the fenate's decree for diftributing the lands,
nor were the ten commiflinonersele&ed. They com-
plained, with great truth, that the fenate did not
aft with fincerity ; and accufed the tribunes of the
laft year of betraying their interefts. The tribunes
of this year warmly demanded the execution of
the decree ; to elude which a new war was in-
vented. The patricians preferved their ariftocra-
tical tyranny for many centuries, by keeping up
continually fome quarrel with foreigners, and by
frequently creating di&ators. The patricians, in
the aflemblies by centuries, had an immenfe ad-
vantage over the plebeians. The confuls were
here chofen by the patricians, as Caflius and Man-
lius were murdered by aflemblies in centuries. In
270 Casfo Fabius, one of Caflius's accufers, was
chofen conful, though very unpopular. In 271
the other of Caflius's accufers was chofen conful.

In

Commonwealth, examined. 263

In thefe contefls the fteadinefs of the patricians
is as remarkable as the inconftancy of the ple-
beians ; the fagacity of the former as obvious as
the ftupidity of the latter ; and the cruelty of the
former as confpicuous as the ingratitude of the
.latter. Prejudice, paflion, and fuperftition, ap-
pear to have altogether governed the plebeians,
without the lead appearance of their being ra-
tional creatures, or moral agents ; fuch was their
total ignorance of arts and letters, all the little
advantages of education which then exifted being
monopolized by the patricians. The ariflocracy
appears in precifely the fame character in all thefe
anecdotes, as we before faw it in Venice, Poland,
Bern, and elfewhere. The fame indifpenfable ne-
ceffity appears in all of them, in order to preferve
even the appearance of equity and liberty, to give
the patricians a mafter in the firft executive ma-
giftrate, and another mafter in a houfe of com-
mons : — I fay, mafter; for each of the three
branches muft be, in its turn, both mafter and fer-
vant, governing and biing governed by turns.

To underftand how the people were duped upon
thefe occafions, and particularly how Manlius was
condemned to death, we muft recollect that the
tribunes cited him before the people, not in their
curise, but centuries. The centuries were formed
on an artful idea, to make power accompany
wealth. The people were divided into clafles, ac-
cording to the proportion of their fortunes : each
clafs was divided into centuries ; but the number
of centuries in the different claffes was fo unequal,
that thofe of the firft, or richeft clafs, made a ma-
jority of the whole, and when the centuries of
this clafs were unanimous they decided the quef-
tion. By this inftitution the rich were mafters of
the legiflature,

State

264 The right Conftitution of a

State of the Claffes and Centuries.

Clafs.

Roman
Valuation.

Sterling.
£. s.

No. of
Centuries

Ijjtif.

.100,000

~

322 18

- 98

2

75,000

— -

"242 3

— 21

3 —

50,000

=

161 9

— 21

4 —

25,000

=

80 14

21

5 —

11,000

=

35 i°

— 31

Total 193 from
98 fub.

95

Majority of the firft clafs 3

So that by citing Manlius before the people by
centuries, the fenate were fure of a vote for his de-
itruftion, and the people had not fenfe to fee it,
or fpirit to alter it. ^

Nedham thus far appears to reafon fairly and
conclufively, when he adduces the examples of
Melius and Manlius, and he might have added
Caffius, to prove that the people are ever in dan-
ger of lofing their liberty, and indeed he might
have advanced that they never have any liberty,
while they are governed by one fenate. But thefe
examples do not prove what he alledges them to
prove, viz. that the people, in their fupreme af-
femblies, fucceffively chofen, are the befl keepers
of their liberty ; becaufe fuch an aflembly is fub-
jeft to every danger of a {landing hereditary fe-
nate ; and more the firft vote divides it Into two
parties, and the majority is omnipotent, and the
minority defencelefs. He fbould have adduced

thefe

Commonwealth, examined. 265

thefe examples to prove the neceffity of feparating
the executive, legiflative, and judicial, and of di-
viding the legiilature into three branches, making
the executive one of them, and independent of
the other two. This is the only fcientific govern-
ment ; the only plan which fakes into confidera-
tion all the principles in nature, and provides for
all cafes' that occur. He is equally right, and
^equally wrong, in the application of his other ex-
amples. u The people," fays he, " were fome-
" times in danger of a furprife by a grandee cabi-
<c net or junto, as that upftart tyranny of the decem-
" viri, where ten men made a fhift to enflave the
" fenate as well as the people." It is no wonder
that Caffius, Melius, and Manlius, were facrificed
to the paffions of the fenate, for until the year of
Rome 300, the Romans had no certain laws ; fo
that the confuls and fenators, a&ing as judges,
were abfolute arbiters of the fate of the citizens.
Terentillus, a tribune, had propofed an ordinance
that laws mould be inflituted* as rules of right,
both in public and private affairs. The fenate
had eluded and poAponed, by various artifices,
the law of Terentillus until this year, 300,
when the tribunes folicited the execution of it
with great fpirit ; and the fenate, weary of con-
tention, or apprehenfive of greater danger, at
Length decreed, " That ambafiadors mould be
fent to Athens, and to the Greek cities in Italy, to
collect fuch laws as they mould find mod con-
formable to the conftitution of the Roman com-
monwealth ; and that at their return the confuls
fhould deliberate with the fenate upon the choice
of legiflators, of the power to be, confided to them,
and the time they were to continue in office/' Sp.
Poithumius, Servius Sulpicius, and A. Manlius,
three perfons of confular dignity, were appointed
VOL. III. M m deputies.

266 The right Conftitutlon of a

deputies. Three gallies were prepared by the
public, of a magnificence that might do honour
to the Roman people.

In the year 302 the ambaffadors were returned,
and Appius Claudius, whofe anceftors had always
been haughty ariflocratics, was chofen conful, with
T. Gentius for his colleague. The fenate af-
fembled, and refolved that decemviri mould be
eleded out of the principal fenators, whofe au-
thority mould continue a year ; that they mould
govern the commonwealth with all the power
which the confuls then had, and as the kings had
formerly exercifed, and without any appeal from
their judgments ; that all other magiftracies, and
even the tribunalfhip, mould be abolifhed. This
decree was received by the people with loud ac-
clamations. An afTembly, by centuries, was im-
mediately held, and the new magiftrates created,
and the old ones all abdicated their offices. Thus
the conftitution was wholly changed, and all au-
thority transferred to one centre, the decemvirs.
It was foon exercifed like all other authorities in
one centre. AVe fee here the effecl: of two powers,
without a third. I he people from hatred to the
confuls, and the fenate from hatred to the tri-
bunes, unite at once in a total abolition of the
conftitution.

The conftitution of the decemvirs was precifely
Nedham's idea ; it was annually eligible ; it was
the people's government in their fucceflive aflem-
blies : but we find that an annual power, with-
out any limits, was a great temptation. The de-
cemvirs were all fenators of confular dignity, and
therefore, in the opinion of the people themfelves,
the moft eminent for talents and virtues ; yet their
virtues were not fufficient to fecure an honed ufe
of their unbounded power. They took many

precautions

Commonwealth 9 examined, 267

precautions to preferve their own moderation., as
Well as to avoid exciting jealoufy in their fellow-
citizens : only one had the rods and axes, the
others had nothing to diftinguifh them but a Angle
officer, called Accenfus, who walked before each
of them. Their prefident continued only one
day ; and they fucceeded each other daily, till the
end of the year. — It is much to our purpofe to
enlarge upon this example ; becaufe, inftead of
being an argument for Nedham's inconcinnate
fyftem, it is full proof againft it. The courfe of
paflions and events, in this cafe, were precifely the
fame as will take place in every fimple govern-
ment of the people, by a fucceflion of their repre-
fentatives, in a fmgle afiembly : and whether that
afiembly confifts of ten members, or five hundred,
it will make no difference. In the morning, the
decemviri all went to their tribunal, where they
took cognizance of all caules and affairs, public
and private ; juflice was adminiftered with all pof-
fible equity ; and every body departed with per-
fect fatisfaction. Nothing could be fo charming
as the regard they profefled for the interefts of the
people, and the protection which the meaneft
found againft the oppreffion of the great. It was
now generally affirmed, that there was no occafion
for tribunes, confuls, praetors, or any other magif-
trates. The wifdom, equity, moderation, and hu-
manity of the new government, was admired and
extolled. What peace, what tranquillity, what
happinefs were enjoyed by the public, and by in-
dividuals ! what a confolation ! what glory to the
decemvirs ! Appius Claudius, efpecially, en-
groffed the whole glory of the adminiflration in
the minds of the people. He acquired fo de-
cided an afcendency over his colleagues, and fo ir-
refiftible an influence with the people, that the

whole

268 The right Gonftitutlon of a

whole authority feemed centred in him. He
had the art to diflinguifh himfelf, peculiarly, in
whatever he tranfacted, in concert with his col-
leagues. His mildnefs and affability, his kind
ccndefcenfion to the meaneft and weakeft of the
citizens, and his polite attention in faluting them
all by their names, gained him all hearts. Let
it be remembered, he had, till this year, been the
open enemy of the plebeians. As his temper was
naturally violent and cruel, his hatred to the peo-
ple had arifen to ferocity. On a fudden he was
become another man ; humane, popular, obliging,
wholly devoted to pleafe the multitude, and ac-
quire their affections. Every body delighted in the
government of the decemvirs, and a perfect union
prevailed among themfelves. They completed
their body of laws, and caufed it to be engraved
on ten tables : they were ratified by the fenate,
confirmed by the people in the comitia centuriata,
engraven on pillars of brafs, and placed in the fo-
rum. The year was upon the point of expiring ;
and as the confuls and fenators found themfelves
delivered by the new government from the perfe-
cutions of the tribunes, and the people from what
they equally hated, the authority of the confuls,
both parties agreed in the propriety of choofing
ten fucceffors. It was pretended, that fome fur-
ther laws might be Itill wanting ; that a year was
too fhort to complete fo great a work ; and that
to carry the whole into full effect, the independent
authority of the fame magiftracy would be necef-
fary. That which muft happen upon all annual
elections of fuch a government in one centre, hap-
pened in this cafe. The city was in a greater and
more univerfal ferment than had ever been known.
Senators, the moft diftinguifhed by age and me-
rit, demanded the office : no doubt to prevent

factious

Commonwealth, examined. 269

factious and turbulent fpirits from obtaining it.
Appius, who fecretly intended to have himfelf con-
tinued, feeing thofe great perfons, who had pafled
through all dignities, fo eager in purfuit of this,
was alarmed. The people, charmed with his paft
conduct while decemvir, openly clamoured to
continue him in preference to all others. He af-
fected at firft a reluctance, and even a repugnance,
at the thought of accepting a fecond time an em-
ployment fo laborious, and fo capable of exciting
jealoufy and envy againfl him. To get rid of his
colleagues, and to ftimuiate them to refufe the
office, he declared upon all occafions, that as they
had difcharged their duty with fidelity, by their
affiduity and anxious care for a whole year, it was
but juft to allow them repofe, and appoint them
fuccefibrs. The more averfion he difcovered, the
more he was folicited. The defires and wimes of
the whole city, the unanimous and earneft felici-
tations of the multitude, were at length with pain
and reluctance, complied with. He exceeded all
his competitors in artifice : he embraced one, took
another by the hand, and walked publicly in the
forum, in company with the Duillii and Icillii,
the two families who were the principals of the
people, and the pillars of the tribunate. His col-
leagues, who had been hitherto his dupes, know-
ing thefe popular condefcenfions to be contrary to
his character, which was naturally arrogant, began
to open their eyes : but not daring to oppofe him
openly, they oppofed their own addrefs to his ma-
nagement. As he was the youngeft among them,
they chofe him prefident, whofe office it was to
nominate the candidates to offices, relying upon
his modefty not to name himfelf ; a thing without
example, except among the tribunes. But mo-
defty and decency were found in him but feeble

barriers

270 The right Conftitution of a

barriers againft ambition : he not only caufed
himfelf to be ele&ed, but excluded all his col-
leagues of the laft year, and filled up the nine
other places "with his own tools, three of whom
were plebeians. The fenate, and whole patrician
body, were aftonifhed at this, as it was thought
by them contrary to his own glory, and that of his
anceftors, as well as to his haughty character.
This popular trait entirely gained him the multi-
tude. It would be tedious to relate the manner
in which they continued their power from year to
year, with the mod hardened impudence on their
part, the moft filly acquiefcence of the people,
and the fears of the fenate and patricians. Their
tyranny and cruelty became at length intolerable ;
and the blood of Virginia, on a father's dagger,
was alone fufficient to aroufe a ftupid people from
their lethargy.

Is it not abfurd in Nedham to adduce this ex-
ample, in fupport of his government of the people
by their fucceflive reprefentatives annually chofen ?•
Were not the decemvirs the people's reprefenta-
tives ? and were not their elections annual ? and
would not the fame confequences have happened, if
the number had been one hundred, or fivehundred,
or a thoufand inftead of ten ? — " O, but the
people of Rome fhould not have continued them
in power from year to year." — How will you hin-
der the people from continuing them in power ?
If the people have the choice, they may continue
the fame men ; and we certainly know they will :
no bonds can reftrain them. Without the liberty
of choice, the deputies would not be the people's
reprefentatives. If the people make a law, that
the fame man (hall never ferve two years, the
people can and will repeal that law ; if the peo-
ple impofe upon themfelves an oath, they will foon

fay

Commonwealth , examined. 271

fay and believe they can difpenfe with that oath :
in fhort, the people will have the men whom they
love beft for the moment, and the men whom they
love beft will make any law to gratify their pre-
fent humour. Nay more, the people ought to be
reprefented by the men who have their hearts and
confidence, for thefe alone can ever know their
wants and defires ; but thefe men ought to have
fome check to reftrain them, and the people too,
when thofe defires are for forbidden fruit — for in-
juftice, cruelty, and the ruin of the minority : —
and that the defires of the majority of the people
are often for injuftice and inhumanity againft the
minority, is demonft rated by every page of the
hiftory of the whole world.

We come next to the examples of continuing
power in particular perfons. The Romans were
fwallowed up, by continuing power too long in
the hands of the triumvirates of emperors, or
generals. The firft of thefe were Csefar, Pompey,.
and Crafius. But who continued the power of
Csefar ? If the people continued it, the argument
arifing from the example is againft a fimple go-
vernment of the people, or by their fucceilive
reprefentative aflemblies. Was it the fenate,
was it the (landing permanent power in the con-
ftitution, that conferred this continuance of power
on Casfar ? By no means. It is again neceflary
to recoiled the ftory, that we may not be impofed
on. No military ftation exifted in Italy, left
fome general might overaw the republic. Italy,
however, was underftood to extend only from Ta-
rentum to the Arnus and the Rubicon. Cifal-
pine Gaul was not reputed in Italy, and might be
held by a military officer and an army. Csefar,
from a deliberate and fagacious ambition, procured
from the people an unprecedented prolongation of
his appointments for five years j but the diftribu-

tion

272 The right Conftitution of a

tion of the provinces was (till the prerogative of
the fenate, by the Sempronian law. Casfar had
ever been at variance with a majority of the fe-
nate. In the office of prastor he had been fuf-
pended by them : in his prefent office of conful,
he had fet them at open defiance. He had no
hopes of obtaining from them the prolongation of
his power, and the command of a province. He
knew that the very propofal of giving him the
command of Cifalpine Gaul fora number of years
would have (hocked them. In order to carry his
point, he mud fet afide the authority of the fe-
nate, and deftroy the only check, the only appear-
ance of a balance, remaining in the conftitution.
A tool of his, the tribune Vatinius, moved the
-people to fet afide the law of Sempronius, and by
their own unlimited power name Casfar as pro-
conful of Cifalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five
years, with an army of feveral legions. The fe-
nate were alarmed, and in vain oppofed. The
people voted it. The fenate faw that all was loft,
and Cato cried, " You have placed a king, with
his guards, in your citadel." Caefar boafted, that
he had prevailed both in obtaining the consulate
and the command, not by the conceflion of the
fenate, but in direct oppofition to their will. He
was well aware of their malice, he faid, Though
he had a confummate command of his temper,
and the profoundefl diffimulation, while in purfuit
of his point, his exuberant vanity braved the
world when he had carried it. He now openly
infulted the fenate, and no longer concealed his
connection with Pompey and Craflus, whom he
had over-reached to concur in his appointment.
Thus, one of ^he cleared and ftrongeft examples
in hiftory, to fhew the neceffity of a balance be-
tween an independent fenate and an independent

people,

Commonwealth, examined. 273

people, is adduced by Nedham in favour of his
indigefted plan, which has no balance at all. The
other example of Auguftus, Antony, and Lepi-
dus, is not worth confidering particularly ; for the
trial between them was but a ftruggle of arms,
by military policy alone without any mixture of
civil or political debates or negotiations.

The fourth reafon is, " becaufe a fucceflion of
" fuprerne powers deftroys faclion :" which is de-
fined to be an adherence to an intereft deftinct from
the true intereft of the (late.

In this particular one may venture to differ
altogether from our author, and deny the fact,
that a fucceffion of fovereign authority in one af-
fembly, by popular elections, deftroys faclion.
We may affirm the contrary, that a flanding au-
thority in an abfolute monarch, or an hereditary
ariftocracy, are lefs friendly to the monfter than
a .fimple popular government ; and that it is only
in a mixed government of three independent or-
ders, of the one, the few, and the many, and
three feparate powers, the legiflative, executive,
and judicial, that all forts of factions, thofe of
poor and the- rich, thofe of the gentlemen and
common people, thofe of the one, the few, and
the many, can, at all times, be quelled. The
reafon given by our author is enough to prove
this : " Thofe who are factious, muft have time to
" improve their fleights and projects, in difguifing
" their defigns, drawing in inftruments, and
•" worming out their oppofites." in order to
judge of this, let us put two fuppofitions : i . Ei-
ther the fucceffion muft be by periodical elections,
limply ; or, 2. by periodical elections in rotation :
and, in either cafe the means and opportunities of
improving addrefs and iyftems, concealing or
feigning defigns, making friends and efcaping
. III. N n enemies,'

274 The right Cortftitution of a

enemies, are greater in a fucceflion of popular
elections than in a {landing ariftocracy or fimple
monarchy^ and infinitely greater than in a mixed
government. When the monfter Faftion is
watched and guarded by Cerberus with his three
heads, and a lop is thrown to him to corrupt or
appeafe him, one mouth alone will devour it, and
the other two will give the alarm. — But to return
to our firft cafe, a fucceflion in one affembly, by
fimple annual elections. Elections are -the beft
poflible fchools of political art and addrefs. One
may appeal to any man who has equal experience
in elections and in courts, whether addrefs and art,
and even real political knowledge, is not to be
acquired more eafily, and in a fhorter time, in
the former than in the latter. A king of France
once afked his moft able and honed ambaffador
d'Oflat, where he had learned that wonderful
dexterity, with which he penetrated into the bo-
foms of men of all nations and characters, unra-
velled every plait in the human foul, and every
intricacy of affairs and events ? The cardinal an-
fwered, " Sire, I learned it all, in my youth, at
the ele&ion of aparifh officer." It is a common
obfervation in England, that their greateft ftatef-
men, and their favourite Chatham among the
reft, were formed^by attendance on elections. The
human heart is no where fo open and fo clofe by
turns. Every argument is there exhaufted ; every
paffcon, prejudice, imagination, fuperftition, and
caprice, is eafily and iurely learned among thefe
fcenes. One would fufpect that Shakefpeare had
been an electioneering agent. When thefe elec-
tions are in a fmgle city, like Rome, there will
be always two fets of candidates : if one fet fuc-
ceeds one year, the other will endeavour to fuc-
ceed the next. This will make the whole year a
fcene of faction and intrigue, and every citizen,

except

Commonwealth, examined, 275

fexcept perhaps a very few who will not meddle on
either fide, a partifan or factious man. If the
elections are in a large country like England, for
example, or one of the United States of America,
where various cities, towns, boroughs, and cor-
porations, are to be reprefented, each fcene of
election will have two or more candidates, and
two or more parties, each of which will itudy its
Heights and projects, difguife its defigns, draw in
tools, and worm out enemies. We mult remem-
ber, that every party, and every individual, is
now ftruggling for a ihare in the executive and
judicial power as well as legiflative, for a (hare
in the distribution of all honours, offices, rewards,
and profits. Every paffion and prejudice of every
voter will be applied to, every flattery and me-
nace, every trick and bribe that can be bedowed,
and will be accepted, will be ufed ; and, what is
horrible to think of, that candidate or that agent
who has fewed fcruples ; who will propagate lies
and (landers with mod confidence and fecrecy ;
who will wheedle, flatter, and cajole ; who will
debauch the people by tears, feads, and diver-
fions, with the lead hefitation, and bribe with the
mod impudent front, which can confift with hy-
pocritical concealment, will draw in tools and
worm out enemies the faded : unfullied honour,
flerling integrity, real virtue, will dand a very un-
equal chance. When vice, folly, impudence, and
knavery, have carried an eledtion one year, they
will acquire, in the courfe of it, frefh influence
and power to fucceed the next. In the courfe of
the year, the delegate in an aflembly that difpofes
of all commiflions, contracts, and penfions, has
many opportunities to reward his friends among
his own condituents, and to puni(h his enemies.
The fon or other relation of one friend has a

cominiflion

$7 6 The right C on/lit ut ion of a

commiffion given him in the army, another in the
navy, a third a benefice in the church,~a4burth in
the cuitoms, a fifth in the excife ; fhares in loans
and contracts are diftributed among his friends,
by which they are enabled to increafe their own
and his dependents and partifans, or, in other
words, to draw in more inilruments and parties,
and worm out their oppofites. All this is fo eafy
to comprehend, fo obvious to fight, and fo cer-
tainly known in univerfal experience;, that it is
aftoniming that our author mould have ventured
to alfert that fuch a government kills the canker-
worm Faction.

But to confider the fubject in one other point of
view, let us introduce the idea of a rotation, by
which is here meant, not merely vacating a feat,
which the electors may fill again with the fame
Tubject, but a fundamental law, that no man fhall
ierve in the foveriegn afTembly more than one
year, or two or three years, or one in three, or
three in fix, &c. : for example, fuppofe England,
or any of the United States, governed by one
fovereign aflembly, annually elected, with a fun-
damental law, that no member mould ferve more
than three years in fix ; what would be the con-
fequence ? In the firft place, it is obvious that this
is a violation of the rights of mankind ; it is an
abridgment of the rights both of electors and can-
didates. There is no right clearer, and few of
more importance, than that the people mould be
at liberty to choofe the ableft and beft men, and
that men of the greateft merit fhould exercife the
mod important employments ; yet, upon the pre-
fent fuppofition, the people voluntarily refign
this right, and fhackle their own choice. This
year the people choofe thofe members who are
theableil, wealthier!, beft qualified, and have moft

of

Commonwealth^ examined. 277

of their confidence and affection. * In the courfe
of the three years they increafe their number of
friends,and confequently their influence and power,
by their adminiftration, yet at the end of three
years they muft all return to private life, and be
fucceeded by another fet, who have lefs wifdom,
wealth and virtue, and lefs of the confidence and
affection of the people. Will either they or the
people bear this ? Will they not repeal the fun-
damental law, and be applauded by the nation,
at lead by their own friends and constituents, who
are the majority for fo doing ? But fuppofing fo
unnatural and improbable a thing, as that they
ihould yet refpect the law, what will be the con-
fequence ? They will in effect nominate their
fucceffors, and govern ftill. Their friends are
the majority, their fucceffors will be all taken
from their party, and the mortified minority will
fee themfelves the dupes. Thofe men who have
the mod weight, influence, or power, whether by
merit, wealth, or birth, will govern, whether they
ftay at home or go to parliament. Such a rota-
tation then will only increafe and multiply fac-
tions.

Our author's examples muft be again examined.
" What made the Roman kings factions, but a
" continuation of power in their perfons and fa-
" milies ?" If it is admitted that they were fac-
tious, as Tarquin no doubt was, it is certain that
the nobles about them were much more fo ; and
their fa&ious actfons were chiefly occafioned by
the eternal jealoufy and envy, rivalry and ambi-
tion, of the great families that were neareft to
them. But the effect was produced by their
powers being undefined, unlimited by law, and
unchecked by conflitutional power, not by its pro-
longation. * The power of the king, and the

power

right Conftitution of a

•

power of the fenate, were continued ; and neither
was checked, for the people had not a power
adequate to the purpofe of checking either, much
lefs both : both grew factious, but the fenate
mod fo, and drove away the king, that they might
have the exclufive power of being factious, and
without the leaft regard to the liberty of the
people.

" After the Romans became a commonwealth,
ct was it not for the fame reafon that the fenate
<c fell into fuch heats and fits among themfelves ?"
It may be truly anfwered, that it was not the con-
tinuation of power in the fenate, but the powers
being unlimited, that made it factious. A power
without a check is a faction. The fenate itfelf
was a faction from the firft moment after the ex-
pulfion of the kings. But if the fenate had been
annually chofen by the people, and held the fame
unlimited power, their factions, heats, and fits,
would have been much earlier and more violent.
" Did not Appius Claudius and his junto by the
" fame means lord it over the fenate ?" It was,
again, the illimitation of his power that enabled
him to lord it. It was granted only for one year.
And who continued it ? The people. And who
can hinder the people, when they have no check,
from continuing power ? Who ought to hinder
them ? But if Appius's unchecked power had
grown up from ftep to ftep, by a feries of popular
ele&ions, he would not have lorded it lefs : he
might have pofleiTed Virginia, and have murdered
her father with impunity. Continuation of power,
in the fame perfons and families, will as certainly
take place in a fimple democracy, or a democracy
by reprefentation, as in an hereditary ariftocracy
or monarchy. This evil, if it be one, will not be
avoided nor remedied, but encreafed and aggra-
vated,

Commonwealth, axamintd. 279

vated, by our author's plan of government. The
continuation will be certain ; but it will be acconv
plifhed by corruption, which is worfe than a con-
tinuation by birth ; and if corruption cannot effecl
the continuation, fedition and rebellion will be re-
curred to : for a degraded, difappointed, rich and
illuftrious family would at any time annihilate
heaven and earth, if it could, rather than fail of
carrying its point.

It is our author's peculiar misfortune, that
all his examples prove his fyftem to be wrong,
" Whence was it that Sylla and Marius caufed
" lo many profcriptions, cruelties, and combuf-
" tions in Rome, but by an extraordinary continua-
" tion of power in themfelves ?" Continuation of
power in Mariusi, &c. enabled him to commit cru-
elties to be fure : But who continued him ia
power ? Was it the fenate or the people ? By the
enthufiafm of the people for Marius, he had fur-*
rounded himfelf with afiafTms, who confidered the
patricians, nobles, and fenate, as enemies to their
caufe, and enabled him and his fa&ion to become
mailers of the commonwealth. The better fort
of people, the really honeft and virtuous repub-
licans, were difcouraged and deterred from fre-
quenting the public aflemblies. He had recourfe
to violence in the ele&ions of tribunes, that he
might carry the choice of a proftituted tool of his
own, Apuleius, againft the fenate and nobles ; and
becaufe their candidate Nonius was chofen, though
now vefted with a facred character, Marius's crea-
tures murdered him. No man had courage to
propofe an enquiry into the caufe of his death.
Apuleius, to gratify his party, propofed new laws,
to diftribute lands to the poor citizens and to the
veteran foldiers, to purchafe more lands for the
fame purpofe, to remit the price of corn already

diftributed

280 The right Conftitution of a

diftributed from the public granaries, and to dif-
tribute (till more gratis, at the public expence, to
the people. In vain did the quaeftor and the fe-
nate reprefent that there would be an end of in-
duftry, order, and government. Apuleius, to ex-
tend the power of the popular affemblies, and re-
move every check from his own and Marius's de-
figns, brought forward new laws : i. That the
acts of the tribes mould have the force of laws ;
2.. That it mould be treafon to interrupt a tribune ;
3. That the fenate mould be compelled to take an
oath to confirm every aft of the tribes in five days.
The power of the fenate was thus entirely fup-
prefled ; their branch of the legiflature was reduc-
ed to a mere form, and even the form they were
not at liberty to refufe. Marius, though he was
at the bottom of this meafure at firft, by the
moft abandoned hypocrify declared himfelf in fe-
nate againft taking the oath, in order to ruin
Metellus and all the other honed men ; and, as
foon as he had accomplifhed this, he took the
oath, and compelled the reft to do the fame. It
was by flattery, bribery, artifice, and violence,
that Marius and Apuleius prevailed with the peo-
ple to continue their power, in oppofition to alt
that the fenate could do to prevent it. What
would have been the confequence then if there
had been no fenate ? Would not the majority of
the people in the tribes have continued their
power, againft all that could have been done by
the minority ? Would not ftill more of the pub-
lic lands, money, and grain, have been lavifhed
upon proper inftruments among the majority, and
the minority have been compelled to pay the ex-
pence ? Our author afFecls to fay, that the " fenate
" and people continued the powers of Pompey
" and Ceaiar." But Casfar himfelf kaew it was

the

Commonwealth, examined* 281

the people, and not the fenate ; and if the fenate
continued Pompey, it was becaufe Cssfar and the
people laid them under the neceffity of doing it in
their own defence. Would Casfar have had lefs
" command in Gallia," if the people, or their fuc-
ceffive aflemblies, had been polfefTed of all power ?
It is mod obvious, that a majorityof the people, in
that cafe, would have continued Csefar as long as
he defired, and have given him as much power as
he wifhed : fo that every ftep of our author's
progrefs demonstrates his fyflem to be falfe. It is
idle to fay, that a continuation of power increafes
influence, and fpreads corruption, unlefs you point
out a way to prevent fuch a continuance of power.
To give all power to the people's fucceflive fihgle
reprefentative affemblies, is to make the continu-
ance of power, with all its increafmg influence and
corruption, certain and inevitable. You may as
wifely preach to the winds, as gravely exhort a
triumphant majority to lay down their power.

It is undoubtedly honourable in any man, who
has acquired a great influence, unbounded confi-
dence, and unlimited power, to refign it volunta-
rily 5 and odious to take advantage of fuch an
opportunity to deftroy a free government: but
it would be madnefs in a legiflator to frame his
policy upon a fuppofition that fuch magnanimity
would often appear. It is his bufmefs to contrive
his plan in fuch a manner, that fuch unlimited in-
fluence, confidence, and power, fliall never be ob-
tained by any man. The laws alone can be
trufted with unlimited confidence : — Thofe laws,
which alone can fecure equity between » all and
every one * ; which are the bond of that dignity
which we enjoy in the commonwealth ; the

* Quod ^ sequabile inter omnes atque unum, omnibus efTe
poteft. Cic. p. Csecin.

VOL. III. O o foundation

282 The right Conftitutlon of a

foundation of liberty, and the fountain of equity ;
the mind, the foul, the counfel, and judgment of
the city ; whofe minifters are the magiftrates,
whofe interpreters the judges, whofe fervants are
all men who mean to be free* : — Thofe laws, which
are right reafon, derived from the Divinity, com-
manding honefty, and forbidding iniquity ; which
are filent magiftrates, where the magiftrates are
only fpeaking laws ; which, as they are founded
in eternal morals, are emanations of the Divine
mind f .

If, " the life of liberty, and the only remedy
" againft felf-intereft, lies in fucceffion of powers
u and perlons," the United States of America
have taken the moil effectual meafures to fecure
that life and that remedy, in eftablifhing annual
elections of their governors, fenators, and repre-
fentatives. This will probably be allowed to be
as perfect an eftablifhment of a fuccedion of
powers and perfons as human laws can make : but
in what manner annual elections of governors and
fenators will operate remains to be afcertained. It
mould always be remembered, that this is not the
firft experiment that was ever made in the world
of elections to great offices of ftate : how they

* Hoc vinculum eft hujus dignitatis qua fruimer in repub-
lica, hoc fundamentum libertatis, hie fons asquitatis. Mens,
et animus, et conulium, et fcntentia civitatis, pofita eft in legi-
bus. Ut corpora noftra fine mente, fie civitas fine lege
fuis partibus, ut nervis ac fangnine et membris, uti non po-
teft. Legum miniftri, magiftratus : legum interpretes judi-
ces : legum denique idcirco omnes fervi fumus, ut liberi efle
pofiimus. Cic. pro Cluent. 146.

f Lex nihil aliad eft nifi re&a, et a numine Deorum tra&a
ratio, imperans honefta, prohibcns contraria. Cic. ii. in
Anton. 28. Illa'lDJvina mens fumma lex eft. De Leg. ii. u.
Magiftratum legem efle loquendem, legem magiftratum mu-
tum. De Leg. iii. 2.

have

Commonwealth, examined. 283

have hitherto operated in every great nation, and
what has been their end, is very well known. Man-
kind have univerfally difcovered that chance was
preferable to acorruptchoice,and have trufted Pro-
vidence rather than thernfelves. Firfl magiflrates
and fenators had better be made Jiereditary at
once, than that the people fhould be univerialiy
debauched and bribed, go to loggerheads, and fiy
to arms regularly every year. Thank Heaven !
Americans underfland calling conventions; and if
the time mould come, as it is very poflible it
may, when hereditary defcent (hall become a lefs
evil than annual fraud and violence, fuch a con-
vention may ftill prevent the firft magiftrate from
becoming abfolute as well as hereditary, — But if
this argument of our author is confidered as he
intended it, as a proof that a fucceffion of powers
and perfons in one afiembly is the mod perfect
commonwealth, it is totally fallacious.

Though we allow benevolence and generous
affections to exifl in the human breaft, yet every
moral theorifl will allow the felfifh pailions in the
generality of men to be the ftrongeft. There are
few who love the public better than themfelves,
though all may have fome affe&ion for the pub-
lic. We are not, indeed, commanded to love our
neighbour better than ourfelves. Self-intereft,
private avidity, ambition, and avarice, will exift in
every (late of fociety, and under every form of
government. A fucceffion of powers and perfons,
by frequent ele&ions, will not leffen thefe paf-
lions in any cafe, in a governor, fenator, or repre-
fentative ; nor will the apprehenfion of an ap-
proaching election reftrain them from indulgence
if they have the power. The only remedy is to
take away the power, by controuling the felfifh
avidity of the governor, by the fenate and houfe ;

of

2 84 The right Conftitution of a

of the fenate, by the governor and houfe ; and of
the houfe, by the governor and fenate. Of all
pofllble forms of government, a fovereignty in one
aflembly, fuccellively chofen by the people, is per-
haps the beft calculated to facilitate the gratifica-
tion of felf-love, and the purfuit of the private
intereft of a few individuals ; a few eminent con-
fpicuous characters will be continued in their feats
in the fovereign afifembly, from one election to
another, whatever changes are made in the feats
around them ; by fuperior art, addrefs, and opu-
lence, by more fplendid birth, reputations, and
connections, they will be able to intrigue with the
people and their leaders out of doors, until they
worm out moll of their oppofers, and introduce
their friends : to this end they will beftow all
offices, contracts, privileges in commerce, and
other emoluments, on the latter and their connec-
tions, and throw every vexation and difappoint-
ment in the way of the former, until they eftablifh
fuch a fyftem of hopes and fears throughout the
flate as mail enable them to carry a majority in
every frefti election of the houfe. The judges will
be appointed by them and their party, and of con-
fequence will be obfequious enough to their in-
clinations. The whole judicial authority, as well
as the executive, will be employed, perverted, and
proftituted to the purpofes of electioneering. No
juftice will be attainable, nor will innocence or
virtue be fafe, in the judicial courts, but for the
friends of the prevailing leaders : legal profecu-
tions will be inflituted and carried on againft op-
pofers, to their vexation and ruin, and as they
have the public purfe at command, as well as the
executive and judicial power, the public money
will be expended in the fame way. No favours
will be attainable but by thofe who will court the

ruling

Commonwealth, examined. 285

ruling demagogues in the houfe,by voting for their
friends and inftruments ; and penfions and pecu-
niary rewards and gratifications, as well as ho-
nours and offices of every kind, voted to friends
and partifans. The leading minds and moft in-
fluential characters among the clergy will be
courted, and the views of the youth in this de-
partment will be turned upon thofe men, and the
road to promotion and employment in the church
will be obftructed againft fuch as will not worfhip
the general idol. Capital characters among the
phyficians will not be forgotten, and the means of
acquiring reputation and practice in the healing
art will be to get the (late trumpeters on the fide
of youth. The bar too will be made fo fubfer-
vient, that a young gentleman will have no chance
to obtain a character or clients, but by falling in
with the views of the judges and their creators.
Even the theatres, and actors and actrefles, muft
become politicians, and convert the public plea-
fures into engines of popularity^br the governing
members of the houfe. The prefs, that great
barrier and bulwark of the rights of mankind,
when it is protected in its freedom by law, can
now no longer be free : if the authors, writers,
and printers, will not accept of the hire that will
be offered them, they muft fubmit to the ruin that
will be denounced againft them. The prefles,
with much fecrecy and concealment, will be made
the vehicles of calumny againft the minority, and
of panegyric and empirical applaufes of the lea-
ders of the majority, and no remedy can poflibly
be obtained. In one word, the whole fyftem of
affairs, and every conceivable motive of hope and
fear, will be employed to promote the private inte-
refts of a few, and their obfequious majority :
and there is no remedy but in arms. Accord-
ingly

The right Conjlitutlon tfa

ingly we find in all the Italian republics the mi-
nority always were driven to arms in defpair.
*c The attaining of particular ends requires length
" of time ; defigns muft lie in fermentation to
*c gain the opportunity to bring matters to per-
fection." It is true ; but lefs time will be
neceffary in this cafe, in general, than even in a
fimple hereditary monarchy or ariftocracy.

An ariftocracy, like the Roman fenate, between
the abolition of royalty, and the inftitution of the
tribunate, is of itfelf a faction, a private partial
intereft. Yet it was lefs fo than an affembly
arfhually choien by the people, and vefted with all
authority, would be ; for fuch an affembly runs
fader and eafier into an oligarchy than an heredi-
tary ariftocratical affembly. The leading mem-
bers having, as has been before fhewn in detail,
the appointment of judges, and the nomination to
all lucrative and honourable offices, they have
thus the power to bend the whole executive and
judicial authority to their own pfivate intereft,
and by thefe means to increafe their own reputa-
tions, wealth and influence, and thofe of their
party, at every new election : whereas in a ilm-
ple hereditary ariftocracy, it is the intereft of the
members in general to preferve an equality among
themfelves as long as they can ; and as they are
.f mailer in number, and have more knowledge, they
can more eafily unite for that purpofe, and there
is no opportunity for any one to increafe his
power by any annual elections. An afpiring
ariftocratic therefore muft take more time, and
ufe more addrefs, to augment his influence : yet
we find in experience, that even hereditary arifto-
cracies have never been able to prevent oligarchies
rifing up among them, but by the mod rigorous,

fevere,

Commonwealth examined. 287

fevere, and tyrannical regulations, fuch as the in-
ftitution of inquifitions, &c.

It may found oddly to fay that the majority is
a fa&ion ; but it is, neverthelefs, literally juft.
If the majority are partial in their own favour, if
they refufe to deny a perfect equality to every
member of the minority, they are a faction : and
as a popular affembly, colle&ive or representative,
cann'ot aft, or will, but by a vote, the firft ftep
they take, if they are not unanimous, occafions a
divifion into majority and minority, that is into
two parties, and the moment the former is unjuft
it is a faction. The Roman decemvirs themfelves
were fet up by the people, not by the fenate :
much longer time would have been required for
an oligarchy to have grown up among the patri-
cians and in the fenate, if the people had not
interpofed and demanded a body of law$, that is, a
conftitution. The fenate oppofed the requifition
as long as they could, but at laft appointed the
decemvirs, much againfl their own inclinations,
and merely in compliance with the urgent cla-
mours of the people. Ned ham thinks, that " as
" the firft founders of the Roman liberty did well
" in driving out their kings ; fo on the other
"fide, they did very ill in fettling a {landing
"authority within themfelves." It is really very
injudicious, and very ridiculous, to call thole Ro-
man nobles who expelled their kings, founders of
the Roman liberty : nothing was farther from
their heads or their hearts than national liberty ;
it was merely a ftruggle for power between a
king and a body of haughty envious nobles ; the
interefts of the people and of liberty had no mare
in it. The Romans might do well in driving out
their king : he might be a bad and incorrigible
character ; and in fuch a cafe any people may do

well

2S8 The right Conftitution of a

well in expelling or depofmg a king. But they
did not well in demqliming the fingle executive
magiftracy : they fhould have then demanded a
body of laws, a definite conftitution, and an in-
tegral fhare in the legiflature for the people, with
a percife deliniation of the powers of the firft ma-
giftrate and fenate. In this cafe they would have
been entitled to the praife of founders of Roman
liberty : but as it was, they only fubftituted one
fyftem of tyranny for another, and the new one
was worfe than the old. They certainly " did
" very ill in fettling a (landing* fovereign fupreme
" authority within themfelves." Thus far our
author is perfectly in the right, and the reafon he
gives for this opinion is very well founded : it is
the fame that was given thoufands of years before
him, by Plato, Socrates, and others, and has been
conflantly given by all fucceeding writers in fa-
vour of mixed governments, and againft fimple
ones, " beeaufe, lying open to the temptations of
" honour and profit," or, in other words, having
their ambition and vanity, avarice and luft, hatred
and refentment, malice and revenge, in ihort,
their felf-love* and all their paflions (" which are
" fails too big for any human bulk") unreftrain-
ed by any controuling power, they were at once
tranfported by them ; made ufe of their public
power not for the good of the commonwealth, but
for the gratification of their private paffions,
whereby they put the commonwealth, into frequent
flames of difcontent and fedition. Thus far is
very well : but when our author goes on, cc which
4C might all have been prevented, could they
" have fettled the date free, indeed, by placing an
" orderly fucceflion of fupreme authority in the
<f hands of the people," he can be followed by no
one who knows what is in man, and in fociety —

t>ecaufe

Commonwealth, examined 4 £89

becaufe that fupreme authority falls out of the
whole body into a majority at the firft vote. To
expect felf-denial from men, when they have a
majority in their favour, and confequendy power
to gratify themfelves, is to difoelieve all hiftory
and univerfal experience ; it is to difbelieve Reve-*
lation and the Word of God, which informs us, the
heart is deceitful above all things, and defperately
wicked. There have been examples of felf-de-
nial, and will be again ; but fuch exalted virtue
never yet exifted in any large body of men and
lafted long : and our authors argument requires
it to be proved, not only that individuals, but
that nations and majorities of nations, are capable
not only of afingleact, or afewa&s of difintereft-
ed juftice and exalted felf-denial, but of a courfe of
fuch heroic virtue for ages and generations 5 and
not only that they are capable of this, but that it is
probable they will practtfe it. There is no man
fo blind as not to fee, that to talk of founding a
government upoil a fuppofition that nations and
great bodies of men, left to themfelves, will prac-
tife a courfe of felf-denial, is either to babble like
a new-born infant, or to deceive like an unprinci-
pled impoflor. Nedham has himfelf acknow-
ledged, in feveral parts of this work, the depravity
of men in very ftrong terms. In this fifth reafon
he avers " temptations of honour and profit to be
" fails too big for any human bulk." Why then
does he build a fyftem on a foundation which he
owns to be fo unflable ? If his mind had been at
liberty to follow his own ideas and principles, he
mufl have feen, that a fucceffion of fupreme au-
thority in the hands of the people, by their houfe
^of reprefentatives, is at firft an ariftocracy as def-
potical as a Roman fenate, and becomes an oli-
garchy even fooner than that affembly fell into the
decemvirate. There is this infallible difadvan-
VOL. III. P p tage

lgc> The right Conftitution of a

tage in fuch a government, even in companion
with an hereditary ariltocracy, that it lets in vice,
profligacy, and corruption, like a torrent, \\ ith
tyranny ; whereas the latter often guards the mo-
rals of the people with the utmoft feverity : — even
the defpotifm of ariftocracy preferves the morals
of the people.

It is pretended by fome, that a fovereignty in
a fmgle afiembly, annually elected, is the only one
in which there is any reiponfibility for the exer-
cjfe of power. In the mixed government we con-
tend for, the minifters, at leaft of the executive
power, are refponfible for every inilance of the ex-
ercife of it ; and if they difpofe of a fmgle com-
miffion by corruption, they are refponfible to a
houfe of reprefentatives, who may, by impeach*
ment, make them refponfible before a fenate,
where they may be accufed, tried, condemned,
and punimed, by independent judges. But in a
fmgle fovereign affembly, each member, at the
end of' his year, is only refponfible to his conftitu-
ents : and the majority of members who have
been of one party, and carried all before them,
are to be refponfible only to their constituents,
not to the conflituen-ts of the minority who have
been overborne, injured, and plundered. And
who are thefe conftituents tp whom the majority
are accountable ? Thofe very perfons to gratify
whom they have proitituted the honours, re-
wards, wealth, and juftice of the flate. Thefe,
inltead of punching, will applaud ; in (lead of dif-
carding, will re-elefl:, with (till greater eclat, and a
more numerous majority ; for the lofmg caufe will
be deferted by numbers : and this will be done in
hopes of having flill more injuflice done, {till
more honours and profits divided among them-
felves, to the exclufion and mortification of the
minority. It is then aftonifhing that fuch a fim-

ple

examined. 491

pie government mould be preferred to a mixed
one, by any rational creature, on the fcore of re-
fponfibility. There is in fhort, no poflible way
of defending the minority in fuch a government,
from the tyranny of the majority, but by giving
the former a negative on the latter, the mod ab- y
furd inflitution that ever took place among men.
As the major may bear all poffible relations of
proportion to the minor part, it may be fifty-one
againd forty-nine in an afiembly of an hundred,
or it may be ninety-nine againft one only : it be-
comes therefore neceflary to give the negative to
the minority, in all cafes, though it be ever fo
fmall. Every member mutt pofiefs it, or he can
never be fecure that himfelf and his condituents
fhall not be facrificed by all the reft. This is the
true ground and original of the liberum veto in
Poland ; but the confequence has been ruin to
that noble but ill-conftituted republic. One fool,
or one knave, one member of the diet which is
a fingle fovereign alTembly, bribed by an in-
triguing ambafiador of fome foreign power, has ..
prevented meafures the moft eflential to the de»
fence, fafety, and exiftence of the nation. Hence
humiliations and partitions ! This alfo is the rea-
fon on which is founded the law of the United
Netherlands, that all the feven provinces muft be
unanimous in the afiembly of the States General ;
and all the cities and other voting bodies in the
arTemblies of the feparate dates. Having no fuf-
ficient checks in tjieir uncouth conditution, nor
any mediating power poflefled of the whole exe-
cutive, they have been driven to demand unani-
mity indead of a balance : and this mud be
done in every government of a fingle afiembly, or
the majority will indantly opprefs the minority.
But what kind of government would that be in
the United States of America, or any one of them,

that

29 2 The right Conftitution of a

that fhould require unanimity, or allow of the li-
berum veto ? It is fufficient to aik the queftion,
for every man will anfwer it alike.

No controverfy will be maintained with our
author, u that a free (late is more excellent than
*' fimple monarchy, or fimple ariftocracy." But
the queftio'n is, What is a free ftate ? It is plain
our author means a fingle aflembly of reprefen-
tatives of the people, periodically ele&ed, and
vefted with the fupreme power. This is denied
to be a free ftate. It is at firft a government
of grandees, and will foon degenerate into a go-
vernment of a junto or oligarchy of a few of the
mod eminent of them, or into an abolute mo-
narchy of one of them. The government of thefe
grandees, while they are numerous, as well as
when they become few, will be fo oppreffive to the
people, that the people from hatred or fear of the
gentlemen, wijl fet up one of them to rule the
reft, and make him abfolute. Will it be afked
how this can be proved? It is proved, as has
been often already faid, by the conftitution of hu-
man nature, by the experience of the world, and
the concurrent teftimony of all hiftory. Thepaf-
fions and defires of the majority of the reprefen-
tatives in aflembly being in their nature infatia-
ble and unlimited by any thing within their own
breafts, and having nothing to controul them
without, will crave more and more indulgence,
and, as they have the power, they will have the
gratification ; and Nedham's government will have
no fecurity for continuing free, but the prefump-
tion of felf-denial and (elf-government in the
members of the aflembly, virtues and qualities
that never exifted in great bodies of men, by the
Acknowledgment of all the greateft judges of hu-
man

Commonwealth , examined. 293

man nature, as well as by his own, when he fays,
that " temptations of honour and profit are fails
" too big for any human bulk." It would be as
reafonable to fay, that all government' is altoge-
ther unneceflary, becaufe it is the duty of all men
to deny themfelves, and obey the laws of nature,
and the laws of God. However clear the duty,
we know it will not be performed ; and therefore
it is our duty to enter into affbciations, and com-
pel one another to do fome of it.

It is agreed that the people are the beft keepers
of their own liberties, and the only keepers who
can be always trufted ; and therefore the peo-
ple's fair, full and honeft confent, to every law,
by their reprefentatives, muft be made an eflen-
tial part of the conftitution : but it is denied that
they are the beft keepers, or any keepers at all, of
their own liberties, when they hold collectively, or
by reprefentation, the executive and judicial pow-
er, or the whole and uncontrouled legiflative ; on
the contrary, the experience of all ages has
proved, that they inftantly give away their liber-
ties into the hands of grandees, or kings, idols of
their own creation. The management of the exe-
cutive and judicial powers together always cor-
rupts them, and throws the whole power into the
hands of the moft profligate and abandoned among
themfelves. The honeft men are generally nearly
equally divided in fentiment, and therefore the
vicious and unprincipled, by joining one party,
carries the majority , and the vicious and unprin-
cipled always follow the moft profligate leader,
him who bribes the higheft^ and fets all decency
and fhame at defiance ; it becomes more profit-
able, and reputable too, except with a very few,
to be a party man than a public fpirited one.
It is agreed that " the end of all govarnment

right Conftitiition of a

" is the good and eafe of the people, in a fecure
" enjoyment of their rights, without oppreffion ;M
but it muft be remembered, that the rich are/>f0-
fle as well as the poor ; that they have rights as
well as others ; that they have as clear and asy#-
creel* right to their large. property, as others have
to theirs which is fmaller ; that oppreflion to them
is as poflible, and as wicked, as to others ; that
ftealing, robbing, cheating, are the fame crimes and
fins, whether committed againft them or others.
The rich, therefore, ought to have an effectual
barrier in the conftitution againft being robbed,
plundered, and murdered, as well as the poor ;
and this can never be without an independent fe-
nate. The poor mould have a bulwark againft
the fame dangers and oppreflions ; and this can
never be without a houfe of reprefentatives of
the people. But neither the rich nor the poor
can be defended by their refpeftive guardians in
the conftitution, without an executive power, veft-
ed with a negative, equal- to either, to hold the
balance even between them, and decide when
they cannot agree. If it is afked, when will this
negative be ufed ? it may be anfwered, Per-
haps never : the known exiftence of it will pre-
vent all occafion to exercife it ; but if it has not
a being, the want of it will be felt every day. If
it has not been ufed in England for a long time
paft, it by no means follows -that there have not
been occafions when it might have been employed
with propriety. But one thing is very certain,
that there have been many occafions when the con-
ftytution would have been overturned fince the
Revolution, if the negative had not been an in-
dubitable prerogative of the crown.

It is agreed that the people are " moft fenfible
€< of their own burthens; and being put into a

" capacity

Commonwealth examined. 295

" capacity and freedom of acting, are the mod
" likely to provide remedies for their own relief."
For this reafon they are an eflential branch of the
legiflature, and have a negative on all laws, an
abfolute controul over every grant of money, and
an unlimited right to accufe their enemies before
an impartial tribunal. Thus far they are mod fen-
fible of their burthens, and mod likely to pro-
vide remedies. But it is affirmed, that they are
not only incapable of managing the executive
power, but would be inftantly corrupted by it in
fuch numbers as would deftroy the integrity of
all elections. It is denied that the legiflative
power can be wholly entruftedin their hands with
a moment's fafety: the poor and the vicious
would inftantly rob the rich and virtuous, fpread
their plunder in debauchery, or confer it upon
fome idol, who would become the defpot ; or, to
fpeak more intelligibly, if not more accurately,
fome of the rich, by debauching the vicious to
their corrupt intereft, would plunder the virtuous,
and become more rich, until they acquired all the
property , or a balance of property and of power,
in their own hands, and domineered as defpots in
an oligarchy.

It is agreed that the " people know where the
"fhoe wrings, what grievances are moft heavy,"
and therefore they mould always hold an inde-
pendent and eflential part in the legiflature, and
be always able to prevent the Ihoe from wringing
more, and the grievances from being made more
heavy ; they mould have a full hearing of all their
arguments, and a full fhare of all confultations,
for eafmg the foot where it is in pain, and-fbr lef-
fening the weight of grievances, or annihilating
them; but it is denied that they have right, er
that they fhould have power, to take from one man

his

right Conftitution of a

his property, to make another eafy, and that they
only know "what fences they (land in need of to
" (helter them from the injurious aflaults of thofe
" powers that are above them ;" meaning, by the
powers above them, fenators and magiftrates,
though, properly fpeaking, there are no powers
above them but the law, which is above all men,
governors and fenators, kings and nobles, as well
as commons.

The Americans have agreed with this writer in
the fentiment, " that it is but reafon that the
" people mould fee that none be interefted in the
" iupreme authority but perfons of their own
*c election, and fuch as muft, in a fhort time, re-
" turn again into the fame condition with them-
" felves." This hazardous experiment they have
tried, and, if elections are foberly made, it may
anfwer very well ; but if parties, factions, drun-
kennefs, bribes, armies, and delirium, come in, as
they always have done fooner or later, to embroil
and decide every thing, the people muft again
have recourfe to conventions, and find a remedy.
Neither philofophy nor policy has yet difcovered
any other cure, than by prolonging the duration
of the firft magiftrate and - fenators. The evil
may be leflened and poftponed, by elections for
longer periods of years, till they become for life ;
and if this is not found an adequate remedy,
there will remain no other but to make them he-
reditary. The delicacy or the dread of unpopu-
larity, that mould induce any man to conceal this
important truth from the full view and con-
templation of the people, would be a weakness, if
not a vice. As to " reaping the fame benefit or
" burthen by the raws enafted that befals ! the
V reft of the people," this will be fecured, whe-
ther the firft magiftrate and fenate be elective or

hereditary.

Commonwealth, examined. 297

hereditary, as long as the people are an integral
branch of the legislature ; can be bound by no
laws to which they have not confented ; and can
be fubjected to no tax which they have not agreed
to lay. It is agreed that the *c iffue of fuch a
" conflitution," whether the governor and fenate
be hereditary or elective, mufl be this, " that no
" load be laid upon any, but what is common
" to all, and that always by common confent -y
" not to ferve the lufts of any, but only to fup-
*c ply the neceflities of their country."

The next paragraph is a figurative flourifh, cal*
culated to amufe a populace, without informing
their underflandings. Poetry and myftics will
anfwer no good end in difcuiling queilions of this
nature. The fimpleft flyle, the moft mathemati-
cal precifion of words and ideas, is bed adapted
to difcover truth, and to convey it to others, in
reafoning on this fubje£l. There is here a confu-
fion that is .more than accidental — it is artful : —
the author purpofely Rates the queftion, arid
makes the comparifon only between fimple forms
of government, and carefully keeps out of fight
the idea of a judicious mixture of them all.
He feems to fuppofe, that a fupreme power
mufl be wholly in the hands of a fimple monarch,
or of a fingle fenate, or of the people, and fludi-
oufly avoids considering the fovereignty lodged in,
a compofition of all three. ct When a fupreme
" power long continues in the hands of any per-
" fon or perions, they, by greatnefs of place, be-
u ing feated above the middle region of tl}e peo-
" pie, fit fecure from all winds and weathers, and
" from thofe florins of violence that nip and ter-
" rify the inferior part of the world." If this ia
popular poetry, it is not philefophical reafoning.
It may be made a queftion, whether it is true in

VOL. III. Q^q fad,

TJNIV

\

EH.SITY \

298 The right C on/lit ut ion of a

fact, that perfons in the higher ranks of life are
more exempted from dangers and evils that threat-
en the commonwealth than thofe in the middle
or lower rank ? But if it were true, the United
States of America have eftablifhed their govern-
ments upon a principle to guard againd it ; and,
"•by a fucceflive revolution of authority, they
" come to be degraded of their earthly godheads,
" and return into the fame condition with other
" mortals ;" and therefore, " they mufl needs be
" more fenfible and tender of what is laid upon
" them."

Our author is not explicit. If he meant that
a fundamental law mould be made, that no man
mould be chofen more than one year, he has no
where faid fo. He knew the nation would not
have borne it. Cromwell and his creatures would
all have deteded it; nor would the members of
the Long Parliament, or their condituents, have
approved it. The idea would have been uni-
verfally unpopular. NO people in the world will
bear to be deprived, at the end of one year, of
the fervice of their bed men, and be obliged to
confer their fuffrages, from year to year, on the
next bed, until the rotation brings them to the
word. The men of greated intered and influence, A
moreover will govern ; and if they cannot be <
chofen themfelves, they will generally influence .
the choice of others fo decidedly, that they may
be faid to have the appointment. If it is true
that " the dronged obligation that can be laid
•" upon a man in public matters, is to fee that
" he engage in nothing but what mud either
•" offenfively or beneficially refled upon himfelf,3*
it is equally true at lead in a mixed government
as in a fimple democracy : it is, indeed, more
clearly and univerfally true, bacaufe in the fir ft

the

Commonwealth, examined. 299

the reprefentatives of the people being the fpecial
guardians of equality, equity, and liberty, for the
people, will not conient to unequal laws ; but in
the fecond, where the great and rich will have the
greateft influence in the public councils, they will
continually make unequal laws in their own fa-
vour, unlefs the poorer majority unite, which they
rarely do, fet up an oppofition to them, and run
them down by making unequal laws againft them.
In every fociety where property exifts, there will
ever be a druggie between rich and poor. Mixed
in one aflembly, equal laws can never be expected :
they will either be made by numbers, to plun-
der the few who are rich, or by influence, to fleece
the many who are poor. Both rich and poor,
then rnuft be made independent, that equal juf-
tice may be done, and equal liberty enjoyed by
all. To expeft that in a fingle fovereign aflem-
bly no load fhall be laid upon any but what is
common to all, nor to gratify the paflions of any,
but only to fupply the neceflities of their country,
is altogether chimerical. Such an aflembly, under
an awkward unwieldy form, becomes at once a fim-
ple monarchy in efFeft : fome one overgrown ge-
nius, fortune, or reputation, becomes a defpot, who
rules the ftate at his pleafure, while the deluded
nation, or rather a deluded maiority, thinks itfelf
free ; and in every refolve, law, and a£t of go-
vernment, you fee the interefl, fame, and power,
of that fingle individual attended to more than
the general good.

It is agreed, that " if any be never fo good a
cc patriot," (whether his power be prolonged or
not) " he will find it hard to keep felf from
" creeping in upon him, and prompting him to
" fome extravagances for his own private bene-
'«*• fit." But it is afferted, that power will be pro-
longed

300 The right Conftitution of a

longed in the hands of the fame patriot, the
fame rich, able, powerful, and weli-defcended
citizen, &c. as much as if he had a feat for life,
or an hereditary feat in the fenate, and, what is
more deftructive, his power and influence is con-
ftantly increafing, fo that felf is more certainly
and rapidly growing upon him; whereas, . in
the other cafe, it is denned, limited, and never
materially varies. If, in the firft cafe, " he
" be fhortly to return to a condition common
" -with the reft of his brethren," it is only fora
moment, or a day, or a week, in order to be re-
elected with frefh eclat, redoubled popularity,
increafed reputation, influence, and power. Self-
intereft, therefore, binds him to propagate a falfe
report and opinion, that he ct does nothing but
" what is juft and equal," while in fact he is
every day doing what is unjuft and unequal.;
while .he is applying all the offices of the ftate,
great and frriall, the revenues of the public, and
even the judicial power, to the augmentation of
his own wealth and honours, and thofe of his
friends, and to the punifhment, depreffion, and
deftruction of his enemies, with the acclamations
and hofannas of the majority of the people.

" This, without controverfy, muft needs be the
" moft noble, the moft juft, and the moft excel-
" lent way of government in free ftates," provid-
ed our author meant only a mixed ftate, in which ,
the people have an eflential fhare, and the com-
mand of the. public purfe, with the judgment of
caufes and accufations as jurors, while their power
is tempered and controuled by the ariftocratical
part, of the'community in another houfe, and the
executive in a diftinct branch. But as it is plain
his meaning was to jumble all thefe powers in one
centre, a fmgle aflembly of reprefentatives, it muft

be

Commonwealth , examined. 361

be pronounced the mod ignoble, unjuft, and de-
teftable form of government ; worfe than even a
weil-digefted fimple monarchy or ariftocracy.
The greateft excellency of it is, that it cannot
laft, but haftens rapidly to a revolution.

For a further illuftratioh of this fubjeft, let a
fuppofition be made, that in the year 1656, when
this book was printed, the fyftem of it had been
reduced to practice : A fair, full, and jufl reprefen-
tation of the people of England appears in the
houfe of commons in Weftminfter-hall ; my lord
general Cromwell is returned for Weftminfter or
London; Ireton, Lambert, &c. for other princi-
pal cities .or counties ; Monk, Sir Harry Vane,
&c. for others ; and even Hugh Peters for fome
borough ; — all eyes profoundly bow to my lord
general as the firft member of the houfe ; the
other principal characters are but his primary
planets, and the multitude but fecondary ; altoge-
ther making a great majority in the interefl of his
highnefs ; if the majority is clear, and able to ex-
cite a ftrong current of popular rumours, ardor,
and enthufiafm, in their favour, their power will
increafe with every annual election, until Crom-
well governs the nation more abfolutely than any
fimple monarch in Europe. If there are in the
houfe any members fo daring as to differ in opi-
nion, they will loofe their feats, and more fubmif-
five characters be returned in their places ; but
if the great men in the houfe mould fall into
pretty equal divifions, then would begin a warfare
of envy, rancour, hatred and abufe of each other,
until they divided the nation into two parties, and
both muft take the field. — Suppofe for a furjther
illuftration, the. monarchical and ariftocraticat
branches in England fufpended, and all authority
lodged in the prefent houfe of commons ; — fup-

pofe

50 2 *tbe right Conftitution of a

pofe that, in addition to all the great national quef-
tion of legiflation, were added the promotion of
all offices in the church, the law, the army, navy,
cxcife, cuftoms, and all queftions of foreign alli-
ance ; let all the foreign ambaffadors, as well as
candidates for offices, folkit there : — the contem-
plation muft be amufing ! but there is not a mem-
ber of the houfe could ferioufly wifh it, after
thinking a moment on the confequence. The
objects are fmaller, and the prefent temptations
Jefs, in our American houfes ; but the impro-
priety would be equally obvious, though perhaps
not fo inftantaneoufly deftructive.

Our author proceeds to prove his doctrine by
examples out of Roman hiftory. " What more
<c noble patriots were there ever in the world than
" the Roman fenators were, while they were
<c kept under by their kings, and felt the fame
*c burthens of their fury, as did the reft of the
" people ?"

If by the patriots are meant men who were
brave and active in war to defend the common-
wealth againft its enemies, the Roman fenators
and patricians were, under the kings, as good
patriots as the plebeians were, and no better.
Whether they were ever kept under by their
kings, or whether their kings were kept under by
them, I fubmit to Livy and Dionyfius. The
whole line of their kings, Romulus, Numa, Tul-
lus, Ancus, Lucius Tarquinius, Servius Tullius,
were meritorious princes ; yet the patricians and
fenators maintained a continual feries of cabals
againft them, conftantly confpiring to fet up one,
and pull down another, Romulus was put to
death by the patricians ; Tullus Hoftilius was
murdered by the patricians ; Lucius Tarquinius
was aflafiinated by the . patricians ; and Servius

Tullius

Commonwealth, examined. 303

Tullius too was murdered by the patricians, to
make way for Tarquin. Some of thefe excellent
princes were deftroyed for being too friendly to
the people, and others for not being fervile
enough to the fenate. If it is patriotifm to perfe-
cute to death every prince who had an equitable
defire of doing juftice, and eafmg the burthens of
the plebeians ; to intrigue in continual factions
to fet up one king and butcher another ; to coa-
fider friendfhip, and humanity, and equity, to the
plebeians as treafon againft the ftate, and the
higheft crime that could be committed either by
a king or patrician ; then the Roman fenators
under the kings were noble patriots. But the
utmoft degrees of jealoufy, envy, arrogance, am-
bition, rancour, rage, and cruelty, that ever con-
ftituted the ariftocratical or oligarchical character
.in Sparta, Venice, Poland, or wherever unbalanc-
ed ariftocratics have exifted and been mofl enor-
mous, exifted in the Roman patricians under their
kings.

What can our author mean by the fenate and
people's " feeling the burthens of the fury of their
" kings ?" Surely he had read the Roman hiftory !
Did he mean to reprefent it ? The whole line of
Roman kings, until we come to Tarquin the
Proud, were mild, moderate princes, and their
greateft fault, in the eyes of the fenators, was an
endeavour now and then to protect the people
againft the tyranny of the fenate. Their greateft
fault, in the judgment of truth, was too much
complaifance to the fenate, by making the con-
ftitution more ariftocratical : witnefs the aflem-
blies by centuries inftituted by Servius Tullius.

But Nedham fhould have confidered what
would have been the fruits in Rome, from the
time of Romulus, of annual elections of fenators to

be

304 The right Conftitutlon of a

be vefted with fupreme power, with all the au-
thority of the king, fenate, and people. All thofe
perfons whofe names we now read as kings, and
all thofe who are mentioned as fenators, would
have caballed with the people as well as one
another. Their paflions would not have been
extinguifhed ; the fame jealoufy and envy, ambi-
tion and avarice, revenge and cruelty, would have
been difplayed in aflemblies of the people : fome-
times one junto would have been popular, fome-
' times another ; one fet of principles would have
prevailed one year, and another the next ; now
one law, then another ; at this time one rule of
property, at that another ; riots, tumults, and
battles, would have been fought continually ; the
law would have been a perfect Proteus. But
as this confufion could not lafl long, either a
fimple monarchy, or an ariftocracy, muft have
arifen ; thefe might not have lafted long, and all
the revolutions defcribed by Plato and Ariftotle
as growing out of one another, ana that we fee in
the Greek, Roman, and . Italian republics, did
grow out of one another, muft have taken place,
until the people, weary of changes, would have
fettled under a fingle tyranny and {landing army,
unlefs they had been wife enough to eftablifh a
well-ordered government of three branches. It is
eafy to mifreprefent and confound things in order
to make them anfwer a purpofe, but it was not
becaufe the authority -was permanent or Jlanding^
or hereditary ', that the behaviour of the fenate was
worfe after the expulfion of the kings than it had
been under them ; for the dignity of patricians,
and the authority of fenators, was equallyyfow^/ttg',
•permanent L, and hereditary ', under the kings, from
the institution of Romulus to the expulfion of
Tarquin, as it was afterwards, from the expulfion

of

Commonwealth^ examined. 305

of Tarquin to the inftitution of tribunes, and in-
deed to the fubverfion of the commonwealth. Ic
was not its permanency, but its omnipotence, its
being unlimited, unbalanced, uncontrouled, that oc-
cafioned the abufe ; and this is percifely what we
contend for, that power is always abufed when
unlimited and unbalanced, whether it be perma-
nent or temporary, a didinction that makes little
difference in efFeft. The temporary has often
been the word of the two, becaufe it has often been
fooner abufed, and moregrofsly, in order to ob-
tain its revival at the dated period. It is agreed
that patricians, nobles, fenators, the ariftocratical
part of the community, call it by what name you
pleafe, are noble patriots when they are kept
under ; they are really then the bed men and the
bed citizens : but there is no poflibility of keep-
ing them under but by giving them a mader in a
monarchy, and two maders in a free government-
One of the maders I mean is the executive power
in the fird magidrate, and the other is the people
in their houfe of reprefentatives. Under thefe
two maders they are, in general, the bed men,
citizens, magidrates, generals, or other' officers j
they are the guardians, ornaments, and glory of the
community. •

Nedham talks of " fenate and people's feeling
" the burthens of the fury of the kings ;" but as
we cannot accufe this writer of ignorance, this
mud have been either artifice or inadvertence.
There is not in the whole Roman hidory fo happy
a period as this under their kings. * The whole
line were excellent characters, and fathers of their
people, notwithdanding the continual cabals of
the nobles againd them. The nation was formed,
their morality, their religion, the maxims of their
government, were all edablifhed under thefe kings:

VOL. III. R r the

306 The right C on/It tution of a

the nation Was defended againft innumerable and
warlike nations of enemies ; in ihort, Rome was
never fo well governed or fo happy. As foon as
the monarchy was abolifhed, and an ambitious
republic of haughty alpiring ariftocratics was
erected, they were feized with the ambition 'of
conqueft, and became a torment to themfelves and
the world. Our author confefles, that " being
" freed from the kingly yoke, and having fecured
ce all power within the hands of themfelves and
" their pofterity, they fell into the fame abfurdities
" that had been before committed by their kings,
" fo that this new yoke became more intolerable
" than the former/' It would be more conform-
able to the truth of hiftory to fay that they con-
tinued to behave exactly as they had done ; but
having no kings to murder, they had only people
to deftroy. The fovereign power was in them
under the kings, arid their greateft animofity
againft their kings, next to the ambitious defireof
getting into their places, was their too frequent
patronage of the people. The only change made
by the revolution was to take off a little awe
which the name of king infpired. The office,
with all its dignities, authorities, and powers, was
in fact continued under the tttle of conful ; it was
made annually elective it is true, and became ac-
cordingly a mere tool of the fenate, wholly clefti-
tute of any power or will to protect plebeians, a
difpofitiori which the hereditary kings always dif-
covered more or lefs, and thereby became odious
fo the fenate ; for there is no fin or crime fo hei-
nous, in the judgment of patricians, as for any one
of their own rank to court plebeians, or become
their patron, protector, or friend.

It is very true that " the new yoke was more
" intolerable than the old, nor could the peo-

« pie

Commonwealth , examined. 307

** pie find any remedy until they procured that
" neceflary office of the tribunes." This was
fome remedy, but a very feeble and ineffectual
one : nor, if the people had inftituted an annual af-
fembly of 500 reprefentatives, would that have been
an efFe&ual remedy, without a plenary executive-
power in the confu'l; the fenate and affembly would
have been foon at war, and the leader of the vic-
torious army matter of the (late. If "the tri-
*' bunes, by being vefted with a temporary au-
" thority by the people's election, remained the
" more fenfible of their condition," the American
governors and fenators, vefted as they are with a
temporary authority by the people's election, will
remain fenfible of their condition too. If they do
not become too fenfible of it, and difcover that
flattery, and bribery, and partiality, are better cal-
culated to procure renovations of their authority,
than honefty, liberty, and equality, happy indeed
ihall we all be !

66 What more excellent patriot could there be
" than Manlius, till he became corrupted by time
" and power ?" Is it a clear cafe that Manlius was
corrupted ? To me he appears the bed patriot in
Roman hiflory : the moft humane, the mofl
equitable ; the greateft friend of liberty, and the
moil defirous of a conftitution truly free ; the real
friend of the people, and the enemy of tyranny in
every fhape, as well as the greateft hero and war-
riour of his age — a much greater character than
Camillas. Our author's expreffion implies, that
<c there was no greater patriot/ ' until he faw the
neceflityof new-modelling the conftitution, and
\vas concerting meafures upon the true principle of
liberty, the authority of the people, to place checks
upon the fenate. But Manlius is an unfortunate
inftance for our author. It was not time and

power

The right Conftitutlon of a

power that infpired. him with his defigns ; the
jealoufy and envy of the fenate had removed him
from power : he was neither conful, dictator, nor
general. Ariftocratical envy had fet up Camillus,
and continued him in power, both as conful and
dictator, on purpofe to rival and mortify Manlius,
It was difcontinuance of power then that corrupt-
ed him, if he was corrupted ; and this generally
happens, difappointed candidates for popular elec-
tions are as often corrupted by their fall from
power, as hereditary ariftocratics by their conti-
nuance in it.

" Who more noble, courteous, and well affect -
<€ ed to the common good than Appius Claudius
*c at fir ft ? But afterwards, having obtained acon-
c tinuation of the government in his own hands,
*c he foon loft his primitive innocence and integ-
" rity, and devoted himfelf to all the practices
*c of an abfolute tyrant." This is very true, but
it was not barely continuation of power, it was
abfolute power, that did the mifdiief. If the
power had been properly limited in degree, it
might have been continued, without limitation of
time, without corrupting him : though it might be
better to limit it, both in degree and in time ;
and it muft never, be forgotten that it was the
people, not the fenate, that continued him in
power.

The fenate acted an arbitrary and reprehenfible
part, when they thought to continue Lucius C)uin-
tius in the confulfliip longer than the time limited
by law : by violating the law they became tyrants,
and their act was void. That gallant man acted
only the part of a good citizen in refufing to fet
a precedent fo prejudicial to the Roman conftitu-
tion ; his magnanimity merits praife : but per-
haps he was the only fenator who would have

refufed,

Commonwealth, axamlned. 309

refufed,and we cannot fafely reckon upon fuch
felf-denial in forming any conftitution of govern-
ment. But it may be depended on, that when
the whole power is in one aflembly, whether of
patricians or plebeians, or any mixture of both, a
favourite will be continued in power whenever the
majority wifhes it, and every conceivable funda-
mental law, or even oath, againfl it will be dif-
penfed with.

A feventh reafon, why a people qualified with
a due and orderly fucceflion of their fupreme
afiemblies are the bed keepers of their own
liberties, is " becaufe, as in other forms, thofe
" perfons only have accefs to government who
" are apt to ferve the luft and will of the prince,
" or elfe are parties or compilers with fome
*c popular faction ; fo in this form of government
*c by the people, the door of dignity (lands open
*c to all, without exception, that afcend thither
*' by the fteps of worth and virtue : the confider-
" ation whereof hath this noble effect in free
" ftates, that it edges men's fpirits with an active
" emulation, and raifeth them to a lofty pitch of
" defign and action."

This is a mafs of popular afiertions, either ha-
zarded at random, or, if aimed at a point, very
little guarded by the love of truth. It is no
more true, that in other forms thofe perfons only
have accefs to government who are apt to ferve
the luft and will of a prince or a faction, than it
is that, in our author's form, thofe only would
obtain elections who will ferve the lufts and wills
of the moft idle, vicious, and abandoned of the
people, at the expence of the labour, wealth, and
reputation of the moft induftrious, virtuous, and
pious. The door of dignity, in fuch a govern*

ment,

3 1 a The right Conftltution of a

jnent, is fo far from (landing open to all of worth
and virtue, that, if the executive and judicial
powers are managed in it, virtue and worth will
foon be excluded. In an abfolute monarchy the
road to preferment may He open to all. In
an ariftocracy, the way of promotion may be
open to all, and all offices in the executive de-
partment, as in the army, navy, courts of juflice,
foreign embaffies, revenues, &c. may be filled
from any clafs of the people. In a mixed govern-
ment, confiding of three branches, all offices ever
will be open, for when the popular branch is def-
tined exprefsly to defend the rights of the people,
it is not probable they will ever confent to a law
that mail exclude any clafs of their conflituents.
In this kind of government, indeed, the chance
for merit to prevail is greater than in any other.
The executive having the appointment to all
offices, and the minifters of that executive being
refponfible for every exercife of their power, they
are more cautious ; they are refponfible to their
matter for the recommendations they give, and to
the nation and its repreientatives for the appoint-
ments that are made : whereas a fingle repre-
fentative aflembly is accountable to nobody. If
it is admitted that each member is accountable to
his conftituents for the vote he gives, what is the
penalty ? No other than not to vote for him at
the next election. And what punifhment is that f
His confHtuents know nor care any thing about
any offices or officers but fuch as lie within the
limits of their parifh : ancj let him vote right or
wrong about all others, he has equally their
thanks and future votes. What can the people of
the cities, countries, boroughs, and corporations
in England know of the characters of all the gene-
rals.

Commonwealth, examined.

rals, admirals, ambafiadors, judges, andbifhops,
whom they never faw, nor perhaps heard of?

But was there never a Sully, Colbert, Malefher-
bes, Turgot, or Neckar, called to power in France?
nor a Burleigh, nor a Pitt, in England ? Was
there never a Camillus appointed by a fenate, nor
a De Ruyter, Van Tromp, or De Witt, by an
ari-ftocratical body ? When a writer is not careful
to confine himfelf to truth, but allows himfelf a
latitude of affirmation and denial, merely addrelT-
ed to an ignorant populace, there is no end of
ingenuity in invention. In this cafe his object
was to run down an exiled king, and a deprefled
nobility ; and it mud be confefled he is not very
delicate in his means. There are, in truth, exam-
ples innumerable of excellent generals, admirals,
judges, ambafladors, bifhops, and of all other
officers and magiflrates appointed by monarchs,
abfolute as well as limited, and by hereditary fc~
nates ; excellent appointments have been alfo
made by popular aflemblies : but candour muft
allow, that very weak, injudicious, and unfortu-
nate choices have been fometimes made by fuch
aflemblies too. But the bed appointments for a
courfe of time have invariably been made in
mixed governments. The " a&ive emulation'*
in free flates is readily allowed ; but it is not lefs
active, lefs general, or lefs lofty, in defign or action,
in mixed governments than in fimple ones, even
fimple democracies, or thofe which approach
neareft to that defcription : and the inftances
alledged from the Roman hiftory are full proofs of
this.

" During the vaflalage of the Romans under
** kings, we read not of any notable exploits, but
" find them confined within a narrow compafs ;
" oppreffed at home, and ever and anon ready to

« be

<c

The Right Conft button of a

befwallowcd up by. their enemies." It is really
impoflible to guefs where this author learnt his
hiftory. The reigns of the kings are a complete
confutation of his aflertions. The vaflalage was
to the nobles, if to any body, under the kings.
The kings were friends and fathers of the people
in general. If the people were opprefled at home,
it was by the patricians ; but they appear to have
been much lefs opprefled than they were under
the ariftocracy which fucceeded the abolition of
monarchy, as our author himfelf confeffes. " But
" when the people were made free, indeed, and
" the people admitted into a {hare and intereft in
" the government, as well as the great ones, then
" it was that their power began to exceed the
". bounds of Italy, and afpire towards that pro-
" digious empire." Was Rome ever a free ftate,
according to our author's idea of a free flate ?
Were the people ever governed by a fucceflion of
fovereign power in their aflemblies ? Was not the
fenate the real fovereign, through all the changes,
from Romulus to Julius Csefar ? When the tri-
bunes were inftituted, the people obtained a check
upon the fenate, but not a balance. The utmofl
that can with truth be faid is, that it was a mixed
government compofed of three powers ; the mo-
narchical in the kings or confuls, the ariftocra-
tical in the fenate, and the democratical in the
people and their tribunes, with the principal fhare
and real fovereignty in the fenate. The mixture
xvas unequal, and the balance inadequate ; but it
was this mixture, with all its imperfections, that
cc edged men's fpirits with an active emulation,
" and raifed them to a lofty pitch of defign and
" a&ion." It was in confequence of this compo-
fitjon, that " their thoughts and power began to ex-

*c ceed

Commonwealth, examined. 313

" ceed the bounds of Italy, and afpire towards
sc that prodigious empire." In fuch a mixture,
where the people have a mare, and Cfc the road to
" preferment lies plain to every man, no public
" work is done, nor any conqueft made, but every
" man thinks he does and conquers for himfelP*
in fome degree. But this fentiment is as vivid
and a&ive, furely, where the people have an equal
ihare with the fenate, as where they have only an
imperfect check by their tribunes. When our
author advances, " that it was not alliance, nor
" friendfhip, nor faction, nor riches, that could
" advance men," he affirms more than can be
proved from any period of the Roman or any
other hiftory. If he had contented himfelf with
faying, that thefe were not exclufive or principal
caufes of advancement, it would have been as
great a panegyric as any nation at any period has
deferved. Knowledge, valour, and virtue, were
often preferred above them all ; and, if we add, ge-
nerally', it is as much as the truth will bear. Our
author talks of a preference of virtuous poverty j
but there was no moment in the Roman, or any
other hiftory, when poverty, however virtuous,
was preferred for its own fake. There have been
times and countries when poverty was not an in-
fuperable objection to the employment of a man
in the higheft ftations ; but an ablolute love of
poverty, and a preference of a man for that attri-
bute alone, never exifted out of the imaginations
of enthufiaftic writers.

In the Roman ftory, fonie few of their brave
patriots and conquerors were men of fmall for-
tune, and of fo rare a temper of fpirit, that they
little cared to improve them, or enrich themfelves
by their public employment. Some, indeed, were
buried at the public charge. And perhaps this

VOL. III. S s racs

3 1 4 "The right Constitution of a

race is not quite extinct ; but the examples are fo
rare, that he who (hall build his frame of govern-
ment upon a preemption that characters of this
itamp will arife in fucceflion, in fiifficient num-
bers to preferve the honour and liberty, and pro-
mote the profperity of his people, will find himfelf
miftaken. " The time will come," faid a Roman
fenator, ." when Horatii and Valerii will not be
" found to forego their private for tunes for the fake
" of plebeian liberty." His prediction was fulfilled ;
and a fimilar prophecy will be accomplimed in
every nation under heaven. The inftances too
of this kind, in the Roman hiftory, are all of pa-
tricians and fenators : we do not find one exam-
ple of a popular tribune who was fo in love with
poverty. Cincinnatus was a patrician, a fenator
of a fplendid family and no mean fortune, until
his fon Ca^fo was profecuted, and obliged to fly
from his bail. The father had too noble and
fublime a fpirit to let the bail be ruined, and fold
his fortune to pay the forfeiture : when this was
done, he had only 'four or fix acres left. But who
was it that made him dictator ? Not the people,
nor the tribunes, but the fenate, that very Hand-
ing power againft which our author's whole book
is written : by no means by a fucceflive fove-
reignty of the people's reprefentatives, which our
author all along contends for. Had the appoint-
ment of a dictator at that time lain with the peo-
ple, mod probably a richer man would have had
the preference. He behaved with fo much mag-
nanimity, integrity, and wifdom, that he fubdued
the enemy, and quitted his authority with all wil-
lingnefs, and returned to painful private life.
This example is a good argument for a mixed go-
vernment, and for a fenate as an eflential part of
it j but no argument for a fucceflive fovereignty

in

Commonwealth, examined 3 1 5

in the people's reprefentatives. Gracchus, Ma-
rius, Sylla, and Caefar, whofe elevation to power
was by the people, in oppofition to the fenate,
did not exhibit fuch moderation and contentment.
—Our author's other examples of Lucius Tar-
quin, and Attilius Regulus, by no means prove
fuch difinterefted and magnanimous virtue to be
ordinary in that flate, nor Lucius Paulus .ZEmi-
lius. Lucius Tarquin, or Lucius Tarquinius Col-
latinus, was not only a patrician and a fenator,
but of the royal family, and therefore by no
means an example to (how what the conduct of a
general, or other officer or magiflrate, will be,
who (hall be appointed by a majority of the peo-
ple's fucceffive annual reprefentatives. He was
the hufband of Lucretia, whofe blood had ex-
pelled the king. It was in an aiTembly of the cen-
turies, where the fenate were all powerful, that he
was appointed confui with Brutus. Valerius was
the favourite of the plebeians. Collatia had been
given by the king to Ancus Tarquin, becaufe he had
no eftate ; and from thence the family were called
Collatings. At the fiege of Ardea the frolic com-
menced between Collatinus and the other young
Tarquins, over wine, which ended in the vifit to
their wives, which proved at firft fo honourable to
the domeftic virtues of Lucretia, and afterwards
fo fatal to her life ; it occafioned alfo the expul-
fion of kings, and inftitution of confuls. Brutus
and Collatinus were created confuls, but by whom ?
By the people, it is true, but it was in their af-
fembly by centuries ; fo that it was the fenate and
paft-icians who decided the vote. If the people
in their tribes, or by their fucceffive reprefenta-
tives, had made the ele&ion, Collatinus would
not have been chofen, but Valerius, who expeded
it, and had moil contributed, next to Bnutus, to

the

316 The right Conftitution of a

the revolution. And, by the way, we may obferve
here, that an averfion to public honours and offices
by no means appears in the behaviour of the virtu-
ous and popular Valerius. His defire of the office
of confui was fo ardent, that his difappointment and
chagrin induced him, in a fullen ill-humour, to
withdraw from the fenate and the forum, and re-
nounce public affairs ; which fo alarmed the people,
that they dreaded his reconciliation and coalition
•with the exiled family. He foon removed his jea-
loufy, by taking the oath by which Brutus wanted
to bind the fenate againft kings and kingly govern-
ment. All the art of the patricians, with Brutus at
their head, was now exerted, to intoxicate the peo-
ple with fuperftition. Sacrifices and ceremonies were
introduced, and the confuls approaching the altar,
fwore, for themfelves, their children, and all pof-
terity, never to recal Tarquin or his fons, or any
of his family ; that the Romans mould never more
be governed by kings ; that thofe who mould
attempt to reftore monarchy mould be clevoted to
the infernal gods, and condemned to the mod
cruel torments : and an abhorrence of royalty be-
came the predominant character of the Romans,
to fuch a degree, that they could never bear the
name of king, even when, under the emperors,
they admitted much more than the thing in an un-
limited defpo/ifm. But is the caufe of liberty,
are the rights of mankind, to ftand for ever on no
better a foundation than a blind fuperftition, and
a popular prejudice againft a word, a mere name ?
It was really no mere in this cafe : for even
Brutus himfelf intended that the confuls mftuld
have all the power of the kings ; and it was only
againft a family and a name that he declared
war. If nations and people cannot be brought
to a more rational way of thinking, and to judge

of

Commonwealth, examined, 317

of things, inftead of being intoxicated with pre-
judice and fuperftition againft words, it cannot be
expected that truth, virtue, or liberty, will have
much chance in the eftablifhment of governments.
The monarchical and ariftocratical portions of
ibciety will for ever underftand better how to ope-
rate on the fuperftition, the prejudices, paffions,
fancies, and fenfes of the people, than the demo-
cratical, and therefore will for ever worm out
liberty, if me has no other refource.

Tarquin, by his ambafladors, folicited at lead
the reftoration of his property. Brutus oppofed
it. Collatinus, the other conful, advocated the de-
mand of his royal banifhed coufm. The fenate was
divided : the queftion was referred to the people
aflembled by centuries. The two confuls zealoufly
fupported their different opinions. Collatinus pre-
vailed by one vote. Tarquin's ambafladors re-
joice and intrigue. A confpiracy was formed, in
which a great part of the young nobility was con-
cerned : two of the Vitellii, fons of Collatinus's
fifter, and brothers of Brutus's wife ; two of ,the
Aquilii, fons of another fifter of Collatinus, as
well as two of Brutus's fons, were engaged in it.
When the confpiracy was discovered, Brutus alone
was inexorable. Callatinus endeavoured to fave
his nephews. — Collatinus, as the hufband of Lu-
cretia, appears to have been actuated by refent-
ment againft the perfon of Tarquin, but not to
have bean very hearty in the expulfion of the fa-
mily, or the abolition of monarchy. His warmly
contending for the reftitution of Tarquin's ef-
fects, and his averfion to the condemnation of the
confpirators, completed his ruin with Brutus.
He aflembled the people, and was very forry that
the Roman people did not think their liberties
fafe while they law the name and blood of Tar-
<juin not only fafe in Rome, but vefted with fo-

vereign

3 1 8 The right Conftitution of a

vereign power, and a dangerous obflacle to li-
berty. Collatinus was amazed at fuch a fpeech,
and prepared to defend himfelf from this attack ;
but rinding his father-in-law Spurius Lucretius
join Brutus, and other principal men, in perfuading
him, and fearing that he mould be forced into
banimment, with the confifcation of his eftate, he
abdicated the confulfliip, and retired to Lavini-
um : but he carried all his effe&s with him, and
twenty talents, or ^C-3'^75 fterling, to which Bru-
tus added five talents more, a moft enormous fum,
if we confider the univerfal poverty of that age,
and the high value of money. — Is it pofTible to
find, in this character and conduct of Collatinus,
fuch difmterefted and magnanimous virtue as our
author fpeaks of ? Is this an example to prove
that difinterefted virtue was frequent in that ftate ?
He muft have been dead to every manly feeling,
if he had not refented the rape and death of his
wife. He did not retire but to avoid banifh-
rnent ; nor was he contented without his whole
eftate, and a fplendid addition to it : fo that
there is fcarcely a character or anecdote in hiftory
lefs to our author's purpofe in any point of view.
There is an extravagance in many popular wri-
ters in favour of republican governments, which
injures much oftener than it ferves the caufe of li-
berty. Such is that of our author, when he cites
the example of Regulus. Let us firft remember,
however, that Regulus was a patrician and a fe-
nator, and that he was appointed to his command,
and continued in it, by the fenate ; and therefore,
inftead of being an example in honour of a fim-
ple or a reprefentative democracy, it operates in
favour of an ariflocracy, or at mod in favour of
a mixed government, in which an ariflocracy has
one full third part. Regulus had been in a courfe

of

Commonwealth, examined. 3 1 9

of victory, which the fenate would not interrupt,
and therefore continued him in the command of
the army. He wrote to the fenate to complain
of it. The glory of it to himfelf, the advantage
to the public, was not reward enough for him.
He demanded a fucceffbr ; and what was his rea-
fon ? A thief had flolen his tools of hufbandry
ufed in manuring ; his tenant was dead, and his
prefence was abfolutely neceffary to prevent his
wife and children from ftarving. Is it poflible
to read this without laughter and indignation ;
laughter at the folly of that government which
made fo poor a provifion for its generals, and in-
dignation at the fordid avarice of that fenate and
people, who could require a threat of refignation
from the conquerer of Carthage to induce them
to provide for his wife and children. The fenate
decreed that his field mould be cultivated at the
public expence, that his working tools mould be
replaced, and his wife and children provided for.
Then, indeed, Regulus's averfion to the fervice
was removed : to fuch {ordid condefcenfions to
the prejudices and the meannefs of the flingy and
envious parts of the community are fuch exalted
fouls as that of Regulus obliged fometimes to
fubmit ; but the eternal panegyrics of republican
writers, as they call themfelves, will never recon-
cile mankind to any thing fo ridiculous and con-
temptible. The labourer is worthy of his hire :
he who labours for the public mould live by the
public, as much as he who preaches the gofpel
fhould live by the gofpel ; and thefe maxims^ of
equity are approved by all the generous part of
mankind. And the people whofe heads are turn-
ed with contracted notions of a contrary nature,
will for ever be the dupes of the defigning ; for

where

320 The right Conftltution of a

where you will find a fmgle Regulus, you will find
ten thoufand Caefars.

The example of Paulus .ZEmilius is equally
hoftile to our author's fyftem, and equally friendly
to that which we contend for. The firft conful
of that name, the conqueror of Illyricum, in 533,
although he returned to Rome in triumph, yet, at
the expiration of his office he was cited before
the people, in their tribes, and accufed of having
converted part of the fpoils to his own ufe. JEmi-
lius had great difficulty to efcape the condemna-
tion which his colleague fuffered. This great pa-
trician and conful commanded, and was killed at
the battle of Cannae. His fon, of the fame name,
whofe fitter jEmilia was married to the great
Scipio, diflinguifhed himfelf by avoiding thofe
intrigues, folicitations, carefles, and other arti-
fices, pra&ifed by mod candidates, even at this
time, 562. His pains were employed to make
himfelf efteemed by valour, juftice, and ardor in
his duty, in which he furpaffed'all the young men
of his age. He carried the aedilemip againft ten
competitors, every one of whom was fo diftin-
guifhed by birth and merit, as afterwards to ob-
tain the confulfhip. By his wife Papiria he had
two Tons, whom he procured to be adopted into
the moft illuftrious houfes in Rome ; the eldeft
by Fabius Maximus, five times conful and dida-
tor ; the younger by a fon of Scipio Africanus.
His two daughters he married, one to a fon of
Cato the Cenfor, and the other to Tubero. In
•563 he gained a complete victory over the Lufi-
tanians, in which he'killed them eighteen thou-
fand men, and took their camp, with thirteen
hundred prifoners. In the offices of Redile, and of
augur, he excelled all his contemporaries in the
knowledge and praftice of his duty j and military

difciphne

Commonwealth , examined. 32 i

discipline he carried to greater perfe&ion than had
ever been known : neverthelefs, when he flood
for any office, even in thefe virtuous times, there
was always an oppofition ; and he could not ob-
tain the confullhip till after he had fuffered feveral
repulfes. Why ? Becaufe his virtue was too fe-
vere ; not for the fenate, but the people ; and be-
caufe he would not flatter and bribe the people.
Before the end of the year of his firft' confulate he
fought the Ligurians, and gained a complete vic-
tory over them, killing more than fifteen thou-
fand men, and making near three thoufand pri-
foners, and returned to Rome in triumph : yet
with all this merit, when he flood candidate, fome
years after, for the confulate, the people rejected
him ; upon this he retired to educate his chil-
dren. He was frugal in every thing of private
luxury, but magnificent in expences of public
duty. Grammarians, rhetoricians, philosophers,
fculptors, painters, equerries, hunters, were pro-
cured for the inflruclion of his children. While
he was thus employed in private life, in 583,
fourteen years after his firft confulfhip, the affairs
of the republic were ignorantly conducted, and the
Macedonians, with Perfeus at their head, gained
great advantages againfl them. People were not
fatisfied with the conduft of the confuls of late
years, and began to fay, that the Roman name was
not fupported. The cry was, that the command of
armies mud no longer be biven to faction and fa-
vour. The fingular merit of JEmilius, his fplen-
did fervices, the confidence which the troops had
in his capacity, and the urgent neceflity of the
times for his wifdom and firmnefs, turned all eyes
upon him. All his relations, and the fenators in
general, urged him to fland candidate. He had
already experienced fo much ingratitude, injuflice,
VOL. III. T t and

The right Conftitution of a

and caprice, that he fhunned the prefent ardor, and
chofe to continue in private life. That very people
, who had fo often ill ufed him, and rejected him,
now crowded before his door, and infifted on his
going to the forurn ; and his prefence there was
univerfally confidered as a fure prefage of victory,
and he was unanimoufly elected conful, and ap-
pointed commander in Macedonia. He con-
quered Perfeus and his Macedonian phalanx, and
in the battle he formed Fabius's and Scipios to
be the glory and triumph of his country after
him. He plundered the immenfe wealth of Ma-
cedonia and Epirus : he plundered feventy cities,
and demolimed their walls. The fpoils were fold,
and each foldier had two hundred denarii, and
each of the hcrfe four. The foldiers and com-
mon people, it feems, had little of that difinte-
reftednefs for which jEmilius was remarkable.
They were fo offended at their general for giving
fo little of the booty to them, and referving fo
much to the public treafury, that they raifed a
great cry and oppofition againft his triumph ; and
Galba, the foldiers, and their friends among the
plebeians, were determined to teach the great
men, the confuls, generals, &c. to be lefs public-
fpirited — to defraud the treafury of its wealth,
and beftow it upon them : they accordingly op-
pofed the triumph of this great and difmterefted
general, and the firft tribes abfolutely rejected it.
—Who, upon this occafion, faved the honour,
juftice, and dignity of the republic ? Not the ple-
beians, but the fenators * The fenators were highly
enraged at this infamous injuftice and ingratitude,
and this daring effort of popular licentioufnefs
and avarice, and were obliged to make a noife,
and excite a tumult. Servilius, too, who had
been conful, and had killed three and twenty ene-
>"':, mies

Commonwealth, examined.

raies who has challanged him 'in flngle combat,
made a long fpeech, in which he (hewed the bafe-
nefs of their conduct in fo ftriking a light, that he
made the people afhamed of themfelves ; and at
length they confented to the triumph, but to all
appearance more from a defire to fee the mow of
Perfeus laden with chains, led through the city
before the chariot of the victor, than from any
honefl and public-fpirited defign to reward merit.
The fum which he caufed to be carried into the
public treafury on the day of the triumph was
one million three hundred thoufand pounds fter-
ling, and caufed the taxes of the Roman people
to be i abolifhed. At his death, after the fale of
part of his flaves, moveables, and fome farms, to
pay his wife's dower, the remainder of his fortune
was but nine thoufand three hundred and feventy-
five pounds fterling. As he was defcended from
one of the moft noble and ancient houfes of
Rome, illuftrious by the higheft dignities, the
fmallnefs of his fortune reflects honour on his
anceftors as well as on himfelf. The love of fim-
plicity was ftill fupported in fome of the great
families, by extreme care not to ally themfelves
with luxurious ones ; and j^Emilius chofe Tubero,
of the family of jElii, whofe firft piece of plate
was a filver cup of five pounds weight, given him
by his father-in-law. Thefe few families ftem-
med the torrent of popular avarice and extrava-
gance.

Let us now confider what Would have been the
fate of jflEmilius, if Rome had been governed at
this time by Nedham's fucceflion of the people's
repiefentatives, unchecked by the fenate. It is plain
he muft have given into the common practice of
flattering, carelfing, foothing, bribing, and cajol-
ing the people, or never have been conful, never

commanded

324 5^* r\$i Conjlitutlon of a

commanded armies, never triumphed, .An ex-
ample more deftrudtive of our author's fyftem can
fcarcely be found, and yet he has the inadvertence
at leaft to adduce it in fupport of his Right Con-
ftitution of a Commonwealth. It has been necef-
fary to quote thefe anecdotes at fome length, that
we may not be deceived by a fpecious mow, which
is deititute of fubftance, truth and fact, to fup-
port it.

But how come all thefe examples to be patri-
cians and fenators, and not one inftance to be
found of a plebeian commander who did not make
a different ufe of his power ?

There is a ftrange confufion or perverfion in
what follows : " Rome never thrived until it was
" fettled in a freedom of the people." Rome
never was fettled in a freedom of the people ;
meaning in a free ftate, according to our authors
definition of it, a fucceflion of the fupreme au-
thority in the people's reprefentatives. Such an
idea never exifted in the Roman commonwealth,
not even when or before the people made Caefar
a perpetual dictator. Rome never greatly prof-
pered until the people obtained a fmall mixture of
authority, a flight check upon thefenate, by their
tribunes. This, therefore, is proof in favour of
the mixture, and againft the fyftem of eur au-
thor.

" Freedom was bed preferved, and interefl
" beft advanced, when all places of honour and
*; truft were expofed to men of merit, without
*6 difti action." True, but this never happened
till the mixture took place.

u This happinefs could never be obtained, until
ic the people were inflated in a capacity of pre-
^ ferring whom they thought worthy, by a free-
*c dom of electing men fucceffively into their fu-

" preme

Commonwealth, examined. 325

" preme offices and affemblies." What is meant
here by fupreme offices? There were none in Rome
but the dictators, and they were appointed by the
fenate, at leaft until Marius annihilated the fenate,
by making the tribes omnipotent. Confuls could
ijot be called fupreme officers in any fenfe. —
What is meant by fupreme affemblies ? There
were none but the fenate. The Roman people
never had the power of electing a reprefentative
affembly. — cc So long as* this cuftom continued,
" and merit took place, the people made fhift to
" keep and increafe tfceir liberties." This cuftom
never took place, and, ftrictly fpeaking, the Ro-
man people never enjoyed liberty. The fenate was
fovereign till the people fet up a perpetual dic-
tator.

" When this cuftom lay neglected, and the
" ftream of preferment began to run along with
" the favour and pleafure of particular powerful
" men, then vice and compliance making way
66 for advancement, the people could keep their
" liberties no longer ; but both their liberties
•c and themfelves were made the price of every
*c man's ambition and luxury." But when was
this ? Precifely when the people began, and in
proportion as they approached to, an equality of
power with the fenate, and to that ilate of
things which our author contends for ; fo that
the whole force of his* reafoning and examples,
when they come to be analyzed, conclude againft
him.

The eighth reafon, why the people in their
affemblies are the beft keepers of their liberty,
is, " becaufe it is they only that are concerned in
" the point of liberty." — It is agreed that the
people in their affemblies, tempered by another

coequal

326 The right Conftitution of a

coequal afiembly, aijd an executive coequal with
either, are the bed keepers of their liberties. But
it is denied that in one afiembly, collective or re-
prefentative, they are the belt keepers : it may
be reafonably queftioned, whether they are not the
word ; becaufe they are as fure to throw away their
liberties, as a monarch or a fenate untempered
are to take them ; with this additional evil, that
they throw away their morals at the fame time ;
whereas monarchs and fenates fometimes by fe-
verity preierve them in fome degree. In a fimple
democracy, the fir ft citizen^and the better fort of
citizens, are part of the people, and are equally
" concerned" with any others " in the point of
" liberty." But is it clear that in other forms
of government " the main intereft and concern-
*c ment, both of kings and gradees, lies either in
<c keeping the people in utter ignorance what li-
" berty is, or elfe in allowing and pleafing them
" only with the name and (hadow of liberty in-
*c ftead of the fubftance ?'* It is very true that
knowledge is very apt to make people uneafy
under an arbitrary and oppreflive government :
but a fimple monarch, or a fovereign fenate,
which is not arbitrary and oppreffive though abfo-
lute, if fuch cafes can exift, would be interefted
to promote the knowledge of the nation. It
muft, however, be admitted, that fimple govern-
ments will rarely if ever*favour the difperfion of
knowledge among the middle and lower ranks 'of
people. But this is equally true of limple demo-
cracy : the people themfelves, if uncontrouled,
will never long tolerate a freedom of inquiry, de-
bate, or writing ; their idols muft not be reflected
on, nor their fchemes and actions fcanned, upon
pain of popular vengeance, which is not lefs terri-
ble than that of defpots or fovereign fenators.

" In

Commonwealth, examined. 327

• " In free ftates, the people being fenfible of
" their pad condition in former times under the
" power of great ones, and comparing it with the
" poflibilities and enjoyments of the prefent, be-
" come immediately inflrudled, that their main
" intereft and concernment confifts in liberty ;
" and are taught by common fenfe, that the only
" way to fecure it from the reach of great ones,
" is to place it in the people's hands, adorned
" with all the prerogatives and rights of fupre-
4c macy." It is very true that the main intereft
and concernment of the people • is liberty. If
their liberties are well fecured they may be happy
if they will ; and they generally, perhaps always,
are fo. The way to fecure liberty is to place it in
the people's hands, that is, to give them a power
at all times to defend it in the legiflature and in
the courts of juftice : but to give the people, un-
controuled, all the prerogatives and rights of fu-
premacy, meaning the whole executive and judi-
cial power, or even the whole undivided legifla-
tive, is not the way to preferve liberty. In fuch
a government it is often as great a crime to op-
pofe or decry a popular demagogue, or any of his
principal friends, as in a fimple /monarchy to op-
pofe a king, or in a fimple ariftocracy the fena-
tors : the people will ;not bear a contemptuous
look or difrefpe&ful word ; nay, if the ftyle of
your homage, flattery, and adoration, is not as
hyperbolical as the popular enthufiafm dictates,
it is conftrued into difaffe&ion ; the popular
cry of envy, jealoufy, fufpicious temper, vanity,
arrogance, pride, ambition, impatience of a fupe-
rior, is fet up againft a man, and the rage and
fury of an ungoverned rabble, ftimulated under-
hand by the demagogick defpots, breaks out into
every kind of infult, obloquy, and outrage, often

ending

328 The right Conftitution of a

ending in murders and maflacres, like thofe 6f
the De Witts, more horrible than any that the
annals of defpotifm can produce.

It is indeed true, that " the intereft of freedom
" is a virgin that every one feeks to deflour ; and
" like a virgin it muft be kept, or elfe (fo great is
" the luft of mankind after dominion) there fol-
** lows a rape upon the firft opportunity." From
this it follows, that liberty in the legiflature is
•" more fecure in the people's hands than in any
*c other, becaufe they are mod concerned in it :" —
provided you keep the executive power out of
their hands entirely, and give the property and
liberty of the rich a fecurity in the fenate, againft
the encroachments of the poor in a popular aflem-
bly. Without this the rich will never enjoy any
liberty, property, reputation, or life, in fecurity.
The rich have as clear a right to their liberty and
property as the poor : it is eflential to liberty that
the rights of the rich be fecured ; if they are not,
they will foon be robbed and become poor, and in
their turn rob their robbers, and thus neither the
liberty or property of any will be regarded.

" The careful attention to liberty makes the
xc people both jealous and zealous, keeping a con-
<c ftant guard againft the attempts and encroach-
" ments of any powerful or crafty underminers."
But this is true only, while they are made a diftind
body from the executive power, and the mod con-
fpicuouscitizens mingle all together, and a fcramble
inftantly commences for the loaves and fifhes, abo-
lition of debts, fhutting up courts of juftice, divi-
ilons of property, &c. Is it not an infult to
common fenfe, for a people with the fame breath
to cry liberty, an abolition of debt^ and divijion of
goods? If debts are once abolifhed, and goods are
divided, there will be the fame reafon for a frefh

abolition

examined.

329

abolition and divifion every month and every day :
and thus the idle, vicious, and abandoned, will
live in conftant riot on the fpoils of theinduftrious,
virtuous, and deferving. " Powerful and crafty
underminers have no where fuch rare fport" as in
a fimple democracy, or fimgle popular affembly.
No where, not in the completed defpotifms, does
human nature (how itfelf fo completely depraved,
fo nearly approaching an equal mixture of bru-
tality and devilifm, as in the lad ftages of fuch a
democracy, and in the beginning of that defpot-
ifin that always fucceeds it.

" A people having once tailed the fweets of
cc freedom, are fo affe&ed with it/that if they dif-
" cover or fufpeft the lead defign to encroach
" upon it, they count it a crime never to be for-
" given." Strange perverfion of truth and faft !
This is fo far from the truth, that our author him-
felf is not able to produce a fingle inftance of it
as a proof or illuftration. Inftead of adducing an
example of it from a fimple democracy, he is
obliged to have recourfc to an example that ope-
rates ftrongly againft him, becaufe taken from an
ariftocracy. In the Roman (late, one gave up his
children, another his brother to death, to revenge
an attempt againft common liberty. Was Brutus
a man of the people ? Was Brutus for a govern-
ment of the people in their fovereign aflfemblies ?
Was not Brutus a patrician ? Did he not think
patricians a different order of beings from ple-
beians ? Did he not ered a fimple ariftocracy ?
Did he not facrifice his fons to preferve that
ariftocracy ? Is it not equally probable that he
•- would have facrificed them, to preferve his arifto-
cracy from any attempt to let -up fuch a govern-
ment as our author contends for, or even agamic
any attempt to have given the plebeians a fiiare

VOL. Ill, U u in

33° The right Conftitution of a

in the government ; nay, againft: any attempt to
erect the office of tribunes at that time ? — ;c Di-
tc vers facrificed their lives to preferve it." To pre-
fer ve what ? The (landing government of grandees,
againft which our author's whole book is written.
" Some facrificed their beft friends to vindicate
" it, upon bare fufpicion, as in the cafe of Melius
" and Manlius." To vindicate what ? Liberty ?
popular liberty ? Plebeian liberty ? Precifely the
contrary. Thefe characters were murdered for
daring to be friends to popular liberty ; for daring
to think of limiting the power of the grandees, by
introducing a lhare of popular authority, and a
mixed conflitution ; and the people themfelves
were fo far from the zeal, jealoufy, and love of
liberty, that our author afcribes to them, that
they fuffered their own authority to be proftituted
.before their eyes, to the deftruction of the only
friends they had, and to the eftablifhment of their
enemies., and a form of government by grandees,
under which they had no liberty, and in which they
had no fhare. — Qur author then cites examples of
revenge in Greece. 1656 was a late age in the
hiftory of philofophy, as well as morality' and
religion, for any writer to preach revenge as a
duty and a virtue: reafon and philanthropy, as well
as religion, pronounce it a weaknefs and a vice in
all pollible cafes. Examples enough of it, how-
ever, may be found in all revolutions : but mo-
narchies and ariflocracies have practifed it, and
therefore the virtue of revenge is not peculiar to
our author's plan. In Corcyra itfelf the people
were mafTacred by the grandees as often as they
mafiacred the grandees : and of all kinds of fpi-
rits that we read of, out of hell, this is the laft that
an enlightened friend of liberty would philofophi-
cally inculcate. Let legal liberty vindicate itfelf

Commonwealth examined. 331

by legal punifhments and moral msafures ; but
mobs and maifacres are the difgrace of her facred
caufe ftill more than of that of humanity.

Florence too, and Cofmus*, are quoted, and the
alternatives of treachery, revenge, and cruelty ;
all arifing, as they did in Greece, from the want of
a proper divifion of authority and an equal balance.
Let any one read the hiftory of the nrft Cofimo,
his wifdom, virtues, and unbounded popularity,
and then confider what would have been the.con-
fequence if Florence, at that period, had been go-
verned by our author's plan of fucceffive (ingle
aflemblies, chofen by the people annually. It is
plain that the people would have chofen fuch, and
fuch only, for reprefentatives as Cofimo and his
friends would have recommended : at leafh a vafl
majority of them would have been his followers,
and he would have been abfolute. It was the
ariftocracy and the forms of the old conflitution
that alone ferved as a check upon him. The
fpeech of Uzzano muft convince you, that the
people were more ready to make him abfolute
that ever the Romans were to make Csefar a per-
petual dictator. He confefles that Cofimo was fol-
lowed by the whole body of the plebeians, and by
one half of the nobles: that if Cofimo was not made
mafter of the commonwealth, Rinaldo would be,
whom he dreaded much more. In truth, the go-
vernment at this time was in reality become mo^
narchical, and that ill-digefted ariftocracy, which
theycalledapopular ftate,exifted only in form; and
the perfecution of Cofimo only ferved to explain
the fecret. Will it be denied that a nation has a
right to choofe a government for themfelves?
The queftion really was no more than this, whe-
ther Rinaldo or Cofimo fhould be mafter. The

*Sec vol. ii. p. 94.

nation

332 The right Conftitution of -a

nation declared for Cofimo, reverfed that banifh-
ment into which he had been very unjaftly fent by
Rinaldo, demanded his return, and voted him
the father of his country. This alone is full
proof, that if the people had been the keepers
of their own liberties, in their fucceflive aflem-
blies,they would have given them all to Cofimo ;
whereas, had there been an equal mixture of mo-
narchy, ariftocracy, and democracy, in that con-
flitution, the nobfes and commons would have
united againd Cofimo the moment he attempted
to overleap the boundaries of his legal authority.
Uzzano confefles, that unlefs charity, liberality,
and beneficence, were crimes, Cofimo was guilty
of no offence, and that there was as much to
apprehend from his own party as from the other, in
the point of liberty. All the fubfequent attempts
of Rinaldo to put Cofimo to death and to banifh
him were unqualified tyranny. He faved his life,
it is true, by a bribe, but what kind of patrons of
liberty were thefe who would betray it for a
bribe ? His recall and return from banimment
Teems to have been the general voice of the na-
tion, expreffed, according to the forms and fpirit
of the prefent conftitution, without any appear-
ance of fuch treachery as our author fuggefts.
Whether Nedham knew the real hiftory of Flo-
fence is very problematical; all his examples
from it are fo unfortunate as to be conclufive
againft his project of a government*. The real
e {fence of the government in Florence had been,
for the greateft part of fifty years, a monarchy, in
the hands of Uzzino and Nafo, according to Ma-
chjavel's own account ; its form an ariftocracy,
and its name a popular ftate : nothing of the

* See vol. ii, p. 96, -97, 98, 99.

effence

Commonwealth examined. 333

efTence was changed by the reftoration of Co-
fimo: the form and name only underwent an altera-
tion.— Holftein too is introduced, merely to make
a (lory for the amufement of a drunken mob.
cc Here is a health to the remembrance of our li-
" berty," faid the "boorifh, poor, filly genera-
u tion,5' feventy years after they were made a
duchy. Many hogfheads of ale and porter, I
doubt not, were drank in England in confequence
of this Holftein (lory ; and that was all the effect
it could have towards Supporting our author's ar-
gument.

" How deep foever the impreflion may be, that
" is made by the love of liberty upon the minds
" of the people, it will not follow that they alone
" are the beft keepers of their own liberties,
" being more tender and more concerned in their
" fecurity than any powerful pretenders whatfo-
" ever." Are not the fenators, whether they be
hereditary or elective, under the influence of
powerful motives to be .tender and concerned for
the fecurity of liberty ? Every fenatof, who con-
fults his reafon, knows that his own liberty, and
that of his pofterity, mufl depend upon the con-
ftitution which preferves it to others. What
greater refuge can a nation have, than in a coun-
cil, in which the national maxims, and the fpirit
and genius of the ftate, are preferved by a living
tradition ? What ftronger motive to virtue, and
to the prefervation of liberty, can the human mind
perceive, next to thofe of rewards andpunifhments
in a future life, than the recollection of a long
line of anceftors who have fat within the walls of
the fenate, and guided the councils, led the armies,
commanded the fleets, and fought the battles of the
people, by which the nation has been fuflained
in its infant years, defcended from dangers, and
carried, through calamities, to wealth, grandeur,

profperity,

334 Fke r'l&ht C on/lit utlon of a

profperity and glory ? What inditution more ufe-
fal can poffibly exid, than a living repertory of
all the hidory, knowledge, intereds, and wifdom of
the commonwealth, and a living reprefentative of
all the great characters whofe prudence, wifdom,
and valour, are regiflered in the hidory and re-
corded in the archieves of the country ? If the
people have the periodical choice of thefe, we may
hopethey willgenerally felect thofe, among the mod
confpicuous for fortune, family, and wealth, who
are mod fignalized for virtue and wifdom., which
is more advantageous than to be confined to the
eldefl fon, however defective, to the exclufion of
younger fons, however excellent, and to one family
though decayed and depraved, to anothermore de-
ferving, as in hereditary fenates : but that a fenate,
guarded from ambition, fhould be objected to, by a
friend of liberty and republican governments very
extraordinary. Let the people have a full lhare,
and a decifive negative ; and, with this impregna-
ble barrier againd the ambition of the fenate on one
fide, and the executive power with an equal ne-
gative on the other, fuch a council will be found
the patron and guardian of liberty on many occa-
fions, when the giddy thoughtlefs multitude, and
even their representatives, would neglect, forget,
or even defpife and infult it ; inftances of all which
are not difficult to find.

The ninth reafon is, " becaufe the people are
" lefs luxurious than kings or grandees." — That
may well be denied. Kings, nobles, and people,
are all alike in this refped, and in general know
no other bounds of indulgence than the capacity
of enjoyment, and the power fo gratify it. The
problem ought to be to find a form of govern-
ment bed calculated to prevent the bad effects
and corruption of luxury, when in the ordinary

courfe

Commonwealth^ examined. 335

courfe of things, it muft be expe&ed to come in-
Kings and nobles, if they are confefied to enjoy v
or indulge in luxury more than the commons, it is
merely becaufe they have more means and oppor-
tunities ; not becaufe they have ftronger appetites,
paflions, and fancies, or, in other words a ftronger
propenfity to luxury than the plebeians. If it
fhould be conceded, that the - paflions and appe-
tites ftrengthen by indulgence, it muft be con-
fefled too, that they have more motives to re-
ftrain them ; but in regard to mere animal grati-
fication, it may well be denied that they indulge
or enjoy more than the common people on an
average. Eating and drinking furely is pra&ifed
with as much fatisfaction by the footman as his
lord ; and as much pleafure may be tafted in gin,
brandy, ale, and porter, as in Burgundy or Toc-
kay ; in beef and pudding, as in ortolans and jel-
lies. If we confider nations together, we (hall find
that intemperance and accefs is more indulged in
the loweft ranks than in the higheft. The luxury
of drefs, beyond the defence from the weather, is
a mere matter of politics and etiquette through-
out all the ranks of life ; and, in the higher ranks,
rifes only in proportion as it rifes in the middle
and the loweft. The fame is true o/ furniture and
equipage, after the ordinary conveniences and
accommodations of life. Thofe who claim or
afpire to the higheft ranks of life, will eternally
go a certain degree above thofe below them in
thefe particulars, if their incomes will allow it.
Confideration is attainable by appearance, and ever
will be ; and it may be depended on, that rich
men in general will not fuffer others to be confi-
dered more than themfelves, or as much, if they
can prevent it by their riches. 'The poor and
the middle ranks, then, have it in their power to

diminifh

The right conftltutlon of &

diminifli luxury as much as the great and rich
have. Let the middle and lower ranks leflbn their
ftyle of living, and they may depend upon it the
higher ranks will leflen theirs. It is commonly
faid every thing is regis ad exemplum ; that the
lower ranks imitate the higher ; and it is true :
but it is equally true that the higher imitate the
lower. The higher ranks will never exceed their
inferiors but in a certain proportion ; but the dif-
tinftion they are abfolutely obliged to keep up, or
fall into contempt and ridicule. It may gratify
vulgar malignity and popular envy, to declaim
eternally againft the rich and the great, the noble
and the high ; but, generally and philofophically
fpeaking, the manners and characters in a nation
are all alike : the lowed and the middling peo-
ple, in general, grow vicious, vain, and luxuri-
ous, exactly in proportion. As to appearance,
the higher fort are obliged to raife theirs in pro-
portion as the (lories below afcend. A free peo-
ple are the moft addicted to luxury of any : that
,equality which they enjoy, and in which they
glory, infpires them with fentiments which hurry
them into luxury. A citizen perceives his fel-
low-citizen, whom he holds his equal, have a
better coat or hat, a better houfe or horfe, than
himfelf, and fees his neighbours are flruck with
it, talk of it, and refpect him for it ; he cannot
bear it ; he muft and will be upon" a level ,with
him. Such an emulation as this takes place in
every neighbourhood, in every family ; among
artifans, hufbandrnen, labourers, as much as be-
tween dukes and marquifles, and more — thefe are
all nearly equal in drefs, and are now diftin-
guifhed by other marks. Declamations, oratory,
poetry, fermons, againft luxury, riches, and com-
merce, will never have much effect : the moft

• rigorous

Commonwealth, examined. 337

rigorous fumptuary laws will have little more.—
" Difcordia et avaritia, atque ambitio, et ceterst
" fecundis rebus oriri fueta mala, pod Carthaginis
" excidiurn maxume aucta funt. Ex quo tem-
" pore majorum mores, non paulatim ut antea,
" fed torrentis modo prascipitati." Sailuft. ia
Frag. — In the late war, the Americans found ari
unufual quantity of money flow in upon therri,
and, without the leaft degree of prudence, fore-
fight, cbnfideration, or meafure, rufhed headlong
into a greater degree of luxury than ought to
have crept in, in an hundred years. The Romans
charged the ruin of their commonwealth to luxu-
ry : they might have charged it to the want of a
balance in their conftitution. In a country like
America, where the means and opportunities for
luxury are fo eafy and fo plenty, it would be
madnefs not to ex-pelt it, be prepared for it, and
provide againft the dangers of it in the conftitu-
tion. The balance, in a triple-headed legiilature,
is the bed and the only remedy. If we will not
adopt that, we muft fuffer the punifhment of our
temerity. The fupereminence of a threefold ba-
lance, above all the' imperfect balances that were
attempted in the ancient republics of Greece and
Italy, and the modern ones of Switzerland and
Holland, whether ariftocratical or mixed, lies in
this, that as it is capable of governing a great
nation and large territory, whereas the others can
only exift in fmall ones, fo it is capable of pre-
ferving liberty among great degrees of wealth,
luxury, diflipation, and even profligacy of manners j
whereas the others require the utmoft frugality,
fimplicity, and moderation, to make human life
tolerable under them.

" Where luxury takes place, there is a natural
" tendency to tyranny." There is a natural ten-

VOL. III. X x dency

333 The Right C on/lit ution of a

dency to tyranny every where, in the fimpleft
manners as well as the moft luxurious, which no-
thing but force can flop. And why mould this
tendency be taken from human nature, where it
grows as in its native foil, and attributed to
luxury ? " the nature of luxury lies altogether
<c in excefs. It is an univerfal depravation of man-
" ners, without reafon, without moderation : it is
" the canine appetite of a corrupt will and phan-
" tafy, which nothing can fatisfy ; but in every
" action, in every imagination, it flies beyond the
" bounds of honefty, juft and good, into all ex-
ec tremity." This is declamation and rant that
it is not eafy to comprehend. There are all pof-
fible degrees of luxury which appear in fociety,
with every degree of virtue, from the firft dawn-
ings of civilization to the laft ftage of improve-
ment and refinement ; and civility, humanity, and
benevolence, increafe commonly as faft as ambi-
tion of conqueft, the pride of war, cruelty, and
bloody rage, diminifhes. Luxury, to certain de-
grees of excefs, is an evil ; but it is not at all
times, and in all circumftances, an abfolute evil.
It fhould be reflrained by morality and by law,
by prohibitions and difcouragements. But the
evil does not lie.here only ; it lies in human na-
ture : and that muft be reflrained by a mixed form
of government, which is the beft in the world to
manage luxury. Our author's government would
never make, or, if it made, it never would execute
laws to reftrain luxury.

" That form of government," fays our author,
" muft needs be the moft excellent, and the peo-
" pie's liberty moft fecured, where governors are
" leaft expofed to the baits and fnares of luxury."
That: is to fay, that form of government is the
beft, and the people's liberty moft fecure where

the

Commonwealth , examined. 339

the people are pooreft : this will never recom-
mend a government to mankind. But what has
poverty or riches to do with the form of govern-
ment ? If mankind muft be voluntarily poor in
order to be free, it is too late in the age of the
world to preach liberty. Whatever Nedham
might think, mankind in general had rather be
rich under a fimple monarchy, than poor under a
democracy. But if that is the bed form of go-
vernment, where governors are leaft expofed to
the baits and fnares of luxury, the government
our author contends for is the word of all poflible
forms. There is, there can be no form in which
the governors are fo much expofed to the baits
and fnares of luxury as in a fimple democracy.
In proportion as a government is democratical, in
a degree beyond a proportional prevalence of mo-
narchy and ariftocracy, the wealth, means, and
opportunities being the fame, does luxury pre-
vail. Its progrefs is inftantaneous. There can be
no fubordination. One citizen cannot bear that
another fhould live better than himfelf ; a univerfal
emulation in luxury inftantly commences ; and the
governors, that is, thofe who afpire at ele&ions,
are obliged to take the lead in this filly conten-
tion : they muft not be behind the foremoft in
drefs, equipage, furniture, entertainments, games,
races, fpe&acles ; they mufl feaft and gratify the
luxury of electors to obtain their votes ; and the
whole executive authority muft be proftituted,
and the legiflative too, to encourage luxury. The
Athenians made it death for any one to propofe
the appropriation of money devoted to the fup-
port of the theatre to any the moft necefiary pur-
pofes of the ftate. In monarchies and ariitocra-
cies much may be done, both by precept and ex-
ample, by laws and manners to diminifh luxury

and

343 The right Conftitution */ a

and retrain its growth ; in a mixed government
more ftiil may be done for this falutary end ; but
in a fimple democracy, nothing : every man will
do as he pleafes — no fumptuary law will be obey-
ed— every prohibition or impoft will be eluded ;
no man will dare to propofe a law by which the
pleafures or the liberty of the citizen (hall be re-
ftrained. A more unfortunate argument for a
fimple democracy could not have been thought
of: it i.% however, a very good one in favour of
a mixed government.

Our author is no where fo weak as in this rea-
fon, or tinder this head. He attempts to prove
his point by reafon and examples, but is equally
unfortunate in both. Firft, by reafon. " The
^ people/' fays he, cc mud be lefs luxurious than
*' kings, or great ones, becaufe they are bounded
*c within a more lowly pitch of defire and ima-
" gination : give them but panem et tircenfes,
" bread, fport, and eafe, and they are abundantly
" fatisfied." It is to be feared that this is too
good a character for any people living, or that
have lived. The difpofition to luxury is the
fame, though the habit is not, both in plebeians,
patricians, and kings. When we fay their defi.res
are bounded, we admit the defires to exift. Ima-
gination is as quick in one as in the other. It is
demanding a great deal, to demand " bread, and
" fports, and eafe.5' No one can tell how far
thefe terms may extend. If by bread is meant a
fubfiftence, a maintenance in food and clothing,
it will mount up very high ; if by fports be meant
cock-fighting, norfe-racing-, theatrical reprefenta-
tions, and all the fpecies of cards, dice, and gam-
bling, no mortal philofopher can fathom the
depth of this article ; and if with " bread" and
" fport" they are to have " eafe" too, and by eafe

be

Commonwealth, examined. 341

be meant idlenefs, an exemption from care and la-
bour, all three together will amount to as much
as ever was demanded for nobles or kings, and
more than ought ever to be granted to either.
But let us grant all this for a moment ; we mould
be difappointed ; the promifed u abundant fa-
*' tisfaction would not be found. The bread
muft foon be of the fined wheat ; poultry and gib-
bier muft be added to beef and mutton ; the en-
tertainments would not be elegant enough after a
time ; more expence muft be added : in mortt con-
tentment is not in human nature ; there is no
paflion, appetite, or affection for contentment.
To amufe and flatter the people with compliments
of qualities that never exifted in them, is not the
duty nor the right of a philofopher or legiflator ;
he muft form a true idea and judgment of man-
kind, and adapt his inftitutions to fads, not com-
pliments,

" The people have lefs means and opportune
** ties for luxury than thofe pompous {landing
" powers, whether in the hands of one or many.*'
But if the fovereignty were exercifed wholly by
one popular aflembly, they would then have the
means and opportunities in their hands as much
as the king has in a monarchy, or the fenate in an
ariftocracy or oligarchy ; and much more than
either kings or nobles have in the triparite compo-
fition we contend for ; becaufe in this the king
and nobles have really no means or opportunities
of luxury but what are freely given them by the
people, whofe reprefentatives hold the purfe. Ac-
cordingly, in the fimple democracy, or reprefen-
tative democracy, which our author contends for,
it would be found, that the great leaders in the
affembly would foon be as luxurious as ever king
€* hereditary nobles were, aad they would make

partifans,

342 The right C on/lit ut ion of a

partifans by admitting aflbciates in a luxury,
which they would fupport at the expence of the
minority : and every particle of the executive
power would be proilituted, new lucrative offices
daily created, and larger appointments annexed to
fupport it : nay, the power of judging would
be proflituted to determine caufes in favour of
friends and againft enemies, and the plunder de-
voted to the luxury. The people would be found
as much inclined to vice and vanity as kings or
grandees, and would run on to ftill greater excefs
and riot : for kings and nobles are always re-
ftrained in fome degree, by fear of the people,
and their cenfures ; whereas the people themfelves,
in the cafe we put, are not reflrained by fear or
fhame, having all honour and applaufe at their
difpofal, as well as force. It does not appear, then,
that they are lefs luxurious ; on the contrary they
are more luxurious, and neceflarily become fo, ia
a fimple democracy.

Our author triumphantly concludes, " it is
cc clear the people, that is, their fucceflive repre-
" fentatives" (all authority in one centre, and that
centre the nation) " muft be the beft governors,
" becaufe the current of fucceflion keeps them
" the lefs corrupt and prefumptuous." He muft
have forgot that thefe fucceflive reprefentatives
have all the executive power, and will ufe it at
once for the exprefs purpofe of corruption among
their conflituents, to obtain votes at the next elec-
tion. Every commiffion will be given, and new
offices created, and frefli fees, falaries, perquifites,
and emoluments added, on purpofe to corrupt
more voters. He muft have forgot that the judi-
cial power is in the hands of thefe reprefentatives,
by his own fuppofitions, and that falfe accufations
of crimes will be fuftained to ruin enemies, dif-

putes

Commonwealth, examined. 343

putes in civil caufes will be decided in favour of

friends ; in (hort, the whole criminal law, and the

whole civil law concerning lands, houfes, goods*

and money, will be made fubfervient to the covet-

oufnefs, pride, ambition, and oftentation of the

dominant party and their chiefs. " The current

" of fucceflion," inflead of keeping them " lefs

" corrupt and prefumptuous," is the very thing

that annually makes them more corrupt and

fhamelefs. Inftead of being more " free from

" luxurious couries," they are more irrefiftibly

drawn into them ; inflead of being" free from

" oppreflive and injurious practices," their parties

at elections will force them into them : and all

thefe things they mud do to hold up the port

and fplendor of their tyranny ; and if any of

them hefitates at any imprudence that his party

demands, he alone will be rejected, and another

found whofe confcience and whofe fhame are fuf-

ficiently fubdued.

Unfortunate in his arguments from reafon, to
(hew that the people, qualified with the fupremc
authority, are lefs devoted to luxury than the
grandee or kingly powers, our author is ftill more
unhappy in thofe drawn for example.

The firft example is Athens. " While Athens
" remained free, in the people's hands, it was
" adorned with fuch governors as gave themfelves
" up to zferious, abftemious, and fevere courfe of
" life." Sobriety, abft'mence, and feverity, were
never remarkable chara&eriftics of democracy, or
the democratical branch or mixture, in any confti-
tution ; they have often been the attributes of
ariftocracy and oligarchy. Athens, in particular,
was never eonfpicious for thefe qualities ; but, on
the contrary, from the firft to the laft moment of
her democratical conflitution, levity, gaiety, incon-

344 The right Conflituilon of*

Jlancy, dijfipation, intemperance^ debauchery ', and a
dijjolution of manners^ were the prevailing charac-
ter of the whole nation. At what period will it
be pretended that they were adorned with thefe
ferious, abftemious, and fevere governors ? and
what were their names ? Was Pififlratus fo feri-
ous, when he drove his chariot into the Agora,
wounded by himfelf, and duped the people to give
him his guard ? or when he drefifed the girl like
Minerva ? Was Hipparchus or Hippias, Cleif-
thenes or Ifagoras, fo abftemious ? Was there fo
much abftinence and feverity of public virtue in
applying firft to Sparta, and then to Perfia, againft
their country, as the leaders alternately did ? Mil-
tiades indeed was ferious, abftemious, and fevere ;
but Xanthippus, who was more popular, and, who
conduced a capital accufation againft him, and
got him fined fifty talents, was not. Themifto-
cies ! was he the fevere character ? A great ftatef-
man and foldier, to befure; but very ambitious,
and not very honeft. Pericles facrificed all things
to his ambition ; Cleon and Alcibiades were the
very reverfe of fobriety, moderation, and mo-
dfefty. Miltiades, Ariftides, Socrates, and Pho-
cion, are all the characters in the Athenian ftory
who had this kind of merit ; and to fhew how lit-
tle the Athenians themfelves deferved this praife,
or efteemed it in others, the firft was condemned
by the people in an immenfe fine, the fecond to
banifhment, and the third and fourth to death.
Ariftides had Themiftocles, a more popular man,
conftamly to oppofe him. He was, indeed, made
financier of all Greece ; but what other arbitra-
tion had Athens ? And Ariftides himfelf, though
a profeffed imitator of Lycurgus, and a favourer
of ariftocracy, was obliged to overturn the con-
ftitution, by giving way to the furious ambition

of

Commonwealth, examined. 345

of the people, and by letting every citizen into the
competition for the archbifhop*. " Being at the
"' height, they began to decline ;" that is, almoft
in the inftant when they had expelled the Pififtra-
tidas, and acquired a democratical afcendency,
though checked by the areopagus and many other
inflitutions of Solon, they declined. The good
conduct of the democracy began and ended with
Ariftides. " Permitting fome men to greaten.
" themfelves by continuing long in power and
" authority, they foon loft their pure principles
cc of feverity and liberty." In truth, nobody yet
had fuch principles but Miltiades and Ariftides,
At foon as the people got unlimited power, they
did as the people always do, give it to their flat-
terers, like Themiftocles, and continued it in
him. To what purpofe is it to talk of the rules
of a free ftate, when you are fure thofe rules will
be violated ? The people unbalanced never will
obferve them.

" The thirty" were appointed by Lyfander,
after the conqueft of Athens by Sparta : vyet it
was not the continuance, but the illimitation, of
their power that corrupted them. Thefe, indeed,
behaved like all other unchecked affemblies : the
majority deftroyed Theramenes, and the few vir-

* When the city of Athens was rebuilt, the people finding
themfelves in a ftate of tranquillity, endeavoured by every
means to get the whole government into their own hands.
Ariftides perceiving 'that it would be no eafy matter to re-
ftrain a people with arms in their hands, and grown infoleat
with victory, ftudied methods to appeafe them He parted a
decree, that the government mould be common to all the
citizens ; and that the archons, who were the chief magiftrates,
and uled to be chofen only out of thofe who received at lead
five hundred medimnis of grain from the product of their
lands, mould for the future be ele&ed from among all the
Athenians without diftinftion. Plut. Arift.

Y y tUOUS

346 The right Conftitution of a

tuous members who happened to be among them
and were a reproach to them, and then ruled with
a rod of iron. Nothing was heared of but murders
and imprisonments. Riches were a crime that never
failed to be punifhed with confifcation and death.
More people were put death in eight months of
peace than had been flam by the enemy in a war
of thirty years. In fhort every body of men,
every unchecked aifembly in Athens, had invari-
ably behaved in this manner : the four hundred
formerly chofen ; now the thirty ; and afterwards
the ten. Such univerfal, tenacious, and uniform
confpiracies againit liberty, juftice, and the pub-
lic good ; fuch a never failing paffion for tyranny
poffefling republicans born in the air of liberty,
nurtured in her bolom, accuftomed to that equa-
lity on which it is founded, and principled by their
education from their earlieft infancy in an abhor-
rence of all fervitude, have aflonifhed the genera-
lity of hiftorians. There muft be in power, fay
they, fome violent impulfe to actuate fo many
perfons in this manner, who had no doubt fenti-
ments of virtue and honour, and make them for-
get all laws of nature and religion. But there is
really no room for all this furprife : it is the form
of government that naturally and neceffarily pro-
duces the effecl. The aftonifhment really is, and
ought to be only, that there is one fenfible man
left in the world who can Itill entertain an eileem,
or any other fentiment than abhorrence, for a go-
vernment in a fmgle affembly.

" Such aifo was the condition of Athens when
" Pifiitratus ufurped the tyranny." But who was
it that continued the power of Pififtratus and his
fons ? The people. And if this example mows,
like all others, that the people are always difpofed
to continue and increafe the power of their fa-
vourites

Commonwealth, examined. 347

Younies againft' all maxims and rules of freedom,
this alfo is an argument for placing balances in.
the confHtution, even againft the power o'f the
people.

From Athens our author comes to Rome.
" Under Tarquin it was dilfolved in debauchery."
— " Upon the change of government their manners
ec were fo'mewhat mended." This difference does
not appear : on the contrary, the Roman manners
were under the kings as pure, as under the arifto-
cracy that followed. " The fenate being a ftand-
cc ing power, foon grew corrupt, and firft let
u in luxury, then tyranny ; till the people being
<c interefted in the government, eftablifhed a good
" difcipline and freedom both together, which
tc was upheld with all feverity till the grandees
<c came in play." When an author writes from
imagination only, he may fay what he pleafes ; but
it would be trifling to adduce proofs in detail of
what every one knows. The whole hiftory of
Rome fhows that corruption began with the peo-
ple fooner than in the fenate 3 that it increafed
fafter ; that it produced the chara&ers he calls
grandees, as the Gracchi, Marius/ Sylla, and
Csefar ; and that the fenate was for centuries/ the
check that preferred any degree of virtue, modera-
tion, or modefty.

Our author's conclufion is, that . cc grandee
" and kingly powers are ever more luxurious
<c than the popular are or can be ; that luxury
<c ever brings on tyranny as the bane of liber-
^ ty ; and therefore that the rights of the peo-
*c pie, in a due and orderly fucceflion of their
" fupreme alfemblies, are more fecure in their
" own hands than any others.

But if the fa£t is otherwife, and the people
are equally luxurious in a fimple democracy as

in

348 The right Conftiiution of a

in a fimple ariftocracy or monarchy ; but more
efpecially if it be true, as it undoubtedly is, that
they are more fo ; then the contrary conclufion
will follow, that their rights are more fecure when
their own power is tempered by a feparate execu-
tive and an ariftocratical fenate.

The truth relating to this fubjecl: is very ob-
vious, and lies in a narrow compafs. The dif-
pofition to luxury is fo ftrong in all men, and in
all nations, that it can be refrained, where it has
the means of gratification, only by education,
difcipline or law. Education and difcipline foon
lofe their force when unfupported by law : fim-
pie democracies, therefore, have occafion for the
jftri&eft laws to preferve the force of education,
, difcipline and feverity of manners. This is the
reaibn why examples of the mod rigorous, the
mod tyrannical, fumptuary laws are found in go-
vernments the mod popular : but fuch fumptuary
laws are found always ineffectual ; they are always
hated by the people, and violated continually ; and
thofe who approve them neither dare repeal them,
nor attempt to carry them into execution. In a
fimple ariitocracy the difpofition to luxury mews
itfelf in the utmoil extravagance, as in Poland: but
it is confined to the gentlemen ; the common peo-
ple are forbidden it ; and fuch fumptuary laws are
executed feverely enough. In fimple monarchies
fumptuary laws are made under the guife of pro-
hibitions or impofts ; and luxury is generally no
otherwife retrained than by the ability to gratify
it: but as the difference of ranks is eftablifhed
by laws and cufloms univerfally known, there is
no temptation for people in the lower ranks to
imitate the fplendor of thofe in the higher. But
in the mixed government we contend for, the
diftinftion of ranks is.alfo generally known,, or

ought

Commonwealth, examined. 349

ought to be : it has therefore all the advantage
againft general luxury which arifes from fubordi-
nation ; and it has the further advantage of being
able to execute prudent and reafonable fumptuary
laws, whenever the circumftances of affairs require
them. It is, therefore, fafe to affirm, that luxury
is lefs dangerous in fuch a mixed government
than any other ; has lefs tendency to prevail ; and
is much more eafily reftrained to fuch perfons and
objects as will be lead detrimental to the public
good.

The tenth reafon is, " becaufe the people under
" this government are ever endued with a more
" magnanimous, active, and noble temper of fpi-
" rit, than under the grandeur of any (landing
" power ; and this arifes from an apprehenfion
4C which every man has of his own (hare in the
" public intereft:, as well as of that fecurity which
" he poffefles in the enjoyment of his private
" fortune, free from the reach of any arbitrary
" power. "

This is a good argument in favour of a go-
vernment in which the people have an effential
part of the fovereign power ; but none at all for
one in which they exercife the whole. When
they have a part, balanced by a fenate and a
diftindi: executive power, it is true they have more
magnanimity, activity, and fpirit ; they have a
regard to their own immediate (hare in the public
intereft ; they have an apprehenfion of that fecu-
rity they poffefs in the enjoyment of their private
fortunes, free from the reach of any arbitrary
power. Whenever fuccefs betides the public, and
the commonwealth conquers, thrives in dominion,
wealth, or honour, the citizen reckons all his
own : if he fees honours, offices, rewards, diftri-

buted

The right C on/lit ut ion of a

buted to valiant, virtuous, or learned men, he
efteems them his own, as long as the door is left
open to fucceed in the fame dignities and enjoy-
ments, if he can attain to the fame meafure of
defert. Men afpire to great a&ions when rewards
depend on merit ; and merit is more certain of
reward in a mixed government than in any fim-
ple one. Rewards depend on the will and plea-
fure of particular perfons, in (landing powers of
monarchy or ariftoeracy : but they depend equally
on the will and pleafure of the principes populi,
the reigning demagogues, in fimple democracies,
and for obvious reafons are oftener diftributed in
an arbitrary manner. In a mixed government the
minifters of the executive power are always re-
fponfible, and grofs corruption in the diftribution
of offices is always fubject to inquiry and to pu-
nifhment : but in fimple governments the reign-
ing characters are accountable to nobody. In a
fimple democracy each leader thinks himfelf ac-
countable only to his party, and obliged to bellow
honours, rewards, and offices, not upon merit and
for the good of the whole flate, but merely to in-
creafe his votes and partifans in future elections*
But it is by no means juft, politic or true, to fay,
that qffices &c. are always conferred in free dates,
meaning fmgle aflemblies, according to merit,
without any confideration of birth or fortune.
Birth and fortune are as much confidered in fimple
Democracies as in monarchies, and ought to be
confidered, in fome degree, in all flates. Merit,
it is true, ought to be preferred to both ; but
merit being equal, birth will generally determine
the queftion in all popular governments ; and
fortune, which is a worfe criterion, oftener ftill.

But what apprehenfion of their (hare in the pub-
lic intereft, or of their fecurity in the enjoyment

of

Commonwealth^ axamined. 351

of their private fortune, can the minor party
have in a fimple democracy, when they fee that
fucceffeS', conquefts, wealth, and honour, only tend
to increafe the power of their antagonifts, and to
leflen their own ; when all honours, offices, and
rewards, are beftowed to leflen their importance,
and increafe that of their opponents ; when every
door is (hut againft them to fucceed to dignities
and enjoyments, be their merit what it will ; when
they fee that neither birth, fortune, nor merit, can
avail them, and that their adverfaries, whom they
will call their enemies, fucceed continually, with-
out either birth, fortune, or merit ? This is furely
the courfe in a fimple democracy, even more than
in a fimple ariflocracy or monarchy. Abilities,
no doubt, will be fought and purchafed into the
fervice of fortune and family in the predominant
party, but left to perifh in oppofition.

A mixed government is the only one where
merit can be expeded to have fair^lay ; there it
has three refources, one in each branch of the
legiflature, and a fourth in the courts of juftice ;
whereas in all fimple governments it has but one.

Our author proceeds again to Roman hiftory,
and repeats examples he had ufed before, with
equal ill fuccefs. The examples prove the con-
trary of what he cites them to prove. u The
** Romans, under their kings, remained inconli-
<c derable in reputation, and could never enlarge
<c the dominion very far beyond the wails of
" their city. Afterwards, under the {landing
" power of the fenate, they began to thrive a
" little, and for a little time. But when the
" people began to know, claim, and pofiefs their
u liberties, in bejng governed by a fucceflion of
" their fupreme officers and aifemblies, then it
" was, and never till then, that they laid the

" foundation^

352 The right Conftltuilon of a

" foundation, and built the ftruclure, of that
4e wondrous empire that overihadowed the whole
" world.''

In fupport of all this, no doubt, will be cited
the fpiendid authority of Salluft. " Nam regibus,
" boni quam mali, fufpectiores funt, femperque
" his aliena virtus formidolofa eft. Sed civitas,
" incredibile memoratu eft, adepta libertate, quam
" brevi creverit ; tanta cupido glorias incefferat.
" Jam primum juventus fimul laboris ac belli
" patrius orat, in caftris per ufum militiam difce-
<c bat ; magifque in decoris armis et militaribus
" equis, quam in fcortis atque conviviis lubidi-
" nem habebat." — The condition and happinefs
of Rome under their kings, till the time of Tar-
quin, have been before related. It has been
Ihewn, that the introduction of laws and forma-
tion of the manners of a barbarous rabble, afiem-
bied from ail nations, engaged the attention both
of the kings ^ind the fenate during this period.
Their wars have been enumerated, and it has been
fhewn that the nation was not in a condition to
ftruggle with its hoftile neighbours, nor to con-
tend among themfelves. It has been fhewn that,
in proportion as they became eafy and fafe, the
nobles began to envy the kings, and to form con-
tinual confpiracies againft their authority, thrones,
and lives, until it became a queftion only whe-
ther monarchy or ariftocracy mould be abolifhed.
In this manner kings were neceffitated either to
give up all their authority into the hands of an
haughty and afpiring fenate, or affert a more de-
cifiVe and arbitrary power than the conftitution
allowed them. In the conteft the nobles pre-
vailed, and in the wars with Tarquin and his fuc-
ceflbrs, and their allies, foldiers and officers were
formed, who became capable and defirous of con-

queft

Commonwealth , examined. 353

queft and glory. Salluft himfelf confefies this
in the former chapter : " Poft, ubi regium impe-
" rium, quod initio c&nfervandte liber tat is, atque
" augenda reipublica fuerat, in fuperbiam, domi-
" nationem que convertit ; immutato more, an-
" nua imperia, binofque imperatores, fibi fecere."
In addition to this it mould be remembered, that
Salluft was an ariftocratical hiftorian, and attached
to the fovereignty in the fenate, or at lead defirous
of appearing fo in his hiftory, and an enemy to
the government of a fingle perfon, of which the
republic was at that time in the near profped: and
the utmoft danger. The queftion, in the mind of
this writer, was not between an ariftocracy and a
mixed fovereignty, but between ariftocracy and
fimple monarchy, or the empire of one : yet all
that can be inferred from the faft, as dated by
our author and by Salluft, is, that ariftocracy at firft
is better calculated for conqueft than fimple mo-
narchy. It by no means follows, that ariftocracy is
more friendly to liberty or commerce, the two
bleflings now moft efteemed by mankind, than
even fimple monarchy. But the moft exception-
able fentiment of all is this, " When the people
•" began to pofiefs their liberties, in being govern-
" ed by a fucceffion of their fupreme officers and
" aflemblies, then they laid the foundation of em-
" pire, and built the ftru&ure." By this one
would think that the Romans were governed by a
fingle reprefentative affembly, periodically chofen,
which is our author's idea of a perfect common-
wealth : whereas nothing can be further from the
truth. There is fcarcely any conftitution farther
removed from a fimple democracy, or a reprefen-
tative democracy, than the Roman. As has been
before obferved, from Romulus to Caefar, arifto-
VOL. III. Z z cracy

354 The right C on/lit ution of a

cracy was the predominant feature of the fov<r-
reignty. The maxim of monarchical power in
the kings and confuls, and the mixture of demo-
cratical power in the tribunes aud popular aflem-
blies, though unequal to the ariftocratical ingre-
dient, were checks to it, and ilrong ftimulants to
exertions, though not complete balances : but
the periods of greateft liberty, virtue, glory, and
profperity, were thofe in which the mixture of
all three was neareft equality. Our author's argu-
ment and example are clear and flrong in favour
of the triple combination, and decifive againft
the democracy he contends for. — " In thofe days
" the world abounded with, free flates more
" than any other form, as well over Italy, Gal-
" lia, Spain, and Africa." It may be quef-
tioned whether there was then in the world one
free ft^te, according to our author's definition of
it : all that were called free ftates in thofe days,
were either ariftocracies, oligarchies, or mixtures
of monarchy and ariftocracy, of ariftocracy and
democracy, or of monarchy, ariftocracy, and demo-
cracy ; but not one do we read of which was
governed by a democracy fimple, or by reprefenta-
tion. The Achaian league, and others like it,
were confederated cities, each city being indepen-
dent, and itfelf a mixed^ government.

Carthage is the next example : and an excel-
lent one it is to prove that a mixed government,
in which the people have a mare, gives them
magnanimity, courage, and activity ; but proves
nothing to our author's purpofe. The fuffetes, the
fenate, and the people, the monarchical, ariftocrati-
cal, and democratical powers, nicely balanced, as
Ariftotle fays, were the conftitution of Carthage,
and fecured its liberty and profperity : but when
the balance was weakened, and began to incline to

a dominatio

Commonwealth, examined. 355

a dominatio plebis, the precife form of govern^-
ment our author contends for, they haftened to
ruin. The next examples quoted by our author
are the Swifs ; another example which proves
nothing for him, and much againft him. All the
cantons of any extent, numbers, or wealth, are
ariftocratical ; or mixed : the little fpots, that are
called democratical, are more or lefs mixtures.
The Hollanders, his lad example, had no de-
mocratical mixture in their conftitution ; entirely
ariftocratical ; and preferved from tyranny and
deftrudion, partly by a ftadtholder, partly by the
people in mobs, but more efpecially by the num-
ber of independent cities and fovereignties aflb-
ciated together, and the great multitude of per-
fons concerned in the government and compofing
the fovereignty, four or five thoufand ; and,
finally, by the unanimity that is required in all
tranfa£tions. Thus every one of thefe examples,
ancient and modern, are a clear demonftration
againft our author's fyftem, inftead of being an
argument for it. There is not even a colour in
his favour in the democratical cantons of Swit-
zerland, narrow fpots or barren mountains, where
the people live on milk ; nor in St. Marino or
Ragufa : no precedents, furely, for England or
American ftates, where the people are numerous
and rich, the territory capacious, and commerce
extenfive.

Freedom produces magnanimity and courage ;
but there is no freedom nor juflice in a fimple
democracy for any but the majority : the ruling
party, no doubt, wHl be a&ive and bold ; but the
ruled will be difcouraged, brow-beaten, and infult-
ed, without a poffibility of redrefs but by civil war.
It is a mixed government then, well balanced, that
makes all the nation of a noble temper. Our

author

The right Conftitutlon of a

author confefles, " We feel a lofs of courage and
" magnanimty follow the lofs of freedom ;" — and it
is very true. This lofs is no where fo keenly felt,
as when we are enflaved by thofe whom the con-
ftitution makes our equals : this is the cafe of the
minority always in a fimple democracy.

The eleventh reafon is, " becaufe no deter-
u minations being carried but by confent of the
" people, therefore they muft needs remain fecure
" out of the reach of tyranny, and free from the
" arbitrary difpofition of any commanding pow-
" er." — No determinations are carried, it is true,in
a fimple or reprefentative democracy, but by con-
fent of the majority of the people, or their repre-
fentatives. If our author had required unanimity
in every vote, refolve., and law, in that cafe no
determination could be carried but by confent of
the people ; but no good government was ever
yet founded upon the principal of unanimity ; and
it need not be attempted to be proved that none
fuch ever can exift. If the majority, then, mud
govern, and confequently often near half, and al-
nioft always a party, mud be governed againfl
their confent, it is the majority only who will re-
main fecure out of the reach of tyranny, and free
from the arbitrary difpofition of one commanding
power : the minority, on the contrary, will be
conftantly within the reach of tyranny, and under
the arbitrary difpofition of the commanding power
of the majority. Nor do the minority, under
fuch a government, " know what laws they are
«' to obey, or what penalties they are to undergo,
" in cafe of tranfgreflion ; nor have they any mare
<e or intereft in making of laws, with the penalties
" annexed ; nor do they become the more inex-
"cufableif they offend :" nor ought they " the

" more

Commonwealth , examined.

willingly to fubmit to punifhment, when
u they fuffer for any offence," for the minority have
no laws but what the majority pleafe to give,
any more than " when the government is managed
" in the hands of a particular perfon," or " con-
" tinued in the hands of a certain number of great
" men :" nor do the minority " know how to
" walk by thofe laws" of the majority, or how to
underftand them, " becaufe the fenfe is oftentimes
" left at uncertainty ; and it will be reckoned a
" great myftery of (late, in fuch a form of govern-
" ment, that no laws (hall be of any fenfe or force,
" but as the great ones" among the majority
" pleafe to expound them ;" fo as " the people
'* of the minority" will be " left, as it were,
u without law, becaufe they bear no other con-
" ftrudion and meaning but what fuits with the
" interefts and fancies of particular men" in the
majority ; " not with right reafon, or the public
" liberty." To be convinced of this, we mould
recollect that the majority have the appointment
of the judges, who will be generally the great
leaders in the houfe, or their friends and parti-
fans, and even great exertions will be made to
pack juries ; but without packing, the probability
is, that a majority at leaft of the juries will be of
the ruling party in the nation, and its fovereign
afiembly. We may go farther, and fay, that as
the paflions and interefts of the majority have no
check, they will frequently make ex pod fa&o
laws ; laws with a retrofpecl, to take in cafes
which, at the time, were not forefeen, for the
mortification of the minority, and the fupport and
encouragement of their adverfaries. The judges
will not be lefs u reputed the oracles of the law'*
under fuch a government, than under kings or
Handing fenates 5 and the " power of creating

" judges"

358 The right Conftitution of a

"judges" will not indeed be " ufurped," but will
be legally and conftitutionally in the hands of the
majority, or rather of their leader or leaders,
"who will never have a care to create fuch as will
" make the law fpeak in favour of them upon any
" occafion." Thefe principes populi may fay, with
as much arrogance and as much truth as it was
ever faid by Charles or James, " As long as we
" have the power of making what judges and
" bifhops we pleafe, we are fure to have no law
nor gofpel but what fhall pleafe us."

The example of Henry the Seventh and Hen-
ry the Eighth, thofe of James and Charles, are
no doubt pertinent to prove, that " the ufurpa-
" tion of a prerogative of expounding the laws
" after their own pleafure, made them rather fnares
" than inftruments of relief, like a grand catch-
" pole, to pill, poll, and geld the purfes of the
" people ; to deprive many gallant men of their
u lives and fortunes." But if we had the hiftory
of any fimple democracy, or democracy by fimple
reprefentation, fuch as our author contends for, we
mould find that fuch a prerogative was ufurped by
the majority and their chiefs, and applied to as
bad purpofes. But the truth is, no fuch govern-
ment, that we know of, ever exiited. The uni-
verfal fenfe of mankind has deemed it fo deftruc-
tive or impracticable, that no nation has ventured
on it. The Italian republics of the middle age
approach the neareft to it : their hiftory is an an-
fwer. But if we confider thofe pamons in human
nature which caufe defpots, oligarchies, and
(landing fenates, to make fuch an abufe of power,
we muft fee that the fame paffions will ever exift
in the majority and their leaders in a democracy,
and produce the fame fatal effe&s. It is really
aftoniming, that the inftitution of Lycurgus fhould

be

Commonwealth^ examined. 359

be adduced as a precedent in favour of our au-
thor's project of the right conftitution of a com*
monwealth — there is fcarcely a form of govern-
ment in the world more eflentially different from,
it, in all its parts. It is very true that the pro-
vifion made by that Jegiflator for an equality of
laws, rights, duties, and burthens, among all the
citizens, however imperfect it was, however infe-
rior to the provifion in the Englifh and American
conflitutions, was^the principal commendation of
his plan ; but inflead of giving all power to the
people or their reprefentatives, he gave the real
fovereignty to his ftanding fenate. Our author
himfelf is fo fenfible of this, that he allows the
<c Lacedemonian commonwealth to be cut out
" after the grandee fafhion," — " confirming the
" fupremacy within the walls of the fenate." — .
" The fenate was in fome meafure reftrained by
** laws, walking in the fame even pace of fub-
** jection with the people ; having few offices of
*' dignity ot profit which might make them fwell
" with ftate and ambition ; but were prefcribed
**- alfo the fame rules of frugality, plainnefs, and
** moderation, as were the common people ; by
" which means immoderate lufts and defires be-
<l ing prevented in the great ones, they were the
" lefs inclined to pride and oppreflion ; and no
" great profit or pleafure being to be gotten by
" authority, very few defired it ; and fuch as were
" in it fat free from envy, by which means they
" avoided that odium and emulation which ufed
*6 to rage betwixt the great ones and the people
*' in that form of government." But how was
this done ? by collecting all authority into one cen-
tre ? No ; but by prohibiting travel and commu-
nication with ftrangers, which no people on earth
are ncrw barbarous and ftupid enough to bear ; by

prohibiting

3#o The right Conftitution of a

prohibiting commerce, which no people who have
fenfe and feeling will now renounce \ and by pro-
hibiting money, which all people now defire, and
which makes the effential inftrument for guiding
the world. But all this would not have fucceeded,
if his conftitution had been only one popular af-
fembly. This was effected by reciprocal checks,
and a real balance, approaching nearly to an ab-
folute controul of the fenate, by a marriage be-
tween the king and people. * The king, fo far
from being a cypher, had great authority ; he was
the (landing and hereditary head of the common-
wealth, and this alone muft give him a dominion
over the hearts and understandings, both of fenate
and people, that muft have amounted to a great
authority. Our author is generally fo fenfible of
the influence gained over high and low by (land-
ing authority, that it is wonderful he mould for-
get it in this cafe. He was, befides, always com-
mander in chief of the armies, and generally led
in perfon ; and this, in all governments, gives a
general, an influence bordering on royal fuprema-
ey. But befides, there were two aflemblies of the
people, one for the city, and one for the country,
and thofe popular reprefentatives, the Ephori.
But the indiffoluble bond that united the king
and people for ever, was the oath taken by the
kings and Ephori every month ; the former never
to violate the privileges of the people, and the
latter for ever to be loyal to the kings, the de-
fcendants of Hercules. This was not equivalent
to an abfolute negative in the king and the people
both, upon the laws of the fenate, but it amount-
ed to one complete negative upon the fenate ; Be-
caufe the kings and people were both fworn to
oppofe all encroachments of the fenate ; and if
thefe had made unequal laws, and fcrambled for

more

••••*•• - <

Commonwealth, examined. 361

more power, the people would have inftantly taken
arms, under the command of their Ephori and
their kings, againil thefenate. This balance, thvS*
mixture, was the real caufe of that equality which
was preferved in Sparta. But if all authority had
been in the popular aflemblies, without kings or
fenate, the right conftitution of a commonwealth
which our author is an advocate for, that equality
could not have exifted twenty years ; a majority
would neceflarily have rifen up to carry all before
them, and to deprefs the minority more and more,
until the firft man among the majority would
have been king, his principal fupporters nobles,
and the reft not only plebeians, but ilaves.

The queftion between us and our author, is not
whether the people mail be excluded from all in-
tereft in government or not. In this point we
are perfectly agreed, viz. that there can be no con-
ftitutional liberty, no free ftate, no right confti-
tution of a commonwealth, where the people are
excluded from the government ; where, indeed,
the people have not an independent equal mare
with the two other orders of the ftate, and an ab-
folute controul over all laws and grants of money.
We agree therefore in his next example, the com-
monwealth of Venice, " where the people are ex-
" eluded from all intereft in government ; where
." the power of making and executing of laws,
" and bearing offices, with all other immunities,
" lies only in the hands of a (landing fenate, and
" their kindred, which they call the patrician or
•" noble order." Their duke is indeed reftrained ;
but far from being " made juft fuch another of-
'" ficer as the Lacedemonian kings," he is re-
duced in dignity and authority much below them,
" differing from the reft of the fenate only in a
>*<< corner of his cap, befides a Httk outward cere-
III. 7 A " mony

362 The right Conftitut'um of <f

" mony and fplendor." — " The fenators them-
" felves have, indeed, liberty at random arbitra-
^ rily to ramble, and do what they pleafe with
"• the people, who, excepting the city itfelf, are fo
" extremely opprelfed in ail their territories, liv-
" ing by no law but the arbitrary dictates of the
" fenate, that it feems rather a junto than a com-
" monwealth ;" — " and the fubjech take fo little
" content in it, that feeing more to be enjoyed
<c under the Turk, they that are his borderers take
" all opportunities to revolt, and fubmit rather to
" the mercy of a Pagan tyranny ; which difpo-
" fition if you confider, together with the little
"courage of their fubje&s, by reafon they prefa
" them fo hard, and how that they are forced for
*6 this caufe to rely upon foreign mercenaries ia
" all warlike expeditions, you might wonder how
" this ftate hath held up fo long, but that we
** know the intereft of Chriflendom being con-
<l( cerned in her fecurity, (he hath been chiefly
<c fupported by the fupplies and arms of others."
All this is readily allowed. We concur alfo mod
fmcerely in our author's conclufion, in part, viz,
" That'fmce kings, and all (landing powers, are
" fo inclined to aft according to their own wills
" and interefts in making, expounding, and exe-
" cuting of laws, to the prejudice of the people's
" liberty and fecurity, that no laws whatfoever
" fhould be made but by the people's confent,
" as the only tneans to prevent arbitrarinefs."
But we mud carry the conclufion farther, viz.
that fmce all men are fo inclined to aft accord-
ing to their own wills and interefts, in making,
expounding, and executing laws, to the prejudice
of the people's liberty and fecurity, the fovereign
authority, the legiHative, executive, and judicial
power, can never be fafely lodged in one affembly,

though

Commonwealth, examined, 363

though chofen annually by the people ; becaufe
the majority and their leaders, the principes po-
puli, will as certainly opprefs the minority, and
make, expound, and execute laws for their own
wealth, power, grandeur and glory, to the pre-
judice of the liberty and fecurity of the minority,
as hereditary kings or (landing fenates. The con-
clufion, therefore, that the peopte, in a fucceffion of
their fupreme fmgle afiemblies, are the bed keep-
ers of their liberties, mud be wholly reprobated.

The twelfth reafon is, " becaufe this form is
a mod fuitable to the nature and reafon of m.an-
" kind." — If Socrates and Plato, Cicero and Sene-
ca, Hutchinfon and Butler, are to be credited, rea-
fon is rightfully fupreme in man, and therefore it
would be mod fuitable to the reafon of mankind to
have no civil or political government at all. The
moral government of God,and his vicegerent Con-
fcience, ought to be fufficient to redrain men to
obedience, tojudice and benevolence, at all times
and in all places ; we mud therefore defcend from
the dignity of our nature, when we think of civil
government at all. But the nature of mankind is
one thing, and the reafon of mankind another ;
and the firft has the fame relation to the lad as
the whole to a part : the paflions and appetites are
parts of human nature,as well as, reafon and the mo-
ral fenfe. In the inditution of government, it mud
be remembered, that although reafon ought al-
ways to govern individuals, it certainly never did
fince the Fall, and never will till the Millennium ;
and human nature muft be taken as it is, as it has
been, and will be. If, as Cicero fays, cc man
<c is a noble creature, born with affections to rule
" rather than obey, there being in every man a na^
*l tural defire of principality," it is yet certain

that

364 The right Cenftituttin of a

that every man ought to obey as well as to rule,
«f%E/v x*< a?xtM, and that every man cannot
rule alone. Each man mud be content with his
fhare of empire ; and if the nature and reafon of
mankind, the nobleneis of his qualities and af-
fections, and his natural defires, prove his right to
a fnare in the government, they cannot furely
prove more than the conftitutions of the United
States have allowed, an annual election of the
whole legillative and executive, the governor, fe-
nate, and houfe. If we admit them to prove
more, they would prov? that every man has every
year a right to be governor, fenator, and repre-
fentative ; which being impoflible, is abfurd. Even
in our author's " Right conftitution," every man
would have an equal right to be reprefentative,
chofen or not. The reafon why one man is con-
tent to fubmit to the government of another, as
afligned by our author, viz. " not becaufe he con-
" ceives himfelf to have lefs right than another,
ic to govern, but either becaufe he finds himfelf
u lefs able, or elfe becaufe he judgeth it will be
<c more convenient for himfelf and the commu-
" nity if he fubmits to another's government/' is
a proof of this; becaufe the moment it is al-
lowed that fome are more able than others, and
that the community are judges who the moft able
are, you take away the right to rule, derived
from the noblenefs of each man's individual na-
ture, from his affections to rule rather than obey,
or from his natural 'appetite or defire of princi-
pality, and give the right of conferring the power
to rule to the community. As a fhare in the ap-
pointment of deputies is all that our author can
with any colour infer from this noble nature of
man, his nature will be gratified and his dignity
fupported as well, if you divide his deputies into

three

Commonwealth, examined. 365

three orders, of governor for the executive, and
an integral fhare in the legiflative, of fenators for
another independent part of the legiilative, and
of reprefentatives for. a third, and if you intro-
duce a judicious balance between them, as if
you huddle them into one affembly, where they
will foon difgrace their own nature, and that of
their confticuents, by ambition, avarice, jealoufy,
envy, faction, divifion, fedition, and rebellion.
Nay, if it mould be found that annual elections
of governors and fenators cannot be fupported
without introducing venality and convulfions, as
is very poffible, the people will confult the dig-
nity of their nature better by appointing a (land-
ing executive and fenate, than by infifting on
elections, or at leaft by prolonging the duration
of thofe high trufts, and making elections lefs
frequent.

It is indeed a c.c moft excellent maxim, that the
" original and fountain of all juft power and go-
" vernment is in the people ;" and if ever this
maxim was fully demonftrated and exemplified
among men, it was in the late American revolu-
tion, where thirteen governments were taken down
from the foundation, and new ones elected wholly
by the people, as an architect would pull down
an old building and erect a new one. There will
be no difpute then with Cicero, when he fays, " A
" mind well inftructed by the light of nature, will
" pay obedience," willingly, " to none but fuch as
" command, direct, or govern, for its good or
" benefit ; nor will our author's inferences from
thefe paffages of that oracle of human wifdombe
denied: i. That by the light of nature people
are taught tc> be their own carvers and contrivers
in the framing of that government under which
they mean to live ; 2. That none are to prefide

in

3 66 The right Conjlitution of a

in government, or fit at the helm, but fuch as
fliall be judged fit, and chofen by the people ;
3. That the people are the only proper judges of
the convenience or inconvenience of a govern-
ment when it is erected, and of the behaviour of
governors after they are chofen. — But then it is
infifted, that rational and regular means mail be
ufed that the whole people may be their own
carvers, that they may judge and choofe who
(hall prefide, and that they may determine on the
convenience or inconvenience of government, and
the behaviour of governors. But then it is in-
fifted, that the town of Berwick upon Tweed
fliall not carve, judge, choofe, and determine for
the whole kingdom of Great Britain, nor the
county of Berkshire for the Maflachufetts ; much
lefs th :t a lawlefs tyrannical rabble mall do all
this for the date, or even for the county of Berk-
fhire. *./..

It may be, and is admitted, that a free govern-
ment is mofl natural, and only fuitable to the
reafon of mankind ; but it by no means follows
cc that the other forms, as a (landing power in the
<c hands of a particular perfonj as a king, or of
" a fet number pf great ones, as in a fenate," much
lefs that a mixture of the three fimple forms
<c are befide th^ dictates of nature, and mere
" artificial devicis of great men, fquared only to
cc ferve the ends and interests of avarice, pride,
** and ambition of a few, to a valTallizing of the
** community.'' — If the original and fountain of
all power and government is in the people, as un-
doubtedly it is, the people have as clear a right
to ere& a fimple monarchy, ariftocracy, or demo-
cracy, or an equal mixture, or any other mixture
of all three, if they judge it for their liberty,
happinefs, and profperity, as they have to erecl: a

democracy j

Commonwealth, examined. 367

democracy ; and infinitely greater and better men
than Marchamont Nedham, and the wifeft nations
that ever lived, have preferred fuch mixtures, and
even with fuch (landing powers, as ingredients in
their compofitions. But even thofe nations who
choofe to referve in their own hands the period^
cal choice of the firft magiflrate, fenate, and af-
fembly, at certain ftated periods, have as clear a
right to appoint a firft magiftrate for life as for
years, and for perpetuity in his defcendants as
for life. When I fay for perpetuity, or for life,
it is always meant to imply, that the fame people
have at all times a right to interpofe, and to de-
pofe for mal-adminiftration — to appoint anew.
No appointment of a king or fenate, or any {land-
ing power, can be, in the nature of things, fora
longer period than quam diu fe bene geflerit, the
whole nation being judge. An appointment for
life, or perpetuity, can be no more than an ap-
pointment until furtherorder ; but further order
can only be given by the nation : and until the
nation mall have given the order, an eftate for
life, or in fee, is held in the office. It mufl be
a great occafion which can induce a nation to
take fuch a fubjeft into confideration and make a
change. Until a change is made, an hereditary
limited monarch is the representative of the whole
nation, for the management of the executive
power, as much as an houfe of reprefentatives is,
as one branch of the legiflature, and as guardian
of the public purfe ; and a houfe of lords too, or
a' (landing fenate, reprefents the nation for other
purpofes, viz. as a watch fet upon both the re-
prefentatives and the executive power. The peo-
ple are the fountain and original of the power of
kings and lords, governors and fenates, as well
as the houfe of commons, or aflembly of repre-
fentatives :

368 The right Conjlitution of a

fentatives : and if the people are fufficiently en-
lightened to fee all the dangers that furround
them, they will always be reprefented by a diftinft
perfonage to manage the whole executive power ;
— a diftindl fenate, to be guardians of property
againft: levellers for the purpofes of plunder, to
be a repofitoryof the national tradition of public
maxims, cuftoms, and manners, and to be con-
troulers in turn both of kings and their minifters
on one fide, and the reprefentatives of the people
on the other, when either difcover a'difpofition to
do wrong; — and a diftincl houfe of reprefentatives,
to be the guardians of the public purfe, and to
protect the people in their turn againft both kings
and nobles. A fcience certainly comprehends all
the principles in nature which belong to the fub-
je6l. The principles in nature which relate to
government cannot all be known, without a know-
ledge of the hiftory of mankind. The Englifh
conftitution is the only one which has confidered
and provided for all cafes that are known to have
generally, indeed to have always happened in the
progrefs of every nation ; it is, therefore, the only
fcientifical government. To fay then that (land-
ing powers have been erected, as mere artificial
devices of great men, to ferve the ends of avarice,
pride, and ambition of a few, to the vaflfallizing of
the community, is to declaim and abufe. Stand-
ing powers have been inftituted to avoid greater
evils, corruption, fedition, war, and bloodfhed, in
elections ; it is the people's bufmefs, therefore, to
find out fome method of avoiding them, without
ftanding powers. The Americans flatter them-
felves they have hit upon it : and no doubt they
have for a time, perhaps a long one : but this
remains to be proved by experience.

Our

Commonwealth , examined. 369

|!ff> Our author proceeds : " A confent and free
<e election of the people, which is the mod na-
" tural way and form of governing, hath no real
" effect in the other forms ; but is either fup-
" planted by craft and cuflom, or fwallowed up
" by a pernicious pretence of right, in one or
ce many, to govern only by virtue of an heredi-
" tary fucceffion." — If the people are fo unen-
ligtened, and fo corrupt, that they cannot manage
one third part of a legislature and their own purfes
by their reprefentatives, how much worfe would
it be if they had the whole, and all the executive
and judicial powers, to manage ? But the affertion
is not true. The confent and free election of the
people has a great and decided effect in the
Englifh conftitution, and would have had much
more if it had been more equal : but if the prefent
inequalities cannot be altered, nor a vote obtained
to alter them in the houfe of commons, nor any
general application of the people to have them
altered, what would be the effect of the whole
executive and'judicial powers, were they in the
hands of the houfe ? The leading members would
employ both thefe refources, not only to prevent
the reprefentation from being rendered more
equal, but to make it ftill more unequal. Our
author, alluding to the times of Charles and
James, had fome colour for reprefenting the
power of the commons as of little effect ; but he
faw that an attempt, or fufpicion of one, to grafp
all power into the hands of the crown, had proved
the deftruction both of king and lords j this,
furely, was a real and great effect. If nations
will entangle their conftitutions with fpirituai
lords, and elective lords, and with decayed bo-
roughs, how can it be avoided ? But would not
the nation fend bifhops and elective lords into a
VOL. III. 3 B fingle

370 The right Conftitittion of a

fmgle houfe as their deputies ? and would not the
utmoft artifices of bigotry, fuperftition, and en-
thufiafm, be fet at work among the people, as well
as bribery and corruption at elections ? If the peo-
ple cannot be fufficiently enlightened, by education
and the prefs, to defpife and refent, as infults and
impofitions on human nature, all pretences of
right drawn from uninterrupted fucceflions or di-
vine miffions, they will be duped by them in one
afiembly more than in three. . Our author has n;o
more right to call his project " the people's form/*
any more than Montefquieu, Blackftone, and De
Lolme, have to call their admired fyftem by that
endearing appellation : both are the people's
form, if the people adopt, choofe, and prefer
them ; and neither, if they do not. The people
have liberty to make ufe of that reafon and un-
derftanding God hath given them, in choof-
ing governors, and providing for their fafety in
government, where they annually choofe all ;
nay, they have even where the king and fenate
are hereditary, as long as they have the choice
of an eflfential branch, no law can be made, no
money rai fed, not one ftep can be taken, without
their concurrence ; nay, there is no one aft can
.be done by the tninifters of the executive, but
the people, by their reprefentatives, can enquire
into, and profecute to judgment and to punifh-
rnent if it is wrong. Our author will not con-
fider the cafe of a- mixed government ; all govern-
ments muft be fimple with him ; the people muft
exercife all power, or none. He had his reafons
for this artifice at that time, which do not exift at
this : His reafons, however, were not fufficient ;
and if the nation had been dealt with more can-
didly, openly, and boldly, by him, and Milton,
and others, a better fettlement might have been

obtained.

Commonwealth , examined* 371

obtained. But it is plain that Milton, Nedham,
and even Harrington, wrote in (hackles ; but had
Nedham and Milton underftood the fcience of
government as vpell as Harrington, Charles had
never been reftored. Our author, inftead of con-
fidering the projedt of two aflemblies, as Harring-
ton did, flies from the idea, and will allow no
mixtures.

*c In the other forms of a (landing power, all
" authority being entailed on certain peribns and
<s families, in a courfe of inheritance, men are
" deprived of the ufe of their reafon about choice
" of governors." In mixed governments, even
fuch as Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage, imper-
fect as thofe mixtures were, our author very well
knew, that although fome authority was entailed,
all was not. In America none at all is entailed,
or held for more than a term of years : their
courfe, therefore, is not " deftru&ive to the rea-
u fon, common intereft, and majefty of that noble
" creature called man," and has avoided " that
cc mod irrational and brutifh principle, fit only to
" be hifled out of the world, which has transform-
" ed men into beads, and mortified mankind with
" mifery through all generations."

This violent declamation, however, does not
remove the danger of venality, faction, feditioii,
and civil war, in the choice of governors and fena-
tors, principles .more brutifli and irrational, more
fit to be hifled out of the world, than hereditary
kings and fenates — evils, indeed, if you will, but
the lead of the two. Hereditary fenators, it is
certain, have not been the advocates, abettors, or
ele&ors, in general, of abfolute monarchies ; no
fuch government ever was, or will be, ere&ed or
fupported but againft their wills. It is the peo-
ple, who, wearied and irritated with the felicita-
tions,

372 The right C on/lit ution of a

tions, bribes, intrigues, and tyranny of the nobles,
and their eternal fquabbles with kings, have al-
ways fet up monarchy, and fortified it with an
army. Our author proceeds to fearch for exam-
ples all over the world ; and fixes firft upon mo-
narchy, abfolute hereditary monarchy : but as
Americans have no thoughts of introducing this
form of government, it is none of their concern to
vindicate the honour of fuch kings or kingdoms.
Two quarters of the globe, Afia and Africa, are
governed wholly by defpotifms. There are in Eu-
rope near two hundred fimple monarchs, and in
the courfe of the two laft centuries, allowing 20
years to each reign, two thoufand abfolute prin-
ces*. If thefe have been generally of fuch a
character as our author defcribes, what are we to
think of the pride and dignity of that rational,
noble animal, man, who has fubmitted fo quietly
to their tyranny. Mr. Hume thinks more fa-
vourably of them ; and he has the judgment of
the fpecies in his favour. The fpecies, not hav-
ing yet attended to the balance and tried its vir-
tues, have almoft univerfally determined monar-
chy preferable to ariftocracy ; or mixtures of mo-
narchy and ariftocracy ; becaufe they find the peo-
ple have more liberty under the firft than under
the two laft. They may poflibly one day try the
experiment of mixtures and balances : when they
do, a greater improvement in fociety will take
.place thaa ever yet has happened. Nations too
have tried the experiment of elective monarchies,
in Bohemia, Poland, Hungary. Sweden, &c.
inftances which our author adduces : but after
long miferies, wars, and carnage, they have al-
ways deter mined chance to be better than choice,

* Hume's Eflays, vol. i. p. 98.

and

Commonwealth, examined. 373

and hereditary princes preferable to elective ones.
Thefe elections, it is true, have been made by
nobles, and by very inadequate methods of col-
lecting the votes ot the people; and when elected,
there has been no good balance between them and
the nobles, nor between the nobles and the people.
The Americans have hoped that thefe circumftances
might be arranged fo as to juftify one more expe-
riment of elective executives, as well as fenates
and reprefentatives. They have not adopted our
author's idea, that if.any kingly form be tolerable,
it muft be that which is by election, chofen by
the people's reprefentatives. They were well
aware, that <c prefent greatnefs would give their
<c governors an opportunity to practife Heights,
" fuch (leights, that in a Ihort time the govern-
" ment?that they received only for theirown lives,
" will become entailed upon their families ;
" whereby the election will be made of no effect
*6 further than for fafhion, to mock the poor peo-
" pie, and adorn the triumphs of an afpiring
" tyranny." An hereditary firft magiftrate at once
would, perhaps, be preferable to elections by legif-
lative reprefentatives : it is impoflible to fay, until
it is fairly tried, whether it would not be better than
annual elections by the people ; or whether elec-
tions for more years, or for life, would not be
better dill.

Our author concludes by a very curious defini-
tion of the people : " To take off all mifconftruc-
" tions, when we mention the people, obferve all
e; along, that we do not mean the confufed pro-
<c mifcuous body of the people,- nor any part of
" the people who have forfeited their rights by
" delinquency, neutrality, or apoftacy, &c. in re-
** lation to the divided (late of any nation ; for
" they are not to be reckoned within the lifts of

"the

374 Vbe right Conftitution of 4

" the people." This wife precaution to exclude
all royalifts, prelatifts, and malignants, accord-
ing to the flyle of thofe times, was very fagacious :
and all majorities will ever be equally penetrating
in fuch a Right Conftitution of a commonwealth
as our author contends for — the minority will fel-
dom be accounted people.

The thirteenth reafon is " becaufe in free dates
*c there are fewer opportunities of oppreffion and
'* tyranny than in other forrr\s."

This is very true, and moft cordially admitted ;
but then the queftion occurs, what is a free (late ?
In the ariftocracy of Venice and Poland there are
opportunities of oppreflion and tyranny : and al-
though our author's Right Conftitution of a Com-
monwealth has never been tried, the unanimous
determination of all nations having been againft
it, and almoft the univerfal voice of individuals ;
yet the inftantaneous effects of it upon human
nature are fo obvious, that it is eafy to forefee it
would afford more opportunities for tyranny and
oppreffion, and would multiply fuch opportuni-
ties more than ariftocracy or even monarchy ; be-
caufe the leaders of the majority in the houfe
would be fupported and ftimulated by their par-
ties continually to tyrannize and opprefs the
minority. The reafon given by our author in
fupport of his pofition is directly againft it : " It
" is ever the cafe of free commonwealths to pre-
'* ferve not an equality, which were irrational and
" odious, but an equability of condition among
" all the members." Equality, it feems, was not
his favourite : this would not do in England, to
be fure, any more than America. What his dif-
tin&ion is between equality and equability is not
known : he defines it, " that no man be permit-

" ted

Commonwealth, examined. 375

c* ted to grow over great in power." But how
much is over great ? this is reduced to no (land-
ard. " Nor any rank above the ordinary ftandard."
What is this ? Excellencies, honourables, gentle-
men, yeomen, and labourers, are really as diftindt
ranks, and confer as different degrees of confidera-
tion, refpeft, and influence, among a people who
have no other diftin&ions, as dukes, marquifies,
earls, and barons, in nations that have adopted
thefe titles, and the higher are as eagerly coveted
by the lower. But at Tail the fecret comes out —
" to aflume the flate and title of nobility." The
houfe of lords had been voted ufelefs, and it was
our author's fyftem" to keep it down ; without
confidering that the thing would ilill exift, call it
by what name you will.

" Preferving the equability fecures the peo-
** pie's liberty from the reach of their own officers,
" in camp or council." But no people ever yet
were provident enough to preferve either equality
or equability. Their eternal fault is too much
gratitude to thofe who ftudy their humours, flatter
their pailions, and become their favourites. They
never know any bounds in their praifes, honours,
or rewards, to thofe who poflefs their confidence,
and have excited their enthufiafm. The reputa-
tion of their idol becomes as complete a tyranny
as can be ereded among men : it is a crime that
is not to be born, to fpeak a word, to betray a
look, in oppofition to him ; nay, not to pro-
nounce their moil inflamed hyperboles in his
praife, with as ardent a tone as theirs, is envy, dif-
affection, ambition. u Down with him ! the Tar-
ic peian rock !" as foon as Manlius dares to think a
little higher of his own fervices, and a little lower
of Camillus, than the fafhion. Ariftocracies are
anxious and eager to prevent any one of the no-

" "Kqr

";T'V
rrV'<. •-^1 <J

376 The right Conftitution of a

bility from overtopping the reft; monarchies are
jealous of any very great near the throne ; but an
unmixed, unbalanced people, are never fatisfied
till they make their idol a tyrant. An equal mix-
ture of monarchy, ariflocracy, and democracy, is
the only free government which has been able to
manage the greatefl heroes and ftatefmen, the
greatefl individuals and families, or combination
of them, fo as to keep them always obedient to
the laws. A Marlborough, a Pulteney, or a Pitt,
are here harmlefs beings : but in Rome a Marl-
borough would have been worfe than Marius,
Sylla, or Casfar ; in Athens, worfe than Themif-
tocles, Pericles, or Alcibiades, becaufe, with all
their ambition, he had more avarice, and lefs
fenfe.

" Not allowing any rank above the common
" ftandard fecures the people from the preflures
" and ambition of fuch petty tyrants as would
"• ufurp and claim a prerogative, power, and
" greatnefs, above others, by birth and inheri-
cc tance." Thefe expreflions have all the keen-
nefs and bitternefs of party rancour ; and although
they were, at that time, no doubt, mufic to his
friends, and death to his enemies, they are fo dif-
ficult to avoid in fuch times, that on the one
hand candid philofophy will extenuate their fero-
city, but on the other political wifdom will for
ever be on its guard againft their feductions. —
" Thefe," that is a nobility, " are a fort of men
" not to be endured in any well-ordered common-
" wealth." If thefe words are true, no well-or-
dered commonwealth ever exifted ; for we read of
none without a nobility, no, not one, that I can
recollect, without an hereditary nobility — Spar-
ta, Athens, Rome, Venice, Bern, Holland, even
Geneva, and St. Marino, &c. where (hall we look

for

Commonwealth^ examined. 377

for one without ? It would be an improvement in
the affairs of fociety, probably, if the hereditary
legal defcent could be avoided ; and this experi-
ment the Americans have tried. But in this cafe
a nobility muft and will exift, though without
the name, as really as in countries where it is
hereditary ; for the people, by their .elections,
will continue the government generally in the
fame families from generation to generation, De-
fcent from certain parents, and inheritance of
certain houfes, lands, and other vifible objects,
will eternally have fuch an influence over the
affections and imaginations of the people, as no
arts or inftitutions of policy will controul. Time
will come, if it is now or ever was otherwife, that
thefe circumftances will have more influence over
great numbers of minds than any confideration of
virtues or talents ; and whatever influences num-
bers, is of great moment in popular governments,
and in all elections. " They always bear a na-
" tural and implacable hate towards the people.'*
This is too ftrong and univerfal. The Romans
obferved certain families, as the Valerii, &c. who
were conftant friends and lovers of the people, as ,
well as others, the Claudii, &c. who as conftantly
hated them. It has been before admittted, that fuch
a body naturally encroaches both ways, on the peo-
ple on one fide, and on the king on the other*
The people hate and envy them as much, and
endeavour equally to encroach : but the fame
fentiments, paflions, and enterprises, take place
between the democratical body and the ariftocra-
tical, where the laft is not hereditary, but annually
elective. Our author's next argument is ftill more
grofsly erroneous. If any great man arrives at
" fo much power and confidence as to think of
cc ufurping, thefe are the firft that will fet him on,
VOL, III. 3 G " mingls

37$ Tire right Conflltutlon of a

" mingle interefts with him, and become the
" prime initruments in heaving them up into the
" feat of tyranny." It is true, that fome few
individuals of a nobility may join fueh a man in
his confpiracy, in hopes of enjoying high ftations
and great emoluments under him ; but fuch an
iifurpation was never fet on foot by a body
of nobility : it has ever been the people who
have fet up fingle defpots, in oppofition to the
body of the nobility ; and it is the people wha
have furnifhed the men and money to fupport the
(landing army by which he is defended. If any
one example of the contrary is to be found, it has
efcaped a diligent enquiry.

It is very unneceflary to produce " examples, to
" mew that dates have loft their liberties by per-
mitting one or a few to be over great." Every
monarchy, oligarchy, and ariflocracy, is an in-
ftance and a proof of it. The very notion of a
free people's lofing their liberties, implies the
fetting up one or a few with too much power.
1 his will be readily admitted; but it is con-
tended, that the people in a fimple democracy,
collectively or by reprefentation, are neceflarily
the moft addicted to fetting up individuals with
too much power. To fay that it is their duty not
to do it ; that their happinefs forbids it; that
their intereft is againft it ; that their liberty will
be ruined by it, is to exhort and to preach to be
fure. The clergy exhort and preach in favour of
religion and morality, and againft prophanenefs
and vice ; but there are numbers, multitudes, we
find, who will not regard them ; and laws, checks,
power, are the only fecurity againft thefe. The
thirty tyrants of Athens, Pififtratus, Hiero of
Syracufe, Dionyfius and Agathocles of Sicily, are
very oddly introduced here, wh^n every def-

potifm,

Commonwealth, examined. 379

potifm, empire, monarchy, oligarchy, and arifto-
cracy, that ever had a being, is as much to the
purpofe. Melius and Manlius are cited very
improperly. The Decemviri, Sylla, Cadar, are
no more to the purpofe than all tyrannies or ab-
folute governments ; all of which are proofs of
the people's indifcretion, and conftant difpofition
to fet up idols, as much as they are of the danger
of permitting individuals to be too powerful.

Florence and Cofmus, Milan and Switzerland,
and Holland and the family of Orange, are all
proofs againft our author. There is not a ftronger
inftance to be found than the houfe of Orange,
which has been fupported by the people, I mean
the plebeians, againft the ariftocracy, and who in
their courfe have facrificed to their deified pro-
teclors, Barnevelts, Grotius's ; and De Witts's, pa-
triots that one need not fcruple, to compare to
Ariftides's, Phocions, and Camillus's ; and, horrid
as the facrifice has been, one need not fcruple to
fay, that all the liberty there has been in Hol-
land for the common people, has been preferved
by this alliance between the houfe of Orange
and them, againft the encroaching difpofition
of the ariftocracy, as much as the liberties of
Sparta were preferved by the oath of the kings
and Ephori. It would, neverthelefs, be an in-
finite improvement, if the power of the prince
and common people were defined, limited, and
made conftitutional and legal.

The author's principle is excellent and eter-
nal, " to keep any man, though he have de-
" ferved never fo well by fuccefs or fervice,
"from being too great or popular;" — " it is
" indeed a notable means (and fo efteemed by
" all free ftates) to keep and preferve a cotn-
** naonwealth from the rapes of ufurpation."—

But

380 The right Conftilution of a

But the queftion between us ftill is, how it is to
be done ? In a fimple ariftocracy it is impoflible ;
with all their pride, jealoufy, and envy, fome one,
and fome few of the nobles, obtain more influ-
ence than the reft, and would foon obtain all
power, if ballots and rotations, and innumerable
intricate contrivances were not ufed to prevent it.
In a limple democracy no ballots or rotations can
prevent it ; one fingle tyrant will rule the whole
commonwealth at his pleafure, refpecling forms
and appearances a little at firft, but prelently
throwing off" all reftraint. How can you prevent
a man in fuch a government from being too
popular ? There can be nothing to prevent him
from making himfelf as popular as his abilities,
fortune, or birth, will enable him to be ; nothing
to prevent him from employing the whole execu-
tive and judicial power : nothing to prevent him
from applying the puplic purfe to the augmenta-
tion of his own popularity and power : in fhort,
nothing but the mixture we contend for can pre-
vent it. The King and lords are interefted to pre*
vent any commonor from being too popular and
powerful ; the King and commons are interefted
to keep any lord from being too popular and
powerful ; and the lords and commons are in-
terefted to prevent the king from being too popu-
lar and powerful, and they always have the means.
There is not a ftronger argument againft our
author's form, nor in favour of the triple com'po-
fition.

• '•''••* ' '•<'.'. >•-•' r'^f'c.fT ~ . - i* ''**/rt '' ^f '" **''

The fourteenth and laft reafon is, " becaufe in
" this form all powers are accountable for mif-
" demeanors in government, in regard of the
*€ nimble returns and periods of the people's
^ election ; by which means he that ere while

" was

Commonwealth, examined. c 38 1

" was a governor, being reduced to the condition
" of a fubject, lies open to the force of the laws,
" and may with eafe be brought to punifhment
" for his offence."

In a free government, whofe legiflature confifts
of three independent branches, one of which
has the whole executive, this is true. Every
member of the two houfes is as amenable to the
laws as his pooreft fellow-citizen : the king can
do nothing but by minifters, who are accountable
for every act they do or advife ; and this refponfi-
bility is efficacious to protect the laws from being
trampled on by any perfon or perfons, however
exalted in office, reputation, or popularity. But
in our author's " Right Conftitution" no member
can be refponfible to any but his conftituents ; and
by means of the influence of the executive power
and the offices it beftows, by means of perverfions
of the judicial power, and even of the public
treafure, which his party will affift him in apply-
ing to his purpofe, he will be able to procure a
pardon among his conftituents in a fmgle city or
borough, and a re-election ; nay, he will be able to
procure applaufe and rewards for that very cri-
minal conduct which deferved punifhment. There
is no form of government, not even an abfolute
monarchy, where a minifter will find it fo eafy to
elude enquiry ; — recollect the inftance in Poland.

" He that was once a governor, will generally
** continue always a governor, becaufe he will apply
" all the executive and judicial authority, and even
" the public money, as well as his perfonal and fa-
" mily influence, to increafe that party in the legif-
" lature," i. e. the fmgle aflembly, upon whofe
fupport he depends.— By a governor here is no
doubt intended a perfon appointed by the aflem-
to manage the executive power. Such a go-
vernor

382 The right Conftltution of a

vernor will generally be continued ; but if he is
not, he will be fucceeded by another of the fame
party, who will fcreen and fupport him, while he
again takes his ftation in the houfe, and fupports
or rules his fucceflbr. But if oppofition prevails
in the houfe and nation,and the minority becomes
the majority, they will be fo weak as not to dare
to look back and punifh ; and if they do, this will
again render them unpopular, and reftore the
reins to their antagonift : in this way, after a few
vibrations of the pendulum, they muft have re-
courfe to arms to decide the conteft. Thefe
confequences are fo obvious and indifputable,
that h is amazing to read the triumphant afifer-
tions which follow. u Such a courfe as this cuts
<c the very throat of tyranny, and doth not only
<c root it up when at full growth, but crumeth
" the cocatrice in the egg, deftroys in the feed, in
*c the principle, and in the very poffibilities of its
" being for ever after." — "The fafety of the people
<c is/' indeed, " the fovereign and fupreme law !'*
and if " Laws are difpenfed by uncontroulable,
" unaccountable perfons in power, they will never
" be interpreted but in their own fenfe,nor execut-
" ed but after their own wills and pleafure." But
it is unaccountable that our author did not fee that
it is precifeiy in his Right Conftitution of a Com-
monwealth that we are to expect fuch uncon-
troulable and unaccountable perfons, at leaft as
certainly as in a fimple monarchy or ariftocracy.
The only *c eftablifhment" then, in which we may
depend upon therefponfibility of men in power,
and upon their being actually called to account,
and punifhed when they deferve it, is the tripartite
balance, the political trinity in unity, trinity of
legiflative, and unity of executive power, which in
politics is no myftery. This alone is " the im-

" pregnable

Commonwealth, examined. 383

" pregnable bulwark of the people's fafety, be-
" caufe without it no certain benefit can be ob-
" tained by the ordinary laws." This alone is
*' the bank againft inundations of arbitrary pow-
" er and tyranny/'

Our author aflerts very truly, " that all ftand-
" ing powers" (meaning unlimited, unbalanced,
ftanding powers, as hereditary fimple monarchies
and ariitocracies) " have, and ever do affume unto
*c themfelves an arbitrary exercife of their own
" dictates at pleafure, and make it their only in-
" tereft to fettle themfelves in an unaccountable
*c ftate of dominion ; fo that, though they commit
" all the injuftice in the world, their cuftom hath
" been ftili to perfuade men, partly by ftrong pre-
" tence of argument, and partly by force, that
<c they may do what they lift ; and that they are
" not bound to give an account of their actions
" to any but to Godhimfelf/' — This is perfectly
true, and very important. But our author did
not confider, that the leading men in a fingle po-
pular aflembly will make it their intereft to fettle
themfelves in a ftate of dominion ; that they will
perfuade men, by ftrong pretence of argument, by
force, by the temptations of offices, civil, mili-
tary, fifcal, and ecclefiaftical, and by the allure-
ments and terrors of judgments in the executive
courts ofjuftice, to connive at them while they
do what they lift, and to believe them God's
vicegerents. Our author forgets, that he who
makes bifhops and judges, may have what gofpei
and law he pleafes ; and he who makes admirals
and generals, may command their fleets and ar-
mies. He forgets that one overgrown Segamore
in the houfe, with his circle of fubordinate chief-
tains, each with his clan at his heels, will make
bifhops, judges, admirals, generals, governors of

provinces,

3 $4 The right Conftituiion of a

provinces, &c. in as great number, and with as
much facility, as an abfolute monarch. This in-
advertence in our author is the more remarkable
for what follows. " This dodrine of tyranny hath
" taken the deeper root in men's minds,becaufe the
" greateft part (i. e. the greateft part of mankind)
" was ever inclined to adore the golden idol of
" tyranny in every form; by which means the
" rabble of mankind being prejudicated in this
" particular, and having placed their corrupt hu-
<c mour or intereft in bafe fawning, and the favour
" of the prefent great ones, therefore, if any re-
" folute fpirit happen to broach and maintain true
"principles of freedom, or do at any time arife
" to fo much courage as to perform a noble aft of
" juftice, in calling tyrants to an account, pre-
" fently he draws all the enmity and fury of the
<c world about him." It is really aftonifhing that
any man could write thefe words, and not fee that
they totally overthrow the whole fyftem of go-
vernment that he calls the Right Conftitution of
a Commonwealth. " The greateft part of men
<c was ever inclined to adore the golden idol ;"
yet his Conftitution places the golden idol in the
midft of the people, without any check or re-
ftraint, that they may fall down and worfhip as
foon as they will. He places all power in the
hands of that very "rabble of mankind," who have
" prejudicated in favour of tyranny :" he places
" great ones" in the midft of thefe, who " have
" placed their corrupt humour and intereft in bafe
" fawning, and the favour of thofe prefent great
" ones. Human nature is not honoured by this
account of it, nor has it juftice done it. With-
out fuppofing the majority fo bad, if we fuppofe
one third or one quarter of this character, and
another third or quarter indifferent, neutral, luke-
warm,

Commonwealth , axamined. 385

warm, or even enough in love with private life
and their own induftry to flay at home at elec-
tions, this is enough to demonftrate the tyranny
and ruin to which fuch a fimple democracy would
rufh. But our author's device for extricating
himfelf out of this difficulty is more curious ftill.
Although the greateft part of men always incline
to worfhip the golden calf Tyranny, yet cc in com-
" mon wealths it is, and ought to be, otherwife.
a The Greeks and Romans were wont to heap all
" the honours they could invent, by public re-
" wards, confecrations of ftatues, and crowns of
" laurel, upon fuch worthy patriots as had the
" courage to call tyrants to account." Here he
can only mean the ftories of Harmodius and Arif-
togeton, Brutus and Caflius ; fo that all the fecu-
rity which freedom is to have is, that as foon as a
great one arifes in his aflembly, and the majority
begin to fawn, fome Harmodius or Caflius will
arife to aflaflinate him. But we know that the
msurder of Hipparchus only inflamed Hippias,
and that of Caefar entailed the empire in his fa-
mily, and the murder of Alexander by Lorenzo
completed the deipotifm of the Medici. The
ill fuccefs of liberty, in thofe inftances, ought to
be a warning againft fuch attempts in future* ra-
ther than precedents on which to build all the
hopes of the caufe of liberty. The right of a
nation to kill a tyrant, in cafes of neceflity, can
no more be doubted, than that to hang a robber,
or kill a flea : but killing one tyrant only makes
way for a worfe, unlefs the people have fenfe, fpi-
rit, and honefty enough to eftablifh and fupport a
conftitution guarded at all points againft tyranny ;
againft the tyranny of the one, the few, and the
many. Let it be the ftudy, therefore, of law-
givers and philofophers, to enlighten the people's
VOL. III. 3 D underftandings,

386 The right Conjlituiion of a

understandings, and improve their morals, by good
and general education ; to enable them to com-
prehend the icheme of government, and to know
upon what points their liberties depend ; to dif-
fipate thole vulgar prejudices and popular fuper-
ftitions that oppofe themfelves to good govern-
ment ; and to teach them that obedience to the
laws is as indifpenfable in them as in lords and
kings.

Our author contends, " that the honours decreed
" to tyrannicides by the Greeks and Romans, were
*£ beftowed out of a noble fenfe of commonweal
" intereft ; knowing that the life of liberty confifts
" in a drift hand and zeal againft tyrants and ty-
" ranny :" but he mould have recollected, that in
Rome thefe honours were decreed to fenators, for
fupporting the (landing authority of an hereditary
fenate againft fingle men who afpired to popular
favour, but never in any inftance in fupport of
fuch a government as he contends for. In Greece
too, there is no inftance of any honors decreed for
deftroying tyrants, in defence, of any fuch govern-
ment. The government of Athens was as diffe-
rent as podible from that of a fingle aflembly of
fucceffive reprefentatives of the people. It is
agreed that " perfons in power cannot be kept
" from all occafions of tyranny better than by leav-
" ing them liable to account ;" but it is denied
that perfons in power can ever be brought to ac-
count, unlefs by affaffination (which is no account
at all) in a government by a fingle fovereign af-
fembly : and it is aflerted that this " happinefs
" was never feen yet under the fun, by any law or
" cuftom eftablifhed, fave only in thofe ftates
" where all men are brought to tafte of iubjec~lion
" as well as rule," afx«, xai a?%ecre«;, by a go-
vernment of three branches reciprocally depen-
dent on each other.

" In

Commonwealth^ examined. 387

" In Switzerland the people are free indeed,
*c becaufe ail officers and governors in the cantons
" are queftionable by the people in their fuccef-
" five aflemblies." What does he mean ? in the
ariftocratical aflemblies ? The people have no af-
femblies, and officers are called to account only
in (landing councils. In the democratical cantons
there is nothing to account for but milk and
cheefe. But why (hould England be forgotten,
where all officers are queftionable, and often have
been questioned, by the people in their fucceffive
aflemblies ; and where the judicature in parliament
is digefted with infinitely more prudence than in1
any canton in Switzerland, or any other republic
in the world.

ft is agreed that cc freedom is to be preferved
" no other way in a commonwealth, but by keep-
"> ing officers and governors in an unaccountable
" ftate ;" but it is infifted, that ail " (landing
" powers" in the Englifh conftitution, as the lords
and minifters who conduct the prerogative of the
crown, may at any time be called to account
without the lead " difficulty, or involving the
" nation in blood and mifery." But it is denied
that powerful men, in our .author's " Right Con-
" ftitution," can be called to account, without
the utmoft difficulty, and danger of involving the na-
tion in blood and mifery ; and therefore it is con-
cluded, that the Englifli conftitution is infinitely
preferable to any fucceflion of the fingle fupreme
aflemblies of the reprefentatives of the people.

Our author having eftablimed his building upon
fourteen folid pillars, as he feems to think, pro-
ceeds to anfwer objections. — The firft objection is,
" that fuch a government would fet on levelling
<6 and confufion.'* By levelling, he underftands"le-

" veiling

388 The right Conftitutlon of a

" veiling all men in point of eftates ;" — " making
" all things common to all ;" — cc deftroying pro-
u perty ;" — cc introducing a community of enjoy-
" ments among men." This he allows to be " an
" oclious thing, a fcandal fattened by the cunning of
" the common enemy upon this kind of government,
*c which they hate above all others." We are not
then put to the trouble of examining the whim-
fi.es of Plato or Xenophon, about a community of
goods, wives, and children ; nor thofe of Sir
Thomas More, about a community of property
only. He afferts, that his pro] eft is " fo far from
" introducing a community, that it is the only
" prefervative of property in every particular."
It is agreed that it would not introduce levelling,
nor a community of goods, unlefs the poor fhould
be more numerous than the rich, and rife for a
divifion. But even this would produce but a
temporary level ; the new acquifitions would foon
be fpent, and the inequality become as great as
ever ; and there mud be a perpetual fucceflion of
divifions and fquanderings, until property became
too precarious to be fought, and univerlal idle-
nefs and famine would end it. But the penny-
lefs, though more numerous, would probably never
unite;' and the principals of the majority would
make ufe of the mod artful among them in (trip-
ping, by degrees, the minority, and accumulating
for themfelves : fo that inftead of levelling, and
community of goods, the inequalities both of
power and property would be conftantly increaf-
ing, until they became as great as in Poland be-
tween the gentlemen and peafants. But it is de-
nied that this would be a prefervative of property ;
on the contrary, property mud become infecure.
The ruling party, difpofmg of all offices, and
annexing what falaries and fees they will ; laying

on

Commonwealth, examined. 389

on all taxes, and diftributing them according to
their ideas of juftice and equality ; appropriating
the public money to what ufes they will, and de-
ciding all caufes in the courts of juftice by their
own judgments ; in all thefe ways, thenifelves and
their partifans will be found continually growing
in wealth, and their antagonifts, the minor party,
growing poorer ; thefe lalt can have no fecurity of
property at all. This will not be prevented nor
alleviated by thofe handfome words of our author:
" It is not in reafon to be imagined, that fo
" choice a body as the reprefentatives of a na-
" tion^ fhoxild agree to deftroy one another In
" their feveral rights and interefts." A majority
would be found to agree to deftroy the rights and
interefts of the minority; and a man's property is
equally infecure, whether it is plundered by an ar-
bitrary lawlefs minority, or by a domineering de~
cemvirate, triumvirate, or fmgle defpot. " Allde-
" terminations being carried by common confent,
" every man's particular intereft rnuft needs be
cc fairly provided for againft the arbitrary difpo-
<c fitions of others." If common confent means
unanimous confent, there might be fame plaufi-
bility in this : but, as unanimity is impoffible, and
common confent means the vote of the majority,
it is felf-evident that the latter are at the mercy of
the former ; and the government of the latter be-
ing unbalanced by any equal force, intereft, paf-
fion, or power, is as real a tyranny as the fove-
reignty of an hereditary fenate, or thirty tyrants,
or a fmgle defpot. Our author himfelf confefles
this in fo many words, when he fays, that what-
ever u placeth every man's right under the will of
" another, is no lefs than tyranny,"—" feating
<c itfelf in an unlimited, uncontroulable preroga-
*e tive over others, without their confent," and

" is

39<> The right Conftitutton of a

" is the very bane of property." Is not the pro-
perty, liberty, and life of every man in the mi-
nority under the will of the majority ? and may
not the majority feat themfelves in an unlimited,
uncontroulable prerogative over the minority with-
out their confent ?

Our author then runs all over^the world in
fearch of examples, and affirms, that " a free ftate,
" or fucceffive government of the people," &c.
expreflions which he always explains to mean his
Right Conftitution of a Commonwealth, " or fu-
preme reprefentative aflembly," the fame with
Mr. Turgot's, all authority collected into one
centre, the nation, " is the only prefervative of
" property, as appears by inftances all the world
<e over," This is a fpecies of fophiftry, grofsly
calculated to deceive the moft ignorant of the
people, that is unworthy of fo great and good a
caufe as that of liberty and republican govern-
ment. This aflertion is fo wide from the truth,
that there was not in the world, nor had been, one
example of fuch a government, excepting the
long paaliament ; for the Italian republics, which
refembled it the moft, were ftill better confti-
tuted. We know what became of the long par-
liament ; Oliver foon found they were felf-feekers,
and turned them out of the houfe.

The reader is next led on, through a feries of
examples, in a very ^curious (train of popular rant, to
fliew that monarchies and all (landing powers,
been levellers. " Under monarchs, fubjects had
" nothing that they could call their own ; neither
" lives, nor fortunes, nor wives, nor any thing
" elfe that the monarchs pleafed to command^ be-
e< caufe the poor people knew no remedy againfl
" the levelling will of an unbounded fovereignty."
— -" In France," it is aflerted, " the people have

" no

Commonwealth^ examined. 30/1

" no property, but all depends on the royal plea-
'< fure, as it did lately in England." The truth
now almoft breaks out, and he almoft confefles that
he fees it. cc It is very obfervable, that in king-
" doms, where the people have enjoyed anything
" of liberty and property, they have been fuch
" kingdoms only, where the frame of government
<c hath been fo well tempered, as that the beft
ec fhare of it hath been retained in the people's
" hands." If he had faid an equal fhare, inftead
of the beft fhare, this fentence would have been
perfect ; but he fpoils it in the next breath, by
adding, " and by how much the greater influence
" the people have had therein, fo much the more
" fure and certain they have been in the enjoy- <
" ment of their property." This is by no means
true ; on the contrary, wherever the people have
had any fhare in the executive, or more than one
third part of the legiflative, they have always
abufed it, and rendered property infecure.

The Arragonians are quoted as " firm in their
" liberties and properties, fo long as they held
" their hold over their kings in their fupreme
<e aflemblies." " And no fooner had Philip the
<* fecond deprived them of their fhare in the
" government, but themfelves and their proper-
" ties became a prey to the Will and pleafure of
<c their kings." It is aftonifhing that Arragon
mould be quoted as an example of a government
of the people in their fupreme fucceflive aflem-
blies. If it is to be called a republic, it was fuch
another as Poland ; it was what is fometimes
called a mixed monarchy, and fometimes a limit-
ed monarchy : but as no judgment of a govern-
ment can be formed by the name that is given it,
we may fafely pronounce it an ariftocracy. Much
pains were taken to balance it, but fo awkwardly

and

39 2 The right Conflitutim of a

ancTunfkiifuIly, that its whole hiftory is a fcenc of
turbulence, anarchy, and civil war. The king
was, among the twelve rich men, little more than
primus inter pares, like the king among his twelve
archons in Phaeacia. Although the royal dignity
was hereditary, and Arragon was never an elective
kingdom, yet the confirmation of the ftates to the
title of the next heir was held neceflary ; and it
was highly refented if he affumed the royal title,
or did any public aft, before he had taken an oath
to preferve the privileges of the ftates. When any
difpute arofe concerning the fucceffion, the ftates,
took upon them to decide it. One awkward at-
tempt to balance the influence of the king was the
inftitution of a chief juftice*, to whom appeals
might be made from the king. This judicial
authority was impowered to controul the king if
he acted illegally ; and this high officer was ac-
countable only to the ftates for whatever he did
in the execution of Jiis office. This was a very
powerful check. Another attempt to form a ba-
lance againft the royal authority has been cele-
brated as one of the moft fublime and fenti-
mental inftru&ions of liberty. If it had been
an inftitution of the body of the people, it
would have been the moft manly and noble afler-
tion of the rights and natural and moral equality
of mankind to be found in hiftory, and would
have merited immortal praife ; but, in fact and
effect, it was no more than a brilliant expreffion
of that ariftocratical pride which we have feen to
be fo common in all the nations of the earth/ At
the inauguration of the monarch, the chief juftice
was feated in his robes, on an elevated tribunal,
with his head covered : the king appeared before
him bare-headed, fell down upon his knees, and

* El jufticia de Arragon.

fwore

Commonwealth) examined. 393

fwpre to govern according to law, and to main-
tain the privileges of the ftates. Proclamation was
then made, in the name of the alTembly of the
ftates — " We, who are as good as you are, have
" accepted you for our king and lord, upon- con-
" dition that you obferve our laws and protect
" our liberties*." But who were thefe noble ai-
fertors of rights ? Not the people. And whofe
liberties were aflerted ? Not thofe of the people,
but of a few gentlemen. The men of property,
who in general had acquired their eftates by their
fwords, were called rich men-)-, or barons ; for
whatever titles were afterwards introduced by the
grants of kings, the right to feats and votes in
the ftaces arofe not from the rank or dignities of
d,ukes, marquifles, or counts, but was attached to
the quality of landholders, rich men, or batons.
There were not more than twelve old families
who were the original barons, or ricos hombres,
of Arragon. In a courfe of time they were dif-
tinguifhed into the greater and lefler nobility :
the former were fuch as were raifed by the kings
to fuperior titles ; the latter were thofe who re-
tained only their, ancient character of landholders.
The clergy were reprefented in the ftates by the
prelates, and the greater cities by deputies ; but
farmers, the mechanics, the merchants, in one
word the common people, were, according to the
doctrine of Ariftotle, not admitted to the rank or
rights of citizens : they had no feat in the ftates,
or any vote in the choice of thofe who had. The
third eftate,'as it was called, or the reprefentatives
of cities, was very unfkilfully compofed : in fome
cities the mayor of courfe reprefented the city ;

* Nos quc valemos tanto como vos os hazemos nueftro rey
y fegnor con tal que guardeis nueftros fueros y libertades, fi
no, no.

•f- Los ricos hombres.

VOL. III. 3 E in

394 TKe right Conjlituthn of a

in others the king, appointed the reprefentative \
in others it was either by fome grant of the king,
or fome fenfelefs cuftom of the city, an hereditary
right in a fingle family; and the beft appointments
of all were made by the ariftocratical regencies of
the cities. In fuch an aflembly of the ftates laws
were made for -the government of the nation ;
but it was a (ingle aflembly, and neither eftate
had a negative. If two eftates agreed, it was a
law ; and, indeed, the mod important queftions,
even donations of money, were decided by a
majority, and the chief juftice was the only ba-
lance againft the oppreflion of any fubjeft, or even
of the king, and the only guardian of the laws, to
fee them carried into execution. The rich men
and the clergy, as well as the king, were fuch
(landing powers as always excite our author's in-
vectives ; and the third eftate was as diftant as
poflible from being an adequate and equitable
reprefentative of the people, annually elected.
The clergy became generally humble fervants of
the king, and the deputies of cities were often
corrupted ; fo that the conteft was chiefly between
the crown and the nobles. In progrefs of time,
by gaining over more and more the prelates and
.deputies of the cities to the intereft of the crown,
it became an over match for the nobility, and made
itfelf abfolute. This example, therefore, is as ill-
chofen as all the others, and inftead of fupporting
our author's argument, is decifive againft it.

France is the next example, where, " as long
" as the people's intereft bore fway in their fu-
" preme aflemblies, they could call their lives
" and fortunes their own, and no longer : for all
•" that have fucceeded fince Louis the Eleventh,
" followed his levelling pattern fo far, that in a
<c (hort time they deftroyed the people's property,
" and became the greateft levellers in Chriften-

<PV " dom."

Commonwealth, examined. 395

c< dom." — It would take up too much time to
give in this place a fketch of the hiftory of France,
to ibow in detail how inapplicable this example is
to the purpofe of our author. Thofe who have
leifure and curiofity, may confult Boulainvifliers,
the Abbe de Mably, and Monfieur Moreau ; and
many mod beautiful reflections may be found in
Lord Bolingbroke's DilTertation on parties. Let-
ters xiii. xiv. xv. xvi. It is fufficient here to fay,
that the dates-general were compofed of nobles,
clergy, and a third edate, all meeting in one aiTem-
bly ; that the third eftate confided -of reprefenta-
tives of cities not chofen by the people, but ap-
pointed at lead by the aridocratical regencies ; that
in fome places the mayor, in others fome particular
family, held it as an hereditary right : but nothing
can be conceived more unlike our author's idea of
the people's fucceffive fovereign aflemblies than
thefe dates-general. The conditution in thofe
times was an unfkilful attempt to reconcile an ill-
compounded aridocracy with firnple monarchy ;
but the. dates-general conducted like all other
fmgle afiemblies, till they were laid afide.

England comes next, where, " as long as the
*c people's intered was preferved by frequent and
" fucceflive parliaments, fo long we were in fome
" meafure fecure of our properties ; but as the
" kings began to worm the people out of their
" mare in government, by diicontinuing of par-
" liaments, fo they carried on their levelling de-
" figns to the dedroying of our properties ; and
" the oracles of law and gofpel at lad fpoke it
" out with a good levelling grace, ' that all was
" the king's, and that we had nothing we might
" call our own.'"

There is at- lead wit and burlefque humour in
thus afcribing levellifm to monarchy 5 and while it

is

396 The right Conftitution of a

is confidered only as rodomontade, there is no
objection to it. Nor is there any thing to fay
againft confounding levelliim with infecurity of
property ; for though the ideas are diftinct, the
things muft always exift together. — From monar-
chy he proceeds to other ftanding powers which
have all produced errant levellers. " In Athens,
" as long as the people kept free, indeed, in an
" enjoyment of their fucceflive aflemblies, fo long
<c they were fecure in their properties." But
Athens never was free, according to our author's
plan of fucceflive aflemblies. Athens never had
aflemblies of reprefentatives. The collective af-
femblies of the people were made fovereigns, in all
cafes whatfoever, by Solon : but they never prac-
tifed it till Ariftides began, and Pericles compleat-
ed. the plan ; and as foon as it exifted, it began to-
render property, liberty, and life, infecure. Yet the
ordinary adminiftration was never conducted in
thefe aflemblies ; the fenate and the Areopagus,
and the ten other courts, conducted them : yet
with all thefe checks, afk Demofthenes and Pho-
cion, and Militiades and Ariftides, how the fove-
reign people behaved. — " After kings were laid
*c afide, they erected another form of ftanding
tc power in a fmgle perfon, called a governor
" (archon), for life, who was accountable for mif-
" demeanors : and yet a trial being made of nine
" of them, the people faw fo little fecurity by
" them, that they pitched upon another ftanding
" form of decimal government ; and being op-
" prefled by them too, they were caihiered. The
" like miferies they tafted under the ftanding
" power of thirty, which were a fort of levellers
c< more rank than all the reft, who put to death,
cc banifhed, pill'd, and poll'd whom they pleafed,
" without caufe or exception ; fo that the poor

" people,

t o •.•"-.: ,-ir

Ctimmonivealthy examined. 397

"people, having been tormented under all the
*c forms of danding power, were in the end forced,
" as their lad remedy, to take fancluary, under the
" form of a free date, in their fucceflive aflem-
<c blies." It is droll enough thus to turn the drain
of popular banter upon the royalids, by charging
kings, perpetual archons, annual archons, the ten
archons, the thirty tyrants, &c. as levellers. It was
the levelling fpirit of the nobles, to be fure, that
abolifhed kings and fmgle archons, and fet up
ten : but the poor people had no hand .in it but
as paflive indruments. As to the people's taking
fancluary under the form of a free date, in their
fucceflive aflemblies, they never did it : they ne»
ver let up any fuch government. They did aflume
the fovereignty, it is true ; but Pericles led them
to it, only that he might govern them, and he, and
fucceflive, unprincipled wretches after him, did
govern till the commonwealth was ruined. But
there was as much levelling at lead, indeed much
more, under Themidocles, Pericles, and Alcibia-
des, as under kings or archons.

Our author's confcience was always uppermofh
He always betrays fomething which mews that he
knew very well what the truth was. He judges
very rightly here : " And though it may be ob-
" jec~led," lays he,- " that afterwards they fell into
" many divifions and miferies, even in that form,
" yet whoever obferves the dory mail find it was
4C not the fault of the government, but of them-
" felves, in fwerving from the rules of a free date,
" by permitting the continuance of power in par-
" ticular hands ; who having an opportunity there-
6* by to create parties of their own among the
*c people, did for their own ends inveigle, engage,
" and entangle them in popular tumults and di-
ic vifions. This was the true reafon of their mif-

" carriages ;

398 Tht right Conflitution of a

** carriages ; and, if ever any government of the
'* people did mifcarry, it was upon that account."
It is plain from this' paflage, that our author was
well read, and judged very well upon thefe fub-
je&s. He knew how it was ; but he has not can-
didly told us what he knew. That they fell into
divisions and miferies he owns ; but denies that it
was the fault of the government — it was the fault
of themfelves. Is it not the fault of themfelves
under all governments, defpotifms, monarchies,
ariilocracies, oligarchies, as well as democracries ?
Was it not the fault of themfelves under their
kings, their perpetual archons, their archons for
life, their ten archons, as well as under the Pifif-
tratidse, that they were tormented with divifions
and miferies ? The law of nature would be fuffi-
cient for the government of men, if they would
confuk their reafon, and obey their consciences.
It is not the fault of the law of nature, but of them-
felves, that it is not obeyed ; it is not the fault of
the law of nature that men are obliged to have re-
courle to civil government at all, but of therafelves,
it is not the fault of the ten commandments, but
of themfelves, that Jews or Chriftians are ever
known to (leal, murder, covet, or blafpheme : but
the legiilator who (hould fay, the law of nature is
enough, if you don't obey it, it will be your own
fault, therefore no other government is necef-
fary, would be thought to trifle. We certainly
know, from the known conflitution of the human
mind and heart, and from uniform experience, that
the law of nature, the decalogue, and all the civil
laws, will be violated, if men's paffions are not
reftrained ; and therefore to prefumethat an un-
mixed democratical government will preferve the
laws, is as mad as to prefume that a king or fenate
will do it. If a king or fenate don't obferve the

laws,

Commonwealth, examined. 399

laws, we may fay it is not the fault of the govern-
ment, but of themfelves. — What then ? We know
that themfelves will commit the fault, and fo will
a fimple democracy, and therefore it is in all thefe
cafes the fault of the government as well as of
themfelves. The government mould be fo con-*
flituted, that themfelves cannot commit the fault.
Swerving from rules is no more the fault of (land-
ing kings and fenates, than it is of (landing or fuc-
ceffive popular aflemblies. Of the. three, the laft
have the (Irongeft difpofition to fwerve, and always
do fwerve the fooneft when unbalanced. But the
fault of permitting the continuance of power in
particular hands, is incurable in the people, when
they have the power. The people think you a
fool, when you advife them to rejecl: the man you
acknowledge to be the ablefl, wifeft, and bed, and
whom you and they know they love bed, and ap-
point another, who is but fecond in their confi-
dence. They ever did, and ever will continue
him, nay, and augment his power ; for their love of
him, like all their other paflions, never (lands ftill;
it conflantly grows, until it exceeds all bounds.
Thefe continual *re-ele6lions, this continuance of
power in particular men," gives them an oppor-
•" tunity to create parties of their own among the
" people, and for their own ends to inveigle, en-
" gage, and entangle them in popular tumults and
<c divifions." Let me now a(k Marchamont Ned-
ham, or any advocate for his fyftem, Do you be-
lieve that the people, unbalanced, ever will avoid
to confer a continuance of power on their favou-
rites ? Do you believe they ever did in any age or
country ? The anfwer mud be in the negative.
Do you believe it poflible, from the conftitution of
human nature, that they ever will, any more than
that they will univerfally obey the law of nature

and

The right Conjlitution of a

and the ten commandments? The anfwer muft
be in the negative. Why then is the world any
longer amufed with a Speculative phantom, that all
enlightened men knew never did, and never can,
exift? My hand is impatient of the pen, and longs
to throw it down, while I am labouring through a
feries of popular fophifms, which difgraces a work
which abounds with fenfe and learning, with ex-
cellent principles, maxims, and rules of govern-
ment, miferably perverted to anfwer a prefent pur-
pofe, to run down one party, and fupport another :
but as this book is known in America, and ought
to be perufed by Englifhmen, in whatever part of
the globe, as a valuable monument of the early
period in which the true principles of liberty be-
gan to be adopted and avowed in the nation, I

fhall purfue the fubjecl; to the end. Lacedjemon

is next introduced as an inftance of levellifm.
After they had tried the government of one
king, then of two, afterwards came in the Epho-
ri, as fupervifors of their kings. After they had
tried themfelves through all the forms of a (land-
ing power, and found all to be levellers of
the people's intereft arid property , then necefTity
" taught them to feek fhelter in afreejlate^ under
" which they lived happily > till, by the error of the
" Athenians, they were drawn into parties by pow-
" erful perfons, and fo made the inftruments of
" divifion among themfelves, for the bringing of
" new levellers into play, fuch as Manchanidas
" and Nabis." — The Ephori were fupervifors of
the fenate, rather than of kings. They fwore both
for themfelves and the people, to fupport the kings
for ever againft the enterprizes of the fenate. But
when did the Lacedemonians take fhelter in a free
ftate ? Never, according to our author's definition
of a free (lace, until the Ephori murdered the king,

inflead

Commonwealth, examined. 401

inftead of fupporting him according to their oath,
and until the people fet up Manchanides and No-
bis. And it is always thus : the firft thing a
people, broke loofe from all reftraints of their pow-
er, do, is to look out for a chief, whom they in-
ftantly make a defpot in fubftance, and very foon in
form. The government of Sparta was as different
from a free ftate, during the fix or feven centuries
that Lycurgus's inftitution lafted, as the Englilh
conftitution is, and much more : the people had
not half the weight in it. Standing powers, both
of king andfenate, flood like Mount Atlas while
the republic exifted, and when the free ftate fuc-
ceeded, it was the tyranny of Manchanides and
Nobis, not better than that of Nero. It is droll
enough to call the Spartans levellers, to be fure ;
they who fupported an haughty ariftocracy at
home, and in every other city of Greece where
they could negociate. When the inftitution of
Lycurgus was worn ;out, and the people began to
gain in power, they ufed it as the Athenians and
all others have done when unbalanced ; they fet
up idols, continued and increafed their power,werc
drawn into parties and divifions, and made them-
felves inftruments of divifion, until defpotifm be-
came inevitable.

Rome in her turn comes round. " After the
" ftanding form of kings was extinct, and a new
<c" one eftablifhed, the people found as little fafety
"and property as ever." Here the faft is truly
ftated, and the exprefiions are very juft, " for
" the ftanding fenate and the decemviri proved
" as great levellers as kings." It is buriefque
again to call the fenate and decemviri levellers :
they were the very antithesis. But if by levellers
he means arbitrary men, it is very true. " So that
" they were forced to fettle the government of the

VOL.. III. 3 F " people

402 "The right Conftitution of a

" people by a due and orderly fucceflion of their
" fupreme alTemblies." I wonder when. To
quote Athens, 'Sparta, and Rome, as examples of
a government of one fovereign reprefentative af-
fembly, is dimoneft : nothing can be further from
the purpofe. The (landing power of the fenate
exifted from Romulus to Casfar, as our author very
well knew, and the people never obtained even an
effectual check, fo far from fettling the govern-
ment of the people by a due and orderly fucceflion
of their fupreme aflemblies. If they ever reco-
<c vered their property, in having fomewhat they
" might call their own," they owed the blefling
to the ferjate's wifdom and equity, for the people
were fo far from being fovereign in their fucceflive
aflemblies, that they had not an equal fhare of
power with the fenate, allowing for all the aflift>
ance they derived from the tribunes. But as foon
as they began to arrogate a fuperior power, or even
an equal fhare, they began to run into " the error
" of Lacedemonians, Athenians/' and all other
people that ever lived, " fwerving from the rules
" of a free date," or, in other words, trampling on
the laws, " lengthening of powers in particular
" hands/5 — " drawn and divided into parties," —
" to ferve the Tufts of fuch powerful men as by
" craft became'their leaders ; fo that by this means,
" through their own default, they were deprived
" of their liberty long before the days of imperial
" tyranny. Thus Cinna, Syila, Marius, and the
ct reft of that fueceeding gang, down to Caefar,
" ufed the people's favour to obtain a continuation
" of power in their own hands ; and then having
" faddled the people with a new (landing form ;of
" their own, they immediately rooted up the peo-
u pie's liberty and property by arbitrary fentences
" of death, profcriptions, fines, and confiscations ;

" which

Commonwealth, examined. 403

** which ftrain of levelling (more intolerable than
" the former) was maintained by the fame arts of
*e devilifh policy down to Casfar, who ftriking in
u a favourite of the people, and making ufe of
*c their affections to lengthen power in his own
" hands, at length, by this error of the people,
" gained opportunity to introduce a new levelling
" form of (landing power in himfelf, to an utter
" and irrecoverable ruin'of the Roman liberty and
<c property." — Thus it is that our author accumu-
lates examples from hiftory, which are demon ftra-
tions againft his own fyftem, and in favour of the
Englifh and American conftitutions. A good En-
glifhman, or a good American, with the mod di-
ligent fearch, could not find fafts more precifely in
vindication of thofe balances to the power of the
people, a fenate, and an executive firfl magiftrate;
Nothing elfe can ever prevent the people from run-
jiing into the fame error, and departing from
the rules of a free ftate, and even the fundamerr-
tal laws.

Florence is again introduced to the fame pur-
pofe, and with the fame fuccefs ; fo is Pifa ; fc*
is Mantua, and its fons Pafferimo and Gonzaga,
You have already feen enough of thefe Italian re-
publics to convince you that every page in their
hiftory is againft our author's fyftem. His con-
clulion is exactly the reverfe of what • it mould
be. It fhould be, that a commonx^alth, by the
people in their fucceffive affemblies, hath never,
in any age, been .a prefervation of liberty or pro-
perty, or any remedy againft ufurpations of ftand-
ing powers, but had, in '.all ages, been, in his own
fenfe, levellers of all things to the will of a ftand-
ing defpot.

: .-. .-., ^j-:-*

The

4o4 The right Conftltutkn of a

The next chapter is intitled, " The Original of
e< all juft Power is in the People. v — This book is
valuable, as it is fo ancient a monument of liberty
and political knowledge in England. Many of
its principles were at that time extremely rare in
the world, excepting in England : they have been
fince enlarged on, with great fuccefs, by Sidney,
Locke, Hoadly, Montefquieu, Roffeau, Raynall,
de Mably, Price, Prieftle'y, Beccaria, and many
others of various nations, and are now becoming
univerfal. It is unneceffary to abridge this chap-
ter ; becaufe, although it contains the hints on
which fucceeding writers have enlarged, their dif-
courfes are more ample and more fatisfaftory.

"The firft error in^ ancient Chriftian policy,
<c which hath indeed been a main foundation of
" tyranny, is that corrupt divifion of a ftate into
" ecclefiaftical and civil." Our author enlarges
upon this error, and his fpeculations are worth
reading ; but as this is not likely to be the error
of America, I fhall leave this to be read when
fuch danger approaches.

" The fecond error is very frequent under all
<l forms of government. It is this; that care hath
" not been taken, upon all occafions of alteration,
" to prevent the paffage of tyranny out of one form
*c into anothe/,in all the nations of the world. The
" intereft of abfolute monarchy, and its inconve-
" niences, have been vifible and fatal under the
" other forms, and given undeniable proof of this
" maxim by experience, in all times, that the in-
" terejl of monarchy may rejide in the hands of many
*€ as well as of a Jingle perfon." The intereft of,
abfolute monarchy he defines to be, " an unli-
** mited, uncontroulable, unaccountable ftation of

" power

Commonwealth^ examined. 405

** power and authority in the hands of a particular
" perfon, who governs only according to the dic-
" tates of his own will and pleafure ; and though
" it hath often been difguifed by fophifters in po-
" licy, fo as it hath loft its own name by fhifting
<c forms, yet the thing itfelf has been difcovered
cc under the artificial covers of every form, in the
" various revolutions of government. In Athens,
" when they had laid afide their king, the kingly
" power was retained ftill in all the after-turns of
" government ; for their decimal governors, and
" their thirty tyrants, were but a multiplied rno-
** narchy, the people being in a worfe condition
cc than before ; for their kings had fupervifors,
" and fenatic aflemblies, that did reftrain and cor-
" reel them ; but the governors having none, ran
" into all the heats, and fits, and wild extrava-
" gances, of an unbounded prerogative. Necef-
" fity and extremity opening the people's eyes,
" they at length faw all the inconveniences of
" kingfhip wrapt up in new forms, and rather in-
" creafed than diminifhed ; fo that, as the only
44 remedy, they diflodged the power out of thofe
" hands, putting it into their own, and placing
" it in a conftant orderly revolution of perfons
<c elective by the community. And now, one
" would have thought there w.as no fhelter for a
" monarchal intereft, under a popular form too :
" but alas ! They found the contrary ; for the
<c people not keeping a Jirift watch over tbemf elves,
" according to the rules of a free ft ate, but being
" won by fpecious pretences , and deluded by created
" necejjities^ . to intruft the management of affairs
" into fome particular hands, fuch an occafion was
<c given thereby to thofe men to frame parties of
*c their own, that by this means they in a fhort
*v time became able to do what they' lift without

"the

406 The right Conjlitution of a

^ the people's confent ; and, in the end, not only
€i difeontinued, but utterly extirpated, their fuc-
" ceffiv« affemblies." — I have given this at length
in our author's own words, becaufe it is an exact
compendium of the whole hiflory of Athens, and
fliews that he had read it attentively, and under-
ilood it perfectly well ; and becaufe it is a com-
plete refutation of his own fyftem, his Right Con-
*fHtution of a Commonwealth. Abfolute mo-
narchy, unlimited power, in a particular perfon,
who governed by his own will, run through all
the hiflory and changes in Athens, according to
his own account, even when the people had placed
the fupreme power in an orderly revolution of
perfons elective by themfelves. Why ? " Becaufe
44 the people did not keep a watch over them-
" felves." Did any other people keep a drift watch
over themfelves ? Will any people ever keep a ftrict
watch over themfelves. No, furely. Is not this,
then, a fufficient reafon for inftituting a fenate to-
keep a ftrict watch over them ? Is not this a fuf-
ficient reafon for feparating the whole executive-
power from them, which they know will and
muft corrupt them, throw them off their guard,
and render it impofftble to keep a ftricl: watch
over themfelves ? " They did not obferve the rules
" of a free ftate." Did any people, that ever at-
tempted to exercife unlimited power, obferve the
rules of a free ftate ? Is it poflible they fhould,
any more than obey, without fin, the law of na-
ture and nature's God ? When we find one of thefe
forts of obedience, we may expect the other. If
this writer had been one of theenthufiafts of that
day, and told the people they muft pray to God
for his omnipotent grace to be poured out upon
them, diftinguifh them from all the reft of man-
kind as his favourite people, more even than the

Jews

Commonwealth, examined. 407

Jews were, that they might be enabled to obferve
the rules of a free ftate, though all hi ft cry and
experience, even that of the Hebrews themfelves,
and the conflitution of human nature, proved it
impoffible without a miracle ; or if he had told
them that they were a chofen people, different
from all other men, numbers would have believed
him, and been difappointed : for it is impious
prefumption to fuppofe that Providence will thus
diftinguilh any nation ; but it would have been
more fenfible than thus to acknowledge in effect,
as he does repeatedly, the impracticability of hi*
fcheme, and. (till infift upon it. " The people
" were won by fpecious pretences, and deluded
<c by created neceffities, to intruft the manage-
" ment of affairs into fome particular hands."
And will not the people always be won by fpe-
cious pretences, when they are unchecked ? Is any
people more fagacious or fenfible than the Athe-
nians, thefe ten thoufand citizens, who had four
hundred thoufand flaves to maintain them at lei-
fure to ftudy ? Will not a few capital characters
in a fingle affembly always have the power to ex-
cite a war, and. thus create a neceflity of com-
manders ? Has not a general a party of courfe ?
Are not all his officers and men at his devotion, fo
long as to acquire habits of it ? When a general
faves a nation from deftrudtion, as the people
think, and brings home triumph, peace, glory,
and profperity to his country, is there not an af-
feftion, veneration, gratitude, admiration, and
adoration of him, that no people can refift ? It is
want of patriotifm not to adore him — it is enmity
to liberty — it is treafon. His judgment, which is
his will, becomes the only law ; reafon will allay
a hurricane as foon; and if the executive and ju-
dicial power are in the people, they at once give

him

40 8 The right Conftltutlon of a

him both, in fubftance at firft, and not long after-*
wards in form. The reprefentatives lofe all au-
thority before him : if they difoblige him, they
are left out by their conftitue ts at the next elec-
tion, and one of his idolaters is chofen.
, " In Rome, alfo, the cafe was the fame, under
" every alteration; and all occafioned by the
" crafty contrivances of grandizing parties, -and
*t tjie people's own frailty and negligence in fuf-
" fering themfelves to be deluded : for with the
" Tar quins (as it is obferved by Livy and others)
" only the name king was expelled, but not the
" thing; the power andintereftof kingfhip was ftill
" retained in the fenate, and engrofled by the con-
" fuls : for befides the rape of, Lucretia, among
"the other faults objected againft Tarquin, this
*' was moft confiderable, that he had acted all
"things after his own head, and difcontinued
" confutations with the fenate, which was the
" very height of arbitrary power ; but yet as foort
"as the fenate was in the faddle, they forgot what
" was charged by themfelves upon Tarquin, and
" ran into the fame error, by eftabliming an arbi-
" trary, hereditary,unaccountable power in them*
" felves and their pofterity, not admitting the
" people (whofe intereft and liberty they had
" pleaded) into any (hare in confultation or go-
" vernment, as they ought to have done, by a
" prefent erecting of their fucceffive affemblies :
" fo that you fee the fame kingly intereft, which
" was in one before, refided then in the hands of
" many. Nor is it my obfervation only, but
" pointed out by Livy, in his fecond book, and in
" many other places, ' Cum a patribus, non con-
" fules fed carnifkes,&c.' when the fenators ftrove
" to create, not confuls, but executioners and tor-
". mentors, to vex and tear the people, &c. And

" in

Commonwealth^ examined. 409

u in another place of the fame book, c Confutes,
"immoderata, infinitaque poteftate, omnes metus
" legum, &c/ the confuls, having an immode-
" rate and unlimited power, turned the terror of
" laws and punifhments only upon the people
" themfelves, (in the mean while) being account-
" able to none but themfelves, and their confe-
" derates in the fenate. Then the confular go-
cc vernment being cafhiered, came on the decem-
" viri : c Cum confulari imperio ac regio, fine
" provocatione,* faith my author ; being inverted
" with a confular and kingly power, without ap-
" peal to any other. And in his third book he
" faith, c Decem regum fpecies erat,' it was a
" form of ten kings ; the mifesies of the people
" being increafed ten times more than they were
" under kings and confuls. For remedy, there-
" fore, the ten were cafhiered alfo ; and confuls be-
" ing reftored, it was thought fit, for the bridling
a of their power, to revive alfo the didatorfhip,
u which was a temporary kingfhip, ufed only now
" and then upon occafion of neceility ; and alfo
" thofe deputies of the people, called tribunes,
<c which one would have thought had been fuf-
" ficient bars againft monarchic intereft, efpecially
" being aflifted by the people's fucceffive aflem-
<c blies : but yet, for all this, the people were
*c cheated through their own neglect, and beftow-
** ing too much confidence and truft upon fuch as
" they thought their friends ; for when they
" fwerved from the rules of a free ftate, by length-
" ening the diclatorfhip in any hand, then mo-
" narchic intereft ftept in there as it did under
" Sylla, Casfar, and others, long before it return-
<c ed to a declared rnonarchiai form ; and when
" they lengthened commands in their armies, then
" it crept in there, as it did under the afore-named
VOL. III. 3G « perfons,

4i.o The right Conjlitttt'ton of a

" perfons, as well as Marius, Cinna, and others
u alfo, and even Pornpey himfelf ; not forgetting
<c the pranks of the two triumvirates, who all
** made a fhift under every form, being fometimes
" called confuls, fometimes di'&ators, and fome-
<c times tribunes of the people, to outaft all the
" flagitious enormities of an abfolute monarchy."
— This valuable paflage, fo remarkable as an
abridgment of the Roman hiftory, as containing
the elfence of the whole that relates to the con-
flitution, as a profound judgment of what paries
in all focieties, has been tranfcribed in the au-
thor's own words ; and, it may be truly faid, it
contains a full confutation of his own fyftem, and
a complete proof* of the neceffity of the compo-
fition of three branches. It is ftridly true, that
there is a ftrong and continual effort in every fo-
ciety of men, ariiing from the conftitution of
their minds towards a kingly power ; it is as true
in a fimple damocracy, or a democracy by repre-
fentation, as it is in fimple ariftocracy, ogligarchy,
or monarchy, and in all poflible combinations and
mixtures of them. This tendency can neve? be
eradicated ; it can only be watched and controuled :
and the whole art of government confifts in com-
bining the powers of fociety in fuch a manner,
that it fhall not prevail over the laws. The ex-
.cellence of the Spartan and Roman conftitutions
lay in this ; that they were mixtures which did re-
ftrain it, in fome meafure, for a long period, but
never perfectly. Why? Becaufe the mixture was
not equal. The balance of three branches is alone
adequate to this end ; and one great reafon is, be-
eaufefit gives way to human nature fo far, as to
determine who is the firft man. Such is the con-
ftitution of men's minds, that this queftion, if
undecided, will for ever diforder the ftate. It is

a queftion

Commonwealth , examine^.

a quedion that mufl be decided* whatever blood
or wounds it may occafion, in every fpecies of gre-
garious animals as well as men. This point, in
the triple divifion of power, is always determined ;
and this alone is a powerful argument in favour of
fuch a form. Our author's Right Conftitution is
the word of all .poflible forms in this refpect ;
there are more pretenders ; the choice of means
is multiplied ; the worft men have too much in-
fluence in the decifion, more, indeed, than the
bed ; and the whole executive and judicial pow-
ers, and the public treafure too, will be prodi-
tuted to the decifion of this ppint. In the (late
of nature, when favage brutal man ranged the fo-
reds with all his fellow-creatures, this mighty
conteft was decided with nails and teeth, fids,
(tones, and clubs, in fingle combats, between all
that dared to pretend. Amidd all the refinements
of humanity, and all the improvements of civil
life, the fame nature remains, and war, with more
ferious and dreadful preparations* and rencounters
of greater numbers, mud prevail, until the decifion
takes place. " The people" fays our author,
<c Were cheated through their own neglecl, and
" bedowing too much confidence and tjud upon
" fuch as they thought their friends." And could
he quote an indance from all hidory 0f a people
who have not been cheated ; who have not been
negligent ; who have not bedowed too much con-
fidence and truft upon fuch as they thought their
friends ; who have not fwerved from the rules of
a free date, by lengthening power in hands that
hold it ? Can he give a plaufible reafon to hope
that fuch a people will ever appear ? On the con-
trary, is it not demondrable that fuch a people is
impoflible, without a miracle and a renovation of
the fpecies. Why, then, ihould the people be

bribed

412 Tie right Conftitution of a

bribed to betray themfelves ? Putting the exe-
cutive power into their hands is bribing them to
their own deftruftion ; putting it into the hands
of their reprefentatives is the fame thing, with
this difference for the worfe, that it gives more
opportunity to conceal the knavery : giving the
executive power to the fenate is nearly the fame,
for it will be in that cafe ufed in bribes, to elevate
certain fenatorial families. All projects of go-
vernment, formed upon a fuppofition of continual
vigilance, fagacity, virtue, and firmnefs of the
people, when poffeffed of the exercife of fupreme
power, are cheats and delufions. The people are
the fountain of power ; they mud, in their con-
ftitution appoint different orders to watch one
another, and give them the alarm in time of dan-
ger. When a firft magifirate, poffeffed of the
executive, can appeal to the people in time of
danger ; when a fenate can appeal to the people ;
and when a houfe of commons can appeal to the
people ; when it is the intereft of each, in its
turn, to appeal to the people ; when felf-prefer-
vation caufes fuch appeal ; then, and then only,
can the people hope to be warned of every dan-
ger, and be put conftantly on their guard, kept
conftantly vigilant, penetrating, virtuous, and
fteady : when their attention, too, is fixed only
upon the prefervation of the laws, and they can-
not be diverted, like apes, by throwing the nuts
of the executive power among them, to divide
them. When they have any thing to do with the
executive power, they think of nothing elfe but
fcrambling for offices, and neglect altogether the
Jegiflature and the laws, which are their proper
department. All the flagitious enormities of ab-
folute monarchy will be pra&ifed by the demo-

cratical

Commonwealth, examined. 4 1 3

cratical defpot, triumvirs, decemvirs, who get pof-
feflion of the confidence of the majority.

Florence teftifies the fame truth : " Even when
" it feemed mod free, it was ever the bufmefs of
" one upflart or other, either in the fenare or
cc among the people, to make way to their own
cc ambitious ends, and hoift themfelves into a
" kingly pofture through the people's favour ; as
" Savanarola, Soderino, and the Medici, whofe
" family fixed itfelf in a dukedom. Nor c:-m it
<c be forgotten how much of monarchy of late
66 crept into the United Provinces."

The conclufion is, that " fmce the intereft of
" monarchy" (that is, arbitrary power, or the
government of men) * ' may refide in a cofiful as
" well as in a king ; in a dictator as well as in a
" conful ; in the hands of many as well as of a
<c fingle perfon ; and that its cuftom hath been to
*c lurk under every form, in the various turns of
•" government ; it concerns every people, in a ftate
" of freedom, to keep clofe to the rules of a free
" ftate for the turning out of monarchy, whether
<c limple or compound, both name and thing, in
" one or many ; fo they ought ever to have a re-
" njerend and noble refpeft of fuch founders of free
" dates and commonwealths, as (hall block up
" the way againfl monarchic tyranny, by declar-
" ing for the liberty df the people, as it confifts
" in a due and orderly fucceffion of authority in
" their fupreme aflemblies;" that is, for himielf,
Oliver Cromwell, and their party, for no other
fuch founders of commonwealths had then ever
exifted. The true conclufion from all the reafon-
ing, and all the examples, under this fecond head
of Error in Policy, ought to have been, that ar-
bitrary power, or the intereft of monarchy, or the
government of men, cannot be prevented, nor

the

414 The right Conflltutlon of a

the government of laws fupported, but by mixing
the powers of the one, the few, and the many, in
equal proportions in the legiflature j by feparat-
ing the executive from the legiflative power, and
the judical department from both.

The third error in policy is," keeping the peo-
" pie ignorant of thofe ways and means that are
<c eflentially neceflary for the perfervation of their
** liberty; for implicit faith and blind obedience
" hath hitherto pafled current, and been equally
" preffed and prattifed by grandee?, both fpi-
*c ritual and temporal, upon the people." — Under
this head our author merits all the approbation
and praife that can be beftowed upon him. The
inftruction of the people, in every kind of know-
ledge rhat can be of ufe to them in the practice
of their moral duties, as men, citizens, and Chrif-
tians, and of their political and civil duties, as
members of fociety and freemen, ought to be the
care of the public, and of all who have any mare
in the conduct of its affairs, in a manner that
never yet has been practifed in any age or nation.
The education here intended is not merely that of
the children of the rich and noble, but of every
rank and clafs of people, down to the loweft and
the pooreft. It is not too much to fay, that
fchools for the education of all mould be placed
at convenient diftances, and maintained at the
public expence. The revenues of the (late would
be applied infinitely better, more charitably, wife-
ly, ufefully, and therefore politically, in this way,
than even in maintaining the poor. This would
be the bed way of preventing the exiftence of the
poor. If nations mould ever be wife, inftead of
creeling thoufands of ufelcfs offices, or engaging
in unmeaning wars, they will make a fundament-

*•£ al

Commonwealth, examined. 415

tal maxim of this, that no human being {hall
grow up in ignorance. In proportion as this is
done, tyranny will difappear, kings and nobles
will be made to feel their equitable equality with
commoners, and commoners will fee their intereft
and duty to refpecl: the guardians of the laws ; for
guardians they muft have as long as human na-
ture endures. There is no room to doubt that
the fchools, academies, and univerfities, the
ftage, the prefs, the bar, pulpit, and parliament,
might all be improved to better purpofe than
they have been in any country for this great pur*
pofe. The emanations of error, folly, and vice,
which proceed from all thefe fources, might be
leflened, and thofe of wifdom, virtue, and truth,
might be increafed ; more of decency and dignity
might be added to the human character in high
and low life ; manners would affift the laws, and
the laws reform manners : and impoflure, fuper-
flition, knavery, and tyranny, be made afhamed to
mow their heads before the wifdom and integrity,
decency and delicacy, of a venerable public opi-
nion.— But it is in vain that our author endeavours
to throw the blame of impreffing implicit faith and
blind obedience upon grandees fpiritual and tem-
poral ; for the grandees he contends for, both
fpiritual and temporal, I mean the firft man and
other principal members of his fucceflive repre-
fentative aflemblies,will have as much occafion to
keep the people in ignorance, and more opportu-
nity to conceal truth and propagate falfehood,
than thofe whom he calls (landing powers. All
intelligence and information will be directed to
them ; they may conceal what they will, and
they will conceal every thing they can from their
adverfaries the minority, and even much from their
own followers. It is a mixed government alone

that

The right Conftltutlon of a

* ' t ' '~ ' fl*. r*3 V* : '

that can bear that truth and knowledge fhould be
communicated freely to the people ; and in a mix-
ed government alone can the people compel all men
'to communicate fuch information as ought to be
laid before them. The majority in a fingle
aflfembly can conceal much from the minority,
indeed almoil what they will ; but the crown, nor
its miniflers, can conceal any thing from an houfe
of reprefentatives which they ought to know.

It is very true, that a people who have declared
themfelves '* a free ftate, mould know what free-
" dom is, and have it reprefented in all its lively
" and lovely features, that they may grow zealous
" and. jealous over it. They mould alfo be
?' .'made acquainted, and thoroughly inftrufted in
" the means and rules of its prefervation againft
" the adulterous wiles and rapes of any projecting
" fophifters that may arife." — How different from
this, alas ! is the deplorable (late of mankind !
" Ce n'eft, qu'n Angleterre, ou Ton pourroit faire
" ni avoir des livres fur des conftitutions, " faid
one of the mod enlightened ambafladors in Eu-
rope : and it is but a very few years fince a French
gentleman anfwered a foreigner, who enquired for
the bed book upon the conftitution of France,
" Monfieur, c'eft TAlmanach Royal/'

" The fourth error in policy hath been the re-
" gulation of affairs by reafons of (late, not by
" the ftri&.rule of honefty." — It is unnecerTary to
follow our author through Greece and Italy, the
Old Teftament and the New, through France,
Spain, and England, for inftances of this raggione
de flato, this kingcraft and prieft craft ; it is well
enough known : but it may be pradifed with more
facility in a fimpie democracy than in any other

government.

Commonwealth, examined. 417

government. The leaders ©f a majority have only
toalicdge " reafon of ftate" to juftify themfelves
to their par tifans for every fpecies of tyranny and
oppreflichi over the minority, until they become
ftrong enough toalledge the fame " reafon of ftate>f
to juftify their tyranny over their own party.

44 Permitting of the legiflative and executive
44 powers of a flate to reft in one and the fame
44 hands and perfons.-^By the legiflative pow-
44 er we underftand, the power of making, alter-
44 ing, or repealing laws, which, in all well-order-
" ed governments, hath ever been lodged in a fuc-
44 ceilion of the fupreme councils or affemblics of
44 a nation. — By the executive power we mean
44 that power which is derived from the other, and
44 by their authority transferred into the hands of
44 one perfon called a prince, or into the hands of
44 many called ftates, for the adminiftration of
44 government in the execution of thofe laws*
44 In the keeping of thefe two powers dijtind^
44 flowing in diftintf channels, fo that they may
44 never meet in one, fave upon fome fhort extraor*
44 dinary occafion, conflfls the fafety of the ft ate*
44 The reafon is evident,becaufe if thelaw*makersl
44 (who ever have the fupreme power) mould be
" alfo the conftant adminiftrators and difpenferS
44 of law and juftice, then by confequencc the peo-
44 pie would be left without remedy in cafe of in*
44 juftice, fince no appeal can lie under heaven
44 qgainft fuch as have the fupremacy ; which, if
44 once admitted, were inconfiftent with the very
44 inteut and natural import of true policy, which
14 ever fuppofeth that' men in power may be un-
44 righteous, and therefore, prefuming the worft,
44 points always, in all determinations, at the enor-
*4 mities and remedies of government, on the be-

VOL. III. 3 H " half

The right Constitution of a

44 half of the people. — For the clearing of this, it
44 is worthy,yourobfervation,that in all kingdoms
44 and dates whatfoever, where they haye had any
4 ' thing of freedom among them, the 'legiflative
44 and executive powers have been managed in
44 diftinft hands ; that is to lay, the law-makers
44 have fet down laws as rules of government, and
44 then put po-wer into the hands of others, not their
44 own, to govern by thofe rules ; by which means
44 the people were happy, having no governors but
44 fuch as were liable to give an account of govern-
44 ment to the fupreme council of law-makers.
44 And on the other fide, it is no lefs worthy of a
41 very ferious obfervat ion, that kings and {landing
44 ftates never became abfolute over the people,
44 till they brought both the making and execution j
44 of laws into their own hands ; and as this ufur-
44 pat ion of theirs took place by degrees, fo un-
44 limited arbitrary power crept up into the throne,
44 there to domineer over the world, and defy the
44 liberties of the people."

Let us paufe here with aftonifhment. A per-
fon who had read the former part of the book with j
attention, would think thefe words a complete re-
futation of his whole " Right Conftitution of a
44 Commonwealth." — The wholedriftofthebook
before this was to prove, that all authority fhould
be collected into one centre; that the whole legif-
latiVe and judicial power, as well as the executive,
was to be vefted in fucceflive fupreme fovereign
aflemblies of the people's representatives; and our
endeavour has been to (how, that this would na-
turally be applied to corruption in ele&ion, to
promote divirion, faftion, (edition, -and rebellion.
All this is now very frankly admitted, and " the
44 fafety of the date" depends upon placing the
power of making laws, of executing them, and ad-

mlnifterincr

Commonwealth, examined. 4.19

miniilering juftice, in different bands. But how is
this to be done ? bt The executive power, our
author tells us, " is derived from the legiflative ;
" and by their authority transferred into the hand
44 of one peribn called a prince, or into the hands
" of many called ftates, for the adminiftration of
" government in the execution of thofe laws.1'
This is totally denied. The executive power is
not naturally, nor neceiTarlly, and ought never to
be in fad, derived from the legiflative. The body
of the people, according to our author and to
truth, is the fountain and original of all power and
authority, executive and judicial, as well as le*
giflative ; and the executive ought to be appointed
by the people, in the formation of their conftitu-
tion, as much as the legiflative. The executive
reprefents the majefty, perfons, wills, and power
of the people in the adminiftration of govern-
ment and difpenfing of laws, as the legiflative does
in making, altering, and repealing them. The
executive reprefents the people for one purpbfe,as
much as the legiflative does for another; and the
executive ought to be as diftinft and independent
of the legiflative, as the legiflative is of that. — •
There is no more truth, nature, or propriety, in
faying that the executive is derived from the legif-
lative, than that the legiflative isderivedfrom the
executive: both are derived from the people. It
is as untrue to fay that theexecutive power is tranf-
ferredby the authority of the legiflative into the
hands of a prince, as it would be to fay that the
legiflative power was transferred by the authority
of the prince/into the hands of a legiflative afTem-
bly. The people may, indeed, by their conflitu-
tion, appoint the houfe of reprefentatives, to re-
prefent them in watching theexecutivemagiftrateSp
and in accufing them of mifrnle and mifclemean^

oura

ight Conftitution of &

'.-•-.' '

ours : they may appoint a fenate to reprefent
them, in hearing and determining upon thofe ac-
cufations.-~-The people are reprefented by every
power and body in the ftate, and in every aft they
do. So the people are reprefented in courts of
juftice by the judges and juries, grand and petit,
in hearing and determining complaints againil
minifters of the executive power, as well as mem-
bers of the fenate and the houfe. It is true the
body of the people have authority, if they pleafe,
tq impower the legifjative aflembly or aflemblies
to appoint the executive power, by appointing a
prince, prefjdent, governor, podefta,dpge, or king,
and to call him by which of thefe names they
pleafe ; but it would be a fatal error in policy to
do it, becaufe it would in fa6t amount to the fame
thing which our author feemed to contend for
through his whole book, and which he now allows
to be inconfiftent with the fafety of the ftate,
viz,, a union of the legislative and executive pow-
ers in the fame hands. Whoever appoints bifhops
^nd judges will diftatc law and goipel : whoever
appoints a general will command the army, an ad-
miral the fleet : any executor of the law will have
it executed a,s he will. It makes the executive
power a mere tool of the legiflative, and the prince
a weathercock blown about by the leading mem*
ber of the hpufe, Every commiflion will be cHf--
pofed of as the lord and matter in the houfe fhall
rfired ; military difcipline will bow before .his
nod ; and the judicial power mufl have the fame
complaifance: fo that both executive and judicial
powers will be proftituted to corrupt the people in
elections, and the members, of the houfe, as much
as if a.11 thefe powers were exercifed in the houfe,
$ndall the legiflative, executive, and judicial pow-
£rs IQ th? fame tiands^ the ftate unfafe, the people

left

Commonwealth, examined. 4.31

left without remedy, in cafe of injuftlce, but by an
appeal to heaven, by onr author's own confeffion, —
*4 In all free flates, the legiflative and executive
46 powers have been managed in diftinft hands,"
fays our author : " i, e. the law-makers have fet
44 down rules, and then put power into the hands
44 of others to govern by thofe rules." J wonder
where. In Sparta the executive power was in the
kings, hereditary kings, not appointed by the fe*
nate, or either of the popular affemblies, that of
the city, or that for the country ; in Athens the
executive power was in the archons ; in Rome,
firft in kings, and then in confuls, through all the
period of the republic : but, what is worfe, fome
important executive powers werereferved in the
hands of the ienate in Sparta, in the popular af-
femblies in Athens, in the fenate in Rome; that
is, the executive and legiflative powers were fo far
united, which finally produced the ruin of all of
them. In fhort, our author is perfeftly right in
his rule, that the two powers ought to be diftindr,
and in the fatal effe&s of their union ; but totally
wrong in deriving one from the other, and in his
examples to {hew they ever werefo derived. But
as the feparation and divifion of authority, for the
prefervation of equity, equality, and liberty, in op*
pofition to, the union of it fimply in one, the few,
or the many, is the end, of all the pains we have
taken upon this fubjeft, not a word of afliitance
afforded us by our author ought to be loft. He
goes on : '* Cicero, in bisfecond book De Officiis,
»" and his third De Legibus, fpeaking of the firft
44 inftitution of kings, tells us, how they were at
44 firft left to govern at their own difcretion with-
44 out laws. Then their wills and their words were
t4 law ; the making and execution of laws were in
44 one and the? -fame hands. But what was the

44 confequence f

The right Conflitution of a

44 confequence ? Nothing bat injuftice, and in-
44 juftice without remedy, till the people were
*4 taught by neceffity to ordain laws, as rules
44 whereby they ought to govern. Then began
44 the meeting of the people fucceffively in their
44 flipremeafTemblies to make laws, whereby kings,
44 in fuch places as continued under the kingly
44 form, were limited and retrained, To that they
44 could do nothing in government but what was
44 agreeable to law, for which they were accounta-
44 ble, as well as other officer's were in other forms
44 of government, to thofe fupreme councils and
44 aflemblies. Witnefs all the old ftories of Athens-,
44 Sparta, and other countries of Greece, where
'* you fh&ll find, that the law-making and the law-
44 executing powers were placed in diflincl hands
44 under every form of government ; for fo much
44 of freedom they retained ftill under every form,
44 till they were both fwallowed up, as they were
44 feveral times, by an abfolute domination. — In
44 old Rome we find Romulus, their firft king, cut
b4 in pieces by the fenate, for taking upon him to
" make and execute laws at his own pleafure: and
** Livy tells us, that the reaibn why they expelled
*4 Tarquin, their laft king, was, becaufe he took
44 the executive and legislative powers both into
44 his own hands, making himfelf both legiflator
44 and officer, inconfultofenatu, 4 without advice,
** and in defiance of the fenate.' Kings being ca-
•4 flrered, then their (landing fenates came in play,
** who, making and executing laws by decrees of
44 their own, foon grew intolerable, and put the
44 people upon divers defperate adventures, to get
4<r the kgiflative power out of their hands, and
44 place it in their own, that is, in a fucceffion of
44 their fnpreme afTemblies : but the executive
44 power they left, part in the hands of officers of

44 their

Commonwealth, examined. 4.23

" their own, and part in the fenate; in which ftate
44 it continued fome hundreds of years, to the great
44 happinefs and content of all, till the fenate, by
44 fleights and fubtilties, got both powers into
44 their own pofleffion again, and turned all into
44 confuilon. — Afterwards their emperors, though
44 usurpers, durft not at firft turn both thefe pow-
44 ers into the channel of their own unbounded
44 will; but did it by degrees, that they might
44 the more infenfibly deprive the people of their
4C liberty, till at length they openly made and exe-
44 cuted laius at their own pleajure, being both le-
44 gifla tors and officers, without giving an account
44 to any : and To there was an end of the Roman
44 liberty. — To come nearer home, let us look
44 into the old conftitution of the commonwealths
44 and kingdoms of Europe. We find in the Italian,
44 ftates Venice, which having the legiflative and
*4 executive power confined within the narrow
44 pale of its nobility in the fenate, is not fb free
44 as once Florence was, with Siena, Milan, and
44 the reft, before their dukes, by arrogating both
44 thofe powers to themielves, wormed them out
*4 of their liberty. — Of all thofe'ftates, only Ge-
44 noa remains in a free pofture, by keeping the
44 power of legiilation only In their fbpreme af-
44 femblies, and leaving the execution of law in a
" titular duke and a council. The keeping of
44 thefe powers afunder, within their proper fphere,
44 is one principal reafon why they have been able
44 to exclude tyranny out of their own ftate, while
44 it hath run the round in Ifaly. — What made
44 the Grand Signior abfolute of old, but his en-
** groffing both thefe powers ? and of late the
44 kings of Spain and France? In antient times
44 the cafe flood far otherwife ; for in Ambro-
*4 flo Morales his Chronicle you will find, that in

" Spain

424. ' *fhe right Constitution of a

44 Spain the legiflative power was lodged only in1
44 their fupreme council, and their king was no
44 more but an elective officer, to execute fuch laws
44 as they made, and, in cafe of failing, to give
44 them an account, and fubmit to their judgments,
44 which was the common practice, as you may fee
44 alfo in Mariana. It was fo alfo in Aragon, till
*-* it was united to Caftile by the marriage of Fer-
44 diand and Ifabella ; and then both ftates fbon
44 loft their liberty, by the projects of Ferdinand
44 andhisfuccefTors, who drew the powers of lc*
44 giflation and execution of law within the verge
44 and influence of the prerogative royal : whilft
44 thefe twj powers -were kept diflintt, then thefe
44 ft ate s 'were free ; but the engrqffing of them in
44 one and the Jame hands, was the lofs of theif
44 freedom. — France like wife was once as free a$
u any nation under heaven : though the king of
44 late hath done all, and been all in all, till the
44 time of Lewis the Eleventh he was no more but
44 an officer of ftate, regulated by law, to fee the
44 laws put in execution, and the legiflative power
44 refted in theaffembly of the three eflates ; but
14 Lewis, by fnatching both thefe powers into the
"r Jingle hands ofhimfelfzud his fucceflbrs, rooked
44 them out of their liberty, which they may now
44 recover again, if they have but fo much man-
44 hood as to reduce the two powers into their an-
46 tient, or into better channels. — This pattern of
44 Lewis was followed clofe by the late king of
44 England (Charles the Firft.) /ho, byourantient
44 laws, was the -fame here that Lewis ought to
44 have been in France, an officer in truft, to fee
44 to the execution of the laws ; but by aiming at
44 the fame ends which Lewis attained, and ftrain-
44 ing, by the ruin of parliaments, to reduce the /<?-
44 gifiative power, as well as the executive > into his

4

Commonwealth, examined,

"f own hands, he, inftead of an abfolute tyranny ^
44 which might have followed his projeft, brought
** a fwift deftruftion upon himfelf and his family.
44 Thus you fee it appears, that the keeping of thefe
44 two powers diftintf hath been a ground prefer-
44 vative of the people's intereft, whereas their
44 uniting hath been its ruin all along in fo many
44 ages and nations."

ThispafTage at large, in the author's own Words,
has been quoted with pleafure, becaufe, although
the accuracy of it in every particular cannot be
anfwered for, the principle and examples are good,
and he might have added as many more examples
as there were or had been flmple governments in
the world. It is in mrxed governments alone
where thefe two powers are feparated. But the
misfortune is, that our author contends for a mixed
government, and a feparation of thelegiflative and
executive powers, in name and appearance only*
If.tbe executive is appointed by, or derived from,
the legiflative, it is ftill in eflence but one power,
arid in the fame hands. It is inaccurate to fay, that
in 46 Athens and Sparta" the law-making and law-
executing powers were placed in diftinfit hands
under every form of government : it would be
nearer the truth to fay, that they were free and
happy in proportion as they feparated thefe pow-
ers. But the fa6i is, thefe powers were never
wholly feparated : part of the executive always
was in the legiflative, andfometimes all of it, and
thefe errors proved their ruin. When u the exe*
44 cutive power was left by the people of Rome
44 partly in the hands of officers of their own, and
44 partly in the fenate," it war* a continual objedt
of jealoufy and contention between the fenate and
people. Whether France was ever 44 as free as any
*4 nation under heaven," or not, may be learned

VOL. Ill, 3 I from

¥hc right Constitution of &

from Boulainvilliers *,- Abbe de Mablyf, and!
M. MoreauJ.

To read through the voluminous hiilories of
Father Daniel, Mez^eray, Veilly, and confult ori-
ginal authorities, as Gregory of Tours, FroifTart,
Sec. would be a tedious enterprise, and, after all,
the controversy would remain. Boulainvilliers
Contends that^ France was a republic, and that the
feudal lords had a right to make war upon the
kings and upon one another : but it was, ac-
cording to him, but an ariftocracy. M. Moreau,
who examines all the other writers, as Boulain-
villiers, Du Bos, De Mably, &c. contends that the
monarchs have ever been abfolute: but at what
period the common people, fuch as farmers,* me-
chanics, merchants, Sec. were admitted to a vote
in the choice of their rulers, even of the procu-
rators of cities and boroughs which compofed the
third eitate, the public would yet be glad to be
informed. Lewis the Sixteenth has the unrival-
led glory of admitting the people to a (hare in the
government. Upon what grounds our author
could pretend that France was ever as free as any
nation under heaven is utterly incomprehensible.
The kings, nobles, and clergy, were fuch flanding
powers as our author detefled j and the third
cftate was very far from being an adequate repre-
fentation of the people : fo that the affemblies of
the dates, and the ancient parliaments, were by no
means fucceilions of the people's fovereign af-
femblies. The conflitutions of the cortes in Caf-
;tile, Arragon, Portugal, and all the other kingdoms
now united under the kings of Spain or Portu-

J - -4F •( '• P

* Etat de la France. Lcttres fur les aneieas Parlcmens
cle France.

•^p Obiervations fur 1'Hiftoire de France.
$ Difeours lur 1'Hiftoire de France.

Commonwealth, examined- .4.27

,gai, were equally repugnant to our author's fyf-
tem, and equally deftruftive of it*. Upon this
head a judgment may be formed, by confulting
Geddes's Hiftory of the Wars of the Commons of
Caflile, and his Vie w of a Cortes aflbmbled at
Toledo in 1406.

44 Reducing tranla£ions and the intcrefls of the
4* public into the difpolition and power of a few
" particular perfons.— The consequences have
44 been, that matters were not carried by fair de-
44 bate, but by deflgn and furprife ; not by deli-
44 beration of %the people in their open alTemblies,
44 but according to premeditated refolutions, and
" foreftalments of crafty projectors in private
44 juntos ; not according to the true interefl of
44 flate, but in order to the fcrving of men's ends 4
44 not for the benefit and improvement of the peo-
•*fc pie, but to keep them under, as ignorant of
44 true liberty, as the horfe and mule, to be bri-
44 died, faddled, and ridden., tinder the wile pre-
^4 tence cf being governed and kept in order.
44 But the grand and worie confeqilence of all
44 hath been this, that inch colleagues, partners,
*' and engrofTers of power, having once brought
A* about their -ends by lying practices upon the
44 people, have ever fallen into fits of emulation
44 againfl themfclves ; and their .next deiign hath
4; ever been to rook their fellows, and rid them-
44 felves of competitors, fo that at length they
44 have been their own executioners, and ruined
*'* one another: and the people having by this
" means been torn with civil diffeniions and
44 the miferies of war, by being drawn into par-
I A4 ties, according to their feveral humours andaf-

* Alifcellaneous Trafts, vol. Ju

•" fedions,

4.28 "The right Conftitution of a

" fe£tions, the ufual event ever was, that in the
" end they have been feixed as the prey of fome
" fingle tyrant."

It muft be confefTed our author underftands
himfelf and his fubject very well ; he is aware of
all the difficulties and dangers, but yet he will not
fee, or will not confefs, that his own Right Con-
ftitution remains expofed to all their ravages,
without the {mailed provifion to defend it. How
will it be poflible, in a (ingle fovereign aflembly,
to prevent tranfa£tions and public interefts falling
into the difpofition of a few P How will it be pof-
lible that matters mould always be carried by I
friendly debate, and not by defign and furprife,
by premeditated refolutions of crafty projectors in j
private cabinets ; not according to public inte-
refl, but private ends; not for the benefit of the
people, but to keep them in ignorance, to be
bridled and ridden ?• Howcanfuch colleagues and
partners be prevented from impofing lying prac-
tices on the people, from emulation, envy, and
jealoufy among themfelves; and from rooking one:'
another? How {hall the people be prevented from,
being torn with civil diflenfions, and drawn into
parties, by their feveral humours, principles, fu-
perftitions, prejudices, fancies, and affections?!
and how (hall all this be prevented from ending
in a (ingle tyranny ? Not one check, not the leaft
reftraint, no appearance of balance or controul,
is once mentioned or thought of: for an executive
appointed by the legiflative will be none at all ; it
will only facilitate intrigue and artifice, to diiguife
and conceal the blackeft defigns. The example
of " the thirty tyrants of Athens" is a proof of
this. " Xenophon tells us, they drew the deter- !
u ruinations of all things into their own clofets,
to manage them ' calculis et fuffra-

" giis

Commonwealth, examined. 4.20

" giis populi,' by the deliberations and votes of
44 the people, whom they had brought to their
44 own devotion in the aflembly, to countenance
44 their proceedings ;" — "and their "cuftom was, if
44 any fort of men complained and murmured at
44 their doings, or appeared for the public, imme-
44 diately to fnap them off, by the lofs of life or
»" fortune, under pretence of being fedifious ^nd
44 turbulent fellows againfl the peace of their ty-
44 ranny." But will not fiu:h thirty, or lefs num-
ber of tyrants, arife in every fingle fovereign af-
fembly, and behave in the fame manner ? In a re-
prefentative affembly they may take offa trouble -
ibme member in an eafier manner, by applying
the executive and judicial powers, and the public
treafure, among his conftituents, to have him re-
jetted or left out at the next election. 44 The
44 event of the thirty tyrants, combination was a
44 civil war, which ended in their banilhment ; but
44 a new junto often men got into their places,
" whofe government proving little lefs odious than
44 the former, gave occafion to. newchanges, which
44 never left fhifting till they fell into a fingle ty-
44 ranny." If 44 the wilder fort of people, having
44 by a fad experience felt the fruits of their own
44 error, in following the lufls of particular power-
44 ful perfons, grew wife, and combining with the
•4 honefter fort, they all, as one man, fet their
44 moulders to. the work, and reftored the primi-
44 tive majefly and authority of their fupreme af-
44 femblies," how long did it lafl ? Ariilides him-
fe if began to deftroy it, Thcmiftocles did more,
Pericles more ftill, and Alcibiades iinifhed the
ruin. It is not poifible to fay that the Athenian
conftitution operated as a fteady fyftem of liberty
for one moment ; becaufe, although a multitude
of checks played in it, there was no fettled ba-
lance.

43° fhc right Conflitution of a

lance. The example from Herodotus, book ii.
is (lill more deciflve in pur favour, and againfl
our author : " Monarchy being abolifhed in
Ac Egypt after the death of Icing Setho, and a de-
. ** claration publifbed for the freedom of the peo-
44 pie, immediately the adminiftration of all af-
44 fairs wasengrofTed iu the hands of twelve gran-
" dees (or popular men, principes populi) who,
44 having made themfelves fecure againft the peo-
44 pie, in a few years fell to quarrelling with one
44 another, as the manner is, about their afhare in
** the government. ' This drew the people into
44 feveral parties, and a civil war enfued, wherein
" Pfammeticus, one of the twelve, having flam
44 all his partners, left the people in the lurch,
*' and feated himfelf, inflead of a free ilate, in a
*4 fingle tyranny." Our autiior might have quoted
the example of the apoftles themfelves, who fell
into difputes who fhoukl be the firft in the king-
dom they thought approaching. — The two trium-
virates are illuflrious, among thoulands of other
examples equally appofite. Pompy, Ca^far, and
CraiTus, drew the affairs of the world into their
hands, determining all in a private junto, without
the advice or the confent of the fenate or people,
u unlefs itwerenowand then tomakeftalkinghorfes
i4 of them, for the more clear conveyance of fome
i4 unpleafing defign." ; Thefe men, having made
" an agreement among themfelves, that nothing
*4 mould be done in the commonwealth but what
" pleafed their own humour, it was not long be-
Ai fore the fpirit of ambition fet them flying at the
i; faces of one another, and drew the whole world
w upon the ftage, to ad that bloody tragedy,
-" whofe cataflrophe was the death of Pompey,
64 and the dominion of Caefar." — " The fecond trj-
** iimv irate was between Qdavius, Lepidus, and

64 Antonyf

Commonwealth, examined*

" Antony. Thefe having fliared the world be-
*4 tween them, prefently fell to bandying againft
44 one another ; Auguftus, picking a quarrel with
44 Lepidus, gave him a lift out of his authority,
44 and confined him to a clofe imprifbnment in the
44 city ; next he picks a quarrel with Antony,
44 begins a new civil war, in which he ruined
44 Antony, and feated himfelf in the enjoyment
44 of a fingle tyranny.'*" But our author mould
have remembered, that all this was after the fe-
nate had loft its authority, and the people, in
their affemblies, afTumed all power; and he
fhould have been fenfible, that thus it will and
muft ever be, in all fimple governments, to the
end of the world.

44 In the great conteft between Henry the
14 Third and the Barons, about the liberties of
44 themfelves and the people, the king being forc-
44 ed at length to yield to the lords, inftead of
44 freeing the nation, engrofFed all power into their
*4 own hands, under the name of the twenty-four
44 confervators of the kingdom, and became toti-
44 dem tyranni,attingallin their own names, neg-
44 letting or over-ruling parliaments ; but then,
44 not agreeiitgamong themfelves, there were three
44 or four of them who defeated the other twenty,
44 and drew the entire management of affairs into
44 their own hands, viz. the earls of Leicefter,
44 Gloucefter, Hereford, and Spencer :- yet it con-
44 tinned not long ; for Leicefter getting all into
44 his power, fell at enmity with Gloucefter, and
44 was defeated by him. At length Leicefter,
*4 putting his fortune to a batttej was flain ; and
the king thereupon getting all power back
again, took advantage of that opportunity for
greatening himfelf and his prerogative. All
the people got by the effufion of their blood

44 and

44

4.3 2 fhe right Constitution of a

44 and lofs of their peace was, that inftead of one
44 tyrant they had twenty-four, and then four ;
44 and after them a (ingle ufurper, Montford, earl
44 of Leicefter ; and he being gone, they were
44 forced to ferve their old tyrant Henry the
44 Third again, who by this means became the
44 more fecure and firm in his tyranny." — And are
not all thefe examples, and millions of others that
happen in every village, hamlet, and burgade in
the world (for in all thefe there are contentions
for precedence, and men who would rather be
there the firft than the fecond in Rome as fin -
cerely as Ca?far) enough to convince the people
and popular writers of the ncceffity of more than
one branch of power, and indeed of more than
two? The fingle ftruggle for the firft place mud
eternally diftraft every fimple government, and
muft difturb every one that has only two branches*
Unlefs there is a legal, conftitutional, and habi-
tual mode of always determining who mall be
foremoft, there can be no tranquillity among
mankind. Grave exhortations to fingle aflem-
blies, whether fenates or reprefentatives, not to
permit public tranfa&ions to be engrofled, and
reft in the power of a few particular perions, will
be thrown away ; for, flich are the contradictions
in the human character, the multitude who have
no hopes of being intruded, are as fervile, as the
few who have, are afpiririg; and, upon the whole,
there is more fuperiority in the world given than
afTumed.

44 Driving offa&ions and parties. — Faction de*
44 ftroyed Rome : the factions, headed by the two
44 potent families of Hannibal and Hanno, de-
" llroyed Carthage. Faction made Rome floop
44 to Caefar ; Athens to Pififlratus. Faction let

44 the

Commonwealth, examined. 4.33

C4 the Turk into Conftantinople and Hungary ;
" the Goths and Vandals into Spain and Italy ;
44 the Romans into Jerufalem : it fubje&ed Ge-
4i noatothe family of Sforz.a, dukes of Milan;
" brought the Spaniard into Sicily and Naples ;
ki and the French into Milan, where they oufted
" Sforza." — To thefe inftances might be added
as many as you pleafe ; but it is amazing that all
that have happened, have not been fufficient to
fhew the neceflity of a government fo mixed that
fa&ions may always be ruled. There can be no
faction but of the one, the few, or the many;
and a triple balance of equal powers aifords a
never-failing remedy againft either ; and if either
of thefe is wanting, there is always not only a
poflibility and a probability, but an abfolute cer-
tainty, of one fpecies of fa&ion arifing, againft
which the conftitution affords no defence.

" Violation of faith, principles, promifes, and
44 engagements," an " impiety that ought to be
64 exploded out of all nations that bear the name
64 of Chriftians ;" and yet we find it often pafs
among the lefs difcerning 44 fort of men for ad-
" mirable policy ;" and thofe importers that ufed
ij: 44 have had the luck to be efteemed the only
44 politicians."--Our author wifely and nobly con-
demns the reafoning of Machiavel in his Prince,
44 that becaufe the greateft part of the world
" being wicked, unjuft, deceitful, full of trea-
44 chery and circumvention, there is a neceflity
44 thatthofewhoaredownright,andconfinethem-
44 felves to the ftrid rules of honefty, muft ever
'4 look tobe over-reached by theknavery of others.
He quotes too from Machiavel : 4t This part hath
" been covertly fliewed to mankind by antient
44 writers; who fay that Achilles, and many others

VOL. III. 3 K

434 The right Conftitution of &

" of thofe antient princes, were intruded to Chi-
" ron the Centaur, to be brought up under his
" difcipline. The moral of this, having for their
*' teacher one that was half a bead and half a
" man, was nothing elfe, but that is was needful
" for a prince to underfland how to make his ad-
" vantage of the one and other nature, becaufe
" neither could fubfid without the other."

Without condemning our fpecies fo far as Ma-
chiavel, by pronouncing the greatefl part wicked ;
or going the length of the antients, in fuppofing
them half beads ; or of fome moderns, in calling
them half devils ; candor, and charity itfelf, mud
allow,, that in all great nations, at lead, there arc
many both wicked, brutal, and diabolical ; and
enough of both to trample on the laws, and .dif-
turb the peace, liberty, and property, of the good
and humane, unlefs pro vifion is made in the con-
flitution to redrain them. In all fimple govern-
ments, the word part of the fpecies are lead con-
trouled, and have mod temptations ; and from
hence arifes a new and drong argument in favour
of fuch a mixture, as (hall guard every avenue to
impodure, and every inlet to vice. Although
the vices and follies of mankind, no more than
their difeafes and bodily infirmities, can never be
wholly eradicated in this mixed date of good and
evil, and we cannot rationally hope that policy
will ever change the earth into heaven, yet the
balance of three branches appears to afford all
that the cenditntion and courieof things will ad-
mit ; at lead all that have hitherto been difco-
vered. It would be folly to fay that no further
improvements can be discovered : the moral and
intellect ual world is as little known as the phyfi*
cal. We may hope, from education, enquiry, and
experiment, great advances ; but until they are

further

,

Commonwealth, examined, 435

farther pnrfned, let ns adopt fuch as have already
been found practicable and ufeful. There is one
alteration which will be found indifpenfible, be-
fore any great meliorations can be made in fo-
ciety and government ; fome more rational me-
thod of determining the people's votes in elec-
tions, and fome effectual provifion againfl cor-
ruption. The cry of family fortune, fome pre-
judice of fuperflition, fome habitual fondnefs, a
prejudice, a whim, a name, too often determine
the votes of multitudes, even when groifer pro-
fligacy has no (hare. The people muft be taught
to be governed more by reafon, and lefs by founds.
The word king, like magic, excites the adora-
tion of fome, and execration of others : fome,
who would obey the lawful orders of a king,
would rebel againfl the fame orders, given by the
fame authority under the name of governors or
prefidcnt : others would cheerfully fubmit to a
governor or prefident, but think rebellion againfl
a king, with only the fame authority, virtue and
merit, and obedience to God. Until the nature
of things are more generally underflood by the
people, and mere founds have lefs influence, it
will be in vain to expert any great improvements.
There is another particular too. in which, I fuf-
pe£V, the people mud change the fundamental
maxim of their policy throughout the world, be-
fore much further improvements will be made.
The people, in all ages and countries, have laid
it down as a rule, that their fervice muft be per-
fectly difmterefled ; no man deferves to be em-
ployed by them, who will not fervc them gratis,
at lead, if not put himfelf to great expence to
procure their votes. The confequences of this
are many. i. No man can ferve them who is not
rich : this is giving up at once their own right of

ele&ion

436 The right Constitution of a

election into the hands of an ariftocracy, and that
charaCteriftic of ariftocracy too which has theleaft
merit in it, mere wealth. 2. This introduces an
univerfal fyftem of Machiavelian hypocrify into
popular elections : and thofe who are moft inte-
refted, moft corrupted, and moft determined to
carry the commodity to market, are the moft libe-
ral in their offers of a price to purchafe it, the moft
oftentatious in profeffions of difinterefted motives.
Ariftides,Fabricius, andCincinnatus, are eternally
quoted, as if fuch characters were always to be
found in fufficient numbers to protect the people's
liberties, and a cry and fhew of pure virtue is fet
up by the moft profligate and abandoned of hu-
man kind, fuch as would fell their fathers, their
country, and their God, for profit, place, and
power. Hypocrify, fimulation, fincfTe, are not
more practiied in the courts of princes then rliey
are in popular elections, nor more encouraged by
kings then people. Unlefs fome means can be j
difcovered to reform the people, and to enlighten
them, to make reCtitu.de, inftead of chicanery, ;
the vifible obvious intcreft both of governors
and governed, it will be in vain to expeCt great
changesfor the better in government. To improve .
this, morals andfcience muftbe improved, extend-
ed, and made more general, if not univerfal ; and,
after all, perfection we know can never be at-
tained in either.

Thefecond objection is, " that fuch a form in
*' the people's hands would caufe confuflon in go-
" vernment." — This objection feems to have been
flatted by his own party, who were afraid of the
influence of royalifts ; and the anfwer to it diftin-
guifhes t wo ftates of a commonwealth ; --one, while
it is new after a revolution, when great numbers j

are

Commonwealth, examined.

are difaffe&ed. Thefe he treats with great feve-
rity, and allows the danger of confufion from their
intrigues ; he therefore excludes them from vot-
ing, or being chofen, and juftifies it by Greek and
Roman examples.

The other is a quiet flate, when all the people
may, he thinks, he admitted to choofe and be cho-
fen without confufion. But as this whole objec-
tion, and anfwer to it, relate to the time and cir-
cumftances in which he wrote, it is unnecefTary to
enlarge upon it ; it is neverthelefs amufing, or pro-
voking, to obferve with what facility he aflerts
the right of the majority to mzkeflaves of the mi-
nority. " Such as have commenced a war, to ferve
44 the lufts of tyrants againft the people's intereft,
44 mould not be received any longer a part of the
46 people, but may be handled as (laves when fub-
44 dued, if their fubduers pleafe fo to ufe them ;
44 becaufe, by their treafons againit the majefty of
44 the people, they have made forfeiture of all their
44 rights and privileges/' The majefty of the peo-
ple is a very venerable, fublime, and affe&ing idea;
but, in human theory, every government, defpo-
tifm, monarchy, ariftocracy, and every mixture,
is created by the people, continued by their fove-
reign will, and reprefents their majefty, their au-
guft body. R.efiftance therefore to adefpotifm, or
fimple monarchy or ariftocracy, or a mixed go-
vernment, is as really treafon againft the majefty
of the people, as when attempted againft a fimple
or reprefentative democracy; fmce the right of
the people to confide their authority and majefty
to one man, or a few men, can no more be doubted
than to a large number. In the divine theory,
upon which moft of the governments of Europe
ftill reft, it is not only treafon, but impiety and
Wafphemy, to refift any government whatever. If

the

The right Conftitution of a

the fovereignty of a nation is a divine right, there
is an end of all the rights of mankind at once ; and
refinance to the fovereignty, wherever placed, is
rebellion againft God.

It is worth while to obferve alfo acontradi&ion
to what our author had advanced in the former
part of his work. " The old commonwealth of
*4 Greece," he fays here, " were wont to heap up
44 all honours they could vent, upon fuch as did
44 or fufFered any thing for the maintenance of
44 their liberties." Under a former head he repre-
fented it as a commendable cuftom of common-
wealths to make their fervice a burthen.

The third objedion is, " that the management
44 of (late affairs requires judgment and expcri-
44 ence, which is not to be expefted from new
44 members coming into thofe affemblies upon
44 every election." — Theanfwer to this objection
is of great importance, becaufe it in effeft, though
not in words, gives up his whole argument in fa-
vour of a fmgle fovereign afTembly. He diftin-
guifties between afta imperii and arcana imperil,
a6ls of {late and fecrets of ftate. By atts of ftate
he means the laws and ordinances of the legiflative
power ; things that have moft influence upon a
commonwealth, as to its ill or well being ; and. the
only remedies for fuch bad cuftoms, inconveni-
ences, and incroachments, as afflict and grieve it.
Matters of grievance being matters of common
fenfe, and fuch as are obvious to the people, who
bed know where the fhoe pinches them, there is
no need of any great fkill or judgment in pafling
or apply ing a law for remedy. — 44 But as to fecrets
44 of ftatc, or the executive part of government,
44/ during the intervals of their fupreme aflemblies ;
" thefe things being of a nature remote from or-

44 dinafy

Ccmmomvealth, examined.

44 dinary apprehenfions, and fuch as neceflfarily
." require prudence, time, and experience, to fit
44 men for management, much in reafon may be
44 faid, and mull be gr&ntcd, for the continuation of
"fuch trufts in the fame hands, as relate to matter
44 of council or adminiftration of juftice, more or
44 kfs, according to their good or ill behaviour.
44 A prudential continuation of thefe may (with-
44 out quelUou) and ought to be, allowed upon
44 difcretion ; becaufe if they do amifs, they are
44 eafily accountable to the people's aflemblies."
Here our author's plan begins to develope itfelf.
Hitherto we had heard nothing but of fucceflive
fovereign aflemblies of the people's reprefentatives :
now indeed we learn that this afTembly is to ap-
point judges, generals, and admirals, and a fiand-
jng committee perhaps for the treafiiry, the admi-
ralty, the cuftoms, excife, and foreign affairs.
Whether thefe judges, and committees, and com-
manders, are to be members of the fovereign af-
fembly, or whether their appointments are to va-
cate their feats, is not afcertained ; but in either
caie it is obvious they will be the friends and con-
fidents of the prevailing party in thehoufe: they
will beperfonson whofc friendfmp the major party
in the afTembly can rely to promote their views,
by advancing their friends among their conflitu-
cuts, in order to procure a new election, or, in
other words, zftanding power, a thing which our
author dreads fo much in the reprefentative affem-
bly ; and thus the whole executive and judicial
poweryand all the public treafure, is at once ap-
plied to corrupt the legiflature and its electors.
And what is it 44 to be accountable to the people's
44 aflemblies ?" It is to be afraid to offend the
flrorigeft party in the houfe, by beftow ing an office
or deciding a caufe, civil or criminal, againft their

inclinations.

44-0 The right Conftitution of a

inclinations. James's boaft comes in very perti-'
nently here. The leaders in the houfe having the
appointment, the impeachment, cenfnre, condem-
nation, reward, and pay of all thebifhops. jndges,
and commanders, in their power, they will have
what law, gofpel, war, peace and negociation they
pleafe. Corruption is let in in fnch a torrent, as
the virtue of no people that ever lived, or will
live, is able to refifl, even for a few years : the
gangrene fpreads immediately through the whole
body.

Our author proceeds to his ordinary routine of
examples. " Athens upheld conftant returns and
44 periods of fucceflion in their fnpreme afTemblies
44 for remedy of grievances ; and they had a ftand-
u ing council, called the Areopagus, to whom the
44 fecrets of ftate were committed during the ad-
44 miniftration of government, during the inter-
44 vals of thofe aflemblies, at whofe return they
44 were accountable, and warily continued or ex-
44 eluded, as the people found caufe." But our au-
thor no where recollects the checks to the popular
government of Athens, which, however, was never
at any one moment fo popular as his project. He
no where recollects, that there were ten flaves to
one citizen ; that the education of the citizens
therefore was fuperior to that which is poflible in
any nation that has not flaves. He no where re-
colleCts, that the whole of religion was favcd in the
hands of the nobly born, which gave a few fami-
lies fuch an influence as no part of Chriftendom
now affords an example of, not even in catholic
countries. He no where recollects, that the whole
people were divided into ranks, and all magiftrates
taken out of the higher ranks. He no where re-
collects the fenate of one hundred, and afterwards
of five hundred, appointed by lot, which formed

the

Commonwealth, examined. 4.4.1

council of ftate, which had the conftant charge
of political affairs, and particularly the preparation
of bufinefs for the afTembly of the people. He
no where pays a fufficient attention to the court of
Areopagus, and its important powers, and the per*
fons of whom it was compofed: all the archonsout
of office were members for life. He no where
-recoltefts, that a flngle reprefentative afTembly,
being necefTarily few, are more liable to corrup-
tion than even a colie£Uve afTembly, who are ma*
ny. Thefe important checks, which gave fuch vaft
weight to the ariftocratical part of the commu*
nity in the government of Athens, have no equi-
valent in our author's plan. He no where recol-
le£ls, that Solon's inftitution was at laft ruined by
allowing to the fourth clafs of citizens an equal
VoteintheafTembly of the people; a terrible warn*
Ingagainft all Rich projects of government*

In Sparta and Rome, fays our author, they had
the like : but it is really mocking to read thefe af*
Hrmationsfo entirely without foundation. The go-
vernments of Sparta and Rome were governments
as different and as oppofite to our author's " right
ifc form" as can be imagined ; and the moment
they obtained the leafl refemblance of it, all au^
thority was ieen in one centre, in Nabis andCasfan
Florence too was after the fame mode : Holland
and Switzerland. In Holland the people never
had the election of any regular aflemblies, and they
never fpeak but by petition, or in bodies unknown
to any written conltitution; I mean mobs: a more
nnjucky example could not have been thought of.
Their regencies too are for life in general, and fill
up their own vacancies : in all the ariftocratical
cantons of Switzerland the fame. How far fome
of the imallefl democratical cantons in any parti-
cular referable our author's notions, may be Ieen in

VOL. III. 3 L the

• ' *r .- 1 .... < X "~\

44.2 The right Conftitution of a

the former volume; but no fiifficient juftificatioir
of them will be found there : but if a parallel
could,- in ftates fo fmall and poor, be found, it
would be no precedent for nations, large, opulent,
and powerful, full of great objr&s of ambition,
andconftantly expofed to the hoftile envy and re-
fentment of great and dangerous neighbours.

The fourth objection is, " that fuch a govern-
" merit brings great damage to the public, by their
" frequent difcontents, divifions, and tumults.'"

In anfwer to this, he confiders feveral cafes.- —
i .'When any citizens arrogate privileges to them-
felves or their families, beyond the ordinary ftand-
ard of the people, .then difcontents, divifions, and
tumults arife. In Rome, the fenate retaining the
power of the old government in the hands of them -
felves and their families, upon the expuldon of
the Tarquins, occafioned the fubfequent difcon-
tents and tumults. " Had Brutus made them
free when ** he declared them fo, or had the fe-
4fc iiate followed the advice and example of Pub-
u licola, all occafion of difcontent had been ta-
" ken away." — " 2. When the people felt them-
44 felves not fairly dealt withal" by their leaders
and generals. In Syracufe, Dionyfius being made
general, under pretence of defending the people's
liberties, and then ufing his power to other pur-
pofes, became the firebrand of the (late, and
put the people all into flames for his expulfion.
" In Sparta, the people were peaceable until
44 they found themfelves over-reached, and their
" credulity abufed, for converting liberty into ty-
46 ranny under Manchanides and Nabis. In Romef
" under the people's government, the fad iight of
"^people fwarming in tumults, their fhops fhut
u up, alL trade given over, and the city forfaken,

44 as

Commonwealth, examined, 44.3

.f* a£ alfo in Athens, the oecafion was the fame ; for
44 though the people naturally love eafe and peace,
44 yet finding themfelves outwitted by Heights, and
44 abufed by feats of the Senate, they grew out of
44 all patience. When any one of their fenators,
44 or of themfelves, arrived to any height of pow-
44 er, by inlinuating into the people's favour upon
44 fpecious and popular pretences, and then made
*; a forfeiture of thofe pretences, as Syllaand Ma-
44 rius, they were the caufes of thofe tumults and
" flaughters among the Romans, the infamy of
44 which has been caft moft injurioufly on the peo-
f4 pie's government by the profane pens of court
44 penlioners. Caefar too was the cauie of all thofe
f4 civil broils and tragedies among the people."
An impartial writer would have brought every one
of thefe examples in proof of the direct contrary ;
for they all (hew, that in proportion as the people
gained an authority, uncontrouied, or more than,
a balance for the fenate, they grew more difcon-
tented, divided, and tumultuous, the more inclined
to ftir up fa&ious leaders, as Pericles, Alcibiades,
Cleon, the Gracchi, Marius, Sylla, and Cataline
and Csfar. The people were certainly peaceable
under the kings, though the archons.and nobles
were not. The people were peaceable under the
Grecian archons and Roman fenate, fo peaceable as
to bear extreme oppreflion ; but their turbulence
began with their afpiring at power, and increafedas
it grew, and grew intolerable the moment they ob-
tained the exercife of that authority which our au-
thor contendsthey ought always toexercife. Thefe
examples, therefore, all (hew the neceffity of a ba-
lance to the people's exercife of power in a mixed
government. — 3. The peoplearetumultuouswhen
fenfible of oppreflion, although naturally of a
peaceable temper, minding nothing but a free en-
joyment :

444- yhc right Conftitution of a

joyment ; but ifcircumvented,mifled,orfqueeLed^
by fuch as they have truded, they fwell like the fea,
over-run the bounds of judice and honefty, ruin-
ing all before them ; but, unhappily, they very
often midake and fwell againd the moil: honed and
faithful men, and infift upon being mifled by the
mod artful and knavifh. A great majority of the
people, and thofe as honed as any, are too fond of
eafe and peace to trouble themfefves with public
affairs, which leaves an opportunity to the profli-
gate and difTolutetohave more influence than they
ought to fet up flich idols as will flatter and fe-
duce them, by gifts, by offices, and by partiality
in judgments ; which fhews, • that although they
are very competent to the choice of one branch of
the legiflative, they are altogether incapable of
well managing the executive power. It is really
unaconntable, but by that party fpirit which der
droys the under (landing as well as the heart, that
our author mould conclude, " there is not one pre-
" cedent of tumults or iedition, which can be cit-
" ed out of all dories, where the people where in
" fault." It was even their fault to be drawn in or
provoked; it was their fault to let up idols, whofe
craft or injudice, and whofe fair pretences, had
defigns upon the public liberty. They ought to
know that fuch pretenders will always arife, and
that they never are to be truded uncontrouled.

But he feems to be aware that all this would;
not be quite fatisfa&ory. In order to extenuate
the evil, he admits, for argument fake, that the
people were tumultuous in their own nature ; and
he ought to have admitted, from regard to truth,
that without laws, government, and force to re-
ftrain them, they really are fo. " Tumults, when
u they happen, are more eafily born than thofe in-
^ eaaveniences which arife from the tyranny of

" monarch^

Commonwealth, examined.

*4 monarchs and great ones." It is a great quef*
tioii, whether anarchy or tyranny be the greater
evil ? No man who reads the third .book of Thu»
cidkks, or Plato's defcription of :, demccratical
city, or who confiders the nature of mankind, \vill
helitate to lay that anarchy, while it hits, is a
greater evil than fimple monarchy, even exercifed
by tyrants: but as anarchy can never laft long,
and tyranny may be per'petual, no man who loves
his country, and is willing to fubmit to a prefent
evil for a future public good, would heiitate to
prefer anarchy, provided there was any hope that
the fair order of liberty, and a free conftitution,
would ariie out of it. A chance of this would be
preferred by a patriot to the certainty in the other
cafe. ' Some men too would prefer anarchy, con-
fcious of more addreis with the people than with
a monarch : but if anarchy and tyranny were to be
alike permanent and durable, the generality of
mankind would and ought to prefer tyranny ; at
lean: monarchy, upon the principle that a thonfand
tyrants arc worfe than one. But our author exte-
nuates the evils of tumults.-— i. The injury never
extends farther than ibrae few perlbna, and thoic,
for the moffc part, guilty enough, as the thirty
grandees in Athens, the ten in Rome, Sec. Such,
tumults, however, have often proceeded to greater
lengths, and have had innocent and cxcelknrmcn
for their obje£L Examples enough have been cit-
ed from Greece and Italy, as well as Holland. — 2.
Tumults are not laiiing* An eloquent oration of
a grave man, as Menenius, Agrippa, Virginias, or
Cato, may pacify them. True ibmetimes, but
much oftener the grave man will fall a facrifice to
their fury. — 3. Tumults ufually turn to the good
of the public; the great are kept, in awe, the fpi-
rits of the people kept warm and high with

thoughts

446 The right Constitution of a

thoughts of liberty. This has fome weight in
monarchies and ariftocracies, where they may be
quelled; but in fimple democracy, where they can-
not, they would be fatal. 44 In Rome they ob-
" tained the law of the twelve tables, procured
44 the tribunes and fupremeafTemblies, and frequent
44 confirmation of them." The fupreme aifem-
blies they obtained are very unluckily quoted, be-,
caufe thefe, having no controul, deflroyed the
commonwealth.

44 All this is far otherwife under the ftandjng
" power of the great ones. They, in their conn-
*4 cils, projects, and defigns, are faft and tenaci-
44 ous." As this is an acknowledgment that the
people are noffafl and tenacious, that isfteady, it
fliould feem an argument in favour of a (landing
fenate, at lead of fome fenate appointed from the
perfons of mod experience, belt education, moil
refpe£taole families, and confiderabie property,
who may be fuppofed thoroughly to underiland
the conftitution, to have the largeil: views, and be
44 faft and tenacious" of the maxims, cuftoms,
and laws of the nation, to temper theunfieadmefs
of the people, and even of their reprefentatives.'
44 The evils under thefe forms are more remedilefs
4(r and univerfal." Not at all in mixed govern-
ments. They are, on the contrary, more eafily
44 remedied," for the houfe of commons is the
grand inqueft of the nation. 4t Thofe tumults
44 and quarrels that arife among them, never tnd
44 but in further oppreffion of the people." Quar-
rels among them have commonly given more
weight to the people, and muft always end in reliev-
ing the people, where the people have a full (hare.
Upon the whole, tumults arife in all govern-
ments ; but they are certainly mofl remedilefs and
certainly fatal in. a fimplc democracy. Cheats and

tricks

Commonwealth, examined, 44,7

tricks of great men will as certainly take place in
iimple democracy as in flmple ariflocracy or mo-
narchy* arid will belefs eafily refifted or remedied ;
and therefore our author has not vindicated his
projeft from the objection of its danger from tu-
mults. A mixed government, of all others, is heft
calculated to prevent, to manage, and to remedy
tumults, by doing juflice to all men on all occafi-
ons, to the minority as well as majority ; and by
forcing all men, majority as wrell as minority, to
be contented with it.

The fifth objeftion is, " that little fecurity is
44 to be had for the more wealthy and powerful
44 fort of men, in regard of that liberty which the
" people aifume to accufe or calumniate whom
44 they pleafe."

In anfwer to this, our author acknowledges that
ciilumniation (by which he means ambitious flan-
dering of men, by whifperings, reports, or falfe
accufations,) have been more or lefs in all forms
of government, but affirms that they were never
allowed or approved in his form of government ;
that they have been mod in ule under Handing
powers of great ones, who make it their grand en-
gine to remove or ruin all who (land in their way,
and have always inftruments ready at hand ; that
it is marked out by Ariftotle inter flagitia domi-
nationis. But the true and impartial anfwer is
this, that all fimple governments are addicted to
this vice, and make ufe of it as an inftrument to
deftroy their adverfaries. In our au thor's " Right
" Conititution" it would be as prevalent as in any
monarchy orariftocracy, and in each of the fimple
governments it is equally impoflible to prevent,
palliate, or remedy the evil. * In a fimple demo-
cracy it i-nnft be the worft of all upon the whole,

becaufe

;Y . -
fhe right Conflitution ofd

becaufe the wfiole nation mud necefTarily be flart-*
derers. Tjx1 majority calumniate of courie for the
fame repptfn that unlimited monarchs and fenates
do, v\Lt to fupport their power and annoy their en-
emies and the minority are neceiTUated to flander
in tficir turn in ielf-defence. The liberty of accu*
fjptiQp, however, in every form of government, muft
in fome degree be admitted; without it, neither
will nor pleafure, nor law, can govern. In a fitn-
ple democracy it would be unlimited ; every body
belonging to the majority would be informers and
accufers, and always fure of iupporting his accu-
fation. The minority, therefore, in a limple de-
mocracy, are fubjcdted to ipies, informers, acCufa*
tions, and llanders, without end and without re-
drefs.

In a mixed government, like the Englifh and
American, informers from private motives are
juilly odious ; from public motives rclpefted*
Every crime, however high, may be proiecuted
and punifhed : the grand inqueft of the nacionbe*
comes accufer againfl thofe in high places ; the
grand inqueft of the counties for ordinary offences.
No crime can be concealed ; no fi&itious crime
can be pretended or alledged. Calumny itielf is
punimable as an offence againft the public, and
the injured individual may obtain fatisfadtion. It
is in fuch a government alone that calumny is or
can be managed upon principles of public fafety
and private juftice, neither of which can ever be
generally regarded in any iimple government, and
mod certainly leaft of all in our author's " Right
44 Conftitution," or authority in one centre.

For the proof of thefe obiervations any hiftory
would ferve; but it will be fufficient to attend to
thofc anecdotes quoted by our author. In Rome
" the ten grandees, and ail that fucceeded them in

" that

Commonwealth, examined. 44,9

-" that domineering humour over the people, ever
44 kept a retinue, well flocked with calumniators
44 and informers (fuch as we call " Knights of the
44 Poft" ) to fnap thofe that any way appeared for
44 the people's liberties. This was their confiant
4i trade, as it wasalfo of their emperors ." — 4fc But
44 while the people kept their power entire in the
*4 fupreme aiFemblies, we read not of Its being
4i brought into any conftant practice." — This
continued chicanery, in holding out to the people
of England an idea that the Romans wereever go-
verned by his 44 Right Conftitution," is really un-
pardonable : nothing can be more unfair. But
to pafs this over : Are the examples of Caffius,
Melius, Manlius, Coriolanus, the Gracchi, ib foon
, forgot? The Scipios indeed he recol lefts. Thefe
calumnies were promoted by the fenate, in fome
inftances, it is true ; but by the people too in all :
at lead the people were made the dupes and tools ;
which is fuificient to make the examples rtrong
proofs againfi our author.

The fame profligacy of a party fpirit appears in
his example of Athens. 44 By their lofty and un-
4fc worthy carriage, they flirred up the people's fear
44 and jcaloufy fo far, as to queflion and lend di-
44 vers of them into banifhment ; as Alcibiades,
*rThemiftocles,and others." Why are Ariftides,
Miltiadcs, Socrates, and Phocion forgotten ? Thefe
would have been too grofsly againfl him, and
warnings too terrible againit his paltry fyPem,
44 Whereas, if the rules of a free ftate had been
44 punctually obferved, by preferving a difcreet
44 revolution of powers, and an equability or mo-
'4 derate ftate of particular perfons, there had been
4t no occafion of encroachment on one part, or of
44 fear on the other." That is to lay, if the rules
of a free flate had been obferved in a city where
VOL. III. 3 M no

45° ¥hc right Conftitution of a

no fuch rule of a free ftate exifted; and an eqna*
bility and moderation maintained, of which there
is no example in hiftory, and which is totally im-
practicable ; then there would have been no en-
croachment or fear: or, in other words, if all men
had been wife and virtuous, and there had been
no need of government at all, then there would
have been no democratical tyranny, and, he might
add, monarchical or ariftocratical. It isbdrlefque
-to talk of a rule of a free (late, which never was,
-and every man of common fenfe knows never can
be, a rule of a free ftate. Our conclufion muft
be diie&ly contrary to that of our author; viz.
the calumniation under his " Right Conftiiution"
muil be more frequent, intolerable, and remidilefs,
than under any form of tyranny, whether monar-
chical or ariftocratical. The Englifh eonftitution
furniflies rules, means, and judicatures, in their
grand and petit juries, and in impeachments of the
commons before the lords, fo equitable and ad-
mirable, that it is very unaccountable that any
man mould think of preferring to it a fimple de-
mocracy of a (ingle reprefentative affembly, where
it is fo obvious that every man's reputation, liberty,
property, and life, muft be in conftant danger of
accufations by and before an omnipotent party.

** The liberty of accufation by the people be-
" fore their fupreme affemblies," cannot mean
that the whole people fliould join in fuch accufa-
tion : this is impoflible ; every man then muft
have liberty to accufe whom he will. The houfe
will confider who is the'accufer, and who the ac-
cufed ; and members in the houfe will confider
how their parties are likely to be affected by the
fentence, more than truth or juftice. An accufer,
who is ufeful to the majority, will rarely be pu-
nifhed, let his accufation be ever fo falfe or mali-

."•' *'\ cious :

Commonwealth^ examined. 4.51

cions : one of the minority will never be heard,
though his complaint be ever fo true. — k4 The
44 liberty of accufation is, indeed, a thing fo ef-
44 fentially neceffary for the prefervation of acorn -
i4 munity, that there is no poflibility of having
44 perfons kept accountable without it ; and, by
44 confequence, no fecurity of life and eftate, li-
44 berty and property. 4 Maxime intereft reipub.
44 libertatis ut libere poffis civem aliquem accu-
44 fare ;' it mod highly concerns the freedom of a
44 commonwealth, that the people have liberty of
A4 accufing any perfonswhatfoever." Thus far we
agree, as well as in the opinion, that a great evil
in governments, limply monarchical or ariftocrati-
cal, is the want of fuch liberty. But fimple de-
mocracy has in it as great an evil in this refpecl ;
for the minority have too little liberty of accufa-
tion, in proportion as the majority have too
much : it is therefore in a mixed government
only where an equal liberty can be prefer ved to
all, without being too great in any. It is agreed
further to be a means, and the only means, of ex -
tinguiftiing jealouflcs and emulations, diicontents
and fury, in the people, when they can bring to
.account their oppreffors ; and the inftances of the
Decemviri and Coriolanns are properly enough
produced : the ftory from Florence too, of one
who occafioned fuch calamities for want of this
liberty of accufation, by which he might have
been taken down ; and the cafe of Soderino, who
drove the people to call in the Spaniards to fup-
prefs him for want of fuch a power. To thefe
examples there is no objection, nor to the doctrine
they convey, viz. that the liberty of accufation
prevents the people very often from running in
rage and defpair to internal violence or foreign al.
liancc, and in both cafes to arms. But the concltj.

fion

45 2 ¥he ngh t Ccnftitu tion of a

• \\ ~

fion upon the whole muft be, that this objection
ftands in full force againft our author's plan, and
wholly unanfwered. There is no fecnrity for the
moft wealthy and powerful fort of men among
the minority ; they will be conflantly expofed to
ruin by falfe accufations.

The fixth objection is, " that people by nature
44 are fadtions, inconflant, and ungrateful." In
anfwer to the charge of faction, he repeats his
pofitions under the fourth reafon; and his exam-
ples of Pompey and Csefar ; Guelphs and Ghibel-
lines in Italy ; the families of Orleans and Bur-
gundy in France ; the Guifians ; York and Lan-
cafter, Sec. we muft refer to our obfervations ©n
the fourth reafon.

Inconflancy he allows to be a characteriftic of
the people who are debauched, and in a corrupted
flate of a common wealth, when degenerated from
its true principles, as in Athens, Rome, Florence.
44 But yet in Rome you may fee as pregnant in-
44 fiances of that people's conflancy, as of any fort
44 of men whatfoever; for they continued con-
44 ftant, irreconcileable enemies to all tyranny in
44 general, and kingly power in particular. In
*- like manner, when they had once gotten their
44 fuccellive afFemblies, they remained fo firm and
44 fliffto uphold them : in making their elections,
44 too, they could never be perfuaded to chooie a
44 known infamous, vicious, or unworthy fellow.
44 fb that they leldom or never erred in the choice
44 of their tribunes and other offices. But it has
44 ever been otherwife under kings and ftand-
44 ing powers." Here he muft mean fimple mo-
narchies and ariftocracies, becaufe hediflinguimes
the cafe from Rome, which was a mixed govern-
ment. 44 Standing powers ufually ran into all

44 the

Commonwealth, examined,

*'• the extremes of inconftancy upon every new pro-
" je&, petty humour, and occafion; fhifted princi-
" pies every moon ; caihiered all oaths, protefla-
44 tions, promifes, and engagements, and blotted
" out the memory of them with a wet finger," he
inftances in Charles the firft. If we fpeak impar-
tially upon this head, we muft fay that all men
are alike ; that fimple governments are equally in-
conftant, as far as they partake of the fame hu-
man nature. Kings have been as inconftant as any
men; fo have fimple fenates. Simple democracies
have never been tried ; but, if we reafon from their
nature, we fhall conclude, that they are more in-
conflant than either, becaufe the refult depending
on the majority of votes, the difficulty and im-
poffibility of afTembling equal numbers at all
times, iricreafes the chances of change and incon-
ftancy. The ignorance of multitudes who compofe
a part of the people, is another caufe: fo that if a
difference muft be allowed, it muft be confefled
that fimple democracy is the leafl conflant. But
a mixed government produces and neceflitates
conftancy in all its parts ; the king ffiuft be con-
flant, to preferve his prerogatives ; the fenate muft
be conflant, to preferve their mare; and the houfe
theirs : neither can go beyond its line, without
being called back by the other. The legiflative
mufl be con (Ian t to p'referve its rights, and the
executive for the fame end : the judicial too muft
be conflant to the laws, which alone can fcreen it
from the refentment and encroachment of one or
other of the three branches in the legiflature. It
is to this univerfal vigilance and conftancy, which
fuch a conftitution renders neceflary and unavoid-
able, that the laws owe their perpetual fuperiori-
ty, and are able to make kings, nobles, and com-
moners, miniflers ofilate and religion, and judges

too

454 The right Conftitution of a

too, bow with reverence to its decifions : to this
conftancy, therefore, is due that delightful tran-
quillity of mind, arifing from a fenfe of perfect
fecurity in the protection of known laws, for the
enjoyment of life, liberty, honour, reputation,
and property. 44 Ingratitude has been much
44 charged upon this form." — C4 In Athens and
44 Rome, unhandfome returns were made to wo'r-
44 thy perfons, who had done high fervices — A.1-
44 cibiades, Themiftocles, Phocion, Miltiades, Ca-
44 millus, Coriolanus, and both the Scipios, the
44 caufeof whofe misfortunes is defcribed, by Plu-
44 tarch and Livy , to be their own lofty and unwary
44 carriage, which excited the people's fear and
44 jealoufy. The Scipios were moft to be pi-
44 tied, becaufe the nobles, not the people, dif-
44 obliged them ; as for Camillus and Goriolanus,
44 theydeferved whatever befel them, becaufe they
44 maligned and hated the people." All this is
tolerably juft. — Our author proceeds : 44 Thishu-
44 moiir, however, is highly commended by lonne,
44 as a fign of a commonwealth's being in pure
44 and perfect health, when the people are thus ac-
44 tive, zealous, and jealous, in behalf of their
44 liberties, that will permit no fuch growth of
44 power as may endanger it." Yet he adds, with
great truth, " that the people have been fb far
44 from ingratitude, that they have always been
X4 exceflive in their rewards and honours to fuch
44 men as deferved any way of the public, while
44 they conformed themfelves to rules, and kept
**. in a pofture fuitable to liberty. Witnefs their
** confecrations of ftatues, incenfe, facrifices, and
•" crowns of laurel, enrolling fuch men in the num-
44 ber of their deities. The crime of ingratitude
^ cannot, in any peculiar manner, be faftened upon
•** the people." — This is very juft ; the people arc

no

Commonwealth, examined.

wo more ungrateful than kings or fenates, nor
more jealous ; and the inftances from republics,
of apparent ingratitude, are not fair proofs. They
commonly have arifen from party ; and the ill-
treatment of deferving men has been the work
of intrigues of the ariftocratical and monarchical
parts of thefe communities, oftener than of the
people themfelvcs. The jealoufy and envy of
commanders, and leading fenators and patricians,
have plotted with the people, fomented theifi pre-
judices, inflamed their paflions, and mifreprefented
by falfe reports, until fuch points have been
carried. There is another thing too to be confi-
dered : the -real merit of public men is rarely
fully known and impartially confidered ; empi*
ricifm is pra£lifed to an altoniming degree by
fonie, even in the purefl times. Ariflides and
Themiftocles, Ca^far and Cato, are not upon an
equal footing ; but when men ariie, who to real
fervices add the arts of political empiricifm,
conform to the errors of the people, comply with
their prejudices^ gain their hearts, and excite
their enthufiafrn, then their gratitude is a conta-
gion ; it is a whirlwind ; — it is infinitely worle to
the public than their ingratitude, or than the in-
gratitude of kings or nobles. Our author pro-
duces, as inftances «f the ingratitude of princes —
44 Alexander hated Antipater and Parmcnio, and
44 put the latter to death ; Vcfpaiian caihiered the
46 meritorious Antqnies; the king of Portugal,
44 Alphonfus Albuquerque ; Ferdinand of Arra-
fc4 gon, Confalvus the Great ; Henry the Seventh,
44 Stanley, of the .houfe of4 Derby, who pnt the
*4 crown upon his head ; Sylla, his iniiruments ;
44 Auguftus, Cicero;" and, he might have added,
many thoufands of others. After all, joftice and
found policy ought to be the ruie and roealure of

rewards

45 6 The right Conftitution of a

rewards and punifhments, not any vague fenfation
of gratitude or jealoufy. Every fimple govern-
ment, and every unbalanced mixture, mufl pro-
duce frequent inftances, not only of ingratitude,
but of injuflice and bad policy, in the article of
rewards and punifhments ; but in a mixed govern-
ment, effe&ually balanced, it is rarely poifible
that real fervice, merit, ai?:l virtue, ihould go un-
rewarded. If the king is difpofed to be ungrate-
ful, the lords and commons will not fufFcr it ; if
the commons are ungrateful, the king and lords
will do juftice; if the lords are faulty, the king
and commons will fet all right. The chances of
ingratitude, therefore, in fueh a government are
much lefs, and the aflurance of a juft recompence
ofrewa?*d is much greater, while the danger of
royal favour! tifm and popular extravagance are
wholly avoided. As there is nothing ot more ef-
fential importance to the prefervation of liberty,,
the promotion of profperity, and the exaltation of
the dignity and grandeur of a ftate, than a juft, ge-
nerous, and fteady rule of policy in rewards and
punifhments, it muft, with all humble fubmiilionr
be prefumed, that a mixed government has an
infinite advantage of all others in this relpedt.
But of all imaginable governments, that of one
afTembly is the worft ; for every man of the mi-
nority will be fure of ingratitude and injuflice, let
his fervice be what it will ; nay, he will be in
danger of punifhment for his merit ; and every
man of the majority will be fafe againft punifh-
mentfor many mifderneanors, and fure of exceffive
rewards for every trifling fervice. We may fair-
ly conclude, upon the whole, that none of thefe
fix objections ftand againft a free government of
three branches ; but every one of them in full
force againft a fingle fovereign afTembly,

" To

examined.

u l^o educate the young fry in principles of
* dill ike and enmity againft kingly government^
*'* and enter into an oath of abjuration, to abjure
" a toleration of kings and kingly power in time
'*' to come."— This rule was made for Charles
Stuart. Brutus made the Romans fwear, " that
f4 they never fhouM luffer any man again to reign
" at Home. The Hollanders abjured Philip, his
4i family, and all kings, for ever/' Thefe were
inventions of ariftocratical cunning, and the peo-
ple were dupes for taking them. A king, mean-
ing a fmgle perfon vefbed with the whole execu-
tive, is the only remedy for the people, whenever
the nobles get the better of them, and are on the
fcramblefor unlimited power. Let every people
have a care how they enflave themfelves by fucli
an oath, or Jay themfelves under the neceility ^f
committing perjury : let them fwear, if they will,
never to be governed by an abfolute monarch;
but even tWs had better be omitted, for there are
cafes in which an abfolute monarch is a lefs evil
than a crowd of lawlefs lords. A better oath for
the common people w^oiild be, never ,to intrufl
any part of the executive power to a fenate, or,
-in other words, to the body of the gentlemen. .

I am, not without apprehenfions that I have not
made mvfelf fully underflood. The pepple, iii
all nations, are naturally divided into two forts,
>the gentlemen and the fimplemen, a word which
is here, chofen to fignify the common people. By
gentlemen are not meant the rich or the poor,
the high-born or the low-born, the induftriousor
the idle* .but all thole who have received a liberal
education, an ordinary degree of erudition j,nji-
beral arts and iciences^ whether by, birth they, t>e
deicended from magiftratcs and officers of , govern-
ment, Qr.fv.oirt luiibancJiDen, merchants, media-

VToL.IIf. N Hies,

458 The right Conflitution of a

nics, or labourers; or whether they be rich or
poor. We muft neverthelefs remember, that ge-
nerally thofe who are rich, and defcended from
families in public life, will have the beft educa-
tions in arts and fciences, and therefore the gen-
tlemen will ordinarily, notwithfbanding fome ex-
ceptions to the rule, be the richer, and born of
more noted families. By the common people we
mean labourers, hufbandmen, mechanics, and mer-
chants in general, who purfue their occupations
and induflry without any knowledge in liberal
arts or fciences, or in any thing but their own
trades or purfuits ; though there may be excep-
tions to this rule, and individuals may be found
in each of thefe clafles who may really be gen-
tlemen.

%, Now it feems to be clear that the gentlemen in
every country are and ever muft be few in num-
ber, in comparifon of the fimplemen. If you
pleafe then, by thedemocratical portion of fociety
we will underfland the common people as before
explained ; by the ariftocratical part of the com.
munity we will underftand the gentlemen : the
diftin&ions which have been introduced among
the gentlemen into nobility, greater or lefTer, are
perfe&ly immaterial to our prefent purpofe ;
knights, barons, earls, vifcounts, marquiiTes,
dukes, and even princes and kings, are ftill but
gentlemen, and the word noble iignifies no
more than knowable, or confpicuous. But the
gentlemen are more intelligent and Ikilful, as
•well as generally richer and better connected, and
therefore have more influence and power than an
equal number of the common people : there
is a conftant energy and effort in the minds of
the former to increafe the advantages they poffefs
over the latter, and to augment their wealth and

influence

Commonwealth, examined. 4.59

influence at their expence. This effort produces
refentments and jealoufies, contempt, hatred, and
fear, between the one fort and the other. Indi-
viduals among the common people endeavour to
make friends, patrons, and protestors, among the
gentlemen. This produces parties, divifions, tu-
mults, and war ; but as the former have moft ad-
drefs and capacity, they gain more and more con-
tinually, until they become exhorbitantly rich, and
the others miferably poor. In this progrefs the
common people are continually looking up for a
protestor among the gentlemen, and he who is
mod able and willing to protect them, acquires
their confidence. They unite together by their
feelings, more than their reflections, in augment-
ing his pqwer, becaufe the more power he has, and
the lefs tiie gentlemen have, the fafer they are.
This is a fhort fketch of the hiftory of that pro-
grefs of paflions and feelings which has produced
every fimple monarchy in the world ; and, if na-
ture and its feelings have their courfe without
reflection, they will produce a fimple monarchy
for ever. It has been the common people, then,
and not the gentlemen, who have eftablifhed iim-
ple monarchies all over the world : the common
people, againft the gentlemen, eilablifhed a fim-
ple monarchy in Ca-far at Rome, in the Medici
at Florence, &c. and are now in danger of doing
the fame thing in Holland ; and if the Britifli
conflitution fhould have its euthanalia in fimple
monarchy, according to the prophecy of Mn
Hume, it will be effected by the common people,
to avoid the increafing oppreffions of the gentle-
men.

If this is the progrefs and courfe of things (and
who does not know that it is ?) it follows, that it
is the true intereft aad beft policy of -Ike common

people

right Conftitution of a

people to takeaway from the body of the gentle*
men all fhare in the diftribution of offices, and ma~
nagement of the executive power. Why? Be-.
caufe if any body of gentlemen have the gift of
offices, they will diipofe of them among their
own families, friends, and connexions ; • they will
alfo make ufe of their votes in difpofmg of of-
fices, to procure themfelves votes in popular elec- J
tions to th1e fenate or other council, or to procure
themfelves appointments in the executive depart -
viiient.: It is the true policy of the common peo-
ple to place the whole executive power in one
man, to, make him a diftinft order in the ftate,
from whence arifes an inevitable jealouiy between
him and the gentlemen ; this forces h.im to be-
come a father and proteftor of* the common peo-
ple, and to endeavour always to humble every
proud afpiring Tenator, or other oiliccr in the
ilate, who is in danger of acquiring San influence
too great for the law, or the fpirit of the confli-.
tutton. This influences him to look for merit a^
mong the common people, and to promote from
.among them fbch as are capable of public employ-
ments ; fo that the road to preferment is open to
the common people much more generally and equi-
tably in fiich a government, than in an arifto.cra-
•cy; or one in which the gentlemen have any fhare
in appointments to offices.

From this dedu&ion it follows, that the pre-
cept of our author, 4i to educate children (of the
" common people) in principles of diilike and
4i enmity againil kingly government, and enter
^ into ^.n oath of abjuration to abjure a toleration
u of kings and kingly powers," is a mod iniqui-
^•tous and infamous ariilccratical artifice, a Jnofi:
formal confpiracy againft the rights of mankind,
and ap-amft that equality 'between the gentlemen

Commonwealth, examined. 46

the common people which nature has
blifhed as a moral right, and law mould ordain
as a political right, for the prefervation of liberty.
By kings, and kingly power, is meant, both by
our author and me, the executive power in a fm-
gle perfon, American common people are too
enlightened, it is hoped, ever to fall into fuch an
hypocrital fnare ; the gentlemen too, it is hoped,
are too enlightened, as well as too equitable, ever
to attempt fuch a meafure ; becaufe they muft
know that the confequence will be, that, after
fuffering all the evils of contefts and diiTenfions,
cruelty and oppreffion, from the ariftocratics, the
common people will perjure themfelves, and fet;
up an unlimited monarchy inflead of a regal re-
public.

': .••*,»; .jio. *£..' 'e-*v' •'- " 'fl: ' ;'•>& *'r:£ ".f'-.-iVf?*"' -''si 'VV; ' •. "'~'.v

Thcfecond rule of policy is, " not to fuffer
M particular perfons to grandife or greaten them-.
*' {elves more than ordinary ;, for that by the Ro-
t; mans was called ' affecTtatio regni,' an afpiring
^ to kingfhip." Melius and Manlius are again
cited : " The name of the latter was ever after dil-
44 owned by his whole family, that famous family
" of the Manlii, and both the name and memory
" of * him and of his confulnYip were raz,ed out
44 of all public records by decree of the fenate."
— rlt is certainly aneilential rule in a free govern*
ment, to fuffer no man to greaten himfelf above
the law : -but it is impofFible it mould ever be ob-
fervedina firnple democracy or ariftocracy. What
might not Manlius have done, if Home had been
governed by a fingle fovereign alfembly of repre-
fentatives? It was the ariftocracy that murdered
Manlius, much againil the will of the democracy,
fo that the inflance is againfl the author. The
Orange family in Holland are mentioned too; but

it

4.62 The right Conftltution of a

it is the common people who have fupported that
family , for their protection againft the ariftocracy.
It is agreed, however, by many refpe&able wri-
ters, that the family of Orange have been danger-
ous in that ftate, becaufe the people have no con-
ftttutionai mare in the government, and the autho-
rity exercifed by the ftadtholder is not legally de-
fined : if the people, therefore, in their anger,
fhould augment the power of that houfetoo much
above the ariftocracy, it would be abfolute; but if
the people fhould expel that houie, they muft fct
up another, as well as demand a (hare in the legif-
lature for themfelves, or become (laves, and a prey
to the ariftocracy. It is a good rule for Holland
to beware of too great a man ; but it is equally
nccefTary to beware of five thoufand men, who
may eafily become too great. But in our author's
Right Conftitution the obfervance of the rule is
impoffible. The people, if unreftrained by a ienate
or a king, will fet up fome one man, and advance
him to a greatnefs of dignity and authority incon-*
fiftent with liberty : as foon as any one in fuch a
government gets the command in chief of an ar-
my, he has the ftate in his power. The common
people in Holland would aflift the army in making
the prince abfolute (if, indeed, the prince would
accept of a gift that would ruin his country as
well as his houie) if they were not reft rained by
a Handing ariftocratical power, which our author
abhors.

Nan diurnare imperia ; " not to permit a con-
44 tinuationof command and authority in thehands
4t of particular perfons orjfamilies." — This rule is
undoubtedly necefTary to preferve a fimple arifto-
cracy or democracy ; but it is impracticable in
both, and therefore it is impracticable to preferve

an

Commonwealth, examined. 463

an ariftocracyor democracy. But this is by no
means a necemry or proper rule in a well confti-
tuted free government. Command and authority
may be continued for any number of years, or for
life, in the fame hands, without the leaft danger;
becauic, upon the fmalleft fyrnptom of an inclina-
tion to abufe his power, he may be difplaced by the
executive, without danger or inconvenience: but
in a fimple ariftocracy or democracy he cannot be
removed at all; the majority will fupport him at
all events ; or, if they do not, the majority that
removes him will be fo fmall, that the minority
who are his friends may often raife convulfions. It
is a necefTary rule, too, in fuch a mixed government
as that of Rome, where, in the beft of times, the
people had an authority nearly equal to that of the
fenate. Where the mixture is of two powers only,
and the executive is wholly in one of thernr or
partly in one, and partly in another, they arc in
continual danger of the tyranny of a (ingle perfon,
on account of the frequent difputes between the
two branches about the exercife of the executive
and judicial power; but where the executive is in
one hand, the legiflative in three, and the judicial
brands different from both, there is rarely, if ever,
any danger from a continuance of command in
any one. Livy had good reafon in the Roman
ftate to fay, " Libert at is magna cuftodia eft, (I
" magna imperia eiTe non fines, et temporis mo-
" dus imponatur ;" it is a grand preservative of
liberty if you do not permit " great powers and
44 commands to continue- long, and if you limit in
44 point of time." And to* this purpofe the./Eiiriliaii
law, if it could have been obferved, would have
been a good one, *4 The noble Roman, in the ninth
44 book, fpoke in character, when he faid, ' Hoc
44 q.uidem regno ilrnile eft./ and this indeed is like

** a king-

4.64. The right Conflitution of a

" a kingfiiip, that I alone fhould bear this great
44 office of cenforfhip 4 triennium et fex menfes,'
44 three years and fix months, contrary to the jE
44 Jian law." Livy too (peaks in character, as a
good citizen of an ariftocratical government, when
in his third book he fpeaks of a monftrous bufi-
nefs, that the ides of May were come (" which
" was the time of their year's choice") and yet
44 no new ekftion appointed : id vero regnumhaud
'* dubie videre,deploratur in perpetuum libertas;"
44 it without doubt feems noother than a kingdom*
44 and liberty is loft for ever." It was no doubt
44 treafon for any man to hold that high office of
" the didtatorfliip in his hand beyond fix months.
44 Cicero's Epiftles to Atticus concerning Csefar
" contain notable fluff to this purpofe. The care
44 of that people in not permitting any man to bear
44 the fame office twice together," was all in cha-
racter, becauie continuance in high office con-
flantly expofed the ftate and Conftitution to the
danger of being overturned, and converted into an
abfolute monarchy. In this conflitution too, in
confequence of the checks between the fenate, the
tribunes, and the people, there was fome chance
for having this law obfervedj but an jEmilian h
in our author's 44 Right Conftitution," would
made to no purpofe; it would be fet aflde, with-
out ceremony, when nothing but a vote of an all-
powerful majority would be wanting to fet it at
defiance : but in a mixed Conftitution of three
branches, fuch a law, if made, would be punctu-
ally executed* much more exactly and certainly
than in the Roman conftitutio.n ; but in fuch a
Conftitution fuch a law would be unneceflary, aS
no danger can a rife from the continuance of any
general or admiral in command. . The fame rea-
foning is applicable to the. free ftates of Greece*

where

Cvmmtin'wealth, examined,

where, Ariftotle tells ns, "this rule was ob-
*' ferved." The fpeech of Gincinnatus to the peo-
ple, to perfuade them to let him lay down his
command, now the time was come, though the
enemy was almoft at the gates^ and never more
need, than at that time, of his valour and prudence,
is a terrible example againft our author's fyftem :
for, though " no perfuafion would ferve the turn,
44 refign he would, telling them there would be
*4 more danger to the ftate in prolonging his pow-
44 er than from the enemy > fince it might prove
*; a pernicious precedent to the Roman freedom;"
yet, as no more than two or three fuch characters
as Cincinnatus appeared in feven hundred years, a
(latefman would be mad who mould place the ex-
iftence of his form of government upon the pre-
fumption that a fucceffion of characters fo difinte-
refted would appear to refill the people themfelves
in their defire to violate a law. If the people at
that period could forget a rule fo efTential to their
fafety, what are we to expecl: when they, and their
idols too, are more corrupt ? " M. Rutilius Cen-
" forinus, although he too made a fpeech again!!
44 it, gave way to the people, when they forced
" him to undergo the office of cenfor twice toge-
44 ther, contrary to the intent and practice of their
" ancefcors, and accepted it upon this condition,
" that a law might pafs againft the title in that
" and other officers, left it fhould be drawn into
44 precedent in time to come." But our author
all along miftakes the fpirit of this rule ; it was
sn ariftocratical regulation altogether: it was the
ienate and patricians who procured it to be ob-
ferved, from an ariftocratical motive and princi-
ple; from a jealoufy of the people on one fide, and
of kingly power on the other. It is the fame fpirit
which precipitated Caffius and Maivlins from the
VOL. III. 30 rock,

466 The right Conftitution of a

rock, and put $!elius to death without ceremony.
The people, or their reprefentatives, if uncon-
trouled, would not probably ever make fuch a law ;
if they did, they woukl never long obferve it :
the people would not fivffer it to be much or long
obferved in Rome, notwithftanding all the exer-
tions of the ariftocracy. The times foon came when
Cincinnatus's and Cenforinus's were not found to
refufe power and office offered them againft law,
any more than Horatii and Valerii were found to
poflpone their private fortune to plebeian liberty.
Even the Grecian arHtocracies could not obferve
this rule. It was a law of Sparta that no man
fhould be twice admiral ; but Lyfander had ad-
drcfs enough to perfuade his countrymen to give
the title to Aratus, but the real command to him-
felf, under the title of vice-admiral. Even in that
which was in appearance the moft democratical
ftate of Greece, Achaia, Aratus had the real power
and command when he was out of place; as much
as when he was in. Our author miftakes too the
fpirit of the law, " that no tribune mould be con-
" tinned two years together." This law was a
mere ariftocratical artifice, to weaken the influ-
ence of the tribunes and their conflitnents, by pre-
venting them from acquiring confidence, fkill, and
influence, by experience. If the people had un-
derflood their own caufe, they would have infill-
ed upon the privilege of choofing the fame tribune
as long as they approved his condu£b

" Not to let two of one family to bear offices of
f ' high truft at one time, nor to permit a continua-
" tion of great powers in any one family." This
rule is indifpenfible in ariftocracies, where the fo-
vereignty is in continual danger from individuals of
great influence and powerful connections, where a

jealoufy

Commonwealth, examined. 4.67

jealoufy of popular men and meafures muft be con-
ftantly kept up to its higheft pitch. The Roman
rule, " Ne duo vel plures ex una familia magnos
*; magiftratus gerant eodem tempore, let not two
" or more of one family bear great offices at the
" fame time ;" and the other, " Ne magna 5m-
" peria ab una familia prefer ibantur, let not great
" commands bje prefer ibed or continued in one
" family;" were neceflary ariftocratical rules, be-
caufe, as the patricians were ajways afraid of the
people, who were continually urging for more
power,a very powerful family, by joining with the
people, might have changed the conftitution. It
is a wife and ufeful rule in general in all govern-
ments; but in a fimple democracy, though it may
be more necefTary than in any other form, it is al-
ways impracticable ; the people will fet it afide
whenever they pleafe, and will always be fure to
,depart from it in favour of a favourite man or fa-
mily : but in a mixed conftitution of three branch-
es there is lefs neceflity of obferving the rule with
ftridtnefs, and more facility of obferving it when
necefTary. It is very doubtful whether the confti-
tution of Rome could have been longer preferved,
if Cicero had joined Antony inftead of Oclavius.
The people were now uncontrolled, and the fe-
nate had loft its authority ; and the people behav-
ed as they always do, when they pretend to exer-
cife the whole executive and legislative power ;
that is, they fet up immediately one man and one
family for an emperor, in cffcft, fometimes refpetf:-
ing ancient forms at firft, and fometimes rejecting
them altogether. But of ail rules, this is the leaft
poffible to perfuade them to obferve in fuch a cafe.
The Florentine family of the Medici were fet up
jn this manner by the people, who, as Machiavei
informs us, aimed at all power, and a fimple de-
mocracy ;

468 The right Conftitution of a

mocracy ; and in fuch cafes " Cofimus is always
'*- eafily admitted to fucceed his coufin Alexan-
" der." It is not to be wondered at, that " Pom-
" perns Columba flood up in the conclave, and
" (hewed them how dangerous and prejudicial it
" mufl of neceffity prove to the liberties of Italy;
" that the popedom mould be continued in one
** houfe, in the hands of two brothers, one after
46 another;" but if the election of a pope had
depended upon the people of Florence, Julian
de Medicis would have been chofen to fucceed
his brother, though Columba had harangued
them with ever fo much eloquence againfb it. A
conclave of cardinals, and a body of people in a
city, are very different electors. The continua-
tion of power in the houfe of Orange is another
inftance in point ; that family have been conti-
nued in power by the will of the people, very often
expreffed in outrageous fury, and very often much
againfl the inclination of the ariftocracy.

In every nation, under every form of govern-
ment, public affairs were always managed by a
very fmall number of families, compared with
the whole number. In a fimple democracy they
will ever be conducted by the fmalleft number of
all ; the people will confer all upon a very few fa-
milies at firfl, and upon one alone at length.
" The Roman fenate carried all by families; fo
•u does the fenate of Venice;" but the number is
greater than will ever be intrufled by a people
who exercife the whole executive and legiflative
power in one affembly. But the largeft number
of families that can be introduced into aftual con-
fidence and fervice, in any combination of the
powers of fociety, is in the compofition of three
branches; becaufe here as many families are em-
ployed to reprefent the people by numbers, as to

reprefent

Commonwealth, examined. 4.69

reprefent property in the fenate ; and it is in fuch
a form alone that fo many families may be em-
ployed without confufion and fedition. Here
then this rule of policy may be befl obferved, not
to let two or more, unneceflarily, bear high offices
at once ; or, if there are feveral of a family whofe
merit is acknowledged, they may be employed
without the fmalleft danger.

" To hold up the majefty and authority of their
44 fuifrages or votes entire, in their fenators or
44 fupreme afTemblies ;" or, in other words, " to
*' maintain the free fuffrages of fenates or people,
44 untainted with the influence or mixture of any
44 commanding power ; for if this were not fe-
44 cured from controul or influence of any other
u power, then a&um erat de Jibertate." — To
maintain the independence and integrity of fuf-
frages, without corruption from flattery, artifice,
bribes, or fear, is no doubt a good rule ; but if the
author here means that the power of the people
mould be abfolute, and without controul from a
fenate or a firft executive magiftratc, it is beg-
ging the queflion, and, what is more, it is noto-
rioufly falfe and definitive.

44 So long," fays our author, 44 as the Roman
u people kept up their credit and authority as
44 facred, in their tribunes and fupreme afTembiies,
44 fo long they continued really free." But how
long was this ? While they were only defending
themfelves from the tyranny of the lenate ; while
they were greatly inferior to thefenate in power ;
while they were increaiing their own power by
obtaining the office of tribune, by obtaining li-
berty to marry into patrician families, to be ap-
pointed ediles,confuls, cenfors,&c. : in Ihort, while
their power was inferior to that of the fenate and

controulable

4,7 o The right Conflitution of a.

controulable by it, they enjoyed as much liberty
as ever was enjoyed under that government; but
the moment they obtained an equality of power
with the fenate, they began to exercife more than
their hair', and tp give it to their idols. '• When,
44 by their own negleft they gave Sylla, amd his
44 party in the fenate, an opportunity of power to
44 curb them, then their fuffrages (once efteemed
44 (acred) were trodden under foot; for immedi-
44 ately after they came to debate and ad but by
*4 courteiy, the authority left being by Sylla, after
44 the expiration of his diftatorfhip, in the hands
44 of the (landing fenate, fb that it could never
44 after be regained by the people. Caefar, when
44 he marched to Rome, deprived them alfo of
44 the authority of their fuffrages ; only in a for-
44 mal way made ufe of them ; and fo, under a
44 (hadow of legality, he affumed that power unto
44 himfelf, which they durft not deny him." Our
author is never weary of producing anecdotes and
examples from hiftory, which prove his own fyftem
to be infallibly deftruftive of liberty. It is a mi-
ierable confolation to a virtuous citizen, who has
loft his liberty, to tell him that he has loft it " by
44 the neglect and fault of his fellow-citizens in
44 general;" it is the moft humiliating anddefpe-
rate flavery of all. If he had loft it by the fimple
ufurpation of a {ingle man or fenate, without the
fault of the people (if that indeed is a poffible or
fuppofeable cafe) he might ftill entertain a hope
of regaining it ; but when we are told that a peo-
ple loft their liberty by a neglect or fault that we?
kuow they will alwayscommit whenuncontrouled,
is it not a conclufive argument for providing in
the conftitution an effectual controul ? When the
people exercife all powers in (ingle aflemblies, we
know that the power of Sylla and Gaefar will a]-;

ways

tl ammonia e a It h, examined.

mix in, and influence and controul : ft is im-
poilible, then, that in our author's form of go-
vernment this fifth rule of policy ever fhould be
obferved, or the fuffrages kept pure and upright.
44 Juil in the fame manner dealt Cofmus in the
44 Florentine fenate : he made nfe of their fuf-
" frages, but he had fo played his cards before-
44 hand, that they durft not but yield to his ambiv
44 tion. So Tiberius firft brought the fuffrages
44 of the ienate at his own devotion, that they
44 durfl not but confent to his eftablifhment, and
" then £b ordered the matter that he might feem
" to do nothing, not only without their confent,
44 hut to be forced to accept the empire by their
*' in treaty ; fo that you fee there was an empire in
44 effect long before it was declared in formality."
Will duplicity be lefs practicable, or lefs com-
• mon, in an aflembly of the people than in a fe-
nate ? May not an empire or defpotifm in effect,
though democratical in form, be lefs difficult to
accomplifh than even under an ariflocratical form?
Empire of particular men will exift in effect un-
der every fimple form, and every unequal mix-
ture : an empire of laws in reality can be main-
tained only in an equal mixture of all three.

44 That the people be continually trained up in
44 the exercife of arms, and the militia lodged only
44 in the people's hands, or that part of them
*' which are moft firm to the interefl of liberty,
44 that fo the power may reft fully in the difpo-
44 fition ot their fupreme afTemblies." — The limi-
tation to 4i that part moft firm to the intereft of
" liberty," was inferted here, no doubt to referve
the right of difarming all the friends of Charles
Stuart, the nobles and bifhops. Without flopping
to enquire into the jnflice, policy, or neceffity of

this

4. 7 2 The right Conftitu tion of (t

this, the rule in general is excellent : all the
confequences that our author draws from it, how-
ever cannot be admitted. One coniequence was,
according to him " that nothing could at any
4fc time be impofed upon the people but by their
44 confent," that is, by the confent of themfelves,
44 or of fuch as were by them intruded. As Arif-
44 totle tells us, in his fourth book of Politics, the
44 Grecian dates ever had Ipecial care to place the
44 ufe and exercife of arms in the people, becaufe
44 the commonwealth is theirs who hold the arms :
44 the fword and fovereignty ever walk hand in
44 hand together." This is perfectly jud. "Rome,
44 and the territories about it, were trained up
44 perpetually in arms, and the whole common-
44 wealth, by this means, became one formal mi-
44 litia. There was no difference in order be-
44 tween the citizen, the hufbandman, and the
44 foldicr." This was the " ufual courfe, even
44 before they had gained their tribunes and af-
44 femblies; that is, in the infancy of the fenate,
44 immediately after the expulfion of their kings."
But why does our author difguife that it was the
fame under the kings? This is the truth; and
it is not honed to conceal it here. In the times
of Tarquin, even, we find no danding army,
44 not any form of foldiery ;.' — " nor do we find,
44 that in after times they permitted a depofition
44 of the arms of the commonwealth in any other
44 way, till their empire increafing, neceffity con-
44 drained them to eredl a continued flipendiary
44 foldiery abroad, in foreign parts, either for the
" holding or winning of provinces." Thus we
have the truth from himfelf ; the whole people
were a militia under the kings, under the fenate,
and after the fenate's authority was tempered by
popular tribunes and afTemblies ; but after the

people

examined. 473

people acquired power, equal at leaft, if not fupe-
rior to the fenate, then 44 forces were kept up,
44 the ambition of Cinna, the horrid tyranny of
44 Sylla, and the infolence of Marius, and the
" felf ends of divers other leaders, both before
44 and after them, filled all Italy with tragedies,
44 and the world with wonder." Is not this an ar-
gument for the power of kings and fenates, rather
-than the uncozitroulable power of the people,, when
it is confefTed that the two firft uied it wifely, and
the laft pernicioufly ? The truth is, as he faid be-
fore, 4i the fword arid fovereignty go together."
While the fovereignty was in 'the fenate under
kings, the militia obeyed the orders of the fenate
given out by the kings ; while the fovereignty was
-in the fenate, under theconfuls, the militia obey-
ed the orders of the fenate given out by confuls ;
but when the fovereignty was loft by the fenate,
and gained by the people, the militia was neg-
le&ed, a {landing army let up, and obeyed the
orders of the popular idols. 44 The people, fee-
44 ing what miiery they had brought upon them-
" felves, by keeping their armies within the
44 bowels of Italy, pafled a law to prevent it, and
46 to employ them abroad, or at a convenient dif-
44 tance: the lav/ was, that if any general march -
<4 ed over the river Rubicon, he fliould be de-
44 clared a public enemy ;" and in the paffage of
that river this following infcription 44 was ere&-
46 ed, to put the men of arms in mind of their du-
44 ty: 4 Imperator,fivemiles,fivetyrannusarmatus
44 quifque, iiftito v^xillum, armaquc deponito, nee
44 citra hnnc amnem trajicito ;' general, or fol-
44 dier, or tyrant in arms, whofoever thou be,
44 ftand, quit thy ftandard, and lay afide thy arms,
4i or elfe crofs not this river." But to what pur-
pofe was the law ? Cx-far knew the people now to
VOL. III. 3 P be

4.74. ^ he right Conftitution of a

be fovereign, without controul of the fenate, and
that he had the confidence both of them and his
army, and caft the die, and erected " pra?torian
" bands, inftead of a public militia; and was fol-
44 lowed in it by his fucceffors, by the Grand Sig-
44 nior, by Cofmus the firft great duke of Tuf-
44 cany, by the Mufcovite, the Ruffian, the Tar-
44 tar, by the French," and, he might have added,
by all Europe, who by that means are all abfo-
lute, excepting England, becaule the late king
Charles I. who attempted it, did not fucceed ; and
becaule our author's 44 Right Conftitution of a
Commonwealth" did not fucceed: if it had, Oliver
Cromwell and his defcendants would have been
emperors of Old England as the Caefars were of
Old Rome. The militia and fovereignty are in-
feparable. In the Englifli conftitution, if the
whole nation were a militia, there would be a mi-
litia to defend the crown, the lords, or the com-
mons, if either were attacked : the crown, though
it commands them, has no power to ufe them im-
properly, becaufe it cannot pay or fubfift them
without the confent of the lords and commons ;
but if the militia are to obey a fovereignty in a
flngle afTembly, it is commanded, paid, fubfifted,
and a ftanding army too may be railed-, paid, and
fubfifted, by the vote of a majority ; the militia
then muft all obey the fovereign majority, or di-
vide, and part follow the majority, and part the1
minority. This laft caie is civil war ; but until it
comes to this, the whole militia may be employed
by the majority in any degree of tyranny and op-
preffion over the minority. The conftitution
f ur nifties no refource or remedy ; nothing affords
a chance of relief but rebellion and civil war : if
this terminates in favour of the minority, they
will tyrannise in their turns, exafperated by re-
venge,

Commonwealth, examined. 4.75

venge, in addition to ambition and avarice ; If the
majority prevail, their domination becomes more
cruel, and foon ends in one defpot. It muft be
made a facred maxim, that the militia obey the
executive power, which reprefents the whole peo-
ple in the execution of laws. To fuppofe arms
in the hands of citizens, to be ufed at individual
difcretion, except in private felf-defence, or by
partial orders of towns, counties, or diftrifts of
a flate, is to demolifh every conftitution, and lay
the laws proftrate, fo that liberty can be enjoyed
by no man — it is a diffolution of the government.
The fundamental law of the militia is, that it be
created, dire&ed, and commanded by the laws,
and ever for the fupport of the laws. This truth
is acknowledged by our author, when he fays,
" The arms of the commonwealth fliould be
*4 lodged in the hands of that part of the people
}' which are firm to its eftablimment."
.

" Children mould be educated and inftru&ed hi
" the principles of -freedom. Ariilotle fpeaks
" plainly to this purpofe, faying • that the inflitu-
" tion of youth fhould be accommodated to that
" form of government under which they live ; for-
f afmuch as it makes exceedingly for the pre-
" fervation of the prefent government,' whatfb-
" ever it be." — It is unneceiTary to take pains to
{hew, that the " impreilions men receive in youth
" are retained in full age, though never fo bad,
" unlefs they happen, which is very rare, to quit
" the corrupt principles of education by an ex-
" cellent reafon and found judgment ;" nor is it
neceffary to cite the teflimonies tfc of Plutarch or»
,t' liberates," Plato or Solomon, or " Caefar's Coni-
t' mentaries," nor the examples of " Greece or
»* Gallia?" and her "Druids." — Theexampleofthe

difficulty

476 7^* r/g-/2/ Constitution of a

difficulty the Romans found to eftablifh their
ariftocracy upon the ruins of monarchy, arifing
from the education of their youth (even the fons
of Brutus) in diiferent principles, and the ob-
ftruftions experienced by the Caefars in eftabJifh-
ing defpotifm among a people educated under a
commonwealth, are oppofite enough. Education
is more indifpenfible, and muft be more general,
under a free government than any other. In a
monarchy, the few who are likely to govern muft
have fome education, but the common people
in uft be kept in ignorance; in an ariftocracy, the
nobles fhould be educated, but here it is even
more necefTary that the common people fhduld be
ignorant; but in a free government knowledge
muft be general, and ought to be univerfal. Yet
fiich is the miferable blindnefs of mankind, that in
our author's " Right Conftitution" it is very doubt-
ful whether thepitifuJ motive of favirigtheexpence'
would not wholly extinguish public education. If
there were not a fcnate, but the people in one af-
fcmbly ruled all, it is a ferious queftion, whether
there is one people upon earth fo generally gene-
rous and intelligent, as to maintain fchools and
univerlities at the public expence. The greater
number of every people are ftill ignorant ; and
although their leaders might artfully perfuade
them to a thoufand idle expences, they would not
be able to perfuade them to this. Education,
then, muft be iiipported by private munificence ;
and this iburce, although fulficient to maintain a
few fchools and a univerilty in a great nation,
can never be fufficient to maintain fchools in fuf-
• ficient numbers to educate a whole people. Where
a ienate is preierved, it is always a maxim with
them to reipecl learning, and educate their own
families; their example is followed by all others,

who

1

Commonwealth, examined. 4.77

who are any way in eafy circumdances : in a go-
vernment of three branches, commoners as well
as nobles are under a neceflity of educating
their children, becaufe they hope to be called
to public fervice, where it is neceflary. In all
the mixed governments of antiquity, education
was neceflary, and where the people had a (hare
it was the mod generally praftifed ; but in a fim-
ple government it never was general. In Sparta it
was far from being general ; it was confined to youth
of family ; fo it was under the aridocracy in Rome :
and although we have no examples of fimple de-
mocracy to recur to, we need only coniider, that
the majority mud be ignorant and poor ; and re-
colledt the murmurs and oppofition made by num-
bers of the lowed clafTes, who are often joined for
fmider purpoies by ibme men of confequence, to
be convinced, that a general public education ne-
ver can long ex id in a (imple deinocracy ; — the
dhiginefs, the envy, and malignity of the bafe and
ignorant, would be flattered by the artful and de-
figning, and the education of every family left to
its own expence, that the rich only might have
their children educated.

" To ufe liberty with moderation, led it turn
" to iicentioufnefs ; which, as it is a tyranny it-
u felf, fo it ufually occafions the corruption and
" converlion of a free date into monarchical ty-
" ranny." — This is a caution to the people, and
can do no harm ; but will do little more good,
than " be ye warmed, and be ye clothed," will
relieve the wants of the poor. Ledtures, and fer-
mons, and admonitions, will never be fufficient to
make all men virtuous ; political, as well as mo-
ral, writers and exhorters will ipend their ink and
breath, not in vain, it is to be hoped, but with-

out

47 S The right Confl-itutlon of a

out completely reforming the world, and rcftoring
innocence and purity to all mankind. How then
is the tyranny of licentioufnefs to be avoided? By
the energy of Jaws. And where will be the energy
of law, when a majority may fet it afide upon
every queftion? Will not the licentious rich man,
who has perhaps greater influence in elections for
his licentioufnefs, be protected from punifhment
by his party in the houfe ? Will not the continual
profHtution of judgment in the executive courts,
to the views of a political party, increafe and pror
pagate licentioufnefs ? Will not the daily profti-
tution of the executive power, by bellowing of-
fices, not for virtue or abilities, but merely for
party merit, daily increafe licentioufnefs ? Will
not the appropriation of the public money to
eleftions increafe the means of debauchery among
the vicious? Will not the minor party be necei-
litated to imitate the majority in thefe practices as
much as pofiible, in order to keep themfelves in
any hopes? When their hopes are gone, they muft
join the other fide in worfhipping the fame idols,
who then become complete defpots. In our au-
thor's plan of government, then, his caution
againfl licentioufnefs will be thrown away ; but in
a mixed government it will be extremely ufeful.
The laws may be made to concur with fermons,
and thefcourge, the pillory, and the gallows, may
enforce the precepts of moral writers : the ma-
giftrate may be a terror to evil doers, and a praifc
to them that do well, inflead of being a terror only
to the minority, and a praife to thofe who op-
preis them. As cautions and admonitions, there-
fore, are undoubtedly uieful in a government tru-
ly free, though idle and trifling in a fimple de-
mocracy, let us proceed to confider thofe of our
author.

His

Commonwealth, examined. 479

His firft caution under this eighth rule of po-
licy is/4 It is above all things necefTary to avoid
44 civil diflenfions;" and " the uttermoft remedy
44 is not to be ufed upon every diftemper or de-
44 fault of thofe that (hall be in trifled with the
44 people's power and authority." How charming
it is for brothers to live in harmony ! The fmalleit
things increafe by concord ! How many beautiful
fentiments, in heavenly numbers, from writers fa-
cred and profane, might be faid or fling in ho-
nour of peace, concord, harmony, and brotherly
love ! repetitions of them from age to age have
been made, no doubt, to the edification and com-*
fort of many , but, alas! diflenfions flill
and daily arife, in every nation, city, village,
I fear, I may add family, in the whole world*
Something more efficacious, then, than moral fong,
ingenious fable, philofophic precept, or Chriflian
ordinance, with reverence be it fpoken, muffc be
employed infociety or diiTenfions will (till ravage
and defolate the world. In a fifnple democracy
the citizens will not all think alike ; various fyi-
tems of policy will be approved by different per-
fons ; parties will be formed, even with the befl
intentions, and from the pureft motives ; others
will be formed from private views and from bafe
motives : the majority mufl decide, and, to ob-
tain this, the good will be obliged to unite with
the bad, and probably there will be no circle or
combination, no club or party in the houfe, but
will becompofed partly ofdifinterefled men and
partly by intercfted ones, partly by the virtuous,
and partly by the vicious; honeit men and knaves,
wife men and fools; will be kneaded together
in every mafs., Out of the colliiions of thefe
diflentions unavoidably grow, and therefore fome
provi-fion mud be made to decide them. An up-
right

4.80 fhe right Conftitution of a

right independent tribunal, to judge of contro-
verfies, is indifpenfible ; and an upright, inde-
pendent, judiciary tribunal, in a fl mole democracy,
is impoflible. The judges cannot hold the:r com-
miffions but durante bene placito of the majority ;
if a law is macic, that their coromiffions {hall be
quamdiu fe bene gefTerint, this iray be repealed
whenever the majority will, and v without repealing
it, the majority only are to judge when the judges
behave amifs, and therefore have them always at
mercy. When difputes arife between the rich and
poor, the higher and the lower dalfes. the majo-
rity in the houfe muft decide them ; there is no
portability, therefore, of having any fixed rule to
fettle difputes and compofe contentions : but in
a mixed government the judges cannot be dif-
placed but by the concurrence of two branches,
who are jealous of each other, and can agree in
nothing but juflice ; — the houfe mutt accufe, and
the lenate condemn ; this cannot be without a
formal trial, and a full defence. In the other a
judge may be removed, or condemned to infamy,
without any defence, or hearing, or trial. This
part of our author's caution, then, is vain, ufelefs,
and idle, in his own form of government, but
wife, juft, and excellent, in a government pro-
perly mixed : fuch cautions are provided by the
conflitution itfelf, that civil diffeniionscanfcarcely
ever arife ; or, if they do, may be eafily com-
pofed.

The other part of the caution, " that the ut-
*' termofi remedy, is not to be ufed upon every
" diflemper or default of thofe that fhall be in-
" trufled with the people's power and authority,"
is, in a (imple democracy, totally ufelefs and im-
pra&icable. There is no other remedy but the
•uttermoft for any diftemper or default : the

courts

Commonwealth, examined. 4.81

courts of juflice, being tools of the majority, will
give no remedy to any of the minority : peti-
tions and remoriflrances to the houie itfelf, againft
its own proceedings, will be defpifed or refented ;
fo that there can be abfolutely.no remedy but in
arms, or by the enormity of tumult, diiTenfion,
and fedition, which 1 fuppofeare meant by " the
nttermofl remedy/'

It is very true, as our author lays, " if one in-
64 convenience happen in government, thecorrec-
44 tion or curing of it by violence introcluceth a
44 thoufand ; and for a man to think civil war or
44 the fword is a way to be ordinarily ufed for the
4i recovery of a fick ftate, it were as great a mad-
44 nefs as to give flrong waters in a high fever ;
4t or as if he mall let himfeif blood in the heart to
4i cure the aching of his head." This is perfectly
jufl, and exprefTed with great beauty, propriety,
and force : yet it is certain, that a member of the
minor party, in Needham's and Turgot's govern-
ment, has no chance for any other remedy ; and
even this is often as defperate as it is always dread-
ful, becaufe the weaker mud attack. the ftronger.
If the only expedient to, "confute the arguments"
againft fuch a collection of authority in one centre
be, that fuch a people " give them the lye by a
4k clifcreet and moderate behaviour in all their pro-
44 ceedings, and a due reverence of fuch as they
44 have once elected and made their iuperiors."
thefe arguments will never be confuted, and the
caufe of liberty is defperate ; becauie it is as def-
perate to expect that a majority uncontrouled
mould behave always dilcrcctly and moderately,
as to expect that all men will be wife arid good.

Our author's criterion for determining the ca Vs
in which the people (in whom 4i all majefly ai^ci
44 authority fundamentally reiides, being only mi-

VOL. III. 3 Q, " nifteriall/

4.82 The right Conftittition of a

44 niflerially in their trtiftecs or reprefentatives)
44 may ufe fharp and quick remedies for the cure
" of a commonwealth," is very judicious, and has
been the rule in all Englifh revolutions fince —
44 in fuch cafes only as are manifeft intrench ments
44 either in defign or in being, by men of power,
44 upon the fundamentals or efTentials of their li-
44 berty, without which liberty cannot confift." —
This rule is common to him and Milton, and has
been adopted by Sidney, Locke, Burnet, Hoad-
ley : but this rule is ufelefs in a fimple democracy.
The minority have no chance for juflice in iinaller
cafes, becaufe every department is in the hands of
their enemies ; and when the tyranny arrives at
this laft extremity, they have no hope, for all the
means, at leaft the mofl of the means, of quick
and fharp remedies, are in the hands of their ene-
mies too; fo that the mofl defperate, irremediable,
and forlorn condition of liberty, is in that very
collection of all authority into one centre, that our
author calls 44 a right Conflitution of a Common-
wealth."

The inftance brought by our author to illuftrate
his meaning, proves the fame thing. In that con-
tention of three hundred years in Rome, between
the fenate and people, about the divifion of the
conquered lands, the people made a law that no
citizen fhould poflefs above five hundred acres of
land. The fenators cried it was an abridgment of
liberty ; the people cried it was inconfiftent with
liberty, that the fenators fhould engrofs too much
wealth and power. Livy fays, 4k the people were
44 right, and the fenators wrong, but that both did
44 ill in making it a ground of civil difTenfion;" for
the Gracchi, inftead of finding out moderate ex-
pedients to reduce the fenators to rcafon, proceeded

with

Commonwealth, examined. 4.83

with fuch heat and violence, that the fenate was
forced to choofe Sylla for their general ; which
being obferved by the people, they alfo raifed an
army, and made Marius their general, and herein
came to a civil war, " which, through fines, banifh-
44 ment, inhuman cruelties aded on both fides,
" defeats in the open field, and mafTacres within
44 the city, coft the beft blood and eftates of the
44 nobility and commons, and in the end coft
44 them their liberty, for out of the root of this
" fprang that civil war between Pompey and Cae-
i4 far." All this again, which is true and juft,
(hews that our author had read the Roman hiftory
with difcernment, and renders it more unaccount-
able that he mould have perverted fo much good
fenfe and learning to fupport a fantaftical image,
that he muft have feen could not endure. The ex-
ample in queftion (hews more than the impractica-
bility of liberty in a fimple democracy ; it mews
the imperfection of a mixture of/two powers, a
fenate and people. In a iimple democracy, what-
ever difpute arifes, whether about a divifion of
lands, or any thing elfe, muft be decided by the
majority ; and if their decree is unjuft, there is no
remedy but to appoint Sylla and Marius generals.
In the Roman mixture of two powers there is no
remedy to decide the difpute, but to appoint Sylla
and Marius, Pompey and Caefar ; but when there
are three branches, after two have offered all pof-
fible arguments, and cannot agree, the third has
only to confider which is neareft juftice, and join
with that, to decide the controversy andreftore the
peace. It fhall readily be granted, that the civil
war between Marius and Sylla was needlefs, and
about an objeft, which did not immediately af-
fe& the fundamentals of the conftitution ;yet indi-
reftly it did ; and the faft is, that the ftruggle now

began

484 The right Conflitution of a

began to be ferious which fhould be mailer. It
was no longer a queflion, whether theienate fhonld
be reflrained, but whether the people fhould be
matters. The army under Pompey was neceffary.
Why? To prevent the people from being mailers,
and to defend the exiftence of the fenate. The
people indeed were already matters, and would
have an idol. The inftance of Charles the Firtt
may be equally applicable ; but rhofe times afford
as melancholy an example of a dominatio plebis,as
.they do a fuccefsful one of refinance to a tyrant.
But if any one thinks thefe examples and cautions,
without a balance in the conttitution, will inttruft
people how to demean themfelves, and avoid licen-
tioufnefs, tumult, and civil difTention, and in all
44 the neceflary points of prudence and forbear -
" ance which ought to take place in refpeft of
46 fupcriors, till it (hall evidently appear unta a
" people, that there is a design on foot to furprife
64 and feize their liberties," he will be miferably
miilaken. In a fimple democracy they will riie
in arms, a thoufand times, about common affairs
of meum and tuum, between the major and minor
party, before any fundamental attack fhall be
made on the conflitution.

44 That in all elections ofmagiflrates, the}?- have
44 an efpecial eye upon the public, in making
4fc choice of fuch perfons only as have appeared
44 mofh eminent and a£Hve in. the eflablifbmenl
"4 and love of freedom."

But fuppofe any of the people mould love their
.friends better than liberty, and themfelvcs better
than the public, as nine tenths of the'people did
in the purefl moments of Grecian and Roman li-
berty, even when Ari (tides appeared as a rire phe-
nomenon in one, and Cincinnatus in the other P tn

fuch

Commonwealth, examined. 485

fuch cafe they will vote for their friends, though
royalifts, papifts, malignants, or call them by what
name you will. In our author's *' Right Confli-
44 tut ion" many will vote for a treat, many fora
job, fome for exemption from punifhnient for a
crime, fome for a monopoly, and fome for the
promife of an office. This will not be virtuous,
but how can yon help that?

44 In the hands of thofe," fays our author, u who
" have appeared moft eminent and a&ive in the
44 •eftabliflimcnt of freedom, may be fafely placed
44 the guardianfhip of liberty ; becaufe fuch men
44 have made the public intereft and their own all
44 one, and therefore will neither betray nor defert
44 it in profperity or adverfity." This was mo-
cleflly beipeaking unlimited confidence for Oliver
Cromwell and his affociates; and fuch blind, ram
confidence has fnrrendered the liberties of all na-
tions : but it is not the language nor the maxim of
liberty ; her univerfal precept (hould be, trufl not
to human nature ', -without a confront, ihe ccndutt of
my caufe. To lay it down 44 as a certain rule, that
i4 if any perfon be admitted into power that loves
44 not the commonwealth above all confiderations,
44 fuch a man is every man's money ; any ftate-
44 merchant may have him for a fa&or ; and for
4i good confideration he will often make returns
44 upon the public intereft, have a ftock going in
" every "party, and with men of every opinion ;
44 and, if occalion ferve, truck with the common
44 enemy and commonwealth both together," is
perhaps to rely upon a patriotifm that never ex-
ifled in any whole nation. It is to be feared the
commonwealth %yould fuffer in moft countries: but
admitting fo exalted an opinion of the patnotifm
of any given country, it will flill remain true, that
there will be differences of fentiment concerning

the

The right Conftitu tion of a

the good of the Commonwealth ; and the parties
formed by thefc divifions, if uncontrolled, will
have all the ill confequences that have been point^
ed out. The more fincerely parties love the re-
public, with fo much the more ardour will they
purfue their own notions of its good. Ariftotle's
opinion, in the firft book of his Politics " Per
" negligentiam mutatur flatus reipublicae, cum ad
" poteftates affumuntur illi qui prefentem ftatum
" non amant ; the form of a -commonwealth is
44 then altered by negligence, when thofe men are
4t taken into power who do not love the prefent
" eftablifhment," may be well founded; and yet it
may not follow that it is fafe to truft omnipotence
to thofe who are well affe&ed, nay even to thofe
who really love the common wealth above all other
things, and prefer her good to their own, fince
that character may change, and thofe virtues too
may not be accompanied with fo many motives
and fo many advantages of information, in what
the good of the public confifls, as may be had in
a divifion and mixture of powers. It is a good
rule " to avoid thofe who hate the commonwealth,
" and thofe who are neutral and indifferent about
44 it;" and no doubt moft of the broils, tumults,
and civil diflenfions, in free ftates, have been oc-
cafioned by " the ambitious, treacherous, and in-
" direct praftices of fuch perfons admitted into
46 power, as have net been firm in their hearts to
44 the interefts of liberty." But how fliall the
people know whofe heart will ftand the trial, when
Ib many people have been difappointecl before
them? Rome is again quoted as an example; and
the fenate are faid to have garbled, perplexed, and
turmoiled the people's affairs, concernments, and
understandings : but although this is true, it is
equally fo that the people perplexed their own af-
fairs,

Commonwealth, examined. 3.87

fairs, and thofe of the fenate too. — You, who have
pardoned already fo many digreflions, will eafily
excufe another in this place. The words virtue
and patriotifm might have been enumerated among
thofe of various and uncertain figniflcation. Mon-
tefquieu's Spirit of Laws is a very ufeful collec-
tion of materials ; but is it too irreverent to fay
that it is an unfinimed work*? He defines a re-
publican government to be 44s that in which the
44 body, or only a part of the people, is poffelfed
44,of the fupreme power j." This agrees with
Johnfon's definition, " aftate in w hich the govern -
kfc ment is more than one." — " When the body of
44 the people," fays MontefquieuJ, " in a republic,
44 are poffelfed of the fupreme power, this is called
44 a democracy ; when the fupreme power is lodged
44 in the hand of a part of the* people, it is then
44 an arifbocracy." And again§, 44 it is the na-
44 ture of a republican government, that either the
44 collective body of the people, or particular
44 friends, fhould be poffeffed of the fovereign
44 power. In a popular Hate, virtue is the necef-
44 fary fpring of governmentj|. As virtue is ne-
44 ceflary in a popular government, fb it is necef-
44 fary alib under an ariflocracy. True it is, that
44 in the latter it is not fo abfolutely requiflte."
Does this writer mean that honour and fear, th«
former of which he calls the principle of monar-
chy, and the latter of defpotifm, cannot exiit in a
republic ? or that they are not necefTary ? Fear,
furely, is neceiTary in a republican government :
there can be no government without hopes and
fears. Fear then, in truth, is at leail one principle

* C'eft le ponefcuilje d'un homme, d'efprit, qui a eie jette
par le fenetre et ramaffee par des lots, laid Voltaire,
t Spirit of Laws, book ii. c. i. t B- ii- c- 2-

5 B. iii. c. 2. {j B» iii. c. 3.

in

4.83

The right Conftitution of a

in every kind of government, in the fimpleft de-
mocracy as well as the fimpleft defpotiim. This
arrangement, fo exaft and iyftematical in appear-
ance, and which has been celebrated as a difcovery
of the principles of all government, is by no nie^ s
fatisfaftory, fince virtue and honour cannot be ex-
cluded from defpotifms, nor fear nor virtue from
monarchies", nor fear nor honour from republics ;
but at leail it is apparent that in a republic, confti-
tuted as we propofe, the three principles of fear,
honour, and virtue, unite and produce more union
among the citizens, and give greater energy to the
laws. — But not to enlarge on this, let us proceed
to the enquiry, what is virtue? It is not that claf-
iical virtue which we iee perfonified in the choice
of Hercules, and which the ancient philofophers
fummed up in four words, prudence, jiiltice, tem-
perance, and fortitude. It is not Chriflian virtue,
fo much more fublime, which is fummarily com-
prehended in univerfal benevolence. What is it
then? According to Montefquieu*, it fhould
feem to be merely a negative quality; the abience
only of ambition and avarice : and he thinks that
what he thus advances is confirmed by the unani-
mous teftimony of hiftorians. But is this matter
well confidered ? Look over the hiflory of any
republic, and can you find a period in it, in which
ambition and avarice do not appear in very flrong
characters, and in which ambitious men were not
the mod popular. In Athens, Piliftratus and his
fucceflbrs were more popular, as well as ambitious,
than Solon, Themiflocles than Ariflides, &c. In
Rome, under the kings, the eternal plots of the
nobles againft the lives of the kings, to ufurp their
thrones, are proofs of an ardent and unbridled am-
bition. Nay, if we attentively examine the mod

* Book iii. c. 3.

virtuous

Commonwealth, examined. 4.89

^irtuouscharafters,wefhallfindunequivocalmarks
of an ardent ambition. The elder Brutus, Ca-
millus, Regulus, Curius, ^Emilius, Cato, all diico-
ver an ambition, a third of glory, as ftrong as that
of Csefar : an honourable ambition, an ambition
governed by juilice, if you will; but an ambition
ftill. But there is not a period, in Athenian or Ro-
man annals, when great characters did not appear
actuated by ambition of another kind ; an unjuft
and diflionourable ambition : fuch as Pififtratus,
Themiftocles, Appius Claudius, Sec. and thefe
characters were always more popular than the
others, and were fupported chiefly by plebeians,
not fenates and patricians. If the abfence of ava-
rice is necefTary to republican virtue, can you find
any age or country in which republican virtue has
exifled? That fingle characters, or a few among
the patricians, have exiftecl, who were exempt from
avarice, has been already admitted ; but that a
moment ever exilted, in any country, where pro-
-perty was enjoyed, when the body of the people
were univerfally or even generally exempted from
avarice, is not eafy to prove. Every page of the
hiflory of Pvome appears equally marked with am-
bition and avarice; and the only difference appears
in the means and obje&s. In fome periods the
nation was extremely poor, in others immenfely
rich ; but the paflions exiiled in all; and the Ro-
man foldiers and common people were for ever
quarrelling with their mod virtuous generals, for
refilling to indulge their avarice, by dillributing
the ipoils among them, and for loving the public
too well, by putting the booty into the public trea-
fury. Shall we fay then that republican virtue is
nothing but Iimple poverty ; and that poverty
alone can fupport fuch a government ? But Mon-
VOL. III. 3 K tefcpieu

49 o The right Constitution of a

tefquieu tells us*, virtue in a republic, is a love
of the republic ; virtue in a democracy, is love of
the democracy : and why might he not have faid,
that virtue in a monarchy, is a love of the monar-
chy ; in a defpotifm, of the defpot ; in a mixed
government, of the mixture? Men in general
love their country and its government. Can it be
proved that Athenians loved Athens, or Romans
Rome, more than Frenchmen love France, or En-
glifhmen their ifland ? There are two principal
caufes of difcrimination. — The firft is, the great -
nefs or irnallnefs of the ftate. A citizen of a fm all
republic, who knows every man and every houfe
in it, appears generally to have the ftrongeft at-
tachment to it, becaufe nothing can happen in it
that does not interefl and affedl his feelings : but
in a great nation, like France or England, a man
is as it were loft in the crowd ; there are very
few perfbns that he knows, and few events that
will much affeft him ; yet you will find him as
much attached to his circle of friends and know-
ledge as the inhabitant of the fmall ftate. — The
fecond is, the goodnefs or badnefs of the conftitu-
tion, the climate, foil, &c. Other things being
equal, that conftitution, whofe bleilings are the
moft felt, will be moft beloved ; and accordingly
we find, that governments the beft ordered and ba-
lanced have been moft beloved, as Sparta, Athens,
Carthage, Rome, and England, and we might add
Holland, for there has been, in practice and efFeft,
a balance of three powers in tha^t country, though
not fufficiently defined by law. Moral and Chrif-
tian, and political virtue, cannot be too much be-
loved, pra&ifed, or rewarded; but to place liberty
on that foundation only would not be fafe: but
* Book v. c. 2. 3.

it

Commonwealth, examined. 491

st may be well qneftionecl, whether love of the
body politic is precifely moral or Chriftian vir- '
tue, which requires juftice and benevolence to
enemies as well as friends, and -to other nations
as well as our own. It is not true, in fa£t, that
any people ever exifted who loved the public
better than thernfelves, their private friends,
neighbours, &c. and therefore this kind of virtue,
this fort of love, is as precarious a foundation for
liberty as honour or fear : it is the laws alone
that really love the country, the public, the whole
better than any part ; and that form of govern-
ment which unites all the virtue, honour, and
fear of the citiz-ens, in a reverence and obedience
to the laws, is the only one in which liberty can
be fecure, and all orders, and ranks, and parties,
compelled to prefer the public good before their
own ; — that is the governmentfor which we plead.
The firft magiftrate may love himfelf, and family,
and friends, better than the public, but the laws,
fupported by the fenate, commons, and judges,
will not permit him to indulge it ; thefenatx: may
love themlelves, their families, and friends, more
than the public, but the firft magiftrate, com-
mons, ami judges., uniting in fupport of public
law, will defeat their projects ; the common peo-
ple, or their reprefentatives, may love themfelves
and partial connections better than the whole, but
the firft raagiftrate, fenate, and judges, can fup-
port the laws againft their enterprises ; the
judges may be partial to men or factions, but the
three branches of the legiflature, united to the
executive, will eaflly bring them back to their
duty. In this way, and in no other, can our .au-
thor's rule be always observed, " to avoid all who
" hate the commonwealth, and thofe who are
" neutral and indifferent about it."

4.91 The right Conftitution of a

Montefquieu adds,* " a love of democracy is
*' that of equality." But what paflion is this?
Every man hates to have a fuperior, but no rrmi
is willing to have an equal ; every man defires to
be fuperior to all others. If the meaning is, that
every citizen loves to have every other brought
down to a level with himfelf, this is fo far true,
but is not the whole truth : when every man is
brought down to his level, he wifhes them de-
prefled below him; and no man will ever acknow-
ledge himfelf to be upon a level or equality with
others, till they are brought down lower than
him.— Montefquieu fubjoins, " a love of the de-
" mocracy is likewife that of frugality/' This is
another paflion not eafilyto be found in human
nature. A paflion for frugality, perhaps, never
exifted in a nation, if it ever did in an indivi-
dual. It is a virtue : but reafon and reffe&ioii
prove the neceflity and utility of this virtue ; and
after all, it is admired and cfteemed more than
beloved. But to prove that nations, as bodies,
are never actuated by any fuch paflion for fruga-
lity, it is fufficient to- obferve, that no nation ever
pra&ifed it but from neceflity. Poor nations
only are frugal, rich ones always profuie ; except-,
ing only fome few inftances, when the paflion of
avarice has been artfully cultivated, and became
the habitual national character : but the paflion of
avarice is not a love of frugality. Is there, or is
there not, any folid foundation for thefe doubts ?
Ivluft we bow with reverence to this great mafter
of laws, or inay we venture to fufpe£t that thefe
doctrines of his are {pun from his imagination ?
Before he delivered fo many grave leilons upon
democracies, he would have done well to have

* Spirit of. La \vs, book v. chap. 3.

fhown

Commonwealth, examined.

(ho ^vn when or where fuch government exifted.
Until fome one ihall attempt this, one may ven-
ture to fufpeft his love of equality, love of fru-
gality, and love of the democracy, to be fantafti-
cai .pa&ions, feigned for the regulation and ani-
mation of a government that never had a more
folid exiftence than the flying ifland of Lagado.

Suppofe we fhould venture to advance the fol-
lowing proportions, for further examination and
reflexion.

1. No democracy ever did or can exift.

2. If, however, it were admitted, for argu-
ment lake, that a democracy ever did or can
exift, no fuch paffion as a love of democracy,
ftronger than felf-love, or fuperior to the love of
private intcreft, ever did, or ever can, prevail in
the minds of the citizens in general, nor of a ma-
jority of them, nor in any party or individual of
them.

3. That if the citizens, or a majority of them,
or any party or individual of them, in adtion and
practice, preferred the public to his private intq-
r.eft, ssmany undoubtedly would, it would not be
from any fuch palfion as love of the democracy,
but from reafon, confcience, a regard to juftice,
and a fenfe of duty and moral obligation ; or elfe
from a defire of fame, and the applaufe, gratitude,
and rewards of the public.

4. That no love of equality, at leaft fince
Adam's fall, ever exifted in human nature, any
otherwife than as a defire of bringing others down
to our own level, which implies a defire of railing
ourlelves above them, or depreliing them beloW
us. That the real friends of equality are fuch
from reflection, judgment, and a fenfe of duty,
not from any paffion, natural or artificial.

, 5. That no love of frugality ever exifted as a

paffion,

4.94 The right C on/lit ut ion of a

pafHon, but always as a virtue, approved by deep
and long reflection, as ufeful to individuals as well
as the democracy,

6. That therefore the democracy of Montef-
quieu, and its principle of virtue, equality, fruga-
lity, Sec. according to his definitions of them, are
all mere figments of the brain, and delufivc im-
aginations.

7. That his paffion of love of the democracy
would be, iu the members of the majority, only a
love of the majority ; in thofe of the minority,
only a love of the minority.

8. That his love of equality would not even
be pretended towards the members of the mino-
rity, but the feinblance of it would only be kept
up among the members of the majority.

«9. That the difthiction between nature and phi-
lofophy is not enough attended to ; that nations
are actuated by their paflions and prejudices; that
very few, in any nation, are enlightened by philo-
fbphy or religion enough to be at all times con*
vinced that it is a duty to prefer the public to a
private interefl, and fewer dill are moral, ho-
nourable, or religious enough to practife fuch
{elf-denial.

i o. Is not every one of thefe propofi tions proved
beyond difpute, by all the hiflories in this and the
preceding volumes, by all the other hiftories of
the world, and by univerlal experience?

n. That, in reality, the word democracy fig^
nifies nothing more nor lefs than a nation or peo-
ple without any government at all, and before
any conftitution is inilituted.

1 2. That every attentive reader may perceive,
that the notions of Montefquieu, concerning a
democracy, are imaginations of his own, derived
from the contemplation of the reveries ofXeno-

phon

Commonwealth, examined.

phon and Plato, concerning equality of goods and
community of wives and children, in their deli-
rious ideas of a perfeft commonwealth.

1 3, That fuch reveries may well be called de-
lirious, iince, befides all the other arguments
againft them, they would not extinguifli the fa-
mily fpirit, or produce the equality propofed;
becaufe, in fuch a (late of things, one man would
have twenty wives, while another would have
none, and one woman twenty lovers, while others
would languifh in obfcurity, folitude, and celi-
bacy.

A third caution is, " that in all their elections
u- of any into the fupreme court or council, they
44 be not led by any bent of faction, alliance, or
44 affection, and that none be taken in but purely
" on the account of merit." — This is the rule of
virtue, wifdom, and juflice ; and if all the people
were wife and juft they would follow it: but
how (hall we make them fo, when the law of God,
in nature and in revelation, has not yet effected
it ? Harrington thinks, that advifing men to be
mannerly at the public table, will not prevent
fome from carving for themfelvcs the beft parts,
and more than their (hares. Putting " men in au-
44 thority who have a clear reputation of tran-
44 fcendent honefty and wifdom, tends, no doubt,
44 to filence gainfayers, and draw theconfent and
44 approbation of all the world ;" but hov/ (ball
we prevent fome from getting in, who are tran-
fc^ndent only in craft, hypocrify, knavery, or fol-
ly ? The bed way that can be conceived of, furely ,
is t,o feparate the executive power from the legif-
lative, make it refponfible to one part of the legif-
lature, on the impeachment of another, for the
ufe of its power of appointment to offices, and

to

496 The right Constitution of a

to appoint two afTemhlies in the Icgiflaturc, that
the errors of one may be corrected by the other.

44 To avoid falfe charges, accufations, and ca-
*' lumniations, againfl perfons in authority, which/
4t are the greatest abuies and blemifhes of liberty,
" and have been the mod frequent caufes of tu-
44 mult and diflenfion ;" though, it is the fecret
ifc of libertv, that all magiftrates and public offi-
44 cers be kept in an accountable ftate, liable to
44 render an account of their behaviour and ac~
44 tions, and that the people have freedom to ac-
44 cufewhom they pleafe." — Difficult as it is to re-
concile thefe necefTary rules in a free government,
where an independent grand jury protects the re-
putation of the innocent, and where a fenate judges
of the accafations of the commons, how can it be
done in a fimple democracy, where a powerful ma*
jority, in a torrent of popularity, influences the
appointment of grand and petit juries, as well as
the opinion of the judges, and where a triumph-
ant party in the legiflature is both accuicr and
judge ? Is there not danger that an accufer be-
longing to the minor party will be punifhed for
calumniation, though his complaint is juft ; and
that an accufed of the minor party will be found
guilty, though innocent ; and an accufed of the
major party acquitted, though guilty ? It is ridi-
culous to hope that magiftrates and public officers
will be really refponfible in fuch a government, or
that calumniations will be difcountenanced except
on one fide of the houfe. The oflracifms and pe-
talifms of antiquity, however well intended againft
iufpefted men, were foon perverted by party, and
turned againfl the befl men and the leaf! fufpici-
ous ; and in the fame manner it is obvious^ that
refponfibility and calumniation in a fimple demo-
cracy

Commonwealth, examined.

cjracy will be mere inftruments in the bands of the
majority, to be employed againft the beft men of
an oppofite'party, and tofcreen the word in. their
own. The Romans, by their caution to retain in
full force and virtue that decree of the fenate, cal-
led Turpitianum, whereby a fevere fine was fet on
the heads of all calumniators and falfe accufers,
at the fame time that they retained the freedom
of keeping all perfons accountable, and accufing
whom they pleafed, although they preferved
their '(late a long time from usurpation of men
in power on one fide, fend from popular clamour
and tumult on the other "fide, we mufl remember
had a fenate to check the people, as well as to be
checked by them ; and yet even this mixture did
not prevent the Gracchi, Marius, Sylla, and Cx-
far, from ufurping, nor the people from being
tumultuous, as loon as they obtained even an
equality with the fenate: fo that their example
• cannot convince us that either of thefe rules can
be obferved in a fimple democracy ; on the con-
trary, it is a proof that the more perfect the ba-
lance of power, the more exa&ly both thefe ne-
ce(Fary rules may be obferved.

A fifth caution is, " that as by all means they
" fhould beware of ingratitude and unhandfome
%t returns to fucli as have done eminent fervices
.*' for the common wealth, fo it concerns them-, for
" the public peace and fecurity, not to impofe a.
..-'• truft in the hands of any perfon or perfonc,
" further than as they may take it back again at
:v jfteafiire. The reafori is, honores mutant mo-
%i res. AccelTions and continuations of power
" expofe the mind to temptations; they are f aits
>; too big for any bulk of mortality to fleer an
k< even courie by." How is this cpnfifteot wifii

'VOL. III. 3 S ' wh'ac

¥fo right Conftitution of a

what is faid under the head of the fecond cau-
tion P " In the hands o'f fuch as have appeared
46 moil eminent and a£Uve in the eftablifhment
" and Jove of liberty, the guardianfhip of liberty
u may be fafely placed, becaufe fuch men have
" made the public intereft and their own all one,
'* and therefore will never betray nor defert it,
*' in profperity or adverfity." In ftiort, our au-
thor inculcates a confidence and diffidence at the
fame time that feem irreconcileable. Under this
head he is diffident. " The kingdoms of the
<; world are baits that feldom fail : none but he
** that was more than man could have refilled
44 them. How many free Hates, by trading their
46 own fervants too far, have been forced to re-
^ ceive them as maflers ! Immoderate power
** lets in high thoughts. The fpirit of ambition
44 is a fpirit of giddinefs : it foxes men, makes
*•* them drunk, mere fots, non compos mentis,
'* hurried on without fear or wit. All tempta-
** tions and opportunities of ambition mud be re-
4* moved, or there will arife a neceflity of tumult
•*' and civil dlfTenfion; the common confequence
44 hath ever been a ruin of the public freedom."
How is it poOTible for a man who thinks in this
manner to propofe his " Right Conftitution,"
where the whole authority being in one reprefen-
tative aiTemble, the utmoft latitude, temptation,
and opportunity, is given to private ambition?
Wlu£ has a rich and ambitious man to do, but
ftand candidate for an ele£tion in a town where he
has many relations, much property, numerous de-
pendants? There can be no difficulty in getting
choien. When once in, he has a vote in the dif-
pofal of every office, the appointment of every
judge, and the diftribution of all the public mo-
ney. May not he and others join together to vote

for

Commonwealth, examined. 4.99

for fuch as will vote for them? A man once in,
has twice as much power to get in again at the
next election, and every day adds acceflions, accu-
mulations, and continuations of power to him.
** Caefar, who firft took arms upon the public
" fcore, and became the people's leader, letting
*6 in ambitious thoughts, forfook his friends and
" principles, and became another man, and turned
*' his arms upon the public liberty." And has not
every nation, and city, and affembly, many Csfars
in it ? When private men look to the people for
public offices and commands, that is, when the
people claim the executive power, they will at firil
be courted, then deceived, and then betrayed.
Thus did Sylla ferve the fenate, and Marius the
people; thus every fim pie government is ferved:
but where the executive appoints, and the Icgifla*
tive pay, it is otherwife; where one branch of a
legiflative can accufe, and another condemn, where
both branches of Jegiflature can accufe before the
executive, private commanders mnft always have
a care— they may be difarmed in an inftant.
Pififtratus, Agathocles, Cofmos, Soderino, Sava-
narola, Caftruccio, and Orange, all quoted by our
author, are all examples in point to (hew, that fim-
ple democracies and unbalanced mixtures can ne-
ver take a trufl back again, when once committed
to an ambitious commander. That this caution
therefore may be obierved, and trufl taken back
at pleafure when ill managed, or in danger of be-
ing fo, no government is equal to the tripartite
competition.

The ninth rule is, " that it be made an unpar-
" donable crime to incur the guilt of trcalbii
*' againfl the intereft and majefly of the people.
"It was treafon in Brutus's ions to confpire the

** rcil oral ion

500 . The right Constitution of a

44 rdloration of Tarquin." So their father judged
it, but it was the intereft and majefty of the fenate
' here that was held to be the intereft and majefty
of the people. The treafon of Melius and Man-
lius too was again ft the majefty of the fenate, and
ui favour of the majefty of the people. The trea-
fon of the Decemviri too was againfl: the fenate,
and fo was that of Caefar. In Venice too it is trea-
fon to think of confpiring with the people againft.
the ariftocracy, as much as it was in Rome. It-
is treafon to betray fecrets both in Venice and in
Home; the guilty were hanged upon a gibbet, or
burnt alive.

No doubt a fi'mple democracy would make it
treafon to introduce an ariftocracy or a monarchy ;'
but Jiow could they punifh it, when the man who
commits it has the army, the judges, the bifiiops,
and a majority of the affembly and people too £t
his devotion? How can fecrecy in a iimple demo-
cracy be kept, where the numbers are fo great,
and where constituents can call to account P or how
can it be punifhed, when betrayed, when fo many
will betray it; when a member of the majority
betrays it, to ferve the caufe of the majority ? <; It
4i is treafon in Venice fora fenator to receive gifts
4i or penfions from a foreign prince or ftate." But
ns, according to the heathen proverb, " the Gods
44 themfelves may be taken with gifts," how can1
you prevent them from being* taken by the ma-
jority in a fimple democracy ? Thuanus, who
lays, t4 the king of France need not ufe much Ja-
41 bour to purchafe an intereft with any prince or
" ftate of Italy, unlels it be the Venetian repub-
" lie, where all foreign ptrnfioners and compli-
44 ancesare punifhed with tile utmofLfeverity, but
*> efcape well enough in other places," might have
added, that no difficulty would ever be found to'

purchafe

Commonwealth, examined. ' 501

purchafe an intereft in a fimple democracy, or in
any other fimple vmcontrouled aiTemlbly. In a
fimple democracy no great fum would be required
to purchafe elections for proper inftruments, or
to purchafethe fuffrages of fome already in their
feats. A party pardons many crimes, as well as
JefTer faults. " It is treafon for any Venetian fe-
" nator to'have any private conference with fo-
" reign ambafTadors and agents ; and one article
" of charge, which took off Barnevelfsbead, was
" that he held familiarity and converfe with the
" Spanim ambaffador in timeof war." Although
receiving bribes from foreign ambafTaclors ought
to be punifhed with .'the utmoft feverity, and all
uncommon familiarity with them avoided as fuf-
picious and difhonourable, fuch extremes as theic
of Venice and of Holland, in the cafe of Barne-
velt, may as well be avoided. But in a fimple de-
mocracy, it will be found next to impoflible to
prevent foreign powers from making a party, and
purchafing an intereil : an ambaiTador will have
a right to treat with all the members, as parts of
tlie ibvereignty, and therefore may have accefs to
thofe who are lead on their guard, and mod eafily
corrupted. But in a mixed government, where
the executive is by itfelf, the minifters only can
be purcbafed, who, being few, are more eafily
watched and puhiftied ; befides that it is the exe-
cutive power only that is managed by minifters ;
and this often cannot be completed but by the
concurrence of the legiflatufe. The difficulties of
corrupting fuch a government therefore are much
greater, as both the legiflative, executive, and ju-
dicial power, muft be all infecled, or there will
be danger of detection and punifhment.

LETTER

LETTER VII.

Grofvenor-Square, Dec. 26, 1787.

Dear Sir,

IT fhould have been before obferved, that the
Weftern empire fell in the fifth century, and
the Eaftern in the fifteenth.

Auguftnius was compelled by Odoacer, king of
the Heruli, in 4.75, to abdicate the Weftern em-
pire, and vvas the laft Roman who pofTefled the
Imperial dignity at Rome. The dominion of Italy
fell, loon afterwards, into the hands of Theodoric
the Goth. The Eaftern empire lafted many cen-
turies afterwards, till it was annihilated by Ma*
hornet the Great, andConftantinople was taken in
the year 14.53. ^^e initial bet ween the fall of
thefe two empires, making a period of about a
thoufand years, is called THE MIDDLE AGE.*
During this term republics without number arofe
in Italy; whirled upon their axles or fingle cen*
tres ; foamed, raged, and burft, like fo many wa-*
ter-fpouts upon the ocean. They were all alike
ill-conftituted ; all alike miferable : and all ended
in fimilar difgrace and defpotifm. It would be
curious to purfue ourfubjed through all of them
whofe records havcfurvivcd the ravages of Goths,
Saracens, and bigot ted Chriftians ; through thofe
other republics of Caftile, Arragon, Catalonia,
Gallicia, and all the others in Spain ; through
thofe in Portugal ; through the feveraJ provinces

* Barbeyrac's Preface to his Hiftory of Ancient Treaties.
Corps Dipl. torn, jxxii. Harris's Philological Enquiries,
part iii. chap. i.

that

I 503 ]

that now compofe thekingdom of France; through
thofein Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Holland,
England, Scotland, Ireland, £c. But if fuch a
work mould be fufficiently encouraged by the
public (which is not probable, for mankind in ge-
neral dare not as yet read or think upon CONSTI-
TUTIONS) it is too cxtenfive for my forces, and
ought not to be done in fo much hade. The pre-
ceding Letters have been produced upon thelpur
of a particular occafion, which made it neceflary
to write and publifh with precipitation, or it might
have been nfelefs to have publifhed at all. The
whole has been done in. the midft of other occu-
pations, in fo much hurry, that fcarce a moment
could be fpared to correct the ftyle, adjufl the
method, pare off excrefcences, or even obliterate
repetitions ; in all which refpe&s it (lands in
need of an apology. Ton may purfue the invefti-
gatien to any length you pleafe. All nations,
from the beginning have been agitated by the
fame paffions. The principles developed in thefe
Letters will go a great way in explaining every
phenomenon that occurs in the hiffory of govern-
ment. The vegetable and animal kingdoms, and
thofe heavenly bodies whofe exiftence and move-
ments we are as yet only permitted faintly to
perceive, do not appear to be governed by Jaws
more uniform or certain than thofe which regu-
late the moral and political world. Nations move
by unalterable rules : and education, difcipline and
laws, make the greateft difference in their accom-
plifhments, happinefs, and perfection. It rs the
matter artift alone who finifhes his building, his
pidture, or his clock. The prefent actors on the
ftage have been too little prepared by their early
views, and too much occupied with turbulent
fcenes, to do more than they have done : impar.

fkl

[ 5°9 ]

tial juftice will confefs, that it is aftonifliing they
have been able to do fo much. It is for you and
your youthful companions, to make yourfelves
matters of what your prcdecelfors have been able
to comprehend and accovnplifh but imperfectly.
A profpect into futurity in Americans like con-
templating the heavens through the telefcopes of
Herichell : objects, flupendous in their magni-
tudes and motions, ftrike us from all quarters,
and fill us with amazement ! When we recoiled,
that the wifdom or the folly, the virtue or the
vice, the liberty or fervitude, of thofe millions
now beheld by us, only as Columbus faw thefe
times in vifion,* are certainly to be influenced,
perhaps decided, by the manners, examples, prin-
ciples, and political inftitutions of the prefent.
generation, that mind muft be hardened into ftone
that is not melted into reverence and awe. With
fuch affefting icenes before his eyes, is there, can
there be, a young American indolent and incuri-
ous ; furrenciered up to diffipation and frivolity ;
vain of imitating the loofefl manners of coun-
. tries, which can never be made much better or
much worfe ? A profligate American youth muft
be profligate indeed, and richly merits the fcora
of all mankind.

The world has been too long abnfed with no-
tions, that climate and foil decide the characters
and political inftitutions of nations. The laws of
Solon, and the defpotifm of Mahomet, have at
different times prevailed at Athens : confuls, em-
perors, and pontiffs, have ruled at Rome. Can
there be defired a ftrongcr proof, that policy and
education are able to triumph over every dii*
advantage of climate ? Mankind have been (till

* Barlow's Vifion of Columbus.

more

C 505 ]

more injured by inflnuatians, that a certain celef-
tial virtue, more than human, has been neceflary
to preferve liberty. Happinefs, whether in defpo-
til'in or democracy, whether in flavery or liberty,
can never be found without virtue. The bed re-
publics will be virtuous, and have been fo ; but
we may hazard a conjedhire, that the virtues-have
been the effeft of the well-ordered confutation,
rather than the caufe : and perhaps it Would be
impoffible to prove, that a republic cannot exift,
even among highwaymen, by letting one rogue
to watch another; and the knaves themfelves may,
in time, be made honeft men by the itruggle.

It is now in our power to bring this work to a
conclufion with unexpected dignity. In the courfe
of the laftiummer, two authorities have appeared,
greater than any that have been before quoted, in
which the principles we have attempted to defend
have been acknowledged. The firft is an Ordi-
nance of Congrefs, of the igth of July 1787, for
the Government of the Territory of the United
States North-weft of the River Ohio; the fecond
is, the Report of the Convention at Philadelphia,
of the 1 7th of September 1787. The former con-
federation of the United States was formed upon
the model and example of all the confederacies,
ancient and modern, in which the fcederal coun-
cil was only a diplomatic body : even the Lycian,
which is thought to have been the beft, was no
more. The magnitude of territory, the' popu-
lation, the wealth and commerce, and efpecially
the rapid growth of the United States, have fhewn
iuch a government to be inadequate to their
wants; and the new fy item, which feems ad-
mirably calculated to unite their interefls and af-
fections, and bring them to an uniformity of prin-
ciples and ientiments, is equally well combined to

VOL. III. 3 T unite

I 506 )

unite their wills and forces as a Tingle nation. A.
refult of accommodation cannot be fuppofed to
reach the ideas of perfection of any one ; but the
conception of fbch an idea, and the deliberate
union of fo great and various a people in fuch a
plan, is, without all partiality or prejudice, if not
the greateft exertion of human underftanding, the
greateft fingle effort of national deliberation that
the world has ever feen. That it may be im-
proved is not to be doubted, and provifion is
made for that purpofe in the Report itfelf. A
people who could conceive, and can adopt it, we
need not fear will be able to amend it, when, by
experience, its inconveniences and imperfections
fhall be feen and felt.

C £07 ]

WE, the People of the United States, in
order to form a more perfect Union, efta-
blifh Juflice, infure domeftic Tranquillity,
provide for the common Defence, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and fecure the
Bleffings of Liberty to ourfelves and our
Pofterity, do ordain and eftablifh this
CONSTITUTION for the United States 0f
America,

ARTICLE L

Serf. i. A LL legiflative powers herein grant'
jfX ed mall be veflcd in a Congrefs of
the United States, which fhall confifl of a Senate
and Houfe of Reprefentatives.

Bed. 2. The Houfe of Reprefentatives (hall be
compofed of members chofen every iecond year by
the people of the feveral flates, and the electors
in each ilate fhall have the qualifications requifite
for electors of the mod numerous branch of the
flate legiflature.

No perfon fhall be a reprefentative who fhall
not have attained to the age of twenty-five years,
and been {even years a citizen of the Unite4
States, and who (hall not, when ele&ed, be an in-
habitant of that ftate in which he fhall be
chofen.

Reprefentatives and diredt taxes fhall be ap-
portioned among the feveral flates which maybe
included within this Union, according to their re-

fpcdive

t

fpe&ive numbers, which (hall be determined by
adding to the whole number of free perfons, in-
cluding thofe bound tofervicefor a term of years,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three -fifths of all
other perfons. The actual enumeration fhall be
made within ihree yeafs after the firft meeting of
the Congrefs of the United States, and within
every fubfequent term often years, in fuch- man-
ner as they fhall by law direft. The number of
reprcfentatives (hall not exceed one for every
thirty thoufand, but each ftate fhall have at leaft
one r^prefentative ; and until fuch enumeration
fhall be made, the flate of NewHampfhire fhall
be entitled to chufe three, MafFachufetts eight,,
Rhode-Ifland an4 Providence Plantations one,
Conne&icut five, New York fix, New Jerfey four,
Pennfylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland fix,
Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, SoiUh-Car6lina
five, and Georgia three.

, When vacancies happen in the reprefentation
from any ftatcr the. Executive authority thereof
fhall ifTue writs of cleft ion to fill fuch vacancies,
; The Houfe of Reprefentatives (hall chufe their
Speaker and other officers .; and fhall have thefolc
power of impeachment. , ; -.. i

Sett. 3. The Senate of the United States dial!
be compofed of two fenators from each ilate, cho>
fe-il by the kgiflature thereof, for fix years ; and
each fenator. fhall have one vote. : &..'

Immediately after they fliall be afTembled in
ccnlequence of the firft. election, they fhall be di-
vided as equally as may be Into three clafTes. The
feats of the fenators of the firft clafs fliall be vacated
at the expiration, of thefecond year, of the fccond
clals at the expiration of the fourth year, and of
the third clafs at the expiration of the fixth year,
fb that one- third may be chofen every fecond year;

and

C 5°9 1 ,

and if vacancies happen by refignation, or other-
wile, during the recefs of the legiflature of any
ftate, the Executive thereof may make temporary
appointments until the next meeting of the legif-
lature, which fhall then fill fuch vacancies.

No perfon fhall be a feriator who mall not have
attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine
years a citizen of the United States, and who (hall
not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that ftate
for which he fhall be choien.

The Vice-Prefrdent of the United States (hall
be Preiident of the Senate, but mall have no Vote,
unlefs they be equally divided.

The lenate fhall chufe their other officers, and
alfo a Prefident pro tempore, in the abfence of the
Vice-Prefident,orwhen he fhall exercife the office
of Prefident of the United States.

The Senate fhall have the fole power to try all
impeachments. When fitting for that purpofe,
they fhall be on oath or affirmation. When the
Prefident of the United States is tried, the Chief
Juftice fhall preflde : And no perfon fhall be con-
vifted without the concurrence of two- thirds of
the members prefent.

Judgment in cafes of impeachment (hall not
extent further than removal from office, and dif-
qualification to hold and enjoy any office qf ho-
nour, truft, or profit, under the United States ;
but the party convicted fhall neverthelefs be liable
and fubjeftto indictment, trial,judgment, and pu-
riifliment, according to law.

Setf. 4. The times, places, and manner of
holding elections for fenators and reprefentatives,
fhall be prefcribed in each ftate by the legiflature
thereof : but the Congrefs may at any time by law
make or alter fuch regulations? except as to the
places of choofing Senators.

The

C 5" 3

The Congrefs (hall affemble at leaft once in
every year, and fuch meeting mall be on the firft
Monday m December, unlefs they mall by law ap-
point a different day.

Sec. 5. Each houfe fhall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its own
members, and a majority of each fhall conftitute
a quorum to do bufiuefs ; but a fmaller number
may adjourn from Jay to day, and may be autho-
rifed to compel the attendance of abfent members,
in fuch manner, and under fuch penalties, as each
houfe may provide.

Each houfe may determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings, punifa its members for diforderly beha-^
viour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel a member.

Each houfe fhall keep .a journal of its proceed-
ings, and from time t/Sp^time publifh the fame, ex-
cepting fuch parts as may in their judgment re-
quire fecrecy ; and the Yeas and Nays of the mem-
bers of either houfe on any queftion fhall, at the
defire of one-fifth of thofe prefent, be entered on
the journal.

Neither houfe, during the feffion of Congrefs,
(hall, without the confent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place
than that m which the two houfes fhall be fitting.

Setf. 6. The fenators and reprefenta lives fhall
receive a compenfation for their fervices, to be
aicertained by law, and paid out of the trealury of
the United States. They fhall in all cafes, except
treaibn, felony, and breach of the peace, be privi-
leged from arreft during their attendance at the
(effion of their refpective houfes, and in going to
and returning from the fame ; and for any fpeechor

debate

C 5" ]

debate in either houfe, they (hall notbe quefiioncd
in any other place.

No fenator or reprefentative fhall, during the
time for which he was eledted, be appointed to any
civil office under the authority of the United
States, which {hall have been created, or the emo-
luments whereof fhall have been encreafed during
fuch time ; and no perfon holding any office under
the United States, fhall be a member of either
houfe during his continuance in office.

7. All bills for raifing revenue (hall ori-
ginate in the Houfe of Reprefentatives ; but the
Senate may propofe or concur with amendments
as on other bills.

Every bill which fliall have patted the Houfe of
Reprefentatives and the Senate, fhaJl, before it be-
comes a law, be prefented to the Prefident of the
United States ; if he approve he fhall fign it, but
if not he fhall return it, with his objections, to
that houfe in which it fhall have originated, who
fhall enter the objections at large on their journal,
and proceed to reconfider it; If, after fuch re-con-
fideration, two-thirds of that houfe fhall agree to
pafs the bfll, it fhall be fent, together with the
objections, to the other houfe, by which it fhall
likewife be re-confidered, and if approved by two
thirds of that houfe, it fhall become a law. But in
all fuch cafes the votes of both houfes fhall be
determined by Yeas and Nays, and the names of
the perfons voting for and again ft the bill fhall bt
entered on the journal of each houfe refpeCtively,
If any bill fhall not be returned by the Prefidenf
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it fhali
have been prefented to him, the fame fnall be a
law, in like manner as if he had figned it, unlefs

the

[ 5'4 ]

ftitution in the government of the United States^
or in any department or officer thereof.

Sefi. 9. The migration or importation of fuch
perfons as any of the dates now exifting {hall think
proper to admit, (hall not be prohibited by the
Congrefs prior to the year onethoufand eight hun-
dred and eight, but a tax or duty may be impofed
on fuch importation, not exceeding ten dollars for I
each perfon.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus fliall
not be fufperided, unlefs when in cafes of rebellion
or irivafi-on the public fafety may require it.

No bill of attainder or ex poft fatfo law (hall be
paired.

No capitation, or other dired: tax {hall be laid,
unleis in proportion to the cenjus or enumeration
herein before directed to be taken.

No tax or duty {hall be laid on articles ex-
ported from any ftate. No preference mall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue
to the ports of one ftate over thofe of another ;
nor {hall veffels bound to, or from one ftate,
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in
another..

No money mail be drawn from the treafury, but
in confequence of 'appropriations made by law ;
and a regulai-ftatement and account of the receipts
and expenditures of all public money {hall be pub-
limed from time to time.

No title of nobility fhall be granted by the
United States : Arid no perfon holding any office
of profit or truft under them, mall, without the
content of the Congrefs, accept of any prefent,
emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever
from any king, prince, or foreign ftate.

C 5*5 ]

Setf. ro. No ftate fhall enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation ; grant letters of marque
and reprifal ; coin money ; emit bills of credit ;
make any thing but gold and filver coin a tender
in payment of debts ; pafs any bill of attainder, ex
poft fatfolwf) or law impairing the obligation of
contra&s^ or grant any title of nobility.

No ftate fhall, without the confent of the Con-
grefs, lay any impofts or duties on imports or ex-
ports, except what may be abfolutely necefTary
for executing its infpeftion laws ; and the net pro-
duce of all duties and impofts, laid by any ftate on
imports or exports, fhall be for the ufe of the
Treafury of the United States ; and all fuch laws
fhall be fubjeft to the revifion and controul of the
Congress. No ftate fhall, without the confent of
Cc...grefs,lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or
fliipsof war in time of peace, enter into any agree-
ment or compadi; with another ftate, or with a
foreign power, or engage in war, unlefs aftually
invaded, or in fuch imminent danger as will not
admit of delay.

ARTICLE II.

Setf. i. The executive power mall be vefted
in a*Preiident of the United tates of America.
He fhall hold his office during the term of
four years, and, together with the vice-Prefi-
dent, chofen for the lame term, be eleded as
follows :

Each ftate fhall appoint, in fuch manner as the
legiflature thereof may direft, a number of elec-
tors, equal to the whole number of fenators and
reprefentatives to which the ftate may be entitled
in\Ue Congreis : but no fenator or reprefentative

or

3

or pcrfon holding an office of truft or profit
under the United States, (hall be appointed an
elector.

The electors {hall meet in their refpe&ive dates
and vote by ballot for two perfons, of whom one
at leaft fhall not be an inhabitant of the fame ftate
with themfelves. And they fhall make a lift of all
the perfons voted for, and of the number of votes
for each ; which lift they fhall fign and certify,
and tranfmit fealed to the feat of the government
of the United States, directed to the Prefident of
the Senate. The Prefident of the Senate fhalJ, in
the prefence of the Senate and Houfe of Repi e-
fentatives, open all the certificates, and the votes
lhall then be counted. The perfon having the
greateft number of votes fhall be the Prefident, if
fuch number be a majority of the whole number
of electors appointed ; and if there be more than
one who have fuch majority, and have an equal
number of votes, then the Houfe of Reprefenta-
tives fhall immediately chufe by ballot one of them
for Prefident ; and if no perfon have a majori-
ty, then from the five higheft on the lift the faid
Houfe fhall in like manner chufc the Prefident.
But in chufing the Prefident, the votes mall
be taken by ftates, the reprefentation from
each ftate having one vote ; a quorum for* this
purpofe fhall confift of a member or members
from two-thirds of the ftates, and a majority of all
the ftates fhall be necefTary to a choice. In every
cafe, after the choice of the Prefident, the perfon
having the greateft number of votes of the ele&ors
fhall be the Vice- Prefident. But if there mould
remain two or more who have equal votes, the
Senate fhall chufe from them by ballot the Vice-
Prefident,

The

5'7 ]

The Congrefs may determine the time of chuf-
ing the electors, and the day on which they mall
give their votes; which day mall be the fame
throughout the United States.

No perfon, except a natural born citizen, or a
citizen' of the United States at the time of the
adoption of this conflitution, (ball be eligible to
the office of Prefident; neither (hall any per-
fon be eligible to that office who (hall not have
attained to the age of thirty -five years, and been
fourteen years a refident within the United States.

In cafe of the removal of the Prefident from
office, or of his death, refignation, or inability to
difcharge the powers and duties of the faid office,
the fame (hall devolve on the Vice-Prefident, and
the Congrefs may by law provide for the cafe of
removal, death, refignation, or inability, both of
the Prefident and Vice Prefident, declaring what
officer fhall then aft as Prefident, and fuch officer
/hail aft accordingly, until the disability be re-
moved, or a Prefident fhall be elefted.

The Prefident fhall, at ftated times, receive for
his fervices a compenfatlon, which fhall neither
be encreafed nor dimibifhed during the peviod
for which he fhall have been elefted, and he fhall
not receive within that period any other emolu-
ment from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the execution of his office,
he fhall take the following oath or affirmation : —

" I do folemnly fwear (or affirm) that I will
" faithfully execute the office of Prefident of the
44 United States, and will, to the beft of my abili-
ik ty, preferve, proteft, and defend the conftitu-
44 tion of the United States.''

Setf. 2. The Prefident fhall be commander in
chief or the army and navy of the United States,

and

C

and, of the militia of the feveral dates when called
into the aftual fervice of the United States : lie
may require the opinion in writing of the princi-
pal officer in each of the executive departments,
upon any fubje£t relating to the duties of their
refpective offices, and he (hall have power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offences againft the
United States, except in cafes of impeachment.

He (hall have power, by and with the advice
and confent of the Senate, to make treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators prefent concur ;
and he mall nominate, and by and with the advice
and confent of the Senate, (hall appoint ambafTa-
dors, other public minifters and confuls, judges
of the fupreme court, and all other officers of the
United States, whofe appointments are not herein
otherwife provided for, and which fhall be efla-
blifhed by law. But the Congrefs may by Jaw
veil the appointment of fuch inferior officers, as
they think proper, in the Prefldent alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The Prefident mail have power to fill up all
vacancies that may happen during the recefs of
the Senate, by granting commiffions which mail
expire at the end of their next fedion.

Setf. g. He (hall from time to time give to the
Congreis information of the flate of the Union,
and recommend to their consideration fuch mea-
fures as he (hall judgeneceffary and expedient ; he
may, on extraordinary occafions, convene both
houfes, or either of them, and in cafe of diiagree-
ment between them, with refpe£t to the time of
adjournment, he may adjourn them to fuch
time as he {hall think proper : he mall re-
ceive ambafTadors and other public minifters ; he
(hall take care that the Jaws be faithfully execut-
ed,

r 5^9 3

ed, and (hall commiflion all the officers of the
United States.

Setf. 4. The Prefident, Vice-Prefident, and all
civil officers of the United States, fhall be remov-
ed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of treafon, bribery, or other high crimes andmif-
demeanors.

ARTICLE III.

Setf. i. The judicial power of the United States
fliall be veiled in one fupreme court, and in fuch
inferior courts as the Congrefs may from time to
time ordain and eflablifh. The judges, both of
the fupreme and inferior court, mail hoid their
offices during good behaviour, and fhall, at flated
times, receive for their fervices a compenfation,
which fhall not be diminifhed during their conti-
nuance in office.

Serf. 2. The judicial power fhall extend to all
cafes, in law and equity, arifing under this confli^
tution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which fhall be made, under their autho-
rity ; to all cafes affe£ling ambafTadors, other pub-
lic miniflers and confuls; to all cafes of admiralty
and maritime jurifdiftion ; to controverfies to
which the United States fhall be a party ; to con^
troverfies between two or more flates, between a
flate and citizens of another ftate, between citi-
zens of different flates, between citizens of the
fame flate claiming lands under grants of different
flates, and between a flate, or the citizens thereof,
and foreign flates, citizens, or fubje&s.

In all cafes affe&ing ambafTadors, other public
miniflers and confuls, and thofe in which a flate

fhall

t $20 ]

mall be party, the fupreme court (hall have origi-
nal jurifdidtion. In all the other cafes before men-
tioned, the fupreme court fliall have appellate ju-
rifdiftion, both as to law and fadt, with fuch ex-
ceptions, and under fuch regulations, as the Con-
grefs fhall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in cafes of im-
peachment, fhall be by jury ; and fuch trial fhall
be held in the ftate where the faid crimes fhall
have been committed; but when not committed
within any ftate, the trial fhall beat fnch place or
places as the Congrefs may by law have directed,

Setf. 3. Treafon againft the United States
fhall coniift only in levying war againft them, or
in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort. No perfon fhall be convinced of
treafon unlefs on the teftimony of two wjtnefTes
to the fame overt ad, or on confeffion in open
court.

The Congrefs fhall have power to declare the
punifhment of treafon, but no attainder of treafon
ihall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, ex-
cept during the life of the perfon attainted.

ARTICLE IV.

Serf. i. Full faith and credit fhall be given ia
each ftate to the public a£ts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other ftate. And the Con-
grefs may by general laws prefcribe the manner in
which fuch a&s, records, and proceedings fhall be
proved, andtheeffeft thereof.

Setf. 2. The citizens of each ftate fhall be enti-
tled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the feveral ftates.

A perfon

\ -•

C 6*1 3

A^perfbn charged in any ftate with treafon, fe-
lony, or other crime, who fhall, flee from juftice,
and be found in another ftate, mall, on demand of
the executive authority of the ftate from which he
fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the ftate
having jurifHid: ion of the crime.

No pcrfon held to fervice or labour in one
ftate, under the laws thereof, efeaping into an-
other, mall* in confequence of any law or regu-
lation therein, be difcharged from fuch fervice or
labour, but mall be delivered up on claim of
the party to whom fuch fervice or labour may be
due..

Setf. g. New ftates may be admitted by the
Congrefs into this union ; but no new ftate (hall
be formed or ere&ed within the jurifdi&ion of any
other ftate ; nor any ftate be formed by the junc-
tion of two or more ftates, or parts of ftates, with-
out the content of the legiflatures of the ftates
concerned, as well as of the Congrefs.

The Congrefs (hall have power to difpofe of
and make all needful rules and regulations refpe£t-
ing the territory or other property belonging to
the United States ; and nothing in this confti-
tution mail be fo conftrued as to prejudice any
claims of the United States, or of any particular
ftate.

Setf. 4. The United States (hall guarantee to
every ftate in this union a republican form of go-
vernment, and ftrall protect ea,ch of them againft
invailon ; and, on application of the legiflatnre, or
of the executive (when the kgiflature cannot be
convened), againft domeftic violence.

VOL. lit. 2 X ARTICLE

ARTICLE V.

The Congrefs, whenever two.thirds of botli
Houfes (hall deem it necefTary, fhall propofe a-
mendments to this confutation, or, on the applica-
tion of the legitiaturesof two -thirds of the Several
ftates, fhall call a convention for propofing amend-
ments, which, in either cafe, (hall be valid to all
intents and purpofes, as part of this conftitution,
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the feveral ftates, or by conventions in three-
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of
ratification maybe propofed by the Congrefs : Pro-
vided, that no amendment which may be made
prior to the year one thoufand eight hundred and
eight fhall in any manner affedt the firft and fourth
claufes in the ninth fedYion of the firft article ; and
that no flate, without its confent, fliaD be depriv-
ed of its equal fufFrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered
into before the adoption of this conftitution, (hall
be as valid againft the United States under this con-
ftitution, as under the confederation.

This conftitution, and the laws of the United
States which mall be made in purfuance thereof;
and all treaties made^ or which" fhall be made,
under the authority of the United States, fhall be
the fupreme law of the land ; and the judges in
every ftate fhall be bound thereby, any thing in
the conftitution or'laws of any ftate to the con-
trary notwithstanding.

The fenators and reprefentatives before men-
tioned, and the members of the feveral ftate legif-

latures

C 523 ]

latures, and all executive and judicial officers,
both of the United States and of the feveral ftates,
ftiall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to ftipport
this conftitution ; but no religious teft fliall ever
he required as a qualification to any office or pub*
lie truft under the United States.

ARTICLE VIL

The ratification of the conventions of nine
ftates, fhallbe fufficient for the eftablifhmentof this
conftitution between the ftates fo ratifying the
fame.

DONE in Convention, by the unanimous confent
of the States prefent, the feventeenth day of
September, in the year of our Lord one thou-
fand feven hundred and eighty-feven, and of
the Independence of the United States of
America the twelfth. In witnefs whereof
we have hereunto fubfcribed our Names.

GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefideiit,
and Deputy from Virginia.

New-Hamp/hhe, \&* ^anSd™>

^Nicholas Gilman,

I* /r i r ' (Nathaniel Gorham,
g&frWetts. jRufusKing.

~ .a- S William Samuel Tohnfon,

Connecticut. < „ c, •?•

\ Roger Sherman,

New-Tor k. Alexander Hamilton,

f William Livingfton,

. , „ r I David Brearly,

New-Jerfcy. ^ wi]Ham ^^

[Jonathan Dayton.

Pennfyivania

Pennfylvania.

Delaware.

Maryland.

C 524 1

Benjamin Franklin,

Thomas Mifflin,

Robert Morris,

George Clymer,

Thomas Fitz-flmons,

Jared Ingerfoll,

James Wilfon,
[Gouverneur Morris.
'George Read,

Gunning Bedford, Junior,

John Dickinfon,

Richard Baffct,

Jacob Broom,
r James M'Henry,
3 Daniel of St. Tho. Jenifer,
CDaniel Carol.

} James Madifon, Junior.
c William. BJount,

North-Carolina. -) Richard Dobbs Spaight,
. (Hugh Williamfon,

f John Rutledge,
South Carolina. ] Carles Cotefworth Pinckncy,

Charles Pinckney,
• >r [Pierce Butler, . ;
g . \ William Few.

orgu (Abraham Baldwin.

Attefl. WILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary.

IN CONVENTION,
MONDAY, September 17, 1787. 5&i*

P R E S E NT,

The States of New-Hampfliire, Maflachufctts,
. Connediicut, Mr. Hamilton from New -York,
Nevv-Jerfey, Pennf ylvania, Delaware, Mary-

land,

i 525 ]

land, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Garoli-
na, and Georgia :

RESOLVED,

'THAT the preceding Conftitutlon be laid before
the United Statei-'tnCongrefs ajjembled, and that
it Is the opinion of this Convention, that it /hould
afterwards be fubmitted to a Convention of Dele-
gates, chofen in each ft ate by the people thereof \
u nder the recommendation of its legiflature,jor their
ajff'ent and ratification ; and that each Convention
ajfenting to, and ratifying the Jam e, /hould give no-
tic ether eoj to the United States in Congrcfs ajfembled.

Refolvcd, That it is the opinion of this Convention
thitasfoonas the Conventions of nine fiates/Jzall have
ratified this conflitution, the United States in Con-
grefs ajfembled /hould fix a day on which elect-
ors fhou Id be appointed by the ftates 'which /hall
have ratified the fame, and a day on 'which the
electors /hould ajfemble to vote for the Pre/ident,
and the time and place for commencing proceedings
under this conftitution* . That after Juch publication
the electors /hould be appointed, and the fenators
and reprefentatives elected ; 'That the electors
/hould meet on the day fixed for the election of the
President, and fliould tranfmit their votes, certified
Jigned,fealed, and directed, as the constitution re-
quires, to the fecretary of the United States, in Con-
grefs ajfembled, that the fenators a,nd rcprefenta-
tives Jhould convene at the time and place ajjigned ;
that the Jenators /hould appoint a prefident of the
fenate, for the folepurpofe of receiving, opening, and
counting the votes for Prefident \ and that after he
Jhallbe chofcn, the Congrefs, together1 'with the pre-*

fidcnt,

*

• ' . I" 5*6 ]

fident,fliould, without dday, proceed to execute-
this conftitution.

By the unanimous Order of the Convention,

GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefidcnt.
William Jackfon, Secretary.

In CONVENTION, September 17,1787.

SIR,

WE have now the honour tofubmit to the confe-
deration of the United State f in Congrefs ajfembled
that Conftitution which has appeared to us the moft
advifable. .«*^..

The friends of our country have long fee n andde-
fired, that the power of making war, peace, and;
treaties, that of levying money and regulating com-
merce, and the c orrefpondent executive and judicial
authorities, fliould be fully and effectually vefted in
the general government of the Union : but the im-
propriety of delegating fuc h extenftve trufl to one
body of men is evident — Hence refults the necejfity
of a different organization.

It is obvioujly impracticable in the federal go-
vernment of thefe States, tofecure all rights of inde-
pendent fovereign to each, and yet provide for the
interefl andfafety of all — Individuals entering in-
to fociety, muft give up a/hare of liberty to pre-
ferve the reft. "The magnitude ofthefacrifice muft
depend as well on fituation and circumftance, as on
the object to be obtained. It is at all times diffi-
cult to draw with precifion the line between thofe
rights which mu ft be Jurrendered, and thofe which
may be referved ; and on the prefent occafion this
difficulty was encreafed by a difference among the

States.

I 5'7 ]

feveral States as to their fituation, extent, habits,
and particular interefls.

In all our deliberations on this fubject we kept
fleadily in our view, that •which appears to us the
greatefl interefl of every true American, the confo-
lidation of our Union, in 'which is involved our prof-
perity, felicity, fafety, perhaps our national exifl-
ence. This important c on fi deration, ferioufly and
deeply imprejfed on our mind, led each flat e in the
Convention to bt lefs rigid on points of inferior
magnitude, than might have been otherwife ex-
pected', and thus the Conftitution, which we now
prefent, is the refult of a fpirit of amity, and of
that mutual deference and concejjion which the pe-
culiarity of our political fituation rendered indifpen-
fible.' '

'fhat it will meet the full and entire approbati-
of every State is not perhaps to be expected ; but
each will doubtlefs confider, that had her interefts
been alone tonfulted, the conjequences might have
been particularly dijagreealile or injurious to others
that it is liable to as few exceptions as could rea-
fonably have been expected, we hope and believe',
that it may promote the lafting welfare of that
country fo dear to us all, and fecure her freedom
and happinejs, if our mofl ardent wijh.
With great refpect,

We have the honour to be

SIR,
Tour Excellency's mofl

Obedient and humble ferv ant f,
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefident.

By unanimous Order of the Convention,

HIS EXCELLENCY

The Prefident of Congrefs.

UNITED

UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS
ASSEMBLED.

Friday, September 28, 1787.
PRESENT, New-Hampftiire, Maffachufetts,
Connecticut, New- York, New-Jerfey, Penn-
fylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North-Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia, and from Mary-
land, Mr. Rofs.

CONGRESS having received the report of the
the Convention lately aflembled in Philadelphia,

Rejolved unanimoujly, That the faid report,
with the Refolutions and Letter accompanying
the fame, be tranfmitted to the feveral Legiflatures
in order to befubmitted to a Convention of Dele-
gates chofen in each date by the people thereof^
in conformity to the Refolves of the Convention
made and provided in that Cafe.

CHA. THOMSON, Sec'ry.

INDEX.

I N D EX,

A.

the government of, I. 295. The lirft repub*
licof Greece whichadmitted foreigners, I. 295. Praifed
by Polybius, I. 296. Termination of the league, L

Accujation, liberty of, prevents the people from proceeding to
internal violence through defpair, II. 451.

Addifotij Mr. his account of the republic of St. Marino^ I. 9.

Adrian, Pope, confers with cardinal de Medici at Leghorn
and Florence, II. 182. Dies, 183.

&milius, Paulus, conqueror of Iliyricum, returns to Rome in
triumph ; accufed of extortion; nar.rowly efcapes con-
demnation ^ killed at the battle of Canna, III. 3201
His fon, by his virtue, carries the sedilelhip againft
ten competitors; procures his ions tp be adopted into
the moitilluftrious hoafes in Rome; his daughters no^
bly matched, III. 320. Always oppofed when he Hood
for any pffice ; becauie of the feverity of. his virtue^
rejecled by the people, and retires to his eftares, III*
321. Recalled, and conquers Pcriius, III. 322^
The public ingratitude towards him ; dies in poverty^
111. 323.

A^athocles, mafia c res during his ufurpation, I. vii.

Age, Middle, what per5od of time jo called, ILL 502.

Albericus, airaflinated by the Rowans, II. 2.59.

Aiberti, family of, fuiferersin the cgmrnotions at Florence, lt»

77i 78*
Albizi and Ricci, divifiotis between the families of, at Flo*

rence, II. 52.

Alexander the Vllth, Pope, drowned, II. 14^*
— Duke, made fovercign of Florence, by tlje pope and th^

emperor, II. 218.
' III. 3 Y

INDEX.

Alexander, Duke, murdered by Lorenzo and Scoronconcolo,

H. 228.
Afoiano, Bartolomeo d\ invades Florence to affifl the Medici,

and put to flight, II. 150.
Alum Mine discovered at Volterra, II. 122.
Amato, Pontio, podefta of Milan, killed in battle, III. 135.
Ambition^ the end of, becomes a means, I. 132.
America, neceflity of three orders in the government, I. viii.
- — an ablblute monarchy to be dreaded, I. viii.
• — great men of, I. xvi.

— wifdom of, in establishing their government, I. xvii.

— writers concerning, unqualified for the talk, I. xviii.

• — Turgot's objections to a democratic government, I. 3.
His objections anfsvered, I. 5.

— AVifdom of, in forming a government nearly after the

Eaglifh, I. 70.

— not liable to cenfure for eftablifhing governors, I. 91.

— acted wifely in adopting fenates, I. 92.

— - not erroneousin appointing houfes ofreprefentatives,1.93-

— propriety of their attempting to produce an equilibrium,

1 93-

— excellency of the conititution of, I. 96.

— goyernment of favages, I. 225.
— • Gongrefs, 1.362.

— an excellent warning for, II. 445.

— liable to divide into factions, unlefs retrained by a proper

government, III. 124.
~ an allufion to theirtitles and diftinclions, III. 207.

— the life of liberty fecured by the prefent eftablifliment.

III. 282. '

— • '• not likely to be tyrannized over by corrupt divifion into an
ecclefiaftical and civil ftate, III. 404.

— aftonifhing progreis of, to an eftablifhed conftitution, III.

504-

— conltitution of the United States, III. 507.

•*— Wafliington's letter on the conftiturtion, ill. 526.

Amphictyons in Greece, account of that council, 1. 5*2.

Andria, Count d\ his bad government of Floreuce, II. 33.

Antalcidas, his opinion of government, I. 286.

Arziani of Florence, II. 12.

Appenzel, account of the canton of, I 23.

Appius Claudius,\\iQ tyranny of, caufed by the unlimited power

given by the people, III. 278.
— - his continuance in office by. die people the taufe ofkis

tyranny, Ilf, 308. ,^
Apuidus chofen tribune, in opposition to the fenate, III. 279.

ConfHtute/ new laws to incrcafe his power? III. 280.
or gr^tlcouncii of St. Marino, I. n.

•INDEX.

Argos, the government of, I. 311.
Ariftocracy defined, I. 148.

— the fimple'formof, according to Plato, Ariftotle, Pclybius,

and others, III. 170.

— the form of government oppofedto ariftocracy, III. 179.

— an unanfwerable objection againft it, III. 2*6.

— defcribed, III. 286.

.— like the Roman fenate, of itfelfa faction, III. 286. Yet
lefs fo than an affembly chofen .by the people, III. 286.

Ari/locracies unable to prevent oligarchies, but by tyrannical
regulations, III. 286:

Ariftotle on government .by laws only, I. izj,

— on changes "in governments, I. 309.

— the impropriety of his idea of a government, III. 163.
'Army, power of, I. 163.

— difad vantages from a genera;! appointed by a fmgle aflenx

bly, I, 372.

Arragon, a defcription of its government, III. 391.
Arts, flouriming-rtate of, under the government of the Medici,

II. 128.
Athens, a mixed monarchy, I. 98.

— government of, eftablifhed by Solon, I. 98.
. — how governed by Solon, I. 145.

— the government of, I..26o. Fidt fettled by Cecrops, I. 26,0.

— obfervations on the government of, III. 396.

— more remarkable for irregularity thao fobriety, proved in

various inftances of its governors, HI. 344.

— the Thirty Tyrants, not their continuance, but the illi-

mitation of their power, ihe caufe of their corruption,

I". 345-

— conititution deftroyed by its own patriots, III. 429.

— Duke of, fent by the King of Calabi'ia as his lieutenant at

Florence, II. 37. Intreated to take the government,
II. 41. Made governor for life, II. 42. His tyranny,,
II. 42. Depoied, II. 43.

TSacon, Lord, on government, I. 159.

Baldaccio, General, the moft eminent in Italy for courage and
military ikill, II. 109.

— murdered by Orlandini, the ftan:lard-bearer? affifled by

other affaiFins, II. no.
Baldinotti, Bandinotto, punifhed with death, for endeavouring

tuailailinate Lorenzo, de Medici, 111. 65. ' .
Balance of Power neceilary to government, I. 159.

— true meaning of, I. 100.

.— neceflity of the prcfervatipnof, I. 371.

INDEX.

Capponi, Nicolo, his curious expedient to obtain his

II. 201.

— dropt a letter in the council-chamber, which caufed^him

to be deprived of his office, II. 207.

— tried, and honourably acquitted, II. 208.

— dies at Garfagnana, II. 212.

Carducci, Francijco, chofcn gonfalonier of Florence, II. 208.
Carolina, Lock's fyfle-m for the government of, condemned, I.

365-
Carrara, Giacomo Grande da, made the firfl lord of Padoua,

III. 192.

Carthage, on the government of, I. 98.

— declined through the too great power of the people,!. 101.
-r- government of, I. 211.

— le'oate to be unanimous, I. 213.

— committee of a hundred and four, I. 213.

— fub-committee of five, I. 213.

— its government, III. 355. '

Caffimer the Great, retrenched the authority of th« nobles in

Poland, I. 75.

Caflius, his ambitious views, and death, I. 343.
Caffius, Spurius, a flcetch of his hiftory, III. 258.
Caflruccia, attempts to gain the {upreme power at Florence,

II. 35.

— his death, II. 38.

Cavalcabo, Charles, feizes Cremona, III. 153.

— and Andreafo his brother, murdered by Cabrino Fondulo,

III. 154,

.Cavalcabo, Giacopo, a noble citizen of Cremona, created po-
defla of Milan, III. 139.

— abandons Cremona, the Emperor Henry vii. having fent

Matthew Vifcoate with a powerful army againft it,
III. 142..

— e'le6led again to the dominion of Cremona, III. 145.

< — flies from Cremona upon Ponzon^ taking pofleflion of the

city III. 147.
Cavalcaboy Ugolino, feizes the dominion of Cretnona, III. 153.

— taken prifbner, III. 153.

— murdered by Cabrino Fondulo, whom he had made captain,

HI. '54-

>Cavalieri, Niccolas de, a brave nobleman of Montepulciano, III.
203.

Cavalieri, Jacob de, torn to pieces by the plebeians of Monte-
pulciano, III. 206.

Chariots, Triumphal, ufed in the Italian cities, IL 262.

Charles, Duke of Calabria, his government of Florence^ II. 38.

I N D E X.

Charondas, his regulations for the government of S/baris, I.

3*9-
Cherchi, quarrel between the families of Chercbi and Donati,

11.22.

Cicero, his opinion of governments, I. xix.
Cincinnatus, the reaion of his retiring into the country from his
dictatorship, III. 226.

— a patrician, fells his eftate to pay the forfeiture of his fon's

bail ; chofen dictator by the fenate ; quits his authority

and retires to a private life, 111. 314.
Cino, Guido, pretor of Bologna, depofed from his Office, II.

404.

Ci'no, the lawyer of Piftoia, dies, III. 54.
Civil War, caufes and efirecls of, oji the Roman dates, III. 482,
Clement VII. Pope, of the houfe of Medici, elecled, II. 184.

— befieged in the caltle of St. Angelo by the Imperialiits, II.

187.

— fhut up in the caftle by the French, II. 191.

— projects againft Florence, II. 202.

— motive in the interview with the king of France at Mar-

feilles, II. 220.

— dies, II. 221.

Collefi, Bartolemeo, a brave Piftoian, afTaffinated, III. 81.
Columbus, Chriftopher, a native of Coguretto, II. 135.
Commonwealth, Machiavel's plan of a perfecl one, II. 241.

— The Right Conftitution of a, examined, III. 209.
Congrefs confidered, I. 362.

Confuls began to be re-eftablifhed in the Italian cities, III. 3,
Contentment, no appetite or aifeclion for, III. 341.
Contrwerfies, an independent tribunal necefTary to iudp-e of,

III 480.
Corcyra, dreadful itate of, during the flay of Eurymedon there,

I. iv.

— the people of, maffacred by the grandees as often as thefe

were maffacred by the people, III. 330.
Corinth, the government of, I. 308.
Coriolaniis, his ftory, I. 341.

Corregio, Giberto, made lord of the city of Cremona, III. 145.
Corruption, began with the people of Rome fooaer than with

the fenate, III. 347.

Courage^ and bravery acquired by habit, II. 387.
Coxe , Mr. his travels into Poland praifed, I. 74.
Cremona, an account of the government of that republic in

A. D. 1 1 80, III. 125.

— the republic divided into two parties, called the new and

old

1 K D E X.

oM cities; confuls and podefta chofen alternately, III,
127.
Cremona, the factions become inveterate enemies, III. 128.

— affitts the marquis of Efte at Ferrara, III. 128.

— infefted with difcords and civil wars ; the Milanefe and

Brefcians deform the whole country ; Guelph and
Ghibelline factions very destructive to the city, III.
129.

4 — Boffio Dovara, and AzzoLno Dovara, fucceflively made
lords of the new city, KI. 132.

— Uberto Pallavicino made abfolut i lord of the common*

wealth, III. 132.

— Pallavicino depoied, and Boflio I>ovara fucceeded, but foon

after driven out of the city, III. 134.

— makes peace with Ottone Vifconte, while the tv o armies

fronted each other prepared for battle, III. 136.

— greatly diftreffed by factions and civil difcord, III. 140.

— Henry VI!. enters the city, throws down the walls, and

commits great ravages, III. 142.

— William Cavalcabo takes pofTefi on of the city after a con-

flict with the Ghibellines, III. 143.

— Corregio made lord of the city i or five years, III. 145.

— Giacopo Cavalcabo elected to the dominion of the city>

III. 145-

— Ponzino Ponzone lays feige to the city, but repulfed, Ilf.

145.

— Ponzone proclaimed lord of Cremona by the Ghibellines

and Maltraverfi factions, Ilf. 147.

• — the lordfhip given to Azzo Vifconte, III. 148.

— - the lordfhip fucceeded by Luchino Vifconte, and John Vif-
conte, archbifhop of .Milan, III. 149.

• — the lordfliip voluntarily given to John Galeazzo conte di
Virtu, III. 151.

— ~ John Ponzone and Ugolino Cavalcabo drive the Ghibel-
lines out of the city, III. 152.

— Ugolino Cavalcabo feizes the dominion of the city: after-

wards taken prifoner, and fuc ceeded by Charles CavaU
cabo, III. 153.

— the dominion falls into the hands of Fondulo, who mur-

dered the Cavalcabo, III. 155.

— Fondulo lurrenders the city to Philip Maria duke of Mi-

lan, III. 156.

Crete, lawsof,fuppoicd to have been dictated to Minos by Ju-
piter, I. xiv.

— the government of, I. 305. .y.^<v
Criminal Laws not fafely to be trufted to a fingle aflembly,:il.

375-
Cromwell, his power examined, III. 301.

Crotona,

INDEX.

Crotona, the government of, I. 322.

Crown, leis in itj power to conceal than in a majority, III.

416.

Cruelty, a general characteriftic of the ftates of Greece,!. 302,
Cuypfelus, the tyrant of Corinth, I. 309.

D.

Danhia, on the revolutions of Italy, II. 2. " i.

Dante, the poet, born, II. 417.

Dante, Appolonio di, precipated himfelf from a tower; by his
cloak taking the wind, he defcended with little hurt,
III. 108.

Debtors, ftate of at Rome, I; 223.

Debts, abolition of, and a divifion of goods a fign of a deprav-
ed ftate, III. 328.

Decemviri eftablifhed at Rome, III. 266.

Demagogue, a popular, dangerous to oppofe, without rilk of
obloquy and rapine, III. 327.

Democracy, a fpecies of bad government, according to Plato,
Ariflotle, and others, III. 171.

— fimple, not a free or juft government, III. 355.

— fimple, a government that never exifted, being deftruclive

and impracticable, III. 358.

— more inconftant in principles than monarchies or fenates,

HI. 453.

— defined, I. 148. „. .^ .,

— defcribed by Plato, I. 194.

Dentatus, M. Curius, obfervations. on his character, III. 228.
and 230.

Diodorus Siculus, his account of the mafTacres of Greece, I. vi.

Dionyfius Halicarnajfus on government, I. 215.

Difputes, a fixed rule to fettle, variously proved in various in-
ftances, III. 480.

Diffenfions, fomething more efficacious than morality, philofo-
phy, or Chriftian precept, muft be employed to pre-
vent, III. 479.

Doges of Venice, ill conduct and tyranny of many of them, I. 58. '

Donato, Corfo, acquitted for murder at Florence, the caufe of
an infurreotioa, II. 21.

— quarrel between the families of Donati and Cherchi, II. 22,'

— his death, II. 32.

— banifhed to Barletta, II. 80.

Dovara, Boffio, and Azzolino liis brother, made lords of the

new city of Cremona fuccefllvely, III. 132.
Duke, the title of, its origin in Italy, II. 256.

VOL. III. 3Z E. Eaflem,

N D E X.

E.

Eafttrn Empire fell in the fifteenth century, III. 502.
Education and difcipline loie their force, when unsupported t>y
law, III. 348.

— more indifpenfible and general under a free government

than any other, III. 4/^6.

— muft be Supported by private munificence) III. 476.
Electioneering, an example of, in Florence, II. 196.
Elettions, the bell Schools of political art andaddrefs, III. 274.

— the various illegal methods at, defcribed, III. 274. et fly.

— by the people in different ftates, defcribed, III. 441.
Eleia, the fcene of athletic games, I. 315. The government

of, I. 316.
'Ertgfyktti of the government of, I. 70.

— excellency of the government of, I. 9/>.

— Montefquieu's account of the government of, I. 153.
Eurymedon, dreadful ftate of Corcyra during his flay there,

I. iv.

Example of Parents, its influence on children, I. 114.
Ezzelino commits enormous cruelties in Padoua, III. i3o.

F.

£ . . :t • \f iSf.^ *V»Xfc;,> i£-K sii* v.-'?- f.i «•• fi '!;ji";_ «/>

Fabitis's Speech for declining honours in his old age, III. 233.

Faction, citizens of Greece, Rome, and Tufcany, actuated

more by factions than the love of their country, II. 386.

— deftroyed by a fucceflion of fovereign authority by popular

elections, denied, III. 273.

— in Rome, their rife and their confequence, III. 277.

— in a majority, proved from various circumftances, III. 287.
— - in Rome, not caufed by the continuation of power in

the fenate, but by the power's being unlimited, III.
278.
*— and divifions, their ill confequences, III. 131.

— the fatal effects of, defcribed, III, 432.

— a triple balance of equal powers an effectual remedy

againft, III. 433.

Fa/Jiiom, laws againft, in Piftoia, III. 53. 65.
Fear, neceffity of, in every kind of government, III. 487.
Felfinuf) King of Tufcany, founder of the city of Bologna, II.

39°-

Fergufon\ account of the proceedings of the Roman people te
increafe their own power, and decreafe that of the fe-
nate, I. 335.

Florence, the government of> II, 6. Distinction of the inha-
bitants,

INDEX.

bitants, II. 8. Factions, II. 9. Foundation of, IL

10. Progrefs aad government, II. u. Divifions and
parties, II. 1 1.

Florence, magistrates granted to each trade, II. 16. Buonhomini
chofen, II. 17. priori chofen, II. 19. Called Signiori,

11. 19. Infurreclioii on account of the acquittal "of
Corfo Donati for murder, II. 21. Quarrels between
the families of Cherchi Donati, II. 22. Under Count
di Andria, 11.34. Under Lando, II. 35. Attempts
of Caftruccio to obtain the chief government, II. 35.
Under Charles, duke of Calabria, il. 38.'

• — duke of Athens chofen governor for life, II. 42. Depof-
ed, II. 43. Savage barbarity, II." 44. Rebellion of
Ancfrea Strqzzi, II. 47. Government compared with
that of Rome, II. 50. 'Divifion between the families oF
Albizi and Ricci, II. 52. Speeches on the critical and
dangerous iituation of II. 54. 64. 67. Popular and
plebian factions, IL 72.

— a new infurrection there in confequence of Scali's death,

which caufes the eftablifhment of a new government,
II. 75. The exiles recalled; offices in 1378 abolifhcd;
and the Guelphsdifpoirefled of their fiiperiority, 11-56".

— the new government oj)preilive ; banifhes the heads of

the plebians, IT. 76.

— the city of, in an uproar ; intreat Veri de Medici to take

the government into his hands ; he declines it, II. 79.'

— in a proiperous fituation, attributed to the abilities of

Nafo, II. 8 1.
• — goes to war with Philip Vifconti, II. 86.

— peace made with Philip Vifconti, II. 91.

— new wars; the city divided into little meetings and cabals;

Uzzanb and his party oppofe it, II. 92. Unfuccefsful
clamours againfr the condu6tors-6f it, II. 93.

— concludes a peace with the Lucchele ; the towns takep.

are reftored, II. 94.
— . commonwealth undergoes many alterations by the return

of Cofimo, II. 107.
• — the adminiilration of, tyrannical and infupportablc, II.

112.

— Effeminacy and luxury infeBs the citizens of, II. 122.

- — jfeized upon by Charles v. : Alexander de Medici, made
Sovereign and Duke of Florence, murdered feven
years after, II. 127.

— government of ; Soderini's opinion on, II. 137. Remarks

" on it, II. 138.

— divided in parties for the restoration of the government-,

II. 145. Pet^r.dc Medici attempts to be replaced,

.but

INDEX.

but difappointed of affiftance, gives up the enterprise,
II. 45.

Florence invaded by the Spanifh army, attended with Giuliane
de Medici, and the legate of Tufcany, II. 153.

— government undergoes a reformation, II. 156.

— government falls into the hands of fifty citizens, II. 158.

— government of, altered by cabal of about twenty citizens,

II. 159.

— government of, lodged in Giuliano de Medici, II. 166.

— government of, reformed by the intervention of Pope Leox.

II. 169.

— government of, fettled by Cardinal de Medici, on the death

of the Duke Lorenzo, II. 176.

— government of, different opinion upon its reformation,

II. 179.

— government of, modelsfor its reformation wrote byZano-

bi, Buondelmonti, and Nicholas Machiavel, II. 180.

— fociety of the literati form a confpiracy, in order to alTaf-

iinate the Cardinal de Medici, II. 181. The confpi-
rators difcovered and punifhed, II. 182.

— government committed to Hippolito, under the guardian-

fliip of the cardinal di Cortona, II. 184.

— enters into a league with the Venetians, France, and the

Pope, againft the Emperor, II. 186.

— attempts to enlarge the government, II. 188.

— in great diforder by means of a falfe report, II. 190,

— government of, upon the refignation of Cardinal di Cor-

tona, fufrains a revolution, II. 193.

— aflifts Malatcfta vith 3,000 men, to withftand the Pope

and the emperor, II. 211.

— the Prince of Orange lays fiege to the city, II. 214.

— after a long fiege, enters into a convention with Don Fer-

v nandoda Gonzaga, II. 216.

— government of, receives an alteration in favour of the Me-

dici, after the convention with Gonzaga, II. 217.

— government of, reformed by the pope, and Alexander made

duke and head of the (late, - 218.

— government of, terminate^ with Cofimo being made duke
,,;. t and fovereign, II. 236.

— government of, a review of it, and its improprieties

pointed out, II. 236.

— when moft free, moil enflaved, III. 413.

Fondula, Cabrino, make himfelf mailer of Cremona, after
cruelly murdering Ugolino, Charles and Andreafo Ca-
valcabo, III. 154.

— furrenders Cremona to Philip Maria, Duke of Milan,

III. 156.

Fondulz

INDEX.

Fontlula, Cabrino, condemned to death by the Duke of IVftlan,

and beheaded, III. 157.
Fvntanes, Abbe de, his account of the government of Poland,

I. 74.

Fortune, oi more influence than birth, I. 116.
France has retained a league with ieveral of the cantons of

Switzerland for more than a century, I. 44.
— - obfervations on the government of, III. 395.
— proved an ariftocracy, by M. Boulanvilliers, III. 426.
Franklin, Dr. his opinion of governments, I. 105.
Fribourg, account of the canton of, I. 39.
Funerals, the Piftoians regulated the expence and 'uniform oF

them, II. 50.

G.

Galeazzo, Btike of Milan, aflaflinated, II. 123.

— John, made a knight when two years old, by the Emperor

Charles the ivth, III. 150.
Gall, St. account of the republic of$ I. 51.
"Geneva, account of the republic of, I. 52.
Genoa, account of the republic of, I. 56. »

Gerardo, Bifliop of Bologna, received the title of prince, which

was retained afterwards by the bjftiops of that city,

11.401. Made pre tor of the city, II. 401. Opprelfes

the nobles, II. 402.

— and Giacomo Orfi, drove out cf the city of Bolcgna by

Gi iftbni and the nobles, II. 403.
TT- defeated, and his : cattle deflroyed, II. 404.
Germans, government of the ancient, I. 226.
Ghibellims and Guelphs, account of, II. 11.

— obliged the Guelphs to quit Florence, II. 15. Driven out

again by the Guelphs, II. 16.

— occafion troubles in Italy, II. 266.
Glaris. account of the canton of, I. 28.

Gonfalonier of, Jujlice, the authority of that office in Piftoia,

lil. 12.

Gonzaghi, Luigi, the author and founder of the lordfiiip and
marquifate of Mantoua, III. 200.

Governments, improvements in, I. i. Checks and balances ne-
c^fTary, I. iv. Superiority of free governments to all
Other, }. ix. Duration of various fyftems, I. xxiy.
Of St. Marino, I. 9. Of Bifcay, I. '16. The Gri-
fons, I. 21. Switzerland, I. 22.

— - not to be fupported without a king, I. 91. A fenate, or
little council, necefiary, I. 92. A larger aflembly ge-
nerally eftablifhtf1, \. 92. Balance of power aimed at

in

1 N D E X.

'•'j|| in all republics, I. 93. Power of people, except \Q
England, preferred only on inaccefiible mountains, I.
93. Ariftocracy arifes from arts, fciences, and com-
rnerce fiourifhing, I. 94.

Government, Dr. Swift's opinign of ancient, I. 97. Dr. Frank-
lin's opinion of, I. 105. Appofite allufions to different
forms of, I, 106. Dr. Price's opinion of governments,
I. 122. Laws made by a majority may oppreis a mi-
nority, I. 123. Nation cannot be free, except govern-
ed by fixed laws, 1. 124. Difference between a govern-
ment of laws and of men, I. 126.

•— not to be Bruited in a {ingle aflembly, I. 133. Myftery of,
in dividing and choofing, I. 235. Various forts of, I.
142. Principles of, I. 158, Riches, I. 159. Balance
of power, i. 159. Tillage, I. 160. Army, I. 163.
Landed property, I. ^65. Nobility, I. 1 66. Vices of,
I. 170. Roman, I. 171.

,-— changes in, generally the contrary to what they were be-
fore, I. 339.

— three branches of power exift in every fociety, I. 362.

— difadvantages from "appointments being made by a Tingle

aflembly. 1. 372.. Dangers to be apprehended from
committees, I. 376. Danger from electing a governor
or prefident, I. 376. Progrefs from a {ingle aflembly
to ariftocracy or oligarchy, I. 380.

-— none {imply democratical, JJ. i.

-*- remarks upon the impolitic conduct of governors and
princes, in permitting violences, H. 76.

— new regulation of, at Florence, to diminifh the authority

of the plebeians, II. 78.

— }he efficiency of a chief magistrate to mediate between

ariftocratical and democratic governments, II. 82.

— the evils of, are caufed by an unbalanced conftitution, ra-

ther than dcftiny or the perverfenefs of men, II. 103.
— - in one centre, the ill effecls of it in Florence, IJ-. 198.

— the want of a proper divifion of authority the alternatives

of treachery and cruelty in Florence, III. 331. Proved
in the hiftory of Cofimo, III. 331.

— in one centre, 'its impropriety, III. 57.

— the beft appointments of ministers in mixed, III. 311.
-~- in the hands of thole in a middle rank, moil productive of

happinefs, III. 166.

••— the theory of, greatly improved by the Englilh nation,
III. 209.

— Engli/h, the three periods in which it has been moft ftu-

died, III. 210.

— an indifpenfible rub to be obferved in perufing writers on,

III. 21 1. ;

Government,

I N D t X.

, a popular, lefs friendly to faction, than the ft and'
ing authority in abfolute monarchy, or an hereditary
ariftocracy, III. 273.

— under every form, has felf-intereft exifting in itj III. z83.
— - the beft form of a fovereignty ckofen by the people, III.

284. Its falutary conlequences, III. 284.

— no conftitution can be defended without a negative execu-

tive power, III. 294.

^— people an efTential branch of the legiflature, as being moft,
lenfible of their own burthens, III. 295.

• — perfbns elected from among the people, a hazardous ex-
periment, tried by the Americans with doubtful fuc-
cefs, III. 296.

— the afTertion, " that a people qualified with a due and or-

derly fucceffion of their fupreme aflemblies, are the befl
keepers of their own liberties," difproved, III. 309.

— thofe who labour for the public fkould live by the public,

III.3i9.

' — • knowledge apt to make people uneafy under oppremve
governments, HI. 326.

- — people, in aflemblies, co-equal with other aflemblies, al-
lowed to be the befl prefervers of their liberties, III.
326. That they are loin one anV-Tibly, denied, III. 326.

— the rich have as much right to their liberty and property

as the poor, III. 328. EfTential to liberty that their
property fhould be fecure, III. 328.

— fenators, whether elective or hereditary, tender and con-

cerned for the fecurity of liberty, III. 333.

— governors moft expofed to the fnarcs of luxury in a demo-

.cracy, III. 339.

•"— > fucceffive reprefentatives ufe power for the exprefs purpofe
of corruption, III. 342.

- — people, their rights more fecure when their power is tem-
pered by a leparate executive, and an ariflocratical jfc-
nate, III. 348.

— where the people have no fhare in it, neither a free flate

or a right conftitution of a commonwealth, III. 361.

— unneceffary, according to Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Seneca,

Hutchinfon, and Butler, III. 363.

— and juft power, the original of, in the people, III. 365.

— reafons of (rate often juftify tyranny, III. 417.

— the propriety of administering juftice by different hands,

proved, III. 419.

— the executive power reprefents the majefty of the people,

111.419.

— art of, confifls in combining the powers of iociety, fb as
; ., not to prevail over the laws, III. 410.

— all projects formed upon a fuppofition of continual vigi-

lance and virtue, cheats and delujionsj III. 412.

I N D E X.

Government, a free date fhould know what freedom is, III. 416.

— the people reprefented by every power and body of the

(tates, III. 420.

— executive power in the Grecian dates, defcribed, III. 421.

— the error of reducing traniaclions, and the intereds of the

public, into the power of particular perfons, proved^
111.427.

— Pompey, Cadar, and Craffus, determined all the affairs of

the woiidj without the advice of fenate or people, III,

430." '

— votes of multitudes too often determined by prejudice and

iuperftirion, III. 435.

— the majefty of the people a very fublime idea, III. 437.

— the objection, " that t,he management of date affairs re-

quires more judgment than can be expected from new
members," anfwered, III. 438.

— refinance to the fovereignty, wherever placed, rebellion.

againit God, III. 438.

— a mixed one mod proper to do judice to all men, III. 447.

— true policy to place the executive power in one man, III.

460. No man to exalt himfelf above the law, III. 461^
Grandees, laws concerning them in Pirioia, III. 51.
Greece, mafTacres in the moft poliflied times of, I. vi.

— myderies of, imported from the Ead, I. xv.

Griffoni, Specialino, his harangue to the nebles of Bologna

againfl Gerardo the biihop, II. 402.
Grifons, account of the democratic republic, I. 21.
Gracchus, Tiberius, propofes a revival of the law of Licinus,

!• 359-
Guelphs and Ghibellines, account of, II. n.

— obliged by the Ghibellines to quit Florence, II. 15. Re-

turn to Florence, II. 16.

— and Ghibellines itir up great diffenfions and troubles ih Ita-

ly, II. 266.

— party divided into two factions, called the Bianchi and the

Neri, II. 317.
Guicchiardini, Luigi, fpeech on the diffracted ftate of Florence,

11.64.

.

Hanging, example of it being hereditary in a family, I. 115.
Harrington on government by laws only, I. 126.

— on popular governments, I. 134.

— on government, I. 159, 165.

Henry III. his coateih with the barons, III. 431.
*"TT ^' °f Germany, magnificently entertained by the Bofog-
nefe, II. 401.

Henry,

'•i«i - • - *•

INDEX.

ffenry VII. emperor of Germany, comes into Italy to b*
crowned, lil. 140.

— his cruelty to the Crefaoniatis, III. 142.
Heraldry, little attended to in America, I. 113. ~: •
fiertjlerg, Baron <&, his opinion of the advantages of monar-
chy, I. 324,

tiippolito the magnificent, with cardinals Cortona, and Ciboy

leave Florence, JI. 192.

— - Cardinal, dies on a journey to meet the emperor, II. 222,
Holland, account of the republic of the United Proviaces of

the Low countries, I. 69.
— • its government, III. 355.
Homer , account of the government of Phseacia, I. 232.

— of the government of Ithaca, I. 237, 242.

Honefty of republican governments in difcharging their debts.

II. 358-

Honour, point of, I. 252.
liofiilim characterized, I. 219.

Hume, his opinions of the writings of Rapin, Locke, Sidney,
Hoadley, &c. I. 325.

— his idea of a perfect commonwealth condemned, I. 369.
•Hypocrify, pra<£lifed-*s much in elections as at courts, III. 436.

i,

Jerufahm taken by the Saracens, II. 260,

Jews, not enabled to obier ve the rules of a free, ftate, III. 407.

Improvements', a folly to fay that no new ones can be dilcover^

ed, III. 434.

Inconftancy, a charadleriftic of a debauched people, III. 452.
«— proved in the examples cf Athens, Rome, and Florence,

III. 45^

Independence, aimed at by the cities of Italy, under Otto^ it,

III. 2.

Inequality, fources of, common to every people, I. 116.
Informers, in the EngliJh and American governments, from
private motives, odious, III. 448.

— from public motives, refpeOled, 111. 448.
Ingratitude, the crime of, not peculiar to the people, III. 4^4,

— of princes, proved in various inftances, III. 455.

— the balance of, in king, lords, and commons, HI, 4^6.
John of. Bologna, a famous preacher, reconciles maoy families

of Bologna who had been constant enemies, II. 409.
jphitus, his government; of Ellia, I. 315.
Italian language, its origin, II. 257.
Italy, republics of, in the middle age, II, i.
Ithaca, government of, I, 237, 242."
VOL. III. 4 A

I N D E X.

' • --»

fm&fl, his ojHnion that laws are Intended to guard againft

what men may do, I. 132.
JnJ:ice, to be equally enjoyed by the rich and poor, III. 299.

K.

Kingly government, origin df, I. 178.

Kings, divine right of, inveftigated, I. &iV.

Kings of Rorqe, their power, I. 217.

AYr/fj the propriety or impropriety- of expelling in Rome",

ihted/lll. 288.
Kings, and all ftanding powers inclinable to make laws for

their own interests, III. 362.
Knighthood^ origin of, II. 2.6'z'.
•< ""•',**",*''.*./• ^/,* »" f V> ^ -• •*- '

L.

Laced<zmon, laws of, fuppoied to have been communicated by
Apollo to Lycurgus, I. xv.

— the government of, I. 249.

— - remarks on the revolutions of the governmentof, III. 406.

— observations on its government. III. 359.
Lambertacci, Aberto, kills Gabriel Sancio, which raifes a tu-
mult, in Bologna, II. 408.

-- family, and 15,000 Bolognefe banifhed from Bologna, IL

427-

Landed property, power of in government, I. l6£»
Lando Michael di, his governrrient of Florence, II. 34.

— raifed by the mob to the chief magiftracy of Florence, II.

70.

'-6— his-inregritv and difmtereftednefs, II. yi.
Laws of all nations fuppofed to have been mstde or liiggeited
by their deities, I. xv.

— made by a majority may opprefs a minority, I. 123.

— difHnftion between a government of laws and of men, I

— made to guard agairitt what men may do, I. 132.

— - alone to be trufted with unlimited confidence, III. 281.
•--^ emanations of the divine mind, lit. 282.

— owe their perpetual feniority to vigilance and conftancjf,

III. 453.
Legislation, thV confufion and uncertainty of the terms ufed in

that fcience, III. 157.
Leo X. Pops, pompous coronation, II. 167.

— enters Florence, and confers with the king of France and

Lorenzo, II. 172.
- dies, II. 177, '

J N X) E £.

Leo X. the laft by legitimate fucceflion of the houie of Medi-

ci, II. 178.
Levellers in Greece and Rome defcribed, III. 401. .

— progrefs of at Rome, III. 402,.

— inapplicable to the Englifli or American c^onftitution, III.

4°3-

Lewis XL embroiled in a war with his barons, IT. 115.
Lewis XVI. admitted the people to a (hare of the government,

III. 426. '
Liberty, love ©f, inftanced in the mountain of St, Marino be-

ing well peopled, w'hilit the campania of Rome is al-

moft deftilute of inhabitants, I. 12.

— Dr. Price's explanation of that term, I. 122.

— Montefqnieu's definition of, I. 124.

— Sidney's definition of, I. 127.

— cannot exiit without laws, I. 128.

— the iife of, 'fecured by the prefent eftablifliment in Ame-

rica, III. 282:'

— bed kept by the people, IJI. 293.

— the rich and poor independent, to enjoy equal liberty and

jaitice, III. 299,
-*— never enjoyed by the Roman people, III. 325.

— the main intereft of the' people, under certain r

impracticable in a (imple democracy, III. 483.
on government by laws only, I. 12^,.

— on the revolutions in Italy, 1L ^..

Locke's fyftem of government* coniidered, I. 365^
Locrh, the government of, I. 331.

Lolme de, his account of the coiillitution of England, pral(ed,
I. 70.

— on thehappieftdifpolitionsnot prsof againft power, I. 13121.
Love of our country, defined, ILL 490.

Lucca, account of the republic of, I. 56.

Lucerne, account of the canton of, I. 45^

Lucius Qitiiiiius, his magnanimity applauded in refufiqg a pre-
cedent prejudicial to the Roman conftitutioii, i'lj.1. 308.

Lucius Tarqiunius, affaflinated-by the patricians, III. 302.

Lucius Tarquinius Collfltinus a patrician and fenator, hiilband
of Lucretia, appointed in an aliembjy of the centurii
conful withBrtirus; bymeansofhis wife's death, occa-
fions the cxpulfion of kings, and the inftitution of con^
fuls, III. 315. Advocates the rcttoration of Tarquin's
e(tate; endeavours to fave his nephews who were en-
gaged in a cotiipiracy ; averfc to the expulfioii of the
fd.quin family, Ili. 317. Obliged to abdicate the
confulihip, he retires to 'his eilate with an immegfe

> ai8-

Ladi/laus

1 ' N b E X. •'

tafcjlaus goes to -war with Florence, II. 81.
vary^ laws againft in Piftoia, III. 53, 65.
people lefs luxurious than kings and grandees, denied, IEL

334-

— the balance in a triple-headed legislature, the only remedy

againft it, III. 337.-

— to certain degrees of excefs an evil, though not an abfolute

evil in all circumftances, 111. 338. To be retrained by
morality and law, and a mixed government, III. 338.

— a natural tendency to tyranny, doubted, III. 337.

— various methods for the iupprelfion of, III. 339.

— the difpofition to, the lame in plebians, patricians, and

kings, III. 340.

— kings and nobles retrained from luxury, by fear of the

people, and their cenfures, III. 34Z.
— - people lefs devoted to luxury than kingly powers, dif-

proved in various inftances, III. 343.

«— retrained by different methods in various ftates, IH. 348.
Lycurgus on government, I. 170.
• — on the vices of government, I. 181.

— the difmterefted integrity of, I. 250.

!**-? his regulations in the government of Lacedsemon, I. 253.

M.

jfbbt de, on his defign of writing an hiftory of the
American revolution, I. 383.
— difficulties attending fuch an attempt, I. 384.

l) founders of ftates to prefume all men to be bad, I.

- — on man never being good but through necefTity, I. ^S3'

— on the tiHt decade of Livy, I. 141.

— borrowed his politic from Plato and Ariftotle, I. ,325.

- — his partiality for popular government, II. 9.

— plan of a perfect commonwealth, II. 241.
Magifir&tes, cautions neceflary in the election of, I'H: 484.
Magna Charta, broken 30 times, I. 126.

Majority, the power of, over the fnkiority — ill -c&nfequcncts
of, III. 291.
ltii Gierentia killed by a' fall rrom his horfe, II. 405.

s^ Bernard, bifhop of Padoua made governor or
prince of that city, III. 175.
Man, nature of, in fociety* I- 129.
v-- pafiions incrcafe by gratification, I. 129,

— all to be fuppofed bad in founding a flate, I. 131.
•— apt to abufe power, I. 131. •

— dcteiki?ie pictures of, by modern philofophers, I. 153.

I N D B X.

M. his conduct in endeavouring to be made fovereign
of the Romans, III. 244.

— his oration to the Romans, to animate them to attempt a

reformation, in which are all the principles of the En*
glifli conftitution, III. 250.

— a better man and citizen than Carnillus, III. 252.

— » abandoned by his friends, and condemned by the fenate ;
\ i falfe affertions of hiftorians relative to him, III. 254.

— falls a facrifice to the ariftocratical government of Rome,

HI. 255-

— the befl patriot that occurs in Roman hiftory, III. 307.

- — compared with Camillus, III. 307.

Mantoua, ailiimed independence in A. D. mi, but obliged to
fubmit again to Matilda their princefs, 111. 195.

— the government of, in one centre, III. 196.

— a new form of government efiablifhed, III. 197.

— the Mautuaris reafoning upon their government, III. 20o.
Marino, Saint, account of the government of, I. 9. Their

Arengo, or great council, 1. 1 1. Council of fixty, I. IT.
Marius, and Sylla, the profcriptio^s by them, caufed by rije

cnthufiafm of the people, III. 279.
T his hypocrify to ruin Metellus, III. 280. ;

- — and Apuleius, prevail with the people to continue them in

their office, in oppofition to the fenate, III. 280.
Martin IV. elected pope, II. 308.

Maffachufetts, inequalities amongft the inhabitants, I. 109.
~ the probable progrefs of a iingle affembly, I. 118.
Maffacre, in the molt polifhed times of Greece, I, vi.
Mtdici family firft diflringuiflied themfelves at Florence, 11,29.
•— party grow the riioft powerful in Florence, and difcounte-

nanced at the court of Rome, II. 123.
-^ family of, reirored by Ferdinand king oi Spam, and €K-

pelled again, II. 127.'
^.family reftered to Florence, II. 156.

— - family of, fet up by the people, III. 467.

Medici, Cofimo di, friends are chofeto fignors ; his enemy RU
naldo and his party lofe their intereft, II. 103. (

Medici, Cofimo der character, II. 94.. Uzzano's reply to Bar-

badort concerning him, 96. Summoned before the

Signori ; committed prifoner to Frcderigo ; and banilh-

ed td Padua, 101. Honourably received by the Vene-

yi.4 tians, 102.

— recalled with the citizens \vlio were baniihed with him,

II. 105. Death of, II. 112. Character, II. 113.

— view of his government, II. 130.

— elefted head of the commonwealth of Florence, II. 235.
«*-• invefted with the fover eignty7 and made duke of Florence >

Mtdici,

fc- N- D E X

Giovanni di, executed, II. 41.

— admitted to a (hare in the government of Florence, IL

—- attempts to fjpplant Uzzano, II. 86.

— keeps in the intereft of the plebeians, II. 89.

- — falls Tick ; his advice to Iji.^ t\To ions, Colitno and Lorenzo,
i;£? U. 91.

.- — he died immenfely rich, full of glory and reputation, 11.92.
Medici, Cardinal de, elected pope, Leo X. II. 167.

— eledted pope, aflumed the name of Clement the Vllth,

II. 184.

— killed in a jfkirmifli, II. 187.

Msdici, Giuliano di, attempts to be reftored fo Florence, II. 152,

— gives up ail pretenfions to the government of Florence, II,

i6y.

— dies at Badia de Fiefole, II. 173.

Medici, Lorenzo di, death and characler, II. 126.

— made captain general of Florence, II. 171.

— made duke of Urbino, II. 174.

— duke makes a journey to France; inclined to reduce Flo-

rence to a principality^ II. 175.

— dies at Florence, H. 176.

Medici, Lorenzo di Pierfranco di, his infamous characler, II. 222,
Medici, Peter di, (fon of Cofirno) falfely advifed by his father's
friend, Neroni, II. 1 17.

— the whole city of Florence in an uproar againft him, II. 118.

— 'his death, II. 121.

Medici, Peter di, (great grandfon to the firft Cofimo) ejected
by the Florentines, and retired to Venice, II. 127.

— makes attempts upon Florence; the fcheme fails, II. 147.

— drowned, II. 149.

Medici, Sylwftro di, appointed gonfalonier, II. 61. Difturb-
ances 'during and afcer his adminiflration, II. 62.

ti&liur, Spurius, his attempt to make himfclf king of the Ro-
:|j mans, III. 2400

Merit has fair play only in a mixed government, III. 351.

Metellus, ruffled- through the hypocriiy of Marias, III. 280.

Michael di Lando, banifced b\ the new government of Florence,
II. 76.

Milan, the firfl duke of, Conte di Virtu, III. 152.

Militia, power and ufe of, I. 163.

— in the people's hands moft firm to the intereft of liberty,

argued, III. 471.

— and fovereignty infeparable, III. 474,

iVIilton, his ready and eafy way to a commonwealth, condemnr
ed, I. 366.

— did not properly underfland the fcience of government, II L

371- '

Mimften

I N D E X,

frlinifltrs refpofiblc for every excrcife of the executive power,'
III. 290. Punifliable by independent judges, III. 290.
Monarchy the number of in Europe, III. 372.
Monarchical government, arguments in favor of it, III. 172.
Monarchy defined, I. 148.

— Baron de Hertfberg's opinion of the advantages of, I. 324.

— the fimple form of, according to Plato, Ariflotle, Polybius,

artd others, III. 169.

— arid iriftocracy, the fufpenfion bf, in England ; the confe-

quence, III. 301. Equally definitive in America,

III. 302.

-«— eftablifhedby the commons, and not by the gentry, III. 459.
Montefauieu, his definition of liberty, I. 124.

— on the aptnefs of men to abufe power, I. 131.

— on the government of England, I. 153.

— borrowed from Machiavel^ I. 325.

Montepuleiano, the city of, afketch of its hiftory, til. 202.
Mulhoufe, account of the city of, 1. 56.
Murmer, a conduit fo called in the republic of Cremona, as the
citizens murmured greatly at the expence of it, III. 127;

N.

his account of the government of Florence, II; "ji "
Nations, their happinefs muft depend upon the form of their

government, I. 322.
Navy, difadvantages from appointments to be made by 'a fm*

gle aflembly, I. 374.
Nedham, Marchmont, his fundamental principles of a govern-

ment examined, III. 213;

— idea that perfons in the higher ranks of life are exempt-

ed from the dangers ef the commonwealth, difprov-
•edl'lll. 298;

— aflertion u that the fenate and people felt the burthensof

the fury of the kings of Rome," disproved, III. 306.

— • did not properly underftand the decline of government,

III. 371.

Negligence^ danger to a commonwealth from, III. 486. -
Neufchatal, its government, II. 446;
• — defcription of the city, II. 447.

— a trait of that conftimtion, It. 448.

Nobility ', the odium of that name in the republics of Tufcany,
II, 270.

— Roman, improperly called founders of liberty, III. 287.
~ exifted in all commonwealths, III, 376, Better if it could

be avoided, LI. 377,

INDEX.

Nonius, a tribune, murdered, III. 279.
character ized, L 219.

o.

Oligarchy defcribed by Plato, I. 192.
» Olympian Games reftored, J._3i6.
Qpprefforsi the accufation o/, the only means to extinguiiii

jealoufies, III. 451. Proved from examples, 451.
Orange, Prince of, killed in belieging Florence, II. 215,
Otho the Firft, of Germany, expels the Saracens from Tufcany,

II. 260.

P.

Padctta, a fketch of the hiflory of that city, commencing
A. D. 452, III. 174.

— the emperor Henry iv. grants the liberty of being govern-

ed by their own laws, III. 175.

— the independent government, after continuing eighty years

in tranquillity, begaa to be infected with fa&ions and
civil war, III. 176.

— the plan of the government in ftituted ia 1194* confining

of a mixed monarchy and a republic, III. 177.

— a podefta elecled ; his office, III. 179.

— the manner of electing the podefta,*III. 180. The po-

defta's officers, III. 181. The duty of the podefta,
r-n*.. HI. *83.

— the proceres, or noblemen, in the territory of the city,

enobled with the titles of MarquUTes, Counts, and Ca-
ftellans, III. ii»5-

— • the Ghibelline and Guelph parties, under the names of the
Empire and the Church, the greateft evil attending
the republic, I1L 187.

— the whole government of the city devolves into the hands

of the tribunes, III. 189.

— the tribune/hip abolifhed, and the authority transferred t«

the patricians, III. 189.

— a retrofpecl view of its government, III. 190.
Pallavicino, Marquis Uberto, podefta of Cremona, III. 130.

— makes himfelf ablolute lord of Cremona, III. 132. Made

podefta of Placentia, III. 132.

— grew odious to the Cremonians, and depofed by them,

III. 134. Dies miierably in his caftle of Silfalgio,

HI- 135.
Pancfatica, a memorable gent ral, III. 48.

Ptnciatichi

INDEX.

Panciatichi and Cancellieri fa&ions the ruins of themfelves and

Piftoia, HI. 57.
Paradife of Pleafure, the record by which all the flaves and

villams of Bologna were made free, II. 411.
Parents, duty of children to, univerfal, I, in. Influence of

their example on their children, I. 114.
PaJJions of men increafe by gratification, I. 130.

— felfifh, moil predominant in the human breaft, III. 283.
Patriots, Roman, a comparifon of, III. 302.

— moft of them patricians, III. 314.

Patriotifm, a word of uncertain fignification, III. 487. „

Pazzaglia, Captain Guidotto, affifts the Cancellieri faction of
Piftoia, III. iii. Taken prifoner by duke Cofimo, and
made his confidential friend, III. 114..,

Pazzt concerts a confpiracy againft the Media's ; murders
Giuliano, III. 124.

People, the belt keepers of their own liberties, III. 293.

— the fountain and origin of all juft power and government,

III. 365.

^» the fountain of power, III. 412.
— * the inftruftion of, mould be the care of the public, III.

414. The beft way of preventing the exiftence of the

poor, III. 414.

— tumultuous when fenfible of opprefiion, III. 443.

— " are factious by nature," anfwered, III. 452.

Perut Manco Capac, fuppofed to have been the child of the

fun, I. xv.
Peter the Second unqualified for the government of Florence,

II. 135. His flight to Bologna, and conditions made
with the ftat'e, II. 136.

Phaacia, Homer's account of the government of, I. 232.
Pilgrimage and penitence, very prevalent in Tufcany, Ro-

magna, and Lombardy, in order to reftore peace to
, the cities, III. 133.
Pinamonte affumes the title of Captain General of Mantoua,

and expelled the noble families of* the city. III. 198^
Pi/iftratus, the tyrant of Athens, I. 275.

— and his fons, their power continued by the people, III. 346.
Piftoia, hiflory of the government of, III. I.

• -T— the office of conful eftabliflied in the city, III. 4.

— the office of podeita eftablifhed, III. 5.

— the officeMif podefta limited, III. 6.

-*- conf uls no longer appointed ; the office of captain of the
people eftablifhed, III. 8.

— the twelve anziani created, with the power of the consuls,

III. 10. The priors authority, III. 10.
•— Gonfalonier of juftice inftituted, HI. 12.

4 B Piftoia

INDEX.

Ptflola becomes fubject to the Florentines, and the government
framed upon the fame principle as Florence, III. 18.

— the office of gonfalonier confined to the nobles, III. 20.

— form of government called the Supreme Magiftracy, de-

fcribed, III. 24.

— delivered to Clement VII. ; a magiftrate with the title of

Commifiary General fubftituted inilead of podefta, or
Captain, III. 32.

— motto engraved on the gates of, III. 33.

— the office of CommifTary-General annulled by Francis II.

Grand duke of Tufcany, and an officer with the title
of Governor appointed, III. 33.

— the faction of the Guelphs and Ghibellines, III. 34. The

citizens divided into two parties; each one elected its
podefta and confuls, and have feparate governments,

111.34.

— the two parties conclude peace, III. 34. The old parties

revive the troubles till all are exhaufted, then nego-
ciate a new peace, III. 35.

— Guelphs gain a memorable victory, III. 37.

— a tumult occafioned by Mone Sinibaldi ftriking Gio Ver-

giolefi on the face with a fword, III. 38.

— in 1296, reduced almoil to its final ruin: fortify their

houfcs ; revolutions, afiaflinations, &c. daily happen,
III. 38.

— troubles continue, and the records fall a prey to the flames,

III. 39-

— earthquakes for eight days, III. 40.

— Bianchi and Neri factions, III. 41.

— taken by Florence, in concert with Lucca, III. 43.

— put under the protection of Robert, King of Naples,

III. 44. (

— AbbeTedici feizes the palace, and made Lord of the city,

III. 46.

— Philip, nephew to the Abbe Tedici, feizes the govern-

ment from his uncle, and made Lord, III. 47. Hift
artful knavery, III. 47.

— delivered by Philip into the hands of Caftruccio, III. 48.
— - fumptuary laws againil the extravagance and luxury of the

citizens, III. 53. 65.

— governed three years by the duke of Athens, III. 54.

— attacked by the Florentines, under the command of

Richard Cancellieri, who was driven out of Piftoia,
III 59.

— Kjrkes peace with Florence, and the other Guelph cities of

Tufcany, III. 60.

Plftaia,

IN D E X.

Pi/loia, the emperor Charles IV. allows the citizens to be go*
verned by their own laws and cuftoms, III. 6 1 .

— the people of every denomination go in proceffion, clothed

in white facks, mutually afking each others pardon,
III. 63.

— the ladies take arms, And fight with as much bravery as the

men, III. 65.

— difturbance and mu,rder, occafioned by the Panciatichi and

the Cancellieri, III. 56.

— divided into two parties, the Cancellieri, and the Panciati-

chi, III. 69.
— - a moft bloody battle fought between the two parties,

III. 72.
— - the Cancellieri party obtains a bloody vi&ory ; the other

party reaflemble, III. 73.

— eight citizens ele&ed, to whom was given the authority of

the general council, III. 75.

— the Panciatichi renew hoftilities, III. 75.

— the Panciatichi entreated to leave the city, III. 79.

— the Panciatichi ereft fortifications, and prepare to attack

the city, III. 80. Defeated, and Bartolemeo Collefi
affaffinated, III. 81.

— the Panciatichi become formidable, and a truce is conclud-

ed, but of fhort duration, III. 82.

— alms given, and prayers offered to heaven, to fend peace,

III. 83.

— the Cancellieri, in attempting to force the adverfe party

out of the adjoining country, are woriled in federal en-
gagements, III. 84.

— the Cancellieri pawn and fell all the relics and valuables,

HI. 88.

• — the Cancellieri again defeated, owing to the women, who
(hewed more courage than the men, III. 89.

— the citizens become the fable and fcorn of the world, IIL

93-

— peace concluded between the Cancellieri and the Panciati-

chi, III. 93.

— the Panciatichi again driven out of the city, III. 96.

— Guida, an impartial man, elected Doge, with fupreme au-

thority, and three counfeliors appointed to afiift. him,
III. 97.

— one hundred ?f the Panciatichi, who flew to the church of

Lizzano for refuge, were burnt and fuffocated, III. 100.

— Lewis, king of France, excited the Florentines to inter-

pofe, ill. 102.

— the citizens reftored to the government and revenues of the

city, IIL 103.

Ptjloia.

INDEX

Pijloia, another furious contention between the two parties,
III. 104.

— the Cancelled and Panciatichi caufe another civil war,

III. 105.

— the faction of the Cancellitri extirpated from the city,

III. 107.

— becomes fubjecl to pope Clement vii. III. 108.

— the Guelphs, Ghibeilines, Cancellieri, &c. all united,

III. 109.

— ten roble citizens placed by Alexander to govern the city,

III. no.

— the remains of the Cancellieri cut to pieces, and inhumanly

dellroyed, III. 112.

— duke Coiimo divefted the citizens of all honours and pub-

lic offices, III. 1 1 8.

— the citizens difarmed, and the city in danger of depopula-

tion, III. 119.

— the Cancellieri attempt to deftroy all the Panciatichi, III.

1 20.

— the government of 'the city reftored to the citizens by Co-

iimo, III. 123. The factions of the Cancellieri and
Panciatichi, under the names of Dormentoni and Rifo-
luti, caufe difturbance, 111. 123.

•— theXciiizens fwear allegiance to Francefco di Leopoldo,

duke of Lorrain and Bar, III. 124.
-Plato, his opinion of governments, I. 188.
-Poland, account of the government of, I. 72. Meafures
which caufed the ruin of, 1. 77. The PaSa conventa,
I. 79. The partition, I. 83. King Staniliaus's ob-
fervations on the government of Poland, I. 88.

folybius, his opinion of the beft fort of government, I. '98.

— - on government, 1. 169.

— his opinion of checks and balances in governments, I. 17^.

177.

— his partiality for the republic of Achaia, I. 296. 298.
Pompe\\ con- in tied in office by the people, in their own defence,

"ill. 281.

Pope afiaiimaied, II. 259.
Pope's Homer, remarks on, I. 234.
Popular Afftmllies fubjed to the fame vices -as fmgle men, I.

103.
Portenari, his obfervations on a republic, or commonwealth,

III. 161.
Poverty, the love of, a fi&itious virtue, II. 387.

— an abfolute love of never cxifted, III. 313.

Power,

IN D EX.

Power not always fafely lodged in the hands of many, I. 102.
The defires of men exorbitant and endlefs, I. 103.

— the only remedy to lefien, III. 283.

— prolonged in the hands of a patriot, in what refpeft repu-

table or deftructive, III. 300.

— derived from the people, III. 412.

— arbitrary, cannot be prevented, but by mixing equal pro-

portions of the legiflature, III. 412.

Prato taken from the Florentines, II. 155.

Price, Dr. his opinion of governments, I. 122. On the prin-
ciples that govern human nature, I. 133.

Priors of Florence, II. 19.

Providence and chance preferable to a corrupt choice, III. 283.

Pythagoras, his notions of government, I. 322.

R.

Reafon will not always govern individuals, III. 363.

Reformers, thirteen volumes of MSS. letters of, in the library
of St. Gall, I. 52.

Regulus appointed to his command by the fenate, III. 318.
Continued in his command againft his will ; the fenate
cultivate his fields at the public expence, III. 319.

Reprefentatives of the people, their duty, I. iii. Neceffary re-
gulations in the choice of, I. iii.

Reprefentatives, a fmgle aflembly of, worfe than monarchy or
ariftocracy, III. 301.

Republic, falfe application of that term, I. 87.

— defcribed by Plato, 1. 190.

— a definition of that word, HI. 159.

— Portenari's obfervations on, III. 161.

— arguments in favour of it, III. 173*

— in the Italian, the minority always driven to arms in de-

fpair, III. 286.

— defended, II. 128.

— the fimple form of, according to Plato, Ariflotle, Poly-

bius, and others, III. 171. Oppofed to popular go-
vernment, III. 171.

— defined by Montefquieu, III. 487.
Revenge, a weaknefs and vice, III. 330.

Rewards, how afcertained in different governments, III. 350.

- — juftice and found policy the rule of, III. 455.

Rlcci and Alli%\, divifions between the families of, at Flo-
rence, II. 52.

Rifhes, neceflary to government, I. 159.

. — a crime in Athens, always puniflied by confifcation and
death, III. 346.

I t N D E X.

Ridolpht, Giovambattfta di Luigl, elected gonfalonier of Flo-
rence, II. 162.

Rochefaucault on the end of ambition, I. 132.

Rome, laws of Numa, fuppofed to have been fuggefted to him
by Egeria, I. xv.

— ftate of, under its confuls, I. 98. Progrefs of the com-

mons in power, I. 101.

— government, I. 171. Power of the confuls, I. 171.

Power of the fenate, I. 172. Power of war in the
people, 1. 173.

— on the government of, I. 2 1 6. Inftitutions of Romulus,

I. 216. Power of the kings, I. 217. Senate, I. 218.
Alterations in the form of government by Servius
Tullius, I. 220. Confuls eftablifhed, I. 222. De-
cemviri. I. 223.

— tribunes, I, 223.

— government of, I. 334. Law of the twelve tables, I. 346.

— government of, contrafted to that of Florence, II. 50.
— — embafly of, to Ptolemy Philadelphus, III. 231.

— • centuries and claffes, the ftate of them, at the timer
Manlius was condemned, III. 264.

— rife and confequence of factions, III. 277.

— the prefcriptions of Marias and Sylla, occafioned by the

enthufiafm of the people, III. 279.

— fenate of, maintained a continual cabal, and murdered

their beft princes, HI. 302.

— kings of, their greateft fault a too much complaifance to

the fenate, III. 303.

— the freedom of the ftate of, difputed, III. 312.

— never fettled in a freedom of the people ; a proof againfl

Nedham's fyftem, III. 324.

— nofupreme officers but the di&ators, III. 325.

— the fenate of, fovereign, till the people fet up a perpetual

di&ator, III. 326.

— manners equally pure under the kings, as under the arif-

tocracy, III. 347.

— a review of this condition and happinefs under its kings

andfenates, III. 352'

— people of, owed their iafety to the wifdom of the fe-

nate, III. 402. Th^ir arrogance led them into error,
III, 402.

— conftitution of, by what means deftroyed, III. 467.

— governments unequal, becaufe their conftitutions were un-

reilrained, III. 410.
Romulus, his government of Rome, I. 216.

— put to death by the patricians, III. 302.

Rouffeau, J. J. his opinion of a government to be formed
by the gods, I. 8.

I N D E X.

s.

Salemlini, Andrew, murders a young lady, whom he had takca

prifoner, II. 366.

Saluft, a defender of ariftocratical government, III. 253.
Sahiati oppofes the gonfalonier of Florence, II. 151.
Savanarota's oration on the government of Florence, II. 144.

— burnt for preaching againil Alexander vi. and the corrup-

tions of the court of Rome, II. 148.
Schaffhaufen, account of the canton of, I. 49.
Scotto, Alberto, lord of Placentia, chofen captain-general of

Cremona, Placentia, and Pavia, and expels Matthew

Vifconte from Milan, III. 138.

— the lordfhip of Placentia wrefted from him by the Tor-

riani, III. 139.

— killed, III. 148.

Scali George, his infolence in the government of Florence, II.

73. Beheaded, II. 74.
Secrets, betrayers of, hanged upon a gibbet, or burnt alive, at

Venice and Rome, III. 500.
Sedition and rebellion recurred to, where corruption has failed,

III. 279.
Self-denial, the expectation of, from man, a difbelief of the

word of God, III. 289.
Senates, the Roman and Venetian carried all by families, III.

468.
Senators, annual election of, with the authority of king, fe-

nate, and people, confidered, III. 304.
Sermons will never be fufficient to make all men virtuous, III.

477-
Sidney, on government by laws only, I. 1 25. On liberty and

flavery, I. 127.

— his opinion of government, I. 148.
Siena, city of, its origin, II. 251.

— city of, made a free Hate by Charlemain, II. 258.
— the coaft of, deftroyed by the Saracens, II. 260.

— Popolo, the faction of, its origin in, II. 261.
— - commerce enlarged, II. 260.

— - goes to war with Florence, and obtains a victory, II. 264.

— monuments, towers, &c. erected nigh the houfes of thofe

who behaved bravely in the engagement with the Flo-
rentines, II. 264.

— plebeians began to have the appellation of " the people/*

II. 267.

— the plebeians began to have a mare in the government, II.

268.

— divided into three popular factions, II. 268* Siena*

I N 5! D E X.

Siena, the Guelphs fhut the gates $Pthe city againft the em-
peror, and defeat his army, -i'l. 274.

— the plebeians attempt at a popular government, and rc-

pulfed, II. 275. Remonftrances againft it, 276.

— woollen manufacture introduced, II. 277.

— a podeila elected, II. 278.

— concludes an alliance with Florence, II. 279.

- — a law made that the podefta mould be a Foreigner^J-I^S 3 .

— a faction to fet up a popular government, II. 2$5*?r The

fcheme ineffectual, the perfuafion of Malavolti and
others againft it, 286. Gollucci's reply, 289.

— the popular fpeakers, aim at honours and emoluments, II.

292.

— diftinctions among the different factions of the city, II.

294;

— the foldiers and officers ferve without pay, II. 296.

— Council ofeCpjdenza, or Secret Council, its authority, II.

297-

— obtains a victory over the Florentines, and peace conclu&frl,

II. 298. *?';-

— .a reformation of the government, its ill effects, II. 300.
— - peace made between the Guelphs and Ghibellines, which

caufed another alteration in the government of, II.
302.

— Ghibellines and exiles beat the army.^1. 304. Peace con-

cluded by the interceffion of the p^»e, 305.
— - the government lodged in thirty-fix magiftrates ; reduced
to fifteen, II. 305.

— the Ghibellines, headed by N. Niccolo Buonfignori, raife

a civil war, II. 306.

— the government veiled in nine merchants, II. 311.

— — tyrannical government of the nine magiftrates, II. 314.

— the name of nobility deteftable in, II. 316.

— the Tolomei and Salimbeni families quarrel with each

other, II. 318.

— the government of nine greatly augment the militia, II. 3 1 9.

— a riot in the city, caufed by the fmiths and butchers, II. 322.

• — the judges and notaries demand to be admitted into the go-
vernment, 11.322. Rejected, they attempt to affafll-
nate the nine fignori, 323. Suppreffed, 324.

— Walter Duke of Athens, demands the feigniory of the

city, II. 325.

— the people numbered, II. 326. Salembeni flain, and

Tolomei affafiinated ; the whole city in tumults and
commotions, 327.

— the people and the nobles attempt to depofe the nine ma-

giftrates, II. 328. Fail in the plot, 329.

Siena,

IN D E X.

Siena, enters into a new league with Florence, II. 330.

— enters into another confederation with Florence, Arezzo,

and Perugia, II. 330.
~- the nine magistrates driven out of the palace, II. 331.

— revolution of the government of, II. 332.

. — the patriarch of Aquilea in veiled with the fovereignty, II.

333-.

— the patriarch voluntarily renounces the government, after

a few days, JI. 334.

— the new government ineffectual, II. 335.

— the nobles excluded from the government, and the autho-

rity lodged in twelve magiftratcs and a captain, II. 337.

— confpiracy againft the government, difcovered, II. 338.

— Giovanni de Salimbeni, made himfelf head of a confpiracy,

difcovered, II. 339.

— the nobles artfully difpoffefs the twelve magiftrates, and

new model the government, II. 341. The emperor af-
fifts the old government, who drive out the nobles, 341.

— the government of, changed into an oligarchical ariftocracy,

II. 342.

— the different parties raife a civil war, II. 351.

— the emperor made lord of the city, and a new office called

the executor created, II. 353.

— • many of the nobles deftroyed and taken prifoners, II. 355.
reflored to the city, 357.

— the company del Bruco, raife a tumult, which occafions

murders, ravages, and alteration in the government,

II- 359,-

— felling the public revenue commenced, the reafon why the

public was always in debt. II. 363.

— the government of undergoes another revolution, ll. 372.

— alterations in the government, II. 373. The tranquillity

foon difturbed by frefh commotions, 374.

— the citizens endeavour to put the city into the hands of Ga-

leazzo, II. 383.

— the government of put into the hands of Giovan. Galeazzo

Viiconte contedi Vertu, &c. feveral of the adverie
party beheaded ; the citizens humbly folicit the privi-
lege of paffive obedience to their new lord, II. 385.

Sigibert made himfelf lord of Parma and Reggio, and an ac-
count of him and his family, III. 195.

Strvius TuUius, murdered by the patricians, to make way for
Tarquin, III. 303.

Slavery, Sidney's definition of, I. 127.

Smith, Sir Thomas, on governments, I. 207.

Sobriety, abftineiice, and feverity, never remarkable charac-
VOL. III. 4 C tmftics,

INDEX.

teriftics of democracy, particularly proved in Athens.
III.. 343.

Socrates, his notions of government, I. 322.

Sodorini's oration,, anfwered by Vefpuci for invefting the au-
thority in the fenate, II. 140.

— elected gonfalonier of Florence for life, II. 149.

— moil confiderable among the leading men of Florence, II.=

121.

— the gonfalonier, depofed by the Florentines, and flies to

Ragufa, II. 155.

Sokure, account of the canton of, I. 42.
Solon, n'eWmodels the government of Athens, I. 98.

— his government of Athens, I. 145, 266.

Sommo Guiliana, a noble Cremonian, made podeftaof Placentia,

III. 140.

Spain taken by the Saracens, II. 260.
Sparta, the primitive government of, I. 98.

— on the government of, I. 216.

— the government of, different from that of a free ftate, III.

401.

•— * government of, unequal, III. 410.
Staniflaus, King, his obfervations on the government of Poland,

I. 88.

State, a free one, what it is, III. 292.

Statefnun, comparifon of them, III. 225.

•i— the greatefl, formed by their attendance on elections, III.
274.

Strozzi, Andrea, his rebellion at Florence, II. 47.

Strozzi, Pretro Baccio, Valori, and others put to death in Flo-
rence for rebellion, III. 117.

Strozzi, Tomafo, his infolence in the government of Florence,

II. 73-

Swift, Dr. his opinion of ancient republics, I. 97.

— on the exorbitant dcfires of men,A I. 132.
Switz, account of the canton of, I. 33.

Switzerland, account of the democratical republics of, I. 22.
Cantons of Appenzel, 1. 23. Unc^rwald, I. 26. Claris,
1.28. Zug, I. 31. Uri, I. 32'. Switz, I. 33.

— account of the ariilocratical republics, I. 35. Berne, I. 35.

Fribourg, 1. 39. Soleure, I. 42. Lucerne, I. 45. Zu-
rich, I. 47. Schaffhauien, I. 49. Mulhoufe, I. 50.
Bienne, I. 50. St. Gall, I. 50. Geneva.

Fybaris, the government of, I. 327.

SyUa, the .profcriptions by him and Marius, caufed by the en-
thufiafm of the people, III. 279.

Tacitus,

I N D EX. ;•

T.

Tacitus, his opinion of governments, I. xix.

— on the government of the ancient Germans, I. 225.
Tarquinius, Lucius, characterized, I. 219.

Teeth drawn as a punifhment, II. 404.

Tell, William, lines on his mooting the apple on the head of
his fon, I. 48.

Thebes, the government of, I. 318.

Tillage, advantage of, to government, I. 1 60.

Tofchi, Giufippi, caufes a {edition at Bologna, II. 407.

Treafon, in the divine theory, to refift any government what-
ever, III. 437.

Triumvirates of Rome, their dreadful confequences, III. 430.

Tullius, Hoflilius, put to death by the patricians, III. 302.

Tullius Scrvius, chara&erized, I.- 2 20. Alterations in the
form of government by him, I. 220.

Turn ults, their various caufes, III. 442.

— moft remedilefs and fatal in a fimple democracy, III. 446.

Turget, M. his objections to a democratic government of Ame-
rica, I. 3. His objections anfwered, I. 5. Anfwer
to his idea of government by a fingle aflembly, I. 108.
His opinion that liberty confifts in being fubject to the
laws only, combated, I. 123.

— his opinion of a perfect commonwealth, confuted, I, 372.

— pofition of all authority collected in one centre, calculated

to deceive the ignorant, III. 390.
Tufcany ravaged by the Hungarians, II. 259.
•T— congrefs or parliament, for fettling the difputes among the

cities of the league, II. 280.
Tyranny, defcribed by Plato, I. 198.
Tyrant, not formerly, in Greece, a term of reproach, I. 278.

U.

Valerius, Manlius, fpeech on government, I, 184.

Valori, Francefco, affaffinated in Florence, for being the chief

patron of Savanarola, II. 148.
Faflalage of the Romans defcribed, III. 312.
Venice, account of the republic of, I. 58. Ill conduct and

tyranny of many of the doges, I. 58. State inquifit-

ors, I. 66.

— obfervations on the government of, III. 361.

— betrayers-of fecrets hanged or burnt, 111. 500. Senators

receiving gifts or penfions from foreign ftates guilty of
treafon, II. 500. Conferring with ambafladors or
agents, treafon, II. 501.

I N D . E X. •

Vices of different governments, I. 1 70.

Violante, daughter of Galeazzo, married to a fon of the king of

England, III. 150.
VirtUtJohn Galeaxzo Vifconte, contedi,mzde Lord of Cremona

and feveral other cities, III. 151.

— purchafed the title of duke of Milan, and inaugurated with

great pomp, III. 152.

Virtue^ a word of uncertain fignification, 111.487. Defined,
III. 488.

Vifconte, AKZO, lord of Milan, and Cremona, died, III. 148.

Vifconte, Galeaxzoy flies out of Cremona, III. 143.

flmt up in -Milan by the Guelph fa&ions, III. 148.

Vtfconte, John, Archbifhop of Milan, made fole lord of Milan
and Cremona, III. 149.

Vifconte, John Maria, duke of Milan, caufes his mother Catha-
rine Vifconte, to be ftrangled, III. 153.

— duke of Milan, murdered while at mafs, III. 155.
yifconte, Luchino, lord of Cremona, jointly with his brother

John, III. 149.
Vifconte, Philip Maria, duke of Milan, caufed his wife to be

beheaded, becaufe (he was grown old, and he wa*

weary of her, III. 156.
Underpaid, account of the canton of, I. 26.
Unlimited Power, honourable to refign, III. 281. Odious to

take advantage of it, III.' 281.
Uri% account of the canton of, I, 32.
UzKano, Niccolo dey • dies, Rinaldo fucceeds him, IL 93.

W.

Wajhington, G. letter on the Conilitution of the United States,

III. 526.

Wejiern Empire fell in the fifth century, II. 502.
Women of Piftoia, take arms and fight in the commotions of

that city, III. 65. Their courage, III. 89.
Woollen ManufaSure introduced in Siena, II. 277.

Z.

Zaleuciif, his government of Locris, I. 331.

ZambrapO) Tibald'eUo, his carious expedient to rid Fienza of

the Lambertacci, II. 433. His attempt fuccefsful,

and made a noble of Bologna, 438. .
Zcnecalli of Mantoua, treacheroufly murdered by the Bona-

colfi, III. 197-

Zug, account of the canton of, I. 31.
Zurich, account of the canton of, I. 47.

GENERAL L/BBABY-U.C. BERKELEY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY