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ELEMENTS OF INTERPRETATION

TRANSLATEj^^ROJJ THE. LATMC OF

J, A. E^^ESTI
//

ACCOMPANIED BY NOTES ;

WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM MORUS
BECK AND KEIL

By MOSES STUART
Associate Prof, of Sac. Lit, in the TheoL Seminary at Andovev

ANDOVER :

FLAGG AND GOULD, PRINTERS,

1822.

PREFACE.

1 HE publication of the following work, in its present form,
originated from the want of a text-book, in our country, on the
science of interpretation. But few copies of Ernesti's Institutio
Interpretis have yet been imported ; and the Library of the The-
ological Seminary, with which the Translator is connected, con-
tains by far too few for classic use among the students.

The importance of regular scientific instruction in the Princi-
ples of Interpretation, has been long acknowledged, by the best
Biblical and classical scholars of Europe. A multitude of books
within a few years have been published, with a view to present
a regular digest of the principles and rules of Hermeneutics. Of
these, some are much too copious to admit of publication in our
country. Others are mere text books of particular lecturers,
and formed upon a plan not adapted to our circumstances. The
work of Ernesti, now re-published, has been through several edi-
tions in Europe, and has been more extensively used as a class-
book, than any publication of this nature.

It may be asked, why it is not now republished in the original
form. My reasons for making an English translation are, (1)
That the original Latin, though sufficiently pure in respect to the
choice of words, is arranged very much according to the idiom
of the German language, the vernacular tongue of Ernesti. It is
therefore difficult to be understood by any young man, who has
read Latin only in the Roman Classics. (2) Repeated trials, by
using the work as printed in Latin for a class book, have satisfied
me that comparatively little profit is gained in reading it, by most
who are entering upon their theological studies. For the work is
not only difficult, but from its brevity and technical form, it soon
becomes dry and uninteresting to a beginner. (3) I wished to add
some explanations for the sake of perspicuity, and if possible,
of creating additional interest in the study of interpretation. (4)
An edition in Latin, with the mere text, would hardly meet with
sale enough to defray the necessary expenses of publication.

The edition, from which I have made the translation, is that
published at Leipsic, in A. D. 1809, and edited by Dr. Aramon,
who has interspersed many notes of his own. Of these I have
made but little use. My reason for this is, that I did not regard
them as being of much value. Besides, they not unfrequently
partake of the extravagancies of the author ; who, in his Preface,
among various improvements recounted by him as introduced
since the time of Ernesti, mentions one, which may serve as a spe-
cimen of many others ; viz. that when Jesus is said by the Evan-

IV PREFACE.

gelist to have walked upon the sea^ the interpreter can new give
the real uieaning;, which is, that he wAded as far as the shoal ua-
ter would permit^ and after that began to swim.

I do not deny that Dr. Ammon is learned ; but that sobriety
and discretion, which are the first characteristics of a good inter-
preter. I am unable to find in him ; at least to such a degree as
to make his opinions worthy of special consideration.

Besides ; ! have found a much better commentator on Ernesti,
from whose labours I have reaped great advantage. I refer to
Morus ; whose Hermeneuiica is a system of Lectures on Inter-
pretation, of which Ernesti's Institutioia the basis or text-book.
This work of Morus I prize so highly, that ( have, at the close
of almost every Section of Ernesti, referred to the corresponding
part, in his Commentator. The notes which I have added to the
work, contain, for the most part, a summary of what Morus has
said. For the fidelity of this summary, and for the matter of
some of the notes, specially of the longer ones, I am responsible.
The notes are distinguished from the text, by being printed in
smaller type. Any more distinction was thought unneceissary.

Morus is an author too copious for republication in our coun-
try, but may easily be imported. The Student cannot fail to
read him with great profit. The Latin is uncommonly easy ; and,
if I may judge by ray own feelings, very pure and classical. 1
would earnestly recommend it to every student, to compare Mo-
rus with Ernesti, in all the places where reference in the follow-
ing work is made to him.

The works of Keil, Beck, and Seller, to which reference is
made at the head of most of the chapters, are very useful Manu-
als of the Science of Interpretation, and can be procured at a
very moderate expense. In point of arrangement, and in the ex-
clusion of matter which does not belong to the proper province
of Hermeneutics, they have some advantages over Ernesti. I
believe, however, that Ernesti has exhibited the essential part of
the science in question, more fundamentally, and in a more con-
vincing and instructive way, than either of these authors. Still,
as they are more recent, and have been much used by those who
study interpretation, I thought it might be acceptable to refer to
them.

Other books are occasionally referred to, but not often, with
the exception of Morus. It would have been easy to add a mul-
titude of references to books, on every subject, and every ramifi-
cation of subjects, throughout the work. But I am not persuad-
ed of the utility of this method, with beginners. The mind is
overwhelmed with the endless task, which the reading of so ma-
ny writers would occasion. There may be a shew of learning
in a writer, who makes his references so copious; but the real
profit to the student is comparatively small. A few oi the best
books are of more importance than the undistinguished mass,

which presents a mere catalogue of what has been published.
Beck is not free from this fault; and even Keil has not made his
*' select literature" sufficiently select.

My reasons for omitting some parts of the original work of Er-
nesti, are stated at the end of the Introduction, It is sufficient
here merely to say, that as Ernesti's work was one of the first
respectable efforts, to reduce the principles of interpretation to
a science, it is not a matter of any surprise, that he has included
in it much more than appropriately belongs to this subject. Sub-
sequent writers hare marked out the limits of the science, with
more accuracy. I have omitted what is now commonly omitted,
in works of this nature.

There are some topics, belonging to Hermeneutics, on which
the work of Ernesti has not touched. I have omitted them in
this work, because it is not my object to appear as an original
writer here, on these subjects. It is proper however to say, that
the topics omitted are much less the subject of precept or rule,
than those inserted ; and that the principles of several of them
are very far from being settled, to the satisfaction of critics.
What is most useful will be found in Ernesti. The rest experi-
ence will supply ; or the iustructer, who uses Ernesti, and con-
sults the books referred to, will be able to give the student some
adequate views of them. As my duty leads me to read lectures
in this department of science, to those whom I am called to ia-"^
struct, it will be my aim, so far as I am able, to supply deficien-
cies of this nature ; in order that no topic may be neglected,
which may be useful to those, who are beginning the study of
interpretation.

To PART III. of this work, which treats of translating from one
language into another, I have added the greater part (#f an excel-
lent Dissertation of Morus, which comprises liiis topic. In or-
der to do this, I have omitted a part of the chapter in Ernesti,
pertaining to this subject; as I thought it far less useful, than
what is inserted from iMorus.

Part iv. contains a summary of the laws of criticism, which
are to regulate the judgment of those, who form opinions about
the genuine text of the Scriptures. Exceptions might be made
to some of these laws ; but I have not thought them of sufficient
importance to be urged here, where every thing is designed to
be a mere summary of general Maxims. Beck has given a more
brief view of the subject of criticism, than I have been able else-
where to find ; and the Biblical student should not be altogether
ignorant of it, as cases of controversy may arise about the text,
where ignorance of this nature would subject him to serious dis-
advantages.

Fart v. consists of a chapter from Keil, on the Qaalificalions
of an Interpreter. It is so much more brief and comprehensive
than the corresponding chapter in Ernesti, that I could not hesi-

VI

PREFACE.

tate to prefer it. A list of some of the best books, on the topics
to which the chapter adverts, will be found at the close of the re-
spective Sections.

In regard to the manner of the following Translation, it may-
be proper to state here, that my first attempt was to make a close
version of Ernesti, and publish it in this simple form. I proceed-
ed through the work of translating, with this design in view.
When 1 began to review my labour, I found that there was so
much of Latinism in it ; the sentences were so long and involv-
ed ; the connecting particles and words of this nature so few and in-
definite ; and the form in general so technical and uninviting, that
I abandoned the design of publishing it in this way ; renewed
my work of translating ; broke up sentences, or sections as be-
came necessary for the sake of perspicuity ; supplied connect-
ing words where they seemed to be wanting; added parts of sen-
tences for the sake of explanation, and in a few cases, whole sen-
tences and even paragraphs have been added for the sake of ex-
planation or connexion. I have not wittingly changed or per-
verted the sentiment^ in any case ; but 1 have taken the liberties
of a free translator, who is more concerned to make his book
perspicuous and useful, than to represent the exact style and man-
ner of his Original.

Instead of the subdivision of Sections under each chapter in Er-
nesti, they are here numbered continuously through the work ;
which is by far the most convenient method. The titles of the
parts and chapters have also received some alteration.

After all, such is the excessive difficulty of putting English
costume upon Ernesti, that I cannot flatter myself that the book
does not still contain many Latinisms, which may be unpleasant
to a reader, who is not acquainted with the original. Q^uod pot^
ui^fecL Without absolutely abandoning the idea of being a trans-
lator, and making a new book, I could not in general well do
more than I have done.

At the commencement of each Section of the text, I have pTa-
ced a very brief notice of the Contents ; which, for convenience
to the reader, in order to find easily any subject after which he is
seeking, has been printed in Italics. These summaries belong
not to the original work ; I am respnosible for them.

If the Manual shall prove to be intelligible and useful, my wish-
es and highest expectations will be gratified. It is possible, if this
endeavour to promote a knowledge of the science of Interpretation
should meet with approbation, it may excite an efibrt on my part,
at some future period, to give the whole work a new form, more
specially adapted to the circumstances of this country. At pres-
ent, official duties are too numerous and urgent, to admit of such
an effort.

M. STUART.

Andover, Theol^ Seminary^ Jan. 22. 1822.

CONTENTS.

Page.
Introduction . . • . . . 1

Part I. general principles of language.
Chap. I. Of the meaning of words . . 7
Chap. II. Of the kinds of words, and their vari-
ous use 21

Part II. rules of interpretation.
Chap. I. Introductory Remarks ... 32
Chap. II. On finding the usus loquendi in the dead

languages ...... 34

Chap. 111. Subsidiary means of finding the usus

loquendi . . . . . . 45

Chap. IV. On finding the usus loquendi of the

New Testament 56

Chap. V. Rules in respect to tropical language 71
Chap. VI Rules respecting emphasis . 93

Chap. VII. On reconciling apparent discrepancies 89

Part III. on translating.
Maxims to be observed by a translator . 91

appendix.

Morus^ on the general principles of translating 100

Beck^ on the general principles of criticism 111

Keil^ on the qualifications of an interpreter 119

INTRODUCTION.

OF INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL.

{With this introductory chapter, may be compared Keil, Herm-
eneutica, pp. 1 — 14. Beck, Monogramm. Herm. pp. 1 — 22.
Seller, Hermeneutik, H 9 — Jl.]

§ 1. JVecessity and utility (if it. The interpretation of
the sacred books is the highest and most difficult task
of the theologian. This may be shown from the na-
ture of the case, from experience, and also from the
consent of all enlightened periods. All solid knowl-
edge and judicious defence of divine truth, must origi-
nate from a right understanding and accurate interpre-
tation of the Scriptures. The purity of the Christian
religion has shone brighter or been obscured, in pro-
portion as the study of sacred interpretation has flour-
ished or decayed.

Finally, those have always been reckoned as the
most distinguished theologians, who have excelled in
this kind of learning. (Compare Morus, Hermeneuti-
ca, p. 3. I.)

As Christian doctrine is preserved only in written records, the
interpretation of these is absolutely essential to a knowledge of
it ; and unless we know what Christianity is, we can neither
maintain its purity nor defend its principles, to the best advan-
tage.

§ 2. Difficulties attending interpretation. The science
of interpretation in general is difficult ; because it re-
quires much learning, judgment, and diligence. Not
unfrequently, a felicity of talent, or a more than usual
degree of understanding, is requisite to manage an exe-
getical inquiry with success. But the interpretation of
1

^ INTRODUCTION.

the sacred books is, from various causes, (a) still more
difficult; as the general consent of the learned, and the
wonderful paucity (6) of good interpreters fully evince.
(Morus, p. 4. II.)

a) These causes are, their antiquity ; the peculiar dia-
led of the Scriptures, which greatly differs from that of the
western laneuages ; the manners, customs, education, style,
modes of thinking and expression, situation, government, cli-
mate, &c, of the authors, in many respects so very dissimilar to
ours ; the fewness of the hooks written in the Scriptural dialect ;
and the want of commentators and lexicographers to whom
the language was vernacular. To these causes may he addt d,
the authority and influence which many erroneous commentaries
of distincuished men have had, over the Christian world.

6) 1 he paucity of siood interpreters, who, unbiassed by par-
ty sentiments, have pursued the interpretation of the Scrip-
tures in A Pimple philological mi^nner, and been consistent through-
out in the application of principles i)urely exfgetical, is much
greater than anj one will be disposed to believe, until experi-
ence, acquired by consulting Commentaries, shall have convinced
him.

§ 3. Definitions. The art of interpretation is the
art of teaching what is the meaning of another's lan-
guage ; or that faculty, which enables us to attach to
another's language, the same meaning as the author
himself attached to it. (Morus, p. 6. 111.)

It is better to define interpretation as an act than as an art.
To interpret a passage is to shew or declare the sense of it, or
•imply to explain tHe meaning, 1. e. the meaning which the
author himself of the passage attached to it. Any other mean-
ing than this, can never be called, with propriety, the meaning
of the author.

Interpretation, strictly speaking, may be called grammatical,
when the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, is made out
from the usus loquendi and context ; historical, when the mean-
ing is illustrated and confirmed by historical arguments, which
serve to evince that no other sense can be put upon the passage,
whether you regard the nature of the subject, or the genius and
manner of the writer.

§ 4. Requisites of a good interpreter. The act of in-
terpretation implies two things ; viz., a right percep-
tion of the meaning of words, and a proper explanation

INTRODUCTION. 3

of that meaning, (a) Hence a good interpreter must
possess a sound understandings and be skilful in explana-
tion, (Morns, p. 8. IV.)

a) The words of Ernesti are, Subiilitas intelligendi ft explican-
di ; a phrase which would convey a meaning quite foreie;n to his
intention, if literally translated into F.n^lish, or, at niost, convey
his idea very imperfectly. His meaning is, that the interpre-
ter, who eX' rcises a sound under^anding, or possesses subiilitas
initUigendi^ must demand satisfactory reasons for believing in any
parliciilar exegesis, and build his opinion, in respect to the
meaning: of any passage, on such reasons. These reasons are
founded on the usus loquendi, the context, the nature of the sub-
ject, the design of the writer, &c. An interpretation supported
by none of these, cannot be admitted by a sound understanding.

The subiilitas explicandi, which I have referred to skill in tX'
planalion^ consists generally in the accuracy of explanation. To
constitute such accuracy, in its proper sense, a right use must be
made of all the means of interpretation, so as to gain precise
and definite views of the author's meaning ; then, every thing
should be so defined and expressed, as to exclude all ambiguity
and uncertainty; and lastly, the vvh<»le should be exhibited in
the proper order, which the nature of language and of reasoning
demands.

§ 5. Suhtilitas intelligendi. A sound understanding is
exhibited in two ways ; first^ in discerning whether we
really understand a passage or not, and, in case we do
not, in discovering the difficulties that lie in the way of
rightly understanding it, and the grounds of those diffi-
culties ; secondly^ in finding out, by a proper method of
investigation, the sense of those passages which are
difficult. (Morus, p. 10. V.)

§ 6. Means by which difficulties and their causes are
detected, A good degree of talent or capacity is requi-
site for this ; for men of small capacity frequently as-
sent to things which seem to be taught, without any
good reasons for so doing ; and often believe themselves
to understand, what they do not understand. To a good
degree of talent, must be joined a careful habit of dis-
tinguishing ideas of things from mere words or sounds ;
(a) for we ought always to inquire, in respect to any
word, whether we have a distinct perception of the

4 INTRODUCTlOJr.

thing or idea, which it is meant to designate, and not t#
regard merely the sound of the word. (Morns, p. 10.
VI.)

o) Specially should this be done, where language is employed
to designate any thing, that is not the object of our senses, but is
of an intellectual or metaphysical nature. Habit as well as care
will do much in these cases. Translating from one language in-
to another, is an excellent exercise to form a habit of nice dis*
tinctioQ ; for when we come to express the ideas of an author in
another language, we often find that we had only an indefinite
perception ol them. The employment of teachiug, also, is well
adapted to promote the same purpose; as is the study of logic^
or any science which leads to nice discrimination.

§ 7. Aleans of removing these difficulties. The first
means is, a just and accurate knowledge of languages,
(a) The next^ an acquaintance with the principles of
interpretation. Not that no one can interpret, at all,
without a scientific knowledge of these principles ; but
because they assist men of moderate talents, and guide
them, as it were, in the right way, so that they are not
left to depend on chance rather than reason. Besides,
they are, in this way, supplied with a common rule for
judging, in controverted cases. (6) Finally^ as in detect-
ing difficulties, exercise and habit are important; so
here, they are of so much consequence, that all other
advantasres will be of little use without them. (Morus,
p. 12—19. VII. Nos. I. II. HI.)

a) An accurate knowledge of grammatical principles and of the
tisus loquendi is here intended ; for what authority can an inter-
pretation have, which violates rules of grammar and the usages
of speech ?

b) Precepts for interpretation, well grounded, clearly under-
stood, and judiciously applied, very much facilitate the task of
the interpreter, and render the result of his labours more worthy
of confidence. He who acts by well established rules is more
certain that he acts right, than if he fo!iov/ed his own opinion
merely, in nil cases of difficulty and doubt. And in controversies
of an exegetical or doctrinal nature, to what can the appeal be
made, in the ultimate resort, but to the principles of interpreta-
tion, i. e. the precepts or rules which it prescribes ? Nor are
these principles useful only to men of moderate talents, (as Er-
nest! would seem to iDtimate,) but to men of the highest talents

INTRODUCTION.

and best acquisitions. Men may, indeed, learn them by usage
in the interpretation of authors, without the scientific study of
them ; but the latter is the easier method, and guards most effec-
tually against mistakes.

In addition to these helps for removing difficulties, a knowledge
of history, geography, chronoiogy, antiquities, iic, is of high im-
portance.

§ 8. Exercises and habits adapted to overcome the dijffi'
culties of interpretation. First, we should attend the in-
structions of a g"ood interpreter; next, we should read
those works where exegetical knowledge is displayed in
the best manner, and reflect much upon them, for in
this way we may be led to the imitation of them ; and
lastly, those books, which we desire to interpret, must
be assiduously and constantly perused. (Morus, p. 19,

In the two first exercises, example serves both to excite and to
guide our efforts. The habit of readif g, oftt n and assiduously,
the book which we desire to interpret, is of more importance
than any, or perhaps than all, other means within our power. Ev-
ery new perusal will suggest to an intelligent and inquisitive mind
many ideas, frequently very important ones, which he had not
before entertained. This practice cannot, therefore, be too
strongly recommended to the student.

§ 9. Subtilitas explicandi^ i. e. skill in explanation. This
is exhibited, by expressing the sense of an author, ei-
ther in words of the same language which are more
perspicuous than his, or by translating into another lan-
guage, and explaining by argument and illustration, (a)
In addition to an accurate knowledge of the language
which we translate, skill in explaining requires that we
should exhibit purity of diction ; still preserving, so far
as may be, the features of the original, lest the mode
of reasoning should be obscured, which sometimes de-
pends on the /or w of the words. (Morus, p. 20. VIII.)

d) VVe explain by arsnment^ when we exhibit reasons dfawn
from the grammar and idiom of the lans:uage, the contest, and
the design of the writer. We illustrate^ when we cast Jig'ht upon
the meaning of an aurhor, which is borrowed from history, chro-
nology, antiquities, kc. Purity and brevity of style should char-
acterize both these modes of explanation.
1*

J6f introdi.ctio:n'.

§10. Definition of Hermeneutics. {a) Hermeneiitics is
the science which teaches to find, in an accurate and ju-
dicious manner, the meaning of an author, and appro-
priately to explain it to others. (Morus, p. 21. IX.)

(a) Modern usage distinguishes between Hermeneutics and
Exegesis. Hermeneutics is the theory or scievce of interpre-
tation ; it comprises and exhibits the principles and rules of
this art. Exegesis is the practical application of these rules ;
the act of carrying them into execution. The etymology of the
two words would lead to the conclusion, that both are of the
same meaning ; but usage has assigned a different signification
to them.

§ 11. Division of Hermeneutics. Hermeneutics, con-
sidered as the art of finding the sense of words, (so far
as it is an art, and is the proper subject of precepts,)
consists of two parts, viz. the theoretical and preceptive.
(a) The first comprises general principles^ in respect
to the meaning of words and the various kinds of them.
On these principles, the rules of interpretation and the
reasons of them are grounded. The second consists of
rules, which are to guide us, in investigating the sense
of an author's words. Both of these parts are essential;
for on the one hand, principles^ without any rules de-
duced from them, would be inadequate to guide our
philological inquiries ; and on the other, rules can nei-
ther be perspicuous, nor well grounded, which are not
established upon principles. (Morus, p. 22. X.)

(a) Exegesis differs from the preceptive part of Hermeneutics,
inasmuch as it is the act of carrying the precepts into execution,
and not the precepts themselves.

§ 12. Division of the work. It may be divided into
three parts ; the first contains the principles and pre-
cepts of Hermeneutics ; the second has respect to the
making of translations and commentaries ; and the third
treats of the various kinds of hermeneutical Apparatus,
and of its proper use, in the interpretation of the New
Testament.

Of these three parts, the fi'-st is translated fhrouffhout, and so
much of the second as seemfd to be particularly useful. The
third part is essentially comprised in the first, so far as it prop-

OF THE MEANING OF WORDS. V

criy belops^s to the province of Flermeneutics ; and therefore may
well be dispensed with, in an elementary treatise like this. So
far as the third part contains any thing not substantially com-
prised in the first, it properly belongs to the province of sacred
literature, and specially to literary history, or Introductions, (as
they are called) which are designed to give the student a sjptdal
view of the various authors, books, versions, &;c, of the Scrip-
tures.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.
fCompare with this chapter, Keil, H 5 — 8. Seller, k) 41 — 46.]

OF THE MEANING OF W^ORDS.

§ 13. Design of this chapter. The design of the fol-
lowing' remarks upon the meaning of words, is to ex-
hibit the ground or principles, whence all certainty in
the interpretation of language arises. If from the na-
ture and use of language, certain principles may be
clearly deduced, which will serve as a guide to explain
it, then, it is evident, the essential part of the theory of
Hermeneutics consists of these principles. (Morus, p.
27. I.)

§ 14. Every word must have some meaning. To
every word there ought to be assigned, and in the
Scriptures, there is unquestionably assigned, some idea
or notion of a thing ; which we call the meaning or
sense of the word, (a) (Morus, p. 28. II.)

a) Otherwise words are useless, and have no more significa-
tion than the inarticulate sounds of animals.

§ 1 5. Definitions. The literal sense of words, is the
sense which is so connected with them, that it is first

8 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS.

in order, and is spontaneously presented to the mind,
as soon as the sound of the word is heard, (a) The lit-
eral sense does not differ, among- the older and valuable
writers, from the sense of the letter ; although some ig-
norant persons, in later times, have very erroneously
made a distinction. Era^^mus and his cotemporaries use
both phrases promiscuously. Literal means the same
as the Greek lo yfy^a(.i}ievov^ or the Latin 5cn/>/w//i /
whence the phrases scriptum sequi^ and scriptum inter-
pretari.

a) The literal sense is the same as the primitive or original
sense ; or, at least, it is equivalent to that sense which has usurp-
ed the place of the original one, e- ^. the original sense of the
word tragedy has lona^ ceased to be c urrent, and the literal sense
of this word, now, is that which has taken the place of the orig-
inal one.

§ 1 6. The meaning of words conventional. Words con-
sidered simply as sounds, have no meaning; for they
are not natural and necessary signs of things, but con-
ventional ones, (a) Usage or custom has constituted a
connexion between words and ideas. (Morus, p. 28. III.)

a) InteTJections or exclamations may, perhaps, be considered
as a kind of exception to this reiiiark. Words also which the
Greeks call Ovo^aTOnenocri^ieva^ i e. words the sounds of
which imitate the sense, are also considered by many as an ex-
ception. But there is so much of fancy in the construction of
these words, and *'.jey are so ditferently formed in different lan-
guaj^es, that no solid proof of their being an exception can fairly
be made out. Great efforts have been made, in former times,
to shew that every syllable and even letter of a word, in the He-
brew laneuaire, had a special sis:nifi<ancy attached to it. F. M,
Helmont published a work entitled Jiiphabetum JS^aturale^ the ob-
ject of which was to sh^'W, that everydifferent opening of the mouth
in order to pronounce different lette rs,was significant of some idea.
To illustrate this, he caused a great number of plates to be en-
graved, which he insert^^d in the work ; so thrit his book, as Vlo-
rus pa)s, is mira capitiim humanorum collection quae admodum
distorta ora ostendat. Caspar iVeumann, in his Exodus Lin juae
Sonctae^ followed much the same path, but with more modera-
tion ; and V. E. Loescher, in his De caussis Lin<r, Heh. exhibits
the same principles. E. g. in the word Vl.fi< N says hr, indi-
cates motion; 'n<j eruption; !lfe, violence. The whole word Y'^M
then, signifies something in which motion bursts forth with vio-

ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 9

hnce. The stuileut may smile at this egregious trifling ; but the
time has been, when the word of God was explained by leading
men in the churches, in connexion with such wretched puerili-
ties. (Morus, p. 3]. IV.)

§ 17. The connexion beiweoi rvords and ideas now ren-
dered necessary^ by usage. Such is the fact, whatever
may have been the case, at first. This does not mean,
however, that a word is susceptible of only one mean-
ing-; for usage contradicts this. But from this princi-
ple, we learn (1) That neither in using or interpreting
a word, are we at liberty to, afiix to it an arbitrary
sense, (a) (2) That the sense of a word cannot be di-
verse or multifarious, at the same time, and in the same
passage or expression. (6) (Morus, p. 33. V. VI. VII.)

a) The fact, that usage has attached any particular meaning
to a word, lilte any other historical fact, is to be proved by ade-
quate testimony. This testimony may be drawn from books in
v/hich the word is employed, or from daily use io conversation.
But the fact of a particular meaning being attached to a word,
when once established, can no more be changed or denied, than
any liistoricai event whatever. Of course, an arbitrary sense
can never, with propriety, be substituted for a real one.

b) All men, in their daily conversation and writings, attach but
one sense to a word, at the same time and in the same passage ;
unless they design to «peak in enigmas. Of course, it would be
in opposition to the universal custom of language, if more than
one meaning should be attached to any word of Scripture, in
such a case. Yet many have done so. See H 21. 22.

§ 18. Signification of words multiplied in process of
time. Although a word can have but one meaning, at
the same time and in the same place, usage has gradu-
ally assigned many meanings to the same word, (a) lest
words should be indefinitely multiplied, and the diffi-
culty of learning a language become too great. (Mo-
rus, p. 39. VIII.)

a) The question then for an interpreter is simply this ; which
one of the significations thnt a woid has, is connected with its
use in any particular instance ^

§ 19. How can the meaning iti each case be found ? (l)
From the general manner of speaking, i. e. commoa

10 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS.

usage. (2) From the proximate words or context. (Mo-
rus, p. 41. I. II.)

That is, the usual and obvious raeaniuG: is attached to the
word; or t- Ise one which the context render? riecesDiry. In ad-
dition to the aid drawn from these s -urces, an interpreter r«iay
sometintes obtain assistance ^rom th(^ scope or design of the wri-
ter, or ffom history, antiquities, the nature of the sulject, k.c.
(Morus, p. 42. III. IV.)

§ 20, Ambiguify of words arises from various causes.
(1) From the faiiit oi' writers, (a) (?) From neglect m
the construction and necessary coiHiexions oi" words
and sentences ; proper care not having been taken to
guard the reader against uncertainty^, and to afford him
the best means for tinding the true sense. (6) (3) From
the manner in which common usage often forms lan-
guage ; which, not being guided by philosophy or re-
fined knowledge, is frequently deficient in respect to
accuracy. (^c) (Morus, p. 44. X. I — V.)

a) When they are ignorant of the rules for writing with accu-
racy and perspicuity. 6) E. g. the answer of the Delphic oracle,
Aio tc Romanos vinctre posse., which may be rendered, with equal
prf»bability, that the Romans would conquer lyrrfius, or P>r-
rhus the Komans. c) No other proof of this is needed, than what
the perusal of a conuposition by an illiterate person will afford.

Besides the causes of ambiguity above enumerated, we may-
reckon, ignorance of the usus loquendi. If the interpreter is not
acquainted with this, (and in respect to words which are ana^
XeyOfA€va^ he must of course be ignorant of it, in many cases, )he
is 1» ft in doubt, unless the context decides for him. As this is
not always the case, there is room here for ambiguity.

§ 21. Conclusions from what has been said. From what
has. already been said, in this chapter, about the use of
words, we may discover the ground of all the certainty
which attends the interpretation of language. (a) For
IJiere can be no certainty at all, in respect to the inter-
pretation of any passage, unless a kind of necessity com-
pel us to affix a particular sense to a word ; which
sense, as I have said before, must be one ; and, unless
there are special reasons for a tropical meaning, it must
be the literal sense. (&) (Morus, p. 47. XI .)

ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 11

a) If any one should deny that, the above principles lead to
certainty, when strictly observed, be vrouJd deny the possibility
of finding; the meaning of language with certainty, b) The sec-
ondary or figurative sense of words is as often necessary, as the
literal sense. Many words have even ceased to convey a literal
meaning. The obvious sense of a word, therefore, in any par-
ticular connexion, is the necessary one ; and a conviction that
the sense in any case is necessary, will be in exact proportion to
the degree in which it is felt to be obvious. Hy obvious here, is
not meant what is obvious to an illiterate or hasty interpreter;
but to one who has learning, and good judgment, and makes use
of all the proper means of interpretation.

§ 22. Error of those^ who assign many meanings to a
word^ at the same time and in the same place. Such an
opinion is to be rejected ; although the practice is very
old, as Augustine testifies, Confess. Xll. 30, 31. The
opinion probably originated from the variety of inter-
pretations given to ambiguous passages ; several of
which appeared probable, and were recommended by
a sentiment of reverence towards the authors of them.
A principle of this nature, however, must introduce
very great uncertainty into exegesis ; than which noth-
ing can be more pernicious. (Morus, p. 35. VII.)

§ 23. Error of those^ who affirm that the words of Scrip-
ture mean all that they possibly can -mean. This <iprung
from the Rabbinical schools, and passed from them, in
early times, to Christians. The transition is very
easy from this error, to every kind of licence in the in-
troduction of allegory, prophecy, and mystery into eve-
ry part of the Bible ; as the experience of the Jews, of
the ancient Fathers, the scholastic divines, and the fol-
lowers of Cocceius demonstrates.

The Rabbinic maxim is ; On every point of the Scripture, hang
suspended mountains of sen«e. The Talmud says, God so gave
the Law to Mos< s, that a thing can be shewn to ne clean and
unclean in 49 different ways. Most of the Fathers, and a mul-
titude of Commentators in later times, were infected with these
principles. Little more than a century ago, the celebrated Coc-
ceius, of Leyden, maintained the sentiment, that all th^ possible
meanings of a word in the Scripture are to be united. By his
learning and influence, a powerful party were raised up, in the

12 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS.

Protestant church, in favour of such a principle. The mischiefs
resulting from it have not yet ceased to operate.

§ 24. The sense of words -properly considered^ is not al-
legoricaL Alleg-ory is rather an accommodation of the
sense of words ^ or an accommodation of things, to the il-
lustration of some doctrine. Moderately used, and well
adapted, it may be of some profit which is entitled to
regard. But when resorted to by the unlearned and
those of an uncultivated taste, it commonly degenerates
into empty and ridiculous trifling, (Comp. Morus, Dis-
sertt. Tom. I. p. 370, &c.)

It is impossihle adequately to describe the excesses and ab-
surdities, which have been committed, in consequence of the al-
eporizing spirit. From the time of Ori8:en, vtrho converted into
allegory the account of the creation of the world, the creation
and fall of man, and multitudes of other simple facts related in
the Bible, down to the Jesuit, who makes the account of the
creation of the greater light to rule the day to mean the Pope,
and the creation of the lesser light and the stars to mean the
subjection of kings and princes to the Pope, there have been
multitudes in and out of the catholic church, who have pursued
the same path. The most sacred doctrines of religion have of-
ten been defended and assailed by arguments of equal validity
and of the same nature, as the exposition of the Jesuit just men-
tioned. The spirit which prompts to this may, in some cases,
be commendable ; but as it is a mere business of fancy connect-
ed with no principles of philology, and supported by no reasons
drawn from the nature of language, so it is, for the most part, not
only worthless, but dangerous. And of what possible use, in the
end, can a |)rinciple be, which can prove the most important
doctrine, either of Judaism or Christianity, as well from the first
verse of the first chapter of Chronicles, as from any part of the
Bible ? Or rather, of what use can the Bible be, if it may be in-
terpreted by such principles ?

§ 25. Properly speakings there is no typical sense of
words. Types are not words hut things^ which God has
designated as signs of future events. Nor is any spe-
cial pains necessary for the interpretation of them.
The explanation of them, which the Holy Spirit him-
self has given, renders them intelligible. Beyond his
instructions on this subject, we should be very careful
never to proceed. As for those, who maintain a typi-

ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 13

cal design in all parts of the Scripture, they certainly
display very little judgment or consideration ; for they
lay open the way for the mere arbitrary introduction
of types into every part of the Bible. The design of
the Holy Spirit, in the mention of this or that thing
in the Scriptures, can be understood only so far as he
himself has explained it, or afforded obvious grounds of
explanation.

If it be asked, How far are we to consider the Old Testament
as typical? I should answer, without any hesitation ; Just so
much of it is to be regarded as ty{)ical, as the New Testament
affirms to be so ; and \o more. The fact, that any thing or
event under the Old Testament dispensation was designed to pre-
fjg:ure something upder the New, can be known to us only by
revelation ; and, of course, all that is not designated by divine
authority as typical, can never be made so, by any authority
less than that which guided the writers of the Scriptures.

§ 26. Danger resulting from the spirit of multiplying
allegories and types. That sentiment, which through
imprudence or want of knowledge fell from some of
the ancient Fathers, and was echoed by many of the
Romish doctors, viz. that some passages of Scripture have
no literal sense^ (a) is dangerous beyond description. I
presume they meant to affirm this of those passages
which they did not understand. Such a sentiment has
been recently defended by Wittius on the Proverbs of
Solomon ; and Thomas Woolston, taking advantage of
this, has converted the narrations of our Saviour's mir-
acles into mere allegories. (6)

a) By literal sense here, Ernesti means a sense not allegorical
or mystical ; for to these literal is here opposed, and not to trop-
ical., as it commonly is. There are a multitude of passages in
Scripture, which have only a tropical meaning, and which, nev-
ertheless, are neither allegorical nor mystical,

h) This shews how dangerous it is, to set the adversaries of
religion an example of perverting the interpretation of the Scrip-
tures.

§ 27. *The sense of words depends on the vsus loquendi.
This must be the case, because the sense of words is
conventional and regulated wholly by usage. Usage
then being understood, the sense of words is of course
understood.

2

H #N THE MEANING OF WORDS.

§ 28. Usus loquendi determined in a variety of ways. To
determine it, respect must be had to time, (a) religion,
(6) sect, education, common life, (c) and civil affairs ; (e)
all of which have influence on an author's language,
and characterize it. For the same word is employed
in one sense respecting the things of common life ; in
another, respecting the things of religion ; in another
still, in the schools of Philosophy, and even these are
not always agreed in the use of words. (Morus, p. 48.
XII— Xlil.)

a) The ancient and modern sense of many words differs. 6)
rictim^ sacrifice^ law^ &c, in the Old Testament, are ofien em-
ployed in a sense, which differs from that of the same words ia
the New Testament, c) Thus to perceive in common life is to
feel or experience ; in philosophy, l9 form an id'^a in the mind ;
amon^ the Academic sect, it means to know a thing vrith certain-
iy, in opposition to mere conjecture. So XdOa^lfff^og^ O^Cf^J,
&;c, differ in meaninj^, when employed by a heatlien, a Jew, or a
Christian, c) The technical and peculiar sense of law-language,
is too well known to need illustration.

To these causes, which operate upon the usus loquendi^ may
be added, the style of a writer. We must inquire whether he
"wntes poetry or prose ; and whether the writer himself is fervid
or cool, turgid or dry, accurate and polished or the reverse.
Every writer has his own particular usus loquendi; and most
writers, provincialisms; and every one is influenced bj his own
peculiar circumstances. What writers can be more unlike, in
respect to style, than Isaiah and Jeremiah, Paul and John? An
interpreter must make himself thoroughly acquainted with all
these various circumstances.

§ 29. Grammatical and historical sense. The ob-
servance of all these matters belongs, in a special man-
ner, to grammarians, whose business it is to investigate
the sense of words. Hence the literal sense is also call-
ed the grammatical ; literalis and grammaticus havmg
the same meaning. It is also called the historic sense ;
because, like other matters of fact, it is supported by
historic testimony. (Morus, p. 66. XVII. Comp. § 3,
note, supra.)

The grammatical sense is made out by aid of the principles of
grammar, liberally and philosophically, not technically consider-
ed. The historical sense, is that wldch is built^oo the grammati-

ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 1 5

ual one, but modified by historical circumstances. Interpreter*
now speak ofthe true sense of a passage, by calling it the gram^
matico-historical sense ; and exegesis founded on the nature of
language, is called grammatico- historical. The object, in using
thi<? compound name, is to shew that both grammatical and his-
torical considerations are employed, in making out the sense of
a word or passage.

§ 30. The grammatical sense the only true one. Those
who make one sense grammatical^ and another logical^
do not comprehend the full meaning" of grammatical
sense. We are not to look, therefore, for a sense of
words, which varies, (in its nature, or simply consider-
ed as the sense,) with every department of learning,
or with every diverse object. For if this were the
case, words would have as many kinds of senses, as ob-
jects are multifarious. (Morus, p. 67. XVllI.)

In regard to the term grammatical^ see the Note above. The
meaning of Ernesti, in this Section, is, that the laws of language
are the same, in whatever department of writing or speaking it
is employed ; i. e. the meaning of it is to be investigated by the
usus loquendi^ &c, and not that logic, or philosophy can deter-
mine what the sense of words must be, in such a way, that the
sense may be called logical^ philosophical^ &c.

But when he says, as in 5 29, that the literal and grammatical
sense are the same ; and in ^ 30, that the grammatical sense is
the only true one ; he does not mean by literal^ that which is
opposed to tropical, (for the tropical meaning, in thousands of
cases, is the grammatical one,) but he means by it, the same as
the grammaiico-hislorical sense above described.

§ 31. The principles of interpretation are common to
sacred and profane writings. Of course, the Scriptures
are to be investigated by the same rules as other books.
Those fanatics, therefore, are not to he regarded, who,
despising literature and the study of the languages, re-
fer every thing merely to the influence of the Spirits
Not that we doubt the influence of the Spirit; or that
men truly pious and desirous of knowing the truth, are
assisted h}^ it in their researches, specially in those
things that pertain to faith and practice. (Morus, p. 69.
XIX.)

If the Scriptures be a revelation to men, then are they to be

16 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS.

read and understood by men. If the sanae laws of language are
not observed in this revelation^ as are coiamon to men, then they
have no guide to the right understandins; of the Scriptures ; and
an interpreter needs inspiration as much as the original writer.
It follows, of course, that the Scriptures would be no revelation
in themselves, nor of any use, except to those who are inspired.
But such a book, the Scriptures are not ; and nothing is more
evident, than that ^' id hen God has spoken to men^ he has spok-
en in the language of men^ for he has spoken by men^ and for

§ 32. Language can he properly interpreted only in a
philological way. Not much unlike these fanatics, and
not less hurtful, are those, who from a similar contempt
of i\\Q languages and from that ignorance of them which
breeds contempt, depend, in their interpretations, rath-
er on things than on words. (a) In this way, interpreta-
tion beconies uncei'tain ; and truth is made to depend
merely on the judgment of men, as soon as we depart
from the words, and endeavour to decic'e upon the
sense, by the use of means not connected with them.
Nor will this mode of exegesis at all avail to convince
gainsayers ; who themselves boast of interpreting, in
like manner, by things^ i. e. either by their own princi-
ples and opinions before formed, or by the sentiments
of philosophers. Hence arises the abuae of reason, in
the interpretation of the Scriptures.

a) The meaning is, that they decide from that knowledge of
things, which they suppose themselves already (o possess, rather
than from the words of the author ; they decide by what they
suppose he ought to mean, rather than by what he says.

§ 33. *)hiy method of interpretation not philological^ is
fallacious. Moreover, the method of gathering the sense
of words from things is altogether deceptive and falla-
cious; since things are rather to be known, from point-
ing out the sense of words in a proper way. it is by the
words of the Holy Spirit, only, that we are led to un-
derstand what we ought to think respecting things.
Said Melancthon very truly ; The Scripture cannot be
understood theologically^ until it is understood grammal-

ON THE MEANING O^ WORDS. 1 7

ically. Luther also avers, that a certain knowledge of
the sense of Scripture, depends solely on a knowledge
of the words.

This section repeats, in another form, the idea of ihe preced-
ing one. In both, Ernesti means to deny the possibility of truly
interpreting any book, by other means than those which are phi-
lological. By things, he means the application of our previous
views of things to the words of an author, in order to elicit his
meaning ; instead of proceeding to our inquiries, in the way of
grammatico-hiatorical exegesis^ Not that our previous knowl-
edge of things can never aid us ; for it often does so ; bat that
this can serve for nothing more than an assistant to our philolog-
ical efforts, as the following section shews.

§ 34. The analogy of faith or doctrine not to guide our
interpretation. Things^ therefore, and the analogy of
faith^ or doctrine^ (as they call it,) assist an interpreter
only so far, that when words are ambiguous, either from
variety of signification, from structure, or any other
cause, they may lead us to define the signification of
them, or to select some one particular meaning. But
here we must take good care, that the considerations
which we use for explaining, should he deduced from
the plain, perspicuous, well understood language of oth-
er passages, and that the words which we are endeav-
ouring to explain do not contradict them. For when
we investigate the sense in any other way than by a
grammatical method, we effect nothing more, than to
make out a meaning, which in itself perhaps is not ab-
surd, but which lies not in the words, and therefore is
not the meaning of the writer. (Morus, p. 253. XVI —
XIX.^

Very much has been said both for and as:ainst the analogy of
faith, as a rule of interpretation. I may safely add, that on this
subject, as well as on many others, very much has been said
amiss, for want of proper definitions. What is the analogy of
faith ? It is either simply Scriptural or sectarian. By Scriptu-
ral analoiiy, 1 mean, that the obvious and incontrovertible sense
of clear passages of Scripture affords a rule, by which we may
reason analogically concerning the meaning of obscure passag-
es ; or at least, by which we may shew, what obscure passages
cannot mean. F.. g. God is a spirit, is omniscient, supreme, the
creator and governor of all things, &Cj are truths so plainly anil
2*

I 8 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS.

incontrovertibly taught in the Scriptures, that all the passages
whicli would seem to represent liinti as material, local, limited
in his knowledge or power, &c, are to be interpreted a,2;reeabl3'
to analogy with the former truths. The same thing holds true
of other doctrines taught in the same perspicuous manner. We
explain what is doubtful or obscure, by the application to it of
what is plain. 'I his rule is not appropriate to the Scriptures on-
ly. It is adopted by all good interpreters of profane authors.
It is a rule which common sense prescribes ; and is therefore well .
grounded.

If the question then be asked, whether Scriptural analogy of
faith is a rule of interpretation ; the answer must readily be giv-
en in the affirmative.

But the analogy of the faith or creed of any /jar^^/ of Christians,
taken without abatement, cannot be applied as a rule of exege-
sis, unless it can be assumed, that the whole creed of that party
is certainly correct. If a Romanist, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, or
a Unitarian avers, that the Scriptures are to be construed
throughout, in accordance with the respective Symbols of each ;
whom are we to credit? The creed of one partj-, in seme re-
spects, contradicts that of the others. Is the Scripture then to
have a contrndiclory exegesis put upon it? If not, the analogy of
party-faith cannot be our rule of interpretation.

In Ihe contest about the analogy of faith being the guide of in-
terpretation, both parties have usually been in the right, in some
respects ; and in the wrong, in others. Comp. Campbell's Gos-
pels, Prelim. Dissert. IV. H 13. 14.

§ 35. The sense of Scripture not arbitrary. Allowing' the
above principles to be correct, it is plain that the me-
Ibod of investigating the sense of words in the Scrip-
tures, is not more arbitrary than the method used in ex-
plaining other books ; but equally regulated by laws
deduced from the nature of language. Those then act
very absurdly, who subject the interpretation of the
holy Scriptures to mere human opinion ; for example,
to the decision of a Roman pontiff, as if this could deter-
mine such a matter. (Com. § 31. Note.)

§ 36. We must not hastily conclude any sentiment of the
Scriptures to be unreasonable. The meaning*, which ac-
cordmg to grammatical principles should be assigned to
any word of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on ac-
count of reasons derived from things or previously con-

ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 19

ceivcd opinions; for, in this way, interpretation would
become uncertain. In books merely human, if reason
and the nature of the subject are repugnant to the ap-
parent sense of the words, we conclude there must have
been either a fault in the writer, or an error in the
copyist. In the Scriptures, if any sentiment does not
agree with our opinions, we must remember the imbe-
cilitj^ of human reason and human faculties ; we must
seek for conciliation^ and not attempt a correction of
the passage without good authoritj^ It is wonderful,
that in this matter more reverence should be paid to
mere human productions, than to the sacred books.

In ancient authors, when any difficult}^ occurs, we
seek for correction or conciliation ; as if they must be
rendered avaf.tagTrjTOc^ faultless. But occasion is often
taken of carping at the writers of the Scriptures, or of
perverting their meaning or the doctrines v/hich they
teach.

Nothing can be more appropriate to the present times, than
the caution of Ernesti, not to conclude hastily against the reason-
ableness of Scriptural sentinaent. Many set the Scriptures at va-
riance with reason, because they do not attain the real meaning
of them. Others decide, independently of the Scriptures, what
must be true ; and then, whatever is found in the sacred books,
which thwarts their opinions, they reject as unreasonable. The
prudent and pious interpreter will suspend his judgement, in cases
of difficulty, and investigate with great patience and caution, be-
fore he decides. Multitudes of passages in sacred writ have been
satisfactorily elucidated by critics of this character, which have
been given up as unreasonable by those of «fi diiferent character.
The time is coming, (I cannot doubt it,) when all the dark pla-
ces of the Bible will be elucidated, to the satisfaction of intelli-
gent and humble Christians. But how ntar at hand that blessed
day is, I do not pretend to know. '' The Lord hasten it, in its
time I"

§ 37. Interpretation should rather be grammatical than
doctrinal. In comparing reasons for the exegesis of
particular passages, greater weight should be attribut-
ed to grammatical than doctrinal ones. A thing may be
altogether true in doctrine, which yet is not taught by
some particular passage. Books of theology exhibit

20 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS.

many doctrinal interpretations, consentaneous indeed
with Christian principles, but not deduced from the
words interpreted ; doctrinally true, but not grammati-
cally.

It is really matter of regret, to find in most of the old and dis-
tinguished writers on theology, such a multitude of passages ad-
duced as proof-texts, which, when hermeneutically examined,
proved to be in no wise adapted to esta!/lish the doctrine, in con-
firmation of which they were cited. It mu«t be acknowledged,
that (he pleasure of reading many very valuable work?> of this
Dature, is greatlyabated by the study of sacred interpretation,
which teaches more correct exegesis. This loss, however, is
more than compensated, by the deep conviction which springs
from the examination of genuine proof passages.

§ 38. Real contradiction does not exist in the Scriptures,
As the books of Scripture were written by men divine-
ly inspired, it is evident there can be no real contradic-
tion in them. God is not incapable of seeing what is
consistent, and what is contradictory ; nor can he for-
get, when he speaks, what was said on former occa-
sions. If fl^/3are?if contradictions then occur, a proper
method of conciliation is to be pointed out ; of which,
in another place. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 1 — 49.)

§ 39. Every interpretation should harmonize with the de^
sign of the writer^ and with the context. For the very
reason that these books are inspired, every interpreta-
tion ought to agree with the design of the writer, or
harmonize with the context. We admit this principle
in the interpretation of profane writers ; much more
ought we to admit it in respect to the Scriptures. Mere
men, through negligence or want of knowledge, may
insert some things that disagree with their principal de-
sign ; but not so the Holy Spirit. Hence, the certain-
ty of any exegesis is connected with the design and se-
ries of the discourse. Rules of caution, however, are
important here, as, in its proper place, will be shewa
(Morus, ut supra.)

21

PART I.

CHAPTER II.

or THE KINDS OF AVORDS AND TITEIIl VARIOUS USE.

[V\ ith this chapter may be compared, Keil $ 43, and H 73 —
84. Beck, pp. 129—131. Seller }; 41—64. Lowth on lieb. Fo-
etrv, Lect. V— 12.]

§ 40. Design of the following chapter. The former
chapter treated of the connoxion between words and
ideas, and deduces from that connexion, several funda-
mental principles for the interpretation of language.
The present chapter is appropriated to the considera-
tion of words as used in a literal or tropical, emphatic
or unemphatic sense. It also treats of words as em-
ployed in antithesis ; and of abstract words as employed
for concrete ones.

All these things belong to the nature of languas^e. as employed
(o communicate our ideas ; and therefore are properly classed,
by ErR(;sti, among the principles of language, on which the sci-
ence of Hermeneutics is built. Morus has thrown this chapter
into his preceptive part, and thus confounded principle with />r«-
cept. The rules, which grow out of the principles here develop-
ed, are exhibited in Part il. Chapters V. VI.

§ 41. Importance of the following considerations. It is
of great importance, in respect to finding the sense of
words, to be acquainted with those distinctions which af-
fect the sense, and alter or augment the meaning*.

6 42. Words proper and tropical. The first impor-
tant division or distinction of words, in respect to their
meaning, is into proper and tropical^ i. e. literal and fig-
urative, or (better still) primary and secondary. (Com-
pare Morus, p. 260. II.)

22^ OF THE KINDS OF WORDS

A proper word is a definite name given to a certain thing ; and
as such, may be explained by adverting to the proper names of
persons. A tropical word is one used out of its proper \. e. orig-
inal sense ; e. g. rosyface^ snov)y skin^ v/here rosy and «noM?i/ can-
not be lilerally or ;7ro/?er/y predicated of the skin. The names trope
and tropical come from the Greek word rgonog^ inversio^conver-
sio.

Tropes arise (1) From similitude^ real or supposed. E. g.
The vine creeps. This is called metaphor. (2) From conjunc-
tion ; which is either physical or inlelleciualy (i. e. supposed, be-
lieved.) Physical or real, where a part of a house is put to sig-
nify the whole; or the container for the thing contained, as to
offer tkecup^ viz. to offer what is contained in it, i. e. the wine.
The conjunction is intellectual or supposed, when the cause is put
for the effect, and vice versa^ (e. g. blushing for modesty ;) the
sign for the thing signified ; or the subject lor the attribute.
From conjunction arises that species of trope, which is called
metonymy,

§ 43. Words first used in their proper sense. Original-
ly, words were undoubtedly used in their proper sense ;
for they were invented to indicate things,, and by these
things they raight be easily explained, without any am-
biguity. A small number of words sufficed, at an ear-
ly period ; because there were, in the age of simplicity,
but few objects about which speech could be employ-
ed. (Morus, p. 262. III.)

What Ernesti says, here and in the following section, about
the mode of forming tropical language may he true ; but there are
no facts to sup{)ort it. On the contrary, the most rude and bar-
barous languages, abound most of all in words used figuratively.
As we can trace no languai,^e back to its original, it is clear that
the propositions advanced l)y Ernesti are incapable of direct
proof; and analogy, so far as we can go back, is against him.
PJothing can be more destitute of proof, than a great part of the
speculations of philosophizing gramfiiarians, about the original
stale of language. One tells us that the language of barbarians
has but few words, and very few varieties in declension ; another,
that they are filled with 0l>0}.iaT0nen0i7ifAeva ; another, that the
roots of all w.jrds are verba; anottier, that they are nouns;
another, that all the original words are monosyllabic, &c. Some
of these things may be true of some languages ; but what can all
such speculators say, when they come to know the state of lan-
guage among our Aborigines? A state which puts at defiance
all their theories ; for in minutiae of declension they surpass the
Greek or even the multiform Arabic ; and in niost respects they

AXD THEIR VARIOUS USES. 23

differ widely from that state, which the above theory would teach
us to be necessary.

§44. Mode of forming tropical words. But in pro-
cess of time, objects being multiplied, there arose ane-
nessity of using words in various senses. For men now
began to think and speak concerning those things which
had hitherto been neglected ; and of course to form
ideas of them in their minds, or to describe them in
words. New objects also were invented or discovered,
to describe which, words became necessary. To serve
this necessity, men resorted to two different expedients.
Either new words were coined, or old ones were appli-
ed to new objects. In those languages, that were
spoken by a people ingenious and devoted to science,
or in those which by nature or art were flexible and
fitted for the coining of new words, new ones were
most usually coined. Yet this usage was not without ex-
ceptions; for had new words been coined on every oc-
casion, the number of them would have been multipli-
ed without end. In languages of a character differ-
ing from that just mentioned, there was a greater ne-
cessity of applying the same word to the designation of
several things. Hence it is, that a language, poor as to
variety of words, either in general or in particular parts
of speech, employs the more frequently the same words
in different senses. (Morus, p. 262. III.)

§ 45. Tropical words sotnetirnes become proper ones. But
there are several different points of light, in which trop-
ical words are to be viewed For^first^ the primitive
or proper signification, strictly understood, often be-
comes obsolete, and ceases for a long period to be us-
ed. In this case, the secondary sense, which original-
ly would have been the tropical one, becomes iheprop-
er one. This applies specially to the names of things.
Hence, there are many words, which at present never
have their original and proper sense, such as etymolo-
gy would assign them, (a) but only the secondary sens-
es, which may in such cases, be called the proper sense.
(Morus, p. 264. IV.)
a) E. g. In English, tragedy, comedy, villain, pagan, knave, &c.

24 OF THE KIXDS OF WORDS

§ 46. Usage sometimes converts tropical words into prop-
er ones. Secondly^ in like manner, the tropical sense of
certain words has become so common, by usage, that it
is better understood than the orig-inal sense. In this
case too we call the sense proper ; although, strictly
and technically speaking, one might insist on its being
called tropical. If one should by his last will, give a li-
brary [bibliothecam] to another, we should not call the
use of bibliotheca tropical ; although strictly speaking it
is so, for bibliotheca originally meant the shelves or places
where books are deposited. (Morus, ibid.)

§ 47. Tropical names become proper by transfer. So
thirdly^ when names are transferred to things destitute
of them, they become in respect to these things, the
same as proper names ; as when we predicate luxurious'
7iess of a crop, (a) For although we in fact use the
word luxuriousness metaphorically, in respect to the
crop, yet in this case the word may be called a proper
one. The same holds true of perception and liberty^
when predicated of the human mind; and so of many
other things. (Morus, ibid.)

a) So the Latin acies^ ala^ corny,, spoken of an army ; t»nd, in
the 8aaie way, /oo/ of a mountain^ head of a river,, or bed if a riv-
er,, &c ; all originally proper nouns !i««ed in a very different sense,
but now they have become proper as thus used, by transfer.

§ 48. Tropical words used for the sake of variety in
expression. Words, moreover, are frequently used in a
tropical manner, without any necessity arising from the
occurrence of new objects. For it is not necessity only,
to which we must attribute the use of tropical words,
but suavity and agreeableness of style occasion their in-
troduction. To the genius and habits of writers much
also is to be attributed. For, first, tropes are used for
the sake of variety in expression,^ so that the same word
may not often and always recur. To this species of
tropical language belong metonymy, syecdoche, and
other smaller tropes. In every thing, variety is de-
manded ; and without it, tedium quickly follows. No
person, desirous of writing elegantly and with suavity,

AND THEIR VARIOUS USE. S5

will fail to discern, that an inriportant part of a good
style consists in using variety of language. (Morus, p,
266, [.)

Examples ; heaven is used for God^ sleep for death% threshold
for house^ uncircumcision for Gentiles, Sec.

§ 49. Tropical words used for ornament. But se-
condly, tropical words, specially metaphors, are used,
for ornament. In metaphors, which are the most coni- \
mon speciefs of tropes, there is contained a similitude, .\
reduced to the narrow compass of a single word ;* and-j|
the mind is delighted with metaphors, because we are?/
so formed as to be pleased with similitudes and im- ^
ages, specially with those which are derived from ob-
jects that are splendid and agreeable. (Morus, p. 267,

11.)

§ 50. Tropes used specially for ornament.) by poets and
orators. The more desirous a writer is of ornamenting
his discourse, the more frequently does he use tropical
language ; as is evident from the style of poets and or-
ators. And it is with the special design that their style
may be ornate, that w^e concede them the liberty of
frequently employing tropical language.

§ 51. The frequency of tropes depends much on the ge-
nius of the writer. It should be observed, however,
that the genius of a writer, and the subject on which
he writes, are intimately connected with this. Those,
who possess great fervour of imagination and vivid con-
ception, more frequently use tropes, even bold ones,
and, as it often seems to others, harsh ones also. This
results from the fact, that they easily perceive and frame
similitudes, and by their temperament, are excited to
make comparisons. Hence they often content them-
selves with slight similitudes. But great subjects, by
their importance, naturally excite most men to the ase
of tropes, and sometimes of splendid ones. (Morus, p.
288. HI. IV. Lowth, Lect. V— XII.)

Frorn the object of employina: tropeg, as above described, we
may conchide that he abuses them, who interprets them etymo-
3

26 OF THE KINDS OF WORDS

logically, or seeks any thing more in them except variety and
ornament, or urges too far exactness in estimating the limits of
meaning in tropical phrases.

§ 52. Tropes used from necessity differ from those em-
ployed for variety or ornament. From these principles
we may understand, that in ail books, but specially in
the Scriptures, tropical language used from necessity
differs much from that which is used on account of oth-
er reasons. In the first case, a thing has a definite name,
by which it is called : in the other, the trope is used
either for pleasure or ornament. The former is gram-
matical ; the latter rhetorical. In the first, the reason
of the trope lies in analogy of nature; in the second,
it lies in some similitude. And since every thing must
have some name, either peculiar or common, and that
name belongs to the thing grammatically, it follows
that the proper sense of words is not lost in a grammat-
ical trope, but only in a rhetorical. (Morus, p. 270. VI.)

§63. The sense of tropical words is grammatical. But,
as may be easily understood from what has been said,
since the meaning of all tropical words as well as proper
ones, is deduced from the purpose and design of those,
who employed them to designate certain things, (as is
plain from observation ;) it appears that this meaning is
grammatical or literal, and that they are in an error,
who, with Jerome, have thought differently. Interpre-
tation is of the same name nature^ whether it is applied
to words tropical or proper. (Morus, p. 271. VII.)

§ 54. Origin of synonymous words. From the custom
of using tropical language, flow synonymous words. In
respect to these, the interpreter must beware, lest he
seek for diversity of meaning, where none really exists ;
which not unfrequently hajjpens. Usually, in the same
dialect of the same nation and age, proper words are
not synonymous ; but when synonymes exist, (as, for ex-
ample, they do in Greek,) they originate from differ-
ent dialects or from difterent ages. The greatest num-

AND THEIR VARIOUS USE. 27

ber of sj^nonymes arises from tropical words, which, for
the sake of variety and ornament, express the same
idea by various names. (Morus, p. 271. VIII.)

The interpreter should not seek for any definite distinction be-
tween !»ynon3'naes, (1) Where they are introduced for the sake
of variety. (2) Where usage conjoins two words ; as /wcfc and
fortune^ peace and quietness^ long and lasting^ &LC. (3) Where
they are used for the sake of ornament. (4) Where excited feel-
ing produces a repetition of the same idea, while different words
fire employed. And, (5) Where it is the habit of an author to
employ synonyraes ; e. g. Cicero.

The Hebrew poetry affords the most striking exhibition of sy-
nonymes, in its synonymous parallelisms ; where, from the na-
ture of the composition, the second GTt^og or stanza is expect-
ed, in general, to exhibit the same sense as the first. An inter-
preter would mistake the essential part of his office, if he should
here endeavour to exhibit a difference between the sense of words,
which the nature of the composition requires to be regarded as
synonymes.

GENERAL NATURE OF EMPHASIS.

§ 55. Definition of emphasis. In the use of language,
cases arise, where the ordinary signification of a word
receives, if I may so speak, accession or augmentation.
This may be effected in two ways ; the first of which
consists in the use of a word in an honorary or in a de-
grading sense, e. g. verba svcf^^iag et dvoqjrjficag^ of
which it would Jbe irrelevant to treat here. The second
class of words are those, which receive augmentation in
their extent or force of meaning. These constitute what
may with propriety be called emphatic words. Emphasis
then may be defined ; An accession to the ordinary signi-
fication of a word^ either as to the extent or the force of its
meaning. (Morus, p. 321. II.)

Emphasis comes from e^KfCCvetv, which signifies to shcw^ op
make conspicuous. It is to language, what a nod or a sign is to
looks; i.e. it makes more significancy. Examples: when the
Jews speak of Moses by the appellation of the Prophet ; or the
Greeks say, the Orator^ the Philosopher ^ the Poet, meaning De-
mosthenes, Plato, and Homer; these respective appellations ar©
emphatic.

28 GENERAL NATURE OF EMPHASIS.

§ 56. JVo word of itself emphatic. It may be easily
seen, then, that no word of itself is emphaiic. Each
word has by itself a certain power, and designates a de-
finite idea of a thing either small or great, in which
there can be no emphasis. It is not because a word
designates any thing, which is very grv^at or very small,
that it is emphatical. Were this the case, then such
words as God^ the world^ the sun^ the king^ would be al-
ways emphatical ; which surely no one will assert.
(Morus, p. 322. III.)

If emphasis be an occasional accession of force to a word, then
the ordinary/ meaning of the word, be the signification ever so
important or forcible, of course is not emphatic.

§ 57. Kinds of emphasis. Emphasis is either occa^
sional^ or constant. We call it occasional^ when it is
connected with words, in some particular place, or at a
certain time. From the animated feelings of the speak-
er, or from the importance of the subject, a word is
chosen to express more than its ordinary import. Con-
stant emphasis is that, which usage makes invariably so,
by employing a word continually in an emphatic, rather
than in the ordinary sense. (Morus, p. 323. IV.)

Constant emphasis, if admitted, wouM destroy the very defini-
tion which Ernesti has sjiven of emphasis. That no word of it-
seh" is emphatic ; and that emphasis is an accession to the or-
dinary force of a word, is what he very rightly teaches us. What
then is that emphasis which is constant .^

§ 58. Emphasis^ how known. Occasional emphasis
must be known by the context, and from the nature of
the discourse. (Morus, p. 324. V.)

I have retained Ernesti's lansfuage here, in respect to the term
occasional or temporary as he calls it. But as occasional empha-
sis is really all, which from the nature of the thing can ever ex-
ist, ! shall not hereafter make any distinction, but speak simply
of emphasis.

The nature of the subject and the context are the only means
of knovving whether a word is to be regarded as emphaiic ; for
these must shew that more or less force is to be given to particu-
lar terms. As a general rule, we may say that emphasis is re-

GENERAL NATURE OF EMPHASIS. .^9

quired whenever a frigid, incongruous, or inept sense would be
made without it. Thus 1 John iii. 9. He that is born ofGodsin*
netk not^ which the writer does not mean to assert, understand-
ing the word sinneik in a common and general way ; but he
means to say that such an one does not sin^ in the peculiar sense
of which he is speaking.

As to constant emphasis^ (which Morus and his editor have ad-
mitted,) the rule for determining it is said to be the usus loquen-
di. The rule is good, if the principle be admitted. The ex-
amples given to support this species of emphasis are such as the
names Jehovah applied to God, and Son of man applied to ( hrist.
But these prove no more, than that these appellations, ap-
plied in certain circumstances, have a significant and exalted
meaning ; which is true of very many words, where no real em-
phasis is to be found. But see and compare Morus, p. 325. VI.
VII.

§ 59. No ground for dividing emphasis into real and
verbaL Some rhetoricians divide emphasis into real and
verbal: the former of which, consists in the greatness
and sublimity of things ; the latter consists of words
adapted to express their qualities. But this division is
erroneous. To things belongs sublimity ; to words^ em-
phasis. Nor, as we have above said, does a word, de-
signating a great object, therefore become emphatic.
(Morus, p. 328. VIll.)

§ 60. Tropical words are not of course^ and from their
nature^ emphatic. Those also err, who make every
tropical, specially metaphorical word, emphatic. In
necessary tropes, or those used for the sake of variety,
it i& clear there can be no emphasis. Ornamental tropes
depend on mere similitude, which serve to render the
discourse agreeable. Flagrare cupiditate means no more
than vehementer cupere ; and no one gets a different idea
from using it. If then there be no emphasis in the lat-
ter expression, there is none in the former. The er-
ror arises in this way, that some understand^aorare cu-
piditate to be used instead of cupere ; and thence con-
clude, that there is an accession of meaning. Hence we
learn, that the emphasis of tropical words is to be found
3*

30 OP ANTITHESIS.

in the same waj as that of proper words. (Morus, p.
329. IX.) ^

§ 61. Words in one language do not always correspond
exactly to those in another. It may be proper to repeat
here a well known, though very important and neces-
sary observation, viz. that every language has words
and phrases, to which none in any other language, or at
least in that into which we are interpreting, ea;aci/z/ cor-
respond. Of this nature are many words and phrases,
both in the Greek and Hebrew Testament. The rea-
son of this lies not solely in the difference of objects,
peculiar to every nation; such as pertain for example,
to laws, religious rites, manners and customs, k ; but
also in the variety of minds, which are not all affected
in the same manner ; and lastly, in an arbitrary forma-
tion of notions, respecting those things which do not
pertain to substance and essence. (Campbell, Diss. II.)

OF ANTITHESIS.

§ 62. Where antithesis exists^ if the sense of one part
can be founds the other may be easily known. Finally, as
ideas are often contra distinguished from each other,
so the language corresponds. Therefore, as when
ideas are repugnant to each other, if you understand the
one, of course you must understand the other which is
the opposite, (for what one asserts the other denies ;)
so in antithetic language^ whether the subject or predi-
cate of a sentence, the rule is obvious, that the inter-
pretation of the one part must be directed by that of
the other, which is understood either from the usus lo-
qiiendi., or, v/here this is various, from the context. E.
g. when multi and pauci occur in the same sentence,
and it iS evident, that jnulti means cf//, it is, of course,
evident, that pauci cannot here have its ordinary sense,
but means non omnes^ without limiting the idea to feW'
ness of numbor. Of a like kind, are aa^^ and uviVfiu;
ygufifia and nvevfiUp in which the interpretation of the

ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS. 31

one is to be accommodated to that of the other. (Morue,
p. 167. XIV. 1— II.)

a) But if multi mpans a//, does not panci (the opposite of it)
mean none? In Hebrew, irb and b^ ^^b nriean all and none ;
and tb i<)r is equivalent to non omnes^ in such a case.

ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS.

§ 63. Abstract words used for concrete. Nor must the
interpreter neglect the distribution of words into ab-
stract and concrete. All languages, specially ancient
ones, often use abstract terms for concrete ones. Gen-
erally abstract terms are most frequently employed.

Abstract words are the names of qualities or attributes ; con-
crete, of thin2:s or subjects. E. g. Divinity '\s an abstract word,
meaning the quality of divine nature ; but God is a concrete
term, meaning the divine agent or beings The former is, bj
usage, often put for the latter.

§ 64. The use of abstracts for concretes arose from ne»
cessity. This method of speaking is employed, (1) From
necessity. Those languages, which have but a few con-
crete terms, necessarily employ abstract ones ; e. g. the
Hebrew and its cognate dialects, in which abstracts are
often used in the place of concretes. Such usage being
once established by necessity, it often extended itself
where necessity did not require it.

§ 65. (2) From a desire to render the subject spoken
of prominent. When an abstract is put for a subject
with its pronoun, or for the subject itself, it directs the
mind to that very thing on account of which the predi-
cate is asserted. No one will deny that this mode of
expression is energetic.

§ 66. (3) The purpose of ornament is subserved, not
only by the prominence of which I have just spoken,
but by a certain elevation and grandeur of style, con-
Bected with this mode of speaking.

32 RULES OF INTERPRETATION.

§ 67. Popular and learned use of words. Finally, to
some words, popular use attributes one meaning, the
usage of the learned another. Not that words natural-
ly Signify one thing in common life, and another in a
treatise of science ; but that they are used less skilfully
in the one case, and with more skill and accuracy in the
other. Interpreters who confound these usages, of
course pervert the sense of words.

PART II.

RULES OF INTERPRETATIOIT.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory Remarks,

§ 68. Design of Part 11. Thus far we have beea
employed in considering the general nature of language,
the various kinds of words in use, and also the meaning
appropriate to each class. Having taken this general
view of the nature and properties of words, we may
now proceed to deduce from the principles already es-
tablished, various Rules of Interpretation^ by which the
efforts of the interpreter are to be directed. The con-
sideration of these rules, with their various classes and
ramifications, will constitute the second part of the
present Treatise on Hermeneutics.

§ 69. What are Rules of Interpretation ? They are
directions or formulas, which explain and define the
mode of rightly investigating and perspicuously repre-
senting the sense of words, in any particular author.

§70. Origin of these rules. They are deduced from
the nature of language, as above explained ; and deduc-
ed, not by logical subtleties, but by observation and ex-
perience.

RULES OF L\TERPIlETATIO^^ 33

§ 71. Object of Rules. These rules serve not only
to assist in finding- the sense of words, but also in judg-
ing" whether any particular sense put upon words be
true or false. By them too one may not only be assist-
ed to understand why a particular sense is erroneous,
but also why the true one cannot be discovered.

§ 72. Rules of exegesis connected with the usus loquen'
di. We have seen above, that the sense of words de-
pends on the usus loquendi. Proper rules then for find-
ing the sense, or judging of it, ought to have special
respect to the usus loquendi^ and to show how it is ap-
plied to every particular case.

§ 73. Usus loquendi general and special. The usus
loquendi^ considered at large, has respect to a language
generally ; specially considered, it has respect to some
particular writer. To the common usage of words, al-
most every writer adds something that is peculiar to
himself; whence arise the idioms of particular writers.

§ 74. Order in which the subject will he pursued. The
natural method of treating the usus loquendi will be
followed : so that we shall first consider the method, in
general, of findmg the usus loquendi in the dead languag-
es ; and then the method of finding it in any particular
authors, and specially in the writings of the N. Test.

54

PART II.

CHAPTER II.

OP FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI GENERALLY IN THE DEAB
LANGUAGES.

[Compare Keii, H 25—34. Beck pp. 131 — 136. Seiler, H 236—
254.]

§ 75. Usus loquendi is known by testimony. If the
vsus loquendi is mere matter of fact, it may be known,
in the dead languages, by the testimony of those, who
lived when these languages were flourishing and in
common use, and who well understood them. This tes-
timony is direct or indirect. (Morus, p. 74. II.)

By the usus loquendi is meant, the sense which usage attaches
to tlie vfords of any language. It is surprising that any attempts
should ever have heen made to find the sense of words in a dead
languag:e, by mtaus different in their nature from those which we
employ, to find the sense of words in a livins: language. The
meaning of a word must always be a simple matter of fact ; and
of course, it is always to be estahlished by appropriate and ade-
quate testimony. Yet how very different a course has been pur-
sued, I will not say by many Rabbinic, Cabbalistic commenta-
tors merely, nor by monks and zealots for the ilomish hierarchy ;
but by many Protestants, who have had great influence, and who
deserve, on many accounts, the hig:hest respect. Witness the
exegetical principles of Cocceius and his followers; and read, if
the statement just made be doubted, many of the articles in Park-
hurst's Heb. Lexicon.

§ 76. How to obtai7i direct testimony. Direct iesti-
mony may be obtained. Firsts from those writers, to
whom the language investigated, was vernacular ;
either from the same authors whom we interpret,
or from their contemporaries. JVcaV, from those who,
though foreigners, had learned the language in ques-
tion, (a) Thirdly^ from Scholiasts, Glossographers, and

OP FINDING THE USUS LOQITENDI 35

Versions made while the language was spoken and by
those who were acquainted with it. But these must be
severally treated.

c) Thus the writinsrs of Marcus Antoninus a Ronaan emperor,
and of Philo and Josephus who were Jews, may be used to ilhis-
trate the meaning of Greek words, because, although foreigners,
they well understood the Greek language.

§ 77. Testimony of cotemporary writers. The most
important aid is afforded by writers of the first class ;
for their testimony is particularly weighty. This tes-
timony may be drawn from three sources. (1) From
the definitions of words. (2) From examples and the
nature of the subject. (3) From parallel passages.
(Morus, p. 79. V.)

§ 78. (1) Definitions, In regard to these, nothing
more is necessary, than to take good care that the de-
finition be well understood ; and to consider how much
weight, the character of the writer who defines may
properly give to it.

§ 79. (2) Examples and the nature of the subject. In
regard to these, it may be said, that a good understand-
ing and considerable practice is necessary to enable
one to judge well, and to make proper distinctions,
(Morus, p. 81. VII.)

By examples is meant, that the writer who uses a particular
word, although he does not directly define it, yet gives, in some
one or more pasaagt s, an fxample of what it meafjs, by exhibit-
ing its qu.'^lities. or shewing the operation of it. Thus,"Paul uses
the words orocysia tov xoojaov, at first, without an explana-
tion. But w. have an exarnpje uf the meaning of it in Gal. iv. 9.
Thus TCVOTvg is illustrated b^ examples in Heb xi ; and so, of
m^ny other words.

The nature nf the subject^ in innumerable places, helps to 6e-
fine which meaning of a word the writer attaches to it, m any
particular passage E. g XaQig is pardon of sin^ divine benev-
olence, divine aid^ temporal blessings^ !^c» Which of these senses
it bears in any particular passage,^ is to be determined from the
nature of the subject.

36 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI.

§ 80. (3) Comparison of parallel passages. Great
caution is necessary here, in order to find tne true sense
of those passages which are to be compared and judg-
ed of, with a view to throw light on some more obscure
place. Unless such caution is used, the object cannot
be well accomplished. On this account, the prin-
ciple in question ought to be well understood ; es-
pecially, as all who are skilled in interpretation agree,
that this principle of exegesis is very broad, and ap-
plies not only to the Scriptures^ but to all other books.
(Morus, p. 79. VIII.)

§ 81. Parallelisms are Verbal and Real (1) Verbal.
This occurs, when a word is ambiguous and doubtful,
(because neither the subject nor the context affords
matter of illustration,) and this same word, (a) or its
synonyme, (6) is repeated in a similar passage, with
those attributes by which it may be defined, or with
some plain adjunct, or intelligible comment, (c) (Mo-
rus, p. 85. X. XI.)

The sense of many words is so plain, that investig^ation by
parallelism, i. e. the like use of them in other passages, is un-
necessary. But comparison is specially necessary to illustrate
words (1) Which belong to the Hellenistic or Hebrew-Greek
idiom. E. %. fCpOi^OVPTO navTsg is often said, when the event
to which it relates is some special favour. The language here
may be compared with the Hebrew ^?'l'^ and TiHS, or the syno-
nyriies {^avjuaocci and -O^a^l^rjOai ; by which it appears that
6(fO^OVVTO^ in such cases, u»eans admiration^ astonishment. (2)
Words shuuld be compared, which have a kind of technical re-
li2:ious use. E.g. fAVGTTjQtOV. romp. Rom. 16: 24, Colos. 1:27,
Eph. 3 : 45. So mOTig, dixaioovprjj fxtxavoia, Kaivri
KriGtg, &c. (3) Words of unfrequent occurrence. The neces-
sity of this is obvious. (4) Words which are ambiguous. For
words which are so in one place, frequently are plain and easy
to be understood in another, from the connexion in which they
stand.

a) E. g. Christ is frequently called a stone of stumbling. In
1 Pet. 2: 8, those who stumble are said anSidsLV rot Ao/w, to

eE]<JERALLY fN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 37

ye/cc/ or disobey the gospel of Christ. (Jb) F. s:. 2 Cor. 1:21,
XQLGag f]fA(xg 6 Seog ; I John, 2t 20 X9*'^M^ ^^ ^^^^ *^ ^®
instruction in the truth, (e) Coinp 2 Cor. 4: 10 wiUi v-rse 11th.
Parallelisms, appropriately so called, are of this nature ; ihe
one often serving to explain the other These are very numerous
in the Old Testament, and considerably so in the New. Comp.
Matt. 1:20 with Luke 1:35.

To the cases already mentioned may be added, {(f) Renewed
mention with explanation. Comp. 1 Cor. 7: 1 with verse 26.
Also (c) Renewed mention with antithesis. Comp. dccvaxog
in Rom. iii. iv. and v. with Chap. 6: 23.

§ 82. Real Parallelism. This means, that there is a
parallelism of object or sentioient, although the words
are not the same ; or to describe it in a manner some-
what different, it occurs, when the same thing- or senti-
ment is expressed in other words more perspicuous, or
with fuller and more numerous words, the meaning of
which is plain.

Real parallelism may respect a/ac/, or a doctrine, related or
taught in different passages. Examples of the former are abund-
ant in the Gospels, which, in very numerous instances, relate to
the same facts. So in the books of Samuel and Kings, compared
with the Chronicles.

Paralleh'sm of doctrine or sentiment is where the same princi-
ples are taught, in both passages. To this head of parallelism
belong repetitions of the same composition; e.g. Ps. 14 and
53; Ps. 96 and I Chron. 16; Ps. 18. and 2 Sam 22 ; some of
Jude and 2 Epistle of Peter; with many other such passages.
On the faithful, skilful, and diligent comparison of the different
parts of Scripture, which treat of the same doctrine, depends, in
a great measure, all our right conclusions in regard to the real
doctrines of religion ; for in this manner, and this only, are they
properly established. Most of the mistakes m^de about Chris-
tian doctrine, are made in consequence of partial exe2;esi8, di-
rected not unfrequently by prejudices previously imbibed. The
student cini never feel too deeply the importance of a thorough
comparison of all those parts of Scripture^ which pertain to the
same subject.

Besides the verbal and real parallelism considered above, there
is another species of parallelism, which constitutes one of (he
principle features of Hebrew poetry. This consists in a corres-
pondence of two parts of a verse with each other, so that words
answer to words, and sentiment to sentiment. This runs through-
out the books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Canticles, and most of
the Prophets. See Pa. 1. 2. 19. 119. Is. 1: 2—5. 40. et passim.
4

38 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI

This style, so predominant in the language of the Old Testament,
has passed into many parts of the New, which strictly speaking
are not poetical ; but which receive their hue from the influence
that Hebrew poetry had produced on the lang-uag^e of the Jew*
ish nation. See Luke 1; 35. 1: 46, &;c. 11 : 27; and many parts
of the Apocalypse, which is a kind of poem. The attentive and
experienced observer, will find these characteristic idioms of He-
brew poetry, in a greater or less degree, in almost every chap-
ter of the New Testament.

The appropriate method of studying this part of exegesis con-
sists, of course, in attention to Hebrew poetry. How great as-
sistance may be derived from a thorough knowledge of this id-
iom, one can scarcely imagine, who has not made the experi-
ment. I cannot dwell upon it here, except merely to observe, that
the student will be in no great danger of overrating the benefit to
be derived from a thorou§;h acquaintance with it; and that he
will find the advantages very perspicuously stated by Schleusner,
De paiallelismo membroram egregio interprelationis subsidio.

As Ernesti has failed to consider the appropriate maxims of
exegesis, in regard to the kind of parallelisms now in question, I
will add a few considerations, that may be useful. (I) In par-
allelism of this kind, seek for the principal idea, that lies at the
ground of both parts of a distioh. (2) lie not anxious to avoid
the same sense or meaning in both parts, as though it would be
tautological, and unworthy of the sacred writers ; for sameness
of meaning, in innumerable cases, constitutes the very nature of
the idiom, or mode of expression. (3) Inquire whether one
member of the parallelism is explanatory; or whether it is add-
ed for the sake of ornament; or is a repetition or amplification,
which result from excited feeling, or from mere custom of speech.
This inquiry will enable one to know how mucli exegetical aid
may be derived from it. If one member be explanatory or ex-
egetical of the other, it will comprize synonymous or antithetic
words ; or one member will be in tropical, and the other in prop-
er language ; or one will enumerate species, which belong to the
genus mentioned in the other. Instructive on the above subject
is Morus, pp. 96—107.

But the student must not fail here, to read Lowth's Lectures on
Hebrew Poetry^ or the Preface to Lowllis Commentary on Isaiah.
With much profit, may be read, on this very interesting and im-
portant branch of a sacred interpreter's knowledge. Herder,
Geist der Heb, Poesie, B. I. s. 22, Sec. De Wette, Ueber die
Psalmen, Einleitun^. Meyer, Hermeneutik^ B. II. s.

§ 83. Parallel passages to be read continuously and fre-
quently. A good interpreter, therefore, must speclalljr
attend to those passages of an author, which resemble

GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 39

each other, when he finds occasion to doubt in respect
to the meaning of any one of them. He should read
them over continuously, or at short intervals. For in
this way, while the passages are fresh in his mind about
which he doubts, or with which others are to be com-
pared, he will more easily trace the real resemblances
between them. (Morus, p. 107. XVIII.)

§ 84, Similarity of passages should be real, in order to
be compared^ and not merely verbal. By this is meant,
that the same idea is presented by both, and not mere-
ly that the language of each may be the same. For real
likeness between them cannot exist, unless the idea of
each be the same ; nor, of course, can the one throw
any true light upon the other, except there be a real
similarity. But when this point is settled, the inter-
preter must consider which of the two is the most per-
spicuous and definite, and regulate the exegesis of the
more obscure passage by that which is the more per-
spicuous. Explanation, in this way, often becomes very
obvious. (Morus, p. 107. XIX.)

But is there not a kind of VGxeQOv uQOreQOV, in this direc-
tion ? Morus has indeed admitted the propriety of the rule ; but
still there seems to me to be difficulty in it. In order to deter-
mine whether two passages may be properly compared, (one of
which \^ obscure) you musi first determine whether there is real
similarity between them, i. e. whether they both contain the
same idea. But to determine this, of course, implies a previous
knowledge of what the obscure passage contains ; otherwise yea
cannot tell whether the idea is the same in both. You have al-
ready determined, then, how the obscure passage is to be inter-
preted, and so need not the comparison after which you are la-
bouring ; or else you assume the interpretation, and then build
your exegesis on that assumption. In either way, the rule would
seem to amount to little or nothing.

But to relieve the difficulty, in some measure, it may be said
with truth, you determine what idea is conveyed in each of the
passages to be compared, from the context, and the design of the
writer, or the nature of the case. Having made this determina-
tion about each passage, independently of the other, you then
bring them together, and the one, being expressed more fully or
with more explanatory adjuncts than the other, confirms the less
certain meaning of the other. A comparison of passages, then,
which is real^ (that of ideas) and not merely verbal, can never

40 OF FINDING THE tSUS LOQ.UENDI

be made to any purpose, where the obscurity of either is so ^reaf,
tiidt you can attain no tolerable degree of satisfaction about the
meaning. It can never be used, therefore, for any higher degree
of evidence, than for the confirmation of a sense not improbable
in itself, find not contradicted by the context.

This subject, in such a view of it, becomes fundamental, in
regard to the validity of testimony to the meaning of ^^ords, af-
forded by what are called parallel passages. The nature t*nd
strength of the evidence, and the proper mode of its application
are ali illustrated by the above considerations. Unless the stu-
dent forms ideas of this subject, n^hich are correct, and ground-
fed upon principle that will bear examination, he is liable to be
carried about '* by every wind of doctrine" in Hermeneutir's, and
to be cast upon the opinion, or conceit, or merely confident as-
sertion of every commentator or lexicographer, who has over-
rated the authority of passages called parallel, in deciding upon
some particular word or phrase, or who has no definite views of
the exact nature and application of the evidence in question.

§ 85. The exercise of comparison should he often re-
peated. To the observance of these principles, fre-
quent practice must be added, so that the interpreter
may easily discern what passages are similar, and how
he maj rightly compare them, and judge of them. It
will be very useful, here, to consult good interpreters^
not only of the Scriptures, but of profane authors; that
where they carry these principles into practice, and
plainly make a right and skilful application of them,
we may learn to imitate them, by attentively consider-
ing the manner in which they attain to the understand-
ing of things which are obscure or ambiguous. By/re-
quently renewing this exercise, we may learn to go in
the same path, in which they have travelled.

The books of the New Testament present more inducement to
repeat this exercise very frequently, than any other books. For
(I) They are of all books the most important. (2) They are
not only all of the same idiom in general, but they have refer-
ence to the same subject, viz. the developeraent of Christianity.
They originated too from cotemporary writers, possessed of views,
feelinj^s, and lanjruage that were alike. Hence, comparison has
more force in illustrating the N\ Testament, than in the illustra-
tion of either Greek or Latin authors; many of whom, that agreed
with each other in all the circumstances just stated, cannot be
found. But (3) To all who admit that the same Holy Spirit guided
the authors of the New Testament, and that their views ofrelig-

GENERALLV IiV THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 41

it)n, ID consequence of this, must have been harmonious^ the in-
ducement to comparison of various parts and passages with each
other, in order to obtain a correct view of the wliole, must be
very great; and the additional force of the evidence arising from
comparison, on account of the really harmonious views of the
writers, must make this exercise an imperious dutj of every
theologian.

§ 86. Many parallel passages should be compared. To
compare one passage only, is often insufficient, wheth-
er you are endeavouring to find the usus loquendi by
the aid of parrallel passages, or by testimony derived
from the nature of the subject and from examples.
(Comp. § 77.) Specially is this the case, when we are
investigating the sense of words, that have a complex
or generic meaning, made up of various parts. In this
case, comparisons should be made from numerous pas-
sages, until we perceive that what we are seeking is
fully and entirely discovered. (Morus, p. 109. XX.)

Suppose the word niGTcg occurs in a particular passage, where
you are doubtful what sense should be applied to it. First, you
call to mind, that niGTigis a generic word, having several mean-
ings related to each other, but still diverse, as species under the
genus. You wish to determine how many species of meaning
ncaig has ; and in order to accomplish this, many passages where
it is used must be compared, in order that you may know wheth-
er all the species are found. This being done, you proceed to
compare them with the passage under investigation, and see
which will fit it. And in this way all generic words must be in-
vestigated, before the generic idea can be determined.

§ 87. Testimony of Scholiasts respecting the usus loqueu'
di. It was said, § 76, that testimony to linguistic usage
might be derived from Scholiasts ; and this testimony is
either given by themselves, or it is cited by them from
others. It is valuable, in proportion as the time in
wrhich they lived approximates to the age of the author
whom they interpret; (a) and also in proportion to ^
their knowledge of the language in which he wrote. (&)
The latter must be judged of by men of learning and
practical skill ; although to judge of it is not a matter
of special difficulty. (Morus, pp. 113 — 115.)

42 OF FINDING THE US US LOQ.UENDI

Scholia means short notes upon any author, either of an exe-
|:etical or graoimatical nature. On all the distinguished ancient
Greek authors, SchoHa have been written in more recent times ;
many volumes of which are still extant, upon Homer, Thucydidea,
Sophocles, Aristophanes, &c. In like manner, a multitude of
Scholia, from the ancient Christian Fathers, specially of the
Greek Church, have come down tons in their works. Orij^inally,
they were brief remarks, occasionally made in their commenta-
ries and other writings. Afterwards, thrse were extracted and
brought together, and^ they now form what is called Catena Pa-^
trum. Many Scholia also are found on the margin of MSS. or in-
terlined, or placed at the end of a book.

a) This is too generally expressed ; for surely an ignorant
Scholiast of the second century would not be more valuable than
Chrysostom in the fourth ! In short, antiquity adds nothing to
the value of a Scholiast, except as it renders it more probable,
ceteris paribus, that he may have a better knowledge of ancient
manners, customs, history, &:c, than a modern writer would
have.

b) Almost all that is important in this subject turns on *his
point. The simple question always is. Is the author well, skil-
fully interpreted ; not, when or where the Commentator lived.

§ 88. Glossaries. In a similar way is the testimony
of Glossographers to be estimated ; which testimony is
by no means to be despised. Its credit depends on its
antiquity, and on the learning either of the Glossogra-
phers themselves, or of others whom they cite.

§ 89. Nature of* Glossaries. But here we must be
cautious, not to suppose the Greek Glossaries to be
like our modern Lexicons. They explain only partic-
ular passages, or words ; especially nouns that are in
an oblique case, or verbs that are not in the Infinitive,
nor first person of the Present Tense. An ignorance
of this construction of the Glossaries, has often been
the occasion of ridiculous errors.

Glossarium is a book or writing comprehending yXcaooag.
Among the Greeks, ykwOGU meant either zrfeowmhc f/'orrf,peculiar
to a certain dialect only, and itnknown in others ; or obsolete word;
or obscure one. Glossary means a hook, coutaininer explanations
of obscure and difficult words. Of course, a Glossary extends
only to a few of the words and phrases of any author. It is not
to be used at a lexicon ; for it is only a commeat ou particular

GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 43

passages. It differs, therefore, in nothing except mere form, from .
very brief Scholia,

As to the authority of Glossaries, it is regulated by the same
principles as that of Scholia ; mere antiquity of itself adding no-
thing important to its weight, which is proportioned to the phi-
lological knowledge and accuracy of its author.

The principal ancient Glossaries published, are those of He-
sychius, Suidas, Phavorinus, Cyrill, Photius, Et^mologicon Mag-
num. Compare, on this note and the two preceding Sections,
Morus, pp. 115--130.

§ 90. Testimony of Versions, The testimony of Fer-
sions is to be estimated by their antiquity, and by the
knowledge of the Original which the translator pos-
sessed. In order to judge of the latter, the Version must
be compared in many places with the original, in passa-
ges where the sense is certain. But here, we must well
understand the language of the Version itself, lest we
should err in judging of it, and rashly suppose the Trans-
lator has not hit the true sense, (which has often hap-
pened to those who have passed sentence on the Sept.
Version, and on the quotations from the Old Test., that
are to be found in the JSTew ;) or lest we should under-
stand the words which are nicely chosen, in a low and
vulgar sense. Boyce has shewn, that even Erasmus and
Beza have erred here. (Morus, p. 130. XXXV.)

Here again, antiquity is to be regarded only as conferring
more advantage on a translator, in respect to a knowledge of
ancient customs, history, &c. In some cases, too, the translator
may have lived before the languaere which he translates had
ceased to be vernacular. But in either of these cases, an igno-
rant man could not be recommended as a translator, because he
preceded, by one, four, or ten centuries, an intelligent, thorough
philologist. The credit of any Version turns on its fidelity and
ability. No ancient Version, either Sept., Vulgate, Italic, Syri-
ac, Chaldaic, &c, will bear any comparison in respect to either
of these characteristics, with many recent versions, made by the
finished Oriental scholars of the present day.

§91. Other similar testimonies. Similar to the helps
just mentioned, are those writers, who have explained
to their readers, words and obscure expressions taken
from another language. E. g. Cicero explains many
Oreek words, and Dionysius Halicar. many Latin ones.

44 ©N FINDING THE USlTS LO^UENDI

Of the same class, are writers who have inserted trans-
lations from another language ; e. g. the Latin poets
and historians, from the Greek ; the writers of the New
Testament, from the Hebrew of the Old. (Morus, p.
131. XXXVI.)

Passages cited from the Old Testament, are frequently ex-
plained in the New, either by the connexion in which tiiey stand,
the language in which they are expressed, (Comp. Is. 40:13 with
Rom. 11: 34) or by some adjuncts or direct explanation.

§ 92. Knowledge of the peculiar style and all the civ
cumstances of an author necessary. The principles of in-
terpretation, thus far, apply to writers of all ages and
nations. But in addition to these, there are some prin-
ciples peculiar and appropriate to certain writers, of
a particular age, nation, or sect. This peculiar usus lo-
quendi may be known, (l) From the writer's own testi-
mony, either express or implied.(a) (2) From the cus-
toms and principles of the sect to which he belongs, (6)
whether philosophical or religious ; and these customs
and principles may be known, from the testimony of
those who belonged to the same sect, or have explained
its principles. (3) The interpreter must have a knowl-
edge of the manners and customs of the age, to which
his author alludes ; (c) and this is to be obtained by con-
sulting those, who have given information on these top-
ics, {d) (4) The interpreter should have a general
knowledge of writers of the same age. (Morus, pp.
132—141.)

a) If an author have a manner of expression wholly suigeneriSf
then his own writings are the only legitimate source of informa-
tion in respect to it ; and in them, testimony may be either di-_
rect, where the author himself gives explanations ; or indirect,
where the explanations are to be drawn from adjuncts, or the
context. (6) Every religious sect has terms used in a sense pe-
culiar to itself. Of course, a writer belonging to this sect may be
supposed to use its language ; and an explanation ofitislobe
found, as Ernr sti directs, (c) F.very age has its own peculiar
language, customs and sentiments, in some respect or other.
Consequently a knowledge of these peculiarities is necessary, in
order to explain language that is predicated upon them. Hence

GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 45

it is plain, (rf) That cotemporary authors are the most probable
source o/' illustration, next to the writings of an author himself;
as they were conversant with the same manners, customs, lan-
guage, sentiments, <StC, as the author.

The question, To what nation did the author belongs, is of
great moment, oftentimes, in explainmg his niethod of using lan-
guage. E. g. What can be more diverse, than the Jewish, and
Roman and Attic method of writing, in a great variety of re-
spects ?

§ 93. The nature of composition should be specially
reg-arded in the interpretation of it History is one
thing; poetij, another; oratory, another, (a) Partic-
ular periods have their special characteristics in each
of these modes of composition; which frequently arises
from a fashion of writing- or speaking, introduced by
some distinguished person. (Morus, p. 141 — 147.)

History therefore is to be interpreted as history, not as alle-
gory, or mythic fiction ; poetry is to be construed as possessing
its own peculiar characteristics ; and so of the rest. No one
circumstance more displays an interpreter's knowledge and crit-
ical acumen, than a judicious regard to the kind of composition,
and the age, circumstances, and idiom of the author.

PART II.

CHAPTER III.

OTHER MEANS TO ASSIST IN FINDING THE SENSE OP WORDS,
BESIDES THE USUS LOQUENDI.

[Compare Keil, pp. 45—80. Beck, pp. 127—141. Seiler, H 250
—256.]

§ 94. Design of the following chapter. The preced-
ing chapter treated of the method of finding the usus la-
quendi^ i. e. the meaning which usage has attached to
words, by direct testimony. This testimony, it was

46 SUBSIDIARY MEAN*

shewn, might be deduced from three sources; viz,
from the author interpreted, or his cotemporaries ;
from foreigners who understood his language ; and from
Scholia, Glossographies, and Versions. With these was
united a knowledge of the peculiar style, idiom, coun-
try, circumstances, &c, of the author, as also the kind
of compositions, which is to be interpreted. We come
now to treat of indirect testimony, to which we must
frequently resort, in order to iind the meaning of words.

§ 95. JVecessity of indirect testimony. The usus lo-
quendi cannot always be found, with sufficient certainty,
by those means which have been pointed out. Proper
evidence respecting it is sometimes wanting ; some-
times usage is variable or inconstant, even in the same
age, or in the same writer ; or there is an ambiguity of
language, or of grammatical forms; or an obscurity
covers the subject or thing treated of; or novelty of
language occurs ; or a neglect of the usus loquendi^ which
sometimes happens even in the most careful writers.
Other means therefore must be used, by which the true
sense can be elicited. (Morus, p. 148. I.)

§ 96. Scope of a writer the first and best means. The
most important of these means for discovering the sense
of any particular passage, is found in resorting to the
general tenor of the discourse. The design or scope of
the discourse in general, is to be compared with the
passage investigated. (a) The ground of this rule is,
that we ought not to suppose a good and judicious writ-
er has said what is inconsistent with his design. Abso-
lute certainty, however, is not always attainable, in this
way; for it sometimes happens, that several interpre-
tations may agree with the scope of the writer. Hence,
there are cases in which only a probability in favor of
a certain meaning is to be found ; and even cases, where
not so much as this can be attained. (Morus, p. 149.
III—V.)

o) But how is this scope of the writer to be ascertained ? (1)
From the express statement of the M'riter, E. g. John 20:31.

OP FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 47

Rom. 3; 28. (2) From the occasion or circumstances, which
originated the discourse. E. g. the parables of Christ, and many
passages in the Epistles. (3) From history, i. e. authentic ac-
counts of facts, that would very naturally give rise to the dis-
course in question, and would serve to explain it ; e. g. the epis-
tle of Jude is directed against teachers, who lived licentiously.
2 Cor. almost throughout, has reference to facts which existed at
that time. If none of these things cast sufficient light on the
scope of the writer, the whole must be perused and re-perused
carefully ; by which, unexpected light often breaks in.

But some caution, in respect to the rule in Section 96 is proper.
All parts of a discourse have not, invariably, a strict connexion
with its general scope. iVIany things are often said, which are
wholly irrelevant to it, and which are mere obiter dicta. These
are not to be interpreted by the general scope of the discourse,
but agreeably to the subject thai is treated of, in the place where
they occur. Recurrence to this principle is very important, in
many parts of the New Testament.

§ 97. Caution in regard to the rule above. In regard
to this means, then, of attaining the sense, we must take
care not to trust too much to it, nor to rely solely upon
it. Nor must we rest satisfied with only some tolera-
ble agreement of the sense given, with the general
scope of the writer. This the unlearned are v.ery apt
to do, for want of skill in the languages ; whence have
arisen many idle conjectures. We must insist upon an
evident and necessary connexion with the scope of the
discourse.

But how shall we know when it is evident, and necessary^ (1)
"Where a meaning plainly contradicts the tenor of a discourse, it
is to be rejected. (2) When it violates the principles of paral-
lelism, and the conclusions drawn from them, as to the sense of
a passage. (See H 80 — 86.) (3) Reject a meaning, which
gives an inept and frigid sense. By a frigid sense, is mf ant one
which contributes neither to argument, nor perspicuity, nor or-
nament.

A meaning which infringes upon none of these negative pre-
cepts, will be found to harmonize with the subject of which the
author is treating, unless he has violated all the rules of language
and reasoning.

§ 98. Second caution^ in regard to the scope of the dis-
course. Another caution is, that we compare the mean-

48 SUBSIDIARY MEANS

ing, as discovered by the scope of the writer, with that
which the asus loqucndi affords, and see whether they
can be niade to agree. In other words, we must see
whether the usus loquendi will tolerate any particular
sense given to the passage by the scope of the dis-
course, specially in respect to words which have vari-
ous meanings; or whether there be a repugnance to it.
Occasionally, the meaning derived from the scope of
the writer, will lead to a knowledge of something
which may serve to establish its harmony with the usus
loquendi.

But to interpret solely from the supposed scope of a
writer, without the aid and consent of the usus loquendi^
and even in opposition to it, belongs rather to rash con-
jecture, than to interpretation by rule. Wherefore this
help is not to be used, unless in cases of ambiguity, or
of words which are dna'S, Ifyof-ievcc, and generally in
cases where the best testimony to the meaning of words
is either wanting, or is insufficient to determine the
sense.(a) (Morus, p. 168. VII. and VIII.)

a) The reason why (he scope of a discourse is not to be re-
sorted to, except in cases where anibiguity arises, is, that the
usus loquendi is the best evidence which can be liad of the mean-
ins: of a passH^e, and nothing can be admitted which shall con-
tradict it, where it can be established by adequate testimony.
iBut in case one doubts what meaning the usus loquendi would
assign, or at least allow, to any word or phrase, secondary or
subsidiary means, i. e. the scope of the discourse may be resort-
ed to, for the sake of obtaining the desired illustration.

§ 99. Use of the context in interpretation. Of more
limited extent,(a) but rather more evident, is the rule,
to have recourse to the antecedents and consequents of
a passage, i. e. the context, in order that you may de-
termine its meaning. This is done for two reasons : ei-
ther that we may choose out of several meanings, one
which does not disagree with the usus loquendi ; or that
the meaning of an uncommon word, not explained by
the usus loquendi^ may be discovered. Here, however,
we must guard against proceeding be} ond probability ;
and to do this, we must observe the same cautions, as
have been just given above. (IVIorus, p. 160. IX.)

GF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 49

a) In the original, angustius ; by which Ernesti probably
meant, of less importance^ or confined within narrower limits.
But I cannot accede to the propriety of this sentinrient ; for the
inamediate context, either preceding, succeeding, or both togeth-
er, is a rule for judging of the meaning of words, of the \eTy
broadest extent. I might say that even the evidence of the usus
hjquendiy is, in very many cases, built upon iae context. We
adopt the opinion, that the usus loquendi sanctions this or that
particular sense, because the context clearly shews that such a
meaning is to be assigned to it, and that no other can be given
without rendering the sense frigid and inept. Moreover, the
general scope of an author does not forbid the admission of a
great variety of arguments, illustrations, and episodes (if I may
be indulged in the use of such a word here) into the intermediate
parts of a discourse ; so that one is far more certain of giving
a sense that is congruous, by consulting the immediate contexty
than by merely consulting the general scope of the whole. Both,
no doubt, are to be regarded ; but of the two, the former is by
far the most important means of assistance.

Indeed, I should doubt whether there is any one rule, in the
whole science of Hermeneutics, so important, and of so much
practical and actual use, as the one in question. Great care in-
deed, is necessary, to decide with certainty what sense the con-
text requires that a word should have ; specially when the im-
mediate subject is briefly stated. But this carets as easily prac-
tised, as any other rule is, which Hermeneutics prescribes in dif-
ferent cases. Violence must not be done to words, by forcibly
subjecting them to the context, against etymology, analogy, the
rules of grammar, and the nature of language. But in every
thing short of this, all good Lexicographers and Commentators
adapt the meaning of words to the context, in cases too numerous
to need any specification. Comp. Morus ut supra.

§ 100. Various comparisons useful., in order to discov-
er the m.eaning of words. Of similar utility ibr finding
the sense of ambiguous or obscure words is the compar-
ing of subject and attribute ; of nouns and adjectives ; (a)
of words accompanied by other words that qualify them,
which may consist of adverbs, or of nouns joined to the
word investigated by prepositions and constituting a
kind of adverbial periphrasis; {b) or finally of disjunc-
tives.(c) (Morus, p. 163. XI— XIV.)

^ a)Quah'a sint subject a ^ ialia sint attributa, is the old rule of
the Schools and of philosophy, founded upon the common sense
of mankind. In accordance with this, we understand as tropica!

->0 SUBSIDIARY MEANS

language, all those expressions which ascribe hands, feet, eyes,
ascent, descent, &:c, to God, who is a Spirit. The principle in
question is of vast extent in construing the figurative language of
the Scriptures ; and it also extends to manj expressions that are
not strictly tropical. Too much certainty however, should not
be ascribed to it ; for some cases occur, where the subject is im-
perfectly known, and of course, we are unable to pronounce, with
confidence, what attributes may be ascribed to it.

b) E g. ^ar oxpcv agcGcg' Kax o\pcv serves merely the
purpose of an adjective, qualifying agiGl^Q^ and shewing that
judgment from external appearance only is meant.

b) By disjunctives are meant, words placed in antithesis. E.g.
Heaven, earth ; spirit, Jiesh; &c. The rule for finding the sense,
in such cases, is obvious, provided the meaning of either term
can be found. For whatever meaning one term has, the other has
the opposite ; so that if certainty be acquired as to the one, it is
of course acquired as to the other, which is to be construed as a
real antithesis. Compare ^ 62.

§ 101. Analogy of languages a means of interpreta-
iion. Analogy of languages may also assist, in judging"
of the meaning of words. This is of different kinds.
The first is analogy of any particular language, (i. e. the
same language with that to be interpreted, which anal-
ogy was treated of in a former chapter, and shewn to
be useful in ascertaining the usus loquendi,) the princi-
ples of which are developed by the precepts of gram-
marians. It is necessary here only to touch upon this
analogy. (Morus, p. 168. XV.)

Analogy means similitude. E. g. From the meaning attach-
ed to the forms of words, their position, their connexion, &c, in
one or rather many cases, we argue to establish a similarity of
meaning, where the phenomena are the same, in another. This
analogy is the foundation of all the rules of Grammar, and of all
that is established and intelligible in language.

§ 102. Grammatical analogy useful not only in finding
the usus loquendi^ but applicable to some doubtful cases.
E. g. when the kind of meaning generally considered,
is evident, (by comparing other similar words, and me-
thods of speaking concerning such things, appropriate
to the language,) we may judge of the special force or
power of the word, by aid of grammatical analogy : as,

OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 51

1 Pet. Y. 5, where many critics have attached to eyy^Ofx-
6(aaa(56uv an emphatic sense, we must compare the oth-
er Greek phrases, which relate to clothings or investing.
And thus we shall see, that the prepositions, neQi, af,iqt,
ev are used in composition, without any accession of
meaning to the verb thereby ; and consequently that
fyao^SojoaGdac is no more than evdvoccoOac^ with which
it is commuted, in Clemens Rom. Ep. I. p. 39. A good
interpreter should be well versed in such comparisons.
(Morus, p. 170. XVI.)

§103. Analogy of kindred languages. Another ctwai-
ogy is that of kindred' languages ; either as descended
from one common stock, as Hebrew, Syriac, Chaldee
and Arabic ; or derived the one from the other, as Latin
and Greek. The former kind of analogy Schultens has
explained, and often had recourse to it, in his Origines
Ling, Heb.^ and in his various Commentaries.

Morus, on this section, sajs, thai dialects differ only in the mode
of declining, in the pronunciation and forms of words, &c ; and
ranks the Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic, among the dialects of the
Hebrew ; while he calls the Latin and Greek, cognate languages.
General usage, however, is against him ; for cognate languages
of the Hebrew is almost the appropriate name of those which he
calls dialects.

§ 101. Use of this analogy. This analogy is of use
to the interpreter, not only in assisting him by the aid
of one dialect, to restore roots which have perished in
another that is the subject of his investigation, and thus
opening a way of access to the signification of words;
but still more useful as a means of illustrating and con-
firining that sense of words, which the scope of the dis-
course commends.

This is a subject deeply interesting to every student of the
original languages of the Bible, especially of the Hebrew.
Analogy, moderately and judiciously used, is of great worth ;
but pushed too far, it degenerates into a violation of all the fun-
damental rules of Interpretation. Comp. Morus, p. 176. XIX —
XXII, where several valuable cautions may be found. Better
still may be found in the admirable Preface of Gesenius to hie

5^ SUBSIDIARY MEANS

Hebrew Lexicon, Preface to Part I. pp. 4 — 6. Part II. 4 — 14.
See also Jahn on the study of the original languages of the Scrip-
tures, pp. 19, 20, and Note G.

§105. Etymology an uncertain guide. The fluctuat-
ing use of words, which prevails in every language,
gives rise to frequent changes in their meaning. There
are but few words in any language, which always re-
tain their radical and primary meaning. Great care,
therefore, is necessary in the interpreter, to guard
against rash etymological exegesis ; which is often very
fallacious. Etymology often belongs rather to the his-
tory of language, than to the illustration of its present
meaning ; and rarely does it exhibit any thing more
than a specious illustration.

See an admirable illustration of this, in Canapb. IV. H 15 — 26.

§ 108. Expressions which convey a similar meaning are
to be compared^ although in respect to etymology they may
differ. That analogy is particularly useful to an inter-
preter, which leads him not only to compare similar
words and phrases, and so cast light from the one upon
the other; but also to compare expressions, which
though dissimilar in respect to etymology^ are employed
to designate the same idea. Of this nature are TcenQafxa'
vog V7T0 Tf]p dfAaQTiuv compared with the Latin addictus
alicui^ and ojg dta 7n;()0^ compared with amhustus ; when
the Latin words are used tropically. So we may com-
pare the Hebrew l3']b^'n "JS^ with the Greek enTiodcov.
For as the Greeks clearly use ennodajv where the Lat-
ins say, e medio ; so iTtnodcov and D'^blJ'^ 'jS^ are so
much alike, that the Greek would almost seem to be
made out of the Hebrew phrase. Hence we may see
that the sense of fi'^b^^ )7iJ2 is c medio. (Morus, p. 180.
XXI.)

§ 107. Foundation of analogy in all languages. No
one can doubt that men are affected in nearly the same
way, by objects of serise. Hence, those who speak of
the same objects, perceived and contemplated in the

OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 53

same manner, although they may use language that dif-
fers in respect to etymology, yet must be supposed to
have meant the same thing; and on this account, the
one maybe explained by the other. (Morus, p. 178.
XX.)

Men are physically and mentally affected in the same manner,
by very many objects ; and of course, it may be presumed that
they entertain and mean to express the same ideas concerning
these objects, however various their language may be. Besides,
modes of expression are often communicated from one people
to another. Of the use to be made of these facts, the following
Section treats.

§ 108. Use of the above general principle. In general,
this principle is of great extent, and of much use to the
interpreter, in judging of the meaning of tropical lan-
guage, and in avoiding fictitious emphasis. According-
ly, we find it resorted to, now and then, by good inter-
preters, with great profit. But it needs much and ac-
curate knowledge of many tongues to use it discreetly ;
whence it is not to be wondered at, that its use is not
very common among interpreters. (Morus, p. 181.
XXII.)

The following general cautions, on the subject of comparing
words and languages with each other, may be of some utility,
(1) The meaning in each or any language is not to be resolved
into the authority of Lexicons, but that of good writers. (2)
Words, phrases, tropes, &c, of any ancient language are to be
judged of by the rules of judging among those who spoke that
language, and not by those which prevail in modern times, and
have originated from different habits and tastes. (3) Guard
against drawing conclusions as to the meaning of words, in the
same or different languages, from fanciful etymology, similarity
or metathesis of letters, &c. (4) "When the sense of words can
be ascertained in any particular language, by the ordinary means,
other languages, even kindred ones, should not be resorted to; ex-
cept for the purpose of increased illustration or confirmation.
(5) Take good care, that real similitude exists, whenever com-
parison is made. See Morus, pp. 182 — 184.

§ 109. Interpretation by appeal to the nature of things^
the common sense^ views ^ and feelings of men^ &c. We
*5

^*i SUBSIDIARY MEANS

must also resort to the nature of things, and the analo-
gy of the sentiment, which a writer is inculcating, that
^ve may find the true meaning of his words, and not at-
tribute to them more nor less than he did. Every wri-
ter, spontaneously or from education, feels that his read-
ers must understand what he is saying, so that there is
no danger of misapprehension. It happens, not unfre-
quently, that on this accoui-t he uses language which is
not altogether accurate, if it be judged of by the rules
of logical precision. Of this nature are catachresis, hy-
perbole^ hypallage^ and those phrases which assert gen-
erally what is true of only a part, or of some particular
kind. These and other like modes of speech are in-
troduced by vulgar custom into every language, spe-
cially into the Oriental ones. They abound in poetry
and oratory. Nor is there any particular reason, that
a writer should take special pains to avoid them. It is
necessary, therefore, in these cases, to have recourse,
for the sake of interpretation, to the nature of things,
(a) to innate conceptions, common sense, and the plain
elements of knowledge, {b) Moreover, we must avoid
urging mere verbal criticism too far, or introducing far
fetched etymologies, or hastily concluding that the ex-
pression of the author is faulty. Language is made by
prevailing usage ; nor can that be faulty language, which
agrees with the usage of those who are well skilled in
it. Wherefore grammatical anomalies are not only free
from fault, when predominant usage sanctions them, but
they become a part of the language, so that one who
departs from them may be said to write inaccurately.

a) E. g. The mind is injlamed ; in interpreting which expres-
sion, we resort to the nature of the mind, to show that the sense
of inflamedmxi^i he tropical. So when the sun is said to rise^ go
down^ &c ; God to ascend, descend, &c, we resort to the real na-
ture of the subjects in question, in order to explain the language.
So in explaining prophetic language, if the event prophesied have
come to pass, we resort to the history of the event, to cast ligiit
on the language which predicts it.

b) E. g. Pluck out thy right eye; cut off thy right hand. In
construing this, our views of the worth of life, and of our mem-
bers ; our views of duty as to the preservation of life and use-

Ol> FINDING THE USUS I.OqL'F.NDI. 5i)

fulness, and our knowledge of the nature of the Christian relig-
ion in general, all conspire to lead us to reject the literal expo-
aition, and to give the words a tropical sense. So when Christ
tells his disciples to salute no one by the way^ Sec ; and in like
manner, in innumerable other cases.

As to the various figures of speech, mentioned in the section
above, can it be doubted, whether they occur in the Scriptures?
Catachresis is the use of a word, so as to attribute to a thing, what
cannot be really and actually predicated of it. When the heav-
ens then are said to listen ; the floods to clap their hands ; the
hills to skip ; the trees of the forest to exult ; what is this but ca-
tachresis of the boldest kind ? Hyperbole magnifies a thing be-
yond its real greatness. When the Saviour says. It is easier for
a camel to go through the eye of a needle^ than for a rich man to
enter into the Kingdom of God; which is afterwards explained
as merely meaning, How hardly shall they that have riches, be
saved ; was not his language hyperbole ? Hypallage means a
change of appropriate language for other terms unappropriate.
E.g. Luke 1:64, his mouth and his toiigue ^v£C0)^6f]. The
student, however, must not be content with a meagre note, on
this great subject. Let him peruse and re-peruse Lowth's Lec-
tures on Hebrew poetry, where the nature, design and extent of
figurative language in the Scriptures, is better unfolded, than in
any other book, of which I have any knowledge. Comp. also
Glassii Fhilol. Sac. ed. Dathii, Vol. II. (Morus, pp. 185—194.)

In regard to that usage, by which the whole is put for a part,
and a part for the whole ; it is by no means uufrequent in the
Scriptures. How often do we meet with nccQ or navreg, when
only a large or considerable number is intended. On the other
hand, a part is put as the representative of the whole, in very
many passages ; e. g. Ps. 8: 7, 8. Rom. 8: 38, 39. Surely in
the last example here, the apostle does not mean to say that the
things which he particularizes, are the only things which are un-
able to separate us from the love of Christ. He means to say,
that nothing whatever can efifect a separation. In all such cases,
the extent, the nature of the subject, and scope of the discourse,
must determine the latitude in which the words are to be taken.

Especially must common sense^ as Ernesti says, be appealed to
in the interpretation of parables, allegories, and all kinds of fig-
urative language, proverbial expressions, &.c. Every writer ad-
dresses himself to the common sense of his fellow men.

§ 110. The error of pressing etymologies too far not
unfrequent. The fault of pressing etymologies too far,
is more general than we should be, apt to imagine. For
not only they are guilty of this fault, who explain all ,

56 ON FINDING THE USUS lOQUENDI

words by tracing them to their primitive meaning,
(which is very common ;) but those also, who always
insist too strenuously on the ordinary and grammatical
Force of a word. Hence arise many false interpreta-
tions and fictitious emphases. But of this, more here-
after.

PART II.

CHAPTER IV.

ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

[Keil, pp. 46—60. Beck, pp. 131—136. Seiler, H 236—257.]

§ 111. What has been said thus far in this Treatise,
has respect to the laws of Interpretation generally con-
sidered. We come now to treat of our subject, with
reference to the exegesis of the JN'ew Testament.

§ 112. Knowledge of the JV. Testament dialect impor-
tant. In the first place, we must inquire concerning the
kind of language, or dialect in general, which the writ-
ers of the N. Testament use ; for a knowledge of this
is highly important, in order that we may be able to
find and judge of the sense of the words ; as will speedi-
ly be shewn.

§ 1 1 3. The question to be here investigated. This sub-
ject in general is comprised in a single question ; viz.
Is the N. Testament, in its words, phrases, and form of
language, pure (a) classic Greek ; or does it partake of
the Hebrew idiom ?

The former is defended by Pfochen, Stolberg, E.
Schmidt, Blackwall, Georgi, and a few others, not
very eminent for their knowledge of Greek ; the lat-
ter, by Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Camerarius, Beza,

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 57

Drusius, Casaubon, Glass, Gataker, Solan, Olearius,
V^orstius, and many others who were well skilled in the
Greek language ; with whom also, Origen and Chrys-
ostom agree. (Morus, p. 195. 11. Vide etiampp. 217—
222.)

a) We call that a pure style, which has neither barbarisms nor
solecisms in it.

§ 1 14. What belongs not to the present question. If this
question may be rightly understood and judged of, we
must premise, that the inquiry is not, whether some
have not mistaken or do not still, mistake, pure Greek
expressions for Hebraisms. We may readily concede
this; for error may bo, and has been committed here;
and there are some modes of speech, which are com-
mon to all languages. (Morus, p. 201. IV. I.)

§ 115. Still further defined. Nor is the question,
whether the same Greek words and phrases^ occurring
in the N. Testament, may be found in good Greek au-
thors. This we may often concede. Nor do we in-
quire whether some phrase, apparently a Hebraism,
may be found in some sublime or tragic poet, e. g. in
Eschylus or Sophocles, and used in the same sense ; as
^tjQu for the main land. For poets, specially these and
Lyric ones, say many things in an unusual way, which
are not to be imitated in common usage. They even
intermix foreign expressions; and sometimes use anti-
quated phrases. IVIany such things Stanley has noted
in Eschylus, and Zwingle in Pindar, whose preface to
fhis author should be read. The same is the case in
Sophocles. (Morus, pp. 203—209.)

§116. The same subject continued. Nor is it incon-
sistent with the purity of N. Testament Greek, that
certain words are found, which designate objects un-
known to the Greeks, and are therefore to be under-
stood in a manner different from Greek usage, because
they borrow their meaning from the Hebrew manner of
speaking. Of this kind are ncaiig^ fUTupoia^ and other
words. (Morus, p. 209. IV.)

68 OP FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI

§ 117. The question directly stated. The question, as
to the idiom of the N. Testament, turns on the use of
those words and phrases, which designate those objects
that the Greeks are accustomed to designate ; and the
inquiry here must be, whether such words in the N.
Testament are used in the same sense which the Greeks
attach to them ; and whether phrases not only have the
same syntax as that of classic Greek, but also the same
sense as in the Greek authors : for this is essential to
the purity of language. E. g. diaaioovvr] used for liber-
ality ; £vXoyia ior plenty ; "Aotvov ior profane. So also,
dc^aiog evmniov rov Geov, agrov qayetv, na^aOT7]vcct
svoiTiLOv Tii/og^ &c, have a peculiar sense, in the JNT.
Testament. Morus, pp. 196. 197.)

§ 1 18. With what kind of Greek is the JV. Testament to
be compared ? In regard to the writers with whom the N.
Testament Greek is to be compared ; we must see that
they themselves are pure, i. e. ancient, prosaic authors,
who have not derived any thing in their style from the
Scriptures or the N. Testament ; and then historical
writers must be compared with historical ; doctrinal
with doctrinal; poetical with poetical, (a) (Morus, pp.
208. 209.)

a) Several hymns in the New Testament, and the Apocalypse,
with occasional quotations from the poetry of the Old Testament,
are poetical in their nature^ though not in their form ; at least,
they are not in the form of Greek poetry.

§ 119. JVew Testament Greek not pure. The ques-
tion being thus stated and defined, we deny, without
hesitation, that the diction of the New Testament is
pure Greek; and contend that it is modeled after the
Hebrew, not only in single words, phrases, and figures
of speech, but in the general texture of the language.
This can be established by clear examples, more nu-
merous than even those who agree with us in opinion
have supposed. For Luke himself, who is usually
thought to be the most pure in his style, has innumera-
ble Hebraisms. The very beginning of his Gospel, af-
ter a short preface of pure Greek, immediately goes

©F THE NEW TESTAMENT. 59

into the use of the Hebrew idiom so exactly, that it
seems to be translated literally from a Hebrew original.

§ 120. Some phrases are common to Greek and He-
hrczv. To prove that Hebrew-Greek is the language
of the New Testament, by citing examples here, would
be superfluous ; as these may be found in abundance,
by consulting the works of Olearius, Vorstius, Leusden,
Glass, and others. It may be proper however to re-
mark, that although certain phrases may be found in
pure Greek, yet they may also be Hebraisms. For
it may happen, that a writer, in translating a Hebrew
expression, may adopt words used by a good Greek
writer ; which is an observation sanctioned by the au-
thority of Gataker, Hemsterhuis, Raphel, and others.
E. g. yaiQav yatQeiv^ rnetum metuere^ which are good
Greek and Latin, but also literal translations of the He-
brew ^tiD ins.

§ 121. Arguments to support the sentiment expressed in
§ 1 19. It is no small argument for the Hebraistic style
of the New Testament, that many parts of it can be
more easily translated into Hebrew, than into any other
language, as Erasmus Schmidius confesses, though a
strenuous defender of the classic purity of the New
Testament. Nay, many parts of the New Testament
can be explained in no other way, than by means of the
Hebrew. Moreover, in many passages, there would
arise an absurd or ridiculous meaning, if they should be
interpreted according to a pure Greek idiom ; as ap-
pears from the examples produced by Werenfels, and
by me, in my Essay De difficidtt, interpr. gromm. A''.
Test, § 12; to which many others might easily be add-
ed. Theology would have been freed from many er-
rors, that have crept in, if Hebraisms had not been in-
terpreted as pure Greek ; as Melancthon in his Com-
mentaries has frequently shewn. (Morus, p. 198. III.)

122, Additional argument. It is another argument in

60 ©F FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI <

favor of the Hebraisms of the New Testament, that
former Greek and Latin interpreters, who have follow-
ed the manner of classic Greek, in their interpretations,
have often tortured the sense, and made it plainly in-
ept. E. g. in explaining GvpdeofAco TilHOTt]Tog, as Me-
Jancthon remarks. The same thing has happened to
modern interpreters, who are ignorant of the Hebrew
idiom ; while, to those who are acquainted with it, such
passages are very plain. But mistakes, on such ground,
could not be made, if the Apostles had written pure
Greek. (Morus, p. 199.)

§ 123. Objections answered. We need not be under
any apprehension, that the dignity of the New Testa-
ment will suffer, by the admission that Hebraisms may
be found in its style. Tr?/^/i cannot injure religion ; and
many reasons, moreover, may be given, why the He-
brew-Greek style was proper and necessary for the
New Testament writers.

For 1, The writers of the New Testament could not
spontaneously write Greek well, ina-smuch as they were
born and educated Hebrews ; nor did they learn Greek
in a scholastic way, nor were they accustomed to the
reading of Greek authors. This is true of Paul as well
as the others. For although he was born at Tarsus,
where schools of rhetoric and philosophy were estab-
lished, it does not follow that he attended them; nor
that he was familiar with the Greek poets, because he
quotes a single verse from one of them. Greek taste,
style, and literature were plainly foreign to a man, who
belonged to the most rigid of the sect of the Pharisees,
and was brought up at the feet of Gamaliel.

2. Nor was it congruous, that the Holy Spirit should
inspire the Apostles to write pure Greek. For pass-
ing by the consideration, that if they had written classic
Greek, no critic would now admit that they were the
authors of the books ascribed to them, we may say that
the Apostles themselves would not have understood
their own language, unless by additional inspiration giv-

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. . ^1

en for this very purpose. Much less would the com-
mon peo[>le among the Jews have understood it ; for
whom these books, for the most part, w^ere primarily
written; and who, through hatred of the Greeks and
of Grecian eloquence, would not have approved of a
classic style, it being so contrary to the diction of the
Septuagint, and so diverse from the Hebrew Scrip-
tures.

Finally^ as the New Testament is built upon the old,
the same diction ought to be preserved throughout.
(Morus, pp. 210—217.)

§ 124. Hehrcw-Greek idiom does not necessarily make
the style of the JVew Testament obscure. Nor does the
Hebrew idiom of the New Testament injure its perspi-
cuity. Every writer has special reference to his own
times ; to those for whom he primarily writes ; not to
future times, so as to neglect his cotemporaries. The
obscurity which arises ft:om this mode of writing is not
a necessary one ; but results merely from the change
which time makes in languages. It is an obscurity
common to all good ancient writers ; for the ground of
it lies in the ignorance of later readers, and not in the
writers.

§ 125. Language of the Kew Testament is Hebrew^
Greek. Hence the style of the New Testament may
justly be named, Hebrew-Greek, if any, with Scaliger and
Drusius, Choose to call it Hellenistic^ let them not, with
Heinsius, understand by this a peculiar^Z)ia/ec( ; which ^^^
Salmasius has sufficiently refuted. Nor would I name
it the Alexa?idrine Dialect ; for the Jews, in other
places, wrote in the same style. The Alexandrine dia-
lect, concerning which there is extant a little book of
one Irenaeus an Alexandrine grammarian, respects
merely peculiarities of language appropriate to the Al-
exandrians ; such for example, as existed among the
Attics, lonians, &c. Some choose to call it the Mace-
donian dialect, becauj^e many words in the New Testa-
6

/

62 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDi

ment are peculiar to the Macedonians, and the language
agrees more with that of Polybius, Diodorus Siculu5<,
&c, than with that of the ancient Greek writers. (Mo-
rus, pp. 222—234.)

§ 126. It also comprizes Latinlsms. Nor is all, which
is not pure Greek, of course to be named Hebraism ;
for some words are of Latin derivation, occasioned by
intercourse with the Romans ; and others are of the
Syriac, Chaldee, or Rabbinic dialect. Vide Olearius
de Stylo Nov. Test. Sect, didac. ii. iii ; et Wetsteni-
um ad N. Test. Acta. 13. 48. (Morus, pp. 235.-238.)

Besides Fiatinisms, as (Sne^OvXaxMQ zovGreodia, and such
phrases as XajLi^ai^eiv OV^^OvXcov consilium capere^ e^yaocvcv
dovi/av operam dare, &c, there are Persian words to be Ibund in
the New Testament, as Aa^a^, fiayov, ayyaQevetv. Sjriasms,
as A^^a. MaQav ylda. Also Chaldaisms and llabbinisms.
See Marsh's Michaelis, on the New Testannent idioms.

§ 127. Method of finding the usus loquendi of the A''ew
Testament not difficult. These things being settled re-
specting the general nature of the New Testament
diction; it will be easy to point out the method of
ascertaining the usus loquendi, and of drawing aid
from it, in the interpretation of particular passages', so
as to assist the interpreter.

§ 128, Rules for finding the usus loquendi. First ^ the
interpreter should be well skilled in the Greek and
Hebrew idioms ; so that he can distinguish between
pure Greek, and that method of writing which is de-
rived from another language. This is necessary in order
rightly to interpret either. In regard to good Greek,
he must specially consult not only the writers, who
have used the popular language, but writers of a proxi-
mate age, who have imitated the Attic diction, though
not studiously. Among these are Polybius, Diodorus
Siculus, and Artemidorus ; in which authors are many
words common to the New Testament, either not used

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 63

at all by the old Greeks, or else used in a different
sense. (Morus, p. 238.— 240.)

§ 129. Much caution necessary to decide what is classic
and what is Hebrew-Greek ; Sept. and Hebrew to be com-
pared. In all places, therefore, let him carefullj' ex-
amine whether the diction he pure Greek, or not ; in
which there is more difficulty than one mi«;ht be apt to
suppose. Where the diction departs from pure Greek,
let him resort to the Hebrew. To do this properly, he
must not only be acquainted with the genius of the He-
brew, as it is developed in the forms and tenses of
words, in the construction of them, and in the junction
of the members of a sentence, (which however will
often be sufficient,) but he must also know in what
Greek words the Jews were accustomed to express
Hebrew things, when they spoke in the then common
Greek style, without aiming, like Philo and Josephus,
at elegant classic diction. In this way, by a proper
comparison with the Hebrew, he may elicit the sense.

Sometimes there is no better method, than to trans-
late the Greek directly into the Hebrew ; which often-
times may be easily done by a tolerable Hebrew scholar,
both as it respects single words, and also phrases. But
at other times, this is difficult on account of the rare
occurrence of words, or the obscurity of them, or the
dissimilar etymology. The Septuagint, therefore, must
often be consulted ; and the interpreter should be so
familiar with it, as readily to know in what way Hebrew
expressions are translated into Greek. For as the origin of
speaking and writing in Greek, concerningsacred things,
took its rise from that Version, so it is evident, that

THIS VERSION MUST BE THE BASIS OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH
THE HEBREW-GREEK.

It will be useful, also, to be well acquainted with
writers on the Hebraisms of the New Testament, in
general ; such as Vorstius, Leusden, and specially
Gataker, the most learned of them all. (Morus, p. 241.
ii.)

64

OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI

§ 130. Aquila and Symmachus to be studied. It will
be proper, moreover, to study the remains ofAquila's
Greek Version, which exhibits a similar diction ; as he
was not very remote from the age of the apostles, and
has some things in his Version, which ma}^ be of special
use here. The Version of Symmachus should also be
read, who, by translating into pure Greek, has made the
understanding of Hebrew more easy.

In addition to the Hebrew-Greek mentioned in H 128 — 130,
the Apocrypha is of special use in the attainment of this idiom. The
apocryphal books of the New Testament, also, and several of
the apostolic Fathers exhibit a style, in many respects partak-
ing of this idiom. Comp. Morus, p. 241 — 245.

§ 131. When the Hebrew idiom is to be preferred. It
is a sound maxim, also, that when the same word or
phrase is Hebraistic, and also good Greek, and a
meaning not at all incongruous may be assigned to it, as
used according to either idiom, we should prefer that
sense which accords with the Hebrew idiom. For it is
more probable that Hebrew writers used the latter
idiom ; especially if the phrase, understood as classic
Greek, should be of the more polished and refined
kind. Accordingly I should explain xaraffohjv GuiQ^a-
TOQ^ Hebrews 1 1 : 11 . by the Hebrew in Genesis 4 : 25,
rather than from the Greek idiom. So (xnoOrjOicecv iv
cifiaQTLag^ John 8 : 24, by the Greek idiom would mean,
you will persevere to the end of life in sinning ; by the He-
brew, you will be condemned on account of your sins.
(Morus, p. 246. XI.)

§ 152. In the doctrines of religion^ the Hebrew idiom te
he specially regarded. An interpreter should particu-
larly observe, that when things appropriate to religion,
specially to the Christian religion, are* spoken of, the
idiom should be referred to the Hebrew ; because in
speaking of religious matters, the writers of the New
Testament were accustomed to use the phraseology of
the Hebrew Scriptures. The interpreter will be mu ch

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 65

assisted here by analogy of doctrine; with which he
ought to be familiar, lest the words of the New Testa-
ment should be drawn to a sense alien from that which
the authors desired to express, and different from the
essential points of religion. (Morus, p. 246. Xll.)

§ 1 33. Specially is Hebrew idiom to he' regarded in respect
to thefortns^ tenses^ and numbers of words. Nor should
the maxims here inculcated be applied only to the
meaning of words and phrases, but also to the forms and
tenses of verbs, and also to the number of both nouns
and verbs. In respect to these things, the idiom of
the New Testament, not unfrequently, departs A-om
classical Greek, and follows the Hebrew. An interpre-
ter, who neglects this, will fall into great difficulties,
and commit many surprising and almost ridiculous mis-
takes. (Morus, p. 248.)

§ 134. Other idioms to he consulted,^ in certain cases.
When the Hebrew idiom fails us, in the explication of a
passage or word, we must then have recourse specially
to the Syriac, Chaldee, or to Rabbinic. All concede that
we should have recourse to the Syriac and Chaldee ;
but all do not rightly understand the nature of this
comparison; as is evident from the attempts of some,
who have endeavoured to cast light upon the Greek of
the New Testament, by comparing the Sj'riac version
of it. The right method of proceeding is, to have re-
course to the Syriac, when we find ourselves deserted
by the Hebrew. If we find the idiom to be Syriac,
then we can attain to the meaning of the phrase or
word, when we have attained a right understanding of
the Syriac, which corresponds with it. This may be
more easily and certainly attained, provided the Syri-
ac be still a living language ; which, however, 1 find to
be doubted.

The same may be said of the Chaldee and Rabbinic.
But he who expects aid different from that which has
just been described, will seek and hope for it in vain.
*6

66

OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDl

He will either labour to no purpose, in heaping up
what will be useless ; or will abuse, to a bad purpose,
a help in exegesis which is by no means to be despised.
At most, he will only be able to determine, whether the
Syriac interpreter has rightly translated or not. (Mo-
rus, p. 249. XIII.)

§ 135. Direct testimony not always sufficient. Thus
far, we have been describing the method of discovering
the usiis loquendi in particular passages of the New
Testament, by evidence which we call direct. But al-
though this evidence is important and goes very far,
yet alone, it is not always sufficient. There are many
things in the New Testament, which are described in a
novel way, because the things themselves are new.
Not that a religion absolutely new is taught ; but an-
cient doctrines are delivered in language more per-
spicuous, appropriate, and distinctive, the veil of
figures and allegories being removed. New words
were therefore necessary, in order to describe new
things ; among which words are many, that are adapt-
ed to designate certain things, on account of some simi-
litude to them. These words, by the way, were not
invented by the Apostles, and could not have been ;
for such invention is a thing that belongs to minds
trained up by literary discipline, and not to unlet-
tered men. We may conclude, therefore, that terms
of such a kind were suggested by the Holy Spirit ;
which is an argument in favour of the divine inspiration
of the Scriptures. Of this nature are such words as
dat^fiOvcC^ffdaiy TOiQza^ogj avayevvav, and others. ^Mo-
rus, p. 249. XIV.)

§ 136. J\'ew words to be explained by testimony direct
and indirect. Such words cannot be explained from the
more ancient usus loquendi; but have an interpretation
peculiar to themselves, yet not less certain than the other
which is gathered from ancient usage. This interpre-
tation depends on the direct testimony of the writers.
Hence it must be gathered from the collation of similar

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

passages ; as we have already taught above. (Mo-
rns, p. 251.)

§ 137. Greek Fathers to be consulted. Nor is the tes-
timony of the ancient Greek Fathers of the Church by
any means to be neglected, which has respect to the
meaning of words and phrases ; whether it be the testi-
mony of professed interpreters, or of other writers.
Respecting a choice of interpreters among the Fathers,
and the use to be made of them, we shall hereafter
treat. I would merely observe here, that in those au-
thors, who are not direct interpreters, passages of the
New Testament now and then occur, in such a connex-
ion, or with such adjuncts, that we may clearly per-
ceive what meaning the age attached to them. Such
interpretations we find in Clemens Romanus, Ignatius,
Hippolytus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others. The in-
terpreter, in reading such authors, should diligently
attend to this. (Morus, p. 251. III.)

§ 138. These may exhibit interpretations of the primitive
age of Christianity. In writers of very early times,
there may, not improbably, be interpretations that have
come down from the apostolic age ; certainly if they
are consentaneous with apostolic doctrines, they are not
lightly to be rejected. It is one mark that they are
worthy of our approbation, if they are of a character
appropriate to the apostolic style, formed and moulded
after the genius and idiom of the Hebrew, {a) (Morus,
iibi supra.)

a) But who will venture to decide upon this, except by the
use of common means of interpretation ?

§ 139. Glossaries. The ancient Glossaries maybe of
use here, specially that of Hesychius ; in which is found
many things pertaining to certain passages of the Nevy
TeMament, that were deduced from the most ancient in-
terpreters of it, and which are of a character by no
means to be despised.

le

G8 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI

Similar to these are a few of the Glossaries of Sui-
das, and also of Photian ,• both of which are to be used
with that caution, in respect to any particular word,
which requires us well to ascertain, whether the word
in the Glossary really belongs to the passage, which
we desire to interpret.

In regard to all these things, good judgment is requi-
site in order to determine what is useful, and what is
worthless, and to distinguish between them ; which is
done, much in the way that has been above described.
(Morus, p. 252. IV.)

§ 140. Glosses. Even the glosses in some MSS. that
have crept into the text of the New Testament in place
of the true reading, may be used to assist the interpre-
ter, either to understand the true text, or to find means
for illustrating or contirming the true interpretation
Thus, for €Q6vi/7]oov^ in John 7 : b, Chrysostom has the
reading eQMxrioov^ Homil. 51, and explains it by ^aOe^
TOVTO yuQ iOTtv eQ(OTr}Gov. These glosses may have
flowed from the ancient schools, instructed by Origen ;
although some, indeed, may have proceeded from the
Latin Commentaries. (Morus, ubi supra.)

§141. Context. When all the above described means
fail, we must then resort to the context, and to the well
known nature of the things themselves. (Morus, p.
25^. V.)

§142. Analogy of faith. The analogy of Scripture
and of Christian doctrine should be always before our
eyes, so that the interpretation may be guided b}^ it ;
i. e. that it may so far be guided by it, that no explana-
tion contrary to it should be adopted ; and in the ob-
scure phrases, where the meaning may be doubtful,
the sense may be accommodated to the analogy of
Scripture sentiment.

This rule need not be wondered at, as common
sense has sanctioned it, and applied it to the interpre-
tation of other books ; all of which are to be explained,

OF THE XEW TESTAMENT. 69

generally, and in particular passages, agreeably to the
analogy of that doctrine which they contain.

Analogy of doctrine or faith does not consist in
the doctrine which is approved by any particular body
of men, as uncandid or unskilful persons assert ; for then
it would be various and inconstant. Grammatical analo-
gy is the rule of speaking, or form of speech, constitut-
ed by the laws of the language, which is opposed to
anomaly or a method of speaking in opposition to usage,
or varying from it. la like manner, the analogy of
sacred doctrine or faith consists in the summary of re-
ligion, and the rules plainly taught in the Scriptures ;
whence the Latin Church called it Regula Fidei. To
this analogy all things are to be referred, so that noth-
ing may be discordant with it. And when this is done,
the analogy of faith is said to be preserved. Nor, as to
faith and practice, does analogy of Scripture differ
from analogy of doctrine. Examples of analogy, and
of judgment agreeably to analogy, may be found in
Galatians 6: 15, 10. 1 Corinthians 15:3 — 11, &c.
where the writer calls that analogy rcJ uQMTa, In all
the departments of learning, analogy of such a kind has
the force of a rule, both in our judgment and interpre-
tation of a passage. (Morus, p. 253. XVI.)

In a special .manner, must we betake ourselves to
analogy, in those passages which seem to speak what
disagrees with that which is plainly taught in other
parts of the Scriptures, and with common sense, con-
cerning divine and human things. For it is common to
all uninspired writers, although eloquent, and thinking
and writing with acuteness and subtilty, that when they
are not composing a summary of doctrine, or the ele-
ments of it, nor treating designedly of any head of
doctrine, they exhibit the common views and elements
of learning, as taught by the usual discipline and in-
struction. Nor do they always speak of things in such
a way as a subtile and scholastic method of discipline
would demand ; but often use the more vulgar and
popular methods of expression. The same traits of
style are found in the works of the sacred writers \

70 OF FINDlNeJ THE USUS LOQlTENDl

who, in all respects, desired to speak, and must have
spoken, in order to be understood, more humano ; the
Holy Spirit so guiding them, that they differed as little
as posssible from the usuhI method of speaking. It is
not therefore to be wondered at, if we find in their ex-
pressions some things seemingly harsh, since this is
characteristic of the oriental genius and method of ex-
pression. (Morus, pp. i£55 — 259.)

Respecting the subject of analogy, compare $ 34.

§ 143. Difficult idioms to be specially studied. The
student, who aspires to the faculty of interpreting,
should be familiar and well acquainted with the more
difficult forms of speech, in the sacred writers, or those
forms which differ from the idioms of our own language,
and are not adapted to express, with simplicity and lo-
gical accuracy, principles of any doctrine. A right
understanding of these he must by all means attain ; so
that he may not be impeded in his inquiries, or thrown
into embarrassment, by them. E. g. many things are
affirmed simply and without any limitation^ which how-
ever, are to be understood as having only a particular
and partial application. Specially is this the case, in
moral propositions. In like manner, active verbs do
not always indicate action or efficiency, properly con-
sidered ; which Glass in his Philol. Sac, Calovius de
persona Christi p. 527, and Turretine de interp. Sac.
Lilt., have already noted. (Morus, p. 256. I. 11.)

§144. Difficult forms in profane writers to he studi-
ed. It will be very useful, also, to attend to such forms
of speech in common books, or classics; for there is
scarcely any form of speech in the Sacred books, which
is not found in other writings. Nor can there be any
doubt, that an interpreter will understand the Scrip-
tures with much more facility, if he be familiar and
well acquainted with the difficulties and obscure forms
of speech in other books. Those things which ap-
pear to be somewhat hard, or clogged, in the writings
of Paulj will not be wondered at, nor give offence, if

OF TftE NEW TESTAMENT. 71

©ne goes from the study of Thncydides to the interpre-
tation oftbe Apostle. Nor will such an one l>e ahumed
at fatHts, which seem hardly to be compatible with the
dio^nity and sanctity of the Scriptures ; nor at transpo-
sitions, apparent want of consistf my in construction, en-
allages, and the like things. This has, indeed, offen
happened to some good men; hut they were not well
^skilled m the languages. Such an alarm is rather the
result of unlearned superstition, than of a J!idicious
reverence for the word of God ; a** Melancthon has
justly observed. Dedic. Epist. ad Romanos.

PART II.

CHAPTER V.

RULES IN RESPECT TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE*

[Keil, pp. 115—128. Beck, pp. 129—136. Seiler, H 50— 78.']

5 145. Design of this chapter. Having explained the
method of finding the sense of the New Testament by
the usus loquendi^ or other artificial aids, we come now,
to treat separately of certain things which usually are
not enough explained, nor made sufficiently explicit m
regard to theory or practice. The first of these re-
spects tropes ; the second, emphasis ; the third, apparent
contradictions^ or discrepancies. Of these in their order.

§ 146. Duty of an Interpreter^ in respect to tropical
language. In respect to tropical language the office
of the interpreter is two fold. Firsts he must rightl}''
distinguish it from language not tropical, so as not to
mistake the one for the other, (as formerly the disci-
ples of Jesus, and the Jews did, in respect to some of

72 RULES IN RESPECT

the Saviour's discourses,) (a) and so as not to pervert
the proper sense of words by a tropical interpretation.
Secondly^ he must rightly interpret tropes, and give
their true sense. For it often happens, that men think
Ihey have attained the tropical sense of words, when
they understand only the literal one ; and they are de-
luded by an empty shadow, or pervert the trope by an
etymological interpretation. To avoid these faults, it is
proper to give rules, drawn from the nature of tropical
diction as learned from use and observation, by which
the interpreter may be guided in the judging and in- .
terpreting of figurative language. (Morus, p. 274. IX.)
a) E. g. John 6; 52. John 4; 11. Matt, 16: 6—12.

§ 147. Certain rules respecting tropical diction examin-
ed. In order to judge of diction, whether it should be
taken in a literal or tropical sense, the vulgar maxim is,
JVot readily to depart from the literal sense. But this max-
im is neither strictly true^ nor perspicuous, nor adapt-
ed to use. (Morus, p. 320.)

JVot easily (non facile,) if you rightly understand the
phrase, means almost never., very rarely. This is errone-
ous ; for tropes in the sacred writings are very common ;
so much so, that Glass has filled a large volume with
them. It is ambiguous; for it describes no certain
mark or characteristic by which ^ropicflHanguage may
be distinguished from that which is to be literally under-
stood ; which is certainly a great fault, in a rule.

Danhauer, Tarnoff, and Calovius have stated the
principle in question with more distinctness, when they
aver, that the literal meaning is not to be deserted^ i^ithout
evident reason or necessity. No one will deny, that
where there is plain and necessary reason for departure
from the literal sense, we may admit the tropical. But
some apparent repugnance of things, or facts, is not
hastily to lead us to reject the literal seme. The older
writers regard the phrase proper sense., as meaning the
same as the literal or historic sense; and rightly teach,
that we should not depart from the customary signification

s

TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 73

of a word without a weighty and sufficient reason. That
we may sometimes depart from it is evident, from the
fact, that the sacred writers themselves do, beyond all
doubt, sometimes depart from it. And indeed, in re-
spect to many words, the tropical sense is the customary
or usual one. (Morus, p. 320.)

§ 148. How to examine whether language is tropical.
We may commonlj understand, at once, whether a
word is to be taken tropically or not, by simply exam-
ining the object spoken of, either by the external or
internal senses, or by renewing the perception of the
object. To judge of figurative language, in such cases,
is very easy ; and in uninspired writings, it very rarely
happens that there is any doubt about it, because the
objects spoken of are such as may be examined by our
senses, external or internal, and therefore it may be
easily understood, (a)

In the Scriptures, however, doubts have frequently
arisen from the nature of the subjects there treated ;
which are such as cannot be subjected to the examina-
tion of our senses. E. g. The divine nature, {b) divine
operations, &c, are subjects beyond the scrutiny of our
senses ; and the question whether the language that
respects such things is to be undersood literally or
tropically, has given rise to fierce controversies, which
are still continued.(c) In these, the parties have often
disputed about tropical diction, in a way which savoured
more of metaphysical or diaiectical subtilty than of
truth. (Morus, p. 275. XI.)

a) E. g. Inflamed mind we understand tropically, by repeating
the perception of the idea of minc?,and taking notice that the lite-
ral meaning of inflamed is incongruous with it. In interpreting
the phrase, snowy locks., we appeal to the external senses, which
determine that the meaning of snowy here must be tropical.

b) To the language which respects God and his operations, may
be added all that respects the invisible things of a future state ;
whatever respects heaven, hell, &c. The controversy, whether
descriptions of this nature are to be literally or tropically under-
stood, is by no means at an end. One of the things which the hu-
man raind learns very slowly, is to detach itself from conceptions

7

74 RULES IN RESPECT

that arise from material objects, and to perceive, that in all the de-
scriptions of a future state, words are of absolute necessity em-
ployed, which originally have a literal sense, because language
affords no other. Even the internal operationsof our own mind,
we are obliged, for the same reason, to describe in language that
of necessity must be tropically understood. Almost all men, in-
deed, now allow that most of the language employed to describe
God and his operations, is necessarily to be understood as tropic-
al. Most men will allow that the language which respects the hea-
venly world may be so considered ; but what regards the day of
judgment, or the world of woe, they would strenuously contend,
must halileraUy understood. There is, indeed, sufficient in con-
sistency in this, and it betraj^s no small degree of unacquaintance
with the nature and principles of interpretation ; but as it is pro-
ductive of no consequences specially bad, the error is hardly
worth combating. The motive, no doubt, may be good, which
leads to the adoption of this error. The apprehension is, that if
you construe the language that respects the day ©rjudgment, or
the world of woe figuratively, you take away the reality of them.
Just as if reality did not, of course, lie at the basis of all figura-
tive language, which would be wholly devoid of meaning with-
out it. But how inconsistent too is this objection ! The very
person who makes it, admits that the language employed to de-
scribe God, and liis operations, and also to describe the heavenly
world, is tropical ; that it must of necessity be construed so.
But does this destroy the reality of a God, and of his operations,
and of the heavenly world ^

c) Who is ignorant of the innumerable controversies that have
arisen, about the tropical and literal sense of a multitude of pas-
sages in the Sacred Writings ? Almost all the enthusiasm and ex-
travagance, that have been exhibited in respect to religion, have
had no better support, than gross material conceptions of figura-
tive language ; or, not unfrequently, language that should be
properly understood, has been tropically construed. There is no
end to the mistakes on this ground. Nor are they limited to en-
thusiasts and fanatics. They develope themselves not unfrequent-
ly in the writings of men, grave, pious, excellent, and in other
parts of theological s'^ience very learned. Indeed, it is but a re-
cent thing,that it has come to be considered as a science, and a spe-
cial and essential branch of theological science — to study the na-
ture of language, and above all the nature of the oriental, bibli-
cal languages. Long has this been admitted in respect to the
Classics, and all works of science in ancient languages. But in
regard to the Bible, the most ancient book in the world, and
written in a language, the idiom of which is exceedingly diverse
from our own, it seems to have been very generally taken for
granted, that no other study was necessary to discover its mean-

TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 75

ing, than what is devoted to any common English book. At
least, a Bible with marginal references, studied by a diligent and
careful use of these references, might surely be understood, in a
most satisfactory manner. In very many cases, the Jirst thing
has been to study theology ; the second^ to read the bible in order
to find proofs of what had already been adopted as matter of
belief. This order is now beginning to be reversed. The nature
of language, of Scripture language, of figurative language, and
of interpretation, is now beginning to be studied as a science,
the acquisition of which is one of the greatest ends of study ;
as it is the only proper mode of leading a theologian, to the know-
ledge of what the bible really contains. Here too is a common
arbiter of the disputes that exist in the Christian world. The
nature of language and of tropical words, thoroughly understood,
will prostrate among all intelligent and candid men, who really
love the truth, a great part of all the diversities of opinion that
exist.

§ 149. Certain words not tropical. Those words are
not to be regarded as tropical which have lost their
original and proper signification, and are ysed no longer
in any but a secondary sense ; as we have already
shewn.

§ 150. Words tropical^ where the subject and predicate
disagree. Beyond all doubt those phrases are tropical,
the subject and predicate of which are heterogeneous ;
as where corporeal and incorporeal, animate and inani-
mate, rational and irrational are conjoined ; (a) and also
species of a different genus. Things that cannot possi-
bly exist in any particular subject, cannot be logicallj^
predicated of it; for the fundamental rules of logic, in
respect to this, are inherent in the human mind. If
then such things appear to be predicated, the phrase
must be tropically understood. (Morus, p. 278. XII.)

By this rule, the language of the New Testament
should be interpreted, which respects the person of
Jesus, to whom divine and human qualities are attribut-
ed. For the latter are attributed to him as a man ;
the former, as a divine person united with the human ;
and therefore they may be properly understood.

a.) E. g. The Jields smile^ the stones cry oitty ihe floods clap their
hands ^ &c.

76 RULES IN RESPECT

§ 13K Laws^ history^ didactic works^ seldom admit
tropes. As the customary use of language *hews the
above principle to be correct, so the same use also
shews, that tropical language is rarely employed in
several cases now to be mentioned, if you except words
which have lost their primary signification, or such as
constitute very easy tropes. Legislators in their sta-
tutes ; historians in their narations of facts, where they
aim simply at the declaration of them, (for some narra-
tions are designedly ornate, and decorated to please the
fancy ;) and those who teach any hrauch of science,
where the direct object is teaching, and not merely oc-
casional allusion ; all these employ tropes very seldom.
Hence it follows, that in writings of such a kind, tropes
are not to be acknowledged, unless it can be clearJy
shewn, that either by general usage, or by the use of
the writer, certain tropical words are appropriated to
designate particular things. Of this nature, are several
words of the New Testament, e. g. those which signi-
{y illumination^ regeneration^ &c. (Morus, p. 281. XIY.^

The principle laid down in this section needs more explana-
tion, it is not correct, that in the Mosaic Law, for example,
and in the Gospels and Epistles, there are not a great abundance
of tropical words. But still, it is true that these compositions, so
far as they are mere precept, mere narration, and mere lan-
guage of instruction, comprize as few tropes as the nature of the
case will admit, and these mostlj of the easier and more obvious
kind.

The importance of the principle thus defined, is very great.
Some interpreters, in ancient and modern times, have turned into
allegory the whole Jewish ceremonial Law. So, formerly and re-
cently, the history of the creation of the world, the fall of man,
the flood, the account of the tower of Babel, &c, have been ex-
plained either as fxvOov, or as philosophical allegories, i. e. phi-
losophical speculations on these subjects, clothed in the garb of
narration. By the same principles of exegesis, the gospels are
treated as ^ivdot, which exhibit an imaginary picture of a per-
fect character, in the person of Jesus. In a word, every narra-
tion in the Bible, of an occurrence which is of a miraculous na-
ture in any respect, is fJLvdog ; which means, as its abettors say,
that some real fact or occurrence lies at the basis of the story,
which is told agreeably to the very imperfect conceptions and

TO TKOPICAL I^ilNGUAGB. 77

philosophy of ancient tinies, or has been augmented and adorn-
ed by tradition and fancy.

But that such liberties with the language of Scripture are ut-
terly incompatible with the sober principles of interpretation, is
sufficiently manifest from the bare statement of them. The ob-
ject of the interpreter is, to Jind out uhat the sacred writers
meant to say. This done, his task is performed. Party philoso-
phy or scepticism cannot guide the interpretation of language.
Comp. Morus, pp. 281—291.

§ 152. Usus loquendi in regard to things^ which cannot
he examined by our feelings and conceptions. In regard
to divine things, which can be known merely by reve-
lation, and cannot be examined by the test of our own
feelings or views, we can judge only from the nsus lo-
quendi of the sacred writers, whether their language is
to be understood literally or tropically.

This usage can be known only from the comparison
of similar passages ; which is done in various ways.
(1) When different words are employed, in different [)as-
sages, respecting the same thing, it is easy to judge
wiiich are tropical. E. g. Thie phrase to he born of
water^ John 3 : 5, is tropical ; for the same thing is lit-
erally expressed in Mark 16 : 16. (a) (2)Whenthe same
word is used every where, respecting the same thing, it
has a proper sense. (6) (3.) VVhen the same method of
expression is constantly used respecting divers things,
which are similar, or which have some special con-
nexion, it is to be understood literally, (c) (Morus, p.
291. XV.)

a) So the JH'^n^ covenant which God made with Abraliam, is
explained in Gal. S\ 16, as meaning a promise, I'he latter, as be-
ing plain, is to direct us in the interpretation of the other.

b) E.g. avaaruGig ve^QO)i', eyatQeruo Ob)(.ia, ^Monoteirao
are constantly used in respect to what is to take place at the end
of the world, and therefore are not tropical.

c) Which rule requires some abatement. E. g. God gave
the Israelites bread from heaven,, and Christ gives his disci-
ples bread from heaven. The latter is very different from manna.
In fact, the latter case is plainly an instance of tropical language.
The context, then, or nature of the subject treated of, is to be
our guide in such cases.

7*

78 RULES IN RESPECT

§ 153. Jidjuncis useful in determinmg 'when xoords art
tropical. We may also form a judgment respecting
tropical language, from the adverbs, epithets, or other
limitations expressing the manner or nature of things.
(Morus, p. 295. XVI.)

This case resolves itself substantially into the principle of the
following Section.

§ 154. Context to be consulted. The context also
will frequently assist us. For when the whole passage
19 allegorical, we must acknowledge a trope in particu-
lar parts that are connected with the w^hole allegory.
E. g. TivQog in 1 Corinthians 3 : 13, which relates to
'^vXa and ^^qtov in the context. In like manner
the language is to be regarded as tropical, when al-
though the preceding context is to be literally under-
stood, there is a manifest transition to allegory. (Mo-
ras, ubi supra. Compare also § 99.)

Thus far, respecting the means of distinguishing
what is tropical.

§ 155. Sources of tropical interpretation. In regard
to interpreting tropical language, we may observe, that
there are two sources of aid. The one is, the subject
itself; the other, the usiis Uquendi, The interpreta-
tion by the aid of the subject is easy, when the nature
of it affords an obvious similitude; e. g. qjojTCOfiog is
easily understood as used tropically.

In regard to the usus loquendi ; the general usage of
the Hebrew tongue in respect to tropical words must
be first understood, as in words corresponding to fojt;,
i'O'avciTOv^ Tifxri, ^o|?;, &c ; then Greek usage in general.
Passages must also be compared, in which the same
thing is expressed by a proper word, or in which such
proper word is employed in the context, so that the
sense is obvious. Here too, we may use the com-
parison of words that are conjoined and similar; exam-
ples of which will hereafter be produced.

§ 166. Caution to he used in judging from etymology.

TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 79

Vfe must be very cautious, however, not to judge of
tropes from mere etymology ; as this is very fallacious.
E. g. OQQoTO^eiv, 2 Tim. 2: 15, some have interpret-
ed as implying a distinction between the law and the
gospel, which is mere trifling. For loyog ah]6etag in
the context, means {\\q. gospel ; the law is not the sub-
ject of discourse here. Analogy of the language might
have taught them, that oQQoro^ieiv here means io pos-
sess right views of the gospel^ and correctly to communi-
cate these to others. So the ancients understood it, and
among the moderns, Gerhard ; oqOoto^uc:, being an-
ciently commuted with ooOodolta, and nacvoro^ecv be-
ing used to signifj^, entertaining and disseminatmg novel
opinions respecting religion, (Morus, p. 298. XIX.)

§ 1 57. Method of determining whether a trope is adequate-
ly understood. It is one proof that you understand tropical
language, if you can substitute proper words for tropical
ones. Not that a person, who can do this, always right-
ly understands the words ; but, if he cannot do it, he
certainly does not understand them. The sacred wri-
ters themselves sometimes subjoined proper words to
tropical ones, e. g. Col. 2 : 7. The best Greek and Latin
writers frequently do the same thing.

It is useful also to make the experiment, whether,
when the image presented by the tropieal expression is
removed from the mind, any idea still remains in it, (dif-
ferent from the image itself,) which can be expressed
by a proper word. This experiment is specially to be
made, when words designating sensible objects are
transferred to the expression of intellectual ones, (e.g.
BavaTog., fw?;, diaOi^virj, &c ;) i\\ respect Io which it is
easy to l3e deceived. (Morus, p. 300. XX.)

The context, the nature of the subject, and parallel passages
are the most eifectua] means of ascertaining this.

OF ALLEGORIES.

[Compare Keil, pp. 115—120. Beck, p. 129. 11. Seller, $§
41 — 78. Much more satisfactory will be Morus, Dissert,
de causis Allegorm explicandis, in bis Disserit. Theol. philoL
Vol. I. pp. 370—393.]

80 ALLECORILS.

§ 158. Allegories hoii) interpreted. As allegories fre-
quently occur in the sacred books, which abound in
tropical diction, it seems proper to say something here
of the method of interpreting them. First of all, the
general design of the allegory is to be ascertained ;
which is easily done when it is connected with a con-
text explanatory of its design. For the most part,
however, it is expressly declared. (Morus, p. 301.
XXI.)

^XhiywQta is derived from cdXo ayoQiiraiy i. e. a
different thing is said from that -^vhich is meant. It differs from
metaphor, in that it is not confined to a word, but extends to a
whole thought, or, it may be, to several thoughts. Allegory may
be expressed, moreover, by pictures, Kzech. 4:1; by ac-
tions Ezech. III. IV. V. Luke 22 : 30, or by any significant thing.

One most important principle in explaining allegories, is omit-
ted by Ernesti. 1 refer to the rule, that coniparison is not to be
extended to alt the circumstances of the allegory, "^I'hus in the
parable of the good Samaritan, the point to be illustrated is,
the extent of the duty of beneficence. Most of the circum-
stances in the parable go to make up merely the verisimilitude
of the narration, so that it may give pleasure to him who hears
or reacts it. But how differently does the whole appear, when
it comes to be interpreted by an allegorizer of the mystic school ?
The man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho is Adam won-
dering in the wilderness of this world ; the thieves v^^ho robbed
and wounded him are evil spirits ; the priest who passed by
on the one side without relieving him, is the Levitical law; the
Levite is good works ; the good Samaritan is Christ ; the oil
and wine are grace. Sac, What may not a parable be made to
mean, if imagination is to supply the place of reasoning and phi-
lology ? And what riddle, or oracle of Delphos could be more
equivocal, or of more multifarious significancy, than the Bible, if
such exegesis be admissible .'' It is a miserable excuse, which
interpreters make for themselves, that they render the Scrip-
tures more edifying and significant, by interpreting them in this
manner. And are the Scriptures then to he made more signifi-
cant than God has made them ; or to be mended by the skill of
the interpreter, so as to become more edifying than the Holy
Spirit has made them ? If there be a semblance of piety in such
interpretations, a semblance is all. Real piety and humility ap-
pear to advantage, in receiving the Scriptures as (hey are,
and expounding them as simply and skilfully as the rules of lan-
guage will render practicable, rather than by attempting to
amend and improve the revelation which God has made.

ALLEGORIES. 81

§ 169. This being done, the primary word is to be
sought for, and the force of it expressed by a proper
word. Other tropical words are then to be explained,
agreeably to this, {a) In this way, the explanation of
particular things will be rendered more easy, and we
may avoid errors. The design of the exhortation in
the form cf allegory, found in 1 Corinthians 5 : 6, is,
that the Corinthians should be purified from vitious in-
clinations, and the faults springing from them. Zvfit],
therefore, here means vice ; cc^vfiog free from vice^ viz.
to be a true Christian. ^EoQxa^eLv^ consequently, is
not to celebrate a feast, (according to its proper signi-
fication,) for a tropical meaning is required. It means
to serve God^ to worship God^ to he a Christian^ to be
free from former vices ^ and worship him in purity.

It is altogether incongruous to understand one part
literally and another tropically, in the same allegory ;(6)
as those do, who take nvQog^ in 1 Corinthians 3:15,
literally, when all the context is to be understood tro-
pically, Indt?^d the expresdon wV ^^« tivqq^ pnakes
it plain, that the word is to be figuratively understood,
(Morns, p. 309. XXV.)

(a) The meaning of the author is, that trie word which desig-
nates the leading design of the allegory being explained, the re-
mainder is to be interpreted in conformity with it.

(6) This rule is of great importance, and of wide extent. I
wish I could add, that it is not every day transgressed, by multi-
tudes who expound the Scriptures.

To the brief precepts here given by Eraesti, may be added
from Morus, (1) That we must sometimes resort to history, in
order fully to explain allegory. E. g. The kingdom of God is
likened to leaven, which gradually ferments the whole mass into
which it is put ; and to a grain of mustard seed, v/hich gradual-
ly springs up and becomes a large plant. History shews that
the Church has arisen from small beginnings, and is extending
itself through the earth. (2) The nature of the subject wiU fre-
quently direct the interpretation of the allegory. E. g. Ye art
the salt of the earth, &c, Matthew 5:13. The subject is, the in-
structions to be given by the disciples. The leading word (salt)
in the allegory means instruction ; and the sentiment of the passage
is. Ye are the teachers, by whom others are to be preserved from
corruption, i. e. destruction, See Morus, pp. 311. — 313.

82 ALLEGORIES.

§ 160. Parables. Not unlike to the method of inter-
preting allegories, is that of explaining parai/es ; which
often contain allegory. We must guard here against
urging too far the meaning of all parts of a parabolical
narration ; and refer the particular parts to the gener-
al design, so that all may be accommodated to it. It is
a very common fault of interpreters to urge the expla-
nation too far ; but it is a very great fliult. Therefore,
in Luke 15: 11, &c, we are not to seek for a doctrinal
meaning in (jroXfj^ fioo)^og, du^Arvhog, &c. Such cir-
cumstances are commonly added to complete the form
of the narration, and to make it a more finished picture
of what might be supposed to have happened; as is
commonly done in stories, fables, and other things of
like nature. (Morus, pp. 314 — 320.)

Parable^ in Greek usage, means any comparison introduced in^
to a discourse. It may be called an example, taken from things
real or fictitious, designed tor special and graphical illustration.
The means of explaining it are, the context, the subject, the
occasion, &ic, as in allegory. The caution suggested by Ernesti,
against interpreting all the minute circumstances of a parable so
as to give them a mystic significancy, is very important.

It should be added here, that allegory differs from parable only
in the style, and mode of expression. Take an allegory and ex-
press it in the historic style, and you convert it into a parable.
Hence, the same rules of exegesis apply to both. Comp. Beck,
p. 134. Keil, H 78—81. Seiler, 71—78 and ^ 183. But spe-
cially worthy of thorough study, is Storr''s Comment, de parabolis
Chrisli, Opuscula. Vol. 1 . p. 89. See also Lowlh's Lectures on
Allegory and Parables, Lect. x— xii.

83

PART II.

CHAPTER VI.

itVLES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.

[Keil, $ 42. Beck, p. 130. III. Seller, }J 65—70.]

§ 161. Errors respecting emphasis very frequent. In
no part of an interpreter''s business, are errors
more frequently committed, than in judging of empha-
sis. The reason of this is, that many are too prone to
find emphasis every where ; supposing that by so doing,
they exhibit the sacred writers as speaking in a manner
more worthy of themselves, and the divine origin of the
Scriptures. However, nothing can have dignity attach-
ed to it, which has not truth for its basis.

§162. Ground of these errors. The ground of this is
want of skill in the knowledge of the original Scripture
languages; for many who interpret, are obliged in
general, to depend merely on the definitions of Lexi-
cons, and are ignorant of the analogy of languages, be-
cause they have not been sufficiently accustomed to
these studies. It is comjnon for men of this sort, to
push etymologies, specially tropical ones, to an exces-
sive length ; from which very little that is useful can be
extracted. Yet tVom these, they form notions which
never entered the minds of the sacred writers. They
form, moreover, rules respecting Emphasis, indepen-
dently either of any reason drawn from the nature of
things and of language, or of the usus loqucndi.

Mistakes such as these may be very easily com-
mitted, in respect to the Hebrew language, in regard to
those forms of speech in the New Testament, which are

S4 RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.

deduced from the Hebrew ; because this idiom is so
unlike the occidental languages of modern Europe.

§ 163. JVeed of rules to direct us in judging of empha-
sis. On this account, there is the more need of well
grounded precepts, drawn from the nature of human
language and of things, that we may judge correctly of
emphasis ; so that we may neither pass by those which
are real, nor follow after those which are imaginary.
Erasmus, (on 1 Corinthians, 7:1.) thinks this may be
endured in hortatory and consolatory preaching; but
for myself, I had rather every thing should have a solid
foundation ; as there is no need of any thing fictitious.
In serious argument, fictitious emphasis is intolerable.
Indeed it is nothing less than to sport with that which
is sacred.

§ 164. Insufficient rules. The vulgar rule, which
bids us beware of making fictitious emphasis or of ne-
glecting real ones, although good sense, is in fact no
rule ; as it does not serve at all to direct the mind in
judging where emphasis really exists. No one believes
himself to make Jic^i^io?i5 emphasis. There are some
other maxims concerning emphasis, which are not form-
ed with good judgment, nor worthy of refutation here.

§ 165. Kinds of writing., where emphasis is rare. To
proceed with precepts. First^ It is clear, that in re-
gard to subjects which are to be explained with great
nicety ; in perspicuously exhibiting the precepts that
respect any branch of the sciences; in laws ; in simple
narrations of facts, &c, emphasis can scarcely find place.
For emphasis is, in a certain sense,tropical or figurative ;
and this kind of language does not belong to writings of
the classes just named, as I have already shewn, §151,
and as all concede. (Morus, p. 330. XI.)

That is,simp!e narration, simple instruction, simple legislation,
for the most part is destitute of emphases, except such as are 9(
the lower and more usual kinds. But in the Pentateuch, Gospels,

RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 85

and Epistles, for example, which are specimens of the different
kinds of composition in question, are intermixed many parts
which contain words that are emphatic.

§ 166. Ao word of itself is emphaiical. Secondly,
We must guard against finding emphasis in any word of
itself, whether used properly or tropically ; because,
as has been already shewn, no word used either figura-
tively or literally, has of itself an emphasis. Emphasis
implies an accession of meaning to the ordinary significa"
tion of a word,

§ 167. Emphasis not to be taught by etymology^ or re-
curring to the original sense of words. Thirdly. Empha-
sis should not be deduced from the etymology of a
word, (which often misleads as to the proper sense of
it;) nor in tropical expressions should, we recur to the
proper sense of the words to deduce emphasis from it;
as has sometimes been done in respect to the word
eQBvvav. Tropically used, this word does not signify
to seek with great exertion and diligence ; for the Ho-
ly Spirit is said eQevvav ra fiaOrj xtjg OiorriTog, to whom
this emphatic meaning surely will not apply. The
ancient interpreters used SQfvvav in the same sense as
ycvcoonet^v. In both of the above points, errors are very
frequent. (Moras p. 331. XII.)

§ 168. Prepositions in composition do not always make
any accession of meaning to a word. In Greek words,
moreover, we are to take special care not to make any
accession of signification to the word, simply because
it is compounded with a preposition. E. g. ava, ccno,
TiQOf xnvVf £x, TitQt, compounded as in ccvugtccvqovv
avavrideiv, ovfifxapTv^ecv, nQoyivojGiiecv, &c. Many are
accustomed to build arguments on such imaginary em-
phasis, and oftentimes very incongruously ; while use
and observation teach us, that these prepositions do not
always change the meaning of simple words ; nay,
they very commonly are redundant, as in Polybius.

86 RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.

The custom of the language, in such cases, must be
well studied. (Morus, p. 331. Xlll.)

§ 169. Emphasis not to be deduced merely from the
plural number. We must be Cdutious, also, that we do
not deduce emphasis merely from the use of the plural
number, supposing that where the plural is put instead
of the singular, it necessarily denotes emphasis. This
is not correct, either in regard to Hebrew {a) or Greek.
With good reason, Melancthon blames Origen, for mak-
ing a distinction between ovgavov and ovQuvovg, A
similar mistake Origen also made, in regard to ot^yiviQ-
(iio7g in Romans 12 : 1 ; which many have incautiously
imitated : as Bengel has the former error. (Morus, p.
332. XIV.)

a) If all that is meant here, be simply that some nouns have only
a plural form ; that others are used both in the singular and plu-
ral, with the same meaning ; and that in neither of these cases is
emphasis to be found ; all this may readily be conceded. But
Ernesti, and his commentators, Morus and Eichstaedt, have
stated the assertion in the absolute form, that the plural has no
emphasis, even in the Hebrew language. I have softened this as-
sertion in the translation : and add here, It is so far from be-
ing correct, that the Pluralis excellenticB, (e. g. in D^^biN^ d^jl^
B'^^ii'.a, &c,) is formed on the very basis that the Fiural is em-
phatic, in such cases. This principle extends to many cases of
the Hebrew ; e. g. Their inward part is ni^llTT depravities^ i.e.
very depraved. It is a principle, however, which no grammari-
an has yet sufficiently defined and established,

§ 170. Abstract words not of course emphatic^ when
used for concrete ones. In like manner, we must beware
of attaching emphasis to an abstract word, which mere-
ly stands for a concrete one. Seme learned men have
done this ; and even Glass himself admits that it may
properly be done, as do many others, who have follow-
ed his example. But they have neither given any good
reason for this, nor shewn the origin or cause of the
pretended emphasis ; so that it seems to be rather
a thing which they wish, than one which they can in-
telligibly teach. The true ground of using abstract

RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 87

words in the room of concrete ones, is either/rojn ne-
cessity^ or for the sake of perspicuity ; not on account of
Emphasis. In the sacred books, the necessity of it
springs from the Hebrew dialect, which often employs
abstract words in this manner, because it has only a
few concrete ones. The mistake of the interpreters
in question, arises from the infrequency of the practice
in the Latin, and in their own vernacular tongue. But
dissimilarity of idiom does not constitute, as a thing of
course, any real emphasis. The ground above taken
is quite clear also, from another circumstance, viz. that
in the same forms of expression, abstracts and concretes
are commuted for each other. Comp. Col. 1 : 13 and
Matthew 3:17. Also Ephesians 5 : 8 and 4:18, &c.
(Morus, p. 332. XV.)

fi
§ 171. Emphasis must not be deduced merely from ori-
ental idioms. In the sacred books, and specially in the
Hebraisms of the New Testament, we must take care
not to seek for and recognize emphasis, merely in the
idiom which is so very dissimilar to ours. Many
persons, though acquainted with the Hebrew, have oft-
en made this mistake. But nothing is more fallacious.
In the oriental languages, many things appear hyperbo-
lical, (if you translate them literally, that is, merely by
the aid of common Lexicons and etymology,) which are
not in reality hyperbolical. E. g. In Lamentations, it is
said, My trouble is great as the sea ; which is simply
equivalent to the Latin expression, Malamea sunt maxi-
ma, (Morus, p. 335. XVI.)

§ 172. How to discover emphasis in doubtful cases. If
there be no adequate testimony to shew that any word
has a constant emphasis, we must consult usage. And
here we should first inquire, whether in all the passages
where the word is found, emphasis would be congru-
ous. Next, whether in the same passage or a similar
one, another word may be substituted in the room of
this, which other contains a special designation ofinten*

tS RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.

sity. If neither of these be the case, but the word in
question may be commuted for others, which are plain-
ly unemphatic ; or in some of the passages where the
word occurs, a special designation of intensity is made,
by adding some other word for this purpose ; then
there is no emphasis to be recognized in the word in
question. E. g. Some have attached emphasis to ctno-
xa^adoitiag, in Romans 8: 19; but in Phil. 1: 20. it
would be incongruous. There it is used as a synonyme
with iXnvdi^ (as it is also by the LXX,) and in fact,
commuted with it, in verse 22. Nor is emphasis al-
ways attached to such phrases as ^apuv %aLQeLv ; (a)
for such phrases are often used, when another word is
added to \n(\'\c:,^\e intensity^ (e- g» Matt. 2: 10.) This
would be useless if the}' indicated intensit}^ of them-
selves. ^

a) But in Hebrew, it is admitted by the best oriental scholars,
not only that such forms as b^I^pD !:Nlp2 admit of emphasis, but
that this is the prevailing usus 'loquend'i. The imitation of this,
in Greek, may consequently be emphatic.

§ 173. Further rules to discover emphasis. The usual
or temporary emphasis, arising from the affection of the
speaker, or some other cause, may be recognized with-
out difficulty, by the following mark ; viz. if the ordi-
nary signification of the word is far below the manifest
intensity of the affection which the speaker or writer
feels, or is incompetent to describe the greatnes of the
object. If emphasis be not admitted, in such cases, the
discourse would be frigid ; which fault is certainly
very foreign from the style of the sacred writers.

§ 174. Continued, Another rule for finding whether
a word or phrase is emphatic, is this. If the usual
force of the word or phrase would give a frigid mean-
ing, when, on the other hand, an apt one would arise,
if some intensity were given to the word, there is a
plain necessity of emphasis ; which is the best guide
for finding it. So in 1 Cor. 4 : 3, 4, avaKQiveiv is con-

ilttLEfe ilESiPECl'lKG EMPHASIS. 89

stantly emphatic; meaning either to he tried by the
judgment of another^ or to take to one'^s self the right
of trying and judging^ or, to have the right of judging^ or,
to he able rightly to judge. But if you translate it sim-
ply to judge^ a frigid jsense would be given to it, not at
all adapted to the context. In like manner, nvorvv in
Col. 1 : 4, is used, as the context shews, to denote
the constancy^ greatness^ or fruitfulness of faith. For
Paul was not necessitated to know, by report, that
the Church at Colosse had simply Chritian faith,
since he had founded that Church. So in Rom. 1 : 8,
that faith must have been special^ which was celebrated
throughout the world. Also in Matt. 4 : 2, ^nfi^vaas
must imply intensity, from the circumstances of the
case.

§ 175. Emphasis must not contradict the usus loquendi.
In this however, the usus loquendi is not to be neglected.
It must be so far consulted, as to see that the emphasis
implies nothing repugnant to it.

PART 11.

CHAPTER VIL

MEANS OF HARMONIZING APPARENT DISCREPANCIES.

[Keil, 5 102. Beck, pp. 192—194.]

§ 176. If two passages contradict each other^ the text
of one must he faulty. If it could be plainly shewn, that
two passages of Scriptures are so repugnant to each
other, that no method of conciliation is practicable, it
must then necessarily follow, that one of the readings in
the usual copies must be faulty. Consequently, an emen-
dation of the text must be sought. Of this nature, per-
haps, is the passage John, 19 : 14, compared with

^0 MEANS OF HARMONIZING

Matthew, 27: 45, and Mark 15: 25. Also, as many-
think, Luke 3 : 36, compared with Genesis 10: 24;
thoagh this is not clear, in my view. Some add Mat-
thew 27: 9, compared with Zechariah 11: 12,13.
(Morus, Vol. II. p. 3. I.)

§ 177. If the text of both he genuine^ then Gonciliation
is to be sought^ where apparent discrepancies exist. If the
text of both passages plainlj^ appears to be genuine, so
that it cannot fairly be questioned, then it must be un-
derstood, that there is a mere appearance of inconsisten-
cy : which should be removed, and the passage concili-
ated by a proper interpretation. (Morus, Vol. II.
p. 7. II.)

§ 178. Discrepancies doctrinal and historic. The ap-
pearance of inconsistency sometimes occurs in passages
of a doctrinal, and sometimes of a historical kind. The
writers of the New Testament sometimes appear to be
at variance with themselves ;(a) sometimes with each
other ;(6) and occasionally with the writers of the Old
Testament.(c) Many writers have laboured to harmonize
these apparent discrepancies ; some devoting them-
selves to the consideration of a particular class of them,
and others treating of the whole. A catalogue of these
writers may be found in Le Long, Pfaff, Fabricius, and
others. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 8.)

o) E. g. 1 Cor. 8: 1 comp. verse 7. (b) E. g. Paul as-
serts that a man is justified by faith and not by works ; James,
that he is justified not by faith only, but also by works, (c) E. g.
In many passages cited from the Old Testament, by the writers
Qf the New Testament.

§ 179. Causes of apparent discrepancy in doctrinal pas-
sages. In doctrinal passages, an apparent contradiction
that is to be removed, arises, for the most part, either
from the style of the authors, which is rather of the
popular kind, than that of nice refinement ; or from the
genius of the oriental languages, which differs so wide-
ly from that of the western ones. An apparent con-
tradiction, in respect to doctrines plainly taught, (which

APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 91

has often been objected to our religion by impious and
profane men, e. g. Julian in Cyril's works, who says,
that it is expressly taught there is but one God, and yet
Matthew xxviii. ascribes Divinity to three,) is to be
removed by theologians, in the way of explaining
things^ rather than words merely; and so comes not di-
rectly wiihin the province of the interpreter. (Morus,
Vol. II. p. 9.)

§ 180. Method of harmonizing apparent doctrinal dis-
crepancies. The method of harmonizing doctrinal pas-
sages may be regulated by the following maxims. An
obscure passage, i. e. one in which is something ambi-
guous, or unusual, should be explained in accordance
with what is plain and without any ambiguity.(a)
Again, a passage in which a doctrine is merely touched,
or adverted to, is to be explained by other passages,
which present plain and direct exhibitions of it. (6)

We must however, be careful to harmonize apparent
discrepancies, if it can be done, by recourse to the usus
loquendi ; so that all occasion of doubt or cavilling may
be removed. For it is very desirable, that the usus lo'
quendi should justify that sense, v/hich we put on any
doubtful passage, from having compared it with passages
that are plain and clear. (Morus, Vol II. p. 9. and 10.)

(a) E. ^. We explain all antbropopathic expressions in regard*
to God, by the plain truth that his nature is spiritual.

(6) E. g. The subject of justification in Rom. lU. is design-
edly treated at large ; of the resurrection, in 1 Cor. XV. Such
passages are called classic, (loci classici,) and by them other ex-
pressions, which simply occur obiter, are to be explained,

181. Continued, It is very important to remember,
that many things of a doctrinal nature are simply and
absolutely declared, agreeably to common usage in all
languages, which still have only a relative sense. This
may be accounted for from the fact, that there are parts
of religion which are cornmonly known and understood ;
therefore such parts do not need accurate limitations.
E. g. That we are saved byfaith^ is one of the elementa-

92 MEANS OF HARMONIZING

ry principles, of the Christian religion. The sacred
writers, therefore, do not, on every mention of any
duty, reniind ws of this principle ; as they expect us to
keep it in memory. When they say, therefore, that
almsgiving is acceptable to God, they expect to be un-
derstood as meaning, if it he accompanied by faith. In
this way apparent discrepancies may be reconciled ; and
the reconciliation becomes the more probable, as the
reason for it can be given. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 11.)

Apparent discrepancies, arising from oriental style or manner
of expression, ($ 179.) are pretty numerous. E. g. Pluck out the
eye that offends thee ; It is easier for a camel to go through the
eye of a needJe, &:c ; To follow Christ, one must hate parents,
&c, Luke 14 : 26. The context, passages similar as to the sub-
ject, the nature of the style, the subject itself, &c, are the means
of finding the true sense of such places ; and then the harmony of
them with other passages is obvious. (Morus, Vol. II. pp.
11-~14.)

Apparent discrepancies between various writers, or between
different parts of the same author, not unfrequently occur. E. g.
Rom. Ill, and James II, in respect to justification. The mode
of conciliation is simply to obtain a complete view of the meaning
of each writer. It will then be seen, for example in this case,
that Paul is arguing against those who would establish meritori'
ows justification ; James, against Antinomian views of the gospel.
WorkSf in Paul's epistle, means complete obedience to the law ;
in James, it means such obedience as must be the necessary conse-
quence of Christian faith. The object of both Apostles being
fully understood, all discrepancy vanishes. In like manner, the
advice of Paul in I Cor. VII, respecting matrimony, is only pro
tempore ; dictated merely by the present exigencies of the times ;
for the apostle, in many other places of his writings, has express-
ed a different sentiment. (Morus, pp. 14 — 17.)

Similar to the apparent discrepancy just mentioned, is the
case where different predicates are apparently asserted of the
same subject. £. g. Rom, 3 : 20, it is said that a man cannot
be justified by works; but in 2:13, it is stated, that the
jiov^iat doers of the law shall be justified. Here one verse states
the rule of legal justification ; the other asserts that no man can
claim it on the ground of that rule. Again where we are said to
he justified byfaith^ the meaning is that we receive pardon on the
ground of gratuity ; but justification.^ as applied to the doers of
the law, means reward on the ground of merit or perfect obedi-
ence. (Morus, Vol. 11. p. 17. VI.)

Discrepancies seem to exist, at times, between the writers of
the Old Testament and the New, merely from the different man-

APPAP.ENT DISCREPANCIES. 93

ner in which they express themselves on the same subjects;
when this is rather to be attributed to different degrees of iight
which the writers had, and to the differences in the eras, man-
ners, habits, &c, of each. E. g. The subject of war ; of loving
enemies ; of benevolence to the Gentiles; of God's equal and pa-
ternal regard to them, of gratuitous justification ; &c. A repre-
sentation less perfect, in the Old Testament, need not be under-
stood as contradicting one more perfect in the New. (Moras,
Vol. II. p. 18. VI!.)

Finally; in every case of apparent doctrinal discrepancy, the
rule to guide the interpreter is simple ; viz. Find the true mean-
ing of each writer ; take every thing into view, which the prin-
ciples of interpreting language requires ; the subject, scope, con-
text, design, age, habits, style, object, &c, of the author ; and
when the meaning is found of each writer, the passages may be
brought together, without fear of any real discrepancy.

§ 182. Origin of apparent historical discrepancies. Ap-
parent discrepancies of a historical nature, originate
from a difference of design and manner in narrating the
same thing ; as often happens in the Gospe-lc. For a
diversity of design varies the choice of circumstances.
Many circumstances differ, after all, in nothing important
as to designating the ideas, which the authors in com-
mon mean to designate ; and oftentimes they may be
either commuted for each other, or omitted. It is of
no importance, sometimes, whether a thing be asserted
in a generic or specific form. Hence, appearances of
discrepancy have frequently arisen. (Morus, Vol. II.
p. 22. IX.)

§ 183. Continued. But far more frequently, an ap-
pearance of discrepancy arises from the mere manner of
expression ; which seems, at first view, to imply a dif-
ference in the things described, while it is merely a
difference in the mode of describing them. It is very
evident, that the best and most careful writers do not al-
ways exhibit the same precise and accurate method in
respect to the names of things, persons, or places 5(a)
in regard to numbers,(6) dates, (c) years, &c. Nor
are they usually blamed for this, nor ought they to be.
Hence, where several names of the same object exist^

94 MEANS OF HARMONIZING

they sometimes exhibit one, and sometimes another.

In regard to the manner of expressing time, places, and

numbers, sometimes they tise the more vulgar and in-

\ distinct method, and sometimes the more nice and accu-

jp'ate one. in designating time, they vary. They sometimes

/ put genus for species, and vice versa. Examples of such

a nature occur in common histories ; and also in the

Gospels.
a) E. g. Mat. 17 : 14, comp. Luke 9: 38. Gadarene and Ger-

gasene, Matt. 8 : 28, comp. with Mark 5. 2. Matt. 5.1'

comp. Luke 6: 17. 6) Matt. 27: 44. comp. Luke 23:39.

Matt. 8: 5—9 comp. Luke 7:1—10. Matt. 8: 28. comp.

Mark 5 ; 2. Acts 7:14 comp. Gen. 46 : 27. Acts 7 : 6 comp.

Gal. 3 ; 17. c) Luke 2; 2. comp. with history of Syrian Pro-

consuls.

§ 184. We should be conversant with conciliations of
passages in the best classic authors. With these usages in
vfriting history, we ought to be well acquainted, either
by our own study of the classics, or from the remarks
of skilful interpreters ; e. g. Perizonius in Animadverss.
hist, et al. lib. ; Duker on Livy ; Wesseling on Herodotus
and Diodorus. An acquaintance with these, will enable
us promptly to obtain aid from them, when it is needed,
for harmonizing passages, which seem to disagree ; for
it is plain, that the difficulty of harmonizing passages
arises, for the most part, from want of skill in this ex-
ercise. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 28. XIIL)

§ 185. Historical Facts not to be confounded because of
a slight similitude ; nor to be represented as different^ on
account of some slight discrepancy. In historic discrepan-
cies, we must guard against confounding things which
really ditfer, merely because they have some similitude ;
or deducing discrepancies thence, as has often happen-
ed, in the interpretation of profane authors. On the
other hand, we must not rashly multiply facts because
there are some slight discrepancies in the narration of
them. The reading of history, and of good commen-
taries upon different authors, is very important to assist
one here.

APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 95

On the subject of harmonizing the narrations contained in the
Gospels, it is difficult to say any thing here, which will give even
a faint representation of the efforts that have been made. Sever-
al hundred harmonies have been published. Some have chosen
one Gospel as exhibiting the regular order of time, and conform-
ed the rest to it ; others have rejected the supposition of perfect
chronological order in any. Some have made the number of
facts related as small as possible, and forced the language to a
harmony ; others, have multiplied the number of facts, so that
every narration comprising a single circumstance of discrepancy
from others, has been supposed to contain a history of a similar but
still of a separate fact. Some have supposed the public ministry of
Christ to have continued for three years ; others for more than
seven.

Dispute about the sources of the Gospels has been multiplied
almost without bounds, among the German critics. By different
writers, each of the first three Evangelists has been considered as
the source of the rest ; while others allow that there are two in-
dependent writers, and the rest are compilers. Many others
suppose that original Hebrew, or rather Syro-Chaldaic docu-
ments existed in writing, from which the first three evangelists
drew in common. Hence their resemblance to each other in re-
spect to diction. But different copies of sucli' documents, they
suppose, were used by the Evangelists, which had been interpo-
lated or augmented. Hence their discrepancies. Some assert
a perfect harmony between the Evangelists even in the minutest
circumstances ; while others maintain discrepancies, which
amount to absolute contradictions. — Where shall the young in-
terpreter go, to find any refuge from such a chaos of doubts and
difficulties, as are here presented? If I may venture to express
an opinion, which is not the mere result of speculation, I would
say ; Let him go to the diligent, thorough, repeated study of the
gospels, with a candid mind, united to a life of prayer and faith.
Let him carry with him to this study, a fundamental knowledge
of the nature of language, that he may not be embarrassed with
the mere forms of words. I will venture to add, that he will find
it necessary to believe with Jerome, that the Scripture consists in
the sense of a passage^ and not in the words only ; which are the
mere costume of the sense. Notions of I'crfea/inspiration may be,
and''often have been such, as to render the conciliation of the
Evangelists a desperate undertaking. That notion, which at-
taches absolute perfection to ihe form of language^ as well as to
the sense which it conveys, makes the reconciliation of them im-
possible. In some cases, two, three, or even the four Evange-
lists, relate the same thing in different words. Now if the form
of the words in one is absolutely perfect^ what is to be said of

96 MEANS OF HARMONIZING

the other thrfee, who have adopted different forms ? And if the
form of a narration in Luke, with two, three, or more circum-
stances interwoven is absolutely perfect, what become of the
narrations in Matthew and Mark, where one, or more of these
circumstances are omitted ?

. It is a fact whicli admits of no doubt, that,the sacred writers
differ from each other as much, in respect to the mode of writing,
as profane authors. The proper question always is. What is the
meanings which they design to convey r What is their principal
or special object, in conveying it ? These questions being an-
swered, it matters not in what garb this meaiiing is clad ; nor
whether more or fewer circumstances accompany it, that are not
essential to the main point.

Considerations of this nature will help to remove the apparent
discrepancies of the Gospels ; as they are now presented to us.
And as to speculations about the origin of them, very little terra
firma has yet been won, by all the adventures that have been un-
dertaken.

The Student may read with some profit, Morus, Vol. II. pp.
24 — 49; and many of Newcome's Notes, printed at the end of
his Harmony, are the result of good sense joined with much criti-
cal experience.

§ 186. Doubtful passages to he interpreted by plain ones.
In harmonizing passages, it is very inoportant to deter-
mine which is to be accommodated to the other. We
ought to have some rule here, lest we should wander
from our way. The rule is thfs ; if one passage be
plain and accurately expressed, so as to admit of no
doubt, it cannot admit of any accommodation. The
doubtful one must be accommodated, then, to the plain
one.

§ 187. A perfect Harmony not to he expected. After
all, I should admit, with PfaiT, that a perfect Harmony
of the Gospels can hardly be made by rule. Conjec-
ture must sometimes be applied to the rules of harmo-
nizing, and to the use of them in particular cases. But
A it is well to observe here, that the subject respects
merely occasional historical facts; of which one may
be ignorant, without endangering his salvation. Nay,
better submit to be ignorant here, than to torture one's
brain to find out what is not of essential importance.

ON TRANLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 97

PART III.

ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.

§ 188. An interpreter should not only understand the
Scriptures^ but be able to explain thetn well^ so as to give
an exact delineation of the original. An interpreter
should not only possess a thorough understanding of the
Scriptures, but also the faculty of interpreting and ex-
plaining them well. On this subject, it may be proper
to say a few things.

The object of interpretation is to give the sense of
an author, without addition, diminution, or change. Aver-
sion ought to be an exact image of the original or arche-
type, in which image nothing should be drawn either
greater or less, better or worse, than the original ; but so
composed that it might be acknowledged as another ori-
ginal itself. It follows, that a translator should use those
words, and those only, which clearly express a// ^/ie mean-
ing of the author.^ and in the same manner as the aiithor.
But this needs illustration.

§ 189. The words of the version ought to correspond as
exactly as possible to those of the original. First, as the
same meaning must be conveyed, those words are to be
selected, the force of which plainly corresponds to that
of the original, and which are not ambiguous, but of a
plain and established meaning, among those for whom
the translation is made. Those words are to be pre-
ferred, (if such can be found,) which correspond alto-
gether with the words of the author, in respect to
etymology, tropical use, and construction. But great
caution is necessary here, in judging whether the usage

98 ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.

of the two languages agrees. Otherwise no version c^n
be made, which can be well understood by those who
are ignorant of the original language ; but rather an
obscuration of the author, and not unfrequently a per-
version of him. For men will understand the words of
a Latin version, according to the Latin usus loquendi^
(and so of a German translation ;) when they ought to
be understood, if the rule above be violated, according
to the Greek or Hebrew idiom. Or perhaps the un-
learned reader will not understand them at all, although
from the habit of hearing and using the words, he may
think he understands them. A frequent case, indeed,
among the unlearned ; and 1 may add, among their
teachers also !

§ 190. When one cannot translate ad verhum^ he must
translate ad sensum. But if appropriate words, as above
described, cannot be selected, on account of the differ-
ence of idiom between the two languages, (the original,
and that of the translator,) which often express the
same things by words that do not correspond in their
etymology or their proper signification, (specially is this
the case with the oriental and occidental languages, so
that a literal translation of the former would be often
unintelligible in the latter,) then we must relinquish
the design of translating ad verbum^ and content our-
selves with merely giving the sense of the original,
plainly designated.

§ 191. A knowledge of Hebrew as well as Greek^ neces-
sary to translate the New Testament. This can be ef-
fected only by one, who has an accurate knowledge of
both languages. To accomplish this in respect to the
New Testament, a man, besides the knowledge of his
vernacular tongue, must have an accurate knowledge of
both Greek and Hebrew. This is necessary, not only-
to understand the original, but to judge of what is pe-
culiar to each language, and to express the sense of the
original, in a manner adapted to the genius of his own
language.

ON TRANSLATING THE SCKIPTURES. 99

§ 192. Cases where we must adhere to the mode of trans-
lating ad verbum. But various causes operate, to pre-
vent a translator from strictly following the rule in
§ 190. For Jirst^ when the form and manner of the
Greek words has such a connexion with the things sig-
nitied, and the method of arguing, that those things
cannot he well understood, nor the argument proceed
well, if a translation ad verbum he not made, then we
must sacrifice the idiom of our own language, and ad-
here to that of the Greek. This frequently happens,
in respect to the epistles of Paul ; e. g. 2 Cor. III. in re-
gard to the words y^a^fAarog and nvev^arogj also do^rig ;
add Gal. 3 : 16 ; and m respect to allegories, John X.

§ 193. Continued, Antithesis, Paronomasia, and the
like figures of speech, also require a modification of the
rule in § 190. For the grace and beauty of these
perish, when the language is changed. Paul has many
of these figures. But they cannot always be preserved;
as another language will not always admit them. E. g.
in Matt. 16: 18. nexQog and ittrQa^ the paronomasia
can be preserved in Latin, but not m English.

§ 194. Continued. Another class of words, which
must be literally rendered, are those, for which no
equivalent Ones can be found, in the language of the
translator, so as fully and unambiguously to express
the idea. E. g. the word fcoi? ; and others, as nioxig,
f-uravoca, &;c.

§ 193. Continued, In very difficult and doubtful passa-
ges, also, a literal translation must be given, because a
version ad sensum would be assuming that one definitely
understood the real meaning of the passage. This
might do in a commentary, but not in a translation.
With propriety, says Castalio, on 1 Pet. 4: 6, "This
1 do not understand ; therefore I translate it ad verbum,

§ 196. In translating^ we ought to lean towards our own
vernacular idiom. A good acquaintance with these maxims

106 ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.

of translation, specially a practical acquaintance, will
enable any one to judge whether a version has pre-
served the right method in regard to purity of language,
or introduced too many of the idioms of the original.
As versions, however, are not made for the learned,
who can read the original, but for others, and specially
for the common people, it is better to incline to the idi-
om of our vernacular tongue, (even in cases where
you might with some propriety adhere to the original
idiom,) for the sake of rendering the translation more
intelligible. It was well said by Jerome to Pammachius,
wh<»n speaking of the best mode of interpretation, '' Let
others hunt ?ii\er syllables and letters ; do you seek for
the sense."

APPENDIX.

MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

Extract translated from a Dissertation of Dr, Morus^
late Professor of Theology in the Univerity of Leipsick^
entitled de discrimine sensus et significationis in inter-
PRFTANDo, and contained in his Dissertationes theol. et.
philol. VoL I. JVo, IL^

To the above rules of Ernesti, the object of which is to guide
the translator, in making a version of the original Scriptures in-
to his own vernacular language, I have thought it would he ac-
ceptable and useful to those for whom this little volume of the
Elements of Hermeneutics is designed, to subjoin an extract from
the dissertation of Morus just mentioned, which appears to be
very judicious and instructive. To the business of teaching Her-
meneutics, Morus was peculiarly attached and devoted ; and
few men have understood it better, or left behind them more use-
ful precepts, on this interesting subject. Equally removed from
the recent latitudinarianism of many German interpreters, and

MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 101

from the mystic and technical method of the older interpreters,
he formed and nurtured a school, which has produced great dnd
lasting influence upon the science of interpretation ; and the
principles of which, for the most part, must commend them-
selves at once, when well understood, to every intelligent and
unbiassed mind.

The dissertation in question commences, with pointing out the
impossibility of translating ad verbum out of one language into
another, in every case that ooay occur. The reason of this is
grounded in the different modes in which men of different nations
view the same objects, and express themselves in respect to them.
The age in which writers live, their different manners, customs,
culture, temper, manner of life, knowledge, &c, all concur in
producing these differences. In consequence of the operation of
causes so diverse, there is in one language much of rude antiqui-
ty, in another a high or a partial state of cultivation ; in one,
the connexions and transitions are circuitous, in another, short
and easy ; in one ellipsis abounds, in another it is unfrequent ;
one is profuse in allegories and tropes, another, dry and jejune in
expression ; one abounds with equivocal and indefined phraseolo-
gy, another, with definite and certain words ; the one is fitted
for expression in respect to the arts and sciences, the other, des-
titute of such means of expression ; the one is copious, the other
furnished with a scanty stock of words.

In consequence of these diversities, and the differences of idiom
which spring out of them, it becomes impossible always to
translate ad verbum from the one to the other. In such cases,
Morusjustlj^ contends, that the translator, abandoning a literal
version, should aim at exactly communicating the sense, E. g.
the literal translation of xaxw? ^X^f'V is to have badly ; but what
idea could an English reader attach to this translation ? Leaving
then the version ad verbum^ we must translate it, to be sicky which
conveys the exact sense of the Greek phrase, in an intelligible
form. And this instance may serve to illustrate what iVforus
means, by the phrase, difference between the signification and the
sense of words. The former is the literal and primary meaning
of the words, simply considered ; the sense^ is the idea conveyed
by the words, in the phrase, or in the connexion where they stand.

What is said of words may also be applied to phrases and
sentences, for the same reasons, and from the same causes, la
all these cases, where the sense cannot be given by a literal
translation, we must phoose other words which will designate it ;
and where particular^ words are wanting in "our own language to
do this, we must have recourse to circumlocution.

Having discussed these principles of translating, Morus pro-
ceeds to descant upon the method of applying them to practice.
As this subject is a matter of importance to all, who are to ex-
9*

102 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

pound the word of God in their own vernacular tongue, I shall
here present it, in a translation oi'the author's words.

\ It is proper here, to point out the duty of the inter-
preter, in reference to the above principles. In regard
to the first case, namely, where we abandon a literal
version, and use a word which will convey the sense of
the original, [ may say, in general, that the word substi-
tuted should approximate as nearly as possible, in its
signification, to that of the original word which it repre-
sents. On accuracy of this kind, depends, in a high de-
gree, the excellence of any version.

But, as it rarely suffices to give merely general di-
rections, I will descend to particulars. A version, then,
should exhibit a trope, where the original does, wheth-
er it be used for the sake of ornament, or variety ; an
energetic word, where there is one in the original.
Let the translator avoid tropes, where the diction of
the original is not figurative ; let him avoid technical
expressions, where those of common life should be used,
e. g. Tilatov should not be rendered perfection^ but pro-
bity^ uprightness. Let him not commute genus for spe-
cies; nor antecedent for consequent. In respect to
words which depend on an excited state of mind, such
as reproachful terms, and those of complaint, lamenta-
tion, and indignation; also proverbs, and proverbial
phrases ; let him compare these most carefully with the
practice of common life ; and what men are wont to
say on such occasions, let him express in his version,
and not rest satisfied with some kind of general meaning,
nor make a version which is cramped by its diction.
In general, let him take care to form a right estimate
of subjects from the nature ©f the predicates attached
to them 5 which is a matter of great importance, where
there is a departure from a literal version. It will also
afford an antidote against negligence and error.

It is sufficient to have given these few hints ; and he
who wishes for more accurate knowledge of the laws
of translating, must inquire into the grounds or reasons

MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 103

of these laws. These reasons are, the desire to translate
closely and not paraphrastically ; a wish to give an ex-
act idea of the thing designated by the original words,
so that the reader may understand it ; the necessity of
exhibiting the external beauty of the original diction ;
and the design of so exhibiting the writer's thoughts in
our own language, as to make it apparent, that if the
writer himself had used our language, he would have
expressed this proverb, that exclamation, that formula
of speech, just as the translator has done.

In regard to the second case, viz, where circumlocu-
tion is to be employed, one rule may be given to guide
the translator. Let him use words, if possible, which
do not express entirely an idea that is composed of many
parts in the original, and some of which are not desig-
nated exactly in the passage which is translated ; but
let him choose terms, ivhich are as exactly equivalent to
the original as possible. Where doubt may hang over
the expression, he may explain it by notes ; but he
should not be blamed for not expressing definitely in a
translation, what is indefinite in the original ; and while
he avoids doing this, he cannot be accused of obtruding
his own views upon the author whom he translates.

Thus far in respect to translating ad sensum rather
than ad verbmn^ when single words are to be explained
or translated. Let us come now to sentences and pro-
positions ; in regard to which, when they cannot be
literally translated without obscuring instead of illus-
trating the sense, we must, in like manner as before de-
scribed, substitute the meaning of the words instead of
the words themselves. In merely explaining a passage,
which contains the sign of some particular thing, the
interpreter may substitute the thing signified for the
sign of it. E. g. when God is said to come from heaven^
an interpreter in merely explaining, may say. This
means God as performing some illustrious work^ or doing
any thing in general ; or God as taking cognizance of any
things or as propitious^ or unpropitious^ just as the context
requires. Or when Christ is presented as sitting at the

104 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

right hand of God^ the meaning is, that Christ is partici-
pating in divine sovereignty. So when, in the oriental
writers, the sun is represented as darkened, the moon
obscured, and the stars as shaken, these are images of
distressing times ; and therefore, when it is said that
these things will happen, the simple meaning is, that
times of great distress will follow, in which, as it were,
all nature seems to threaten ruin. To this class of
passages, moreover, belong all those, in uhich God, as
future judge, is represented as visible; the forms of
speech being taken from the customs of men. The
meaning of such passages is, that God will render to eve-
ry one according to his deeds^ as it is plainly expressed in
Matt. 16 : 27.

In the mere explanation of these formulas of language,
every one sees that the sense is to be given ; but our
translator has a work of more ditBculty. For where
the object of enumerating many signs of the nature de-
scribed above, is to render the description more vivid
and impressive, (as in Matt. 24 : 29, 30,31. Joel 3:1.
Dan. 7 : 9.) every thing must be closely translated.
The translator would mutilate the diction of the author,
if he should abridge the description and give only the
general meaning ; for it was not the design of the wri-
ter, merely to present to the mind the thing summarily
and literally declared, but as it were, to place it before
the eyes in a picture or painting of it. For if the ver-
sion, by preserving these special traits, is not liable to
produce an erroneous impression in the reader's mind,
but every one who reads will easily understand that the
whole is to be considered as figurative expression, (as
those things are, which are spoken of God avdQMiio-
nadcag,) then there is no good reason why the version
should be changed into a paraphrase or explanation.
Who would doubt, or be at loss, what was meant, if
men, in a state of suffering and wretchedness, should be
described as approaching the throne of God, for the
purpose of supplication? But if a translation, as it
stands in our vernacular tongue to be read by the un-

5I0RUS ON TRANSLATION. 105

learned, necessarily leads to wrong views of the senti-
ments of the author, by being literal ; or communicates a
sentiment opposite to his ; or makes no sense ; 1 see oo
reason why we should fear to substitute the sense instead
of the literal signification o( the words; specially when
an argument follows, which does not depend on the
wo7^ds but on the sense^ and which no one can understand,
who does not attend to the sense rather than the words.
Of this nature are such expressions as making interces-
sion for men; sitting at the right hand of the king;
Christy who was rich^ becoming poor that men might be
made rich ; Christ being received into the heavens^ &c ;
which last phrase clearly means, to be most exalted^ to
have supreme dominion. Had some critics understood
this, they might have spared themselves the trouble of
inquiring, whether Christ contains the heavens, or the
heavens him; nor would they have thought of the ma-
jesty of Christ as suffering degradation, by being includ-
ed in a place ; nor would Beza have written such a
note as he has, on this subject. The meanings the
meaning only is to be sought for ; and not the mere lite-
ral signification of the words.

In other cases, what the sacred writers have applied
only to a part or species, interpreters have sometimes
applied to the whole, or the genus ; and vice versa.
Contemplated in the light where they have placed it,
the thing appears obscure, or difficult, or as needing to
be softened down ; but in the other light, it is plain,
easy, and accurately described. What David, in a
certain place, imprecates upon his enemies, (and there-
fore the enemies of Christ) viz, that their habitation
might be desolate and deserted^ Peter applies to Judas
the betrayer of Christ, and declares that it happened to
him. (Acts, 1 : 20.) But if a literal application of it is to
be made to David's enemies, it is not to be applied, iu
the same sense in which it is to Judas. How will it be
shewn, that the habitation of Judas became desolate
and deserted? Surely violence must be done to the pas-
sage, if any one determines to understand it literally.

106 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

We rnay, therefore, see whether the passage cannot be
translated ad sensum, E. g". if in uttering an imprecation
against one, we say, let his house become desolate,
our meaning is, in general, that he may be erAirpated^
thai he may utterly perish. Many imprecations are of
this nature, that the object of them is evil in general, by
which some one is to be overwhelmed or crushed ; and
to the mere form of the words themselves we are not
scrupulously to adhere. For the language of impreca-
tion is of such a nature, that it designates, by its vehe-
mence or moderation, the more vehement or moderate
affection of the mind, and also the weight or lightness,
the abundance or fewness, of the evils which are to be
inflicted.

Similar to the imprecations, of which I have just been
speaking, is that of wishing that any one may he extirpat-
ed.^ or, to express it rhetorically, that his house may be
deserted; which is the image of destruction or extirpa-
tion. This expression, logically considered, means a
species of destruction ,• and in the language of common
life, it would stand for an example of destruction. If
now the words above applied to Judas are considered
as simpl}^ designating the idea. Let him perish^ and are
urged no farther, all this most truly happened to Ju-
das ; and this entirely agrees with the sense put upon
the words, in Peter's discourse. For, as Peter argues,
if Judas has perished, there is need of a successor in
his office. But if the passage be literally understood,
the conclusion is not valid ; for it would not follow, that
because the house of Judas is deserted, a successor to
his office is needed. We may conclude, therefore, that
Peter cites one of the many imprecations contained in
a long poem, not because this imprecation only is to be
regarded literatim et syllabatim^ but merely to shew to
whom all imprecations of that nature attach, and to
whom they may be referred.

But still further to confirm this exegesis; does Paul,
I would ask, when he cites a part of the imprecations in
the same poem, insist upon and urge the literal

MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 107

meaning^ of them? (Rom. 11: 9, 10.) Does he apply
the tropical language of it, to some particular kind of
suffering, as poverty, for example, or sickness ? Not at
all ; but plainly teaches us, that the language of the
Psalmist metms generally to express the imprecation,
Let the enemies of God he wretched !

But still, in translating passages of this nature, it is
not enough to give the sense in general. We must pre-
sent the same images as the author does, and of course
express his words.' If we neglect to do this, our read-
ers may indeed know, in general, the meaning of the
author ; but they will remain ignorant of what language
he employs, and how much force and ornament he ex-
hibits.

I come next to allegory, or where similitudes are
employed for the sake of illustration. The use which
we should make of allegories in interpretation, is, to
deduce from them the general sentiment, in which is
summarily and properly contained, that which the wri-
ter wished to illustrate by his similitudes. In explain-
ing allegories, it is surely proper to have respect to the
design of the author in writing them. But all men,
who make use of allegories, expect their readers to re-
gard the general sentiment inculcated by them, rather
than the similitudes themselves ; or, which amounts
to the same thing, not to dwell upon the language mere-
ly, but to consider the design of it. For example ;
When Christ was asked why he did not enjoin it upon
his disciples oftener to fast, according to his usual cus-
tom ; he answered by allegories, using these three
similitudes, viz,that while the bridegroom was present, it
was not proper for the wedding-guests to be sad ; that
a new patch should not be sewed upon an old garment;
and that new wine should not be put into old bottles.
(Matt. 9 : 14 — 18.) In these similitudes, is doubtless
contained one general sentiment, which being under-
stood, the force of Jesus' reply is manifest. That senti-
ment, as it appears to me, i:i this ; that no one in common
life is wont to do those things^ which are incongruous with

108 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

the iime^ place^ and occasion. For if any one should be
sad at a wedding feast, or put new wine into old bottles,
or sew a new patch upon an old garment, would he not
act foolishly, and be regarded as one destitute of a sense
of propriety ? It is as much as to say, in common life such
things are incongruous. Whether, therefore, we advert
to all these similitudes, or only to one of them, the same
meaning is, and ought to be, deduced from the passage.

The amount of the whole is, that Christ being asked
why he permitted his disciples so much indulgence irt
regard to fasting, replied, by making use of similies, to
shew that no one in common life would do that which is in-
congruous ; and therefore, he would not compel his dis-
ciples to do that, which neither the time nor the occa-
sion required. For certainly it would have been incon-
gruous for the disciples, while Christ was with them as
their guide and teacher, to spend their life in sadness,
and to devote themselves to rites of this nature ; espe-
cially when Christ was soon to be taken from them, and
they were to be assailed by many calamities and dis-
tresses. Now if Christ, who knew this would be their
lot, had forbidden them their present enjoyments, and
prematurely loaded them with burdensome rites, which
were incongruous with their present circumstances, and
with the indulgence of his affection for them, he would
have done that, which would be like being sad at a
wedding-feast, or sewing a new patch upon an old gar-
ment, or putting new wine into old bottles, i. e. he
would have done an incongruous, unseemly thing.

But he, who, overlooking the fact that so many words
are employed in the designation of one general senti-
ment, thinks this mode of explanation does not exhaust
the whole meaning of the similies, will, after the man-
ner of many ancient and modern expositors, explain
every part ijy itself; so that the bridegroom is made the
husband of the church, the wine is the gospel, the old
and the new are Pharisaical and Christian doctrine, &c.
For myself, I am wont to follow the usage of common
life, in explaining similitudes ; for this is the voice of

MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 109

nature, and can easily be known, from the usual method
of allegory, fable, and simile. I could wish that the
language, opinions, and customs of common life, were
more frequently regarded in the interpretation of an-
cient authors.

If it be true, that whatever pertains to the art of ex-
pression is drawn from the observation of nature and
common life, how shall we judge that we have learned
not the mere opinions and speculations of others about
language, but the real art of language, which agrees
with the practice of common life, unless we compare
what we have learned with the results of common and
every day's experience ? If it be true, that any book is
simply the language of the author as it were addressed
to us, can we persuade ourselves that we have attained
the sense of it, if, when we read it, we construe every
thing in a different manner from what we should, had
we heard it spoken ? If we understand language, against
all the usages of common life ? If we seek in the very
syllables of a writer mountains of sense^ which no one, in
the language of common life, looks for or suspects ? If
we deny to an author the right of being reasonably
construed, and not to have his words urged beyond their
proper bounds^ a thing we always concede in conver-
sation, and which is indeed a fundamental rule of ex-
plaining language that is spoken ? If we suppose an
author to have written merely to afford us an occasion
of indulging our ingenuity, and while he walks upon the
earth, to mount ourselves upon the clouds ? Only think
how many errors, phantasies, and difficulties have been
introduced, by those, for example, who have comment-
ed on the ancient poets, and setting nature at defiance
as exhibited in common life, have undertaken to inter-
pret from their own fancy ! How much grave wisdom
has been obtruded upon Homer, against his will, where
his words breathed simple nature and common life !
Think with what anxiety of mind many have handled the
sacred writings, while they seemed to forget, that al-
though the authors were inspired, yet they were men,
10

no MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

they used human language, and so wrote it, that others
for whom it was designed could understand it in the
usual way, that is by the application to it of their know-
ledge of the idiom in which it was composed. It may
happen, indeed, that pursuing this plain beaten path we
may seem to be unlearned, because we do not profess to
know all which others think they know ; but we shall
be more than compensated by the abundant satisfaction
of having every thing around us, all that common life
comprizes, testifying in our favour, and that the mean-
ing of language must be scanned by the rules which we
have brought to view. Some perhaps may think too,
that we do not exhibit much modesty or diffidence in
regard to the sacred books, and that we are too liberal
and studious of neology. Still, our satisfaction will be
very great, if the reasons of our interpretation depend
on precepts drawn from common life and usage, which
carry along with them a convincing weight of evidence
in their favour, and are not repugnant to the nature and
genius of all languages. Such incongruous principles,
Turretine has very ably refuted, in his book, De Sac.
Script, inter pretatione, I do not mean to say, that
acuteness or subtilty in philology is to be neglected.
By no means ; for without these, no doctrine can be
well understood. He who heaps together much, is not
therefore a learned man ; but he who arranges, defines,
fortifies with arguments. Who would be satisfied with
being deprived of all the advantages of subtilty, or nice
discrimination, which enables us more certainly, briefly,
clearly, and orderly to learn any thing ? But when
we have so learned it, all is to be brought to the test
of common life, so that it may appear what we have
learned for ourselves, what for others ; what for the
schools, and what for every day's use.

[As related to the general subject of translating, and specially
of trans] atins: the New Testament, the reader will not fail to
compare with the above remarks, Campbell's excellent observa-
tions, comprized in the Preliminary Dissertations to his Transla-
tion of the Gospels, Diss. II. VIII. X.]

GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM, 111

PART IV.

GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM IN RESPECT TO THE NEW
TESTAMENT.

[Translated from Beckii Monogramnaata Hermeneutiees Li-
brorum Nov. Testanaenti, edit. 1803, Lipsiae, Sectio III. pp.
117, &;c.]

§ 1. Criticism is divided into lower and higher^ (terms
not altogether adapted to express a proper division of
it;) each of which is again subdivided into grarnmatico'
historical^ and conjectural.

§ 2. The authenticity of a book, the genuineness of
a passage, and the goodness of a particular reading,
are established by arguments external and internal. The
latter kind of arguments are deduced from the nature
of things treated of, the sentiments, and the language.

§ 3. Lower or verbal criticism is regulated by the fol-
lowing general principles; viz, That reading is prefera-
ble, respecting which it may be probably shewn, that it
bears the stamp of the author, and from which it may
appear that all the varieties of readings have proceeded.
Hence all the errors of copyists should be noted; as
they often furnish means of finding out the true reading
and the origin of various readings.

§ 4. Common laws of lower criticism^ zvhich apply to
books in general^ whether sacred or profane,

1. That reading is to be regarded as true, which is
supported by far the greater number of copies and wit-
nesses.

But still, readings supported by a few books are not

112 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM

entirely to be disregarded ; [specially when they har-
monize with the usus loquendi of the author.]

2. That reading which the better copies exhibit, un-
less special reasons prohibit it, is to be preferred to the
one which thepoorer copies exhibit, although most nu-
merous. What copies are of the better knid, is a ques-
tion to be discussed in another place, where inquiry is
made respecting the genius of the N. Test, writings.
Neither the antiquity nor propriety of a reading, solely
considered, always proves it to be a true one ; [unless
the antiquity should extend back to the autograph ; or
the propriety should be shewn to be exclusive.]

3. That reading which is more harsh, obscure, diffi-
cult, unusual, or delicately chosen, if supported by the
authority of a proper witness, is preferable to one which
is plain, easy, usual, and common. Difficulty sometimes
exists in respect to a whole passage, and its connexion ;
sometimes in regard to the ambiguity of particular
words and phrases ; sometimes in respect to the gram-
matical forms, historical and doctrinal passages, Sic.
But

4. That reading which approaches nearest to the
popular and famihar method of speaking, if it be sup-
ported by external testimonies, is preferable to one
more artificial and subtile.

5. The shorter reading, when supported by testimo-
ny of importance, and not incongruous with the style
and design of the writer, is preferable to a more verbose
one. Still there are eases, where the more copious
reading is to be preferred.

6. That reading which gives the best sense, is pecu-
liarly preferable. But to determine this, the nature of
the whole passage, the genius of the writer, and not the
mere opinions and sentiments of particular interpreters,
are to be consulted

7. The reading which produces a worthless or an in-
congruous sense, is to be rejected. Good care however
must be taken, not to condemn a reading as worthless
or incongruous, which a more correct grammatical and

IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 113

historical investigation would prove to be a true read-
ing", or at least a probable one.

8. A reading which agrees with the usus loquendi of
the writer, is preferable to that which disagrees with
it. It must be remembered, in judging here, that the
style of an author sometimes varies, with increasing
age.

9. A reading is to be rejected, in respect to which
plain evidence is found, that it has undergone a design-
ed alteration. Such alteration may have taken place,(a)
From doctrinal reasons. (6)From moral and practical
reasons. (g) From historical and geographical doubts;
Matt. 8 : 28, comp. Mark 5:1. {d)From the desire of
reconciling passages apparently inconsistent with each
other. (e)From desire to make the discourse more in-
tensive. Hence many emphatic readings have originat-
ed. (/) From the comparison of many MSS, the readings

*of which have been amalgamated. (^)From a compari-
son of parallel passages.

Corrections of the more celebrated MSS. have been
sometimes detected.

10. Various readings are to be rejected^ which spring
from the mere negligence of copyists, and from those
errors, which are very common in all kinds of books.
To these belong, (rt)The commutation of forms in the
Macedonico-Alexandrine dialect, and also other unusu-
al forms, for those of the common dialect. The Alex-
andrine and common forms, however, have the prefer-
ence over others in the New Testament ; and the
Alexandrine dialect itself also admitted some Attic
forms. (6)The commutation of single letters and sylla-
bles, by an error of either the eye or the ear ; the
former resulting from obscure and compendious meth-
ods of writing, [the latter, from copying after the read-
ing of one, who was misunderstood, or who read erro-
neously.] (c) The commutation of synonymes. (c^)Froaa
transferring into the text, words written in the margin
of copies, and thus uniting both readings, James V.
2. (e)From the omission of a word or a verse, by an

10*

114 OExVERAL RULES Of CRITICISM

error of (he sight. (/)From the transposition of words
and passages-, whence it may have happened, that some
error has crept into most of our books. (g)From words
which ended with the like sound, or appeared alike ;
and from proximate words, one ending and the other
beginning with the same syllable. (/i)From incorreclty
uniting or separating words ; which naturally resulted,
in some cases, from the ancient method of continuous
writing. (i)From an erroneous interpunction and dis-
tinction of passages.

11. A reading is to be rejected, which plainly be-
trays a gloss or interpretation. This may be a word
or a whole passage. Sometimes these glosses are unit-
ed to the true text, and sometimes they have thrust it
out. Not all interpretations, however, are spurious
glosses ; [for authors themselves sometimes add them,
in order to explain their own language.]

12. Readings deduced from versions or the commen-
taries of interpreters, are to be rejected. In judging of
them, however, great prudence and much skill is neces-
sary.

[The maxims, thus far, are comprized within the province of
lower criticism. But higher criticism may be, and ought to be
employed, in order to assist in lorming a judgment of the genu-
ineness of many passages. Here follows from the same writer,
a Synopsis of the]

§ 5. Laws of higher criticism^ respecting the establish-
ment of a pure text.

1. The sentiment, declaration, passage, book, or
part of a book of an}' author, which on account of its
nature, form, method, subject, or arguments, does not
appear to have originated from him, is either spurious,
or at least very much to be suspected.

Imitations of authors, made with design, or for the
sake of practice in writing, or from other reasons, may
easily be ascribed to the a.uthors tliemselves, though
they are supposititious.

2. A passage which manifestly disagrees with the na-
ture and connexion of the context, and interrupts! it, is
to be regarded as spurious.

IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 1 1 5

3. A passage which appears in another place, either
in the same words or with little variation, and seems to
be more properly and commodioiisly placed there,
may be suspected of having been transferred to the
place where it stands with less propriety, and may be
removed from thence.

But here great care is requisite, lest we judge rash-
ly, or form our opinion rather from the taste and style
of the present day, than from the genius of the author,
his design and style, or the subject and argument of the
discourse. As an example, one might appeal to the
disputations about the Apocalypse, and to the x\ppendix
of John's Gospel in chap. XXI.

4. Passages which are manifestly interpolated, by the
comments of interpreteis or from any other cause, are
to be rejected from the text.

But great caution is necessary here, to judge rightly.
In general, internal arguments alone are not to be relied
on, as sufficient evidence.

5. Parts of books, which appear incoherent, and yet
clearly exhibit the genius and style of the author, may
be reduced to better order, by separation, and making
a different arrangement. [Great caution here too is
necessary.]

6. If numerous and very diverse readings of a book
are found in the best copies, we may conclude, either
that the book has gradually received various accessions,
or has been re-published by a later hand, or has been
edited a second time by the author, and corrected, so
as to give occasions for the introduction of such various
readings.

§ 6. Laws proper to guide our judgment, in respect
to the true reading of passages in the New Testament,
spurious additions, the books themselves, or the au-
thors of them, may be deduced from the peculiar nature
of the things described, and the style of the books.
They may also be deduced from the nature of the
sources, whence the various readings come, and from
the testimony of witnesses. Such are the following.

116 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM

1. Passages are to be regarded as spurious, at least
are to be suspected, (if any such there are,) whioh dis-
agree with the nature of the Christian religion, the his-
tory of it, or the mode of teaching and deciding appro-
priate to any sacred writer ; or if they appear trifling,
inapt, or jejune, when compared with the force of the
doctrine exhibited, or the gravity of the author who
exhibits it. Specially are they to be suspected, if his-
torical reasons concur to render them suspicious.

The importance of subjects, the force of precepts
and narrations, and other things of this nature, are to be
estimated by the manner, judgment, and usage of those
times, in which the books were written. In judging of
doctrines, special caution is to be used.

We must be watchful against the pious frauds (as they
are called) of ancient Churches, committed in the in-
terpolation of books, and in giving new forms to pas-
sages of them. The special causes of interpolations
were tradition, apocryphal writings, the desire of ex-
plaining, augmenting, correcting, &c. On the other
hand, some passages were ejected as spurious, which
seemed to be unworthy of the authors of them. E. g.
Luke 22 : 43, vide Paulus, Commentary, p. 613.

2. In general, the reading which savours of Hebra-
ism or Syro-Chaldaism, is preferable to that which sa-
vours of classical Greek. [Ceteris paribus^ it is always
preferable.]

Some of the writers of the New Testament, however,
as Paul and Luke, approach negrer to the Greek style.

The conjecture of some critics, that the books of the
New Testament were originally written, for the most
part, in Syro-Chaldaic, and afterwards were translated
into Greek, by an interpreter who has committed many
errors, can, at most, be extended to but very few books.

3. Since the New Testament was commonly used,
both in public and private, and certain parts of it were
selected for ecclesiastical use, inquiry must be made,
whether any portion of it has bet^n interpolated, either
from the parallel pa^^sages of the Old Testament, or
from the Church Lectionaries.

IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 117

4. As many copies, versions, and fathers of the an-
cient Churches, are found nearly always to have fol-
lowed the same text, those which belong to the same
class are not to be separately numbered, but rather to
be regarded as standing ift the place of one witness. Still
less are we to trust solely to any one copy, however an-
cient, critical, or carefully written. JNor is any copy,
which may be erroneously written, or recent, or occa-
sionally interpolated, to be rejected as altogether use-
less.

5'. In respect to any reading, the first inquiry is. To
what recension or edition does it belong ?

The age and country of copies and readings, is to be
examined by careful comparison.

No copy extant is perfectly free from error in all the
books, or uniformly follows any one uncorrupted recen-
sion. We must judge, therefore, from the consent of
many things of the same kind, and from internal evi-
dence, what recension is followed, either generally, or
in particular passages. Some copies are thought to fol-
low various recensions in particular parts. A few cop-
ies of the most ancient classes of manuscripts are ex-
tant ; but the majority of copies are more modern. If
an ancient copy has been propagated through many edi-
tions, it may have been exposed to vary from the an-
cient recension, or have been corrupted by new er-
rors.of the copyist, more than if a recent copy were
directly taken from the ancient one.

6. That reading in which all the recensions of the
best copies agree, is the most correct, certainly the
most ancient. Slight deviations are unimportant.

7. Readings supported by the authority of the most
ancient classes of mannscripts, and of the more credi-
ble witnesses, are to be preferred to others. But a re-
gard must be had to the internal goodness of a copy.

8. The Alexandrine class of manuscripts is sometimes
preferable to the occidental, and sometimes of less au-
thority. In the conflicting claims of various classes,
special regard must be had to historical and internal
means of judging of a reading.

118 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM

9. Manuscripts are of the highest authority ; but nei-
ther the ancient versions, nor the exegetical and other
books of the Fathers are to be neglected.

10. In collecting and judging of the ancient versions,
(I) Regard must be had to those made directly from
the Greek. Among these, the Latin, Syriac, and Goth-
ic deserve special mention. (2) We must use a cor-
rected text of these Versions. (3) We must inquire
whether the translator has rendered literally or ad sen-
sum ; whether the errors in the version arise from the
fault of the translator's copy, or from other causes ;
and finally whether the version has been corrected or
not. (4) Those versions, which from comparison are
found to belong to the same family of manuscripts, are
to be regarded as standing in the place of one ancient
witness. (5) No reading derived merely from versions,
and destitute of other support, can be received ; but the
consent of all the ancient v6rsions and fathers in a par-
ticular reading, which varies from that of manuscripts,
renders the latter suspicious.

11. In regard to the readings derived from the writ-
ers of the ancient churches, we must see (1) That they
are drawn from a correct and not a corrupt edition of
the Fathers. (2) We must diligently consider the au-
thors, their descent, age, erudition, subtilty of judging,
temerity in emendation, the nature of the copies which
they used, and the creed of the churches to which they
belonged. (3^ We must consider, in what kind of book
or passage or ecclesiastical writers, various readings
are found. (4.) Inquiry must be made, whether the vari-
ations are supported by real and direct testimony of the
fathers ; or whether changes were occasioned in the
text by lapse of memory, or a designed accommoda-
tion ; or whether merely opinions or conjectures are
proposed. It seems to be very unjust to ascribe all the
variety found in the ecclesiastical fathers, either to er-
ror of the memory, or to temerity in accommodation,
or a fondness for emendation. (5.) The omission of
some passage, in the Commentaries of the Fathers, does
not always shew that it was wanting, in the copy which

IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTEMENT. 119

the writer had. Silence however, concerning an impor-
tant passage, renders it suspicious.

12. The fragments of heretical writings are not to
be overlooked, in the search for various readings ; for
the supposition is rash, that they generally corrupted
the text of all parts of the sacred writings.

13. That interpunction, and distinction of verses and
chapters, which is most consonant with the argument,
sentiments, connexion of discourse, and usus loquendi of
the sacred writers, is to be regarded as the best.

§ 6. In the criticism of all ancient books, it is well
understood, that particular readings are not required to
be established by most certain and irrefragable argu-
ments, but only that a probability be shewn that they
approximate, at least, very near to the original read-
ings ; and the judgment is to be made up, in view of
what appears to be most probable. So in respect to
the New Testament ; no more should be required than
can, from the nature of the case, be performed. Every
thing on all sides should be considered, before the
judgment is made up. And if, in judging of the text of
profane authors, gravity and modesty are rightly com-
mended ; surely in judging of the sacred books, we oiight
most scrupulously to abstain from all rashness and levi-
ty, as well as from all favoritism and* superstition.

PART V.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER.

[The followinff Chapter is extracted from KeiPs Elementa Her-
meneutices, translated from the orig^inhl O'einjan into l.atin by
C. A. G. Emmerling, and published at Leipzick in 1811. Although
it contains several things that seem to be a repetition of the ideas
advanced in various places hy Ernesti. as exhibileJ in the fore-
going pages ; yet as the object is lo describe the qualifications of

120 ON THE QUALIFICATIONS

the interpreter himself^ in respect to knowledge^ and as it is a very
brief and well digested summary, it appears desirable that the
student, who aspires to the place of an interpreter, should have
the qualifications of one definitely and separately described, as
here, in order that he may direct his special attention to this sub-
ject, unembarrassed by other considerations.]

§ 1. He who desires to understand and interpret the
books of the New Testament, must,^r5^ of all^ acquire
some historic knowledge of the author of each book ;
of the state of things existing when it was written ; of
the body or collection of the New Testament books ; of
the particular history of its ancient versions, editions,
and parts in which it was written ; and other things of
this nature. To this must be added a knowledge of the
principles of criticism, in respect to the text of the New
Testament.

Books to be read for information on these topics : Marsh's trans-
lation of Michaelis' Introduct. to the N. Test.; and Haenlein
Handbuch der Einleitung in die Schriften des N. Testaments.

§ 2. Of the second kind of knowledge^ preparatory to
the understanding and interpretation of the JY, Testament,

(1) The interpreter must understand the language in
which the books are written. As the diction is not pure
classic Greek, but the Hebrew idiom here and there in-
termixed with classic Greek, and as vestiges of the Chal-
dee, Sj^iac, Rabbinic and Latin languages occur ; it fol-
lows, of course, that the interpreter should not only be
acquainted with pure Greek, but with its various dia-
lects, specially the Alexandrine. Above all, he ought
to be well versed in the Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, Rab-
binic, and Latin idioms.

Vorstius de Hebraismis N. Test., cura Fischeri. 1778. Leus-
den de Dialectis N. Test. edit. Fischeri. 1792. Maltaire Dc Di-
alectis. Ling. Graec. Sturtz De Dialecto. Macedonica et Alex-
andrina, 1808. Pfannkuche, Ueber die Palaestinische Landes-
sprache in dem Zeitalter Christi ; im Eichhorn's Allgemeine
Bibliothek, B. viii. s.365, &c.

(2.) The interpreter mtist possess a knowledge of the things^
respecting which the books treat. These are partly his-
torical^ and partly doctrinal. The explanation of them
must be sought, primarily, from the books themselves ;

OF AN INTERPRETER. 121

and, secondarily, from those writings of more recent au-
thors, which may be subsidiary to the attainment of this
knowledge.

§ 3. As to the historic matter of these books. It is of
great importance to the interpreter to be well versed
in sacred geography, chronology, civil history, and ar-
chaeology ,' i. e. to understand those things which re-
spect the situation and climate of the countries, where
the events referred to happened ; as well as those which
serve to define the times when they happened ; and al-
so the history of the nation among whom they took
place, and of other nations mentioned in this his-
tory, with their condition, manners, and customs.

(1) Geographical knowledge. The geography of Pal-
estine and the neighbouring countries should be well
understood, (a) as also their natural productions, (b)
To this must be added a knowledge of many countries
in Asia, and of some in Europe ; also of the Roman em-
pire, as it then existed, divided into provinces.

a) Wells' Sacred Geography. Relandi Palaestina. Bachiene
histor, und geograph. Beschreibung von Palaestina, Tom. vii.
8vo. 1766. Hamelsfeldt biblische Geographic, 3 Theile. 1796.
Specially, Bellerman's biblical Geography, now in the course of
translation by Messrs. R. C. Morse and James Marsh, Alumni of
the Theol. Sem. at Andover ; a classical and excellent work.

6) Celsii Hierobotanicon, 1745. Bocharti Hierozoicon, edit.
Rosenmueller, 1776. Tom. iii. Supp. to Calmet's Dictionary,
Vols, iii — V. Harmar's Observations edited by A. Clarke.

(2) Chronology, The interpreter should have not on-
ly a knowledge of technical chronology, but of the Ro-
man mode of reckoning aburbe condita^ and of the Greek
Olympiads ; (on which subjects he may study authors
well deserving of credit;) but in respect to historical
chronology, he should know in what order of time the
events related in the Old Testament happened ; when
and where the first Roman emperors, the various kings
and princes that sprung from the house of Herod the
Great, the Roman Consuls at the beginning of the em-
pire of the Caesars, the Jewish high priests (and the
number of them) in our Saviour's time, and the Roman

11

n

ON THE QUALIFICATIONS

magistrates, specially in the provinces of Syria and Ju-
dea, succeeded each other.

Petavii Opus de doctrina temporum, 1703. Scaliger de emen-
datione temporum, 1629. Usherii Annales Vet. et N. Test.
Franckii Novum Systeraa Chronol. fundamentalis. Goelting. 1778.

(3) History civil and Political. In regard to the his-
tory of events among the nations mentioned in the sa-
cred books, and also their forms of government, it is
important for the interpreter to make himself acquaint-
ed, ^r^^, with the ancient history of the Jews. In study-
ing this, he is not to confine himself merely to the Old
Testament ; he must also consult the traditionary ac-
counts, which were extant in the time of Christ and the
Apostles, (a) Secondly^ he must study the history of the
Jews under the Herods, and that of these princes.
Thirdly^ the condition and circumstances of the Jews in
Palestine, while under the dominion of the Romans ; and
also of the Jews living in other countries. Finally, the
history of the Roman Emperors at that period, and of
the Roman Prefects over the Asiatic Provinces.

a) Shuckford's Connexion. Prideaux' Connexion. Krebsius,
Decreta Romanorum pro Judaeis, e Joseph© collecta, 1 vol. 8vo.
1763. Wesselingii Diatribe de Judaeorum Archontibus, 1 vol.
8vo. 1738. Benson^s History of the first planting of the Chris-
tian religion. Josephi Opera, edit. Havercarapii. Jahn, Ge-
schichte der Juden in Archaeologie der Hebraer, Vol. I.

(4) Manners and customs. In regard to these, (a) A
knowledge of Hebrew antiquities in general is necessa-
ry. (6) A considerable knowledge of the Greek and Ro-
man Antiquities, (c) A knowledge of the ecclesiastical
rites and customs of the primitive churches ; both those
which they received from the Hebrews, and others
which w^ere introduced by Christians themselves.

Opera Philonis Alex, et Josephi. Warneknos Entwurf der
Heb. Alterlhuemer, 1 vol. 8vo. Specially, Jahnii Archaeologia
Biblica in compendium redacta, now in a course of translation
by Mr. T. C. Upham, an Alumnus of the Theol. Sem. at Ando-
ver, and soon, it is hoped, to be published, for the use of biblical
students in our country ; a vsrork, which combines brevity with
perspicuity and good order, and comprizes the substance of all
the preceding publications on this interesting subject.

Of Roman Antiquities, Adams' work is a very useful Compend ;
and of the Greek, Potter remains not only the best, but almost

OF AN INTERPRETER. 1 23

the oniy respectable one. Ecc. .;4n^igfM^7^c5. Bingham, Orig.Ecc.
Also Roealer Bibliothek, der Kircheavaetern.

§ 4. Doctrinal contents of the sacred books. That part
of the New Testament, which is directly concerned with
faith and practice, will be rightly understood, when the
interpreter rightly understands what each particular
writer has inculcated. As there are many passages
which relate to the Jews ; and as the writers of the New
Testament and their first readers were of Jewish ex-
traction ; it will be important,

(1) To know the sentiments of the Jews of that peri-
od, in regard to religion ; specially of those, who used
the Hebrew-Greek dialect, and of the three great sects
among which the Jews were divided, viz. the Pharisees,
Sadducees, and Essenes.

Joseph! et Philonis Scripta. An admirable view of Philo's
Sentiments has been published by Schreiter, in Analekten der
exeget. Theologie, Band i. ii. Fabricii Codex Pseudepigraphus
Vet. Test., et Codex Apocryphus Nov. Test. Grabii Spicile-
gium Sanctt. Patrum, saec. i. ii. iii. 2 vols. 8vo. On the right
use of these sources, see Mori Hermeneut. Vol. ii. p. 172, &c.
Brettschneider, systemat. Darstellung der Dogmat. und Moral
der Apocryph. Schriften des A. Test. 1805. Staeudlin, Theulo-
giae Moralis Ebraeorum ante Christum Historia, 1794. De tri-
bus Judaeorum Sectis, delph. 1703, 4to. comprizing the works of
Serrarius, Drusius, and Scaliger, on this subject.

(2) The precepts of the Christian religion. What was
adopted from the Jewish religion, what rejected, and
what was added anew to Christianity, must be understood
in order to explain the New Testament properly. But
knowledge of this nature, that is certain^ can be drawn
only from the sacred writings themselves.

The Biblical Theology of Storr, Reinhard, Doederlein, Zach-
aria, Leun, Muntinghe, (and for some purposes, of Ammon and
Bauer,) may be used with profit. But the student is not to be
guided by any system, except so far as the author shows it to fee
built upon a satisfactory interpretation of the word of God.
Flatt's edition of Storr, translated into German, and accompani-
ed by the notes of the Editor, is a fundamental book in the study
of Biblical Theology.

(3) The doctrines of heretical Sects* It is important to
know the opinions of early heretics, because, it is prob-
able, some passages of the New Testament have a spe-
cial reference to them.

124 QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER.

The best book, by far, is Walch's Entwurf einer vollstaend.
Geschichte der Ketzereien, Sic. 11 vols. 8vo. Vol. i. contains an
account of the earliest heresies. Titmanni de vestigiis Gnosti-
corum in Nov. Test, frustra quaesitis, will well repay the labour
of perusal.

§ 5. In enumerating the qualifications of an inter-
preter, we must not omit a knowledge of grammar, rhet-
oric, and philosophy.

(1) Grammar. Not only a general knowledge of its
principles is necessary, but also a special technical
knowledge of both etymology and Syntax. The inter-
preter must be acquainted with the various forms of
words, and understand how the significations are con-
nected with the forms ; he must understand the manner
in which words are connected in a sentence ; the use of
the particles; and also of the grammatical figures, as
they are called, such as ellipsis and pleonasm.

Vigerus, de idiotismis Ling. Graecae, edit. Hermann^ ISO'S.
Hoogeveen, Doctrina partic. Graec. edit. Schutz, 1806. Bos,
Ellipses Graecae, edit.Schaefer,1808. Weiskii, Pleonasmi Grae-
ci, 1807.

(2) Rhetoric. A knowledge of this is necessary, not so
much to judge of rhetorical figures, as to find out the
meaning of them, or the sentiment which they are de-
signed to convey.

(3) A knowledge of Philosophy. Not that of some par-
ticular school or sect merely, but that which pertains
to the cultivation of the mental powers, and to nice psy-
chological discrimination. Such a knowledge is requi-
site, in order to form clear conceptions in the mind, and
accurately to define our ideas ; to discern what is simi-
lar in different things, and what is distinct; to judge of
the connexion of thought and argument, and finally, to
qualify one perspicuously to represent the opinions of
an author to others. Great caution, however, is neces-
sary here, lest the interpreter intrude upon his author,
his own particular philosrphy.

Ernesti, Opuscula Philol. de Vanitate Philosophantium, &e.

FINIS.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
BERKELEY

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