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ENGLAND   IN  THE 
SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 

DRAKE    AND     THE    TUDOR 

NAVY :  with  a  History  of  the  Rise  of 
England  as  a  Maritime  Power.  With 
Portraits,  Illustrations,  and  Maps.  2 
vols.     Crown  8vo,  16s. 

THE  SUCCESSORS  OF  DRAKE. 
With  4  Portraits  (2  Photogravures)  and 
12  Maps  and  Plans.     8vo,  21s. 

ENGLAND  IN  THE  MEDITER- 
RANEAN: A  Study  of  the  Rise  and 
Influence  of  British  Power  within  the 
Straits,  1603-1713.   2  vols.   8vo,24s.net. 


LONGMANS,  GREEN,  AND  GO. 

LONDON,    NEW   YORK,    BOMBAY,    AND   CALCUTTA 


ENGLAND    m   THE 
SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR 

A  STUDY  IN  COMBINED  STRATEGY 


BY 


JULIAN    S.   CORRETT,  LL.M. 

LECTURER    IN    HISTORY    TO    THE    ROYAL 
NAVAL    WAR    COLLEGE 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.  II 


WITH  MAPS  AND  PLANS 


LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

39    PATERNOSTER    ROW,    LONDON 

NEW  YORK,  BOMBAY,  AND  CALCUTTA 

1907 

All  rights  reserved 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  (ALIFORNL 
SANTA  BARBARA 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  The  French  Couxter- Attack  of  1759  .         .         1 

II.  The  Second  Phase  of  the  War  .         .         .         .71 

III.  Main  Attack,  1760 — Montreal    ....     105 

IV.  Transition  from  Commerce  Protection  to  Eccen- 

tric Attack  in  the  East  Indies      .         .         .119 

V.  The  Resumption  of  Coastal  Pressure — Belleisle     141 

VI.  Spain  and  the  Fall  of  Pitt       .         .         .         .171 

VII.  Completion    of     the    West     Indian     Attack — 

Martinique 209 

VIII.  The  Intervention  of  Spain  .....     227 

IX.  The  Attack  on  Spain — Havana  ....     246 

X.  Between  War  and  Peace — The  Bourbon  Counter- 
attack— Portugal    ......     285 

XI.  Bute's  Peace 327 

XII.  Conclusion — Lessons  of  the  War       ,         .         .     366 


APPENDIX — Definitive   Treaty  of  Peace   he- 
tween  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain       .     377 

INDEX 391 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


Iittp://www.arcliive.org/details/englandinsevenye02corb 


MAPS  AND  PLANS 

PAGE 

1.  Chart  to   Illustrate  Hawke's  Blockade  in 

1759 Toface       1 

With  his  Operations  against  Conflans  in  November. 

2.  Map    to    Illustrate    the    Montreal    Cam- 

paign, 1760 ,,105 

3.  Belleisle        .         .         .         .         .         .         .  .         IGl 

4.  Greater  Antilles To  face  255 

Showing  the  Operations  against  Havana. 


ENGLAND    IN    THE    SEVEN 
YEARS'   WAR 

CHAPTER   I 

THE  FRENCH  COUNTER-ATTACK   OF   1759 

A  STRIKING  feature  of  the  operations  against  Quebec  is 
that  in  spite  of  their  extreme  difficulty  and  the  risk  they 
involved,  and  in  spite  of  the  decisive  importance  of  the 
objective,  no  direct  attempt  to  interrupt  or  even  to  harass 
them  was  made  from  France.  The  conditions  which 
produced  this  result  have  still  to  be  dealt  with,  and  are 
well  worth  study. 

In  the  first  place,  they  introduce  us  to  a  fresh  principle 
of  higher  strategy  which  recurs  in  almost  all  great  wars, 
and  above  all  others  tends  to  strategical  confusion  in 
their  conduct.  That  law,  or  principle,  is  the  tendency 
of  limited  wars  to  become  unlimited  in  character.  The 
process,  as  between  two  powerful  and  determined  states,  is 
almost  inevitable.  In  a  limited  war,  correctly  conducted, 
a  phase  must  be  reached  sooner  or  later  in  which  one 
party  begins  to  predominate  in  the  limited  area — that  is, 
the  area  of  the  special  object.  The  other  party,  as  he 
feels  himself  unable  to  retain  his  hold  in  that  area  or 
shake  that  of  his  adversary,  will  seek  to  redress  the 
bahmce  by  striking  him  at  the  centre  of  his  power.     In 

VOL.  II.  A 


2  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

other  words,  the  losing  party  will  seek  to  destroy  or 
cripple  his  enemy's  resources  for  war  at  their  base,  and 
to  inflict  upon  his  home  population  suffering  more  intense 
than  the  attainment  of  the  special  object  is  worth.  A 
war  conducted  on  these  lines  is  unlimited  in  character, 
since  by  acting  thus  we  seek,  through  general  pressure 
upon  the  national  life  of  an  adversary,  to  force  him  to 
do  our  will  or  to  abandon  his  own. 

It  is  this  stage  of  a  limited  war  which  most  severely 
tests  the  imperturbability  of  a  government,  and  at  the  same 
time  exhibits  the  highest  function  of  the  defensive.  And 
here  lies  the  second  point,  in  which  the  home  aspect  of 
the  campaign  of  1759  is  so  significant.  Pitt's  success  in 
the  war,  so  far,  had  been  due  fundamentally  to  the  clear- 
eyed  determination  with  which  he  had  differentiated  and 
co-ordinated  the  offensive  and  defensive  parts  of  his 
scheme.  The  vigorous  offensive  in  the  limited  area  had 
been  given  its  utmost  attainable  intensity,  and  nourished 
to  the  last  available  man  and  gun  by  a  cool  insistence 
upon  a  rigid  defensive  at  home,  so  far,  at  least,  as 
that  defensive  was  compatible  with  diplomatic  demands. 
Though  France  had  for  a  while  hung  back  from  the  truth, 
it  had  been  her  interest  from  the  first  to  make  the  war 
unlimited  in  character.  She  was  so  much  the  weaker  in 
the  limited  area  and  upon  the  common  lines  of  passage 
and  communication,  that  general  coercion  was  her  only 
real  chance  of  fighting  the  war  to  a  favourable  peace. 
It  was  with  this  object  in  view,  as  we  have  seen,  that  she 
had  attacked  Hanover,  but  the  connection  betAveen  Han- 
over and  England  had  not  proved  sufficiently  intimate 
to  convert  the  character  of  the  war.  In  Europe  Pitt 
stubbornly  refused  to  go  beyond  the  general  defensive 
attitude  which  was  necessary  to  cover  his  offensive  in 
America ;  and  France  had  been  provided  by  diplomatic 


1759  A    NEW    PHASE    OF   THE    WAR  3 

means  with  preoccupations  which  as  yet  had  made  it 
impossible  for  her  to  break  that  defensive. 

So  far,  the  correct  Hne  for  England  to  pursue  had  been 
comparatively  clear  and  easy  to  follow ;  but  when  France, 
finding  her  first  design  for  expanding  the  war  ineffective, 
went  a  step  further  and  decided  to  make  a  direct  attack 
upon  the  British  Islands,  the  case  became  more  complex. 
The  question  at  once  arose  whether  the  time  had  not 
now  come  for  abandoning  the  defensive  attitude  which 
had  hitherto  sufficed.  Pitt  above  all  men  was  a  believer 
in  the  supreme  efficacy  of  the  offensive.  In  our  history 
he  may  be  taken  to  stand  for  that  faith,  as  Napoleon 
stands  for  it  in  France ;  and  yet  it  was  Napoleon  who 
wrote,  "  The  whole  art  of  war  consists  in  a  well  reasoned 
and  strictly  judicious  defensive,  followed  by  audacious 
and  rapid  attack."  Such  too  was  Pitt's  faith.  No  man 
grasped  more  firmly  than  he  the  absolute  dependence 
of  the  offensive  upon  a  foundation  of  defence,  and  no  one 
moreover  knew  better  that  where  the  offensive  is  not 
directed  justly  at  the  main  object  of  the  war,  it  is  mere 
superstition  and  untutored  instinct.  To  meet  offence  by 
quicker  and  more  violent  offence  was  the  keynote  of 
Pitt's  method,  but  he  never  permitted  the  brilliance  of 
the  conception  to  blind  him.  He  never  forgot  that  to  be 
tempted  into  taking  the  offensive  in  an  area  which  was 
not  the  true  area  of  the  war,  and  in  which  the  enemy 
was  naturally  the  stronger,  was  not  to  show  vigour,  but 
to  play  stupidly  into  the  enemy's  hands.  We  have  only 
to  follow  his  handling  of  the  new  situation  to  see  how 
true  was  his  eye  and  how  masterly  his  grasp  of  war. 

That  the  French  determined  to  resort  in  some  form 
or  other  to  their  old  deterrent  device  of  an  invasion,  or 
at  least  a  formidable  demonstration,  was  known  early  in 
the  year.      Indeed  they  made  no  secret  of  it.     Seeing 


4  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

that  the  whole  object  of  the  design  was  to  divert  British 
attention  from  America  and  to  attract  her  main  forces 
within  reach  of  French  weapons,  she  had  every  reason  to 
sound  her  trumpets  as  loudly  as  possible.  What  she  had 
to  keep  secret  was  not  her  intention,  but  the  manner  in 
which  it  was  to  be  carried  out.^  Before  ever  Saunders 
and  Wolfe  had  sailed  for  Quebec,  our  intelligence  left  no 
doubt  that  the  French  intention  was  at  least  serious 
enough  to  be  reckoned  with.  Choiseul,  who  was  now  all- 
powerful  at  Versailles,  had  said  they  meant  to  play  the 
Pretender  again  and  make  a  serious  descent  upon  England 
to  ruin  her  credit,  since  in  his  opinion  this  was  the  only 
means  France  had  left  for  maintaining  the  balance.  It 
was  English  supplies  that  kept  the  war  in  Germany  going, 
and  they  must  be  stopped.  For  it  was  only  in  Germany 
that  France  could  secure  the  means  of  recovering  the 
ground  she  had  lost  in  America.  There  Frederick  must 
be  subdued,  and  the  only  way  to  subdue  Frederick  was  to 
invade  England,  and  so  detach  her  from  his  alliance. 
Her  eyes  were  not  shut  to  the  naval  diflSculties,  but  these 
she  hoped  to  overcome  by  bringing  in  the  other  maritime 
powers,  and  particularly  Sweden,  who  was  as  anxious  as 
herself  to  see  the  horn  of  Frederick  brought  low.^  The 
fleet  was  already  arming,  and  forty  thousand  men  were 
cantoned  along  the  Channel  coasts.  Threats  so  definite 
as  these  had  never  failed  to  impress  the  peculiar  tender- 
ness of  British  strategy.  The  device  had  been  tried 
again  and  again,  and  had  always  had  the  effect  of  attract- 
ing to  itself  the  mass  of  British  effort.  But,  unlike  his 
predecessors,  Pitt  was  unmoved.  He  saw  the  old  net 
being  spread  before  his  eyes,  and  refused  to  walk  into  it. 

»  Choiseul  to  Havrincour,  June  7,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,891. 
»  Information  from  Paris,  NcivcasUc  Papers,  Add.  MSS.   32,888,  f.  252, 
Jan.  20,  1759  ;  Scbuffer  to  HUpken  (intercepted),  Ibid.,  Jan.  20,  32,887. 


1759  DANGER   FROM    NEUTRALS  5 

The  orders  for  Canada  stood,  and  Pitt  gave  no  more  heed 
to  the  French  threat  than,  as  we  have  seen,  sHghtly  to 
strengthen  his  naval  defensive  by  ordering  Saunders 
to  detach  two  of  the  line  to  reinforce  Brodrick  in  the 
Mediterranean. 

There  was,  however,  one  factor  in  the  situation  which 
caused  Pitt  real  anxiety,  and  that  was  the  uncertain  and 
even  menacing  attitude  of  the  neutral  sea  powers — Spain, 
Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden.  It  may  be  taken  as 
a  law  of  maritime  warfare,  which  cannot  be  omitted  from 
strategical  calculation  with  impunity,  that  every  step 
towards  gaming  command  of  the  sea  tends  to  turn 
neutral  sea  powers  into  enemies.  The  prolonged  exer- 
cise of  belligerent  rights,  even  of  the  most  undoubted 
kind,  produces  an  interference  with  trade  that  becomes 
more  and  more  oppressive.  But  the  process  is  usually 
accelerated  as  the  sense  of  power  inclines  the  dominat- 
ing belligerent  to  push  its  privileges  beyond  admitted 
limits.  In  the  present  case  the  atmosphere  was  very 
highly  charged,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  and 
those  that  followed  them  still  claimed  immunity  for 
enemy's  goods  in  neutral  ships ;  while  England  asserted 
her  traditional  doctrine  that  enemy's  goods  were  good 
prize  everywhere  upon  the  high  seas.  In  the  present 
war  this  old  dispute  received  a  special  aggravation.  For, 
as  we  have  seen,  France,  in  an  eftbrt  to  save  her  West 
Indian  trade,  had  suspended  her  exclusive  navigation  laws, 
and  had  thrown  open  that  trade  to  neutrals.  Now,  how- 
ever willing  England  might  be  to  relax  the  severity  of 
her  doctrine  in  order  to  keep  well  with  her  neighbours, 
this  was  a  length  to  which  she  could  not  go.  To  permit 
neutrals,  and  above  all  the  Dutch,  to  carry  on  for  France 
her  West  Indian  trade,  was  to  render  that  trade  almost 
invulnerable,   and    the   islands   themselves    much   more 


6  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

defensible.  We  argued  that  for  a  neutral  in  war  time 
to  carry  on  belligerent  trade  which  was  denied  to  her 
in  peace  was  to  better  her  position  by  the  war,  and  to 
give  illegitimate  assistance  to  the  belligerent.  Our 
courts,  therefore,  had  laid  down  from  the  first  the 
famous  "  Rule  of  175G  "  that  during  war  neutrals  may 
not  engage  in  a  trade  with  the  colonies  of  a  belligerent 
which  is  denied  to  foreign  vessels  in  time  of  peace. 

On  this  rule  our  courts  acted  with  legitimate  severity, 
to  the  especial  annoyance  of  the  Dutch,  whose  com- 
mercial position  had  always  owed  so  much  to  their 
inveterate  practice  of  fishing  thus  in  troubled  waters.^ 
Added  to  this  was  the  further  provocation  that  the 
Dutch  were  the  most  confirmed  dealers  in  contra- 
band of  war,  and  the  result  was  that  their  ships  were 
seized  ruthlessly  and  condemned  in  our  prize  courts 
without  mercy,  and  often  with  a  stretch  of  justice. 
Danes,  Swedes,  and  Spaniards  fared  little  better.  What 
the  King's  cruisers  did  might  possibly  have  been  borne, 
but  the  action  of  our  privateers  was  outrageous  beyond 
endurance.  Every  year  it  had  been  growing  worse,  and 
it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  at  this  time  there  was  a 
swarm  of  smaller  privateers  in  the  Narrow  Seas  who 
were  not  to  be  distinguished  from  pirates.  No  matter 
from  what  innocent  port  the  luckless  vessels  came,  they 
seized  them  regardless  of  their  papers,  and  in  some 
cases  went  so  far  as  to  capture  vessels  which  had  just 
been  released  by  our  own  prize-courts.  To  increase  the 
danger  of  the  situation,  it  happened  that  the  Princess 
Royal,  who  had   been   regent  in  Holland,  had  recently 


*  P'or  the  serious  extent  of  this  trade  see  Governor  Thomas  to  Pitt, 
Antigua,  Nov.  20,  1750,  Chatham  MSS.,  98.  He  says  three  Dutch  convoys 
under  French  escort  had  passed  between  Martinique  and  St.  Eustatius  in 
the  last  four  months. 


IS79  DANGER    FROM    NEUTRALS  7 

died,  and  we  were  deprived  of  her  kindly  influence.  In 
Spain,  too,  the  Anglophile  King  Ferdinand  had  sunk  into 
imbecility.  His  end  was  obviously  near,  and  the  heir- 
presumptive  was  the  Bourbon  King  of  Naples,  a  strong 
partisan  of  France.  Still  General  Wall  maintained  his 
ascendency  over  Spanish  policy,  but  it  was  expected  not 
to  outlast  the  frail  life  of  the  King. 

This,  then,  was  the  uncertain  element  in  the  situa- 
tion, and  it  was  the  only  one  which  caused  Pitt  any  real 
anxiety.  He  was  honestly  doing  his  best  to  check  the 
abuses,  but  the  privateers  were  incorrigible.  What 
oppressed  his  mind  from  the  first  was  a  vision  of  the 
three  northern  powers  uniting  to  protect  their  trade. 
He  saw  how  easily  on  such  a  pretence  they  might  gather 
a  powerful  combined  fleet  to  escort  their  convoys  down 
Channel,  and  then,  having  seen  them  clear,  it  would  be 
open  to  them  to  run  into  Brest,  join  hands  with  the 
French  fleet,  and  declare  war.  We  should  then  be 
unable  to  keep  command  of  the  Channel  or  the  North 
Sea,  and  the  threatened  invasion  would  become  a  real 
danger.^ 

The  vision  does  credit  to  Pitt's  long  sight  and  acute 
perception.  It  was  far  from  fanciful.  France  was  doing 
all  she  could  at  this  time  to  tempt  Sweden  into  taking 
a  hand  in  her  invasion  project,  and  Denmark  was  actually 
approaching  Holland  as  to  the  possibility  of  forming  a 
maritime  union  and  taking  common  action  for  the  asser- 
tion of  neutral  rights.  Pitt,  who  knew  how  to  make 
concessions   as  well  as   to   be   bold,  met  the  danger  by 


1  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  Dec.  19,  1758,  and  "  Mem.  for  the  King,"  Dec.  22. 
"  Mr.  Pitt's  apprehensions  that  the  Dutch  and  Danes  may  come  into 
our  channel  without  our  having  any  certain  knowledge  of  their  object,  and 
if  the  court  of  France  should  have  any  design  to  disturb  us,  these  very 
ships  may  join  and  assist  in  it." — Add.  MSS.  32,886. 


8  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  the  prize  courts  to  release 
as  many  ships  as  possible,  and  by  restraining  the  excesses 
of  the  privateers  by  administrative  action.  In  May,  as 
the  complaints  continued  and  the  crisis  became  more 
acute,  he  went  so  far  as  to  hurry  a  severe  Act  through 
Parliament  to  restrain  and  punish  their  abuses,  and  to 
facilitate  the  release  of  captured  vessels,  while  licenses 
were  almost  entirely  refused  to  small  vessels,  and  the 
prize  courts  had  a  fresh  hint  to  show  every  possible 
leniency.  The  resistance  of  the  privateer  owners  was 
violent  and  formidable,  but  a  few  weeks  after  the  Act 
came  into  operation  means  were  found  for  reconciling 
them  to  the  new  measures,  and  at  the  same  time  of 
using  their  energy.  The  growing  menace  of  invasion 
called,  as  it  always  did,  for  the  formation  of  a  defensive 
flotilla,  and  a  number  of  them  were  taken  into  Government 
pay  and  attached  to  squadrons  under  the  command  of 
naval  officers  who  could  direct  their  energy  into  more 
profitable  channels.  By  these  means  the  air  was  cleared. 
The  neutral  powers  were  pacified,  and  the  special  danger 
passed.^ 

Still  in  spite  of  these  measures  as  the  spring  advanced 
the  seriousness  of  the  general  outlook  only  increased. 
Week  by  week  signs  that  the  French  were  in  earnest 

^  Waddington,  vol.  iii.  p.  425  ;  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  pp.  201-20.3.  Beatson 
says :  "  Great  numbers  of  these  privateers  were  very  small,  and  some  of 
them  were  commanded  by  men  remarkable  only  for  brute  courage  and 
entirely  devoid  of  every  principle  of  honour  or  humanity,  &c."  They  actu- 
ally robbed  the  Marquis  de  Pignatelli,  Spanish  Ambassador  to  Denmark, 
on  his  way  to  Copenhagen  in  a  Dutch  ship.  The  new  Act  came  into  force 
on  June  1,  and  was  entitled,  "An  Act  to  explain  and  amend  an  Act  of 
29  George  II.  for  the  encouragement  of  seamen  .  .  .  and  for  the  better 
prevention  of  piracies  and  robberies  by  private  ships  of  war."  Commissions 
were  limited  to  ships  of  over  100  tons  and  10  guns,  with  a  discretionary 
power  to  grant  them  to  smaller  vessels  made  in  favour  of  the  Channel 
Islands,  whose  fishing  craft  had  been  doing  real  service  against  the  French 
coastwise  traffic. 


I7S9  PROSPECTS    OF    INVASION  9 

grew  in  intensity.  Troops  were  gathering  about  the 
Flemish  ports,  and  a  flotilla  was  being  prepared  in  those 
of  the  Channel.  Yorke,  in  Holland,  assured  the  Govern- 
ment it  meant  nothing,  but  Newcastle's  intelligence  was 
too  good,  and  he  had  no  illusions.  "  The  design,"  he  wrote 
"  of  making  an  attempt  here,  and  perhaps  at  the  same 
time  in  Ireland  and  Scotland,  goes  on,  but  the  particular 
time  of  its  execution  is  not  yet  determined.  These  things 
are  not  given  out  to  frighten  us,  but  are  under  their 
serious  consideration.  You  know,  I  suppose,  that  flat- 
bottomed  boats  are  preparing  all  along  the  French 
coasts."  ^  Yorke  persisted  in  his  scepticism,  while  at 
home  the  Government  was  acting  on  its  convictions. 
The  French  were  assuring  all  the  allied  courts  that, 
owing  to  the  great  fleets  which  England  had  sent  out 
to  the  West  Indies  and  Canada,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  them  to  be  superior  in  European  waters.  But  Anson's 
labour  had  never  ceased.  On  April  5th  he  was  able  to 
promise  the  King  that  he  would  have  thirty  of  the  line 
ready  for  the  Channel  Fleet  in  May,  and  that  the  French 
between  Brest  and  Rochefort  would  have  no  more  than 
twenty-seven.  He  proposed  to  send  Boscawen,  who  was 
still  at  home,  to  look  into  Rochefort  with  ten  sail,  and  to 
order  a  cruiser  squadron  to  Bordeaux  to  destroy  a  convoy 
of  victuallers  which  had  gone  thither  for  provisions.^  His 
cruisers  upon  the  French  coasts  were  supplying  him  with 
excellent  information,  and  at  the  same  time  actively 
operating  against  the  coastwise  trade  upon  which  the 
equipment  of  the  French  invading  forces  must  prin- 
cipally depend.  The  effect  of  Anson's  energy  and  Pitt's 
politic  concessions  to  the  neutral  powers  was  that  the 
control  of  the  home  waters  was  soon  in  little   danger. 

^  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  April  3,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,889. 
«  "  Mem.  for  the  King,"  April  5,  ibid.,  32,889 


lo  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

The  more  immediate  anxiety  was  from  Toulon,  where 
the  French  preparations  were  more  advanced.  The 
probable  intention  of  the  squadron  was  to  seek  to  join 
the  Brest  fleet,  and  if  this  were  carried  out  the  control 
of  the  Channel  would  become  more  difficult  to  secure. 
It  was  therefore  decided  to  give  Boscawen  three  of  the 
line  and  send  him  down  to  join  Brodrick  before  Toulon 
and  take  command.  In  accordance  with  this  plan  he 
sailed  on  April  14th. 

So  far,  it  will  be  observed,  the  measures  taken  to 
repel,  or  rather  prevent,  the  threatened  disturbance  were 
purely  naval.  Pitt  refused  to  take  the  invasion  seriously. 
For  him  it  was  but  a  menace,  intended  to  cover  some 
ulterior  action  by  the  French  fleet,  possibly  in  the  West 
Indies,  Canada,  or  elsewhere.  The  situation,  in  his  e3'es, 
was  met  by  confronting  it  with  a  fleet  capable  of  deal- 
ing with  the  threatened  attack.  Everything  else  Avas 
courageously  ignored.  Formidable  as  was  the  display 
of  military  movement  along  the  French  coasts,  there 
was  no  calling  out  of  the  militia,  no  raising  of  volunteers, 
no  issue  of  orders  for  driving  the  coast  country,  nor  indeed 
any  of  the  traditional  measures  by  which  governments 
had  been  used  on  these  occasions  to  further  the  enemy's 
object  by  creating  a  scare  at  home  and  disturbing  the 
current  of  national  life.  It  was  Pitt's  conviction  to  make 
the  defence  purely  active,  to  picture  the  country  to  itself 
as  only  waiting  eagerly  for  the  tortoise  to  dare  to  show 
its  head.  The  army  must,  therefore,  take  its  part  in  the 
play  beside  the  fleet,  and  be  deprived  of  any  appearance 
of  waiting  to  be  attacked.  So  of  land  defence  there  was 
no  sign,  nor  any  considerable  movement  of  troops,  except 
the  formation  of  another  camp  in  the  Isle  of  Wight. 

It  was  his  old  device,  and  it  had  never  failed  him. 
With  the  Channel  fleet  getting  rapidly  ready  for  Hawke's 


1759  PITT'S   HOME    DEFENCE  ii 

flag  at  Spithead,  the  Isle  of  Wight  force  became  a 
violent  threat,  and  its  effect  had  been  immediate.  The 
Due  d'Aiguillon,  Governor  of  Brittany,  had  been  pressing 
for  leave  to  make  an  attempt  to  seize  Jersey,  but  Marshal 
Belleisle,  who  was  directing  the  whole  of  the  operations, 
would  not  consent.  "  We  must  not  permit,"  he  wrote, 
"  a  secondary  expedition,  however  interesting,  to  turn 
our  attention  from  an  enterprise  of  far  more  importance, 
the  great  project  against  England,  which  is  on  the  eve 
of  being  realised."  In  justification  of  his  discouraging 
attitude,  he  informed  the  sanguine  governor  that  they 
were  expecting  an  attack  upon  Brest  in  March,  and  that 
he  must  devote  all  attention  to  placing  it  in  a  state  of 
defence.  "The  English  Ministers,"  he  said,  "  have  learnt 
that  all  the  batteries  of  the  port,  the  haven,  and  the 
adjacent  parts  are  unarmed,  and  a  portion  of  the  garrison 
withdrawn.  .  .  .  Success  by  the  enemy  at  this  point 
would  give  us  a  mortal  blow."  ^ 

Nor  was  it  at  Brest  alone  the  disturbance  was  felt. 
From  all  quarters  as  before,  where  it  was  possible  for  an 
expedition  to  strike,  the  same  anxiety  clogged  the  French 
preparations.^  Even  so,  Pitt  was  not  content.  The 
threat  must  be  made  keener  still,  and  once  more  New- 
castle, whose  nerves  had  already  as  much  as  they  could 
bear  with  the  risks  that  Pitt  was  calmly  taking,  was 
thrown  in  a  flutter  of  despair.  On  the  morning  of  April 
17th,  Anson  received  a  note  from  Pitt,  desiring  him  to 
receive  the  King's  orders  that  very  day  for  ton  thousand 
tons  of  transport  for  five  thousand  men.  Not  a  word 
was  said  of  the  objective,  and  Anson,  who  himself  was  still 
unreconciled  to  Pitt's  fondness  for  combined  expeditions 

^  Lacour-Gayet,  pp.  302-3. 

*  Intelligence  from  Sluys,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,890,  f.  70 ;  Yorke  to 
Newcastle,  April  17,  ibid. 


12  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

went  to  Newcastle.  The  admiral  assumed  the  King  knew 
Pitt's  mind.  Newcastle  went  to  the  King ;  but  the  King 
knew  no  more  than  he,  and  refused  to  issue  the  order. 
This  was  far  from  brintano:  comfort  to  Anson.  When 
Newcastle  came  out  of  the  closet  and  told  the  admiral, 
who  was  waiting  in  the  antechamber,  what  had  passed, 
Anson,  to  the  Minister's  surprise,  expressed  regret  at 
the  attitude  the  Kincr  had  taken.  Pitt,  he  said,  would  be 
outrageous  and  blame  them  ;  and  finally  he  persuaded 
Newcastle  to  go  back  and  tell  the  King  the  thing  had 
better  go  forward,  and  that  he,  as  First  Lord,  personally- 
wished  it  to.  Upon  this  the  King  agreed  to  sign  the 
order,  on  condition  that  Anson  went  to  Pitt  to  find  out 
what  service  he  intended.  Newcastle  tried  to  console 
himself  with  the  reflection  that  perhaps  a  mere  alarm 
was  intended,  as  we  certainly  could  not  spare  troops  for 
another  expedition.  But  he  was  thoroughly  upset,  and 
told  his  friend  Hardwicke  it  was  "  a  most  abominable  and 
most  unheard-of  measure."  ^  To  make  matters  worse, 
Pitt  was  continuing  to  display  a  breezy  disbelief  in  the 
reality  of  the  invasion.  Next  day  Newcastle  tried  to 
relieve  his  feelings  by  a  long  memorandum  on  home  and 
foreign  affairs.  He  despaired  of  England's  being  able  to 
bear  the  expense  of  the  war  any  longer,  and  lamented  the 
disposition  which  existed  to  despise  the  notion  that  an 
invasion  was  really  intended.  It  was  certainly  the  French 
aim,  though  it  would  probably  bo  deferred  till  the  autumn. 
It  would,  of  course,  depend  on  the  naval  force  they  could 
gather  and  the  state  of  the  Avar  in  Germany.  But  in 
any  case  our  policy,  as  he  laid  it  down  in  italics,  was  not 
to  waste  our  land  and  sea  forces  with  useless  and  expen- 
sive expeditions,  but  to  collect  an  organised  army  for 
home  defence,  and  keep  the  home  fleet  superior  to  any- 

^  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  April  17. 


1759  PITT'S    HOME    DEFENCE  13 

thing  the  French  could  bring  against  it.  There  was  no 
knowing  how  long  Spanish  neutrality  would  last,  and  it 
was  indeed  a  question  whether  they  should  not  inform 
Frederick  at  once  that  they  could  not  support  the  war 
another  year.^ 

Meanwhile  Anson  had  been  to  Pitt.  He  found  him 
too  ill  to  be  seen,  but  his  secretary  explained  that  no 
new  expedition  was  intended.  The  purpose  was  only  to 
increase  the  defensive  activity  of  the  kingdom  by  giving 
complete  mobiUty  to  the  Isle  of  Wight  corps.  The  effect 
would  be  to  increase  the  French  apprehension  of  a 
counter-attack,  and  at  the  same  time  to  secure  that  a 
force  could  be  dropped  in  Scotland  or  Ireland  wherever 
the  French  might  land.^  Newcastle  and  his  friends  were 
quieted,  but  not  for  long.  In  the  course  of  the  next 
fortnight,  intelligence  came  in,  Avhich  made  the  prospect 
of  invasion  more  formidable  than  ever.  Newcastle  had 
obtained  information,  which  he  regarded  as  certain,  that 
the  French  corps  in  Flanders  was  intended  for  England, 
that  it  was  to  be  reinforced  by  the  Guards  and  a  detach- 
ment from  the  army  of  the  Rhine,  and  that  Soubise 
himself  was  to  command  it.^  There  was  also  an  assur- 
ance from  our  spies  that  thirty  thousand  men  were 
assembling  within  twenty-four  hours'  march  of  Brest,  and 
that  they  were  suddenly  to  be  thrown  upon  the  west 
coast  of  Ireland. 

Consequently  Newcastle's  nervousness  returned  with 
increased  force,  and  to  do  him  justice  it  was  not  without 
excuse.  As  he  had  said,  the  offensive  action  of  the  French 
would  depend  upon  how  the  war  went  in  Germany,  and 
it  was  going  very  badly.     Ferdinand,  who  had  wintered 

1  Add.  MSS.  32,890,  f.  149,  April  18-19. 
*  Anson  to  Newcastle,  ibid.,  April  18. 
3  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  April  27. 


14  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

on  the  line  of  Miinster,  Lippstadt,  and  Paderborn,  found 
himself  confronted  by  Marshal  Contades  in  superior  force. 
Added  to  this,  his  left  rear  was  threatened  by  the  French 
army  of  the  Upper  Rhine,  which  was  based  on  Frankfort, 
and  which,  as  Soubise  had  been  called  to  command  the 
army  of  England,  was  then  in  the  far  more  capable  hands 
of  the  Due  de  Broglie.  To  free  himself  from  the  impos- 
sible situation,  Ferdinand,  with  characteristic  energy, 
before  the  campaign  had  really  opened,  made  a  dash  at 
Frankfort ;  but  his  attack  on  Broglie's  position  failed,  and 
he  had  to  fall  back  with  considerable  loss  and  no  relief 
of  his  awkward  situation.  A  secondary  effect  of  this 
operation  was  to  relieve  the  French  of  one  serious  uncer- 
tainty. Till  Ferdinand  began  to  move  towards  Frankfort, 
that  is,  eastward  and  away  from  the  coast,  they  had  to 
face  the  possibility  that  Pitt's  force  in  the  Isle  of  Wight 
foreshadowed  a  combination  with  him  m  Flanders.^  This 
fear  was  removed,  and  though  they  were  still  anxious 
about  Normandy  and  Havre,  the  army  of  Soubise  in 
Flanders  was  left  comparatively  free  for  eccentric  offen- 
sive action. 

Still  Pitt  refused  to  believe  in  the  reality  of  the  French 
threat,  while  Newcastle's  alarm  grew  in  proportion  to 
Pitt's  assumption  of  confidence.  Pitt  was  still  confined  to 
his  room,  and  Newcastle  was  everywhere.  The  result  was 
that  by  the  first  week  in  May  he  had  worked  the  country 
into  a  regular  scare,  and  on  the  9th  a  Cabinet  Council  had 
to  meet  at  Pitt's  house  to  deal  with  it.  Pitt  was  as  con- 
temptuous as  ever.  He  told  Newcastle  that  he  and  his 
friends  had  worked  up  the  panic,  and  it  Avas  their  busi- 
ness to  allay  it.  The  French,  he  affirmed,  were  in  no 
condition  to  attack,  and  had  made  no  preparation  to  do 
so.  Newcastle  and  Hardwicke,  whose  information  was 
'  Yorkc  to  Newcastle,  April  I7. 


1759  PITT    AND    THE    PANIC  15 

often  better  than  Pitt's,  contradicted  him.  Holderness 
held  his  tongue.  Bedford  urged  the  unprotected  condi- 
tion of  Ireland.  But  nothing  could  be  got  out  of  Pitt, 
except  an  order  that  in  ten  days'  time  Hawke  was  to 
repair  to  Torbay  with  eighteen  of  the  line  to  watch  Brest, 
and  that  a  proclamation  should  be  issued  calling  out  some 
of  the  new  militia.^  The  force  was  still  scarcely  born, 
and  Pitt  seems  to  have  relied  for  military  defence  upon 
his  characteristic  principle  of  giving  the  regular  troops 
their  extreme  mobility  by  providing  them  with  sea 
carriage.  For  at  this  time  he  ordered  the  ten  thousand 
tons  of  transport  he  had  called  for  to  be  victualled  for 
three  months,  and  a  fortnight  later  he  called  for  fifteen 
thousand  tons  more  to  assemble  at  the  Nore  for  immedi- 
ate service,^  What  this  last  order  meant  is  not  known ; 
but  in  all  probability  the  intention  was  to  frighten 
Soubise  and  hold  him  in  Flanders  away  from  Ferdinand. 
From  this  point  the  whole  situation  turned  upon  the 
capacity  of  the  home  fleet  to  perform  its  defensive  func- 
tion. That  function  was  to  secure  the  lines  of  passage 
and  communication  in  the  Narrow  Seas  so  as  to  make  it 
impossible  for  any  French  invading  force  to  get  to  sea — 
or  if  by  the  hazard  of  war  any  part  of  that  force  did  get 
away  and  land,  to  ensure  that  we  could  quickly  throw 
troops  upon  its  back  and  prevent  the  French  supporting 
it.  It  was  in  fact  a  problem  as  purely  naval  as  any  pro- 
blem of  war  can  be,  and  Pitt  acted  accordingly.  We 
have  seen  that  in  the  offensive  areas  of  the  war,  where 
results  depended  upon  the  intimate  co-ordination  of 
naval  and  military  action,  the  admirals  were  receiving 

•  For  the  Cabinet  see  "  Mem.  for  the  King,"  May  9,  Newcastle  Papers, 
32,891,  and  for  calling  out  the  militia  the  correspondence  from  May  17  to 
27,  ibid. 

'  Admiralty  Secretary,  In-lctlers  {Secretary  of  State),  4123,  May  IG  and 
June  1. 


1 6  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

their  orders  direct  from  him,  but  in  this  case  it  was 
different.  Nothing  is  more  eloquent  of  Pitt's  grasp  of 
war  than  his  frank  recognition  that  here  his  interference 
was  uncalled  for.  Having  determined  the  function  of 
the  navy  in  the  liome  area  he  gave  it  a  perfectly  free 
hand,  and  the  whole  of  the  operations  for  discharging 
that  function  were  left  to  the  judgment  of  Lord  Anson 
and  his  colleagues  on  the  Board  of  Admiralty. 

The  energy  which  they  had  been  displaying  in  turning 
what  remained  of  the  navy  into  a  powerful  home  fleet 
fully  justified  Pitt's  confidence.  Hawke  acted  with  equal 
promptitude.  Throe  days  after  the  decision  of  the  Secret 
Committee  he  hoisted  his  flag  at  Spithead,  where  he  was 
informed  by  the  Admiralty  that  Bompart  had  left  Mar- 
tinique for  San  Domingo,  and  would  probably  be  home 
shortly.  He  was  therefore  to  try  to  intercept  him  by 
keeping  a  detachment  down  the  Bay,  and  for  this  purpose 
he  would  shortly  be  reinforced.^  Within  the  ten  days 
specified  he  was  at  Torbay  with  his  eighteen  of  the  line  : 
on  the  morrow  he  was  stretching  over  to  Ushant,  and 
before  the  week  was  out  he  had  struck  the  note  which 
was  to  dominate  the  idea  of  naval  blockade  for  a  century 
to  come. 

His  instructions  had  been  framed  on  the  traditional 
"  observation  "  idea  of  watching  Brest  from  Torbay.  But 
once  his  flag  was  flying  he  determined  to  act  on  his  own 
theory  of  what  a  defensive  blockade  should  be.  In  his 
first  two  despatches  he  enunciates  his  ideas.  On  May  27th 
he  wrote  that  he  had  arrived  ofi'  Brest  on  the  24th,  and 
found  eleven  sail  out  in  the  Road.  His  advanced  cruisers 
reported  four  others  ready  for  sea  at  L'Orient,  and  he  had 

^  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  with  answer  endorsed,  Admiralty  Secretary,  Jn- 
letten,  U2,  May  14.  In  this  volume  and  in  Out-lcttcrs,  83-4  and  526, 
and  Secret  Orders,  1331,  will  be  found  the  whole  of  the  despatches  relating 
to  the  Brest  blockade  hereafter  quoted. 


1759  HAWKE'S    CLOSE    BLOCKADE  17 

immediately  detached  Captain  Keppel  with  five  of  the 
Hne  to  Audierne  Bay  to  prevent  their  stealing  round  to 
Brest.  In  his  opinion  the  eleven  ships  in  the  Road  were 
not  intended  to  proceed  against  Great  Britain,  but  for  the 
relief  of  the  West  Indies.  He  himself  was  going  to 
stay  where  he  was  to  watch  them.  "  As  the  eleven  in 
the  Road,"  he  said,  "  may  be  joined  by  others  from  the 
port,  I  don't  think  it  prudent  to  give  them  a  chance  of 
coming  out  by  retiring  to  Torbay."  He  therefore  signi- 
fied his  intention  of  staying  where  he  was  unless  their 
lordships  recalled  him,  or  strong  westerly  weather  forced 
him  to  seek  shelter.  A  week  later,  on  June  4th,  he  reported 
that  the  ships  from  L'Orient  must  have  got  round  before 
Keppel  reached  his  station.  There  were  no  longer  any 
to  be  seen  there,  and  there  were  seventeen  in  Brest  Road. 
He  therefore  reiterated  his  intention  of  staying  where 
he  was  till  further  orders.  On  the  morrow,  however,  a 
south-westerly  gale  was  upon  him ;  and  on  the  6th  he 
was  forced  to  run  back  into  Torbay,  and  there  he  was 
held,  in  spite  of  every  effort  to  get  back,  for  the  best  part 
of  a  fortnight. 

As  ill-luck  would  have  it,  it  was  at  this  moment  that 
the  whole  situation  was  intensified  by  a  master-stroke  of 
the  intelligence  department  which  seriously  increased  the 
agitation  in  London,  and  which  for  the  first  time  opened 
Pitt's  eyes  to  the  magnitude  of  the  French  design. 
Neither  Choiseul  nor  Belleisle  concealed  from  themselves 
how  desperate  was  their  plan  without  further  naval  assist- 
ance. Except  from  Sweden  there  seemed  no  immediate 
chance  of  obtaining  it,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  they  were 
straining  every  device  to  induce  her  to  turn  her  war  with 
Prussia  into  a  war  with  England  as  well.  The  Swedes, 
however,  were  sceptical  as  to  the  practicability  of  the 
intended  invasion.     To  convince  them,  Choiseul  decided 

VOL.  II.  B 


1 8  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

to  reveal  to  them  practically  the  whole  of  Belleisle's  plan, 
and  on  May  31st  he  sent  to  his  ambassador  at  Stockholm 
a  complete  account  of  it.  About  the  middle  of  June  a 
copy  of  this  letter  found  its  way  into  Newcastle's  pocket/ 
He  could  now  rejoice  in  something  to  justify  his  attitude 
against  that  of  Pitt :  for,  as  he  told  Hardwicke,  the  French 
design  was  "  not  only  serious  but  extremely  well  laid."  ^ 
Few  will  deny  that  Newcastle's  opinion  was  no  more  than 
the  truth.  The  idea  which  the  letter  disclosed  was  a  con- 
siderable modification  of  that  which  Belleisle  had  first 
put  forward.  His  original  plan  was  one  which  Napoleon 
adopted — that  is,  a  flotilla  of  flat-boats  sufficient  for  the 
transport  of  fifty  thousand  men  was  to  be  assembled 
between  Ambleteuse  and  Boulogne,  under  cover  of  for- 
midable coast  defences.  The  work  was  actually  begun, 
but  Belleisle,  unlike  Napoleon,  when  he  came  closer  to  the 
design  rejected  it  as  requiring  too  much  time  and  being 
too  costly.  In  its  place  he  adopted  a  plan  which  was 
far  less  amateurish  and  much  more  promising,  and  was 
entirely  new.  It  was  based  on  a  coup-de-7nain  upon 
London  from  the  army  of  Flanders.  Twenty  thousand 
men  were  to  march  suddenly  to  Ostend,  embark  there, 
and  land  upon  the  coast  of  Essex  at  Maid  on  in  the 
estuary  of  the  Blackwater,  where  they  would  be  within 
two  marches  of  London.  So  far  all  was  simple  and  pro- 
mising enough — but  there  remained  the  difficulty  of 
securing  the  passage.  It  was  approached  in  a  thoroughly 
scientific  spirit.  Its  seriousness  was  not  shirked.  Indeed 
the  greater  part  of  the  whole  design  was  devoted  to  a 
very  ingenious  method  of  securing  what  was  wanted. 
Another  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  was  to  be  as- 
sembled in  Brittany  under  the  Due  d'Aiguillon,  whose 

*  Choiseul  to  Havrincour,  May  31,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,891. 

•  Newcastle  Papers,  32,892,  June  14. 


1759        BELLEISLE'S   PLAN    OF   INVASION  19 

destination  was  the  Clyde.  By  a  junction  of  the  Medi- 
terranean and  Atlantic  squadrons  a  fleet  of  from  thirty- 
five  to  forty  of  the  line  was  to  be  concentrated  in  Brest. 
Under  escort  of  this  fleet  D'Aiguillon  was  to  proceed  to 
his  destination,  and  the  fleet,  after  landing  him  at  some 
favourable  point  near  Glasgow,  was  to  proceed  north- about 
and  run  down  to  Ostend  to  cover  the  passage  of  the 
Flanders  army.  Meanwhile  D'Aiguillon  would  have 
marched  across  Scotland  and  seized  Edinburgh,  and  as  a 
further  source  of  confusion  Thurot,  the  famous  privateer 
captain,  would  have  sailed  from  Dunkirk  with  a  cruiser 
squadron  and  made  a  raid  on  Ireland.^ 

The  design,  it  will  be  seen,  was,  as  Newcastle  said, 
"  extremely  well  laid."  So  far  as  it  was  possible  for  such 
an  enterprise  to  succeed  without  previous  command  of 
the  sea,  every  chance  was  taken.  Nothing  could  be  better 
devised  for  confusing  the  enemy  and  concealing  from 
them  what  the  real  line  of  operation  was.  But  with  all 
its  cleverness  it  was  a  soldier's  plan,  based,  as  such  plans 
always  have  been,  on  the  analogy  of  an  army  protecting 
its  train  in  an  enemy's  country.  In  the  eyes  of  Belleisle, 
the  fleet  while  at  sea  was  the  active  force  advancing 
against  its  objective,  and  the  transports  the  train.  The 
analogy  is  false,  and  the  fact  that  the  plan  involved  a 
hybrid  conception  between  a  passage  by  force  and  a 
passage  by  evasion  shows  that  its  falseness  was  felt,  if  not 
quite  realised.  If  the  French  fleet  was  capable  of  defend- 
ing an  expedition  of  twenty  thousand  men  against  an 
attack  by  Hawkc,  still  more  was  it  capable  of  dealing  with 
Hawke  if  it  had  no  convoy  to  encumber  it.  All  it  would 
then  have  to  do  would  be  to  fight  a  containing  action, 
while  the  two  expeditions  crossed  freely  under  commerce 
protection  escort.     This  had  been  pointed  out.     At  one 

*  Lacour-Gayet,  Marine  sous  Louis  XV.,  321-2. 


20  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

time  there  had  been  a  suggestion  that  D'Aiguillon  ought 
to  sail  for  Scotland  under  a  small  escort  sufficient  to  keep 
off  cruisers,  and  that  the  mass  of  the  fleet  should  engage 
Hawke's  attention  in  the  Channel  while  the  Flanders 
corps  crossed.  This  idea  was  eventually  rejected  for  the 
one  which  really  rested  ultimately  for  its  success  on 
evasion.  For  since  by  clogging  the  French  fleet  with 
a  cumbrous  convoy  its  sole  chance  of  decisively  defeating 
Hawke  was  denied  it,  the  expedition  could  only  hope  to 
arrive  safely  by  evasion.  Yet  at  the  same  time  nothing 
was  so  likely  to  attract  Hawke's  fleet,  and  reduce  the 
chances  of  evasion,  as  the  presence  of  the  main  French 
fleet  with  the  invading  corps. 

The  difficulty  which  brought  so  capable  a  strategist  as 
Belleisle  to  adopt  so  faulty  a  design  was  probably  a  part 
of  the  British  system  of  naval  defence  which  has  not 
yet  been  noticed.  To  confine  the  enemy's  main  fleet  to 
port  is  not  to  command  the  sea.  By  so  doing  you  may 
prevent  the  enemy  gaining  command,  but  your  own  fleet 
Avill  be  too  much  occupied  to  exercise  the  command 
itself.  In  demobilising  the  enemy's  main  fleet  you  de- 
mobilise your  own  to  an  even  greater  degree,  for  the 
blockading  fleet  must  be  superior.  For  the  active  control 
of  the  communications  in  the  theatre  concerned,  secondary 
lines  are  necessary.  No  principle  of  naval  Avarfare  is  so 
much  ignored  in  ordinary  discussion  as  that  you  cannot 
command  the  sea  with  a  battle  fleet.  Without  it,  it  is  true, 
you  cannot  do  so,  if  the  enemy  has  one  too.  But  even 
if  your  own  battle  fleet  be  not  occupied  and  contained  by 
the  act  of  watching  that  of  the  enemy,  it  can  never  itself 
be  numerous  or  ubiquitous  enough  to  exercise  the  actual 
control.  It  is,  and  always  has  been,  the  third  and  the 
second  lines  of  the  fleet  that  actually  control  the  lines  of 
passage — particularly  against  transports — that  is  to  say, 


1759       THEORY    OF   DEFENCE    FLOTILLAS         21 

it  is,  and  always  has  been,  the  flotilla  and  its  sup- 
porting cruisers  and  intermediate  ships.  The  function 
of  the  battle  fleet  is  to  prevent  the  enemy's  battle 
fleet  from  interfering  with  the  function  of  your  cruisers 
and  flotilla.  By  corollary  to  it  follows  that  you  by 
no  means  necessarily  lose  control  when  your  battle 
fleet  is  defeated,  unless  that  defeat  is  so  complete  as  to 
leave  your  enemy  potent  enough  to  remove  your  other 
two  lines.^ 

All  the  great  naval  First  Lords  from  Anson  to 
St.  Vincent  recognised  this  principle,  and  in  the  present 
case  secondary  lines  had  been  provided,  for  the  special 
purpose  of  preventing  the  enemy's  transports  passing  the 
Channel  while  the  British  main  fleet  was  tied  to  Brest. 
The  actual  defence  force  took  the  form  of  a  series  of 
flotillas  with  supporting  cruiser  squadrons,  disposed  along 
our  south-eastern  and  southern  coasts.  One,  under  Com- 
modore Boys,  was  watching  Dunkirk  and  the  Flemish 
ports,  and  another,  under  Sir  Peircy  Brett,  was  stationed 
in  the  Downs.  His  special  point  of  vigilance  was  Havre 
and  the  adjacent  ports,  where  it  was  known  that  the 
French  were  massing  a  number  of  large  flat-boats  for  the 
obvious  purpose  of  transporting  troops  across  the  Channel. 
A  third  squadron,  under  Rodney,  was  being  prepared  at 
Spithead.  The  defence  system  was  thus  complete,  and 
it  was  impossible  for  the  invasion  to  take  place  till  these 
squadrons  were  removed.  A  mere  containing  action 
would  not  enable  the  transports  to  avoid  this  danger,  nor 


1  The  "  flotilla  "  of  that  time  may  be  taken  to  include  all  vessels  of  sloop 
type  and  under,  which  regularly  used  sweeps  as  auxiliary  propulsion. 
The  "  intermediate  "  ships  had  also  battle  value,  and  corresponded  to  the 
armoured  cruisers  of  to-day.  They  were  niaiidy  "  fifties  "  and  light-anued 
"  sixties,"  whose  normal  function  was  to  support  cruisers  in  the  regular 
duties  of  commerce  protection  and  the  like,  though  they  were  frequently 
diverted  to  assist  battle  squadrons. 


22  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

did  the  presence  of  Hawke  permit  of  its  being  removed 
by  anything  less  than  the  whole  fleet.  It  all,  indeed, 
comes  back  to  the  old  story  that  the  defeat  and  dis- 
ablement of  the  British  main  fleet  was  the  sole  ex- 
pedient which  could  bring  the  enterprise  within  the 
limits  of  a  sound  military  risk.  Still,  given  the  fact 
that  the  enterprise  had  to  be  undertaken  as  the  only 
chance  of  saving  the  general  situation,  it  was  as  well 
laid  as  it  could  be  with  the  given  material,  and  far 
more  likely  to  have  succeeded  than  was  the  alternative 
rejected  plan  which  was  the  one  Napoleon  most  obstinately 
favoured. 

In  London  it  was  received  at  least  with  respect.  As 
divulged  to  Sweden  by  Choiseul  it  differed  slightly  from 
the  above  design.  Havrincour  was  told  that  twenty-four 
battalions  and  a  regiment  of  dragoons  would  sail  from 
Brest  under  the  escort  of  Conflans  and  the  main  fleet, 
and  that,  having  seen  this  force  to  its  destination,  the 
admiral  would  then  proceed  north-about  into  the  North 
Sea  to  cover  the  passage  of  fifty  thousand  men  from 
Flanders  and  Dunkirk.  Marshal  Contades  meanwhile 
would  prevent  Ferdinand  from  interfering.  Of  the  naval 
concentration  nothing  was  said,  but  Newcastle  assumed 
that  La  Clue  would  join  Conflans  from  the  Mediterranean 
if  he  could  escape  Boscawen,  and  that  Bompart  would 
come  in  from  the  West  Indies.  He  was,  therefore,  for 
ordering  home  eight  or  ten  large  ships  from  the  West 
Indian  squadrons  as  soon  as  Bompart  left,  but  he  feared 
Pitt  would  not  consent.  He  was  getting  more  and  more 
anxious,  and  had  no  faith  in  Hawke's  blockade.  "  My 
chief  dependence  still,"  he  wrote,  "  is  that  our  little  light 
squadrons  in  the  Downs  and  Spithead  [that  is,  Boys's, 
Brett's  and  Rodney's]  will  prevent  or  harass  them  extremely, 
on  their  landing."     If  they  failed,  he  did  not  see  how  we 


1759  PITT'S    CONFIDENCE  23 

could  oppose  thirty  thousand  men,  or  half  that  number, 
unless  the  militia  were  used  to  guard  the  thousands  of 
French  prisoners  that  crowded  our  jails.  The  comfort 
was,  there  was  time  to  prepare.  It  was  known  the  French 
were  still  pressing  Sweden  to  assist  the  Scottish  enter- 
prise, and  that  they  could  take  no  final  decision  till  they 
got  a  definite  answer.  Anson  therefore  did  not  look  for 
the  attempt  for  two  months,  and  Newcastle  accepted  his 
view,  but  only  as  a  reprieve  from  the  terrors  he  saw 
ahead.^ 

Pitt,  on  the  other  hand,  continued  breezily  confident. 
At  Anson's  suggestion  he  had  sanctioned  a  secret  blow 
against  the  French  preparations,  with  which  he  hoped  to 
teach  them  a  severe  lesson.  His  gaiety  even  irritated 
Newcastle,  who  complained  to  Hardwicke  that  Pitt  ridi- 
culed the  idea  of  the  French  being  able  to  make  any 
serious  attack,  though  he  had  no  doubt  they  would  be 
mad  enough  to  try.  The  difficulties  Hawke  was  encoun- 
tering in  the  Brest  blockade  increased  the  anxiety  of  those 
who  could  not  share  Pitt's  security.  No  sooner  did  he 
get  to  sea  again  than  another  gale  drove  him  back  to 
Torbay.  "  I  never  saw,"  he  wrote,  "  so  much  bad  weather 
in  summer  since  I  have  been  at  sea."  So  seriously  dis- 
turbed was  Newcastle  that  he  now  determined  to  show 
Pitt  the  Swedish  correspondence  he  had  intercepted. 
Hitherto  it  had  been  kept  from  him  ;  for  ever  since  the 
days  of  Elizabeth  it  had  been  the  practice  of  Ministers 
who  were  not  too  sure  of  themselves  to  increase  their 
importance  with  the  Crown  by  getting  intelligence  and 
keeping  it  from  their  rivals  in  power.  How  far  Pitt  Avas 
affected  by  the  disclosure  is  difficult  to  say.  The  im- 
mediate  effect  was  that  Ligonier   was  ordered   to   form 

^  Choiseul  to  Havrincour,  June  7,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,891  ;  Newcastle 
to  Hardwicke,  June  14,  ibid.,  32,892. 


24  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

camps  in  England  and  in  Ireland,  or,  as  we  should  say 
now,  to  mobilise  the  army.  It  was  now  too  that  the 
privateers,  who  were  just  then  growling  over  the  opera- 
tion of  the  new  Act,  began  to  be  taken  into  navy  pay 
to  increase  the  flotilla,  and  Anson's  project  was  pressed 
on  with  all  vigour. 

His  idea  was  one  after  Pitt's  own  heart.  For  the 
project  was  a  vigorous  counter-stroke  with  Rodney's 
squadron  against  the  flat-boats  at  Havre.  It  was  in  this 
manner  he  proposed  to  use  the  respite  of  two  months 
which  he  believed  he  had  in  hand.-^  Bomb-vessels  and 
fireships  Avere  brought  forward  for  Rodney's  flag,  and  in 
hope  of  keeping  the  objective  secret  his  own  orders  and 
those  of  all  his  captains  were  made  out  for  proceeding  to 
Gibraltar  to  reinforce  Boscawen.  But  as  Rodney  at  the 
same  time  had  to  institute  inquiries  for  pilots  for  Havre, 
the  attempt  was  not  very  successful.  The  admiral 
said  his  officers  were  already  talking  of  Havre,  and  before 
the  weather  would  permit  him  to  sail  the  newspapers 
were  doing  the  same.^  By  June  19  th  the  weather  had 
moderated  enough  for  Hawke  to  return  at  last  to  his 
station  off  Brest,  and  what  with  this  and  the  newspapers 
Rodney  was  burning  to  be  ofl";  but  all  who  knew  the 
Norman  coast  said  it  would  be  useless,  since  with  the 
winds  that  prevailed  there  would  be  such  a  seaway  off" 
Havre  as  would  make  it  impossible  for  bomb-ketches  to 
be  used.  June  passed  away  before  the  weather  changed, 
but  on  July  2nd  Rodney  was  able  at  last  to  sail  with  his 


*  The  evidence  that  the  project  was  Anson's  is  that  he  was  giving  all 
the  orders  from  the  Admiralty,  and  that  on  June  8,  two  days  after  Rodney 
received  definite  instructions,  Newcastle  noted  in  his  "  Memoranda  for  the 
King,"  "  Lord  Anson's  project." — Add.  M:S1S.  32,801. 

-  Rodney  to  Cleveland,  June  G,  10,  and  18,  Admiralty  Secretary,  In- 
letters,  9.3.  The  sham  orders  are  in  Out-hitcrs,  83,  dated  June  8.  The  real 
ones  are  in  Secret  Orders,  1331,  June  26. 


I7S9  RODNEY    BOMBARDS    HAVRE  25 

flag  in  the  Achilles  (60)  and  a  squadron  of  four  "  fifties," 
five  frigates,  and  six  bomb-ketches.^ 

The  next  day  he  anchored  before  Havre,  and  during 
the  night  proceeded  to  get  the  bomb-ketches  into  posi- 
tion. There  was  considerable  difficulty  in  doing  so,  for 
as  usual  the  pilots  proved  quite  useless.  But  Samuel 
Hood  and  two  of  the  other  frigate  captains  undertook 
the  work  themselves,  and  by  the  following  morning  had 
them  all  arranged  in  the  Honfleur  channel  within  range 
of  the  town,  the  docks,  the  flat-boats  that  were  finished, 
and  the  extensive  magazines  for  making  the  remainder. 
Under  support  of  the  frigates  a  furious  bombardment 
was  commenced,  Rodney  directing  it  in  person  from 
Hood's  ship,  the  Vestal.  For  fifty-two  hours  it  lasted, 
and  then  only  ceased  because  the  mortars  were  no  longer 
serviceable.  The  actual  extent  of  the  damage  done  was 
never  ascertained.  The  French,  of  course,  minimised  it. 
Rodney  reported  that  the  town  was  on  fire  several  times, 
that  the  magazines  were  burning  for  six  hours,  and  that 
"  many  of  the  boats  were  overturned  and  damaged  by  the 
explosion  of  the  shells."  Also  that  the  consternation  was 
so  great  that  all  the  inhabitants  forsook  the  town.  The 
probability  is  that  the  material  damage  was  not  very  great. 
In  any  case,  that  was  unimportant  beside  the  moral  effect. 
In  that  respect  all  that  was  wanted  had  been  achieved. 
For  Rodney  had  demonstrated  to  the  most  nervous  and 
sceptical  that  his  light  squadron  was  quite  sufficient  to 
prevent  the  Havre  flotilla  ever  putting  to  sea  without  a 
fleet  escort,  and  on  July  8th  he  was  back  at  Spithead  to 
refit  for  renewing  his  attack.^ 

^  Among  his  officers  were  several  who  afterwards  achieved  distinction. 
Samuel  Hood  and  Thomas  Graves  commanded  frigates  under  him,  as  they 
did  squadrons  in  the  fatal  year  of  tlie  next  war.  Hyde  Parker  also 
commanded  a  frigate,  and  Rodney's  flag-capfain  was  liarrington. 

*  The  most  impartial  account  of  the  damage  done  was  afterwards 
obtained  from  a  Spanish  officer  who  was  in  the  place  at  the  time.     He 


26  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

The  real  anxieties,  however,  of  the  Ministers  were  far 
from  being  allayed.  Ferdinand,  with  the  whole  force  of 
Contades's  army  pressing  on  his  loft,  was  persistently 
retreating,  and  no  one  could  see  where  the  retreat  would 
end.  Frederick  had  refused  to  move  to  his  assistance. 
For  the  first  time  in  the  war  he  was  showing  a  tendency 
to  act  on  the  defensive,  and  to  adopt  any  desperate  means 
rather  than  his  wonted  activity  in  the  field.  Amongst 
other  expedients  he  was  deep  in  a  negotiation  with  the 
Sultan,  to  try  to  get  him  to  fall  on  the  back  of  the 
Austrians.  It  was  an  unscrupulous  policy,  which  others 
had  tried  before  him  and  some  have  tried  since.  The 
only  result  that  has  ever  come  of  it  is  to  make  the  per- 
petrator a  pariah  in  Europe.  By  the  end  of  May  he  had 
got  so  far  that  Newcastle  was  ofiicially  informed  that  the 
Grand  Vizier  had  promised  a  treaty  of  alliance  if  England 
would  also  affix  her  seal,  Newcastle,  with  characteristic 
levity,  was  delighted,  but  Pitt  refused  to  be  a  party.  He 
knew  too  well  the  folly  in  war  of  taking  measures,  how- 
ever plausible,  which  must  have  the  effect  of  raising  up 
fresh  forces  for  the  enemy,  and  he  knew  that  the  effect 
of  Frederick's  barbarous  plan  would  be  to  turn  Russia's 
lukewarm  interest  in  the  war  into  fierce  and  fiery  earnest. 
For  this  reason  alone  he  would  give  nothing  but  an 
equivocal  promise  of  his  good  offices  for  securing  the 
execution  of  the  treaty  when  made.  The  Porte  at  once 
drew  back,  aud  for  the  time  the  subject  dropped.^ 

During  July  the  situation  in  Germany  went  from  bad 
to  worse.  On  the  9th  the  Due  de  Broglie  seized  Minden, 
and  there  appeared  no  possibility  of  Ferdinand's  being 

said  about  600  shells  and  carcases  fell  in  the  town,  of  which  he  counted 
100  in  the  basin  and  harbour.  He  also  said  the  magazine  of  plank,  pitch, 
and  cordage  was  entirely  destroyed.  See  Admiralty  Secretary,  In-lcttera, 
93,  Sept.  21,  1759. 

*  Waddington,  vol.  iii.  p.  113. 


1759  THE    THREAT    GROWS   GRAVER  27 

able  to  retain  even  the  line  of  the  Wesor.  Hanover  again 
seemed  doomed.  A  fortnight  later,  the  Prussian  general 
Wedell  was  defeated  by  the  Russians  at  Poltzig,  and  the 
way  was  open  for  a  junction  between  them  and  the 
Austrians  at  Frankfort.  Nothing,  therefore,  stood  in  the 
way  of  the  French  devoting  a  very  considerable  force  to 
the  invasion  of  England,  and  it  was  known  that  at  the 
end  of  June  Conflans  had  left  Paris  to  hoist  his  flag  at 
Brest.  At  the  same  time  came  intelligence  that  the 
Toulon  fleet  was  to  sail  for  Brest  on  July  15th,  and  that 
at  Bordeaux,  Nantes,  Bayonne,  and  Rochelle  they  were 
arming  ships  enfiHtc  for  the  same  port.  All  these  circum- 
stances, coupled  with  the  information  which  Newcastle  had 
obtained  as  to  the  real  nature  of  the  French  design,  exer- 
cised a  marked  reaction  on  the  system  of  naval  defence. 
Hitherto  the  primary  objective,  or,  as  the  technical  phrase 
then  was,  "  the  principal  object,"  of  the  home  fleet  was 
the  French  main  fleet,  but  now  it  tended  to  become  what 
it  really  was,  the  French  invading  armies.  The  first  in- 
dication of  this  is  seen  in  Anson's  activity  in  strengthening 
the  light  squadrons.  At  the  end  of  June  he  was  taking 
up  more  privateers  and  small  craft  right  and  left,  and  to 
reinforce  the  cruiser  squadrons  he  was  arming  some  of  the 
transports  which  had  now  served  Pitt's  purpose  in  alarming 
the  French,  and  for  which  he  had  no  longer  any  use.^ 

The  most  interesting  reaction,  however,  is  seen  in  the 
changed  nature  of  Hawke's  blockade.  It  was  on  June 
21st  that  he  succeeded  in  reaching  his  station.  The  port 
had  been  open  a  whole  fortnight,  but  to  his  great  relief 
he  found  that  nothing  had  stirred  out.  He  was  able  to 
send  home  a  list  of  the  French  fleet,  showing  twenty  of 
the  line  ready,  or  almost  ready,  to  sail,  which  Dufl",  one 
of  the  best  of  his  cruiser  captains,  had  obtained.     The 

^  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  June  27. 


2  8  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

dispositions  he  then  made  related  ahnost  entirely  to  this 
fleet,  in  accordance  with  a  design  which  he  had  already 
sent  to  the  Admiralty.  "  Except  I  shall  be  drove  ofif," 
he  had  said,  "  by  winds  and  weather,  I  shall  keep  them 
constantly  in  view,  so  as  either  to  prevent  their  coming 
out  or  doing  my  utmost,  in  case  they  should,  to  take  or 
destroy  them."  ^  His  idea  was  that  for  this  purpose 
he  required  a  battle  squadron  equal  to,  but  no  stronger 
than,  that  of  the  enemy.  This  main  squadron,  when- 
ever the  wind  was  easterly,  that  is,  offshore,  and  fair 
for  the  French  to  come  out,  he  kept  off  Point  St.  Mathieu, 
inside  the  Black  Stones,  and  practically  in  the  entrance 
to  the  harbour.  In  advance  of  this  was  an  inshore 
squadron  of  two  of  the  line  and  two  frigates,  under 
Commodore  the  Hon.  Augustus  Hervey,  who  in  the 
course  of  this  command  was  to  clinch  the  reputation 
he  had  already  established  as  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
officers  in  the  service.  Whenever  the  weather  rendered 
the  St.  Mathieu  station  unsafe,  Hawke  moved  out  to  a 
rendezvous  fifteen  leagues  W.  i  S.  of  Ushant,  while  Hervey 
took  his  place  off  St.  Mathieu,  and  a  chain  of  connecting 
ships  of  the  line  was  formed  between  the  two  squadrons. 
This  arrangement,  with  the  three  ships  of  the  line  which 
remained  over  and  were  stationed  in  Audierne  Bay  to 
watch  L'Orient,  constituted  the  naval  blockade.  The 
commercial  blockade  was  completed  by  frigates  at  both 
ends  of  the  Passage  du  Four,  one  in  the  Passage  du  Raz, 
and  one  right  in  the  Goulet.  It  was  thus  rendered  effec- 
tive enough,  in  Hawke's  opinion,  to  entitle  him  to  turn 
back  any  neutral  that  tried  to  enter,  and  to  seize  every 
Swede  on  suspicion  of  carrying  contraband.^     His  task, 

1  To  Cleveland,  "  OiY  the  Start,"  Juno  12. 

*  To  Cleveland,  July  IG.  Danes  were  allowed  in  and  out,  Dutch  as  a 
rule  were  merely  warned  off.  In  Hawke's  view  a  strictly  effective  blockade 
did  not  entitle  him  to  seize  neutrals  except  under  suspicion  of  contraband. 


1759     HAWKE  ON  THE  PRIMARY  OBJECTIVE     29 

however,  did  not  eud  with  watching  the  Breton  ports. 
For  about  this  time  the  Government  received  definite 
news  that  Bompart  was  about  to  come  home  from  the 
West  Indies  with  seven  or  eight  sail,  and  Hawke  was 
ordered,  so  soon  as  he  had  ships  enough,  to  throw  out  a 
squadron  down  the  Bay  to  intercept  him/ 

So  far,  it  will  be  seen,  Hawke's  attention  was  entirely 
devoted  to  the  enemy's  battle  fleets  and  their  supplies. 
It  was  not  till  he  had  been  nearly  a  month  on  the  station 
that  he  seems  to  have  thought  it  necessary  to  attend  to 
the  transports  and  the  army  that  were  gathering  to  the 
southward  of  him.  In  the  middle  of  August,  however, 
whether  upon  fresh  information  or  upon  a  hint  from 
home,  he  seems  to  have  suddenly  awakened  to  the  danger 
of  the  French  transports  evading  him,  while  the  presence 
of  Conflans's  fleet  compelled  him  to  concentrate  before 
Brest.  The  first  idea  apparently  Avas  that  the  transports 
which  had  assembled  in  the  ports  between  L'Orient  and 
Nantes  were  about  to  attempt  to  steal  round  to  Brest. 
On  August  15th  Captain  Roddam  was  ordered  to  cruise 
with  the  Audierne  or  southern  squadron  as  far  as 
L'Orient,  with  instructions  that  if  he  met  a  convoy  he 
was  to  attack  it  and  not  its  escorting  frigates.  "  The 
convoy,"  he  was  told  emphatically,  "is  your  principal 
object."  A  week  later  the  anxiety  grew  more  serious. 
It  was  thought  the  troops  might  sail  direct  for  Ireland 
— perhaps  even  that  they  had  already  done  so.  The 
southern  squadron  was  therefore  increased,  and  on  August 
26  th  Commodore  John  Reynolds  was  given  the  com- 
mand, with  orders  to  extend  the  blockade  as  far  down 
as  Nantes.  If  he  found  no  transports  there  he  was 
immediately  to  take  the  whole  squadron  to  Ireland  in 
search  of  them,  and  to  remember  particularly  that  the 

1  Out-letUrs,  526,  Aug.  13. 


30  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  .759 

transports  were  his  "  principal  object."  If  he  found  them 
still  in  Nantes,  he  was  to  keep  them  there,  and  see  if 
they  could  not  be  destroyed  with  bombs.^ 

On  his  arrival  Reynolds  found  the  transports  had  not 
moved,  and  with  the  force  at  his  command,  viz.  one  ship 
of  the  line  and  a  dozen  cruisers,  he  established  a  strict 
blockade.  So  far  then  all  was  well,  and  just  then  came 
news  that  ashore  things  were  even  better.  While 
Reynolds  was  closing  Nantes,  Hawke  was  standing  in 
to  St.  Mathieu  on  special  orders  from  home  to  fire  a 
feu-de-joie  in  the  face  of  M.  de  Conflans.  The  French 
fleet  could  not  mistake  its  meaning.  It  was  for  the 
famous  victory  of  Minden.  After  the  Due  de  Broglie's 
brilliant  seizure  of  the  town,  which  finally  threw  Hanover 
open  to  the  French,  Ferdinand  had  turned  in  his  ap- 
parently hopeless  retreat.  Marshal  Contades  was  busily 
and  successfully  engaged  in  enlarging  the  hole  which 
Broglie  had  pierced.  All  Westphalia  and  the  whole 
line  of  the  Weser  were  practically  in  his  hands,  when 
Ferdinand  had  suddenly  fallen  upon  him  at  Minden  and 
completely  defeated  him.  As  all  allowed,  the  victory 
was  mainly  due  to  the  daring  attack  of  the  British 
infantry,  but  the  honour  of  the  exploit  was  overshadowed 
by  Lord  George  Sackville's  refusal  to  charge  with  his 
cavalry  when  Ferdinand  had  called  upon  him  to  com- 
plete the  rout  the  infantry  had  begun.  Every  one  now 
knew  him  for  the  man  he  was ;  at  last  it  was  clear 
enough  how  little  chance  a  combined  expedition  ever 
really  had  with  him  as  its  moving  spirit.  But  for  his 
cowardice — for  it  could  be  called  nothing  else — Minden 
must  have  been  one  of  the  most  complete  victories  in 
history.     As  it  was,  it  was  sufficient  to  save  Hanover  for 

^  Hawke's  orders  to  Roddam,  Aug.  15  ;  to  Reynolds,  Aug.  26  ;  Hawke 
to  Cleveland,  Aug.  28,  Admiralty  Secretary,  In-lettera,  93. 


I7S9  EFFECT    OF    MINDEN  31 

another  year,  and  the  defensive  part  of  Pitt's  system 
ashore  was  restored  almost  as  completely  as  it  existed 
at  sea. 

This  aspect  of  Minden  must  never  be  forgotten  if  we 
would  keep  a  clear  understanding  of  the  development  of 
Pitt's  system.  We  naturally  connect  the  battle  almost 
solely  with  Sackville's  disgrace  of  the  British  cavalry  and 
that  unsurpassed  attack  of  British  infantry  on  the  un- 
shaken horse  of  France.     But  the  masrnificent  resolution 

O 

of  Ferdinand,  the  cunning  with  which  he  prepared  his 
success  against  heavy  odds,  and  his  eye  for  the  moment 
to  turn  upon  his  enem}'^,  rise  above  it  all.  But  for  his 
victory  Hanover  must  have  been  lost,  and  the  efforts  of 
Saunders  and  Wolfe,  of  Boscawen  and  Hawke,  would 
have  been  of  little  avail.  If  the  navy  was  able  in 
the  end  to  secure  the  object  of  the  campaign,  it  was 
because  Ferdinand  kept  the  ring  intact  at  Minden.  No 
finer  example  exists  of  the  use  of  counter-stroke,  of  the 
function  of  attack  in  defence. 

The  victory  could  not  have  been  more  timely.  For, 
as  Marshal  Contades  was  preparing  to  sweep  Ferdinand 
before  him  and  reoccupy  Hanover,  the  great  French  naval 
concentration  had  begun.  Bompart  we  know  was  on 
his  way  home  to  Brest ;  Conflans  was  making  his  final 
preparations ;  and  on  August  5th,  four  days  after  Minden 
was  fought.  La  Clue  put  to  sea  from  Toulon.  There 
was  nothing  to  stop  him,  and  ten  days  later,  just  when 
Hawke  was  extending  his  blockade  to  meet  the  expected 
movement  of  D'Aiguillon's  transports,  he  was  able  to  pass 
out  of  the  Straits  untouched. 

For  the  moment,  then,  the  fate  of  the  great  French 
counter-stroke  lay  between  La  Clue  and  Boscawen.  What 
had  happened  was  this.  It  was  now  nearly  three  months 
since  in  the  middle  of  May  Boscawen  had  found  Brodrick 


32  FRENCH   OOUMTER- ATTACK  1759 

off  Toulon  and  had  taken  over  the  command.  The 
secret  orders  ho  brought  out  reflected  the  spirit  that 
prevailed  at  home  when  he  had  sailed.  There  was  no 
suggestion  of  an  invasion  to  be  stopped.  In  the  time- 
honoured  form  ho  was  instructed  that  the  principal 
intentions  of  the  Government  in  sending  him  out  were 
to  annoy  the  enemy,  secure  Gibraltar,  and  protect  the 
trade.^  His  method  of  performing  these  functions  was 
from  the  first  moment  he  arrived,  to  establish  a  close 
blockade  of  Toulon  and  Marseilles,  while  his  cruisers 
were  distributed  at  all  the  well-known  focal  points,  or 
escorting  the  convoys  along  the  well-known  routes.  It 
was  the  direct  and  obvious  way  to  carry  out  the  Govern- 
ment's intentions,  and  the  annoyance  to  the  enemy  was 
all  they  could  wish.  So  close  was  Boscawen's  blockade, 
so  daring  the  activity  of  his  fireships,  that  the  Toulon 
squadron  had  retired  into  the  inner  road  under  the  guns 
of  the  fortress.  Captured  letters  told  him  the  people 
were  fearing  a  descent  at  any  moment.  Besides  his 
dozen  cruisers  he  had  thirteen  of  the  line  and  two 
"  fifties,"  and  they  could  not  believe  so  large  a  fleet 
meant  only  a  blockade.  The  disturbing  effects  of  Pitt's 
previous  descents  were  still  working,  and  between  Toulon 
and  Marseilles  there  were  no  less  than  ten  battalions 
of  regular  infantry,  besides  the  militia.^  Boscawen's 
movements  seemed  to  have  threatened  attacks  in  various 
places,  and  the  troops  were  constantly  marching  to  oppose 
them.  On  Juno  7th  a  very  daring  piece  of  service  in- 
creased the  effect.  Two  French  frigates  trying  to  got 
into  Toulon  had  been  forced  to  anchor  in  a  small  bay, 
now  known  as  the  Anse  de  Sablettes,  immediately  south 
of   the   entrance  of  the   port.     Like   all   the   coast,   the 

'  Secret  Orders,  1331,  March  28. 

*  In-lettcrs,  384,  May  30  aud^June  1. 


1759  BOSCAWEN'S    PART  33 

place  was  bristling  with  batteries,  but  Boscawen  sent 
in  the  Culloden,  Conqueror,  and  Jersey  to  try  to  destroy 
the  frigates.  For  an  hour  they  had  to  endure  the  fire 
of  nine  batteries,  and  then,  with  their  mission  unaccom- 
plished, they  had  to  come  away  in  such  a  condition  that 
the  Culloden  was  sent  to  Gibraltar  to  refit. 

Till  the  end  of  June  his  activity  kept  the  coast  in 
perpetual  alarm,  but  then  it  became  necessary  to  carry  the 
whole  squadron  to  the  coast  of  Spain  to  water,  and  thence 
to  Gibraltar  to  revictual.  Till  nearly  the  end  of  July 
he  lay  in  Salou  Bay,  close  to  Tarragona,  which  he  de- 
scribes as  the  best  watering-place  in  all  the  Mediterranean. 
Then  he  moved  on  to  Gibraltar,  where  he  arrived  on 
August  3rd.  Here  he  received  a  modification  of  his 
original  instructions,  which  had  been  sent  off  at  the  end 
of  June  after  the  discovery  of  the  formidable  nature  of 
Belleisle's  plan.  The  new  orders  reveal  the  new  anxiety 
about  a  naval  concentration  upon  Brest.  He  was  told 
that,  notwithstanding  any  former  order,  if  the  Toulon 
squadron  got  out  of  the  Straits  and  he  heard  it  was 
bound  for  Brest,  Rochefort,  or  any  Atlantic  port,  he 
was  to  detach  part  of  his  squadron  to  England  or  to 
come  home  himself,  at  his  discretion,  leaving  behind 
him  at  least  seven  of  the  line  and  all  the  frigates  for 
the  protection  of  Gibraltar  and  the  other  Mediterranean 
services.^ 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  La  Clue  had  completed  his 
crews,  and  on  August  5th,  by  which  time  he  must  have 
known  that  Boscawen  had  just  sailed  to  Gibraltar  to  refit, 
he  put  to  sea.  His  force  was  ten  of  the  line,  two 
"  fifties,"  and  three  frigates,  quite  enough  to  force  the 
Straits  when  Boscawen's  fleet  was  more  or  less  disabled 

*  Secret  Ordert,  1331,  June  29;  Boscawen  to  Cleveland, /n-/e«cr«,  384, 
Aug.  8. 

VOL.  II.  C 


34  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

in  the  process  of  refitting.  For  ten  days  or  so  it  was 
actually  in  this  condition,  and  practically  out  of  action. 
But  so  soon  as  it  was  nearly  ready  for  sea  again  Boscawen 
sent  out  the  only  two  frigates  he  had  with  him  to  watch 
for  La  Clue's  coming.  One  was  to  cruise  off  Malaga  and 
the  other  across  the  entrance  to  the  Straits  between 
Estrepona  and  Ceuta.  Boscawen  had  thus  changed  his 
close  blockade  for  an  open  one  ;  that  is,  he  left  La  Clue 
free  to  come  out,  and  was  waiting  for  him  at  the  point  of 
his  line  of  passage,  where  contact  was  practically  certain. 
Whether  it  was  a  mere  result  of  his  necessities  or  the 
outcome  of  mature  calculation,  no  strategy  could  be 
sounder.  So  long  as  his  object  was  to  secure  trade  and 
annoy  the  French,  the  close  blockade  and  the  threats  to 
the  coast  were  the  best  method  of  attaining  it ;  but  when 
the  object  was  to  demonstrate  to  France  the  futility  of 
her  trying  to  recover  her  position  by  an  invasion,  the 
actual  destruction  of  La  Clue's  fleet  was  indicated.  A 
decision  was  wanted,  and  open  blockade  was  the  best  way 
to  secure  one. 

If  Boscawen  had  indeed  opened  the  blockade  deliber- 
ately, he  had  certainly  calculated  his  time  much  too 
narrowly.  When  on  August  17th  La  Clue  appeared  on 
the  scene  the  British  refit  was  not  complete,  and  there 
was  every  chance  of  his  getting  through.  His  idea  had 
been  to  make  the  Barbary  coast,  steal  along  it  to  the 
entrance  of  the  Gut,  and  then  run  through  under  a  press 
of  sail  in  the  night.  The  game  was  well  played,  and  only 
detected  when  it  could  not  be  stopped.  It  was  already 
nightfall  when  one  of  Boscawen's  scout  frigates  came 
flying  in  to  report  the  French  fleet  just  east  of  Ceuta.  It 
was  eight  o'clock  before  she  could  give  the  alarm,  and 
nothing  was  ready.  Boscawen's  flagship,  the  Namnr,  had 
her  sails  still  unbent ;  other  ships  were  equally  unpre- 


1759        LA    CLUE    SURPRISES   BOSCAWEN  35 

pared,  and  all  of  them  had  parties  of  men  ashore.  To 
make  matters  worse,  the  admiral  and  several  of  the  prin- 
cipal officers  were  away  dining  with  the  Governor  of  San 
Roque.  Somebody  in  the  flagship,  however,  was  bold 
enough,  possibly  by  previous  orders,  to  make  the  signal 
to  unmoor.  It  was  seen  from  San  Roque,  and  broke  up 
the  governor's  party  in  a  moment.  From  all  sides  there 
was  a  stampede  for  the  fleet,  officers  and  liberty  men 
getting  on  board  any  ship  they  could  fetch.  The  excite- 
ment and  confusion  were  intense.  Yet  such  was  the 
discipline  that  by  ten  o'clock  Boscawen  was  able  to  slip 
and  make  sail  with  eight  of  his  own  division.  Brodrick, 
who  had  been  lying  further  in,  followed  not  long  after 
with  the  rest.  By  eleven  Boscawen  was  clear  out  ofi:' 
Cabritra  Point,  and  there  he  had  to  bring-to  to  hoist  in  his 
boats  and  clear-ship.  It  was  a  splendid  feat  of  seaman- 
ship, such  as  only  seamen  who  know  the  Rock  can  fully 
appreciate.  In  less  than  three  hours  a  fleet  of  the  line, 
moored  in  a  difficult  harbour,  with  sails  unbent  and  the 
admiral  absent,  had  got  to  sea  at  night.  It  would  be 
hard  to  surpass  it  in  all  our  annals.^ 

Meanwhile  La  Clue,  with  a  fine  easterly  breeze  behind 
him,  had  been  pushing  through  the  Straits  in  sailing  order 
and  unhindered.  His  plan  was  to  rush  past  as  fast  as  pos- 
sible with  all  lights  extinguished,  and  then  to  make  for 
Cadiz  in  order  to  rally  his  fleet,  which  was  sure  to  have 
got  scattered.  About  midnight,  however,  he  changed 
his  mind.  He  had  seen  the  frigate  signal  his  presence 
and  knew  she  was  shadowing  him.  He  had  all  his  fleet 
together,  and  instead  of  hauling  up  for  Cadiz  he  resolved 
to  carry  on  as  he  was,  direct  for  Cape  St.  Vincent,  while 

*  See  Admiral  Sir  Edward  R.  Fremantle,  Boscawen  {Twelve  Sailors), 
p.  26()  ;  Ekin,  Naval  BaWat,  p.  36  ;  Journal  of  the  Plag-Captain,  printed  in 
Colomb's  Naval  War/are,  p.  139. 


36  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

the  wiud  held  fair,  and  accordingly  he  uiade  a  signal  to 
that  effect.^  This  signal  was  either  not  seen  or  disre- 
garded by  the  rear  ships,  which  had  presumably  fallen 
somewhat  astern.  Still  it  appears  they  held  on  after  La 
Clue  till  about  two  in  the  morning.  Up  till  that  time 
La  Chie  says  his  poop-lanterns  were  still  burning,  and 
the  whole  squadron  could  be  counted.  Between  two  and 
three,  however,  Boscawens  van  began  to  come  up  and  tire 
upon  the  roar  ships  of  the  French.  Thereu^^Kin,  seeing 
their  admiral  had  extinguished  his  lights,  they  thought 
best  to  act  on  their  original  orders  and  steer  for  the 
Cadiz  rendezvous.^ 

Boscawen,  with  tine  decision,  made  no  attempt  to  follow 
them.  Without  wavering  a  moment,  he  too  held  on  direct 
for  St.  Vincent.  Wliether  it  was  by  instinct  or  reason 
we  canuv^t  tell.  Possibly  his  frigate  was  calling  him  on ; 
he  does  not  say.  Whatever  his  motive,  his  action  could 
not  be  more  correct.  Ho  was  engaged  in  an  open  block- 
ade. Ho  had  failed  to  get  actual  contact  at  the  first 
likely  point  on  the  enemy's  line  of  passage.  The  next 
thing  to  do  was  to  hurry  on  to  the  second.  That  was 
St.  Vincent,  and  there  he  reaped  his  rewarvi.  At  day- 
break ho  saw  seven  of  the  line  lying-to  to  leeward  of  him, 
about  thirty  miles  short  of  the  Cape.  It  was  La  Clue 
with  all  the  best  ships  of  his  tleot.  He  had  just  dis- 
covered that  his  rearguanl  was  not  with  him.  Bosoawen's 
fleet  also  was  split  into  two  divisions.  Brodriek  w.s,s 
still  out  of  sight,  and  La  Clue  was  hoping  the  eight  sail 
that  wore   with   Boscawen  were  his  own  lost  rearguard. 

*  Thf  Kn'tioh  h«vl  no  night  ovnupass  signals  at  that  tiiu*".  Somo  French 
aathur:;  say  h»  sigiuillw.1  "*W.N  W.."  others  "  wtxstcrly."  He  j)robably 
signalltHl  to  "  sail  Uvrgw  on  th«i>  starUwrvi  tack."  which,  as  tho  wimt  then 
was  K.S.  K.  to  E..  would  givv  a  ooursw  aK'ut  W.N.W..  straight  for  doubling 
St.  Vincont,     St'O  Coloiub.  A'aW   tt'arfarr,  p.  139.  n. 

'  Laoour-Gayt>t,  Marviui  n>u3  Louts  .V*'.,  p.  285;  Waddingtoxi,  vol.  iii. 
p.  atJl. 


1759  LA    CLUE    CAUGHT    AT    LAGOS  37 

However,  as  some  of  Brodrick's  division  began  to  appear 
he  grew  suspicious  and  made  a  private  signal.  Bosoawen 
of  course  could  not  answer,  and  La  Clue  held  away  in 
line  ahead  under  a  press  of  sail.  It  was  then  about  eight 
o'clock  and  broad  daylight,  and  Boscawen  immediately 
signalled  for  a  chase  to  the  north-west.^  Then  hour  after 
hour  it  went  on ;  but  one  of  La  Clue's  ships  was  a 
slug ;  Boscawen,  moreover,  got  the  best  of  the  breeze  ; 
and  the  French  were  fast  being  overhauled.  By  one 
o'clock  they  were  abreast  of  Lagos,  and  though  the 
wind  was  dying  away  it  was  clear  an  action  could 
not  bo  avoided.  Both  fleets  showed  their  colours,  and 
twenty  minutes  later  Boscawen  made  the  signal  to 
engage. 

It  was  not,  however,  till  half-past  two  that  the  CuUodcn, 
who  was  leadini?',  trot  into  action  with  the  Centaure,  the 
rearmost  French  ship.  As  the  others  came  up  they,  too, 
tackled  the  rearmost  ships,  doubling  on  them,  and  bring- 
ing about  a  formidable  concentration.  Tliis  apparently 
was  not  what  Boscawen  wanted.  With  Brodrick's  division 
rapidly  coming  up,  ho  could  now  make  certain  of  the 
enemy's  rear.  He  wanted  to  get  at  the  van,  and  prevent 
any  escaping.  As  yet  there  was  no  Additional  Instruc- 
tion to  meet  the  case.  He  could  not  perform  the 
manoeuvre  of  attacking  in  inverted  order,  by  which  each 
ship  as  she  came  up  passed  on  under  cover  of  the  one 
already  engaged  and  got  alongside  the  next  ahead,  till  all 
the  enemy  from  rear  to  van  were  tackled  in  succession. 
All  he  could  do  was  to  keep  signalling  to  individual  ships 
ahead  of  him  to  make  more  sail.  But  thoy  did  not 
understanil,  and  it  was  not  till  four  o'clock  that  he  him- 

'  The  "  Instructious  "  under  which  these  chasing  sig:uals  were  made  are 
lost.  They  are  not  containtvl  in  the  "  Additional  Fighting  Instructions" 
of  the  time.     See  Fijfitiity  It^Hruclioiu  (iVot'y  Rfcords  i^iK-icty),  p.  "204. 


38  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

self  got  up  and  engaged  La  Clue's  flagship.^  His  recep- 
tion was  worthy  of  a  French  flagship,  and  after  a  hard 
fight  he  had  to  fall  away  with  his  mizzen-mast  and  main 
and  fore  topsail-yards  gone."  In  doing  so,  he  came  abreast 
the  rearmost  Frenchman — the  obstinate  Gentaure — which 
had  been  battered  to  pieces  by  four  other  ships,  and  now 
at  last  surrendered.  Meanwhile  La  Clue  was  trying  to 
make  off  to  the  north-east.  The  "  General  chase  "  signal 
had  already  been  altered  for  "  Chase  to  the  north-east," 
and  Boscawen,  thirsting  to  renew  his  action,  shifted  his  flag 
to  the  Newark  (80).  All  through  the  night  the  chase 
went  on,  guided  by  the  little  Guernsey  of  50  guns,  who, 
having  understood  Boscawen's  meaning,  had  tried  to 
tackle  the  enemy's  van  ship  and  was  now  far  enough 
ahead  to  keep  them  in  sight.^ 

At  daylight  they  were  seen  again  a  few  miles  ahead, 
making  for  Lagos.  But  now  there  were  only  four  of  them. 
Of  the  original  seven,  the  Gentaure  had  struck,  one  was 
making  for  Rochefort,  and  another  for  the  Canaries.  For 
the  rest  there  was  no  escape,  and  La  Clue  knew  it  well. 
Determined  not  to  surrender,  he  ran  his  splendid  flagship 
straight  on  the  rocks,  with  every  sail  set  and  his  flag 

^  Boscawen  had  issued  a  set  of  Additional  Fighting  Instructions  when 
he  came  on  the  station,  but  they  contained  nothing  to  meet  the  case 
except  a  signal  for  the  leading  ships  to  form  line,  but  this  was  far  from 
being  the  same  thing.  Subsequently  the  following  instruction  was  intro- 
duced, and  appears  in  the  Additional  Instructions  used  by  Rodney  in 
1780  :  "  If  the  commander-in-chief  should  chase  with  the  whole  squadron 
and  would  have  those  ships  that  are  nearest  attack  the  enemy,  the  headmost 
opposing  their  sternmost,  the  next  passing  on  under  the  cover  of  her  fire 
and  engaging  the  second  from  the  enemy's  rear,  and  so  on  in  succession," 
&c.  This  was  the  form  of  attack  which  Hawke  used  against  L'Etanduere, 
Oct.  14,  1747,  but  there  the  engaging  in  inverted  order  of  coming  up 
seems  to  have  taken  place  naturally. 

*  Boscawen  in  despatch  (In-letters,  384,  Aug.  20)  says  this  happened  in 
"half  an  hour."  The  flag-captain's  log  says  his  action  with  the  Oc^an 
lasted  till  7.15. 

'  The  Quernsey  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  M.  Kearney,  her  captain, 
Millbank,  being  absent  on  a  diplomatic  mission  to  Morocco. 


1759  RESULTS    OF    LAGOS  39 

flying.  The  captain  of  the  Redoubtable  followed  his 
example.  The  other  two,  the  T^mdraire  and  Modeste, 
anchored  under  some  Portuguese  batteries.  But  blood 
was  up.  The  chase  was  too  hot  for  neutral  rights  or 
neutral  batteries  to  stop.  Boscawen  could  not  hold  his 
hand.  Against  each  of  the  doomed  vessels  a  ship  was 
sent  in,  and  they  all  struck.  The  OcSan  and  the  Redoubt- 
able were  burnt ;  the  T6m6rairc  and  Modeste  were  brought 
out  as  prizes  ;  and  La  Clue's  fleet  had  ceased  to  be  a 
factor  in  the  situation.^ 

This  fact,  however,  was  not  clear  immediately.  All 
Boscawen  knew  was  that  half  La  Clue's  fleet  was  still 
unaccounted  for,  and  immediately  after  his  work  at  Lagos 
was  finished  he  took  up  his  station  olF  St.  Vincent.  After 
watching  there  a  couple  of  days  and  seeing  no  sign  of 
the  missing  ships,  he  felt  there  was  a  possibility  of  their 
having  gone  northward,  and  that  therefore  the  situation 
contemplated  by  the  last  modification  of  his  instructions 
had  arisen.  The  Toulon  fleet  had  passed  the  Straits 
bound  for  the  French  Atlantic  ports,  and  seven  of  them 
were  still  at  sea.  Accordingly  on  August  20  th  he  sent 
home  an  account  of  the  action,  and  informed  the  Admir- 
alty that  it  was  his  intention  to  return  to  England  in 
accordance  with  his  last  instructions,  leaving  Brodrick 
on  the  station  with  the  seven  sail  they  had  ordered.'^  At 
the  same  time  he  despatched  to  Hawke  a  laconic  note 
saying  exactly  what  he  had  done,  and  giving  him  details 
of  the  number  and  force  of  the  ships  that  were  missing. 
"  I  heartily  wish,"  he  wrote,  "  you  may  meet  with  them. 

1  All  the  English  authorities  state  that  La  Clue  died  of  his  wounds 
shortly  after  the  action.  Really  he  returned  to  France,  and  was  so  far 
held  guiltless  for  the  loss  of  his  fleet  as  to  be  retired,  April  1,  1764,  with  a 
lieutenant-general's  pension. — Lacour-Gayet,  pp.  261,  469. 

*  Boscawen  to  Cleveland,  fn-letters,  384,  Aug.  20,  "Off  Cape  St. 
Vincent." 


40  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

I  hope  to  make  sail  this  evening,  and  as  I  am  bound 
home  will  endeavour  to  fall  in  with  you."  ^ 

This  resolution  was  entirely  in  accord  with  the  state  of 
opinion  at  home.  Indeed  it  so  happened  that  the  force 
which  he  was  taking  was  even  less  than  Anson  wanted. 
For  on  July  25  th,  when  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  doubt 
that  the  French  really  intended  to  make  their  desperate 
attempt  to  invade,  an  order  had  been  directed  to  Boscawen 
to  bring  home  ten  of  the  line  instead  of  six."  Before  it 
could  roach  him,  however,  he  had  repaired  the  damages 
of  the  action,  and  on  August  26  th,  therefore,  the  two 
admirals  parted  company,  Brodrick  going  back  to  Gib- 
raltar to  take  up  the  ordinary  duties  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean station,  while  Boscawen  stood  north  with  his 
three  prizes. 

The  news  of  what  had  happened  reached  home  in  a 
good  hour.  Newcastle  was  getting  thoroughly  frightened, 
An  intercepted  letter  from  the  Danish  Minister  in  Paris, 
who  had  always  disbelieved  the  French  would  try  any- 
thing so  mad  as  Bolleisle's  scheme,  showed  that  even  he 
was  now  convinced  they  would,  as  a  counsel  of  despair. 
Yet  Pitt  would  not  hear  of  a  man  or  ship  being  called 
home  from  the  West  till  Quebec  was  taken.  The  militia 
was  proving  a  broken  reed ;  the  nervous  Prime  Minister 
had  confirmation  that  Thurot  from  Dunkirk  would  strike 
at  one  place  while  Conflans  struck  at  another,  and  he  was 
wailing  to  Hardwicke  that  if  La  Clue  once  got  to  Brest 
nothing  could  stop  the  invasion.  On  September  5th  the 
Danish  Minister's  letter  was  discussed  in  the  Cabinet. 
Next  day  came  the  glorious  news.  "  Now,"  wrote  New- 
castle to  his  friend,  "  Boscawen  will  come  back  with  seven 
ships  and  three  French  ones,  and  two  regiments   from 

*  Burrow's  Life  of  Ifawke,  p.  379. 
'  Hecret  Orders,  1331. 


1759  HAWKE    ON    BLOCKADE  41 

Gibraltar,"  "  I  own,"  he  added,  "  I  was  afraid  of  invasion 
till  now." ' 

The  news  was  sent  off  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  fleet 
before  Brest,  where  things  by  this  time  were  at  high 
tension.  During  August,  while  Boscawen  was  refitting 
in  Gibraltar,  Hawke's  fleet  also  began  to  show  signs  of 
breaking  down  under  the  continued  strain,  and  he  told 
the  Admiralty  he  could  not  last  unless  drastic  measures 
were  taken  to  send  him  relief  ships  to  keep  up  his 
strength.  How  weak  a  form  of  war  is  a  prolonged  close 
blockade  Ave  have  seen  in  La  Clue's  almost  successful 
attempt  to  evade.  Hawke  himself  had  failed  too  often 
not  to  know  the  danger  well.  His  importunity  was  not 
understood.  At  home  it  was  thought  he  was  asking  for 
unnecessary  superiority,  and  some  friction  ensued.  He 
quickly  replied  that  he  had  never  asked,  and  would  never 
seek,  more  than  simple  equality  with  the  enemy.  "  I 
never  desired,"  he  said,  "  or  intended  to  keep  more  line-of- 
battle  ships  than  equalled  the  number  of  the  enemy, 
which  is  now  augmented  to  twenty-two."  With  an  equal 
number  he  did  not  doubt  of  success,  when  a  seasoned 
fleet  was  pitted  against  one  fresh  from  port.  But  he 
insisted  that  his  fleet  must  be  kept  in  battle  trim  by 
constant  reliefs.  Not  only  did  ships  want  cleaning,  but 
what  was  more  important,  crews  wanted  rest  and  refresh- 
ment. So  the  friction  passed,  and  everything  was  done 
as  Hawke  wished. 

In  addition  to  these  anxieties,  we  have  seen  that  the 
harassed  admiral  had  been  forced  during  the  last  half  of 
August  to  extend  his  blockade  to  all  the  Breton  ports  as 
far  down  as  the  Loire.  His  last  move,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, had  been  to  send  Captain  Reynolds  with  a  cruiser 

^  Newcastle  to   Hardwicke,  Aug.   31    and   Sept.    6,   Newcastle   Papers, 
32,895. 


42  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

squadron  before  Nantes,  with  orders  if  he  found  the 
transports  gone  to  pursue  them  to  Ireland,  and  to  blockade 
them  if  he  found  them  still  there.  He  had  only  just 
heard  that  Reynolds  had  them  safely  blockaded  in  the 
Loire,  when  on  September  7th  an  express  reached  him 
from  the  Earl  of  Bristol,  our  ambassador  at  Madrid,  that 
La  Clue  had  passed  the  Straits.  The  news  seems  scarcely 
to  have  disturbed  him,  at  least  outwardly.  Either  then 
or  the  next  day  he  must  have  received  Boscawen's  letter, 
for  he  contented  himself  with  sending  word  to  Reynolds 
that  he  feared  some  ships  which  escaped  Boscawen  might 
have  got  into  the  Basque  Roads,  and  that  he  was  to  send 
a  frigate  or  two  to  see.^ 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Hawke's  main  objective 
and  his  chief  anxiety  seems  still  to  have  been  the  trans- 
ports and  not  the  battle  fleet.  We  have  seen  how  he  was 
constantly  increasing  the  blockading  cruiser  squadron. 
His  correspondence  is  full  of  minute  directions  for  the 
conduct  of  the  transport  blockade  and  the  distribution 
of  the  ships.  By  the  middle  of  September  he  had 
even  resolved  to  attempt  the  destruction  of  the  tran- 
sports where  they  lay,  and  for  this  purpose  he  once 
more  changed  the  southern  command  'and  gave  it  to 
Duff  over  Reynolds's  head.^  Before  the  new  com- 
modore could  take  over  the  command,  Reynolds  had 
to  report  that  the  Nantes  division  of  transports  had 
come  out  of  the  Loire,  and  had  stolen  northward  to 
join  those  at  Vannes.  He  had  chased  them  in  Quiberon 
Bay,  but  had  only  succeeded  in  driving  them  into  Auray. 

*  Hawke  to  Cleveland,  Sept.  7  ;  Hawke  to  Reynolds,  Sept.  8.  In  his 
letter  to  Cleveland  of  the  8th  he  does  not  mention  Boscawen's  victory, 
and  it  is  not  till  the  12th  he  says  definitely  he  has  heard  of  it  {In-letters, 
92).  He  probably  received  Boscawen's  letter,  therefore,  on  the  8th,  between 
his  letters  to  Cleveland  and  to  Reynolds. 

*  Hawke  to  Duff,  Sept.  17,  In-letters,  92. 


1759       THE   TRANSPORTS    AT    MORBIHAN         43 

He  had  held  a  council  of  war  to  consider  an  attempt  to 
destroy  them,  but  the  decision  was  that  the  operation 
was  impracticable. 

A  few  days  later  the  impression  that  the  French  move- 
ment was  about  to  begin  was  further  increased.  Three  or 
four  of  the  Brest  fleet  made  a  demonstration  of  coming 
out.  Hervey  engaged  them  in  Camaret  Bay,  and  drove 
them  back.  Such  signs  of  activity  could  not  be  ignored, 
and  Hawke  sent  an  urgent  order  to  Duff  to  go  in  person 
to  Quiberon  and  see  if  nothing  could  be  done  with  the 
transports.  Duff  had  already  forestalled  the  order. 
Having  decided  to  give  Reynolds  the  division  watching 
L'Orient,  he  himself  had  gone  into  the  Bay,  and  with 
Reynolds  and  another  of  his  captains  had  actually  landed 
on  the  island  of  Meaban,  at  the  entrance  of  the  Morbihan 
Gulf,  where  he  got  a  clear  view  into  the  Auray  River, 
But  he  could  only  endorse  the  decision  of  the  previous 
council  of  war.  He  assured  himself,  however,  that  by 
leaving  the  bulk  of  his  squadron  in  Quiberon  Bay  he 
could  make  it  impossible  for  either  the  transports  or  their 
escort  to  come  out.  This  accordingly  he  did,  returning 
himself  with  his  fastest  frigates  to  the  Isle  de  Croix  to 
watch  L'Orient. 

With  this  Hawke  had  to  be  content,  as  he  now  could 
well  be.  For  he  had  just  heard  that  Brodrick,  on  his 
way  back  to  Gibraltar,  had  located  the  remainder  of  La 
Clue's  squadron  in  Cadiz,  and  was  blockading  it  there. 
Hawke  therefore  had  nothing  more  to  fear  from  that 
quarter,  and  having  received  some  fresh  ships,  he  felt 
himself  able  to  deal  with  Bompart,  who  Avas  daily  expected. 
Accordingly  Admiral  Geary  was  detached  down  the  Bay 
with  seven  of  the  line,  with  orders  to  lie  off  Rochefort  so 
as  to  prevent  Bompart  getting  into  that  port,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  was  to  keep  close  touch  with  Duff  so  as  to 


44  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  m9 

support  him  in  case  of  need.^  This  bold  conception  was, 
however,  disapproved  by  the  Admiralty.  No  sooner  had 
Hawke  announced  what  he  had  done  than  Anson  informed 
him  that  their  lordships  considered  he  was  devoting  too 
much  force  to  Bompart  and  Rochefort.  He  was  reminded 
that  "the  particular  object  of  attention  at  this  time"  was 
"the  interception  of  the  embarkations  of  the  enemy  at 
Morbihan,  and  the  keeping  of  the  ships  of  war  from  coming 
out  of  Brest."  He  was  therefore  recommended,  with  some 
asperity,  to  station  his  ships  accordingly."  Hawke,  who 
believed  he  was  fully  strong  enough  to  deal  with  Bompart 
as  well  as  Conflans,  was  nevertheless  forced  to  comply,  and 
he  immediately  recalled  half  Geary's  squadron  to  his  own 
flag  and  sent  the  rest  to  reinforce  Duff.  It  is  difficult  to 
judge  between  Anson  and  Hawke.  Had  Hawke  been  at 
Whitehall,  saturated  with  the  highly  charged  political 
atmosphere,  he  would  probably  have  been  as  eager  as 
Anson  to  see  a  rigid  concentration  of  the  fleet  upon  the 
main  object.  Had  Anson,  been  in  Hawke's  place,  he 
would  probably  have  felt  the  same  breezy  mastery  of  the 
whole  situation.  It  is  a  case  where  it  is  almost  impos- 
sible to  decide  whether  the  man  at  headquarters  or  the 
man  on  the  spot  was  in  the  better  position  to  decide. 

At  Versailles  the  tension  was  no  less  high  than  at 
Whitehall.  When  the  news  of  La  Clue's  disaster  had  come, 
Belleisle  and  his  supporters  had  only  set  their  teeth  the 
harder  and  adopted  a  still  more  reckless  plan.  Conflans 
must  do  what  was  no  longer  in  La  Clue's  power.  He 
was  told  to  form  a  division  of  six  of  the  line  under  Bi^ot 


'  For  the  above  details  see  Hawke's  Correspondence  during  September, 
Jn-Utters,  92. 

'  Hawke  to  Cleveland,  Sept.  28,  with  minute  endorsed,  In-lctters,  92  ; 
Cleveland  to  Hawke,  Oct.  5,  Out-letters,  526.  Compare  a  similar  rebuke 
administered  to  Cornwallis  in  July  1803. — Blockade  of  Brest  (Navy  Record 
Society),  vol.  i.  pp.  82-3. 


1759   CONFLANS  GETS  FRESH  ORDERS    45 

de  Morogues  and  send  it  down  to  Morbihan  to  set  the 
Due  d'Aiguillon  free  and  escort  him  to  the  Clyde.  In 
vain  Contians  protested  against  the  viciousness  of  a 
scheme  which  divided  a  fleet  already  far  too  weak  for 
its  work.  In  vain  he  lamented  the  soldiers  were  per- 
mitted to  direct  what  was  purely  a  naval  operation.  In 
the  middle  of  September  the  final  orders  arrived.  We 
have  seen  what  came  of  them.  The  moment  Morogues 
showed  his  nose  outside  he  was  driven  in  again  by 
Hervey  and  the  inshore  squadron.  Conflans  continued 
his  protests.  Possibly  the  fiasco  of  Morogues's  attempted 
sortie  was  only  intended  to  demonstrate  their  justice. 
In  any  case  no  way  could  be  found  of  disputing  his 
arguments.  He  pointed  out  that  the  only  possible 
chance  of  success  was  to  keep  the  fleet  united.  Let  him 
retain  Morogues  under  his  flag,  and  he  himself  with  the 
whole  fleet  would  go  down  and  set  the  transports  free. 
Choiseul  and  Belleisle  were  forced  to  adopt  his  view,  and 
in  the  middle  of  October  he  was  authorised  to  put  it 
in  operation.  "  I  leave  it,"  wrote  the  KLing,  "  to  your 
experience  and  courage  to  profit  by  any  circumstance 
you  may  think  favourable  to  go  out  and  attack  the 
squadrons  and  vessels  blockading  at  Ushant  and  at 
Belleisle.  Then,  whether  you  decide  to  return  to  Brest 
for  a  fresh  sortie  or  whether  you  keep  the  sea,  I  give  you 
full  authority  to  go  yourself  and  escort  the  Morbihan 
flotilla  so  soon  as  it  is  ready  to  sail.  I  only  bind  you 
never  to  forget  that  the  main  point  of  all  our  present 
operations  must  be  the  greatest  safety  of  the  Morbihan 
flotilla."  Finally  he  was  told  that  if  he  decided  to  return 
to  Brest  he  was  to  detach  six  of  the  lino  and  some 
cruisers  to  convoy  D'Aiguillon  to  his  destination.^ 
These    orders    left    Conflans    no    further   ground    for 

*  Lacour-Gayet,  Mariiu  sous  Louis  XV.,  ch.  xx. 


46  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

protest.  His  own  plan  of  operation  had  been  adopted, 
and  there  was  nothing  left  but  for  him  to  go  out  and 
execute  it.  The  moment,  too,  seemed  favourable.  It 
was  on  October  14th  that  Louis  signed  the  new  orders, 
and  that  very  day,  to  every  one's  consternation,  Hawke 
reappeared  at  Plymouth.  A  gale  from  the  west-south- 
west had  forced  him  to  run  for  shelter  and  to  leave  Duff 
clinging  alone  to  the  transports  at  Morbihan.  It  Avas  an 
unhappy  hour.  For  that  same  day  there  reached  London 
Wolfe's  desponding  despatch  in  which  he  announced  to 
Pitt  the  breakdown  of  his  health,  the  failure  of  his  plans, 
and  the  small  hope  he  had  of  eventual  success.  The 
despatch  plunged  every  one  into  a  serious  fit  of  depression. 
As  Horace  Walpole  says :  "  In  the  most  artful  terms 
that  could  be  framed  he  left  the  nation  uncertain  whether 
he  meant  to  prepare  an  excuse  for  desisting  or  to  claim 
the  melancholy  merit  of  having  sacrificed  himself  with- 
out a  prospect  of  success."  ^ 

Newcastle  believed  the  game  in  Canada  was  lost.  He 
told  Hardwicke  that  Pitt  was  of  the  same  opinion,  and 
said  so  openly.  Anson  still  maintained  stoutly  that 
Quebec  would  fall.  But  then  he  had  not  seen  Wolfe's 
despatch.  "  If  he  had,"  wrote  Newcastle,  "  he  could  not 
be  of  that  opinion."  The  old  First  Lord  was  equally  un- 
moved at  Hawke's  being  driven  off.^  Nor  would  Hawke 
himself  hear  a  word  of  the  croaking.  He  assured  my 
lords  that  Conflans  could  not  stir  in  such  weather.  His 
enforced  absence  was  therefore  rather  a  stroke  of  luck,  for 
he  could  fill  up  with  water  for  three  months.  There  was 
no  foundation,  he  protested,  for  the  present  alarms.  Duff 
would  be  able  to  ride  out  the  gale  where  he  was  and 
prevent    the   transports    moving;    and    so    long    as   the 

*  Memoirs  of  George  II.,  vol.  iii.  p.  218. 

"^  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Oct.  15,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,896. 


1759  A    DRAMATIC    MOMENT  47 

weather  kept  his  own  fleet  from  resuming  its  station,  it 
must  also  prevent  Conflans  from  moving  his.  So  con- 
fident indeed  was  he  in  his  ability  to  deal  with  the 
situation  that,  so  far  from  agreeing  with  the  alarmists, 
he  did  not  scruple  to  express  his  chagrin  at  having  being 
ordered  to  call  off  Geary,  and  begged,  as  there  were  now 
plenty  of  ships  at  home,  that  he  might  be  reinforced 
sufficiently  to  extend  his  blockade  to  Rochefort.  As  for 
himself,  he  did  not  mean  to  set  foot  out  of  the  Ramillies, 
his  flagship,  and  expected  to  be  at  sea  again  in  a 
few  days. 

Still,  there  were  other  causes  of  anxiety  at  sea  which 
the  landsmen  could  not  shake  off'.  Rodney  had  found  it 
impossible  to  make  any  further  impression  on  the  flat- 
boats  at  Havre.  So  active  was  the  French  defence  that 
the  bomb-vessels  could  no  longer  get  near  them,  and  it 
was  only  with  the  greatest  danger  and  difficulty  he  could 
even  maintain  the  blockade.  Then  in  the  depth  of  the 
depression  came  the  news  that  the  blockade  of  Dunkirk 
had  been  broken.  Boys  had  been  driven  off  in  a  violent 
storm.  No  one  knew  what  had  become  of  him,  and 
Thurot  had  seized  the  opportunity  to  make  his  escape 
with  his  whole  squadron. 

This  last  stroke,  however,  had  hardly  been  realised 
when  the  whole  scene  was  changed.  The  widespread 
depression  disappeared  as  by  magic,  and  the  sturdy  con- 
fidence of  Anson  and  Hawke  was  echoed  in  a  shout  of 
triumph  from  end  to  end  of  the  country.  Three  days 
after  Wolfe's  melancholy  letter  had  been  received,  and 
the  very  night  of  the  news  of  Thurot's  escape,  Pitt,  just 
before  midnight,  was  breaking  open  Townshend's  despatch, 
which  announced  that  Quebec  had  fallen.  No  such  re- 
action had  ever  been  seen.  "  The  incidents  of  dramatic 
fiction,"   says  Walpole,  "  could  not  be    conducted    with 


48  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

more  address  to  lead  an  audience  from  despondency  to 
sudden  exultation,  than  accident  prepared  to  excite  the 
passions  of  a  whole  people.  They  despaired  —  they 
triumphed — and  they  wept — for  Wolfe  had  fallen  in  the 
hour  of  victory  !  Joy,  grief,  curiosity,  astonishment,  were 
painted  in  every  countenance ;  the  more  they  inquired, 
the  higher  their  admiration  rose." 

In  the  enthusiasm  of  the  moment  the  alarms  of  in- 
vasion  were  forgotten.      Indeed  all    immediate    danger 
quickly  ceased.      In  a  few  days  it  was  known  that  Boys 
and  his  squadron  were  safe  and  in  hot  chase  of  Thurot. 
A  squadron  had  been  sent  to  head  him  off  from  Emden, 
which  was  believed  to  be  his  most  likely  objective.     That 
important  post  was  safe   at   any  rate,  and  Thurot  was 
known  to  be  speeding  north  for  Sweden.^     Rodney  about 
the  same  time  sent  in  word  that  the  flat-boats  at  Havre 
seemed  to  be  on  the  point  of  starting ;  but  no  one  cared. 
For — best  news  of  all — on  the  20  th  Hawke  had  been  able 
to  resume  his  station  off  Ushant,  and  the  French  enterprise 
looked   more   desperate   than   ever.       Conflans   had  not 
stirred.     He  was  still  bombarding  the  Ministers  with  re- 
quisitions.   Crews,  stores,  ships,  everything  was  defective, 
and  he  practically  refused  to  take  his  fleet  to  sea  in  the 
condition  it  was,  without  victuals  or  seamen.     The  truth 
was  that  trained  sailors  were  no  longer  to  be  had,  and  a 
convoy  of  storeships   on   which   Conflans   depended   for 
victuals   had  been   driven  into  Quimperle    by    Hawke's 
cruisers.     Its  escape  was  out  of  the  question.     The  stores 
had  to  be  landed  where  they  were,  a  hundred  miles  from 
the  fleet,  and  laboriously  carried  by  the  almost  impassable 
Breton  roads  to  Brest.'^ 

Under  the  circumstances  Hawke  continued  to  press  his 

1  Newcastle  to  Hardwickc,  Oct.  20. 

*  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  Oct.  10,  fn-letters,  02. 


1759      CONFLANS'S    ORDERS    INTERCEPTED      49 

idea  of  extending  the  blockade  to  Rochefort,  so  as  to  in- 
tercept Bompart.  Anson  approved,  but  at  the  same  time 
he  sent  out  a  very  serious  piece  of  intelligence  which 
must  have  rejoiced  Hawke's  heart.  On  October  11th 
Choiseul,  still  bent  on  inducing  the  Swedes  to  co-operate 
Avith  D'Aiguillon's  attack  on  Scotland,  had  sent  to  the 
French  ambassador  in  Stockholm  details  of  the  final 
arrangements,  and  particularly  the  heroic  resolution  that, 
desperate  as  it  was,  "  the  essential  enterprise "'  was  to 
proceed  in  the  teeth  of  the  British  fleet,  and  that  Conflans 
had  positive  orders  to  go  out  and  fight  Hawke,  in  order 
to  cover  the  sailing  of  D'Aiguillon's  transports.  This 
letter  was  intercepted,  and  its  material  contents  im- 
mediately sent  on  to  Hawke.  He  was  therefore  warned 
that  the  Admiralty  was  sending  him  every  ship  it  could 
lay  hands  on,  but  that,  until  he  had  enough  to  make  sure 
of  Conflans,  he  was  to  send  no  detachment  to  Rochefort.^ 
Still,  October  passed  into  November  and  neither  Con- 
flans nor  the  transports  moved.  Hawke  clung  to  his 
station,  battling  with  incessant  heavy  weather.  The 
strain  was  terrible.  Hervey  completely  broke  down : 
ships  were  continually  reporting  dangerous  leaks,  and 
Hawke  began  to  grow  anxious.  He  warned  the  Admiralty 
he  might  at  any  time  have  to  let  go,  and  if  so  it  would  now 
be  a  case  of  running  for  Torbay,  as  Plymouth  Sound  was 
no  place  for  three-decked  ships  in  winter.  Two  days 
after  he  had  penned  the  warning  the  expected  gale  was 
upon  him,  and  on  November  10th  he  reported  himself  in 
Torbay.  He  had  received  at  last  the  Admiralty's  full 
approval  of  his  design  to  intercept  Bompart,  but  the 
arrangements  he  had  been  on  the  point  of  making  had 
now  to  be  abandoned.     Nevertheless  he  had  still  little 

*  Choiseul  to  Havrincour,  Oct.  11,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,896;  Hawke  to 
Admiralty,  Oct.  24,  with  answer  endorsed,  Oct.  29,  In-letters,  92. 
VOL.  II.  D 


50  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

anxiety  except  for  the  two  ships  of  the  line  that  were 
supporting  Duff's  cruiser  squadron  at  Quiberon.  He  ad- 
vised that  they  should  be  immediately  called  off.  "  If," 
he  wrote,  "  Avhich  is  very  probable,  the  enemy  should 
escape  me  and  make  their  push  there  with  their  whole 
squadron,  these  two  ships  will  be  of  little  avail,  and  with- 
out them  the  five  '  fifties '  and  nine  frigates  would  be  a 
much  more  manageable  squadron,  and  therefore  better 
able  to  preserve  itself  till  my  arrival."  In  view  of  what 
afterwards  occurred,  the  letter  is  interesting  as  showing 
how  clearly  he  shared  with  Anson  the  view  of  what  was 
the  main  objective,  and  what  the  point  on  which  his  eyes 
must  be  fixed.  For  the  present  he  had  no  fear.  "  It  blows," 
he  said, "  a  mere  frett  of  wind  from  the  north-west.  Bom- 
part  may  get  in,  but  nothing  can  come  out."^  He  had  taken 
every  precaution  for  locating  Conflans  the  moment  the 
weather  changed;  and  he  knew  exactly  what  to  expect.  Be- 
fore he  was  driven  off  Duff  had  procured  for  him,  through  a 
Portuguese  skipper,  information  of  the  exact  position  of 
the  Morbihan  transports  and  D'Aiguillon's  troops,  and  that 
they  were  not  to  sail  till  the  Brest  squadron  came  round 
to  raise  the  blockade.^  Accordingly  Duff  had  received 
standing  orders,  in  case  Hawke  were  driven  off'  by  a  gale,  to 
cruise  with  his  own  "fifty"  and  two  frigates  before  Brest,  so 
soon  as  the  weather  would  permit.  If  anything  came  out 
that  he  could  not  deal  with,  he  was  to  send  a  frigate  into 
Torbay  and  himself  to  shadow  the  enemy  till  he  was  certain 
of  their  objective,  and  then  to  report  to  the  Admiral ty.'"' 

On  November  12th  the  weather  moderated  a  little,  and 
Hawke  at  once  put  to  sea.     But  it  was  only  to  be  driven 

^  "  More  "  is  here  used  in  the  old  sense  of  "  unmitigated  "  ;  "  Frett  "  = 
squally  storm. 

«  Duff's  report  to  Hawke,  Oct.  18,  In-letters,  92. 

3  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  Nov.  10,  enclosing  Duff's  orders  of  the  3rd 
In-letters,  92. 


1759  THE    CRISIS    COMES  51 

back  to  Torbay  again  next  day,  with  the  Ramillies  in  such 
a  condition  that  he  had  to  condemn  her  for  winter  work 
and  shift  his  flag  to  the  Royal  George.     On  the  morrow, 
the  14th,  he  was  out  again  laboriously  trying  to  resume 
his  station.     On  the  16th,  as  he  was  then  still  short  of 
Ushant,  he  grew  seriously  anxious  about  Duff,  and  decided 
to  send  him  orders  to  leave  only  four  frigates  with  the 
fireships  and  bomb- vessels  in  Quiberon  Bay :  to  station 
three  frigates  off  L'Orient,  and  himself  with  the  rest  of 
the  squadron  to  cruise  off  Belleisle  in  such  a  position  as 
best  to  cover  the  Quiberon  detachment,  and  at  the  same 
time  have  sea-room  to  escape  being  surprised  by  Conflans. 
The  fate  of  these  orders  is  well  worth  recording.     They 
were  entrusted  to  a  favourite  young  officer  of  Hawke's 
called  Stuart,  who  had  been  his  second  lieutenant  in  the 
Ramillies,  and  who,  when  she  was  condemned  for  the  winter, 
had  been  given  the  command  of  the  Fortune  sloop.     On 
his  way  to  Quiberon  he  fell  in  with  the  H4h^,  a  French 
forty-gun  frigate  belonging  to  Conflans's  squadron.      She 
was  under  jury-masts,  and,  eager  to  flesh  his  new  com- 
mission, he  immediately  attacked  her.     The  recklessness 
and  obstinacy  with  which  for  several  hours  he  clung  to  a 
ship  of  three  times  his  force  compels  a  certain  admira- 
tion, but  nothing  could  be  more  unsailorlike,  and  scarcely 
anything  deserves  more  serious  reprobation.     In  the  end 
he   was   killed,  his    ship   reduced    to   a  wreck,   and   his 
message — on  the  prompt  delivery  of  which  hung,  for  all 
he  knew,  the  fate  of  the  whole  of  Duffs  squadron — never 
reached   its    destination.       As  it   happened,    it   did   not 
matter.     An  hour  or  two  after  the  orders  were  despatched 
Hawke  knew  they  must  bo  too  late.     The  crisis  had  come.^ 

*  For  the  Fortune  episode  see  Hawke's  Despatch,  Nov.  24,  In-letters,  'J2, 
and  Lacour-Gayet,  p.  338.  The  Hibe  had  been  dismasted  in  a  collision  on 
the  18th. 


52  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

What  he  had  anticipated  had  happened.  On  Novem- 
ber 5th,  as  he  was  battling  with  the  weather,  Marni^re, 
returning  from  an  unsuccessful  cruise,  had  slipped  in  with 
a  ship  of  the  line  and  a  frigate,  and  two  days  later  as 
Hawke,  in  a  westerly  gale,  was  vainly  trying  to  double 
Ushant  in  order  to  run  into  the  Channel,  Bompart  had 
arrived  with  seven  of  the  line  and  another  frigate.  None 
of  these  vessels,  it  would  seem,  were  fit  to  take  the  sea 
asfain,  but  some  of  their  crews  were.  Conflans  was  thus 
able  to  complete  his  companies  with  good  seasoned  men, 
and,  having  no  further  ground  for  delay,  on  November 
14th  he  put  to  sea  with  twenty-one  of  the  line  and  five 
cruisers. 

Duff,  not  having  received  any  fresh  orders,  was  still 
clinging  tight  to  his  station  in  Quiberon  Bay,  The 
L'Orient  division  was  also  there,  having  run  in  presum- 
ably for  shelter  during  the  gale,  though  they  sailed  to  re- 
sume their  station  the  day  Conflans  came  out.^  His  exit, 
however,  had  been  seen  by  Captain  Ourry  of  the  Adceon, 
who  all  through  the  gale  had  clung  to  his  post  off  Brest." 
He  immediately  sent  word  to  Hawke's  rendezvous,  but  the 
message  missed  him,  and  for  a  good  reason.  Before  the 
rendezvous  was  reached  he  had  received  later  and  better 
information.  Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  some 
forty-five  miles  west-north-west  of  Ushant,  he  fell  in  with 
four  victuallers  returning  empty  from  Quiberon.  One  of 
them,  the  Love  and  Unity,  informed  him  that  the  previous 
afternoon  at  two  o'clock  they  had  sighted  the  French  fleet 
about  seventy  miles  to  the  westward  of  Belleisle,  working 
to  the  eastward.  By  the  skipper's  report,  it  consisted  of 
eighteen  of  the  line,   besides  three  frigates,   which  were 

*  Duff  to  Hawke,  Oct.  18,  Jn-httfrs,  92;  and  Log  of  tlio  Rochester  (DxxS's 
flagship),  Nov.  14. — Captains'  Logs,  p.  792. 

•  Captain  Ourry's  Intelligence,  Oct.  14,  In-lctters,  92. 


1759  HAWKE'S    CRUISER    WORK  53 

chasing  the  Juno  towards  Quiberon.^  The  Jano  was 
one  of  the  L'Orient  blockading  squadron  who  had  left 
Quiberon  after  the  rest.^  On  her  way  to  her  station  she 
had  fallen  in  with  the  Sivallow  sloop,  who  reported  that  she 
had  just  seen  the  French  fleet.  Both  vessels  attempted 
to  get  back  to  warn  Duft';  but,  whether  from  being  chased 
or  from  the  change  in  the  weather,  they  both  failed, 
and  the  Juno,  getting  clear  of  the  chasing  ships,  hurried 
north  to  Hawke's  rendezvous.^  But  she  also  missed  him, 
for  Hawke  had  already  acted  on  the  information  he  had 
chanced  to  get  from  the  Love  and  Unity.  Leaving  word 
for  Geary,  whom  he  had  sent  into  Plymouth  to  land  the 
sick  and  bring  out  what  ships  were  there,  to  take  his 
station  oft'  Brest,  he  had  then  and  there  made  for  Quiberon 
as  hard  as  he  could  go,  with  the  twenty-three  of  the  line 
he  had  with  him.  Writing  to  the  Admiralty  next 
morning,  the  I7th,  he  says,  "I  have  carried  a  press  of 
sail  all  night,  with  a  hard  gale  at  south-south-east,  in 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  make  no  doubt  of  coming  up 
with  them  at  sea  or  in  Quiberon  Bay." 

Much  has  been  written  of  Hawke's  profound  strategic 
insight  in  taking  this  decision ;  but  in  truth  insight  had 
little  to  do  with  it.  It  was  something  better.  The 
correctness  of  his  move  was  not  due  to  inspiration,  but  to 
sober  preparation  beforehand,  combined  with  the  excellent 
work  of  the  intelligence  department  at  home.  Acting  on 
this  basis  Hawke  was  able,  by  well  thought-out  cruiser 
work,  to  ensure  that  if  Conftans  put  to  sea  he  would 
immediately  know  for  certain  on  which  of  his  possible 
objectives  he  was  bent.     It  is  true  a  lucky  chance  had 

^  Log  of  the  Royal  Oeorge,  Captains'  Logs,  811  ;  Admiral  Geary  to  the 
Admiralty,  Nov.  17,  In-letters,  93. 

-  Log  of  the  Rochester. 

'  Admiralty  Advices,  Nov.  19,  Newcastle  Papers,  32.898  ;  Hawke  to 
Admiralty,  Nov.  17,  Jn-letters,  93. 


54  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

enabled  him  to  anticipate  by  some  hours  his  cruisers' 
information.  But  apart  from  this,  as  to  what  Conflans's 
objective  would  bo,  and  what  in  any  case  was  the  main 
danger  to  go  for,  there  was  no  room  for  doubt  at  all,  and 
had  been  none  for  at  least  two  months.  It  was  just  no 
more  and  no  less  than  a  piece  of  just  appreciation  and 
admirable  organisation,  and  it  requires  no  false  colour  of 
inspiration  to  make  it  glow  in  naval  memory. 

The  Juno  not  finding  Hawke  at  his  rendezvous,  and 
having  heard  apparently  what  he  had  done,  held  on  to 
carry  the  news  home.  Thus,  so  far  from  causing  any 
panic,  it  seems  to  have  been  received  with  elation.  There 
had  been  some  alarm  for  Ireland.  Pitt  had  recently  told 
the  Duke  of  Bedford,  the  Lord-Lieutenant,  plainly  that  at 
this  season  of  the  year  it  was  impossible  to  maintain  a 
strict  blockade,  and  that  the  enemy  might  at  any  time 
elude  Hawke  and  appear  on  the  Irish  coast.  Ireland 
must  therefore  make  ready  to  defend  herself  till  assistance 
could  reach  her.  The  announcement  was  received  with 
enthusiasm  in  the  Irish  Parliament,  but  there  the  matter 
ended  and  very  little  was  done.^  In  England  every  one 
was  now  certain  Conflans  must  be  caught,  and  Newcastle 
wrote  in  high  spirits  to  reassure  Bedford.  It  was  thought, 
he  said,  impossible  for  Conflans  to  escape,  and  as  to  fight- 
ing, Anson  treated  it  as  the  idlest  notion.  Moreover, 
they  were  in  a  very  strong  position  at  home.  The  day 
after  Hawke  had  been  driven  into  Torbay,  both  Holmes 
and  Durell  had  reached  Spithead  with  the  bulk  of  the 
Quebec  Heot,  and  they  reported  that  Saunders  with  the 
rest  was  close  behind  them.^  Newcastle  therefore  con- 
tinued to  write  in  the  same  triumphant  strain.     He  told 

1  Newcastle  Papers,  Nov.  1,  32,898. 

2  Holmes  to  Admiralty,  and  Durell  to  same,  Nov.    11,  In-lcttcrs,  481. 
They  made  the  passage  from  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  in  sixteen  days. 


1759  SAUNDERS   JOINS    THE    HUNT  55 

Yorke,  at  The  Hague,  that  they  were  looking  forward  to  a 
battle  which  would  give  the  coup  de  grace  to  the  French 
marine  and  decide  the  whole  war,  nor  wore  they  in  the 
least  uneasy  about  it. 

But  this  was  not  all.  For  now  came  news  which  raised 
the  prevailing  elation  to  real  enthusiasm.  "We  are  in  the 
highest  spirits  from  expectation,"  Newcastle  wrote  to 
Yorke,  "  Sir  Edward  Hawke  is  now  joined  by  Geary  and 
the  brave  and  judicious  Admiral  Saunders  in  pursuing 
Monsieur  Oonflans."  It  was  true.  On  the  19  th  Geary 
had  got  to  sea  with  three  of  the  line  before  Hawke's 
order  reached  him,  and  instead  of  proceeding  off  Brest, 
he  too  had  held  away  for  Quiberon.^  On  the  same 
day  Saunders,  with  Townshend  in  his  flagship,  and 
accompanied  by  two  other  ships  of  the  line,  had  reached 
within  about  fifty  miles  of  the  Lizard,  and  there,  within 
a  few  hours  of  the  repose  and  honours  which  he  and  his 
men  had  so  richly  earned,  he  fell  in  with  Captain  Phillips 
of  the  Juno,  whom  Geary  had  sent  out  again  to  try  to 
find  Hawke.  On  hearing  his  news,  Saunders,  without  a 
moment's  hesitation,  had  made  up  his  mind,  and  in  a 
stirring  little  note  which  he  sent  off  to  Pitt,  he  laconically 
informed  him  of  his  meeting  with  Phillips  and  his  news. 
"  I  have  therefore,"  he  wrote,  "  only  time  to  acquaint  you 
that  I  am  making  the  best  of  my  way  in  quest  of  Sir 
Edward  Hawke,  which  I  hope  his  Majesty  will  approve 
of."  2  So  soon  us  his  resolution  was  known,  a  shout  of 
applause  went  up  from  every  side.  Even  Hardwicke  was 
moved.     "  The  part,"  he  wrote,  "  which  Admiral  Saunders 

^  For  Geary's  movements  and  orders  see  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  Nov.  16  ; 
Geary  to  same,  Nov.  17,  18,  and  26,  In-letters,  93. 

2  Saunders  to  Pitt,  Nov.  19,  "  Lizard  N.W.  by  W.  17  leagues,"  and 
Nov.  24,  "  Off  Isle  Groas,"  S.P.  Colonial  (A.  and  W.  /.),  88  ;  Chatham  MSS. 
79.  He  had  with  him  Somerset  (fiag),  Devonshire,  and  Vanguard.  —  7'ownj- 
hend's  Life,  p.  251. 


56  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

has  taken  voluntarily  is,  I  think,  the  greatest  I  ever 
heard  of." ' 

So  across  the  stormy  waters  of  the  Bay  the  squadrons 
were  gathering  for  the  linal  act  of  that  immortal  year. 
And  as  day  by  day  went  by  and  no  word  came  from 
Hawke  a  reaction  set  in  at  home,  and  the  first  feelings 
of  elation  began  to  give  way  to  nervous  anxiety.  Yet 
Hawke  was  playing  his  part  with  a  directness  that  left 
nothing  to  be  desired.  Conflans's  conduct  is  less  easy  to 
explain.  Ten  days  before  putting  to  sea  he  had  told 
Berryer,  the  Minister  of  Marine,  that  his  intention  was 
to  avoid  action  so  as  not  to  bring  the  Morbihan  project 
to  nothing.  If,  however,  an  action  were  forced  upon 
him  he  would  fight  with  all  the  glory  possible.  What 
was  really  in  his  mind  is  hard  to  say.  On  the  balance 
of  evidence,  the  French  incline  to  the  belief  that  he 
meant  to  avoid  action  at  all  costs,  but  the  case  is  far 
from  clear.^ 

On  the  eve  of  coming  out  he  wrote  to  D'Aiguillon 
that  his  main  object  was  to  join  hands  with  him,  and 
then  to  escort  his  transports  out  with  all  the  security 
that  was  possible.^  On  the  other  hand,  there  exists  a 
remarkable  memorandum  or  general  order  which  he  issued 
on  coming  oiit,  from  which  it  would  appear  the  recent 
gale  had  made  him  more  hopeful.  At  any  rate  it  is  clear 
that  in  this  order  he  intended  to  persuade  the  fleet  he 
was  eager  for  battle,  and  thought  his  chances  good.  The 
document  shows  considerable  tactical  ability.  He  hoped, 
he  said,  to  find  the  British  fleet  broken  up  into  detach- 

1  Newcastle  Papers,  32,899,  Nov.  21-23. 

2  His  latest  French  critic  is  of  this  opinion.  Sec  Lacour-Gayet,  Marine 
sous  Louis  XV.,  p.  329.  Conflans's  letter,  given  in  Beatson,  vol,  iii.  p.  247, 
is  apocryphal,  a  burlesque  written  by  an  officer  of  Keppel's  ship,  the 
Torbay.     See  Burrow's  Life  of  Hawke,  p,  412. 

»  Waddington,  vol.  iii.  p.  3G8. 


1759    CONFLANS'S  FIGHTING  INSTRUCTIONS     57 

ments,  and  to  be  able  to  crush  tbem  in  detail.  If, 
however,  he  found  it  all  together,  he  meant  to  attack  from 
to-windward  as  close  as  possible.  If  the  British  had  the 
wind  and  would  not  come  to  close  action,  he  meant  to 
keep  away  and  then  suddenly  haul  to  the  wind,  which 
would  certainly  bring  the  fleets  together.  He  impressed 
the  tactical  importance  of  concentration,  and  of  trying  to 
reduce  the  eneni}^  unit  by  unit  in  the  most  modern  style. 
He  was  absolutely  determined,  he  said,  to  fight  at  musket- 
shot  or  closer.  For  this  purpose  he  formulated  a  method 
of  oblique  approach  identical  with  that  which  Byng  had 
attempted  at  Minorca,  in  order  to  keep  the  broadsides 
bearing  as  the  fleet  ran  down  to  attack,  and  to  avoid 
being  raked.  Disabled  ships  of  the  enemy  were  to  be  left 
for  the  frigates  to  secure.  Finally  he  noted  that  board- 
ing in  line  was  an  almost  impossible  manoeuvre,  but  that  if 
he  saw  it  was  desirable  he  would  make  the  signal,  and  all 
were  to  board  their  opposite  number  simultaneously.^ 

It  is  of  course  possible  that  this  spirited  order  did 
not  represent  his  real  mind,  but  was  rather  intended  to 
enhearten  his  desponding  fleet.  Moreover,  whatever  his 
real  intention,  he  has  always  been  accused  of  executing 
his  movement  on  Morbihan  with  unpardonable  slowness 
and  hesitation.  Here  again  it  is  doubtful  whether  the 
accusation  is  just.  Owing  to  various  accidents,  it  was 
not  till  the  15th  that  he  got  the  whole  fleet  to  sea. 
By  midday  on  the  16th  he  was  already  half-way  to  his 
destination,  that  is,  about  seventy  miles  west  of  Ijelleisle. 
In  the  afternoon,  however,  the  wind  veered  east-by- 
south,  and  then  it  was  Conflans  was  seen  by  the  British 
victuallers  from  Quiberon,  trying  to  work  against  it  to 
the  eastward.  But  his  eflbrts  were  in  vain.  The  wind 
rapidly  increased  to  a  gale  with  heavy  seas,  and  he  was 

^  Troude,  Bataill-es  Navales  de  France,  vol.  i.  p.  382. 


58  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

forced  to  bear  up  and  run ;  nor  could  he  stop  before  he 
was  a  hundred  and  twenty  miles  west  of  Belleisle.^  It 
was  not  till  early  on  the  morning  of  the  18ih  that  he 
was  able  to  begin  reaching  back,  and  even  then  he  could 
not  hold  a  true  course.  The  wind  had  settled  in  the 
north-north-east,  so  that  to  make  his  easting  he  had  to 
stand  far  to  the  southward,  and  when  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  19th  the  breeze  died  away  he  found  himself 
becalmed  seventy  miles  south-west  of  Belleisle,  and  no 
nearer  to  his  destination  than  he  was  when  the  Juno 
sighted  him  on  the  15  th.  It  was  not  till  nearly  mid- 
night that  the  wind  came  again.  It  was  now  fair  from 
the  westward,  and  he  was  able  to  signal  to  fill  and  hold 
away  for  Morbihan.^ 

It  was  really  not  a  bad  performance.  Hawke,  with  all 
his  skill  as  a  seaman  and  his  highly  trained  and  homo- 
geneous fleet,  had  been  able  to  do  little  better,  but  being 
well  to  northward  of  his  destination  the  northerly  winds 
had  lost  him  nothing,  and  he  had  been  able  to  gain  a 
day  on  his  adversary.  The  easterly  gale  had  struck  him 
soon  after  he  received  the  victuallers'  report,  but,  being 
nearer  inshore  than  Conflans,  he  was  better  able  to  hold 
up  to  it,  and  by  noon  on  the  18  th  he  had  gained  to  the 
eastward,  and  was  reaching  on  the  north-north-east  wind 
parallel  to  Conflans,  and  on  what  was  for  him  his  true 
course.  Thus  when  the  fair  wind  failed  he  too  found 
himself  only  seventy  miles  from  Belleisle,  and  at  noon 
was  lying-to  west-by-north  of  it  under  double-reefed 
topsails  in  heavy  squalls  from  south-by-east.^     By  seven 

1  Conflans  to  D'Aiguillon,  Nov.  21,  Troude,  vol.  i.  p.  401. 

2  Couflans's  Official  Despatch,  ibid.,  p.  386. 

'  Hawke's  noon  positions  were :  16th,  Start  N.E.  by  N.  30  leagues  ;  17th, 
Ushant  E.  by  N.  18  leagues  ;  18th,  Penraarks  E.  by  S.  30  leagues  ;  19th, 
Belleisle  E.  by  S.  23  leagues  ;  20th,  Belleisle  E.  by  N.  JN.  5  leagues.— 
Captains^  Logs,  811. 


I7S9  HAWKE    GETS    CONTACT  59 

in  the  evening,  however,  he  felt  the  westerly  breeze,  four 
to  five  hours,  that  is,  before  it  reached  Conflans.  With 
the  first  breath  of  it  Hawke  signalled  to  send  up  top- 
gallant masts,  shake  out  reefs,  and  fill,  and  so  under  a 
press  of  sail  he  bore  away  direct  for  Morbihan.  At  the 
same  time  Howe  in  the  Magnanime  was  ordered  ahead  to 
make  the  land,  and  with  him  were  two  frigates  that  had 
recently  joined.  All  that  night  Hawke  held  on  as  he 
was.  He  seems  to  have  read  clearly  in  the  face  of  the 
skies  what  must  have  happened  to  his  enemy,  and  was 
in  hourly  expectation  of  getting  contact.  At  daybreak 
on  the  20th  he  had  reached  a  point  some  forty  miles 
west  of  north  of  Belleisle,  when  sure  enough  at  half- 
past  eight  one  of  the  ships  ahead  made  the  signal  for 
a  fleet.  So  Hawke's  conviction  that  he  would  come 
up  with  Conflans  at  sea  or  in  Quiberon  Bay  proved 
correct. 

Early  in  the  night,  as  the  fair  wind  had  rapidly 
increased  in  strength,  Conflans  had  ordered  the  fleet  to 
proceed  under  easy  sail,  so  as  not  to  make  the  land 
before  daylight,  and  shortly  before  dawn  he  hove-to.  In 
this  position,  a  little  more  than  twenty  miles  west  of 
Belleisle,  he  sighted  at  daybreak  seven  of  Duffs  squadron. 
It  was  but  the  evening  before  that  Duff  had  received  any 
warning,  and  then  it  was  by  the  Vengeance,  another  of  the 
frigates  belonging  to  the  L'Orient  division.  He  was  then 
still  in  Quiberon  Bay  watching  the  transports  dropping 
down  the  Vannes  River,  and  joining  the  frigates  in  Auray 
in  anticipation  of  Conflans's  arrival.  It  was  blowing  hard 
from  the  west-north-west,  but  during  the  night  Duff 
managed  to  get  the  whole  of  his  squadron  to  sea.  So 
soon  as  they  were  sighted  Conflans  signalled  for  the  fleet 
to  close  and  clear  for  action.  But  as  the  light  grew  he 
saw  he  had  only  Duff  before  him,  and  signalled  to  fill 


6o  FRENCH   COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

and  give  chase.^  Duff  divided  his  squadron  and  stood 
inshore,  half  to  the  north  and  half  to  the  south.  The 
French  van  stood  after  one,  the  centre  after  the  other, 
while  the  rearguard  held  the  wind  to  watch  some  strange 
sails  which  were  appearing  to  seaward.  The  French  fleet 
was  thus  getting  badly  scattered  when,  just  as  the  chase 
Avas  growing  too  hot  to  last,  Duff  saw  the  enemy  haul 
off.  Ignorant  of  the  reason,  he  seized  the  opportunity 
to  send  a  cutter  away  to  Hawke's  rendezvous,  which 
reached  Plymouth  five  days  later  without  ever  having 
seen  his  fleet — to  the  great  increase  of  the  anxiety  at 
home." 

The  fact  was  that  just  at  this  moment  Conflans  had 
found  that  the  strange  sails  to  seaward  were  the  British 
fleet.  Directly  Hawke's  look-out  frigate  had  reported 
Conflans's  presence  he  made  the  signal  for  line  abreast, 
"  in  order,"  as  he  says,  "  to  draw  all  the  ships  of  the 
squadron  up  with  me,"  for,  being  in  cruising  order,  that  is, 
in  no  particular  formation — the  roulc  libre  of  the  French — 
the  admiral  would  be  leading  the  body  of  the  fleet.  As 
this  movement  began  to  bring  the  whole  fleet  into 
sight,  the  astonishment  of  Conflans  was  profound.  So 
soon  as  he  realised  the  truth,  he  signalled  to  cease  chasing 
and  to  close  on  the  flag.  His  position  was  very  difficult. 
In  face  of  a  superior  fleet  bearing  down  on  him,  he  had 
to  take  a  prompt  decision  whether  to  give  battle  where 
he  was  or  to  continue  his  movement  into  Quiberon  Bay. 
He  decided  on  the  latter,  and  making  the  signal  for  order 

^  Conflans's  signals  were  :  1.  Ralliement  (Close  on  the  admiral) ;  2.  Faire 
le  braulebas  (Clear  for  action)  ;  3.  Attention  aux  signaux  de  combat 
(Preparatory  for  battle  signals)  ;  4.  Prepare  for  action  ;  5.  General  chase. 

2  Commodore  Hanway  to  Cleveland,  Nov.  18  and  25,  Netocastlc  Papers, 
32,898-9.  The  fact  that  the  Vengeance  did  not  reach  Quiberon  till  the 
night  of  the  19th  shows  that  Conflans  must  have  done  very  well  to  get  his 
fleet  there  by  the  morning  of  the  20th,  and  acquits  him  of  the  slowness 
with  which  he  is  usually  charged  by  his  countrymen. 


1759  CONFLANS'S   TACTICS  6i 

of  sailing  in  single  line  ahead,  he  wore  and  led  the  way 
for  the  entrance.^ 

His  idea,  so  he  reported,  was  that  he  would  be  able 
to  haul  to  the  wind  as  he  entered  and  form  line  of  battle 
on  the  weather  side  of  the  Bay.  In  view  of  his  inferiority 
and  what  his  object  was,  he  believed  it  was  the  best  thing 
thus  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  and  defy  Hawke  to 
touch  him  in  the  labyrinth  of  shoals  and  reefs  that  would 
surround  him  if  he  tried.  Seeing  how  the  French  ships 
were  manned,  and  how  great  an  advantage  Hawke's 
seasoned  fleet  would  have  in  an  engagement  in  the  open 
on  a  lee  shore  and  in  boisterous  weather,  it  is  difficult  to 
say  he  was  not  right  in  assuming  the  defensive.  It  was 
thus  he  put  his  case.  "  The  wind  was  then,"  he  wrote  in 
his  report,  "  very  violent  at  west-north- west,  the  sea  very 
high,  with  every  indication  of  very  heavy  weather.  These 
circumstances,  added  to  the  object  which  all  your  letters 
pointed  out,  and  the  superiority  of  the  enemy  .  .  .  deter- 
mined me  to  make  for  Morbihan.  ...  I  had  no  ground 
for  thinking  that  if  I  got  in  first  with  twenty-one  of  the 
line  the  enemy  would  dare  to  follow  me.  In  order  to 
show  the  course,  I  had  chosen  the  order  of  sailing  in 
single  line.  In  this  order  I  led  the  van ;  and  in  order 
to  form  '  the  natural  order  of  battle '  I  had  nothing  to  do 
but  to  take  my  station  in  the  centre,  which  I  intended  to 
do,  on  the  second  board,  so  soon  as  the  entire  line  was 
inside  the  bay." 

Nothing  really  could  be  more  correct.  He  would  at 
least  have  gained  an  important  point  in  getting  the  fleet 
and  the  transports  united  in  one  port.  Had  they  been 
together  in  Brest  it  is  obvious  that  the  whole  expedition 


'  His  signals  were  :  1.  Lever  le  chasse  ;  2.  Ralliement ;  3,  Ordre  de 
marche  sur  une  ligne  ;  4.  Preparatory  for  battle  signals  ;  5.  Prepare  for 
action. 


62  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

would  have  eluded  Hawke  at  least  for  a  time,  and  that  is 
all  that  was  hoped.  Once  in  a  good  defensive  position  in 
Quiberon  Bay,  all  he  had  to  do  was  to  wait  till  the  next 
westerly  gale  blew  Hawke  off  and  then  proceed  to  sea 
with  his  charge  in  company,  and  with  every  possible 
chance  there  was  of  getting  it  clear  away  north.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  he  had  turned  and,  with  everything  against 
him,  had  fought  Hawke,  no  good  could  have  come  of  it, 
even  if  he  had  sacrificed  his  own  fleet  to  put  Hawke's 
out  of  action.  This  is  what  his  critics,  and  especially 
those  of  his  own  country,  seem  to  think  he  ought  to  have 
done.  But  they  forget  that  the  force  which  had  held 
D'Aiguillon's  transports  so  long  was  still  there.  Duff,  with 
his  six  cruisers,  was  even  then  in  the  act  of  joining  Hawke, 
and  the  whole  coast  was  swarming  with  the  rest  of  his 
frigates  and  their  supporting  ships.  How  many  men  in 
such  circumstances  would  have  come  to  a  different  de- 
cision from  that  which  Conflans  had  to  take  so  rapidly  ? 
As  a  piece  of  pure  strategy  it  cannot  be  found  fault  with 
seriously.  If  it  failed,  it  was  because  Conflans  had  failed 
to  calculate  a  factor  that  was  really  incalculable.  He 
could  not  calculate  that  Hawke  in  such  weather  would 
continue  to  carry  the  press  of  sail  he  did  and  hurl  himself 
on  a  lee  shore  bristling  with  every  kind  of  seen  and 
unseen  danger.  He  did  not  know  the  new  English 
manoeuvre  which  would  double  the  rapidit)^  of  the  attack ; 
nor  could  he  tell  how  desperate  was  the  man  that  was 
tearing  after  him  out  of  the  west  on  the  wings  of  the 
rising  gale.  He  could  not  have  in  mind  the  ill  luck  that 
had  dogged  Hawke's  splendid  efforts  without  one  break 
from  the  first  shot  of  the  war ;  how  time  after  time 
he  had  missed  fleets  by  the  skin  of  his  teeth,  in  spite 
of  unprecedented  tenacity  and  unsurpassed  strategical 
cunning  till  it  seemed  some  curse  had  doomed  him  to 


1759  HAWKE'S   TACTICS  63 

failure  for  ever.  Du  Guay,  De  la  Motte,  Galissonifere, 
he  had  missed  them  all,  and  Bompart  only  a  fortnight 
before.  Was  Conflans,  too,  to  slip  through  his  fingers  ? 
If  Hawke  was  desperate,  who  can  wonder  ?  He  had  to 
break  his  luck,  and  there  was  a  demon  in  him  that  wild 
winter  day  that  knew  no  rule  or  risk. 

About  nine  Hawke  had  sight  of  Conflans,  and  seeing 
he  was  making  away,  he  hauled  down  the  signal  for 
line-abreast  and  substituted  that  for  general  chase, 
quickly  adding  one  which  possibly  was  now  made  for 
the  first  time  in  action.^  It  was  a  modification  of  general 
chase — a  comparatively  recent  introduction  into  the  "  Ad- 
ditional Fighting  Instructions,"  and  possibly  of  Hawke's 
own  invention,  as  a  result  of  his  action  with  L'liltanduere 
in  1747.  It  enabled  the  admiral  while  in  general  chase 
to  direct  the  five  or  seven  ships  nearest  the  enemy  to 
form  line  of  battle  ahead  of  him  as  they  chased,  without 
any  regard  to  their  regular  stations  in  the  order  of  battle, 
and  to  engage  as  they  came  up  with  the  enemy,  the  rest 
of  the  fleet  to  support  as  soon  as  they  could,  also  without 
regard  to  their  regular  stations.^    The  signal  Hawke  made 

^  For  Hawke's  preparatory  movements  I  have  followed  his  despatch. 
The  log  of  his  flagship  (Captains'  Logs,  811)  puts  them  differently,  thus: 
"At  8.0  made  signal  for  the  line  of  battle  abreast,  two  cable's  length 
asunder.  At  ^  past  Mar/nanime  made  signal  for  a  fleet.  Made  the  general 
signal  to  chase  at  J.  Magnanime  made  signal  for  the  fleet  being  an 
enemy."  From  this  it  would  appear  that  Hawke  signalled  "General 
chase "  the  moment  the  enemy  was  signalled.  Hawke  is  confirmed, 
however,  by  the  Warspite  (Captains'  Logs,  4004)  and  the  Magnanime 
(Master's  Logs,  935).  The  point  is  of  interest  as  determining  whether 
Hawke's  first  impulse  on  getting  contact  with  the  enemy  was  to  get  his 
fleet  well  in  hand  or  to  let  it  loose  upon  them  at  once.  There  can  be 
little  doubt  he  took  the  steadier  course. 

^  Articles  IX.  and  X.  of  the  "Additional  Fighting  Instructions,  1759." 
The  manoeuvre  first  appears,  so  far  as  is  known,  in  a  MS.  Signal-Book  in 
the  United  Service  Institution,  dated  175G. 

Article  IX.  is  ;  "  And  if  I  should  chase  with  the  whole  and  would  have 
a  certain  number  of  the  ships  that  are  nearest  the  enemy  draw  into  a  line 
of  battle  ahead  of  me,  in  order  to  engage  till  the  rest  of  the  ships  of  the 


64  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

was  for  seven  ships,  and  he  could  give  the  order  with  the 
lighter  heart,  owing  to  his  having  some  hours  earlier 
sent  Howe  forward  to  make  the  land.  Howe  was 
therefore  nearest  the  enemy,  and  would  lead  the  attack. 
Such  was  the  compliment  which  in  that  great  moment 
Hawke  paid  the  man  of  whom  he  had  so  much  reason  to 
be  jealous. 

As  the  admiral  made  the  signal  he  hoisted  his  flag, 
and,  in  spite  of  the  weather,  set  his  topgallant  sails. 
Following  his  example,  the  rest  shook  out  their  topsail 
reefs.  Keppel  carried  so  much  sail  that  the  water 
poured  into  his  lee  ports,  and  he  had  to  come  up  into 
the  wind.  So  when  Duff  saw  them  he  describes  them 
as  bearing  down  under  a  crowd  of  sail.^  Conflans,  in 
his  report  to  the  King,  said  he  thought  he  could  well 
get  all  his  ships  inside  before  the  enemy ;  but  he  had 
not  counted  on  the  nerve  of  his  pursuers,  hardened  in 
the  long  and  stormy  blockade.  In  the  rising  gale  the 
movement  was  taking  shape  with  a  rapidity  beyond  all 
his  calculation.  "  All  the  day,"  wrote  Hawke,  "  we  had 
very  fresh  gales  at  north-west  and  west-north-west,  with 

squadron  can  come  up  with  them,  I  will  hoist  a  white  flag  with  a  red  cross 
on  the  flagstaff  of  the  main  topmast-head  and  fire  the  number  of  guns  as 
follows  [one  gun  for  five  ships,  three  for  seven]. 

Article  X.  "  Then  those  ships  are  immediately  to  form  the  line  without 
any  regard  to  seniority  or  the  general  form  delivered,  but  according  to 
their  distances  from  the  enemy,  viz.  the  headmost  and  nearest  ship  to 
lead  and  the  sternmost  to  bring  up  the  rear,  that  no  time  may  be  lost  in 
the  pursuit ;  and  all  the  rest  of  the  ships  are  to  form  and  strengthen  that 
line,  as  soon  as  they  can  come  up  with  them,  without  any  regard  to  my 
general  form  of  the  order  of  battle."  See  Fighting  Instructions  {Navy 
Record  Society),  pp.  208,  221. 

This  whole  set  of  "  Additional  Fighting  Instructions"  had  probably  been 
printed  and  issued  in  1757,  for  on  May  28  in  that  year  Commodore  Moore, 
on  his  way  to  the  Leeward  Islands  station,  entered  in  his  Journal  that  he 
issued  to  his  captains  "  The  Sailing  and  Fighting  Instructions,  with  the 
printed  Additional  Signals  and  Further  Additional  Signals." — Moore's 
Journal,  K.O.  Admiralu'  Journals. 

'  The  logs  of  the  Royal  George,  Warspite,  I'wbay,  Rochester,  &c. 


1759  BATTLE    OF   QUIBERON  65 

heavy  squalls.  M.  Conflans  kept  going  off  under  such 
sail  as  all  his  squadron  could  carry  and  at  the  same  time 
keep  together ;  while  we  crowded  after  him  with  every 
sail  our  ships  could  bear."  Before  them  lay  the  narrow 
entrance  to  the  bay  between  the  La  Four  shoal  to  star- 
board and  to  port  "  The  Cardinals,"  the  last  of  the  long 
range  of  rocks  and  islets  that  continue  the  Quiberon 
peninsula ;  beyond  it  a  lee  shore  bristling  with  reefs. 
Yet  no  one  faltered,  and  hour  after  hour  the  wild  chase 
went  on. 

At  half-past  two  Conflans  made  the  entrance,  and 
hauled  round  The  Cardinals  preparatory  to  forming  line 
inside.  Just  then,  far  in  the  rear  he  heard  guns,  and 
knew  that,  as  will  nearly  always  happen  when  the  admiral 
leads,  he  had  misjudged  the  speed  of  his  rear.  It  was, 
in  truth,  the  Wars])ite  and  one  or  two  other  of  Hawke's 
ships  firing  without  orders  at  random  range  upon  the 
rearmost  ship  of  the  enemy.  It  was  immediately  stopped, 
and  the  chase  went  on  in  silence.^  Howe,  in  the  Magna- 
nime,  held  on,  trying  to  reach  as  far  towards  the  enemy's 
centre  as  he  could  before  attacking.  Hawke  had  made 
the  signal  to  engage  so  soon  as  the  first  shot  was  fired, 
and  it  was  not  long  before  it  was  obeyed.  The  French 
van  and  centre  got  clear  in,  but  with  the  rear  it  was 
different.  They  were  in  no  formation,  and  the  leading 
British  ships  were  quickly  all  amongst  them  like  a  pack 
of  wolves.  Still  there  was  no  pause,  and  Conflans,  as 
he  says,  could  see  them  all  crowding  into  the  bay  pell- 
mell  together. 

All  that  could  be  done  the  French  rear-admiral,  Du 

1  It  is  for  this  reason  it  is  usually  said  the  Warspite  was  leading.  Her 
captain,  Sir  John  Bentley,  in  his  log  says  fire  was  opened  without  his 
orders,  and  he  did  not  begin  again  till  within  musket-shot.  He  had  been 
with  his  ship  at  Lagos,  and  had  recently  been  knighted  for  his  conduct  in 
that  action. 

VOL.  II.  E 


66  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

Verger,  did.  But  he  was  battered  to  pieces  by  ship  after 
ship,  and  as  Hawke  himself,  just  before  four  o'clock, 
rounded  The  Cardinals,  he  struck  to  the  Resolution}  At 
the  same  time  Keppel,  after  recovering  himself,  had 
engaged  the  TMs^e,  and  after  a  couple  of  broadsides  she 
suddenly  went  down,  a  victim  to  the  danger  he  himself 
had  so  narrowly  escaped.  Two  other  vessels,  the  Sujyerbe 
and  the  Juste,  shared  the  same  fate,  while  a  fourth,  the 
H&ros,  struck  to  Howe. 

Meanwhile  the  wind  had  shifted  into  the  north-west 
and  thrown  Conflans's  half-formed  line  into  complete 
disorder.  Before  the  impetuous  rush  of  the  British  fleet 
the  van  and  centre  were  huddled  in  an  almost  helpless 
throng  in  the  depth  of  the  bay.  Seeing  it  was  impos- 
sible to  form  line  where  they  were,  Conflans  made  a 
signal  to  wear  in  succession,  in  order  to  clear  the  tangle ; 
but  it  seems  only  to  have  increased  it.  "  The  confusion 
was  awful,"  wrote  a  French  officer,  "  when  the  van,  in 
which  I  was,  tried  to  go  about.  Part  could  not  do  it. 
We  were  in  a  funnel,  as  it  were,  all  on  the  top  of 
each  other,  with  rocks  on  one  side  of  us  and  ships  on 
the  other.  So  we  anchored."  ^  As  for  Conflans  he  had 
made  one  attempt  to  get  into  his  station,  and  seeing  it 
was  now  impossible  to  take  the  defensive  position  he 
had  intended,  his  idea  was  to  lead  the  fleet  out  to  sea 
again.  With  this  object  he  bore  up  for  the  entrance. 
But  here  he  encountered  Hawke  coming  in.  Even  in 
the  gathering  dusk  the  Soleil  Royal  was  unmistakable. 
Through  the  murk  of  the  storm  Hawke  saw  a  chance  of 

^  At  this  point  there  is  a  curious  entry  in  the  log  of  the  Royal  Qeorge  : 
"  Fired  a  shot  at  the  Buxford  for  her  to  make  sail  and  engage  the  enemy." 
Her  captain  was  James  Gambler,  uncle  to  Lord  Gambler.  He  had  been  at 
Louisbourg  in  1758,  and  had  just  come  home  from  the  capture  of  Guade- 
loupe. 

2  Waddington,  vol.  iii.  p.  371. 


I7S9  BATTLE    OF    QUIBERON  67 

raking  her,  and  in  spite  of  his  master's  anxious  protest 
made  a  determined  push  to  get  across  her  stern.  Seeing 
the  flagship's  danger,  the  Intrdpide,  a  70-gun  ship  that 
had  followed  closely  the  admiral's  movements,  thrust 
herself  gallantly  in  between  the  two  giants,  and  received 
the  Royal  Georges  fire.  Though  she  had  baulked  Hawke 
of  his  purpose,  Conflans's  movement  was  stopped.  In 
endeavouring  to  avoid  Hawke's  bold  attempt  to  rake, 
the  Soleil  Royal  had  fallen  to  leeward,  and  in  trying  to 
tack  to  recover  her  position  she  fouled  two  ships  that 
were  following  her  lead.  The  result  was  she  fell  still 
further  away,  and  being  no  longer  able  to  weather  the 
Four  Shoal,  she  had  to  run  back  and  anchor  behind  it 
off  Croisic,  at  the  opposite  end  of  the  bay  to  the  bulk 
of  the  fleet.^  By  this  time  it  was  five  o'clock  and  nearly 
dark.  It  was  blowing  harder  than  ever  ;  the  sea,  even 
in  the  bay,  was  running  high ;  an  unknown  shore  was 
roaring  just  under  their  lee;  the  narrow  waters  were 
crowded  with  bewildered  shipping.  There  was  no  more 
to  be  done,  and  Hawke  made  the  signal  to  anchor. 

So  that  famous  day  came  to  an  end.  Darkness  settled 
down,  and  all  through  the  night  signals  of  distress  could 
be  heard  above  the  din  of  the  gale.  Whether  they  came 
from  friend  or  foe  no  one  could  tell.  It  was  not  till  the 
morning  broke,  dark  and  stormy  as  ever,  that  any  one 
knew  what  had  happened.  Then  it  was  seen  that  the 
Resolution  was  ashore  and  dismasted  on  the  Four  Shoal, 
and  the  Hdros  beside  her.  The  bulk  of  the  British  fleet 
had  anchored  about  three  miles  from  Dumet  Island, 
which  lies  off  the  mouth  of  the  Villainc  River.  The 
Soleil  Royal  was  in  the  midst  of  them,  and  only  eight 
of  the  French  fleet  Avere  to  be  seen,  anchored  beyond 
and   inshore   of  the   British   line.      The   rest,   including 

'  Conflans's  Report. 


68  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK 


1759 


Bauftremont,  the  vice-admiral,  and  Bigot  de  Morogues, 
had  succeeded  during  the  night  in  doing  what  Conflans 
had  tried  in  vain.  They  had  got  to  sea,  and  were  seen 
making  for  the  Basque  Roads  and  Rochefort.  One  other 
vessel,  the  Juste,  after  suffering  severely  in  the  action, 
had  made  for  the  Loire,  and  in  getting  in  was  lost  with 
all  hands. 

The  position  of  Conflans  was  indeed  desperate,  and 
the  moment  he  realised  it  he  slipped  and  tried  to  get  into 
Croisic  Road,  where  there  were  batteries  to  protect  him. 
Hawke  immediately  signalled  the  Essex  to  follow  her, 
with  the  result  both  vessels  brought  up  hard  on  the 
Four  Shoal  beside  the  H^ros.  At  the  same  time  Hawke 
made  the  signal  to  weigh  and  attack  the  rest  of  the 
French  fleet  that  was  lying  in  the  Villaine  estuary.  But 
his  blood  had  cooled,  and  he  quickly  saw  it  was  madness 
to  move.  "  It  blowed  so  hard,"  he  said,  "  from  the 
north-west,  that  instead  of  daring  to  cast  the  squadron 
loose  I  was  obliged  to  strike  topgallant  masts."  The 
French  vessels  seized  the  respite  to  escape.  So  soon  as 
the  tide  began  to  make,  they  set  to  to  work  into  the 
Villaine  River,  and  by  dint  of  jettisoning  all  their  guns 
and  gear,  and  having  the  wind  in  their  favour,  they 
managed  to  get  over  the  bar.  Only  three  of  them,  how- 
ever, were  ever  fit  for  service  again.  The  rest  broke  their 
backs  on  the  mud. 

All  that  day  the  gale  continued  to  rage  and  nothing 
more  could  be  done.  But  on  the  morrow  it  moderated 
a  little,  and  three  of  Duffs  ships  were  sent  in  to  destroy 
the  Soleil  Royal  and  the  Hiros.  Conflans  thereupon  set 
tire  to  his  flagship,  and  Duft's  people  burnt  the  other. 
Meanwhile  Hawke  worked  the  fleet  into  the  Villaine 
estuary,  where  the  French  ships  had  been  lying.  Here 
he  found  a  more  sheltered  anchorage,  but  no  means  of 


I7S9  RESULTS    OF   THE    BATTLE  69 

attacking  the  ships  in  the  river.  An  attempt  with  fire- 
boats  proved  impracticable,  and  so  the  long-sought  en- 
counter ended.  It  was  not  till  the  fourth  day  after  the 
action  that  he  sat  down  to  write  a  report  of  his  immortal 
victory.  He  had  lost  two  ships  and  between  three  and 
four  hundred  men.  The  French  had  lost  six,  one  the 
Formidable,  Du  Verger's  flagship,  a  prize,  two,  including 
the  Soldi  Royal,  burnt,  and  three  driven  ashore,  besides 
four  as  good  as  wrecks  in  the  Villaine,  together  with 
about  two  thousand  five  hundred  men.  It  proved  indeed 
the  coup  dc  grdce  of  the  French  navy,  but  Hawke  was  far 
from  satisfied.  "  In  attacking  a  flying  enemy,"  he  wrote 
apologetically  to  the  Admiralty,  "  it  was  impossible  in  the 
space  of  a  short  winter's  day  that  all  our  ships  should  be 
able  to  get  into  action,  or  all  those  of  the  enemy  brought 
to  it.  .  .  .  When  I  consider  the  season  of  the  year,  the 
hard  gales  on  the  day  of  action,  a  flying  enemy,  the 
shortness  of  the  day,  and  the  coast  we  were  on,  I  can 
boldly  affirm  that  all  that  could  possibly  be  done  has 
been  done.  As  to  the  loss  we  have  sustained,  let  it  be 
placed  to  the  necessity  I  was  under  of  running  all  risks 
to  break  this  strong  force  of  the  enemy.  Had  we  had 
but  two  hours  more  daylight,  the  whole  had  been  totally 
destro3^ed  or  taken." 

And  if  he  had  not  fallen  in  with  the  victuallers,  if  he  had 
waited  till  his  cruisers  gave  him  the  news,  what  then  ? 
He  would  have  arrived  probably  the  next  day  and  found 
Conflans  snug  in  the  bay.  Before  the  gale  had  blown 
out  he  would  have  been  joined  perhaps  by  Geary,  cer- 
tainly by  Saunders,  who  was  only  just  too  late  to  share 
Hawke's  triumph.  Then  he  would  have  gone  in  with 
perhaps  thirty  of  the  line.  As  the  wind  was  ho  would 
have  got  to  leeward  of  Conflans  and  prevented  all  possi- 
bility of  escape,  either  out  of  the  bay  or  into  the  Villaine. 


70  FRENCH    COUNTER-ATTACK  1759 

Then  there  must  have  been  another  Battle  of  the  Nile, 
but  yet  more  terrible  and  destructive,  since  the  numbers 
were  so  much  greater,  and  the  waters  more  confined. 

Still  it  was  enough.  The  catastrophe  had  come,  yet 
Hawke  could  not  tear  himself  away  from  the  scene.  In 
his  eyes  the  triumph  which  awaited  him  at  home  was 
nothing  compared  with  the  chance  of  completing  his 
work.  A  flying  squadron  was  organised  under  Keppel  to 
follow  the  ships  that  had  fled  to  the  Basque  Roads.  He 
returned  in  a  few  days  to  say  that  they  had  all  got  up 
the  Charente,  and  were  as  inaccessible  as  those  in  the 
Villaine.  Meanwhile  Hawke,  after  engaging  in  an  angry 
interchange  of  notes  with  D'Aiguillon  over  a  question  of 
prisoners,  had  been  making  the  French  feel  the  penalty 
of  their  abandonment  of  the  sea.  Croisic  was  bombarded 
for  firing  on  working  parties  that  were  trying  to  salve 
the  guns  of  the  Soleil  Boyal.  Isle  d'Yeu,  half-way  down 
the  coast  to  Rochefort,  was  seized,  its  defences  destroyed, 
and  its  cattle  carried  off  to  refresh  the  fleet.  In  short, 
the  movements  of  his  squadrons  kept  the  whole  coast  in 
alarm,  with  the  effect  that,  though  the  English  invasion 
was  at  once  abandoned,  D'Aiguillon's  army  remained  un- 
available, for  it  had  to  be  cantoned  along  the  threatened 
shores  to  save  them  from  attack. 

By  the  middle  of  December  Hawke  recognised  that  he 
had  done  his  work.  On  December  9th  he  had  written 
home  recommending  a  division  of  the  fleet  into  two 
squadrons,  one  for  Quiboron  and  one  for  the  Basque  Roads, 
and  the  distribution  of  the  frigates  and  fifties  at  the  usual 
points  from  Brest  down  to  Bordeaux.  At  the  same  time  he 
ordered  Geary  to  send  home  all  the  ships  which  had  been 
specially  ordered  out  as  reinforcenients.  A  week  later  he 
asked  to  be  relieved,  and  early  in  the  new  year  he  was 
permitted  to  take  the  rest  which  he  had  so  hardly  earned. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE   SECOND   PHASE   OF   THE   WAR 

It  is  recognised  as  a  fundamental  principle  that  lies  at 
the  root  of  the  higher  strategy  that  wars  tend  to  exhibit 
two  successive  phases — phases  not  always  very  distinct, 
yet  always  existing,  and  so  important  in  their  differences 
that  unless  they  be  kept  firmly  grasped  the  conduct  of 
any  great  war  is  sure  to  go  astray.  There  is  firstly  the 
phase  in  which  we  seek  to  destroy  the  armed  forces  of 
the  enemy,  to  overcome  his  means  of  attack  and  resist- 
ance, so  that  he  is  no  longer  able  to  gain  his  own  object 
or  to  prevent  us  from  gaining  ours.  If  we  are  successful 
in  this  phase,  then  follows  the  second,  in  which  we  seek  to 
exert  our  ascendency  over  him  by  bringing  to  bear  upon 
his  national  life  a  general  pressure  in  order  to  force  him 
to  accept  our  terms.  In  other  words,  our  main  objectives 
are  no  longer  his  armed  forces,  but  what  may  be  called 
the  sources  of  his  vitality  ;  we  direct  our  efforts  to  in- 
flict upon  him  or  to  threaten  loss  and  suffering  which  he 
shall  recognise  as  harder  to  endure  than  the  terms  of 
peace  we  offer. 

In  the  Seven  Years'  War,  so  far  at  least  as  England 
was  concerned  in  it,  this  change — this  transition  from 
the  first  phase  to  the  second — began  to  take  place  at  the 
point  we  have  reached.  The  complete  failure  of  the 
desperate  attempt  of  France  to  recover  the  situation  by 
direct  counter-attack  demonstrated  how  irrevocably  the 
armed  forces  of  England  dominated  the  situation  in  the 


72  THE   SECOND    PHASE  1759 

main  theatre  of  the  war.  It  was  clear  that  for  all  pur- 
poses of  serious  attack  or  resistance  the  French  sea  power 
had  been  reduced  to  impotence,  and  seeing  the  nature  of 
the  contest  and  its  real  object,  it  was  the  only  kind  of 
force  that  could  directly  affect  the  end.  It  is  true  Canada 
was  not  yet  completely  conquered.  There  remained  upon 
the  St.  Lawrence  a  residue  of  potent  armed  force  that,  as 
we  shall  see,  was  destined  to  exhibit  an  unexpected  power 
of  resistance.  But  that  made  no  inherent  difference. 
For  purposes  of  war-direction  Canada  was  rightly  re- 
garded on  both  sides  as  lost.  With  the  naval  force  of 
France  destroyed,  the  destruction  of  her  power  of  attack 
and  resistance  across  the  ocean  could  only  be  a  question 
of  a  few  months.  The  utmost  the  Canadian  forces  could 
do  was  to  prolong  the  transition  from  the  first  phase  to 
the  second. 

By  no  one  was  the  decisive  character  of  Hawke's 
victory  more  clearly  recognised  than  by  Frederick. 
"  This  naval  battle,"  he  wrote  in  the  lowest  depth  of  his 
fortunes,  "  is  admirable,  and  comes  to  us  as  from  the 
Lord."^ 

In  France  the  point  of  transition  was  recognised  by 
the  collapse  of  her  credit.  The  financiers  saw  too  well 
that  the  pressure  which  England  would  now  bring  to 
bear  would  be  mainly  against  her  trade  and  against 
the  Colonies,  from  which  her  resources  could  no  longer 
be  replenished.  It  was  obvious  that  her  finance  was 
shattered,  and  the  Government  had  to  declare  itself 
unable  to  meet  its  engagements. 

A  still  more  striking  indication  of  the  point  which  had 
been  reached  is  the  fact  that,  as  almost  always  happens, 
there  began  to  appear  feverish  attempts  to  patch  up  a  peace 
and  end  the  war.      Hawke  and  his  officers  were  startled 

^  To  Finchenstein,  Dec.  12,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xviii.  p.  693. 


1759         INTRIGUES    TO    STOP    THE    WAR  73 

to  find  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  movement  im- 
mediately after  the  battle.  During  the  course  of  the 
angry  discussion  that  ensued  between  Hawke  and  the 
Due  d'Aiguillon  over  the  question  of  exchanging  prisoners, 
Howe  had  been  sent  ashore  to  conduct  the  negotiations. 
While  thus  engaged,  he  was  surprised  one  day  by  D'Aiguil- 
lon's  broaching  the  subject  of  a  separate  peace  between 
the  two  countries  without  any  regard  to  "  Madame 
d'Hongrie,"  as  he  called  the  Austrian  Empress.  He 
said  that  his  abortive  irruption  into  the  British  Islands 
had  been  intended  to  secure  peace,  and  that  he  had  been 
given  full  power  to  treat  so  soon  as  he  should  have  estab- 
lished himself  in  Scotland.  These  powers,  he  asserted, 
were  still  good,  and  he  set  himself  to  cajole  Howe  by 
all  kinds  of  flattery  to  act  as  an  intermediary  between 
him  and  Pitt.  Howe  of  course  refused,  but  Hawke 
thougfht  it  best  to  send  him  home  at  once.  He  reached 
London  at  Christmas  time,  and  as  soon  as  he  had  reported 
himself  Anson  sent  him  on  to  Pitt.^ 

It  was  a  thread  of  a  very  tangled  skein  which  Howe 
had  found  so  strangely  in  his  hand.  In  every  court  in 
Europe  they  were  pulling  at  it,  and  no  one  could  quite 
tell  how  far  his  neighbour  was  committed.  It  was  the 
outcome  of  a  clever  idea  of  Choiseul's  to  extricate  France 
from  the  war  by  inducing  Spain  to  mediate  for  a  separate 
peace  between  France  and  England.  If  such  a  negotia- 
tion could  be  set  on  foot  it  would  be  sure  in  any  case  to 
breed  mistrust  between  England  and  Prussia.  Moreover, 
it  was  no  part  of  Choiseul's  policy  to  leave  Austria  with- 
out a  rival  in  Germany,  and  if  the  negotiation  succeeded, 
France  would  be  able  to  withdraw  from  the  war  before 
Prussia  was  entirely  crushed,  without  openly  breaking 
her  ensfagfements  with  Vienna.     On  the  other  hand,  if 

^  Anson  to  Newcastle,  Dec.  27,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,900. 


74  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1759 

the  mediation  were  refused,  it  was  very  likely  to  provoke 
Spain  into  declaring  war  upon  England.  The  matter  was 
put  in  hand  directly  after  the  battle  of  Minden,  when, 
on  August  10th,  Ferdinand  of  Spain  opportunely  died, 
and  was  succeeded  by  his  brother  Don  Carlos,  King  of 
the  Two  Sicilies,  who  had  the  reputation  of  being  a 
devoted  partisan  of  France,  and,  a  man  of  energy  and 
character.  The  new  king,  eager  to  cut  a  figure  in 
Europe,  embraced  the  idea  with  alacrity.  It  was  shortly 
after  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Quebec  had  come  home  that 
the  subject  was  definitely  put  before  Pitt  by  Don  Carlos's 
representative  in  London.  He  received  it  with  a  haughty 
intimation  that  the  time  had  not  yet  come  for  thinking 
of  peace.  The  Spanish  agent  replied  that  his  master 
only  wished  to  testify  his  goodwill,  but  at  the  same  time 
he  was  bound  to  add  that  Spain  could  not  sit  still  and 
see  the  balance  of  power  in  America  entirely  upset.  The 
idea  came  on  Pitt  with  disturbing  suddenness.  He  saw 
in  a  flash  the  danger  of  the  game  that  was  being  played 
on  him,  quickly  recovered  himself,  and  returned  a  soft 
and  temporising  answer. 

But  the  news  of  Quebec,  which  hardened  Pitt's  heart, 
only  drove  the  high  spirit  of  Don  Carlos  further  on  the 
fatal  path.  It  was  the  first  thing  he  heard  on  landing 
in  his  new  kingdom,  and  he  vowed  it  froze  his  blood. 
If  France  were  broken  by  England,  it  would  be  Spain's 
turn  next.  He  was  minded,  he  told  the  French  ambas- 
sador, to  act  at  once,  but  he  must  have  time  to  arrange 
his  finances,  reorganise  the  army  and  navy,  and  repair 
the  Colonial  fortifications.  All  this,  of  course,  was 
behind  the  back  of  General  Wall,  who  was  still  at  the 
head  of  the  Government  and  as  staunch  as  ever  as  to  the 
insanity  of  breaking  with  England.  He  was  determined 
not   to  play  the   new   king's  ambitious  game,  and    Pitt 


I7S9  A   CONGRj:SS    PROPOSED  75 

quickly  offered  him  the  means  of  checking  it.  Before 
Carlos  reached  Madrid,  Pitt's  answer  arrived.  It  was  to 
the  effect  that  when  there  was  a  question  of  a  number 
of  allies  the  difficulties  of  mediation  were  very  great, 
and  for  this  reason  his  Britannic  Majesty,  while  highly 
appreciating  Don  Carlos's  good  intentions,  had  decided 
*  to  propose  a  Congress  of  the  Powers  with  a  view  to  a 
general  peace. 

This  clever  parry  had  been  originally  the  idea  of 
Frederick.  Early  in  the  year  he  had  suggested  that 
England  and  Prussia  should  jointly  propose  such  a 
congress.  It  had  been  the  outcome  of  one  of  his  periods 
of  depression,  when  he  saw  no  way  of  continuing  the 
struggle.  After  the  disastrous  day  of  his  defeat  at 
Kiinersdorf  on  August  12th  by  the  Austrians  and  Russians 
and  the  consequent  loss  of  Dresden,  Frederick  had  re- 
curred to  the  idea.  The  fact  that  not  only  Spain  but  Den- 
mark also  was  being  pushed  forward  by  France  to  mediate 
for  a  separate  peace,  made  the  suggestion  welcome  in 
London.  Pitt  waited  only  for  the  news  of  Quebec  to 
act,  and  then  rushed  it  through.  On  October  30th  a  joint 
declaration  in  favour  of  a  congress  was  transmitted  to 
Prince  Louis  of  Brunswick,  Prince  Ferdinand's  brother, 
and  commander-in-chief  of  the  Dutch  army,  with  a  re- 
quest that  he  would  place  it  before  the  representatives  of 
France,  Russia,  and  Austria  at  the  Hague.  He  accepted 
the  mission,  and  proceeded  to  arrange  for  regular  four- 
parlers  to  open. 

Such  was  the  diplomatic  situation  while  France  was  in 
the  act  of  hazarding  her  desperate  throw.  On  November 
25th,  before  the  news  of  Quiberon  had  been  received  at 
the  Haofue,  Prince  Louis  had  delivered  the  declaration, 
and  it  had  been  fairly  well  received.  The  French 
ambassador  went  so  far  as  to  tell  the  Prince  that  his 


7^  THE    SECOND   PHASE  1759 

court  was  in  sore  need  of  peace.  He  would  not  say  that 
the  sortie  of  M.  de  Conflans  was  their  last  effort,  but  he 
must  own  it  was  one  of  the  last.  Choiseul,  though  he 
quite  understood  the  proposal  for  a  general  congress  was 
meant  to  check  his  game  of  mediation  and  a  separate 
peace  with  England,  could  congratulate  himself  that  it 
also  indicated  mutual  suspicion  between  England  and 
Prussia.  In  his  eyes  the  anxiety  of  both  powers  for  every 
one  to  play  with  his  cards  on  the  table  in  open  congress 
meant  that  neither  power  could  trust  the  other.  He 
consoled  himself  with  this  further  reflection  :  "  We  know 
that  a  congress  is  not  always  the  road  to  peace,  but  ex- 
perience tells  us  it  is  very  difficult  for  it  not  to  become  a 
cause  of  coldness  between  allies  and  soreness  with  the 
mediators."  In  any  case  it  was  diplomatically  impossible 
not  to  entertain  the  suggestion,  and  accordingly  the 
negotiations  were  opened  at  the  Hague  under  the  conduct 
of  General  Yorke.  There  m.onth  after  month  they  con- 
tinued, with  ever-growing  insincerity,  while  the  exhausted 
armies  lay  still  in  winter  quarters.  The  King  of  Spain, 
who  disliked  the  Anglo-Prussian  move  as  much  as  France, 
was  still  trying  to  insinuate  his  mediation  in  some  form  or 
other,  in  spite  of  Wall's  efforts  to  keep  him  quiet.  In 
line  with  him  France  was  continuing  to  play  for  a  separate 
peace  with  England,  to  save  what  colonies  she  had  left, 
and  as  a  step  to  stop  the  war  before  Frederick  was 
crushed.  Austria  and  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
equally  bent  on  the  continuation  of  the  war  till  Prussia 
was  wiped  from  the  map  of  Europe,  while  Pitt  was 
absolutely  inflexible  in  standing  by  his  ally  and  in  re- 
fusing even  to  consider  any  form  of  peace  in  which 
Frederick  was  not  included. 

The  overtures  which  the  Due  d'Aiguillon  had  made  to 
Howe  were  the  first  attempt  of  France  to   shake  Pitt's 


I760  THE   NEGOTIATIONS    FAIL  77 

attitude — the  first  overt  act,  as  Newcastle  put  it,  of  her 
desire  and  hope  of  a  separate  peace.  No  one  but  Wall 
seemed  to  believe  in  England's  loyalty  to  Prussia.  The 
French  ambassador  at  Madrid  assured  him  that  there 
were  clear  indications  that  she  was  about  to  abandon  her 
ally.  "  Oh,"  said  Wall,  "  when  you  begin  to  think  that, 
I  have  no  more  to  say  to  you."  Wall  was  right.  The 
negotiations  went  on  actively,  but  to  every  trick  and  turn 
Yorke  opposed  a  blunt  insistence  on  the  participation  of 
Prussia.  Frederick,  after  some  back-hand  negotiations 
directly  with  Versailles,  through  the  medium  of  Voltaire, 
became  as  confident  as  Wall,  and  finally  placed  the  whole 
of  his  interests  in  the  hands  of  the  British  Cabinet.  In 
vain  Choiseul  went  on  scheming  to  open  direct  com- 
munication with  Pitt.  The  attempt  only  produced,  early 
in  April  1760,  an  ultimatum  which  led  quickly  to  a  com- 
plete rupture  of  the  negotiations.  By  the  middle  of  May 
the  pourparlers  came  to  an  end,  and  there  was  no  doubt 
a  new  campaign  must  be  opened. 

It  was  in  the  black  prospects  of  this  campaign  on  the 
Continent  that  lay  the  complication  of  the  British  position. 
It  has  been  said  that  the  point  of  transition  between  the 
"  armed  force  "  phase  and  the  "  general  pressure  "  phase 
had  been  reached  in  all  but  one  area  of  operations. 
Though  generally  true  of  the  war  between  France  and 
England — the  maritime  war,  as  it  was  called — throughout 
the  negotiations  it  was  not  true  of  the  Continental  sphere. 
There  neither  side  had  achieved  a  real  domination,  and 
it  was  still  reciprocally  a  question  of  destroying  armed 
forces.  Yet  everything  pointed  to  the  probability  that 
those  of  Frederick  could  not  possibly  endure  another 
campaign,  and  if  he  succumbed  it  would  be  out  of  the 
power  of  Ferdinand  to  continue  the  defence  of  Hanover. 
Soon  after  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  for  the  con •■ 


7%  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1759 

gress,  Ferdinand  had  made  "  a  most  secret  and  private  " 
appeal  to  Pitt  on  the  subject.  "  The  army  of  the  King 
of  Prussia,"  he  wrote,  "  has  melted  away  to  half  what  it 
was  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  I  have  good 
reason  to  doubt  whether  he  can  possibly  recruit  his  regi- 
ments and  mend  everything  for  the  next  campaign.  .  .  . 
What  is  more,  the  enemy,  remaining  masters  of  Dresden, 
can  open  the  campaign  when  they  will,  that  town  serving 
them  as  a  iilact  d'armes  et  d'appui.  If  the  Russians  re- 
appear at  the  same  time,  I  don't  know  what  will  happen." 
The  only  salvation  he  saw  was  in  making  peace  with 
France  before  the  campaign  opened.  Mitchell,  our 
ambassador  with  Frederick,  sent  home  an  equally  de- 
sponding account.  He  spoke  of  the  ten  months'  arduous 
campaign,  the  exhaustion  of  the  troops,  the  two  battles, 
Kiinersdorf  and  Maxen,  lost,  with  twenty-one  battalions, 
forty-five  squadrons,  and  all  the  best  officers  taken 
prisoners.  To  make  peace  with  France  and  hold  back 
Russia  was  the  only  way  to  save  Frederick  from  being 
lost  beyond  hope.  The  picture  was  not  exaggerated. 
Frederick  himself,  in  his  secret  correspondence,  was  paint- 
ing it  in  still  blacker  colours.  But  for  Ferdinand's  victory 
at  Minden  all  would  perhaps  have  been  lost  already.  The 
whole  foundations  on  which  Pitt's  war-plan  had  been 
built  were  shaking,  and  something  must  be  done  to  save 
them,  or  it  would  be  impossible  for  England  to  garner 
the  fruit  of  her  late  glorious  campaign. 

It  was  but  natural,  therefore,  that  a  feeling  should 
arise  for  drawing  on  the  favourable  balance  of  the  mari- 
time war  to  redress  the  Continental  default.  Accordingly, 
at  the  end  of  December,  as  the  time  drew  near  for 
settling  the  distribution  of  the  fleet  for  the  coming  year, 
Newcastle  broached  the  old  idea  of  a  Baltic  squadron. 
He   told    Hardwickc    that    nothing  could   now   hurt   us 


1759  A    BALTIC    FLEET    AGAIN  79 

except  Russian  action,  and  that  a  British  fleet  was  what 
Russia  most  feared,  and  what  Prussia  most  ardently 
desired.  It  would  have,  in  his  opinion,  the  additional 
advantage  of  checking  the  negotiations  which  France 
was  carrying  on  in  Denmark  and  Sweden  for  a  Northern 
coalition  against  us.  As  to  the  Swedish  navy,  it  would 
be  able  to  offer  little  opposition,  since  it  was  only  twenty- 
two  sail  strong,  of  which  six  had  been  disarmed  to  pro- 
vide France  with  guns,  and  four  others  already  had  their 
hands  full  with  the  Prussian  privateers  that  were  operat- 
ing from  Emden.^  At  Newcastle's  request,  Hardwicke 
communicated  these  ideas  to  Anson.  Anson  replied  in 
a  guarded  manner  that  he  generally  agreed  with  New- 
castle about  a  Baltic  squadron,  if  it  should  be  possible 
to  spare  ships,  but  that  must  depend  on  the  final  attitude 
of  Spain,  which  at  present  was  very  uncertain.  He  also 
begged  to  remind  Newcastle  that  the  statement  of  our 
naval  force  upon  which  he  relied  as  showing  a  Baltic 
squadron  was  possible,  exaggerated  the  number  of  ships 
that  would  be  at  home  ;  for  over  and  above  Hawke's 
squadron,  Avhich  he  regarded  as  a  division  of  the  home 
fleet,  they  had  then  thirty  of  the  line  employed  on 
different  foreign  stations.  Hardwicke  threw  further  cold 
water  on  the  idea  upon  his  own  account.  When  the 
King  of  Prussia,  he  said,  originally  asked  for  a  Baltic 
fleet,  it  was  to  protect  Pomerania  and  his  ports  on  that 
side,  and,  secondly,  to  terrorise  Russia.  Now  he  said 
nearly  all  the  Baltic  shore  was  in  Russia's  hands,  and 
what  remained  Sweden  was  too  weak  to  take.  Moreover, 
Russia  had  already  sunk  back  into  her  old  half-hearted 
attitude  to  the  war,  and  a  Baltic  fleet  was  more  likely  to 
provoke  her  into  fresh  activity  than  anything  else.^ 

1  Mem.  on  the  Swedish  Navy,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,900,  f.  41G. 
*  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Dec.  29,  and  Hardwicke's  answer,  Dec.  30, 
Newcastle  Papers,  32,900. 


8o  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

Though  Pitt  does  not  appear  to  have  countenanced  the 
idea,  it  must  have  been  talked  of  somewhat  freely.  The 
French  ambassador  in  Stockholm  assured  the  Swedish 
Government  the  squadron  was  coming,  but  this  may 
have  been  merely  a  move  against  the  strong  Anglo- 
Prussian  party  that  was  growing  up  out  of  jealousy  of 
Russia's  conquest  of  Pomerania.  Still  Hopken,  the  chief 
Minister,  professed  to  be  seriously  alarmed.  He  said 
that  the  Swedish  fleet  would  certainly  be  beaten,  and 
that  an  English  Baltic  squadron  would  have  the  most 
serious  consequences.  Still  Pitt  gave  no  sign.  There 
was,  indeed,  a  very  special  reason  for  not  proceeding  with 
the  idea.  For  at  the  moment  Frederick  was  engaged  in 
an  attempt  to  gain  the  Russian  court  by  offering  a 
bribe  of  a  million  crowns  to  a  certain  Grand  Duke,  and 
a  demonstration  in  the  Baltic  was  the  last  thing  that 
was  wanted.^ 

The  truth  was  that  Pitt's  mind  was  working  in  quite  a 
different  direction.  From  the  first,  with  the  unerring 
instinct  of  the  great  War  Minister  he  was.  his  eyes  were 
fixed  on  Spain.  At  the  end  of  January  he  had  consented 
to  send  to  Prince  Ferdinand  two  more  regiments  of  horse 
and  three  of  dragoons,  but  there  was  never  a  hint  of 
entangling  the  fleet  in  the  Baltic  when  Spanish  arsenals 
were  awakening.  So  concerned  indeed  was  he  with  the 
outlook  in  the  southern  danger  area,  that  he  had  sent 
the  Earl  of  Kinnoul  on  a  special  mission  to  Lisbon,  to 
apologise  for  Boscawen's  breach  of  neutrality  in  destroying 
La  Clue's  ships  on  the  Portuguese  coast. 

By  April,  when  it  had  become  clear  that  the  negotiations 
for  the  congress  must  break  down,  and  that  another  cam- 
paign would  be  necessary,  the  idea  of  a  Baltic  squadron 
seems  to  have  been  entirely  dropped.     Newcastle  had  a 

^  Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  27-31. 


i76o  NEWCASTLE    AND   PITT  8i 

stormy  interview  Avith  Pitt  upon  the  prospect  of  a  re- 
newal of  the  war,  in  the  course  of  which  he  said  he  did 
not  see  how  we  could  carry  on  another  year.  Pitt,  he 
says,  "  flew  into  a  violent  passion."  That  kind  of  talk,  he 
said,  was  the  way  to  encourage  the  enemy.  We  were  a 
hundred  times  better  able  to  continue  than  the  French. 
"  In  short,"  says  the  Duke,  "  there  was  no  talking  to  him." 
As  to  the  Continental  situation,  Prince  Ferdinand,  whose 
Prussian  contingent  had  been  recalled  by  Frederick,  was 
still  pressing  for  further  reinforcement.  Here  Pitt  took 
a  curious  attitude.  He  said  he  personally  would  send  no 
more  troops  to  Germany,  but  if  others  wished  it  he  would 
not  oppose.  Newcastle's  circle  thought  this  meant  a  fresh 
outbreak  of  combined  expeditions.  "  Anson,"  the  Duke 
wrote  to  Hardwicke,  "  suspects  there  is  some  new  project 
of  an  attempt  on  some  part  of  the  coast  of  France  carrying 
on  unknown  to  him,"  which  he  said  was  "  monstrous  and 
insufferable."  Hardwicke  replied  that  he  too  had  his 
suspicions,  and  though  Anson  certainly  knew  nothing  of 
any  such  expedition,  he  fancied  that  Howe  did.^ 

There  is  some  reason  to  believe  that  these  suspicions 
were  not  without  foundation.  No  indication  is  found, 
however,  that  what  was  in  Pitt's  mind  was  any  operation 
against  the  French  coast.  An  expedition  does  seem  to 
have  been  on  foot  very  secretly,  but  the  cotton  clothing 
ordered  for  the  troops  and  the  sheathing  of  the  ships  gave 
an  impression  that  it  was  intended  for  tropical  seas. 
Keppel,  moreover,  was  mentioned  for  the  naval  command, 
and  he  was  best  known  for  his  brilliant  conduct  of  the 
little  expedition  which  had  inaugurated  the  great  year  of 
victory  by  the  capture  of  Goree,  the  French  slaving 
station  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa,  and  had  finally  estab- 
lished  the   British  position  in  that  quarter.      The   im- 

'  Newcastle  Papers,  April  9  and  10,  32,904. 
VOL.  II.  F 


82  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

pression  was  that  his  mission  was  to  do  in  the  East  Indies 
what  he  had  done  on  the  West  Coast  by  the  seizure  of  the 
French  naval  bases  in  those  seas  at  Mauritius  and  Reunion. 
The  miUtary  force  was  considerable,  said  indeed  to  amount 
to  eight  thousand  men  under  General  Kingsley ;  and 
those  who  knew  were  aware  that  orders  had  been  sent 
out  to  the  admiral  on  the  East  Indian  station  to  meet  the 
expedition  with  his  whole  force  at  Madagascar.^ 

How  far  Pitt  had  really  committed  himself  to  devoting 
so  large  a  force  to  what  we  have  called  the  "  general  pres- 
sure "  phase  of  the  war  is  uncertain.  The  idea  was  very 
likely  strongly  in  his  mind,  but  his  behaviour  at  this  time 
suggests  that  his  instinct  for  strategy  was  forcing  him 
against  his  inclination  to  continue  the  process  of  striking 
at  the  section  of  the  enemy's  armed  force  that  was  still 
confronting  him  undominated.  It  is  as  though  he  felt 
intuitively  the  necessity  of  breaking  it  down  before  he 
could  move  freely  in  the  second  phase  of  the  war.  We 
know  for  certain  there  was  growing  in  his  mind  a  convic- 
tion that,  in  view  of  the  overtures  of  France,  a  decisive 
blow  in  Westphalia  by  Ferdinand  was  the  shortest  road  to 
peace.  Such  a  blow  would  bring  home  to  Versailles  the 
hopelessness  of  trying  to  regain  in  Hanover  what  had  been 
lost  beyond  the  seas.  How  coercively  this  idea  possessed 
him  will  appear  later.  There  can  be  little  doubt  it  was 
correct.  On  the  Continent  the  second  phase  had  not  been 
reached — there  armed  forces  still  remained  to  be  struck, 
and  in  spite  of  his  antipathy  to  Continental  operations, 
and  in  spite  of  his  anxiety  to  reap  the  harvest  of  the  sea,  he 
could  not  resist  the  promptings  of  his  unerring  instinct 
for  war. 

It  was  such  considerations  as  these  that  were  almost 
certainly  at  the  bottom  of  the  striking  change  of  attitude 

^  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  420. 


i76o     "THE    GLORIOUS    REINFORCEMENT"       83 

which  compelled  him,  as  we  have  seen,  to  relax  the 
stubbornness  of  his  antipathy  to  sending  British  troops  to 
Germany.  Upon  Lord  Hardwicke's  suggestion,  he  and 
Newcastle  had  come  to  a  compromise  on  the  point.  On 
condition  that  Newcastle  would  not  oppose  Pitt's  contem- 
plated Bill  for  the  continuance  of  the  militia,  Pitt  would 
not  oppose  sending  more  troops  to  Germany.^  Newcastle 
promptly  ordered  away  four  battalions  of  infantry.  Pitt 
protested  against  such  a  step  without  the  consent  of  the 
Secret  Committee.  He  insisted  on  its  being  convened, 
and  thereupon  consented  to  the  despatch  of  six  battalions 
and  another  regiment  of  horse.  But  it  was  on  condition 
that  they  were  to  be  recalled  at  the  end  of  the  campaign, 
or  if  a  new  invasion  were  threatened,  and  that  the  best  of 
the  militia  were  to  be  embodied  "  to  make  the  face  of  an 
army  at  home  " ;  all  of  Avhich  is  suggestive  of  his  longing 
to  free  the  regular  army  for  offensive  operations  abroad. 

In  less  than  three  weeks  "  the  glorious  reinforcement," 
as  Newcastle  called  it,  had  sailed  from  the  Nore,  this 
time  for  the  Weser  instead  of  Emden.  It  reached 
Ferdinand's  camp  by  the  middle  of  June,  just  in  time  for 
the  opening  of  the  campaign.  The  British  troops,  now 
under  the  Marquis  of  Granby  in  place  of  Lord  George 
Sackville,  numbered  about  twenty  thousand,  Avhich,  with 
the  German  troops  in  British  pay,  were  calculated  as 
givmg  Prince  Ferdinand  an  army  of  eighty-eight  thousand 
men,  without  counting  Prussians  and  Hanoverians.  It 
was  a  force  which,  in  view  of  the  diversion  caused  by  the 
presence  of  the  fleet  on  the  French  coasts,  could  be  relied 
on  to  keep  Hanover  intact.  But  this  was  not  enough, 
and  here  arose  a  question  of  the  deepest  strategical  in- 
terest, and  one  which  is  still  amongst  the  most  difficult 
to  answer. 

*  "Mem.  fur  the  Kiug,"  April  24,  Newcastle  Papers,  :5L',y04. 


84  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

Hitherto  the  function  of  Ferdinand's  army  in  relation 
to  the  whole  war  had  been  defensive — to  cover  Hanover 
while  our  main  offensive  proceeded  elsewhere.  But  now 
that  something  more  was  required  of  it — some  positive, 
definite  gain,  and  not  merely  prevention — its  function 
became  positive,  and  defensive  action  no  longer  sufficed. 
To  achieve  a  positive  gain  leading  by  direct  pressure  to 
peace  the  offensive  is  always  essential,  and  somebody, 
probably  Pitt,  regarded  it  as  a  matter  of  course  that  "  the 
glorious  reinforcement  "  was  to  enable  Ferdinand  to  pass 
to  the  offensive.  It  was  an  implied  if  not  an  express 
condition  of  the  reinforcement  that  this  should  be  done. 
Newcastle,  however,  appears  to  have  raised  the  plausible 
but  more  than  doubtful  objection  that  the  general  on 
the  spot  must  be  the  judge.  Others  were  certainly 
determined  to  dictate  the  nature  of  his  operations,  and 
Newcastle  could  not  understand  their  attitude.  He 
referred  as  usual  to  Hardwicke,  and  the  shrewd  old 
lawyer  laid  down  the  strategical  principle  as  lucidly  as 
though  it  had  been  a  knotty  point  of  equity.  "  Last 
year,"  he  Avrote,  "  the  question  was  whether  he  should 
fight  a  battle.  Of  that  nobody  could  judge  but  the 
general  on  the  spot.  But  whether  the  general  plan  of  a 
campaign  should  be  offensive  or  defensive  is  a  political 
consideration  and  to  be  determined  upon  a  great  variety 
of  circumstances,  of  many  of  which  the  King  and  his 
Ministers  are  the  most  proper  judges,  though  of  many 
others  of  them  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  must 
first  determine."  ^  It  would  be  difficult  to  carry  this 
thorny  problem  further.  Certainly  no  one  has  ever  done 
so,  and  in  this  case  it  settled  the  question. 

The  point  once  determined  against  Newcastle's  view, 
we  find  Pitt  going  still  further  on  the  new  line.     It  was 

1  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,  June  G,  17G0,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,907. 


i76o  PITT'S   NEW    ATTITUDE  85 

never  his  way  to  do  things  by  halves,  and,  moreover,  it 
was  his  inflexible  rule  that  where  you  take  the  offensive 
and  seek  to  obtain  some  positive  advantage,  there  you 
must  concentrate  every  unit  you  can  come  by.  In  June, 
owing  to  Frederick's  finding  it  necessary  to  recall  his 
cavalry  from  Ferdinand's  army,  two  more  regiments  of 
horse  were  ordered  out  to  fill  the  gap.  But  even  this 
did  not  satisfy  Pitt.  More  must  and  could  be  spared. 
Ferdinand's  offensive  opening  which  was  directed  against 
Homburg  failed,  and  thereupon  Pitt  himself  took  the  lead. 
The  moment  was  favourable.  A  new  ambassador  from 
Spain,  the  Conde  de  Fuentes,  had  arrived,  and  was  making 
so  good  an  impression  in  London  that  an  alliance  with 
Spain,  or  at  least  an  entente  cordiale,  began  to  look  as 
likely  as  war.  At  any  rate  it  was  clear  that  Spain  was 
not  nearly  ready  for  hostilities.  The  ambassador  had 
dropped  the  question  of  mediation,  and  was  devoting  his 
attention  in  a  very  amicable  tone  to  settling  the  long 
outstanding  differences  as  to  our  right  to  cut  logwood  in 
Spanish  Central  America.  Towards  the  end  of  July, 
when  Ferdinand's  check  was  known,  all  looked  Avell,  and 
Pitt  surprised  Newcastle  by  proposing  to  send  out  three 
battalions  of  guards  so  as  to  ensure  the  campaign  being 
decisive.  Even  the  King  was  staggered.  At  first  he 
strongly  objected  ;  but  in  the  end  Pitt  prevailed,  and  the 
brigade  was  promptly  sent.^  Meanwhile  on  July  21st 
Ferdinand  had  fought  and  won  his  brilliant  little  action 
at  Marbourg,  mainly  by  the  daring  and  endurance  of 
Granby's  troops,  and  had  thereby  snatched  the  initiative 
from  his  adversary.  A  fortnight  later  Frederick  stumbled 
on  his  lucky  victory  at  Liegnitz,  at  which  no  one  was 
more  astonished  than  himself.     What  he  had  struggled 

*  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  July  21,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,908  ;  Ferdinand 
to  Holderness,  Aug.  28,  ibid.,  32,910. 


86  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

for  in  vain  with  all  his  art,  Fortune  suddenly  threw  into 
his  lap  ;  and  thus  at  the  end  of  August,  when  the  Guards 
reached  Ferdinand's  camp,  everything  looked  promising 
for  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  his  offensive  operations. 

Such,  then,  after  the  first  two  months  of  the  campaign, 
was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  our  Continental  theatre  of 
the  war.  Shortly,  it  may  be  said  that  our  operations 
there,  which  had  been  originally  of  a  purely  containing 
or  defensive  nature,  had  now  been  complicated  with  a 
true  offensive  intention,  and  were  taking  on  themselves 
the  characteristics  of  a  great  attack.  True,  it  was  an 
eccentric  attack,  for  though  aimed  directly  at  the  main 
forces  of  the  enemy,  it  was  not  aimed  at  the  main  object 
of  the  war  or  at  the  forces  in  the  main  theatre.  It  par- 
took, by  its  very  nature,  rather  of  the  second  phase,  and 
was  aimed  not  at  acquiring  anything  more  for  ourselves, 
but  of  forcing  the  enemy  to  accept  the  situation,  and  to 
agree  to  abandon  what  she  had  lost  beyond  the  seas. 

Bearing  all  this  in  mind,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to 
study  the  manner  in  which  naval  action  in  European  seas 
was  related  to  the  new  development  ashore.  In  general 
design  it  was  a  military  blockade  of  the  whole  French 
coast  from  Dunkirk  to  Marseilles.  The  operations  opened 
with  what  w^ere  really  the  dregs  of  the  last  campaign. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  new  year  there  remained, 
besides  the  ships  of  Conflans's  fleet  in  the  Villaine  and 
the  Charente,  two  other  fragments  of  the  French  naval 
force  that  had  escaped  destruction.  In  the  south  was  the 
division  of  La  Clue's  fleet  which  had  taken  refuge  in 
Cadiz,  under  the  command  of  its  senior  captain.  In  the 
north  was  Thurot,  with  the  squadron  he  had  got  out  of 
Dunkirk.  The  former  had  been  engaging  Brodrick's 
attention  ever  since  Boscawen's  action.  The  same  after- 
noon that  he  had  parted  with  his  chief  off  St.  Vincent 


I760  BRODRICK    AT    CADIZ  87 

lie  had  ascertained  from  a  Glasgow  merchantman  it  was 
in  Cadiz.  In  those  days  there  was  no  question  of  intern- 
ing or  disarming  belligerent  vessels  which  had  taken 
refuge  in  a  neutral  port.  Brodrick,  therefore,  sat  himself 
down  to  cruise  before  Cadiz,  and  his  action  was  quickly 
confirmed  from  home  by  orders  to  blockade.  For  three 
months  he  held  the  station,  picking  up  a  number  of 
valuable  prizes  from  the  West  and  East  Indies,  and  living 
in  constant  hope  that  the  French  would  put  to  sea.  But 
not  once  did  they  offer  to  stir.  This  state  of  things  con- 
tinued till  the  first  week  in  December,  when  a  heavy 
south-westerly  gale  forced  the  British  squadron  to  take 
refuge  in  Cadiz  Roads  in  an  almost  disabled  state.  The 
Prince  (90),  Brodrick's  flagship,  was  so  much  injured  that 
he  had  to  shift  his  flag  to  the  Conqueror  (74)  and  send 
the  Prince  to  Gibraltar,  Two  others  of  the  line  had  had 
to  cut  away  their  masts,  and  all  the  rest  were  short  of 
spars.  But  General  Wall  was  still  supreme  at  Madrid, 
and  the  Spanish  governor  showed  himself  complacent  in 
providing  masts  and  spars  and  all  facilities  for  a  refit. 

Brodrick,  left  with  only  three  of  the  line  and  a  fifty  fit 
for  service,  was  now  inferior  to  the  French,  who  had  three 
sixty-fours  and  two  fifties.  De  Castillon,  their  acting 
commodore,  saw  his  chance  to  escape,  and  formally 
demanded  assurance  from  the  governor  that  the  British 
should  not  bo  allowed  to  sail  for  twenty-four  hours  after 
he  left.  Thereupon  Brodrick,  to  put  a  good  face  on  the 
matter,  boldly  demanded  a  reciprocal  privilege  for  him- 
self, and  eventually  it  was  agreed  that  each  side  should 
have  the  right  to  put  to  sea  on  alternate  days.  Occa- 
sionally the  French  showed  signs  of  getting  under  weigh, 
and  it  is  said  the  English  did  their  best  to  assist  them  by 
passing  warps  and  the  like.  But  nothing  came  of  it,  and 
on  Christmas  Day  Brodrick  himself  got  out.     Scarcely 


88  THE   SECOND    PHASE  1 760-1 

was  he  off  the  port  again  when  another  gale  struck  him, 
and  on  December  30  th  forced  him  into  Gibraltar  in 
almost  as  bad  a  state  as  before.  Once  more  he  had  to 
devote  all  his  energy  to  repairing  his  ships.  Then  at 
last  the  French  commodore  hardened  his  heart  to  come 
out,  and  Brodrick  had  not  been  in  Gibraltar  two  days 
before  the  French  stole  through  the  Straits  at  night 
unseen  by  the  British  cruisers.  So  cleverly  had  they 
managed  that  it  was  not  till  January  16  th,  the  day  before 
Castillon  got  safely  into  Toulon,  that  Brodrick  knew  for 
certain  they  had  escaped  him.  Shortly  afterwards  he 
received  orders  to  return  home  with  all  his  ships  of  the 
line,  leaving  his  senior  frigate  captain  in  command  of  the 
cruisers  to  perform  the  ordinary  commerce  protection 
duties  of  the  station.  From  all  that  France  had  in  the 
Mediterranean  there  was  little  to  fear.  Castillon's  squadron 
was  paid  off  and  dismantled,  and  in  view  of  the  changing 
attitude  of  Spain  it  was  necessary  to  use  the  respite 
gained  by  Hawke's  and  Boscawen's  victories  to  overhaul 
the  whole  fleet  as  completely  as  possible  in  readiness  for 
a  great  effort.-^ 

The  squadron  of  Thurot,  well  known  as  he  was  to  the 
Baltic  trade  as  a  daring  and  redoubtable  privateersman, 
caused  the  Government  even  less  anxiety.  After  eluding 
the  blockade  of  Commodore  Boys  in  the  gale  off  Dunkirk, 
he  had  been  forced  by  bad  weather  to  run  to  the  coast  of 
Sweden,  and  Boys  ever  since  had  been  at  Leith  watching 
for  his  reappearance.  He  was  heard  of  at  Goteberg,  and 
towards  the  end  of  the  year  near  Bergen,  Boys  had 
cruisers  out  off  Peterhead,  but  in  council  of  war  with  the 
authorities  in  Edinburgh  it  was  decided  that  it  was  best 
for  him  to  remain  on  the  Scottish  coast  cruising  between 
Buchanness  and    St.  Abb's    Head    till    Thurot's  where- 

^  For  Brodrick's  Despatches  see  In-letters,  384. 


i76o  THUROT    AT    CARRICKFERGUS  89 

abouts  was  definitely  known.  He  had  indeed  already 
left  Bergen,  and  the  first  day  of  the  new  year  he  was 
forced  to  anchor  at  the  Faroes.  There  he  remained 
unreported  for  a  month.  It  was  not  till  the  end  of 
February  that  news  came  of  how  three  vessels  had 
appeared  at  Islay,  off  the  Argyle  coast,  and  were 
plundering  the  island  for  fresh  meat.  Still  Boys  did 
not  move.  It  was  known  that  Thurot  had  sailed  from 
Dunkirk  with  five  frigates  of  from  forty-four  to  eighteen 
guns,  and  a  sloop.  The  general  impression  at  Edinburgh 
was  that  the  strangers  must  be  part  of  La  Clue's  squadron, 
and  that  if  Boys  went  to  the  West  Coast  Thurot  might 
appear  on  the  East  at  any  moment. 

But  it  was  indeed  Thurot,  with  all  that  the  winter 
weather  had  left  of  his  squadron.  Sailing  from  Islay  so 
soon  as  his  wants  were  satisfied,  on  February  21st  he 
appeared  in  Belfast  Lough,  and  landed  about  a  thousand 
men  at  Carrickfergus.  Thurot  had  wished  to  attack 
Belfast  itself,  but  Flobert,  the  military  officer  in  command 
of  the  troops,  refused.  Indeed  relations  between  the 
two  services  were  by  this  time  strained  to  a  point  that 
made  substantial  success  impossible.  The  little  town, 
which  was  without  walls,  and  whose  castle  was  in  ruins, 
resisted  two  half-hearted  attacks ;  but  the  small  detach- 
ment that  garrisoned  the  place  then  found  its  ammunition 
was  exhausted,  and  unfortunately  decided  to  surrender,  a 
course  for  which  there  was  no  need.  Flobert  had  been 
seriously  wounded,  and  the  flag  of  truce  found  the  French 
cowering  behind  walls  with  apparently  no  idea  of  renew- 
ing the  attack.  They  naturally  jumped  at  the  capitula- 
tion, and  so  the  sorry  affair  ignominiously  ended.  Thurot 
then  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  Belfast  to  demand  victuals, 
and  General  Strode,  who  was  in  command,  and  the 
gentlemen    of    the    place   were   weak-kneed    enough    to 


90  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

comply.-'  Upon  this  Thurot  disappeared,  but  into  seas 
wliicli  were  soon  so  thickly  swarming  with  cruisers  as  to 
leave  him  scarcely  a  chance  of  escape. 

The  news  reached  the  Admiralty  on  the  26th,  five  days 
after  the  landing  and  the  day  after  the  re-embarkation. 
Boscawen  was  then  at  Plymouth  about  to  take  Hawke's 
place  on  the  French  coast,  and  orders  to  meet  the  situa- 
tion were  sent  him  the  same  night.  They  are  of  con- 
siderable interest  as  showing  how  speedily  the  organisation 
of  the  time  could  deal  with  a  raid.  One  ship  of  the  line 
and  two  frigates  were  to  cruise  off  Cape  Clear  in  such  a 
way  as  to  intercept  Thurot  if  he  came  down  St.  George's 
Channel.  A  similar  squadron  was  to  cruise  west  of  Cape 
Clear  to  catch  him  if  he  came  down  the  West  Coast  of 
Ireland,  while  a  third  was  to  proceed  off  Brest  to  be 
ready  for  him  if  he  escaped  the  other  two.  Yet  a  fourth 
squadron,  after  picking  up  the  Milford  guardship,  was 
to  proceed  direct  to  Carrickfergus.  By  the  evening  of 
the  29th  all  these  ships  were  away:  yet  all  were  fore- 
stalled.^ 

While  Thurot  and  his  troops  were  still  at  work  there 
was  lying  in  Kinsale  Captain  Elliot  of  the  yEolus  (32),  who 
had  been  forced  in  there  from  Hawke's  fleet  to  revictual. 
There  were  also  in  the  harbour  two  30 -gun  frigates,  the 
Pallas  and  Brilliant,  which  were  then  on  a  cruise  in  the 
Soundings  on  commerce  protection  duty.  In  Cork  was 
Captain  Scott,  whose  station  for  similar  duty  extended 
to  sixty  leagues  west  of  Cape  Clear.  Both  these  officers 
received  the  news  on  the  24th,  that  is,  the  day  before 
the  French  re-embarked.    Scott  immediately  ordered  the 

1  Provost  of  Glasgow  to  the  Admiralty,  Feb.  21  and  2G ;  Duke  of  Bed- 
ford's Despatch  with  Strode's  Report,  Feb.  23.  Copies  of  all  these  are 
collected  in  Newcastle  Papers,  32,902. 

'■^  In-letters,  5'20  (Boys) ;  Out-letters,  84,  Feb.  20-27  ;  In-letters,  90 
(Boscawen),  Feb.  28-9. 


i76o  THE    END    OF    THUROT'S    RAID  91 

Kinsale  frigates  to  join  him.  His  order  was  never 
delivered.  Elliot  was  already  away,  waiting  for  no  man. 
On  the  26th,  as  the  news  reached  the  Admiralty,  he  was 
reporting  himself  off  Dublin.  Without  pausing,  he  held 
on  straight  for  Belfast  Lough,  being  informed  Thurot  Avas 
still  there.  Arrived  off  the  Lous^h,  he  tried  in  vain  to  beat 
in.  A  contrary  and  violent  wind  kept  him  out.  But  it  was 
all  to  the  good.  At  daybreak  on  the  29th  he  had  sighted 
the  enemy  under  sail  and  gave  chase.  Thurot  had  then 
the  Marechal  de  Belleislc  (44),  the  Blo7ide  (36),  and  the 
Terpsichore  (24).  Elliot's  force  was  practically  equal. 
Coming  up  with  him  off  the  Isle  of  Man,  he  closed  at 
once,  and  in  an  hour  and  a  half  Thurot  was  dead,  and 
all  three  ships  had  struck.^ 

So  in  a  smart  display  of  cruiser  control  ended  the 
dregs  of  Belleisle's  great  attempt  at  a  counter-stroke, 
showing  how  little  such  a  raid  could  do  even  in  days  of 
slow  communication  on  a  coast  wholly  unprepared,  whore 
officers  behaved  badly  and  citizens  without  spirit.  The 
opinion  of  the  French  military  officers  on  the  whole  con- 
ception was  expressed  in  stinging  terms.  "  A  madman," 
wrote  one  of  Thurot,  "  puffed  up  with  the  favour  and 
confidence  of  a  Minister  whom  he  has  abused  with 
chimerical  projects.  .  .  .  Happy  is  he  to  have  found  a 
glorious  death  in  action,  when  he  ought  to  have  found  it 
on  the  gallows." " 

By  the  second  week  in  March  all  the  ships  that  had 
joined  the  hunt  were  on  their  stations  again,  and 
Boscawen  sailed  to  take  up  the  Great  Blockade.  Holmes 
was  given  the  Jamaica  station,  which  he  had  so  earnestly 


^  For  copies  of  Elliot's  Despatches  see  Newcastle  Papers,  32,902,  Feb.  24, 
2G,  and  29,  and  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  413.  The  Blonde  and  7'erpsichorc  were 
taken  into  the  navy  under  the  same  names. 

*  Lacour-Gayet,  p.  350  n.  , 


92  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

desired.  To  Saunders  fell  the  Mediterranean.  The  recall 
of  Brodrick  and  his  ships  of  the  line  did  not  mean  the 
suppression  of  the  squadron  for  long.  The  persistence 
of  Spain  in  her  equivocal  attitude  rendered  a  strong 
display  of  force  within  the  Straits  as  necessary  as  ever, 
and  in  May  Saunders  sailed  with  thirteen  of  the  line  and 
a  number  of  frigates,  which  brought  his  cruiser  squadron 
up  to  a  dozen.  While  he  kept  his  eye  on  Toulon  he 
devoted  a  large  part  of  his  force  to  the  destruction  of 
French  Levant  trade.  "  The  diligence  of  Admiral 
Saunders  was  such,"  says  Beatson,  "  that  from  the  time 
he  made  his  appearance  in  these  seas  the  enemy's  trade 
was  reduced  to  a  state  of  stagnation,"  and  all  the  evidence 
available  tells  us  this  was  no  exaggeration.  His  sagacious 
feeling  for  a  general  situation  enabled  him  also  to  play 
an  excellent  stroke  in  support  of  Lord  Kinnoul's  mission 
to  Portugal.  Hearing  that  a  number  of  influential 
Portuguese  had  been  expelled  from  the  Papal  dominions, 
he  sent  a  frigate  to  Leghorn  to  carry  them  to  Lisbon. 
The  step  had  an  excellent  effect,  and  no  doubt  contri- 
buted substantially  to  Kinnoul's  success. 

With  Saunders  thus  active  in  the  Mediterranean,  the 
Great  Blockade  extended  from  Marseilles  to  Brest,  and 
thence  it  was  carried  onward  by  Rodney  and  Boys  as 
far  as  Dunkirk.  It  was,  of  course,  not  a  true  commercial 
blockade ;  that  is,  it  was  not  regarded  as  binding  on 
neutrals  except  for  contraband  of  war.  It  was  aimed  at 
preventing  any  reunion  of  the  fragments  into  which  the 
French  navy  had  been  broken,  as  well  as  at  covering 
the  operations  in  Canada,  and  paralysing  the  French  sea- 
borne trade.  Several  home-coming  ships  of  war  were 
taken,  and  many  privateers  and  rich  merchantmen, 
while  tlie  coastwise  traffic,  according  to  French  local 
accounts,  was  almost  completely  stopped.      The  pressure, 


i76o  HAWKE'S    LANDING   PROJECT  93 

added   to   that  which   Ferdinand  was   exerting    on    the 
northern  frontier,  was  very  severe. 

Nor  did  it  end  here.  Up  and  down  the  coast  threats 
of  attack  kept  the  local  forces  in  constant  alarm.  In 
July  Rodney,  in  pursuit  of  some  flat-boats  that  were 
being  used  to  transport  naval  stores  to  Brest,  destroyed 
the  forts  of  Sallenelles  and  Ouistreham,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Orne,  and  then  bombarded  Port-en-Bessin,  where 
some  of  the  chases  tried  to  take  refuge.  He  also 
destroyed  all  the  fisheries  about  Dieppe.  In  August, 
when  Hawke  relieved  Boscawen  and  a'j^ain  took  com- 
mand  of  the  blockade,  the  pressure  became  still  more 
severe.  The  island  of  Dumet,  off  Morbihan,  commanded 
the  best  anchorage  in  the  bay.  He  resolved  therefore 
to  seize  it,  and  as  soon  as  he  arrived  he  entrusted  its 
capture  to  Howe.  He  performed  the  work  as  neatly  as 
usual.  The  island  proved  of  great  value  for  fresh  vege- 
tables, and  so  excellent  a  watering-place,  that  thence- 
forward water  transports  could  be  dispensed  with,  greatly 
to  the  ease  and  economy  of  the  blockade.  Having 
secured  this  advantage,  Hawke,  full  of  renewed  vigour 
after  his  rest  ashore,  forthwith  proceeded  to  work  out  a 
bold  plan  for  seizing  the  ships  that  were  still  lying 
beyond  his  reach  in  Morbihan  and  the  Villaine.  His 
idea  was  to  establish  himself  on  the  mainland  at  a 
point  from  which,  with  his  marines  and  landing-parties, 
he  could  operate  at  little  risk  against  Auray,  Vannes, 
and  the  Villaine.  The  little  peninsula  of  Rhuys,  which 
is  cut  off  from  the  interior  by  a  narrow  pass,  called  by 
Hawke  the  "  St.  Jacques  Neck,"  seemed  to  offer  an  ideal 
position.  In  the  admiral's  opinion  he  would  be  able  to 
hold  it  against  anything  the  enemy  could  bring  to  bear 
upon  him,  and  thus  secure  a  perfectly  safe  base  and  point 
of  retreat.     The  operation  seems  to  have  been  designed 


94  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

in  the  soundest  style,  and  to  afford  an  excellent  example 
of  the  kind  of  territorial  pressure  which  is  legitimately 
open  to  a  purely  naval  force  in  complete  command  of 
the  sea.  Few  things  in  the  whole  war  would  be  more 
interesting  than  to  know  how  such  an  extension  of  the 
naval  arm  would  have  worked;  but  unfortunately,  as 
Hawke's  scheme  Avas  ripening  for  execution,  he  received 
a  communication  from  home  which  brought  everything 
to  a  standstill. 

As  though  by  the  working  of  some  inevitable  law,  the 
strategical  necessities  of  the  shore  operations  against  the 
armed  forces  of  the  enemy  began  to  assert  themselves 
over  the  secondary  operations  of  the  fleet.  We  have 
seen  how  rosy  was  the  outlook  for  Ferdinand's  taking 
the  offensive  when  at  the  end  of  August  Hawke  had 
resumed  the  command  in  Quiberon  Bay.  So  threatening, 
indeed,  was  the  prospect  for  France  that  Marshal  Belleisle 
saw  that  a  further  effort  must  be  made  to  save  the  situa- 
tion. Accordingly  he  ordered  a  fresh  army  to  be  formed 
upon  the  Lower  Rhine  to  check  Ferdinand's  advance  by 
operating  against  his  extreme  right.  As  the  new  move 
became  known,  Ferdinand  redoubled  his  efforts  to  get  a 
decision  in  the  field.  In  England  from  day  to  day  every 
one  was  hoping  to  hear  a  battle  had  been  fought,  and 
nobody  was  so  eager  as  Pitt  himself.  As  the  days  went  by 
and  Ferdinand's  enemy  continued  to  evade  him,  he  grew 
anxious.  Pitt  know  that  a  decisive  victory  and  that 
alone  would  serve  his  turn,  and  for  that  and  nothing 
else  he  had  consented  to  let  the  "  glorious  reinforce- 
ment "  go.  He  was  specially  annoyed  by  a  despatch  from 
the  commissary  of  the  British  troops,  in  which  it  was 
said  that  if  Ferdinand  could  make  the  French  retire  it 
would  be  a  great  campaign  even  without  a  decisive 
battle.     "  I  don't  think  so,"  said  Pitt  to  Newcastle    in 


i76o        COASTAL    OPERATIONS    RESUMED         95 

discussing  the  letter.  "  That  won't  do  our  business.  I 
declare,  for  one,  that  without  a  battle  I  will  not  be  for 
the  continuance  of  the  measures  in  Germany  another 
year."  ^ 

September  was  passing  to  its  end,  and  still  there  was  no 
news  of  the  battle.  Instead  of  it  came  growing  expres- 
sions of  anxiety  about  the  new  French  army.  The  best 
intelligence  reported  that  the  bulk  of  the  troops  were  to 
be  drawn  from  the  coasts  of  Flanders,  Picardy,  Normandy, 
and  even  Brittany.  It  was  a  clear  case  for  the  kind  of 
diversion  with  which  Pitt  had  inaugurated  his  conduct 
of  the  war.  At  the  beginning  of  the  difficulties  which 
Ferdinand  was  encountering  he  had  pressed  for  still 
further  reinforcements,  and  had  been  refused  with  some 
asperity.  Now  therefore  came,  as  before,  a  cry  for 
another  diversion  by  sea.  On  the  last  day  of  September 
Pitt  and  NcAvcastle  talked  it  over.  Pitt  suggested  as  an 
objective  Boulogne,  which  seemed  the  most  obvious  way 
to  stopping  the  new  French  movement,  and  Newcastle 
was  inclined  to  agree  as  it  had  a  distinct  Continental 
flavour.  But,  says  Newcastle,  Pitt  also  "  flung  out  Belle- 
isle,  which  he  has  always  harped  upon."  To  Newcastle 
it  was  anathema.  The  idea  had  been  suggested  to  Pitt 
as  early  as  1756  as  a  reply  to  the  loss  of  Minorca. 
In  the  view  of  the  author  of  the  design  the  occupation 
of  Belleisle  would  enable  us  effectually  to  blockade  the 
French  coast  and  force  them  to  keep  fifty  or  sixty  thousand 

*  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Sept.  13.  Hardwicke's  answer  is  interesting 
as  showing  that  he  had  made  a  serious  study  of  strategy.  He  doubted  the 
absolute  truth  of  Pitt's  strenuous  theory  of  the  decisive  battle  whicli  has 
since  become  current  coin.  He  quoted  against  it  a  saying  of  the  great 
Duke  of  Alva :  "  It  is  the  business  of  a  general  always  to  get  the  better  of 
his  enemy,  but  not  always  to  fight,  and  if  he  can  do  his  business  without 
fighting  so  much  the  better."  This  was  certainly  the  accepted  theory  of 
war  at  the  time,  and  there  were  few  besides  Pitt  and  Frederick  who  would 
then  have  questioned  it.    See  Newcastle  Papers,  32,911,  Sept.  13  and  14. 


96  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

men  in  the  neighbourhood.  They  would,  he  said,  be  even 
more  afraid  of  us  than  our  people  had  been  of  them.^ 

It  was  at  any  rate  too  good  an  idea  not  to  recur  now. 
The  news  that  Montreal  had  fallen  was  expected  any 
day,  and  the  main  object  of  the  war  was  practically 
attained.  The  secondary  phase  of  general  pressure  was 
declaring  itself  more  emphatically,  and  what  could  be 
better  for  the  work  than  the  capture  of  Belleisle  ?  As 
a  base  for  the  great  blockade,  and  for  such  attacks  as 
Hawke  even  then  had  in  his  mind,  it  was  ideally  placed. 
In  Pitt's  view  the  presence  of  a  number  of  troops  in 
so  perfect  a  iilace  d'armes  would  expose  all  the  coast  of 
the  Bay  of  Biscay  to  sudden  raids,  and  force  the  French 
to  detach  a  considerable  section  of  their  forces  for  its  pro- 
tection. As  a  diversion  in  Ferdinand's  favour  it  would 
be  almost  as  powerful  as  an  attack  on  Boulogne.  But 
in  Pitt's  mind  there  was  almost  certainly  a  very  different 
motive.  The  troops  that  were  to  form  the  new  army 
on  the  Rhine  were  already  in  motion  from  all  parts  of 
France,  and  Ligonier  and  most  other  people  were  of 
opinion  that  by  no  possible  means  could  the  expedition 
be  organised  in  time  to  be  of  use  to  Ferdinand.  This 
difficulty  only  inclmed  Pitt  still  more  strongly  to  prefer 
Belleisle  as.  an  objective,  for  he  saw  in  it  a  means  of 
securing  compensation  for  a  failure  he  could  not  prevent. 

It  happened  that  the  negotiations  with  Spain  had 
once  more  taken  an  ugly  turn.  The  ambassador  had 
just  presented  a  new  claim  about  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries  which  was  regarded  as  absolutely  groundless. 
But  this  was  not  the  worst.     In  presenting  his  note  the 

1  "  Project  by  Tlionias  Cole  for  taking  Belleisle,"  Aug.  11,  1756.  Who- 
ever Cole  was,  he  seems  to  have  taken  himself  seriously  as  a  strategist. 
He  supports  his  idea  thus  :  "  To  carry  on  war  to  the  greatest  advantage 
would  be  always  to  invade  the  invader.  Queen  Elizabeth  did  so  with 
Philip  II.,  and  soon  found  the  good  effect  of  it." 


i76o  PITT    COVETS    BELLEISLE  97 

ambassador  stated  that  it  had  been  communicated  to 
France.  Pitt  had  very  firmly  expressed  his  surprise  at  such 
a  provocatory  proceeding,  and  demanded  an  explanation 
of  what  Spain  meant  by  bringing  into  the  negotiations  a 
court  at  war  with  England.  Fuentes  replied  with  two 
'  extraordinary  pieces  "  which  reiterated  both  claims  and 
only  made  things  worse.  ^  In  Pitt's  eyes  it  was  a  clear 
intimation  that  Spain  intended  to  make  common  cause 
with  France  in  order  to  secure  her  own  Colonial  pos- 
sessions, and  to  save  herself  from  the  results  of  a  peace 
which  would  leave  England  mistress  of  North  America 
and  predominant  in  the  West  Indies. 

Here,  then,  it  was  that  lay  the  supreme  value  of  Belle- 
isle,  which  no  one  but  Pitt  seems  to  have  thoroughly 
appreciated.  Great  as  was  the  naval  and  even  the 
military  importance  of  its  capture,  both  were  outweighed 
by  the  diplomatic  value.  Nothing  within  the  scope  of 
our  forces  could  so  surely  strengthen  our  hand  when  it 
came  to  making  peace.  Its  retention  would  place  us  in 
a  position  to  dominate  the  maritime  activity  of  France 
that  was  unsurpassed  by  Minorca  itself.  It  gave  us  a 
post  in  the  gateway  of  French  Atlantic  commerce ;  it 
placed  us  astride  of  every  avenue  of  their  seaborne 
trade.  From  every  point  of  view  it  created  a  situation 
which  was  unendurable  for  France,  and  nothing  we 
could  demand  could  well  be  too  high  a  price  to  pay 
for  its  retrocession.  It  was  not  unlikely  that  Spain 
would  demand  Minorca  as  a  condition  of  her  assistance, 
but  so  long  as  we  held  Belleisle  France  would  not  be 
able  to  grant  it.  It  was  an  absolute  pledge  for  our 
recovery  of  the  lost  island,  while  as  for  its  special  strate- 
gical value,  if  Spain  declared  war  it  gave  us  a  naval  base 
interposed  between  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets. 

1  Hardwickc  to  Pitt,  Sept.  29,  Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  p.  68. 
VOL.  II.  G 


98  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

Such  at  least  was  Pitt's  view  of  the  strategical 
value  of  Belleisle.  Others  thought  differently,  and,  like 
Choiseul  himself,  regarded,  or  affected  to  regard,  its 
capture  as  a  pin-prick  of  no  importance.  Still,  the 
reasoning  which  weighed  with  Pitt  was  undeniably 
strong,  and  if  he  was  convinced,  and  in  his  masterful 
assurance  carried  away  all  opposition,  it  is  no  wonder. 
The  day  after  his  talk  with  Newcastle  he  went  to  the 
King,  and  the  King  "  was  violently  for  it."  From  the 
royal  closet  he  Avent  to  the  Admiralty  to  order  ten 
thousand  tons  more  transport  to  increase  the  expedition 
that  was  already  on  foot.  Newcastle  thereupon  went 
in  indignation  to  the  King  to  protest.  He  also  asked 
Anson  to  dinner,  and  Anson,  he  says,  was  "  extremely 
against  it."  Ligonier,  too,  expressed  his  doubts.  The 
question  was  therefore  referred  to  the  Secret  Committee. 
But  there,  to  Newcastle's  disgust,  no  one  would  support 
him.  Ligonier,  it  is  true,  pronounced  the  troops  could 
not  be  ready  for  six  weeks,  and  Pitt  wavered  a  little. 
Anson  in  his  turn  declared  the  weather  would  be  good 
till  the  middle  of  November.  In  the  end  nothins^  was 
definitely  decided  except  that  the  expedition  designed 
for  the  Mauritius  was  to  be  reinforced,  and  that  it  would 
act  somewhere  on  the  coast  of  France  instead.^ 

Next  day  came  the  news  that  Montreal  had  fallen 
and  Pitt  appears  to  have  made  up  his  mind.  The  ex- 
peditionary force  at  Portsmouth  was  quickly  brought  up 
to  seven  battalions  of  the  line.  At  the  same  time  two 
more  regiments  were  ordered  to  embark  from  Ireland, 
while  a  battalion  of  the  guards,  a  regiment  of  dragoons, 
and  a  great  siege-train  were  set  in  motion  for  the 
coast. 

Every  one  could  see  the  objective  was  no  longer  in  the 

^  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Oct.  3,  Newcastle  Papers,  32.912. 


I760         PREPARATIONS    FOR   BELLEISLE  99 

East  Indies.  "  Where  they  go,  God  knows,"  wrote  New- 
castle to  Hardwicko,  as  troops  and  guns  and  stores  began 
to  file  down  the  Portsmouth  Road  past  his  house  at 
Claremont  in  endless  procession,  "  I  write  treason. 
Not  a  word ! "  For  him  it  was  all  another  bit  of 
Pitt's  mania,  and  he  was  almost  in  despair.  For  such 
an  army  to  be  risked  on  the  sea  in  a  November  expedi- 
tion was  madness,  and  Anson  himself  was  ill  at  ease. 
The  only  hope  of  Newcastle  and  his  friends  was  that 
Pitt  could  not  be  really  in  earnest,  and  that  the  whole 
thing  was  intended  to  operate  as  a  threat  only. 

It  was  a  view  for  which  there  was  some  colour.  The 
objective  was  still  not  decided  officially.  It  had  been  agreed 
to  refer  the  matter  to  the  Secret  Committee,  and  Keppel, 
who  was  to  command,  Avas  called  home  to  attend  it.  He 
had  personally  reconnoitred  Belleisle  during  the  summer, 
and  when  he  arrived  it  was  clear  to  the  committee  that 
he  was  by  no  means  sure  the  operation  was  practicable. 
He  was  in  doubt  whether  the  ships  could  approach 
within  gunshot  of  the  only  landing-place,  and  whether 
the  citadel  did  not  command  it.  Pitt  himself  was 
shaken,  and  thought  the  point  serious  enough  to  refer 
to  Hawke  before  anything  was  finally  settled.  This  step 
was  regarded  by  the  doubters  as  meaning  the  abandonment 
of  the  expedition,  and  Hardwicke  predicted  that  no  clear 
opinion  would  be  got  from  Hawke,  "  whose  character,"  he 
said,  "  I  take  it,  is  to  be  diffident  and  balancing."  ^ 

It  was  the  receipt  of  a  despatch  from  Anson  in- 
forming Hawke  of  the  project  on  foot  and  the  points 
he  was  to  report  on  that  interrupted  his  arrangements 
for  a  landing  on  his  own  account.  Naturally  he  did  not 
receive   the   idea   with   any   great   favour,   being   wholly 

'  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke.  Oct.  11,  and  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle, 
Oct.  12,  Newcastle  I'aperi,  32,913. 


loo  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

wrapt  up  in  his  own  promising  design,  A  fresh  recon- 
naissance was  made,  and  upon  it  Hawko  made  his  report. 
He  began  with  a  strictly  professional  protestation  of  his 
readiness  to  carry  out  any  enterprise  that  was  com- 
manded, and  then,  without  very  definitely  answering  the 
questions  that  had  been  referred  to  him,  he  proceeded  to 
throw  cold  water  on  the  whole  project.  Full  weight  was 
given  to  the  undoubted  difficulties  of  the  enterprise,  but, 
worse  still,  ho  criticised  Pitt's  strategy  in  terms  that  came 
near  to  ridicule.  He  could  not  see,  he  said,  how  you 
were  going  to  affect  the  mainland  by  occupying  an  island, 
and  he  then  went  on  to  explain  his  own  project  and  to 
point  out  how  superior  it  was  to  Pitt's.  He  took  no  pains 
to  conceal  his  disappointment,  but  said  that,  as  somethhig 
so  much  more  ambitious  was  on  foot,  his  own  scheme 
would  be  abandoned.^ 

A  week  later  Hawke's  answer  reached  Anson,  and  he 
carried  it  straight  to  the  King.  In  the  interval  the 
opposition  had  been  growing.  Ligonier  declared  the 
troops  would  be  fit  for  nothing  for  three  months  after 
they  returned.  Anson  could  not  forget  November 
weather  in  the  bay,  and  Pitt,  bending  before  the  storm, 
had  declared  himself  ready  to  drop  the  whole  thing  if 
Hawke  reported  unfavourably,  or  if  the  Council  was  against 
it.  When  he  know  the  report  had  come  he  hurried  to 
the  palace.  Newcastle  describes  the  scene.  Pitt  was 
thoroughly  out  of  temper  that  the  report  had  been  taken 
to  the  King  before  ho  saw  it,  but  Hawke,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, was  not  directly  under  his  orders.  Anson 
came  out  of  the  closet  to  say  that  the  King  declared  the 
thing  impracticable,  and  would  not  permit  his  troops  to 
go.     Pitt  was  used  to  overcoming  such  opposition.     He 

1  A  copy  of  the  despatch,  dated  Oct.  17,  is  in  Newcastle  Papers,  32,913, 
also  in  Lord  Donoughmoie's  Beaufort  MSH,  {Hist.  Com.  Rep.),  p.  122. 


i76o  PITT    AND    HAWKE'S    REPORT  loi 

was  the  last  to  go  in,  and  presently  came  out  "  very  dis- 
turbed." Presumably  there  had  been  something  like  a 
scene.  Pitt  gave  vent  to  his  feelings  in  the  anteroom  by 
attacking  Hawke  "  most  bitterly,"  He  was  "  a  very  good 
sea  officer,"  he  said,  "  but  no  Minister."  Not  only  had  he 
stopped  the  Belleislc  plan,  but  he  had  dropped  his  own, 
and  the  angry  Minister  declared  he  would  have  no  more 
to  do  with  it.  He  was,  in  short,  furious  with  Hawke 
and  his  report.  "  From  this  letter,"  concludes  Newcastle, 
"  I  date  poor  Sir  Edward's  fall  and  Admiral  Boscawen's 
rise."  ^  Newcastle  was  probably  right.  In  the  defec- 
tive statesmanship  which  in  Pitt's  eyes  Hawke  had  ex- 
hibited, and  which  the  great  War  Minister  regarded  as  so 
essential  a  qualification  for  high  naval  command,  we  see 
at  least  one  of  the  reasons  that  so  long  denied  the  ill- 
starred  admiral  his  reward.  It  was  without  doubt  the 
origin  of  Pitt's  well-known  remark  to  Boscawen.  "  When," 
he  is  reported  to  have  said,  "  I  apply  to  other  officers 
respecting  any  expedition  I  may  chance  to  project,  they 
always  make  difficulties :  you  find  expedients." 

But  the  episode  was  to  have  a  catastrophe  far  more 
forcible  than  the  marring  of  Hawke's  career.  The  tension 
and  heart-burning  it  caused  culminated  in  a  tragedy  that 
distorted,  no  one  can  tell  how  profoundly,  the  whole 
course  and  result  of  the  Avorld-wide  struggle.  For  early 
next  morning,  a  few  minutes  after  the  harassed  old  King 
had  risen,  his  valet  found  him  dead. 

The  tragic  end  of  a  reign  that  was  culminating  so 
gloriously  was  wholly  unexpected.  No  one  was  pre- 
pared. Nothing  had  been  decided,  and  while  every 
one  was  forced  to  be  securing  his  position  under  the 
new  sovereign  nothing  could  be  done.  The  expedi- 
tion remained  in  suspense,  while  Ministers  schemed  and 

*  Newcastle  to  Ilanlwicke,  Oct,  25,  ibiiL 


I02  THE   SECOND   PHASE  1760 

intrigued.  Still  it  was  not  abandoned.  The  Irish  regi- 
ments were  already  marching,  and  advices  kept  coming  in 
of  the  disturbance  the  armament  was  causing  in  French 
counsels.  Ferdinand  himself  sent  in  a  report,  for  the 
truth  of  which  he  could  not  vouch,  that  it  had  stopped 
the  troops  ordered  against  him  from  Flanders.  The 
regular  intelligence  agents  sent  in  information  to  the 
same  effect,  and  Hawke  obtained  from  a  Dutch  skipper 
an  assurance  that  the  marching  orders  of  the  troops  in 
Southern  Brittany  had  been  countermanded.^ 

It  is  possible  these  reports  had  their  effect.  Within  a 
fortnight  of  the  young  King's  accession  Pitt  had  estab- 
lished his  ascendency ;  he  was  on  the  best  terms  Avith 
the  new  favourite,  Lord  Bute ;  and  Newcastle's  party, 
which  included  Anson,  Hardwicke,  and  Mansfield,  were 
in  the  shade.  In  the  second  week  of  November  the 
Cabinet  met  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  Belleisle  enter- 
prise, and  Pitt  was  able  to  obtain  a  resolution  that  it 
should  proceed.  Nor  was  this  all.  On  November  14th 
Anson  sent  Hawke  full  details  of  the  expedition  that  was 
coming,  and  orders  to  despatch  a  frigate  for  the  Irish 
units,  but  that  was  the  last  he  had  to  do  with  it.  For 
Pitt,  according  to  his  usual  practice  where  combined 
operations  were  concerned,  obtained  from  the  King  an 
order  that  Hawke  was  to  take  his  instructions  from  him, 
and  not  from  the  Admiralty. 

On  the  17th  he  sent  off  his  secret  orders.  Practically 
they  relegated  Hawke  to  the  position  he  had  so  deeply 
resented  in  1757.  He  was  simply  told  he  was  to  afford 
every  assistance  to  Keppel  and  Kingsley,  and  cover  their 
operations  Avith  his  fleet.^     That  Hawke  would  have  done 

^  Ferdinand  to  Holdcrncss,  Oct.  10;  Advices  from  Versailles,  Oct.  31, 
ibid.  ;  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  In-letters,  Nov.  (5. 

2  Burrow's  Life  of  Ilaioke,  p.  433  ;  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  Nov.  2G,  In- 
letters,  92 ;  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Nov.  7,  Newcastle  Pai^rs,  32,914. 


i76o  EFFECTS    OF    THE    THREAT  103 

his  duty  in  a  situation  that  can  hardly  have  been  easy 
for  him  no  one  will  doubt,  but  he  was  destined  not  to 
be  put  to  the  proof.  In  less  than  a  week  after  Pitt  had 
given  the  secret  orders  he  was  convinced  that  it  was 
too  late  for  the  expedition  to  proceed,  and  on  Novem- 
ber 22  nd  he  told  Hawke  he  was  to  send  back  the  Irish 
regiments,  and  that  the  expedition  had  been  postponed.^ 

For  some  time  longrer  it  continued  in  France  to  cause 
anxiety  for  Rochefort,  L'Orient,  and  Belleisle,  and  every- 
where to  exercise  the  ingenuity  of  the  embassies.  One 
was  certain  that  it  was  going  to  combine  with  Amherst 
against  Martinique.  Another  guessed  Belleisle  or  the 
French  coast.  The  Spaniards  were  sure  it  had  been 
intended  for  Ostend  if  Ferdinand  could  have  held  his 
ground,  and  were  equally  certain  it  was  now  going  to 
Minorca.  "  Every  one,"  it  was  said  at  the  Hague,  "  is 
impatiently  watching  for  news  of  the  great  expedition."  ^ 
Keppel  himself  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  its  postpone- 
ment up  to  the  last  moment.  On  November  28th  he 
informed  Pitt  the  expedition  was  ready  to  sail,  and  the 
Admiralty  that  he  meant  to  take  the  first  fair  wind.  A 
few  days  later  he  dropped  down  to  St.  Helens  to  await 
his  final  orders.  The  movement  caused  a  fresh  out- 
break of  alarm  along  the  French  coast.  As  late  as  the 
middle  of  December  they  were  trying  desperately  to  pass 
troops  across  to  Belleisle  in  the  face  of  Hawke's  light 
cruisers ;  the  colonels  of  all  the  coast  regiments  were 
ordered  to  remain  with  their  colours ;  troops  were  passed 
from  Normandy  to  Brittany;  Brest  and  Bordeaux  were 
in  a  feverish  state  of  alarm.  Till  the  last  possible 
moment  Pitt  kept  up  the  threat  that  could  no  longer 
be  executed,  and  it  was   not   till  December   11th  that 

>  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  Dec.  30,  In-lMers,  92. 

'  See  8. P.  Porevjn  {Intercepted  Letters)^  Nov.-Dec,  vol.  80. 


I04  THE    SECOND    PHASE  1760 

Keppel  was  informed  that  he  was  not  to  proceed  to  sea 
till  further  orders,  and  that  he  was  to  disembark  the 
troops  at  once.^ 

Nothing  could  illustrate  better  the  importance  which 
Pitt  attached  to  the  peculiar  deterrent  effect  of  troops 
upon  the  sea.  Far  away  in  India,  as  we  shall  see,  it 
had  been  felt  as  keenly  as  in  Europe.  There  it  pro- 
duced a  marked  and  lasting  effect,  but  at  home  it  was 
all  too  late  to  save  the  situation  in  Westphalia.  The 
decisive  battle  never  came.  The  new  army  of  the  Lower 
Rhine  was  formed,  and  though  not  as  strong  as  had 
been  intended  OAving  to  the  threat  of  Keppel's  expedi- 
tion, it  sufficed  to  drive  in  Ferdinand's  right  under  the 
young  Hereditary  Prince  of  Brunswick.  The  consequence 
was  that  Ferdinand  Avas  forced  to  retire  and  finally  to 
take  up  winter  quarters,  which  abandoned  Hesse  to  the 
French,  and  left  in  their  hands  all  the  chief  passes  into 
Hanover.  True,  Frederick  had  balanced  the  situation 
somewhat  by  his  costly  victory  at  Torgau,  which  gave 
him  back  the  greater  part  of  Saxony :  but  on  the  side 
of  Hanover  the  outlook  for  the  next  campaign  was  very 
dark.  "  For  God's  sake,"  wrote  Newcastle  to  Yorke  in 
the  depths  of  his  depression  at  the  coldness  of  the  new 
court,  "  don't  name  the  expedition  any  more.  I  don't 
believe  it  ever  frightened  or  alarmed  France.  I  thank 
God  it  is  now  unanimously  stopped." 

^  Paris  Advices,  Dec.  12,  French  Intelligence,  Dec.  17,  Newcastle  Papers, 
32,916;  Pitt  to  Commodore  Keppel,  Dec.  11,  Keppel,  /Afe  of  Viscount 
Keppel,  vol.  i.  p.  295;  Hawke  to  Admiralty,  Dec.  15,  In-lettcrs,  92  ;  Keppel 
to  same,  Nov.  28  and  Dec.  li,  ibid.,  91. 


CHAPTER   III 

MAIN  ATTACK,   1760— MONTREAL 

If  the  operations  in  Europe  had  failed  to  achieve  all  the 
secondary  effects  that  had  been  hoped,  in  their  main 
function  they  had  been  an  entire  success.  Behind  them 
the  conquest  of  Canada  had  been  proceeding  smoothly 
and  without  interruption.  It  might  even  be  dismissed 
as  little  more  than  a  military  promenade,  but  though  no 
feat  of  arms  like  that  of  Wolfe  at  Quebec  distinguished 
it,  it  is  still  noteworthy  as  a  piece  of  well-adjusted  organ- 
isation, and  as  an  example  of  the  overwhelming  force  of 
a  concentrated  attack  scientifically  conceived,  resolutely 
maintained,  and  adequately  covered. 

Amherst,  in  spite  of  his  failure  to  penetrate  to  the 
St.  Lawrence  in  the  previous  campaign,  had  far  too  great 
a  power  of  administration,  and  too  fine  a  talent  for  work- 
ing with  the  Colonial  authorities  and  troops  not  to  be 
continued  in  command.  His  general  orders  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  campaign  were  sent  him  by  Pitt  on  January 
7th.  They  gave  him  practically  a  free  hand.  He  was 
instructed  to  push  operations  for  the  invasion  of  Canada 
with  the  utmost  vigour.  His  objective  was  to  be 
Montreal,  but  it  was  loft  to  him  to  proceed  by  one  or 
more  lines  of  operation  as  he  deemed  best.  He  was  also 
instructed  to  have  a  constant  and  particular  care  for 
Quebec,  to  inform  General  Murray,  the  officer  in  com- 
mand, of  the  operations  decided  on,  and  to  give  him  such 
directions   as   he   thought  expedient.     Further,  he   was 


io6  THE    MONTREAL    CAMPAIGN  1760 

directed  to  undertake  from  Pennsylvania,  in  the  southern 
area  of  his  command,  such  operations  as  he  thought 
necessary  for  removing  all  future  dangers.^ 

Upon  these  instructions  he  proceeded  to  work  out  one 
of  the  finest  combinations  ever  carried  through  by  British 
forces.  As  before,  the  plan  was  based  upon  a  convergence 
of  three  lines  of  operations,  but  with  this  important  modi- 
fication of  the  last  year's  design.  His  own  main  attack 
was  no  longer  to  be  by  Lakes  George  and  Champlain,  but 
by  the  westerly  route  which  Prideaux  and  Johnson  had 
opened  for  him  by  the  capture  of  Niagara.  Upon  the 
old  line  he  would  merely  employ  a  minor  covering  force 
under  Colonel  Haviland,  one  of  his  most  trusty  lieu- 
tenants, which  would  confuse  the  enemy,  hold  them  to 
Montreal,  and  prevent  a  counterstroke  upon  his  base  at 
Albany.  The  advance  on  both  lines  was  to  be  simulta- 
neous, and  to  complete  and  emphasise  the  design  a  third 
advance  in  time  with  the  other  two  was  to  be  made  by 
the  Quebec  garrison  under  Murray.  The  strategy  was 
excellent,  and  obviously  directed  at  dealing  a  decisive 
blow  from  which  there  could  be  no  escape.  For  some 
time  past  Vaudreuil,  in  his  more  heroic  moments,  had 
been  informing  the  French  court  that  his  intention  was 
never  to  give  up  the  struggle,  but  as  a  last  resource  to 
retire  into  the  interior,  either  towards  the  Great  Lakes 
or  the  Mississippi,  so  that  when  it  came  to  negotiations 
for  peace  the  King  of  France  could  maintain  that  he  still 
had  a  footing  in  Canada.  How  far  this  was  known  to 
Amherst  is  uncertain.  But  it  will  be  observed  how  nicely 
his  change  of  plan  was  calculated  to  foil  such  a  game,  for 
by  his  very  first  move  he  would  seize  the  proposed  line  of 
retreat,  and  advance  along  it  to  deliver  his  attack.  When 
we  consider  how  often  so-called  British  victories,  and  not 

^  Pitt  to  Amherst,  Jan.  7,  printed  bj'  Tliackeray,  vol.  i.  p.  465. 


I760  PLAN    OF    OPERATIONS  107 

only  our  own,  have  in  similar  theatres  of  war  merely  re- 
sulted in  driving  the  enemy  further  and  further  into  the 
wilds,  and  only  making  a  decision  more  and  more  difficult 
to  obtain,  there  seems  much  to  justify  the  high  place 
which  has  been  claimed  for  Amherst  as  a  general. 

His  line  was  not  chosen  because  it  was  the  easiest. 
It  involved  enormous  difficulties,  and  amongst  them  the 
descent  of  the  famous  St.  Lawrence  Rapids.  To  pass  a 
force  of  over  ten  thousand  men,  for  that  was  the  number 
of  his  active  column,  with  its  stores,  baggage,  and  artillery 
through  such  a  series  of  obstacles  in  the  face  of  an  active 
and  desperate  enemy,  was  an  enterprise  at  that  time  pro- 
bably without  precedent.  This  is  a  consideration  that 
should  never  be  forgotten.  Only  the  strongest  military 
character  could  have  faced  the  risk.  Yet  for  the  sake  of 
a  decision,  Amherst  faced  it  without  flinchinsf.  Nor  was 
this  all.  His  plan  also  demanded  the  naval  command  of 
Lake  Ontario,  and  his  first  care  was  to  secure  it.  At 
Niagara  he  ordered  two  fine  sloops  to  be  built.  At 
Oswego,  which  was  to  be  his  final  point  of  departure,  he 
established  a  royal  dockyard,  and  commenced  the  con- 
struction of  half-a-dozen  row-galleys,  besides  collecting 
the  great  flotilla,  amounting  to  some  eight  hundred  boats 
and  canoes,  which  his  force  would  require. 

While  this  inland  fleet  was  being  prepared  in  the  Far 
West,  upon  the  Atlantic  there  was  equal  activity.  The 
naval  force  which  was  to  assist  Amherst  upon  the  ocean 
and  cover  his  wide  operations,  was  in  three  divisions. 
There  was  firstly  a  squadron  of  five  of  the  line  and  four 
frigates,  based  at  Halifax,  under  Commodore  Lord  Colville, 
which  on  Pitt's  orders  Saunders  had  left  behind  him 
to  winter  on  the  station  in  the  usual  way.  A  similar 
squadron  under  Commodore  Swanton  sailed  from  England 
in  the  early  spring  direct  for  Quebec  with    a  convoy  of 


io8  THE    MONTREAL    CAMPAIGN  1760 

storesliips  for  the  garrison.  And  about  the  same  time 
a  third  squadron  of  three  of  the  line  and  two  frigates 
under  Captain  the  Hon  John  Byron  proceeded  to  Louis- 
bourg  with  engineers  and  miners  to  destroy  the  fortifica- 
tions. For  "  after  serious  and  mature  deliberations  "  it 
had  been  decided  that  it  was  inexpedient  to  maintain  the 
place  as  a  fortress.^ 

Such  a  concentration  of  force,  consisting  as  it  did  of 
thirteen  of  the  line,  was  more  than  enough  to  secure  all 
that  was  wanted.  Indeed,  in  the  strain  of  the  continental 
struggle,  every  one  at  home  had  dismissed  Canada  from 
his  mind,  when  early  in  June,  just  as  all  hope  of  peace 
was  at  an  end  and  Ferdinand  was  opening  his  offensive 
campaign,  came  the  news  that  Wolfe's  conquest  was  in 
the  sorest  danger  of  being  lost.  At  the  moment  it  was  a 
severe  shock.  "  Who  the  deuce,"  wrote  Walpole,  "  was 
thinking  of  Quebec  ?  America  was  like  a  book  one  has 
read  and  done  with,  but  here  we  are  on  a  sudden  reading 
our  book  backwards." 

It  will  be  remembered  that  at  the  close  of  the  last 
campaign  General  Murray  had  been  left  with  some  seven 
thousand  men,  more  or  less  fit  for  service,  to  establish 
himself  amongst  the  ruins  of  Quebec.  With  so  large 
and  well  seasoned  a  force,  with  a  long  winter  in  which  to 
recover  its  strength,  and  abundantly  supplied  as  it  was 
with  guns  and  ammunition,  no  anxiety  for  his  safety  was 
felt.  No  one  had  rightly  calculated  the  effects  of  a 
Canadian  winter  under  such  conditions.  The  last  frigates 
fired  their  parting  salute ;  the  ice  closed  in  behind  them ; 
and  the  terrors  of  that  frost-bound  prison  began  quickly 
to  declare  themselves.  To  begin  with  it  was  found 
impossible  to  throw  up  the  outworks  which  the  state 
of  the    fortress    imperatively    demanded.         The    garri- 

1  Pitt  to  Amherst,  Feb.  9,  17G0,  Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  472. 


i76o  PERIL    OF    QUEBEC  109 

son,  moreover,  could  not  be  housed  properly  or  even 
clothed  ;  fresh  provisions  were  unobtainable,  and  scurvy 
added  its  terrors  to  the  rigour  of  the  merciless  cold. 
Instead  of  recovering  the  men  began  to  drop  in  scores, 
and  it  was  only  continual  successes  against  hovering 
parties  of  the  enemy  that  kept  the  garrison  from  despair. 
Everything  that  passed  within  the  crazy  walls  was 
known  at  the  French  headquarters.  There  Vaudreuil 
was  still  governor,  and  De  L^vis  commander-in-chief,  Avith 
Bourlamaque  and  Bougainville  for  his  chief  lieutenants. 
They  knew  well  enough  what  to  expect  in  the  coming 
campaign,  and  saw  their  only  chance  was  to  crush  Murray 
before  a  new  combined  attack  could  develop.  This  at 
least  they  judged  was  the  best  chance  of  being  able  to 
keep  a  footing  in  Canada  till  the  peace,  which  they  like 
every  one  else  were  expecting,  brought  the  war  to  an  end. 
Fired  with  this  idea,  De  Levis  took  the  extreme  step  of 
mobilising  his  forces  in  the  depth  of  winter,  determined 
to  stake  all  on  a  desperate  attempt  to  take  Quebec  by 
escalade.  Everything  Avas  prepared.  But  the  difficulties 
proved  too  great.  The  militia  was  dismissed,  and  the 
regulars  returned  to  Montreal  to  resume  their  winter 
quarters,  with  outposts  at  Jacques  Cartier,  Deschambault, 
and  Pointe-aux-Trembles.  They  could  well  afford  to 
wait.  Their  daily  reports  from  Quebec  told  them  how 
the  winter  and  the  scurvy  were  doing  their  work.  By 
March,  Murray  had  not  five  thousand  men  fit  for  duty, 
and  the  sickness  was  increasing.  Till  April  it  was  left 
to  shatter  the  garrison  still  further,  and  by  the  end  of 
the  month  the  French  began  to  move.  By  this  time 
Murray's  effective  strength  was  barely  three  thousand, 
and  he  recognised  how  desperate  was  his  situation.  On 
April  21  he  took  the  ruthless  step  of  expelling  the  whole 
of   the   French  citizens,  and   two  days   later,  the   river 


no  THE    MONTREAL    CAMPAIGN  1760 

being  now  partly  open,  he  sent  off  one  of  the  sloops  that 
had  been  left  with  him  to  Halifax  to  hasten  Colville  to 
his  rescue. 

Meanwhile  the  Chevalier  de  Levis  was  falling  down  the 
river  with  the  four  cruisers  Holmes  had  been  unable  to 
destroy,  a  whole  flotilla  of  armed  vessels  and  smaller 
craft,  and  over  seven  thousand  men,  besides  Indians. 
On  the  evening  of  the  27  th  he  began  to  appear  on  the 
heights  about  Sillery  and  St.  Foy.  The  situation  was 
now  desperate.  With  the  enemy  once  established  on 
the  heights  of  Abraham,  Quebec  was  untenable.  It  had 
been  Murray's  intention  to  occupy  them  himself.  All 
the  material  was  ready  for  constructing  an  entrenched 
camp,  but  the  soil  was  still  iron-bound  with  the  frost 
and  field  works  were  out  of  the  question.  Murray  saw  no 
way  out  of  the  difficulty  but  a  bold  attack.  It  was  a 
remedy  as  desperate  as  his  condition ;  but,  full  of  con- 
fidence in  the  superiority  of  his  troops,  he  decided  to 
fling  his  whole  force  upon  the  French  advanced  guard 
before  their  movement  was  complete.  After  leaving  the 
necessary  guards  in  the  town,  he  had  barely  two  thousand 
men  available :  yet  he  thought  he  saw  his  only  chance, 
and  without  hesitation  delivered  a  furious  onslaught.  At 
first  success  seemed  to  justify  the  boldness  of  his  counter- 
stroke,  but  overwhelming  masses  began  gradually  to  pour 
round  both  his  flanks,  his  advance  had  entangled  him 
and  his  guns  in  a  morass  of  melting  snow,  and  in  two 
hours  he  was  forced  to  beat  a  retreat  with  the  loss  of 
about  a  thousand  men.  The  blow  meant  the  annihila- 
tion of  a  third  of  his  potent  force,  including  most 
of  his  best  men,  and  for  three  days  the  garrison  was 
reduced  to  such  a  state  of  demoralisation  that  an 
immediate  assault  could  hardly  have  failed  to  carry  the 
ruined  city.     But  De  Levis  had  suffered  almost  as  heavily, 


i76o  PERIL    OF    QUEBEC  m 

and  had  to  content  himself  with  securing  his  position  on 
the  heights  of  Abraham. 

Murray  seized  the  respite  to  send  another  sloop  away 
to  communicate  his  situation  to  Amherst.  He  told  him 
he  had  still  hopes  of  being  able  to  hold  out  till  the  fleet 
arrived  to  relieve  him,  and  that  in  the  last  extremity 
he  should  retire  to  Wolfe's  first  position  on  the  island  of 
Orleans  and  there  await  reinforcements.  His  despatch 
was  opened  by  Colonel  Lawrence  at  Halifax,  and  the 
news  sent  direct  home  with  the  startling  effect  we  have 
seen.  Amherst  did  not  receive  it  till  the  middle  of  May. 
He  immediately  ordered  transports  to  be  requisitioned 
at  Boston  to  carry  the  Louisbourg  garrison  to  Murray's 
relief,  and  supplied  their  places  with  labourers  for  the 
work  of  demolition.^ 

Meanwhile  De  Levis  had  sat  himself  down  to  a  formal 
siege.  It  was  no  part  of  his  plan  to  risk  further  loss  in 
an  assault.  There  was  still  plenty  of  time  to  take  the 
place  by  regular  approach  if  only  the  stores  he  was 
expecting  from  France  could  reach  him.  If  they  did 
not,  then  everything  was  lost,  and  the  r^^capture  of 
Quebec  was  useless.  He  knew  a  convoy  was  coming  out 
with  the  idea  of  forestalling  the  British  blockade,  as  had 
been  done  the  year  before.  Its  safe  arrival  would  ensure 
a  bloodless  success.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  failed  to 
arrive,  there  was  no  hope  but  to  fall  back  into  the 
interior  and  concentrate  the  whole  of  the  Canadian  forces 
at  Montreal.  So  while  his  army  tried  to  entrench  itself 
and  commence  its  approaches  in  the  frozen  ground,  his 
ships  were  brought  down  to  the  Anse  de  Foulon,  and 
his  guns  and  stores  hauled  up  the  clifi'  by  the  way  the 
British  had  made.    The  process  was  slow,  for  Murray  had 

1  Amherst  to   Pitt,  May    19;    Murray  to  Amherst,  April    '{O ;   Pitt   to 
Lawrence  and  to  Amherst,  June  20.— Thackeray,  vol.  i.  p.  472,  ct  seq. 


112  THE    MONTREAL   CAMPAIGN  1760 

quickly  restored  the  spirit  of  his  stricken  force.  All  was 
activity  once  more,  and  the  French  siege  works  were  soon 
being  galled  by  a  fire  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  guns.  Still 
the  weakness  of  the  defences,  which  there  was  no  means 
to  strengthen,  made  the  case  scarcely  less  desperate, 
and  every  eye  was  turned  down  the  river.  At  last,  on 
May  9,  a  frigate  was  seen  standing  up  the  Orleans 
channel.  For  a  while  there  was  breathless  suspense  in 
both  armies.  Was  she  French  or  was  she  English  ? 
Every  hand  and  gun  was  still,  watching  for  what  was 
to  come.  It  was  not  till  she  was  well  in  the  Basin  that 
the  British  flag  fluttered  out  to  decide  the  question.  A 
roar  of  triumph  went  up  from  the  shattered  ramparts ; 
for  every  one  knew  the  fate  of  Canada  was  decided  too. 

It  was  Captain  Deane  in  the  Lowestoft,  He  had 
separated  in  a  fog  from  Swanton's  squadron,  but  he 
could  promise  Murray  his  chief  was  close  behind.  In 
less  than  a  week  Swanton  himself  appeared  in  the 
Vanguard  (74)  with  another  frigate.  On  the  morrow, 
amidst  a  scene  of  the  wildest  excitement,  he  dashed  at 
the  French  squadron  and  drove  it  with  heavy  loss  from 
its  moorings.  Ordering  his  frigates  to  chase  and  com- 
plete the  destruction,  which  they  did  in  thorough  style, 
he  himself  took  up  a  position  to  enfilade  the  besieger's 
trenches.  It  was  more  than  the  French  could  endure. 
The  game  was  lost  ;  De  Levis's  well-played  stroke  had 
failed ;  and  that  night,  without  striking  his  camp,  he  stole 
away,  leaving  all  his  siege-guns  behind  him,.  Then,  day 
after  day,  the  relief-transports  kept  crowding  into  the  Basin. 
On  the  18th,  Colville  and  his  squadron  came  in,  and 
then  the  happy  news  was  hurried  home.  In  London,  the 
drama  of  Wolfe's  year  was  repeated.  For  only  ten  days 
after  the  first  alarming  report  had  reached  the  govern- 
ment, Murray's   despatches   came  to  hand,  and  all  was 


i76o  FRENCH    RELIEFS    CAPTURED  113 

once  more  bonfires  and  festivity.  "  Join,  my  love,  with 
me,"  wrote  Pitt  to  his  adored  wife,  "  in  most  humble  and 
grateful  thanks  to  the  Almighty.  The  siege  of  Quebec 
was  decided  on  May  1 7,  with  every  happy  circumstance. 
The  enemy  left  their  camp  standing,  abandoned  forty 
pieces  of  cannon,  &c.  Swanton  .  .  .  destroyed  all  the 
French  shipping,  six  or  seven  in  number.  Happy,  happy 
day  !     My  joy  and  hurry  are  inexpressible.^ 

Pitt  had  cause  enough  to  feel  the  relief  with  elation. 
The  danger  had  been  real  and  pressing.  For,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  convoy  with  stores  and  drafts  for  Canada  had  left 
Bordeaux  early  in  April,  and  in  spite  of  the  vigilance  of 
Boscawen,  who  was  then  commanding  on  the  station, 
had  cleared  the  blockade  with  the  loss  of  only  three 
sail.  On  May  14th  they  reached  the  inouth  of  the  St. 
Lawrence,  but  only  to  find  that  a  British  squadron  had 
just  got  in  six  days  before  them.^  To  enter  the  river 
was  now  impossible.  They  therefore  ran  into  La  Chaleur 
Bay,  the  deep  inlet  just  south  of  the  St,  LaAvrence  estuary. 
Their  hope  was  to  be  able  to  communicate  with  Vaudreuil 
over  land,  but  their  presence  was  soon  known.  Captain 
Byron,  who  by  this  time  was  at  Louisburg  assisting  in  the 
demolition,  heard  of  it,  and  immediately  left  the  Avork  of 
destruction  in  search  of  them.  At  the  same  time  Colville 
at  Quebec  sent  down  a  detachment  on  the  same  quest. 
The  two  squadrons  met  in  the  bay,  and  in  a  few  hours 
all  the  French  stores  of  value  were  on  board  the  British 
ships,  and  a  score  of  transports  and  the  frigate  that 
escorted  them  were  in  flames. 

The  same  day,  July  9th,  that  the  efforts  of  this  devoted 
convoy  were  brought  to  so   disastrous  an  end,  Amherst 

1  Pitt  to  Lady  Hester  Pitt,  Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  p.  45. 

2  See  a  captured  Journal  of  the  Voyage?  in  Newcastle  Papers,  32,911, 
f.  379. 

VOL.   II.  H 


114  THE    MONTREAL   CAMPAIGN  1760 

reached  Oswego.  On  June  21st,  after  seeing  Colonel  Havi- 
land  off  with  the  centre  column  of  some  3500  men  upon 
the  old  line  of  attack  northward,  he  had  left  Albany,  and 
his  army  was  streaming  over  the  Great  Portage  down 
to  the  shores  of  Ontario.  The  same  week  he  reached 
Oswego,  Murray  started  up  the  river  from  Quebec  with  a 
force  of  2500  men,  which  he  had  been  able  to  form  from 
the  ruins  of  his  garrison.  His  flotilla  and  its  escort- 
ing frigates,  sloops,  and  floating  batteries,  were  under  a 
Captain  Deane.  The  only  serious  obstacle  in  his  path 
was  the  Richelieu  rapids,  which  it  will  be  remembered 
had  been  the  limit  of  Holmes's  operations  in  the  previous 
campaign.  They  could  only  be  passed  at  flood -tide  and 
with  a  fair  wind ;  the  channel  was  intricate  and  defended 
by  batteries,  while  a  little  below  them  was  a  regularly 
entrenched  position  on  the  heights  of  Jacques  Cartier. 
This  was  the  main  outpost  of  the  French,  and  presumably 
it  was  hoped  that  its  reduction  would  delay  the  British 
advance.  But  Murray  had  learnt  from  the  last  campaign 
the  secret  of  such  riverine  warfare,  and  finding  a  channel 
under  the  south,  bank  out  of  range  of  the  French  works, 
he  coolly  passed  them  by  and  anchored  immediately 
below  the  rapids.  Owing  to  persistent  contrary  winds 
the  passage  of  them  proved  a  lengthy  affair.  Under 
cover  of  the  fire  of  the  floating  batteries  and  of  perpetual 
diversions  and  raids  ashore  the  force  was  gradually  passed 
up  in  fragments,  but  it  was  not  till  July  26th,  ten  days 
after  the  operation  commenced,  that  the  obstacle  was 
passed. 

Ahead  of  him  at  Trois  Rivieres,  where  the  St.  Lawrence 
leaves  the  St.  Pierre  Lake,  lay  another  entrenched  posi- 
tion, but  Murray  would  not  be  stopped.  It  was  treated 
with  the  same  contempt  as  Jacques  Cartier.  The  troops 
were  passed  by  under  the  south  bank,  where  the  French 


i76o  THE    THREE    COLUMNS  115 

guns  could  not  reach  them,  while  the  Canadians  on  that 
side  were  kept  in  check  by  landing  parties.  So  Murray 
advanced,  and  as  all  obstacles  seemed  to  melt  before  him, 
parish  after  parish  submitted.  By  August  9  th  he  had 
entered  the  St.  Pierre  Lake.  At  Sorel  at  the  lake-head 
was  the  main  position  of  the  French,  for  here  fell  in  the 
Richelieu  River  from  Lake  Cham  plain,  the  line  of  Havi- 
land's  advance,  and  it  was  at  this  point  Bourlamaque  was 
concentrating  his  force.  On  August  12th  Murray  was 
joined  by  Lord  Rollo  with  the  Louisbourg  battalions,  and 
was  thus  ready  to  push  home  his  attack  well  up  to  time. 
Two  days  earlier  Amherst,  without  waiting  for  the 
completion  of  all  his  galleys,  had  left  Oswego  with  his 
vast  flotilla  punctually  to  the  day,  and  at  the  same 
moment  Haviland  began  his  voyage  up  Lake  Champlain 
from  his  advanced  post  at  Crown  Point.  Nothing  could 
have  been  prettier.  Murray  was,  of  course,  somewhat 
ahead  of  the  other  two  columns,  but  the  eflfect  w^as 
excellent.  It  forced  Bougainville  to  fall  back  before 
Haviland  from  post  to  post,  for  although  his  forces 
numbered  about  2000  men,  he  dared  not  risk  any  serious 
resistance  for  fear  of  being  cut  off  from  the  final  concen- 
tration at  Montreal.  At  the  same  time  it  held  Bourla- 
maque at  Sorcl  and  prevented  De  Levis  drawiiig  on  that 
division  to  reinforce  the  positions  above  the  city,  which 
were  to  bar  the  advance  of  Amherst.  The  most  advanced 
of  these  posts  was  a  little  below  La  Galette,  the  present 
Ogdensburg,  where  on  Isle  Royale  a  strong  fort  had 
recently  been  erected  and  named  Levis,  after  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. Had  Murray  been  in  command  he 
perhaps  would  have  passed  it  by,  but  Amherst  was  too 
correct  a  soldier  to  permit  himself  such  an  irregularity. 
Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  when  Murray  passed  Trois 
Rivieres  the  dangers  of  the  river  were  behind  him.     For 


ii6  THE    MONTREAL   CAMPAIGN  1760 

Amherst  they  were  immediately  ahead,  and  it  was  more- 
over only  by  capturing  Fort  L^vis  he  could  hope  to  secure 
pilots  for  the  rapids.  Although,  therefore,  he  did  not 
reach  the  place  till  August  19th,  ten  days  after  Murray 
was  safe  in  Lake  St.  Pierre,  he  decided  to  invest  it,  and 
so  gallantly  was  it  defended  that  it  was  a  week  before  it 
was  in  his  hands,  and  not  till  August  31st  was  he  able 
to  resume  his  advance. 

It  was  upon  such  a  delay  that  De  L6vis  had  counted  to 
enable  him  to  crush  Murray  or  Haviland  in  detail.  But 
apparently  Amherst  had  counted  on  it  too,  and  the 
rhythm  of  his  fine  combination  was  in  no  way  interrupted. 
Neither  Murray  nor  Haviland  were  to  be  drawn.  Murray, 
after  landing  his  force  at  Sorel  and  trying  to  tempt 
Bourlamaque  out  of  his  entrenchments,  re-embarked,  and 
slowly  pursuing  his  way  up  stream  as  the  wind  permitted- 
he  forced  Bourlamaque  to  follow  him  in  fear  of  his  join- 
ing hands  with  Haviland.  The  moral  effect  at  least  was 
excellent.  Regulars  began  to  desert  by  scores,  and  the 
militia  by  hundreds.  By  the  end  of  the  month  trust- 
worthy intelligence  came  down  that  Amherst  had  taken 
Fort  Levis ;  whereupon  Murray  seized  Isle  Therese,  just 
below  the  great  island  on  which  Montreal  is  built,  and 
there  stood  fast.  Haviland  was  equally  cautious.  Bougain- 
ville had  fallen  right  back  from  the  hills  into  the  St. 
Lawrence  valley,  and  was  now  in  junction  with  Bourla- 
maque. Instead,  therefore,  of  advancing  direct  upon 
Montreal,  as  ho  might  have  done,  Haviland  moved  farther 
down  the  Richelieu  River  to  his  right  and  seized  Fort 
Chambly,  the  last  French  post  that  lay  between  him  and 
Murray's  column.  Thence  he  proceeded  to  feel  for  his 
colleague  away  to  his  right,  and  on  September  3rd  he 
succeeded  in  getting  into  communication.  Murray  now 
lost  no  time  in  acting.     Two  days  later,  finding  Bourla- 


i76o  THE    FINAL    CONCENTRATION  117 

maque  and  Bougainville  were  again  falling  back,  he  crossed 
from  his  island  camp  to  the  south  bank  with  his  grena- 
diers, light  troops,  and  rangers,  and  on  the  6tli  joined 
hands  with  Haviland  at  Longeuil,  the  point  where  the 
road  from  Chambly  reaches  the  St.  Lawrence,  opposite 
the  island  of  Montreal. 

On  the  very  same  day  Amherst  began  to  land  at  its 
upper  end.  In  five  days  he  had  overcome  the  terrors  of 
those  famous  rapids  with  the  loss  of  some  fifty  boats  and 
less  than  a  hundred  men.  It  was  a  feat  of  Avhich  he 
might  well  be  proud.  True  he  had  not  been  opposed. 
The  Canadians  who,  under  a  tried  partisan  leader,  had 
been  told  off  to  harass  the  passage,  for  some  reason  did 
next  to  nothing.  Probably  they  knew  the  game  was  up, 
as  indeed  it  was.  Halting  but  a  day  at  the  foot  of  the 
rapids  to  repair  his  shattered  boats,  Amherst  had  pushed 
forward  immediately  with  the  utmost  vigour.  The  same 
day  he  landed  on  Montreal  island  saw  him  encamped 
before  the  walls  of  the  city.  Murray  as  promptly  hurried 
back  to  Isle  Therese,  landed  his  column  on  the  lower 
end  of  the  great  island,  and  next  morning  encamped  just 
below  the  city. 

So,  like  the  striking  of  a  clock,  Amherst's  wide-flung 
movements  chimed  together  at  the  appointed  hour.  When 
we  think  of  the  distance  the  columns  had  had  to  travel, 
the  wildness  of  the  solitudes  they  had  to  pass,  the  obstacles 
to  be  overcome,  and  the  difficulty  of  communicating  one 
with  the  other ;  if  we  add  the  diversity  of  the  troops  with 
which  Amherst  had  to  deal,  and  the  skill  of  the  com- 
manders he  had  to  oppose — we  seem  to  have  before  us  one 
of  the  most  perfect  and  astonishing  bits  of  work  which 
the  annals  of  British  warfare  can  show.  In  the  long 
struggle  we  had  blundered  enough — blundered  in  every 
conceivable  way — in  strategy  and  tactics,  in  training  and 


ii8  THE    MONTREAL    CAMPAIGN  1760 

organisation;  but  the  national  adaptability  had  told  at 
last.  The  lesson  had  been  learnt  to  perfection,  and  so 
in  the  end  Canada  was  cleanly  cut  from  France  by  a 
masterstroke  of  the  art  of  war. 

For  won  it  was.  The  noose  had  been  thrown  too 
dexterously  to  admit  of  resistance,  and  drawn  too  tightly 
for  surrender  to  mean  dishonour.  Levis  and  the  veteran 
battalions  of  France  clamoured  indeed  to  fight  it  out,  but 
Vaudreuil  would  not  permit  the  sacrifice,  and  harsh  as 
were  the  terms  on  which  Amherst  insisted  as  his  right, 
on  September  8  th  all  Canada  was  signed  away  to  the 
British  Crown. 


CHAPTER  IV 

TRANSITION   FROM  COMMERCE  PROTECTION   TO 
ECCENTRIC  ATTACK  IN  THE  EAST  INDIES 

America  was  now  indeed  "  like  a  book  that  is  read  and 
done  with."  Our  object  in  the  war  was  attained,  and 
the  transition  from  the  primary  to  the  secondary  stage 
was  complete.  France,  as  we  have  seen,  was  still  refusing 
to  acknowledge  her  defeat.  She  was  pushing  on  more 
vigorously  than  ever  against  Hanover  in  order  to  counter 
our  success,  and  it  remained  for  us  to  force  the  energy  of 
our  general  pressure  upon  her  in  order  to  compel  her  to 
accept  the  situation  before  she  could  achieve  a  counter- 
vailing advantage. 

The  passing  effort  to  clinch  the  pressure  continentally 
by  bringing  up  Ferdinand's  force  to  offensive  strength  had 
failed.  The  attempt  was  false  to  Pitt's  system,  and  but 
for  the  political  and  diplomatic  exigencies  of  the  case  he 
probably  would  never  have  sanctioned  it.  The  true  sphere 
for  such  supplementary  operations,  as  he  knew  well,  was 
where  our  fleet  could  add  its  overwhelming  impulse  to  our 
slender  military  force — on  the  coast  of  France  and  in  the 
East  and  West  Indies. 

In  the  latter  theatres  the  effect  of  the  changed  condi- 
tions of  the  war,  which  had  been  inaugurated  with  the 
fall  of  Quebec,  are  highly  interesting.  In  both  areas  the 
operations  were  originally  based  on  the  idea  of  commerce 
protection.  In  the  West  Indies  we  have  already  seen 
how,  as  the  transition  began  to  make  itself  felt,  this  idea 


I20  THE    EAST    INDIES  1758-9 

of  commerce  protection  began  to  be  transformed  into 
an  extension  of  the  general  oftensive,  with  a  view  partly 
of  acquiring  guarantees  against  possible  successes  of  the 
enemy  in  Europe,  and  partly  of  coercing  her  into  peace. 
In  the  East  Indies  the  influence  of  a  similar  transforma- 
tion is  now  to  be  observed. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  autunm  of  1758 
D'Ache,  the  French  naval  commander,  had  insisted  on 
returning  to  Mauritius  in  the  usual  way.  In  spite  of 
General  Lally's  protests,  who,  eager  to  carry  out  his 
orders  for  seizing  the  coast  factories  of  the  British  Com- 
pany, and  fired  by  his  success  at  St.  David's,  was  burning 
to  lay  siege  to  Madras,  D'Ache  absolutely  refused  to  risk 
another  action  with  Pocock.  The  British  admiral,  on  his 
part,  after  vainly  trying  to  intercept  the  French  squadron 
on  the  way  to  its  base,  had  also  returned  to  refit  at 
Bombay  on  the  approach  of  the  monsoon.  This  was 
Lally's  opportunity.  So  soon  as  he  knew  Pocock  was 
really  gone,  he  moved  against  Madras,  and  on  December 
12  th  sat  down  before  the  place  in  form.  The  force  his 
energy  had  collected  was  formidable,  but  the  resistance 
offered  by  Governor  Pigot  and  his  officers  was  no  less. 
For  nine  weeks  the  struggle  went  on  without  Lally's  being 
able  to  make  any  serious  impression.  Still  the  situation 
was  very  critical ;  it  could  not  last.  It  began  indeed  to 
look  as  though  Madras  must  share  the  fate  of  St.  David's, 
when,  on  February  16  th,  long  before  Pocock's  return 
could  be  looked  for,  Kempenfelt,  who  -was  flag-captam  to 
Steevens,  the  second  in  command,  appeared  with  a  couple 
of  frigates  and  half-a-dozen  transports  carrying  troops  and 
stores.  Pocock,  unable  to  move  himself  without  ruining 
his  fleet  and  risking  the  whole  situation  for  the  coming 
season,  had  hurried  him  off  from  Bombay  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.     And  he  was  in  time.     As  Kempenfelt 


1759  CLIVE    GAINS    GROUND  121 

anchored  in  the  road,  Lally  knew  that  his  chance  was 
gone,  and  in  deepest  exasperation  he  broke  up  the  siege 
and  withdrew  to  Pondicherry. 

Meanwhile  Clivc  had  so  firmly  established  himself 
in  Bengal  that  he  felt  strong  enough  to  send  down 
an  expedition  under  Colonel  Forde  into  the  Northern 
Sirkars,  the  district  lying  half  way  between  Calcutta 
and  Madras,  which  Lally  had  succeeded  in  bringing 
entirely  under  French  domination.  Clive  had  just  sent 
home  his  secretary  to  persuade  Pitt  to  extend  his  offensive 
to  India.  He  urged  how  easy  was  the  conquest  of  Bengal, 
and  that  it  was  in  the  East  rather  than  the  West  that 
England  should  look  for  her  Imperial  destiny.  It  was 
full  of  this  faith  that  he  had  sent  Forde  down  to  the 
Northern  Sirkars,  and  fully  did  the  expedition  justify 
his  conviction.  Forde  achieved  a  signal  success.  On 
April  8th  Masulipatam,  the  chief  town  and  port  of  the 
district,  fell  into  his  hands,  and  Lally  found  his  province 
confined  to  Pondicherry  and  its  immediate  neighbourhood. 
It  was  plain  throughout  India  that  the  tide  was  turning 
against  France,  and  Lally  felt  his  retention  even  of  Pondi- 
cherry depended  on  D'Ache  and  his  fleet. 

It  was  an  asset  on  which  he  could  count  with  some 
confidence,  for  it  had  been  considerably  increased.  At 
Mauritius  D'Ache  had  found  Captain  Froger  de  I'lilguille 
with  three  of  the  line  and  several  of  the  Company's  ships. 
They  brought  his  fleet  up  to  eleven  of  the  line,  but  it 
was  a  force  greater  than  the  resources  of  the  island  could 
bear.  He  had  to  send  a  dozen  ships  away  to  the  Cape 
to  get  supplies  from  the  Dutch.  It  was  not  till  July  1 7  th 
that  he  was  able  to  put  to  sea,  and  then  he  had  to  go  to 
Madagascar  for  rice.  In  India  no  one  could  tell  why  he 
lingered.  Pocock,  determined  to  be  beforehand,  had  left 
Bombay  with  seven  of  the  line  the  day  after  Masulipatam 


122  THE   EAST   INDIES 


1759 


had  fallen,  and  had  established  himself  off  Ceylon  before 
D' Ache's  ships  had  returned  from  the  Cape.  There  he 
cruised  week  after  week,  knowing  how  much  stronger 
D'Achc  was,  but  determined  not  to  let  him  pass  unscathed. 
At  the  end  of  June  he  was  joined  by  two  more  of  the 
line  from  England,  bringing  out  five  Indiamen.  They 
contained  part  of  a  new  King's  regiment  which  Colonel 
Eyre  Coote  had  raised  for  service  in  India,  and  Pocock, 
knowing  what  odds  were  against  him,  kept  the  troops  to 
reinforce  his  shrunken  crews. 

But  now  came  a  fresh  complication.  The  Dutch, 
after  their  manner  of  fishing  in  troubled  waters,  had 
sent  out  a  powerful  armament  to  increase  their  own 
influence,  and  it  was  feared  they  meant  to  oust  Clive 
from  Bengal.  As  soon  as  Pocock  knew  of  the  danger, 
he,  with  his  characteristic  devotion,  sent  the  troops  on  to 
Madras  with  a  strong  recommendation  that  at  least  part 
of  them  should  go  forward  to  Clive. 

Still  there  was  no  sign  of  D'Ache,  and  fearing  he  had 
missed  him,  Pocock  early  in  August  sailed  for  Pondicherry. 
There  he  remained  cruising  before  the  port  till  the  end  of 
the  month,  when  want  of  water  forced  him  to  go  back 
to  Trincomalee.  As  he  lay  there  D'Ache  appeared  off 
Batticaloa,  twenty  leagues  to  the  southward.  His  presence 
was  unknown  to  the  British,  for  on  September  1st,  so 
soon  as  his  water  was  complete,  Pocock  sailed  again  to 
resume  his  station  off  Pondicherry.  D'Ache  did  the 
same,  and  on  the  morrow  the  two  fleets  sighted  each 
other.  Pocock  after  his  manner,  regardless  of  the  enemy's 
superiority,  immediately  signalled  General  Chase,  and  all 
that  day  and  the  next  strove  vainly  to  bring  the  French 
to  action.  But  this  was  no  part  of  D'Ache's  strategy. 
In  his  eyes  his  duty  was  to  throw  supplies  into  Pondi- 
cherry, and  he  felt  that   if  he   prevented  Pocock  from 


I7S9  POCOCK   AND    D'ACHfi  123 

stopping  him  lie  won  the  round.  L'%uille,  his  new 
colleague,  was  a  man  of  different  temper,  but  it  was  the 
abiding  misfortune  of  France  that  most  of  the  admirals 
she  chose  could  never  free  themselves  from  the  bonds  of 
her  defensive  strategy.  Excellent  in  its  place,  it  was 
certainly  out  of  place  in  India.  The  whole  problem  was 
one  of  commerce  protection  emphasised  and  made  clearer 
by  the  vital  necessity  that  France  should  get  quickly 
into  her  hands  something  England  could  not  afford  to 
part  with.  It  depended  absolutely  on  getting  command 
of  the  sea;  D'Ache's  force  thoroughly  justified  a  bold 
and  sustained  offensive ;  and  yet  his  eyes  were  closed.^ 

In  justice  to  D'Achu  it  must  be  said  that  there  is 
one  possible  explanation  of  his  apparently  faint-hearted 
behaviour.  According  to  a  sailor  who  was  in  the  fleet 
he  had  ordered  seven  of  his  largest  ships  to  board,  and 
had  provided  the  men  with  "  caps  and  breastplates  for 
the  purpose."  It  is  conceivable,  therefore,  that  his  tactics 
may  have  been  designed  to  secure  a  certain  chance  of 
executing  this  manoeuvre,  but  the  same  authority  says 
the  whole  object  of  his  voyage  was  to  land  stores  and 
money  at  Pondicherry.^ 

Pocock,  as  though  he  divined  the  object  that  was  in 
his  opponent's  mind,  was  not  to  be  beaten,  and  without 
making  any  further  attempt  to  keep  contact,  gave  up 
trying  to  engage  him  away  from  his  port,  and  pushed 
on  boldly  to  cut  him  off  from  Pondicherry.  The  stroke 
was  well  played.  He  was  off  the  port  on  September  8th. 
D'Ach(5  had  not  arrived,  and   it  was  not   till  next  day 

'  D'Achd's  force  was  two  74's  and  two  64's  of  the  King's,  and  one  68  and 
six  54's  of  the  Company's,  or  eleven  capital  ships  in  all  (Lacour-Gayet, 
p.  515).     Pocock  had  seven  of  from  GO  to  68  guns  and  two  60's. 

2  "  Report  of  a  Man  who  was  in  the  French  Fleet,"  enclosed  in  Pocock's 
Despatch  of  Oct.  12,  In-lctters,  161.  Pocock  believed  this  report  was 
substantially  correct. 


124  THE   EAST   INDIES  1759 

that  he  appeared.  It  was  now  impossible  for  him  to  get 
in  without  fighting,  and  he  did  not  refuse  the  action. 
Early  on  September  10th  Pocock  saw  him  some  eight  or 
nine  miles  to  leeward  standing  towards  the  land  on  the 
starboard  tack  in  line  ahead,  with  the  wind  at  north- 
west by  west.  He  at  once  bore  down  in  line  abreast  on 
the  enem3'^'s  centre.  As  he  approached  D'Achc  wore  on 
the  opposite  tack,  and  Pocock  hauling  into  line  ahead 
brought  the  two  fleets  parallel  on  the  same  tack  in  the 
orthodox  manner.  The  usual  action  ensued,  greatly  to 
the  disadvantage  of  Pocock,  for  D'Ache's  movement  had 
thrown  his  two  rearmost  ships  out  of  action,  and  they 
were  not  able  to  engage  at  all.  From  eleven  till  four 
the  action  lasted,  seven  ships  against  eleven,  so  that 
the  British  were  constantly  fighting  two  to  one.  Still 
even  so  the  superior  British  gunnery  told  its  tale.  One 
by  one,  as  the  French  received  the  rapid  fire  into  their 
hulls,  they  were  beaten  out  of  the  line.  At  last,  with 
D'Ache  severely  wounded  and  his  flag-captain  killed,  the 
flagship  herself  hauled  out.  The  rest  that  were  still  in 
action  followed  her  lead,  and  by  five  the  whole  French 
fleet  was  bearing  off  south-south-east  away  from  Pondi- 
cherry.  So  far  it  was  a  fine  victory  for  the  British. 
But  as  usual  the  French  had  cut  our  rigging  to 
pieces,  and  Pocock,  being  unable  to  follow,  could  do  no 
more  than  lie-to  where  he  was,  between  the  enemy  and 
their  destination.  Next  morning  they  were  seen  again, 
but  were  soon  out  of  sight,  and  as  Pocock  was  scarcely 
able  to  move,  still  less  to  beat  back  to  the  northward, 
they  easily  worked  round  him,  and  while  in  the  far  St. 
Lawrence  the  French  flag  was  being  hauled  down  on  the 
walls  of  Quebec,  they  got  safely  into  Pondicherry. 

Thus  D'Achc  achieved  his  object,  but  at  tremendous 
cost.     While  the  British   lost   about   five   hundred   and 


1759  POCOCK   AND    D'ACH^  125 

seventy  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  the  French, 
according  to  the  report  Pocock  received,  lost  abont 
fifteen  hundred,  L'Eguille  losing  no  less  than  a 
hundred  and  eighty  in  his  own  ship  alone.^  Allowing 
for  all  exaggeration  it  was  for  the  numbers  engaged  a 
very  sanguinary  battle.  But  Pocock  was  not  yet  satisfied. 
On  the  12th  he  anchored  at  the  Dutch  factory  of 
Negapatam,  and  sending  thence  to  Madras  received  a 
small  reinforcement  of  men.  Thus  recruited,  on  the 
20th  he  put  to  sea  again,  and  began  to  work  up  to 
Madras  in  order  to  cover  that  place.  To  reach  it  he 
had  to  pass  Pondicherry,  and  the  French  fleet  was  lying 
in  the  road.  He  might  easily  have  run  past  in  the 
night  or  have  given  the  danger  a  wide  berth,  but  that 
did  not  suit  his  spirit.  It  was  liable,  he  thought,  to 
misinterpretation.  So  in  the  true  Elizabethan  manner 
he  chose  to  saunter  past  in  broad  daylight  and  in  battle 
order  just  out  of  range  of  D' Ache's  guns,  with  the  wind 
straight  off  shore.  Laying  his  main  topsails  to  the 
mast  he  just  kept  steerage  way,  till  towards  evening  the 
French  officers  could  bear  it  no  longer,  and  they  forced 
D'Ache  to  weigh.  By  the  time  they  were  under  sail  it 
was  of  course  too  late  to  engage,  and  as  night  fell  they 
returned  ignominiously  to  the  anchorage,  leaving  Pocock 
to  continue  his  way  in  high  contentment. 

Angry  as  the  garrison  was  with  D'Ache  for  the  insult 
he  had  suffered,  their  feelings  rose  to  fury  when  he 
announced  his  intention  of  returning  to  his  base  as  soon 
as  he  had  landed  the  stores  and  treasure.  In  vain  they 
protested.  D'Ach4  said  the  season  was  too  far  advanced 
for  further  operations,  and  that  he  knew  a  British  rein- 
forcement of  four  of  the  line  was  close  at  hand.     Accord- 

1  "Report  of  a   Man   who  was  in  the  French  Fleet,"  In-Iettcrs,    161, 
Oct.  12. 


126  THE    EAST    INDIES  1759 

ingly  on  September  19  th  he  sailed.  Thereupon  there 
was  a  solemn  meeting  at  the  governor's,  where  it  was 
unanimously  resolved  that  D'Ache's  conduct  meant  the 
loss  of  everything  in  India,  and  they  held  him  responsible 
for  the  death-blow  of  the  French  power  in  the  East.  The 
resolution  Avas  sent  after  him  by  a  ship  that  had  been 
detained.  It  overtook  him,  and  he  came  back.  But 
still  he  would  not  stay,  and  still  protested  his  mission 
was  fulfilled.  All  they  could  even  then  obtain  from  him 
was  five  hundred  Europeans  and  four  hundred  natives, 
and  having  landed  this  reinforcement  on  September  27th 
he  finally  sailed  for  Mauritius. 

It  was  indeed  the  death-blow  to  the  French  position  in 
India,  as  Lally  and  his  officers  had  protested.  It  is  easy 
to  exaggerate  the  effect  of  the  command  of  the  sea  upon 
Continental  power,  but  in  this  case  it  meant  nearly  every- 
thing. The  end  might  be  far  or  near,  but  if  the  English 
were  left  in  control  of  the  Indian  seas  there  could  be  but 
one  end.  Above  all  was  it  fatal  at  a  moment  when  the 
war  was  changing  to  its  second  phase,  and  England  was 
free  to  turn  her  commerce  defence  into  a  coercive  often- 
sive,  which  the  French  in  the  East  were  left  powerless  to 
resist.  What  D'Achc  the  sailor  could  not  see,  Lally  the 
soldier  saw  too  well :   and  Pocock  saw  it  too. 

For  some  days  he  had  hovered  to  windward  of  Pondi- 
cherry,  but  when  D'Ache  put  to  sea  and  Avent  southward 
he  penetrated  the  whole  situation.  Convinced  that  it 
meant  a  return  to  Mauritius,  and  being  wholly  unable  to 
chase,  he  went  north  to  Madras.  There  he  heard  that 
Cornish  was  at  hand  with  the  rest  of  his  reinforcements, 
and  after  watering  he  decided  he  might  safely  go  round  to 
the  Malabar  coast  to  refit.  On  his  way  he  met  the  new 
squadron  with  Coote  and  the  rest  of  his  regiment.  All 
was  therefore  secure,  and  sending  the  troops  to  Madras  he 


1759  CLIVE    STOPS   THE    DUTCH  127 

carried  on  round  Ceylon  with  the  whole  fleet  till  the  mon- 
soon should  be  passed. 

So  ended  Pocock's  command.  Cornish  had  brought 
out  his  recall,  couched  in  highly  complimentary  terms, 
by  which  he  was  authorised  to  hand  over  the  station  to 
Steevens,  his  capable  second  in  command,  and  come  home 
for  his  health.^  Still  he  tarried.  For  as  he  lay  at  Bom- 
bay refitting  his  squadron  news  reached  him  that  the 
Dutch  armament  had  actually  struck  at  Clive  in  Calcutta, 
and  he  wrote  home  to  say  that,  until  he  knew  the  extent 
of  the  danger  and  how  far  it  was  likely  to  be  supported 
by  the  governor  of  Batavia,  he  meant  to  remain.  The 
danger  was  real  enough ;  but  Clive  knew  how  to  deal 
with  danger.  Two  Dutch  transports  arrived  in  the  river 
from  Batavia,  bound  for  their  chief  factory,  which  was  at 
Chinsura,  some  twenty-five  miles  above  Calcutta..  Clive 
promptly  sent  down  word  that  he  could  not  permit  the 
troops  they  carried  to  proceed  to  their  destination.  The 
officer  in  command  submitted,  with  a  request  that  he 
mierht  land  his  men  for  refreshment  at  the  mouth  of 
the  river.  It  was  granted,  but  he  had  no  real  intention 
of  being  stopped.  He  was  only  Avaiting  for  the  rest  of 
his  force  to  persist  in  his  mission.  Five  more  ships 
quickly  arrived,  and  he  began  seizing  all  the  British 
vessels  he  could  lay  hands  on.  An  Indiaman,  under  a 
Captain  Wilson,  dropping  down  the  river  homeward 
bound,  was  stopped  and  told  she  would  be  sunk  if  she 
tried  to  pass  the  squadron.  Wilson  promptly  returned 
to  Calcutta.  Two  more  Indiamen  were  lying  there,  and 
Clive  ordered  the  three  to  go  down  together  and  clear 
the  river.  The  Dutch  were  seven  to  three,  but  the  Com- 
pany's captains,  being  better  armed,  did  not  hesitate.  On 
November   24th   they  boldly  engaged,  and  in  two  hours 

1  "  Secret  Orders,"  Out-lelUrs,  1331,  March  30,  1759. 


128  THE    EAST    INDIES 


1759 


they  had  captured  all  the  Dutch  squadron  except  the 
second  m  command.  He  escaped  down  the  river,  but 
only  to  be  captured  by  two  other  Indiamen  that  had  just 
come  in  from  home.  On  shore  Clive  was  equally  success- 
ful. Before  the  action  the  Dutch  troops  had  been  landed 
to  march  to  Chinsura.  Forde,  the  hero  of  the  recent 
success  in  the  Sirkars,  was  ordered  out  to  intercept  them, 
and  after  a  sharp  engagement  he  practically  annihilated 
the  Dutch  force.  So  the  British  position  and  prestige  in 
Bengal  were  more  firmly  established  than  ever,  and  the 
Dutch  eventually  disowned  the  action  of  their  officers 
and  paid  the  Company  compensation. 

It  is  eloquent  of  the  strategical  difficulties  of  the 
Indian  station  that  the  news  of  these  successes  took 
nearly  three  months  to  reach  Pocock  in  Bombay.  It  is 
the  fashion  now  merely  to  deride  his  battle  tactics,  which 
after  three  actions  in  eighteen  months  had  failed  to 
secure  a  real  decision,  though  the  tactics  which  would 
have  secured  a  decision  against  a  superior  force  deter- 
mined to  avoid  one  are  never  very  clearly  indicated. 
More  just  it  would  be  to  praise  his  vehement  "  general 
chases,"  the  daring  and  resolute  attacks  which  in  manner 
yielded  nothing  to  Hawke's,  and  above  all  for  the  strate- 
gical insight,  and  courage  which  enabled  him  to  dominate 
a  sea  which  it  was  practically  impossible  for  his  inferior 
force  to  command.  Thus  it  was  his  conduct  was  justly 
regarded  at  the  time.  In  April  17 GO  he  sailed  for  Eng- 
land loaded  with  the  praises  of  the  Company's  officials. 
At  home  the  King  received  him  with  promotion  and  the 
Bath,  and  the  India-House  with  the  fullest  honours  they 
could  confer.  He  had  been  sent  out  "  to  protect  the 
East  India  Company's  trade  and  settlements,"  and  well 
had  he  done  his  duty.  In  one  place  only  did  he  fail. 
While  he  was  helpless  after  his  last  action,  the  Comte 


I760  THE    LAST   FRENCH    HOLD  129 

d'Estaing,  a  general  officer  who  had  broken  his  parole, 
struck  behind  his  back  with  a  small  expedition  from 
Mauritius  at  the  defenceless  factory  of  Gombroon  in  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  forced  it  to  capitulate.  But  so  small  a 
loss  was  scarcely  seen  in  the  mass  of  Pocock's  success. 

It  was  not  till  he  had  seen  the  fleet  ready  for  a  new 
campaign,  and  on  its  way  to  the  Coromandel  coast,  that 
he  left  the  station.  By  his  able  arrangements  Cornish 
was  in  position  off  Ceylon  at  the  opening  of  the  new  year 
with  his  fresh  squadron.  Shortly  before  his  arrival  Coote 
had  on  January  22nd,  1760,  completely  defeated  Lally  at 
Wanderwash,  a  victory  second  only  in  importance  to  that 
of  Clive  at  Plassey.  Its  effect  was  to  enable  him  to  re- 
duce all  the  French  minor  positions  in  the  Carnatic,  till 
at  the  end  of  March  he  was  able  to  combine  a  joint  attack 
with  Cornish  on  the  important  port  of  Carical.  It  fell  on 
April  5th.  As  it  was  the  outlet  for  the  rich  country  of 
Tanjore,  to  which  Lally  had  to  look  for  his  supplies,  the 
loss  was  very  severe.  Accompanied  with  the  British 
successes  in  the  interior,  it  meant  that  Lally  had  nothing 
left  but  Pondicherry,  and  that  his  retention  even  of  his 
capital  depended  absolutely  on  the  return  of  D'Achd 
But  of  D'Achd  there  was  no  news.  At  the  end  of  April, 
Steevens,  the  new  commander-in-chief,  joined  Cornish 
from  Bombay,  and  as  Coote  began  to  close  in  methodi- 
cally upon  the  last  French  foothold,  Steevens  estab- 
lished a  vigorous  blockade  of  the  port.  In  July  he 
was  joined  by  two  more  of  the  line,  which  had  been 
sent  out  in  hot  haste  at  the  end  of  1759,  when  it 
became  known  how  strong  D'Achd  was.^  In  August 
Coote  completed  the  investment  by  land,  and  still 
D'Ache  did  not  come. 

'  "  Secret  Order  to  Captain  (Hyde)  Parker  of  the  Norfolk."     The  seeond 
ship  was  the  ParUher.— Out-letters,  1331,  Dec.  10. 

VOL.  II.  I 


I30  THE    EAST    INDIES  1700 

So  late  in  the  season  he  was  scarcely  to  be  expected 
now.  Some  unknown  cause,  it  was  felt,  must  have  kept 
him  at  the  Mauritius.  Yet  the  situation  was  by  no 
means  easy.  The  time  was  close  at  hand  for  Steevens  to 
retire  to  the  Malabar  coast,  and  Coote  found  himself  too 
weak  to  deliver  an  assault.  To  starve  Lally  out  was  the 
only  chance,  and  if  Steevens  abandoned  the  blockade 
this  could  not  be  done.  Contrary,  therefore,  to  all  pre- 
cedent the  admiral  received  from  Governor  Pigot  an 
urgent  request  to  hold  his  position  despite  the  stormy 
season.  Was  it  the  inspiring  influence  of  Hawke's 
winter  blockade  of  Brest  reverberating  to  the  distant 
East  ?  Who  can  tell  ?  All  we  know  is  that  Steevens 
consented.  Early  in  October,  when  there  was  no  longer 
any  reasonable  fear  of  D'AcIk^'s  appearing,  he  held  away 
to  Trincomalee  to  water  and  refit  as  he  could,  leaving  five 
of  the  line  to  continue  the  blockade,  and  by  the  end 
of  December  he  was  back  again  in  person.  Still  Lally 
stubbornly  held  his  ground,  and  day  by  day  his  devoted 
garrison  strained  their  eyes,  almost  without  hope,  for  the 
sails  of  a  relieving  squadron.  Why  did  it  not  come  ? 
The  answer  to  the  question  is  one  of  the  most  striking 
points  in  the  war.  It  brings  home  to  us  more  forcibly 
than  ever  the  far-reaching  effect  of  Pitt's  favourite 
strategical  device,  and  reveals  how  coercively  the  war 
was  changing  its  character. 

Olive's  urgent  appeal  to  Pitt  had  reached  his  hands 
just  after  he  had  received  the  inspiring  news  of  Quebec. 
In  this  letter  Olive  told  how  all  in  vain  he  had  be- 
sought the  Oompany  to  put  him  in  a  position  to  seize 
a  country  which  by  an  easy  conquest  would  bring  them 
a  revenue  of  two  millions.  Possibly,  he  said,  so  large  a 
sovereignty  as  all  Bengal  was  too  great  for  a  mercantile 
company,  but  he  urged  it  was  well  worthy  of  the  British 


I760  CLIVE'S   ADVICE    TO    PITT  131 

government  to  take  such  a  conquest  in  hand,  and  that 
it  might  be  brought  about  without  draining  the  mother 
country  of  her  resources,  as  had  been  too  much  the  case 
with  our  possessions  in  America.  On  November  26th, 
while  Pitt  was  in  hourly  expectation  of  hearing  Hawke 
had  destroyed  Conflans's  fleet,  he  had  an  interview  with 
Walsh,  Olive's  secretary,  who  had  brought  the  letter 
home.  Pitt  received  him  very  cordially,  but  though 
he  declared  he  regarded  Olive's  project  as  quite  practical, 
he  made  difficulties.  There  was  doubt,  he  said,  whether 
under  the  charter  the  Oompany  would  not  be  entitled  to 
the  conquest,  and  although  the  country  might  easily  be 
taken,  he  did  not  believe  it  could  be  retained  except  by 
such  "  a  genius  as  Oolonel  Olive."  His  successors  would 
probably  not  be  equal  to  the  task.^ 

There  the  matter  rested.  Walsh  could  elicit  no 
further  encouragement,  but  it  may  be  that  a  seed  had 
been  sown.  It  will  be  remem.bered  that  in  April  1760 
Newcastle  Avas  troubled  with  suspicions  of  a  new  com- 
bined expedition,  of  which  Anson  knew  nothing  but  to 
which  Hardwicke  believed  Howe  was  privy.  Earlier  in 
the  year  Pitt  had  certainly  been  bent  upon  carrying  out 
his  long-deferred  project  against  Belleisle.  At  the  time 
it  was  suspected  that  Soubise  meant  to  occupy  Flanders, 
and  that  possibly  the  movement  portended  another 
desperate  attempt  to  invade.  For  Pitt  it  was  a  reason 
for  renewing  his  old  policy  of  counter-attack  by  attempt- 
ing Belleisle,  but  the  idea  filled  Newcastle  and  his  friends 
with  alarm.  Boscawen  apparently  had  been  consulted 
and  had  reported  against  the  enterprise,  but  Pitt  was 
not  to  be  deterred,  and  according  to  Newcastle  he  re- 
fused even  to  look  at  Boscawen's  report,  since  he  knew 
naval  opinion  regarded  the  capture  of  the  island  as  use- 

^  Chathatn  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  387-392,  and  note. 


132  THE    EAST    INDIES  1760 

less}  However  this  may  have  been,  the  thing  was  dropped, 
partly,  no  doubt,  because  the  information  of  the  intended 
invasion  was  soon  found  out  to  be  false,  and  partly 
because  Pitt  was  persuaded  to  give  way  and  send  the 
"  glorious  reinforcement "  to  Ferdinand  in  order  to  en- 
able him  to  take  the  offensive  and  get  a  decision  in 
a  more  orthodox  way. 

It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  idea  of  a  combined 
expedition  was  not  entirely  laid  aside,  but  it  was  now 
to  be  directed  to  a  colonial  sphere.  The  contemporary 
historian  of  the  war,  who  was  usually  well  informed, 
asserts  that  such  an  expedition  was  certainly  being 
prepared,  and  that  its  objective  was  the  islands  of 
Mauritius  and  Bourbon.^  This  authority  is  not,  of 
course,  unimpeachable,  and  no  trace  of  such  an  intention 
is  to  be  found  in  official  papers.  This,  however,  counts 
for  nothing  when  the  secret  was  Pitt's  own.  In  any 
case,  it  is  certain  something  of  the  kind  was  in  his  head, 
and  that  he  communicated  it  to  the  East  India  Company. 
In  April  the  Company  wrote  out  to  the  Council  in  Bengal 
a  long  and  formal  answer  to  Clive's  unending  complaints 
that  his  importunity  for  troops  was  ignored.  They 
showed,  on  the  contrary,  that  they  had  done  their  best, 
but  that  hitherto  it  had  been  impossible  to  move  the 
government.  Pitt's  hands  had  been  too  full,  but  now 
things  had  changed.  "  The  force,"  they  wrote,  "  which 
went  abroad  last  year  and  is  now  destined  for  India 
will  show  how  we  are  working  for  you."^  Hence  it 
would  seem  quite  clear  that  Pitt  at  this  time  was 
certainly  planning  to  extend  his  offensive  to  the  Indian 

^  Newcastle's  "  Mem.  for  business  with  Hardwicke,  &c.,"  Feb.  18,  1760, 
Stowe  MSS.,  263;  and  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  Feb.  8,  Newcastle  Papers, 
32,902. 

*  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  420. 

'  Auber's  British  Power  in  Inilia,  vol.  i.  p.  71. 


i76o  HOW    D'ACHl^.    WAS    HELD  133 

Ocean.  But  there  came  a  cry  from  Ferdinand  for  a 
diversion  in  his  favour.  In  spite  of  the  "  glorious  re- 
inforcement "  he  had  been  unable  to  make  head,  and  we 
have  seen  how  at  the  last  moment  the  secret  expedition 
had  to  be  reorganised  and  strengthened  Avith  the  inten- 
tion of  directing  it  against  the  original  objective,  Belleisle. 
How  it  eventually  fared  must  be  told  later.  For  the 
present  the  effect  in  India  suffices. 

There  it  had  already  done  its  work.  The  menace  was 
enough  to  upset  the  whole  position  of  the  French  in 
the  East.  By  some  means  or  other  they  must  have 
got  wind  of  the  design  almost  as  soon  as  it  was  con- 
ceived. For  on  June  8th  a  warning  reached  Mauritius 
from  Versailles  that  an  attack  was  coming.  And  not 
only  a  warning.  For  the  French  government  in  its 
alarm  felt  compelled  to  order  the  fleet  on  which  Lally's 
position  in  India  depended,  to  devote  itself  to  defending 
its  own  base.  D'AcIkj  had  not  yet  sailed  for  Pondi- 
cherry  when  the  fatal  order  arrived.  Early  in  the  year 
a  terrible  cyclone  had  overwhelmed  both  fleet  and  island 
with  misfortune.  Ever  since  that  time  he  had  been 
busy  repairing  damages,  and  now  that  he  was  at  last 
ready  to  try  conclusions  once  more  upon  the  Coromandel 
coast,  he  was  stopped.  For  the  warning  from  France  of 
the  intended  attack  brought  him  strict  orders  that  on  no 
account  was  he  to  quit  the  islands,  and  that  even  if  he 
had  left  them  he  was  to  return  immediately.^ 

So  this  is  why,  on  the  walls  of  Pondicherry,  Lally 
strained  his  eyes  in  vain  for  the  sails  of  the  fleet  which 
alone  could  save  him.  This  is  the  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion why  D'Ache  did  not  come.  It  was  another  startling 
result   of   Pitt's    favourite    weapon — one    more    striking 

'  Barchou  de  Penhoen,  Hist,  de  V Empire  Anylaisc  dmis  Ics  hides,  vol.  ii. 
p.  247  ;  Lacour-Gayet,  p.  385. 


134  THE    EAST   INDIES  1760 

example  of  the  far-reaching  disturbance  of  troops  upon 
the  sea.  "  I  don't  beHeve,"  wrote  Newcastle  of  the 
abortive  expedition,  "  it  ever  frightened  or  alarmed 
France."  He  could  not  tell  that  even  if  the  threat 
had  not  availed  to  achieve  what  was  hoped  in  Europe, 
yet  far  beyond  his  ken  in  the  Indian  seas  it  had  caused 
so  grave  an  alarm  as  to  tear  from  Lally  his  last  hope  of 
retaining  his  hold  for  France. 

So  soon  as  the  fatal  order  reached  D'Ache  he  sent 
away  two  frigates,  the  Hermione  and  the  Balcine,  to  inform 
Lally  that  he  must  now  rely  on  his  own  resources. 
Both  vessels  managed  to  get  into  Pondicherry ;  and  so, 
as  Coote  and  Steevens  closed  him  in,  Lally  knew  the 
succour  on  which  he  had  been  relying  as  his  only 
chance  would  never  come.  He  did  his  best  to  keep 
the  sentence  of  death  to  himself;  he  gave  out  that  a 
great  fleet  was  shortly  to  be  expected;  but  the  end  of 
all  was  staring  him  in  the  eyes.  To  emphasise  the  im- 
potence of  his  position,  Steevens  one  night,  by  a  daring 
piece  of  boat-work,  cut  out  both  the  Hermione  and  Baleine 
from  under  his  guns. 

Once  and  once  only  there  was  a  gleam  of  hope. 
Coote's  lines  drew  closer  and  closer  and  his  batteries 
galled  more  shrewdly,  and  it  looked  as  if  nothing 
would  loose  Steevens's  hold  in  spite  of  the  risk  he  had 
run  in  remaining  on  the  coast.  But  as  the  old  year 
passed  there  was  a  change,  and  the  first  hours  of  1761 
brought  down  upon  the  fleet  such  a  cyclone  as  D'Ach(5 
had  suffered  just  a  year  before  at  the  islands.  The 
havoc  was  terrible.  At  the  moment  the  blockading 
force  consisted  of  eight  of  the  line  with  a  couple  of 
frigates  and  some  storeships.  Of  these  four  of  the  line 
were  dismasted,  one  driven  ashore,  two  foundered,  and 
the  smaller  craft  fared  no  better.     Steevens  alone  sue- 


i76i  SURRENDER   OF   PONDICHERRY  135 

ceeded  in  getting  to  sea  in  the  Norfolk,  his  flagship, 
and  shortly  returned  all  standing.  He  found  Lally  had 
sent  far  and  wide  notices  that  the  blockade  was  raised, 
and  urgent  invitations  for  the  despatch  of  provisions  at 
any  cost.  But  Steevens  only  set  his  teeth  the  harder. 
In  a  day  or  two  he  was  joined  by  Cornish,  who  had 
fortunately  been  at  sea  with  two  of  the  line,  and  three 
more  came  in  a  little  later.  Thereupon  Steevens  sent 
out  counter-notices  to  Dutch  and  Danes  that  he  still 
had  eleven  of  the  line  and  two  frigates,  and  the  blockade 
remained  effective.^  For  the  French  to  hold  on  longer 
was  useless.  The  reappearance  of  the  dogged  force 
which  even  cyclones  could  not  shake  off  quenched  the 
last  spark  of  hope,  and  on  January  15  th  Pondicherry 
capitulated. 

So  in  the  end  the  splendid  fabric  which  the  ill- 
requited  sons  of  France  had  erected  for  her  in  India, 
fell  to  fine  seamanship.  We  duly  honour  the  great  ex- 
ample which  Hawke  had  set  before  Brest;  his  bold 
institution  of  the  winter  blockade  has  won  its  true 
place  in  our  annals ;  but  there  is  no  reason,  when  we 
feel  the  glow  of  his  achievement,  why  we  should  forget 
how  the  tempests  of  the  changing  monsoons  were  faced 
triumphantly  by  Charles  Steevens. 

Thanks  to  his  courage  and  the  tenacity  of  Coote,  all 
was  lost  to  the  French  on  the  mainland  of  India.  But 
there  yet  remained  their  base  in  the  islands,  from  which 
their  position  had  been  nourished,  and  from  which  it  was 
still  open  to  them  to  harass  our  Indian  trade.  While 
Mauritius  and  Bourbon  remained  in  their  hands  the 
work  was  unfinished,  and  it  so  happened  that  the  very 
day  Pondicherry  surrendered,  orders  were  being  issued 
for  the  final  stroke. 

'  steevens  to  Admiralty,  Feb.  G.  17G1,  Inletters,  102. 


136  THE    EAST    INDIES  1761 

In  spite  of  the  diversion  of  the  secret  expedition 
for  a  European  objective,  the  original  intention  had  not 
been  lost  sight  of  for  a  moment.  Directly  Keppel's 
orders  were  changed  for  Belleisle,  it  had  been 
taken  up  by  the  East  India  Company  on  their  own 
account,  and  at  the  end  of  November  1760,  when  it 
was  still  believed  that  Keppel  was  going  to  Belleisle, 
they  sent  out  instructions  for  the  purpose  to  Madras. 
The  idea,  as  they  put  it,  was  that  as  soon  as  the  French 
were  driven  from  the  coast  of  Coromandel,  the  blow 
should  be  followed  to  the  Mauritius  and  Bourbon ;  but 
the  Madras  council  were  given  clearly  to  understand 
that  the  Company  had  no  intention  of  increasing  their 
responsibilities  by  retaining  the  islands  permanently. 
The  object  of  the  expedition  would  be  to  destroy  the 
fortifications  and  to  ruin  the  harbours,  so  that  the 
French  could  never  use  them  again.  The  caveat  is 
important,  for  it  certainly  suggests  that  Pitt's  idea, 
while  it  lasted,  had  been  a  permanent  occupation.  As 
to  the  means,  the  Indian  provincial  authorities  were 
informed  that  the  King's  government  had  procured 
twelve  hundred  men  for  the  enterprise,  and  that  the 
Company  was  raising  recruits  of  its  own.  At  the 
moment  they  were  trying  to  get  from  Pitt  a  definite 
order  for  the  admiral  to  co-operate  with  his  whole 
fleet,  and  they  assured  their  officers  that  success  at  the 
islands  was  certain  if  they  would  do  their  part.^ 

The  efforts  of  the  Company  at  home  fared  even  better 
than  was  hoped.  For  no  sooner  was  the  Belleisle 
project  abandoned,  as  it  was  too  late  in  starting  to 
succeed,  than  the  matter  was  again  taken  in  hand  by 


^  Secret  Committee  of  E.I.C.  to  Select  Committees  of  St.  George  and 
Bombay  (Extracts),  Nov.  23,  1760.  Enclosed  in  Cornish  to  Anson, 
June  21,  1761,  In-letterK,  1701. 


1761  DESIGN    AGAINST    MAURITIUS  137 

Pitt.  The  completion  of  the  conquest  of  Canada  made 
an  ^ttempt  on  Mauritius  and  Bourbon  more  than  ever 
legitimate  as  a  form  of  final  pressure  to  bring  France 
to  terms.  It  Avas  exactly  suited  to  the  secondary  phase 
which  the  war  had  now  entered.  Consequently,  within 
a  fortnight  of  Keppel's  being  ordered  to  disembark  his 
troops  at  Portsmouth,  the  original  idea  was  laid  before 
the  new  king,^  and  a  fortnight  later  again,  as  Pondi- 
cherry  was  surrendering,  secret  orders  for  carrying  out 
the  enterprise  were  drafted  and  placed  in  a  sealed 
packet  to  be  taken  out  to  Steevens  by  Captain  Hughes 
in  the  Seaford  frigate.'  The  plan  was  on  a  scale  that 
the  seriousness  of  the  operation  warranted.  By  the 
sealed  orders  Steevens  was  informed  that  in  March 
Keppel  would  sail  with  a  fleet  of  the  line,  besides 
frigates,  transports,  fireships,  and  victuallers,  that  the 
troops  would  number  ten  thousand,  besides  an  artillery 
train,  that  they  would  be  victualled  for  eighteen  months, 
and  that  Mauritius  was  the  objective.  He  was,  accord- 
ingly, to  do  all  he  could  to  co-operate.  After  detailing 
a  fully  sufficient  force  to  protect  the  interests  of  the 
Company  in  India,  he  was  to  send  or  take  the  rest  of 
his  fleet  to  St.  Augustine  Bay  in  Madagascar.  There 
he  would  find  a  frigate  sent  forward  by  Keppel  to  inform 
him  when  his  force  was  to  be  expected  off  Mauritius, 
and  the  two  admirals  were  then  to  rendezvous  eastward 
of  it  at  the  island  of  Diego  Rays.^     The  original   idea 

'  Newcastle  Papers,  Jan.  1,  17G1,  "Mem.  for  the  King.  The  Two 
Operations  in  the  East  Indies  and  in  Martinico,  &c." 

*  "Secret  Orders,"  Jan.  15  and  16,  Out-letters,  1331. 

^  "  Secret  Orders,"  Jan.  16,  \1Q\,  Out-lettcrs,  1331.  Professor  Laughton 
informs  me  that  "  Diego  Rays  "  was  the  name  given  in  Queen  Anne's  time 
to  "Rodriguez,"  which  lies  to  the  eastward  of  Mauritius.  It  is  also  so 
called  in  the  East  India  Pilot,  1796.  The  movements  of  Cornish  and 
Tiddeman  show  it  cannot  have  been  the  present  "Diego  Rays"  which 
lies  to  the  south  of  the  Maldives. 


138  THE    EAST    INDIES  1761 

had  been  that  Pocock  should  command  the  whole,  but 
since  he  had  come  homo  Steevens  was  informed  a  little 
later  that  Keppel  was  to  do  so,  and  that  he  himself 
Avas  to  remain  on  the  Coromandel  coast  and  merely  send 
his  spare  ships  to  Diego  Rays.^ 

These  orders  Steevens  never  received.  He  died  in  May, 
leaving  the  command  to  Cornish.  No  sooner  was  the 
new  admiral  in  office  than  he  found  himself  entangled 
in  what  he  regarded  as  a  wild  and  ill-digested  scheme  for 
seizins:  Mauritius  and  Bourbon  with  the  forces  which 
the  Company  had  at  its  disposal.  The  scheme  was  the 
result  of  the  orders  which  the  India-house  had  sent 
out  in  the  previous  November,  when  Keppel's  expedi- 
tion was  first  abandoned.  The  condition  for  action  on 
which  the  Company's  plan  was  based,  was  fulfilled  by 
the  fall  of  Pondicherry,  and  Pigot  felt  himself  bound 
to  begin.  The  idea  had  already  been  mooted  at  the 
beginning  of  March  between  Pigot  and  Colonel  Monson, 
the  officer  who  had  taken  Carical  with  Cornish.  In 
communicating  with  Steevens  the  two  officers  said 
nothing  about  the  Company's  orders.  The  proposal 
came  as  an  idea  of  Pisfot  himself,  and  there  was  a 
good  deal  of  misunderstanding  and  delay,  especially 
as  Clive  was  clamouring  for  the  troops  intended  for 
the  expedition  to  be  sent  to  Bengal  instead.  The  fact 
is,  that  when  Pigot  first  broached  the  project,  the  orders 
from  the  India  House  cannot  have  reached  him.  It 
was  an  idea  of  his  own,  but  this,  apparently,  Cornish 
did  not  know.  He  felt  that  something  had  been  held 
back  from  his  former  chief  and  from  himself.  Still, 
believing  Pigot  had  no  real  wish  to  undertake  the 
enterprise,  and  that  he  was  only  trying  to  entrap  him 
into  refusing  on  naval  grounds,  he  gave  a  sullen  assent, 

»  "Secret  Orders,"  March  4,  Out-htters,  1331. 


i76i  DESIGN    AGAINST    MAURITIUS  139 

and  in  no  pleasant  humour  went  round  to  Bombay  to 
prepare  his  part,  leaving  Commodore  Tiddeman  in 
command  on  the  Coromandel  side. 

The  acrimonious  correspondence  that  ensued,  boded 
little  hope  of  success.  Fortunately,  it  was  not  put  to 
the  trial.  In  July  Pitt's  secret  orders  reached  Madras. 
Tiddeman  opened  them,  and,  without  telling  Pigot 
their  contents,  he  got  him  to  forward  them  to  Cornish 
at  Bombay.  He  himself  took  the  responsibility  of 
acting  on  them  at  once,  and  sailed  with  his  squadron 
for  St.  Augustine  Bay.  It  was  not  till  the  end  of 
August  that  the  orders  reached  Cornish.  He,  too,  was 
as  eager  as  Tiddeman.  Delighted  to  be  rid  of  Pigot's 
scheme,  he  Avrote  to  the  governor  that  he  was  now  pro- 
ceeding on  the  King's  affairs,  and  immediately  sailed 
direct  for  Diego  Rays.^  There  the  two  squadrons  met. 
Tiddeman  had  not  been  into  St.  Augustine  Bay,  because 
he  had  met  the  frigate  which  was  bringing  out  Pitt's 
latest  order  that  Keppel  was  to  command  and  Cornish 
to  remain  on  his  station.  From  the  same  source  Tidde- 
man had  also  learnt  that  Keppel  would  be  at  the  Cape 
early  in  September,  and  he  had  therefore  come  on  to 
Diego  Rays  direct.  Still  Cornish  was  too  eager  for 
action  to  go  back.  He  resolved,  having  come  so  far, 
to  stay  and  see,  as  he  said,  if  there  was  anything  ho 
could  do  for  Keppel. 

So,  in  spite  of  the  last  order,  the  two  waited  together 
in  keen  expectation  week  after  week.  October  passed 
into  November  and  still  there  was  no  sign  of  Keppel 
and  his  fleet,     December  came  and  with  it  a  message 


1  Cornisli  to  Anson,  June  21,  1761,  witli  its  enclosures  ;  same  to  Madras 
Council,  Aug.  22  and  31,  and  to  Admiralty,  Aug.  31  ;  Pigot  to  Cornisli, 
July  .30,  Jn-letters,  1G2.  Colonel  Monson  to  Colonel  Draper,  March  2, 
Newcastle  Papers,  32,919. 


I40  THE   EAST   INDIES  1761-2 

from  our  Consul  at  Aleppo,  by  way  of  the  Persian  Gulf, 
tliat  the  expedition  had  been  again  diverted  to  Belle- 
isle,  and  that  a  peace  congress  was  to  meet  in  July.  '^ 
Though  only  half  willing  to  believe  the  tale,  Steevens  ,'ji8vv; 
and  Tiddeman  could  remain  no  longer  where  they  were. 
Provisions  were  giving  out,  and  in  deep  disappointment 
they  sailed  back  to  Madras.  There  they  found  the 
Terpsichore,  Thurot's  old  frigate,  which  they  had  missed 
by  not  going  to  St.  Augustine  Bay,  and  in  her  were 
orders  eight  months  old  cancelling  the  whole  project.^ 
The  Consul  at  Aleppo  was  right.  Again  at  the  last 
moment  the  expedition  had  been  diverted  to  Belleisle, 
and  a  congress  was  once  more  on  foot. 

1  Cornish's  Despatch,  Dec.  6,  1761,  and  April  5,  \1^2,  In-Jetters,  162; 
"  Secret  Orders,"  May  18,  1761,  Out-letters,  1331. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE  RESUMPTION   OF   COASTAL   PRESSURE— 
BELLEISLE 

The  reasons  for  the  second  diversion  of  the  Mauritius 
expedition  lie  deep  in  the  tangled  politics  of  the  Avar. 
Since  Pitt  had  first  conceived  the  idea  the  situation 
had  completely  changed,  and  was  twining  itself  into 
fresh  complexities,  which  profoundly  influenced  his 
strategy. 

At  the  end  of  1760  the  war  had  reached  a  crisis  at 
which  it  occurred  to  every  one  that  a  balance  might  be 
struck.  With  the  completion  of  the  conquest  of  Canada 
England  had  attained  her  object,  and  with  the  other 
securities  she  had  in  hand  was  in  a  position  to  claim 
all  she  had  fought  for.  Prussia  was  nearly  exhausted, 
but  had  more  than  held  her  own.  France  was  in  a 
deplorable  condition  internally,  and  quite  incapable,  with 
the  destruction  of  her  navy,  of  recovering  what  she  had 
lost  to  England.  Moreover,  she  was  persuaded  she  had 
nothing  to  gain  by  pursuing  the  quarrel  of  Maria  Theresa 
with  Frederick  to  the  death.  It  was  obviously  not  her 
interest  to  leave  Austria  without  a  rival  in  Germany. 
Every  one,  indeed,  was  weary  of  the  cause  of  "  Madame 
d'Hongrie,"  and  no  one  but  Austria,  at  least  none  of  the 
combatants,  could  discern  any  advantage  in  the  war  being 
prolonged. 

Frederick,  with  his  usual  penetration,  saw  it  was  the 
moment  to  act,   and    saw   what   the  moment   required. 


142  BELLEISLE  1760-1 

With  the  new  year  there  came  from  him  a  proposal 
that  England  should  open  communications  with  France 
with  a  view  to  negotiating  a  separate  peace  without  regard 
to  his  own  quarrel  with  the  Austrian  coalition.  The  idea 
was  thoroughly  worthy  of  his  ingenuity.  The  previous 
attempt  at  stopping  the  war  had  demonstrated  the 
clumsiness  and  indeed  the  futility  of  trying  to  secure 
a  general  peace  by  means  of  a  congress.  The  situation 
was  too  complex  and  the  various  interests  too  diverse. 
But  as  between  France  and  England  they  were  plain 
and  simple,  if  Frederick  himself  chose  to  give  England 
a  free  hand.  This  he  could  well  afford  to  do,  for  he  had 
no  illusions  as  to  the  real  nature  of  the  war.  The  clear- 
ness of  his  political  vision  told  him  that  if  France  once 
made  peace  with  her  real  and  original  enemy  she  would 
soon  find  means  of  forcing  Austria  to  follow  her  example. 
With  France  and  England  at  one  and  the  great  imperial 
struggle  finished,  the  minor  European  superstructure 
must  quickly  collapse.  Thus  from  Frederick's  own  lips 
we  have  a  striking  confirmation  of  the  British  view  of 
the  war.  Like  Pitt  he  saw  the  Prussian  struggle  for 
existence,  with  which  in  uiodern  times  the  Seven  Years' 
War  has  been  too  freely  identified,  as  a  sub-plot  of  the 
world-wide  drama  in  which  France  and  England  were 
the  protagonists.  So  dispassionate  a  sense  of  proportion 
is  the  rarest  of  political  virtues.  Pitt's  view  of  the  war 
could  want  no  stronger  endorsement.^ 

In  London  the  proposal  was  received  with  mixed 
feelings.  Pitt  held  back,  and  kept  finding  excuses  for 
not  receiving  Frederick's  envoys.     In  his   eyes  enough 

^  Newcastle  Papers,  32,917.  "  Mem.  for  the  King,"  Jan.  1, 1761,  "  Precis 
of  the  King  of  Prussia's  Letters"  ;  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke  and  Hard- 
wicke's  reply,  Jan.  3.  For  the  text  of  the  letters  to  which  Newcastle 
clearly  refers,  see  Frederick  to  Knyphausen  from  Leipzig,  Dec.  19  and  21. 
Politsche  Corr.,  vol.  xx.  pp.  156  and  162. 


i76i  NEW   EXPEDITIONS  143 

had  not  been  done.  He  had  firmly  fixed  in  his  mind 
that  it  was  his  duty  to  put  it  out  of  the  power  of 
France  ever  to  resuscitate  her  navy,  and  that  more 
must  be  torn  from  her  before  she  would  consent  to 
the  terms  he  wished  to  impose.  His  expedition  against 
Mauritius  was  almost  ready  to  start,  and  he  was  already 
preparing  another  for  the  complete  destruction  of  the 
French  power  in  the  West. 

Already  in  the  middle  of  December  he  had  warned 
Amherst  to  prepare  to  support  it  by  placing  the  North 
American  garrisons  in  the  hands  of  provincial  troops  in 
order  to  free  the  greater  part  of  the  King's  forces  for 
an  expedition  "  either  against  Mobile  and  the  Mississippi, 
or  Martinique  and  the  other  French  islands  in  the  West 
Indies."  The  first  week  in  the  new  year  after  Frederick's 
proposal  had  been  received,  Amherst  was  informed  more 
definitely  that  the  expedition  was  to  be  directed  against 
Martinique.  Such  an  attempt,  however,  could  not  be 
made  until  after  the  hurricane  months — that  is,  not 
till  the  end  of  September  or  the  beginning  of  October. 
"  In  the  meantime,"  Pitt  wrote, "  as  it  would  be  highly 
expedient  for  the  good  of  his  Majesty's  affairs  if  some 
interesting  attempt  could  be  made  with  success  during 
the  earlier  part  of  the  year,  the  impression  whereof  could 
not  but  have  a  very  beneficial  influence  in  Europe  both 
at  home  and  abroad,"  he  was  to  endeavour  to  get  away 
two  thousand  troops  at  once,  and  in  co-operation  with 
the  governor  of  Guadeloupe  and  Sir  James  Douglas, 
who  was  commodore  on  the  Leeward  Islands  station,  to 
seize  Dominica,  and,  if  possible,  St.  Lucia. ^ 

With  these  projects  on  foot  it  was  natural  Pitt  had  no 
desire  to  treat  till  the  results  were  in  his  pocket.    Perhaps, 

»  Pitt  to  Amherst,  Dec.  17,  17C0,  and  Jan.  7,  1761,  Thackeray,  History  of 
Lord  Chatham,  appendix  iv. 


144  BELLEISLE  1761 

too,  his  acute  penetration  permitted  him  already  to  per- 
ceive the  deep  and  dangerous  game  with  which  the 
proposed  negotiations  were  likely  to  be  entangled — for 
which,  perhaps,  they  were  only  a  cloak.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  King  and  his  favourite,  Bute,  were  ready  to 
seize  any  opportunity  of  escaping  from  the  German  war. 
Newcastle  and  his  friends,  together  with  the  powerful 
Bedford  influence,  Avere  even  more  eager  for  peace,  partly 
from  a  genuine  belief  that  enough  had  been  done,  and 
that  it  was  bad  policy  to  secure  too  great  a  domination 
of  the  sea,  and  partly  because  nothing  but  peace  could 
rid  them  of  the  detested  domination  of  Pitt. 

More  powerful,  perhaps,  than  all  these  ministerial 
influences  were  the  rise  and  growth  of  a  serious  revul- 
sion of  public  opinion  against  the  war.  It  had  been 
aroused  during  the  past  year  by  the  publication  of  a 
pamphlet  entitled  "  Considerations  on  the  Present  German 
War."  With  the  exception  of  Swift's  "  Conduct  of  the 
Allies,"  no  such  work  had  ever  produced  so  deep  an 
effect  in  England,  and  no  history  of  the  war  can  afford 
to  ignore  it  either  on  political  or  strategical  grounds. 
It  was  issued  anonymously,  but  was  known  to  be  the 
work  of  a  nonconformist  schoolmaster,  called  Israel 
Mauduit,  who  had  aheady  come  forward  as  a  clever 
pamphleteer  during  the  controversy  over  the  loss  of 
Minorca  in  1757.^  Coming  from  such  a  source,  the 
work  displays  astonishing  ability  and  understanding. 
With  a  full  grasp  of  modern  military  history,  the 
author  makes  an  ordered  attack  on  the  whole  system 
of  Continental  war  into  which  Pitt  had  been  reluctantly 
forced.  With  merciless  cogency  he  points  out  the 
political  folly  of    a    country  with  a  weak  army  and    a 

1  A    Letter  to  the  Riglit  Hon.  Loi-d  B y  (Blakency),  being  an  Enquiry 

into  the  Merits  of  his  Defence  oj  Minorca. 


I76I  MAUDUIT'S    PAMPHLET  145 

powerful  navy  engaging  in  a  war  between  Continental 
States,  and  in  an  area  where  the  nature  of  our  national 
force  had  everything  against  it — and  all  for  the  integrity 
of  a  small  German  province  in  which  England  had  no 
real  interest.  We  had  already  spent  upon  it,  he  said, 
more  than  all  the  cost  of  Marlborough's  war  both  by 
land  and  sea,  and  were  only  sinking  deeper  and  deeper 
into  the  mire.  The  whole  is  a  frank  and  forcible  appeal 
to  the  insular  national  spirit.  No  adequate  justice  is 
done  to  the  place  which  the  Continental  operations  held 
in  Pitt's  system,  but  it  is  not  ignored.  The  necessity  of 
covering  Hanover  is  met  by  the  argument  that  that 
country,  from  its  geographical  position,  was  not  one  that 
Franco  would  care  or  could  afford  to  hold  permanently — 
an  opinion  which  shortly  afterwards  was  expressed  by 
Choiseul  himself.^  The  argument  was  plausible,  and  to 
some  extent  sound,  though  it  certainly  does  not  cover 
the  other  complex  diplomatic  considerations  which  had 
forced  Pitt's  hand,  and  which  the  public  was  not  likely 
to  recall. 

Most  remarkable,  however,  of  all  Mauduit's  conten- 
tions is  the  strategical  argument  with  which  the  latter 
part  of  the  pamphlet  is  occupied.  "  Every  one,"  he 
writes,  "  who  has  thought  on  the  subject  of  war,  must 
have  considered  the  three  different  kinds  of  it — a  war 
of  offence,  a  war  of  equality,  and  a  war  of  defence.  And 
every  one  knows  that  of  these  the  last  is  the  most  dis- 
advantageous and  the  most  difficult.  When  an  army 
is  to  defend  itself  only,  a  general  will  find  employment 
for  all  his  attention  ;  but  if  it  bo  to  defend  a  large  tract  of 
country,  unless  the  attacking  general  be  greatly  inferior 
in  his  art,  he  will  usually  prevail.     The  reason  is  that 

*  To  Hans  Stanley.     See  Stanley  to  Pitt,  June   12,   17G1,  Thackeray, 
vol.  i.  p.  523. 

VOL.  II.  K 


146  BELLEISLE  1761 

the  general  who  acts  offensively  has  it  in  his  own  choice 
when  and   where  to   direct    his    main   force,   while   the 
defender  must  equally  divide  his."     Further,  he  points 
out  that,  if  the  attacking  party  fails,  it  merely  means  that 
he  must  try  again,  whereas  if  the  defender  be  defeated, 
it  means   disaster.     So  in  the  long  run   defensive  war 
has  scarcely  a  chance  of  succeeding.     In  dyke  countries, 
like  the  Netherlands,  where  fortified  lines  can  be  used 
effectively,  he  admits  defensive  war  may  be  strong,  but 
shows   that  even  there  the  Duke  of   Marlborough  had 
always    been    able    to    penetrate    any  lines   the   French 
could  make.     Now,  our  whole   war   in  Westphalia   was 
in   conception  a  defensive  war.     Ferdinand's  army  was 
in    theory   an   army   of    observation,    a   defensive   army, 
to   cover  Hanover  and  Frederick's  right.      Recently,  it 
is  true,  by  the  late  "  glorious  reinforcement "  an  effort 
had  been  made  to  enable  it   to   pass   to   the    offensive. 
But  Mauduit  argues  that  even  this  idea  is  fundamentally 
unsound,   because  in  the  Westphalian  theatre  we  must 
always  be  inferior,  for  no  matter  how  many  troops  we 
sent,   France    could    always    send    more.     Consequently 
to  adopt  the  offensive  was  bad,  because  we  could  never 
be  in  sufficient  superiority  to  push  it  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion by  invading  France  itself.     From  this  undeniably 
good  point  he  proceeds  to  develop  on  the  most  modern 
lines  the  whole  theory  of  the  supremacy  of  the  offensive, 
rounding  up  with  the  conclusion  that  our  right  line  of 
action  was   upon   the   sea   against   the  enemy's   oversea 
possessions,  since  in  that  way  we  could  employ  the  arm 
in  which  our  supremacy  was  overwhelming,  and  which 
enabled  us  to  take  the  offensive  legitimately  and  with 
resistless  power.     From  beginning  to  end,  it  is  the  doctrine 
which  sees  the  British  army  as  a  sword  in  the  hand  of 
the  fleet. 


I76I  MAUDUIT'S    PAMPHLET  147 

The  weak  point  of  the  argument  of  course  is  that 
it  treats  the  Continental  operations  as  a  separate  war 
instead  of  as  the  defensive  part  of  the  whole.  Still 
it  remains  the  most  striking  criticism  of  Pitt's  war- 
direction  that  exists.  Where  the  learning  and  the  very 
modern  exposition  of  the  theory  of  war  came  from  is 
hard  to  say.^  The  hand  was  the  hand  of  the  dissenting 
schoolmaster,  the  mind  was  Lord  Hardwicke's.  Every 
one  at  least  understood  the  pamphlet  was  issued  with  his 
countenance,  and  as  we  have  seen  his  letters  at  this  time 
are  full  of  sound  and  advanced  strategical  thought.^  It 
was,  perhaps,  hard  that  he  should  turn  Pitt's  own  cher- 
ished theory  against  him.  But  the  case  was  serious ; 
politics  are  pitiless ;  and  no  one  can  expect  to  sin  against 
the  inexorable  laws  of  war,  however  courageous  the 
motive,  without  finding  the  sin  come  home  to  roost.  It 
was  Pitt's  own  system  that  the  pamphlet  developed,  and 
the  wound  was  the  deeper  for  the  true  temper  of  the 
weapon.  The  power  and  clear  conviction  with  which 
the  case  was  reasoned,  the  obvious  mastery  of  the 
question  which  it  displayed,  were  irresistible.  Attempts 
were  made  to  answer  it.  By  the  army  men  still  devoted 
to  la  grande  (jucrre  it  was  ridiculed  in  the  way  we 
know  so  well.  "  These  are  sounds,"  they  mocked, 
"  drawn  from  speculation,  paper-staining  warriors,  and 
castle-building   politicians,   but    they   are  disclaimed   by 


*  It  does  not  occur  in  Puys^gur's  Art  de  la  guerre,  2nd  ed.,  1749,  nor  in 
the  Riveries  of  Marslial  Saxe,  published  in  Paris  in  1757,  and  at  The  Hague 
by  M.  de  Bonneville,  capitaine  ingenieur  de  campaign  in  the  Prussian 
service  in  1758.  Conite  Turpin  de  Crissc  has  something  like  it  in  his 
Essai  sur  I'  art  de  guerre,  1754,  and  still  more  in  his  commentaries  on  the 
Memoirs  of  Monteciiculi,  but  this  was  not  published  till  1770.  Nowhere  is 
found  at  any  rate  the  important  distinction  of  the  middle  terra,  "  war  of 
equality,"  meaning  where  the  two  belligerents  are  equally  balanced 
enough  for  each  to  seek  to  attack  the  other. 

*  See  ante,  p.  84. 


148  BELLEISLE  1761 

practice  and  experience.  Every  war  in  its  own  nature 
becomes  offensive,  whatever  the  pretences  may  have 
been  upon  which  it  was  originally  founded.  If  an  army 
of  defence  can  offend  the  enemy,  the  means  of  offence 
becomes  the  most  effectual  principle  of  defence."  ^  All 
this,  though  of  course  perfectly  true,  was  beside  the 
point ;  it  missed  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
major  and  minor  strategy,  and  displayed  an  incapacity 
to  understand  the  eternal  conditions  of  the  offensive 
and  the  whole  theory  of  the  classification  on  which 
Mauduit's  argument  was  based.  Naturally,  it  failed 
to  convince.  In  spite  of  the  mockery  of  the  Continental 
school,  its  influence  continued  to  spread.  In  a  few 
months  it  went  through  six  editions,  and  Mauduit 
eventually  received  a  Government  post  from  Bute. 
Pitt,  of  course,  entirely  shared  Mauduit's  views,  and 
would  gladly  have  gone  back  to  his  old  system  had  it 
been  possible  at  the  stage  the  war  had  reached.  "  If 
the  King,"  he  said  to  Bute  at  this  time,  "  is  not  for 
the  war  on  the  Continent,  I  am  ready  to  abandon  it, 
though  I  think  it  a  right  measure,"  ^  Here  he  was 
probably  correct,  given  the  fact  that  the  best  chance 
of  tiring  France  of  further  resistance  was  to  support 
Frederick,  and  Pitt's  instinct  for  concentration  of  effort 
justified  his  feeling  that  now  was  the  time  to  throw  all 
the  weight  we  could  into  that  particular  scale.  For 
him  to  do  things  by  halves  was  the  one  unpardonable 
course.^ 

With  such   a   weight   of   opinion  behind   Frederick's 
proposal  for  bringing  the  war  to  an  end,  it  was  impossible 

^  A  Fiill  and  Candid  Answer,  kc.  (Brit.  Mus.  8132,  a.  51,  p.  71). 

*  Newcastle  to  Duke  of  Devonshire,  Mar.  13,   17G1,  Newcastle  Papers, 
32,920. 

Newcastle  to  Ilardwicke,  Jan.  3,  1761,  and  Hardwicke's  reply,  New- 
castle Papers,  32,917. 


i76i  THE   SHADOW    OF    SPAIN  149 

to  resist  it.  Secret  negotiations  were  opened  through 
The  Hague,  and  proceeded  so  fast,  that  by  February  22 
an  intimation  had  come  from  Versailles,  that  if  a  British 
agent  were  sent  to  Calais  in  a  fortnight,  Choiseul  would 
simultaneously  send  an  agent  to  Dover,  and  pourparlers 
could  begin  in  both  capitals  at  once.^ 

To  all  appearance  France  was  as  sincere  as  she 
was  eager.  But  this  may  be  doubted.  At  this  time 
Marshal  Belleisle,  who  was  regarded  as  the  strongest 
advocate  of  peace  at  the  French  court,  fell  ill. 
Choiseul,  the  firmest  believer  in  his  country's  power 
of  recovery,  was  dominating  the  situation,  and  when, 
on  February  25  th,  the  Marshal  died,  Choiseul  took  his 
place  at  the  War  Office,  with  practical  and  partly  direct 
control  of  foreign  relations  as  well.  That  Choiseul  was 
already  engaged  in  a  subtle  game  with  Spain  is  certain. 
It  was  a  game  which,  if  successful,  seemed  sure  to  place 
him  in  a  good  position  either  to  continue  the  war  or 
to  insist  on  easy  terms  for  peace.  It  was  this  game 
which  Pitt  had  possibly  detected.  He  saw  the  old 
shadow  of  Spain  across  the  path,  and  by  the  sudden 
change  in  the  objective  of  his  expedition,  he  was  making 
ready  to  deal  with  the  lurking  antagonist. 

On  March  4th,  it  will  be  remembered — about  ten 
days  that  is  after  the  French  had  agreed  to  open  secret 
relations — the  last  order  about  the  attempt  on  Mauritius 
had  been  signed  for  despatch  to  India.  At  that  time, 
therefore,  and  indeed  for  some  days  later,  Pitt's  intention 
must  have  been  that  the  enterprise  against  the  French 
islands  should  go  forward.  Yet  in  ten  days  more,  on 
March  25  th,  the  King  had  signed  secret  orders  for 
Keppel   to   make   Belleisle  his    objective,"       What    had 

>  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Feb.  22,  ibid.,  32,919. 
*  Keppel,  Life  of  Viscount  Keppel,  vol.  i.  p.  302. 


I50  BELLEISLE  1761 

happened  in  that  three  weeks'  interval  ?  Nothing  that 
can  be  detected,  except  the  interception  of  some  highly 
confidential  Spanish  despatches  that  were  in  a  bad  code 
and  easily  deciphered. 

To  grasp  all  that  these  compromising  documents  said 
to  Pitt,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  exactly  hoAv  our 
relations  stood  with  Spain.  First,  it  must  be  recalled 
how  at  the  end  of  September  in  the  previous  year,  the 
tone  of  the  Conde  de  Fuentes,  the  Spanish  ambassador, 
had  suddenly  changed.  The  claims  he  had  been  sent  to 
settle  related  to  certain  ships  seized  during  the  war,  in 
the  exercise  of  our  belligerent  rights  over  enemy's  goods, 
but  mainly  to  the  settlements  which  our  West  Indian 
colonists  had  "made  in  Honduras  for  cutting  logwood,  and 
to  an  alleged  right  to  complete  freedom  of  fishery  on  the 
Newfoundland  coast  and  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence. 
Wall,  who  had  never  swerved  from  his  Anglophile  policy, 
honestly  believed  that  Pitt  would  eventually  settle  these 
matters  in  a  liberal  spirit  for  the  sake  of  Spanish  friend- 
ship ;  and  hitherto  Fuentes  had  been  urging  the  matter 
in  a  friendly  and  equable  tone.  That  Spain  had  much 
reason  to  complain  of  our  dilatoriness  is  not  to  be  denied  ; 
but  when  Fuentes  suddenly  assumed  a  peremptory  tone, 
and  at  the  same  time  made  the  extraordinary  statement 
that  the  Spanish  claims  had  been  communicated  to 
France,  it  could  only  be  interpreted  as  a  threat  that  was 
not  to  be  endured. 

The  notorious  Marquis  of  Ensenada,  the  arch-Anglo- 
phobe  in  Spain,  had  been  recalled  to  court  by  Charles  the 
Third.  In  1754  he  had  been  banished  for  instructing 
the  Spanish  governors  to  make  a  piratical  attack  on  the 
British  in  the  West  Indies,  such  as  John  Hawkins  had 
suffered  at  San  Juan  de  Luz  two  hundred  years  before. 
The  natural  inference  was  that  Wall's  friendly  influence 


1761  MENACING    MOVE    OF    SPAIN  151 

was  waning  and  Ensenada's  taking  its  place.  But  the 
truth  was  that  Wall  himself  was  losing  patience,  and  the 
real  motive  force  was  the  energetic  and  not  too  wise  King 
himself.  Pitt  answered  in  the  firm  and  high  tone  that 
was  natural.  "  I  must  observe  to  your  Excellency,"  he 
said,  "  that  we  are  quite  unable  to  understand  the  motive 
and  object  of  so  extraordinary  a  communication  to  a 
court  at  war  with  England,  and  which  in  any  case  or  on 
any  consideration  has  not  any  business  to  interfere  with 
Spanish  claims  on  us  to  the  Newfoundland  fishery."  He 
referred  the  matter  to  Hardwicke,  and  even  the  level- 
headed, peaceable  old  lawyer  was  staggered.  "  I  own,"  he 
wrote,  "  I  never  was  more  surprised  in  my  life  than  at 
the  style  and  turn  of  these  two  extraordinary  pieces,  so 
different  from  what  there  was  reason  to  expect  from  the 
mission  of  M.  de  Fuentes ;  but  what  could  not  fail  to 
strike  most  was  the  previous  and  unprecedented  appeal 
to  the  Court  of  France  avoAved  in  the  memorial  relating 
to  the  Newfoundland  fishery;"  and  he  heartily  approved 
Pitt's  dignified  and  forcible  answer.  As  to  the  Honduras 
and  other  claims,  although,  as  he  said,  the  manner  and 
tone  of  their  presentation  disgusted  and  offended  him,  he 
wished  parts  of  the  claim  were  not  so  well  founded  upon 
the  merits.  But  he  warmly  applauded  the  step  which 
Pitt  had  taken  in  the  matter,  which  was  in  a  very  tem- 
perate despatch  to  instruct  Lord  Bristol  in  Madrid  to 
confer  confidentially  with  Wall.^  Since  then  relations 
had  only  been  going  from  bad  to  worse.  The  Spaniards 
continued  to  arm  both  by  sea  and  land.  At  the  end  of 
January,  the  Marquis  de  Grimaldi,  a  prot(5ge  of  Ensanada's, 
who  had  also  been  in  Wall's  confidence,  was  called  from 

*  Hardwicke  to  Pitt,  Sept.  29,    17G0,  Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.    pp.    68- 
72,   and   notes;  Pitt  to   Lord   Bristol,  Sept.    2G.— Thackeray,  vol.    i.   p. 

487. 


152  BELLEISLE  1761 

The  Hague  to  take  the  Spanish  Embassy  in  Paris.^  On 
December  23rd  and  January  3rd  Fuentes  again  presented 
his  claims,  and  Pitt  absolutely  refused  to  listen  to  him. 
Wall  kept  pressing  him  to  get  an  answer,  and  on  January 
23rd  he  wrote  to  say  it  was  useless.  Pitt  would  add 
nothing  to  the  despatch  he  had  written  to  Lord  Bristol. 
At  the  same  time  Fuentes  gave  Wall  to  understand  that 
Pitt's  inexorable  attitude  was  not  generally  approved,  and 
that  a  strong  party,  headed  by  the  Duke  of  Devonshire, 
were  bent  on  unseating  him.  This  letter  was  intercepted, 
with  what  effect  upon  Pitt  can  be  imagined.^ 

Meanwhile  Grimaldi  had  arrived  in  Paris  and  con- 
tinued his  correspondence  with  Fuentes.  The  whole  of 
this  was  also  intercepted.  Grimaldi  opened  on  February 
15th,  with  information  that,  although  there  was  an 
ardent  wish  for  peace  in  France,  he  was  officially  in- 
formed no  direct  negotiation  had  begun.  Choiseul  was, 
however,  trying  to  get  Russia  and  Austria  to  agree  to 
terms  which  he  believed  England  and  Prussia  could  not 
fail  to  accept.  Grimaldi  enjoined  absolute  secrecy,  because 
he  meant  to  try  to  get  some  advantage  out  of  it.  "  I  do 
not  know,"  he  concluded,  "  whether  our  court  will  come 
to  it,  but  I  think  it  my  duty  to  propose  what  may  be 
useful  to  us  and  I  judge  it  necessary  without  exposing 
the  King."  Ten  days  later  another  letter  was  inter- 
cepted, saying  that  France  was  resolved  to  make  peace 
on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis,  and  that  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg  had  assented.  It  was  absolutely  necessary 
to  keep  this  from  the  English  court,  for,  as  he  said,  "  In 
consideration  of  this  and  of  our  situation,  I  begin  working 


^  Grimaldi  to  Fuentes,  Jan.  30,  S.P.  Foreign  [Intercepted  Letters),  91. 

«  Fuentes  to  Wall,  Jan.  23,  1701,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,918.  See  also 
Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  p.  89,  where  only  the  latter  part  of  the  letter  is 
given. 


i76i  GRIMALDI'S    INTRIGUE  153 

in  order  to  see  if  we  can  make  some  alliance  with  France 
which  may  protect  us  from  those  accidents  we  ought 
to  fear." 

So  far  then  it  would  look  as  if  Grimaldi  thought  peace 
certain,  and  had  hovering  in  his  mind  the  idea  which  was 
to  develop  into  the  famous  "  Family  Compact,"  to  secure 
Spain  against  the  maritime  domination  which  the  peace 
would  confirm  to  England.  On  March  5th  he  wrote  a 
third  letter,  saying  he  had  begun  his  intrigue  and  had 
informed  Madrid  for  approval.  "  It  appears  to  me,"  he 
wrote,  "  of  the  utmost  importance  for  us  to  assure  our- 
selves of  France,  and  engage  her  before  she  makes  peace : 
for  afterwards  I  do  not  know  what  inclination  she  may 
have  to  go  to  war  again  for  our  sake.  I  return  your 
excellency  a  thousand  thanks  for  your  advices  about  the 
English  expedition.  .  .  .  The  notion  of  making  proposals 
to  England  for  a  congress  continues,  and  I  believe  will  be 
made;  but  for  all  this  peace  is  not  yet."  On  March  10th 
Fuentes  replied  in  terms  which  showed  he  thoroughly 
understood  that  Grimaldi's  game  was  to  deter  France 
from  consenting  to  peace  by  offering  to  make  common 
cause  with  her,  and  thereby  to  drag  her  into  the  Spanish 
quarrel.  In  a  week  Fuentes  wrote  to  Paris  again  to  say 
amongst  other  things  the  expedition  was  about  to  sail, 
but  that  he  had  nothing  to  add  about  its  destination. 
He  was  delighted  with  Grimaldi's  progress.  "  If,"  he 
concluded,  "  we  behave  with  proper  resolution — as  I 
hope  we  shall — and  if  the  Court  of  France  thinks  and 
acts  as  it  ought,  I  promise  myself  great  satisfaction,  and 
the  greatest  of  all  will  be  to  reduce  this  nation  to  proper 
limits,  and  to  reason,  which  they  do  not  know."  On 
March  20th  he  wrote  in  the  same  strain  to  Wall.  "  If 
France,"  he  said,  "  continues  the  war,  we  shall  be  able  to 
operate  more  at  our  ease.     However,  the  blow  will  be 


154  BELLEISLE  1761 

none  the  less  certain  if  the  King  is  wilHng  to  strike 
alone."  ^  On  the  top  of  these  stirring  discoveries  there 
was  received  on  March  I7th  a  formal  intimation  from 
Paris  that  the  French  secret  agent  had  been  appointed 
and  was  about  to  start  for  England.^ 

With  all  this  information  before  him,  Pitt  had  reason 
enough  to  make  Belleisle  and  not  the  Mauritius  the 
objective  of  his  expedition.  If  war  with  Spain  was 
coming,  it  would  not  do  to  send  so  considerable  a  part 
of  our  force  into  the  Indian  Ocean.  There  would  be 
demand  and  use  enough  for  it  nearer  home.  Again,  if 
we  were  really  on  the  brink  of  peace  with  France,  it  was 
desirable  to  improve  our  position  at  once  by  a  telling 
stroke  before  negotiations  began.  Success  in  the  Indian 
Ocean  would  have  no  effect,  for,  as  Hardwicke  had  pointed 
out  at  the  first,  the  result  could  not  be  known  for  ayear.^ 
On  March  18th  the  instructions  for  our  diplomatic  agent, 
Hans  Stanley,  were  settled,  and  they  conclude  with  a 
significant  direction  that  he  was  "  to  give  watchful  atten- 
tion to  the  conduct  and  motions  of  the  Spanish  ambas- 
sador "  in  Paris.* 

Pitt  thus  saw  the  country  committed  to  negotiations 
for  peace ;  but  for  him  that  was  only  a  reason  for  pressing 
the  war  to  its  utmost  energy.  The  week  that  followed 
was  devoted  to  this  end.  On  March  24th  he  wrote  again 
to  Amherst  to  tell  him  that  "  an  early  impression  on  the 
enemy  in  America  would  not  fail  to  have  the  most 
material,  and  probably  a  decisive,  influence  on  the  Court 
of  France."     He   was  therefore  to  endeavour  to  deliver 

1  See  Chatham.  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  89-101.  Fuentes's  letter  of  March  10 
is  also  in  Newcastle  Papers,  32,920,  and  is  endorsed  as  having  been  read 
the  same  day.  None  of  this  correspondence  is  amongst  the  "  Intercepted 
letters"  in  the  Record  Office,  S.P.  Foreign. 

*  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,  March  17,  Newcaalle  Papers,  32,920. 

^  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,  Jan.  3,  1761,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,917. 

*  Thackeray,  vol.  i.  p.  C)02. 


I76I  PITT   PLAYS    TRUMPS  155 

the  attack  on  Martinique  the  moment  the  hurricane 
months  were  passed,  and  to  the  six  thousand  troops  he 
had  been  told  to  despatch,  he  was  to  add  every  man 
who,  in  his  opinion,  could  be  spared.  Further,  he 
was  to  take  up  transports  on  the  spot,  to  prevent  the 
possibility  of  delay  from  the  failure  of  a  sufficient 
tonnage  coming  from  home.^  It  was  the  day  after  this 
letter  was  penned  that  Keppel's  secret  instructions  for 
Belleisle  were  signed,  and  four  days  later  the  expedition 
had  sailed. 

Still  no  countermand  was  sent  to  India.  Possibly 
Pitt  believed  that  a  quick  success  would  clinch  matters 
with  France,  and  that  he  would  be  able,  with  Bristol's 
help  in  Madrid,  to  get  ahead  of  Grimaldi's  intrigues  in 
Paris.  Such  an  impression  must  have  been  strengthened 
ten  days  after  Keppel  was  gone.  For  on  March  31st  Pitt 
received  from  Choiseul  a  memorandum  concerning  the 
peace,  assuring  him  of  his  good  faith  and  of  his  inten- 
tions to  treat  the  King  of  Prussia  in  a  liberal  spirit  in 
the  proposed  congress,  and  confirming  the  retention  of 
conquests  as  the  basis  of  negotiation."  More  probable, 
perhaps,  is  the  view  that  Pitt,  knowing  what  he  did  from 
the  intercepted  Spanish  correspondence,  read  in  Choiseul's 
memorandum  a  mere  device  to  gain  time  till  he  could 
gather  the  fragments  of  the  French  navy  into  some  show 
of  a  fleet,  and  till  Spain  had  completed  her  armament. 
It  is,  at  any  rate,  certain  he  was  for  adopting  a  very  high 
tone  for  the  answer  to  the  memorandum,  as  though  he 
wished  to  unmask  the  Franco-Spanish  game  by  forcing 
Choiseul's  hand,  and  so  bo  in  a  position  to  strike  before 
the  enemy  had  time  to  concert  their  measures  for  the 
revival  of  the  war. 

^  Pitt  to  Amherst,  March  24.-  Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  499. 
*  Copy  in  Newcastle  Papers,  32,921   March  26. 


156  BKLLEISLE  1761 

Three  days  after  the  receipt  of  Choiseul's  memo- 
randum, Pitt  had  a  talk  with  Newcastle,  in  which  he 
formulated  his  views.  In  answer  to  Choiseul,  he  pro- 
posed to  say  that  the  British  Government  would  not 
entertain  the  idea  of  making  any  compensation  for  the 
evacuation  of  Hanoverian  territory.  He  was  ready,  he 
said,  to  defend  it,  but  not  to  purchase  its  restitution.  On 
our  own  account  he  would  insist  on  retaining  the  whole 
of  Canada  and  Cape  Breton,  and  the  exclusive  right 
to  the  Newfoundland  fisheries ;  and  he  was  for  giving 
the  French  agent  to  understand  at  the  outset  that  on  no 
consideration  would  these  demands  be  abated.  New- 
castle objected  that  Spain  would  never  consent  to  a 
monopoly  of  the  fishery,  even  if  France  would  ;  but  Pitt 
was  unmoved.^  He  must  have  believed  as  firmly  as 
Newcastle  that  his  attitude  would  in  all  probability  break 
oflf  the  negotiation  at  once,  and  this  was  apparently  his 
real  desire.  For  everything  points  to  the  fact  that  his 
keen  intuition  had  already  convinced  him  that  France 
would  not  suffer  us  to  gather  the  fruits  of  the  war  while 
she  had  Spain  to  fall  back  upon,  and  that  Spain,  more- 
over, was  determined  to  intervene. 

A  few  days  later  he  had  an  audience  of  the  King,  in 
which  he  pressed  the  same  course  of  action.  He  urged 
that  he  was  far  from  hopeless  about  the  war  in  Ger- 
many, where  Ferdinand  had  opened  the  campaign  with  a 
brilliant  if  desperate  stroke  at  Soubise,  and  had  forced 
him  to  retire  out  of  Hesse  and  fall  back  on  Frankfort. 
As  for  the  rest  of  the  war,  our  successes  in  the  East  and 
West,  the  prospects  of  the  coming  expedition  against 
Martinique,  on  the  heels  of  that  against  Belleisle,  would 
place  us  in  a  position  to  make  the  demands  he  had 
formulated.    But  the  King  was  unconvinced.     He  argued 

^  "  My  Conversation  with  Pitt,"  Newcastle  Papers,  32,921. 


i76i         COMMAND    OF    THE    EXPEDITION         157 

strongly  against  any  peremptory  declaration,  and  so  the 
matter  had  to  rest.^ 

To  add  to  Pitt's  vexation,  his  rebuff  was  followed 
immediately  by  news  that  Keppel  had  failed  at  Belleisle. 
It  was  scarcely  surprising.  The  constant  reconnaissances 
that  had  been  going  on,  and  the  long  postponement  of 
the  enterprise,  had  given  the  French  warning  and  time 
enough  to  reinforce  the  garrison  and  greatly  strengthen 
its  defences.  Moreover,  the  military  part  of  the  expedi- 
tion was  far  from  what  Pitt  had  intended.  At  the  outset 
the  King  had  vetoed  the  despatch  of  two  old  regiments, 
because,  as  ho  said,  to  Pitt's  disgust,  our  safety  at  home 
was  endangered  in  several  quarters.^  The  influence  was 
probably  the  old  Duke  of  Cumberland,  to  whom  the 
young  king  was  showing  marked  deference  and  attention. 

To  the  same  influence,  at  least  partly,  must  have  been 
due  the  appointment  of  General  Hodgson  as  commander- 
in-chief.  He  had  been  one  of  Cumberland's  numerous 
aides-de-camp  both  at  Fontenoy  and  Culloden,  and  was 
a  thorough  Duke's  man.  Writing  to  his  friend  Lord 
Albemarle,  the  commodore's  brother,  he  says,  "  Amongst 
other  flattering  things  his  Majesty  was  pleased  to  say,  he 
told  me  he  should  always  have  a  partiality  for  the  officers 
bred  under  the  Duke :  he  looked  upon  that  as  the  best 
school."  ^  In  the  present  war  he  had  commanded  the 
first  brigade  at  Rochefort,  and  been  one  of  the  famous 
council  of  war  which,  as  Wolfe  put  it,  decided  unani- 
mously "  not  to  attack  the  place  they  were  ordered  to 
attack,  and  for  reasons  ^that  no  soldier  will  allow  to  be 
sufiicient."    Still,  times  had  changed  since  then,  and  with 


^  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  April  17,  ibid.,  32,922,  and  see  Albemarle's 
Memoirs  of  Rockingham,  vol.  i.  p.  23. 

^  Barriiigton  to  Newcastle,  Jan.  2,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,917. 
'  Keppel,  Life  of  Keppel,  vol.  i.  p.  298. 


158  BELLEISLE  1761 

them  the  whole  spirit  of  tlie  service.  Keppel  at  least 
must  have  approved  his  colleague's  appointment,  for  he 
was  an  old  and  intimate  friend  of  his  family  ever  since 
he  had  served  as  aide-de-camp  to  the  commodore's  father 
at  Dettingen.  Pitt,  too,  expressed  his  confidence  hand- 
somely, gave  him  carte  blamhe,  and  kissed  him  when  he 
said  good-bye.^  It  was  the  composition  of  the  force 
that  was  wrong.  To  begin  with,  it  was  far  short  of 
the  designed  ten  thousand  men.  Though  nominally 
comprised  of  twelve  battalions,  it  mustered  only  seven 
thousand.  Most  of  the  regiments  were  quite  unseasoned, 
and  two  of  them  in  so  disgraceful  a  condition  of  dis- 
cipline and  equipment  that  Keppel  wanted  to  leave  them 
behind.  To  complete  the  trouble  a  large  proportion  of 
the  oflScers  were  absent.^ 

The  transports  for  the  force  numbered  about  a  hundred 
sail.  The  escorting  fleet  consisted  of  ten  of  the  line,  all 
of  the  lighter  kind  except  one,  and  eight  frigates,  besides 
sloops,  bomb-ketches,  and  fireships.  Keppel  had  also  a 
covering  squadron  off  Brest,  consisting  of  three  or  four 
sail,  so  little  was  the  old  danger  point  to  be  feared.^ 
It  was  under  the  immediate  command  of  Commodore 
Matthew  Buckle,  who  had  been  Boscawen's  flag-captain 
throughout  the  war.  As  such  he  had  been  present  at 
the  capture  of  Louisbourg,  and  had  brought  home  the 
despatches  from  Lagos.  He  also  had  had  the  luck  to 
fight  at  Quiberon.  Boscawen  himself  had  died  suddenly 
of  typhoid  fever  early  in  January  as  the  squadron  was 
being  brought  forward  for  sea,  but  the  influence  of 
"  old  Dreadnought  "  was  in  the  ascendant,  and  was 
evidently  great  enough  to  secure  the  command  for  his 
most  trusted  officer. 

1  Keppel,  Life  of  Kcppd,  vol.  i.  p.  2!)8.  "  Ibid.,  pp.  300-1. 

*  Keppel  to  Admiralty,  May  21,  In-lcUers,  91. 


I76I  HAWKE    OUT    OF    FAVOUR  159 

HaAvke's  unlucky  star,  as  Newcastle  had  foretold,  was 
waning.  His  peerage  was  still  denied  him.  Pitt,  who 
had  never  liked  him,  had  been  exasperated,  as  we  have 
seen,  at  his  failure  to  grasp  the  possibilities  of  the  situa- 
tion at  Quiberou,  and  his  original  patron,  the  old  king, 
was  dead.  This  scant  recognition  of  the  admiral's  ser- 
vices, however,  was  by  no  means  confined  to  Pitt.  There 
certainly  existed  a  general  dissatisfaction.  To  all  appear- 
ances his  last  command  had  been  entirely  barren  and 
inactive.  No  service  had  been  done  of  a  kind  to  touch 
the  popular  imagination.  It  was  forgotten  how  little  the 
completeness  of  his  victory  left  him  to  do.  Still  it  was 
not  to  be  denied  that  the  'ships  which  had  escaped  into 
the  Charente  and  the  Villaine  remained  in  the  security 
they  had  reached,  and  no  attempt  had  been  made  to 
destroy  them.  In  January  two  of  them,  with  a  couple  of 
frigates,  actually  got  away  to  Brest  under  the  charge  of  a 
few  brilliant  young  officers,  who  had  volunteered  for  the 
service.  It  could  hardly  be  argued  in  Hawke's  favour 
that  their  destruction  was  impossible,  for  he  had  been  in 
the  act  of  attempting  a  carefully  elaborated  operation  to 
that  end  when  he  had  received  the  first  intimation  that 
Keppel's  expedition  was  coming.  Later  critics  have 
supported  the  opinion  of  the  time  in  severely  censuring 
his  inactivity.  There  is,  however,  this  in  support  of  his 
attitude.  The  operation  he  contemplated  was  essentially 
one  for  a  military  force,  and  if  he  had  reason  to  expect 
that  a  military  force  was  coming,  it  was  at  least  correct 
not  to  hazard  the  fighting  efficiency  of  his  fleet  and  his 
power  of  keeping  control  of  the  sea  by  exposing  a  large 
part  of  his  crews  ashore.  Moreover,  when  he  abandoned 
his  own  scheme,  he  was  only  told  that  the  expedition 
was  postponed — not  that  it  was  abandoned.  All,  indeed, 
that  can  fairly  be  laid  to  his  charge  is  that  his  genius 


i6o  BELLEISLE  1761 

for  using  the  command  of  the  sea  was  not  equal  to  that 
which  he  displayed  in  obtaining  it ;  or,  as  Pitt  succinctly 
put  it,  he  was  a  fine  sea-officer  but  no  minister. 

At  the  end  of  January,  when  the  menacing  attitude  of 
Spain  could  be  ignored  no  longer,  Anson  had  ordered 
him  to  send  home  all  his  three-deckers.  A  week  later 
he  was  told  to  bring  them  home  himself,  and  in  March, 
just  as  Pitt  decided  finally  to  send  Keppel  against  Belle- 
isle,  he  struck  his  flag  at  Spithead.  Now,  therefore,  he 
was  enjoying  the  repose  that  his  long  winter  blockade 
had  earned,  and  took  no  part  in  the  revival  of  the  coastal 
warfare  which  had  been  inaugurated  under  his  flag  at 
Rochefort. 

Pitt's  resumption  of  his  original  policy  is  worth  close 
study.  That  policy  has  come  to  be  judged  by  the  Rochefort 
expedition.  Its  real  exemplification  was  at  Belleisle.  It  is 
there  in  its  ripest  form  we  should  look  not  only  for  the 
strategical  power  of  such  designs,  but  also  for  the  character 
and  spirit  of  the  operations  they  demand.  For  though 
the  force,  both  in  its  units  and  in  its  commander,  seemed 
tainted  with  the  old  Rochefort  sickness,  its  performance 
was  in  every  way  the  antithesis  of  that  unhappy  fiasco. 
It  is  true  the  first  attack  of  Keppel  and  Hodgson  proved, 
as  has  been  said,  a  failure,  but  it  was  just  this  failure 
that  marked  how  great  a  change  had  been  wrought  in 
the  spirit  of  the  services  since  Pitt  first  took  the  war  in 
hand. 

Owing  to  adverse  weather  it  was  not  till  April  6  th 
that  they  were  off'  Belleisle,  but  six  frigates  had  already 
been  thrown  forward  to  cut  off'  its  communication  with 
the  mainland.  Working  in  during  the  night,  the  fleet 
rounded  the  south  end  of  the  island  at  daybreak,  keeping 
close  inshore  so  that  a  reconnaissance  could  be  made  as  it 
passed.      The   inspection  was   not    encouraging.     Every 


I76I 


A   JOINT    RECONNAISSANCE 


161 


accessible  point  was  well  entrenched  and  guarded  by 
batteries.  Still,  at  an  inlet  midway  upon  the  south- 
eastern shore,  known  as  Locmaria  Bay,  both  Keppel  and 
Hodgson   thought  they  saw  a  chance.     They  were  for 


attempting  it  on  the  spot,  but  the  wind  was  southerly, 
almost  dead  on  the  landing-place,  and  it  put  an  attack 
out  of  the  question.  They  had  to  pass  on,  and  at  noon 
the  whole  fleet  anchored  in  the  road  opposite  Palais,  the 
chief  town  and  fortress  of  the  island,  which  lay  on  the 

VOL.  II.  L 


1 62  BELLEISLE  1761 

north-eastern  shore  facing  the  mainland.  Not  to  waste 
time  while  the  flat-boats  were  being  prepared  for  the 
troops,  the  two  chiefs  at  once  proceeded  together  in  a 
cutter  to  reconnoitre  the  extreme  north  end,  where  stood 
the  little  fishing  port  of  Sauzon.  But  here,  as  every- 
where, they  found  the  garrison  alert  and  formidably 
entrenched.  "  The  coast,"  wrote  the  general,  "  is  the 
most  inaccessible  I  ever  saw,  the  whole  island  is  a  forti- 
fication." To  both  of  them  the  task  looked  almost 
desperate,  but  no  longer  was  that  a  reason,  as  at  Roche- 
fort,  for  not  trying.  "  The  enemy,"  wrote  Hodgson, 
"  have  been  at  work  upon  it  ever  since  Sir  Edward  Hawke 
appeared  here  in  the  winter,  but  all  this  is  nothing.  The 
fashion  of  the  times  required  extraordinary  measures. 
Therefore  when  we  returned  from  our  reconnoitring  we 
agreed  that  Port  St.  Andro,  on  the  south-east  part  of  the 
island,  was  the  most  practicable  place  to  attempt  a 
descent."  Here  surely  was  Wolfe's  spirit  burning.  Again 
we  can  hear  the  echo  of  the  words  he  wrote  in  his  shame 
for  Rochefort :  "  The  greatness  of  an  object  should  come 
under  consideration  as  opposed  to  the  impediments  that 
lie  in  the  way."  Indeed  the  whole  conduct  of  the  enter- 
prise was  in  exact  accordance  with  his  trenchant  and 
soldierlike  criticism.  Here  was  no  council  of  war,  no 
considering  whether  an  attack  was  feasible  or  not,  but  an 
instant  decision  by  the  admiral  and  general  in  perfect 
harmony  to  try,  and  try  hard,  where  the  thing  looked 
least  ugly. 

From  Keppel's  letter  it  appears  Port  St.  Andr^  was  the 
same  little  bay  they  had  reconnoitred  the  previous  day 
near  Point  Locmaria,  and  here  on  the  morrow  they  set 
to  work.  To  ease  the  difficulty  of  the  task.  Captain  Sir 
Thomas  Stanhope  of  the  Swiftsure,  who  had  been  knighted 
for  his  conduct  in  Boscawen's  action  at  Lagos,  and  had  also 


i76i  FIRST    ATTACK    REPULSED  163 

fought  well  at  Quiberon,  was  ordered  to  make  a  demon- 
stration to  the  north  against  Sauzon  with  two  battalions 
and  the  marines.  With  the  rest  of  the  troops  in  the 
flat-boats  Keppel  went  southward,  sending  forward  two 
of  the  line  to  destroy  a  battery  that  commanded  the 
beach  at  Port  St.  Andre,  This  was  quickly  done,  and 
the  troops  were  at  once  pushed  forward  for  the  strip 
of  sand  that  had  been  marked  for  a  footing.  Above  it 
rose  the  hills  in  an  amphitheatre,  where  the  enemy  were 
entrenched  up  to  the  teeth.  Under  a  destructive  fire 
the  troops  moved  in,  and  effected  the  landing  with  bold- 
ness and  precision.  But  it  was  only  to  be  brought  to 
a  hopeless  standstill.  The  foot  of  the  hill  had  been  so 
cleverly  scarped  away  that  it  was  impossible  to  reach  the 
enemy's  breastworks  without  scaling-ladders.  Desperate 
attempts  were  made,  but  all  in  vain,  and  Generals  Crau- 
ford  and  Carleton,  who  were  in  command,  decided  to 
retreat.  Meanwhile  a  party  of  sixty  grenadiers,  who 
landed  at  a  little  distance  from  the  rest,  succeeded  in 
climbing  up  beyond  the  entrenchments,  and  formed  on 
the  top.  Could  they  have  been  supported  all  might 
have  gone  well,  but  unfortunately  their  success  was  not 
seen  in  time,  and  before  anything  could  be  done  all  but 
twenty  were  killed  or  taken  prisoners. 

It  was  a  gallant  but  unhappy  beginning.  Though  the 
retirement  had  been  well  covered  by  the  ships  and  bomb- 
vessels,  the  loss  was  about  five  hundred  men.  To  make 
matters  worse,  as  the  troops  were  getting  back  to  the 
fleet  a  severe  gale  blew  up,  lasting  all  night  and  all  next 
day,  and  in  the  end  half  the  flat-boats  on  which  a  land- 
ing depended  were  lost.  Both  commodore  and  general 
became  seriously  discouraged.  At  first  Keppel,  in  an- 
nouncing the  defeat  to  the  Admiralty,  had  quietly 
informed  them  they  were  going  to  find  a  better  place 


i64  BELLEISLE  1761 

and  try  again.  But  that  proved  not  so  easy.  After 
careful  reconnaissances  they  could  find  no  spot  which 
gave  any  hopes  of  success,  and  a  few  days  later  both 
of  them  wrote  home  to  Pitt  that  they  regarded  it  as 
quite  impracticable  to  make  good  a  landing.^  Seeing 
the  situation  Pitt  was  in  at  the  moment,  the  repulse 
was  a  serious  blow  to  his  influence,  but  it  does  not  seem 
that  he  lost  heart  for  a  moment.  Instead  of  repining, 
he  immediately  ordered  off  four  more  battalions  with  a 
fresh  supply  of  boats  and  military  stores.  So  determined 
was  he  to  succeed  that,  even  at  the  risk  of  delaying  the 
Martinique  enterprise,  he  devoted  to  the  Belleisle  rein- 
forcements some  of  the  transports  preparing  to  go  out 
to  New  York  to  carry  Amherst's  troops  to  the  West 
Indies,  and  for  their  escort  he  called  for  five  more  ships 
of  the  line.^ 

He  knew  his  men.  With  such  a  war-seasoned  band 
as  they  were  despair  did  not  last  long.  A  week  later 
they  were  joined  by  a  number  of  transports  bringing  on 
four  troops  of  light  dragoons  which  had  not  been  ready 
to  sail  with  the  fleet.  They  at  once  decided  to  try  again, 
since  the  new-comers  would  enable  them  to  support  a 
fresh  attack  with  two  feints  instead  of  one.  This  was 
important,  for  the  attempt  was  to  be  on  a  new  plan, 
modelled  apparently  on  Wolfe's  great  exploit.  Both  the 
commanders  were  still  of  opinion  that  all  the  ordinary 
landing-places  were  impregnable;  but  it  was  thought, 
says  Keppel,  "  that  by  attempting  a  place  where  the 
mounting  of  the  rocks  was  just  possible,"  and  where 
the  enemy  consequently  had  not  thought  of  entrench- 


^  Keppel  to  Admiralty,  April  13,  In-letters,  91  ;  Hodgson  to  Pitt,  April  12 
and  18,  and  Keppel  to  same,  April  18 — Albemarle's  Life  of  Keppel,  vol.  i. 
pp.  306-310. 

*  Pitt  to  Amherst,  June  18 — Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  500. 


i76i  THE   SECOND   ATTACK  165 

ing,  they  might  succeed.  Such  a  chance  seemed  to 
offer  at  a  point  just  to  the  southward  of  Port  Locmaria, 
where  stood  a  small  work  called  Fort  d'Arsic.  Here 
was  to  be  the  main  attack,  and  Crauford,  the  second  in 
command,  was  again  entrusted  with  it.  He  was  to  be 
assisted  by  a  feint,  under  Brigadier  Hamilton  Lambart, 
upon  the  little  village  of  St.  Foy,  which  stood  on  the 
opposite  or  northern  side  of  Point  Locmaria,  the  eastern 
extremity  of  the  island.^  This  demonstration  was  to  be 
supported  by  Stanhope  from  the  sea  with  three  of  the 
line  and  a  "forty-four."  At  the  same  time  the  demon- 
stration against  Sauzon  to  the  northward  was  to  be 
repeated  by  the  newly-arrived  dragoons,  with  two  of  the 
line  and  some  frigates. 

By  April  22nd  all  was  ready.  At  daybreak  the  ships 
were  in  position  and  at  work  with  the  batteries,  while 
the  troops  gathered  at  their  stations.  By  three  o'clock 
the  enemy's  guns,  not  without  considerable  damage  to 
the  ships,  were  silenced,  and  the  attack  began.  Crau- 
ford made  for  Fort  d'Arsic,  where  he  found  the  enemy 
ready  and  in  great  strength  to  meet  him.  Lambart, 
however,  reached  the  shore  without  a  shot  being  fired, 
and  finding  himself  unobserved,  landed  his  force  about 
half-way  between  St.  Foy  and  Point  Locmaria.  There  was 
not  a  soul  to  oppose  him,  but  above  his  head  towered 
cliffs  that  the  French  regarded  as  defence  enough.  Lam- 
bart was  of  a  different  opinion.  He  had  been  told  he 
might  push  home  his  feint  if  he  saw  a  fair  chance,  and 
he  thought  he  did.  It  was  a  case  of  the  Heights  of 
Abraham  over  again,  and  he  had  at  least  one  good  pre- 
cedent to  justify  his  daring.     The  grenadier  company  of 


*  Keppel    to  Admiralty,    April   23,   In-letters,    91  ;    Engineer   Welsh's 

LIX 

737 


LIX 

Survey^  Kinrj^s  Drawings.,  Brit.  Mus.,     ■— 


1 66  BELLEISLE  1761 

the  19th  Foot  led  the  way  and  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  summit,  still  unobserved.  A  detachment  of  marines 
followed,  and  before  the  enemy,  whose  attention  was 
absorbed  in  watching  Crauford's  column  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Point,  could  recover  their  surprise,  more 
troops  had  joined  the  advanced  parties.  At  last,  from 
the  height  upon  which  the  enemy  were  watching  Crau- 
ford,  they  were  attacked  by  half  a  battalion  of  regular 
infantry,  but  posting  themselves  behind  a  low  wall,  they 
held  their  ground  with  a  steady  fire  till  Lambart  himself 
joined  them  with  another  grenadier  company  and  the 
rest  of  the  marines.  He  immediately  ordered  an  ad- 
vance, attacked  the  enemy  in  flank,  and  forced  them 
to  retire  under  their  guns  at  the  top  of  the  hill  they 
had  come  from.  Below  Captain  Stanhope  had  been 
eagerly  watching  the  brilliant  feat  of  arms  from  his 
ship,  and  the  moment  he  saw  the  advance  he  sig- 
nalled for  all  his  boats,  manned  and  armed,  to  support 
Lambart's  attack.  The  movement  attracted  Crauford's 
attention.  With  quick  perception  he  saw  what  it 
meant,  and  promptly  followed  suit.  Abandoning  his 
own  attack  on  Fort  d'Arsic,  he  hurried  back  round  Point 
Locmaria  to  his  colleague's  assistance.  Thus,  thanks 
to  the  quick  appreciation  of  Stanhope  and  Crauford, 
Lambart  soon  found  himself  strong  enough  to  press 
home  his  attack  and  supplant  his  opponents  in  their 
commanding  position.  By  five  o'clock  the  whole  of  the 
troops  were  landed,  and  before  night  Hodgson  was 
securely  posted  with  all  his  force  on  a  height  three  miles 
in  the  interior. 

There,  as  they  lay  upon  their  arms  all  night,  they  saw  a 
great  beacon  fire  reddening  the  sky  in  the  centre  of  the 
island.  It  was  the  signal  of  Monsieur  de  Sainte  Croix, 
the  gallant  and  capable  officer  to  whom  the  defence  of 


i76i  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    ISLAND  167 

the  island  had  been  entrusted,  for  all  the  troops  and 
inhabitants  to  concentrate  on  Palais.  He  had  at  his 
command  three  regfular  battalions  and  one  of  militia, 
numbering  probably  at  this  time  nearly  three  thousand 
men.  The  Due  d'Aiguillon,  at  the  first  alarm,  had  arrived 
at  Vannes,  and  was  gathering  a  large  force  on  the  main- 
land. His  intention  was  to  throw  in  more  troops,  but 
the  vigilance  of  the  cruisers  which  Keppel  had  pushed  for- 
ward put  it  out  of  the  question.  With  a  strength  num- 
bering barely  half  what  the  British  could  land,  it  was 
useless  for  Sainte  Croix  to  try  to  hold  the  whole  island, 
but  it  was  a  force  quite  capable  of  a  prolonged  defence 
of  the  fortress.  Hodgson  quickly  overran  the  island  as 
the  French  retired,  seized  all  the  defenceless  ports,  and 
so  soon  as  the  weather  permitted  the  necessary  stores 
and  material  to  be  landed,  he  sat  down  to  besiege  Palais, 
securely  covered  by  Keppel's  fleet. 

The  news  of  the  British  success  came  as  a  serious  shock 
to  Versailles.  The  exact  extent  to  which  it  modified  the 
French  plans  is  as  usual  difficult  to  determine.  By  heroic 
exertions  Choiseul  was  collecting  a  vast  force  of  a  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  men,  which  was  to  form  two  armies 
under  Soubise  and  Broglie,  and  finally  crush  those  of 
Ferdinand  and  the  Hereditary  Prince  of  Brunswick.  Such 
numbers  were  of  course  overwhelming,  and  Ferdinand 
had  been  forced  to  retreat  again  out  of  Hesse,  but  not 
before  he  had  destroyed  all  Soubise's  advanced  magazines. 
Such  a  loss  must  necessarily  delay  the  opening  of  the 
campaign,  and  on  the  top  of  it  came  the  news  of  Belleisle. 
According  to  our  most  trustworthy  intelligencer  the  Court 
was  very  anxious  about  it.  It  was  seen,  he  said,  that 
once  the  island  was  entirely  in  British  hands,  it  could  be 
used  as  a  iplace  d'armes  to  alarm  the  whole  coast  from 
Brest  to  Bayonne.     To  increase  the  trouble  there  was 


1 68  BELLEISLE  1761 

serious  discontent  in  Brittany,  and  it  is  said  there  was  a 
proposal  to  recall  at  once  thirty  battalions  from  Germany.^ 
This  was  certainly  not  done.  It  seems,  however,  that  it 
was  found  necessary  to  provide  D'Aiguillon  with  twenty- 
two  battalions  and  eight  squadrons,  and  Pitt  received 
from  the  Dutch  ambassador  at  Paris  intelligence  "  that 
the  whole  line  of  Soubise's  corps  was  altered."  That  is 
to  say,  that  the  Normandy  troops  had  to  be  moved  into 
Brittany,  those  of  Picardy  into  Normandy,  those  of 
Flanders  into  Picardy,  and  these,  finally,  had  to  be 
replaced  from  Soubise's  active  army.  We  also  know  that 
an  inquiry  was  held  as  to  why  D'Aiguillon  had  too  few 
troops  to  reinforce  Sainte  Croix  while  the  sea  was  open, 
and  the  answer  was  that  Choiseul,  in  order  to  swell  Sou- 
bise's army,  and  in  spite  of  the  protest  of  the  War  Office, 
had  recalled  troops  which  Marshal  Belleisle,  while  he  was  in 
office,  had  considered  absolutely  necessary  for  the  defence 
of  the  coast.  The  one  hope  of  relief  now  was  to  get  a 
squadron  to  sea  to  engage  Keppel's  attention,  and  the 
result  was  that,  instead  of  being  able  to  devote  all  his 
resources  to  answer  Pitt  on  land,  Choiseul  had  to  order 
the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  be  devoted  to  the  ships  at 
Brest  and  Rochefort." 

These  last  preparations  Keppel  soon  detected  for 
himself.  He  heard  that  seven  of  the  line  were  being 
brought  forward  at  Brest  and  eight  at  Rochefort,  and  the 
news  was  confirmed  from  home.  The  danger  naturally 
caused  him  some  anxiety,  and  drew  from  him  a  highly 
interesting  expression  of  what  he  regarded  as  the  correct 
strategy  to  meet  the  occasion.    Assuming  the  two  French 


1  Cressener's  Intelligence,  May  4,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,922. 

-  Memorandum  in  Newcastle's  hand,  May  13,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,923  ; 
Cressener's  Intelligence,  May  16,  and  other  Paris  advices,  May  22  and  24, 
iOid. 


i76i  KEPPEL   ON    CONCENTRATION  169 

divisions  were  under  orders  to  combine  against  him,  he 
said  he  intended  to  keep  practically  his  whole  force  con- 
centrated at  Belleisle;  but  as  soon  as  the  expected  re- 
inforcement which  Pitt  had  ordered  arrived,  he  would 
send  a  squadron  to  Rochefort  to  stop  that  division 
mobilising.  He  could  not,  however,  conceal  his  appre- 
hension that  the  French  ships  might  get  to  sea  before 
he  could  blockade  their  ports  effectually.  "  Indeed,"  he 
added,  "  the  confining  them  at  Brest  is  so  very  precarious 
that  it  cannot  be  depended  upon,  and  therefore  I  should 
imagine  Captain  Buckle  and  his  ships  being  called  here 
would  answer  the  purpose  better  than  his  remaining 
there — unless  ships  could  be  spared  to  make  him  as 
strong  as  the  Brest  ships,  while  the  King's  squadron, 
[meaning  his  own],  after  despatching  one  to  Rochefort, 
remains  equal  to  both  the  enemy's  squadrons  at  Brest 
and  Rochefort."  He  concluded  by  saying  he  was  going 
to  order  Buckle  to  fall  back  on  him  if  the  French  came 
out  and  were  superior.^ 

The  principle  that  was  guiding  him  was  practically 
that  on  which  Pitt  had  been  acting  all  along.  Where  a 
military  force  was  engaged  in  coastal  operations  from  a 
sea  base,  it  was  not  a  just  risk  to  trust  to  the  blockade 
of  the  enemy's  fleets  at  their  points  of  departure.  The 
covering  fleet  itself  ought  to  be  equal  to  them,  or  so  dis- 
posed as  to  ensure  concentrated  equality  with  any  con- 
centration which  the  enemy  might  be  in  a  position  to 
make  at  the  point  of  operation. 

On  this  principle  therefore  he  acted  till,  at  the  end  of 
May,  his  reinforcements  began  to  arrive.  Six  of  the  line 
joined  him  by  April  31st,  and  he  at  once  detached 
Stanhope  with  a  division  of  six,  besides  fireships  and 
bombs,  to  prevent  the  Rochefort  ships  getting  out  into 

*  Keppel  to  Admiralty,  May  21,  In-lelters,  91. 


I70  BELLEISLE  1761 

the  Basque  Roads,  and  also  to  keep  his  eye  on  Bordeaux. 
During  the  next  week  two  more  ships  of  the  line  joined 
him,  and  he  thereupon  sent  away  to  Ushant  five  to 
bring  Buckle's  blockading  force  superior  to  that  which 
was  said  to  be  in  Brest.  Though  only  a  captain,  Keppel 
now  had  some  twenty  of  the  line  and  as  many  cruisers 
under  his  broad  pendant,  so  that,  with  eight  left  for 
himself,  he  was  able  to  enjoy  the  disposition  he  wanted. 
With  the  landing  of  the  fresh  regiments,  which  arrived 
simultaneously  with  the  ships,  the  position  of  Sainte  Croix 
was  therefore  hopeless.  The  wall  of  Palais  was  breached  ; 
relief  was  impossible;  and  the  gallant  French  soldier 
knew  it  as  well  as  any  one.  Accordingly,  on  June  8th, 
he  capitulated,  being  allowed,  as  he  richly  deserved,  to 
march  out  through  the  breach  with  all  the  honours  of 
war,  and  was  conveyed  to  L'Orient  with  all  that  was  left 
of  his  force. 


CHAPTER    VI 

SPAIN  AND  THE   FALL   OF   PITT 

The  great  news  reached  London  on  June  13,  and  the 
country  was  once  more  ablaze  with  bonfires  and  illumi- 
nations as  in  the  intoxicating  days  of  1759.  The  effect, 
of  course,  was  greatly  to  increase  the  strength  of  Pitt's 
attitude  on  the  terms  of  peace ;  and  he  certainly  needed 
all  the  support  he  could  get.  Things  had  been  moving 
fast.  Not  only  were  the  negotiations  for  the  separate 
peace  between  France  and  England  proceeding  apace 
both  in  Paris  and  London,  but  all  the  Powers  had 
accepted  the  proposal  for  a  general  Congress,  and  pleni- 
potentiaries had  already  been  named.  Lord  Bute  had 
replaced  Holderness  as  Secretary  of  State  for  the 
Northern  department,  and  thus  had  the  continental 
war  and  its  diplomacy  in  his  hands.  At  present,  it  was 
true,  be  showed  a  strong  inclination  to  act  with  Pitt, 
but  at  any  time  his  own  instability  and  Pitt's  domineer- 
ing might  shift  him  to  the  opposite  camp.  There  the 
peace  forces  were  closing  up,  and  had  received  a  powerful 
addition  in  the  person  of  the  Duke  of  Bedford.  He  had 
recently  resigned  the  Lord-Lieutenancy  of  Ireland,  and 
was  attending  the  Cabinet,  where  he  quickly  earned  the 
reputation  of  being  the  only  man  bold  enough  to  face 
Pitt. 

Nor  was  it  only  in  the  dignity  and  power  of  its 
members  that  the  peace  party  was  strong.  The  argu- 
ments by  which  they  supported  their  views  were  states- 

171 


1/2  THE    FALL   OF    PITT  1761 

manlike  and  widely  convincing.  By  no  one  were  the}"^ 
so  cogently  put  as  by  Bedford,  and  from  the  mouth  of 
no  one  did  they  come  with  greater  weight,  for  his 
unwilling  admiration  for  Pitt  was  evident  to  all.  Though 
he  has  not  lived  in  history  as  a  statesman  of  mark,  his 
utterances  at  this  time  are  instinct  with  a  political 
wisdom  and  insight  that,  whether  his  own  or  not,  are 
little  short  of  prophetic.  What  troubled  him  most  was 
not  the  continental  war,  though  that  he  believed  to  be 
beyond  the  resources  of  the  country,  both  in  treasure 
and  manhood.  His  firmest  opposition  was  to  Pitt's 
determination  to  crush  the  French  sea  power  out  of 
existence  by  refusing  them  the  right  of  fishery  in  New- 
foundland and  the  St.  Lawrence  Gulf.  To  exclude 
France  from  the  fisheries,  Bedford  argued  in  a  letter  to 
Newcastle,  would  give  umbrage  to  Spain  and  the  other 
maritime  powers;  for  it  would  be  a  great  step  to  the 
monopoly  of  a  trade  which  was  the  source  of  all  mari- 
time power,  "  and  which,"  as  he  said,  "  would  be  as 
dangerous  for  us  to  grasp  at  as  it  was  for  Louis  XIV. 
when  he  aspired  to  be  the  arbiter  of  Europe,  and  might 
be  likely  to  produce  a  grand  alliance  against  us."  France 
would  never  acquiesce  for  long  in  a  peace  concluded  upon 
such  terms,  and  to  make  a  peace  that  could  not  last  was 
emphatically  bad  policy. 

Nothing  could  shake  his  well-reasoned  convictions. 
They  grew  stronger  as  time  went  on.  "  Indeed,  my  lord," 
he  wrote  to  Bute  two  months  later,  "  the  endeavouring  to 
drive  France  entirely  out  of  any  naval  power  is  fighting 
against  nature,  and  can  tend  to  no  one  good  to  this 
country ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  must  excite  all  the  naval 
powers  of  Europe  to  enter  into  a  confederacy  against  us, 
as  adopting  a  system,  viz.,  that  of  a  monopoly  of  all 
naval  power,  which  would  be  at  least  as  dangerous  to 


i76i  BEDFORD'S   VIEWS    ON   PEACE  173 

the  liberties  of  Europe  as  that  of  Louis  XIV.  was,  which 
drew  almost  all  Europe  upon  his  back."  It  was  all  the 
modern  doctrine,  so  firmly  insisted  on  by  Clausewitz  and 
so  seldom  recalled  by  our  "  idolaters  of  Neptune,"  that 
measures,  however  plausible,  which  tend  to  raise  up 
fresh  enemies  do  not  increase  the  strength  of  our  inter- 
national position.  So  strongly  did  Bedford  feel  this 
truth  that  he  even  doubted  the  policy  of  excluding 
France  from  Canada.  He  dreaded  our  overloading  our- 
selves with  colonial  possessions,  as  Spain  had  done  to 
her  ruin,  but  that  was  not  the  darkest  outlook.  "  In- 
deed, my  lord,"  he  wrote  to  Newcastle,  "  I  don't  know 
whether  the  neighbourhood  of  the  French  to  our  North 
American  colonies  was  not  the  greatest  security  for  their 
dependence  on  the  mother  country,  which  I  feel  will  be 
slighted  by  them  when  their  apprehension  of  the  French 
is  removed."  How  prophetic  were  both  warnings  we 
know.  Both  were  destined  to  be  fulfilled  to  the  letter 
ere  twenty  years  were  gone.^ 

Such  arguments  as  these  could  not  but  have  weight. 
Indeed  even  for  us  to-day  they  would  go  far  to  condemn 
Pitt's  attitude  did  we  not  know  how  strong  and  well 
founded  was  his  conviction  that  the  coalition  which 
Bedford  feared  was  already  on  foot.  Too  much  had 
been  done  already  to  let  Spain  rest.  Even  Bedford 
grew  doubtful  whether  France  was  in  earnest  for  peace. 
The  complaisance  with  which  Choiseul  accepted  the  basis 
of  uti  possidetis  and  the  seizure  of  Belleisle,  made  him 
question  whether  she  was  not  merely  seeking  to  gain 
time  in  order  to  recover  breath  for  a  now  and  more 
dangerous  war.'^ 

'  Bedford  to  Newcastle,  May  9,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,922  ;  same  to  Bute, 
July  9,  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  24. 

'^  Bedford  to  Bute,  June  13,  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  14. 


174  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

Choiseul's  proposals  about  the  "  compensations "  had 
come.  He  suggested  the  return  of  Guadeloupe,  Marie- 
galante,  and  Goree  in  exchange  for  Minorca;  was  ready 
to  cede  all  Canada  except  Cape  Breton,  which,  however, 
was  not  to  be  fortified  by  France,  but  merely  used  as  a 
fishing  station ;  and  in  return  for  the  retention  of  the 
fishing  rights  she  would  give  up  all  her  conquests  upon 
England's  allies  in  Germany. 

The  dominant  note  of  France,  it  will  be  observed,  was 
the  preservation  of  her  sea  power,  and  as  the  negotiations 
progressed  it  became  more  and  more  evident  that  it  was 
upon  this  question  they  would  turn.  From  this  point  of 
view  Choiseul's  proposal  was  very  unsatisfactory,  for  it  said 
nothing  about  the  fate  of  Dunkirk,  Ostend,  and  Nieuport. 
Still  Pitt  expressed  himself  ready  to  treat  on  this  basis, 
and  two  Cabinets  were  held  to  discuss  the  answer. 
Under  the  pressure  of  the  peace  party  he  somewhat 
relaxed  his  attitude.  The  majority  of  the  Ministers 
were  clearly  against  insisting  on  the  exclusive  right  of 
fishery,  and  Lord  Granville,  the  President,  with  all  the 
weight  of  his  great  reputation,  strongly  indorsed  Bedford's 
arguments  on  the  impolicy  of  doing  so.  He  was  for 
reviving  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  both  as  to 
the  Newfoundland  fisheries  and  the  fortification  of 
Dunkirk.  Pitt,  in  reply,  drew  attention  to  the  obscurity 
and  duplicity  of  Choiseul's  note,  as  pointing  to  the 
insincerity  of  France.  For  himself  he  said  he  would 
rather  risk  another  campaign  than  give  way  on  the 
fishery  question  at  all,  but  if  the  rest  thought  otherwise 
he  would  acquiesce.  Bute  was  urgent  for  a  shifty  com- 
promise by  which  we  were  "  to  make  trial,"  that  is,  we 
were  still  to  demand  the  exclusive  fishery  and  give  way 
if  France  stood  firm.  Pitt,  much  to  Bute's  annoyance, 
ridiculed  the  idea,  and  tried  to  persuade  the  King  it  was 


I76I  TERMS    OFFERED    BY    PITT  175 

useless  to  "  make  trial "  unless  we  meant  what  we  said. 
Eventually  it  was  left  to  Pitt  to  answer  Choiseul,  and 
his  draft  was  to  be  settled  in  the  Cabinet  next  day. 
After  a  renewed  and  somewhat  heated  discussion  on 
Bute's  compromise,  Pitt's  view  was  finally  accepted  in  a 
modified  form — that  the  fisheries  "  could  not  be  given  up 
except  for  some  substantial  compensation."  ^ 

So  the  words  stand  in  the  despatch  which  Pitt  sent  to 
Stanley  in  Paris,  with  the  significant  addition  that  the 
question  of  the  "  substantial  compensation "  could  be 
discussed  with  that  of  Dunkirk.  For  the  rest  Stanley 
was  to  say  the  British  court  regarded  Belleisle  as  an 
equivalent  compensation  for  Minorca,  and  that  if  we 
ceded  Guadeloupe  and  Mariegalante  as  well,  France 
must  immediately  vacate  all  her  conquests  in  Germany. 
As  the  minimum  on  which  the  King's  intentions  were 
"  fixed  and  unalterable,"  he  was  to  stipulate  for  all  Canada 
and  Cape  Breton  unequivocally :  Senegal :  Dunkirk  to  be 
unfortified  on  the  footing  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht :  the 
Neutral  Islands  in  the  West  Indies  to  be  evacuated,  and 
Minorca  restored.  Finally  he  was  to  give  Choiseul  to 
understand,  as  delicately  as  might  be,  "that  the  most 
indispensable  interests  of  Great  Britain  can  never  allow 
his  Majesty  to  acquiesce  in  any  views  of  acquisition 
which  it  has  sometimes  been  surmised  France  might 
entertain  with  regard  to  Ostend  and  Nieuport."  ^  In 
other  words,  the  maintenance  of  the  British  naval  position 
in  the  Narrow  Seas  as  well  as  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
America,  was  made  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  continuance  of 
the  French  sea  power.  It  was  on  the  question  of 
Dunkirk  and  the  Flemish  ports  that  most  difficulty  was 

1  For  what  passed  at  these  two  meetings,  i.e.  June  24  and   26,  see 
Newcastle  to  Devonshire,  June  28,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,924. 
*  Pitt  to  Stanley,  June  26,  Thackeray,  vol.  i.  p.  549. 


1/6  THE    FALL   OF   PITT  1761 

expected,  yet  every  one,  even  Bedford,  felt  this  condition 
must  be  insisted  on.  "  I  have  never  myself,"  he  said, 
"  been  much  in  apprehension  of  invasion  of  England 
.  .  .  but,  however,  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  nation, 
too  great  security  cannot  be  taken  to  guard  against 
any  future  alarms."  ^ 

Having  clearly  presented  the  British  claims,  Pitt  took 
care  not  to  relax  for  a  moment  the  pressure  necessary  to 
force  them  home.  The  preparations  for  Martinique  were 
pushed  on  without  disguise,  and  Keppel  was  told  to 
attempt  some  place  on  the  French  coast  within  striking 
distance  of  Belleisle. 

Captain  Stanhope,  in  pursuance  of  the  commodore's 
directions  to  prevent  the  mobilisation  of  the  Rochefort 
division,  was  already  destroying  for  the  third  time  the 
works  on  the  Island  of  Aix,  in  spite  of  the  French  bomb 
vessels ;  but  Keppel  felt  doubtful  about  the  possibility  of 
a  descent  on  the  mainland.  L'Orient  and  Port  Louis 
were  tempting,  he  said,  "  but  everywhere,  as  far  down  as 
Bordeaux,  the  alarm  has  caused  a  formidable  concentra- 
tion of  troops."^  This  was  of  course  well,  so  far  as  it 
went.  It  was  part  of  Pitt's  object,  as  before,  so  he 
assured  Newcastle,  to  draw  troops  away  from  Westphalia, 
where  the  campaign  was  opening  in  form.^ 

The  effect,  however,  in  this  direction  seems  to  have 
been  small.  According  to  our  intelligence  a  few  regi- 
ments were  moved  down  from  Soubise's  army,  but  the 
bulk  of  the  coastal  defence  force  came  from  the  central 
provinces  and  from  Languedoc  and  Provence.  By  these 
means  Choiseul  considered  he  rendered  the   coast  safe, 


^  Bedford  to  Bute,  July  9,  and  Bute's  answer,  July  12,  Bedford  Corr. 
vol.  iii.  p.  23  et  scq. 

2  Keppel  to  Pitt,  July  10,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,925. 
'  Newcastle  to  Devonshire,  June  18,  ibid.,  32,924. 


i76i  CAPTURE    OF   DOMINICA   •  177 

and  vowed  that  no  landing  in  Oleron,  Rh6,  or  any  of  the 
neighbouring  French  islands  should  induce  him  to  recall 
a  single  man  from  Germany.  He  was  even  prepared  to 
risk  the  Martinique  expedition  striking  in  Normandy 
rather  than  weaken  Soubise's  push  for  Hanover.^  Still 
the  pressure  by  the  blockade  alone  was  severe,  and  to 
add  to  it  came  the  news  that  in  the  East  Indies  Pondi- 
cherry  had  fallen,  and  that  in  the  West  Douglas,  with 
a  force  from  New  York  under  Lord  RoUo,  had  seized 
Dominica. 

Once  more  Amherst  had  shown  his  brilliant  powers  of 
organisation,  Pitt's  idea,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  to 
seize  the  islands  of  Dominica  and  St.  Lucia  before  the 
hurricane  season  came  on,  so  as  to  leave  all  clear  for 
Martinique  in  the  autumn.  For  this  it  was  necessary 
that  the  expeditionary  force  should  be  on  the  spot  by  the 
end  of  May  at  latest.  It  was  not,  however,  till  January 
that  he  despatched  the  order,  and  he  did  not  disguise 
from  himself  that  it  was  only  by  a  lucky  passage  of  his 
despatch  vessel  and  of  the  reinforcements  that  were 
necessary  that  the  thing  could  be  managed,  and  then  only 
if  Amherst  had  suflScient  troops  in  a  state  of  immediate 
mobility.  Yet  it  was  done.  On  June  4th,  only  a  week 
or  so  late,  Lord  Rollo,  with  three  of  the  line  and  as  many 
frigates  from  the  North  American  squadron,  met  Douglas 
at  Guadeloupe,  the  appointed  rendezvous.  His  military 
force  was  four  battalions  from  Amherst's  army,  besides 
rangers  and  artillery,  and  not  a  moment  was  lost.  Two 
days  later  they  were  before  Roseau,  which  the  French 
had  made  the  capital  of  Dominica,  and  next  day,  though 
the  inhabitants  made  a  plucky  attempt  at  resistance,  it 
was  seized  by  a  coup  de  main. 

The  capture  was  one  of  naval  value.      Being  a  neutral 

1  "French  Intelligence,"  July  2  and  3,  ibid.,  and  July  14,  ibid.,  32,926. 
VOL.  II.  M 


178  THE    FALL    OF   PITT  1761 

island  under  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  only 
recently  occupied  by  the  French,  it  was  not  intrinsically 
rich,  but  in  Prince  Rupert's  Bay  it  could  boast  an  un- 
rivalled roadstead  admirably  placed.  It  had,  moreover, 
become  a  paradise  for  French  privateers,  and  failing  St. 
Lucia,  which  it  was  then  too  late  to  attempt,  no  island 
afforded  a  better  strategical  position,  if  war  in  the  West 
Indies  was  to  be  renewed  with  Spain  and  France.  This 
was  all  beside  its  political  value  at  the  moment — a  value 
which  Douglas  was  "  minister "  enough  to  understand. 
So  soon  as  it  was  in  his  hands  he  sent  a  vessel  home  with 
the  neAvs,  apologising  that  as  they  had  heard  many  reports 
of  a  congress  he  thought  it  best  to  let  the  government 
know  as  soon  as  possible  of  their  "  little  acquisition,"  as 
he  called  it.^ 

An  extension  of  the  war  grew  every  day  more  certain, 
at  least  in  Pitt's  eyes,  and  the  prospect  of  having  to  deal 
with  Spain  as  well  as  France  became  more  and  more  the 
dominant  note  of  his  war  plan.  Already,  before  the  blow 
at  Dominica  had  been  struck,  he  had  elaborated  a  scheme 
for  pushing  the  operations  in  that  quarter  still  further, 
and  instructions  had  gone  out  to  Amherst  to  have  another 
large  force  ready  by  the  time  the  hurricane  season  was 
over  to  go  down  to  Barbadoes  in  order  to  take  part  in  a 
great  concentration  against  Martinique  and  all  that  the 
French  had  left  in  the  West  Indies.  This  order,  as  we 
shall  see,  was  only  part  of  his  great  scheme  to  render  the 
intervention  of  Spain  impotent  when  it  came. 

As  the  weeks  went  by  the  outlook  at  home  served 
only  to  mark  the  wisdom  of  the  precautions  he  was  taking 
and  the  necessity  for  energetic  action.  By  the  third 
week  in  July  no  answer  had  come  from  Choiseul,  and  the 

^  Douglas  to  Admiralty,  June   13,  Admiralty  Secretary,  In-leliers,  307. 
See  also  same  to  same,  June  3  (with  enclosures),  ibid. 


i76i         CHOISEUL'S   COUNTER-PROPOSAL         179 

news  from  Westphalia  was  that  Soubise  and  Broglie  were 
actively  engaged  in  a  great  combined  movement  to  drive 
Ferdinand  from  the  position  he  had  taken  up  to  cover 
Hanover  on  the  line  of  the  Lippe.  As  the  two  French 
armies  amounted  to  nearly  double  that  of  Ferdinand  the 
situation  looked  very  ugly.  Pitt's  impatience  and  dis- 
trust of  Choiseul  increased  every  day,  and  so  far  infected 
his  colleaofues  that  it  was  decided  to  call  a  Cabinet  on 
July  21st  to  consider  his  suspicious  procrastination. 
Every  one  felt  something  must  be  done  and  done 
quickly,  "  the  affected  slowness  in  the  negotiations  on 
the  part  of  Franco,"  as  Pitt  said,  "  combined  with  the 
vivacity  of  her  operations  in  the  field  .  .  .  being  too 
dangerous  to  the  sum  of  affairs,  and  too  interesting  to  his 
Majesty's  honour,  to  be  longer  acquiesced  in."  ^ 

It  was  while  the  atmosphere  was  thus  highly  charged 
that  Choiseul's  answer  at  last  arrived.  It  reached  London 
on  July  20th,  just  in  time  to  be  considered  by  the  Cabinet 
on  the  morrow.  The  new  Memorial  appeared  to  be  a  frank 
endeavour  to  meet  the  English  views,  Choiseul  was  ready 
to  give  up  Minorca  in  exchange  for  Guadeloupe  and  Marie- 
galante ;  to  evacuate  the  French  conquests  in  Germany  in 
return  for  Belleisle ;  to  consent  to  the  British  occupation 
of  the  neutral  island  of  Tobago  if  France  might  retain 
St.  Lucia ;  to  permit  to  England  the  choice  between  Goree 
and  Senegal ;  to  settle  the  relations  of  the  two  East  India 
Companies  on  the  basis  of  the  stains  quo  ante  helium  ;  and 
to  refer  the  question  of  the  prizes  taken  before  the  declara- 
tion of  war  to  the  British  Court  of  Admiralty;  but  he 
resolutely  insisted  on  the  fisheries  and  the  retention  of 
Cape  Breton  for  a  fishing  station  as  the  price  of  guarantee- 
ing to  England  the  conquest  of  Canada,  As  to  Frederick, 
France  would  withdraw  all  her  auxiliaries  from  Austria  if 
*  Pitt  to  Stanley,  July  25. — Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  554. 


i8o  THE    FALL   OF   PITT  1761 

England  withdrew  the  German  forces  in  her  pay  from 
Prussia.  She  offered  also  as  the  British  forces  were  re- 
called from  Westphalia  to  recall  double  the  number  of 
her  own. 

So  far  there  was  a  distinct  advance  towards  an  agree- 
ment, and  had  there  been  no  more  there  was  little  reason 
why  an  equitable  arrangement  should  not  have  been 
reached.  But  unfortunately  the  counter-proposals  Avere 
accompanied  by  a  "  Private  Memorial "  which  was  as 
soothing  as  the  explosion  of  a  mine.  It  was  nothing  less 
than  a  bare-faced  proposal  that  Spain  should  be  invited 
to  guarantee  the  treaty.  The  Memorial  stated  that  the 
Spanish  Court  had  communicated  to  Versailles  its  three 
points  of  dispute  with  England,  viz.  the  restitution  of 
Spanish  ships  captured  during  the  war ;  the  right  to  fish 
on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland ;  and  the  demolition  of 
the  British  log-cutting  settlements  in  Honduras.  Worse 
still,  it  was  declared  that  France  regarded  the  settle- 
ment of  these  differences  with  Spain  as  essential  to 
the  conclusion  of  a  lasting  peace  with  herself.  Alone 
this  was  objectionable  enough.  It  was  sufficient  to  open 
the  eyes  of  the  most  sceptical  to  the  game  France  and 
Spain  were  playing;  and  by  a  nation  elated  and  con- 
fident with  successful  war  it  could  only  be  regarded  as 
an  insolent  threat.  But  to  make  matters  still  worse  and 
leave  no  room  for  doubt,  Stanley  informed  Pitt  that  it 
was  only  with  difficulty  he  had  persuaded  Choiseul  to 
relegate  the  Spanish  claims  to  a  separate  document,  and 
not  to  incorporate  them  in  the  articles  proposed  for  the 
treaty  of  peace.  Personally,  he  did  not  think  that 
France,  having  given  up  Canada,  would  be  in  a  hurry 
to  go  to  war  about  logwood,  and  he  had  told  Choiseul 
plainly  we  were  not  to  be  frightened  by  Spain.  This 
hopeful  opinion,  however,  he   modified   by   a  later  dis- 


I76I  INDIGNATION   IN   ENGLAND  i8i 

CO  very  that  he  had  made.  It  was  that  France  and 
Spain  had  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  joint  action  before 
ever  the  present  negotiations  had  begun,  and  that  Spain 
had  offered  to  exchange  Puerto  Rico  for  Minorca.^ 

At  the  same  time,  to  add  fuel  to  the  fire,  Bussy,  the  diplo- 
matic agent  whom  Choiseul  had  sent  to  London,  presented 
a  note  on  the  subject  of  Prussia.  It  was  to  the  effect 
that  since  the  presentation  of  her  first  proposals,  France 
had  received  Austria's  consent  to  the  principle  of  a  separate 
peace,  but  on  two  conditions.  One  was  that  the  Empress- 
Queen  should  keep  possession  of  all  the  Prussian  territory 
which  her  armies  occupied,  and  the  other  that  England 
should  cease  to  support  Frederick  either  with  her  own 
troops  or  those  of  Hanover  and  the  subsidised  allies. 
France  on  her  part  was  to  withdraw  her  succour  from 
Austria.  Bussy  intimated  that  France  had  acquiesced 
in  these  "  natural  and  equitable "  conditions,  and  that 
she  expected  that  England  would  do  the  same.  In  Pitt's 
eyes  it  was  no  better  than  a  shameless  invitation  for 
England  to  break  her  solemn  word  to  Frederick,  and  to 
the  high  sense  of  honour  which  was  one  of  his  most 
marked  characteristics  it  was  insolent  beyond  endurance.^ 

So  on  the  morrow,  in  hot  blood,  the  new  counter- 
proposals were  considered  by  the  Cabinet,  and  with  one 
voice  condenmed  as  insulting  and  inadmissible.  Pitt, 
indeed,  appears  to  have  had  things  entirely  his  own  way, 
and  was  permitted  to  frame  an  answer  in  his  highest  and 
most  dictatorial  tone.  Bussy  received  it  face  to  face, 
and  that  there  might  be  no  mistake  he  had  it  repeated 
in  a  note  next  day.  "  It  is  my  duty,"  wrote  Pitt,  "  to 
declare  farther  to  you  in  plain  terms,  in  the  name  of  his 

^  Stanley  to  Pitt,  July   14,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,925.     See  also  under 
July  20,  ibid. 

^  Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  553. 


1 82  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

Majesty,  that  he  will  not  suffer  the  disputes  of  Spain  to 
be  blended  in  any  manner  whatsoever  in  the  negotiations 
between  the  two  crowns.  .  .  .  Moreover,  it  is  expected 
that  France  Avill  not  at  any  time  presume  a  right  of 
intermeddling  in  such  disputes  between  Great  Britain 
and  Spain.  ...  I  likewise  return  to  you,  sir,  as  totally 
inadmissible,  the  Memorial  relative  to  the  King  of  Prussia, 
as  implying  an  attempt  upon  the  honour  of  Great  Britain." 
Nothing  could  well  be  stronger ;  and  to  Stanley  Pitt's  in- 
structions were  equally  forcible.  To  add  to  the  heat  of  his 
spirit  news  had  just  come  in  of  the  fall  of  Pondicherry  and 
the  capture  of  Dominica.  Two  days  later,  on  July  22nd, 
came  tidings  of  even  greater  moment.  Ferdinand,  beyond 
all  hope,  had  soundly  defeated  Broglie  in  his  first  attempt 
to  strike.  The  general  elation  was  scarcely  less  than 
after  Minden.  "  All  is  triumph.  All  is  joy,"  wrote 
Pitt.^  And  no  wonder.  The  victory  had  been  as  un- 
expected as  Minden,  and  again  it  had  been  won  mainly 
by  the  British  troops.  Gran  by,  indeed,  had  directed  the 
action,  and,  as  Ferdinand  handsomely  stated,  he  had  only 
arrived  on  the  field  to  be  an  ordinary  spectator  of  his 
lieutenant's  admirable  dispositions.  The  result  of  the 
victory  was  entirely  to  upset  the  combination  of  the  two 
French  armies,  and  to  give  great  hopes  that  Ferdinand 
would  be  able  to  hold  his  position  on  the  line  of  the  Lippe. 
The  effect  upon  the  whole  balance  of  the  war  Pitt  was 
careful  to  point  out  to  Stanley,  and  the  despatch  was 
further  seasoned  with  the  information  that  the  transports 
which  were  to  go  out  to  America  to  fetch  Amherst's 
contingent  for  the  Martinique  expedition  had  received 
their  sailing  orders.    He  also  told  him  that  in  the  opinion 

1  GrenvUlc  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  377,  July  22.  See  also  Jenkinson  to  Gren- 
ville,  July  21,  ibid,  p.  376;  and  Newcastle  Papers,  32,925,  July  20  and 
July  22  (Hardwicke  to  Newcastle). 


i76i  BRITISH   ULTIMATUM  183 

of  the  British  governDient  France  had  now  left  no  room 
for  doubt  that  her  whole  object  from  the  beginning  had 
been  merely  to  gam  time  to  push  her  operations  in 
Germany,  and  that  as  for  the  French  engagements  with 
Spain,  the  British  government  regarded  them  "  to  have 
been  as  disingenuously  suppressed  as  they  were  now  in 
the  moment  insolently  produced."  "  In  this  view,  there- 
fore," he  wrote,  "  and  in  consequence  of  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  the  second  council  held  yesterday,  his  Majesty 
has  commanded  me  to  send  you  the  enclosed  paper 
containing  conditions  of  peace  ...  to  serve  as  an  answer 
to  the  French  Memorial  of  the  13  th,  and  as  the  ultimatum 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain."  Further,  Stanley  was  "  to 
express  without  asperity,  but  with  all  firmness,  a  desire 
for  a  categorical  answer,"  intimatin^r  at  the  same  time, 
with  politeness  and  regret,  "  that  otherwise  your  stay  in 
Paris  cannot  probably  be  long."  ^  The  enclosed  paper 
which  Stanley  was  to  present  as  an  ultimatum  was  a 
counter-proposal  which  amounted  practically  to  falling 
back  to  the  original  terms  suggested  by  the  British 
government  in  the  spring,  though  Stanley  was  instructed 
that  he  might  give  way  a  little  about  Dunkirk  and  the 
west  coast  of  Africa. 

The  justification  of  Pitt's  high  attitude  comes  from 
Choiseul's  own  pen.  About  lour  years  later,  when  all 
Avas  over,  he  drew  up  a  long  memoir  for  the  King  in 
defence  of  his  policy.  As  seen  and  presented  by  him  at 
that  time  his  conduct  of  affairs,  no  doubt,  possessed  an 
artistic  roundness  which  it  may  have  lacked  in  reality, 
but  still  there  is  little  doubt  the  memoir  represented 
fairly  well  what  his  aims  had  been."     From  the  moment 


1  Pitt  to  Stanley,  July  25. — Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  554. 

2  '<  Mc'moire  pr^seutii  h  Louis   XV.,"  Feb.    1765,    Soulange-Bodin,   La 
diplomatic  dc  Louis  XV,  et  le  I'acte  de  PamiUe. — Piices  Juatificatives,  B. 


1 84  THE   FALL   OF    PITT  1761 

that,  at  the  end  of  1758,  he  had  superseded  Bernis  at  the 
Foreign  Office,  he  had  set  himself  to  bring  the  maritime 
war  to  an  end.  The  increased  power  of  England  upon 
the  seas  he  believed  he  could  balance  in  Europe  by 
getting  for  France  the  Flemish  ports,  and  above  all  by 
placing  her  at  the  head  of  a  Bourbon  confederation  which 
would  include  Spain,  Sicily,  and  the  Duchy  of  Parma. 
In  1759,  when  Charles  was  about  to  proceed  to  Spain,  he 
had  nearly  succeeded  in  arranging  an  interview  at  Lyons 
between  him  and  Louis,  but  the  influence  of  the  Spanish 
queen  Maria  Amelia  brought  it  to  nothing.  In  Novem- 
ber 1760  he  tried  again — this  time  going  so  far  as  to 
propose  a  naval  coaUtion  against  the  domination  of 
England  which  Holland  was  to  be  forced  to  join.  But 
under  the  same  restraining  influence  Charles  replied  that 
his  fleet  was  not  as  yet  in  a  condition  to  make  such  a 
thmg  possible.^ 

Early  in  the  next  year,  however,  when  Choiseul  was 
appointed  War  Minister,  and  the  Spanish  queen  died,  he 
thought  he  saw  in  the  proposal  for  a  Congress  a  better 
opportunity.  Persuading  his  master  that  England  was 
not  in  earnest  for  a  general  peace,  he  obtained  permission 
to  attempt  once  more  some  arrangement  with  Spain.  It 
was  at  this  time  that  the  old  Spanish  ambassador  was 
recalled  and  Grimaldi  put  in  his  place.  Choiseul's  plan 
was,  while  the  general  negotiations  for  the  Congress  pro- 
ceeded, to  enter  into  separate  negotiations  with  England. 
To  this  course,  he  boasts  with  pardonable  pride,  he  ob- 
tained the  consent  of  Austria  and  the  other  allies  of 
France  in  spite  of  their  suspicions.  There  was  certainly 
room  enough  for  suspicion.  He  further  says  he  knew  Pitt's 
character  too  well  to  expect  success  with  him,  but  that 
in  his  second  interview  with  Stanley  he  became  convinced 

^  Bourguet,  Lc  Due  de  Choiseul  et  ['alliance  Eapagnol. 


i76i  CHOISEUL'S   APOLOGIA  185 

that  Pitt's  position  was  growing  precarious,  and  that  Bute 
and  a  strong  party  in  England  were  eager  to  end  the  war 
in  order  to  destroy  his  dictatorship.^  "  I  then,"  he  says, 
"  proposed  to  your  Majesty  two  games  to  play  together  : 
one  to  keep  up  the  negotiation  with  England  in  such  a 
way  that  if  it  did  not  succeed  this  time  it  would  serve 
from  its  simplicity  as  a  base  for  the  genuine  negotiation 
which  must  take  place  if  .Pitt  fell  before  the  influence  of 
Bute,  At  the  same  time — and  this  was  the  second  game 
which  I  thought  essential — I  entered  into  an  exchange  of 
views  with  Spain,  so  devised  that  if  we  were  to  make 
peace  that  crown  would  find  it  to  its  interest  to  support 
us  in  the  negotiation,  and  guarantee  the  stability  of  the 
treaty.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  failed  in  this,  my  plan 
was  that  Spain  should  be  drawn  into  the  war,  and  that 
France  would  be  able  to  profit  by  the  events  which  this 
new  complication  might  produce  and  repair  her  losses. 
Finally,  if  the  event  proved  unfortunate,  I  had  in  view 
that  the  losses  of  Spain  would  lighten  those  which  France 
might  suffer."  A  policy  so  Machiavellian,  so  astutely 
selfish,  compels  a  certain  admiration,  but  it  certainly 
justifies  Pitt's  passionate  instinct  that  it  deserved  nothing 
but  swift  violence. 

Choiseul's  path  had  not  been  easy.  To  begin  with,  the 
readiness  with  which  Grimaldi  seized  the  first  opening  to 
propose  an  offensive  alliance  against  England  frightened 
him.'"^  It  looked  like  a  snare,  and  he  believed  the  am- 
bassador was  ahead  of  his  court.  This  was  true,  but 
Grimaldi's  arguments  and  dexterity  soon  brought  Charles 
up  to  the  point  of  a  defensive  alliance,  though  he  still 

'  This  is  one  of  Choiseul's  artistic  touches.  He  proposed  the  treaty  on 
May  12  (Bourguet,  p.  207),  before  Stanley  had  started  for  Paris.  The  first 
interview  did  not  take  place  till  June  7.  See  Stanley  to  Pitt,  June  12, 
Thackeray,  vol.  i.  p.  514. 

*  Feb.  15,  Bourguet,  p.  188. 


1 86  THE   FALL   OF    PITT  1761 

hesitated  about  making  it  offensive.  Gradually,  however, 
the  suspicions  on  both  sides  were  reduced.  In  May,  just 
as  Choiseul's  arrangements  for  negotiating  a  separate 
peace  with  England  were  completed,  Charles  authorised 
Grimaldi  definitely  to  propose  a  general  treaty  of  alliance 
between  France  and  Spain.  Choiseul  considered  it  was 
now  safe  to  proceed,  and  forwarded  to  the  Spanish  court 
a  counter-proposal.  His  suggestion  was  that  two  treaties 
should  be  made.  One,  which  he  proposed  to  call  the 
Facte  de  Famille,  was  to  be  a  general  and  intimate  alliance, 
amounting  almost  to  a  confederation,  between  the  two 
courts,  and  having  no  relation  to  any  other  Power.  The 
other  would  regulate  their  relations  with  the  rest  of 
Europe.  The  project  was  not  well  received.  Wall  con- 
sidered the  very  title  "  Family  Compact  "  would  alarm 
Europe,  and  for  Charles  in  his  warlike  mood  it  did  not 
go  far  enough.  Grimaldi,  on  his  part,  particularly  ob- 
jected that  it  avoided  the  main  object  in  view,  which 
was  the  concert  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  two  Powers. 
Choiseul  could  wish  for  nothing  better.  By  this  time  it 
had  become  pretty  clear  to  his  mind  that  the  mere  threat 
of  Spanish  intervention  was  going  to  have  little  or  no 
effect  in  England;  and  seeing  it  was  safe  to  take  yet  another 
step,  he  proposed  on  June  2nd  that  the  Family  Compact 
should  be  supplemented  by  a  Special  Convention  to  meet 
the  actual  situation.  His  suggestion  was  that  Spain 
should  undertake  to  declare  war  on  England  on  May  1, 
17G2,  if  by  that  time  peace  had  not  been  concluded,  and 
on  this  condition  France  was  ready  to  include  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Spanish  grievances  in  the  separate  negotia- 
tion that  she  was  carrying  on  with  England.  It  was,  in 
fact,  a  proposal  for  a  complete  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance.  Grimaldi  sprang  at  the  idea,  and  was  for  sign- 
ing on  the  spot.     But  Choiseul  held  back.     The  fact  was 


I76I  THE   FAMILY   COMPACT  187 

he  had  made  up  his  mind  not  to  commit  himself  until 
the  result  of  the  existing  negotiation  with  London  was 
known.  So  he  told  Grimaldi  that  he  felt  it  would  be 
improper  for  them  to  proceed  further  till  the  matter 
had  been  referred  to  Madrid  and  the  King's  consent 
obtained. 

With  the  Family  Compact  as  drafted  by  Choiseul  the 
Spanish  Court  was  delighted.  Wall  himself  approved, 
or  apparently  approved,  and  knowing  what  to  expect 
from  Pitt  if  the  secret  leaked  out,  forthwith  set  about 
strengthening  all  the  old  scarred  places  on  the  coasts. 
By  the  end  of  June  the  matter  was  regarded  by  the 
Spanish  court  as  settled,  though  some  mmor  points  were 
deemed  to  require  adjustment. 

With  the  "  Special  Convention,"  however,  things  were 
not  so  smooth.  Wall  penetrated  Choiseul's  game  far 
enough  to  suspect  that  if,  under  the  threat  of  Spanish 
intervention,  France  could  get  a  favourable  enough  peace 
with  England,  she  would  certainly  leave  Spain  and  her 
grievances  in  the  lurch.  Choiseul's  attitude  was  clearly 
wavering  with  the  changing  aspect  of  his  negotiation  with 
London.  Charles  himself  began  to  grow  suspicious  again, 
and  to  bring  matters  to  a  head  offered  to  send  Grimaldi 
authority  to  sign  the  Family  Compact  at  once.  Wall, 
however,  found  it  easy  enough  to  suggest  difficulties  over 
the  points  that  were  still  unsettled.  He  particularly 
called  attention  to  the  free  hand  with  which  France  was 
dividing  the  West  Indies  with  England  without  consult- 
ing Spain.  Spanish  feathers  were  on  end  in  a  moment : 
the  position  grew  strained,  and  oddly  enough  it  was 
intensified  by  what  was  regarded  as  the  half-hearted 
and  equivocal  way  in  which  Bussy  had  presented  the 
Spanish  claims  to  Pitt. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  the  British   ulti- 


1 88  THE    FALL   OF   PITT  1761 

matum  reached  Paris,  and  with  it  Bussy's  account  of 
the  haughty  manner  in  which  his  note  on  the  Spanish 
claims  had  been  thrown  back  in  his  face.  The  effect 
was  immediate.  Scarcely  a  hope  of  peace  remained, 
and  Choiseul  had  to  choose  between  the  chance  of  Pitt's 
fall  and  the  nearer  prospect  of  losing  Spain.  There  was 
indeed  no  room  for  hesitation,  and  he  forthwith  sent 
word  to  Madrid  that  Louis  regarded  the  two  treaties 
as  signed,  and  was  sure  that  Charles  must  be  feeling 
as  deeply  wounded  as  himself  at  the  insult  of  the 
British  minister.  In  Spain  the  message  was  received 
in  the  same  spirit  that  it  was  sent.  By  Pitt's  instruc- 
tions, Lord  Bristol  had  just  submitted  Bussy's  offensive 
memorial  to  Wall,  and  asked  whether  it  was  authorised 
by  the  Court  of  Spain.  On  its  being  acknowledged,  his 
orders  were  to  remonstrate  on  the  unexampled  irregu- 
larity of  the  proceeding,  and,  as  it  could  only  be  regarded 
as  "  a  declaration  of  war  in  reversion,"  he  was  to  demand 
an  explanation  of  the  warlike  preparations  that  were 
being  made  in  the  Spanish  arsenals.^  The  effect  of 
Bristol's  action  was  naturally  to  increase  Charles's  delight 
at  the  communication  from  Paris.  The  only  trouble 
was  he  was  not  yet  ready  for  war.  Choiseul  had  told 
him  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  Spain  to  hasten  her 
declaration.  But  Charles  had  to  reply  that  he  could 
not  possibly  commence  hostilities  till  the  Jiota,  or  Plate 
Fleet,  came  home  from  Havana,  and  he  did  not  expect 
it  till  October.  Every  other  point  was  rapidly  agreed 
upon,  and  on  1.5  th  August  both  the  Family  Compact  and 
the  Special  Convention  were  signed. 

The  Special  Convention  is  what  chiefly  concerns  us 
here.  It  was  a  military  agreement  by  which  a  complete 
and    unreserved    offensive    and    defensive    alliance    was 

'  Pitt  to  Bristol,  July  28. —Thackeray,  vol.  i.  p.  572. 


i76i  THE    SPECIAL   CONVENTION  189 

formed  between  the  two  crowns  for  the  period  of  the 
war ;  all  plans  were  to  be  concerted,  and  no  peace  or 
truce  was  to  be  made  without  mutual  consent.  May  1st 
still  stood  as  the  date  for  the  arrangement  to  come  into 
operation.  Louis  engaged  on  that  day  to  hand  over 
Minorca  to  Charles.  It  was  to  be  occupied  during  the 
war  by  a  Spanish  garrison,  and  if  the  arms  of  the 
two  kings  were  successful,  France  was  to  use  every 
effort  to  assure  its  cession  to  the  Spanish  crown  at  the 
peace.  Then  came  a  highly  important  article  to  the 
effect  that  Portugal  was  to  be  invited  to  become  a  party 
to  the  Convention,  in  order  to  close  her  ports  and  trade 
to  the  British,  and  it  was  understood  that  if  she  refused 
she  was  to  be  treated  as  a  common  enemy  and  an  ally 
of  England.  Other  maritime  states  that  might  wish 
to  join  the  coalition  should  be  permitted  to  do  so ;  and, 
finally,  if  Spain  were  driven  to  begin  the  war  before 
May  1st,  the  treaty  was  to  come  into  force  from  the 
moment  she  commenced  hostilities. 

All  these  details  were,  of  course,  kept  secret  from 
England,  but  it  was  impossible  to  conceal  entirely  the 
fact  that  an  arrangement  of  some  kind  had  been  come 
to  between  the  two  Bourbon  Powers.  Pitt,  however, 
seems  still  to  have  regarded  the  rapjorochement  as  a  mere 
attempt  to  intimidate  him  into  easier  terms.  In  view 
of  the  four  great  successes  he  had  just  won — at  Belle- 
isle,  at  Dominica,  at  Pondicherry,  and  in  Westphalia- — he 
believed  that  a  firm  attitude  was  all  that  was  required 
to  force  France  to  give  way,  and  that  the  resolute  answer 
to  Choiseul's  memorandum,  which  had  been  sent  on 
27th  July,  would  be  accepted  at  Versailles.^ 

He  was  quickly  undeceived.  On  August  nth  Bussy 
handed  him  what  was  called  an  ultimatum  in  reply  to 

*  Jenkinson  to  Grenville,  July  28,  GrenvUle  Papers,  vol.Ji.  p.  .'J80. 


190  THE    FALL    OF   PITT  1761 

his  own.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  defiant  reply  to  the  British 
ultimatum.  Though  most  of  Pitt's  points  were  accepted, 
all  the  important  ones  were  refused.  France  still  insisted 
on  her  right  to  fish  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  as  well 
as  on  the  Newfoundland  banks,  and  to  have  a  fishing 
station  reserved  to  her.  She  refused  to  exchange 
Belleisle  for  Minorca,  as  was  only  natural,  since  Minorca 
was  promised  to  Spain ;  she  went  back  on  her  under- 
taking to  evacuate  her  conquests  in  Westphalia;  gave 
no  undertaking  about  Nieuport  and  Ostend,  and  finally 
revived  more  strongly  than  ever  her  demand  for  the 
restitution  of  the  prizes  taken  by  England  before  the 
declaration  of  war.  At  the  same  time  a  note,  actually 
drawn  up  by  Choiseul,  was  presented  by  Bussy  in  his  own 
name  resenting  the  tone  of  Pitt's  last  communication, 
and  requesting  an  interview  to  discuss  the  new  French 
proposal.  Instead  of  granting  it,  Pitt  laid  the  whole 
matter  before  the  Cabinet. 

Whatever  doubts  he  may  have  entertained  hitherto 
as  to  what  was  before  him,  he  was  now  certain  that 
France  did  not  intend  to  make  peace,  and  that  war 
with  Spain  was  inevitable.  He  had  received  from 
Stanley  a  despatch  in  which  he  said  the  whole  tone 
at  the  French  court  had  altered.  The  anxious  air 
which  till  then  he  had  noted  in  Grimaldi,  as  well  as 
in  the  Austrian  ambassador,  had  changed  for  one  of 
exultation.  He  could  not  but  see  they  had  gained  the 
upper  hand  of  him,  and  that  unless  some  unforeseen 
circumstance  occurred  he  entirely  despaired  of  accom- 
plishing his  Majesty's  wishes  for  peace.^  He  had  come 
to  be  convinced  that  the  kernel  of  the  situation  was 
resistance  to  the  maritime  domination  of  England,  and 
that    the    fishery    difficulty    Avas    insuperable.     Choiseul 

^  Stanley  to  Pitt,  Aug.  6. — Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  571. 


I76I  STORMS   IN   THE    CABINET  191 

vowed  he  dared  not  give  way.  He  would  be  stoned, 
he  said,  in  the  streets  of  Paris  if  he  did,  and  all  Stanley 
could  suggest  to  Pitt  was  that,  in  hopes  of  arousing  in 
the  starving  and  exhausted  French  provinces  a  popular 
demonstration  in  favour  of  peace,  he  should  be  recalled 
and  Bussy  dismissed. 

This  letter,  together  with  the  French  ultimatum  and 
notes,  Pitt  laid  before  the  Cabinet  on  August  13  th. 
The  peace  party  was  for  making  one  more  effort. 
Pitt  was  as  determined  to  break  off  the  negfotiations — 
to  refuse  even  to  discuss  the  ultimatum  with  Bussy. 
With  Bedford  at,  their  head  his  opponents  Avere  able  to 
make  some  impression.  He  was  forced  from  his  irrecon- 
cilable attitude  about  the  fisheries,  so  far  as  to  agree  to 
test  the  sincerity  of  Choiseul  by  offering  a  port  of  refuge 
or  abri  on  the  Newfoundland  coast.  The  little  island  of 
St.  Pierre  was  suggested.  So  far,  but  no  further,  would 
Pitt  go.  On  the  morrow  they  met  again  to  settle  his 
draft  answer  to  Choiseul.  It  was  found  to  be  drawn 
in  a  highly  peremptory  tone,  and  the  peace  party  freely 
criticised  its  phrasing  as  objectionable  and  irritating. 
Pitt,  having  given  up  his  darling  point  of  excluding 
France  from  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  altogether,  and 
denying  her  an  abri  anywhere,  was  in  no  mood  to  bear 
criticism,  and  another  scene  occurred.  To  every  amend- 
ment that  was  suggested,  Pitt  objected  in  his  most 
overbearing  manner.  Not  a  word  Avould  he  have  altered. 
He  would  permit  no  one,  he  cried  fiercely,  to  cobble  his 
work,  and  the  sitting  ended  in  heat  with  a  sullen  acquies- 
cence that  the  despatch  should  go  as  it  stood.  Both 
meetings  lasted  for  hours.  "  Very  stormy  they  were," 
wrote  Hardwicke  to  his  eldest  son,  "  but  we  rid  out 
the  tempest.  .  .  .  After  much  altercation  and  some 
thumps  of  the   list   on   the  table,  it  was  at  last  carried 


192  THE   FALL   OF   PITT  1761 

(on  my  motion),  that  the  conference  should  be  had,  but 
not  without  an  answer  to  Bussy's  letter."^ 

So  far  Pitt  had  his  way,  but  it  had  been  too  fierce  a 
struggle  not  to  leave  deep  scars.  The  Duke  of  Bedford 
announced  that  he  would  not  attend  another  Cabinet,  and 
kept  his  word.  Pitt's  imperious  manner  of  doing  busi- 
ness was  beyond  bearing.  Devonshire  said  as  much,  and 
Newcastle  went  so  far  in  the  same  direction  as  his 
constitutional  irresolution  would  let  him.  Could  they 
have  known  the  truth  it  might  have  been  different. 
For  on  that  very  day,  as  we  know,  while  Pitt,  in  his 
passion  to  make  them  see,  was  banging  the  table  in  their 
faces,  Choiseul  and  Grimaldi  at  Versailles  were  quietly 
signing  the  two  secret  treaties. 

Still  the  question  was  far  from  settled.  There  remained 
the  instructions  that  were  to  be  sent  to  Stanley  with  the 
new  British  ultimatum.  Council  after  council  was  held, 
the  Duke  of  Bedford  stubbornly  refusing  to  attend  even 
at  the  King's  urgent  entreaty.  The  point  was  that  the 
offer  of  the  island  of  St.  Pierre  was  to  be  regarded  as 
a  final  test  of  France's  sincerity,  and  Stanley  had  to  be 
informed  as  to  how  far  he  was  to  go  in  meeting  any 
alternative  suggestions  which  Choiseul  might  offer.  Pitt 
himself  was  against  ofii'ering  even  St.  Pierre.  He  said  he 
was  clearly  against  leaving  any  fishery  rights  to  France 
except  those  allowed  her  on  the  Newfoundland  banks  by 
the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  in  letting  her  into  the  Gulf 
of  St.  Lawrence  he  was  only  conforming  to  the  opinion  of 
others.  Hardwicke  thus  summed  up  the  result :  "  We 
had  two  meetings  this  week.  The  same  persons  present. 
All  was  calm  and  decent.  The  great  points  were  liberty 
to  fish  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  and  an  dbri.     Many 

^  Hardwicke  to  Viscount  Royston,  Aug.  15,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i. 
p.  27. 


I76I  PITT   GIVES   WAY  193 

speeches.  At  last  hoth  agreed  to  by  all.  ...  It  is  also 
agreed  to  speak  clearly  about  Dunkirk  being  put  on 
the  footing  of  the  Treaty  of  Aix,  and  the  liberty  of  fish- 
ing and  drying  fish  in  Newfoundland  according  to  the 
thirteenth  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  It  has  also 
been  agreed  with  the  honne  foi  of  the  French  king's 
declaration  about  Nieuport  and  Ostend  [that  is,  that 
he  had  no  intention  of  occupying  them  permanently], 
and  that  each  side  (after  our  particular  peace  made)  may 
assist  their  respective  allies  in  money  only.  Thus  far  is 
settled,  and  we  meet  on  Monday  to  fix  the  particular 
place  for  the  abri."  ^  This  meeting  also  went  off  calmly 
enough.  It  was  agreed  to  offer  St.  Pierre,  though  Pitt 
persisted  in  his  opinion  that  the  whole  concession  was  a 
mistake.  He  would  not  have  given  an  inch,  he  said.  He 
had  no  fear  of  Spain,  and  so  far  from  being  deterred  by 
her  threat  of  intervention,  he  vowed  he  would  rather 
fight  France  and  Spain  together  than  France  alone — his 
meaning  being  that  the  benevolent  neutrality  of  Spain 
towards  France  was  a  greater  evil  than  her  declared 
hostility.^ 

Pitt's  check  in  the  Cabinet  was  all  the  more  exasper- 
ating because  he  felt  he  had  the  general  feeling  of  the 
country  behind  him.  In  the  City  the  idea  of  war  with 
Spain  was  popular — it  meant  rich  prizes.  Indeed,  that 
all  important  factor  in  war,  the  spirit  of  the  people, 
was  a  grave  anxiety  to  the  peace  party,  and  made  them 
more  than  half  afraid  of  what  they  had  done.  Much  as 
the  nation  desired  peace,  it  was  too  umch  intoxicated 
with  the  recent  recrudescence  of  victory  to  be  willing  to 
give  up  anything  to  secure  it.     "  Mr.  Pitt,"  as  Bedford 

1  Hardwicke  to  Lord  Royston,  Aug.  22  (Saturday),  Rockin<jhaiii  Memoirs, 
vol.  i.  p.  33. 

'^  "(Short  Notes  of  the  Meeting  at  St.  James's,  Aug.  24,"  Hardwicke 
Papers  (Add.  MSS.),  35,570,  £.  301. 

VOL.  II.  N 


194  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

was  told  by  his  alter  ego,  Richard  Rigby,  "  it  is  plain, 
does  govern ;  and  the  worst  of  it  is,  he  governs  not  only 
in  the  Cabinet  Council,  but  in  the  opinions  of  the  people 
too.  .  .  .  They  will  tell  you  in  the  same  breath  that  you 
must  keep  everything  which  you  have  taken  from  the 
French,  and  have  everything  returned  to  you  which  you 
have  lost  by  the  war.  Depend  upon  it,  my  Lord,  this 
is  the  madness  of  the  times,  and  there  is  but  one  cure 
for  it,  and  that  is  a  defeat  of  some  one  of  our  projects. 
Whilst  we  succeed  and  make  conquests  and  bonfires, 
the  value  of  the  capture  is  no  part  of  the  consideration 
— fresh  fuel  is  added  to  the  delirium,  and  the  fire  is  kept 
constantly  fanned.  ...  I  should  not  be  sorry  to  hear  that 
Martinico,  or  the  next  windmill  which  you  attack,  should 
get  the  better  of  you."  ^ 

As  Rigby  wrote,  the  matter  was  settled.  On  the  same 
day  Pitt  instructed  Stanley  that  he  was  to  present  the 
new  ultimatum  as  England's  last  word.  If  the  French 
refused  to  accept  the  main  points — that  is,  the  fishery 
settlement,  the  entire  cession  of  Canada,  the  restitution 
of  everything  in  Germany,  and  liberty  of  each  party  to 
continue  to  assist  its  allies — he  was  not  to  await  further 
orders,  but  to  return  home  without  taking  leave. 

With  such  a  letter  on  its  way  the  hope  of  peace  was 
very  remote.  But  worse  was  yet  to  come.  As  the  deci- 
sion was  thus  hanging  in  the  balance,  another  cyphered 
letter,  written  by  Grimaldi  to  Fuentes  on  August  31st, 
was  intercepted.  It  was  enough  to  open  a  blind  man's 
eyes.  "  They  have  not  given  Lord  Bristol  the  answer  in 
writing,"  Grimaldi  wrote.  "...  The  fear  of  our  Court, 
which  is  not  ill  grounded,  is  for  the  Flota.  They  want  to 
gain  time  there  till  it  has  arrived  at  Cadiz,  and  they  are 
secretly  sending  out  twelve  ships  by  way  of  convoy.  .  .  . 

^  Rigby  to  Bedford,  Aug.  27,  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  42. 


i76i  THE    SECRET    INTERCEPTED  195 

They  have  remained  here  [in  Paris]  entirely  bound  by 
the  Family  Compact  and  the  Convention.  .  .  .  What 
your  Excellency  mentions  is  not  to  be  feared  .  .  .  since 
both  instruments  were  signed  on  the  15  th,  and  I  expect 
shortly  the  ratification."  At  the  same  time,  moreover — 
apparently  on  the  same  day — came  a  despatch  from 
Stanley,  saying  he  had  got  sight  of  an  article  from 
some  recent  secret  treaty,  by  which  France  engaged  to 
support  the  interests  of  Spain  equally  with  her  own  in 
the  negotiation  of  the  peace.  This  article  was  also 
referred  to  in  Grimaldi's  letter  as  ensuring  that  the 
French  could  not  finish  the  war  without  the  Spanish 
claims  being  settled.^ 

A  day  or  two  later  came  three  more  letters  from 
Stanley  respecting  the  result  of  his  discussions  with 
Choiseul  on  the  last  ultimatum.  He  could  no  longer 
hope  that  any  concession  that  Choiseul  seemed  inclined 
to  make  would  lead  to  peace.  France  was  certainly  not 
in  earnest.  He  had  come  to  a  final  conclusion  that  a 
reconciliation  between  the  two  Crowns  was  impracticable, 
and  that  it  was  time  for  him  to  return  home  without 
taking  his  leave.  People,  moreover,  were  everywhere 
asserting  that  Spain  was  about  to  declare  war,  and  he 
had  little  doubt  it  was  true.  "  I  cannot  answer,"  he  said, 
"  whether  the  convention  between  these  two  Crowns  is 
actually  authenticated  ;  but  I  am  assured  that  at  least  it 
wants  only  the  last  hand  and  signature."  Finally,  he 
confirmed  the  intelligence  about  the  Spanish  ships  going 
out  to  meet  the  Flota,  and  added  that  Choiseul,  thou'di 
personally  polite,  had  suddenly  become  extremely  grave 
and  full  of  anxiety.^ 

*  Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  p.  139  ;  Newcastle  Papers,  Aug.  31,  32,927- 

•  Stanley  to  Pitt,  Sept.  4,  G,  and  8,  Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  pp.  012-618. 
The  letters  came  to  hand  on  the  11th.  Newcastle  to  Bedford,  Bedford 
Corr.,  vol.  ii.  p.  43. 


196  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

For  Pitt  this  was  enough.  Indeed,  it  was  no  more 
than  he  had  long  expected,  and  he  was  resolved  to 
seize  the  initiative.  The  means  was  ready  in  his  mind. 
Stanley  must  be  recalled  immediately,  and  a  squadron 
sent  down  to  Cadiz  to  intercept  the  expected  Flota. 
There  was  apparently  no  difficulty  about  it.  Keppel 
had  now  something  like  sixty  sail  under  his  broad- 
pendant  ;  and  on  intelligence  from  Holmes  that  some 
rich  French  vessels  were  coming  home  under  convoy 
from  St.  Domingo,  he  had  spread  his  fleet  as  far  down 
as  Finisterre  to  intercept  them.^  Anson,  moreover,  fur- 
nished a  memorandum,  showing  he  had  "  within  call " 
fifty-four  of  the  line  and  fifty-eight  frigates,  besides  the 
Mediterranean  squadron.^ 

On  September  15  th  the  Cabinet  met,  and  Pitt  laid  his 
drastic  proposals  before  it.  About  their  attitude  towards 
France  there  was  little  difficulty.  Hardwicke  himself  was 
for  Stanley's  recall,  and  though  he  was  absent,  at  the 
death-bed  of  his  wife,  his  influence  prevailed.  That 
night  Pitt  wrote  to  Stanley  that  he  was  to  demand  his 
passports  forthwith.  With  the  Spanish  business  it  was 
different.  For  the  peace  party  the  continuance  of  the  old 
war  was  as  much  as  they  could  bear.  To  rush  into  a 
new  one  was  midsummer  madness.  And  here  they  had 
the  powerful  support  of  Anson.  He  had  recently  been 
promoted  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  to  fetch  the  new  Queen 

^  Keppel  to  Admiralty,  July  25,  In-letters,  91. 

*  Newcastle  Papers,  Add.  MSS.,  32,928,  Sept.  15,  and  Hardwicke  Papers, 
ibid.,  35,870,  f.  301.  Anson  gave  the  distribution  of  the  fleet  as  follows: 
Home  Stations. — Ships  of  the  line  :  convoys  and  cruising,  5  ;  Downs,  1  ; 
off  Havre,  2  ;  Keppel,  28  ;  in  port  or  under  sailing  orders,  20,  less  2  just 
cast.  Total,  56;  frigates,  58.  Mediterranean. — Saunders,  "probably  off 
Toulon,"  1 1  of  the  line  and  12  frigates.  Distant  Stations. — Ships  of  the 
line  :  East  Indies,  14 ;  Jamaica,  6  ;  Leeward  Islands,  8  ;  North  America,  6 ; 
other  plantations,  2  ;  convoys  and  cruising,  4.  Total,  40.  Grand  total — 
Home  and  Mediterranean,  65  of  the  line  and  70  frigates.  In  all,  105  of 
the  line. 


I76I         PITT    URGES   WAR   WITH    SPAIN         197 

from  Holland.  Thither  he  had  gone  in  high  state  with 
all  the  royal  yachts,  and  had  just  returned  in  time  for 
the  council.  It  was  the  last  time  he  ever  flew  his  flag. 
He  was  approaching  seventy,  and  the  strain  of  his  strenuous 
life,  and,  above  all,  of  the  last  few  years,  had  told  its  tale. 
He  had  set  out  on  his  stately  mission  when  hopes  of 
peace  were  high.  He  returned  to  find  a  new  war  before 
him.  It  was  more  than  he  could  face,  and  with  all  the 
authority  of  his  great  name,  he  pronounced  that  it  was 
impossible  to  support  a  war  with  Spain.^ 

The  Cabinet  met  again  for  a  final  decision  on  the  l7th, 
but  so  violent  was  the  struggle  that  it  had  to  bo  adjourned 
till  the  next  day.  Then  it  was  Pitt  laid  before  them 
Grimaldi's  intercepted  letter,  but  still  they  resisted.  In 
vain  he  urged  his  point  with  all  his  eloquence  and  powers 
of  exposition,  and  every  one  agreed  he  had  never  spoken 
better  or  more  reasonably.  He  began  by  setting  out 
all  the  varied  evidence  that  pointed  irresistibly  to  the 
existence  of  a  Bourbon  alliance.  There  was  danger  in 
his  proposal,  he  admitted,  but  danger  lay  in  any  resolution 
they  might  take,  and  delay  could  only  increase  it.  What 
was  the  "  option  of  dangers  "  ?  he  asked,  in  the  words 
Wolfe  had  used  about  Rochefort.  There  was  nothing 
between  vigorous  action  and  acquiescence.  If  there  was 
danger  now,  how  much  greater  would  it  be  in  the  coming 
May,  when  Spain  was  to  declare  herself.  Why  not  act  at 
once  ?  There  was  now  but  one  House  of  Bourbon. 
Spain  had  grafted  herself  upon  Franco,  and  her  fleet 
must  be  regarded  as  the  remnant  of  the  fleet  of  France. 
"  Spain,"  he  added,  "  is  France,  and  France  is  Spain."  - 

»  Newcastle  Papers,  Sept.  15,  32,928. 

^  "Notes  of  Pitt's  Speech,  Sept.  18,"  Hard^vicke  Papers,  Add.  MSS., 
35,570,  f.  304.  In  the  margin  his  son  and  successor  has  written, 
"  This  was  an  able  speech."  And  compare  Newcastle's  Notes,  ibid., 
32,928. 


1 98  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

But  for  all  his  force  and  eloquence  the  men  of  peace 
were  unshaken.  Supported  by  Bute,  they  urged,  with  the 
nicety  of  the  grands  seigneurs  they  were,  that  a  blow  before 
declaration  could  not  be  justified  on  knowledge  obtained 
from  intercepted  letters.  Spain,  like  France,  must  be 
put  to  fair  trial.  Before  adopting  the  drastic  course  for 
which  Pitt  was  on  fire  and  well  prepared,  they  argued 
that  there  were  first  three  questions  to  be  settled  :  was 
such  a  course  justified  ?  was  it  within  our  naval  and 
military  strength  ?  and,  lastly,  was  it  expedient  ?  It  was 
recalled  by  Lord  Granville  how  Lord  Torrington's  instruc- 
tions in  1718,  which  had  resulted,  in  full  time  of  peace, 
in  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  oif  Cape  Passaro, 
had  never  been  forgiven  to  that  day.  It  was  also  urged 
that  Boscawen's  opening  of  the  present  war  was  no  great 
argument  for  repeating  the  experiment.  Let  Bristol, 
therefore,  be  instructed  to  make  a  strong  protest,  and 
demand  an  explanation  at  Madrid,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
give  a  handsome  offer  about  Honduras.  Let  Saunders  be 
strengthened  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  Holmes  and 
Douglas  in  the  West  Indies,  and  let  care  be  taken 
against  a  sudden  blow  from  Spain,  either  upon  the 
British  coasts  or  Ireland.  Finally,  Anson  clenched  the 
matter  by  declaring  that  the  ships  he  had  within  call 
at  home  were  nearly  four  thousand  men  short  of  their 
complements. 

Such  talk  Pitt  knew  well,  and  it  drove  him,  as  always, 
to  violent  resistance.  Seeing  argument  was  no  further 
use,  he  insisted  on  putting  Bristol's  immediate  recall  to 
the  vote.  In  spite  of  his  convinced  vehemence,  no  one 
but  his  fiery  brother-in-law.  Lord  Temple,  supported  his 
motion,  and  the  decision  was  given  against  him.  Furious 
at  his  check,  but  not  yet  defeated,  Pitt  fell  back  on 
the  old  device,  which  had  served  him  so  well  before,  of 


i;6i  OUTVOTED    IN    THE    CABINET  199 

insisting  that  a  minute  of  the  vote  should  be  drawn 
up  that  the  King  and  country  might  know  who  was 
responsible.  Nor  was  this  all,  for  he  went  so  far  as  to 
announce  his  intention  of  drawing  up  a  protest  against 
the  decision  for  presentation  to  the  King.  Still  the 
rest  stood  to  their  guns,  and  a  minute  of  the  pro- 
ceedings was  drafted.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  Pitt's 
proposals  had  been  rejected  by  the  majority  as  both 
inexpedient  and  unjustified ;  that  Bristol  was  to  demand 
an  explanation  of  the  Spanish  intentions,  and  to  offer 
to  evacuate  Honduras  if  the  right  to  cut  logwood  were 
guaranteed,  and  that  three  thousand  men  and  seven 
ships  of  the  line  should  be  sent  to  Guadeloupe,  and 
Saunders  reinforced.^ 

For  the  peace  party  it  was  a  Pyrrhic  victory.  In  the 
heat  of  the  debate  Pitt  had  plainly  hinted  at  resignation. 
Bute,  at  least,  was  seriously  alarmed,  and  Newcastle,  as  of 
old,  almost  subdued.  To  defeat  Pitt  was  one  thing,  to 
face  the  war  and  the  excited  country  without  him  was 
another.  On  the  morrow,  therefore,  Bute  summoned  his 
party  to  meet  him  at  Devonshire  House.  If  peace  came, 
he  said,  Pitt  might  go  or  stay — it  mattered  not — but  as 
war  was  practically  certain  they  ought  to  make  a  great 
effort  to  keep  him.  He  begged  them,  therefore,  to  meet 
again  on  the  morrow,  and  consider  Pitt's  protest.  This 
they  did,  all  but  Hardwicke,  the  death  of  whose  wife 
deprived  them  of  his  sagacious  and  temperate  counsel  at 
the  critical  hour.  In  the  end  it  was  found  they  could 
not  take  the  step  Pitt  demanded.  It  was  agreed  that 
before  hostilities  were  commenced  a  notification,  tanta- 
mount to  a  declaration  of  war,  must  be  given  to  Spain, 
and  Bristol  recalled.      The   only   concession  they   could 

1  Newcasde  Papers,  Sept.  15,  17,  and  18,  Add.  MSS.,  32,928;  Hnnlwieke 
Papers,  ibid.,  :}5,.'570,  f.  304. 


200  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

bring  themselves  to  make  was  that  naval  preparations 
should  go  on  as  though  war  were  certain/ 

On  September  21st  Pitt  presented  his  protest  to  the 
King.  The  King,  to  his  surprise,  refused  to  receive  it. 
His  Majesty,  with  Bute  at  his  elbow,  declared  bluntly  he 
would  take  no  resolution  with  regard  to  Spain  till  Stanley 
came  back  to  tell  them  all  he  knew.  A  Council  was  held 
directly  afterwards  to  consider  this  last  means  of  deferring 
a  decision.  Bute,  Devonshire,  and  Newcastle  approved  it 
and  held  their  ground.  Mansfield  was  unsteady,  but  was 
inclined  to  side  with  them  on  the  plea  that  he  could  not 
see  what  operations  could  be  undertaken  against  Spain  that 
would  suffer  by  the  delay.  This  gave  Pitt  his  chance.  At 
great  length,  and  with  studied  politeness  and  candour,  he 
laid  before  them  the  whole  plan  of  war  which  he  had  already 
elaborated,  showing  how  important  was  instant  action,  and 
how  certain  was  success  against  the  united  House  of  Bour- 
bon.  He  ended  by  declaring  he  would  not  set  his  hand  to 
any  other  plan,  and  that  was  his  last  word.  His  eloquence 
shook  Mansfield,  who  declared  the  statement  put  things 
in  a  very  different  light,  and  he  "plainly  made  fair 
weather  for  Pitt."  Temple  followed  hotly  and  rudely  on 
the  same  side,  but  in  the  end  there  was  nothing  but  an 
adjournment  sine  die  till  Stanley's  return." 

With  Mansfield's  half  conversion  the  crisis  became 
acute,  and  a  new  meeting  of  the  Opposition  was  called. 
Pitt's  protest,  which  was  also  signed  by  Temple,  was  for 
them  the  alarming  factor.  It  was  a  temperate  document 
and  difficult  to  meet.  After  reciting  that  the  Spanish 
Government    had    acknowledged  Bussy's  action   in   pre- 


*  Minute  of  Meeting,  Sept.  19,  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Sept.  20.  The 
Ministers  present  were  Granville,  Devonsliire,  Newcastle,  Bute,  and 
Mansfield.     Newcastle  Papers,  Add.  MSS.,  32,928. 

*  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Sept.  21,  BocHw/ham  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  37. 


i76i  PITT'S   PROTEST  201 

senting  their  claims,  and  his  boast  that  the  French  King 
was  ready  to  support  Spain  if  she  took  action,  the 
document  proceeded,  "This  unjust  and  unexampled  pro- 
ceeding .  .  .  and  the  full  declaration  and  avowal  at  last 
made  of  the  union  of  counsels  and  interest  between  the 
two  monarchies  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  .  .  .  call  in- 
dispensably on  his  Majesty  to  take  forthwith  such 
necessary  and  timely  measures  as  God  hath  put  into  his 
hands,"  And  therefore  an  order  should  be  sent  to  Lord 
Bristol  to  deliver  a  declaration  to  that  effect,  and  come 
away  immediately  without  taking  his  leave.  The  protest, 
it  will  be  seen,  though  it  hinted  at  action  before  declara- 
tion, did  not  demand  it  categorically.  Nothing  was 
definitely  insisted  on  but  an  immediate  breaking  ofif  of 
diplomatic  relations  tantamount  to  a  declaration  of  war. 
It  might  easily  have  been  done  before  any  blow  was  struck 
at  the  Plate  fleet.^ 

Scarcely  had  this  step  been  taken  when  a  new  weapon 
came  to  Pitt's  hand.  Yet  another  despatch  from  Grim- 
aldi  to  Fuentes,  dated  September  13th,  was  intercepted 
on  the  22nd.  In  this  letter  Grimaldi  said  the  treaty  had 
been  ratified,  and  that  in  accordance  with  its  provisions 
Bussy  had  been  instructed  by  Choiseul  to  sign  nothing 
that  did  not  include  an  accommodation  with  Spain.  Still, 
what  weakened  Pitt's  position  was  that  the  Spaniards 
were  plainly  ill  at  ease.  Grimaldi  said  he  believed  that 
the  French  were  ready  to  accept  the  British  terms,  and 
that  if  the  negotiations  were  broken  off  it  would  be 
entirely  on  the  account  of  Spain.^     From  this  point  of 

*  For  the  text  of  the  protest  or  "Advice  in  Writing,"  see  QrenviUe 
Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  386,  and  Ilardvdcke  Papers,  Add.  MSS.,  35,570,  f.  300. 

"  Grimaldi  to  Fuentes,  Sept.  13,  Chatham  Corr.,  vol.  ii.  p.  141.  It  was 
intercepted  apparently  about  a  week  later.  Newcastle's  copy  is  endorsed 
as  read,  Sept.  23,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,928  ;  Grenville  saw  it  on  Friday, 
24th,  Grenville  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  391. 


202  THE    FALL   OF    PITT  1761 

view,  therefore,  the  letter  might  be  said  to  tell  in  favour 
of  trying  to  come  to  terms  with  Spain,  rather  than  for 
immediate  action. 

Pitt,  however,  demanded  that  a  Cabinet  should  be 
called  forthwith  to  consider  Grimaldi's  despatch,  but  to 
no  purpose.^  A  last  letter  had  come  from  Stanley 
which  served  materially  to  strengthen  the  position  of 
Bute  and  his  friends.  Stanley  had  had  another  talk 
with  Choiseul,  in  which  that  accomplished  diplomat 
protested  warmly  that  he  still  desired  peace,  and  that 
the  affairs  of  Spain  should  not  prevent  it.  And  he 
added  Spain  could  easily  be  dropped.  On  the  other 
hand,  Stanley  also  said  that  from  information  he  had 
received  an  attack  on  Portugal  must  be  expected  as 
soon  as  Spain  declared  war.  In  a  previous  letter  he 
had  given  warning  that  the  tone  of  the  Court  was 
changing.  There  had  been  influences  about  the  King 
which  till  lately  had  threatened  to  subvert  Choiseul's 
domination.  Now  he  said  Choiseul  was  completely  in 
the  ascendant,  and  that  he  was  convinced  he  wanted 
peace.^  These  letters  made  no  impression  on  Pitt,  who 
saw  clearly  through  Choiseul's  game.  "  Mr.  Pitt," 
wrote  Newcastle,  "  triumphs  much  on  Grimaldi's  letter 
and  on  that  curious  expression  in  Stanley's, '  When  Spain 
declares  war  I  expect  an  attack  in  Portugal.' "  The 
King  and  Bute  thought  differently,  and  were  supported 
by  all  the  peace  party.  Another  meeting  was  held  at 
Devonshire  House,  at  which  they  decided  that  Pitt's 
request  for  a  Cabinet  should  be  refused,  since  Stanley's 
letters  made  it  absurd  to  take  any  step  until  he  returned.^ 

^  Jenkinson  to  Grenville,  Sept.  29,  Orenville  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  391. 

*  Stanley  to  Pitt,  Sept.  15,  Thackeray,  vol.  ii.  p.  623  ;  Newcastle  to 
Hardwicke,  Sept.  23,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  40. 

»  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Sept.  23  and  20,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,928, 
and  part  of  the  letter  of  the  23rd  is  printed  in  the  Rockingham  Memoirs. 


1761        TACTICS    OF   THE   PEACE    PARTY        203 

So  much  was  easy,  but  there  still  remained  the 
thorny  question  of  how  to  meet  the  protest  of  Pitt  and 
Temple.  To  answer  it  in  writing  could  only  lead  to 
a  paper  war.  Hardwicke  had  warned  Newcastle  to 
bear  in  mind  that  the  House  of  Commons  might  call 
for  papers  and  Pitt  would  certainly  support  the  motion.^ 
To  enter  into  a  written  controversy,  therefore,  would  only 
be  playing  into  Pitt's  hand.  It  was  his  obvious  game  to 
appeal  from  the  Cabinet  to  the  people,  and  that  was  a 
proceeding  they  were  not  prepared  to  face.  It  was 
accordingly  resolved,  to  Pitt's  deep  resentment,  that 
each  of  them  should  go  singly  to  the  King  and  give 
his  private  opinion  by  word  of  mouth.  So  one  by  one 
they  went — Mansfield,  Anson,  Ligonier,  and  all.  Anson 
told  the  King  he  could  not  have  a  squadron  ready  for 
the  coast  of  Spain  for  two  months  since  Keppel's  ships 
were  so  foul,  and  he  promised  to  say  so  in  the  Cabinet 
so  as  to  cut  short  any  idea  of  immediate  operations.^ 
When  Pitt  found  out  what  was  going  on,  he  had  an 
audience  too.  But  the  effect  was  only  to  increase 
the  King's  growing  antipathy.  "  The  King,"  wrote 
Newcastle,  "  seems  every  day  more  offended  with 
Mr.  Pitt,  and  plainly  wants  to  get  rid  of  him  at  all 
events."  ^ 

On  the  last  day  of  September  Stanley  had  arrived 
from  Paris,  and  a  Council  was  forthwith  called  for  three 
days  later.  His  report  once  more  swung  opinion  to 
Pitt's  side.  On  being  questioned  it  was  found  he  could 
not  or  would  not  uphold  the  views  expressed  in  his 
last  letters.  His  talk  tended  all  to  war  and  not  to 
peace,  and  he  represented  the  whole  situation  in  a  light 

*  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,  Sept.  24,  ibid. 

^  Newcastle  Papers,  32,929,  "Mem.,  8ept.  30." 

^  To  Hardwicke,  Sept.  20,  Rockingham  Mcinoin,  vol.  i.  p.  43. 


204  THE    FALL   OF   PITT  1761 

favourable  to  Pitt.^  Even  Hardwicke  was  shaken.  He 
thought  Stanley's  report  and  Grimaldi's  letter  together 
showed  that  Spain  was  more  in  earnest  than  they  had 
thought.  Still  he  was  against  declaring  war  without 
first  demanding  an  explanation,  but  Anson,  he  said, 
had  told  him  he  had  six  clean  ships  of  the  line  ready, 
and  these  had  better  be  sent  at  once  to  Saunders,  with 
orders  for  him  to  remain  at  Gibraltar  ready  to  act  the 
moment  Spain  stirred.^ 

So  before  ever  the  Cabinet  met  the  matter  was  settled. 
Pitt  made  one  more  appeal,  urging  particularly  Grimaldi's 
last  letter,  and  Stanley's  warning  about  the  danger  of 
Portugal.  It  was  useless.  The  rest  all  held  their  old 
ground.  Ligonier  supported  them  in  the  strongest 
manner,  arguing  plausibly  enough  that  war  with  Spain 
meant  adding  sixty  thousand  good  troops  to  the  army  of 
France.  Anson  pronounced  that  the  fleet  was  not  ready 
for  any  material  operation  against  Spain.  Mansfield 
dwelt  on  the  danger  from  neutral  maritime  powers,  who 
would  all  suspect  we  meant  to  destroy  them  one  after 
the  other.  To  press  the  matter  further  was  waste  labour. 
Temple  took  an  angry  farewell  and  left  the  room.  Pitt 
declared  his  opinion  unchanged.  The  King  and  country, 
he  said,  had  received  an  indignity  under  which  he  could 
not  sit  down.  "  I  have  in  my  bag,"  he  solemnly  declared, 
"  so  much  matter  as  I  think  would  be  criminal  matter 
against  any  Secretary  of  State  who  let  it  sleep  in  his 
office."  He  reminded  them  how  he  had  been  called  to 
direct  the  war  at  a  time  when  every  one  had  abdicated, 
how  all  or  nearly  all  of  his  expeditions  had  been  ridiculed 
and  thwarted,  and  what  success  they  had  won.  Now  it 
was  clear  all  were  against  him  and  he  must  make  an  end, 

'  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Oct.  1,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  44. 
^  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,  Nejvcastle  Pafpers,  32,929,  Oct.  1. 


i76i  THE    LAST    CABINET  205 

"  I  will  be  responsible,"  he  said,  "  for  nothing  that  I  do 
not  direct."  ^ 

Thus  in  his  last  words  he  formulated  the  doctrine 
which  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  resistance  he  had  raised. 
He  undoubtedly  believed  that  it  was  only  by  the  com- 
plete responsibility  of  a  War  Minister  that  a  constitutional 
country  could  hope  to  make  war  successfully.  Such  had 
been  his  position,  and  well  had  he  justified  the  new 
theory.  But  it  was  one  which  the  old  Constitutional 
Whigs  could  not  possibly  accept  or  endorse.  Granville, 
the  personification  of  their  political  theories,  broken  as 
he  was  with  his  excesses,  and  at  death's  door,  took 
upon  himself  to  answer.  "  I  find,"  he  is  reported  to  have 
said,  "  the  gentleman  is  determined  to  leave  us,  nor  can 
I  say  I  am  sorry  for  it,  since  he  would  otherwise  have 
compelled  us  to  leave  him.  But  if  he  is  resolved  to 
assume  the  right  of  addressing  his  Majesty  and  directing 
the  operations  of  war,  to  what  purpose  are  we  called  to 
this  Council  ?  .  .  .  However,  though  he  may  possibly 
have  convinced  himself  of  his  infallibility,  still  it  remains 
that  we  should  be  equally  convinced  before  we  can  resign 
our  understandings  to  his  direction,  or  join  with  him  in 
the  measure  he  proposes."'"  Pitt's  theory  which  the 
brilliant  old  statesman  combated  with  the  last  flare  of 
his  genius  has  found  to  this  day  no  real  resting-place 
in  English  ideas  of  government.  To  the  great  political 
leaders  of  that  day — the  high  priests  of  the  English 
Revolution — it  was  little  short  of  treason.  Granville's 
declaration  could  only  convince  them  that  loyalty  and 


*  "  Notes  at  the  Meeting  of  the  Lords,  Oct.  2,"  Hardwicke  Papers,  Add. 
MSS.,  35,370,  f.  310  ;  Nexocastle  Papers,  Oct.  2,  ibid.,  32,929;  Newcastle  to 
Bedford,  Oct.  2,  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  46. 

*  Annual  Rcjister,  1761,  p.  44.  The  speech  is  not  mentioned  by  Hard- 
wicke or  Newcastle  in  their  notes  of  the  meeting  and  it  may  be  apocryphal, 
but  it  certainly  represents  the  feeling  which  crushed  Pitt. 


2o6  THE    FALL    OF   PITT  1761 

patriotism  demanded  they  should  stand  firm.  So  when 
the  President  ceased  to  speak,  the  Council  broke  up  un- 
shaken and  three  days  later  Pitt  resigned. 

So  fell  the  greatest  war  administrator  England  has 
ever  had,  a  victim  to  the  disease  which  in  a  constitu- 
tional country  is  inherent  in  effective  war-direction.  His 
words,  "  I  will  be  responsible  for  nothing  that  I  do  not 
direct,"  were  taken  hold  of  and  harped  upon  with  in- 
creasing resentment,  and  perhaps  with  justice  and  sound 
intuition.  Under  a  government  like  our  own,  it  is  pro- 
bable that  any  form  of  real  combined  control  in  war 
must  sooner  or  later  produce  a  pathological  condition,  so 
obnoxious  to  the  constitution  that  either  the  constitution 
must  perish  or  develop  a  paroxysm — as  in  one  of  Pitt's 
own  fits  of  the  gout — in  which  it  will  throw  off  the  disease 
and  rid  itself  of  the  morbid  impurity.  In  Cromwell's 
case,  the  constitution  was  not  sound  enough  to  engender 
the  healing  paroxysm ;  in  Marlborough's  and  in  Pitt's  it 
was,  and  with  what  diverse  results  we  know. 

In  the  present  case  the  loss  was  indeed  great — the 
remedy  severe — and  yet,  perhaps,  the  utmost  good  had 
been  already  obtained  from  the  strong  wine  of  Pitt's 
domination.  Of  Lord  Hardwicke,  the  greatest  of  the 
Chancellors,  it  is  said  that  during  his  tenure  of  the 
woolsack,  he  raised  equity  from  a  chaos  of  isolated 
precedents  to  a  reasoned  system.  Pitt  had  done  the 
same  for  the  war,  and  afforded  his  country  for  all  time, 
if  she  had  had  the  wit  to  understand,  a  complete  system 
of  how  to  use  the  peculiar  strength  that  belonged  to  her 
and  to  no  one  else.  He  had  done  so  triumphantly — too 
triumphantly,  indeed,  for  the  security  of  the  world — and 
there  lay  cause  enough  for  his  defeat.  In  his  vision  of 
England  as  sole  mistress  of  the  sea,  he  fell  into  an 
error  as  enticing  and  as  fatal  as  that  which  brought  the 


i76i  ITS    CAUSES  207 

Grand  Monarque  and  Napoleon  to  their  ruin.  Magnifi- 
cent as  Avas  his  strategy,  it  broke  the  golden  rule.  He 
pushed  his  action  beyond  the  point  where  by  drawing 
fresh  force  to  the  enemy  it  strengthens  him  more  than 
it  can  hurt.  In  Pitt's  defence  it  must  be  said  he  did 
give  way.  He  was  ready  to  make  peace  on  terms  below 
what  he  believed  it  to  be  in  his  power  to  enforce.  His 
mistake  was  that  in  the  pride  of  the  power  to  which  he 
had  lifted  his  country  he  did  not  make  sure  of  Spain. 
A  liberal  and  timely  concession  in  Honduras  might  well 
have  kept  Wall  staunch,  but  he  let  the  hour  slip  by  and 
so  played  into  Choiseul's  hands.  It  is  usually  said  his 
fall  was  due  to  the  dislike  and  intrigue  of  the  young 
King  and  his  Court.  It  would  be  truer,  perhaps,  to  regard 
it  as  a  triumph  of  Choiseul's  subtle  policy.  By  the 
French  Minister's  own  statement  that  policy  was  based  on 
Pitt's  fall,  and  by  his  clever  balancing  so  long  between 
a  reasonable  peace  and  an  alliance  with  Spain  Pitt's 
quarrel  with  his  colleagues  and  the  throne  was  brought 
to  a  head.  But  for  the  Spanish  complication  there 
would  certainly  have  been  a  compromise  between  Pitt 
and  the  peace  party,  and  France  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  make  peace  on  the  terms  he  last  oftered.  It 
was  on  the  question  of  an  immediate  attack  on  Spain, 
and  on  that  alone  that  he  fell. 

On  that  question  was  he  right  or  wrong  ?  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  say  even  now  when  we  know  all  that  followed. 
No  situation  could  better  exemplify  the  extreme  delicacy 
of  disentangling  politics  from  pure  strategy.  Being  con- 
vinced that  war  with  Spain  was  inevitable  he  was  bidden 
by  pure  strategy  to  strike  at  once.  Every  war  we  had 
had  with  Spain  had  opened  with  an  attempt  upon  the 
Plate  fleet.  One  more  such  attempt  could  hardly  have 
given  us  a  worse  reputation,  especially  as  in  this  case  it 


2o8  THE    FALL    OF    PITT  1761 

would  probably  have  been  preceded  by  the  withdrawal 
of  our  ambassador.  Yet  was  the  game  worth  the  candle  ? 
Assuming,  as  we  well  may,  that  the  material  difficulties 
raised  by  Anson  were  not  insuperable,  could  we  have 
gained  enough  to  compensate  for  the  odium  which  the 
contemplated  blow  would  have  entailed  ?  It  is  very 
doubtful.  There  were  other  wavering  neutrals,  like 
Denmark  and  the  Dutch,  who  would  have  felt  the  smart 
dangerously.  It  is  strange  that  Pitt  of  all  men  should 
have  been  ready  to  run  the  risk.  No  one  felt  so  strongly 
as  he  how  weak  and  unready  was  Spain,  and  how  easily 
she  was  to  be  beaten  by  open  war  upon  the  high  seas. 
But  the  vice  of  permitting  an  almost  declared  enemy  to 
commence  hostilities  at  the  moment  that  best  pleases  her 
seems  to  have  been  intolerable  to  his  strategic  sense.  If 
war  was  inevitable  Pitt  was  perhaps  right ;  if  it  was  not 
he  was  wrong.  Pitt  believed  it  was :  his  opponents  still 
hoped.  There  was  enough  evidence  to  show  that  the 
main  impulse  came  from  France  and  not  from  Spain ; 
that  the  union  of  the  two  countries  was  by  no  means 
stable,  and  that  even  at  the  eleventh  hour  Spain  might 
be  persuaded  there  was  an  easier  way  of  obtaining  her 
end  than  by  burning  her  fingers  for  France.  There  was 
much  to  justify  at  least  an  attempt  to  stay  her  hand,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  read  the  reasoned  arguments  of  such  a 
man  as  Hardwicke  without  feeling  that  the  great  majority 
of  sagacious  and  experienced  statesmen  would  have  been, 
like  Anson  and  Ligonier,  on  his  side  and  the  King's,  and 
not  on  Pitt's. 


CHAPTER   VII 

COMPLETION   OF  THE   WEST   INDIAN   ATTACK- 
MARTINIQUE 

If  there  had  been  hesitation  about  commencing  hostilities 
with  Spain,  there  was  none  about  a  vigorous  continuation 
of  the  war  with  France.  Before  Pitt  resigned,  he  had 
been  able  to  fire  his  last  bolt  against  her,  and  to  set  in 
motion  the  third  wave  of  the  great  attack,  with  which  he 
meant  to  sweep  her  from  her  last  footing  in  the  West  Indies. 

The  only  effect  of  Choiseul's  cunning  had  been  to 
increase  its  intensity.  In  July  the  final  orders  had 
gone  to  Amherst  and  Admiral  Colville,  on  the  American 
station,  for  the  despatch  of  ten  battalions  with  artillery 
and  engineers  to  Barbadoes,  where  they  were  to  find 
their  orders.  At  the  same  time  Sir  James  Douglas, 
who  was  still  in  command  in  the  Leeward  Islands,  was 
told  to  expect  them  at  Guadeloupe  by  the  end  of  October. 
He  was  also  informed  that  the  French  were  preparing 
two  squadrons,  one  at  Brest  and  one  at  Rochefort,  each 
consisting  of  about  seven  of  the  line,  which  were  intended 
for  the  succour  of  Martinique,  and  that  if  they  escaped 
the  home  blockade  he  was  to  station  a  squadron  off 
the  island  strong  enough  to  deal  with  them.  General 
Monckton,  who  was  bringing  the  troops  from  America, 
was  to  command  in  chief  ashore,  and  he  was  to  arrange 
with  him  for  a  rendezvous.  There  Lord  Rollo's  troops 
and  all  that  could  be  spared  fro^m  the  garrisons  of 
Guadeloupe  and  Antigua  were  to  be  concentrated,  and  the 

VOL.  II.  *°^  o 


2IO  MARTINIQUE  1761 

whole  force  would  then  amount  to  about  eleven  thousand 
men.  Douglas  would  have  about  twelve  of  the  Ime 
available  to  act  with  the  military  force,  and  with  these 
he  was  to  render  them  every  assistance  in  his  power.^ 

But  for  the  possibility  of  Spanish  intervention  such  a 
force  would  have  been  ample  for  its  purpose.  But  as  the 
horizon  darkened,  Pitt's  intention  was  not  bounded  by 
the  mere  conquest  of  Martinique.  It  must  also  serve  as 
a  secure  foothold  from  whence  he  could  spring  upon  the 
Spanish  islands  the  moment  Spain  stirred.  So  far  and 
no  further  had  Pitt  persuaded  the  Cabinet  to  go  upon 
the  road  he  knew  they  would  have  to  tread.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  at  the  famous  meeting  in  September, 
where  he  had  exhausted  all  his  vehemence  in  trying  to 
force  them  to  strike  a  sudden  blow  at  Spain  and  had 
been  outvoted,  he  had  wrung  from  them  a  consent  to 
reinforce  Saunders  in  the  Mediterranean  and  to  send  out 
three  thousand  fresh  troops  and  seven  more  of  the  line 
to  Guadeloupe.  The  very  day  after  the  meeting,  when 
the  King  refused  to  receive  his  protest,  the  orders  were 
issued — to  Belleisle  for  four  regiments  to  be  sent  off 
immediately,  and  for  Swanton  and  five  other  captains  to 
join  Douglas,  and  finally  to  Rodney  to  hoist  his  flag  and 
proceed  to  Guadeloupe  to  take  Douglas  and  the  whole 
naval  force  under  his  command.  This  notable  appoint- 
ment, which  became  necessary  owing  to  the  increase  of 
the  force  and  the  danger,  and  which  Rodney  had  well 
earned  by  his  indefatigable  operations  in  the  Channel 
against  the  French  flotillas,  was  the  last  Pitt  ever  made. 
Even  before  the  new  commander-in-chief  had  hoisted  his 
flag,  Pitt  had  resigned.^ 

^  Admiralty  Secretary,  Out-Iclters  {Secret  Orders),  1331,  July  22. 
^  Secret  Orders,  ibid.,  Oct.  1  and  7.    Rodney's  Orders  are  dated  Sept.  21. 
He  hoisted  bis  flag  on  Oct.  i)  at  Portsmouth. 


I76I  POSITION    OF   THE    CABINET  211 

As  thus  from  America,  from  Belleisle,  and  from  home 
the  forces  which  his  spirit  contimied  to  wield  were 
gathering  to  do  his  Avill,  the  new  Ministers  were  making 
the  best  of  the  more  sober  policy  to  which  they  had 
committed  themselves.  Newcastle  still  retained  the 
nominal  leadership,  but  his  reward  for  the  part  he  had 
played  in  unseating  Pitt  was  to  find  himself  more  of  a 
nonentity  than  ever.  Eager  to  take  the  fallen  leader's 
place,  he  was  for  consulting  Anson  on  a  number  of 
vague  projects,  which  showed  all  his  old  incapacity  for 
concentrated  design.  Ol^ron,  the  French  coast,  the 
Scheldt,  Emden,  America,  India,  all  passed  through  his 
mind,  aimlessly,  but  no  one  gave  him  heed.  He  com- 
plained that  he  was  entirely  neglected ;  that  new  regi- 
ments were  being  raised  every  day,  of  which  he  knew 
nothing ;  that  the  King  was  doing  everything ;  and  his 
letters  to  all  his  old  correspondents  and  allies — Bedford, 
Devonshire,  Hardwicke,  and  the  rest,  who  were  as  much 
out  in  the  cold  as  himself — were  filled  with  sarcasms 
upon  the  Ministers  who  had  his  ambitious  Majesty's  ear.^ 
The  truth  was  that  the  blow  they  had  struck  in  the 
name  of  the  Constitution  and  of  Cabinet  responsibility 
was  raising  the  worse  devil  of  autocracy. 

The  real  head  of  the  new  government  was  Bute,  whom 
we  know  for  a  well-meaning  mediocrity,  full  of  high 
ideas  of  kingship.  Ignorant  as  yet  of  what  government 
meant,  he  still  thought,  like  Phaeton,  he  could  drive  the 
horses  of  the  sun.  "  Young  king,  young  nobility,"  was 
his  motto.  For  him  Newcastle  was  but  a  "  crazy  old 
man,"  whom  it  was  convenient  to  permit  to  "  tide  over  a 
year  or  two  more  of  his  political  life.""  To  Bute  and 
the  King,  whose  brains  were  buzzing  with  Stuart  theories 

1  Newcastle  Papers,  32,029-30 /)ass«n. 

*  "  Heads  of  Lord  Bute's  Letters,"  Orenvillc  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  3'.)G. 


212  MARTINIQUE  1761 

of  monarchy,  the  old  minister  represented,  with  the 
Russells,  the  Cavendishes,  and  the  rest,  the  aristocratic 
oligarchy  that  had  dominated  the  throne  ever  since  the 
Revolution.  Their  power  was  to  be  broken,  but,  for  the 
present,  concessions  had  to  be  made  and  places  provided 
for  them  in  the  Government.  Bedford  himself,  who  at 
this  time  was  entirely  devoted  to  Bute,  was  made  Privy 
Seal.  Devonshire  received  no  office,  probably  because 
he  was  regarded  as  too  entirely  under  the  influence 
of  Fox. 

It  was  an  influence  which  seriously  added  to  the 
greatest  difficulty  of  the  new  administration.  The  crux 
was  the  management  of  the  House  of  Commons,  where 
Pitt's  terrible  figure  would  still  be  supreme.  For  this 
arduous  task  Bute  pitched  on  his  intimate  friend,  George 
Grenville,  who  had  held  the  lucrative  office  of  Treasurer 
of  the  Navy  almost  continuously  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  Though  brother  to  Lord  Temple,  and  conse- 
quently brother-in-law  to  Pitt,  he  had  not  tendered  his 
resignation  with  the  rest  of  his  family,  and  Bute  pressed 
him  to  accept  the  seals  which  Pitt  had  laid  down.  This, 
however,  Grenville  protested  was  too  much  for  his 
"  delicacy."  He  begged  to  be  made  Speaker,  but  neither 
the  King  nor  Bute  would  listen,  and  eventually  he  was 
induced  to  retain  his  old  office  and  accept  the  leadership 
of  the  House.  Under  this  arrangement  it  was,  of  course, 
necessary  to  keep  Pitt's  successor  out  of  the  Commons. 
Beyond  all  question,  if  ability  were  to  decide,  Fox  was 
the  man  who  should  have  taken  up  the  reins.  But 
Grenville  absolutely  refused  to  do  business  with  him,  and 
he  himself  was  content  to  continue  amassing  a  fortune 
as  Paymaster  of  the  Forces.  At  Grenville's  suggestion, 
therefore,  Pitt's  cloak  was  fastened  on  the  shoulders  of 
Lord  Egremont,  whose  sister  he  had  married,  and  by  this 


I76I  THE    NEW    POLICY  213 

means,  the  Navy  and  the  Foreign  Office  continued  to  be 
as  intimately  connected  as  before.^ 

The  Spanish  question  was  by  no  means  the  end  of  the 
false  position  which  the  new  Government  had  taken  up 
in  regard  to  the  war.  To  justify  a  policy  founded  on 
the  good  intentions  of  Spain  was  bad  enough,  but  behind 
it  lay  the  equally  thorny  questions  of  the  German  war 
and  the  militia.  The  annual  treaty  with  Frederick  and 
the  term  for  which  the  militia  had  been  raised  were  both 
about  to  expire.  The  King  wished  to  renew  neither. 
His  passion  to  be  an  English  king  set  his  mind  obstin- 
ately against  using  the  resources  of  the  country  for  the 
defence  of  Hanover.  He  hated  the  place — the  wits  said 
he  could  never  find  it  on  the  map.  Could  he  but  with- 
draw his  troops  from  the  Continent  there  would  be  no 
need  of  the  militia,  and  in  his  eyes  the  militia,  being  in 
the  hands  of  the  territorial  aristocracy,  was  the  great 
danger  to  the  royal  prerogative  which  he  was  determined 
to  enhance. 

Such  were  the  difficulties  which  Grenville  had  to  face 
at  the  start.  The  new  Parliament,  the  first  of  the  new 
reign,  was  to  meet  early  in  November,  and  every  one  was 
looking  to  the  King's  Speech  for  light  on  the  burning 
questions.  The  country  was  in  a  highly  excitable  condi- 
tion. After  a  few  days'  resentment  at  Pitt's  accepting  a 
pension  for  himself  and  a  peerage  for  his  wife  at  the 
King's  hands  it  had  worked  itself  into  a  fury  of  sympathy 
and  admiration  for  the  fallen  Minister.  It  had  bejifun 
again  to  rain  upon  him  addresses  and  gold  boxes ;  and  jan 
Lord  Mayor's  Day,  on  the  occasion  of  the  King  and 
Queen  visiting  the  City,  there  had  been  a  riotous  demon- 
stration against  Bute  and  in  Pitt's  favour.  Three  days 
earlier  the  King's  Speech  had  been  delivered,  and  it  was 

*  "  Grenville's  Narrative,"  ibid.,  409-12. 


214  MARTINIQUE  1761 

silent  on  all  that  the  country  wanted  to  know.  Neither 
the  German  war  nor  the  militia  were  mentioned,  and  far 
from  there  being  a  word  about  the  insult  which  the 
country  regarded  itself  to  have  suffered  from  Spain,  the 
Gazette  had  vaunted  the  pacific  disposition  of  the  offending 
Court. 

On  November  13  th  the  Address  was  moved,  and  led 
to  a  great  deal  of  violent  invective  on  both  sides.  Above 
all  was  heard  a  loud  note  of  arraignment  of  the  German 
war.  Frederick  had  recently  suffered  a  serious  reverse 
at  Sweidnitz,  and  in  spite  of  Ferdinand's  victory  Germany 
was  again  in  bad  odour.  Loyalty  to  Frederick  forced  Pitt 
at  last  to  his  feet.  He  did  not  wish,  he  said,  to  defend  his 
conduct  then,  but  he  could  not  let  the  post  go  abroad 
Avithout  a  word  being  said  in  that  House  in  support  of 
England's  allies.  So  he  fell  into  an  explanation  of  all 
the  German  war  had  meant  in  his  system.  Recalling  the 
old  scare  under  which  he  had  come  to  power,  he  reminded 
them  that  it  was  nothing  but  the  spectre  of  an  invasion 
that  had  frightened  us  out  of  Minorca.  The  Ministers  of 
that  day,  he  said,  had  not  had  constancy  enough  to  look 
it  in  the  face,  and  so  it  would  be  again  if  the  troops  of 
France  found  themselves  at  liberty  to  quit  Germany. 
He  had  known  five  thousand  French  occasion  our  recal- 
ling seventy  or  four-score  thousand  to  confront  them 
(alluding  probably  to  what  had  occurred  in  1745).  The 
way  to  peace  was  not  by  abandoning  our  efforts.  England 
was  equal  to  both  wars,  the  American  and  the  German  ; 
and  if  they  were  continued,  nothing  but  conquest  would 
follow — all  owing  to  the  German  war.  If  we  abandoned 
our  allies,  God  would  abandon  us.  When  we  had  spent 
a  hundred  millions,  should  we  throw  away  the  fruit  rather 
than  spend  twelve  more.  Let  a  man  so  narrow-minded 
stand    behind   a   counter,    and   not   govern   a   kingdom. 


1761  PITT    DEFENDS    HIS    POLICY  215 

Then  he  made  his  famous  declaration,  "America  has  heen 
conquered  in  Germany."  Forced  from  its  context  it  was 
much  ridiculed  at  the  time,  and  since  has  led  to  serious 
misconception  of  what  Pitt's  system  really  was.  It  will 
be  seen  that  it  must  not  be  taken  as  a  scientific  statement 
of  the  principle  on  which  his  war-plan  was  framed,  but 
as  a  defence  of  the  principal  containing  or  defensive 
operations,  without  which  his  main  attack  could  not  have 
been  made,  and  if  made,  must  in  the  end  have  been 
fruitless.  He  ended  by  solemnly  repudiating  the  accusa- 
tion that  he  had  courted  war  with  Spain,  protested  he 
would  divulge  nothing  it  was  his  duty  as  a  Privy  Coun- 
cillor to  conceal,  but  would  leave  it  to  the  House  to 
judge  when  all  the  papers,  including  his  own  protest  to 
the  King,  were  produced,  how  patient  and  long-suffering 
he  had  been.  With  that  he  sat  down,  and  Grenville  did 
not  venture  to  answer  him. 

The  conclusion  at  least  Avas  very  difficult  to  answer. 
A  fortnight  after  Pitt's  resignation  another  despatch  from 
Grimaldi  to  Fuentes  in  London  had  been  intercepted, 
which  made  the  intentions  of  Spain  look  less  pacific  than 
ever.  Bussy,  so  Grimaldi  said,  had  just  returned  to  Paris, 
and  then  added,  "  We  shall  see  one  another  shortly,  be  it 
a  little  sooner  or  a  little  later.  The  moment  is  not  yet 
fixed."  Meanwhile  Fuentes  was  to  send  advices  of  any 
expeditions  and  warlike  preparations  that  were  on  foot  in 
England.^  It  was  clear  Spain  was  only  waiting  till  she 
was  ready  to  commence  hostilities,  and  in  the  course  of 
the  week  the  Cabinet  hardened  its  heart  to  instruct  Lord 
Bristol  at  Madrid  to  ask  in  a  friendly  way  for  the  com- 
munication of  the  Franco-Spanish  treaty,  and  to  intimate 
with  all  politeness  that  although  the  new  Government 

*  Grimaldi  to  Fuentes,  Paris,  Oct.  5,  received  Oct.  16,  Nexccastlc  Papers, 
32,929. 


2i6  MARTINIQUE  1761 

was  prepared  to  negotiate  liberally  on  the  Spanish  claims, 
the  granting  of  his  request  was  to  be  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  negotiation.  The  day  after  the  debate  on  the 
Address  Bristol's  reply  arrived.  He  had  seen  Wall,  and 
asked  him  if  the  rumour  of  the  alliance  was  true.  Wall 
had  answered  with  long  and  angry  abuse  of  England  and 
all  her  ways.  At  a  second  interview  Bristol  had  continued 
to  press  his  point,  till  at  last  Wall  acknowledged  that  the 
Family  Compact  had  been  renewed,  but  absolutely  refused 
to  say  whether  any  further  treaty  existed.  Bristol  con- 
cluded his  despatch  by  saying  that  the  Plate  fleet  had 
got  home  with  enormously  rich  cargoes,  and  he  assumed 
that  this,  coupled  with  the  recent  French  successes  to- 
wards Hanover  and  those  of  Austria  in  Silesia,  accounted 
for  Wall's  startling  change  of  tone.^ 

It  would  have  been  thought  that  the  game  of  Spain  was 
now  clear  enough,  and  that  the  obvious  course  was  not  to 
leave  her  to  declare  war  at  her  own  time.  That  there 
was  any  hope  of  averting  it  no  man  could  really  believe ; 
yet  the  Government  could  bring  themselves  no  further 
than  to  send  an  ultimatum.  Bristol  was  instructed  to 
demand  an  explicit  and  prompt  answer  as  to  whether 
or  not  it  was  the  intention  of  Spain  to  ally  herself  with 
France  against  England.  If  he  failed  to  obtain  a  satis- 
factory answer  he  was  to  come  from  Madrid  forthwith, 
without  taking  leave,  and  repair  to  Lisbon.  But  first, 
when  all  hopes  were  at  an  end,  he  was  to  send  word  of 
his  approaching  departure  to  Saunders  and  Keppel,  and 
to  repeat  the  information  the  moment  he  reached  the 
Portuguese  frontier.  He  already  had  been  told  to  dis- 
abuse the  Spanish  Government  of  any  idea  they  might 
have  conceived  that  the  resignation  of  Pitt  meant  that 
the  whole  spirit  of  the  war  was  subsiding.    "  The  example 

^  Jbid.,  Nov.  2,  received  14th  ;  Beatson,  vol.  iii.  p.  313. 


i7^>i  THE    ULTIMATUM    TO    SPAIN  217 

of  the  spirit  of  the  late  measures,"  Egremont  had  written, 
"  will  be  a  spur  to  his  Majesty's  servants  to  persevere, 
and  to  stretch  every  nerve  of  this  country  towards  forcing 
the  enemy  to  come  into  a  safe,  honourable,  and,  above  all, 
a  lasting  peace." 

It  is  no  more  than  justice  to  say  that  the  action  of  the  new 
Government  did  not  belie  this  spirited  declaration.  On 
November  20th,  the  day  after  the  ultimatum  was  received, 
seven  of  the  line  and  two  frigates,  which  Anson  by  this 
time  had  been  able  to  get  ready,  were  ordered  to  reinforce 
Saunders,  whereby  the  Mediterranean  fleet  would  be 
brought  up  to  nineteen  of  the  line  and  a  dozen  frigates, 
and  at  the  same  time  Keppel  was  ordered  to  send  him 
three  bomb-vessels.  All  cruisers  on  the  Portuguese  coast 
were  ordered  into  Lisbon  to  be  ready  to  receive  the  news 
of  the  result  of  the  ultimatum  and  to  carry  it  to  all 
stations.  Next  day,  moreover,  the  Admiralty  issued 
warnings  in  every  direction  that  the  ultimatum  had  been 
sent,  and  that  it  was  expected  that  Bristol  would  leave 
directly.  The  moment  the  commanding  officers  heard 
from  him  that  he  intended  to  do  so  they  were  to  com- 
mence hostilities,  but  not  before.  Saunders's  attention 
was  specially  directed  to  the  ships  that  were  in  Cadiz, 
and  he  was  impressed  with  the  importance  of  dealing  a 
severe  blow  at  once.^  Grenville's  admiration  for  Pitt's 
energy  and  thoroughness  had  always  been  high.  His 
first  act,  as  Horace  Walpole  tells,  had  been  to  add  to 
Hardwicke's  sober  draft  of  the  King's  Speech  "  some  of 
Mr.  Pitt's  sonantia  verba."  The  old  spirit  had  not  ceased 
to  glow.  Anson  was  still  at  the  helm,  and  the  intimacy 
between  the  Admiralty  and  the  Foreign  Office  left  nothing 
to  be  desired. 

The  following  day,  November  22nd,  Rodney,  ignorant 

'  Admiralty  Secretary,  Out-letters  (Secret  Orders),  13.31. 


2i8  MARTINIQUE  1761 

of  the  turn  things  had  taken,  reached  Barbadoes.  He 
was  alone.  His  squadron  had  been  scattered  in  a  gale 
and  foul  winds  had  seriously  delayed  its  passage.  In 
Carlisle  Bay  was  Douglas  waiting  for  him.  He  had  been 
there  all  the  month  with  cruisers  watching  Martinique 
and  his  battle  squadron  ready  to  sail,  according  to  his 
previous  orders,  the  moment  he  heard  of  the  escape  of  a 
squadron  from  Brest  or  Rochefort.  He  had  made  up  his 
mind,  when  he  still  believed  he  was  to  be  in  command  of 
the  attempt  against  Martinique,  that  the  first  thing  to  do, 
so  soon  as  Monckton  arrived  from  America,  was  to  make 
feints  in  various  parts  of  the  island.^  The  idea  appar- 
ently commended  itself  to  Rodney,  for  directly  he  had 
communicated  with  Douglas  he  despatched  him  to 
blockade  St.  Pierre,  the  capital  of  the  island,  and  to 
destroy  the  batteries  there,  although  it  was  not  his  real 
objective. 

Then  followed  a  long  wait  while  his  scattered  forces 
gathered.  Rodney  employed  it  hiring  and  fitting  out 
ten  local  sloops  to  supply  his  weakness  in  small  cruisers, 
and  these  he  sent,  partly  to  search  the  creeks  of  Martinique 
and  partly  to  watch  St.  Eustatius,  and  prevent  the  Dutch 
sending  supplies  to  the  enemy.  It  was  not  till  December 
9th  that  all  his  own  squadron  joined,  being  three  of  the 
line,  with  two  cruisers  and  three  bomb-vessels.  On  the 
14th  arrived  the  Te'nUraire  and  a  frigate,  with  the  trans- 
ports from  Belleisle,  and  ten  days  later  General  Monckton 
and  the  North  American  contingent,  escorted  by  three  of 
the  line  and  a  forty-gun  ship  from  Colville's  squadron. 
Lord  Rollo,  with  the  troops  from  Guadeloupe  and  Antigua, 
joined  shortly  afterwards,  and  the  force  was  then  com- 
plete. With  Douglas's  squadron  Rodney  had  now  at 
his  disposal  eighteen  of  the  line,  a  score  of  cruisers,  and 

*  Douglas  to  the  Admiralty,  Nov.  5,  In-letters,  307. 


1762  TACTICS  OF  RODNEY  AND  MONCKTON  219 

four  bomb-vessels,  while  Monckton  had  over  thirteen 
thousand  troops,  besides  about  a  thousand  volunteers  and 
negroes  raised  by  the  authorities  at  Barbadoes.^ 

After  a  few  days,  required  to  water  the  fleet,  they  sailed, 
and  on  January  8,  1762,  anchored  in  St.  Pierre's  Bay. 
There  they  found  Douglas  had  silenced  the  batteries, 
though  with  the  loss  of  the  Raisonnable,  a  "  sixty-four," 
which  a  clumsy  pilot  had  run  aground  as  she  was 
leading-in  for  the  French  forts.  But,  as  has  been  said, 
there  was  no  intention  of  proceeding  further.  "  Having," 
says  Rodney,  "  by  the  motion  of  the  fleet  and  army  taken 
possession  of  an  excellent  harbour,  and  secured  a  landing 
in  the  northernmost  part  of  the  island,  which  might  be 
made  tenable  at  any  time,  and  likewise  thereby  greatly 
alarmed  the  enemy,  at  General  Monckton's  request  I 
despatched  Commodore  Swanton  with  a  squadron  of 
ships  and  two  brigades  to  the  Bay  of  Petite  Anse,  in  order 
to  take  post  there."  Petite  Anse  d'Arlet  was  in  the 
extreme  south-west  of  the  island,  below  Fort  Royal,  the 
naval  station  which  was  the  real  objective.  The  influence 
of  the  operations  at  Quebec  is  clear.  Under  Wolfe  and 
Saunders,  Monckton  had  learned  the  bewildering  power 
that  is  the  strength  of  troops  afloat,  and  full  use  of  it  was 
being  made.  To  confuse  the  enemy  still  further  a 
squadron  of  five  large  frigates  was  sent  to  La  Trinity,  a 
port  almost  opposite  St.  Pierre,  on  the  windward  side  of 
the  island,  with  orders  to  threaten  a  landing,  and  Swanton 
was  directed  to  fly  a  flag  similar  to  the  Admiral's. 
Rodney  himself,  so  soon  as  these  detachments  were  away, 
took  the  mass  of  the  fleet  round  Swanton,  and  came  to 
anchor  in  St.  Anne's  Bay,  in  the  extreme  south  of  the  island. 

^  Rodney  to  the  Admiralty,  Jan.  19, 1761. — Mundy,  Life  of  Rodney,  vol.  i. 
p.  (59.  Monckton  to  Egremont,  Dec.  31,  1762,  S.P.  Colonial  (America  and 
West  Indies),  102. 


220  MARTINIQUE  1762 

Here  the  little  batteries  were  quickly  silenced  and 
the  troops  landed,  for  from  this  point  it  was  intended  to 
make  the  real  attack  on  Fort  Royal  over-land.  A  direct 
attack  from  the  sea  was  impossible,  for  in  the  mouth 
of  the  Bay,  on  its  south  side,  stood  a  high  rocky  island 
known  as  Isle  des  Ramiers,  or  Pigeon  Island.  It  was 
crowned  by  a  battery  of  heavy  guns,  which  effectually 
barred  the  entrance  to  a  hostile  fleet.  Consequently  the 
reduction  of  this  work  was  regarded  as  the  first  step  to  be 
taken.  The  idea  was  to  land  the  troops  at  a  point  known 
as  St.  Luce,  on  the  southern  shore  of  the  island,  close  to 
St.  Anne's  road.  Hence  in  distance  it  was  but  a  day's 
march  to  Fort  Royal  Bay.  This  method  of  getting  at 
Pigeon  Island,  therefore,  looked  feasible  enough ;  but  no 
reconnoitring  had  been  done  in  advance,  and  they  were 
quite  unaware  that  the  country  over  which  they  meant 
to  pass  was  so  deeply  scored  with  ravines  and  rocky 
ridges  as  to  be  impassable  for  artillery.  The  first  recon- 
naissance revealed  the  ugly  truth,  and  it  was  obvious 
that,  if  Pigeon  Island  was  to  be  reduced,  a  landing  much 
nearer  Fort  Royal  Bay  must  be  used.  It  was  resolved, 
therefore,  to  try  again  to  the  westward,  where  Swanton 
had  been  operating  at  the  Petite  Anse  d'Arlet.  The 
troops  were  accordingly  re-embarked  and  the  St.  Anne's 
fort  blown  up. 

At  the  new  point  a  footing  had  already  been  estab- 
lished by  Brigadier  Haviland,  the  same  who  had  com- 
manded the  central  column  against  Montreal.  The 
indefatigable  Hervey,  too,  was  there — the  hero  of 
Hawke's  inshore  squadron  off  Brest,  who,  always  in  the 
thick  of  the  work,  had  come  out  with  Swanton  from 
Keppel's  Belleisle  squadron.  After  Swanton  had  silenced 
the  batteries  at  Petite  Anse  d'Arlet,  he  had  sent  Hervey  on 
the  10th,  the  same  day  that  Rodney  had  anchored  at  St, 


1762  LANDING    AT    FORT    ROYAL  221 

Anne's,  into  the  adjoining  Grand  Ansa,  whicli  lay  imme- 
diately to  the  north  and  nearer  still  to  the  objective. 
There,  with  his  wonted  energy,  he  had  promptly  silenced 
the  battery  and  occupied  it  with  his  marines.  Troops 
quickly  followed  from  Haviland  in  support,  and,  march- 
ing inland,  they  seized  Gros  Point,  immediately  opposite 
Pigeon  Island.  But  here  it  was  the  same  story.  The 
officer  in  command  reported  the  country  quite  imprac- 
ticable for  artillery,  and  suggested  his  return  to  Haviland 
and  S wanton's  ships.  While  waiting  for  orders,  he  was 
attacked  by  troops  sent  from  Fort  Royal  across  the  Bay ; 
but  he  easily  drove  them  off,  and  eventually  retired  un- 
molested. It  was  unpleasant  news  for  Rodney  and 
Monckton  when  they  arrived.  There  was  obviously 
nothing  left  but  failure  or  a  direct  attack,  and  on  the 
morrow,  the  14th,  the  whole  fleet  anchored  in  the  mouth 
of  Fort  Royal  Bay. 

Rodney  and  Monckton  immediately  proceeded  to  make 
a  fresh  reconnaissance,  and  ugly  the  project  looked.  The 
whole  country  appeared  a  kind  of  natural  fortification, 
and,  in  spite  of  the  various  feints  which  had  been  made, 
it  seemed  to  be  swarming  with  irregular  troops  exactly 
adapted  to  the  warfare  in  hand.  The  shores  bristled 
with  batteries,  deep  in  the  Bay  sat  the  formidable  citadel 
towering  on  a  rocky  height,  and  above  it,  a  little  inshore, 
rose,  like  great  outworks,  three  lofty  hills — the  Morne 
Tortensson,  the  Morne  Garnier,  and  the  Morne  Capuchin, 
all  strongly  entrenched.  A  landing  within  the  Bay  was 
clearly  impossible,  but  next  day  a  likely  place  was  found, 
just  to  the  north  of  it,  at  Cas  Navires,  close  to  where 
Moore  and  Hopson  had  tried  two  years  before.  Like  every 
other  possible  point,  it  was  defended  by  batteries,  and  the 
country  between  it  and  Fort  Royal  looked  as  bad  as  ever. 
But  it  was  this  or  nothing.     Accordingly,  on  the  IGth, 


222  MARTINIQUE  1762 

the  whole  fleet  stood  in,  silenced  the  batteries,  and  at 
sunset  Monckton  was  able  to  establish  himself  ashore 
unopposed,  with  a  strong  advanced  guard.  Their  bewil- 
dering activity  had  been  rewarded  by  an  effective  surprise, 
and,  shortly  after  daybreak  next  morning,  the  whole  army, 
including  marines,  had  disembarked  without  the  loss  of 
a  man.  Swanton  himself,  with  Hervey  and  Shuldhain 
of  the  lost  BaisonTuible,  conducted  the  three  divisions  of 
boats;  and  so  well  practised  by  this  time  was  such 
amphibious  work,  that  all  had  gone  like  a  clock.  The 
whole  study  of  the  war  tells  how  difficult  and  dangerous 
are  these  operations  to  a  force  that  is  unfamiliar  with 
them,  and  how  easy  and  formidable  when  both  fleet  and 
army  are  at  home  with  the  work,  and  schooled  for  it, 
hand  in  hand,  by  constant  and  well-ordered  practice. 

So  soon  as  the  footing  was  made  good,  something  like 
a  regular  approach  was  commenced  against  Morne  Tor- 
tensson  and  Morne  Gamier,  the  two  nearest  heights.  Of 
what  followed  a  picture  has  survived  which  is  too  vivid 
to  lose  :  "  As  soon  as  we  were  all  safely  disembarked," 
wrote  an  officer  of  Scott's  Light  Infantry,  "  our  engineers 
were  immediately  set  to  work  in  raising  batteries,  as  well 
to  establish  our  footing  on  the  island  as  to  cover  our 
approaches  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  their  posts.  For 
this  purpose  all  the  cannon  and  other  warlike  stores  were 
landed  as  soon  as  possible,  and  dragged  by  the  '  Jacks ' 
to  any  point  they  [the  engineers]  thought  proper.  You 
may  fancy  you  know  the  spirit  of  these  fellows :  but  to 
see  them  in  action  exceeds  any  idea  that  can  be  formed 
of  them.  A  hundred  or  two  of  them  with  ropes  and 
pullies  will  do  more  than  all  your  dray-horses  in  London. 
Let  but  their  tackle  hold,  and  they  will  draw  you  a 
cannon  or  a  mortar  on  its  proper  carriage  up  to  any 
height,  though  the  weight  bo  never  so  great.     It  is  droll 


1762  AN    AMPHIBIOUS    ATTACK  223 

enough  to  sec  them  tugging  along  with  a  good  twenty- 
four  pounder  at  their  heels ;  as  they  go,  huzzaing  and 
hallooing,  sometimes  up  hill,  sometimes  down  hill ;  now 
sticking  fast  in  the  brakes,  presently  floundering  in  the 
mud  and  mire ;  swearing,  blasting,  damning,  sinking,  and 
as  careless  of  everything  but  the  matter  committed  to 
their  charge  as  if  death  or  danger  had  nothing  to  do  with 
them.  We  had  a  thousand  of  these  brave  fellows  sent 
to  our  assistance  by  the  admiral,  and  the  service  they 
did  us  both  on  shore  and  on  the  water  is  incredible."  ^ 

But  though  the  bluejackets  revolutionised  the  ideas  of 
the  army  officers  as  to  what  ground  was  practicable  for  a 
siege  train  and  what  was  not,  the  work  of  the  troops  was 
equally  determined  and  brilliant.  True  their  force  was 
overwhelming  compared  Avith  that  of  the  French,  but  the 
country  was  extraordinarily  close  and  difficult,  a  paradise 
for  irregular  troops.  It  was  not  till  a  week  after  the 
landing  that  the  batteries  against  Morne  Tortensson  were 
complete,  and  early  on  January  24th  a  general  assault 
was  ordered.  It  was  most  brilliantly  done.  On  the  right 
Colonel  Rufane's  brigade  and  the  marines,  supported  by 
a  thousand  seamen  in  flat  boats  rowing  along  the  shore, 
had  to  take  battery  after  battery.  In  the  centre  the 
massed  Grenadier  companies,  supported  by  Lord  Rollo's 
brigade,  found  an  endless  succession  of  works  in  their 
path,  and  scarcely  could  have  succeeded  but  for  Scott's 
Light  Infantry,  who,  with  the  third  brigade  in  support, 
outflanked  the  position  and  forced  the  enemy  slowly  back. 
Almost  every  yard  had  to  be  won ;  yet  by  nine  o'clock 
all  was  over,  and  the  troops  were  cheering  in  the  formid- 
able and  well-armed  redoubt  on  the  summit  of  Morne 
Tortensson. 

Before  the  overwhelming  pressure  of  the  well-nourished 

*  Mundy,  Life  of  Jiodncy,  vol.  i.  p.  74,  note. 


2  24  MARTINIQUE  1762 

attack  the  enemy  had  retreated  to  the  still  higher  Morne 
Garnier,  across  an  almost  impassable  ravine.  So  com- 
pletely did  it  command  the  captured  position  that  it  was 
seen  it  must  be  taken  before  batteries  could  be  erected 
against  the  citadel  upon  the  ground  they  had  won.  Havi- 
land,  who  now  had  the  extreme  left  and  had  already 
seized  a  footing  across  the  ravine,  was  ordered  to  establish 
batteries  there.  On  the  27  th  he  began  the  work ;  but 
no  sooner  had  he  broken  ground  than  the  enemy  resolved 
to  dislodge  him,  and  towards  evening  made  a  desperate 
attack  in  force.  But  the  troops  seasoned  in  the  Canadian 
wilds  and  the  Highlanders  he  had  with  him  withstood 
the  shock,  and  not  satisfied  with  repulsing  their  enemy, 
pushed  on  after  them  as  they  retreated,  and  by  nightfall 
were  in  possession  of  all  the  batteries  on  the  lower  slopes 
of  Morne  Garnier.  Still  they  were  not  content.  Major 
Leland,  with  a  detachment  of  light  infantry  on  the 
extreme  left  flank,  still  crept  on  through  the  darkness. 
Feeling  nothing  in  front  of  him  he  climbed  higher  and 
higher,  till  at  last  he  found  himself  in  the  deserted  re- 
doubt on  the  summit  with  a  loaded  mortar  and  eight  un- 
spiked  guns  in  his  possession.  He  was  quickly  supported 
from  below,  and  thus  as  the  contemporary  narrator  says, 
"  by  a  happy  presence  of  mind  was  a  defensive  advantage 
improved  in  the  nick  of  time  to  a  successful  attack."  ^ 

The  fact  was  that  the  French  governor,  M.  de  la 
Touche,  after  leaving  a  garrison  of  about  a  thousand  men 
in  Fort  Royal,  had  retired  with  the  bulk  of  his  force  to 
St.  Pierre.  A  garrison  so  abandoned  has  seldom  great 
resisting  spirit.  So  soon  as  the  governor's  back  was 
turned  the  regulars  retired  into  the  citadel,  and  the 
militia  dispersed  to  their  homes.  A  day  or  two  later, 
while  the  citadel  was  bombarded  from  Morne  Tortensson, 

1  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  524. 


1762  THE    CAPITULATION  225 

the  third  position,  Morne  Capuchm,  which  was  the 
nearest  to  Fort  Royal,  was  occupied  without  opposition. 
It  was  but  four  hundred  yards  from  the  citadel,  and 
Monckton  immediately  prepared  to  establish  a  new 
and  more  effective  battery  upon  its  summit.  But 
the  garrison  would  stand  no  more.  Further  resistance 
was  indeed  hopeless.  On  February  3rd  they  beat  the 
chamade,  and  next  day  Fort  Royal  was  in  Monckton's 
hands.  The  garrison  that  marched  out  was  but  eight 
hundred  men  all  told,  but  none  the  less  the  extra- 
ordinary physical  difficulties  and  the  precision  and  dash 
with  which  they  had  been  overcome  made  the  Avhole 
exploit  a  fine  feat  of  arms.  The  strength  of  the  French 
preparations,  which  they  had  had  so  long  a  time  to  make, 
may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  over  a  hundred  and 
seventy  pieces  of  artillery  fell  into  Monckton's  hands,  with 
a  vast  quantity  of  ammunition.  Added  to  this  Rodney 
received  the  surrender  of  Pigeon  Island  on  summons,  and 
fourteen  fine  privateers  that  were  lying  in  the  harbour. 

Immediately  Fort  Royal  had  surrendered  Hervey, 
with  a  small  squadron,  was  sent  round  to  support  the 
frigates  at  La  Trinity.  There  he  promptly  landed  five 
hundred  seamen  and  marines  to  seize  the  place,  and  the 
whole  district  at  once  made  its  submission.  It  was  the 
end  of  the  operations.  M.  de  la  Touche  could  resist  no 
further  the  pressure  which  the  inhabitants  brought  to  bear 
upon  him.  Rodney  was  in  the  act  of  moving  on  against 
St.  Pierre  when  a  proposal  for  capitulation  arrived,  and 
on  February  15  th  Martinique  was  a  British  possession. 

At  last  the  power  of  the  French  in  the  West  Indies 
was  completely  broken.  It  remained  but  to  gather  in 
the  lesser  islands.  Swanton  with  a  brigade  was  des- 
patched to  Grenada,  where  he  quickly  forced  the  governor 
to  surrender.      Hervey,  with  an  insignificant  detachment, 

VOL.  II.  P 


2  26  MARTINIQUE  1762 

was  sent  to  St.  Lucia  and  St.  Vincent.  His  orders 
were  to  attack  St.  Lucia  if  lie  found  it  not  beyond  his 
strength,  and  if  it  were  he  was  to  report  to  the  admiral. 
On  arriving  before  the  place  he  found  he  could  not  make 
sure  whether  it  was  beyond  his  force  or  not.  The  en- 
trance was  so  narrow  as  to  block  the  view,  but  as  usual 
he  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  He  resolved  to  send  in  a 
summons  to  the  governor,  and  after  his  own  peculiar 
manner  accompanied  the  flag  of  truce  dressed  as  a  mid- 
shipman so  as  to  see  for  himself.  His  visit  satisfied  him 
that  the  task  was  not  beyond  his  strength.  The  place 
was  defended  by  a  single  fort,  and  he  assured  himself 
it  was  possible  to  run  right  in  and  lay  his  ships  close 
enough  to  knock  it  to  pieces.  This  plan  he  accordingly 
proceeded  to  put  in  execution  the  next  day,  but  no  sooner 
were  his  ships  seen  standing  for  the  harbour  than  a 
capitulation  was  sent  to  meet  him.  It  was  thus,  as  it 
were,  single-handed,  this  intrepid  officer  had  the  honour 
of  adding  to  the  British  possessions  that  famous  naval 
base,  which  in  the  future  was  destined  to  be  the  key  of 
our  position  in  the  Caribbean  Sea.  No  doubt  St.  Vincent 
too  would  have  been  added  to  his  score,  but  in  his  absence 
an  event  had  happened  which  changed  the  whole  situa- 
tion. As  he  was  in  the  act  of  proceeding  to  carry  out 
the  rest  of  his  instructions  he  received  an  urgent  order 
from  Rodney  to  rejoin  him  with  all  expedition. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   INTERVENTION   OF   SPAIN 

While  Rodney  had  been  engaged  in  breaking  the  last  of 
the  French  power  in  the  West  Indies,  the  situation  in 
Europe  had  been  developing  with  equal  energy.  As  the 
new  Ministers  in  London  waited  for  the  result  of  their 
ultimatum  in  Spain  their  situation  grew  daily  more 
difficult.  Their  efforts  to  curb  the  momentum  which 
Pitt  had  given  the  war  in  his  last  weeks  of  power  had  no 
eifect  but  to  mark  the  divisions  that  hampered  them. 
The  army  estimates  had  involved  them  in  a  damaging 
debate  on  the  German  war.  Charles  Townshend,  the 
general's  brother,  who  had  succeeded  Barrington  at  the 
War  Office,  moved  for  sufficient  forces  to  continue  to 
support  Prince  Ferdinand  on  the  previous  scale.  In  the 
course  of  his  speech  he  justified  the  continental  operations 
as  the  bed-rock  defence  from  which  the  whole  of  our 
conquest  had  been  pushed  forward.  He  urged  that  the 
harmonious  co-ordination  of  offence  and  defence,  "  the 
totality  of  the  war,"  as  he  called  it,  had  been  one  of  the 
great  causes  of  its  success,  and  he  ended  with  a  well- 
reasoned  panegyric  on  what  he  termed  "  Mr.  Pitt's  divine 
plan."  The  Court  dared  not  permit  its  views  on  the 
subject  to  be  seen  too  openly,  but  Rigby,  Bedford's  man, 
had  no  such  scruples,  and  he  denounced  the  whole  con- 
tinental system  from  beginning  to  end.  Grenville  was 
more  guarded.  It  was  France's  lack  of  seamen,  he  said, 
and  not  the  German  war  which  had  prevented  her  sup- 


228  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1761 

porting  her  operations  in  America  or  invading  England  ; 
yet  he  protested  Ministers  were  bound  by  treaty  to  con- 
tinue the  continental  war  against  their  will.  Such  a 
speech  was  tantamount  to  a  declaration  that  they  meant 
to  desert  Frederick  so  soon  as  they  could  find  a  decent 
occasion,  and  it  brought  Pitt  to  his  legs  once  more.  In 
temperate  language  he  defended  his  system.  The  German 
war,  he  said,  had  been  forced  upon  him  against  his  will  by 
the  breach  of  the  Convention  of  Kloster  Zeven,  but  even 
so  he  had  only  agreed  to  it  after  every  other  service  had 
been  provided  for.  Having  had  to  undertake  it,  he 
claimed  that  he  had  managed  it  in  such  a  way  that  he 
had  thereby  annihilated  the  French  power  both  in  the 
West  and  the  East  Indies.  As  Germany  had  formerly 
been  handled,  it  had  been  a  millstone  round  our  necks, 
but  he  had  made  it  a  millstone  about  the  neck  of  France, 
and  he  vowed,  though  he  stood  alone,  he  would  divide 
the  House  against  deserting  our  allies. 

The  debate  closed  without  a  division,  but  next  day  the 
trouble  was  renewed  by  a  private  member's  motion  for 
papers  on  our  relations  with  Spain.  Grenville  could  only 
resist  it  by  a  high  assertion  that  the  power  to  negotiate 
belonged  to  the  Crown.  The  debate  grew  angry,  the 
House  lost  its  temper,  and  Pitt  magnanimously  inter- 
vened. Too  loyal  and  too  deeply  convinced  of  the  value 
of  his  cherished  view  of  sound  war  administration  to  go 
back  on  it  for  a  tactical  advantage,  however  tempting,  he 
claimed  for  Lord  Egremont  "  the  right  to  guide  his  own 
correspondence."  He  himself,  who,  he  hoped,  had  not 
lessened  his  country,  had  always  claimed  the  right.  It  was 
no  question,  he  said,  of  "  sole  Minister,"  and  in  thus  dis- 
tinguishing between  his  idea  of  ministerial  responsibility 
and  the  spectre  of  dictatorship,  he  seized  the  opportunity 
of  repudiating  the  stories  that  were  and  still  are  current 


i76i  PITT'S   EXEMPLARY   ATTITUDE  229 

about  his  despotism.  In  tlie  Treasury,  he  said,  in  the 
MiHtary,  and  in  the  Navy  he  had  never  assumed  or 
claimed  any  direction  :  he  had  never  spoken  to  the  King 
on  these  heads,  but  had  always  applied  to  the  Ministers 
of  the  several  departments.  Then,  having  vindicated  his 
theory  of  war  direction,  he  proceeded  moderately  to 
support  the  motion  for  papers  on  the  ground  that  their 
production  could  only  strengthen  the  King's  hands  by 
showing  how  patient  we  had  been,  and  that  it  was 
impossible  for  the  House  to  judge  what  supplies  were 
necessary  till  it  knew  how  we  stood  with  Spain.  Yet  he 
protested  he  would  not  press  the  motion  if  told  by 
authority  it  was  premature.  He  concluded  by  saying 
that  he  had  secret  information  which  placed  it  beyond 
doubt  that  Spain  meant  war,  and  by  pointing  out  how 
weak  and  unready  she  was.^  A  gross  and  violent 
personal  attack  by  truculent  Colonel  Barre  was  his 
reward.  Disdaining  to  answer,  he  dismissed  the  insult 
with  a  jest  about  Red  Indians  and  tomahawks.  Eventu- 
ally, on  a  suggestion  that  an  express  from  Spain  was  pro- 
bably even  then  on  the  road,  the  motion  was  negatived 
without  a  division.^ 

An  express  was  indeed  on  its  way  not  only  to  England, 
but  to  all  the  ends  of  the  earth.  While  they  debated 
the  crisis  had  come.  The  King's  messenger  had  reached 
Madrid  with  the  ultimatum  on  December  oth.  Bristol 
saw  Wall  next  day,  and  repeated  his  demand  for  a  dis- 

'  These  frequent  allusions  of  Pitt  to  information  in  his  possession  leave 
little  doubt  that  he  had  evidence  of  Spain's  intentions  bej-ond  that  which 
was  known  to  the  Cabinet  from  the  intercepted  Fueutes-Grimaldi  corre- 
spondence. The  common  explanation  is  that  he  had  obtained  it  under 
seal  of  absolute  secrecy  from  George  Keith,  the  attainted  Earl  Marischal, 
who  in  1759  was  Frederick's  ambassador  in  Madrid,  and  that  the  Earl's 
pardon  was  his  reward.  His  pardon,  however,  was  signed  on  May  29, 
1759,  and  his  attainder  reversed  the  following  year. 

*  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i.  p.  9 1  et  seq. 


2  30  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1761 

closure  of  the  treaty.  Wall  was  polite  and  conciliatory, 
so  Bristol  said  nothing  about  leaving.  Misled  by  Fuentes's 
reports  of  the  infirmity  of  the  new  Government  in  London, 
decisive  action  was  the  last  thing  Wall  expected.  Two 
days  later  he  calmly  presented  Bristol  with  the  King's 
reply,  which  was  to  the  effect  that  no  further  answer  could 
be  given  beyond  a  memorial  which  had  been  despatched 
to  Fuentes  for  deliver}^  to  Egremont.  Then  Bristol  plainly 
declared  what  his  instructions  were — to  demand  Avhether 
Spain  meant  to  j  oin  France,  and  if  an  answer  were  refused 
to  leave  at  once.  Wall  was  astounded.  He  could  scarcely 
believe  his  ears,  and  requested  Bristol  to  put  his  demand 
in  writing.  This  he  did,  and  next  day  received  a  cate- 
gorical refusal.  On  the  same  day,  the  10th,  orders  Avere 
sent  out  to  seize  every  British  vessel,  man-of-war  or 
merchantman,  in  the  Spanish  ports,  with  an  embargo  on 
all  Spanish  ships,  so  as  to  prevent  the  news  of  the  seizure 
getting  abroad.  Bristol  immediately  set  about  carrying 
out  his  secret  instructions,  but  he  found  it  no  easy 
matter.  Every  difficulty  was  thrown  in  the  way  of  his 
communicating  with  the  admirals.  Post-horses  were 
even  refused  him,  and  it  Avas  not  till  he  reached  the 
Portuguese  frontier,  nearly  at  the  end  of  the  month,  that 
he  Avas  able  to  send  forward  warning  to  the  fleet. 

Saunders  Avas  at  Gibraltar  crouchmg  for  a  spring.  In 
the  middle  of  November  he  had  sent  to  Anson  a  project 
for  dealing  a  death-bloAv  to  the  French  Mediterranean 
trade  by  raiding  Marseilles  under  cover  of  a  feint  on 
Minorca.  In  vicAV  of  war  Avith  Spain,  it  was  accompanied 
by  another  plan  for  a  similar  blow  on  the  ships  at  Cadiz, 
and  for  the  capture  of  Oran  as  an  equivalent  for  Minorca 
if  that  island  Avere  handed  over  to  Spain.  He  regretted 
that  never  having  seen  either  Marseilles  or  Cadiz  he  could 
not  give   a   decided   opinion    as   to  the  practicability  of 


I76I-2  SAUNDERS'S    POSITION  231 

his  proposals,  but  he  was  ready  to  try  so  soon  as  he  got 
the  word.  His  information  was  that  the  Spaniards  had 
ten  of  the  line  in  Cadiz.  He  himself,  besides  his  detached 
ships,  had  fifteen  of  the  line  in  Gibraltar  Bay  ready  to 
sail  at  a  moment's  notice.  At  the  end  of  the  year  two 
more  joined  him  with  some  fireships,  but  still  there  was 
no  word  from  Lord  Bristol.  It  was  not  till  January  4th 
that  the  ambassador's  letter,  which  he  had  written  on 
December  11th  to  say  he  was  leaving,  reached  him.  It 
was  forwarded  by  Hay,  our  Minister  at  Lisbon,  and  with 
it  unhappily  came  news  that  ever  since  the  middle  of 
December  the  Spaniards  had  been  hard  at  work  putting 
Cadiz  in  a  state  of  defence,  and  that  the  ships  had 
been  withdrawn  into  the  inner  harbour.  Saunders  sadly 
recognised  that  his  chance  was  gone.  Seeing  at  once  that 
the  only  method  of  performing  his  containing  functions, 
was  to  assume  a  purely  defensive  attitude,  he  wrote 
home  to  say  he  had  decided  the  attack  was  impracticable 
and  that  he  must  confine  himself  to  preventing  any  con- 
centration of  the  scattered  divisions  of  the  allies,  and 
particularly  to  keeping  apart  the  divisions  within  the 
Straits  and  those  in  the  Atlantic.  His  main  preoccupa- 
tion was  the  Toulon  squadron,  and  his  dominant  object 
to  prevent  its  getting  out  of  the  Mediterranean,  For  the 
present,  however,  he  knew  it  was  not  ready  for  sea,  and 
felt  he  could  attend  to  the  scarcely  less  important  object 
of  preventing  a  junction  between  the  enemy's  Atlantic 
divisions.  So  soon,  therefore,  as  the  wind  would  permit, 
he  moved  up  to  the  westward  to  blockade  Cadiz,  so  as  to 
prevent  its  squadron  getting  out,  or  anything  from  the 
northward  getting  in.^ 

So  far,  then,  as  Saunders  was  concerned,  the  Spaniards 

1  Saunders  to  the  Admiralty,  Dec.  8,  16,   18,  24,  1761,  Jan.  8  and  21, 
1762,  In-ktttrs,  384. 


232  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1761 

had  certainly  managed  well  in  preventing  his  striking 
the  rapid  blow  which  would  so  greatly  have  eased  the 
difficulties  of  his  containing  position.  Elsewhere,  how- 
ever, owing  to  the  enterprise  of  an  obscure  naval  officer, 
they  were  not  so  successful.  It  happened  that  a  certain 
Captain  George  Johnstone,  of  his  Majesty's  sloop  Hornet, 
had  just  captured  a  smart  French  privateer  off  the  coast 
of  Portugal,  from  whom  he  learned  of  the  order  of 
December  10th  for  the  seizure  of  British  shipping.  He 
immediately  carried  her  into  Lisbon,  where  a  few  days 
later  he  ascertained  that  Spain  had  declared  war.  There- 
upon, on  his  own  responsibility,  he  manned  and  victualled 
his  prize,  placed  her  under  the  command  of  his  master, 
and  sent  her  away  express  to  Rodney  with  the  news.^ 

London  was  equally  fortunate.  In  spite  of  the  Spanish 
precautions,  Bristol's  advices  of  his  departure  reached 
home  in  less  than  a  fortnight,  and  on  Christmas  Eve 
orders  were  issued  to  all  stations  to  commence  hostilities. 
Two  days  later  the  Gazette  announced  a  state  of  war  with 
Spain,  and  on  the  29  th  Sir  Peircy  Brett,  the  officer  who 
since  1759  had  had  charge  of  the  northern  section  of  the 
Channel  blockade,  was  sent  down  with  two  more  of  the 
line  and  another  frigate  further  to  reinforce  Saunders. 

The  latest  information  that  Bristol  had  sent  home  was 
that  there  was  a  squadron  of  eleven  of  the  line  in  Ferrol 
ready  for  sea,  and  that  fifteen  hundred  troops  had 
marched  to  that  port  to  embark  for  the  West  Indies. 
In  Cadiz  were  five  battalions  awaiting  final  orders  for  the 
same  destination.  One  regiment  had  already  gone  to 
Majorca,  and  another  was  on  its  way,  and  two  vessels 
laden  with  arms  and  ammunition  had  sailed  for  the  West 
Indies  from  Barcelona.  The  movement  to  Majorca  might 
of  course  be  merely  defensive,  or  it  might   indicate    a 

'  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  531  ;  and  see  infra  note,  p.  235. 


i76i  SITUATION    IN   THE    ATLANTIC  233 

Spanish  occupation  of  Minorca.  The  intention  of  the 
Ferrol  squadron  was  still  more  uncertain.  The  general 
belief,  however,  both  in  England  and  Spain,  was  that  it 
threatened  a  descent  on  Ireland.^  To  Choiseul,  however, 
it  meant  something  much  more  ambitious.  He  was 
forming  in  his  mind  a  grandiose  plan  for  a  combined 
invasion  of  England  on  the  familiar  lines  which  have 
failed  so  often.  His  complete  plan,  however,  was  not 
presented  to  the  Spanish  Court  till  the  following  April, 
and  may  be  considered  later. 

The  immediate  anxiety  of  the  British  Government  was 
a  squadron  of  seven  of  the  line  and  four  frigates  which 
was  lying  in  Brest  ready  for  sea  with  some  three  thousand 
troops  on  board,  and  known  to  be  destined  for  the  West 
Indies,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  ships  in  Rochefort 
and  the  Charente  were  intended  to  steal  round  and 
join  it.  The  Brest  squadron  was  being  watched  by  a 
division  of  Keppel's  fleet  consisting  of  thirteen  of  the  line 
under  Captain  Matthew  Buckle.  On  December  5  th  word 
came  home  from  him  that  he  feared  it  had  given  him  the 
slip,  and  warning  was  at  once  sent  out  to  Rodney  to  be 
on  his  guard.  If  the  escaped  squadron  appeared  towards 
Jamaica  he  was  to  send  Douglas  with  at  least  six  of  the 
line  to  reinforce  Holmes,  an  order  which  must  be  remem- 
bered as  it  came  to  have  considerable  importance.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  came  his  own  way  he  might  call  on 
Holmes  for  assistance."  Next  day  orders  were  despatched 
to  Keppel  recalling  five  more  regiments  from  Belleisle, 
which  with  artillery  and  the  dragoons  made  up  four 
thousand  five  hundred  men.  He  had  previously  told 
the  Government  that  four  of  the  line  and  a  few  cruisers 
would  be  enough  to  co-operate  with  the  garrison  that 

'  Duro,  Armada  EspaTwUi,  vol.  vii.  p.  40. 

-  Admiralty  Secretary.  Oat-letters  {Secret  Orders),  1331,  Dec.  5. 


2  34  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1 761-2 

would  remain,  and  he  was  ordered  in  consequence  to 
leave  such  a  squadron  on  the  station  and  proceed  him- 
self to  take  command  off  Ushant.^  At  the  same  time, 
since  the  combined  operations  in  which  he  had  been 
ensjfaored  Avere  at  an  end,  he  was  told  henceforth  to  receive 
his  orders  from  the  Admiralty  and  not  from  the  Secretary 
of  State. 

The  reported  escape  of  the  Brest  squadron  was  soon 
known  to  be  a  false  alarm,  but  Keppel  was  by  no  means 
easy  about  the  blockade.  He  had  been  pressing  the 
Admiralty  with  his  opinions  on  the  vital  necessity  of 
speed,  pointing  out  the  error  of  setting  foul  ships  to  in- 
tercept clean  ones.^  He  knew  the  Rochefort  ships  were 
ready  to  sail,  and  doubted  the  possibility  of  the  slugs  at 
his  command  preventing  their  junction  with  those  that 
were  still  in  Brest.  His  mistrust  of  the  blockade  with 
the  material  at  his  disposal  was  too  well  founded.  On 
December  23rd,  before  ever  he  could  crawl  up  to  his  new 
station,  the  whole  Brest  squadron,  under  Monsieur  de 
Blenac,  gave  the  slip  to  Captain  Spry,  who  had  succeeded 
Buckle  off  Ushant,  and  had  made  straight  for  the  West 
Indies.^  Even  when  Keppel  reached  the  station  he  could 
not  hold  it.  The  weather  proved  quite  beyond  the  en- 
durance of  his  worn  squadron,  and  the  second  week  of 
January  a  terrific  gale  sent  the  whole  of  his  ships  flying 
for  any  Channel  port  they  could  reach,  and  for  the  time 
he  was  practically  off  the  board. 

Once  more  it  was  proved,  as  was  to  be  shown  so  often 
in  the  future,  how  weak  a  form  of  war  is  a  prolonged  close 
blockade ;  how  the  wear  and  tear  of  ships,  and  the  con- 
sequent loss  of  speed  and  endurance,  even  in  sailing  days, 

1  Ibid.,  Dec.  6,  1761. 

*  Keppel,  Life  of  Keppel,  vol.  i.  p.  336,  Keppel  to  Buckle,  Oct.  17,  1761. 

*  Rodney  to  the  Admiralty,  March  24,  1762. — Mundy,  Life  of  Rodney, 
vol.  i.  p.  76. 


1762  RODNEY    GETS    WARNING  235 

inevitably  gives  the  enemy  his  chance  sooner  or  later. 
For  a  short  time  it  is  well.  It  would  serve  to  keep  the 
enemy  in  and  the  sea  clear  for  covering  or  preventing 
a  definite  oversea  operation — that  is,  for  a  temporary  and 
local  command.  For  permanent  command  it  must  always 
be  doubtful  whether  it  can  compare  with  an  open  blockade 
conducted  from  a  good  interior  position  by  a  fleet  that  can 
retain  its  speed  and  fitness  for  action,  without  the  demorali- 
sation of  absolute  inactivity. 

It  was  these  events  which  had  recalled  Hervey  in  the 
midst  of  his  little  career  of  conquest.  Rodney  had  al- 
ready received  by  Captain  Johnstone's  prize  a  copy  of  the 
embargo  order,  and  news  that  a  state  of  war  had  been 
declared  in  Spain  on  December  15  th.  The  transformed 
French  prize  had  all  the  qualities  of  her  class,  and  had 
made  an  extraordinarily  quick  passage,  so  that  Rodney 
received  the  warning  some  time  in  the  middle  of  February, 
a  fortnight  or  more  before  an  official  intimation  reached 
him.  The  news  was  quickly  confirmed  by  a  British 
transport  bringing  out  infantry  drafts,  Avhich,  having  put 
into  a  Spanish  port  on  the  way,  had  narrowly  escaped 
seizure  herself.  Thereupon  Rodney  threw  out  his  cruisers, 
and  before  the  end  of  the  month  Captain  Ourry,  of  the 
Adceon  frigate,  had  captured  a  "  register  ship  "  laden  with 
arms  and  military  stores,  presumably  one  of  those  which 
Bristol  had  reported  as  sailing  from  Barcelona.  On  the 
last  day  of  the  month  all  doubt  was  removed  by  the 
arrival  from  Antigua  of  a  frigate  from  home  with  the 
Admiralty  orders  to  begin  hostilities.^ 

^  Beatson  (vol.  ii.  p.  531)  says  M'Laurin,  the  Hornet's  master,  made  the 
passage  in  twenty-three  days,  and  delivered  Johnstone's  letter  to  Rodney 
on  Jan.  18,  that  is,  just  after  the  landing  at  Cas  Navires.  This  may  well 
be  true,  though  Rodney  sent  home  a  despatch  next  day,  and  another  on 
Feb.  10,  without  saying  a  word  about  it.  In  his  next,  however,  dated 
Feb.  28,  he  says  he  had  received  the  news  some  time  back,  and  had 
already  captured  a  valuable  Spanish  prize  ;  and  the  Actwon's  Log  mentions 


236  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1762 

Still  Rodney  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  interrupt 
the  work  of  organising  his  new  conquest  in  which  he  was 
engaged  off  St.  Pierre,  or  to  call  in  his  scattered  squad- 
rons. Within  the  week,  however,  the  whole  situation 
was  changed.  On  March  5th,  three  more  frigates  reached 
him  with  despatches.  One  was  direct  from  home,  and 
another  from  Saunders  with  copies  of  the  orders  already 
received.  The  third  had  a  different  and  less  pleasant 
tale  to  tell.  She  was  straight  from  Ushant,  sent  off  in 
hot  haste  by  Spry  to  inform  him  of  Bl^nac's  escape. 
Since  the  first  false  alarm  had  reached  him  Rodney  had 
had  a  chain  of  frigates  to  windward  the  whole  length  of 
the  Caribbee  Islands,  on  the  look-out  for  the  Brest  squad- 
ron as  well  as  for  Spanish  prizes,  and  he  now  repeated  to 
them  his  orders  for  the  utmost  vigilance.  It  was  now, 
too,  he  despatched  his  urgent  order  recalling  Hervey,  and 
at  the  same  time  sent  word  to  Swanton,  who  was  down  at 
Grenada  with  seven  of  the  line,  positive  orders  to  attack 
Blonac  if  he  appeared  on  his  station.  As  Fort  Royal, 
however,  was  Bl(jnac's  probable  destination,  Swanton 
was  further  directed,  if  he  had  already  taken  Grenada,  to 
join  the  flag  at  once  with  five  of  the  line,  so  as  to  enable 
Rodney  to  form  two  squadrons  each  strong  enough  to 
engage  the  enemy  whether  he  tried  to  reach  his  goal  by 
the  north  or  the  south  end  of  Martinique. 

Bk'nac,  however,  was  too  clever  to  do  either.  Having 
no  mind  to  thrust  his  head  into  the  lion's  mouth,  he 
warily  made  the  windward  side  of  Martinique  near  La 
Trinitc,  and  on  March  8th  sent  an  officer  ashore  for  in- 
telligence. Here,  early  on  the  9  th,  he  was  sighted  by 
the  very  frigate  by  which  Spry  had  sent  the  warning. 

the  capture  of  a  Spanish  ship,  bound  to  La  Guayra  from  Cadiz  on  Feb.  4. 
— Admiralty  Secretary,  In-letters,  307  ;  Captain's  Logs,  2.  Johnstone  and 
M'ljaurin  were  both  made  post  for  the  service,  and  Johnstone  governor  of 
Pensacolain  17(>.S.  -Hardy,  List  of  Captains,  1673-1783. 


1762  BLISNAC    disturbs    RODNEY  237 

The  same  afternoon  she  was  seen  from  Rodney's  flag- 
ship off  St.  Pierre,  flying  the  signal  for  an  enemy's  fleet, 
and  the  admiral  immediately  signalled  to  weigh.  Un- 
happily it  fell  calm  and  he  could  not  stir.  The  frigate- 
captain  came  on  board  and  reported  that  at  eight  o'clock 
that  morning  the  enemy's  squadron,  thirteen  sail  strong,  of 
which  eight  were  of  the  line,  were  off  La  Trinitd  standing 
south. 

The  information  indicated  that  it  was  Bldnac's  inten- 
tion to  reach  Fort  Royal  round  the  southern  point  of 
the  island.  There  Douglas  was  cruising  with  a  weak 
detachment,  and  his  position  was  critical.  Fortunately 
the  wind  had  now  sprung  up,  and  Rodney,  who  had  with 
him  six  of  the  line,  crowded  all  sail  to  the  rescue. 
Swanton  and  Hervey  had  been  given  the  same  point  for 
rendezvous,  and  he  made  no  doubt  Bk'nac  was  delivered 
into  his  hands.  But  he  was  doomed  to  disappointment. 
After  joining  Douglas  he  sailed  round  the  island  on  the 
windward  side,  but  without  finding  a  trace  of  his  oppo- 
nent. When  Blenac  had  been  seen  by  the  British  frigate 
he  had  already  ascertained  that  the  island  was  in  British 
hands,  and  was  now  on  his  way  northward,  heading  for 
Cap  Francois.  His  board  to  the  south  which  the  frigate 
had  seen  had  probably  been  only  a  ruse.  After  lying-to 
till  midday  on  the  10th  he  put  before  the  wind,  warned 
perhaps  from  the  shore  of  Rodney's  movement,  and  after 
running  so  close  to  La  Trinite  that  the  ofiicer  in  command 
made  ready  for  an  attack,  he  held  away  northward  to- 
wards Dominica.  A  day  or  two  after  came  news  from 
Guadeloupe  that  he  had  been  seen  from  there  steering 
to  the  westward.  There  could  no  longer  be  room  for 
doubt  that  he  was  making  either  for  Jamaica  or  Cap 
Francois,  with  the  probable  intention  of  effecting  a  pre- 
concerted   junction   with    the   Spaniards.      Rodney   thus 


2  38  INTERVENTION    OF   SPAIN  1762 

found  himself  confronted  witli  a  strategical  situation 
which  called  for  all  his  sagacity  and  readiness  to  take 
responsibility. 

In  Havana  he  knew  that  a  formidable  naval  concentra- 
tion had  been  going  on  for  some  time.  It  was  said  that 
fourteen  of  the  line  were  already  there,  and  others  were  on 
the  station.  He  felt,  like  Saunders  at  the  other  side  of 
the  ocean,  that  at  all  hazards  the  allied  squadrons  must  be 
prevented  from  getting  together.  To  stop  Blenac  reach- 
ing Cap  Francois  was  now  impossible,  and  Swanton  and 
Hervey  having  by  this  time  joined  he  resolved  to  return 
to  St.  Pierre  for  victuals  and  water  with  all  speed,  and 
then  to  proceed  to  the  succour  of  Jamaica.  His  orders 
under  the  circumstances  that  had  arisen,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, did  no  more  than  authorise  his  detaching 
Douglas  to  Jamaica.  But  they  had  been  issued  before 
the  Spanish  declaration  of  war,  and  like  the  fine  officer 
he  was  in  his  prime,  he  determined  to  take  the  responsi- 
bility of  leaving  his  station  for  the  point  of  danger. 

As  in  hot  haste  he  was  watering  at  St.  Pierre  the  crisis 
was  intensified,  and  the  course  on  which  he  had  determined 
made  clearer.  An  urgent  express  came  in  from  the 
governor  and  council  of  Jauiaica,  to  say  they  had  learned 
from  intercepted  letters  that  the  island  was  to  be  attacked 
by  the  combined  forces  of  Spain  and  France,  and  the 
French  officers  who  were  to  command  were  on  board 
Blenac 's  fleet.  Blenac  had  reached  Cap  Francois  on  the 
15  th,  that  is  about  the  same  time  that  Rodney  had  re- 
turned to  water  at  St.  Pierre.  Captain  Carteret  of  the 
Merlin  sloop  had  been  watching  the  port  as  usual,  when 
that  night  he  suddenly  found  himself  close  to  the  French 
fleet.  Some  of  them  gave  chase,  and  seeing  no  escape 
Carteret,  as  a  last  hope,  began  signalling  with  lights  and 
guns,  as  though  the  British  battle-fleet  were  within  call. 


1762      RODNEY    CONSTRUES    HIS    ORDERS      239 

Trite  as  was  the  device,  it  succeeded.  It  was  no  part  of 
Blenac's  game  to  fight  single-handed.  He  was  fortunate 
enough  not  to  find  the  Jamaica  squadron  barring  his  en- 
trance to  Cap  Francois.  The  chasing  ships  were  recalled, 
and  the  squadron  went  crowding  into  port  in  such  a 
hurry  that  a  sixty-four  took  the  ground  and  was  lost.^ 

Thus  threatened,  the  Jamaica  authorities  felt  compelled 
to  urge  Rodney  and  Monckton  to  send  them  relief.  To 
add  to  the  trouble,  their  demand  was  accompanied  by 
a  letter  from  Captain  Forrest,  the  senior  oflficer  on  the 
station,  to  say  that  his  admiral,  the  gallant  and  resource- 
ful Holmes,  was  dead — a  loss  which  may  have  accounted 
for  Cap  Francois  having  been  left  open. 

All  shadow  of  doubt  as  to  what  his  duty  was  was  now 
removed  from  Rodney's  mind.  Not  only  did  he  resolve 
to  move  at  once  to  the  Jamaica  station  Avith  every  ship 
that  could  be  spared  from  the  Caribbee  Islands,  but  he 
pressed  Monckton  to  let  him  take  a  body  of  troops  as 
well.  In  spite  of  the  admiral's  importunity,  Monckton 
in  great  distress  refused.  He  did  not,  he  said,  consider 
himself  sufficiently  authorised  to  detach  troops  from 
his  command  without  orders  from  England.  For  this 
refusal  he  was  afterwards  blamed  by  his  commander-in- 
chief,  Amherst,  who  wrote  to  him  that  he  ought  to  have 
assented,  in  view  of  the  Spanish  concentration  at  Havana. 
In  the  general's  defence,  however,  it  must  be  said,  that 
whereas  Rodney  had  definite  orders  to  make  a  detach- 
ment to  Jamaica  if  it  were  threatened  by  Blenac,  Monck- 
ton had  not.  Still,  with  this  evidence  of  what  was  in 
the  mind  of  the  Home  Government,  Monckton,  had  he 
been  a  less  commonplace  officer  than  he  was,  might  well 
have  decided  "  to  march  to  the  sound  of  the  guns."  Still, 
for  all  his  fine  soldiership,  he  would  not  be  persuaded, 

'  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  536. 


240  INTERVENTION    OF^  SPAIN  1762 

and  Rodney  went  off  with  practically  his  whole  fleet. 
"  I  flatter  myself,"  wrote  Rodney  in  his  despatch,  "  their 
lordships  will  not  be  displeased  with  me  if  I  take  the 
liberty  to  construe  my  instructions  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  think  myself  authorised  and  obliged  to  succour 
any  of  his  Majesty's  colonies  that  may  be  in  danger ; 
and  shall  therefore  hasten  to  the  succour  of  Jamaica  with 
ten  sail  of  the  line,  three  frigates,  and  three  bombs." 
And  he  concluded  by  saying  that  it  was  his  intention, 
unless  he  received  orders  to  the  contrary,  which  he  ob- 
viously expected,  to  return  to  his  station  before  the  hur- 
ricane months,  leaving  a  sufl&cient  force  behind  him  for 
the  protection  of  Jamaica.  After  making  all  deductions, 
it  was  a  fine  resolve,  and  should  live  as  a  classical 
example  of  a  seamanlike  interpretation  of  orders,  and 
of  the  true  spirit  of  command.^ 

When  Rodney  penned  his  despatch,  he  had  already 
reached  Antigua.  By  the  division  of  his  force  which 
he  intended  to  make,  he  would,  with  Holmes's  squadron, 
have  perhaps  twenty  of  the  line,  a  force  about  equal  to 
the  combined  squadrons  of  the  enemy,  and  amply  suf- 
ficient by  defensive  action  to  prevent  an  oversea  military 
expedition.  At  the  same  time  he  would  be  able  to  send 
back  Douglas  with  eight  of  the  line,  which  would  be 
sufficient  to  deal  with  Blenac  if  he  doubled  back,  or  with 
the  Rochefort  squadron  if  it  came  out.  To  Forrest, 
as  acting  commander  on  the  Jamaica  station,  he  wrote 
that  he  was  to  meet  him  with  his  whole  squadron  at 
Cape  Nicholas  in  the  Windward  Passage,  as  it  was  his 
intention  to  get  between  the  enemy's  squadrons  and 
blockade  Bk'nac  wherever  he  found  him.     This  done  he 


»  Rodney  to  the  Admiralty,  March  24,  In-letters,  307  (Printed  by  Mundy, 
i.  p.  80);  Amherst  to  Egremont,  May  12,  S.P.  Colonial  (America  and  West 
Indies),  97  ;  and  c/.  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  530  et  seq. 


1762  RODNEY   GETS    FRESH    ORDERS         241 

went  on  to  St.  Christopher's,  where  he  meant  finally 
to  divide  his  force.  He  reached  it  on  March  26,  but 
only  to  sufifer  another  bitter  disappointment,  for  there 
he  was  met  by  Captain  Elphinstone,  of  the  Richmond 
frigate,  with  fresh  orders  direct  from  home. 

They  told  him  that  a  secret  expedition  was  coming  out 
by  the  middle  of  April  under  Sir  George  Pocock  of 
Indian  fame  and  the  Earl  of  Albemarle.  He  was  to 
be  superseded  in  the  supreme  command,  but  with  a 
handsome  apology  it  was  explained  that  the  importance 
of  the  enterprise  demanded  an  officer  of  high  rank  at 
its  head.  The  actual  objective  was  not  disclosed.  Rodney 
was  merely  informed  that  the  intention  was  to  make  an 
impression  on  the  Spanish  colonies  and  everything  must 
give  way  to  it.  Even  if  Martinique  were  not  entirely 
conquered,  all  further  operations  must  be  suspended. 
Rodney  himself  was  to  be  under  Pocock's  orders,  and  was 
to  devote  himself  to  preparing  for  the  "  grand  expedition." 
He  had  strict  orders  himself  to  repair  to  Martinique  to 
prepare  transports  for  Monckton's  force  to  take  its  part, 
and  to  organise  a  division  of  ten  of  the  line,  whose 
captains  were  junior  to  Swanton,  for  special  service  with 
the  expedition.  To  leave  no  room  for  independent  judg- 
ment, the  order  concluded  in  the  most  stringent  form. 
"  As  you  must  be  sensible  of  the  great  importance  of  these 
orders  it  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  add  any  motives  to 
enforce  the  most  punctual  and  expeditious  obedience 
thereto."  ^ 

Even  so  it  was  beyond  Rodney's  nature  to  obey.  Strict 
as  were  his  orders,  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  abandon 
his  move,  and  at  this  point  his  conduct,  which  up  to  then 
most  men  will  praise,  becomes  more  doubtful.  There  was 
within  his  knowledge  something  upon  which  the  Home 

1  In-laters  (Secret  Orders),  1332,  Feb.  5. 
VOL.  II.  Q 


242  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1762 

Government  had  not  counted.  The  Brest  squadron  was 
in  Cap  Francjois,  bent  on  forming  a  junction  with  the 
Spaniards  at  Havana.  Strategy  cried  aloud  with  a  voice 
that  seemed  to  drown  all  other  considerations  that  it 
should  be  kept  there,  and  Rodney  could  not  shut  his 
ears.  On  the  other  hand,  he  certainly  should  have 
remembered  that  there  was  much  in  the  mind  of  the 
Government  which  was  concealed  from  him,  and  he  knew 
they  were  not  unaware  of  Blenac's  escape.  There  was  a 
new  war  plan  on  foot,  the  details  of  which  had  been  kept 
from  him,  and  to  which  he  was  strictly  enjoined  to  make 
himself  subservient.  Under  such  circumstances  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  an  officer  is  ever  justified  in  acting 
on  his  own  initiative,  however  plausible  it  may  appear  on 
the  spot,  when  such  initiative  involves  a  clear  departure 
from  the  main  lines  of  the  war  plan,  so  far  as  it  is  dis- 
closed to  him.  Yet  this  is  what  Rodney  did.  For  him 
to  leave  his  station  himself  was  now  impossible.  The 
orders  were  too  imperative  for  that.  But  in  spite  of  his 
plain  instructions  to  have  a  squadron  under  Swanton  ready 
for  Pocock  when  he  arrived,  he  decided  that  Douglas 
should  still  go  on  in  accordance  with  the  discretion  his 
original  orders  allowed.  While  he,  therefore,  returned  to 
Martinique,  Douglas,  with  ten  of  the  line  and  Hervey  for 
his  second,  held  on  for  Jamaica. 

In  Port  Royal,  which  Douglas  reached  on  April  12,  he 
found  nine  sail.  Here,  too,  he  heard  that  the  Brest 
squadron,  now  reduced  to  six  of  the  line  and  three 
frigates,  was  in  Cap  Francois,  and  that  any  intention 
there  may  have  been  of  an  attack  on  Jamaica  from 
Havana  had  been  abandoned,  owing,  it  was  believed,  to 
the  dispositions  which  Rodney  had  maxie.  He  also  heard 
that  more  troops  were  expected  down  from  North 
America  to  join  the  "  grand  expedition,"  and  had  sight  of 


1762  RODNEY   DISOBEYS  243 

the  orders  which  had  been  sent  to  Holmes,  in  view  of  the 
coming  expedition.  In  these  the  dead  admiral  was 
ordered  to  assist  in  raising  five  hundred  negroes  to  act 
with  Albemarle's  troops  and  to  await  Pocock's  instruc- 
tions at  Port  Royal  with  all  his  squadron  ready  to  sail. 
The  orders  ended  with  the  same  stringent  clause  as 
Rodney's.^  But  Douglas  was  as  little  atfected  as  his 
chief.  The  danger  of  the  American  contingent  seemed 
to  him  to  justify  the  freest  interpretation.  Instead,  there- 
fore, of  obeying  he  took  a  leaf  out  of  Rodney's  book,  and 
immediately  sent  Hervey  away  with  seven  of  the  line 
and  two  frigates  to  take  station  at  Tortuga,  an  island 
which  lies  just  to  leeward  of  Cap  Francois,  so  as  to  cover 
the  passage  of  the  North  American  transports,  and  deal 
with  Blenac  if  he  attempted  to  come  out.- 

Rodney  himself  returned  to  St.  Pierre.  There  he 
found  Monckton  had  been  concentrating  every  man  that 
could  safely  be  recalled  from  the  island  garrisons.  The 
unhappy  admiral  likewise  busied  himself  with  transport 
arrangements  according  to  his  new  instructions.  Still  he 
could  not  be  content  to  see  his  squadron  idle,  and  in  spite 
of  the  order  to  undertake  no  new  operations,  and  his 
special  directions  about  Swanton,  he  despatched  him  with 
the  greatest  part  of  his  remaining  ships  to  cruise  on  the 
Spanish  main. 

It  may  be  that  the  chance  of  rich  prizes  was  not  without 
influence  in  this  decision.^  There  was,  however,  a  good 
strategical  reason  which  was  quite  in  accord  with  his  other 
dispositions.  For  in  Cartagena  lay  a  Spanish  squadron 
of  three  of  the  line  and    a   frigate,  which  might  well  be 

»  Secret  Orders,  1332,  Feb.  5. 

*  Douglas  to  the  Admiralty,  May  8,  In-lctters,  307. 

*  Rodney  to  the  Admiralty,  May  31. — Mundy,  vol.  i.  p.  02.  There  he 
only  says,  "Mr.  Swanton  has  rejoined  me  from  the  Spanish  main,  where 
I  sent  him  to  cruise  for  some  time,  but  without  success." 


244  INTERVENTION    OF    SPAIN  1762 

destined  to  form  part  of  a  general  concentration  against 
Jamaica,  and  which,  therefore,  had  to  be  watched  as  well 
as  Blenac  in  Cap  Francois.^  Even  if  we  assume  this  to 
have  been  his  intention,  and  he  nowhere  says  so,  the 
responsibility  he  took  in  sending  a  squadron  so  far  to 
leeward  was  very  serious.  He  was  still  further  scattering 
the  fleet  he  had  been  told  to  concentrate,  and  surely  with- 
out sufficient  justification. 

Such  cases  are  very  hard  to  judge.  Nothing  is  more 
admired  with  us  than  a  fearlessness  of  responsibility  and 
a  sagacious  readiness  to  interpret  orders  in  the  light  of 
actual  conditions  on  the  spot.  Yet  nothing  is  more 
dangerous.  Where  is  the  line  to  be  drawn  ?  It  is 
impossible  to  say.  Yet  the  present  case  would  seem 
to  indicate  that  it  lies  somewhere  between  Rodney's  first 
resolution  and  his  second.  His  first  impulse  to  protect 
Jamaica  it  is  difficult  not  to  applaud ;  but  what  of  his 
second  after  his  new  orders  were  received  ?  He  knew 
that  he  was  to  be  superseded,  and  superseded  because 
of  his  inexperience  and  the  impossibility  of  his  knowing 
what  was  in  the  mind  of  the  Government.  So  much  he 
was  plainly  told.  He  knew,  moreover,  that  he  was  to 
be  subservient  to  a  new  plan  of  campaign  for  which 
another  man  was  responsible,  and  which  had  not  been 
disclosed  to  him.  Even  the  objective  he  could  only 
guess.  It  may  well  be  doubted  whether,  under  such 
circumstances,  any  local  considerations  could  justify  the 
wide  liberty  Rodney  took  with  his  plain  orders.  Surely 
he  should  have  considered  that  what  he  know  of  the 
local  conditions  to  justify  his  action  was  insignificant 
compared  with  his  almost  entire  ignorance  of  the  new- 
plan    of    campaign.       The    special     knowledge    of    the 

1  Duro,  Armada  Espanola,  vol.  vii.  p.  43.     There  is  no  actual  evidence 
that  Rodney  knew  of  this  squadron. 


1762  WAS    RODNEY    RIGHT?  245 

Admiralty  was  out  of  all  proportion  greater  than  his 
own,  and,  in  such  cases,  simple  obedience  like  Monckton's 
seems  the  better  course.  At  best,  Rodney's  conduct  on 
this  occasion  must  stand  for  an  example  of  latitude  of 
interpretation  being  stretched  to  its  extreme  limit. 


CHAFIER   IX 

THE   ATTACK   ON   SPAIN— HAVANA 

In  the  attitude  which  each  officer  had  chosen  to  assume, 
Rodney  and  Monckton  awaited  the  coming  of  the  "  grand 
expedition."  Its  objective,  as  none  could  doubt,  was 
Havana.  It  is  said  the  conception  was  Pitt's,  and  that, 
like  Drake  in  1585,  he  was  bent  on  stabbing  Spain  at 
once  in  the  heart  of  her  colonial  power  and  wealth. 
However  this  may  be,  the  general  design  was  certainly 
Anson's,  founded  on  information  furnished  by  Admiral 
Sir  Charles  Knowles,  whom  we  have  met  with  as  second 
in  command  of  the  Rochefort  expedition.  During  the 
late  war,  he  had  himself  conducted  operations  against 
Cuba,  had  made  an  unsuccessful  attack  on  Santiago, 
and  had  fought  an  indecisive  action  before  Havana. 
Since  then  he  had  been  for  four  years  governor  of 
Jamaica,  and,  as  late  as  1756,  in  the  last  year  of  his 
office,  had  visited  Havana  and  been  entertained  by  the 
Spanish  governor.  Having  kept  his  eyes  open,  he  was 
able  to  provide  a  detailed  report  on  the  defences  and 
general  condition  of  the  place,  and  to  indicate  exactly 
the  points  at  which  it  was  most  easily  assailable.  To 
his  report  he  added  a  strong  opinion  as  to  the  feasibility 
of  the  enterprise,  and  the  unparalleled  advantages  that 
must  ensue  from  its  success.^ 

•  Add.  MSS.,  23,678.     This  unnoticed  document  is  in  the  form  of  an 

anonymous  pamphlet,   but  apparently  Knowles  never  published  it.     He 

says  that  after   all  was  over  the  Journal  of  the  Siege   was  submitted  to 

him  to  revise  before  publication.     He  seized  the  occasion,  after  his  cross- 

246 


1762  ANSON'S    LAST    PROJECT  247 

Thus  fortified,  Anson  had  little  difficulty  in  over- 
coming the  resistance  in  his  way.  In  spite  of  the 
determined  opposition  of  Bedford  and  the  half-hearted 
doubts  of  the  Newcastle  set,  the  new  Government  took 
up  his  idea  with  commendable  promptitude.  It  was 
only  at  Christmas,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Bristol's 
departure  was  known  in  London,  yet,  by  the  first  week 
in  January,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Secret  Committee  to 
settle  the  war  plan,  all  was  decided.  Bedford,  who  was 
in  open  opposition  to  continuing  the  war  at  all,  was  not 
summoned.  There  were  present  Devonshire,  Anson, 
Ligonier,  Grenville,  and  Newcastle,  with  the  two  Secre- 
taries of  State,  Bute  and  Egremont.  "  We  began,"  wrote 
Newcastle,  "  with  my  Lord  Anson's  project  of  attacking 
Havana,  and,  after  hearing  the  facility  with  which  his 
lordship  and  Lord  Ligonier  apprehended  there  was  in 
doing  it,  we  all  unanimously  ordered  the  undertaking."  ^ 


grained  manner,  to  draw  up  an  intemperate  invective  on  the  whole  conduct 
of  the  operations  and  Anson's  plan  of  campaign,  being  particularly  bitter 
against  the  soldiers.  No  great  importance  need  be  attached  to  it.  J""or 
all  his  many  good  qualities  he  was  constitutionally  wrong-headed  and 
quarrelsome,  and  by  this  time  he  was  thoroughly  embittered  and  a  con- 
firmed pamphleteer.  After  Vernon's  failure  at  Cartagena  in  1741  he  had 
written  a  similar  attack  on  the  army  ;  his  action  off  Havana  had  led  to  an 
unprecedented  crop  of  duels  and  court-martials  ;  and,  after  Rochefort,  he 
had  perversely  taken  upon  himself  to  defend  General  Mordaunt,  and  so 
offensive  was  the  pamphlet  he  wrote  both  to  Pitt  and  Anson  that  he  was 
deprived  of  the  command  of  the  "Grand  Fleet,"  which  he  then  held,  and 
was  no  more  employed  at  sea. 

The  work  submitted  to  Knowles  for  Tewision  v/a,s  An  AutherUic  Journal 
of  the  Siege  of  Havana,  by  an  Officer,  1762.  It  is  from  the  military  point  of 
view,  and  is  the  chief  authority  for  the  expedition.  With  Knowles's  MS. 
there  is  another  Journal  by  "  the  chief  engineer,"  Patrick  MacKellar,  who 
had  served  in  the  same  capacity  at  the  taking  and  the  defence  of  Quebec, 
and  at  Martinique,  and  as  second  at  Louisbourg.  It  was  published  in  the 
Gazette,  Sept.  1762. 

1  Hardwicke  clearly  attributed  the  design  to  Anson.  In  the  notes  of  his 
speech  on  the  Peace,  where  he  reaches  the  question  of  Havana,  he  writes, 
"  Stop  a  little,  and  here  do  justice  to  Lord  Anson." — Parliamentary  History, 
vol.  XV.  p.   1254,  note.     Cf.  also  -post  p.  2()1,  note.     Writing  to  Newcastle, 


248  HAVANA  1762 

Then  Egremont  brought  up  Colonel  Draper's  design  for 
taking  Manilla  with  the  troops  already  in  India  in  concert 
with  the  East  India  Company.  This  also,  "  in  a  manner," 
says  Newcastle,  was  agreed  to.  Then  followed  the  thorny 
question  as  to  whether  it  was  possible,  in  view  of  the 
demands  of  the  new  war,  to  continue  the  war  in 
Germany.  On  this  point  no  agreement,  even  "in  a 
manner,"  was  possible.  It  was  destined,  indeed,  in  a 
few  months  to  break  up  the  Government.^ 

The  new  offensive  movement,  once  decided  on,  was 
pushed  forward  with  energy.  Anson  was  still  at  his 
post,  spilling  the  last  drops  of  his  devoted  life  in  the 
service  of  the  country  which  owed  him  so  much.  He 
had  always  protested  the  fleet  was  unequal  to  a  war 
with  both  France  and  Spain.  With  the  last  glow  of 
his  energy,  as  it  smouldered  out,  he  proved  it  was  not ; 
but  the  effort  killed  him.  Pocock's  final  orders  were 
issued  on  February  18th,  and  they  were  the  last  he  ever 
signed.  After  that  he  broke  up,  and,  early  in  June, 
before  he  could  know  the  result  of  his  work,  he  was 
dead.^ 

Pocock's  appointment  was  certainly  his  work.  As  we 
shall  see,  the  plan  of  campaign  demanded  for  its  conduct 
a  man  of  the  highest  powers,  not  only  as  a  fighting 
admiral,  but  as  a  navigator  and  seaman,  and  from  both 
points  of  view  no  better  choice  could  have  been  made. 
Boscawen  was  dead ;  Hawke  was  wanted  for  the  Channel 

Oct.  2,  on  receiving  news  of  the  fall  of  Havana,  he  says:  "It  does  the 
greatest  honour  to  the  memory  of  poor  Lord  Anson,  who  had  so  great  a 
part  in  the  formation  and  direction  of  it." — Newcastle  Papers,  32,943. 

1  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Jan.  10,  NeiocasUe  Papers,  32,933. 

*  Writing  on  July  22  a  private  letter  to  Anson,  Rodney  begins:  "It 
was  with  infinite  concern  I  heard  of  your  lordship's  bad  state  of  health, 
and  I  most  sincerely  hope  ere  this  it  is  perfectly  restored." — Mundy, 
vol.  i.  p.  93.  He  had  been  ill  since  the  beginning  of  the  year. — Walpole, 
George  III.,  vol.  i.  p.  130,  and  Newcastle  Papers,  ibid,  passim. 


1762  STAFF    OF   THE    EXPEDITION  249 

Fleet ;  Saunders  could  not  be  spared  from  the  all- 
important  Mediterranean  command  ;  and,  after  them,  no 
one  could  show  so  fine  a  record  of  fleet  actions  as 
Pocock,  and  he  had  served  as  commander-in-chief  on 
the  Leeward  Islands  station  during  the  late  war.  Keppel, 
though  still  only  a  commodore,  was  selected  for  the 
second  post,  as  he  richly  deserved,  and  was  given  a 
special  commission  to  be  second-in-command  and  Pocock's 
successor  in  case  of  his  death.  It  was  not  quite  fair  to 
Rodney,  whose  knowledge  of  the  theatre  and  well-earned 
success  should  have  marked  him  for  the  second  post. 
But  his  success  was  not  yet  known,  and,  besides  in 
Keppel's  appointment,  though  as  an  old  "  Centurion " 
he  was  probably  a  'persoTia  grata  to  Anson,  we  perhaps  see 
traces  of  an  influence  which  was  flagrantly  evident  in 
the  military  command. 

At  the  War  Office  there  was  no  Anson  to  resist  court 
and  political  favouritism.  The  Duke  of  Cumberland  was 
again  in  the  ascendant.  The  young  King  had  a  high 
regard  for  his  uncle,  and,  though  he  held  no  office,  he  was 
the  real  military  adviser  of  the  throne.  So  the  unhappy 
game,  which  Pitt  had  stopped  with  so  much  difficulty, 
began  again.  The  old  Duke  was  incorrigible.  After  the 
Martinique  expedition  had  sailed,  he  had  told  Newcastle 
he  approved  of  the  design,  but  not  of  the  admiral,  the 
general,  or  the  number  of  troops.^  Whether  he  thought 
the  troops  were  too  many  or  too  few  is  not  clear,  but 
what  he  meant  about  the  general  became  painfully 
evident.  In  his  eyes  no  one  could  be  fit  for  such  a 
command  who  had  not  been  on  his  staff".  He  believed, 
no  doubt  honestly  enough,  that  his  "  family  "  embraced 
all  the  real  military  talent  in  the  country,  and  highest 
in  favour  in  his  "  family  "  stood  Keppel's  eldest  brother, 

*  Newcastle  to  Devonshire,  Oct.  31,  1761,  Neiocastle  Papers,  ;i2,9;5(i. 


2  50  HAVANA  1762 

the  young  Earl  of  Albemarle.  He  was  not  yet  forty, 
and  had  been  a  member  of  the  Duke's  household  ever 
since  he  was  sixteen,  and  had  served  on  his  staff  at 
Fontenoy  and  Culloden,  Whatever  his  hereditary 
abilities  for  command,  he  had  never  held  one,  and 
whatever  knowledge  of  his  profession  he  had  acquired 
as  the  Duke's  aide-de-camp  he  had  never  proved  it. 
By  Wolfe,  with  all  his  admiration  for  the  Duke, 
Albemarle  was  set  down  as  a  parade  officer,  whose 
soldiership  consisted  in  a  taste  for  showy  uniforms. 

For  second  in  command  there  was  General  George 
Eliott,  better  known  as  Lord  Heathfield,  the  famous 
defender  of  Gibraltar.  His  record  during  the  war  was 
very  high.  In  the  expedition  against  Cherbourg  and 
St.  Malo,  he  had  been  remarked  for  his  soldier-like  efforts 
to  set  right  the  mistakes  of  the  incompetent  quarter- 
master-general,^ and  ever  since  he  had  been  commanding 
his  regiment  in  Germany  and  winning  golden  opinions 
from  Prince  Ferdinand,  The  two  divisional  generals 
were  La  Fausille  and  Albemarle's  younger  brother, 
William  Keppel.  Thus  no  less  than  three  of  that 
favoured  family  were  given  the  chance  of  a  lion's  share 
in  the  enormous  booty  that  was  confidently  expected 
from  the  expedition,  while  the  men  on  the  spot,  like 
Haviland  and  Rollo,  who  had  borne  the  heat  and  burden 
of  the  day  and  made  themselves  masters  of  amphibious 
warfare,  had  to  be  content  with  brigades.  The  only 
redeeming  feature  in  the  staff,  besides  Eliott,  was  the 
appointment  of  Colonel  Guy  Carleton  to  the  important 
post  of  quarter-master-general.  He  had  been  Wolfe's 
favourite  officer,  and,  in  spite  of  the  old  King's  vehement 
opposition,  Pitt  had  insisted  on  his  having  him  in  the 
same   post   for   the   Quebec   expedition.      He   was  fresh 

^  Stop  ford- SackeviUe  MSS.  (Hist.  MSS.  Com.),  IX.  iii.  72a. 


1762  POSITION    OF    PORTUGAL  251 

from  the  successful  command  of  a  brigade  at  Belleisle, 
and,  as  he  also  had  been  of  the  Duke's  family,  there  was 
now  no  difficulty  about  it. 

It  is  usually  said  that  considerable  delay  occurred  in 
getting  the  expedition  away.  It  is  certainly  true  that, 
owiner  to  the  hesitation  of  the  new  Government  in  de- 
daring  war,  preparations  began  a  little  late.  But  the 
truth  is  that  when  once  the  decision  Avas  taken,  the 
matter  was  pushed  through  with  an  energy  and  success 
that  Pitt  himself  could  not  have  surpassed.  The  feat 
of  the  new  administration  is  all  the  more  remarkable  if 
we  consider  the  difficulties  it  had  to  overcome  from  the 
nervousness  of  the  older  Ministers  and  the  vastness  of 
the  whole  plan,  of  which  the  Havana  expedition  Avas 
only  a  part.  Newcastle  soon  became  alarmed  at  the 
scale  on  which  it  was  being  prepared,  for  it  was  be- 
coming every  day  more  evident  that  assistance  of  some 
kind  would  have  to  be  sent  to  Portugal.  In  every  war 
we  had  had  with  Spain  the  security  of  our  ancient  ally 
had  always  been  a  serious  preoccupation.  Apart  from 
the  importance  of  our  commercial  interests,  which  the 
famous  Methuen  treaty  had  set  up,  Lisbon  was  almost 
essential  to  maintaining  our  naval  position  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  especially  so  since  the  loss  of  Minorca. 
At  the  moment,  owing  to  the  earthquake  at  Lisbon 
and  other  causes,  Portugal  was  particularly  weak,  and 
one  of  the  motives  which  had  hardened  the  heart  of 
Spain  to  declaring  war  was  always  supposed  to  be  the 
prospect  of  seizing  it,  as  the  Duke  of  Alva  had  done 
for  Philip  II.  in  1580.  Choiseul  quite  approved  the 
idea.  In  the  eyes  of  both  France  and  Spain,  Portugal 
was  little  better  than  a  British  colony,  and  it  seemed 
obviously  to  offer  the  necessary  scope  for  bringing 
military  pressure   to  bear  upon  the  common  enemy  in 


252  HAVANA  1762 

exactly  the  same  way  that  Hanover  did  in  Northern 
Europe. 

So  certain  was  the  Conrt  of  Lisbon  of  what  to  expect 
that  Mello,  who  was  then  Portuguese  Minister  in  London, 
was  already  pressing  for  assistance.  What  he  asked 
was  twelve  thousand  foot,  three  or  four  thousand  horse, 
guns  and  arms  for  the  whole  Portuguese  army,  and 
a  complete  staif  to  organise  and  command  it.  Such 
a  succour  was  quite  out  of  the  question,  at  least  for 
the  present ;  but  he  had  been  promised  half  the  foot 
he  asked,  a  regiment  of  light  horse  and  twenty  thou- 
sand stand  of  arms.  Mello  was  not  content,  and  pro- 
tested if  the  whole  did  not  come  before  May,  his  master 
must  submit.  Newcastle  pressed  the  point  on  Bute,  and 
Bute  would  only  say  that  he  would  probably  be  able  to 
do  what  was  wanted,  as  he  had  no  intention  of  support- 
ing the  war  in  Germany.  This,  of  course,  shut  New- 
castle's mouth.  It  was  a  price  he  was  not  prepared  to 
pay,  and  in  the  old  feeble  spirit  he  began  to  tease  to 
have  the  Havana  expedition  diverted  to  Lisbon.  His 
suggestions  were  treated  almost  with  contempt.  "  A 
most  expensive,  hazardous  expedition  to  the  Havana," 
he  wrote  in  despair,  "  when  both  ships  and  men  are 
wanted  elsewhere.  A  wild-goose  chase  (as  I  now  under- 
stand), afterwards  after  Mexico,  St.  Augustine  and  God 
knows  what,  and  the  whimsical  plan  of  expeditions 
going  on  faster  than  ever.  Portugal  is  also  to  be 
defended  at  a  vast  expense.  God  knows  from  whence 
and  how."  ^ 

The  strain  of  this  aspect  of  the  war  must  have  been 
very  great,  but  Grenville  at  least  was  too  good  a  pupil  of 
Pitt's  to  allow  anything  to  distract  his  attention  from 
the  main  attack.     He  and  Bute  had  quiie  got  the  upper 

^  Newcastle  Papers,  Jan.  10,  32,923,  and  Feb.  11  and  12,  32,934. 


1762        STRENGTH    OF   THE    EXPEDITION        253 

hand,   and,  so  far  from  relaxing  their  concentration  on 
Havana,  they  persisted  at  all  hazards  in  massing  upon  it 
every  man  which  Cumberland  and  Ligonier  considered 
necessary  to   ensure  success.      Important  as   it  was   to 
control  the  Bay  of  Biscay  and  to  attract  French  troops 
from  the  Spanish  frontier,  they  resolved  to  reduce  the 
garrison  of  Belleisle  to  its  lowest   defensive  point,  and 
even,  if  necessary,  to    abandon  it  altogether.     Early  in 
December,  as  we  have  already  seen,  five  more  battalions 
had  been  called  home  to  take  the  place  of  an  equivalent 
number  added  to  Albemarle's  force.     Thus  when  at  last 
they  sailed,  Albemarle  had  with  him  over  four  thousand 
men.^     Nor  was  this  all.     Immediately  after  the  troops 
arrived  from  Belleisle,  orders  were  despatched  to  Amherst 
in  America  to  provide  a  further  contingent,  and  to  Col- 
ville  to  arrange  for  their  transport  and  escort  to  Cape 
St.   Nicholas,  where   they  were   to   meet  Pocock,  or  to 
Havana  if  he  was  not  there."     In  this  way  it  was  cal- 
culated   that,    with    Monckton's    men     already    on    the 
spot,  the  force   available  in  the  West  Indies  would  be 
some  sixteen  or  seventeen  thousand  men,  which,  after 
providing   for  the  garrisons  of  the  islands,  would  give 
Albemarle  about  fourteen  thousand  for  the  main  attack. 
Finally,  Pocock  got  away  on  March   6,  a   month  later 
than  it  should  have  been,  but  still  well  in  time.     He 
took  out  five  more  of  the  line,  and,  though  this  was  two 
less  than  was  intended,  it  would  bring  the  whole  naval 
force  in  the  West  Indies  up  to  thirty-four  of  the  line, 
and  about  as  many  cruisers. 

Even  this  great  effort  did  not  exhaust  the  energy  of 

'  The  troops  were  recalled  on  Dec.  fi.  Admiralty  Secretary,  Out-lettcrs, 
1331.  Hodgson  arrived  at  Spithead  with  them  on  Jan.  10. — Hodgson  to 
Townshend,  Jan.  10,  W.O.  In-lcltcrs.  Only  one  of  the  Belleisle  regiments, 
the  9th  (Whitmore's),  went  out  with  Albemarle. 

*  Admiralty  Secretary,  Out-lettcrs  (Secret  Orders),  1332,  Jan.  13,  1762. 


2  54  HAVANA  1762 

Grenville.     Colonel  Draper's  project  for  the  capture   of 
Manilla,  which  Newcastle  thought  had  been  only  "in  a 
manner  "  agreed  upon,  was  put  in  motion  without  any 
further  regard  to  him.     At  all  costs  the  new  men  were 
determined  to  recover  the  mistake  they  had  made  by 
rivalling  the  exploits  of  the  man  they  had  supplanted. 
Before  January  was  out  the  necessary  orders  had  been 
signed,  and  Draper   was   taking  them  out  to  Steevens. 
His  instructions  were  to  arrange  a  joint  expedition  with 
the  King's  and  the  East  India  Company's  officers  for  the 
capture  of  Manilla.     The  idea  was  still  commerce  destruc- 
tion.    The   Ministers'   aim    apparently  was   to   paralyse 
Spanish  trade  at  both  its  main  sources,  and  thus  induce 
the  new  enemy  to  see  the    wisdom  of  abandoning  her 
ally.     Permanent    conquest    was    certainly   not    in   con- 
templation ;    for   Steevens   was    instructed,  after  taking 
Manilla,   to    establish   a  settlement   in   the   independent 
island  of   Mindanao,    at    the  opposite   extremity   of  the 
Philippine  group,  "  which  could  be  kept  after  the  peace."  ^ 
The  point,  though  generally  overlooked,  is  of  some  im- 
portance, not  only  for  a  correct  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  the  war  in  the  Far  East,  but  also  for  rightly 
judging  the  manner  in  which  Manilla  was  dealt  with  in 
making  peace. 

Vast  and  wide-flung  as  were  these  offensive  move- 
ments, they  were  not  permitted  to  prejudice  the  defensive 
part  of  the  plan  to  which  Pitt  had  always  attached  so 
much  importance.  Grenville,  with  Anson's  devoted  help, 
was  equal,  in  spite  of  the  strain  upon  the  resources  of  the 
country,  to  covering  the  whole  with  a  series  of  blockades 
extending  from  Dunkirk  to  Gibraltar.  The  system  upon 
which  it  was  done  is  of  the  highest  interest,  as  represent- 
ing the   developed   ideas  of   naval   strategy  which  had 

1  Secret  Orders,  1332,  Jan.  25. 


1/62  POCOCK   AND    RODNEY  255 

ripened  during  the  war.  It  is  the  last  word  of  Anson's 
school,  and  the  full  consideration  it  deserves  can  best  be 
given  when  we  come  to  consider  the  counter-strokes 
which  the  enemy  contemplated,  and  which  the  blockade 
was  designed  to  prevent.  For  the  present  it  is  enough 
to  remember  that  it  existed,  while  we  follow  the  fortunes 
of  Pocock  and  Albemarle. 

On  April  20,  forty-live  days  out,  but  well  up  to  time, 
Pocock  reached  Barbadoes  with  his  five  of  the  line,  thirty 
transports,  and  nearly  as  many  store-ships.  Here  he 
learnt  of  the  capture  of  Martinique,  and  that  Rodney, 
according  to  instructions,  had  appointed  Gas  Navires  Bay 
as  the  best  point  for  the  rendezvous.  Stores  were  also 
ready,  which  enabled  him  to  complete  to  six  months 
victuals.  Having  taken  them  on  board  he  sailed  at  once, 
and  reached  Gas  Navires  Bay  on  the  25  th.  Monckton's 
transports  were  all  there  ready  to  sail  with  the  troops  on 
board,  but  fleet  there  was  none,  and  Pocock's  feelings 
may  easily  be  imagined. 

As  instructed  by  his  secret  orders,  he  had  of  course 
expected  to  find  Rodney's  whole  squadron,  with  a  special 
division  of  ten  of  the  line,  under  Swanton,  ready  to  join 
his  flag.^  What  he  did  find  was  nothing  but  Rodney's 
own  flagship,  the  Marlborough,  with  three  other  ships  of 
the  line,  and  three  "  fifties  "  whose  condition  demanded 
their  being  sent  home  to  refit  with  the  next  convoy.  It 
was  no  more  than  the  security  of  the  island  required, 
and  Pocock  was  aghast.  To  add  to  his  vexation,  Rodney 
sent  off  word  that  he  was  down  with  fever  at  St.  Pierre 
and  could  not  come  ofl"  to  pay  his  respects.  The  anger 
of  the  new  commander-in-chief  was  pardonable ;  for,  in 
consequence  of  what  Rodney  had  done,  he  found  himself 

1  Secret  Orders,   1332,  Feb.  18;  Rodney  to  the  Admiralty,  May  31.— 
Mundy,  vol.  i.  p.  88. 


2  56  HAVANA  1762 

confronted  with    a   situation   which    must    have   looked 
almost  desperate. 

The  information  awaiting  him  was  that  in  Havana  the 
Spaniards  had  a  fleet  of  twenty  of  the  line,  and  that  the 
Brest  squadron  had  got  into  Cap  Francois,  but  whether  it 
was  still  there  or  not  was  unknown.  He  had  therefore 
to  conduct  a  combined  expedition  over  an  uncommanded 
sea  actually  in  the  face  of  two  fleets,  with  the  least  of 
which  he  was  barely  equal.  Nor  was  this  all.  The 
anxieties  of  commerce  protection  were  almost  as  great. 
For  at  St.  Kitts  lay  some  fifty  sail  of  the  outward-bound 
Jamaica  convoy,  with  two  more  of  the  line  waiting  to 
proceed  across  the  danger  zone  under  his  protection, 
while  at  Kingston  was  gathering  the  first  homeward- 
bound  convoy,  which  he  was  charged  to  see  safely  on  its 
way.  The  problem  presented  was  about  as  diflficult  as 
a  man  could  have  to  face,  and  Rodney  had  entirely  upset 
the  design  as  it  had  been  planned  at  home.  Anson  had 
based  the  whole  operation  regularly  on  a  naval  concentra- 
tion outside  the  danger  area,  but,  as  the  harassed  Admiral 
wrote  home,  Rodney  had  scattered  his  units  so  widely 
that  it  was  impossible  to  order  them  to  close  upon  him 
at  Martinique.  Rodney  had  committed  him  to  a  concen- 
tration at  Cape  St.  Nicholas,  and  from  this  there  was 
no  escape.  The  way  in  which  he  finally  solved  the 
problem  presents  one  of  the  most  instructive  strategical 
combinations  in  the  whole  war. 

There  was  one  important  consideration — and  Anson 
had  certainly  counted  upon  it  to  some  extent — which 
rendered  the  problem  less  difficult  than  it  appeared,  and 
went  far  to  justify  Rodney's  distribution.  A  concentra- 
tion of  the  allied  fleets  was  by  no  means  a  simple  matter. 
In  the  first  place,  two  allied  squadrons  are  seldom,  if  ever, 
the  same  thing  strategically  as  two  divisions  of  one  fleet. 


1762       CONFLICT    OF    ALLIED    STRATEGY        257 

It  will  rarely  happen  but  that  they  have  opposing  in- 
terests drawing  them  in  opposite  directions,  and  hardly 
ever  is  it  easy  for  them  to  agree  as  to  which  of  several 
risks  is  the  lesser  one  to  accept.  This  was  markedly  so 
in  the  present  case.  Both  the  hostile  admirals,  and 
particularly  Blenac,  who  had  express  orders  on  the 
subject,  counted  upon  a  concentration,  but  each  was 
naturally  anxious  that  it  should  be  effected  at  a  point 
which  Avould  best  cover  the  interests  of  his  own 
country.  Blenac,  who  had  left  France  before  war  with 
Spain  was  declared,  or  immediately  expected,  had  come 
to  save  what  he  could  of  the  French  islands.  Don  Juan 
de  Prado  Porto  Carrero,  the  Spanish  Captain-General,  on 
his  part,  was  strictly  charged  with  the  defence  of  Havana. 
He  had  with  him  not  twenty  of  the  line,  as  reported  to 
Pocock,  but  twenty  sail,  of  which  only  twelve  were  of  the 
line.  There  were  also'  three  of  the  line  at  Santiago  at 
the  opposite  end  of  the  island,  and  one  or  two  at  Vera 
Cruz,  the  port  of  Mexico.  They  were  all  under  the 
command  of  Don  Gutierre  de  Hevia,  Marques  del  Real 
Transporte,  who  had  come  out  with  Prado  as  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  American  squadrons.  His  orders  were,  after 
the  true  Spanish  model,  to  keep  the  Havana  squadron 
concentrated  and  within  the  port  ready  for  any  emergency, 
and  not  to  risk  needless  sorties.^  These  at  least  were  the 
last  instructions  which  he  and  Prado  had  received,  and 
they  were  nearly  six  months  old.  When  war  was  certain, 
later  orders  had  been  sent  out,  but,  owing  to  Captain 
Johnstone's  smart  warning  to  Rodney,  he  had  been  able 
to  intercept  them.  The  Milford,  of  16  guns,  fell  in 
with  the  Aviso,  that  was  carrying  them,  off  Cape  Tiburon, 
the  westernmost  point  of  St.  Domingo,  and  after  fighting 
her  all  day  he  forced  her  to  strike.     The  commander,  of 

^  Duro,  vol.  vii.  p.  43.     'J'liey  were  dated  Nov.  24. 
VOL.  II.  R 


m 


258  HAVANA  1762 

course,  sunk  his  despatches,  and  nothing  ever  reached 
Havana  except  a  copy  of  the  Madrid  Gazette  containing 
the  declaration  of  war.^ 

Added  to  these  considerations  there  was  in  the  way  of 
a  concentration  the  further  difficulty  of  the  prevailing 
weather  conditions,  and  on  these  Anson  certainly  counted. 
Though  it  was  easy  enough  for  Blenac  to  run  down  to 
Havana,  it  was  very  difficult  for  He  via  to  beat  up  to  Cap 
Fran9ois.  Rodney  and  Douglas,  of  course,  thoroughly 
appreciated  the  situation,  and,  knowing  there  was  little 
chance  of  Hevia's  attempting  to  get  to  Blenac,  had  taken 
care  that  Blenac  should  not  get  to  Hevia.  When  Prado 
and  Hevia  came  out  from  Spain  they  had  a  squadron  of 
six  of  the  line,  and  Blenac  had  securely  expected  them  to 
call  at  Cap  Francois.  Keenly  disappointed,  he  was  now 
urging  them  to  come  to  his  help.  He  informed  them 
that  Hervey's  squadron  was  before  the  port,  and  that  if 
Hevia  would  only  come  it  might  easily  be  surprised  and 
destroyed.  Then  together  they  might  take  the  offensive 
and  strike  an  important  blow.  But  Prado  and  Hevia, 
entrenched  in  their  defensive  orders,  would  not  move. 

Under  these  circumstances  a  concentration  at  Cape 
St.  Nicholas,  although  within  the  theatre  of  operations, 
was  scarcely ,  beyond  the  limit  of  legitimate  risk.  In 
any  case,  it  had  to  be  done,  and  the  day  after  Pocock 
reached  Martinique  he  sent  off  an  express  to  Douglas 
to  meet  him  there  with  all  the  Jamaica  squadron,  which, 
according  to  his  instructions,  he  believed  was  awaiting 
his  orders  in  Port  Royal.  There  was  plenty  of  time, 
for  Monckton's  arrangements  did  not  please  Albemarle, 
and  he  spent  the  best  part  of  a  fortnight  reorganising 

!  ^  Ihid.,  p.  45.  Beatson  (vol.  iii.  p.  531)  -says  the  British  vessel  was 
"tender  to  the  Dublin"  which  was  Douglas's  flagship.  If  so,  she  must 
have  been  sent  on  special  service  into  these  waters. 


1/62        ANSON'S    PLAN    OF    OPERATIONS         259 

the  whole  of  the  transport  disposition  that  had  been 
made,  getting  more  troops  from  Dominica  and  fitting 
out  horse  transports.  It  is  clear  every  one  was  in  a 
bad  temper  over  what  had  been  done.  Pocock  found 
relief  for  his  feelings  in  taking  away  Rodney's  flagship. 
Owing  to  the  scattering  of  the  fleet,  so  he  informed  the 
Admiralty,  he  could  not  possibly  do  without  the  Marl- 
borough, and  to  Rodney's  intense  disgust  he  bundled  all 
his  staff  into  a  sixty-four.  By  this  means,  with  the  tAvo 
ships  of  the  line  which  were  waiting  at  St.  Kitts,  he  was 
able  to  bring  his  own  battle  squadron  up  to  eight  sail, 
that  is,  superior  to  what  he  believed  Blenac's  to  be,  and 
on  May  6  th,  after  having  sent  forward  orders  for  the 
convoy  to  meet  him  at  Basse  Terre  Road,  in  St.  Kitts, 
he  sailed  on  his  perilous  enterprise. 

The  reason  why  the  final  concentration  was  to  be  at 
Cape  St.  Nicholas,  that  is,  in  the  Windward  Passage 
between  St.  Domingo  and  Cuba,  brings  us  to  the  most 
brilliant  point  in  Anson's  design.  It  was  not,  of  course, 
on  the  ordinary  route  from  the  Windward  Islands  to 
Havana.  That  lay  dead  to  leeward,  past  Jamaica  and 
through  the  Yucatan  Channel,  with  an  easy  beat  back 
of  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  with  the  current 
along  the  north-western  end  of  Cuba.  The  natural  plan, 
therefore,  and  the  one  the  enemy  would  expect,  was  a 
concentration  at  Port  Royal,  with  a  squadron  held  back 
off  Cap  Francois  to  blockade  Blcnac  and  cover  the  line 
of  passage  from  North  America  as  Hervey  was  then 
doing.  It  was  indeed  a  strategical  certainty  that  so  long 
as  the  Spaniards  saw  no  concentration  at  Jamaica  they 
Avould  be  lulled  into  comparative  security. 

Now,  surprise  is  of  the  essence  of  the  class  of  opera- 
tions to  which  the  present  one  belonged,  and  had  there 
been  any  doubt  of  it  there  was  the  fine  old  precedent  of 


26o  HAVANA  1762 

Drake's  attempt  on  San  Juan  de  Puerto  Rico  in  1595,  the 
last  and  perhaps  boldest  of  his  dazzling  career.  That 
master  of  daring  expedients  had  not  been  content  to  reach 
his  objective  by  the  ordinary  route  from  the  westward 
through  the  Mona  Passage,  but,  in  order  to  effect  a 
surprise,  had  performed  what  was  then  regarded  as  the 
incredible  feat  of  carrying  his  whole  force  through  the 
uncharted  labyrinth  of  the  Virgin  Archipelago,  and  had 
sprung  upon  his  prey  from  the  eastward.  Anson,  whose 
name  had  been  made  in  reviving  Drake's  glory  in  the 
South  Sea,  must  have  known  the  story  well.  Indeed,  a 
declaration  of  war  with  Spain  had  always  been  the  signal 
for  reopening  the  pages  of  Drake's  life,  and  Anson  knew 
that  here  was  a  chance  of  repeating  his  exploit  at  Puerto 
Rico. 

To  Havana,  as  to  Puerto  Rico,  there  existed  another 
route  from  the  eastward  and  windward.  It  lay  through 
the  Old  Bahama  Channel,  and  as  the  similar  route 
through  the  Virgins  had  never  been  used  till  Drake 
sounded  his  way  through  it,  so  the  Old  Bahama  Channel, 
from  its  intricacies  and  dangers,  was  regarded  as  im- 
practicable for  the  unweatherly  fleets  of  those  days,  and 
was  never  used  by  the  Spaniards  except  for  quite  small 
craft.  But  Anson  had  in  his  possession — booty  probably 
of  his  adventurous  youth — an  old  Spanish  chart  of  it, 
and  it  convinced  him  that  under  such  a  man  as  Pocock, 
a  British  fleet  could  pass.  It  was  at  least  too  fine  a 
stroke  of  strategy  not  to  try.  Not  only  would  the  line 
•of  advance  be  wholly  unexpected,  but  it  would  be 
quicker.  It  involved  no  beat  back,  it  was  before  the 
wind  the  whole  way,  and  it  was  much  shorter.  While, 
therefore,  it  would  ensure  a  surprise,  it  would  also 
mean  a  great  gain  of  time  before  the  hurricanes  set  in. 
And,  over  and  above  all  this,  it  would  permit  a  sudden 


1762  THE    FINAL    CONCENTRATION  261 

and  unlooked-for  concentration  interposed  between  the 
two  bases  of  the  enemy ;  it  would  provide  for  the  rapid 
junction  of  the  American  contingent,  and  it  would  prob- 
ably prevent  the  Spanish  and  the  French  fleets  joining 
hands.  Whether  Rodney  had  divined  this  brilliant  con- 
ception is  not  clear.  It  was  certainly  not  communicated 
to  him  in  the  orders  he  received  to  prepare  for  it.  But 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  dispositions  he  had  made  did  not 
really  prejudice  its  execution.  So  far  as  they  had  gone 
they  indicated  an  attack  on  St.  Domingo  rather  than 
Havana,  and  they  had  prevented  the  allied  junction, 
which  it  was  an  integral  part  of  the  design  to  stop.^ 

Such,  then,  was  the  adventure  on  which  Pocock  was 
proceeding.  In  two  days  he  was  ofif  St.  Kitts,  where 
the  two  ships  of  the  line  and  the  Jamaica  convoy  were 
awaiting  him,  and  he  found  himself  in  charge,  all  told,  of 
some  two  hundred  sail.  In  the  transports  Albemarle, 
besides  military  stores,  and  his  artillery  and  engineers, 
had  five  brigades  of  infantry,  numbering  nearly  twelve 
thousand  men,  and  over  two  thousand  more  were  to 
come  from  North  America  and  Jamaica.^  With  this 
unwieldly  armada  the  admiral  proceeded  without  stop- 
ping, and  reaching  through  the  Mona  Passage,  so  as  to 
keep  to  windward  of  St.  Domingo,  made  Cape  St.  Nicholas 
on  May  I7th.  Here  was  awaiting  him  a  letter  from 
Douglas,  saying  that  his  orders  had  been  received,  that 
he  Avas  about  to  join  him  with  nine  of  the  line,  and  that 

1  Sir  Charles  Knowles  roundly  condemns  what  he  calls  Lord  Anson's 
••obstinacy"  in  persisting  in  his  approach  by  the  Bahama  Chani^. 
Thereby,  he  contends,  he  gravely  imperilled  the  whole  force  merely'^to 
save  a  week's  time.  He  entirely  ignores  the  advantage  of  surprise  and 
interposition  between  the  Spanish  and  French  fleets. 

*  In  his  despatch  from  St.  Nicholas,  May  2G,  Pocock  says  he  had  I  GO 
sail  of  transports,  &c.,  46  of  the  Jamaica  convoy,  and  13  of  his  own 
squadron.  It  is  possible  he  meant  that  KJO  included  them  all,  but  tbe 
sense  seems  rather  as  stated  in  the  text. — In-letters,  307. 


262  HAVANA  1762 

he  had  also  given  the  rendezvous  to  Hervey,  who  with 
seven  was  blockading  Cap  Fran(jois.  He  had  secured 
pilots  for  the  Old  Bahama  Channel,  but  as  they  seemed 
very  incapable,  he  had  despatched  Captain  Elphinstone  in 
the  Richmond  frigate  to  survey  it  as  far  to  leeward  as 
Cay  Sal,  where  the  five  hundred  miles  of  danger  came 
to  an  end. 

On  the  morrow  Hervey,  with  whom  Pocock  had 
already  got  in  touch  as  he  passed,  joined  him,  and 
reported  Bl^nac  still  in  Cap  Frant^-ois.  Douglas  sailed 
the  same  day,  and  joined  on  the  23rd.  It  was  Pocock's 
intention  to  detach  the  Jamaica  convoy  under  his  com- 
mand. As  Douglas  had  leave  to  go  home,  he  was  also  to 
take  charge  of  the  homeward-bound  convoy,  which  Pocock 
intended  to  get  away  through  the  Yucatan  and  Florida 
Channels  if  BMnac  remained  at  Cap  Francois.  This 
of  course  could  be  done  safely,  so  soon  as  he  had  made 
sure  of  the  Spanish  fleet  in  Havana.  The  only  trouble 
was  the  troops  from  America.  On  the  26  th  he  heard 
from  Amherst  that  they  were  just  about  to  sail  when 
his  despatch  left.  Pocock  no  doubt  expected  them  to 
join  in  a  day  or  two.  But  in  any  case  by  his  secret 
orders  he  was  instructed  not  to  wait  for  them,  and  on 
May  27,  after  detaching  Douglas  and  the  convoy  to 
Port  Royal,  he  sailed  with  his  whole  fleet,  leaving  the 
American  transports  to  take  their  chance  with  Blenac. 

This  was  the  weak  part  of  his  design,  but  Rodney's 
action  in  sending  Swanton  to  the  Spanish  main,  and  the 
information  available,  left  no  alternative.  The  latest 
intelligence  Douglas  had  obtained  was  that  there  were 
sixteen  of  the  line  in  Havana.  Pocock  had  but  nine- 
teen— all,  except  two,  of  the  lower  rates.  To  divide 
his  fleet  was  therefore  impossible.  Moreover,  Douglas 
had  received  a  credible   report  from  a  vessel  that   had 


1762  THE    OLD    BAHAMA    CHANNEL  263 

been  in  Cap  Francois  that  Blenac  was  bitterly  disap- 
pointed on  finding  that  Hevia,  when  he  brought  out 
Prado  with  his  six  of  the  line,  had  gone  on  to  Havana 
instead  of  joining  him,  and  that  he  had  declared  his 
intention,  if  the  Spaniards  made  no  move  to  unite  forces, 
to  go  straight  home  with  the  French  trade.^ 

To  the  men  of  Quebec,  who  had  made  light  of  the 
St.  Lawrence,  the  Old  Bahama  Channel  can  have  pre- 
sented few  terrors.  The  pilots  proved  as  useless  as 
Douglas  had  feared,  but  fortunately,  owing  to  his  fore- 
sight, Elphinstone  met  them  the  day  after  they  sailed. 
He  had  been  right  up  to  Cay  Sal  and  back  again,  and 
was  able  to  produce  a  complete  survey  of  the  channel, 
with  sketches  of  the  land  and  Cays  on  both  sides,  and  to 
report  that  Anson's  chart  was  correct.  He  was  there- 
fore in  a  position  to  lead  through,  and  the  main  cause 
for  anxiety  was  at  an  end.  Following  the  method 
Saunders  had  adopted  on  the  St.  Lawrence,  Pocock 
organised  the  transports  into  seven  divisions,  each  with 
its  conducting  men-of-war.  The  way  in  which  the 
escort  was  distributed  deserves  notice.  Contrary  to 
what  would  naturally  be  looked  for,  there  was  no  regular 
vanguard  or  rearguard — the  whole  of  the  navy  ships 
being  allotted  to  the  various  divisions.  With  the  first 
division  were  four  of  the  line  under  Pocock ;  with  the 
second  was  Keppel's  ship  alone ;  and  with  the  third  were 
again  four  of  the  line,  the  idea  being  apparently  to  pro- 
vide for  a  concentration  of  nine  of  the  line  in  the  van  or 
the  centre.  The  next  two  divisions  had  between  them 
only  two  of  the  line  and  a  fifty,  but  the  sixth  had  three 

'  Douglas  to  Pocock,  May  6,  enclosed  in  Pocock's  despatch  of  May  2(j, 
In-letters,  307.  Besides  his  nineteen  of  the  line  he  had  one  forty-four,  five 
frigates,  two  sloops,  and  three  bomb  vessels. — "List  of  the  Fleet,"  ibid. 
He  was  subsequently  joined  at  Havana  by  four  more  of  the  line  and  one 
or  two  cruisers. — Beat.son,  vol.  iii.  p.  394. 


264  HAVANA  1762 

of  the  line  and  a  fifty,  and  the  last  division  five  of  the  line 
and  a  fifty.  The  main  anxiety,  it  will  be  seen,  was  an 
attack  from  the  windward  upon  the  rear  by  Bl^nac,  and 
provision  was  thus  made  for  a  rearguard  of  eight  of  the 
line  and  two  fifties  to  deal  with  him  effectively  if  he 
made  the  attempt.^  But  Blenac  had  less  mind  than 
ever  to  burn  his  fingers  for  the  Spaniards,  whom  he 
regarded  as  having  deserted  him.  He  remained  passive, 
and  the  fleet  proceeded  without  interference.  Elphin- 
stone  performed  his  duty  admirably.  No  hitch  of  any 
kind  occurred.  The  narrowest  and  most  dangerous  part 
of  the  channel  between  Cay  Lobos  and  Cay  Comfite  was 
actually  passed  at  night  by  means  of  fires  burning  upon 
the  rocks,  and  by  the  evening  of  June  5th,  that  is  a  week 
after  leaving  Cape  Nicholas,  the  whole  fleet  was  clear  of 
Cay  Sal,  and  in  sight  of  Matanzas,  less  than  a  hundred 
miles  from  its  objective. 

Meanwhile  the  authorities  at  Havana  were  resting  in 
blind  security.  Though  it  was  a  little  more  than  a  year 
since  the  captain-general  and  the  admiral  had  come  out 
with  two  French  engineers  and  elaborate  directions  for 
repairing  and  improving  the  defences  of  the  place,  next  to 
nothing  had  been  done.  The  weak  point  of  Havana  was 
a  rocky  ridge  known  as  the  Cabana  Hill,  which  ran  along 
the  east  side  of  the  harbour  opposite  the  city.  It  was 
high  enough  to  command  all,  or  nearly  all,  the  defences 
as  well  as  the  city  itself  and  the  harbour.  The  official 
scheme  of  defence  provided  for  its  occupation  by  a  power- 
ful redoubt  at  its  inner  and  landward  termination,  the 
famous  Morro  Castle  being  at  the  other.  But  the  work 
had  only  been  talked  about  until  the  copy  of  the  Gazette 
announcing  war  had  been  received.  Then  they  began  to 
clear   the  site,  but  some  troops  and  labourers  sent   for 

1  See  organisation  of  the  fleet  in  Keppel's  Life  of  Kejypel,  vol.  i.  p.  34G. 


I762I  THE    SURPRISE    COMPLETE  265 

from  Mexico  had  introduced  an  outbreak  of  yellow  fever 
and  the  work  had  been  abandoned.  In  the  eyes  of  the 
authorities  there  was  really  nothing  to  fear.  Prado  fully 
believed  that  owing  to  the  other  preparations  he  had 
made  the  British  Avould  not  think  of  attacking  them, 
and  cheerily  assured  his  sovereign  that  if  they  were  so 
rash  they  would  certainly  break  their  heads.  Nothing 
could  shake  the  captain  -  general's  complacency.  As 
Pocock  lay  at  Cape  St.  Nicholas  waiting  for  Douglas  to 
join,  a  travelled-stained  man  had  rushed  into  his  ante- 
chamber demanding  an  instant  audience.  He  was  a 
Spanish  merchant  from  Jamaica  who  had  got  away  to 
Cape  Antonio  in  a  boat,  and  had  ridden  night  and  day 
with  news  of  what  was  in  the  wind.  The  captain-general 
would  not  listen.  No  one,  indeed,  would  admit  the  possi- 
bility of  a  fleet  coming  through  the  Old  Bahama  Channel. 
A  fortnight  later,  on  June  6  th,  Pocock's  sails  were  seen 
from  the  top  of  Morro  Castle,  and  an  officer  hurried 
across  the  harbour  to  tell  the  news  in  the  city  ;  but  only 
to  be  reprimanded  for  spreading  false  alarms.  The  fleet 
could  be  nothing,  he  was  told,  but  the  regular  Jamaica 
convoy  homeward  bound.  Finally  it  was  not  till  fresh 
messengers  reported  that  a  fleet  was  standing  in  a  little 
to  the  eastward  with  flat-boats  in  tow  that  the  miracle 
could  be  believed.  Then  all  was  alarm.  Then  and  not 
till  then  the  garrison  was  mobilised,  the  militia  called 
out,  and  horses  sought  for  the  dragoons.  Anson's  clever 
device  had  entirely  succeeded.  The  surprise  was  com- 
plete.^ 

It  was  on  the  evening  of  June  6th,  as  the  old  First 
Lord  lay  d3dng  at  home,  that  the  alarm  was  given.  On 
that  day  Pocock  had  arrived  off"  the  Coximar  river,  about 

1  nuro,  Armada  Etpafiola,  vol.  vii.  pp.  4G-9.     His  main  authority  is  the 
report  of  the  oOicial  Spanish  Court  of  Inquiry. 


266  HAVANA  1762 

five  leagues  east  of  the  Morro.  Before  sailing  he  and 
Albemarle  had  been  furnished  with  a  copy  of  Knowles's 
report.  It  indicated  the  sandy  bay  where  the  river  falls 
into  the  sea  as  the  only  possible  landing-place,  since  on 
the  further  or  city  side  of  the  harbour  the  coast  was 
supposed  to  be  all  foul  ground.  Here  then  the  admiral 
dropped  the  transports  and  a  division  of  six  of  the  line 
under  Keppel  to  destroy  the  two  forts  which  they  found 
guarding  the  bay,  exactly  as  Knowles  had  stated,  and  to 
cover  the  landing,  Pocock  himself  with  the  remaining 
thirteen  of  the  line  and  the  bomb-vessels  went  on  to 
blockade  and  threaten  the  city.  It  was  all  on  the  regular 
lines  that  Drake  had  laid  down,  and  it  went  with 
practised  precision.  Pocock  in  the  orthodox  way  got  his 
marines  into  the  boats  and  made  a  feint  of  landing  on 
the  further  or  western  side  of  the  city.  At  the  same 
time  Keppel,  having  quickly  destroyed  the  forts,  was 
getting  the  troops  ashore  in  the  usual  three  divisions 
under  Captains  Hervey,  Barton  and  Drake  at  a  point  on 
the  east  side  of  Coximar  Bay  which  Knowles  had  advised, 
and  it  was  done  without  the  loss  of  a  man. 

Here,  however,  Knowles's  plan  began  to  be  departed 
from.  From  the  point  where  the  landing  was  made  a 
path  led  through  the  bush  to  the  inner  end  of  the 
Cabana  ridge  where  the  redoubt  had  been  planned,  and 
Knowles  had  recommended  that  an  immediate  advance 
should  be  made  along  this  track  and  the  position  seized. 
For  some  reason  this  was  not  done,  probable  because  the 
soldiers  considered  that  the  Morro  Castle  rendered  the 
ridge  untenable.  This  formidable  work  stood  at  its  sea- 
ward end  upon  a  somewhat  isolated  rock,  and  formed 
the  main  defence  of  the  harbour  entrance.  It  was  to 
be  assumed  that  it  enfiladed  the  Cabana  ridge.  Knowles 
seems  to  have  thought  it    did  not :  and,  moreover,  had 


1762  ALBEMARLE'S    MISTAKES  267 

satisfied  himself  that  from  the  Quarry  Hill,  in  which 
the  ridge  terminated  towards  the  sea  just  short  of  the 
Morro,  the  Castle  could  be  attacked  on  its  weakest  side. 
The  soldiers  apparently  were  of  a  diflferent  opinion.  At 
all  events,  though  an  immediate  advance  was  made,  it 
was  not  made  upon  the  ridge.  The  soldiers  preferred 
to  make  direct  for  the  bastioned  front  of  Morro.  They 
therefore  advanced  along  the  shore,  Keppel  scouring  the 
beach  and  woods  before  them  with  his  small  cruisers, 
With  this  help  they  had  passed  the  last  obstacle  between 
them  and  their  objective  before  night. 

Still  no  attempt  on  the  Cabana  ridge  was  made.  Instead 
a  corps  was  detached  next  day  under  Eliott  with  orders  to 
force  his  way  through  the  woods  below  it,  and  endeavour 
to  seize  the  village  of  Guanabacoa,  which  lay  in  the  open 
country  beyond  at  the  head  of  Havana  Bay.  Driving  a 
considerable  body  of  troops  before  him,  he  successfully 
accomplished  his  task.  The  idea  of  the  operation  seems 
to  have  been  to  secure  horses  and  fresh  provisions,  and 
to  cut  off  the  communication  of  the  city  with  the  in- 
terior on  that  side,  and  to  cover  the  siege.  The  whole 
movement  is  roundly  condemned  by  Knowles,  and  it 
must  be  said  with  some  show  of  reason.  It  had  the 
effect,  as  he  points  out,  of  permanently  dividing  the 
army,  and  of  preventing  Eliott's  corps  taking  any  part  in 
the  subsequent  siege  operations.  It  appears  also  as  the 
first  indication  of  Albemarle's  incapacity  for  the  kind 
of  operation  entrusted  to  him.  A  coup  de  main  is  the 
method  to  which  such  combined  attacks  peculiarly  lend 
themselves,  and  which  above  all  in  such  a  climate  they 
particularly  demand.  Pocock  had  handed  the  general  a 
complete  surprise  for  the  purpose,  yet  he  was  proceeding 
by  the  text-book  rules  for  continental  warfare  in  Europe, 
and   every   hour   was    letting   his   chances    slip.      There 


268  HAVANA  1762 

may,  of  course,  have  been  military  reasons  of  which  we 
are  unaware,  still  we  cannot  but  endorse  Knowles's  com- 
ment. "  Experience,"  he  says,  "  in  former  expeditions 
might  have  taught  them  that  whatever  is  to  be  effected 
in  the  West  Indies  must  be  done  as  expeditiously  as 
possible."  But  it  is  all  part  of  a  large  and  vital  question 
on  which  clearer  light  will  fall  as  we  proceed. 

To  see  how  fine  was  the  chance  which  Albemarle  was 
missing,  we  have  but  to  look  within  the  city  walls. 
During  all  this  time  the  Spanish  Council  of  War  was 
sitting  in  distracted  debate.  An  order  had  been  immedi- 
ately issued  to  complete  the  unfinished  redoubt  which 
had  been  designed  for  the  shore  end  of  the  Cabana  ridge, 
so  as  to  enfilade  the  whole ;  for  the  truth  was  that  by 
this  means  alone  could  its  occupation  by  the  enemy  be 
prevented.  A  thousand  sailors  from  the  fleet  were  set  to 
drag  up  guns  to  arm  it.  Knowles's  view  of  what  was 
the  vulnerable  spot  is  certainly  endorsed  by  the  Spaniards' 
alarm  for  its  safety.  In  their  eyes  the  point  which  the 
British  had  chosen  for  their  landing  indicated  the  Cabana 
as  the  first  objective.  But  in  the  panic  that  prevailed  no 
one  thought  of  covering  the  working  parties  by  abattis  or 
other  temporary  expedients  such  as  the  difficult  ground 
afforded  in  abundance.  The  consequence  was  fatal.  The 
following  night  Carleton  pushed  a  reconnaissance  towards 
the  enemy's  works.  The  excited  Spaniards  took  it  for  an 
attack  in  force,  and  took  to  their  heels.  The  panic  spread 
to  the  Council,  and  in  spite  of  the  direct  and  elaborate 
orders  from  Spain  they  hastily  decided  to  spike  the 
twelve  heavy  guns  which  the  sailors  had  got  up,  and  to 
abandon  the  position  as  untenable.  But  still  Albemarle 
let  it  alone. 

In  the  city  they  almost  gave  themselves  up  for  lost. 
With  all  the  warning  they  had  had,  and  the  years  Spain 


1762  DISTRACTION    IN    THE    CITY  269 

had  been  preparing  for  war,  the  regular  force  in  the  place, 
according  to  the  official  return,  was  under  three  thousand, 
including  marines  and  available  seamen,  and  the  militia 
and  volunteers  amounted  to  less  than  six  thousand.^ 
Without  the  help  of  Hevia's  crews,  therefore,  they  regarded 
the  place  as  untenable,  and  the  depressing  step  was  taken 
of  paralysing  the  fleet  by  devoting  its  life  to  the  land 
defence.  But  even  here  the  panic-brewing  did  not  stop. 
Close  off  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  lay  Pocock  threaten- 
ing attack.  The  entrance  to  the  splendid  haven  was 
but  half  a  mile  wide.  It  was  defended  in  the  strongest 
manner.  Besides  the  Morro  Castle  and  two  heavy 
batteries  below  it  on  the  water's  edge,  there  was  on  the 
opposite  or  western  side  the  formidable  Punta  Fort  and 
the  city  batteries,  denying  all  access.  Yet  even  so  the 
timid  and  startled  Council  could  not  rest  at  ease,  and  the 
insane  resolution  was  taken  of  sinking  three  ships  of  the 
line  to  block  the  entrance.  So,  for  no  possible  good, 
they  imprisoned  their  own  fleet  and  rendered  Pocock  free 
to  assist  the  army.  The  British  had  been  presented 
gratuitously  with  the  absolute  local  command  of  the  sea, 
and  the  admiral  was  able  to  perform  the  last  part  of  his 
special  task,  and  send  word  to  Douglas  that  all  was  clear 
for  him  to  pass  the  convoy  homeward. 

On  the  11th,  under  cover  of  a  diversion  which  Pocock 
made  to  the  westward,  Carleton  seized   the  end  of   the 

^  The  total,  according  to  Captain  Duro,  given  by  the  official  returns 
which  were  put  in  at  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  were : — Regular  troops,  sailors, 
and  marines  of  the  squadron,  2800 ;  militia  and  paisanos  voluntarios,  a 
little  more  than  5000  ;  arsenal  hands,  250;  freed  slaves,  GOO.  See  Armada 
Espaiiola,  vol.  vii.  p.  50  note.  English  authorities,  of  course,  place  the  total 
much  higher.  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  543,  gives  a  return,  apparently  the  report 
of  a  prisoner,  three  times  greater — Dragoons,  810 ;  infantry,  3500 ;  artillery, 
300  ;  sailors  and  marines,  9000 — total  regulars,  13,G10.  Militia  and  people 
of  colour,  14,000.  Grand  total,  27,610.  This  may  have  been  on  paper  the 
whole  force  in  the  island.  Probably  it  was  the  judicious  exaggeration  of  a 
prisoner. 


2  70  HAVANA  1762 

Cabana  ridge  adjoining  the  Morro  with  hardly  any  resist- 
ance, but  no  use  was  made  of  the  lodgment.  The  idea 
was  merely  to  prevent  interruption  of  the  siege  works 
which  were  now  opened  against  the  Morro.  Thus  several 
days  had  been  lost  to  no  purpose,  and  of  the  rest  of  the 
proceedings  the  best  that  can  be  said  is  that  they  con- 
tinued to  afford  an  unhappy  example  of  the  unwisdom  of 
committing  such  work  to  a  general  without  experience  of 
combined  expeditions,  and  with  no  genius  for  amphibious 
warfare. 

That  he  landed  where  he  did  cannot  be  laid  to  his 
charge.  It  was  Knowles's  idea  that  he  should  do  so 
and  proceed  to  attack  the  Morro  as  being  the  key  of  the 
place.  Where  he  failed  was  in  not  shifting  his  ground 
so  soon  as  it  was  found  how  far  beyond  the  range  of  a 
coup  de  main  the  capture  of  the  castle  was.  From  first 
to  last  it  seems  never  to  have  entered  his  head  to  try 
elsewhere.  In  spite  of  what  Saunders  and  Wolfe  had 
proved  so  well  at  Quebec  ;  in  spite  of  its  endorsement  by 
Keppel  and  Hodgson  at  Belleisle,  and  by  Rodney  and 
Monckton  at  Martinique,  the  peculiar  strength  of  the 
force  at  his  command  was  a  sealed  book  to  him.  Bred 
in  the  rigid  school  of  Cumberland,  he  had  no  notion  of 
how  to  avail  himself  of  the  mobihty  of  an  amphibious 
force.  He  could  do  nothing  more  original  than  sit  down 
before  the  Morro  in  solemn  Low  Country  form.  Yet  on 
the  other  side  of  the  harbour  lay  the  city,  his  real  objec- 
tive, so  weakly  defended  that,  seeing  the  state  of  panic 
and  confusion  that  prevailed,  it  could  scarcely  have  re- 
sisted a  vehement  assault  from  troops  steeped  in  victory 
like  those  at  Albemarle's  command.  To  the  men  who 
had  climbed  the  Heights  of  Abraham  and  the  cliff  of 
Belleisle,  and  had  rushed  the  Morne  Gamier  at  Marti- 
nique, there   would   have   been   no   thought   of  repulse. 


1762  THE    ILL-DESIGNED    ATTACK  271 

Such  at  least  was  the  opinion  of  many  officers  in  both 
services,  and  of  the  Spaniards  thenaselves.  The  city  walls 
were  low  and  old,  designed  merely  for  defence  against 
buccaneers  ;  in  several  places  they  had  crumbled  down 
and  half-tilled  the  ditch,  and  whatever  loss  a  bold  assault 
in  the  early  days  would  have  cost  it  must  have  been  far 
less  than  that  which  Albemarle's  pipeclay  tactics  involved. 

It  is  true  he  had  the  excuse  that,  according  to  Knowles's 
information,  a  landing  on  the  city  side  was  impossible, 
owing  to  there  being  all  foul  ground  off  the  shore.  But 
Pocock  quickly  found  out  that  it  was  not  so,  and  in  a  day 
or  two  he  had  anchored  off  the  Chorera  river,  a  little  to 
the  westward,  and  seized  the  village  at  its  mouth  as  a 
watering  place.  Good  anchorage  was  found  all  along  the 
coast,  but  it  made  no  difference  to  Albemarle.  Knowles's 
general  comment  is  worth  recording.  "  When  a  general," 
he  says,  "  is  sent  abroad  upon  a  particular  enterprise,  in 
which  he  is  to  co-operate  with  another  corps  [meaning  a 
fleet],  both  are  obliged  to  make  use  of  their  joint  force  for 
the  accomplishment  of  that  object,  for  it  differs  widely 
from  his  having  an  unlimited  power  in  an  enemy's  country 
during  the  continuance  of  a  war."  But  it  is  a  difference 
of  which  Albemarle  was  unable  to  grasp  the  significance. 

Not  even  when  the  formidable  nature  of  the  task 
he  had  set  himself  was  fully  apparent  were  his  eyes 
opened.  The  work  of  conducting  a  regular  siege  under 
the  conditions  that  prevailed  proved  murderous,  and  the 
labour  was  severely  increased  by  Eliott's  corps  being  too 
distant  to  share  it.  The  soil  was  too  thin  for  proper 
approaches  to  bo  made  ;  the  whole  ground  was  a  tangle 
of  dense  and  sickly  bush,  through  which  roads  had  to 
be  cut,  and  so  rocky  was  the  surface  that  the  moving 
of  stores  and  guns  was  beyond  measure  arduous.  And 
overhead  burned  the  pitiless  Juno  sun,  under  which  not 


2  72  HAVANA  1762 

even  a  Cuban  can  work  with  impunity.  Finally,  and 
worst  of  all,  there  was  no  water  to  be  found  ;  every  drop 
had  to  be  brought  by  the  seamen  from  the  other  side  of 
the  Bay.  Yet  Albemarle  clung  stolidly  to  his  false 
position,  and,  the  word  being  given,  soldier  and  sailor 
strove  merrily  together  to  make  the  best  of  it.  But  in 
spite  of  the  confident  spirit  that  prevailed,  they  began 
quickly  to  drop  at  their  work,  struck  down  in  ever 
increasing  numbers  by  the  insufferable  heat  and  thirst. 
For  three  weeks  the  deadly  toil  went  on  without  a  single 
effort  to  turn  the  surprise  to  advantage.  Colonel  Howe, 
it  is  true,  had  been  sent  to  the  other  side  to  occupy 
the  village  of  Chorera,  but  the  object  was  merely  to  cut 
the  enemy's  communications  to  the  westward,  to  interrupt 
his  water-supply,  and  to  protect  our  own. 

It  was  not  until  the  end  of  the  month  that  the 
breaching  batteries  were  complete.  On  July  1st  they 
were  to  open,  and  Albemarle's  limited  ideas  of  combined 
operations  were  fully  displayed.  Having  no  higher  grasp 
of  the  possibilities  of  the  force  at  his  disposal  than  to  use 
the  fleet  as  an  artillery  reinforcement,  he  requested  the 
Admiral  to  batter  the  castle  from  the  sea,  so  as  to  take 
off  some  of  the  fire  from  his  batteries.  It  was  madness. 
The  Morro  was  too  high  for  ships  to  touch ;  but  Hervey, 
after  his  wont,  volunteered  to  try.  He  was  given  three 
of  the  line,  and  in  the  morning  stood  in.  The  leading 
ship  of  the  devoted  squadron  could  not  face  it,  and  her 
captain  was  afterwards  cashiered  for  not  going  close 
enough.  Hervey  took  his  place,  and  held  on  until  he 
ran  aground  with  his  broadside  bearing.  So,  in  chorus 
with  the  shore  batteries,  he  continued  firing  ferociously 
till  two  in  the  afternoon — one  of  the  hottest  fires  ever 
seen,  it  was  said.  "  I  am  unluckily  aground,"  he  wrote 
presently  to  Keppcl ;  "  but  my  guns  bear.     I  cannot  per- 


1762  HERVEY'S    BOMBARDMENT  273 

ceive  their  tire  to  slacken.  ...   I  am  afraid  they  are  too 
high  to  do  the  execution  we  wished.     I  have  many  men 
out  of  combat  now,  and  officers  wounded ;  my  masts  and 
rigging  much  cut  about,  and  only  one  anchor.     I  shall 
stay  here  as  long  as  I  can  and  wait  your  orders."     Every 
minute  he  expected  to  hear  the  army  was  advancing  to 
the  assault,  but  no  word  came,  and  in  the  heat  of  the 
fire   he   wrote   again,   asking   for   assistance    to    get    off. 
"  The  smoke,"  he  said,  "  makes  it  impossible  to  see  the 
effect  we  have  had  or  likely  to  have,  nor  can  we   tell 
when  the  army  will  advance,"  and,  still  cheery  as  ever,  he 
signed  himself  "  often  duller,  and  ever  yours,  A.  Hervey." 
But   the   army   could   not    advance.     The   new    battery, 
as  was  usual  with  our  engineers  at  that  time,  had  been 
badly   placed.     Hervey's   bombardment,  so   the   soldiers 
say,  did  so  far  distract  the  enemy's  fire  seawards  that  it 
enabled  them  to  dismount  most  of  the  guns  on  the  land 
front  of  the  Morro,  but  the  fire  of  its  sea  bastion  was 
not  dominated  sufficiently  to  permit  an  assault.      At  two 
o'clock  Albemarle  decided  to  abandon  the  attempt  and 
signalled  to  the  ships  to  that  effect.    By  that  time  Hervey's 
squadron  had  nearly  two  hundred  men  killed  and  wounded, 
including  Captain  Goostrey  of  the  Camhridge,  and  he  drew 
off  at  last,  cut  to  pieces,  and  with  another  brilliant  bit  of 
daring  to  his  record. 

The  fact  was  they  had  miscalculated  the  resistance 
they  were  to  meet,  as  was  only  natural  in  view  of  the 
pusillanimous  opening  of  the  defence.  The  arrangements 
were  all  those  of  Hevia,  the  Spanish  Admiral,  who,  making 
up  in  truculence  what  he  lacked  in  military  insight,  com- 
pletely dominated  the  captain-general  and  all  his  council.^ 

1  Pezuela,  Ilistoria  de  Cuba,  vol.  ii.  p.  474,  quoted  by  Captain  Duro,  with 
many  other  authorities,  in  his  Appendix.  "  Dates  y  juicios  de  la  rendicion 
de  la  Habana." — Armada  Etpanola,  vol.  vii.  p.  71  et  seq. 

VOL.  II.  S 


274  HAVANA  1762 

So  it  happened,  curiously  enough,  that  his  faint- 
hearted treatment  of  the  fleet  turned  to  the  Spaniards' 
greatest  advantage.  For,  having  resolved  to  devote 
his  force  to  the  defence  of  the  city,  Hevia  insisted  on 
turning  out  all  the  enervated  local  officers  and  com- 
mitting the  important  posts  to  the  captains  of  his  ships. 
The  Morro  had  been  given  to  the  famous  Don  Luis 
Vicente  de  Velasco,  a  veteran  captain  of  the  old  war,  who 
still  lives  as  one  of  the  national  heroes  of  Spain.  The 
castle  mounted  about  seventy  guns,  and  for  garrison  he 
was  allowed  three  hundred  infantry,  fifty  seamen  and  fifty 
gunners,  with  three  hundred  negro  labourers,  who  were 
relieved  every  third  day.  In  testimony  of  the  spirit  that 
was  in  him,  he  began  by  walling  up  the  gate  of  the 
castle,  and  leaving  no  communication  with  the  outside, 
except  by  hanging  ladders.  The  fire  he  kept  up  was 
beyond  all  control,  and,  not  content  with  mere  defence, 
he  kept  urging  the  authorities  to  sally  out  and  attack 
the  works  which  the  British  were  so  painfully  rearing. 
The  example  which  he  and  his  fellows  set  put  new  heart 
into  the  place,  reinforcements  began  to  come  in  from  the 
interior,  and  the  heroism  of  the  defence  proved  in  striking 
contrast  to  the  nerveless  plan  on  which  it  was  designed. 

Still  the  odds  against  him  were  enormous.  Hervey's 
diversion  had  enabled  General  William  Keppel,  who  had 
charge  of  the  siege,  to  make  some  little  impression,  and 
next  day  the  bombardment  was  continued  more  furiously 
than  ever.  Several  of  the  batteries  were  manned  and 
armed  from  the  fleet,  and  the  way  the  seamen  served 
their  guns  is  said  to  have  filled  the  soldiers  with  astonish- 
ment. "  Our  sea  folks,"  wrote  one,  "  began  a  new  kind  of 
fire  unknown,  or,  at  all  events,  unpractised  by  artillery 
people.  The  greatest  fire  from  one  piece  of  cannon  is 
reckoned  by  them  from  eighty  to  ninety  times  in  twenty- 


1762  THE    ASSAULT    FAILS  275 

four  hours,  but  our  people  went  on  the  sea  system,  firing 
extremely  quick  and  with  the  best  direction  ever  seen, 
and  in  sixteen  hours  fired  their  guns  one  hundred  and 
forty-nine  times."  ^  Nothing  could  stand  such  work,  and 
by  next  evening  Velasco  had  only  two  guns  in  action. 
All  promised  a  speedy  success,  but,  unhappily,  the  fury  of 
the  seamen's  fire  was  equally  disastrous  to  their  own 
works.  The  fascines,  scorched  to  tinder  under  the 
burning  sun,  kept  taking  fire  —  water  was  not  to  be 
had,  and  scarcely  any  earth — and  just  as  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Morro  defences  seemed  nearly  complete,  the 
principal  battery  was  almost  entirely  destroyed.  In  a 
few  hours  the  labour  of  seventeen  days  and  hundreds  of 
men  was  consumed,  and  all  had  to  begin  again.  It  was 
a  mortifying  stroke,  for  in  the  suftbcating  air  the  hard- 
ships of  the  siege  were  growing  beyond  human  endurance. 
The  food  got  worse  and  worse,  the  water  scarcer,  and 
the  air  more  pestilential.  Over  five  thousand  troops  and 
three  thousand  seamen  were  down  already  with  wounds 
and  sickness,  and  scores  were  dying  daily.  No  reinforce- 
ments had  come  from  America,  and  the  hurricane  season 
was  getting  alarmingly  near.  Still  Albemarle  clung 
stolidly  to  his  conventional  plan,  and  the  Spaniards  were 
left  almost  as  completely  undisturbed  from  the  sea,  as 
though  Havana  was  the  heart  of  a  continent. 

Meanwhile  Pocock  had  thoroughly  established  his 
position  at  Chorera  on  the  other  side,  and  had  his  whole 
fleet  comfortably  berthed  in  the  new  anchorage  he  had 
found.  Since  the  Spaniards  had  relieved  him  of  the 
pains  of  blockading,  he  had  practically  nothing  for  his 
battle  squadron  to  do  except  to  assist  the  troops  with 
shore  parties,  and  to  keep  a  small  division  in  the  ofUng 
to  intercept  any  reinforcements  that  might  appear.    This 

^  Lift  of  Kcppel,  vol.  i.  p.  357. 


276  HAVANA  1762 

precaution  was  still  necessary.  So  soon  as  Hevia  had 
regained  his  senses  and  discovered  that  effective  resist- 
ance was  made  possible  by  Albemarle's  mistake,  he  had  sent 
far  and  wide  through  the  Indies  for  help.  Pocock's  in- 
formation still  was  that  in  Santiago  there  were  three  of 
the  line,  at  Cartagena  three  more,  besides  two  others 
cruising  in  Campeachy  Bay.  These  vessels  constituted  a 
menace  to  our  local  control,  remote  it  is  true,  but  they 
had  to  be  watched.  Besides  this  preoccupation,  Pocock 
had  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  Jamaica  convoy  and  the 
arrival  of  the  American  division,  and  both  of  them  were 
daily  expected.  He  therefore  threw  a  chain  of  frigates 
out  to  the  Bay  of  Florida,  and  kept  a  cruiser  squadron  off 
Matanzas  to  the  eastward,  and  another  off  Cape  Antonio 
to  the  westward  to  watch  the  Yucatan  Channel,  and, 
though  the  enemy's  squadrons  never  appeared,  he  was 
rewarded  by  a  number  of  prizes. 

It  was  on  June  15  th — that  is,  three  days  after  the 
harbour  was  finally  blocked — that  he  had  landed  at 
Chorera,  by  Albemarle's  request,  two  battalions  of  marines 
and  the  detachment  of  infantry  which  the  general  sent 
across  with  Howe.  This  looked  more  like  the  proper 
thing,  but  nothing  came  of  it.  Albemarle  could  not  rise 
to  anything  better  than  a  commonplace  diversion.  With 
such  a  man  as  Wolfe  or  any  of  his  pupils  in  command  it 
is  impossible  to  believe  nothing  more  would  have  been 
done.  In  a  single  night,  as  at  Quebec,  sufficient  troops 
could  have  been  thrown  across  to  Pocock's  side  to  rush 
the  defences  of  the  city  itself,  while  Eliott's  corps  replaced 
them  before  the  Morro.  At  least  the  possibilities  of  a 
successful  surprise  were  great  enough  to  have  made  it 
under  the  circumstances  almost  criminal  not  to  have 
tried. 

Yet  for  three  weeks  more  after  the  first  failure   the 


1762  OPERATIONS    OF    THE    FLEET  277 

work  went  on  just  as  before  on  the  Morro  side,  where 
new  batteries  had  to  be  estabhshed  in  a  better  position, 
with  the  same  appalUng  sacrifice  of  hfe.  The  walls  of  the 
castle  seemed  to  be  all  in  ruins,  but  yet  Velasco  kept  up 
his  fire  as  vigorously  as  ever.  This  he  was  well  able  to  do, 
because  no  attempt  was  made  to  interrupt  his  periodical 
relief  from  the  city,  although,  so  Knowles  says,  this  could 
easily  have  been  done  with  a  gun  or  two  on  the  Quarry 
hill,  which  Carleton  had  seized.  The  situation  grew  more 
critical  and  hopeless  every  day,  and  still  nothing  was 
heard  of  the  American  troops.  Yet,  to  the  credit  of  all 
concerned,  there  was  no  thought  of  letting  go  their  hold, 
even  though  the  hurricanes  might  burst  upon  them  in  a 
few  weeks.  After  the  failure  of  the  attack  on  the  Morro, 
Pocock  devoted  himself  to  preparing  for  the  worst.  Some 
thirty  miles  to  the  westward  lay  the  excellent  natural 
harbour  of  Mariel.  This  he  seized  with  a  number  of 
vessels,  including  two  royal  frigates  that  had  sought 
shelter  there,  and  thus  provided  himself  with  a  refuge 
where  the  whole  fleet  could  lie  in  perfect  security  and 
water. 

Ashore  the  work  slowly  progressed,  in  spite  of  every 
difficulty.  On  July  12th  Douglas  appeared  with  the 
Jamaica  convoy  on  its  homeward  voyage.  He  came  to 
drop  some  hundreds  of  negroes  whom  Albemarle  had 
purchased  for  labourers,  and  the  occasion  was  seized  to 
buy  a  number  of  cotton  bales  to  form  the  approaches  and 
batteries.  Then  things  began  to  go  better.  In  a  fort- 
night we  had  twenty  guns  against  only  five  or  six  of  the 
enemy's.  Velasco,  seriously  wounded,  had  had  to  leave 
his  post.  In  a  day  or  two  more  the  Morro's  fire  was 
entirely  silenced,  or  at  least  there  was  but  a  gun  or  two 
fitfully  firing.  The  sap  could  now  be  pushed  along  the 
edge  of  the  coast  towards  the  sea  bastion  of  the  castle, 


278  HAVANA  1762 

and  by  the  20tli  the  miners  reached  the  face  of  the  rock 
on  Avhich  it  stood.  The  ditch  was  seventy  feet  deep,  and 
could  only  be  passed  in  single  file  by  an  exposed  ridge 
that  had  been  left  to  prevent  its  being  entered  from  the 
sea.  Yet  it  was  done  with  the  loss  of  only  three  or  four 
men,  and  a  mine  was  commenced  under  the  bastion. 
At  the  same  time  a  shaft  was  sunk  in  the  counter-scarp 
opposite,  in  order  to  throw  it  into  the  ditch  and  form  a 
way  for  the  stormers  to  cross.  That  same  night,  further 
to  mark  the  lack  of  enterprise  in  the  pedantic  general,  a 
sergeant  and  his  party  scaled  the  sea  face  and  found  the 
guard  asleep.  They  stole  down  again  for  support,  but 
ere  they  could  return  the  alarm  was  given  and  the 
chance  lost. 

Still  the  mining  went  on,  and  Velasco,  as  he  lay  in 
hospital,  could  not  rest.  Though  himself  condemned  to 
inactivity  by  his  wound,  he  persuaded  his  chiefs  that 
a  passive  defence  could  no  longer  save  them.  A  second 
sally  in  force  was  ordered  and  excellently  planned.  It 
was  in  two  divisions — one  against  Carleton's  post  on  the 
Cabana  ridge,  the  other  directly  against  the  sap.  But 
at  such  work  the  Spaniards  were  no  match  for  Albemarle's 
seasoned  veterans,  sick  and  exhausted  as  they  were. 
Carleton,  who  had  replaced  Lord  Rollo,  invalided  home, 
was  brigadier  of  the  day.  He  was  everywhere,  and, 
thanks  to  his  energy  and  the  staunchness  of  the  troops, 
both  sorties  were  quickly  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  All 
hope  of  stopping  the  British  work  was  given  up,  and 
Velasco  left  his  bed  to  return  to  his  doomed  post.  Four 
days  later,  on  the  28th,  to  make  matters  worse,  the  first 
division  of  the  American  contingent  appeared. 

The  moral  effect  was  excellent,  but  the  force  which 
Burton  brought  was  but  a  fragment  of  the  whole  that  was 
expected.     The  weak  point  in  Pocock's  disposition  had 


1762  A    REGRETTABLE    INCIDENT  279 

told.  To  begin  with  it  was  no  more  than  the  first  division, 
and  in  the  Caicos  Passage  it  had  encountered  a  division 
of  Bl^nac's  squadron,  under  M.  Fabre,  consisting  of  two  of 
the  line,  two  frigrates,  and  half-a-dozen  smaller  cruisers. 
Its  escort  was  but  one  ship  of  the  line  and  a  frigate. 
The  French  gave  chase,  cut  off  five  or  six  transports  and 
captured  them,  with  350  regulars,  150  provincials,  and  a 
quantity  of  stores.^  The  rest  the  escort  saved,  but  only 
to  lose  in  their  hurry  the  frigate  and  four  more  transports 
on  the  Cayo  Comfite,  in  the  narrowest  part  of  the  Old 
Bahama  Channel,  for  want  of  a  guide.  Pocock  immedi- 
ately sent  off  Elphinstone,  with  some  transports  and  sloops, 
to  rescue  the  wrecked  crews  and  bring  on  the  second 
division. 

The  failure  of  the  whole  American  contingent  to  arrive 
was  particularly  unfortunate,  and  may  to  some  extent 
account  for  Albemarle's  inactivity  on  the  city  side. 
Though  the  slender  reinforcements  which  Burton  brought 
appeared  in  the  nick  of  time  to  enhearten  the  army  for 
the  supreme  effort,  the  rest  were  sadly  wanted.  By  this 
time  the  Morro  mines  were  ready,  and  it  had  been  decided 
to  attack  the  city  the  moment  it  fell.  Preparations  were 
already  well  advanced,  and  Burton  and  his  troops  were 
landed  at  Chorera  in  readiness  for  the  contemplated 
attack.  On  the  morrow  the  mines  were  to  be  sprung. 
Velasco  saw  that  all  was  over,  and  sent  to  his  chiefs  for 
orders  whether  to  abide  the  assault,  or  evacuate  and 
save  the  garrison.  The  council  of  war,  irresolute  to  the 
last,  sent  word  back  that  he  was  to  act  as  he  saw  best 
according  to  circumstances. 

To  a  man  of  Velasco's  punctilious  honour  such  an  order 
was  a  condemnation  to  death.  Alive  to  its  folly,  and 
broken-hearted  for  his  devoted  garrison,  he  sent  again 

^  Pocock  to  Admiralty,  Aug.  IG. 


2  8o  HAVANA  1762 

next  day  for  precise  orders.  The  answer  never  came. 
At  the  hour  of  siesta,  when  the  British  camp  seemed 
sunk  in  rest  under  the  blazing  sun,  a  terrific  explosion 
was  heard  which  shook  the  castle  like  an  earthquake. 
The  garrison  sprang  to  arms,  but  only  to  find  the  narrow 
and  almost  impracticable  breach  swarming  with  British 
grenadiers.  Counter-guards  had  been  erected  in  plenty, 
but  there  was  no  time  to  man  them.  Velasco  himself,  as 
he  rushed  to  the  ramparts,  fell  shot  in  the  breast.  In  a 
few  minutes  all  was  over,  and  the  Morro  had  fallen. 

The  defence  had  been  brilliant  as  the  end  was  sudden. 
The  British  officers  were  far  more  deeply  impressed  with 
Velasco's  achievement  than  with  their  own.  Their  first 
care  was  for  his  life,  and  at  his  own  request  he  was  sent 
across  the  harbour  to  be  treated  by  the  Spanish  surgeons. 
Night  had  fallen,  and,  as  there  might  be  a  difficulty 
about  his  being  landed,  one  of  the  general's  aide-de- 
camps was  sent  with  him,  with  orders  that  if  admittance 
could  not  be  had  he  was  to  bring  the  wounded  man  back 
to  Albemarle's  own  camp,  "  that  he  might  be  treated  with 
all  the  care  and  homage  that  was  due  to  an  officer  who, 
with  so  much  glory,  had  known  how  to  uphold  his  trust 
and  the  honour  of  his  Prince's  arms."  ^  He  was  ad- 
mitted, but  all  care  was  unavailing,  and  two  days  later 
he  died,  spared  the  knowledge  of  the  final  act. 

Albemarle  now  lost  no  time  in  doing  what,  in  the 
opinion  of  many,  he  ought  to  have  done  at  fu'st.  He 
went  over  to  reconnoitre  the  west  side,  leaving  his 
brother  to  form  heavy  batteries  on  the  shore  end  of 
the  Cabana  ridge,  which  could  now  be  reached  from  the 
Morro  by  water,  and  to  prepare  the  Morro  batteries 
for  bombarding  the  city  and  Fort  Punta.  The  re- 
connaissance proved  his  mistake  up  to  the  hilt.     A  road 

*  Hevia's  Diary,  quoted  by  Duro,  vol.  vii.  p.  67. 


1762  THE    SURRENDER  281 

was  found  leading  almost  up  to  the  weak  defences,  and 
covered,  the  greater  part  of  the  way,  from  the  fire  of 
Fort  Punta.  Even  now  it  was  only  stopped  by  abattis, 
and  had  a  bold  advance  been  pushed  home  at  first,  in 
the  midst  of  the  panic  and  under  cover  of  a  bombard- 
ment of  Fort  Punta  by  the  fleet,  it  could  scarcely  have 
failed  to  succeed.  So  untenable  was  the  place  on  this 
side  that,  although  the  second  American  division  arrived 
safely  on  August  2nd,  Albemarle  would  not  waste  life  in 
an  assault,  assured  that,  according  to  the  rules  of  his  art, 
the  city  must  surrender  when  the  Cabana  and  Morro 
batteries  and  those  he  was  making  on  the  western  side 
were  complete.  The  difficulties  of  the  ground  were 
almost  insuperable,  but  the  Admiral  solved  them  by 
making  the  fleet  carpenters  saw  up  one  of  the  prize 
frigates  for  gun  platforms.  On  the  10th  all  was  ready, 
and  Albemarle  sent  in  his  summons.  It  was  refused  in 
handsome  style,  and  next  day  at  dawn  all  the  new 
batteries  opened.  Before  ten  o'clock  Punta  was  silenced, 
and  by  noon  there  was  scarcely  a  Spanish  gun  firing. 
Shortly  afterwards  all  was  silence,  and  white  flags 
were  flying  from  every  point.  Havana  had  decided  to 
surrender.  On  August  14th,  after  two  days'  wrangling, 
the  gates  were  delivered  into  our  hands,  and  what  was 
left  of  the  garrison  marched  out  with  the  full  honours 
of  war. 

So  after  a  two  months'  siege  fell  the  Queen  city  of  the 
Indies.  For  over  a  hundred  and  fifty  years,  since  Drake 
first  sailed  out  against  it,  it  had  baffled  our  every  effort 
even  to  approach  its  virgin  walls.  It  had  come  to  be 
regarded  as  impregnable,  the  inviolate  symbol  of  the 
power  of  Spain.  The  moral  effect  of  such  a  blow  at 
the  outset  of  the  new  war  was  incalculable.  As  always, 
it   had  been  the  hope  of  Spain,  in  challenging  England, 


282  HAVANA  1762 

that  she  would  recover  the  gate  of  the  Mediterranean. 
Instead,  she  had  lost  the  gate  of  the  Indies,  and  we  had 
won  another  Gibraltar  in  the  West.  Such  a  gain  was 
well  worth  perhaps  its  terrible  cost.  The  day  after  the 
capitulation,  the  return  showed  eighteen  hundred  dead, 
besides  thousands  of  sick  and  wounded,  who  were  dying 
daily.  And  that  was  only  the  beginning.  The  sickness 
continued  to  rage  unabated  all  the  autumn.  Early  in 
October  the  return  showed  five  hundred  and  sixty  killed 
or  dead  fi-om  their  wounds,  and  no  less  than  four  thousand 
seven  hundred  dead  from  disease.  This  alone  was  well 
over  a  third  of  the  whole  force,  and  it  took  no  count  of 
the  hundreds  who  died  afterwards  in  England  or  America, 
or  only  recovered  to  drag  out  a  crippled  and  deca3'ed 
existence.  Albemarle  himself  was  a  sick  man  for  the  rest 
of  his  life.  This  terrible  loss  by  disease  was  the  real  cost 
of  refusing  Pitt's  importunity  to  begin  the  war  at  the 
proper  season,  and  of  the  delay  that  was  caused  by  the 
hesitation  of  the  new  Ministry  and  their  general's  lack  of 
experience. 

Yet  when  all  the  carnage  is  reckoned,  the  fact  remains 
that  probably  no  conquest,  at  once  so  rich,  so  decisive, 
and  of  so  high  a  strategical  value,  was  ever  made  against 
a  civilised  force  at  so  small  a  cost.  Over  and  above  the 
moral  and  strategical  effect,  the  actual  booty  was  enor- 
mous, and  the  direct  loss  to  Spain  even  greater  still. 
With  the  city  were  surrendered  nine  ships  of  the  line, 
besides  the  three  that  had  been  sunk  and  two  nearly 
finished  on  the  stocks.  It  meant  a  fifth  of  the  whole 
Spanish  navy.  Added  to  these  were  half-a-dozen  royal 
frigates  and  despatch  vessels  captured  either  hi  the  port 
or  outside  at  various  times,  a  ship  of  seventy-eight  guns 
and  six  more  frigates  belonging  to  the  great  trading 
corporations,  and  nearly  a  hundred   merchantmen.     The 


1762  THE    BOOTY  283 

booty  was  further  swelled  by  over  a  hundred  brass  guns, 
quantities  of  warlike  stores,  and  an  immense  amount  of 
merchandise.  The  actual  sum  of  prize-money  divided 
equally  between  the  navy  and  the  army  was  nearly 
three-quarters  of  a  million.  Unhappily,  according  to 
the  evil  old  precedents,  it  was  divided  wholly  in  favour 
of  the  senior  officers.  Each  commander-in-chief  received 
a  third  of  the  moiety  allotted  to  his  service,  and  the 
commodore  and  divisional  generals  a  fifteenth.  Thus 
Pocock  and  Albemarle  each  received  over  £122,000, 
and  the  three  Keppel  brothers  between  them  over 
£150,000,  or  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  whole.  Pocock's 
share  was^at  least  well  earned,  if  only  because  with  Olive  he 
had  given  us  the  Indian  empire ;  but  Albemarle  had  spent 
the  years  of  stress  as  Lord  of  the  Bedchamber  to  the 
Duke  of  Cumberland.  And  it  was  not  even  a  general's 
victory.  Success  had  been  won  by  the  indomitable 
staunchness  of  rank  and  file,  the  devotion  of  the  sub- 
ordinate oflScers,  and  the  co-operation  of  the  men  of 
both  services  forcing  a  bad  plan  through  by  sheer  pluck 
and  endurance.  It  was  the  men  who  had  borne  the 
heat  and  the  burden,  and  their  reward  was  to  every 
private  £4,  Is.  8^d.,  and  to  every  bluejacket  £3,  14s.  9fd.^ 
It  was  Hervey  whom  Pocock  selected  to  carry  home 

'  The  division  of  the  prize-money  is  often  spoken  of  as  though  it  were 
contrary  to  precedent.  This  was  not  so.  Before  sailing  Pocock  was 
given  "Additional  Instructions"  to  enable  him  to  adjust  the  division 
with  Albemarle.  For  this  purpose  they  were  furnished  with  three  pre- 
cedents: —  1.  The  expedition  of  Commodore  Wilmot  and  Colonel  Lillingston 
to  the  West  Indies  in  lGM-5  (William  III.) — Commanders-in-chief,  J,  the 
rest  to  officers  and  men.  Of  the  Navy  share,  officers  had  J  ;  warrant 
officers,  I;  petty  officers  and  men,  |.  2.  Naval  Orders  under  Anne,  1702 
—Queen  and  States-General  {i.e.  the  Dutch  Government),  §  ;  of  the  re- 
maining J — admirals,  i\;  vice-admirals,  ^V  !  captains  and  lieutenants,  ^\  ; 
the  rest,  y\.  3.  The  Order  of  1740  ((Jeorye //.)—Commandors-in-chief  by 
land  and  sea,  equally  between  them,  /'j ;  generals  and  flag  officers,  in  pro- 
portion to  their  salaries,  I'j  ;  commissioned  oflicers,  i\  ;  rest  of  the  force,  ,\. 


2  84  HAVANA  1762 

the  glorious  despatch,  and  richly  had  he  deserved  it. 
In  Spain  the  honours  of  the  fine  defence  rested  on  the 
hero  of  the  Morro.  While  the  captain-general  and  the 
Marques  del  Real  Transporte  were  both  disgraced,  his 
family  was  ennobled  with  the  title  of  the  place  he  had 
held  so  well,  and  the  King  issued  a  decree  that  for  ever 
afterwards  there  should  be  a  ship  in  the  Spanish  navy 
named  Velasco. 


CHAPTER  X 

BETWEEN  WAR  AND  PEACE— THE  BOURBON 
COUNTER-ATTACK— PORTUGAL 

By  the  time  Havana  fell  Bute  and  the  King  had  suc- 
ceeded in  dragging  their  unwilling  country  to  the  brink 
of  a  nerveless  peace.  So  far,  indeed,  had  they  gone,  that 
Hervey  reached  home  with  the  glorious  news  only  just  in 
time  to  prevent  them  flinging  away  the  priceless  advan- 
tage that  had  been  won,  and  all  the  blood  and  devotion  it 
had  cost. 

With  Bute,  such  things  weighed  but  light.  He  had 
come  to  power  to  make  peace,  and  to  make  it  at  the 
lowest  price  an  abiding  fear  of  impeachment  would  let 
him.  Within  ten  days  of  Pitt's  fall  he  had  begun  his 
task  by  taking  secret  steps  to  reopen  the  negotiations  at 
the  point  where  they  had  been  broken  off.  The  inter- 
mediaries he  employed  were  his  old  friend  the  Comte  de 
Viri,  Sardinian  ambassador  in  London,  and  his  colleague 
in  Paris,  the  Bailli  de  Solar,  and  the  correspondence  was 
conducted  apparently  without  the  knowledge  of  any 
other  person  except  the  King.  It  began  with  a  letter 
from  Viri  to  Solar  on  October  17,  1761,  in  which  he 
speaks  of  Pitt's  fall  as  a  great  surprise,  and  says  a  certain 
person  of  credit  wishes  it  had  taken  place  before  Stanley 
and  Bussy  had  been  recalled.^ 

'  Lansdowne  House  MSS.,   Viri-Solar  Corr.,  vol.  i.     The  three  vohimes, 

for  access  to  which  I  am  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  the  Marquis  of 

Lansdowne,  contain  a  complete  copy  of  the  correspondence  which  led  to 

the  peace.     Except  when  otherwise  stated,  the  letters  quoted  in  the  text 

are  to  be  found  there.     See  also  Lord  Fitz-Maurice's  Life  of  Shelburne, 

vol.  i.  p.  137  and  note. 

283 


286  BETWEEN   WAR   AND    PEACE  1 761-2 

Upon  this  hint  the  delicate  Avork  was  begun,  and  in  a 
month's  time,  just  when  our  ultimatum  was  sent  to 
Spain,  negotiations  were  actually  on  foot.  According  to 
Lord  Chesterfield  they  were  managed  on  the  English  side 
by  Viri,  since  Bute  was  entirely  without  experience  in 
diplomacy,  a  statement  which  the  correspondence  itself 
fully  endorses.  On  December  13  th  Choiseul  formally  ac- 
cepted the  Sardinian  mediation,  but  there  is  no  trace  of 
Bute's  having  communicated  the  affair  to  the  rest  of  the 
Cabinet  before  the  end  of  January,  when  Newcastle  saw 
a  cold  letter  from  Choiseul  to  Solar  expressing  grave 
doubt  of  the  sincerity  of  the  overture.^  Viri,  however, 
was  clever  enough  to  keep  the  matter  going,  and  early  in 
February  another  "  most  secret "  letter  to  him  from  Solar 
was  shown  to  Newcastle,  intimating  that  Choiseul  was 
willing  to  make  peace."  From  this  point  the  negotiations 
appear  to  have  passed  mto  Egremont's  hands,  to  whose 
province  they  properly  belonged,  and  early  in  March 
Choiseul  began  to  communicate  directly  with  him.  By 
March  21st,  only  a  fortnight  after  Pocock  and  Albemarle 
had  sailed,  he  had  got  so  far  as  to  send  to  Viri,  for 
Solar's  information,  the  terms  on  which  England  was 
ready  to  treat.  It  must  be,  he  said,  on  a  basis  of  uti  possi- 
detis. Of  the  neutral  West  Indies  we  should  require  St. 
Lucia  and  St.  Vincent,  in  Africa  Goree,  and  on  the  knotty 
point  of  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  we  were  ready  to 
grant  a  French  police  post  in  the  island  of  St.  Pierre.^ 

This  negotiation  was  by  no  means  the  only  one  in  which 
the  new  Government  was  groping  for  a  way  out  of  its 
troubles.     At  the  same  time  Newcastle  was  urging  Yorke 

1  Choiseul    to    Solar,   Jan.    23,  and    Newcastle   to   Hardwicke,   dated 
Wednesday  (?  Jan.   27),  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  pp.  97-9. 

2  "Substance  of  a  most  secret  letter,  Ac,"  Newcastle  Papers,  32,934, 
Feb.  5. 

»  Egremont  to  Viri,  March  21,  ibid.,  32,93«. 


1762  BUTE'S    DIPLOMACY  287 

at  the  Hague  to  persuade  the  Dutch  to  come  in,  on  the 
ground  that  if  they  did  not  we  should  have  to  withdraw 
from  the  Continent  and  leave  them  to  the  mercy  of  the 
Bourbon  coalition.  It  was  a  suggestion  after  Bute's  own 
heart.  He  himself  was  telling  Yorke  to  persuade  the 
Dutch  to  let  their',  Scots  brigade  serve  in  Portugal,  and 
he  endorsed  Newcastle's  scheme  cordially.^  Hardwicke 
shook  his  head  over  it  all.  He  did  jiot  believe,  he  said, 
in  secret  negotiations,  and  feared  they  would  only  make 
France  think  we  were  "  knocking  at  every  door  for  peace."  ^ 

Still  they  went  on,  and  had  he  but  known  to  what 
further  lengths  they  were  being  carried  he  would 
have  shaken  his  wise  head  more  dubiously  still. 
With  the  airy  self-confidence  of  a  novice  Bute  had 
undertaken  on  his  sole  responsibility  no  less  a  task 
than  the  restoration  of  the  system  of  William  III. — the 
old  Triple  Alliance  which  the  war  had  upset.  New- 
castle's idea  of  bringing  in  the  Dutch  therefore  exactly 
hit  his  fancy.  His  own  part  had  been  a  characteristically 
amateurish  attempt  to  come  to  a  secret  understanding 
with  Austria.  So  hopeless  a  misconception  of  the  trend  of 
European  politics,  on  which  Kaunitz's  great  coalition  had 
been  founded,  is  almost  inconceivable.  For  Austria,  the 
dominant  factor  in  the  world  was  the  rise  of  Prussia  as  a 
rival  for  the  hegemony  in  Germany.  Yet  Bute  in  his 
blindness  believed  that  he  could  raise  in  its  place  the  old 
bugbear  of  the  Bourbon  alliance,  and  bring  Europe  back 
to  what  it  was  before  the  days  of  the  great  Elector  and 
Frederick's  unpardonable  seizure  of  Silesia. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  there  was  much  in  the 
actual  situation  of  affairs  to  tempt  a  sanguine  novice 
to  try  such  an  overture.     But   even  so,  an  older  liand 

^  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  Jan.  8  ;  Bute  to  same,  Jan.  12,  ibid.,  32,933. 
*  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,  March  21,  ibid.,  32,936. 


288  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1761-2 

would  have  known  it  was  the  worst  possible  moment  to 
make  it.  The  heart  of  the  matter  lay  in  the  military 
situation.  For  our  own  army  on  the  Lower  Rhine,  the 
campaign  of  1761  had  ended  satisfactorily  enough.  It 
was  in  its  old  position  on  the  line  of  the  Upper  Ems, 
and  the  British  contingent  was  wintering  at  Miinster  and 
Osnabriick.  The  French  had  withdrawn  their  left  for 
the  winter  behind  the  Rhine,  with  their  headquarters  at 
Cassel,  so  that  neither  side  had  gained  any  ground  during 
the  campaign,  and  the  defence  of  Hanover  if  not  of 
Hesse  was  still  good.  With  the  central  armies  things 
Avere  in  the  same  unchanged  condition,  but  in  the  Eastern 
or  Prussian  theatre  they  were  as  bad  as  they  could  be. 
After  a  desperate  defensive  campaign  Frederick  had  only 
just  been  able  to  hold  his  front.  He  had  secured  it, 
however,  at  the  last  moment  by  winning  the  battle  of 
Torgau  in  Saxony,  which  had  practically  decided  the 
campaign  in  his  favour  and  enabled  him  to  maintain 
his  headquarters  at  Breslau :  still,  for  the  first  time  in 
the  war,  the  Austrians  were  wintering  in  Silesia.  But 
worst  of  all  was  in  his  rear.  There  the  Russians,  after 
raiding  Berlin,  had  turned  into  Pomerania  and  captured 
the  important  seaport  of  Colberg.  Their  success  had 
been  achieved  by  combined  operations  with  a  fleet  in  the 
Baltic,  and  Frederick  could  not  help  harping  on  the 
naval  help  he  had  confidently  expected  when  he  began 
the  war.  "  Give  my  compliments  to  the  good  Mitchell," 
he  wrote  to  his  Minister  in  Berlin,  "  and  tell  him,  but 
with  no  kind  of  reproach,  that  with  six  English  ships  of 
the  line  Colberg  would  have  been  saved."  ^  It  was  a 
crushing  disaster.  Russians  as  well  as  Austrians  were 
able  to  winter  in  Prussian  territory,  and  worse  still  they 

1  Frederick  to  Finchenstein,  Dec.  27,   1761,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xx. 
p.  144. 


1762  PRUSSIA    AND    PORTUGAL  289 

had  a  sea  base  from  which  in  the  next  campaign  they 
could  deal  Frederick  a  blow  in  the  back  which  he  had  no 
means  of  resisting.  Once  more  he  fell  into  a  black  fit  of 
despair,  feeding  the  dregs  of  his  hope  on  the  chimerical 
chance  of  getting  the  Tartars  to  make  a  diversion  against 
Russia  and  the  Porte  against  Austria.  It  is  even  said 
he  took  to  carrying  poison,  determined  never  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  his  enemies  or  to  sign  an  ignominious 
peace. 

If  Bute,  too,  thought  the  game  in  Germany  was  lost 
beyond  redemption,  it  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered.  The 
news  of  the  fall  of  Colberg  reached  London  on  January 
4th,  just  when  Mello  was  pressing  the  Government 
to  come  to  the  rescue  of  Portugal.  Our  annual  treaty 
with  Frederick  had  expired  ;  negotiations  for  its  renewal 
were  on  foot ;  but  in  view  of  the  secret  communications 
with  France,  there  was  a  difficulty  about  renewing  it  on 
precisely  the  old  terms,  for  it  contained  a  proviso  that 
neither  party  should  treat  with  the  common  enemy  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  the  other.  Further  hesitation  was 
caused  by  the  fact  that  with  the  defence  of  Portugal  added 
to  our  burden  it  seemed  scarcely  possible  to  continue  to 
give  Prussia  any  assistance  that  could  avail  to  save  her. 
It  was  just  at  this  time,  moreover,  that  the  Cabinet  had 
been  in  the  throes  of  a  final  decision  about  Havana.  In 
the  eyes  of  the  Court  party  the  whole  situation  was  beyond 
our  resources,  and  although  after  the  fall  of  Colberg  a 
renewal  of  the  Prussian  treaty  had  been  promised  in 
general  terms,  Parliament  had  not  been  asked  to  vote  the 
subsidy.  Instead,  therefore,  of  anything  definite  about 
the  renewal  being  said,  Bute  wrote  off  to  Mitchell  in 
Berlin  to  tell  him  that  Frederick  must  make  peace  on 
the  best  terms  he  could  get ;  for  in  the  face  of  the  new 
war,  and  our  having  to  defend  Portugal,  we  could  go  on 

VOL.  II.  T 


290  BETWEEN    WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

in  Germany  no  longer.^  It  is  conceivable  under  these 
circumstances  that  Bute  really  believed  the  only  possible 
way  of  helping  Frederick  out  of  his  difficulties  was  to  try 
to  come  to  terms  with  Austria,  though  the  ruling  motive 
was  undoubtedly  his  own  and  his  master's  detestation  of 
the  whole  German  embroilment.  In  the  rawness  of  his 
inexperience  he  does  not  seem  to  have  stopped  to  consider 
what  the  effect  on  Frederick's  darkened  mind  Avould  be 
should  the  Austrian  overture  come  to  his  ears,  nor  of  the 
disastrous  effect  on  our  prestige  if  it  failed.  He  could 
think  of  nothing  but  tearing  himself  and  the  country  free 
from  the  hopeless  situation  at  any  cost. 

Yet  scarcely  had  he  taken  his  blundering  step,  when 
the  whole  prospect  changed  by  one  of  the  most  dazzling 
tricks  of  fortune  even  in  Frederick's  career.  The  very 
day  after  the  fall  of  Colberg  was  known  in  London  the 
Czarina  Elizabeth  suddenly  died.  Her  successor  was 
Peter,  Duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp,  who  had  been  serving 
under  Frederick  as  a  general  of  horse,  and  idolised  him 
as  devoutly  as  Elizabeth  had  detested  him.  He  at  once 
intimated  a  complete  change  of  policy.  At  his  first  levee 
he  had  come  up  smiling  to  Keith,  the  British  ambassador, 
and  whispered  in  his  ear  he  hoped  he  would  be  pleased 
with  him,  for  he  had  sent  an  order  to  stop  the  Russian 
advance  into  Prussia.  Immediately  afterwards  Keith  was 
informed  that  orders  had  been  issued  for  an  armistice, 
and  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  troops  from  the 
Austrian  army,'"^  Thus  at  the  very  moment  when  Bute 
was  deciding  to  abandon  Frederick  to  his  fate,  the  danger 
which  threatened  Prussia  with  extinction  vanished  with 
magical  suddenness,  and  the  great  coalition  of  Kaunitz, 

*  Bute   to   Mitchell,  Jan.  H,   NeivcasUe   Corr.,   32,933 ;  same  to  same, 
May  20,  Mitchell  Memoirs,  vol.  ii.  p.  294. 

-  Keitb  to  Bute,  Jan.  8,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,933, 


1762  BUTE'S    GREAT    BLUNDER  291 

on  which  our  obligations  to  Frederick  were  founded,  was 
broken  in  pieces  at  a  stroke.  "  I  can  only  compare  my 
situation,"  wrote  Frederick  to  Ferdinand,  "to  that  of 
Louis  XIV.  at  the  end  of  the  War  of  Succession.  What 
the  disgrace  of  Marlborough's  party  was  to  him,  the  death 
of  the  Empress  of  Russia  is  to  me."  ^ 

Unfortunately  it  was  impossible  for  the  startling  news 
to  reach  London  till  the  end  of  the  month,  and  in  the 
meanwhile  Bute's  clumsy  activity  had  had  time  to  do  all 
the  harm  it  could.  Yorke,  according  to  his  orders,  had 
got  into  communication  with  Vienna,  and  Bute's  overture 
in  due  course  found  its  way  to  Kaunitz.  As  was  only  to 
be  expected,  it  was  treated  by  him  with  the  haugbtiest 
disdain.  He  would  not  even  vouchsafe  to  reply.  In  the 
most  contemptuous  manner  in  which  such  an  application 
can  be  met,  he  merely  wrote  to  Yorke's  secret  agent, 
reminding  him  that  in  the  original  negotiations  in  1755, 
on  the  eve  of  the  war,  Austria  had  already  put  forward 
her  apprehension  of  her  danger  from  a  new  Bourbon 
coalition,  but  that  England,  absorbed  in  her  own  ends, 
refused  to  listen.  "  Under  these  circumstances,"  he  con- 
cluded, "  I  must  confess  to  you  that  his  Imperial  Majesty 
and  his  Minister  cannot  understand  what  the  confidential 
overture  of  the  English  really  means,  and  consequently  it 
is  easy  to  see  that  we  do  not  find  ourselves  here  in  a 
position  to  return  an  answer."" 

To  the  prestige  of  a  country  about  to  treat  for  peace 
as  a  conqueror,  no  rebuff  could  be  more  damaging.  But 
even  this  was  not  the  worst.  Kaunitz  took  care  to  spread 
the  story  all  over  Europe,  and  Frederick  quickly  got  to 
know  that  an  overture  of  some  kind  had  been  made  to  his 


1  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxi.  p.  256,  Feb.  17. 

^  Kaunitz  to  Baron  de  Reischach,  Vienna,  March  3  ;  Adolpluis,  History 
uf  England,  vol.  i.  p.  41)3,  Appendix  II. 


292  BETWEEN    WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

arch-enemy  behind  his  back.  There  can  now  be  no  doubt 
that  Bute's  unfortunate  idea  was  no  worse  than  the  well- 
intentioned  blunder  of  a  self-confident  and  incapable  man 
without  diplomatic  experience,  and  that  it  Avent  no  further 
than  his  actual  written  instructions  to  Yorke.  Without 
doubt  he  foolishly  believed  that  Austria  could  be  induced 
to  take  a  new  view  of  the  situation,  and  turn  her  energies 
against  the  Bourbon  coalition  instead  of  consuming  them 
on  Frederick.  It  would  be  best  for  every  one  if  she  did. 
But  there  were  interested  parties  who  took  care  that 
the  whole  transaction  should  be  given  a  very  different 
colour.  To  complete  Bute's  folly,  although  he  kept 
the  matter  secret  from  Frederick,  he  was  moved  to 
impart  it  to  Galitzin,  the  Russian  ambassador  in  London, 
who  was  about  to  leave.  Now  Galitzin  was  a  con- 
vinced member  of  the  powerful  Austrian  party  which, 
of  course,  still  existed  at  the  Russian  Court,  and  he 
took  care  that  his  conversation  with  Bute  should  reach 
Frederick's  ears  in  so  garbled  a  form  as  fairly  to  astound 
the  unhappy  British  Minister  when  he  heard  of  it. 
Galitzin  in  his  report  to  the  Czar  said  that  Bute  wished 
to  warn  Russia  to  be  on  her  guard  against  encouraging  the 
chimerical  projects  of  Frederick  against  Austria.  Bute 
had  also  expressed  a  hope  that  Peter  would  not  desert  his 
old  ally  for  the  new  one,  and  had  declared  he  could  not  do 
better  for  Frederick  than  induce  him  to  save  himself  from 
destruction  by  making  peace  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  some 
of  his  territory.  According  to  the  report,  Bute  further 
suggested  that  the  best  way  to  keep  a  hand  over  the  King 
of  Prussia  and  accelerate  a  general  peace  was  not  to  with- 
draw the  Russian  troops  from  the  Austrian  army.  Peter 
lost  little  time  in  communicating  the  news  to  his  friend, 
and  Frederick  was  naturally  furious.  Bute  with  trans- 
parent sincerity  absolutely  and  vehemently  denied  having 


176.     LAPSE    OF    THE    PRUSSIAN    TREATY      293 

said  any  such  thing,  but  the  relations  between  England 
and  Prussia  at  the  moment  were  so  uneasy  that  Frederick 
could  only  believe  the  worst,^ 

At  the  end  of  the  previous  year,  when  the  last  news 
from  Germany  was  the  favourable  winter  position  of 
Ferdinand  and  Frederick's  victory  at  Torgau,  Parliament 
had  agreed  without  a  division  that  all  the  German  sub- 
sidies should  be  continued  for  another  year.  Two  millions 
had  been  voted  for  Ferdinand's  army,  but  still  no  call  had 
been  made  for  Frederick.  At  this  time  Bute  and  the 
King  seemed  resolved  to  abandon  him  altogether  rather 
than  renew  the  treat}^  on  the  old  terms.  It  is  true  that 
when  news  came  of  the  new  Czar's  attitude  they  had 
made  a  desperate  effort  to  recover  their  mistake.  Bed- 
ford, in  spite  of  every  pressure  that  could  be  brought  to 
bear  on  him,  had  insisted  on  moving  in  the  House  of 
Lords  for  the  suppression  of  all  the  subsidies  and  the 
immediate  recall  of  our  troops.  Bute  had  seized  the 
opportunity  to  make  a  handsome  speech  against  the 
motion,  in  which  he  declared  that  "  a  steady  adherence 
to  our  German  allies  was  now  necessary  for  bringing  about 
a  speedy,  honourable,  and  permanent  peace."  Bedford 
was  beaten  by  an  overwhelming  majority,  but  it  did 
nothing  to  satisfy  Frederick.  It  was  peace,  not  war,  that 
was  clearly  in  Bute's  mind.  Instead  of  proceeding  at 
once  to  settle  the  payment  of  the  Prussian  subsidy,  he 
intimated  that  in  view  of  the  changed  attitude  of  Russia 
his  master  hoped  that  the  money  would  be  used  for 
securing  peace  rather  than  for  continuing  the  war,  and 
begged  to  know  what  Frederick's  plans  were  to  that  end. 
Absorbed  in  the  obvious  advantage  of  replacing  England 

*  "  Extrait  d'une  depeche  du  Prince  Galizin,"  London,  Jan.  26, 
forwarded  to  Frederick  from  St.  Petersburg,  March  13. — Frederick  to  Goltz, 
March  23,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxi.  pp.  311-12. 


294  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

by  Russia  as  his  main  ally,  and  as  yet  uncertain  how  his 
overtures  to  St.  Petersburg  would  go,  Frederick  was  at  a 
loss  what  to  reply.  Week  after  week  he  maintained  what 
in  England  could  only  be  regarded  as  an  almost  insolent 
silence.  When  at  last  a  letter  did  come  from  him  to 
the  King,  it  contained  nothing  but  exultation  over  his 
new  friend  and  exhortations  for  a  vigorous  continuation 
of  the  Avar.  The  Prussian  Ministers  in  London  were  at 
the  same  time  pressing  importunately  for  the  subsidy 
to  be  settled.  Bute  and  the  King  lost  temper,  and 
the  Prussians  got  for  an  answer  a  sharp  protest  to  the 
effect  that  not  a  penny  would  be  paid  till  Frederick 
explained  his  ideas  on  the  subject  of  peace. 

It  was  just  at  this  time  that  Frederick  got  wind  of  the 
perverted  version  of  Bute's  overtures  to  Vienna,  and  to 
make  matters  worse,  he  himself  was  taking  an  equally 
unfortunate  step.  Peter  had  told  Keith  shortly  after  his 
accession  that  he  would  be  glad  to  receive  an  envoy  from 
Frederick.  Keith  quickly  arranged  the  matter  through 
Mitchell,  but  before  the  officer  who  was  sent  had  been  in 
St.  Petersburg  many  days,  our  vigilant  ambassador  dis- 
covered that  some  negotiations  were  going  on  which  were 
being  kept  secret  from  him.  It  was  nothing  less  than 
a  suggestion  from  Frederick  to  the  new  Czar  for  coming 
to  terms  at  the  expense  of  Denmark.  Since  Peter  was 
Duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp,  his  position  as  heir  to  the 
Russian  crown  raised  the  eternal  question  of  the  duchies. 
By  the  terms  of  the  original  sub-infeudation  by  the  King 
of  Denmark,  they  could  not  be  severed  from  the  Danish 
crown.  In  the  danger  that  thus  threatened  the  integrity 
of  Denmark  Frederick  had  seen  a  chance  of  getting  from 
her  the  assistance  he  most  needed,  and  up  to  the  moment 
of  the  Czarina's  death  he  had  been  contemplating  an 
offer  to  guarantee  to  the  Danish   Court  the  sovereignty 


1762  FREDERICK'S    NEW   INTRIGUE  295 

of  the  Schleswig-Holstein  duchies  in  return  for  a  Baltic 
fleet  to  recover  Colberg.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  new 
Czar  ascended  the  throne  and  began  making  his  friendly 
overtures,  the  versatile  King  turned  round.  The  special 
envoy,  whom  Peter  had  invited,  carried  with  him  to 
St.  Petersburg  instructions  to  say  that  if  the  Czar  would 
evacuate  Prussian  territory,  and  also,  if  possible,  guarantee 
him  Silesia,  he  Avas  ready  to  guarantee  Holstein  to  his 
crown.  He  was  even  ready  to  sign  an  act  of  neutrality 
in  view  of  Russia  making  war  on  Denmark,  but  it  must 
be  "  most  secret,"  and  above  all,  be  concealed  from  the 
British  ambassador.^ 

Mitchell  in  Berlin  also  got  wind  of  the  affair.  He 
believed,  like  Keith,  that  the  arrangement  extended  to 
Schleswig,  and  added  a  rumour  that  Frederick  was  making 
preparations  to  seize  the  free  city  of  Liibeck  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  execution  of  his  plan.  Considering  that  the 
Prussian  mission  to  the  Czar,  and  indeed  the  whole 
rapprochement,  had  been  arranged  by  the  good  offices  of 
the  British  representatives  at  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg, 
the  secrecy  in  which  the  Danish  intrigue  had  been 
wrapped  could  only  raise  the  gravest  suspicions.  For  of 
all  the  Courts  in  Europe,  that  of  Denmark  was  the  one 
to  which  our  own  was  most  closely  allied  by  blood.  The 
Queen  of  Denmark  was  actually  a  daughter  of  George 
the  Second,  and  what  made  matters  still  worse  was  that 
England  and  Russia  were  two  of  the  Powers  which  had 
guaranteed  the  Danish  sovereignty  of  Schleswig.  It  is 
true  that  at  first  Frederick's  proposal  did  not  go  beyond 
Holstein,  but  even  so,  it  was  a  considerable  strain  on  the 
loyalty  of  his  harassed  ally.  King  George  was  naturally 
indignant.      In  a  personal  letter  he  accused  Frederick  of 

'  "  Instruction  pour  le  Baron  de  Goltz,"  Feb.  7,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxi. 
p.  231. 


296  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

intending  to  use  the  subsidy  not  for  making  peace  but 
for  spreading  the  war  still  further,  and  Bute  instructed 
Mitchell  to  say  that  if  the  King  of  Prussia  had  made  any 
engagement  about  Schleswig  it  would  cost  him  his  subsidy, 
and  if  he  had  not,  his  denial  of  all  such  intention  must 
be  a  condition  of  the  grant.^ 

This  letter  was  written  in  April,  and  just  a  week  after 
news  had  come  in  of  the  capture  of  Martinique.  Every 
one  was  in  high  spirits  about  the  Spanish  war,  and  even 
the  most  timid  were  now  confident  that  Havana  would 
share  the  fate  of  the  French  island.  On  the  8th  the 
Cabinet  had  met  to  settle  the  three  vital  questions  of  the 
hour — that  is  to  say,  the  formal  opening  of  negotiations 
with  France,  the  amount  of  assistance  that  could  be  given 
to  Portugal,  and  the  continuance  of  the  Prussian  subsidy. 
Grenville  and  Bute  were  openly  for  making  no  further 
payments,  even  for  Ferdinand's  army,  and  would  stop  the 
war  in  Germany  altogether.  On  this  point  no  firm  deci- 
sion was  taken,  but  on  the  question  of  Portugal  it  was 
otherwise.  Though  at  first  Frederick  had  admitted  our 
duty  of  protecting  her  even  at  the  cost  of  neglecting 
Ferdinand's  army,  he  had  recently  changed  his  tone,  and 
was  now  doing  his  best  to  get  us  to  desert  our  old  ally. 
Not,  of  course,  openly ;  but  "  in  confidence  "  he  told  his 
Minister  in  London  that  the  case  of  Portugal  was  hope- 
less, and  that  the  King  had  better  retire  to  Brazil.  The 
following  week,  again,  he  suggested  that  the  threatened 
invasion  of  Portugal  was  a  mere  parade  designed  to 
cover  a  Spanish  descent  on  Ireland,  or  even  on  England 
itself.2 


'  See  the  correspondence  in  Adolphus,  vol.  i.  Appendix  II. ;  also  Mitchell 
to  Bute,  Jan.  30  and  March  2,  7,  and  25,  Mitchell  Memoirs,  vol.  ii. 

'•*  Frederick  to  Knyphausen,  Feb.  8  and  13,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxi. 
pp.  239-50. 


1762  PRUSSIAN    SUBSIDY    REFUSED  297 

At  the  moment  such  an  attitude  on  the  part  of 
Frederick  in  regard  to  Portugal  was  quite  enough  to 
bring  the  British  Cabinet  to  unanimity  in  the  opposite 
sense.  The  main  trouble  was  that  it  was  agreed  we  could 
spare  no  more  than  six  thousand  men,  and  it  was  doubtful 
whether  so  small  a  force  could  be  of  any  use.  To  settle 
the  question,  Lord  Tyrawley,  the  old  friend  of  the 
Portuguese  Court,  had  been  sent  out,  at  Mello's  request, 
with  some  other  oflEicers  on  a  secret  mission  to  report 
on  the  situation,  and  to  arrange  a  plan  of  defence.  It  so 
happened  that  his  report  just  now  came  to  hand,  and  it 
was  to  the  effect  that  the  available  force  would  probably 
be  sufficient  to  enable  Portugal  to  hold  her  own.  For  the 
Cabinet  this  was  enough,  and  without  further  hesitation 
it  was  decided  to  issue  orders  for  six  thousand  men  to 
proceed  to  Lisbon  at  once.  To  mark  further  the  complete 
breach  with  Frederick,  Bute,  as  the  result  of  the  meeting, 
sent  his  defiant  despatch  on  the  question  of  the  Danish 
duchies  and  the  subsidy,  and  Egremont  wrote  formally 
to  Choiseul  proposing  a  revival  of  the  negotiations  on  the 
basis  of  the  last  "  two  ultimatums,"  and  intimating  our 
readiness  to  attend  a  congress  to  settle  the  war  in 
Germany.^ 

Within  a  week  of  the  despatch  being  sent,  Choiseul 
had  penned  a  favourable  reply,  and  on  the  very  same 
day,  like  the  resolute  statesman  he  was,  he  had  sent  to 
Spain  his  elaborate  war  plan  for  a  final  effort  to  bring 
England  to  reason."  At  the  same  moment  Anson,  as 
though,  on  the  brink  of  the  grave,  he  was  inspired  with 
a  vision  of  Choiseul's  mind,  was  preparing  a  plan  for  the 

'  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  April  1  and  10  ;  same  to  Bedford  and  to 
Barrington,  April  8  ;  Egremont  to  Choiseul,  April  8,  JVrAvca.itle  Paperf, 
32,936-7  ;  Viri  to  Solar,  April  8,  Lanulownc  House  MSS.,  i. 

2  Choiseul  to  Egremont,  April  14,  Newcaatle  Papers,  32,!)37 ;  Duro, 
Armndri  Expailoln,  vol.  vii.  p.  53. 


298  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

defence  of  the  coasts.  The  force  that  remained  available 
for  the  purpose  was  slender  to  the  last  degree,  and  he 
was  urging  that  Hawke  must  hoist  his  flag  in  the  Channel 
fleet  at  once.  On  April  12th  Bute  went  to  see  him.  The 
same  day  the  Cabinet  considered  his  proposals,  ordered 
them  to  go  forward,  and  the  dying  admiral,  at  the  end  of 
his  strength,  was  carried  down  to  Bath.^ 

It  had  been  the  hope  of  Bute  and  the  peacemakers 
that  their  work  ere  this  would  have  made  sufficient 
progress  to  render  needless  the  opening  of  a  new 
campaign.  Ferdinand  had  been  held  back,  fretting  and 
inactive,  till  the  last  moment,  but  now  the  time  had 
come  when  "  aye "  or  "  no  "  must  be  pronounced,  and 
the  air,  which  should  have  been  mild  with  peace,  was 
highly  charged  with  war.  The  diplomatic  tangle  was 
too  dangerous  for  any  man  to  trust.  The  British 
Ministers  could  feel  Pitt's  spirit  burning  round  them 
throughout  the  country.  They  dared  not  flinch  if  they 
would — Choiseul  would  not  if  he  could.  The  word  was 
peace,  but  sword  in  hand.  On  both  sides  the  war  plans 
had  to  be  set  in  motion ;  and  to  turn  to  them  from  the 
misguided  and  trothless  diplomacy  of  the  hour  is  a 
welcome  relief.  They  at  least  were  marked  on  the 
French  side  by  the  grandiose  mind  of  a  great  War 
Minister,  and  on  our  own  by  the  skill  and  comprehen- 
sive grasp  which  Pitt's  administration  had  bred  in  every 
department  concerned. 

The  original  proposals  of  Spain  bore  no  such  stamp. 
Penetrated,  like  Napoleon,  with  the  idea  that  England's 
power  rested  entirely  on  her  commerce,  she  anticipated 
him  in  suggesting  to  France  the  formation  of  a  "  conti- 
nental system  "  for  the  exclusion  of  British  trade  from 

*  Bute  to  Newcastle,  April   10 ;   Newcastle  to  Devonshire,  April  13, 
Newcastle  Papers,  32,5)37. 


1762  THE    SPANISH    WAR    PLAN  299 

European  ports.  Choiseul  was  to  get  the  adhesion  of 
Russia,  and  she  herself  would  manage  the  Mediterranean 
Princes.  Choiseul,  more  far-sighted  than  Napoleon,  at 
once  refused,  on  the  ground  that  such  a  method  of 
meeting  England  would  be  as  costly  as  it  was  dangerous. 
"  Commerce,"  he  observed  in  his  reply,  "  is  a  kind  of 
torrent.  Its  course  can  only  bo  changed  with  difficulty, 
and  if  you  try  to  cut  it  off  suddenly,  it  destroys  the 
banks  where  you  stop  it."  The  military  operations  which 
Spain  had  to  propose  were  of  the  usual  nature — an  attack 
on  Gibraltar  by  sea,  a  descent  in  Ireland,  the  conquest  of 
Jamaica,  and  the  invasion  of  Holland  by  France  on  the 
old  plan  of  securing  an  indemnity  against  the  British 
conquests  beyond  the  sea.^  But  Choiseul  would  have 
none  of  these  thingjs.  Methods  so  trite  were  below  the 
starting-point  where  his  creative  mind  began  to  think. 
He  Avas  bent  on  Spain's  concentrating  the  whole  of  her 
home  energy  on  Portugal,  enforcing  his  advice  with  the 
reflection  that  the  Portuguese  Court  was  resting  secure 
and  inactive  in  the  confidence  of  neutrality.  In  this 
belief — if  it  really  was  a  belief — we  know  Choiseul  was 
wrong.  Portugal  was  already  awake  and  busy  securing 
British  protection. 

In  order  to  afford  Spain  no  pretext  for  attack,  the 
affair  was  being  conducted  with  the  utmost  secrecy  by 
Mello  in  London.  Not  even  Hay,  our  minister  in  Lisbon, 
was  informed  of  it  officially.  Oeyras,  the  famous  Portu- 
guese dictator,  was  in  power.  As  early  as  November 
1761  he  scented  what  was  in  the  wind,  and  he  was  deter- 
mined at  all  costs  that  no  sign  of  his  moving  should 
give  Spain  the  handle  she  wanted.  It  was  in  the  middle 
of  December  that  Mello  had  made  his  application   for 

*  Flassan,  La  Diplomatic  FranQctise,  vol.  vi.  p.  456,  citing  a  despatch  of 
the  Due  d'Ossun,  the  French  Ambassador  in  Madrid,  dated  Jan.  18. 


300  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

Lord  Tyrawley.  By  January  7th  Egremont  had  been 
instructed  to  give  the  desired  assurance.  A  month 
later  the  resjriraents  that  were  available  had  been  warned 
for  service,  and  Tyrawley  appointed  to  command,  and 
given  his  secret  instructions  for  the  confidential  report.^ 

Whether  or  not  it  was  Choiseul  who  first  suggested 
the  shameless  violation  of  Portuguese  neutrality  is  diffi- 
cult to  determine.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  he  was 
for  Spain's  striking  an  immediate  blow  while  the  victim, 
as  he  supposed,  was  still  asleep  and  before  England  could 
act.  This,  however,  was  a  length  to  which  the  chivalry 
of  the  Spanish  King  would  not  permit  him  to  go.  He 
insisted  on  proceeding  more  honourably  by  diplomatic 
means.  He  would  first  present  a  demand  to  Portugal, 
in  accordance  with  his  original  plan,  that  she  should 
close  her  ports  to  British  trade,  and  detach  herself  alto- 
gether from  the  British  interest.  If  she  accepted,  she 
was  to  be  guaranteed  against  attack ;  if  she  refused,  she 
would  be  regarded  as  an  ally  of  the  common  enemy. 
She  must  choose  between  one  side  and  the  other — 
neutrality  was  impossible  ;  but  until  she  had  made  her 
choice  Charles  declined  to  act,  and  Choiseul  had  to 
consent.  He  was  careful,  however,  to  send  a  special 
envoy  to  Lisbon  to  conduct  the  negotiation  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  Spanish  Minister,  and  to  see  things  went 
the  right  way.^  It  must  further  be  remembered  that  an 
intrigue  to  create  in  Portugal  itself  a  reaction  of  popular 
sentiment  against  England  had  been  an  undercurrent  of 
French  policy  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  that 
under  Choiseul's  administration  the  French  Minister  at 
Lisbon  had  been  fomenting  a  campaign  in  the  press  to 
that  end.     The  affair  had  ended  in  failure,  and  by  the 

1  Egremont  to  Hay,  Feb.  9,  S.P.  Foreign  (Portugal),  54. 
*  Flassan,  Diplomatic  Fran^nixc,  vol.  vi.  p.  458. 


1762        THE    HARD    CASE    OF    PORTUGAL       301 

end  of  1761  it  was  clear  that  nothing  but  force  could 
overcome  the  stubborn  loyalty  of  Portugal.^  But  what 
is  most  significant  of  all  is  that  an  attack  on  Portugal, 
and  the  diversion  of  British  attention  to  its  defence,  was 
a  point  upon  which  Choiseul's  whole  war  plan  turned. 

As  we  have  seen  already,  this  war  plan  in  its  final 
form  was  not  delivered  to  Spain  till  after  the  Havana 
expedition  had  sailed,  and  news  had  come  of  Rodney's 
success  at  Martinique.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that 
Choiseul  had  just  been  officially  informed  that  Sweden 
was  going  to  follow  the  lead  of  Russia,  and  make  her 
peace  with  Frederick."  All  chance,  therefore,  for  France 
to  obtain  in  Hanover  the  long-sought  guarantee  for  a 
favourable  peace  was  gone,  and  it  was  the  moment  when 
Choiseul  had  decided  to  re-open  negotiations  with  Bute. 

To  aggravate  the  situation  for  him  Spain  was  still 
hanging  back  from  the  final  step.  In  the  middle  of 
March  the  joint  ultimatum  of  the  two  powers  had  been 
presented  in  Lisbon,  and  an  answer  demanded  in  four  days. 
It  was  given  without  shrinking,  in  terms  of  brave  and 
pathetic  dignity.  Honour  and  justice  would  not  permit 
the  King's  joining  them  against  England.  He  deplored 
the  quarrel  of  his  friends,  and,  after  expressing  his 
willingness  to  mediate,  appealed  to  Charles  to  have  pity 
on  the  miserable  state  of  his  country.  Charles  was 
moved,  and  his  emotion  was  sharpened  by  the  unwelcome 
news  that  Martinique  was  lost.  For  the  moment  nothing 
was  done.  "  I  see  well,"  wrote  Choiseul  to  the  French 
ambassador  in  Spain,  "  that  at  Madrid  they  are  not  used 
to  disasters.  It  is  a  difficult  habit  to  acquire  when  you 
are   engaged  in  war;  but  these  are  just  the   situations 

'  Wheeler,  I'he  "  Discours  Politique,"  attributed  to  Pombal  [then  Count 
of  Oci/ras]. — English  IJistorical  Review,  vol.  xix.  p.  12.S. 

2  Havrincourt  to  Choiseul,  March  20,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,!t3(i. 


302  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

that  call  for  the  highest  courage."  ^  But  even  as  he 
wrote  the  die  was  cast.  A  second  threatening  ultimatum 
had  been  presented  to  the  King  of  Portugal,  and  he  had 
rejected  it  passionately,  exclaiming,  "  It  would  aifect  him 
less  to  let  the  last  tile  of  his  palace  fall,  and  see  his 
faithful  subjects  spill  the  last  drop  of  their  blood,  than  to 
sacrifice  the  honour  of  his  crown  and  all  that  Portugal 
held  most  dear."  It  was  four  days  after  this  high 
answer  was  penned  that  Choiseul  sent  off  his  war  plan. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  it,  it  cannot  be  denied  the 
quality  of  courage.  With  England  still  advancing  from 
success  to  success  beyond  the  seas,  and  all  hope  of  coun- 
tervailing advantages  on  the  Continent  gone,  Choiseul 
found  himself  driven,  as  a  counsel  of  despair,  to  deliver 
a  counter-stroke  at  his  enemy's  heart,  and  deliver  it  by 
invasion  over  an  uncommanded  sea.  This  condition  was 
the  absorbing  difficulty.  He  did  not  disguise  from  him- 
self that  for  the  success  of  his  scheme  local  and  tem- 
porary command  was  essential.  For  it  was  no  mere  raid 
that  he  had  in  contemplation,  but  a  continuing  operation 
in  successive  waves.  He  frankly  faced  the  situation  that 
such  a  command  could  only  be  obtained  by  diversion — 
by  working,  that  is,  for  a  dissipation  of  the  English  naval 
defence,  and  the  deflection  of  the  enemy's  attention  from 
his  theatre  of  operation.  With  this  postulate  as  the 
essential  condition  of  success,  he  argued  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  throw  across  the  whole  force  required  in  one 
body.  The  concentration  of  the  troops,  and  the  collec- 
tion of  sufficient  transport,  would  at  once  put  England  on 
her  guard.  Concealment  was  only  possible  by  suddenly 
seizing  a  pied  a  tcrre  with  a  small  body  of  troops  that 
could  be  passed  over  in  local  craft,  and  reinforcing  them 
as   rapidly  as   possible.     The   obvious  drawback   of  the 

*  Choiseul  to  d'Ossun,  April  5. — Flassan,  vol.  vi.  p.  460. 


1762  CHOISEUL'S   INVASION    PLAN  303 

method  was,  that  it  involved  securing  a  local  control  of 
the  sea  of  considerable  duration,  but  Choiseul  made  up 
his  mind  that  this  was  the  lesser  risk. 

In  the  memorandum  then,  in  which  he  communicated 
his  plan,  he  began  by  pointing  out  that  if  the  two 
crowns  decided  to  send  an  army  to  England,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  arrange  a  combination,  so  as  to  secure 
"  the  command  of  the  Channel  and  a  superiority  in  that 
sea  for  at  least  five  Aveeks."  In  view  of  the  force  they 
had  available  this  was  by  no  means  easy.  According  to 
Choiseul's  information  there  were  in  Brest  6  of  the  line ; 
in  Rochefort,  10  ;  in  Ferrol,  8;  in  Cadiz,  14;  in  Carta- 
gena, 4;  and  in  Toulon,  10.  In  all  there  were  52  of 
the  line,  but,  as  he  observed,  they  were  distributed  in  a 
manner  that  by  no  means  lent  itself  to  concentrating  and 
carrying  them  in  one  fleet  into  the  Channel.  The  ten 
sail  in  Toulon  could  easily  join  the  four  in  Cartagena,  but 
they  would  together  form  a  squadron  too  weak  to  force 
the  Straits  in  the  face  of  Saunders,  and  the  attempt  to  do 
so  would  probably  end  in  giving  the  enemy  a  decision 
in  the  Mediterranean.  It  was  only  possible,  therefore, 
to  count  on  the  thirty-eight  that  remained  in  the  various 
Atlantic  ports,  and  from  these  must  be  deducted  the 
ten  in  Rochefort,  which  could  not  move  so  long  as 
the  British  held  their  blockading  position  at  the  Isle  of 
Aix.  There  remained,  then,  no  more  than  the  twenty- 
eight  in  Brest,  Ferrol,  and  Cadiz ;  and  as  it  would  be 
necessary  to  leave  at  least  six  of  these  for  the  defence  of 
the  Cadiz  waters,  the  striking  fleet  could  not  amount  to 
more  than  twenty-two  of  the  line.  With  such  a  force 
an  open  bid  for  the  command  of  English  waters  was 
impossible,  but,  seeing  how  widely  the  British  fleet  was 
distributed,  it  might  be  possible,  by  diversion,  to  seize 
the  Channel  and  hold  it  for  the  five  weeks  needed  before 


304  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

the  enemy  could  concentrate  a  sufficient  force  to  drive 
them  off. 

For  such  a  method  to  succeed  he  insisted  that  two 
things  were  necessary:  firstly,  absolute  secrecy,  and, 
secondly,  operations  to  throw  the  enemy  off  his  guard 
and  lull  him  to  security  at  home.  The  primary  object, 
therefore,  must  be  to  induce  him  to  send  the  greatest 
possible  number  of  vessels  away  from  his  own  seas,  and 
to  denude  the  British  Islands  of  troops.  The  means  to 
this  end  were  the  war  in  Germany,  the  war  in  Portugal, 
a  demonstration  of  besieging  Gibraltar,  and  across  the 
Atlantic  a  threat  to  recover  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe, 
and  to  seize  Jamaica,  for  which  operations  the  two  crowns 
had  already  thirty  of  the  line  in  the  West  Indies.  These 
diversions  must  be  made  with  promptitude  and  vigour ; 
for  the  moment  the  enemy  got  wind  of  the  real  object 
of  the  allied  squadrons,  they  would  gather  a  force 
together  which  would  never  lose  sight  of  them,  and  be 
certain  to  ruin  the  plan.  "  Well  do  we  know,"  wrote 
Choiseul,  "  that,  in  spite  of  the  Avide  distribution  of  their 
fleet  which  they  have  maintained  throughout  the  war, 
they  have  always  shown  themselves  in  a  position  to  face 
every  danger  with  which  France  threatened  them."  In 
the  European  theatre  he  thought  that  Gibraltar  would 
afford  the  best  means  of  diversion,  as  being  furthest  away 
from  England.  A  feint  of  besieging  it  was  to  be  made, 
and,  to  give  it  reality,  thirty  French  battalions  would  be 
sent  down  from  Marseilles,  and  landed  at  Estrepona.  If, 
at  the  same  time,  the  operation  was  accompanied  by 
movements  of  the  Toulon  and  Cartagena  squadrons,  it 
would  certainly  fix  the  bulk  of  the  British  strength  in 
the  Straits. 

Meanwhile  France  would  quietly  be  making  the 
necessary    preparations    for    passing    troops    across  the 


1762  CHOISEUL'S   INVASION    PLAN  305 

Channel.     The   originality   of  ChoisGul's    plan  Avas  that 
no  more  than  eight  small  vessels  were   to   he   collected 
between  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  enough  to  enable   him  to 
establish  a  footing  in   England,  and  rapidly  to  support 
it  during  the  four  or  five  weeks  the  allied  fleet  would 
be  masters  of  the  Channel.      So  small  an  assemblage  of 
transports,  he  repeated,  would  not  arouse  suspicion,  and 
the  English  would  be  certain  to  take   the  substance  for 
the  shadow.     The  real  difficulty  would  be  the  formation 
of  the  corps  of  invasion.     To  assemble  a  sufficient  force 
on  the  coast  would  be  to  betray  the  whole  secret.     But 
he  believed  it  could  be  managed  in  another  way.      By 
organising  the  corps  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Lower 
Rhine,  it  would  acquire  the  colour  of  a  reserve  for  the 
Westphalian  army,  and  at  the  last  moment  it  could  be 
moved   by  forced   marches   to   the   coast  in   echelon    as 
required.     It  was  to  consist  of  a  hundred  battalions,  or 
about  50,000  men. 

Then  follows  the  method  in  which  he  hoped  to  manage 
the  naval  concentration  without  revealing  its  object.  The 
rendezvous  must  be  Ferrol,  as  being  the  point  calculated 
to  make  the  enemy  most  uneasy  about  Gibraltar,  and  also 
as  being  outside  the  actual  theatre  of  operations,  so  as  to 
admit  of  the  allied  fleet  reaching  the  Channel  without 
fiofhtinsf.  To  Ferrol,  then,  France  must  send  eight  of  the 
line  from  Brest,  and  Spain  eight  from  Cadiz,  and  the 
junction  must  be  made  without  meeting  the  enemy. 
This  might  reasonably  be  counted  on  because  the  English 
would  naturally  believe  the  concentration  was  intended 
to  form  a  combination  with  the  fourteen  ships  of  the 
Mediterranean  squadrons  and  establish  the  siege  of 
Gibraltar,  and  they  would  therefore  prefer  to  hold  the 
Straits  to  blockading  Ferrol.  Consequently  it  was  to 
be  expected  that  the  English  would  take  u])  a  position 

VOL.  II.  u 


3o6  BETWEEN    WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

somewhere  between  Cape  Gata  and  Cape  St.  Mary,  that 
is  either  within  or  without  the  Straits,  so  as  to  "  attend 
the  motions  "  of  the  allies  and  be  superior  to  either  wing 
of  the  combined  fleets.  That  this  would  be  done  could 
be  counted  on  with  certainty,  for  so  favourable  for  the 
British  was  the  position  indicated  that  with  a  score  or  so 
of  the  line  they  could  contain  the  whole  of  the  available 
thirty-six  of  the  allies.  Such  a  trap  would  be  all  the 
more  certain  to  catch  them  because,  while  they  would 
see  active  operations  ashore  against  Gibraltar,  there 
would  bo  no  sign  of  movement  at  Calais  or  Dunkirk. 
Further  to  ensure  the  deception,  the  King  of  Spain  must 
withdraw  all  his  troops  except  ordinary  garrisons  from 
Galicia,  since  even  a  small  force  on  that  coast,  with  a 
fleet  in  Ferrol,  would  indicate  a  raid  on  Ireland,  and  tend 
to  reveal  to  the  enemy  all  that  it  was  most  essential  to 
hide.  It  would  turn  their  attention  to  Ferrol,  and  they 
would  take  up  a  position  off  the  port  which  would  make 
it  impossible  for  the  allied  fleet  to  get  out  without  fight- 
ing. An  action  would  ruin  the  whole  plan,  for,  even  if 
victorious,  the  combined  squadron  must  suffer  so  much 
damage  that  the  English  would  be  able  to  retain  com- 
mand of  the  Channel  with  a  mere  handful  of  ships.  It 
was  indeed  essential  that  the  combined  squadron  in 
Ferrol  should  be  ordered  to  defer  its  sailing  till  there 
was  nothing  in  its  path.^ 

It  will  be  seen  at  once  how  vital  to  the  scheme  was  a 
diversion  against  Portugal.  Within  a  week  Solar  sent 
over  to  Viri  a  report  of  what  was  in  the  wind.  Falling 
straight  into  Choiseul's  trap  he  warned  Viri  that  the 
chief  obstacle  to  securing  peace    would    be   Spain  and 

*  "  Project  for  the  invasion  of  England,  formed  by  the  French  Ministry, 
and  remitted  April  14,  1760,"  Duro,  Armada  Espanola,  vol.  vii.  p.  53, 
Appendix. 


1762  CHOISEUL'S   INVASION    PLAN  307 

Grimaldi,  and  that  England's  best  chance  of  spoiling 
their  game  was  to  support  Portugal  with  all  the  troops 
she  could.  PortULjal,  he  said,  and  not  Hanover,  was  to 
be  the  main  object  of  the  year's  campaign.^  Clearly 
what  Choiseul  was  aiming  at — and  what  Viri  unwittingly 
was  doing  his  best  to  bring  about — was  to  throw  into  con- 
fusion the  covering  or  containing  system  which  Pitt  had 
used  Avith  so  much  success  throughout  the  war.  Anything 
like  a  conquest  of  England  was  not  in  his  mind.  The 
military  force  at  his  disposal  was  not  great  enough,  and 
if  it  had  been  he  could  not  have  got  it  across.  But  if 
only  the  enemy's  home  defence  force  could  be  temporarily 
reduced  to  a  low  enough  point,  he  trusted  that  his  fifty 
thousand  men  would  be  able  to  deal  to  England  a  blow 
which  would  rush  her  into  accepting  reasonable  terms. 
The  attack  on  Portugal  was  the  only  means  of  securing 
such  a  reduction ;  for  Gibraltar  was  fully  garrisoned,  and 
in  view  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Germany,  and  the 
fate  of  Martinique,  no  reinforcements  were  likely  to  be 
drawn  away  to  either  of  those  theatres. 

The  whole  plan,  though  suffering  from  an  excess  of 
subtlety  and  elaboration,  was  undeniably  well  conceived 
in  view  of  the  actual  situation.  It  cannot  be  said  it  had 
no  chance  of  success,  and  it  was  certainly  simpler  and  more 
firmly  knit  than  any  of  those  which  Napoleon  afterwards 
adopted.  A  scheme  very  like  his  last — so  like,  indeed, 
that  it  is  obviously  the  origin  of  Napoleon's  idea — had 
actually  been  submitted  to  Choiseul  amongst  many  others 
at  this  time.  A  squadron  was  to  leave  Toulon  in  the 
winter,  and,  after  recapturing  Goree,  Avas  to  return  to  Ferrol 
in  July  the  following  year.  Two  other  squadrons,  leaving 
Brest  and  Rochefort  in  the  same  way,  were  to  rendez- 
vous at  Martinique,  recapture  Guadeloupe,  and  threaten 

'  Solar  to  Viri,  April  IG,  Lanadmone  House  MSS, 


3o8  BETWEEN   WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

Jamaica.  In  July  they  were  to  meet  the  Toulon 
squadron  in  Ferrol,  and  then  the  three  in  company  were 
to  set  free  a  fourth  squadron  in  Brest,  seize  the  command 
of  the  Channel,  and  cover  the  passage  of  an  invading 
army.  This  project,  which  was  drawn  up  before  the 
Family  Compact  was  signed,  became  even  more  attrac- 
tive when  the  Spanish  co-operation  was  available ;  but 
Choiseul  rejected  it  in  favour  of  his  simpler  scheme, 
founded  directly  on  a  combination  with  the  Spanish 
fleet,  and  the  fresh  possibilities  of  diversion  arising  from 
the  shift  in  the  balance  of  the  war.^ 

The  manner  in  which  the  danger  of  this  scheme  was 
detected  and  met  by  England,  and  the  system  on  which, 
in  spite  of  it,  she  maintained  her  covering  position  for 
the  main  attack  on  Havana,  are  of  high  interest.  Let  us 
turn  first  to  the  Straits — the  southern  area,  where  for  the 
defence  the  situation  was  most  critical  and  difficult. 
There,  it  will  be  remembered,  Saunders,  having  found 
that  from  unavoidable  delays  his  chance  of  striking  a 
blow  at  Spain  was  lost,  had  correctly  decided  to  assume 
the  defensive.  Clearly  appreciating  that  his  function  in 
the  British  plan  was  discharged  by  keeping  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  Atlantic  divisions  of  the  enemy  apart,  he 
would  permit  nothing  to  distract  him  from  holding  the 
Straits  and  setting  up  the  strategical  deadlock  which 
Choiseul  had  recognised  to  be  insoluble.  We  left  him 
before  Cadiz,  whither  he  had  gone  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  hoping  for  a  chance  to  attack.  Though  he  at 
once  recognised  there  Avas  nothing  left  for  him  but  the 
defensive,  it  was  by  no  means  easy  to  decide  how  best  to 

*  See  Lacour-Gayet,  Marine  sous  Louis  XV.,  p.  354.  The  author  is  of 
opinion  that  Napoleon  consulted  this  memoir  as  well  as  the  subsequent 
projects  of  the  Due  do  Broglie  di-awn  up  in  1703-65,  ibid.,  422  n.  He  does 
not,  however,  mention  the  project  which,  according  to  Captain  Duro, 
Choiseul  actually  forwarded  to  the  Spanish  Court  as  his  final  plan. 


1762         SAUNDERS   AND    HIS    FUNCTION         309 

perform  his  function.  The  force  at  his  command  was 
eighteen  of  the  line,  and  though  all  were  small  except 
his  own  flagship,  he  had  nothing  to  fear  from  any 
probable  concentration  of  the  allies,  provided  ho  could 
maintain  an  interior  position  between  their  Mediter- 
ranean and  their  Atlantic  divisions.  But  it  Avas  essential 
for  him  to  make  sure  of  being  able  to  deal  with  either 
concentration  singly,  if  the  Atlantic  divisions  tried  to 
join  those  in  the  Mediterranean,  or  vice  versa.  There  was, 
of  course,  an  obvious  temptation  to  endeavour  to  improve 
the  situation  by  blockading  Cadiz,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
Atlantic  divisions  getting  together  at  all.  But  his  fine 
strategical  insight  and  his  masterly  grasp  of  the  essential 
conditions  quickly  convinced  him  that  this  would  be 
an  error.  It  would  be  trying  too  much  at  the  risk  of 
losing  everything.  A  position  which  would  enable  him  to 
blockade  Cadiz,  and  at  the  same  time  make  sure  of 
barring  the  Straits,  was  not  to  be  found.  In  his  despatch 
to  the  Admiralty  we  have  his  exact  appreciation  of  the 
position.  If,  he  says,  with  the  wind  easterly  he  remained 
in  the  Gut  to  prevent  the  exit  of  the  combined  Mediter- 
ranean divisions,  he  left  Cadiz  open  for  a  concentration 
of  the  Atlantic  divisions.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
prevent  this  he  cruised  west  of  the  Gut  and  within 
striking  distance  of  Cadiz,  the  tirst  Levanter  would 
probably  drive  him  so  far  to  sea  that  the  Mediterranean 
division  would  be  able  to  pass  out  untouched,  and  slip  by 
inshore  of  him  round  Capo  Trafalgar  into  Cadiz.  To  his 
broad  grasp  of  essentials  this  was  the  greater  danger,  and 
he  decided  that  the  position  which  his  function  in  the 
war  plan  indicated  was  to  secure  the  Gut  and  ignore  the 
minor  risk  of  leaving  Cadiz  open. 

So  much  was  plain  to  him,  but  it  happened  that  this 
dilemma,  which  he  solved  so  sagaciously,  did  not  exhaust 


3IO  BETWEEN   WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

the  strategical  complexity  of  his  position.  For,  no  sooner 
had  he  reached  Cadiz  and  realised  the  problem  before 
him,  than  he  had  received  an  urgent  and  mysterious 
summons  from  Hay  for  three  or  four  ships  to  be  sent  to 
Lisbon  immediately,  if  he  could  possibly  spare  them.  No 
explanation  was  given,  but  it  was  requested  that  they 
should  drop  in  one  by  one,  as  though  by  hazard.  As 
yet  there  was  no  sign  of  movement  at  Toulon,  which  his 
frigates  Avere  watching  from  the  Savoyard  port  of  Villa- 
franca.  An  immediate  occupation  of  the  Gut,  therefore, 
was  not  necessary,  and  on  February  4th  he  decided  to 
send  up  three  of  the  line  to  the  Tagus  "  to  see  what  was 
the  matter  there." 

The  matter  was  that  Oeyras  had  just  let  Hay  into  the 
secret  of  the  Franco-Spanish  designs.  The  Paris  Gazette 
had  arrived  with  an  acknowledgment  of  the  Family  Com- 
pact, and  with  it  news  that  O'Dunn,  Choiseul's  special 
envoy,  was  on  his  way  to  force  Portugal  to  declare  war 
for  or  against  the  alliance.  Oeyras  also  said  that  British 
protection  had  been  claimed,  and  that  Mello  had  been 
promised  the  succour  he  asked  in  London,  and  pending 
its  arrival  they  were  making  the  best  defensive  arrange- 
ments they  could.  For  the  present,  at  least,  so  completely 
disorganised  was  the  Portuguese  army,  there  could  be  no 
thought  of  holding  the  frontier.  The  only  way  was  to 
make  a  stand  at  Lisbon,  where  they  could  hold  out  for 
three  or  four  months.  The  immediate  need  was  to  keep 
the  Tagus  open  till  the  sea-forts  were  repaired,  and  the 
few  ships  they  had  could  be  prepared  for  its  defence. 
It  was  with  this  object  that  he  had  begged  Hay  to  send 
the  message  to  Saunders.  But  Oeyras  still  attached  so 
much  importance  to  giving  no  colour  of  provocation  to 
Spain,  that  he  begged  Saunders  should  not  be  told  the 
reason.     The   move   was   very  happily  timed,  for   it   so 


1^62  A   POLITICAL   DEFLECTION  31 1 

happened  that  the  very  day  O'Dunn  reached  Lisbon  the 
three  battleships  came  saihng  into  the  Tagus  and  quietly 
requested  victuals  and  water. 

Though  Saunders  was  too  good  a  "  minister  "  to  refuse 
an  urgent  diplomatic  request,  if  he  could  possibly  assent, 
he  did  not  like  it.  The  officer  in  command  of  the 
detached  division  brought  a  letter  from  him  to  Hay, 
saying  that  the  call  left  him  with  only  fifteen  of  the  line, 
and  that  the  French  and  Spaniards  had  twenty-eight 
between  Toulon  and  Cadiz.  He  was,  therefore,  not  to 
keep  the  ships  a  moment  longer  than  was  necessary. 
But  so  soon  as  the  detachment  had  parted  company, 
Saunders  seems  to  have  repented  his  decision,  for  the 
next  day  he  wrote  again  to  say  that  he  could  not  employ 
the  ships  of  his  squadron  without  knowing  what  service 
they  had  gone  on,  and  the}^  must  be  sent  back  at  once. 
Hay  in  great  distress  went  to  Oeyras  and  begged  to  be 
allowed  to  tell  Saunders  everything.  Oeyras  consented, 
and  the  admiral  was  informed  that  succours  were  coming 
from  England,  and  that  his  ships  were  wanted  in  con- 
junction with  the  Lisbon  squadron  to  keep  the  port  open 
from  an  attack  from  Ferrol  till  they  came.  Hay,  there- 
fore, begged  they  might  stay  a  little  longer.  By  the 
time  the  new  request  reached  Saunders,  Sir  Peircy  Brett 
had  joined  him  as  second  in  command,  with  two  more  of 
the  line,  and  he  had  heard  that  the  French  and  Spanish 
force  east  of  the  Straits  was  only  seventeen.  Recognising, 
therefore,  the  importance  of  the  mysterious  service,  he 
gave  his  consent,  and  the  first  week  in  March  he  moved 
down  to  take  up  his  Gibraltar  position  and  do  his  best 
with  the  force  he  had  left.^     The  whole  episode  has  long 

*  Hay  to  Egremont,  Jan.  17,  Feb.  9  and  20  ;  Saunders  to  Hay,  Feb.  4  and 
6  ;  Hay  to  Saunders,  Feb.  19,  S.P.  Foreign  {Portugal),  54  ;  Hay  to  Saunders, 
Jan.  18  ;  Saunders  to  the  Admiralty,  "Off  Cadiz,"  Jan.  18,  Feb.  2  and  22, 
and  "Gibraltar  Bay,"  March  4,  Admiralty  Secretary,  In-lettcrs,  384. 


312  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

been  forgotten,  Avitli  so  much  else  that  stands  to  Saunders's 
credit.  But  it  is  well  worth  rescuinir  from  oblivion  as 
a  fine  example  of  an  admiral  weighing  with  sagacity 
and  ripe  understanding  the  political  object  against  the 
purely  strategical,  and  deliberately  choosing  to  run  the 
risk  of  a  strategical  failure  for  the  sake  of  securing  a 
great  and  certain  political  advantage.  Let  us  see  with 
how  clear  a  head  and  sure  a  grasp  he  held  the  high  line 
he  had  chosen. 

His  new  position,  as  he  had  said,  left  Cadiz  open ;  but 
it  could  not  be  helped.  At  Lisbon  there  was  no  appre- 
hension of  an  attack  from  that  quarter,  and  his  own 
observation  convinced  him  the  Cadiz  squadron  did  not 
intend  to  move  unless  and  until  it  was  joined  by  the 
squadrons  in  Toulon  and  Cartagena.  There  was  little, 
therefore,  to  deflect  his  clear  view  that,  having  done  what 
was  wanted  for  Portugal,  he  could  rightly  devote  himself 
to  his  primary  object  of  preventing  a  junction  of  the 
enemies'  Mediterranean  and  Atlantic  divisions.^  With 
this  intention  he  began  cruising  in  the  Gut  between 
Europa  Point  and  Ceuta.  In  a  few  days,  however,  a 
frigate  arrived  from  Villafranca  to  report  that  the  Toulon 
squadron  was  not  nearly  ready  for  sea.  Whereupon, 
seeing  he  was  still  free  to  attend  to  his  minor  object  of 
thwarting  a  concentration  of  the  Atlantic  divisions,  he 
returned  immediately  to  Cadiz,  and  there  he  was  rejoined 
by  his  Lisbon  detachment. 

Oeyras  had  done  with  it.  Early  in  March  he  had 
informed  Hay  that  the  Tagus  forts  were  complete,  and 
that  with  his  own  ships  he  had  now  no  fear  of  anything 
the  Spaniards  had  ready  to  send  out  of  Ferrol.  Moreover, 
though   the    Spanish   army  was  slowly  massing  on  the 

^  Saunders  to  the  Admiralty,  "Gibraltar  Bay,  March  4,"  In-Utters, 
384. 


1762  TYRAWLEY   IN   PORTUGAL  313 

frontier,  O'Dunn  had  made  no  move.  Oeyras  believed 
he  was  waiting  till  the  arrival  of  the  British  troops  gave 
him  an  excuse  for  acting,  and  the  Minister,  anxious  to 
remove  all  shadow  of  such  excuse,  desired  that  the  ships 
should  be  returned  at  once  to  Saunders,  with  a  warm 
expression  of  gratitude.^ 

The  position  with  which  Oeyras  had  to  deal  is  well 
worth  noting,  for  it  must  almost  necessarily  recur 
where  a  neutral  state  is  in  the  position  that  Portugal 
found  herself.  Though  determined  not  to  break  with 
England,  her  main  desire,  prostrate  as  she  was  with 
misfortune,  was  to  preserve  her  neutrality.  She  wished 
to  give  all  her  preparations  the  colour  of  being  made  as 
much  against  one  belligerent  as  the  other.  Consequently 
when,  on  March  12th,  Tyrawley  arrived  on  his  delicate 
mission,  he  found  it  in  spite  of  his  cordial  reception  very 
diifficult  to  do  anything  owing  to  the  nervous  desire  for 
secrecy  that  obtained.  "  They  cry  aloud  for  the  King's 
assistance,"  he  Avrote  home,  "  and  are  afraid  to  avail  them- 
selves of  it."  ^  It  was  a  situation,  however,  that  had  to  be 
accepted,  and  Tyrawley  went  quietly  to  work  to  ascertain 
and  report  the  real  necessities  and  possibilities  of  the 
case.  Still  his  movements  could  not  be  concealed,  and, 
in  the  belief  of  the  Portuguese  Government,  they  brought 
down  the  crisis  on  their  heads.^  At  all  events,  about  a 
week  after  the  arrival  of  Tyrawley  and  his  staff  of  British 
officers,  O'Dunn  and  his  Spanish  colleague  presentetl 
their  joint  ultimatum  and  Oeyras  presented  his  tem- 
porising answer.  It  was  long,  he  told  Hay,  but  would 
have  been  much  shorter  if  the  troops  as  well  as  the 
officers  had  arrived  from  Entrland. 


1  Hay  to  Epjrcmont,  March  12,  fi'.P.  Foreign  (Portu'jal) ,  54. 
*  Tyrawley  to  Egremont,  March  1 2,  ibid. 
'  Hay  to  Saunders,  March  2y,  ibid. 


314  BETWEEN   WAR   AND   PEACE  1762 

But  there  was  yet  long  to  wait.  The  British  Govern- 
ment was  still  standing  fast  for  TjTawley's  confidential 
report.  Its  tenour  we  have  already  seen.  Contrary  to 
the  insidious  suggestions  of  Frederick,  it  was  to  the  effect 
that  the  six  thousand  troops  and  a  regiment  of  dragoons 
that  were  available  would  in  all  probability  save  the 
situation.  There  was,  of  course,  no  certainty  in  the 
matter,  but,  as  he  observed,  the  value  of  the  Portuguese 
trade  was  worth  the  risk,  for  the  force  specified  was  too 
insignificant  to  affect  materially  the  safety  of  the  British 
dominions.  He  urged,  however,  that  if  it  was  to  come, 
it  could  not  come  too  soon. 

The  truth  was  that  the  hesitation  of  Bute  for  a  while 
exposed  Portugal  to  serious  danger.  Since  the  ultimatum 
had  been  delivered  and  answered  a  state  of  war  practically 
existed,  and  the  invasion  might  begin  at  any  moment. 
There  was  a  special  anxiety  for  the  southern  or  Algarve 
coast,  which  lay  open  to  a  blow  from  the  opposite  shores 
of  Andalusia.  Hay  therefore  promptly  warned  Saunders 
of  what  had  occurred,  and  begged  he  would  have  a  care 
for  the  threatened  coast.^  But  Saunders  was  already 
moving  away  from  Cadiz.  He  had  heard  that  the  naval 
force  of  the  allies  within  the  Straits  was  going  to  con- 
centrate at  Cartagena,  and,  never  taking  his  eyes  from  what 
he  called  his  "  principal  object,"  he  returned  to  Gibraltar. 
Here  Hay's  request  reached  him.  He  was  at  his  Avit's 
end  for  cruisers,  but  he  still  kept  his  hold  on  the  master 
thread,  and,  without  hesitating,  he  spared  two  or  three 
for  the  Algarve  coast,  telling  Hay  at  the  same  time 
that  the  Portuguese  must  form  a  coast  defence  flotilla 
under  their  protection.  It  was  all  he  could  do,  and,  come 
what  might,  he  was  determined  thenceforth  to  hold  his 

1  Hay  to  Egremont,  and  Tyrawley  to  same,  March  22  ;  Hay  to  Saunders, 
March  29,  ibid. 


1762  ANSON'S    PRECAUTIONS  315 

position  in  the  Gut  and  close  the  Straits.^     The  admiral's 
concentration  of  purpose  was  excellent,  but  at  the  same 
time  it  should  be  observed  how  well  Choiseul's  plan  for 
confusing  the  British  defence  was  working.     It  remains  to 
be  seen  how,  nevertheless,  it  entirely  failed  to  bring  about 
the  situation  at  which  he  had  aimed,  and  for  this  we 
must  turn  to  the  northern  area  of  the  covering  operations. 
It  is  clear  that  if  Anson  had  not  penetrated  Choiseul's 
design   from   the  first,  he   at  least  considered   that  our 
defensive  system  was  incomplete  without  providing  against 
some  such  counter-stroke  at  home  as  the  French  Minister 
had  suggested  to  Spain.      When,  on  Jan.   24th,  Blenac 
eluded  Spry's  blockade  and  got  out  of  Brest,  immediate 
steps  were  taken  to  see  whether  it  was  not  the  first  move- 
ment of  a  concentration  for  counter-attack.     Ferrol  was 
open,  and  the  Spanish  force  there  was  being  watched  by 
only  a  small  cruiser  squadron.     It  was  the  chief  source  of 
anxiety,  and  there  was  an  obvious  probability  that  it  was 
Blenac's  destination.     His  intention  might  be,  after  joining 
hands  with  the  Ferrol  squadron,  to  return  either  to  attack 
Commodore  Denis,  who  had  succeeded  Howe  in  the  Basque 
Roads  with  nine  of  the  line,  or  to  cover  a  blow  at  England 
itself,  or  both.     Orders,  therefore,  were  hurried  off  to  Denis 
to  proceed  to  Ferrol  and  ascertain  the  truth.^     Before  the 
result  of  his  reconnaissance  could  be  known,  definite  warn- 
ing came  from  our  agents  in  France  that  an  invasion  was 
intended  from  Dunkirk.     The  French,  so  the  information 
ran,  were  far  from  thinking  themselves  capable  of  making 
a  conquest,  but  their  object  was  to  throw  England  into 
confusion,  and  destroy  her  credit,  so  as  to  prevent  her  main- 
taining her  army  in  Germany.^     It  was,  of  course,  soon 

1  Saunders  to  the  Admiralty,  April  !)  and  2i)  and  May  10,  In-lcttcrs,  384  ; 
Hay  to  Egr(!mont,  S.P.  Foreujn  (Portugal),  54. 

»  Secret  Orders,  1332.  ^  Newcastle  PujKrs,  :i2,'.)U,  f.  357. 


3i6  BETWEEN    WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

known  that  Bk'nac  had  gone  to  the  West  Indies,  but,  as 
our  cruisers  reported  twelve  of  the  line  in  Ferrol  nearly 
ready  for  sea,  the  place  continued  to  cause  grave  anxiety. 
The  usual  cruisers  and  flotillas,  supported  by  a  small 
battle  squadron  under  Moore  in  the  Downs,  were  watch- 
m2  Dunkirk  and  the  Breton  ports  to  see  that  no  trans- 
ports  crossed,  but  for  Ferrol  there  was  nothing  but  the 
Channel  Fleet,  which  was  not  yet  available. 

The  tension  was  soon  increased  by  the  news  that  France 
and  Spain  had  presented  their  joint  ultimatum  at  Lisbon, 
and  that  it  had  been  rejected.    The  tidings  reached  London 
from  Hay  on  April   6th,  together  with  Oeyras's  remark 
about  "  a  short  answer,"  and  Tyrawley's  urgent  report.    It 
was  then  the  Cabinet  met,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to 
make  a  final  decision  as  to  what  troops  were  to  be  sent  to 
Lisbon.     It  was  clear  that  action  must  be  taken  at  once ; 
and  it  was  then,  too,  that  Anson  presented  his  scheme  for 
coast  defence,  and  told  Bute  plainly  it  was   absolutely 
necessary  for  Hawke  to  get  the  Channel  Squadron  to  sea 
without  a  moment's  delay .^     At  all  costs  the  necessary 
succour  for  Portugal  must  be  passed  to  Lisbon  in  face  of 
the  Ferrol  squadron.     Steps  for  her  assistance  had  already 
been  taken  on  the  strength  of  an  informal  note  which 
Oeyras  had  dictated  to  Hay  in  the  middle  of  January. 
Arms,  tents,  and  equipments  were  already  at  Portsmouth, 
and  transports  had  gone  to  Cork,  under  convoy  of  two 
ships  of  the  line,  to  pick  up  two  battalions  of  infantry. 
Their  line  of  passage  to  Lisbon  involved  little  risk ;  they 
could  easily  steal  across  unperceived;  but  with  the  rest 
of  the  troops  it  was  different,  and  for  them,  seeing  where 
they  were  to  come  from,  more  serious  precautions  had  to 
be  taken.     When  Frederick  first  heard  of  the  Spanish 
movement  against  Portugal  he  had  not  yet  been  alienated 

1  Neweaath  Papers,  32,936,  April  8  to  10. 


1762  PORTUGAL    INVADED  317 

by  Bute's  tricks,  iind  he  had  immediately  suggested  that 
it  could  be  met,  without  prejudice  to  the  war  in  Germany, 
by  throwing  into  Portugal  the  garrison  of  Belleisle.^  His 
advice  was  now  adopted.  Indeed,  the  dragoons  and  the 
rest  of  the  infantry  that  Tyrawley's  report  called  for 
could  come  from  nowhere  else,  and  from  Belleisle,  at 
least,  the  course  lay  past  the  jaws  of  Ferrol,  and  the 
movement  could  not  be  concealed. 

On  April  8  th  Hawke  received  his  commission,  and  on 
the  27th  hoisted  his  flag.  For  second  in  command  he 
had  to  take  Prince  Edward,  Duke  of  York,  but  Howe 
had  been  summoned  back  to  be  the  royal  admiral's  flag 
captain,  Hawke  did  not  got  to  sea  at  once.  There  was 
no  great  hurry.  Portugal  still  had  a  faint  hope  of  pre- 
serving her  neutrality.  For  some  reason,  partly  because 
the  allies  were  not  ready  and  partly  because,  on  a  strange 
hint  from  the  Spanish  ambassador,  the  Portuguese  Queen 
was  interceding  with  her  brother,  the  King  of  Spain,  a 
declaration  of  war  did  not  follow  the  ultimatum  immedi- 
ately. It  was  not  till  May  3rd,  as  the  stores  from  England 
began  to  arrive,  that  the  Spaniards  crossed  the  north- 
eastern frontier,  and  seized  the  border  town  of  Miranda. 
Three  days  later  the  Irish  regiments  came  in,  and  as  soon 
as  it  was  known  they  were  in  the  Tagus,  but  not  till 
then,  war  was  declared.  The  seizure  of  Braganza  followed 
immediately,  on  May  15  th,  and  the  Spaniards  began  to 
advance  doAvn  the  Douro  on  Oporto.  But  this  mattered 
little.  The  procrastination  had  been  so  great  that  in  the 
middle  of  April  Hay  had  been  able  to  report  that  the 
Spaniards  had  lost  their  chance,  for  Lisbon  was  now  safe 
from  a  coiqj  de  main? 

'  Frederick  to  Ferdinand,  Feb.  3,  Pulitischc  Corr.,  vol.  xxii.  p.  221. 
*  Hay  to  Egremont,  April  13  and  27,  S.P.  Foreir/n  {Portmjal),  ")4  ;  same 
to  same,  May  0,  ibid.,  55. 


3i8  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

Meanwhile,  at  Portsmouth,  till  the  Belleisle  transports 
were  ready,  Hawkc  was  devoting  himself  to  organising  the 
plan  of  home  defence  which  Anson  had  worked  out  with 
the  last  dregs  of  his  strength.  He  was  dying  down  at 
Bath.  Lord  Halifax  Avas  acting  in  his  place,  with  Admiral 
Forbes  for  his  chief  adviser — a  capable  officer,  whose  health 
had  denied  him  all  active  service  since  he  had  fought 
well,  twenty  years  before,  in  Mathews's  action  off  Toulon, 
and  who  had  served  on  the  Board  throughout  the  war. 
The  new  chief,  not  content  to  let  Hawke  make  his  own 
arrangements,  began  bothering  him  with  detailed  orders. 
The  interference,  which  certainly  seems  to  have  been 
excessive,  was  naturally  resented  by  a  man  of  Hawke's 
temper,  who  always  considered,  in  common  with  other 
wise  heads,  that  he  should  have  worn  Anson's  cloak.  He 
was  at  all  events  conscious  of  a  unique  experience  in  the 
Avork  that  was  required.  Under  Pitt  and  Anson  such 
annoyance  never  occurred,  and  before  the  admiral  had 
flown  his  flag  a  week  he  was  driven  to  forward  a  formal 
request  that  he  might  be  left  a  free  hand  in  disposing  the 
ships  under  his  command.  A  week  later,  in  answer  to 
some  further  nervous  suggestions,  he  Avas  informing  the 
Board  he  considered  the  passage  of  the  troops  to  Portugal 
the  most  important  part  of  his  duty.  At  the  end  of  May 
he  told  them  he  had  reorganised  the  blockade  of  Dunkirk 
on  the  plan  approved  by  Anson  before  he  left  toAvn, 
so  as  to  insure  that  the  French  should  at  once  encounter 
a  superior  squadron  if  they  came  out.  Under  the  old 
system,  he  explained,  the  cruisers  were  scattered  in  such 
small  groups  that  if  the  French  moved  they  could 
not  attack  at  once,  but  must  fall  back  and  inform 
Moore  in  the  DoAvns.  The  reply  was  that  he  was  to 
maintain  the  old  system  until  they  Avarned  him  there 
Avas  danger. 


1762  A    QUESTION    OF    CONTROL  319 

So  far  the  Admiralty  was  probably  within  its  function. 
It  was  a  question  of  Home  defence,  and  they  had  the 
information.  But  the  interference  pursued  him  when 
he  sailed  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  Belleisle  troops. 
He  had  worked  out  the  problem  with  the  utmost 
care,  but  he  merely  informed  the  Board  his  rendezvous 
would  be  ten  leagues  north-west  of  Finisterre.  Failing 
to  fathom  his  strategy,  they  were  seriously  alarmed,  and 
immediately  sent  down  to  press  upon  him  a  crude  plan 
of  their  own  founded  on  a  series  of  ingenious  pictures 
they  had  been  making  for  themselves.  In  their  minds 
the  Ferrol  squadron  was  given  so  many  dangerous  possi- 
bilities that,  on  the  eve  of  Hawke's  sailing,  they  had  been 
contemplating  ordering  an  attack  upon  it.  With  our 
own  fleet  only  just  of  sufficient  strength  to  perform  its 
covering  functions  such  a  design,  of  course,  involved  a 
wholly  unjustifiable  risk,  and  a  departure  from  the  defen- 
sive attitude  at  home  on  which  Pitt's  whole  system  had 
been  founded.  The  idea,  which  presumably  arose  out  of 
a  false  analogy  with  Pitt's  own  expeditions  against  the 
French  coast,  was  abandoned,  but  only,  it  would  appear, 
from  political  reasons,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  unwise 
to  provoke  Spain  further,  now  that  direct  negotiations 
were  on  the  point  of  opening.^  Still  their  nervousness 
about  Ferrol  was  such  that  they  could  not  feel  safe  unless 
Hawke  planted  himself  immediately  before  the  port. 
This  was  the  effect  of  their  orders,  but  before  they  could 
reach  Spithead  Hawke  was  gone. 

Arrived  off  Ushant,  he  despatched  two  sixty-fours  to 
Belleisle  with  orders  for  the  troops  to  sail  at  once  under 
their  convoy.  He  himself  held  on  for  his  chosen  station, 
and  reached  it  on  July  1st.  A  chain  of  cruisers  was 
then  thrown  out  to  Ferrol,  and  in  this  position  he  waited, 

^  OrenvUle  Papers,  vol.  i.  pp.  443-5,  May  20. 


320  BETWEEN    WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

certain  of  securing  the  safe  passage  of  the  troops.     By- 
good  fortune  his  line  of  reasoning  is  known  to  us  exactly, 
for  at  the  end  of  the  week  the  Board's  correction  reached 
him,  and  in  his  testy  but  dignified  way  he  once  more 
practically  told .  them  to  mind  their  own  business.     "  I 
had  maturely  considered,"  he  wrote,  "  every  circumstance, 
both  with  regard  to  the  enemy  and  the   transports  to 
come    from    Belleisle.     As    to    the    first,  not    the    least 
fear  of  them  bein<?  at  sea  filled  me  either  with  distrac- 
tion  or  irresolution.     The  enemy  themselves  could  never 
suppose  me  so  absurd  as  either  to  appoint  a  rendezvous 
for  the  convoy  from  Belleisle  or  the  commander  of  it  to 
shape  his  course  for  any  port  within  the  Cape,  as  thereby 
he  would  run  the  risk  of  being  embayed  with  a  westerly 
wind.     The  course  from  that  island  with  a  fair  wind  is 
west-south-west  by  compass,  which  will  fall  in  with  Cape 
Torrinana  [just   north  of  Finisterre],  and  consequently 
with  my  rendezvous."     The  conductor  of  the  convoy,  he 
pointed  out,  would  certainly  in  common  prudence  keep 
outside  that  line.     "  Under  these  circumstances,"  he  con- 
cluded, "  I  should  not  think  of  being  nearer  Ferrol  than 
I  am.     Had  I  shown  myself  off  that  port  I  must  have 
come  here  at  once  for  fear   of  westerly  winds,  Ortegal 
being  improper.       The   enemy   cannot   get   out   Avith   a 
Avesterly  Avind,  and  if  they  come   out   on  an  easterly  I 
must    have   intelligence,   and   they   can't    get    in    again. 
When  the  army  arrives  I  shall  see  it  safe   round   the 
Cape,  and  proceed  Avith  the  last  part  of  your  orders."^ 
To  his  oAvn  disposition,  therefore,  he  clung.     What  the 
new  orders  Avere  Ave  shall  see. 

To  the  southward  the  covering  combination  was  com- 
pleted by  Saunders.     All  through  May  and  June  he  had 

1  Hawke  to  the  Admiralty,  June  25,   "  OIT  St.  Helen's,"  and  July  9, 
"  Finisterre,  9  leagues,"  In-letterx,  92. 


1762  THE    HERMIONE  321 

been  cruising  in  the  Gut,  held  there  by  so  much  of 
Choiseul's  war  plan  as  had  been  realised.  Early  in  June 
the  Cartagena  squadron  put  to  sea.  It  returned  in  a 
week,  but  no  sooner  did  Saunders  hear  it  was  in  port 
again  than  he  received  intelligence  that  the  Toulon 
squadron  was  about  to  sail,  and  that  troops  were  con- 
centrating in  the  port.  Their  real  purpose  was  to  re- 
inforce the  French  garrison  in  Minorca,  since  it  was 
impossible  to  tell  that  Port  Mahon  was  not  the  objective 
of  the  British  force  coming  from  Belleisle.  A  report, 
however,  was  spread  that  Gibraltar  was  to  be  besieged, 
and  at  the  end  of  June  the  Toulon  squadron  did  actually 
put  to  sea.  Saunders  was  thus  held  more  firmly  than 
ever.  But  he  was  not  without  reward.  Prizes  came  fast, 
and  among  them  one  of  the  most  famous  in  our  annals. 
This  was  the  treasure  ship  Hermione,  that  had  sailed  from 
Lima  before  the  declaration  of  war  was  known.  On  May 
loth  she  was  met  and  captured  off  Cape  St.  Mary,  on 
the  Algarve  coast,  only  a  day's  sail  from  home,  by  two 
of  Saunders's  cruisers — the  Active  (28)  and  Favourite 
(18),  Captains  Sawyer  and  Pownal.  So  enormously  rich 
did  she  prove  that,  after  deducting  all  expenses,  more 
than  half  a  million  sterling  was  distributed  in  prize- 
money.^ 

The  Toulon  squadron  was  still  out  when  Saunders  heard 
the  Belleisle  troops  were  moving.  For  the  moment,  in 
his  clear  appreciation  of  the  position,  their  safe  passage 
into  the  Tagus  overrode  all  other  considerations,  and 
he  did  not  hesitate  to  leave  the  Gut  and  move  up  to 
blockade  the  Cadiz  squadron.     The  result  of  the  com- 

1  Saunders  to  the  Admiralty,  June  16,  In-letters,  384.  Saunders  and 
the  two  fortunate  captains  had  about  £65,000  each,  and  the  share  of 
every  seaman  was  nearly  £500.  The  commissioned  officers  had  £13,000 
each. — Beatson,  vol.  iii.  p.  419. 

VOL.  II.  X 


322  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

bination  between  him  and  Hawke  was  an  entire  success. 
The  Toulon  squadron,  after  landing  the  troops  which 
Saunders  had  heard  of  at  Minorca,  returned  to  Hyeres 
and  made  no  attempt  to  come  out ;  the  Belleisle  trans- 
ports passed  into  Lisbon  without  interruption  either 
from  Ferrol  or  Cadiz ;  and  within  a  week  Saunders  had 
resumed  his  position  in  the  Gut.^ 

Once  arrived,  the  British  troops  lost  no  time  in  getting 
to  work.  Lord  Loudoun,  called  from  his  long  retirement, 
was  in  command  as  second  to  Tyrawley ;  Townshend  was 
third ;  Burgoyne,  of  American  fame,  had  a  brigade  ;  and 
with  them  came  a  number  of  officers  to  organise  the 
Portuguese  army,  and  three  naval  captains  for  their  fleet. 
With  this  assistance  they  were  able  to  hold  their  own. 
At  Oeyras's  request  the  British  Government  had  sent  out 
Count  zu  Lippe-Brlickeberg,  one  of  Prince  Ferdinand's 
ablest  lieutenants  in  Westphalia,  to  take  supreme  com- 
mand. Under  him  the  defence  was  conducted  with  great 
skill  and  spirit,  and  though  the  French  sent  a  dozen 
battalions  to  the  Spaniards'  assistance,  they  were  never 
able  to  do  more  than  capture  a  few  unimportant  places 
on  the  frontier.  Oporto  was  for  a  moment  in  danger, 
but  Lisbon  was  never  even  approached ;  and  Saunders, 
maintaining  his  watch  on  the  Algarve  coast,  successfully 
prevented  any  attempt  to  penetrate  the  country  from  the 
south." 

The  fresh  orders  which  Hawke  had  received,  with  the 
shallow  criticism  of  his  strategy,  instructed  him,  as  soon 
as  he  had  seen  the  troops  in  safety,  to  cruise  between 
Finisterre  and  the  south  of  Ireland  for  a  month  to  en- 


^  Saunders  to  the  Admiralty,  July  21  and  Aug.  17,  ibid.  He  was  off 
Cadiz  on  July  15.     Hawke  parted  with  the  transports  on  the  14th. 

2  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  campaign  see  Pajol,  Guerres  sous 
ouis  XV,,  vol.  vi.  oh.  iv. 


1762  HAWKE'S    LAST    CRUISE  323 

deavour  to  intercept  Blenac  on  his  return.  Accord- 
ingly, after  parting  with  the  transports  on  July  14th, 
he  made  for  Cape  Clear,  confident  that  Blenac  would 
steer  for  Brest.  In  three  weeks  he  was  standing  back 
again,  and  having  made  Ortegal  without  any  sign  of 
his  quarry  he  bore  up  for  England,  according  to  orders, 
and  struck  his  flag  for  the  last  time  at  Torbay  on 
August  23rd.  So  to  the  end  his  ill  luck  dogged  him. 
It  is  true  that,  like  Saunders,  he  had  a  number  of  fat 
prizes  to  his  credit,  but  Blenac  had  not  moved  from  Cap 
Fran(.'ois. 

Hawke  was  immediately  relieved  by  Sir  Charles  Hardy. 
The  Government  was  once  more  nervous  about  the  Brest 
squadron.  Mann  was  off  Ushant  with  seven  of  the  line, 
but  that  did  not  content  them.  They  had  certain  news, 
moreover,  that  Blenac  was  bringing  home  the  French 
trade,  and  our  own  East  and  West  India  fleets  were  due. 
Hardy  was  therefore  to  take  every  ship  he  could  lay 
hands  on  and  cruise  in  the  Soundings  for  six  weeks,  but 
he  had  no  more  luck  than  Hawke.^  Blenac,  arriving 
with  the  now  familiar  happy  gale  which  opened  Brest, 
got  safely  in,  and  the  French  took  no  action  in  the 
Channel.  The  war  was  indeed  over,  and  nothing  came 
of  Choiseul's  grandiose  projects  for  a  counter-stroke  but 
an  idle  raid  on  Newfoundland, 

Still  it  must  be  said  that  from  a  naval  point  of  view  the 
operation  was  very  brilliantly  conducted,  and  it  success- 
fully diverted  a  force  more  than  double  its  own.  Its 
hero  was  the  Chevalier  de  Ternay,  who  had  served  as  a 
lieutenant  in  Conflans's  action  with  Hawke.  Since  then, 
with  another  lieutenant,  the  Comte  d'Hector,  he  had 
highly  distinguished  himself  at  various  times  by  getting 
no  less  than  five  ships  of  the  line  and   a  frigate  out  of 

'  Secret  Orders,  1332,  Sept.  2. 


324  BETWEEN    WAR    AND    PEACE  1762 

the  Villaine  and  into  Brest  in  spite  of  the  vigilance  of  the 
British  blockading  squadrons.  For  this  both  officers  were 
given  post  rank,  and  on  May  8th,  1762,  by  Choiseul's 
orders,  Ternay,  who  had  just  brought  in  the  last  of  the 
ships  he  saved,  adroitly  slipped  out  of  Brest  with  two  of 
the  line,  both  of  which  he  and  his  friend  had  rescued, 
two  frigates,  and  a  military  force  under  M.  de  Haus- 
sonville. 

Reaching  Newfoundland  on  June  20  th  they  quickly 
captured  St.  John's,  seized  a  sloop  in  the  harbour,  and 
proceeded  to  destroy  the  fisheries  and  plunder  the  colony. 
They  claimed  to  have  destroyed  nearly  five  hundred  craft 
of  all  sizes,  and  to  have  inflicted  damage  to  the  extent  of 
a  million  sterling,  before  they  were  interrupted.  Nothing 
was  known  of  the  raid  in  England  till  the  end  of  July, 
when  orders  were  despatched  to  Colville  on  the  North 
American  station  to  see  to  it,  and  Captain  Hugh  Palliser 
with  three  of  the  line  Avas  sent  to  reinforce  him.  But 
Colville  was  already  at  work.  When  Ternay  arrived,  the 
governor,  Captain  Graves,  the  well-known  admiral  of  the 
next  war,  was  away  with  his  ship  at  Placentia  on  the 
western  side.  He  immediately  sent  off  to  New  York  to 
warn  Amherst  and  Colville,  and  remained  where  he  was 
to  defend  the  port.  Colville  reached  Placentia  in  person 
about  August  20th  with  his  flagship  and  a  frigate,  and 
after  landing  some  of  his  marines  to  strengthen  the 
garrison,  he  sailed  with  Graves  for  St.  John's.  As  yet  he 
had  no  troops,  and  could  do  little  but  prevent  further 
depredations.  But  inferior  as  he  was  he  boldly  blockaded 
Ternay. 

Owing  to  the  efforts  Amherst  had  made  for  the 
Havana  expedition,  no  troops  were  available  except  those 
in  the  garrisons  of  Nova  Scotia.  They  took  some  time 
to  collect,  but  by  September    11th  fifteen  hundred    of 


1762  RAID    ON   NEWFOUNDLAND  325 

them,  a  force  only  just  equal  to  Haussonville's,  reached 
Colville  under  Colonel  Amherst,  the  general's  brother. 
Graves  had  a  plan  of  action  ready  which  Colville  at  once 
adopted  as  better  than  his  own,  and  in  less  than  a  week 
the  enemy  were  driven  from  their  advanced  posts,  and 
St.  John's  was  invested.  On  the  16th,  under  cover  of  a 
dense  fog.  Colonel  Amherst  was  able  to  make  his  final 
arrangements  for  attacking  the  place.  Ternay  saw  all 
was  lost,  and  he  did  not  doubt  a  moment  what  to  do. 
He  had  not  brought  his  ships  out  of  the  Villaine,  he  said, 
to  take  such  a  place  as  St.  John's,  and  he  was  determined 
to  save  them  or  make  Colville  pay  dear  for  their  capture. 
He  too,  therefore,  seized  the  opportunity  of  the  fog,  as  he 
had  done  so  often  before,  towed  out  with  his  boats,  stole 
quietly  past  Colville,  and  was  far  away  beyond  pursuit 
before  the  fog  lifted.  By  good  luck  he  just  missed  the 
superior  squadron  of  Palliser,  which  arrived  a  day  or  two 
later,  but  on  the  18  th,  before  it  could  appear,  Hausson- 
ville  surrendered.  Ternay,  it  is  pleasant  to  relate,  after 
being  chased  off  the  coast  of  France  by  two  British 
divisions,  found  refuge  in  Coruna.^ 

But  the  dreams  of  Ternay  and  his  like  of  the  jeune 
4cole — dreams  of  attempting  one  more  bid  for  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea — were  not  to  be  realised.  For  France 
to  recover  her  broken  navy  from  the  blows  which  Hawke 
and  Boscawen  had  dealt  was  beyond  the  national  power 
so  long  as  the  war  lasted.  Choiseul  knew  it  too  well — 
the  study  of  revenge  was  all  that  was  left,  and  for 
that  peace  must  be  had.  Though  fresh  alarms  arose, 
Ternay's  raid,  to  which  the  ambitious  invasion  project 
had  dwindled,  was  the  last  effort  of  Choiseul  to  secure 

1  Lacour-Gayet,  Marine  sous  Louis  XV.,  p.  364;  Beatson,  vol.  iii.  p.  576 
et  seq.  ;  Secret  Orders,  1332,  July  31  ;  Amherst  to  Egremont,  Aug.  15, 
S.P.  Colonial  (America  and  West  Indies),  97. 


326  BETWEEN    WAR   AND    PEACE  1762 

by  force  endurable  terms.  Spain  had  failed  him ;  every- 
where upon  the  sea  the  British  fleet  held  him  fast ;  and 
there  was  nothing  to  look  to  except  the  negotiations. 
To  these  we  must  now  return,  and  follow  them  to 
the  end. 


CHAPTER    XI 

BUTE'S   PEACE 

It  was  at  the  beginning  of  April,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
the  secret  negotiations  which  had  been  conducted  through 
the  Sardinian  ambassadors  reached  a  stage  when  direct 
and  official  communication  with  the  French  Court  could 
begin.  It  was  just  at  this  time  that  our  relations  with 
Frederick  were  strained  to  breaking-point.  Towards  the 
end  of  March,  it  will  be  remembered,  Frederick  had  re- 
ceived from  the  Czar  Galitzin's  report  of  his  conversation 
with  Bute,  Aghast  at  what  he  naturally  regarded  as 
the  shameless  perfidy  of  the  British  Ministers,  he  practi- 
cally decided  to  have  no  more  to  do  with  them.  In  the 
first  heat  of  his  indignation  he  wrote  to  his  envoy  in  St. 
Petersburg  to  agree  at  once  to  military  co-operation  with 
Peter  in  Holstein  in  return  for  a  Russian  corps  to  assist 
him  against  Austria,  and  on  no  account  was  a  word  to  be 
said  to  Keith.  To  Denmark,  who  was  growing  uneasy 
and  had  appealed  to  England,  he  wrote  a  friendly  letter 
to  lull  her  into  security,  and  immediately  afterwards  to 
St.  Petersburg  again  to  ascertain  if  Peter  wished  to  extend 
his  operations  to  the  conquest  of  Schleswig.  Frederick 
pointed  out  that  it  was  a  perfectly  safe  operation,  and 
with  an  expression  of  his  own  readiness  to  assist,  he 
enclosed  a  complete  war  plan  for  the  purpose. 

If  we  would  judge  Frederick  fairly  for  this  unscrupulous 
step,  if  indeed  we  would  form  anything  like  an  impartial 
estimate  of  the  whole  unhappy  quarrel,  which  even  yet  has 


328  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

not  ceased  to  embitter  Ansflo- Prussian  relations,  one  con- 
trolling  consideration  must  not  be  forgotten.  For  purely- 
geographical  reasons  alone  a  Russian  alliance  was,  and 
must  always  be,  of  higher  value  to  Prussia  than  a  British 
alliance.  At  the  moment  also,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
the  very  existence  of  Prussia  seemed  to  hang  on  the 
possibility  of  gaining  the  friendship  of  Russia,  and 
Frederick  could  see  no  way  in  which  it  was  to  be  pur- 
chased except  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  Danish  duchies.  It 
meant  offence  to  England,  but  he  had  to  choose  between 
the  old  ally  and  the  new,  and  seeing  how  desperate  was 
his  position  he  could  not  hesitate  in  the  choice.  With 
the  best  will  in  the  world  to  do  him  justice,  it  is 
impossible  to  miss,  both  in  his  conduct  and  his  utterances 
at  this  time,  symptoms  of  an  uneasy  conscience — it  is 
impossible  to  avoid  a  suspicion  that  a  plausible  reason 
for  breaking  with  England  was  not  un^velcome.  When 
Mitchell  afterwards  taxed  him  with  his  knowledge  of 
Galitzin's  notorious  French  and  Austrian  sympathies  he 
could  make  no  reply.  He  simply  passed  by  what  he 
obviously  felt  was  a  very  weak  link  in  his  case  ;  and  yet  to 
the  end  he  never  ceased  to  justify  his  grievance  against 
England,  on  the  very  point  with  which  he  always  shirked 
to  deal.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  while  his  direct  and 
unvarnished  political  methods  determined  him  rightly 
enough  to  let  no  tenderness  for  England  and  her  engage- 
ments stand  in  the  way  of  binding  Russia  to  his  cause, 
he  was  at  the  same  time  anxious  to  go  on  using  England, 
or  if  that  were  impossible,  to  throw  the  whole  odium  of 
the  change  of  front  upon  her.  "  I  laugh  at  the  friend- 
ship of  England,"  he  said,  even  in  the  darkest  hours  of 
his  fortunes,  "  if  it  is  no  use  to  me."  ^  Bute's  clumsiness 
had  given  him  just  the  handle  he  wanted,  and  whether 

^  Politische  Con:,  vol.  xviii.  p.  630,  Nov.  12,  1759. 


1762       THE    QUARREL   WITH    FREDERICK       329 

or  not  he  really  believed  the  Galitzin  story,  it  would  be 
absurd  to  blame  him  for  taking  a  quick  hold  and  making 
the  most  of  it.  That  he  was  playing  a  double  game  is  as 
certain  as  that  he  had  a  very  pretty  excuse  for  doing  so. 

To  any  soothing  representation  from  Knyphausen  and 
Michel,  his  Ministers  in  London,  he  would  not  listen  a 
moment,  but  fell  to  scolding  them  in  a  manner  which 
well  betrays  his  state  of  mind.  "  I  think,  gentlemen,"  he 
said,  "  you  are  Bute's  clerks.  You  don't  seem  to  be 
Prussians.  Your  father,  Knyphausen,  used  to  take 
money  from  France  and  England,  and  was  broken  for  it. 
Has  he  bequeathed  the  habit  to  you  ?  "  ^  Poor  Knyp- 
hausen was  meanwhile  doing  his  best.  That  same  day 
he  presented  Bute  with  a  formal  demand  for  the  com- 
munication of  the  overtures  to  Vienna.  Bute  immedi- 
ately showed  him  his  correspondence  with  Yorke.  It  was 
innocent  enough,  as  we  know,  and  all  there  was  to  show ; 
and  Bute,  not  content  with  defending  himself,  chose  in 
his  clumsy  way  to  proceed  to  counter-attack.  He  caused 
the  King,  as  wo  have  already  seen,  to  send  his  indignant 
personal  protest  to  Frederick  for  having  vouchsafed  no 
reply  to  his  request  for  the  Prussian  views  about  peace,  and 
he  instructed  Mitchell  to  desire  that  Knyphausen  should 
be  reprimanded  for  sending  libellous  reports  about  the 
Vienna  overture.^  Nothing  could  have  been  more  ill- 
advised.  Mitchell  was  even  then  writing  to  say  that 
peace  between  Prussia  and  Russia  was  on  the  point  of 
being  concluded,  and  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
treat  Frederick  tenderly,  so  as  to  share  the  advantages  of 
the  new  coalition.      He   urged,   therefore,   that  for   the 


1  Pditische  Corr.,  vol.  xxi.  pp.  312,  316-8,  March  23-5 ;  despatch  to  Goltz, 
March  28,  pp.  323-7. 

-  Bute  to  Mitchell,  March  20  and  30  ;  George  III.  to  Frederick,  March  30. 
— Adolphus,  vol.  i.  p.  488  et  seq. 


3  30  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

moment  at  any  rate  tlie  excuses  about  the  Duchies  which 
he  would  certainly  make  should  be  accepted,  and  on  no 
account  should  his  temper  be  spoilt  by  dealing  with  him 
as  a  pecuniary  dependent.  In  spite  of  the  sound  advice,  as 
we  know,  Bute  demanded  a  categorical  disavowal  of  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  intrigue,  on  pain  of  the  subsidy  being 
stopped/ 

Bute  and  Frederick  were  now  at  arm's  length,  and  each 
went  the  best  way  to  widen  the  breach.  Frederick,  after 
his  manner,  took  a  clear  view  of  the  situation,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  act  upon  it.  He  convinced  himself  that  the 
suspicious  attitude  of  the  British  Ministers  was  solely 
due  to  the  mess  they  had  got  themselves  into  with  the 
Spanish  war,  and  the  defence  of  Portugal  that  it  involved. 
"  All  the  same,"  he  wrote  to  General  Goltz,  his  envoy  in 
St.  Petersburg,  "  it  would  be  doing  the  English  nation  an 
injustice  to  attribute  to  them  a  proceeding  of  this  nature. 
It  is  the  Earl  of  Bute  and  the  Duke  of  Bedford  who  are 
the  sole  authors  of  this  pretty  scheme,  and  the  nation, 
with  the  Chevalier  Pitt  at  its  head,  would  be  as  much 
revolted  by  it  as  I  have  cause  to  be,  if  they  came  to 
know  of  it."^  Such  expressions  constantly  recur  in  his 
correspondence.  So  far  he  had  measured  English  senti- 
ment with  perfect  accuracy,  and  saw  that  if  he  still  hoped 
to  get  anything  out  of  it  his  only  game  was  to  upset  Bute 
as  Choiseul  had  upset  Pitt.  Knyphausen  and  his  colleague 
were  therefore  directed  to  approach  Pitt.  After  informing 
him  of  the  whole  "  perfidy,"  they  were  to  consult  him  as 
to  the  propriety  of  their  making  a  declaration  to  the  King 
that  they  could  no  longer  negotiate  with  such  a  minister 
as   Bute,  and  of  communicating   his   conversation   with 

*  Mitchell  to  Bute,  March  25,  Mitchell  Memoirs,  vol.  ii.  p.  279  ;  Bute  to 
Mitchell. — April  9,  Adolphus,  vol,  i.  p.  491. 
'  Politiache  Corr.,  vol.  xxi.  p.  320,  March  27. 


1762  FREDERICK   CONSULTS    PITT  331 

Galitzin  to  Frederick's  friends  in  both  Houses.  Frederick 
gave  them  further  to  understand  that  if  nothing  was  to 
be  done  in  this  direction  they  were  to  consider  that, 
though  he  did  not  actually  recall  them,  they  only  held 
their  place  in  order  to  watch  Bute's  tricks.^ 

The  whole  series  of  his  despatches  to  London  since 
Pitt's  fall  had  been  full  of  the  same  kind  of  insulting 
expressions  as  had  embittered  his  relations  with  the 
Czarina  Elizabeth,  Maria  Theresa,  and  the  Pompadour. 
Many  of  them  reached  Bute's  ears,  and  they  inflamed 
his  antipathy,  and  that  of  the  Court,  to  burning-point. 
The  consequence  was  that  when  Pitt  was  consulted 
by  Knyphausen  he  could  only  say  that  Frederick's 
plan  was  impracticable.  He  was,  in  any  case,  too  good 
an  Englishman  to  permit,  or  even  encourage,  foreign 
interference  with  home  politics.  He  therefore  put  the 
Prussians  ofl"  by  saying  that  the  subjection  into  which 
Bute  had  reduced  the  King  made  any  denunciation  of 
him  useless,  and  as  for  Parliament,  the  Court  party  was 
now  so  strong  that  nothing  could  be  done  there." "  Pitt 
was  of  course  absolutely  right,  and  Frederick  did  not  for 
a  moment  question  his  advice.  He  was  contented  to 
accept  the  situation,  and  instructed  Knyphausen  to  devote 
himself  to  keeping  a  strict  watch,  and  to  fomenting  the 
discord  between  Bute  and  Newcastle. 

Meanwhile  the  French  proposals  had  been  forwarded 
to  Viri,  and  were  being  considered  by  the  British  govern- 
ment. Choiseul  declared  himself  ready  to  persuade 
Spain  to  settle  her  three  points  in  a  manner  acceptable 
to  us.  The  question  of  prizes  taken  during  the  war  Avas 
to  be  left  to  our  courts ;  we  were  to  destroy  our  fortified 

^  Tbid.,  pp.  365  and  425  ;  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  May  14,  Newcastle  Papers^ 
32,938. 

*  Polilischc  Corr.,  vol.  xxi.  p.  469  and  note. 


332  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

posts  in  Honduras,  and  to  retain  our  right  to  cut  logwood  ; 
and  as  for  her  right  of  fishing  in  Newfoundland  waters,  it 
was  pointed  out  that  in  the  last  century  she  had  only 
sent  two  ships.  The  claim  was  a  mere  point  of  honour, 
and  Choiseul  suggested  the  matter  might  well  be  left  as 
it  was.  For  herself,  France  was  ready  to  acknowledge 
Canada  as  conquered,  but  was  not  satisfied  with  St.  Pierre 
as  an  ahri.  She  must  have  more,  but  was  willing  that 
England  should  take  precautions  to  secure  that  no  forti- 
fications were  erected.  On  the  West  Coast  of  Africa  she 
merely  wanted  one  station  for  the  slave  trade,  Goree  or 
Senegal.  In  India  England  could  propose  a  settlement. 
In  Europe  she  would  restore  Minorca,  and  evacuate  the 
territory  of  the  King  of  England  and  his  allies.  This, 
Choiseul  considered,  could  be  done  without  difiiculty  by 
finding  a  formula  which  would  remove  all  suspicion  of 
deserting  their  respective  allies.  Belleisle  he  regarded, 
so  he  said,  as  too  trivial  a  conquest  even  to  mention,  well 
knowing  that  this  view  was  shared  by  most  of  Pitt's 
political  opponents.  It  was  in  the  West  Indies  the  crux 
of  the  settlement  lay.  The  news  of  the  conquest  of 
Martinique  and  the  Grenadines,  with  the  rest  of  the 
neutral  islands,  had  just  come  home,  and  he  said  he 
should  have  to  add  to  the  old  demand  for  Gaudeloupe 
and  Mariegalante  the  restitution  of  Martinique  and  an 
equitable  division  of  the  neutral  islands. 

The  proposals  arrived  on  April  22nd.  On  the  whole 
they  were  well  received.  It  was  easily  agreed  to  add 
the  Island  of  Miquelon  to  St.  Pierre  as  an  ahri  for  the 
fisheries,  but  the  West  Indian  demands  staggered  every 
one.  Cabinet  after  Cabinet  was  held  and  Viri  worked 
hard.     The    general    feeling    was    that,   if   we  gave    up 

^  Choiseul  to  Solar,  with  the  accompaujiDg  proposal,  April  15,  Lansdowiie 
House  MSS. 


1762        REPLY    TO    THE    FEENCH    TERMS       333 

Martinique,  we  ought  to  have  something  substantial 
in  return.  Gaudeloupe  or  Louisiana  were  regarded 
as  reasonable  equivalents,  and  so  strongly  was  this 
opinion  supported,  particularly  by  Granville,  that  Egre- 
mont  was  instructed  to  draft  his  reply  accordingly.  It 
was  not  until  the  last  moment,  when  an  extraordinary 
Council  was  summoned  finally  to  settle  the  draft  and 
Grenville  was  too  ill  to  attend,  that  Bute  seized  the 
moment  to  intervene.^  "When  we  met  again,"  he 
wrote  to  the  Duke  of  Bedford,  "  to  hear  Lord  Egre- 
mont's  despatch  read  over,  I  ventured  to  fling  out  the 
following  opinion :  that  on  weighing  attentively  the  offer 
we  had  made  for  restoring  Martinique  on  the  French 
ceding  Guadeloupe  or  Louisiana,  I  frankly  owned  I  saw 
no  probability  of  peace.  They  certainly  would  not  accept 
these  terms,  and  if  so  war  must  be  continued."  To  avert 
this  he  proposed  that  we  should  demand  instead  "the 
neutral  islands  and  the  Grenada,  and  that,  to  prevent  all 
further  disputes  in  North  America,  the  Mississippi  should 
be  the  boundary  between  the  two  nations."  The  com- 
promise was  probably  the  suggestion  of  Viri ;  but  who- 
ever was  its  inventor,  it  was  certainly  ingenious.  For 
while  the  Mississippi  line  had  the  colour  of  being  a  mere 
method  of  securing  a  natural  geographical  boundary,  it 
would  give  us  the  ports  of  Mobile  and  New  Orleans  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  or  all  there  was  worth  having  in 
Louisiana.  Newcastle  and  Devonshire,  Bute  says,  heartily 
agreed. 

So  the  matter  was  settled,  and  they  went  on  to 
discuss  the  explosive  question  of  the  Prussian  subsidy. 
Newcastle,  Hardwicke,  and  Devonshire  would  not  budge 
from  their  position  that  it  must  be  continued.  Mansfield 
would    say  nothing,  but  "  the   other  Lords,"  Bute  says, 

*  Orenville  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  450. 


334  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

"  thought  it  highly  improper  to  continue  it  under  the 
load  of  evidence  we  have  of  the  most  determined  enmity 
of  that  Prince  and  under  our  own  necessitous  circum- 
stances."^ Considering  that  Frederick's  representatives 
at  the  moment,  with  the  obvious  intention  of  wrecking 
the  peace,  were  trying  to  induce  the  city  to  petition 
against  the  retrocession  of  Martinique,  it  must  be  owned 
that  Bute  and  "  the  other  Lords  "  had  some  grounds  for 
their  attitude.^ 

So  deep,  indeed,  was  the  exasperation  of  the  Court 
party  at  the  way  Frederick  was  behaving,  as  they 
honestly  believed  without  any  just  provocation,  that 
Bute  made  up  his  mind  that  the  interval  of  waiting 
for  the  French  answer  must  be  used  in  getting  rid  of 
the  old  Prussian  party  in  the  Cabinet.  He  accordingly 
commenced  an  intrigue  which  rapidly  brought  his  dis- 
cord with  Newcastle  to  a  head,  and  saved  the  Prussian 
Legation  the  pains  of  fomenting  it. 

Newcastle's  loyalty  to  Frederick  had  always  gone  far 
to  redeem  his  career  from  mere  political  opportunism,  and 
he  was  now  using  all  the  weight  of  his  powerful  con- 
nection in  a  last  desperate  effort  to  secure  a  renewal  of 
the  Prussian  Treaty.  Parliament,  having  been  prorogued 
a  month  before,  had  just  been  summoned  for  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  a  supplementary  grant.  Bute  proposed  to 
ask  for  no  more  than  a  million,  and  to  earmark  it  for 
Portugal.  Newcastle  was  for  demanding  two  millions 
and  not  restricting  the  expenditure  to  Portugal,  and  he 
was  warmly  supported  in  the  Cabinet  by  Devonshire, 
Hardwicke,   and   Mansfield.     Bute   regarded    so   large  a 


^  Bute  to  Bedford,  May  1,  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  I'u 

*  Viri  to  Solar,  May  4,  Lansdowne  House  MSJS.     This  is  a  separate  letter 

from  that  of  the  same  date  in  which  Viri  communicated  the  results  of  the 

Cabinets. 


1762  HE    GETS    RID    OF    NEWCASTLE         335 

sum  as  beyond  our  resources.  Newcastle,  as  bead  of  the 
Treasury,  pronounced  that  we  could  easily  afford  it.  Bute, 
however,  was  not  to  be  beaten.  He  went  behind  New- 
castle's back,  and  secretly  got  a  declaration  from  the 
Treasury  officials  that  no  more  than  a  million  could  be 
raised.  An  irregularity  so  offensive  was  more  than  even 
Newcastle's  tenacity  of  office  could  endure.  "  I  send 
your  lordship,"  he  wrote  to  Hardwicke  on  May  10th, 
just  as  Parliament  was  reassembling,  "  direct  proof  ...  of 
such  a  behaviour  in  my  lord  Bute  to  me  in  my  office,  as 
hardly  any  gentleman  ever  acted  towards  another,  let  him 
be  ever  so  insignificant." 

Three  days  later  Grenville  moved  in  the  House  of 
Commons  for  a  million  for  the  defence  of  Portugal.  Pitt 
in  one  of  his  best  speeches  supported  the  motion,  but  he 
declared  himself  not  content  with  it.  He  implored  the 
ministers  to  ask  a  larger  sum,  that  we  might  do  our  duty 
to  the  King  of  Prussia.  It  was  but  ten  days  since 
Knyphausen  had  brought  him  Frederick's  appeal  for 
help,  and  he  did  his  best  to  honour  it ;  but  still,  true  to 
his  principles,  he  would  not  stir  a  finger  to  encourage  his 
royal  admirer  in  his  ill-judged  interference  with  British 
politics.  He  would  not  move  himself,  he  told  the  House, 
for  a  continuation  of  the  Prussian  subsidy,  because  he 
did  not  think  it  became  him  to  oppose  the  King's 
servants.  But  if  such  a  motion  were  made  he  w^ould 
support  it.  He  earnestly  begged,  if  a  cloud  arose  between 
London  and  Berlin — and  ho  knew  too  well  how  black  a 
cloud  there  was,  and  how  much  Frederick  was  to  blame 
for  it — that  the  situation  might  be  handled  without  temper 
and  for  reconciliation.  In  his  peroration  he  made  one  more 
passionate  appeal  to  lift  his  country  from  the  degradation 
to  which  Bute  was  dragging  it,  and  to  inspire  his  sup- 
planters  with  something  of  his  own  heroic  statesmanship. 


3  36  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

Recalling  our  long  succession  of  victories  in  all  parts  of 
the  world,  and  how  favourable  was  our  situation  since 
the  break  up  of  Kaunitz's  coalition,  he  called  on  them  to 
act  now  "  upon  a  great  system  while  it  was  in  their 
power."  "  A  million  more,"  he  said,  "  would  be  a  pittance 
to  place  you  at  the  head  of  Europe,  and  enable  you  to 
treat  with  efficacy  and  dignity.  Save  it  not  in  the  last 
critical  year !  give  the  million  to  the  war  at  large,  and 
add  three,  four,  or  five  hundred  thousand  pounds  more 
to  Portugal,  or  avow  to  the  House  of  Bourbon  you  are 
not  able  to  treat  at  the  head  of  your  allies."  ^ 

His  lofty  appeal  made  a  great  impression  on  the  House, 
but  on  the  ministers  it  was  thrown  away.  One  million 
only  was  voted,  and  voted  for  Portugal,  and  next  day 
Newcastle  tendered  his  resignation.  None  of  his  friends 
followed  his  example — indeed,  he  had  begged  them  not 
to  do  so.  He  fell  alone  and  unregretted,  a  feeble  victim 
of  the  blunderer  for  whom  he  had  betrayed  Pitt.  But 
pitiable  as  was  the  figure  he  cut,  he  was  not  yet  defeated. 
There  still  clung  to  him  the  intangible  force  of  political 
aptitude  which  had  enabled  him  so  long  to  control  the 
machinery  of  State.  Every  one  felt  it.  Bute  and  the 
King  did  their  best  to  get  him  to  accept  some  favour 
as  Pitt  had  done,  but  with  a  courage  and  dignity  that 
touches  his  fall  with  light,  he  firmly  refused  every  offer 
either  for  himself  or  his  family,  and  retired  into  the 
country  to  nurse  the  forces  of  opposition  which  began 
at  once  to  gather  round  him.^ 

But  for  the  time  Bute  was  master,  and  the  power  of 
the  old  oligarchy  was  broken.     The  triumphant  favourite 


1  From    Horace  Walpole's    Report,    Memoirs    of   George    III.,    vol.   i. 
pp.  163-6. 

2  For   a   detailed  account   of  the  whole  affair  by  Newcastle,  see  his 
"  most  secret"  letter  to  Yorke,  May  14,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,938. 


1762  ENGLAND'S   JUSTIFICATION  337 

became  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury.  Grenville  took  liis 
place  as  Secretary  of  State,  and  with  Egremont  they  had 
complete  control  of  the  negotiations.  Before  leaving  the 
Foreign  Office  Bute  was  careful  to  send  to  Berlin  a 
detailed  defence  of  his  conduct,  which  amounted  also  to 
a  declaration  of  the  polic}^  he  meant  to  pursue.  Parlia- 
ment rose  again  in  a  few  days  without  havmg  granted  a 
subsidy  to  Prussia,  and  Bute  felt  he  must  explain  why 
it  was  withheld.  Shortly  the  new  policy  was  based  on 
the  new  situation.  "  We,"  wrote  Bute  in  the  pith  of 
his  despatch,  "  have  a  very  powerful  additional  enemy 
to  contend  with ;  His  Prussian  Majesty  has  a  new  and 
very  powerful  friend.  The  weight  of  Spain  is  thrown 
into  our  opposite  scale ;  that  of  Russia,  and  Sweden  too, 
is  taken  out  of  his.  The  King  of  Prussia  had  Pomerania 
and  Brandenburg  to  defend,  besides  Saxony  and  Silesia : 
the  two  former  are  no  longer  in  danger.  We  had,  on  our 
part,  a  most  expensive  land  war  to  support  in  Germany : 
we  must  now  provide  for  another  in  Portugal."  ^ 

The  British  case  was  perfectly  good  if  Bute  had  had 
the  sense  and  candour  to  put  it  to  Frederick  at  the  first. 
There  was  ample  reason  for  discontinuing  Frederick's 
subsidy.  We  were  in  no  way  bound  to  provide  it  when 
the  danger  on  which  it  was  originally  based  disappeared. 
We  were  doing  Frederick  no  wrong.  He  did  not  even 
pretend  we  were.  The  negotiations  had  been  regularly 
communicated  to  him  from  the  moment  they  were  officially 
on  foot ;  he  had  had  copies  of  the  material  documents,  and 
had  been  invited  to  express  his  views.^  What  we  were 
doing  in  the  matter  was  much  what  he  himself  had  pro- 
posed to  Pitt.      He  kneAv  as   well  as  any  one  that  the 

»  Bute  to  Mitchell,  May  26,  Mitchell  Papers,  vol.  xvii.,  Add.  MSS.  6820, 
and  printed  by  Adolphus,  vol.  i.  p.  493,  and  Bisset,  vol.  ii.  p.  294. 
2  Bute  to  Mitchell,  April  9  and  30,  MitchtJl  Papers,  vol.  xvii.  p.  6820. 
VOL.  II.  Y 


338  BUTE'S   PEACE  1762 

only  way  to  bring  the  war  to  a  speedy  end  was  for  us 
to  come  to  terms  with  France.  The  main  issue  once 
decided,  the  subordinate  continental  war,  which  had 
attached  itself  to  the  imperial  struggle,  must  collapse. 
Under  Pitt,  therefore,  he  had  fully  endorsed  the  policy 
of  a  separate  negotiation  with  France.  His  grievance 
now  and  till  the  end  was  not  that,  but  that  he  could  not 
trust  Bute.  He  had  made  up  his  mind  that  he  was  going 
to  be  betrayed,  and  Bute  did  his  worst  to  confirm  the 
impression.  He  was  hand-in-glove  with  Frederick's  arch- 
enemy, the  Duke  of  Bedford,  and  actually  had  selected 
him  to  go  to  Paris  as  British  Plenipotentiary  so  soon  as 
the  negotiations  were  sufficiently  advanced.  The  most 
ardent  French  patriot  could  not  have  invented  a  better 
scheme  for  weakening  our  hand.  Bedford,  by  his  exag- 
gerated behaviour,  had  stamped  himself  as  an  advocate 
for  peace  at  any  price.  Choiseul  could  scarcely  conceal 
his  delight  at  having  such  a  simpleton  as  Bute  to  deal 
with.  He  was  as  eager  to  keep  him  in  power  as  Frederick 
was  to  get  rid  of  him.  Indeed,  during  the  late  minis- 
terial crisis  he  had  become  so  much  alarmed  for  the 
security  of  Bute's  position  that  he  solemnly  warned  Solar 
to  let  the  King  of  England  know  that  unless  Bute 
remained  in  power  he  would  have  nothing  more  to  do 
with  the  negotiations.  "  I  would  rather  go  and  row  in 
the  galleys,"  he  said,  "than  have  to  discuss  any  kind 
of  peace  with  Mr.  Pitt."  ^ 

On  Bute's  becoming  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury  he  was 
reassured,  and  the  negotiations  could  proceed.  Bute, 
fooled  and  flattered  by  Choiseul's  expressions  of  regard, 
was  like  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  accomplished  veteran. 

-  Choiseul  to  Solar,  May  13,  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii,  p.  84.  "Nous  avons 
eu  une  peur  effroiable  du  chaugeruent  du  Ministere,"  same  to  same.  May  25. 
— Lansdovme  House  MSS. 


1762  THE   QUESTION   OF   ST.    LUCIA  339 

He  was  beaten  at  every  turn,  and  liad  it  not  been  for 
Grenville's  stiffness,  and  the  awe  of  Pitt  in  which  Bute 
stood,  there  is  no  knowing  to  what  lengths  of  unstable 
concession  he  would  not  have  gone. 

The  first  and  decisive  trial  of  strength  took  place,  as 
before,  over  the  question  of  naval  position.  It  was  in- 
evitable that  it  should  be  so,  seeing  that  the  whole  war 
was  a  struggle  for  maritime  empire.  Directly  Grenville's 
despatch  reached  Paris  with  the  British  reply  to  the 
terms  Choiseul  had  proposed.  Solar  sent  over  a  warning 
that  France  would  never  abandon  all  the  neutral  islands. 
The  crux  was,  of  course,  St.  Lucia.  We  have  seen  the 
importance  which  English  strategy  had  come  to  attach 
to  it  as  the  commanding  naval  position  of  the  Windward 
Islands.  Choiseul  was  equally  aware  of  its  value,  and  on 
this  he  took  his  most  determined  stand.  He  was  not, 
indeed,  satisfied  with  St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon  as  dbris  for 
the  fishery.  He  wanted  Cape  Breton  Island  too,  but  as 
he  must  have  known  this  would  not  be  granted  he 
intimated  he  would  be  satisfied  with  a  drying  station  on 
its  shores.  It  was  St.  Lucia  that  he  refused  to  swallow. 
"  The  restitution  of  Martinique,"  he  wrote,  "  will  be  a 
precarious  restitution  if  England  blockades  it  to  leeward 
and  to  windward  by  keeping  St.  Lucia  and  Dominica. 
There  would  be  nothing  left  for  France  but  to  renew 
the  war  as  soon  as  she  was  able." 

The  whole  despatch  is  characteristic  of  his  method. 
He  stated  his  position  with  the  assumption  of  an  almost 
cynical  candour.  There  was,  he  said,  no  example  in 
history  of  a  victor  retaining  all  his  conquests  beyond 
the  sea,  and  this  for  three  good  reasons.  Firstly,  such 
acquisitions  were  very  costly  at  the  outset  to  the  metro- 
politan country ;  secondly,  it  made  an  enduring  peace 
impossible ;    and  thirdly,  because,  as  the  case  of  Spain 


340  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

herself  proved,  such  conquests  were  extremely  difficult 
to  maintain.  For  these  reasons,  he  said,  he  intended 
to  persist  in  his  attitude,  as  knowing  that  its  inherent 
and  fundamental  strength  made  it  impossible  for  us  to 
resist.  With  equal  candour  he  explained  that  his  claim 
was  of  the  essence  of  his  colonial  policy.  On  principle 
he  objected  to  the  whole  American  system.  He  did  not 
believe  in  colonies — better  far,  he  thought,  for  a  country 
to  devote  its  strength  to  developing  its  own  resources. 
There  were,  however,  certain  luxuries,  like  coffee  and 
sugar,  which  had  become  necessaries  to  the  French 
people,  and  which  they  could  not  produce  at  home. 
Colonial  possessions,  therefore,  for  the  production  of 
such  articles,  he  regarded  as  legfitimate  and  even  neces- 
sary.  That  was  the  simple  extent  of  his  ideas  of  Colonial 
expansion — he  wished  nothing  more,  but  so  much  he 
must  have,  and  could  not  leave  at  the  mercy  of  the 
British  navy.  For  India,  on  the  same  principle,  he 
would  be  content  with  simple  factories  in  Bengal  and 
on  the  Coromandel  and  Malabar  coasts,  but  he  must 
retain  Mauritius  and  Bourbon.  He  therefore  reiterated 
his  demand  for  Guadeloupe,  Mariegalante,  and  Mar- 
tinique, with  the  addition  of  St.  Lucia,  but  in  return 
he  was  ready  to  give  us  Mobile  and  the  line  of  the 
Mississippi,  but  not  to  the  sea.  It  must  diverge  at 
La  Belle  Riviere  to  Lake  Pontchartrain,  so  as  to  leave 
New  Orleans  to  France. 

Having  thus  clearly  defined  his  position  beyond  the 
seas,  he  attacked  the  German  question.  Here  the  only 
real  difficulty  was  Cleves,  Wesel,  and  Gueldres,  with  the 
rest  of  the  Prussian  territory  on  the  Lower  Rhine.  These 
he  intimated  he  was  willing  to  evacuate  with  the  rest  of 
Germany,  but  in  that  he  was  bound  by  his  alliance  to 
regard  them   as  Austrian  conquests  he  could  not  do  so 


1762  CHOISEUL'S    REVISED    TERMS  341 

without  the  consent  of  Vienna.  This,  he  urged,  would 
take  time  and  delay  the  peace.  He  therefore  proposed 
that  the  Prussian  Rhenish  towns  should  be  held  by  French 
or  Austrian  troops  till  a  general  peace  was  secured,  and 
that  England  should  give  an  assurance  that  no  part  of 
Ferdinand's  army  in  her  pay  should  join  Frederick. 

His  Memoir  was  accompanied  by  a  note  from  Choiseul 
to  Solar,  in  which  he  explained  that  Grimaldi,  whom  he 
detested  for  an  ill-mannered  braggart,  objected  violently 
to  any  concession  to  England  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and 
was  talking  very  big.  The  little  Spanish  successes  in 
Portugal  had  turned  his  head,  and  he  was  confident  that 
the  British  expedition  to  Havana  would  end  in  disaster. 
But  Choiseul  was  not  afraid  of  his  bragging.  "  I  cajole 
M.  de  Grimaldi,"  he  said,  "  as  though  I  were  his  own 
heart's  dupe."  The  importance  of  a  rapid  settlement,  he 
urged,  was  that  Russia  must  be  prevented  from  upsetting 
all  Europe  with  her  Tartars  under  Frederick's  direction ; 
but  he  could  not  secure  it  at  the  price  of  St.  Lucia.  "  I 
tell  you  frankly,  my  dear  ambassador,"  he  wrote,  "  if 
England  persists  in  wanting  it  I  shall  advise  the  Council 
to  break  off  negotiations."  He  was  ready,  however,  to 
give  up  the  Grenadines.  "  I  don't  mention  Belleisle  in 
my  Memoir,"  he  added.  "  I  have  always  maintained 
that  it  was  a  folly  England  committed  in  undertaking 
that  conquest."  ^ 

In  England  the  Memoir  produced  so  bad  an  impres- 
sion, especially  by  what  most  of  the  ministers  regarded  as 
the  French  chicanerie  about  St.  Lucia  and  the  abris,  that 
it  was  a  month  before  an  answer  could  be  sent.  The 
period  of  silence  that  the  delay  entailed  could  only  in- 
crease Frederick's  mistrust.     His  military  position  had 

^  "  Memoire  du  Due  dc  Choiseul,"  May  25,  and  Choiseul  to  Solaii 
May  27,  LausdowHc  JJnasi:  JZ-S'.b'. 


342  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

been  materially  improved.  A  victory  of  Prince  Henry 
had  given  him  back  Freyburg,  and  with  growing  elation 
he  was  ordering  his  ministers  in  London  to  attach  them- 
selves to  the  opposition  which  was  forming  round  New- 
castle under  the  patronage  of  the  Duke  of  Cumberland, 
till  they  saw  a  chance  of  "  breaking  the  neck  of  a  minister 
so  little  versed  in  affairs,  so  inconsequent  and  without 
system."  "  It  is  astounding,"  he  said,  "  to  see  Lord  Bute 
not  only  acting  against  all  rules  of  good  faith,  prudence, 
and  even  politics,  but  playing  the  game  so  clumsily  that 
if  he  loses,  it  can  only  cost  his  master  the  confidence  of 
the  nation.  As  for  me,  I  will  not  confound  this  minister 
with  the  King  and  the  nation."  ^ 

It  was  a  strange  coincidence  that  immediately  after 
the  French  Memoir  was  received,  and  peace  was  seen  to 
turn  on  our  future  naval  position  in  the  West  Indies, 
Anson,  who  best  knew  the  strategical  value  of  St.  Lucia, 
died.  "  Who  will  succeed  him  ?  "  wrote  Newcastle.  "  Some 
say  Hawke,  but  I  hardly  believe  they  will  do  so  right  a 
thing."  They  did  not.  Halifax  was  confirmed  in  his 
appointment,  and  according  to  Barrington,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Grenville  as  Treasurer  of  the  Navy,  it  was  with 
the  full  approval  of  Pitt  and  Cleveland,  the  veteran 
secretary.^  In  any  case  it  made  little  difference  to  the 
burning  question.  For  Grenville,  too,  with  his  long  ex- 
perience at  the  Admiralty,  knew  St.  Lucia's  value  well 
enough,  and  continued  violently  to  oppose  the  concession. 
A  Cabinet  to  settle  the  matter  was  held  on  June  21st. 
Bedford  and  Bute  were  both  for  giving  way,  but  the  feel- 
ing was  too  strong  for  them,  and  a  tart  reply   agreed 

^  Frederick  to  Kuyphausen  and  Mitchell,  June  10,  Politischc  Corr., 
vol.  xxi.  p.  523. 

*  Newcastle  to  Devonshire,  June  10,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,939  ;  Barrington 
to  Newcastle,  June  21,  ibid.,  32,940. 


1762  CHOISEUL'S    TERMS    REFUSED  343 

to.     Displeasure  was  frankly  expressed   at  France's  not 
accepting  the  extra  abri  offered,  and  some  resentment  at 
the  refusal  of  the  whole  Mississippi  line  after  the  large 
concessions  we  had  made,  and  especially  at  the  demand 
for   St.  Lucia.     To  this  they  said  it  was  impossible  to 
agree,  nor  could  they  consent  to  the  proposed  arrange- 
ment   about    Wesel     and    Gueldres    without    consulting 
Prussia,  but  they  were  ready  to  fall  back  on  the  old  plan 
of  both  sides  retiring  from  German  territory  altogether. 
To  smooth  matters  a  little  Viri  was  informed  that  Bedford 
would  go  as  plenipotentiary  when  the  time  came ;  but  in 
the  same  breath  Egrernont  warmly  expressed  to  him  his 
surprise  that  France  could  have  so  much  regard  for  her 
treaty  with  Austria  and  so  little  for  ours  with  Prussia. 
Egremont  further  said  we  were  not  to  be  frightened  by  a 
Russian  bogy — in  fact,  we  looked  upon  a  Russo-Prussian 
alliance    as    an    excellent    counterpoise    to    the    Family 
Compact.^ 

So  far,  then,  it  will  be  seen  there  had  been  little  giving 
way  and  no  disloyalty  to  Prussia.  Bute,  however,  as 
though  bound  to  commit  every  mistake  within  his  reach, 
made  no  further  communication  to  Frederick  as  to  how 
the  negotiations  Avere  proceeding.  The  natural  inference 
was  that  we  had  something  to  hide,  whereas  the  truth 
was  that  so  far  from  deserting  Frederick  we  had  taken 
up  so  strong  an  attitude  in  his  interest  that,  in  the 
opinion  of  most  people,  a  continuation  of  hostilities  was 
inevitable.  Orders  indeed  were  now  issued  to  Ferdinand 
for  a  new  campaign  in  Westphalia.  There  was  as  yet  no 
word  from  Spain  or  news  from  Pocock  and  Albemarle. 
Even  Ligonier  grew  nervous  that  what  he  had  divined  of 
Choiseul's  war  plan  would  be  carried  out.     He  saw  forty- 

1  Egremonfc  to  Viri,  June  20  (enclosing  the  British  Memoir)  ;  Viri  to 
Solar,  June  27,  Lansdowne  House  MfiiS. 


344  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

five  thousand  men  cantoned  along  the  opposite  coast. 
Hawke  was  taking  the  Channel  Fleet  to  Ferrol,  and  there 
were  neither  troops  nor  ships  enough  at  home,  in  his 
opinion,  to  stop  an  invasion  if  it  were  intended.  His 
fear  Avas  that  the  Channel  Fleet  might  be  overwhelmed 
by  a  Franco-Spanish  concentration,  unless  Saunders  and 
Hawke  had  orders  to  unite.  He  hoped  they  had,  but 
did  not  know. 

Hawke  and  Saunders,  as  we  have  seen,  had  no  such 
instructions,  and  they  knew  better  than  to  club  their 
fleets  m  a  lump.  They  had  passed  beyond  such  crude 
ideas  of  naval  concentration,  and  as  we  know  had  arranged 
between  them  a  subtler  and  more  elastic  combination, 
which  rendered  impossible  the  concentration  Ligonier 
feared.  Still  he  was  none  the  less  anxious.  Like  so 
many  of  our  best  soldiers  before  and  since,  so  long  as 
he  saw  across  the  water  troops  in  sufficient  strength 
to  make  an  invasion,  he  thought  invasion  possible.  He 
told  Newcastle,  however,  that  he  could  not  get  any  one 
to  listen  to  him,  and  in  a  kind  of  heroic  despair  that  if 
anything  happened  he  meant  to  gather  the  flower  of  his 
troops  round  London  and  do  his  best.^ 

As  it  happened  his  apprehensions  were  groundless, 
even  on  military  grounds.  The  danger,  such  as  it  ever 
was,  had  already  passed.  In  view  of  the  unpromising 
nature  of  the  French  reply,  it  had  been  decided  as 
we  have  seen,  to  hold  Ferdinand's  hand  no  longer. 
Granby  went  over  to  his  command,  and  both  sides  were 
already  mobilising  for  a  fresh  campaign.  D'Estrees  and 
Soubise  had  been  ordered  to  join  hands,  and  had 
advanced  northward   from   Cassel   towards    the    Diemal 


1  "List  of  the  French  Army  in  Flanders  under  M.  de  Heronville," 
May  21,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,939  ;  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  June  28  ; 
same  to  Devonshire,  June  29,  ibid.,  32,940. 


1762  FERDINAND'S   LAST   VICTORY  345 

behind  which  Ferdinand  was  at  work.  The  French 
Marshals  appear  to  have  thought  the  war  was  over. 
Soubise,  so  it  was  said  in  the  City,  was  at  this  time 
making  immense  purchases  in  the  EngUsh  funds,  and  the 
French  Court  was  following  his  example.^  The  Marshals 
at  any  rate  made  the  loosest  dispositions,  took  no  precau- 
tions against  surprise,  and  Ferdinand,  with  his  usual 
promptitude,  seized  the  chance.  Secretly  concentrating 
his  force,  he  suddenly  passed  the  Diemal,  and  after  a 
night  march  flung  himself  upon  the  French  camp.  There 
was  a  hard  struggle.  The  French  had  seventy  thousand 
men  to  Ferdinand's  forty,  but  in  the  end  they  were  driven 
back  in  confusion  under  the  walls  of  Cassel.  The  exul- 
tation in  England  was  great ;  for  again  a  large  share  of 
the  glory  had  fallen  to  Granby  and  the  British  troops. 
He  had  executed  a  difficult  and  well-sustained  flank 
attack  that  had  proved  decisive,  and  more  than  half  the 
allies'  loss  was  in  his  corps.  The  relief  was  immediate. 
News  quickly  came  that  the  French  army  of  the  Lower 
Rhine  had  marched  to  the  support  of  the  defeated  Mar- 
shals ;  that  the  Maison  du  Roi,  which  was  at  Dunkirk,  had 
orders  to  hurry  in  the  same  direction ;  and  that  the  force 
which  Ligonier  was  watching  so  anxiously  was  to  be 
broken  up.^ 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  the  rejoicings  over  the  victory 
that  the  next  communication  arrived  from  France.  It 
amounted   to  nothing,  however,  but   their  last  proposal 

'  Newcastle  to  Yorke,  June  25,  ibid.  Later  he  reported  that  Walpole,  a 
well-known  broker,  and  Vanneck,  his  partner,  had  received  from  De  Borde, 
"a  creature  of  Choiseul's,"  £100,000  to  invest  in  the  Funds.  Same  to 
Cumberland,  July  11,  ibid.  This  is  to  some  extent  confirmed  bj  Solar, 
who  wrote  to  Viri  on  Aug.  22  that  everything  was  being  told  to  "  M.  de  la 
Borde,  the  Court  banker,"  apparently  for  him  to  use  the  information.  He 
was  sending  expresses  everywhere,  and  had  probably  sent  Vanneck  to 
London. — Lansdoivne  House  MSS.,  Aug.  22. 

-  Hague  Advices,  July  9,  ibid. 


346  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

reduced  to  formal  articles  and  regularly  signed  on  behalf 
of  France  and  Spain  by  Choiseul  and  Wall,  whose  general 
assent  to  treat  had  at  last  reached  Paris.  It  was  accom- 
panied by  another  note  from  Choiseul  to  Solar  explaining 
that  Austria  had  expressed  herself  as  ready  to  agree 
to  any  settlement  France  might  make  with  England, 
provided  she  sacrificed  no  territory  and  steps  were 
taken  to  extinguish  the  war  in  every  part  of  Europe. 
To  this  end  she  was  ready  to  assent  to  a  revival  of  the 
abortive  Congress  and  to  an  armistice,  and  she  desired 
that  Frederick's  views  should  be  obtained  through  the 
British  Court.^ 

Bute  now  found  his  position  very  delicate.  Since 
Ferdinand's  victory  on  the  Diemal,  Grenville  and  others 
who  thought  with  him  were  naturally  more  determined 
than  ever,  but  Bute  and  Egremont  had  taken  a  step 
behind  their  backs  which  made  further  resistance  on  the 
main  point  practically  impossible.  While  waiting  for  the 
French  answer  they  had  told  Viri,  without  saying  a  word 
to  their  colleagues,  that  if  the  reply  were  otherwise  favour- 
able St.  Lucia  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  peace." 
The  deception  of  course  had  to  be  kept  up.  To  keep 
Grenville  and  his  followers  quiet,  Egremont  was  obliged 
to  present  to  Viri  formal  observations  on  the  French 
articles  in  which  the  original  British  attitude  was  firmly 
maintained.  It  was  impossible,  he  repeated,  after  sacri- 
ficing Guadeloupe  and  Martinique,  to  give  up  St.  Lucia 
too,  nor  did  loyalty  to  Prussia  permit  them  to  accept  the 
proposals  about  Wesel  and  Gueldres  without  Frederick's 
consent. 

Viri  was  now  almost   in   despair.     "  You   can't  tell," 

^  "  Projet  des  Articles  de  Paix  dresse  par  le  France,"  and  Choiseul  to 
Solar,  June  28,  Lansdoione  House  MSS. 

*  Viri  to  Solar,  June  28,  Lanadoionc  House  MSS. 


1762  HIS    SECRET    SURRENDER  347 

he    wrote    to    Solar,    "  how    Grenville    bothers    us.     He 
may  be  sound  at  heart  but  he  wants  popularity,  and  the 
worst  of  it  is  Egremont  sometimes  gets  the  same  idea 
into  his  head."     Since  his  last  letters  from  Paris  naturally 
referred  to  Bute's  secret  concession  it  was  impossible  to 
show  them  to  Grenville.     Viri  told  him  they  contained  a 
definite  declaration  that  if  the  British  claim  to  St.  Lucia 
and  New  Orleans  were  not  abandoned  the  negotiations 
would  be  broken  off.     He  had  talked  with  him  for  six 
hours,  but  was  sure  six  hours  more  would  not  make  him 
give  up  St.  Lucia,  and  Egremont  was  with  him  on  New 
Orleans.     He  warned  Solar,  therefore,  that  France  had 
better   be   careful  and   not  make   difficulties  about   the 
Mississippi   line,  for   there   was  serious   danger   brewing 
from  the  gathering  opposition.     No  one  but  Bute  and 
Egremont  yet  knew  of  the  offer  about  St.  Lucia,  and  the 
only  cour.se,  he  said,  was  to  send  at  once  an  answer  to 
the  last  British  Memoir  which  must  reveal  nothing  of 
the  secret,  so  that  it  could  be  shown  to  the  Cabinet.     St. 
Lucia  should  be  insisted  on  as  a  sine  qua  own,  and  a  new 
line  excluding  new  Orleans  be  proposed.     It  would  also 
be  well  to  offer  a  joint  Anglo-French  occupation  of  Wesel 
and  Gueldres,  but  it  must  be  understood  that  England 
had  so  far  committed  herself  to  her  last  suggestion  for 
reciprocal  evacuation  of  all  German  territory  as  to  refer  it 
to  Frederick  for  his  consent.     Lastly,  there  was  no  need 
to  worry  about  Portugal,  for  until  Spain  had  evacuated 
it,  England  would  simply  not  stir  from  Cuba.^ 

The  Cabinet  had  in  fact  decided  to  break  its  long 
silence  with  Berlin,  and  to  communicate  the  exact  state 
of  the  negotiations,  so  far  as  they  knew  them,  to  Frederick, 
together  with  the  Austrian  proposal  for  a  Congress  and 
British    mediation.     All    the    documents    were    sent    to 

1  Viri  to  Solar,  July  12. 


348  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

Mitchell,  including  the  French  proposals  about  Rhenish 
Prussia,  and  he  was  instructed  to  ask  for  a  special  inter- 
view with  Frederick  to  ascertain  his  views.^  In  this  we 
undoubtedly  see  the  determination  of  Grenville  to  deal 
loyally  with  our  ally. 

No  sooner,  however,  had  this  straightforward  despatch 
gone  off  than  Bute  received  a  secret  intimation  from 
Paris  that  if  St.  Lucia  were  given  up  Choiseul  would  let 
nothing  stop  him  concluding  peace."  But  he  pressed  for 
a  speedy  settlement.  In  view  of  a  growing  anxiety  in 
France  lest  Prussia  and  Austria  should  settle  their 
differences  first,  he  urged  that  plenipotentiaries  should 
be  exchanged  to  sign  the  preliminaries  at  the  earliest 
moment.  The  effect  upon  Bute  was  to  determine  him 
to  push  the  matter  through  at  all  costs.  On  July  19th 
he  sent  for  Bedford  and  told  him  of  the  last  French 
assurance.  France,  he  said,  had  agreed  to  everything 
except  New  Orleans  and  the  Prussian  towns,  which  she 
declared  must  be  given  over  to  Austrian  garrisons.  She 
had  also  undertaken  that  Portugal  should  be  evacuated, 
and  that  peace  should  be  signed  with  Spain  either  in 
Paris  or  Madrid,  as  we  preferred  ;  and  in  view  of  the 
importance  she  attached  to  plenipotentiaries  being  ex- 
changed at  once,  the  King  hoped  Bedford  would  be  able 
to  set  out  in  the  middle  of  August.  Bute  further 
explained  that  in  consenting  to  the  French  proposal  they 
would  have  fulfilled  all  their  ensrasfements  to  Prussia, 
and,  as  Bedford  thought,  was  obviously  anxious  to  make 
peace  on  the  basis  proposed  by  France.^  A  day  or  two 
later  the  French  answer  on  the  lines  Viri  had  suggested 
was  received.     St.  Lucia  and  New  Orleans  were  insisted 

1  Grenville  to  Mitchell,  July  14,  Mitchell  Papem,  Add.  HtSS.  6820. 

*  Solar  to  Viri,  July  1). 

*  Bedford  Oorr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  88. 


1762  GRANVILLE    ASSERTS    HIMSELF  349 

on.  As  to  Gueldres  and  Wesel,  Choiseul  protested  he 
could  not  give  them  up  without  the  consent  of  Austria, 
but  undertook  to  propose  nothing  in  regard  to  their 
final  disposition  which  could  be  deemed  contrary  to  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  loyalty  to  his  allies.^ 

For  Bute  this  was  enough,  and  the  Cabinet  was  called 
for  July  29th  to  make  the  final  decision.  Since  the 
resignation  of  Newcastle,  Hardwicke  had  ceased  to  be 
summoned  and  Devonshire  had  refused  to  attend. 
Mansfield,  still  recalcitrant,  had  gone  on  circuit  to  be 
out  of  the  way.  Still  the  obstacles  in  Bute's  path  were 
great.  Egremont  only  gave  way  on  peremptory  orders 
from  the  King  that  he  was  to  hasten  peace.  Granville 
and  Bedford  were  specially  called  up  from  the  country, 
but  the  former  proved  unexpectedly  obstinate.  Bute 
had  meant  to  talk  to  them  both  before  the  meeting, 
in  order  probably  to  let  them  into  his  secret  understand- 
ing with  Choiseul,  but  they  arrived  too  late.  Granville 
had  been  in  secret  concert  with  Egremont  and  Grenville, 
and  at  the  Cabinet  he  took  a  strong  line  against 
Bute.  Not  only  did  he  refuse  to  give  way  on  St.  Lucia, 
New  Orleans,  or  the  German  article,  but  he  protested  we 
must  come  to  terms  with  Spain  before  agreeing  with 
France,  since  Grimaldi's  language  was  still  impossible  on 
the  question  of  our  admittance  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.^ 

Seeing  how  formidable  a  political  figure  Granville  still 
was  and  that  he  was  universally  regarded  as  the  highest 
authority  on  foreign  affairs  in  the  kingdom,  Bute  was  at 
his  wits'  end.  In  fear  of  his  head,  he  did  not  dare  to  act 
without  him.  With  difficulty  he  secured  an  adjournment. 
Viri,  who  naturally  could  not  estimate  the  importance  of 
the  naval  questions  involved,  assured  himself  that  the 
obstinacy  of  Grenville  and  his  friends  was  solely  due  to 

'  Lansdowne  House  MSS.,  July  20.  -  Ibid.,  Aug.  I. 


350  BUTE'S   PEACE  1762 

fear  of  the  gathering  opposition.  If  so,  it  was  not  only 
they  who  were  afraid.  Within  living  memory,  Harley 
had  been  sent  to  the  Tower  for  his  share  in  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht  on  a  charge  of  high  treason.  It  was  but  five- 
and-twenty  years  since  Walpole  had  narrowly  escaped 
impeachment  for  preserving  an  unpopular  neutrality,  and 
it  was  Pitt  who  had  voiced  the  national  outcry.  Bute 
could  not  forget  it,  or  that  it  was  mainly  Newcastle's 
influence  that  had  saved  the  fallen  minister.  In  the 
midst,  therefore,  of  his  struggle  with  the  Cabinet  he 
made  a  desperate  effort  to  re- open  relations  with  his 
old  chief,  but  only  to  encounter  an  icy  rebuff.^ 

With  Grenville  and  his  recalcitrant  supporters  in  the 
Cabinet  he  was  more  successful.  In  concert  with  the 
King  and  Viri  he  worked  hard  to  bring  them  round. 
By  July  31st  they  had  been  so  far  dominated  as  to  pass 
a  despatch  to  Choiseul,  practically  accepting  the  French 
terms,  except  those  relating  to  Rhenish  Prussia.  The 
King,  so  Egremont  was  made  to  say,  would  give  up  New 
Orleans  and  St.  Lucia,  though  with  deep  regret.  He 
would  also  at  once  proceed  to  exchange  plenipotentiaries. 
But  on  the  question  of  Gueldres  and  Wesel,  Bute  had 
not  been  able  to  carry  them  so  far.  On  that  point 
Egremont  had  leave  to  say  the  King  had  already  gone 
as  far  as  he  could  without  breaking  faith  with  his  ally, 
and  Grenville  wrote  off  to  Mitchell  to  tell  Frederick  that 
we  had  decided  to  hold  firm  to  our  simple  proposal  of  a 
general  evacuation  of  German  territory  on  both  sides.^ 
So  far,  therefore,  the  Cabinet  was  perfectly  loyal ;  but,  as 
the  matter  was  not  finally  settled,  it  still  to  some  extent 

^  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  118. 

^  Egremont  to  Choiseul,  July  31  ;  Viri  to  Solar,  Aug.  1,  Lansdowne 
J/ouse  MSS.  ;  Grenville  to  Mitchell,  Aug.  2,  Mitchell  Papers,  vol.  xvii.. 
Add.  MSS.  6820. 


T762  FREDERICK    LOSES    RUSSIA  351 

rested  in  the  hands  of  Bedford,  and  if  Frederick  still 
believed  he  was  being  betrayed  by  Bute  he  certainly  had 
good  reasons. 

The  day  after  the  decisive  Cabinet,  Mitchell  saw 
Frederick  at  his  headquarters  in  the  field  to  make  the 
formal  communication  of  the  negotiations  and  the  Austrian 
proposal.  Unfortunately  he  as  yet  knew  nothing  of  the 
final  decision  to  stand  by  Frederick  on  the  question 
of  Wesel  and  Gueldres,  and  it  was  otherwise  a  bad 
moment.  A  few  weeks  before,  a  revolution  had  taken 
place  at  St.  Petersburg.  Peter  III.,  mainly  for  his  violent 
Prussian  sympathies,  had  been  deposed.  The  great 
reign  of  the  Czarina  Katherine  had  begun,  and  her 
first  step  had  been  to  withdraw  the  Russian  contingent 
from  Frederick's  army,  and  her  Marshal  had  forced  the 
Prussians  under  his  jurisdiction  to  take  the  oath  of  fidelity 
to  her  crown.  How  much  more  was  to  come  could  not 
yet  be  told.  Mitchell  consequently  found  the  King  cold, 
though  still  personally  cordial.  Frederick  began  by 
explaining  to  the  ambassador  the  Russian  revolution,  and 
told  him  Peter  had  just  died  under  suspicious  circum- 
stances. Colberg,  however,  had  been  given  up,  the 
Marshal's  action  disavowed,  and  his  troops  ordered  to 
evacuate  Prussian  territory.  He  also  said  that  that  very 
morning  he  had  received  a  formal  notification  of  the 
Czarina's  intention  to  confirm  the  late  peace,  but  not  the 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  Mitchell  then  com- 
municated the  negotiations  and  his  master's  desire  to 
have  Frederick's  views  upon  the  terms  suggested,  as 
showing  the  friendly  disposition  of  the  English  Court,  and 
affording  an  opening  for  British  mediation  with  Vienna. 
At  the  mention  of  Vienna  Frederick  immediately  froze, 
and  the  interview  ended  abruptly.  Next  day  Mitchell 
handed  the  King  the  papers  he  had  received  from  London, 


3  52  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

but  could  obtain  no  answer.  Frederick  protested  he  was 
too  much  occupied  with  his  military  operations  to  consider 
the  matter,  and  must  refer  it  to  his  Minister  in  Berlin.-^ 

This  he  did,  with  instructions  to  return  Mitchell  a 
polite  and  straightforward  answer,  insisting  on  his  desire 
for  an  honourable  peace,  but  pointing  out  that  in  the 
proposal  to  permit  the  French  to  occupy  Wesel  and 
Gueldres  till  a  general  peace,  while  evacuating  the  rest  of 
Germany,  he  had  reason  to  detect  an  intention  to  sacrifice 
his  interests  in  breach  of  the  most  solemn  engagements 
between  him  and  Great  Britain.  Had  he  known  that  the 
British  Cabinet  had  just  rejected  this  proposal,  his  answer 
might  have  been  different.  As  it  was,  he  felt  he  could 
only  refuse  the  British  offer  of  mediation.  The  matter, 
he  bluntly  said,  was  one  that  could  only  be  treated 
directly  between  Vienna  and  Berlin ;  at  present  he  was 
waiting  for  Austria  to  begin.  But  even  here  his  sardonic 
spirit  would  not  permit  him  to  stop.  He  must  needs 
instruct  his  Minister  that,  in  declining  British  mediation, 
he  was  to  hint,  "  in  the  most  gentle  and  delicate  manner," 
that  Prussia  would  not  trust  her  interests  to  the  British 
government  as  at  present  constituted.  "  Finally,"  he 
wrote,  "  you  will  easily  grasp  that  your  answer  must  be 
decent  and  agreeable  to  the  present  situation,  but  illusory, 
so  as  to  gain  time  for  me  to  see  more  clearly  into  my 
affairs  and  the  success  they  may  have."  "  It  is  useless 
worry,"  he  concluded  ;  "  it  will  all  lead  to  nothing  but 
haggling,  of  which  I  am  surfeited."  2 

Considering  what  Frederick's  knowledge  was  at  the 
time  his  unhappy  reply  had  much  to  excuse  it,  but  the 
step  with  which  he  followed  it  up  was  unpardonable  and 

*  Mitchell  to  Grenville,  Aug.  6,  Mitchell  Memoirs,  vol.  ii.  p.  ;522. 
^  Frederick  to  Finckenstein,  Aug.  2,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxii.  p    103  ; 
same  to  Knyphausen,  Aug.  5,  ibid.,  p.  114. 


1762  FREDERICK    SPOILS    HIS    CASE  353 

disastrous.  His  constitutional  fondness  for  underhand 
means  was  too  much  for  him.  A  day  or  two  later,  before 
Grenville's  second  despatch  could  arrive  with  the  formal 
decision  of  the  Cabinet,  he  received  from  Knyphausen  a 
report,  dated  July  23rd,  of  what  Avas  going  on  in  London, 
and  immediately  instructed  him  "  to  lose  no  opportunity 
that  might  occur  in  secretly  inciting  and  embittering  the 
nation  asfainst  Bute  and  his  administration,  and  to  cast 
upon  him  the  odium  of  any  regrettable  incidents  that 
might  occur,  as  arising  from  mismanagement."  "  Finally," 
he  concluded,  "  you  will  even  incite,  so  far  as  possible, 
the  authors  of  the  current  pamphlets  to  decry  the  con- 
duct of  this  minister,  so  as  to  come  constantly  nearer  to 
hurling  him  from  his  place."  ^  This  letter,  as  usual,  was 
intercepted  and  read,  and  naturally  with  the  worst  con- 
sequences. Following  upon  Frederick's  dilatory  answer 
and  his  abrupt  rejection  of  British  mediation,  it  could 
only  deepen  Bute's  exasperation  and  disgust  Grenville. 
It  had  already  been  found  necessary  to  administer  to 
Knyphausen  and  his  colleague  a  sharp  rebuke  for  their 
previous  efforts  in  the  same  direction,  which  amounted 
practically  to  breaking  off  relations  with  them.  On 
August  5  th,  Grenville,  by  the  King's  orders,  had  formally 
declared  to  them  "  that  until  such  time  as  the  King  of 
Prussia  had  Ministers  who  abstained  from  meddling  in 
matters  that  concerned  the  interior  of  the  kingdom,  his 
Majesty  judged  it  proper  to  make  no  communications  to 
the  King  of  Prussia  except  through  his  own  Ministers  at 
the  Prussian  Court."  ^ 

To  aggravate   the   situation   Bute   was  growing  more 
and  more  alarmed  at  the  increasing  feeling  in  the  country 

'  Frederick  to  Kuyphausen,  Aug.  7,  PoUlische  Corr.,  vol.  xxii.  p.  117, 
and  Grenville  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  467,  note.  The  two  copies  have  verbal 
differences  which  have  no  importance.  ^  /hid. 

VOL.  II.  Z 


3  54  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

against  him,  and  at  the  growing  strength  and  coherence 
of  the  opposition.  The  pamphleteers,  with  Wilkes  at 
their  head,  were  pouring  upon  him  and  his  policy  a  flood 
of  scurrility  such  as  not  even  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  had 
called  forth.  The  most  biting  suggestions  with  which 
Frederick  continued  to  ply  his  legation  in  London  were 
harped  upon  with  ever-growing  venom,  and  how  much 
Knyphausen  had  to  do  with  it  could  not  be  told.  In 
London  Bute  could  scarcely  appear  in  public.  In  the 
country  his  name  became  a  byword.  At  the  Guildford 
Assize  dinner,  for  instance,  the  solicitor  to  the  Treasury 
had  proposed  his  health.  The  sheriff  and  over  a  hundred 
of  the  county  gentry  were  present,  but  every  man  got  up 
and  refused  to  drink  it.  Such  an  insult  to  a  Prime 
Minister  was  unheard  of.^  It  was  at  this  time,  moreover, 
that  the  popular  excitement  against  the  peace  was  further 
inflamed  by  the  arrival  of  the  Herviione  treasure.  Laden 
in  twenty  wagons  and  decorated  with  British  colours  flying 
gaily  over  those  of  Spain,  it  reached  London  on  August 
12  th  while  Havana  was  in  the  act  of  surrendering,  and 
was  escorted  by  dragoons  and  martial  music  in  a  stirring 
procession  down  Piccadilly,  past  St.  James's  Palace,  and 
so  through  the  city  to  the  Tower,  "  amidst  the  acclama- 
tions of  a  prodigious  concourse  of  people."  ^  Then  within 
a  week  came  news,  obtained  by  a  West  Indian  merchant- 
man from  one  of  Pocock's  cruisers,  that  a  landing  had 
been  effected  at  Havana,  and  that  by  July  1st  the  siege 
of  the  Morro  was  well  advanced.^  Every  day,  therefore, 
tidings  were  looked  for  that  the  Gate  of  the  Indies  had 
fallen,  and  the  exultation  was  increased  by  contmued 
news  of  military  successes  on  the  Continent. 

*  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  Aug.  11,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,941. 

*  Beatson,  vol.  ii.  p.  588. 

3  Halifax  to  Newcastle,  Aug.  18,  Newcastle  Papers,  32,941. 


1762  GRENVILLE    STANDS    FIRM  355 

Thus  passed  the  month  of  August  while  Bedford  made 
ready  for  his  mission,  and  in  this  atmosphere  he  received 
his  last  instructions  from  Bute.  Nothing  but  details 
remained  except  on  two  points,  Havana  and  the  Prussian 
Rhineland.  Bute  told  him  that  if  news  came  of  the 
capture  of  Havana,  Egremont  and  Grenville  insisted 
on  further  compensation  being  demanded  from  Spain, 
and  he,  with  apparent  reluctance,  instructed  him  accor- 
dingly. As  to  Wesel  and  Gueldres,  our  understanding 
was  they  were  to  be  evacuated  to  the  first  comer, 
the  French  giving  notice  to  Austria  and  we  to  Prussia 
— an  arrangement  which  for  military  reasons  must 
certainly  result,  if  loyally  carried  out,  in  Frederick's 
seizing  them  both.^ 

This  did  not  content  Grenville.  His  suspicion  was 
kept  alive  by  a  despatch  from  Paris  in  which  was 
dropped  all  mention  of  reciprocal  evacuation,  and  the 
final  understanding  was  stated  to  be  that  "  the  two  crowns 
have  taken  as  the  basis  of  their  conciliation  to  propose 
nothing  which  is  contrary  to  their  honour  and  their 
engagements,  and  to  establish  a  perfect  reciprocity  in 
their  conduct  to  their  allies."  Now  Grenville,  in  view 
of  Bedford's  departure,  had  drafted  a  circular  to  all  the 
German  powers  concerned,  including  Prussia,  based  on 
the  British  idea  of  complete  evacuation  on  both  sides,  and 
the  King  had  approved  it.  He  begged,  therefore,  that 
its  terms  should  be  clearly  explained  to  Bedford  before 
he  started.  "  Your  lordship,"  he  wrote  to  Bute,  "  will  see 
that  the  whole  depends  on  the  repeated  declarations  made 
to  the  King  of  Prussia  of  his  Majesty's  resolution  not  to 
depart  from  the  measure  of  withdrawing  the  troops  on 
both  sides  as  soon  as  the  preliminaries  shall  be  signed ; 
ftnd  consequently  if  this  letter  be  sent,  no  other  expedient 

*  Bedford  Corr.,  vol.  iii.  p.  96. 


3  56  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

can  be  taken."  ^  Distasteful  as  the  despatch  must  have 
been  to  Bute  he  dared  not  stop  it,  and  it  went  forward. 
After  expressing  to  Mitchell  the  resentment  felt  by  the 
British  Court  at  Frederick's  blunt  refusal  of  their  media- 
tion, Grenville  proceeded  to  say  they  meant,  nevertheless, 
to  stand  by  him  in  the  matter  of  the  Rhineland.  They 
had  informed  France  finally  that  "  she  must  withdraw 
from  all  Prussian  territories  as  well  as  from  every  other 
country  and  place  in  the  Empire  whereof  she  had  got 
possession  in  the  course  of  the  war."  Mitchell  was  further 
instructed  to  point  out  that  the  King  was  surprised  at 
the  silence  Frederick  had  kept  in  face  of  our  repeated 
requests  for  his  views,  and  at  his  not  having  sent  a  word 
in  acknowledgment  of  our  loyalty  to  his  cause,  or  of  the 
fact  that  we  had  not  stipulated  anything  in  regard  to  his 
interests  without  his  knowledge.^ 

Unfortunately  the  despatch  had  to  conclude  with  an 
official  intimation  that  Bedford  was  to  be  our  plenipo- 
tentiary. In  Frederick's  eyes,  in  spite  of  all  Grenville 
could  honestly  say,  it  could  only  be  regarded  as  a  triumph 
for  Bute's  policy,  and  as  such  it  was  angrily  recognised 
throughout  the  country.  The  City  especially,  so  New- 
castle told  Devonshire,  was  in  the  highest  rage  with 
Bedford,  and  with  Fox  as  Bute's  adviser.^  Every  English- 
man who  was  not  in  the  Court  Camarilla  regarded  his 
mission  as  meaning  a  betrayal  of  our  heroic  ally,  and 
the  feeling  against  Bute  rose  higher  and  higher.  But  in 
truth  the  struggle  was  far  from  over.  The  King  himself 
sent  for  Newcastle  to  try  to  assuage  the  anger  of  the 
Opposition.     He  told  him  Choiseul  had  declared,  "  No 


'  GrenviRe  Papers,  Sept.  1,  vol.  i.  p.  465  ;  Comte  de  Choiseul  to  Egre- 
mont,  Aug.  26,  Lansdoume  House  MSS. ,  vol.  iii. 
2  Grenville  to  Mitchell,  Aug.  31,  Mitchell  Papers,  Add.  MSS.  6828. 
*  Newcastle  Papers,  32,942,  Sept.  4. 


1762         PLEXIPOTEyilARIES    AT   WORK         357 

St.  Lucia,  no  peace."  Newcastle  only  replied,  that  when 
he  was  in  the  Cabinet  they  had  agreed  to  insist  on  all  the 
neutral  islands  in  exchange  for  Martinique.  Passinsr  to 
Germany,  the  Kingr  said  he  could  do  nothing  but  leave 
Frederick  to  himself,  since  he  flatly  refused  his  mediation 
and  would  open  nothing.  Newcastle  was  unconvinced, 
and  told  the  Kin?  he  ought  at  least  to  ask  something 
more  for  our  successes  this  year.  The  King  merely 
thanked  him  for  explaining  the  views  of  the  Opposition, 
and  dismissed  him  with  nothing  done.^ 

Bute  now  stood  almost  alone.  Even  Egremont  was 
growing  hostile.  The  Due  de  Xivemais  had  come  over 
as  the  French  plenipotentiary,  and  was  making  various 
suggestions  on  his  own  account,  aU  of  which  had  been 
rejected  already.  He  was  particularly  pressing  about 
putting  neutral  garrisons  into  the  Rhenish  towns,  and 
Egremont  stubbornly  refused  to  listen.  It  was  a  fort- 
night since  Bedford  had  reached  Paris,  and  not  a  word 
had  come  from  him.  Egremont  grew  anxious.  '•  Pray 
come  to  town  soon,"  he  wrote  to  Grenville  ;  "  you  may 
be  wanted-"  And  indeed  he  was.  Two  days  later  a  long 
and  complacent  despatch  came  fi-om  Bedford.  Egremont 
sent  it  on  inmiediately  to  meet  his  colleague  <5n  his  way 
to  London.  "  You  will  see,"  he  wrote,  ''  that  headstrong 
silly  wretch  has  already  given  up  two  or  three  points  in 
his  conversation  with  Choiseul,  and  that  his  design  was 
to  have  been  signed  without  any  communication  here. 
I  have  seen  Lord  Bute  this  morning  and  had  much  talk 
with  him.  Some  I  did  not  like,  but  I  have  not  given 
way  in  anything :  nor  shall  in  the  attack  I  expect  from 
the  Superior." ' 

*  Intemew  with  King,  Sept.  11,  Xeweattlt  Papert,  32,942. 

*  Egremont  to  Grenville,   Sept.   24  and   26,   GrenviUe  Papen.    voL  i. 
p.  474. 


3  58  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

The  points  that  Bedford  had  let  go  were  really  of  little 
importance.  They  related  merely  to  the  inspection  of  the 
fishery  stations,  Dunkirk,  and  the  status  of  the  factories 
to  be  restored  to  France  in  India.  Still  they  gave 
ground  for  suspecting  the  Duke's  constancy  ;  but  quite 
groundlessly,  as  his  next  despatch  proved.  It  followed 
close  on  the  heels  of  the  other,  and  its  contents  raised 
still  greater  alarm.  At  his  second  interview  with  Choiseul, 
Bedford,  to  his  dismay,  found  that  no  arrangement  what- 
ever had  been  made  with  Spain.  Choiseul  had  not  even 
dared  to  tell  Grimaldi  that  he  had  agreed  to  let  us  into 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  or  that  we  should  require  fresh  con- 
cessions if  Havana  were  taken.  He  had  not  so  much  as 
settled  for  the  evacuation  of  Portugal,  and  he  implored 
Bedford  not  to  say  a  word  to  Grimaldi.  Bedford,  how- 
ever, insisted  on  seeing  him  at  once.  The  Spanish 
ambassador  talked  like  a  madman.  "  Either  he  or  his 
Court,"  wrote  Bedford,  "  have  lost  their  senses."  In  vain 
the  two  Choiseuls,  Solar,  and  the  Pompadour  herself  tried 
to  smooth  the  anger  of  the  indignant  Englishman,  and 
get  him  to  give  way.  He  would  not  budge  an  inch,  and 
insisted  on  referring  the  whole  matter  home. 

The  immediate  effect  was  to  inspire  every  one  but  Bute 
with  a  conviction  that  France  was  false.  "I  do  not 
suppose,"  wrote  Egremont  to  Grenville,  "  that  ever  there 
existed  such  a  specimen  of  falsehood,  inconsistency,  in- 
solence, &c.,  &c.,  as  these  papers  exhibit :  and  I  do  not 
see  almost  how  the  negotiation  can  proceed.  The  Duke 
of  Bedford  is  in  consternation  about  it  himself.  .  .  .  The 
King  comes  to  town  to  dinner.  Lord  Bute  is  at  Kew. 
For  God's  sake  come  up  to  town."  ^ 

With  both  King  and  Cabinet  a  panic  ensued  at  the 
risk   they  had  run  in  entrusting  Bedford  with  plenary 

^  Egrumont  to  Grenville,  Oct.  — ,  Grenville  Papers,  vol.  i.  p.  470. 


1762  THE    SHADOW    OF    THE    BLOCK         359 

powers.  There  was  a  feeling  they  must  be  curtailed,  so 
that  he  should  not  have  authority  to  sign  anything  till  it 
had  been  referred  home.  Grenville  went  so  far  as  to 
press  that  the  preliminaries  should  be  submitted  to  Par- 
liament before  anything  was  done.  Bute  was  obstinate. 
To  revoke  Bedford's  powers  was  to  annul  the  symbol  of 
his  success.  A  desperate  struggle  for  the  mastery  ensued, 
which  brought  both  the  peace  and  the  Cabinet  to  the  brink 
of  wreck.  Grenville  threatened  to  resign.  Bute  begged  the 
King  for  leave  to  abandon  a  position  for  which  at  last  he 
felt  himself  wholly  inadequate  ;  but  at  the  bare  suggestion 
of  his  desertion  his  distracted  master  would  sit  "  for  hours 
together  leaning  his  head  upon  his  arm  without  speaking." 
Bute  felt  he  must  stay.  But  he  quite  lost  his  head. 
His  advisers  in  the  City,  whose  language  he  pathetically 
confessed  he  could  not  understand  when  they  came  to 
talk  finance,  were  declaring  it  would  be  impossible  to 
raise  money  so  long  as  he  was  in  power.  The  war  could 
not  go  on,  and  Bute  in  despair  proposed  to  accept  the 
last  French  terms,  and  demand  no  equivalent  if  Havana 
were  taken.  Grenville  utterly  refused  to  listen.  He 
would  not  give  way :  Bute  could  not  let  him  go :  and  not 
a  ray  of  hope  was  to  be  seen  in  the  darkness. 

To  increase  the  blackness  of  the  outlook,  Frederick  was 
continuing  his  amiable  instructions  to  his  Ministers  in 
London.  He  told  them  that  if  Bute  dared  to  do  anything 
against  the  sentiment  of  the  nation  he  would  assuredly 
risk  his  head,  and  that  they  were  to  do  their  best  to  add 
to  the  risk — not  only  by  tampering  with  the  press,  but 
by  getting  some  of  the  great  cities  to  petition  against  the 
shame  which  the  Ministers  were  bringing  on  the  Crown 
and  country.  They  were  to  leave  no  stone  unturned  to 
fling  Bute  down,  and,  in  particular,  were  to  inspire  the 
Opposition   press   with  remarks   upon   the   misery  royal 


36o  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

favourites  had  always  brought  011  England  ;  a  hint  which 
the  pamphleteers  developed  Avith  shameless  and  ingenious 
fertility.-^  Bute  felt  the  danger  only  too  keenly.  Viri 
told  Solar  plainly  that  Choiseul  must  remember  Bute 
could  not  keep  Harley's  fate  out  of  his  head.  He  could 
not  make  war :  he  dared  not  make  peace.  What  would 
have  happened  it  is  impossible  to  tell,  but  the  very  after- 
noon that  the  deadlock  pronounced  itself  Captain  Hervey 
sprang  boisterously  upon  the  scene  with  the  glorious 
news  that  Havana  had  fallen.^ 

He  came  like  a  flash  of  light  into  the  gloom,  and  with 
a  lusty  breeze  from  the  west  that  cleared  the  situation 
like  magic  and  fanned  the  whole  country  once  more  into 
flames  of  triumph.  The  bells  and  the  bonfires  left  no 
two  words  to  be  said.  Within  an  hour  of  the  news  being 
told  Grenville  and  Egremont  both  declared  that  they 
would  sign  no  such  peace  as  Bute  desired.  At  their 
backs  was  rising  a  cry,  loudest  in  the  City,  that  no  peace 
should  be  made  till  Spain  denounced  the  Family  Compact. 
There  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  bend  before  the  storm. 
Bute  dared  not  face  Parliament,  on  which  Frederick  based 
his  hope.  It  was  to  meet  next  week,  but  was  hastily  pro- 
rogued. He  dared  not  even  face  a  Cabinet.  Without 
any  meeting  being  called  Bedford's  plenary  powers  were 
revoked,  and  he  was  told  to  expect  a  new  "  Project  of 
Peace  "  as  England's  last  word. 

But  Bute,  with  courage  worthy  of  better  ends,  was 
only  bending.  Already  he  was  at  work  to  get  rid  of 
Grenville's  opposition.  With  such  a  man  at  the  Foreign 
Office  and  leading  the  House  of  Commons,  he  could  not 
go  on.     Grenville,  moreover,  was  pressing  for  Newcastle 

^  Frederick  to  Kynphausen,  Sept.  10,  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxii.  p.  207. 
*  Newcastle  Papers,  32,94.3,  Oct.  3.     Note  of  his  interview  with  Cumber- 
land.    Hervey  arrived  on  Sept.  29. 


1762  THE    BRITISH    ULTIMATUM  361 

and  his  friends  to  be  called  back  to  council,  and  Halifax, 
who  had  supported  Bute  throughout,  was  in  favour  of 
the  coalition.  The  King  sanctioned  an  overture,  but 
Halifax's  well-meant  efforts  were  met  with  a  blunt  refusal 
from  Newcastle  and  his  friends.  Bute  was  now  free  to  go 
his  way.  He  had  n:iadc  up  his  mind  to  fall  back  on  Fox, 
whose  unpopularity  was  second  only  to  his  own ;  still  he 
was  the  only  man  who  could  hope  to  face  Pitt.  Indolent 
and  satiated  as  he  was  with  the  wealth  he  had  acquired 
as  Paymaster  during  the  war,  he  was  persuaded  to  accept 
the  leadership  ■,  of  the  House  of  Commons,  without  office 
but  with  almost  despotic  powers.^  Grenville  was  forced 
to  go  to  the  Admiralty,  and  Halifax  took  his  place  as 
Foreign  Secretary  for  the  North.  Nor  did  Bute  stop 
there.  It  had  been  decided  in  principle  that  the  "  New 
Project "  should  adhere  to  the  English  plan  of  a  general 
evacuation  of  Germany  and  Portugal,  that  Florida  or 
Puerto  Rico  should  be  demanded  for  Havana,  and  that 
no  variation  of  the  material  articles  would  be  permitted. 
The  moment  it  was  settled  Bute  secretly  informed  Viri  of 
what  was  coming,  in  order  that  he  might  prepare  the 
Court  of  France,  and  told  him  that  on  no  account  must 
Bedford  or  Spain  be  informed. 

He  might  well  have  saved  himself  the  last  piece  of 
treachery  to  the  constitution.  The  Court  of  France 
needed  no  preparation.  Havana  had  done  its  work ; 
Choiseul  himself  had  taken  alarm;  Paris  was  as  clamorous 
for  peace  as  London  was  violent  for  higher  terms,  and 
the  long-headed  French  Minister  knew  the  time  had 
come  to  close.  Havana,  ho  said,  "had  stopped  Grimaldi's 
cackle  "  ;  Frederick  had  taken  Sweidnitz,  the  main  objec- 
tive of  his  campaign ;   Ferdinand  was  expected  any  day 

^  For  the  best  and  most  authentic  account  of  Fox's  interveution  see 
Lord  Fitzmaurice's  Ufe  of  Shdburne,  vol.  i.  p.  153  ct  s^q. 


362  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

to  capture  Cassel ;  and  Choiseul  resolved  at  all  costs  to 
force  the  English  terms  down  Spain's  throat.  On  October 
22nd  and  25th  the  reconstructed  Cabinet  met  to  pass 
the  draft  of  the  "  New  Project."  Grenville  was  still  for 
demanding  St.  Lucia,  but  it  was  not  brought  up,  and  the 
Project  as  it  stood  was  passed  unanimously,^  It  reached 
Paris  by  the  end  of  the  month.  Hard  as  the  terms  were, 
Choiseul,  with  characteristic  decision,  did  not  flinch.  He 
saw,  as  was  only  fair,  that  France  must  pay  the  price  for 
Havana,  and  as  the  payment  could  be  made  to  clear  his 
country  of  the  "  American  system  "  altogether,  he  could 
do  it  with  a  light  heart.  All,  therefore,  of  Louisiana  that 
was  not  already  promised  to  England  was  offered  to  Spain 
if  she  would  give  up  Florida.  Spain  accepted,  and  on 
November  3rd  the  long-fought  Preliminaries  were  signed 
at  Fontainebleau. 

On  only  one  material  point  had  Bedford  given  way, 
and  this  unfortunately  was  in  the  article  relating  to  the 
Prussian  Rhineland.  By  the  English  Project  France  was 
to  evactuate  Cleves,  Wesel,  and  Gueldres  immediately 
after  the  ratification  of  the  Preliminaries,  and  neither  side 
was  to  furnish  succour  of  any  kind  to  their  respective 
allies.  In  this  form  the  article  was  communicated  to 
Frederick ;  ^  but  when,  a  few  days  later,  he  received  the 
whole  text  of  the  Preliminaries  it  was  found  the  article 
had  been  altered.  Not  only  was  France  merely  to 
evacuate  his  territory  "  as  soon  as  it  can  be  done,"  but 
there  was  attached  a  declaration  that  she  was  to  be  per- 
mitted to  pay  all  arrears  of  her  subsidy  to  Austria.  It  was 
the  last  false  stroke  of  Bute  and  Bedford,  and  Frederick 

*  Grenville  to  Egremont,  aud  Egremont  to  Grenville,  Grenville  Papers, 
vol.  i.  p.  492,  Oct.  24 ;  Jones  to  Newcastle,  Oct.  23,  24,  and  26,  Newcastle 
Papers,  32,943-4. 

*  Halifax  to  Mitchell,  Nov.  9,  Mitchell  Papers,  vol.  xvii.,  Add.  MSS. 
6820. 


1762  PITT'S    LAST    EFFORT  363 

was  naturally  more  convinced  than  ever  he  was  betrayed. 
He  saw  in  the  variation  a  clear  intention  of  letting  Austria 
into  the  disputed  towns.  He  had  suspected  so  much 
already,  and  was  deep  in  a  scheme  for  persuading  either 
the  Dutch  or  Ferdinand  to  seize  them  on  his  behalf  as 
soon  as  the  French  left.  He  now  redoubled  his  efforts, 
made  preparations  to  lay  hold  of  other  Westphalian 
territory  by  way  of  security,  and  sent  a  firm  and  indig- 
nant protest  to  London,  which  Knyphausen  was  ordered 
to  have  printed  and  scatter  broadcast. 

There  was  still  hope  that  the  obnoxious  article  might 
be  given  a  proper  turn.  Grenville's  insistence  and  Bute's 
memories  of  Harley  and  Walpole  had  so  far  prevailed 
that  the  Preliminaries  were  to  be  submitted  to  Parlia- 
ment before  a  definitive  treaty  was  proceeded  with.  As 
the  terms  leaked  out  the  anger  of  the  nation  blazed 
hotter  and  hotter.  The  King,  by  an  insult  to  Devon- 
shire, had  alienated  all  the  best  of  the  nobility,  and  they 
were  resigning  their  offices  every  day ;  and  worst  of  all, 
Pitt  and  the  Newcastle  group  were  meeting  in  the  Duke 
of  Cumberland's  house.  But  all  was  of  no  avail  against 
the  able  and  not  too  nice  generalship  of  Fox.  Having 
put  his  hand  to  the  plough  he  let  no  indecency  of  reward 
or  punishment  turn  him  aside.  Never  had  bribery  been 
so  open  and  drastic,  or  proscription  so  heartless  and 
searching.  By  the  time  Parliament  met  both  Houses 
had  been  purged  and  poisoned  to  the  core.  It  was  on 
December  9th  the  great  debate  took  place.  In  the  Lords 
Hardwicke  rent  the  peace  to  tatters  with  unanswerable 
logic.  To  the  Commons  Pitt,  swathed  in  flannel,  was 
carried  from  a  bed  of  sickness,  and,  suffering  agonies 
from  the  gout,  unable  to  stand,  at  times  hardly  able  to 
speak,  he  denounced  it  for  three  hours  and  a  half.  Out- 
side a  turbulent  crowd  roared  in  concert,  but  not  even 


364  BUTE'S    PEACE  1762 

their  shouts  could  replace  the  fire  his  pain  had  quenched. 
At  his  best,  perhaps,  he  could  not  have  availed  to  undo 
Fox's  insidious  work.  As  he  ended  and  was  carried  from 
the  House  it  was  clear  the  game  was  lost.  Newcastle 
passed  the  word  for  his  men  not  to  vote.  In  the  Lords 
the  peace  was  agreed  to  without  a  division.  In  the 
Commons  it  was  carried  by  an  overwhelming  majority. 

The  Government  had  triumphed,  but  the  temper  that 
had  been  displayed  in  the  attack  and  which  continued  to 
rise  in  the  country  could  not  be  ignored.  The  desertion 
of  the  Protestant  hero  had  been  the  point  that  had 
pricked  the  deepest,  and  it  might  yet  kill.  Thus  it  was 
that  righteous  and  justifiable  as  was  Frederick's  anger,  he 
quickly  found  it  was  uncalled  for.  Halifax,  at  least,  was 
a  man  of  too  high  character  to  purchase  peace,  much  as 
he  loved  it,  at  the  price  of  national  honour.  He  had 
already  set  on  foot  a  scheme  by  which  Frederick  should 
receive  all  he  wanted.  It  took  the  form  of  a  joint  effort 
by  France  and  England  to  induce  all  the  princes  of  the 
Empire  to  declare  their  neutrality  and  withdraw  their 
contingents  from  Austria.  To  complete  the  pacification 
he  also  proposed  a  convention  by  which  all  Frederick's 
territory  in  Westphalia  and  on  the  Rhine  should  be 
restored  to  him,  and  that  as  a  counterpoise  France  and 
England  should  jointly  guarantee  the  neutrality  of 
Holland  and  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  This  statesman- 
like scheme  was  so  well  received  that  by  the  time 
Frederick's  impassioned  protest  arrived  Halifax  was  able 
to  assure  Knyphausen  there  was  nothing  to  fear.  So 
soon  as  the  plan  was  conveyed  to  Frederick  he  accepted 
it  with  alacrity.  "  As  I  find  this  measure,"  he  wrote  to 
Knyphausen,  "  to  be  in  complete  conformity  with  my 
interests,  my  intention  is  that  you  declare  .  .  .  that 
I  am  willing  to  put  my  hand  to   it   and  conclude  the 


1763  FREDERICK    IS    SATISFIED  365 

proposed  convention  under  the  guarantee  of  the  two 
Courts." ' 

So  in  the  end  he  was  not  betrayed,  and  England,  at  the 
cost  of  the  great  sacrifice  of  her  interests  that  had  been 
forced  on  her  in  the  East  and  West  Indies  and  on  the 
African  coast,  had  fulfilled  to  the  letter  every  engagement 
to  her  ally.  On  February  10th  the  definitive  treaty  was 
signed  at  Paris  by  Bedford,  the  Cornte  de  Choiseul,  and 
Grimaldi,  and  the  great  imperial  war  was  at  an  end. 

But  by  this  time  it  had  reached  to  the  farthest  ends 
of  the  earth,  and  there  it  still  continued  to  rumble  like 
passing  thunder.  In  the  West  Indies  Keppel  swept  up 
prize  after  prize,  and  in  the  far  East,  Admiral  Cornish 
and  General  Draper  were  doing  no  less.  On  October  6th 
they  had  taken  Manilla,  and  the  eastern  fountain  of 
Spanish  wealth  was  as  completely  in  our  hands  as  the 
western.  But,  though  the  capitulation  had  been  made 
before  the  Preliminaries  were  signed,  the  news  did  not 
reach  Europe  till  after  their  ratification ;  and  as  no 
mention  of  the  conquest  was  made  in  the  treaty,  all  had 
to  be  restored  without  equivalent.  Even  the  ransom  bills 
which  had  been  extorted,  the  Spaniards  refused  to  pay. 
It  required  but  this  to  complete  the  popular  exasperation. 
The  rage  against  Bute  knew  no  bounds,  and  two  months 
were  not  passed  before  he  fell,  crushed  under  the  weight 
of  his  own  peace. 

^  Politische  Corr.,  vol.  xxii,  p.  483,  Jan.  2G,  1763. 


CHAPTER   XII 

CONCLUSION— LESSONS   OF  THE    WAR 

A  CONTEST  SO  prolonged  and  waged  with  so  much  ability 
as  the  Seven  Years'  War  could  not  but  leave  its  mark 
upon  the  naval  art.  It  may  indeed  be  said  to  have 
effected  the  transition  from  the  ideas  of  the  seventeenth 
century  to  those  of  the  eighteenth.  No  definite  formula- 
tion of  the  revolution  in  thought  is  known  to  exist,  but 
in  the  change  that  came  over  the  organisation  of  the 
fleet  it  is  very  clearly  expressed.  It  is  impossible  to 
examine  these  changes  without  feeling  ourselves  in  con- 
tact with  a  new  and  more  scientific  conception  of  naval 
warfare.  We  can  see  growing  up  a  clearer  analysis  of 
the  various  services  required ;  a  germ  of  their  classifica- 
tion into  battle,  scouting,  and  inshore  work ;  and  side  by 
side  an  attempt  to  organise  the  fleet  upon  a  correspond- 
ing threefold  basis  of  battleships,  cruisers,  and  flotilla. 
The  process  accompanied  the  effort  to  improve  our  naval 
architecture  in  accordance  with  the  French  models  cap- 
tured by  Anson  and  Hawke  in  1747.  That  process  is 
well  known.^  The  subtler  strategical  development  is  of 
even  higher  interest,  and  deserves  wider  recognition  than 
it  has  hitherto  received. 

Up  till  the  end  of  the  war  of  the  Austrian  Succession 
the  classification  of  our  ships  had  become  purely  arbi- 
trary, corresponding  to  no  philosophical  conception  of 
the   duties  of  a  fleet.     In  the  first  rate  were   100-gun 

1  Charnock,  History  of  Marine  Architecture,  1801-3,  vol.  iii.  pp.  158  et  seq. 

366 


FLEET    CLASSIFICATION  367 

ships;  in  the  second  90 -gun  ships — all  three-deckers. 
So  far  there  is  nothing  to  criticise.  It  is  in  the  third 
rate  the  lack  of  system  becomes  apparent.  It  was  headed 
by  80-gun  ships  of  three  decks,  and  the  bulk  of  the  rest 
were  70-gun  ships  of  two  decks.  In  the  fourth  rate 
was  a  weak  class  of  60 -gun  and  50 -gun  ships  also  of  two 
decks.  This  class  was  the  largest  of  all,  numbering  no 
less  than  seventy.  Their  multiplication,  so  Charnock 
believed,  was  due  to  the  increasing  area  our  trade  was 
covering,  and  we  can  only  assume  it  was  due  to  a  desire 
to  combine  battle  and  commerce-protection  properties  in 
one  type — that  is,  they  were  hybrids  between  a  weak 
battleship  and  a  powerful  cruiser  without  any  clear 
recognition  of  an  intermediate  type.  In  any  case,  in 
spite  of  their  known  battle  weakness,  they  were  regarded 
primarily  as  battleships,  and  until  nearly  the  end  of  the 
Seven  Years'  War  were  all  classed  as  ships  of  the  line. 
Below  these  came  the  fifth  rates,  Avhich  were  cruisers, 
but  in  no  way  did  they  differ  from  ships  of  the  line 
except  in  size.  They  were  all  cramped  two-deckers  of 
44  and  40  guns,  and  had  no  distinctive  class-name.  No 
doubt  they  were  to  some  extent  an  expression  of  the 
fundamental  need  of  an  intermediate  type  for  cruiser 
support,  but  being  merely  small  battleships  they  had 
no  special  adaptation  for  acting  with  cruisers.  The  true 
cruiser  was  represented  by  the  sixth  rates,  which  com- 
prised small  and  weakly  armed  20-gun  ships,  and  be- 
tween them  and  the  "  forties  "  there  was  nothing.  Below 
these,  but  again  without  any  clear  differentiation,  came 
the  unrated  sloops. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  not  only  was  there  no  logical 
distinction  between  the  large  and  the  small  type  of  battle- 
ship, but  there  was  none  between  the  battleship  and  the 
cruiser  or  between  the   cruisers  and  the  flotilla.     It  is 


368  LESSONS    OF    THE    WAR 

impossible  to  detect  any  strategical  or  tactical  theory  of 
class  functions  to  which  the  classification  will  correspond. 
The  only  conceivable  explanation  is  that  the  system  was 
a  decrepit  survival  of  the  earliest  days  of  warfare  under 
sail.  In  the  whole  gamut  of  rates  there  is  nowhere  a 
distinct  gap  except  between  the  two -decked  "  forties  " 
and  the  20 -gun  cruisers.  A  special  characteristic  of 
these  vessels  and  the  sloops  was  that  they  could  be 
moved  by  oars,  and  we  are  therefore  driven  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  rating  of  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century  was  purely  arbitrary,  with  no  scientific  founda- 
tion beneath  it  except  the  obsolete  classification  of  the 
fleet  into  true  sailing  ships  and  vessels  with  auxiliary  oar 
propulsion.  It  was  the  classification  on  which  Henry 
the  Eighth  had  originally  founded  the  sailing  navy,  and 
which  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  Elizabethan  distinction 
between  ships  and  pinnaces.  In  other  words,  it  is  the 
last  trace  of  the  hybrid  ship  and  galley  navies  of  the 
Middle  Ages. 

If  we  turn  now  to  the  Navy  List  as  it  existed  at  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  after  Anson's  long  spell  of 
office,  we  find  all  this  is  changed.  Whether  or  not  it 
was  done  as  the  conscious  expression  of  a  scientific  con- 
ception of  naval  warfare  is  unknown,  but  it  is  none  the 
less  interesting  if  it  was  due  to  the  silent  pressure  of 
strategical  law  acting  through  hard  experience  vipon  a 
creative  mind,  and  forcing  the  fleet  into  the  shape  it 
demanded. 

To  begin  with  we  find,  eliminating  foreign  prizes  in- 
troduced into  the  service,  that  the  three-deckers  or  fleet 
flagship  type  are  confined  to  the  two  highest  rates,  and 
three-deckers  of  less  than  90  guns  have  ceased  to  be 
built.  Similarly  there  is  a  tendency  to  confine  the  two- 
deckers — the  rank  and  file  of  the  line  of  battle — to  the 


THE    NEW    RATING  369 

third  and  fourth  rates,  and  at  the  same  time  their  size 
was  increased  to  make  them  really  fit  for  their  special 
function.  A  new  class  of  1500-ton  74's  was  begun  in 
place  of  the  older  70's,  and  a  class  of  1200-ton  64's  in 
place  of  the  older  60's.  In  both  cases  there  was  an 
advance  of  about  300  tons,  and  it  was  regarded,  even  at 
the  end  of  the  century,  as  a  "  grand  stretch  of  mechanics." 
Still  the  fermenting  aspirations  of  the  new  school  were 
unsatisfied,  and  in  1758  were  laid  down  two  74's  of 
a  still  larger  design,  which  had  been  in  contemplation 
ever  since  Anson  and  Hawke  had  captured  their  models 
in  1747.  They  marked  another  "grand  stretch"  of 
300  tons,  or  of  no  less  than  one-third  over  the  old 
class  of  70's.  But  somewhere,  possibly  due  to  Anson's 
death,  the  courage  of  conviction  was  wanting,  and  for 
many  years  to  come  these  two  vessels  were  regarded  as 
experimental,  and  not  repeated.  In  all  ten  74's  were 
added  during  the  war,  besides  three  French  prizes  and 
the  seven  large  Spanish  70's  taken  at  Havana. 

Coming  to  the  fourth  rate  we  see  it  still  comprising 
ships  of  from  60  to  50  guns,  but  with  a  highly  signifi- 
cant diflference.  A  hard  line  is  drawn  between  the  60's 
and  the  50's,  and  the  60's  only  are  classed  as  ships  of 
the  line.  Charnock  tells  us  that  even  so  their  retention 
as  battleships  was  nominal,  and  that  they  were  no  longer 
regarded  as  really  fit  to  lie  in  the  line  against  the  power- 
ful rank  and  file  of  France  and  Spain.  The  interesting 
point,  however,  is  not  so  much  the  status  of  the  60's  as 
that  of  the  50's.  For  in  the  fact  that  though  increased 
in  power  and  still  included  in  the  fourth  rate  they  were 
no  longer  classed  as  battleships,  we  seem  to  get  the  first 
clear  recognition  of  the  need  of  an  intermediate  type — a 
type,  that  is,  whose  function  is  to  act  as  a  supporting 
ship  to   stiffen   the   cruiser   line — and   for   this  purpose 

VOL.  II.  2  A 


370  LESSONS    OF    THE    WAR 

they  were  almost  invariably  used  in  the  later  years  of 
the  war.  As  flagships  of  cruiser  squadrons,  for  convoy 
work  and  for  commerce  protection  generally,  they  found 
their  chief  employment,  and  the  tendency  was  for  the 
old  60's  that  remained  to  sink  to  the  same  category, 
while  no  less  than  twelve  60's  and  eight  50's  Avere 
broken  up  during  the  war. 

In  the  cruiser  class  we  find  the  advance  in  thought 
no  less  strongly  marked.  During  the  war,  besides  units 
that  were  lost,  ten  40's  were  broken  up  and  eighteen 
20's  sold.  The  40's  ceased  to  be  built,  and  their 
numbers  had  fallen  from  thirty-eight  to  twenty-one. 
In  their  place  are  no  less  than  thirty-two  32-gun  frigates, 
the  first  of  the  new  type  of  cruiser  which  was  to  prove 
so  effective,  and  to  clothe  itself  with  so  much  renown. 
Added  to  these  were  four  of  36-guns,  of  which  one  was 
a  French  prize.  In  the  same  way  there  appears  in  the 
sixth  class  twenty-two  new  2  8 -gun  frigates.  A  few 
more  of  the  old  20-gun  type  had  been  completed, 
which  kept  the  numbers  up  to  forty-four,  but  at  the 
same  time  a  comparatively  new  experimental  class  of 
18-gun  frigates  had  been  disrated  and  relegated  to  the 
flotilla.1 

If,  then,  we  summarise  broadly,  eliminating  instances 
of  confusion  caused  by  the  incorporation  of  prize  ships, 
the  tendency  becomes  clear.  It  is  towards  simplification 
and  specialisation  of  the  three  main  types.  The  battle- 
ships remain  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  one  hundred 
and  forty  in  number,  with  a  proportion  of  one-seventh 
three-deckers  for  flagships,  while  the  two-deckers,  largely 


1  The  frigates  actually  added  during  the  war  were  four  36's  (one  French), 
two  30's  (one  bought  and  one  French),  twenty  32's  (two  French),  sixteen 
28's  (two  French),  one  2G  and  one  24,  both  French. — Chamock,  vol.  iii. 
p.   198. 


A   LOGICAL    NAVY   LIST  371 

increased  in  force,  are  condensing  to  two  types  only, 
74's  and  64's.  Between  them  is  a  wide  gap  to  the 
32  and  28-gun  cruisers,  filled,  however,  by  the  inter- 
mediate 50's,  which  are  no  longer  classed  as  battleships. 
Then  the  40-gun  class  is  dying  out,  leaving  a  distinct 
cruiser  class  of  true  single-decked  frigates,  while  an 
equally  well-marked  gap  is  forming  between  the  frigates 
and  the  sloops,  that  is,  between  cruisers  and  flotilla. 

Such  was  the  revolution  which  was  carried  out  practi- 
cally in  ten  years.  When  we  consider  that  in  those 
days  74's  took,  as  a  rule,  nearly  four  years  to  complete, 
and  that  the  Royal  George  (100),  the  first  ship  laid  down 
on  the  improved  French  lines,  took  nearly  ten,  "  revolu- 
tion "  seems  not  too  strong  a  term.  It  is  noteworthy, 
moreover,  that  unlike  the  similar  sweeping  reform  which 
was  inaugurated  by  Sir  Thomas  Hardy  in  1830,  it  was 
carried  out  in  high  time  of  war,  and  as  a  result  of  the 
actual  experience  of  a  previous  war.  Anson,  a  true 
fighting  admiral  as  well  as  a  great  administrator,  is  the 
personality  to  whom  we  must  credit  the  great  advance; 
but  in  honouring  him  we  must  not  forget  the  name  of 
Sir  Thomas  Slade,  who,  as  Surveyor  of  the  Navy  from 
1755  to  1771,  was  directly  responsible  for  the  creation 
of  this  true  modern  fleet. 

In  tactics  no  such  advance  was  made.  In  the  army 
the  improvement  was  great,  but  the  nature  of  the  struggle 
at  sea  robbed  the  admirals  of  that  day  of  the  necessary 
stimulus  of  general  actions.  That  it  was  not  a  period 
of  actual  stagnation  in  thought  is  proved  by  the  official 
introduction  of  the  new  Additional  Instructions  which 
have  been  noticed  in  their  place.  It  was  practice 
and  the  need  of  tactics  that  were  wantinof.  How  little 
practical  attention  was  given  to  the  subject,  we  have  seen 
in  Anson's   complaint    of   the   ignorance    and    slackness 


372  LESSONS    OF   THE   WAR 

of  battle  tactics  which  he  found  on  taking  over  from 
Hawke  and  Boscawen  the  main  fleet  in  1758.  Indeed, 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  that  although,  from  the 
conditions  of  the  war,  there  was  little  tactical  fruition, 
Anson  was  the  true  begetter  of  a  better  state  of  things. 
Men  who  knew  him  well  acclaimed  his  appointment  as 
First  Lord  as  heralding  a  new  era.  "  How  seldom," 
wrote  one  of  them,  "  have  we  had  one  man  at  the 
Admiralty  Avho  .  .  .  made  the  improvement  of  discipline 
(i.e.  tactics)  any  part  of  his  care !  .  .  .  I  expect  a  great 
deal  from  you,  and  if  I  am  deceived  will  never  again 
hope  to  see  .  .  .  any  real  improvements  made,  but  con- 
clude we  are  to  go  on  in  the  old  stupid  tracks  of  our 
predecessors,  leave  all  to  chance,  and  blunder  on  ad 
infinituvi  without  any  regular  system  of  discipline.  .  .  . 
I  hope  you  will  give  another  turn  to  affairs,  and  form 
a  society  for  the  propagation  of  sea-military  knowledge. 
I  think  you  had  formerly  such  a  scheme."  ^ 

This  scheme  he  never  realised,  but  the  fact  that  it 
had  been  in  his  mind  suggests  that  the  great  reforms  he 
made  were  the  outcome  of  a  reasoned  apprehension  of 
the  principles  of  his  art  and  not  the  mere  intuitions  of 
hand  to  mouth  experience.  But  of  all  this  scarcely  a 
glimpse  remains.  "  The  silent  son-in-law  of  the  Chan- 
cellor," as  Horace  Walpole  called  him,  seldom  spoke  and 
never  wrote  a  word  more  than  he  could  help.  His  friends 
cherished  his  few  letters  as  the  rarest  of  possessions, 
and  affectionately  reviled  him  as  the  worst  of  corre- 
spondents. For  him,  as  for  his  disciple  Saunders,  silence 
was  golden.  Yet  how  great  a  loss  it  cost  the  service  can 
never  be  known,  for  it  meant  the  minds  of  both  were 
buried  with  them. 

The  reason  why  Anson  and  his  admirals  were  denied 

^  Barrow,  Life  of  Anson,  p.  405, 


THE    FRENCH    STRATEGY  373 

the  chance  of  putting  his  tactical  ideas  to  the  test  brings 
us  to  another  permanent  lesson  of  the  war.  No  great 
action  took  place,  because  the  weakness  of  the  French  at 
sea  and  the  exigencies  of  their  war  plan  forced  them  to 
adopt  a  naval  defensive.  It  was  their  wise  policy  to 
avoid  a  decision  at  sea,  and  to  keep  the  command  in 
dispute  as  long  as  possible,  while  they  concentrated  their 
offensive  powers  upon  the  array  ashore.  It  was  exactly 
the  reverse  of  Pitt's  system,  and  how  nearly  it  came  to 
defeating  it  is  one  of  the  great  facts  of  the  war. 

The  essence  of  the  defensive  is  waiting  for  an  oppor- 
tunity to  pass  to  the  offensive,  and  we  cannot  look  back 
upon  the  struggle  which  the  French  attitude  so  skilfully 
prolonged  without  a  shudder  to  see  how  nearly  they 
were  rewarded.  Had  Ferdinand,  the  Anglophile  king 
of  Spain,  died  a  year  or  two  sooner  than  he  did,  Spain 
would  certainly  have  joined  our  enemy  before  we  had 
attained  our  object  in  America.  As  it  was,  the  French, 
by  preserving  their  fleet  from  a  decision,  prevented  us  for 
five  long  years  from  completing  that  easy  conquest  which 
we  looked  to  settle  in  one  campaign.  With  the  Spanish 
fleet  to  help  them  dispute  the  control  of  the  American 
communications,  there  is  no  saying  how  much  longer 
the  labour  would  have  lasted.  Again,  if  the  Czarina 
Elizabeth  had  survived  one  more  campaign  it  is  impos- 
sible to  see  how  Frederick  could  have  maintained  his 
position.  On  all  the  chances  of  war  we  must  have  been 
crushed ;  Hanover,  and  Holland,  and  the  Netherlands 
would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  France,  and  the  treaty 
of  peace  could  scarcely  have  been  on  a  better  basis  for  us 
than  the  status  quo  ante  helium. 

There  is  no  clearer  lesson  in  history  how  unwise  and 
short-sighted  it  is  to  despise  and  ridicule  a  naval  defen- 
sive.    Of  all  stratc'dcal  attitudes  it  is  the  most  difficult 


374  LESSONS    OF   THE    WAR 

to  meet  and  the  most  deeply  fraught  with  danger  for  the 
opposing  belligerent  if  he  is  weak  ashore  and  his  enemy 
strong.  The  prolongation  of  war  at  sea  tends  to  raise  up 
fresh  enemies  for  the  dominant  power  in  a  much  higher 
degree  than  it  does  on  land,  owing  to  the  inevitable 
exasperation  of  neutrals.  In  the  long  run  and  by  itself 
the  defensive  cannot,  of  course,  lead  to  a  final  attain- 
ment of  the  command  of  the  sea.  But  it  can  prevent 
its  attainment  by  the  other  side,  and  this,  taken  in 
concert  with  a  powerful  offensive  ashore,  may  well  secure 
a  final  triumph.  The  real  lesson  of  the  war  is  not  that 
we  should  treat  a  naval  defensive  with  contempt,  just 
because  in  this  case  it  failed  by  the  chance  prolongation 
of  two  human  lives ;  but  that  we  should  note  the  supreme 
necessity  and  difficulty  of  crushing  it  down  before  it  has 
time  to  operate  its  normal  effect.  The  primary  and 
all-absorbing  object  of  a  superior  naval  power  is  not 
merely  to  take  the  offensive,  but  to  force  the  enemy  to 
expose  himself  to  a  decision  as  quickly  as  possible.  One 
of  the  rare  glimpses  we  have  had  into  Anson's  mind 
showed  us  how  deeply  he  was  impressed  with  this  pre- 
occupation. In  his  heart  he  never  approved  of  Pitt's 
coastal  operations.  Great  as  he  was  as  a  master  of  naval 
warfare,  there  is  no  sign  he  ever  rose  to  Pitt's  larger 
conception  of  combined  strategy.  It  was  only  because 
Hardwicke's  broad  mind  grasped  and  approved  the  policy, 
that  his  silent  son-in-law  held  his  tongue  and  loyally 
gave  an  outward  assent.  We  have  seen  that  the  sole 
use  he  could  find  in  coastal  expeditions  was  a  means 
of  forcing  a  decision  at  sea,  and  so  far  and  no  further 
he  believed  them  justified.  Much  has  been  said  of  the 
first  function  of  the  British  army  being  to  assist  the  fleet 
in  obtaining  command  of  the  sea.  We  may  take  it 
that  in  Lord  Anson's  opinion  there  was  no  better  way 


COMMERCE    DESTRUCTION  375 

in  which  this  function  could  be  performed  than  by 
operating  over  the  uncommanded  sea,  and  tempting  the 
enemy's  battleships  into  the  open. 

There  remains  to  consider  the  lessons  of  commerce 
destruction.  Though  actual  statistics  are  hard  to  come 
by,  there  seems  no  doubt  that  the  French  claim  to  have 
captured  a  greater  number  of  vessels  than  we  did  is 
justified.  The  value  of  the  captures  is  less  certain. 
Very  little  harm  was  done  to  our  convoys,  less  still  by 
the  enemy's  cruisers.  The  bulk  of  the  havoc  was 
amongst  small  vessels  and  coasting  craft  by  the  enemy's 
privateers,  and  the  results  afford  a  poor  precedent  as  to 
what  is  likely  to  happen  now  that  privateering  is  sup- 
posed to  be  abolished.  This,  however,  is  not  the  important 
point.  The  fact  of  permanent  value  is  that  successful 
as  were  the  French  operations,  they  did  very  little  to 
injure  our  credit,  and  that  is  the  main  strategic  value 
of  commerce  destruction.  Money  was  freely  obtainable, 
at  least  until  the  end  of  Pitt's  administration,  and  then 
any  tightness  there  was  was  entirely  due  to  mistrust  of 
Bute's  capacity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  credit  of  France 
was  effectively  destroyed,  and  her  finances  reduced  to  the 
direst  straits. 

The  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  bulk  of  our  com- 
merce was  so  great  that  the  mere  pelagic  operations  of 
our  enemy,  though  they  absorbed  in  the  end  almost  the 
whole  of  her  vitality  at  sea,  could  not  make  a  sufficient 
percentage  impression  to  produce  any  real  warlike 
advantage.  Such  an  advantage,  it  would  appear,  is 
only  to  be  obtained  by  a  practical  stoppage  of  trade 
communications  and  the  capture  of  the  oversea  depots. 
When  the  volume  of  commerce  is  so  vast  and  its  theatre 
so  widespread  as  ours  was  even  in  those  days,  pelagic 
operations  against  it  can    never   amount   to    more  than 


376  LESSONS   OF   THE    WAR 

nibbling.  They  may  produce  inconvenience,  but  cannot 
paralyse  finance.  To  injure  credit  to  sucb  an  extent  as 
to  amount  to  a  real  consideration  of  war,  operations 
against  trade  must  be  systematically  carried  on  by  land 
and  sea  till  its  main  sources  and  the  possibility  of  transit 
are  practically  destroyed.  Then,  and  then  only,  can  it 
become  a  material  factor  in  securing  the  ultimate  object 
— a  favourable  peace.  That,  at  least,  is  the  moral  of  the 
Seven  Years'  War. 

With  regard  to  the  merits  of  the  peace  itself,  though 
it  was  the  most  triumphant  we  ever  made,  it  can  only  be 
said  that,  as  Boscawen  began  the  war,  so  Bute  ended  it. 
What  we  did  was  either  too  little  or  too  much.  That 
we  were  in  a  position  to  extract  still  harder  terms  than 
we  did  is  certain.  Pitt  would  have  done  so,  and  was 
minded  by  crushing  the  French  navy,  body  and  soul,  to 
put  it  out  of  her  power  ever  to  retaliate.  Whether  this 
was  possible  or  not  there  were  many  wise  heads  who 
thought  it  impolitic ;  better,  they  argued,  to  be  easy  and 
rest  content  with  a  situation  which  would  be  endur- 
able to  a  chivalrous  enemy.  To  this  end  we  sacrificed 
much,  and  all  to  no  purpose.  We  had  gone  already  far 
beyond  what  so  great  and  proud  a  nation  could  accept; 
and  even  while  Choiseul  was  pressing  for  terms  mild 
enough  to  secure  a  lasting  peace,  he  was  planning  the 
revenge  which  was  to  fall  so  heavily  and  so  soon. 


APPENDIX 

DEFINITIVE   TREATY   OF    PEACE    BETWEEN 
GREAT  BRITAIN,  FRANCE,  AND  SPAIN 

1763 


Peace. — Art.  1.  There  shall  be  a  Christian,  universal,  and 
perpetual  peace,  as  well  by  sea  as  by  land,  and  a  sincere  and 
constant  friendship  shall  be  re  -  established  between  their 
Britannic,  most  Christian,  Catholic,  and  most  Faithful  ma- 
jesties, and  between  their  heirs  and  sucessors,  kingdoms, 
dominions,  provinces,  countries,  subjects,  and  vassals,  of  what 
quality  or  condition  soever  they  be,  without  exception  of  places, 
or  of  persons :  so  that  the  high  contracting  parties  shall  give 
the  greatest  attention  to  maintain  between  themselves  and 
their  said  dominions  and  subjects,  this  reciprocal  friendship 
and  correspondence,  without  permitting,  on  either  side,  any  kind 
of  hostilities,  by  sea  or  by  land,  to  be  committed,  from  hence- 
forth, for  any  cause,  or  under  any  pretence  whatsoever,  and 
every  thing  shall  be  carefully  avoided  which  might,  hereafter, 
prejudice  the  union  happily  re-established,  applying  themselves, 
on  the  contrary,  on  every  occasion,  to  procure  for  each  other 
whatever  may  contribute  to  their  mutual  glory,  interests,  and 
advantages,  without  giving  any  assistance  or  protection,  directly 
or  indirectly,  to  those  who  would  cause  any  prejudice  to  either 
of  the  high  contracting  parties :  there  shall  be  a  general 
oblivion  of  everything  that  may  have  been  done  or  committed 
before,  or  since,  the  commencement  of  the  war,  which  is  just 
ended. 

Treaties  Confirmed. — Art.  II.  The  treaties  of  Westphalia  of 
1648  ;  those  of  Madrid  between  the  crowns  of  Great  Britain 
and  Spain  of  1667  and  1670  ;  the  treaties  of  peace  of  Nimeguen 


378  APPENDIX 

of   1678  and   1679  ;    of  Ryswick  of   1697  ;    those  of  peace  and 
of  commerce  of  Utrecht  of  1713;  that  of  Baden  of  1714;   the 
treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance  of  the  Hague  of  1717  ;    that  of 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  of  London  of  1718  ;  the  treaty  of  peace 
of  Vienna  of  1738;    the  definitive  treaty  of  Aix  la  Chapelle 
of   1748;    and  that   of   Madrid   between  the   crowns  of  Great 
Britain  and  Spain   of    1750,  as  well    as  the  treaties   between 
the  crowns  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  of  the  13th  February  1668  ; 
of  the  6th  February  1715  ;  and  of  the  12th  February  1761  ;  and 
that  of  the   11th   April    1713  between   France   and    Portugal, 
with   the    guarantees   of    Great  Britain,  serve  as  a  basis  and 
foundation  to  the  peace  and  to  the  present  treaty  ;  and  for  this 
purpose,  they  are  all  renewed  and  confirmed  in  the  best  form, 
as  well  as  all  the  treaties  in  general,  which  subsisted  between 
the    high  contracting  parties  before  the  war,  as  if   they  were 
inserted    here  word  for  word,  so  that  they  are  to  be   exactly 
observed,  for   the  future,  in  their  whole  tenor,  and  religiously 
executed   on  all  sides,  in   all  their  points,  which  shall  not  be 
derogated    from    by    the    present   Treaty,    notwithstanding   all 
that    may    have    been    stipulated    to    the  contrary   by    any   of 
the    high    contracting    parties :    and    all    the    said    parties    de- 
clare, that  they  will  not   suffer   any  privilege,  favour,  or  in- 
dulgence, to  subsist,  contrary  to  the  treaties  above  confirmed, 
except   what    shall    have   been    agreed    and   stipulated    by  the 
present  Treaty. 

Exchange  of  Prisoners. — Art.  III.  All  the  prisoners  made, 
on  all  sides,  as  well  by  land  as  by  sea,  and  the  hostages  carried 
away,  or  given  during  the  war,  and  to  this  day,  shall  be  restored 
without  ransom,  six  weeks,  at  latest,  to  be  computed  from  the 
day  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty, 
each  crown  respectively  paying  the  advances  which  shall  have 
been  made  for  the  subsistence  and  maintenance  of  their  prisoners, 
by  the  sovereign  of  the  country  where  they  shall  have  been 
detained,  according  to  the  attested  receipts  and  estimates,  and 
other  authentic  vouchers,  which  shall  be  furnished  on  one  side 
and  the  other ;  and  securities  shall  be  reciprocally  given  for  the 
payment  of  the  debts  which  the  prisoners  shall  have  contracted 
in  the  countries  where  they  have  been  detained,  until  their 
entire  liberty.  And  all  the  ships  of  war  and  merchant  vessels 
which  shall  have  been  taken  since  the  expiration  of  the  terms 
agreed  upon   for  the  cessation  of  hostilities  by  sea,  shall  be 


PEACE    OF    PARIS  379 

likewise  restored  bona  fide,  with  all  their  crews  and  cargoes  ; 
and  the  execution  of  this  article  shall  be  proceeded  upon 
immediately  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this 
treaty. 

Nova  Scotia  and  Canada.  —  Art.  IV.  His  most  Christian 
majesty  renounces  all  the  pretensions  which  he  has  heretofore 
formed,  or  might  form,  to  Nova  Scotia,  or  Acadia,  in  all  its 
parts,  and  guarantees  the  whole  of  it,  and  with  all  its  de- 
pendencies, to  the  king  of  Great  Britain :  moreover,  his  most 
Christian  majesty  cedes  and  guarantees  to  his  said  Britannic 
majesty,  in  full  right,  Canada,  with  all  its  dependencies,  as  well 
as  the  island  of  Cape  Breton,  and  all  the  other  islands  and 
coasts  in  the  gulph  and  river  St.  Laurence,  and,  in  general, 
every  thing  that  depends  on  the  said  countries,  lands,  islands, 
and  coasts,  with  the  sovereignty,  property,  possession,  and  all 
rights  acquired  by  treaty  or  otherwise,  which  the  most  Christian 
king,  and  the  crown  of  France,  have  had,  till  now,  over  the  said 
countries,  islands,  lands,  places,  coasts,  and  their  inhabitants,  so 
that  the  most  Christian  king  cedes  and  makes  over  the  whole  to 
the  said  king,  and  to  the  crown  of  Great  Britain,  and  that  in  the 
most  ample  manner  and  form,  without  restriction,  and  without 
any  liberty  to  depart  from  the  said  cession  and  guaranty,  under 
any  pretence,  or  to  disturb  Great  Britain  in  the  possessions 
above  mentioned.  His  Britannic  majesty,  on  his  side,  agrees 
to  grant  the  liberty  of  the  Catholic  religion  to  the  inhabitants 
of  Canada  ;  he  will,  consequently,  give  the  most  precise  and 
most  effectual  orders,  that  his  new  Roman  Catholic  subjects 
may  profess  the  worship  of  their  religion,  according  to  the  rites 
of  the  Romish  Church,  as  far  as  the  laws  of  Great  Britain  permit. 
His  Britannic  majesty  further  agrees,  that  the  French  inhabi- 
tants, or  others  who  had  been  subjects  of  the  most  Christian 
king  in  Canada,  may  retire,  with  all  safety  and  freedom,  wher- 
ever they  shall  think  proper,  and  may  sell  their  estates,  provided 
it  be  to  subjects  of  his  Britannic  majesty,  and  bring  away  their 
effects  as  well  as  their  persons,  without  being  restrained  in 
their  emigration,  under  any  pretence  whatsoever,  except  that 
of  debts,  or  of  criminal  prosecutions  :  the  term  limited  for  this 
emigration  shall  be  fixed  to  the  space  of  eighteen  months,  to 
be  computed  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
of  the  present  treaty. 

Fisheries. — Art.  V.  The   subjects  of   France  shall   have  the 


38o  APPENDIX 

liberty  of  fishing  and  drying,  on  a  part  of  the  coasts  of  the 
island  of  Newfoundland,  such  as  it  is  specified  in  the  13th 
Article  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht ;  which  article  is  renewed  and 
confirmed  by  the  present  treaty  (except  what  relates  to  the 
island  of  Cape  Breton,  as  well  as  to  the  other  islands  and 
coasts,  in  the  mouth  and  in  the  gulph  of  St.  Laurence) ;  and 
his  Britannic  majesty  consents  to  leave  to  the  subjects  of 
the  most  Christian  king  the  liberty  of  fishing  in  the  gulph  of 
St.  Laurence,  on  condition  that  the  subjects  of  France  do  not 
exercise  the  said  fishery,  but  at  the  distance  of  three  leagues 
from  all  the  coasts  belonging  to  Great  Britain,  as  well  those 
of  the  continent,  as  those  of  the  islands  situated  in  the  said 
gulph  of  St.  Laurence.  And  as  to  what  relates  to  the  fishery 
on  the  coasts  of  the  island  of  Cape  Breton  out  of  the  said  gulph, 
the  subjects  of  the  most  Christian  king  shall  not  be  permitted 
to  exercise  the  said  fishery,  but  at  the  distance  of  15  leagues 
from  the  coasts  of  the  island  of  Cape  Breton  ;  and  the  fishery 
on  the  coasts  of  Nova  Scotia  or  Acadia,  and  everywhere  else 
out  of  the  said  gulph,  shall  remain  on  the  foot  of  former 
treaties. 

Fishing  Stations. — Art.  VI.  The  king  of  Great  Britain  cedes 
the  islands  of  St.  Peter  and  Miquelon,  in  full  right,  to  his  most 
Christian  majesty,  to  serve  as  a  shelter  to  the  French  fisher- 
men :  and  his  said  most  Christian  majesty  engages  not  to  fortify 
the  said  islands ;  to  erect  no  buildings  upon  them,  but  merely 
for  the  convenience  of  the  fishery  ;  and  to  keep  upon  them  a 
guard  of  50  men  only  for  the  police. 

The  Mississippi  Line. — Art.  VII.  In  order  to  re-establish 
peace  on  solid  and  durable  foundations,  and  to  remove  for  ever 
all  subject  of  dispute  with  regard  to  the  limits  of  the  British 
and  French  territories  on  the  continent  of  America  ;  it  is 
agreed,  that,  for  the  future,  the  confines  between  the  dominions 
of  his  Britannic  majesty,  and  those  of  his  most  Christian 
majesty,  in  that  part  of  the  world,  shall  be  fixed  irrevocably 
by  a  line  drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  river  Mississippi,  from 
its  source  to  the  river  Iberville,  and  from  thence,  by  a  line 
drawn  along  the  middle  of  this  river,  and  the  lakes  Maurepas 
and  Pontchartrain,  to  the  sea ;  and  for  this  purpose,  the  most 
Christian  king  cedes  in  full  right,  and  guarantees  to  his 
Britannic  majesty,  the  river  and  port  of  the  Mobile,  and  every- 
thing which  he  possesses,  or  ought  to  possess,  on  the  left  side 


PEACE    OF    PARIS  381 

of  the  river  Mississippi,  except  the  town  of  New  Orleans,  and 
the  island  in  which  it  is  situated,  which  shall  remain  to  France  ; 
provided  that  the  navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi  shall  be 
equally  free,  as  well  to  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain,  as  to  those 
of  France,  in  its  whole  breadth  and  length,  from  its  source  to 
the  sea,  and  expressly  that  part  which  is  between  the  said 
island  of  New  Orleans,  and  the  right  bank  of  that  river,  as 
well  as  the  passage  both  in  and  out  of  its  mouth  :  it  is  further 
stipulated,  that  the  vessels  belonging  to  the  subjects  of  either 
nation,  shall  not  be  stopped,  visited,  or  subjected  to  the  pay- 
ment of  any  duty  whatsoever.  The  stipulations,  inserted  in 
the  4th  Article,  in  favour  of  the  inhabitants  of  Canada,  shall 
also  take  place,  with  regard  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  countries 
ceded  by  this  Article. 

Restoration  of  French  Islands. — Art.  VIII.  The  king  of  Great 
Britain  shall  restore  to  France  the  islands  of  Guadaloupe,  of 
Marie  Galante,  of  Desirade,  of  Martinico,  and  of  Belleisle  ; 
and  the  fortresses  of  these  islands  shall  be  restored  in  the  same 
condition  they  were  in,  when  they  were  conquered  by  the 
British  arms ;  provided  that  his  Britannic  majesty's  subjects, 
who  shall  have  settled  in  the  said  islands,  or  those  who  shall 
have  any  commercial  affairs  to  settle  there,  or  in  the  other 
places  restored  to  France  by  the  present  treaty,  shall  have 
liberty  to  sell  their  lands  and  their  estates,  to  settle  their 
affairs,  to  recover  their  debts,  and  to  bring  away  their  effects, 
as  well  as  their  persons,  on  board  vessels,  which  they  shall  be 
permitted  to  send  to  the  said  islands,  and  other  places  restored 
as  above,  and  which  shall  serve  for  this  use  only,  without  being 
restrained  on  account  of  their  religion,  or  under  any  other 
pretence  whatsoever,  except  that  of  debts,  or  of  criminal  pro- 
secutions:  and  for  this  purpose,  the  term  of  eighteen  months 
is  allowed  to  his  Britannic  majesty's  subjects,  to  be  computed 
from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present 
Treaty  ;  but,  as  the  liberty,  granted  to  his  Britannic  majesty's 
subjects,  to  bring  away  their  persons  and  their  effects,  in  vessels 
of  their  nation,  may  be  liable  to  abuses,  if  precautions  were  not 
taken  to  prevent  them ;  it  has  been  expressly  agreed  between 
his  Britannic  majesty  and  his  most  Christian  majesty,  that  the 
number  of  English  vessels,  which  shall  have  leave  to  go  to  the 
said  islands  and  places  restored  to  France,  shall  be  limited,  as 
well  as  the  number  of  tons  of  each  one  ;  that  they  shall  go  in 


382  APPENDIX 

ballast ;  shall  set  sail  at  a  fixed  time ;  and  shall  make  one 
voyage  only,  all  the  effects,  belonging  to  the  English,  being  to 
be  embarked  at  the  same  time.  It  has  been  fui'ther  agreed, 
that  his  most  Christian  majesty  shall  cause  the  necessary  pass- 
ports to  be  given  to  the  said  vessels ;  that,  for  the  greater 
security,  it  shall  be  allowed  to  place  two  French  clerks  or 
guards,  in  each  of  the  said  vessels,  which  shall  be  visited  in 
the  landing  places,  and  ports  of  the  said  islands,  and  places, 
restored  to  France,  and  that  the  merchandise,  which  shall  be 
found  therein,  shall  be  confiscated. 

Islands  Ceded  to  England. — Art.  IX.  The  most  Christian  king 
cedes  and  guarantees  to  his  Britannic  majesty,  in  full  right, 
the  islands  of  Grenada,  and  of  the  Grenadines,  with  the  same 
stipulations  in  favour  of  the  inhabitants  of  this  colony,  in- 
serted in  the  4th  Article  for  those  of  Canada ;  and  the 
partition  of  the  islands,  called  Neutral,  is  agreed  and  fixed, 
so  that  those  of  St.  Vincent,  Dominica,  and  Tobago,  shall 
remain  in  full  right  to  Great  Britain,  and  that  of  St.  Lucia 
shall  be  delivered  to  France,  to  enjoy  the  same  likewise  in 
full  right ;  and  the  high  contracting  parties  guaranty  the 
partition  so  stipulated. 

Goree  and  Senegal. — Art.  X.  His  Britannic  majesty  shall 
restore  to  Fi-ance  the  island  of  Goree,  in  the  condition  it  was 
in  when  conquered :  and  his  most  Christian  majesty  cedes, 
in  full  right,  and  guarantees  to  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  the 
river  Senegal,  with  the  forts  and  factories  of  St.  Lewis,  Podor, 
and  Galam ;  and  with  all  the  rights  and  dependencies  of  the 
said  river  Senegal. 

India. — Art.  XI.  In  the  East  Indies,  Great  Britain  shall 
restore  to  France,  in  the  condition  they  are  now  in,  the 
different  factories,  which  that  crown  possessed,  as  well  on 
the  coast  of  Coromandel,  and  Orixa,  as  on  that  of  Malabar, 
as  also  in  Bengal,  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1749.  And  his 
most  Christian  majesty  renounces  all  pretensions  to  the  acquisi- 
tions which  he  had  made  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel  and  Orixa, 
since  the  said  beginning  of  the  year  1749.  His  most  Christian 
majesty  shall  restore,  on  his  side,  all  that  he  may  have  con- 
quered from  Great  Britain,  in  the  East  Indies,  during  the 
present  war ;  and  will  expressly  cause  Nattal  and  TapanouUy, 
in  the  island  of  Sumatra,  to  be  restored ;  he  engages  further, 
not  to  erect  fortifications,  or  to  keep  troops  in  any  part  of  the 


PEACE    OF    PARIS  383 

dominions  of  the  subah  of  Bengal.  And  in  order  to  preserve 
future  peace  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel  and  Orixa,  the  English 
and  French  shall  acknowledge  Mahomet  Ally  Khan  for  lawful 
nabob  of  the  Carnatic,  and  Salabat  Jing  for  lawful  subah  of 
the  Decan;  and  both  parties  shall  renounce  all  demands  and 
pretensions  of  satisfaction,  with  which  they  might  charge 
each  other,  or  their  Indian  allies,  Tfor  the  depredations,  or 
pillage,  committed,  on  the  one  side,  or  on  the  other,  during 
the  war. 

Minorca. — Art.  XII.  The  island  of  Minorca  shall  be  restored 
to  his  Britannic  majesty,  as  well  as  Fort  St.  Philip,  in  the  same 
condition  they  were  in,  when  conquered  by  the  arms  of  the 
most  Christian  king;  and  with  the  artillery  which  was  there, 
when  the  said  island  and  the  said  fort  were  taken. 

Dunkirk. — Art.  XIII.  The  town  and  port  of  Dunkirk  shall 
be  put  into  the  state  fixed  by  the  last  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
and  by  former  treaties.  The  cunette  shall  be  destroyed  im- 
mediately after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present 
Treaty,  as  well  as  the  forts  and  batteries  which  defend  the 
entrance  on  the  side  of  the  sea  ;  and  provision  shall  be  made, 
at  the  same  time,  for  the  wholesomeness  of  the  air,  and  for  the 
health  of  the  inhabitants,  by  some  other  means,  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  king  of  Great  Britain. 

Germany. — Art.  XIV.  France  shall  restore  all  the  countries 
belonging  to  the  electorate  of  Hanover,  to  the  landgrave  of 
Hesse,  to  the  duke  of  Brunswick,  and  to  the  count  of  La  Lippe 
Buckebourg,  which  are,  or  shall  be  occupied  by  his  most  Chris- 
tian majesty's  arms ;  the  fortresses  of  these  different  countries 
shall  be  restored  in  the  same  condition  they  were  in,  when 
conquered  by  the  French  arms ;  and  the  pieces  of  artillery, 
which  shall  have  been  carried  elsewhere,  shall  be  replaced 
by  the  same  number  of  the  same  bore,  weight,  and  metal. 

Time  for  Evacuation. — Art.  XV.  In  case  the  stipulations, 
contained  in  the  13th  Article  of  the  Preliminaries,  should 
not  be  completed  at  the  time  of  the  signature  of  the  present 
treaty,  as  well  with  regard  to  the  evacuations  to  be  made  by 
the  armies  of  France  of  the  fortresses  of  Cleves,  Wesel,  Gueldres, 
and  of  all  the  countries  belonging  to  the  king  of  Prussia,  as 
with  regard  to  the  evacuations  to  be  made  by  the  British  and 
French  armies  of  the  countries  which  they  occupy  in  West- 
phalia, Lower  Saxony,  on  the  Lower  Rhine,  the  Upper  Rhine, 


384  APPENDIX 

and  in  all  the  empire,  and  to  the  retreat  of  the  troops  into  the 
dominions  of  their  respective  sovereigns ;  their  Britannic,  and 
most  Christian  majesties  promise  to  proceed,  hona  fide,  with 
all  the  dispatch  the  case  will  permit  of,  to  the  said  evacuations, 
the  entire  completion  whereof  they  stipulate  before  the  15th 
of  March  next,  or  sooner  if  it  can  be  done ;  and  their  Britannic 
and  most  Christian  majesties  further  engage  and  promise  to 
each  other,  not  to  furnish  any  succours,  of  any  kind,  to  their 
respective  allies,  who  shall  continue  engaged  in  war  in 
Germany. 

Spaiiish  Prizes  before  War. — Art,  XVI.  The  decision  of  the 
prizes  made  in  the  time  of  peace,  by  the  subjects  of  Great 
Britain,  on  the  Spaniards,  shall  be  referred  to  the  courts  of 
justice  of  the  admiralty  of  Great  Britain,  conformably  to  the 
rules  established  among  all  nations,  so  that  the  validity  of 
the  said  prizes,  between  the  British  and  Spanish  nations,  shall 
be  decided  and  judged,  according  to  the  law  of  nations,  and 
according  to  treaties,  in  the  courts  of  justice  of  the  nation,  who 
shall  have  made  the  capture. 

Logwood. — Art.  XVII.  His  Britannic  majesty  shall  cause 
to  be  demolished  all  the  fortifications  which  his  subjects  shall 
have  erected  in  the  bay  of  Honduras,  and  other  places  of  the 
territory  of  Spain  in  that  part  of  the  world,  four  months  after 
the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty ;  and  his  Catholic  majesty 
shall  not  permit  his  Britannic  majesty's  subjects,  or  their 
workmen,  to  be  disturbed,  or  molested,  under  any  pretence 
whatsoever,  in  the  said  places,  in  their  occupation  of  cutting, 
loading,  and  carrying  away  logwood  :  and  for  this  purpose,  they 
may  build  without  hindrance,  and  occupy  without  interruption, 
the  houses  and  magazines  which  are  necessary  for  them,  for 
their  families,  and  for  their  effects :  and  his  Catholic  majesty 
assures  to  them,  by  this  Article,  the  full  enjoyment  of  those 
advantages,  and  powers,  on  the  Spanish  coasts  and  territories, 
as  above  stipulated,  immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the 
present  treaty. 

Spanish  Fishery. — Art.  XVIII.  His  Catholic  majesty  desists, 
as  well  for  himself,  as  for  his  successors,  from  all  pretension, 
which  he  may  have  formed,  in  favour  of  the  Guipuscoans,  and 
other  his  subjects,  to  the  right  of  fishing  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  island  of  Newfoundland. 

Restoration  of  Cuba. — Art.  XIX.  The  king  of  Great  Britain 


PEACE    OF    PARIS  385 

shall  restore  to  Spain  all  the  territory  which  he  has  con- 
quered in  the  island  of  Cuba,  with  the  fortress  of  the  Havana, 
and  this  fortress,  as  well  as  all  the  other  fortresses  of  the  said 
island,  shall  be  restored  in  the  same  condition  they  were  in 
when  conquered  by  his  Britannic  majesty's  arms  ;  provided, 
that  his  Britannic  majesty's  subjects,  who  shall  have  any  com- 
mercial affairs  to  settle  there,  shall  have  liberty  to  sell  their 
lands,  and  their  estates,  to  settle  their  affairs,  to  recover  their 
debts,  and  to  bring  away  their  ett'ects,  as  well  as  their  persons, 
on  board  vessels  which  they  shall  be  permitted  to  send  to  the 
said  island  restoied  as  above,  and  which  shall  serve  for  that 
use  only,  without  being  restrained  on  account  of  their  religion, 
or  under  any  other  pretence  whatsoever,  except  that  of  debts, 
or  criminal  prosecutions  :  and  for  this  purpose,  the  term  of 
eighteen  months  is  allowed  to  his  Britannic  majesty's  subjects, 
to  be  computed  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifica- 
tions of  the  present  treaty  :  but  as  the  liberty,  granted  to  his 
Britannic  majesty's  subjects,  to  bring  away  their  persons,  and 
their  effects,  in  vessels  of  their  nation,  may  be  liable  to  abuses, 
if  precautions  were  not  taken  to  prevent  them  ;  it  has  been 
expressly  agreed,  between  his  Britannic  majesty  and  his  Catholic 
majesty,  that  the  number  of  English  vessels,  which  shall  have 
leave  to  go  to  the  said  island  restored  to  Spain,  shall  be  limited, 
as  well  as  the  number  of  tons  of  each  one  ;  that  they  shall  go 
in  ballast ;  shall  set  sail  at  a  fixed  time ;  and  shall  make  one 
voyage  only ;  all  the  effects  belonging  to  the  English  being  to 
be  embarked  at  the  same  time :  it  has  been  further  agreed, 
that  his  Catholic  majesty  shall  cause  the  necessary  passports  to 
be  given  to  the  said  vessels ;  that,  for  the  greater  security,  it 
shall  be  allowed  to  place  two  Spanish  clerks,  or  guards,  in 
each  of  the  said  vessels,  which  shall  be  visited  in  the  landing- 
places,  and  ports  of  the  said  island  restored  to  Spain,  and 
that  the  merchandise  which  shall  be  found  therein,  shall  be 
confiscated 

Florida. — Art.  XX.  In  consequence  of  the  restitution  stipu- 
lated in  the  preceding  Article,  his  Catholic  majesty  cedes  and 
guai-antees,  in  full  right,  to  his  Britannic  majesty,  Florida,  with 
Fort  St,  Augustin  and  the  bay  of  Pensacola,  as  well  as  all  that 
Spain  possesses  on  the  continent  of  North  America,  to  the  east, 
or  to  the  south-east,  of  the  river  Mississippi.  And,  in  general, 
everything  that  depends  on  the  said  countries,  and'  lands,  with 

VOL.  II.  2-li 


386  APPENDIX 

the  sovereignty,  property,  possession,  and  all  rights,  acquired 
by  treaties  or  otherwise,  which  the  Catholic  king,  and  the 
ci'own  of  Spain,  have  had,  till  now,  over  the  said  countries, 
lands,  places,  and  their  inhabitants  ;  so  that  the  Catholic  king 
cedes  and  makes  over  the  whole  to  the  said  king,  and  to  the 
crown  of  Great  Britain,  and  that  in  the  most  ample  manner 
and  form.  His  Britannic  majesty  agrees,  on  his  side,  to  grant 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  countries,  above  ceded,  the  liberty  of 
the  Catholic  religion  :  he  will  consequently  give  the  most  express 
and  the  most  effectual  orders,  that  his  new  Roman  Catholic 
subjects  may  profess  the  worship  of  their  religion,  according  to 
the  rites  of  the  Romish  church,  as  far  as  the  laws  of  Great 
Britain  permit :  his  Britannic  majesty  further  agrees,  that  the 
Spanish  inhabitants,  or  others  who  had  been  subjects  of  the 
Catholic  king  in  the  said  countries,  may  retire,  with  all  safety 
and  freedom,  wherever  they  think  proper ;  and  may  sell  their 
estates,  provided  it  be  to  his  Britannic  majesty's  subjects,  and 
bring  away  their  effects,  as  well  as  their  persons,  without  being 
restrained  in  their  emigration,  under  any  pretence  whatsoever, 
except  that  of  debts  or  of  criminal  prosecutions  :  the  term, 
limited  for  this  emigration,  being  fixed  to  the  space  of  eighteen 
months,  to  be  computed  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  the 
ratifications  of  the  present  treaty.  It  is  moreover  stipulated, 
that  his  Catholic  majesty  shall  have  power  to  cause  all  the 
effects,  that  may  belong  to  him,  to  be  brought  away,  whether 
it  be  artillery,  or  other  things. 

Evacuation  of  Portuguese  Territory. — Art.  XXI.  The  French 
and  Spanish  troops  shall  evacuate  all  the  territories,  lands, 
towns,  places,  and  castles,  of  his  most  Faithful  majesty,  in 
Europe,  without  any  reserve,  which  shall  have  been  conquered 
by  the  armies  of  France  and  Spain,  and  shall  restore  them  in 
the  same  condition  they  were  in  when  conquered,  Avith  the  same 
artillery,  and  ammunition,  which  was  found  there  :  and  with 
regard  to  the  Portuguese  colonies  in  America,  Africa,  or  in  the 
East  Indies,  if  any  change  shall  have  happened  there,  all  things 
shall  be  restored  on  the  same  footing  they  were  in,  and  con- 
formably to  the  preceding  treaties  which  subsisted  between 
the  courts  of  France,  Spain,  and  Portugal,  before  the  present 
war. 

Restoration  of  Archives. — Art.  XXII.  All  the  papers,  letters, 
documents,  and  archives,  which  were  found  in  the  countries, 


PEACE    OF    PARIS  387 

territories,  towns,  and  places,  that  are  restored,  and  those  be- 
longing to  the  countries  ceded,  shall  be  respectively  and  bona  fide, 
delivered,  or  furnished  at  the  same  time,  if  possible,  that  posses- 
sion is  taken,  or,  at  latest,  four  months  after  the  exchange  of 
the  ratifications  of' the  present  treaty,  in  Avhatever  places  the 
said  papers  or  documents  may  be  found. 

Unknown  Conquesl!<. — Art.  XXIII.  All  the  countries  and 
territories,  which  may  have  been  conquered,  in  whatsoever 
part  of  the  world,  by  the  arms  of  their  Britannic  and  most 
Faithful  majesties,  as  well  as  by  those  of  their  most  Christian 
and  Catholic  majesties,  which  are  not  included  in  the  present 
treaty,  either  under  the  title  of  cessions,  or  under  the  title  of 
restitutions,  shall  be  restored  without  difficulty,  and  without 
requiring  any  compensation. 

Epochs.— Axt.  XXIV.  As  it  is  necessary  to  assign  a  fixed 
epoch  for  the  restitutions,  and  the  evacuations,  to  be  made 
by  each  of  the  high  contracting  parties ;  it  is  agreed,  that  the 
British  and  French  troops  shall  complete,  before  the  1 5th  of 
March  next,  all  that  shall  remain  to  be  executed  of  the  12th 
and  13th  Articles  of  the  Preliminaries,  signed  the  3rd  of 
November  last,  with  regard  to  the  evacuation  to  be  made  in 
the  empire,  or  elsewhere.  The  island  of  Belleisle  shall  be 
evacuated  six  weeks  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
of  the  present  treaty,  or  sooner,  if  it  can  be  done.  Guadeloupe, 
Desirade,  Marie  Galante,  Martinico,  and  St.  Lucia,  three  months 
after  the  exchange  of  the  I'atifications  of  the  present  treaty, 
or  sooner  if  it  can  be  done.  Great  Britain  shall  likewise,  at 
the  end  of  three  months  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
of  the  present  treaty,  or  sooner,  if  it  can  be  done,  enter  into 
the  posse.ssion  of  the  river  and  port  of  the  Mobile,  and  of  all 
that  is  to  form  the  limits  of  the  territory  of  Great  Britain, 
on  the  side  of  the  river  Mississippi,  as  they  are  specified  in  the 
7th  Article.  The  island  of  Gortie  shall  be  evacuated  by  Great 
Britain,  three  months  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
of  the  present  treaty ;  and  the  island  of  Minorca,  by  France, 
at  the  same  epoch,  or  sooner,  if  it  can  be  done :  and  according 
to  the  conditions  of  the  6th  Article,  France  shall  likewise  enter 
into  possession  of  the  islands  of  St.  Peter,  and  of  Miquelon,  at 
the  end  of  three  months  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
of  the  present  treaty.  The  factories  in  the  East  Indies  shall 
be  restored  six  months  after  the  oxchantre  of  the  ratifications 


388  APPENDIX 

of  the  present  treaty,  or  sooner,  if  it  can  be  done.  The  for- 
tresses of  the  Havana,  with  all  that  has  been  conquered  in 
the  island  of  Cuba,  shall  be  restored  three  months  after  the 
exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  or  sooner, 
if  it  can  be  done  :  and,  at  the  same  time.  Great  Britain  shall 
enter  into  possession  of  the  country  ceded  by  Spain,  according 
to  the  20th  Article.  All  the  places  and  countries  of  his  most 
Faithful  majesty  in  Europe,  shall  be  restored  immediately  after 
the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty  :  and 
the  Portuguese  colonies,  which  may  have  been  conquered,  shall 
be  restored  in  the  space  of  three  months  in  the  West  Indies, 
and  of  six  months  in  the  East  Indies,  after  the  exchange  of 
the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  or  sooner,  if  it  can  be 
done.  All  the  fortresses,  the  restitution  whereof  is  stipulated 
above,  shall  be  restored,  with  the  artillery  and  ammunition 
which  were  found  there  at  the  time  of  the  conquest.  In  con- 
sequence Avhereof,  the  necessary  orders  shall  be  sent  by  each 
of  the  high  contracting  parties,  with  reciprocal  passports  for 
the  ships  that  shall  carry  them,  immediately  after  the  exchange 
of  the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty. 

King  George  as  Elector. — Art.  XXV.  His  Britannic  majesty, 
as  elector  of  Brunswic  Lunenbourg,  as  well  for  himself,  as  for 
his  heirs  and  successors,  and  all  the  dominions  and  possessions 
of  his  said  Majesty  in  Germany,  are  included  and  guaranteed 
by  the  present  treaty  of  peace. 

Mutual  Guaraiitee. — Art.  XXVI.  Their  sacred  Britannic, 
most  Christian,  Catholic,  and  most  Faithful  majesties,  promise 
to  observe,  sincerely  and  bo7ia  fide,  all  the  articles  contained 
and  settled  in  the  present  treaty ;  and  they  will  not  suffer  the 
same  to  be  infringed,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  their  respective 
subjects ;  and  the  said  high  contracting  parties,  generally  and 
reciprocally,  guaranty  to  each  other  all  the  stipulations  of  the 
present  treaty. 

Ratification. — Art.  XXVI I.  The  solemn  ratifications  of  the 
present  treaty,  expedited  in  good  and  due  foi-m,  shall  be 
exchanged  in  this  city  of  Paris,  between  the  high  contracting 
parties,  in  the  space  of  a  month,  or  sooner  if  possible,  to 
be  computed  from  the  day  of  the  signature  of  the  present 
treaty. 

In  witness  whereof,  we  the  underwritten,  their  ambassadors 
extraordinary,  and  ministers  plenipotentiary,  have  signed  with 


PEACE    OF    PARIS  389 

our  hand,  in  tlieir  name,  and  in  virtue  of  our  full  powers,  tlie 
present  definitive  treaty,  and  have  caused  the  seal  of  our  arms 
to  be  put  thereto. 

Done  at  Paris  the  10th  of  February,  1763. 

(L.S.)  Bedford,  C.P.S. 

(L.S.)  Choiseul,  Due  de  Praslin. 

(L.S.)  El  Marquis  de  Grimaldi. 

Separate  Articles, 

Saving  Titles. — I.  Some  of  the  titles  made  use  of  by  the 
contracting  powers,  either  in  the  full  powers,  and  other  acts, 
during  the  course  of  the  negotiation,  or  in  the  preamble  of  the 
present  treaty,  not  being  generally  acknowledged  ;  it  has  been 
agreed,  that  no  prejudice  shall  ever  result  therefrom  to  any 
of  the  said  contracting  parties,  and  that  the  titles,  taken  or 
omitted,  on  either  side,  on  occasion  of  the  said  negotiation, 
and  of  the  present  treaty,  shall  not  be  cited  or  quoted  as  a 
precedent. 

French  Language. — II.  It  has  been  agreed  and  determined, 
that  the  French  language,  made  use  of  in  all  the  copies  of  the 
present  treaty,  shall  not  become  an  example,  which  may  be 
alleged,  or  made  a  precedent  of,  or  prejudice,  in  any  manner, 
any  of  the  contracting  powers  ;  and  that  they  shall  conform 
themselves,  for  the  future,  to  what  has  been  observed,  and 
ought  to  be  observed,  with  regard  to,  and  on  the  part  of 
powers,  who  are  used,  and  have  a  right,  to  give  and  receive 
copies  of  like  treaties  in  another  language  than  French  ;  the 
present  treaty  having  still  the  same  force  and  effect,  as  if 
the  aforesaid  custom  had  been  therein  observed. 

Portugal. — III.  Though  the  king  of  Poitugal  has  not  signed 
the  present  definitive  treaty,  their  Britannic,  most  Christian, 
and  Catholic  majesties  acknowledge,  nevertheless,  that  his 
most  Faithful  majesty  is  formally  included  therein  as  a  con- 
tracting party,  and  as  if  he  had  expressly  signed  the  said  treaty  ; 
consequently,  their  Britannic,  most  Christian,  and  Catholic 
majesties,  respectively  and  conjointly  promise  to  his  most 
Faithful  majesty,  in  the  most  express  and  most  binding  manner, 
the  execution  of  all  and  every  the  clauses  contained  in  the 
said  treaty,  on  his  act  of  accession. 


390  APPENDIX 

The  present  Separate  Articles  shall  have  the  same  force  as 
if  they  were  inserted  in  the  treaty. 

In  witness  whereof,  we  the  underwritten  ambassadors  extra- 
ordinary, and  ministers  plenipotentiary,  of  their  Britannic,  most 
Christian,  and  Catholic  majesties,  have  signed  the  present 
Separate  Articles,  and  have  caused  the  seal  of  our  arms  to 
be  put  thereto. 

Done  at  Paris  the  10th  of  February,  1763. 

(L.S.)  Bedford,  C.P.S. 

(L.S.)  Choiseul,  Due  de  Praslin. 

(L.S.)  El  Marquis  de  Grimaldi. 


INDEX 


Abercromby,  Gen.  James,  his  com- 
mand, 1758,  306-7  ;  his  disaster, 
330-3  ;  superseded,  397 

Abraham,  Heights  of,  270,  419,452, 
456,464  ;  iirilO-ll 

Abreu,  Marques  de,  Spanish  Ambas. 
in  London,  48 

d'Ache,  Anne  Antoine,  ComLe  (Chef 
d'Escad.),  160,  338-40,  344-50; 
ii.  120-6,  129-30,  133-4 

Achilles,  ii.  25 

Acrias,  249 

Active,  ii.  321 

Actceon,  ii.  52,  235-6 

Additional  Instructions.  See  Fight- 
ing Instructions 

Africa,  West  Coast  of,  337,  362, 366  ; 
ii.  183 

Aiguillon,  Emanuel  Armand, 
Vignerot  -  Duplessis  -  RicheHeu, 
Due  d',  Governor  of  Brittany, 
299-300  ;  ii.  11,  18-9,  21,  45,  49, 
50,  56,  70  ;  his  overtures  to 
Howe,  73,  76.  168 

Aix,  Island  of,  211-4,  217,  221,  223, 
261-2,  269  :  ii.  176 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Peace  of  (1748),  11, 
17,  64,  82  ;  ii.  178,  192 

Albany  (New  York),  175,  306  ;  ii. 
106,  114 

Albemarle,  George  Keppel,  3rd  Earl 
of,  ii.  157;  C. -in-C.  against 
Havana,  241,  250,  253,  258,  261, 
266-73,  275-83 

Albemarle,  William  Anne  Keppel, 
2Dd  Earl  of,  Ambas.  in  Paris,  10, 
16,  27,  30 

Alcide,  55,  65,  260 

Aleppo,  ii.  140 

Algarve,  ii.  314,  321-2 

Alleghany,  mountains,  13;  river,  14 

AUer,  river,  193,  233-5,  238,  245-6 

Almeria,  132 

Alva,  Duke  of,  cited,  ii.  95  n. 


Ambleteuse,  ii.  18 

Amherst,  Gen.  Jeffrey  (afterwards 
Lord  Amherst),  254,"315  ;  C.-in-C. 
at  Louisbourg,  320-31  ;  C.-in-C. 
in  N.  America,  397-9  ;  his  orders, 
1759,  404-5  ;  his  campaign,  423, 
442,  445,  452-3  ;  in  Montreal 
campaign  (1760),  ii.  105-7,  111, 
113-8  ;  his  instructions  (1761), 
143,  154,  177-8,  209,  239,.  253, 
262  ;  relieves  Newfoundland, 
324-5 

Amherst,  Capt.  John  (afterwards 
Admiral,  brother  of  above),  114 

Amherst,  Col.  William  (afterwards 
General,  brother  of  above  and 
father  of  William  Pitt,  Earl 
Amherst),  ii.  321-5 

Andrews,  Capt.  Thomas,  114 

Anson,  Adm.  of  Fleet,  George,  Lord 
(First  Lord  of  Admiralty),  his 
character,  34-6,  42,  47,  49  ;  his 
relations  with  Hardwicke,  51-2, 
85,  179  ;  58-9,  86  ;  his  responsi- 
bility for  Minorca,  97, 102-3, 133- 
5;  resigns,  138,  150;  returns  to 
office,  179-82  ;  his  relations  with 
Pitt,  191,  232  ;  ii.  11-13,  100,  103  ; 
hoists  his  flag  (1758),  267,  269, 
273,  275,  289-91,  297,  373-5;  at 
Admiralty  (1759),  403  ;  his  home 
defence,  ii.  9,  21-4,  27,  44,  46-7, 
49,  54,  73,  315-6  ;  on  Baltic 
squadron,  79  ;  on  Belleisle,  98, 
100,  131 ;  102 ;  on  war  with 
Spain,  196-8,  203-4,  208;  his 
design  against  Hanava,  ii.  246-9, 
254-5, 259-60,  261  n.;  dying,  297- 
8,  318  ;  dead,  342  ;  his  influence 
on  the  navy,  ii.  ^66-73 ;  his 
strategical  opinions  and  practice, 
i.  265  n.,  270.  273,  290,  311-3  ; 
ii.  374  ;  on  fleet  tactics,  i.  274-5  ; 
his  pupils,  i.  400  ;  his  influence 
as  First  Lord,  i.  51,  56  ;  ii.  366-73  ; 
letters  of,  i.  129-30 


392 


INDEX 


Anson,  Lady  {Lad}'  Elizabeth  Yorke, 

Lord  Hardwicke's  daughter),  335 
Army,  its  antipathy  to  amphibious 

operations,  287,  s'TG,  397  ;  ii.  149- 

50,  158 
Arnouville  (or  Arnonville),  38G 
Aubignv,  Comte  d',  Chef  d'Escad., 

357-9,  3G3 
Audierne  Bay,  ii.  17,  28-9 
Augusta,  365 
Austria,  policy  of,  17,  74,  79,  141- 

3,  145,  148-9,  153,  1(50,  244,  284  ; 

ii.  141-2,  346 
Austrian     Netherlands    (Belgium), 

naval  importance  of,  64,  74,  142  ; 

ii.  175-6,  364,  373 
Auray  (Morbihan),  ii.  42-3,  59 


B» 


Bahamas,  351-2,  355,  383.     See  aho 

Old  Bahama  Channel 
Baird,  Capt.  Patrick,  114 
Baleine,  ii.  134 
Balfour,  Capt.  George,  328 
Baltic,  38  ;  Russian  fleet  in,  75,  185, 

193 ;    ii.  288  ;    British   squadron 

proposed  for,  i.  146-7, 163-5,  184, 

187,  243,  262,  264  ;  ii.  78-80 
Barbadoes,  351-6,  362-3,  377,  383, 

385,  392,  394  ;  ii.  209,  218-9,  255 
Barbuda,  351 
Barjleur,  103,  211,  214 
Barr^,  Major  Isaac,  A.-G.,  Quebec, 

449;  Col.,  ii.  229 
Barrier  fortresses,  19,  20,  38,  74,  76 
Barrington,  Gen.  Hon.  John,  377  ; 

succeeds  Hopson  at  Guadeloupe, 

382-95,  408 
Barrington,     Capt.     Hon.     >Samuel 

(afterwards    Adm.,     brother    of 

above),  25  n. 
Barrington,  William  Wildman,  2nd 

Viscount,  Sec.  at  War,  brother  of 

above,  377  ;  ii.  227  ;  treasurer  of 

navy, 342 
Barton,  Capt.  Matthew,  ii.  266 
Basque  Roads,  203,  209,  211,  260-1, 

269,  316  ;  ii.  42,  68,  80,  170,  315 
Basseterre    (Guadeloupe),    379-83, 

386, 388,  391-2 
Basseterre  (St.  Kitt's),  ii.  259 
Batiscan,  419,  443,  446,  450,  454-5 
Batticaloa,  ii.  122 
Battleships,  development  of   their 

classification,  ii.  367-71 
Batz  or  Bas,  island  of,  273,  200 
Bauffremont,  Chev.  de,  Prince  de 


Listenois,  Chef  d'Escad.,  159, 
160,  260,  263-4 

Bayreuth,  Wilhelmine,  Margravine 
of  (Frederick's  sister),  184 

Beauharnais  Beaumont,  Marquis 
de,  Gov.  of  Fr.  Leeward  Islands, 
387 

Beaumout  (Quebec),  422 

Beauport,  Cote  de  (Quebec),  417-9, 
427,430-1,  437,  440,  448,  452-3, 
456-7,  460,  462,  468-9,  470 

Beausejour  (Acadia),  26 

Beaussier  de  I'lsle,  Capt.,  316,  326-7 

Bedford,  223 

Bedford,  314.  410 

Bedford,  John  Russell,  4th  Duke  of. 
Lord  Lieut,  of  Ireland,  223  ;  ii. 
15,  54  ;  head  of  peace  party  in 
Cabinet,  ii.  171-3,  176, 191-2, 194, 
212,  247,  293,  333  ;  peace  pleni- 
potentiary, 338,  342-3,  348,  355- 
60,  365 

Belfast  Lough,  ii.  89,  91 

Belleisle,  Strait  of,  56-7 

Belleisle,  Island  of,  70,  260  ;  ii.  45, 
51-2,  57-9,  95-9, 101-3.  131,  133, 
135,  140-70,  173-6,  179,  189-90, 
210-1,  218,  220,  223,  251,  258, 270, 
317-22,  332,  341 

Belleisle,  Louis,  Due  de  Vernon, 
Mar^chal  de,  87-92,  98,  247,  250- 
1,  283-4,  295-6,  .303  ;  ii.  17-20, 
45,  94,  168  ;  dies,  149 

Berg,  Duchy  of  (Prussian  Rhine- 
land),  148,  203 

Bergen  (Norway),  ii.  88-9 

Berlin,  Raid  on,  ii.  288 

Bermudas,  317  n. 

Bernis,  Frangois  de  Pierre,  Comte 
de,  Fr.  Foreign  Minister,  247, 
251 

Berryer,  Nicolas  Ren^,  Fr.  Minister 
of  Marine,  ii.  56 

Bic,  Isle  de  (St.  Lawrence),  402-3, 
407,  410,  419,  428 

Bienfaisant,  327-8,  334 

Blackstones  (Ushant),  ii.  28 

Blackwater  River  (Essex),  ii.  18 

Blakeney,  Gen.  William,  98,  132 

Blankenburg,  195 

Bldnac  Courbon,  Chcv.  de  (Chef 
d'Escad.),  ii.  234,  236-40,  242-4, 
279-9,  262-4.  279,  31.5-6,  323 

Bligh,  Gen.  Edward,  286-7,  293-9, 
372,  376 

Blockade,  273-5  ;  ii.  27,  41,  54,  86, 
92,  135,  158,  160,  234-5  ;  Keppel 
on,  169,  318-20 

Blond'-,  ii.  91 


INDEX 


393 


Boarding,  ii.  57,  123 

Bohemia,  ItJl,  163-4,  184-5,  193 

Uombay  (as  naval  base),  340-1,  344, 
350  ;  ii.  120,  127-1),  1S9 

Bompart  (or  Bompar),  M.  de,  Chef 
d'Escad.,  382-93;  ii.  10,  22,  29, 
31.  43-4,  49,  52 

Bordeaux,  200,  203,  2G0,  262,  303-4, 
413-4  ;  ii.  9,  27,  70,  103, 113,  170, 
176 

Boscawen,  Adm.  Hon.  Edward,  16  ; 
liis  record,  42  ;  as  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  150,  159,  183  ;  his 
command  (1755),  45,  et  xeq ;  his 
encounter  with  Delamotte,  54-9, 
65,  67,  72,  80-3,  139,  2;!6 ;  ii. 
198;  (1756),  i.  129;  C.-in-C, 
Louisbourg  (1758), 254,307  n.,  312 
-8,  323-30 ;  his  return,  334-5, 396 ; 
C.-in-C.  in  Mediterranean  (1759), 
398-9,  464  ;  ii.  9-10,  22,  24,  31- 
41 ;  (1760),  90-1,  131  ;  dead,  158  ; 
as  a  sea-officer,  275  ;  ii.  101  ;  no 
had  fantassin,i.  325;  his  nervous- 
ness, 134 

Boston  (Mass.),  26,  310,  317,  331, 
42;«,  433  ;  ii.  Ill 

Bougainville,  M.de,  A.D.C.  to  Mont- 
calm, 102  ;  his  mission  to  France, 
411-4,  437,  444-8,  455-61,  466, 
469-72;  ii.  109,  115-7 

Boulogne,  93,  263,  272  ;  ii.  18,  95-6 

Bourlamaque,  Chev.  de,  102,  475; 
ii.  109,  115-7 

Boys,  Commodore  William,  21, 47-8, 
88-9,  92 

Braddock,  Maj.-Gen.  Edward,  16, 
25,  27,  31,  42-3,  45  ;  defeat  and 
death  of,  73 

Bradstreet,  Col.,  333 

Bremen,  161, 193,  195,  224-6,  238-9, 
241-2,  245-6 

Bremervorde,  224,  226,  233 

Brest  passira.  >'«■  Blockade,  Hawke, 
Boscawen,  Keppel,  Spry,  &c. 

J5rett,  Adni.  Sir  Peircy,  "i29,  131, 
205,  216,  220;  ii.  5,  10,  31,  36- 
40  ;  at  Cadiz,  43,  86-8 

Brilliant,  ii.  90 

Bristol,  Augustus  Herve.y.  :>rd  Earl 
of.     See  Capt.  llervey 

George  William   Ilervcy,  2iid 

Earl,  ambas.  to  Madrid  (1758- 
1762\  ii.  42,  151.  1S!=!,  1^4,  198- 
201,  215-7,  229-31.  217 

Brodrick,  Adm.  Thomas,  129,  131, 
205,  216.  220  ;  ii.  5.  10,  31,  36-40  ; 
at  Cadiz,  43,  86-8 

Broglie,  Marechal  Victor  Fran9ois, 


Due  de.  238-9,  244,  292;  ii.    14, 
26,  30,  167,  179,  182,  308  ?j. 
Brunswick,  154,  155,  193,  196,  226, 

229,  233-4.  245-6 
Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel,  Karl  Wil- 
helm.    Hereditary  Prince  of,    ii. 
104,  167.     See  also  Ferdinand  and 
Louis  of  Brunswick 
Buchanness,  ii.  88 
Backiwjham,  100,  114,  117 
Buckle,   Commodore    Matthew,   ii. 

158,  169-70,  233 
Bull  River,  12,  14,  25 
Bunge  (Swedish  foreign  minister), 
intercepted  letters  of,  84-5,  96-7, 
109 
Burford,  ii.  66 

Burgoyne,  Brigadier  John,  ii.  322 
Burton,  Colonel,  .398,  426,    463-4  ; 

at  Havana,  ii.  278-9 
Bussy,  General  de,  344 
Bussy,  Abbe,  his  mission   to  Eng- 
land, ii.  182,  187-92,  200,  285 
Bute,  John  Stuart,  3rd  Earl  of,  288  ; 
ii.   102  ;  his  anti-German  policy, 
144;    Sec.   of  State.    171,   174-5; 
j       heads  peace  party,  198-200, 202-3; 
i        forms  new  administration,  211-2  ; 
I       247,  252 ;  his  intrigues  for  peace, 
I       285-94,  296-8,  333-4,  342,  .346-9, 
I       355-60  ;  First  Lord  of  Treasury, 
I       .337,  361 ;  his  quarrel  with  Fred- 
I       erick,  329-31,  333-8,  34.3,  353-4, 
1       361-2 ;     his    unpopularity,    218, 

354  ;  his  fall,  365 
I  Byng,  Adm.    Hon.  John,  his  com- 
j       mand,    1756,   97-8  ;    his  instruc- 
I       lions,  100-1 ;  his  character,  104-7  ; 
his    campaign.    111    et   seq.  ;    his 
tactics,  11.5-121;   ii.   57;    super- 
seded, 129-31  ;  execution,  1.33-4, 
140,  175 
Byron,  Capt.  Hon.  John  (afterwards 
Admiral),  ii.  108,  113 


Cadiz,  53,  70,  211-2,  265  ;  ii.  35-6. 
43,  86-7,  194,  196,  217,  230-2, 
303-14,  321-2 

Caen,  228,  280 

Calcutta,  149,  157.  .341-2.  .344,  350; 
ii.  121-7 

C'aldwell,  Lieut.  (Capt.  1765),  401  n. 

Campeachy  Bav,  ii.  276 

Canoall  Bay,  275-7,  279 

Cap  Franfois  (capital  of  San  Do- 
mingo, now  Cap  Haytien),  353-4, 


394 


INDEX 


347-GO,    3G3-7,    393;     ii.   237-9, 

242-4,  256,  259-9,  2(J2-3,  323 
Cap  Kouije  (R.  St.  Lawrence),  435-7, 

456,  459, 461-5, 468 
Cape  Antonio  (Cuba),    358-9,  365, 

368  ;  ii.  265,  276 
Cape    Breton    Island,    18,    43,    76, 

318-9,  328;  ii.  156 
Cape  Coast  Castle,  366 
Cape  Clear,  ii.  90,  114-5,  179,  323 
Cape  Nicholas  (St.  Domingo),  368; 

ii.    240,    253,    256,    258-9,    261, 

264-5 
Cape  Passaro,  Battle  of,  ii.  198 
Cape  Race,  53 
Cape  Sagres,  391 
Cape  St.  Vincent,  ii.  35-6,  39 
Cape  Tiburon  (St.  Domingo),  354, 

359;  ii.257 
Cape  Torrinana,  ii.  320 
Capes-Terres   (Guadeloupe),  381-2, 

1387 
Captain,  100,  114,  410,  423,  430 
Captain  -  General,    Office    of,    dis- 
cussed, 230 
Cardinals,  Battle  of.     See  Quiberon. 
Carical,  346,  349;  ii.  129,  138 
Carisbrook  Castle,  271-2 
Carlisle  Bay   (Barbadoes),  253 ;    ii. 

218 
Carkett,  Capt.  Robert,  259 
Carleton,  Col.  Guy  (afterwards  Lord 

Dorchester),     Q.-M.-G.,     Quebec 

(1759),    408,   411,    416,  426,  432, 

437-8;    at     Belleisle,     ii.     163; 

Q.-M.-G.,  Havana,  ii.  250,  268-9, 

277-8 
Carrickfergus,  raid  on,  ii.  89-90 
Cartagena,  44,  238,  255-8,  399  ;  ii. 

243,  247,  276,  303-6 
Cas   Navires  (Martinique),  378  ;  ii. 

221,  235,  255  , 
Castillon,  Capt.  de,  352 
Cassel,  186  ;  ii.  288,  344-5,  362 
Catford,  Capt.  Charles,  114 
Cay  Comfite,  ii.  264,  279 
Cay  Lobos,  ii.  264 
Cay  Sal,  ii.  262-4 
Caycos  Passage,  359  ;  ii.  279 
Cavlus,  Chev.  and  Marquis  de,  352 
Cdebre,  327 
Celle,  233.  235,  245 
Centaurc,  ii.  37-8 
Vcntarion,  130,  410,  440;  ii.  249 
Cevennes,  The,  163-4 
Chads  (or  Shads),  Capt.  James,  463, 

467-8 
du   Chaffault    de   Besne,   Capt.    le 

Comte,  316-7,  334-5 


Cliandernagore,  157,  342,  344-5, 
350 

Charente  River,  211  ;  ii.  70,  80,  86, 
159,  233 

Charles  III.  (of  Spain),  ii.  74,  76, 
186-9,  300-1 

Chinsura,  ii.  127-8 

Choiseul,  Comte  de,  ii.  365 

Etienne     Fran9ois,    Due    de. 

Minister  of  War,  Marine,  and 
Foreign  Affairs.  His  first  in- 
vasion project,  ii.  4,  17-9,  22-3, 
45,  49 ;  tries  to  snatch  a  peace, 
73-7 ;  his  Spanish  policy,  149, 
152,  155,  174-5,  179-89,  195, 
201-3;  his  war  plans,  167,  176; 
his  second  invasion  project,  233, 
251,297-308,324-5;  his  negotia- 
tions with  Bute,  286,  297,  331-2, 
338-41,  346-50 ;  makes  peace, 
361-2;  his  share  in  Pitt's  fall, 
1S3-.5;  his  apologia,  183-5;  on 
commerce  destruction,  299 ;  on 
colonies,  340,  362 

Chorera  (Cuba),  ii.  270,  272,  275-6, 
279 

Ciudadela  (Minorca),  105,  111-2, 
126 

Clarke,  Capt.,  192 

Clermont,  Gen.  Louis,  Comte  de. 
Prince  de  Bourbon  Conde,  244-7, 
250-2,  282-4,  286,  302-3  ;  super- 
seded, 288 

Cleveland  (or  Clevland),  John,  Sec. 
to  Admiralty,  373  ;  ii.  342 

Cleves,  duchy  of,  148 ;  city  of,  153, 
240,  283  ;  ii.  340,  362.  See  also 
Prussian  Rhineland. 

Clive,  Col.  Robert,  340-2,  350;  ii. 
121-2,  127-8  ;  his  proposals  to 
Pitt,  343  ;  ii.  121,  130-1 

Coesfeldt,  battle  of,  292 

Colberg,  ii.  288-9,  290,  295,  351 

Colville,  Capt.  Alexander,  Lord, 
473;  Commodore  and  C.-in-C,  N. 
America,  ii.  107,  112-3,  209,  253, 
324-5 

Combined  expeditions,  disturbance 
by,  194-6,  199,  227-8,  236,  252, 
254-5,  282-4.  295,  30-2-3;  ii..l4, 
83,  96,  103,  130-4,  168,  176-7; 
direction  of,  218  ;  ii.  102 

Command  of  sea.  See  Lines  of  Pass- 
age and  Conununication 

Commander-in-Chief,  oiiice  of,  231 

Commerce  destruction,  war  value  of, 
Gl ;  ii.  299,  375-6 

protection,  system  of,   in  W. 

Indies,  353-8,  361-2,  369 


INDEX 


395 


Commnnications.  iSfff  Lines  of  Pass- 
age 

Communication  theory  of  naval 
strategy,  308 

Conflans,  Hubert  deBnenne,  Comte 
de,  98,  290 ;  ii.  22  ;  his  campaign 
(1759).  27,  30-1,  45-51;  puts  to 
sea,  52-5  ;  his  fighting  instruc- 
tions, 56-7  ;  his  defeat,  5S-G9 

Conqueror,  ii.  33,  87 

Contadcs,  Marechal  Louis  Eras- 
mus, Marquis,  288,  295,  802  ;  ii. 
14,  22,  30-1 

"Continental  School,"  The,  9,  290 

Convoys,  129,  353-8,  3G1-2.  393; 
ii.  9 

Conwav,  Gen.  Hon.  Henry  Sey- 
mour, 201-2,  209,  220 

Coote,  Col.  (Sir)  Eyre,  ii.  122,  129- 
30,  134-5 

Cornewall,  Capt.  Frederick,  114' 

Capt.  James,  44 

Cornish,  Adm.  (Sir)  Samuel,  ii. 
126-7,  129,  137  n.;  C.-in-C,  E. 
Indies,  138-40,  365 

Cororaandel  Coast,  341,  346  ;  ii.  129, 
133, 136, 138-9,  340 

Corsica,  91,  98,  124,  129,  135-7,  144, 
153-4 

Cotes,  Adm.  Thomas,  363-5 

Coudres,  Isle  de  (St.  Lawrence), 
407,  411,  414,  428 

Council  of  Defence.  See  Secret 
Committee 

Councils  of  War,  Byng's,  124-5,  170, 
213,  216-20;  at  Quebec,  438, 
451-2;  ii.  43 

Crauford  (or  Crawfurd),  Gen.  John, 
ii.  163,  165-6 

Crefeldt,  Battle  of,  286 

Crete,  383 

Croisic,  67-8,  70 

Croix  (Groix  or  Groa),  Isle  de,  ii.  43 

Crooked  Island  Passage,  353,  359 

Crovirn  Point,  25,  405  ;  ii.  115 

Cruiser  work,  47 ;  ii.  20-1.  50-6, 
89-91,  235 

Cruisers,  development  of,  ii.  367-71 

Cuba,  .351 ;  ii.  246,  259,  .347.  See 
Havana 

Cuddalore,  346 

Cumberland,  William,  Duke  of, 
C.-in-C,  headquarters,  16,  33-4, 
41,  60,  67,  103  ;  C.-in-C.  in  West- 
phalia, 1.58,  162,  185-6,  192-9, 
224-7 ;  his  recall  and  di.sgrace, 
230,  408-9  ;  his  influence  revived, 
ii.  157,  249-50,  253  ;  in  opposition 
to  Bute,  342 


Gumming,  Thomas,  the  "  Fighting 

Quaker,"  157,  3.37 
Curagoa,  352 


D 


Dartmouth,  Adm.,  Lord,  119 

Dauphin  Royal,  55-6 

Deane,  Capt.  Joseph,  ii.  112,  114. 
Sec  also  Reprisals 

Declaration  of  War,  hostilities  be- 
fore, 50  et  seq.,  58-9 

Defensive,  Use  of  Naval,  270-1,  329; 
ii.  3,  123.  373-4 

Defiance,  100,  114.  119,  120 

Delamotte.     See  Dubois 

Delfzijl,  248 

Denis,  Coram .  (after  Adm.  Sir 
Peter),  ii.  315 

Denmark,  23-66,  98,  155,  163-4 ; 
mediation  by,  225-6  ;  ii.  5,  75, 
79,  294-5,  327 

Dcptford,  114,  121 

Deseada  Island,  392 

Deschambault,  447,  456  ;  ii.  109 

Devonshire,  William,  4th  Duke  of, 
his  administration  (1756),  150, 
158  ;  during  the  peace  negotia- 
tions, 192,  200,  212,  247,  333-4, 
349,  363 

Devonshire,  314,  410  ;  ii.  55 

Diana,  432-3 

Diego  Rays  or  Rodriguez,  ii.  137-9 

Diemal  River,  ii.  344-7 

Dieppe,  99  ;  ii.  93 

Dinan,  278,  297 

Dinwiddle,  Robert,  Lieut.-Gov.  of 
Virginia,  14 

"  Discipline,"  synonymous  with 
"tactics,"  274 

Diversions,  theory  and  use  of, 
206-9,  272,  291 

Doddington,  Bubb,  59-61 

Dol,  277 

Dolphin,  114 

Dominica,  259,  339,  .351-2,  364, 
384,  390  ;  ii.  143,  177-8,  182,  189, 
237 

Douglas,  Adm.  Sir  James,  C.-in-C. 
Leeward  Islands,  ii.  143,  177-8, 
198,  209-10  ;  under  Rodnev, 
218-9,  233,  237-8,  240,  242-3. 
258,  261-2,  269,  277 

Downs,  the,  72  ;  ii.  21-2,  316, 
318 

Drake,  Capt.  (afterwards  Adm.  Sir) 
Francis  William,  il.  26() 

Drake,  Sir  Francis,  50-1  ;  at  Cadiz, 
210-1,  388-9  ;  ii.  246.  2()0,  266 


396 


INDEX. 


Draper,  Col.  (Sir)  William,  ii.  249, 
254,  365 

Dresden,  149,  153,  193  ;  ii.  75, 
78 

Drucourt,  Capt.  Cliev.  de,  Gov.  of 
Isle  Rovale,  324,  329,  332 

Dublin,  3i4-5,  320,  410  ;  ii.  258 

Du  Bois  de  la  Motte,  Adm.  Comte, 
47,  50,  54-6,  62,  72,  168,  172-4, 
177-8,  184,  237,  339 

Duff,  Capt.  Robert,  ii.  42-3,  46,  50-3, 
59-60,  62,  64, 68 

Dumas,  Maj.-Gen.,  431,  436-7 

Dumet  Island,  ii.  67,  93 

Dunkirk,  19,  20,  64,  80,  88,  89,  99, 
161,  254,  266,  282-5,  303,  413  ;  ii. 
19,  21-2,  40,  47,  86-9,  92,  124-5, 
182,  193,  254,  305-6,  315-G,  318, 
345,  358 

Dunkirk,  53,  55 

Dupleix,  Gen.,  338,  344 

Duquesne,  Adm.  Marquis  Ange,  13, 
14,  256-60,  281 

Duquesne,  Fort,  15,  25,  73,  260 

Durell,  Adm.  Philip,  114  ;  Louis- 
bourg  campaign  (1758),  313;  Que- 
bec campaign  (1759),  397,  399  ; 
Wolfe's  opinion  of,  401-3 ;  his 
orders,  403-4  ;  his  mistake,  407, 
411,  414-5;  417,  420,  425,  428, 
473  ;  ii.  54. 

Dusseldorf,  273,  284,  286,  288 

Dutch.     See  Holland 

Duvernay,  French  Minister  of  War, 
194-6 


E 


Eccentric  attacks,  theory  of,  206-9, 
271-2,  376  ;  ii.  36 

Eccentric  retreat,  224-5 

Echemin  River,  442,  449,  458.  463 

EcJio,  326 

Ecureils,  444 

Edgecombe,  Comm.  Hon.  George 
(Earl  Mount  -  Edgecombe),  72, 
97-8,  101,  105-7.  114 

Edinburgh,  36(5 

Edwards,  Capt.  Richard,  171 

Egremont,  Charles  Wyndham,  2nd 
Earl  of.  Sec.  of  State  after  Pitt, 
ii.  213,  217,  247 ;  negotiates  peace, 

,  286,  333,  343,  346-50,  355-61 

Eguille.     See  Froger  de  I'Eguille 

Eliott,  Col.  George  Augustus  (Lord 
Heathfield),  294  ;  general  at  Ha- 
vana, 250,  267,  271 

Elizabeth,  Czarina  of  Russia,  22,  75, 
141  ;  death  of,  ii.  290,  373 


}   Elliot,Capt.  John  (afterwards  Adm.), 
'       ii.  90-1 

Elphinstone,  Capt.  John  (after- 
wards Adm.),  302  n.  ;  ii.  241, 
262-4,  279 

Emden,  185,  194-5,  199,  205,  223, 
241-53,  264,  285-9,  291-2,  372, 
399  ;  ii.  48,  79,  83,  21 1 

Emperor,  the.  See  Tuscaiij",  Grand 
Duke  of,  and  Maria  Theresa 

Ems  River,  23,   162,  185,  2^9,  242, 
247-8  ;  ii.  288 
I    English  Harbour  (Antigua),  352 
j    Ensenada,  Marquis  of,  ii.  150 

Entreprenant,  56 

Erfurt,  163,  193 

Essex,  ii.  18,  68 

Essex,  Earl  of  (1596),  on  diversions, 
208 

Estaing,  Charles,  Comte  d',  Briga- 
dier (afterwards  Admiral),  ii.  129 

Estr^es,  Louis  de  Tellier,  Marechal 
Comte  d',  162,  185-7,  192-3  ;  ii. 
344-5 

Everit,  Capt.  Michael,  1 1 4 


F 


Fabre,  Capt.,  ii.  279 

"Family  Compact,"  The,  ii.  153, 
180-9,  195,  197,  216 

Faroes,  ii.  89 

Favourite,  ii.  321 

Ferdinand,  Prince  of  Brunswick- 
Wolfenbuttel,  Gen.-Lieut.,  229  ; 
his  campaign  (1757),  233-40; 
(1758)  243-53;  calls  for  coastal 
diversion,  266-7,  27'2-.3,  295,  302; 
ii.  133  ;  passes  the  Rhine,  i.  282-4, 
286,  288-9 ;  forced  to  repass,  292, 
372 ;  General-Feldmarschall  (1759) 
ii.  13-14,  26,  30-1,  77-S  ;  (1760) 
reinforced  from  England,  80-6, 
132  ;  his  campaign,  94,  96,  103-4, 
lOS,  119. 133  ;  (1761)  156,  166, 179, 
182  ;  (1762)  298,  343-6.  361 

Ferdinand  VI.  (of  Spain),  ii.  74,  373 

Ferrol,  ii.  232-3.  303,  305-8.  311-2, 
315-20,  322,  344 

Fighting  Instructions  (English),  35, 
1 16-21,  347  ;  ii.  37,  63-4,  371  ;  of 
Conflans,  56-7 

Finisterre,  Battle  of,  35 

Fisheries,  ii.  15(J,  172,  179-80,  190, 
19  2-3 

Flanders,  naval  importance  of,  42, 
76,  78,  197,  266-7,  283,  303,  372, 
381;  ii.  95,  102,  131,  168 


INDEX 


397 


Fleet,  reform   in   its   organisation, 
*     ii.  3GG-71 
Flobert,  Gen.  de,  ii.  89 
Flota.     See  Plate  Fleet 
Flotilla,  defensive,  ii.  8,  20-1,814, 

316  ;  offensive,  9,  35  ;  differentia- 
tion of,  21  n.,  367-71 
Florida,  ii.  361-2 
Forbes,  Adm.  Hon.  John,  ii.  318 
Forde,  Col.,  ii.  121 
PormidaLlr,  ii.  G9 
Forrest,  Capt.  Arthur,  365-8 
Fort  Chambly,  ii.  1 16-7 
Fort  Edward,  175 
FortFouras  (Rochefort),  215-6 
Fort    Louis    (Guadeloupe),    381-3, 

386,  388 
Fort  Niagara,  25 
Fort  Royal  (Martinique,  now  Fort 

de  France),  353,  357,  368,  383-5, 

390;  ii.  219;  capture  of,  220-5, 

236-7 
Fort  St.  David,  346-8 
Fort  William  Henry,  175 
Fortune,  sloop,  ii.  51 
Frankfort,  ii.  14,  27,  156 
Frehel,  Cape,  297 
Freyburg,  ii.  342 
Friesland  (East  rrisia),23,  185,  194. 

199,  23r,,  238-9,  245-7,  250,  264, 

407 
Frojer  de  I'Eguille,    Capt.,  ii.  121, 

123,  125 
Fuentes,  Conde  de,  Spanish  ambas. 

in   London,  ii.  85,  96-7,    150-3, 

194-5,  215,  230 
Fundy,  Bay  of,  26,  73,  230,  331 


G 


Gabarus  Bay,  318-9,  321,  325,  330 

Galicia,  ii.  306 

Galissoniere,  Adm.   Marquis  de  la, 

12-3,  26 ;   his   character,   107-8  ; 

his    orders   (1756),    108-10;    his 

Minorca  campaign,   132,    136-7; 

his  flagship  taken, 258-9 
Galitzin,  Alexander,  Duke,  Russian 

envoy  in   London,  165 ;    ii.  292, 

327-9 
Gambler,  Capt.  James,  ii.  66  n 
Gardiner,   Capt.  Arthur,   114,   116, 

121,  258-9 
Geary,  Adm.  Francis,  ii.  43,  47,  53, 

55,  69,  70 
Genoa,  policy  of,  91,  97,  135-6 
George  II.,  22,  39,  47,  65,  73-4,  146, 

155,  157-8,   197-8,   285,  289  ;    ii. 


12,  93  ;  his  sudden  death,  100-1 ; 
influence  on  selection  of  officers, 
ii.  201,  286,  377 

George  III.,  ii.  102;  his  antipathy 
to  Germany,  144,  213  ;  opposes 
Pitt,  156-7 ,203  ;  eager  for  peace, 
192,  350,  356-7  ;  ii.  249,  295-6, 
303 

Gibraltar,  56 

Glasgow,  intended  raid  on,  ii.  19 

Goltz,  Gen.  Baron  von  der,  ii.  330 

Gombroon,  ii.  129 

Goodricke,  Sir  John,  minister  desig- 
nate to  Sweden.  239,  244 

Goosetrey,  Capt.  William,  ii.  273 

Goree,  304,  337, 374  ;  ii.  81,  174,  179, 
286,  307,  322 

Gosport,  171 

Goteberg,  ii.  88 

Goth  a,  154,  226 

Gouttes,  Marquis  Charry  des,  Chef 
d'Escad.,  316-7,  323-33 

Grafton,  242 

Granby,  Gen.  John  Manners,  Mar- 
quis of,  285  ;  C.-in-C.  in  Germany, 
ii.  83,  85,  182.  344-5 

Grande  Terre  (Guadeloupe),  381-2, 
387-8,  390 

Granville,  John  Carteret,  Earl  of. 
President  of  the  Council,  16  ;  his 
character,  33,  42,  46 ;  on  com- 
merce destruction,  61  ;  his  atti- 
tude to  peace,  ii.  174,  198,  205, 
349  ;  on  war  direction,  205 

(Normandy),  99,  278,  280,  295 

Graves,  Capt.  Thomas  (;ifterwards 
Adm.  Lord),  ii.  25  n.,  324-5 

Great  Portage,  ii.  114 

Greemvich,  160,  360-7 

Grenada  and  Grenadines,  351,  393; 
ii.  225,  236,  332-3,  341 

Grenville,  George.  Treasurer  of 
Navy,  succeeds  Pitt  as  leader  of 
Commons,  ii.  212-5,  217,  227-8, 
247,  252,  254,  296,  333-6  ;  Secre- 
tary of  State,  337,  342,  346-50, 
355-60 ;  returns  to  Admiralty, 
361-3 

Griffon,  391 

Grimaldi,  Marquis  de,  Spanish 
ambas.  in  Paris,  ii.  151-3,  184-7, 
190,  194-5,  197,  201-2, 204,  215, 
307  ;  Choiseul's  treatment  of,  341, 
349,  358,  361,  365 

Guadeloupe,  354-5;  conquest  of, 
379-89,  391-2,  395  ;  ii.  66,  143, 
174-5,  177,  179,  199,  209,  210, 
218,  237,  304,  307;  as  peace 
counter,  332-3,  340,  346 


398 


INDEX 


Guardships,  function  of,  in  mobi- 
lisation, 36 ;  ii.  90 

Guay,  Comte  du,  Chef  d'Escad., 
68-71 

Gueldres  (Prussian  Rhineland),  ii. 
340,  343,  346-7.  349,  350-2,  355, 
362 

Guernsey,  ii.  38 

Guildford,  ii.  354 

Guinea  ships  (slavers),  362-3 

Gunnery  (naval),  ii.  274-5 


H 


Halberstadt,  196,  232 

Haldane,  Col.  George,  Gov.  desig- 
nate of  Jamaica,  388 

Halifax,  George  Montagu  -  Dunk, 
Earl  of,  158  ;  succeeds  Anson,  ii. 
318,  342,  361  ;  Sec.  of  State,  361, 
364 

Hamburg,  224,  228 

Hameln,  247 

Hamilton,  Capt.  George,  432 

Hampton  Court,  259 

Hanau,  251 

Hanover,  position  of,  22-3,  39,  42, 
64-6,  75,  77-8,  82,  87,  141  ;  eccen- 
tric attack  on,  191 ;  ii.  2,  213 

Hanoverian  troops  in  England,  139, 
151,  155 

Harcourt,  Gen.  de,  280-1 

Hardy,  Adm.  (Sir)  Charles  (1757), 
167-8,  170  ;  in  Louisbourg  cam- 
paign (1758),  254,  312,  317-8,  320, 
324;  (1762),  ii.  323 

Hardwicke,  Philip  Yorke,  1st  Earl 
of,  Lord  Chancellor  (1736-56), 
16,  33,  42  ;  his  relations  with 
Anson,  51-2,  58,  85  ;  arranges 
Newcastle-Pitt  coalition,  179-181 ; 
without  office;  183,  187,  209  ;  on 
•'Captain-General,"  230-1,  243; 
ii.  12,  14,  55,  83,  102,  131,  151, 
191-2,  196,  199,  206,  208,  247; 
on  the  peace,  287,  333-5,  349, 
363 ;  his  strategical  opinions,  i. 
227,  229,  241 ;  ii.  79,  84,  95  n., 
147,  154,  204,  374  ;  on  commerce 
destruction,  i.  86 

Hardeur,  99 

Harley,  Robert,  Earl  of  Oxford,  ii. 
350,  360,  363 

Harraan,  Capt.  William,  381 

Hastcnbeck,  battle  of,  193,  197 

Hau.ssonville,  Col.  d'.  ii.  324-5 

Havana,  373 ;  ii.  188 ;  expedition 
against,   ii.   238-9,   242,    246-84, 


289,    296,    301,   308,   324,    354-5, 

358-9.  360-2,  369 
Haviland,  Col.,  in  N.  America,   ii. 

106, 114-7  ;  at  Martinique,  220-1; 

at  Havana,  250 
Havre,  87,  99,  200,  254,  280 :  ii.  14, 

21,  24-5, 47-8 
Havrincour,     French     ambas.     to 

Sweden,  ii.  18,  22,  49 
Hawke,  Adm.  Sir  Edward  (Lord), 

44,  123  ;  his  command  (1755),  50, 
53,  59-61  ;  his  strategy,  66-73 ; 
(1756),  97-8,  100;  supersedes 
IJyng,  129;  his  tactical  exercises, 
131 ;  C.-in-C.  in  Mediterranean, 
132,  134-7,  144-5,  156,  183; 
Rochefort  expedition,  187,  195, 
197  ;  his  instructions,  201  ;  his 
opinion  of  the  generals,  209-10, 
232;  at  Rochefort,  210-21,  229, 
236;  (1758),  260-2;  strikes  his 
flag,  '268-91,  271,  275,  316,  320; 
invalided,  399 ;  Channel  Fleet 
(1759),  ii.  10,  15;  his  blockade. 
16-24,  27.  39,  41-51 ;  in  chase  of 
Conflans,  52-6  ;  defeats  him,  58- 
70,  72-3;  (1760),  90;  his  landing 
project,  93-4,  96,  99-103.  159-60  ; 
Channel  Fleet  (1762),  248,  316- 
20;  his  last  cruise,  322-3,  342, 
344  ;  his  character,  i.  204  ;  ii.  99, 
101 

Hay,  Edward.  British  Minister  at 
Lisbon,  ii.  231,  299,  310-4,  316-7 

Ilcbe,  ii.  51 

Hector,  Capt.  Charles-Jean,  Comte 
d',  ii.  323 

Ilermione,  ii.  134,  321,  354 

H6ros,  ii.  66-7 

Hervey,  Capt.  Hon.  Augustus  (3rd 
Earl  of  Bristol),  129;  ii.  28.  43, 

45,  49 ;  at  Martinique,  2'20-2, 
225-6,  235-8,  248  ;  at  Havana, 
258-9,  266,  272-4,  283,  '285,  360 

Hesse,  39  ;  troops  of,  88,  154-5 

Hevia,  Adm.  Don  Gutierre  de. 
Marques  del  Real  Transporte,  ii. 
2.')7-8,  263,  269,  273-4,  284 

Highland  regiments,  152  and  n., 
372,  377 

Hocquart,  Capt.,  54 

Hodgson,  Gen.  Studholme,  ii.  157- 
8,  160-1,  166-7 

Holburne,  Adm.  Francis,  his  com- 
mand (1755),  48  et  seq.,  100;  his 
campaign  (1757),  156,  160,  169- 
76 ;  blockades  Delamotte,  177-8, 
184,  237 

Holderness,  Robert,  Earl  of.  Sec,  of 


INDEX 


399 


state  for  North,  33,  49-50,  70, 
150,  154,  187,  1H9-90,  229,  267; 
ii.  15  ;  retires,  171 

Holland,  policy  of,  74,  80,  89,  139, 
143;  ii.  5-7 

Holmes,  Capt.  Charles,  177 ;  com- 
modore at  London,  242, 246-252, 
410;  Adm.,  Quebec  (1759),  399, 
4'^5,  428,  430,  434,  435  n.,  438, 
442-3, 444-51,  456,  458-9,  463-7; 
ii.  54  ;  C.-in-C,  Jamaica,  91,  196, 
198,  233 ;  dead,  239-40,  243 

Holstein,  ii.  295-6,  327;  Duke  of, 
see  Peter  III.  and  Schlesvvig-Hol- 
stein 

Honduras,  ii.  150-1,  180,  198-9, 
207,  332 

Honfleur,  280 ;  ii.  25 

Hood,  Capt.  Samuel  (afterwards 
Adm.  Viscount),  ii.  24 

Hopken,  Baron  Johann,  Swedish 
Chancellor,  85  ;  ii.  80 

Hopson,  Gen.,  376-82 

Hornet,  sloop,  ii.  282,  235 

Houelberg,  386 

Howe,  Col.  George  Augustus,  3rd 
Viscount,  306-7  ;  death  of,  322  n. 

Capt.  Hon.  Eichard  (afterwards 

Adm.  Earl),  54-5 ;  his  character, 
205;  at  Rochefort,  212-4;  his 
command  (1758),  266,  272,  275-81. 
287-9,  293-302;  4rh  Vi-scount, 
304  ;  ii.  59,  64-6  ;  overtures  made 
to  him,  73,  76,  131,  315 

Col.  Hon.  William  (afterwards 

Gen.,  5th  Viscount),  at  Quebec, 
464 ;  at  Havana,  ii.  272,  276 

Hughes,  Capt.  (afterwards  Adm. 
Sir  Richard),  ii.  137 

Commodore  Robert,  377 

JIunter,  sloop,  443,  454,  461,  467-8 


Imber  Court,  223 

India,  Pitt's  views  on  conquest  in, 

337-9 
Intermediate  ships,   ii.  21  n.,  367, 

369-70 
Intelligence  service,  activity  of,  41, 

84-5,  87,  97;  ii.  13,  17-8,  23,  49, 

150,  152,  194,  201,  229  n. 
Intrepid,  100,  114,  122-4,  131 
Intrepide,  ii.  67 
Invasion,    projects    of,    Belleisle's 

(1756),   87-92,   98;    (1757),    104; 

(1759),  ii.  3-4,  8,  13,  17-20,  22-3  ; 

Choiseul's  (1762),  301-8  ;  various 


categories  of,  i.  207-9 ;  panics, 
84,  88,  140,  197;  ii.  14-15;  Bed- 
ford on, 176 

Invincible,  314 

Ireland,  133,  159,286,310,317;  ii. 
299 

Irwin,  Col.  Sir  John,  297,  301  n. 

Islay,  raid  on,  ii.  89 

Isle  of  Wight  as  place  d'armes,  195, 
163-4,  267,  301  ;  ii.  10-1,  13-4 

Isle  Royale  (St.  Lawrence),  ii.  115 

Isle  d'Yeu,  ii.  70 


Jacques  Cartier,  river,  444-6,  456, 

471 ;  ii.  109,  114 
Jamaica,    72,    168,   351-5,    357-64, 

368,    388,  399;   ii.  91,   233,  237- 

40,  242, 244, 246,256,  258-9, 261-2, 

265,  276-7,  299,  304,  307 
James,  Comm.  (H.E.I.C.S.),  344 
Jersey,  ii.  11,  33 
Jervis,     Lieut.     John     (afterwards 

Adm.,  Earl  St.  Vincent),  400,  430 
Johnson,  Sir  William,  ii.  106 
Johnstone,    Capt.   George,    ii.   232, 

235  n.,  287 
Juno,  ii.  53-5,  58 
Juste,  ii.  66,  68 


K 


Kaunitz-Rittberg,   Count,  Austrian 

chancellor,  20,  141 ;  ii.  287,  290-1, 

336 
Kearney,  Lieut.  M.,  ii.  38 
Keene,    Sir  Benjamin,   K.B.,    am- 

bas.  to   Spain  (1748-57),  21,   80, 

145 
Keith,  George,  Earl  Marischal,   ii. 

229  n. 

Robert,  ambas.  to  Russia,  ii. 

290,  294-5 

Kempenfelt,  Capt.  Richard  (after- 
wards Adm.),  340;  ii.  120 

Kent,  345 

Keppel,  Commodore  Hon.  Augustus 
(Viscount),  25,  45,  98-9,  205; 
(1759),  ii.  17  ;  in  Quiberon  action, 
64,  70;  his  Belleisle  command, 
102-4,  135-9,  149,  15.=;,  157-64, 
168;  his  blockade,  176,  196,  203, 
216,  233-4 ;  under  Pocock  at 
Havana,  249,  263,  272,  283,  365 

William   Anne,    and    George. 

8cc  Albemarle 

Gen.    Hon.   William,    ii.   250, 

274,  283 


400 


INDEX 


Kersaint  rle  Coetiiempron,  Capt., 
3G6-7,  861) 

King  of  Prussia,  hospital  .ship,  272 

Kingsley,  General,  ii.  102 

Kingston  (Jamaica),  352 

Kingston,  100,  114 

Kinnoul,  Thomas  Hay,  8th  Earl  of, 
Envoy  Extr.  to  Portugal,  ii.  80, 
92 

Kinsale,  ii.  90-1 

Klosterzeven,  convention  of,  223, 
228,  409 

Knok,  184,  18U 

Knowles,  Adm.  Sir  Charles,  201, 
204,  211,  358  n.  ;  bis  peace  re- 
connaissance of  Havana,  ii.  24(> 
and  note,  266-71 ;  his  criticism  of 
the  campaign,  261  n.,  277 

Knyphausen,  Dodo  Heinrich,  Baron 
zu  Inn  iind,  Prussian  Minister  in 
London,  264,  267  n. ;  his  interfer- 
ence in  English  politics,  ii.  329- 
31,  335,  353-4,  363 

Ktinersdorf,  battle  of,  ii.  75,  78 


La  Borde,  M.  de,  a  banker,  ii.  345  n. 
La  Chaleur  Bav,  action  in,  ii.  113 
La  Clue  Sabran,  Adm.  de,  227-8, 

255-60,  316 ;  ii.  22,  31-41 
La  Fausille,  Gen.,  ii.  250 
Laforey,  Capt.  L,  328 
LaGolette,  405;  ii.  115 
Lagos,  battle  of,  31-9,  65,  158,  162 
La  Guayra,  ii.  236 
La  Hogue,  99 
Lally  ToUendal,  Gen.  de,  338,  347-9; 

ii.  120-1,  126,  129,  133-5 
Lake  Champlain,  25,  306,  330,  405, 

414,  442;  ii.  106,  115 
Lake  Erie,  13,  25 
Lake  George,    166,    175,   306,   330, 

405  ;  ii.  100 
Lake  Pontchartrain,  ii.  340 
Lambale,  299 
Lambart    (or    Lambert),   Brigadier 

Hamilton,  ii.  165-6 
Lancaster,  100,  114 
Langdon,  Capt.  William,  366-7 
Langeron,  M.  de,  C.-in-C.  at  Roche- 
fort,  215 
La  Touche,  Capt.  Le  Vassor  de,  Gov. 

of  Yv.  Leeward  Islands,  ii.  224-5 
La    Trinitc    (Martinique),    ii.    219, 

225,  236-7 
Leeward  Islands  station,  351-7, 360, 

368 


Legge,  Henry  Bilsou,  Chan,  of  the 
Exchequer,  76,  180 

Leghorn,  137,  267  ;  ii.  92 

Lehwaldt,  Gen.-Feldmarschall  Hans 
von,  133, 162 

Leith,  ii.  88 

Lelaud  (or  Leyland),  Major,  ii.  224 

Leslie,  Lieut.,  401  n 

L'Etandu^re,  Adm.  Henri-Francois 
des  Herbiers,  Marquis  de,  130 

Leuthen,  battle  of,  234 

L^vis,  Chev.  de,  102,  414,  431,  445, 
471-2;  C.-in-C  in  Canada,  ii. 
109-12,  115-8 

Liegnitz,  battle  of,  ii.  85 

Ligonier,  General  Sir  John,  Lord, 
33-4,  192,  201  ;  his  Kochefort 
appreciation,  203-4,  216,  229 ; 
C.-in-C,  230-2,  263,  271,  397  ;  ii. 
23,  96,  98,  100  ;  opposes  war  with 
Spain,  203-4,  208,  247,  253  ;  his 
groundless  fear  of  invasion,  343-4 

Limited  wars,  336  ;  ii.  1-2 

Lines  of  passage  and  communica- 
tion, as  basis  of  naval  strategj% 
307-10 ;  methods  of  controlling, 
311-4;  ii.  19-22 

Lippe  -  Schaumburg  -  Biickeburg, 
Wilhelm,  Count  zu,  ii.  322,  383 

Lisbon,  53,  60,  388  :  ii.  92,  216-7, 
232,  251,  297,  300-2,  316-7,  319, 
322 

L'Orient,  70,  200,  254,  260,  263, 
280,  339,  345  ;  ii.  16-7,  28-9,  42, 
51-3,  59,  103 

Loudoun,  Gen.  John  Campbell,  4th 
Earl  of,  at  Louisbourg,  166-76  : 
recalled,  306,  364  ;  in  Portugal, 
ii.  322 

Louis  XV.,  22,  64,  81,  141  ;  ii.  45-6 

Louisa,  Princess,  of  England,  Queen 
of  Denmark,  ii.  295 

Louisbourg,  18,  26-7,  40,  43,  45,  48, 
56-7,  67,  144,  152,  156,  1,59-60, 
163 ;  first  attack  on,  167-79,  187, 
190,224,232,  237,  242,  255,  260-2, 
269  ;  second  attack  on,  305-33, 
339,  343  ;  demolition  of,  ii.  108, 
111,  113,  115,  158. 

Louisiana,  307,  359,  365 ;  as  peace 
counter,  ii.  333-62 

Love  and  Unity,  ii.  52 

Lowestoft,  429,  443,  454-5,  4(i6-7, 
469;  ii.  112 

Liibeuk,  ii.  295 

Lundy  Island,  335 

Liineberg,  233,  238 

Lynn,  363,  365 

Lys,  55,  65 


INDEX 


401 


M 


MacLaurin,  John,  a  master,  235  n. 
Macnamara  (or  Macneruara),  Adui. 

Comte  de,  47  et  seq. 
Madras,    341,    340-50;    ii.    120-2, 

125-6,  136,  139-40 
Maqnanime,  211-14;  ii.  59,  63,  65 
Ma'hon,  Port,  91-2,   103,  105,    110, 

110-3,   125-6,    129-30,   132,   135, 

137,  144,  149,  204,  258,  260,  338. 

See  also  Minorca. 
Maillebois,  Gen.,  127 
Malaga,  Battle  of,  4 ;  ii.  34 
Maldon  (Essex),  ii.  18 
Man,  Isle  of,  action  off,  ii.  91 
Man  (or  Mann),  Commodore  Robert, 

ii.  323  ;  Adm.,  i.  124  n. 
:Manilla,  ii.  248,  254,  365 
Mansfield,  William  Murra)',  1st  Earl 

of,  L.C.J.,  230  ;  ii.  102,  200,  203-4, 

334,  349 
Maplesden,  Capt.  Jervis,  302  n. 
Maria    Amelia,    Queen    of    Spain, 

ii.  184 
Maria   Theresa,    Empress,    20,    22, 

141-3  ;  ii.  73,  141 
Marlborough,   John   Churchill,   1st 

Duke  of,  19,  22  ;  ii.  206,  291 
Charles  Spencer,  3rd  Duke  of, 

60  ;    his    command   (1758),    266, 

275-85  ;  C.-in-C.  in  Westphalia, 

286-8.  292,  372 
Mariegalante,  390,  392;    ii.   174-5, 

179,  322,  340 
Marniere,  Capt.  de,  ii.  52 
Marseilles,  ii.  32,  86,  92,  230,  304 
Marsh,  Commodore  Henry,  337 
Martinique,  304,  352-7,  362-3,  368, 

37.3-9,    387,    390,    392-5;    ii.  16, 

102,    103,   137,  143,    155-6,    164, 

176-8;  capture  of,  209-26,  225-6, 

286, 241-2,  249,  258,  270,  296,  801, 

804,  :!07,  332-4,  339-40,  346,  357 
Masulipatarn,  344;  ii.  ILM 
.Alatignon,  298-9 
Mauduit,   Israel,    his   anti-German 

pamphlet,  ii.  144-8. 
Mauritius,  340,  344-5,  349  ;   ii.  82, 

97,    120-1,     126,    129-38,    141-3, 

149,  154,  .340 
Maxen,  Battle  of,  ii.  7.s 
Moaban,  island,  ii.  43 
Medica;/,  410 

Mello  (or  Melho),  Baron  de,  Portu- 
guese Minister  in  London,  ii.  2.52, 

289,  297,  299 
Momel,  193 
Merlin,  sloop,  ii.  238 
VOL.  II. 


Michell,  Abraham  Ludwig,  Prussian 
Minister  in  London,  251-2 ;  ii. 
329 

Milford,  ii.  90 

MUford,  ii.  257 

Militia,  88,  151,  223  ;  ii.  10,  15,  23, 
83 

Millbank,  Capt.,  ii.  38 

Mindanao,  ii.  254 

Minden,  Battle  of,  234,  246-7,  250, 
278 ;  ii.  26,  30-1,  74,  78,  182 

Minorca,  21,  89,  91,  94;  operations 
against,  96-130 ;  capitulation, 
132  ;  effect  thereof,  137,  139, 
143-6,  149,  153,  161,  164,  179, 
191,  237,  270,  340,  367,  372;  in- 
fluence on  Pitt's  strategy,  374-6, 
395  ;  ii.  95,  97,  103, 144  ;"its  value 
in  the  negotiations  for  peace, 
174-5,  179,  181,  188,  190,  214, 
230,  232 ;  French  garrison  in- 
creased, 321-2;  its  retrocession, 
332,  347 

Miquelon,  Isle  of,  ii.  382,  339 

Miranda  (Portugal),  ii.  317 

Mirepoix,  Marquis  de,  French 
Ambas.  in  London,  30-1,  40,  40-3, 
44-7,  49  ;  leaves,  61,  412 

Mis.sissippi,  12,  108,  307,  360,  365, 
!       376;   ii.    106,    143;    as    Franco- 
i       British  frontier,  333,  840,  343 
I   Mitchell,  Sir  Andrew,  K.B.,  Briti.-li 
I        Ambas.  at  Berlin  (1757-64),  145, 
!        155,  163,  184,   187-90,   240.  263; 
!       ii.  78,  288-9.  294-6,  329.  850-2 
j   Mobile,  807,  331  ;  ii.  143,  333,  340 
I   Modestt,  ii.  39 
!   Mona  Passage,  ii.  260-1 
I    Monarque,  138 

;  Monckton,  Col.  Hon.  Robert,  72  ;  at 
Louisbourg,  318 ;  Gov.  of  Nova 
Scotia,  398 ;  Brigadier  (1759), 
408,  422,  425, 433, 451-3,  457,  461 , 
4t)6  ;  General  and  Gov.  of  New 
York,  C.-in-C. against  Martinique, 
ii.  209,  218-9,  221-2,  225 ;  in  war 
with  Spain,  239,  241,  24.5-6,  258, 
255,  258 

Moncrieff,  Major,  42(i 

Monmouth,  258 

Monson,  Col.,  ii.  138 

Montcalm,  Louis  Joseph,  Marquis 
de,  C.-in-C.  in  Canada,  102;  his 
counter  stroke  (1757),  174-5, 
(1758)  830-2.  (17.59)  413,  415; 
his  dispositions,  418-9,  423, 
42,5-7,  431-2,  436-41  ;  begins  to 
be  shaken,  448-9,  455-62,  469- 
71  ;  mortally  wounded,  471 
2  (' 


402 


INDEX 


Monte  Christi  (St.  Domingo),  066, 
368 

Montmorenci  River  (Quebec),  417-9, 
42(5-7,  429-35,  438-41,  451-3, 
457-8,  460 

Montreal,  12,  25-6,  42-3,  306,  334, 
405,  414,  419,  445,  471,  475; 
campaign  agjainst,  ii.  98-118,  220 

Montserrat,  351,  358,  362-3 

Moore,  Adm.  Sir  John,  368 ;  his 
campaign  (1759),  377-87  ;  out- 
witted by  Bompart,  387  ;  causes 
of  his  failure,  388-91  ;  end  of  the 
campaign,  392-4;  ii.  316 

Morbihan,  The,  ii.  43-6,  50,  56-61, 
93 

Mordaunt,  Gen.  Sir  John,  character 
of,  201  ;  at  Rochefort,  203,  209- 
10,  213-21 ;  his  court-martial, 
232,  247  n. 

Morlaix,  273,  290 

Morogues,  Adm.  Bigot  de,  ii.  43, 
45,  68 

Morro  Castle  (Havana),  ii.  264-70, 
276-9  ;  fall  of,  280-1,  284,  354 

Miinchhausen,  Baron  von,  Hano- 
verian Minister  in  London,  235-6, 
239 

Munster,  292  ;  ii.  14,  288 

Murray,  Col.  Hon.  James,  398 ; 
Brigadier  (1859),  408,  425,  438, 
442-51,  461  ;  in  Montreal  cam- 
paign, ii.  105-6,  108-12,  114-7 


N 


Namur,  ii.  34 

Nante.«,  ii.  27,  29,  30,  42 

Naples,  relation  of,  to  the  war,  64, 

143, 145 
Napoleon,   origin  of    his   invasion 

plans,  ii.  18-22,  .307-8 
Naval  construction,  ii.  369,  371 
Negapatam,  ii.  125 
Nelson,  quoted,  5,  7,  93 
Netherlands.     See  Austrian  Nether- 
lands and  Flanders. 
Neutral  Powers,   164  ;    ii.   5-8,   79, 

208,  218 
Nevis,  351,  353,  362-3 
New  Orleans,  12,  13,  25,  305  ;  ii. 

333,  340,  347-  50 
New  Providence,  351,  383 
New  York,  167-8,  172-3,  175,  310, 

313-4,  317,  330,   347,  429,   474; 

ii.  164,  .324 
Newark,  258  ;  ii.  38 
Newcastle,  Thomas  Polham-Holles, 


Duke  of,  10 ;  as  war  minister, 
15-6,  27-9 ;  relations  with  the 
Pompadour,  30 ;  parliamentary 
influence,  31,  37-8,  42,  49-53, 
58-61,  70,  76,  85-6,  88 ;  relation 
to  loss  of  Minorca,  96-9, 102,  333  ; 
resigns,  138,  140,  143,  149-50, 
157-8;  coalition  with  Pitt,  179, 
185,  197-8,  227,  235-6,  268,x285, 
289 ;  of  the  continental  school, 
290-1,  295,  372-4  ;  (1759),  ii.  11- 
14,  18-9,  22-3,  26-7,  46,  54-5; 
suggests  Baltic  squadron,  ii.  78-9, 
83-4  ;  opposes  Belleisle  project, 
95,  98-102,  104,  137  ;  his  waning 
influence,  102,  156,  211,  251-2; 
his  fall,  324-6 ;  his  attitude  on 
peace,  192,  200,  202-3,  286-7, 
333 ;  in  opposition,  342,  349, 
356-7,  361,  363-4  ;  his  party,  102, 
211,  247,  333,  363 

Newfoundland,  72,  171;  ii.  96, 
150-1,  156,  174,  180,  190-3  ;  ques- 
tion of  its  fisheries,  286,  323-4, 
332 

Newspapers,  indiscretions  of,  30. 
See  also  Press 

Niagara,  Fort,  25,  405,  414,  445, 
449 ;  ii.  106-7 

Nienburg,  239,  246 

Nieuport,  64,  161,  195,  266,  289; 
ii.  174-5,  190,  193 

Nivernais,  Due  de,  82,  84-7;  ii. 
357 

Noel,  Capt.  Hon.  Thomas,  114 

Norfolk,  ii.  129  n 

Northumberland,  410,  473 

Nova  Scotia,  ii.  26,  40,  42-3,  46,  72, 
177,  310,  314,  418  ;  ii.  326 


0 


Object,    ISth    cent,   equivalent   of 

"  objective." 
Ocean,  ii.  38-9 
Ocker,  the,  245 
O'Dunn,  French  envoy  to  Portugal, 

ii.  310-3 
(Eolus,  ii.  90 
Oeyras,  Sebastiio  Jose  de  Cavalho 

e  Mello,  Count  (afterwards  Mar- 

quez    de     Pombal),     Portuguese 

Prime   Minister),  ii.  299,  310-3, 

316,  322 
Ogdensburg,  ii.  115 
Ohio  River,  10,  13,  14,  16,  40,  62, 

256,  259,  306,  333-4 


INDEX 


403 


Old  Bahama  channel,  ii.  2G0-3,  2Gr), 

279 
Old  Cape  Fran9ois,  359,  360 
Oldenburg,  23 

01(^ron,  island  of,  209;  ii.  177.  211 
Onslow,  Arthur,  Speaker,  222 
Ontario,    Lake,  25,   149,  333,    40.5, 

413;  ii.  114 
Oporto,  ii.  317,  322 
Oran,  ii.  230 
Orford,  410 
Orifiamme,  258 
Orne,  the,  ii.  93 
Orph^e,  258,  281 
Ortegal,  ii.  320,  323 
0.sboine,   Adm.    Henrv,    102,    159 ; 

blockades  La  Clue,  237-8,  255-60, 

316.  320.  399 
Osnabriick,  246,  250 ;  ii.  288 
Ostend,  20,  64,  IGl,   195,  251,  266, 

285:    ii.   18,   19,   103;    ii.  174-5, 

190,  193 
Oswego,  25,  149,  333,  405;  ii.  107, 

114-5 
Ouistreham,  280  ;  ii.  93 
Ourry,  Capt.  Philip  Henry,  ii.  52, 

235 
Oxford,  474 


Paderborn,  162;  ii.  14 

Pallas,  ii.  90 

Palliser,  Capt.  (Adm.  Sir  Hugh),  ii. 

324 
Panther,  ii.  129  n 
Param^,  276 
Parker,    Capt.    (Adm.    Sir    Hyde), 

198-9,  225-6  ;  ii.  25  n,  129  n 
Parry,  Capt.  William,  114 
Paston,  Capt.  William,  302  n 
Paulet,  Capt.  Lord  Harry,  71  n 
Peace   of   Paris  (1763),   signed,    ii. 
362-5 ;    its   value,  376 ;    its  text, 
377-90 
Pembroke,  410 
Penzance,  47 

Pdrier  de  Salverte,  Capt.,  56,  357-9 
Peter  111.  of  Russia  (Duke  of  Hol- 
stein-Gotterp),    ii.    290,    294-5; 
died,  251 
Petit  Bourg  (Guadeloupe),  331 
Petite  Terre  Island,  392 
Philadelphia,  310,  317 
Phipps,  Sir  William,  his  attempt  in 

Quebec,  418,  440 
P/ucnix,  114,  120 
Picardy.  303  ;  ii.  95,  168 
Pigot,     George     (Lord),     Gov.     of 
Madras,  ii.  120,  130.  138-9 


Pirna. 149 

Pitt,  Ladv  Hester,  ii.  113  ;  Baroness 
Chatham,  213 

William  (Earl  of  Chatham),  his 

"system,"  8-9,  28-9,  79-80,  148, 
150-2,   155-6,    187-91,   223,    369, 
371-5;  ii.  31,  78,  119,  144-5,  148, 
160,  214-5,  227-8,  374;   opposes 
continental    measures,    i.    75-S ; 
favours  territorial  army,  88  ;  tries 
to  save  Byng,  133  ;  in  Devonshire 
administration,    150,    157  ;     dis- 
missed,   158  ;    on    Loudoun   and 
Holburne,  176  ;  returns  to  power, 
179  ;    his    Rochefort   expedition, 
192-6,  200;  on  Klosterzeven,  227, 
229-.30  ;  plans  for  saving  Hanover, 
234-6  ;  distrusts  Frederick,  241-3, 
262  ;  his  coastal  operations  (1758), 
262-8  ;   proposes  troops  for  con- 
tinent, 285-6 ;   continues  coastal 
operations,  287-9,  29J,  295-6.  301, 
303-4  ;   his    main  design  (1758), 
305-13,  317  ;  his  views  on  India, 
337-8,  343;  ii.  121,  131 ;  his  war 
plan    (1759),    i.  371-0,  377,  379, 
396  ;  his  attitude  to  invasion,  ii. 
3,  26-7,  46,  54  ;  refuses  Spanish 
mediation,    74-7 ;    his   war   plan 
(1760),  80-6,  94-105,  113,  131-2, 
135-6,    142-3,    154-6,    164,    169, 
176-7,  206  ;  suspects  Spain,  149- 
52,  156,  182;  on  the  peace,  171- 
5,  179-83,  188-93,  376  ;  wants  to 
declare  war  with  Spain,  196-208  ; 
resigns,   209-10 ;    after    his   fall, 
213-5,  228-9,  285,  298;  consulted 
by  Fr.derick,  330-1,  335-6;    de- 
nounces  the    peace,   363-4;    his 
method  of  war  direction,  i.  180-3, 
191-2,  267-9;  ii.  11-3,  15-6  ;  its 
constitutional  aspect,  205-7,  228- 
9  ;  on  home  defence,  i.  223  ;  ii.  10, 
14-5,  23-4  ;  his  choice  of  officers, 
i.  366-7,  382,  397-8,  408 ;  ii.  158- 
60  ;  on  naval  positions,  i.  408 

Pittsburg,  13-4.  334 

Placontia  (Newfoundland),  ii.  324 

Plassev,  battle  of,  342,  344,  350, 
ii.  129 

Plate  fleet  (Flota),  ii.  188,  194-G, 
201,  207,  21G 

Pocock,  Adm.  Sir  George,  157; 
C.-in-C.  East  Indies,  344-50  ;  ii. 
120-6;  invalided,  127-8;  C.-in-C. 
against  Havana,  241-2;  248-9; 
253,  254-65.  267,  275-9,  2S3  _ 

Pointe  aux  Trembles,  437,  445-9, 
456,  lGl-4,  466  ;  ii.  109 


404 


INDEX 


Poltzig,  battle  of,  ii.  27 
Fomerauia,  1G;J,  193  ;  ii.  288,  337 
Pompadour,  Madame  de,  30,  ()4,  81, 

141 
Pondicherry,  342-9  ;  ii.  121-6,  129  ; 

capture  of,  133-5, 137-8,  177,  182, 

189 
Porcupine,  430 
Port  Arthur,  18 

Port  Dauphin  (Cape  Breton),  317 
Port  au  Prince  (St.  Domingo),  354, 

368 
Port  en  Bessin.  ii.  93 
Port  Louis,  ii.  176 
Port  Mahon,  91,  102-3,  lOo,  108-13, 

125-6,  129-32,  135,  137,  144,  149, 

204,  260,  33S  ;  ii.  321 
Port  Royal  (Jamaica),  352.  358,  360, 

364-5,   367,  378;   ii.  242-,%  256, 

258-9,  262 
Portland,  114,  296,  372 
Portugal,  4,  21  ;  ii.  189,  202,  251-2, 

296-301,  334-5 
Pownal,  Capt.  Philemon,  ii.  821 
Prado      Portocarrero,     A  dm.     Don 

Juan  de,  ii.  257-8,  263,  265,  284 
Prague,  164,  184 
Presqu'ile,  14 
Press,  influence  of  the,  30  ;  ii.  144- 

8,  301-2,  353-4,  359-60 
Preston,  258 
Pretender,   the   (Charles   Edward), 

65,  90  ;  ii.  4 
Prideaux,  Gen.,  445 
Prince,  ii.  87 

Prince  Edward's  Island,  328 
Prince  Frederick,  314,  410 
Prince  Rupert's  Bay,  ii.  178 
Prince  of  Orange,  410 
Princess  Amelia,  410 
Princess  Louisa,  114 
Princess  Mary,  358 
Privateers,    96,   392-5 ;    regulation 

use  of,  ii.  7-9,  27,  79,  178 
Prize-money,  ii.  283,  321,  354 
Prudent.  316,  327 
Prussia,  policy  of,  17,  22,  39.     Sec 

also  Frederick  the  Great 
Puerto  Rico,  351,  3,V.),  393;  ii.  181, 

260,  361 
Public  spirit,  bad  state  of,  223  ;  as 

strategical  factor,  224-5,  286,373- 

4  ;  ii.  19.3-4,  360 


Quebec,  26,  27,  42,  43,  57,  73,  152, 
156,  166,  167,  170,  177,  204,  242  ; 


ii.  1,  40,  46-7,  54,  74-5.  113  4, 
119,  124,  130,  219,  250,  263,  270, 
276 ;  capture  of,  i.  425,  476 ; 
Murray's  defence  of,  ii.  105-10, 
305-7,  317,  321,  326,  330-2,  334, 
391,  396,  424 

Quiberon,  ii.  42-3,  50-3,  55,  57, 
59,  60,  62,  65,  70,  75,  90,  94,  158- 
9,  163 ;  battle  of,  ii.  65-70 

Quimperle,  ii.  48 


R 


Raisonnable,  ii.  219,  222 

RamiUies,  100,  114,  123,  261  ;  ii.  47, 
51 

Ranee  river,  296 

RedouUable,  366  ;  ii.  39 

Repeating  frigates,  120 

Reprisal,  67.  See  also  Declaration 
of  War 

Resolution,  ii.  66-7 

Reunion,  ii.  82 

Revenge,  100,  114,  258 

Reynolds,  Comm.  John,  ii.  29,  30, 
41-3 

Revest,  du.  Chef  d'Escad.,  159 

Rhe,  Isle  of,  209,  229,  2.30,  261  ;  ii. 
177 

Rhineland,  the  Prussian,  ii.  .340-1, 
347-9,  355,  362,  364.  See  also 
Berg,  Cleves,  Gueldres,  Wesel 

Rhuys,  peninsular  of,  ii.  93 

Richelieu,  Marechal,  Due  de,  at 
Minorca,  107-8,  127,  131-2,  133  ; 
his  campaign  against  Cumber- 
land, 193-6,  224->;  against  Fer- 
dinand, 228,  232-5 

Richmond,  ii.  241,  262 

Rigbv,  Mr.  Richard,  M.P.,  ii.  194, 
227 

Robinson,  Sir  Thomas,  Sec.  of 
State,  33,  46,  49,  59,  158 

Rochefort,  peace  reconnaissance  of, 
192  ;  expedition  against,  197-222  ; 
its  strategical  effects,  227-9,  244 

Rochester,  ii.  52-3,  64 

Rodney,  Capt.  George  Brydges 
(Adm.  Lord),  205  ;  his  prize,  315, 
327;  Coram.  (1759),  ii  21;  at 
Havre,  24-5  ;  Channel  (1760),  92- 
3 ;  C.-in-C.  against  Martinique, 
210,  217-21,  225-6;  in  war  with 
Spain,  233,235-40;  under  Pocock, 
241-6,  225-9,  244 

RoUo,  Brigadier,  Andi'cw,  5th  Lord, 
ii.  115  ;  takes  Dominica,  117  ;  at 
Mai-tinique,  209,  218,  232;  at 
Havana,  250,  278 


INDEX 


405 


Rosbach,  battle  of,  283-4 

Kouille,   Antoiiie   Louis.  Cotnte   de 

Jouy,  French    foieis:n    minister, 

45,  65 
Rous,  Capt.  John,  72,  169,  320,  433, 

438,  456-7 
Rowley,    Capt.    (Adm.    Sir    John), 

302  n 
A'oya/   George,  '21)1  ;    ii.   51,   53,   64, 

66-7,  371 
Royal  William,  211,  410 
Rufane,  Col.  William,  ii.  223 
Rule  of  1756,  ii.  5-6 
Russia,  Briti.sh  relations  with,  38-9, 

75,    141,    161  ;    turns   to    France, 

145 


Sable,  Isle  de,  317 

Sackville,  Gen.  Lord  George  (1758), 

266,  269  ;  his  evil  influence,  278, 

287  ;  Wolfe's  letters  to,  269,  314, 

323,  326  ;  his  disgrace,  30-1,  83 
St.  Augustine  (Florida),  456;  ii.  137, 

139,  140,  252 
St.  Brieuc,  298 
St,  Cas,  282;  disaster  at,  29S-;304, 

373 
St.  Christopher.     See  St.  Kitt's 
St.  David's,  ii.  120 
St.  Domingo  (Hayti  or  Hispaniola), 

351-6,  359,  364-5,  368,  393,  410; 

ii.  16,  194,  257,  259,  261 
St.  Eustafius,  :;.52,  383,  386;  ii.  6, 

218 
St.  Germain.  Gen.  de,  244-7 
St.  Kitt's,  351-3,  362-3,  .393  ;  ii.  241, 

256,  259,  261 
St.     Lawrence      River,      Saunders' 

passage  of  the,  416-7 
St.  Lucia,  357,  368,  390-1,  408;  its 

strategic     importance,    ii.     143, 

177-9,    286,     339  ;     negotiations 

turn    on    it,  340-3,  346-50,  359, 

362  ;  its  capture,  226 
St.   Malo,  99,    2.54,265,    271.    273; 

attacks  on,    275-(),    279,    283-4, 

288,  296-7 
St.  PieiTe  (capital  of   Martinique), 

368,  378-9,  395  ;   ii.   capture   of, 

218-9 
St.  Pierre  Island   (Newfoundland), 

as  fishing  station,  ii.  191-3.  286 

332,  339 
St.  Servan,  destruction    of,    276-7 

297 
Hainte-Croi.v,     Chev.    de,    gov.    of 

Belleisle,  ii.  166-8,  170 
Sal  vert.     See  Pdrier  de  Salvert 


Sandershausen,  batlle  of,  292 

Sandwich,  John  Montagu,  Earl  of, 
35 

Santiago  (Cuba),  ii.  24G,  257,  276 

Sardinia.     See  Savoy 

Saunders,  Adm.  Sir  Charles,  130  ; 
at  Gibraltar  (1757)  159,  237 
(1758)  255-60;  Anson's  esteem 
for,  274,  400  ;  recalled  for  Channel 
fleet,  281,  334  ;  C.-in-C.  against 
Quebec,  399-401  ;  his  strategy, 
406-7,  410,  420-2,  424-6,  428  ; 
his  co-operation  with  Wolfe,  432- 
4,  438-43  ;  with  the  brigadiers, 
451-5 ;  his  final  operations, 
457-8.  466,  470-4,  476;  his 
tribute  to  the  army,  473  ;  tries 
to  join  Hawke,  54-6,  69  ;  C.-in-C. 
in  Mediterranean  (1760),  92,  198- 
!>,  204,  220,  216-7  ;  defence  of 
Portugal,  230-2,  236,  249,  308-15, 
321-3,  344 

Savoy,  4,  64,  154 

Sawyer,  Capt.  Herbert,  ii.  321 

Saxony,  Frederick  Augustus  II., 
Elector  of.  King  of  Poland,  145 

Schleswig-Holstein,  154  ;  ii.  294-7, 
327-30 

Schomberg,  Capt.  Alexander,  432 

Scott,  Capt.,  ii.  90 

Sea-horse,  248,  255-6 

Scaford,  47  ;  ii.  137 

Secret  (or  Inner)  Committee  of  the 
Council  —  its  constitution  and 
functions,  32-3,  ISl,  183,  201  ;  ii. 
83  ;  meetings  of,  i.  33,  42-3,  45, 
53,  59-61,  67,  70,  144,  187,  192  n, 
198,  229,  265.  285  ;  ii,  99,  247 

Senegal,  157,  304,  337,  374  ;  ii.  175, 
179,  332 

Shirley,  William,  Gov.  of  Massa- 
chusetts, 25-6,  42 

Shreivshury,  410 

Shuklham,  Capt.  Molyneux  (Adm. 
Lord),  ii.  222 

Silesia,  17,  79,  141,  153,  161,  234; 
ii.  216,  287-8,  295,  337 

Slade,  Sir  Thomas,  chief  construc- 
tor, ii.  371 

Solar  de  Breille,  Caspar  Joseph, 
Bailli  de,  Sardinian  ambas.  in 
Paris,  ii.  285-6,  306,  341,  346-7, 
360 

Soleil  Royal,  ii.  ()6-V0 

Somerset,  410  ;  ii.  55  n 

Soubise,  Charles  de  Rohan,  Marechal 
Prince  de,  185,  193,  225,  227-8, 
232-3,  244,  284,  291-2,  302  :  ii. 
13-5,  131,  136,  l(i7  8 


4o6 


INDEX 


Spain,  policy  of,  SO,  139,  145  ;  as 
neutral  sea  power,  ii.  5  ;  attempts 
to  mediate,  73,  97  ;  resolves  on 
war,  216  ;  her  war  plan,  298-9 

Spcircken,  August  J'riedrich  Baron, 
general-lieutenant,  227 

Spry,  Capt.  Richard,  47-1 ;  commo- 
dore, ii.  224,  23G,  315 

Squirrel,  432 

Stade,  18(),  193,  190-9,  205,  224-6, 
239,  243,  292 

Stanhope,  Capt.  Sir  Thomas,  ii.  162, 
164-5,  169,  176 

Stanley,  Hans,  his  mission  to  Paris, 
ii.  154,  175,  180,  182-.3,  190-2, 
194-6,  202,  285 

Steevens,  Commodore  Charles, 
340-1,  344;  admiral  and  C.-in-C. 
E.  Indies,  120,  127.  129-30,  134-5, 
137  ;  dies,  138,  254 

Stirling  Castle,  406,  417 

Storr,  Capt.  John,  258 

Stralsund,  234 

Strode,  Gen.,  ii.  89 

Slromboli,  248 

Stuart,  Lieut.,  ii.  51 

Success,  276 

Suckling,  Capt.  Maurice,  366-7 

Superhe,  ii.  66 

Surajah  Dowlah,  341-3 

Sutherland,  410,  432,  443,  466-7 

Swallow,  ii.  58 

Swanton,  Commodore  Robert,  ii. 
107,  112;  at  Martinique,  210, 
219-22,  236-8,  241-3,  262 

Sweden,  23  :  as  naval  power,  84,  98, 
164;  ii.  4,  5,  17,  22-3,  79 

Sweidnitz,  ii.  214,  361 

Sioiftsure,  259  ;  ii.  162 


Tactical  exercises,  131,  273-4 
Tactics,  Byng's,  at  Minorca,   116- 

121 ;  cutting  the  line,  114  n.,  122  ; 

French,  ii.  56-7;   Pocock's,  128; 

progress  in,  371-2 
Tagus,  the,  ii.  310-2,  317,  321 
Tanjore,  ii.  129 
Taylor,  Capt.,  47,  249 
Ttmiraire,  ii.  39,  218 
Temple,    Richard    Grenville,    Earl, 

150;    supports  Pitt,  ii.  198,   200, 

204,  213 
Ternay  d'Arsic,  Cliev.  de,  ii.  323-5 
Thesee,  ii.  66 
Thierre,  a  pilot,  213-4 


Thurot,  Capt.   Francois,   ii.  19.  47  ; 

liis  raid,  89-91 
Ticonderoga.  330-3,  404,    442,  449, 

475 
Tiddeman,  Capt.  Richard,  ii.  137  n., 

139-40 
Tobago,  352,  362 ;  ii.  179 
Torbay,  5.5,  211  ;  ii.  56,  64 
Torgau,  battle  of,  ii.  104,  288,  293 
Torrington,    Adm.     Lord,    119  ;    ii. 

198 
Tortuga,  ii.  243 
Toulon,  68,   88,    91.    97,   98,   101-2. 

106,    108,    126,    128,    132,    135-7, 

159,    168,    196,    237,    255-6,   260, 

406;  ii.  10,  27,  31-3,  39,  88,  92, 

230,  303-4,  307-12,  318,  321-2 
Townshend,  Hon.  Charles,  Sec.  at 

War,  ii.  227 
Col.  Hon.  George  (1st  Marquis), 

his  militia  bill,  88  ;  brigadier  at 

Quebec   (1759),   408,  430,   433-4, 

451-3,  461  ;  in  command,  471-2  ; 

ii.  47,  55  ;  in  Portugal,  322 
Adm.  Hon.   George,  357-362, 

365 
Trade,  course  of,  E.  Indies,  70-1 ; 

W.  Indies,  353-7,  359  n. 
Transports,  tonnage   allowance  in. 

205-6  ;     escort    of,   see   Lines   of 

Passage 
Trident,  100,  114,  410 
Trincomalee,  349  ;  ii.  122,  130 
Trinidad,  352 

Trois  Rivieres,  444,  449  ;  ii.  114-5 
Turkey,    65 ;    Frederick's   relations 

with,  154  ;  ii.  26,  289 
Tuscany,  Francis  IL,  Grand  Duke 

of  (Emperor  and   Duke  of   Lor- 
raine), 143, 145, 267 
Tyrawley,     Gen.     James     O'Hara, 

Lord,   130;    ii.    297,  300,    313-4, 

317,  322 


U 


Utreclit,   Treaty  of   (1713),  20;   ii. 
174-5,  192-3,  350, 354 


Val,  battle  of,  34 

Valogne,  228,  295 

Vandreuil,  Marquis  de.  Gov.  of 
Canada,  412-4,  419,  431,  444-5, 
455-6,  459;  ii.  106,  109,  118 

Vaivjunrd,  410,  425,  435;  ii.  55,  112 

Vanneck,  financier,  345  n. 


INDEX 


407 


Vannes,  ii.  42,  Sit,  167 

Velasco,  Capt.  Luis  Vicoiite  de,  ii. 

274-5,  277-80,  284 
Venezuela,  352 
Ve7igea'nce,  ii.  59 
Vera  Cruz,  ii.  257 
Vevden,    19H,    198,    224,    22G,    233, 

239,  245-6 
Verger,     Saint  -  Andre     du,     Chef 

d'Escad.,  ii.  66,  69 
Versailles,  treaty  of  (1756),  142,  143, 

145,  153;  (1759),  160,244 
Vestal,  ii.  25 
Vienna,  20,  148,  244 
Vigo,  315 

Villa  Franca,  ii.  310,  312 
Villaine  River,  ii.  67,  68,  69,  70,  86, 

93,  159,  324-5 
ViUe  de  Paris,  315 
Viper,  sloop,  213 

Virgin  Islands,  351-2,  362  ;  ii.  260 
Virginia,  11,  12,  14,  72,  306,  413 
Viri  (or  Viry),  Comte  de,  Sardinian 

anabas.  in  London,  ii.  285,  306-7, 

331-3,  343,  346-50,  360 
Vladivostock,  389 
Voltaire,  133 


W 


Wall,  Gen.  Richard,  Spanish  Prime 
Minister,  21,  80  ;  ii.  74-7,  87, 
131-3,  188 

Walpole,  Horace.  33,  77,  102,  108, 
201  :  ii.  46-8,  108,  216,  229-30 

Sir  Robert,  ii.  350,  363 

Walsh,  Clive's  secretary,  ii.  131 

Wanderwash,  battle  of,  ii.  129 

Warspitc,  ii.  634-5 

Warwick,  'Sol,  361 

Washington,  George,  10 

Watson,  Adm.  Charles,  C.-in-C.  E. 
Indies,  157,  160,  340-3  ;  death  of, 
344-5,  350 

Wedell,  Karl  Heinrich,  general- 
lieutenant,  ii.  27 

Wellard,  Capt.  Robert,  104 

Wesel  (Prussian  Rhineland),  14S, 
153,  155,  162,  239,  241,  247,  284  ; 
ii.  340,  343,  346,  349-52,  355,  362 


Weser  River,  23,  152,  155,  185-6, 
193-4,  224-6,  233-4,  239,  240-2, 
245-8  ;  ii.  27,  30,  33 

Westminster,  treaty  of  (1756),  141, 
146 

Whitmore,  Col.  Edward,  314,  317 

Wilkes,  John,  ii.  354 

Willes,  Sir  John,  Chief-Justice  of 
Common  Pleas,  133 

William  III.,  strategy  of,  4,  19 

Wilson.  Capt.  (H.E.LC.S.),  ii.  127 

Winchelsea,  Daniel  Finch,  Earl  of. 
First  Lord  of  Admiralty,  158 

Windward  Islands,  352,  361 ;  ii. 
259,  339 

Wolfe,  Col.  James,  Q.M.G.  at  Roche- 
fort,  202,  211,  214-5,  220  ;  his 
criticism  on  the  expedition,  211-2, 
214, 221-2, 232 ;  on  value  of  coastal 
operations,  269-70  ;  his  admira- 
tion of  Col.  Howe,  207  ;  brigadier 
in  Louisbourg  campaign,  314, 
318-9, 321-31;  C.-in-C.  for  Quebec, 
397-8,  405-7,  416  ;  his  naval  ap- 
preciation, 401-4  ;  his  plan  of 
attack,  417-8 ;  his  operations  to 
draw  Montcalm,  425-443 ;  falls 
ill,  449-458  ;  resumes  command, 
459-60 ;  cancels  brigadiers'  plan, 
462-8  ;  his  death.  469-471  ;  ii. 
46-7;  his  influence,  ii.  162,  164. 
197,  219;  letters  of,  see  Major 
Wolfe  and  Sackville 

Major  Walter,  uncle  of  above, 

321,  326 

Wolfenbuttel,  245-6 

Wright,  Capt.  Fortunatus,  137 


Yarmouth,  242 

York,  314 

York,  Prince  Edward,  Duke  of,  ii 

317 
Yorke,  Col.  Hon.  Joseph,  Minister 

at  the  Hague,  89,  229,  239;   ii. 

9  ;  general,  76,  287,  329 
Young,  Capt.  James,  114,  122 
Yucatan  Channel,  357-9,  860,  362  ; 

ii.  259,  262.  276 


Prmted  by   Ballanttne,   Hanson  6^  Co. 
Edinburgh  0=  London 


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