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» f
DEMOCRACY AND THE
■ JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
By
HIROSHI SATO
SubmiUed in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Political
Science, Columbia University, New York, 19S0
V
,- 1
THE ARBOR PRESS
29£9 BROADWAY, NEW YORK
1920
^'^ii
e
n B'n . rS"
*^
CopyriKkt IMO, by Haahi Ssto
(PnbfidMd December IMO)
TO
COUNT SOYESHIMA
HON. THOMAS BURKE
\
\
PREFACE
The book was prepared in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Columbia
University in the City of New York. The major work in this
University was done in Political Science under the direction
of Professor Howard Lee McBain. The writer was at the same
time studying under Professors Powell and Beard.
The writer wishes to express his special indebtedness to
Professor Thomas R. Powell, who has, in the absence of
Professor H. L. McBain, read the whole of the manuscript
and given many valuable criticisms and suggestions. Acknowl-
edgments are likewise due to Professor McBain and Professor
Munroe Smith, who have also kindly read parts of the manu-
script giving many valuable suggestions. The writer has
also to acknowledge his particular obligation to Mr. P. T.
Ward, of Columbia University, for his assistance; to Mr.
G. M. Fisher, secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Japan, for his
kindness in reading the manuscript and giving many sug-
gestions.
Acknowledgment is also due to Miss Frances L. Lurkins,
Messrs. S. K. Arima, Jinkitsu Shoji, O. Yamaoka, Y. Fujimaki,
O. Otake and O. Inouye, for their kindly assistance in many
ways. Lastly the writer offers his sincere thanks to the Ameri-
can institutions at which he has had the privilege of studying.
HiROSHi Sato
New York City
Dicetnber i, ig20
Table op Contents
DEMOCRACY AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
Chapter i
Democracy and The Executive Department
Chapter 2
Democracy and the Legislative Department
Chapter 3
Democracy and The Japanese Election Law before 1919
Chapter 4
Democratic Movement for the Extension of the Suffrage
Chapter 5
Democracy and Local Government
Chapter 6
Democracy and Municipal Government
Chapter I
DEMOCRACY AND THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
To find out the degree of democracy of a nation, one must
study the system of government through which the affairs
of the nation are administered. Democracy depends upon a
system of fundamental law, namely, a constitution. A govern-
ment is democratic just in proportion as it responds to the will
of the people. If a constitution is erected as a bulwark against
public opinion, the government created by it is undemocratic
just in proportion as it is inelastic. This follows from the fact
that in a society in which the people are really sovereign, a
constitution is merely the means of securing the supremacy of
public opinion, and not of thwarting it. Hence it necessarily
follows that any constitution which is democratic in spirit
must yield to change in public opinion.
With this view let us examine the working of the Japanese .
onstitution rather than its theory. However, to understand
i^ true nature of the Japanese government, one must take
to consideration not only the Constitution proper, but its
C>I)lementary laws as well.
I^he government of Japan is in theory an absolute monarchy,
:f orm a limited, constitutional monarchy, and in fact a
^:mroughgoing bureaucracy. At its head stands the sovereign,
^<:3^ is at the same time the supreme executive, a co-ordinate
ri Native authority (and, in theory, much more than that),
— fountain of justice and of honor, the commander-in-chief
le army and navy, the conservator of peace, and the guard-
of the helpless and the needy. In law, all land is held,
ctly or indirectly, of him. Technically, the sovereign
dies; there only a demise of the crown, i. e., a transfer
gal authority from one person to another, and the state
^ *^ever without a recognized head. Article I of the Constitu-
•
y
2 Democracy and Japanese Government
tion says: The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and
governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.''
So far as the Constitutional provisions are concerned, there is
I no country where the theory of a divine right to rule is acknowl-
' edged to such a degree. No Stuart ever even dreamed of
such pretensions.
As to legislative authority, the Emperor exercises his power
with the consent of the Diet.^ And as the Emperor, by Article
VI, "gives sanction to laws and orders them to be promul-
gated and executed," it naturally and logically follows, accord-
ing to Prince Ito that "he also possesses the power to refuse
his sanction."* In respect to this. Dr. Uyehara says: "The
sanction of the sovereign to a bill is the final step in Japanese
legislation. The Emperor is absolutely free either to give
or to refuse sanction. Therefore, it may be said that the Em-
peror has an absolute veto over all legislation. There is no
constitutional way for the Diet to override the veto of the
Emperor."' Therefore it seems that there is no particular
difference between a constitutional amendment and an ordinary
^ law, except that the former must be initiated by the Emperor
and be approved by a two-thirds majority of both Houses.* The
Emperor is entirely free to block any legislation, whether it
is a constitutional amendment or an ordinary bill.
The assertions that have been made represent with sub-
stantial accuracy the ultimate theory of the status of the Em-
peror in the governmental system. In respect to the form and
practice of that system, however, it would hardly be possible
to make assertions that would convey a more erroneous
impression. Therefore, to understand the place of the Em-
peror in the Japanese scheme of government, we must study
» Article XXXVII.
* Ito, Commentaries t p. ii.
*Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 128.
* In regard to amendment, Prince Ito says: "The right of making an amendment
to the Constitution must belong to the Emperor himself as he is sole author of it.*
{Commentaries^ p. >40.) This means that all amendments must be set in motion by
the will of the Emperor. The people must wait until the sovereign recognizes the
necessity of amending the Constitution.
The Eocecutive Department 3
the real working of the Constitution. The extent of the dis-
crepancy between theory and fact will become apparent
upon an examination into the operations of the executive and
the legislative departments of the government.
It is necessary first of all to examine the function of the
Cabinet. All administrative functions are carried on by the
Cabinet Ministers. The Cabinet in a collective sense has no
formal recognition in the Japanese Constitution. Article
LV says: "The respective Ministers of State give their advice
to the Emperor and are responsible for it. All laws, Imperial
ordinances, and Imperial rescripts of whatever kind that
relate to the affairs of State, require the countersignature
of a Minister of State." In order, therefore, to obtain any
clear conception of the functions of ministers, it is necessary
to turn to a group of Imperial ordinances issued in 1 885-1 889,
which are still in force by virtue of Article LXXVI of the
Constitution providing that "existing legal enactments such
as laws, regulations, ordinances, or by whatever names they
may be called shall, so far as they do not conflict with the
present Constitution, continue in force." According to these
Imperial decrees, ministers are responsible for all matters
fallifig within their sphere, and are empowered to issue de-
partmental ordinances, to present for the Cabinet's considera-
tion drafts of laws relating to their departments and projects
for amendment or abrogation of existing laws, to organize
their respective departments, and to delegate to their sub-
ordinates any of their numerous functions except the counter-
signing of laws or ordinances, personal reports to the Emperor,
voting in the cabinet meetings, and the issue of departmental
ordinances.
This raises two questions: first, to whom are the ministers
responsible? second, are they responsible individually or
collectively? As to these questions, Marquis Ito has explained
the text, making a positive statement that the members of
the Cabinet are charged with responsibility to the Emperor,
each within the limits of his jurisdiction for every public
4 Democracy and Japanese Government
act of the sovereign. The evil of a system of joint responsi-
bility would be, Marquis Ito holds, that the power of party
combination would ultimately overrule the supreme power
of the Emperor.^
The objection of the framers of our Constitution to joint
responsibility of the Ministers is said to be their fear that this
would result in encroachment upon the power of the Emperor.
Marquis Ito observes :
In some countries the cabinet is regarded as constituting a
co-operative body; the Ministers are not held to take part in the
conduct of the government each one in an individual capacity,
but joint responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is
that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the
supreme power of the Emperor. Such a state of things can never
be approved of according to our Constitution. But with regard to
important internal and external matters of State, the whole govern-
ment is concerned, and no single department can therefore be
exclusively charged with the conduct of them. As to the expediency
of such matters and as to the mode of carrying them out, all the
Ministers of State shall take united counsel, and none of them is
allowed to leave his share of the business to be a burden upon his
colleagues. In such matters, it would, of course, be proper for
the Cabinet to assume joint responsibility.*
The Imperial Decree of the year 1889 provides that all laws
and Imperial ordinances, affecting the administration as a
whole, shall bear the counter-signature of the Minister Presi-
dent as well as that of the Minister from whose Department
they directly emanate. It is by this provision and also by the
constitutional provision of Article LV, that the Imperial
Ordinance dissolving the Diet requires the counter-signature
of each of the Cabinet Ministers in order to establish a joint
responsibility. When any member of the Cabinet refuses
to countersign, the Cabinet cannot dissolve the Diet.' Such,
at least, is the theory of the law.
^Commentaries, pp. 94-95.
•/WJ. 94-95.
^Declaration of war and peace also requires counter-signature of each of the Cabinet
Ministers.
The Executive Department 5
It is said that the object of instituting the cabinet system
in 1885 was to concentrate the administrative power in the
hands of the Minister President, to make him responsible
for the general policy, of the government by subordinating
all departmental Ministers to him and by holding them respon-
sible only for their respective departments. At the same time,
there appeared the additional purpose of making the admin-
istrative machinery adaptable to the Constitution under
contemplation.® If these were the motives for adopting the
cabinet system, why is it that the power of the Minister
President, head of the Cabinet, is so much curtaiijed? If he
is responsible, and it is his official duty to see that laws are
faithfully executed, should he not have more power — especially
the power of appointment and dismissal of his subordinates?
As to the appointive power of the Minister President, it has
been the custom ever since the creation of the cabinet system
for the Minister President to advise the Emperor in the matter
of nomination of ministers. So far this practice has never
been violated.* The Emperor has always accepted the advice
of the in-coming Minister President in the matter of appoint-
ments.
However, we must remember in this connection that his
power of selection of Ministers for the Army and the Navy
is restricted to a small group of men who are generals and
Keutenant-generals in the Army and admirals and vice-
admirals in the Navy. The Imperial Ordinance of 1894,
promulgated while the Yamagata Cabinet was in power,
makes it impossible for any civilian to take the army or the
navy portfolio in the Cabinet.^® Under this system, it has
*Japan Weekly Mail, April 3, 1896; Prince Sanjo's Memorial to the Emperor,
December, 1885, on organization of the Respective Departments.
* Ex-Minister Ozaki, in conversation with the writer, April 17, 1919, New York,
N.Y.
^•Prcrfessor Vyeham— Nippon Minken HaUatsu Shi (Devehpment of Political
RigfU of the People), p. 408. It is said that the indifferent attitude by the House toward
the Bill when presented before the House was due to the fact that hitherto the posts
of Ministers of Army and Navy were always filled by military officers. The House
did not at that time think its apathy would bring about such an important result.
6 Democracy and Japanese Government
been possible, to a large extent, for the Supreme Military
Council to control the policy of the Cabinet. An example may
serve to make this matter clear. In December, 1912, when
the second Saionji Cabinet was in power, the Premier and his
associates were forced to resign in spite of the fact that they
enjoyed the support of the majority of the members of the
Lower House of the Diet. The cause of the downfall of the
ministry was the defection from its ranks of the Minister of
the Army, General Uyehara, whose resignation came about
in consequence of the refusal of the Cabinet to adopt as part
of its legislative program for the year an army measure pro-
viding for the creation of two new divisions. Uyehara exer-
cised his constitutional right to resign, but the Supreme
Military Council made the ministry pay the penalty by re-
fusing to detail a qualified officer to take his place, which
made it impossible to fill the vacancy in the Cabinet and thus
forced the Minister President and his colleagues to resign.
Another example may serve to show how impossible it
is for the Minister President to resist the military branch of
government. When the great naval and miUtary expansion
was decided upon after the Russo-Japanese war, the plan
had been drafted and the approval of the Emperor had been
obtained before the Prime Mininster was informed. "Thus,*'
says Mr. Ozaki, "Minister President as he was in name, he
had no part whatever in the decision on schemes of national
defence which are intimately related to the most important
affairs of State, diplomacy and finance; but had the honor of
being notified of the result only after the question had been
finally disposed of by the Emperor." ^^ Thus, although he
is legally the head of the ministers and has general control
over the various branches of the administration,^^ he is entirely
helpless in such a situation ; to reject any plan means that he
is acting against the will of the Emperor, which has already
been expressed.
" Constitutional Loyalty, Ozaki, pp. 76-77.
"See Imperial Notification No. 135 issued in 1889 on function of the Cabinet.
Article II.
The Executive Department 7
The significance of this practice will be appreciated when
it is recalled that the essence of cabinet government is unan-
imity of its members. If the Cabinet embraces any malcon-
tent, it is impossible to conduct an efficient administration.
An English writer says of this :
It is absolutely necessary that there should be in the conduct
of affairs in this country, an avowed and real minister, possessing
Che chief weight, in the Council and the principal place in the
confidence of the King. There can be no rivalry or division of
power. That power must rest in the person generally called the
First Minister, ... If it should unfortunately come to such
a radical difference of opinion that no spirit of conciliation or con-
cession can reconcile, the sentiment of the minister must be allowed
and understood to prevail, leaving the other members of the admin-
istration to act as they may conceive themselves consciously called
upon to act under such circumstances.^'
In Japan, as long as the present system prevails, it is im-
possible even for the recognized leader of a party to construct
an efficient cabinet for prosecuting a uniform course of action.
The popular elements in Japan welcomed the Cabinet of Hara "\
in 1918, because Hara was the first commoner who ever formed
a cabinet. His success was considered a sure victory for parlia-
mentary government. It was hailed as government by party,
but how can it be called a government by party in a true sense,
-when it contains two hostile members who served under the
former Cabinet?
This inquiry into the place of the Army and Navy Minis-
ters in the Japanese system will lead the reader to ask: "If
the Cabinet is not the real working executive organ in Japan,
-where is the real seat of executive power?" To answer this
question, the nature of the Genro, or "invisible government"
of Elder Statesmen in Japan, must be taken into account.
The institution which retards the democratic development
of constitutional government in Japan more than anything
else is the Genro. At present it is more powerful than any other
institution, except, of course, the Emperor. It is an entirely
" Stanhope* Life of PiU, Vol. IV. p. 24.
8 Democracy and Japanese Government
extra-constitutional body. The Elder Statesmen have no
official standing in the Japanese Constitution. Therefore,
if they participate in the determination of national policies,
it is not only a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, but
also an encroachment upon the rights of the Privy Council,
which has a constitutional standing as the highest deliberative
body of the Emperor's official family. Nevertheless, the Elder
Statesmen have, by custom, acquired an enormous power-^
power to advise and even power to form and overthrow cab-
inets. It has been the custom to call them into deliberation at
every meeting of importance. They have been by custom in
a position to nominate the organizer of the Cabinet, namely,
the Minister President. Generally speaking, no change of
Cabinet is effected nor any treaty concluded without their
advice.
(In nominating the Prime Minister, the Elder Statesmen are
guided by the principle of clan government {Hambatsu Seiju)^
that is, they usually reconmiend to the Emperor as an organizer
of the Cabinet a man who is affiliated with one of the two great
western clans, namely, Satsuma and Choshu. They recom-
mend outsiders — party politicians — to organize the Cabinet
whenever they think it necessary as, for instance, the recom-
mendation of Okuma in 1914 and of Hara in 1918.
The abolition of the rule of the Genre presents one of the
most vital problems in the development of constitutional
government. Such a task is not easy. The frequent impeach-
ment (Dangai)^* of super-party cabinets, an increase in the
party strength, and political education of the people may
decrease the power of the Genre, but these are not enough to
destroy the foundations of their strength. At present the most
>< The word "Dangai* does not mean impeachment as it is used in America. How-
ever the word is often translated "impeachment.* because its use is regarded in Japan
as deadly as impeachment. The word really means "right of address* (Dangai Josoan —
a proposed impeachment to the throne) by the Lower House to the Emperor censuring
specific acts of the government. Dangai inust be supported by absolute majority of
the members in the Lower House. "Dangai* or impeachment is also used for the
resolution of the Lower House censuring some specific acts of the government. But
it is the Dangai Josoan that is the most effective.
The ExecvUve Department 9
influential power they exercise is the right of recommending
the Prime Minister. If they lose this right, their power will
naturally disappear. To eliminate the Genro, therefore, it
is necessary to destrpy the source of their power. This source
is an Imperial Ordinance of 1894 in reference to the appoint-
ment of army and navy officers to portfolios in the Cabinet.^^
And at present, from the affiliation of the clans with the mili-
tary and bureaucratic circles, the real power derived from
this Ordinance is in the hands of the Elder Statesmen. It is
by controlling these army and navy officers that they have
the power to set up or overthrow cabinets. Therefore it is
impossible to deprive the Elder Statesmen of the right, ac-
quired by custom, of recommending an organizer of the Cabinet
unless the Imperial Ordinance in question is repealed.
Such being the true state of affairs, the actual depository
of the real executive power, of which the sovereign is the sym-
bol, is an extra-constitutional council, the Genro. The mem-
bers of this organization, by their immense prestige as the
founders of modem Japan, virtually exercise sovereign powers
in all emergencies of domestic and foreign policies. The
Cabinet Ministers are nothing but their secretaries charged
with performing the routine of administration under their
guidance and supervision.
Besides the Genro there is another political institution which
overshadows the power of the Cabinet — ^the Privy Council.
The Privy Council is a deliberative body only so far as the
letter of the Constitution is concerned. It is neither a legis-
lative nor an executive body at all. Article VIII of the Im-
perial Ordinance of April, 1888, says: "Though the Privy
Council is the Emperor's highest resort of council, it shall not
interfere with the Executive." Therefore, anything that the
Council does in the nature of executive, legislative, and ad-
ministrative work is unconstitutional.
According to the Imperial Ordinance of 1890, which minutely
describes its functions, the Council has power to hold its meet-
^* See i>ase 5 and 6 in reference to the power of Prime Minister.
\
I
f
10 Democracy and Japanese Government
ings to deliberate and to express its opinion in reference to
any important matters, such as treaty making and the proc-
lamation of the law of siege and all laws supplementary to
the Constitution and Ordinances. It is largely due to this
provision that the Privy Council can exercise a dominant
power over the Cabinet. Although the function of the Council
is merely deliberative, so far as the letter of the Constitution
is concerned, the Council can practically reject any measure
of the Cabinet, since it is the highest advisory council of the
Emperor. In fact, therefore, the deliberation of the Council
has more weight with the Emperor than that of the Cabinet.
In fact, no important legislative measure can be promulgated
without the consent of the Privy Council.^* When the Cabinet
wishes to introduce any important measure in the Diet, it is
customary for it first to send the bill to the Council which
will presumably sanction its introduction. Without securing
the approval of the Council in advance, it is useless for the
Cabinet to introduce a bill, for if a bill approved by the Diet
is later rejected by the Council, the Cabinet will be humiliated,
and its efforts, as well' as those of the Diet, will become naught.
The Cabinet Ministers well understand that the actual opera-
tion of the government can not be carried on smoothly without
the co-operation as well as the sanction of the Council.
The Privy Council in Japan is the equivalent of the Supreme
Court of the United States so far as the sole power of inter-
pretation of the constitution is concerned. All questions of
Constitutional interpretation are presented by the government
to the Council, since there is no other body which has any
legal power in the matter. The Cabinet is the only official
channel of communication with the Council. The proceedings
and deliberations of the Council are secret, and no outside
body is permitted to participate in them. Of course, its
decision is subject to the will of the Emperor.
The significance of this power of constitutional interpreta-
tion in the hands of the Council for the future of democracy
1* There are at present thirty-nine memberst of whom ten are Cabinet Ministers.
The Executive Department i i
of Japan can be easily seen, especially if the Diet becomes more
and more dominant. The popular representatives have no
power to participate in the decision of constitutional questions.
These are handled by an irresponsible body, which is placed
far beyond the reach of the electorate. So far there has been
no difficulty in the matter,^^ but with the advance of democracy
the Constitution must be interpretated to suit the progress
of the day. Especially is this true of the Japanese Constitu-
tion, in which only fundamental rules of the State are embodied
in broad and general language.
The Council also has the power to make and to revoke
treaties in conjunction with the Cabinet. In this important
function, too, the popularly elected chamber^* has no power
to participate. The Law (Koshikirei) provides: "All laws and
ordinances which have been approved by the Privy Council
must have its signature," ^' in order that its judgment may
have more weight in the decisions of the Cabinet. In like
manner, laws and ordinances which have been approved by
the Privy Council cannot be amended or changed without its
consent.*® This is an enormous power of the Privy Council,
since the Cabinet must get the approval of that body for any
important bill or law before presenting the same to the Diet.
Why is such enormous power given to the Privy Council,
the members of which are not responsible? They (excepting
Cabinet Ministers who are members of the Council) are in
no fear of impeachment by the House, since they have no
official relation with the House, but only with the Cabinet.^^
Members of the Council are not subject to the interpellation
>' In 1892 in a hard-fought contest with the House of Representatives, the Upper
House won for itself an imperial interpretation (in fact a Privy Council decision) to
the effect that it had the right to reinsert in the Budget items expunged by the House
of Representatives, i. e., that it had equal rights of amendment with the latter. Cle-
ment Constitution Imperialism in Japan, p. 21.
>* See Imperial Ordinance No. 22, 1888.
>* G. Soyeshima, Present and Future of Constitutional Government, Nippon Oyobi
Nippon, January issue, p. 31.
^ Regulations of the Business of the Privy Council (Imperial Ordinance, Nov.
32, 1888), Article III.
12 Democracy and Japanese Government
of the Diet as are the Cabinet Ministers. It would seem that
the f ramers of the Constitution thought that dangerous demo-
cratic movements could be checked only by creating a Privy
Council far beyond the reach of the electorate. They thought
that the Cabinet Ministers might sometimes represent a
popular will contrary to their interests, and that they might
influence even the Upper House by patronage and by some other
means. Therefore, the framers may have felt the necessity
of finding some institution which would be far beyond the
reach of the Cabinet, the Houses and the electorate.
We have seen that the Privy Council is higher than the
Cabinet in its relation to the Emperor. Then what will be
the attitude of the Cabinet in case of conflict with the Council?
In case of a conflict with the Lower House, the Cabinet can
dissolve the House; in case of a conflict with the Upper House,
the Cabinet can advise the Emperor to swamp the House
with the appointment of new members if necessary; but in a
conflict with the Privy Council, the. Cabinet can neither dis-
solve nor swamp that body.
Up to this day there has been no serious conflict between
the Cabinet and the Privy Council, as both have been and still
are occupied by men of the same mode of thinking. For
many years past, the Cabinet, with the approval of the Council
issued many Imperial Ordinances which have the same effect
as law.^^ This power of the Cabinet to issue an Imperial Or-
dinance in conjunction with the Privy Council is one of the
most powerful weapons of the bureaucrats against democracy.
Thus, when the Cabinet is on friendly terms with the Privy
Council, the Cabinet can easily make laws independently of
the Diet by means of Imperial Ordinances.
However, with the development of the parliamentary
system, the friendly relation between the Cabinet and the
Council will not long continue. There is every indication that
the Privy Council will not harmonize with the policy of the
** For instance, Imperial Ordinance of 1894 and Imperial Ordinance No. 205 in
references to civil liberties.
The Executive Department 13
Cabinet, especially when the Cabinet is formed by the support
of a party. "If the Privy Council is," as Ito hopes, ''competent
to lend assistance to the wisdom of the Emperor, to be impar-
tial, with no leaning to this or that body, and to solve all
difficult problems, it will certainly prove an important piece
of constitutional mechanism."^ But, if not, it will be the worst
constitutional barrier against the development of democracy.
The recent attitude of the Council toward the liberal ministry
has aroused apprehension among our liberal statesmen. It
has greatly usurped its constitutional power by interfering
with the legislative and administrative functions of the Cabinet.
For example, during the Okuma administration, the Privy
Council presented to the Cabinet various objections to the
enforcement of a factory law passed in 191 1. As a result
this factory law was not promulgated until 191 6 — five years
after it was passed by the Diet.
No doubt with the progress of democracy it must become
more and more evident that a system which places this far-
reaching power in the hands of a body not amenable to proper
control, is a constant menace to liberty. It not only may be
made to serve the purpose of defeating reform but may even
accomplish the overthrow of popular rights. Unless the Privy
Council entertains a more liberal view, no cabinet, even with
the support of both Houses, will be able to pass any liberal
legislation.
** Commentaries, p. 98.
Chapter H
DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT
Coupled with the executive department in Japan, there is
the Diet, the legislative organ, a bicameral legislature consist-
ing of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The
organization and legal powers of the Diet are provided for
by the Constitution, the law of the Houses, the law of election
and various other Imperial ordinances issued in 1889 ^^d
1890.
The law concerning the House of Peers was promulgated
not as ordinary law, but as an Imperial Ordinance to be
amended upon the initiation of the Emperor with the consent
of the House of Peers alone. While the rules of organization
for the Lower House are determined by both Houses, the
Lower House cannot participate in the determination of sim-
ilar rules for the Peers.*
In 1 91 8, the House of Peers was composed of 374 members,
of whom 210 were peers, 119 Imperial nominees, and 45 repre-
sentatives of the highest tax-payers.^ Among the peers the
hereditary members are the Imperial princes and the princes
and marquises. The rest of the members of the peers are
elected by and from the Counts, Viscounts, and Barons.
Next in number to these nobles come the Imperial nominees.
They are mostly government officials or former government
officials. They are nominated by the Emperor on account
of erudition or meritorious services to the State on the advice
of the Ministers of State, who are not responsible to the
1 Law of the Houses, Article CXI.
* Japan Year Book, 1918, p. 637.
The Legislative Department 15
people. These Imperial nominees hold office for life* and,
being generally the ablest men in the House, exercise a dom-
inating influence. Next in number to these nobles and Imperial
nominees come the representatives of the highest tax-payers.
They are elected, one member for each Fu (Municipal Prefec-
ture) and Ken (Prefecture), by and from the tax-payers of the
highest amount of direct national tax on land, industry, or
trade therein, and are afterwards appointed (commissioned)
by the Emperor. This group, comprising about one-eighth
of the total number of the Peers and consisting, as it does, of
men of wealth, is said to be the most incompetent and least
important of the three groups. An ordinance also provides
that the peers, hereditary or representative, shall not be out-
numbered by Imperial nominees and the representatives of
the highest tax-payers. Articles IV and VI of ordinance further
provide that the term of all elective members shall be seven
years.
An analysis of the composition of the House of Peers clearly
indicates the general tendency of its political force. The
control of the Upper House by the aristocracy exercising
co-ordinate powers with the Lower House explains the weakness
of the representative body. The Upper House on account of
the aristocratic traditions of the majority of its members has
little sympathy with any democratic movement. Its members
invariably support the government no matter who form it so
long as the government adheres to its traditional principles
of bureaucracy. The members of the Peers, unlike the repre-
sentatives of the Lower House, are exempt entirely from elec-
tion by the people either directly or indirectly. This means
that they do not feel any responsibility to the people at all.
In conflict with the Lower House, the Peers can stop all legisla-
tion, however important and necessary it may be, without
any consequent fear of dissolution. They can block every
* The House of Peers was composed as follows on December 25, 191 7t on the
occasion of the fortieth session: Princes of the Blood. 13; Princes, 13; Marquises,
36; Counts, 17; Viscounts. 69; Barons, 62; Imperial nominees, 119; Highest tax*
payers. 45-
1 6 Democracy and Japanese Government
governmental bill if such is against their interests. It is true
that, in case of extreme necessity the Ministry can advise
the Emperor to create a great many Imperial nominees and
peers above the ranks of Count and thus swamp the Upper
House. For there is no limitation to the number of Princes
and Marquises who ex officio occupy seats in the House of
Peers, although the Imperial Ordinance limits the total number
of members of elective peers, namely, Count and Viscount
and Baron, and although in the matter of the Imperial nom-
inees, the Emperor is limited to 125. As a matter of fact this
method is not so simple as a dissolution and has never been
practiced, because the Upper House has almost invariably
supported the Ministry in the past.
Perhaps, aside from the undemocratic eictra-legal institution
of the Genro and the bureaucratic deliberative oi^an of the
Privy Council, the chief obstacle in the way of development
of true democratic government is the existence of the House
of Peers. Even today, the majority of this legislative oi^gan
distrust the oi^an of popular representation. They regard
political parties as bodies inconsistent with the established
order and the Constitution. This inherent distrust of parties
by the majority of Peers accounts for the small success of
the so-called party cabinets, even when they are supported
by a majority of the Representatives of the people.
We have the authority of Marquis Ito for the fact that the
framers of the Constitution did not like to see the organized
activities of political parties in the House of Representatives.
They wished the government not to be subject to "the influence
of one-sided movements" and "the despotisms of the major-
ity" of the House of Representatives.* They felt that the
Upper House, which is composed of "the higher grade of so-
ciety," would check this much-dreaded political tide in the
House of Representatives and protect the government from
its encroachment.^ "If the House of Peers fulfils its functions,"
* Ito, Commentaries t p. 64.
» Ibid. 65.
The Legislative Department 17
says Ito, "it will serve in a remarkable degree to preserve
an equilibrium between political parties, to check the evil
tendencies of irresponsible discussions in the House of Repre-
sentatives, and to be an instrument for maintaining harmony
between the government and the governed.'' •
If the Upper House had served the country as a stabilizer,
as Ito hoped, then it would have won the respect and esteem
of the people. But the parliamentary history of the last thirty
years does not indicate the development of the Upper House
along the line that Ito desired. Indeed Ito himself suffered
at the hands of the Upper House.
In 1900, Ito, renouncing his traditional view of government,
took the r61e of leader of the newly reorganized Liberal Party
under the name of Seiyukai, and formed a Ministry on some-
thing resembling party lines under his premiership. No
sooner had this happened than factions in the Peers united
against the government, because they believed that the very
existence of party government was a menace to the established
order and the Constitution. They believed that their former
friend, Ito, had abandoned his old conservative idea. They
strongly opposed the passage of the Budget for 1901. So per-
sistent was the determination of the Peers that Ito, after
exhausting every means of persuading them to pass the Budget,
was finally compelled to resort to an Imperial Rescript.
It may be interesting to note here an incident which took
place in connection with this Imperial Rescript. Ito, after
trying every ordinary device for inducing the Peers to pass
the bill, had asked for an Imperial Rescript which was granted.
After perceiving his difficulty in the Upper House, he wished
to resign his premiership. The Emperor, hearing this, said:
"You say that you wish to resign. You are fortunate indeed
to be in a position to resign. But how about me? I can not
resign like you. You must try to i&ie best of your ability." ^
• Jbid, pp. 6s, 66.
^ Representative Motsuzuki, Speech on the Japanese Position on the Treaty, May,
^9t9» before the Columbia Japanese students.
1 8 Democracy and Japanese Gaoemment
It was said that Ito was deeply struck with admiration for
the Emperor and abandoned his purpose.
Ito was not the only one who suffered at the hands of the
Upper House. During the Yamamoto Cabinet, the govern-
ment suffered from an amendment to its budget by the Peers.
In spite of the fact that the bill was regarded as one of the most
important measures, the Peers cut down the original naval
appropriation of 130,000,000 yen a year by 70,000,000 yen
a year.* Usually, unlike the House of Representatives, the
Peers, when opposed to the governmental policy, amend its
bill in such a way that it is impossible for the government
to carry out a desired program because of lack of funds. This
b the strongest weapon of the Peers, and they often use it
against the government instead of the right of address in the
form of impeachment (Dangai) as is the case in the House
of Representatives.
The House of Representatives is composed of members
elected by the people in accordance with the provisions oi
the law of election. Under the new revised election \?c^^
there are 464 members. The actual powers of the Low^
House are of necessity limited by reason of the fact that ^
can not hold the cabinet responsible for its public pglicy.
Formal communication between the Diet and the Executi\^
is regulated by the Constitution and the Law of the Hous^
The only method of communication between the legislature
and the Crown is an address, which, like any other resolution
of either House, must have the support of the majority o^
the members present at the sitting. The Crown may conu-:
municate with the legislature at will by means of an imperial
rescript addressed to either of the Houses through the mediunT
of its President.
Communication between the Diet and the Cabinet is carried
on by divers means. Either House may make representations
to the Ministry concerning laws or upon any other subject.
These representations, like other resolutions of the House,
* Uyehara, Nippon Minken HaUatsu Shi, p. 584.
The Legislative Department 19
must, to be in due form, be supported by a majority of the
members. Further, members of either House may inter-
pellate the Ministers, and if the questions are presented in
due form and are not objectionable in content, the Ministers
must reply or state in writing their reasons for not doing so.
On the other hand, members of the Cabinet, though they
may not be members of either House, have free access to the
Diet. Ministers of State or their delegates may attend the
sitting of either House and all committee meetings and may
speak at any time, provided the floor is not already occupied.
The Cabinet may introduce projects of laws, and such bills
have the right of way on "the order of the day," unless the
government consents to a postponement of the debate.® The
Cabinet may withdraw any of its bills at any stage of their
progress through either House.^®
Relative to the Emperor's co-ordinate power in the matter
of legislation, the Constitution says: "The Emperor exercises
the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet." "
So far as this article is concerned, it may be interpreted to
mean that the Emperor is co-ordinate with the legislature in
the matter of legislation. However, the framers of the Con-
stitution unquestionably meant by this that the legislative
power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, and
that the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent. Accord-
ing to this theory (as well as to the present practice) the
Japanese Diet is not an assembly of representatives of the
people to control and supervise the government but a mere
deliberative body.
This political relation in which the Emperor (in practice,
his advisers) stands to his popularly elected chamber sheds
light on many features of Japanese public life which seem
strange to English and American observers. It explains in
the first place the fact that it is considered a moral and wholly
• Law of Houses, Article XXVI.
" /Wd, Article XXX. Article V.
" Article V.
20 Democracy and Japanese Government
justifiable practice for the monarch — ^in reality his advisers —
''the government,'' not only to control so far as they are able,
the election of the members to the representative body, but
also by rewards and other forms of political pressure to in-
fluence the votes of representatives after election. These
practices were actually carried on as early as the third election.
In that year it was said that the government spent more than
three million " yen to buy votes. This caused a conflict be-
tween the government officers and the people resulting in
' 388 persons being hurt and 25 killed.^' In 1914, during the
/ Okuma administration, Minister of Interior Oura was com-
pelled to resign as a result of the discovery of his connection
with bribery.^* This political relation also explains the policy
of the "government'' in playing off one party or faction against
another, and thus, through the block system," obtaining a
majority of votes in favor of action which the government
desires. It explains still further the right which is freely
exercised by the "government" of dissolving the elected cham-
ber whenever other methods of obtaining its support for a
government measure have failed; and, it may be said, so
powerful is the official influence that may be exerted in the
ensuing election, that in all cases the result has been that
the newly chosen chamber was of the desired political com-
plexion." As a matter of fact, the government never failed
to obtain a favorable result whenever it dissolved the House
of Representatives during the last twenty years of constitu-
tional government in Japan. It is customary for the Ministers,
whenever they dissolve the chamber and order a new election,
^*Shin Nippon, February issue, 1915, p. 4. An appeal to the people before the
dissolution.
"Uyehara, Nippon Minken 5W, p. 254. During the seventeenth session the
government also (Katsura Ministry) bribed a number of Representatives to pass
through both the taxation bill and the naval bill. — Uyehara, Mingei HaUatsu, Shit
p. 447.
^* 1914 — In spite of his clear violation of the election law, he was not arrested.
^* Perhaps the most outstanding example of this occurred during Premier Katsura's
administration. g
" The elections of 1914. ipi? and 1920 were landslide victories for government or
pro-government parties.
The Legislative Department 21
to influence the voters by means of a hint of a dissolution of
the chamber as often as it is necessary unless the election turns
out as they desire.
Observing this situation, Mr. Hayashi says:
It is a general opinion among our people that whenever the
government dissolves the Diet and a new election is held, it always
results in the victory for the government. This was shown during
the administration of Okuma and again this time [Terauchi admin-
istration]. After all, it is not too much to conclude that victory of
the government in the general election after dissolution is one of
the peculiar phenomena of governmental supremacy.^^
Another prominent Japanese, Professor Uyehara, comment-
ing on the supremacy of the government, remarks:
No doubt the dissolution of the House in the seventeenth session
was the direct result of the uncompromising attitude of the majority
party then led by Prince Ito toward the government. In the
eighteenth session the government and the Seiyukai compromised.
However, the dark political struggle between them never ceased.
Seeing this situation, the Emperor, by the advice of the Elder
Statesman who were influenced by Premier Katsura, appointed Ito
to the presidency of the Privy Council. This caused Ito to abandon
the party in order to accept reluctantly the position, because the
refusal would mean disobedience of an Imperial command. This
fact is a most noteworthy incident in our constitutional history.
It signifies that no person — even such a powerful statesman as
Prince Ito (who had a large influence among the people as well as
the great confidence of the Emperor, not to mention the fact that
he was a leader of a majority party) — can successfully oppose the
government. He was squarely defeated even with a large majority
party behind him. Under the existing political system, no matter
who opposes the government, no matter what principles and politi-
cal views he may have, no matter who may control the House as a
leader of the majority party, as long as the Cabinet stands inde-
^7 Hayashi Election, The Taiyo, Volume 33 (June, 191 7). A dissolution enables
the government to continue the administration for at least five months from the time
of dissolution without the interference of the House, and to preixare during this interval
to meet the possible opposition of the new House. But after the dissolution, if the
Ministers see that public sentiment is very strong against the government, they
usually resign. In this case pressure is usually brought to bear upon the Cabinet by
the Privy Council or Elder Statesmen.
22 Democracy and Japanese Government
pendent of the majority party and does not take responsibility,
that is, as long as the Cabinet adheres to a poli(^ repugnant to the
will of the popular representatives, it is impossible to win ultimate
success against the Cabinet. Alas! Mighty I to had succumbed to
the government led by Katsura."
Thus we see how helpless the popularly elected chamber
is against the government. The only weapon the chamber
has is the right of address to the Emperor which might be
called a sort of impeachment. Under the constitutional pro-
vision either House of the Imperial Diet can present an address
directly to the Emperor," thus cutting off the monopoly of
communication of the Cabinet Ministers to the Emperor.
Owing partly to the peculiar political psychology of the
people, partly to the fact that the government not only is
not responsible but also always screens itself behind the
crown whenever popular attack is acute, the right of address
by the Diet, especially by the popularly elected chamber,
has become very important in the history of Japan's political
development.
The right of address to the Emperor is largely traditional.
In the minds of the people the chief duty of the advisers of
the Emperor, namely, the "government," is to maintain and
to promote the happiness and prosperity of his subjects. The
Constitution of Prince Shotoku provides: "The officers of
the government are also the subjects of the prince [Emperor],
and there is no reason why they should dare to lay undue
burden upon others — the people, who are the subjects of the
same prince [Emperor] .^® " When intelligent men take ser-
vice, the applause of the people follows; but when the un-
intelligent are in office, calamities ensue. If wise officers are
chosen, the matters of the State are well managed, the com-
munity is free from danger, and prosperity prevails.^^ To
1^ Uyehara, Nippon Minken HaUatsu Shi, p. 458. (This may not be true if the
press and public opinion are behind the party.)
1* Imperial Ordinance concerning the House of Representatives, Article LI.
" The Constitution of Prince Shotoku, Chapter II; Dai Nihonshi, Vol. XII. (This
constitution was written about Seventh Century, B. C.)
» The Constitution of Prince Shotoku, Chapter VII.
The Legislative Department 23
allow the Emperor to be cognizant of the dissatisfaction and
suffering of his beloved subjects is considered disloyal on the
part of the Ministers. Hence, whenever the Diet is dissatisfied
with the policy of the administration, it presents an address
to the Emperor, pointing out certain defects and unsatisfactory
conditions in the government, and making the Cabinet Min-
isters appear to the people as thwarting the will of the Emperor.
Unless they are able to refute the charges made against them,
the Ministers will suffer public discredit. Moreover, since
they are considered as Ministers or advisers of the Emperor,
ivho is always anxious to promote the happiness of his subjects,
the Ministers must either prove that the action of the House
is wrong or acknowledge their own defects. To do the former
is to defy the House by a dissolution, and appeal to the country
for its judgment or decision. To do the latter is to tender
their individual or joint resignation.^^ Indeed, six dissolutions
out of ten in thirty years of parliamentary history since 1890
were directly or indirectly the result of an address of the House
of Representatives impeaching the Cabinet.
Although the Houses are given some powers over the matters
enumerated in the Constitution these powers are limited in
the sphere of their operation. The House may refuse by major-
ity vote to approve a legislative proposition; but even in its
negative sense, it is to be observed that they can not prevent
the execution of any laws already enacted by refusing to ap-
prove the necessary appropriations. If these appropriations
are not made by the chambers, the government — the advisers
of the Emperor — are generally conceded to have the consti-
tutional right to raise and expend what funds are necessary
in order to carry out the laws already upon the statute books.
Article LXVII says, "Those expenditures already fixed,
based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to
^ Cabinet Ministers in Japan have not collective responsibility as in England, as
the writer has already said elsewhere. Therefore it is not necessary for all Ministers
to resign at once as a unit. Sometimes the Minister who has been most subjected to
popular criticism tenders his resignation while the rest remain in the office. This was
the case during the administration of Okuma.
24 Democracy and Japanese Government
the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by
effect of law or that appertain to the legal obligations of the
government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the
Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the government."
This means that, if the legislature will not pass the measures
proposed by the executive, the latter gets on just as well with-
out them.
The upshot of this provision is that under no conceivable
circumstances can the Diet withhold the funds necessary
to enable the government to exercise its functions.** It is
true that, when the government's budget fails to pass the
Diet, a certain amount of embarrassment may ensue, particu-
larly if the government has some large-scale project to under-
take. But even so, the difficulties may not be so great as
might be expected, since the expenditures of the government
which do not come in the list annually voted in the Budget
are of very wide range. These, according to Prince Ito,
include ordinary expenditures required by the oi^ganization
of the different branches of the administration and by that
of the Army and Navy ; the salaries of all civil and military
officers, and expenditures that may be required inconsequence
of treaties concluded with foreign countries; the expenses
of the Houses of the Diet, annual allowances and other mis-
cellaneous allowances to the members, pensions, annuities,
expenses and salaries required b|y the organization of offices
determined by law, and other expenses of a like nature ; and
expenditures relative to the interest of the national debt,
redemption of the same, subsidies or guarantees to companies,
expenses necessitated by the civil obligation of the govern-
ment, and compensations of all kinds, and the like.** From
this list it is apparent that a large part of the expenditures
of the state is permanently provided for by the Constitution.
Moreover, the government has means of raising the revenue
** Article LXXI. When the Diet fails to vote on the Budget, the Government shall
carry out the Budget of the preceding year.
** Commentaries, pp. 128-129.
The Legislative Department 25
by the imposition of administrative fees, or other charges having
the nature of compensation, such as railway fares, warehouse
charges, school fees, and the like, which are fixed by adminis-
trative ordinance.^^ These fees which escape the direct control
of the Diet, according to Professor Uyehara, amounted to
about a third of the total ordinary revenue during the year
1905-1916.^ Thus the Japanese theory of the Budget is based
upon the doctrine that, inasmuch as only the will of the Em-
peror is competent to create law, the Diet cannot, by its
action, defeat the operation of law.
Though the members of the Diet have legal power to intro-
duce bills, this has not been exercised to any great extent. A
majority of its members are not well trained in drawing up
any bill which requires particularly technical knowledge. In
this respect the experienced government officials have far
superior qualifications. The handicaps imposed by the law
and custom of the Constitution also discourage the members
of the Houses from attempting to secure legislation by private
bills. At present no important government bill is introduced
without first being submitted to the Privy Gouncil. In case
of a private bill, the members of the Diet can not submit
it to the Council, because they have no connection with that
body. Under such circumstances the members of the Diet
are loath to trouble themselves by introducing a bill which is
very likely not to receive the approval of the Privy Council.
Moreover, the Emperor has the veto power which he can exer-
cise freely if he wishes to. Such laws as receive Imperial sanc-
tion must, according to the Constitution, be promulgated
before the next session of the Diet. However, this does not
mean that laws must be enforced immediately after entry
in the statute books, because the enforcement of any law
involves expense. And until an item covering such an expen-
diture has been put into the Budget by the government
and approved by the Diet, the laws will be ineffective. Thus,
** Article LII, Commentaries^ p. 114.
M Dr. Uyehara, Political DevelopmetU of Japan, p. 144.
26 Democracy and Japa$$ese Government
the Factory Law of 1910 was not enforced until 1916.'^ In
the same way the Foreigner's Land Ownership Act which passed
several years ago has still no effect as a law.'^
The shortness of the session of the Diet and the power of the
government reduce still further the actual power of the houses.
The government can minimize criticism and inquiries by sus-
pending the sittings of the Representatives of the people. The
length of the annual session as fixed by the constitutional
provision *• is three months, but in the law of the Houses it
is provided that at any time, and as often as it wishes, the
Cabinet may prorogue either house for a period not exceeding
fifteen days.'® Such a suspension may be used by the govern-
ment as a warning that continued recalcitrancy will result in
a dissolution — dissolution which involves an enormous expense
to the Representatives of the people.
Further curtailment of the power of the Houses is brought
about by cutting short the length of the annual session. The
Houses meet the latter part of December. In practice the
real work begins after taking about a month's recess for the
New Year's holiday, that is, sometime about the 25th of
January. Moreover, by the rules of procedure of the Lower
House a further diminution of the actual time for debate or
investigation is effected.
Plenary sittings of the House take place on alternate days.'^
Committee meetings'^ occupy the rest of the time. The actual
time occupied by the sittings of the Lower House since its
foundation in 1890 was, until the twenty-sixth session^ eighty-
three days and twenty-seven hours.** Full sittings of the
House do not exceed thirty days.
Such is the operation of the legislative organs in Japan. To
democratize the l^islative system the Constitution must be
*7 Dr. I. Takaxni, Meaning of National Census, Chuo Koron, p. a. March, 191 8.
» Tokyo, Nichi Nichi, March, 1919, p. 2.
«• Article XLII.
M Law of Houses, Article XXXIII.
^ Japan Year Book. 191 8. p. 639.
«/Wd, 667. (Yeari9iS.)
" Ibid, 1918, p. 639.
The Executive Department 27
either amended or interpreted in a new way. So long as this
is not done,. the Diet can not obtain substantial powers in
legislation, and can not enforce responsibility upon the Cabinet.
It is hardly possible that any extensive change can occur
unless the franchise is greatly extended.
Chapter ni
DEMOCRACY AND THE JAPANESE ELECTION
LAW BEFORE 1919
The original Election Law of Japan was enacted in 1889,
the year of the promulgation of the Constitution. The Con-
stitution, which is extremely difficult to amend, is silent as
to the provision for suffrage. Whether this was due to the
wisdom of the framers of the Constitution or was by mere
accident of imitation, the Election Law of Japan is fortunately
amendable by the ordinary legislative process. ''It is not
proper," says Ito, one of the constitutional framers, "that the
Constitution should provide for such detailed matters as laws
of election which are subject to change whenever necessity
requires them." ^
The Law of 1889 was undemocratic in that high property
qualifications were placed both upon the electorate and the
candidates. The principle laid down in the law was that
only those who showed "sufficient evidence of attachment
to the community were entitled to suffrage." However, this
evidence consisted in the possession of a certain amount of
property, preferably real estate. In discussing the subject
of suffrage, Dr. Yegi says in his book Ideal ConstUutionalism
that the political philosophy of universal suffrage is a mere
fallacy. He considers that those who possess no property
should not be active participants in political life.* Dr. Uyesugi
entertains a similar opinion. "Generally speaking," he says,
"only those who have a definite amount of property have a
definite opinion, and they alone have any chance to equip
' Ito, ConstUtUional Law and the Law of the Imperial House of Japan, p. 3a.
* See his last page as well as his article regarding election of members of the House.
He says on the last page, referring to the common people, "Are you still dreaming of
human rights and liberty? If you live, you should be satisfied with that. As long as
you have no actual power, your complaints have no effect upon us. You ought not
to try to disturb the feeling of the bureaucrats. You should pray for us. It is the
best policy to be in peace under the protection of the bureaucrats."
Election Law before igig 29
themselves with education and common sense. If there is
no restriction in the way of a qualification for voters, those
who have no property and no education, as they far exceed
in number, will make our national assembly far from ideal."'
In accordance with this philosophy the accepted idea of
those who drafted this law of 1889 was that only the property-
holding class should enjoy political rights. Thus the statute
provided that "the elector must have been paying, in the Fu
or Ken, for not less than one year previous to the date of the
making out of the electoral list, direct national taxes to the
amount of not less than fifteen yen, and must be still paying
the same. But in the case of income tax, he must have been
paying for not less than three full years previous to the same
date, and must be still paying."*
The result of this provision was that the voting population
was only 450,365.^ The population of Japan in 1889 was 39,-
382,200; there was, therefore, about one voter in every 87.7
persons.*
The same principle was applied in the requirement of
property qualifications for the legislative candidates. It was
provided that "those alone shall be eligible who are male
Japanese subjects of not less than thirty years of age, and who
in the Fu or Ken in which they desire to be elected, have been
paying direct national taxes to an amount not less than fifteen
yen one year previous to the date of the making out of the
electoral list, and who are still paying that amount of direct
national taxes." ^ The result of this provision was that par-
ticipation in political life was limited to the most prosperous
part of the population.
Another jFeature of the original law was the requirement
of publicity in voting. Article XXXVIII provided "every
* Professor Uyesugi, Imperial Constitution^ 7th edition, p. 404.
« Article VIII. Election Law of 1889.
* Professor Kudo, Constitutional History, p. 343 (statistics of Meiji 31).
'Professor Kudo, Kenpo Hatiatsu Shi (History of Constitutional Development),
p. 344.
7 Article VIII.
30 Democracy and Japanese Government
voter shall, at the voting place, inscribe upon the voting
paper, the name of the person he votes for, then his own
name and residence, and shall put a stamp upon it." This
had to be done in the presence of the election officers. This
open voting facilitated bribery since the briber could ascertain
afterwards how any man voted. Another result was that
persons economically connected, or in friendly association,
with others were often coerced into voting as those others
bade them.
Under the first election law, the system of small electoral
districts was adopted, and each Fu or Ken (administrative
district) was divided into several election districts, each of
which constituted a single-member constituency, with the
exception of some large districts which, because incapable
of further division on account of their topography, had two
seats alloted with the system of scrutin de liste. There were
257 districts in all, and the number of representatives to be
elected out of those districts was 300.
It seems that the framers of the Election Law were not
fully aware of the effect of the Law upon the real operation
of the Constitution. They constructed election districts
based on a principle of administrative convenience rather
than on any principle of a political nature, without seriously
considering the distribution of voters having the property
qualification. They simply allotted to each district one or
two representatives at the rate of one representative to every
120,000 people.^ To those districts which had a population of
between 100,000 and 200,000 was assigned one seat; to those
which had a population of between 200,000 and 300,000
were alloted two seats.* But the defect in this division as a
result of the property qualification was that the population
was by no means proportionate to the number of voters.
* Professor Kudo, History of ConsUttUional Development, Vol. I, p. 343.
* Hayashida, Senkyo Kaise Iken, Kokuminno JTomOt 1893, No. 198, Shimane-ken,
6th electoral district had only 53 voters; Kagoshima-ken, 7th district, 53; Nagasaki-
ken, 6th district, 55; Fukushima-ken, 5th district, 4,395; Shiga-ken, 3nd district,
4,379; Mie-ken, 3rd district, 4,568.
Election Law before igig 31
Certain electoral districts were able to elect one representative
wth 52 or 53 votes, while other one member constituencies
had to elect their respective representatives with more than
4,300 votes.^® Owing to this disproportionate distribution
of votes in election districts it often happened that a minority
of the voters, instead of a majority, in certain Fus or Kens
obtain the majority of the members returned; and, on the
other hand, a party with a majority of the votes at the polls
sometimes secured only a very small minority of the repre-
sentatives. For instance, in the first General Election in the
Prefecture of Yehime, the Liberals had five seats with 3,260
votes, while the Progressives secured only two seats with
3,540 votes." In the fourth General Election, the ultra-
Conservatives (Kokumin Kiokwai) in the Prefecture of
Fukuoka succeeded in securing five seats with 7,442 votes,
while the Liberals (Jiyu-to) in the same prefecture secured
only four with 10,451 votes.^^
The following table gives a general idea of election results
under the original system : "
Election of March, 1898
Number of
Number of Number of Votes per
Votes Cast Representaivoes Representative
Liberal Party 101,087 87 1,162
Progressive Party 86,712 67 if294
People's Party 20,695 20 1,035
Seiyukai 3,815 7 545
New Liberal Party .... 4f375 . 3 i,459
East-North Union Club . . 2,353 2 1,177
Aitsu Doshikai 872 2 437
Tsukuzen Kyokai 3f29i i 3f29i
Kokuken-to 1,330 i 1,330
Mushozuku, Unattached 112,881 no 1,026
^* Hayashidat Senkyo Kaise Iken, Kokuminno Tomo, 1892, No. 198.
u Senkyo Kaisei, Kokumin Shinbum, July 8, 1899; Hayashida, Senkyo Ho Shakugi,
Appendix, p. 33; Uyehara, PoliUcal Development of Japan^ p. 171.
>* Hayashida, Senkyo Ho Shakugi, Appendix, p. 33.
" Nippon Teikoku Dai, No. 17 Tokei Nenkwan Meiji 31, p. 1,078.
32 Democracy and Japanese Gaoemment
Elbction op August, 1898
Gmadtutional 264,367 196 i>348
Progreative 12,386 8 It548
Sciyukai 3,501 7 500
Ptopk's Part>r 8,664 7 1.238
Kokuken-to 7,119 6 I>i87
Liberal 3469 2 1,735
Party affiliation uncertain . 94i732 68 Ii393
No party 6,463 6 1,077
Another characteristic of the original law was the dispro-
portionate representation of different classes of people in the
House of Representatives, owing to the property qualification
imposed upon the candidates. At the time when the first
General Election was held, land taxes were the main source
of revenue, amounting to about two-thirds of the direct na-
tional taxes. It is interesting to note here that in 1890, the
year in which the first General Election was held, the tax-
paying capacity of representatives rangec^ from 15 yen to
2,230 yen. The average was 125 yen for each member.**
As a result of this property qualification, the great majority^
of both voters and candidates were of the agrarian class—
Moreover, as municipalities had no separate independen
electoral districts except the large cities of Tokyo, Osaka, an
Kyoto, the rural voters and their candidates had a further
advantage. The result was that a majority of the representa-
tives in the House were those representing the agrarian class.
According to Mr. Hayashida, there were only seventeen out
of the three hundred members of the House, who really repre-
sented the interest of the urban population.** The following
figures *• give a general idea of how the rural and the urban
interests were represented.
^* Professor Kudo, History of Constitutional Development, p. 344.
^* Hayashida, Senkio Shakugi, Appendix, p. 163; Uyehara, p. 172.
^* Quoted directly from Kokumin Nenkwan Taisei Gonene, pp. 11 3-1 13.
o. ' '
Election Law before igig 33
Under the Original Law
Sessions 12^456
Manufacture 2 — — I. i 2
Fishing — I — — — —
Farmers 129 144 137 155 128 134
Commercial 19 25 24 29 32 24
Mining I i i 2 4 3
Liquor — 2 i — — —
Landowners — — — — 15 n
Physicians and pharmacists ... 3 3 3 i 4 3
Bankers 4 3 4 5 4 6
Company officials 7 7 9 6 9 13
Newspaper reporters and magazine
writers 8 12 10 12 7 4
Teachers — — — — i i
Lawyers 20 22 28 21 22 24
Public officials 12 6 2 6 2 17
Authors I 2 I — I —
Miscellaneous 20 13 i — 13 4
No occupation jj^ j^ j^ Ja 47 50
Total 300 300 300 300 300 300
Under THE Revised Law OF 1900 r.xj ,tv^ v^ ir,r »a.-,
Sessums 7 8 g 10 11 12 13
JParmers 120 129 129 105 80 81 79
Commercial 33 35 39 33 16 32 19
A^3.iiufacture 2 2 — — 3 8 8
Raiding — I 3 5 4 5 6
^ix^ing 7 7 3 6 10 6 9
Licj^or 755 i 5 — —
^^^^downers — — — — — — —
^'^i^cians and pharmacists 109376415
^^-^■^^ers 19 16 12 7 15 14 8
-^^^■^^fcpany officials 10 13 18 20 57 51 53
^^"^^rspaper reporters and
^^"^^lagazine writers .... 9 8 13 17 22 51 28
"^^chers 4 3 3 3 3 5 6
^ers 31 54 59 64 61 54 56
lie officials 10 6 5 8 12 8 i
A>^"thors 2 3 5 I — — —
"W^isceiianeous 14 13 8 14 11 11 16
t'^ occupation 78 73 74 88 76 73 73
Total 376 376 379 379 381 381 381 ^^
1' Quoted directly from Kokumin Nenkwan, pp. 137-138, 1919.
34 Democracy and Japanese Government
From the foregoing table it can easily be seen that even
after thirty years, although the population of cities has been
increasing by leaps and bounds, the rural interests are still
protected by a large majority of so-called country gentlemen.
Such being the case, it is not strange that there has been no
democratic social legislation enacted in the interest of the
large majority of urban working men and women.
It was evident from the very beginning that the Law of
1889 was not satisfactory. Its defects became more pronounced
at each successive election. There were constant movements
among the liberal politicians to amend the legislation. I'M.
was not, however, until the year 1895 that an electoral refom^=^
bill was introduced by private members into the House c^ -
Representatives. The bill proposed to extend the franchis
by lowering the property qualification of both electors an<
candidates from fifteen yen of direct national taxes to fivi
yen, and in the case of the income tax to three yen, and alsc?
by reducing the age qualification from twenty-five to twenty
for the voter, and from thirty to twenty-five for the candidate.
If the bill had passed, the number of voters would have been
quadrupled. The bill, however, was opposed by the govern-
ment, and, although it passed the Lower Houseof the legislature
by a large majority, it was rejected by the Upper House. Three
years later another electoral reform bill was introduced into
the House of Representatives by the government under the
premiership of Ito, notwithstanding the fact that it was his
former cabinet that opposed the reform bill of 1895. This
introduction by the same premier who opposed the former
reform act was due to the fact that Ito wished to mitigate the
political antagonism toward the government.
The bill proposed a more radical reform of the election law
than did that of 1895. The principles involved were: (i) the
extension of the franchise by reducing the property qualifica-
tions of electors; (2) the creation of independent electoral
districts for municipalities; (3) an increase in the number of
representatives from 300 to 472; (4) the abolition of the
Section Law before igig 35
property and residential qualifications of the candidates;
(5) the adoption of large electoral districts combined with the
principle of a single non- transferable vote.^* Had this bill
become law it would have increased the number of voters
from 450,465 to 2,000,000.^' Though it was passed by the
Lower House, it did not go to the other House because the House
was dissolved on account of the rejection of a most important
government bill for increasing the land tax.
In 1899, a bill which was not substantially different from
Ito's, was brought into the House of Representatives by the
Yamagata Cabinet. The bill, after prolonged discussion, was
passed by the Lower House, with certain amendments, the most
important of which concerned the property qualification of
the elector. The bill was modified in such a way as to increase
the amount of direct national taxes other than the land tax
from three yen to five, and to reduce the number of seats
allotted to municipal districts from ninety-eight to seventy-
three. As we have already seen, the great majority of the
House was representative of rural interests. Consequently
it was but natural for it to oppose any scheme which would
increase the political strength of the urban population.
The bill came to a deadlock in the Upper House, and after
prolonged debate it was restored to its original state.^® There-
upon committees were chosen from both Houses to settle the
matter, but without reaching a compromise the conference
broke up, and the bill was laid on the table sine die.
In the following session of the House, the bill was again
introduced by the same cabinet,, and it was passed by both
Houses with an important amendment by the Upper House.
The property qualification of the elector was raised from five
yen direct national taxes to ten yen.
It seems almost incomprehensible that the same House
which in the previous session so persistently opposed undemo-
cratic amendments made by the Peers to an identical bill
1* Senkyo Ho Raise An, 1898.
1* Speech by Ito on the Electoral Reform Bill in the House of Representatives.
** Kudo, Tiehoku Gikaishi, Vol. II, pp. 120-124.
36 Democracy and Japanese Government
would accept this important change which was to reduce
the number of voters by about one-half. The possible reasons,
Dr. Uyehara thinks, were three: first, the inability of the
majority of the members of the House to realize the effect of the
amendment upon the electorate; second, the indifference of
the people directly benefited by the lower property qualifica-
tion; third, the united support of the Liberal Party." Pro-
fessor Uyehara continues:
The fact that the majority of members in the House of Repre-
sentatives did not realize the full force of the amendment is shown
by the absence of any discussion on the vital point of the effect of
a greatly extended franchise upon national politics and the working
of the Constitution. It seems to me from the parliamentary bills
introduced into the House, that a large number of the members
did not consider the problem of the extension of the fmnchise any
more seriously than does a simple-minded woman demanding the
franchise on the principle of ''no taxation without representation"
considers the problem of woman suffrage. Besides, as it was chiefly
the politicians, not the people, who urged an extension of the
franchise, the majority in the House could decide the limit of that
extension at their own capricious will, without fear of conflict with
public opinion. Then, too, the Liberal Party, which had fought
bitterly with the Peers over minor points in the previous session,
changed its policy, and, accepting the amendment, voted for the
Bill en bloc^ while the Conservative government, which had intro-
duced the Bill at the request of the Liberal Party, made no objec-
tion, the extension of franchise being more limited by the amend-
ment than in the original bill. So the Bill was passed and became
a law."
Thus after heated discussion in three successive sessions,
an electoral law was passed.
This law of 1900 adopted the system of large districts
combined with the principle of a single non-transferable vote
. (that is, giving a voter in each district but one vote for one
candidate) , as well as that of secret voting, and it created inde-
pendent electoral districts for municipalities having a popula-
" Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 177.
» Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 178.
Election Law before igig 37
tion of over 30,000,** The country was divided into forty-
seven large (rural) districts making each prefectural adminis-
tration a unit; to each was allotted from two to twelve seats
according to population,** Sixty-one urban electoral districts
were created, to each of which was allotted one seat except
the districts of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, and Yokohama
which were given eleven, six, three, two and two seats respect-
ively. The number of representatives was increased from 300
to 376 ^ while the number of voters increased from 450,365 *•
to 983,193.*^ The property qualification for legislative candi-
dates was also abolished, thus widening the opportunity for
young men of ability to enter public life.
Another reform enacted by this law was the abolition of
residential qualifications for the candidate. This was important
because it gave the opportunity to a man of prominence to
run from another district when he was likely to lose in his
own district. Under the original system of residential qualifica-
tion, even such a prominent man as Mr. Matsuda, who was
once a Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Minister of Finance in the Saionji Cabinet, suffered Several
defeats because he was unable to run from another district.**
Moreover the system of a large electoral district under the
law gave to the voter independence and freedom from the
rule of the party machine. It did not abolish parties; it
recognized them. But it permitted new alignments and group-
ings of individuals within and without existing parties at the
expense of the iron-bound classification imposed by the modem
highly developed party machine. It gave to men of inde-
pendent mind and character a better opportunity to maintain
' »The Etectipn Law of 1900. Article I. XXIX. XXXVI. Appendix VIII. X, or
Shlnhorei No. 34. May. 1918. SupplemeiUary Issue of Taiyo, p. 69.
** One representative in rural districts for every 130,000 persons, ibid.
** This number increased by three in 1904 by having given three seats to Hokkaido
and later in 1913 additional two seats were added by allowing Okinawa-Ken to choose
two representatives. The number of representatives was 381 until 1930.
** Based on first General Election.
*' This number is based on the first election after the promulgation of the New
Electoral Law. — Nippon-Teikoku Nenkwan No. 36. p. 644.
** Humphreys. Proportional Representation, p. 288,
38 Democracy and Japanese Government
their seats in the House, for in the election they might, i mJ^
spite of opposition of parties, draw their votes from all
within a large electoral district, and it might be said that
larger the electoral district, the greater was opportunity
independent candidates. It was largely due to this fact thi
Mr. O^ki and Mr. Shimada, by being independent candidates
have never lost their seats in Parliament.^* However,
present throughout Japan, as a matter of custom, it is t
unwritten law that a candidate runs from his native prefectu
or town; and the rule is practically self -operating, for it
next to impossible for any candidate to run successfully
another electoral district unless he is unusually prommen
This is especially so in a country like Japan where canipaii
speeches have not much weight with thrf VotetSt because th
majority of them are not politically educated. It is but natura
that the voters cast their votes, not so much with a particul
political idea in mind, as from personal considerations. Thi^
is the reason that private canvassing is more effective in Japan •
It appeals directly to the voters.
The result of the large electoral district system was of no
mean value; it was a marked improvement over the small
electoral district on the single constituency principle. Yet,
in spite of this advance, the system lacked elasticity and adapta-
bility. The single vote, like the cumulative vote and the
limited vote, required exact calculations on the part of the
party organization, which otherwise might fail to secure for
its party the maximum number of representatives. The
number of candidates to be nominated depended upon a
careful calculation on the part of the political oiiganization
as to the exact number of their probable supporters; and
when the nominations had been made, efforts had to be taken
by the party organizations to allot their support to their candi-
dates in such a way that not one of them was in danger of;
defeat. Since the nomination of too many candidates would,
as with the limited vote, be disastrous, parties have been un-
** Taisei Gonen Kokumin Nenkwan, section Cendai Jinbutsu, pp. 24-107.
Election Law before jqjq 39
willing to nominate more than the number of candidates
'who are absolutely necessary, in order to prevent the scattering
of votes. The defeat of the Seiyukai in Tokyo in the election
campaign of 1908 was attributed to the ncui-limitation of
tlie number of candidates.'^ The result was that the Seyukai
secured only two seats with 6,579 votes while the Daido-ha
(Conservative) elected an equal number of representatives
with 2,879 votes."
The defeat of the Seiyukai in the general election of May
1920, in the city of TcJcyo was also the result of the non-
limitation of the candidates. The result of the election is as
follows :
Party Number of Number of
Votes Members EUcUd
Seiyukai 2if3i8 3
Kenseikai I9fi36 6
Kokuminto I545i 4
Mushozuku (or unclassified) I4t506 4 *
As to the qualifications of a candidate, the revised law of
1900 remained substantially the same as the old law of 1889
except in those particulars which have already come under
discussion. Among the classes still specifically excluded are
the peers, clergy, army, navy, certain office-holders," bank-
rupts, and persons convicted of treason, felony, or corrupt
practice. As to the meaning of the phrase "office-holder^
there has been some controversy recently among Japanese
politicians. Article XVI provides that "officials other than
those enumerated in the preceding article ** may, so long as
their official functions are not thereby interfered with, serve
with membership in the HcSuse of Representatives, retaining
their official position." The questions involved in the contro-
** J. H. Humphreys, Proportional Representaiion, p. 284.
^ a Ibid, p. 285.
'" Tokyo. Asahi, p. 3, May 18, 1920.
» and ** Article XV— Officials in tiie Imperial Household Department. Officials of
Justice, Chiefs and Judges of the Administrative Litigation Court, AiiditorB, Revenue
Officials, and Police Officials.
40 Democracy and Japanese Government
versy are, first, who can detemuBe whether serving as a member
m The House is detrimental to the other position which a rep-
resentative holds, and seoond, whether persons in the service
oC the commune and of the government sduxd are excluded.
These questions still await definite answers, though during
recent years it seems quite settled that teadiers in both govern-
ment and private institutions may serve as members of the
l^;islature, holding at the same time their original positions.
Thus Dr. Ogawa has been serving as a member of the l^^ature
and at the same tinie has been holding his professorship in the
University of Kyoto. Mr. Horita has accepted a position as
secretary to the Minister of the Treasury, retaining his seat
in the House.^ Although the statute prohibits siny* member of
a Fu or Ken (prefecture) Assembly from combining his office
with membership in the House of Representatives,** it seems
to be conceded that the mayor of a city may do so.*^ Thus,
Mr. Ozaki was at one time serving as mayor of Tokyo as well
as a member of the House of Representatives. However, with
these exceptions, the clause has never been clearly defined.
An able, conservative political writer. Dr. Uyesugi, explains
the meaning of the clause by saying that a man can hold his
seat in the House of Representatives together with his official
position until he is notified by his superior officer that his
services are no longer needed. "In this case," he says, ''one
must decide whether he will resign his official position or
accept membership in the House." •* The practical operation
of the Article, however, is that when a man has been chosen
for membership in the House by the votes of his fellow citizens
who hold the same political views as the authorities (for in-
stance, the Cabinet) in power, he may not, in the exercise of
the functions that have been assigned to him, be hindered
by any superior, (for instance, the governor). This is especially
^ In the Hara C abinet, 191 8. The infonnation has been furnished by Mr. Sugiyama,
correspondent of Osaka Mainichi.
••Article XVII, Election Law of 1900.
*' The position of mayor is not regarded as a government position.
** Dr. Uyesugi, Constitution and Constitutional Government, and edition, p. 445.
Election Law before jgjg 41
so since in Japan most higher officials are directly appointed
by the central authority in power. Of course any contro-
versy such as this may come up before the Administrative
Court, but it must be remembered that even the Administra^
tiye Court is under the influence of the political authority
^ in power.
' So far as the abolition of property as well as residential
qualifications for the candidates is concerned, the revised
law of 1900 was a marked advance toward democracy. How-
ever, the law did not democratize the qualifications of the voter
except that it reduced the tax-paying requirement from fifteen
yen of direct national taxes to ten yen.** ^
Besides the property qualification, the Election Law also
provided a residential qualification. Article VIII says: "He
must be a male Japanese subject and be not less than full
twenty-five years of age. He must have had his permanent
residence in the election district for not less than one year
previous to the date of the drawing-up of the electoral list."
This residence qualification seems universal at present. The
niobility of population makes it necessary to have residence
Qualifications to prevent fraud. However, the mobility of
Population was very slow at the time when the Election Law
^as promulgated and such a requirement of long residence
9^* edification seemed almost unnecessary.*®
^II!ertain persons were excluded from voting, though possess-
^Sr the general qualifications above mentioned. The Law
d^^ignated the following limitations: (i) Those who have been
d^^^lared bankrupt and have not yet fulfilled their obligations,
or "those who have been declared to be in process of liquidation
Otr to be insolvent and who have not yet definitely rehabilitated
titiemselves; (2) those who have been declared incompetent
o^ quasi-incompetent; (3) those who have been deprived of
"Article XVIII.
^ The rate of increase of population during the ten years just prior to the promulga-
tion of the revised law was an average of 10.03 per 1,000 persons, while the rate of
increase during five years beginning with 1909 was 14.78 per 1,000. — Nippon Teikoku
Jfo, 36 Tokei Nenkwan, 1918, pp. 30-21.
42 Democracy and Japanese Government
•
civil rights or whose civil rights are su^)ended.^ However,
in case the civil rights are suspended or withdrawn on account
of political misdemeanor or crime, the right to vote revives
as soon as the penalty imposed has been paid or remitted
through pardon.
Perhaps one of the most peculiar features of the Japanese
Electoral Law, interesting to Occidentals, although found
also in the German Electoral Law, is the disqualification of
the clergy.** The objection to permitting the clergy to partici-
pate in public affairs seemed to be founded up<m the waning
notion that their profession is of so sacred a character that it
is a profanation of it to allow the clergy to mingle in the secular
affairs of the community. This is an idea that belongs to ^
past age rather than to the present, although it is probat>Vf
shared by many pious persons.
By the practice of most of the religious bodies in Japavi^
the ministers of the respective denominations are deemed ^
be consecrated to the work of the ministry, and to be un^0^
Obligation to make that the principal business of their Ir
If they engage in secular employments inconsistent with
performance of their duty as ministers of religion, they
thought to violate their professiplial obligations. This sent
ment has its foundation both in the generally avowed profe^^
sions of the clergy themselves and in the religious opinions ^^^
the people. But there is nothing in the mere exercise of th»^
right of suffrage inconsistent with the performance of clerics/
duties or with professional obligations. The clergy of Japan
are an enlightened, patriotic, and virtuous body of men. There
is nothing, therefore, in their character or qualifications that
renders them unfit for the exercise of the suffrage for the deter-
mination of the national policy and the election of members
to the House. They have no exclusive privil^es and are
subject to the same laws that govern others; and they have
the same interest in the welfare of the country. It is therefore
*^ Article XI, section 4.
« Article XIII.
44 Democracy and Japanese Government
their own right. An establishment at any place, under such
circumstances, can not even give one a domicile there. Troops are
stationed at various posts and garrisons throughout the country.
They are liable to be removed from one station to another.
In like manner the exercise of the right of suffrage is denied
to the persons who, though otherwise entitled to vote, are not
registered in the list of qualified voters. However, the law
allows them to exercise the right of suffrage if non-registration
was based on reasonable ground. It provides : "No person other
than those entered in the electoral list shall be capable of
voting. Should, however, any one come to the voting plac^
on the day of election, bringing with them a writ entitlinj
him to have his name entered on the electoral list, the votin
overseer must permit him to vote," ^
The list of voters in every village, town, and city is care-:^
fully made up and is posted for a sufficient length of tim(
(fifteen days) for public inspection to enable every citizen wh<
is interested to see that his name is included. Should th<
voter fail to scrutinize the list and should his name be erron -
eously omitted, whether he scrutinized it or not, he may claim
that a correction be made by giving to the Guncho or to the
mayor (head of the administrative district) written notice
and his reason therefore, together with corroborative evidence.*^
However, in case he is barred from the exercise of the franchise
through his own fault, he is only barred from that particular
election ; his right of suffrage is not lost, but merely suspended
until the next registration.
To be elected a member of the House the candidate must
secure a certain percentage of votes. In regard to this the
statute provides : "The individual who has obtained a relative
majority of the total number of valid ballots shall be declared
the person elected." However, the number of the ballots ob-
tained must not be less than one-fifth of the quotient obtained
by dividing the total number of the electors entered in the
** Article XXXVIII.
« Article XXI.
46 Democracy and Japanese Government
an increase of 47.3 per cent., while the country districts would
have enjoyed- 352 representatives instead of 305, an increase
of 15.4 per cent. The population of the six larg^t cities in
1900, the very year when the revision of the original Election
Law took place, was 3,074,442." Though this number has
increased to over 5,000,000 during the last nineteen years,"
there was no alteration in the number of seats until 19 19.
Thus while the six largest cities could elect only one member
to every 200,000 persons, the small cities such as Marugame,
Onomitsu, and Akita with a population of less than 35,000 '^
were also allowed to elect one representative. Moreover,
there were twelve ** cities which could not enjoy the privil^e
of being independent electoral districts.
In the rural districts we find the same discrepancies though
they were not so bad as in the urban districts. According to
the statute, rural districts could elect one member for every
130,000 persons. But in spite of this provision each of three
islands was allowed to elect one member with far less popula-
tion than that provided in the statute, while Okinawa and
Hokkaido with 545,900 and 1,513,317 respectively were
allowed to choose only two and three members. It was said
that those two states belonged to a special category and that
they should not have been classed equally with other provinces.
These special cases were said to have been due to mobility of
population, or to a low standard of wealth. Under the terms
of the law, however, representation was based on population,
not on wealth.
The result was that certain districts with only 489 or 559
voters had one seat in the House, while certain other single
member constituencies had more than 3,770 voters.*' For
instance, in the thirteenth general election in the district of
Marugame, the Kenseikai secured one representative with
** Naikaku Tokei, year 1918, p. 30 (based on statistics of 1898).
** Naikaku Tokei, p. ao (on Population).
•' Naikaku Tokei, p. 20.
** This is based on 1913 statistics of Naikaku Tokei Nenkwan,
»• md.
Election Law before igig 47
131 votes, while the Kokuminto obtained one seat with more
than 4,390 votes in the district of Osaka; in the district of
Kirosaki-shi, the Seiyukai secured one seat with less than
182 votes while in the district of Kyoto-shi, the Kokuminto
secured only one vote with more than 2,480 votes.*®
Though the people and a majority of their representatives
were very indifferent to such vital problems as that of suf-
frage, there were always a few groups of liberal politicians who
were deeply interested in the matter. These groups introduced
in 191 1 a most democratic electoral reform bill in the Lower
House. This was a universal manhood suffrage bill, providing
that "every citizen of the Empire, of male sex, who has com-
pleted his twenty-fifth year, is entitled to vote for the Mem-
bers of the House in the electoral districts in which he has
been domiciled for not less than one year previous to the date
of the drawing-up of the electoral list." •* The bill passed the
, Lower House by an overwhelming majority, only to be rejected
in the House of Peers by a unanimous vote.*^ Mr. Sakai, one
of the prominent Socialists in Japan, who was arrested in
February, 191 9, in connection with the agitation for the uni-
versal suffrage movement, gives a most interesting account of
the events incident to the passage of the Bill. He says:
In the forty-fourth year of Meiji (191 1), the universal suffrage bill
was passed by the House of Representatives by an overwhelming
majority. This you may think a phenomenal achievement ; to tell the
truth, the success was more of a comedy than a real achievement;
but some of the representatives approved of it for their own personal
credit, for they would not very much oppose a movement which
has for its object the extension of the political rights of the people.
Now this Bill was so radical, as you can easily imagine, that many
representatives thought that it would never pass, and they voted
in favor of it "just for fun,*' you might say. - But lo! It passed with
an overwhelming majority. None was^more astonished at this
than the Representatives themselves. It was of course quashed in
**Shinbun Nenkwan, April, Z9i7t PP- 158-161.
^ Osaka Asahi, Shinbun» February 17. zpn- This bill was introduced by Mr.
Hinata and nineteen other members. February 15. zgn-
*i The Jiji Shiubun, Kiai^min CiaMroku. March z6. zgii.
48 Democracy and Japanese Government
the House of Peers by a unanimous vote. But it set them thinking —
members of parliament, the police, the powers that be, and the
people themselves, "This is no joke," they said to themselves, and
from that time on they began to behave with great circumspection.
Police supervision of the men concerned in this movement became
so thorough that men became shy and disassociated themselves
from it. So the universal franchise endeavor had been quite for-
gotten until this year when it was suggested that it should be
revised. We accordingly printed circulars calling on the people
to co-operate with us in petitioning the House on February ninth,
and held meetings or rather tried to do both, but they were failures
owing to police intervention. As for me, I was asked at first to take
an active part in promoting this scheme, but I declined because I
was afraid that being known as a socialist I might spoil the whole
thing, and confined myself to helping in a non-public way. The
(l^lice, suspecting that I was in the game, called at my office on the
eighth during my absence. I was not molested, but other persons
were summoned by the police as reported in the press. This police
intervention had of course scared those who might otherwise be
interested in it from taking any part in the petition plan. Now you
have the whole history of the 191 8 attempt to petition on behalf
of the universal franchise.**
It is interesting to note in connection with this Bill some
debates which took place in both chambers. Mr. Arakawa
said:
The government can not be conducted by theory alone, however
much that theory may be right. It is necessary to give a practical
rather than a theoretical reason to the people of the lower class.
The property qualification in elections is by no means a class dis-
tinction ; but, as it is one of the encouragements to the people to
reach that stage where they can exercise their political right, it is
necessary to maintain the present system. Moreover, I do not
agree with the framer of this Bill that universal suffrage will lessen
corruption in elections.**
Mr. Watanabe also protested against the passage of the
Bill. "It is wrong," he said, "to think that the extension of the
right of suffrage means extension of human right. If we con-
** T. Sakai's interview with the reporter of the Japan Advertiser, February 12, 1918.
M Parliamentary Debate, March 15, 1911 — Jiji Skimpo, March 16, 191X.
Election Law before igig 49
sider suffrage as a human right, it would be necessary for
women to have it too. But the argument for universal suffrage
seems not to be based on this principle. Besides, the argument
that the Bill will diminish corruption as well as the expense
of election has no real foundation."^ When this Bill passed
the House of Representatives, the government issued a warn-
ing to the public through the government agent, Mr. Yasuhiro,
It reads:
The Bill is to change the present system of restrictive qualifica-
tions of suffrage. This principle is based on the extraordinarily
dangerous idea which had been prevailing for a time in Europe,
known as an inalienable human right, but such a theory has already
lost its power. No person has the right of suffrs^ from his birth.
It is clear that the right of suffrage is a privilege given by the govern-
ment. Even if there are doubts on this point, they are to be fouail
only in democratic countries, not in monarchical countries, and
much le^in a country like ours where the foundation of this con-
stitutional government is entirely different from constitutional
governments in Europe; such is not the system to be adopted at all.
If such a system should be adopted in this country, our idea of the
election would only be lowered, not raised; and it might be im-
possible to select the best that the country has to offer. The final
result of this will be the dictation of the lower over the upper class.
The government will use every means to oppose such a bill.*
The Bill which passed the Lower House was laid before the
House of Peers where it was rejected unanimously without
any debate worth mentioning. However, it is interesting to
note here a statement made by Mr. Hozumi, a prominent
conservative and constitutional writer, in answer to the ques-
tion made by Mr. Ohoki as to the reason for the Committee's
rejection of the Bill.
In reading the Parliamentary records of the Lower House, I have
not found a single necessity for changing the present status of the
Election Law. As the question of reform of the suffrs^ is only a
matter of convenience, there is no particular reason why this must
be permanent, and why it must not be changed. However, I do
^Jiji Skimfo, March 14, 191 1.
50 Democracy and Japanese Gtwernment
not believe that universal suffrage will bring a result better than the
present statute. I believe the Bill has not been introduced from
real necessity, but rather that it is based upon the principle of
democracy. Therefore, hereafter I will see that such a bill does not
even pass the gate of the House of Peers,*'
In examining public opinion at the time when the suffrage
bill was being discussed by the l^slators, one may be sur-
prised at the absence of any popular excitement. The writer,
in examining many magazines as well as the press, could
scarcely find any strong resentment expressed at the failure
of the passage of the bill. The Osaka Asahi barely mentioned
the announcement of the presentation of the bill before the
Diet, while the Jiji was silent. Even when the bill passed the
Lower House and was rejected by the Upper House both papers
seemed entirely indifferent. They merely mentioned it in a
casual way as a part of the proceedings of the legislature.
No leading publication discussed the problem in its editorials^
Four or five years had to pass before the people or the
really began to understand what the extension of suffragi
means in the development of constitutional government.
*' Parliamentary records in the House of Peers, March 15, 191 1, in Jiji Skim:
March 16, 191 1.
Chapter IV
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR THE EXTENSION
OF THE SUFFRAGE
During the worid war a gener^ movement for the extension
of suffrage was slowly taking place. Thus, early in 191 8
electoral reform bills were introduced by each of the three
leading parties. The features of these bills were the extension >^
of the franchise by lowering the property qualification of the
electors from ten yen of direct na;tional taxes to five yen or
from ten yen to two yen,^ readjustment of electoral districts;
bestowal of the right of suffrage to those who had certain
educational qualifications. Besides these the government
also laid before the house a bill which would increase the
number of representatives from 381 to 438. The Seiyukai
insisted upon the adoption of the principle of election by
small districts while the Constitutional party (Kenseikai)
SLiid the People's party (Kokuminto) tried to keep aliy^ the
-tlien existing system of large electoral districts. In the bill
.grxanting the right of suffrage to those with certain educational
^^anding, both the People's and Constitutional parties sub-
stantially agreed to give the vote to those who had the foUow-
f^'^g" educational qualification: (i) Graduates from high schools,
^<^nnal schools, or from schools higher than these ; (2) gradu-
^"^^s from those institutions where politics, economics, and
^^^^uice are taught with permission from the Minister of
iication.2
The problem of increasing the number of representatives
also considered by each party. The suggestion of the
^^^^iyukai in this matter was to increase the number from 381
* Shin Hord, Taiyo, Zohan, May 20, 1919, p. 70 — History of Imperial Diet. The *
^-^^^uminto differed from the Kenseikai and Seiyukai in that it insisted upon lowering
^^^ property qualification to three yen.
^ Shin Horei. The Kenseikai differed from Kokuminto as to the educational quali-
"^^-tion in that it providedt besides these educational qualifications, a clause reading:
"Tliose graduated must be able to live independently."
52 Democracy and Japanese Government
to 444 * while the Constitutional and People's parties provided
in their respective bills for increases to 439 and 461 respectively.
In addition to these the Kenseikai or the Constitutional
party also introduced a bill which provided, first, for shortening
the residence requirement from one year to six months, and
second, for giving the right of suffrage to those who can earn
their own living. It was also noteworthy that for the first
time the Kenseikai tried to lessen the inflyences of certain
corporations over the government by proposing that "officers,
directors, and managers of banks or corporations, with un-
limited liability, enjoying special protection from or super-
vision by the government and also those who undertake
government work under contract, and officers, directors, and
managers of juridical persons, with unlimited liability, under-
taking principally government work under contract shall be
ineligible for the House of Representatives." * The same bill
also aimed to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous statute *
as well as to define the eligibility of the l^slators by a pro-
vision which reads: "No officers, unless retired, except those
designated by the Imperial Ordinance, shall be eligible.'' •
Though the government and each political party introduced
their own bills, these generally speaking were of two kinds.
One was that of the Seiyukai, which had the smaller electoral
divisions as its main feature. The other provided for larger
electoral divisions with some minor changes which we have
seen. Of this latter kind was the government bill. The gov-
ernment had already introduced an amendment in the House
of Peers which would increase considerably the number of
members.^ Therefore the government bill in the House of
* Shin Horei (New Laws), May* 1918. Additional Issue of Taiyo, p. 69.
^ Mr. 03rama on attitude of each party on the question of extending suffrage, p. 103.
April number Chuo Koron.
' Article XIII which reads, "Those who undertake government work under contract
or those who are oflFicers or juridical persons undertaking principally government
work under contract shall be ineligible.*
*See footnote i.
'It will be increased by eight. New Law increases maximum number of Counts
from 17 to 20, and number of Viscount Barons from 70 to 75. Shin Horei, May,
T.918, p. 2.
Extension of Suffrage 53
Representatives was a kind of balance to this increase of the
members in the House of Peers. It was generally agreed that
the government had already secured the approval of the Privy
Council for the bill and * also the approval of the Upper House
in exchange for increasing the number of Peers. Therefore,
there was every indication that the government bill would
have passed through both Houses even against the opposition
of the Seiyukai. All parties • except the Seiyukai, were united
in support of the government bill. The Seiyukai were alarmed
over the situation and negotiated with the government to
secure the withdrawal of the government's bill on condition
that the party withdraw its bill also. The party threatened
the government that in the event of the government's insisting
on pressing its bill before the Diet against the wish of the
party, they would oppose every bill including the industrial
* 'Mobilization Bill."^® The government was alarmed and
decided to withdraw the suffrage bill.
Commenting on this, the editor of the Chugai Shogyo said :
That a party government, if realized, will be just as indifferent
to the interests of the people as the super-party ministry, has been
proved by the majority party's interference with the passage of the
suffrage bill. The government bill was rejected solely from con-
siderations of selfish party interest. The Seiyukai preferred to
sacrifice the interests of the people rather than have it pass to its
own disadvantage." If the Seiyukai dared to abuse its power even
while it was not yet in control of the government through the
regular channels, how much more inconsiderately will it act if
allowed to form a ministry on the basis of its influence. A political
* Shin Horei, May, 191 8, p. 69.
* Kokuminto, Kenseikai, Shinsekai and part of Seiwa Kurabu — 200 in number.
1^ Osaka Asaki, March 21, 1918.
11 All parties united to support the principles of "large electoral districts" advanced
by the government against the Seiyukai who wanted the principle of "small electoral
districts." Therefore, if the government insisted on its passage, it would result in the
defeat of the Seiyukai. The "small electoral districts" system was the principle for
which the Seiyukai fought for years in the past but was unable to get it through the
Upper House. Therefore the passage of the government bill was regarded as a great
defeat to the party. Moreover, if once such a bill passed, the Seiyukai would be
probably unable to amend it for years to come since the Upper House seldom changes
any important measure like the Election Law.
54 Democracy and Japanese Government
party should represent the will of the people. A majority party is
only worthy of controlling influence when it represents the interests
of the majority. But the Seiyukai does not seem to be so broad.
The party is concerned only with the usurpation of power. If its
own interest or caprice is served, it is indifferent whether its policies
work for the interest of the people or not.
It is a debatable question whether in this country a government
based on ihe influence of a majority party would be better than a
super-party government. The latter is free from many abuses to
which a party government will inevitably be exposed. Such abuses
can be prevented only by the vigilance of the public and by a highly
developed sense of responsibility on the part of the political party.
Neither the public nor the political parties seem to possess such
qualities. Herein lies the weakness of the party government, and
the strength of the super-party government. As long as political
parties have no sense of responsibility to the people and are un-
worthy of their confidence, super-party government will be able to
maintain its prestige.^*
In the 1919 session of the Diet, the political parties as
well as the government again proposed suffrage reform bills.
The main features of these were similar to those of previous
years. There were, however, marked differences, especially
regarding the tax-paying qualification. The Kokuminto, the
most liberal party, proposed a bill, first, granting the franchise
to those who pay direct taxes to the extent of two yen per
annum, instead of ten yen, and to those who are graduates of
the high schools, normal schools, or those who have completed
their military service; secondly, increasing the number of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
the population, one representative being allotted for every
130,000 in the counties and one for every 30,000 {persons in
the cities; thirdly, establishing regulations to prevent gov-
ernment interference in elections; and lastly, lowering the
age qualification of the voter from twenty-five to twenty, and
in case of. candidates from thirty to twenty-five." The Kensei-
kai also introduced a suffrage reform bill which was similar
w The Chugai Shogyo, March 21, 1918.
" The Jiji, December 29, 19 18.
Extension of Suffrage 55
to that of the Kokuminto except m regard to educational
qualifications. As to the latter, the Kenseikai, while main-
taining principles similar to the Kokuminto, restricted its
provision by inserting a clause that "only those graduates
from high school who are maintaining an independent living
shall have the right of suffrage.'* ^* Following the lead of the
Kokuminto and Kenseikai, the government also proposed a suf-
frage bill. The main difference between the government bill
and those of the Opposition was that the former adopted the
small electoral system, dividing the country into 373 districts "
ivhile the latter maintained the principle of a large electoral
system on the ground that the small electoral system was
unsatisfactory in the matter of minority representation.^*
That the trend of public opinion was undoubtedly toward
democracy was revealed by public opinion itself as well as by
the debates which took place in the Diet. There were many
politicians as well as plain people who were dissatisfied with
the proposed suffrage bills based on the property qualification.
The students of Tokyo Imperial University, which hitherto
has been r^arded as a hotbed of bureaucracy, organized a
movement supported by the radical members of the House
to bring about manhood suffrage. They presented to the
Emperor a petition which read :
When the late Emperor Meiji established his Government at the
beginning of his era, he wisely announced that the policy of the
country should be decided by public opinion. Thus we, the subjects
of your Majesty, were granted freedom and opportunity to respond
to your Majesty's benevolence by directly participating in the
affairs of state. In spite of this fact, the politicians in the govern-
ment have exerted themselves for the last thirty years to prevent us
from obtaining full rights of participating in politics, which are to
be duly granted to us^ by establishing a law which regulates the
qualification of franchise holders. Due to the great changes which
have taken place in the political and social situation at home and
^* Toyo Ketai Shinpo, No. 483, March 5, 1919, p. 38.
" Tokyo, Asahi, February 27, 1919, p. 4.
^'Speech by Representative Saito in the House on Suffrage Reform, March 8,
1919. Jiji, March 8, 1919, p. 2.
56 Democracy and Japanese Government
abroad the time has come when the country should adopt universal
suffrage as the basis of the nation's political activity. We, the
members of the National Students' League, hereby desire to express
the thoughts of seventy millions of Your Majesty's faithful sub-
jects, while earnestly praying for the long reign of Your Majesty
and the prosperity of our country.*'
Mr. Qzaki, a radical member of the Kenseikai, was one of
the strongest advocates of manhood suffrs^e. At a meeting
on February 9, 1919, at Nagoya, he delivered the following
speech on universal manhood suffrage :
The late Emperor, soon after ascending the throne, issued a
message declaring that the administration of the country should be
based on public opinion and that the principle of equality among all
classes of the people should be observed. The Constitution was
framed in this spirit and put into force. As a matter of practice,
however, this principle is not strictly observed. According to the
law of the House of Peers, Princes and Marquises occupy hereditary
seats in the chamber without election. In the Upper House there is
another class of members who are elected from the big tax-payers.
The state, however, does not exist by reason of the high tax-payers
alone, and there are a large number of men in different walks of life
who are as much entitled to seats in the House on account of their
contribution to the state in various respects as are all these big tax-
payers. Moreover, the property of those big tax-payers is created
only by the co-operation of the poorer class. For instance, the
wealth of the land is really created by the tenants who cultivate
and produce it. No landlord can cultivate vast areas of land by
himself. Therefore, in a sense, the tenants themselves are directly
paying the tax. The present prevailing practices are contrary to
the principles of equality and must be interpreted as recognizing a
difference in political rights between the poor and the rich. Similar
instances of class distinction may be given. Students known for
their superiority in the colleges and schools have to bow before the
sons of the rich, once they are out in active life, no matter how able
they are or how talented. No wonder that the dissatisfaction
engendered by such inequality should find vent on such occasions
as the rice-riots of last year.
" Japanese Advertiser^ February lo, 1919, p. 10.
Extension of Suffrage 57
Toothing could be more advisable or eflfective than the adoption
of xiniversal suffrage for the realization of equality among all the
classes. Different views are advocated as to the lowering of the
property qualifications of voters, but it is quite absurd to wrangle
oxrer the matter. Suppose the qualification of voters be lowered to
pEi.>^ment of a two yen tax, then the number of voters to be obtained
by this process will be only 4,000,000 out of a population of 60,-
000,000, and the extent to which the prevailing discontent regarding
tt&e unequal distribution of the suffrage would thus be removed
nxust be considered infinitesimal.
-At present laborers are entirely excluded from taking part in
politics. This omission must be rectified. An essential condition
of the administration of a country should be the safety and security
of living among all classes, but under the present condition there is
neither safety nor security of living among such classes as school
teachers and minor officials. Under such circumstances it is not
surprising that there should take place an irresistible movement
for the removal of the existing bars of inequality.
Nothing is more dangerous than the worship of bureaucratic
ideas, which have brought ruin to Russia and Germany. Some
y^ars ago an argument was advanced in the House of Peers that
It Would be dangerous to allow universal suffrage, and that it was
absolutely necessary that some property qualification be adopted.
In other words, the advocates of this theory imply that all the
Japanese who do not pay any direct tax are not intelligent enough to
vote or are even dangerous. It should be remembered, however,
that the same people who are not intelligent or who are even danger-
ous are recruited as conscripts for the defense of the country. This
is the height of absurdity and partiality. For these reasons it is
only just and right that the existing unequal distribution of political
rights be abolished and universal suffrage be adopted.^*
The Miyako entertained the same opinion as Mr. Ozaki
and it attacked vigorously in its editorials the proposed suffrage
bills based on the property qualification. It said:
The present franchise system is inadequate in that only a limited
number of men have the privilege of voting. In Japan there are
only 1,500,000 electors. The comparison of the number of the
11 Speech of Representative Ozaki on universal suffrage, February g, at Nagoya,
as quoted in Japan Advertiser, February ii, 1919, p. 10.
58 Democracy and Japanese Government
electorate in our country with that in England indicates that we
men are not given a right equal to one-fourth of that of the British
women to participate in the nation's council. We now possess an
army as large as that of Great Britain. The government encourages
the men to serve the country regardless of their property qualifica-
tions, saying that to become a soldier of the Emperor is the noblest
duty of a Japanese. That is all right, but why are the majority of
our countrymen not allowed to take part in national politics? In a
word, the authorities recognize the full value of a Japanese man as a
soldier, but in their eyes his value as a voter is hardly as much as
one-fourth that of a British woman.^*
These extracts which could be multiplied by thousands
taken from resolutions, speeches, and writings, clearly indi-
cate the trend towards democracy in Japan at present. In
191 1 when the universal suffrage bill which passed the Lower
House was rejected in the Upper House, one could hardly find
any popular argument or press comment; but the political
atmosphere of 1919 was entirely different.
On February 26 the Cabinet introduced a suffrage bill in
the House. Mr. Tokonami, Minister of Interior, delivered a
speech stating the reason for introducing the bill. He said :
More than eighteen years have elapsed since the present election
law was put into force, but it has not succeeded in bringing about
the purpose for which it was designed. A reform of the law in
keeping with the requirements of the period has long been recog-
nized as necessary, though so far the government has not been able
to put the required revision into concrete shape. According to the
existing law the number of voters is 1,440,000, which represents 2.6
per cent, of the total population. The percentage is too small to
form the basis of a real representative system of government. The
Government, however, is of the opinion that too radical a change
is not advisable, and so it will adhere to a policy of gradually extend-
ing the suffrage.
With regard to fixing the qualifications of voters, various theories
have been advanced; but the Government is convinced that it
would be most advisable, in view of the prevailing condition in the
>* The Tokyo Miyako as quoted in the Woman Citizen, Vol. Ill, No. 36. February,
Extension of Suffrage 59
covintry, for the property qualification to be fixed at an annual
pa-yment of a three yen tax. In case the qualification is lowered to
th.ir«e yen as proposed, the number of voters will be increased from
i»4.6o,ooo to 2,860,000 — ^nearly double the present number. It has.
b^^n claimed by some that "the intellectual class" should be included
arrxong the voters. The demand, though it may appear reasonable
a^ a first glance, will be found untenable on closer scrutiny. It is
coxitended by the advocates of this theory that all graduates of high
sc^lnools and higher colleges should be given the franchise. It should
b^ observed, however, that besides the school graduates there are
nx^ny men who are as intelligent and educated as these graduates. :
Consequently it would be difficult to make education a basis of
svi^ffrage qualification, and, if adopted, it could hardly be considered
t^-ir and impartial.
The existing S3(stem of the large electorate was adopted with the
^ope of eliminating bribery and other questionable methods which
^^«re made easier on account of the small electorate. The experience
of the last ten years has demonstrated beyond all doubt that, with
the.large electorate, corruption is made easier than in the old small
electorate and therefore the Government, taught by experience, has
mapped out a system of small electorates which will be most suitable
to the condition of the country.
In the bill before the House the Government has allotted the
number of representatives roughly at the rate of a representative
for 130,000 people. The result will be that the total number of Diet
members will be increased to 464 showing an increase of eighty-
three over the present number. In other words, the number of
members for the urban districts will be increased from 75 to 112 and
that of members for the country districts from 305 to 352,*®
As to the change in the electoral district, the government
vigorously insisted upon the small district system. Mr.
Tokonami, Minister of the Interior, gave the following reasons
for this: (i) Decrease of the election expense; (2) elimination of
election contests among party members in the district ; (3) de-
velopment of the political ideas of the district; (4) more justice
in the results of elections; (5) elimination of the trouble of by-
*^ speech of Minister of Interior in the House, February 25, Tokyo Asahi, February
26, 1919, p. 2. Translation in Japanese Advertiser^ February 26, 1919, p. 10.
^■w
6o Democracy and Japanese Government
elections in whole prefecture: (6) stricter enforcement of <
tion laws ; etc.^^
The Opposition vigorously opposed the change. "The C
emment bill for small electoral districts," says Hon. Uyeh
"will greatly increase the practice of selling and buying v(
It is possible neither to have a fair election nor to elect i
candidates." ^ During the first six elections under the si
district system, candidates were elected on the average
sixty-five per cent, of the total votes cast, while in the sevi
to the thirteenth elections under the large district sys
candidates were elected on the average by seventy-nine
cent, of the total votes. Even so, under the small elect
district system the number of votes received by those defej
in the election often exceeds the votes received by tl
elected, especially when there are three candidates in a dist
For instance, in the twelfth general election, the total nun
of votes the candidates-elect received in six indepenc
districts, Tsushima, Takasaki, Hirosaki, Ogi, Tokushima,
Oshima, was 1,927, whereas the total number of votes rece:
by those defeated was 2,693, that is, men were elected in tl
districts by forty-two per cent. ; "therefore the small elect
system is by no means an ideal system." ^ As has been sh
elsewhere, the chief defect of the small electoral system is
impossibility of furnishing a fair representation to the mir
ties. It also tends to create too much sectionalism w!
makes it impossible for any independent candidate to
successfully against the party machine.
After spirited debates which lasted for almost two we
the Government bill passed the Lower House with a majc
of 61 out of 349 votes cast. The same bill also passed
Upper House with a majority of 204 out of 228 votes ca
The main features of the new revised law are:
^ Minister Tokonaini» Speech on Suffrage Reform. — The Tokyo Asahit p. a» F
ary a6» 1919.
^ Dr. JJyeharsLf on Suffrage Reform. Ibid, February 27.
**Mr. Saito, Problem of increasing the electorate and electoral district. 7
February first issue, pp. iis-116.
** Shin Horei Taiyo Zokan, p. 94. May 20, 1919.
Extension of Suffrage 6i
I . Small electoral districts with the principle of single
itidnber constituencies,^
^. Reduction of the property qualifications from ten yen
of cdirect national taxation to three yen annually.
3. Redistribution of seats and an increase of 83 in member-
ship of the House of Representatives, i. e., from 381 to 464.^
This latest law increases the number of voters by i ,400,000.
It, however, still excludes a large number of the small agri-
cultural and landholding classes. Moreover, as the revised
laiv is still based on the principle that the property holding
doss should have a special privilege, it excludes a large number
of the intelligent class. The following will serve to give a gen-
c«<d idea of Japanese democracy in respect to suffrage :
In Cities In Counties Total
Number of voters with college education
under the law of 1900 ^ 36,000 70,000 106,000
Number of voters with college education
under revised law * 48,000 95,000 143,000
Number of voters with high school or simi-
lar educational standing under the re-
-viaedlaw* 150,000
Total number of voters regardless of edu-
cation under the law of 1900 in March,
1919 1460,000
1^0 tal number in the next election . . . 2,859,000
*In counties the districts were roughly divided, making one representative for
crh 130,000; however, there are five districts which elect one representative for
190,000 population, while there are also twelve districts which elect one repre-
tative for '90,000. Speech of Minister of Interior, February 25, on the floor of the
I^lLct. Larger cities, as in counties, elect one representative for every 130,000. Senkyo
^CD Kaisei Yomoku — Nichi Nichi, p. 2, February 25, 1919. Smaller cities elect one
i*ex>reaentative for every 30,000.
* Tokyo Nichi Nichi, February 23, 1919, p. 3. Under the law of 1900, cities were
'^^I>resented by 76 against 305 in counties; under the revised law of 1919. cities will
*^ represented by 112 and counties by 352. There will be 378 electoral districts;
'^'^Slc-member districts, 298; two-member districts, 69; three-member districts, 11.
*^ Tokonami, Minister of Interior (Kikairoku). — The Kokumin ShinhuHt March
'*• 1919.
*• Tokonami. — Tokyo Nichi Nichi, February 26, 1919, p. 2.
** There are about 180,000 high school graduates alone who are excluded, solely
^^^Use they are not tax-payers of 3 yen a year. It is said that among 180,000 there
^'^ only 40,000 or so who can have an independent living. Representative Saito —
^iugjen Kaiseiho, Nichi Nichi, p. 2, February 26, 1919-
' •>^
62 Democracy and Japanese Government
Considering the fact that only the small landholding class
enjoys the reform, the revised law failed entirely to satisfy
the majority of the liberals.
Scarcely a year has passed since another movement for the
extension of suffrage has taken place in Japan. Even such an
ultra-conservative paper as the Kokumin began to declare itself
for universal suffrage as follows:
What is welcome to the disaffected classes in Europe and America
.L^ is not Christ's, but Lenine's gospel. This is an age of destruction.
We urge universal suffrage as a means of limiting to a minimum the
evil effect on the country of this general tendency of the world and
as a safety-valve for dangerous ideas. Besides, no one can deny
that a great many difficulties lie in the path of the Empire, and it is
as certain as the sun will rise to-morrow morning that a great
capitalistic force will bring pressure to bear on the Empire sooner or
later, in some form or other; and this danger can only be faced by
a general mobilization of the nation. Now, in order to make an
effective physical mobilization of the nation in case of emergency,
it is necessary that the latter should be placed in a state of moral
mobilization in ordinary times — in other words, it is necessary that
the nation should be allowed to participate in the government and
made fully interested in, and conversant with, the administrative
and diplomatic policies of the Empire. In short, we urge universal
suffrage as a preparation for a general mobilization of the nation on
the one hand and a safety-valve for dangerous thought on the other,
and also for a political education and training of the nation, for one
can learn how to swim only in water.*®
The Tokyo Nichi-nichi, an organ of the middle class, also
. favoring the adoption of universal suffrage, remarks:
In days when the nation at large was backward in political
knowledge, it was perhaps desirable for a smooth working of the
legislative organ that privileged and propertied classes alone should
have a share in the Government; when political intelligence is
diffused in all sections of the nation, as it now is, the legislative
organ, in the operations of which all the nation are deeply interested,
should be common property of all. So not only should the tax
qualification be abolished, but all males of twenty-five years and
*^ Quoted in Literary Digest^ February a8, 1920.
Extension of Suffrage 63
^pwards» making their independent livelihood, should be admitted
^o the franchise ... It is evident that even the Government
^d its party are alive to the necessity of adopting universal suffrage,
although they hesitate to do so on consideration of party tactics.'^
These editorials are only a few extracts from among many
^"^lutions and writings appearing in magazines and papers.
The main features of the universal manhood suffrage bills
^re as follows:
Kenseikai KokutnifUo
qualification None None
Otfiier qualification Those who can live
independendy
qualification for both electors and
crsndidates'' 25 20
El^i€:tion district Chu-senkyo-ku " Small district
£esides these, the Kokuminto proposed a bill allowing all
stvidents above twenty years of age to vote, for the present
totial excluded, and also giving the franchise to the primary
sciliool teachers as well as to priests.
On February 26, 1920, a great debate took place in the Diet
0x1 the question of suffrage. The Government opposed this
iiew bill on the ground that the election law passed in 1919
aYiould be- put to test before conferring universal suffrage upon
all males in Japan. But the fact was, as revealed in Premier
Hara's speech later, that the government was not anxious to
participate in a democratic movement. In a speech before
• his own party, Premier Hara said: '^Universal suffrage will
bring a destruction of social class distinctions and is a menace
to the conscription system.**** The Government had found
that both Kokuminto and Kenseikai united for the passage
of this bill. Therefore, without awaiting a test vote which
might have amounted to an expression of a lack of confidence
in the Cabinet, the Government has ordered the dissolution
«7Wrf.
"Tokyo Asahi, January 21, 1920, p^ 3. The Kenseikai also proposed in the bill
to increase the number of representatives from 462 to 485.
** District between Scrutin de liste and Scrutin d* arrondissement in size.
** Premier Hara, March 17, 1920.
64 Democracy and Japanese Government
of the Diet by Imperial decree. This is the first dissolution
of the Diet on the question of suffrage in our political history.
Hitherto the majority of dissolutions have resulted from an
exercise of the Diet's right of address to the Emperor showing
a want of confidence in the government.
A general election was held on May lo, 1920. The result,
as predicted, was a land-slide victory for the Government. It
secured over sixty per cent, of the members in the newly
elected House of Representatives. One of the most striking
characteristics of this election was that the Government party
(Seiyukai) lost heavily in the urban districts while the Opposi-
tion lost in the country districts. This indicates that th
extension of suffrage is favored by the urban voters while th
conservative voters in the country are against it.
Chaptek V
DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
It is interesting to note that the Japanese method of pro-
viding for local participation in the work of administration is
quite different from the American method, in that local gov-
ernment is conducted by officers who are agents of the central
government, and who are at the same time executives of local
administration. In this system local power is given by the
Diet by general grant, but exercise of it is subject to central
administrative control. The Diet has never attempted to
enumerate the duties of the local corporations with the same
xninuteness as in America. The laws simply enumerate the
principles of local administration, leaving the localities to
carry them out in detail. The local corporations are not,
'therefore, as in America, given specific powers, but have the
Tight to exercise all such powers as they wish provided they
<lo not violate the letter or the spirit of the law. However,
they are subject to a rigid central administrative control
nvhich prevents them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction
of the central government and from acting extravagantly or
unwisely.
Throughout Japanese local government the principle of
separation of matters of general and of local administration is
sharply drawn. Such subjects as police, schools, and the
supervision of subordinate local authorities are deemed to
affect the whole country, and are placed in the hands of per-
sons who act as agents of the national government ; while the
construction of roads, the establishment of market houses, the
maintenance of almshouses, and the voting of appropriations
for local purposes are regarded as matters of local interest.
Another feature of Japanese local government is the dis-
tinction between professional and lay (honorary) officials. It
66 Democracy and Japanese Government
•
is said that the introduction of unpaid or lay officers into local
government lessens the influence of the bureaucracy in local
affairs and tends to draft into the public service the better
class of private citizens and at the same time to interest the
people in local self-government. All professional officials are
members of the Japanese bureaucracy. Before they are
qualified to hold positions, they are required to go through an
elaborate training, and to pass a civil examination. The non-
professional officers have no special training, but are selected
from among the members of the assembly.
Japan proper is divided for the purpose of local administra-
tion into forty-three prefectures and three Fus, excluding
Hokkaido, Taiwan and Chosen. These are sub-divided into
sub-districts or counties in which urban and rural communes
are organized. Rural communes are the smallest local entities;
they differ somewhat in area and population. Urban com-
munes are of two classes. One is called the city and is an inde-
pendent municipal county; the other is the urban commune
called Cho or Machi. The organization of government within
these divisions is practically uniform and is characterized by
the vesting of executive power in a single officer, called governor
or prefect in the Fu or prefecture, Guncho in the counties, and
mayor or headman in the communes. The administrative
relation of these divisions is highly hierarchical. Appeals go
from each local government to the next above it. The whole
system of Japanese local administration is quite similar to the
Prussian and French hierarchical administration of local
government.
Like the national election laws, the prefectural election laws
(Fu-ken-sei) place restrictions in the way of property quali-
fications both upon the electorate and candidates. The princi-
ple laid down in the law is that only those who show sufficient
evidence of attachment to the community are entitled to
suffrage. This evidence must be in the tangible form of the
possession of a certain amount of property. Article VI, which
prescribes the qualifications of an elector, provides that "for
Local Government 67
not less than one year previous to the date of the making out
of the electoral list, he must have been paying a national direct
tax of three yen or more, and must be still paying the same."
The results of this provision were that the voting constituency
was limited to 2,384,078 ^ in all prefects, fus, and Hokkaido.
As the population of Japan at present is about fifty-five millions,
this means about one voter to every twenty-three persons.
The same characteristics are evidenced in the requirement
of property qualifications for the legislative candidates. The
law reads : "Those inhabitants of the communes alone shall be
eligible, who are male Japanese of not less than fully twenty-
five years of age and who, in the Fu or Ken, in which they
desire to be elected, have been paying direct national taxes to
an amount not less than ten yen, one year previous to the
date of the making out of the electoral list, and who are still
paying the amount of direct national taxes." ^ Consequently
the law disqualifies many men of ability and intelligence fit to
serve their prefects as members of the Assembly. As the
Assembly is an honorary office, its members are not compen-
sated for their service.
The system which eliminates the greater part of the intelli-
gent class from exercising political rights, coupled with the
helplessness of their representatives, is largely responsible for
the extensive apathy of the voters in prefectures in Japan.
In 1915 there were 2,384,078* voters, of whom those who
actually exercised their political rights were only 1,924,068.*
Out of that number the valid votes amounted to only i ,896,210.
There were 460,027 * absentees, that is, more than one-fifth
did not take a part in the election at all.
The prefectural governmental organs consist of an executive
and two deliberative bodies — council and assembly. The
members of the assembly are elected for a term of four years.
> The Teikoku, No. 36, Tokei Nenkwan, p. 647, 1918.
« Fu-Ken Sei. Article VI.
* The Teikoku Tokei Nenkwan, No. 36, p. 647. 1918.
•JWrf.
68 Democracy and Japanese Government
The size of the assembly varies according to population. The
minimum number required is at least thirty in those prefectures
which have a population of less than 700,000. The matters
that are to be deliberated and decided by the assembly are
principally the following: The determining of the budget;
the making of reports on financial estimates and settled
accounts (Kessan Hokoku ni kwansuru koto); the determin-
ing of the mode of imposing and of collecting duties for use
(shiyoryo), fees, prefectural taxes, and services in person or in
kind, so far as not determined by laws or Imperial ordinances;
alienation, purchase, exchange, or mortgage of the immovable
property of the prefecture of Fu ; and the determining of the
modes of management of the prefectural property and estab-
lishment.*
The prefectural law also empowers the assembly to deliberate
and decide anything within its legal jurisdiction. This vague
and comprehensive authority is accompanied by a careful
supervision and control on the part of the government ; hence
the governor or prefect, as the agent of the national govern-
ment, has an extensive supervisory power. In all matters,
whether it be the budget or ordinary legislation, the function
of the assembly is merely deliberative. Its resolutions can be
carried out only after they have been approved by the governor
who has power to veto subject to confirmation by the central
government. Even as to appropriations, the power of the
assembly is not great. The assembly can not refuse any
appropriation necessary for the execution of any laws already
enacted. If the appropriations are not made by the assembly,
the governor with the advice of the Minister of the Interior,
may include the necessary amount of such expenditures in
the budget in order to carry out laws or Imperial ordinances
already upon the statute books. The law provides:
In case the prefectural assembly has not taken up necessary bills
or has failed to conclude its deliberations thereon within the period
of meeting, the governor with the consent of the Minister of Interior
• Fu-Ken Sei. Article XLI.
Local Government 69
may determine the amount of the local expenditures and the means
of defraying them and execute his plan.^
The sessions of the assembly are brief. It meets regularly
once a year, but its duration is limited to a month, and although
extra sessions can be held for a week at a time, discussion in
such sessions is confined to the special subject upon which the
session has been called.*
The functions of the council, like those of the assembly,
are largely deliberative. The council formerly was the stand-
ing committee of the assembly. The Imperial Decree No. 49,
issued November 5, 1880, reads:
The Standing Committee shall be consulted by, and give advice
to, the Governor in accordance with the resolutions of the Assembly,
upon the works which are to be paid for out of the local taxes. In
case of urgent necessity, the Standing Committee may decide the
amount to be spent upon such works, and report the same to the
Assembly later. The Committee shall also receive bills to be intro-
duced by the Governor into Assembly, and shall give its opinion.
These Standing Committees have been gradually trans-
formed into a council which since 1899, has exercised advisory
powers in the local administration.
At present the council is composed of a governor, two high
officials, and non-professional members who are elected for a
year by the assembly from among its members. The func-
tions of the council as enumerated in the Fu-Ken Sei under the
revised laws of Meiji 32 are as follows:
(i) To deliberate and decide those questions which are
entrusted to it by the assembly, provided such questions are
within the legal jurisdiction of the assembly; (2) to deliberate
and decide, on behalf of the assembly, any question which
requires urgent attention when the governor has no time to
call a special session of the assembly ; (3) to express its opinion
on the bills to be introduced by the governor into the assembly;
(4) to deliberate and decide upon the management of public
property in conformity with the resolution of the assembly;
» Article LXXXII-LXXXV.
• Fu-Ken Sei, Article L.
70 Democracy and Japanese Government
(5) to determine the regulations in reference to the carrying out
of public works to be paid for out of prefectural funds, provided
such regulations are not still made by the laws, etc.
Besides these functions the council performs within certain
limits judicial functions, such as the settling of claims against
the prefecture and the decision of disputes between communes.
The meetings of the council are secret, and they are held
more frequently than those of the assembly. The prefect
can call the council at any time; upon the demand of the
honorary members of the council, he must do so if such demand
is reasonable. The attendance of the chairman (governor)
or his representatives and at least one-half of the honorary
members of the council is required for the validity of any
meeting. •
The supreme authority is placed in the chairman of the
council, namely, the governor. Just as the council may refuse
to amplify the resolutions passed by the assembly when it
believes them to be illegal or improper, so may the governor
control the action of the council. If any decision of the council
appears to exceed its jurisdiction, or is prejudicial to public
good, the governor may, upon his own judgment, or by in-
struction of the Minister of Interior, suspend its execution."
If the council is not satisfied with the decision of the governor,
the case may be taken into the administrative court." In case
of an emergency the governor can settle any question without
the council upon his own judgment, making report of his
decision at the next meeting."
The governor is central figure in Japanese local administra-
tion. He is appointed by the Emperor by the advice of the
Minister of Interior, and holds office during his pleasure.^
He is the chief agent of the national government, and under
the direct control of the Minister of Interior in all ordinary
• Fu-Ken Sei. Article LXXIII.
w Article LXXXII.
" Ihid.
M Article LXXXV.
1* The governor is appointed by the Minister of Interior in practice.
/
Local Government 71
irsoatters; but in finance he is responsible to the Minister of
mance. He is both a central and a local officer. As a central
fficer he is to see that all laws, ordinances and instructions
nt out by the ministers are put into operation.^^
It is significant that as an agent of the general government
'tzhe governor fulfills a l^al rdle as electioneering agent of the
S^ovemment, and it is his activity in this respect that has
"become one of the chief sources of his unpopularity. It is
f'requently said diat the first requisite of a good governor is
-fchat he should make a good electioneering agent in carrying
-fche prefecture for government candidates. When a political
<:^oinbat between the government forces and the Opposition
iDCComes acute, the government is said to instruct secretly
ither the governor or the police commissioner to use his
influence in favor of government candidates. In 1916 Police
ommissioner Niki resigned his position because he was
issatisfied with the interference of Baron Goto, then Minister
f Interior, who instructed him to suppress the candidates of
e Opposition. He announced his reasons as follows:
The circumstance which caused my resignation was not due to
he fact that the present cabinet is a super-party government
pposing the interest of the people, but it was due to the fact that a
like Goto with such a responsible position as Minister of
nterior interferes unjustly with elections under the pretense of law
order. How culpable it is to have such interference from Goto
"^irhb publicly instructs his subordinates to do justice and contempt-
mbly and secretly instructed me to persuade a certain person to
l)ecome a candidate against the Opposition candidates. When Mr.
Tatsubana, with instructions from Goto, tried in vain to induce his
father to become a candidate, he persuaded Mr. Inugari through his
relatives, who declared publicly that Mr. Inugari 's candidacy would
be backed by the governor. When this was unsuccessful they
blamed the governor and the injustice of the police commissioner
(me). I can not stand for instructions which usurp the police power
so long as I am head of the police in the prefecture. The govern-
ment knows well that I am legally forbidden to take part in politics.
>«ArticleLXXVIII.
72 Democracy and Japanese Government
To ask me to use my influence to make some person a candidate
against the Opposition is dearly against the spirit of the law."
The prefect has the power to appoint and to dismiss a large
number of officers employed in the administrative services of
the local government (including even the school teachers),
subject in some cases to the approval of the Minister of Interior.
The prefect also has power to issue either for the whole terri-
tory under his control or for a part of it, dty or prefectural
ordinances relating to administrative and police business.
These ordinances and police powers give the prefects a laiige
opportunity for interfering in local affairs, and this is a constant
source of complaint. As head of the police offices, he can
direct all police officers and determine the distribution, separa-
tion, and uniting of branch police offices in each urban and
rural division.** He even has the power to call the militia in
any case of extraordinary emergency.
Although the power of the governor is so extensive, there is
a growing tendency for the governor to work in conjunction
with the representatives of the people." He is realizing that
without co-operation with other members of the council he
can not successfully govern the prefecture, especially as he is
often a stranger in the state where he is stationed. Further-
more, his tenure of office is very uncertain. He is subject to
transfer from one place to another. This phenomenon becomes
more striking and more frequent with the growing of party
influence. If the governor acts contrary to the interests of the
assembly or non-professional members of the council who not
only are representatives of the people, but also are affiliated
with a party, the people or their representative can take up
the matter directly or indirectly before the Minister of Interior,
^*Shinhun Nenkwan, June. 19x7. p. 139.
1* Rules for PoUce Administration, Article II. Meiji 8 (March 7). Taisei Kwan
Tatsu. No. 29. See also ShUio Keisatsu Rei, Article III.
1^ The proof of this tendency is that the governor usually listens to the popular
wishes in removing local officers or teachers. The growing tendency towards local self •
government is making the governor feel more responsible to the people of the prefecture.
Though appointed by the Minister of Interior, he frequenUy owes his appointment to
the favorable influence of the representatives from his prefecture.
Local Government 73
•
who is ever anxious to win the favor of the people, because his
opi>osition to the interests of the people will result in the
defeat of his party, assuming he is a member of some political
party. Even if he is not a party man, the government will
gain nothing by retaining a governor who is unpopular among
the people of a prefecture. The government knows it is essen-
tial to avoid any unnecessary conflict with the people in order
that its bills may have a smooth path in the national Diet,
since every member of the council or assembly ^* is directly
^^ffiliated with the national political parties.
However, it is interesting to note from the following inci-
dent how the governor can exercise his enormous power
Arbitrarily.
In 1882 Governor Mishima was transferred to Fukushima-
Ken, and it was rumored he had been sent to suppress the
liberal parties in that province. It was reported that he had
^^id : "As long as I am the governor, I shall see that thieves and
^he liberal parties shall not raise their heads." Immediately
^Pon assuming his duties in Fukushima-Ken, he dismissed
'^ixety officers in the prefecture and substituted for them
F^rsons who were politically acceptable to him. He planned to
Construct two highways connecting his prefecture with Niugata
^^d Yams^ata. Without asking any appropriation or making
^^^y survey, he forced the people to pay 370,600 yen for the
I^^rpose. He ordered the people of six sub-prefectures, who
^^^re between fifteen and sixty, regardless of their wealth or
J^^overty, to work one day in every month for two years. He
^Harged those who could not work fifteen cents, a day in case
^^f men, and ten cents a day in case of women. He ordered the
^issoliltion of the assembly of the towns and villages which
^^Pposed his plan.
In connection with the prefectural government the Assembly
^f the Prefectural Governors should be considered. The first
^* In 191 5 the party affiliations of the 3 Fus and 40 prefectural assemblies were as
^^Uows: Sei3rukai 641; Doshikai 566; Chusei kai 55; Kokuminto 108; no party
^fiUiation 271. See Kokumin Nenkwan, 1916, p. 124.
74 Democracy and Japanese Government
session of the assembly was convened in 1875. The purpose
of the convention was to apprise the central government of
the condition of local affairs, to provide the facilities for the
exchange of views in matters of local administration, and to
discuss the bills submitted by the national government. It
was said that die government in establishing this institution
was to form some sort of foundation preparatory to the adop-
tion of representative government. The reason of the govern-
ment in sununoning the governors was clearly stated in the
imperial decree issued at the time, which read:
In accordance with the meaning of the oath taken by Me at the
commencement of My reign and as a gradual development of its
policy, I am convening an assembly of representatives of the whole
nation so as by the help of public discussion to ordain laws, thus
opening up the way of harmony between governors and governed
and of the accomplishment of national desires, and I trust by ensur-
ing to each subject throughout the nation an opportunity of peace-
fully pursuing his vocation to awaken thus a sense of the importance
of matters of state.
I have therefore issued this constitution of the deliberative
assembly providing for the convening of the chief officials of the
different local jurisdictions and for their meeting and deliberating :
as the representatives of the people.^*
Mr. Kido, president of the Assembly, submitted for its -i
consideration the question of a popular l^slative assembly,
though the majority of representatives maintained that the ^
condition of the country was not right for such an advanced
step. Thus we can see that the establishment of this institu-
tion was intended to serve as a preliminary to the Constitution.
However, the assembly of the Prefectural Governors has
changed its nature in recent years. Instead of fostering the
development of constitutional government it tends to retard it.
According to the plan of its establishment it had thet power
to end its existence when the Diet [national l^slative body],
was established. The purpose of establishing the Assembly
1* Imperial Declaration, No. $8, May a. 1874. Translation in Engliah is quoted in
Professor McLaren's Japanese Government Documents, p. 505.
Local Government 75
was to make the local authorities deliberate on the national
administrative policy prior to the organization of the national
Diet. The Assembly no longer fulfills the object for which it
had been established. It is today convened as one means of
extending the influence of bureaucracy. It does not increase
the power of the people in local government. Once in every
year at present the assembly is convened, usually right after
the adjournment of the Diet, for the purpose of instructing
the governors on the policy of the nation or of consulting with
them on local conditions.
/
/
/
/
• »■
r
•■V "■
Chapter VI V. .
DEMOCRACY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
Our scheme of municipal government, like the rest of the
Japanese system, originally came from Germany. It was^
drafted by a German scholar under the guidance of Prince Itg^
who was largely responsible for drafting the present Japanese
constitution. A municipal law was promulgated together with
statutes for the organization of towns and villages, April 14,
1888, to go into effect a year later. Although the present
municipal law is based on the revised laws of 191 1, the prin-
ciple as well as the spirit of its administration has not been
changed.
The preface to the decree of promulgation of the communal
law is as follows:
Animated by a desire for the development of the advantages
attending the communal union of the country and for the promotion
of the welfare of our subjects in general, and recognizing the im-
portance of maintaining and of further extending the old customs
of inter-relationship between neighbors, and of protecting the
inherent rights of cities, towns, and villages by a new law, we give
our sanction to the present law on the organization of cities and to
that on the organization of towns and villages, and render it to be
duly promulgated.^
Japanese political writers complain that many matters of
purely local interest are administered and controlled by a
minister at Tokyo who from his office may touch a button and
give orders to 43 prefectures, 3 Fu, 636 sub-prefectures, 74
cities, 12,218 towns and villages.* Perhaps there is not a com-
munity in Japan today, however remote, in which the govern-
ment at Tokyo does not have an agent to whom it can give
^ Clement, p. 294, Political Science Quarterly, June, 1892.
* Kohutnin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 143.
Municipal Government 77
orders. The government is in close touch with local problems
through the prefectural governor and the guncho, the head of
the sub-prefectures.
The administration of the communal government is highly
centralized, and to a large extent the principle of centralization
prevails in respect to legislation of a local character. It is said
by the government that this supervision or control is necessary
for the protection of tax-payers against the extravagsmce and
wastefulness of municipal councils, as well as of citizens against
possible arbitrary conduct of mayors and councils, who,
through their rather broad powers, might violate the rights of
individuals. It is argued that the powers of the communal
authorities over finance must be kept in check by means of
sorne form of central control in order to prevent the dissipation
^f communal property and resources and to forestall any
^expedient heavy loans which might oppress property owners
'^^cause of resultant burdensome taxes.
It is said that such powers of supervision and control as are
^>cercised by the central executive over local authorities in
J ^-pan, as in Prussia, is justified solely on the theory that all
'^^>cal government is a devolution of State function and author-
^t'^r. The State has renounced certain powers, but subject to
^l>.e condition that it may still retain the power to satisfy itself
^l>at these powers are properly exercised by the authorities to
^^^liich they have been transferred. How rigid is the State in
^Vipervising the enforcement of its law can be seen from the
^^ict that in 1915 Mayor Okuda of Tokyo received a disciplinary
T>nnishment from the governor of the Tokyo prefecture for his
V^iefficient management of primary schools in the city. This
disciplinary punishment seems to be unreasonable when we
consider that the mayor in Japanese cities has no appointive
power over the teachers in public schools.' The State imposes
upon the local authorities the duty of discharging the state
/aws, such as those relating to the protection of the public
•(The Taiyo, 1917. November issue, p. 163) — Municipal System of Tokyo, J.
Taniya.
78 Democracy and Japanese Government
health, an efficient school system, the preservation of public
order, and the performance of other services which concern not
merely the local inhabitants but the people of the entire coun-
try.
The power of the local legislative body as such is mudh
restricted, and in consequence many local matters are directlj
r^^lated by the national government at Tokyo. The com-
munes, as a result, often suffer from the inevitable delays
incident to such a system, to say nothing of the inconvenience
which arises from their dependence upon the national legisla-
tion with the approval of the government. Not infrequently
the conununes are compelled to wait months or years for the
necessary authority to undertake a new project or to levy an
additional tax which has been made necessary by the action
of the Diet itself in imposing upon them the burden of estab-
lishing and maintaining a new service. If the government
would surrender its power of local legislation and transfer it tc
the local assemblies where it seems more properly to belong
it would relieve the Diet from the burden of legislating upon
local matters for which it has neither time nor knowledge. Al
the same time it would free the representatives from the con-
stant pressure to which they are subjected by their consti
tuencies.
While the mayors of the communes are chosen by the
municipal assembly, and while communes, like prefectures
have popularly elected assemblies, they are subject to stric
control by the central government at Tokyo or its representa
tives in the provinces. The mayor may be removed from offia
by decree of the Emperor with the advice of the Home Min
ister,* or he may be suspended from exercising his function!
by the governor.* In practice, however, these powers of re
moval and suspension are rarely if ever exercised.
Certain acts of the municipal assembly are also subject t<
superior authority. Those measures affecting the dispositioi
* Article CLXX (Municipal Law), issued April 6, 191 1. Law No. 68.
» Ibid.
> ii.j i i i L i J.J .-. P -
Municipal Government 79
of communal property, those relating to financial affairs, such
^ the budget, supplementary appropriations and loans, and
^cts for the establishment of fairs and markets, require the
approval of a representative of the central government, usually
^Hc prefect, but sometimes the council of the prefecture.*
^<aious other acts of the municipality such as alterations of
^^'^^mmunal boundaries require authorization by the prefectural
^cr^uncil.^ Any act of a municipal council may be annulled by
e prefect, if it is considered idtra vires, and so may any act in
e passage of which a member of the council has a personal
In case the mayor refuses or neglects to perform any duty
►rescribed by law, the prefect may, after requesting him to
jrform the act, proceed himself or by a special delegate to
^^^acecute the act.* If the duty required is one which devolves
'^.jpon the mayor as agent of the central government, the con-
erring of this power upon the prefect is entirely logical ; if, on
:he contrary, the duty is one which rests upon him in his
character as agent of the municipality, the exercise of this
)wer involves a distinct encroachment upon the freedom of
^^he municipality. In this case he may appeal directly to the
T^inister of Interior. •
As to suffrage, the municipal law divides the people of the
^ity (town and village) into two classes: those who can vote
-and those who can not. The former are called "citizens ;" ^®
the latter, ^'residents.'* " The "residents" of a city (town or
"village) include all those who have their residence in the city
(town or village) without distinction as to sex, age, color,
nationality, or condition in life. A "citizen," however, must be
an independent male person, that is, "one who has completed
Ms twenty-fifth year;" he must be "a subject of the Empire
• See Article CLXV-CLXVII.
' /Wrf. Article IV.
•/M. Article CUXIII.
• /M. Articles CLVIII and CLXIII.
»• Article IX.
"Article VIII.
8o Democracy and Japanese Government
and in the enjoyment of his civil rights ;" and for two years he
must have been a resident of the given local division, and must
have paid therein a "national direct tax" of two yen or more.
The citizen has the privilege of franchise in the local elections,
and of eligibility to the honorary offices."
One of the most peculiar features of suffrage qualification is
that a juridical person is allowed to vote in municipal elections
through its representative.
There are certain disqualifications, some permanent and
others temporary; the former include chiefly judicial convic-
tion for certain offences, and the latter, bankruptcy and refusal
to undertake honorary civil office when required.
Under this system, the voters of a city are divided into three
classes according to the amount of direct national taxes they
pay. The classification is made in the following manner : The
total sum of the taxes payable by them is ascertained, and this
is divided into thirds. The names of electors are arranged in a
list according to the taxes they pay, the highest tax-payer
being first on the list, '^he electors are then divided into three
groups. The first group contains the names of those whose
tax payments will make exactly one- third of the total taxation ;
the second contains the next following names whose tax pay-
ments will make a second third and the the third contains the
remaining names. Provisions exist to meet the case of persons
paying the same amount of taxes who may happen to fall into
different classes."
Each of these three groups elects one-third of the assembly-
men from among the eligible citizens, the candidates being
chosen irrespective of the classes.*^
" Article IX and X. The service in communal council and assembly is regarded
honorary as the service is not compensated.
1* An elector, the amount of whose taxes may fall into two classes, shall belong to
the higher class. Should there be two or more persons who pay the same amount of
taxes, and they come between two classes, the one of these, as the case may be. whose
residence in the city has been longest, shall be included in the higher class; when the
matter can not be decided by length of residence, it shall be decided by seniority of
age, and in case of impracticability of the latter, by lot drawn by the mayor. (Article
XV.)
»*ArUcle XVIII.
Municipal Government 8i
The effect of this three-class method of apportioning voting
powers is that in cities with a considerable number of wealthy
tax-payers, the well-to-do form the first and second classes,
while the third class represents the vast majority of the small
tax-payers."
Another effect of this sytem is that two citizens of the same
fortune will have entirely disproportionate political influence,
if they live, one in a rich city and one in a poor city. If a
prosperous citizen chooses to settle in a moderately wealthy
city, he may totally upset the composition of the classes there,
niay control one-third of the electorates, and may even obtain
Personal representation in the city assembly.
The skillful use of this curious system of electing members of
^^^ assembly enabled one or two large corporations in a Tokyo
district to secure a predominant influence in city politics. In
^ ^ II, in the district of Kojimachi-ku, the only voter in the first
clsiss was a juridical person who elected Mr. Kaneko.^®
In the same district when the municipal election was held in
^^i6 the number *of voters in the first class was only two juri-
d-ical persons ^^ who elected one member of the assembly ; the
ri^vimber in the second class was five, of which four were juridical
F^^rsons and one a citizen. The number of voters in the third
^lass was 1,919 persons who elected also one member to the
^^Jsembly. In this same district the population then numbered
^5,893."
In the municipal election of 191 7, in the city of Osaka, the
■^vimber of voters in a population of 1,557,989 was 31,744,^® of
** In 1919 Uie Kenseikai, with a view of remedying certain undemocratic features
^ the municipalities, proposed a bill eliminating qualification to pay the national
tax and giving a franchise to those who pay municipal taxes. However, the bill
entirely silent as to the three-class system. {The Osaka Mainchi), Editorial,
^ch 19, 1919.
^* "Baron K. Kaneko was elected a member of the city assembly of Tokyo as repre-
^^itative of the first-class tax-payers in Kojimachi Ku. Then the Nippon Yusen
f^^^Bha was the only first-class tax-payer in that district and it voted for him." Quoted
^ Clement's Handbook of Modern Japan, p. 139.
** These juristic persons were two corporations — namely. Steamship (Yusen) Co.
Kingyo (Bank), quoted in p. 3. Tokyo, Nichi.» March 14, 1919.
^* Kokumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 495 (Statistics based on report of 1917)*
^* Kokumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 519 (Statistics of 191 7) •
82 Democracy and Japanese Gaifernment
which 29,199 were voters of the third class; 2,287 were voters
in the second; 258 in the first.*" In the district of Kita-Ku, in
Osaka, fifteen assemblymen were to be elected under the three-
dass system. One-third of that number, namely five members,
were elected by five corporations, three of which had enjoyed
either a special franchise from or a contract with the city tc
carry on a public utility.** *TJnder such a condition," says the
Osaka Mainchi, "it is but natural that the corporations arc
anxious to elect their own candidates for their own selfisb
purpose, and as a result the canidates once elected think
more of the interest of the corporations than of the interests ol
the public." ^
An acute foreign observer declares ;
This system [the three-class system] must be responsible in great
part for the almost universal apathy of the electorate, the votinf
power being so unevenly divided that voters do not think it wOrtl
while to exercise their franchise. Especially is this the case with the
noveau riche middle class, composed of commercial and professiona
people, the great majority of whom are qualified to vote in th<
third class. Thus, in the election for the assembly held in Tok3r<
in 1905, there were 42,100 names on the voters* list, but only 7,91'
votes were actually polled. In the third class there were 37 ,00^
names and 5,816 votes, in the second 4465 names and 1,825 votes
and in the first 630 names and 274 votes; or to put these figures ii
percentages, in the third class, 15.7 per cent.; in the second, 39.,
per cent., and in the first 43.6 per cent., or taking the average of al
classes, 18.8 per cent, of the electorate vote.
Not only has it been impossible in the past to get more than j
modicum of the electorate to vote at an election for a city assembly
but the system upon which elections are conducted makes it almos
impossible to bring about any improvement in the ability of th
*<* The Osaka Mainchi, Editorial, p. i, March 19, 1919.
n/Wrf.
« Osaka Mainchi, July 9, 1919, p. 3.
The number of the voters of the three classes in Osaka is as follows:
South Districi Bast Distria North Disiri
First Class 64 43 5
Second Class 689 396 365
Third Class 9*904 7*50$ 1 6,965
Municipal Government 83
members of the assembly. The voting power is so unequal that,
even if the vast majority of the electorate, say 80 per cent., were to
be stirred up by a popular agitation in favor of honest government,
it would be still possible for two-thirds of the members of the
assembly to be elected by the remaining 20 per cent, of the voters,
who conceivably might not be affected by the popular movement.
In fact in Tokyo in 1905 one-third of the members of the assembly
were elected by a little more than one-half of the one per cent, of
the qualified voters."
To be eligible for membership in a municipal assembly a
person must be a qualified voter, that is, a person paying a
tax amounting to two yen or more a year and enjoy full civil
rights. However, many persons are disqualified by reason of
their positions. Thus officials and members of personnel by
^hich the prefectural government exercises control over the
^^mmunes, salaried officials of the city, prosecuting attorneys.
Police officials, tax-collectors, priests, school teachers of ele-
'^Cntary schools, those who contract with the city, and direc-
tors and managers of unlimited corporations doing business
^nder contract with the city are excluded. The same dis-
qualifications apply to father and son or to two brothers, who
'^ay not at the same time be members of an assembly, and, if
"Oth are elected, the older is admitted to membership.^*
So far as the property qualifications of the candidates for the
Assembly are concerned, they are more undemocratic than in
*he national government where the property qualifications of
^^^ndidates for the House have long ago disappeared.
The Japanese municipal code makes no provision for any
stem of primaries, caucuses, nomination papers, or, indeed,
any formal method of putting candidates in the field. As
France the absence of any nomination of candidates in
[vance of the actual polling is characteristic of Japsmese
.unicipal election. The candidates receive no official recogni-
s> Japanese Government Documents, W. W. McLaren. Transactions of the Asiatic
"^ocfrfy of Japan, pp. 97-99.
»< Article XVIII — If father and son or two brothers are elected from the same
^^i«trict, the person who received the highest number of votes is declared to be elected.
\
84 Democracy and Japanese Gauemment
tion as in America. So far as the election authorities are con-
cerned, they recognize no candidate for the municipal assem-
bly; they set before the voter at the polls no list of aspirants;
they restrict his entire freedom of choice in no way what-
ever.
In order to be elected, a candidate for admission to the
assembly must have secured a majority of the votes cast.
However, the number of ballots obtained must not be less than
one-seventh of that obtained by dividing the total number of
the electors in each class entered in the electoral list by the
fixed number of members to be returned from each class.
It is interesting to note that in the Japsmese municipal
elections electors in each class vote separately. Article XXI I of
municipal law provides that electors of third class shall vote
first ; electors in second class second ; electors in the first class
last.
The political psychology of the Japanese voters presents
more or less of a puzzle to the foreign student of politics. That
the Japanese who possesses considerable natural impulsiveness
should display calm in even hotly contested elections is a mat-
ter that seems to call for some comment. One who watches
a Japanese municipal campaign can not fail to get the impres-
sion that the local elections do not even ruffle the surface of
everyday life. The campaign is largely, if not entirely, con-
ducted by private canvasses, but not by speech-making as in
America. It is said that this general lack of interest shown by
the Titers is due partly to the comparative inefficiency of the
Idial party orgsmization, but largely to the fact that the voters
are less interested in politics under the present system of gov-
ernment.
The power of the Japsmese city assembly is very limited.
The general powers granted to the assembly are purely advis-
ory, the initiative resting with the higher authorities, and the
assembly having nothing but the privilege of tendering its
advice, which may or may not be accepted. The powers of the
assembly as enumerated in the municipal law are as follows:
Municipal Government 85
The determination of the city budget as well as the approval
of any outlay not included in the budget or of one exceeding
the estimate; the giving of publicity to the annual accounts
of receipts and expenditures; determining the modes of im-
posing and of collecting duties, fees, city taxes, and services in
person or in kind, so far as they are not determined by laws or
Imperial ordinances; alienation, purchase, exchange, or
mortgaging of the immovable property of the city; matters
relating to the disposition of the stock suid property, etc.,
selection of the municipal executive.^
Throughout Japan, the system of municipal administration
exhibits on a small scale the working of the political philosophy
of our national government. Like the national constitution,
Ae municipal law limits the direct authority of the electorate,
providing various checks on and safeguards against the popular
assembly. The functions and powers of the executive are
placed far beyond the control of the representatives of the
people. Just as the National House of Representatives and
"^e prefectural or Fu assemblies lack legislative independence,
^ the city assemblies are mere auxiliary bodies. Their juris-
*ction is restricted at every turn; first by the limitation of
"^eir deliberative powers, then by the institution of a per-
^an^nt mayor and council, and finally by the strict control of
^^ J^ational government.
^l>e doctrines of* "popular responsibility,'' which is more or
^ Idealized under the political constitutions of all democratic
courv tries where executive officers can be removed from office
y ^lie adverse vote of a representative assembly, or by the
^""^^ination of a brief specified term of office, or by impeach-
"?^«^X or recall, finds no place in the local government of Japan.
Th^ mayor and council, once chosen, are not only independent
*^Vie representatives of the people, namely the assembly, but
^^^ practically irremovable. Just as in relation to the national
^^gv^lature the ministers stand outside the representative body
^^ ^Vie people, the mayor and council, once chosen, are no longer
** Article LXVII
86 Democracy and Japanese Government
subject to the assembly. The mayor, like the Ministers of
State, has the right to attend all meetii^ of the assembly and
to speak or to be heard at any time upon any subject within his
jurisdiction.^ Again, like the national cabinet, which can
convoke a special session of the Diet, the municipal executive
can call the assembly at any time he deems necessary.
There is, however, one sphere in which, in the municipal
government as in the national, the popular assembly can exer-
cise to a certain extent its legitimate power over the executive.
This is in the sphere of finance. The assembly has the legal
power to refuse by majority vote to approve the budget of the
mayor, but it can not prevent the execution of any laws already
enacted by refusing to approve the necessary appropriations.
If these appropriations are not made by the assembly, the Fu
or prefectural governor can include the necessary amount of
such expenditures in the budget in order to carry out the laws
or Imperial ordinances already upon the statute books. More-
over, the government, when it r^;ards it as necessary, can
impose any amount of expenditure upon the city without the
consent of the assembly. Article CLXI 1 1 says : *When a city does
not include in its budget an expenditure imposed upon it by
law or ordinance, or one that has been ordered by duly con-
stituted authorities, or when it does not approve or actually
supply funds for an extraordinary expense, the Fu or prefec-
tural governor may, upon the statement of his reason for so
doing, embody the amount of such expenditure in the budget
or order payment of the same.''
The upshot of this provision is that under no conceivable
circumstance can the assembly withhold the funds necessary
to enable the city government to exercise its functions. When
the budget fails to pass the assembly a certain amount of
embarrassment may ensue, particularly if the city has some
project to undertake. Even so, the difficulties may not be so
great as might be expected, since every project can be carried
out if the approval of the higher authority is secured.
«• Article LI.
MM
Municipal Government 87
The other organ of municipal government is the council.
This body consists of a mayor and a number of members, some
of whom are paid and some unpaid. The number of unpaid
members of the council is fixed by municipal code.^^ The num-
ber of paid members is determined by the city ordinance sub-
ject to the approval of higher authority.^* In general the total
membership of the council is not very large. Tokyo, for
example, with an assembly of seventy-five members, has
e^hteen members of the council, including a mayor, three
deputy mayors and two professional administrators called
shi-san-yo. However, these shi-san-yo do not participate in
tile deliberations of the council except when questions relating
^o their respective jurisdictions arise. In the smaller cities most
^f the members of the council are honorary or unpaid members.
All members of the council are appointed for terms of four
i^'^ars. The choice of honorary members of the council is made
^*X)m within the assembly. In the case of paid members the
^^^^uncil may select any one who is qualified for the position,
^^owever the choice of all paid members of the council must be
^^<:^nfirmed by the higher authorities before it becomes valid.
The council like the German administrative board, the
^^agistrat, was an executive body, but under the revised law
^^f 191 1 it has lost its executive and administrative functions.
It: has become merely a deliberative and advisory body.^'
*The duties of the council are set forth partly in the municipal
Code, partly in the detailed ordinances, and partly in instruc-
tions from the higher authorities. Article LXVII of Shisei [mu-
nicipal law] confers the following powers : (i) To deliberate and
decide those questions which are entrusted by the assembly
to its legal sphere of jurisdiction; (2) to express its opinion on
the subjects to be presented to the assembly by the mayor;
*J The number of honorary members of the council is fixed at six except in the
cities with special privilege. In such cities the number may be increased up to 12.
See ArUcles LXV a&d LXVI.
«• ArUcle LXXIV.
** The main business of the council at present is the investigation and amplification
of resolutions passed by assembly.
MH
m
88 Democracy and Japanese Government
(3) to decide all questions which come within its jurisdiction.
The council also performs within certain limits judicial func-
tions such as the settling of claims against the city when the
amount does not exceed 1,000 yen.'®
Though technically the council is the creature of the assem-
bly by virtue of its appointment by that body, its action is
independent. The council can perform in some cases all the
functions of the assembly. Article XCI of the Municipal Law
says : 'Whenever the mayor has no time to convoke a meeting
of the assembly or when an attendance of members of the
assembly does not constitute one-half of its members, the
mayor can present to the council smy matter which is within
the legal sphere of jurisdiction of the assembly.*^
The meetings of the council, unlike those of the assembly,
are not open to the public, and they are held more frequently
than those of assembly. The mayor can call the council at
any time. Upon the demand of half of the honorary members
of the council he must do so. The attendance of the chairman
(mayor) or his representative and at least one-half of the
honorary members of the council is required for the validity
of meeting.*^
The most important personage in the municipal govern-
ment is the mayor; He is the chief magistrate of the city.
He governs the city and represents \t.^ His duties are twofold :
those to be performed as an agent of national government,
and those as the head of the community he represents. As to
the former, he is responsible for the due execution of all national
and prefectural laws and regulations and imperial oniinances
incumbent on a commune. As to the latter he has to carry
out the resolutions of the assembly and council.
As sxi agent of the national government the Japanese mayor,
like his French counterpart, has an enormous power. He is
entrusted with the enforcement of all national laws and
>« Tokyo Shi'Sei Gaiyo, p. 15 (1913 Edition).
» Article LII.
» Ibid, LXX.
» Article LXXX VII.
^
Municipal Government 89
iVastructions within the limits of the city without concurrence
ox:^ the part of the assembly or the council. He is also entrusted
^v^ith police power. Article II of Shiho-keisatsu (Police Law)
ssi^ys that the mayor is required, under the direction of the
F>x-osecuting attorney of the province, to search out criminals
^i^^ithin the commune. He is entrusted with the supervision
o:f the civil register.
The system of the civil register involves the preparation
a-»id maintenance of a register of all the births, marriages and
ci^^ths that take place within the commune. The mayor is
so entrusted with military duties, acting in this matter as
agent of the Minister of War at Tokyo. He prepares each
^ar the list of persons liable to military service.
Another duty of the Japanese mayor as an agent of the
ational government is his responsibility for carrying out the
ational as well as the local election laws. He is responsible
the proper supervision of all matters connected with the
reparation of the voters* lists to be used in the national,
refectural or Fu, and communal elections.**
As the head of the municipal administration, the mayor is
he apex of the municipal government just as the Emperor is
he apex of the national government. Article LXXXVII of the
unicipal Law mentions the following matters as falling within
he province of the executive : The preparation of subjects for
eliberation in the assembly and in the council and the execu-
ion of resolutions of the assembly and the council ; the adminis-
ration of the city revenue ; direction of receipts and payments
ed in the budget; the general supervision of the city prop-
rty; supervision over the city officials and disciplinary
uthority over them ; imposition and collection of fees and of
^taxes determined by law or by the assembly. In such capacities
the mayor makes an elaborate annual report to the local
authorities. He also makes practically all appointments of
city officers although sometimes his choice is subject to the
approval of the assembly or of a higher authority.
** See *l>aw of House" and also Shisei.
• •
90 Democracy and Japanese Government
As to the financial power, it is the duty of the Japanese ^
mayor to see that the revenues of the city are properly collected. ^
He makes an annual report to the assembly on the financial J
condition of the city. A copy of this report also goes to the -
higher authorities.
As the head of the commune, he is also entrusted, under a^
recent law, with the duty of looking after all highways within^
the municipality.
As chairman of the council the power of the mayor is enor —
mous. Just as the council may refuse to pass such resolutions^
of the assembly as it believes to be illegal or improper, so it i
the right and duty of the mayor to control the action of th
council. If any decision of the council appears to exceed
authority or is prejudicial to public good, he may, upon hi^
own judgment or under the instruction of the higher authori — ■
ties, suspend the execution of the regulation of the council.'^
If the suspension of execution of its decision is due to the rulin gs
of the prefectural or Fu council and the case involves existing^
laws or an Imperial ordinance, the council may appeal to th^
administrative court.^®
The power of the mayor is further enlarged by the fact that
he can act independently of the council in case of emergency.
*When any question," reads the provision, "which belongs to
the competency of the council requires immediate settlement,
so that there is no time for convoking a meeting of the council,
the mayor may decide it upon his own judgment and make a
report thereon at the next sitting of the council.*^
So important is the office of the Japanese mayor that appoint-
ment to such a position requires confirmation by the crown.
Article LXXIII of the Municipal Law reads: "The mayor shall
be appointed for four years. The Home Minister shall cause
the assembly to make a list of names of three candidates, which
he shall present to the crown, and ask the crown's pleasure in
** Ibid, The mayor is given similar power as to the assembly by Article XC.
*• Ibid,
»" Article XCI.
Municipal Government 91
ri^[ard to the selection of one of them." If he is unable to
obtain the Imperial approval of any of them he shall cause
tie assembly to make another proposal of candidates. If he
is still unable to obtain the Imperial approval he shall, until
the city assembly presents proper candidates, either appoint a
deputy pro tempore or despatch a government official to dis-
charge the mayor's duties at the expense of the city.^® The
real power of this provision is in the hands of the Home Minis-
ter. The approval of the Emperor is merely nominal.
The municipal government of Japan, patterned as it is
largely from the Prussism system, has been to a considerable
extent a failure. This failure can be attributed mainly to too
Clinch partisan politics in municipalities.
Examination elsewhere showed the fact that the members
^f the assembly elected under the undemocratic three-class
^i^stem have the power of recommending the candidates for
.ayor. And this recommendation of candidates, according to ■■- ■ '
[r. Ozaki, means practically appointment,^® for thus far the
-mperor has never refused to appoint the one who has re- ^ : /;^ ,.. Ta*
^^^ived the highest number of votes among the three candidates ^ ^y . t v . ^ ., ,
^^^commended by the assembly.*® This mesms that assembly-
"^^en have a large influence in the selection of a mayor. They
^ill recommend and select only such a person as is likely to
pursue their policy.
If the popularly elected members did not play politics
among themselves, this power conferred upon the assembly
might be beneficial instead of harmful, because it would act
as a check upon the probable abuse of power by the executive.
Although the mayor has supervisory power over the entire
municipal administration for which he is responsible, it is said
that he has not much independent power in practice either to
appoint or to dismiss even minor municipal official without
consulting the assembly.*^ This practice compels a mayor to
»• Article CLXI V.
■• Mr. Ozaki, conversation with the writer in New York, 1919.
« Ibid.
" Nippon Oyobi Nippon Jin, No. 748, January, 1919.
Mk
92 Democracy and Japanese Government
r
carry on his administration less effectively and efficiently.
There has been a tendency during recent years for subordinate
officers to respect the members of the assembly rather than the
mayor himself, since they are in no danger of losing their places
when they are in harmony with the assemblymen. Conse-
^ quently the honor of being mayor is less attractive to the able
t men of Japan than it is to the able men of such countries as
England, America, and Germany.
It is reputed that when Mr. Okuda was elected mayor of
Tokyo, he made a personal visit to each member of the assem-
bly in order to ingratiate himself.*^ This clearly indicates the
difficulties confronting any Japanese mayor in carrying on a
successful administration. At present the municipal govern-
ment of Tokyo is in the hands of a few politicians who control
the parties. In 1919 the members of the assembly belonged
to the following political parties: twenty-seven to Shiyu-kai;
fifteen to Chuusei-kurabu ; twenty-six to Kowa-kai ; seven to
Mushozoku.^
There exists in practically -every large city in Japan a
miniature Tammany Hall. Dr. Washio, describing the Tam-
many of Tokyo, says: "The assembly is at present a den of
thieves controlled by the capitalists of the city, and the council
elected by the assembly from among its own members is the
nerve center of corruption and the most trying body for the
mayor to deal with. They have long had the reputation of
being the most subtle, crooked, and unscrupulous politicians.
If the mayor happens to be a man of doubtful character, any
sort of scandalous plan can be concocted by this body. And
if he happens to be a clean man, he is sure to be subjected to
all sorts of abuse and criticism.*^
To appreciate further the magnitude of city politics and to
show the real conditions of our municipal administration, let
us illustrate as an example municipal politics in the city of
Tokyo.
** Nippon Oyobi Nippon Jin, No. 748, January, 1919, p. 68.
** Kokumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 491.
<^ Tammany of Tokyo, by Dr. Washio. Japan Advertiser, April 10, 191 8.
Municipal Government \ 93
Prior to the appointment of Mr. Tajiri on April 5, 1918, the
mayoralty office in Tokyo was vacant for eight months despite
the fact that the authorities were earnestly seeking for a proper
candidate. During this long period the city was without a
mayor, and the municipal administration was carried on by
the council. After eight months the city of Tokyo finally
found a mayor in the person of Viscount Tajiri who was elected
by the support of two factions of the assembly with a majority
of sev^n votes over Mr. Abe. Viscount Tajiri was an able man
with a bureaucratic career and a rigorous temper. The first
objection to his qualification for the mayoralty office was that
he was not flexible enough to work with the members of the
council, with whom he had naturally to participate in the
executive work. In other words, he was not acceptable to the
interests of the council.^
*We wonder," says the Yorodzu, *if the municipal officials
consider municipal administration a sort of gambling and the
mimicipal assembly a market. They do not face municipal
administration with conviction and principles; during the
proceedings of the municipal assembly they may be only
calculating their own interests."^
Commenting upon the difficult problem of selecting may-
oralty candidates in the city of Tokyo,. Dr. Washio remarks :
The mayor is sought preferably from men with ministerial
dignity. The assembly itself being a body of unscrupulous poli-
ticians of rather low type, its members have enough sense to know
that there can never be found among themselves a man of sufficient
dignity to be acceptable to the public as the mayor of this city
[Tokyo]. And yet they want to control him in all practical questions
of the city administration. This is an unusual situation. It can be
remedied only by substitution of the system of direct election for the
present system of indirect election which even iron-headed Bismarck
condemned as an agency through which the dominant class revamps
the popular will to suit its own interests.*^
• Yorodzu, June 4, 1919, p. i.
*'' Dr. Washio, Tammany of Tokyo, Japan Advertiser, April 10, 1918.
94 Democracy and Japanese Government
The restriction of suffrage makes it impossible for the
people to control their own affairs. In limiting the right to
vote on municipal problems, the lawmakers evidently pro-
ceeded, as in the case of the national government, upon the
theory that the policy of a city with reference to the public
utilities or what not should be controlled by its tax-payers.
The justification for this provision is not apparent in the
case of a city inasmuch as the burden of supporting the public
service industries of a city is not borne by the tax-payers as
such, but by the people generally. Such a system makes it
possible for the tax-paying class to control public utilities in
their own interest and to the disadvantage of the general public.
The resignation of Mayor Sakatani in 191 7 as a result of his
failure to effect a compromise with the council over the ques-
tion of municipal ownership of electric companies in order to
prevent unjust competition gives a side-light on the under-
current of politics in the city.
The evils in administration are more easily traced in the
city where we find a numerically small but very wealthy class
and a large class owning little or no property. There the
general political movement toward democracy has encountered
the most obstinate resistance. At present only a small part of
the population own land or capital enough to be allowed to
participate in the municipal elections. The overwhelming
majority of those who live in cities are employees and tenants.
In the year 191 3, the total franchise-holders under the tax-
paying qualification of national direct tax of two yen a year
were only 297,956 ** out of a total population of 8,999,264 *•
in all the cities of Japan having a population over 30,000.
In 191 7, the entire population of Tokyo was 2,349,830,*®
out of which only about 59,471 *^ persons were property
owners paying a direct national tax of two yen a year.
^^ Nippon Teikoku, No. 36, Tokei Nen Kwan (Japan Statistics No. 36;, Year 1918.
p. 89 (Section Ryakusetsu).
«»/W(/, p. 27.
*^ Kokumin Nen Kwan, 1919, p. 496.
"Statistics of year 191 1 — Year Book of Tokyo Municipal Government (Tokyo
Shisei Caiyo) Issued by Tokyo City Government, 1913, p. 18.
Municipal Government 95
This property-owning minority class in the cities must be
taken into account in any attempt to find an explanation of
the reluctance on the part of the property-owning class to
recognize the necessity of civic improvement in the way of
hospitals, transportation lines, etc., since any improvement
means additional taxation imposed on the property owners.
Inequalities in the assessment of property for taxation are
permitted to exist in favor of landlords.
Let us examine this point with more detail.
The total area of land in the city of Tokyo in 1918 was
23,468,000 tstibOj out of which 8,654,000 tsubo belonged to the
National government; 1,245,000 to the city, and 13,567,000
to private persons.^^ In the same year, the total number of
Pej-sons who participated in the ownership of these lands was
23,476.^3 The legal valuation of those private lands was
estiimated at 94,719,324^ yen, that is, about 7.60 yen per
tST4.io. However, at present in no part of the city can land be
fc^vind which can be bought at 7.60 yen per tsubo. The actual
valuation of land at present in Tokyo is about eight times
Higher than the legal valuation which is made by the com-
ttvittees appointed from among the property-owners together
^ith some government officials.
According to Professor Abe, the total land tax in the city of
Tokyo in 1918 was 226,310.68 yen.^^ Therefore, if the assess-
ment were to be made on the real valuation of the land, the
revenue from the land would be eight times 226,310.68 yen
or 1,810,485.44 yen — ^an increase of 1,600,000 yen which will
be ample enough to better the present miserable municipal
conditions.
A more undemocratic feature in connection with real estate
in the city of Tokyo is that there is a large area of land which
enjoys a special lower rate of taxation. This land is classified
•* Ibid, p. 497.
M Ibid, p. 497.
" Professor Abe, Finance and improvement in the Greater Tokyo, The Chugai
Shinron, May issue, p. 34.
K Ibid, p. 34. This amount of tax does not include national and prefectural taxes.
96 Democracy and Japanese Government
as "rice field,'* "forest land," "farms" and "swampy land/' The
total area which enjoys this special taxation is 834,261 tsribo.
The legal valuation of these different lands per tsubo is: rice
fields, 14 sen;" farm land, 5 sen; forest land, i sen; field,
.56 sen; swampy land, .22 sen.*^
Another illustration of the unsatisfactions of a government
in which property-owners are dominant is an astonishing lack
of transportation facilities in Tokyo as well as in other cities.
The Mancho gives the following statistics as to the number
of street cars in the city of Tokyo during the last three years :
XQi^ iqj8 jqiq
Average number of cars running a day . it004 996 944
Number of passengers (average a day) . . 860,000 930,000 1,170,000*
The above figures show that the transportation system
which is at present under municipal ownership is left unim-
proved.
Before leaving this subject, a word or two must be said of
town and village governments. The form of government in
towns and villages is similar to that in cities except that the
council is absent in town [and village]. The chief differences
between city and town governments are in the matter of the
suffrage, and in respect to their legal relations with the central
government. In the city the voters are divided into three
classes; in the town they are divided into two. While the city
is independent financially and politically and constitutes an
independent urban county, the town and the village form
parts of the districts in which they are situated. In other
words, in the city, state supervision comes either from the
prefect or from the Home Minister, but in the town and in the
village it comes from a district authority.
In both city and town government, however, the main
spring of all local actions comes from the Home Minister who
is the original source of power. Administration is completely
M Ibid, p. 34.
*' Ihid, p. 34.
*' The Mancho, February s, 1920.
VITA
The writer of this dissertation was bom January 7, 1889, at
Tochiuda, Sodesaki-mura, Kitamurayama-gun, Yamagata-ken,
Japan. He received the degree of A.B. from the University of
Washington, Seattle, Washington, in 191 7, and the degree of
A.M. from Columbia University in 191 8. He was in residence
at Columbia University during the years 191 7-1920, taking
courses under Professors H. L. McBain, T. F. Powell, E. M.
Sait, E. R. A. Seligman, W. A. Dunning and F. H. Giddings.
During the same years he also attended the lectures of Dr.
Charles A. Beard at the Bureau of Municipal Research.
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