The ethics of Aristotle, illustrated with essays and notes

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ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

VOL. II.

THE

HTHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH

ESSAYS AND NOTES

BY

SIR ALEXANDER GRANT, BART.

LL.D. (EDINBURGH, QLASGOW, CAMBRIDGE), D.C.L. (OXFORD)

PRINCIPAL AND VICE-CHANCELLOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH ; HON. MEMBER OF
THER UNIVERSITIES OF ST PETERSBURG AND MOSCOW, AND OF THE FRANKLIN
INSTITUTE OF PENNSYLVANIA; FORMERLY FELLOW AND NOW
HON. FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD

FOURTH EDITION, REVISED

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. IZ.

LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1885

All rights reserved

6 fw '

Vw

Farvard Oolleve Library
Gift of
G Moran “cro. ne ae
. 66.12.1921

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

=i

BOOKS III.—X.

VOL. I. A

PLAN OF BOOK ΠῚ.

T has been already assumed without proof, that virtue implies
purpose (ἢ. 11. iv. 3, II. v. 4, IL iv. 15), and therefore of
course will and freedom. Before proceeding to the analysis of
particular virtues, Aristotle begins by examining the generic con-
ception of the Voluntary, with a view chiefly to the comprehension
of its species, Purpose.

The first five Chapters of Book IIL are accordingly devoted
to this subject, and stand so much apart from what goes before
and after, that some have been led to the conclusion that they
were written as a separate treatise (see Vol. I. Essay L p. 45).
That several parts of these chapters are unnecessarily repeated in
Book Y. c. xiii., and that certain points in them do not agree with
the psychology of Books VI. and VII., is no argument against
the present chapters having formed part of Aristotle’s original
draft and conception of his Ethics, but only tends to show that
Books V. VI. VIL were written later. It is more to the purpose
to notice that in Chapter v. § 10, there is an apparent ignoring of
the whole discussion upon the formation of moral states which
occupies the commencement of Book II., and that no allusion
occurs to ‘the mean’ or to ‘happiness.’ But this is only a
specimen of the way in which Aristotle concentrated his mind on
each new subject as it arose, and in writing upon it frequently
neglected to refer to other cognate passages. The same thing is
observable in the treatise on Friendship (VIIL i. 1). The treatise
on the Voluntary is'neatly fitted on to the general ethical treatise
by § 2], 22, of the fifth chapter of this book. There is no reason
to suspect these sections of being other than the work of Aristotle.

It must not be supposed that the present disquisition on the
Voluntary is a disquisition on Free Will The latter question

4 PLAN OF BOOK III.

Aristotle would certainly have assigned to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or
metaphysics, and would have thought out of place in a system of
ethics, Some remarks upon his views of Free Will, so far as
they can he gathered, will be found in Vol. I. Essay V. The
ensuing chapters assume that man is the ἀρχὴ of his own actions,
and with this assumption treat of the Voluntary under its various
aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward
and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters
furnish to some extent a psychology, though not a nanetaphyate, of
the Will. Their contents are as follows :— |

(1.) The general definition of the Voluntary. Ch. i.

(2.) The special account of Purpose, that it is distinct from
desire, wish, opinion ; its relation to the process of deliberation.
Ch. ii. —iii.

(3.) Some consideration of the question whether Wish is for
the absolute or the apparent good. Ch. iv.

(4.) An attack upon the position that while virtue is free, vice
is involuntary. Ch. v.

The remainder of the book is occupied with a discussion of the
two first virtues upon Aristotle’s list—Courage and Temperance.
With regard to Courage the following heads are treated of :—
(1.) Its proper objects; Ch, vi. (2.) That it is a mean; Ch. vii.
(3.) That true courage is to be distinguished from five spurious
kinds of courage; Ch. viii. (4.) That it is particularly related to
pain, and implies making great sacrifices for the sake of what is
noble; Ch. ix. The objects and the nature of Temperance are
treated of in Chapters x, and xi. And the book ends with two
remarks on Intemperance: (1.) that it is more voluntary’ than
cowardice ; and, (2.) that its character is shown in its etymology ;
Ch. xii.

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III.

THE ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ

‘ a @ , ᾽ ’ 4 , ’ ΕΣ
μεν τοις EKOUTIOIS ἔπαιϊινῶὼν Kal ψόγων γινομένων, ETE

δὲ -~ 9 ’ , 2? δὲ Q é oe 8
€ TOS ακούσιοις συγγνωμῆς, ΕΜΙΟΤῈ CE Καὶ ENEOU, TO EKOU-

4 9 , 9 a wv , a 4 ~
σιον καὶ ακουσιον αναγκάιον (TOS διορίσαι Τοῖς πέρι ἀρετῆς

4 A 4 4 n - ’
ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε2

ee oe — =

I. 1-2 Tis ἀρετῆς &4—xoddces}) | doubtless God. Mathematical ἀρχαί
‘Virtue then being concerned with |;

feelings and actions; and praise and
blame being bestowed on acts which
are voluntary, while pardon and
sometimes even pity are conceded to
involuntary ones,— it will surely be
necessary for the philosopher who
treats of virtue to define the volun-
tary and involuntary ; and moreover
this will be useful for the legislator
with a view to the rewards and
punishments with which he has to
deal.’ In the Eudemian Ethics, which
contain generally speaking a repro-
duction of these Ethics, for the most
part compressed, but also occasionally
expanded and supplemented, we find
(£th, Eud., τι. vi.) ἃ more definite and
reagoned statement of the voluntari-
ness of virtue and vice. The reason-
ing of Eudemus is briefly as follows :
—All οὐσίαι are ἀρχαί, and tend to
reproduce themselves; and only those
dpxal are properly 80 called (κύριαι)
which are primary causes of motion,
as is especially the case with regard
to invariable motions, whose cause is

are called so only by analogy, not
being causes of motion. We have
hitherto only mentioned necessary
consequences: but there are many
things which may happen or may
not, and whose causes therefore must
be, like themselves, contingent. All
human actions being contingent, it is
obvious that man is a contingent
cause, and that the reason of the
contingency in his actions is his
ability to will one way or the other,
as is farther manifest from our praise
or blame of actions.—A deeper ground
than that which Aristotle has taken
might surely have been found for the
position that morality implies free-
dom. But though philosophy even
before Aristotle had dealt to some ex-
tent with the ideas of necessity and
freedom, it remained for the Stoics to
open the question more decisively.
It is plain that the discussions on the
Will in this place are never meta-
physical. An appeal to language and
common opinions sums up nearly the
whole. The scope of the argument is

6 HOIKQN NIKOMAXETON IIT.

3 τὰς τιμὰς Kat τὰς κολάσεις.

[(ΠΔΡ.

ὃ “- δὲ 9 3 Φ 4
OKEL € GKOvG(a ELVA ThE

Bia ἢ δὲ’ ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα. Biaov δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν,

Φ a ’
τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἢ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἣ ὃ

a 9 “~ ’ A ” ,
πάσχων, οἷον εἰ TWVEUMQ κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κυριοι

#
οντές.

ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἣἧ διὰ

4 i 9 a ’ 4 ’ “
καλὸν Tl, οἷον et τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι

᾽ fal , 4 ’ 4 4 A ,
κύριος ὧν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζοιντο,
4 ’ δ 4 θ ’ ” ’ ν ,
μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον

limited to a political, as distinguished
from a theological point of view
(ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι,
χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι).

4 δοκεῖ δὲ---γινόμενα)]) ‘ Now those
acts seem to be involuntary which are
done under compulsion or through
ignorance.’ In asking what is the
Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue
a speculative method of inquiry. Such
a method might have commenced with
the deep-lying ideas of personality
and consciousness, of the individuality
of the subject, &c. But he is content
with defining the voluntary by a con-
trast to the common notions (δοκεῖ) of
what constitutes an involuntary act.
It might be said that this is giving a
merely negative conception of free-
dom. But in fact the conception given
is positive, only the analysis of it isnot
pushed very far. The voluntariness
of an act Aristotle represents to be
constituted in this—that the actor is
in every case the ἀρχή, or cause, of his
actions, except in cases of compulsion,
where there really is a superior ἀρχή
(Kant’s ‘heteronomy’), or of ignor-
ance, where he does not know what
his action is, and can only be held to
be the cause of what he meant to do.
In what sense and how the individual
is an ἀρχή, is the point where Aris-
totle stops short in the inquiry.

βίαιον 5¢—Ovres] ‘That is com-
pulsory, whose cause is external to
the agent, and is of such a nature

that the agent (or patient) contributes
nothing towards it ; as, for instance,
if a wind were to carry you to any
place, or men in whose power you are,’
᾿Αρχή seems here equivalent to ἀρχὴ
κινήσεως, the efficient cause. Ari-
stotle attributes spontaneity so de-
cisively to the individual act, that he
confines the term compulsion as only
applicable tocasos of absolute physical
force, where a man’s limbs are moved
or his body transported, as if he
were inanimate, by some external
power. The compulsion of threats,
fear, and such like, he will not call
compulsion without qualification, be-
cause still the individual acts under
it. He has already spoken of the life
of money-making as being βίαιός ris,
‘in a sort compulsory’ (Fth. 1. v. 8).
With ὁ πράττων 4 ὁ πάσχων cf. v. viii.
3: πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων
εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν---
οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἣ ἀποθνήσκειν.

4-9 The cause of the act must be
entirely from without, for in some
cases men are forced, not to an act,
but to an alternative. They may do
what is grievous for the fear of what
is worse. Such acts, then, are of a
mixed character, partaking of the
nature both of voluntariness and
involuntariness. Relatively to the
moment, they come from the choice
and will of the individual. Ab-
stractedly and in themselves they
are contrary to the will. But as

I.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 7

4 td , bd a e , “"-Ἐ td , A
ακούσια ἐστιν exovoia. τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ 5
4 4 3 - ~ 9 v 9 ~ A 4 4 4
wept Tus ev τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολας" ἁπλῶς μὲν yap οὐδεὶς
4 4 φ ? 9 A ἢ) Ε] e ~ A ~ ~
ἀποβαάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
~ wW 4 4 3 9 4 ~
ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται 6
[ > # A “ e ’
πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μάλλον ἑκουσίοις"

? a ’ 4 be i σι ’ ‘ 4
τότε OTE πράττονται, TO CE τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν

αἱρεταὶ yap εἰσι

every act aims at something in refer-
ence to the particular moment, and
is thus entirely dependent on it, so
these must be judged as acts done and
chosen voluntarily, and according to
circumstances must obtain blame or
praise. There seem to be four cases
which Aristotle conceives as possible:
(1). Praise is deserved where pain or
degradation is endured for the sake of
some great and noble end; (2) but
blame, where what is degrading is
endured without a sufficiently great
and noble end. (3) Pardon is con-
ceded where human nature succumbs,
under great extremities, to do what is
not right; (4) except the action be
such as no extremities ought to bring
a man to consent to, in which case
pardon is withheld. In these dis-
tinctions we may recognize a practical
and political wisdom such as might
be found in the speeches of Thucy-
dides, but the discussion does not rise
to the level of philosophy.

6 pexral—ovdév] ‘Now it may be
said that such actions are of a nixed
character, but they are more like
things voluntary, for at the particular
moment when they are done they are
such as one would choose, and the
moral character of an action depends
on the circumstance of the moment ;
hence also the terms “voluntary ” and
‘‘involuntary ” must be predicated in
reference to the moment when a per-
son is acting. Now, in the supposed
case (ἐν τοιαύταις πράξεσι), the indi-
vidual acts voluntarily ; for the effi-
cient cause of the movement of the

accessory limbs is in himself, and
where the cause is in a person, it
rests with him to act or not. There-
fore such things are voluntary, though
abstractedly perhaps, involuntary, for
in themselves no one would choose
any of such things as these.’

τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς mpdtews] The phrase
is general, not referring only to the
cases under dispute, but to action
universally, In this sense we may
translate τῆς πράξεως ‘of an action.’
Ἰέλος is used here in a peculiar sense
to denote the ‘moral character of an
action.” This sense arises out of a
combination of associations, ‘final
cause,’ and ‘motive,’ being combined
with ‘end - in - itself,’ ‘ perfection,’
‘completeness.’ A precisely similar
use of the word occurs, Eta. 111. vii.
6: Tédos δὲ πάσης ἐνεργεία----ὁρίζεται
γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει (on which see
note). The Paraphrast, in accordance
with the above explanation, states the
argument thus :—‘ Because the char-
acter of an action as good or bad is
judged in reference to the mind of
the actor at the moment of action, so
also must the voluntariness of an
action be judged.’ ᾿Επεὶ καὶ τὸ éxd-
orns πράξεως τέλος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν
αὐτῆς ἐστί, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ ἣ ἀγα-
θὸν ἢ πονηρὸν γίνεται ὥστε καὶ τὸ
ἑκούσιον, ἢ τὸ ἀκούσιον, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν
ὅτε πράττεται, ζητητέον. Of course
the interpretation of Muretus is
wrong which attributes a merely
popular and un-Aristotelian sense to
rékos—‘actio terminatur eo ipso
tempore quo agimus,’

8 HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEION III. [CHap.

καιρὸν ἐστιν, καὶ TO ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ TO ἀκούσιον, ὅτε
πράττει, λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἑκών" καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν
αὐτῷ ἐστίν" ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράτ-
Tew καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ ἴσως ἀκού-
gia οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
7 ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται,
ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ
καλῶν: ἂν δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται: τὰ γὰρ αἴσχισθ᾽
ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἡ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ’ ἐνίοις
δ᾽ ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ᾽, ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα
πράξη τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ
ὃ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι. ἔνια δ᾽ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανατέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα' καὶ
γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου ᾿Αλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγ-
9 κάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι, ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι
ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον,
ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν' ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ
τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ᾽ ἀναγκά-
ζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς

ὅτε πράττει)] The omission of vis, : means to the life, mind, or soul,
especially after conjunctions like el, whichistheend. Cf. De An. 11.1.6:
ὅτε, &c., is common in Aristotle, ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος
though not peculiar tohim. Cf. Eth. | φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο
111, ix. δ: πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους δέ, ὃ ἂν ἣ ὀργανικόν. De Part. An.
ἐφάπτεται, Pol. vil. xiii. 8: ὥσπερ | 1. i. 41 : οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον
εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς | (ἕνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων,
αἰτίῳτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον), ἀνάγκη ἄρα

τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη] The ‘subservient,’ | τοιονδὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνο
or ‘instrumental’ limbs. ΤῊΘ modern | ἔσται,
word ‘organised,’ which has grown 8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Evpirl3ou—pyrpo-
out of the Aristotelian conception of κτονῆσαι) ‘For the things which com-
ὀργανικὸν σῶμα, does not exactly re- | pelled the Alemwon of Euripides to
present it. ‘Organisation’ implies . kill his mother appear absurd,’ ¢.e.
multeityin unity, the co-existenceand | the curses threatened by Amphiaraus,
interjunction of physical parts under | who, when departing for Thebes,
a law of life. But in ὀργανικός | enjoined his son to put Eriphyle
originally nothing more was implied | to death. Aspasius preserves the
than ‘that which is fitly framed as | lines :—
an instrument,’—according to Aris- | Μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπῇρ' ἐπισκήψας πατήρ,
totle’s principle, that the body is the ; ὅθ᾽ dppar’ εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών.

1.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 9

9 ὔ a a δι ~
ἀναγκασθέντας ἣ μή. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια ; ἣ ἁπλῶς το
, eC Pern @ 9 8 ἢ a % & @ coe ’ a
μέν, ὁπότ᾽ ἂν ἡ atria ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ Kal ὁ πράττων μηδὲν

AX 4 a“ δὲ θ ς a a 9 e | a} a“ δὲ a
συμβαλληται; ἃ de καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἐστι, νῦν de καὶ
A [2 ὕω
ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
A 4 , a 4 “~ A 4 φ a ~ ¢ ’
μὲν ἀκούσια ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσιαι, μᾶλλον
eo ~
δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις: αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα,
ζω δ᾽ 4 , a δ 4 4 ’ e 4 9 e "ὃ
ταῦτα δ᾽ ἑκούσια. ποῖα 0 ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ padtov
ἀποδοῦναι: πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.
[2 4 ᾽ 4 4
εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ pain βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν
γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια: τούτων γὰρ
χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν βίᾳ καὶ
ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς.
a on a 4 ~ 6 a 9 4 9 4 4 e 4 4 ἤ
γελοῖον On τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον

oe}

» ε 4 - ᾽ 4 ~ 4 ~ e 4 ~

ὄντα ὑπο τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ'
“-« 4 ᾿

αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ

9 A ζω.

ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

2

oe .-. --------.-. ee .

10 ποῖα δ᾽ ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, ob} own definition, then, is sufficiently
ῥᾷδιον ἀποδοῦναι) These words repeat | qualified by the addition of the words,
what has been already said in the pre- | ‘the person under compulsion in no-
ceding section. “Ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε | wise consenting’ (μηδὲν συμβαλλομένον
x.7.d., but they add the reason ‘be- | τοῦ βιασθέντοε).
cause each particular case hasitsown ' 7a ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλά] Aspasius
special diversity :’ cf. διαφορὰν καὶ | reads τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ λυτηρά. The
τλάνην, I. iii, 2. commentators, Victorius, Muretus,

11-12 In these sections Aristotle | Giphanius, and Zell, get over the
guards his definition against a possible | difficulty by taking τὰ καλά to mean
misconception. Having defined the | ‘non honesta, sed formosa, pulchra.’
compulsory to be that whose cause is | It is plain, however, that the same
external, he disallows the supposition | classification of inducements is here
that the two great inducements toall | referred to as that given Eth. 11. iii.
action, the pleasant and the noble, | 7, the συμφέρον being a means either
because external to us, make the | to the #i0orthexaddy. The καλόν is
actions they induce compulsory. His | in short ‘the noble,’ or ‘the good,
arguments against this supposition | viewed as morally beautiful.’ A con-
are : (1) It would make all action com- | cise definition of it is given in Rhet.
pulsory, and thus imply more than | 1. ix. 3: καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ dy 30
any one would wish to support. (2) | αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ὃν ἐπαινετὸν ἢ, 4 ὃ ἂν
Compulsory actions are painful; those | ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἡδὺ 7, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. It is
done for the pleasant or the noble are | used in the present passage not at all
pleasurable. (3) It leaves out of ac- | emphatically, but simply to denote
count the internal susceptibility ofthe | that form of inducement which con-
agent (αὐτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα). His | sists in our wishing to do a thing

VOL, 11. B

10 HOIKQN NIKOMAXKEION III. [CHap.

4 a 9 ” 9 e eo 4 e 9 g 4 ἤ

13. To δὲ dt ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκού-
4 , 3 ’ \ 9 ἤ e 4 4. Ψ

σιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ: ὁ γὰρ δὲ ἄγνοιαν

? e na δὲ δὲ ὃ ’ 9 A “ , ea

πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν de δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν

4 4 4 0 4 νκν'ὶ io’ ao Ν 8 ’ ’

μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ἥδει, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός

γε. τοῦ δὴ dt ἄγνοιαν ὃ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ

δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών"

14 γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ᾽ ἔοικε

καὶ τὸ Of ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν" ὁ γὰρ

[4 A 9 ’ 9 } “- ὃ 3 w” 3 i 4 4 A

μεθύων ἣ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι’ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ

> 48
ΘΊΕι

----- ώ-ὄἥ-:---.Ῥ. ee ------

because itisright. A little examina-
tion shows that the writing here is
vague, for presently it is said to be
absurd to assign the cause of the good

things to oneself, and of the bad

things to pleasure (αἰτιᾶσθαι---τῶν
μὲν καλῶν» ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ᾽ αἰσχρῶν τὰ
ἡδέα) ; whereas consistently the ‘ good
things’ would have been assigned to
‘the good’ as an external cause by
those who maintained the position,
el δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα κι. Also would
Aristotle say that what is done διὰ τὸ
καλόν, is always done μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ?
This goes strangely against Eth, III.
ix. 4-5, where the higher satisfaction
of the καλόν is represented as pur-
chased by great pain. There is a
vagueness also in the use of βίαια,
which first stands for that which
compels, and secondly for that which
is compelled. The principle, how-
ever, is well brought out, that the
objective inducement to an action
cannot be separated from the subjec-
tive apprehension of this in the will.

13 τὸ δὲ δι’ ἄγνοιαν---ἔχειν ἴδιον]
‘Now that which is done through
ignorance is always non-voluntary,
but it is involuntary only when
followed by pain, and when it is a
matter of regret. For he who has
done something through ignorance,
but without feeling any dislike at the

action, has not, it is true, acted

voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not

know he was doing it, but, on the

other hand, not involuntarily, since

he is not sorry. With regard, there-

fore, to actions done through ignor-

ance we may say that he who repents

has been an involuntary agent, while

him who does not repent we may

distinguish as having been a non-

voluntary one ; for where there is a
real difference, it is proper to have a
distinctive name.’ Aristotle begins
the discussion of ignorance as modify-
ing volition by this refined distinction,
that an action may be done through
ignorance, and yet not against the
will. It may in short be neither with
the will nor against it. He then goes
on to consider the precise meaning of
δι᾽ ἄγνοια».

14-16 ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε--- ἀκουσίως
πράττει] ‘There seems to be a farther
difference between acting through
ignorance and doing a thing in ignor-
ance. Common opinion pronounces
that the drunken or the angry man
acts not through ignorance, but in
consequence of drunkenness or anger,
and yet that he does not act wittingly,
but in ignorance. Without doubt
every depraved man is in ignorance of
what he ought to do, and of that from
which he ought to refrain, and it is

1] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. 11

, ~ ἂς -
διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοῶν.

4 ‘a A
ἀγνοεῖ μεν

οὖν πῶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ

in consequence of this error that men
become unjust, or bad generally.
But the term involuntary is not meant
to cover ignorance of man’s true in-
terest. Ignorance which affects moral
choice, and ignorance of the universal,
are the causes, not of involuntary
action, but of wickedness, and it is
precisely for this ignorance that
wicked men are blamed. The ignor-
ance which causes involuntary action
is ignorance of particulars, which are
the circumstances and the objects of
actions. With regard to these parti-
culars, pity and pardon may be proper,
for the man who acts in ignorance of
some particular is an involuntary
agent.’ The connection of this some-
what compressed passage is as follows.
An act is involuntary when caused
by ignorance. But ignorance cannot
be said to be the cause of an act if
the individual be himself the cause of
the ignorance. In that case ignorance
rather accompanies the act (ἀγνοῶν
πράττει) than causes it (δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν
πράττει). Wesee this (1) in instances
of temporary oblivion, as from anger
or wine; (2) in those of a standing
moral ignorance or oblivion (ef τις
ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον---ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει
ἄγνοια--- καθόλου ἄγνοια). The only
ignorance, then, which is purely ex-
ternal to the agent, so as to take
away from him the responsibility of
the act, is some chance mistake with
regard to the particular facts of the
case, A great deal of trouble has
been expended upon the endeavour to
distinguish and explain the various
terms, ἀγνοοῦντα πράττει»--- ἀγνοεῖν τὸ
συμφέρον---ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια
«--οΟἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια. But a closer exa-
mination shows that these different

terms are not opposed to cach other, |

but rather are all different ways for
expressing the same thing, being op-
posed to the ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἐν ols ἡ
πρᾶξις, This is the way in which the
Paraphrast understands the passage,
for he renders it: Al δὴ τοιαῦται
τράξεις οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκούσιοι" ἡ yap ἐν τῇ
προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῶν
κακιῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου,
ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλον
περὶ τῆς μέθης ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πονηρόν,
αἴτιον γίνεται τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τὸ
ἀγνοῆσαι μερικῶς τήνδε τὴν μέθοδον"
olov, φέρε εἰπεῖν, οὐκ εἰδότα μέχρι πόσοι:
πιόντας ἔνι μεθύειν. Aristotle strictly
confines ignorance, as a cause οὗ in-
voluntary action, to mistakes about
particulars. Before proceeding to this
particular ignorance, he separates
from it that kind of ignorance which
is faulty, because caused by the agent
himself. Of this there are two kinds,
the temporary, as for instance that
caused by intoxication, and the per-
manent, such as that caused by any
vicious habit. ‘ Ignorance of the uni-
versal’ is not different from ‘ignorance
of our real interest,’ but serves to
point the antithesis of ‘ignorance of
the particular :’ nor is it opposed to
ignorance as shown in wrong moral
choice, but to ignorance of external
facts. It goes to constitute ignorance
in the purpose, for in every moral act
there is a universal conception, as well
as a particular application of this.
But Aristotle does not here enter upon
the psychology of the subject, as is
afterwards done, Zth. vir. iii. The
word συμφέρον is used, Politics, i. 11.
11, to include and denote all kinds of
good, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ
συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

14 διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων] Some refer

uw

12 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION ΠῚ. [CHap.

4 4 ’ 4 Υ XO 4 HON 4 ’
διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται.
τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμ-
φέρον οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου
~ A
ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ᾽ ἡ καθόλου {(ψέγονται yap διά γε
ταύτην) ἀλλ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πράξις"
4
ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη" ὁ γὰρ τούτων
τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι
αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἣ ἐν
τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα
a 4
τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.
ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος,
δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; ὃ
δὲ πράττει, ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν
9 ’ A 9 Oe φῇ 4 o Ψ Αἱ Ἂ
αὐτούς, ovx εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἣν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος
4 a. a td 9 a e φ 4
τὰ μυστικά, ἣ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν κατα-
4 , δ᾽ Ψ 4 4 eS ᾽ὔ φ w
πέλτην. οἰηθείη δ᾽ av τις καὶ τὸν ViOV πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ
ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν
λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι: καὶ ἐπὶ σ ia παίσας ἀποκτείναι
ρ ὠτήρις
3 a ὃ a ld Φ @ 9 ’
ἄν: καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι,

se Θ = -..ὄ........ ..... - .-- -«.ὄ᾽᾿τζιὶᾧ..

this to § 11, τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλά, but | (6) The manner (rds), e.g. one might

it appears simply to mean ‘not from : strike harder than one wished.

ignorance, but from one of the things ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά] Re-
|

now specified ’ (ie. drunkenness or | ferring to the well-known story that
anger). Cf. 111. iii, 11, τὸν εἰρημένον | Aischylus was summoned before the
τρύπον, which refers to the passage | Areopagus on the charge of having __
immediately preceding. revealed the mysteries, against which
16-17 The particulars connected | charge he pleaded that he had never
with an action are as follows :—(1) | himself been initiated. lian, Var.
The person doing it, about which | Hist. v. το.
ignorance is impossible to the doer. | ὥσπερ ἡ Μερότη] This same incident
(2) The thing done, which may not , isalluded to by Aristotle in the Poetics,
ke known, eg. schylus did not | c. xiv. 19: Κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον,
know he was revealing the mysteries. | (he. τὸν μέλλοντα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέ-
(3) The thing or person made the | στων δι’ ἄγνοιαν, ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν
object of the action (περὶ τί 4 ἂν τίνι), | ποιῆσαι), λέγω δὲ οἷον ty τῷ Ἐρεσφόντῃ
e.g. Merope did not know it was ' ἡ Μερόκη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν,
her son. (4) The instrument, 6.9. ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεγνώρισεν.
one might fancy one’s spear had a καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ ol dxpo-
button on it. (5) The purpose or | χειριζόμενοι, rardtecer ἄν] ‘ And wish-
tendency of the act (ἕνεκα τίνος), e.g. | ing to show the way, as those do
one wishing to preserve might kill. . who box with the open hand, a man

I.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. 13

, » 4 ἢ a “a a 9 e Ψ 9
πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης ev 18
οἷς ἡ πράξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι,
καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις" κυριώτατα δ᾽ εἶναι
ὃ a 9 φ e ζω 4 a wv ~ δὴ ‘

oxel ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις Kat οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ On KaTa 19
τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν
πράξιν λνπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν perapedcig, ὄντος δ᾽ 20
9 ᾽ ζω Ul 4 9 δῇ 4 e , ;
ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ. καὶ δὶ ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν

> e 4 a 9 9 “~ 44 ἢ 4 9 Ψ 9
dy εἶναι οὗ 4 ἀρχὴ ev αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐν

ι e “ Ν ν" 4 “A , 9 ,

οἷς ἢ πράξις. ἰσῶς γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι 21
‘ 4 , 4 4. Ὁ ’ A a 4 4 »νἕΨ

τὰ διὰ θυμὸν 4 Ot ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι 22

τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, ovd οἱ παῖδες" εἶτα 23
πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν dt ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ
go
θυμόν, ἣ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως ; ἢ
γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια 24
ῦ a“ ~

φαναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργί ζεσθαι ἐπί τισι
4 4 a ~ ~

Kal ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως, δοκεῖ δὲ 25
4 ‘ . », . 4 . a , 9 ’ eu

Ta μεν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, Ta de KaT ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα,

6

&

” \ ’ a 4 a
ert de Ti διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν j

ee ee ee es + eee ee

might give another a blow.’ Aspasius | tendency of it.’ The words ἐν ols are
explains ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι thus: ἔστι τὸ | used at the beginning of the section in
πυκτεύειν ἣ rayxparidgew πρὸς ἕτερον | a general sense, as before (8 15) ; after-
ἄνεν συμπλοκῆς ἢ ὅλως ἄκραις ταῖς | wards they correspond with περὶ τί καὶ
χερσὶ per’ ἀλλήλων γυμνάζεσθαι, te. it | ἂν τίσι (§ 16). There is an awkward-
is what we call ‘sparring.’ This same | ness about οὗ ἕνεκα. A person knows
phrase δεῖξαι βουλόμενος was applied | with what end or view he is acting
before to ‘the man who was showing | (and this is what οὗ ἕνεκα legitimately
the catapult,’ and was given as an | expresses), But he is mistaken about
instance of one being ignorant of the | the means which he uses. Hence
nature of his act. Here it is an | wishing to produce one result he pro-
instance of ignorance of the tendency | ducesanother. But what he mistakes,
of an act. The different kinds of | is not the end (οὗ ἕνεκα) but the means
ignorance are not very distinct from | (rd πρὸς τὸ τέλοε)]. The phrase here
one another. would imply that an action had anend,
18 κερὶ πάντα δή--- ἕνεκα) ‘Ignor- | oraim of its own(od tvexa)independent
ance then being concerned with all | of the doer,—in other words a ten-
these circumstances of the action, he | dency, of which therefore the doer
that was ignorant of some one of these | might be ignorant.
is beld (δοκεῖ) to have acted involun- 20-27 Having separated off the
tarily, and especially (if ignorant) | involuntary in its two forms of com-
with regard to the most important; | pulsionand mistake, there remains to
and the most important seem to be | us the conception of the voluntary, as
the objects of the action and the | that whose cause is in an agent know-

14 ΗΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION III. [CHap.

27 θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ de οὐχ
ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. αἱ δὲ “πράξεις τοῦ

ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

»# a a
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθεναι

a 4 ~ e , 4 ζω
Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ

rr eee .....

ing the circumstances of the action.
This definition requires justification,
owing to a false notion (οὐ καλῶς
λέγεται) that acts done from anger or
desire (which are ‘in the agent’) are
involuntary. This notion is refuted
by the following arguments: (1) It
would prove too much, and would

make all the actions of brutes and of |

children involuntary. (2) Some acts
prompted by desire or anger are right
and good. We must either call these
involuntary, or say that while theseare
voluntary, bad actssimilarly prompted
are involuntary. Either supposition
is absurd. (3) There is a feeling of
obligation (δεῖ), attaching sometimes
to these emotions ; we ought to desire
some things and be angry at some.
This feeling of ‘ought’ implies free-
dom. (4) Acts prompted by desire
are pleasant ; involuntary acts, pain-
ful. (5) We have as strong a feeling
about errors of passion, as about errors
of reason, that they are to be eschewed
(φευκτά). The passions are as much
part of the man as the reason, there-
fore acts prompted by them are acts
of the man.

The polemic in these arguments
does not seem to be directed against
any philosophical school, but rather
againsta popular error. Aristotle does
not deal with the maintainers of the
doctrine of necessity as a whole, but
only with those who, allowing that
half our actions are free, would argue
that the other half are not free. Such
reasoners are comparatively easy to
answer. The most important argu-

where he implies that the idea of
freedom is contained in that of duty.
He does not draw out this principle,
nor could he have done so without
anticipating the philosophy of later
times. The last argument seems to
come to this, that you cannot separate
a man from his passions, or say the
reason is the man’s self and the
passions not. Elsewhere Aristotle
says ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος. And in
truth the relation of a man’s desires
to his individuality might be more
deeply investigated than is here done.

φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω] This seems
8 counterpart to the former argu-
ment, ἄτοπον lows τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι
ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι The passions are
proved to be voluntary on account of
the feeling of reprehension we have
for errors of passion. On the em-
phatic opposition between φευκτόν
and αἱρετόν, cf. Eth. xX. ii. 5.

II. Having given 8 generic
account of the voluntary, Aristotle
proceeds to examine the special
form of it which he calls προαίρεσις.
This does not mean the will as a
whole (for which, indeed, Aristotle
has no one name), but a par-
ticular exhibition of it, namely, a
conscious, determinate act of the
will. ‘Purpose’ or ‘determination ’
is perhaps the nearest word in our
language, but in fact no word exactly
corresponds. The contrasts and dis-
tinctions made in this chapter might
at first seem unnecessary, until we
observe that Aristotle is himself

ment adduced by Aristotle isthethird, ; founding a new psychology. The

L—IL]

προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν"

HOIKON NIKOMAXEIQON IIT.

15

4 , 4 > a
OlCKELOTaATOV yap E€LYaL δοκεῖ

τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ 2

προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ᾽

᾽ 4 e ’
σλέον TO εκούσιον"

> SN

κα!

A 4 4 ς , 4 a 8
TOU μὲν γὰρ εκουσιοὺυ Καὶ παῖδες Ka

τἄλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης

4 [4 4 ‘4 4 é δ wv
exovola μὲν λέγομεν, KATA προαίρεσιν ὁ᾽ ov.

οἱ δὲ λέγον- 3

τες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἣ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ

4. 4 mn ’
ἐοίκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

word προαίρεσις only once occurs in
Plato, and then not in its present
psychological sense, but merely de-
noting ‘selection’ or ‘choice.’ Par-
menides, Ὁ. 143 B: τί οὖν ; ἐὰν προελώ-
μεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ
τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ὃν εἴτε
τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, Ap’ οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ
προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά rwe ὦ ὀρθῶς
ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω ; It is true
that the verb προαιρεῖσθαι is of fre-
quent occurrence in Plato, but gene-
rally in the sense of ‘selecting’ or
‘preferring,’ and not ‘ purposing’ or
‘determining.’ As in other cases,
then, Aristotle takes up a floating
term from common language, and
gives it scientific definiteness, so that
it becomes henceforth a psychological
formula. His account of προαίρεσις
in the present chapter is, that it is
a species of the voluntary (ἑκούσιον
μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ
πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον), and that it differs
from anger, desire, wish, and any
form of opinion. (1) It differs from
desire or anger as not being shared

by irrational creatures, as being often |

opposed to desire, &c. (2) It is still
less like anger than like desire, anger
excluding the notion of purpose or

deliberate choice (ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ .

θνμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ). (3)
It is not wish, because we often wish
for what is impossible, or beyond our
control, and because, speaking gene-

ou γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ
τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.

4
προαίρεσις καὶ

a
Kat ὁ ἀκρατὴς 4

rally, wish is of the end, whereas pur-
pose is of the means, and restrictsitself
to what isin our power. (4) Nor is it
opinion, which may beabout anything,
the eternal or the impossible, and
which is characterised as true or false,
not, like purpose, as good or bad.
Nor is it opinion on matters of action.
For opinion on good and evil does not
constitute the moral character in the
way that purpose does; again, the
use of these terms in common Jan-
guage points out a difference between
purpose and opinion.

Purpose then, being a species of the
voluntary, implies also intellect (μετὰ
λόγου καὶ διανοίας) and deliberation.
It is a deliberate desire of what is
within our own power (βουλευτικὴ
ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, Eth. 111. iii. 19).

1 οἰκειότατον γὰρ---πράξεων] ‘For
it seems most closely bound up with
virtue, and to be a better criterion of
moral character than even actions.’
Cf. Bth. x. viii. §: ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ
πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ wpoal-
peots hal πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης.
The importance of this position as ἃ
ground-work for the whole doctrine
of morality must be estimated by the
advance which is made in it beyond
what Plato had arrived at.

3 of δὲ λέγοντε:)] There is a ten-
dency in Plato to merge the distinc-
tions of will and reason: whether
some of his school are here alluded

16 - HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IIL. [Cnar.

ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ᾽ οὔ: ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
4 ᾿ ’ ’ 4 “A ΜΝ A
56 ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ
4 9 [2 ? ζω 9 v 9 ἕ
προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία
wv 4 e 4 4 td eQaes 4 9 ’ 4 4
οὔ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ. ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις
6 δ᾽ οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον ἥκιστα
.Ὶ a δ 8 4 « a > ὃ a 4 A a
7 γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν
οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον᾽ “προαίρεσις
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι,
δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι’ βούλησις δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
8 οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ
μηδαμῶς O¢ αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν
ἢ ἀθλητήν’ προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα
9 οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι᾽ αὑτοῦ, ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ
9 4 e 4 ’ ~ 4 a ὔ
τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
e ’ ’ ’ 1 Qrn el a
οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι᾽ ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν,
a 9 a , 4 a é ’ a
καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ
λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει: ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ
1o τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι, οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη: ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα
δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀΐδια καὶ
τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν: καὶ τῷ Ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ
διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις
It μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς.

to, or whether it isa merely popular | οἷον ἀθανασία:)] ‘But wish is for im-
confusion of terms that Aristotle | possibilities, as, for instance, immor-
attacks, is not clear, tality.’ This is not a passage that
§ καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία | can be cited as an indication of
ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμίᾳ 3° ἐπιθυμία of] | Aristotle’s opinion with regard to a
It might be said that desires are | future life. ᾿Αθανασία here means
really contrary to each other, and | ‘exemption from death,’ and does not
contradict each other as much as | touch the question as to the imperish-
purpose contradicts any desire, eg. | ability of the soul. It seems to have
the desire for money is thwarted by | been a stock instance of an impos-
that for pleasure. But the psychology | sible wish. Dr. Cardwell quotes
is not very explicit here, and Aris- | Xenophon’s Symposium (1.§ 15): οὔτε
totle seems to imply without de- | yap ἔγωγε σπουδάσαι ἂν δυναίμην
finitely expressing it, that in the | μᾶλλον ἥπερ ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι.
moral will there is an element con- 1i-13 ὁλῶς μὲν οὗ»---ἴσμεν)] ‘ Now
tradicting the desires in a manner | that purpose ®identical with opinion
different from that in which one | as a whole, perhaps no one maintains
desire interferes with another, at all. But neither is it identical
7 βούλησις δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν ddvvdrwv, | with any special kind of opinion.

ee

IT.—III.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 17

ἱλλ᾽ Oe ‘ a a a 9 LY A A A
ἀλλὰ ovde Tit’ τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ
ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα
μὲν λαβεῖν ἣ φυγεῖν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί
9 a t , A ~ a » ] A ~ 9 [2

ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμῴερει ἢ πῶς" λαβεῖν δ᾽ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ

δοξάζομεν.

καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ
δεῖ μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.

4
Kal

προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν

δὲ A 9 , 4
€ ἃ OV TWaAvu I(T Mev.

4 9 ’ a »
Te ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον,

διὰ κακίαν 0 αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ,

εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα

τῆς προαιρέσεως ἣ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει" οὐ τοῦτο

a ~ 4 4 9 9 o 9 ld s
yup σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ef ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξη τινί.

, a A
τι οὖν ἢ

a? ’ ’ ἢ ‘ a 9 , Me , ς΄ ‘
FOLOV Tl ECTIV, ἐπειδὴ Τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθὲν: εκουσίον μεν

δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ᾽ ἑκούσιον οὐ wav προαιρετόν.

ἀλλ᾽ dpa

γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ yap προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου

4 ῇ
καὶ διανοίας.
πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

ς , δ᾽ 4 A wv e A
υποσημαινειν ΕΟἰικὲ Καὶ τούυύνομα WS ον

12

13

-ᾧ ἢ 4 e 9 A ry ὔ
δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι 14

5

Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ wav βουλευτόν 3

For in purposing what is good or bad
our moral character consists,—not in

opining it. And we purpose to take |
; sections consist in an appeal to lan-

or avoid, or something of the kind,
but we opine what a thing is, or for

whom it is good, or how; but we do .

not exactly opine to take or avoid.
And while purpose is praised rather
by the epithets, “οὗ the right object,”
or “rightly,” opinion is praised by the
epithet ‘“‘truly.” And we purpose
things that, as far as may be (μάλιστα),
we know for certain to be good, but
we opine what we do not exactly know.’

οὐδέ τινι] t.¢. purpose is not identical
with an opinion as to moral matters.
The first argument to prove this is cha-
racteristic of Aristotle as opposed to
Plato. He says, ‘our moral character
does not consist in our opinionson good

and evil, but in the deliberate acts of |

our will.’ This is guarded afterwards

by the limitation (§ 15) that ‘ opinion

may go to form purpose, and may
VOL, 11.

again be reacted on by it;’ but the
question is, are they identical ?
12-13. The arguments in these

guage—we cannot speak of ‘ opining
to take,’ ἄς,

μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς) Ἢ is of course
not connected with μᾶλλον, It simply
means ‘or.’ ᾿Ορθῶς, which should
properly go with a verb, seems used
because the verb προαιρεῖσθαι was
much commoner before Aristotle than
the abstract form προαίρεσις. ᾿Ορθή
is applied to ὄρεξις (the element of
desire in wpoalpeots), Eth, VI. ii. 2.

III. Since Purpose implies delibe-
ration, this latter is now analysed, and
an account is given, first of its object,
secondly of its mode of operation.
The object of deliberation is deter-
mined by an exhaustive process. All
things are either eternal or mutable ;
we do not deliberate about things

C

18 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ITI.

(Crap.

ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ᾽ ἴσως Bov-

λευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος,

9 4 χὰ ~
3 ἀλλ ὑπερ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς

Φ v“~ on ~
βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου 4 τῆς διαμέτρον καὶ τῆς

4 πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι.

4 9 ~
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει,

8 δὲ Α 4." ’ ΕΣ: 9 » ” 4 ,
aéi OE KATA Ταῦτα γινομένων, aT ἐξ αναγκῆς εἰΤ1 ὲ Και φύσει

5 ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν.
περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων.
6 περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως.

οὐδὲ
οὐδὲ
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ

eternal. Of things mutable, we do | perceives ends. We might have ex-

not deliberate about those things .

which are regulated by necessity, by
nature, or by chance. Hence it
remains that we deliberate about
mutable things within the power of
man, and not about all such, but
about those within our own power,
and not about ends, but about means,
and where there is room for question.
The mode of operation in deliberating
isa kind of analysis, Assuming as
desirable some end, we first ask what
means will immediately produce this
end, what again will produce those
means, and so on till we have brought
the last link of the chain of causation
to ourselves, when we commence
acting at once, the last step in the
analysis being the first in the pro-
ductive process. If any step occurs
which is on the one hand necessary
for the given end, and on the other
hand unattainable by us, the chain
cannot be completed ; the deliberation
is relinquished. But if all the steps
are feasible, that which was indefinite
before at once becomes definite, and
purpose succeeds deliberation. A dis-
cussion of the nature of εὐβουλία as
related to φρόνησις occurs Eth. vi. ix.,
but is evidently written quite inde-
pendently of the present chapter, on
which it improves by employing the
formula of the moral syllogism, and
by inquiring after the faculty which

pected Aristotle to say that in the
deliberation which precedes an action
some account should always be taken
of the right or wrong of the action.
But here the only question is repre-
sented to be, how a given end is to be
obtained ? What action will sorve asa
means to it ? Hence while the present
discussion must be considered a subtle
piece of elementary psychology, and of
great merit in the infancy ofthescience,
on the other hand it seems incomplete
as regards the theory of morals.

3-5 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων---εὑρέσεως
‘No man deliberates about eternal
things, such as the universe, or the
incommensurability of the diagonal
and the side in a square ; nor indeed
about things in motion, if the motion
takes place invariably in the same
way, Whether of necessity, or by
nature, or from any other cause, as in
the instance of the solstices and the
risings of the sun: nor about things
entirely variable, like droughts and
rains: nor about matter of chance,
like the finding of a treasure.’ The
opposition to τὰ ἀΐδια is τὰ ἐν κινήσει.
The more exhaustive division οὗ ob-
jects would have been that which is
given Eth, VI. i. 6, into τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα
ἄλλως ἔχειν and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα.
But there is an absence of logical
formule in the present book which is
observable. The instances here given

II. ] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION 11]. 19

4 “- 9 aA ’ φΦ A ” , »”
περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα
᾽ 4 4 e , 9 Q
πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. οὐ γὰρ
4 3 vn 6 f\ ὃ 3 en ; 8 δὲ a
γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τούτων οὐθεν dt ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα de περὶ 7
τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν" ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά, αἴτια
‘ ms ΠῚ ’ . 9 8 ‘ , ν ‘ ἣν
γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς
a ἴα 4 3 4 a, “a 9 A @
καὶ πᾶν τὸ δὶ ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι
βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δὲ αὑτῶν πρακτῶν.
4 4 a 4 3 “ “A > “A 9 4 4
τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή,
οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)"
ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα γίνεται δὶ ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων
βουλευόμεθα. οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματι-

a 4 A
καὶ περί μεν ὃ

a ..... . -----.--.ὄ. ....-......

of the eternal are (1) the universe,
(2) a particular mathematical truth
—that the diagonal of a square is in-
commensurate with its side. That the
universe is eternal, being uncreated,
indestructible, and, as a whole, immu-
table, was part of Aristotle's physical
philosophy. Cf. de Celo 1. x. το:
Ὥστ᾽ εἰ τὸ ὅλον σῶμα συνεχὲς ὃν ὁτὲ
μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνως διατίθεται καὶ
διακεκόσμηται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου σύστασὶς
ἐστι κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός, οὐκ ἂν ὁ κόσμος
γίγνοιτο καὶ φθείροιτο, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ διαθέσεις
avrov.—Theabove mathematical truth
is called ‘eternal,’ De Gen. An. 11.
vi. 15: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχειν δυσὶν
ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον

ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν πλευρὰν |

ἀΐδιον, It is mentioned as one of
those things which philosophy begins
by wondering at, and ends by feeling
their universal necessity. Ifetaphys.
I. iL 35: καθάπερ τῶν θαυμάτων ταὐτό-
ματα τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν,
4 περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἣ τὴν τῆς
διαμέτρον ἀσυμμετρίαν" θαυμαστὸν yap
εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ
μετρεῖται. δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀπο-
τελευτῆσαι: ---οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτω θαυμά-
σειεν ἀνὴρ γεωμετρικὸς ὡς εἰ γένοιτο 7
διάμετρος μετρητή Two kinds of
eternity seem here placed in juxta-

thematical. But eternity or necessity
can only exist in relation to the laws
of the mind that perceives it. There-
fore we might say that these two
kinds of eternity find their meeting-
point in a metaphysic above the
division of the sciences. Aristotle
however is writing οὐ κατ᾽ dxpl-
Bear.

7 αἴτια γὰρ--- ἀνθρώπου] ‘For the
causes of things seem to be as follows,
nature, and necessity, and chance, and
again reason and all that depends on
man. A similar classification of
causes is implied Eth. 1. ix. 5, VI. iv. 4.
The relation of necessity and chance,
as causes, to nature, forms the subject
of Aristotle's Physics, Book 11. Chap-
ters iv.-ix. See Vol. I. p. 250.

8 καὶ wepl—yparrdéov] ‘And on
the one hand there is no deliberation
about sciences that are fixed and
complete in themselves, as for instance
about writing—for we do not doubt
how we ought to write.’ The ἀκριβεῖς
ἐπιστῆμαι here meant are not the
‘exact sciences,’ as we may judge
from the instance given. ᾿Ακριβής
seems equivalent to ‘fixed’ (cf. the
note on £th. 1. vii. 18), and ἐπιστήμη
is used in a sense equivalent to τέχνη,
though the words are immediately

position—one physical, the other ma- | afterwards distinguished.

20 ΗἩΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION IIL [Cuap.

’ 4 4 4 » a ’ ud
στικὴν, καὶ περι κυβερνητικὴν μαλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὁσῷ
ον \ » 4 “A “A e , ~

9 ἧττον διηκρίβωται, Kal ἔτι περί τῶν λοιπῶν ομοίως, μάλλον
ry 4 ‘ ’ a ‘ ’ A ‘
δὲ καὶ περι τὰς τέχνας ἢ τας ἐπιστήμας" μάλλον γὰρ

A 9 A ὔ 4 ’ 4 9 a e 9 a
1o περὶ αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ev τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ
Α ; 58, . A 9 , , 9» , 93 ?
TO πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, Kai ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον.
A [2 4 4 4
συμβούλους de παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀτι-
Il στοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βθουλευ-
~ ων 4 “- A ,
ὄμεθα δ᾽ ov περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ta τέλη.
” 4 4 4 ’ > ε ’ » er 4
οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ
a ΄ι ~
“πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν
΄ S ~
οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους" ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ
Ἁ om A} ὔ
διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου
4 ’ en a ’ 9 A 9
γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι
εν δ 4 ’ ΄-ς S , 4 4 a ὃ ν
ἑνὸς ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ
8 of a 9 A a un wv ad 9 ~ 4 ‘4
Tivos, ἕως dv ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ TO πρῶτον αἴτιον, Ὁ εν τῇ εὑρεέσει
, a
ἔσχατον ἐστιν' ὁ γὰρ BovAevomevos ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ
’
12 ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. φαίνεται
9 φ A , 9 ~ ΓΙ e
δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ζϊτησις ov πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον ai μαθημα-
~ 4 S 9 3 ~
Tai, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ TO ἔσχατον ἐν TH
9 ~ ~~ 4 gv
13 ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ — κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ

‘ It οὔτε γὰρ --- διάγραμμα] ‘The | of deliberation is analytical, procecd-
physician does not deliberate whether | ing backwards ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. It ends
he is to cure, nor the orator whether | with the πρῶτον αἴτιον, ic. the indi-
he is to persuade, nor the statesman |! vidual will. ‘ Will,’ says Kant, ‘is
whether he is to produce law and | that kind of causality attributed to
order. The end is not the subject | living agents, in so far as they are
of deliberation in any science. An | possessed of reason, and freedom is
end being assumed, we consider how | such a property of that causality as
and by what means it can be brought | enables them to originate events in-
about ; if it appear that there are | dependently of foreign determining
more ways than one, we inquire which | causes.’ That each man is, as re-
is the easiest and best; if it can be | gards his own acts, an originating
accomplished by one mean alone, we | cause not determined by other
inquire how this produces the end, | causes, is Aristotle’s view through-
and by what it is itself produced, | out. Kant’s definition throws light
until we come to that which as a | upon this.

cause is first, but is the last thing to κἀκεῖνο) Refers to ἑνός and διὰ
be discovered ; for such deliberation | τούτον.

as we describe is like seeking the ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.] Aristotle com-
solution of a geometrical problem by | pares deliberation with the analysis
analysis of the diagram.’ The process | of mathematical problems. Given a

111.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 21

4 [2 4 ὔ 9 [4 a a 4 4
ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ
| od a 98 a N , 9 ΄
otov τε πορισθῆναι' ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι
’ 4 + « > ea ’ , ΚΨ' . ‘ ‘
πράττειν. δυνατὰ de ἃ δί ἡμῶν γένοιτ᾽ ἄν: τὰ yap διὰ
~ ὔ 9 e “~ 4 [2 φ a 9 A 9 e a
τῶν φίλων δὲ ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν: ἡ yap ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.
ζητεῖται δ' ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ᾽ ἡ χρεία ωὐτῶν.
e ’ Ἢ . 8 a ~a eA 4 > 2» evn ~ a
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁτὲ μὲν Ot οὗ, OTE δὲ πῶς ἢ
διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ
τῶν πράξεων" ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ
9 n 4 Ν 4 A ’
οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος
281 4 ᾿ ᾧ 4
οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ

πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα.
9 A 4 . a ,
ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ TEAR,
ἡ ~ “a f e δὰ 9 4 ~
ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ws δεῖ: αἰσθησεως γὰρ ταῦτα.
εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ
‘ 4 4 » a 9 a ἭῬ 4 ,
προαιρετὸν TO αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμενον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετον"
τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύετωι
γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὑτὸν avayayn
τὴν ἀρχήν, Kat αὑτοῦ εἰς TO ἡγούμενον " τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ

problem of geometry, ¢.7. to find the ! πρόκειται τῷ συμβονλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ

method of constructing some figure.
Assume it as constructed, and draw

it accordingly. See what condition |

is immediately necessary, and what
again will produce this, &c.
14 ζητεῖται δ᾽ ---διὰ tivos]
question is sometimes what instru-
ments are necessary, sometimes how

they are to be used; and, speaking -

generally, we have to find sometimes
the means by which, sometimes the
manner or the person by whom.’
Michelet makes a difficulty about ἐν
τοῖς λοιποῖς, explaining it ‘in reliquis
categoriis ;’ but the Paraphrast ren-
ders it simply καὶ ἁπλῶς.

15 ἔοικε δὴ--- ἕνεκα] ‘It secms,
therefore, that man is, as we have
said, the cause of his actions: that
deliberation is about tho things to be
done by ourselves, and that actions
are means to something else.’ In
one sense, and so far as deliberation
is concerned, actions must be regarded
as means. Cf. Rhetoric, 1. vi. 1:

‘The |
| VIAL 5: Οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶ----τὸ ποιητόν.

, ᾿Αλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία

συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ

τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς
πράξει. But in another sense, and
from a moral point of view, each
action is an end-in-itself. Cf. Eth.

τέλος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τούτου.
16 εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει) ‘It will yo on

᾿ toinfinity’'—impersonal. Cf. 1. ii. 1,

I. vii. 7.

17 παύεται γὰρ---προαιρούμενο»)
‘For every one stops inyuiring how
he shall act, when he has brought
home the first link in the chain to
himself and to the guiding principle
in himself; that is to say, to that
which purposes.’ Throughout these
discussions we find a striking clearness
of expression for some of the ordinary
phenomena of consciousness ; on the
other hand, evident tokens that the
psychology is new and tentative; and
again, a want of deeper inquiry into

ome

7

22 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III.

18 προαιρούμενον.

[Cuap.

δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων

πολιτειῶν, ἃς “Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο' of γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προ-

19 ἐλοιντὸ ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ.

ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ

~ 9 - A 949 ες a \ ε , a 4
βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν ey

~ a ἴω 4
βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν: ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι yap

20 κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βϑούλευσιν.

ε - 4
ἢ μεν ον

᾿ ‘ “᾽ν . ᾧ A
προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περι ποία εστι; καὶ OTL τῶν

QA a ὔ
πρὸς τὰ τελη.

Ἢ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν, εἴρηται,

the nature of personality and of the
will.

18 δῆλον δὲ -- δήμῳθ, ‘Now this
is exemplified from the old politics
which Homer depicted ; for the kings
used to announce to the people the
course they had selected.’ Cf. the
conduct of Agamemnon, Jliad 11. 53,
sqq. A modern illustration isfurnished
by the French Parliaments, which
used to register the edicts presented
to them by the king as a matter of
course. The Paraphrast explains the
comparison hy making the people re-
present the wpoalpecis—Elodye γὰρ
τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βουλὴν τὸ προ-
κριθὲν ἀταγγέλλοντας τῷ δήμῳ ὥσπερ
τῇ προαιρέσει, ὥστε πραχθῆναι. The
people were required to acquiesce in
and carry out the decisions of the
kings, which else would have remained
unratified. So the reason announces
its decisions to the will or purpose,
t.e. the active powers in the mind.
Metaphors of this sort never accu-
rately represent mental distinctions,
The present comparison has many
flaws. For the προαίρεσις is here
called τὸ ἡγούμενον, which does not
answer to the people, distinguished
from the king. Again, it is the indi-
vidual (ἕκαστος), not the reason, that
announces his deliberations to the
leading part in himself. What consti-
tutes the individual as separate from
the will or purpose? And, is not

reason part of purpose, how then can
it be distinguished from it?

19 ὄντος δὲ---βούλευσυ]͵ ‘If the
object of purpose is that, which, being
in our power, we desire after delibera-
tion, purpose will be a deliberate
desire of things in our power. After
deliberating we decide, and form a
desire in accordance with our delibera-
tion.’ The Paraphrast here reads
κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν at the end of
this passage. There might seem to
be something plausible in the change,
because βούλευσις is represented as
confining itself to means ; hence how
can we be said to desire κατὰ τὴν
Bovrevow? Consistently, our desires
must depend on something else,
namely, BovAnois—deliberation is the
faculty for attaining them. On the
other hand, the phrases fovAevrod
épexro0, and βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις, run
the consideration of means and ends
together.

IV. Hitherto every act has been
regarded as a means, and has been
accounted voluntary because origi-
nating in the individual. Delibera-
tion and purpose have been restricted
in their function to the mere choice
and taking of means. A great question
therefore remains to be mooted,
whence do we get our conception of
ends? What is the nature of the
faculty called βούλησις, which has

III.—IV.]

HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEION ITI.

28

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινο-

e 9 ~
μένου ἀγαθοῦ͵

been assumed to be the faculty of
ends? Are we as free in the choice
of these, as we are in that of the
means! Aristotle contents himself
with mentioning inthe present chapter
that there are two extreme opinions,
the one (that of Plato) that wish is
always for the good; the other (that
of some of the sophists) that it is for
the apparent good. He rejects both of
these, the first as contradicting facts,
the second as ignoring any true object
of wish. He takes a position between
them, that, abstractedly and ideally,
as appealing to the universal reason
(ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ Kar’ ἀλήθεια») the good
is the object of wish, while to the
individual mind only what appears
good can seem desirable; hence,
although the good man, who has the
mens sana, and is thus in accordance
with the universal reason, and is its
exponent in particular cases (τάληθὲς
ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾷ ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον
αὐτῶν ὥν), wishes for the good alone,
others are deceived by false appear-
ances and by pleasure, and choose
what is not truly good. In the
statement that the morally good man
(cwovdatos) wishes aright, there is
implied the doctrine, afterwards de-
veloped by the Peripatetics, that it
is Virtue that gives a right concep-
tion of ends. Cf. Eth. Fud, 11. xi. 1,
and ΚΖ εἶ. Nic. vi. xii. 8, and see Vol.
I. Essay I. p. §9.

1 δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι]
This doctrine is found stated at length
in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 466, sqq.
Polus having argued that the position
of a tyrant or orator is enviable,
because ‘he can do what he wishes,’
Socrates answers that ‘the tyrant or
orator does nothing that he wishes :’
φημὶ γὰρ, ὦ ἸΠῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς

| βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὃν καλόν.

συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλητὸν τὰἀγα-

ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι
μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον.---οὐδὲν
γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν" ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς
δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. Then follows an
account οὗ βούλησις, that it is of ends
not means. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν
οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν
πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα
πράττουσι τοῦθ᾽ ὃ πράττουσι»; By
which it can be demonstrated that
βούλησις is of the absolute good.
The difference between Plato’saccount
and the one above is, that Plato dis-
tinguishes βούλησις from ἐπιθυμία,
while Aristotle does not. The βούλη-
σις of Plato is the higher will, or
desire of the Universal. In this
higher sense of the word wish, no
one wishes except for what is goud,
that is, in his best moments, in the
deepest recesses of his nature, if the
true bearings of his wish be pointed
out tohim. In this sense the wish
of the individual is in accordance with
universal reason, and is an expres-
sion of it. In a lower sense, we wish
with different parts of our nature, and
thus wish for all sorts of things, bad
as well as good. But to this latter
kind of wish the name ‘ desire’ is ap-
propriate. The tenet ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ βού-
Anos ἐστιν is of great importance
for morals, It implies much that
modern systems would convey in other
terms, such as the ‘supremacy of con-
science,’ the ‘autonomy of the will,’
&c. Elsewhere Aristotle distinctly
maintains it. Cf. Metaphys. x1. vii.
2: τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ
κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά
(transcendentally the objects of reason
and of longing are identical). ᾿Επιθυ-
μητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν,
In

N

24 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. [ Crap.

θὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς
e » ,“ A Ν ’ . 9 ’ my ’
αἱρούμενος (εἰ yap ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν: ἣν δ᾽, εἰ

3 οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ

βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστῳ
τὸ δοκοῦν: ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε,

4 ὔ 4 A 4 ~ 4 > ἢ » ἢ ε A
4 τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ apeoKe, apa φατέον απλῶς

re

μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ de
a ’ δ, a ᾿ 9 , a » %4F
TO φαινόμενον > Τῷ μεν ον σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν
4 ~ δὲ Ἂ Α i ’ Ρ 4 9 4 “a f
εἶναι, το ε φα; ῳ το τύχον; waxep και om τῶν σώματῶν
τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὕγιεινα ἐστι τὰ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν
τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς 0 ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βα ἕα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
p JY ee p a 9 4 >
ἕκαστα. ὁ σπουδαῖος yup ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ev
er 4 a 2 κα , >» e¢ P 4 Pv
ἑκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ᾽ ἑκάστην yap ἕξιν
ἴδια ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ
σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρῶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ
μέτρον αὐτῶν ὦν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἔοικε γίνεσθαι: οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται: αἱροῦνται
> Se δὲ e 4 θ ’ 4 δὲ x 7 ς 4 ’
οὖν ΤῸ Hou ὡς ἀγαῦον, τὴν dé Λύπὴην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
De Animé, 111. x. 4, he makes the | know what ‘seemed’ to him, he
wish (or will) side with reason, in | could only wish for what seemed
opposition to desire. Ἧ γὰρ βούλησις | good. Thus the aoe pwinetiads
ὄρεξις᾽ ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῇ- | between good and evil is done away
ται, kal κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ᾽ | with (συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλη-
ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν' ἡ yap | τόν). Cf. Metaphys. x. vi. 1: ᾿Εἰκεῖνος
ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστι. In other | (ὁ Πρωταγόρα) ἔφη πάντων χρημάτων
parts of the Ethics also (which may | εἶναι μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, οὐθὲν ἕτερον
hence be concluded to have been λέγων 4 τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ
composed at a different period from | εἶναι παγίως. τούτον δὲ γιγνομένου
this chapter) this distinction between | τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ
βούλησις, the genoral wish, and any εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
particular desire or determination, is | 4 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει
observed. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 6 : οὐθεὶς γὰρ | ὀρθῶ] The good man is made here
βούλεται οὐδ᾽ 7 ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ | again, as above (11. vi. 15), that
τὴν βούλησιν πράττει. οὔτε γὰρ βούλε- | standard of right and wrong, that
ται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον. | exponent of the universal reason, by
vil, xiii. 8: τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ | which Aristotle escapes being forced
βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἣ τοὺς πλείστους | into an utterly relative system of
τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. | morals.
τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ] This 5 οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται}
is a corollary of the doctrine of Prota- | The ‘pleasant’ is characterised as
goras. If the individual could only | ‘the seeming good’ in the Peripa-

IV.—V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEITON ITT. 25

"Ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν de καὶ 5
προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ
προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι

4 σ΄ 939 ea δὲ A ς 4 , e [ δὲ e
περί ταῦτας. ε ἡμῖν de Kal ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως Oe καὶ ἡ 2

tetic book De Motu Animal. vi. 5: δεὶ ignorance and carelessness producing
δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν vice, men are held to be respon-
ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ" φαινό- sible. (4) Men must not charge their
μενον γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν. | acts upon their natural character
. —rather their character is produced

by their acts. (5) The analogy of
i bodily infirmities shows us that if
some vices are cogenital, some, at al]
events, are self-produced. (6) The

VY. Aristotle winds up his ac- |
count of the voluntary, by arguing |
that virtue and vice are free (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν |
δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ |
κακία). As before remarked, this , great difficulty of the question is as
must not be taken as a metaphysical | follows: if, as was said above (Chap-
discussion of the question of free-will. | ter IV.), we each of us desire what
Partly, the question had never yet | seems good ; if our conception of the
been fully started; partly, Aristotle | end, that is, our idea of good, de-
would have thought it foreign to pends not on our own will, but on
an ethical treatise ; partly, we find | nature, or our character and tendency
in the present chapter that same | from birth; and if all our acts are
elementary and tentative character | determined by this conception of the
which marks the previous discussions | end, how can they be called free?
in this book. In dealing with one of | Aristotle answers by putting vari-
the real difficulties of the question at | ous alternatives: (a) You may either
the end of the chapter, Aristotle con- | accept this position in its full extent.
tents himself with a very qualified | It will then apply to virtue as well
and moderate assertion of freedom, | as vice. Both will be equally under
which contrasts with the dogmatic | a law of nature. Neither will be
statements on the same subject in | voluntary. But this the mind seems
the Ethics of Eudemus. The discus- _ to revolt against. (6) Or, you may
sion here is evidently suggested by, | say that while the end is absolutely
and directed against, the doctrine of | determined, the means to it are all
the Platonists, that ‘vice is involun- | free as springing from the will of the
tary,’ since it consists in ignorance. | individual. Thus, virtue and vice
The arguments are as follows: (1) | are free, because all their parts are
All action implies the possibility of | free. (y) Or, you may modify the
its contrary, hence if to act rightly | doctrine by admitting that there is
be in our power, to act wrongly must | something self-produced and self-
be in our power also. (2) That an | determined in the character as a
individual is the originating cause of | whole, and therefore in the idea of
lhis actions, is a conception which it | good, which is to determine our
is difficult to get ridof. Thisimplies | actions.
freedom. (3) We all act as if vice 1-2 ὄντος δὴ -- ἡ κακία] “ The
were free as well as virtue. It is | end then being the object of wish,
punished by the state. Even for | while the means are the objects of
VOL. 11. D

SAGA a SS A A nO — EP

26 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IIT.

[Cuap.

’ 4 @ ‘ 949 @ a 4 ’ ‘ 4 4 ἢ

κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ eb ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πρατ-
a A 4 ὔ 9 9 A ’

τειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ val’ @oT εἰ τὸ πράττειν
4 939 ὁ a 4 ὔ A 4 4 ’ 949? @ a 4

καλὸν ὃν eb ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ TO μὴ wMparrew eh ἡμῖν ἔσται

9 4 » a 9 AQ a f 4 “a 9 9 ec a A

αἰσχρὸν ὃν, καὶ εἰ TO μὴ πράττειν καλον ὃν εᾧ ἡμῖν, Kat

4 g 9 4 a 939 δ. «a
3τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὃν eh ἡμῖν.

e δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τὰ

4 a A 4 9 ’ 4 ’ δὲ ‘ 4 4 ,
καλὰ πράττειν Kal τὰ αἰσχρᾶ, ὁμοίως OE καὶ TO μὴ πρατ-
σι 3 4 9 a A a > 9.9 @ a w
Tew, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν TO ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ep ἡμῖν apa

4 9 g a 4
4 τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι.

τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν αονηρὸς οὐδ᾽ ἄχων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθεῖ’ μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς

deliberation and purpose, the actions
that are concerned with the means
must depend on purpose and must be
voluntary. But every calling out of
the virtues into play is concerned with
the means; virtue accordingly is in our
power, and in like manner so is vice.’

αἱ περὶ ταῦτα wpdtes] The words
wept ταῦτα are ambiguous, The
Paraphrast confines them to ‘the
means,’ which rendering is supported
by κατὰ προαίρεσιΨ ἂν elev. Actions
were above said to be means (III.
iii, 15).

al δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι) This
is an unusual expression, We find
it again, Eth. x. iii. 1: οὐδὲ γὰρ al
τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν.
Aristotle’s usual formula is ἐνέργεια
κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, 4.e. the evocation of the
internal nature into consciousness or
action, under the regulation of the
moral law.
sidering ἀρετή as a δύναμις, or latent
quality that might be so evoked. The
psychology of this passage is different
from that of Zth. vi. xii. 8-10. Here
it is said that βούλησις gives us the
idea of the end, and that virtue con-
sists in προαίρεσις and βούλευσις taking
the means; there that virtue gives
the end, and an intellectual faculty

He seems averse to con- |

(¢péynors) the means. But see above,
note on iv. 1.

2 ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν
καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττει») Elsewhere (Meta-
phys. VIII. ii, 2) Aristotle states in more
philosophical form this first step in
the doctrine of free-will, namely, that
every psychical δύναμις is a capacity
of contraries, see Vol. I. p. 238.

3 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς
εἶναι] ‘And this is, according to our
hypothesis,—being good and bad.’
ἣν = ‘is as we have said,’ referring to
the preceding section. Trendelenburg
in his paper on τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι (Ihein-
tsches Museum, 1828) tells us that
ἀγαθοῖς in the present passage is by
attraction to ἡμῖν. It is therefore to
be distinguished from the logical ex-
pression τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, ‘the essential
idea of goodness.’

4 τὸ δὲ Adyew ὡς---ἀληθεῖ] ‘ But to
say that “ No man prefers a crime or
spurns a bliss” seems half false and
half true.’ The line here quoted, on
which the discussion in this chapter
turns, is of uncertain authorship, It
is quoted in the ninth book of the
Laws of Plato, Ὁ. 374, A, Which passage
is referred to here, Πότερον δὲ ἑκόν-
τας οἴει ἔχειν τοῦτο τὸ ἄδικον τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἄκοντας; ὧδε δὲ λέγω,

V.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. 27

ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον. ἣ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις 5
ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι
οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα 6
φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ
τὰς ep ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν
καὶ ἑκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ up 7
ἑκάστων καὶ Ux αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν' κολάζουσι γὰρ
καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἣ δὲ
ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας
τιμῶσιν, ὧς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες, τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες.
καίτοι ὅσα μήτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ᾽ ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προ-

ἑκόντας οἴει ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδίκους εἶναι ἣ
ἄκοντας ; ‘Exévras ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες"
πονηροὶ γάρ εἰσιν. ‘Exdévras ἄρα σὺ
οἴει πονηροὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώ-
πους; “Εωγε᾽ σὺ δ' οὔ; Οὐκ, εἴ γέ τι
δεῖ τῷ ποιητῇ πείθεσθαι. oly ποιητῇ;
Ὅστις εἶπεν

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ᾽ ἄκων μάκαρ.

᾿Αλλά τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ ἡ παλαιὰ
παροιμία ἔχει, ὅτι πολλὰ ψεύδονται
dodol, The answer to this is, an ar-
gument to show that injustice is δι᾽
ἀμαθίαν, and therefore involuntary.
Οὐκ dpa ἐψεύσατο τοῦτό ye ἁοιδός.
The original saying was probably a
mere truism, πονηρός meaning not
‘ wicked’ but ‘wretched.’ This play
on the word rendered the line pecu-
liarly suitable for Plato’s argument.
The same quotation occurs in the spu-
rious Platonic dialogue repi Δικαίου.
5 γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ
τέκνω»] The analogy here given, when
looked at closely, does not imply any
wery strong assertion of free-will
(though Aristotle meant it to be so).
For the father inherits, or receives by
nature, qualities that he transmits to
his children. Analogously the will
might be regarded as an effect, as
well as a cause, of circumstanccs.,

|
|
|

TN ὃ ue

7 τούτοις 8° ἔοικε---.μμομοθετῶ»} ‘This
seems to be supported by the testimony
both of individuals and of the great
legislators themselves,’ Theargument
drawn from theconstitution of society,
from the fact of rewards and punish-
ments, goes so far as this. It proves
that the mind is of a nature to be
acted on by inducements. It, of
course, does not touch the metaphy-
sical difficulty as to the whole world
being bound by a law of necessity.
But it proves an instinctive belief
existing in society, exactly coincident
with the position of Aristotle, that the
individual is the cause of particular
acts. There is no natural tendency
in criminals to disclaim responsibility
for their crimes, If they do so, it is
not from an instinctive feeling, but
rather from a sophisticated mind. As
before said, this fact is not sufficient
to disprove a metaphysical system
which would represent legislature,
judge, criminal, and the whole world,
as forced to do what they do by an
irresistible succession of cause and
effect. But ethically and politically
it is sufficient to justify a practical
assumption of freedom. And in any
system it must at all events be taken
account of.

28 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. [Cuar.

, ἤ @ 9Qs 4 MM “a 4 ~ 4

τρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ

, A 4 a <A “~ A ΚΝ 9 φ ~ “Ὁ ὔ i

θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ αλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ GAA οτιοὺν τῶν τοιούτων

A 4 ἡ ῇ ‘ A s > 93 9 ”~ ἊΝ

8 οὖθεν γὰρ ἧττον πεισόμεθα αὐτα. καὶ γὰρ ex αὐτῷ τῷ
ΡῈ ἢ A > ~ ~ 9 , Φ

ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον

a ~ Ά a 9 A 9 9 ~

τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια" ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ'
~ 4 ~ “" ww “~ 4 ’

κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ᾽ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.

“"Ἠ} ~ “A [2 e a
καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστα-
4

ὁμοίως δὲ Kal
> a 3 Ψ > 4.9 ? a ~ e 9.» 4

ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι’ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ αὐ-

ἤ ἢ
οσθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπὰ ἐστι, κολαζουσιν.

σι a A a 9 a ~ 4 9 ~ , 9 4

10 τοῖς ὃν TO μῆ αγνοεῖν᾽ τοῦ yap ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι, αλλ
4 a bd er ᾿ ? A ? a a
ἴσως τοιοῦτος ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ

τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ
ἀδίκους ἣ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν
πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες" αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα
τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν

μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν" διατελοῦσι
12 γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν
13 περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. ἔτι

δ᾽ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν
14 ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον,

bd οι
11 ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν.

4 4 a 9 ~ [4
ει δὲ fy ayvowy τις σραττει

8 διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια] Cf. Poli-
tics, 11. xii, 13: ᾿Εγένετο δὲ καὶ
Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ
πολιτείας" νύμος δ᾽ ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς
μεθύοντας, ἂν τυπτήσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν
ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων᾽ διὰ γὰρ τὸ
πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας
οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι
δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τὸ συμφέρον. Drunkenness is self-
caused ignorance of right and wrong.
(Cf. Eth, 111. i. 14.) The law of Pit-
tacus is given in the Rhetoric to illus-
trate an ἔνστασις depending on an
appeal to authority. (11. xxv. 7) Ef ris
ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ
σνγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρ-
τάνουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς
alverés. οὐ γὰρ dy μείζους ζημίας ἐνο-
μοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

10-12 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα --- ἀναι-

σθήτου] ‘For the particular develop-
ments of the mind in each case give
people their character. This may be
illustrated by the case of those who
are practising for some contest or
action,—for they keep on exercising
their powers. Now not to know that
the several states of mind arise from
particular developments of the powers
is absolute idiocy.’ This passage con-
tains exactly the same theory of the
formation of moral states as that given
at the beginning of Book II. But it
is written independently of the former
passage—in that separate way, which
must be called a marked peculiarity
of Aristotle’s writings.

132 ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλογον — ἀκόλαστον
‘Again it is absurd to say that he
who acts unjustly does not wish to be
unjust, or he who acts iutemperately

V.] HOIKQON NIKOMAXEION 11]. 29

3 » κν Ψ 3 εν ” 3 a ¥ 4 4 ὟΝ
ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε
᾿᾿ 4, [4 ᾽ν 4 oar 4
βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται Kat ἔσται δίκαιος" οὐδὲ yap
ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. Kat εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς
βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξὴν
2 0A 4 ᾿Ξ ἢ ; 4. “ 4 237
αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἀφέντι
λίθον ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ
\ Ξ Ves ee ν᾿ 49 © τ, 9 α “ \ 4
τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι" ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ
~ 9, 4 ~ 9 a 9 4 ~ 4 Igen ὔ
τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις
4 , ver oo > / ”
μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν’ γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι
4 > 4 σι ~
μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μόνον δ᾽ at τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί
4 9 > 9 ἢ 4 ε a“ [4 . "Ὁ “A
εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοις Kal αἱ TOU σώματος, οἷς Kal ἐπιτιμῶμεν"
a 4 4 4 , 9 a 5 Α 3 Ὁ a 4 4
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι
ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ
’ 1 8 Sa! eS ἢ ~A yr a? ’
πήρωσιν" οὐθεὶς yap ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἣ ἐκ νόσου
ΓῚ 4 ~
ἢ ex πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι: τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας
A ΧᾺλ 4 ’ “a A 4 , “a or a A
ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας was ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ TO
~ “~ © F439 ὃ a 9 ~ ε 4 4 749 ὃ « ¥
σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ de μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔ.
9 C7 ao 4 “- eo» , aA “»
εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν

ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν,

to be intemperate.’ Aristotle would
not say himself that any one ‘ wished
to be intemperate,’ that is, wished it
in the general, in the abstract, for its
own sake. But here he points out
that those who do not wish to be
intemperate yet take the steps that
lead inevitably to this. He argues
that the means make the end free ; the
outset, the conclusion ; the parts, the
whole. Afterwards (§ 22) he allows
that the general state is not so entirely
in our power as the particular act.
With regard to the former it is rather
true to say that we are responsible for
it, than that we choose it. A para-
dox then still remains, that men pro-
duce by voluntary acts that which
they do not wish. The resolution of
this is to be found in Eth, vit. iii.,
where it is shown that right moral
acting consists in allowing the act
of the moment to be sufficiently in-

9 i e @ a 9 , ~
εἰ δέ τις λεγοι ὅτι πάντες εἐφιενται τοῦ

fluenced by universal considerations.
Error and vice, on the contrary,
consist in suffering the universal
idea, the general conception of what
is good and desirable, to stand in
abeyance.

14 προεμένῳ 8 οὐκέτι] ‘But after
he has thrown his health away, he
has no longer a choice.’ To ‘give
away’ is the only sense in which
προΐεσθαι is used in the Ethics. Cf.
Iv. i, 9, ΙΧ, i 7, ας.

17-20 This complex argument
will be perhaps made most clear, if
divided into the following separate
members, (1) El δέ τις λέγοι--αὐτῷ
is the general protasis. Suppose it
to be said that all aim at what appears
to them good, but that their ideas and
impressions are beyond their control,
being dependent in each case on the
character of the individual, (2) On
this an alternative follows: either (el

6

30 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III.

[Cuar.

, ~ 9 ~ “A 4 a
atvouevov ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας ov κύριοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁποῖός
@ , 9 σι ΡῈ
ποθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ'

μὲν οὗν---αἴτιος) the individual is the
cause of his own character, and 80
accordingly of his ideas, or (3) let us
see what the consequences will be if
we allow that the individual is not
the cause of his own character (el δὲ
μή--εὐφυΐα), In this case no one
will be responsible for doing wrong :
wrong will reduce itself to mere
ignorance, the knowledge of the good
to a happy gift of nature. (4) But
these extreme deductions are over-
thrown (εἰ δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν»--- ὁπωσδήποτε)
by its being shown that they will
equally disprove the voluntariness of
virtue, as well as that of vice. (5)
The argument is concluded by
summing up the results of the pre-
vious discussions (εἴτε δή---ὁμοίως
γάρ). In whatever sense virtue is
said to be free, whether as implying
that the idea of the end is in our
power, or only that there is something
free and individual in the taking of
means,—in exactly the same sense
will vice be free, for these two
opposite terms stand on exactly the
same footing.

17 τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι)
‘But are not masters of their impres-
sion.’ Φαντασία is a special word, de-
noting something between sense and
intellect (φαντασία yap ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθή-
σεως καὶ διανοίας" αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται
ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ dvev ταύτης οὐκ
ἔστιν ὑπόληψιι. De An. 111. iii. 5).
It denotes, in short, the sensuous im-
pression of an object. Aristotle says
that we may have a false φαντασία
even where we have true opinions,
as, for instance, our φαντασία of the
sun makes it a foot in diameter,
while our belief is that the sun sur-
passes in magnitude the habitable
world (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ

a

ὧν dua ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῇ ἔχει, οἷον
φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πετί-
στευται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης.
De An. ur. iii, 15). Φαντασία is
closely allied with μνήμη, it belongs
to the same part of the mind (De
Memor, i. 9). Memory and ¢ap-
τασία are something short of in-
tellect—Aristotle attributed them to
the lower animals. Cf. Metaphys. 1.
1. 3: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις
sy καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ
μετέχει μικρόν. Cf. also Eth. Vil.
iii. 11. Brutes and the incontinent
are said to follow their φαντασίαι, De
An. 111. 11]. 21 : καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ
ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ
κατ᾽ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ Spa, τὰ μὲν διὰ
τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ
διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν γοῦν ἐνίοτε
πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι.
Cf. Eth. vii. vii. 8. We find the
word φαντασία not as yet settled into
a psychological formula in Plato’s
Theetetus, p. 152 B, where the doc-
trine of Protagoras is shown to imply
that everything is as it appears, and
that this appearing is identical with
sensation. 2. τὸ δέ ye φαίνεται alc Od-
verbal ἐστι»: Θ. Ἔστι γάρ. Σ.
Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἐν
re θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις,
οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα
ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. Aristotle,
giving a scientific account of it in the
De Anima, separates it, as we have
seen, from sensation on the one hand,
and reason on the other. The term
does not correspond with any of our
regular psychological terms. In rela-
tion to the fancy and the imagination,
it represents the material for these,
the brain-images out of which the
creations of fancy (as well as the
phantasmagoria of dreams) are con-

V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 31

. a 3 ὦ ε a A we ¢ ἢ ’ r ‘
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, Kal
A , # ᾽ν ν . w SS 6 ΩΝ ν
τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος" εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ
wv ~ 4 a ᾶ a 9 wv δι ~
αἴτιος τοῦ κακὰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
e ὃ a , ἢ ε ~ 4 ww ,ᾳ΄
πράττει, δια τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι.
A ~ a a
ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
»” yp ~ n~
ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἧ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ Kat’ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν
δ΄, »ν»γ ? 4 cas a “- , 4
αἱρήσεται. καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυής ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πεφυκεν" Το
, ,
γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ wap’ ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε
a Q a“ Φ “-
λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ
A 4 ~
καὶ TO καλῶς ταῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη
εὐφυΐα, εἰ δὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς
κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ
4 “ ~ 4 , “A e , ’ Α
καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος Φύσει 7 ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ
δι 4 “~ a
κεῖται, τὰ de λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ᾽ ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν
ς ὃ ’ wv on a , a a e ἢ ~ ,
ὁπωσόήποτε. εἴτε δὴ TO τέλος μὴ Φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαι-
ς ἢ 4 , 4 ᾽ a ” ‘
νεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι Kat παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐστιν, εἴτε TO
a r ὔ ~ δὲ 4 a ’ e- ἤ Α
μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν
ὃ a e % A Φ A ld 4 sft a A e td
σπουδαῖον 4 ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὖθεν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία
n~ n~ SY 9
ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη" ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει TO Ot
~ ~ gz
αὑτὸν ev ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ev τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὗν,
@ 4 e A e 9 ε 5 i A a “- [.2
ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκοὑσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων
΄σ΄οὭ 4 f
συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι TO τέλος

structed. Aristotle, not entering at
all into the philosophy of the imagi-
native faculties, merely speaks of
φαντασία as farnishing a necessary
element to thought (νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν
ἄνεν φαντάσματος, De Mem. i. 5).
From what has been said it is easy
to see the special appropriateness of
the word in the above passage to
denote an impression or idea of the
good received passively, and in itself
erroneous,

19 εἴτε δὴ --- τέλει] ‘ Whether,
then, the conception of the end, of
whatever kind, comes not to each
individual. by nature, but something
also is contributed by himeelf (7: καὶ
παρ᾽ αὐτόν ἐστι»), or whether the end

indeed is fixed by nature, but it is
through the good man’s voluntarily
taking the means that virtue is volun-
tary; in either case, I say, vice will

_be not a whit less voluntary (than

virtue), for the bad man, exactly aa
the good, has individuality (τὸ δι᾽
αὑτὸν) in the particular actions, if not
in the conception of the end.’

20 καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων cuvalriol πως
αὐτοί ἐσμενὶ ‘For we are ourselves
joint causes, in a way, of our own
states of mind.’ The word cvvalrios,
meaning not the primary, but a con-
comitant cause, is of not unfrequent
occurrence in Plato. Cf. Timeus, p.
46 D, where it is said of fire, &c.,
δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ

9

20

32 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ITI. [Crap.

τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), Kai ai κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν" ὁμοίως

21 γάρ.
, ’ Φ , , 4 . ὦ “ Cyr ἡ

γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ᾽ ὧν τε

[2 4 9

γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ᾽

ea a @¢ é 4 @ φ nv e 9 ‘ ’ e Η͂

ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ

4 e , δὲ [ ’ e a , 4 4 ¢ Ψ é ~

22 opy ὁμοίως de αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις" τῶν

μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν,

© ld A @ ”~ Ww 4 σι 4 ~ 3

eddres τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων de τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ

~ 4 9 4 “- 9 “~ 4 δ) a i 4
κοινῇ μὲν OUV περι τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰρηται ἥμιν TO TE

ο΄ \ e ’ 3 , Ν ἘΠῚ “~ 4
ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις OU γνώριμος, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρω-

s ~ e [4
23 διὰ Τοῦτο ἐεκοῦύυσιοι.

στιων"

2 N δ 4 a 4 a
τίνες εἰσι Kat περί “οία καὶ “Πῶς "
Q a a) ’
Και πρῶτον σερί ἀνδρείας.

, 4 ἢ
TOCa εἰσιν.

ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἣν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι,
4 , ‘ 4 QA e [2 ww
ἀναλαβόντες δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης, εἴπωμεν

ἅμα δ᾽ ἔσται δῆλον καὶ

ξυναίτια, ἀλλ᾽ αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάν»-
TOY,

21-22 These sections form the
junction between the somewhat
isolated treatise on the Voluntary
and Aristotle's discussion of the
separate virtues. They bear marks
of having been added for the express
purpose of forming a junction. For
after a general statement of the theory
of virtue in section 21 there is a
résumé of some points with regard to
the voluntariness of actionsand habits,
which is just what a man might have
been likely to add after reading over
his own treatise, and thinking that it
required a word or two of elucidation.

22 οὐχ ὁμοίως 3) — ἀρρωστιῶ»)
‘But actions and habits are not equal-
ly voluntary, for we are masters of
our actions from the beginning to the
end because we know all the parti-
culars, but we can only control the
beginning of our habita, while the
gradual addition made by each parti-
cular step is unperceived, as is the
case also with illnesses,’

23 ἀναλαβόντες δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης
—elgly] ‘Let us therefore resume
our discussion of the separate virtues,

stating what they are, with what
actions they are concerned, and in
what manner. It will at the same
time appear how many there are.’
On the assumed completeness of Aris-
totle’s list of the virtues, see note on
Eth, 11. vii. 1, and the plan of Book
IV.; cf. also Eth. 111. x. 1, note.

καὶ πρῶτον περὶ dvdpelas] Aristotle's
admirable account of courage is to
some extent indebted to the observa-
tions of Plato, while in some points
again it isa protestagainst the Platonic
theory. In the Protagoras (pp. 349-
351, 359-361) courage is identified
with the science of the traly safe and
the truly dangerous, In the Laches
(pp. 198-201), however, written pre-
viously, it is argued that, if danger
be ‘future evil,’ courage cannot be
the science of this, for a science
excludes all consideration of time, so,
if courage be a science at all, it must
be the science of good and evil
universally. Thus Plato merges
courage in that universal wise con-
sciousness, which he considered the
true ground of morality. In the
Republic (p. 430 5), courage is
said to be the maintenance of

V.—VI_] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION III. 33

"Ort μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη 6
‘ , Υ̓͂ ’ ‘ ~ 4 ᾿ ,
καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι Ta φοβερά, 2

a 9 a ¢ ες ἊΝ 9 Ἂς ῦ + 4 4 ,
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλώς εἰπεῖν κακά" διὸ Kat τὸν φόβον
e , ᾽ a“ o A a ὔ
ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα 3
τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ᾽
οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι" Ena γὰρ καὶ δεῖ
φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν" ὁ
4 Ἁ , 4 4 a OQ 4 A 4
μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ de μὴ φο-

.»--“--- ὦ»... .. -- ῥ«'5Ἕ-ὉπἨ.- -οὠ- -- — -_—- ὅν ee eee we

right principles in spite of the dis-
tractions of danger. By Aristotle,
courage is more definitely fixed as a
condition of the moral side of man’s
nature, and as implying not only a
consciousness, but a conscious choice
of the highest moral good. Its sphere
is limited to war, and thus a rather
special and restricted character is
given to the virtue. At the same
time a reverence is shown for the
nobleness of courage beyond what we
find in Plato. And deep human ob-
servations are made which are in the
best style of Aristotle’s moral writing.

VI. 1-2 περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη---
ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά"
διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν
κακοῦ) These points are accepted from
Plato, cf. Protag. p. 358 Ὁ: προσδο-
xlay τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον
εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Laches, Ὁ. 108 Β:
ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ
δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος
παρέχει" δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα
οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ
προσδοκώμενα" δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδο-
κίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. .. . τούτων δέ γε
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις ;
κομιδῇ γε. The subject of the present
chapter is the propersphereof courage.
ἤδη καὶ πρότερον», Eth, τι. vii. 2.

3-8 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν---κινδύνῳ])
These sections contain a protest
against the doctrine represented in
the Zaches, Ὁ. 191, D, B, where

VOL. Il,

courage is extended to all those
objects which are here expressly
excluded from it—dangers by sea,
illness, political conflicts, even the
encountering of temptation. Ἐουλό-
μενος γάρ cov πνθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς
ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξύμπαντι τῷ
πολεμικῷ εἴδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ
πολέμῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν
θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ
ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς
πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ
ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι
πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους,
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ
μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἣ ἀναστρέφοντες

. εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὦ Λάχης καὶ ἐν
τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖο. Aristotle treats
all such applications of the word
ἀνδρεῖος as merely metaphorical
(λέγεται δ᾽ ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ
μεταφορά»), to these he opposes the
proper use of the word (κυρίως δὴ
λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν, § 10) 88 belonging peculiarly
to war.

ἔνια γὰρ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν]
Of, Eth. 111. 1. 24: δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι
ἐπί τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον
ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. It admits of
discussion how much, independently
of a merely permissive attitude in
the will and reason, the instincts of
fear, anger, and desire may be posi-
tively called out and even created
by considerations and suggestions of
the reason, or how far their place

E

Tro

34 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. [Crap.

’ . ’ , Εὲ᾿᾽», ’ mis ‘
βούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ᾽ ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖὸς κατὰ
ἢ » ἢ Ψ ~ 9 ’ »
μεταφοράν' ἔχει yap τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ: ἄφοβος
‘ 4 e 9 a , wv 4 - a
4 γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι
οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δὲ αὑτόν,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ
τοῦτον καθ᾽’ ὁμοιότητα' ἕνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς
A , » , 4 9 4 ,
κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων
5 ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ
a“ 4 a - a 4 4 “ ,
παῖδας Kat γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τὼν τοιούτων,
δειλός ἐστιν" οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος.
6 περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερών ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ; ἢ περὶ τὰ
μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν, φο-
βερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος" πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ
7 τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ᾽
Ἂ zx) 4 , . 2 , oe 9 > 3 Φ 4
ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ
3 , a ἢ ’ 9 ἢ a a ’ Ν
8ἐν θαλαττὴ ἢ ἐν νόσοις. ev τίσιν οὖν; ἢ εν τοῖς
καλλίστοις ; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν Badu’ ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
A 4 [4 e 4 , e A 4 e
9 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ Kat ai

‘ 9 a a “ a ’
τΤιμαι αἱ €y Tags ON €gi Kal wap a Tog μονα pXols.

10 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον

4δ , oo , 9 , « » “ “-
adens, καὶ οσα θανατον ἐπιφέρει UTOYULG OVTa*’ TOlaUTa

A ‘ 4 Α ‘
ιι δὲ μάλιστα Ta κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν

ὔ om
θαλάττη καὶ ev νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ
θαλάττιοι: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν
θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι

‘ 4 3 ’ ” δὲ a 9 ὃ ’ ’ - 9 4
12 Tapa THY εμπειρ!αν. αμα οὧοε καὶ ἂν ρίζονται Εν οἰ εστιν

ἀλκὴ ἡ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν" ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς
οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

----- =a — see --. + eee

may be supplied by the reason itself. | death, and about things which sud-
It is a similar question which is dis- | denly (ὑπόγνια ὄντα) bring on death,
cussed by Kant, How far is it possible | —and such are especially the affairs
to obey in a positive sense the injunc- | of war. No doubt the brave man,

tion, ‘love your enemies’ ? when he is upon the sea, or upon a
6 φοβερώτατον δ᾽ ὁ Odvaros* πέρας | sickbed, will be brave: but his bravery
γάρ] See Vol. I. Essay V. p. 302. will not be that of a sailor. Lands-

10-12 κυρίως---ὑπάρχει)] ‘He then | men in danger of drowning give up
can be properly called brave who | all hope of safety, and feel repugnance
is fearless about the noble kind of | at the thought of such a death;

VI.—VII.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 35

To δὲ φοβερὸν ov πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ 7
ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν
ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ kat’ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον

a fy e , A a 4 ‘4 e A 4 a
καὶ ἧἥττον' ὁμοίως δὲ Kal τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δε ἀνδρεῖος 2
.. », e 4 , A 9 A 4
ἀνέκπληκτος ws ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ

~ e a 4 a e e , e κι “" σι
τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὃ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ
” σι Α 4 ~ 9 ~ Ψ 4
ἕνεκα' τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς" ἔστι δὲ μάλλον 3
ee A a oo , \ ἊΝ:
καὶ ἧττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς
τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν 4
δῇ 4 a e 4 Η͂ 3 φ a € \@ 9 ε # “~
ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ Ore, ἤ τι τῶν
[4 « , 4 Α A Α ὔ 4 A i)
τοιούτων: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περί τὰ θαρραλέα. Ὁ μὲν ον
a a a ae @ e oe 4 t \ e@ a 4
ἃ det καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ws δεῖ καὶ
a e , \ ‘ A ’ τι > ὑφ! ’ Q
ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος: κατ᾽ ἀξίαν yap, καὶ
τέλος 6

Lg nA e ὔ , 4 [4 φ 4 σι
ὡς dv ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

while sailors are made confident by
their experience. Besides, men put
forth their courage on occasions where
prowess may be shown or where to
die is glorious ; but in death at sea or
from sickness neither of these qualities
is to be found.’ In this passage Aris-
totle was evidently not alluding to

---- -.... er .. ....

death in ἃ sea-fight, but to being |

drowned in ashipwreck. At Salamis
“the deck’ was a ‘field of fame’ (ἐν
ols ἀλκὴ ἢ καλοὺ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν).

VII. This chapter discusses courage
as being a mean state with regard to
daring and fearing. Setting aside
terrors which are too great for human

-.----.---ὉὉ-- eee

nature to bear, the brave man is calm |
(dvéxwAnxros), and endures or fears ,
all things in their due measure ac- ,

cording to the true standard, his aim
being to attain the noble. Thus he
is distinguished from the extremes by
w bom these proportions are violated.
The extremes, by a refinement which
Aristotle does not extend to the other
virtues (cf. note on Eth. 11. vii. 2),
are fourfold. (1) Deficiency of fear,
producing a character whith has no

name. (2) Excess of fear = cowardice.
(3) Deficiency of daring = cowardice.
(4) Excess of daring=rashness. Two
of these terms are identical, and one
is nameless, so that the extremes
really reduce themselves to cowardice
and rashness ($ 12). Some excellent
remarks are introduced on the char-
acters of the boastful man and the
rash man.

1 τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν---θαρραλέα] Having
said where fear and courage are to be
looked for, we next observe that fear
admits of degrees, so that courage is
proportionate. ‘Now the Fearful is
different to different persons, indepen-
dently of our calling some things fear-
ful beyond human endurance. These
latter are fearful to every man in his
senses, but dangers that are not
beyond human endurance differ both
in magnitude and in degree, a differ-
ence found also in the things that
give courage.’

6 τέλος δὲ---ἀνδρεία»)] This diffi-
cult section must be taken in con-
nection with what has gone before.
Aristotle is determining the charac-
teristics of a brave act. He here says

36 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION ITL.

[Cuap.

4 ’ 4 ’ 9 4 4s 4 4 (4 + ~ 9§ ὃ Π]
δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστί TO κατὰ THY ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ avoperw

δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος" ὁρίζεται

. oo ~ +
yup ἕκαστον Tw τέλει.

4 ’ 4 4 4 9 ὃ ’
7 Και πραττεί Ta Κατα ΤῊΝ ay βέίαν.

καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει

τῶν δ᾽ ὑπερβα-

λόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς

, (ad ‘ 9 9 o ww 3 ,
πρότερον ὅτι WoAAG ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις μωινό-
μενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηθὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε

τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς.
ὃ ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς.

4 4 > e 4 4 4 9 ’

ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας.

ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
δὲ καὶ

4
ὡς οὖν

δοκεῖ

ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνε-

9 σθαι’

3 ? iy o ~
ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται.

4 Ά 9 Ἀ e
διὸ καὶ εἰσιν ot

πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι: ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι

10 τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν.

ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι

ὑπερβάλλων δειλός" καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ

that ‘the End-in-itself, or perfection,
of a particular moral act will be
identical with that which belongs to
the formed moral character. The
End-in-itself for courage, as a whole,
is the idea of the beautiful. The idea
of the beautiful, therefore, must be
that End-in-itself which a man pro-
poses to himself in each separate act
of bravery in order to constitute it
brave.’ In short, the meaning comes
to this, ‘what makes an act truly
brave, is that, like the perfect state of
bravery, it aims at the beautiful.’ The
term τέλος is used in a sense between
that of ‘perfection’ and ‘ motive,’ or
rather as implying both (see Vol. I.
p- 226, and cf. Eth, 111. i. 6, note),
᾿Ενέργεια, in πάσης ἐνεργείας, is op-
posed to ἕξις as ‘act’ to ‘state.’
The phrase τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν τέλος
occurs again 111. ix. 3: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
τέλος ἡδύ. The whole notion that
a moral act can only be considered

been already brought forward, 11.
iv. 3.

καὶ rp ἀνδρείῳ &—dvdpelay] ‘ Now
to the brave man courage is some-
thing morally beautiful. Of this
nature, then, must be the end of
courage, for it is the end of a thing
which in each case determines its
character. Therefore the beautiful is
the end for the sake of which the
brave man endures and does whatever
is brave.’ The argument is as follows:
Moral beauty is what characterises
bravery, therefore it is the end of
bravery (because final and formal
causes coincide), therefore it should
be the end of each brave act. The
above explanation agrees with that
given by the Paraphrast, except that
he does not appear to supply τέλος
with τὸ κατὰ τὴν fu. His words are,
τοῦτο yap τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης ἐνεργείας
τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν Ἀόγον
τῆς ἕξεως γίνεσθαι" οἷον αἱ κατὰ δι.
καιοσύνην πράξεις τέλος ἔχουσ τὸ κατὰ

good when it exhibits the qualities | τὸν λόγον τῆς ἕξεως τῆς δικαιοσύνης:
of the formed moral character has ; πράττεσθαι" καὶ al κατὰ τὴν ἃνδρίαν

VIT.—VITI.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. 37

a, “~ a ~ “~
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ
θαρρεῖν" ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον κατα-

’ 9 4 ἢ e , , a
φανής εστιν. δύσελπις δή τις ὁ δειλός" πάντα γὰρ φο-

a e + 9 a 4 , 4 ‘ a 4 ἢ
βεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως" τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος.

4 4." A 3 . A rv] ‘ ae 4 a
περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασυς καὶ
4 4 ὃ a ὃ ld δ᾽ ww A 9 “ὍὋ e 4 4
ὁ ανὸρεῖος, διαφόρως ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτα' of μὲν yap
ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς
dei: καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν

δύ 4 3 a δ 4 , e δ᾽ 4 ὃ a 9 a
Kivouvwy ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀφίστανται, οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς
ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ᾽ ἡσύχιοι. καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται,
°° νὃ ’ ’ > A ‘ , 4 an) 4
ἡ ἀνόρεια μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς
εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἣ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν

a , 4 9 " ᾿ , o “A Ψ᾿ cd
TO μή. τὸ δ᾽ ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἥ τι
λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ" μαλακία γὰρ
τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ
φεύγων κακόν.

ῥα

2

Ἔστι μὲν οὗν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ὃ

4 S , , A 4
ETEPUL κατα πέντε τρόπους, πρωτὸν μεν ἡ πολιτικὴ"

κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἕξεως τῆς ἀνδρίας. _ five shades (τρόποι) mentioned by
K.T.r. Aristotle are : apparent courage pro-
13 Aristotle denounces suicide com- | duced (1) from a regard to the opinions
mitted on account of poverty, or love, | of society, (2) from experience of the
or anything grievous, as the act | particular danger, (3) from anger, (4)
rather of a coward than of a brave | from a sanguine mind, (5) from ignor-
man, Taking a broad human view of . ance.
life, he does not sympathise with or I πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική] This
discuss the sentimental deaths of the | phraso is to be found in Plato’s
Cynic philosophers (see Vol. 1. Essay Republic, p. 430 c, where it probably
Il. p. 174). Suicide was afterwards | originates, but it is there used in a
dignified by the Stoics with the name ; different sense from the present.
of ἐξαγωγή, ‘ushering oneself out of | Plato meant bv the term ‘civil
the world.’ | courage’ to distinguish the true
; courage of a civilised man from all
VIIY. This chapter discusses the merely brutal instincts. Δοκεῖς γάρ

spurious kinds of courage, classified μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
under five heads. Of this classifica- τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τήν τε
tion we find the germ in Plato’s Pro- , θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ
tagoras, Ὁ. 351 A: θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ | νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἣ ἀνδρείαν
ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ | καλεῖν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ | λέγεις. ᾿Αποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο
δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Kal γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν 3’
εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται The ἐγώ, πολιτικήν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει.

38 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ITT.

[CHap.

’ 4 rv) A ‘ e , a ¢
μαλιστα γάρ εΕοίκεν" δοκοῦσι γαρ νποβεγειν. TOUS κινδύνους

ε “ ‘ . A , ’ , ‘ . 9 9 8
ot “πολῖται διὰ TA EK TWV νομῶν ἐπίτιμα Καὶ TE ὀνείδη Kat

διὰ Tas τιμάς.

’ Φ ε 4. s» 4 e 5 a Ν
2 παρ ols οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐντιμοι.

4 a ~ 4 ὔ ~ >
Και διὰ TOUTO ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἰναι

’
TOtou-

a .@ = r 4 4 ‘
Tous δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν

“Ἕκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει"

καὶ Διομήδης,

"Exrwe γάρ αοτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ οἰγορεύων,

“Τυδείδης ὑπ᾽ ἐμεῖο,"

e ’ ’ Ν , ”~ , 4 , a ᾽
3 WKLOLWTUL ὃ αὕτη μαλιστὰα Ty πρότερον εἰιρημενῆς. OTL δι

ἀρετὴν γίνεται" δι᾿ αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς

Aristotle meant by ‘civil courage’
that daring which is prompted, not by
an independent desire for the beauti-
ful, bat by a regard to reputation,
and to the fame or disgrace, and even
punishment, awarded by society to
brave or cowardly actions respectively.

διὰ τὰ ἐκ νόμων ἐπιτίμια] The laws
relating to cowardice are alluded to,
Eth. V. i. 14.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο---ἔντιμοι)] ‘And for
this cause men appear to be more
brave in communities where cowards
are held in dishonour, and the brave
inhonour.’ Aristotle does not actually
assert that real courage is capable of
cultivation by the influence of society.
But if we do not put too fine a mean-
ing on the word courage, there is no
doubt that it flourishes most in war-
like ages and communities, And, in
short, with all but the very few, indi-
vidual virtue generally springs out
of the feelings of society ; what is first
outward, afterwards takes root in the
mind,

2 τοιούτους δὲ ---- ἐμεῖο] ‘Now just
such men does Homer depict, as, for
instance, Diomed and Hector, (when
the latter says,) “ Polydamas will be
the first to cast a reproach at mne;”

-.........ὄ ..Ψ..... ... ---:.ὄ.ς-ς-.-.ςβ.ῬΏ!...-..-.Ῥρ..».....-΄- ὕ.-ς-

and so Diomed, “ὁ Hector will some
day, haranguing among the Trojans,
declare,—Tydides, by me _ terrified,
fled to the ships.”’ Cf. Ziad ΧΧΙΙ.
100, vill. 148, sq., where the line
ends φοβούμενος ἵκετο νῆας.

4 ὡμοίωται δὃδ᾽---ὄντο)] ‘ But this
courage is most like the kind which
we described above, for it originates
in virtue, namely, in a sense of
honour (αἰδῶ), in a desire for the
beautiful (since it aims at reputation),
and in a fear of dishonour as of some-
thing base.’ On the nature of αἰδώς,
see Eth, rv. ix. and the note on 11. vil.
14. Most admirably does Aristotle
touch off here in a few words the
spirit of honour which is the nearest
approach to, and, at all events in
many of the relations of life, the
best substitute for a genuine mo-
rality. In reading his words, we
can hardly fail to be reminded of
Burke’s magnificent lament over the
loss of the age of chivalry. ‘The
unbonght grace of life, the cheap
defence of nations, the nurse of manly
sentiment and heroic enterprise, is
gone! It is gone, that sensibility of
principle, that chastity of honour,

, Which felt a stain like a wound, which

VII] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. 39

’ a 4 ~
yap) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ᾽ ἄν τις 4
a a ~
Kal τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων αναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό"
a ~ ~
χείρους δ᾽, ὅσῳ ov dt αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ
, 4 a 9 4 4 a 4 ΓΦ 4 [2
φεύγοντες ov τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλα τὸ λυπηρόν" ἀναγκάζουσι
4
yup οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ “Ἕκτωρ
« o 97 4 ® «6 ° ΄ ,
ὃν δέ x’ ἐγὼν ἀφάνευϑε μαχῆς - τώσσοντα νοήσω,
οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνα.
‘ e ’ ra) 4 “᾿ , a x 4
καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες TO αὐτὸ 5
δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρα-

’ . , ιν 4 , a ? , ?
TATTOYTES Tavres yep ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ ὃ ου δι

4 a
ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καλόν.

inspired courage whilst it mitigated
ferocity, which ennobled whatever it
touched, and under which vice itself
lost half its evil, by losing all its
yrossness’ (Reflections on the Revolu-
tion in France, p. 149). Just as
Plato placed the philosopher above
the man of honour (θυμοειδής, ef.
Repub. Ὁ. 547-9), 80 Aristotle con-
ceives of a courage higher and purer
than that which emanates from the
spirit of honour.

4 ‘Civil courage ’ is of two kinds:
(1) that which depends on honour,
(2) that which depends on fear. The
latter may remind us of the descrip-
tion given by Plato (Phedo, p. 68 D),
where he speaks of most men being

courageous from a sort of cowardice. :
‘ appearances.’ The second cause (after

There is a vast falling off between
the first class and the second. To the

second belongs the spirit of Asiatic |
is experience, the quality of the prac-
' tised veteran.

slavery, which Burke contrasted with
the spirit of chivalry (ic.). The

instances here given are the compul- |
(1) ἃ familiarity with, and contempt
. for, much that is seemingly, but not

sory measures used by the princes in
the Trojan war to make the people
fight, and similar devices used by the
Persians, &c.

ὁ Ἕκτωρ] This is a misquotation ;
the words are those of Agamemnon
(/liad τι. 391).

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ

5 txposrdrrovres}] As Rassow ob-
serves, the emendation of Lambinus
—ol spordrrovres, ‘those who set
the soldiers in front of them and beat
them if they fall back,’—seems certain.

τύπτοντες] As done by the Persians
at Thermopyle, Herod. vii. 223.

6 δοκεῖ 8¢—dorw] ‘Experience of
particular dangers is also accounted
a kind of courage; which gave
Socrates occasion to think that courage
was a science. Different men have
experience in different dangers, and
regular soldiers in the dangers of
war. Now there are many unreal
shows of danger in warfare, and
professional soldiers, being perfectly
accustomed to these, appear brave,
because other men are deceived by

that of a regard for opinions) which
gives rise to a semblance of courage,

The effects of this
may be analysed and subdivided into

really, terrible ; (2) a skill of weapons,

‘ &, giving both an offensive and a

defensive superiority (ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ
παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπει-
pias).

40 HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEIQON ITI. [Cuap.

9 ’ e ,“, ὦ 4 ὃ ’ 4 ᾿ “0 Qe
ἐμπειρία 4] περὶ ΕΚαστΤα Ομ pea Tig eval οὔεν Καὶ 0

Dw , , 9 , > a 9 ὃ ’ ~ δὲ
κράτης φήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι OE
ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ᾽ οἱ στρατιῶται"

a a > a 4 “~ 4 ra) , ,
δοκεῖ γάρ εἴναι πολλα Keva τοῦ πολεμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωρα-

“Ὁ ’ 4 9 - μή 9 4 ε
κασιν οὗτοι" φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι
ero ry m e 4 a , , ’
οἷά ἐστιν, εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ
τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα
a 4 ~

ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη Kat πρὸς TO ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ

ΠΡΕΕΡΉΒΟΒΕΣΕ a τα

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης] Οἱ, Memorad. |

111, ix. 2, and Plato, γοίαγ. p. 350,
where it is agreed that those who
dive most boldly are the professional
divers, those who fight most boldly
the professional soldiers, &c. This
empirical view of courage forms one
side, it is true, of the Socratic doc-
trine, but by no means the whole
(see Vol. I. p. 107), and the state-
ment about Socrates in the text is
accordingly unfair. The statement is
corrected by Eudemus in his £thics
(111. i, 13), where he well sums up
the present part of the subject : Ἔστι
δ᾽ εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ'
ὁμοιότητα " τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. Μία μὲν πολιτική "
αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ bt αἰδῶ οὖσα. Δευτέρα
3° ἡ στρατιωτική" αὕτη δὲ δι᾿ ἐμπειρίαν
καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης
ἔφη, τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι (ἴσασι) τὰς
βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.

πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] This is
the reading of Bekker, supported by
a majority of the MSS., the Scholiast,
the Paraphrast, Casaubon, &c. It is
illustrated by Cicero, Eptst. ad Att.

τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου. Cf. Thucyd.
111. 30: καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίν-
δυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ
καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἣ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἴ
τις στρατηγὸς ἕν τε αὑτῷ φυλάσσοιτο
καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἑνορῶν ἐπιχειροίη,
τλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο: where also the
MSS. vary between καινόν and κενόν.
It would seem, then, that τὰ κενὰ
τοῦ πολέμου, and τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμοι,,
were both received formule, only
with different senses. In the text
above, either phrase might have been
substituted for the other, according
as it was more familiar to the tran-
scriber. But τὰ κενὰ alone makes
good sense, for while the soldiers
would get accustomed to the empty
show, the noise and pageantry of
war, it is not true to say that they
would get accustomed to the surprises
of war, these being exactly what not
even the experienced could calculate
upon. Perhaps there is no better
setting forth of the κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου
than in the speech of Brasidas, Thu-
cyd, Iv. 126, 4: οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν
μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν" καὶ

v. 20: ‘Scis enim dici quedam πα-
γνικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου;
where the editio princeps (Romana)
has κοινά, another instance of similar
confusion. Another reading, supported
by six MSS., is "τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμον,᾽
which would mean ‘the surprises of
war.’ The phrase occurs in Diodorus
Siculus, xx. 30: ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὅτι πολλὰ

| γὰρ τλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς
μεγέθει ἄφόρητοι, ἥ τε διὰ κενῆς
| ἑπανάσεισις τών ὅτλων ἔχει τινὰ
| δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς" προσμίξαι δὲ τοῖς
| ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι.
συνεωράκασυ] The σὺν here seems to
mean not ‘together,’ or ‘at a glance,’
but as in συγγινώσκω, σύνοιδα, &c.,
‘intimately,’ ‘ privily,’ ‘familiarly.’

VIII.)

μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα.

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION ITI.

41

@ Φ φΦ eo
ὥσπερ OV ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι 8

a a 9 a -
μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις

4 ΄- 4 e 4 yo td eo id 9 9 9
ἄγωσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνόρειότατοι μαχιμωτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ

μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. 019
στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνη ὁ κίνδυνος
καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς" πρῶτοι
γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ

κἀπὶ τῷ ᾿Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη.

τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύ-

γειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος"
4 4 ~
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἁρχῆς ἐκινδύνενον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες

δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μῶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμε-

φ 8 na 9 on
νοι" ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος.

A a a , 84 a
καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν 10

4 ὃ ῇ 9 a 4 ὃ ΄- 4 4 ~ a e
avopeav ἐπιφέρουσιν: ἀνδρεῖοι yap εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ
διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι,
«Ψ a e 9 a a 9 γ᾽ Ἁ ς a
ὅτι καὶ of ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς" ἐτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ “Ὅμηρος “ σθένος ἔμβαλε
θΘυμῷ᾽ καὶ “ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε 7 καὶ “ δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ
ῥῖνας μένος καὶ “ ἔζεσεν αἷμα ᾿ πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οὗτι

9 οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ---συνέβη] ‘ But
regular troops lose heart when the
danger is overpowering, and when
they are inferior in numbers and
equipment. In such cases they are
the first to run away, while citizen
troops remain and die, as actually
happened at the Hermzeum.’

ἐπὶ τῷ Epyaly] Of this affair the
Scholiast gives the following account.
Coronea had been betrayed to one
Onomarchus of Phocis; an engage-
ment took place in an open spot
called the Hermeum ; the Coronean
citizens were killed to a man, while
their Boeotian auxiliaries fled in a
panic. Ta πολιτικά, by 8 common
usage, is nearly equivalent to ol
“πολῖται. Cf. Asch. Perse, 1. τάδε
μὲν Wepoiv—miord καλεῖται, &e.
Στρατιῶται, or mercenaries, in the time
of Aristotle had not a high name. As
common fighting men, the machines of

VOL. 11.

war, they are oppoeed to the indepen-
dent heroism of the brave man; see
below, 111. ix.6. The present passage
contrasts the courage of the man of
hononr with the hardiness of the vete-
ran, which under any extraordinary
pressure gives way. ‘Citizen courage’
in the instance mentioned cannot ex-
ternally be distinguished froin the
very highest kind of courage.

10 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ᾽ ---ὁρμήν)] ‘The
spirit of anger, too, men reckon as
courage, and they who act through
anger (like brates turning on those
who have wounded them) get the
character of being brave, because the
converse is true, and brave men are
spirited. The spirit of anger is most
keen for the encountering dangers,
and hence Homer wrote :

‘‘(Apollo) put strength into his

wrath.”
F

12

42 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. [Cuap.

δι 4 4
μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὃ δὲ θυμὸς
‘ 9 “- 4 | A A ’ a a 4
συνεργεὶ αὐτοῖς" τὰ θηρία de διὰ λύπην" διὰ γὰρ τὸ
a a gS 4
πληγῆναι 7 φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλη ἢ ἐν ἕλει ἢ», OV
, 9 , 9 9 a ὃ 4 4S e » 4 ὃ ’
προσέρχονται. οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ UT ἀλγηδόνος
4 ~ 9 , 4 4 , e ~ va th) “~
καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς Tov κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὖθεν τῶν
“᾿ “-- a“ 4
δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ vot ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν
πεινῶντες' τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς"
καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν.
οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ ol ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
‘ Α , , 9 ow ε Ν ‘ θ ᾿
πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτη δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν
εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀν-

‘He roused up his strength and
wrath.”

‘* Fierce strength in his nostrils.”

‘* His blood boiled.”

For all such things appear to signify
the awakening and outbreak of anger.’
These quotations are obviously made
from memory, and none of them are
quite accurate. The first seems to be
compounded of Jl. xiv. 151, μέγα
σθένος ἔμβαλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ Kapdip, and xvi.
529, μένος δέ of ἔμβαλε Oyug. The
second appears to be meant for 7}. v.
470, Grpuve μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου.
The third is Od, xxiv. 318, ἀνὰ ῥῖνας
δέ οἱ ἤδη Δριμὺ μένος rpotrupye. The
last is not in Homer at all This
passage illustrates the progress of
psychology towards distinctness, for
it is impossible to translate it simply
into English; θυμός means more than
anger, or than any one modern word,
for even with Aristotleit includes what
we should call ‘spirit’ But with
Homer it meant (1) life, (2) spirit, (3)
wrath, (4) heart, (5) mind. Aristotle
in quoting Homer fails to remember
this great indefiniteness, though there
is no doubt that in Homer a simple
and physical account is given of the
manifestations of courage.

|

12 φυσικωτάτη δ᾽ ἔοικεν --- εἶναι]
‘Yet the sort that springs from anger
appears most natural, and with pur-
pose and motive added, it becomes
genuine courage.’ Taking this sen-
tence in its context, it must be an
apology for the ἀνδρεία διὰ θυμόν.
Aristotle had said that anger makes
a man brave only in the sense that a
hungry ass is brave, obeying the goads
of a blind instinct. Headds that the
instinct of anger is part of our nature
(cf. Eth. τι. iii. το, note, and VIL vi.
2), and that, rightly directed and
brought under the control of the will
and reason, it can be elevated into a
moral state. It isremarkable on what
a high level Aristotle places courage.
It must be entirely, he says, prompted
by a desire for what is morally beau-
tiful (ol μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν
πράττουσιν) ; mere physical courage
is only an assistance in realising this
(ὁ δὲ θυμὸς σννεργεῖ αὐτοῖς), and the
prompting of anger, &c., will inake
men pugnacious, but not brave (οἱ δὲ
διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ
ἀνδρεῖοι δέ). Perhaps Aristotle makes
almost too great a separation between
true courage and this ‘spirited ele-
ment,’ which must be its physical
basis, This is to be attributed (1) to

VIII.) HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III. 43

’ 4 “ e 4 4 ~ o
τιμωρούμενοι δ᾽ ἥδονται’ οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι
Fd , 9 9 a ΄, 4 4 ‘ a 4 48) ε e
μάχιμοι MEV, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ' οὐ γὰρ διὰ TO καλὸν οὐδ᾽ ὡς ὁ
λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ παθος" παραπλήσιον δ᾽ ἔχουσί τι.
Fas 4 ς oP »Ρ νὴ a A a 4

οὐδὲ δὴ of εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι: διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολ-
axis καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις.
παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι: ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι
διὰ τὰ προειρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείτ-
τοὺς εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν, τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι
εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται.
ἀνδρείου δ᾽ ἣν τὰ

a e , μή ,
καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι" ὅταν δὲ
αὑτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν"

A 4 ld yy 4 , e ‘4 ae N
φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν
καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ
ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν
τοῖς προδήλοις. ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἧττον
ἐκ παρασκευῆς" τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ

’ 4 ‘ 3 9 ἤ Ἁ 4 ο΄
Aoyou τις προέλοιτο, τὰ ὃ ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν,
ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ

’ ΄“- 9 , td ) ᾧ 9 τοῦ Qn MM
πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ᾽ ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχου-

δέ,

9 a
σιν, ἐκεῖνοι

a 4 a , ,
διὸ καὶ μένουσι τινὰ χρονον"

his high moral tone, (2) to his ἀπαῖὶγ-

tical mode of treatment. In Shake-
speare, as in Homer, courage is
attributed to physical causes. It is
made sometimes to depend on the
action of the spleen, or it is con-
nected with the gall. Cf. Kiny
John, Act. 11. Se. 1:

‘Rash, inconsiderate, fiery volun-
taries,

With ladies’ faces and fierce dragons’
spleens.’

And Hamlet, Act u. Sc. 2, quoted
below on Eth. tv. v. 6.

13-15 The fourth kind of spurious
courage is that which arises from a
sanguine mind. This may be due to
previous success, and gives a con-
fidclence like courage, but also like
izatoxication. Such confidence is
Liable to a collapse.

δ᾽

ε
ol

15 διὸ xal—€éw] ‘For this reason
it seems braver to be fearless and un-
troubled in sudden perils than in such
as may be anticipated. In the fermer
case a man is brave more by habit, or
in other words less by premeditation ;

‘ for in foreseen dangers a man may

calculate and reason out the course to
be chosen, in sudden ones he must
depend upon his habitual character.’
This acute observation puts real cour-
age in opposition to the case of a man
puffed out with a sort of extraneous
confidence. ‘Take a man ona sudden,
and you will find how brave he is,
While Aristotle makes courage a
quality of the moral will, he requires
that it should be a settled habit,
and a second nature of the mind,
not prepared consciously to meet a
particular emergency.

16 ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ-----Σικυωνίοι:] ‘In the

4. ΄ HOIKON NIKOMAXEION III. [Cuar.

9 ἢ 98 “- @ [4 4 e [4
ἡπατημένοι, ἐᾶν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι,
φεΐγουσιν' ὅπερ οἱ ᾿Αργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς
17 Λάκωσιν ὡς ΣΣικνωνίοι. of τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται
ποῖοι τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι,
4 ’ \ a , e 5 ’ Ξ δ ς ’
9 Περὶ θαρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως
9 , ~ φ
περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερα' ὁ yap
ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος
μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ
ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον
ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται: χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ

N

. ε΄ , 4 A eas > 9 ὴ 9 4
3 λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. ov μὴν αλλα
’ n 4 4 4 4 4 ’ ’ ear . " A
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ THY ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν
ὔ 9 9 id 4φ 4 a a 4 σι ἤ
κύκλῳ ὃ ἀφανι ζεσθαι, οἷον Kay τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γινε-
a 4 A A 4
ται τοῖς yap πύκταις TO μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ
, 4 4 4 4 td 9 ’ wv
στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ, TO δὲ τύπτεσθαι άλγεινον, εἴπερ
, 4 , 4 ~ e [4 4 4 a ‘
σαρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρὸν, καὶ πὰς ὁ πόνος" διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ
“Ἄ,» 4 Son 4 “ oo 4 ἈΝ ean ’ v
ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, μικρὸν ὃν TO OU ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

See Ξε — τ Αδδῶς = ee a -- ---

last place, nen appear brave from not ' IX. This interesting chapter is on
knowing theirdanger. Such persons the connection of courage with pain
are not far removed from the sanguine, . and loss. The nobleness of courage
but are inferior to them, because they | chiefly dependsonthesacrifice which it
have no self-confidence, as the san- | implies (ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαίως
guine have. This confidence enables ἐπαινεῖται). The brave man by en-
the sanguine to stand their ground | countering death consciously makes
for a time; while those who have | a sacrifice of the greatest magnitude,
blundered into bravery, as soon as it , since he runs the risk of relinquishing
appears that the danger is other than | a life which is eminently valuable,
they had supposed, take to their heels, ' and, by reason of his virtue, full of
as was the case with the Argives, when | happiness. Courage, then, is not to
they fell in with some Lacedemon- | be called pleasurable, except as attain-
ians whom they took for men of | ing to a satisfaction above all plea-

Sicyon.’ The last and poorest sem- | sure, attaining, in short, to the end of
blance of courage is when something | one’s being (οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς
daring is done unknowingly, and from | ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει,
a mistake. The instance given is τ γὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται).
mentioned by Xenophon (Hellenics, | The conscious heroism of the brave
Iv. 10). Some Spartans assumed the | man distinguishes him from the reck-
shields of some vanquished Sicyon- | lessness of the mercenary; it dis-
iaus, and were at first contemptu- | qualifies him, indeed, from becoming
ously encountered by the Argives, | mere rank and file, a mere machine
who, when they discovered their for- | of discipline.

midable enemies, took to flight. 3 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ--ἔχει») § Without

VITI.—IX. ] HOIKQN NIKOMAXKEION III. 45
4 a ~ ὔ 9 a a N a 4 [2 ς a
€ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ TO περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν 4
θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῷ καὶ ἄκοντι
Ε e ‘4 4 4 ἤ w 4 a od 9 4 A ’
ἔσται, ὑπομένει δὲ avra, ὅτι καλὸν h ὅτι αἰσχρὸν TO μή.
δ) @ a A 4 a # ~ 4 9 ,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μάλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πάσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
4. ~ 4 4 “ ? , ee 4
στερος ἢ. μάλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται. τῷ τοιούτῳ
γὰρ μάλιστα Civ ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
~ 9 o 4 4 ~ 4 9 9QN >
στερεῖται εἰδώς * λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον
ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μάλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν

doubt the end that belongs to courage Great issues, good or bad for human
is pleasant in itself, but this pleasant- kind,

ness is neutralised by the attendant Is happy as a lover, and attired
circumstances, as happens likewise in ' With sudden brightness, like a man
the contests of the arena. The end at inspired ;

which the boxers aim, the garlandaud And, through the heat of conflict,

the honours, is pleasant; but the keeps the law
blows, and indeed the whole exertion, In calmness made, and sees what he
are painful and grievous to flesh and foresaw ;

blood ; so that by the multitude of | Or if an unexpected call succeed,
intervening painsthe incentive,which | Come when it will, is equal to the

is small in itself, loses 811] appearance ; need :
of being pleasant.’ He who, though thus endued as with
4 καὶ ὅσῳ--- αἱρεῖται) ‘ And in pro- a sense

portion as a man possesses all excel- And faculty for storm and turbuleuce,
lence, and the happier he is, so much [8 yet a soul whose mastcr-bias leaus
the more will he be pained at death, To homefelt pleasures and to gentle

for to such a one life is especially scenes ;
valuable, and he will consciously Swect images! which wheresoe’er he
be deprived of the greatest blessings. be

And this is painful. But he isnot Are at his heart, and such fidelity
the less brave, nay, perhaps even | It is his darling passion to approve ;
more, because he chooses the noble More brave for this, that he hath
in war in preference to those other much to love.’

goods.’ These last words may re-

pind Wacol the. Ghatectensic-an: The consciousness of the sacrifice to

buted by Wordsworth to his Happy | be made appears rather more promi-
‘ nent in Aristotle's brave man than in

Warrtor, who is ‘moro brave for this, _. : ; ὃ

that he hath much to love.’ The | Wordsworth’s, In saying us me

whole of Wordsworth’s description must not forget that the word ‘ sacri-
fice,’ in the moral sense of the term,

ll ‘ith th
pee τὰ i act | expresses an idea that has grown

| up in the human mind subsequently

‘Who, if he be called upon to | to Aristotle. How nearly Aristotle,

face by the force of his penetration,

Some awful moment to which Heaven ' realised it, the present chapter shows
has joined most remarkably.

46 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ITT. [Cuap.

> 59 9 #8 toa > Q 2 εν» Ά 4 Ξ 4
5. ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ
e ‘ 9 - φ e 4 9 y @ ~ , 9 ,
ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, “πλὴν εφ σον Tov τέλους ἐφα-
6 πτεται. στρατιώτας δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους
κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ'
ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας" ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κιν-
δύ 4 A , 4 ‘ a ’
ὕνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
4 Α 9 9 ’ 2 A A . + rw? ’
7 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω: τί δ᾽ ἐστίν,
οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
10 Μετὰ δὲ τωΐτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν᾽ δοκοῦσι

5 οὐ δή-- ἐφάπτεται) ‘Therefore let us speak of temperance, for these
it is not the case that in all the virtues | (namely,courageandtemperance)seem
virtuous action is accompanied by _ to be the excellencies of the irrational
pleasure, except in so far as one . parts of our nature.’ This is almost
attains to the End-in-itself.’ Onthe . the only indication which Aristotle
import of this passage, see Vol. I. | gives of the system upon which he
Essay IV. p. 226. With ἐφάπτεται, | has arranged the several virtues in
τις is to be understood ; see above, ' order; he places together, and first
111, i. 6, note. ' treats of, the development of the

6 στρατιώτας δ᾽ ---- καταλλάττονται)͵ ' lower and more instinctive qualities.
‘ After all, perhaps it is true that it is On the arrangement of the remaining
not brave men such as I have ἀθ- virtues see the plan of Book IV.
scribed who will make the best mer- With regard to the first two, there is
cenaries, but fellows who, while they a want of any distinct principle in
are less brave, have nothing to lose; their arrangement. If it be said
for these are ready for dangers, and that they are based on ϑθυμός and
will sell their life for a trifling sum.’ ἐπιθυμία, and that Aristotle begins at
See above, ch. viii. 9, note. On the _ the bottom of the scale, why does he
readiness of miserable wretches for | not begin with σωφροσύνη, since θυ-
danger and death, cf. Shakespeare, | μός is higher than ἐπιθυμία (Eth. vir.
Macbeth, Act 111. Sc. i: vi.)? Again, as we have seen (ch,

Second Μ - Vill. § 12) θυμός is here considered
τω δὴ rather as having an occasional con-

liege, : : ἴ
Whom the vile blows and buffets of , Dection with courage than as being
the world ι the basis of it. But in fact Aristotle’s
Have so incens’d, that I am reckless Ethics are very little psychological in
what their character. In them psychology

᾿ and morals are both in process of for-
mation ; we cannot therefore expect
in so tentative and unfinished a work
to find systematic arrangement. Aris-

I do, to spite the world.
First Murderer.—Aund I another,
So weary with disasters, tugg’d with

fortune, | Eine
That I would set my life on any , totle probably began his list of the
chance, , . Virtues with courage and temperance

because they were two of the Greek
cardinal virtues, and when he came
X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην---ἀρεταῇ ‘Next to temperance, he said ‘this comes

To mend it, or be rid on't.

TX.—X.

yap τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION TIT.

44

@ 4 9
OTL μεν οὖν

a 9 4 4 ¢ 4 e ? 4 ε «
μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν"
ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας" ἐν τοῖς

αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται.

e ~ “. 4 ’
ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν.

A ἤ > “~
περί FOoiag οὖν Τῶν

διηρήσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ

αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια" ἑκάτερος γὰρ

----..---. -.... ὄὄ .....

next, since it also belongs to the irra-
tional part of our nature.’

τῶν ἀλόγων pepGy] The instincts,
such as those of self-preservation, fear,
desire, &c., can only be capable of
excellence by being brought under a
law (μεσότης, λόγος) of the intellect,
having no law in themselves. This
law of the intellect becomes the most
important part of the conception of
virtues, as form is more striking than
matter. In Plato the law is put for
virtue altogether, and thus, as we
saw, he calls courage a science.
Similarly in the Charmides, where
temperance is discussed, the nearest
definition that is given is ‘self-know-
ledge,’ though it is shown that mere
‘self-knowledge’ has no content, and
would be a useless blank ; therefore it
is implied that knowledge of the good

must be added to make the conception ,

complete.

It is the extreme opposite of Plato's
view to speak of temperance as ‘a
virtue of the instincts’ (τῶν ἀλόγων
μερῶν) ; the word μεσότης however in
the next line implies what was omitted,
namely, ‘under a law of the intellect.’
The formula of Aristotle attributes a
worth to the bodily instincts which
would be opposed to asceticism.

μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς] Σωφροσύνη,
which, in spite of the false etymology
given in Plato’s Cratylus, 411 ¥, and
Eth. VI. V. 5, meant originally ‘sound-
mindedness’ (in German Besonnen-
heit), soon came to mean temperance
with regard to pleasures. In this

|
!

I

sense it is often popularly defined by _

Plato, cf. Repub. p. 430 B: κόσμος πού
Tis— ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν
καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια. ϑ'γπιροδ. Ρ. 106
σ: εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ
κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὅζα. Aris-
totle’s procedure in discussing it is
first to ascertain definitely its object.
Pleasures are either bodily or mental.
With mental pleasures temperance and
intemperance are not concerned. Nor
again with all bodily pleasures—not
those of hearing, nor of smell; but
only the merely animal pleasures (ὧν
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ) of touch
and taste. Even taste, as an object
of intemperance, reduces itself to
touch ; and with regard to touch we
must exclude the manly and human
satisfaction felt in exercise, &c.
(chapter xi.) Desires of the kind in
question are either common, or special
and acquired (ἴδιοι καὶ éwi@erot) ; in
the former, excess is the only kind of
error possible ; in the latter all kinds
of errors are committed, The only
pains with which temperance and in-
temperance can be concerned are
pains arising from the want of certain
pleasures ; these pains the intemperate
man feels to excess. While intem-
perance thus consists in excess, there
is no such thing as deficiency in the
sense for the above-named pleasures ;
thus there is no name for the opposite
extreme to intemperance. With due
regard to his health, and the means at
his disposal, and acting under the law
of the beautiful (xi. 8), the temperate
man preserves a balance.

2 διῃρήσθωσαν---διανοίας] ‘We must

Ww

- 9 ταῦτα,

48

τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IIT.

(Cuar.

9 Ah ἢ ml
ἐστιν, οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ

σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας" οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς
’ ς N ww o ,Ψν᾽ 4 ἢ
τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται.
e , 3 9Q e 4 ‘ id 4 , 4
ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν'
τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
’ A e , 9 ? 4 ὔ 9
κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ᾽ ov
λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις,
4 4 A “ Ν ς ᾽ 4 ’ 4
3 περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη dv ἡ σωφροσύνη, ov πάσας δὲ
Oe ὔ ᾿ [ ‘ [ a ὃ ‘ ~ ww ?
οὐδὲ Tavras* ot yup χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον
χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε
, ? ’ ᾿ , “ > ce Η
ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται" καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ
χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν,

e , 4 ‘ 4 “ A
4 ομοιὼς δὲ καὶ ἐν τοις περί

τὴν ἀκοήν" τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερ-

βεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολά-

5 στους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς

περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός"

δεῖ σώφρο yas, οὐδὲ τοὺς

τοὺς γὰρ χαί-

povras μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν

ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μῶλλον τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὄψων" χαίρουσι

4 ᾽ὔ ε 9 ᾽ὔ
yup τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι,

6 γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν,

Ψ - sf 4

ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀναμνησὶις
# 9 »” 4 4
ἴδοι 0 ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς

ww. Ψ a“ ’ “ “A a 9 “-
ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὑσμαῖς.

‘ 4 , , 4 , 4 4 9 a
τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου" τούτῳ yap ἐπιθυμητὰ

take a distinction between the bodily
pleasures and such as are mental, like
ambition and the desire of knowledge.
The man who has either of these feel-

ings takes pleasure in the object of ©

his desire without the body being at
all affected, but only the mind.’ The
writing is loose here, constituting a
σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον. ‘Transi-
tions as from φιλοτιμία to φιλότιμος
are common. Cf. below, ch. xi. § 3:
διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, where
there is nothing preceding which an-
swers to οὗτοι, only a general descrip-
tion of a course of action.

4-5 While Aristotle justly says |

that the words temperance and in- |-

9 » 4 IQr ~ ὔ a ,
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας

temperance do not apply to the plea-
sure felt in colours, forma, painting,
music, and acting, it is strange that
he should have spoken of these at all
as bodily pleasures. Such a way of
speaking shows an early and imma-
ture psychology.

6 Pleasures of smell are not the
objects of intemperance, except acci-
dentally, as by association, remind-
ing people of eating, &c. Eudemus
quotes a witty remark on the subject.
Eth. Eud, 111. ii. το: ἐμμελῶς Eby Στρα-

' πόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν, τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.

7 Brutes, says Aristotle, have no
pleasures of hearing, or smell, or
sight, except accidental ones, namely,

X.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ITI, 49

‘ 4 ~
τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς
ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει"

4 δ᾽ ¥ θ e 4 4 3 , 4 δ e , “ “
τὴν ἀἄἄσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν. ov ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ
τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ ὅτι δ᾽ ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς

“- ww 4 é A ’ ἤ φ ’ 3
φωνῆς ἤσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτη φαίνεται. ὁμοίως ὃ
οὐδ᾽ ἰδὼν ἢ εὑρὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι βορὰν
φ 4 A td A e 4 e ’ 4 ἐ
ἕξει, περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ 8
ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν
ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται" αὗται δ' εἰσὶν

e 8 4 ~ ὔ A 4 ~ ’ . ‘ 4 A
ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὴ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ 9
οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι" τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν,
ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα
aptvovres. οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἵ γε
ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι’ ἁφῆς
καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις.

4 4 Ν a 4 ’ n A ὔ e “Ὁ
διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὧν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ το

when sounds or scents indicate to | 10 διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις dpopdyes]
them their prey or their food. It 3 The name of this glutton is recorded
may be questioned whether this is | by Eudemus (111. ii. 10), who para-
abevlutely true, whether, for instance, | phrases the present passage as fol-
brutes are not capable of some plea- | lows: διὸ ol ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν
sure from musical sounds. This | γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φά.
appears to be the case with lizards | ρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος 6’ Epi-
and snakes ; and horses are fond of | g:des. Athenseus mentions the same
bells, It is said that the cat likes the | story (v111. 26), quoting the verses—

sinell of mint. Dogs like the smell Φιλόξενος ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ᾽, ὁ Κυθήριος

of carrion, apparently for its OWN | gar τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πήχεων
pais thie being the tasts. Wilke | ν βγγ πὰχ

brutes the senses are the intellect, and | Aristotle uses the word φάρυγγα here
thus by the well-known law that as | in its loose sense for the ‘ throat,’ as
an organ increases in fineness οὗ per- | λάρνγξ (which properly meant the top
ception, it decreases in sensitiveness to | of the windpipe) was also loosely em-
pleasure and pain,—we may conceive | ployed by the ancients to mean the
bow it is that the fine perceptive | whole throat. Speaking scientifically
organs of brutes are to them ina less | Aristotle confined the term φάρυγξ to
clegree the instruments of pleasure. | mean the trachea or windpipe, dis-
See Sir W. Hamilton, Reid’s Works, | tinguishing it from the esophagus or

pp. 880 and 886. gullet, cf. De Part. An. 1 iii. 1:
εὑρὼν ἔλαφον») ThisalludestoHomer, | ὁ μὲν οὖν φάρυγξ τοῦ πνεύματος ἕνε-
Ie. WW. 23: κεν πέφυκεν" ---ὸὁ 3° οἰσοφάγος ἐστὶ δι’

ὥστε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ σώματι | οὗ ἡ τροφὴ πορεύεται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν.
κύρσας, The latter was the term properly

evpuwy ἣ ἔλαφον xepadv ἣ ἄγριον αἶγα. required above. <Artotle seems to
VOL. II. G

I

ξωκῳ

11

N

3

4

50 HOIKON NIKOMAXEIQON ITI. [ Crap.

? , 4 e e ld ~ e “~
μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ws ἡδόμενος τῇ apy. κοι-
’ 4 ~ 9 , 3 .“' e 9 a Ε 4 ὃ Ld
νοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ᾽ ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία" καὶ dogeer

a , 9 4 {2 b e ȴ a 9
ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρωποί ἐσμεν
ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Coa. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα
9 vos ~ 4 ‘ e ’ ~ “ σι
ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς
e σι e ΄, 4 e 9 ry | 4
ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῴρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ
τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι" οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν
4 ΄σ΄ e ~ 9 a e ’ 4 A ’ a
TO σῶμα ἡ TOU ἀκολάστου adi, ἀλλα περί τινα μέρη.

Tov δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ᾽ ἴδιοι

Ἁ Ψ ἢ ? e 4 ~ “- ’ ἴω 4
καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική" πᾶς γὰρ
4 a e€ 9 4 ~ a ie ~ ~ e 4 ) " a a
ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ore ὃ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ
9 A 4 @ e , 4 4 a 4 A ~
εὐνῆς, φησιν Όμηρος, Ο νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων" τὸ δὲ τοιάσδε
«ἢ ~ 4. # ~ 48 ΄- 4. «“«᾿ 4 ὔ
ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται
9 4 4 3 Ψ ’ 4 eo
ou μὴν GAN ἔχει ye τι καὶ φυσικον.
ov 4 .» > A eg . oo» a ene oe
ἕτερα yup ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν
τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι
e ἢ ‘ 9 3 τ ΦΧ ‘ a
ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ep ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον.

ἡμέτερον εἶναι.

4 a 4 ? “
τὸ yap ἐσθίειν τὰ
, A , Ψ Ἅ e λ θη e , 9 a 8
τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῃ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ TO

N ἢ a ber ὁ VY 4 Ἵν ὃ ’ e

κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει" ἀναπλήρωσις yap τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ
Α e

φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς

παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ

λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ

have considered that the pleasure of

' the very diversity of tastes to a law of
gluttony was not in daste, of which the

nature, which no doubt exists,—and

tongue was the organ, but in the con-
tact of food with the passage of the

cesophagus.

XI. 1 καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν “Opnpos]
Iliad XXIV. 129: μεμνημένος οὔτε τι
σίτου, Οὔτ᾽ εὐνῆς, the remonstrance of
Thetis to Achilles. It is plain what
εὐνῆς means.

2 διὸ---τυχόντω)]) ‘Hence (this
choice of particular foods, &c.) ap-
pears merely capricious. In reality,
however, it has something natural in
it, for different things are pleasant to
different people, and all men have

to a wise purpose, else what a fearful
rivalry there would be in the world.
Some MSS. for πᾶσιν read τισιν. It
seems common for transcribers, when
they do not understand a sentence, to
play fast and loose with πᾶς and τες:
see below, Eth. v. vii. 4.

3 yaorpluapya] ‘Greedy-bellies '
from pdpyos, cf. Homer, Od. χντιι.
2, μετὰ δ᾽ ἔπρεπε γαστέρι μάργῃ--- διὰ
Euripides, Cyclops 310, πάρες τὸ
μάργον σῆς γνάθου.

πληροῦντες αὐτήν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα,
which is to be supplied from γαστρί-

' papyo, according to the Aristotelian

their preferences.’ Aristotle attributes | mode of writing.

X.—XI.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IIT. 51

a “--- e a A 4 r
Kat πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν" τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων
λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἣ τῷ μᾶλλον, 7 tas οἱ

a a
πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' of ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερ-
βάλλουσιν" καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ

4 a . 4 ὃ a e ~ é A a
yap), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἣ δεῖ,

,.. ε ε 4 ’ ς 4 9 N ‘ e .
καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὗν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς 5
ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον: περὶ δὲ τὰς
λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται
σώφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μή, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ
λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ

4 ἢ Α a“ 9 ~ ς e a e A & “Ὁ 4
τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ
λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος. ὁ μὲν 6
a 9 ’ a A ene , a - ’
οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων h τῶν μάλιστα,

4 wv e ‘ ~ 9 a a 4 4 A “Δ,
καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ

e a a A 4 a” 4 4 Ul 4 9 ~
αἱρεῖσθαι" διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται Kat ἀποτυγχάνων Kai ἐπιθυμῶν.

Α a 4 e 9 ’ é 4 é 3 4 ‘ 3 e 4
μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία" ἀτόπῳ δ᾽ ἔοικε τὸ δι’ ἡδονὴν
λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἧττον 47
δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν
ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία" καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ
βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ᾽ οὔ" εἰ δέ τῳ μηθέν
4 far A ’ Ψ) e ἢ 4 Ἅ 4 “~
ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ
¥ Φ ‘ 9 , δ᾽ ε “ > + ‘ a
ἄνθρωπος εἶναι" ov τέτευχε δ᾽ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ TO

4 ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἣ tws οἱ wodXol]
It seems almost certain that ws here
is an interpolation. It could not have
been said that ‘with regard to the

special pleasures men are called
“lovers of particular things” because
they like them as people in general do,’ | might have been justified in asserting
What Aristotle wrote was, no doubt, | that a deficiency in the sense for

produces him his pain.’ This is stated
ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἣ οἱ πολλοί, ‘or because plessuree ‘could hardly be said to
|

as if it were a sort of disgraceful
paradox, which takes place in intem-
perance,

7 οὐ πάνν γίνονται) Aristotle,
from his experience as a Greek,

they like them more than people in | exist.’ It is not so certain that the
general ;’ cf. Eth. tv. iv. 4, ἐπαινοῦντες | same would be true in all periods of
μὰν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον 8 οἱ πολλοί, | the world. It is not so certain that
φύέγοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἣ δε. The | the monkish turn of mind does not
copyist must have taken ἢ οἱ πολλοί | occasionally diminish to an unhappy
for a separate sentence, and so have extent the natural and human feel-
thought it necessary to insert ws. ings, ΒΟ as to impair the kindliness,

ς καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ | the geniality, and the good sense of
#8ovh] ‘ And thus it is pleasure that | mankind.

52 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ITT. [CHap.

4 ? , e 4 td ὔ A m~ 3 ww ‘
8 μὴ πάνυ yiverOa. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει
4

οὔτε yap ἤδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
a a

δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ᾽ ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιούτῳ
φὰς ~ f

οὐδενί, οὔτ᾽ ἀπόντων λυπεῖται ovd ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως,

οὐδὲ μῶλλον ἧ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων

οὐθέν: ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα,

τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων
. 9 ἢ , ν a 4 4 4 aes 4

μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἥ ὑπερ τὴν

οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας

¢ 4 ~ 9 ἢ e A ᾽ 9 ~ 4 3 e e

ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας" ὁ de σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁ

ὀρθὸς λόγος.
[2 ‘Exovoi» δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἡ μὲν
γὰρ δι᾽ ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευ-

’ \ ¢ A tA ed a Ul A ~ wf
2KTOV, Katy μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι και φθειρει τὴν τοὺ ἔχοντος

8 We see how indefinite after all
Aristotle has left the standard of
temperance ; he refers it merely to the
blank formula of ws δεῖ and τὸ καλόν.
In so leaving it, however, he appeals
to a sense in each man’s own mind.
There is a relative element to be con-
sidered, the health or fortune of the
individual (πρὸς ὑγίειαν, μὴ ὑπὲρ τὴν
οὐσία»), and there is also something
that appears absolute amidst all that
is relative (τὸ καλόν).

6 yap οὕτως ἔχω This is an
awkward piece of writing. Οὕτως
refers to those phrases which have
been negatived—wapd τὸ καλὸν ἣ ὑπὲρ
τὴν οὐσίαν.

XII. Which is most voluntary,
cowardice or intemperance? a suitable
question to conclude a Book which
opened with a theory of the voluntary
and proceeded to discuss courage and
temperance. Thus far there is method.
Courage and temperance are con-
sidered very much throughout in re-
lation to each other, and here they are
considered in relation to the voluntary.

On the other hand, the subject of this |

chapter is closely connected with the
theory of the formation of habits (Eth.
11. i.-ii.), and also with the questions
mooted above (Zth. 111..v.) as to the
voluntariness of vicious habits. Stand-
ing then as it does isolated, it forms
an instance of the immaturity of
Aristotle's moral investigations.

Intemperance is more voluntary
than cowardice, inasmuch as it con-
sists in choosing pleasure, while
cowardice is under a sort of compul-
sion, flying from pain, (2) Again it
is easier by practice to learn to resist
temptation, than it is to learn to with-
stand danger, for the opportunities are
frequent and free from risk. Hence
intemperance is the more disgraceful
of the two. (3) These vices are in
a peculiar way different from each
other, for cowardice as a whole is
more voluntary than its parts. In-
temperance as a whole is less volun-
tary than its parts.

The chapter ends with some re-
marks on the nature of ἀκολασία as
connected with its etymology.

2 καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη---ποιεῖ}ὺ ‘And
while pain distracts and overturns

XI.—XII.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION ITT. 53

φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἑκούσιον"
διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον" καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά"

‘ A > ~ 4 A ~ 4 e 3 ν᾿;
πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε 0 ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως 3
ες» ς ἢ 4 ~ en 2 4" 4 4
ἑκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον" αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ

~ 4 Α a 9 .σῦ Cd 4 - Ψ
ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα
δί i τἄλλα a ive διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ Bi ἡ
ῥίπτειν καὶ τἄλλα ἀσχημονεῖν" διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι.

“"- " 9 ’ > » 8 Α > Ψ e 4
τῷ δ᾽ ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἑκούσια, 4
9 ~ A A 4 “ ‘ 4 Ψ 9 4
ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῷ, τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον ἧττον" οὐθεὶς
4 4 a 3 4 > A δ᾽ δ΄ σι 4 [
γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ᾽ ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας 5
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν: ἔχουσι γάρ τινα
ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς
‘ ”~ ld ~ @ ‘ Ca 3 A ~
τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι TO ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-
ἢ 9 ~ 9 δ , ΄ 4
Tépov. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι" κεκολάσθαι γὰρ 6
δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον,
τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα 4 ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς" κατ᾽ ἐπι-
θυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις

the mental balance of him who ex- temperance, which at first was volun-
periences it, pleasure does nothing tary, becomes, the longer it lasts,
of the kind.’ Φύσις here denotes the more and more involuntary and a
perfect or normal state: see above, | mere bondage.
Eth, τι. i, 3, note. 5-6 τὸ δ᾽ ὄνομα---ὄρεξι 5] ‘ Now
4 δόξειε δ᾽ ἄν---ἐξίστησο) ‘But ! the name intemperance (or unre-
cowardice is not equally voluntary strainedness) we apply also to the
with (i.¢. is more voluntary than) its faults of children, for these have
particular acta, for in iteelf it is pain- . some resemblance to it. Which is
less, while ita particulars distract the | called from schich, matters not for our
mind with pain.’ It seems curiousto present purpose ; obviously that which
speak of cowardice in this abstract | is later in conception is called from
way as distinct from all particular that which is earlier. And it seems
acts of cowardice. It is, however, no bad metaphor, for that which han-
true that cowardice is not, like in- | kers after what is base, and which has
temperance, a growing chain upon | a mighty capacity for development,
the mind. Each cowardly act, while | requires to be chastened, and this is
it leaves the mind irresolute and so | just the character of desire and of the
prone to fresh cowardice, onthe other child. Children live entirely by desire,
hand brings experience and renders _ and have the longing for what is
the mind more familiar with danger. | pleasant most strongly.” Eudemus
Thus cowardice, which at first was | (£th. EFud. 11. ii, 1) commences his
involuntary, tends to become more | account of intemperance with this
and more voluntary and deliberate, | etymology. He points out that dxé-
the more it is continued in ; but in- | Aacros is capable of two meanings,

7 ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις"

54 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION III.

[Cuap. XII.

» δ oe» 9 4 ce 8 4
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὕπο τὸ

ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει" ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις
καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια

», ‘ ’ n , ‘ . 9 Ἢ 4
αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν

λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.

διὸ δεῖ

4 ~ , ΄ι
8 ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι.

= oN a
μετρίας εἰναι auTas Kat

4 4 a
TO δὲ TOLOUTOV

9 4 ld 4 a e A 4 a
εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον᾽" ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα

“-“ A 4 ~ ”~ rN
δεῖ κατὰ TO πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ

4 4 Α 4 ,
9 ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ Tov λόγον.

διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ

9 N a ~ ὔ A A 4 “-
ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ" σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
‘ a 4 9 a e 74 co a 4 e a A
To καλὸν, καὶ επιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ

e

A 4,
περὶ sas re

‘he that has not been chastened,’
and ‘he that cannot be chastened.’
His account of the metaphor implied
in the word appears to be lost. He
says (§ 3), διεγράψαμεν πρότερον πῶς
τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν,
but in F#th. Ἐπα, It iii, to which he
alludes, there is apparently a lacuna.
Aristotle declines to decide which is
the primary and which the metapho- |
rical use of the word ; but there can
be no doubt that the punishment and
unrestrainedness of children is the
more concrete and the primary idea.
7 εἰ οὖν---ἐναντιοῦσθαι.)͵ ‘If then
this thing be not obedient and sub-
jected to the governing element, it
will develop vastly ; for the longing
for what is pleasant is insatiable in
him that is foolish, and it seeks satis-
faction from all quarters; and the

a . Cd δὲ 4 ,
10 OTE’ οὕτω CE TATTEL καὶ O λόγος,

συ σαν σππασσαενευν

a 3 gy ς a 9 Ff
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω

exercise of desire increases its native
powers, and if the desires grow great
and vehement, they expel all reason-
ing inthe end. Wherefore the desires
should be moderate and few, and ae
wise opposed to the law of reason.’
Εἰὐπειθές is indefinite ; it might refer
either to ἡ ἐπιθυμία or 6 παῖς. Aria-
totle speaking indistinctly had the
idea of ἐπιθυμία most present to his
mind. Out of this etymology of

‘intemperance’ he develops anew
the relationship which ought to exist
between the passions and the reason.
The passions should be to the reason
as a child to his tutor. This analogy
was already suggested in Eth, 1. xiii.
19: διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ
μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ
τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

PLAN OF BOOK IV.

en ae

ITH only two exceptions, this Book follows faithfully the

programme drawn out in the seventh chapter of Book II.

These exceptions are, that it inverts the order of the social virtues

—Truth, Wit, and Friendship; and that, being at its close frag-

mentary or mutilated, it omits to discuss Indignation, and breaks
off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.

The only question, then, that arises is—Can we find any logical
sequence in Aristotle’s list of the virtues as given in Book II. and
followed out here? There are various principles on which a classi-
fication of the virtues might have been made ; as, for instance, on
@ principle of psychological division, it might have been shown how
the virtues are the proper development of man’s nature in its
various parts. Or, again, with a view to education, the virtues
might have been arranged according to the most natural order of
inculcation. Or, again, in point of excellence, the greater virtues
might have taken precedence of the lesser ones. But no one broad
principle of this kind is to be found in the arrangement made by
Aristotle. It must always be remembered that his Ethics, while
tending to advance psychology very greatly, are not composed upon
a psychological system. Hence, though he said (Zth. m1. x. 1) that
Temperance must succeed Courage, because these both consisted
in the regulation of the brute instincts, we do not find elsewhere
any reference to a classification of the parts of man’s nature.
Aristotle, having clearly divided moral from intellectual excellence,
does not carry out the same sort of division in discussing moral
excellence. He seems to have taken up first the most prominent
and striking qualities, according to the common notions in Greece
—Courage, Temperance, and Liberality. Liberality suggested to
him Magnificence—Magnificence, Great-souledness ; and from this

56 PLAN OF BOOK IV.

he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition.
He then added, what had hitherto been omitted, the virtue of
regulation of the temper ; and pointed out that in social intercourse
three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the demeanour
under the control of the law of balance. Lastly, he was proceed-
ing to show that even in the instinctive and untrained feelings of
Modesty and Indignation, this same law exhibits itself, when, either
from interruption, or from mutilation, the book came abruptly to
8 close.

HOIKON NIKOMAXETON IV.

AETQOMEN δ᾽ ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι
ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης" ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευ-
θέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων,
92... κ᾽ 3 Α ’ 4 ‘ 4 ἢ ; Ἢ
οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἄλλα περι δόσιν χρημάτων Kat
λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ ἐν τῇ doce, χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν 2
πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ 3
9 ’ 4 e 4 ἤ ‘ a e A 4
ἀσωτία καὶ ἥ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καί
ἤ 4A a 4 4 8 ’ * A
ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ
a & a 4 8 , 4
τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ᾽
ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες " τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρα-
τεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν.
διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶνα. πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα 4
κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται " βούλε- 5
ται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἕν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν
3 A wv 4 e }] e A 4 lA a p
οὐσίαν: ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ dt αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ ὃ

I. 1 Aristotle’s excellent account ' we call “property” all things whose
of liberality represents it as the | value is measured by money.’ In
balance between illiberality and pro- | other words ‘all things with an ex-
digality. On the characters produced | changeable value.’
by these different qualities the most 3 τὴν δ' dowrlay—xadoduer] ‘But
discriminating and happy remarks are | the term “ prodigality ” we sometimes
made in the present chapter. apply in a complicated sense, for we

1 οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς xpiceow] ‘Nor | call those who are incontinent and
avain in decisions.’ The Paraphrast | who lavish money on intemperance—
adds ὥσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Koplocs here is | prodigals.’? Exactly the same usage
used in a general sense; it may or | has been confirmed in modern lan-
may not be a legal decision. Cf. Eth. | guage by the associations of the
Vv. Vi. 4: ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίον | parable of ‘the Prodigal Son.’
καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. 5 οὐ δὴ οἰκείω:---ἐκδεχόμεθα] ‘This

2 χρήματα δὲ--- μετρεῖται) ‘Now application of the name is improper ;

VOL. I. ᾿ H

58 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [ Crap.

ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ws τοῦ
~ 4 , ” “ \ \ 4 ᾿ 9 ’
ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.,
6 ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς"
ὁ πλοῦτος δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων: ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἄριστα
χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν" καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ
χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν.
7 οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ Χχρημά-
τῶν δαπάνη καὶ δόσις: ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις
μᾶλλον. διὸ μάλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς
δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ dei.
τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μῶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ
τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν"
2. ἡ , ἢ a 4 ’ Ψ 1, 8 οὶ 4 ‘
8 οὐκ ἄδηλον δ᾽ ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἕπεται TO εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ TO
Q ’ - \ , ‘ mn ’ 4 4
καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ de λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν H μὴ
αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμ-
, A e Ψ 4 4 en A A ‘
9 Bavovrt, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ

for “prodigal” ought to denote a
man who has one fault, the habit of

wah ὡ dents 4 | ght reg, ἃ right receiving. The former is the
| positive and active side, the latter is
wasting his substance. The word | the negative and passive side, Giv-
literally means ‘‘he who desteoys | ing is the ‘use’ of money: recetving
himself,” and the wasting of one’s | and keeping is mere ‘possession.’
substance may well be thought a kind | And ‘use,’ as Aristotle tells us in the
of self-destruction, for life depends | Rhetoric (1. v. 7), constitutes wealth
upon substance. This accordingly is | proper, as being a sort of life and
the sense in which we take the word | reality (ἐνέργεια), which mere posses-
“ prodigality.”' Aristotle attributes | sion is not. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν
some weight here to the etymology of | ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἣ ἐν τῷ
ἄσωτος, arguing that the man who ᾿ κεκτῆσθαι" καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν
destroys his property, destroys him- ᾿ τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος.
self, and he who destroys himself is | 8 οὐκ ἄδηλον δ'---αἰσχροπραγεῖ»
beyond salvation (ἄσωτος), Βούλεται | ‘It is not hard to see that giving is
εἶναι is exactly πΒδιοποῦε to the Eng- [ an avenue to the doing of good and to
lish word ‘means.’ Cf. Eth, 111. 1. 15, | noble action, while in taking we only
Td δ᾽ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι x... | receive a benefit or at most keep clear
In Eth. v. v. 14, βούλεται is used in | of doing a base action.’ Aisxypowpa-yety
a slightly different sense to denote | here corresponds with αἰσχροκέρδεια
not the ‘meaning’ of a word, but a | in 8 41; an act of λῆψις may have the
‘tendency’ in things, ὅμως δὲ βούλεται | negative praise of having avoided this.
μένειν μᾶλλον. ᾿ς 9 καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ--- ἀλλότριον] ‘And it
7 Liberality or ‘the virtue con- | is easier too to abstain from taking
nected with property’ consists more than it is to give; for men are less
in right giving and spending than in — willing to give away (ἧττον προΐενται

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 59

11

λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι.
μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον.
λέγονται οἱ διδόντες: οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευ-
θεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην'
οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ᾽ ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ
σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς. ὠφέλιμοι
αἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις
καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει

τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον προΐενται
καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ

, ~ 9 4 ~ ’
γάρ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ὅόσει.
καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.
τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς" οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε,
καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως
4 9 ’ 4 4 , 9 4 ς δὺ A A o A
ἢ ἀλύπως" τὸ yap κατ᾽’ ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ
λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα
ἀλλὰ διά τιν’ ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις
ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ᾽ ὁ λυπηρῶς: μάλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν τὰ

ἧς καλῇ 4 υ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλευθερί
χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.

οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ"

τὸς τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις.

4 a, ’ 9 “-
αἰτητικός. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ

μᾶλλον) what is their own, than they
are to abstain from taking what
belongs to others.’ Μᾶλλον is re-
dandant; it goes to strengthen the
coniparative force of #rrov.—Od λαμβά-
νουσι corresponds to μὴ λαβεῖν just
before, and makes up a positive notion
to ‘abstain from taking.’ Aristotle
attributes to men in general a cha-
racter the reverse of that attributed
by Sallust to Catiline, ‘ alieni appetens,
sui profusus.’ ἮΝ

11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ᾽ ἐπαι-

γνοῦνται πάνυ] ‘But they who receive |

are not praised at all.’ IId»v means
‘quite’: οὐ πάνυ in the sense of
* hardly ’ is frequent in Aristotle ; cf.
Eth, ul. ii. 12-13: λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ
πάνυ δοξάζομεν--- δοξάζομεν ἃ ob πάνυ
ἔσμεν : and οὐδὲ πάνυ appears to mean
“ not at all,’ the οὐδέ being joined with
the verb.

16 οὐκ ἃ» εἴη---εὐεργετεῖσθαι)] ‘Nor
would he be ready to ask favours, for

οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι TOU μὴ τιμῶν-
οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ᾽
εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργε-

it does not belong to the benefactor
to be easily a receiver of benefits,’
This is a manifestation of the spirit
which runs through the virtuous
characters of Aristotle—the spirit of
| manliness and nobility (ἀνδρώδης καὶ
φιλόκαλος, cf. Eth. tv. iv. 3). It
appears most strongly in the cha-
racter of the great-souled man; see
below, ch. iii. § 24. The principle of
individuality, a sense of life and free
action (ἐνέργεια), are with Aristotle the
basis of morality, and the first requisite
to nobleness seems to be self-respect.
| Now, a slight difference in the way in
which this truth is stated will make
it appear a pure or a selfish principle.
Christianity says, ‘It is more blessed
to give than to receive,’ implying
that to gratify a feeling of love and
kindness is better than any pleasure
that the sense of gain could afford.
But the Christian sentiment of loveand
| charity, though unselfish, is not selfless,

1)

L oa)

I

Lo!

2

bmg

3

Gag

4

[5
16

60 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [ Crap.

17 τεῖσθαι., ὅθεν δὲ dei, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημά-
των, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχη διδόναι.
3 4 ‘4 ~ 907 ’ a A a 4
οὐδ᾽ ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν
me 4 ὯΝ a a ’ “ ν ’ Άᾶ4 =
ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη διδόναι οἷς δεῖ
18 καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ᾽ ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ
ς ἤν“ " 9 “ , Ψ , e a ?
ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ eaTTH’
4 a Ἁ ? , 949 ὃ 4 4 ’ ‘ Α
19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν
οὐσίαν & ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει
τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, GAN’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει,
αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθε-
, = \ 4 ἢ ὃ ὃ , 98 + 9 > ’
ριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ’ ἐλαττόνων
20 διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι
4 Ά ’ Α 4 ἢ »” g ‘ ~
ἀλλα παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν" ἄπειροί τε yap τῆς

For as all knowledge implies ἃ sub- | to counterfeit love; but really secret
ject as well as an object, so does | hatred, For benefits oblige, and ob-
every moral act or feeling imply the | ligation is thraldom; and unrequitable
will and individuality of the actor. | obligation, perpetual thraldom, which
In the Christian sentiment there isso | is to one’s equal, hateful.’ Cf. Eth.
great a harmony between the object | ΙΧ, vii.

and subject, that the subjective side 17-19 Points in the character of
appears to be lost; but in reality it is | the liberal man: he will take care of
only lost to be found again, it is di- | his own property in order that he
minished to be enhanced. Aristotle’s | may have means for his liberality.
statement would be, ‘It is better to | Hence, too, he will be discriminating
give than to receive, because it is | in the objects of his favours; yet his
more noble.’ This has a slight ten- | tendency is to forget himself, to give
dency to give too much weight to the | largely, to leave hardly anything for
subjective side. In Aristotle’s whole | himself; yet again, liberality does
account we do not find a word about | not depend on the largeneas of the
benevolence or love to others as | gift, it is in proportion to the means
prompting acts of liberality. We find | of the giver—a less gift may be more
no other motive but the ‘splendour’ | liberal than a large one.

(καλόν) of the acts themselves, What 20 ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ ---ποιηταῇ ‘We
is said in the present section verges | see that those are the most liberal who
towards the selfish theory, which | have not themselves acquired their
would ascribe such acts to the love of | property, but have inherited it; for
power inherent in man. In Hobbes | they have never known what want is,
(Leviathan, Book 1. Chap. xi.) we find | nor are they restrained by that love
a bitter statement of the feelings with | of what we have ourselves produced,
which benefits may be received. ‘To | which belongs to all men, and is well
have received from one, to whom we | exemplified in parents and poets.’
think ourselves equal, greater benefits | On the philosophy of this remark, ef.
than there is hope to requite,disposeth | th, 1x. vii. 2-7. The remark itself

1] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION IY. 61

9 ὃδ ’ a ‘ 9 ~ a ea Ν)Ἅ ΓῚ
ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ
οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ᾽ οὐ padtov τὸν ἐλευ-
td 4 ΝΜ
θέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν
A 4A a “~
δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα OC αὑτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα
~ ὃ ld ὃ 4 Ά 9 δι ~ a, Ψ ς ,
τῆς ὁοσεως. tO καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχη ὅτι οἱ μαλιστα 21
» μή “ “- , 9 . νὰ 7
ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ᾽ οὐκ ἀλόγως
τοῦτο' οὐ yup οἷόν τε χρήματ᾽ ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον
Cod Δ oe > 8 - rr 9 a ὃ ,
ὅπως ἔχη, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μὴν δώσει γε 22
Γ.] 4 ~~ td
ois ov δεῖ οὐδ᾽ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα" οὐ γὰρ
ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
4 ? 9 A wv 9 a σι 4 ἢ Μ 4
ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ 23
4 ~
εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ THY οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ
~ ’
εἰς ἃ δεῖ" ὁ 0 ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους
A. ~ ~ a
οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους" TO yap πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ
ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν.
4
τὴς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων 24
ὃ ld . a “- ς la A o 4 ,ὔ 4
ὅσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὃ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς
ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα
ἡδέως" καὶ λήψεται δ᾽ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, τῆς ἀρετῆς
a A »” δ 4 4 , 9 , e ὃ Ἄς
γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ
“) ‘ ~ 3 a , e a a e A ‘
ἔπεται yap τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ
4 a
τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. ai μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίγνονται
o φ “ῬΜ 4 “A e δ᾽ 4 on ¢ » 9X δὲ A
ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ 25
~ ~ 4
τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνη αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν,
A “ “-- A A 4
λυπήσεται, μετρίως de καὶ ws δεῖ" τῆς ἀρετῆς yap καὶ

χρείαν, ἥπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. From another
cause, however, merchants, with their
large fluctuating gains, seem often

comes almost verbatim from Plato's
Republic, Ὁ. 330 B-0. Socrates asks |

Cephalus whether he made his money |

or inherited it, and gives as a reason | more liberal than the landowners,
for the question, οὗ ro: ἕνεκα ἠρόμην, | with their fixed incomes.

ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας od σφόδρα | 21 With perfect good sense Aris-
ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. Ἰοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν | totle says that a very natural expla-
ws τὸ πολὺ of ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται" | nation may be given of the common
οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ 4 of ἄλλοι | railings you hear against fortune for
ἀσπάζονται αὐτά" ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ | not making ‘the right people’ (i.e,
γὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς | the liberal) rich. People can’t expect
παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ | to be rich who have hardly any care
χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα owov- | for money, and this is the character-
δάζουσιν, ws ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, kal κατὰ τὴν | istic of the liberal.

62 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IY. [CHap.

26 ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ Kat ὡς dei, καὶ εὐκοινώ-
3 9 4 e , 9 ͵ ’ 4 4
27 νητὸς δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα΄ δύναται γὰρ ἀδι-
κεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος
Cd δέ a 9 ἢ a , 9 ‘ , 4 ἢ
εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον TL ἀνάλωσε,
\ a ’ 3 4 , e +, Ψ . 3
28 καὶ τῷ ΣΣιμωνίδη οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ'' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν
’ ὃ Ν Α ” ὃ 949 . ὃ “ 9 δὲ e
τούτοις διαμαρτάνει. οὔτε yap ἤῤεται ἐφ᾽ ois det οὐδὲ ws
¥ ὃ a 4 “ 4 A ow A iA Ld
29 δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται" ἔσται de προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον. εἴρηται
δ᾽ e «a Ψ e 4 ‘ ’ 9 A e 9 t A e
ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ
4 ἢ a 9 ἢ 9 ld 4A ᾽ A a td
ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει" καὶ τὴν δαπάνην
N 4 4 ’ ’ e A = 4 ’ A ’
γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι
καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει,
ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν
9 « , A 9 A a ‘ 4 @ A 9 ,
30 δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας
9 ? , 9 A en“ , ’
οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται" οὐ γὰρ ῥᾷδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα
πᾶσι διδόναι" ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας
διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος

φ--

3
δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρον. εὐίατός

| «λουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν ᾿Ιέρωνος
ἑρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρεῖττον
πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν" πλούσιον εἰπεῖν "
τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν
πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας. Again,
there is quoted by Plutarch a say-
having omitted any proper expense _ ing that ‘the money-chest is always
than vexed at spending what is | full, and the chest of the graces

26-27 καὶ εὐκοινώνητο: ----᾽ἀὀρεσκό- .
{
needless, nor does he approve the always einpty;’ and another, that

pevos] ‘Further, the liberal man is
easy to deal with in business transac-
tions; for there is no difficulty in
cheating him, owing to his disregard
of money, and he is more annoyed at

precepts of Simonides.’ These re- | ‘avarice is the proper pleasure of
marks show a penetrating knowledge | old age.’ On the philosophy of
of mankind, but they do not exhibit | Simonides, see Vol. I. Essay IL. pp.
liberality in the highest light. The | 95-96.

gratification of a personal feeling is 29 τῷ AapBdvew—puxpois] ‘Tllibe-
made rather too prominent, hence we | rality exceeds in taking, only it must
miss the beauty of ‘charity seeketh | be in petty matters.’ Grasping on a
not her own.’ With the present ; large scale gets another name than
passage we may compare the descrip- _illiberality ; cf. 88 41-42.

tion of equity in the Rhetoric (1. xiii. 30 τὰ μὲν οὖν--- ἀνελευθέρου] ‘The
15-19), part of which is τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ΕΟ sides of prodigality can hardly
ἀδικούμενον. Various sentiments are exist together; as it is not easy to
attributed to Simonides, all testifying | give to everybody and receive from
to the solid advantage of riches. Cf. | nobody; private persons, whom alone
Ar. Rhetoric, 1. xvi. 2: ὅθεν καὶ τὸ | we reckon prodigals, soon find their
Σιμωνίδον εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ | substance failingthem. For, in fact, the

1. HOIKQN ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΈΕΈΙΩΝ IV. 63
Te yap ἐστι Kai ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ
ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου"
καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ᾽ εὖ.
εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη % πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν
ἐλευθέριος: δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος" οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ
οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα,
ἠλιθίον de. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ 32
βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι
ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ’ οὐδ᾽ αὑτόν,
ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμ- 33
Bavovew ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι,
ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, 34

—_ = ..τΤτὖὃᾧ’ὕ3ὕἭ΄

prodigal manmay well bethoughtinno | be even not so bad as this, the solid
small degree superior to the illiberal.’ _ benefit which accrues from any ten-
The commentators, from not seeing | dency to capitalise money may surely
the train of thought in this passage, be set against the chance good done
have made a difficulty about ἐπεί, | by money given away indiscriminately
which refers to the beginning of the or spent unproductively.
sentence, the intermediate clauses oJ | 33 ἀλλ᾽ of πολλοὶ--- ἀνελεύθεροι)
γὰρ ῥᾷδιον---εἶναι being parenthetical. | ‘But most prodigals, as we have
With ofrep καὶ Soxoicw, cf. § 23. implied already, take whence they
31-32 Reasons are given why the | ought not, and in this way are illibe-
prodigal is better than the illiberal | ral.’ This is an instance of a pheno-
man; namely, he may be cured by | menon often to be observed in Aris-
time, or by the failure of his means. _totle’s virtues and vices, that the
His tendency to give is a principle ' textremes meet’ (cf. IV. vii 15, 11.
which requires only to be harmonised | vii. 15). The rationale of this phe-
to become a virtue. Lastly, he does ' nomenon appears to be that the
more good than the illiberal man. | extremes are both the result of the
Aristotle here is speaking of a better . same principle, they are both different
sort of prodigality (τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον | forms of selfishness. Selfishness can
adowros), which is only a slight over- 3 equally produce prodigal giving and
stepping of the bounds of liberality; | meanness in receiving. Hence, if a
but even with this restriction, it is man be selfish, though his tendency
|

much to be doubted whether prodi- | is to be prodigal, yet on occasion
gality does more good than illiberality. | selfishness, which is his governing
From wise acts of liberality much | principle, will lead him to become
good may arise, but the common sort | illiberal. The fact is noticed by Eude-
of prodigality, as Aristotle himself | mus, £th. Eud. 1. vii. 12: “Ἔστι 8
says, 8 35, being prompted by folly | ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον 4
and vanity, almost invariably goes to ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ᾽ οὐδε-
enrich the wrong people. Ifthe case τέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις

64 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [ CHa.

9 A 4 ~ a 4 ’ 4 a 9 ,
εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι: ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει
αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν.

” A a 4 A 4 ~ ~ ᾽
ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν odrywpus
4 4 ’ , 4 4 “ A
καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν: διδόναι yap ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ
35 δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει.
ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν"
4 5 ~ [.4 4 ἂλ φ δι.
τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ.

’ 4
διόπερ οὐδ'
καλαί, οὐδὲ
ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε ots δεῖ

ὔ ὔ ~ δι
πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις
A A ~ ~

τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν ἄλλην

ε ὃ 4 y ’ ‘ 4 4 3 A 44

ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλα, διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν

« ῇ 9 “-ς a 9 gf A 4 4 3
οἱ πολλοί: εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκο-
s
λασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ dia τὸ μὴ πρὸς TO καλὸν
κι 4 a 4 cy
36 ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσι. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος
ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
δ᾽ ’ x ’ 9 4 , 4 \ ὃ , 4. > καὶ e δ᾽
37 0 ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ᾽ ἄν. ἡ
ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατος ἐστιν δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν.
ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας,
38 μάλλον ἣ δοτικοί,

καὶ συμφνυέστερον τοῖς
οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές
4 4 4 [4 “~ ΄-- 4 [

ἐστιν" πολλοὶ yap τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι.
9 Α A a ”“ γ iA A , a ἰδὲ e

ἐν δυσὶ yap οὖσα, τῇ τ᾽ ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερ-

μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσὶν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ
θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ
ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς.
37 καὶ συμφνυέστερον---δοτικοῆ ‘ This
vice runs more in our blood than
prodigality : the mass of men love to
keep money, rather than to give it.’
It may be doubted whether this as-
sertion is universally true. Would
it, for instance, be true of the Irish?
Again, Aristotle hardly acknowledges
enough the dtndness that exists among
men, and which made Kant wonder
that there was ‘so much kindness
and so little justice’ in the world.
Aristotle, from his dislike to all that
is sordid, and his admiration for the
brilliant and noble qualities, takes
perhaps tuo favourable a view of the

vice of prodigality. Its connection
with vanity, selfishness, and often
utter heartlessness, he does not suffi-
ciently notice, nor dves he observe
that lavish giving often proceeds from
the want of a faculty—from an inca-
pacity for estimating the worth of
objects. Thus if illiberality be im-
compatible with a magnanimous spirit,
prodigality is incompatible with ab-
solute truth and justice.

38 Illiberality is widely spread,
and has many forms ; it contains two
elements—excess of taking and defect
of giving; but it does not always
manifest iteelf in its entirety (od
πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίγνεται), eome-
times one element exists separately
from the other.

1: HOIKON NIKOMAXEION Iv. 65

βολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, GAN’
ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ
δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις 39.
προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ
δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ
βούλονται λαμβάνειν, of μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὖὐλά-
βειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἣ φασί γε διὰ
τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή ποτ᾽ ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι
πράξαι, τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος" ὠνόμασται δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ἂν
δοῦναι. οἱ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς 40
οὐ padioy τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ
ἑτέρους μή: ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε
διδόναι, οἱ 0 αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντο-
θεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐρ-
γαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ
κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμ-
βάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ, κοινὸν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχρο- 41
κέρδεια φαίνεται: πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου
μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν 42
δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους,
οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας,

ae ee ee .-.ὄ --.-.

39-40 οἱ μὲν γὰρ---οὐ δεῖ] ‘Men
of one class, those who go by such
names as “stingy,” “' closefisted,”’
“ curmudgeons,” all fall short in what
they give away, but they neither
covet their neighbours’ goods, nor
wish to take them. With some of
them this arises from a certain sense
of equity and shrinking from what is
base; for their motive, either supposed
or professed, in being careful of their
means, is to prevent the possibility
of their being compelled by want to
do base actions. To this set belong
the “skinflint,”’ and all his like, a
name derived from superlative un-
willingness to give to anybody. But
others again abstain from their neigh-
bours’ goods through fear, since it is

VOL. Il.

not easy to take what belongs to
others, and not have others take what
belongs to oneself—they are content,
therefore, neither to take nor give.
A second class are excessive in taking
everything and from all quarters, as,
for instance, those who ply illiberal
trades, brothel-keepers, and all such
like, and lenders of small sums at
high interest. For all these take
whence they ought ποῦ, and more than
they ought.’ This passage falls into
two parts, οἱ δ᾽ αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν
corresponding to οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
τοιαύταις. There are two subordinate
divisions of the first part, namely,
ol μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν, and οἱ δ᾽ αὖ
διὰ φόβον.

66 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV.

43 ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς Kat ἀδίκους.

[Crap.

ες ,
O μέντοι

κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης Kat ὁ ληστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων

> ἡ
εἰσιν.

αἱ σχροκερὸ εἷς γάρ.

κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἀμφότεροι

e A « a γ᾽
πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους
4 ? @ ζω ’ 4 δ᾽ 4 4 “- Xr
τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, of 0 ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων

κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι.

ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερ-

δαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται

44 λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι.

εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευ-

? 9 , , δι ὔ g 9 A ~
θερια εναντίον Aeyerat’ μεῖζόν τε γὰρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς
4 ’ A “ Φ.Ν ’ ? a a 4
ἀσωτίας, καὶ μάλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατα τὴν

45 λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

Ἁ A ” ld a “--
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν

39 ὔ ~ ~ []
ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ᾽ εἰρήσθω.

Δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας

44 μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς
dowrlas] Before (§ 32) Aristotle
made the doubtful statement that
prodigality does more good than
illiberality. He now makes the
positively untrue statement that illi-
berality does more harm than prodi-
gality. His view is fallacious from
an ignorance of the principles of
political economy, and from not
looking at the question with sufficient
breadth. He regards prodigality as a
short-lived evil which will be cured
by time, and illiberality as inveterate.
But in their consequences it is rather
prodigality that is incurable, and
illiberality transitory. liberality
can always be remedied, and indeed
it brings its own remedy, for saving
produces wealth and capital, and
these lift a man naturally and neces-
sarily into a more expensive style of
living, however much he may haggle
over details. But prodigality causes
personally, to the family, and to the
nation, a loss of resources which is
absolutely incurable.

II. Magnificence, the virtue next
discussed, is a higher kind of liber-

ality. In consists in spending money
on a great scale with propriety (ἐν
μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν) Thus
there are two elements, greatness and
propriety. The greatness is relative,
being limited by the propriety, and
the propriety is relative to the per-
son, the circumstances, and the
object. Magnificence will of course
be prompted by a desire for what
is noble. There will be something
imaginative and striking about the
effect it produces (τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς
θαυμαστόν). Great and solemn occa-
sions will be its proper sphere, the
services of religion, the entertaining
of foreigners, public works, gifts, and
return-gifts. The well-born and
illustrious will be the proper persons
to exercise it. The house of the
magnificent man will be of suitable
splendour, everything he does will
show taste and propriety: even in a
gift to a child he will exhibit the idea
of magnificence. The vulgar man,
missing this happy nicety, will jar on
our taste with his excessive splendour
(λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος), his object
being evidently mere ostentation.
The petty man, on the other hand,

1.---Τ] HOIKQN NIKOMAXKION IV. 67

διελθεῖν: δοκεῖ yap καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ
Φ 4 Ψ 9 e 4 ? 4 ’
εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας
τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον'
ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθά-
πὲρ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα
δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός Tr οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ 2
δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ἅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἧ ἐν μετρίοις 3
4 4 ’ ~ ? 0 ’ e a
κατ ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον ΤῸ
“πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη"᾽ GAN’ ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν
μάλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς τοιαύτης δ᾽ ἕξεως ἡ μὲν 4
ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία

a ’ A \
TO πρέπον δὴ T pos

4 5 ’ . a a 3 e ’ a
Kat ἀπειροκαλία Kat ὅσαι τοιωῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβαλλουσαι τῷ
μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, GAN’ ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμ-

from timidity and constant fear of
expense, will be always below the
mark, and even after considerable
expense will mar the whole effect
by meanness in some point of de-
tail.
2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος---ἀρχιθεωρφ] ‘Now
the greatness is relative, for there is
not the same expense for a trierarch
as for the head of a sacred legation.’
This latter office would of cuurse
demand peculiar splendour. The
λειτουργίαι at Athens were exactly
fitted to exercise the magnificence of
the citizens,

γὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ
καὶ περὶ Δ] ‘The propriety accordingly
must be relative to the person, the
circumstances, and the object.’ We
have here nearly the same categories
as were given, £th, 11. i. 16, where
the points connected with an action
are enumerated, τίς re δὴ καὶ τί καὶ
περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνει πράττει. On the
suitableness of the person see below
83 12-14. The circumstances are

touched upon §§ 11, 15. The object ἡ

(which cannot be definitely sepa-
rated from the circumstances), 88
16-18,

3 πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ) Homer
Odyss. XVII. 420.

4 ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ Bavavola καὶ
ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται] ‘The
corresponding excess is called “ νυϊ-
garity,” and “bad taste,” and the like.’
Bdvavoos is said to be derived from
Bacvos ‘a forge’ and adw. Thus it
means a metal-worker, or artisan.
From the contempt felt by the Athe-
nians for this kind of craft, βάνανσος
came to imply ‘mean,’ ‘ vulgar,’ ana-
logously to goprixés. In Aristotle's
Politics, there is a definition of what
kind of work is strictly to be con-
sidered βάναυσος (VIII. ii. 4). Βάναυσον
δ᾽ ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ
τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς
τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς
ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα
τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψνχὴν ἣ τὴν
διάνοιαν. The word βαναυσία is ap-
plied here to denote vulgarity in ex-
penditure.

68 HOIKQON NIKOMAXEION IV. [Cuap.

5 πρυνόμεναι" ὕστερον de περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ meya-
λοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν: τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεω-
6 ρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.
αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι.
τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα" οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ
πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον
δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβαλλειν.
’ A a ~ e 4 “" ~ ©

7 δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοὺ evexa’
ὃ κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετι-
9 κῶς" ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον
4 ’ ’ >” a , 4 A
καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ᾽ dv μάλλον ἣ πόσου Kal πῶς
10 ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ
4 ᾿ ‘ Α ς , ὃ ’ a a A e ὃ -
εἶναι" καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
περὶ ταὐτὰ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ
249 A ᾿ . oo» ~ \ ‘ ‘ °
αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος Kat ἔργου" κτῆμα μὲν yap TO -“πλεί-
στου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον de τὸ μέγα

----- ---- -- -- i ee ῳ -.....--τὄ...

5 ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρετὴς --- ἐμμελῶς] | generally to the beginning of Book IT.;
‘The magnificent man is a kind of | perhaps £tk. 1. ii. 8 is the nearest
artist, because he has an eye for the | reference that can be given. But in
becoming, and can spend great sums | the present place Aristotle is not
tastefully.’ The word ἐπιστήμονι here speaking of the formation of habits
conveys the association of those quali- ᾿ out of acts, but rather of moral habits
ties which were said to belong to a ! or states having a definite existence
perfect work of art, Zth. τι. vi.g: Εἰ and reality anly in acts and in the
δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ | objective circumstances (ὧν ἐστί») to
ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα, | which they (the moral states) refer.
κιτ.λ, ' ‘This view regards a moral state as a

6 ὥσπερ yap—ry Epyy] ‘For as mere potentiality, which only attains
we said at the outset, a moral state is , definite and conscious reality by
determined by its acts and its objects, | emerging into an act. The remark
Therefore the outlays of the magnifi- . is apparently made to account for a
cent man will be great and suitable. | concrete treatment of the virtue of
And the works on which he employs magnificence. Elsewhere we have
them will be of the same character, noticed (Zth. 111. xii. 3 note) a com.
for only thus it will be possible to plete separation made between the
have a great outlay suitable to the | habit and the act.
work,’ 10 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ---ν meyer] «γιὲ

ἐν dpxy] The allusion seems to be _fullows therefore that the magnificent

II. ] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. 69

καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, TO δὲ
μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν,

καὶ ἔστιν ἔργον ἀρετὴ μεγα-
λοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει,

4 μὰ
δὲ δαπανημάτων οἷα
’ a ’ @ Y Y AY 4 ’ 4
λέγομεν τὰ τιμία, οἷον τὰ περι θεοὺς ἀνγαξημᾶτα Kal
κατασκευαὶ Kat θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ wav τὸ

Ἂν ~
e€CTi TWY

δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά Sorry οἷον
εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἣ καὶ
ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν, ἐν ἅπασι δ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς
τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὧν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων"

man must also be liberal, for the
liberal man spends what he ought
and in the way he ought. But it is
in these same particulars, which are
common to magnificence and liberality,
that the element of greatness which
there is in the magnificent man ap-
pears, as for example in vastness of
proportions, and with the same expense
he will make the result more splendid.
For a work is not to be esteemed for
the same qualities as ἃ possession.
That possession is most prized which
is worth most, as for instance gold,
but that work which is great and
noble. When we contemplate such a
work, we admire; but the magnificent
is always admirable ; and in short
magnificence is—excellence of some
work, which is on a scale of grandeur.’
The words οἷον μέγεθος have vexed the
commentators. One device that has
been adopted is to omit the stop after
μέγεθος and to translate the passage,
‘Sed in his magnum est magnifici,
veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa
heec (reading ταῦτα) versantis’ (Mi-
chelet). Or, without altering the
punctuation, we might construe, taking
οἷον μέγεθος as epexegetic of τὸ μέγα,
*But the greatness of the magnificent
man, as it were a certain grandeur of
scale, appears in these same particulars,
which are common to magnificence
and liberality.’ But the point Aris-

totle insists on is that magnificence
differs from liberality not in degree,
but in kind, being a display of more
genius and imagination on the same
objects, and thus with the same ex-
pense producing a more striking result.
He gives as an instance of the means
employed, ‘ vastness of size.’ Τὸ
péya is the moral greatness of the

magnificent man, this takes as its —

exponent μέγεθος or physical bulk.
Cf. Aristotle's definition of Tragedy
(Poetic. vi. 2). "Ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία
μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας,
μέγεθος ἐχούσης, κιτ.λ., where μέγεθος
implies bulk, or length of the story.
Its limits are assigned J6. vii. 12.
del μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος
εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ws
δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν͵ ἐν ὅσῳ
μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον
ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἷς εὐτυ-
χίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἣ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς
δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ
τοῦ μεγέθου:.

11 εὐφιλοτίμητα) ‘favourite ob-
jects of rivalry.’ Dr. Cardwell (upon
§ 2 above) quotes Lycurgus, Orat.
contra Leocr, p. 167: Οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
ἱπποτετρόφηκεν ἢ κεχορήγηκε λαμπρῶς
-ἀξιός ἐστι wap’ ἡμῶν τοιαύτης χάριτος
--ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις τετριηράρχηκε λαμπρῶς ἣ
τείχη τῇ πατρίδι περιέβαλεν, ἣ πρὸς τὴν
κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων συνευπό-

, βρῆσε.

70 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. ᾿ [CHap.

” 4 a ἢ 4 ‘ A ’ “ [᾽ν 9 a ‘
ἄξια yap δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλα καὶ
13 τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο-
᾿ 9 ‘ Ἂν 4 9 δι ‘ ? ’ a
πρεπῆς" οὐ yap ἔστιν ap ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως

ε > 9 a ’ 4 ‘ 2s 4 4 3 ’
ὁ ὃ ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος" παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον,

» 9 ‘ \ ee. , 4 . 2 \ A
14 KaT ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς, πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἱς Ta τοιαντα
προὔπάρχει δ αὐτῶν ἣ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς
μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα
τοιαῦτα' πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.
15 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν 7 μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται"

td 4 A 9 a, ~ A “(ὁἡ,ὃἉ [2 4 ld

μέγιστα yap καὶ ἐντιμότατα᾽ τῶν de ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ
γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ

’ a . 4 , 4 4 , 1 ς
“πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑπο-

a

δοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς" οὐ γὰρ
ς᾽. ε ‘ . ε . 9 2. 9 \ ’ 4
εἰς EQUTOV δαπανηρὸς Oo μεγαλοπρεπὴς αλλ᾽ εἰς Ta Kola, Ta
4 A a 9 , ΨΚ ῃἕ ~ 4
16 δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ
καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ" κῦὄσ-
μος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος. καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν
ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων" κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν
17 ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον᾽ οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀν-
θρώποις, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ Tadw* καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων
ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ
18 ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. καὶ
διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι"
σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἡ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν
παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον.
19 διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει,

14 πρέτει δὲ---ἀξίωμα)] ‘The under- | events which in a play are supposed
taking of such expenses is proper for | to have been done before the com-
persons already distinguished by mag- | mencement of the action.
nificence, either in themselves, or their 18-19 καὶ διαφέρει---δαπανήματος
ancestors, or their connections, and | ‘And the “greatness,” which is ex-
for the noble, the illustrious, and such 1 hibited in the work, differs from the
like persons: for in all those cases | ‘‘ greatness” of the expense ; for the
greatness and dignity are present.’ | most beautiful of balls or of bottles is
The use of προὔπάρχειν here to denote | magnificent as a present to a child,
that which exists already as an achieve- | though its price be small and paltry.
ment in one’s family is not unlike its | Hence the magnificent man, whatever
use, Eth. 1. xi. 4, to denote those | kind of thing he be producing, will

IL] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION-IV.

71

μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν" τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον,
καὶ ἔχον κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ 20
μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ
ὔ 9 ‘ e f Φ » 9 4 a
δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβα λλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. εν yap τοῖς
~ ~ g ‘ 9 , 4 ,
μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνε-
ται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς “γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳ-
δοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὦ ὥσπερ οἱ
Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι,
ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ᾽ ὀλίγα, πολλά, ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς 21
4 4 , ‘ 4 , 9 ? 3 ΄“-
περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ
A 4 9 a A ov “ 4 4 ~
τὸ καλον ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὃ Tt ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν
a a f 4 , \ A» 4 , 4
πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ ὀδυρόμενος, και

produce it magnificently ; for the cha-
racter of such work is that it cannot
be easily outdone, its magnificence
being always in proportion to the
outlay ;’ 1.6. the feeling about such
works will never be merely ‘how
costly they are !’ but ‘how great they
are!’ from an imaginative point of
view ; cf. § 10. The ‘ball’ and the
* bottle’ seem to have been common
toys. Dr. Fitzgerald compares the
description of Cupid’s toy in Apollonius
Rhodius, Arg. 11. 135, and Plato,
Phedo, p. 110 B, ὥσπερ al δωδεκάσκυτοι
σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη.
Also Theophrastus’ Characters, Περὶ
ἀρεσκείας, where the dpecxos is said to
purchase Θυριακὰς τῶν στρογγύλων
ληκύθου:---καὶ σφαιριστήριον.

20 τοιοῦτοι---πολλά] ‘Such now is
the magnificent man, but he who ex-
ceeds and is vulgar—exceeds, as was
said befure, in that he spends more
than is right. He spends much upon
trifles, and preserves no harmony in
his splendour ; he entertains his club-
fellows with a wedding-feast, and
when he has charge of a comic chorus,
he makes them appear in purple,

the Megarians do. In all this extra-
vagance he never aims at the beautiful,
but only seeks to parade his riches, in
the hope of being stared at ; where
he should spend much, he draws his
purse-strings, where he should spend
little, he squanders.’ The last sentence
shows that in vulgarity extremes meet,
selfishness prompting both too much
expense and too little; see above,
chap. i. § 33, note. With παρὰ μέλος
we may compare Shakspeare, Merry
Wives, Act i. sc. 3. ‘ His filching was
like an unskilful singer: he kept not
time.’

οἷον épamoras] ἔρανος being a club
where each member entertained in
turn, or an entertainment where each
guest contributed, it was of course
bad taste to eclipse the rest in splen-
dour.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ] The parode was the
first song of the chorus sung atitsentry.
Naturally the comic chorus would not
require rich purple dresses. The ex-
pense of a comic chorus at Athens
appears to have been sixteen ming
(642.), that of a tragic chorus thirty

as ‘ mins (120l.); see Bentley on Phalaris,

12

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV.

[Crap.

ae) ἐξ , ’ a I a 4" 4 a ew
22 TavVT OLOMEVOS μείζω Totely ἢ δεῖ. εισι μεν ον a ἕξεις
χὰ , 4 4 5 ’ 3 ἦ » δ ’
QUTQi KQKiQl, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη Ύ ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μῆτε
4 ~ 4 ᾽ 4 9 ,
βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

Go

‘H de μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος

p. 360. The Megarians were noted
among the Greeks for stupidity.

22 εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν---ἀσχήμονε:} ‘Now
these (i.e. vulgarity and pettiness)
are vices, but they do not entail dis-
grace, because they are neither hurtful
to one’s neighbour, nor are they very
unseemly.’

III. Aristotle’s famous description
of the virtue of great - souledness
(which he places as a mean between
vanity and want of spirit) throws
light upon the whole bearing of bis
moral system.

We must notice in it rather an
admiring picture of what ts than an
investigation into what ought to be.
Great-souledness is nothing else than
a certain loftiness of spirit possessed
by great men. It can only (in its
fullest sense) belong to great men,
for unless accompanied by qualities
superior to those of the rest of the
world, it would be simply ridiculous.

Aristotle takes this loftiness of
spirit, and, considering it fine and
admirable, points out the various
traits in which it exhibits itself. And
nothing can be more subtle or felici-
tous than many of his observations on
this head But it is plain that great-
souledness, as here represented, is
not something which is prompted by
duty; rather it stands quite beside
the idea of duty. Greatness and the
sense of moral obligation are essen-
tially distinct, however much they
may accidentally coincide.

The great-souled man has all
virtues, says Aristotle (§§ 14-15).

a A SSS nS SASS STE BEES

But we find on nearer inspection that
this means that he is above all those
minor interests which might induce
to vice; he does not care about
money, so he will never cheat; he
does not value even life very high,
so he will not be a coward. Here
then there is no self-subjection to a
law. The great-souled man does not
avoid vice because it is ‘wrong’ (in
the modern sense), but simply be-
cause it is unworthy of him. Thus
he is most essentially a law to him-
self and above all other law. Aris-
totle spoke of great-souledness as
being a sort of culmination of the
virtues (§ 16), and justly so, for it is
the culmination of his moral system.
As we before remarked (ch. i. § τό,
note), his system is based on the idea
of self-respect. Loftiness of spirit ia
the highest form of self-respect (με-
γάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ, ἄξιος dv). This
principle goes a long way in elevating
the character and purifying the con-
duct, but its natural development is
also a dislike (§§ 24-26) of all
limitations of the individuality; in
short, its natural development is a
sort of noble pride.

Great-souledness, however fine may
be the qualities that go to make it up,
is essentially not a human attitude.
As we have observed already, it ia
something exceptional, and in Aris-
totle’s account of it we have a psycho-
logical portrait of a great man. Yet
still this account shows Aristotle not
to have been familiar with that con-
ception of ‘ moral goodness’ which has
arisen out of later associations.

11.---111]}

ΝΥ > A a y 9 a ΄- ’

ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν.

δ᾽ θὲ 4 [2 A 4 a 4 @ a
ouGev τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν.

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 73

μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὦν, ὁ

γὰρ μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ᾽
9 4 9 4 4 Ὁ) 9 [4
οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος avd’ ἀνόητος.

εἰρημένος.

ε ‘ “a v ‘ , yA
O γάρ μικρῶν ἀξιος Καὶ τουτων ἀξιῶν

ἀρετὴν

οὖν ὁ

μεγαλόψυχος μὲν

διαφέρει 2
δοκεῖ δὲ 3

A
ἕαντον 4

σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ᾽ οὔ" ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλο- 5

᾽ [2 a A g 9 g , e a
ψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ ΤῸ καλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σωματι, Ot μικροί

δ᾽ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ᾽ οὔ.

e 4 9 ~ 9 ? vn ~ es ς A , Γ] »
€QUTOYV ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ων Xavvos oO δὲ μειζόνων 2) ἄξιος

οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος.

a 4. a7 ‘ “A » AY 4
τε μεγάλων εαν TE μετρίων, EaY TE καὶ μικρὼν ἀξιος ων ετι

9 y € a 9 ~
ἐλαττόνων AUTOV ἀξιοῖ,

a f
καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων

ὁ δὲ μεγάλων 6

ὁ δ᾽ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν 7

” . oS \ n % ?P > 4 , a » .
ἄξιος" τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἣν ἄξιος ; ἔστι 8
δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ

μέσος" τοῦ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ.
4 A 4 U e A 4 a Κ᾿
εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος 9

λουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν,

οἱ δ' ὑπερβαλ-

φ 4 a, ~ g 4 a [4 ww
ὧν, Kat μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἕν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη.

ἡ δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθα,

μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽

Ἂ 0 [4 ad - θ a 9 c A Lo U > > 4
av θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ ov μαλιστ ἐφίενται

9 9 A 4 , A “᾿ 4
of ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ TO ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον,

2 διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν--- σκοπεῖν} ‘ Now
it does not make the least difference
whether we consider the state of
mind, or the character that is pro-
duced by the state of mind.’ The
procedure adopted by Aristotle
throughout is that of describing
virtues in the concrete, though in no
other case does he give so complete
ἃ personality as in describing the
great-souled man. This procedure,
while it gives graphic liveliness to
his discussions, tends to make us
forget that these virtues are not so
much different kinds of character as
different elements in the same char-
acter. A later development of Aris-
totle’s ethical system calls attention
to this point (cf. £th. vi. xiii, 6). It

VOL, IL

has been said that the picture of ἃ

great-souled man here given to us
must have been taken from life.
Probably Aristotle traced different
manifestations of the great-souled
element in different people, and has
here combined them.

5 ty μεγέθει γὰρ--- οὔ] ‘For great-
souledness implies greatness, just as
beauty implies a large body; little
people may be pretty and elegant, but
not beautiful’ This was the Greek
idea, cf. Politics, vit. iv. 8: τό γε καλὸν
ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.
Poetic, vii. 8: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει
καὶ τάξει dori. Cf. also the story of
Phye in Herodotus, 1. 6. 60. Against
such critics of beauty as the Greeks,

, nothing is to be said.

K

Io

74 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. [CHapr.

τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμὴ" μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς

4 ~ A A A 4 4 ὔ e , ld 9
ἀγαθῶν. περὶ τιμὰς δὴ Kal ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
11 ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι

4 4 4 ~ Α ἤ e r 9 ~
περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι" τιμῆς yap μαλισθ᾽ of μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν
12 ἑαυτούς, κατ’ ἀξίαν δέ, ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ
‘ e A A a 4 mn ‘4 9 ἤ e δὲ
13 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ de
ῦ ὃς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλό-

χαννος προς ie ρ " Ου Μὴ γε Mey

φ 4 ὔ » ~ ἤ #
14 ψυχον. ὁ de μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος,
. Ν᾽ 4 ww t 4 9 4 e ῆ wv A
ἄριστος ἂν εἴη" μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ

’ e »” A e 9 ~ »” ld

μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον
δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν

e ? 4 ~ ¢ 9 ~ 2 ἡ e 4 4
IS ἑκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς T ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ
φεύγειν παρασείσαντι; οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν" τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πρά-

’ rm 4) , 7 » 9 > 2 κι
Fe αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα; καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δ᾽ ἐπισκοποῦντι
g ~ a 3 vA e ’ A 9 4
πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς
cy 4 9 » 3 Γι 9AL ~ Mw ἢ Α ~
ων. OUK εἰιῇ δ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τίιμης ἄξιος φαῦλος wy’ τῆς
ἀρετῆς γὰρ GOXov ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
Ὗ A iO" ς ? μχ 4 > ΄-
16 ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἢ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἰναὶ τῶν
ἀρετῶν" μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ
ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον

10-11 τοιοῦτον 5’—xar’ ἀξίαν δέ] | Tlapacelew (1.6. τὰς χεῖρας) meant ‘to
‘Such a prize is honour, which is the workh the hands in running.’ Cf. De
greatest of all outward goods. There- | Incess: Animal. iii. 4, where the
fore the great-souled man bears him- | principle of the lever is shown to be
self as he ought with regard to honour | involved in this-motion. Διὸ καὶ ol
and dishonour. But why should we ᾿ πένταθλοι ἄλλονται πλεῖον ἔχοντες
prove what is obvious, that the study
of magnanimous minds is honour?
And great men lay especial claim to
honour, yet according to their desert.’
Aristotle here fixes external honour
as the object with which great- 16 ἔοικε μὲν ody — καλοκἀγαθίας}
souledness deals. Afterwards he , ‘Now great-souledness appears to

τοὺς ἁλτῆρας ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ
|
sets it above all external honour be, as it were, a sort of crown of

θέοντες θᾶττον θέουσι wapacelovres τὰς
χεῖρας" γίνεται γάρ τις ἀπέρεισις ἐν
τῇ διατάσει πρὸς τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τοὺς
καρπούς.

(8 17), ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν | the virtues; it enhances them, and
γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, Honour is not | it cannot come into existence without
good enough, but the world has ; them. Hence it is hard to be great-
nothing better to give. souled in the true sense of the

15 οὐδαμῶς --- παρασείσαντι) ‘It ' term, for this is impossible without
would never suit the great-souled | nobleness and virtue.’ The word
man to fiy in ungraceful haste.’ | ‘magnanimity’ is the conventional

111 HOIKOQN ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΊΩΝ IV. 75

> 4
εἶναι" οὐ yap οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκἀγαθίας. μάλιστα μὲν
εχ 4 ‘ 4 9 s e 3 3 9 4 8. <4
οὖν περὶ τιμὰς Kat ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι, Kal ἐπὶ
a a“ ὔ “~
μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθή-
σεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων" ἀρετῆς
‘ ~
yap παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή" οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀπο-
’ ᾽ ΄- ~ «-
δέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς
4 A na a
δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων Kal ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει"
9 4
οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας. οὐ γὰρ
» 2
ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ
» e ζ Α ὔ 4 4 9 a 4 4a
εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περι τιμὰς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλα καὶ περὶ
πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
, “-ς 4
μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ᾽ εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
Ed “~ 4
ἔσται οὔτ᾽ ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως
ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ov. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος
“ 4 σε 4 a
διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά" οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ Tipa-
σθαι δι’ αὐτῶν βούλονται. ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι,
γ᾽ 0) ~ a
τούτῳ καὶ τἄλλα, διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ
δὲ A a 3 , ? A ὔ
€ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.
4 a ~ ~
of yap εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ of δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ
πλουτοῦντες" ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν
ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ.
τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν, κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν δ᾽ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος
, φ ᾽ » e Vl 9 “. ~
τιμητέος᾽ ᾧ δ᾽ ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μῶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς.
οἱ δ᾽ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως

Pe ρας ἐανουνακα, -βω ὰ»λρνῶῦδι: ἡπνώστοι ὡπωκολολαρά ἰ στὸν, κωνώιλρυς Ξεύξονεους ξουδὴν ῶρδλ θὲ ——

representative of μεγαλοψυχία, but it | troduces the present form, Eth. x. ix.
does not really answer to it. ‘Mag- | 3, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς
nanimity’ often implies rather gene- καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι. In Pol.
rosity, and what Aristotle calls ἐπιεί- | 1. xiii. 4, he asks if both ruler and
κεια, than that loftiness of spirit which | ruled must equally partake of καλο-
he attributes to the μεγαλόψυχος. | καγαθία. In these passages there is
καλοκἀγαθία] This abstract noun | no special import given to the word.
does not occur in Plato, who fre- : It seems to imply a sort of elevated
quently uses the words καλός τε ' virtue. Stahr translates the present
κἀγαθός (written separately) in the place, “ Es ist unmdglich ein Gross-
common Athenian sense, denoting | gesinnter zu sein, ohne die Totalitit
very much what we mean by ‘a | aller Tugenden.” And St. Hilaire—
gentleman.’ Aristotle uses the words ἢ On ne peut 1 ὀΐγθ sans une vertu
τῶν ἐν βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (Eth. τ. viii. | compltte.” This is, however, taking
9) to denote generally ‘what is noble | καλοκαΎ in the Eudemian sense, on
and exovllent in life.’ He also in- | which see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 25-27.

17

19

76 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [CHap.

ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγον-
21 ται, ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ὑπερ-
omra δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ
γίγνονται, ἄνευ yup ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾷδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ
εὐτυχήματα οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ὅ τι
ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον
οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται" τὰ μὲν
οὖν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι de τῶν
22 ἄλλων, ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει
23 γὰρ ἀληθῶν), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμῶν, μεγα-
λοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύη, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίον ὡς οὐκ
24 ἄξιον ὃν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
δ᾽ αἰσχύνεται" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπερεχο-
μένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων" οὕτω γὰρ προσ-
οφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ
καὶ μνημονεύειν ots ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ᾽ ἂν πάθωσιν
οὔ: ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται
δ᾽ ὑπερέχει. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ᾽ ἀηδῶς" διὸ
καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Au οὐδ᾽ of
Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ.

2

wa

ee - --- <= ὡς

22 ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχο:---τυχόντω:} 1 one; he will serve any readily; he
‘But the great-eouled man despises _ will be proud tothe great, and easy
justly (for his estimate is true), but | with the lowly, &c. On the principle
most people do so at haphazard.’ οὗ independence, which appears here
Throughout, the great man is justified | in an extreme form, see above, note
in the high position he assumes by | on ch, i. 8 16.
reason of the correctness of his esti- | 8 καὶ τὴν θέτι»] Homer, Jitad 1.
mate. Modern ideas of delicacy, to | 503-4. She only says—
say the least, would proscribe this , εἴποτε δή σε μετ᾽ ἀθάνατοισιν ὅνησα
accuracy of self-appreciation, and the | 4 ἔπει 4 ἔργῳ.
claims founded upon it. | οὐδ᾽ of Adxwves] This is said to have

24-26 He is glad to do a benefit ' been on the occasion of a Theban in-
and ashamed to receive one; he will | vasion into Laconia. Aspasius quotes
wipe out a favour by doing a greater ' from Callisthenes a mention of the
one in return; he will remember ' circumstance, Xenophon is thought
those whom he has benefited, but ' to allude to the same event (//ell. VL
not those by whom he has been : Vv. 33), where, however, he makes the
benefited ; he will be in want of no | Spartans enumerate their services.

IIL]

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 77

μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἧ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν 26
δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις

μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον" τῶν μὲν γὰρ

e a ‘ A ’ “-ς 4 er a 9 9 ,
ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις
PS

‘ ’ 9 4 ,» 9 ἐν a a ,
μεν σεμνύνεσθαι OUK AVEVVES, εν GE Τοῖς TATELVOIS φορτικὸν,

φ 9 4 9 ~ 9 fA
ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.

a oF a > ’ ») ᾿ cy 4 Y 4 ry
μὴ eval, ἢ οὐ “πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι" Kat apyov εἰναι Kat

μελλητὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων

Υ͂ a ~
μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.

ἀναγκαῖον δὲ 28

καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον" τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν

φοβουμένου.

καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης,

Α [2 A “ ~ a ‘ 8
και Aeryetv καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς" παρρησιαστῆς yap διὰ

τὸ καταφρονεῖ: ». διὸ καὶ

9 4 , ¥ A 4 4 ’
δι εἰρωνειαν" εἰρῶνα δὲ προς τοὺς πολλούς.

ἀληθευτικός,

A id §
πλὴν ὅσα μὴ

καὶ πρὸς 29

ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πρὸς φίλον' δουλικὸν yap,

a a ’ e , δ Ye ᾿
διὸ καὶ FavTes ot κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ Ol Τατεινοὶ κόλακες.

2Q8 , 4Δλ ‘ , 2A ’ f
οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός᾿ οὐθὲν γὰρ μεγὰα QUTW εστιν.

μνησίκακος.

οὐδ᾽ avOpw- 31

, »ν ‘ ‘ € ~ 9 aA ” Le +
“πολογος" OUTE γάρ περί αὐτου εβέει OUTE Wept €TEpou"

οὔτε yap ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ᾽ ὅπως of ἄλλοι

’ 4 Ὁ) ΟΣ. ’ 9 ’ 40
ψέγωνται, οὐδ QU ETQIVETIKOS ἐστιν" διόπερ οὐδὲ Κακο-»

λόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι ὕβριν.

3 ᾽ “A ~
AVAYKALWY ἢ μικρὼν ἥκιστα

27-34 A list of characteristics fol-
lows, completing the picture of the
great-souled man. He will not
compete for the common objects of
ambition (τὰ riya); he will only
attempt great and important matters,
he will seem otherwise inactive ; he
will be open in friendship and hatred ;
really straightforward and deeply
truthful, but reserved and irvnical in
manner to common peuple. Will live
for his friend alone, will wonder at
nothing, will bear no malice, will be
no gousip (οὐκ avOpwrodcyos), will not
be anxious abvuut trifles, and will care

' than that which is productive.

καὶ περὶ 32
ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός"

nore to possess that which is fine
His
movements are slow, his voice is
deep, and his diction stately.

28 εἴρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς]
Bekker has introduced this reading
on the authority of one MS. alone;
all the rest read εἰρωνεία. Elpwva is

| not strictly grammatical, but it is in

accordance with the Aristotelian mode
of writing ; it comes in despite the
nominative ἀληθευτικός, as a carrying
on of the accusatives before used,
καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι---καὶ ὀλίγων πρακτικόν,
&c.

4 4 Ν 4
καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐντιμα 27

οὐδὲ 30
3 A , A 9 ,
οὐ yap μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν,
ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορῶν.

78 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IY.

33 σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα.

[Cuap.

4 ?
καὶ Glos

σι ~ a a a ΕΣ ~ id a
κεκτῆσθαι μάλλον Ta καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων Kat

34 ὠφελίμων" αὐτάρκους γὰρ μάλλον.

καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα

τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις

’ 9 ‘ A ε 4 ἣ- ἢ 4
στασιμος" ου γὰρ σπευστικος O περι ολιγα σπουδάζων,

2 QA , e ‘ , 4 ἘΣ > 9 ’ ‘
οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηθὲν μεγα οἰομενος" ἢ ὃ ὀξυφωνιία και

e A ‘ a,
ἡ ταχντῆς διὰ τούτων.

~ ‘ oe , .
τοιοῦτος μὲν οὗν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ

δ᾽ ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ 0 ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος.

4 4
oU κακοὶ

4 ᾿ a 2 9 4 9 ‘ ae
μεν ουν δοκοῦσιν €L Vat ovo οὕτοι" OU γὰρ κΚακοτΟιοι Εἰσὶν

ἡμαρτημένοι δέ,

ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὧν ἀγαθῶν

e , 9 ~ p My ἢ ᾽ \ oo» ‘ ” 9
E€QUTOV aT OC TE PEL ων ἀξιός ΕΟΤί. Καὶ EOMKE KQAKOY ἔχειν Tt €K

- 1 9 ~ e ‘ A 4 ΝΕ . 9 * . Ἔ Pg
τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, Kat ἀγνοεῖν δ᾽ ἑαυτόν

> ἢ Α n a ” > 9 A Ν)
ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἀξιος ἣν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων,

οὐ μὴν

’ “~ ~ 4 ,
ἠλίθιοί ye οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί,

35 οὐ κακοὶ---ἡμαρτημένοι δέ] ‘Now
it is true that these again are not
bad, for they do no harm, but are
only in error.’ Οὐδέ refers to ch. ii
8 22. Vanity and want of spirit are,
like pettiness and vularity, not very
serious vices. Of the latter pair,

speaking of the qualities and not the ᾿
persons possessing them, he said they |

are κακίαι, but not disgraceful.

ὁ μὲν yap— ἀγαθῶν] ‘ For the small-
souled man, though worthy of good
things, deprives himself of his deserts,
and seems to be harmed by not
appreciating his own claims, and by
ignorance of himself; else he would
have ained at the good things he had
a claim to. Such characters, how-
ever, are not to be called foolish, but
it is rather their energy that is de-
ficient. Still this way of thinking
seems to have a bad effect upon the
character: for men’s aims are regu-
lated by their opinions of their
merits,—but these draw back from
noble actions and pursuits, thinking
themselves unworthy; and in the

Baine way they cut themselves off |

from external advantages,’ From

these considerations, and from the
whole tendency of his system, Aris-
totle decides that small-souledness is
worse than vanity (§ 37), and he also
asserts that it is more common.
Want of elevated aims, want of effort,
of will, of individuality, these are
indeed fatal deficiencies as regards
the attainment of what is fine and
noble in character. The conception
of ‘humility’ is of course quite
beside the system of Aristotle, but
we may observe that it does not come
into necessary collision with a con-
demnation of pixpoyuxla. For this
latter implies a want of moral aspira-
tion. Now it is desirable to combine
with humility the greatest amount of
moral aspiration.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον dxynpol] Another
reading, supported by several MSS.,
is voepol, which the Scholiast explains
by δριμεῖς καὶ ἐπινοητικοί, The Para-
phrast, however, gives νωθροί, which
supports the present reading. Noepol
makes good sense, since it is true that
want of spirit often accompanies an
intellectual turn of mind, men’s
‘native hue of resolution’ being

ITI.—IV.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. 79

e wv 4 [4 ΄“- 4 ? a Ψ ,Ὶ
ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν. ἕκαστοι γὰρ
4.» a > yr 4 ἢ 4 ‘ A ᾿
ἐφίενται τῶν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων
τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαντοὺς 36
ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπιφανῶς" ὡς γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες
τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται" καὶ ἐσθῆτι
κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται
τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὑτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ
αὑτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ 37
p 4 “ ~ td A
μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μάλλον τῆς χαυνότητος" καὶ
γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγα- 538
λοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
w# 4 4 a , 9 ’ὔ g 9 -
Eoue δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ev τοῖς 4
7 , a , Ἅ , ¥ 4 4
πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν
9 a φ A e id A A
μέγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγα-
λοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι,
περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ,
° » 9 ἢ ‘ ’ ’ 4 " ᾿
ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ 2
ε ’ Ὧ ν e 4 ? ~ > ἢ A
ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει TO
μᾶλλον ἣ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, τόν τε 3
γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἣ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
~ ~ 9 td 4 9 ’ ς 4 ἃ) x’, 4 a
τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τὸν Te ἀφιλότιμον ws οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς

“ “ A
καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἡ

‘sicklicd o’er with the pale cast of
thought.’ ‘Yet, on the other hand, it
is possible that voepol has come to sup-
plant ὀκνηροί from a mistake arising
from a fancied antithesis to ἠλίθιοι.

IV. Descending now from what
is extraordinary to the common level,
Aristotle discusses another virtue
which bears the same relation to
great-souledness as liberality does to
magnificence, namely, the virtue of a
laudable ambition. This is concerned
with the desire for honour as it exists
in ordinary men. There is no name
for this virtue, but language testifies
to the existence of extremes, hence

we may infera mean. There are two
words, ambitious and unambitious ;
both these are made terms of reproach,
thus implying that there must be a
middle quality, in relation to which
they are each extremes. Again, both
are used as terms of praise, which
shows that each in turn lays claim to
the mean place, as setting itself off
against its opposite.

I καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι] Cf. Eth,
Ι:. vii. 8. This expression might
seem to suggest that the present
passage was written after an interval ;
it is repeated in § 4.

4 ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε--- μέσον] ‘But some-
times we praise the ambitious man as

80 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [ Crap.

“΄-- 4
ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς
μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν.
ὡς . ow - “ ’ ’ "
δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ
A 4 A 9 A N ~
ἐπὶ TO αὐτὸ ἀεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαινοῦντες
4 A ~ -
μὲν ἐπὶ TO μᾶλλον ἣ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ TO μᾶλλον

ἢ δεῖ, ἀνωνύμου
ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ
ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ
ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον,

wv 9
UK pa - 1}

Lore

μέσον.

δ᾽ ¥ “A , ς 2» ΠῚ
οὔσης τῆς μεσοτῆτος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν

οἷς δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ

4 ἢ 4 ~ 4 ~
ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον
9 9 [τ a e “. 9 a ~
ἔστι δ' ὅτε Kal ὡς δεῖ" ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν
τῷ Καὶ “ , a ‘ 4 > »

ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης OTA περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος.

φαίνετ αἰ

δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερα πως.

¥ A ~ >
6 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι Kal περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

4 a
QVTIKEl-

σθαι δ᾽ ἐνταῦθ᾽ of ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι

4ΑἉἊ
τὸν μέσον.

5 Llpacrns δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ἀνωνύμου δ᾽
ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον

manly and noble-spirited, and some-
times we praise the unambitious man
as moderate and sober-minded, as
mentioned in our first remarks. Now
it is plain that as the term “lover of
anything” is used in more senses than
one, we do not always apply the term
“lover of honour” to express the same
thing, but when we praise, we praise
that ambition which is more than
most men’s, and when we blame, we
blame that which is greater than it
should be. The mean state having
no name, the extremes contend, as it
were, for this unoccupied ground ;
but still it exists : for where there is
excess and defect there must also be
ὃ mean.’

6 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ περὶ ras
ἄλλας ἀρετάς] Cf. Eth. τι. viii. 1-2.

V. The regulation of the temper
(μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς) is the next
subject for discussion. Aristotle con-

though this term is also used to ex-
J

' fesses that there is no name for this,
| but he provisionally calls it mildness,

press a deficiency in the feeling of
anger. Excess in this feeling has
various forms, and accordingly various
names ; the passionate (ὀργίλοι), the
hasty (dxpdxoXor), the sulky (πικροί), the
morose (χαλεποί), all come under the
same category as showing excessive
or ill-directed anger. Aristotle does
not here enter upon the philosophy of
anger, inquire its final cause, and in
accordance with this determine its
right manifestation. He says it is
human to avenge oneself (§ 12), and
not to resent certain things is slavish
(§ 6) and a moral defect, hence
we must have ἃ certain amount of
anger. This amount must be duly
regulated, but where the true mean is
cannot be laid down in the abstract
(od ῥᾷδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι) : it
depends on the particular circam-

1V.—V.]

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 81

τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν,

4 o 4
ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν.

ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ᾽ ἄν. 2

A 4 A ’ 4 4 4 ’ Y > 9 a Q 4
ΤῸ μὲν γαρ “παθος ἐστὶν opyn, Ta δ᾽ ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ

διαφέροντα.

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, 3

” 4 Ve a“ .a , Ψ , ’ a -
ΕΤῚ δὲ Καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ OTE Καὶ OGWOYV χβονον, ETWQLVELT AL *° Wpaos

3: * ” Ν ς ’ φ a
ἢ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ 4 “πραοτῆς επαινεῖται,

βούλεται

4 e ζω 4 ’ Α 4 ἢ e 4 ΄-
γὰρ ὃ πρᾶος arapaxos εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ

, ° > ¢ Ἂ e , ’ “ ΕΝ ,
πάθους, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος Taky, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις

καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαί νειν.
4 ~
ov yap τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος,

μῶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν.
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός.

τίς ἐστιν εἴθ᾽ ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται.

e a A a
ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ 4

ἡ δ᾽ ἔλλειψις, εἴτ᾽ ἀοργησία 5
οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζό-

μενοι ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ of μὴ ὡς δεῖ
μηδ᾽ ὅτε μηδ᾽ οἷς δεῖ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ 6

“Ψ 4 9 ld ? 9 9 ld
λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός.

προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι

---- ee

stances, and must be left to the in-
tuitive judgment of the mind (ἐν τῇ
αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσι53).

3-6 βούλεται γὰρ --- ἀνδραποδῶδες]
‘For the term “mild man” means
one that should be dispassionate and
not carried away by his feeling, but
should be angry in the way, at the
things, and for so long a time, as the
mental standard may have appointed.
Yet this character seems rather to
incline to error on the side of de-
ficiency, for the mild man is more apt
to pardon than to resent. But the
deficiency is a moral fault (ψέγεται),
whether it be called perhaps (τις)
want of anger, or whatever else,
For men seem fools who do not feel
anger at things at which they ought
to feel it, or in the manner they ought,
or at the time they ought, or with the
persons they ought. Such a man
seems to be devoid of feeling and of
the sense of pain, and since nothing
provokes him, he seems not to know
how to defend himself: but to suffer

VOL. II.

4 A
τὸ δὲ
Ἁ Α 4 ld =
Kat τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν

insult or to stand by and see one’s
friends insulted is servile,’

βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶο:] βούλεται ap-
pears to be used here in a doubtful
sense, something between ‘the word
mild means, &c., and ‘the mild
man has a tendency to,’ &c.; cf. ch.
1. § 5, note.

τὸ δὲ rporndaxi{éuerov] Had the
Ethics been composed on a psycho-
logical plan, what is said here might
have been arranged under the head of
θυμός, and would have been connected
with the relation of θυμός to courage,
which is discussed above, Eth. ΠῚ.
viii. 10-12. The present passage is
admirably illustrated by Shakespeare's
Hamlet, Act IL Scene 2:

‘Am I a coward ἢ
Who calls me villain? breaks my
pate acroes ἢ
Plucks off my beard and blows it in
“my face?
Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the
lie i’ the throat
L

82 HOIKQN NIKOMAXETQON IY. [ Cuap.

7 ἀνδραποδῶδες.

e 9 e 4 “ a 4 ’
ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται"

καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἣ δεῖ,

Q ~ 4 ὔ td 9 4 Γ s en
kat θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον" οὐ μὴν ἅπαντα ye τῷ

4 ~ ς ἤ 3 Α ΓῚ
αυτῷ UTAPXEt. ou γάρ αν

δύ 4 4 a ἢ ‘
vvaiT εἰναι" ΤῸ γαρ κακον

καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ἣ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.
ὃ οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέων"
a ‘ ὔ ,“ ’ 3 4 “- ~ w
ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι
4 i 4 9 a 9 3 9 e a e
οὐ κατέχουσι Thy ὀργὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἧ φανεροί

9 4 ὔ Φ
9 εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ

ἀἁποπαύονται. ὑπερβολῃ δ᾽

9 4 e 4 ’ 4 a a \ ~ 9 , 4 9 4
εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς Kal πρὸς πᾶν οργίλοι καὶ EF

[ of 4 »”
10 παντί" ὃθεν καὶ τοὔνομα.

οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλντοι, καὶ

--θ-.. .-... -. ae ee

As deep as to the lungs? Who does
me this ?

Ha! why I should take it: for it
cannot be

But I am pigeon-liver’d, and lack
gall .

To make oppression bitter.’

7 ἡ 8 ὑπερβολὴ---γίνεται) ‘Now
the excess is possible under all heads,
the wrong people, the wrong things,
more, quicker, longer, than is right.
However, these excesses cannot all
coexist in the same man. This would
be impossible, For evil destroys even
itself, and if it exist in its entirety,
it becomes unbearable.’ Psychologi-
cal reasons might be assigned why
the same person cannot be passionate,
peevish, and sulky. But Aristotle
here gives an abstract generalisation
—that the different forms of evil are
mutually destructive, and that it is
only by tempering evil with a certain
admixture of good that its existence
can be borne.

8 συμβαίνει 5’—droratovra] ‘This
happens because they do not keep in
their anger, but through their keen-
ness make reprisals in an open way,
and then they are done.’ The words

ἢ φανεροί εἶσι can have nothing to do
with the principle given in the Rhe-
toric, 11. ii, 1, that anger desires to
make itself manifestly felt, else we
must have had 7 φανεροὶ dy εἴησαν.
The Paraphrast simply renders οὐ
κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργήν, οὐδὲ κρύπτουσιν,
ἀλλὰ ἐξάγονται καὶ ἀμύνονται εὐθύς.

9 οἱ ἀκρόχολοι) ‘The hasty.” The
older form of this word is ἀκράχολοι.
The etymology appears to be ἄκρος
and χολή, as if ‘on the point’ or
‘extreme verge of anger.’ On the
same analogy we find the word
ἀκροσφαλής, ‘on the verge of being
overturned,’ ‘ ricketty,’ cf. Plato,
Repub. p. 404 B. Plato speaks of
passionate and peevish people as
having become so through the ener-
vating of an originally noble and
spirited temperament. Cf. Repeud.
Ρ. 411 B-413: ἐὰν δὲ θυμοειδῆ (ἐξ
ἀρχῆς λάβῃ), ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν
ὀξύρροπον ἀπειργάσατο, ἀπὸ σμεκρῶν
ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενόν τε καὶ κατασβεννύ-
μενον. ἀκρόχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀντὲ
θυμοειδοῦς γεγένηνται, δυσκολίας ἔμι-
πλεοι. κιτλ.

10 οἱ δὲ πικροὶ---φἴλοι] ‘But the
sulky are hard to bring round, and
are angry a long time, for they keep

V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 83

πολὺν Χρόνον ὀργίζονται" κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν.
παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷς" ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία
παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα'
oe 4 a a A ὔ Γ2 4
τούτου de μὴ γινομένυ τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν᾽ διὰ
4 a 4 φ 4 9Qt ἢ 4 4 9 ὔ
yap τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς,
3 Coa ἊΝ ? 4 4 4 ’ Ξ 94 ’
ἐν αὑτῷ de πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου dei, εἰσὶ ὃ
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα
φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ᾽ οἷς τε μὴ
δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον,
a a ἢ ” ἢ a ’ a
Kat μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολασεως. τῇ
πραότητι δὲ μάλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν" καὶ
γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται" ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι.
καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν
τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον" οὐ
γὰρ padiov διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ
πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ
τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνε. oO μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ
ψέγεται, οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον. ἐνίοτε
γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ
a , ° , e 4 WwW e 4
τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ
πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾳδιον τῷ λόγῳ
4 ὃ “- Ξ 4 a a 4 4 ζω 4 , e
ἀποδοῦναι" ἐν yap τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ
g 4 . ζω G4 e 4 0
κρίσις, adAa τὸ γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση
ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ed’ οἷς δεῖ
4 ¢ ~ 4 td a ~ e e 4 A
Kat ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα Ta τοιαῦτα, ai δ᾽ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλ-
a U 4 4 Α N 4 ὔ 4 ᾽ x Α
λείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἦρεμα, ἐπὶ
πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ a a δῆλον οὖν ὅτι

in their wrath. Now there is a | their best friends.” An admirable
natural termination, when one has | account of sulkiness, on which nothing
wreaked one’s resentment, since re- | more need be said.

venge stops anger by substituting a 13 ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται)
feeling of pleasure for that of pain. | This refers to Eth. 11. ix. 7-9, which
But if this does not take place, these | passage is with some amplification
people continue to feel their burden. | almost exactly repeated here. This
Their feeling is not manifest, and so | part of the Ethics is written with a
no one reasons them out of it, while | constant reference to Book II., and
to digest it internally requires time. | yet as if the subject had been taken
‘Therefore such persons areexceedingly | up again to be worked out after an
vexatious beth to themselves and to | interval.

4

84 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [Crar.

15 τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον: αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν
ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

6 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ Nave καὶ πραγ-
μάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πᾶντα
πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, Pye

2 οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι" οἱ 0 ἐξ
ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν
οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ppovriCovres δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦν-

3 ται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις pecrai εἰσιν, οὐκ
ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀποδέξεται

4 ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ᾽ οὐκ
ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ" τοιοῦτος

γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν

5 ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ
τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς
ὁμιλεῖ. οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν 7 ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα
ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας
καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει,
πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει

rr ee

VI. The next subject is the regu-
lation of one’s deportment in society,
with regard especially to complacency
or the reverse. This also is a balance
between extremes, avoiding on the
one side surliness (τὸ δύσκολον»), and
on the other side the conduct both of
the weak assentor (dpecxos), and of
the interested flatterer (κόλαξ The
balance has no name, it is most like
friendship, but differs from it in being
devoid of affection, and being ex-
tended to all in proper degrees.
There is a slight departure here from
Book ITI. vii. 11-13, and it may be
said that the present treatment is an
improvement. Before (i.c.) it was
said, there are three virtues connected
with speech and action in society: the
first is about what is true, the others
about what is pleasant. But here the
quality which concerns the deport-

ment and whole spirit of a man in
society is rightly treated as most
generic, and placed first. In Book 11.
the name φιλία is unreservedly given
to the quality in question, but here no
name is assigned, and only a resem-
blance to friendship is pointed out.

5 οὐ γὰρ duolws—duweiy] ‘For it is
not fitting that we should pay the
same regard to strangers as to
familiars, nor again have we an
equal title to put them to pain.’
This latter clause is explained in
§§ 7-9, where it is laid down that
though the general object will be to
give pleasure, yet that a man must
bring himself to give pain on occa-
sion, with a view to important moral
consequences in the future. He
would, of course, feel himself more
bound to exercise this duty with
regard to friends. Φροντίζειν is a

V.—VI.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 85

συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου 6
- Φ ” @ e -~ ε ’ 9 , ; a 4
μεν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ
καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν jj
συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι 7
τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ
ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ
προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. Kav τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην
‘4 a e 4 e A ὔ 8 φ 9 ἤ
φέρη, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικραν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ᾽ ἐναντίωσις
μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφε- 8
ρόντως δ᾽ ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ
A τ , e ? 4 A q ‘
μάλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν
e a 4 ὃ ᾽ὔ - δ᾽ 4 ’ a δ᾽
αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηόυνειν, λυπεῖν εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς
4 td 9N » ᾽ a, 4 A ζω
ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἣ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ
καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς 0 ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις
μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, 9
4 9 [2 4 “a A r 4 4 ~ ed
οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ, τοῦ de συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν TOU ἡδὺς εἶναι
στοχαζόμενος μὴ dt ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ᾽ ὅπως ὠφέλειά
τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,
Kodak’ ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ

general expression, implying equally | show his repugnance,’ (1) It may be
care to please, and care for the wel- | derogatory to oneself to show compla-
fare of the persons in question. cency. (2) It may be hurtful to some
6-7 καθόλου --- dvoxepavet] ‘We | member of the company. These cau-
have said generally that (the good | tions show the moral and thoughtful
man) will associate with people as he , spirit by which Aristotle would have
ought, bunt we may add (δὲ) that, with | conduct in society regulated. The fol-
a constant reference to what is beauti- | lowing section prescribes the bearing
ful and what is expedient, he will aim | of a finished gentleman, giving to all
at not giving pain, or at contributing | their due. It must not be forgotten
pleasure. The province of his virtue | that Aristotle himself had played the
lies among the pleasures and pains | part, not only of a philosopher, but
that arise out of social intercourse, and | also of a courtier.
wherever in giving pleasure he would 9 dvexodos] Eudemus uses the
dishonour or injure himself, he will | word αὐθάδης to denote this character
make a difficulty, and rather choose | (Sth. Fud. 11. vii. 4), in whieh he is
to give pain than such gratification. | followed by Theophrastus (Characters,
And if there be something which will | co 15) and the author of the Magna
bring, to any considerable degree, dis- | Moralia (1. xxix.) Eudemus makes
grace or harm on the doer, while oppo- | the mean state σεμνότης, which is a
sition will give him alight pain, (the | departure from the present treat-
good man) will not approve it, but will | ment.

7

Ww WN

86 HOIKON NIKOMAXKEION IV. [Cuap.

a 3“ φ a a 4
δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαντοῖς διὰ τὸ
ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

΄“- 4 [
Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας
~ 4 a a
μεσότης" ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον de καὶ Tas

- 4 ἤ 4 a

τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν’ μᾶλλόν Te yap ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περι
a ’ 4 4
τὸ ἦθος, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς
“ἢ a
ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες.
4 δ) “~ ~ e A 4 e ὃ a 4 λ ἢ ε r ~
ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν of μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες
“A a ’
εἴρηνται, περὶ de τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων
4 ~ ᾽
εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πραξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιῆ-
a 4 e A 9 4 a ~ 9 ὃ ’
ματι. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐν ὄξων
φ | e 4
εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ
Ν 2 7 9 Δ , oe oF a ἢ me
εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,
4 a “~ ἤ A
ὁ de μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὧν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ

VII. There follows another name- | that the man who is truthful in little
less excellence closely connected with | things will also be truthful in more
the former, having still to do with | important affairs.
demeanour in society; this, by a 3 εἴρων] This is an excessively
curious formula, is termed the regu- | difficult word to express in English.
lation of boastfulness (ἡ τῆς ἀλαΐζο- | ‘Ironical’ has acquired an association
γνείας μεσότης). The boastful man lays | of bitterness and taunting,—‘ Dissem-
claim to honourable qualities which | bler’ of craft. If we render it by
he does not possess, or to a greater | ‘over-modest’ we trench upon the
degree than he possesses them (δοκεῖ qualities of the μικρόψυχος, and imply
προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι x.7.X.), , too much that is connected with the
while the ironical man denies or | whole character. Εἰρωνεία as here
understates his own merits. The | spoken of is simply an affair of the
balance between these two is found {| manner; there appear to be two
in the straightforward character | forms of it, one that refined species
(αὐθέκαστός ris), who in word and | exhibited by Socrates, the other an
deed neither diminishes nor exagge- | affectation of humility which is really
rates his own good qualities. In | contemptible. There is perhaps no
Eth, 11. vii. 12, the provisional name | one English word to express these
ἀλήθεια was given to this virtue, but two forms, the only resource appears
here Aristotle pointe out that it is to | to be to use the word ‘Ironical’ in
be distinguished from ‘truth,’ in the | 8 restricted sense. Εἴρων in Theo-
more serious sense of the word,—that | phrastus (Char. I.) is used in a
‘truth’ which makes the difference | worse sense than in Aristotle, to
between justice and injustice. What | denote one who dissembles for selfish
he is at present concerned with is | motives, and whose whole life is arti-
merely a truthfulness of manner, | ficial and deceitful.
though he confesses (§ 8) that this 4 αὐθέκαστος] probably from αὐτὸ
has a moral worth (éceixyjs), and ἕκαστον, ‘everything exactly as it is,”

VIL—VILI.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 87

ry ᾽ a ς ’ e ~ > A e ld a
τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὕπαρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, Kat
» ἢ “rv , Ww δὲ ὔ @ , @&W ‘
οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι de τούτων ἕκαστα Kal ἕνεκά 5

a a ,
Tivos ποιεῖν καὶ μηθενός.
4 a o A @ An 9A ἕ Ψ [
λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ: ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πραττη.

4 e 4 4 A a ~ 4 a 4 4
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον και ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ 6
9 4 4 4 3 ’
ἄληθες καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν.

@ δ᾽ ad 4 n~
ἐκαστος οἷος ἐστι, τοιαῦτα

[4 a \ e 4 9

οὕτω δὲ Kal ὁ μὲν ἀληθευ-

τικὸς μέσος ὧν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν

ψεκτοί, μάλλον δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζών.
? 4 4 σι 9 a

πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ.
΄΄Ὦὦ» e e 9 ὔ ὔ Q> ὦ 9 4 ὔ

ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ᾽ ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν

a e a 9 wv
περὶ ἑκατέρου δ᾽ εἴπωμεν,
οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν 7

A , [4 Α A @ a 9% 9 “A
ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ᾽ ἀρετῆς),
, 2 9 ΓῚ 4 ’ ? 1 9 , 4
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς μηθενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ
ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ᾽
dv ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν
οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει
ἔτι μᾶλλον. ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ Ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται,
φ a ? e 4 a ὸ e δὲ ζω 9 4
& ye καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο" 6 δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός.
ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει " 9

co

and hence a ‘matter-of-fact’
‘ straightforward’ man.

5-6 ἔστι δὲ---ἀλαζών] ‘Now it is ᾿

possible to practise both irony and

boastfulness either with or without a |

particular motive. But in general a
man speaks, acts, and lives, in accord-
ance with his character, unless he
have a particular motive. Falsehood
is in itself base and reprehensible, and

truth is noble and praiseworthy. And .
thus the truthful man, who occupies |

or

the mean, is praiseworthy, while those |

who strive to give a false impression
of themselves are both reprehensible,
and especially the boaster.’ Aristotle
first appears to assert that both irony
and boastfulness are prompted gene-
rally by a particular motive, for, if it
were not so, men would be simple and
natural, Afterwards we are told that
boastfulness is a condition of the will
(ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει), that it aims at either
gain or reputation,—that irony may

--- — — —

spring from a motive of refinement,
or again from vanity itself. These
things however may aim at reputation
and yet be instinctive, the desire for
reputation forming part of men’s
natural impulses.

8 δόξειε δ᾽ Av—éwawerds] ‘ But
this character appears to possess a
moral excellence, For the lover of
truth, who adheres to what is true
even in things where it does not
matter, will be still more truthful in
affairs of importance, for he will
surely avoid a lie when it appears as
something base, when he avoided it
before merely for its own sake.’ The
writing here is a little careless, since
above, all lies were declared to be
essentially base, but here a contrast
seems to be drawn between the
‘ white lie’ in society, and the base lie
in affairs of importance. Aristotle
probably intended in his account of
Justice (§ 7) to treat more profoundly

88 HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEION IV. [Cuap.

9 ’ Ἁ . ἤ ‘ . 9 “ ‘ e
ἐμμελέστερον yap φαίνεται dia τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερ-

‘ 4 e Qs ’ a oe ’ ,
10 βολὰς εἶναι. ὁ de μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
8 rd 4 4 4 4 Ψ) “a
μηθενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (ov yap dv ἔχαιρε τῷ
ι1 ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός. εἰ δ᾽ ἕνεκά
τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, ὼς ὁ ἀλαζών,
126 δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. οὐκ

9 δι ᾿ > oo ON ¢ 9 ’ 9 » 9 κι ,ὕ
ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει"

A 4 Ψ ‘ 4 “A ’ 4 9 , ’
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν yap καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν,
“ 4 ? e 4 A , , κα ’ ς ‘
ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ Ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὃ δὲ
13 δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν
ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔπαινος
A 9 ᾽ ς δὲ ’ δ n A 9 or ὔ 9 “-
ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς
πέλας καὶ ἃ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἣ
ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα
. 9 , rd ‘ 3 ? a ‘ 4. , e
14 καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται" ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ
δ᾽ εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη
, 9 “ ὔ 4 ~ ὔ 4 x
φαίνονται" οὐ yap Pie cere ee ery ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, αλλα

of Truth in its relation to the moral
character. This intention, however,
was never fulfilled.

tw&s ὁ ἀλαζών] This makes no sense.
The Paraphrast omits ws altogether,
rendering the passage, εἰ δέ τιρὸς
10-12 ὁ δὲ pelfw—xépsovs] ‘But the | ἕνεκα προσποιεῖται, el μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς
man who pretends to better qualities | οὐ λίαν ψεκτὸς ὁ ἀλαζών. To follow his
than he really possesses, if he has no | example seems the simplest remedy.
motive, shows like a mean man, for | One of the MSS. omits ὁ, which would
else he would not have delighted in | give the sense ‘he is not very blame-
the falsehood, though he seems foolish | able considering that he is a boaster."
rather than bad. Supposing there 12 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει---ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ
is a motive, if it be reputation or προαιρέσει) Cf. the well-known pas-
honour, the boaster is not to be | sage Rhel. 1. i. 14, where the Sophist
severely blamed, but if it be money, | is said to be distinguished from the
directly or indirectly, his conduct is | Dialectician not intellectually but
more discreditable. The boaster is | morally, ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ
not constituted by a given faculty, | δυνάμει ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.
but by a particular condition of the 13 This is a very happy observation,
will; for it is in accordance with his | that desire for reputation makes men
moral state, and by reason of his | pretend to virtue, power, and the like;
character, that he is a boaster, just as | but desire for gain makesthem pretend
either from taking pleasure in false- | to useful arts the possession of which
hood itself, or from aiming at reputa- , cannot be tested; thus a man will
tion or. gain (in short, from the state | give himself out to be a clever sooth-
of his will and moral character)—a | sayer or doctor,
man is called a liar. 14-15 οἱ δ᾽ elpwres — ἀλαζονικὸν»}

VIL—VIII.]

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. 89

, 4 494 ’ ’ 4 4 a . Ψ
φεύγοντες TO ὀγκηρόν. μάλιστα de Kat οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα
ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει, οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ τς

μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιούμενοι
λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοί εἶσιν.

βανκοπανοῦργοι
4 4 ἢ 4
καί. ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία

φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής" καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ

καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν.

οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τό

~A 9 a 4 a Ἀν 4 [ 4 4 4 s 3
Τῇ Elpwvea καὶ περί τὰ μή λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρω-

νευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζὼν 17

’ nA 9 rn ͵ ’
φαινεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ" χείρων yap.

» 4 4 4 ὔ 9 “a , 4 4 [2
Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν TauTn 8

‘ Ironical persons, in depreciating | ἔνδοξα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἀπαρνεῖται,

themselves, exhibit, it is true ἃ certain
refinement of character, for they do
not appear to speak in that way for
the sake of gain, but to avoid pom-
posity ; but it must be confessed that
these too especially disclaim qualities
held in repute, as Socrates used to do.
But they who make a pretence about
things petty and obvious are called
‘‘humbugs,” and are despised by every
one, Sometimes this kind of conduct
appears to be really pretension, as in
the case of the Laconian dress ; for
both the excess and the extreme of
deficiency are of the nature of boast-
ing.’ .

There appears to be a slight anti-
thesis between χαριέστεροι péev—and
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι, as if the dis-
claiming of honourable qualities were
not so much to the credit of the Ironi-
cal. καὶ οὗτοι seems to imply a refer-
ence to the great-souled man, who was
described as having tendencies of the
same kind, 1, ii. § 27-28.

οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης) On the Irony of
Socrates, see Vol. I. Essay IT. p. 157.

15 mwposrototjuevn}] It is impos-
sible to understand this in the sense
of ‘disclaiming’ which the context
requires. The Paraphrast supplies μὴ
δύνασθαι, and explains it very clearly,
as follows, 8s δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ μεγάλα καὶ

VOL. II.

καὶ ἃ δῆλός ἐστι δυνάμενος ταῦτα
προςποιεῖται μὴ δύναςθαι. But τροσ-
ποιούμενος can never have been con-
sciously meant to stand for this.
There must have been some slip
about the writing. Two of the MSS.
read μὴ προσποιούμενοι This sort of
variation in MSS. does not show what
was the original reading, but only that
the transcribers felt a difficulty.

VIII. 1 Οὔσης δὲ----τοιούτων ἀκούειν)
‘Rest also being a part of human life,
and an element of this being playful
diversion, we find here likewise the
sphere for a certain harmonious man-
ner of intercourse, and the possibility
of both speaking and hearing the
right sort of things in the right way ;
though there will be a difference as
to whether one is the speaker in such
matters or listens to what is said.’

Aristotle considers the virtue of wit
or tact (εἴτ᾽ ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ᾽ εὐτράπελος
λέγεται) to be concerned with the
amusing and sportive element in
society, and to be a balance between
buffoonishness that sacrifices all pro-
priety to the ludicrous, and dulness
that is incapable of either making or
appreciating a joke. Aristotle does
not here enter into the philosophy of
the ludicrous, or inquire what is a

M

90 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IY. [ CHap.

διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις
9 4 ~ a ‘4 Ψ e ¢ 4 4 9 ὔ
ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν.
4
διοίσει δὲ Kat TO ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἣ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
2 δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις
“~ ’ e 4 ~ , 4 [2
3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμο-
n~ , ~
λόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ
γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἣ
~ - 4
τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον" οἱ
Α a a
de μήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηθὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι
δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ᾽
A [4
ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔς-
τροποι" τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι,
ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ
, »y 9 U 4 “~ , ‘N ~ ,
4 τὰ ἤθη. ἐπιπολαάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καί τῶν πλείστων
Ἵ ἢ διᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώ ἄλλον ἣ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ
χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μῶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ
ἤ
βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες. ὅτι

~

5 δὲ διαφέρουσι, kat οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. TH
μέση δ᾽ ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν" τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπι-

joke and why it pleases. Nor does | vile creatures who lay in wait at the
he lay down any canons for the regu- | altars to purloin the offerings, and
lation of wit, except such general ones | hence to have been applied to those
as that ‘nothing should be said which | who thought nothing too low forthem,
is unworthy of a gentleman’ (πότερον | buffoons who would descend to any-
οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ | thing.
λέγειν ἃ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ ;), that the οἱ δ᾽ ἐμμελῶς---τὰ ἤδη] ‘But they
hearer must not be shocked, &c. On | whose jocularity is in good taste are
the whole he leaves it indefinite, say- | called witty, by a name that implies
ing that tastes differ, and the educated | their happy turns; for such motions
man will be a law to himself. His | of wit seem to belong to the moral
account of wit then is negative, and | character, and characters, like bodies,
abstract, though perfectly just as far | are judged by their movements.’
as it goes, Aristotle here calls attention to the
I διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς] διαγωγὴ | etymology of εὐτράπελος, as he did
is the passing of time, hence ‘diver- | before to that of ἄσωτος, Ch. i.
sion.’ Cf. Metaphys. 1.1.15: πλειόνων | § 5.
δ᾽ εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν 4 ἐπιπολάζοντο: ---- xaplevres] “ But
πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν | as the ludicrous meets us at every
οὐσῶν. Eth. x. vi. 3: καταφεύγουσι δ᾽ | turn (ἐπιπολάζοντος, cf. Eth, τ. iv. 4),
ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαι- | and most people take pleasure in sport
μονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί. and jesting more than they ought,
3 βωμολόχοι This name seems { even buffoons get the name of witty,
originally to have belonged to the | just as though they were fine wits.’

VIII] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV. 91

’ δ a aA ’ 1 9 , ΓῚ a 9 ᾿Ξ Ἢ
δεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ
g 4 ld 4“ [2 ὔ -~ ὔ
ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει" ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ
4 4 ~ a a
λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει Kat ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου
παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὖ τοῦ πεπαι-
ὃ 0 4 9 g wv 3 ww ‘ b ~
εὐμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ᾽ av τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν 6
a ~ ar “~ A ~ ~ 7 « A 4 4
κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν" τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἣν
γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μάλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια" δια-
[ o~
φέρει δ᾽ οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον 7
a 4 α ;
οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἃ πρέπει ἐλευ-
g A ~ a
θερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν ; 1 Kat
, a wa . MY: . oo» , ,
TO γε τοιοντον ἀόριστον ; ἄλλο yup ἄλλῳ μισητὸν τε Kat
ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται. ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, 8
ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει’ τὸ yap9
~ ? ἤ , 9 e A [2 M@ “~
σκῶμμα λοιδόρημα Ti ἐστιν, οἱ de νομοθέται Evia λοιδορεῖν
4 9 ε 4 ἤ a
ἔδει ὃ ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ
Ξλευθέ ἢ “ ? , noe a a ‘
ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὧν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν
> e ᾽ 9 , #9 3 , Ww 4 9 , ,
οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ᾽ ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ᾽ εὐτράπελος λέγεται"
ε ἢ ’ ἐξ > 4 a ’ . oo» ἢ κι
ὁ de βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαντοῦ

, ” ‘ ,
κωλνυουσιν" (OWS καὶ CKWTTTELV.

6 ἴδοι 3 ἃν--- εὐσχημοσύνην] ‘This
we may see from a comparison of the
old and the new comedy. In the
former it is coarse language that pro-
vokes laughter, in the latter it is
rather inuendo; which makes no small
difference with respect to decorum.’
This interesting remark is in accord-
ance with what we know from other
sources of the comparative tameness
of the new comedy in relation to the
license of the old. Cf. Horace, A. P.
281 sqq.

9 οὐ δὴ wav—oxwrrew] ‘There-
fore he will not give utterance to
every jest, for the jest is a sort of
reviling, and the lawgivers forbid
certain kinds of reviling—they ought
perhaps to have forbidden (certain)
jests.’ “Ἔνια must be understood as
carried on from λοιδορεῖν to σκώπτειν.
Aristotle could never have wished
that jesting altogether should be for-
bidden by the law.

ὁ δὴ xaples—éaury] ‘This then
will be the attitude of the refined and
liberal man, he being as it were a law
to himself.’ Aristotle usually escapes
from pure indefiniteness and relativity
by asserting that the standard in each
case is to be found in the gcod, the
wise, the refined man. This standard
is evidently the expression of the
universal reason of man. It is not
to be supposed that wit, beauty, or
goodness are mere matters of taste,
as Aristotle would seem for a moment
to imply (ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον ;
ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ).
When he adds afterwards that the
educated man must be the standard
of appeal, he means that the laws of
reason must decide. And _ these
might, had Aristotle thought it worth
his while, have been more drawn out
in reference to the question under
discussion.

10-12 These sections are an almost

92 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IV. [Cuap.

VW ~ MM: 9 ὔ 4 ὔ ἢ 4 ~
οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα
λέγων ὧν οὐθὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἕνια δ' οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀκούσαι.
φ δ᾽ 33 4 ‘ ὔ 4 ὔ 4 “- ns a
ὁ 0 ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος" οὖθεν γὰρ
11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις
12 καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ
9 g 4 ~ , Ld 9 =A 4 ἴω ‘ [4
εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων
σ΄ AY ἤ ἢ ὔ ) 4 e 8
τινῶν Kat πραξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν
Δ. 9" , a 9 e 4 4 Y eas A 4 a “
περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν de περὶ THY
τ 4 € 4 9 a δ a e δ᾽ 9 a N 4 ΧᾺ
ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον
βίον ὁμιλίαις.
9 Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν"

verbal repetition of what was said, | be a kind of fear of evil report; and
Eth, τι. vii. 11-13. They appcar like | in its effects it is analogous to the
an after-thought as compared with | fear of danger, for persons who are
Ath, Iv. vi. 1. ashamed blush, and those who are
We perhaps ought hardly to quit | in terror of death grow pale. Both
the present subject without alluding | affections then appear to be in a
to the remarks which Aristotle has | manner corporeal, which is the mark
elsewhere thrown out on the nature | rather of feelings than of states.’
of wit and of the ludicrous. The most | Aristotle, following out the programme
striking are Rhet. 11. xii. 16, where | given, /th. 11. vii. 14-15, arrives now
he defines wit as ‘chastened inso- | attheplace fordiscussing two instances
lence,’ ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη | of the law of the balance existing in
ὕβρις ἐστίν, and his account of the | the instinctive feelings of the mind (ἐν
ludicrous, that it consists ina thing | τοῖς πάθεσι μεσότητες), namely modesty
being out of place, anomalous, ugly | and indignation. But from some
and faulty, though not in such a way | cause his work is interrupted here ;
as to cause any sense of apprehension | indignation (Νέμεσις) is not treated of
or pain. Poet, ν. 2: Td yap γελοῖόν | at all, and the discussion on modesty
ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον | is left unfinished. There is no men-
καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον | tion of the extremes, shamelessness
πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον | (ἀναισχυντία, and shamefacedness
ἄνευ ὀδύνης. This definition, which is | (xardwAnés), which are specified in
to the highest degree penetrating, has | Book 11. (7. ¢.) and in Eth, Bud. nr.
been made by Coleridge the text for | vii. 2. After stating that only to
his admirable dissertations on wit | certain ages is ‘modesty’ suitable,
und humour. See Literary Remains, | and that only in a certain provisional
Vol. L sense (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) can it be called a
virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a
IX. 1-2 Περὶ δὲ aldots—elvac] | couple of sentences having been added
‘Modesty we can scarcely with pro- | by some later hand which give an
priety describe as a virtue; for it | appearance of finish to the book and
seeins to be rather a feeling than a | awkwardly connect it with the open-
moral state ; at least it is defined to | ing of Book V.

VIII.—IX.] HOIKQON NIKOMAXEION Ivy. 93

ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις

ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παρα- 2

πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἣ ἕξει.

, 9 , a [] 4 ᾽ e 4 ‘
πλήσιον: épvOpaivovrat yap of αἰσχυνόμενοι, of δὲ τὸν
θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί
mos εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως
Φ 4 43 6 s 4 f « 4 8 ~ ?
εἶναι. οὐ παάση δ᾽ ἡλικίᾳ TO πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλα τῇ ven’ 3
7° ‘ a A , Ww > ‘ 4
οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ
ἤ “-Ὄ 4 e ’ e 4 “A 4 σὰ 4 sf
παθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτανειν, υπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύ-
εσθαι. καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας,
’ ? 20 4 a ’ ’ “ 9 ,
πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς dv ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός"
“Δ ‘ , . » A ἢ 4.1} > A
οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐστὶν
αἰσχύνη.
4 ἃ “- 4 bY ὔ A “σ᾿
Ta ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις" οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα.

4 AS 4 9 “~ 4 4 4 4 ὔ »# ὔ
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίγνε- 4
εἰ καὶ
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν,

yay! , 207 ‘ , ? 4 9 ἢ
οὐθὲν διαφέρει" οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχυν-
τέον. φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι 6
τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ᾽ εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν
τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι,
δ 4 A ~ 6 ὔ 4 e 4 ᾽ e 4 4 4 φ
ἄτοπον" ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ ἐπιει-
κὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ 7
εἰ γὰρ mpaka, αἰσχύνοιτ᾽ ἄν.
εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία

¢ 4 9 o 9
υ ποθέσεως ἐπιεικές" οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετας.

4 4 A 9 a ἃ 4 bY a nt
φαῦλον καὶ To μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πραττειν, οὐθεν

~ 4 ~ ’ 9 , 9 ’ 9
μώλλον TO τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. Τ οὐκ 8

3-5 αἰδώς is the apprehension of
shame, joined of course with a capa-
city for strongly feeling it; neither
modesty nor any other English word
seems adequately to convey the force
of αἰδώς. Aristotle speaks of it as a
desirable quality in tender age, before
the character is formed. But in
maturer life the necessity for it, and
therefore its merit, ceases to exist.
It might be said that sensibility to
shame ought to be preserved with
regard to acts that are conventionally
(κατὰ δόξαν) and not really (κατ᾽
ἀλήθειαν») disgraceful; but Aristotle
says that any possibility of feeling

shame must be avoided altogether, so
that the former acts must not be done.

7 ‘Modesty can only be good hy-
pothetically: if a person were to do
so and #0, he would be ashamed. But
this is not the way with the virtues.
Though shamelessness and the having
no sensibility about base acts is bad,
it does not follow that to do such
things and feel shame is good.’ ᾿Εξ
ὑποθέσεως ‘conditionally’ is opposed
to ἁπλῶς ‘absolutely.’ While the
virtues are absolutely good, modesty ἡ
is only conditionally so.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς]
The same formula occurs before, Eth.

94 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV.

[Cuap. IX.

᾿ ἔστι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτη" δειχθή-

a ‘ 49. a 9 a
σεται δὲ περι αυτῆς εν Tol ὕστερον.

ὔ 9ἢ
δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

ee ----- ee ee eae

1. vii. 20 : ἱκανὸν ἕν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι
καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή,
ἀλλά τις μικτή " δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ
αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. Νῦν δὲ περὶ
δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν) Aristotle’s MS.
of the fourth book having ended

~ 4 ‘
νυν δὲ Te pt

abruptly at the word ἐπιεικές, Nico-
machus or the editor, whoever he was,
in all probability added these clauses
in order to give the book a seeming
union with the three Eudemian books
which were now to be grafted on.

PLAN OF BOOK V.

THERTO all has been perfectly coherent and regular in the
Ethics of Aristotle. Down to the ninth Chapter of Book IV.,
though all the parts may not have been composed at the same
time, yet all belong to the same plan, and bear every mark of being
the work of the same author. But the MS. of Book IV. seems
suddenly to have broken off in the middle of ἃ subject. Whether
this was owing to mutilation, or to original incompleteness, there are
now no means of saying. What is clear to us from internal evi-
dence is, that the editor has at this point commenced supplying a
lacuna ; and accordingly three whole books are now introduced,
which, though bearing a close resemblance to the style of Aristotle,
and probably conveying, with only slight modifications, his actual
system, yet belong to the Ethics of Eudemus, Aristotle’s disciple,
and thus have only an imperfect coherence with the present work.
The chief arguments by which it is demonstrated that Books V.,
VL, VIL, are only ‘copies’ from Aristotle by one of his school
have been given, Essay I. pp. 50-71, and need not here be
recapitulated,

The present Eudemian book on Justice may bear the same rela-
tion to Aristotle’s theory of Justice, now lost, as the Eudemian
theory of Pleasure in Book VII. bears to Aristotle’s theory of
Pleasure given in Book X. Or, on the other hand, Aristotle’s
account of Justice may never have been actually written, and may
only have existed as orally imparted to the School; in which case
the present book would claim a slightly more original character, being
built up by Eudemus out of Aristotelian materials, but not on the
lines of any one treatise. The extent to which parts of this book
appear to have been suggested by passages in the Politics of Aris-
totle (see ii. 11, iii, 1-14, v. 6, vi. 4-5, and notes) would rather

96 PLAN OF BOOK V.

favour the latter supposition. But we trace the same endeavour
to slightly improve on the conclusions of the Politics, which Eu-
demus elsewhere so often exhibits to improve upon the Ethics of
Aristotle. We observe here also indications that the Peripatetic
School had been busy in working out the beginnings of political
economy as made by Plato and Aristotle. The theory of money,
value, and price, given in chap. v., is in its way excellent. The
Eudemian books, however, have all a peculiar indistinctness which
taxes the reader’s thought to divine their exact bearing. But on
consideration, the outlines of a method appear to show themselves
through the mist. And accordingly the following parts may per-
haps be discerned in Book V.

(1.) Justice having been defined to be ‘a state of mind that wills
to do what is just,’ the first part of the book is concerned with
determining what is the just? (τὸ δίκαιον as distinguished from d:xar-
οσύνη). The abstract principle of ‘the just’ may either be iden-
tified with all law, and therefore with all morality ; or it may be
restricted to its proper sense, fair dealing with regard to posses-
sions, &c. (τὸ ὅσον. In this restricted sense ‘the just’ finds its
sphere either in distributions of the state, or in correcting the
wrongs done in dealings between man and man. Though justice
is not retaliation pure and simple, yet in all commerce, &c., there
is a sort of retaliation. Ch. i—v. ὃ 16.

(2.) Having settled the nature of ‘the just,’ it follows to discuss
‘justice,’ or this same principle manifested in the mind of the
individual. This part of the subject is very imperfectly carried
out, We miss the graphic impersonations of the virtues with
which the fourth book of Aristotle’s Ethics is filled. We find
nothing but a few barren remarks on voluntariness as necessary to
make an act unjust, and deliberate purpose to constitute an unjust
character. There is a large digression here on the proper sense of the
word ‘justice.’ Justice, it is said, can only properly exist between
citizens ; it is a mere metaphor to talk of justice in families, &c.
Ch. v. § 17—Ch. viii

(3.) Certain questions are added, the answers to which go to
supply deficiencies in the definition hitherto given of justice. The
leading question is, Can one be injured voluntarily ? and the answer
to this shows that justice implies a relation between two distinct

PLAN OF BOOK V. 97

wills and interests. It is again repeated that justice must be a
settled state of the character; thus the just man could not at will
be unjust. The subject is concluded by an assertion that justice is
essentially a human quality. Ch. ix.

(4.) An appendix follows on the nature of Equity, which is a
higher and finer justice, dealing with exceptional cases and acting
in the spirit, not in the letter of the law. Ch. x.

(5.) Ch. xi. might be called superfluous and out of place. It
touches on the already settled question, Can a man injure himself?
But the want of a lucidus ordo is universally characteristic of the
Eudemian Ethics ; and this chapter adda some after-thoughts on
suicide as an act of injustice, and on the metaphor of justice be-
tween the higher and the lower faculties.

Owing, probably, to the want of distinctness in it, this book has
not made so much impression on the world as some of the Nico-
machean books with which it has been incorporated. The distinc-
tion between ‘distributive’ and ‘corrective’ justice is, however,
sometimes referred to, as, for instance, by Lord Bacon in the ‘ Ad-
vancement of Learning.’ This and the other distinctions which
the book brings out belong rather to politics or political economy
than to morals. The remaining contributions to the subject here
made—such as the showing that injustice implies a conflict of
wills—may have been useful as a clearing up of language at the
time when the book was written.

Hildenbrand, in his Geschichte und System der Rechis- und
Staaisphilosophie, complains of the meagre account of Contracts
given in this book, especially as contrasted with the full disquisition
in the Laws of Plato.

What is still more to be complained of and regretted is, the
insufficient account of Justice—from an ethical point of view, as a
state of the soul—with which we have here to content ourselves,

VOL. 1]. N

HOIKON [EYAHMION] V.

[J EPI δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας
τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης

9 4 4Φ ὔ A A c , ?
2 ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ TO δίκαιον τίνων μέσον.

ἡ δὲ

, en ἡ ‘ 4 24 , a e
σκέψις μιν ἐστω KATA ὍΤην AvTHV μέθοδον Toy προειβημε-

3 γοις.

I. This chapter proposes and opens
the discussion upon the nature of
justice and injustice. The chief
points it contains are as follows. (1.)
Justice and injustice must stand
opposed to each other, as being two
contrary states of mind. From the
nature of one, we may infer its
contrary the nature of the other, and
if the one term be used in a variety
of senses, the other term will be used
in a corresponding variety of senses.
(2) The term ‘unjust man’ is used in
two senses, to denote one who is
lawless, and one who is unfair.
Therefore the term ‘just’ must
denote both lawful and fair. (3) The
lawful (τὸ νόμεμον) is simply all that
the state has enacted for the welfare
of its citizens. Therefore, in one
sense, ‘justice’ means fulfilling all
the requirements of law. Thus it is
nothing else than perfect and con-
summate virtue. In this general
sense justice is different from virtue
only in the point of view which one
would take in defining it.

I ποία μεσότη:] Aristotle proposed

|
|
|

ea 4 , a , [τὰ ὔ
ορωμεν δὴ wavras τὴν τΤοιαυτὴν ἕξιν βουλομένους

justice, ‘in what sense are they mean
states?’ πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν (δι. τι.
vii. 16), which is slightly different
from the above. Cf. ch. v. § 17 of
this book.

2 ἡ δὲ σκέψι: ---προειρημένοιΞ) ‘ And
let our inquiry be according to the
same method as what has preceded.’
This probably refers to the way in
which the moral virtues have been
treated in the preceding Book of the
Eudemian Ethics. There is nothing
distinctive about this method, or
different from the procedure of Aris-
totle. What is most specially alluded
to at present must be the fixing of
the meaning of terms, which is now
resorted to with regard to justice,
and which was more or less employed
before. Cf. Eth, Eud. 1. v. 1-3,
where the general method and the
style of the writing has great affinity
to the present opening. Περὶ δὲ
μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλο.
ψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι γὼ
ἴδιον (6 conj. Bonitz, Ceteri alr»).
Ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τη»
γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι res

the question about the two kinds of | λανθάνειν πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ

Cuap. 1.] HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V. 99

λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ad’ ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ
ἀφ᾽ ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια: τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ad’ ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται
τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω
ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπι- 4
στημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν
γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι,
ἕξις δ᾽ ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ
πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον" λέγομεν
γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζη ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων.
πολλάκις μὲν οὗν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τὴς ἐναν- 5
τίαρ, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων: ἐάν τε
γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ἢ ἢ Φανερά, καὶ i καχεξία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ
ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ
γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχε-
ξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν
πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν 6
θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγε-

τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταὐτὸ συμβέβηκεν. | τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή, and then, to

--Λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ | answer to it, ἕξις ἡ ἐναντία τῶν
τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ | ἐναντίων οὔ.

ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. | 5-6 Though a state does not in-

K.T.X. clude its contrary, yet its contrary

4 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ---- ubvov] | may be inferred from it; and the

‘(And I have specified them thus), state itself may be known by its par-

β

|

|

for it is not the same with developed | ticular manifestations (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπο-
states as it is with sciences and | κειμένων), just asa bodily condition
faculties. A faculty or a science | is known from the symptoms. If the
appears to be the same of contraries, | name of a state be used in more
but a contrary state does not include | senses than one (πλεοναχῶς), it follows
its contraries, as, for instance, from | usually that the name of its contrary
health only healthful things and not | will be used in more senses than one,
the contraries of health are produced.’ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων] As we might
Tap refers to the mention of both | say, ‘from its facts,’ the ὑποκείμενα
justice and injustice separately, and _ being the singular instances in which
as opposed to each other. The writer | a general notion is manifested. The
accounts for this by saying that ' meaning is, that τὰ δίκαια are to
a δύναμις admita of contraries, but δικαιοσύνη as good symptoms are to
a ἕξις not (see Vol. I. p, 241). | good health. Ta» ὑποκειμένων is an
The style above is somewhat care- | instance of the logical formule with
less, for we first have ἐπιστήμη ᾿ whichthe writing of Eudemusabounds.

100 HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V. [Cuar.

7 σθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ TO ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεονα-
~ a
χῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ
΄- , 4
σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν AavOave καὶ οὐχ ὥσ-
περ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον" ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ
e 4 4 9 δ , e ev a a e c ᾿
ἥ κατὰ τὴν iweav, οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεῖς ομωνύμως ἢ
e a 4 9 td “A t 4 A ae 4 td 4

Te ὑπὸ Tov αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων Kai ἧ Tas θύρας κλείουσιν.
8 εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ de ὅ τε
παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ὁ ἄνισος,
4 ~ Gd A 4 id δ id 4 a 4
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ

” ‘ 4 δί ” 4 , Α \ oo” 4 δ
ἰσος. τὸ μεν ὁικαίον apa τὸ νῦμιμὸν καὶ TO ἰσὸν, TO

a .. —_———

Cf. Ar, Met. τ ii 4 (ὁ ἔχων τὴν
καθόλου ἐπιστήμην) οἷδέ πως πάντα τὰ
ὑποκειμένα.

7 ἔοικε δὲ---κλείουσι») ‘Now the
term “ justice” appears to be used in
more senses than one, and so does the
term injustice, but, because there is
a close resemblance between the
ambiguous senses, the ambiguity
escapes notice, and the case is not the
same as with things widely differing,
where the ambiguity is comparatively
plain (δήλη μᾶλλον) Α physical
difference appealing to the eye (κατὰ
τὴν ἰδέαν) is widest, as, for instance,
the word “key ” is used ambiguously
to denote the clavicular bone of
animals, and that with which men
lock doors.” While the general up-
shot of this passage is clear enough,
the writing is in itself very indistinct.
Hence in translation it has been
necessary to use expansion. To say
that ‘their equivocation escapes notice
because it is close’ goes beyond the
legitimate bounds of compression.
Cf, the obscure and probably corrupt
passage above cited from Eth. Kud.
III, Vv. 1: ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ
τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μεχρὶ τοῦ
λανθάνειν πόρρω προϊόντα,

κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν] This seems to mean
‘in external form.’ Cf. Eth. 1. viii.
16: ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν ravaloxns.

κλεῖς] There is a pun attributed to
Philip of Macedon—cf. Plutarch, Reg.
et Imp, Apophth., Philippi 1x.—which,
it has been thought, may be here
alluded to: τῆς κλειδὸς αὐτῷ xare-
ayelons ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος
ἰατροῦ πάντως τι καθ᾽ ἡμέραν αἰτοῦντος,
λάμβανε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει, τὴν γὰρ
κλεῖν ἔχεις.

8-11 The word ‘unjust’ is used
in three different senses to denote the
lawless man, the greedy man, and the
unfair man. The word ‘just’ may
mean either the lawful man or the
fair man. In this statement there is
something illogical, for we notice at
once that there are only two senses of
the word ‘just’ to match the three
senses of ‘unjust.’ We find in § 10,
that unfairness (τὸ ἄνισον») is a generic
term, including both greediness (πλεο-
vetla) and also the collateral notion
of selfishly avoiding evil. In short,
to divide ‘unjust’ into lawless,
greedy, and unfair, is a croas
division. Evidently there are on
each side two terms: (1) justice
is divided into lawfulness or umi-
versal justice, and (2) fairness about
property, or particular justioen. In-
justice is divided into (1) lawless.
ness or universal injustice, and
(2) unfairness about property,
particular injustice.

or

1] H@IKON [EYAHMION] V. 101

τὸ 4 2 a 4 4 9 4 a 4 ?
αὐικον TO παράνομον καὶ TO ἄνισον. Emel δὲ καὶ wAeove- 9

e 10. a 4 a ΗΝ 4 e 9 a Ά
κτῆς O ἄόοικος, περὶ ταγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περί
ἣν 4 ᾿ . 9 , a? A ‘ 4 A 9. 9 ἢ
ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά,

4 δ 9 2. e δ ” νθ a » Q ὃ ’
τινὶ οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώ-
κουσιν" δεῖ δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ

ς a 9 4 e oa 4 ‘ e a 4 ’ e ’
αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά. ὁ ὃ
10. 9 44 4 e e δι 4 4 4 4 9 A
ἄδικος οὐκ aet TO πλεοὸν αἱρεῖται, ἀλλα καὶ TO ἔλαττον ἐπὶ
A e ~ ~ 9 3 Ψ “ A 4 a A
τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν" ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ TO μεῖον κακὸν
4 ~ ~
ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ
τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ᾽ ἄνισος" τοῦτο γὰρ

ὔ 4 ὔ 9 A 9 φ f wv iy e A
περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὃ παράνομος ἄδικος ἣν ὁ δὲ

ὔ ~

νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα Ta νόμιμά ἐστί πως

? ~ ~

δίκαια" τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά

4 4 rd ’ ’ > , φ 5)

ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. οἱ δὲ

νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ
~ ~ δι ιν

κοινῇ συμφέροντος πῶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις,

9 ἐπεὶ δὲ ---- ἃγαθά] ‘Now, since | δ᾽ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια,
the unjust man is greedy, he will be | πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. τὸ δὲ
concerned with things good, not all, χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν
but the “goods of fortune,” which μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτ᾽ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.
abstractedly are always goods, but 12-15 In one sense all that is
which are not so always to the in- | lawful is just; the law aiming at the
dividual. (Men pray for these and | good of all, or of a part, of the citizens,
follow after them, but they ought not | speaks on all subjects, and more or
to do so; they ought to pray that ᾿ less rightly enjoins the practice of all
what are abetractedly goods may be | the virtues, J ustice, then, in this
80 to them, and they ought to choose | sense, may be said to be the practice
the things which are good for them).’ | of entire virtue towards one’s neigh-
The goods of fortune are those which | bour.
all men desire, though it is not certain 13 στοχαζόμενοι ἣ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέ-
that they will prove goods to them. | povros κτλ) Cf. Ar. Pol. τι, vii. 5:
The phrase τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά is an | h μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς

|
|

Eudemian formula. See Vol. L Essay τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ'
I. p. 63. The difficulties connected ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ
with prayer, arising out of human δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν
ignorance, form the subject οὗ Plato’s | ἀπόρων. The term νομοθετική (§ 12)
Second Alcibiades. They are also | occurs again in the Eudemian book,
alluded to, Laws, 111. p. 687. Atthe | Eth. vi. viii. 2. The view given here
end of Phadrus is given the prayer | of law, which is expressed still more
of Socrates (279 B): Ὦ φίλε Πᾶν | strongly below, ch. xi. § 1, is quite
τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε Geol, Solyré | different from modern views. Law is
μοι Kary γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν " ἔξωθεν _ here represented as a positive system

102 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cnar.

e229 595 4 a ’ " , “- ., “ Cd
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον" ὥστε Eva

a ζω
μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς

΄- ~ “~ ”~ ,
εὐδαιμονίας Kal τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.
~ wv a
14 προστάττει δ᾽ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ TOU ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν,
A - a
οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ
“ ‘ δ a , ? 4 ’ δ᾽ e ’
ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ TOU σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ᾽ UBpI-

~ 4 PY
ζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν,

« f 4 4 8 cy 9 x 4 ’ 8 a
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ Tas ἄλλας ἀρετὰς Kat μοχθηρίας τὰ μεν

~ 4 ~
κελεύων τὰ δ᾽ ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς,
I

7 a}

’ δ' ς ὃ ’ Φ 4 a e ὃ ,
χεῖρον ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμενος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁικαιοσυνὴη
Ἵ 4 , ’ ’ 4 9 9 e a 9 \ ‘ Ψ
ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστι τελεία, GAX οὐὧχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ προς ἐτερον.

~ σε “~ 4 ~
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ

(though the instances quoted of its | to one’s neighbour.’ There is a care-
formule are all negative, μὴ λείπειν less transition here from τὰ γόμιμα
τὴν τάξιν, &c.), aiming at the regu- , and τὰ δίκαια to ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Cor-
lation of the whole of life, sometimes, ' rect writing would have required
however, with a bias of class-interests, | ἡ κατὰ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνη or 8. similar
and sometimes only roughly executed | phrase. Generally speaking, this first

|

|

᾿

|

|

(ἀπεσχεδιασμένος). This educational | part of the Book is about τὰ δίκαια
and dogmatic character of the law | as distinguished from ἡ δικαιοσύνῃ
was really exemplified to the greatest | (see Plan of Book V.)
extent in the Spartan institutions. 15-20 Hence justice is often
Athens rather prided herself (ac- | thought the best of the virtues,
cording to the wise remarks which | brighter than the evening or the
Thucydides puts into the mouth of | morning star, the sum of all other
Pericles) on leaving greater liberty | excellence. It is the use of virtue,
to the individual. But Plato and | and not in relation to oneself alone,
Aristotle both made the mistake of | but also towards others. Hence it
wishing for an entire state-control | has been defined ‘others’ profit.’ As
over individual life, he is the worst man who is bad both
14 τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου] Cf. Eth. m1. | to himself and others, so he is the
viii, 1-2, Enactments of the kind | best who is good to himself and to
here mentioned form part of the | others. This kind of justice is not a
system given in Plato’s Laws, pp. | part of virtue, but the whole; it can
943-4. Modern statutes of military | only be distinguished from virtue
discipline against desertion, &c., | when you come to define it, and dis-
furnish an exact parallel to these | cover that you must take a different
ancient laws, if we only consider that point of view for each.
in the Greek cities the whole state 15 οὔθ᾽ ἕσπερος x.7.d.] This may
was more or less regarded as an army. | have allusion to something in litera-
15 αὕτη μὲν οὖν --- Erepov] ‘Now | ture now lost. At all events, it is a
this justice is complete virtue, not , fine saying.
absolutely, however, but in relation ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ} Given among the

I.] HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V. 103

δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ᾽ ἕσπερος οὔθ᾽ ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός"

4

Kal παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν
ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην «ἄσ᾽ ἰριτὴ ἕνι.

4 ’ , 9 ’ 4 σι , 9 ΄- -ἰ,᾽
καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις
ἐστιν. τελεία δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον
δέ σι 4 ~ σ΄ 9 9 9 , 9 4 ,

ὑναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ov μόνον καθ᾽ avrov:
πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆ-
σθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
“Ὁ - "ΚΓ a ~ ᾽ @ 9 A Ψ ,

εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει"

Ἁ ΕΥ̓͂ 4 4 9 ὔ PA e »” 4 A 4
πρὸς ἕτερον yap καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ TO

>» 8 ~ “ 9 ’ 4 ‘ a ἷφΦ e ,
αὐτὸ ToUTO Kat αλλοτριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη
μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ
συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκιστος μὲν
οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ

’ ” 9 9 e 4 εν ~ 9 ~ 9 r Ἢ
μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτον τῇ ἀρετῇ αλλὰ
~ 4 iy

πρὸς ἕτερον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μεν οὖν
ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ᾽ ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἡ
ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ᾽ ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέ-
pel ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ne

verses of Theognis (147 sy.) in the | ἡ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς

following couplet : | ἄλλας.

16 ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα] The same senti-

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ᾽ ἀρετὴ ment is expressed by Sophocles,
᾽στιν, Anti. 175 8q.

was δέ τ' ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, Kupve δίκαιος 17 ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] Repeated
ἐών. below, ch. vii § 6. Cf. Plato’s

Repub. τ. p. 343 C: ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν

δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον

ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε

καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ

It is, however, also attributed to
Phocylides, and may have been the
common property of many early |

᾿ πρὸς trepor Fritzsche quotes Eurip. ᾿ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντο: βλάβη
Herad. 2: | (see Vol. I, Essay IL p. 150). The

sophistical and sneering definition of

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τοῖς πέλας πέφυκ' ἀνήρ. ᾿ Justice is here repeated without com-
ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ κέρδος λῆμ᾽ ἔχων ἀνειμένον, | Ment, being accepted as 8 testimony
πόλει τ’ ἄχρηστος καὶ συναλλάσσειν . Ὁ the unselfish character of justice.
βαρύς, 20 τί δὲ διαφέρει --- ἀρετὴ] ‘ But
αὑτῷ 8 ἄριστος. what the difference is between virtue
and this kind of justice is clear from
And Ar. Pol. 111 xiii. 3: κοινωνικὴν | what we have said already. They
yap ἀρετὴν elval φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην are the same, only conceived diffe-

to

104 HOIKOQN [EYAHMION] V. (Crap.
ἔστι μὲν ya p ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ μὲν
πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.
Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην" ἔστι
γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ
μέρος. σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι ἔστιν: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας

rently : viewed as a relation to others, | tutions, but far more on the nature of
the state is justice; viewed as a state ᾿ the human soul. Thus he concluded
of the mind simply, it is virtue.’ by defining it to be a just balance in
τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό] This logical | the mind itself. The Peripatetic
formula occurs again £th, vi. viii. 1, | starting-point is different. It is as-
where it is said that wisdom and | sumed that justice proceeds from the
politics are the same state of mind, | development of man’s nature as a
only their essence is differently con- | ‘political creature.’ Also it is assumed
ceived (τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν | that in political institutions there is
αὐταῖς), On the force of εἶναι, see | something which is absolute and not
Eth. 11 vi. 17, note. In both of | merely conventional (Eth. v. vii.
these Eudemian passages, where it is | 1-5). Then the only question is,
said of two things that ‘they are | what are the exact limits of justice
the same, only their εἶναι is different,’ | itself? To which the answer is, that
we must understand that the results | we may either regard it in the
are the same, but the essential nature, | broadest sense as including the whole
the causes, and what the Germans | of right dealing with others, or, more
would call the Grund-begriff, or fun- | restrictedly, as right dealing in respect
damental conception, are different. | of property and advantages of all
Thus the first idea about justice (in | kinds.
the widest sense) is, that it is a rela-
tion to others. The first idea about II. This chapter consists of three
virtue is, that it is a regulation of the | parts. (1) It brings arguments to
mind. There is a slightly different | prove the existence of a particular
application of the formula, Arist. De | kind of injustice, relating chiefly to
Anim4, 111. iit. 4: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ | property, from which the existence of
ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ | 8 particular kind of justice might also
μέν ἐστι καὶ pla, rd δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν | be inferred, §§ 1-6. (2) It sets aside
αὐταῖς. ‘Now the present existence | universal justice as not being the
of an object is identical with and in- | object of discussion to the present
separable from the present existence | book, 88 7-11. (3) It divides par-
of the sensation of it, but yet in con- | ticular justice into two kinds, distri-
ception these differ from each other | butive and corrective, §§ 12-13.
fundamentally.’ Here we have two 1-6 The arguments brought to
distinct sides or ‘moments’ repre- | prove the existence of a particular
sented as, though logically distinct, | kind of injustice reduce themselves
yet inseparable. apparently to an appeal to language.
Plato in discussing justice had first (1) We speak of the coward as
to clear the subject of sophistical | ‘doing wrongly’ (ἀδικεῖν); also we
notions, and to prove that justice did | speak of the man who takes more
not depend alone upon human insti- _ than his share as ‘doing wrongly ;”

1..-11] HOIKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΝΊ τ. 105

μοχθηρίας ὃ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ᾽ οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ
ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπό-
tyra ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι᾽ ἀνελευθερίαν. ὅταν δὲ
πλεονεκτῇ,. πολλάκις κατ᾽ οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν
yap) καὶ κατ᾽ ἀδικία. ἔστιν ἄρα ye ἄλλη τις aduia 3
φ td ΄-Ἄ φ 4 Η“ Fd 9 ΥΩ ~ @ 4 4
ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου
τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα 4
ὔ a [4 φΦ a a a di
μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, 6 de προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμε-
9 9 f oe a 2 ᾽ a φ
νος δ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἄν ava
μῶλλον ἣ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ᾽ ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος 6 οὔ-
ὅῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνει. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἄλλας
tf 4 , ’ e 9 a 9 g
πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ exavadopa ἐπί τινα μοχθη-
ρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ex’ ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε
τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ex’ ὀργήν" εἰ δ᾽
“», ν- 4 g ᾽ 9 ’ 2 > 3 4 [2
ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ᾽ οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἀδικίαν.

the latter use of the terms is evidently | (κατ᾽ ἀδικία). Hence there is a kind

different from the former.

(2) A crime committed for the sake
of gain is called a ‘wrong’ distinc-
tively, rather than by the name it
would have had, were this motive of

gain not present.

(3) While all other wrongs (ἀδική- .
para) are referred each to some evil |

principle, such as cowardice, intem-
perance, and the like ; acts of unjust
gain are referred to no other principle
except ‘injustice,’ which accordingly
must be used in a special sense and
denote a special vice in the mind.
The statement of the first of these
arguments in the text is extremely
confused. It is put in such a way
that it would as well prove any other
vice as weovetla to be particular
injustice. Suppose we substituted
‘ idleness’ in the text for ‘ grasping ;’
it would then be true to say, ‘When
@ man is idle, he often errs in none of
the other vices, certainly not in all,
but yet he acts with a certain faulti-
ness (for we blame him) and wrongly
VOL IL

' of wrong separate from universal
᾿ injustice,’ ἄς. However, this is only
a matter of statement; there is no
_ doubt that ἀδικία with regard to pro-
᾿ perty means something special, and
different from ἀδικία in the sense of
wrong-doing in general. In English
‘injustice’ is not used to mean vice
| generally ; though its opposite ‘just’
is occasionally used in the transla-
tion of the Bible as equivalent to
‘righteous,’ and in a sense answering
pretty nearly to that of νόμεμοι,

4 ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν---κερδαῖσει») ‘ Again
if one man commits an adultery for
the sake of gain, making a profit by
it, and another man does the same for
lust, lavishing money (προστιθείς) and
incurring loss; the latter would
rather be deemed intemperate than
covetous, the former would be called
unjust, but not intemperate; evi-
dently because of his gaining by it.’
Fritzsche (upon i. 14) quotes Aeschines
Socraticus, 11, 14: δοκεῖ 3° ἄν σοι
ἄνθρωπος εἰ μοιχεύει τὰς τῶν πέλας

4)

106 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Caar.

4 @ 9 g
6 ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν
, ὔ Φ ι8 4 A 9 ~ 9 ~ ἤ 3
μέρει, συνώνυμος, OTL'O ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει" ἄμφω
a 9 “~ 4 4 2 a δύ 9 > ε 4
γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν
4 A “A ’ Q Ν
περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἣ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ
΄-Ἔ ~ 4 ‘ 9
ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, Kat δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ
“ A A .\ @w ry
τοῦ κέρδους, ἡ de περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.
Ψ 4 Φ 9 4 4 [2 4 ῳ cd
7 “Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις
Α e a, Ἁ 4 Cd 9 ? “A ’ A x, ¢ ,
καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον" Tis δὲ Kai ὁποία
, td 4 4 . 4 ? eo
ὃ τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ TO ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον
4 4 wy Α 4 f , id 4 , »
Kai TO ἄνισον, TO δὲ δίκαιον TO TE νόμιμον καὶ TO ἴσον.
4 a 4 , ’ ° ,
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία
’ , y 4 \ . ν 4 4 , 4" ’ ᾽
9 ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ
Ψ ε ’ 4 Ψ \ 4 . , ἽΣ
ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἅπαν
» 8 3 ν 4 “ ὔ a 4 . A €
ἄνισον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄνισον ov πᾶν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ
10. , 9 9 Ἁ 4 9 @W 9 , a a € F a δ᾽
ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτα αλλ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ
φ ἊΝ ᾿ , ‘ C4 e 10. , ~ ὅἋ δ ’ e e
ὡς ὅλα" μέρος yup αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως
4 a i ~ 4 ~
δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν
ὔ 4 a σι
μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον,

Α “~ ὃ ’ Α ~ 9 δί ' e 4 ᾿ ε ‘ a .
IO καὶ Tov Olalou καὶ τοῦ αὐοἰκοῦυ ὠσαυτῶς. ἢ μεν οὖν κατα

rr

γυναῖκας ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρίῳ, ἀδικεῖν ἂν ἢ οὔ,
καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ
τῶν νόμων κωλυόντων ;

6 ὥστε-- σπουδαῖο:}] ‘So that it is
plain that there is a particular kind
of injustice distinct from the uni-
versal kind, having the same name by
reason of a kindred nature (συνώνυ-
jos), because its definition falls under
the same genus. For both have
their whole force consisting in a rela-
tion to others, but the one is con-
cerned with honour, property, or
safety (or by whatever one name one
might sum up all such things), and
is prompted by the pleasure of gain,
but the other has to do with the
whole sphere of virtue.’

συνώνυμος] What logic calls ‘ana-
logous.’ We before had the word
ὁμωνυμία to denote ‘equivocation’
(c. i. § 7), see Eth. 1, vi. 12, and note;
and cf. Ar. Categor. i. 3: Συνώνυμα δὲ

λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὃ
κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός.
9 ἐπεὶ δὲ---δικαιοσύνηῃ!} ‘But as
(ἐπεὶ) ‘unequal’ and ‘more’ are not
the same, but stand related to each
other as part to whole (for ‘more’ is
& species of ‘unequal’), so (καὶ) the
unjust principle and habit belonging
respectively to the two kinds we have
mentioned are not the same but dif-
ferent, this from that, the one being as
part, the other as whole. For thisinjus-
tice (about property) is a part of uni-
versal injustice, and the correspondent
justice is a part of universal justice.’
The only way to give any meaning to
this indistinct passage is to consider
what is said about ‘more’ and
‘unequal ’ to have nothing to do with
πλεονεξία, but simply to be an illustra~
tion of a part included by a whole.
Particular justice includes all the
generic qualities of universal justice,

IL] HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. 107

a 9 4 ’ A 9 g e 4
τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν
τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας,
4 ’ \ ‘ ' ‘ 4 « Κ 4 Ἢ ’
ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύ-

8 ς , A a 4 4 pd

Tas φανερὸν ws διοριστέον: σχεδὸν yap τὰ πολλὰ τῶν
νομίμων. τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα ἐστιν'
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκά-

, , ¢e , 4 A 4 “ Ψ

στὴν μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης
ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν
τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς xa’ ἕκαστον παιδείας,
“ e ΄σ΄ι » 84 4 , 9 ? ~ “a

καθ᾽ ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς
ἐστὶν ἧ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον: οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν

4 ’ ᾽ 4 “ > 3 “. 4 4
ἀνδρί τ᾿ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. τῆς δὲ κατὰ
μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ Kat’ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἕν μέν ἐστιν

“-.--..-..»... - Sh ξορυσες, oe ee eS -.-.--.-..-ς.. .....Ἐ -Ἐς-.ς.

must afterwards determine whether it
belongs to politics or some other pro-
vince. For perhaps the idea of the
good man is not the same as that of
the citizen in every case.’

no less than as a particular virtue it |
includes all the generic qualities of |
universal virtue. Some MSS. read |
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον, |
from not understanding the force of |
the illustration applied in érei. It is | ὕστερον διοριστέον] This is an un-
no wonder that confusion should have . fulfilled promise in the Fudemian
been caused when the writer was at | Ethics as they stand. The question
so little pains to avoid it. here started seems to have arisen out
10-11 We may set aside justice | of the discussions in Politics m1. iv.
in the wider sense as being identical | and 111. xviii, as to whether the virtue
with the exercise of virtue, and also | of the man and the citizen is the same,
the principle on which it depends | which, on the whole, Aristotle would
(καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ), this being simply | answer in the affirmative; and he
the inculcation of virtue by the state. | also lays it down decisively that all
(The question as to whether private | education should be public, i.e. under
education is the same as public, | thecontrol of government and reduced
whether the good man is the same as | to a common standard. Aristotle’s
the good citizen, may be discussed | treatise on education was however
hereafter.}—This seems to be the | unfinished, the eighth book of the
train of thought, the whole of ὃ 11 | Politics being a fragment. Eudemus
being parenthetical. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ | would seem to have wished to take up
«ολλὰ x.7.r. is & mere repetition of | the question where Aristotle left it,
ch. i. § 14. | and—with the view of giving a sepa-
τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ---παντῇ ‘Now the | rate existence to Morals as a science—
enactments productive of entire virtue | to ask whether there is not a kind of
are those which have been made with | education, not falling within the pro-
regard to education for public life. | vince of Politics, which aims at pro-
With regard to individual education, | ducing the virtues of the individual
according to which one is not a good | man, as distinct from those of the
citizen, but simply a gocd man, we | citizen. But the Eudemian Ethics

ee ....

13 ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν.

a

ὥ

A Ψ ‘ , 9 ~a 39 7
2 δῆλον ΟΤι καὶ μέσον TL εστι TOV AVITOU.

108 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuar.

ᾶΦ 8 3 a a ~ a , es! a 3
εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις
. Ψ ᾿ Ψ » 2 ov eo. a δὲ ‘
yap ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἕν de τὸ
τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο"
~ 4 4 4 e ὔ ’ 9 a δ᾽ 9 ,
τῶν yap συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μεν εκούσια ἐστι TA axou-
gid, ἑκούσια μὲν Ta τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς
ἐγγύη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις" ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται,
ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος. τῶν
3 4 ? 4 4 “- Φ A ἢ
δ᾽ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμα-
s A ᾽ e ,
κεία προαγωγεία δονλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία,

4 4 , Ὁ 4 ἢ ’ , 4 e 4 t
τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θανατὸς ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις

κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

Mw” 5 A ‘ ¥ ”
"Eve δ' 6 τ᾽ ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ TO ἄδικον ἄνισον,

nw > 3 A 4
TOUTO ὃ Εστί TO

ΜΝ) ., 2 ε f 4 , 3 ‘ ‘ λέ - 8 er
σὸν" ἐν οποία γαρ πράξει ΕΟ Τὶ TO ἾΛΟΟΡ Καὶ TO ε aTTOV,

were also unfinished, or else mutilated.
See Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 67-68.

ἀνδρί 7’ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι] ‘The essen-
tial idea of a good man.’ On this
formula, see £th. 11. vi. 17, note.

12-13 Particular justice is now
divided into distributive and correc-
tive justice. For all details connected
with these two forms, see the follow-
ing chapters. It is here said that
‘voluntary transactions’ (τὰ ἑκούσια
συναλλάγματα), ‘such as buying, sell-
ing, lending, pledging, using, deposit-
ing, and hiring,’ come under the head
of corrective justice, as well as ‘in-
voluntary transactions.’ By this must
be meant that the rectification of acts
of injustice committed under these
various heads falls to be made by cor-
rective justice. Buying and selling,
as we learn from ch. v., are, or ought
to be, arranged on the principle of
geometric proportions, and thus re-
semble cases of distributive justice.
It is only where cheating. or mistake
has occurred, that buying and selling
would be brought under corrective
justice.

III. This chapter, without for-
mally announcing its subject, treate
of distributive justice. The main
points with regard to it are as fol-
lows. Justice implies equality, and
not only that two things are equal, but
also two persons between whom there
may be justice. Thusitisa geometrical
proportion in four terms ; if A and B
be persons, C and D lots to be
divided, then as A is to B, so must
C betoD. Anda just distribution
will produce the result that A + C will
be to B + D in the same ratio as
A was to B origivally. In other
words, distributive justice consists in
the distribution of property, honours,
&c., in the state, according to the
merits of each citizen.

With regard to this principle,
though the text is not explicit, yet
it appears to be (1) really applicable
in all cases of awards made by the
state, (2) ideally to be capable of a
wider application as 8. regulative
principle for the distribution of pro-
perty and all the distinctions of
society. As to the history of the

IL—III.]

4 a a \ »
Εστί καὶ TO iGoyV.

” @ 4 2 , a “~
(cov περ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.

doctrine, we find it shadowed out by
Plato in the great idea of a harmony
and proportion ruling in the world ; cf.
Gorgias, p. 507 &: φασὶ δ᾽ ol σοφοί,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ
θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν
συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα
καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ
ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν,
ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν, οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν.
σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν
τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὦν, ἀλλὰ
λέληθέ σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ
καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα
δύναται" σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν
ἀσκεῖν" γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. There
is a still nearer approach to the pre-
sent doctrine in Laws, p. 757 B,
where it is said that there are two
kinds of equality; one is a mere
equality of number and measure, the
other is the ‘award of Zeus,’ the
equality of proportion. Τὴν δὲ ἀληθε-
στάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾷ-
διον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις
ἐστί" καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ σμικρὰ
μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ" πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ
πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ
ἀπεργάζεται. τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι
πλείω, τῷ δέ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα
νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν
φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ' καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς
μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους °
τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε
καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις
ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

It is remarkable that the terme
‘ distributive and corrective justice’
are not found in the Politics of Aris-
totle, though this distinction and the
various points connected with it in
reality belong much more to political
than to ethical science. However,
though the name of distributive jus-
tice does not occur, yet the idea of

HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V.

109

. 2 \ os» # ‘ ,
εἰ Ouvyv TO ἄδικον avucoyv, TO δίκαιον 3

> 8 Qe . oe
ETEL δὲ ΤῸ ἰσὸον 4

it is fully developed in Politics, 111.
Ὁ. ix._a passage from which it is not
improbable that the present chapter
may be partly taken, though an inter-
polated reference (καθάπερ εἴρηται πρό-
τερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖδ) gives the passage
in the Politics a fallacious appearance
of having been written later, and of
having accepted conclusions from the
present book, Far rather it is likely
that the conception of ‘distributive
justice,’ having been received as a con-
ception from Plato, and farther worked
out by Aristotle in his Politics, only
became stcreotyped into a phrase in
the after-growth of his system, at the
end of his own life, or in the exposi-
tion of his views made by Eudemus.
It is in speaking of the ‘oligarchical
and democratical principles of justice ’
that Aristotle says: (8 1) πάντες γὰρ
ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός ἀλλὰ μέχρι
τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγονσιν οὐ πᾶν
τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. Οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ
δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πᾶσιν
ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις. καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ
δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ
χᾶἄσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ᾽
ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς.
τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὑτῶν ἡ xplois’
σχεδὸν δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ
τῶν οἰκείων. Ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον
τισίν, καὶ διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ols, + καθά-
wep εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς,
τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα
ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.
The conclusion is (Pol. ut. ix, 15)
that they who contribute most to the
joint-stock of virtue and good deeds
in the state are entitled to a larger
share in the control of affairs than
those who base their claims upon any
other kind of superiority.

1-4 These sections are full of

110 HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] V. [Cuap.

Ψ A . oo» 3

ΕσΤι δὲ TO (ἰσὉ» ἐν
td ‘ 9 e 8 A ᾽ ὔ Α

ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν" αγναγκῆ Τοίνυν TO δίκαιον μεσον Te και

᾽ A , , Γι wv
μεσον. TO δίκαιον μεσον τι ay εἰῆ.

4 , A td A ~
ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρός τι] καὶ τισίν, καὶ YY μὲν μέσον, τινῶν
΄“ δ᾽ 9 4 “- ΜΝ Φ δ᾽ ” 9 , ὃ “-
(τωτα ἐστι πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), n ὃ ἰσον ἐστί, ὀνοῖν,
χὰ 4 , ‘ 9 ὔ MM A OL 9 ?
5 ἢ de δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη apa τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις
ὔ x Ι ἢ »” a
εἶναι τέτταρσιν" ols Te yap δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί,
ΠῚ . ’ ’ ‘
6xat ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης,
φ a a 9
ois καὶ ἐν οἷς" ὡς yap ἐκεῖνα ἔχει Ta ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀ-
a ” 9 δ 1.” , ἡ “Ψ) Ωγ 9 A
κεῖνα ἔχει" εἰ γὰρ My ἰσοι;, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν
e ’ 4 A 4 ’ ef A 6” . yp A 4
αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ
WwW # 4 “A
ηἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν
~ ~ 4 a , 9 ~ a
τοῦτο δῆλον: τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολο-
“ε [2 9 >»? a
γοῦσι πάντες κατ᾽ ἀξίαν twa δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν
9 4 4" ’ , eo 4 ; e 4
οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπαρχεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μεν
’ σε
δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ᾽

4 , e δ᾽ 4 A ᾿ ,
8 ευγε μνείαν. οἱ αρισ ΤΟΚ βατικ Ot ἀρετὴν.

’ 9 ’ ἢ
δίκαιον avahoryov τι.

confused writing. It is said ‘since
the unjust is unequal, there must be
a mean, which is equal; justice must
be equal; the equal is a mean, there-
fore justice must be a mean. As
being equal justice implies two terms,
as being a mean two extremes, as
being just two persons, therefore it
must be in four terms, &c.’ The
general meaning is clear, but the
statement, especially in § 4, is very
faulty. A confusion is made by the
introduction of the idea of μέσον with
regard to justice, which at the present
part of the argument was not required.

6 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, κιτ.λ.] Cf. Ar.
Pol, 111. ix. 1 aq. ἰ. 6.

7 ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ---ἀρετήν)] ‘Again this
is clear from the principle of equality
according to standard ; for all agree
that justice in distributions must be
according to standard, but men are
not unanimous in declaring the same
standard. While the democrats de-
clare freedom, those who are for an
oligarchy declare wealth or birth, and

“ἢ Ψ ‘
EO TLV apa TO

4 Α 4 ’ 9 , 4 4
ΤΟ γὰρ ἀνάλογον Ov μονον Εστι

those who are for an aristocracy (in
the highest sense) declare virtue.’
This is apparently taken from the
saying in Aristotle’s Pol. 111. ix. 4:
Oi μὲν yap ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι dow, οἷον
χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἅνισοι εἶναι, οἱ
δ᾽ ἂν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως
ἴσοι. Cf. 76. m1. ix. 15. ‘Freedom’
here of course means being above the
condition of a slave. To make this
the ground for political claims would
be analoyous, from A.’s point of view,
to instituting manhood suffrage. For
a slave is less than man; cf. 76. § 6,
where it is said that slaves and the
lower animals could not constitute a
state διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας
μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν.

8-14 ἔστιν ἄρα--- ἀγαθοῦ) ‘The just
then is something proportionate. The
proportionate is not restricted to pure
number alone, but applies to every-
thing that admits the idea of number.
Proportion is an equality of ratios, and
implies four terms at the least. Now
it is plain that “discrete proportion ’*

IIT. ] HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. 11}

μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ: ἡ γὰρ ἀνα-
λογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.
e a my 4 Ψ 9 3 ~ 9 Ἁ 4 φ
ἢ μεν οὗν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ
συνεχής" τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δὶς λέγει, οἷον
ὡς ἡ τοῦ a πρὸς τὴν τοῦ B, οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ B πρὸς τὴν

~ ») 9 e ”~ ww Ψ 4 oN e “~ ~
τοῦ y. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται" dot’ ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ B τεθῇ
δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός" διήρηνται
yup ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἅ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν
B ν᾿ e 4 4 ὃ a 3 αλλὰ Ν e e A 4

» οὕτως ὁ Ὑ πρὸς Tov ὃ, Kai ἐναλλὰξ dpa, ὡς ὁ a πρὸς τὸν

e a 4 ow a , a 4 A Ω Γ
ry, ὁ B πρὸς τὸν ὃ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον" ὅπερ
ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει: κἂν οὕτως συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυαζει.
e mw ~ 4 “- 4 e ~ “~ 4 3
ἡ ἄρα τοῦ a ὅρου τῷ Ὑ καὶ ἡ τοῦ B τῷ ὃ σύζευξις TO ἐν
διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ
4 a 9 t 4 Ἁ 9 , o 4 A ἤ

παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ yup ἀνάλογον μέσον, ΤῸ δὲ δίκαιον

--.-- -- — eee nc ..-.--τΤ... —

is in four terms ; but so also is “con- ' standing in a double relationship.
tinuons proportion,” for it uses the | Well, then, the just is that which is
one of its terms as two, and names it ‘ thus proportionate, and the unjust is
twice over, thus,—as ὦ is to ὃ, 80 is | & violation of proportion, which takes
δ toc. 6 then is twice named, and place either on the side of more or
if it be set down twice over, the pro- . less. And this is actually the case,
portionate terms will be four. But | for he that does an injury has more
justice also’ implies four terms at | than hisshare, while he that is injured
least, and an equality of ratios: for | has less than his share of what is
the two persons and the two things | good.’ This passage gives a formula
are divided in similar proportion. | for distributive justice in mathemati-
(The formula) then will be, ‘as the | cal language, which comes in short to
term a is to ὦ, so is ὁ to d;” and | this, that in all awards of the state,
alternando, “as a is to ὁ, 30 is b to | the result should be proportionate to
d,”’ and so too the whole to the whole, | the separate worth of the citizens.
which the distribution couples, and if 8 μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] ‘Number ex-
the terms be thus united, it couples | pressed in ciphers,’ ‘abstract number,’
them justly. The joining therefore | inGerman, unbenannteZahl. Fritzsche
of a to ¢ and of 6 to d in distribution | refers to Euclid Ki. vir. def. 1. The
ia just, and this justice is a mean | terms introduced in this chapter seem
between violations of proportion. For | to be neither lines, nor numbers, but
proportion is a mean, and the just is ; algebraic quantities.

proportionate. Mathematicians call 9 ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ A] ἡ is indefinite, and
this kind of proportion geometrical, | probably meant to be so. It may
for in geometrical proportionthe whole | stand for στιγμή, γραμμή, or the like.
is to the whole as each separate term 13 γεωμετρικήν) Cf. Plato, Gorgias,
is to each. This proportion is not | p. 508, quoted above, p. 109.

“+ continuous ” for it has no one term

Gung

Ls |

μι

Oo

2

112 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuap.

13 ἀνάλογον: καλοῦσι de τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμε-
τρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί: ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει
καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον.

14 ἔστι δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία" οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἷς
ἀριθμῷ ὅρος,

Oe
@®

, @ ‘ A cy , ~ Ἁ Φ ἢ
f Kat Ο. TO μεν OuV δίκαιον TOUTO ΤῸ αμΜμα-

‘ 4
λογον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ TO ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα
A A a A \ + Ψ A 9 A x wv
TO μὲν πλέον τὸ de ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων
’ ε ‘ . 4 A , ν © % 3 ,
συμβαίνει" 6 μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ᾽ ἀδικούμενος
# ~ 9 ~ 9 A 4 ~ “~ 9 ’ 9
15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν: ἐν
9 ~ , 4 σι
ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον
’ ‘ ‘ ~ ~
16 κακόν: ἔστι yup τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ
? 4 δ᾽ € 4 9 θ ’ 4 HAA A
17 μείζονος, TO δ᾽ αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ
μὲν οὖν ὃν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.

4 Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἕν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλ-

15-16 A repetition of ch. i. § 10.

IV. This chapter is on corrective
justice, which is said to apply to the
transactions between men whether
voluntary orinvoluntary. Corrective
justice goes on a principle, not of
geometrical, but of arithmetical pro-
portion ; in other words, it takes no
account of persons, but treats the cases
with which it is concerned as cases of
unjust loss and gain, which have to be
reduced to the middle point of equa-
lity between the parties. Justice is
a mean, and the judge a sort of imper-
sonation of justice, a mediator, or
equal divider. The operation of jus-
tice, bringing plaintiff and defendant
to an equality, may be illustrated by
the equalising of two unequal lines.
The names, ‘loss’ and ‘gain,’ are,
however, often a mere metaphor bor-
rowed from commerce.

The term ‘corrective justice’ (7d
διορθωτικόν, or, 88 it is afterwards
called, § 6, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον)
is itself an unfortunate name, because
it appears only to lay down principles
for restitution, and therefore implies
wrong. Thus it has a tendency to

confine the view to ‘involuntary trans-
actions,’ instead of stating what must
be the principle of the just in all the
dealings between man and man. In
the present chapter, it is remarkable
that although we are told at first that
‘voluntary transactions’ belong to
corrective justice, yet all that is said
applies only to the ‘involuntary trans-
actions ;’ and at last we are told that
the terms used are ‘a metaphor from
voluntary transactions ’—as if these
were something quite distinct. It
may be said, however, that bargains,
and voluntary dealings in general,
have no respect of persons (κατὰ τὴν
ἀριθμητ. dvad.), and thus have some-
thing in common with civil and
criminal law. Bacon, in the Advance-
ment of Learning, Book II., refers
to the two heads of Justice here
given, under the names ‘ commutative
and distributive.’

1 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ev] This excludes all
possibility of the writer having con-
ceived another kind of justice, to be
called ‘ catallactic’ or some such name,
as it has been sometimes fancied. Tad
διωρθωτικὸν dx. implies not merely
‘regulative,’ but strictly ‘remedial "

IIL—IV.]

HOIKON [EYAHMION τ᾿

1i3

λάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. TerTO “63
a ~ - - -
τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέροι. τὸ κὸν γι

διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ εατὰ τι ἀγ)αλυγία

ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην"

καὶ γὰρ ἀτὸ χρηαστω» κορῶν ew

γίγνηται ἥ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸ λύγον τὸ ατὸν ὥστερ

ἔχουσε πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ sedan. ἐγ τα:

ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίω τούτω raps To aun

. - we =
Cc“ Te £4603 TO

o e
yep) ΘΠ).

τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι C.catoy ἐστὶ μὲν ἔσον τι, UG

4 wv Γ 2 2 ° e 2 e - ΄ - φ
τὸ ἄδιον ἄνισον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ cara TH ππλογιαν axa

ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρεθμητικήν.
ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ Gea los erin. © Σ εἰ
ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικῆς ἢ φαῦλος"

4 9 .
Cnet
(WIGtOH, εἰ

γὰρ

aes

ἀλλὰ rps τὰ Dusas

4 a td t 4 φ ΄ . “- o Ψ΄
τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον Brera ὁ νύμος, κα χρῆται ὡς i708,
εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ᾽ ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔ Tinbe ὁ ἐς ide-

βλαπται.

4 ww ~ ᾽ a o ΄σ’΄ “-
ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισο» 2.» ἰσάζειν» τειράται 4

0 δικαστής" καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν τληγῃ © cE Ξατάξη, ij
καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνη, δίύρηται τὸ τάθος καὶ ἡ xputes

εἰς ἄνισα. ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ

justice ; δύύρθωμα is used to signify a
remedy in Arist. Pol. m1. xiii 23,
where it is said of ostraciam, βέλτιον
μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω
συστῆσαι τὴν πολιτεία»; ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαε
τοιαύτης ἰατρείας" δεύτερος δὲ υλοῦτ:͵ ἂν

συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιούτῳ τισὶ διορϑώ-

ματι διορθοῦν.

2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ---εἰσενεχθέντα] ‘For
distributive justice deals always with
the goods of the state according to the
proportion we have described ; for if
the distribution be of common goods,
it will be according to the proportion
which the different contributions bear
to one another.’ Td εἰσενεχθέντα is
thus explained by the Paraphrast,
ἀναλόγως ἑκάστῳ δίδωσι κατὰ τὴν ἀξία»
ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ἣν εἷς τὸ
κοινὸν συνετέλεσεν" ἐπεὶ οὗ πάντες
ὅμοιοι, οὐδὲ πάντες ὁμοίως εἰσφέρουσιν.
Possibly the remark in the text was
taken from Aristotle, Pol. 1m. ix. 15:

διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον els

ΥΟΙ, 11.

ἰσάζει», ἀφαιρῶν

Cua

τὴν τοιαύτην covwias, τούτοις τῆς
σόλεως: μέτεστι υλείαν.

3 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητική»] This term
oceurs Eth. τι. vi 7. ‘ Arithmetical
proportam’ denotes a middle term
or point οἵ eyuality, e;cidistant from
two extreme terms; thus, 6 is the
mean, according to arithmetical pro-
portion, between 4 and & In Eth.
i. (1.4 ἴξ is called μέσαν τοῦ rpdy-
paros, which implies that it has no
respect of persons. So corrective
justice is here said to regard each
case impersonally as an affair of loss
and gain, and between these it strikes
the middle point. It is the moral
worth of persons that is ignored (εἰ
ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλαν «.7T.r.), for we find
afterwards, ch. v. 8§ 3-4, that a
consideration of the position and cir-
cumstances of persons does come in
to modify the estimate of the loss
sustained from an indignity, &.

Pr

114 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuar.

” , , “ ig e ~ 9 a 9 AN “
5 τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς
9 a »# # A 4
τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος,
᾿ “~ , ἢ “ ’ 9 4
ὁ οἷον τῷ παταξαντι, καὶ 7 ia τῷ παθόντι: ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν
Ἴ 9 4 ;

67; 4 ’ θ a i A ἢ a δὲ ’ δ
γε MerpnOy τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρόος.
φ »ὋῸ.“, A ’ a rv [2 4 9“, ’ a δὲ
ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, TO OE

, ὃ \ ε , 4 4 Ἃ , Q δ᾽ ξᾺλ 4
κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ᾽ ἔλαττον ἐναντίως,
A 4 nm 5 ΄-ς ἤ σι ~ 9 a Q
TO μὲν TOU ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ᾽ ἔλαττον κέρδος, TO
δ᾽ 9 [ [2 ‘ a ’ \ ww a , >
ἐναντίον ζημία: ὧν ἣν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι
, 4 A , ‘ ’
δίκαιον: ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
4 4 ὃ ὃ 4 4 ¢v 9 “~ % 8,
γιζημίας καὶ κέρδους. (ὁ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ
4 A t A 9 9 A A a oF
Tov δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν" τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι
4“, 4 4 9 A ‘ OL e ‘ ὃ 4 =
ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ TO Oikatov’ ὁ yap δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι
3 ἤ EA A A 4 [2 “
οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον" καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
~ “ “- ~
καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ws ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ
ἤ ld la 3 A ἢ 9“(᾽ 4 ε
8 δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὃ
4 4 a ~
δικαστής. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς
Ww a a 4 a ~ ~ ,
εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ TO μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας
, ~ a 4 ~ , 4
ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ᾽ ἀφεῖλε Kai τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέ-
θ Ψ δὲ δ ὃ θ; \ @ , ‘ Μ᾽
nev. ὅταν de δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν
Α eon Ψ) ' \ \ >” , 3 4
9 τὰ αὑτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ᾽ ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ
~ “ A ἤ 4 9
τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ava-
[ ‘ “- ‘ v Ν᾽ , Fd
λογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν,

Cd 44 ΨΝ 9’ “ A e A e
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι dixatov, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής.

7 ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον Cf.
Thucyd. rv. 83: ᾿Αρριβαῖος ἑπεκηρυ-
Kevero, ἑτοῖμος ὧν Bpaclig μέσῳ
δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν. Ar, Pol, Iv. xii.
5: πανταχοῦ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής,
διαιτητὴς δ᾽ ὁ μέσος.

peordlovs] Used in rather ἃ dif-
ferent sense, Pol. v. vi. 13: ἐν δὲ τῇ
εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς
ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φνλακὴν
στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ.

9 διὰ τοῦτο---διχαστήξ) ‘ Hence, too,
justice gets its name, because it is a
dividing in twain (δίχα), as though it
were written not δίκαιον, but δίχαιον,
and the judge is one who divides in
twain.’ This etymology, though in-

genious, is falee. The earlicr notion
connected with δίκῃ seems not to have
been one of decision, arbitration, or
justice, but rather of ‘showing,’ ‘in-
struction,’ ‘ rule,’ ‘manner.’ The word
is derived from a root δικ- , which
appears in δείκνυμι, and the Latin
indico, index, judex (the law-shower),
ἄς. Plato, in the Cratylus, p. 412 Ὁ,
gives a sportive etymology of δίκαιον,
in accordance with the spirit of the
work, Justice is there said to be
the ‘permeating,’ rd διὰ ἰόν, with a
x added for euphony. ᾿Επεὶ ἐπιτρο-
weve. Ta ἄλλα πάντα diatéy, τοῦτο τὸ
ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας
ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβόν.

IV] H@IKON [EYAHMIOQN] V. 115

4 a a ~

ἐπὰν yap δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ
προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον" εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη

Υ a ἴω

μέν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου
ν er 4 4 , 249 @ 3 , ee , Ν
apa ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ad οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἑνί. τούτῳ ἄρα
γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ
a a ~

τι προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι; ᾧ μὲν γὰρ TO μέσον
ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ᾽
φ ce 4 a 9 4 “᾿ , wW e ’ ᾽ a
ὑπερέχεται, αφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι at ed’ ὧν
AA ΒΒ IT’ ἀλλήλαις: ἀπὸ τῆς AA ἀφηρήσθω τὸ AE,
καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΙ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ὧν ΓΔ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ATT
τῆς EA ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ. τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ
ΓΔ. Ἰξστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο: ἀνη-
ροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον,
καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.

, A ‘ > ἢ ~ φῇ ’ A 4 ,

ἐλήλυθε de τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ Te ζημία Kat τὸ κέρδος,
4 ~ e s 9 ~ A 8g 4 , » a a
εκ τῆς ἐκουσίου adAayns' TO μὲν yap πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ

10ο-12 ἐπὰν yap—IA] ‘For, of

two equal lines, if a part be taken | A-
B

from the one and added to the other,
that other will exceed the first by
twice this part; for if it had been
subtracted only from the one and not
added to the other, that other would
have exceeded the first by only once
this part. Therefore the line which
is added to exceeds the mean by once
the part added, and the mean exceeds
the line subtracted from by once the
part added. By this we learn what
we must take from the term which
has more, and what we must add to
that which has less. We must add
to that which has less the amount by
which the mean exceeds it, and we
inust take from the largest term the
amount by which the mean is ex-
cceded. Let AA, BB, and CC be equal
to one another; from AA take AE,
and add CD to CC; then the whole
DCC exceeds EA by CD and CZ;
and therefore it exceeds BB by CD.’
The figure required is as follows :

E
: τ
ee ere δὴ
Z
Ο Ἐξ 6 σὲ τς τς D

téor: δὲ---τοιοῦτο] This clause

‘ exists in all the MSS. The Para-

phrast explains it here to signify that
the same principles of corrective
justice are applicable to the arts and
commerce, &c. But when the clause
is repeated with a different context in
the next chapter, the Paraphrast, no
doubt feeling a difficulty about the
repetition, does not again touch it.
In its present position the clause has
no meaning, in the next chapter it is
an important remark. All we can
say about its appearance here is that
it is an evidence of the same sort of
unskilful interpolation which shows
itself in chapter xi, and also in
sundry other parts of Books v., v1.,
and VII.

13-14 ἐλήλυθε δὲ---ὕστερον] ‘Now
these names, “loss and gain,” have

-»

116

HOIKON [EYAHMION] V.

[Cuap.

¢ “- ὃ ? 4 A δ᾽ ” a 9 9 ~
ἑαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, TO ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις

14 ἄλλοις ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος.

Ψ 4 4 4 4
ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ

a ~ | 4 a @ ~ a
ἔλαττον ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ δ αὑτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὑτῶν φασὶν
MM ‘ wv ~ θ . ὃ ? [2 ‘ ὃ
ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν: ὥστε κέρδους

8 A , 4 a td 9 ~ “ δ. [4
τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκού-

σιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον,
MA e , # e ἢ 4 ε κι 8
ὥσπερ of Ἰ]υθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν' ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ

4 ‘ #
δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ.

come from voluntary exchange.
having more than one’s own is called
“gaining,” and having less than at
the commencement is called “losing,”
as, for instance, in buying and selling,

τὸ © ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ

-

For | be construed ‘but result in being

| themselves by means of reciprocity,’

|

and all the other things in which the |

law gives one immunity. But when
the things are neither more nor less,
but on a level (αὐτὰ δι᾽ αὑτῶν), then
men say they have their own, and
neither lose nor gain. Thus justice
is a mean between a sort of gain and
loss in involuntary things; it is the
having the same afterwards as before.’

ἐν ὅσοις ἄδεια») In commerce of all
kinds, the law allows one to gain as
much as one can. In involuntary
transactions, the law allows no gain
to be made, but brings things always
back to their level. This non-inter-
ference of the law with bargains
becomes, if carried out, the principle
of free-trade.

ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ δι’ αὑτῶν γένηται) This
has puzzled the commentators. Fe-
licianus interprets it ‘sed sua cui-
que per se ipsa evaserint ;’ Argy-
ropulus, ‘sed sua per se ipsa sunt
facta ;᾿ Lambinus, ‘sed paria paribus
respondent.’ What the phrase must
mean is plain, whether grammatically
it can mean this is another question.
It must mean ‘neither more, nor less,
but equal to itself.” Perhaps it may

te. by mutual giving and taking,
ἑαυτῶν being equivalent to ἀλλήλων.

V. This chapter, commencing with
a critical notice of the Pythagorean
definition of justice, that ‘justice
is retaliation,’ shows it to be in-
adequate, and then gues off into an
interesting discussion upon the law
of retaliation as it exists in the state.
Proportionate retaliation, or an inter-
change of services, is said to be the
bond of society. The law of propor-
tion regulates exchange, and settles
the value of the most diverse products.
Money measures and expresses value,
and turns mere barter into commerce.
The chapter concludes with some
general remarks on the relation of
justice as a quality to the just as a
principle.

1 δοκεῖ δὲ --- ἄλλῳ] ‘Now some
think that retaliation without further
qualifying (ἁπλῶς) is justice, as the
Pythagoreans said, for they defined
justice simply as retaliation on one’s
neighbour.’ On the rude and in-
adequate attempts at definition made
by the Pythagoreans, cf. Ar. Metaph.
I. v. 16: wolforrd τε γὰρ ἐπιπολαίως,
καὶ ᾧ πρώτῳ ὑπάρξειεν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος,
τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος

IV.-V.] HOIKQN [EYAHMION] V. 117

4
ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ
διορθωτικόν: καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 3

“Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον"
si χε πάθοι τά x’ ἔρεξε, δίκη x’ ἰϑεῖχ γένοιτο,

“~ bY a ,
πολλαχοῦ yap διαφωνεῖ" οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, 4
9 a 9 “- WwW a
ov δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπαταξεν, οὐ πλη-
~ td ὃδ ~ 4 ᾿ 4 ~ ΕΣ a 4 ᾽
γῆναι μόνον det αλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον 5
4 4 9 γΊ ὃ ’ 4 9 > 3 A “ t 4
καὶ TO ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. GAA’ ev μεν ταῖς κοινωνίαις 6
~ 9 o ~
ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει TO τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπε-
’ ᾽ 8 g A A ? 9 ’ ~ 9
πονθός, κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰσότητα" τῷ ἀντι-
ν᾿ a “~
7 yap τὸ κακῶς
~ 5 Oc ’ ὃ rv , ὃ a > 9 A . e
ζητοῦσιν εἰ ὃε μή, ὁουλεία ὁοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αντιποιήσει"

ποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις.

@ Α i) 9 a ’ [2 4 ἤ ~ , a
ἢ τὸ εὖ" εἰ δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ

note. Rank is here looked at as a

ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ ef τις οἴοιτο ταὐτὸν εἴναι |

διπλάσιον καὶ τὴν δυάδα, διότι πρῶτον
ὑπάρχει τοῖς δυσὶ τὸ δισλάσιον. Their
inadequate account of justice was
doubtless owing not only to an im-
perfect logical method, but also to the
immature political and social ideas of
the day. Demosthenes mentions a
law of retaliation given by Zaleucus
to the Locrians (Timocr. p. 744):
ὄντος yap αὐτόθι νόμου, ἐάν τις ὀφθαλ.-
μὸν ἐκκόψῃ, ἀντεκκόψαι παρασχεῖν τὸν
ἑαυτοῦ. In the Mosaic code the same
rude principle appears, Ezod. xxi. 24,
Levit. xxiv. 20, Deuteron. xix. 21.

2 It is obvious that simple re-
taliation cannot be the principle of
- distributive justice; the state does
not win battles for its generals, &c.
Nor is it that of corrective justice: (1)
because the same treatment is diffe-
rent to different individuals; (2)
because an involuntary harm must
not be requited like a voluntary one.

4 τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος) Necessarily a
primitive idea of justice.

εἴ xe wd8x] Of uncertain author-
sbip, attributed to Hesiod.

4 οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων] CE. ch. iv. § 3,

kind of property. It is not a ques-
tion of individual goodness or bad-
ness, but an officer being struck
loses more than a common soldier
being struck in return, so that re-
taliation is in that case not justice.

6 ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μὲν---συμμένουσι»)] ‘ But
in commercial intercourse, at all
events, this kind of justice, namely,
retaliation, is the bond of union—on
principles, not of equality, but pro-
portion, for by proportionate requital
the state is held together. Men seek
to requite either evil or good; to omit
the one were slavery, to omit the
second were to fail in that mutual
interchange by which men are held
together.’ On mutual need as the
basis for civil society, cf. Plato,
Repub. p. 369 B: γίγνεται τοίνυν
πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος
οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.
A recognition of this principle might
be called the first dawning of political
economy ; from it several deductions
are made in the text above as to the
nature of value, price, and money.
These, though rudimentary, are able

118 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuar.
7 συμμένουσιν. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν᾽
ἀνταπόδοσις ἣ" τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος " ἀνθυπηρετῆ-
gai τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι

06

’ “" δὲ Q 9 ὃ 4 9 4 x ᾽
χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν
, Φ ᾽ a
ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ᾽ ᾧ A, σκυτο-

a ~ 4%

τόμος ἐφ᾽ ᾧ B, οἰκία ἐφ᾽ ᾧ 1, ὑπόδημα ἐφ᾽ ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν
, A a ~ ~ 9 g

λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον Tapa τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου

a ~ 4" ον

ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν

“- κυ 4 4 λιν.

πρῶτον ἣ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπον-

θὰ , ww . 8 ᾽ 4 δὲ , 9 »” 4 δε

ὃς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ de μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ
a A ,

συμμένει: οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου

-_— -- Se Se Se ae ee ee "δ ἀξ αι, ἴα Se St ee

and interesting, but the relation of | Architect. Shoemaker.
the law of value (τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς ἃς Ps
κοιν. ταῖς ἀλλ.) to the other kinds of !
justice is not stated.

τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, Kar’ ἀναλογίαν καὶ Jf |
μὴ κατ᾽ ἰσότητα] This seems to be | | LS Ἢ
written as if in correction of Ar. Pol. | “΄ τ
11. ii. 4. Διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπε- | (Aes site ite eee
πονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, Τῶὥσπερ ἐν House, Shops:
τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον. On The joining of the diagonal gives each
which see Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 52, 53. . producer some of the other’s work,

7 διὸ---χαριζόμενον] ‘Hence, too, and thus an exchange is made, but
it is that men build a temple of the the respective value of the com-
Graces in their streets, that there modities must be first adjusted, else
may be reciprocity. For this is the 7 there can be no fair exchange. What,
property of grace, one must serve in then, is the law of value? It is
return one who has done a favour, | enunciated a little later (§ 10). δεῖ
and again be in turn the first to | τοίνυν --- τροφήν. ‘As an architect
confer favours.’ Seneca (Benef. 1. 3) | (or a farmer it may be) is to a
mentions with some disdain the | shoemaker, so many shves must there
various symbolical meanings which be toa house or to corn.’ That is,
were supposed to be expressed by the | the value of the product is determined
figures of the Graces, and on which | by the quality of the labour spent
Chrysippus appears to have written | uponit. The sort of comparison here
an elaborate treatise. Of course no | made between the quality of farmer
English word will exactly answer to | and shoemaker seems connected with
χάρις. a Greek notion of personal dignity

8 ποιεῖ δὲ --- σύζευξ!) ‘Now the | and a dislike of βαναυσία. But in the
joining of the diagonal of a square | following section a view more in
gives us proportionate return.’ The | accordance with Political Economy is
diagram supposed to be drawn is as | taken,—for it is said that all pro-
follows : ducts must be measured against one

a ee ees

V.] HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VY. 119

ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου, δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι de
τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν" ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ
“᾿ Φ
μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον
ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο
ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ καὶ
4 9 | A 9 # 9 Ἁ tA ~ 4 ~
ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων. ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
. 4 a a“ > ge 9 a 9 ἤ
διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή
,ν.,4 @ 4 ’ > , ‘ ἢ ’ ’ ,
ἐφ᾽ ὃ τὸ νόμισμ’ ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον" πάντα
x a ΜΝ A A e A A 4 ΨΥ ’
γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα
4 δ) 4 δ ¢ ἢ ἡ 4 ἢ A oe ὃ ~ , ΦΨ
ἅττα δὴ ὑποδήματ᾽ ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ
οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν
a ’ 9 ᾿ a “~ 9 »¥ 9 a 3. AA
ἡ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοι-
ὔ ΄- δ᾽ 4 a wv ” 4 Ε΄ ἃ a Ν
νωνία. τοῦτο δ᾽, εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα
ἑνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο
ν >, NA 4 » θ roe , “ ’ ἢ 4 ἢ
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἣ πάντα συνέχει" εἰ γὰρ
A , “a A e U A 9 w# 4 ΔΝ 4 9 e
μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ
αὐτή. οἷον δ᾽ ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε

standard, and that this is in reality does, and, in short, out of persons
‘demand’ (χρεία. It is demand, who are different from one another,
then, or in other words the higgling and not equal; these, then, require
of the market, which determines how to be brought to an equality.’ The
many shoes are to be given for ἃ division of labour, the mutual de-
house. But the result ought to be ' pendence of the arts, and the corre-
such (§ 12) that the architect + the . spondence of supply and demand, are
number of shoes that he will receive here well stated. The terms ποιοῦν
(or the equivalent of these in money) . and πάσχον may probably have some
will be to the shoemaker + a house, | reference to the dyriwerov6bs, which
as the architect was to the shoemaker, | | is the subject of the chapter.
originally. That is, each producer Ir οἷον δ᾽ ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας
will have got his deserts, , τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην]
9 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο---ἰσασθῆναι)] Cf. | ‘Now money is ἃ sort of represen-
ch. iv. § 12, note. ‘Now this is the | tative of demand conventionally
case with the other arts also (i.e | established.’ This excellent defini-
beside those of the architect and shoe- | tion was not altogether new; Plato
maker), for they would have been | had already said (Repub. p. 371 B):
destroyed if there had not been the ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον
producer producing so much, and of a τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου.
certain kind, and the consumer (rd The present chapter is disfigured by
πάσχον) consuming just the same _ repetitions. Thus cf. § 15: τοῦτο δ᾽
quantity and quality. For out of two | ἐξ ὑποθέσεως" διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται.
physicians no commerce arises, but The saying (§ 10) τὸ νόμισμ᾽ ἐλήλυθε
out of a physician and a farmer it καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον, is repeated

9

omg

Oo

I

5

120 HOIKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΧ] V. [Cuar.

κατὰ συνθήκην: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα,
ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ᾽’ ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν
καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσα-
A“ A ~
σθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, TO ἔργον TO τοῦ
~ ~ a ld
σκυτοτόμου πρὸς TO τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ᾽ ἀναλογίας
οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας
Ψ a e ‘ \ @ Mv 9 3 @ wv 4
ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ
e ~ ΠῚ Ν A [2 @ a e 4 ’ δύ
αὑτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται
9 } 9 A ’ θ Ἁ Α Γ ,
ἐπ’ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς A, τροφὴ 1, σκυτοτόμος

eT PD

14: τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον effected (ὅταν loacGy),—which is done
σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει. The law of | by ‘demand’ or the higgling of the
value is given twice, § 10 and § 12, | market,—then simple retaliation, or
δα. ‘tit for tat,’ begins. After an ex-

12 ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθό:--- γίνεσθαι) change has been made, or, in short,
‘Retaliation, then, will take place . after the price of an article has once
when the terms have been equalised, been expressed in money, it is no
and the production of the shoemaker _ longer the time to talk of ‘the quality
has been made to bear the same __ of labour,’ or for either side to claim
relation to that of the farmer, as a | an advantage on this account. If he
farmer himself does to a shoemaker. | did he would have ‘ both superiorities’
We must not, however, bring the | reckoned to him, te. his own superi-
parties to a diagram of proportion | ority over the other producer, and
after exchange has taken place, else | the superiority of his product over
the one extremity of the figure will | that of the other (see § 8, οὐθὲν
have both superiorities assigned to | κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου
it, but at a moment when the parties | ἔργον) Having enjoyed the superi-
still retain their own products. They | ority of price already, in which the
are thus equal and capable of trad- | quality of labour was an element,
ing, for proportionate equality can | he would now proceed to claim the
be established between them.’ This | superiority of labour by itself, which
vexed passage appears to describe the | would thus be reckoned to him twice
steps in a commercial transaction. | over. Ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται can mean
There being a mutual need between | nothing else than ‘when they hare
producers of a different kind, their | exchanged,’ ὅταν with the aorist im-
products require to be equalised. | plying a completed act. It seems
This is done by reducing the goods to | unnecessary to say that the value of
8 standard of inverse proportion. As ; a thing is not to be settled after it is
a farmer to a shoemaker, so shoes to sold. Rather it is after the goods

|

----

corn ; thus, if a farmer's labour be § | have come to market, and had a
times better than a shoemaker’s, then | market price put upon them, that
5 pair of shoes = a quarter of corn; or | considerations of their production
if a pair of shoes = 10 shillings, then | must cease, The expression, there-
@ quarter of corn= 50 shillinga, When | fore, is not clear, but the above inter-
this process of equalisation has been | pretation seems the most natural that

V.] HOIKQN [EYAHMIQN] V. 121

B, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ 8 οὕτω μὴ ἣν
ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἣν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ᾽ ἡ χρεία συνέ-
χει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὧσιν
ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἅτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ
ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου
ἐξαγωγῆς. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελ-
λούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ,
τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ᾽ ἡμῖν" δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι
εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό" οὐ
γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται: ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.
ὃ s δ a , A @ 4 9 4 Ῥ 9 λ
to δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι" οὕτω yup ae ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμ-
μετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει" οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς
κοινωνία ἣν, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ᾽ ἰσότης
μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας... τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ
τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
[2 9 δέ e ~ Α ὃ ὃ σι > ~ δ᾽ 9
χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς" Ev δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἐξ
can be given of the passage. The | ing to give it for an export of corn:
words ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν are | and then an equality has to be brought
opposed to ὅταν ἀλλάξωντα. The | about.” Some MSS., and the Para-
punctuation therefore has been altered | phrast, read ἐξαγωγήν, ‘and giving
above, in concurrence with Fritzsche | for it an export of corn.’ Acdévac
and with the learned paper by Mr. H. | ἐξαγωγήν, ‘to Sip a oe
Jackson in the Journal of Philology | tion,’ occurs in Theophrast. ar.
(vol iv. p. 316), the other conclusions | ΧΧ. : διδομένης ἑαυτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων
of which are not accepted. “Axpoy ἀτελεοῦς.
above seems to mean ‘one of the 14 ὑπὲρ δὲ--- μᾶλλον] ‘ But with a
extremities of the figure’ (ἐφ᾽ ὦ A, | view to future exchange, supposing
x.7.r.) ‘Both the superiorities’ must | onedoes not want an article at present,
be those named or implied in 8 8-10, | money is a security that one will be
the superiority of the one product | able to get the article when one wants
over the other, and the superiority | it, for with money in his hand a man
of the one producer over the other. must be entitled to take whatever he
13 ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία---ἰσασθῆναι) ‘And | wishes, It is τ that hie is
that mutual want like a principle of | under the same law as other com-
unity binds men together, this fact | modities ; for its value fluctuates, but
demonstrates, namely, that when men | still its tendency is to remain more fixed
are not in want of each other, whether | than other things.’ On these excellent
both parties or one be thus indepen- | remarks nothing farther need be said.
dent, they do not exchange ; whereas, | ae ae BB fi i bigs
when some one else wants the com- | sophist Lycophron by Aristotle, s’ot.
modity that a man has (they effect an ‘ 111. ix. 8, in application to the law.
exchange), one party wanting, for in- _ 15 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐξ ὑποθέσεω:] ‘Conven-

stance, wine, and the other being will. tionally’ opposed to ἁπλῶς, cf. Eth.
VOL, II. Q

192 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuar.

ὑποθέσεως: διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖτα. τοῦτο yap πάντα
ποιεῖ σύμμετρα" μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία
A, μναῖ δέκα B, κλίνη T. τὸ δὴ A τοῦ Β ἥμισυ, εἰ
πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἣ ἴσον" ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος
τὸ Γ τοῦ Β' δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι

δὲ >
16 πέντε. ὅτι O° οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἣν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι,

a 4 σι RA
δῆλον" διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ
ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.
9° ’ A ”

17 TY μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται.
~~ [2

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον
4 a “a 9 a A 9 “a ‘ A a td w#

ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι" τὸ μὲν yap πλέον ἔχειν

AY 2 ’ ᾽ e ‘ ὃ , , 4 A 9

τὸ δ᾽ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ

ιν. ix. 7. The merely conventional society, the writer proceeds to consider
character of money is strongly stated justice subjectively, that is, as mani-
by Aristotle, Pol. 1. ix. 11: Ὅτε δὲ | fested in the character of individuals.
πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ ἡ δικαιοπραγία--- ἀδικεῖσθαι) ‘Just
νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι | treatment is plainly a mean between
μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς | injuring and being injured. δΔικαιο-
ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον, κιτ.λ. πραγία is formed on the analogy of
16 ὅτι 8 οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγή] The | εὐπραγία, and as εὖ πράττειν is used
origin of commerce seems taken from | ambiguously to denote both ‘doing’
this place by Paulus, cf. Digest. 1. De | and ‘faring well’ (cf. Eth. 1. iv. 2), 80
Contr. Empt.: ‘Origo emendi venden- | δικαιοπραγία includes both the doing
dique a permutationibus ccepit; olim | and the receiving justice.
enim non ita erat nummus, neque ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ μεσότης § xT.d.]
aliud merx aliud pretium vocabatur, | Justice is a mean state or balance
sed unusquisque secundum necessita- | in a different sense from the other
tem rerum ac temporum utilibus inu- | virtues. It is not a balance in the
tilia permutabat, quando plerumque | mind, but rather the will to comply
evenit ut quod alteri superest alteri | with what society and circumstances
desit ; sed quia non semper nec facile | pronounce to be fair (τοῦ μέσονὲ orl»).
concurrebat ut, quum tu haberes que | Justice, according to this view, is con-
ego desiderarem, invicem ego haberem | pliance with an external standard.
quod tu accipere velles, electa materia | While in courage, temperance, and
est cujus publica ac perpetua esti- | the like, there is a blooming of the
matio difficultatibus permutationum | individual character, each man being
equalitate quantitatis subveniret.’ a law to himself, in justice there is
17 τί μὲν otv—elpyrat] ‘We have | an abnegation of individuality, in
now stated what is the nature of the | obedience to a standard which is one
unjust and the just abstractedly.’ A | and the same for all, It must be
fresh division of the book commences | remembered that the account of
here ; after discussing the various | ἐσιείκεια in this book supplements
kinds of justice objectively, that is,as | that of justice and takes off from its
principleswhich manifestthemselvesin | otherwise over-legal character.

V.—VL] HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. 123

TOV αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μέσου
ἐστίν: ἡ δ᾽ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ
καθ᾽ ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ
δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ
πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ
ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ
τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς
ἄλλον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμον ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ
διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι
ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς
μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ" ἐπὶ
δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν

ς 9 i 3 [ ----ὀ DOP
4] δ᾽ ἀδικία Τουναντίον TOU ἀδίκου.

a 9 a
TO avahoyoy,

ς a ‘ A 4 A 9 ͵

ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλο-
~ 4 4 Α A w#

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος TO μὲν ἔλαττον
ἢ A 9 a
δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
ὃ , A 10 a e e ’ 3 4 φ ,
Katoovms Kat ἀδικίας, Tis ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις,

γον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν.
. 9 ὃ δ 99 4 ‘ 4 5
τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ περὶ μεν οὖν
> » ~ 4 , ς 7 4 4 4 ~ ,
εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ Kai περὶ TOU δικαίου
καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

"Eze δ᾽ ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα
4 , 9 “A »” 3 ’ 3 e »ν» 4 , Φ
ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικος ἐστιν ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον

κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστής ; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ

ἢ

18 διὸ ὑπερβολὴ--- ποτέρως ἔτυχεν)
‘ Hence, too, injustice is an excess
and a defect, because it is a principle
that aims at excess and defect, in
one’s own case the excess of what is
beneficial absolutely, and the defect
of what is hurtful; but in the case
of others, while the general result
will be similar, it will not matter
in which of these two ways propor-
tion is violated.’ That is, an unjust
award may be made by giving a
person too mach good as well as
too little, and too little evil as well
as too much. Injustice is here said
to be an extreme ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς ἐστίν,
just in the same way as justice was
before said to be a mean state ὅτι
μέσου ἐστίν.

VI. This chapter, which is written

confusedly after the manner of
Eudemus, apparently has for its
object to restrict the term justice yet
more definitely than has hitherto
been done, We are now entering on
the second division of the book, and
the question is, what will constitute
an individual unjust? This question
tends to elucidate the nature of
justice and injustice as individual
qualities, But before answering it,
there is a digression. It must be
remembered, says the writer, that we
are treating of justice in the plain
sense of the word, that is, civil
justice, not that metaphorical justice
which might be spoken of as existing
in families. On the nature of this
justice, proper or civil justice, and
on the metaphorical kinds, some

| remarks are given.

19

6

124

, a ’ . 1 59 4
γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἢ, ἀλλ
2 ρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος.
οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ,
᾿ 4 , , e f 4 . 9 ON a

3 ἐμοίχευσε δέ" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἩΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMIQN] V.

— (CHar

οὐ διὰ προαι-
ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ᾽
οὐδὲ μοιχός,
πῶς μὲν οὖν

” . 3? A ‘ ‘ ’ ” ’
exel TO GYT(TET ονθὸς Wpos TO δίκαιον, εἰρηται προότέρον “

᾿ .-“ Α U χ4 4 ’ ; 4 “A
4 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι TO ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς.

4 8 4
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

a , 9 94
TOUTO δέ εΕστιν EF’ Κοι-

“- , “4 1. Φ > ἢ ’ , om” a
νωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ

> 3 , “A , 9 ? οἷ red », 3 ~
κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν 9 κατ ἀριθμὸν" ὥστε OTOIS μὴ εστι TOU-

9 »” , 4 4 , A A ,
το, οὐκ ἐστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους TO πολιτικὸν δίκαιον,

ἤ
ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα.

ἔστι γὰ ρ δίκαιον,

e 4 ’ a 9 , , δ᾽ 9 4 10. , e a
Og Καὲ νομὸς προς QUTOUS* νομὸς 4 EF Of αοἰκίὰ" ἢ γάρ

3 πῶς μὲν οὖν---- πρότερον] The allu-
sion is to ch. v. § 4-6, and the mean-
ing appears to be simply, in the variety
of cases that may occur, punishment

by simple retaliation will not do. The '
sentence, however, appears irrelevant. ᾿

|
|
4 Sef δὲ μὴ---κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν] ‘ Now

we must not forget that the object of
our inquiry is at once justice in the
plain sense of the word (ἀπλῶς) and
justice as existing in the state. But
this exists amongst those who live in
common, with a view to the supply of
their mutual wants, free and equal,
either proportionately or literally.’
Td ἁπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to καθ᾽
ὁμοιότητα. It is not meant here to
separate τὸ ἀπ. dix. from τὸ πολ. dik.,
rather it is implied that they are both
the same. The only justice that can
be called so without a figure of speech
is that between fellow-citizens, who
have mutual rights and some sort
of equality, cf. Ar. Pol. 111. vi. 11,
where it is said that all constitutions

that aim at the common advantage |

ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς
δίκαιον. Proportionate equality be-
longs to aristocracies and constitu-
tional governments, numerical or |
exact equality to democracies. Cf. |

Ar. Pol. νι. ii. 2.

es

4-5 ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον --- τύραννος]
‘For what is just exists among those
who live under a common law, and
law is where there is injustice (for
legal judgment is a decision between
the just and the unjust), Now
wherever there is injustice there is
wrong dealing, but it does not follow
that where there is wrong dealing
there is injustice. Wrong dealing
consists in allotting oneself too much
absolute geod and too little absolute
evil; and hence it is that we do not
suffer a man to rule, but the imper-
sonal reason, for a man does this for
himself (ie rules, cf. ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ
below), and becomes a tyrant.’ This
passage does not give the oriyin of
justice, but the signs by which you
may know it. Justice could not be
said to depend on law (especially as
law is said to depend on injustice, for
we should thus argue in a circle), but

' where law exists you may know that

justice exists. The argument then is
that justice exists between citizens
who have a law with each other,
and not between father and children
between whom there is no law. Law
implies justice because it springs out
of cases where a sense of wrong has
been felt,

VL] HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. 125

3 ’ a ὃ ’ 4 a 9 δ᾽ 9 ? 3? 4 ὃ ἢ
ik κρίσις τοῦ δικαίον καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς ἀδικία,
. 9 Ξ 4 ’ 9 a ‘ a9 - 4 a
καὶ TO ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ TO ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν
4 g ~ $ 9 A 4 gv e ~ ὔ ~ e ~
ἀδικία" τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς

9 ~ a» AY ~ 4 ~ ζω A 9 φ κε
ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν: διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ς
Mv » 9 4 4 td @ e ~ “~ ~
ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ Tov λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ
a 4 t ΒΦ > ὲ © ~ a
καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου,
9 A ~ A 4 ~ κΚ΄ὶ 4 a ᾿] IAN , 7” a
εἰ δὲ TOU δικαίου, Kai τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον 6
ww - 3 g 9 4 ae , σι e ~
civat δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος" οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς
9 “ δ “ 9 8 ν᾿ > A 4 ἢ , 4 ee 9@
ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, ef μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν" διὸ ἑτέρῳ
ποιεῖ" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν
δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. μισθὸς ἄρα 7
τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας" ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ
τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννο. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν g
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον"
9 ’ 3 9 ὃ of a “ e ΄- ε ~ ἢ δὲ κι
οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, TO dE κτῆμα
καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ἢ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ
’᾽ 4 “~ e a ῃ 9 4 - tf a
μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν" διὸ 9

> » 2 ’ 4 . »
OUK ἐστιν ἀδικία 7 pos auTov.

ἐν ols δ᾽ ἀδικία κιτ.λ.] This seems to
mean that law has not arisen merely
from the fact of unequal dealings
(ἀδικεῖν), but from a sense of the viola-
tion of a principle (ἀδικία). Thus the
principle of justice is prior to all law
and not created out of it. Τοῦτο 2’, t.c.
τὸ ἀδικεῖν. Following up this concep-
tionof the ἃ priori character of justice,
the writer says we must be governed
not by a man, who may act selfishly,
but by an impersonal standard of the
right. That selfish rule is tyranny,
Aristotle asserts in Pol. m1. vii. 5: ἡ
μὲν yap τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς
τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. CE.
also Pol, mL xvi. 3: τὸν ἄρα νόμον
ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν
πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά.--- μὲν οὖν τὸν
νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν
ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ
δ᾽ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ
θηρίον. ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον,
καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ

οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον

τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας.
ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.

6 ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν---γέρα:]Ἶ The apo-
dosis to ἐπεὶ is μισθὸς ἄρα. From οὐ
γὰρ to πρότερον is parenthetical. ‘But
since he dovs not seem to gain at all,
if he is a just man (for he does not
allot to himself more of the absolutely
good than to others, unless it be pro-
portional to his own merits, and hence
he acts for others, and justice thus is
said to be the good of others), we
must give him some reward, and this
comes in the Shape of honour and
reverence,’

καθάπερ ἐλέχθη τὸ πρότερον] The
reference is to ch. i. 8 17.

8 τὸ δὲ---ὅἥἧμοιον. ‘Now the justice
of masters and parents is not identical
with what we have gone through
(τούτοις 1.6. ἀπ. καὶ πολιτ. δίκ.), but is
only analogous to it.’

9 διὸ --- ἄρχεσθαι) ‘Hence a man
cannot have a spirit of wrong towards

διόπερ Avev

126 HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V. [Cuap.

4 ’ δ ’ . a . 9 ΓῚ 3 ’
τὸ πολιτικόν" κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἣν, Kat ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει
e , a » Ky a a ~
εἶναι νόμος" οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν
A 4 ΜΙ ΄" 4 - ? 4 ἃ ἢ 4
kat ἄρχεσθαι. 610 μάλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ
4 “-
πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα" τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὼν
4 A wn ~ ζω
δίκαιον: ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.
~ 4 ~ A
7 Tov de πολιτικοῦ δικαίον τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ
4 “A ΝΣ
νομικόν, φυσικὸν Mev τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,
4 4 “ ὃ a <A ’ ‘ δὲ a 9 9 ~ 4 9 θὲ
καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν de ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐθὲν
CU A φψ @ a ~
διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ

himself; nor civil justice or injustice; whether it be so or differently, but
for this is, as we have said (ἦν), | when men have instituted it, then
according to law and among those | matters.’ The distinction here drawn
who can naturally have law; namely, | is like that between ἴδιος and κοινὸς
those, as we said (σαν), who have an | νόμος in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, τ, xiii.,
equality of ruling and being ruled.’ and also that between moral and
positive laws in modern treatises.
Natural justice is law because it is
right, conventional justice is right
because it is law. Td γνομικόν is not
to be confused with τὸ νόμιμον (cf.
ch. i. § 8), which is justice expressed
in the law, and which is nearly equi-
valent to πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, containing
therefore both the natural and con-
ventional elements. In the early
stages of society all law is regarded
with equal reverence. Afterwards, in
the sceptical period, the merely con-
ventional character of many institu-
tions is felt, and doubt is thrown on
the validity of the whole fabric.
Afterwards the proper distinction is
made, and the existence of something
above all mere convention is recog-
nised. The idea of ‘nature’ as form-
ing the basis of law, which was started
in the school of Aristotle, was after-
wards developed by the Stoica, and
still further drawn out by Cicero and
the Roman jurists, It became a
leading’ formula in the Roman law,
force everywhere, and does not depend | and hence has influenced the modern
on being adopted or not adopted (τῷ | school of continental jurists, until a
δοκεῖν 4 μή); while that isconventional . reaction was made against it by
which at the outset does not matter Bentham.

VIL. Continues the discussion as to
the nature of civil justice, in which
there are two elements, the natural
(φυσικόν) and the conventional (νγομε-
xév). They are distinguished, and
arguments are brought against the
sophistical position that all justice is
merely conventional, The chapter
as above is not conveniently divided.
We need not have had a fresh coin-
mencement with § 1, τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ,
which is a carrying on of the same
digression before made; and we might
well have bad the end of a chapter at
§ 5, κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη, after which
there is a return to the main question
as to justice and injustice in the acts
and the characters of individuals. In
his later edition Bekker makes one
undivided chapter including Chaps.
VI., VIL, VIIL., of the present edition.

I τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ--- διαφέρει] ‘ Now
in civil justice there is a natural
element and a conventional element ;
that is natural which has the same

mn i Ne a ν͵ἕ͵ἔ΄΄ἷ΄΄΄Β»Β»Β ...

VL—VIL]

HOIKOQN [EYAHMION] V.

127

μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,

»; Ψ 2 4 A > 0 a ? ‘ ’
ert ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν

Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη.

a 9 φῇ >
δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐνίοις εἶναι 2

’ ~ "4 A 4 td 4. ~
πάντα τοιαῦτα, OTt TO μεν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχου

‘ 2 Ὁ ” , ‘ “ 4 es . 9
Tyy αντὴν exet δύναμιν, woTrep TO πυρ καὶ ἐνθάδε Καὶ ἐν

Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν.

te ae

τοῦτο δ᾽

rc Ἀ-ὔ-ςὉὄ. --

τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι] Herod. (ΥἹ. 79) | ward by Locke and Paley to disprove

speaks of two mine as the ransom,
frowd ἐστι Πελοποννησίοισι δύο préat
τεταγμέναι κατ᾽ ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον
ἐκτίνειν.

τὸ alya θύευ] Cf. Herod. 11. 42:
ὅσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαιέος ἵδρυνται

ἱρὸν 4 νομοῦ Θηβαίου εἰσί, οὗτοι μέν '

γυν πάντες ὁὀΐων ἀπεχόμενοι αἶγας
θύουσι.

τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ] ἱ.2. in Amphipolis,
εἴ, Thucyd. ν. xi.: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ
᾿Αμφιπολῖται περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ
μνημεῖον, ws Fowl τε ἐντέμγουσι καὶ
τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους
θυσίας νομίσαντες τὸν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρα
σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι.

2 δοκεῖ δὲ---ὁρῶσ»)] ‘Now some
think that all institutions are of this
character, because, while the natural
is fixed and has everywhere the same
force (as fire burns equally here and
in Persia), they see the rules of jus-
tice altered.’ Kal ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς
Πέρσαις. This appears to have been
a@ common formula, cf. Plato, Minos,
P- 315: ἐγὼ μὲν (νομίζω) ra τε δίκαια
δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικα, οὐκοῦν καὶ
παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται ;
—val,—ovxoly καὶ ἐν Tlépoas ;---καί ἐν
Πέρσαις. In the same dialogue, Ὁ.
513, are given specimens of the dif-
ferent laws and customs in different
times and places (D): Mupla δ᾽ ἄν ris
ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν, πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυ-
χωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ὡς οὔτε ἡμεῖς
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν
οὔτε ἀλλήλοι: οἱ ἄγθρωποι. The variety
of customs and ideas is brought for-

a rr ee rr

the existence of an innate ‘moral
sense,’ This variety is generally over-
stated, and the list of aberrations is
mainly obtained from the usages of
barbarous tribes. On the origin of
the opposition between ‘nature’ and
‘convention,’ and on the use made
of this by the Sophists, see Vol. I.
Essay II. p. 149.

3 τοῦτο 5—ov φύσει) “ But this
is not the case (i.e. that justice is
mutable), though it is so to a certain
extent. May be among the gods
justice is immutable; but with us,
although there is somewhat that exists
by nature, yet all ismutable. Though
this does not do away with the dis-
tinction between what is by nature
and what is not by nature.’ The
writing here is very compressed, ἀλλ᾽
ἔστιν ὥς, t.e. τὰ δίκαια κινοῦνται, to
which also οὐδαμῶς afterwards must
be referred. The answer given to the
sophistical argument against justice
consists in denying the premiss that
‘what is by nature is immutable,’
This might be the case, it is answered,
in an ideal world (παρά γε τοῖς Geots),
but in our world laws are interrupted,
and the manifestation of them is less
perfect (κινητὸν μέντοι way). Again,
‘nature’ must be taken to mean not
only a law but a tendency (see note
on £th, τι. i. 3), as, for instance, the
right hand is ‘naturally,’ but not
always, stronger than the left, while
merely conventional institutions exhi-
bit no natural law (οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ

128

3 M
οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὥς.

ἩΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] Υ.

[Cuap.

καίτοι παρά γε

a a Ψ 4 “A 5 ce «a δ᾽ 4 a td 4
τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς" map’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μέν τι Kal

ὔ A , “΄-
φύσει, κινητον μέντοι Tay.
A c
4 τὸ δ᾽ ov φύσει.

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει
a 4 , - 9 , a
ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ

.- 9 4 a ‘ A
ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη,

εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον.

~ bs
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ

9 ς ’ ὃ , , ‘ e ὃ ‘ ’
αὐτὸς αρμόσει οιορισμος" φύσει γὰρ ἢ εξιὰ κρείττων,

ς καίτοι ἐνδέχεταί τινας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι.

τὰ δὲ

Ἁ Ἷ A 4 ὔ ΄- ͵ @ g 9
κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι

τοῖς μέτροις" οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ

, ἀλλ᾽ ω Α 9 ~ , in δὲ r ~
MeTPa, α ov μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, OU oe πωλοῦσιν,

ἐλάττω.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπινα

, 9 9 SS ~ 9 Α 4 e a ? )
δίκαια OU ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ

4 [4 ~ Ἁ ὔ ee. 5 [2
6 μία μονον πανταχοὺ κατα φύσιν ἡ ἀριστη.

τῶν δὲ δικαίων

A , od e ‘ or A " θ᾽ 4
καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου προς τὰ καῦ ἕκαστα

ΠΣ , 4 8 ’ ’ 4 δ᾽ 4
ἔχει" Ta μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα TOAAG, εκείνων εκαστον
7 ἕν. καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον

συνθήκῃ), and are like weights and
measures, which entirely depend on
the convenience of men.

παρά ye τοῖς θεοῖς) Of course there
is nothing theological in this allusion.
In Eth. x. viii. 7, the notion of attri-
buting justice to the gods is ridiculed.
The present mention of the gods is
not meant to convey anything about
their nature, it merely contrasts a
divine or ideal state with the human
and actual. An exactly similar men-
tion of the gods is made below, ch. ix.
8 17.

4 ἐνδέχεταί rwas}] Bekker reads
τινας, Zell and Cardwell πάντας, all
without mentioning any variation in
their MSS. The latter of the two read-
ings is supported by the Paraphrast
and also by the author of the Magna
Moralia (1. xxxiv. 21): λέγω δ᾽ οἷον el
τῇ ἄριστερᾷῳῪ μελετῶμεν πάντες ἀεὶ
βάλλειν, γινοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι. In
either case, the sense is nearly the
same, wdyras implying ‘any one

out of all,’ aa above, κινητὸν μέντοι
πᾶν.

5 ὅμοια τοῖς μέτροι:] The meaning
appears to be, that measures differ in
size in the producing (οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται)
and the consuming (οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν)
countries.

ὁμοίως 8¢—dplarn] ‘So, too,
those institutions which are not based
on nature, but on human will, are not
the same in all places, for not even
are forms of government the same,
though there is one alone which for
all places is naturally the best.’ From
the primary difference in governments
will follow manifold other differences
in conventional usages. For the
Aristotelian idea of the one best
government, see Politics 11. vii., III.
xv., ἄς,

6 τῶν δὲ δικαίων ---- καθόλον γάρ)
‘Now every just and lawful rulestands
like the universal in relation to the
particulars, for while actions are mani-
fuld, the rule is one, being universal,’

VIL—VIIL] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] V. 129

ἄδικον μὲν yap ἐστι τῇ
ἢ a ὔ A 9 A δὲ σι @ ~ ear g
φύσει ἢ rage. τὸ αὐτὸ de τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημα

4 4 ’ Α ‘ ’
K@i TO δικαίωμα Καὶ TO δίκαιον.

ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὕπω, ἀλλ’ ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ
4A 8 a 4 ~ [4 4
καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται de μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ

καθ᾽

Ψ δὲ 9 «A al ἴδ 4 ld 4 4 “-

ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖα τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ wept ποῖα
ὔ

τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

"Ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ 8
μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττη᾽ ὅταν
δ' ἄκων, οὔτ᾽ ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός" οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἣ ἀδίκοις,
πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ 2
e ’ 8 4 ’ 7 id “ e γ a ’
ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ: ὅταν γὰρ ἑκούσιον ἧ, Ψέγεται,
ε΄ 4 9307 yy. Y b id Ψ 3 ϑ # 4
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα ror’ ἐστίν" ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τι ἄδικον μέν,
4 a ἂν 4" 4 4 € ec ~ A 9
ἀδίκημα δ᾽ οὕπω, ἐὰν μὴ TO ἑκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ᾽ 3
ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν

κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα “τοῦ ἀδικήματος.

We have a transition of subject now,
a return from the digression on civil
justice to inquire into individual
responsibility, &c. The transition is
made by saying that the principles of
justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ
ἄδικον) are universals and differ from
justand unjust acts. At first the writer
makes δικαίωμα stand to δίκαιον, as ἀδί-
κημα to ἄδικο. Afterwards he substi-
tutes δικαιοπράγημα as ἃ more correct
word,inasmuch as δικαίωμα had another
special meaning to denote the setting
right of injustice—lega] satisfaction.
It is not improbable that Eudemus
here is correcting phraseology of
Aristotle, who at all events in his
Rhetoric, τ. xiii. 1, uses δικαίωμα as the
opposite of ἀδίκημα, merely to denote
a justaction. Td δ᾽ ἀδικήματα πάντα
καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν, κ-τ.λ,

VIII. The general principles of
justice having now been defined, the
question is what constitutes justice
and injustice in the individual? In

VOL, 11.

one word the will, This chapter
adds some needless remarks on the
nature of the voluntary, and distin-
guishes between the different stages
of ἃ wrong done, according to the
amount of purpose which accom-
panied it. The same act externally
might be a misfortune, if happening
beyond calculation; a mistake, if
through carelessness ; a wrong, if
through temptation; the act of an
unjust man, if through deliberate
villany (88 6-8). This distinction is
illustrated by the legal view with
regard to acts done in anger (88
9-10). All voluntary just acts are
just. Some involuntary acts are still
unpardonable.

3 λέγω δ᾽ ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ
πρότερον εἴρηται) The reference is to
the Eudemian Ethice τι. ix, 2: Ὅσα
μὲν οὖν ἐφ' dayr ὃν μὴ πράττειν
πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι᾿ αὑτόν, ἑκού-
ota ταῦτ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν" ὅσα δ᾽ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ
ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων.

R

130 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuap.

943? δ ” ¥ 40) 4 A 4 4 ΄ᾷ , ’ aq

ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς Kai μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττη μήτε ὃν
ae Ψ φΦ a A ,

μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος

é
ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ,
ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ
ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
4 ἢ , δ᾽ Ψ 4 4 a ~ ,
πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος | τῶν παρόντων τις
ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον
διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ὅλην.

e » 9 “ 9 93 9 ”~
εκῶν" οὐ yap 8π αντῳ.

[4 Ψ 4 4 9 a
γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ “πατὴρ αγνοεῖν.

‘ 4 9 a, A a 9 e 4 4 > 9 4 “ἡ
τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δ᾽
ὅν. ὃ , 2? ὶ . . . «αὶ ε ’

v, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον" πολλὰ yap καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόν-

4Ν 4 ’ \ ’ a “δὴ vA)
τῶν εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ
Τέκούσιον οὔτ᾽ Ὁ ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.
‘4 e , 9 SN ~ 900 4 “A e A a
4 ἔστι δ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ TO
a Ld 4 a 4
κατὰ συμβεβηκός" καὶ yap ἂν τὴν
»” 4 4 , [.} δ 2 [ v »
doin τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε
δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον GAN’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην
4 4 ld a ‘ Sd 9 a A ‘
μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ

παρακαταθήκην ἀπο-

4 , A A e ἤ a 4 e
5ddKna πράττει. τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι
πράττομεν τὰ δ᾽ οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προ-
4 ‘ A @ ?
6 βουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα de ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα.

4 9. ™ A “A 9 a t a 4 9
δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν per

τριῶν

ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα κιτ.λ.} | It is characteristic of Eudemus to

The same illustration is given in the
Eudemian Ethics τι. viii. 10, where
the discussion has a great affinity to
the present chapter

ἐπὶ τοῦ od ἕνεκα) See the note on
Eth, ται. i, 18.

πολλὰ yap—dwobvicxew] ‘Since we
knowingly both do and suffer many
of those things that happen to us by
nature, none of which are either in our
powcr or voluntary, as, for instance,
growing old or dying.’ Obviously
old age and death are ἀκούσια (cf. ΠΙ.
i. 3). So there must be something
wrong in the text. Rassow conjec-
tures οὐτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ott’ ἑκούσιον, which
has been adopted above. Cf, m1. v. 7,
ὅσα μήτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήτ᾽ ἑκούσια,

turn to the consideration οὗ physio-
logical facts ; see the notes below on
Eth. vii. ch, xiv.

6 τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν
ταῖς κοινωνία) ‘Therefore there
being three kinds of harm that may
be done in the intercourse of men,’
&c. Really four kinds are specified,
but the last (διὰ μοχθηρίαν) seems to
be an addition to the old list, con-
sisting of the misfortune, the error,
and the wrong, which division is to
be found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 1.
ch, xiii. The present discussion is
promised in Eth, Bud. τι. x. 19: ἅμα
δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς
διορίζονται of τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν
ἑκούσια τὰ δ᾽ ἀκούσια τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ προνοίας

VII] HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] V. 131

ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματα ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ
μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ" ἢ yap οὐ βαλεῖν ἣ οὐ
τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἣ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα φήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη
οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα φήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώση ἀλλ’ ἵνα κεντήση,
ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ovx ὥς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη
γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας,
ἁμάρτημα" ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἣ
τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ᾽ ὅταν ἔξωθεν,
προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ
ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἣ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς av
Opwros: ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδι-
κοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ

7

ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ 8

ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί" οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη" ὅταν 9

δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ
ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται" οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει 6 θυμῷ
a 9 9 ¢ 4 ’ ΝΥ 4 9 Ot Q “a , a
“ποιῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ
μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίον" ἐπὶ φαινομένη
b 3 ’ e 59 , 5 φ 5) Ψ 4 a
yap ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ yap ὥσπερ ev τοῖς συναλ-
λάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη
ov € ii θηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ ARO ὑτὸ δρῶσιν"
τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ δια λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν
ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως
δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ,
“ e A 3 4 ry φᾷ i] Ἂν, 39 » la
ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ᾽ ov. ἂν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως
a 4 a 4 a m~ ») »y a ? ᾽ φ
βλάψη, ἀδικεῖ. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ

νομοθετοῦσιν" εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακρι- |

done, and where (if the thing has

Botow, ddr’ ἅπτονταί γέ πῃ τῆς
ἀληθείας" ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων
ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπσι-
σκέψει.

Q-10 διὸ καλῶς --- ἀδικεῖ] ‘ Hence
too acts done from anger are well
judged not to proceed from purpose,
for not he who acts in anger, but he
whoprovoked theangeris the beginner.
Again, the question is not about the
act having taken place or not, but
about the justice of it; for anger
arises on the appearance of injustice.
It is not as in contracts, where men
dispute about the thing having been

been done) one of the parties must be
a villain, unless they have done it in
forgetfulness, But (in the present
case) agreeing about the fact, they
dispute on which side justice is.
Now he that has laid a plot against
another cannot plead ignorance (in
mitigation of the charge of injustice
against him), so that B (the party
who commits an act of wrathful re-
taliation on A, whom he alleges tc
have plotted against him) maintains
that he has been injured, while the
other party, A, denies it. But if A
has purposely hurt B, he is certainly

132

HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V.

[CHap.

4 ~ » e ‘ . 9 ἢ aa 4 . +

ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἣ ἢ παρὰ ΤῸ ἰσον.
ς y 4 _4 g 4 td ~
ὁμοίως δὲ Kat δίκαιος, ὅταν “προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ.
12 δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττη. τῶν δ᾽ ἀκουσίων

τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ 0 οὐ συγγνωμονικά" ὅσα

a A 4 Ld 4 Κι 9 4 4 9 4 e
μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλα καὶ dt ἄγνοιαν auap-

guilty of injustice towards him.’
Owing to the obscurity of expression,
this passage has given great trouble
to the commentators. The context
is a carrying on of the distinction
between ἀμάργημα, ἀδίκημα, and
ἄδικον. What distinguishes these is
the amount of purpose they contain.
This, says the writer, is illustrated by
the way in which acts of anger are
treated legally. In violations of civil
contract the question is merely as to
fact,—did the contract exist, and has
it been consciously violated? But in
cases of agsault, &c., committed in
anger, the fact is admitted, but justi-
fication is pleaded in respect of some
act of injustice, which provoked the
acts complained of. Thus the ques-
tion is moved off from the acts them-
eelves, and is entirely concerned with
their antecedenta. Was it a real
injustice that gave rise to them?
That this is what the writer means,
is shown by the words of the text
(8 10) ἀμφισβητεῖται---τερὶ τοῦ δικαίου"
ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν.
According to the text, when an act
of wrathful retaliation has been com-
mitted, the question is, was the act
that provoked this retaliation an act
of injustice or not? And this turns
very much on the question whether it
was a harm done knowingly and on
purpose? (ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ---
ἂν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ.)
We thus return to the general pro-
position (δ 11) that injustice of act
requires only voluntariness, but in-
justice of character deliberate purpose.
The refercnee here is to the point of

view of the law-courta, and may have
been suggested, like so much else in
this book, by the discussions in the
Politics of Aristotle. Of. Pol. rv. xvi.
1-5, where the different kinds of
law-courts are specified, and it is
mentioned as one of the cases that
fall to be treated of in a criminal
court,—where homicide is admitted,
but fts justification is pleaded :
Φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἴδη, ἄν τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἄν τ᾽ ἐν ἄλλοις, περί
τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκου-
oly, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μέν, ἀμῴφισ-
βητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, x.7.X.

ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ] This is a
reasonable deduction from Aristotle’s
definition of anger, Rhet. τι. ii. 1,
ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης
διὰ φανσομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, x7.r. If
anger arises from a sense of wounded
amour propre, the idea of injustice
and wrong must certainly be counted
among the most common causes of its
being excited.

12 ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ
μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ᾽ ἀνθρώπινο») This
would seem to imply a state in which
moral insensibility and temporary
mental obscuration have been caused
by an access of brutality (θηριότης) as
described in Ath. vil. v. 3. αὖται μὲν
θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διά τε νόσους γίνονται
καὶ μανίαν ἑνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μήτερα
καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συν-
δούλου τὸ ἧπαρρ The police courts
afford frequent instances of the in-
fliction of brutal injuries, which are
‘not forgivable,’ though the per-
petrators seem hardly responsible
beings.

VIII.—IX.]

HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] V.

133

τάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα de μὴ OF ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ᾽’
᾿ ~ A a a 4 ἢ 4 ey 3 4
ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος de μήτε φυσικὸν pyr’ ανθρώπινον,

ὔ
οὐ συγγνωμονικα,

᾿Απορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ 9
ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Kvpr-

πίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα xarixra τὴν ἐμήν, βρωχὺς λόγος,
ἑκὼν ἑχοῦσαν, 9 ϑέλουσαν oby ἑχών,

IX. This chapter, by means of
mooting and answering certain diffi-
culties and objections with regard to
the nature of justice and injustice,
completes and deepens the conception
of them that has hitherto been given.
These questions are as follows: (1)
Can one be injured voluntarily !
§§ 1-2. (2) Is the recipient of an in-
jury always injured? §§ 3-8. The
latter question is first generally
answered, and then, 88 9-13, it is
re-stated in the form of two other
questions, namely, Is the distributor
of an unjust distribution, or he that
gains by it, unjust? and, Can a man
injure himself? By mooting these
points it is at once shown that justice
implies a relationship of two wills,
and that an act of injustice implies a
collision of two wills: a logs on one
side and a gain on the other. The
chapter ends with some remarks cor-
recting popular errors, and deepening
the conception of justice. (1) Justice
is no easy thing consisting in an
external act. It consists in an in-
ternal spirit, 814. (2) To know it is
not like knowing a set of facts, It
implies a knowledge of principles,
§ 15. (3) The just man could not at
will act unjustly. The character of
the act depends on the state of mind,
§ 16. (4) Justice is limited to a
human sphere, § 17.

1 ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ de—éxdvres] ‘ Now
one might doubt whether we have

adequately defined being injured and
injuring ; in the first place, whether
it be as Euripides says, in his strange
language, A. “I killed my mother,
and there’s an end of it.” B. “Was
it with the will of both, or was she
willing while you were unwilling?”
In short, is it as a matter of fact
possible that one should be volun-
tarily injured, or, on the contrary, is
that always involuntary, just as all
injuring is voluntary? And is all in-
justice, like all injuring, to be summed
up under the one category or the
other, or is it sometimes voluntary
and sometimes involuntary? The
same may be said about being justly
treated, for all just doing is volun-
tary, so that it might be supposed
that being injured and being justly
treated would be opposed to each
other as to being voluntary or in-
voluntary correspondingly to the two
active terms (drrix. ὁμοίως καθ᾽
ἑκάτερον). But it would be absurd to
say of being justly treated that it is
always voluntary, for some are treated
justly against their will.’

εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται) This shows the
purpose of the chapter, to complete
the definition of justice and injustice
by looking at them on the passive
side.

ὥσπερ Hiperlins] Wagner (Zur.
Fragm. p. 40) says the lines come
from the Alemwon of Euripides.
The Scholiast refers them to the

134 HQIKON [EYAHMION] V.

[(ΒΔΡ,

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ of ἀλλ᾽
ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον. καὶ
ρα wav οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκού-
: AN Qe 4 ‘ . 8 e or ἢ 98
2 cov, ἣ TO μὲν ἑκούσιον TO O° ἀκούσιον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι" τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον, ὥστ᾽
9 a e a “δ᾽ ὃ ἢ ld 4 9 a
εὔλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τό τ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι
a 4 κι ae of a? , ”
καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἣ ἀκούσιον εἶναι, ἄτοπον δ᾽
vA ὔ 4" ~ ~ 9 ἴω ς ὔ . * 4
ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἑκούσιον" ἕνιοι γὰρ
3 δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἑκόντες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις,
πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ
ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν" κατὰ συμ-
A A 9 γ 3. 4 4 ὔ “-
βεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν
δικαίων.
9 A 4 ww [2 a 9 “" 4ἉΝ a ww ; [4
ταὐύτον τὸ τἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πά-
σχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν
4 a 207 ‘ ’ mn 0 2? a a
καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι" ἀδύνατον yap ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ

ς ’ Δ Qa ΦΨ 4 9 8 ~ WF 4 ‘
ομοιὼς δὲ δῆλον OTt KQ@t ἔπι Τῶν ἀδίκων" ου γαρ

4 δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντοςς. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ

Bellerophon. Wagner writes them
as a dialogue, supposing the persons
to be Alemmon and Phegeus. He
conjectures xaréxray, which appears
more probable than the usual read-
ing κατέκτα, and which accordingly
has been adopted in the above trans-
lation.

2 The passive terms are not op-
posed to each other in respect of
voluntariness in the way that might
be expected from the opposition be-
tween the active terms under which
they stand.

ἀδικεῖν---δικαιοπραγεῖν
ἀδικεῖσθαι---δικαιοῦσθαι.

For ἀδικεῖσθαι is always involuntary,
but δικαιοῦσθαι is not always volun-
tary. A man may be ‘treated justly’
by being hanged.

3 Not every one who suffers what
is unjust is injured, for injury implies
intention on the part of the injurer.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 1. xiii. 5: ἔστι δὴ

τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα
πάσχευσ.

4-6 εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν»--- πράττει] ‘Now, if
to injure is simply defined “to hurt any
one willingly,” and “ willingly” means
“knowing the person, and the instru-
ment, and the manner,” and the in-
continent man hurts himself willingly,
then it follows that one can be
willingly injured, and it will be pos-
sible to injure oneself. But this was
one of the points in question, whether
it is possible to injure oneself. Again,
one might from incontinence be hurt
willingly by another who was acting
willingly, so that in that way it
would be possible to be injured will-
ingly. But shall we not rather say
that the definition is not correct, but
that we must add to the formula
“hurt any one willingly, knowing
person, instrument, and manner,”
the terms “‘against that person’s
wish ?” It is true one is hurt and
one suffers injustice willingly, but no

IX] HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] V. 135

δ i 4 βλά ον ’ Α δ᾽ ον δά 4
QoKeéiy ΤΟ ΑἼΤΤΕΙΜ EXOVTA τινα, TO ΕΚΟΡΤα ΕεΕἰΟοτΤα Kal
a Φ
ον καὶ @
Ἵ

\ @ e δ᾽ 4 a e 4 ’ > A e #
καὶ ὥς, ὁ 0 axpatns ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν,
e » 10 a 4 9 e 9 A e A 9 a
ἑκών τ᾽ ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
Δ΄ δὲ 4 “-- Ψ “A ? 4 9 9 4
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἕν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται

2 8 eA 9 a “ e 4 ” > 9 ἢ e 2
αυτοὸ2ν avToyv ἀδικεῖν. €Tt EKWY AY TIS δι ax paciay UT

we

ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ
οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν
δ , 4 @ 1 {oa A ‘ ‘ Loe = .
εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν ;
βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται 6
δ᾽ οὐθεὶς ἑκών" οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ

8 Α Ἂ 5 » ‘ ms ἃ
παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει" οὔτε yap βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ
μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν

Ld , e δὲ ‘ e ~ ὃ ὃ 4 C4 “O 4
πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ “Opunpos 7
φησι δοῦναι τὸν Τ᾽λαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει

χεύσια χαλκείων͵ ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων,

one is injured willingly. For no one
wishes (harm), nor does the incon-
tinent man, but he acts against his
wish. For no one wishes for what
he does not think to be good, and
the incontinent man does not do
what he thinks to be good.’

ἁπλῶς is opposed to κατὰ πρόσ-
θεσιν as implied in προσθετέον. Cf.
VIL iv, 2-3.

τὸ βλάπτει») Harm does not con-
stitute injustice without a violation
of the will. Cf. Ar. Rhet. 1. xiii. 6:
ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι,
καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι.

ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴ:)] The incontinent man
may harm himself, or be led into
ruin by others. The phenomena of
incontinence appear to have con-
stantly occupied the attention of
Eudemus. They not only form the
main subject of Eth. Book vit. (Zth.
Eud, v1.), but they are also mixed
up with the discussion on the volun-
tary, Eth. Eud. τι. viii.

6 οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται x.7.r.] In
his inmost self every one wishes for
what he thinks good. ‘hus the

incontinent man, following his desire,
acts against his own real wish. This
is the same point of view as is taken
in the Gorgias of Plato (p. 466 sqq.)
It is rather different from that in
Eth. mm. ch. iv. (on which see notes),
though the word ofera: prevents an
absolute collision. The terms παρὰ
τὴν βούλησιν are rather awkwardly
introduced in the text, for it.is said
they are necessary to turn mere harm
into injustice, but with regard to the
incontinent man, while acting volun-
tarily he receives ‘harm—against his
wish.’ Yet he is not injured volun-
tarily, because the terms ‘against his
wish ᾽ constitute him an involuntary
agent. In short, in this case παρὰ
τὴν βούλησιν is made to qualify, not
the harm, but the voluntariness of
the recipient. There is a slight con-
fusion in the expression, but on the
whole the tendency here is to at-
tribute a less degree of voluntari-
ness to weak and foolish acts than
was done by Aristotle in his discus-
sions on the voluntary; th. m1. i.
14, δα.

136 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuar.

9 a
οὐκ ἀδικεῖται" ἐπ’ αὐτῷ yap ἐστι TO διδόναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀδι-
a“ 3 9 9 2 a 9 N \ 4 a a e¢ P
κεῖσθαι οὐκ ex’ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.
4 “a a
ὃ περὶ μὲν οὗν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.
"KE δ᾽ a r ’ θ δύ᾽ tA 9 a ’ e ᾶ
τι 0’ ὧν προειλόμεθα dv’ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ
9 δ ar ’ s 4 4. 4 ᾿Ξ a ¢ » a 9
ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἣ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ
Ε 2 A κι
9 ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν' εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον
A a
λεχθεν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ
’ e aA ea ’ ont . ee 2 a 4"
τις πλέον ἑτέρῳ ἢ αὑτῷ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς
A a “~ a
αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν: ὁ γὰρ
oA ζω ΄-
ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἣ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν ; ἑτέρου
a 9 “~ 9 DW 9 4 ὔ φὶ ~*~ e “σις
yap ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονέκτει, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς
καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν'
4 Δ Ἁ Ἁ A e ~ a ἤ Ψ 4
οὖθεν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ
ἀδικεῖται dia γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.
4 wa
10 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, GAN’ οὐχ ὁ TO πλέον
“ ,, 4 A a S\ ww ἢ ε ov 9 ὃ a 4 > ® 4
ἔχων ae’ οὐ yap ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον νπαρχει adel, GAN’ ᾧ TO
ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν" τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἥ
’ ’ a ’ 4 ’ . 9 a , ν
ιἴἰ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι
9 4 “~ 4 a ὔ μ»»ν e 4 4
ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς TO ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ws Ta ἄψυχα
κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ
4 a δὲ a wv , 9 4 4 “a Ψ 9
12 μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ
4 a a 8 4 s 9 A e a, 9 0
ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ᾽ ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν,
» e 3 @ 4 Α 4 a 4 a
ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος" ἕτερον yap τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον Kat τὸ
πρῶτον: εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ

8-13 ἔτι δ᾽ ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ᾽
ἔστι» εἰπεῖν] ‘But of the questions
which we determined on there remain
two to discuss,’ namely, (1) whether
the distributor of an unjust distribu-
tion does the wrong, or he who gains
by it? (2) Can a man injure himself,
as for instance by taking less than his
share? These questions are as good
as answered already; it is already
clear that no one can injure himself.
Again the act belongs to the distri-
butor and not to the receiver. If the
distributor acts from corrupt motives
he is unjust, if unconsciously and by
accident he is not unjust, though jus-

tice may have been violated by his
decision.

11-12 ἔτι ἐπεὶ---πρῶτον»)] ‘ Again,
as the word doing is used in more
senses than one, and there is a sense
in which inanimate things kill—or
one’s hand—or the slave who does his
master’s bidding—so the distributor
may be the instrument of doing injus-
tice, without himself injuring. Again,
if he decided in ignorance, in the eye
of the law he is not guilty of injuring,
nor is his decision unjust, though
from another point of view it is un-
just, for justice according to law is
distinct from abstract justice.’ The

IX, ] HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] V. 137

. 8 ᾳ ’ a ’ “ Φ Ψ ’
αὑτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ TIS μερί-
Gato τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως

, 4 a 9 ?»- 9 [4 e Ἁ 9 A g 9
πλέον ἔχει" καὶ yap ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ
ἀγρὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι ἐφ᾽ ἑαντοῖς

9 4 9 a A a 4 [2 er
οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον.

4 ζω “-
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν' συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ

a ζω a“
πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ TO ἀργύριον

ς ἢ ὃ 4 9 9 9 a 9 ) A en »ν ~ a
ῥᾷδιον καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ TO wot ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν

,» es » > 93 9 “ e , A 4 a « 4
οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ

, 4 \ sy 9 at » A ΕΥ̓͂ . "4
δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν
οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι. ἀλλ’
ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ᾽ ἣ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς πρατ-
τόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια" τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον ἢ

οὐ ταῦτ᾽

τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον
4 ~ 4 4 207 e?7 9 bY ~ a a
καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι padiov, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι
πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν
» > os vw a ‘ a ’ ” Δ
εἶναι. of αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν
Wrrov τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλλον
δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων" καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι

first case supposes the distributor to
act as the instrument of others, the
second that he makes a mistake
through ignorance. In the latter case
abstract justice (τὸ πρῶτον δίκαιον) is
violated, and yet legally (xara τὸ
γομικόν) no injustice can be com-
plained of. πρῶτον here appears used
analogously to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, πρώτη
ὕλη, &c., to denote that which is most
real and necessary, and also most
abstract as being most removed from
individual modifications. The Para-
phrast and many of the commentators
understand § 11 to refer to the re-
ceiver, not to the distributor. It
might also be taken in a quite general
sense, as applying to all such subser-
vient acts. But it seems simplest to
refer it to the distributor.

14-17 These sections contain re-

marks concluding the subject of |

VOL. IL

justice, As they correct popular errors
regarding its nature, they may be con-
sidered a continuation of the ἀπορίαι,
with which the chapter commenced.
The views which are here combated
are, (1) a shallow and external notion
about justice and injustice, as if they
merely cousisted in outward acts; (2)
a sophistical opinion that to know
justice merely consists in knowing the
details of the laws, cf. Eth. x. ix. 20;
(3) an opinion that justice implies its
contrary, as if it were an art (δύναμις) ;
800 above ch. i. § 4. This opinion
would be a consequence of the Socratic
doctrine that justice is knowledge.
Plato saw what this doctrine led to
and drew out the paradoxical conclu-
sion, Repub. p. 334 4, Lipp. Min. pp.
375-6. The Aristotelian theory that
justice is a moral state (és) set the
difficulty at rest.
8

13

oa

5

138 HOIKQN [EYAHMION] V. [Cuapr.

4 a ’ ν᾿. ¢ 9 ὃ es 4 9 ἢ 4 in
γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνὸόρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα αφεῖ ναι
9 a a. [2
ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν

a A 9 a 4 A ~ a 9 ἤ a a
Kal TO ἀδικεῖν οὐ TO ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν κατὰ συμ-

4 4 949 ¢ ~ ‘4
και στραφεις εφ ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν.

, 9 ‘ Δ et wy “- “" e 4 δ
βεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
4a
ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν 7
4 ἃ 4 A

17 φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί, ἔστι
δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν,
a ‘ “
ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις Kat ἔλλειψιν" τοῖς μὲν yap
9 ἮΝ e A > «ς e 4 a θ a a δ᾽

οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς

\ ’ 9 , a 4 » Ps 9 ‘ ’
οὐθὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα

“ ~ ’ ~

βλάπτει, τοῖς de μέχρι τοῦ" διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.
ζω οι σι a
10 Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μεν

A A 4 Ἁ [

ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,

17 ἔστι δὲ----ἐστι») ‘Now the rela-
tions of justice exist between those
who share in what are commonly
called goods, but with regard to them
can have both too much and too little.
For some cannot have too much, as
perhaps the gods; and to others again
no portion is advantageous, but all
is hurtful—I mean the utterly bad ;
while there is a class who can receive
goods up to a certain point. Hence
justice is human.’ Two ideal states,
one of the absolutely good, the other
of the absolutely bad, are here
depicted in contrast to the condition
of human society. The idea of pro-
perty cannot of course be connected
with God (cf. Eth. x. viii. 7), who has
and is all good (cf. Eth. 1. vi. 3, Ix.
iv. 4); nor again with those who are
so degraded that they could not
receive any benefit at all from what
are called goods (cf. ch. i. § 9). The
passage is a curious one, and may
remind us of the position assigned
by Aristotle (cf. Pol, 1. ii, 14) to man
in his social condition, as something
between the beast and the god.

X. Some account of equity

(ἐπιείκεια) forms a suitable comple-
ment to the theory of justice, and we
find the subject so treated in Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric, τ. xiii, from which it
is not improbable that the present
chapter may be partly borrowed.
Professor Spengel is mistaken in say-
ing that this chapter is out of place,
being introduced into the midst of
the ἀπορίαι on justice. Evidently it
is chapter xi, and not chapter x.,
that is out of place. Spengel thinks
that the words περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας,
would come in well after the words
πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς
τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον (which
occur ch, vi. § 3), as if first retalia-
tion and then equity should be dis-
cussed in relation to justice. But it
is evident that they stand on a dif- .
ferent footing, as treated in this book.
Retaliation is a principle existing tn
justice and with certain modifications
constituting it; equity is something
outside justice and correcting it.
᾿Επιείκεια has a close connection
with what is called γνώμη (considera-
tion), Ath. vi. xi. 1, cf. Rhet. τ. xiii,
And thus it is treated of by the
author of the Magna Moralia amongst

IX.—X] HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] V. 139
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν" οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔθ᾽ ὡς
ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ
ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ
τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ
ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες: ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ
δίκαιόν τι ὃν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν' ἧ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπου-
δαῖον, ἡ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἱ ἄλλο᾽ ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπου-
δαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει
διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δ᾽ ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ
ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς" τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς

the intellectual qualities, and iscoupled
with what he calls εὐγνωμοσύνη, Magna
Moralia, τι. i, 1, sqq.

To us the contents of this chapter
appear natural and easy to appre-
hend. The idea of equity as the com-
plement of law and justice is to us
perfectly familiar, but the writer saw
a difficulty in saying how logically
(τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι) equity could be | people for all other qualities besides.’
praised if it contradicted justice. The | The word ἐπιεικής is constantly used

equitable, but the judge only the law,
answer is well given above, that equity merely in the sense of ‘ good ; cf. Eth.
Ι

and for this an arbitrator was first
appointed, in order that equity might
flourish,’

1 ὁτὲ μὲν---ἀγαθοῦ] ‘Sometimes we
praise what is equitable and the
equitable character in such a way,
that we transfer the term.and use it
instead of the term good in praising

is a higher and ‘finer kind of justice | Iv. ix. 7, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές, and
coming in where the law was too | above, ch. iv. § 3, &.; but it isa mis-
coarse and general. The best illus- _ take to consider this the later sense of
tration of this conception is to be | the word, as if ‘equitable’ were the
found in the beautiful description | primary sense. ‘Ewcecchs (from εἰκός)
given in Rhet. 1. xiii. ‘It is equity to | first means ‘customary,’ asin Homer;
pardon human failings, and to look to | then ‘seemly,’ then ‘good’ in general ;
the lawgiver and not to the law; to | afterwards it is probable that an asso-
the spirit and not to the letter; tothe | ciation of efxw, ‘to yield,’ became con-
intention and not to the action; to | nected with the word, and hence the
the whole and not to the part ; to the | notion of moderation and of waiving
character of the actor in the long | one’s rights arose, and τὸ ἐχιεικές
run and not in the present moment; | was constantly contrasted with τὸ
to remember good rather than evil, | Sixasv. Thus in Herod. 11. 53:
and good that one has received, rather | πολλοὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἐπιεικέστερα
than good that one has done ; to bear τροτιθέασι. Cf. Plato, Laws, p. 757 Ὁ:
being injured (τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικού- | rd γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον τοῦ
μενον); to wish to settle a matter τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν
by words rather than by deeds; ὀρθήν ἐστι παρατεθρανσμένον, ἄς. Out
lastly, to prefer arbitration to judg- | of this contrast the idea of equity was
ment, for the arbitrator sees what is | developed.

140 HOIKON [EYAHMION] V. [Cuar.

Γ
δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι
ὔ A ὔ ld 4 “ ὃ ld 9 4 4 ? A
γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταὐτὸν apa δίκαιον καὶ
ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές,
3 ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ
‘ 4 ’ ’ ’ » 9 , ’ ’
TO κατὰ νόμον δέ, GAN’ ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου.
ΨΥ 7) Φ0Ψ e A ’ ~ . 3 8 ῃ 9
4 αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ᾽ οὐχ
er > δα , « 4 2 eo oF A
οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀναγκὴ μὲν
4 a 4 φ, 4 9 ~ A e 9 A ‘ a,
εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, TO ὡς ἐπὶ TO πλέον
’ ~
λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ apLapTavomevoy’ Kat
M 481 ie 4 ~ A Α e g 4 4 “~
ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθῶς" τὸ yap ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
4 4) 9 “~ e 9 5 3 ~ ᾽ὔ “- ‘ Ld
γόμῳ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ νομοθέτη ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος
4 3 “-ς ~
ἐστιν" εὐθὺς yap τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν
a ᾽ 4 e ld ~ 7 > 8 ? 8
οὖν λέγη μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτον παρὰ
8 , 9 -Ὠ » χὰ f e ,
τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης
καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὅ κἂν
e 4 + ae | eo ww 4 a ᾽ A 9 ΚἕΨ'ῦ
ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι ἐκεῖ παρών, Kal εἰ jet,
6 ἐνομοθέτησεν ἄν.

Wr

4 ’ ὔ 4 a ’ 4
διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος
δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρ-
THMATOS. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπα-
ἢ ’ a ; N a a Ἢ
νόρθωμα νόμου, ἧ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ
~ a
αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων
, ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ
A ~
ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὃ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Kal τῆς
, 9 “a e a ’ 4 4 A δι
Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολίβδινος κανών" πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα
“- - 4A ‘
τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανών, καὶ TO y7-
A ‘ e 4 Oy 4 [2
8 φισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές,

4 περὶ ἐνίων 8 οὐχ οἷόν τε x.7.X.]
That law is necessarily imperfect and
unable to cope with details, Aristotle
constantly admits, cf. Polté. 111. xi. 19:
περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν ol νόμοι λέγειν
ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾷδιον εἶναι καθόλου
περὶ πάντων. Pol. 11, viii. 23: ἑατέον
ἐνίας ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν. Pol.
Ill, xv. 9: μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον
πράττοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.

6 ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ] ‘ There are
some cases for which it is impossible

to legislate; you require a special
decree to meet them.’ The ψήφισμα,
like the exercise of equity, was a
remedy to make up the insufficiency
of laws. On its special character cf.
ch. vii. 8.1, and £th. VI. viii. 2, see
also Arnold on Thucyd. πὶ. 36.

7 τοῦ γὰρ---- πράγματα] ‘For the
rule for what is indefinite must be
itself indefinite, like the leaden rule
in the Lesbian architecture—the rule
is not fixed, but shifts itself according
to the shape of the stone, and 80 does

X.—XL] HOIKQN [EYAHMION] V. 141

καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερὸν
δ᾽ ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν" ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων
προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ
Κ 45 ’ ’ Py 4 , ,
χεῖρον ἀλλ᾽ ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν,
ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα
καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.
ἤ .» 3 ’ e 4 4 » ral ἢ) A 4
Πότερον δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ
“-ς A ’ ~
τῶν εἰρημένων: Ta μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ
~ 4 ~
πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ TOU νόμον τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει
ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει"
ν e ᾿ 4 ’ , . 9 ; ε»
ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλαάπτη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων, ἑκών
10. a ea δὲ € OG 4 | A qe e δὲ ὃ 4 9 Y e 4
ἀδικεῖ, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ @ ὁ de δ ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν
’ e634 ~ ~ 4 4 9 4 ’ da 9 9m 6
σφάττων ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ Tov ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ

ld 9 ~ ΨΚ
νόμος" ἀδικεῖ ἄρα.

εν ‘ , 4 a δ 2 ἃ ε»
εκῶὼν γὰρ σασχεέιὶ, ἀδικεῖται οὐθεις εἐκῶν.

Α a e
διὸ καὶ ”

πόλις ζημιοῖ, Kai τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθεί-

ραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι.

the decree according to the nature
of the case.’ ‘Lesbian architecture’
appears to have been a kind of
Cyclopian masonry, which may
have remained in Lesbos from the
early Pelasgian occupiers of the
island. Polygon stones were used
in it, which could not be measured
by a straight rule; cf. Ausch. Fraym.
70,
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μέν τις Λέσβιον

κῦμ᾽ ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραινέτω ῥυθμοῖς,

where κῦμα means a waved moulding.

XI. This chapter, which is merely
an instance of Eudemian mal-
arrangement, starts by discussing
an already settled question, Can a
man injure himself? Amidst the
somewhat feeble reasonings and the
repetitions which it presents, it is
not quite without interest in the
view that is taken of suicide, §§ 2,
3, and in the saying that it is a
mere metaphor to speak of justice

Il

a ΩΣ :
ἀλλὰ τίνα ; ἢ THY πόλιν, αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὔ; 3

w» ἃ » ὔ
ἔτι καθ᾽ ὃ ἄδικος, ὁ μόνον 4

—

between the higher and lower parts
of a man.

I ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] ie. ch. iL 88
12-20. The question is complicated
by introducing a mention of universal
justice (τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν), and
the extraordinary assertion is made
that ‘ whatever the law does not com-
mand it forbids.’ We might well ask,
Did the Athenian law command its
citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c. ?

2-3 The suicide sins against the
state, not against himeelf. This is
proved by the fact that the state
affixes infamy to the deed. In
/Eschines, Ctesiph. Ὁ. 636, § 64, it is
mentioned that the hand of a suicide
was buried apart from himself, And
in Plato’s Laws, 1x. p. 873 0, sqq.,
regulations are laid down for the burial
of suicides. In the words ἀδικεῖ dpa,
ἀλλὰ τίνα; there is a change of
meaning from the intransitive ἀδικεῖν,
to ‘do wrong,’ to the transitive verb
to ‘injure,’

142 HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] V. [Caar.

ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν.
ἴω 4 Ἐς 9 t ΤΥ gs e ww Lad
τοῦτο yap ἄλλο εκείνου. ἔστι yap πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω
4 ΗΥ͂ 4 ld 4 e @ 2 4 v
πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν,
ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ. ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη
4 “- A a A 9 ’ aA A 4 ’
ἀφηρῆσθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό" τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον,
4 > 98 9 ’ , ἢ > ‘ ἢ , τἊψΨ
αλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν avayKn εἶναι TO δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.
ὁ γὰρ

ὃ a »# θ 4 A 9 AN 9 ~ 9 ὃ “- 10 ae >
toTt eTave, Καὶ TO AUTO GYTITOlLWY OU COKEL GOMKKELY* QuTOS

ΨΥ 4 € ὔ ’ 4 9 ’᾽ 4 ’
5 ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον.
6 δ' ἑαυτόν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν
a 4 ν -ὦὦ A
ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
10. td 4 4 10 a ’ δ᾽ 0 A a ς ~ δὲ
ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ᾽ οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ
δι Α ~ a Α “~
τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαντοῦ.
Ψ A ὔ 4 e a 4 ~ A N 4 4a
ὅλως de λύεται TO ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν
Α ~ e td 9 a 4 4 A @ »#

7 περὶ TOU ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερὸν de καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω
4 Q 4 4 a 4 4 9 σι Α 4 a
μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν: TO μὲν γὰρ

Ν Ἁ A ’ Pg 4 A ἴω ’᾽ 4 Ψ

ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ
e ‘ 4 3 4 ”~ 9 ‘ 4 9 ~ 9 ᾽
ὕγίεινον μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικον δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ" ἀλλὰ
ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν: TO μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας

4 ἅμα γὰρ---ἄδικο»] ‘For it would
be thus possible for the same thing to
be gained and lost by the same person ;
but this is not possible, justice and
injustice must always take place be-
tween more persons than one,’ Cf.
ch. iii. § 4.

6 ὅλως δὲ λύεται «.7.d.] A verbal
repetition of what was said above,
ch. ix. § 9.

4-9 The chapter ends by touching
upon two points which have an
apparent reference to Plato; (1) the
assertion that to injure is worse than
to be injured, which the writer here
qualifies with a consideration; (2) the
conception of justice existing between
the different parts in the mind of an
individual, which is here pronounced
to be a metaphor.

7 καὶ ὥσπερ --- γυμναστικῇ} This
sentence is parenthetical and elliptic,
The train of thought appears to be:
‘Injuring and being injured are both

bad, they are both departures from
the mean, and it is (with justice) as
with health in medicine and good
condition in training,’ namely, it is a
state of balance between excess and
defect. Cf. Eth. 11. ii. 6,

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν) This
is exactly the point which is urged
by Socrates in the Gorgias of Plato
(Ρ. 473 A, 509 ©), and seems to his
hearers a paradox. It is qualified
above by the admission that being
injured might be in its consequences
(κατὰ συμβεβηκός) a worse evil than
injuring ; just as a stumble might
cause a man’s death, and so be acci-
dentally worse than a pleurisy. Is it
then worse to be ruined by the cheat-
ing of others, or to cheat some one
of a sixpence? The writer above
acknowledges that moral science will
maintain the severity of its verdict,
and say cheating is the worse (ἀλλ᾽
οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ «.7.r.). OF

XI] HOIKOQN [EYAHMIQN] V. 143

4 ’ A s A ΄- A e ~ a ? 4
καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας 4 τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς
ἢ ‘ ” . > 9 1 9 ὃ , ‘ δ 4 ὃ ΖΦ
(οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι

Ψ ’ . 9 ὃ , 3 εν 4 > . 9 Ξ
ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι 8
ἧττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ᾽ οὐθὲν κωλύει μεῖζον
εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνη, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν
λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος" καίτοι γένοιτ᾽ ἄν
ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ
΄- yg 4 Α ~ td ~ A 9 ~
πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.
κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητά ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς 9
e 4 s 9 a ~ 9 σι , 9 4 4 ’
αὑτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πὰν δὲ δίκαιον
ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἣ τὸ οἰκονομικόν᾽ ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς
“~ ΄ι 4 4
λόγοις διέστηκε TO λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ
anv 4 an on 4 4 ὃ a νὴ 10 ? δ
ογον. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς
αὑτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν
ὀρέξεις" ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλ-
ληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ 10
σι “~ 4 “~ 4 “-- ’ ᾿ 4
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον
τοῦτον,

course being depraved in mind is
the worst of all evils. It is not
this (ἄδικος εἶναι), but a single act
of wrong (τὸ ἀδικεῖν), that will bear
comparison with the evil of being
injured.

9 κατὰ μεταφορὰν 8e—rovros] ‘Now
metaphorically and by analogy one
is capable of justice, not towards
one’s own self, but towards certain
parts of oneself, not every kind of
justice, but despotic or household
justice. For in the theories alluded
to there is a separation made between
the reasonable and unreagonable part
of man’s nature. Regarding this,
people consider that one can have in-
justice towards oneself, because these

separate parts may be made to suffer

a contradiction of their respective
inclinations ; #0 then, like ruler and
ruled, they have a sort of justice
among each other.’

ἐν rovras γὰρ rots Ad-yos] It can
hardly be doubted that there is a
reference here to Plato, Repub. p. 441
A, 443 D, 432 A, &c. To deny the
appropriateness of the term ‘ justice’
to express a harmony between the
different parts of man’s nature is
unlike the point of view taken Eth.
IX. α. iv., where the friendship which
the good man has with himeelf is
described at length. Eudemus, how-
ever, was much busied with problems
as to the unity of the will, and prv-
bably advanced to some extent the
Peripatetic psychology.

PLAN OF BOOK VI.

WRNING to the contents of this Sixth Book, we see at once
that it includes two subjects, and that the intermixture of
these two has given rise to some little confusion. The questions
are: (1) What is the moral standard? (2) What are the intellectual
ἀρεταί 3

Commencing with the former question, the writer goes off into
the latter. And thus Thought (φρόνησις) is treated of at some
length as a perfection of the moral intellect, but is hardly touched
upon with regard to its operation as the moral standard.

After the two above-mentioned questions have been proposed,
without any statement of their connection, the discussion of the
intellectual agsra/ commences by a division of the reason into
scientific and calculative. Ch. I.

Truth is the object of both, but truth is divided into practical
and specuative. The former enters into and becomes an element
in the decisions of the will. Ch. 11.

Truth of whatever kind is attained by only five organs of the
mind—Science, Art, Thought, Reason, and Philosophy. These
then are severally discussed ; and Philosophy, after being treated
independently, has Thought brought in again in contrast to itself.
Ch. III.—VII.

The relation of Thought to Economy and Politics is then dis-
cussed. Ch, VIII.

Prudence (εὐβουλία), Apprehension (σύνεσις), and Considerate-
ness (γνώμη), as being component elements of Thought, are severally
treated of, and some remarks are added on the natural and intuitive
character of these practical qualities. Ch. IX.—XI.

The book ends by the statement and solution of difficulties with

PLAN OF BOOK VI. 145

regard to Thought and Philosophy, their respective use, and their
relation to each other in point of superiority.

With regard to the use of Thought some important though
not very clear remarks are made on its inseparable connection
with Virtue. Though inseparable, it is not, however, identical
with Virtue, as Socrates wrongly asserted. In relation to Philosophy,
Thought is concerned with the means, while Philosophy is con-
cerned with the end. Ch. XIL—XIIL

The upshot of the book, then, is, that it treats of the intellectual
dperal, These are two—not five, as some would say, reckoning as
such the five organs of truth, nor again an indefinite number, as
Aristotle would seem to say, admitting ‘ Apprehension,’ ἄς, (ΕΝ. 1.
xiii 20); but two essentially, Philosophy and Thought. These are
contrasted with each other, but in such a way that Thought,
though the least excellent, is brought into prominence, and is the
real theme of the book. With all the discrepancies of statement
which are apparent between different passages in this book, ‘Thought’
comes out in its general outlines as the perfection of the prac-
tical reason combined with the will; as inseparable, if distin-
guishable, from Virtue itself. The picture of this quality and of
its growth in the mind is made the occasion of many interesting
remarks ; but the question how the mind acts in determining the
mean, and what is the nature of tho moral standard, is left still
unanswered.

For the term φρόνησις, as used in this book, it is not possible to
find an exact equivalent in English, ‘ Prudence,’ which is generally
employed for this purpose, is not suitable ; for φρόνησις, according
to Platonic views, included the contemplation of absolute existence
(see Vol. 1. Essay IIL p. 194). ‘Thought’ is the equivalent for
φρόνησις in its general Greek sense, and it has been thought better,
in the following notes, to take ‘Thought’ in a peculiar and technical
sense to represent the peculiar and technical application of φρόνησις,
which here occurs.

VOL. II. τ

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VL.

ἜΜΠΕΙ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ
μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν
ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει,

τοῦτο διέλωμεν.

9 ’ 8 a 9 , Ψ
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι,

i 4 a 9 4 ΄- Ἣ’ 4 a a
καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς προς ov

9 ? ς \ a? wv 9 ᾽ 4 > & ‘
ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καὶ τις

I. This chapter states, though some-
what indefinitely, the question which
is to be answered in the ensuing book.
Referring back to a previous mention
of ‘the mean,’ it proposes now to
discuss ‘the right law’ by which the
mean is determined. For only to
know that action must be ‘in the
mean, and according to the right
law,’ is a mere blank formula which
requires filling up (ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν
δὲ σαφέδ). What then is the right
law, and what is the standard of it
(ris τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου
τίς pos)? In answering this question,
the procedure must be to discuss the
most perfect developments of the
intellectual faculties, for by so doing
we shall learn the proper function of
each (ληπτέον ἄρ᾽ ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ
βελτίστη ts: αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου,
ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖο»). As
the inner nature οὗ man was before
divided into two parts, the rational
and irrational, s0 we may now sub-
divide the rational part into two
elements, the scientific and the cal-

culative, in accordance with the two
classes of objects which are presented
to the mind, and which we may con-
clude are dealt with by separate
faculties, namely, the permanent,
which is dealt with by the scientific
element in us, and the contingent,
which is the object of calculation, or
deliberation.

1 érel δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον
elpnxéres] The reference is to Fth.
Eud, τί, v. 1: ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ
εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις dd’ ἧς πρακτικοὶ
τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ᾿ ἣν ἄριστα
διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον
δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,
τοῦτο & ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς κιτιλ.

ἐν πάσαις yap—Abyor] ‘For in all
the states of mind which we have
described, as also in all others, there
is a certain mark to which he who is
in possession of “the law” (ὁ τὸν
λόγον ἔχων») looks, and tightens or
relaxes (the strings) accordingly, and
there is a certain standard of those
mean states which we say are between

ὕπαρ. I.] HOIKON (EYAHMION] VI.

147
> 8 νΨ a a
ἐστὶν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς
e ΄- 4 ~

ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ

ὔ Α a “

σαφές" καὶ yap ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις emipsedeiats, περὶ ὅσας
9 4 9 ? a aA θὲ A 9 “ ε΄ Ψ ,
ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω
οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ
φ ς 4 4 ’᾽ ~ δὲ a, . 4 ἌΡ snr

ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος" τοῦτο de μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐθὲν ἂν
εἰδείη πλέον, αἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,

excess and deficiency, being in accord-
ance with the right law.’ ᾿ΚΜπιτείνει
καὶ ἀνίησιν is a metaphor from tuning
the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato,
Lysis, p. 209 B: καὶ ἐπειδάν, ws
ἐγῷμαι, τὴν λύραν λάβῃς, od διακω-
λύουσί σε οὔθ᾽ ὁ πατὴρ οὔθ᾽ ἡ μήτηρ
émireival τε καὶ ἀνεῖναι ἣν ἂν βούλῃ
τῶν χορδῶν. Phedo, p. 98 0: καὶ τὰ
μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστὶ στερεά, καὶ διαφνὰς ἔχει
χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων», τὰ δὲ νεῦρα ola
ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι. This meta-
phor is not quite in accordance with
that other metaphor of ‘looking to
the mark,’ but in fact the term
σκοπὸς seems to have become 80
regular a formula with Eudemus as
to have lost its metaphorical asso-
ciation. By Aristotle σκοπὸς was
used as a pure metaphor, the appli-
cation of which was borrowed from
Plato (cf. Eth. τ. ii. 2, note). But in
the writing of Eudemus it seems used
as a scientific term equivalent to
γέλος ; cf, Eth. Bud. τι. x. 20: ἐπεὶ
δὲ βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλενόμενος ἕνεκά
τος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις ἀεὶ τῷ
βουλενομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμ-
φέρον, wept μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς
βουλεύεται. Ib. τι. xi. 2: λέγομεν δὲ
προαπορήσαντεςς Ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν
σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν
σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν " ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν
σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον
wepalvovra ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον.
The similar use οὗ ὅρος by Eudemus
is not found in Eth. Nic., but appears

borrowed from the mode of writing
in the Politics of Aristotle (see Vol. I.
Essay I. pp. 61-62). Cf. Eth. Eud.
1. v. 8 (which is especially referred
to in the present passage), ris δ᾽ ὁ
ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον
ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερο;
ἐπισκεπτέον. Ib. writ. 11}. 12: δεῖ
τινὰ εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς
αἱρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων
πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὖτυ-
χημάτων. Ib, VIL iii. 15.

2 ἔστι 5é—~cadés] ‘Now to say
this is to say what is true enough,
but not explicit.’ This same expres-
sion, with the same illustration of the
medical art, is repeated Eth. Eud.
VIL iii, 13: ὃν μὲν τοῖς πρότερον
ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
ὥσπερ ἃν ef ris ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν
εἴχειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγο: ταύτης.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ.
Cf. 1b. 1. vi. 2 : ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν
λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προϊοῦσιν ἔσται
καὶ τὸ σαφῶτ. In the present place
there is an apparent protest against
the indefiniteneses and relativity of
Aristotle’s moral theory of ‘the mean’
and ‘the law.’ Eudemus does not
seem (according to the statement here)
content to give greater explicitness to
the idea of the ‘law’ by the develop-
ment of the idea of the wise man
who is its impersonation. But he asks
(separating σκοπός and ὅρος from
the λόγοι), ‘What is the mark to
which one possessing the law must

N

148

HOIKON (EYAHMIOQN] VL

[Crap.

ww 3 @ Vv e 9 a ’ 4 e e ’
εἰ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὁσα ἢ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς O ταυτὴν

3 ἔχων.

διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον

ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ᾽ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς τ’
9 a e 9 A la 4 [4 ἤ Ψ
ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ

ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας,

4 A a a“
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν

ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς

5 πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως.

πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη

δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον"

νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον.
iu ἴσθω δύο τὰ λό ἔ ὃν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν

καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἕν μὲν ᾧ ροῦμ
| om “~ ww @w e ? 4 A 9 td

Ta τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως

look?’ What is the standard of the
law? In reality these questions get
no answer. They only cloud the sub-
ject by introducing a confusion of for-
mules.

4 τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμε»]
Cf. Eth, Eud, πὶ. i. 18: ἀρετῆς δ'
εἴδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητική "
ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνο» τοὺς δικαίους,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς
σοφούς.

5 πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ'
εἶναι] Cf. th. Fud. τι, iv. 1: Εϊλημ-
μένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον
ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆ: καὶ αἱ
ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διύήρηνται, καὶ al
μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὧν
ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἣ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἣ
κερὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος
δ' ὄρεξιν.

καὶ ὑποκείσθω---αὐτοῖ} ‘And let
us suppose that the parts possessing
reason are two, one by which we
apprehend such existences as depend
on necessary principles, and one by
which we apprehend contingent
matter, for to objects differing in
genus there must be different mem-
bers of the mind severally adapted,
if it be true that these members

obtain their knowledge by reason of a
certain resemblance to and affinity
with the object of knowledge.’ We
have here a division of the mind in
accordance with a division of the ob-
jects of which the mind is cognisant.
And as a justification of this we have
theassumption that knowledge implies
a resemblance and aflinity between
object and subject. With regard to
this, Aristotle (De Animd, τ, ii. 10)
says that ‘those philosophers who
wished to account for knowledge and.
perception identified the ψυχή with
the principles of things, because like
is known by like.’ Ὅσοι 3’ ἐπὶ τὸ
γιώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων
(ἀποβλέπουσιν), οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν
ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦν-
τες, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ "Eure
δοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων,
εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων,
λέγων οὕτω

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽
ὕδωρ,

αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ
ἀΐδηλον,

στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊξ
λνγρῷ.

11 HOIKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VI.

149

4 a 4 > a 4 a a 4 " ζω ’

ἔχειν, ἕν de ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει
ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς
ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειό-

τητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.

λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ

4 > A 4 4 td 4 Α Ul
μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν TO de λογιστικόν᾽ TO yap βουλεύεσθαι
4 9 ? 4 4 g ‘ “~ 4
καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐθεὶς de βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ
Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων
ποιεῖ" γινώσκει ca γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ
ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
eva. Sir W. Hamilton says (Dis-
cussions on Philosophy, p. 60): ‘Some
philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Hera-
clitus, Alemzon) maintained that
knowledge implied even a contrariety
of subject and object. But since the
time of Empedocles, no opinion has
been more universally admitted than
that the relation of knowledge inferred
the analogy of existence. This analogy
may be supposed in two potences.
What knows and what is known are
either, first, similar, or second, the
same; and if the general principle
be true, the latter is the more philo-
sophical.’ The fact is, that every act
of knowledge is a unity of contra-
dictions. It would be absurd to deny
that the subject is contrary to the
object, and it would be equally
absurd to deny that the subject is the
same as the object. As Empedocles
says, the mind only knows fire by
being fire, but, on the other hand, if,
in knowing fire, the mind only were
fire, and were not contrary to fire,
then to know fire would only be to
add fire to fire. But it is qua ‘ know-
ing’ that the mind is contrary to its
object, not qua knowing any par-
ticular object. Thus from the diver-
sity of objects we are justified in oon-
cluding a diversity in the mind. But
we must be sure that objects are

really different from one another in
genus (τῷ γένει ἕτερα), before we con-
clude the existence of different parts,
faculties, or elements corresponding to-
them, else we may attribute to diffe-
rent principles in the mind phenomena
that were only modifications of each
other, and not by any means implying
8 diversity of principle.

6 λεγέσθω δὲ--- ἔχοντος) ‘Of these,
let one be called the “scientific,” the
other the “calculative” part, for deli-
berating and calculating are the same,
and no one deliberates about neces-
sary matter. The calculative part,
then, is one division of the rational.’
The psychology here is an advance in
dogmatic clearness of statement be-
yond what we find in the writings of
Aristotle. The terms τὸ ἐπιστημονι-
κόν and τὸ λογιστικόν are not opposed
to each other in the De Anima. ΔΛογι-
orixéy has not there taken the definite
meaning which it wears in the present
bouk, Rather it is used in a general
sense to denote ‘rational.’ Thus in
asking how the ψυχή is to be divided,
Aristotle says (De An. τι. ix. 2): ἔχει
δ᾽ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς re δεῖ μόρια λέγειν
τῆς γνχῆς καὶ πόσα. Tpbrov γάρ τινα
ἄπειρα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες
λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυ-
μικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν (ἰ,6. Plato, Re-
pub. pp. 436-441), οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον
καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. Cf. 78. ur. ix. 5: ἐν
τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται.
718. 1%. x. 10: φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἣ
λογιστικὴ ἣ αἰσθητική. Cf. Topica,

150

HOIKQN [EYAHMIQN] VI.

[Cuap.

4 id 4
ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε TO λογιστικὸν ἐστιν ἕν τι

7 μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.

a wW e td 4
ληπτέον ap ἑκατέρου τούτων

τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις" αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ'
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.
Τρία 3: ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ

v. v. 4, where in stating the various
ways in which the logical property
may be predicated of a substanoe, it is
said, ἢ ἁπλῶς καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν, ἢ
κατ᾽ ἄλλο, καθάπερ ψυχῆς τὸ φρόνιμον,
ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ λογιστικοῦ
τὸ φρόνιμον (φρόνιμον and λογιστικόν
being here both used most probably
in a general sense for ‘thought’ and
‘reason’). Again, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν is
used, not as here opposed to τὸ λογιστ.,
but generally. De Anim. m1. xi. 3:
τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ
μένε. However, the distinction here
giyen is already prepared in the De
Anim4, and is even stated (though
less dogmatically) in a place which
was probably borrowed by the present
writer. Jb. 111. x. 2: vols δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά
του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὃ wpaxrixés’ δια-
φέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει.

οὐθεὶς δὰ βουλεύεται, x.7.X.}] Cf.
Eth. Bud. τι. x. 9: περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς
ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ
ἀγνοῶν. ἹΙερὶ ὧν δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον
τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύ-
σασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. We before
observed (cf. Eth. 111. iii, 4. note)
that Aristotle, in the parallel passage,
did not use the terms τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα
and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα, To combine
logical with psychological formula is
the characteristic of Eudemus.

II. The last chapter having di-
vided the reason into scientific and
calculative, the present chapter pro-
ceeds to bridge over the interval
between the intellect and moral

| action,

This is done by assuming
three principles in man—sensation,
reason, and desire. Sensation merges
into the other two, and then it is
shown that in purpose, the cause of
action, there is the meeting point of
desire and reason, not of the pure or
speculative reason (answering to the
‘acientific part’ of the last chapter),
but the practical reason aiming at an
end (which answers to the ‘calcu-
lative part’ in the former division).
Thus there are two kinds of truth,
one pure, the other having a relation
to the will, and ‘agreeing with right
desire.’ This distinction is a great
step towards answering the question
with which the present book is con-
cerned. Truth having been divided
into pure and practical, it only re-
mains to see the forms under which
the mind deals with these two kinds,
and the highest developments of the
mind will be disclosed, arranged
under a twofold head.

1 τρία & ἐστί») Cf. Ar. De Anima,
ΠῚ, x. 1: φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα
κινοῦντα, ἣ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν
φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νὀησίν τινα"... ..
ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον,
νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξι. Νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του
λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός" διαφέρει
δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει... . . Καὶ
ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ
ὀρέξεως. It is highly probable that
Eudemus had this passage before his
eyes. The only alteration he has
made is to substitute αἴσθησις for
φαντασία, and to speak of the deter-

L.—IL] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. 151

ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις 2
οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως" δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν
ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ
[2 4 4 ’ “3 φ 9 , 4 4 ‘4
κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ᾽ ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή"
Γ᾿ ;) 5» 4 ©€ 9 . 9 \ 9 : « , ,
aor’ ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις
ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι
4 a cd 9 , Ξ « , a 4 A
καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ
98 4 4 ’ 4 \ , o 4 a e
αὐτὰ Tov μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκει. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ
διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς 3
διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς
τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος" τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητι-
~ 8 [οὶ 4 ~ 4 δι € 9 ,
κοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια
ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. ᾿πράξεως μὲν οὗν 4
9 ‘ ’ Ψ ε ! 4 > 59 v
apxn προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα, προαι-

minators of truth and action as three, | x. 14: δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μέν ἐστιν
with one merged in the other two, | ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ βουλεντική.
instead of calling them two with τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν
a third implied. Τούτων 3 ἡ αἴσθη- | ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν] ‘The decision of the
ow «.7.A. answers to καὶ ἡ φαντασία | reason must be true, and the desire
K.T.X. must be right.’ The terminology
2 δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία---πράξεως | here used is rather more accurate
μὴ κοινωνεῖν} The definite meaning of | than thatof Aristotle, De An. mI. x.
πράττει» and πρᾶξις to denote ‘moral | 4: νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός᾽ ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ
action’ appears perhaps rather more | φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. CF.
strongly in Eudemus than im Aristotle. | th. 1. ii. 13, where it is said that
Cf. Eth. Eud. τι. vi. 2: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις | ὀρθός is the proper epithet for purpose
5 γ᾽ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινὧν ἐστιν | (te. as a function of the will), ἀληθής
ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν Sigur’ τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων | for the functions of the intellect.
οὐθὲν εἴποιμεν ἂν πράττειν. 7. τι, viii. 4-5 πράξεως μὲν οὖν --- dvOpwros]
6: οὐ γὰρ φαμὲν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, | " Now of moral action purpose is the
οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἤδη διὰ λο- | cause (I mean the efficient cause, not
“γισμὸν πράττοντα. the final), and the efficient cause of
ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κιτ.λ.} All this isa | purpose is desire, and reasoning
compreased result of Aristotle’s dis- | on the end to be aimed at. Hence
cussions, De Animdé, 111. x.~xi. purpose can neither be separated
ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή] Cf. Eth. Rud. | from reason and intellect, nor from
11. x. 28: ἀνάγκη τοίνυν---τὴν ἀρετὴν | a particular state of the moral
εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν | nature. Well-doing and its contrary
peobrnros τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ | imply intellect and moral character.
λυπηροῖς. Now intellect by itself moves nothing,
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσι5] Cf. Eth. Eud. τι. | only intellect aiming at an end, that

152 HOIKON (EYAHMION] VI. [Caar.

, 4 4 ,.} 4 e @ [4 4ἉἫ we 3 ,“
ρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος" διὸ οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ
a Α ’ wo» Ν (Hon. ιν νΨ e ἢ :
νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἡθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις
4 ’ 4 4ἉἫ 9 lA 9 a” id 4
εὐπραξία yap καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ
5 ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν, διάνοια δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἕνεκά
Tov καὶ πρακτική" αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει"
ῃῇ ’ a ~ @ ~ a 9 ’᾽ e “~ 9 a
ἕνεκα γὰρ τοὺ ποιεῖ Tas ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς αλλα
πρός τι καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν" ἡ γὰρ
9 , , . δ' , . διὸ te ‘ a
εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τούτου" διὸ ἢ GpexTiKos νοῦς
ἡ προαίρεσις ἧ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ
ΜΝ 4 ww A 4 4Δ ld φ
6 ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὖθεν γεγονὸς, οἷον

is, practical intellect. This controls
the productive intellect as well, since
he that produces, produces for the sake
of some end, and the thing produced is
not an end in and for itself, but is only
ancndrelatively and fora particular in-
dividual, But the thing done is an End-
in-itaelf, since well-doing is an end,
and this is what we desire. Hence
purpose may be defined as desiring
reason, or as rational desire, and such
a principle as this is man.’ We have
here a resumé of Aristotle’s views in
De Anim4, i.c. Another division of
the intellect, however, is introduced,
that into practical, productive, and
speculative, which is to be found iin-
plied in Zth. 1. i. 1, and is stated Me-
taphys. Vv. i. 5: ὥστε el πᾶσα διάνοια ἣ
πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ κιτ.λ.
It is here shown that the productive
faculties of man are subordinate to
the practical thought, since no artist

produces anything purely and solely

for its own sake ; however much he
may seem todo ao, still his art as a
part of his life falls under the control
of his will and reason,

διάνοια δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ
ἕνεκά tov] There is a slight confusion
here. Aristotle had said (De An. IIL.
ix. 10, IL x. 2, ΠῚ. x. 4), that the

reason dealing with ends differed from
the speculative reason, that reason
neither speculative nor practical was
the moving cause of action (1 ix. 10:
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὃ κα-
λούμενος vols ἐστὶν ὃ κινῶν ὁ μὲν γὰρ
θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν ---- οὐδ᾽
ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ.), and
that intellect could not move any-
thing without desire conjoined (m1. x.
4: viv δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν
ἄνευ ὀρέξεως), but Eudemus mixes up
these points. He says that ‘intellect
by itself moves nothing,’ and then as
if in opposition to intellect by itself
he puts ‘but practical intellect does.’
He should have said ‘ practical intel-
lect plus desire.’

καὶ πρακτική] Kal is used here
denoting identity. Cf. Eth. v. vi. 4:
τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν
δίκαιον. Ar. De. An, Il. x.2: νοῦς δὰ
ὁ ἕνεκά rou λογιζόμενος καὶ 6 πρακτικός.

εὐπραξία] On the ambiguity of this
term, of. Eth. τ. iv. 2, note.

6 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν
γεγονό5] ‘ Now nothing that is past ia
ever the object of purpose.’ This
assertion with the quotation from
Agathon to illustrate it, appears cer-
tainly to be a digression. The nature
of purpose had been quite sufficiently

IL—IIL.]

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] VI.

153

οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται ἤϊλιον πεπορθηκέναι᾽ οὐδὲ yap Bov-

λεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ
9 tA a 4 4 9 ? t
ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται

ὀρθῶς ᾿Αγάθων

τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ
4 o A
μὴ γενέσθαι" διὸ

μόνου yao αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσχεται,
ἀγένητα «ποιεῖν ὦσσ᾽ ἂν ἥ πεπραγμένα.

4 a ~ “ ? 9 ’ 4 ww
ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων αλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.
4“ a U @ 9 ? e ἢ a
καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μαλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὗται

9 4 9 ~
ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

᾿Αρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφαναι,

’ a 9 , “- δ᾽
πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν: ταῦτα

explained already, especially in refer-
ence to the present context. How-
ever, to exclude the past, and circum-
stances which though contingent have
become historical, from the sphere
of deliberation, is an addition to
Aristotle’s list of exclusions (£th.
ΠΙ. iii, 1-10), and on this account
probably Eudemus was glad to intro-
duce the above remarks.

IIL This chapter proposes to con-
sider the two parts of the reason
(scientific and calculative) from a
fresh point of view (dptdueroc—wdrw).
It accordingly gives a list of five
modes under which the mind attains
truth ; namely, art, science, thought,
philosophy, and reason. It then pro-
ceeds to give some account of science,
This account will be found to be a
mere cento of remarks from the logical
writings of Aristotle. The chief
points specified ‘are as follows.
Science deals only with necessary
matter. It is demonstrative, starting
from truths already known, and pro-
ceeding by means of induction or
syllogism. Its premises are obtained

VOL. II.

ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη

by induction, but they must be more
certain than the conclusion, else the
knowledge of the conclusion will be
not scientific, but merely accidental.

1 πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν] It seems in
the highest degree probable that this
list was suggested by a passage in
Aristotle’s Post, Analytics (1. xxxiii. 8),
where, after a discussion on the differ-
ence between science and opinion, it
is said: τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι
ἐπί τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης
καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ caodlas,
τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς θεωρίας
μᾶλλον ἐστίν. It will be observed
that Aristotle in this passage does not
propose six terms to be distinguished
from each other, but three pairs of
terms which are to be separately dis-
cussed, part of them (ie probably
the two first pairs) by psychology
(φνσικῆς Gewplas), and part of them
(t.e. σοφία and ¢pdéynocs) by ethics.
Eudemus, taking up the whole list,
has omitted διάνοια, which he does
not distinguish from νοῦς, and has
given the rest as an exhaustive
division of the modes by which the
mind apprehends truth. By so doing

U

- 3 καὶ ἄφθαρτα.

184

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] VI.

[Cuap.

φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς" ὑπολήψει yap καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται

2 διαψεύδεσθαι.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν

? 9 9 ~
οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν

φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς

’
ὁμοιότησιν.

πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,

μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν’ Ta δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως,
@ . 4 “A a [2 ’ > ΨΚ A , 9
ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ

4. » x y 4 3 ,
GvayKns apa eorTl TO €EWITTHTOY.

9h w A 4 4
ἀΐδιον apa’ τὰ yap ἐξ

~ f Ah 4 of. 9 4
ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀΐδια, τὰ 0 ἀΐδια, ἀγένητα

4 Α 4 4 ld
καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν.

he has made a croas division, for
σοφία does not stand apart from vos
and ἐπιστήμη, but includes them, and
surely so complex an idea as ‘philo-
sophy ’ ought not to be placed on the
same level with the intuitions of the
reason, the simplest and deepest
forms of the mind. In ch. vi. § 2,
however, the logical exhaustiveness of
the division is made the only ground
for proving that the principles of
science are apprehended by reason.

ὑπολήψει γὰρ---διαψεύδεσθαι) ‘For
conception and opinion may be false.’
This is suggested probably by Ar.
Post. Anal. τι. xix. 7: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν
περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν,
αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχον-
ται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός,
ἀληθῆ 8 ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, x.7.X.
In Ar. De An, ul. iii. 7, ὑπόληψις
is used in so general a sense for the
apprehensions of the mind as to in-
clude ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις.
If opposed (as here) to scientific cer-
tainty, it comes to very much the
same as δόξα.

2 ἐπιστήμη μὲν---πιστητόν) ‘ Now
what science is, will be clear from the
following considerations, if we wish
to speak exactly and not be misled by
resemblances. We all conceive that
what we know is necessarily what it
is—if it be so only contingently, as

~ a” >
ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι,

ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα

soon as it is out οὗ our ken, we can-
not tell whether it be so or not.
Therefore the object of science is
necessary matter.’

ταῖς ὁμοιότησι»} i.e. the various
analogical and inaccurate uses of the
word ‘knowledge.’ ᾿Επιστήμη is to
be defined ἁπλῶς and not καθ᾽
ὁμοιότητα, cf. Eth. v. vi. 4. The
present passage is taken from Post.
Anal, τ. ii. 1: ᾿Επίστασθαι δὲ oldue?
ἕκαστον dw\Gs—éray τήν τ᾽ αἰτίαν
οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά
ἐστι», ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ
ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ᾽ ἄλλως ἔχειν.---ὥστε
οὗ ἁπλῶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνα.-
τον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν} ‘Out of the reach
of our observation.” Θθεωρ, here re-
tains more of its original sense of
‘seeing’ than generally ; cf. e.g. ch. i.
§ 5: & μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα
κιὶλ, Eth. τ. vii 21. In the follow-
ing chapter, § 4, θεωρεῖν is used for
to ‘consider’ or ‘ speculate,’ though
not in the special sense of philoso-
phical speculation.

τὰ δ᾽ ἀΐδια κιτ.λ.}] For a specimen
of ‘things eternal’ cf. Eth. 111. iii. 3,
and see note.

3 ἔτι διδακτὴ---συλλογισμῷ] ‘ Again
all science appears capable of being
imparted by demunstration, and the
matter of science appears capable of

ΠῚ. HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. 155

διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν' ἡ μὲν
γὰρ δ’ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ, ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ
ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ σνλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν
καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχἀὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ
ἔστι συλλογισμός" ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη 4
ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν
τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς" ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύη καὶ γνώριμοι

being so apprehended. But all de-
monstration depends on pre-exiatent
knowledge (as we say in analytics
also), for it proceeds either by induc-
tion or syllogism.’

ὥσπερ λέγομεν] This is a general
mode of expression, not a particular
reference ; some MSS, however read
ἐλέγομεν. Eudemus, as we know,
wrote a book on analytics (cf. Vol. I.
Essay I. p. 32). In his Ethics, π. vi.
5, he speaks, as here, generally of
analytics, δῆλον δ᾽ ὃ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι
ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. In the
present passage he is borrowing, not
quoting, from the opening of Aris-
totle’s Post. Anal. Πᾶσα διδασκαλία
καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προῦ-
παρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. It is the
first proof of knowing a thing to be
able to impart it, cf. Metaphys. 1. i.
12: ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ
δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν. Hence, by
association with the idea of science,
διδασκαλία comes to be almost iden-
tical with demonstration, cf. Sophist.
Elench. it. 1: Ἔστι δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ
διαλόγεσθαι λόγων τέτταρα γένη, διδα-
σκαλικοὶὲ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ
καὶ ἐριστικοί, διδασκαλικοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐκ
τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἑκάστον μαθήματος
καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν
συλλογιζόμενοι, δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν
μανθάνοντα. Cf. ἰδ. x. 11.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς κιτ.λ.] This
is taken from Post. Anal. 1, i. 2:
where Aristotle, having said that all

knowledge, adds that this is true with
regard to the mathematics, and also
in dialectical arguments, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους of τε διὰ συλλο-
γισμῶν καὶ οἱ &’ ἐπαγωγῆς " ἀμφότεροι
γὰρ διὰ προγειγνωσκομένων ποιοῦνται
τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες
ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ
καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ᾽
ἕκαστον. What Aristotle had said
of dialectical arguments, Eudemus
applies to science, which he accord-
ingly asserts to be sometimes induc-
tive. His further assertion that the
principles of deductive science are
obtained by induction is inconsistent
with the conclusion of ch. vi., though
it agrees with Ar. Post. Anal, τι. xix.
6. In fact ἐπαγωγὴ seems to be used
by Aristotle in the Post. Anal, as
equivalent to that amount of expe-
rience which is the condition, not the
cause, of necessary truths. Cf. ἐδ. 1.
i. 4.

4 ἡ μὲν---ἀναλυτικοῖ!})] ‘Science,
then, is a demonstrative state of mind,
with all the other qualifications which
we add in analytics.’ Cf. Ar. Post.
Anal. τ. ii. 2: ᾿Ανάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδει-
κτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ᾽ εἶναι
καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωρι-
μωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ
συμπεράσματος. Aristotle, in Ais ac-
count of science, represents it from
its objective side as a deduction of
ideas rather than as a state of mind.

ὅταν---γὰρ ἐπιστήμην] ‘For a man

demonstration depends on previous _ knows when he is convinced, and is

156 HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VI. [Cuar.

9.0 2 ες ? , ee 4 Ν Α κι “-
αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ apxal, ἐπίσταται, εἰ γὰρ μὴ μάλλον τοὺ
4 4 lca A 9
συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.
4 ~
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
“~ 4 4
4 Tov δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν Kal
σι ἢ
2 πρακτόν, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πράξις" πιστεύομεν δὲ
a
ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ
΄ι a

λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-
“-ᾧ ‘ 9 δὲ ’ ey ay ’ . 2 .
τικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχονται ὑπ΄ ἀλλήλων" οὔτε yap
ε ~ 4 wv e ‘4 ~ 9 , 9 4 δ' e
3 ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πράξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ 0 ἡ

4 4 ὔ 9 A 4 4 @ ‘ 4
οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου

4

ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις OU μετὰ λόγου

‘A
ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν

4 9 «A 4 9 a ld
TEept αὐτῶν Καὶ TOS ἐξωτ ἐριίκοίς λόγοις.

sure of the premises; since if he is
not more sure of them than of the
conclusion, the knowledge which he
has will be only accidental.’ Taken
from Post, Anal, τ. ii. 1; ᾿Επίστασθαι
δὲ οἰόμεθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν
σοφιστικὸν τρόπον κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
x.7.\. To know results without the
proofs Aristotle called ‘accidental’
knowledge, and this mode of know-
ledge he attributed to the Sophiats ;
cf. Metaphys. v. ii. &c.

wwrety] Cf. Sophist. Elench, ii. 1
(l.c.) : δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα.
Infra, ch. viii. 86 : τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύου-
σιν ol νέοι, ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν.

IV. Eudemus altered the list of
mental operations given by Aristotle
(Post. Anal. lc.) only by the position
of νοῦς, which in first stating his list
Eudemus places at the end, probably
because, having separated it from
διάνοια, he was uncertain about its
admission ; afterwards he discusses it
before σοφία, as being prior to it in
order of time. The list then appears
in Aristotle, διάνοια γοῦς, ἐπιστήμη
τέχνη, φρόνησις σοφία ; in Eudemus,

ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία,
γοῦς (afterwards νοῦς, copia), This

chapter, in treating of art, gives but
8 scanty account, apparently bor-
rowed from different passages in the
Metaphysics of Aristotle. Art, like
action, belongs to the sphere of the
contingent, but its difference from
action is universally recognised {(πισ-
τεύομεν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ. Ady.) As shown
by an instance, it consists in ‘a pro-
ductive state of mind in harmony with
a true law.’ It has to do with pro-
ducing and contriving the production
of things that fall neither under the
law of nature nor necessity. Rather
art deals with the same objects as
chance, by which it is often assisted.

1-2 τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου --- λόγοις}
‘ Now contingent matter includes the
objects both of production and action,
but production and action are dif-
ferent. On this point even popular
notions sufficiently bear us out.’
With regard to ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, cf.
Eth, τ. xiii. 9, and see Vol. I. Essays,
Appendix B.

3 ἐπεὶ δ'---κοιητικὴ] ‘But since
architecture is an art, and may be
defined as (ὅπερ) a certain state of
mind rationally (μετὰ λόγου) pro-
ductive, and there is no art which is
not a rationally productive state of

IlI.—IV.] HOIKON (EYAHMION] VI. 157
εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, ἔστι δὲ 4

τέχνη πάσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν
ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι,
καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ᾽
οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἣ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν,
οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν

ἀρχήν.

mind, nor again any such state which
is not an art: art must be the same
as “productive state of mind rightly
directed.” ’ The procedure here is to
take a species of art, and, abstracting
what is peculiar, to leave the generic
conception remaining, which thus is
taken as the definition of the genus.

ὅπέρ] A logical formula implying
identity, convertibility of terms, cf.
Eth. vit. xiii. 1: οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ
κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη] This is a
slight discrepancy from Aristotle, who
speaks of three modes of production,
art, faculty, and intellect, without,
however, specifying the difference
between them, Jfetaphys. vi. vii. 3:
κἄσαι δ᾽ εἰσὶν al ποιήσεις ἣ ἀπὸ τέχνης
ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας. I.
Χ. vil. 3: ποιητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ
τοιοῦντι καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιουμένῳ τῆς κινή-
σεως ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν εἴτε
τέχρη τις εἴτ᾽ ἄλλη τις δύναμις.

4 ἐστὶ δὲ --- ποιουμένῳ] ‘Now all
art is about creation, and the con-
triving and considering how some-
thing may be created of those things
whose existence is contingent, and
whose efficient cause exists in the
producer and not in the thing pro-
duced.’ There is not any distiuction
intended between τεχράζειν and
θεωρεῖν. The absence of the article
before θεωρεῖν shows that these
belong to the same idea; they are

9 4 δὲ 4 ~ Ψ 4 4
ἔπει ὃε ποίησις καὶ πράξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν
τέ ͵ 9 λ᾽ ᾽ ’ 4

ἔχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πραξεως εἶναι,

4 ’ ‘
και τρόπον Ttiva

both only an expansion of the term
γένεσιν, and are not to be separated
from it, as if the writer was describing
different stages in the process of
art. We find τεχνάζειν used by Aris-
totle simply in the sense of ‘con- °
triving,’ Pol. 1. xi. 12: ἀμφότεροι γὰρ
ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι μονοπωλίαν
1b, νι. ν. 8: τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν
εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ κιτ.λ.] Taken from Aris-
totle, Metaphys. x. vii. 3 (14) CE.
V. i. 5: τῶν μὲν ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ
ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς
τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι
ἡ προαίρεσις. There is the same
classification of causes here as in Eth.
11. iii, 7, into nature, necessity,
chance, and the human intellect. On
Aristotle's conception of nature, see
Vol. I. Essay V.

5 καὶ τρόπον τινὰ---τέχνη] ‘ And
in a way chance and art are concerned
with the same objects.’ Eudemuzs,
taking this observation from Aristotle,
illustrates it, after his own fashion,
with a quotation from Agathon. Cf.
Metaphys. vi. vii. 4: τδύτων (ποιή-
cewy) δέ reves γίγνονται καὶ ἀπὸ Tavro-
μάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ φύσεως γιγνομένοις.
Cf. 716. vi. ix. 1, where the following
question is started: ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν ris
διὰ τί τὰ μὲν ylyrera: καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ἀπὸ
ταὐτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὔ, οἷον
οἰκία. The answer is, that there is a

158

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

[Crap.

‘ ee ee ae e ’ ν ε , ’ ν 2
περὶ TA αὐτὰ ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἢ τέχνη, καθαπερ καὶ ᾿Α-

γάθων φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε χαὶ τύχη τέχνην.

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου

ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽

4 g [ 4
ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ

λόγου Ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως

Μ
ἔχειν».

Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες

principle of self-movement in the
matter to be operated on in the one
case, but not in the other. That the
devices of art are often suggested,
and its results assisted, by chance,
need not be confirmed by examples ;
but while art is thus assisted by
chance, on the other hand, it is the
main object of art to eliminate chance.
Cf. Metaphys. τ. i. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ
ἐμπειρία τέχνην érolncer, ws φησὶ
Πῶλος, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία
τύχην. The theory οὗ art is but
meagre in the writings of Aristotle.
His great defect with regard to the
subject is, his not having entered
into the philosophy of the imagination.
Yet still he gives us remarks of far
greater interest than what is contained
in the brief resumé of Eudemus, cf.
especially the saying, Metaphys. VL vii.
4, that ‘all things are done by art,
of which the idea exists in the mind,’
ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν
τῇ γνχῇ, and add Post, Anal. τι. xix.
4: ἐκ δ᾽ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμή-
σαντὸς τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ
ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἃν ἐν ἅπασιν ὃν
ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ
ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης,
ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

V. Thought (φρόνησις) is next dis-
cussed. Its nature we learn from the
use of the word ‘thoughtful’ (φρόνιμοι)
to denote those who take good counsel

with regard to the general ordering
of life. This subject admita of no
scientific demonstration ; again, it is
different from art. We see the quality
of ‘thought’ exemplified in such men
as Pericles, who know what is good
for themselves and othera. This
knowledge and insight is preserved
by temperance, which hence gets its
name (σωφροσύνη. Art admita of
degrees of excellence, but ‘thought’
does not. Voluntary error in art is
better than non-voluntary, but the
reverse in ‘thought,’ which thus is
shown to be more than a mere quality
of the intellect,—it becomes part of
ourselves (φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστι λήθη).

I περὶ δὲ φρονήσεωΞ)] From Socrates
to Eudemus we may trace a distinct
progress with regard to the doctrine
of φρὄνησις. Socrates said ‘virtue is
knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη). Plato first
‘ virtue is,’ afterwards ‘virtue implies
thought’ (φρόνησιε),. Cf. Deno, Ὁ.
98 Ὁ: διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρό-
wow ἡ ἀρετή, Theatet. p. 176 B:
ὁμοίωσις δὲ (τῷ θεῷ) δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον
μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. Phado, p.
69 A: ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν,
ἀνθ᾽ οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάτ-
τεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα
καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρα-
σκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἧ, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ
σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ξυλλήβ-
δην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως,
καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογεγνομένων

IV.—V.]

’ ’ 4 ὔ
τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονιμους.

HOIKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΝΊ VI.

159

δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι

τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ

la
συμφέροντα,
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ

4 ’
Tous πέρι Tt

daiov εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη.
ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων " χωριζόμενα δὲ
φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλή-
λων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις (ὦ ἡ τοιαύτη
ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης, This
‘thought,’ however, he defined as the
contemplation of the absolute (Phedo,
Ῥ. 79 Ὁ), and thus identified the
moral consciousness with philosophy
(see Vol. I. Essay IIL p. 194).
Aristotle, as we have already seen
( Post. Anal, 1. xxxiii. 8, quoted on ch.
iii, 1), proposed as a subject for dis-
cussion the distinction between φρόνη-
σις and σοφία. With him φρόνησις
was gradually coming to assume its
distinctive meaning as practical wis-
dom ; but this was not always clearly
marked. Cf. Topica, v. vi. 10, where
it is said to be the essential property
of φρόνησις to be the highest con-
dition of the reasoning faculty (τὸ
Aoyuwrrixéy), just as it is of temperance
to be the highest condition of the
appetitive part. In another place of
the Topics (Iv. ii. 2) it is incidentally
mentioned that some think φρόνησις
to be both a virtue and also a science,
but that it is not universally conceded
to be a science, Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἡ
φρόνησις ἀρετή re καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι,
καὶ οὐδέτερον τῶν γενών ὑπ᾽ οὐδετέρου
περιέχεσθαι" οὐ μὴν ὑπὸ πάντων γε
σνγχωρεῖται τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην
εἶναι. In the Politics, ττι. iv. 17, it
is said to be the only virtue properly
belonging toaruler. Ἢ δὲ φρόνησις
ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη ᾿ τὰς γὰρ

a 4a 4 on) “-ο
ποία πρὸς τὸ εὑ ζῆν.

4 φ a 4 6 “a
οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἧ

Ἂν @ ‘
σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ 2

φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπου-

Φ 4 72
ὥστε καὶ ὅλως
βουλεύεται δ᾽ οὐθεὶς περὶ 3

ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ
Τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων.
᾿Αρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ
φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής. Thus it
is used for practical wisdom, but ina
broad general sense, with reference to
state affairs rather than to individual
life, implying, however, an absolute
consciousness as opposed to ἀληθὴς
δόξα. Frequently Aristotle uses φρό-
ynows simply to denote ‘thought’ or
‘wisdom,’ without reference to its
sphere. Cf. Eth. 1. vi. 11, 1. viii. 6,
&c. Finally, it appears in its distinc-
tive sense, De An. 1. ii. 9. ‘ Anaxa-
goras says that all animals possess
γοῦς ; they certainly do not all possess
equally the reason that gives what
we call “thought.”’ οὐ φαίνεται δ᾽ 8
γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν
ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει. Rhet. 1. ix. 11:
φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας, καθ᾽
ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν
καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων» εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.
Eth, x. viii. 3, where there is ἃ con-
trast between the life of contempla-
tion and of practical virtue, φρόνησις
is spoken of as inseparably connected
with the latter, while the happiness
of contemplation by the pure reason
is something apart. In the present
book we have the Eudemian expo-
sition and development of Aristotle's
theory, which entirely contrasts ¢pé-
νησις with σοφία, and limits the for-
mer to the regulation of individual
life.

4 βουλεύεται δ᾽ ovfels] A verbal

160

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

[Cuap.

~ 9 g ww: 4 4 ὯΑ ΄ 4 4 Ί 9 ~
τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
“ σ 9 3 4 , 4 9 4 ᾽ a
πρᾶξαι" ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ᾽ «ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ᾽
e 9 4 > ὔ ν᾿ eo ’ 9 9 td
ai ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπό-
[2 Q 9 [2 A wv a 9 w»#
δειξις (πάντα yap ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι
o 4 ΄ 4 4 ’ ἂν 9 an Υ 4
βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων), οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ
φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται
4 ‘ 4 4 δ᾽ Ψ A ,
TO πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος

, Α 4
4 πράξεως Kat ποιήσεως.

λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν

ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
Kaka’ τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ

’ 9 Ν ΘΚ , 9 A. ε 4 ’ ’
δ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη" ἔστι γὰρ αντὴ 7 εὐπραξία τέλος,

διὰ

~ 4 4 A s f 4 ἢ
τοῦτο [Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα
> 4 ‘ e a 3 θὰ 4 b) - 9 νθ , δύ
εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται

ry 4 A
θεωρεῖν" εἶναι de τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ

a ,
TOUS TOALTIKOUS,

¢ “” ld φ [4 4 [2
6 γορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν,

A ‘ é ε ,
de τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν.

repetition of ch. i.§ 6. Cf. δ ιλ. Bud.
1, x. 9 (l.c.)

4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ] A repetition of ch,
ii. § 5.

δ διὰ τοῦτο---πολιτικού!})] ‘Hence
we consider such men as Pericles
“thoughtful,” because they have a
faculty of perceiving what is good for
themselves and good for men in general.
And we attribute the same character
to those who have a turn for the
inanagement of households and of state

ww a 4 A ὔ
ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσα-

σώζει
οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν

| Wrong, or, as it is here put, about

| ‘the end’ (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) of actions.

affairs.’ On φρόνησις as a quality for |

the ruler of a state, cf. Ar. Pol, 111, iv,
17 (Lc.), and on the connection estab-
lished by Eudemus bet ween thought for
the individual, for the family, and for
the state, see below, ch. viii. § 1, note.

ἔνθεν»---ὑπόληψω] ‘ Hence it is that
we call temperance by its present
name (σωφροσύνη) as preserving one’s
thought (σώξουσαν τὴν φρόνησυ), and
this is the kind of conception which
it preserves,’ t.c. a moral conception
(περὶ τὸ πρακτόν) about the right and

The false etymology here given
comes from Plato's Cratylus, p. 411 Ὁ,
where, after a sportive derivation of
φρόνησις, that of σωφροσύνη is added:
Ἢ φρόνησις " φορᾶς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ῥοῦ
νοήσις. Ely δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν
φορᾶς ἀλλ᾽ οὖν περί γε τὸ φέρεσθαί
ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἣ γνώμη παντάπασι
δηλοῖ γονῆς σκέψιν καὶ νώμησιν " τὸ
γὰρ νωμᾶν καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν ταὐτόν. εἰ
δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν
ois’ τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα σημαίνει
γιγνόμενα ἀεὶ εἶναι" τούτου οὖν ἐφίεσθαι
τὴν ψνχὴν μηνύει τὸ ὄνομα ὃ θέμενος
τὴν νεόεσιν. οὐ γὰρ νόησις τὸ ἀρχαῖον
ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἢ ει ἔδει λέγειν
δύο, γεόεσιν. σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὗ
pov δὴ ἑἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως. Of course
σωφροσύνη merely means ‘sound-
mindedness.’ But the whole concep-
tion of the relation of Temperance to
‘Thought’ here given agrees with
Plato, Repub. 518, 0-E

vi

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

161

διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, οἷον

ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ
ῷ᾽ ὦ 4 ld > “ δὲ ὃ a ὔ oc e δ 4 <A c

οὗ ἕνεκα Ta πρακτὰ" τῷ de διεφθαρμένῳ δὲ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην
εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ
τοῦθ᾽ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν" ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία
φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς: ὥστ᾽’ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι

4 ’ 4 κ᾿ \ . 3 ’ 4 ‘ ,

μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν"
καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνη ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ

4 iy Ψ 4 4 a 9 g
φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς aperas.
ὅτι ἀρετή τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

» ἀλλὰ μὴν---τέχνη] ‘It must be
added, that while in art there are
degrees of excellence, there are none
in thought ; and while in art he that
errs voluntarily is the better, he that
does so in thought is the worse, as is
the case with the virtues also. There-
fore it is plain that thought is a sort
of virtue and not an art.’ ‘Hrvops,
as contrasted with alperidrepos, stands
for ἧττον alperds. The phrase ἀρετὴ
τέχνης occurs again ch. vii. § 1.
The present passage probably has
reference to Topica, tv. ii. 2 (L¢.),
δοκεῖ yap ἐνίοις ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετή re
καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, where ἐπιστήμη
answers to τέχνη in the place before
us. To say that there are no degrees
of oxcellence in ‘thought’ gives it an
absolute character, just 8810 issaid that
there are degrees in the understand-
ing, but not in the reason. Common
language would admit of degrees in
thoughtfulness. Cf. Ar. Metaphys. Li. 2:
διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθη-
τικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν
ἐστίν. De An.\. ii. 9, 1.5. But here
‘thought ’ is considered as something
ideal, just as afterwards, ch. xiii. §
6, it is said to imply all the virtues.

ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων] Eudemus seems

often inclined to betake himself to
VOL, 11.

δῆλον οὖν
δυοῖν δ᾽ ὄντοιν μεροῖν 8

a small antagonism against Platonic
doctrines ; whether in detail this was
original, or borrowed from oral re-
marks or lost writings of Aristotle,
we cannot tell. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 16,
Vv. xi. 9, VI. xiii. 3, & Here there
seems to be an allusion to the So-
cratico-Platonic paradox which forms
the subject of the Hippias Minor,
that to do injustice voluntarily was
better than doing it involuntarily (see
Vol. 1. Essay IL p. 169). Here the
contrary is assumed with regard to
‘thought,’ and the conclusion drawn
is, that ‘thought’ is not an art, in other
words (as is said more distinctly
afterwards), not merely intellectual.
If ‘ thought’ were merely intellectual,
then voluntary error in action would
not be error at all, because knowledge
would remain behind unimpaired ;
but if ‘thought’ is a state of the will as
well as of the intellect, then voluntary
error, 88 implying a defect of the will,
is the worst kind of error. The worst:
kind of error, morally, is considered to
be sinning against knowledge, know-
ing the right and doing the wrong,
which some philosophers deny to be
possible. See below, Book vu. ch.

8 δυοῖν δ᾽ -- ἔστω] ‘And as there

x

162

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

[Cuap.

ἴω ~ “A | ᾿ 9 ὔ ce [4 3 ᾽ [οἱ
τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ
δοξαστικοῦ: ἦ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως

4 4 e 4
ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.

μόνον" σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη

φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.
"Exel δ᾽ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ

͵

are two parts of man’s nature which
possess reason, thought will be the
highest state of one of these, namely,
the opiniative part, for opinion and
thought both deal with the contin-
gent. We must add that it is not
merely an intellectual state (ἕξις μετὰ
λόγου), the proof of which is that
while such states admit forgetfulness,
thought docs not.’ Td δοξαστικόν
answers to τὸ λογιστικόν, ch. i, § 6.
That opinion deals with contingent
matter we are told, Ar. Post. Anal.
L xxxili. 2: λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ
τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ
καὶ ἄλλως ἔχει. After associating
opinion with thought, the writer
separates them, just as Aristotle sepa-
rates προαίρεσις from δόξα, Eth, Im.
ii, 11. In the present passage there
is a great want of clearness. We are
told that thought is an excellence,
or highest state, of a part of the in-
tellect. Hence we should naturally
conclude that it was λόγος ris (cf. ch.
xiii. § 5), but the formula throughout
used is, that thought is ἕξις μετὰ
λόγον. This formula, in the sense of
‘accompanied by inference,’ ‘able to
give an account of itself,’ is applied
by. Aristotle to ἐπιστήμη (see notes
on the next page) ; and 80 too Plato,
Theeteus, 201 Ὁ: τὴν μετὰ λόγου
ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. Cf.
Eth. Eud. viii. ii. 3; οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος
ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί
οὕτω πράττει. Thought then is first
defined to be ‘a reasoning state of
mind’; afterwards we are told that

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγον
τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἕξεώς ἐστι,

τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις

thought is not simply a ἕξις μετὰ
Adyou, by which the writer evidently
means to say, that thought is not a
mere state of the intellect. It may
be indeed true that the moral in-
tellect cannot be separated from the
will and personality (cf. ch. xii § 10),
but what is to be complained of is,
that the formule used for expressing
all the truths connected with this
subject are so very imperfect.

σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη] Cf. Eth. 1. x.
10, where it is said that ‘the moments
of virtuous consciousness in the mind
are more abiding than the sciences,’
and see note. To φρόνησις in the
Platonic and general sense, of course
forgetfulness might attach. Cf. Laws,
Pp. 732 B: ἀνάμνησις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ
φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης.

VI. This chapter treats of reason,
but goes no farther into the subject
than as follows,—science implies prin-
ciples, and we cannot apprehend these
principles by science itself nor by three
out of the other four modes of mind
which give us truth. It therefore
remains, on the grounds of exhaustive
division, that reason must be the
organ by which we apprehend first
principles.

On examination it will befound that
the contents of the chapter are bor-
rowed almost verbatim from Aristotle's
Post. Analyt. τι. xix. 7: ᾿Επεὶ δὲ τῶν
wept τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, als ἀληθεύομεν,
αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσίν͵ αἱ δὲ ὀπιδέ-
χονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός,

VL—VIL] H@IKON [EYAHMION] VI. 163

4 ~ 9 .» ” 74 & 9 Ἢ Ἐξ 9 me
καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν
καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς
ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε
φρόνησις" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχά-

Φ 4... 9 , »” 48. a
νουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ
σοφία τούτων ἐστίν" τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπό-
δειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευ- 2
δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἧ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς,

» 4 ΄΄ε ~ A 9 ἦ 2 4 a
τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία
φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν
ἀρχῶν.

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις 7

ἀληθῆ 8 del ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ
οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο
γένος ἣ νοῦς, αἱ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων
γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ᾽ ἅπασα μετὰ
λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν
οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον
ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἣ νοῦν, νοῦς
ay εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, Ex τε τούτων σκο-
ποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπό-
δειξις, ὥστ᾽ οὐδ ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη.
El οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ᾽ ἐπιστήμην
γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπι-
στήμης ἀρχή. Aristotle argues that
principles inust be apprehended either
by science or reason ; they cannot be
apprehended by science, therefore they
must be by reason. Eudemusz, it will
be observed, follows this mode of
arguing, only he applies it to all the
five organs of truth, which he had
before arbitrarily laid down as an
exhaustive list. In following im-
plicitly the passage above cited, he
has ignored for the time the earlier
part of the same chapter, in which
Aristotle attributes the origin of
universals rather to induction; 46.
§ 6: Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα
ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον. καὶ γὰρ
καὶ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλον ἐμποιεῖ,

Also he is at variance with his own
statement above, ch. iii. § 3.

I μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη] ‘For
science implies inference.’ This is
evidently the meaning of the present
sentence, taken as it is from Post.
Anal. lc. Λόγος is frequently used
to denote ‘inference.’ Cf. ch. viii.
80: ὁ μὲν yap vols τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ
ἔστι λόγος : xi. 4, τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς
ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, &e.

οὐδὲ δὴ---ἐστι»} ‘Nor of course docs
philosophy apprehend these princi-
ples, for it is the part of the philoso-
pher to possess demonstration about
some things,’ It need hardly be said
that this is a very poor ground for
establishing the point in question.

VIT. What ‘philosophy’ is may
be learnt from the use of the word
copés, as applied to the arta. It
denotes ‘nicety,’ ‘subtlety,’ ‘exact-
ness.’ Philosophy, then, is the most
subtle of the sciences. It embraces
not only deductions, but also princi-
ples. It is ‘a science of the highest
objects with the head on.’ It is above
both practical thought and science,
It is one and permanent, while they

164

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

[CHar.

τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν AOovpyov σοφὸν καὶ
Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
2 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἣ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν" εἶναι δέ
τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι
σοφούς, ὥσπερ ΓΟ μηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἂρ σχαπτῆρα θ:οἱ θέσαν οὔτ᾽ ἀροτῆρα

οὔτ᾽ ἄλλω; τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ

3 σοφία.

-“ἝἨ 4 4 4 e 4 9 “-, 9 ~
δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον Ta ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
907 9 4 4 4 4 9 4 9 ?
εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν.

σ 3 # 4
WOT Ely ἂν

ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ext-

td
στήμη τῶν τιμιωτατων.

Ψ}) 4 Ψ A 4
ἄτοπον yap εἴ Tis τὴν πολιτικὴν

are manifold, relative, and change-
able. It is higher, as the cosmos is
higher than man. Philosophy and
not practical thought was the reputed
property of men like Thales and An-
axagoras, who were thought to know
strangeand out-of-the-way, but useless
things. On the other hand, ‘thought’
(φρόνησιΞ) Β good counsel about human
things. It implies knowledge of par-
ticulars as well as of universals. In-
deed, the knowledge of the particular
gained by experience is its most impor-
tant element, though it includes the
universal also, and in its own sphere,
namely, that of action, it is supreme
and paramount (ἀρχιτεκτονική),

1-2 τὴν δὲ σοφία»---σοφία] ‘The
term σοφία we apply in the arts to
those who are the most finished
artista, as, for instance, we call
Phidias a consummate (σοφός) sculp-
tor, and Polycletus a consummate
statuary, and in this application we
mean nothing else by σοφία than the
highest excellence in art. But we
conceive that some men possess the
quality in a general and not a
particular way,—nor in aught else
accomplished,” as Homer says in the

Margites—

‘“Not skilled to dig or plough the
gods have made hin,
Nor in aught else accomplished.”

We may argue, then, that σοφία, in
the sense of philosophy, is the most
consummate of the sciences,’ On the
meaning of ἀκρίβεια as applied to the
arts, and on the transition of meaning
when it is applied to philosophy, see
Eth. τ. vii. 18, note, and m1. vi. 9,
note.

3 dor’ εἴη--τιμμιωτάτων)] ‘So that
philosophy must be the union of
reason and science, as it were a
science of the highest objects with its
head on.’ This excellent definition
does not appear to have anything
in Aristotle exactly answering to it.
There are two chief places where
Aristotle treats of σοφία, namely,
Metaphysics, Book 1. i-ii., and ἐδ,
Book x. ch. i—vii. Metaphys. Book
IL opens by showing an ascending
scale in knowledge, — perception,
experience, art, and the theoretic
sciences, or philosophy. Of philo-
sophy we are told that it is the
science of first causes, it is most
universal, most exact, and most en-
tirely sought for its own sake, ἄς

VIL]

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

165

a 4 ’ ὃ ad w” ἢ 9 4 4
ἢ τῆν φρονησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ TO

# ~ a“ ’ 4 la 9
ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν.

εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν 4

μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν
4 Fat! > <A > #2 4 4 a 4 & a

καὶ evOv ταῦτον ἀεὶ, καὶ TO Godoy ταὐτον πάντες ἂν

Ψ ’᾽ δὲ Ψ 5 4 ‘ 4 e Δ @& a

εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον. TO γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα ev

(Me. i ii. 2-6). Philosophy begins
in wonder, wonder at first about
things near at hand, afterwards about
the sun, moon, and stars, and the
creation of the universe (76. § 9). It
ends in certainty and a sense of the
necessity of certain truths (/b. § 16).
We may see that this account is per-
fectly general—it does not distinguish
in philosophy between mathematics,
physics, and metaphysics. It even
attributes a practical scope to philo-
sophy, saying that philosophy, by
taking cognisance of the good, deter-
mines the object of the other sciences
(7b. § 7), dpxexwrdrn δὲ τῶν ἐπιστη-
μῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρε-
τούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι
πρακτέον ἕκαστον τοῦτο 8 ἐστὶ τἀγα-
θὸν ἐν ἑκάστοις, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν
Τῇ φύσει πάσῃ. From a certain im-
maturity thus shown, it would be
difficult to believe that the account
in Metaphys. Book 1. was written
after that in the preeent chapter of
the Ethics. In Metaphys. Book x. the
subject is taken up anew, and treated
much more fully. Physics, practical
science, and mathematics, are now
separated from philosophy proper.
Ib. i. 4: οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς & rots φυσικοῖς
εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστή-
μὴν θετέον. Οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὗ
ἕνεκεν" τοιοῦτον γὰρ τἀγαθόν, τοῦτο
δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν
ἐν κινήσει. Ib. i 7: οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ
τὰ μαθηματικὰ --κχωριστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν
οὐθέν. These, however, are branches
of philosophy, 70. iv. 3: διὸ καὶ ταύτην
(τὴν φυσικὴ») καὶ τὴν μαθηματικὴν
ἐπιστήμην μέρη ris σοφίας εἶναι θετέον.

Cf. Met. ut. 111, 4: ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις
καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ πρώτη. Hence
we get the famous division οὗ specu-
lative sciences, Met. x. vii. 9: δῆλον
τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, φυσική, μαθηματική,
θεολογική. BédAriorov μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν
θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος, τούτων δ'
αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα" περὶ τὸ
τιμιώτατον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, βελ-
τίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἑκάστη λέγεται
κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν. Philo-
sophy, then, in the highest sense, may
be called theology, or the science of
the divine, that is, of pure, transcen-
dental (χωριστή), immutable being.
It is the science of being qua being
(τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὃν ἐπιστήμη). Eudemus,
following in the wake of this discus-
sion, has adopted as much of its
results as suited his purpose. He
speaks of philosophy as having the
highest objects (τῶν τιμιωτάτων, cf.
Me. x. vii. 9, 1.c.), but he does not
distinguish its different branches,
He includes in it both physical and
mathematical ideas (§ 4, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν
καὶ εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν del: ἐδ. ἐξ ὧν ὃ κόσμος
συνέστηκεν), though he uses σοφός
once in its special sense to denote
a metaphysical, as opposed to mathe-
matical or physical, philosopher. Ch.
vill. § 6 : μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ᾽
ἄν, σοφὸς δ᾽ ἣ φυσικὸς of. In short,
his object is rather to contrast philo-
sophy with practical thought than
exactly to define it. His attributing
to it a union of intuition with reason-
ing seems however a happy result of
his present method of discussion. (See
Vol. L Essay I. Ὁ. 53, 99.)

μι

[ὉΒΔρ.

166 HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VI.

θεωροῦν φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν
2 7 ‘ 4. « ’ " ’ ’ 2 Φ“
αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμα φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα
περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν.
A A 4 Ψ 4 w# ξ ? 4 e A ξ
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ
4 , 9 a 4 ‘ 4 9 ‘4 4 4 “ ? ~
αὐτή: εἰ yap τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα Ta αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι
, »* , 9 A ’ 4 \ e g
σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι" ov yap μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάν-
9 A ~ ’ 9 ͵ ὃ 4 Δ @w 4 4 A
τῶν ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, ef μὴ καὶ
4 | , 4 a ΄- 4 δ᾽ Ψ aN
ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιστον
ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει" καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώ-
που ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατα γε
3 a ε 4 ’ ? δ᾿ A“ 4 ? on
ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον
ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν “τιμιωτάτων
τῇ φύσει. διὸ ᾿Αναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους
σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ᾽ οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν
ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέρονθ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ

4 εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον---συνέστηκε»
‘And if it be said that man is the
best of the animals, this will make
no difference, for there are besides
other things far diviner in their
nature than man, such as, to quote
the most obvious instance, the parts
out of which the symmetry of the
heavens is composed.’ On the Aristo-
telian view of man’s position in the
scale of dignity in the universe, see
Vol 1. Essay V. p. 287. On Aris-
totle’s doctrine of the divine nature
of the stara, &c., of. De Calo, 1 ii. 9:

"Ex re δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι πέφυκέ |

τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐν-
ταῦθα συστάσεις, θειοτέρα καὶ προτέρα
τούτων ἁπάντων (this has given rise to
the notion of the ‘quintessence’). 70.1.
ii, 11, which repeats the same. 72. 11.
iii, 2: Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον,
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Θεοῦ δ' ἐνέργεια
ἀθανασία " τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀΐδιος.
Ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τῷ θείῳ κίνησιν ἀΐδιον
ὑπάρχειν. ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ ὁ οὐρανὸς τοιοῦτος
(σῶμα γάρ τι θεῖον) διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει
τὸ ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, ὃ φύσει κινεῖται

κύκλῳ ἀεί. Cf. Aelaphys. χι. viii. καὶ :
"H τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις ἀΐδιος οὐσία
vis, Jb. x. vi. 8: Ὅλως δ᾽ ἄτοπον ἐκ
τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὰ δεῦρο μεταβάλλοντα
καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένοντα ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς,
ἐκ τούτων περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν
ποιεῖσθαι. Δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ
ταὐτὰ Exorrwy καὶ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν
ποιουμένων τἀληθὲς θηρεύειν. τοιαῦτα
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον.

5 διὸ ᾿Αναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῇ»] CL
Eth, x. viii. 11; Plato, Theatetus, Ὁ.
174 A: Ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῇν dorporo-
μοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα,
πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά τις ἐμμελὴς
καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶξ ἀποσκῶψαι
λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυ-
μοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ
καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν.
Ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας
ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. On the
other hand, Aristotle (Polstics, 1. xi.
9) tells a story of Thales turning his
philosophy to practical account, fore-
seeing by astronomical observations
that there would be a good crop of
olives, buying up the crop in Miletus

VIII] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. 167

θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν,
# δ Ψ 9 a 9 o 9 4a “» e 4
ἄχρηστα 0, ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ 6
ld 4 “ 4 νθ »’,᾽ 4 a Sn κι a
φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσα-
σθαι; τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν,
τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ᾽ οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνά-
wv 9 @ 4 4 4 ζει
τῶν ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ᾽ ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο
πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος 6 τοῦ ἀρίστου
ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.
οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ 7
καθ’ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν’ πρακτικὴ yap, ἡ δὲ πράξις περὶ
a wv a , »# 9 SR 2 e ὔ 9Q 2
τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων
πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι’: εἰ γὰρ
εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ
κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ
8 4 ‘4
ἡ δὲ φρόνη-
σις πρακτική. ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἣ ταύτην μάλλον.
εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν 8

ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον.

beforehand, and having sold at his
cwn price, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα
ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς
φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν.

6 βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶ}] A repeti-
tion for the third time of the same
remark, cf. ch. i. § 6, ch. v. § 3.

7 Owing to its practical character,
‘thought’ (φρόνησιθ) necessarily im-
plies a knowledge of particulars. The
particular, indeed, would seem for ac-
tion the more important element, asap-
pears alsoin other things, if we compare
science with empirical knowledge.

διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότε] Cf. Ar.
Me... i. 7-8 (whence this passage
may probably be borrowed), πρὸς μὲν
οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν
δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπι-
τυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους
τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων.
Αἴτιον 8 ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ᾽
ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν

καθόλοι,, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις
πἄσαι περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.

ΨΙΠ. This chapter fulfils a promise
made before in the Fudemian Ethics
(t. viii. 18), by distinguishing ‘thought’
from other modifications of the same
practical quality, namely, economy
and the various forms of politics.
This distinction would at first sight
tend to reduce ‘thought’ to mere
egotism (8 3, δοκεῖ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι ἡ
περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕναὶ § 4: τὸ αὑτῷ
εἰδέναι), and thus to isolate the in-
dividual within himeelf. In order to
obviate this, the writer brings forward
arguments to show that the welfare
of the individual is bound up with
that of the family and the state (§ 4).
He urges the difficulty of knowing
one’s own interest, hence concluding
that ‘thought’ is no mere instinct of
selfishness, ‘Thought’ implies a wide
experience, on which account boys

168 HOIKQN (EYAHMIQN] VL [Cuap.

Ψ 4 rd > 9 9 " 4 a ~ δὲ v le

ἕξις, TO μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτον αὐταῖς. τῆς περὶ πόλιν

e a e 4 a a’ e e a e a

ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὰ
3 οἵ « A »# ®t v4 oe 4

καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική" αὕτη δὲ πρακ-

τικὴ καὶ βουλευτική᾽ τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ

ἔσχατον.

cannot attain to it, no more than they
can to philosophy, though they are
often clever in mathematics (§§ 5-6).
‘ Thought’ is a sort of deduction with
8 universal and a particular element
(§ 7), and yet we must distinguish it
from science on this very account,
that it deals with particulars (§ 8).
It is the opposite to reason, which is
of first principles, while thought is
rather an intuition of particular facts
(analogous to apprehending a mathe-
matical figure). At all events, one
form of thought is of this character.
1-3 ἔστι 82 — δικαστικὴ]ϊ ‘ Now
politics and “thought” are really the
same faculty of mind, though they
would be defined differently. Thought
dealing with the state is divided into
first,—legislation, which is the mas-
ter-spirit as it were; and secondly,
politics in detail, which is practical as
being deliberative (for a “ measure”
is like the practical application of a
general principle), and which usurps
the common name of politics; hence
too they who are concerned with par-
ticular measures alone get the name of
politicians, for these alone ad, like
workmen under a master. Just so that
appears to be especially ‘‘ thought”
which is concerned with the indivi-
dual self. And this kind usurps the
common name of “ thought,” while the
other kinds I have alluded to may be
specified as—first, economy ; second,
legislation ; and third, politics (in the
restricted sense), which may be sub-
divided into the deliberative and the
judicial.’ This distinction was pro-

a [2 [2 ld , [2
διὸ πολετεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λεγουσιν" μόνοι

mised before, Eth. Eud. 1. viii. 8:
Ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ
τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώτῳ πρακτῶν. Τοῦτο
& ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αὕτη
δ' ἐστὶ πολιτιλὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ
φρόνησις. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ
ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι"
πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν,
ὕστερον λεκτέον. It would appear that
Eudemus by a sort of afterthought
united the conception of φρόνησις,
which was developed later, to that of
πολιτική, to which Aristotle had as-
signed the apprehension of the chief
good for man (cf. Eth. 1, ii. 5). But
in so doing he had to bring together
two different things ; for φρόνησις was
a psychological term expressing a
faculty of the mind, but πολιτική was
merely one of the divisions of the
sciences. In order to make them com-
mensurate, Eudemus alters the signi-
fication of πολιτική, He treats it as a
state of mind (zs), as a mode of
φρόνησις, dealing with the state either
universally or in details. From the
same later point of view he adds also
οἰκονομεική ; cf. Ar. Pol. τ, iii. 1: "Ewet
δὲ φᾳσερὸν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλιβ συνέ-
στῆκεν, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν
«ρότερον, &c,

2 ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον» The ψήφισμα or
particular measure is here compared
to the minor term in a syllogism, ie.
it constitutes the application of a
general principle. Cf. Bth. v. x 6.
On the use of ἔσχατον in this
purely technical and logical sense, cf.
8§ 8-9: Ar. Med. x. i. 9: πᾶς γὰρ
λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου

VIIL]

HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VI.

169

yap πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι . δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ 3

’ ; > 4ᾳψ e 4 9 4 7
φρόνησις μαλιστ᾽ εἶναι 4 περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα.

καὶ ἔχει

@ A Ἁ fd ld > 4 4 φ A 9 0
αὕτη TO κοινὸν Ovosa, φρονησις" ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία

ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτικὴ

ἡ δὲ δικαστική.

4 4 n wv ’ Α ee a
εἶδος μὲν οὗν τι dy εἴη γνώσεως TO αὑτῷ

εἰδέναι" ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν" καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ

καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων. Post. Anal, 1. i.

4: οὐ διὰ τὸ μέσον τὸ ἔσχατον γνωρί-
ζεται.

3 The classification here intended is
as follows, — φρόνησις or thought being

Thought
| |
About oneself

|
‘ Thought’ Economy

|
Universal
ἐών ida
Legislation

|
Deliberative

4 εἶδος μὲν ον ---πολιτεία 1) ‘Now
it must be considered a species of
knowledge to know one’s own inter-
est, but this opens matter for con-
troversy. The man who knows his
own concerns and occupies himself
with these is commonly considered
thoughtfal, while politicians arecalled
busybodies, and hence Euripides
wrote :—

Small wisdom were it in me to
When well I might, mixed with the
common herd,
Enjoy a lot full equal with the best.
But ah 1 how full of vanity is man !
The restless meddling spirits in the
state
VOL, II.

|
About the family

first a general term and including
politics with the other faculties men-
tioned, and secondly a special kind
contrasted with the other faculties—

ἰ
About the State
Politics
: |
In detail
χειροτεχνική
‘Politics ’
|

J ndleial

Are gaped at still and made the
country's gods.

Men with these selfish principles seek
their own advantage, and this, they
consider, is what they have to do.
From this notion the idea has grown
that they are the thoughtful. And yet,
perhaps, the welfare of the individual
is inseparable from the regulation of
the household and from the existence
of a state.’

τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι] Fritzache reads τὸ
τὰ αὑτῷ with the authority of two
MBS., adding ‘Ceterum in hf&c quoque
preefract& orationis brevitate qui mul-
tum Eudemi Moralia diurnf noctur-
nAque manu volutavit Kudemi stilum
agnoscat necesse est.’

Y

170 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. [Cuap.

4 4 4 ‘
αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνίμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ
[2 4 b [ὦ
πολυπραγμονες" διὸ Εἰὐριπίδης
«ὡς δ᾽ ἂν φρονοίην, ὦ warty ἀτραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοὶς ἠριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν ;
τοὺ; γὼ; πιρισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας «λέον...
ζω 4 4 « - 4 la A ” ζω ry
ζητοῦσι yap τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν
Υ 4 ὔ ry ~ ὃ (4 aN ἢ υθ 4 ὔ
πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους
9 4 ~ =
φρονίμους εἶναι" καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι TO αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ
3 , 3 “ ΣΝ eek ng en ee
οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας" ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ
a «- a ΄΄οε 4
5 διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρη-
4 4 4
μένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ
4 4 4 4 ~ Ld δ᾽ > ὃ a ,
γίνονται καὶ codot Ta τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος οὐ doxel γίνε-
A ΑΥ̓͂ 4 9
σθαι. atriov δ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ
la 4
γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ᾽ ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν"
~ 4 ἢ ΄“ 4 9 g 9 4 4 “κ᾿ y
6 πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν" ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἄν
ὔ 4 ἢ Ά 4 A ~ ὔ 4 Ψ
τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν,
a Φ A 8 4 4
σοφὸς δ᾽ ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι ἀφαιρέσεώς

πολυπράγμονε:)]Ί This is often op- | geometry and mathematics, and be-
posed to τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. Cf. Plato, | come clever in such things, no boy
Gorgias, p. §26.0. φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ | seems to attain to “ thoughtfulness.”’’
πράξαντος καὶ οὗ πολυπραγμονήσαντος | Thewriter is arguing against the iden-
ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Repud. p. 433 a: τὸ τὰ | tificationof ‘thought’ with an instinct
αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν. | οὗ selfishness. If it were so simple,

Edperl3ys] in the Philoctetes; the | why should not boys possess it? διότι
later lines are thus filled up by | isfor ὅτι as in Eth. Fud. vii x. 20:
Wagner, Fragm. Eur. Ὁ. 401 :— Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαε, διότι καλλίων
μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ 4

t ἣν τῷ
σον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχης; χρησίμη. Cf, Ar. Meteor. m1. iii. 5:

ὌΝ mar ate
ἐξ | ται ὁ ἄνεμος ὅθεν ἂν ἡ κυρία γίγνηται

διάσπασις. Jb, 1. xiii. 23: Τό τε ὑπὸ
τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἔχειν τὰς πηγὰς μαρτυρεῖ
‘The Scholiast and Paraphrast both | διότι τῷ συρρεῖν ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον καὶ κατὰ
conjecture Ζεῦς μισεῖ to govern περισ- μικρὸν ἐκ πολλῶν νοτίδων διαδίδωσιν ὁ
σούς. This would give no metre, and | τόπος καὶ γίγνονται οὕτως αἱ πηγαὶ τῶν
only a very inferior sense, ποταμῶν.

4-5 ἔτι---γίνεσθαι)] ‘Moreover the 6 σοφὸς 3’ 4 φυσικὸς οὔ] ‘ But not a
directing one’s own affairs is by no | metaphysician or physical philoso-
means simple ; it is a subject for much | pher.’ Σοῴός is here used in a dis-
consideration, In proof whereof we | tinctive sense, ‘ philosopher’ par ex-
may allege that while boys learn | cellence, with a science above physics

τιμῶμεν ἄνδρας τ᾽ ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.

VIIL]

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

171

2 “A δ᾽ € 9 a 9 3 , 4 A 4 9

ἐστιν, τῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας" καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ
4 e 2 9 « ὔ “~ 4 A ’ 3 4

πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ

” . ὗἍ , ἃ . A μι

ἄδηλον ; ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἧ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύ- 7

σασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον" ἧ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ

βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἣ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.

Ψ
οτι 8

δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν" τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου

ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται: τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον.

4 ny ~ “
κειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ.

and mathematics; cf. ch. vii. § 3, |

note.

ἢ ὅτι--- ἄδηλον] ‘The reason surely
is that the former matters (t.e. ma-
thematics) are abstract, while the
principles of the latter (physics and
philosophy) are got by experience ;
thus boys repeat truths of the latter
kind, without being really convinced
of them ; while the nature of the other
subjects is easy to comprehend.’

δι’ dgatpécews} The formin Aristotle
is either ἐν ἀφαιρέσει or ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως.
He constantly applies these terms to
denote the mathematics, The locus
classicus on this subject is Metaphys.
x. iii, 7: Καθάπερ δ᾽ ὁ μαθηματικὸς
περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν
ποιεῖται, περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἱσ-
θητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα
καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τοὐναντίον, ἔτι δὲ
καὶ θερμότητα καὶ ψνχρότητα καὶ τὰς
ἄλλας τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, μόνον
δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές,
κιτιλ. Cf. De Colo, ut. i. 11: διὰ τὸ
τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ
μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσθέ-
σεως. De Animd, τι. vii. 10: οὕτω τὰ
μαθηματικὰ od κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρι-
opéva νοεῖ, ὅταν von ἐκεῖνα.

πιστεύουσι) Cf. ch. iii. § 4, note,
and Eth. vit. iii. 8: οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες
συνείρουσι μὲν rods Néyous, ἴσασι 3
οὕπω.

7 Another argument to prove the
complex and difficult character of

9 “
αντι- 9

e A 4 aA “~ 4 δι
ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι

‘thought’ is that it implies a kind
of syllogism, wherein both the major
premiss and the minor equally admit
of error.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα] This
was probably a medical notion of the
day. Cf. Problems, 1. xiii., where a
similar superstition is maintained :
Διὰ τί τὸ τὰ ὕδατα μεταβάλλειν νοσῶδές
φασιν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα οὔ -:---
ὕδατος μὲν πολλὰ εἴδη ἐστὶ καὶ διάφορα
καθ᾽ αὑτά, ἀέρος δὲ οὔ, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο
αἴτιον.

8 ὅτι δ᾽ -τοιοῦτο»ν)] ‘But (though
implying a syllogism) it is plain that
“thought” is not science, for it deals
with the particular, as we have said,
the action being of this kind.’

9 ἀντίκειται ---- εἶδος] ‘To reason,
indeed, it forms the opposite pole;
for while reason deals with those
terms which are above all inference,
“thought,” on the other hand, deals
with the particular, which is below
demonstration, and is apprehended
by perception; not the perception
of the separate senses, but analogous
to that faculty by which we perceive
that the immediate object presented
to us in mathematics is a triangle.
For on this side also demonstration
must cease. However, it is rather
this particular mode of thought which
is a perception, the other presents a
different form.’

ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῴ νῷ] Having

172

HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] VI.

[Cuap.

n~ 9
λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη αλλ’

“-- Α
αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ᾽ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν
“ a A 9 a“
τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον" στήσεται yap κακεῖ.

alluded to the syllogistic nature of
‘thought,’ the writer seems to have
been reminded to distinguish it from
science ; and thus, having before (ch.
v. § 8; ch. vii. § 6) contrasted it with
art and philosophy, he is led on to
finish the round by placing it in con-
trast with reason.

οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ᾽ οἵᾳ αἰσθανό-
μεθα] This is the same as Ασίβιοι δ᾿ β
famous distinction between the ‘sepa-
rate senses’ and the ‘common sense.’
His own words are olear on the
point ; cf. De Animé, IL vi. 2: Λέγω
δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν (αἰσθητὸν) ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται
ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ
ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὄψις
χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις
χυμοῦ.---Τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται
ἴδια ἑκάστον, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία,
ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος" τὰ γὰρ
τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ
πάσαις: καὶ γὰρ ἁφῇ κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν
αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει It will be seen
that figure (σχῆμα) is one of the
objects of the ‘common sense ;’ the
text gives as an instance of this the
perception of a triangle. In De An.
IIL i. 6, Aristotle adds ‘unity’ to the
list of ‘common sensibles,’ but he
reduces them all to mudifications
of the perception of motion: ταῦτα
yap πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον
μέγεθος κινήσει, Ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα"
μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα. Td δ᾽
ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κωεῖσθαι" ὁ δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς
τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ σννεχοῦς, κιτλ. He
admits (De An. IL. vi. 4) that ‘com-
mon sensibles’ can scarcely be said to
be apprehended by sense at all, τῶν
δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως
ἐστὶν αἰσθητά ; of. 78, τι. i. 6, where
it is said these are apprehended acci-

dentally or concomitantly by the
senses. This is surely the true view ;
we see in the apprehension of number,
figure, and the like, not an operation
of sense, but the mind putting its own
forms and categories, 1.¢. itself, on
the external object. It would follow
then that the senses cannot really be

-separated from the mind ; the senses

and the mind each contribute an ele-
ment to every knowledge. Aristotle’s
doctrine of κοινὴ αἴσθησις would gu
far, if carried out, to modify his
doctrine of the simple and innate
character of the senses, ἐσ. sight (cf.
Fth. τι, i, 4), and would prevent its
absolute collision with Berkeley's
Theory of Vision. On the general
subject of xo». αἴσθ. see Sir ὟΝ.
Hamilton, Reid’s Works, pp. δ2ὃ-
830,

ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχαταν
τρίγωνον) This has been frequently
understood to mean that ‘the ulti-
mate or simplest possible figure is a
triangle.’ But the Paraphrast does
not so explain it: his words are τοῦτον
δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὸ
αἰσθητὸν γινώσκουσι τρίγωνον, κιτ.λ,
And referring to Ar. Post. Analyt. L
i, 4, we find exactly this inatance
given of a particular knowledge, the
result of observation, dri μὲν γὰρ πᾶν
τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας,
προύΐδει" ὅτι δὲ τόδε τό ἐν τῷ ἡμικυ-
κλίῳ τρίγωνόν ἐστιν ἅμα ἐπαγόμενος
ἐγνώρισεν. The term ἔσχατον is used
in the very next line: ἐνίων yap
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡ μαάθησίς ἐστι, καὶ
οὐ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἔσχατον γνωρίζεται.
It is true that in different places Aris-
totle uses ἔσχατον in different senses,
as denoting with various applications

VIIL—IX.]

HOIKON (EYAHMION] VI.

173

ἀλλ’ αὕτη μάλλον αἴσθησις + ppovnsis, ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλο

εἶδος.

To ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει: τὸ γὰρ βου- 9

λεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας
, »Ὁ ’ 4 , 4 ’ a ? ’ 4
τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἣ εὐστοχία 4 ἄλλο

τι γέ νος.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν" οὐ γὰρ Crrover

περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ᾽ εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος

the end of ἃ series ; thus cf. De An.
mI. x. 2, where it means ‘ final
cause ;’ Eth, 111. iii. 11, ‘ the last step
in analysis;’ Medaph. vi iii. 6,
‘matter, &c. But in the place be-
fore us τὸ ἔσχατον has been already
appropriated to the logical meaning
of ‘ particular,’ ‘ minor term,’ ‘ imme-
diate truth ;’ cf. § 2 and § 8.

στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ} ‘For on that
side too (ic. in dealing with an
object of the sense as well as an m-
tuition of reason) demonstration must
stop.’ Ἴστασθαι is a commun logical
form, it is opposed to προϊέναι els
ἄπειρον, and is frequently impersonal ;
cf. Post. Anal. 1. iii. 1: ἀδύνατον yap
τὰ ἄπειρα διελθεῖν. El re ἵσταται καὶ
εἰσὶν ἀρχαί, κιτιλ, Met. τι. iv. 22, &c.

ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις +H
φρόνησι}] Three of Bekker's MSS.
read ἡ φρόνησις, and this seems moet
natural, and to give the best sense
(though # is supported by the Para-
phrast). What the writer means is
apparently to add that only one kind
of thonght can be called analogous to
the apprehension of a triangle ; aérn
refers to ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα φρόνησις, men-
tioned above, ch. vil. § 7: δεῖ ἄμφω
ἔχοιν ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. There is
amother kind (éxeiyys), namely, the
possession of universal ideas (τῶν
καθόλου) (2.c.), which is of a different
nature.

IX. This chapter commences the

examination of a set of faculties
cognate to ‘ Thought,’ or forming part
of it. The first of these is good
counsel (εὐβουλία. This, says the
writer, is to be distinguished from
science, which does not deliberate ;
from gueasing (εὐστοχία), which is too
quick ; from sagacity (ἀγχίνοια), which
is a kind of guessing; and from
opinion, which is too definite. It con-
aiste, then, in a certain ‘ rightness ;’ it
chooses the right means to a good end.
The conception of this end ‘ Thought’
itself must supply. There is a
great assumption here of the manner
of Aristotle. The chapter seems
formed after Zth. 111. ti.; § 6 reminds
us of many similar paxsages in Book
IV., and § 7 is after the manner of
Eth. τ. iii. 5. There is an advance
upon Aristotle’s account of delibera-
tion (Ath. 111. iii.) in two points: (1)
the process is illustrated here by the
logical formula of the syllogianm ; (2)
there is a mention here of the faculty
whereby ends are apprehended, which
Aristotle had left wnnuticed. See
διὰ. 111. iit, 1, note.

I it is an abrupt, awkward com-
mencement of the chapter to say,
‘inquiring and deliberating are diffe-
rent, for deliberating is a species of
inquiring.’ But what is meant appa-
rently is, to bring ‘ good counsel’
under the head of inquiring, which
separates it at once from both science

; and opinion.

2

174 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. [CHap.

ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ εὐστοχία. ἄνευ τε

4 Ud 4 rf e 9 ’ λ , δὲ λὺ
γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται de πολὺν
χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα,
3 βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ
εὐβουλία" ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα
ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμίας ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος
ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ᾽ εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ᾿
ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτ᾽ ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης" ἐπιστήμης
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δ᾽
ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια: ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα
ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας
»” ’ Ψ δὴ wv , 8 4 ς ὃ 9
ἄρα λείπεται" αὕτη γὰρ οὕπω φάσις" καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ

2 φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ
k.T.A.] Fritzsche quotes Isocr. Demon.
Ῥ. 9, 6. 8 35: βουλεύον μὲν βραδέως
ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα. Herod.
VII. 493 ἀνὴρ δὴ οὕτω dy εἴη ἄριστος,
εἰ βουλευόμενος μὲν ἀρρωδέοι, πᾶν ἐπι-
λεγόμενος πείσεσθαι χρῆμα, ἐν δὲ τῷ
ἔργῳ θρασὺς εἴη.

3 ἔστι δ᾽ εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια]
This is announced by Aristotle, Post.
Anal, 1. xxxiv. 1, in the very next
line to that passage on the distinction
of the organs of truth, which appa-
rently suggested so much of the sub-
jects of the present book, ἡ δ᾽ ἀγχίνοιά
ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ
τοῦ μέσου. In more general terms
ἀγχίνοια isdefined by Plato, Charmides,
p. 160 A, as ὀξύτης τις τῆς ψυχῆς.

ἐπιστήμης μὲν---λογίζεται) ‘Now
in science there is no such thing as
“rightness,” for fhere is no such
thing as wrongness. In opinion, on
the other hand, rightness is truth
(and not good counsel), And besides,
whatever we have an opinion about is
already decided. But good counsel is
not by any means beyond questioning
(ἄνευ λόγου). Therefore it must be a
kind of operation of the reason (δια-
volas ἄρα λείπεται), for this does not

amount to decision. Opinion is not
an inquiry, but is already a kind of
decision. On the other hand, he that
deliberates, whether well or ill, is in-
quiring after something and calcula-
ting.’

ἐπιστήμη:] This is said here just
as it was before said, ch. v. § 7, that
there were no degrees of excellence in
Thought.

δόξης δῚ Οἱ. Eth. mm. ii. 13, and
above, ch. ii. § 2, note.

διανοίας ἄρα] Plato, Repub. p. 511 Ὁ,
proposed to confine the term διάνοια
to the discursive understanding as
opposed to νοῦς, the intuitive and
speculative reason, διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν
μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοῦν, ὡς
μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν
οὖσαν. Aristotle probably had the
same distinction in view, Post. Anal. I.
xxxili. 9 (/.c.), πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι ἐπί τε
διανοίας καὶ νοῦ. But he did not
maintain the distinction in his works,
and certainly it is not observed by
Eudemus in the present book, where
both νοῦς πρακτικός and διάνοια θεωρη-
Tih are spoken of. In the place
before us διάνοια apparently means
the exercise of the reason.

IX.]

HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VI.

175

ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ de βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ

φῇ ΄-- ζ ~ 4
ἐάν te κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.

ἀλλ᾽

ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς" διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα

πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί.

ἐπεὶ 0 ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,

δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα" ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτί-
θεται tideiy ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται
βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν de μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἀγαθόν
τι εἶναι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι" ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς
9 ’ εν a , ae eee a ’
εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ᾽’ ἔστι καὶ τούτου ς
ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν,
δ οὗ δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδὴ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι" ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽
“ 4 ἢ Δ » 4 ’ : ,
αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ᾽ ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι

4 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ --- βεβουλεῦσθαι) ‘ But
since the term “ rightness” is used in
more senses than one, it is plain that
“ἰ good counsel ” does not answer to all
the senses. For the incontinent or
bad man will obtain, by his calcula-
tion, what he proposes to himself to
obtain, so that he will have deli-
berated rightly, yet secured a great
evil. Whereas, to have deliberated
well is generally thought (δοκεῖ) to be
δ good.’

wieovaxGs] i.e. rightness of means,
either respective or irrespective of
rightness in the end; or, again,
rightness of end (§ 5), whatever may
have been the means,

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής] It would seem rather
the abandoned man (ἀκόλαστος) who
by calculation attains bad ends. The
incontinent man would not generally
have deliberation attributed to him;
cf, Eth, vu. ii. 2. But the characters
cannot be kept very distinct.

+ ἰδεῖν] δεῖν, which some have pro-
posed to read for ἰδεῖν, makes no
better sense. Rassow conjectured
τυχεῖν, and as Bekker gave this con-
jecture his sanction, it has been
adopted in the above translation.

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἀγαθόν] Fritzsche quotes
Herod. vii. 10: τὸ γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι
κέρδος μέγιστον εὑρίσκω ἐόν. Sopho-
cles, Antig. 1050: κράτιστον κτημάτων
εὐβουλία. Isocr. Demon. p. 9, ο. § 35:
ἡγοῦ κράτιστον εἶναι παρὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν
εὐτυχίαν, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εὐβουλίαν.

5 ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι---εἶνα.] ‘ But, further,
it is possible to obtain what is good
by a false syllogism, and to hit on
doing what one ought, not however
by the right means, but with a false
middle term.’ It is an inaccuracy
to speak of a ‘false middle term.’
Falsehood or truth is the attribute of
& proposition, not a term ; cf. De Inter-
pret.i. 3: περὶ yap σύνθεσιν καὶ διαί-
ρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές,
If the conception of the end be right
and yet the syllogism wrong, it follows
that the minor premiss must be false,
thus :

Preservation of health is good :
Abstinence from intellectual labour is
preservation of health :

the result of which syllogism will be
the preservation of health, but by the
sacrifice of mental culture,

176 HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VI. [ CHap.
6 δ οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν,
τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνη mw εὐβουλία, GAN’ ὀρθότης
ς 4 a 9 a A oe a ΛΔ «4 , @ »” w#
7 ἡ κατὰ TO ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι
4 e ~ > ~ 4 ld [
καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος.
ς “~ € a 4 ᾽ A e “-ς ~ e 4 e
ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος TO ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, ἡ δέ τις ἡ
πρός τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι,
ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρός τι
τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψιίς ἐστιν.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, καθ᾽ ἃς λέγομεν

ἡ μὲν δὴ

10
συνετοὺς Kai aouverous, οὔθ᾽ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξη

6-7 The writer first raises yood
counsel to the rank of one of the vir-
tues, by the mention of all the quali-
fications necessary; afterwards he
seems to modify this by saying that,
besides the absolute good counsel
which aims at the absolute end, there
is also such a thing as relative good
counsel aiming at relative ends.

One might have thought that it
was unnecessary to give so separate a
psychological existence to excellence
in deliberation. However, the quality
here described answers mure nearly
than φρόνησις to what we call ‘ pro-
dence.’ Φρόνησις, we are here told,
is the conception of ends, and after-
wards (ch. xii. § 9) it is shown to be
the faculty of means. In truth, it is
both, according to the Aristotelian
views (as far as we can discern them);
it implies both pradence (εὐβουλία),
and aleo a certain moral condition
(ἀρετή), and it is implied by both
of them. As compared with the one
it is of ends, and as compared with
the other it is of means.

X. This chapter treats of another
faculty which forms an element in
wixdom, and yet may be distinguished
from it, namely, apprehension (σύνε-
os). Apprehension is not mere

opinion (else all would possess it),
nor is it a science, for it deals with
no separate class of objects whether
necessary or contingent (οὔτε γὰρ περὲ
τῶν del ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς
ἐστιν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτου-
ofv). It deals with all that can be
matter of human deliberation, in short,
with the same objects as Thought.
But Thought commands ; it is oon-
cerned with right action; in short,
it belongs to the will as well as
to reason. But apprehension only
judges, it is merely intellectual. It
is neither the having nor the getting
Thought, but rather it is the applica-
tion of one’s knowledge to give a
meaning to the dicta of wiedom. It
is ‘understanding,’ as its name im-
plies, or ‘putting things together’
(συνιέναι) when another person speaks,

Aristotle had spoken of σύνεσις as
one of the intellectual excellences,
Eth. τ. xiii. 20: σοφία» μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν»
καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς. Eudemus
does not apply the term ἀρετή to this,
or to any of the other intellectual
qualities which he treats of, except
Thought and Philosophy. He gives
here a psychological account of σύνε-
ow, the operation of which he con-
fines to intellectual insight with regard
to moral subjects, apprehension of

IX.—X.] HOIKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΝῚ VI. 177

(πάντες yap ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος
“--Ο 4φ ~
ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν jj γεωμετρία περὶ
μεγέθους: οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ
σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ
. ᾿»᾿ν ’ Ψ a , \ Q ‘
περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν av τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ
4 4 a“
aura μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸν σύνεσις
A sf A 4
Kat φρόνησις" ἡ μὲν yap φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν" τί 2
Α σι [4 ΄-
γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν" ἡ δὲ σύνεσις
4 8
κριτικὴ μόνον" ταὐτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις Kal εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνε-
4 A > ἢ w# δ᾽ ξ 4 A # 4 ’
τοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν 3
»ἢὦ A , e 4 4 " Ν A ’
οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις" ἀλλ ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν
’ ὔ 4 a“ ~ 4 9 ΄“
λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμη, οὕτως ἐν τῷ
σι “ td 4 4 0
χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ
ld , 9 ‘4 4 , ~ 4
Ppovysis ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς" τὸ

γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταὐτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ 4

the meaning of moral dica and |

critical judgment thereon. That
there is such a faculty of apprehen-
sion, and of sympathetic or critical
understanding, quite distinct from
moral goodness in people, the ex-
perienoe of life seems to show.

The author of the Magna Moralia
gives ἃ much inferior account of
σύνεσις (I. xxxv. 17), making its
characteristic to be that it deals
with small matters, περὶ μικρῶν τε
καὶ ty μικροῖς ἡ κρίσις.

1 διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει)
It is used nearly equivalently to
φρόνησις by Thucyd. 1. 140: Δικαιῶ rots
κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἣν dpa τι καὶ σφαλλώ-
μεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς
ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι.

2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική
ἐστιν---- δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνο»] The
opposition of these terms is taken
from Plato, Politicus, p. 259 Ε--
260 σα, where it is argued that the
arithmetician (λογιστήθ) is content
with a knowledge and judgment about
numbers, whereas the architect (ἀρχι-
τέκτων) must go on to apply his know-

VOL, IL

ledge by directing the workmen—thus
that all science may be divided under
the two heads of critical and manda-
tory. (2604) Οὐκοῦν yrwortxal μὲν al
τε τοιαῦται ξύμπασαι καὶ ὁπόσαι ξυνέ-
πονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσει δὲ καὶ ἐπι-
τάξει διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν τούτω τὼ
γένεε ;---φαίνεσθον. “Ap’ οὖν συμπάσης
τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν

μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι
προσείποιμεν, ἐμμελῶε ἂν φαῖμεν

διῃρῆσθαι; κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

4 ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται
συνιέναι ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ)
The word μανθάνειν was ambiguous in
Greek ; it meant either to ‘learn’ or
to ‘understand.’ The Sophists used
to play on this ambiguity, arguing
that one could ‘learn what one knew
already.’ Cf. Ar. Soph. Elench. rv. 1,
2, which illustrates the present pas-
sage: Εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθά.-
»ουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι" τὰ γὰρ ἀπο-
στοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσι» οἱ Ὑραμμα-
τικοί. Td γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό
τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ
τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην,

Ζ

TI

178

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

[Cuap.

‘ > κ( > ἡ 3 a 4 δι ’ ,
σύνεσις, καθ’ ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν" λέγομεν
a
yap τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

"H δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ᾽ ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν

φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον
δέ: τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά ᾧαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν,

καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην.
γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή.

ἀληθοῦς,

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη
9 a @e “
ὀρθὴ δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ

2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι"
λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν
ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ
φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς" πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν
ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς

ΧΙ. This chapter (which is not
conveniently divided as it stands)
opens with a mention of the quality
of considerateness (γνώμη), and pro-
ceeds to point out how various quali-
ties unite in ‘thought,’ and what are
the natural and intuitive elements
‘which it contains.

I ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη] By the
progress of psychology, this term
came to bear the special meaning of
‘considerateness.’ At first it meant
knowledge in general, cf. Theognis,
vv. 895 sq.

Γνώμης δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἀνὴρ ἔχει αὐτὸς
ἐν αὑτῷ,

Οὐδ᾽ ἀγνωμοσύνης, Ἐὑρν᾽, ὀδυνηρότερον.

In Thucydides it bore a variety
of significations, especially when used
in the plural, standing for almost
anything mental, ‘minds’ as opposed
to bodies, ‘thoughts’ as opposed to
deeds ; ‘ feelings,’ ‘ principles,’ ‘ max-
ims,'&c. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, τι.
xxi. 2-15 γνώμη is used for a moral
maxim (such as those of the so-called
Gnomic Poets) ; so also for all popu-
lar sayings, Soph. El, xvii, 17. It
was probably from the association

of σνγγνώμη that γνώμη came to have
its distinctive meaning. The author
of the Magna Moralia calls it εὐγνω-
μοσύνη, and makes it a sort of passive
form of ἐπιείκεια (11, ii. 1): ἔστι μὲν
οὖν οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη *
τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρῖναι τοῦ εὐγνῶμονος, τὸ
δὲ δὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ
ἐπιεικοῦς.

In the text above, it is said that
‘considerateness is a right judgment
of the equitable man. Pardon is a
right critical considerateness of the
equitable man.’

ὀρθὴ δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] ‘Now by a
right considerateness is meant a true
one.’ This must be the import of the
sentence, but the writer says not ἀλη-
O%s, but τοῦ dAnGols—probably ‘ by
attraction’ to τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς. But it is
an inaccuracy of language to speak
of ‘a true man’ in the sense of ‘a
man whose judgment is true.” Stahr
translates τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς as if it were
neuter. But the ‘equitable man’
here apparently gives the standard
for γνώμη, as the φρόνιμος for virtue,
Eth. τι, vi. 15.

2 εἰσὶ δὲ---ἄλλο»] ‘Now all the
(above-mentioned) conditions of mind

X.—XI.] HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] VI. 179

4 .., Δ ε , 4 A ᾽ , a ,
εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώ-
Α a “~ 4 “A ~ ὔ
μων" τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν
σι 4 wv 4 ΄- @ 4 ~ 9 [4
τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχά-
sf A ? 4 4 a
των πάντα τὰ TpakTa’ Kai yap τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν
[4 [2 ἴω
αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ, ταῦτα
δ᾽ ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχατῶν ἐπ᾽’ ἀμφότερα" καὶ
a “- @W 4 ζω ὔ ~
yap τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ Kal οὐ
[2 4 A 4 4 4 A
λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ Tas ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων

naturally tend to the same point ; we
apply (ἐπιφέροντες) the terms consi-
derateness, apprehension, thought, and
reason to the same persons, and say
(λέγομεν) that they have considerate-
ness, that they have attained to (437)
reason—that they are thoughtful—
that they are apprehensive. For all
these faculties deal with ultimate truths
(τῶν ἐσχάτων) and particulars ; and it
is by being able to judge of those
matters with which the thoughtful man
is concerned that a man is apprehen-
sive, considerate, or forgiving. Equity
extends itself over all the forms of
good which consist in a relation to
one’s neighbour.’

νοῦν ἤδη) What this means is not
quite clear. It may refer to what is
said in § 6, ἤἦδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει.
Thus it might be nearly equivalent to
our saying of a person that he had
‘attained to years of discretion.’ Or
again, it may refer to the moment of
action, and ἤδη would be thus equiva-
lent to the French vowd. ‘There is
reason exhibited.’ "Hi is used
similarly to denote the present
moment, Eth. Bud. τι, viii. 11: Kal
γὰρ ὃ éyxparevdépevos λυπεῖται παρὰ
τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει
τὴν ἀπ᾽ ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον
ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται
ὑγιαίνων.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ} This is said because
γνώμη and σνγγνώμη are acta of
equity. Cf. Eth, v. x. 1, note,

4-5 καὶ ὃ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων---
voids] ‘ And reason is of the ultimates
at both ends of the series. Both the
first and the last terms are appre-
hended, not by inference, but by
reason. On the one hand, the scien-
tific and demonstrative reason (ὁ μὲν
κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις) apprehends those
terms which are immutable and
primary. And on the other hand,
the practical reason (ὁ ἐν ταῖς mpax-
Tikats) apprehends the ultimate
(éoxdrov) and contingent truth, and
the minor premiss. For these con-
stitute the sources of our idea of the
end, the universal being developed
out of the particulars. Of these par-
ticulars, then, one must have percep-
tion, and this perception is reason.’
The writer having before (in § 3) con-
nected the faculties of ‘ apprehension,’
&c., with ‘Thought,’ on the ground
of their all being concerned with
ultimate truths, proceeds to include
reason (νοῦς) under the same category,
and says that this apprehends ἔσχατα
at both ends of the series. But now
comes in a piece of confusion which
is thoroughly Eudemian, for he goes
on to say that the scientific reason
apprehends first truths or principles
(cf. ch. vi.), while the practical
reason apprehends last terms or par-
ticulars. To mix up considerations
of the scientific reason with the
present discussion is to introduce
what is entirely irrelevant. We see

180

4 ,
καὶ πρώγων, O

HOIKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VI.

[Cuap.

a a ~ ’
δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ

ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως" ἀρχαὶ yap τοῦ οὗ

5 ἕνεκα αὗται" ἐκ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου.
a # ὃ a # θ φ δ᾽ 9 A “".
οὗν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ γοῦς.

τούτων
διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ

δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς, γνώμην δ᾽

A t 4 δι
6 ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν.

κίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία
γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ

here ἃ bringing together of two things
which were before placed in contrast
with each other (ch. viii. § 9), namely,
the reason which apprehends first
principles, and thought apprehending
particular facts (ἐσχάτων) In the
present passage, what was before
called thought (¢pdrycis) is called
reason (vois), and it is said that
reason is the faculty which perceives
or apprehends the particular in moral
subjeots (ἐν ταῖς wpaxrixais). This,
then, is the main purport of the
present remarks. Setting aside as
irrelevant what is said of the scien-
tific reason, we learn that the moral
judgment is intuitive, that moral in-
tuitions are to be attributed to the
reason, and that out of these par-
ticular intuitions the moral universal
grows up. When stripped of its
ambiguities of statement, the sense of
the passage becomes unexceptional.
We may compare it with the in-
cidental observations of Aristotle,
Eth. i. iv. 7: "Apxh yap τὸ ὅτι" καὶ el
τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσ-
δεήσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἣ ἔχει
ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. Jb. vii. 20 :
ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς,
οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς" τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι
«τρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή, The expression of
Eudemus is not so strong as that of
Aristotle, Eudemus says ἐκ τῶν xaé’
&acra τὸ καθόλον, while Aristotle
said ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι. The latter must be
truc if reason be the organ by which

σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλι-

~ 4“ 4
γνουν € χει Καε
A 9 4 a
καί ἀρχὴ Kat

the fact is apprehended, for reason is
in itself universal, and whatever it
apprehends must be of the nature of
the universal.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται] This
is similar in form of expression to ch.
lil. § 3: ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι
καὶ τοῦ xa@édov. On οὗ ἕνεκα see
below, ch, xii. § 10, note.

αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ voids] To say that
‘ reason is a perception of particulars’
is only the counterpart of Aristotle's
saying that we oan have ‘a perception
of universals,’ th, 1. vii. 20; τῶν
ἀρχῶναϊ μὲν αἰσθήσει θεωροῦνται, Aris-
totle expresses the intuitive character
of reason by saying that it ‘touches’
its object. Cf. Metaphys. vit x. 5,
τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές. . ..
τὸ δ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν. Jb. xt. vii.
8, αὑτὸν δὲ voel ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν
τοῦ νοητοῦ" vonrds “γὰρ γίγνεται
θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν γοῦς
καὶ νοητόν. That reason, while it is
on the one hand intuitive, is on the
other hand developed by experience,
we learn from the discussions in Post.
Anal. 11. ch. xix, The same is ex-
pressed above in the saying that
‘reason is the beginning and the end.’

5-6 διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ.---- ὀρθῶς]
‘ Hence it is that these faculties are
thought to come naturally, and that
although no one without conscious
effort (φύσει) gets to be a philosopher,
men do get naturally to have con-
siderateness, and apprehension, and

XL—XIL]

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI.

181

, me 4 , 4 eo ’ 4 ‘ ,

τέλος νοῦς" ἐκ τούτων yap ai ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρο-
νίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν
4 , 4 Α Α ws» 9 - 9 , 4 ¢ «“
ἀποδείξεων" διὰ yap TO ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶ-

σιν ὀρθῶς.

, 4 2 > A e ’ Ve ’ 4
τὶ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, Kat

4 ’ e , ’ 2 . Ψ a
περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς
ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.

Διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν͵ τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν,
e 4 4 ’ 208 a %e me καὶ xe, »

ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρω-

a

reason. A proof of this is, that we
think they ought successively to appear
as age advances, and (we say that)
such and such an age possesses reason
and considerateness, as if these things
came from nature, Hence reason is
the beginning and the end, the matter
of premises and conclusions is the
same. Thus we must pay regard to
the unproved assertions and opinions
of the elderly and experienced, or of
the thoughtful, no less than to demon-
strations. For, from having obtained
the eye of “old experience,” they see
aright.” In these excellent remarks
the subject is brought round again
to the contrast between Philosophy
and Thought. The former never
comes naturally, but the latter does.
The nature of reason, and its growth
in the mind, is illustrated by the
common fact of the respect paid to
age.

ἐκ τούτων---καὶ περὶ τούτω») Cf. Eth.
1. iii, 4 : περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων
λέγοντας. The ‘subject’ of the de-
monstration is the conclusion, cf. Eth.
I. Vili. 1, Σκεπτέον. .. οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ
συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος.

ὄμμα] Cf. Eth. 1. vi. 12, ὡς γὰρ ἐν
σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦΞ:. Plato,
Repub. p. 533 Ὁ, ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρ-
βαρικῷ tol τὸ τῆς ψνχῆς ὄμμα κατο-
ρωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει

ἄνω.

XIL In this and the following
chapter, by mooting the question, Of
what use are Thought and Philosophy?
the writer shows the relation of the
two qualities to each other, and the
inseparable connection existing be-
tween thought and virtue. The fol-
lowing difficulties are first stated.
(1) Philosophy is not practical, it does
not consider at all the means to
happiness, how then can it be useful ?
(2) Thought, on the other hand,
though it treats of happiness, might
be said to be mere knowledge. It
might be said that a man no more acts
well from having this knowledge of
the good, than he ἐδ well from having
a knowledge of medicine. (3) Or
again, if thought be useful for telling
us how to be good, why not get this
advice from others? Why should it
be necessary to have thought, any
more than it is to learn medicine,
when one can go toa doctor? (4) If
philosophy be better than thought,
how is it that the latter controls the
former? ‘The answer to question (1)
is, that both philosophy and thought
are good in themselves, and desirable
as being perfections of our nature,
even though they were not useful as
means to anything beyond. But they
are not without results. Philosophy,
if it does not serve as an instrument
to happiness, is identical with happi-

is)

182 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. [Cuar.

φ “~ , 9 ’ e A ὔ ζω 4
πος (οὐδεμιᾶς yap ἐστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν
ν 9 ‘ ’ Ψ a 2 a ν e 4 ’ ’
ἔχει. ἀλλα τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μεν φρονησὶς
4 € 4 4 , 4 Α A 9 ‘ 9 4
ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ,

a“ 9 3 4 a ~ "5" n~ 9 4 9 A 0 ah)
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν
δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ
4 ἤ 4 Ψ 9aAs 4 « Ά 40ι a 9 iA @
ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα

4 ~ a 9 4 ~ 9 4 ~ Ww o ns
μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται" οὐθὲν
γὰρ “πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν
9 9 4 4 e , [4 ἢ 9 4 ~
ἐσμεν. εἰ de μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ
γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος, ἔτι
3 FAN a a a Fab! 4 a 9 a Ψ a
δ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν" οὐθὲν yap διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ
ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ’ ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ

neas itself, Questions (2) and (3) are
answered by showing the relation of
thought to virtue. Virtue gives the
right aim, and thought the right
means. They are inseparable from
one another, Thought without virtue
would be mere cleverness, apt to
degenerate into cunning, and virtue
without wisdom would be a mere gift
of nature, a generous instinct capable
of perversion. While thus inseparable
from virtue, thought is not to be
identified with it. In this respect an
advance has been made beyond the
crude formula of Socrates. Wisdom
accompanies the virtues, and is a sort
of centre-point to them all (dua τῇ
φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσυ,
xiii. 6) Question (4) is easily an-
swered, since wisdom rather ministers
to philosophy than thinks of control-
ling it.

1 οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι ‘yerécews]
Suggested perhaps by Eth. x. vii. 5,
where it is said of the θεωρητικὴ ἐνέρ-
γεια ---οὐδὲδ γὰρ dm αὐτῆς γίνεται
παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι. 17. ὶ 7: δοκεῖ. ..
παρ᾽ αὑτὴν οὐδένος ἐφίεσθαι τέλους.

εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ
δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ]
‘If thought be that which is concerned

with things just and beautiful and
good forman.’ ‘H is indefinite, being
probably feminine on account of the
preceding ¢pévncis. This passage is
the first that asserts strongly the
moral nature of ‘thought.’ We are
told here that it takes cognisance of
the just and the beautiful ; before it
was only said to be concerned with
what was good (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα
ἀγαθά, ch. v. § 6). These concluding
discussions about φρόνησις show the
inadequacy of the term ‘prudence,’
by which it has been so often trans-
lated, really to represent it.

οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι
αὐτά] The answer to this objection
has virtually been already given, ch.
τ. § 8: where φρόνησις was said not
to be a merely intellectual quality.

2 εἰ δὲ μὴ---πείθεσθα!)] ‘But sup-
pose we assume that a man is thought-
ful not for this object (ὦ. 6. mere know-
ledge of virtue), but with a view to
becoming (virtuous), we must then
concede that to those who are virtuous
thought will not be useful,—nor any
more so to those who have not got
(virtue), for there will be no dif-
ference whether they have (thought)
themselves, or follow the advice of

XIL] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. 183

a a e Υ [4 a φ id we ? [2
περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν" βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθά-
νομεν ἰατρικήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, 3
εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται" ἡ γὰρ
ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ
τούτων λεκτέον" νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς 4
αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ᾽ οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ς

A ᾿ e 4 .φ'ι. ε, 4, 6 :ε»ν
ποιοῦσι μεν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, add’ ὡς ἢ υγιίεια,

a e a 4 ᾽ ψ' ’᾽ « a ~ Ψ
οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης
ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα, ἔτι 6

others possessing it.’ The compres-

sion used here is quite in the style of
Eudemus, and so is the confusion
caused by the careless writing in τοῖς
μὴ ἔχουσιν" οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς
ἔχεν, where ἔχουσιν and ἔχειν appear
to refer to two different things,

3 εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα
αὐτῆς ἔσται) This difficulty may have
been partly suggested by the promi-
nent position assigned to Thought in
the present book (cf. ch. vil. § 7: εἴη
δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική),
partly by the authoritative character
attributed to politics by Aristotle,
Eth. 1. i 4-6: δόξειε δ' ἃ» τῆς
κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς °
τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται x.7.X.
Cf. Plato on the βασιλικὴ τέχνη,
Euthydem. p. 291 B, quoted Vol. L
Eesay IIL. p. 191.

4 Thought and Philosophy cannot
be otherwise than desirable, as they
are the best state of the human mind.
And the mind must necessarily
(ἀναγκαῖον) desire its own best state.

5. ἔπειτα — εὐδαίμονα] Further-
more they do produce happineas—
philosophy produces it, not in the
way that medicine produces health,
but rather it operates like health
itself. Being a part of the entire
well-being (τῆς ὅλης dperfs) of man,

it makes one happy by the con-
sciousness of possessing it.’

τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῇ!) This phrase, which
never occurs in the writings of Aris-
totle, is frequent in those of Eude-
mus. Cf. Eth. Fud. τι. i 9: καὶ ἔστι
ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ
ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόριον).
1b. § 14: διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόριόν ἐστι
ψνχῆς, οἷον τὸ Operrixéy, ἡ τούτον
ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς.
Eth. Eud. rv. (Nic. γ.} ii, 7: ὅτι μὲν
οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι
ἔστι ris καὶ ὁτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν,
δῆλον. 1d. § 10: ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν
ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη.
This conception Eudemus came to
identify with καλοκἀγαθία, Eth. Eud.
vin. iii, Σ : κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν rep
ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον" ἐπεὶ
δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν,
καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαρθρωτέον τῆς ἐκ
τούτων, ἣν ἑκαλοῦμεν ἤδη καλοκάγα-
θίαν.

τῷ ἔχεσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν) ᾿Ἐνεργεῖν
added on to ἔχεσθαι expresses the
fruition, aa well ag the posseasion, of
philosophy. It implies that philo-
sophy exists not only in, but for, the
mind. See Vol. L Essay IV. pp
243 δα.

6 &r—rolroy] ‘ Again, man’s
proper function is discharged by an

184 ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] VI. Cur.

4 ww 3 a 4 4 4 A 8 4φ 4
τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν
ἀρετήν" ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ
φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον,

“ 9 ΨΚ 4 4 ὔ ~ a. (Vat! 4
ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ οὖθεν yap
7 ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς

4 4 “ 4
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν
’ Α 4 a, ~ “A a
εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ
4
δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πραττοντάς τινας οὕπω
δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα
~ 4 ΝΗ a > a 1 @ , 8 4
ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἣ dt ἄγνοιαν ἢ Ot ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ
δ αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν
σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν
ἕκαστα ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν
aA “A 4
8 καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων, τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν
4 δᾶ ~a e¢9 ’ ‘ Ψ >. Ψ , ἢ
ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ᾽ ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράτ-

accordance with thought and moral
virtue. For virtue makes the aim
right, and thought the means to the
attainment of this.’ The conception
of τὸ ἔργον is taken from Ar. Sth.
I. vii. 10. The rest of the psychology
here is different from that of Aris-
totle (see Fh. mi. v. 1, note), but is
identical with that adopted by Eude-
mus in his earlier books, Cf. Sth.
Bud. τι. xi. 1: τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων
λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον
ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν,
οὕτως ὥστε οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι,
ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισί, τὸν λόγον. "ἔστι
δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια" αὕτη γὰρ οὐ
διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον, "Ἔστι δ᾽ ἀρετὴ
καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. Λεκτέον δ᾽
ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν (this refers to
ch. v. 8 6, where, however, σωφρο-
σύνη is substituted for ἐγκράτεια),
10. § 3: πότερον 3 ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν
σκοπὸν ἣ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν ; τιθέ-
μεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τρύτου οὐκ
ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. 16. § 6,
quoted below.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου x.7.X.] The parts
are: (1) the scientific reason, (2) the

practical reason, (3) the moral nature
(λόγου μετέχον), (4) the vegetative
element,— Aperh τοιαύτη, ie. ‘moral
virtue.’ The vegetative soul has its
own ἀρετὴ or ‘excellence,’ in a general
sense.

7 The first step to prove the use
and practical necessity of thought, is
to show that moral action implies con-
sciousness and a conscious purpose.

8 τὴν pev—durduews] ‘ Now virtue
makes the purpose right, but the
means to this (ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα wé-
guxe πράττεσθαι) do not belong to
virtue, but to another faculty.’ There
is some confusion here in speaking of
the means to a purpose, προαίρεσις
itself being in the Aristotelian psycho-
logy a faculty of means; but cf. Fth.
KEud, τι. xi. 5-6, where προαίρεσις is
said to imply both end and means,
and whence the present passage is
repeated almost verbatim. “ἔστι “γὰρ
κᾶσα προαίρεσίς τινος καὶ ἕνεκά twos.
Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ
αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ (τῷ, Fritzache, e
conj.) προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα. Ἕστι
μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ

XII. ] HOIKON [EYAH MIQN}] VL 185
τεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον

δ᾽ ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν.
a a ’ ΄ , > 8 ’ σ΄ ᾿
wus ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα" αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ
4 a e ’ 4 v eo “-
πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα
πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὃ σκοπὸς 7
καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἂν de φαῦλος. πανουργία" διὸ καὶ
ἢ ᾿ ἢ 4 ’ 4 >
Tous φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι.
δ᾽ ς ld 9 e ὃ ᾽ ἀλ 9 9 » ~ 4
ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως
ταύτης. ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς
4 w 9 ~ e vw t 4 a wv ~ φ a
οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ws εἴρηταί Te Kat ἔστι δῆλον" of γὰρ συλ-

»”
€oTt

a ΄- ΄-- φ 4 . 4 2 3 4 a
λογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε

2 oo 9 τε ---- -α -- ——————— ee

τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. Td μὲν οὖν τυγχά-
ve τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα
τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν" τοῦ δὲ τὸ
τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως, οὗ
ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, ͵
8-10 λεκτέον δ᾽ ---ἀγαθόν) ‘ But we
must speak on the point with a more
exact attention. There is a certain
faculty which is called “cleverness,”
this is of a nature to perform and
to hit upon the means that con-
duce to any given aim. Now if the
aim be good, this faculty is praise-
worthy, but if bad, it turns to cun-
ning. Hence it even comes to pass
(καὶ) that thoughtful men get called
“clever” and“ rogues.” Now thought
is not cleverness, but it is not without
a faculty of the kind. But this eye
of the mind attains its full condition
not without virtue, as we have already
stated, and as is clear, for the syllo-
gisms of action have as their major
premiss—“ Since such and such is the
end and the best ’”’—(being whatever
it is,—something for the sake of argu-
ment, it matters not what). But this
(major premiss) cannot be apprehended
except by the good man; for vice
distorts (the mind), and makes it
false with regard to the principles

of action. Hence it is evident that :

VOL. II.

one cannot possess “thought ” unless

' he be good.’

καὶ τοὺς φρονίμου: δεινοὺς καὶ παν-
obpyous φαμὲν εἶναι]. The terms δεινὸς
and πανοῦργος went often together.
Cf. Plato, Theeia. p. 177A: ἂν μὴ

| ἀκαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος---ταῦτα

δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ
πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.
Demosth. Οἷ 1, p. 9: πανοῦργος ὧν
καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος πράγμασι χρή-
σασθαι. Rassow refera to Plato,
Hippias Min. p. 365 8, for the
popular identification of φρόνησις
with δεινότης.

10 ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ] The
whole conception of reason, ‘the eye
of the soul,’ being capable of being
perverted into worldly cunning or of
being kept pure by good moral habits,
comes, originally, no doubt, from
Plato, Repub. 518 BE: ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆ-
σαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τνγ-
χάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν
οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περια-
γωγῆς χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ
ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται, 4
οὕπω ἐννενόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονη-
ρῶν μέν, σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει
τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα 颒
ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν
ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ᾽ ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν,

AA

ἔστι δή TIS δύνα- 9

Ge

186 HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VI. [(Cuap

A 4 4A a 4 4 , ” 3 4 Ld
TO τέλος καὶ TO ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν. ἔστω γὰρ λόγου
χάριν τὸ τυχόν. τοῦτο 0 εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται:
διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ “μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ
τὰς τρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνι-
μον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.

’ 4 a a , 9 AY 4 4 ς 9 a
Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆν᾽ καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ

4

παραπλησίως. ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα" οὐ
ταὐτὸν μέν, ὅμοιον δέ. οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν
κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει
πω;" καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ

oe ee lw

ὥστε ὅσῳ dy ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ | ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας
πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον ; αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρ-
ὡς εἴρηταί τε] Ch. ii, § 4: διὸ οὔτ᾽ | χει---Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προὔπάρχειν πως
dvev νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἠθικῆς | οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν
ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις. Eth. Eud. | καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. In the
11. xi 5: διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη | present passage, the analogy between
τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ. the development of the reason and of
ol γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν] | the moral will is well drawn out. At
The form of the practical syllogism | first, there is the intellectual faculty,
is similarly given, Eth. Eud. τι. xi. 4: | cleverness, undetermined as yet for
ὥσπερ yap ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς al brodé- | good or bad, but requiring a right
σεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ | direction to be given to its aims.
τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις " "ἐπειδὴ δεῖ | This the moral feelings can alone
τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, el | supply. On the other side, there is
ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, ‘el ἔστι τὸ | the generous instinct, the impulse to
τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὲ εἶναι. | bravery, justice, and the like, but this
On the doctrine of the practical syllo- | is deficient in consciousness and in
gism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 263, sq. | the idea of a law, which reason can
alone supply. The joint development
XIII. 1 Σκεπτέον &}—«xvplay] ‘We | of these two sides gives, on the one
must consider then, over again, the | hand, ‘thought,’ on the other hand,
nature of virtue. For there is a rela- | virtue, in its complete and proper
tion in virtue analogous to that borne | form. What there is difficult or
by ‘thought’ to cleverness. Clever- | strange in the doctrine is, that virtue
ness, though not the same as ‘thought,’ | has apparently assigned to it the
is similar to it, and this is the way in | intellectual function of apprehending
which natural virtue stands related | the end of action. This appears
to virtue proper.’ The doctrine of | an inversion. ᾿Αρεγή seems now to
the natural element in virtue was | have changed places with λόγος. But,
clearly given by Aristotle, cf. Eth. x. | at all events, the point is clearly
ix. 6-8: Γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται, | established that an intellectual side
ol μὲν φύσει, ol δ᾽ ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. | and a moral side are entirely insepar-
To μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ | able.

XIL—XIII.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] VI. 187

τἄλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς" GAN’ ὅμως ζητοῦμεν

ow A ~

ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον
4

ὑπαρχειν" καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν

ἕξεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι.

τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁράσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ
δ 4 ~

ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ
4 # ww * 4 4 “-- 98 4 ’ ~ 4
μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα" ἐὰν δὲ λάβη νοῦν, ἐν
“ἭΝ [2

τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. ἡ 8 ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα Tor’ ἔσται 2

4 9 “- a

κυρίως ἀρετή, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο
9 4 10. ὃ ’Ὄ - 4 @ 4 > " ~ 4 -

ἐστιν E10, ϑεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ
af 3 & Ά 4

δύο ἐστί, TO μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων
ε a 3

ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι 3

“πλὴν

4 8 s ’ "Ἢ ~
wacas Tas aperas φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης TH μὲν

καὶ γὰρ παισὶ---ἀρετήὴ] ‘For the
natural dispositions belong both to
children and beasts, but without reason
they appear harmful. At least this
seems evident, that as a strong
body, if moved without sight, comes
into violent collisions because it has
not sight to guide it, so is it in men-
tal things (ἐνταῦθα). If the natural
qualifications have reason added to
them, they then excel in action, and the
state, which (before) wasasemblance of
virtue, now becomes virtue in the true
sense of the term.’ Φυσικαὶ ἕξεις is
used inaccurately for φυσικαὶ διαθέ-
σεις, cf, Eth. τι. vii. 6, note. On the
moral qualities of brutes Aristotle
often speaks ; cf. Hist. dn. 1 i.; 1x
i. &c. The ‘courage’ of brutes, being

undirected, is no doubt harmful, so :

the generosity, &c, of boys. That
fine natures are capable of the worst
perversion, is an opinion to be found
stated in Plato’s Republic, p. 491 E:
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, καὶ

[
|
|
i

ee ..

τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφνεστά- .

ras κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας δια-
φερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἣ οἴει τὰ
μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον

|

πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ νεανι-
κῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνε-
σθαι, ἀσθενῇ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε
ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι;

3-5 διόπερ ---- μετὰ λόγου] ‘ Hence
it is that some say that all the virtues
are manifestations of thought ; and
thus Socrates was partly right and
partly wrong in his investigations.
He was wrong in considering the vir-
tues manifestations of thought, but
perfectly right in holding that they
were inseparable from thought. The
same point is testified to by the fact
that, at present, persons, when they
wish to define virtue, add the terms
“state (specifying the particular ob-
ject), according to the right law.”
And that law is right which is in
accordance with thought. All men
therefore seem to have a presentiment
that a particular state in accordance
with thought is virtue. But a little
alteration is necessary. Not merely
the state according to the right law,
but that which is conscious of (μετὰ)
the right law constitutes virtue. Now
in such matters thought is right law.
Socrates then considered that the

188 HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VL [Cuap.

5 “~ 4 , “- 4 e [4 @w 4 a ,
ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ ὃ ἡμαρτανεν. ὅτι μὲν yap φρονήσεις
ᾧετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι 0 οὐκ ἄνευ
’ ΄ wv a a a a “-
4 φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ: καὶ γὰρ νῦν

Α [2
πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν,
εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον"
9 4 ’ e ‘ A ? > 8 4 ᾽ a
ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαι
πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν
φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι: οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, GAN’ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις
9 , 9 4 4 4 ὔ A ΄- ld e a ’
ἀρετή ἐστιν. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς
ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾧετο εἶναι

4 , 4 y c e a 4 A ᾽ ~
6 (ἐπιστήμας yup εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον
οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως

4 , Ἶδὲ ’ @ aA 10 n~ 9 “~
ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς αρετῆς.
ia

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτη λύοιτ᾽ ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη Tis ἂν

[]

vw v 9 , € 9 a 4 A e 9 s 3 ἤ
ὅτι χωρίζονται αλλήλων αἱ ἀρεται" οὐ yap ὁ αὐτὸς eucpue-

rr

virtues were laws (for he defined ' the article, and so too elsewhere in
them all as sciences), but we consider | contrasting Socrates with Plato, ἂς.
’ that they are conscious of a law.’ , The only exceptions to this rule are
καὶ Σωκράτη) On the doctrine of , the cases of renewed mention. Cf.
Socrates that ‘virtue is science,’ see . Jet. xu. iv. 5: Δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις
Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 165, sq. In ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει dixalws—AXX’ ὁ
Eth, τπ. viii. 6, the phrase is ὅθεν καὶ | μὲν Σωκράτης «.7.A. But in discuss-
ὁ Σωκράτης, on which Bishop Fitz- | ing Plato’s Republic and Laws (Pol.
gerald remarks, that by prefixing the | 11. i-vi.), Aristotle invariably speaks
article Aristotle appears to have in- | of ὁ Σωκράτης, οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι,
dicated the Socrates of Plato’s dia- | &c., as referring not to a real but to
logues, the dramatic, and not the a represented personage. Assuming
historical, philosopher. Thus speak- | that Eudemus has followed the same
ing similarly of characters in books, | rule, we may conclude that here and
Aristotle says, Ath, UL viii, 2, τὸν | in Eth. vit. ii. 1, Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ
Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα. Ib, τι. ix. 3, | ὅλως ἐμάχετο, 1b. vis. iii. 14, ὃ ἐξήτει
ἡ Καλυψώ. 1. ix. 6, πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην. | ZSwxpdrys,—the actual and historical
And contrariwise of real persons he | Socrates is designated.
speaks without the article. Ath. I. iv. δ, καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντε:] zc. since the
Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει. 7.1. ν. 3, | establishment of the Peripatetic doc-
ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ. 1. vi. 8, trine. Eudemus (8 5) refines upon the
ols δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος. 1. xX. I, κατὰ | usual Peripatetic formula, substituting
Σόλωνα. All through the first book | μετὰ λόγου for κατὰ λόγον. On the
|

of the Metaphysics, when writing the | meaning of this alteration, see Eth. 1.
history of philosophy, Aristotle speaks | vii. 14, note.
of the different philosophers without 6 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λύόγο:---ὑπάρξουσω

XIIL.] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VI. 159

4 a
στατος πρὸς ἅπασας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ᾽ οὕπω
Ἂ 4 ν - . ἂν ‘ ny 4 N . 4 4
εἰληῴφως ἔσται" τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς
ἐνδέχεται, καθ᾽ ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται"
« ~ ~ ~

ἅμα yap τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔση πᾶσαι ὑπαρξουσιν. δῆλον 7
δέ “a 9 a 4 @ ἔδ An > «a ὃ ‘ ‘ σι
ἐ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἣν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ
μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ
Ψ ’ 4 ») 4 ~ | e ‘ 8 ‘ ’ e \
ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς" 9 μὲν yap τὸ τέλος 7 δὲ
a 4 4 i‘ a ld 9 ‘ 4 4.4 [
Ta πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλα μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία 8
4 9 4 “- Qt ~ ’ ἤ ΜΝ 40Ν
γ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
“- φ ’ ε 9 , 4 4 “A 9. “ἡ 9 3 ea
τῆς ὑγιείας 4 ἰατρικὴ" οὐ yap χρῆται auTy, αλλ ope
ad 4 9 ὔ iy 4 > ’ 9 3 4 4 ‘
ὅπως γένηται" ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπίταττει, GAA’ οὐκ ἐκείνη.
ἢ rd n # 4 4 ἢ Ν) a a
ETL ὅμοιον Kav εἴ τις THY πολιτικὴν dain apxev τῶν θεῶν,
ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

- ee τίντα «γῆς. - ἡ» cle

‘ Thus the opinion is refuted of him ' proaches to the Stoical idea of the
who would argue that the virtues are | ‘ wise man.’

separated from one another, that the _ 7 This section is a mere repetition,
same man is not equally gifted by in Eudemian fashion, of what has
nature for all the virtues, so that he gone before, ch. xii. 88 4, 10; Eth.
will acquire one now and another Jud. u. xi. 6 (lc.) Cf. also ch. ii.
later. This is possible with regard to ὃ 4: διὸ οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας
natural good qualities, but not so with οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ
regard to those which constitute a mpoalpecis.

good man absolutely; for together 8 The relation of thought to Philo-
with Thought, which is one, all the sophy is clearly stated by the author
virtues will be in his possession.’ The of the Magna Moralia, who para-
same perfect character is attributed phrases the present passage (M. M.
to Thought below, £tk. vit. ii. 5: | I. XXXV. 32), ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτρο-
πρακτικός ye ὁ ppdmpos’ τῶν γὰρ | πός ris ἐστι τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευά-
ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων | fee ταύτῃ σχολὴν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ
ἀρετάς. The theory is, that he who ' αὑτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ
has thought can do no wrong. It | ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα.

will be seen how nearly this ap- ,

PLAN OF BOOK VII.

— προο.. ὠἈἩθ"»Ψ

HIS last of the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books consists of two

parts, of which the one is a necessary complement to Aristotle’s

ethical system ; the other superfluous, being little more than a modi-
fication of Aristotle’s (far superior) treatise on Pleasure.

Part I. having enumerated the moral states which are above,
below, and between virtue and vice, mentions six ordinary opinions
on these states (Ch. L.), points out the difficult questions to which
those opinions give rise (Ch. II.), and proceeds to elucidate them.

In Ch, IIT. the question is discussed, How is Incontinence com-
patible with a knowledge of the right?

In Ch. IV. the question, Whether Incontinence is confined to
any definite object-matter ?

Chs. V. and VI., pursuing the same inquiry, treat of certain
morbid and unnatural kinds of Incontinence, and of Incontinence
(analogously so called) in the matter of anger.

Ch. VII. compares generally Incontinence with Intemperance,
treats of the subordinate forms of the intermediate moral states
(endurance, softness, &c.), and traces Incontinence to two separate
sources in the character.

Ch. VITT. continues the comparison between Intemperance and
Incontinence, reverts to two questions before mooted, namely :—
(1) Is Intemperance more curable than Incontinence? (2) Is In-
continence to be regarded as absolutely bad? and gives a negative
answer to both.

Ch. IX. §§ 1-4 discusses the question mooted in Ch. II., Does
Continence consist in sticking to an opinion or purpose, right or
wrong? In answering this question, a good distinction is drawn
between Obstinacy and Continence.

Ch, IX. § 5—Ch. X. winds up the previous discussions, and

PLAN OF BOOK VII. 191

formally settles the remaining questions of Ch. II. Is Intemperance
the same as Incontinence? Can the thoughtful man be incontinent ?

These chapters form, as we have said, a necessary complement
to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of
view (ἄλλην ἀρχήν) than that which would divide mankind simply
into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have
perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states ;
and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction
between the ‘ Intemperate’ and the ‘Incontinent,’ as the use of
these English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to
give a certain special and technical meaning to the word ‘ Intempe-
rate’ in order to make it stand as the representative of a&xéAacrog.}
A subtle, but not always clear psychology is employed to explain
the phenomena of moral weakness, and it is observable that
physical and medical considerations are prominently appealed to
throughout this book. The remarks on bestiality, cretinism, or
morbid depravity (θηριότης) here made have attracted the notice of
modern writers on the psychology of insanity (as, for instance, Dr.

Thomas Mayo).?

1 The attributes assigned (c. vii.
8 2) to the Intemperate man, who ‘ of
deliberate purpose pursues excessive
pleasures, for their own sake, and
never repents of doing so, and thus is
incurable,’ make this a sort of ideally
vicious character. <A similar concep-
tion of ideal vice in its extremest
form, with the element of cruelty
added, is to be found in Shelley's por-
trait of Count Cenci: see The Cenci,
Act I. ac. i.

As to my character for what men call
crime,

Seeing I please my senses as 1 list,

And vindicate that right with force
or guile,

It is a public matter, and I care not

If I discuss it with you.

All men delight in sensual luxury,

All men enjoy revenge ; and most
exult

And the interesting allusions here made to the

Over the tortures they can never feel ;

But I delight in nothing else. I love

The sight of agony, and the sense of
Joys

When this shall be another’s and that
mine.

And I have no remorse, and little fear,

Which are, I think, the checks of
other men, &c.

2 “Now, according to this view of
the subject, we have a class of per-
sons, differing from the majority of
mankind in their incapacity for moral
distinction, differing from the insane,
in not labouring under any suspension
of the power of will. On the first of
these grounds, they have aright to a
place in our system of mental patho-
logy. On the last, they must con-
stitute a distinct head from insanity.
I am not at present considering this
class generally ; I exclude indeed that

192 PLAN OF BOOK VII.

melancholic or bilious temperament might be illustrated, not only
from Aristotle’s Problems, but also from Burton’s Anatomy of
Melancholy, The chief thing that we have to complain of in this
book is the too vague way in which incontinence is treated. For
the sake of forming a more definite notion of the standard of Greek
morality, we could have wished a graphic portrait of the continent
man, in the style of Aristotle’s fourth Book. As it is, we must be
content to know that the continent man yields to temptation less,
and the incontinent man more, than people in general.

Part 11. consists of that superfluous treatise on Pleasure, the
authorship of which has been so much disputed. While professing
to treat of pleasure as falling under the philosophy of human life,
the writer seems to confine himself almost entirely to a refutation
of three positions maintained by the Platonic school: Ist. That
pleasure is in no sense a good. 2nd. That most pleasures (2.e.
physical pleasures) are bad. 3rd. That no pleasure can be the
chief good.

The first and third of these positions are refuted in Chs, XII.
and XIII., and the second in Ch. XIV. The subject is treated
in this book under a more physiological and practical aspect than
in the tenth book of the Nicomachean work.

section of persons, in whom the ab- | propensities, For these I have bor-
sence of principle is obviated bythe | rowed the designation given to them
harmlessness of their tendencies. I | by Aristotle: and I call them brutal.’
am speaking of personsdestitute of the | —Mayo, Elements of the Pathology of
moral faculty, and alsovicious in their | the Human Mind, p. 127.

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII.

META δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν,

ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία
ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα" τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ᾽ ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν" πρὸς δὲ τὴν
θηριότητα μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς
ἀρετήν, ἡρωϊκήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ “Ομηρος περὶ
“Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν IIpiauoy ὅτι σφόδρα ἣν
ἀγαθός.

L This chapter proposes a new | virtue, or pure reason. 2. Virtue
field of inquiry (ἄλλην ἀρχήν) in | (afterwards called temperance, ow-
Ethics, namely, to consider those | φροσύνη), or the perfect harmony of
intermediate states, continence and | passion subjugated to reason. 3.
incontinence, together with their sub- _ Continence, or the mastery of reason
ordinate forms (softness, luxury, and | over passion after a struggle. 4. In-
endurance), which are ‘neither iden- | continence, or the mastery of passion
tical with virtue and vice, nor yet | over reason after a struggle. 5. Vice
wholly distinct from them.’ After | (afterwards called ἀκολασία, intem-
an enumeration of the moral states | perance), or the perfect harmony of
above, below, and between, virtue and | reason subjugated to passion. 6.
vice, the writer announces that his | Bestiality, or pure passion. It is
method of inquiry will be, as else- | remarkable that the terms σωφροσύνη
where, to collect current opinions on | and ἀκολασία, which in this book
the subject, to raise doubts and ob- | certainly supply the place of ἀρετή
jections to them, and by a process of | and κακία, are actually introduced
sifting to reject such existing opinions | extremely late. Cf. ch. v. § 8.
as are untenable, and to leave a residue ἡρωϊκήν τινα] Cf. Arist. Pol, ΥἹΙ.
of ‘ sufficiently demonstrated’ theory. | xiv. 2, where the gods and heroes are
He accordingly mentions six com- | mentioned as excelling men. Dr.
mon notions about the states in ques- | Hampden, in his Bampton Lectures,
tion. mentions that, in the canonisation of

1 τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία κιτ.λ.] A scale of | a Roman Catholic Saint, it was cus-
the moral states is here drawn out, | tomary to declare that he had gradu-
which stands as follows: 1. Divine | ated ‘in heroico gradu virtutis.’

VOL, IL BB

194 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL [ Crap.

οὐδὲ ἐῳ χει

εἰνδρὸς γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο,
4
, ὥστ᾽ εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι
ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θη-
A
ριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις" καὶ yap ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίον ἐστι
κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον
3 ἀρετῆς, ἡ 0 ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ

4 a 4 > ἤ ε a 4 ἢ
τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Aaxwves εἰώθασι προσα-

a @ 4 ΄“-Ο 0 a 9 ,

γορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ανήρ φασιν,
οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα
δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ᾽ Ena καὶ διὰ νόσους
καὶ πηρώσεις" καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν
4 ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ
τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ

4 ὔ
ἀνθρώπων
περὶ μὲν

δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον᾽ περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας
καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας"
οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθη-

“a 4
5 pig ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ᾽ ws ἕτερον γένος.

οὐδὲ ἐῴκει] Il, xxiv. 258.

3 of Adxwres] Apparently taken
from the Meno of Plato, p. 99 D.

4 ὕστερον] te. in chapter v.

πρότερον εἴρηται] Cf. Eth, Eud. τι.
x, 28, &e.

§ δεῖ δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων -- ἶκα-
y@s] ‘Our course must be, as elsewhere,
to state existing ideas (τὰ φαινόμενα),
and, having gone through the doubts
(which these ideas suggest), to esta-
blish thus, if possible all, but if not
all, anybow the greater number and
the most important of the ideas which
are generally admitted (ἔνδοξα) about
these conditions of mind. For if the
difficulties be resolved and at the
same time the generally admitted ideas
be suffered to stand, the thing will be
established sufficiently.’ This passage
is obscure, chiefly on account of the
ambiguity in the words ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί
re τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ
ἔνδοξα. Two meanings might be

δεῖ

attributed to λυήται τὰ δυσχερῇ, Which
might either refer (1) to the rejection
of ideas that involved a difficulty ; or
(2) to the clearing up of difficulties
attaching to any of the popular ideas.
The former interpretation would seem
best to suit the context, and to be
justified by the actual procedure of
subsequent chapters, and accordingly
the following is the way in which the
passage is rendered by the Paraphrast.
Λέγωμεν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον
καθ᾽ ὃν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴπομεν"
ἐκθησόμεθα γὰρ τοὺς δοκοῦντας περὲ
αὐτῶν λόγους, ὧν τοὺς μὴ συμβαίνοντας
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐλέγξαντες, τοὺς μάλιστα
ἐνδόξους καταλείψαντες βεβαιώσομεν "
καὶ οὕτως ἔσται φανερὸς ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν
λόγος. But on looking below we find
a sentence answering to, and in fact
repeating, the present one in such a
way that we cannot help taking it as
a decisive guide as to what is here
meant. After a statement of the

1] HOIKON (EYAHMIQN] VII. 195

δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ
πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα
»ν ὃ 4 ~ 4 ἢ 4 δὲ , ‘ a 4
Ta ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα Kal
κυριώτατα" ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κατα-
a
λείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
Δ .- δὲ “ 4 , Α “- ὃδ
οκεῖ On ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία" τῶν σπουδαίων 6
καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία
~ a n~ a e 9 A 9 4 A
τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, Kai ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ
ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ
a . ε q 9 4 48) ΑΜ μ
λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μεν ἀκρατής εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πραττει
δ A 1.0 e δ᾽ 9 4 ἰδὲ @ e 9 θ ἤ 9
ta παῦος, ὁ ὃ ἐγκρατής εἰδῶς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ επιθυμίαι οὐκ
καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ
καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ

ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον,

various ideas, and of the difficulties
which they suggest, the writer adds
ai μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί tives συμ-
βαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ,
τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν" ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπο-
ρίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν (ii. 12. The words
before us, λύηται τὰ δυσχερῇ, corre-
spond with τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν (τῶν ἀποριῶν)
and with ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας. It is to
be observed, however, that καταλιπεῖν
is used in the one place to refer to the
popular ideas, and in the other to
the objections (ἀπορίαι) urged against
those ideas. τὰ φαινόμενα, as shown by
what follows, is here equivalent to τὰ
λεγόμενα in § 7, the common sayings
and ideas of men. It is used in the
same sense, Eth. Fud, τ. vi. 1: πειρατέον
δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν
διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παρα-
δείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις.

6-7 The common ideas are now
enumerated. They are six in number:

(1) ‘ That continence and endurance
are morally good, while incontinence
and softness are morally bad.’

(2) ‘ That the continent man is he
who sticks to his opinion, while the
incontinent man is he who departs
from his opinion.’

(3) ‘That the incontinent man errs

through his peculiar state, knowing
all the while that he is doing wrong ;
while owing to this knowledge the
continent man abstains.’

(4) ‘That temperance is the same
as continence, and in like manner
incontinence is sometimes confused
with intemperance.’

(5) ‘It is occasionally maintained
that “thoughtful” and clever men
may be incontinent.’

(6) ‘That there is such a thing as
incontinence of other things beside
pleasure, 6.9. of anger, of honour, and
of gain.’

6 δοκεῖ δὴ x.7.d.] Cf. Kenophon,
Memorab, 1. v. 4-5, where it is said
that Socrates considered ἐγκράτεια
the foundation of the virtues. (Cf.
Ib, IV. v. 1, IV. V. 3-7, 11.)

καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ
καρτερικόν)] The distinction between
σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and καρτερία,
was not accurately maintained either
by Xenophon or Plato ; cf. Memorab.
Iv. v. 7, 1 i. 1, &c. Plato, Gorgias,
Ῥ. 491 Ὁ: πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις ;
οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί,
σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῇ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ,
τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν
ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Rep. p. 430E: κόσμος πού

196

H@IKON [EYAHMION] VII.

(Crap.

δ᾽ ν a 4 4 9 a ‘ ‘ 4 -ΟΦ 9
οὔ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλα-

στον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ᾽ ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν.

τὸν δὲ

’ e A 4 »Ἤ > OP > 9 A es
φρόνιμον OTE μὲν OU φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἰναι ἀκρατῆ, OTE

δ' 2°” ’ » ‘ ὃ 4 9 5 4
ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι,

#
e€Tl

9 ~ ’ A ~ 4 “”~ a ὔ bY
ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται Kat θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. Τὰ

A iow ὔ ~ 9 9 a
μεν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστιν,

᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύε-

,
ται TI.

ee ee ee ee ee

TIS. « « ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ Kal ἡδονῶν
τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια,

τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ})] Fritzsche
refers to Xen. Mem. iv. v. 6 sqq., and
for the opposite comparison to Xen.
Mem. 1. iL 1: ἐδόκει προτρέπειν τοὺς
συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν Bpwrod καὶ
ποτοῦ καὶ Naxveias καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους
καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνον. γνοῦς γάρ τινα
τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα
πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, K.T.X.

7 ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ
τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους] Cf. Plato, Legg. ix.
p. 869 4. Isocr. Demon. p. 6: ὑφ᾽ ὧν
κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψνχὴν αἰσχρόν, τούτων
ἐγκράτειαν ἄσκει πάντων, κέρδονς,
ὀργῇ, ἡδονῆς, λύπης.

II. This chapter contains a state-
ment of the objections and difficulties
which may be raised against the
above-mentioned ideas.

1-4 state the difficulties which at-
tach to the third-mentioned idea—
that the incontinent man sins against
knowledge. How is this possible?
how can one know the best and not
doit? Socrates denied the possibility
of incontinence altogether, making it
convertible with ignorance ; but with
what kind of ignorance remains to be
_ asked. Others confess that it is not
knowledge which is perverted in the
mind of the incontinent, but only
opinion, 1.6. a vague and weak con-
viction.

5 Continuing the same subject,

3 4 ων » , er 9
ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν OU φασι τινες οἷον TE εἰναι"

introduces also an objection to idea
(5)—that the thoughtful man may
be incontinent. Some fancy that
Thought (though not knowledge in
the scientific sense) may co-exist with
incontinence. But this shows a mis-
conception of the nature of ‘thought.’
The thoughtful man can do no wrong.

6 Contains an objection to idea (4).
How can continence be the same as
temperance, since the former implies
evil desires to be controlled, but the
latter is a harmonious state of the
moral nature ?

7-10 Shows the difficulties and
abeurdities which attach to idea (2),
that continence consists in sticking to
your opinion. If so, it must be bad
sometimes; Neoptolemus was incon-
tinent; folly and incontinence com-
bined will produce right actions; the
abandoned man will be a more hopeful
character than the incontinent, &c.

1r Urges against the sixth of the
ideas that the term ‘incontinence’
cannot be indiscriminately relative
to wealth, honour, &. There must
be some absolute conception of in-
continence, independent of these
qualifications.

Ι᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ ---ἄγνοια»] ‘ Now one
might raise the question, how it is
that a person with right conceptions
comes to act incontinently, That a
man who had absolute knowledge
should do so, some say would be
impossible, for it would be a strange

L—II,]

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMIQN] VIL.

197

δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς Gero Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι

a 4 i 9 AN a 9 ,
κρατεῖν Και περιέλκειν αντον ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.

Σωκρά-

a 4 4 9 [2 ‘A A γ᾽ e 9 Ww
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ws οὐκ οὔσης
ἀκρασίας" οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ

βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ dt ἄγνοιαν.

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμ-

a ”~ ‘4 9 “~ Q a a 4
φισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ
τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας.

ΑΜ 4 9 # ? ¢ 5» ld 4 4 ΄-ὠ ’
OTi yup OUK Ol€TQL γε Oo ak PAT EVOMEVOS πρὶν εν τῶ παθει γεν

’ ’ 9 A w a 4 A ἴω A
ver Oat, Φανερον. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τὰ μὲν σνγχωροῦσι τὰ

thing, as Socrates thought, if know-
ledge were in a man, that anything else
should master himand twist him about
like a slave. Socrates, in short, was
totally opposed to the idea, (arguing)
as if incontinence did not exist at all,
for he said no one with a conception
of what was best could act differently
from that best, but he could only so
act through ignorance.’ On _ this
doctrine of Socrates, and on its con-
nection with the rest of his ethical
views, see Vol. L Essay II. p. 166.
The omission of the article before
Σωκράτης seems to show that the real
man, and not the personage of Plato’s
dialogues, is referred to (see above,
note on Eth, vi. xiii. 3), but yet the
words of the passage before us have
obvious reference to Plato's Protagoras,
Ῥ. 352 B: δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ
ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ᾽
ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι" οὐδὲ ὡς
περὶ τοιούτον αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπι-
στήμης, ob τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν,
ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ
ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα,
πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοού-
μενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ
ἀνδραπόδον, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν
ἄλλων ἁπάντων.

ὅλως ἐμάχετο] This is repeated in
strong terms by the author of the
Magna Moralia, τι. vi. 2: Σωκράτης
μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης dyppe ὅλως καὶ

a Sach | Ra mers

οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς
εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά εἰσιν ἕλοιτ᾽ ἄν.
Cf. Plato, Protag. p. 357 E: ἡ δὲ ἐξα-
μαρτανομένη πρᾶξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε
που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττεται͵ &c.

2 οὗτος μὲν οὖν---φανερό»] ‘Now
this reasoning is manifestly at variance
with experience, and we require to
ask with regard to the state, supposing
it to arise from ignorance, what man-
ner of ignorance it is that takes place,
for it is plain that the person who acts
incontinently does not at all events
think (that he must so act) before
he gets into the particular state.’
Φαινομένοις here refers no doubt to
the actual facts of life, and accordingly
the rendering of the Paraphrast is
οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐναντίος ἐστὶ τοῖς
φανεροῖ. And yet there is probably
some allusion also to the φαινόμενα
mentioned above (i. 5); we may re-
present the double allusion of the
word by translating it ‘ experience,’
comparing with it also the use of τὰ
ὑπάρχοντα, Eth, i, viii. 1,

οὐκ οἴεταί ye] There seems to be
an ellipsis of δεῖν πράττειν ἃ πράττει.
Cf. below, iii. 2: ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ οἴεται μέν,
διώκει δέ. The writer argues that if
incontinence be ignorance, it is a pe-
culiar kind of ignorance, an ignorance
that comes on (γίνεται), not aconsistent
ignorance ; for the incontinent person
does not think ignorantly, f.e. wrongly,
before the time of temptation. On

iS)

Ww

198 HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VII. [Cuar.

δ᾽ οὔ: τὸ μὲν yap ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολο-
A v og , , ‘ \ , ἢ ’
γοῦσι, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ
ὁμολογοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην
4 ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ
4 3 ld A a 9 7 4 9 a e e
μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ᾽ ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἡ
4 ἢ 9.» 2 , , ’ Ξ ’
αντιτείνουσα ἀλλ᾽ npeuaia, καθαπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι,
συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς"
~ A ? 9 ᾽ 9 Qtr ~ 9 a ~
τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν
5 ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης᾽" αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυ-
, Δ᾽)» . \ ¢ 9 8 ν ,
ρότατον. ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον" ἔσται γὰρ 6 αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος
καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράτ-
e ld ‘ td 4 4 , ’ ’
τειν ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρό-
τερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος᾽ τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις
6 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας
3 4 a 4 Ἂ e 9 ἤ 4 δῇ € Fa
ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων
ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων" οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώ-
ww 4 Ἂ » 9 4 4 ὃ σι,
povos οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλα μὴν δεῖ γε.
4 A ς 3 ἤ ᾽ e tA 4 4a 4
yap xpnorat αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις nN aKo-
Aovbeiv, dof ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία" εἰ δ᾽ ἀσθε-

4 A
εἰ μεν

a a ~ a
vets Kat μὴ φαῦλαι, οὖθεν σεμνόν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθε-
a Wah! a 4, 4 ’ ld 3 4 a «
7 νεῖς, οὐθὲν μέγα. ἔτι εἰ macy δόξη ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ

ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ. καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης

Plato’s conception of moral ignorance
see Vol. I, Essay III. p. 187.

3 ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον] Cf.
Eth. Eud. vi. i. 10: καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸ
Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον
φρονήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη,
οὐκ ὀρθόν. Plato, Protag. p. 352 Ὁ:
αἰσχρόν ἐστι--- σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ
οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν
ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.

5 πρὸς δὲ rovros—dperds] ‘And
besides, it has been previously de-
monstrated that the thoughtful man
is emphatically (ye) one who acts, for
his province isto deal with particulars,
and he possesses also all the virtues.’
πρότερον, cf. Eth, vi. vii. 7, vi. viii. 8;
τῶν ἐσχάτων is here the genitive of

the object, as, in the place just quoted,
τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστὶν (ἡ φρόνησι5).

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων dperds] Cf. Eth.
VI. xiii. 6 ; καὶ τὰς ἄλλας is equivalent
to καὶ αὖ πάσας. See the note on Eth.
11. 1. 4.

7 The rough and hasty conception
of continence which would confound
it with obstinacy is here refuted by
showing that absurdities would follow
from it. Continence would be some-
times an evil, and incontinence some-
times a good. From this pointof view,
the conduct of Neoptolemus (who first
promised to deceive Philoctetes, and
afterwards abandoned the design as
unworthy) must be called incontinent
and at the same time right. The

IT. HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] VII. 199

ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ
Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτη" ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ
οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ᾿Οδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖ-
σθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος ἀπο- 8
ρία" διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ

χὰ iad 3 ὔ 4 , 4 9 v
wow ὅταν επιτύχωσιν, O γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία

a

allusion is repeated below, c. ix.§ 4. | ®. τί wore λέγεις, ὦ τέκνον, ws ov
For the sake of observing more μανθάνω.

accurately the ‘noble incontinence’ ' N. οὐδέν σε κρύψω. δεῖ γὰρ ἐς Τροίαν
of Neoptolemus, it is worth while to σε πλεῖν

quote at length the passage referred πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αχαιοὺς καὶ τὸν ’Arpec-
to (Soph. Phil. 895-916). δῶν στόλον.

N. παπαῖ" τί δῆτ᾽ ἂν δρῴμ' ἐγὼ rovs- 8-0 ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸδε----κακὰ πράξει]
θένδε ye; ‘ Again (if we accept the above-men-

Φ, Τί 8 ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ; ποῖ wor’ &éBys | tioned definition of continence) the
λόγῳ; sophistical argument [though lying]

Ν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅποι χρὴ τἄπορον τρέπειν | will cause us perplexity. For from
ἔπος. the Sophists wishing to confute, and

@. ἀπορεῖς δὲ rod σύ; μὴ Ady’ ὦ | at the same time astonish (παράδοξα
τέκνον, τάδε. ἐλέγχειν), in order that on succeeding

N. ἀλλ᾽ ἐνθάδ' ἤδη τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους | they may establish a reputation for
κυρῶ, ability — [ΠΟῪ construct a piece of

#. οὐ δή σε δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος | reasoning which perplexes, since the
ἔπεισεν ὥστε μή μ' ἄγειν ναύτην ἔτι; | intellect is fettered, on the one hand

N. ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν | not wishing to abide by a conclusion

which does not please, and, on the
other hand, being unable to get loose,
from having no means of breaking
the chain of argument. Now from

ὅταν λιπών τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσει-
κότα.

@, adr’ οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ φντεύσαντος σύγε

δρᾷς οὐδὲ φωνεῖς, ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρ᾽

ἐπωφελῶν. one of their reasonings it ensues that
N. αἰσχρὸς φανοῦμαι" τοῦτ ἀνιῶμαι | folly together with incontinence will
πάλαι. make up virtue; for (he who pos-

@. οὕκουν ἐν ols γε Spas’ ἐν ols 8
αὐδᾷς ὀκνῶ.
Ν. ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δράσω ; δεύτερον ληφθῶ

sesses these qualities) does the reverse
of what he conceives (he ought) by
reason of his incontinence, but he

κακός, conceives good to be bad and that he
κρύπτων θ᾽ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ λέγων | ought not to do it, and thus he will
αἴσχιστ᾽ ἑπῶν ; do what is good and not what is bad.’

ᾧ. ἀνὴρ ὅδ᾽, εἰ μὴ "γὼ κακὸς γνώμην | In the Oxford edition of Bekker
ἔφυν, (1837) there is a misprint of μένει»

μὲν δή. The Berlin edition of Bekker,
like all other editions, reads μένειν μὲν
μή. The MSS. appear to vary with
regard to μὲν (which by some of them
is omitted), but not with regard to μή.

apodots μ᾽ ἔοικε κἀκλιπὼν τὸν
πλοῦν στελεῖν.
N. λιπὼν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε᾽ λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ
πέμπω ae μᾶλλον, τοῦτ᾽ ἀνιῶμαι
τάλαι.

eae ee Le SS SS SS Sah ϑῸΚΆὉ.ὉὉ070..............-... ..

200

HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VII.

[CHap.

f ? Α ε , Od ’ 4 a ?
γίνεται" δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ Bov-
ὃ 4 A 4 4 A a oes 4 4

ληται διὰ TO μὴ ἀρέσκειν TO συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ

9 δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.
τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετή.

’ w#
συμβαίνει δ᾽ ἔκ

4 s
τἀναντία

8 ’ “ e 4 4 9 ’ e U
yap πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει
δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ

The great difficulty in the passage
before us is caused by the word Ψευδό-
μενος. This is explained either to be
(1) an additional adjective to ὁ σοφι-
στικὸς λόγος, in which position it has
an awkward appearance, or (2) to refer
to the well-known puzzle of Eubulides
the Megarian, which was called ὁ
ψευδόμενος, and in logic books ‘Men-
tiens’ or ‘the liar.’ The puzzle was
as follows: ‘If a man says that he
lies, does he lie or speak the truth?’
to which of course no simple answer
can be given. He may lie, and yet
speak the truth in saying that he lies;
for if he lies in saying that he lies, then
he speaks the truth. This was a speci-
men of the ‘eristic’ of the Megarians,
which consisted to a great extent in
drawing out the difficulties that beset
the common forms of language. Chry-
sippus wrote six books on the puzzle
of ‘the Liar;’ and Philetas of Cos
is said to have died of vexation from
failing to solve it. Hegel (Geschichte
der Philos. 11. 117) compares it to the
squaring of the circle. But clearly
this puzzle has nothing to do with the
subject under discussion in the text.
Indeed one might almost fancy that
the word ψευδόμενος was an interpo-
lation which had crept in owing to
the occurrence of the words διὰ τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος in the line before.
The acquaintance of the copyist with
the fallacy ‘Mentiens’ might have
tended to shroud the mistake. Evi-
dently the words συμβαίνει δ᾽ Ex τινος
λόγου are an explanation of ὁ σοφι-
orixds λόγος, and the Paraphrast,

— ee

seeing this, ignores the word ψευδό-
μενος altogether. Supposing, how-
ever, that it be allowed to stand, we
must interpret it in a logical sense,
not as if it had anything to do with
the fallacy of Eubulides. The ex-
planation of it is to be found in the
Sophist. Elench. of Aristotle, iii. 1-2,
where it is said that the aims of the
Sophists and Eristics are five in
number, ἔλεγχος καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ wapd-
δοξον καὶ σολοικισμὸς (making one talk
bad grammar), καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιῆσαι
ἀδολεσχῆσαι (making one repeat the
same thing over and over)... μάλιστα
μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι ἔλέγ-
xovres, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενόν τι δει-
κνύναι, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἄγειν, κιτ.λ.
In the above passage we see that the
writer has brought together two of
these separate terms, speaking of
παράδοξα ἐλέγχειν. It is possible
that he may also have qualified the
‘sophistical reasoning’ with another
of these logical formule. The above-
mentioned fallacy is an instance of
the Sophists’ way of tampering with
moral notions in order to be thought
clever. _

δέδεται ἡ διάνοια] Cf. Ar. Metaph.
IL i, 2: λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας
τὸν δεσμόν" ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία
δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος" 7 γὰρ
ἀπορεῖ ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς
δεδεμένοις " ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως
προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. αὶ If we grant
the premiss that continence is sticking
to an opinion of whatever kind, we
cannot ‘get loose’ from the conclusion
forced upon us by the Sophists.

IL.—II1.] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL. 201

9 bY 4 , » ς ΄΄ a ᾽ Α ᾽
οὐ τὰ κακὰ mpage. ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώ- 10
κων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ
διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀκρασιαν εὐϊατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν. ὁ 0 ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ἧ
φαμὲν “ ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν ." εἰ μὲν
γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο"
~ a a
νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄλλα πράττει. ἔτι εἶτι

4 [4 σι
περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, Tis ὁ ἁπλῶς

Ἵ ve. 9 a ‘ € ᾽ wt a 9 ὔ a
ἀκρατής; οὐθεὶς yap ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν
9 > “~ κυ ~
δ᾽ εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες 12

’ ’ 4 “ 4 4 a a Ά 4
συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ κατα-
~ N ~
λιπεῖν: ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.
~ a Ou ~
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς 3
εἰδότες, εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον,

10 ἔτι ὁ τῴ---ἄλλα πράττει] ‘Again ᾿ omit μὴ, which is not to be wondered
he who on conviction and with full ‘ at, as there is a transition of meaning
! purpose acts and pursues pleasure | in the use of ἐπέπειστο: (1) the in-
would seem to be in a better state | temperate man is said to act τῷ πε-
than he who does so not from reason- | πεῖσθαι, t.e. with a wrong conviction,
ing, but from incontinence ; for (the! thinking bad ‘to be good ; (2) the in-
former) is more curable, since there | continent man acts οὐ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι,
is a possibility of changing his con- | not by reason of a conviction that
victions, whereas the incontinent man | he ought to do so as he does ; (3) the
is open to the saying, ‘When water | incontinent man πέπεισται ἃ πράττει,
chokes, what must one take to wash | has a full conviction with regard to
‘it down?” Had he not been convinced | what he does (i.e, that it is wrong),

oe penta OF Og EP τε ρῶν apn OF fete 5 τ πος

- bafpre with regard to his _acHona, | but does not abide by that conviction.
there might ‘have heen-o-hupe-eb-his 12 al μὲν ofv—éorw) ‘This then
mind being suligbtened and-bis.ceags | is the kind of difficulties which arise;
ing 80 to to act; but as it is, with all | part of them we must explain away
| the conviction | in the world,he still (ἀνελεῖν), while we leave part un-
“Ἢ dots ce contrary to. it.’ Thisisareductio | answered, for resolving a difficulty is
ad absurdum of the saying that in- | finding something out.’ Cf. Ar. Meta-
continence means never acting on | phys. 11. i. 2: ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι
your conviction, and that continence βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι
means sticking to your conviction. | καλῶς" ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις
If it were so, intemperance (ἀκολασία) | τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν
would seem to be a sort of continence, | δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν.
and, on the other hand, incontinence | See above, ch. i. 5, note.
would seem incurable. The reverse,
however, of all this is true. See
below ch. viii. which is really the most important
el μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο) Some MSS. | and interesting question with regard
VOL, II. co

III. This chapter discusses that

[Ὁ]

202 ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] VIL. [Cuar.

, A , 3 “ ε 4 4 a ’
λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἣἥ περί
a ~ 4

τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν,
πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης.
ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής
9 “-. 4 ἡ “ “ ΝΜ) 4 , , ‘
εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ
πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἦ
οὔ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὔ ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν" ἔπειτ᾽ εἰ περὶ wat’

ἔστι 0

4 4 e 9 ἤ \ ¢ 9 v a ww Ψ “ 4 ἰ 9

ἐστίν ἡ ἀκρασία Kat ἢ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ" οὔτε yap περὶ παντ

4 4 e e ~ 9 t 9 4 a ΝΜ e 9

ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος,

οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἣν τῇ

4 id 9 - “ ee w» e 8 ‘ ἢ

ἀκολασίᾳ). ἀλλὰ τῷ wor ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαι-
[4 id i) “ 4 4 «Qs , Lg .

ρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν TO παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν" ὁ ὃ

to incontinence and the whole nature
of the moral will, namely, how is it
possible to know the right and yet do
the wrung? It treats of the third of
the popular opinions mentioned above
(ch. i. § 6), and the difficulties arising
out of the same (ch. ii. §§ 1-4). The
commencement of the chapter is rather
confused, as it touches on, without
discussing, the nature of the object-
matter of continence and incuntinence,
&o. With ὃ 3 the main question is
opened, namely, the relation of know-
ledge to incontinence, and a prelimi-
nary step is taken by the assertion
that it makes no difference whether
it be right opinion or knowledge which
the incontinent man possesses, since
opinion may be held quite as strongly
as knowledge.

In 88 5-8 it is shown that the real
point to be ascertained is, what is
meant by knowing or having know-
ledge. A man may have knowledge
which is in abeyance, either because
he does not apply a minor premiss
to his general principle, or because
he is under the influence of asleep,
wine, madness, or the like,

9-14 A more intimate examination
tells us that there may be two syllo-
gisms in the mind, the one leading to
continence and the other to incon-
tinence, The former is not drawn
out, but remains in want of a minor
premiss ; the latter through the in-
stincts of sense and desire becomes
realised and -is acted on. However,
the former knowledge cannot be said
to have been present in a complete
form to the mind, and therefore So-
crates was not wrong in denying that
knowledge of the right could exist,
and yet be overborne.

1-2 There is something awkward
in the way in which the questions to
be discussed in succeeding chapters
are here propounded. The writer
might have made it his ἀρχὴ τῆς
σκέψεως to consider what is the exact
point of difference between continence
and incontinence, but as a matter of
fact he has not done so, Thereis a
want of art in the sudden announce-
ment (ὁ μὲν yap ἄγεται, x.7.d.) of the
distinction between intemperance and
incontinence. The same want of art,
proceeding from whatever cause, marks

IIT. ] HOIKON (EYAHMION] VIT. 203

οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ 3
a
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ᾽ ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐθὲν δια-
, 4 ‘ ὔ 2 A ~ a 9 ,
φέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον" ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων ov διστά-
4 3 wv 4 ~ 9N 0 4 δ iy a 4 9 ,

ουσιν. αλλ οἵονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ TO ἤρεμα 4
v4 € , ~ 9 ὔ Ἁ 4
“πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζοντες μάλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν
ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης" ἔνιοι
γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἣ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπί-

μι

στανται" δηλοῖ δ᾽ ᾿Ηράκλειτοςς. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ
ἐπιστήμη καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει
τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ
ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα" τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰ

the whole of these two sections, and ᾿ μὴν fre οἱ ἐγκυβερνήσει πάντα διὰ
the main business of the chapter only πάντων.
oommences with section 3. 5 ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ διχῶ:---θεωρῶν)][ἠ ‘ But
3-4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῇ | since we use the term “ knowing” in
K.T..] Cf. above ch. ii, §§ 3-4. We | two senses, both to denote the man
must dismiss any idea that the pheno- | who possesses without applying, and
mena of incontinence can be explained | the man who applies knowledge, there
by saying that the incontinent man | will be a difference between doing
has only moral opinions, and that | what is wrong, when you have the
opinions are weak. ‘Heraclitus shows’ | knowledge but do not attend to it,
that opinions may be as atrongly held | and doing the same when you have
as scientific certainties. Of course | the knowledge and pay attention to it.
neither Aristotle nor his school would | The latter case seems strange, but
wish to do away with the distinction | not so if you act without attending.’
which Plato had established between | This distinction between the posses-
δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. It is only as | sion and the application of knowledge,
connected with the will, and as form- | which is of the utmost importance
ing a ground for action, that opinion , for explaining moral weakness, was
can be considered as strong as science. | perhaps first started by Plato in the
δηλοῖ δ᾽ ‘HpdxAecros] Heraclitushad | Theetetus, pp. 197-198, where he
® reputation with the ancients for | introduces his famous image of the
pride and dogmatism ; cf. Diog. Laert. | pigeon-house. Every knowledge once
IX. i. 5: ἥκουσέ re οὐδενὸς ἀλλ᾽ abrdv | acquired by the mind is like a bird
ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα wap’ | caught and placed in a pigeon-house ;
ἑαυτοῦ. Ib. rx. i. 1: μεγαλόφρων δὲ | it is possessed, but not available, till
γέγονε wap’ ὁντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης, ὡς | it be chased within the enclosure and
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ δῆλον | captured anew.
ἐν ᾧ φησι" πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει. μὴ θεωροῦντα] θεωρεῖν is used to
᾿Ησίοδον γὰρ ἃν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, | express ‘direct obzervation,’ just as
αὖθίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον. | in Eth. vi. iii. 2 : ὅταν ἕξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν
εἶναι γὰρ ὃν τὸ σοφὸν ἐπίστασθαι γνώ- | γένηται.

204 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. [Cnar.

A - Ψ 3 4 , td ΄- , w

6 μὴ θεωρῶν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα
μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστή-
, , “ 4 Ν ‘ ii.) ‘
μήν, χρωμένον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατα
ἤ Ἁ Α 4 [4 a 4 a A
μέρος" πρακτὰ yap τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ

A 4 3 A 4 9 ¢ “~ 4 9 SN ~ ῇ [
καθόλου: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ πραγματός
4 ᾶ Ψ . 1 , , ‘ ἢ , ὦ
ἐστιν, οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ Enpa, καὶ ὅτι
οὗτος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε" ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τόδε τοιόν-

ὃ «ἃ 9 wW a 4 4 a , δὲ ἢ ὃ ,
e, ἢ οὐκ. ἔχει ἣ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ Te dy τούτους dioicel
τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι

A 4 » ΔΑ , » 4 # 4
μηθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως de θαυμαστον. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν
ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς
9 ᾽ Ἵ ~ A ww 4 4 “A 4 r
ἀνθρώποις" ev TH yap ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέ-
ρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ
ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον.
ἀλλὰ
θυμοί

A a ὃ ‘0 € 9 o 0 Ν 7
μὴν οὕτω ὀιατιῦθενται οἱ εν τοῖς παῦεσιν ὄντες

γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοι-

, 9 ἢ 4 “ “ ~ 9 7 a
OUTWY ἐπιδήλως καὶ TO σῶωμα μεθιστάσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ

6 ἔτι ἐπεὶ--- θαυμαστόν) ‘Again | specified, but that he should know

since the premisses (in a syllogism)
are of two modes, nothing hinders a
man acting against kuowledge, al-
though he pussesses both these, if he
apply only the universal premiss, but
not the particular, for it is particulars
which are the objecta of action. More-
over there 18 a distinction which may
be made in the universal itself ; part
of it applies to the subject (ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ),
and part to the object (ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγ-
paros); for instance (you may have
the universal) “dry things are good
for all men,” and (the minor premiss)
“this is a man,” or “such and such
is dry ;” but (the farther knowledge)
that “this object is such and such,”
the person either has not or it is not
realised. According then to these
different modes of the premisses there
will be an immense difference (in the
way one knows), 80 that there is
nothing paradoxical in (the incontinent
man) “ knowing” in the way I have

otherwise would be marvellous,’ This
section well points out the number of
particular applications which have to
be made before a general moral prin-
ciple can be realised and acted on.
Else it remains in abeyance, and the
man who possesses it may yet act
against it.

7 ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν---οἰνωμένων) ‘ For
in the case of having and not using we
see that the having (τὴν ἕξι») becomes
quite a different thing, so that in such
cases a man has (knowledge) after a
manner, and has it not, as for instance
in sleep, in madness, and in drunken-
ness.” ἕξις is used here simply as the
active verbal noun of ἔχω, as itis in a
passage of Plato, already alluded to,
which the writer possibly had before
his mind, Theatetus, p. 197 A: ἀκή-
κοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαε ;
—Tows' οὐ μέντοι ἕν γε τῷ παρόντι
μνημονεύω.--- πιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶ
αὐτὸ εἶναι,

IIL] HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VII. 205

a , ~ ~ Φ Ψ e , wv ?
καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον

A 9 σι ὔ 4 3 a, 4 ’ 4 9 4
τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ de λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ 8
~ n a a Υ
τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον᾽ καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι
[4 4 4 ’ Ω»νγν , 3 ,
τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις Kai ἔπη λέγουσιν ᾿Εἰμπεδοκλέους,
σι, 4
καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι
3 ᾿ὖ᾽ ἣν σι Α ~ ὔ 4 td a“ Ψ
δ᾽ οὕπω" δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνου δεῖ" ὥστε
͵
καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ

4 9
τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους.

w# N ~ #
ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς av τις ἐπι-

8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν --- ἀκρατενομένον:]
‘Now repeating the words which
belong to knowledge is no sign, for
those also who are in the states I have
mentioned repeat demonstrations and
verses of Empedocles, and thoae who
are beginning to learn string the words
together without yet Anderstanding
them ; for (to be understood) a thing
must be assimilated, and for this
time is required. So in short we
must suppose that men in a state of
incontinence speak just like actors.’
This is an extremely subtle observa-
tion. The writer having said that
passion is like sleep or madness,
which make one know and yet not
know at the same time, proceeds to
remark that men acting incontinently
will often speak as if they were fully
aware of the nature of their acts.
They will say at the very moment of
yielding to temptation, ‘I know I
ought not todothis.’ But such words
are no sign that the knowledge is
really felt and realised ; they are
only like the verses of Empedocles
which a man might mutter in his
sleep ; they are like the repetition of
a schoolboy’s task ; they are hollow
like the ranting of an actor.

ἀπὸ τῇ ἐπιστήμη:) ‘That are caused
by, are the results of, science.’ Cf.
Mit. i. iv. 4: ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἐκεῖνοι ἀπὸ
ἐπιστήμης, ‘they do it not because of
science ;” and see below, IX. ix. 6.

ol πρῶτον pabdvres] Cf. Eth. vi.
viii. 6.

Q-1i ἔτι καὶ ὧδε--- μνήμη») ‘Again
in the following manner one might
psychologically consider the cause.
There is first a general belief, and
secondly a particular belief, which is
no longer under the domain of reason,
but under that of sense. Now when
out of these two a third is created, it
is a necessity that the mind should on
the one hand assert the conclusion,
and in the sphere of practice should

-atraightway carry it out, As, for

instance, if (there be the general pro-
position) “one ought to taste all that
is sweet,” and the particular one “ this
thing is sweet,” it is a necessity that
he who is able, and is not hindered,
should at once proceed to act upon
the knowledge. When therefore there
is in the mind one universal which
forbids tasting, but another which
says, ‘all that is sweet is pleasant ”
(havinga minor), “this thing is sweet,”
and thus the second universal is
realised,—and supposing that desire
happen to be there; (in this case) the
first universal says, “avoid this,” but
desire leads us on (to take it), from
the power which it has of setting in
motion every one of our organs, Thus
the result is that one is incontinent
under the sanction as it were of reason
and belief, and a belief too which is
opposed not directly but only acciden-

206 HOIKON [EYAHMION)] VII.
βλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν.

[ CHa.

ἡ μὲν yap καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα

4 A 1 @ , Ὄ td ΝΜ , , Κα
περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία" ὅταν
δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀναγκὴ τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα

A , 4 ἢ 4 A a ΄-νὦ Υ 4 ῇ
μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς,
4 Ά “ ὔ σι 4 4 A e ΕΥ̓͂
οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν
An > @& 4 ’ 4 ’ 4 a ͵
τι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυό-
“ ὔ io
μενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου
ἣν ' ΑΝ 4 c ς [ Ψ “ A 4 ea?
ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ dé, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ ἡδύ,
4 4 ἤ a a 9 a ? 9 , 9 “-
τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχη δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα,
e A ao S ~ e ᾽ > ’ δ᾽ a ‘
ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία ἄγει" κινεῖν γὰρ
ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων" ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγον

tally (to the true knowledge). For
it is desire, and not the intellectual
belief, which is opposed to the right
law. And this consideration leads us
to see why it is that brutes are not
incontinent, namely, because they have
no conception of universals, but only
an image and a memory of parti-
culars.’

This passage gives an admirable
explanation of the way in which a
man under temptation may ignore his
moral principles. Action (as the
writer implies) always depends on a
syllogism in the mind, and, if a minor
premiss were applied to the right
moral principle, wrong action could
never take place. But it is equally
true that the man who acts wrongly
does so under some sort of shadow of
reason. The story of the temptation
of Eve is typical of all similar cases
of yielding. There are always argu-
ments and considerations on which
the mind, self-deceived and blinded by
desire, may form a syllogism. And
as the writer observes, the misleading
principle thus applied is not directly
false or contrary to what is right. The
saying ‘sweet things are pleasant’ is
not in itself contrary to the principle
‘intemperance is to be avoided.’ Ac-
cidentally and in their effects the two |

propositions are brought into collision,
though not originally opposed.

φυσικῶς] Perhaps ‘ psychologically ’
is the most representative translation
which we can give of this word im the
present passage. Psychology, up to a
certain extent, was considered as a
branch of physics by Aristotle, see Vol.
I, Essay V. p. 295, and cf. Eth. rx. ix. 7.

ἤδη] A circumlocution is necessary
to express what was probably here
meant by this word. Cf. Eth. vi. xi.2.

ἔνθα μὲν} te. in the sphere of the
reason, to which ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς
is opposed, For the latter phrase we
should have expected to find ταῖς
wpaxrixats, 8, formula which occurs
Eth. vi. xi. 4. But in the Fudemtan
Ethics, τι, xi. 4, exactly the same
usage is found : ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρη-
τικαῖς al ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς
ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.
It is not easy to say what substantive
is understood. Perhaps al πρακτικαὶ
(or ποιητικαὶ) ἐπιστῆμαι was the origi-
nal phrase.

ἀνάγκη----πράττειν εὐθύ) On the
doctrine of the practical syllogism, see
Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 263-270.

τῶν μορίων] i.e. ‘the parts of the
body.’ This is mixing up a physical
explanation with the account of mental
phenomena. The same thing is done

111. ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYOHMIOQN] VII. 207

. ’ 9 ’ 3 ’ ’ ‘ ’ e+
πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας de καθ᾽ αὑτήν,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ’

’ e ’ a >» 4 ’ ” 4 . a ‘ ’
οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ" ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Ta θηρία
, 5 ~ a 9 ww ~ [2 e , 9 ‘ ~
οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν
Ψ [ a , ΄- A , e
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ
ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς
4 a 4 4 2 4 e 4 9 Ἅ
λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένονυ καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος
τούτον τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν.
. 4 ’ e ἢ , ’ 9 A 4
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῷ πάθει ὦν,

— —

in the Peripatetic treatise De Motu
Animalium ; cf. especially with the
present passage 76. viii. 5: διὰ τοῦτο
δ᾽ ἅμα ws εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορεντέον καὶ
πορεύεται, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ ἕτερον.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει
ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη,
τὴν δ᾽ ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία" αὕτη δὲ
γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως 4 δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως.
11 The mere intellectual knowledge
that a thing is pleasant is not opposed
to the moral law. It is only when
this knowledge has become desire,
t.e. part of the will, which implies
acting, that an opposition is felt.
Brutes act on desire, but their in-
tellectual apprehension being entirely
of particulars, there is a harmony
between desire and the data of per-
ception which prevents our attributing
incontinence to brutes.—It might be
said that there are dawnings of the
moral faculty, traces of a sense of
right and wrong, in some aniumals,
for instance, dogs; but the writer
here does not enter upon the subject.
On the meaning given by Aristotle to
φαντασία, see note on Ath. IL. v. 17.
12 ‘Now to explain how the ob-

livion (ἄγνοια) of the incontinent man ,
is stopped, and how he comes again to |

the use of his knowledge, requires nu
special account peculiar to this con-
dition, but the same account as is w

be given about (the recovery of) the
intoxicated man or the sleeper, for
which we must inquire of the physiv-
logista.’ The most interesting relic
of the speculations of the old physiv-
logists upon the above question which
has come down to us, is the account
given by Sextus Empiricus (ddr. Math.
VII, 129) of the opinion of Heraclitus,
who thought that our rationality de-
pended upon our communion through
the senses with the universal reason
that surrounds us ; in sleep we become
foolish because cut off from all com-
munication with this, except through
the act of breathing alone, but on
awaking we are again replenished.
Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' ‘Hpd-
κλειτον δι' ἀναπγοῆς σπάσαντες voepol
γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ
ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμῴρονες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
ὕπνοις μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων,
χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφυΐας
ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν νοῦς, μόνης τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν
προσφύσεως σωζομένης, olovel τινος
ῥίζης ᾿ χωρισθείς τε ἀποβάλλει ἣν πρό-
τερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύναμιν. ἐν δὲ
ἐγρηγορόσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν
πόρων, ὥσπερ διά τινῶν θυρίδων προ-
κύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβάλλων
λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.

13-14 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ---οαἰσθητικἢ}] ‘ But
the minor premiss being a belief with
regard to perception of the segses

12

208 HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] VIL. [Cuap.

ἀλλὰ λέγειν

τὸ μὴ καθό-

“A 0 MM e 9 4 ‘ Ν» 4 td
ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἣν TO ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι
[2 e 9 ’ 4 9 , A a
ὥσπερ O οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ
λου μηδ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου
τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον. καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμ-
14 βαίνειν" οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης
, ἢ 4 ’ 209 “ ’ 4 ‘
παρούσης γίνεται τὸ παθος, οὐδ᾽ αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ

[2 9 4 ΄- 9 »“- 4 A a “- oa #

πάθος, ἀλλα τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περι μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα
καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα

εἰρήσθω.

and being what determines action,—
this is either not possessed by a man
in the condition we have been describ-
ing, or he possesses it in a wayin which,
as we said (ws οὐκ ἢν), possession is
mot knowledge, but is only a form of
words, like the drunken man spouting
Empedocles. And since the minor
term is not universal and has not the
saine scientific character as the uni-
versal, the question raised by Sucrates
seems really (καὶ) to be substantiated.
For it is not knowledge properly so
called that is present when the con-
dition arises, nor is it this which is
twisted about by the condition of
mind that comes on,—but only per-
ceptional knowledge.’ This section
winds up the discussion of the com-
patibility of knowledge with incon-
tinence, The first sentence is clear
enough, but there is some little ob-
scurity in the saying that perceptional
knowledge is present in incontinence,
and is overborne by passion. What
is meant apparently is, that passion
prevents that perception which would
cause the moral principle existent in
the mind to be realised. Hence, in
short, there is a moral oblivion, and it
is quite true that Socrates was justified
in saying that incontinence could not
take place if knowledge of the right
were really present to the conscious-
ness of the actor.

kal διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου] Lambinus,

cm ee ee ee

followed by Fritzsche, places a full
stop before these words, and connects
them with καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ Σωκράτης. This
punctuation has been adopted in the
above translation as making far better
sense. It must be confessed, however,
that the Paraphrast favours the punc-
tuation of Bekker. The vccurrence
of καὶ before ἔοικεν would naturally
lead to a full stop being placed after
ὅρον, but καὶ is rather to be explained
as giving emphasis to ἔοικε cup-
Balvew; cf. ch. x. 2: διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν
ἐνίοτε κιτιλ. Eth. 111. viii. 6: ὅθεν καὶ
ὁ Σωκράτης. Ib. § 10, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος.

ἡ τελευταία πρότασις] This phrase
is equivalent to ἡ ἐτέρα πρότασις, Eth.
vi. xi. 4. The minor premiss is so
called as containing the ἔσχατος ὅρος,
or minor term, which is mentioned
shortly after.

ws οὐκ ἣν] With this use of the past
tense, cf. Eth. v. vi. 9: κατὰ νόμον γὰρ
ἣν, ‘for this is, as we have said,
according to law.’

ὃ ἐζήτει!) This is sometimes trans-
lated ‘what Socrates meant,’ for which
the Greek would have been ὃ ἤθελε or
ἐβούλετο λέγειν. ὃ ἐζήτει must mean
‘the questionings’ or ‘doubts’ of
Socrates, ὁ.6. as to the possibility of
acting against knowledge. Cf. Eth. 1.
iv. 5: Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο
καὶ ἐζήτει.

τῆς αἰσθητικῆς] The phrase αἰσθητικὴ
ἐπιστήμη would to some philosophers

IIL—IV.] HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VIL. 209

II [4 δ᾽ 4 v 4 λ ~ 9 4 «ἃ e 4 ῇ
oTepov δ᾽ ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέ- 4
A 4 + 4 af 9 , 9 om, Ψ 4 Oy
ρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
4 ~~

περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ’ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ
4 ς 4 ~ 4 , td 4 4 9 9 4 “

καὶ of ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ 8 ἐστὶ τὰ 2
4 a ~

μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τά δ᾽ αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ᾽

αὑτὰ ἔχοντα δ᾽ ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά.
’ 4 a ζω a ~

λέγω δὲ Ta τοιαῦτα, τά Te περὶ THY τροφὴν Kal THY τῶν

ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ

.“ 4 4 , ww 4 a , 4Ἃ 4

ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην. τὰ δ᾽ ἀναγ-

καῖα μὲν οὔ, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτά. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον νίκην τι-

μὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων. τοὺς
4 a 4 “- . 4 4 4 , ς ἢ

Mev οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας

a

be a contradiction in terms, as they
would hold that sensible things cannot
be known. A doctrine was attributed
to Speusippus, of which we may be
here reminded, viz. that besides science
there is ‘scientific perception.’ Cf.
Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. vii. 145:
Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ
μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν
κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονι-
κὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπι-
στημονικὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐπιστημονικὴν | that the use of the word Incontinence
δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπείληφε καθεστάναι τὴν | is metaphorical.

reason and the will, instead of carry-
Ἰ
μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον 2 περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ

ing them on its side, Having thus
laid down a definite notion of Incon-
tinence as something absolute and
positive, it is easy to see that the idea
and the term may be applied in a sort
of analogous sense to mean an ill-
control of the desires for other kinds
of pleasures also, beside the bodily
pleasures, e.g. wealth or honour. In
such applications we must recollect

ἀληθείας. τὴν σωφροσύνη») Cf. Eth. Eud. ται, ii.
5: ᾿Επεὶ 3’ ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ rept ἡδονάς,
ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν
εἶναι. Δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας. Οὐ γὰρ
wept πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἄπταντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ
σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ
δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ γευστὸν
καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ
ἁπτόν, κιτ.λ.} This is of course taken
from Eth, Nec. 11. x. 3-8.

τοὺς μὲν οὖν] Here commences the
apodosis to ἐπεὶ ὃ ἐστὶ, which is a
complicated sentence with two paren-
theses (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα----σωφρο-
σύνη») and (λέγω δ᾽ οἷον»---ἡδέων»),

IV. This chapter discusses the
question mooted above (ch. i. § 7, ch.
ii, § 11), 85 to whether incontinence
is an absolute term, having a definite
object-matter, or is merely relative.
The answer is very simple. Pleasure
is divided into necessary and desirable
(§ 2), or into good, bad, and indifferent
(§ 5). Incontinence, in an absolute
sense, applies only to the necessary or
bodily pleasures. It has then the
same range of objects as were before
assigned to Temperance and Intem-
perance, and differs from Intemper- τοὺς pév—trepos fy] ‘Those then
ance chiefly in that it goes against the | who with regard to these latter objects

VOL. II, DD

210

HOIKQN [EYAHMIQN] VIL.

[Cuap.

Q 9 e a e “-. a 4 td 9 a ͵
τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες
δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ,
e “A ? A e e PP 4 ε ? ,
ἁπλῶς δ' ob ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ᾽’ ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους,
[2 4 ς ‘ 9 ? r 4 4 a N e
ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Ta ᾿Ολύμπια νενικηκώς" ἐκείνῳ yap ὁ
κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῷ διέφερεν ar’ ὅμως ἕτερος ἣν.
σημεῖον δέ" ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία

’ 4 8 4 e , a € a“ a a ’
μόνον aA\Aa καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα ἣ κατα τι

4 [4 3 4 td ~ 4 N a 4Ἃ 4
3 μέρος, τούτων δ᾽ οὐθείς. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπο-
λαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ

μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε
καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων,
καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν

(ie. good pleasures) transgress that
right law which they have within
themselves, we do not cail simply
“incontinent,” but we add a qualify-
ing term (προστιθέντες) and spesk of
them as incontinent of wealth, gain,
honour, rage,—aot as absolutely in-
continent, because they are different
from this and are only called incon-
tinent by analogy, as in the phrase
“ Man that has been victor at Olym-
pia ;” there the general conception (of
man) differed but little from the
special conception of the individual in
question, and yet still it was different.’
The meaning of this passage is clear,
not so however that of the illustration
which closes it. Itis plain that the
word ἀκρατής when spoken of in rela-
tion to anger, money, &c., has a some-
what different sense from the unquali-
fied term dxparis, which implies a
certain moral weakness with regard to
bodily indulgence. But what is meant
by saying that dyOpwros ὁ τὰ ᾿Ολύμπκια
νενικηκώς is different from the general
conception Man? There appear to be
only two explanations possible: (1)
that supported by the Scholiast on

this place and also the Scholiast on |

Eth. v. 1.,—by Alexander Aphrod. ad

ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἁλέας
περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ

Topica 1, χνὶ., by Suidas, and by Eus-
tathius on Jliad, Δ. p. 847: namely,
that there was a certain Olympionices
whose name was Ἄνθρωπος. It might
be said that this name Ἄνθρωπος waa
not more distinct from the general
term ‘Man,’ than the term ἀκρατής
in the phrase ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ is from
the general conception of incontinence.
The historical tenses διέφερεν and
ἕτερος ἣν are in favour of this inter-
pretation. (2) It might be argued
that these very tenses had given rise
toa conjectural fiction about a person
called Ἄνθρωπος. The Paraphrast
takes no notice of the tradition, and
treats the illustration as a logical one,
which would come merely to this, ‘the
conception of an individual implies
a certain diversity from the conception
of the genus.’ If this be accepted, the
past tenses of the verbs must be un-
derstood to mean a reference to some
previous logical discourse with which
the school was familiar. In short, the
passage must be considered to bear
traces of being a scrap from some
oral lecture—a hypothesis not to be
entirely set aside with regard to parts
of the Ethics of Aristotle.

IV.} HOIKON [EYAQHMION} VIL. 21}

SY
παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται,
A ΄--
οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ᾽’
φ ~ , ra
ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ" Kai γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ 4
, . 9 δ’ 35 ’ 4 ὃ 4 ay 9 8
ταῦτας, περι εκείνων ὁ᾽ οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸν
a 4 ~ ~
τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ Tov ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν Kat ἐγκρατῆ καὶ
σώφρονα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς
a
πῶς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι" of δ᾽ εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά,
4 >? e , ° 9 > ε 4 κι © 9
GAN’ οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ᾽ οὐ
v διὸ μᾶλλον axoA iy εἴ ‘4
προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὅστις
4 4 ΄-φ a > ἢ» ? 4 e ‘ 4 ,
μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἣ ἡἠρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει
λ ’ a = “ ὃ ‘ a9 és ’ δ - ’
μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ TO ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα" Ti
γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ
καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲς
τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι τῷ γένει καλῶν
4 ’ ζω 4 ene ” , ε 4 δ 9
καὶ σπουδαίων. τῶν yap ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά, τὰ ὃ
9 ,) 4 Α a e ’ ὔ
ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον,
48
οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή" πρὸς ἅπαντα
A ~ na
δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ
ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν.

3 κατὰ πρόσθεσι»)] See note on Eth.
It, iii. 5.

καθάπερ épyijs] Fritzsche quotes
Thucyd, m1. 84: ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσι:---
ἀκρατὴς μὲν dpyis οὖσα κρείσσων δὲ
τοῦ δικαίου.

4 ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα] i.e. not
one of those mentioned in § 2, who
are immoderate in giving way to a
fondness for riches, honour, ὅσ.

διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον x.7.r.] It is
more intemperate to pursue luxury,
&c., in cold blood, than to do 80
under the influence of passion. It
shows that luxury has become more
a part of the mind iteelf.

5-6 The remainder of this chapter
is little more than a repetition of what
has gone before. Indulgence in the
᾿ good pleasures is no harm, except it
be to excess; even excess in them is
rather folly than vice, and is not to be

called by the name of incontinence,
except as a sort of metaphor.

ἐπεὶ d¢—vdrepBddAX\cw] ‘Now since
some desires and pleasurea are in
their kind beautiful and good—ac-
cording to our former division of
pleasures into the naturally desirable,
the naturally detestable, and the in-
termediate—as, for instance, wealth,
gain, victory, and honour (are good) ;
with regard then to all such, and the
intermediate pleasures, men are not
blamed for feeling, desiring, and
loving them, but for some sort of ex-
cess in them.’ The present division
of pleasures can hardly be said to
have been made ‘before,’ though it can
be harmonised with that given above
in § 2. The φύσει αἱρετά (of which
wealth and honour are specimens)
answer to the αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
ἔχοντα δ᾽ ὑπερβολήν ; while τὰ μεταξύ

212 | HOIKON [EYAHMIOQN] VIL. [Ὁ ΒΡ.

A [2 4 ‘ A ἢ a ~ A ὃ ? ΄-Φ
διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται 7 διώκουσι τῶν
“-- - 4 4
φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ
a « a ~
δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς" Kat yap ταῦτα
~ “~ ἴω mm ,
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, Kal ἐπαινοῦνται of περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες"
ἶ ;
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ
ε Ν , , 4 4 4 θ , >. ’ ς
ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σατυρος ὁ
Ἁ a
φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα" λίαν yap
ἐδόκει μωραίνειν. μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ᾽
ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι
δ αὑτό" φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.
A
6 ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία" ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία ov μόνον φευκτὸν
9 ‘ 4 A - 3 , » Ὁ 4 4 ~ ’
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. ot ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους
φ
προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἑκάστου λέγουσιν, οἷον
4 ~
κακὸν ἰατρὸν Kal κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν
’ a a 909 4 “~ A A 4 g >
κακόν" ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα, dia TO μὴ κακίαν εἶναι
er 2 αὶ 4 ~ φτἣ» ς ’ ” a
ἐκαστὴν αὐτῶν, ἀλλα τῷ ανάλογον ομοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον
ὅτι κἀκεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι
Ud 9 Ά 4 3 4 “” a a ~ 9 t
ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ TavTa τῇ σωφροσυνὴ καὶ Ty ἀκολασίᾳ,
4 4 4 ϑϑρ ε [4 ὔ ; 4 4 VA
περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν" διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες
ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.
"E 4 δ᾽ 3 4 »# 4 e δέ ᾽ 4 s 4 4
5 wet 0 ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν

a ο............Ψ.ὕὕβ.΄....-------............. ..

here correspond with the ‘necessary μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν) This is an ana-
or bodily pleasures’ of the former | coluthon, The sentence ought to
passage. The writer has here intro- [ form an apodosis and supply a verb
duced a mention of pleasures ‘natu- | to διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κι.λ. We therefore
rally detestable,’ by which must be | require μοχθηροὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσί, &c.
meant the bestial pleasures which are | 6 δι’ ὁμοιότητα δὲ] The writer seems

{

!

|

discussed in the following chapter. | here to make a mistake about the
The formula τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, 1 history of the word ἀκρατής, just as
is used by Eudemus in £th, Eud. 11. x. | before (Zth. v. x. 1) about the history
24: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστου ye φθορὰ καὶ ᾿ of the word ἐπιεικής. ᾿Ακρατής in a
διαστροφὴ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ | limited and special sense, to denote
ἐναντία Καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. Later in the | want of control over a particular set
present book (ch. xiv. § 2) there is a , of desires, is certainly later than the
mention made of pleasures which are general use of the word, as in the
not only good in themselves, but do phrase ἀκρατὴς ὀργῆς, ἄο. Hence
not admit of excess. ' the latter is not to be regarded
Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ] Of this per- | (historically) as a metaphorical ex-
sonage nothing is known. The story tension of the former.
given by the Scholiast is, as Fritzsche

observes, not worth repeating. | _V. This chapter discueses those

IV.—V.]

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII.

213

e a SY 4 4 , 4 , 4 9 ᾽ a 9
ἁπλῶς Ta δὲ κατὰ γένη Kut ζῴων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ ὃ

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ dt ἔθη γίνεται,

Q a a a ’ »” A ‘ c 4
τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περί τούτων ἕκαστα

παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις.

λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον

4 » a ‘4 “ ’ 9 4 4
THY ἄνθρωπον ἣν λεγουσι Tag κυοῦσας ἀνασχι ζουσαν τὰ

’ ’ “a a ’ 4 27 a 9
παιδία κατεσθέίειν, 4 «Otols χαίρειν φασιν €vioug TOV ATI-

[2 4 4 td A A 9 a a A 9
γριωμένων περὶ τὸν Ilovrov, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀν-
θρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανεί ζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς

4 e A A 4 ’ ἢ
εὐωχίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φαλαριν λεγόμενον.

Om ,
αὗται μεν θη- 3

’ e ᾿ , , ’ ‘ , 5.»
ριώδεις, αι δὲ διά TE γοσοὺς γίμονται Καὶ paviay ἐμιοῖς,

kinds of incontinence which are some-
thing more than incontinence, being
morbid or bestial. Certain pleasures
are specified which imply a depravity
either of nature or habits, A sort of
classification of these is suggested, but
the whole style of the chapter is care-
less and inaccurate.

1 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ --- ἔξει] ‘ Now while some
things are natural pleasures, either
absolutely so, or relatively to the
different races of animals and men,
other pleasures are not natural, but
depend on physical defects or habits
or depravity of the nature ; and we
may see moral conditions correspond-
ing to each of these latter kinds.’
The apodosis to ἐπεὶ is ἔστι καὶ περὶ
τούτων. The things which are ‘ plea-
sures absolutely ’ are for instance life
and consciousness ; while it depends
on the constitution of the race whether
it be pleasant to live on land or water,
&c. In this passage φύσις is used in
two senses, (1) φύσει = in accordance
with the entire constitution of things,
not only what is, but what ought to
be. (This corresponds with head V.
in the note on Zth. 11 i. 3.) (2)
φύσεις means individual natures, not
as they ought to be, but as they are.
(See the same note, head IV.)

2 τὰς Onpubders] ἴ.ε. ets.

τὴν ἄνθρωπο») ‘The female.’ The

word ἄνθρωπος (in the feminine) was
applied contemptuously, as, for in-
stance, to female slaves. Here it de-
notes the monstrous nature of the
person in question, who was not to be
called ‘a woman.’ Perhaps for the
same reason it was applied by Hero-
dotus to the gigantic Phye. Book 1.
ch. 60: xal ἐν τῷ ἄστεϊ πειθόμενοι τὴν
γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν προσεύ-
χοντό τε τὴν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐδέκοντο τὸν
Πεισίστρατον. Cf. Mag. Μον. 1. xv.2:
Οἷόν φασι ποτέ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρον
τινὶ δοῦναι πιεῖν εἶτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον
ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ φίλτρου, τὴν δ'
ἄνθρωπον ἐν ᾿Αρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποφυγεῖν.

τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις
εἰς εὐωχία») ‘And others (they say)
lend their children to each other (in
turn) to be served up as a banquet.’
Cf. 2 Kings vi. 26-29, where the
same horrible arrangement ia said to
have been inade under the compulsion
of famine. The shores of the Black
Sea seem to have had a character for
cannibalism. Cf. Ar. Pol. vii. iv. 3:
πολλὰ 8 ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ
κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν
εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν
Πόντον ᾿Αχαμοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον] Some
story now lost, which is apparently
referred to again in § 7.

3 al δὲ διά τε νόσου:---αἱ δὲ voon-

214 H@IKON [EYAHMION] VIL [Cuar.

oe e 4 4 ὔ 4 ? a € ray
ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ
συνδούλου τὸ ἧπαρ. at δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἣ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον
A ἢ . oP , “ , 3 ; 4
τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ᾽ ἀνθράκων καὶ
γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν" τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ᾽ ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβρι-
4 ζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους
μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναίκας,
Ψ 4 > » 3 > > ἢ ς , 4 4 Ἂ
ὅτι οὐκ ὀπυίουσιν GAN’ ὀπυίονται' ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς
5 νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι δι ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα
Ἶ δ 4 ων Ψ 9 a ~ ἢ Υ A «
τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θη-
ριότης" τὸ 0 ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἣ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ
4 ᾽ 4 4 6 3 4 ὔ ᾽ 4 4 4 A
ἀκρασία aNd ἡ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα, καθαπερ καὶ τὸν περί τοὺς
θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ᾽ οὐ
λεκτέον. πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δει-
λία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ
6 νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν: ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δε-

Ld

διέναι πάντα, κἂν vopien μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ

.--.ἕ.Ἅ..-.. ...-. .. = =~,

partes] These clauses are a repe- | πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσυ καὶ τῶν πρώτων
tition of each other ; the style is un- | τὰ τόλμημα εἶναι δι᾽ ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς.
finished. 4-5 ὅσοιι μὲν ob — λεκτέον]
ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς dppecw] It is | ‘ Wherenature is the cause, onecannot
important to observe here the strong | call people incontinent, just as no one
terms in whichthe unnaturalcharacter | would find fault with women for being
of these practices is denounced. An | not male but female; and it is the
equally strong and more explicit 3 same with those who by habit have
passage occurs in the Laws of Plato, | superinduced a morbid condition. To
p. 636 8, where the advantages and | possess, indeed, any of thesetendencies
disadvantages of the gymnasia and | is beyond the pale of vice, just as bes-
syssitia are discussed: Kal δὴ καὶ | tiality is; and if a person possesses
παλαιὸν νόμιμον δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτή- | them, his subduing them or being sub-
δευμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια | dued by them isa matter not of simple
ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ | incontinence (orcontinence), but is the
θηρίων διεφθαρκέναι. Kal τούτων τὰς | “ analogous” kind, exactly as a man
ὑμετέρας πόλεις (Sparta and Crete) | whois in this condition with regard to
πρώτας ἄν tis αἰτιῷτο καὶ ὅσαι τῶν | his angry passions may be called (in-
ἄλλων μάλιστα ἅπτονται τῶν yupra- | continent of anger), but not simply
σίων " καὶ εἴτε καίζοντα εἴτε σπουδά- | incontinent.’ What the writer here
ζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοητέον | implies is quite true, that morality
ὅτι τῇ θηλείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων φύσει . requires for its sphere certain natural
els κοινωνίαν ἰούσῃ τῆς γεννήσεως ἡ περὶ | conditions of body and mind. In
ταῦτα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδεδόσθαι | states that are entirely morbid,
δοκεῖ, ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἣ θηλειῶν | whether originally so or from the

V.—VL] HOIKON (EYAHMION] VIL 215

δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον" καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων of μὲν ἐκ
φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις,
” # , A , a e 4 4 ’ὔ
ὥσπερ Ena γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, of δὲ διὰ νόσους,
ὔ
οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις, τούτων 7
δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω
δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν 7
πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν" ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι,
μὴ μόνον ἔχει. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἡ μὲν κατ᾽ 8
ww ς ~ g 4 e A a e
ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν,
ὅτι θηριώδης ἣ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν

ἢ ~ w 4 4 3 Ά e a e « 4
τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ δὲ

᾽ φ ~ 4 ε 4 4 4 , 9 r
νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν
μόνη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον

. κΓ“ . ’ 4 , . 9 ‘ .
περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ Tag
ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μετα-
φορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον-

“Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ 6
τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν
μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν
διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν,
εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν
σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήση, ὑλακτοῦσιν"
Ψ ς ᾿Ὶ ὃ “ id 4 ~ σ΄ ,
οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς dia θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως
ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ᾽ ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν

effects of an ill-regulated life, the dis-
tinctions of right and wrong are no
longer applicable. Cf. ch. vii. 7.

7 el Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν] ‘Had Pha-
laris refrained.’ With this use of
κατέχω, cf. Aristoph. Peace, 944,
where it is applied to a wind lulling :

érelyere νῦν ἐν ὅσῳ

σοβαρὰ θεόθεν κατέχει
πολέμου perdrporos αὔρα.

And Soph. Gd. Rex, 782:
κἀγὼ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἡμέραν
μόλις κατέσχον.

VI. It having been repeatedly laid
down that there are some kinds of

incontinence not simply to be called
so without a qualification, there now
follows a comparison of some of these
kinds, from a moral point of view,
with incontinence proper. Inconti-
nence of anger is not so bad as incon-
tinence of lust, (1) because there is
more semblance of reason in anger ;
(2) because anger is more a matter
of constitution ; (3) it admits of less
deliberate purpose ; (4) because anger
is exercised under a sort of pain, and
not in wantonness. As to the rest,
incontinence which exceeds the pale
of human weakness is more horrible,
but at the same time is rarer and
less mischievous, than vice.

216 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL [Cuap.

ἢ ς 4 ‘ é a e ἢ Og Cd a
τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ
ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ᾽ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ

, Ξ , . 92 © ἢ 39 ͵ 98
τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς" ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν

é ¥
μόνον εἴπη
4
ἀπόλαυσιν.
4ι. 9 ὔ » 9 g 9
δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία ov, αἰσχίων οὗν.

ζω id ”~
τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττάται, ὁ

ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς

λόγου.

Ὶ ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγοι---οὔ] ‘For first
(μὲν) reason or fancy tells that there
is insult or slight, and then (anger)
drawing a sort of conclusion, “ I must
fight with such and such,” forthwith
rages accordingly. But desire, if
reason or sense merely assert that
a thing is pleasant, rushes to the
enjoyment of it; so that anger in a
way follows reason, but desire does
not.’ Φαντασία here seems nearly to
correspond to our word ‘fancy,’ which
has of course grown out of the Greek
term, though it has come to imply
widely different associations. We
are told in Ar. De An ll, iii 15
that φαντασία may be mistaken. See
the note on Eth, 111. v. 17.

The present passage might seem
discrepant from ch. iii. § 10, ὥστε
συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης
ἀκρατεύεσθαι, where incontinence is
said to have some sort of reasoning
in what it does. And if the compari-
son were exactly carried out, it would
probably appear that incontinent anger
had no more reason in it than incon-
tinent desire. But it is true that anger
is fundamentally based on an idea of
justice, however wild that idea may
be, Hence there is a peculiar force
in συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ, And hence,
too, anger is a less immediately selfish
passion than desire. It is less debas-
ing in the long run to the character.
On anger, cf. Eth. v. viii. 10: οὐδὲ
wept τοῦ γενέσθαι 4 μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται,

ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ “πρὸς τὴν
ὥσθ᾽ ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ
ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ax parns
δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας Kat ov τοῦ
μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν

ἀλλὰ wept τοῦ δικαίου" ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ
γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν ; and Ar. Rhet.
IL ii 1: Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ
λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινο-
μένην ὀλιγωρίαν. The illustrations
in the text comparing anger to an
over-hasty servant who runs off before
he has heard half the message, or to
a dog who barks without waiting to
see who it is, are most admirable.

2 The next plea urged in favour
of anger is that it is more natural
(or, we might say, constitutional)
than desire: in support of which two
humorous stories are told in the text
(see Vol. 1, Essay III. p. 217). The
argument appears somewhat contra-
dictory to Eth. 11. iii. 10: ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώ-
τερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἣ θυμῷ, καθάπερ
φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος. However, when
we look closely at the text, we find that
it is ‘excessive and unnecessary desire’
with which anger is here compared
(τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑκτερβολῆς καὶ
τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων) This no doubt
makes the above assertion true, but
it gives a new conception of inconti-
nence as compared with the mention
of ἀναγκαῖα ἡδέα, c. iv.§ 2. It sets
incontinence too much in the light of
θηριότης. But indeed the vagueness
of the term ἀκρασία, and the uncer-
tainty as to what it exactly implies,
must be felt throughout the present
discussions,

With regard to anger, it is true
that hot temper is frequently consti-

VI] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. 217

4 ἢ 9 a 4 4 ῇ σε i @
ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μάλλον ὅσαι
4 a S 31») Ψ ᾿ς δι ᾿ ,
κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον κοιναί" ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον
a € ὔ “A φ ΄- ~ ~ 4 ~ 4
καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
«καὶ γὰρ οὗτος᾽ ἔφη “ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν
ἄνωθεν, καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας “ καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ’ ἔφη, “ ὅταν
ἀνὴρ γένηται" συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμὶν.
τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις" καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς
ς 4 ‘ , 4 3 “ wv 9 [4 e
ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι aduwrepor οἱ 3
9 4 4 4 4 fA 9 9 ld 4 4
ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ᾽ ὁ
θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός" ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν ᾿ΑΦφρο-

δίτην φασί:

TUNTOL

4
καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ

δολοπλόχου γὰρ χυπρογενοῦς "
4 a “ e ἢ a
Kai τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα “Ομηρος"
πάρφασις, ἥ τ᾽ ἔχλεψε νόον σύχα περ φρονέοντος.
ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς
περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.
ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λνπούμενος, ὁ δ᾽ ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ 4

tutional. It appears more difficult to
tame down and eradicate, even with
the help of time, than other passions.
The Stoics gave peculiar attention to
its control.

3 ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι---κακία rws] ‘ Again
there is more wrong where there is
more craft, The angry man and
anger are not crafty, but open ; while
lust is crafty, as they say Aphrodite
is,

“The wily Cyprian goddess.”
And Homer sings of her embroidered
girdle (that on it is wrought)

“ Allurement which can steal the wise
man’s sense,”

So that if this kind of incontinence is
more wrongful than incontinence of
anger, it is also worse, and thus
deserves to be called by the simple
name “ incontinence,” and amounts to
@ sort of vice.’

VOL. I.

δολοπλόκου] From some lyric poet.
Muretus compares the fragment of
Sappho:
Ποικιλόθρον᾽ ἀθάνατ'᾽ ᾿Αφροδίτα,
Παῖ Διὸς δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε.
τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα “Opnpos] Iliad,
xiv. 214-217 :---
Ἦ,, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν
ἱμάντα,
Ποικίλον᾽" ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα
τέτυκτο"
Ἔνθ᾽ ἕνι μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ᾽ ἵμερος, ἐν δ᾽
ὀαριστὺς
Πάρφασις, ἥ 7 ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ
φρονεόντων.

4 Incontinence of desire is full
of wantonness and exultation, while
anger implies pain and suffering,
This argument is similar to that used,
Eth, 1. xii. 2, to prove that in-
temperance is more voluntary than
cowardice,

EE

218 HOQIKQN [EYAHMIQN) VII. [(Cuap.

εἰ οὖν ols ὀργίζεσθαι
ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ
5 δ ἐπιθυμίαν" οὐ yap ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις.

λυπούμενος, ὁ δ᾽ ὑβρίζων μεθ’ ἡδονῆς.
μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα
ὡς μὲν τοίνυν
4 a ς 4 9 , 9 g ~ 4 a ᾽ 4
αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ
ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ
6 ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς
ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρω-
[2 4 a ἢ 4 “~ 4 A ~ a e 4
πικαί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ
θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ
περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν" διὸ
καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ᾽ ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ᾽
ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο δια-
φέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμ-
’ 4. >. νυ ν ᾿ ont ’ ’ ’
φαγον εἶναι" ov yap ἔχει προαιρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμὸν, αλλ
ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

γ ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ' οὐ γὰρ διέ-

ὁ δ᾽ ὑβρίζων μεθ᾽ ἡδονῇ:] ‘ While he
who wantons acts with pleasure.’
There seems to be a double meaning
in this passage to the word ὑβρίζει,
exactly as there might be to our word
‘wantonness.’ It first means ‘to act
insolently ’ or ‘ wantonly’ in a general
sense, and secondly, it means to ‘ act
wantonly’ in a particular sense, te.
lasciviously.

6 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς
ληπτέον] t.e. the difference between
continence and incontinence, which
with other things is treated of in the
next chapter. There is a want of
method about the sequence of different
parts in this book. The reference
which follows, ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατ ἀρχάς
only goes back to ch. v. 1, and gives
colour to a suspicion that the book may
have been put together out of separate
pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of
which may have commenced with the
fifth chapter.

διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία---ἀνθρώπκω»] ‘ Hence
we do not call brutes either temperate

or intemperate, except by a metaphor,
and where it happens that one whole
race of animals in comparison with
another is remarkable for wantonness
it may be (τινε), orlechery, or voracity ;
for (animals) have no purpose or rea-
soning, but are beside themselves like
madmen.’ Different races of animals
have good or bad moral characteristics
ascribed to them. The goat, the ass,
and the monkey have a bad reputation
for wantonness, and the shark, &c., for
voracity. Itis not quite clear what
is meant by étéornxe τῆς φύσεως.
Perhaps it may best be taken to imply
not that animals transgress their own
nature, but simply that they get into
a state of ecstasy, like madmen, and
have no senses nor any principle
which would justify their being called
either temperate or intemperate.

7 ἔλαττον 3¢—Onplov] ‘Now bra-
tality is a less evil than vice, though it
is more fearful, for in it the good prin-
ciple is not corrupted, as in aman, but

| does not exist, Therefore (comparing

VI—VU.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [EYAHMION] VIL 219

φθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ
ε΄ @ ν. Ἁ , 4 Ψ
ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψνχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον,
πότερον κακιον' ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ
μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ
Ρ 9 ῇ “ »# wv Ψ Ἁ ς
συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον: ἔστι γὰρ ὡς

μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν

ν
έχει.

ἑκάτερον κάκιον"
᾿ 4 0
ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

Περὶ δὲ τὰς dv ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ
ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφρο-
σύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε HT-

nn 4 a e A 0 w# 4 a 4
τᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοιῖ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν Kat
ἊΝ P \ , » ε 4 . ε ee) \
ὧν of πολλοὶ ἥττους" τούτων δ᾽ ὁ μὲν περί ἡδονὰς axparns
e 4 , ς a 4 , a e δὲ ,’
ὁ δ ἐγκρατής, O δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ de καρτερικός,

μεταξὺ δ᾽ ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μάλλον

oo

brutality with vice) is like comparing
what is inanimate with a living thing,
and asking which is worse. Evil is
always less harmful when it has no
guiding principle, and reason is the
guiding principle. So it is just like
comparing injustice with an unjust
. man; each is in a different sense
worse. A bad man will do ten thou-
sandfold more evil than a beast.’
ἔχει] wc. τὸ θηρίο. The whole
passage is briefly expressed, but per-
hape requires no further comment.

VII. This chapter, after a general
comparison between intemperance
and incontinence (§ 1-3), makes some
remarks on endurance, softness, and
childishness (§ 4-7); and ends by
distinguishing two kinds of incontin-
ence, of which the one procecds from
impetuosity, the other from weakness
of character.

1 πρότερο»] Eth. Kud. ut. ti. 6. Cf.
above, ch. iv. § 2.

ἔστι pév—xelpovs] ‘It is possible to
be in such a state as to yield to things
that most men are superior to, and
again it is possible to overcome things

—

that most men yield to. Of those
who possess these opposite dispositions
with regard to pleasures, the first is
an incontinent man, and the second a
continent man; with regard to pains,
the first is soft and the second en-
during. But the state of the majority
of mankind lies between these oppo-
sites, albeit men verge rather to the
side of the worse.’ Moral designations
may be fixed either in relation to the
standard of what is, or of what ought
to be. Cf. διὰ. τι]. xi. 4: τῶν γὰρ
φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἣ τῷ χαίρειν
οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί,
Tb. rv. iv. 4 : ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ
μᾶλλον ἣ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ
μᾶλλον ἢ Set. The above pasaage
fixes the terme ‘continent’ and ‘in-
continent’ relatively to what ἐδ, as
implying more or less continence than
people in general have. And yet
there is evidently some reference
beside to the standard of what ought
to be, else it could not be said that
people in general verge rather to the
worse side. To represent the majority
of mankind as possessing a mediocre
moral character, neither eminently

220 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL [Cuar.

a 4 ? 9 “ δ # “~ e ὃ ~ 4 -ςἀἤ 4
2 πρὸς τὰς χείρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαι εἰσιν
αἱ 8’ οὔ καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἂ-
λείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ
μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων % καθ’ ὑπερβολὰς th
διὰ προαίρεσιν, δ αὑτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δ ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον,
ρ 9 : ἢ “ a P ’
4 ~
ἀκόλαστος" ἀνάγκη yap τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,

ὥστ᾽ ἀνίατος" ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος.
μέσος σώφρων.
λύπας μὴ Ot ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαί-
προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν
φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυ-

ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ
yov τὰς σωματικὰς
4ρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ
ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ

ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύ-

good nor bad, but inclining to weak-
ness, was in accordance with the
Greek point of view. Widely dif-
ferent from this was what may be
called the Semitic point of view,
which, regarding man with greater
religious earnestness, attributed to
him ‘desperate wickedness.’ The
latter feeling was not confined to the
Jews and to the pages of the Bible,
but in some degree made itself known
to the world in the Stoical philosophy.
Bee Essay VI. p. 357, &c.

2 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔνιαι---ἀνίατο!ι)] ‘Now as
some pleasures are necessary, but
others are not to be called so, as
being (καὶ) only necessary in cer-
tain degrees, while their excesses or
deficiencies are not necessary (and
the same division holds with regard to
desires and pains), he who pursues
excessive pleasures, or who pursues
pleasures not in themselves excessive
in an excessive way, and does so from
deliberate purpose, with no ulterior
aim beyond the pleasures themselves,
is abandoned (ἀκόλαστος), (and he
may well be called so), for it stands
to reason (ἀνάγκη) that he is not likely
to repent, and so he is incurable ; for
without repentance there is no cure.’

that in some pleasures the μέσον is
good and neceasary. Cf. below, ὁ δ᾽
ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος.

ἢ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὰς +f διὰ προαίρεσυ»)
The Paraphrast well expresses the
meaning of this passage as follows :
ὁ μὸν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδονῶν,
καὶ ἢ τὰς φύσει μεγάλας ἀεὶ ζητῶν
ἡδονάς, ἢ τὰς φύσει μετρίας ὑπερβαλ-
λόντως ζητῶν, οὐχ ἑλκόμενος βιαίως
πως ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προαιρέσεως
ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰς τρέχων, οὐ Se’ ἄλλο τι, δόξαν,
φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἢ κέρδος, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰς δι᾽
ἑαυτάς, ἀκόλαστος. It is plain that
4 before διὰ προαίρεσιν in the text
must be a mistake. One of Bekker’s
MSS. reads καὶ, which would be very
easily changed into ἢ, especially with
the clause ἢ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὰς preced-
ing. It would answer also to the ex-
pansion of the Paraphrast, οὐχ ἑλκό-
μενος κτλ.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ] If a man with delibe-
rate purpose pursues pleasure for its
own sake, he is not likely to repent of
his course, therefore he is ἀκόλαστος.
This is the first intimation we have
had that an unrepenting character
belongs to ‘intemperance ;’ it is an
irregular argument, unless we regard
it as laying some stress on the ety-

οὐδ' al ἐλλείψει4) This might seem | mology of the word ἀκόλαστος. Cf.
superfluous. But what is meant is, | Eek, ται xii. 5-7, IV. i, 5

VIL] HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VIL 221

μίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ᾽ ἂν δόξειε χεί-
pov εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν,
a 4 ’ : A 4 4 1 9 , ’ a
ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι }
4 4 ’ ὃ [ 4 w# 9 g 4 ? 3» ᾿ A e 9 ὔ
εἰ ὀργιζόμενος" τί γὰρ av ἐποίει ἐν πάθει av; διὸ ὁ ἀκό-
λαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν
μαλακίας εἶδος μάλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ 4
μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός" τὸ
μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ᾽ ἐγκράτεια ἐν
τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ
τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν: διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκρά-
’ » , e δ᾽ AX t 4 a ς , 4
Tela καρτερίας ἐστιν. oO 0 ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοί Kat ς
4 é a a a 4 A .
ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαναξου καὶ 7 pem: καὶ
γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν" ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, iva
μὴ πονήση τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν
κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὦν. ὁμοίως 6

3 ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων») ‘So
that they are distinct from one
another,’ ¢¢ on the one hand the
reprobate (ἀκόλαστος), in his two
forms of systematically seeking plea-
sure, and of systematically avoiding
pain; and, on the other hand, the
morally weak, whether in the form
of yielding to the allurements of plea-
sure (ἀκρατής), or flying from the pres-
sure of pain (μαλακός). The compari-
son is not between the two forms of
the μὴ προαιρούμενοι, but these are
together contrasted with ἀκολασία.

παντὶ δ᾽ ἂν δόξειε] A repetition of
ch. iv. § 4, on which see note.

τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας
εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστοι] The
temptation is great to refer τῶν δὴ
λεχθέντων to τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων,
and to read ἀκρατής for ἀκόλαστος,
taking the sentence in connection with
what follows. But when we consider
(1) the unanimity of MSS.; (2) that
μαλακία has been already distinguished
from ἀκρασία, in § 1; (3) the import
of μᾶλλον (cf. Bth. γι. viii. 9, αὕτη

ἄλλο εἶδος), we shall be led to see that
the sentence comes in, though rather
in a disjointed way, to wind up the
comparison here made generally be-
tween incontinence and intemperance
(cf. ch. vi. § 5, and above, § 1). In-
continence may be said to be more
like a kind of softness, while deter-
minate vice is something different.
Ma)aala, according to this interpre-
tation, is used here in a general sense,
in the next section with a special and
limited import.

4 Continence, it is argued, is finer
than endurance, just as victory is
finer than holding out. This argu-
ment is not sound, since continence
is in reality nothing more than hold-
ing out against temptation. To noble
natures continence would doubtless
cause a greater struggle than mere
endurance of pains, and in this sense
it might be called finer.

568 ἐλλείπων---ὅμοιος Sv] ‘Now
he who faints before things against
which most men hold out and are
strong, he is soft and luxurious (for

μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἡ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ᾽ | luxury, it may be added, is a kind

222 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. [Cuar.

> Ψ ars a 9 , . 94 ἢ 4 4 Ν
δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν" οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
9 ~ 4 € ~ e ΄- ς ~ a aA
ἰσχυρῶν Kat ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάταε ἢ λυπῶν,
θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ
Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ

Κ , 9 “~ > rd K , 4 @ e 4
apxivou ἐν τῇ ᾿Αλόπη Kepxvov, καὶ ὥσπερ of κατέχειν
πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέ-
πεσε [Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται
ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ
διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βα-
΄" 4 , 4 4 4 N . 4 ~ 4 x
σιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ TO γένος, Kat ws τὸ θῆλν πρὸς τὸ
7 ἄρρεν διέστηκεν.
Ν 4 ’ ε b S »¥ ’ 9 Ν > »
ἔστι δὲ μαλακός" ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεαίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνά-
παυσις" τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι,

’ ’
ΕστΊιν,

4 4 Α 4 YQ 9 . . A
ἀκρασίας δὲ TO μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ᾽ ἀσθένεια" of μὲν

γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ

of softness), he, for instance, who trails
his cloak rather than have the trouble
of lifting it, and who imitates the
langour of an invalid, without seeing
that it is miserable to be like one who
is miserable.’ This passage is some-
what in the style of the Characters of
Theophrastus. To illustrate the affeo-
tation of weakneas described above,
Coray quotes from Athensus a story
of the Sybarites, one of whom said
that he had been in the fields, and
that ‘to see the men digging had
given him a rupture.’ To which his
friend replied, that ‘the very mention
of it gave him a pain in his side.’

6 ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτη:] A play
by Theodectes the rhetorician, a friend
of Aristotle’s. Fritzsche quotes Cicero,
Tuse. 11. vii. 19 : Adspice Philoctetam,
cui concedendum est gementi: ipsum
enim Herculem viderat in (ita magni-
tudine dolorum ejulantem, &c.

Καρκίνου] Of this tragic poet no-
thing appears to be known,

Eevopdyry|] Giphanius finds in
Seneca, De Jra, 11. 2, a mention of

Xenophantus as a musician of Alex-
ander the Great.

οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ
μαλακία διὰ τὸ yévos] Aspasius for
Σκνθῶν reads Περσῶν. But the com-
mentators refer us to Herodotus 1
105: τοῖσι δὲ τῶν Σκυθέων συλήσασι
τὸ ἱρὸν τὸ ἐν ᾿Ασκάλωνι καὶ τοῖσι τούτων
ἀεὶ ἐκγόνοισι ἐνέσκηψε ἡ θεὸς θήλεαν
νοῦσον" ὥστε ἅμα λέγουσί τε οἱ Σκύθαι
διὰ τοῦτό σφεας νοσέεν. Hippocrates
gives a description of this malady,
which appears to have been a kind
of impotence (De Aer. Ag. et Loc. VL
108) : εὐνουχίαε γίνονται καὶ γυναικεῖα
ἐργάζονται καὶ ὡς αἱ γυναῖκες διαλέγον-
ταί re ὁμοίως, καλεῦνταί re οἱ τοιοῦτοι
ἀνανδριεῖε. ‘ This impotency Hippo-
crates ascribes to venesection, but he
mentions that the natives believed it
to be a judgment from the gods. It
is said that traces of the disease are
still found among the inhabitants of
Southern Russia.,—See Rawlinson’s
Herodotus, Vol. I. p. 248.

καὶ ws rd θῆλυ) Of. ch. v. ὃ 4

8 ἀκρασίας δὲ---φαντασίᾳ) ‘Now in-

continence is sometimes impetuosity

VIL] HOIKON (EYAHMIQN] VIL 223

πάθος, οἱ de διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πά-
θους" ἕνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζον-
ται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγεί-
pavres ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ
πάθους, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡδὺ fj οὔτ᾽ ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς
καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς"
οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα
οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ

φαντασίᾳ.

and sometimes weakness. Some men
when they have deliberated, do not
abide by their deliberations, owing to
the state into which they are thrown,
(and this is weakness): while others,
from never having deliberated, are
carried away by their feelings. Some,
on the contrary, like the beginners in
a tickling match, who cannot be
tickled,—having prescience, and fore-
sight, and having roused up them-
selves and their reason beforehand,
are not overcome by their feelings,
whether pleasant or painful. It is
especially persons of a quick or bilious
temperament who are subject to the
impetuous kind of incontinence, for
the one through the rapidity, and the
other through the intensity, of their
nature, do not wait to see what is the
law of right, because they are apt to
follow impressiona,’

Gorep ol προγαργαλίσαντε:] The
Paraphrast understands ἑαυτούς, ren-
dering the passage ὥσπερ τὰ προτρι-
Bévra καὶ προγαργαλισθέντα μέλῃ οὐ
γαργαλίζονται. And two of Bekker’s
MSS. read οἱ προγαργαλισθέντες, It
might be possible by previous tickling
to exhaust the irritability of the
cuticle, but this would not be a usual
process, and in one of the Problems
attributed to Aristotle (xxxv, vi.) it
is discussed, ‘Why cannot a man
tickle himself?’ To which the answer
is, ‘For the same reason that he

«--

can hardly be tickled by anybody else
if he knows that it is going to happen.
For laughter implies a sudden revul-
sion and a surprise.’ Surely this is
exactly what is meant in the text.

οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ] An ac-
count which seems at first sight the
opposite of this is given by the author
of the Magna Moralia (uy. vi. 43):
"Exelvy μὲν οὖν (the impetuous kind of
incontinence) οὐδ᾽ ἂν λίαν δόξειεν εἶναι
ψεκτή" καὶ γὰρ ἐν vols σπουδαίοις 4
τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ
εὐφνέσιν " ἡ δὸ (the weak kind) ἐν rote
ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦ-
τοι ψεκτοί. If however we consult the
curious disquisition on μελαγχολικοί
and the μέλαινα χολή in Ar. Problems,
Xxx. i., we shall soe that both pas-
sionate impetuosity and cold sluggish-
ness were considered by the ancient
physiologist to be different manifesta-
tions of the samcstrange temperament.
716. xxx. 1. 18: Ὅσοι: δὲ ὧν τῇ φύσει
συνέστη xpiccs τοιαύτη, εὐθὺς οὗτοι τὰ
ἤθη γίνονται παντοδαποί, ἄλλος κατ᾽
ἄλλην κρᾶσιν" οἷον ὅσοις μὲν πολλὴ καὶ
ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει, νωθροὶ καὶ μωροί, ὅσοις
δὲ λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερμή, μανικοὶ καὶ
εὐφνεῖς καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ εὐκίνητοι πρὸς
τοὺς θυμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἔνιοι δὲ
καὶ λάλοι μᾶλλον. With the moderns
the term ‘ melancholy’ is restricted to
the cold and dejected mood ; while the
ancients much more commonly ap-
plied the term μελαγχολικός to denote

224

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL.

(Crap.

Ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελη-
τικός" ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει' 6 δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμε-

λητικὸς πᾶς.

διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠἡπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,

4 ᾽ e 4 9» ς 4 ’ Ψ ‘ € 4

ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος, ὁ δ᾽ ἰατός" ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθη-
vd ΄“- ad i δέ 4 a e δ᾽ 3 [2
pia τῶν νοσηματῶν οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ ἀκρασία
τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς" ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχής, ἡ δ᾽ οὐ συνεχής

πονηρία.

“ὦ ) ὦ 4 , 4 , a ’
και ὅλως ὃ ΕΤΈροΟΡ TO γένος axpacias καὶ κακιας"

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία οὐ. λανθανει.
4. A δὲ , , « 5 \ a 4 A ,
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον

“ , . » , , ey ἢ ᾿ ,
ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ" ὑπ’ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους

warmth, passion, and eccentricity of
genius. Of. Plato, Repub. 573 0:
Ἰυυρραννικὸς δέ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ δαιμόνιε
ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἢ φύσει ἣ
ἐπιτηδεύμασιν 4 ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός
τε καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς γένη-
ται. Of. also Ar. Probl. χι, xxxviii:
τὸ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀκολουθεῖν ταχέως τὸ
μελαγχολικὸν εἶναι ἐστίν. In the lan-
guage οὗ our own day, ‘The passionate
heart of the poet is whirl’d into folly
and vice.’ For more remarks on
μέλαινα χολή, see below.

VIIL This chapter is not separated
by any marked logical boundary from
the preceding one. Rather it is a
continuation of the same subject, as it
goes on comparing incontinence with
intemperance. Two previously mooted
questions are now discussed, namely,
is intemperance more curable than
incontinence ? (which is answered in
the negative), and, is incontinence to
be regarded as absolutely bad? (See
above, ch. i, § 6.) This is also an-
swered in the negative.

1 Ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ
ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός] Cf. ch. vii. 8
2. The continuity of the subject is
preserved, if we consider that the
writer, having mentioned the various
ways in which incontinent people sub-
mit to temptation, next reflects that,

after yielding, these are all repentant
(μεταμελητικὸς was), while the in-
temperate man forms a contrast to
them and is unrepentant.

διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡπορήσαμεν)] Cf. ch. ii.
8 ro, Intemperance, which is a cor-
ruption of the will, is like a chronic
disorder, while incontinence, which is
a temporary derangement of the will,
is like an epileptic seizure.

ἡ γὰρ κακία λανθάνει) As being a
false sort of harmony in the mind, in
which no struggle is felt.

2 αὐτῶν δὲ---ἐμμένοντες δέ] ‘Now
looking at incontinence itself and the
two kinds of it which I have men-
tioned, those people who are carried
away are better than the sort who are
in possession of “ the law” but do not
abide by it.’ As said before, the
thread of reasoning goes on con-
tinuously from the end of the pre-
ceding chapter (according to Bekker’s
division), and so there is nothing re-
markable in the writer's now reverting
to the two kinds of incontinence, as
if he had never digressed from dis-
cussing them. Οἱ éxorarixot here
answers to the ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ
(ot) τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν dxpa-
τεῖς. The words ἔκστασις, ἐκστῆναι,
and ἐκστατικός, are frequently used in
the Problems (i.c.) in connection with
the μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1b. xxx. i 3:

VIII. ] HOIKQN {EYAHMIQN] VII. 225

Φ ~ a 9 4 a @ Φ ε΄
ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι" ὅμοιος
“ 4 9 ’ > a 4 [2 Δ e 9 [
yap 0 ἀκρατής εστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις Kal Ux ὀλίγου
»Ν 4 a ec ς ᾽ “ 4 xd ’ e
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ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν. ἀλλά πη ἴσως" τὸ μὲν γὰρ
παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσίν ἐστιν. οὐ μὴν
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς
Μιλησίους « Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ᾽ οἷα-
περ οἱ ἀξύνετοι, καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν,
4 “- 4 9 4 e 4 ~ ? a a a
ἀδικοῦσι δέ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ TO πε- 4
a“ , a e a 4 a a 9 a
πεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν

λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς,

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ο δὲ WEFELCTAL διὰ ΤῸ τΤοίουτοςζῷ

φ φ ᾽ > 9 > «= 4 > 4 ,’
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ὁ δ᾽ οὔ" ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθεί-

where it is said of Ajax, ἐκστατικὸς
ἐγένετο παντελῶς (i.e. mad). Cf. above,
ch. vi. § 6. ’Exorarixés is used pre-
sently (§ 5) in a different sense to ex-
press ‘departing from’ a purpose, as
also before, ch. i. § 6, and ii. § 7.

oi τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες] On this phrase
see Eth. VL i. 1, and note.

ὅμοιος yap—ol woddol] ‘For the
inan who is weakly incontinent is
like those who are soon intoxicated,
and by a small quantity of wine, less
than intoxicates people in general.’
Ὃ ἀκρατής seems used in this sen-
tence as if specially applicable to the
weak kind of incontinence. It is in
contrast to éxcrarixés. Weakness is
worse than being carried away by
passion, for it is acting against warn-
ing and with less temptation.

3 Incontinence is not vice, though
it resembles vice in what it does (κατὰ
τὰς πράξει), but it goes against the
will, while vice goes with the will.
It is like the saying of Demodocus
against the Milesians: ‘The Milesians
are not fools, but they are just as if
they were fools.’ The incontinent
are not bad, but they do wrong.

Anpodéxov] This was an epigram-
matist of the island of Leros, not far

VOL. IL.

from Miletus. Some of his epigrams
against different cities are preserved
in the Anthology. <A slight change
in the reading shows the above to be
in verse :
Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν
Οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι.

4 ἡ γὰρ dperh— ἐναντίο:] ‘For vir-
tue, on the one hand, preserves, while
vice destroys the major premiss. Now
the end is in action just what the hy-
potheses are in mathematics, namely,
& major premiss on which everything
depends; hence, neither in the one
case nor in the other is it the chain of
inference (ὁ λόγον) that demonstrates
the major premiss, but in the case
of action (ἐνταῦθα) it is virtue, either
natural or acquired, to which a right
opinion with regard to the major
premiss is due. He who possesses
this is temperate, while the contrary
person is intemperate.’ This passage
comes in asa final argument against
the notion that incontinence is more
curable than intemperance. In the
latter the fountain-head of action (the
ἀρχή) is destroyed. While the tem-
perate man has in himself the source
of all good action, the intemperate
man is the direct opposite, and the

FF

226

HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VIL

(CHap.

4 4 ’ 4 4 ry 4 a an @ 9 @
ρει ἡ δὲ σάζει, ev δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ
ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις" οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος
διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετὴ ἢ φυ-

Δ ᾳ4 9 a nm 9 “~ . QA 9 ἤ
σικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.
5 οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ᾽ ὁ ἐναντίος.

Σώφρων μὲν

ἔστι δέ τις διὰ

ἤ 4 A 4 4 9 4 [4 a C4 A A
πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ Tov ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ
πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ᾽
εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύ-

e 8 9 - e a 9 € 4 v a
Tas ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ" οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ

incontinent man is something inter-
mediate.

ἡ δὲ σώζει] Cf. Eth. vi. v. 6, where
almost all the ideas which occur above
are given, even the reference to ma-
thematical axioms. Jb. ch. xii. § 10,
where a still more explicit statement
is made of the relation of virtue to
the practical syllogism.

al ὑποθέσει5] This term is used pre-
cisely in the same way in the EFude-
mtan Ethics, 11 x. 20: περὶ μὲν τοῦ
τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς
θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις" εἴρη-
ται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχή
βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι'
ἀκριβείας (ἐ.6. the Analytics of Eude-
mus) Of. 70. ch. xi. § 4: ὥσπερ γὰρ
ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς al ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί,
οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ
καὶ ὑπόθεσις. In Eth. Lud. vm. ii. 4,
ὑπόθεσις is used as equivalent to
ἀρχή.---(8 3) περὶ τούτων... πειρα-
χέορ διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε
... τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον
ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. Plato, Repub. p. ςτο--
511, reproaches mathematics with
always resting on hypotheses of which
they can give no account. P. sioo:
οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι ol περὶ τὰς
γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό
τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχή-
ματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα
τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην μέθοδον,

| Ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑπο-
; θέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς

οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν
διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων
δ᾽ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες
τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο,
οὗ ἃν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσιν.

Aristotle, Post. Analyt. 1. ii. 7, de-
fines thesis or assumption as an im-
mediate syllogistic principle, inde-
monstrable, but not (as the axioms
are) & necessary antecedent to all
reasoning. He divides these into
hypotheses and definitions, which
differ in that the former assert ex-
istence or non-existence, while the
latter do not. The hypothesis, then,
is a peculiar principle (οἰκεία ἀρχή),
and differs from an axiom, (1) in that
it varies in the different sciences; (2)
in that it is wanting in recognisable
necessity. (Cf, Post. Anal. 1. x. 6:
οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ὑπόθεσις. . . ὃ ἀνάγκῃ
εἶναι δι᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκη). The
Aristotelian hypothesis is, however,
widely different from the hypothesis
of the moderns, which means, in short,
little more than a conjecture. For
more particulars on this subject see
Mr. Poste’s Logic of Science (Oxford,
1850), p. 139-143.

τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν] By what the gram-
marians call zeugma, this genitive
goes with τῶν ἀρχῶν, as governed
by ddaccartixés. One would have
expected αἰτία.

VILL—IX.] HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VII. 227

ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς" σώζεται yap τὸ βέλ-
τιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ
ἐκστατικὸς dia γε τὸ πάθος. Φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ
μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

Ἰ]ότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιφοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὅποι- 9
ᾳοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ
ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιφοῦν λόγῳ fy ὃ
τῷ Ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ
ἡπορήθη πρότερον; ἣ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν,

5 ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐναντίος κιτ.λ.} Incon- | the other hand, is not at all deaf to
tinence having been shown to be an | the voice of persuasion ; it is only the
intermediate state not so bad as in- | voice of passion when opposed to
temperance, it is here added that | reason which he resists. Nor is a
the true opposite to the incontinent | man to be called incontinent if he
man is he deserts a resolution eveu fur the sake
of pleasure, since Neoptolemus de-

‘Who, through the heat of confli
ae the law i ot, serted his resolution to deceive in
In calmness made, and sees what he order to obtain the noble pleasure of
foresaw :’ preserving his honour.
9

I ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαι-
ze. not the temperate, but the conti- | ρέσει τῇ μὴ 6907] Various solutions
nent. And though incontinence is | have been proposed forthe difficulty in-
not absolutely bad, yet relatively, if | volved in this sentence. (1) Aspasius,
you compare it with its opposite, you | followed by Argyropulus, Fritzsche,
must call one bad and the other good. | ἄο, think that ἐμμένων is to be
understood as carried on from μὴ

IX. The first part of this chapter | ἐμμένων in the line before. But this
(8§ 1-4) takes up again the question | will not do. The dxpar%s cannot be
before started (ch. i. 8 6, ch. ii. § 7-10), | said to ‘abide by a false opinion,’
Does continence consist in sticking | (2) Some understand the clause as
to any opinion and purpose, whether | applying to cases like those of Neo-
wrong or right? After some refine- | ptolemus, ‘Isaman incontinent who
ments, which are perhaps unnecessary, | does not stick to a false opinion?’
as to the continent man ‘accidentally’ | But all this is implied in ὁ ὁποιᾳοῦν
or ‘non-essentially’ maintaining a | κιτιλ, And moreover this interpre-
wrong opinion, a good distinction is | tation would give a new sense to 4,
given between obstinacy and conti- | making it a particle of apposition
nence. Obstinate people (ἰσχυρογνώ- | instead of a particle of contrast, which
poves), if not mere dullards (οἱ ἀμαθεῖς | is required for the sake of correspon-
καὶ ol ἄγροικοι), are self-opinionated, | dence with the opening sentence. (3)
which state of mind is rather incon- | One of Bekker’s MSS, reads τῷ μὴ
tinence than continence, for it is a | ψευδεῖ λόγῳ Kal τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ
yielding to the desire for victory and | ὀρθῇ. This is a very natural correc-
self-assertion. The continent man, on | tion to make, and it seems followed by

BS

228 HOIKON (EYAHMION] VII. {Cuap.
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ de τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
τον » τι κῶς ἀρ ra er , δὲ διῶ. τοῦ
ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γὰρ τις τοδὶ διὰ TOOL
ς- « 4 ’ 3 εν 4 “A , ‘ ¢ «
αἱρεῖται ἧ διώκει, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται,
8 4 4 4 , e “- 4 , δ
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
ἢ ς ld C7] Ψ 4 e e “~ 4 e 4 3 lA
καθ᾽ αὑτό, ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξη ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
nxn “~ a a
ὁ δ᾽ ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ
3 ᾿ “- , a “ 4 , φ
εμμενετικοί TY δόξη οὗς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι" of ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι
τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς
~ θ αλ 4 9 A δ᾽ [ὦ 4 λλ. [2 € 4 ‘ ὃ ‘
τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλα. ὁ μὲν yap da
td . 4 9 4 e > y φ 4
πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ov μεταβαλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής, επεὶ
A
εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχη, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής" ὁ δὲ οὐχ ὑπο
rd 9 ‘ 9 ¢ ’ , » ᾿
λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβανουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοί
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες
Q ς 59 a 4 e OM” e Q fa ? ὃδ " 70.
καὶ of ἀμαθεῖς καὶ of ἄγροικοι, of μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δὲ ἠδο-
νὴν καὶ λύπην: χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, ἐὰν μὴ μεταπεί-
θωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἣ ὥσπερ
ψηφίσματα: ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ
ἐγκρατεῖ, εἰσὶ δέ τινες ot τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ
δι ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτη τῷ “Σοφοκλέους ὁ

the Paraphrast, who has ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων
τῇ ὀρθῇ. But since the correction is
so natural, why should such a pre-
ponderance of MSS. have failed to
adopt it? Though the sense ab-
solutely requires some such reading,
it seems better to conclude that there
is some original confusion in the
text. The author may have carelessly
written as above from a mistaken
‘antithesis to 4 ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ in the former
sentence.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον)
One chooses the means ‘ accidentally.’
This is a mere illustration of the
import of καθ᾽ αὑτό and συμβεβηκός.
The whole paragraph seems perfectly
irrelevant. It may be compared with
kth. v. xi. 8: καθ᾽ αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ
ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβε-
βηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι

κακόν, which is a weak qualification
of the moral principle, that to injure
is worse than to be injured.

2 ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος κιτ.λ] The
same illustrations are coupled together
in the Eudemian Ethics, 11. vii. 14:
τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἧττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται,
οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος
καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

ὁ δὲ οὐχ---ἡδονῶν) ‘ But the obsti-
nate man (is immovable), not from the
influence of reason, for such men
assuredly admit desires, and many of
them are carried away by the allure-
ment of pleasures.’ The curious
phrase ἐχιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι occurs
in the Eudemian Ethics, πιι. ii. 13:
πάντες yap τούτοις φύσει τε xalpover,
καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι.

4 οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ) See above,
| ch. ii, § 7, note.

ee en -ὖ τ τς οἰοθὄ-..

1X.] H@IKON [ΕΥ̓ΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII. 229

καίτοι δ ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ

καλήν᾽ τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἣν, ἐπείσθη δ᾽ ὑπὸ
~ 9 ~

τοῦ ᾿Οδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δὲ ἡδονήν τι
’ 3 9 aN » - ¥ 5 9 ’ 9 |

πράττων ovr ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ ἀκρατής, αλλ

ὁ δ αἰσχράν.

4 8 9 > t 4 a ~ φ a a ~
Exe δ᾽ ἐστί τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἣ δεῖ τοῖς σω-

Νεοπτόλεμος.

wi

“σι [2 4 4 ~ ~
ματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ f} τοιοῦτος,
, 4 ΄ι n~
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής" ὁ μὲν γὰρ
4 - 3 4 a = e ὃ " 4 ~ ᾽ ᾿ A
ἀκρατῆς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ dia TO μάλλόν TI, οὗτος δὲ
a a 4 ὃ 4 +] 4
διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι" ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ de ἕτερον
μεταβάλλει.

γ “
τέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαί-

Δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφο-

vovra’ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις
7 ’ Ψ ς 4 ~ 9 Ul ἴω
εἶναι ᾧανεραν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ
ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ “λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἧ 6

5—ch. x. § 5. In his later edition
Bekker makes this portion of the text
into a separate chapter, which seems
a better arrangement. We have now
ὃ winding up of the previous dis-
cussions. Continence is not only the
contrary of incuntinence, but is also
a sort of mean. It bears an analogy
to temperance, but must not be iden-
tified with it. Neither must incontin-
ence and intemperance be confounded
(see above, ch. i. § 6). Nor must it
be thought possible that the ‘thought-
ful’ man can be incontinent, though
the clever man may (see ch. i. § 7).
Incontinence is like sleep or drunken-
ness, not a state of wakeful knowledge
(see ch. iii. 88 6-8). Its acts are
voluntary, but yet it is not absolutely
wicked, since it implies no deliberate
purpose, The incontinent man is
like a state which has good laws, but
does not act upon them. The bad
man like a state with a bad code,
which she carries out. Both the
terms incontinence and continence are
used comparatively, as implying more

firmness than is common, or less. Of the
two kinds of incontinence, that which
is caused by passion is more curable
than that caused by weakness; that
which proceeds from habit is more
curable than that which is natural.

5 καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει)
This is an Atticism for καὶ δι᾽ οὐδέτε-
ρον. Theattempt to make continence
into ‘a mean’ can hardly be called
successful. It can only be done by
assuming the same ἔλλειψις for this
quality as for temperance. You will
have one set of terms, ἀκολασία,
σωφροσύνη, ἀναισθησία, and another
set ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, ἀναισθησία. It
is plain that ἐγκράτεια is not a mean,
in the sense of being a balance or
harmony of the mind, It is only im-
perfect temperance ; it is temperance
in the act of forming.

6 ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἦ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ᾽
ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν)] ‘The “con-
tinence” of the temperate man has
come to be called so derivatively
(ἠκολούθηκεν) and by analogy.’

[ Crap.

230 HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VIL.

τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν: ὅ τε γὰρ
ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς
ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχων
φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
7 ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν
ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ
μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ οἰόμενος.
Ιο Οὐδ᾽ ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν
αὐτόν: ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος
2 δέδεικται ov, ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῷ πρακτικός" ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός, τὸν
δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι" διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν
ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν
δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημέναν τρόπον
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς
4 εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς
ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁ καθεύδων 4% οἰνώμε-
γος. καὶ ἑκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ
καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ᾽ ον" ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής "

ὥσθ᾽ ἡμιπόνηρος.

X. 1 ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπου-
δαῖος τὸ ἢθος δέδεικται dv] CE. ch. ii.
ὃ 5. Eth. vi. xiii. 6.

2 τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ev τοῖς πρώ-
τοις λόγοι] Cf. £th. νι. xii. 8-9. The
phrase ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις is used by
Aristotle, Eth. rv. iv. 1, 4, in refer-
ence to the Second Book of Ethics.
It must mean something more than
πρότερον, one would think. It seems
to point to a sort of interval between
the later passage and that referred
to. Cf. ch. 1. § : ἄλλην ποιησαμένους
ἀρχήν.

3 καὶ ἑκὼν μὲν] Cf. Eth. ν. ix. 4-6,
where the question is discussed, Does
the incontinent man voluntarily do
wrong and injury to himself as well
as harm ?

ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής] Προαίρεσις

4 3 nw” 4 4 9 e a e
καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος" οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος" ὁ

here must mean the general state of
the will. It is only one form of
incontinence, which errs against a
definitely formed purpose. Inconti-
nence is always rapa τὴν βούλησιν (cf.
Eth. v. ix. 6): in passionate natures
it is dvev προαιρέσεως. The Aristo-
telian psycholagy seems however to
have admitted the formation of rpoa:-
pécess which are not carried out into
action, and the question thus arose,
Are purposes or actions most decisive
as constituting virtue? See th, ΣΙ.
ii, 1, note, and Eth, x. viii. 5.

ὥσθ᾽ ἡμιπῤνηρος] ‘So that he is only
half depraved.’ This epithet occurs
in Ar. Pol. v. xi. 34: ἔτι δ᾽ αὐτὸν
(the monarch) διακεῖσθαι (ἀναγκαῖον)
κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἤτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ
ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ᾽

1x HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. 231

“4 8 9 A 9 4 4 4 ’ e 4
μὲν yap αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὁ δὲ
μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ
ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ
a # d ~ 4 9D? Ψ 4

νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ ᾿Αναξαν-
δρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ «πόλις ἐβούλεθ,, ἧ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλε,"

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη. 4
ἔστι δ᾽ ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς
τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως" ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἧττον
τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐϊατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρα-
σιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων
μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι’ ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν
φυσικῶν: ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως: διὰ γὰρ
τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ
Εὔηνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, Gig, χαὶ δὴ

ταύτην ἀνθρώτοισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι,
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία 5
καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὖται πρὸς

ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

ἡμιπόνηρον. In Plato, Repub. p. 352
o, the term ἡμιμόχθηροι is used in
proving that there must be honour
even among thieves.

of γὰρ ériBovdos] Though lust as
compared with anger is called ἐπίβου-
dos (of. ch. vi. § 3), yet it is true on
the other hand that the incontinent
man is not a designing character.

ὁ δὲ peNayxodxés] Cf. above, ch. vii.
ᾷ 8, ch. viii § 2.

ὥσπερ ᾿Αναξα»δρίδη} A Rhodian
comic poet, whoissaid tohave satirised
the Athenians. Aristotle mentions one
of his plays, the Τεροντομανία (Rhet.
Im. xii. 3). Also a famous saying of
his (Jb. n xi. 8), ᾿Αναξανδρίδου τὸ
ὁπαιρνούμενον ---

καλόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾷν
ἄξιον.

And another witticism (72. m1. x. 7).
Cf. Athenseus, Deipnos. 1x. τό.

4 τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεω:} CE.
ch. vii. I, note.

ὥσπερ kal Ednvos] An elegiac and
gnomic poet of Paros, who appears to
have been a contemporary and friend
of Socrates.

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον κ-τ.λ.]

‘ Habit sticketh long and fast,
Second nature 'tis at last.’

μελέτην] ‘That which is acquired
by culture and habit.’ That habit is
‘second nature’ we are told by
Aristotle, De Mem. ti. 16: ὥσπερ γὰρ
φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, διὸ ἃ πολλάκις
ἐννοοῦμεν ταχὺ ἀναμιμγησκόμεθα" ὧσ-
wep γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν,
οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν

a
ποίει,

II

232

HOIKON [(EYAHMION] VIL

[CHap.

Περί de ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν
φιλοσοφοῦντος" οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς
a ὔ C4 4 4 4 Ά .} Q 4 ΄-
ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς

td wv A a “~ 9 a 9 ὔ 4
2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ

XI. We now come to a treatise
upon the nature of Pleasure. With
regard to the authorship and character
of this treatise see the remarks in
Vol. 1. Esray I. pp. 64-65, and
Essay III. p.250. A notable scholium,
discovered by Professor Brandis in
the Vatican, and quoted by Spengel
and Fritzsche, attributes it to Eude-
mus, though in a merely conjectural
way; see below, ch. xiii, § 2, note,
In the outset of the Eudemian Ethics,
a discussion on Pleasure is promised
in terms which correspond both to
the contents and the position of the
present chapters (th. Eud. I. v. 11).
τούτων δ᾽ (i.e. with regard to the
three kinds of life) ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ
σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ
τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων,
οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ᾽ οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ
ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ συντείνουσί τι
πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς συντεί-
γνουσι, καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ
ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ
προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ
τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεραι δ᾽ εἰσὶν
ἡδοναὶ δι᾽ ἃς εὐλόγως οἵονται τὸν εὐδαί-
μονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκε-
“τέον, wept 5 ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως
πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν. It is quite in
agreement with the terms of this pro-
gramme that the present treatise is
prominently concerned with the dis-
cussion of bodily pleasure (ἡ περὶ τὰ
σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή). At
the close of the Eudemian Ethics there
is also a reference backward to these
chapters (Eth. Eud. vu. iii, 11): καὶ
περὶ ἡδονῆς δ᾽ εἴρηται ποῖόν τι Kal πῶς
ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ

καλά, καὶ τά (γε) ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα.
οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει" διὰ
τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἥδιστα
ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι
ἀξιοῦσιν. (Cf. this book, ch. xii. § 3,
and § 7; ch. xiii. § 2.)

1-2 wept δὲ ἡδονῆς — χαίρειν)
‘ Pleasure and pain are subjects which
come within the scope of him who
makes politics a philosophy, for he
has to frame the idea of that supreme
end, in reference to which we call
things absolutely good and bad. Also
these are quite necessary for us to
consider, since we have laid down the
principle that moral virtue and vice
are concerned with painsand pleasures,
and since people in general hold that
pleasure is involved in happiness,
whence they have given the happy
man his name (μακάριος from χαίρειν)"

There are three reasons given here
for discussing pleasure: (1) Because
it has claims to be ‘the end.’ (Cf. Eth.
Fud. w. i. 1, where as a reason for
discussing psychology it is said, φρό-
γησις yap καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ,
ὧν ἕνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.)
(2) From the connection before shown
to exist between pleasure and mo-
rality ; cf. Eth. Eud. τι. iv, 2-4
(3) Because the idea of pleasure is
involved in the common idea of
happiness, as shown by the etymology
(a false one) of μακάριος.

ἀρχιτέκτων τοῦ Té\ous] t.e. to con-
ceive in a grand and liberal way, in-
dependently of details, that supreme
human good at which a state should
aim. Cf. Eth, 1. xiii, 1-3, and 1 i. 4,
note,

ἁπλῶς λέγομεν} There is some con-

ΧΙ] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. 233

αὐτῶν" τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν Kat τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ
’ A e b) w, 4 a 9 , e “"
λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι
, Ὁ ~ PoP ‘ ‘ ‘ ’ ? ;
μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν, διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν _
ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι 3
9 , » . UN ww ‘ a 9 ‘
ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ᾽ avro οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός" οὐ yup
φ 4 4 4 θὰ 4 70. ’ ὼ a δ’ » 4 4 ς
εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν" τοῖς δ᾽ ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι αἱ
4 AY Αῇ A ? , 4 A ~
δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πάσαι
4 ’ Ψ a 9 , Φ , ¥ e ,
ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.
ὅλ a 9 3 θ Ω͂ ~“~ 0 4 A a 9 4
ὅλως μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς 4
φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν,
Η 10. , 9 ὃ ὔ 4 ἢ) w# ς 4 ?
οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδομησις οἰκίᾳ. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει
᾿ ς [4 ww e ὔ A > 9 4 eas
τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος TO ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ TO ἡδύ.
Ψ 9 ld ων a e ὃ ’ \ @ td
ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν ai ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει,
μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων" οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι
νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς" καίτοι πᾶν
4 4 [2 Ε΄ w# δί A ὔ e 4
ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς

yoovas, τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, Ort εἰσὶ καὶ 5

fusion in this expression, for though | I That pleasure is in no sense a

things are called good in reference to . good.

the supreme end, yet they are not (a) because it is a state of be-

called so absolutely. All such goods coming (yéveots) :

are merely means, and therefore goods , (8B) because the temperate man

relatively. What is here meant is , avoids pleasures ;

more definitely expressed in Eth. Eud. (y) because the thoughtful man

I. viii, 18, ὅτι δ᾽ αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τῶν aims not at pleasure, but

ὑφ᾽ αὑτό, δηλοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία. ὁρισά- at a painless condition ;

μενοι yap τὸ τέλος τἄλλα δεικνύουσιν, (8) because pleasure hinders

ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν" αἴτιον γὰρ thought ;

τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, On ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ asa (ε) because there is no art of

Eudemian formula, see Vol. 1. Essay pleasure ;

I. p. 63. (ἢ because children and brutes
μεθ᾽ ἡδονῇ] The first sentence of follow pleasure,

the Eudemian Ethics asserts that 2 That some pleasures may be good,
happiness is not only most good and | but that most are bad ; supported by
beautiful, but also most pleasurable ; | instances of morbid and hurtful plea-
this is taken, of course, from £th. Nic. | sures.
1. viii. 4. 3 That pleasure is at all events not
3-5 The writer now mentions three | the chief good; because it is not an
existing opinions with regard to plea- | end-in-itself, but a state of becoming.
sure, and the arguments by which τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ] The opinions
they are supported. | stated here are negative. The writer
VOL. 11. GG

234

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL.

[Crap.

αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι BraBepai- νοσώδη yap

# fa ene
evia Τῶν ἡδέων.

ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

Φ δ' 4 4 ε « , @ 9 4
ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἄριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος
4 A φ ’ ne ~ ᾽ν» ’

τὰ μεν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεῦον ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.

Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ

τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.

in all probability had before him
Aristotle’s treatise on Pleasure (£th.
x. i-v.) He deviates from it slightly,
and exhibits that kind of differences
which might be expected under the
circumstances. He does not, like
Aristotle, state the positive view
(held by Eudoxus) that pleasure is
the chief good, but commences with
the opinions of the objectors to this
view (i.e. Speusippus and the Plato-
nists of his school), The principal
argument which he attributes to them
(that pleasure is a γένεσιβ) is given,
though not in such a definite form,
Eth, x. iii. 4. Argument ({) appears
to be implied in the objection against
Eudoxus which is mentioned Eth. x.
ii. 4. Argument (e) may be the same
perhaps as that given Eth. x. iii, 2
(that pleasure is ἀόριστον. The
other arguments are not taken from
Aristotle; they may perhaps have
been derived from the books of Speu-
sippus on this subject (rept ἡδονῆς d,
᾿Αρίστιππος d. See Vol. I, Essay 111.
p. 218).

The second view belongs probably
to a more moderate section of the
Older Academy. [Ὁ still, however,
requires qualification, and to this
effect the writer argues below, in
ch, xii.

The third view,—that pleasure,
however good, cannot be the chief
good,—was held by both Plato and
Aristotle (though the argument by
which it is supported, ὅτι οὐ τέλος
ἀλλὰ γένεσις, was Plato's alone; cf.
Philebus, Ὁ. 53 0, 54 4, ἄς, th. x. ii,
3, X. iii. 8-13, Eudemus, identifying

~ ’ 9 4 4 4 Α
πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν

pleasure with happiness, denies this,
ch, xii, ὃ 1, ch. xiii. § 2.

XII. The arguments used in this
chapter are as follows: (1) Before ἡ
deciding on the goodness or badness
of pleasure, a distinction has to be
made between absolute and relative
goodness or badness, and then various
degrees have to be admitted among the
relative kinds of goodness, § 1. (2)
We must allow that real pleasure con-
sists in life itself (ἐνέργεια), not what
merely produces life (yéveors), Hence
all the arguments founded on defining
pleasure to be a γένεσις fall to the
ground. ‘Those processes which re-
store nature are only pleasures in a
subsidiary and accidental way. And
even in them what is pleasant is the
life (évép-yeca) which accompanies them,
88 2-3. (3) Some pleasures may be
morbid or they may hinder thought ;
but this only proves that from one
point of view they are not good; but
again the pleasures of thought are an
assistance to thought, 88 4-5. (4)
There is no art of pleasure, because
art is of conditions, not of functions,
not of life itself, § 6. (5) The argu-
ments about the thoughtful man, the
temperate man, and the child (ch. xi.
§ 4), all apply merely to the inferior
and subsidiary, that is, the bodily,
pleasures, § 7.

The course of procedure here is
like that in th. x. ii.-iii, where the
objections of the echool of Speusippus
are answered before Aristotle gives
his own theory of the nature of plea-
sure, The arguments above are rather
confused in statement. Those in § 1

XL—XIL]

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL

235

“a 4 4 ~
διχῶς (ro μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ

6 Ψ 4
αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ

, 4 “ A“
γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς

φαῦλαι τινὶ δ᾽ οὗ ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ᾽ οὐδὲ τῷδε

ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἱρεταὶ δ᾽ οὔ" ai δ᾽ οὐδ᾽

€ td 9 “ S
ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας

Ψ ~
ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων.

are apparently meant to answer the |

assertion that no pleasure is good,
οὔτε καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
The writer wishes first to urge that
pleasure may be relatively good, if not
absolutely so ; he afterwards goes on
to maintain that it is absolutely good.

Other passages of Eudemus bear a
similarity to this; cf. Eth, πα, 11. 1.
7: GAN ἴσως τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ
ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ robvay-
τίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς
πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα, καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς
παιδίοις ἣ παιδία. VII. ii. 4-7, ἄς.

1 ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει ---- καμνόντων»
‘But that it does not follow from
these arguments that (pleasure) is
not a good, nor even that it is not the
chief good, will be seen from the
following considerations. First, the
term “ good” has a double import ; it
means either the absolute or the
relative good ; in accordance with this
distinction, different constitutions and
states will be either absolutely or
relatively good, and so too the pro-
ceases of change and transition (which
produce them). Thus some of these
processes which appear bad may be
so in the abstract (ἁπλῶς), while they

are not 50 relatively (rei), but are

desirable for the particular indivi-
dual. Others again cannot be called
desirable even for the particular in-
dividual, except on occasion and for
a short time; others are not pleasures
at all, but only seem so, being accom-

a» 9 a ~ 9 ~ a
ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ

panied by pain and being (merely) for
the sake of relief ; as, for instance, the
pleasures of the sick.’

2 ἔτι ἐπεὶ---ἰἀπὸ τούτων) ‘Secondly,
“ good ” may be either the state or the
operation of a state, and so the pro-
cesses which restore any one to his
normal state (φυσικὴν ἕξι») are plea-
surable (not in themselves, but) acci-
dentally (and by association). In
fact, there is an operation or vital
action in desire, namely, that of the
powers in us which remain unimpaired
(τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεωτ).
(And it may be proved that pleasure
depends not on want and desire, but
on vital action) because there are
pleasures which do not imply want and
desire, as, for instance, the pleasures
of thought, which take place when the
nature is in no respect deficient. A
proof (that the processes before-men-
tioned are only accidentally pleasur-
able) is to be found in the fact that
men do ποῦ find delight in the same
pleasure while their nature is being
recruited (ἀναπληρουμένητ) and when
it is in a settled condition, but when
it is settled they delight in things
which are absolutely pleasant, and
during the other process in things
that are even quite the reverse ; as in
sharp and bitter things, which are not
naturally nor abstractedly pleasant.
Nor is the enjoyment of them natural,
for as pleasant things, regarded ob-
jectively (τὰ ἡδέα), are to one another,
so are the subjective feelings which
these excite (ἡδοναί).᾽

N

236 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL. (Cuar.

μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ᾽ ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι
εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔστι δ᾽

a 9 ,
ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις

ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν. ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν

΄--ς e ’ @ a ὔ 4 N
τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, επειί
A 4 , 9 AN e , Ό ς io
καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ
σημεῖον
δ᾽ ΕΥ̓͂ 4 “ 4“ “ ’ ς ὃ a 9 λ , “

ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς

4 “δῇ [4
καὶ ἄνευ λύπης
θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης.

4 a
φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς
« ~ «ἢ; 9 ‘4 A 4 σι 9 ’ a a
ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις" καὶ

3 sy? 4 . ON 9 δὲ » ἤ ἡδὺ

γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει you

~ ¢ a , 4

οὔθ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡδοναί" ὡς yap τὰ ἡδέα προς
, ef 4 e e 4 e Ὁ A ’

ἄλληλα συνέστηκεν, οὕτω Kat αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων.
w# 9 9 , a “ > a“ 70. ~ Cd

ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ

This passage is expressed so ellip-
tically as to require several links of
thought to be supplied. In the above
translation this has been attempted.
A bare rendering of the sentences into
English would leave them utterly un-
intelligible.

al καθιστᾶσαι] i.e, al κινήσεις καὶ al
γενέσεις, carried on from the previous
section, The argument is that it is
only life and the vital action (φυσικὴ
ἕξις καὶ ταύτης ἐνέργεια) which is good
and pleasant ; the restorative processes
are only secondarily, non-essentially,
and by a sort of inference, pleasant.
The words καθιστᾶσαι and καθεστηκυίας
correspond with the term κατάστασις,
which is used of pleasure in Ar.
Rheoric, 1. xi. 1: κατάστασις ἀθρόα
καὶ αἰσθητὴ els τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.

er eS SS

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεω:) The argument .

goes on to add that even in these re-
storative processes there is vital action
(ἐνέργεια), namely, of those organs that
remain unimpaired. The Paraphrast

and others understand ὑπολοίπου to .

mean ‘deficient,’ and as being equi-
valent to ἐνδεοῦς in the next line.
But the above translation is not only
more suitable to the doctrine of the
Peripatetics (see Vol. I. Essay IV.

pp. 247-250), but it is borne out by
6. xiv. §7: λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα᾽ ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει
ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς
πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ
εἶναι. Cf. Eth. x, iii. 6.

ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς) Mentioned as an
instance of things only pleasant during
a morbid condition of the body. Cf.
Eth, x. iii. 8

3 ἔτι οὐκ ἀνἀγκη---ἔστι 8 ἕτερον]
‘Moreover it does not follow that
there must be something better than
pleasure, as some argue, in the same
way that the end is better than the
process which leads to it. For all
pleasures are not transition-states
nor the accompaniments of such, but
they are rather life itself and the end
itself. They do not result from our
coming to our powers (γιγνομένων), but
from our using those powers (xptw-
μένων); and it is not true that all
pleasures have an end separate from
them ; this is only true of such as are
felt by persons in the process of being
restored to their normal condition.
Hence it is not right to define plea-
sure as 8 “sensible transition,” but
rather we should call it “a vital
action of one’s natural state,” and

XII] HOIKON (EYAHMIOQN] VIL. 937

, 4 ἢ ~ td A 9 4 ὔ 4 8
τινὲς ᾧασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως" οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν
pas ν " a 9 > 88 δ ‘
ovde μετὰ γενέσεως πάσαι, ἀλλ ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος"
Qe
οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων" καὶ τέλος
9 ~ σι
ov πασὼν ἑτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων
-Ἠ ἢ a a ~
τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν
’ 4 4 e ὃ , 4 δ ε ’ 2?
ᾧφαναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν
“- 8 ᾽ ΦΨ 4 4 A ζω 9 4 4 ,
τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ de τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδισ-
a 4
Tov, δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν τὴν

x. v. 6: αἱ δὲ (ἡδοναὶ) σύνεγγυς ταῖς
ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστε
ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ
ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ
ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ᾽ αἴσθησις " ἄτοπον
γάρ" ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνε-
ταί τισι ταὐτόν. He however does not
the school, and perhaps the actual | more specifically define it than as
writings of Speusippus, are here al- ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ),

instead of “sensible,” “ unimpeded.”
|
|

luded to. Nowhere in Plato do the Eth, x. iv. 8, ἃς. Eudemus does not
|

Now pleasure appears to people to be
a transition-process from its being
good in the fall sense of the term, for
people confound the ideas of process
and action, whereas they are distinct.’

ὥσπερ τινές φασι] Inall probability

exact words of this definition of plea- | preserve the distinction, but simply
sure occur (γένεσις els φύσιν αἰσθητή), | says that pleasure should be defined
but they represent his views, though | as ‘the unimpeded play of life.’ Aris-
perhaps carried rather farther. The | totle himself occasionally writes in
present section places in opposition to | this way; cf. Metaphys. ΧΙ. vii. 7: ἐπεὶ
each other the theories of the Platonic καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐνέργεια τούτου,
and the Aristotelian school, of whom ἀνεμπόδιστον] This word is borrow-
the one considered pleasure to be a δα from Aristotle’s Politics, Iv. xi. 3.
relief from pain, a return from depres- | See Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 55-56.
sion, an addition to the vital powers ; δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς ris εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως
the other considered it to be the play ἀγαθόν] At first sight there appears
of life iteelf, the flow of life outward | to be a contradiction in saying that
rather than anything received. On | pleasure is thought not to be a good,
these two divergent theories see Vol. | because it is a γένεσις (ch. xi. § 4) ; and
I. Essay IV. pp. 247-250. The same | that it is thought to be a γένεσις
subject may be found worked out at | because it isa good. The explanation
greater length, and with interesting | is that the latter clause refers not to
notices of the opinions held by later | the Platonists, but to the Cyrenaics.
philosophers, in Sir W. Hamilton’s | The Cyrenaica, who considered plea-
Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. τι, lect. | sure the chief good, defined it as an
xliii, pp. 444-475. equable process in the soul. Plato
ἀλλὰ μαλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργεια») Aris- | accepted this definition, and turned it
totle when writing accurately dis- | against them, arguing that by the very
tinguishes pleasure from the moments | terms used the Cyrenaics had proved
of life and consciousness (ἐνέργειαι), | pleasure not to be the chief good.
from which it is inseparable. Cf. Eth. , The Platonists then were originally

ἐ

238

γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ᾽ ἕτερον.

HOIKON [EYAHMIQN] VIL.

(Cuap.

τὸ 0

> , [ὦ δ ®# 10 , 4 2 <A 4 @
εἶναι φαυλας OTL νοσωθὴ Evia NOEa, ΤῸ αὐτὸ καὶ OTL

€ 4 Ψ 4 ?
ὕγιεινα ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν.

ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα

ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν
4 ’ Ἁ e , 9 ? 4 A ἢ

ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν, ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει

οὔθ᾽ ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ad’ ἑκάστης ἡδονή, GAN αἱ ἀλλότριαι,

9 4 e 4 A ~ a“ 4 [2 ~ ,

ἐπεὶ at ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι

θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν.

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τὸ δὲ TEXYNS μὴ εἰναι ἔργον

ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης

ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη

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καίτοι καὶ ἢ μυρεψικὴ τεχνὴ καὶ ἢ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ

ἡδονῆς εἶναι.

τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φροόνι-

ὃ , 4 ἢ; ’ 4 N “ δ' “ -
μον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ

indebted for their definition of pleasure
(αἰσθητὴ γένεσι) to the Cyrenaics.
See Vol. I. Essay IT. pp. 176-177.
4-Ὁ τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι φαύλα----μανθάνειω
‘ To say that pleasures are bad because
some pleasant things are unhealthy
is like saying (health is bad) because
some healthy things are bad for
money-making. From that point of
view it is true they are both bad, but
they are not on account of this in-
cidental badness bad simpliciter, since
even thinking is sometimes injurious
to health; but neither thought nor
any other state of mind is impeded
by its own pleasure, but only by
foreign pleasures; for the pleasures
of thinking and learning will make
one think and learn more.’ The ar-
gument here is that a thing good in
itself may be relatively bad, eg.
health, and thought itself. One good
may clash with another, and be from
that point of view (ταύτῃ) bad. The
writing is elliptical; we might have
expected ἁπλῶς to be added to φαῦλα.
The last clause in section 5, which
asserts that a mental function is rather
assisted than impaired by its own

Eth. X. v. 2-3. Noowdy seems to mean
‘producing disease ;’ cf. ch. xi. ὃ 5:
as Ῥοσματώδης before (ch. v. § 3, &c.)
means ‘ produced by disease.’ Φρονήσει
is evidently used above as the verbal
noun of φρονεῖν, in the general sense
of ‘thought,’ and not in the restricted
sense which is given to it in Book v1.
Cf. Eth. 1. vi. 113; Eth. Hud. m. i. τ
(quoted above).

6 τὸ δὲ τέχνης κιτ.λ.] Cf. ch. xi
§ 6. An answer is now given to an
argument probably occurring in the
works of Speusippus. This argument,
if fairly represented here, must have
had a false major premiss, namely,
‘ All that is good is the subject of art.’
The answer consists of two different
pleas : (1) pleasure, like life, is above
art, which can only deal with the
conditions tending to these things.
(2) In another sense there are arts of
pleasure, e.g. the cook’s or the per-
fumer’s art.

7 Most of the arguments against
pleasure ignore the distinction between
different kinds of pleasures, the one
kind being of the nature of life, and
the end, and therefore good in them-

proper pleasure, is taken from Ar. | selves (ὃ 3); the other kind being

XII.—XIII.] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. 239

, > ”~ ~ td ὔ
θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται
“~ 4 A e “~ A σι 9 4 A “~ e e ?
πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι ai ἡδοναί,
τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν
’ 9 id e [4 4 > » 4 c
τούτων aduriay ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ᾽ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης

4 a , a 4 τ 4 4
καὶ Tas σωματικὰς (τοιαῦται yap αὗται) Kal τὰς τούτων

ὑπερβολάς, καθ᾽ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος.

διὸ ὁ σώφρων

‘4 td 9 4 9 4 e 4 A
φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσίν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σωφρονος.

᾽ σι
᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ
᾿ ΄- , 4 n~ ~
φευκτόν' ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἡ de τῷ πῇ ἐμποδι-

connected with inferior conditions of
our nature, with pain, want, &c., and
being therefore only secondarily and
accidentally good (§ 2). This latter
kind of pleasures, and excess in them,
are made the ground of reproaches
against pleasure in general.

XIII. In this chapter, after refut-
ing (§ 1) the objection of Speusippus
(that pleasure may be the opposite of
pain without being a good), Eudemus
urges the claims of pleasure, of the
highest kind, to be considered the
chief good, because from the terms
of its definition it is inseparable from,
and indeed identical with, happiness
(§ 2). It is a mere paradox to talk
of a man being happy in torture, &c.
Happiness requires prosperity, that an
‘unimpeded function’ may be obtained,
i.e. pleasure, though there must not be
too much prosperity, else happiness is
‘impeded’ in another way (88 3-4).
The instinct of all creatures testifies
to pleasure being the chief good (§ 5) ;
and it is a mistake to think that
bodily pleasure is the only kind that
exists (8 6). In short, that pleasure is
neceasary for happiness proves that it
is a good (§ 7).

: ἀλλὰ μὴν---ἡδονήν] ‘But we may
go further—it is universally agreed
that pain is an evil, and detestable—
for it is either absolutely an evil, or

is so relatively as impeding the in-
dividual in some way or other. But
that which is contrary to the detest-
able in that very point which makes
it detestable and evil is good. There-
fore it follows that pleasure must be
agood. For the answer of Speusippus
to this argument does not hold, that
“(pleasure is contrary to pain and to
the absence of pain) in the same way
that the greater is contrary to the
less, and also to the equal.” For
no one could ever say that pleasure
is identical with any form of evil.’
That pleasure is a good because it is
the contrary of pain, is an argument
attributed to Eudoxus, Fth. x. ii. 2.
Aristotle there (ἐδ. § 5) mentions the
answer to it, and refutes that answer
as above. Eudemus, in accordance
with his usual style, adds the name
of Speusippus, Aulus Gellius, ΙΧ. 5,
mentions this doctrine : ‘Speusippus
vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem
et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt op-
posita inter sese: bonum autem esse
quod utriusque medium foret.’ Ac-
cordingly, the neutral state between
pain and pleasure would have to be
regarded as good. Aristotle and
Eudemus reply that the point of con-
trariety between pain and pleasure is
that the one is φευκτόν and the other
αἱρετόν, therefore the one must be
considered an evil, the other a good.

N

240 HOIKQN [EYAHMIOQN] VII. [Cuar.

; - δὲ aA . 3 , a ’ 4 ’
orun. τῷ de φευκτῷ τὸ εναντίον ἢ φευκτὸν τε καὶ κακόν,
4 , 2, a 4 ε ὃ 4 4 ’ 4 e
ἀγαθόν. ἀναγκὴ οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν. ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς

4 9 a e a Ψ 4
γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλνεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ
x a , 4 ~ κ . ’ 9 ‘ Py '
μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον: οὐ γὰρ ἂν dain
ra t 4 A e δ , ¥” , > 2 3 ’
ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. ἄριστόν τ’ οὐδὲν κωλύει
Pd ? Q
ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ Kai
9 ’ 4 φΦ ἢ Ἂ 4 ΄- ww δὲ 4 9
ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ avay-
a , 4 4 9 ν 4 ὔ
καῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι,
~ [2 4 ’ wW 4 4 “~
εἴθ᾽ ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργεια ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν,

nr en ere

ὅπερ κακόν τι] Cf. Eth. VI. iv. 3,note. | tise conjecturally to Eudemus. Διὰ
We are probably to understand ris, | μὲν οὖν τούτων δοκεῖ ταὐτὸν ἀποφαί-
with the Paraphrast and Scholiast. | γεσθαι τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν" οὐ μὴν
Speusippus would have said that plea- | οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας
sure iganevil, Cf. Eth. x. ii. 5. γένεσιν εἶναι ἢ φαύλας τινὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν,

2 ἄρωτον τ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει!) This | as καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγα-
admission is directly contrary to the | θὸν ἐπιγίγνεται καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐνδόξως ὡς
conclusions of Aristotle (cf. Eth. x. | ἐνὸν αὐτὴν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν, ἐπεὶ ἔν ye
iii. 13). It is to be explained as an | τοῖς Νικομαχείοις ἔνθεν διείλεκται καὶ
after development of the system of | περὶ ἡδονῆς ᾿Αριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἴρηκεν
Aristotle, and an attempt to bring | αὐτὴν μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,
different parts of that system into | ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀκμαίοις
harmony with each other. Aristotle τὴν ὥραν. σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦτ᾽
having used the same formula (ἐνέρ- | ᾿Αριστοτέλους ἀλλ᾽ Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ
γεια) to express both pleasure and | « (Book X.) λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς
happiness, Eudemus from the force of οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διειλεγμένου. πλὴν
the terms identifies them. Inthis he | εἴτε Εὐδήμου ταῦτά ἐστιν εἴτ᾽ ᾿Αριστοτέ-
is quite justified, for it is impossible | λους, ἐνδόξως εἴρηται. διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται
to distinguish the highest kind of plea- | τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονὴ ὅτι σὺν τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ
sure or joy from happiness, especially | ἀχώριστον αὐτοῦ. τούτῳ δ᾽ ὁμολογεῖ καῖ
if we consider peace (ἐνέργεια τῆς | τὰ ἑξῆς. This, which is a remarkably
ἀκινησίας) to be a mode of joy. It is | favourable specimen of the Scholia,
in accordance with the rest of the | may serve to show the wavering and
Kudemian Ethics to speak in this way | unprofitable character of the commen-
of pleasure aa being an essential ele- | taries.
ment in, and as inseparable from, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην] This must not
happiness. Cf. Eth. Fud. 1. i. 6-7,1 ; be taken very strictly, since pleasure
v. 11-12 (quoted above), VIII. iii. 11, and knowledge cannot both be the
ἄς. chief good. Both, however, may be

The Vatican Scholium on this pas- | considered as forms of the absolute
sage speaks of it as being merely good. Cf. £th.1. vii. 5. The article is
dialectical (but this is from an.un- : omitted at first with ἄριστον, but is
willingness to recognise the discre- ᾿ added below. Knowledge is good,
pancy between Books vir. and x.) It ; though some things it is better not to
proceeds to attribute the present trea- | know.

XIII. ] HOIKQN [EYAHMION] VII. 241

Ἁ = 7 ’ ς ᾿ Pa ee ee |
ἂν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱ ρετωτατὴν εἶναι: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
ε ὃ , Cd ᾿Ξ Ν 70 b) A w» “ AA ~
ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη av τις ἡδονὴ TO ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν
ς δ “- Ἂ 9.9. A > ν Ξ ε “ 4 δ ‘ “
noovwy φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς. Kal Ola τοῦτο
a 4 " ὃ , e ou 5 , ἢ Δ 9 ᾿
πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέ-
a e ὃ 8 4 4 9 ὃ ’ ἢ ἢ : δ ’
Kovot τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐθαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως" οὐδεμία
‘ . 7 ’ ’ ὃ ἢ ε δ᾽ 4 ὃ ἢ A
yap evepyeia τέλειος ἐμπὸ ἰζομένη, ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν
τελείων: διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν
καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδί ζηται
΄- 4
ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις με- 3
’ ὔ 4 ’ ’ i ἽΝ 4
γάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, eav ἢ
9 6 e A e » A MM δὲ ἢ ὃ Ἁ δὲ 4
ἀγαθὸς, ἢ exovres ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν eEyouot. dia de TO4
~ σι ” 4
προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισί ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία
~ 9 , 9 iy 9 4 Q 9 4 ς Ρ
τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβαλλουσα
> , 3 , ’ . , ἢ ’ a” bi 2
εμποῦιὸς ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν OiKaLoy

καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως] Cf. Eth. Εωά. 1.
v. 11 (which passage is here referred
to) : ἕτεραι δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι’ ἃς εὐλόγως
οἴονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ
μόνον ἀλύπως.

τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς
καὶ τῆς τύχης] This is the principle
with regard to happiness which is laid
down in Eth. Nic. τ. viii. 15-17. It
was afterwards considered character-
istic of the Peripatetic School. Cf.
Cicero, De Fin. 11. vi. 19 : ‘ Aristoteles
virtutis usum cum vite perfects pros-
peritate conjunxit.’

3 ol δὲ---᾿λέγουσ»] ‘But they who
allege that he who is being racked on
the wheel, or he that is plunged in
great calamities, is happy provided he
be virtuous, talk nonsense, whether
intentionally or not.’ Cf. Eth. Nie.
Iv. 6 The words ἑκόντες οὐδὲν
λέγουσιν answer to εἰ μὴ θέσιν da-
φυλάττων in that place. The paradox
alluded to was maintained by the
Cynics, and afterwards by the Stoics
(who denied that pain was an evil). Cf.

cruciatus, patris eversiones, exsilia,
orbitates, magnam vim habere ad
male misereque vivendum, non est
ausus elate et ample loqui, quum
humiliter demisseque sentiret.—Vex-
atur autem ab omnibus primum in eo
libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in
quo multa disputat, quamobrem is,
qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus
esse non possit: in eo etiam putatur
dicere in rotam beatam vitam non
escendere ’ (quoted by Fritzsche). Cf.
also Cicero, Paradoza, ii.

4 ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία] Cf. Eth.
Eud. τ. i. 4: ἣ διὰ τύχην " πολλοὶ γὰρ
ταὐτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ
τὴν εὐτυχίαν. This, together with the
present passage, is taken from Eth.
Nie. 1. viii. 17.

αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἑμπόδιός ἐστω
A more forcible expression of what is
said Eth. x. viii. 9: ob γὰρ ἐν τῇ
ὑπερβολῇ τὸ abrapkes K.T.d.

καὶ tows—avrijs] ‘And perhaps
(when it is overweening) we should
no longer call it prosperity ; for the
standard of prosperity consists in its
Cicero, Tuse, v. ix. 24: ‘Theophrastus | being conducive to happiness. Cf.
quum statuisset verbera, tormenta, | Eth. πα, vit. iii, 12: τῶν φύσει μὲν

VOL. II. HH

Ee

wi

Lo

242 HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL . = [Cuap.

4 4 . 9 ’ e @ 9 A a 4 ὃ a
πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ TO διώκειν
3 ” A ’ a 9 tA 4 e a ase
δ᾽ ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι
΄σ΄ε > , »
τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.
Φήμη δ᾽ οὔ τί γε πάμααν ἀπόλλυται, AY τινα λαοΐ
σολλοΐ, .
9
GAN’ ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ᾽ ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ᾽
” ” = 3 δ e ὃ ρει δι Ἢ 2 4 ἢ
ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν παντες,

“9 a , ’ # δὲ A δ 4 9 nv
ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. lows ὃὲ καὶ ὀιωκουσιν οὐχ ἣν

- A [2 4

οἴονται οὐδ᾽ ἣν ἂν φαῖεν. ἀλλα τὴν αὐτήν: παντα yap
nn 4 ~ ld

φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ᾽ εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος
4 ’

κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε

ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι | 6 ἴσως δὲ καὶ] Perhaps by a mys-
ὅρον καὶ ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως, καὶ | terious instinct all creatures, in seek-
wept φυγῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὁὀλι- _ ing life and joy, seek under different
γότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων" and | manifestations one and the same prin-
Vol. 1. Essay I. p. 61. ciple of good. Cf. the dream-images
5 καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ᾽ —Geiov] ‘Inshort, | in Goethe’s Faust : .

that all things pursue pleasure, both
beasts and men, is a proof that it is
in some sort the chief good,—

‘ Kinige glimmen

Ueber die Héhen,

Andere schwimmen

Ueber die Seen,

Andere schweben,

Alle zum Leben ;

Alle zur Ferne

Liebender Sterne,

Seliger Huld.’
Aristotle, Eth. x. ii 4 (which is the
source of the above passage), does not
go eo far as to make all creatures aim
not what they think, or would declare, | at the same good, tows δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
but (in reality) the same; forallthings | φαύλοις ἐστί τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν xpetr-

|
“For mankind’s universal voice can
|

have within them by nature a divine τὸν 4 καθ᾽ αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου

not
Be wholly vain and false.”

Since however there is no one nature
or state which is, or is thought to be,
the best for all, so neither do they all
pursue the same pleasure, but still
they all pursue pleasure. Nay, per-
haps unconsciously they are pursuing,

instinct.’ This is said, Eth. x. ii, 1, to ἀγαθοῦ.
have been the argument of Eudoxus : ἀλλ᾽ εἰλήφασι---οἴονται εἶναι] ‘ But
Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν | bodily pleasures have usurped the
wero εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα | possession of the name of pleasure,
αὐτῆς καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα. 76. § 4, | from men’s most often resorting to
Aristotle justifiestheargumentagainst | them, and from all men partaking of
objectors in much the same terms as | them; hence because these are the
those adopted in the text. only pleasures they know of, they
ἥν τινα λαοὶ πολλοί] 86. φημίζωσι. | think they are the only ones which
Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 761. Of. | exist.’ παραβάλλειν appears to mean
Eth. X. ii. 4: ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ᾽ | ‘lay themselves alongside,’ ‘apply
εἶναί φαμεν. themselves to,’

XIII.—XIV.] H@IKON [EYAHMION] VII. 248

Ul 9 4 ‘ 4 , 4 , «ς “

παραβαλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς Kai πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν " διὰ
\ , 2 ’ ? ’ , » 4

τὸ μονας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι,

4 A A Ψ 3 4 ς a 3 ‘ A e > @
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἢ ενεργεια, 7

9 Μ ~ eae, 4 9 ὔ ὔ " [2 ’
οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα - τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι
n 4. A # 4 9 ld 9 “ 4 ~ 9 ,
ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται

or » νι bs ¥ 5 9 A e ‘ »ἭἬ
ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ pnd
ς ‘ow ὃ b) Aon ’ ‘ 3 δὲ δὲ ς δί e f e a“
ἡδονή ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ Bios ὁ τοῦ
σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς
λέγουσιν ὅτι Enai γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ

7 φανερὸν δὲ---αὐτοῦ] ‘Finally, it is | I.v. 11: πότερον, εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ
plain that unless pleasure and the ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονάς rwas, ταύτας (ἑ.6. τὰς
action of life are a good, the happy | σωματικὰς) dec προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων
man cannot live pleasurably. For | μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν
why should he need pleasure if it be | --ἀπάὐλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπι-
not a good, and if it be possible for σκεχτέον.Ό Assuming that there are
him to live painfully ? (and it will be | higher pleasures, and that pleasure
possible), for pain will be neither evil | in the highest form is identical with
nor good, unless pleasure is; 80 why | happiness and the chief good, what is
should he avoid it? and hence it will | to be said of bodily pleasure? is it an
follow that the life of the good man | evil or a good? and why is it that
will not be more pleasurable than | men indulge in it so much? To this
that of the bad man, if his moments | twofold problem the answers are,
of action are not more pleasurable.’ | Bodily pleasure is in itself a good, as
This is a reductio ad absurdum of the | being the contrary of pain; but it is
position that pleasure is not a good. | only good under certain limits, as it
We shall be reduced to think: (1) that | admits of excess, and the exccss is
the happy man may live devoid of | bad (§ 2) There are various reasons
pleasure ; for nothing that is not good | why bodily pleasure recommends itself
can form part of happiness—or even | to human nature. (1) It expels the
he may live a life of pain, which is | sense of pain, and hence as an ano-
the contrary of pleasure ; (2) that the | dyne is universally desired from a
good man will have no more pleasure | physical law, for life is full of labour,
than the bad man, unless pleasure | and the ordinary functions of the
attaches to good acts, in which case | senses are laborious acts, only miti-
it will be part of the good. gated by custom, 88 4, 5. (2) The

period of youth especially craves after

XIV. Hitherto Eudemus has fol- | physical pleasure. (3) There are
lowed the lead of Aristotle, only in | special cases where it is in a way
one respect making a slight develop- | necessary, namely, where peculiarities
ment of his conclusions. He now | of temperament render men constitu-
discusses a subject untouched by Aris- | tionally depressed and in want of a
totle, but which he had proposed to | sort of relief, §§ 4, 6. (4) From
himself in his first book ; cf. Eth. Eud. | the mixture of the material with the

244

HOIKON (EYAHMIQN] VII.

[Cuap.

καλαί, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ai σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
oy ~ ὸ ~ 4 Α
2 διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί ; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν

’
ἐναντίον.

“A ῳ 4 Α e 9 n @ 4 A a
ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ ai ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ

1 3 , "5 . , ’ ,. a 4 ᾿
κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μή ἐστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή,

οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς "

4 ΄- ~ 9 (
ὅσων δ᾽ ἐστί, Kai τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν.

τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος

~ ὃ ᾽ 4 ς β r ’ 4 ἀλλ᾽ Ἵ A 4 ᾽ i
τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν, a οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαΐας
πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφρο-

δισίοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ.

9 [ 3 >» A “--οΟ td 9
ἐναντίως δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης " οὐ

γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως" οὐ yap ἐστι τῇ

ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία GAN’

βολήν.

“A

a , 4 e
4 τῷ διώκοντ. € Tyv νπερ-

᾿Επεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
“A ͵ “ι ᾿ , A Q , s
τοῦ ψεύδους" τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν
ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὃν

spiritual in us, we are unable to con-
tinue perpetually delighting in one,
pure pleasure, that is, the pleasure of
thought. God alone is capable of
this ; to us, through ‘a fault in our
nature (οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῇ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιεικήΞ),
change appears sweet, because lower
and contradictory elements in us re-
quire tobe allowed their due action, §8.

I τοῖς \éyoucw] i.e. that section of
the Platonists referred to above, ch.
xi. § 3: τοῖς δ᾽ ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, al δὲ
πολλαὶ φαῦλαι.

2 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ---- ὑπερβολήν»
‘Butright bodily pleasures admit οὗ ex-
ceas, and the bad man (is bad) in that
he seeks that excess, instead of seeking
such pleasures as are necessary. All
men find delight m meat, and wine,
and love, though not all according to
the proper law. And reversely all
men avoid pain (ἐναντίως δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς
λύπη). A man does not avoid the
excess of pain, but pain in general.
Pain is not contrary to the excess of
pleasure, except to him who pursues

the excess of pleasure.’ This argu-
ment goes toprove that bodily pleasure
is in itself good; only when in excess
is it evil. On the other hand all pain
is evil. Pleasure and pain then are
opposite terms, the one being good
and the other evil. To make the
doctrine of Speusippus (ch. xiii 1)
hold good, it would be necessary to
make pain and the excess of pleasure
opposite terms. But they are not eo,
except perhaps in the mind of the in-
temperate man, who thinks that the
only alternative is between excessive
pleasure and a painful sensation.

3 This section is not logically con-
tinuous with what immediately pre-
cedes. It no longer deals with the
opinion of the Platonists that bodily
pleasure is an evil, but takes up
another question already partly anti-
cipated, ch. xiii. § 6, namely, How is
the vulgar error to be accounted for
which gives 80 much prominence to
physical pleasure in the scale of plea-
sures ἢ

XIV. } HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII. 245

ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μάλλον᾽ ὥστε λεκτέον

ὃ ‘ la , e a e A 4 ᾿
(a τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι.
“A 4 a 4 Ψ > , 4 ὔ 4 ‘ 4
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην" καὶ διὰ τὰς 4
e 4 σι ’ ς ¥ 4 Υ 4 ς A
ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, THY ἡδονὴν
διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν.
σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ
παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ
ἡ ἡδονὴ διά δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης

φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις, ἦ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι

ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων.

ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι.
4 4 A Φ a

τελεουμένων: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν oovdaiat.

αἱ δ ἰατρεῖαι, ὅτι
e Oc 4

ai δὲ συμβαίνουσι

4 ’

ἔτι διώ-

κονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμέ-

4 πρῶτον---φαίνεσθαι) ‘The first
reason is that it drives out pain.
When overwhelmed with pain, as a
remedy men seek excessive pleasure,
and in short bodily pleasure. Now
remedies are naturally violent, and
they are adopted because they seem
to match (παρὰ) their opposites.’ On
the opinion that remedies are the
opposites of the diseases to be cured,
cf, Eth, τι. iii. 4.

καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ----σπουδαῖαι] ‘It
is on account of these two causes, then,
that pleasure is thought not to be a
good ; first, that some pleasures, as we
have said before (ch. Vv. 1.), are the ac-
tions of adepraved nature, whether con-
genital, like that of a beast, or acquired,
like that of depraved men ; secondly,
that other pleasures are remedies, im-
plying imperfection, since a normal
condition (ἔχειν) is better than the
process of arriving at that condition,
and some pleasures take place while
we are arriving at a complete state of
being, hence they are only inferentially

and not directly (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς) |

good.’ This paragraph reverts paren-
thetically to the opinion of the Pla-
tonists.

5-6 ἔτι διώκονται --- γίνονται)] The
argument is now resumed from the
sentence ending φαίνεσθαι. ‘ Another
reason why physical pleasure is sought
is its comparatively coarse and violent
character, which suits those who require
strong excitement. And indeed such
men even create in themselves certain
artificial thirsts for pleasure. If this
does not burt their health, it is no
harm. Such men are incapable of en-
joying the purer and simpler pleasures,
and a neutral state of the sensations
is to many painful by a law of nature.
For the living creature ever travails,
as the physiological books testify,
telling us that the acts of seeing and
hearing are laborious, only that we
are accustomed to them (so they say).
So also the young, in the first place,
owing to the principle of growth in
them, are like those who are intoxi-
cated, and youth is full of pleasure.
And again those of bilious nature are
ever in need of an anodyne. Their
body is continually fretted by reason
of their temperament, and they are
ever in vehement desire. Now pleasure,
be it the opposite of a given pain, or

| be it what it may, provided it be strong

246 HOIKON (EYAHMIOQN] VIL {Cap.

νων χαίρειν" αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς divas τινὰς παρασκευά-

Ψ 4 ” 9 a 9 ‘ @ a

Coucw, ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ

βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ed’ οἷς

χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυτηρὸν διὰ τὴν

φύσιν: ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῴον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ

λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες

εἶναι λυπηρόν" ἀλλ’ ἤδη συνήθεις φασίν.

e ῇ 3 9 4 ~ ὔ AQ a cd [2 e

6 ὁμοίως δ᾽' ev μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ

9 ὔ φ
ἐσμέν, ὡς
4 a , 4 es e 4 e 4
οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ov ἡ νεότης. of δὲ μελαγ-
QA 4 γ 4 4 oe 4 J‘ 4 a 4 ΄--
χολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας" καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα
ἢ δῳ a 4 ἴω AQ 9 A 9 9 ὔ
δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει
σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ᾽ ἐναντία καὶ
ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἣ ἰσχυρά" καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ

7 φαῦλοι γίνονται, αἱ δ᾽ ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερ-

enough, drives out that pain. And
hence persons of the bilious tempera-
ment become intemperate and vicious.’
This passage gives two reasons to
explain why 8 neutral state of the
sensations is distasteful, first a general
reason : that the laborious action of
the human faculties calls for allevia-
tion ; second, a special reason : that
certain periods of life and certain tem-
peraments produce a craving after
physical indulgence.

δίψας rwds] Fritzache, after the
Scholiast, understands this literally,
that some men make themselves
thirsty to enjoy the pleasure of
drinking. But the use of the plural
seems to indicate that we should
rather follow the Paraphrast and the
majority of the commentators in un-
derstanding it generally of artificial
desires for pleasure, ἐπισκενασταὶ
ἐπιθυμίαι, as the Paraphrast calls
them.

ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἐν μὲν κιτ.λ}] The best
commentary on this passage will be
found in Aristotle's Problems, bk. xxx.
ch. i., where a frequent comparison is
made between the effects of wine,

youth, and the melancholy (or bilious)
temperament, in producing desire. Cf.
§ 5: ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς μάλιστα φαί-
νεται παρασκευάζειν τοιούτους οἵους
λέγομεν τοὺς μελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι. 810:
καὶ ὁ οἶνος δὲ πνευματώδης τὴν δύναμι.
διὸ δή ἐστι τὴν φύσιν ὅμοια ὅ τε olvos
καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις, κιτιλ, Cf. Prob. 1v. χχχ.:
διὰ τί ἀφροδισιαστικοὶ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ;
ἣ ὅτι πγευματώδεις, κτλ. The Scho-
liast gives a vapid explanation of the
words ὥσπερ οἱ olvwp évoe in the pas-
sage before us. Evidently, all that is
meant is to compare the desires of
youth with those of drunkenness and
of the melancholy temperament. We
may compare the lines of Goethe :

‘Trunken miissen wir alle sein ;
Jugend ist Trunkenheit obne Wein.’

The principle of αὔξησις in youth is
represented as producing the same
results as the humours (χυμὸς ὁ μελαγΎ-
χολικός---ἡ THs μελαίνης χολῆς κρᾶσι:)
in the bilious temperament.

7-8 al δ' ἄνευ λυπῶ»--- ἐπιεικής}
‘ The pleasures unpreceded by pain do
not admit of excess, they are essen-
tially and not accidentally pleasures.

XIV.] HOIKON [EYAHMION] VIL. 247

βολήν. αὗται de αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμ-
’ s 4
βεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα"
ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς
Ud ~ a
πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι" φύσει δ᾽ ἡδέα, ἃ
ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιάσδε φύσεως. οὐκ ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἡδὺ 8
τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ᾽
7 «a , \ @& A ? Ν 5 A ,
ἐνεῖναί Tt Kat ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον
td σι “ φ ἢ) ’ Q t @ > 9 [4
πραττη; Τοῦτο τῇ ετέρᾳ Φύσει παρα φύσιν, ὅταν ὃ ἰσάζη,
» Xr 4 ὃ a ὕθ᾽ OU Q Ld 9 4 4 e
οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ᾽ ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον. ἐπεὶ εἴ TOV ἡ
a e ~ »# 9 4 e 9 =A ζω eae c 4 e
φύσις ἁπλῇ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πράξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ
θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν: οὐ γὰρ μόνον
, tA 9 > @0 9 4 4 9 4 φ a
κινήσεως ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλα καὶ ακινησίας, Kat ἡδονὴ
4 9 ἢ 9 ‘ a 3 , 4 4 ,
μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ev κινήσε. μεταβολὴ de πάντων
γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά" ὥσπερ
Q 4 θ 4 f € ’ 4 e a e
yap ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονησός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεο-
’ »- 4 . e A 8 » ’
μένη μεταβολῆς" ov yap ἁπλῆ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιεικής.
t Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ 9

By the accidental pleasures, I mean
such as are of the nature of a remedy.
Because, when it happens that we
are relieved, owing to some operation
of that part in us which continues
sound, the result is a sensation of
pleasure. By the natural pleasures,
I mean those which produce the
action of any given nature. The
same thing is never continuously
pleasant to us, because our nature
is not simple, but there is in us a
second element, by reason of which
we are destructible. Thus, when the
one element is in action, it thwarts
the tendencies of the second element.
And when the two elements are
balanced, the result appears neither
painful nor pleasant. If there is any
being whose nature is simple, the
same mode of action will be con-
tinuously and in the highest degree οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ᾽ 7 θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ
pleasurable to him. Hence God ὑπάρχει “ ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ
enjoys everlastingly one pure plea- | συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς
sure. For there is a function not | κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.

only of motion, but of rest ; and plea-
sure consists rather in tranquillity
than in motion. “Change,” as the
poet says, “is the sweetest of all
things,” on account of a certain fault
in our nature. The bad man is fond
of change, and of the same char-
acter is the nature which requires
change; it is not simple or good.’
In the above passage we see 8 re-
production, and to some extent a
carrying out, of Aristotle’s doctrines
in the tenth Book of the Ethics, cf.
especially ch. iv. 9: Πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς
συνεχῶς ἤδεται ; ἣ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ
τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.
On the comparison between the com-
pound nature of man and the purely
divine nature of God, cf. ch. vii. 8: ὁ
δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ᾽
ἄνθρωπον " οὐ γὰρ 7 ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν

ee ͵᾽. . ...-. ϑῸθσὉ Ὡς. ΄ὃὖὮἝὮἝὯ-..-.- .:ἧὥὩ Ὑἧ Κ΄“ ————— ἘΠΕ ΨΟΘΟΣ ἘΠΕ ΘΘΕΝΒΕΥΝΟΕΣ ἩΘΟΒΘΟΝΟΕΣ ΤΤΟΝΕΣ τος ΑΒΕ ΜΟΣ, ΟΙΕΕΣΝΡΟΘΟ ΙΣΤ ΟΣ τσ τ,

248

HOIKON [EYAHMION] VII.

[(Cuar. XIV.

e ~ 4 ἢὌ »” 4 | ΜΨ, Q ~ a 4

ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μεν
“~ A A ῇ a 4 A ’

ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά" λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας

ἐροῦμεν.

It is to be remarked that the pre-
sent Book, which commences with a
mention of θεία ἀρετή, or the opera-
tion of reason unalloyed by passion,
ends with a mention of θεία ἡδονή,
which is the consciousness of the
same,

+ λοιπὸν --- ἐροῦμεν] These words,
which have caused, by their occur-
rence here, an obvious literary con-
fusion in the Nicomachean Ethics (see
Vol. I. Essay I. p. 56), are not even
suitable to the Eudemian treatise.
The clause is evidently an attempt to
suin up and give unity to the pre-
ceding book, but it can hardly have
been written by the author of the
book. To say εἴρηται ri ἕκαστον καὶ
πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ

κακὰ, is an inadequate and incorrect
description of the discussions on Con-
tinence and Incontinence (cf. x. 5)
and on Pleasure and Pain, With re-
gard to the latter, it has been assumed
(xiii, 1) that all Pain is an evil, and
it has been argued (xiii. 2-7) that Plea-
sure, as being ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος, is
identical with the chief Good. We
trace, then, the work of a somewhat
shallow and hasty editor. In the
last chapter of Ath. Eud. it is said xa
περὶ ἡδονῆς δ᾽ εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς
ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα καὲ
καλά, καὶ τὰ [re] ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα,
which seemsto refer generally to chap-
ters xii. and xiii of this book. The
editor may have had that passage be-
fore him.

PLAN OF BOOKS VIII.—IX.

oma GOO

RISTOTLE’S treatise on Friendship, here contained, is quite
continuous. The division of it into two books is merely arti-
ficial, There is really no break between the end of Book VIII.
and the beginning of Book IX. The words ssg/ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐσὶ
τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω (VIII. xiv. 4) havé been introduced, whether by
the Authors or by an Editor's hand, to create a division and to
constitute two books conformable in length to the other books of
the Ethics.

The use of the phrase ἐν ἀρχῇ (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, CX. iii.
. 1), in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., has led some
persons to suppose that this was originally an independent treatise.
But nothing is more clear than that it was written to form a part
of Aristotle work on Ethics, Besides general expressions of the
author’s purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view
(see VIII. i. 7, LX. ii. 2), we find direct quotations of, or references
to, the first books of the Nicomachean Ethics. (Compare IX. ix. 5
with Eth. Nic. I. vii. 14; and I. viii. 13, and IX. iv. 2, with Eth.
Nic. III. iv. 5.)

The present treatise has a close connection with the first three
books of the Nicomachean Ethics, But it is remarkable that it has
no connection with Books V. VI. VII. Friendship is here treated
in relation to Happiness and in relation to Justice. What is said of
Happiness forms the complement to Eth. Nic. Book I., but what is
said of Justice has no reference to Eth. Nic. Book V.; rather it
appears written tentatively, probably before the Politics of Aristotle,
from which the theories of Eth. Nic. Book V. seem to have been
derived. (See VIII. vi. 6, VIIL vii. 2-3, VIII. ix., x., IX. i. 1-2.)

Again, it is equally striking that there is no reference to Book

VII. in the parts of this treatise where the phenomena of vice are
VOL. 11. It

250 PLAN OF BOOKS VIIT.—IX.

discussed (see ΙΧ, iv. 8-9, IX. viii. 6). Indeed the views taken
here are inconsistent with those of Book VII., which contain a
more rigid analysis. (Compare IX. iv. 8 with VII. vii. 1.)

The style of these two Books is certainly unlike that of Books
V. VI. VIL, while it bears a close similarity with that of Eth. Nic.
- I. and X. Not one of the ‘ Eudemian’ forms of expression is to
be found here.

The treatise on Friendship may be roughly divided into three
parts :-—

I. On the different kinds of Friendship, and on the nature of
the highest and truest type. VIII. i—viii.

II. On the connection of Friendship with Justice, (1) as arising
(with certain exceptions, see c. xii.) out of political relationships,
or coinciding with them ; (2) as implying obligations to be repaid.
ΨΗΙ. ix.—IX. iii.

III. On other questions connected with the nature of Friend-
ship, and especially on its relation to Happiness. IX. iv.—xii.

Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the
writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced.
(Thus compare IX. vi. with VIIL i. 4; ΙΧ, x. with VIII i. 5; and
VIII. vi. 2-3, VIII. viii. 7 with VIIL i. 6.)

At the same time we sce what a powerful instrument was the
Aristotelian analysis for producing clearness of view. By an
analysis of the objects of liking (rd φιλητόν, VIII. ii. 1), Aristotle
clears away all the vagueness which the Lysis of Plato had left
around the nature of Friendship. By an application of his own
philosophical form ἐνέργεια (IX. vii. 4-6, IX. ix. 5-6, TX. xii. 1),
he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind
of Friendship in relation to human happiness.

In these Books there is no allusion to the sentimental relation-
ship, in vogue among the Dorians from the earliest ages, between a
warrior and his squire (the εὐσανήλης and ἀΐτης, or ‘inbreather’ and
‘listener’). All here is broadly human. And yet the idea of
‘Friendship ’ is purely Greek. The Romans imitated it. But in
modern times it has been much superseded by the idea of sym-
pathetic marriage. Christianity ignores Friendship ; and theoreti-
cally it now exists only 88 8, temporary advantage for the young.

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII.

META δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἕποιτ᾽ ἂν διελθεῖν: ἔστι
4 9 A “~

yap ἀρετή τις ἢ mer’ ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ᾽ ἀναγκαιότατον
εἰς τὸν βίον" ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ
λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα' καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ
δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ’ εἶναι χρεία"
-ῇ ‘ » ΄- ἢ) 3 , 3 ἤ 4
ti γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας αφαιρεθείσης evep-
γεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς
φίλους 5 ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σώζοιτ᾽ ἄνευ φίλων ;
id ‘\ x , , 9 αλ ’ 4 [
ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε2
καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν
ἢ A \ a ’ ἊΣ 4 . 9 ’ 4
εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ
πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως
δ ἀσθένειαν βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ᾽ ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς
πράξεις"

σύν τ; δύ᾽ ἐρχομένω᾽

I. The discussion of Friendship is
justified here (analogously to the way
in which the discussion of the volun-
tary is justified, £th. m1. i. 1-2), first,
on the ground of its connection with
virtue, secondly, on the ground that it
is @ means to happiness (ἀναγκαιότα-
rov) in all conditions of life. As a
commencement of the discussion, Aris-
totle mentions the difficulties raised
on the subject in the Lysis of Plato:
Does friendship depend on similarity
or on contrast? Can bad men be
friends to each other? and he adds
another : Is there only one species of
friendship, or are there more? Aris-
totle by his own analysis of the like-
able (τὸ φιλητόν) immediately cute
straight through these difficulties,

— ee ..

1 ἀρετή ris ἢ per’ ἀρετῆς] We
have here no reference to that har-
monious manner in society, the mean
between flattery and moroseness,
which is included in the list of
the virtues (Zh. 11. vii. 13) under
the name of φιλία, but is afterwards
said to be nameless (Eth. rv. vi. 4)
and to be devoid of the feeling of
affection.

τί yap ὄφελο:---φίλου:] ‘For what
is the use of that sort of abundance,
if one is deprived of the power of
doing good, which is exercised most
especially, and in its most praise-
worthy form, towards friends ?’

2 σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω] The saying
of Diomede when about to penetrate
the Trojan camp, 7}. Χ, 224:

252 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. [CHap.

A ‘ ΄- A ἴα ’ , 3 kd
3καὶ yup νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει T ἐνυ-
4 , “ 4
mapxew ἔοικε πρὸς TO γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι Kat
πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
3 4 νι,» » ‘ “ , a , be
ἀλλα καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι Kat τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ

- , a 9

τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
”~ # a 9
ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐν
a , e 4 A Ψ ” 4 ? 8
ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ xat
4 φίλον.

νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην᾽

a
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Tas πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ

n~ > 2 a

ἡ yap ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ
U " 87 .' 4 , Ξ i ’

parior’ ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μαλιστα

ξ 4 ~ o

ἐξελαύνουσιν. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης,

4 >] ” ὃ ’ , Q “σι ὃ Π +

δίκαιοι δ᾽ ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν ὀικαίων τὸ

ς μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

4 “-

ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν' τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε

σι ~ ~ > c 4 a

πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἕν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἔνιοι τοὺς

αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

4 ’ 4 ar νΡ̓
ov μονον δ᾽ αναγΎκαιον EO TLV

6 δΔιαμφισβητεῖται de περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν

~~ ee SO er ee

σύν τε δυ᾽ ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ
ἐνόησεν,

ὅππως κέρδος ἔῃ" μοῦνος δ᾽ εἴπερ τε
γοήσῃ,

ἀλλά τε οἱ βράσσων τε γόος, λεπτὴ δέ
TE μῆτις.

The words here quoted had become
proverbial. Cf. Plato, Alczb. τι, 140 A;
Protag. 348 ©.

3 τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι) This word is ap-
plied here to brutes as well as men.
In the same sense ὁμογενέσιν is used,
Eth. Eud. vil. v. 3, and συγγενῆ, Ar.
Rhet. 1, xi. 25.

ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις---φίλον} ‘ And in tra-
velling too one may see how near and
dear every man is to man,’ {.6. one
may see this both as a matter of gene-
ral observation, and as oneself meet-
ing with kindness and hospitality.

4 καὶ οἱ νομοθέται] Cf. the speech
of Lysias in Platos Phedrus.

καὶ τῶν δικαίων---δοκεῖ] ‘And the

height of justice appears to be of the
nature of friendship.’ Under the
words τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα equity
(τὸ éxcecxés) appears to be meant. Cf.
Eth. v. x. 6-8.

5 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν] This is repeating
in other words that friendship is ἀρετή
τις. Thedistinction between ἀναγκαῖον
and καλόν is common in Aristotle, and
the one term suggests the other. Cf.
Eth, ix. xi. 1.

% τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ] ‘To have
many friends is commonly thought to
be something beautiful.’ This popular
opinion is considerably qualified on
further examination: cf. Eth, ΙΧ. x. 6.

καὶ ἔνιοι---φίλους:] § And some think
that the term “good friend ” is con-
vertible with that of “good man.”’
Cf. a similar form of expression, Eth.
V. li. IL: οὐ γὰρ lows ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ'

| ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.

6 διαμφισβητεῖται) The questions
mentioned here are raised in the Lysis

I.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 253

a ’ 6 a 9 4 ‘\ A

yap ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους
ο A 4 ld φ 4 [2 A Ἁ
φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ κολοιὸν
A ~ 9 > ’ a
ποτὶ κολοιόν, Kai ὅσα τοιαῦτα " of δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς

4 ~ 9 Ἁ >
πάντας τοὺς Towvrovs αλλήλοις φασιν εἶναι.

‘ ,
Και Tepe
9 ~
αντῶν

τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον,
φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ἕηραν-
σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν
᾿ὔ a a e ἤ Α 4 0 4 A 9
ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ ᾿Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ
a ’ ἢ ε ; 4 ’ j
τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πᾶαντα κατ
ἔριν γίνεσθαι" ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ ᾿Εμπε-

δοκλῆς᾽ τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι.

Εὐριπίδης μὲν
θεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ

τὰ μὲν οὗν 7
a “-ς 4 ’ 4 , 9 4 e a ~
φυσιὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς
? ’ Υ͂ 9 4 A 9 4 Ὶ > +
παρούσης σκέψεως)" ὅσα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει
εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ᾽ ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον
[4 9 ἴων 0 ’ a 4 φΦ᾿ Α
πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ olov τε μοχθηροὺς

of Plato, pp. 214-215. (214 A) Λέγουσι
δὲ (οἱ ποιηταί) πως ταῦτα, ws ἐγῴῷμαι,
ὡδί"

αἰεί τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον

καὶ ποιεῖ γρώριμορ. . . οὐκοῦν καὶ
τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν
ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτ᾽ αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι
τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον
εἶναι ; εἰσὶ δέ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεως
τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γρά-
φοντες. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, . . (215 ©)
Ἤδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ
ἄρτι ἀναμιμνήσκομαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον
τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
πολεμιώτατοι εἶεν" καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Halo-
δον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα. λέγων ὡς ἄρα
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς

dod

καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ.

καὶ τἄλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγ-
καῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιότατα πρὸς
ἄλληλα φθόνον τε καὶ φιλονεικίας καὶ
ἔχθρας ἐμπίπλασθαι, τὰ δ' ἀνομοιότατα
φιλίας. .. τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ
ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐπιθυ-
μεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἕκαστον, ἀλλ’ οὐ

τοῦ ὁμοίου" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ
δὲ ψνχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος,
τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πλη-
ρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλῆρες δὲ κενώσεως.
Which of the two views is true is not
decided in the Zysis, where, however,
it is laid down that friendship cannot
consist in pure contrariety.

καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν--- φυσικώτερον] ‘And
about these very questions some in-
quire more deeply and physically,’
te. not limiting their view to the
phenomena of friendship itself, but
bringing in the analogies of the whole
of nature. Aristotle sets aside such
speculations as not belonging to ethics ;
he remarks parenthetically below (Eth.
VIIL viii. 7), that the contrary in na-
ture does not desire its extreme con-
trary, but the mean.

Εὐριπίδη) The verses occur in a
fragment of an uncertain play, which
is preserved by Athenzeus, XIII. Ὁ. 599.

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον») ‘The oppos-
ing conduces,’ a play on words char-
acteristic of the oracular style of
Heraclitus,

ἡ ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας]

254 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIIL. [Cuar.

ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ev εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν
A c e 4 4 a 97 4 9 a 4
ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν yap ν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ
μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ "
’ “ a A 4 ~ q a οὔ ~
δέχεται yap TO μᾶλλον καὶ TO ἧττον καὶ Ta ἕτερα TH
,Ὁ 4 9 64 3 >, «A # .
εἴδει. Τεἴρηται δ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
, ® U 4 49 “αἱ 4 A
2 Taya 3 ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος
τοῦ φιλητοῦ- δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλη-
τόν, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. δόξειε δ' ἂν
χρήσιμον εἶναι dr οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε
2 φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον
οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν 4 τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν ; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ
4 ἢ ” e c Α Ἁ Ἁ ‘ eQes e A a
ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ Kai περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ de TO
e ~ 9 Ἁ a 4 A e aA 4 9
αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγα-
θὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ. φιλεῖ δ᾽ ἕκαστος οὐ
τὸ ὃν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ᾽ οὐδέν "

Go

ἔσται yap τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ᾽ ὄντων δι᾽ ἃ

Ῥ. 214 Ὁ: τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ws ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.
ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιοντῷ | As there is no place in the διλίοβ
ὁμοίῳ φίλον λόγοντες, ws ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ | where Aristotle has discussed this
ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτ᾽ | logical question before, a Scholiast
ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῴ οὐδέποτε cis ἀληθῆ | says with regard to the last words
φιλίαν ἔρχεται. of the paragraph : ἔοικε δὲ εἰρῇσθαι ἐν
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὃν οἰόμενοι κ.τ.λ.} ‘For | τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων.
they who think that there is only one | But most probably the words εἴρηται
species of friendship, because it admits | δ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν are the interpolation of
of degrees, trust to an insufficient | acopyist, who was perhaps thinking
proof. For things also that differ in | vaguely of Eth: tt. viii. 5, to which the
species admit of degrees. But we | commentators generally refer. These
have spoken about them before.’ Aris- | words spoil the grammar of the sen-
totle immediately proceeds to show | tence, as περὶ αὐτῶν is used in the
that there are three distinct species | next line with a different reference.
of friendship, in accordance with the
three objects of liking. He also says
that the friendships for pleasure or
profit are less friendships than that
for the good (ἧττόν εἰσιν, VII. vi. 7).
All three kinds admit of the idea
(λόγος) of friendship; thus they agree
in genus and are comparable in point
of degree. Cf. Ar. Categ. viii. 36:
ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφό-

II. 2 πότερον οὖν---αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν»)
Aristotle here guards himself against
the appearance of having admitted
the Platonic theory, that the absolute
good is always the object of human
desire. Cf. Eth. 11 iv. 1, and note.

ἔσται γὰρ--- φαινόμενον) ‘For in that
case the object of liking will be an

This question is started in the Lysis, | repa τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὗ
apparent and not an absolute object.’

I{.—IT. | HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 255

φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται
φιλία: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων
4 ~ ~ “ ” “~ Ψ 4 ,
ἀγαθοῦ: γελοῖον yap ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά-
ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχη. τῷ
δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, τοὺς
δὲ , Ψ 4 ν ww a 4Ἁ 4
ε βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ
ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου γίγνηται" εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντι-
πεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι, ἣ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν" 4
Q ’ 9 a ? 4 ς ’ € ,
πολλοὶ yap εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ εωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβανουσι
δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἧ χρησίμους" τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν κἂν ἐκείνων
μ zs Φ a «
τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. εὗνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται
ἀλλήλοις. φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς
ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι
9 a a 4 9W “~ 9 ἢ)
τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δὲ ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.
Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει" καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα 3
καὶ ai φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς
“- [κτ4 [4 4 9 ὔ 4 U
φιλητοῖς" καθ᾽ ἕκαστον yap ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις ov λανθα-
νουσα. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλή-
tA ae ~ e 4 R s} 4 ,
λοις Tavry ἢ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φι-
λοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ γίγνεταί
e , 4 “ ς 9 e
ὁμοίως δὲ Kat of δι’ ἡδο-
vive οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέ-
οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον

τι αὐτοῖς παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν.

λους, GAN’ ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὑτοῖς.
A a A 4 σι 4 ‘ 4 4 ς +] e 4
φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι’ ἡδονὴν

N

3 τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων] Suggested by the
Lysis of Plato, p. 212 D, where olvos
is mentioned as an object of liking:
οὐδ᾽ dpa φίλιπποί εἰσιν, obs dy οἱ ἵπποι
μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτνγες, οὐδ᾽
αὖ φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι x.7.X.

4 ἣ---τοῦτον] ‘ Or must we add the
proviso that (this good feeling) must
not be unknown? For many are
kindly disposed to men whom they
have never seen, but whom they sup-
pose to be good or useful, and one of
t hese latter might reciprocate the same
feeling.’ τοῦτον, being substituted for
the plural πολλοί, gives definiteness.

Cf. ix. i. 4: τούτοις καὶ προσέχει,
κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

III. 1 ταύτῃ ἣ φιλοῦσι] ‘ Accord-
ing to the particular mode of their
friendship,’ The differences of mode
are specified afterwards.

οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσι»] ‘Do not
love each other for their very selves.’
This phrase καθ' αὑτοὺς is rather ἃ
logical formula than an ordinary
grammatical combination. It seems
to have arisen from καθ᾽ αὑτό, ‘the
absolute.’ Cf. vur1. iii. 7, and the use
of δι' αὑτούς, vin. iv, 6, 1x. i. 7.

Ge

wm

256 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. (Cap.

διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ἧ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί
εἰσιν: οὐ yap 9 ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτη
φιλεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ 7 πορίζουσιν of μὲν ἀγαθόν τι of δ' ἡδονήν.
90 ἢ a e a , 59 4 ’ ς Ae ?

εὐδιάλντοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων"
ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι wot, παύονται φιλοῦντες.
τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλοτε ἀλλο γίγνεται.
ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δ ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία,
ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πρεσ-

a? e a a [2 ld 3 ‘ 4 eQs e
Buras ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ
τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν
9 “A 4 4 @ A 4 ’ 9 ᾽’
ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ'
οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ’ ἀλλήλων: ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ᾽
» 8 4 o 9c 4 a, ~~ 4 ς [ φ"
εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς" οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν

4. ἢ > , A A ’ 4 eR a %49 Φ
μή ὠφελιμοι ὦσιν" ext τοσοῦτον yap εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ep’ ὅσον
ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν
τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δὲ ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ" κατὰ

’ ᾿ a A N ’ , Y «τι eam
πάθος yap οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς
καὶ τὸ παρόν" τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα
γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίγνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται"
ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης
δ “-- - ¢€ , a 9 A 4 e , a Ἁ
ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ᾽ οἱ νέοι" κατὰ

ὔ a a 9 ς ἢ Α A “~ 9 “- a
πάθος yap καὶ δὲ ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς" διόπερ
φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας
μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλον-
ται" γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

Τελεία δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
ὁμοίων: οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις
H ἀγαθοί" ἀγαθοὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ καθ᾽ αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι
τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι. δὲ
αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός"

2 καὶ οὐχ F ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ | Aristotle, the chief blessing of friend-
ἡ χρήσιμος ἣ ἡδύς) The reading surely , ship. Cf. rx. ix. 10: εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ
should be ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν, ‘not by τὸ εἶναι αἱρετὸν ἐστι καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν
reason of the existence of the person | τῇ φύσει ὃν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ
who is loved, but by reason of his | καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλον ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος

being useful or pleasant.’ The personal | τῶν αἱρετῶν ἂν εἴη.
existence of the friend is, according to

111. ΗΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION VIII. 267

διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ dow, ἡ δ᾽
ἀρετὴ μόνιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ
τῷ φίλῳ οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις
ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς" καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ
ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις " ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἡδονήν εἰσιν
αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ
9 4 A @ e a, 4 4 9 4
αὐταὶ ἣ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη de φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως 7
φ ῇ ’ a 9 7. “ἡ ’ 9 @ a ἢ a
ἐστίν" συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ
πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία dt’ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἧ δι᾽ ἡδονήν, 7.
e “ A “A ~ ‘4 4 « [4 ’ ὔ 4
ἀπλωὼς ἢ τῳ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ᾽ ἡμοιότητα τινα" ταύτη δὲ

ὑπάρχειν.

« λδ[ψιἐ͵͵Με rr ‘ 9 ’ ’ e , ’ Q Ψ
πανθ᾽ ὕπαρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ᾽ αὑτούς - ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοια
a 4 , fd e ~ 9 A a e 4 e ~ 9 8
καὶ τὰ λοιπά, TO Te ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν,

Υ 4 ~ a 4 a
μάλιστα de ταῦτα φιλητα, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία
tf
ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς 8
a ἴω a
τοιαύτας εἶναι" ὀλίγοι yap of τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται
χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας" κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν

6 ἑκάστῳ γὰρ---ὅμοιαι) ‘For to ταύτῃ δὲ---τὰ λοιπά] ‘But this

every man his own actions and those
similar to them are pleasurable, and
the actions of the good are (to the
good ) identical (with their own actions)
or similar.’ The friend being alter
ego, the delight of friendship is that it
gives an increased sense of existence.

7 συνάπτει!) Neuter, as in VIII. iv.
5: οὐ rdw 3’ αὗται συνάπτουσιν.

πἄἂσα yap—rwa] ‘ For every friend-
ship is for goud or for pleasure ; either
absolute, or else relative to him who
feels the friendship, and only bearing
a certain resemblance to the absolutely
good or pleasurable.’ The comma
should surely be omitted after ry
φιλοῦντι. Aristotle is not here saying
(as the commentators fancy) that every
friendship implies similarity, but
that every friendship, whether the
genuine type or one of the secondary
and reflected species, aims at either
good or pleasure. This is made clear
by the next chapter, § 4: πρώτως μὲν
καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί,
τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς Kad’ ὁμοιότητα.

VOL. Il.

friendship has all the specified quali-
ties essentially belonging to the per-
sons who feel it (καθ᾽ abro’s)—(I say
essentially), for even the other kinds
of friendship are resemblances of this
(the perfect kind).’ This passage has
vexed the commentators. Zell thinks
that ὅμοια may be referred to xaé’
ὁμοιότητά rwa in the previous sen-
tence (which he mistakes), and ex-
plains, ‘In this kind of friendship
there is similarity and all the other
requisite qualities.’ But we surely
then should have expected τὰ ὅμοια,
Cardwell, following Giphanius, Zwin-
ger, and the Scholiast, reads ταύτῃ
γὰρ ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ Awd. In this
kind of friendship men are similar,
εἰ cetera.’ Stahr doubts the genu-
ineness of the entire section. The
common reading, as above explained,
seems borne out by the opening of the
next chapter, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα
ταύτης ἔχει. Cf. νη, vi. 7. Ὅμοια
here is in opposition to ταύτῃ--- καθ᾽
αὑτούς.
KK

i]

258 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. [Cuap.
εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι "
οὐδ᾽ ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ᾽ εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν
δὲ

ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται

ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ
μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ᾽
ἴσασιν " βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία
3

δ᾽ οὔ.

λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ

αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν Χρόνον. καὶ κατὰ τὰ

Ψ , » e ’ Ψ a ΒΞ ᾿ εν»
ὅμοια ἐκατέρῳ παρ᾽ ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρ-
χειν"
Ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει" καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
e a 9 ’ ες A 8 e a a ’ a
ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 4 διὰ TO χρήσιμον " Kat
“ξ΄
γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τού-
τοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνηται παρ᾽
ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ
~ “~ a 4 ~
τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ
4 ’ 4 8 » 8 a 9 ‘ a δ a 4 ἢ ¢ 4
ἐρωμένῳ " οὐ yup emt τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, aAX ὁ μεν
ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ" λη-
, , A ν , 7 se ’ , a 4 ‘
γούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει" τῷ μὲν γὰρ
9 wy « .“ e Ν ~ i] 9 0 e ‘
οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία.
λοὶ δ᾽ αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρ-
ξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες.

πολ-

4
of δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλατ-
’ 9 a A r 9 a 9 ~ A 9 4 eo
τόμενοι ἀλλα TO χρήσιμον Ev τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον
A ’ ες δὲ ὃ Ν 3 ’ ”
φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. of δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι
ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται"
φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς.
τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις,

οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἧσαν
δι ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ

A 9 ~ A a e ~ 9 e 8
καὶ επιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον οποιφουν, δ αὑτοὺς

8 τοὺς λεγομένους ddas] ‘The salt
of the proverb ;’ cf. Eth. Εωάὰ. vit. ii.
35 : διὸ els παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμ.-
νος τῶν ἁλῶν. Cicero, Lelius, ch. xix.:
‘ Verumque illud est quod dicitur, mul-
tos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut
amicitie munus expletum sit.’

ob3’ ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ.---φίλου:} ‘ Nor
indeed can they be satisfied that they
are friends at all.’ Cf. vimr. v. 3: ol
3 ἀποδέχομενοι ἀλλήλους. ΙΧ. iii, 3:

ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀποδέχηται ws ἀγαθόν. Xen.
Mem. τν. i. τ : ἀποδέχεσθαι Σωκράτην.

9 εἰ μὴ---ἴσασι») ‘Unless they are
likeable (by one another), and are
assured of this,’

IV. 2 καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον--- διαμένουσι)
‘Are both friends in ἃ less degree
and are (less) abiding.’

καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιφοῦν] ‘ And he who
is neither goud nor bad may be a friend

III.—IV. |] HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 259

de δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς" of γὰρ κακοὶ ov χαίρουσιν
ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μή τις ὠφέλεια γίγνοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν 3
ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιαβλητός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ
πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν δεδοκι-
μασμένον. καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ᾽ ἂν
ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται.

eos ay) ’ ‘ ᾿Ξ Μ
ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι.

4 ~ 4
ἀδικῆσαι, Kal
3 4
εν δὲ

> ‘ A ς
ETT EL yap ot

ταῖς
ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρή- 4
σιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς
‘ Ψ ~ , 4 A 9 e 4
πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι’ ἡδονὴν
ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν
δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας
πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ
? ? 4 4 8 e , > ‘ 9 ,
ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα" ἢ yap ἀγαθὸν τι
a Ψ ἢ) 4 4 A «ὍΔ 9 A a
καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτη φίλοι" καὶ yap τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς
φιληδέσιν.

οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ" οὐ γὰρ

wn

9 e 3 a 4 9A t
ov πάνυ 6 αὗται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται

’ ’ Ά Y ’
Tayvu συνδυαζεται TA Kata συμβεβηκός.

4 ~ 4
εἰς Ταῦτα δὲ

τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται

either to the good or to the bad, or
to him who is neither one nor the
other. For the word μηδέτερος to
express a neutral or intermediate
state, cf. Eth, vit. xiv. 5 : τὸ μηδέτερον,
‘that which is neither pleasure nor
pain.’

3 καὶ μόνη Sé—ylyecPac] ‘ And in
. Bhort, the friendship of the good is
alone incapable of being disturbed by
accusations. For it is not easy (for
the good) to believe any person about
δι man whom they have long proved.
And the sayings about “having faith,”
and that (the friend) “never could
wrong one,” and all the other points
which are demanded in ideal friend-
ship, are realised in the friendship of
the good. But in the other kinds
nothing prevents disturbances from
accusations (τὰ τοιαῦτα) arising.’ Δια-
βάλλειν is ‘to set two people by the
ears.’ Cf. Plato, Repub. p. 498 co:

μὴ διάβαλλε ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι
φίλους γεγονύτας.

49 γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ
ὠΐξλοι] ‘For so far as (these kinds of
friendship exhibit) something good and
resembling the good, so far (those who
exercise them) are friends.’ The com-
mentators are again deceived by the
word ὅμοιον, taking it to mean ‘ simi-
larity of character.’ See above, ch. iii
§ 7, note.

5 οὐ wdvyu—oupBeBnxds] ‘ But the
above-mentioned kinds of friendship
do not always coincide. Nor do the
same men become friends for the sake
of the useful, as for the sake of the
pleasant. For things only accidentally
connected are not always found to-
gether.’ On συμβεβηκός, cf. Ar. Met.
IV. xxx. 1: συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται ὃ
ὑπάρχει μέν τινι Kal ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ
μέντοι οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
See also below, § 6.

260 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. [ CHap.

φίλοι δ ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ
δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δ αὑτοὺς φίλοι" ἦ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν
ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῴ ὡμοι-
ὥσθαι τούτοις.

5 “ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ᾽
ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας" οἱ μὲν
γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορί ζουσι τάγαθα,
οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι
μέν, οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχουσιν ὥστ᾽ ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς" οἱ γὰρ τόποι
οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν
δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην
ποιεῖν" ὅθεν εἴρηται

«πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

2 οὐ φαίνονται δ᾽ οὔθ᾽ οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθ᾽ οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ
εἶναι" βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται
συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ" μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ
φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ

3 ἡδέος. οἱ δ᾽ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις

ἐοίκασι μάλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων

ὡς τὸ συζῆν" ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημε-

ρεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι" μονώταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις

ἥκιστα προσήκει, συνδιάγειν de μετ’ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι
μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ
δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ
πολλάκις εἴρηται" δοκεῖ yap φίλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ

“~ a 4 4 ~ ~
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἧ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ TO αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον" ὃ δ'

6 ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντε: ‘In this re-
spect (te. as affording and seeking
pleasure or utility) being like (the

good).’

V. 1 οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντε:---ἐνέργεια»)
‘But those who are asleep, or who are
separated by the intervals of space, do
not exercise friendship, though they
have all the disposition to exercise it,
For the intervals of space do not de-
stroy friendship, but only its exercise.’
This is of course a most inadequate

translation of ἐνεργεῖν and ἔχουσιν.
These words must be understood by a
study of Aristotle’s forms of thought.
See VoL I. Essay IV. On the ἐνέργεια
of friendship, cf. Eth. rx. ix.

3 οἱ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλου!) " They
who are satisfied with one another.’
Cf. above, VIII. iii. 3.

ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχει») ‘And —
this (ie. pleasure and sympathy)
seems the property of companionship."

4 ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι᾽ ἄμφω
ταῦταὶ]Ὕ ‘Now the good man (is a

IV.—VI.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIIL 261
ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φί- ς
λησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει" ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον
πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
ς δὲ [ 4 5 Ψ 4 9 “ “-
ἢ ὃὲ προαίρεσις ad’ ἕξεως. καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἕξιν.
καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν. 6 γὰρ
9 4 ld 3 A v ΄“ ἤ φ Ι
ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἑκάτε-
e “ ‘ e ~ 9 ? Α , ww» 9 t
pos οὖν φιλεῖ τε TO αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ" λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἡ ἰσότης.
Μάλιστα δὴ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει. ἐν δὲ 6
τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία,
ῳ [4 ld 9 4 a “a e e e
ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαιρουσιν.
ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας.
διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται J’ οὔ" οὐ γὰρ
’ , * ΑΞ' 4 , ς e ’ 9 €
γίγνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν' ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ᾽ of στρυ-

friend) to the good man for the sake | good to himself, and he makes an
of both these things’ (te. the |, equal return both in wishing good
absolutely good and the absolutely | and in (actual) pleasure.’ Zell, fol-
pleasant). lowing two MSS., reads εἴδε. But
5 ἔοικε δ᾽ —ttews] ‘Loving is like | Bekker’s reading (ἡδεῖ) appears pre-
an emotion, but friendship like a | ferable: (1) because ἴσον εἴδει would
settled disposition of the mind. For | not be a natural expression ; it con-
loving exists just as well towards | founds degree with kind; we should
inanimate objects; but when men | expect ταὐτὸν εἴδει; (2) because ἡδεῖ
reciprocate friendship it implies pur- | gives very good sense, since it is
pose, and purpose proceeds from a | one thing to reciprocate the motives
settled disposition of the mind.’ In | or feelings of friendship, and another
Eth, rv. vi. § (cf. 11. v. 2), Aristotle | to give your friend the same amount
makes friendship to be an emotion, or | of pleasure as he gives you.
characterised by emotion, The present λέγεται---ἰσότη!}) ‘For equality is
passage does not in the least contradict | said to constitute friendship.’ <A
this, as ἕξις, or a settled disposition of | Pythagorean saying, connecting moral
mind, is merely the result of regulated | ideas with the ideas of number. Cf.
emotions, and the tendency to repro- | Diog. Laert. vu. i. 8: εἶπέ re πρῶτος
duce them. (Gs φησι Τίμαιος) xowd τὰ φίλων εἶναι"
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, κιτ.λ.} In Eth. m1. | καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα.
ii, 1, Aristotle speaks of ‘ purpose’ as
the test of character; 15. § 11, as VI. 1. This section is an awkward
constituting character ; ἰδ. § 2, as not | repetition of what has been said
acting suddenly ; ἐδ. § 17, 88 implying | before, ch. v. ὃ 2. This, however,
reason and forethought. merely shows that we have probably
éxdrepos—det} ‘Each of the two | the uncorrected draft of Aristotle’s
then loves that which is a peraonal | treatise on Friendship.

262 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII.

voi.

‘ 2 ‘ . 9 a ’ 4 ’ ᾿ δ' 4
Tat γαρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ απταντωσιν εἰς Τας Xpetas” φιλοι ου

[ΟΗΑΡ.

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις" βούλον-

, 9 4 A 4 4 4 4 C 9 Ca!
πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ TO μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ
2 δὴ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ᾽ εἶναι φίλον κατὰ
τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν
ἅμα" ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε
γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ᾽ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ
3 ῥᾷδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν
λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ
͵ A 4 ‘ Ee Qe a 9 ᾽ 4 4 4
χρήσιμον de καὶ TO ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται" πολλοὶ
4 γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων
δὲ 4 id e ὃ Α 4 ἐδ ὔ [2 4 4 e ? 9
ε μάλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἡ διὰ TO ἡδύ, ὅταν TavTa UE αμ-
o , Q ῇ 4 , | a 4 a
φοῖν γίγνηται καὶ xaipwow ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς͵ οἷαι
΄- ὔ 9 AN e , 4 9 a, “ =r
τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι" μάλλον yap ἐν ταῦταις τὸ ἐλευ-
καὶ οἱ μακά-
συζῆν μὲν
γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέ-

θέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.

ριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ.

A δ᾽ 9. Δ ε ’ yey 2 4 . 9
povolty, TUVEX WS οὐθεὶς ἂν υτομειναῖ, OU auvTo TO aya~

2 wroddots—elvar] ‘It is not possible
to be a friend to many men on the
footing of the perfect kind of friend-
ship, just as one cannot be in love
with many at the same time. For
(the perfect friendship) is a sort of
excess of feeling, which naturally
arises towards one person alone;
again, it is not easy for many persons
to be intensely pleasing to the same
individual, and perhaps not easy that
many should be good.’ ὑπερβολή here
would be nearly represented by the
French word abandon; it implies
the throwing away of limits and
restraints, a giving up of one’s whole
self, Cf. 1x. iv. 6: ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς
φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. Of
course there is an association of
Aristotelian ideas (μεσότης, ἔλλειψις,
&c.) in the term. It is repeated Eth.
ΙΧ, x. 5, where the question of the
plurality of friendships is carefully
gone into.

3 πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται) We
should have expected πολλοὺς ἡμῖν
ἀρέσκειν, on the analogy of the last
sentence, πολλοὺς τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν,
but the writing seems careless and
the expression is inverted.

οἱ τοιοῦτοι] 1.6. the useful and the
pleasant. Cf. ὃ 6, where τοιοῦτοι again
takes its sense from the context.

4 ἀγοραίων] ‘Of mercenary persons.”
Cf. Ar. Pol. 1v.iv. 10: λέγω δ᾽ ἀγοραῖον
(πλῆθος) τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς
ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας
διατρῖβον. Jb. νι. iv. 12: ὁ γὰρ βίος
φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον per’ ἀρετῆς
ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν
βαναύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρω-
πων καὶ τὸ θητικόν.

χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται!) i.e.
Happiness by its definition implies a
sufficiency of external means, Eth. 1.
Vili. 15.

οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν]
If Aristotle had been capable of a

VI] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 263

ἴων 4 a ~
Oov, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη" διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν
~ & ΚΓ . 9 ‘ ’ ἵν .,. ἊΨ ες κα
δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὑτοῖς"
Φ a. e ’ 4 “~ 4 ΄- A gf
οὕτω yap ὑπαρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις,
a 9 ἤ [4 ὔ ΄΄- a ,
ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις"
A 3 σι 9 8 s A 4 « ΄- #7 ?
ἄλλοι yap αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω ὃ
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τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται" εἰ δὲ μή,

4 4 » ,.. ἢ ς ,
OUK ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον UTEPEXOMEVOS.

τοιοῦτοι γί νεσθαι.

οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ εἰώθασι

9 4 3 e 9 ’ ’ 3 > » 4 4 9 8
Εἰσὶ δ᾽ οὖν ai εἰρημέναι φιλίαι εν ἰσότητι" τὰ yap αὐτὰ

γίγνεται ἀπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον

joke, we must have considered this to
be meant as such. It is a contradic-
tion in terms to speak of the Absolute
Good as painful. But the argument
is given in a merely matter-of-fact
way. See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 216.

δεῖ δ᾽ lows—atrois] ‘And perhaps
(in seeking friends) one ought (to
require) that even good men should
have this qualification (te. pleasant-
ness), and moreover not in a merely
universal way, but relatively to one-
self.’

5 οἱ & ἐν rais—¢iras] ‘Great
potentates’ (cf. Eth. 1. v. 3), ‘ however,
seem to make use of their friends
separately ;’ t.c. they keep two sets of
friends, one for profit or business, and
another for pleasure.

6 ἡδὺς δὲ ---- γίνεσθαι) ‘Now we
have already said that the good man
is both pleasant and useful at once.
But such a man does not become a
friend to his superior (in rank), unless
he be surpassed (by that superior) in
virtue also. Else he does not find

himself in that position of equality
which is produced by superiority in
proportion to merit. Such persons
however (as potentates who surpass
the good in virtue), are not produced
every day.’ The commentators have
strangely interpreted this passage,
making ὑπερέχηται take for its nomi-
native ὁ ὑπερέχων, as though Aristotle
had said that a good man would not
be a friend to a potentate, if that
potentate had superior moral quali-
ties; and as though ‘equality’ were
produced by one man having all
the merit and another all the power
On the contrary, Aristotle would have
said that ‘proportionate equality’ {s
produced, according to the principles
of distributive justice, by each man
having in proportion to his merits ;
cf. Eth. v. iii. 63; Pol, mi. ix. 15.
There is no sense of inequality pro-
duced by the position of a man socially
exalted, if he be also exalted in intel-
lect and character; inequality is felt
when a fool or a villain occupies a high
social position. Cf. Pol. 11 ix. 15:

7

264 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII.

[CHap..

ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ᾽ ὠφελείας.
Ω , "κ᾿ 9 A Φ ε ld Q [4 a
ὅτι δ᾽ ἧττον εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.
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τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι: καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα yap τῆς Kat
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χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει κἀκείνη), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιά-
ταχέως μεταπίπτειν
ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι δὲ ἀνο-
μοιότητα ἐκείνης.
η Ἕτερον 0 ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν, οἷον

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βλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ

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πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον,
ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον.
διαφέρουσι δ᾽ αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων " οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι

A ἤ A #7 ‘ 9 id 4 ? 4601
πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ᾽ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς
γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑκάστῳ
Ψ δὲ 4 ὃ 9 a σι ξ
éTepa de καὶ δι ἃ φιλοῦσιν
καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.

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λιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως" ὅταν γὰρ κατ
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τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
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Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ
φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν: ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲ is δικαίοις t
χ γὰρ ἐν μεν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον
o a 4 4 ἤ 4 δὲ A A δ tl 9 δὲ
πρώτως τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, τὸ de κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
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τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μεν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, TO de κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δευ-

Διόπερ τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι
κλεῖον--- ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέ-
χουσι, κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν δ᾽ ὑπερεχομένοι3.

7 εἴρηται) Cf. νΙΙΣ. iii, 2-3.

VII, 2 ἀνάλογον ὃ] The same
principle of distributive justice, main-

| justice and in friendship.

tained above in § 6 of the last chapter,
is again appealed to. Where friends
are not equal, their friendship must be
regulated by proportion.

3 οὐχ ὁμοίως ---- devrépws] ‘ But
equality seems to stand differently in
In justice

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII.

VIL] 265

4 an 98 4 ᾿ , 4 a a
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, a 4 ΑΔ μή b 3 4 (4 * ?-
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πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον

4 4 x A ~ ld ta \h) “ a 3 ΄-
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων: οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι
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φίλοι ot πολυ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφω-
τάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις 5
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ρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ,
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δ᾽ 4 g Ἢ ς ἴων “ ἤ Γ Ἂ 4 ὔ
οὐ παντα" αὑτῷ yap μαλισθ᾽ ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθα.

proportionate equality is primary, and
quantitative equality secondary; in
friendship, quantitative equality is
the first, and proportionate equality
the second consideration.’ Distribu-
tive justice begins by presupposing
inequalities between man and man,
and by proportionate assignments it
equalises these. Justice, however,
cares little about bringing men to
quantitative or exact equality. The
latter kind of equality, at all events,
is aimed at only in democracies, while
the proportionate equality belongs to
aristocracies and constitutional govern-
ments. Cf. Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2. Friend-
ship, on the other hand, begins by
presupposing equality between the
parties, and though a certain amount
of inequality may be made up by
proportionate assignment of affection,
&c., yet a wide interval of inequality
will render friendship altogether im-
possible.

5 ἀκριβὴ:κ---οὐκέτι] ‘In such cases
there is no exact definition up to
what point friendship is possible ;

VOL. It.

for after many deductions (from
equality) have been made, friendship
still abides; but when (the one
friend) is far removed from the other,
as, for instance, God is from man,
there is no friendship any longer.’ It
is indeterminate at what point, if you
go on diminishing equality, friendship
will cease, just as, in the old puzzle,
at what point the heap ceased to be
a heap.

6 ὅθεν xal—rd-ya0d] ‘From this the
question has arisen whether friends
wish for their friends the greatest of
all goods, as, for instance, to be gods.
For having attained this, they would
no longer at all be friends to those
who formed the wish, and therefore
no advantage to them, for friends
are an advantage. If, then, it has

‘been rightly stated that the friend

wishes all that is good to his friend

for that friend’s sake, it will be

necessary for that friend to remain

as he is, and then he will wish for

him, being a man, the greatest goods,

After all, perhaps, he will not wish
LL

WD

266 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII.

(Cua?

8 Ob πολλοὶ de δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι
μᾶλλον ἣ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκόλακες of πολλοί: ὑπερεχόμε-

a ἤ 4 A ” ~ a
vos yap φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ

μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι.

δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.

τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι

a
ov Ov αὑτὸ

~ 4 S
δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός"

αἰρουσι yao of μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις
Xap γὰρ μ

τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα: οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ’

4 σι Mv t e 4 ἤ ~ 9 2 a
αὐτῶν, ἄν Tov δέωνται: ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαι-

ρουσι τῇ τιμῇ.

ε δ᾽ εν" ΄- 4 “~ 4 00 3
οι UTO Τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ ELOOTWY ορε-

γόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ

CoA ἢ ,. Ψ 2 4 3 ’ ’ a σι
αὐτῶν" Xatpovat δὴ OTt εἰσιν» ἀγαθοί, “ἰστεένοντες TH Tay

λεγόντων κρίσει.

τῷ φιλεῖσθαι de καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν"

διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία

? e A e a =
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι.
δας “' 4
ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι.

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μάλλον ἢ
σημεῖον 0 αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν

χαίρουσαι" ἕνιαι γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ

φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν
9 td 4 ? , 4 3 ς 4 9 - 4 =
ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι,

98 ean 9 ’ 4 3 ‘ “A 9 4 >
€av opwatv €u πράττοντας, καὶ ανταιί φιλοῦσιν autTovs, Kay

him to have everything. For every
one especially wishes for himself what
is good.’ Under the words ἀπορεῖται
μή wor’ οὐ is included a question both
as to fact and cause. Οὐδὲ γὰρ denies
the fact and states the cause, which
is that if we wished our friend to
become a god, we should wish him
to be in a position where he can
no longer be our friend. The last
sentence (lows δ᾽ οὐ πάντα) qualifies
the previous statement, and guards
against the notion that any human
friendship can be utterly disinterested
and selfless. The same topic is fully
discussed in the eighth chapter of
Book IX.

VIII. 1-2 Though the essence of
friendship consists rather in loving
than in being loved, the mass of men

prefer the latter, as ministering to
their vanity. Being loved is akin to
being honoured. Parenthetically it
may be observed that honour is sought
not for itself but on account of things
variously associated with it (κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκόβ). (1) To be honoured by
the great affords a hope of promotion.
(2) To be honoured by the wise and
good is an evidence to men of their
own merits. Thus honour is desired
as a means to the consciousness of
virtue. Cf. Eth. Lv. §: ἐοίκασι τὴν
τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς
ἀγαθοὺς elvacs ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν
φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ᾽ οἷς γιγνώ-
σκονται, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ.

3 The active spirit of love, as op-
posed to the passive gratification of
being loved, is exemplified by the case
of mothers, who give their children

VIII] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII 267

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ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοι-
4 ~ ~ a“ ~
αν. μάλλον de τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλ- 4
οφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ᾽
’ ? a ᾿ > 97 a ’ ’ Ve
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τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ᾽ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστ᾽ εἶεν φίλοι" ς
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ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ᾽ ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ
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φαύλων οὔθ ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ δια-
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νεσθαι φιλία, οἷον
ἢ
τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς
4 ΤΩΙ ΠῚ »
ἐνταῦθα δ' av τις

’ ’ . ‘ one a ‘
πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς eidoTt’ οὗ yap
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ὦν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο.
ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ

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διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι
ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν: ὁμοίως δὴ φιλη-
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τοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας

γελοῖον.

4 A 9 ἢ
καλον Kal αἰσχρὸν.

39 4 a , ~ 9 ,
ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐφίεται TO ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ᾽ 7

αὑτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

«ὦ» “᾿ιι 3 ,
7] ὃ ὄρεξις TOU μεσοῦν ἐστιν"

to be brought up by other persons,
and go on loving them, though not
even recognised by them.

4-5 It is this active spirit of love
which constitutes the virtue of friend-
ship, and which causes us to praise
those who are of a friendly disposi-
tion. This then explains what was
above stated merely as as a fact, Eth.
vil. i. 5. The same spirit serves as
the equalising principle in unequal
friendships, greater merit being met
by greater love,

5-7 Friendship is based on equality
and similarity, especially the friend-
ship of the good. Friendships for

the sake of pleasure or profit seem
rather based on contrariety, as, for
instance, on the contrariety of riches
and poverty. But, after all, one
would say not that the contrary
seeks its contrary, but that the con-
trary seeks the mean.

5 μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν Kar’ ἀρετὴν

' ὁμοιότης} Cf. the Lysis of Plato, p.

214, quoted above upon ch. i. 6.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν----ἐπιτρέπει»)] ‘For the
good will neither do wrong themselves,
nor permit their friends to do it.’

7 ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσον] This phrase is
in accordance with the pantheistic
side of Aristotle’s philosophy, attri-

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII.

268 [ Cuap.

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τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽
> A 4 , ING σι 4 ~ θ ~ 4 a TAX e ᾽
ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως.

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ταῦτα μὲν ovv ἀφείσθω " καὶ yap ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

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ὔ a e > . [2 ὃδ 4

κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία de‘ προσαγο-

ρεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ συστρα-

τιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις "

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γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ

2 ὀρθῶς. ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ

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παροιμία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,
φιλία. ἔστι δ᾽ ἀδελφοῖς μὲν
καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ

a a , a 9 é 4 Ἁ “~ “a 4
τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ᾽ ἐλάττω" καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ
μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ᾽ ἧττον.
γὰρ ταὐτὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους,

διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια" οὐ

A 4 “~
ove’ ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
΄- [4 ‘ A Ἁ Mw 4 e a eo
3 φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων,
a 4 >
καὶ αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι,
ἰὰ ; A a a
οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην,
~ “~ ὔ
καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ % ὀθνείῳ, καὶ παταξαι πατέρα
ἢ ὁντινοῦν ἄλλον. αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ
4 a “-
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ex’ ἴσον
~ t ~
4 dujxovra, αἱ de κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασι τῆς
πολιτικῆς συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ
, {ἢ “A 4 4 ’ Α € 4 a
TopiComevot τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον: καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ

buting to nature a desire for the
good. Cf. De Anima, π. iv. 3:
πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου (τοῦ θείου) ὀρέγεται,
κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει
κατὰ φύσιν. Eth. x. ii. 4: ἴσως δὲ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστί τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν
κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ
οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ,

IX. 1 ἐν ἀρχῇ] Eth. vin. & 4.

περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς avrois} ‘About
the same things, and in the same
persons,’ Cf. Eth. v. iii. 5: οἷς re
γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὅν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ

ἐν ols τὰ πράγματα, δύο. Pol. rt. ix.
3: τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα
ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

3 Αὕὔξεσθαι δὲ----διήκοντα) ‘Justice
of necessity becomes more binding
as friendship becomes closer, for they
exist in the same subjects, and are
co-extensive in their application.’

4 al δὲ κοινωνίαι----βίον] ‘ All com-
munities are like parts of the political
community; for (the members of
them) unite with a view to some
advantage, and to providing some
of the conveniences of life,’

VIIL—X.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 269

κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελ-
θεῖν καὶ διαμένειν: τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζον-
αἱ μὲν ς
οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται,

4a [2 eo > a “~ ,
ται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.

Φ ~ ΄σι “ “σι
οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν
g ~ ~ ζω
χρημάτων ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
a
πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι,
e [2 8 4 ’ 4 ᾽ 4 4 ~
ὁμοίως δὲ Kat φυλέται καὶ δημότα. ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν
γίγνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ

’ nA, @ ‘ θυ , rd 4 ’
ερανιστων auTa@a yap vias €vexa καὶ συνοῦύυσιας.

~ 3 e 4 τῶν
κοινωνιῶν δι ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι
wacat
δ e oN ,) a 9 ἢ 4 4 σι
αὗται ὑπο τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι" οὐ γὰρ τοῦ
? 4 4 4 9 e 4 > 9 id
παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἅπαντα
4 ὔ ~
τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους,
τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς,
πορί ζοντες μεθ’ ἡδονῆς.
’ [ ἤ Ἁ 4 a “A
σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ Tas τῶν καρπῶν συγκο-

4 κι 4 ὔ
καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις

φ - 4 a g 4
ai yap apxaia θυσίαι καὶ

μιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί" μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον

“ a ~ ῇ ~
τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὴ φαίνονται ai κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς 6

a τ
“πολιτικῆς εἶναι"

a [4 ,
TMS Τοίαυύυταις κοινωνιαίς.

ΠΟλιτείας δ᾽ ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, γ0

οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων,

ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι

εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία

δ θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν)] Cardwell
refers for illustration of these terms
to Demosthenes, pp. 313, 23; 403,
19; 1355. 35 1217, 14.

By omitting, with Fritzsche, Bek-
ker’s full stop after συνουσίας, and
by placing the words οὐ γὰρ---τὸν
βίον in a parenthesis, we see that
the participles ποιοῦντες, ἀπονέμοντες,
wopt{ovres are to be referred to xoww-
vol, as implied in κοινωνιῶν above.
The passage which speaks of men
‘awarding honour to the gods, while
providing recreation and pleasure for
themselves,’ is highly characteristic
of the Greek religion. This sort of
thing can perhaps be best understood
in the present day by those who have

seen the religious festivals of the Hin-
doos, Cf. Plato’s Republic, p. 3648:
θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖ:---μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε
καὶ ἑορτῶν.

X. This chapter, containing a classi-
fication of forms of government and
of the perversions to which they are
exposed, can hardly have been written
after the Politics of Aristotle. It has
rather the appearance of a first essay,
the conclusions of which were after-
wards worked out into detail, and
partly modified. Thus Aristotle in
the «Politics by no means concedes
the position that monarchy is the
best form of government. He argues,
Pol, 111, xv. 4-16, that it is better for

270

HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEION VIII.

[CHap.

4 9 e e 9 A s
Te καὶ αριστοκρατία, TpiTn δ᾽ ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣ TI-

4 4 4 a e ( 4 4
μοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ᾽ αὐτὴν

εἰώθασιν ot “πλεῖστοι καλεῖν.

ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ᾽ ἡ τιμοκρατία,

τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν
ld 4
παρέκβασις δὲ

’ 4 ’ ΕΑ ‘ td 4
βασιλείας μὲν τυραννὶς" ἄμῴφω yap μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι
δὲ πλεῖστον: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον

σι ¢ 4 4 a “~ 9 ,
σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων.

9 ’ >
ον γα β Ε΄ Τι

A e 4 9 g S μῶν σι 4 “ ς [4
βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ Tact τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς υπερεχων"

ς 4 ~ , ‘ a . 9 , = ea
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται" Ta ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὑτῷ

μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀρχομένοις" ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος

8 state to be governed by good laws
than by the best individual will;
further on, Pol, 111. xvii., he qualifies
this by admitting that for some peoples
monarchy is better suited.

I wapexBdoes}] ‘Perversions’ or
‘abnormal growths ;’ cf. Pol. 111. vi.
11, where a form of government is
pronounced to be normal as long as
it aims at the public good, abnormal
when its end is private interest :
φανερὸν τοίνυν ws ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι
τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὗται
μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ
ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον
μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἡμαρτημέναι
πᾶσαι καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πο-
λιτειῶν" δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις
κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

πολιτείαν δ᾽ αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι
καλεῖν) ‘But most people are accus-
tomed to term it ‘‘a constitution.”’
The word πολιτεία was used by the
Greeks in a restricted sense, just as
the word ‘constitution’ is in English,
to denote a balanced form of govern-
ment, Cf. Ar. Pol. 111. vii. 3: ὅταν δὲ
τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται
συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα
πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. Aris-
totle does not use the word in the
Politics to denote a timocracy. In
the ninth chapter of Book IV. he uses
it to denote a mixed form between

|

oligarchy and democracy. He also
uses it to express his own ideal of a
state, which was far from being a
timocracy.

2 ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις
εἴη βασιλεύς] ‘For he who had not
these qualifications would be a sort
of ballot-box king.’ It is difficult to
express the word xAnpwrés, which as
coupled with βασιλεύς is certainly
meant to be contemptuous. Aristotle
does not appear to mean any definite
form of monarchy, so we learn nothing
from Pol, 111. xiv., to which the com-
mentators refer us. Aristotle here
says that the genuine king must be
independent in property and position,
and above all his subjects in this re-
spect. Externally wanting nothing
for himself, he will administer the
state for the good of his subjects. If
this is not the case, he will be no
genuine king, but a parvenu, κληρωτός
τις, like a person who had been raised
to the throne by the contingency of
lot, and therefore insecure in his posi-
tion, with perhaps only a temporary
tenure of office. The word ἀμέσθους
is coupled with μὴ xAnpwrds (as an
epithet of wrevrapxlas), Pol. τι, xi. 7.
It is possible that in the present pas-
sage a notion of ‘paid services’ may
be implied. If so, ‘hireling monarch’
would express the terms under notice.

X.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXKEION VIII 271

A w# 4 , e 4 a 9 9 ,
KAnpwros av τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας
ταύτη" τὸ γὰρ ἑαντῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον
ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη" κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ 3
βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα"
φαυλότης γάρ ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς" ὁ δὴ μοχθηρὸς
βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνετα. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς
ὀλιγαρχίαν κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς
πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν éavrois, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ

e tf Ἃ a ~y ἢ 4 ww a
πλείστου ποιούμενοι TO πλουτεῖν" ολίγοι δὴ ἄρχουσι Kat
μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας
εἰς δημοκρατίαν. σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται" πλήθους γὰρ
βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ
τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία' ἐπὶ
μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μετα-

ἤ a Oy , ᾽ Ψ e a ,
βαλλουσι μὲν οὖν μαλισθ᾽ οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι" ἐλάχιστον
γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ᾽ αὐτῶν 4
καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς νἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει
σχῆμα: τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ
καὶ “Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει ' πατρικὴ γὰρ
ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶνα. ἐν Ἰ]έρσαις δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ
πατρὸς τυραννική. χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοίς τοῖς υἱέσιν.
τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους" τὸ γὰρ τοῦ
“"- e A io
δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ
A ’
φαίνεται, ἡ ἸΠερσικὴ δ᾽ ἡμαρτημένη: τῶν διαφερόντων
4 e 9% a ὃ 3 ὃ bs δὲ Α Α >
yap αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαφοροι. avdpos dé καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστο-
4 ‘
κρατικὴ φαίνεται " κατ᾽’ ἀξίαν yap ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ
~ a 4 wv χά A A e ld 9 [2
ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα" ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνη
4 , 4 , 4 ὔ ε 9 4 9 9 ,
ἀποδίδωσι, ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὃ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν

κῃ

ἢ 4 4 9? 4 > A a 4 9 *
pciornow: παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν yap αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἣ
ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι "

4 τῶν διαφερόντων---διάφοροι] ‘For | Greek feeling about ‘heiresses’ is
those who differ should be governed | strongly expressed in a fragment of
differently.’ And therefore the Persian | Menander (Lv.) :
system is wrong, which governs chil- ὅστις γυναῖκ᾽ ἐπίκληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν
dren as if they were the same asslaves. πλουτοῦσαν, Fro μῆνιν exrive θεῶν,

5 γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι) The ' ἢ Bovder’ ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

II

272 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. [CHap.

ov δὴ γίνονται κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ai ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον
τιμοκρατικῇ
δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν" ἴσοι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ταῖς
ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν: διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις

6 καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.

διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ mavres ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς avons ὁ ἄρχων καὶ
ἑκάστῳ ἐξουσία,
Καθ ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, eq’
4 a 4 , a 4 4 ἢ [4
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας" εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους,
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὧν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, i’ εὖ πράττωσιν,
Φ 4 , @ 4 Ὅ Q "A
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων: ὅθεν καὶ “Ὅμηρος τὸν ᾿Αγα-
ἃ μέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν, τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική,
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων" αἴτιος γὰρ
τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας"
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται " φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν
πατὴρ viav καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασι-
3 λευομένων,. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ
τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταὐτὸ
9 4 A 9 3 ὔ C2 a A e g 4 9 a
4 ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν" οὕτω yap καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὶ
δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ. Kar’
ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον
e ’ @ 4 4 a ὔ ς 4 ~ 4 “~ ~
5 ἑκάστῳ᾽ οὕτω de καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ
ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν. ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ᾽
e ~ 4 ς« ᾽ e 4 A A lA ww 4 ?
ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ws ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔοικε δὴ ταύτη
γὰρ of πολῖται
βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι. ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ
6 ἐξ ἴσου: οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλίας ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν,
Cd a 4 ᾿ > 4 , 9 ΠῚ Δ e ’
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία

, 4 4 #
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικήν᾽ ἴσοι

XI. 1 ἐν trepoyn—vyovets] * All
these friendships imply superiority on

live equally and equitably with one
another.’ To understand the fall

the one side, and hence it is that
parents are honoured, te. because
superiority demands honour, as well
as love,

5 ἴσοι yap—elva:] ‘For it is the
part of the citizens (in a timocracy) to

meaning of ἐπιεικεῖς, see the fine pas-
sage from het. I. xiii., translated in
the note on Eth. v. x. i, and cf. rx. x.
6. βούλονται expresses a natural ten-
dency, cf. VIIL x. 3: πλήθους γὰρ βού-
λεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι.

X.—XII.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. 273

ἐστί, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστη" ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἣ
μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι
καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία: οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον: ἀλλ᾽
οἷον τεχνίτη “πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ
δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον. ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα
ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα
οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἣ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς
δοῦλον ἧ δοῦλος, οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν" ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος
ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ff μὲν 7
οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος"
δοκεῖ yap εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν
δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης" καὶ φιλίας δή,
καθ’ ὅσον ἄνθρωπος, ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν 8
αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ
πλεῖστον᾽ πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.

"Ev κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται" 12
ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν.
αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ ὅσαι
τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μάλλον" οἷον γὰρ καθ᾽ ὁμο-
λογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν
τις καὶ τὴν ἕενικήν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυ- 2
εἰδὴς εἶναι, ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς " οἱ γονεῖς
μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ
μᾶλλον δ᾽

Υ͂ e a Ss 2 ea A a ’ [4 9 ὔ
ἰσᾶασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ Ta γεννηθέντα OTL EK TOU-

, 4 a 2 9 Ff ”
TEKYA TOUS yovers ὡς an’ εκείνων τι ὄντα.

its functions. The slave, who is
treated not as a person but asa thing,
receives the same kind of attention.

6 ὠφελεῖται--- δίκαιον] ‘For though
all these things receive benefit from
those who make use of them, yet

neither friendship nor justice is pos-
sible towards inanimate objects,’ The
corresponding passage inthe Fudemian
Ethiceserves as a commentary on this :
Eth. Eud. vii. x. 4: συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ
αὐτὸ τὸ [6 conj. Bonitz] ὄργανον ἐπιμε-
λείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ
ἔργον, ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκέν ἐστι The
instrument receives just so much care
from its master as will keep it in
ptoper condition for the exercise of
VOL, II.

Friendship and justice imply the re-
cognition of personality; they imply
treating men not as instruments, but
as ends in themselves, On the slavery
of the body to the soul, cf. Ar. Pol. 1.
ν. 6-8.

XII. 1 ἀφορίσειε δ᾽ ἄν ris] In say-
ing that all friendships imply com-
munity of interests, an exception is to
be made of the friendships of relations

MM

274 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. (Crap.

τῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται TO ἀφ᾽ οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἧ
τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποίησαντι᾽ τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ
ἀφ᾽ οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς ἢ θρίξ ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι" ἐκείνῳ δ᾽ οὐθὲν
τὸ ἀφ᾽ οὗ, ἢ ἧττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου" οἱ
μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα
τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἴσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ
τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δ ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες.
3 γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐ-
τῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς
an’ ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν
αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι" ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταὐτότης ἀλλήλοις
ταὐτοποιεῖ. ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοι-
4 αὗτα. μέγα δὲ πρὸς
φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν" AE γὰρ
ἥλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι" διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἔται-
ρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται.
τούτων συνῳκείωνται.

44 δὰ . 7 .? ,
εισι δὴ TQAUTO TOS Καὶ ev διηρημένοις.

ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ
τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι, γί-
δ᾽ € 4 9 td φ δ᾽ ° 4 ~ e

γνονται ὃ οἱ ev οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ᾽ ἀαλλοτριώτεροι τῷ συνεγ-

A é Ά 9 A a» yg e€ A A a

5 γὺς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς

4 4

φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν

καὶ ὑπερέχον" εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα" τοῦ γὰρ

εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι.

6 ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μάλ-

λον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς εστίν.

# a 4 9 ~ 9 ~ “ 4 4 ~ e “”~ a

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ev τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ev τῇ ἑταιρικῇ, καὶ
4 “ 9 , 4 9 ζω e ? Ψ

μάλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ

οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλή-

λους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι of ἐκ τῶν -αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι

and companions, which depend on 4 ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ---εἶνα }] ‘But cousins

feeling rather than on any sort of
compact.

ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταὐτότης ἀλλή-
λοις ταὐτοποιεῖ] ‘For their identity
with the parents identifies them with
one another.’ ἐκεῖνα is in the neuter
gender on account of the words ἐκ
τῶν αὐτῶν to which it immediately
refers.

and all other relations get their bond
of unity from these (1.6. the brothers) ;
for (it depends) on their coming from
the same stock. Relations are more
or less closely united to one another,
in proportion as their common an-
cestor is more or leas near,’

5 πρὸς θεοὺς ws πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ὑπερέχον] Cf. Bth. Viti. vii 4, 1x. ἃ. 7,

XIL—XIII.}] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 275

4 4 e [ 4 ε ‘ 4 a f
καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως" Kal ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία
e a
πλείστη καὶ βεβαιοτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοι-
in A ~ a U 9 a 4 A Ἁ [
ποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία
a , ff Ὡ--
δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν" ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συν-
δυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαι-
ὅτερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ᾽
A , “~ 4
ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ
4 ΄- 9 4 ’ Fa th’ “ ’ . » ,
καὶ τῶν εἰς Tov βίον" εὐθὺς yap διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν
ee 4 A 4 ᾽, 9 ”~ ir 3 ? 9
ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς emapxovow οὖν αλλήλοις, εἰς
4 A ~ 4
τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ TO χρήσιμον
4 9 4 ᾽
εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι
3 ? 9 4 a > = wv ‘ e , 9 ͵ 4
ἀρετήν. εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς elev’ ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ
σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ

a ᾿ “ a
εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτη τῇ φιλίᾳ.

χαίροιεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ.
εἶναι. διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται" τὰ γὰρ τέκνα
‘ 9 A 9 - 4 4 - [2 Α 4 “~
κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ TO κοινόν, τὸ δὲ τῶς
συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον,
οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι 4 πῶς δίκαιον" οὐ γὰρ
ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον
καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.
Τριττῶν δ᾽ οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται,
| > © FP ~ A 9 : 4.3. » ct wv ad 4
καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ
, ὁ ? 4 ‘ ς a 4 , ’ , 4
καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ

&c. Aristotle throughout these books | supposes that of the state, which will

In the same

speaks of ‘the gods’ from the point
of view of the popular religion.

7 πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία
wédews] In point of time the family
is prior to the state, but in point of
idea (λόγῳ) and essentially (φύσει)
the state is prior. Cf. Ar. Pol. 1. ii.
12: καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἣ
οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. Ἰὸ γὰρ
ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ
pépous’ ἀναιρουμένον γὰρ τοῦ ὅλον οὐκ
ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως.
Aristotle argues that, without the
idea of the ‘state,’ the terms ‘man’
and ‘family’ would lose their mean-
ing. Thus the idea of family pre-

accurdingly be prior.
way, the family is more necessary as
8. means, the state as an end.
ἑπαρκοῦσιν οὗὖν---ἴδια)] ‘They help
one another, therefore, bringing what
they each have separately into the
common stock.’ Fritzsche quotes
the saying of Ischomachus to his
wife in the @conomics of Xenophon
(vii. 13): γῦν δὴ οἶκος ἡμῖν ὅδε κοινός
ἐστιν. ᾿Εγώ τε γάρ, ὅσα μοί ἐστιν,
ἄπαντα, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποφαίνω, σύ τε
ὅσα ἠνέγκω, πάντα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατέ-

θηκας.

ΧΊΠ 1 ἐν ἀρχῇ] Εἰλ. vit. iii. 1,

8

ὑπὸ

3

2

is

wr

276 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. [ CHap.

9 , , @ , 4 4 ε a A 4 8 a
ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, Kat διὰ TO χρήσιμον
4 , a 9 ’ A a 8 * %
ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν
4 9 ἢ “- “ a 4 a a 4 ἢ a
κατ᾽ ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς
δ᾽ ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. γίγνε-
4 4 9 , A e@ ld 9 “~ 3 a
ται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ TO
, , a ’ a U ~ 7 e a a
χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μονὴ ἢ μάλιστα εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν yap
9 4 4 a ww ios ~ 4 , Κι
δι ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὑ δρᾶν αλλήλους προθυμοῦνται"
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. πρὸς τοῦτο δ᾽ ἁμιλλωμέ-
9 c 4 3 , 9 QA ὔ A A ~
νων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι" Tov yap φιλοῦντα
πε: a 29 8 , Δ᾽ 98 = ἢ
καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἢ χαρίεις,
ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται,
4 vA 4 “” , e a Q ~ 9 ~
οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ irw: exaTepos yap τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
4.7 9 3 2% 5 a 9 e ’ Ψ A
ἐφίεται. οὐ maw δ᾽ oud’ ἐν τοῖς δὶ ἡδονήν’ dua yap
ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν.
γελοῖος 0 ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι,
ΡΤ 4 , ε 4 « ‘ ’ ’ ἢ
ἐξὸν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική"
ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέον-
ται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφον-
ται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὅν-
tes οἱ δ᾽ εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ
, ὃ , Ψ δέ θ U 8 ’ , "» ὃ
πάσχοντες ὀέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθαπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι δετ-
τόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ

2 τὸν γὰρ---εὖ δρῶ») " No one takes
it ill that one loves and benefits him,
but, if he be of gentle mind, pays his
benefactor back in goud deeds.’ The
subject to ἀμύνεται is implied in
οὐδείς. Fritzsche quotes Horace, Saf.
1. 1. 1.

Nemo quam sibi sortem
Seu ratio dederit, seu fors objecerit, illa
Contentus vivat, laude diversa se-
quentes.

χαρίεις has nothing to do with ‘ grati-
tude,’ It means much the same as is
conveyed in the word ‘gentleman.’ Cf.
Eth. uv. 4: of δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ rpax-
τικοί, IV. vill. 9 : χαρίεις καὶ ἐλεύθερος.

5 ἔοικε---διαλύωνται) ‘Now as jus-
tice is twofold, the one unwritten, the

other according to law, so also of
utilitarian friendship there appear to
be two branches, the one moral and
the other legal. The complaints then
(which arise) chiefly take place when
men do not conclude their connection
in the same branch in which they
commenced it.’ συναλλάττειν is to
make a contract, διαλύεσθαι to wind
up a contract by the mutual perform-
ance of the terms. Men who consider
that they have entered upon a s0-
called friendship with a fixed stipula-
tion (νομική) of certain advantages to
be received, will complain if the fixed
stipulation is denied, and only a gene-
ral moral obligation (ἠθική) to render
services is admitted.

XIII. ] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. 277

χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίγνεται
οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ᾽ ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ 6
ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δέ
ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος.
δῆλον δ᾽ ἐν ταύτη τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν
δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει" διὸ παρ᾽ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
δίκαι, ἀλλ᾽ οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συν-
αλλαξαντας. ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φίλῳ 7
δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο. κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον
ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ 8
συναλλάξας καὶ διαλνόμενος ἐγκαλέσε. τοῦτο δὲ συμ-
βαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἡ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ
καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν
δυναμένῳ 9

μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθη, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

6 ἔστι---συναλλάξαντας] ‘That which
is on stated conditions then is legal
(utilitarian friendship). One sort of
it is wholly commercial, implying
payment on the spot (ἐκ χειρὸς els
χεῖρα) ; another is more liberal, allow-
ing time (els χρόνον), but still on the
understanding of a specified return.
In this then the debt is plain and un-
doubted, but the delay which it admits
of is friendly. Hence in some states
no suits are allowed in cases of this
kind, but men think that those who
have contracted on faith should abide
(by the issue).’ ἀναβολή in commerce
answers to ‘credit;’ cf. Plato’s Laws,
XL Ὁ. 915 Ὁ: μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ ἀναβολῇ πρᾶσιν
μηδὲ ὠνὴν ποιεῖσθαι. Or it may an-
swer to buying or selling for future
delivery. φιλικόν (‘of the nature of
friendship’) stands here as a pre-
dicate. Cf. Eth. vuil.i. 4: τῶν δικαίων
τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

7-8 ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ---εὐεργετεῖσθαι) ‘On
the other hand, the moral (branch of
utilitarian friendship) is not on stated
conditions, but the gift, or whatever
else it be, is made as if to a friend.

Yet (the giver) claims to get as much,
or more, as though he had not given
but lent. And if he does not come
off in the connection as well as he
commenced, he will complain. Now
this (sort of disappointment) takes
place because all or most men wish
that which is noble, but practically
choose that which is expedient. It is
noble to do good not with a view
to receive it back, but it is expedient
to be benefited.’ This passage dis-
criminately exposes a sort of vacilla-
tion between disinterestedness and
self-interest, which occurs in utili-
tarian friendships. A man at one
moment thinks vaguely (βούλεται) of
aiming at the noble, and makes a gift
as if he expected no return. But
presently the more definite bent of his
mind (προαίρεσι5) reverts to the profit-
able, and he claims to get back as
good as he gave. On the distinction
between βούλεσθαι and προαιρεῖσθαι cf,
Eth, ται. iv. 1, v. ix. 6, and the notes.

9 δυναμένῳ δὴ---ἢ μή] ‘If one is
able, then one ought to pay back the
full value of what one has received ;

10

bmg

278 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. [ Cuap.

a) , Ι 9s ΓΝ , ee ΝΜ
δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἑκόντι" ἄκοντα
4 , 9 ’ e δὲ ὃ 4 > ~ 3 “
γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ
καὶ εὖ παθόντα ud’ οὗ οὐκ ἔδει" οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δὲ
αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος" καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ᾽ ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν'
3 a ; se \ ¥ 7 ¥ . ww >» 9 ,
ἀδυνατοῦντα δ᾽ ovd ὁ δοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν' ὥστ᾽ εἰ δυνατός,
9 ’ » 9 ~ & » , ει} 9 Σ ‘
ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ᾽ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ᾽ οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ
4 A @ 9 A 4 4 ’ a , 9 ,
ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ wy. ἀμφισβήτησιν
δ᾽ ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ
πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαν-
τος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτα φασι λαβεῖν
παρὰ πῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἣν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ᾽
e 4 a“ t ς +) 9 0 Qa ᾽
ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες" οἱ δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέ-
γιστα τῶν παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς, καὶ ἃ wap’ ἄλλων οὐκ ἣν, καὶ ἐν
κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις.
σιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον
ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιού-
μενος τὴν ἴσην" τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον
Ξ 24 1 9 , 4 , κι φΦ 3 ,
οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο,

a) 9 s 4 4 ,
ap οὺυν διὰ Mev TO ΧΡῊ

[
ἢ καὶ πλέον’ καλλιον γάρ.

for one must not make a man a friend
against his will (te. treat him as if he
were disinterested, when he did not
really mean to be #0). (One must
act) as if one had made a mistake at
the outset, and had received a benefit

_from one whom one ought not to have

received it from, that is to say, not
from a friend, or from some one doing
a friendly action: one must conclude
the business therefore as if one had
been benefited on stated conditions.
And (in this case) one would stipulate
to repay to the best of one’s ability ;—
if one were unable, not even the giver
could demand it; so in short, if one
is able, one should repay. But one
ought to consider at the outset by
whum one is benefited, and on what
terms, so that one may agree to ac-

9 δὲ φι ’ 9 A
ev d€ ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν

καὶ ἑκόντι are omitted in the above
translation. They are left out by two
of the MSS., and while they merely
interrupt the sense of the passage,
they may easily be conceived to have
arisen out of the following words,
ἄκοντα yap. The passage prescribes
the mode of dealing with a person who
having conferred a benefit (as described
in the last section) expects a return
for it. The accusative case dapap-
τόντα is governed by the verbal ad-
jective διαλυτέον which follows; cf. Fth.
VII. 11 : λεκτέον ἄλλην ποιησαμένους
ἀρχήν. Some editions read ὁμολογῇσαι
δ᾽ ἂν, which the commentators explain
to be governed by δεῖ, as implied in
the verbal adjectives ἀνταποδοτέον,
διαλυτέον.

Ir dp’ οὖν--- πλέον») ‘Surely, as the

cept those terme or not.’ The words | friendship is for the sake of utility,

XII.—X1V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII. 279

ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος

προαίρεσις" τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει
ae

TO κύριον.

Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις" ἀξιοῖ
γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύε-
ται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ & τε βελτίων προσήκειν avr
πλέον Exe τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος: ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον
ἔχειν: λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ
kar ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας" οἴονται
γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν
ot συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ᾽
ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν" φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ
ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν" τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ
δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μηθέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν ; ἔοικε
δὲ ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν
ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι
τιμῆς, τῷ δ᾽ ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους" τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς
εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ᾽ ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος.
οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται" οὐ

‘ Ά
γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ
γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν.
γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμά-
σθαι" ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὴ

δὲν ἀγαθὸ Ὁ Ἂν iC . TO κοινὸν
μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων" τὸ

9
οὐ

“-- τος nr 2 ee

the benefit accruing to the recipient
is the gauge (of what is to be repaid).
For he (the recipient) is the asking
party, and (the other) assists him on
the understanding that he will receive
the same value. The assistance ren-
dered then is exactly so much as the
recipient has been benefited ; and he
ought therefore to repay as much as
he has reaped, or even more.’

XIV. διαφέρονται) ‘Men have
differences’ in those friendships which
are contracted between a superior and
an inferior. Aristotle says that these
differences ought to be settled by both

parties respectively getting more than
each other; the one receiving more
money or good, the other receiving
more honour.

3 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν---ὑπτομένει)] ‘For it
is not allowable that a man should at
once gain money and honour out of
the public, for no one endures to have
the inferior position in all points.’
This notion, that the state-officers
should have either pay or honour, but
not both, is expressed before, Eth.
v. vi. 6-7. It is drawn from the
Athenian ideas of liberty and equality,
but is hardly in accordance with the
practice of the modern world.

3

280 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. ([Caar. XIV.

περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δω-
ροδόκῳ χρήματα' τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει
a ¢ [2 Ψ C4 4 A a 9 *#
τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις
4 λ ‘A 4 ~ 9 , 9 λ [2 A 4 9 4
ὁμιλητέον, Kat τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν
4 τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδιδόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δὺυ-
4 Ν e ; 4 a 3 a > ὃ» ΔΑ 3
νατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν" οὐδὲ γὰρ
ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ
A a 9 s 4a MM 4 vr 9 , %
Tous γονεῖς" οὐδεὶς yap av ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς
δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, διὸ κἂν δό-
9 9 a en 4 9 , a 9 e?
ἕειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι vip πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ᾽ υἱόν"
ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐθὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν
ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, war’ ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ᾽ ὀφείλεται,
ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι: καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή.
2ἷ A 9 “A a 4 e ’ g
wor’ ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβαλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ" χω-
Α 4 “ες ~ ? 4 > , 4 a 4
pis yap τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ
διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἣ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρ-
. ρ

ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδείς

κεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι" εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται,
4 a a 7 e 9 [2 a 4 iy ὔ

τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελὲς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

4 ἀπείπασθαι) ‘To disown.’ Card- ; his son).’ διωθεῖσθαι is used in the

well quotes Herodotus i. 59: ef ris ol
τυγχάνει ἐὼν παῖς, τοῦτον ἀπείπασθαι.
Demosthenes 1006, 21 : (ὁ νόμοΞ) τοὺς
γονέας ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θέσθαι
τοὔνομα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν
ἐξαλεῖψαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, καὶ ἁἀποκηρῦξαι.

χωρὶς γὰρ---διωθεῖσθαι) ‘For inde-
pendently of natural affection, it is a
human instinct not to reject the assist-
ance (which he might derive from

same sense, Eth. x. xi. 6.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
εἰρήσθω] These words may have been
written by Aristotle himself, with the
view of dividing his treatise on Friend-
ship into two books, of the same length
as the books into which all his various
writings are divided. Or, on the other
hand, they may have been added, for

the same purpose, by an editor.

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IX.

A a
KN WAZAI2Z δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
4 , 4 ᾽ , ἤ wv
ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον
4 9 ~ “A ~ ὡς
καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων
4 4 ὔ 2)ι}ν ‘[ A ”~ e ’ 4 a “
ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς,
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ
.ιὋᾧΟ γ᾽ a
πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται" ἐν
δὲ ~ 9 a 9 A e 9 A 9 a Ψ e ~
€ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστῆς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν
9 9 λ a Be ww S 4 Ψ Ww
οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐθεν ἔχων φιλητὸν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
[2
πολλάκις δ᾽ ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα
~ 42 9 ἴω ’ 4 Α Κι 4 LY e
νῦν οὐθὲν emtrerci.- συμβαίνει de τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὁ
4 ὃ 4 € ὃ 4 4 9 ᾽ “ ε 4 4 4 ,
μὲν δὲ ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῃ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον

‘ 9 , ~ 4 4 9 a ε ?
TOV ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπαρχῇ.

διὰ ταῦτα

γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται
o @ 4.1} ) ᾿ e Av » 4 a , ee 2
ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν" ov yap αντοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ Ta ὑπαρ-

4 4 »” ὃ A ~ A e ῇ)
χοντα, ov μόνιμα ὄντα" OO τοιανται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.

ἡ δὲ

τῶν ἠθῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διαφέ- 4

I. In heterogeneous friendships,
equality is to be obtained by the rule
of proportion. The same rule holds
good in political economy, where the
most heterogeneous products are
equalised against one another. In
political economy there is the conve-
nience of a common standard, money,
by which prodncts may be measured.
In friendship there is, unfortunately,
no such standard.

1 ἀνομοιοειδέσι) This is not quite the
same as ταῖς xa’ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις. It
implies relationships in which the two
parties have respectively different
objects in view, as, for instance, in the

VOL. II.

case of theemployerand theemployed,
the ἐρώμενος and the ἐραστής, &c.
καθάπερ εἴρηται] Cf. Eth. VI11. xiii. 1.
ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] By the modern
division of scionces, Political Economy
has been raised into separate existence,
so as in its method to be entirely
independent of, and in its results
subordinate to, Politics. On the Aris.
totelian theory of the law of value in
exchange, see Eth, vy. v. 8, and note.
3 ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν] ‘ Moral friendship,’
or ‘friendship based on character,’
the same as ἡ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν φιλία. Cf.
Eth. ὙΠ. xiii. 11: ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ᾽
dperiv—rijs ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους,
ΝΝ

N

282 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. [Ὁ Ηρ.

~ 4 oe 9 a

povrat δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίγνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέ-
vw ‘ la , Ψ ΝΌΟΝ ἢ

γονται" ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηθεν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται

~ Qa

μὴ τυγχάνη, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὃ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ

ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾷσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω" εἰς ἕω δ᾽ ἀπαιτοῦντι

τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ

4 = e 6° ~ 4 Ἂ e ~ a > Ξ 9 δ᾽ e

μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς dv εἶχεν" εἰ δ᾽ ὁ

#

μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
“-ε [4

τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς" ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει,

τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

~ oe A ρα

5 τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ

προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ᾽ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ.

ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν" ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἁδή-

ποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπί-

κιτιλ, Of course the above terms
have nothing to do with the ‘moral’
branch of utilitarian friendship, men-
tioned Eth. vir. xiii. 5, 7.

4 οἷον---ἔφη] ‘Asin the case of him
who promises (a reward) to the harper,
and “the better he sang, the more he
should have,” but when the man next
morning demands the fulfilment of
his promises, said that ‘‘ he had paid
pleasure for pleasure (ἐ.6. the plea-
sure of hope for the pleasure of
hearing music). The present tenses
ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ἀπαιτοῦντι, seem to
imply an oft-repeated and current
story. The story itself is repeated by
Plutarch (De Alexandrt Fortund, 11.1),
where the trick is attributed to Diony-
siun. Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τύραννος, ὥς
φασι, κιθαρῳδοῦ τινος εὐδοκιμοῦντος
ἀκούων ἐπηγγείλατο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ rd-
λαντον" τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπαιτοῦντος ' χθές,
εἶπεν͵ εὐφραινόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ παρ᾽ ὃν
goes χρόνον, εὔῴρανα κἀγώ σε ταῖς
ἐλπίσιν" ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὧν Erepres
ἀπελάμβανες εὐθύς, ἀντιτερπόμενος.

ὧν γὰρ δεόμενοε---δώσει] ‘For a man
sets his mind on tho things he happens
to want, and for the sake of that he
will give what he himself possesses,’

The beginning of the sentence (ὧν yap
δεόμενος) is a general statement, the
words κἀκείνου γε contain an applica-
tion of the goneral statement to a
particular case.

5 τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ--- τοσοῦτον] ‘ But
whose part is it to settle the value (of
a benefit),—is it the part of the giver
in the first instance, or of the reci-
pient ἔ (One would say it was the part
of him who was therecipientin the first
instance), for the giver seems to leave
it to the other. Which they mention
Protagoras as doing, for whenever he
taught anything he used to bid the
learner estimate “ how much worth he
thinks he has learnt,” and he used to
take exactly so much.’ ὁ προϊέμενος is
used in a peculiar sense here to denote
‘qui prior donum dedit,’ in opposition
to ὁ προλαβών (or ὁ προέχων, § 8), " qui
prior ab altero accepit.’ Protagoras
was said to be the first philosopher
who taught formoney. He probably
found it not disadvantageous to
assume a high and liberal attitude
towards his pupils. On the wealth
which he amassed by teaching, see
Plato’s Meno, p. 91 D, and above,
Vol. I. Essay II. p. 119.

I.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXKEION IX. 283

στασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ᾽ 6

> #

ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ “ μισθὸς δ᾽ avdpi.’ of δὲ προλαβόντες

Q 4 ~ «

τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηθὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς

« ΄- ~ 4

ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνον-

ται οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἴσως 7
φ“- ς 4 4 [4 A A ὔ ζω.

ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηθένα ἂν δοῦναι

3 a a

ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν

μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν" ἐν οἷς

4 ~ 4

δὲ μὴ γίγνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δὲ
4 ee

αὑτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι" τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ
3 9 4 rd 4 9 7] td ‘ 4)

κατ΄ ἀρετὴν φιλία, τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ THY

προαίρεσιν" αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὕτω δ᾽

a ‘
ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας kowwnjoaci: οὐ yap πρὸς χρή-
μαθ᾽ ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τ᾽ ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,

6-7 ὃν τοῖς τοιούτοι5---ὀπίστανται
‘In such matters some like the prin-
ciple of ‘‘a stated wage.” Those,
however, who take the money before-
hand, and then do nothing of what
they promised, are naturally blamed
in consequence of their excessive pro-
mises, for they do not fulfil what they
agreed. But this course the Sophists
are perhaps obliged to adopt, because
no one would be likely to give money
for the things which they know.’
Protagoras had no fixed price for his
teaching; he left it to the pupil.
But some people prefer having terms
settled beforehand, μισθὸς εἰρημένος,
as it is called in the line of Hesiod
(Works and Days, v. 368): Μισθὸς δ᾽
ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω. It
is the perversion of this when men
take the money beforehand, and then
fail in performing that which was paid
for. The Sophists (says Aristotle
with severe irony) are perhaps obliged
to insist on payment beforehand, on
account of the utter worthlesaness of
their teaching. Aristotle contrasts
the conduct of Protagoras (of whom
he speaks honourably) with that of

‘the Sophists’ after the profession
had become regularly settled.

7 ἐν ols δὲ---φιλία] ‘ But supposing
there is no agreement with regard to
the service rendered—then, in the
first place (of μὲν), with regard to
those who give purely for personal
reasons, we have said that they are
free from all chance of complaint; for
thisis the mode of virtuous friendship.’
δι’ αὐτοὺς is more of a logical than a
grammatical formula, and would be
represented by per se in Latin. This
phrase and καθ᾽ αὑτούς are frequently
used by Aristotle to characterise the
highest kind of friendship, which is
an ‘absolute’ feeling. th. VIILULI:
ol μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες
ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν. In
the following section, ἐπί τινι, ‘for
some external object,’ is contrasted
with δι᾿ αὑτούς, ‘that which looks to
the personal character alone.’ Cf. ΙΧ,
xX. 6: δι’ ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι’ αὑτοὺς
(φιλία) οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς.

οὕτω δ' ἔοικε ----ἐνδεχόμενο»] ‘And
thus it seems that they ought to act
who are made partakers in philosophy
(%e. they should measure the benefit

284 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IX. [CHar.

9 2 w# e , , 4 % a 4 A -
ἀλλ᾽ tows ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς,
4 ’ A “--
8 τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς δόσεως GAN’
9 td ὔ 4 Ν a 4 4 ὔ [2
ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίγνεσθαι
ὃ a 9 ᾿ » 997 » > AN A 4 e
οκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ de τοῦτο μὴ συμβαί-
vot, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
4 4 : “Ὄ
ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον: ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἡ ἀνθ᾽ ὅσου
A σι a
τὴν ἡδονὴν elder’ ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ
τούτου ἀξίαν" καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-
ονον, ἐνιαχοῦ T εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας

μὴ εἶναι ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθά-

9 o : a a 9 , ~ »# ao
περ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ yap ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιό-
4 ’ ~ 9 4 4 a Ἁ 9

τερον εἶναι ταξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ yap οὐ

~ ν᾿ σι ς # ‘ e ’ a“ ‘
τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ of βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν: τὰ
γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια.
9 3 “ὕΨ 4 4 A ὔ A Κι @v 0
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τατ-
τωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
» , 9’ 3 ν᾿ Δ ἊΨ > #
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

4 ἢ > WW ‘ a “ ’ “ ’

2 ᾿Απορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πότερα δεῖ πάντα
τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἦ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ
πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν"
φ ’ A , a ? e ᾽ 4 4
ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μάλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐερ-

᾽ 4 [ὦ 4 a e ὔ ᾽ 9s
γέτη ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον, ἐὰν

2 ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχηται. dp’ οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι-

“ 4 , 9 e? 2 4 .- |
βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ padiov; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας
Ὁ ‘ A 2 4 , a “~ “--
ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ

received by the intention of their τὸν προέχοντα] ‘ The first recipient,’
teacher), for the worth of philosophy | see above, ὃ 5.
is not measured against money, and 8-9 καὶ γὰρ ἐν--- ἐκοιν ὠνησεν} ‘ For
no amount of honour can balance it. | this is what is done in the market
But, perhaps, as also towards the gods | (i.e. the buyer, who is the recipient,
and one’s parents, it is enough if one | settles the price); and in some places
gives what one can.’ Aristotle, per- ' it is the law that there must be no
haps mindful of thetwenty yearswhich | actionson voluntary contracts, it being
he passed in the school of Plato, places | right that one should conclude with a
very highly the spiritual dignity of | person whom one has trusted on the
teaching in philosophy. After ἔοικε, | same terms as those on which one
ποιητέον εἶναι is to be understood. entered on the contract with him.’
8 μὴ τοιαύτης δ᾽ ofons] ‘In the | Cf. Eth. ὙΠ. xiii, 6: κοινωνεῖν here is
second place, when the gift is not of | used in the same sense as cwwadAdrrew
this kind,’ i.e, not δύ᾽ αὑτούς. there.

1.—II.] HOIKON NIKOMAXKION IX. 285

A - ἤ @ . ζω ΄“-
καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ 3
” ὃ λ Α sy 4 9 ’ 9 , e 9A ‘A
aonAov. καὶ Tas μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ TO
4 ~ “a U we
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ᾧ
9 ὔ 4 ἤ
ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἧ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ 4
~ ®’ ν n~ “~
τοῦτ᾽ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι Tapa ληστῶν πότερον τὸν
4 9 “A
λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἧ, ἢ καὶ μὴ
e ar 4 9 ~ A 9 4 “a A lé
ἑαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἦ τὸν πατέρα λυτ-
4 “~
pwréov; δόξειε yap ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον Tov πατέρα.
“ oo”
ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν TO ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν 5
> ὁ a r ~ ~ “~ ~
δ᾽ ὑπερτείνη ἡ δόσις TH καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ᾽
4
ἀποκλιτέον" ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προῦπαρχὴν
4 a
ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήση, τῷ
δὲ e 9 , ὃ , a ΜΝ θ ‘ 7: ? δὲ
ε ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ
bY nm ΠῚ 4
yap τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον: ὁ μὲν yap
9? a ry
οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλπίζει
κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως
u ?
4 3 ww A 9? ¥ > # 4 A “ Α͂
ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα" εἴτ᾽ ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται
ὔ 9 a a
δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις 6
Ψ € ‘ A s a ‘ [2 ld @ ’
εἴρηται, of περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως
ΜΝ A a Oe
ἔχουσι TO ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ a εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ
9 A ~ nm ’
ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ "μὰ ορπδι enn a πάντα, καθάπερ

the real state of the case, the claim is
of course not equal: and even if it be
not, but the parties only think so, such
conduct does not seem unreasonable.’

Thisand the other casuistical questions
here discussed have very little interest.

II. § ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται----ποιεῖν] ‘Asl |
have said then, as a general rule the |
debt should be repaid, but if the
giving (to some one else) prepon-
derates in moral glory, or in the
urgency of the case (over repaying),
one must incline to this; for some- ! εἴρηται] vide § 3.
times it is not even an equal thing to , προῦπαρχὴν»] ‘that which was pre-
requite the former favour, (namely) | existing,’ here ‘ primary obligation.’
when the one man knowing the other | Cf. Bth. viii. xiv. 4: οὐθὲν ποιήσας
to be good has benefited him, but on | ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων. Eth, τν. ii. 14:
the other hand, the repayment has to | ols τὰ τοιαῦτα προὕπάρχει.
be made to one whom one thinks to ὁ μὲν---τῷ δὲ] These words, by
be a scoundrel, For sometimes a | carelessness of writing, refer to the
man ought not even to lend money in | same subject.
return to one who has lent money to εἴτε τοίνυν----εἴτ᾽ ἔχει μὲν μὴ] This
him. For he lent it to one who is |; double protasis, instead of having as
good, thinking to get it back again, | usual only one, has a double apodosis.
but the other does not hope to get it 6 ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται) Cf.
back again from a villain. If thisbe | Eth. 1 iii. 1; 11. ii. 3, and above, § 2,

286 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. [CHar.

7 οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον" ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ
ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα
καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν
φαίνονται" εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς"
τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις"
καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μαλιστ᾽ οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς

8 ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γόνεῦσι δεῖν
μαλιστ᾽ ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ
εἶναι κάλλιον ὃν ἢ ἑαντοῖς εἰς ταῦτ᾽ ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμὴν
δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ' οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν
αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἣ τοῦ
στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητ-

ο βικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ᾽
ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.
πρὸς ἑταίρους δ᾽ αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων
κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὴ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις
καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν,
καὶ συγκρίνεν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ᾽ οἰκειότητα

lokal ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσι. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾷων ἡ
κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε
τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

3 “Exe & ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας
i μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ

οὐδὲ τῷ Διὸ θύεται] ‘Not even to | them to the seat of honour.’ Cf.
Zeus are all things indiscriminately | Plato, Repub. p. 425 A: ovyds τε τῶν
sacrificed.’ It is given as an illus- | vewrépwy παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ἃς πρέκει,
tration of conventional right, Eth. v. καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.
vii. 1, that goats and not sheep are | 10 τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾷάων ἡἣ
sacrificed to Zeus, | Kplois] te. it is easy to compare a
ἡ καὶ els τὰ κἠδη---διὰ ταὐτό] ‘And | relation with a relation, a tribesman
for the same reason men think that | with a tribesman, &c., but to compare
relations ought especially to meet at | a tribesman with a relation would be
funeral ceremonies.’ more troublesome.
8 τροφῆς ἐπαρκεῖν] ‘To furnish sub-
sistence.’ Fritzsche quotes Xenophon,
Memor. 11. vi. 23: δύνανται δὲ xal |
χρημάτων οὐ μόνον---κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις.
9 ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει] ‘Ris-
ing up to greet them, and conducting ,

III. Σ πρὸς rods ph διαμένοντα:
‘who do not continue the same.’ Cf.
Eth. xX. iii, 3: ἀλλ᾽ ἀνιεμένη διαμένεε
ἕως τινός.

ἐγκαλέσειε δ'--- ἦθος ‘But one might
complain if a man who liked one for

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX,

I1.—IIL] 287

χρήσιμον % τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ᾽
ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι ; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι:
ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν, ἐγκαλέσειε δ᾽ ἄν
τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ
. φ “ ᾿ > 9 A Ἂ A
τὸ ἦθος" ὅπερ yap ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ
γίγνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὧσι
φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβη φι- 2
λεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος,
ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτ᾽ ἄν' ὅταν δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως
ἀἁπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἣ
τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ
κακουργίας ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ 3
4
μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, dp’ ἔτι φιλητέον ; ἣ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ
μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν ; οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν
ΨΝ A e 4 9 4 9 « ~
οὔτε δεῖ" φιλοπόνηρον yap οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ὁμοιοῦσθαι
Ἂ # 5 @ Α ΝΜ “a e , a 9
avr: εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἂρ
οὖν εὐθὺς διαλντέον : ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ
μάλλον βοηθητέον
εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας
4 ’ ld Ψ» Ἀ ε ὃ ’ 4 ἈΝ ww a
οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ διαλνόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν"

, , . 9 ’ “
τὴν μοχθηρίαν ; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ᾽ ἔχουσι

οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν' ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν
4 “- 9 ἢ 4 9 € 4 4 € 9 ὔ
ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικέσ- 4
’ Ἁ 4 ; ~ 9 ~ 9 ,
τερος γένοιτο Kat πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, 4pa xpnoreov
, Δ , 9» OF .? ’ ‘ , ἢ
φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλη de διαστάσει μάλιστα

profit or pleasure pretended to like
one for one’s character.’

ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ] This observation, |
that ‘differences arise when men |

are not really friends to each other
in the way they think,’ has never
been exactly made before. The com-
mentators variously refer us to Eth,
VIII, iii. 3, ὙΠ. iv. 1, and ΙΧ, i. 4,
none of which passages corre-
spond.

2 ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ tis} ‘ When-
ever one is mistaken,’ te. by his own
misconception. Cf. Ar. Metaph. 111.
ili. 7: βεβαιοτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ
ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον. The word

διαψευσθῇ answers to διαμαρτόντα in
Eth. Viii. xiii. 9.

κιβδηλεύουσυ] Tocounterfeit friend-
ship, says Aristotle, is worse than
counterfeiting the coinage. Thecom-
mentators quote Theognis, vv. 110
sqq., where the same maxim occurs.

3 οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ]
The MSS. vary extremely about the
reading of this passage, in which there
is evidently something wrong. οὔτε
δεῖ is at all events an interpolation.
Fritzsche thinks that the whole is a
double gloss upon φιλοπόνηρον.

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι) ‘To those
who are capable of restoration.’

5

4

N

288 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IX, [Crap.

δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις" εἰ yap ὁ
μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ᾽ ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος,
πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτ᾽ ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε
χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι ; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ᾽
ε 4 9 σι Mv 4 ὔ 4 > >
ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ de τούτων οὐκ ἣν φίλους εἶναι"
συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. dp’
κυ 3. Δι 9 ad 4 9 A e 4 K 4 4 9 (4
οὖν οὐὖθεν αλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν εκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει
φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνη-
θείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν
χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ
A 4 a @ A 9 « a
τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δ ὑπερβολὴν μοχ-
θηρίας ἡ διάλυσις γένηται.
Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι
e w# 9 “ Α ς a ; ?
ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαντὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι
Ἢ ; 4 ’ a ’ 4 « a .
yap φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ
ld 3 ? Ψ “A A ’ 4 4 --
φαινόμενα ἐκείνον ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν
τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ xapw* ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα
a ‘ “ ’ ε , ς 4 a
πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων of προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ τὸν
συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ
συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ' μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς
ὔ [ ὔ ὔ 8 a ,
μητέρας συμβαίνε. Tovrwy δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαντὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ

4 ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ Fv φίλους εἶναι]
‘But without these things it is not
possible, as we said, that they should
be friends.’ On this use of the past
tense ἣν in reference to what has
been previously said by the writer,
cf. Metaph. X1. vi. 1: ἐπεὶ 8 ἦσαν τρεῖς
οὐσίαι. Eth, 111. v. 3: τοῦτο δ' ἣν τὸ
ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι. V. i. 12: ἐπεὶ
δ᾽ ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἣν, &c. Aristotle
is here referring to Eth, V1II. iii. 9;
VIIL V. 3.

IV. 1 ὅπερ al unrépes—mpooxexpov-
xéres] ‘Which mothers feel towards
their children, and which friends who
have had a rupture (feel towards each
other),’ ¢.e. they quite disinterestedly,
since in the latter case intercourse is

precluded, wish each other to live. On
the disinterested feeling of mothers,
οὗ, Eth. vin. viii. 3. On the use of
προσκρούειν», cf, Politics, τι, v. 4: ol
πλεῖστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ
καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις.
ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα
προσκρούομεν, οἷς πλεῖστα κροσχρώμεθα
τρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.

2 πρὸς davriv—elvai] ‘The good
man has every one of those feelings
towards himself, and other men have
them in so far as they set up to be
good’ (t.e. wherever they fall short
in these feelings, they fall short also
in their attempt to be good). “ For,
ay we have said, virtue and the good
man are the standard for everything.’
Cf, Eth, ut. iv. §; X. ¥. 10.

III.—IV.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IX, 289

e , “ 4 -~ a ~~ e ? >
ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἧ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι.
ἔοικε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ
σπουδαῖος εἶνα. οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3
9 ΄-- kd ὔ 2 ~ 4 , 4 4
αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ βούλεται δὴ
ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ
ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα’ τοῦ γὰρ
καὶ ζῆν δὲ
βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ
φρονεῖ: ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ἕκαστος δ᾽ 4
ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ᾽ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται
πάντ᾽ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον, (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς
4 ’ 9 IN @ > »$ [ἢ
τἀγαθόν), ἀλλ᾽ ὧν ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν.

“΄“- ᾽ Ψ Φ ὑρῃ
διανοητικοῦ χάριν, οπερ EKAC TOS εἶναι δοκεῖ,

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν
@ Φ a U , e ~ e ”~
ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἣ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε O τοιοῦτος ἑαντῷ 5
βούλεται: ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ: τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγ-
μένων ἐπιτερτπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
4 ὔ ς ~ e “- 4 ὔ 4 ~
ἀγαθαί: αἱ τοιαῦται δ᾽ ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ᾽ εὐπορεῖ
τῇ διανοίᾳ, συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ᾽ ἑαντῷ"

ἤ a 9 4 9 A wv 4 e wv A 9
πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι TO αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε Kat ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ
9 Ἁ e 9 ~ ~ 4 4
ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλο- ἀμεταμέλητος yap ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς
αὑτὸν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν
φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος
αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς

4 ἕκαστος δ᾽ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται---μά-
λίστα] ‘But every man wishes what
is good for himself. No one, on
condition of becoming another man,
chooses that that new thing, which he
should become, should possess every-
thing (for God has now all good) ;
but (every man desires to possess
what is good) remaining his present
self. And the thinking faculty would
appear to be each man’s proper self,
or more so than anything else.’ The
usual punctuation of this passage has
been altered to obtain the above trans-
lation, which has been suggested to
the annotator, and which seems to
give a more natural explanation of
the text than has been arrived at by
the commentators, who universally

VOL. II.

explain ἀλλ᾽ ὧν 8 τι ποτ᾽ ἐστί» to refer
to the unchangeableness or to the
personality of God. If the passage
be read as above, it will be seen that
the words ὧν ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν are in
opposition to γενόμενος δ᾽ ἄλλος. Aris-
totle says that to every man his
personality is what is dear to him;
he would not relinquish this to gain
all the world, for by relinquishing it
he would not gain anything. With
a changed personality, he would no
more possess any good thing, than
he now possesses it because God
possesses all good. All his wishes
are made on the basis of being still
what he is. The good man, who
fosters his thinking faculty, most of
all takes care of his proper self.
00

60

290

6 ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει.

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IX,

[CHap.

q εν \ , ,᾿ » a 7 »
pos avTov δὲ WOTEPOV ECTiY ἢ οὐκ ECTt

φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος" δόξειε δ᾽' ἂν ταύτη

> λί a 4 4 ὃδ ᾽’ R e 9 “~ 9 ὔ 4 Ψ
εἶναι φι ia, ἢ ἐστι Ovo ἢ πλείω EK τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι

7 ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.

φαΐ νεται

4 A 4 a 4 a “ ς ’ , a
δὲ Ta εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὕπαρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι

φαύλοις.

= 3 4 Φ 9 ~ a ἢ
dp’ οὖν ἧ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβα-

9 a 9 7 [2 9 A Ζ 9 A ~
νουσιν EMWLEKKEIS ELVQal, TAaUTH METEX OVELY QUTWY , €WEL ΤΩΡ

ε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐθενὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει,
Ύ ἴ PY PX

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ φαίνεται.

σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις" δια-

,. a e a 4 e a a 9 σι
φέρονται yap ἑαντοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μεν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα

δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς" αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν

6 πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ---ὁμοιοῦται)] “ But
whether friendship towards oneself
is, or is not, possible, we may leave
undecided for the present. It would
seem to de possible in so far as two
or more of the above-mentioned con-
ditions exist, and because the extreme
of friendship resembles one's feelings
towards oneself.’ Several commen-
tators explain 7 ἐστὶ δύο ἣ πλείω to
mean ‘in so far as man consists of
two or more parts,’ and ἐκ τῶν εἰρη-
μένων they would translate ‘in ac-
cordance with what we have before
said,’ referring to Eth. 1. xiii. 9. In
this sense the passage would be a
paralle) one to Eth. v. xi. 9. But it
is clear from the next section that ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων refers to the definitions
of friendship, given in § 1 of this
chapter. ἀφείσθω is used as in Eth.
VIII. 1. 7, VIII. viii. 7. We are not
here referred to the subsequent dis-
‘ cussion in Bth, rx. viii., where by no
means the same subject is renewed.

8 Σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοιε---
ἑαυτού4] ‘But one might almost say
that these things do not appertain to
the bad at all. For they are at vari-
ance with themselves, and desire one
set of things while they wish another,
just like the incontinent ; instead of
what seems to them to be good, they

choose the pleasant though it is hurt-
ful; and others through cowardice
and want of spirit abstain from doing
what they think to be best for them-
selves; and they who through wicked-
ness have committed many crimes
hate their life, and fly from it, and put
an end to themselves.’ The ‘desire’ of
the wicked, as being of the particular
and subject to the domination of the
senses (Eth. VII. iii, 9), 18 at variance
with their ‘wish,’ which is of the
universal and implies a conception
of the good. Cf. Fth. v. ix. 6, Ὑ11|.
xiii. 8. The description of bad men
given here ignores and is at variance
with the conclusions of Book vu. In
that book the strength, and here the
weakness, of vice is represented. Thus
in Eth. vil. viii. the bad man is de-
scribed as unrepentant, abiding by his
purpose (§ 1), having the major pre-
miss of his mind corrupted (§ 4), and
therefore having no wish for the good,
even in the universal. The account
in Book ΥἹΙ., which makes ἀκολασία
or abandoned vice free from all weak-
ness, is more theoretical and lessdrawn
from nature than the above descrip-
tion. All that is said here has a close
relation to, and was probably suggested
by, the words in the Lysis of Plato, p.
214 0: τοὺς δὲ κακούς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται

IV.—V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. 291

δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα'
ς δ᾽ iy ὃ a ὃ lA A 9 ὔ 9 Sg ~ lA

ot αὖ dia ὁὀειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πρατ-
τειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι" οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ
deva πέπρακται διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, μισοῦσί τε καὶ
φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαντούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ
μοχθηροὶ μεθ᾽ ὧν συνδιημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν"
ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽
οὔ 9 , s ¢ 4 4“ φ ς. ἢ + WS

ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες
ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐθέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐθὲν φιλικὸν
πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑἕαντούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρονσιν οὐδὲ
συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐαντοῖς" στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ
ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν,
τὸ δ᾽ ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ
διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
9 eRe ~ , 9 ~ ’ dS e
ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ" μεταμελείας yap οἱ
οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς
ἑαντὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν.

φαῦλοι γέμουσιν.

εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν
μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι" οὕτω
s 8 x ς Ἁ “- A » Q φ
γὰρ καὶ πρὸς eavrov φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος
γένοιτο.
Ἢ δ᾽ εὔνοια φιλίᾳ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἐστί γε φιλία"
γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα,

περὶ αὐτῶν͵ μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μηδ' αὐτοὺς
εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμή-
τους.

9-1ο στασιάζει --- γέμουσιν] ‘For
their soul isin tumult, the one part of
it, through viciousness, grieves at ab-
staining from certain things, but the
other part is pleased (at this abstin-
ence), and the one pulls this way, the
other that way, as though tearing (the
man) in pieces. If it is not possible
to feel pain and pleasure at the same
moment, at all events after a little
while (the bad man) is pained that he
felt pleasure, and he ‘‘could have
wished that those pleasures had not

happened to him ;”’ for the wicked are
full of repentance.’ This picture of
the mental struggles of the bad does
not recall either the phraseology or
the doctrines of Book ΥἹΙ., where
μοχθηρία is contrasted with, and op-
posed to, ἀκρασία (cf. vir. vit. 1). The
metaphor στασιάζει occurs repeatedly
in Plato's Republic, cf. 1. p. 352 A:
(ἡ ἀδικία) ἐν ἐνὶ---ὀνοῦσα---πρῶτον μὲν
ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στα-
σιάζοντα καὶ οὖχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν
ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ
τοῖς δικαίοις, Cf. Αἰ. 1. xiii, 15.

V. 1 Ἢ δ᾽ εὔνοια----ἀκολουθεῖ] ‘Now

292
φιλία δ' οὔ.

HOIKQN ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΊΩΝ IX.

{CHap.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ᾽ εἴρηται. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ

’ ’ 4 9 . » ὃ ’ 49 w# ὭΣ
φιλησιὶς ἐστιν ov yap ἔχει διατασιν οὐδ ὄρεξιν, ΤῊ

2 φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἀκολουθεῖ,

καὶ ἡ μὲν φί λησις μετὰ

e δ᾽ 4 . 9 a φ 4 4 a

συνηθείας, ἡ δ᾽ εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον Kat περὶ τοὺς
4 ὔ μεν 4 “

ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει" εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συν-

θέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ᾽ ἂν οὐθέν" ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν,

προσπαίως εὗνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν.
ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς
» ς F ] 4 4 Α “~ 9a7 4 a | ae e Q
ὄψεως ἡδονή" μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐθεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ
‘ o ” 44 ~ 4 “ἡ 3 > 4 a 4 [4
χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα

good-will is like friendship, but yet it
is not friendship, for good-will is exer-
cised both towards unknown persons,
and when itsown existence is unknown
(to the object), which is not the case
with friendship. But all this has been
said already. It is not even the same
as loving ; for it exhibits neither vio-
lence nor longing, which are the ac-
companiments ofloving.’ The Saxon
word ‘ Good-will,’ and not the Latin
‘Benevolence,’ which is too abstract
and general, is the representative of
εὔνοια. Good-will, says Aristotle, is
Ὁ engendered by the appearance of noble
qualities ; it is rapidly conceived, but
is passive in its character, and is only
the prelude offriendship. There being
no correspondent adjective to the sub-
stantive ‘ Good-will,’ we must express
εὖνοι by ‘ Well-disposed.’ Just as in
Eth, πιι, the cognate faculties to Pur-
pose, and in Eth, vi. the cognate
qualities to Thought are discussed, so
Aristotle here introduces ἃ discussion
of the feelings which are cognate to
Friendship.
καὶ πρότερον δὲ] VIII. il. 3-4.
διάτασι»] ‘Intensity,’ ‘ straining,’
‘violence,’ In the previous section
διατεταμένως means ‘strenuously.’ Cf.
Ar. Polit. vi. xvii. 6: τὰς διατάσεις
τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμούς, ‘ the violent
passions and cryings of children.’

2 ἡ δ᾽ εὔνοια ---- συμβαίνει) While
loving implies acquaintance and fami-
liarity, good-will is conceived instan-
taneously ; thus men conceive good-
will towards particular competitors in
the games from their appearance, and
are inclined to wish them success.

3 Good-will, says Aristotle, is the
prelade of Friendship, just as the
pleasure of the eye is the prelude of
love. This however does not consti-
tute love. The test of love is longing
for a person in absence. Cf. Ar. Rhet.
I. Xi. 11: where the same test is given.
In accordance with the unhappy
notions of the Greeks, ἀπόντα is here
put in the masculine gender.

ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως] In Plato’s Cratylus,
Ῥ. 420 A, it is suggested that "Ἔρως is
derived from εἰσρεῖν.--- ἔρως ὅτι elope?
ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ poh αὕτη
τῷ ἔχοντι, ἀλλ’ ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν
ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰσρεῖν ἔσρος
τό ye παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο. ΟἿ. Shakspeare,
Merchant of Venice, Act. m1. Se. ii.

‘It is engendered in the eyes,

By gazing fed.’
And Romeo and Juliet, Act 1. Se. iii.
‘T’ll look to like, if looking liking

move.’

of τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον] ‘Good-will ἢ

is essentially disinterested in its cha-
racter.

Υ.--.01υν]Τλ HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION ΙΧ, 293

ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους
4φ a
οὐχ οἷόν τ’ εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δ᾽ εὗνοι οὐθὲν
μάλλον φιλοῦσιν: βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν
9 “a σι
εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐθέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.
4
διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν,
χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι
φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ᾽ οὐδὲ
a
yap εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν yap εὐεργετηθεὶς
4 “~
av? ὧν πέπονθεν ἁπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν" ὁ
δὲ λ ’ a 9 9 a ay (ὃ ww 9 , ὃ 3
¢ βουλόμενός tu’ εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι
ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ᾽ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ,

“ 4 ἊΝ , 4 4 4 4 , a
καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν.
ἊΝ δ' e » ὃ » 9 4 . » ’ , ἢ
ὅλως ἡ εὔνοια Ot ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειαν τινα γίνεται; 4
Ψ a“ , a? a ” σ΄ ,
ὅταν τῷ φανῇ καλός τις ἧ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται" διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν 6
e ὃ a a“ a 4 4 9 φ΄ι 4 ’ ς f
ὁμοδοξία" τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπαρ-
ξειεν ἄν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν

Ρ φ 4 4 ~ 9 , 9 4 a 4
φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ yap φιλικὸν τὸ

4 t ς σε 4 4 4 4 ΄- Υ
περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν,
ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ
προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα.
πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ
τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις,
ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν

, ΓῚ Α͂ , 4 4 9 A 4
Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἣ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.

N

4 4
περί Ta

VL 1 φιλικὸν δὲ---ὁμοδοξία] ‘Una- | ment of opinion aboutevery particular

nimity also appears to be of the
nature of friendship ; therefore it is
not the same as agreement of opinion.’
On φιλικὸν, cf. Eth. Vit. Σ 45 VIII.
xiii 6.

οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων] Cf. Eth.
III. ii, 2: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς
βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. Aris-
totle arrives at his definition of ὁμόνοια
inductively, saying that we do not find
the name applied to agreement of

opinion in general, nor again to agree-

subject, but we do find it used of states
whose citizens are unanimous on the
roeasures to be adopted for the common
weal. Hence we get the idea that
unanimity is ‘political friendship.’ Cf.
Eth. vitt. i. 4, where ὁμόνοια is used
as the opposite of στάσις.

24 ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς
ἤθελεν») " Or (if all agree) that Pittacus
shall rule, (supposing this to be)during
the period when he himself was willing
to rule.’ Pittacus, having held his

294 HOIKQN NIKOMAXKEION IX. {CHap.

@ se Pf 9 4 ΠῚ e 9 “-
ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Poww-
; δι 8 4 e
ἰσσαις, στασιάζουσιν" ov yap ἐσθ᾽ ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκά-
4 a e ἤ 4 a a 9 ~ 9 ~ i @ a
τερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ TO ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν Kat
οὕτω γὰρ
πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται

ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν.
πᾶσι γίγνεται οὗ ἐφίενται.
4 ε ᾽ , 4 ld a Α ld ᾽
7 ὁμόνοια, καθαπερ καὶ λέγεται" περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ
4
χέστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον avjxovra. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη
ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν᾽ οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαντοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι
a 9 , 9 a ~ 9 “~ ‘4 e 4 ~ ~
kat αλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν" THY TOI-
οὕτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ
»ἢ; [ 4 , 4 Α 4
εὔριπος, βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα,
᾽ A 4 a φιῇ A 4 4 ed
4 τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν
e a 4 ? Ss Ld , A ,
Te ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι;
ἢ 9 ‘4 9 a 9 S 9 4 δι td
πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις
καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας" ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος
ld ~ 4 a 9 ‘ A 4 a
βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει: μὴ
) 4 a
yap τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν av-
δ ι , [4
τοῖς στασιαζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας,

δὲ 4 , ‘ , “-“
ε μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

> A
QuTOus

7 Οἱὲ δ᾽ εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μάλλον
φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ

elective monarchy for ten years, re-
signed. Had the citizens aster this
period wished him to reign, his own
will would have been wanting to make
unanimity in the state.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Powlacas] Eteocles and
Polynices, Cf. Eurip. Phanisse, vv.
588, sqq.

τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε]
The commentators illustrate this by
the joke of the man who said ‘ that he
and his wife had always perfectly
agreed—in wishing to govern the
house.’

3 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, ὡς εἰπεῖν
‘ Being on the same moorings, as it
were,’ as opposed to the ebbings and
flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Demos-
thenes, De Curona, p. 319, § 281, οὐκ

ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς dppet τοῖς πολλοῖς, 86.
ἀγκύρας. ;

4 This is a picture of the discord
produced by evil passions, where every
one grasping at the larger share in
good things, and shirking his part in
labours and services, watches (ἐξετάζει)
his neighbour to prevent himencroach-
ing. Thus men force each other to
do what is right, while unwilling to
do it themselves,

VII. Aristotle says, it is noticed
as something extraordinary (ὡς παρὰ
λόγον ἐπιζητεῖται) that benefactors
seem to love those to whom they
have done a kindness more than the
benefited persons love them. The
common explanation of the paradox

VIL—VII.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. 295

id “ ~
λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖτα. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις
4 a
φαίνεται, ὅτι of μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται" καθά-
“Ὁ A “- 4
περ οὗν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων of μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ
> F 9 ᾽ € 4 ta 4 >
εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, of δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται
τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετή-
σαντας βούλεσθαι εἷναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους
a ’ σε 4 4 4 ~
τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς TO ἀνταποδοῦναι.
"EK , 4 iO aa a, 4 σι , 9 a 9
πίχαρμος μεν οὖν Tax’ ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ
ζω 4 “~
πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε 0° ἀνθρωπικῷ" ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ
δόξειε 2
vr + > 4 ΑΗ 4 9 Cd ”~ a
δ᾽ ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ
4 ὔ 9 , 9 ’ , 3 Υ 4 a
Tous δανείσαντας" οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ
σι ’ “᾿ “. a e a
τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα: οἱ δ᾽ εὖ
σε ~ 4
πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας, κἂν

9 , “
πολλοί, καὶ μάλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.

‘ Φ , 3 4 , > »# oe
μηθεν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδ᾽ εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ᾽ av. ὅπερ 3
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν. πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον
wv 9 ~ ~ & 9 ’ e Ἁ ~ Ν
ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μάλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου

9 ᾽ 4 U > @ “ 4 4
ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς
ποιητὰς συμβαίνει' ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα

is, that benefactors look forward to
obtaining a return for their kindness,
they thus cherish the persons of those
who are indebted to them. This sel-
fish theory views mankind on the dark
side (ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους), but is not
altogether devoid of truth. <A deeper
(φυσικώτερον) reason, however, may be
assigned for the phenomenon in ques-
tion, namely, that as we can only be
said to exist when we are conscious of
our vital powers (ἐσμὲν ἐνεργείᾳ), 80
anything which gives or increases the
sense of those powers is dear to us.
The benefited person stands to the
benefactor in the relation of a work
to the artist, he is an exponent of the
benefactor’s self, and is thus regarded
with feelings of affection, as being
associated by the benefactor with the
sense of his own existence (στέργει
δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι). These

feelings, of course, cannot be reci-
procated by the benefited person.
Again, the benefactor associates an
idea of the beautiful (τὸ καλόν) with
the recipient of his good deeds; the
other associates with him only an idea
of the profitable, and this is a less
loveable idea, especially when viewed
in the past, and become a matter of
memory. Again, the active part taken
by the benefactor has more affinity to
the active principle of loving.

I τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστο!) This ex-
planation is put by Thucydides (11. 40)
into the mouth of Pericles: βεβαιό-
repos δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε
ὀφειλομένην δι᾽ εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σώζειν.
ὁ δ᾽ ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ
ἐς χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν
ἀποδώσων.

"Exlyappos}] The words ἐκ πονηροῦ
θεωμένους seem to have been taken

296 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX, [Crar.

4 ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε
καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν. τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν
9. «αἱ ~ A 9 “~ a \ a ᾿
αὐτῶν" τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μάλλον ἣ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιή-
σαντα. τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ
φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ: τῷ Civ γὰρ καὶ πράττειν,
ἐνεργείᾳ δὴ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως" στέργει δὴ τὸ
cf ’ A 4 > ~ δὲ la a Υ͂ 9
ἔργον, διότι καὶ TO εἶναι. τοῦτο de φυσικόν: ὃ yap ἐστι
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ
a 9 ‘4 a A a 4 ~ Ψ Fd 9
Mev εὐεργέτη καλὸν TO κατὰ τὴν πράξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν
ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐθὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ᾽
σι 4 “-
6 εἴπερ, συμφέρον" τοῦτο δ' ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ
ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη.

[2 σι ἤ a 4“ γ
5 δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει,

ΝΜ 4 a a
ἤδιστον δὲ TO κατὰ

out of some iambic or trochaic verse
of the Sicilian poet, but the verse
itself has not been preserved.

4 τοιούτῳ δὴ---μηνόει) ‘The case of
benefactors seems then something of
the same kind. For the object bene-
fited is their ‘‘ work ;”’ they love this
therefore more than the work loves
him who made it. The cause of this
is that existence is desired and loved
by all, but we exist by consciousness,
that is to say, by living and acting.
Thus he who has made the work in
question exists consciously, and there-
fore he loves the work, because he
loves his existence. And this is a
principle of nature; for that which
exists potentially, the work proves
to exist actually.” On this mode
of paraphrasing ἐνέργεια, see Vol. I.
Essay IV. Any work of art, or crea-
tion of the mind, or moral achieve-
ment, is here said to show ns ex-
ternally to ourselves. It causes us
to exist ἐνεργείᾳ, that is, not only ἐπ
ourselves, but for ourselves. It thus
becomes 8 union of the objective and
the subjective. And this philoso-
phical principle explains a whole class
of homogeneous facts, not only the

feelings of benefactors towards the
benefited, but of poets towards their
poems, of parents, and especially
mothers, towards their children ;
and of those who have made fortunes
towards their property. These facts
were brought together, without being
analysed, by Plato, cf. Republic, p.
330 B-c. Cf. Btk. rv. i. 20.

ἐνεργείᾳ δὴ--- πω:}] Many commen-
tators understand these words to
mean ‘Therefore by means of con-
scious activity the maker is in a
sense his work,’ in which they are
supported by Eustratius and the Para-
phrast. This would not materially
alter the general drift of the passage.

6 ἡδεῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ----κσήμη)] ‘Now of
the present the living reality is sweet,
of the future the hope, of the past
the memory.’ In two clauses of this
sentence subjective words are used
(ἐλπίς and μνήμη), but ἐνέργεια in the
remaining clause hovers between the
objective and thesubjective. Cf. Ar.
De Memoria, i. 4, where αἴσθησις is
used in an analogous sentence: τοῦ
μὲν παρόντος (ἐστὶν) αἴσθησις, τοῦ δὲ
μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου
μνήμη.

VIT.—VIITL.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. 297

4 > ἢ A 4 e g ~ 4 a
τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιη-
’ ’ , ‘ 4 oN ’ a )
κότι μένει TO ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν yap πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ
παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν
~ e a n~ 4 a 9 , a mn e
καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἣ ἧττον" ἡ προσ-
ὔ 4 , Ε 4 4 4 e 4
δοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἢ μεν φίλησις
ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν.
[4 4 4 a ~ Ψ 4 * 4 a
ἔχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ
φιλικα.
στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν
’ a> BS 4 \ a ἢ ”
παραλαβόντων" δοκεῖ δὴ TO μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι,
τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες
φιλοτεκνότεραι" ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις

τοῖς ὑπερ-

4 4 ‘ 9 la , Ρ
ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον 7

4 Ψ ew
ἴσασιν OTL αὑτῶν.
οἰκεῖον εἶναι.
᾿Απορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ὃ
ἢ ἄλλον τινά" ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα aya-
~ A e 9 4 ~ ὔ 4 ~ a
πῶσι, Kal we ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους αἀποκαλοῦσι;, δοκεῖ
τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ
Ἅ 4 2 rf 4 “- 4 9 oA
ἂν μοχθηρότερος ἢ» τοσούτῳ μάλλον" ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ
oe mY 237 ες A ’ cw 2? \ 4 ᾿ ,
ὅτι οὖθεν ad’ ἑαντοῦ mparre ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ἣ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου

wv ‘ e ~ ’
ἕνεκα" τὸ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ παρίησιν.

VIII. In this interesting chapter,
Aristotle discusses the difficulty as to
‘ whether one ought to love oneself es-
pecially, or some one else.’ On the one
hand, ‘ self-loving ’ is used as a term of
reproach ; on the other hand, one’s
feelings towards oneself are made the
standard for one’s feelings towards
friends. These two points of view
require reconciliation, which may be
effected by a distinction of terms. For
the word ‘self’ has two senses—the
lower and the higher self, the one con-
sisting in appetites and passions, the
other in the intellect and the higher
moral faculties. He that gratifies his
lower self at the expense of others is
‘ self-loving ’ in the bad sense of the
term. He that ministers to his higher

VOL, 11.

n” ᾽ 4 a? N
τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ

self promotesat thesame timethe good
of others, and is worthy of all praise.
Such self-love as this may lead a man
even to die for his friends or for his
country. A man, grasping at the
noble, may give up honour, power,
life itself; and thus the greatest self-
sacrifice will be identical with the
greatest self-love. These considera-
tions show in what sense one ought,
and in what sense one ought not, to
‘love oneself.’

1 ὡς ἐπ αἰσχρῷ] ‘As a term of
reproach.’

οὐθὲν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει] ‘He does
nothing apart from himself.’ ‘ Nihil
a suis rationibus alienum.’

2 τοῖς λόγοις δὲ---οὐκ ἀλόγω:] ‘ With
these theories men’s actions, not un-

FPP

N

298 HOIKQON NIKOMAXEION IX.

[(ΒΔ».

ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν
μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλό-
a 9 ‘ > 9 δ 4 ἢ 5
μενος ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς
εἴσεται. ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει μάλιστ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν,
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πανθ᾽ οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται" εἴρηται γὰρ
4 9 9 9 ~ ll 4 Α A 4 4 ΧᾺ
ὅτι an’ αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
δυΐκε. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν,
4 gS a) A ε a 4 ‘Xr ᾿ 4 4 6 9 [2
οἷον τὸ “μία Ψψυχή᾽ καὶ “ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων᾽ καὶ “ἰσότης
φιλότης καὶ «“ γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον.
πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλισθ᾽ ὑτάρχει' μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ,
καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ᾽ ἑαυτόν.

ὔ ~
παντα γὰρ παῦτα

9 ~ 4 [4
ἀπορεῖται δ᾽ εἰκότως
ὔ 4 4 ? a 9 id 4 ;
ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν.
3ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ
a 9 ’ @ e ? 4 “Ὁ 9 ὔ 4 δ,
διορίζειν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ
g 4 ~ ¢ fF t — oy *
λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, Tay’ ἂν
ὔ ΄-- € 4 i) 9 » 4 >» Ss
4 γένοιτο δῆλον, of μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φὰ-
avrovs καλοῦσι τοὺς
,
χρήμασι
τούτων γὰρ οἱ

e σι 9 [2 Α δι φ
εαντοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον εν
ἡδοναῖς σωματικαῖς"
Α 9 4 4 9 [2 4
πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ
,ν ς Ν ” ᾿ Ἢ ’ ro ε a
αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητα ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ
σι na 4
περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως
a ld 4 ~ “ει ~
τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.

4 e

πολλοί" διὸ καὶ ἡ

A - Α “
Και τιμαῖς και Τοῖς

΄- * A ¢
τοιοῦτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ
id γ᾽ 9 Ἁ ~ ~
προσηγορία γεγένηται amo τοὺ πολλοῦ
ὃ δὲ a ΠῚ ἢ bd ’
ικαίως On τοῖς οὕτω φιλαυτοις ὀνειδί-
[.2 4 4 Ἁ af) € a“ 9 e 47
ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ᾽ αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι
,
λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον᾽ εἰ yap τις ἀεὶ
ἤ A ὔ 4 ( [2
σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μαλιστα παντῶν 7
4 rd “a ς “- “A a a 9 c 4
τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄρετας, καὶ

φαύλου ὄντος.
5 Cerat,

9 4 4 A e ~ “- 3 A ? a ~
ὅλως ἀεὶ TO καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐθεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον
ό φίλαντον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι
Ἂ τοῦ ’ ~ ὁ a 4 ’ ‘ ’ ὶ
φίλαντος" ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ καλλιστα καὶ μαλιστ
Υ ΄΄' ΄σ΄
ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα

reasonably, are at variance.’ To the
list of the meanings of the word ἔργον
given in the note on Κλ. 1. vii. 11,
we must add the above use of τὰ ἔργα
to mean ‘actions’ as opposed to theory.
Cf. Eth. x. i. 3: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν
τοῖς πάθεσι Kal ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν

εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων. X. Vili. 12 : τὸ
δ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων
καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται. Aristotle says
that men do not ‘act’ 88 if they con-
sidered self-love to be wholly bad, and
he proves this by quoting popular pro-
verbs, which support the contrary view.

ΥΠ|.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. 299

ὔ é Μ“ 4 4 4 ’
τούτῳ πείθεται: ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον
μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ
” 4 ’ 4 ἢ ς “a 9 ms ‘
ἄνθρωπος" καὶ φίλαυτος on μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν Kat
τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγε-

ζω a 4 ~ ᾿
Tal τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτον ἑκάστον ὄντος"
καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ
6 cs) ~
λόγον μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἣ μά-
λιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽
“" 4
ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μαλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ ἕτερον εἶδος
τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ
ΤῸΝ “~ 4 , ~ ~ ~
λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ παθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἣ τοῦ
~ 4 (
δοκοῦντος συμφέρει. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς 7

g a ’ ὔ 9 ὔ
πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται

4 b ~ ( A ς 4 a a 4
καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν’ πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν

’ ~

καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ᾽ ἂν
mavr’ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι. ὥστε τὸν μὲν
9 8 ~ ‘ > 4 A 9 N 9 a
ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι’ καὶ yap αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ
καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει: τὸν δὲ μοχ-
θηρὸν οὐ dei: βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας,
’ e ld ~ ων A a σι
φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ 8
ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει" ὁ δ' ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα
, ~ “~ δὶ ~

καὶ πράττει" was yap νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαντῷ,
€ 9 9 a a “ ~ 9 4 4 4 ~
ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ 9
; a 8 “~ Ι 4 A ’ 4
σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ
τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέη ὑπεραποθνήσκειν' προήσεται γὰρ
καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά,

6 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλι:--- ἄνθρωπος]
‘But as the predominant part (in a
state) seems before all things to be
the state, and as the predominant
part in every other system seems to
be that system, so (the predominant
part in man seems, above all things,
to be) man.’ Cf. Bth. x. vil. 9g: δόξειε
δ᾽ Gy καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ
᾿ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. On the uses of the
word κύριος cf. note on Eth. 1. ii. 4; in
the above passage τὸ κυριώτατον means

the ‘most absolute,’ the ‘ruling’
part. Cf. Ar. Politics, 111. vii. 2:
πολίτευμα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων,
ἀνάγκη δ᾽ εἶναι κύριον ἣ ἕνα ἣ ὀλίγους ἢ
τοὺς πολλοὺς.

7 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι»)
‘If virtue is one of the greatest of
goods,’

8-10 The sentiments expressed in
these sections may be compared with
the elevated description of the self-

| sacrifice of the brave man in Εἰ. 11].

300 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. [πὰρ

περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν: ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἧσ-
θῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡἠρέμα, καὶ
“᾿ ~ 9 4 a + νΝ 4 ‘ ,
βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν % πόλλ᾽ ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν
“" 4 4 [4 | Α 4 e “-
πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μίκρας. τοῖς
δ’ ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ᾽ ἴσως συμβαίνει: αἱροῦνται δὴ
‘4 4 φ “ 4 , o 9 A 929 >
μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα mpooivr dy ed’ ᾧ
πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι" γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ
, 9. “A δὲ ‘ ’ νι 4 a 9 4 e fie
χρήματα, αὐτῷ de τὸ καλόν: τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἕαντῳ
ιο ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος"
πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται' καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ
τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι,
, 8 ¢ ef a , 207 4 4
ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ
πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν
τι πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς
ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον
γέμων.
ὡς δ᾽ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται"

9 ᾿Αμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται
’ “a ’ 44 a ’ a ,
φίλων ἢ μή. οὔθεν yap φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις

ix. 4-5. But we may particularly
note here the delicacy of thought
which suggests that the good man
may on occasion give up to his friend
the doing of noble acts, and thus
acquire to himself a still greater
nobility. A comparison is sometimes
instituted between the φιλαυτία of
Aristotle and the ‘self-love’ of Bishop
Butler. But the ‘self-love’ described
by Butler is a creeping quality ; it
deals with means rather than with
ends, and considers the ‘interest’ of
man in this world or the next. Aris-
totle’s g:Aauria is simply a devotion
to what is great and noble.

IX. Does the happy man, who is
all-sufficient in himself, need friends
or not? To prove the affirmative of
this question, Aristotle uses the fol-
lowing arguments :—

1 A priori, we might assume that,
as happiness is the sum of all human
goods, the possession of friends, one
of the greatest of external goods,
would necessarily be included (§ 2).

2 Friends will be required by the
happy man, not so much as the
givers, but rather as the recipients,
of kindness.

3 We might assume also that the
happy man should neither be con-
demned to be a solitary, nor to live
with strangers and chance people (ὃ 3).

4 Those who take the negative side
in the question have an unworthy con-
ception of friends, as persons affording
profit or pleasure. The happy man
is almost independent of such (§ 4),
but yet he may want friends in
a higher sense. Happiness consists
in the play of life (ἐνέργεια), and he
that sees before his eyes the virtuous

VIIL—IX.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION IX. _ 301

καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν" ὑπάρχειν yap αὐτοῖς τἀγαθα- αὐτάρκεις
Φ wv 9 4 a ν᾿ 4 ¢ 4 9 4
οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν
ΝΜ 4 8 ~ 9 a @ 4
ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δ αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ" ὅθεν τὸ

ὅταν ὃ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων .

od ? 9 ’ A , 9 9 , 4 ‘ ~ 9 ,
ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ παντ᾽ ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ edai- 2

, 4 4 ὃ a a ὃ - “a 9 Α 4 ~

μονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν
μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ
πάσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐερ-
γετεῖν, κάλλιον δ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισο-
μένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον
9 9 a a“ ‘ a 9 4 a e 4 ~
ev εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ τοῦ
ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένον τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυ-
χούντων οὗς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώ- 3

a 4 ’ 9 A ‘ Φ 3 4 e "

τὴν ποιεῖν τὸν μακαριον᾽ οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽’ ἂν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν
τὰ παντ᾽ ἔχειν ἀγαθά" πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ
κι ὔ 4 ~ 9 , 4 ΄-ὦ e , ᾿ bY
συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ᾽ ὑτάρχει" τὰ
γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς μετὰ φίλων
καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ᾽ ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων

acts of ἃ friend has a delightful sense = where Aristotle guards himself against
of the play of life, seeing harmonious Ὁ thesupposition that it implies a lonely
action and identifying it with himself , life, and where he promises to return
(ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, § 5). , tothe subject. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν
5 Again, the sympathy and excite- | αὕταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὸ δ᾽ αὕταρκες
ment of friends enables a man to . λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῷντι βίον
prolong that vivid action and glow . μονώτην᾽ κιτιλ. ᾿Αλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦ-
of the mind which is the essence of Os ἐπισκεπτέον.
happiness (§§ 5-6). ὅταν ὁ δαίμων») from the Orestes of
6 It alsoconfirms him in the prac- Euripides, 665, sqq.:
tice of virtue (88 6-7} l ; τοὺς φίλους
7 Finally, a deeper reason may be ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρὴ τοῖς φίλοισιν ὠφελεῖν᾽
assigned for the necessity of friends | ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων ;
to the happy man ; it depends on our ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ὠφελεῖν θέλων.
love of life. That sympathetic con- 2 ἀπονέμοντας) ‘Us who allot;’ cf.
sciousness (συναισθάνεσθαι) which we | Eth. 1. vii. 8, where happiness is said
have of a friend's existence, by means | to be τέλειόν τε καὶ adrapxes. The
of intercourse with him, is, only in a | form of expression here used is similar
secondary degree (χαραπλήσιον), the | to that in Hth. 1. x. 2: Ἢ τοῦτό ye
same as the sense of our own existence. | παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς
1 αὐτάρκεσυ) The quality αὐτάρκεια | λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαι-
is claimed for happiness, Eth, 1. vii. 6, | μονίαν ;

302 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX, [CHar.

4 συνημερεύειν" δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγου-
σιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν ; ἣ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους
οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν
δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. οὐδὲ
δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν. ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐθὲν
δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων

5 φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀλη-
θές" ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τίς
ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει
ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ Cav
καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα
καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ
οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα
ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν
σπουδαίων δὴ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς :

ἄμφω yap ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα.

4 ἐπτεισάκτου ἡδονῇ] ‘ Adventitious
pleasure,’ ‘ pleasure introduced from
without ;’ cf. Eth. L viii. 12: οὐδὲν δὴ
προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν
ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει τὴν
ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Cf. Fth. x. vii. 3.
The word ἐπείσακτος occurs in Plato’s
Cratylus, p. 420 B, quoted above in
the note on ΙΧ. v. 3.

5 ἐν ἀρχῇ --- ῥᾷο») ‘For we said at
the outset (th. 1. vii. 14) that happi-
ness is a kind of vital action, and it is
plain that this arises in us, and does
not exist in us like a possession. But
if being happy consists in the play of
life, and the actions of the good man
are good and essentially pleasurable,
as we said before (Εἰ. 1, viii. 13),
and also the sense of a thing being
identified with oneself is one of the
sources of pleasure, but we are able to
contemplate our neighbours better
than ourselves, and their actions better
than our own, then the actions of good
men being their friends are pleasur-
able to the good; for (such actions)
contain both the two elements that

e e a
Oo paxaptos on

are essentially pleasurable. The su-
premely happy man then will require
friends of this character, if he wishes
to contemplate actions which are good
and also identified with himself: and
such are the actions of the good man
being his friend. Again, men think
that the happy man ought to live
pleasurably, whereas life is painful
to the solitary man, for by oneself
it is difficult to maintain long a
vivid state of the mind, but with
others and in relation to others this
is easier.’

The first part of this sentence con-
tains a complex protaris, to which
the apodosis is al τῶν σπουδαίων δή,
κιτιλ.

τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια) In the
passage referred to (Eth. 1. viii. 13)
the words are al κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις,
which may justify the above trans-
lation.

ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι) Some of the com-
mentators take ἄμφω as though it
were the nominative case to ἔχουσε,
and meant ‘both the good man and

IX. ] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. 303

φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πρα-
ἕξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας" τοιαῦται δ᾽ αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
, ed ΝΜ) , ὃ a “δέ ~ Q 9 ,
φίλου ὄντος. οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα"
, A a ‘ ε ’ 3 . er ’ e A
μονώτη μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος" οὐ yap ῥάδιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸν
ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον.
ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα Kal’ αὑτήν, 6
ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι" ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, 9 σπου-
δαῖος, ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πραξεσὶ χαίρει, ταῖς δ᾽ ἀπὸ κακίας
δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδε-
ται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται γίνοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ 7
ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθά-
4 Θ ? , , δ᾽ 4 Κι
περ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον ἐπισκοποῦσιν
Ρ e a , > , te e e 4
ἔοικεν 6 σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς
4 A ~ , 9 4 4’ @ ~ ,
εἶναι" τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ
4 ‘ ν᾿ «ὃ. 9 ᾽ ε» ὴ 4 - er es
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ᾽ αὑτό" τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς
a ᾽ 4 ’ 4 s 9 ’ a ,
ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἧ νοήσεως"

his friend.’ But it would be irrelevant
to speak of the feelings of the friend.
The question is, what advantage does
the happy man get out of having
friends? ἄμφω here evidently applies
to τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα, as is further
proved by the words ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ
οἰκείας in the next sentence ; it refers
to what has gone before, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ
—olxetoy τῶν ἡδέων.

6-7 ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος---φησι»Ὶ The
good man, feeling the same sort of
pleasure in the moral acts recipro-
cated between himself and his friend
which the musical man feels in good
music, will prolong and enjoy that
reciprocation, and, as Theognis says,
‘will learn what is good by associ-
ating with the good.’ The advantage
here attributed to friendship is that,
by adding the element of pleasure
to the best functions of our nature,
it assists and develops them. (Cf.
Eth, X. ν΄ 2: συναύξει γὰρ τὴν
ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή --- ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν
εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ.

καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς] On the ‘moral
sense ’ in its analogy to the ‘ musical
ear,’ cf. Eth. x. iii. 10.

7 τὸ δὲ ζῆν---»οεῖν) ‘People define
‘‘living” in the case of animals by
the power of sensation, in the case of
men by the power of sensation or
thought. But the word “power” has
its whole meaning in reference to the
exercise of that power, and the dis-
tinctive part of the conception lies
in the ‘‘exercise.” Thus the act of
living appears distinctively to be an
act of perceiving or thinking.’ The
train of reasoning in this latter part
of the chapter is, that life consists in
consciousness; life is good and sweet;
consciousness is intensified, and life
therefore is made better and sweeter,
by intercourse with friends.

rots {pgois] On the ascending scale
of life from the plant to the man, ef.
De Animé, τι. iii 1-9, Eth. τ. vii
12, and Vol. I. Essay V. p. 295.

304 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. [CHap.

e a γ 9 4 9 ¢ 9 ld 4 4 6 3
ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν
~ 54 Π] Ψ δὲ 4 ~~ ἢ ‘ 4A 9 tf a
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ" ἔοικε δὴ TO ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
a 4 4 ~~ ~ 9 e 9 “~ A eNF e
γοεῖν, τὸ de ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων" ὡρισ-
4 a? 4 3 φ0 4 ~ 4 ~ , 4 ΝᾺ] ~
μένον γάρ, τὸ δ᾽ ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως. TO de τῇ
ὔ 9 Ἁ 4 ~ 9 a ὔ 4 ~ ear
φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ" διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ
8 εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρ-
μένην, οὐδ᾽ ἐν λύπαις" ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. fev τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης
ΝΜ + 4 δ᾽ 4" A “ 9 8 4 ee
9 ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ
“) 4 , 93 ~ Ul 4 ἢ 4 ΄ι 4 Ld
(ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα
τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους" τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώ-
τατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή), ὁ δ᾽ ὁρῶν ὅτι
Φ “ 4 ld a « 9% t Ψ 9 ὔ δε ΦΨ
ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι
a a x A “~ wv: ς » 4 3 o
βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανό-

ἡ δὲ δύναμις els τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνά- | vi. 14, and Vol. I. Essay IV. pp.
yerat] Cf. Metaphysics, Vitt. ix. 5: | 252-257.
φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα els ἐνέργειαν ᾿Εν τοῖς ἐχομένοι:] This must
ἀναγόμενα εὑρίσκεται. -be, after all (see Vol. I. p. 49),
διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι] ‘Where- | undoubtedly an interpolation. The
fore it appears to be sweet to all,’ te. | editor probably had in his mind a
of course ordinary individuals love | confused reference to x. iii. 2.
life, in which there is a certain physi- 9 Εἰ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν] This is
cal sweetness; cf. Ar. Politics, 111. vi.§: | the beginning of a complex protasis,
Δῆλον δ᾽ ws καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν Kaxowd- | which gocs on prolonging itself, ὁ δ᾽
Gecay οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχό- | ὁρῶν--- τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, &c., till
μενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημε- | at last it finds its apodosis in 8 10;
plas ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν
This Greek view of the sweetness ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ wapa-
of life contrasts with the philosophy | πλησίως.
of the Hindoos, which represents life καὶ ἐκὶ τῶν ἄλλων---νοεῖν] ‘ And with
as a burden, and individuality as a | respect to all the other functions, in
curse. like manner there is something which
8 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ---φανερώτερον] ‘But | perceives that we are exercising them,
one must not take (as an instance) a | so then we can perceive that we per-
vicious and corrupt life, nor one in | ceive, and think that we think. But
pain ; for such a life is unharmonised, | this (perceiving) that we perceive or
like its characteristics. In the follow- | think, is perceiving that we exist ;
ing discourse the nature of pain will | for existing, as we said (§ 7), consists
be made more clear.’ in perceiving or thinking.’ ἐνεργοῦμεν
dépiocros] ‘Unlimited ;’ ‘without | is here used in a purely objective
law, balance, order, harmony.’ On | sense; the ἐνέργεια is here distin-
the use made by Aristotle of this | guished from the consciousness which
Pythagorean formula, see Eth. 11. | necessarily accompanies it, and with

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION IX.

IX.—X.] 305

μενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα
καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν. τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν,
ef ἢ , 4 4 3 9 r a nz ‘
ὅτι ἐσμέν. τὸ yap εἶναι ἣν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἧ νοεῖν. τὸ 8
4 a w ~ ede 3 e ; a S
αἰσθανεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ᾽ αὑτό" φύσει γὰρ
9 A ἢ a 9 4 4 g 9 e “~ 9 [2
ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ev ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι
ἡδύ.
> 9 ’ 4 > κα Λ΄ ee ’ ᾿
εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ" συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ

ς a A a lo 4 g ἷ a 9 a Ψ 4
αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ
τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται. ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ
σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον" ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος
ἐστίν, καθάπερ οὗν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ,

“" ᾿ \ ᾿ , δ , "Ν᾿ 3
οὕτω καὶ τὸ Tov φιλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἣν
ἡ δὲ

’ 4
συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα

e 4 a ‘ 4 ’ ς ~ 9 ~ ἅΨὶ

αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος.
τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ᾽ δαντήν.
ὃ a ‘ a , Ψ ” a δὲ , ’ ’ a
εἰ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο de γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν τῷ
συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας" οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
4 a ὔ Ἁ 9
ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ

‘ ? “ ϑΨ “(ἡ Ld
τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι,

[ἐ Α los 9 4 ~
δόξειε ΤΟ συζῆν ἔπι τῶν
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων εἰ
δὲ “~ 9 ‘ ἢ e ᾽ 9 θ᾽ e Ἶ, 9 θὸ ~

ἡ τῷ μακαρίῳ To εἶναι aiperov ἐστι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ, ἀγαθὸν τῇ

ἤ A Δ eQ7 ’ ᾿ A 4 ~ P 9 “
φύσει ὃν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλὴήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστιν,

νι ¢ ’ “- ε ~ " »” a » 9 4 4. «A e 4
καὶ ὁ didos τῶν αἱρετῶν ἂν εἴη. ὃ δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετὸν:

aA é ~ e , 7 A A , 4 yo. 4 "4 ὃ ’
τοῦτο del ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτη εἐνόεης ἔσται. εήσει
4 ~ 3 ’ ’ ,
apa τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

4 a ’

Ap’ οὖν ws πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ

τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ

μήτι πολύξεινος μήτ᾽ ἄξεινος,

which it is frequently identified. See
Vol. I. Essay IV. The absolute unity
of existence with thought here laid
down anticipates the ‘cogito ergo
sum’ of Descartes.

10 Συναισθάνεσθαι--νἐμεσθαι] ‘There-
fore we ought to have a sympathetic
consciousness of the existence of our
friend, and this can arise by means of
living together with him, and sharing
words and thoughts with him, which
is the true meaning of “‘living to-
gether” in the case of men; it does
not mean, as with cattle, simply herd-

VOL, IL

ing in the same spot.’ This view of
the importance of ‘intercourse,’ and
of the advantages to be derived from
it, is repeated and summarised in
ch. xii., and forms the conclusion of
the treatise.

X. The question of the plurality of
friends is brought under analysis in
this chapter. The number of one’s
friends for use or for pleasure is shown
to be limited by convenience. The
number of one’s friends, properly so
called, is shown to be limited by one’s

QQ

amg

Oo

306 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. [ Cuar.

an ” φ :
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτ᾽ ἀφιλον εἴναι μήτ᾽ αὖ
“- 4 A 4 ~ a
2 πολύφιλον καθ᾽ ὑπερβολήν ; τοῖς μεν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν Kat
a x 9
πάνυ δόξειεν ἂν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν: πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπη-
σι ~ [4
ρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πρατ-
τειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς
, 4 4 ὃ A} a ave Ae θὲ mp ὃ a
περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς TO καλῶς ζῆν. οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ
αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν
3 τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείοσ-
3 9 ὔ A Αἴ td QA ~ 6
τοὺς κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρων καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους,
ὥσπερ πόλεως ; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ᾽
ἂν πόλις, οὔτ᾽ ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ
A 9 wv ” Ψ 9 a » ᾿Ὶ A σι
ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν
e ‘4 QA g , 9 ~ e a a
ὡρισμένων. Kat φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ
ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι, μεθ’ ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν" τοῦτο
4 γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι 0 οὐχ οἷόν τε πολ-
λοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὑτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλρν. ἔτι δὲ

lxavGs}] This reading, adopted by
Bekker from a majority of MSS., is
surprising; ἱκανῶς περίεργοι would
tical difficulties which would attend | not be a natural phrase, whereas the
a close intercourse (συζῆν) with many | context really requires οἱ πλείους δὴ

incapacity to feel the highest kind |
persons at once, who would also have | τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν.

of affection (ὑπερβολή ris φιλίας) for
many individuals, and by the prac-

to associate harmoniously with each 3 οὔτε γὰρ--- πόλις ἐστίν] ‘For a
other. On the whole the question is | state could not consist of ten men,
answered in the negative. nor again if consisting of a hundred

1 ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι!) ‘Neatly ex- | thousand does it still continue to be
pressed,’ a state.’ This extremely limited idea

μήτε wodttewos] From Hesiod, | of the size of a state is based on the
Works and Days, 713. Greek notion that each citizen must
personally take part in the adminis-
tration of affairs. On this hypothesis,
a state consisting of a hundred thou-
sand citizens might easily appear un-
wieldy. Aristotle in the Polttics, ὙΤΙ.
iv. 9, represents the state as an organ-

2 This section may be said to | ism of limited size: ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι
retract, upon further consideration, μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
what was admitted, Eth. vil. vi. 3: πάντων, ζῴων, purty, ὀργάνων " καὶ γὰρ
Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε
ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται " πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοι- | κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὑτοῦ
στοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ al bwnpecia | δύναμιν, κιτ.λ,

μηδὲ πολύξεινον μηδ᾽ ἄξεινον καλέεσθαι.

The line is untranslateable into
English, as we have no word (like the
German Gastfreund) to express both
‘host’ and guest,’ as ξένος does.

X.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION ΙΧ. 307

κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες
μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν. τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς
ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ 5
τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς" εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα
“ a "ὃ θ ~ δὲ “ θ θ ww a So »
τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ de συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει
μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι
4 Α ζω e ἢ 9a a 9 ὔ a
εἰς τὸ συζὴν ἱκανοί: οὐδὲ yap ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν
πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων'
ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς
ἕνα: καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν 6
ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων' οὐ γίγνονται γὰρ φίλοι
4 4 4 ε a , e δ᾽ ες ᾽ 3
WoAAot κατὰ τὴν εταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ υὑμνούμεναι eV

1

4 td e
δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ

Α ~
δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως

~ 4
ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολι-

ἕω a a ~ 9 [Δ
τικῶς, οὗς καὶ καλοῦσιν αρέσκους.

5 διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων] This is
almost a verbatim repetition of £th.
VIII. vi, 2, which passage contains the
germ of the present chapter.

6 οὕτω δ᾽ --- τοιούτου! ] ‘ And this
seems to be practically the case ; for
we do not find that people have many
friends (together) on the footing of
companionship. And the ‘classical
friendships of story are recorded to
have been between pairs. But they
who have many friends, and who asso-

᾿ ciate familiarly with all, seem to be

|

friends to none, except in a civil way,
and men call them “over-complaisant.”
In a civil way indeed it is possible to
be a friend to many without being
over-complaisant, but being really
kind ; but on a moral and personal
footing this is not possible in relation
to many ; one must be content to find
even a few worthy of this.’

ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων] Opposed to
τοῖς λόγοις implied in τὸ λεχθέν
above. Cf. the use of τὰ ἔργα, Eth.
IX. Vill. 2.

ἑταιρικὴν)] Cf. Eth. vit. xii. 1-6,
and vill. vy. 3. ‘ Companionship,’

“~ Y a
πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν

which Aristotle compares to the feel-

| ing between brothers, is much more

akin to the perfect and ideal friend-
ship than it is to either of the lower
forms of friendship (for gain or for
pleasure). It is essentially based on
personal considerations (δι᾽ avrovs),
though not necessarily on moral con-
siderations (δι᾿ ἀρετήν).

αἱ δ᾽ ὑμνούμεναι) Fritzsche quotes
Plutarch, De Am. λέω. 2: τὸν μακρὸν
καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα dua τοῦ
λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ
κατὰ ζεῦγος φιλίας λέγονται Θησεὺς καὶ
Πειρίθους, ᾿Αχιλλεὺς καὶ Πάτροκλος,
᾿Ορέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φωτίας καὶ
Δάμων, ᾿Επαμινώνδας καὶ Πελοκίδας.

οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι --- οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι φίλοι] Cf. Εμαεηνίαη, Ethics, vii.
xii. 17: τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὔχεσθαι
πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς
φίλος ᾧ πολλοὲ φίλοι, ἄμφω λέγεται
ὀρθῶς, which sentence reconciles the
above passage with Ath. viLi5. In
an external way (wrodcTiuxds) ἃ man
should have many friends, personally
(δι᾽ αὑτούς) a few.

dpéoxous] Cf, Eth. τι. vii. 13, IV. vi. 9.

TT

2 ‘ ‘ , ὃδ ’
καὶ μεέεῖζῖα TOVTWY ἰαΎεΕιν.

3 συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν.

4 καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἤδεται καὶ λυπεῖται,

808 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION ΙΧ. [CHar.

e

ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, add’
ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ" or ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι αὑτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι
4 ὔ 4 4 Α a e e a [4
πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.
Πότερον δ᾽ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυ-
χίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται" of τε γὰρ ἀτυ-
χοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, of τ᾽ εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ
βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγ-
καιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων
4 σι a g 4 “- 9 e Ά 4 4
ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς
ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν" τούτους γὰρ αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν

οὗς εὖ ποιήσουσιν"

ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία
αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις" κουφί-
4 e t , “~ , a
Covrat yap ot λνπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φι λων. διὸ
Ἅ 4 ’ , ’ “ ἵ °
κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβα-
vourw, ἣ τούτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα
καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ
μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ de ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω-
ἔοικε 0 ἡ παρουσία
4 4 A a a 8 ~ a ,
αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ TO Opuy τοὺς φίλους
ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις ἐπικουρία
4 a Ά σι Ξ 4 a e ῇ a
πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι" παραμυθητικὸν yap ὁ φίλος καὶ
~ » 4 κι Ἃ ’ oN a "» dd : 73 a 1, 9
τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ἣ ἐπιδέξιος" olde yap τὸ ἦθος

μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι.

4 4 e

τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον
4 tf 9 4 a e ~ 9 iA ὔ ~ a
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ atuxiats λνπηρόν: sas γὰρ

φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν

δι᾽ αὑτοῦ] Cf, Eth. ΙΧ. i 7, and
note.

rowtrovs}] i.e. capable of being
made personal friends.

XI. The question whether friends
are most needed in adversity or pros-
perity is here answered by saying,
that in adversity friendship is more
necessary, and in prosperity more
beautiful, Some remarks are added
on the exact operation of friendship
in alleviating sorrow, and some prac-
tical rules are deduced.

2 ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν»)
“Whether they take part of the burden,
as it were.’ This is the ordinary me-
taphor. Cf. Xenophon, Memor. 11.
Vil. 1. (Σωκράτη) ’Aplorapyéy wore
ὁρῶν σκυθρωπκῶς ἔχοντα " ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ
᾿Αρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι" χρὴ δὲ
τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις.
ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.
Aristotle εἰ πίβαι, αἰ που fully giving,
a more psychological account of the
operation of friendship in adversity.

3 μικτή mis) Cf. Eth. im. 1. 6, rv.
ix, 8,

X.—XI.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. 309

ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους
αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνη τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινο-
4 4 3 e 4 @# , 9
μένην λυπὴν οὐχ ὑπομένει, OwS τε συνθρήνους ov
a 4
προσίεται διὰ TO μηδ᾽ αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός " γύναια
δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ
~ e t q ~

φιλοῦσιν ὡς irovs καὶ συναλγοῦντας.
ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω.

μιμεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐν
e δ ’ A 3 ’
ἡ εν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις ς
“A , , , ὃ 4 eQ a 3 - 4
τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν
διὸ δόξειεν ἂν

σι 4 A 4 9 ’ σι ‘ , 4
δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως"
εὐεργετητικὸν γὰρ εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας
ὀκνοῦντα" μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν,
ὅθεν τὸ

4 @ AY φᾷ “~ e ~ 5 a
€vvoiay OTt yoOovTal ἐστι τΤοις AvTOU ἀγαθοῖς.

> ,
εἶναι καλον"

ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν,

μάλισκα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχλη-
θέντες μεγάλ᾽ αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν. ἰέναι δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως 6
ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προ-
θύμως (φίλον γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ
δ \ 1 3 2 . 2? n N , \ oo
Kat TO μὴ ἀξιώσαντας " ἀμφοῖν yap κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον),
εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ
9 ζω [ ἤ A 9 ’ A ῇ 4
εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως " οὐ

βρῶ, a ee ee eee

4 κἂν ph ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλνπίᾳ---
θρηνητικόΞ] ‘ And (such a one), unless
he be excessively impassive, cannot
endure the pain which is brought >
upon them; and altogether he does

Aristotle was thinking of the 4jax of
Sophocles, vv. 319, 320:

πρὸς γὰρ κακοῦ re καὶ βαρυψύχον γόους
τοιούσδ᾽ ἀεί wor’ ἀνδρὸς ἐξηγεῖτ᾽ ἔχειν.

not like sympathetic wailers, not being
given to wailing himself.’ The words
κἂν μὴ x.7.A. have troubled the com-
mentators. The Paraphrast explains
them as if meaning :—‘ And unless
(the sympathetic presence of friends)
be exceedingly painless to them.’ But
evidently the clause is brought in
in reference to of ἀνδρώδεις. ‘ Manly
natures’ are not at all unlikely to be
somewhat blunt and callous, and de-
ficient in sensibility for the feelings of
others. One might almost fancy that

§ ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν] These words
are not to be found in any extant play
or fragment. The nearest approach
to them is in Sophocles, Gd. Tyr.
1061: Gus νοσοῦσ᾽ ἐγώ.

6 φίλου γὰρ---ἤδιο»] ‘ For it behoves
a friend to benefit (his friends), and
especially those who are in need, and
to (benefit) them when they have not
asked, For this is nobler and sweeter
for both parties,’ With καὶ τὸ, εὖ
ποιεῖν isto berepeated. Some editions,
against the MSS., read xa? τοὺς,

310 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX. [Curap.

yap καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ᾽
4 δί 9 “- ὃ “ ᾿ 4 ’ Ξ > # ‘
ἀηδίας ev τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον" ἐνίοτε γὰρ
’ e a on ~ ῇ 9 Ψ e a
συμβαίνει, ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ
φαίνεται.
4. Α 4 > Ψ a 7 A ‘ ec a 4 [4 Ld
12 p’ οὗν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι TO ὁρῶν ἀγαπητότατόν
4 4 e ~ ἢ 8 3 a by
ἐστι καὶ paddov αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ Tas
λοιπάς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ
γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ
on) ὁ ὔ A e Ul 4 e A e a Ε
συζῆν ; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει,
” 4 4 bY ὔ a e A e κ᾿ id
οὕτω καὶ πρὸς Tov φίλον. περὶ αὑτὸν & ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι
᾿Ψ᾿ e 4 A A ‘ , ὃ V4 e δ᾽ >? e
ἔστιν αἱρετή" καὶ περὶ Tov φίλον δή. ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια yive-
ται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ᾽ εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται.
, καὶ ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ εἶναι 4 οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται
τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν"
διό f μὲ { ᾿ δὲ j ἄλλοι δὲ
ἰόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ
συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν,
ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγα-
Tact τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ: συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν
φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται
ἈΞ. συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά -
κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ

—_—— ———

δόξαν δ᾽ ---συμβαίνει)] ‘Butone should , Cardwell follow some of the MSS. in
beware perhaps of getting the reputa- | reading αὐτῆς, t¢ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.
tion of churlishnessin rejecting(bene- | But ἡ ἐνέργεια stands naturally alone
fits); for this sometimes happens.’ | (cf. δίλ. ΙΧ. ix. 6), meaning ‘ the vivid
ἀηδία answers to the ‘insuavis, acer- | sense of life. And a similar collo-
bus,’ of Horace, Sat. 1. iii. 85. cation occurs Eth. VILL iii. 5: γίξεται

γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

XII. In conclusion, the best thing 3 κοινωνοῦσι yap—ddAfros] “ For,
in friendship is—intercourse. This ' being of an unstable nature, they
gives vividness to the pursuits of | have fellowship in evil, and become
life ; and when good men have inter- | bad by assimilation to each other.’
course with each other, they mutually | Cf. Eth. 1x. 1. 7: τοῖς φιλοσοφίας
strengthen and increase the good that | κοινωνήσασιν. The word ἀβέβαιοι here
is in them. is not connected with the use of

1 ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ βέβαιον in Eth. viii viii. 5: Ol δὲ
συζῆν] ‘ But it is by living together μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσυ.
that they attain the fulness of life.’ | Aristotle is not talking here of the in-
The word ἐνέργεια here has evident | stability of the friendship between bad
reference to ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν in | men, but of its evil results mutually.
the preceding sentence. Zell and | Throughoutthetreatise on Friendship

XI.—XII.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IX.

41]

’ e , 9 e ‘ A δ a 4 ’
γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις' ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής,
ἤ a 4 , ~ a 4 ,
συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις" δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους
, 9 ΄-ὠ bY ἴω 4 4 ’
γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες αλλήλους" αποματ-
Ἁ 9 ? ’ Φ 4 a [12
TovTat γὰρ wap’ ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ aw’ ἰσθλα.

t περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω" ἑπόμενον δ᾽ ἂν 4

εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

he speaks of the weakness of vice (cf.
note on IX. iv. 9), and here he says

that bad men, from the weaknessand .
instability of their natures, imbibe .

evil example,
ἀπομάττονται ---- ἀρέσκονται), ‘ For
they take the stamp of one another in
those things which they like.’ Cf.
Aristophanes, Rana, v. 1040:
ὅθεν ἡ ᾿μὴ φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς
ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ] On this passage of

' Theognis, which is refcrred to above,

Eth, 1x. ix. 7, see Vol. I. Essay 1].
p- 93 It is after Aristotle’s manner
to end a treatise with a line of poetry;
cf. Metaphysics, x1. x. 14, where the
book ends with the verse

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν wrodvxoipavly’ els κοίρανος
ἔστω.

Accordingly the unnecessary para-
graph περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας x.7.X. is pro-
bably the interpolation of an editor.

PLAN OF BOOK X.

Ce Seemed

HIS book,—beginning with a treatise on Pleasure (which sub-
ject is introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals ;
(2) because of the controversies about it), and rising from the
critical examination of extreme views to Aristotle’s own theory of
Pleasure, namely, that it is the sense of the vital functions, or, in
other words, of the harmonious action of some one faculty—pro-
ceeds, almost without transition, to declare that Happiness in the
truest sense of the term must consist in the action of the highest
faculty, and that, this highest faculty being Reason, Philosophy
must, beyond all comparison with anything else, whether idle
᾿ amusement, or even the exercise of the moral virtues, constitute
Happiness, or that Practical Chief Good which is the end of Man,
and the province of the ethical branch of Politics.

Thus far this branch of Science, having obtained a definite
conception, might be thought to be complete. But it still remains,
says Aristotle, to ask whether something cannot be added towards
its practical realisation, and, as habits of life are clearly necessary
for the attainment of human excellence, on which the Chief Good
depends, it follows that we shall require such domestic institutions
as may be favourable to the cultivation of human excellence. These
institutions, whether of public or private ordinance, can only be
rightly conceived after a scientific study of the principles of Legis-
lation, t.e, of Politics in its highest form. To this, then, Aristotle
proposes to address himself, considering it to be a branch of science
which has hitherto been neglected. He roughly sketches out the
plan of his works on Politics, with a transition to which the ethical
treatise concludes. |

This tenth book then shows us the Ethics as a rounded whole.
It is written in close connection with Book I. (cf. X. vi. 1), and it

PLAN OF BOOK X. 313

sums up referentially the contents of Books I. 11, HI. IV. VIII.
IX. But while the Ethics are thus rounded off in their begin-
ning and end, and as to part of their contents, it is clear on the
other hand that they contain a lacuna which has been artificially
filled up.

It is very significant that the present book makes no reference
to the contents of Books V. VI. VII.; and it seems impossible
to avoid thinking that Aristotle wrote the conclusion to his ethical
treatise at ἃ time when he had not as yet composed certain parts
which were meant to be introduced into it. Whether he after-
wards ever composed those parts in literary form, or whether he
merely gave materials for them in his oral discourses, we have now
no means of knowing. That Books V. VI. and VII. were not
actually composed by Aristotle we have seen many reasons for
believing.

VOL, II. RR

HOIKOQN NIKOMAXEION X.

META δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἕπεται διελθεῖν- μά-
λιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν: διὸ
δ , A , 4 ἤ ἐδ ~ 4 ῇ ὃ «-
παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἱακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπη. οκεῖ
δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν
οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ" διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς
τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ
τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ
λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ ὧν
δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων
3 , ς A Ἁ 9 Ac ἐδ A λ ’ ε
ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τάγαθον ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ
δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι
“ . ς δὲ ww ’ ᾶΞ Q a ,
οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, of δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον
e ΄- 3 ’ a 70 a “~ Ἂ a 4 4 9 v τ
ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μή εστίν
ce? “ A 4 4 4 | Q ὃ ὔ ~
ῥέπειν yap Tous πολλοὺς προς αὐτὴν Kat ουλεύειν ταῖς
e “σι ὃ A δ a 9 . ’ Ww Ἃθ a A a “ὍΦ
ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγειν" ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως

I. The treatise on Pleasure opens
analogously to that on the Voluntary
(Eth. 11. i. 1), and that on Friendship
(vil1. i. 1, 6), justifying the introduc-
tion of the subject, (1) as connected
with Ethics, (2) as having been made
matter of controversy.

I μάλιστα γὰρ---ἡμῶ»] ‘ For it seems
to be most intimately connected with
the human race.’ Omni sed non soli,
seo below v. 8.

διὸ παιδεύουσι «.7.A.] This is all
taken from Plato’s Laws, 11. Ὁ. 653.
See note on £th. τι. iii. 2, where the
passage is quoted.

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν] Some
MSS. read ἀρχὴν, which it is strange

that the commentators should have
thought a natural reading, supported
by al μέν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ (below,
Vili. 3). Because φρόνησις is regarded
by Aristotle as a syllogism, or set of
syllogisms, having dpxal or major
premisses,—it does not follow that
the phrase ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρχή is ad-
missible.

2 οἱ μὲν yap—péoov] ‘For some
call pleasure the chief good, others on
the contrary call it exceedingly evil,
(of these latter) some perhaps beliew-
ing it to be so, but others thinking it
for the interests of morality to declare
pleasure to be an evil, even if it be
not 80, because most men incline

Cuap. I.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X. 315
ἐπὶ TO μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ OU καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται.

οἱ 3
4 Α ΄΄ 9 a ὔ N a“ , , e [ὦ
yap περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν
εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων. ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ
τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθὲς -προσαναιροῦ-
‘ e s ὔ 4 e , 9 , > 9 é 4
aw 6 γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς ποτ ἐφιέμενος, ἀπο-
κλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν. ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν" τὸ
διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀλη-
θεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι
> 9 ‘ 4 s Α QA 4 ΞΡ “-
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον: συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς
»# --
ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς Evmévras ζῆν
κατ᾽ αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιουτων ἅλις, τὰ δ' εἰρημένα

περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

- - - - --....-.-... ee ee

towards it, and are enslaved to plea-

sures, and 80 one ought to lead men .

in the opposite direction, for thus
they will arrive at the mean.’
In all probability Aristotle here

alludes immediately to two sections of |

the Platonists, (1) the party repre-
sented by Eudoxus, whose arguments
are quoted ; (2) that headed by Speu-
sippus, whose anti-hedonistic argu-
ments were contained in two books
mentioned by Diogenes Laertius,under
the titles Περὶ ἡδονῆς α΄ " ᾿Αρίστιππος
α΄, and which are now passed under
review. Under the class of those
who ‘call pleasure the chief good,’
Aristotle less directly refers to Aris-
tippus, who, though he belonged to
a bygone era, still lived in the pages
of Plato’s Philebus, and in the book
of Speusippus bearing his name.

ἐλθεῖν γὰρ---μέσο»] Cf. Eth. ii. ix.
5, where it is said that by going
counter to one’s natural bias one may
attain the mean. Aristotle does not
approve of this being done by means
of a sacrifice of truth.

3 μή wore—Adyera] ‘But perhaps
this is not rightly said.’ Cf. Plato,
Meno, p. 89 C: ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ
καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν. This use of

_ μήποτε became very common in the

later Greek.

ὁ γὰρ ψέγων---πολλῶ»] ‘ For he who

blames pleasure (unreservedly), and
yet is seen occasionally desiring it, is
thought to incline towards it as being
altogether good ; for ordinary persons
cannot discriminate.’ τοιαύτην here,
as τοιοῦτος does frequently in Aris-
totle, takes its sense from the con-
text. Cf. Eth. vii. vi. 6, x. ii, 4, &c.
From what is above stated we learn
that, the decline of philosophy having
commenced, some of the Platonista
enunciated theories which were meant
to be practically useful, rather than
true, Thus they overstated what they
believed to be the truth about plea-
sure, in order to counteract men’s
universal tendency towards it. Aris-
totle ‘doubts whether this is good
policy.’ Their whole theory is likely
to be upset by their occasionally
indulging in the higher kinds of
pleasure.
( τοὺς tunévras] ‘Those who com-
prehend them,’ #.¢, appreciating the
truth of the theories, as shown by
their agreement with men’s actions.
Cf. Eth. vi. x. 1, note, On τοῖς ἔργοις
ef. IX, viii, 2.

316 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [Cuar.

a ᾿

,) Ἐὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾧετ᾽ εἶναι διὰ τὸ

wav ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα" ἐν
“- 4

πᾶσι δ᾽ εἶναι TO αἱρετὸν ἐπιεικές, Kat TO μάλιστα κρατι-
A a t 4 ῃ 3 +} 9 bY td a e ~

στον τὸ δὴ πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς mast

τοῦτο ἄριστον" ἕκαστον tyap τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν,

ΩΣ 4 ’ a a ζω 4 Y , @ “ ?

ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν" τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οὗ παντ

a a
ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν

τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μῶλλον ἢ δι αὑτούς" διαφερόντως γὰρ

II. This chapter contains the grounds
on which Eudoxus ‘used to think that
pleasure is the chief good ;’ and an
examination of three objections, which
had been started to those reasonings.
The arguments of Eudoxus are: (1)
that all things seek pleasure ; (2) that
pain is essentially (καθ᾽ αὑτό) an object
of aversion, and therefore pleasure, its
contrary, must be essentially an object
of desire ; (3) that pleasure is always
desired as an end-in-itself, and not as
a means to anything ; (4) that pleasure
when added to any other good makes
it more desirable. The objections to
these arguments are: (1) the opinion
of Plato (which serves as an objection
to argument 4th), that the chief good
must be incapable of being added to
any other good, and so made better.
This objection Aristotle allows as
valid. (2) An objection to the Ist
argument, probably suggested by
Plato's Philebus, p. 67, and repeated
by Speusippus,—that the testimony
of irrational creatures is of no value.
This objection is disallowed. (3) The
counter-argument of Speusippustothe

2nd argument of Eudoxus,—that not '

pleasure, but the neutral state, is the
true contrary to pain. This is refuted.

i τὸ αἱρετὸν ἐπιεικές] We have here
a quotation of the very words of Eu-
doxus. In § 4, Aristotle generally
approves of the present argument.
His whole conclusion is to be found
Eth. x. iii. 13:—that Eudoxus was

more right than his opponents, but
wrong in not discriminating between
the different kinds of pleasure, and in
going so far as to say that pleasure is
the chief good. The term τὸ αἱρετόν,
in opposition to τὸ φευκτόν, seems to
have played a great part in the rea-
sonings of Eudoxus, It is admitted
by Plato, Philebus, p. 20, as a neces-
sary attribute of the chief good, and
so also by Aristotle, Zth. 1. vii. 8; x.
ii. 4. Here it is implied in the word
ἐφιέμενα. It appears simply to mean
‘that which is a reasonable object of
desire,’ cf. Bth. Vit. viii. 2: ἡ φιλία
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν alper}, and X. iii. 13, ἡδονὴ
οὐ πᾶσα aiperj. As implying will
and choice, it is applicable in a rela-
tive, as well as an absolute sense, to
means as well as toends. Book 111.
of the Topics contains hints on the
method of dealing with this term, and
throws light on its use, which flue-
tuates between a reference to the good,
the useful, and the pleasant (cf. Top,
111. lil. 7).

ἐπιστεύοντο δ' of λόγοι] This is a
pleasing allusion to the personal
character of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who
lived about 366 8.c., and who enjoyed
great fame as an astronomer. He
appears to have introduced the sphere
from Egypt into Greece. The poem
of Aratus is a versification of his
Φαινόμενα, Certain stories in Diogenes
would leave the impression that, being
Plato’s pupil, he quarrelled with his

IT.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X. 317

ov δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει
ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἧττον 2
> > φ Α 9 ~ 59 ’ A 4 ἤ 9
δ᾽ der’ εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου" τὴν yap λύπην καθ

ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι"

εν “- A ᾶ4 e ’ a 9 ’ ς ,
αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν.
[2 9 4 e A a a ὃ Δ Φ δ᾽ e ld [2
μάλιστα δ᾽ εἶναι aiperov ὃ μὴ ‘Ot ἕτερον μηδ᾽ ἑτέρου χαριν
αἱρούμεθα" τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν'
οὐδενα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν
οὗσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν, mporriBenérmy τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν
ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖν, olov τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ
σωφρονεῖν"

4 4 & ’ 8 [4 ΄΄-Ὸ 9 ~ 9 4 4 ῇ
ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, 3

καὶ αὔξεσθαι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ.

καὶ οὐδὲν μῶλλον ἑτέρου" πᾶν γὰρ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ
e a, A tf ᾽ A ld 4 [2

αἱρετώτερον ἧ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ 1] λάτων
ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν: αἱρετώτερον γὰρ
ba A e Qi , » , a , 4 A 4
εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἣ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ
μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν"
γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι.
δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη. ὦ μετά τινος

οὐδενὸς

master. Aristotle (or, as Diogenes 3 πᾶν yap—xwpls] ‘ For that “every

says, ‘Nicomachus’) is the only
authority for his ethical opinions.

2 ὃ μὴ δι᾽ ἕτερο»] The end is better
than the means, but this does not
prove anything as to the comparative
superiority of pleasure to the rest of
the whole class of ends. Thus the
argument of Eudoxus overshot the
mark. A similar argument of his is
mentioned with careless approbation,
Eth. τ. xii. §: Δοκεῖ καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι,
says Aristotle, ‘Eudoxus is thought
to have pleaded well’ in favour of
pleasure being the chief good, because
it is never praised. This argument
would only prove that it belongs to
the class of τὰ τίμια.

προστιθεμένην) It is suggested as a
commonplace of reasoning. Topics,
111. li. 2, that you may say ‘Justice
an courage are better with pleasure
than without,’

good is better in combination with
another good than alone.” This is
indeed the very argument by which
Plato proves pleasure ποὺ to be the
highest good. For the pleasant life
is more desirable with wisdom than
without.’ Cf. Philebus, pp. 21-22,
where however the proposition οὐδένος
προστεθέντος -- γίνεσθαι is not to be
found. Plato only argued that, as the
highest conception of human good im-
plied a combination of both pleasure
and knowledge, pleasure separately
could not be the chief good. It is
a deduction of Aristotle's from the
terms ἱκανὸν καὶ τέλεον, used by Plato,
that the chief good is incapable of
addition orimprovement. Cf. Topics,
ΠῚ. ii, 2, where it is said that the
end plus the means cannot be called
more desirable than the end by itself;
cf. Eth. 1. vii. 8, where the same

318 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [CHap.

~ 9 8 Α 4 “a e [4 e κυ 4 a
4 τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστι
“- 0 ry ζω rs oo a ? σι
τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν ; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖ-
ew ? ’ e 4 ἢ ‘ ΝΥ yy age
ται. of δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὺν οὗ παντ' ἐφίεται,
μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν: ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναί φαμεν.
~ a n~
ὁ δ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ"
4 “-“-ἄς Cy A 4
εἰ μὲν yup τὰ ἀνόητα ὠρέγετο αὐτῶν, ἣν av τι TO λεγό-
> δὲ ἌΝ. ᾿ ~ , » .” ὃς
μενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως
we, . 4 ἢ 4 4 \ ‘a a
καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστί τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ

rt

’ e 7 a 5 ad ζω, > 9 9 θ ~ 4 54 δὲ

καθ’ avra, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἔοικε de
9 Qr A ~ ® , ~ Cd 4 [2 4
οὐδὲ περί Tou ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. ov yap φασιν, εἰ
e ’ ’ 4 a e a 4 Q > 4 2
ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: ἀντικεῖσθαι
γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες
ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.
4 a 4 ‘ ” A Α , » _# 4
ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ ᾧευκταὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἰναι,
“- [2 δὲ ὃ , A e , ~ δὲ ῇ a
TOV μηδετέρων ε μηόέτερον ἣ ὁμοίως" νῦν de ᾧαινονται τὴν
‘ , e Pas 4 4 δ᾽ ς ’ ε 4 θ os
μὲν φεύγοντες ws κακὸν, τὴν αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθὸν
οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.
2 Οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ
τοῦτ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν" οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι

opinion seems to be conveyed, though | the θηρία mentioned by Plato, Phile-
that interpretation of the passage has | bus, lc,
been disputed. 5. ob γάρ φασιν] As we learn from
4 τί οὗν---ἐπιζητεῖται)͵ ‘What is | the Eudemian book, 2th. vn. xiii. 1,
there then which has these character- 3 Speusippus was the author of this
istics (i.e. supreme goodness without | objection.
the capability of addition) which we
men can partakeof? For such is the III. Aristotle investigates remain-
very object of our inquiries,’ That | ing arguments used by the Platonists
is, not a transcendental good, but to prove that pleasure is not a good :
something to be practically realised. | (1) that it is ‘not a quality.’ This
Cf. Beh. τ, vi. 13. argument would prove too much, as
ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ] This acceptance | it would be equally decisive against
of the testimony of instinct occurs | happiness, or the actions of virtue ;
also in the Eudemian book, Eth. vir. (2) that it is ‘unlimited.’ But (a)
xiii. 5. in one sense this will apply to virtue
ὁ δ᾽ ἀναιρῶν] Probably Speusippus, | also, (δ) in another sense it is only
taking up a suggestion from Plato, | applicable to the ‘mixed pleasures,’
Philebus, p. 67. which are analogous to health, t.¢. a
τοῖς φαύλοι:] In the neuter gender, | proportion variable according to cir-
‘the lower creatures ;’—alluding to | cumstances; (3) that it is ‘not final’

i ee es

II.—III.]

[2 4 9 LAS) 4 9 ’
ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ᾽ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

HOIKON NIKOMAXEION Χ.

319

λέγουσι δὲ TO μὲν 2

ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται

τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

4 4 a 9 ζω Η͂
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι

“~ , 4 4 A ὃ av 4 A
TOUTO κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀικαιοσυνὴν καὶ Tas ἄλλας

ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς

‘ e » δ
Totovg¢ νπα βχε ty Κατα

γάρ

δίκαιοι

δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν

4 a e ὃ a ? 9 4
εν Tats 7Ooovals, μὴ TOT ov

or perfect, but in some sort ‘a tranai-
tion.’ Against which Aristotle argues,
(a) that it cannot be a motion, because
not admitting the idea of speed, (δ)
that it cannot be a creation, because
not capable of being resolved into its
component parts, (c) that it cannot be
a filing up, for this is merely cor-
poreal, and even in the case of bodily
pleasure it is not the body that feels;
(4) that there are many disgraceful
pleasures. To which it may be an-
swered, that pleasures differ in kind,
and even if some be bad, others may
be absolutely good.

I el μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων] This seems
to be the only record of an argument,
probably occurring in the works of
Speusippus, that ‘pleasure is not a
good, because it is not a quality.’ It
points to the moralising tendency,
above noticed, of this school of Pla-
tonists, as if they said that no-

thing could be called ‘good’ which |
| belong to the intellect. Of these two

did not form part of man’s moral
character.

2 el μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι] Pleasure
may be said to admit of degrees,
first, in reference to men's different
capacities of feeling it; but in this
respect it will stand on the same
footing as courage and justice.

el 8 ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖ:---μικταῇ ‘In
the second place, if (they predicate
this attribute of “unlimited” as
existing, not in the recipients of

Oo ὥραννος κκοντωὶ a eo me -.- —=- τ ρμακουροντον τρπορ:

4 3 [4 ΑΥ̓͂ ‘ 9 [4
τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό"
4 »“» 4 9 a 4

εἰσι μᾶλλον Kat ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ

μάλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ δ᾽

ὃ ‘4 Α # a
λεγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν

pleasure, but) in the pleasures them-
selves, perhaps they omit to state the
reason of the fact, namely, that while
some pleasures are unmixed, others
are mixed.’ Plato in the Philebus
divides pleasures into mixed and
unmixed. Of each he makes three
classes. Mixed pleasures are: (1)
bodily pleasures, the restoration of
harmony in the animal frame, where
the bodily pain of want or desire is
mixed up with the bodily pleasure
of gratification ; (2) the pleasure of
expecting this restoration, where the
bodily pain of want is mixed up with
the mental pleasure of the idea of
relief ; (3) the pleasure which we feel
in the ludicrous, where the mental
pain of seeing the un-beautiful is
mixed with the mental pleasure of
laughing at it. The unmixed plea-
sures, t.¢. in which no pain is implied,
are (1) those of smell; (2) those of
sight and hearing; (3) those that

classes Plato confines the attribute
of ἀμετρία, ‘want of measure,’ to the
first class. The unmixed or pure

' pleasures necessarily possess ἐμμετρία,

cf. Phileb. p. 52 0. The same doctrine
is given Eth, vit. xiv. 6: al δ᾽ ἄνευ
λυπῶν (ἡδοναὶ) οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν.
Speusippus, forgetful of this distinc-
tion, appears to have made ἀμετρία
(ἀόριστον εἶναι) a universal predicate
of pleasure.

320 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [ Crap.

e a 4 δι e 4 id v a 4 U
3αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς ai de μικταί. τί γὰρ κωλύει, καθαπερ
e , ε , iO 4 a .} ‘ ἐν
ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον,
e
οὕτω Kat τὴν ἡδονήν; ov yap ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν
~ ’ 9 9 Δ ® ~A 9 ~ , 9 , 9 4 4 [
πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνιεμένη
ὔ Ψ v 4 td “~ A Ol
διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μάλλον καὶ ἧττον.
A δὲ ‘ A ‘ \ e ὃ a , ἃ) φ
τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
, , 4 A 4 a a ? 4 a
4 τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, Tas δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς
td σι a
γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν
“- 9 ΄- 4 ἢ , 4 Ὁ) 4 ’
πειρῶνται. ov Kadrws δ᾽ ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ᾽ εἶναι κίνη-
a “~ > a a
σιν" πάση yap οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής.
a 4 a 9 ς ’ Φ ΄“ “-- ’ 4
καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο-

ee ee ane

τί yap κωλύει κιτ.λ.} Even the | definition not merely ad homines, as
mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit | Plato had done, but as if absolutely
the idea of proportion (σνμμετρία), | valid.
just as health is a proportion, though οἷον Ty τοῦ κόσμου] te. οὐκ ἔστε
a relative and variable one, of the τάχος καὶ βραδυτὴς καθ᾽ αὑτήν. “ All
elements in the human body. Inthe | motion has speed and slowness pro-
Topics, vi. ii. 1, the words ἡ ὑγίεια | perly belonging to it, if not relatively
συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν are given | to itself—as, for instance, the motion
as an instance of an ambiguousdefini- | of the universe has no speed or
tion, συμμετρία being used in more | slowness in itself (because it moves
senses than one. equably),—at all events in relation to

οὐ γὰρ --- ἧττον] ‘Health is not the | other things.’ Aristotle argues that
same proportion of elements in all | though it is possible ‘to be pleased’
Men, nor even in the same man (ἡσθῆναι --- μεταβάλλειν els ἡδονήν»)
always, but with a certain laxity of | more or less quickly, it is not pos-
variation it still remains health, | sible to ‘feel pleasure’ (ἥδεσθαι) either
though admitting of difference in | quickly or slowly. This argument
the degrees (according to which the | scems a verbal one, like some of those
elements are compounded).’ in Eth. 1. vi. against Plato’s doctrine

4 τέλειόν Te τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες K.T.A.] | of ideas. If pleasure be identified
Plato, in the Philebus, Ὁ. 53 ὦ, ac- | with κίνησις, the argument holds good.
cepted the doctrine of the Cyrenaics, | But if it only be held to have the
ws ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν (ἡ ἡδονή), and | same relation to κίνησις as Aristotle
then, by the contrast of means and | himself makes it to have to ἐνέργεια,
end, γένεσις and οὐσία, he proved that | Eth. x. viii. 4, the argument falls to
pleasure could not be the chief good. | the ground. This argument and the
As said above, Vol. I. Essay LV. p. | one in § 6 really only apply to the
249, Plato seems to have recognised | want of a sufficiently subjective for-
a class of pleasures above those which | mula to express pleasure. If pleasure
were mero states of transition, but to | were defined as ‘the consciousness of
have had no formula to express them. | a transition,’ there might then be
Speusippus probably appplied the | degrees of speed in the transition,
argument drawn from the Cyrenaic _ though not in the consciousness of it.

III. ] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ. 321

~ 9 e ~ o 4, ἢ ς ὔ e a 4 4
τῇ δ᾽ ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει" ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ
Ν , Ψ 9 ~ Cd 3 ww 9 QS a
ἔστι Taxews ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἤδεσθαι δ᾽ οὔ, οὐδὲ “προς
[,2 ᾽ 4 a ww A f 4 ~
ἕτερον, Badt ζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ἤ 4 9 9 4 ς 4 ’ 4 4
μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς THY ἡδονὴν ταχέως Kal βραδέως
» 9 “a 4 3 9 A 9 » ὔ td 3
ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ’ αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω ὃ

Cd , ’ “~ Ww a 4 4 9 A
ἥδεσθαι. γένεσίς Te πῶς ἂν εἴη ; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ

τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς

a

τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι.

φθορα.

φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν.
ματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ
ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ

δοκεῖ δέ" οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀνα-
γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως

ἥδοιτο' τὸ σῶμα ἄρα" οὐ
πλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ

“ὃ 4 4 4 ld a
HOOT’ ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο.

Aristotle’s real objection to the term
κίνησις lies deeper than these mere
dialectical skirmishings, and has been
explained, Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 247-50.

5 γένεσις re—@Oopd] ‘And how
can it be a creation? For it does
not seem to be the case that anything
can be created out of anything; a
thing is resolved into that out of
which it is created. And (as the
Platonists say) pain is the destruction
of that of which pleasure is the crea-
tion.’ This elliptical argument seems
to require for its conclusion, ‘Where
then are the elements out of which
our perfect nature (οὐσία) is created
by the process called pleasure, and
into which it is resolved by the de-
structive process called pain?’ We
find pain called a destruction in the
Philebus, p. 31 EB: δίψος δ᾽ αὖ φθορὰ
καὶ λύπη Kal λύσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ
πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῖσα δύναμις
ἡδονή. Aristotle, arguing polemically,
says, ‘ Where then are the elements
with which the creative and the de-
structive process must begin and end Τ᾽

VOL, 11.

4 4 4 ς ᾽ [2 ᾽
καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη

A 4 4 4 4 4 # oy 8
καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ

“" 4
ταῦτα δὲ σω-
, 9 “~ QA 4
δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν
4 ͵ ~ 3 A
ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν Kal

ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη

He afterwards reasonably substitutes
ἐνέργεια for γένεσις as ἃ better formula,
but the above polemic seems not to
have much value.

6 οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα----λυποῖτο] ‘ Neither
is pleasure therefore a replenishment,
though one may feel pleasure while
replenishment is taking place, just as
one may feel pain while one is being
cut.’ Pleasure, says Aristotle, may
be synchronous with replenishment,
but cannot be identical with it, for
pleasure is a state of the mind, and
not of the body, cf. Eth. 1. viii. 10: τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν γυχικῶν. All that
is proved here is that a more sub-
jective formula than ἀναπλήρωσις is
required to express the nature of
pleasure. Plato had used the formula
πλήρωσις, Philebus, p. 31 E, and Speu-
sippus probably repeated it.

repyopevos] The words τομαὶ καὶ
καύσεις Were commonly used by Plato,
as instances of bodily pain. Cf.
Timeus, p. 65 B: ταῦτα δ' ab περὶ τὰς
καύσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γιγνό-
μενά ἐστι κατάδηλα.

88

322 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ. {CHap.

ὃ a δι 4 ~ 4 4 4 ΄΄ι a
οκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ex τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ
ἡδονῶν" ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἤδεσθαι
7 τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς
ἡδονάς" ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν at τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν
a a 9 e € “ “. 9 , A 9 Lf
κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ai διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ axpoa-
4 4 φ [4 a 4 “a 4 ’
ματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες.
᾿ ᾶῶῷ a ’ Pa 4 δ ‘ ‘ » 08.
Tivos οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; ovdevos γὰρ ἔνδεια
8 γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ᾽ ἄν ἀναπλήρωσι. πρὸς de τοὺς
προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα" οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακει-
[4 eRe? 9 ὔ 4 a 9 A 4 «ἢ a
μένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι wAny
τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ
’ ’ 4) a 4 Ὗ ’ ὡς
γλυκέα ἧ πικρα, οὐδ᾽ αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς
9 ὀφθαλμιῶσι. ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ᾽ ἄν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ
aiperai εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ TO
πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν
10 φαγόντι. ἣἥ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί: ἕτεραι γὰρ
αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν
ς ~ a “~ ὃ ἤ 4 » OL vee a a
ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίον μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ
“ Δ ΨΚ , ε rd 4 4 9 & “~
μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος ὧν τοῦ κόλακος,
9
οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει" ὁ μὲν γὰρ

πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν

7 ἄλνποι γάρ elow al τε μαθηματικαὶ | capable of feeling certain pleasures ;
«.7..] This is all admitted in so | (δ) that the flatterer is different from
many words by Plato, Phileb. p. 52 | the friend; (6) that the pleasures of
A: Ere δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις (i.e. to the | childhood differ from those ofmatarity.
pleasures of smell, sight, and hear- | The whole reasoning is repeated in
ing) προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα | better form in chap. v.
ἦδονάς, el ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται II ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλοι]
πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ | The term ‘friend’ is used here in a
διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ | distinctive sense to denote ‘the true
ἀρχῆς γενομένας. friend,’ just as it is ἴῃ Eth. Ὑ111. xiii.

8 πρὸς δὲ rods προφέροντας κιτ.λ.}] | 9: ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὗ ποιητέον.
This argument of the Platonists is | Common language, which contrasts
quoted δίλ. vit. xi. 5. the flatterer who ministers pleasure,

10 τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ] Cf. Eth, rx. | from the friend who ministers good,
ix.6; x.iv.10. The arguments here | testifies tothe non-identity of pleasure
given to prove that pleasures differ in | (in all forms) with good.
kind are (a) that some men are in-

III.—IV.]

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X,

323

4 4 » 3 a e A oe e a

ὀνειδίζεται, Tov δ᾽ ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα.
9 ? δας ’ ἢ

οὐδείς τ’ ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου,
, φ " Φ

ἡδόμενος ἐφ’ οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ

ποιῶν τι τῶν

χαίρειν
λυπηθῆναι.

4 S 4 ,
αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων
περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ᾽ ἂν καὶ

4 ’ 9 , e ’ φΦ en , 907
ει μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οίἱον οραν, μνημονενειῖν, εἰδέναι,

τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν.

4 9 9 ’ Ψ ,
εἰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις

ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ

4 4 9 5, >” ἐδ ,
γίνοιτ am αὐτῶν ἡδονή.

Ψ , Φ ” 3 Α ε
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε ταγαθὸν ἡ

ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσί
τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ’ αὑτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ad’ ὧν.
τὰ. μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς

εἰρήσθω.

Ti δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ᾽ ἂν an’

ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν.

12 περὶ πολλά τε] If pleasure, ac-
cording to Eudoxns, were the chief
good, all pursuits would be prized in
proportion to their affording pleasure,
but this Aristotle shows not to be the
case.

IV. Having finished his critical
remarks on existing theories (ra
λεγόμενα) about pleasure, Aristotle
proceeds synthetically to state his own
views, as follows: (1) Pleasure is, like
sight, something whole and entire, not
gradually arrived at, but a moment
of consciousness, at once perfect, in-
dependent of the conditions of time,
$§ 1-4. (2) It arises from any faculty
obtaining its proper object, but is
better in proportion to the excellence
of the faculty exercised, 88 5~7. (3)
It is thus the perfection of our func-
tions, butisdistinct from the functions
themselves, § 8. (4) It cannot be
continuously maintained, owing tothe
weakness of our powers, our func-
tions being soon blunted by fatigue,
§ 9. (5) Pleasure, in short, results
from the sense of life, and is insepa-

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ᾽ ὁντι-

rably connected with the idea of life,
88 10-11.

1 τί & ἐστὶν ἣ ποῖόν τι] Cf. Eth, τι.
Vv. 1: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἢ ἀρετὴ
σκεπτέον. ἴδ. vi. 1: δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον
οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις.
The genus (τί ἐστι) of pleasure here
given is that it is ὅλον τι, one of those
moments of consciousness which are
completein themselves; the differentia
(ποῖόν τι) is that it results from the
exercise of any faculty upon its proper
object. It may be said that this defi-
nition would leave pleasure undefined;
but in fact it is a simple sensation,
not admitting of entire explication.

ἡ μὲν Spacis] Modern researches in
optics would tend to modify this view
of the entirely simple nature of an act
of sight, But it may be conceded
that any ‘ process’ which takes place
in sight is too swift to be noticed by
the mind. Cf. Locke, Eesay on the
Human Understanding, Book II. ch.
xiv. § 10. ‘Such a part of duration
as this, wherein we perceive no suc-
cession, is that which we may call an
instant, and is that which takes up

324 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [ Crap.

νοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι" οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενός, ὃ
εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοι-
οὕτῳ 6° ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή' ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, Kat κατ'
οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον

γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ

vw

ἐστιν ἐν χρόνῳ yap πᾶσα
e 4 a 4 @

ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν
C7 4 ~ , i
ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ Th

ld 9 QA a ’

eldos. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς
’ A , φ

κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινὸς, οἷον
, “ 9 Υ A 9

ποιήση οὗ ediera. ἣ ἐν

ἤ 4 δὲ a ,
τούτῳ ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι

΄- id ~ 4 a A 4 ~ . n~
τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, Kal ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης
καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ
κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως.
ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία " οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκεί-
ς A ~ a 4 ~ lA 9 g
μενον" ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλυῴφου ατελής "
τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ

a
και

A

μέρους yap ἑκατέρα.
δ 4 € σι td a c ’ “~ ¥
ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει,
ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως

4 A ~ 4 ’ 9 e 4 , 4 a
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν" εἰ yap ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ,

A [4 4 9 ” “~ id a
Kai ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ

the time of only one idea in our minds
without the succession of another,
wherein therefore we perceive no suc-
cession at all.’

2 διόκτερ-- ἅπαντι) ‘Therefore it is
not a process; for every process is
under conditions of time and aims at
some end ; as, for instance, the(process
of) architecture is perfect when it has
effected what it aims at. May we not
say (3) then that it is perfect in the
particular (τούτῳ) time viewed as a
whole? But in the separate parts of
the time occupied all processcs are im-
perfect, and are different in species,
both from the whole process, and from
each other. For the collection of the
stones is different from the fluting of
the pillars, and both from the making
of the temple. And the making the
temple is a perfect process, for it wants
nothing towards its proposed object ;
but that of the basement and the
triglyph are imperfect, for they are

each the making of a part. Therefore
they differ in species, and it is not
possible to find a process perfect in
species in any time whatsoever, unless
it be in the time occupied viewed as a
whole.’ With Michelet, who follows
two MSS., # has been omitted above
before τούτῳ. The reading 4 τούτῳ
makes no sense, unless one which
would be opposed to what is said
afterwards (οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν x.r.X.)
ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι) The form 4 with a
question, used for conveying Aris-
totle’s opinion on any subject, occurs
again in § 9 of this chapter, ἢ κάμνει ;
In the illustration given, two of the
processes mentioned are merely pre-
paratory, the collection of the stones
for building, and the fluting of the
pillars before they are set up;
two others are substantive parts of
the building, the laying of the
foundation (the first act), and the
adding the triglyph, which was a

IV.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ, 325

s ~ 9 ’ 9 ew 4 a 4 φ 3. “ἡ ~
τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ᾽ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ Kal ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ
ἢ 4 a id a 9 > A 9 ΄“. a A
Badice> τὸ yap πόθεν ποῖ ov ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ
9 ~ [4 4 9 @ ? , a ¢ , 9 Qs 4 4
ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ TO διεξιέναι
τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην" οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν δια-
πορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ αὕτη
ὃ ᾽ 9 ’ 4 iO 4 ’ 3 4
t ἀκριβείας μεν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις
εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ
πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν

φ “
ἐκείνης.

σι 4 ld
TOt εἰδοποιό νι.
φ
εἶδος.

“- ἐδ ~ δ᾽ 4 € ΄- ’ 4 4
τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρονῷ τέλειον TO
“~ < Ψ “
δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί 7’ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν 4
@ 4 c e ς 4
ὅλων τι Kal τελείων ἡ ἡδονή.

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ

τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ" τὸ

" 4 “ σι Ψ
yap ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι,

9 , A ~ , @ 9
ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον Kat ὅτι οὐ

“A ὔ id A , a e 4 9
καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐ

ap πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὲ
9 ρ μη

fluted tablet added as an ornament to
the frieze (perhaps the last act in the
creation of the temple). The creation
of the temple as a whole, regarded
in the whole time which it occupies,
is.alone to be regarded as a perfect
process.

3-4 ὁμοίως 8é—el8os] ‘So too in
the case of walking, and all other
processes. For if passage be a pro-
cess from place to place, even of this
there are different species, flying,
walking, jumping, and the like. And
not only this, but even in walking
itself (there are different species), for
the whence and the whither are not
the same in the whole course and in
the part of the course, and in one part
and the other part; nor isit the same
thing to cross this line and that. For
8 person not only passes a line, but a
line in space, and this line is in dif-
ferent space from that line. We shall
treat exactly of process elsewhere,
but it seems not to be perfect in every
time, but the majority of processes
seem imperfect and differingin species,
if the whence and the whither con-

stitute a differentia. But pleasure
seems perfect in kind in any time
(of its existence) whatsoever.’ Every
process is under conditions of time,
and its parts being under a law of
succession are essentially different
from each other: the ὕστερον from the
πρότερον, the beginning, middle, and
end, from one another. In pleasure
nothing of the kind is to be found.
One moment of pleasure does not lead
up, a8 a preparative, to another more
advanced moment. Pleasure, when
felt, is, tpso facto, complete.

ἐν ἄλλοις Τ εἴρηται] Cf. Physica, IV.
and V. But as the Physics were pro-
bably a later work, εἴρηται may be
here a mis-reading for εἰρήσεται, as in
the instance given, Vol. I. Essay I.
p. 69, note.

οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι) ‘Non in quolibet
tempore :’ this is of course different
from ἐν ἄπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, and
ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι, in the preceding section.

ἐν ὁτῳοῦν] ‘In quolibet,’ but above,
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν means ‘in nullo
potest.’

4 δῆλον οὖν---ἡδυνἡ)] ‘It is clear

326 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X, {Crap.

@ OA ‘ e [4 ᾽ 4 [2 ΦᾺΣ ΄- ΨΦ“01ι
ὅλων οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ
’ 4ΔΑᾺ tf 44. 3 9A o 9 Qn a
μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις - οὐδὲ δὴ
5 ἡδονῆς ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθη-
\ φ , ἢ 4 a 4 ’ ᾿ 4 ’
TOV ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης προς τὸ καλ-
λιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν" τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ᾽
“τι Ξε , 9? : 9A \ , ’ ~ @
εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια " αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ
ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω" καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ βελτίστη
ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κρά-
“-ς e ) ς ’ Ψ δ᾽ [4 w# a
τιστον τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὑτήν. αὕτη ἂν τελειοτατηὴ εἴη Kat
ew ‘ aA ‘ ¥ , 5 e , ε ’ a
ἡδίστη" κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως de
“ , 4 , ee e a
καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ᾽ ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειο-
τάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν
6 ὑφ᾽ αὑτήν. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή, οὐ τὸν
>» <A 4 td a e a ry 4 4 4 [2
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε
4 e # ὃ a ww Ψ δ᾽ ς e [2 a
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ
7 ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ᾽ ἑκάστην
δ 4 8 @ ‘ ἐδ , Onn 4 a φ Ul
αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον. φαμὲν γὰρ ὁρα-
4 9 , eRe, ov A 4 ud
ματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι
͵ ’ ‘ ἊΝ “) > , a ‘
μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν 4 τε αἴσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ προς
τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ" τοιούτων δ᾽ ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ
8 ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέρ-
ee ‘ 4 ε ew 9 ’ - 4 , e 4
γειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, GAN’ ὡς ἐπι-
γιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα" ἕως ἂν
φ ὔ A A 9 6 Ἁ > a ὃ a a 4 a
οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ Kat τὸ κρῖνον

then that (process and pleasure) must
be different from one another, and
that pleasure belongs to the class of
things whole and perfect.’

6 τελειοῖ δὲ---ὑγιαίν ει») ‘ Pleasure
renders the exercise of a faculty per-
fect, but not in the same way in which
the goodness of the faculty itself and
of its object does so, just as health
and the physician are indifferent ways
the cause of one’s being well ;’ ὁ. 6.
pleasure is the formal, and not the
efficient, cause of a perfect function.
‘Cause’ in this Aristotelian usage
becomes equivalent to ‘result.’ The

illustration used here is given also,
with a slight confusion of terms, in
the Eudemian book, £vh. vi. xii. 5,
Ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν, οὐχ ws ἰατρικὴ
δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς 4 ὑγίεια.

7 τοιούτων 3 ὄντων --- πεισομένου]
‘ But if the object and the percipient
be in this (highest) condition, there
always will be pleasure, as long as
subject and object remain.’ The re-
lative terms τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον
take their meaning from the way in
which they are applied. Thus, Bth. v.
v. 9, they are used for ‘ producer and
consumer,’ Here rd ποιοῦν is used

IV.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION Χ, 327

a * Ν) 4 ~ 9 ’ ες eof Ἢ
ἣ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή" ὁμοίων γὰρ
ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε
παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πουγτικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.

A 2 99 N a “δ . Aa ‘ U Ν
“Τῶς Ouy οὐδεὶς OUVEXWS OETAL, ἢ καμμγμει. σαντα γαρ9

‘ 9 , ? a “A 4 a 9 ἢ
τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται
οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἡδονή" ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.

. # “ δὲ 3 ε ’ ὃ ‘ >? ‘ A
καινὰ OvTa, νστερον ε ovx ομοιὼς (Ἢ Ταυῖο" ΤῸ μεν

4 4 ‘4
€viad δὲ Τερτεί

γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως
περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες,
μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη"
διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται.
οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται"

ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς

4 δὲ A 9 ἢ , [2 9 4 [4 4 ~ aA
ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά Tis ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μαλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς
~ 4 “- 4 a , ς δὲ 4 ~ S 4
τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ Oe φιλομαθῆς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ
τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. 4 δ᾽
4 a “a 4 9 v 4 4 ca) la 9 4
ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ Tas ἐνεργείας, Kai τὸ ζῆν δέ, οὗ ὀρέγονται.
~ 7 9 4 ~ ὁ “ι 94P ἃ 4 er
εὐλόγως οὖν Kal τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται" τελειοῖ yap ἑκαστῷῳ
4 coy ς Ἁ ΨΥ ’ A ‘ A e a 4 fay
τὸ Civ, αἱρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν
αἱρούμεθα ἣ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ

for the percipient, τὸ πάσχον for the
object perceived.

8 ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων -- γίνεσθαι) ‘ For
from similar pairs of relatives, bear-
ing the same relation to one another,
i.e. the active and passive, the same
result is naturally produced.’ This
appears to be an abstract and a priori
way of stating the universality of
pleasure attendant on the harmony
between a faculty and its proper
object.

9 πῶς οὗὔν---ἀμανροῦται] ‘ How is it
then that no one is continuously in
a state of pleasure? The reason
must be that one grows weary. For
all human things are incapable of
continuous activity. Pleasure, there-
fore, ceases to be produced, for it de-
pends on the activity of the faculties.
It is on this same account that some

things please us while they are new,
but afterwards not in the same way.
For at first the intellect is excited
and acts strenuously on the objects
in question (as in the case of sight,
when one first fixes one’s glance),
but afterwards the action is not
equally vivid, but relaxed, and 80
one’s pleasure also fades.’ On this
doctrine, cf, Vol. I. Essay IV., and
Ar. Metaph. viii. viii. 18, there
quoted, p. 251.

10 It is natural to say that all
desire pleasure, from its inseparable
connection with the sense of life,
and with each of the vital functions.
Thus far Eudoxus was right, but he
was wrong in not recognising a differ-
ence in kind between different plea-
sures, and this point is demonstrated
in the ensuing chapter.

II

328 ΗΘΙΚΩΝ NIKOMAXEION X. [Cuar.

παρόντι. συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν yap ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρ-

᾿ 9 4 ¥#¥ A 9 e 9 g e 2
ισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι" ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή,
πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

5 “Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν: τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ
οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται
4 8 ‘ ν 8 εν" 4 a “. 4 ‘4
Kat τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ δένδρα
ὁμοίως
4 4 ‘ φ ’ ‘ ’ ΡΞ Ν) e 8
de καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ

εἴδει ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι.

4 4 4 9 4 N 4“ ἢ 4 ~
καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος.
διαφέρουσι δ᾽ αἱ τῆς
ὃ , A 8 4 9 : 4 9 4 4
tavoias τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων
φανείη δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο

2 διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι.

κατ᾽ εἶδος" καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί,
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ
A Ξ ; x 4 7? e > » e ’
ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει yap τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή"

Y. Pleasures may be thought to
differ in kind : (1) Because our several
functions (mental and others) differ
from each other in kind, and things
different in kind are perfected by
things different in kind, §§ 1-2.
(2) Because while its own pleasure
promotes any particular exercise
of the faculties, an alien pleasure
impedes it, §§ 3-5. (3) Because the
human functions differ from each
other in a moral point of view, and
the pleasures therefore which are so
closely connected with them as almost
to be identical must differ in the same
way from each other, 88 6-7. (4)
Creatures different in kind must have,
and by common consent do have,
different pleasures, § 8. (5) The
pleasures of man when in a morbid
state must differ from the pleasures
of man when in a healthy state. As
a corollary to the last argument it
may be added, that reasonings against
pleasure from a reference to the mor-
bid pleasures have no weight. The
answer to them would be, that such
are not pleasures at all. |

I καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης]
The ἐνέργειαι mentioned in this section

must be those of the rational faculty.
Thus we have the classification of
things capable of being made perfect,
into nature, art, and the moral and
intellectual life of man. Cf Beh. 111.
iii. 7: αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις
καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ
way τὸ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου.

2 φανείη ὃ᾽---τελειοῖ] ‘This would
also seem to be shown by the inti-
mate connection existing between
each pleasure and the function which
it perfects.’ Cf. Eth. x.i 1: μάλιστα
γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν.
Pleasure, generally speaking, is pro-
per to the human race; from another
point of view, each function haz its
own proper pleasure, and the pleasure
‘proper’ to one function is ‘alien’
to other functions. This distinction
of οἰκεία and ἀλλοτρία ἡδονή was per-
haps suggested by a passage in the
Republic of Plato, rx. 587 a, where
these terms are used, though not
with quite the same application. It
is there said that in the philosopher
each part of his soul does its proper
work and attains its proper pleasure ;
but when some lower passion has the
predominance, that passion, causing

IvV.—V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X. 329

a “-

μῶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ᾽
ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες
τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλὸόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ.

’ A 6 ς ld ‘ A , 9 a
συναύξουσι de αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς
e ad \ ~ 2 4 a 9 δι co ~ w# » 4
ἑτέροις de Tw εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα Tw εἴδει. ἔτι δὲ
μῶλλον τοῦτ᾽’ ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς
’ ᾿ a 9 , s e \ ’ 9
ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι " οἱ yup φιλαυλοι ἀδυνα-
τοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦν-
τος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας "
ε ‘ Α 4 4 a e 4 4 4 4 ’
ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον

ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 4

4 [2 Cd 4 ? 3 “ e A ews a
συμβαίνει, ὅταν dua περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ" ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν
ς PF 3 , A 3 , 8 4 “ὁ ,
ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρη κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν,

AA Ψ δ 49 ~ a 4 e ὔ ὃ 4
μάλλον, ὥστε μηδ᾽ ἐνεργεῖν κατά τὴν ετέραν. to
χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα ov πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ
Υ̓ ~ ἢ .ς ἢ» 43 ζ 4 9 a
ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, Kat εν τοῖς
θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζό-

2 ’ ἢ > 9 8 a > A Me 4 . »
μενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστ᾽ αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία
ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ
βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ᾽ ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς

A ~ 4 4 e 4 ld e 4 ”
πολὺ διεστάσιν " σχεδὸν yap αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν
ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι" φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ

, κα a ΠῚ ” 4 ' 9 OQ a ee a
οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἰ τῷ TO ypapew ἀηδὲς Kat ἐπίλυπον ἣ
τὸ λογίζεσθαι" ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ᾽ οὐ λογίζεται,

~ y ~ 9 ἢ ἤ A 4 “
λυπηρᾶς ovens τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τὰς

disturbance, does not itself attain its | the analogy of the arts it means to
own pleasure, and compels the other ; ‘give the last finish to.’ It is used
faculties to pursue a pleasure which is ) intransitively Eth. 1. vi. 13: ἐξακριβοῦν
alien to them: ὅταν δὲ dpa τῶν ἑτέρων ὑπὲρ τούτων, ‘to refine.’
τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν 4 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις --- δρῶσιν»
ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν τά τε ἄλλα | ‘And those who munch sweetmeats
ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῇ ' ἰπ the theatres do so especially when
ἡδονὴν διώκειν. the actors are bad.’ This is one of
éfaxpBotow] ‘They work out.’ Cf. | those illustrations from common life
note on Eth. 1. vii. 18 The word _ which are richly strewed about the
ἐξακριβοῦν is used transitively Eth. 1. | writings of Aristotle.
xii, 7, and below, x. v. 5, where from
VOL, IL TT

wr

330 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [Crap.

ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ
λυπῶν " οἰκεῖαι O° εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ywo-
υπῶν " οἰκεῖαι δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείς ἣν y
ς ’ 4 , e 4 »# @ ’ ’
μεναι. αἱ δ᾽ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν
”~ , ~ ’ “ A > e@ c
τι τῇ λύπη ποιοῦσιν" φθείρουσι yap, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.
“-- a ΄": 4 ~ 9 ’ | id a
6 διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ
΄΄' 4 ° ~ 9” “- a a“ ~ 9 4
τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ᾽ οὐδετέρων,
ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί " καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν
οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής,
e og a , , 4 ᾿ ε 3 , a \
ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά" καὶ yap αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν
καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν αἰσχρῶν Ψψψεκταί.
ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων αἱ μὲν
γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, al δὲ
σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν
9 , 9 9 la 9 ς φῳφ ἢ “~ e ~ 4
γ ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ
a w” (4 e e δ A ὃ , > 9 δ᾽ Ν θ ᾿Ξ ἢ
μὴν Foxe γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις " ἄτοπον
, ᾿Ξ 4 Ἁ oe) A 4 ’ ᾽ 3 ’
γάρ adda διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρί ζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι TavTov.
iy e 9 # 4 ‘ e ε ’ , a
ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ ai ἡδοναί. διαφέρει de
e ww e “A ld 4 4 A \, wD» ὔ
ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως "
ς ͵ 4 a 4 e e , 4 γ e A
ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ
ὔ ~
8 τὴν διάνοιαν, Kai ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ᾽
e , [4 4 e 4 4 Ud Ψ A wv e a
ἑκάστῳ ζώῳ Kat ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον" ἡ γὰρ |
κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

ἢ ᾿ 4
OLKELOTE pa δὲ

φ
ειγαί

4 8ὲ} e ἢ A ~ ~ 3
καὶ ed’ ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ᾽
Ἅ Bes ς« » A ef € A 4 ‘ - 4 ,
ἂν φανείη " ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώ-
που, καθάπερ ᾿ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι

A ’ “ Ἅ ~ , e a
μῶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν" ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ Tpodn ὄνοις, αἱ μεν

en ee ee ΤΕῸΝ

6-7 καὶ ἀδιόριστοι---ταὐτόν] ‘ And
they are so indivisible as to raise a
doubt whether the function is not
identical with the pleasure attached
to it. And yet pleasure can hardly
be thought or perception—this would
be absurd; but through their not
being separated, some persons fancy
them to be identical.’ To ‘divide’
and to ‘distinguish’ are, as Coleridge
tells us, two different things. Plea-
sure, though not divided, should be
distinguished, from the vital functions,
The author of the Eudemian books,

however, Eth. vil. xii. 3, identified
them, and we might well ask Aris-
totle why happiness, any more than
pleasure, should be identified with
ἐνέργεια.

7 καθαριότητ) On the superior
purity of sight, hearing, and smel!
over taste, cf, Plato, Philebus, p. 51,
and £th, 111. x. 3-11.

8 ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον] Cf. Plato,
Republic, p. 352 E: ἼΑρα οὖν τοῦτο ἂν
θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτονοῦν Epyos,
ὃ ἂν A μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἣ ἄριστα ;

καθάπερ ᾿Ἡράκλειτος---χρυσόν} ‘ As

V.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ. 331

οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, Tas δὲ τῶν

αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶνα. διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ

Α 4 e “A 9 , 4 A A 4 4 4 A
μικρὸν emt γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τὰ yap αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν
, 4 A a a A
τέρπει τοὺς de λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά
> a Δ eas 4 ’ A » 84 ’ A ~
ἐστι τοῖς de ἡδέα καὶ φιλητα, καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο
συμβαίνει" οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ
ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ.
e 4 δὲ “ 4 97)? ες » ὃ a δ᾽ 4
ὁμοίως de τοῦτο καὶ ed’ ἑτέρων συμβαίνει, δοκεῖ ἐν
” ~ 4 a ~
ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι TO φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.
9 A ~ ~ , , “- 4 c
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν
φ ἢ» 5 ζω
ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἧ τοιοῦτος, καὶ
ε 4 fr e ’ , 1 ε ὃ ’ ζ ᾿
ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος
Υ A δὲ , ΄-ὦἜῬ 4ἢ id 70 , JOE
χαίρει. τὰ de τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδεν
e “~
θαυμαστόν. πολλαὶ yap φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων
’ . “ ὃ ἢ δ᾽ > » 9 ‘ ’ 4 εἴ ὃ
γίνονται" ἥδεα οὐκ ἔστιν, αλλα τούτοις καὶ οὕτω οιακει-
ὔ 4 a ~
μένοι. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ
φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. τῶν δ᾽
φ ἴω 4 ΄- ΄“"
ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἦ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον ; ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται
eh he id W ΝΆ Or , 3 4 ΝΥ c e ~ ,
αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴτ᾽ οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου
Α ~
Kat μακαρίου ἀνδρός, ai ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως

Heraclitus says that ‘“‘an ass would | κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν" οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ
prefer hay to gold,”’—the reason οὐτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκύ, τοῖς δὲ
being that he isan ass. Τ}νὲ}δ saying τοὐναντίον, μὴ διεφθαρμένων καὶ λελω-
of Heraclitus, which reminds us of βημένων τῶν ἑτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον
the Alsopic fable of the Cock and καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν.
the Jewel, was probably meant to τούτου 3 ὄντος τοιούτου τοὺς ἑτέρους
satirise the low desires of the human μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ᾽
race. It forms the pendant to that ἑτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον. ὁμοίως δὲ
other saying, ‘Zeus looks on the τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ,
wisest man as we look on an ape.’ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

10 ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ. τῶν τοιούτων. Those who are vicious
ὁ ἀγαθό:] That there is a definite ' and corrupt are to be pronounced
standard of pleasure and of taste, as , not to be right judges of what is
of other apparently variable things, _ good or pleasant. Their pleasures
is most clearly laid down in Aristotle’s ' are to be pronounced not pleasures
discussion upon the saying of Pro- | at all. Cf. Plato, Philebus, p. 40 α:
tagoras, that ‘man is the measure of ψευδέσι. ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ ol
all things.’ Cf. Metaphysics, x. vi.6: πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ 3 ἀγαθοὶ τῶν
φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

332 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [Cuar.

λέγοιντ᾽ ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ de λοιπαὶ δευτέρως
καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

6 Ἐρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ
e e Q 4 10 s a ὃ θ - 9 Or
yOovas, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ
τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ

προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴ ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν
δ᾽ 4 9 δ [μ 4 ‘ “~ θ 10 ὃ 4 ᾽

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις" καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι dta βίου
ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι
a ’ .] 4 ~ 4 4 o 4 Α ~
τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλα μάλλον
εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρη-
ται, τῶν δ᾽ ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι ἕτερα
e , e δὲ J e a on Ψ 4 9 ὃ v ~
aiperai, αἱ de καθ᾽ αὑτας, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν
καθ᾽ αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δὶ ἄλλο᾽ οὐδενὸς
‘ 4 ὃδ A e 9 δ 9 9 9 ? θ εν" δ᾽
γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ᾽ αὐτάρκης. καθ᾽ αὑτὰς
εἰσὶν aiperat, ap’ ὧν μηδὲν ἐγ ζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
τοιαῦται δ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις" τὰ
3γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι’ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν.
καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ cia οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἕτερα αὐτὰς
αἱροῦνται" βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἧ ὠφελοῦν-
ται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, κατα-
φεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονι-

VI. Aristotle having concluded his the means to working, than ends in
treatise upon the nature of pleasure, : themselves; (c) they do not represent
reverts now to the general question of . the higher faculties in man.
the nature of happiness, or the chief | 1 εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν κερὶ ras ἀρετάς
good for man. He takes up from the ᾿ τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονά:)] Cf. Eth. 1.
first book the following fundamental xiii. 1, where the analysis of ἀρετή, or
propositions: (1) that happiness must | human excellence(the most important
be an action (ἐνέργεια) and not astate part of the conception of happiness,
(fs) of the faculties; (2) that it | Eth. 1.x. 9)isintroduced; Eth. vit. i.
must be final and satisfying; (3) that | 1, where the discussion of friendship
it must consist in some development | partly as connected with virtue and
of the faculties sought for its own partly as an external blessing, is jus-
sake, The remainder of the chapter | tified; διά. x. i. 1, where a treatise
is occupied with excluding games on pleasure is added on account of
and amusements from the above | the human interest of the topic, and
definition. Though exercises of the the controversies which have been
faculties sought for their own sake, , raised about it.
these are (a) patronised by unworthy 2 εἴπομεν δ᾽ ὅτι κιτ.λ.}] Οἱ, Eth. 1.
judges,—tyrants, children, and the vii. 13; 1. v. 6.
like; (δ) after all, they are rather 3 τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων) ‘Of those

VI.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ. 333

ὔ e t SN Q a ’ 4 “ e
ζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ
“- “- , aN a
ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι" ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται,
4 ὔ᾽ , ~ 9 4 e a a A ὔ
ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς" δέονται δὲ τοιού-
i 4 > ‘ κ 4 ‘ 4
των, ᾿ δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς
φ ’ 9 a 9 , 9 Ar A #
ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολαζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως
~ ~ a ~
σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ 4
9 a 909 e@ “ 9 > ® ξ a heed 3M, 4
ἀρετὴ οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ᾽ ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι " οὐδ᾽ εἰ
” a ” e a A N ’ 94
ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου emt
a ‘ ”~ ,
τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον
SY ~ 4 ie
aiperwrepas εἶναι" καὶ yap of παῖδες Ta παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς
, 4
τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ
9 . 4
παισὶ καὶ ἀνδρασιν ἕτερα φαὶῖνεται . τίμια, οὕτω καὶ
> a
φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν, καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, 5
Α a ~ ~
καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ Ta τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα.
φ , δὲ e Ά 4 9 t ΨΩ 6 [4 4 ἢ
ἑκάστῳ ὃὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια,
σι ἢ 4 a
kal τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ THY ἀρετήν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ 6
4 e 9 v N A 93 4 a > a
dpa ἡ εὐδαιμονία" καὶ yap ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν,
an A σε
καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ
, a a
παίζειν χάρι. ἄπαντα yap ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα
e , 4 ~ 2 , 7 , - Ω
αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας" τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπου-
v A 4 “ ~ , 4 J 4
daCety δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ
, v
λίαν παιδικόν' rai ζειν δ᾽ ὅπως σπουδαζῃη, κατ᾽ ᾿Αναχαρ-
΄΄ “- A ὔ
σιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά,
εἰν ΄- ~ 4
ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ

rr ae eee

who are called happy,’ cf. Beh. 1. ix.
11: τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς evdac-
μονίξει.

4 ἄγευστοι] This reminds one of
the saying about greedy and corrupt
kings in Hesiod, Works and Days,

3-4 δοκεῖ μὲν ody — evépyecat] ' Vv. 40, 84. :
ἐ π' . °
ae feet | ra Ua oy rf
pase i ᾿ παντός,
πὰ μαι —— tis sia in pa | οὐδ᾽ Scov ev paddxy re xal dopodddy
perhaps after all monarchs are uéy’ Bvevap.

no evidence, for neither virtuo nor
reason, on which the higher functions 6 οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ dpa ἡ evdapovia]
of man depend, are involved in kingly With the whole of the present chapter
power.” Cf. #th, 1. v. 3, where it is we may compare the interesting dis-
said that brutish pleasures ‘obtain cussion in Ar. Politics, VIII. V. 12-14.
consideration’ owing to potentates, | On the relation of amusements to
who have everything at their com- happiness, see Vol. 1. Essay IV.
mand, devoting themselves to such. - p. 226.

4

334 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. {CHap.

δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις: γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.
δοκεῖ δ᾽ ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν εἶναι " οὗτος δέ μετὰ

7 σπουδῆς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ

σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ
βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν
ἐνέργειαν " ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικω-

9 ᾽ , b ~ ~ ΄-- ,
8 τέρα ἤδη. ᾿ ἀπαλαύσειέ τ᾽ ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν

Φ 4 a 9 c 9 a ~ 4 , 9
ὁ τυχὼν Kat ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου. εὐδαι-

͵ 9 9 4 9 4 ἤ 4 a a e

μονίας δ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου "

4 4 4 a ? a e ie a 4 ᾿
οὐ yup ἐν ταῖς τοιαυταίς διαγωγαῖς ἢ εὐδαιμονία, GAA
ἐν ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον
εἴρηται.

Ei δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον
κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην" αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε
δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν

SN e a 4 w# Ε 4 4 ~ 4 Π #
Kat ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε
θεῖον ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου
, » 8 A 9 ’ 4 4 Ψ ς ’ vo
ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαι-

’ ef > 2 A . κΥ͂ e ’ ἢ
povia. ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ

8 εὐδαιμονίας δ᾽ ovdels—Blov] ‘For | as it were the fruit of our exertions.
noone allows aslave to sharein happi- | It is indeed something higher than
ness, any more than in the social life | man regarded as a composite being,
ofacitizen.’ In Politics, 1. xiii. 13, it | and is only attainable by him through
is said that the slave, as distinguished . virtue of a divine element which is in
from the artisan, is κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, te. | him. But we must not listen to those
he ‘lives with the family,’ but he is who would preach down our divine as-
not κοινωνὸς βίου, he does not share in , pirations. On the contrary, we should
the career of his master. ' encourage them, and endeavour to live

in harmony with our noblest part,

VII. Aristotle’s argument now cul- | which is in fact our proper self.
minates in the declaration that happi- 1 εἴτε θεῖον--- θειότατον] ‘Whether it
ness, in the highest sense, consists in be, itself too, absolutely divine, or re-
philosophy : (1) because this is the | latively speaking the divinest thing in
function of the most excellent part of | our nature.’ Philosophy is said in the
our nature; (2) because it most admits | Metaphysics, 1. ii. 14, to be most divine
of continuance ; (3) because it affords | in two ways, first, as being kindred to
most pure and solid pleasure ; (4) be- | the thought of God; second, as being
cause it has pre-eminently the charac- | knowledge of things divine. τοιαύτη
ter of being self-sufficient ; (5) because δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη pdvor’ ἥν τε yap μάλιστ᾽
it is above all things an end-in-itself, ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί,
and not a means to ulterior results; κἂν εἴ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. Cf. the note
(6) because it is a sort of repose, and '| on Eth. 1. ii 8.

VI.—VII.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X, 335

τοῦτ᾽ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.
κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια" καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. ἔτι δὲ
συνεχεστάτη᾽ θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μάλλον
ἡ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν, οἰόμεθα τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι 3
τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν Ἶ
κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν: δηκεῖ γοῦν ἥ
φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχεϊν ΄καθάριότητι καὶ τῷ
βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν |!
διαγωγὴν εἶναι. i} τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεω- 4
ρητικὴν μαλιστ᾽’ ἂν εἴη: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγ-
καίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς
δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται

eee -...ρ-ὕὌὐΝθ.. ... ύ“--

2 ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται)͵ It time οἵ ἰΐ ; as they would be infinitely
is difficult to point out a precise pas- | more sensible than others of their
sage corresponding to this reference | poverty in this respect. Thus he who
(cf. Eth. 1x. iii, 1, where a similar | increases knowledge would eminently
vague reference occurs); but perhaps | increase sorrow’ (Sermon XV.) In
it partly is meant to recall Hth. 1. xiii. | one respect these two views are recon-
20: διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν | cileable; for Aristotle never meant to
διαφορὰν ταύτην" λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν | say that the ἕξις or κτῆσις τῆς σοφίας
ras μὲν διανοητικὰς ras δὲ ἠθικάς, | constitutes happiness, but the ἐνέργεια
partly Eth. 1. v. 7: τρίτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ | κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, ‘the play of the mind
θεωρητικός, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν | under the guidance of philosophy.’
rots ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. There is | He contrasts the peace and repose
nothing in Book VI. which corre- | of conviction with the restlessness
sponds. of doubt. In the same spirit Bacon

3 εὔλογον δὲ---εἶνα.}) ‘ And it is rea- | said (Essay I.): ‘Certainly, it is
sonable to suppose that those who | heaven upon earth to have a man's
know pass their time more pleasantly | mind move in charity, rest in provi-
than those who are inquiring.’ This | dence, and turn upon the poles of
is opposed to the often-repeated say- | truth.’ But in another respect the
ing that ‘the search for truth is more | views of Aristotle are irreconcileable

precious than truth itself.’ Thus | with those above quoted from Butler.
Bishop Butler says, ‘Knowledge is | The one over-states, nearly as much
not our proper happiness. Whoever | as the other under-states, the bless-
will in the least attend to the thing | ings of knowledge. And Aristotle
will see that it is the gaining, not the | strangely leaves out of account that
having of it, which is the entertain- | sense of ignorance which the wisest
ment of the mind. Indeed, if the | man will always retain. His state-
proper happiness of man consisted in | ment is chargeable with philosophic
knowledge considered as a possession | pride, from which Socrates and Plato
or treasure, men who are possessed of | were free. (See Vol. I. Essay ITI.
the largest share would have a very ill | p. 216.)

336 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ. [CHap.

δὶ a ὃ ’ 4 εθ᾽ > e ? δὲ 4 ε
πρὸς ovs δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ᾽ ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
σώφρων καὶ a ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ

4 ‘ ne 8 4 ᾿ a . Ψ "
σοφὸς καὶ καθ᾽: αὑτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
σοφώτερος ἣ μᾶλλον: βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων,

wi

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ᾿ ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δὲ
αὑτὴν ἀγαπῶσθαι" οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ
θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἣ πλεῖον ἣ ἔλαττον περι-

On

, ‘ A - } a e 4 ’ ’ -
ποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξιν.' δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ

΄-Ἕ ᾿ 9 , 4 a ὔ Q
σχολῇ εἶναι" ἀσχολούμεθα yap ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ
πολεμοῦμεν ἵν᾽ εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν
ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια"

ζω , ~
αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν
πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς" οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν
a a [2 481 la dl
τοῦ πολεμεῖν EveKa, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον δόξαι
a vA A ’ Φ 3 9 4 ?
yup dv παντελῶς μιαιῴφονος τις εἶναί, εἰ τοὺς diAous πο-
a ἤ
λεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοιντο. ἔστι δὲ
καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ᾽ jaQuTO τὸ πολιτεύ-
εσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἣ τήν γε εὐδαι-
μονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολι-
7 τικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. εἰ δὴ
τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ
4 ’ ‘ ’ ’ 2

πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ᾽
” 4 [4 a 4 ἤ 4 4 9 e a
ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους Tivos εφίενται καὶ ov δὲ αὑτὰς
ε tf 9 e ἢ wn ~ 9 ἢ om r
αἱρεταῖ εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν
δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι
ὦ » e 4 4 ’ cl 4 ΄ A
τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν ἀϊκείαν, αὕτη de συναύξει τὴν
ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ
ΝΜ 4 9 ’ 4 Ὁ w ” , 4 ͵
ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονε-
μεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα, ή
τελεία δὴ εὐδωιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα

6 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ---ἑτέραν exercise of the political art; nay,
οὖσαν] ‘But moreover the (function) we are in search of this happiness—
of the politician also is restless, and plainly as something distinct.’ σοφία,
beyond mere administration it aims while producing happiness, is identical
at power and distinctions, or, ifhap- with it: but πολιτική is to happiness
piness for the man himself and his as meanstoend. Cf. Bth. vi. xi. 5:
citizens, at all events a happiness _ οὐχ ws ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια,
which is something distinct from the οὕτως ἡ σοφία (ποιεῖ) εὐδαιμονίαν. The

VII} ᾿" HOIKQN NIKOMAXKEION X. 337

8
μῆκος βίου τέλειον" οὐδὲν γάρ ἀτελές ἐστί) τῶν τῆς evdat-
’ « 4 a ” ’ ἢ 4 ᾿
μονίας. 6 δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἣ κατ᾽ 8
ἄνθρωπον" οὐ yap ἧ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ᾽
Oa al φ 4 “7 € , a a a “- ~
n θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει" Sow δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ
συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρε-
, 2 ya Ἂ e a ‘ ᾿ Ψ ae Ἢ
τήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ
“"- Ul ~ Ά 4 4 4 , 9 4 A
τοῦτον Bios θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. ov χρὴ de
κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα
οὐδὲ θνητά τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατιζειν
καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν
αὑτῷ" εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιό-
τητι πολὺ μῶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἶναι g
ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον" ἄτοπον οὖν
, x Ν 4 Α 9 ~ s e - 9 ,
γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ μὴ Tov αὐτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου.

words ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν may be referred . though (this noblest part) be small in
to Eth. 1 ii. 9: ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος proportionate bulk, yet in power and
τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα. dignity it far surpasses all the other

8 κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας)] The mo- | parts of our nature.’ Aristotle here
ralists, says Aristotle, take a shallow , signifies that the divine particle (vois)
view in hidding us tame down our as- __ bears a small proportion to the whole
pirations to our mortal condition. Cf. | of our composite nature. And in ac-
Rhet. τι. xxi. 6, where the gnome, θνατὰ | cordance with this he elsewhere in-
χρὴ τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν, is quoted from timates that only at short and rare
Epicharmus. Isocrates(Ad Dem. p.g intervals can man enjoy the fruition
b) gives a sort of reconciliation of the ᾿ of his diviner nature. Cf. Metaph.
views: ἀθάνατα μὲν φρόνει τῷ μεγαλό. ΧΙ. Vil. 9: εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ws ἡμεῖς
ψυχος εἶναι" θνητὰ δὲ τῷ συμμέτρως τῶν | word, ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ, θαυμαστόν. Pol. ὙΤ11,
ὑπαρχόντων ἀπολαύειν, which reminds | v. 12: ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς
one of George Herbert’s quaint lines: | ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι. With

‘Pitch thy behaviour low, th ‘ects | Which we may compare the saying of
ἘΜΟῚ ΕΙΣ ene NOUN Oe nd, ῬΕΘΟΘΟΙΝΟ ον τς (le γεννήτορα τής

high : '
So shalt thou humble and magnani- II.), that at first he found himself
mous be: only able to rest in the idea of ‘the
Sink not in spirit: who aimeth at truly good’ for short intervals, yet
the sky that these intervals became longer

and more frequentashe wenton. ‘ Et
quamvis in initio hecintervalla essent
rara et per admodum exiguum tempo-
_ Yis durarent, postquam tamen Verum

Shoots higher much than he that
means a tree.
A grain of glorie mixt with humble-

A i nr me se

io . . eyes 5
Cures both a fever and lethargick- ᾿ Bonum magis ac magis mihi innotuit,
nesse.’ intervalla ista frequentiora et longiora

fuerunt.’ Aristotle idealises these
el γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ---ὑπερέχε!] ‘For ‘ moments of the philosopher, suppos-
VOL. II. UU

338 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X. [Cuar.

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν: TO γὰρ οἰκεῖον
ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ.
καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο
οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.
8 Δευτέρως δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν αἱ γὰρ κατ᾽
> A 4 ἢ φ δί 4 a 9 = 4
αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί" δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ
Ν 4 4 4 4 4 4 , ’ ’
ἄλλα Ta κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πραττομεν ἐν
συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαίς ἔν τε
τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ.

μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος.

ταῦτα δ'

ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαί-
A σι a ~

vey ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι

4 Π [2 4 Ld
2 εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα avOpwmxa,

3. τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ
φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει,
εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἡθικὰς εἰσιν

4 ’ 9 9 A ~ 0 “ A 4 td
aperas, TO δ᾽ ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συ-

ing them to extend throughout life,
ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη
ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον.

VIII. Aristotle, pursuing this theme,
declares further the paramount excel-
lence of the philosophic life, by show-
ing that the life of practical morality
holds a merely secondary place, (1)
because it is bound up with man’s
composite nature, that is, with the
passions ; (2) because it is more de-
pendent on external circumstances ;
(3) because such a life cannot possibly
be attributed to the gods. He adds
that though the philosopher will cer-
tainly require a degree of external
prosperity, this will only be a very
moderate degree, as the sayings of
ancient sages testify. And if there
be any providence of the gods watch-
ing over men, it may be presumed
that this will especially watch over
the philosopher, who lovesand honours
that which is divine.

3 συνέζευκται δὲ — dvOpwmrixal]
‘Thought, moreover, seems insepar-
ably connected with excellence of the

- moral nature, and this with thought,

since the major premisses of thought
are in accordance with the moral vir-
tues, and the “right” in morals is that
which is in accordance with thought.
But as thought and moral virtue are
bound up with the passions, they
must be concerned with our composite
nature; and the virtues of the com-
posite nature must be purely human.’
And therefore secondary to philosophy,
which is more than human. This
passage appears to contain the germ
of much that is expanded in the
Eudemian books; cf. Eth. Vi. xii.
9-10, xiii. 4. But we may observe,
Ist, that thought (φρόνησις) is here as
if for the first time coming forward
in opposition to philosophy (σοφία),
and not in that recognised opposition
which would have been the case had
Book VI. been previously written ;
2nd, that there is no reference to any
previous discussions on the moral
syllogism.

συνέζευκται] ‘Thought’ and moral
virtue are here said to be reciprocally
connected, just as it is said of pleasure

VIL—VIII.] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. 339

, δ ἢ 4 . , ‘ 4 , n
νηρτημέναι δ᾽ αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν
? e δὲ a , ° ‘ 3 ’ ΔΛ ε Π
εἶεν" αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί, καὶ ὁ βίος
δὴ ὁ κατ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονίας. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισ-
μένη" τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω " διακριβῶσαι γὰρ
μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς 4

Ι 4 4 4 A ® 3 Ν δ a ~ 4 “-
χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς "
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσον ἔστω,
εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ
« ζω A Q w ὔ 4 4 Ἅ
ὅσα τοιαῦτα" μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι ᾿ πρὸς δὲ τὰς
3 ’ 4 ὃ “ 4 4 ὃ ,
ἐνεργείας πολὺ dice. τῷ μὲν yap ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει
χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ
δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσ-
ποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν
3 , ‘ ~ ? 9 t “ ‘ ~ w”
ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας" πῶς yap δῆλος ἔσται
ἢ οὗτος ἣ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον 5
κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν
4 σι Ψ A Α ὔ ~ e 4 9 a »M Mv
ἀμφοῖν ovens, τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη.

Α 4 a ’ na a 4 @ 4, id
προς δὲ τὰς πραξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους
ry ‘ ᾽ , “- 4 a 9 4
@ot καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς 6

and life, chap. iv. 11: συνεζεῦχθαι | πολιτικός here appears to be used in
μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν | opposition to ὁ σοφός (§ 13), not as dis-
ob δέχεσθαι. tinctively indicating ‘the politician,’
τὸ σύνθετον] Cf. chap. vii. 8. The | but as representing the whole class of
term occurs repeatedly in the PAedo | the active virtues, which are subse-
of Plato, cf. p. 86 a: αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἡ λύρα | quently analysed. Thus, δι. 1. v. 4,
καὶ al χορδαὶ σώματά re καὶ σωματοειδῇ | we find οἱ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ given
καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ | as equivalents for of πολιτικοί.
θνητοῦ ξνγγενῆ. Cf. Eth. vit. xiv. 3. τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεωΞ5] δύναμις here
4 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίω»ν--- διοίσει) | seems used in a sense exactly cor-
‘For though on the one hand both | responding to ‘ physical power.’ In
(the philosopher and the practical | modern warfare, a weak body may
man) will have an equal need of the | often be accompanied by the highest
ordinary means of life, even if the | personal courage, but in the ancient
practical man takesmore trouble about , mode of fighting this would have been
the concerns of the body and such ; impossible or useless.
like-— for there will be but little τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσία:] ‘The tem-
difference in this respect—on theother _ perate man will require full liberty of
hand there will be a wide difference , gratification. Cf. Fth 1, ν. 3: διὰ τὸ
with regard to the discharge of their πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπα-
respective functions.” The term ὁ | θεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ, VIL. vi. 5: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν

7

0°

340 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [Cuue.

a , ἢ 4 > 8 ,᾿ ΝᾺ» δ >
τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, GAN’ ὡς εἰπεῖν
a mario , 4 , Φ »” id
καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν" ἧ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπός
ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ» αἱρεῖται τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράττειν.
δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ
τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ
9 “ “a ’ 4 4 4 t e ᾿
ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλη-
φάμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι" πράξεις δὲ ποίας
ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς ; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἣ γελοῖοι
φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδι-
ὃ # a @ ~ ~ 9 a 4 9 ἤ 4 4
ὄντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένον-
4 a
tas Ta φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν: ἢ Tas
ἐλευθερίους ; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται
4 - ’ wv ~ e a a, aon ὡ
αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν elev ;
a \ e ΝΜ ad ω »” bd ? =
ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἕπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας 5
ὃ a ὃ ’ ’ a ‘ 4 4 ’ ‘
ιεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα pavor ἄν τὰ περὶ τας πράξεις μικρὰ
καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα" οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν
Ἢ ὃδ td ~ 4 a “A [2 4 ae
voumiova, τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου,
ἔτι δὲ μάλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε
ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ
ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη
εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ
λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα
τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς
δ᾽ ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας

ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. The use of the article ' defined the thought of God as ‘the
and of the plural number makes a , thinking upon thought’ (Metaph. x.
slight difference in signification. | ix. 4), which would not only deprive

7 διεξιοῦσι δὲ--- Θεῶν] ‘And if we | the Deity of all those fatherly and
went through allthevirtues,weshould | tender functions which the human
see that whatever relates to moral race is prone to attribute to Him,
action is petty and unworthy of the ' but would also remove Him from the
gods.’ Aristotle argues here that we , conditions of all human thinking. If
cannot attribute morality tothe Deity | it be conceded that the life of God is
without falling into mere anthropo- ' only analogous to that of the philoso-
morphism ; but it might be replied ' pher; we might then ask, why not also
that there is the same difficulty in analogous to the life of the good man !
conceiving of God as engaged in Plato, by placing the ‘ idea of justice’
philosophic thought. Aristotle him- in the suprascnsible world, allowed a
self felt this difficulty, and elsewhere . more than mortal interest to morality.

VIII.) HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X., 341

ὑπάρχει" τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ
’ ~~ Ξ ’ 414. @ 4 , e ’
οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ᾽ ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία,
4 e 4 , 4 e ’ 4 a 4
καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ
3 “ 9 A a 9 4 4 Α ’
εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν"
9 A 4 e a ὔ C4 9 Ε an φ ὃ a
αὐτὴ yap καθ᾽ αὑτὴν tysia. ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία

’ ὃ ’ δὲ 4 ~ ’ | 4 ’ φ ’
θεωρία τις. εῆἥσεε OE καὶ τῆς EKTOS εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ 9

ὄντι" οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ

4 Ἁ -- 4 [2 4 4 A 4 4

καὶ τὸ σώμα υγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τῆν λοιπὴν θερα-
πείαν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων
δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ
τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι" οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερ-

A . Ἂ.Ψ 2 Ff κ 4 4 4
βολῇ TO αὕταρκες οὐδ᾽ ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ
ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά" καὶ γὰρ
ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ᾽ ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρε-
τήν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς" οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν
δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ

a
καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν de τοσαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν" ἔσται γὰρ ὁ

, 9 d ~ 4 a 9 A 4 σι A ,
Bios εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Zo-
λων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν
μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ
καλλισθ᾽, ὡς ᾧετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως" ἐνδέχεται
γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ, ἔοικε δὲ καὶ

And he speaks of the just man, by the | ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχει») i.e. τὰ
practice of virtue, being ‘made liketo μέτρια, referring to ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων
God.’ Rep. 613 A, quoted below. | above.

10 Aristotle seems to lose no op- | κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν] ie. whether philo-
portunity of expressing his contempt , sophic or moral excellence.
for great potentates. ‘ Reason is not 11 καὶ Σόλων δὲ] Referring to the
implied in kingly power,’ Eth. x. vi. | well-known story in Herodotus, 1. c.
4. ‘One may do noble deeds with- | 30 8q., where Solon pronounces Tellus,
out ruling over land and sea,’ &c. | the Athenian citizen, to have been
We may again refer to George Her- | the happiest man he had ever
bert, who in his verses on Church | known.
Music, says, — ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ‘Avataydpas — μόνον]
‘ Anaxagoras, moreover, seemns not to
have conceived of “the happy man”
as a rich man or a potentate, when he
said that he should not be surprised

‘Now I in you without a bodie move,
Rising and falling with your wings;
We both together sweetly live and

rE ES ET

love,! if (his ‘‘ happy man”) appeared a
Yet say sometimes, God help poore | strange person to the crowd, for they
kings.’ judge by externals, having no sense

342

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ.

[Cuap.

᾿Αναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυναστὴν ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν

4 , ῳ 4 @ 9 a , ” ¥
εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος

a a a f a 4 ὔ ὔ
Φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς" οὗτοι yap κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτὸς, τούτων

12 αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον.
αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι.

“- 4 σι ἤ 4 ὃ
συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν
’ 8 q 6 4 a
πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ Ta τοιαῦτα

w# a A 9 93 4 +] a a 9 ~ ΕΣ 4
ἔχει τινα, τὸ δ᾽ ἄληθες ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων Kat

a ’ ’ ’ , Α ‘ ,
Του βίου Κρινέται" εν Τοῦυτοίς γάρ ΤΟ κυρίον.

~ 4
σκοπεῖν δὴ

4 ’ 4 ? ᾳ)νλ2νΑ . wp LY a , 9 a
Ta προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ Tov βίον ἐπιφέροντας,
καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων

13 δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.

φ Α 4 ~ 9 ~ a
O δὲ Κατα vouy εμεργὼν Kal

“ [2 A , 4 4 4
τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέσ-
τατος ἔοικεν εἶναι" εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν

of aught beside.” Anaxagoras, being
asked to define ‘the happy man,’
said that his opinion, if he declared
it, would be thought paradoxical.

12 συμφωνεῖν δὴ---ὑποληπτέον»] ‘The
opinions of the philosophers appear
then to coincide with our arguments.
Authority of this kind affords a certain
ground of belief. But truth in prac-
tical matters is settled by an appeal
to facts and human life, for in them
rests the decision. We ought then
to consider previous sayings with a
reference to facts and life; if those
sayings agree with facts, we should
accept them; if they differ, we must
account them mere theories.’ Cf.
Eth. τ. viii. 1.

13 θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν elvac] The
term θεοφιλής occurs repeatedly in
Plato; cf. especially the interesting
passage in Republic, p. 613.4: where it
is said that ‘all things work together’
for the good of those whom the gods
love. οὕτως dpa ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ

δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ᾽ ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται |
' surely be extended in an especial

ἐάν τ᾽ ἐν νόσοις ἥ Tur ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούν-

ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσ-
θαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυ-
νατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι bey.

εἰ γάρ τις---Ὃὁσπερ δοκεῖ] ‘For if
there be any care of human affairs by
the gods, as men think there is.’ We
may compare Shakespeare's

‘If powers divine
Behold our human actions, as they
do,’

Aristotle expresses here no opinion,
one way or the other, as to the reality
of a Divine Providence. δοκεῖ merely
indicates that an opinion is held ; the
word is frequently used to indicate a
false opinion or fancy. Cf. Eth. vit.
xii. 3: δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τις εἶναι, ὅτι
κυρίως ἀγαθόν. X. Vi. 3: δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν
εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι, ὅτι x.7.2.
Plato had said that moral virtue (see
the last note) placed men peculiarly
under the care of the gods. Aristotle,
differing from Plato in his conception
of the Deity, says, if there be any
care of men by the gods, it must

τῶν κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα els ἀγαθόν | degree not to the just man, but to the

τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι" |
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται |

philosopher, since philosophy is most
akin to the life of the Deity Himself.

VIIL.—IX.] HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X. 343

A “ 4 A “ ’ ~
Te αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ, καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ'
»- A 9 “A f ~
ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ
τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους
~ e σι [ ἴω
καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
~ ΄" a td
τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος
A
ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ᾽ εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον: ὥστε κἂν
“ ΜΝ e a , 3 9 ,
οὕτως ein ὁ coos μαλιστ εὐδαίμων.
> A 9 ® 9 ‘ , ‘ ΄΄- 9 ΄-- "» δὲ Q
β οὖν εἰ περὶ TOUTWY Kal τῶν ApETWV, ETL OE Και 9
φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος
ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ 2

—— — cn an ee

κἂν οὕτως] ‘Even on this supposi- | teaching is merely empirical. So far
tion.’ It seems probable that Aris- | from imparting principles, they go to
totle had in his mind the very words | work in an eclectic way, collecting
of Plato, above quoted. laws, which are mere results, lying,
as it were, on the surface. Legis-
IX. The theory of human life now | lation, as a science, has in short been
being complete, Aristotle asks if any- | neglected hitherto, and must now be
thing more is wanting? The answer | essayed. We must enter at once upon
is Yes, since theory is not by itself | the whole theory of the state, examin-
enough to make men good. For virtue | ing former speculations and existing
three things are required, nature, | constitutions, and developing a con-
teaching, and custom. The first is | ception of the best form of government.
beyond man’s control; the second may According to the sequence of ideas
be identified with theory, which we | in this chapter, it would appear that
have now supplied ; the third requires | the connecting link between ethics
institutions for the regulation of life, | and politics is to be found in the
which may either be (1) of public, or | word ἔθος, custom, or mode of life,
(2) of private ordinance. As a fact, | As custom has great influence upon
the state too much neglects (§ 14) the | men’s power of attaining virtue and
arrangement of daily life, and there- | the chief good, and on the other hand
fore private individuals must address | as the institutions of individual life
themselves to the task in a scientific {| have a close connection with those of
spirit, and must first learn the princi- | the state, it follows that politics are
ples of legislation. Whence are these | the complement of ethics,
principles to be learnt? On the one I ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά]
hand we find that practical politicians | Under the head of ‘doing’ are of
neither write nor speak on the prin- | course included the functions of
ciples of their art. On the other | thought, which, as we have just been
hand the Sophists, who profess toteach | told, are the highest forms of action
politics, are far from understanding | inman. Cf. Pol. vis. ili, 8: ἀλλὰ τὸν
even what they are, and their mode of | πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς

344 HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION Χ. [ Crap.

4 ae ‘ a ᾿ 907 9 > Ψ 4 ὡς
ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πει-
4 a # 4 A ld 9 A =
3 parcer, 7 εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. εἰ μὲν οὗν
ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολ-
λοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν
Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι. νῦν δὲ φαίνον-
Y : & p g 4
A ~ “~

ται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς
ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τ᾽ εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλό-
καλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ
4 ἢ a A a , 9

4 πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι" ov
γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσ-
θαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας "
’ Q ~ Ἁ 9 ἢ e 4 ὃ ᾽ 4 or nm
πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δ ὧν
αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ

A “A \ e 9 “- eQes PN, ΜΝ » 4
δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ᾽ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἀγευ-
δ A A é ’ Ἅ 4

5orot ὄντες, τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους Tis ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθ-
? ? ‘ ei Ἅ 9 e? ὃ “ 9 λ ~
μίσαι; οὐ yup οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾷδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ
τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι, ἀγαπητὸν
δ᾽ ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων, δ ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς

ON

δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ᾽
9 θ ᾿ “ e , 4 e & ¥ e δὲ ὃ ὃ “ Ἃ

ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται of μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ᾽ ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ
4 iy ΄Ἰ, a? a φ 4 4 9 δ οἱ ς [2

μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ed’ ἡμῖν ὑπαρχει,
9 a a [2 4 [2 a 6 4 “~ 9 a,

ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν

διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς | Theognis held teaching inefficacious
τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ' to produce virtue. Aristotle borrows
ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς | the application. On Theognis see
αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας Vol. I. Essay II. p. 92 sqq.
καὶ διανοήσεις. So too under ἀρετή, κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῇ!) ‘Under
σοφία is included in its highest form. | the influence of virtue.’ This word,
3 πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοῦ} The saying | which is also written κατακώχιμον,
of Theognis (v. 432) was that the | seems derived from κατέχειν, with a
Asclepiadse would have deserved great | reduplication. In Ar. Pol. 11. ix. 8,
reward had they known how to heal | we find κατακώχιμοι πρὸς, and ἐδ. VIII.
the minds of men. Vii. 4, κατακώχιμοι ὑπό.
Ei δ᾽ ᾿Ασκληπιάδαις τοῦτο ἔδωκε θεός, 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημ-

Ὰ éva] ‘ What has long been fastened
’ ὶ ἀ μ
sacar die καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας τῇ ghaceheractes

6 τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσψ] ‘To
Πολλοὺς ἃ θοὺ ὶ dn
Ἵ αν ἘΠ ΤΟΣ Δα. era those who are in the most ideal sense
; of the term to be called fortunate.’
The last line is quoted in the Meno ' Cf. Eth, 111. v. 17: καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ

ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἵονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς | of Plato, p. 95 &, to indicate that

IX. ] ᾿ς HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. 345

ὑπάρχει" ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ’ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν
ἰσχύη, ἀλλὰ δέη προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ
ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ
γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου
ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ᾽ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν: τὸν δ'
οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ
λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προῦ-
πάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ
δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις"
τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολ-
λοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ veo. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν
τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ

7

8

συνήθη γινόμενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ᾽ ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς Ὁ

καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας
δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ᾽
ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον" οἱ γὰρ πολ-
λοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἣ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἣ
τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν
μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ
καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι
προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις

καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ , ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευ-
ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφνΐία. μάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι᾽ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας,

9 οὐχ ἱκανὸν ὃ᾽---τὸν βίον] ‘It is εἰ καθ’ ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ
not enough perhapsthat, while young, | ἀζημίους μὲν λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθη-
people should meet ἢ right nurture δόνας προστιθέμενοι. On the one hand
and superintendence, but, as when Thucydides praised the free system of
grown up they must practise thethings | Athens; on the other hand Aristotle
in question, and accustom themselves | praised the organised and educational
to them, so we shall need laws about system of Sparta; see below, § 13,
these things, and in general about the and cf. HvA. 1. xiii. 3, and note. He
whole of life.’ In a spirit the very . was probably led into this political
opposite of this remark, Pericles is mistake, partly by the state of society
reported (Thucyd. 11. 37) to have | in Athensitself, partly by theinfluence
boasted of the freedom enjoyed by of Plato, from whom he imbibed one
the Athenians from all vexatious in- | of the essential ideas of communism,
terference with the daily conduct of ' —namely, that the state should ar-
individuals : ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς | range as much as possible, instead of
τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ és τὴν πρὸς | as little as possible.

VOL. IL. xX xX

10

346 HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X. [Cuar.

& f 4 ᾽ 4 δ᾽ ® , ar 9 ’
Te καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορί-
ζειν" τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ
λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον
λύπη κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καί φασι δεῖν
τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας at μαάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται
11 ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς, εἰ δ᾽ οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται;
τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι,
4 @ 9 3 , 4 , ~ 4 , 3 3
εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ᾽ ἄκοντα
wf) ε " ’ DS “- A , > 3
μήθ᾽ exovra πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν
βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν.
12 ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ
4 τ a 9 4 ΦΨ e ea 9 a, 4 4 yw
. avayxaiov, olde δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος
ἤ Tivos τοιούτου" ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν,
λόγος ὧν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν
ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς
κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν: ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς

ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς,
S \ 3 γ. 4 ὔ A ~ ?

13 TaTTwy τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἐν μόνη δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει
μετ’ ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι
τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων᾽ ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν

, ‘ ~ , A [- 2
πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ Cy ἕκαστος
ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχου.

Ἱᾷάκράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ
ὀρθὴν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι: κοινῇ δ᾽ ἐξαμελουμένων
ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ
φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε.

, ’ ~ , ’ 9 A“ 9 ’
μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
ἐπιμέλειαι

νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος" αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ

13 κυκλωπικῶςΞ] Referring to Homer,
Odyss, IX. 114:

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἥδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ᾽ ἀλλήλων
ἀλέγουσιν.

Aristotle considers that any people
among whom the state does not settle
by law the customs of daily life is
unworthy to be called a society at all.
He ignores that element called ‘public

opinion,’ which in so many respects,
and more naturally, supplies the place
of legislation.

14 καὶ Spay αὐτὸ δύνασθαι] ‘ And
that it should have power to effect the
object in question.’ This apparently
refers to § 12: ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ
πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν K.7.A.

μάλιστα δ᾽ ---γενόμενοΞ] ‘But from
what we have said it would appear
that a person would best be able to

IX. ] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION Χ. 347

δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίγνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς 3 αἱ διὰ τῶν
γεγραμμένων δ᾽ ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε

διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι’ ὧν εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ

σπουδαίων.

οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπι-
τηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ
νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ
λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μάλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ
τὰς εὐεργεσίας" προὔπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπει-
θεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς" καθόλου μὲν
γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ
δ᾽ ἴσως οὔ, ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην
ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ᾽
ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης μάλλον γὰρ τοῦ
προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ᾽’ ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν
ἄριστα καθ᾽ év καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος
ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδὼς ὅτι πάσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε' τοῦ κοινοῦ
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ

περιτίθησιν.

Qa e 9 - 4 a 4 4 ἡ"
yap αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονται τε καὶ εἰσὶν.

bd Ἅ » , , 3 “ ‘ ,
ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον 0 ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαί-
4 3 e [4 4 4 “ἢ “ 4 9 A ww
νοντα ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ ot ἐμπεῖρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι
δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι
ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἧττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχ-
΄“ 4 ‘ ~ 9 A ‘ a
νικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον
εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται" εἴρηται

γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ᾽ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ

do this (i.e to help his children and
friends towards virtue) after learning
the principles of legislation.’ As we
find from £th. vi. viii. 2, legislation
was considered by the Peripatetics to
be the superior (ἀρχιτεκτονική) form of
political thought. A person possess-
ing the general principles of scientific
legislation (see below, § 16) would
be best able to deduce rules for the
guidance of his family, and at the
same time to allow of such exceptions
as individual peculiarities might call

for. That the family is a deduction
from the state, which is prior in
point of idea, we know to have been
Aristotle’s opinion, Pol. 1. ii. 12.

16 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ euweiplay] ‘ And
yet perhaps nothing hinders a man
even without scientific knowledge
treating well some particular case,
from an accurate observation, empiri-
cally, of what results on each thing
being tried.’ Cf. Metaph. τ. i. 7:
πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία
τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

348

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X.

(CHar. |

βουλομένῳ δι’ ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ᾽
ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων

ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ᾽ ἄν.

ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν W poTe-

θέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ

4 “Ὁ δ ’ Ψ 42 σ΄ a “~ ~ >
τινὸς, TOV εἰόοτος, ὥσπερ ET’ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν
> 8 ’ ’ ’ ’ > = ~
ἐστὶν ἐπιμέλεια τις καὶ φρόνησις. ap’ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο
4 ‘4 ’ A ~ A , . 4 a
ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ᾽ av Tis, ἢ

a, , A - a “΄- σ΄ ,
καθαπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον

γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι,

4 9 & f
ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται

9 2 ~ ~ a “~ ~ 9 ~ 4 [2
emt τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνά-

4 4 a a
μεων; ἐν μὲν yap τοῖς ἄλλοις
τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ
οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς " τὰ δὲ

φ 9 a Υ e
οἱ αὐτοι φαίνονται τας
ἐνεργοῦντες am αὐτῶν,

“ 9 [2
“πολιτικα ἐπαγγελλονται

μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ᾽

ς r ’ a ὃ ? Ἂ ὃ 4 ~ 4
οἱ TOALTEVOMEVOL, οἱ ogatey ἂν ὀυναμει τινί TOVTO πραττειῖν

A 9 a A ἤ ᾿ w» A f a»
καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μάλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ οὔτε yap γράφοντες οὔτε
λέγοντες περὶ των τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον

3. » a λ , ὃ , 4 ὃ ᾿ ? δ' 4
Ἦν tows ἢ oyous ἐκανμνικοὺς TE Kal ημηγορικούς), ου αν

πολιτικοὺς “πεποιηκότες
19 ἄλλους τῶν φίλων.
yap’ ταῖς πόλεσιν

4
αμεινον

4 , ea ΑΥ̓͂
τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἤ τινας
Ψ κὺ a” 9. ἢ Ε
εὔλογον δ᾽ ἣν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο" οὔτε

οὐδὲν κατέλιπον av, οὔθ᾽

αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ᾽ ἄν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνα-

μεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις.

4
οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν

ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνοντ᾽ ἂν διὰ
τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί: διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις

20 πε 4 χ A ae ὃ -~_ ’ ’
pe TONITUKNHS εἰὐέναι προσ Εν EOMKEV εμπειρίας.

μᾶλλον ἐπιτνγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς
ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον
ἐχόντων.

17 ὄντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα]
‘Any one you like to propose.’ Cf.
Eth, 1. iii. 8: τί προτιθέμεθα, “ what
we propose to ourselves,’

18 μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς
εἶναι] ‘For, as we said, legislation is
generally considered to be a branch
of politics.’ This probably refers to
Eth. τ. iL 7: χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς
λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι
δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ

τῶν δὲ

τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι. In VI. viii. 2--3, the
point of view is different, πολιτικὴ not
being there treated as a science.
ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σο-
φισταῇ Cf. Plato, Meno, p. 95 B: οἱ
σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλ-
λονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς ;
The whole of the present discussion
on the teaching of political science is
evidently suggested by that on the
teaching of virtue in the Meno, where
it was shown that the great statesmen
do not attempt to teach their sons
virtue, and that the Sophists, who

IX. ] HOIKON NIKOMAXKION Χ, 349

σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι
τοῦ διδάξαι" ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα
ἴσασιν' οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν. τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω
ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ᾧοντο ῥᾷδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συνα-
γαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων" ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ
εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν
συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
κατὰ μουσικήν: οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν
ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι’ ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν,
καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει: τοῖς δ᾽ ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ
μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἣ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον,
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις
ἐοίκασιν: πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν τις,
ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ᾽ ἰατρικοὶ
ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε
λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν
ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις.

profess to teach it, are doubtful in-
stractors.

20 ol δὲ rébua—éolxagw] ‘ But laws
are as it were the results of political
science.’ Aristotle's account of the
Sophists’ method of teaching politics
is precisely analogous to his account
of the way in which they taught
dialectic. He here speaks of their
taking a shallow view of politics, and
making it an inferior branch of rhe-
toric; and he adds that they adopted
a superficial eclecticism, making col-
lectionsof laws without touching upon
the principles from which legislation
must depend. They thus imparted
mere results, which to those who are
uninstructed in principles are wholly
useless. In the same way (Soph.
Elench. xxxiii. 16) he says they gave
various specimens of argument to be
learnt by heart, and that this was no
more use than if a person who under-
took to teach shoemaking were to
provide his pupils with an assortment

of shoes. λόγους yap οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς
οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν,
εἰς οὖς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν φήθησαν
ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. Διόπερ
ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ᾽ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία
τοῖς μανθάνουσι wap’ αὐτῶν" οὐ γὰρ
τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόν-
τες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ
τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ
τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτο-
τομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι, μηδ᾽ ὅθεν δυ-
νήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ
πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων.
21 οὐ γὰρ dalvovrai—ttes}] ‘For
men do not appear to learn the
physician’s art from treatises, though
(they who write such treatises) aim at
stating not only modes of treatment,
but how people can be cured, and how
each person is to be treated, according
to a classification of habits (of body).’
σνγγραμμάτων here is frequently trans-
lated ‘ prescriptions,’ but from what
Aristotlesaysabout them clearly some-
thing more is meant. In the Minos

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEION X.

350 [CHap.

ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ᾽
ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν
πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ
᾿κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἁρμόττει,
εὕχρηστ᾽ ἂν εἴη" τοῖς δ᾽ ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι
τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτό-
ματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ᾽ εἰς ταῦτα τάχ’ ἂν γένοιντο.
22 παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύηντον τὸ περὶ τῆς
νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως,
καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἡ περὶ τὰ
23 ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι
κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειρα-
θῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεω-

which bears Plato’s name we find
συγγράμματα used as ἃ generic word,
of which several species, larpixd, -yewp-
γικά, μαγειρικά, &c., are mentioned,
and are compared (as here) with
‘laws.’ Cf. Minos, p. 316 sqq.: ἤδη
wore ἐνέτυχες ξυγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας
τῶν καμνόντων ; "Ἔϊγωγε.---Ἰατρικὰ ἄρα
καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτατὰ σνγγράμματα
ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν ; ᾿Ιατρικὰ μέντοι.---
*Ap’ οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα
γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν ; κι. The
σνγγράμματα here mentioned were
perhaps ‘reports of cases,’ or mono-
graphs on particular diseases.

τοῖς δ᾽ ἄνευ--- γένοιντο) ‘But those
who without proper training study
such things would not be able to
judge of them correctly (except by
mere accident), though they might
gain an appreciative faculty with
regard to the subject.’ és here
denotes the state of mind formed by
scientific training. Such a training
especially produces ‘judgment’ (τὸ
κρίνειν καλῶς). Cf. Pol. 111. xi. 14:
ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς
τῶν εἰδότων. Eth. 1. iii. 5, and note.
This kind of judgment, as being deep
and original, is distinguished above

from σύνεσις, the power of apprecia-
tion, but in Fth. vi. x. 2, σύνεσις is
called κριτική, in a lower sense, and as
contrasted with ‘thought,’ which is
τρακτική.

22 παραλιπόντων οὖν] One must be
struck with the disdainful way in
which Aristotle here quite sets aside
the Republic and Laws of Plato, by
which he had been himself so much
influenced, as if they were not to be
reckoned as even attempts at founding
the science of politics. Below, he
alludes to them as ‘ perhaps on some
particular points having made good
remarks,’

23 πρῶτον μὲν ody] A rough outline of
the Politics is here given, as Aristotle
conceived it before writing it. The
sketch is so very general that it omits
the subject of Book 1., and yet critics
have thought that this passage may
be taken as evidence of what the
order of books in Aristotle’s Polétics
should be.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν» ‘From
my collection of constitutions.’ Cf.
Cicero, De Fintbus, v. iv.: ‘Omnium
fere civitatum, non Greecizs solum, sed
etiam barbaris, ab Aristotele mores,

IX. ] HOIKON NIKOMAXEION X, 351

“- ᾿ a ᾽ 4 ῇ ν 4 8 a
ρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις Kai τὰ ποῖα
σε ~ 4 ἢ 4
ἑκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν
σι ἢ
καλῶς αἱ δὲ τοὐναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ
a 4 δ 4 , ᾿ ,
τούτων tay’ ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν Kat ποία πολιτεία
σε a 4 4 s
ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη. ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νὥμυις καὶ
iy [4
ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενον

instituta, disciplines; . sueophrasto | καί, ἀριστοκρατικαί, καὶ τυραννικαί, The
leges etiam cognovimus,’ Diogenes | fragments of this work have been
Laertius, in his list of the works of | collected by C. F. Neumann, and may
Aristotle, mentions (v. 1.12): πολιτεῖαι | be found in the Oxford reprint of
πόλεων δυοῖν δεούσαιν ἑξήκοντα καὶ | Bekker’s edition of Aristotle.

ἑκατόν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ δημοκρατικαί, ὀλιγαρχι-

OO ΡΝ ααδααιδαοιδδαιιθπαιπιν ρρρρρρ«ρρρρρρρσ στο

350
ταῦτ
aver
πολ

Sa ἱνμαι τι Au.

»”
em’? TOS .-

3 ee
UK ἂν
“IT uv.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ABEBAIOI IX. xii. 3,
ἀβλαβεῖς VII. xiv. 5.
ἀγαθὸς I. iii. 5. vii. 17. viii, 12. x. 11.
xiii. 12. IT. iii. 7, 10. iv. 5. vi 3. IV.
iii 15,20. Υ. 1.11. VI. xiii6. VIL
i 1. xiii, 3. VIII. iii. 6. v. 4, 5. xi. 1.
X.v.10. ἀγαθὴ ILL 5. ἀγαθὸν 1.
iL 1, 7. iv. 1. v. 1, 8. vi. 2, 5, 6, ΣΙ,
13. vil. 1, 6, 15, 17. Viil 9. x. 3, 13.
xi. ς. xii. 2. xiii. 5. 11. vi. 2,14. IIL
iv. 2, 3, 5,6. v.17. vi 6. ἱσ, 6. IV.
fii 14. V. £ το, 17. iii. 17. vi 6. VIL
vii, 4, 6. viii. 4. ix. 4. xii. 7, 10, xiii.
1,6. VIL xi. 1, 3, 4. xi 1, 3. xiii
1,7. xiv. 2. VIIL ii 1, 2. iii. 1, 2, 7.
iv. 4. V. 4, 5. VL 4. Vili. 7. x. 2. xi. 4.
xii, 5, 7. xiv. 3. IX. iii. 3, iv. 3. viii.
7, 9 ix. 7, 8,9, 10, X. ii 1, 2, 4, 5.
iii, 2, 11. ix. 11. ἀγαθοῦ 1. i. 1. iv.
1. vi. 8, 15. χὶ, 6. IIL. iv. 1. v. 17.
V. i. το. iii. 14, 15. iv. 6. vi. 6. ix. 9.
x1. VI. ix. 4. xii. 1. VII. xii. 2.
VIII. iii 4. xiii. 2. xiv. 1. TX. iv. 3.
ix. 1,5, 7,9, 10. X. ii 3, 4. ἀγαθῷ
111. ii. ro. v. 18. IV. iii.19, V. 1.11.
VI. xii. 10. VIIL v. 4. xiv. 1. ἀγαθοὶ
L viii. 16 IL i. 6, 7. ii. 1. ν΄. 5. vi. 9.
VIIL iii. 6. iv. 1, 4, δ. Vv. 1. vill 2.
xiii. 1. IX. ἰχ. 9. KX ix.1,17. ἀγαθαὶ
L viii. 13. VIL. xii. 7. xiv. 2. IX. iv.
δ. ἀγαθὰ L iv. 4. vi. 11, 14. viii. 2.
111. ii. 13. IV. iii 10, 20, 21. V.i. 9.
VIL v. 1, 4, 5, 6. vii. 5. xii 1. xiv. 9.
VIIL i. tiv. 5. vii. 7. IX. viii. 6, 9.
ix. 3. ἀγαθῶν I. vi. 4, 7, 10, 14. vii.
8. viii. 2, 3, 15. ix. 7. xii. 4, 5. IV.
iii. 10, 35. V. vi. 4. ix. 17. xi. 2.
VII. iv. 2, §. xiii. 2. xiv. 2. Ν 111. iii.
6. iv. 3, 4. V. 4, 5. vii. 6. viii. 5. x. 2.
IX. iv. 8. viii, 7. ix. 1,7. X. ii. 2, 3.
iii. 1. villi. 9. ἀγαθοὺς I. v. 5. ix. 8,
VOL. IL

a

x. 4. xiii. 2. 11.1.5. WIIT. i. 5. iv. 2.
vi. 2,4. ἀγαθοῖς I. x. τς. III. v. 3.
IV. iii. 15. VIII. vii. 4. x. 2. IX. ix.
5, 7. xi δ.

᾿Αγάθων VI. ii. 6. iv. 5.

ἄγαλμα X. v. i.

ἀγαλματοποιῷ 1. vii. 10.

᾿Αγαμέμνονα VIII. xi. 1.

ἄγαν VII. ii. 6.

ἀγαπᾷ ITI.xi. 8. ΙΧ. vii. 3. viii 6. XX.
iv. 10. ἀγαπῶσι 1. v. 2. IV. i. 20.
VIIL. iii. 1. vii. 2. viii. 1. IX. xii. 2.
ἀγαπᾷν III. x. 11. ἀγαπῶν IX. iii 1.
viii. 6. ἀγαπῶντας X. viii. 13. dya-
πηθείη IX, vii. 3. ἀγαπᾶται 1. v. 8.
ἀγαπᾶσθαι ΣΧ, vil. 5. ἀγαπώμενα L
vi. 8. ἀγαπωμέναις X. ix. 10.

ἀγαπητὸν L iii. 4. TX. x.6. ΣΧ. ix. 5,
20.

ἀγαπητότατον IX. xii. 2.

ἀγασθῶσι VIL i. 3.

ἀγένητα VI. ii. 6. ἀγέννητα VI. iii. 2.

ἀγεννοῦς 1V.i 31. ἀγεννὲς IV. iii. 26.

ἄγευστοι X. vi. 4. ix. 4.

ἀγνοεῖ IIL i. 14, 15. V. viii 10 dy-
νοοῦσι IX. vi 1. ἀγνοοῖ VL vii. 7.
ἀγνοήσειε 11]. 1.17. ἀγνοεῖν 1. vi. 15,
ΠῚ. v. 8, 9. IV. iii. 35. V. viii. 2.
ἀγνοῶν TIT. i. 14, 16. ν. 12. V. viii. 3.
ix. 12. x. 3 ἀγνοοῦντες IIL viii. 16.
IV. iii. 36. V. viii. 12. ἀγνοοῦντας
ΠῚ. ἃ, 14. νυ. & VL iii. 5. ἀγνοήσας
IIT. i. 18. ἀγνοούμενον V. viii. 3.

ἄγνοια TILL 15. VIL iii 12. ἀγνοίας
IIL i. 18 ν. 8 Vz. viii. 6. VIL, if. 2.
ἄγνοιαν L iv. 3. 11]. i 3, 13, 14, 19,
20.v.7,17. V.viii 12. χ 7. VIL
ii, 1, 2, VWIIL viii 3.

ἀγνῶτας IV. iv. 5. ΙΧ, ν΄ 1.

ἀγοραία VIIL xiii. 6. ἀγοραίων VIII
vi. 4.

δ INDEX VERBORUM.,

Bea

ἀγορεύων IIL viii. 2. ἀγορεύουσι V. i. 13.

ἄγραφον VIII. xiii. 5. ἀγράφων X. ix.
14.

ἄγριος IV, viii. 10.
ἄγριοι IV. viii. 3.

ἀγροικία IL. vil. 13.

ἄγροικος 11. vil. 13. ἄγροικοι IL. ii. 7.
VIL ix. 3.

ἀγρὸν V. ix. 3.

ἀγνμνασίαν TIT. v.15. dyxboa VI.
ix.

bye VIL iiL το. dyewV. v. xi X.i. 2
ἄγωμεν X. vil. 6. ἄγοντες IX. viii. 4.
ἄγουσα IT. vi.9. ἄγεται III. xi. 6.
VIL iii. 2. vii. 3. ἄγονται VII. vii. 8.
ix. 2, ἀγομένων VII. xii 3, ἦχθαι
L iv. 6. IL iti. 8, ἄγεσθαι 11]. xi. 3.
VIL ix. 6.

ἀγωγῆς X ix. 8. ἀγωγὴν X. vii. 3.

ἀγῶσι 11]. viii. 8,

ἀγωνίαν IIT. v. 11.

ἀγωνιζόμενοι I. viii. 9. X. v. 4.

ἀγωνιστὰς IX. ν. 2. dywunordy IX. v.

ἄγριον IIL x, 7.

4.

ἀδεὴς 11], vi. το.

ἄδειαν Ὗ. iv. 13.

ἀδέκαστοι IT. ix. 6.

ἀδελφικὴ VIIL x. 6. xii. 4. ἀδελφικῇ
VIIL xii. 6.

ἀδελφῷ VIII. ix. 3. ἀδελφοὶ VILL xii.
3 ἀδελφῶν VIII. x. 6. xii.5. ἀδελ.
gos VIIL ix. 2. IX. ii 7. ἀδελφοὺς
IX. ii. 9.

ἀδεσπότοις Ὑ 11], x. 6.

ἄδηλον IV. i. 8. vi. 3. VI. viii. 4, 6.
IX. ii. 3, 6. viii 5,6. x. 4. X. viii
13. ἄδηλοι X. viii. 4. ἀδήλοις IIL
iii, 10,

ἀδιάβλητος VIII. iv. 3. ἀδιάβλητον
VIII. vi. 7.

ἀδιαφόρους Χ. v. 8,

ἀδικεῖν ΤΙ. vi. 19. IV. iii. 15. V. ν. 17,
18, vi. 4. viii. 4. ix. 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 14,
16. xi. 1, 5,6, 7. ἀδικεῖ V. if. 2. iv. 3.
vi. 2. viii, 1, 11. ix. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
xi, 2, 4,6. ἀδικῆσαι V.xi.4. VIII.
iv. 3. ἀδικοῦσι V. 1. 3. viii 8. VII.
vill, 3. ἀδικῶν V, iii. 14. vi. 1. viii.
II, xi. 4. ἀδικοῦντος V. ix. 3. ἀδι-
κοῦντι V. xi. 1. ἀδικοῦντα III. v. 13.
V. vi. τ. ix. 7. ἀδικεῖται V. v. 3. ix.
3, 6, 7, 9. xi. 3. ἀδικοῖτο V. ix. 4.
ἀδικεῖσθαι TV. i, 26. V. v.17, 18. viii.
10. ix. 1, 3, 5, 7, 8. xi. 5, 6, 7, 8.
ἀδικούμενος V. v. 14.

ἀδικία V. i. 7, το. ii. 3, 6, 8, 9, TO. v.
17, 18. vi. 4, 8,9. xi. 9. ἀδικίας V.
i. 1, 3 iL 1,9. v.19. xi 7. ἀδικίαν
IV. vit 7. V. ii. 2,5. vi x. WIL
vil 7. ἀδικίᾳ V. viii. 10.

ἄδικος TIT. v. 13, 14. V. i. 8,9, 10, 12.
id 4. iil 1. vi. 1, 2. viii, 8, 11. ix. 12
χί. 4. VIL x. 3. ἄδικον IIL v. 13
V.i 7,8. ii 3, 8, 9, 10. iii 1, 3, 14
iv. 2. 3 4. V. 17. vi. 1, 9. vii 7. viii.
2. ix. 3, 10. mi. 4. VIL vi. 7. ἀδίκου
V. ii. 3, 9. v. 18, 19. vi. 4. ἀδίκῳ IIL
v. 14. ἄδικοι IL i, 7. Π.ϊ.14. V.
vii. 8. VIL. viii. 3 ἀδίκων V. viii.
I, 4. ix. 3. ἀδίκοις V. viii. 1. ἄδικα
V. i, 3. viii. 4. ix. 3, 6, 11, 15. VIIL
ix. 3. ἀδίκους III. v. το. IV. i. 42.
ἀδικωτέρα VIL vi. 3, 4. ἀδίκως V. ix.
12, 13.

ἀδιοριστον TIL iii 10. Xv. 6

ἀδολέσχας LIT. x. 2.

ἀδοξίας IV. ix. 1.

ἀδυναμία IV. i. 37.

dduvare( 1X. ix. 1. KX. iv.g. ἀδυνατοῦσι
V. i. 15. XK. v. 3. ἀδυνατεῖν X. x. 3.
ἀδυνατοῦντα VIIL xiii. 9. ἀδυνατοῦ»-
res X. vi. 6.

ἀδύνατον I. viii. 15. V. v. 15. ix. 2. χ 6.
xi 4. VI. xii.10, ἀδυνάτῳ IIL iii. 13.
ἀδύνατα 111. ii. 10. ἀδυνάτων 111. ii
7. VL ν. 3 vii. 6.

ἀεὶ L vii 8, 11. IL ii 23. vi 18, IID.
iii. 4,8, 16. IV. iii. 14. iv.4. Υ. ἱ. το.
il. §. iv. 2. v. 14. ix. 1A xh 4. VI
vii. 4. x. 1. WIL. ifi. 2, vii 7. xiv.
5,6 WIIL x. 3. xili. 4. xiv.4. IX.
ii. 4, 9. viii. 5. XX. iii. 3. iv. 7. vi. 7.

doe IX. i. 4.

ἀηδὴς IT. vii. 13. ἀηδὲς XK. v. 5. ἀηδίας
IX. xi. 6. ἀηδῶς IV. iii. 25.

ἀθανασίας IIL. ii. 7.

ἀθανγατίζειν X. vii. 8.

᾿Αθηναίους IV. iii. 25.

ἀθλητὴν IIT. ii. 8, ἀθληταὶ IIL viii. 8.

ἄθλιος L x. 4, 13, 14. VIL. vii. 5. ἀθλίῳ
VIL, vii. 5. ἄθλιον», x. & IX. iv.ra
ἀθλίων 1. xiii. 12. ἀθλίως I. ix. 14.

ἀθλοθετῶν I. iv. ς.

ἄθλον I. ix. 3. IV. iii. 10, 15.

ἀθρόον VIT. vii. 6.

αἶγα TIL x. 7. V. vii 1.

ἀδοξίαν IIT. vi. 3.

INDEX VERBORUM. lil -

αἰδεῖσθαι IV. ix. 7. αἰδούμενος 11. vii.
id.

αἰδήμων 11. vii. 14. TIL vi. 3. αἰδήμονα.
IV. ix. 3.

ἀΐδιον Lv. 6. VI. iii. 2. ἀΐδια IIL ii 10.
VL iii, 2. ἀϊδίων 11]. iii. 3.

αἰδὼς IL. vii. 14. IV.ix. 6,7. αἰδοῦς
IV. ix. 1,3. αἰδοῖ Χ, ἴχ, 4. αἰδῶ IT
viii. 3, 4,

αἰκία Ὗ. ii, 13.

αἷμα IIL viii. ro. WIIL xii. 3.

αἵρεσιν 11. iii. 7. αἱρέσεις ΤΊ. iii. 7.

αἱρετὸς IX. ix. 7. αἱρετὴ VIIL viii. 2.
TX. xi 6. xii. ΣΧ Δ, 13. αἱρετὸν
L vii. 4, 8. 11]. ii. 17. xii τ. V. iii
16. VIIL ν. 4. IX. vii. 4 ix. 9, ro.
X, i. 1,2, iv. 10, alperod V. v. 17.
αἱρετὴν X. ii, 2. αἱρεταὶ TIL i. 6. VIL
xii. 1. xiv, 1. ΣΧ, iii. 9, 13. Vi. 2, 3.
vii. 7. αἱρετὰ IIL i. το. IV. iii. 18.
VIL iv. 2, 5. αἱρετῶν 1. vii. 4. VIL
iv. 5. IX.ix. 10 ΣΧ, v. 6. vi. 2, 3
alperds VL xii. 4. IX. vi. 2. alperd-
repos IIL. viii. 9. Vi. ν. 7. alperd-
τερον I. vii.8. WIL. vii. 4. IX. xi. 1.
X ii. 2, 3. alperwrépay I. vii. 8, alpe-
rwrepat VIL. xiv. 3. αἱρετωτέρα I.
i 4. alperwrépas X. vi. 4. αἱρετώ-
τατος IX. ix. 9. alperwrdry X. vi. 5.
αἱρετώτατον IX. xii. 1. alperwrdrny
L vii. 8. VIL. xiii. 2.

αἱρεῖται L. vii. 5. 11. vi. 8. IIT. vii. 13.
ix.4. V.itro, VII. ix.1. IX. iv. 4.
viii 8. X vii.6. αἱροῦνται ITI. iv. 6.
IX. iv. 8. viii. 9. xii. 1,2. X. vi. 3.
alpotro X, vii. 9. αἱρούμεθα I. ii. 1.
vii. 3,5. ΧΟ, 2, iv. 11. νἱ, 6. ὅλοί-
μεθα]. vii. 5. X. iii. 12. ἕλοιτο 111.
L 6. ΤΥ... 14. VIILi. τ. TX. viii. 9.
ix. 3 X 1. 12 ἑλέσθαι K ν. 8.
αἱρεῖσθαι IT. vii. 16. III. ii. 13. xi 6.
Viiig. ΙΟἐΣἱΣ 1. ν. 6. VIII. viii. 2.
αἱρούμενος IIL iv. 2. IV. vi. & IX
vill 10. αἱρούμενον IX. iv. 1. alpotpe-
νοι ΣΧ, ii. §. αἱρήσεται 111, v. 17.
αἱρετέον ITI. iL 9, 10.

αἴρειν VII. vii. 5.

αἰσθάνεται IX. ix. 9. αἰσθανόμεθα VI.
viii. 9. IX.ix.9. αἰσθάνεσθαι TV. v.
6. IX. ix. 7,9, 10. xi. 4. αἰσθανο-
μένῳ I, x. 3. αἰσθανόμενον IX. ix. g.
αἰσθανόμενοι X. viii. 11, ἤσθετο IIL
x7.

αἴσθησις VL. ii. 1, 2. viii. 9. VIL iii. 9.
ΤΙ 1. ΙΧ, ἰχ, το. & iv. 6,7. v. 7.

αἰσθήσεως IIL. iii, 16. IX. ix. 7. ΣΧ. ᾿
iv. 5. αἰσθήσει IV. v.13. VIL v. 6.
αἴσθησιν IIT. x. 4. VI. if. 2. xi. 4.
VIII. xii. 2. IX. xii. 1. KX i. 3. iv. 5.
7. αἰσθήσεις X. iii. 7. v. 2. αἰσθή-
σεων IT. i. 4. IIL x. το.

αἰσθητικὴ I. vii. 12. αἰσθητικῆς VII.
iii, 13.

αἰσθητὴ VIL. χὶ. 4. αἰσθητὸν X. iv. 5,
6, 8. αἰσθητοῦ, VIT. iii 13. ΣΧ, iv. 7.
αἰσθητὴν VIL. xii. 3.

αἰσχροκέρδεια IV. i. 41.

αἰσχροκερδεῖς IV. i. 43

aloxpodoyla IV. viii. 5.

αἰσχροπραγεῖν IV. i. 8.

αἰσχρὸν IIL i. 4, 7. v. 2. vi. 3. vii. 13, .
viii. 4, 9,14. ix. 4. IV. i. 39. vii. 7.
VIL vii. 3. VIIL vii. 6. X ix. 4, 8.
αἰσχρὰ 111. i. 9, 23. v. 3. IV. i. 7. iii.
15. ix. 5, 7. VII. vi. 1. αἰσχραὶ VIL
xi. 5. αἰσχροῦ IT. iii. 7. 111. viii. 3, 9.
αἰσχρῷ TX. viii. 1. αἰσχρὰν VIT. ix. 4.
αἰσχρὰς X. v.11. αἰσχίων VII. vi. 1,
35 αἴσχιστα lILi. 7. αἰσχίστων
X. iii 12. αἰσχρῶν 111. i. 11. xii. 6.
IV. i. 39. ix. 5. ΣΧ. iii το. v.6. αἱσ-
xpos ITT. v. 15.

Αἰσχύλος 11]. i. 17.

αἰσχύνη TV. ix. 4.

αἰσχύνεται IV. iii. 24. αἰσχύνοιτο ΤΥ.
ix. 7. αἰσχύνεσθαι IV. ix. 6, 7. αἱσ-
χυνόμενοι IV, ix. 2. αἰσχυντέον IV.

ix. 5.

αἰσχυντηλὸς LV. ix. 3.

αἰτητικὸς TV. i. 16.

αἰτία II. viii. 8. 111. i. 10,15. VIT. v. 4.
X. iv, 6. αἰτίας IT. viii 7. V. viii. 7.
VI. xi.6. X. ix. 6, 23. αἰτίαν I. vii.
20, ix. 6, 10. IL vii. 9. ITT. iit. 4. IV.
ἡ, 14. VIL iii. 9. αἰτίαι IIL iii. 7.

αἴτιος ITI. v. & 17. VII. xi. 2, ΙΧ. xi.
4. αἰτίου IIT. i. 23. αἰτίῳ I. x. το.
αἴτιον Liv. 4. xii. 8. xiii. 11. II,
fii. 11. ν. 8, V.xu. 4,6 VI. viii. 5.
VIL xiv. 3. IX. vii 2, 4, viii το. &.
fii. 2. αἰτίοις 1X. ii. 8. αἴτιοι III. v.
7,10 VIIL xii. 5.

αἰτιᾶσθαι 111. it. αἰτιῷτο 1X. iii. 2.

αἰφνιδίοις IIT. viii. 15.

ἄκαρπα IV, iii. 33.

ἀκίνδυνοι IIL. xii. 2.

ἀκινησίας VII. xiv. 8,

ἀκίνητον V. vii. 2. ἀκινήτων VL x. 1, 4.

ἄκλητον IX. xi 6.

ἀκμῇ VIIL i. 2. iii, 4.

ae Saale
lV INDEX VERBORUM.

ἀκμαίοις X. iv. 8.

ἀκμάξων 11]. xi, 1.

ἀκοὴ X.v. 7. ἀκοῇ Χ. iv. 10. ἀκοὴν
ITI. x. 4.

ἀκολασία IT, vii. 3. viii. 6,8. ITT. x. 1,
8, 10. xi §. xii. 1. VIL v. 5, 9. vi. 6.
vii. 1. ἀκολασίας IIT. v. 15. xii. 5.
IV. i. 35. ἀκολασίᾳ VIL iii. 2. iv. 6.
ix. 5. ἀκολασίαν IL viii. 8. IV. & 3.
V. ii, §. VIL iv. 2. v. 8.

ἀκολασταίνειν ΤΠ]. vi. 19. ἀκολασταίγοντα
IIL ν. 13.

ἀκόλαστος IT. ii, 7. iii. 1. viii. 2. TIL. xi.
5, 6. xii 4. V.ii 4. VIL iii. 2. vii.
2, 3, 7. Vili. I. ix. 4, 7. ZL 7. Xiv. I.
ἀκολάστου ITI. x. 6. VII. viii. 5. dxo-
λάστῳ TTL v. 14. xii. 4. ἀκόλαστον
IL viii. 2. 111. v. 13. VIL &. 6. iv. 3,
4 ἀκόλαστοι 1]. i. 7. III. x. 2, 3, 5,
9. xi. 4. FV. i. 35. VIL. xiv. 6. ἀκόλα-
ora VIL vi. 6. ἀκολάστον: III. v. 10.
X. 2, 4, 5.

ἀκολουθεῖ 111. vii. το. V. i. 6. VII. i. 6.
vi.t. IX. vir. ἀκολουθοῦσι IL i 8.
V.x.1. ἠκολούθηκε VIL ix. 6. dxo-
λουθήσουσι VII. xii. 1. WIITL ix. 6.
ἀκολουθεῖν VI, iii. 2. xi. 6. WIT. ii. 6.
vi. 2.

ἀκολουθητικὸς I. iii. 6. ἀκολουθητικοὶ
VIL vii. 8.

ἀκόλουθον IV. ii. 1.

ἀκούσιον ITT. i. 1, 6, 13, 15. V. v. 5. viii.
3.ix. 1, 2. ἀκουσίου ITT. i. 15, 19, 20.
iit. ἀκουσίῳ V. viii. 2. ἀκούσια IIL.
i. 3, 6, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27. V. ii.
184. ἀκουσίων V. ii, 13. viii. 12.
ἀκουσίοις IIL i, τ. V.iv. 1. ἀκουσίως
IIT. i. τό, 23.

ἀκούσματα X. iv. 7.

ἀκούει IV. iii. 25. IX. ix.9. ἀκούουσι
IT. ἱν. 6. ἀκούων Liv. 7. IV. viii. 8.
ΙΧ, ix. 9. ἀκούοντα IV. viii.7. ἀκούειν
IV. viii 1,5. VIL iii. 12. vi. 1. xiv.
5. ἀκουσάτω L iv. 7. ἀκοῦσαι IT.
i. 4. IV. viii. το, VII. vir. ἀκούσας
VIL vi.1. ἀκούσειε X. ix. 7. ἀκού-
σεται L iii. 6, IV. viii. 8, ἀκουσό-
μενον I. iv. 6. ἀκουστικὸν I. xiii. 9.

ἀκρασία VII. i. 1, 6. ii. 7, 11. iii. 2, iv.
2, 6. v. 5, 8, 9 vi. 1, 3, 4, 5. viii.
I, 3. Χ. 4,5. ἀκρασίας VIT. i. 4. ii.
I, 9, 11. v. 9. vil. & viii. 1. xiv. 9.
ἀκρασίᾳ VII. ix.5. ἀκρασίαν V. ix. 5.
ΨΙΙ. ii. 9, 10. iv. 6, vii, 6, 8. ix. 4.
ἀκρασιῶν VII. x. 4.

ἀκρατεύεται VII. ii. τ. dxparevorrat
VIL iii. 3. x. 4. ἀκρατεύεσθαι VII.
fii, 10, 14. ἀκρατευόμενος VIL it 2.
axparevopévous VIL, iii. 8,

ἀκρατὴς 11]. ii. 4. V. ix. 4,6. VI ix. 4.
VII, i. 6. ii. 5, τὸ, 11. iii, 1, 2, 12
iv, I, 3 Vi. I. vii. 1, 8. viii. ¥, 2, ς.
ix. I, 4, 5, 7. Χ. 2, 3. IX. viii 6. ἀκ-
parots I. xiii. 15. VIL vii. 3. ix. 5.
ἀκρατεῖ VIL. vil. 4.ix. 3. ἀκρατῆ VIL
i. 6. ii. 3, iii, 11. iv. 4, 6. v. 5.x. 1, 2
ἀκρατεῖς IV. i 3. VIL i. 7. iié. 7. iv.
2.v. 4. Vii 3 x. 2, 4. IX iv. 8.
ἀκρατῶν L xiii τς. ἀκρατέσι L iii 7.

ἀκρατῶς TIL v. 14.

ἀκριβὴς VIIL vii. 5. ἀκριβὲς L iii. 1, 4.
II. ii. 4. ἀκριβεῖς. TIT. iii. 8, ἀκριβέ-
orepor II. vii 5. ἀκριβεετέρα IT. vi. 9.
ἀκριβεστάτη Vi.vii. 2. ἀκριβεστάτοις
VI vil...

ἀκρίβειαν I. vii. 18. ἀκρίβειας X. iv. 3.

ἀκριβοδίκαιος V. x. 8.

ἀκριβολογία IV. ii. 8. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι
VI. iii. 2.

ἀκριβῶς ΤΙ. ii. 3 VIT. fii. 3. EX. ii. 2.
X. ix. 16.

ἀκροάματα X. iii. 7.

ἀκροατὴς I, iii. 5. ἀκροατοῦ 1. iii. 8, X-
ix. 6.

ἄκρος TV.iii, 8. ἄκρον IL. vi. 20. viii. 7.
Υ. ν. 12. ἄκροι IT. vii. 8. viii. 3. IV.
iv. 6. ἄκραι 11. viii. 1. ἄκρων IL. vi
§- Vil. IO ix. 3. IV.v.1. V. v.17.
ἄκρα Il, vii. rr, IV. iv. 4. vi. 9.
ἄκροις 11. viii. 4, 5. ἄκραις IL. viii. 1.
ἀκρότατον I, iv. I.

ἀκροτὴς 11. vi. 17.

ἄκρως IT. ix. 4.

ἀκροχειριζόμενοι IIT. i 17.

ἀκρόχολοι IV. v. 9.

ἄκυρα VIL ix. 3.

ἀλαζονεία IT, vii. 12. FV.vii. 15. ἀλαζο-
γνείας IV. vii. 1.

ἀλαζονευόμενοι lV. vii. 13. ἀλαζονεύον-
ται IV. vii. 13.

ἀλαζονικὸν IV. vii. 15.

ἀλαζὼν II. vii. 12. IIL vit 8. IV. vii.
2, 6, U1, 12, 17.

Gas VIII. iii. 8.

ἀλγεῖν TIT. v. 7. ddyef TX. iv. 9, ἀλ-
γοῦσι IIL. viii. 12.

ἀλγεινὸν ITT. ix. 3.

ἀλγηδόνος IIT. viii. 11, 12.

ἀλέας VII. iv. 3.

ἀλείπτης IL. vi. 7.

INDEX VERBORUM. Ψ

ἀλήθεια ΤΙ. vii. 12. VI. ii. 2, 3, 6. ix. 3.
ἀληθείας]. νἱ. τ. IV. iii. 28. VI. ii. 1.
ἀληθείᾳ TV. iii. 16. Viv. 11,15. UX.
ii, §. ἀλήθειαν 1. vi. 1. xiii. 2. 111.
iv. 4.v. 17. IV. iii. 20. viii. 12. ix. 5.
X. ii. 1.

édnPedecLV.vii. 7. VL iiit. ἀληθεύομεν
VI. vi. 2. ἀληθεύουσι IX, viii. 3. ix.
4. ἀληθεύειν VI. vii. 3. VII. ix. 4.
ἀληθεύων LV. vii. 8. ἀληθεύοντος IV.
vil. 7. ἀληθεύοντες X. ii. 5. ἀλη-
θευνόντων IV. vii. 1. ἀληθεύσει IV.
vii. 8. VI. ii. 6.

ἀληθεντικὸς LV. vil. τ, ἀληθευτικῷ IV.
vii. 17. ἀληθευτικοῦ IV. vii. 6.

ἀληθὴς IL vii. 13. ix. 7. ἀληθὲς 11. vii.
11,12. IV. vi 6. ΜΙ. 2. VII. xiv.
3. IX. viii. 9. ix. 5. X. viii. 12. ἀλη-
θεῖς K. i. 2. ἀληθοῦς IV. vii.g9. VI,
iv. 3,6. xi. τ. ἀληθεῖ VIL ix. 1. xiv.
2. KX vii. 2. ἀληθῇ 11Π1.ν. 17. VI.
ii. 2. ν. 6. VIL iii. 3.

ἀληθινὴ TIT. v. 17. ἀληθινώτεροι IT,
vii. I.

ἀληθῶς IV. iii. 14, 22. V. ix. τ. VIL i. 3.
VIII iv.3. IX.x6. Σ. ix. 3, 4,6.

ἀλήτῃ IV. iii. 3.

ἅλις 1. v. 6. χὶϊί. 14. IX. xh5. K.i 4.

ἁλίσκω. ἑαλωκότι IX. ii. 4.

ἀλκὴ TIT. vi. 12.

᾿Αλκμαίωνα ITI. i. 8.

ἀλλὰ καὶ I. vii. 6. viii. 8. xiii.6. IT. ii.
8. iv. 3, 4. vi. 1. vii. tr. ΠΙ|Ι. vi. 11.
VI. xiii.6. WII. iv. 2. x. 2. xiii. 7.
xiv. 3, 8 VIII. i. 3, 5. iv. 1. xii 7.
IX.i. 8. Xi. giv. 3. viii. 8. ix. 21.

ἀλλὰ μὲν VIL xiii. 8.

ἀλλὰ μὴν 1. vi. 6. viii. 13. ITT. ii.7. V.
ii. 2, VL v. 7, 8. ix. 2, 3. VIT. ii 4, 6.
iii. 7. xiii. 1. X. viii. 7.

ἀλλὰ μὴ IIT. i. 11.

ἀλλ᾽ HIV. iii. 27, 29. V. ii. 5. viii. 1, 4.
ix. 15. VIL vi. 6.

ἀλλαγὴ V.v. 10, 11, 14, 15,16. ἀλλαγῆς
V. iv. 13. v. 14, 15.

ἀλλακτικαῖς V. v. 6.

ἀλλάττονται V.v. 13, ἀλλάξωνται V.v.

13.
ἀλλέων IT. vii. 11. viii. 4, 5. V.v. ΣΙ.
VL. iv. 2. xiii. 6. VII. vii. 3. VIII.
iii, iL 4. iv. 1, 2. v. 3. vii. 1. viii 5.
xq IX. xii 3. K iv. 2, 4. v. 2, 7.
ἀλλήλοις 11. viii. 4, VII. v. 2. VITL
δ. 6, ii. 4. iii. 1, 6. iv. 3, 4. ν. τ. vi
I, 4, 7. Vili. 6. ix 2. xii, 3, 7. xii. 4.

IX. vi. 3. x. 4. xii. 3. ἀλλήλαις IT.
viii. 1. Viiv. 12. ἀλλήλους V. vi. 4.
VIIL. iii. 1, 9. iv. 2, 2. viii. 5. xii. 3,
6. xiii. 2. IX. iii. 4. vi 1, 4. xiii. 3.
X. viii. 1. ἀλλήλας IT. vik x1. VII.
x. §. ἄλληλα II, viii. 4. V. iv. 2.
xig. VIL xii.2, VIIL.i3. &
iv. 8.

ἄλλος I. vi 8. IV. i. 14. VII. viii. 5.

IX iv.4,5. X.ix. 15. ἄλλη Ι. xiii.
15 V. ii. 3,6. ἄλλο. i 5. iv. 3.
vi. 10, 12. vii. 2, 4, 5. ix. 2, 9. xi. 6.
xiii 15. Π|1. 2. ἰχ. 8, ITT. iv. 3. v.
y7.ix.6. IV. vi.9. viii. 7. V.iv. 2.
x.1,2,.xiLq4 VI. v. 3. vii 1, 2, 9.
ix. 1, VII. ii 1. v. 9. vi. 6. VIII.
iii, 3. viii. 6. xiii. 7. DX iv. §. viii.
6. xi, 2. ΣΧ. ii, 3. iii. 4. vi. 2. vii. 1.
ἄλλον Liv. γ. ν. 8 ΤΙ. ἱν. 2. V. ix.
5. ὙΙ.χ. 3 χί. 7γ. VIII. νἱἱ. 4. X.
vil. 9. ἄλλης I. vi. 13. ix. 3. LIT ν.Ψ
1% IV. vii 7. VII. xii 6. ἄλλῳ
I, vi. 12. vii, 1. ΠῚ. iv. 2. IV. viii.
7 V.iirz.v. τ, 18. ἄλλῃ. vii. 2.
ἄλλον I. vi. 8.x. 1. IV. iif. 29. viii.
12, V.i 13. ii ro. v. 17, 18. xi.
2. VI. xiii. τ. VII. iii.7, VIIT. ix. 3.
IX. viii 1. ἄλλην . xiii. TI. iii
4. IV.L13,35. ὙΨΠ.1. 1. &. vii
8. viii. 1. ἄλλοι 1. iv. 3. 1Π| ix. 4.
ITT. viii. 6. IV. iii 28. 31. VITI. i. 6.
vi. 5. ΙΧ, xii 2. ἄλλαε!, i 4. vii.
21. IL ii i vii. 6, 11. WITLI. ix. 5.
ἄλλα L ii 1. xii 5. IL iii. 5. iv. 3.
v. 2. ix. 4. IID. ii 2. xii. 3. IV. i
22. V.viii. 8x1. VIL iii. 4. vii.
4. VII. ii. το. VITI. iv. 2. IX iv. 8.
x. V. 4 Vii. 7. Vili. 1. ἄλλων 1. fi. 7.
viii. 12, xi. 2. ID. i. 4. ii. 7, 8. vii.
11. vili. 3. TIT. iii. 15. iv. 4. v. 16.
xi 6,8 IV. i. 21. iii. 21. vii το. V.
ii. 12. iv. 12. v. 9, 18. vi. 2. vii, 4.
VL i. 1. vii. 4. VILL 5. ii. 4. iii 1.Ψ
VIII. vii. 2. ix. 2. xifi. 10. IX 9. X.
iii. 10. v. 2, 4. Vii. 4. viii. 4, 8. ix. 18.
ἄλλοις I. vii. 19. viii. 6. 111. v. 9. viii.
6.x.7. V.v.13. VI. vii. 7. xii. 2.
VIII. vi. 7. viii. 7. ix. 2. xii 7. X. iv.
3. v. 4. ἄλλαις VITT, ix. τ. Χ. ix. 18,
ἄλλους. x 13% 1Π1.χ, 6. IX. viii
7. ix. 5. X.ix. 18. ἄλλας IL ii. 2.
iv.3. IIL ν. 6. χ, 2. IV.iv.6. V.
ὁ 14... VLii2 VII. ii 5. xiv.
5. 4&. iii. 2.

ἄλλως J. vii. 21. viii. 9. ix. 1. IT. if, 2.

VI INDEX VERBORUM.

fii. 5. IV. i 31. V. vii. τ, 4. VIL
5, 6. iii, 2. iv. 1, 6. v. 3, 8. vi 1, 2
vii 2,6. VII. i=. 6. Σ. ix. 2.
ἄλλως τε καὶ 1. νἱ, 1. χ, 2. IV. iii 30,
IX. xi. 43. X.i 2. ix. 8.
ἄλλοθι IT. vii. 16, .
ἄλλοτε ITI. iii. 5. VIIL iii, 3. IX. iv.

5.

ἀλλοιωθέντα IX. iii. 3.

ἀλλοιότερον IX, iii. 5.

ἀλλότριαι VIT. xii. §. X. v. §. ἀλλό-
τριον I, xifi. 14. IV.i9.17. V. vi 6.
ἀλλοτρίων IV. i. 39. ἀλλοτριώτερα
VIIL. viii. 7. ἀλλοτριώτεροι VIIL xii.

4.

ἀλόγιστοι VIT. v. 6.

ἄλογον I. xiii.9, 18. TID. ν. 12 V. xi.
9. VLis. ἀλόγου I. xiii. 11. ἀλόγῳ
ΙΧ. viii 4. ἄλογα TIL i. 27. X. ii. τ.
ἀλόγων 111. ii. 3.x. τ. ἀλόγωε IV. i
21. IX. viii. 2.

᾿Αλόπῃ VIL vii. 6.

ἀλόχον X. ix. 13.

ἄλσις X. iv. 3.

ἀλυπίᾳ IX. χί, 4. ddAvwlay VII. xii. 7.

ἄλυπος IIT. xii. 3, ἄλυπον IV. 1, 13.
VII. xii.4, 7. ἄλυχοι lV. vir. X.
iii. 7.

ἀλύπως IV. i. 13.

ἀλυσιτελὲς VIII. xiv. 4.

ἅμα IIT, v. 23. vi. 12. IV. i. 3,24, 34.
V. viii. 2. xi. 4,5. VI. ix. 3. xiii. 6.
VI. iii go. χ 1. ὙΠ]. iii. 5. iv. 2.
vi. 2, 6. ix. 3. xiii. 3. xiv. 3, 4. IX.
iv. 10. vil. §. x. 5. XX. ν. 4.

ἀμαθὴς VIIL viii.6, ἀμαθεῖς VII, ix.3.

ἁμαρτάνουσι IT. i. 5. 111. xi 3,4. IV.
i. 44. V. viii. 12. VII. vi. 3. ἁμαρ-
rdvorres V. viii. 8, ἁμαρτάνων VI. v.
7. ἡμάρτανεν VI. xiii. 3. ἥμαρτεν
V.x.5. ἁμαρτάνειν IT. vi. 14, 18. ix.
ς. IV. v. 4. ix. 3 VIIIL viii 5.
ἁμαρτάνεται IT. vi. 12, 20. ἁμαρτανό-
μενον V.x. 4. ἁμαρτησόμεθα IT. ix.
6. ἁμαρτηθέντα 111.1. 26. ἁμαρτάνει
IV.v. 13. V. viii7. VI. ix. 3. ἡμαρ-
τημένοι LV, iii. 35. ἡμαρτημένη VIII.
x. 4.

ἁμάρτημα V. viii. 7.x. 4. ἁμαρτήματος
V.x. 6. ἁμαρτήματα V. viii. 6.

ἁμαρτητικὸς IT. iii. 7.

ἁμαρτία VL viii. 7. ix. 3. VII. iv. 2.
ἁμαρτίας 111. xii.5. ἁμαρτίαν IIL i
14. ἁμαρτιῶν 11]. vil. 4.

ἁμαρτωλότερον II. ix. 3.

ἀμαυροῦται X. iv. 9.

ἀμείψασθαι IX, ii. 5.

ἀμείνων 11. vig, ὙΠ]. x. § xiii 1.
ἄμεινον IIT. it. 14. IX. x. 4. Χ. vib
9. ix. 19. ἀμείνονι VIII. xi. 4. ἀμείνω
VITI. vii. 2.

ἀμέλειαν IIL. v. 15.

ἀμελήσει IV.i. 17. ἀμελοῦντες X. vi. 3

ἀμετακινήτως IT. iv. 3.

ἀμεταμέλητος VIL vii. 2. UX. iv. 5.

ἀμήχανον VII. iii. 7.

ἀμιγεῖς Σ, iii, 2,

ἁμιλλωμένων VITI. xiii. 2.

ἀμνήμονες IX. vii. 1.

ἀμοιβὴ IX.i 1, 9. ἀμοιβὴν LX i 7.

ἀμύνεται VIIL xiii. 2.

ἀμυντικὸς TV. v. 6.

ἀμφιδεξίους V. vii. 4.

ἀμφίλογον VIII, xiii. 6.

dudurByret VIL ii.2. ἀμφισβητοῦσν I.
iv. ἀμφισβητῶσυ V. iv. 7. ἀμφισ-
βητεῖν IV. iv. 4. ἀμφισβητεῖται V.
viii. 9. IX ix. 1. X. viii 5. ἀμφισ-
βητητέον ITT. v. 5.

ἀμφισβήτησις 1. vi. 8. ἀμφισβήτησιν T,
x3 1Π|1.4. V.viii ro VIL
xii, το, X.i 2. v. 6.

ἀμφότεροι LV. i. 43. vil. 6. V. v. 1%
VII. ix. 7. ἀμφότερα IL vi. το. IV.
i, 24. iv. 5. ix. 2. Vi xi. 4. VIL
vii. 3. ἀμφοτέρας V. v. 12. VIL. iii
6. ix. 5. ἀμφοτέρων V. ix. 3. VI. ii. 6.

ἄμφω IL. vi. 13. viii. 4. IDL i. 26. viii.
13. ix. 2. IV. i 24. iii 20. iv. 1.
Υ. ii. 6. vii. 4. x 1. χὶ. γ. VI. vii. 7.
VIL. xii 4. VIII. v. 4. vi. 5. x. 2.
IX. ik 1. ἰχ. 5. ΧΙ 5 ἄμφον 1.
vir. V.x. 2. VIL ii. 6. VIL iit 2
VIII. vi. 4, 7. xii. 7. DXi 3,8 wi
2. viii. 2. xi. 1, 6. ΣΧ, ii. §. viii.

IX. viii 7.

4, 5-

ἂν cum infin. IIT, ii. 8. cum indic. V.
xi, 4.

ἂν pro ἐὰν ITI. viii. 11. V. viii 2, τὸ,
ει. VL χὶΐ. 9. VIL vir. VWIIL ii
4. viii. 2.

ἀνὰ IIT. viii. 10.

ἀναβολὴν VITI. xiii. 6.

ἀναγκάζειν TIT, i, 11. ἀναγκάζουσι ITI.
viii. 4. ἀναγκαζόμενον V. viii. 4.
ἀναγκαζομένους 111. viii. 4. day
κάζονται IIT. 3.9. IV.i.34. DXi
ἡ. dvayxdoarralll.i. 8. ἀναγκασ-
θῶσι IV.i. 39. ἀναγκασθῆναι 111.}.
8. ἀναγκασθέντας ITI. i. 9.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ἀναγκαστικὴν X. ix, 12.

ἀναγκαῖον I. ix, 7. IL. ii 1. iii. 9. ITI
Rx. IV. i. 17. ii. ro. iii, 28. xii. 4.
VIL vi. 2. xi. 2. xiii. 2. VIIL ii. 5.
IX. i 8. X.ix.12. dvaycaly IX. ii
2,5. ἀναγκαῖαι VII, vii. 2. xiv. 2.
XxX vi. 2. ἀναγκαίας VIL xiv. 2.
ἀναγκαία IV, viii. 1. V. viii. 8. VII.
iv. 2. ἀναγκαίων IV. iii. 32. VIL
iv. 4. X. vii 4. viii 4. ἀναγκαιότερον
VIIL xii. 7. IX. xir. ἀναγκαιότατον
ΨΙΠ. ἐ τ.

ἀνάγκη IIL iff. 7. V. i. 5. iii. 4. νὴ. 10,
x 3. χὶ, 4. VIL iv.6.v.6. VIL iii.
9. Vii. 2. xii, 3. xiii. 1, ἀνάγκης 1.
viii 9. III. iii 4. VL iii. 2. iv. 4,
ν.3.νυνἱ 1. SX iii 12. ἀνάγκῃ V. iii
§ ΣΧ, ix. 6. ἀνάγκην IIL viii 5.

ἀναγράψαι L vii. 17.

ἀνάγεται CX. ix. 7. ἀναγάγῃ IIL iii. 17.
ἀναγαγεῖν ITI. v. 6.

ἀναθήματα IV. ii. 11. ἀναθήμασι IV. ii.
15.

ἀναιρεῖν Ἰ. vi. 1. ἀναιρεῖ Χ. ii. 3. ἀναι-
ροῦσι IX. iv. 8. ἀναιρῶν X. ii. 4.
ἀνελεῖν VIL ii. 12. ἀνῃροῦντο V. iv.
12. Vv. 9.

ἀναισθησία 11. viii. 6. 11]. xi 8.

ἀναίσθητος IT. ii. 7. vii. 3. viii.2. ἄναισ-
θήτου IIL v. 12. ἀναίσθητον IT. viii.

2.

ἀναισχυντία 11. vi. 18. IV. ix. 7.

dvaloxuvros II. vii. 14. III. vi. 3.

ἀνακνκλεῖσθαι 1. x 7.

ἀναλαβόντες 1. iv. 1. IILv. 23. ἀναλα-
Bobo. Χ. iv. τ. vit. ἀναλαβεῖν IIT.
v. 14.

ἀναλγησίαν 1. x. 12.

ἀνάλγητος III. vii. 7.

ἀναλίσκει IV. ii. 20. ἀναλίσκειν IV. i
22, 25, 34. ii. 20. ἀναλίσκοντες IV.
L 35. ἀνάλωσε IV.i.27. ἀναλώσαι
IV. ii. 21. ἀναλῶσαι IV. ii. 20. dva-
Adoas IV. i. 22. ii. 21.

ἀναλογία V. iii. 8,14. ἀναλογίας V. v.
12, ἀναλογίαν I. vi. 12. V. 111, 13.
iv. 2, 3, 9. v. 6, 8, 18. vi. 4.

ἀνάλογον 11. i. 6. viii. 3. V. iii 8, 12,
14. iv. 2. v. 6, 18 vi. 6. viii. 11.
VII. iv. 6. VIIL vi. 6. vii. 2. xii. 7.
ΙΧ. i. 1. ἀνάλογα V. iii. 9.

ἀναλύειν IIT, iii. 11.

ἀναλύσει 111, iii. 12.

dvadurixois VI. iii. 3, 4.

ἀναμάρτητον VIIL i. 2.

Vl

ἀναμένουσι VIL vii. 8.

ἀναμιμνήσκονται IX. iv. 9.

ἀνάμνησις IIL. x. 5.

"Avatayépas X. viii. 11. ᾿Αναξαγόραν
VL vii. 5.

᾿Αναξανδρίδης VIL x. 3.

ἀνάξιος IV. iii 6. ἀνάξιοι IV. iii 35.
ἀνάξια XK. viii. 7.

ἀναξίως 11. vii. 15.

dvdradyw I.iv.5. IILi. 7. IV. vii. 3.
V. iii. 15. v. 17. VIIL xiii. 10. xiv.
1. IX. vii. 6. xi. 6.

ἀνάπαυσις TV .viii. 11. VII. vii. 7. X.
vii, 6. ἀναπαύσεως IV, viii, 1. X.
vil. 6. ἀναπαύσει X. vi. 6. ἀναπαύ-
σεις VIIL ix. 5.

ἀναπλήρωσις ITI. xi. 3. ΣΧ. iil 6, 7.
ἀναπληρώσεως Χ, iii.6. ἀναπληρώσει
Χ. iii. 6. ἀναπλήρωσιν X. iii. 6.

ἀναπληρουμένης VII. xii 2.

ἀναποδείκτοις VI. xi. 6.

ἀναστρέφεσθαι II. i 7.

ἀνασχίζουσαν VII. v. 2.

ἀνασῶσαι IX. iii. 3.

ἀναθήσει 111, viii. 2.

ἀνατολῶν ITT. iii, 4.

ἀναφέρων IV. vi. 6. ἀναφέροντες IILv.
18. ἀναφέρεσθαι I. xii. 5. ἀναφέ-
pera IV. ii, 12. IX.i2. ἀναφερό-
μενοι L, xii. 3.

ἀναφορᾶς 1. xii 3.

᾿Ανάχαρσιν X. vi. 6.

ἀναχωρῶσι X. viii. ς.

ἀνδράποδον VII. ii.1. K.vi.8. ἀνδρα-
πόδῳ X. vi. 8.

ἀνδραποδῶδες TV. v.6. ἀνδραποδώδους
IV. viii. 5. ἀνδραποδώδεις 1. v. 3
111. x. 8. xi. 3.

ἀνδρεία IT. ii. 7. vii.2. III. vii. 6, 13.
viii. 6, 11,12. ix. 1,2. ἀνδρείας IT.
ii, 7, 9. Vi 20. III. v. 23. vii 8. ix.
7. xi. ς. ἀνδρείᾳ 11. viii 6, 7. ἀν-
dpelay I. iii. 3. 11. viii. 5. III. vii. 6.
viii. 6, 10. ix. 3, 4.

ἀνδρεῖος IT. iii. 1. viii. 2. IDI. vi. vii.
viii. 9. ix. 1,4. V.ix.16. IX. ν. 4.
Χ. νἱΐ. 4. ἀνδρείου 1. xiii. 17. 111. vii.
13. vill. 14. V.i 14. ἀνδρείῳ ITI.
vi. 3. vil. 6. ix. 4. XK. viii 4. ἀν»-
δρεῖον 1. xii. 2. IL viii. 3. TIL viii.
5. ἀνδρεῖοι ΤΙ. i 4, 7. ii.9. ILL vii.
12. viii. 1, 6, 10, ΣΙ, 12, 13, 16, 17.
ix. 2. VI. xiii. τ. Kili 2. ἀνδρεῖα
ILi. 4. OL vii. 12. & viii 1.
ἀνδρείου: III. ix.6, X. viii. 7. ἀν»-

Vill

δρειοτέρον 11]. viii. 15. ἀνδρειότατοι
IIL viii. 1, 8.

ἀνδριαντοποιὸν VI. vii. 1.

ἀνδρίζονται IIL, vi. 12.

ἀνδροφονία IT, vi. 18.

ἀνδρώδη ΤΡ. iv. 4. ἀνδρώδεις IL. ix. 7.
ΓΝ. ν. 13. [IX χὶ 4.

ἀνδρωθέντας Χ, ix. 9.

ἀνέγκλητοι TX. i. γ.

ἀνέδην VIL, viii. 5.

ἀνέπληκτος ITT. vii. 2.

ἀνελευθερία IL vii. 4. IV.i 3, 29,37,
44. ἀνελευθερίας IV. i. 38. ἀνελευ-
θερίαν IV.2 3. V. ii. 2.

ἀνελεύθερος ΤΙ. vii. 4. viii. 2. ἀνελευ-
θέρονυ IV. i. 31, 32. ἀνελεύθερον IV.
ii, 18. ἀνελεύθεροι IV. i. 33, 43.
ἀνελευθέρων TV. i. 43. ἀνελευθέρους
IV. i. 37, 40, 42.

ἀνεμπόδιστος 11. xiii.2. ἀνεμπόδιστον
VIL. xii. 3. xiii. 2.

ἀνεπιστήμονα KX. ix.16, ἀνεπιστήμοσι
X. ix. 21.

ἀνεπιτίμητον VII. xiv. 5.

ἀνερεύνητον XK. ix. 22,

ἄνευ 1. vii. 14. viii. 6. x.11. IL v. 4.
IV. iii. 11, 16,20. v.11. vi 5. V. iii.
3. vill, 7. xi. 6,7. VL ii. 4. viii. 4.
ix. 2, 3. xii 10, xiiL I, 2, 3, 6, 7. VIL
xii. 2. xiv. 7. VITLi.1. IX. iii. 4.
ΣΧ, iv. 11. viii. g. ix. 21.

ἀνέχεσθαι IV. v. 6.

ἀνεψιοὶ VIIL xii. 4.

ἀνήγγελλον IIL 111, 18.

ἀνήκει VIII. i. 7. ἀνήκοντα IX. vi. 2.

ἀνὴρ. ἵν. 7. Vita. VIL i. 3. vii 2.
ΨΙΠ.χ. ς. IX iti 4. ἀνδρὸς I. vii.
4%. VLxitL VILir. VIIL«
5. xq. X.v. 11. ix. 12. ἀνδρὶ.
ii, 11, VIII. vii. 1. xii. 7,8. IX.i6.
dydpa V.x.1. VII.i.3, WIII. vii.1.
x. 5. ἄνδρες I. viii. 7. IX. xi. 4.
ἀνδρῶν I. xii. 4. ἀνδράσι X. vi. 4.
ἄνδρας I. vi. 1. ὙΠ. i. 5.

ἀνθεκτέον IV. v. 14.

ἀνθράκων VIL v. 3.

ἀνθρώπεια X. iv, 9. ix. 22,

ἀνθρωτπεύεσθαι X. viii. 6.

ἀνθρωπικὸν V. viii.12. WITT. xiv. 4.
ἀνθρωπικὴ IIL xi. ἡ. dvOpwrixp IX.
vii. 1. dvOpwrufsl. xiii. 14. ἀνθρω-
πικαὶ X. viii. 1, 3. ἀνθρωπικὰ ITT. i.
27. X. viii.r. ἀνθρωκικῶν IIL iii.
6. ἀνθρωκικώτερον IV. v. 12.

ἀνθρώπινο: I. ix. 9. ἀνθρώπινον I. ii. 7.

INDEX VERBORUM.

vii. 15. xii 5. V.in.17. X. vii 8.
ἀνθρωπίνης 1. xiii. 5. ἀνθρωπίνῃ 1.
ΧΙ. 12. ἀνθρωείνην I. xiii. ς,6. ΠῚ,
ὦ, γ. VII.v. 8. ἀνθρωπίνων 1. ix.z.
Σ. 1ο. X. vi. 1. viii. 7. ἀνθρώεσνα
Υ. vi. 5§. VI v. 6. vii. 5,6. ΣΧ, vii
8. ἀνθρώτωαι VIL vi. 6.

ἀνθρωπολόγος IV. iii. 30.

ἄνθρωτος 1. vi. 5. vii.6, II. vi. 3. ILL
lit, 15. vii. 2.x1.7. V. viii. 3. VL
il, 5. vii. 3, 4. xii. τ. VIL iii. 6. iv.
2 vii. 7. xiv. 8. VIII. i. 3. xi. 7. xii
7. IX. viii. 6.ix.3. X vii. 8, 9. viii
6. ἀνθρώπου I. vi. 5, 16. vii 10, 11,
14 ILvi3. ΠῚ 27,iit 7 VI
vil 4. XX. v. 8 11. vi. 7. vii. 7.
ἀνθρώπῳ 1. vi. 5, 13. vii. το. ΠῚ. viii
14. VL v. 4 vii 6. xii. τ. VIL iii
6. vil. 7. VIIL i 3. vii. 6. xi. 7.
IX. ix.7. X. vii. 7, 9. viii. 8 ἄνθρω-
wov I. x, 3. 111. v. §. vii. τ. V. vi. 5.
VIL v. 2, 8. vii. ἡ. X. vii. 8. &
θρωποι ITT. i. 3. vil 12. x.10, Vii
9. ix.14. VIIL iv. 4. xi. 7. ἀνθρώ-
wow Lx. TLiii.7, ὙΠ... 2,3
v. 1,2 vi 6. xiv.4. DX ix. ro, x.
3. XK ν. 9, 10 vik 13. ix. 12. dx
θρώποις 1, ix. 2. IV. i 37. ἃ 16. V.
viii. 8. WI. vii. 4. VIL i. 3. iii. 7.
VIII. i. 3. xii. 5. XX. viii. 8 ἀνθρώ-
woot VIL x. 4. ἀνθρώπους I. x. τό.
1 7. VII. xiii 5.

ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ΙΧ. x. 2. ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι
Υ. ν. γ.

ἀνίατος IV. i. 37. VII, vii. 2. viii. 1.
ἀνιάτοις LX, iii, 3. ἀνιάτους X. ix.
10.

ἀνιάτως Ὗ. ix. 17.

ἀνίησι VI. i 1. ἀνειμένῃη ΣΧ, iii 3.
ἀνειμένως ΤΊ. v. 2.

ἄνισος V. i. 11. iii. 1. ἀνίσου V. iii 1,
3. ἄνισον V.i 8, ii. 8,9, 12. iii, 1.
iv. I, 3,4. ἄνισοι VIIL viii.5. ἄνισα
V. iv. 4, 8.1. ἀνίσοις VIIL xiv. 3
ἀνίσους VIIL. xiii 1.

ἀνόητος IV. iii. 3. ἀνοήτῳ IIL xii 7.
ἀνόητα X. ii. 4.

ἀνομοιοειδέσι LX. i 1.

ἀνομοιότερον IL. viii. 7.

ἀνομοιότης 11. viii. 5. ἀνομοιότητα
VIII, vi. 7.

ἀνόνητος L. iii. 7.

ἀνόπλοις ITT. viii. 8.

dvopynola ΤΊ. vii. 10.

ἀνόργιστος 11. vii. 10,

INDEX VERBORUM.

ἀνοσιουργῶν IX. iv. 7.

ἀνταποδιδῷ IV. v. το. ἀνταποδίδωσι
VIII. v. ς. ἀνταποδοῦναι IX. vii. 1.
ἀνταποδοτέον VIII. xiii 9. xiv. 3.
IX, ii. 1, 3, 5.

ἀνταπόδοσις V.v. 7. IX.ii.5. ἀνταπό-
Soow VIII. xiii. το. ΙΧ΄.:, 8. ἀντ-
αποδόσεις Χ, viii. 4.

ἀντενεργετικὸς TV, iii, 24.

ἀντενποιεῖν X. viii. 11,

ἀντέχειν VIT, vii. 4, 6.

ἀντὶ ITT. i. 7, 9, 10, ix. 4. xi.6. IV. 5.
10 V.v. 16. x. i ἀνθ' ὧν IX. v.

3

ἀντιβαῖνον I. xiii. 16.

ἀντιβλάπτων V. xi. 2.

ἀντιδανειστέον IX. ii 5.

ἀντίδοσιν V. v. 8.

ἀντιδωρεῖται VIII. viii. 6.

ἀντικαταλλάττονται VIII. vi. 7. ἀντι-
καταλλαττόμενοι VIII. iv. 2.

ἀντίκειται 11. Υἱϊΐ, 6, VI. viii.9. VIL vii.
4 XK. ii 5. ἀντίκενται 11. viii. 1.
ἀντικεῖσθαι IV. iv. 6. vi. 9. vii. 17. ix.
2 Kiis. ἀντικειμένος VII. vii 2.
ἀντικειμένας K. ix. §. ἀντικειμένων
IV. i 45. V. iv. 3.

ἀντιλαβὼν IX, i. 8.

ἀντίξουν 111. i. 6.

ἀντιπάθῃ 111. xiii. 8. ἀντιπεπονθὸς.
v. 1,2, 6, 8, 12. vi. 3. ἀντιπτεπον-
θέναι V. ν. 12. ἀντιπεπονθόσι VITI.
ii, 3.

ἀντιπληγῆναι Ὗ. iv. 4.

ἀντιποιεῖν . γ. 6. ἀντιποίησει V. ν. 6.

ἀντιποιῶν V. xi. 5.

ἀντιτείνει 1, xiii.15. ἀντιτείνουσα VII.
ii. 4. ἀντιτεινούσηεν 11. ii. 5. ἀντι-
τείνουσι VIT. vii. ς. ἀντιτείνων VII.
vii.6. ἀντιτείνειν 11. vii, 6. ἀντιτεί-
γοντες LV. vi. I, 2.

ἀντιτίθεμεν 11. viiL 7. TV. v.12. ἀντι-
τίθεται IV. iii. 3). ἀντιτιθεμένη VIT.
i, 2.

ἀντιφιλοῦσι 111. v. 5. ἀντιφιλεῖται
ΙΧ.1..2. ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι VITI. viii. 3.

ἀντιφίλησις VIIL, ii. 3. iii, 3.

ἄνω IL i. 2. ἀνώτερον VIILL 6. ἄνω-
θεν VL. iii τ, xii. 7. VIL vi. 2.

ἀνώνυμος IT. vii. 2,8. ITIL vii. 7. IV.
iv. 5. vii. 1. ἀνώνυμα IT. vii. 2, 11.
III. vii. 7. ἀνωνύμονυ IV. iv. 4. v. 1.
ἀνώνυμον IV. v. 1. νἱ. 9. ἀνώνυμοι IT.
vii 8. ἀνωνύμων IT. vii. 10.

ἀνωφελῶς 1. iii 6.

VOL. IL

b

1X

ἄξεινος IX. x. 1.

ἀξία IV. i. 2. ii. 12. 11}, 10, 17. V.v.
15. IX.i5, 7,9. ἀξίας LIL xi. 8.
ἀξίαν 1.χ. 4. IV. ii. 3, 13. 19. iii. 3,
8, 11, 35. V. iii. 7. ix. 8 WITT. vii.
2, 3. Vill, 4. x 3, 5. xi. 3. xiii. 9.
xiv. 3,4 IX.i1, 5, 8

ἄξιος IV. iii. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14,15, 17, 35-
ἄξιον 111. ix. 4. IV. ii 6, 10, 23.
VIII xiv.4. ΙΧ, ig. ἄξιοι TV. 1.
21. iii 36. VIII. vii. 4. xiii. 4.

ἀξιοῖ IV. iii. 7, 8,9. VIII. xiii. 7. xiv.
Ι. ἀξιοῦντες VITI. viii. 6. ἀξιοῦν 11.
ΥἹ. 19. IV. iii 35. VIII. xiv. 2.
ἠξίωσε VITL. xiii 9. ἀξιώσαντας IX.
xi6. ἀξιοῦσι TV. iii. 11. VIII. vii. 4.
ἀξιοῦται IV. 1. 20. VIII. iv. 3.
ἀξιοῦνται IV. iii, 19. ἀξιῶν IV. 111,
3, 4,6. ἀξιωτέον VIII. viii. 6.

ἀξίωμα TIL viii. 16. IV. ii 14. iii. 12.
IX. ii. 5. ἀξιώματα ΤΥ. 11.195. ἀξιώ-
ματι LV, iii. 10, 26. vi. 8.

ἀξύνετοι VII. viii. 3.

dopynola IV, v. 5.

ἀόριστος V. x. 7. IX.ix. 8. doplorov
V.x.7. ἀόριστον IV.viii. 7. X. iii2.

dwayopever V.XLI. ἀπαγορεύων 1.14.

draypibw. ἀπηγριωμένων VII. v, 2.

ἀπάγοντες II. ix. 5.

ἀπαθείας II. iii. 5.

ἀπαιδαγώγητος IV. i. 36.

ἀπαιδεύτον 1V. viii. 5.

ἀπαιτοῦντι IX. i 4. ii. 4. ἀπαιτητέον 1.
vil. 20. ἀπαιτητέοι 11. ii 3.

ἀπάνευθε ITI. viii. 4.

ἀπαντῶσι VIII.vi.1. ἀπαντᾷν IX. ii7.

ἁπαρνοῦνται IV. vii. 14.

ἀπαρχαὶ VIII. ix. 5.

dwarjoarrc:IX. iii. 2, dwarndg IX iii,
2. ἡπατημένοι III. viii. 16.

ἀπάτη 11]. iv. 5.

ἀπειθῶν 111. ν. 14. ἀπειθοῦσι X. ix. 10,

ἀπείπασθαι VIII. xiv. 4.

ἀπειροκαλία 11. vi. 6. IV. ii. 4.

ἄπειρος 1. iii. §. ἄπειρον I. ii. 1. vii. 7.
TIL iii. 16. ἀπείρον 11. vi. 14. ἀπεί-
po IV. i. 20.

ἀπέραντον 1. xi. 2.

ἀπέχον 11. vi 5. ἀπέχοντα II. viii. 5, 7.
ἀπεχόνται IV.i. 39. ἀπεχέσθαι I. ii.
ἡ. IID. ix. 4. ἀπεχόμεθα IT. iii. 1.
ἀπεχόμενος II. ii, 7. 11. τ. IV. viii,
10. ἀπεχόμενον IX. iv. 9.
ἀπιστοῦντες IIT. iii. 10,

ἄτληστος ITI. xii. 7.

xX INDEX VERBORUM.

᾿ἁπλῆ VIL v. 5. xiv. 8. ἁπλοῦν V. ix.
9. ἀπλῆν VII. xiv. 8.

ἁπλῶς 1. iii. 5. iv. 5. vii. 4, 14. xi. 5.
IT. iii. 5. v. 3, 5. vi. 14, 18. vii τό.
TIL i. 5, 6, 10, vi. 2. Μ΄ ἱ 9, 10,15,
20. fi. 11. iv. §. v. 1, 18. vi 4, 6, 8.
ix. 4,9, 17. ΧΟ, 5,6. xi 4, 7. VI.
ii 5. fii. 2. vii 6. x. 7. xiii, 6. VIL
ii. τὰ. iii. 2. iv. 3, 2, 3, 6. v. 1, 8, 9.
vi. 3. viii, 5. ix. 1. x. 5. xii. 1, 7.
xiii. 1, 2, WITT. ii. 2. iii. 6, 7. iv. 5.
v. I, 4

ἀπό. dd’ αὑτοῦ IX. viii. 1.

ἀποβαίνουσι IV. vi. 8. ἀποβαινον VII.
vii. 2. ἀποβαίνοντος I. vii. 5. ἀπο-
βήσεται IIL iii. 10.

ἀποβάλλεται 171. i. 5.

ἀποβλέπων VL L 1.

ἀποβολὴν ITI. vi. 4.

ἀπογινώσκω. ἀπεγνώκασι III. vi. 11.

ἀπογόνους 1. vii. 7. ἀπογόνων I. x. 3.
xi. I.

ἀποδεικτικὴ VI. iii. 4.

ἀποδεικτὸν VI. vi. 1.
vi. I.

ἀπόδειξις VI. v. 3. ἀποδείξεως VI.v. 3.
ἀποδείξιν VI. vi. 1. ἀποδείξεις I. iii.
4. VI. xi. 4,6. VII. iii, 8. ἀπο-
δείξεων VL xi. 6.

ἀποδέχεσθαι 1. iii. 4. ἀποδέχεται IV. vi.
5. ἀποδεχόμενοι VIIL ν. 3. ἀπο-
δέχονται TX. viii. 7. ἀποδέχηται IX.
iii. 3. ἀποδέξεται IV. iii. 17. vi. 3, 7.
ἀποδέξασθαι VIL. iii. 8. ἀποδεκτέον I.
iii, 8. iv. 8. Χ. viii. 12.

ἡποδίδομεν IT. i. 4. VI. νἱ 1. ἀπο-
δίδωσι 11. vi. 2. VIIL x.5. ἀποδιδόασι
I. ἵν, 2. ΤΥ. ν. 8. ἀποδιδόντα Ὗ. viii.
4. VIII. xiv. 2. ἀποδιδόντες X. viii.
ἡ. ἀποδιδόναι 11. i. 8. TX. ix. 1. ἀπο-
δώσει 11. vi. 3. ἀποδώσειν VIIL. xiii.
9. ἀποδοίη Υ. viii.4. VIII. xiv. 4.
ἀποδοῦναι ITT. i το. IV. τ. 13. ἀπο-
δεδωκέναι ΤΧ. i. 4. ἀποδοτέον VIII.
xiii. 9,11. xiv. 4. IX. ii. 3, 4, 5, 6.
ἀποδέδοται IV. vi. 4.

ἀποθανατέον IIT. i. 8.

ἀποθνήσκοιεν IIT. i. 4. ἀποθάνῃ 1. x. 2.
V.iv.4. ἀποθανεῖν III. vi. 2. V.xi.
8. ἀποθνήσκειν IIT. vii. 13. V. viii.
2. ἀποθνήσκει III. viii. 9.

ἀποκαλοῦσι IX. viii. 1. ἀποκαλοῦντες
IT. ix. 7.

ἀποκλίνει TV. vii. 19. ἀποκλίνουσι IV.
i. 35. ἀποκλίνουσαν IV.v. 1. ἀπο-

ἀποδεικτῶν VI.

κλίνει» IL ἷχ. 9. X.i. 3. ἀποκλιτέον
IX. ii. 5.

ἀποκτεῖναι 111. 4.17. ἀποκτιννύναι V.
xi. I.

ἀπόλαυσις IV. vii. 13. ἀπόλαυσει ITL

ix.g. ἀπόλαυσιν VIL vi 1. dro
λαύσεις VII. iv. 3.

ἀπολαυστικὸν I. v. 2.

ἀπολαύειν VIII. xiv. 1. ἀπολαύων IL

ii, 7. ἀπολαύσειε X. vi. 8.

ἀπολιπόντων IX. iii. 1.

ἀπόλλυσι TV. v. 7. ἀπολεῖ IV. ii. 21.
ἀπώλοντο L iii, 4. ἀπόλλυται VIL
xiii, 5. ἀπολλύμενος IV. i. 5.

ἀπολογούμενος VII. vi. 2.

ἀπολυθέντος VIII. iii. 3.

ἀπομάττονται IX. xii. 3.

ἀπομνημονεύειν LV. ili. 30.

ἀπονέμει IX. v. 3. viii 6,9. ἀπονέμομεν
IV. iii. το, ἀπονέμουσι VIII. xiv. 3.
ἀπονέμῃ VIIL. vii. 2. droréuwor VITT.
viii, 3. ἀπονέμειν IV. iii17. TX. ii.
I, 9. ἀπονέμων IV. vi. 8. ἀπονέ-
povres VIIL ix. 5. ἀπονέμοντατ IX.
Vili. 5. ix. 2. ἀπονεῖμαι X. viii. 7.
ἀπονέμεται IV. iii. τς. WIIL xi. 2.
X. vii. 7. ἀπονεμητέον IX. ii. 7. iii 5.

ἄπονον IX. vii. 7.

ἀπόντο IX. v. 3. ἀπόντων IIT. xi. 8.

ἀποπαύονται IV. v. 8.

ἀποπεμπόμενοι IT, ix. 6.

dwopetracl. ix. 1. WIIL.vii. 6. CX. vii
1, 2. ἀπορουμένων Vix. 4. ἠπόρει
Liv. 5. ἀπορήσειε! 1. vi. 5. IT. iv. 1.
V.ix.1. VIL itr. TX xi. 2. ἀπο-
pnOev I x. 6. ἡπορήθη VII. ix. 1.
ἠπόρηται VI. xii. 3. ἠπορήσαμεν VIT.
viii. 2.

ἀπορημάτων VITI. i. 7.

ἀπορίαν. χ.2. VIL. ii. 8. ἀπορίας ΤΥ.

i. 31. VIL ii. 12. ἀπορίαν I. x. 4.
V. x3. IX. ii. 1. iii 1. ἀπορίαι

VII. ii. 12.

ἄπορον I. vi. 16.

ἀπόῤῥητα 111. i. 17.

ἀποστατέον IX. ii 10,

ἀποστερεῖται 111. ix. 4. ἀποστερῆσαι
VIIL ix. 3. ἀπεστέρησεν V. iv. 3
VI. x. 1. ἀποστερεῖ IV. iii. 35.

ἀποστήμασι L x. 4.

ἀποστολὰς IV. ii. 15.

ἀπεσχεδιασμένος V. i. 14.

ἀποσχολάζειν X. vi. 3.

ἀποτελεῖ 11. vi. 2. ἀποτελεῖν I. viii. 9.
ἀποτελεῖται IV. ix. 2. VI. xii. 6.

INDEX VERBORUM. ΧΙ

ἀποτρέποντος Χ. ix. 7.

ἀποτρίψασθαι IT. iii. 8.

ἀποτυγχάνων IIT. χὶ, 6. ἀποτυχεῖν IL
vi. 14.

ἀπουσία ITT. xi. ς. VIIL v. 1.

ἀποφαίνειν X. i. 2. ii 3. ili. 4. ἀποφαί-
vovres I.x. 8, ἀπεφαίνετο X. viii. 11.
ἀπεφήναντο J. i. 1.

ἀπόφασις VI. ii. 2.

ἀποφάναι VI, iii. 1.

ἀποχωρεῖν II, ix. 3.

ἀπραγμόνως VI. viii. 4.

ἀπρακτεῖν I. v. 6.

ἀπρεπῇ IV. viii. 7.

ἀπροαίρετα V. viii. 5. ἀπροαιρέτωτ IT.
Vv. 4.

ἀπροβούλευτα V. viii. 5. ἀπροβούλευτοι
VIL viii. 2.

ἀπροσηγορία VIII. v. 1.

ἀπωθοῦνται IT. viii. 3.

ap VI. vii. 2.

ἄρα I. iil. 5. vi. 11, 12. Vil. 12. viii 14.
IL. i 3. iii. 6. vi 13, 15. ix. το, IV.
lid 14. ΟῚ, 8. ii. 3, 4. ili. 5, 8, 11,
12, 14. iv. 7, 10, 11, 12. Vv. 11, 13.
vi. 7,9, ix. 1.x. 2. xi, 2 VI. i. 7.
iii, 2, 3, 4. V. 4. Vii. 3.ix. 3. VIL ii.
§ WITLI. ii. 4. iti. τ. ΙΧ, ix, 3, Io.
X. iii 6. vi. 6. vii. 9. viii. 7, 13. ix. 23.

@pa 111. iv. 4. ΙΧ, iii. 3, 4.

God ye I. x. 2. ITIL ii. 17.

Gp ofvL.ii.2. WIIL. xiii. τα. DX. 1. 2.
iii 3. iv. 7.x. 1. xi τ. ΣΧ. ix 1, 18.

᾿Αργεῖοι IIT. viii 16.

ἀργία I. xiii. 12. ἀργίαν IX. iv. 8.

ἀργὸν. Υἱϊ. 11. IV.iii.27. dpyhw IX.
Vv. 3.

ἀργυρίον IT. ix. 9. IV. vii. 11. V. ix.
13,14. IX.16,7. dpyuplov IV. vii.
Il.

ἄρεσκος IT. vii. 13. IV. vii. 9. ἄρεσκον
ΙΧ. x.6. ἄρεσκοι TV. vi. 1. ἀρέσκους
ΙΧ. x. 6.

ἀρέσκει TIL ἵν. 4. IV.i. 39. ΙΧ. Σ. 6.
X. vi. 2. ἀρέσκουσι TX. ἵν. 7. ἀρέ-
σκονται LX, xii 3. ἀρεσκόμενος IV.
£27. ἀρεσκόμενοι ΤΧ, 11,4. XX. v.4.
ἀρέσκειν VIL ii. 8 VITI. vi. 2, 3

ἀρετὴ I. v. 5. viii. 6. xiii. 12,20, 11. 1.
6. ii, 1. 111, 1, 3, 6, 10, 11. v. 1, 6.
vil 14,ix.1. TIL v.1,17,19. IV.
ii. 1, 10. ἦν. 1. ἰχ. 8. V.i. 15, 18, 20.
ΨΙ. 1. γ. ii 2. ν. 7, 8. vii 1. xi 7.
xii. 6, 8. xii, 1,2,4,5. VILi2
viii. q4. WIIL i. 1. iii. 6. vii. 1. viii. 4.

xii 7. IX. iv. 2. viii. 7. X. v. 10. vi.
4. vill. 2. ἀρετῆς I. ix. 3, 10. xii. 6.
xiii. 1,5,14 IL i. 1. vi 11, 12, 14.
viii. τ. 111.}.1. IV. i. 7, 24, 25. iii.
15, 17, 21, vi 7. ἰχ. 1. Vi 15, 19.
ii 1, 10,11. VWI. xii. 5,8, 10. xiii 1,
6,7. VILi. 2. VIII. i, 1. vii §. vii.
4. xiii. 2, 11. xiv. 2, DXi. 7. ix. 2,
7. ΣΧ, iii 1. viii, 5. ix. 1, 3, 5, 8.
ἀρετῇ I.v.5. ILiiii το. IV. iii. 14.
V.irs5,18 VILiig. VIIL vi. 6.
IX. iii. 4, XX. viii.3. ἀρετὴν 1. v. 6.
Vii. 5, 14, 15. viii. 8, 10, 11, 13, 17.
ix. 3, 4, 7. X. 9, 10, 13, 15. xii. 2.
xiii. 1,6. IL. vi. 16. IILviii. 2. ix. 4.
IV. i. 6, 12, 13. 1, 13. iii. 3, 21. V.
il, 7, 10. iii, 7. xi. 1. xii. 6. VIL xiii.
4,7. VILi.1. χὶ. 2. WIIL iii. 6.
viii, 5. x. 5. xl 4. xii. 7. xiii. 2, 11.
xiv. 3. IX. i. 7,9. v. 4. ix. 6. x. 6.
X. i. 1. ii. 1, 3. vi. 5, 8. vii 1, 3, 8.
viii. r, 4, 6, 10. ix. 8, 14. ἀρεταὶ I.
vi. 3. vil. 15. IL i 3. iii. 3. v. 3, 4,
6 IILv.20un1. VI. ii. 6. xii. 1.
xiii. 6. X. viii. 3. ἀρετῶν IL i. 2, 7.
ii. 7,9. iv. 3. vil. 16, IIL v. 1, 21.
IV. iii. 16. V.i 15, 17. xi. 10. VIII.
γ.1. X.vii6.ix.1. ἀρεταῖς IIL ix.
5. IV. ii. 7. Viv. 17. ἀρετὰς I. xiii.
20. IL i. 4 ii. 2. iii. 5. iv. 3. v. 3, 4.
IV. iv. 6. vii. t.ix. 7, Μ.1. 14. VI.
i. 4. v. 7. xii. 4. xiii. 3, 5,6. WIL. ii.
5. ΙΧ. viii. 6. ΣΧ. iii, 2, 12. vi. 1.
vii. 7. viii. 1.

ἀριθμέω. ἠριθμημένον VI. viii. 4.

ἀριθμητικὴν IL. vi. 7. V. iv. 3,9.

ἀριθμοῦ V. iii. 8. ἀριθμῷ V. iii, 14.
ἀριθμὸν V. vi.4. VI. iii. τ. IX. x, 3.
ἀριθμῶν 1. vi. 2.

ἀριστείων I. xii. 5.

ἀριστερὰ 1. xiii. 15.

ἄριστος IV. iii. 14. V.i 18. ἀρίστη
Υ͂. vii.6. VIL. xiii. 6. VIILI. iii. 7.
ἄριστον I. ii. 1. vil. 3, 9. viii. 9, 14.
ix. 3,8 11. vir, 17. IIL v. 17.
VL vii. 3. xii. ro. VII. xi. 3, 5. xii.
I. xiii, 2,5. X.ii τ. ἀρίστου VI.
vil 6. X. vi. & vii. 1. ἀρίστῳ Χ.
viii, 12. ἀρίστην I. vii. 15. viii. 14.
ix. 6. ἄριστοι X. ix. 16. ἀρίστων 1.
xii. 4. ἀρίστοις V.i. 13. VIIL vii. 4.
ἀρίσταις I. viii. 14. ἀρίστους TX,
vi. 2, XK.ix. 20, ἄριστα IIL ii. 14.
iii. 6. viii. 8. IV. i. 6. CX. viii. 4. ΣΧ.
iv. 5. viii. 13. ix. 15.

Xil

ἀριστοκρατία VIILx.1. ἀριστοκρατίας
ΨΙΠΙ x. 2. ἀριστοκρατία VIIL xi. 4.

ἀριστοκρατικὴ VIIL x. 4. ἀριστοκρα-
τικοὶ V, iii. 7.

ἀρκεῖ]. iv. 3. ἀρκοῦσι 1Χ. χ. 2. ἀρκού-
μενοι IL vil. 5.

ἀρκούντως I. iv. 7. xiii. 9.

ἄρκιον ITT. viii. 4.

ἁρμόζει IIT. 11, 9. IV. ii. 16. vii 5. ix. 3.
VIIL =x. 5. ΙΧ, xi 6. dppdsoclV. iii.
158. dppdfow VIII. xi. 4. ἁρμόζειν
ΙΧ, x.2. ἁρμόσει V. νἱὶ. 4. IX x. 1.
X. vii. 9.

ἁρμονίαν VITI. i. 6.

ἁρμόττει IV. viii. 5. X. ix. 21. ἁρμότ-
τοι VILi. 1. ἁρμόττοντα IX, ii. 7.

ἀρνεῖσθαι IV. vii. 3.

ἀροτῆρα VI. vii. 2.

ἁρπαγὴ V. ii, 13.

ἄῤῥεν VIL. vii. 6. ἄῤῥεσι VII. v. 3.

ἀῤῥωστιῶν 111. v. 22.

ἀρτάομαι. ἡρτῇσθαι 111. xii. 2.

ἄρτος TIL. iii. 16.

ἀρτύοντες IIT. x. 9.

ἀρχαϊαι VITLix.5. ἀρχαίων ITT. iii 18.

ἀρχὴ L iv. 7. vii. 20,23. III. i. 3, 6,
10, 12, 20, 111, 13, 15. v. 8, 14. V.
i 16. if. 13. viii 7. ix. το, VI. ii. 2,
4. iii. 3. iv. 4. v. 6. xi. 6. WII. iii. 2.
vii. 7. viii. 4,5. VIII. x.4. IK.v. 3.
dpxfs I. xiii. 4. 111. v. 14, 22. viii. 9.
V. iv. 13. vii. τ. v. 6. vi. 1. VIII. ix.
4. Χ ἵν. 1. ἀρχῇ 1. ix.8 IV. ii. 6,
VIIL. ix. 1. xiii. 1,9. UX. iii. 1. ix. 5.
ἀρχὴν L xii. 8. TIL iii. 17. v. 5. V.
v. 4. Vi τ. VIL iv. 4. xii. 7, το. VI.
i, I. Vi 7. Vili 4. XK. i. 1. ἀρχαὶ
ITD. v.6. VWI. i. 5. iii. 3, 4. v. 6. vi.
1. Wii 5. xi. 4. ὙΙΠ. x. 4,5. X.
vill. 3. ἀρχῶν 1. iv. 5. vii. 21. VI.
vi. 2. vii. 3. viii. 4. ἀρχὰς I. iv. 5,
6. vil. 20. 11. 11,3. TLv.6. VI
vii. 3. xi 6. xii. το. VII. vi.6. VIII.
ἷ. 1. Χ, 3. TX vi. 2. viii. ro.

ἀρχηγὸν VIIL. xii. 4.

ἀρχιθεώρῳ IV. if. 2.

ἀρχικὸν VIIL xi. 2.

ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ VI. vii. 7. viii. 2. dpxe-
rexrovuchs I. ii. 4. ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν
I. i. 4.

ἀρχίτεκτων VII. xi. 1.

ἄρχουσι VIIL. vii. 1.x. 3,5. ἄρξαι V.
γ. 7. ἄρχει V. viii g. VI. ii. 5. xii.
3 VIIL «x. 5. dpxewIV.v. 13. V.
vi. 5,9. VI. xiii. 8, VIIL xis. IX.

INDEX VERBORUM.

vi. 2, ΣΧ, vii 1. ἄρχεσθαι V. vi. 9.
ἄρχων V. i. 16. vi. §. ὙΠΠ. x. 6.
ἄρχοντι V.i 17. xi.9. VWIIL vii 1.
xi. 6. ἄρχοντα V.v. 4. ἄρχον IIL
xii, 7. ἀρχόντων III. viii. 4. VII
x. 3. ἄρχοντας X. viii. x. dpxrtw
I. iv. 5. VI. xii 7. ἀρξάμενοι VL iii
1. ΣΧ. ix. 23. ἀρχόμενον VIIE. vii 1.
ἀρχομένῳ IL vi. 7. V. xi.9. VOL
xi.5. ἀρχομένων VIIL x.2. ἀρχομέ-
vos VITI.x.2. ἀρχομένου: VIII. vii. 1.

ἀσεβεῖς IV. i. 42.

ἀσθένεια VIL vii. 8, ἀσθένειαν TIL ν.
15. VIII. i 2.

ἀσθενὴς VIIL x. 6. ἀσθενεῖ X. v. 9.
ἀσθενεῖς IV. iii. 26. VIL ii 6.

doweorépa VIL vi. 7.

ἀσιτία X. ix, 15.

ἄσκησις IX. ix. 7. ἄσκησιν 1. ix. >

ἀσκητὸν I. ix. 1.

ἀσπίδα V. ii. 2, ix. 16.

ἅσσα VI. ii. 6.

ἀστεῖοι IV. iii. 5.

ἀσύμμετροι 111. iii. 3

ἀσυνεσία VI. x. 1.

aouvérous VI. x, 1.

ἀσινήθεις IV. vi. 5.

ἀσφαλῶς I. x. 3.

ἀσχημονεῖν TIT. xii. 3.

ἀσχημοσύνην IV. vi. 7.

ἀσχήμονες IV. ii. 22, ἀσχημονέστερος
IV. vii. xi.

ἄσχολος X. vii. 6. ἄσχολοι X. vii. 6, 7.

αἀσχολούμεθα X. vii. 6.

dowrla II. vii 4. IV.i. 3,29. ἀσωτίας
IV. i. 30, 37, 44. dowrig IL. viii 5.
ἀσωτίαν IV. i. 35. 44.

ἄσωτος ITI. vii. 4. viii 2. IV. i. 5, 23,28,
32, 36. VIL ix. 2. ἄσωτον 11. viii. 2.
ἄσωτοι IV. i 30. ἀσώτων IV. i. 33.
ἀσώτους IV. i. 13, 23.

ἀτάραχος ΠῚ. ἶχ, τ. [V.v. 3. ἀτάραχον
IIT, viii. 15.

ἄτεκνος 1. vill. 16. ἄτεκνοι VITL. xii. 7.

ἀτελὴς X. iv. 2. ἀτελὲς X. vii. 7. dre-

Nets X. iii. 4. iv. 2,3. ατελεστέρα L
v. 6.

ἄτερος V. v.13. ἄτεροι VIL viii. 2.

ἀτεχνία VI, iv. 6.

ἀτεχνῶς I. xiii. 15.

ἀτιμία V. xi. 3. ἀτιμίας IV. iii. 10, 17.
ἀτιμίαι L x. 3,

ἄτιμοι ITI. viii. 1.

ἄτοπος X. viii. 11. ἄτοπον I. x. 2, 5, 7.
ITI.i. 24,27. IV. ἰχ, 6. Voix. 2. x1.

INDEX VERBORUM.

VI. vii. 3 xii 3. VIL. ii. 5. iii 6. v. 7.
IX. iii, 1, 3. ix. 3 Σ, ν. 7. vi. 6. vii. 9.
viii 7. ἀτόπῳ [X.ix.2. ἄτοπα ΙΧ.
ii. 5.

ἀτόπως V. ix. I.

drpuroy X. vii. 7.

ἅττα V. ν. τὸ.

ἀτυχεῖ V. viii. 7. ἀτυχῶν IV. iii. 18.
ἀτυχοῦντος IX. ix. 2. ἀτυχοῦντι IX.
xi. 3. ἀτυχοῦντες IX. xi. 1. ἀτυχοῦν-
ras IX. xi. 6.

ἀτύχημα. νἱῖῖ,7. ἀτυχημάτων. Χ. 14.

ἀτυχίᾳ V.i. 9. ἀτυχίαν IV. iii. 18,
ἀτυχίας 1. χ. 12. ΙΧ, xi.§. ἀτυχίαις
ΙΧ. ix. 2. xi 1, 4.

a8 Liv. 7. IIL i. 13. iv. 3. ΓΥΟΣ 1, 39,
40. iil. 31. vi 5. IX. ii. 8, 9. iv. 8.

αὐθαίρετος IIT. v. 17.

αὐθέκαστος IV. vii. 4.

αὐλοῦντος KX, v. 3.

αὐλητῇ I. vii. το.

αὐλητικῇ X. v. 3.

αὐλοὺς 1. vii. 3.

αὔξει 11. ii. 6. αὔξεσθαι I. xiii. 11.
VIIL ix. 3. X. ii, 2. 111. 4. αὔξεται
IL iii i τ

αὔξησιν IT. 1.1. VIL xiv. 6. WIIT ix. 3.

αὐξήσεις ΤΙ. ii. 8.

αὐξητικὴν I, vii. 12.

αὐτάρκεια X. vii. 4.
αὐτάρκειαν V. vi. 4.

αὐτάρκης VIII. x.2. X. vi. 2. viii. 9.
αὕταρκες I. vii. 6, 7,8. XX. vii. 7. viii.
9. αὐτάρκους IV. iii 33. αὐτάρκεις
IIL it 8. [Xin 1. adrdpxeoc IX.
ix. 1. αὐταρκέστατος X. vii. 4.

αὖτε L iv. 7.

abroavOpwry I. vi. 5.

αὐτοέκαστον I. vi. 5.

αὐτόματον X. ix. 21.

αὐχένα V. i. 7.

αὐχμῶν ITT, iii 5.

ἀφαιρέσεως VIL viii. 6.

ἀφαιρῶν V.iv.4. ἀφεῖλε V. iv. 8, ἀφε-
AewIL vig. V.iv. 11. ἀφαιρουμένων
VIII. vii.5. ἀφαιρεθείσης VIII. i. τ.
ἀφαιρεθῇ V.iv.10. ἀφῃρέθην. iv. το.
ἀφήρηται Viiv. 12. ἀφῃρῆσθαι. xi.
4. ἀφῃρημένῳ Χ. viii. 7. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
L xi. 5. ἀφηγρηνται III. x. 11.

ἀφανὲς I. x. 15. ἀφανῶν IL ii. 6.
ἀφανίζεοθαι IIL. ix. 3.

ἀφειδὴς LV, iii. 23

ἀφεκτέον 11], i. 14.

ἀφέλκειν 11. ix. 5.

αὐλητικὴν X. ν. 3.

αὐταρκείας L vii. 6.

ΧΙ]

ἁφὴ TIL x. 8. ἁφῆς III. x. 9,11. Ὑ1Π1-
vil. 1. Kv. 7. ἀφῇ III. x. 18. »
VIL iv. 3. nae -

ἄφθαρτα VL, iii. 2.

ἀφιέναι VIIL. xiv. 4. ἀφεῖναι 111. i 17.
V. ix. 16. ἀφέντι IIL v. 14. ἀφείσθω
Lv.8 Μ. 1. το. VIILi, 7. viii. 7.
IX. iv. 6. xi, 2. X.iv. 11. ἀφετέον
L vi. 13.

ἀφικνουμένην IX. v. 3. ἀφίκοιτο IV. i.
36. ἀφῖκται I. vii. 2.

ἀφιλία» IIT. vi. 3.

ἄφιλον Lo xi. IX. x. Σ.
ἀφιλοτιμία IV, iv. 5. ἀφιλοτιμίαν IV.
iv. 5.

ἀφιλότιμος]. vii.8. ἀφιλότιμον IV. iv.

3. 4.

ἀφίσταται IX. iii. 3. ἀφίστανται TIL
iii, 13. vil. 12. viii. τι. IV. iii 35.
ΙΧ. iv. 8. ἀφεστᾶσι ΤΥ. iv. 1. ἀπο-
στῆναι VIIL xiv. 4. ἀφέστηκε IL
viii. 5.

ἀφοβίᾳ 11. vii. 2.

ἄφοβος III. vi. 3,4. ἀφοβον IIT. viii. 15.

ἀφόρητον IV, v. 7.

ἀφορίσαι ΤΙ. ἰχ.8, ἀφωρισμένον ITI. iii.
17. ἀφορίσωμεν III. x. 1. ἀφωρισ-
μένα Ὑ111. ix. 2. ἀφοριστέον I. vii. 12.
ἀφορίσειε VIII. xii. 1. ἀφωρισμένας
VIL iii. 1.

a&dpodolosIII. x.9. VIL xiv. 2. ἀφρο-
δισίων VII. iii. 7. iv. 2 Vv. 3, 7. xii. 4.

᾿Αφροδίτην VII. vi. 3.

ἀφροσύνη VII. ii. 2. v. 5.

ἀφρόνων VIT, v. 6.

ἀφνεστέροις X. ix. 10.

ἀχθόμενος IL ii. τ. IV. i. 27.

ἀχορήγητον I. viii. 15.

ἀχρεῖος IV. vii 10. dxpetor VIII. xiv.
I. ἀχρεῖα X. ix. 21.

ἀχρήϊος L iv. 7.

ἀχώριστα 1. xiii. 10.

ἄψυχος 111. xi.6, ἄψυχον VII. vii. 7.
Ayuxa V. ix. τι. VWIIL v. 5. xi. 6,
ἀψύχων VIIL ii. 3

B

βαδίζει TX. ix.9. βαδίζων 1. ii 8. TX,
ix. 9. βαδίζει» V. i. 4. Χ, iii. 4.
βαδίζῃ V. 1.4. βαδιστέον X. ix. 16,

βάδισις KX. iv. 3 βαδίσεως X. iv. 3.
βαδίσει X. iv. 3.

βάλληται T.iv. 7. βαλεῖν ILL v. 14.
Υ. viii. 6.

X1V

βάναυσος 1V. ii. 20. Bavavola IT. vii. 6.
IV. ii. 4.

βαρβάρων VII. v.6. βαρβάροις VIL i. 3.

βάρος IV. v. το. βάρους IX. xi. 2.

βαρεῖα IV. iii. 34. βαρέα IIT. iv. 4.

βαρύσταθμον VL viii. 7. βαρύσταθμα
VI. viii. 7.

βασιλεία VIII. x. 1,2, 4. βασιλείας
VIII. x. 2, 3, 4.

βασιλεὺς VIIL. x. 2,3. xi. 2. βασιλέως
X. ix. 12. βασιλεῖ VIII. xi. Ba-
σιλεῖς 111. iii. 18. βασιλέων VIIL vii.
4. βασιλεῦσι VIL. vii. 6.

βασιλενομένων VIIL xi. 2.
μένους 111. xi. 1.

βανκοπανοῦργοι IV. vii. 15.

βέβαιον VIII. viii.5. βεβαίῳ X. vii. 3.
βεβαιοτάτη VIII. xii. 6.

βεβαιότης 1. x. to.

βεβαιῶσαι VITI. viii. 2.

βεβαίως IT. iv. 3.

βελτίων. xiii.7. 11.1.5. IV. i.31,
32, iii. 14. VIL. ii το. viii. 5. 1X.
viii. 1. βελτίονος VI. xiii 8. Χ, iv. 7.
βελτίω I, i. 2. xiii. 3. TX. xi4g. ΣΧ. vi.
7. βέλτιον L vi. 1, 14. ix. 5. xii. 4.
xiii. IL ifiiro. 111.1.12. V.x.1.
2,6,8. VILii. 3. xii. 3.xiv.4. WIII.
xiv.1. [X.iii. 3. Mix. 1, 22. βελ-
τίους VIL, viii. 2. IX xii. 3. Χ. νυ. 5.
ix. 17.

βέλτιστον Lix.2, IV.v.10. VI vii.
4. VIL ii. 1. viii. 5. IX. viii. 8.
βελτίστῃ VLi 7. VII. χ, 2 X.
iv. 5, βελτίστῳ VIII. x. 2. βάλ.
τιστα I. xiii 15. IX iv. & βελτίσ-
των ΤΊ. iii. 6.

fia IILi. 3, 11, 20. ν. 7. V. viii. 3.
X. ix. 8.

βιασθέντος 111. 1, 12.

βίαιος L ν. 6. βίαια IIT. i. 10, 11. Υ.
ii, 12, βίαιον IIL. i. 3, 12.

βίος I. viii. 10, 12. x. 9. VII. xiii. 7.
VIII. xii.6. IX.ix. 4, 5,9. x2 X.
vi. 6. vii 8, 9. viii. 3, 8, 10. βίον 1,
v. 4, 6. ix. 10. x. 4, 11. xili, 12. IV.
iii, 23. Vivi. 4. KL τ᾿ iii 12. vi.
2. 8. vii. 7. viii. 12. βίῳ 1. vii. τό.
viii. 9. IT. iii. 8. vii. 13. IIL xii. 2,
IV. vii. 4, 7. vill 1,114, 12, ΙΧ. xii.
2. flow I. ii. 2. iii. 5. v. 2, 3. vii. 6,
7. ix. EI. X.12,15. xL3. II, vii. rr.
III. ix. 6. VI. vii. 4. VIL xii. 7.
xiii. 2. ὙΠ. i. τ. ix. 4, 5. xii 7.
TX.vi. 2.x.2. Kit, 2, 4, ii. 3. vi

βασιλενο-

INDEX VERBORUM.

2, 6. vii. 8, 9. viii 12. ix. 9. βίων
I. v. 1.

βιοτεύων IIT. v. 14.

BeBiwxére I. x. 4. βεβιωκότας X. viii.
11. βιῶσαι TX. viii. 9. βιουμένοις
X.ix 11. βιώσεται X. vii. 8. βιω-
σόμενον 1. χ, 15.

βλαβερὸν IV. νἱ. 7. βλαβεροῦ Υ. ν. 18.

βλαβεραὶ LV. 11. 22. VI. xiii τ. VIL
xi. 5. βλαβερὰ TX. ν. 8. βλαβερὰς
VIL xiv. 5.

βλαβὴ V. viii. 7,8 βλαβὴν IV. vi 7.
βλαβῶν V. viii. 6. βλαβὰς L ili. 3.

βλάβους“ V. iv. 3.

βλάπτει V. ix. 4, 17. VIL xii. 4,
βλάπτειν V. vi 8. ix. 4, 5. ἔβλαψε
V.iv. 3. βλάψῃ. viii. 11. BAdx-
τοντες V. viii. 8, βλάψει LX. viii. 7.
βλάπτῃ. χΙ. 2. βλάπτεται V. ix. 6,
9. βλάπτονται Χ. vi. 3. βλάπτοιτο
V. ix. 5. βέβλαπται V. iv. 3.

βλέπει V. iv. 3. βλέπουσι V. xi. 9.
βλέπειν IV.i. 18. βλέπουσα IT. vi. 9.
βλέποντες 11. vig. VII. xi. 1.

βοηθείας VIII. i. 2.

βοηθεῖν IT. ii. 5. βοηθήσας V. ii. 2.
βοηθῆσαι VIII. ix. 3. βοηθητέον LX.
iii, 3.

βοήθημα L. vi. 15.

βοηθὸν V. x. 8.

βορὰν 111. x. 7.

βοσκημάτων 1. ν. 3. UX. ix. 10.

βουλεύονται IIT. iii 1,7. WL ix. 2
βουλεύσαιτο 111. iii. 2. VIL ii 1.
βουλεύεται IIL. iii. 3,6,11. VI. i 6.
ii, 6. v. 3. vii. 6. ix. 3. βουλευόμεθα
IIL iii. 7, 8,11. βουλεύεσθαι IIL iii
10. VI. i 6. v. 1. vii. 6. viii, 7. ix.
I, 2, 4, 7. βουλεύσεται IIL iii. 16
βουλευόμενος ITL iii. Στ. VL ix. 2, 3
βουλεύσασθαι III, iii. 19. VWI v. 3.
vil.6. VII. vii.8. βουλευθέντα VEL
ix. 2, βουλεύηται VI. ix. 3. βεβου-
λεύμενος VI. ix. 4. βουλενόμενον VI.
ix. 6. βεβουλεύσθαι VI. ix. 7. βου-
λευσάμενοι VIL. vii. 8. ἐβουλεύσαντο
VIL. vii 8. βουλεύσηται VIL x. 3.
βονυλευσαμένων VII. x. 4.

βούλευσις IIL. iii. 12. βούλευσιν ITT.
ii. 19.

BovAeurixds VI. v.2. VII. x.3 Bow
λευτικὴ IIL 1. 19. VL 1. 2. viii

2, 3.
βονλευτὸν III. iii. 1, 2, 16, 17. Bov-
λευτοῦ LIL iii. 19. βουλευτῶν LIT. v.1.

INDEX VERBORUM.

βουλὴ 111. iii. 1, 8, 15. VL ix. 2, 4'
βουλῆς ITT. iii. 17. WI. ix. 4.
βούλημα IT.i. 5. βουλήματα LX. vi. 3.
βούλησις IIT. ii. 7, 8. iv. 1. VIIL ii. 3.
iii.9. ΙΧ. vii. 2. βούλησιν LIL ii 3.
V. ix. 5, 6,9. βουλήσει VIIL v. 5.
βουλήσεις X. viii. 4.
βουλητὸν ITIL. iv. 2, 3, 4. βουλητοῦ 111.
v. I.
βούλεται I. x. 3. xiii. 2, 111]. 1. 15. iv.
2. vii. 8. IV. i. 5. iif. 25. v. 2. V. iv.
7. Vv. 14. ix. 6. WITLI. ii. 3. vii. 6. x.
34. IX iv. 3, 4, 5. vill, 2. χ. 5. ΣΧ,
ix. 13. βουλόμεθα I. ii τ. TIL. iii, 9.
IV. vi. 4. βούλονται 1. vi. 5. IV. iii.
18,36. V.i3.v.3. VWIIL iii. 1. 5,
6. 9. Υ. 5. Vi. I, 4, 7. Vii. 6. xi 5.
xiv. 4. IX. iv. 8. v. 3. vi. 3. vii. Ι΄
xi. 1. xii. 2. βούλεσθαι L x. ἡ. 111.
v.13, IV.i34. VIL ii8 VIII.
iL 3, 4. Vili 1. xiii. 8. IX. vir. ΣΧ,
viii. 4. βουλόμενος 111.}. 17. ΤΥ. 1.
17. IX. v. 3. vi 4. viii. 2. βουλό-
μενοι III. vii. 12. IV. i. 43. VI. xii.
2. VIIL iii 6, IX.i 9. xii.2. Bod-
ληται 111.ν. 14. VII ii 8 ΙΧ. vi.
2. βουλομένους V.i. 3. WITLI. ii. 3.
IX. vi. 4. ἐβούλετο VIL x. 3. IX.
L 4.iv. 10, βουλήσεται VIIL vii. 6.
βουλόμενον TX. iv. 1. βουλομένῳ XK.
ix. 16, 17.
βοὸς 111. x.7. ot I. vii. 12.
ix. 9. VIII. xi. 6.
βραδέως VI. ix.2. Χ. iii 4.
βραδεῖα IV. iii. 34.
Bpaduris ΣΧ, iii. 4.
Βρασίδᾳ V. vii. 1.
βραχὺς V. ix. 1.
βρῖθος I. xi. 3.
βρώματα III. xi. 7. βρωμάτων ITI. x. 6.
βρώσει IIT. x. 7.
βωμολοχία 11]. vii 13.. |
βωμολοχὸς IL vii. 13. IV. viii. 10.
βωμολοχοὶ LV. viii. 3, 4.

βοῦν I.

βραχὺ VIIL v. 2.

Γ

γαῖαν 111. i. 6.

“γαλῆν VIL ν. 6.

γαμικῶς TV. ii. 20.

γάμος IV. ii. 15. yupous IX. ii. 7.
“αργαλίζονται VII. vii. 8.

γαστρίμαργοι 11]. xi. 3.
yeliovos V. ix. 14.

xV

γελοῖος IV. iii. 15. VIII. xiii. 3
γελοῖον IIT. i. 11,24. IV. viii. 3, 6.
VIII, ii. 3. viii. 6. γελοίου IV. viii.
3,4, 10. γεγοίῳ IV. viii. 3. γελοῖοι
L. xii. 3. VIII. viii. 6. X. viii. 7.
γελοιῶν ΣΧ, viii. 7. γελοῖα ITT. i. 8.

γέλωτα IV. viii. 3, 10. VII. vii 6.

γέμουσι IX. iv. 10.

γένεσις VII. xi. 4, 5. xii. 3. X. iii. 5. iv.
4. γενέσεως VL xii. 1. VIL xii. 3.
γενέσει 111. iii, 12. γένεσιν 1]. i τ.
ΨΙ. iv. 4. VIL xii. 3. X. iii. 4. iv. 4.
γενέσεις 1]. ii. 8, WII. xii. 1,3. Χ.
iii. 4, 7.

γενετῆς VL xiii. τ, VII. xiv. 4. VIII.
xii. 6.

γεννάδας I. x. 12.

γεννήσαντι VIIL 1, 3. γεγεννημένον
VIII. i. 3. γεννήσασι VIL. vii. 2.
γεννηθέντα VIII. xii. 2. γεννηθέντι
VIIL xii. 2. γεννώμενον Ψ 111. xii. 2.

γέννησις IX. vii. 7.

γεννητὴν IIT. v. 5.

γένος I. iii. 4. 111. v.21. V.x. 2. VI.
v. Rix. I, VIL. i 3, 5. vi. 7. vii. 6.
viii 1. IX. 11. 7. γένους VII. vii. 6.
γένει 1. vii. 14. IL vii.6. IV. ii. 17,
19 Υ͂. 1. 6. χ 1. ΜΙ... 5. VIL
ἦν. 5. Xi. 3. γένη VIL. v. 1, 6.
vi. 5.

γενάνου IIL. x. to.

γέρας V. vi. 7. VIII. xiv. 2.

γεῦσις III, x. 8. γεύσεως IIT. x. 9,
VII. vir. X.v.7. γεῦσει 111. x.
9. γεῦσιν VIL iv. 3.

γεύεσθαι VIT, iii. 9, 10.

γεωμετρεῖν X. v. 2.

γεωμέτρης I. vii. 19.

yewuerpla VI. x. I.

γεωμετρικὴν V. iii, 13. γεωμετρικοὶ VL
viii. 5. X. ν. 2. γεωμετρικῇ V.iii 13.

γεωργὸς V. 12. γεωργοῦ V. v. 9, 12.

vis VII. v. 3. γῆν X. ix. 6.

γῆρας IV. i. 37. γήρως 1, ix. 11.

γηρῶν V. viii. 3.

γίνεται 1. i. 3. iii. 7. vii. 8, 15. viii. 3.
x. 12. xiii, 12. IL i 6. it 7, 8. iii
10, 11. iv. δ. vi. 3. viii, 8. IIT. i, 7.
iii. 8. vii 4. viii. 3. ix. 3.x. 5. IV.
ii, 15. iii. 16, 37. ν. 7, 10. ix. 4. V.
i. 5. ii. 5. iii, 14, 15. iv. 1. v. 6, 9,
10. vi. §. viii. 5. WI. xii. 10. xiii. 2.
VIL i 3. ii 2, 8& iti 12, 13. v. 1.
VIIL ir, 7. ii 3. dit 1, 5, 9. iv. 4.
v. §. vi. 1, 5, 6, 7. Vii 2. viii 4. x. 3.

ΧΥῚ

xiii. 2,3, 5. ΙΧ. is, 3, 7,9. iii 4.
ν. 1,3, 4. Vi 2. viii, 10. ix. δ. x. δ.
xi. 3. xii 1,3. Mii 3. iii. 5. iv. 7
9, 11. vi. 6. vit 6. vill 13. γινο-
μένης1. vi. τ. TLix. 4. SX. iii 6. iv.
I, ix. 15. γένοιτο 1. vii. 10. x 13,
14. xiii, 4. ILD. iii. 7. ITI. iii. 6. 13.
IV. ii 17. V. v. 3. UX. iii 4. viii. 3.
X. iii, 7, 12. iv. 1. ix. 18, 20. γεγό-
γασι I, vii. 17. γίνηται 1. vii. 19.
IV. iii. 18 vig, V.iv.2. VIII. ii.
3. iv. 1. v. 1. wi. 4. Vii. 2, 4. xiv. I.
IX. £ 3,4. 415. γίνεσθαι 1. vii. 21.
x. 4. xii. 8. II. iii. 4, 5. iv. 1. ΠῚ.
iii, τι. iv. §. x0 7. VI. viii. 5. xii.
2. VII. xiv. 4 VIIL i. 6. iii. 4. iv.
3,4. vi. 2, §. vil. 2. viii. 6. ix. 5.
χῖὶν 1. IXi. 4, 8. v. 3. xi 3. Σ,
fi, 3. fii. 5. ἵν. 8, x. §, 6, 14, 21.
γινομένου IV. v.10, IX. xi 1. γί-
γονται I. viii. 9. ix. 11. IT. i. 4, 6,7.
ii. 8. iii. 5. vii. 4. ITT. i 9, 14. ν. 12,
21. viii. 9, 14. xi. 3, 7. IV. i. 24.
iii. 21. V.vi 7. VI. viii. 5. VILi
2. v. 3. xiv. 3,6. WIIIT. iii. 5. iv. 5.
vi. I. viii. 5.x. §. xii. 4. xiii, i. ΙΧ,
i. 6. v.2. x. 6. xii. 4. X. v. 2, 10,
ix. 14. γίνοιτο. x. 4. VIII. iv. 2.
IX. ix.7,10. ΣΧ, vii. 9. ix. 11. yé-
γηται Ὗ. ἵν. 14. v. 8. viii 7. VI. iii.
2. iv. 4. xiii. 8. IX. i 3. iii. 3, 5.
γεγένηνται I. xiii. 3. KX. iii, 7. γέ-
yore V. Vv. 11. γεγονὸς VI. ii. 6.
γενόμενος I. x. 14. IV. i. 36. VII.
i, 8. IX.iv.4. KX ix. 14. γινόμεθα
Il. i. 4, 7. ti. 9. v.55. Koix. 2. γε
νόμενον IL ἴ, 5. IX i 8. viir. &
iv. 1. ἐγίνοντο 11. i. 7. XX. ix. 109.
γενώμεθα ΤΊ. ii 1. γενέσθαι IT. ii. 1.
iv. 3,5. IID. ii. 8. v. ro, 14. Χ. 10.
V. v. 12, 15. vii. 4. viii. ro. VI.i 6.
VII. ii. 2. VIIL vi. 3. viii. 7, IX.
iv. 10, vili. 10, XK. ix. 16,17. γυό-
μενα 1. χ. 12. IT. 11. 6. iv. 3. ν. 1.
IIL i. 3. γενόμενοι IT. ii. 9. γινό-
μενοι 11. ii. g. γινόμεναι ΤΊ, iii. 4.
111.χ. 11. ΓΥὺν. 1 X.v.§. ywo-
μενων 1.χΧ.12. ΤΙ, fiirx. III. i. 1,
iii, 4. Viv. 4 x1. VII. xii. 3.
γινομένους X. ii, 6. ἐγένετο IT. iii
11. ywouédvas 1]. vii. 15. IV. vi. 7.
γενομένοις III. v. 14. WITT. xii. 5.
IX. iii. 5. γενόνενα VIIL xii. 2.
ΙΧ. vit 7. X. ix. 8. γυομένην IX.
xi. 4. γένοιντο IX. vii. 2. X. ix. 21.

INDEX VERBORUM.

γεγονότος VI. ii. 6. γυόμενοε VIII.
Υ͂. 5. γενομένης IX. iii. 5. “γενόμενον
IX. iv. 4. γενομένου IX. vii. 3. γί-
powro Χ. vii. 6. γενοίμεθα X. ix. 17.
γεγενῇσθαι ΣΧ. iii 6. γεγενημένου
IX. vii. 6. γεγένηται VIIL xiii. 11.
IX. viii. 4. ἐγεγόνει IX. iii. 5. γενε-
μένους IX. v. 3.

γινώσκειν Ὗ. viii.3. VI. xi. 3. γινώσκει
I. ili. 5. γιψώσκονται Lv. 5. γυώ-
σκων V. ix. 12. γρόντες TIL iii 9.
γγῶναι V, ix. 15. Kix. 1. γνωσθεῖσι
TIL i. 9.

Γλαῦκον V. ix. 12.

γλισχροὶ IV. i 39.

γλιχόμενοι TV. viii. 3.

γλυκύ VIL iii. 9, 10. γλυκέος VIL iii.
9. γλυκέα ITIL iv. 4. XX. ἐϊ, 8. γλυ-
κέων KX. ν. 9. γλυκύτατον Υ 1]. xiv. 8.

γνώμη VI. xi. 1,3. γνώμην VIL xi. 1,
2, 6.

γνωρίζειν I. νἱ. 4. VL. vii. 7. γνωρίζε-
ται Ὗ. i, 5. γρνωριοῦμεν V. iv. 11.

γνωρισθέντος VIII. ii. 1. γνωριστέον
X. ix. 16.

γνώριμος TTI. v.22. γνώριμον IT. ix. 5.
γνωρίμων I, iv. 5. γνωρίμους IV. vi.
5. VII. xiii. 6. γνώριμοι]. iii. 4.
γνώριμα VI. viii 5. γνωρίμοις TV.
vi. 8.

γνῶσις 1. ii. 2. ti. 6, 7.iv.1. VLi 5.
γνῶσιν 1. vi. 15. xiii. 7. IIL vii. τό.
γνώσεως VI. viii. 4.

γνωστῶν X. vii. 2.

γονεῖς I. vii. 7.x. 4. IV.i2a VIL
iv. 5. VWIIL vii. 2. xi. 3. xii. 2, 3, 5.
xiv. 4. IX.i.7. γονεῦσι 1. vii. 6.
x.5. VIIL vii.1,2ix.2 Iii 7,
8, γονέων TIT. ἃ, 4.

γόνν IX. viii. 2,

γοῦν Lv. §. xiii. 17. IV. iii. 18. iv. 5.
VIL. xiv. 5. VIQix τ. LX. viii 6.
X. vii. 3.

γραμμάτων ITT. iii. 8.

γραμματικὴν 11. iv. 2.

γραμματικὸς IL.iv.2. γραμματικὸν ibid.
γραμματικοὶ, γραμματικὰ II. iv. 1.

γραμματικῶς IT. iv. 2.

γραμμῆς Viiv. 8. γραμμὴν X. iv. 3.

γραφεῖς X. ix. 18.

γραφὴ X.v. 1. γραφῇ III. x. 3.

γραφικῆς X. ix. 20.

γράφει X.v.5. γράφειν ibid. γράφοντες
Χ. ix. 18, γεγραμμένων Χ. ix. 14.
ραπτέον Χ, iii 8.

INDEX VERBORUM.

γυμνάσια 1]. ii. 16, γυμνασίων 1]. Υἱ, 7.
γυμνασίοις 111. x, 11.

γυμναστὴς X. ix. 15.

γυμναστικὴ I. vi. 4. γυμναστικῆς X.ix.
14. γυμναστικῇ V. xi. 7. γυμναστι-
κὴν IIL. iii. 8. VI xii. 1.

γυμνικοῖς ΠῚ, ix. 9.

γύναια IX. xi. 4.

γυναικὸς VITE. x. 5. xii. 7. γυναικὶ 1.
vii. 6. V. vi. x. ix. 16. VIII. vii. 1.
x. 5. xii. 7. γυναῖκα IIT. vi. 5. V.
vi. 9. VIII. vii. 1. xi. 4. xii. 8. γυ-
pvaixes VIII. x. 5. γυναῖκας VII. v. 4.

A

δαιμόνια VI. vii. 5.
11.

δαίμων IX. ix. 1.

δακνόμενον VII. xiv. 6.

δανείζειν ΤΙ, ν. 2. δανείσαντι TX. ii. 5.
ἐδάνεισε IX. 11. 5. δανείσαντες IX.
vil. 1. δανείσαντας IX. vii. 2.

δάνειον IX. ii, 3. δανείων TX. vii. 1.

δανεισμὸς V. ii. 13.

δαπανᾶν LV. 11. 16. δαπανῶν IV. i. 23.
ii, 3,20. SararfoacIT.ix, 2. IV.ii.
5 δαπανήσει LV. i. 24. ii. 7, 10, 13.

δαπάνη IV.i. 7.11.1. δαπάνης IV. ii.

δαιμόνιον IV. ii.

6, 10. δαπάνην IV. i. 20. ii. 6.
δάπαναι IV. ii. 6. δαπάναις 1V.i.23.

δαπάνημα IV. ii. 6. δαπανήματος IV.
ii. 19. δαπανήματι IV.ii, 18. δαπα-
νημάτων LV. il. 11,16, 20. δαπανή-
pac IV. 11. 15.

δαπανηρὸς IV. 11. 15. δαπανηροὶ IV. i.
245. δαπανηροὺς IV. i. 3. δαπανηρὰς
IV iis. °

δεῖ 1. ii. 7. iv. 6. vii. 17. ix. 10. x7.
ΧΙ, 7. IT. i. 4, 8. ii. 4, 6. iii. 1, 2, 5.
iv. I. Vi. I, 1%, 18. vii. 1, 8, 13. ix.
3.4,5,6,9. JIE. i. 7, 14, 19, 24. ii.
13, 14. iii. 13, 16. v. 8, 17. vi. 3, 4.
Vii. 2, 4, 5, 10, 12. viii. §. ix. I. x.
3, 4. xi. 4, 5, 7, 8. xii. 6,7, 8, 9. IV.
1, 3, 7, 12, 13,15, 17, 22, 23. 24, 25,
28, 31, 33, 35, 40, 42, 43. ii. 4, 6, το,
12, 20, 21. ili. 8, ro, 14. iv. ee
4. 5.0. 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 14. Vi. 3, 5, 6.
viii. 4. Υ. ἱ. 9. ἐν. 11. ν. 4 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Vi. 4. ix. 7,
15. χι 6. ὙΙ. 1.1, 2, 3. ii. 2. iii, 2.
Vii. 3, 7. ix. I, κ, 6. x. 2. xi. 3. 4, 6.
xii. 1, 7. xiii. 5. VIL i. 5. ii. 6, το,

VOL, II.

XVIL

12. ili. 5, 9, 12. iv. 5. vi. I. vil. 3.
ix, 5. xiv. 2, 3: VIII. iii. 4,7. 9. iv.

4. vi. 3, 4. vil. 2. x. 5. xiii. I, 10,
ΙΧ. i. 8, 9. ii. 1. iii, §. viii. 1, 2, 3, 7,
8, 11. ix. 2, 3, 6, 8, 10. X. I, 2, 4.
xi. 1,4,5. X.i. 1. iv. 7. viii. 9, 11.
ix. 8,9, 11,21. δεῖν 1. νἱ. τ. IV. ii.
11. vi. I. ix. 3, 4. V. iii. 7. ix. 6.
VL. v. 6. viii. 4. ix. 2. VII. ii. 9. iii.
2. Vili. §. ix. 7. WIII. ii. 3. xiii. 6.
xiv. 1,2. IX. ii. 7, 8. viii. 2. ix. 1,
§. xi. §. X.i. 2. vii. 3. ix. 10. δεήσει
I. vi. 11. ΙΧ, ix. το. X. viii. 4, 9.
ἔδει 11. ἱ. 7. IV. viii. 9. VI. ix. 5.
xiii. 7,9. X. ii. 5. ix. 3. δέοι VII.
xiii. 7. VIII. vii.6. δέῃ IX. viii. 9.
X. ix.6. δεήσεται TX, ix. 1, 2, 4, 5.

X. viii. 6. δέηται V. v. 12. δεηθῇ
V.vi34. δεῖται Π1. 1.1. Viv. 14.

IX. ἰχ. 4. X. vii. 4. viii. 5. δεῖσθαι
IV. iii. 26. UX. ix. 4. X. viii. 4. δέον.
rae VIL. xiv.6. VIII. vi. 4. viii. 5.
xiii. 4. IX.ix. 1. X. vi. 3, 6. vii. 4.
δέοψτο Viv. 11. δέωνται VILL. viii.
2. δεήσεσθαι X. viii.9. δεοίμεθα X.
ix. 9. δεόμενος VIII. xiii. 11. IX. i.
4. ix. 4. δεομένη VIL. xiv. 8. δεομέ-
vou IX, ix. 2.

Senrixds IV. iii. 32.

δεδιέναι VII. v. 6. ἐδεδίει VII. v. 6.

δεικνύναι VII. i. 5. δείξει V. i, 16.
δεῖξαι X. i. 17. Settas VII. vi. 2.
δεδειγμένον VIT. 1. 5. δέδεικται VIT.
li. §. x. 1. δειχθῆναι 1. vii. 20. δει-
χθήσεται TV. ix. 8.

δειλαίνειν 11. vi. 19. V. ix. 16.

δειλία IL. viii. 6, 7. ΤΠ. xii. 3. VII. v.
5. δειλίας 17]. xii. τ. δειλίαν V. ii.
2, 56. VII. ν. 6. IX. iv. 8.

δειλὸς 11. ii. 7. iii. 1. vii. 2. viii. 2, 3.
IT. vi. §. vii. 10, 11,12, V. xi. 4.
VII. v. 6. δειλοῦ IIT. vii. 13. δει-
Nov IT. viii. 2, 3. δειλοὶ 11. i. 7. III.
vi. 4. Vili. 1, 9.

δεινὸν VIT. ii, 1. iii. 5. x. 2. δεινοὶ VIT.
li. 8. δεινὰ 1. xi. 4. I. iii. 1. IV.
ix. 2. IX. iv. 8. δεινῶν ITI. vi. 6.
Vili. 11. δεινοῖς IT. i. 7. δεινοὺς VI.
xii.9. VII.i. 7. VIII. vi. 5.

δεινότερον VIII. ix. 3. δεινότατα ITI.
i, 8. ,

δεινότης VI. xiii. 2. δεινότητα VI. xii.
9. xiii. 1. VII. x. 2.

δέκα 11. vi. 6,7. V.v.31§. ΙΧ. x. 3.
δέκατον V. v. 15.

Xvi

δένδρα X. v. 1.

δεξιὰ 1. xiii. 15. Υ͂. vii. 4.

δέον IT. vii. 1. 1Π.. χὶ. 3. [V.i. 25, 27,
36. ii. 13,20. VIL 1. 2. IX. 1. 9.
fii. 5. δέοντος 1. ii. 2. 1]. vii. τό.
δέοντα VII. x. 2. IX. viii. 4.

δεσμὸς V. ii. 13.

δεσπότῃ VIII. xi. 6. δεσπότου VIII.

Σ. 4.

δεσποτικὸν Ὗ. vi. 8. Xi. 9.

δεῦρο IX. iv. 9.

δεύτερον» II. ix. 4. Ὗ. 11. 9. δευτέρου
V. iii. 9. δευτέρως VIIL. vii. 3. X. v.
11. viii. 1.

δέχεται VIII. i. 7. X. iii. 2, 3. δέχε-
σθαι X. iv. 11. δέξασθαι IT. i 3.

δέδεται VII. ii. 8.

δὴ 1. ii. 3. vi. 7, 12. vii. 2, 5, 8, 10, 12,
14, 19. viii. I, 2, 12. X. 2, 4, 7, 11,
14. Xi, 3, 5. xii. 2. xiii. 8,15, 18. 1].
i. 7, 8. vi. 3, 4, 8, 9. III. i. 1, 6, 10,
II, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 27. ii. 2, 10,
16. iii. 15, 16. iv. 4. Vv. 1, 16, 17, 19,
23. Vi. 5, το. vii. 6, 11. Vili. 6, 11, 12,
13, 17. ix. 2,4, 5. x. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
IV. i. 4, 5, 6, 19, 31, 43. ii. 2, 6, 7,
10. iii. 8, 9, 10, 18. iv. 5. v. 13, Vii.
I, 2. viii. 8, 10. ix. 2. V. i. 3, 8. v.
10, 12, 14, 15, 16. Vili. 3. xi. 9. VI.
i. 4. ii. 6. ili. 1, 3. V. I. Vi 1, 2. Vil.
4, 5. 1X. 3, 7. Xi. 3, 9. xiii. 1,4. VII.
iii. 6. iv. 5. viil. 4. ix. 1. x. 3. Xiil. 7.
xiv. 1, 3. VIIL iii. 1, 2, 3, 4,8. v.1.
vi, I. Vii. 2, 6. ViiL 1, 2, 6. ix. 3, 6.
xX. 3. Xi. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8. xii. 3. xiii. 1,
9, 11. xiv. 3, 4. IX. ii. 7. ill. 3. iv.
3, 5, 9, 10. V. 3. Vi. 2. Vii. 4, 7. Vili.
I, 2, 3, 4, 6,9, 10, 11. ix. 3, 4, 5, 10.
X. 2, 3 5. xi 1,6. X. iL I, 2, 3, 5.
iil. 3, 6. iv. 2, 4, 9. V. 2, 5, 7. Vi. I,
2, 4, 6. vii. 1, 7, 8, 9. viii. 3, 5,
7, 8, 12. ix. 2, §, 8, 9, 12, 15, 19,
22.

Δηλιακὸν 1. viii. 14.

δῆλος Χ, viii. 4. δηλὴ Vii. 7. δῆλον].
ii, I. v. 5, 8. Vi. 3, 9, 13. Vii. 3, 8. x.
4, 8, 12. xii. I, 3, 4, 7. xiii. 4, 7. IT.
i, 2, 4. III. i. 17. ili. 18. v. 11, 23. xi.
δ. xii. 5. IV. i. 24. iv. 4. v. 13, 14.
vill, 1, 4. V.i. 8, 12, 20. il. 2,7. iii.
1,7, 9. V. 15, 16, 17. vii. 4. 1x. 3, 8.
x. 8 VII. ii. 2. v. 7. vii. 2, 5. ix. 3,
4. Xil. 10, xiii. 6, 7. VII. iii. 7. vi.
5. xii. τ, VIII. iv. 2. vii. 4. xii. 2.
xiii. 6. IX. iii. 4. viii. 3. ix. 3, 5. X.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ii. 3. lil. 13. iv. 4, 7. V. 5, 11. VL 2
vii. 6. viil. 5- ix. 6. δῆλα VIL. i. 1.

δηλόνοτι I. xiii. 5. III. vi. 2. VIL 1 2.
iv. 6. v. 8, 9 IX. xi. 4. X. ix. 14

δηλοῖ IL. ix. 9. V. v. 13. WIL. ii. 4.
δηλοῦντες V. x. 1. ἐδήλωσε VIL. V1. 1.

δημηγορικοὺς X. ix. 18.

δημιουργουμένοις 1. 111. 1.

δημογέροντες IT. ix. 6.

Δημοδόκου VII. vill. 3.

δημοκρατία VIII. x. 3. δημοκρατίαν
VILL x. i. δημοκρατίαι VIIL x. 6.
δημοκρατίαις VILL. xi. 8.

δημοκρατικοὶ V. iii. 7.

δῆμος LX. vi. 2. δήμῳ IIL. iii. 18.

δημόται Ν1Π. ix. 5.

δήποτε VI. xii. το. VILL xiii. 7. LX.
ἑ. κ. Vix 2.

διαγνῶναι IIT, iii. 10.

διάγραμμα IIT. iii. 11.

διαγραφῆς I. vii. 1.

διάγειν ΙΧ. xi. 1. xii. 2. διάγοντες TIT.
Vv. Io.

διαγωγῆς IV. viii. 1. διαγωγὴν TX.
xi. 5. διαγωγὰς X. vi. 3. διαγωγαῖς
X. vi. 3, 8.

διάδηλοι 1. xiii. 12.

διάθεσις Il. vii. 13. διαθέσεως: VIL i. 4.
διαθέσεις II. vii. 6, 8. διαθέσεων Π.
viii. I.

διαιρεῖν I. xi. 2. LX. viii. 3. διαιρεῖται
TEL ἢ. το. διελόμενοι IT. vii. 6. VWI.
ἱ. 4. K.ix. 21. διείλομεν VIL. iv. 5.
διέλωμεν VI. i. 1. διήρηνται V. iii
10. διύρηται V.iv. 4. VIII. xii. 7.
διῃρημένη V. iii. 9. διῃρημένοις VITT.
vi. 5. xii. 3. διαιρεθῇ V.iv.8. δεῃρή»
σθωσαν 111. x. 2. διαιρετέον VL. i. 5.
διαιρετῷ II. vi. 4.

δίαιτα I. vi. 3.

διακεῖσθαι 11. v. 4. LX. iv. 10. δεάκεισται
VII. xiv. 6. διακείμενος X. viii. 13.
διακειμένου X. iv. 5. διακειμένης X.
iv. 5. διακειμένοις IIT. iv. 4. X. iii.
8.v. 11.

διακόνων VIT. vi. 1.

διηκρίβωται IT. iii. 8. διακριβῶσαι Χ.
Viil. 3.

διακρίνει 111. xi. 7.

διακωλύουσι VIII. viii. 5.

διαλάμπει I. x. 12.

διαλανθάνειν X. ix. 20, διαλαθεῖν IV.
Vii. 13.

διαλεχθείη VI. xiii. 6.

διαλλάττουσι VIII. x. 6. X.v. 9. Sear

INDEX VERBORUM.

Adrroc IX. iii, 4. διαλλαττομένους
IV. v. τι.
διέλυσε VILL. v. τ. διαλύονται ΠΙ. iv.
2. XH. 7. διαλύωνται VIII. xiii. 5.
διαλνόμενος VIII. xiii. 8. IX. iii. 3.
διαλύεσθαι IX. iii. τ. X. iii. 5. διαλυ-
θῆναι IX. i. 8. διαλύεται VILL. iii. 3.
xiv. 1. διαλυτέον VILL. xiii. 9. ΙΧ.

iii, 3.

diddvors TX. i. 3. iii. 5.

διαμαρτάνει IV. i. 28. διαμαρτάνειν 1.
Vili. 7. διαμαρτόντα VIII. xiii. 9.

διαμένει VITT. iii. 3, 6. ix. 4. X. iii. 3.
διαμένοι TX. 111, 4. διαμένουσι VIII.
iv. I, 2. viii. 5, 6. διαμενόντων VIIL
iii. 3. διαμένοντας IX. ii. 1.

διαμέτρου IIT. iii. 3. διάμετρον V. v. 8.

διαμφισβητεῖται VIII. i. 6.

διανεμητικὸς V. v. 17. Stavennrixdy V.
Iv. 2. ν. 2.

διανέμειν IX. x. 4. διανέμων V, ix. 9,
10. διαγέμοντι V. ix. 10,

διανοούμενον 1. vii. 13.

διανοητικὴ IT. i. τ. VI. ii. 5. δίανοη-
τικῆς 11. i. 1. διανοητικοῦ VI. ii. 3.
VIII. iv. 3. διανοητικὰς I. xiii. 20.

διάνοια VI. ii. 2, 5. VIL. ii. 8. X. iv. 9.
v. 7. διανοίας 11], ii. 17. x. 2. VI. i.
4 li. 3, 4. ix. 3. ΙΧ. ix. 3. X. v.2.
διανοίᾳ VIL ii. 2. IX. iv. 5. X. iv. ro.
ix. 18. διάνοιαν VII. iv. 3. IX, iii. 4.
X. iii. 12. iv. §. v. 7.

διανομὴ Viiv. 2. διανομῇ V. iii. 12.
διανομαῖς V, ii. 12. iii. 7.

διαπονεῖ X. viii. 4. διαπονεῖν IX. iv. 3.

διαπορῆσαι I, vi. 1. διαπορήσειε V. ix. 3,
VI xii. 1. διαπορήσαντας VII. i. 5.
διαπορηθὲν I. x. 10. διαπορεῖσθαι 1.
xi. 5.

διαπορεύεται X. iv. 3.

διαρθρῶσαι I, vii. 17.

διασαφῆσαι I. vii. 2.
iii. 1.

διασπῶντα IX. iv. 9.

διαστάσει LX. iii. 4.

διάστημα VILL vii. 4.

διαστρέφει VI. ν. 6. xii. 10. διεστραμ-
μένα IT. x. 5.

διάτασιν IX. v. 1.

διατάσσει 1. ii. 6.

διατείνει IV. i. 38. ii. 1. TID. i. τ. X.
viii. 8. διατεινρομένων IX. viii. 7.

διατεταμένως ΙΧ, iv. το. X. iv. 9,

διατελεῖ VIL. xiv. 6. διατελοῦσι IIT.
v. IY.

διασαφηθείη I.

ΧΙΧ

διατηροῦντες Χ. viii. I.

διατιθέασι IV. iv. 1. διατίθενται VII.
lll, 7. διαθεῖναι Χ. ix. 18.

διατρίβων VI. viii. 4.

διαφέρει I. i. 5. iii. 7. viii. 9. xi. 4. xiii.
10, 16. IL. i. 5, 8. vii. 6. 111. i. 13,
26. li. 15. iv. 5. vil. 1. Xi. 7. xii. 5.
IV. i. 34. ii. 18. iii, 2. vi. 5. vii. 8.
Vili. 5, 6. ix. 5. V.i. 20. iv. 3. v. 5,
16. vii. 1, 7. VIL. vii. 4. ix. 1. xiii, 1.
VIL. iii. 3, 6. vi. 6. VIII. iii, 1. ix. 2.
xi. 2, X. 11. 3, 12. v. 7. vii. 8. δια-
φέρονσι 1. iv. 5. II. vii. 6, 11. IV.
Vili. 4, 12. VIL. iii. 7. vii. 3. VIII.
Vil. 1, x. 2. X. 111. 10. iv. 2. v. 2, 7,
8. ix. 15. διαφέρῃ X. v. 4. διαφέροι
X. viii. 4. διαφέρει I. xiii. 12. VII.
x. 2. VIII. vi. 7. X. v. τ. vii. 7. ix.
14. διέφερε VII. iv. 2. διαφερέτω
X. iv. 5. διοίσει IV. viii. 1. V. vi. 1.
VI. xii. 2. VIL iii. 4, 5,6. VIII. ii.
2. X. viii. 4. διαφέρωσι VIII. x, 6.
δίαφέρονται VIII. xiv. 1. TX. i. 4. iv.
8. διοίσουσι 1. vi. 56. διαφέρων IX.
viii. 6. διαφέρουσα Χ. viii. 7. διαφέ-
povros IV, vii. 7. διαφέρουσαν IT. vii.
8. διαφέροντα IV. v. 2. V.v. 15.
διαφέροντες 1. vi. 11. WII. xiii. 1.
διαφέρουσαι X. iii. 13. διαφερόντων I.
x. 12. VIIL i. 6. x. 4. IX. ii. το.
X.v. 4. διαφερουσῶν X. v. 6. διαφε-
povoas X. v. 1.

διαφερόντως I. vii.t9. IV. vi 7. ΙΧ.
viii. 7. X. ii. 1.

διαφθείρει VI. ν. 9. διαφθείραντιν. xi.
4. διέφθαρται VIL. vi. 7. διεφθαρ-
μένῳ VI. v. 6. διεφθαρμένην LX. ix.
8. διεφθαρμένοις X. v. 11.

διαφορὰ 1. i. 2. διαφορὰ» I. ili. 2. xi. 5.
xiii. 20. V. iv. 3. VI. viii.4. VII. iii.
2. διαφορὰς Ϊ. xi. 2. 11.1.8. IV. vi.
8. VII. vi. 6. ΙΧ. ii. 2. διαφοραὶ ΠῚ.
iro. ΙΧ. ili. 1. X. Iv. 3.

διάφοροι VIII. x. 4. διαφόρους X. iii. 10.

διαφόρως 111. vii. 12. IV. vi. 8.

διαφυλάττων 1. v. 6.

διαφωνεῖ 1. viii. τ. V. v. 4. VILL. ii. 2.
IX. viii. 2, 8. διαφωνεῖν I. vi. 15.
διαρωνοῦσι X. i. 3. διαφωνούντων X.
Vili. 12.

διαψεύδεσθαι VI. 111. 1. xii. 10. διαψευ.
δόμεθα VI. vi. 2. διεψευσθῇ IX. iii. 3.

διδασκαλία VI. 111. 3. διδασκαλίας IL
1, I.

διδασκαλικὸς VII. viii. 4.

XxX INDEX VERBORUM.

διδάσκειν X. ix. 18. διδάξειε ΙΧ. 1. 5.
διδάξαι X. ix. 20. διδάξοντος IT. i. 7.
διδακτὴ VI. iii. 3.

διδαχὴ X. ix. 6. διδαχῇ X. ix. 6.

διδόναι IV. i. 7, 17, 29, 30; 34, 39) 43.
V. ix. 7. δοῦναι 11]. ix. 2. IV. i. 9,
39. V.ix. 7, 14. IX.1. 7. δίδοται
VIII. xiv. 3. δώσουσι X. viii. 7.
δόντες V. v.13. διδόασι VIII. viii. 3.
IX. i. 9. δεδωκὼς VIII. xiii. 7. δοὺς
VIL. xiii. 9. δίδοντες IV. 1. 10.
δώσει IV. 1. 12, 17, 22, 24, 31. IX.
i. 4. διδοὺς IV. i 14. V. ix. 7. δι.
δομένων IV. i. 19. διδόντος ibid.
δίδωσι LV. 1. 19, 31. διδόντα IV. 1.
19, 31. διδῷ 1V. i. 19. ΙΧ. ix. 1.
διδόντας IV. i. 30. δοῖεν IV. i. 35.
δόσκον IV. ti. 3. δέδωκεν V. iv. 13.
δοθέντων I. x. 13.

διεξιέναι X. iv. 3. διεξιοῦσι X. viii. 7.
ix, 21.

διελθεῖν 111. ii. x. TV. ii. τ. VITI. i. τ.
ΙΧ. xii. 4. X.i. 1. vi. 1. διελθόντες
IV. vii. 1. διεληλύθαμεν VI. i. 4.

διηγητικοὺς III. x. 2.

διήκει LX. viii. 2. διήκοντα VILL. ix. 3.

διϊκνεῖται 1. xi. 5. διϊχνοῦνται ]. xiii. 13.

dcdornxe V. xi 9. VII. vii. 7. διεστᾶσι
X. ν. 5.

δικαιοπραγεῖ V. viii. 1, 11. δικαιοπραγῇ
V. viii. 11. Sixacowpayhoe: X. vii. 4.
δικαιοπραγεῖν 1, viii, 12. V. viii. 4. ix.
2,3. X. ii. 2. iii. 2. viii 4. δικαιο-
πραγοῦντο: V. ix. 3. δικαιοτραγοῦσι
V.L 3.

ἀικαιοπράγημα V. vii. 7. viii. 2.

δικαιοπραγία V. v. 17.

δίκαιος 11. iv. 4, 5. IDI. v.15. V. i. 8,
12, Vv. 17. Vii. 6. Vili. ΣΙ. ix. 16. X.
vii. 4. δίκαιον L. viii. 12. xii. 2, 4.
V.i. 3, 8, 12. ii. 8, 10. iii. 3, 7, 8, 10,
II, 12, 14. iv. 2, 3, 6, 7, 14. Ve I, 2,
3, 6, 17. Vi. 3, 4, 8, 9. vil. 10. ix.
12, 14. X. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8. xi. 4.9. VIL.
vi. 4. xiii. 4. VIII. ix. 1, 3, 4. xi. 1,
3, 4, 6, 7, 8. xii 8. xiii. 5. IX. i. 8.
iii, 2, X. iii 10. δικαίου V. 11. 9.
iii, 17. iv. 7. ν. 17,10. Vi. 4, 5. Vii.
I. vill, 10. ix. 16. x. 2, 3, 6,8. X.
iii. 10. δικαίῳ V. iv. 2. ΣΧ. vili. 4.
δίκαιοι ΤΙ. i. 4, 7. iv. 4. VI. xiii 1.
VIII. i. 4. ΣΧ, iii. 2. δίκαια 1. 11]. 2.
viii. 10. IL. i. 4. iv. 1, 3, 4,5. VeL
3, 12. vii. 2, 5. viii. 4. ix. 15, 17.
VIL xii. 1, 7. VIII. ix. 2. IX. ν. 3.

vi. 3, 4. Vili. 5. X. viii. 1. δικαίωι
I. iv. 6. V. i. 3. Vii. 5, 6. viii. 1, 4
ix. 3. χὶ, τ. VI. xii 7. VOI i 4.
δικαίους IL iv.1. VL xii. 7. δικαίοις
V. viii. τ. VIIL vii. 3. δικαίας X.
Vili. 7. δικαιότερον LX. 1, 9. δικαιό-
τατον I. viii. 14.

δικαιοσύνη V. i. 1, 15, 17, 19, 20.-iL 9,
10, v. 17. X. 8. δικαιοσύνης 11. vii.
16. IV. ix. 8. V.i 1. ii 9, 12. W. 19.
xi. 10. VIII. i. 4. δικαιοσύνη V. i
15. δικαιοσύνην IV. 1, 10. vii. 7.
ΨΟΣ 2. 1, 1. νἱ, 6. χ 1. VOLig.
X. iii. 2. δικαιοσύναι V. ii. 7.

δικαιοῦσθαι V. ix. 2, 3. δικαιοῦνται V.
ix. 2.

δικαίωμα V. vii. 7.

Sccarcxods X. ix. 18.

δικαστὴς. iv. 4.7.8. δικαστὴν. iv. 7.

δικαστικὴ VI. viii. 3.

δίκη V. iv. 3. vi. 4. δίκαι VILL xiii. 6.
δίκας TX. i. 9.

διὸ Li 1, iii. 5. iv. 6. v. 2,8 ILL 8.
iii, 2, 5, 8. vi. 14, 17. Vili. 3, 8. ix.
2,3. OL v. 14. vi. 2. vii. 9. viii
15, 16, ix. 2. X. 10. XL 2, 3, 6. χῖξ.
2, 3»7,9. IV. i. 4, 7, 21, 23, 31, 35.
ii. 13. iii. 18, 19, 25, 29. V. 1. 3. iv.
7. VW. 7, 10, 14, 15, 18. Vi. §, 6, 9.
viii. 9. ix. 14. x. 6. xi. 2. VI. i 2.
ii. 5, 6. vii. 4, 5, 7. Vili. 2, 4. IX. 4.
xi. 5, 6. xii. 9. VII. iv. 4, 5, 6. vi
6. vii. 3, 4. Vill. 3. x. 2. xi 3. XGL
3. xiii. 2. xiv. 4,8. VILL iii. 5. wi.
I. viii. 1, 2,6. xi. 3. xii 4, 7. xiii. 6.
xiv. 4. IX. v. 3. viii. 4, 6. ix. 2. xi.
1,5. X.i. 1, 2,4. ν. 4. Vi. 3. ix. 8,
10, 19.

διοικεῖν VI. viii. 4.

Διομήδης ILI. viii. 2. Διομήδει V. ix. 7.
Διομήδην ITI. viii. 2.
διομολογία IX. i. 7.
διόπερ I. vi. 2. IL. i. 1.
34. iii. 31. VIL xiii. 3. VII. iii.
x. 6. ΙΧ, vi 1. ix. 7. x. 5. xi
xii. 2. X. iv. 2. ix. 10,
διορθοῦντες IX. xii. 3.

διορθωκικὸν V. ii. 12. iv. 1. γ΄. 2.
διορίζεν IX. viii. 3. X. i. 3. διωρίσθω
I.x. 16. V. viii. 3. ix.10. VIL. iii. 4.
διορίζεται 1. xiii. 20. I. iii. 5. διορι-
σθήσεται II. vii. §. διορίσαι IT. ix. 7.
IT. i. 1,16. IV. v. 13. IX. ii. 2.
διώρισται I. viii. 14. V. ii 8. ix. 3.
διωρίσθη VIL. vii. τ. διορισθῶσιϊ, vii.

INDEX VERBORUM. xxi

23. διωρισμέναι X. v. 6. διωρισμένον
VIL i, 3. διωρισμένων 1. xii. 1. IL.
ii. τ. V.v.17. διοριστέον V. ii. 10,
11, IX. ii ro.

διορισμὸς V. vii. 4. ix. §. διορισμὸν.
ix. 9. xi. 6.

διότι 1. iv. 7. V.xi. 5. WI. viii. 5. IX.
vii. 4.

διπλᾶ IIT. ν. 8.

δὶς V. ili. 9.

διστάζομεν111.}11.8,9. διστάζουσι VII.
li. 4. ili. 3.

διττὸν 1. xiii. 18, 19. VIIL xiii. 5.
διττῆς ID. i. 1.

διττῶς I. iv. 5. vi. 9. Vii. 13.

δίχα V. iv. 8, 9.

διχαίον V. iv. 9.

διχαστὴς ibid.

διχῶς VIL. iii. 3. xii. 1.

δίψης VIL. iv. 3. δίψας VII. xiv. 5.

διωθεῖσθαι 111. xiv. 4. IX. xi. 6.

διώκει» 1. 11], 7.v.14. I. iii. 5. VI.
ii, 2. VIL. iii. 2. viii. 4, 5. xii. 7.
xili. 5. Xiv. 2. διώκουσι V. i. 9. VILLI.
iv. 5. ix. 7. xiii. 6. xiv. 4. VIII.
lil. 4, 5. X. ix. 4. διώκομεν 1. vi. ro.
διώκει VII. iii. 2. iv. 4. ix. 1. xi. 4.
xl. 7. VII. x. 3. διώκεται 1. 1. 4.
VL 10. διώκων VIL. ii. 10. iv. 3. vii.
2. διώκοντι VII. xiv. 2. διώκονται
VIL. xiv. 4, 5. διωκόμενα I. vi. 8.
διωκτὸν 1. vii. 4.

δίωξις VI. ii. 2.

δοκεῖ 1.1.1. v. 4, 6. vi. 7. vii. 5, 6, 10,
13, 23. Vill. 6. x. 3. xii. 5. xiii. 2,
12. Π. viii. 7. ITT. i. 3, 13, 14, 18,
25, 27. il. I, 6, 10. iv. I, vi. 3, 6.
vii. 8. vili. 6, 15. xii. 3. IV. i. 1, 5,
7, 23. 31, 32, 37. ii. 1. iii. 3, 19, 34,
35. V. 4. Vil. 2. Vili. 1, 8, 11. ix. 2.
V. i. 4, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17. iii. 3. Vv. 1,
6. vi. 6. vil. 2. xi. 5,9. VI. iii. 3.

Vv. 1. Vili. 3, 5. 1x. 4. Xi. 5. xiii. 1.

VI. i. 6. iii. 5, 6. vii. 7. ix. 5. xi.

3. xii. 3, 6. ΧΙ. 4, 6. xiv. 3, 8.

VIII. i. 1, 4, 5. ii. 1, 2. iii. 4. v. 1,

3, 4. Vi. I. Vii. 2. viii. 1, 3, 6. ix. I,

4. xi. 7. xii. 7. Xiv. 4. IX. i. 5.

iii. 3. iv. 3, 5. Vii. 7. Vill. 1, 6, 10.

ix. 2,4. X.i. ΣΧ. i. 1, 3. ii. 4. 18. 4,

5, 6, 12. iv. 5. V. 8, 9, 10. vi. 3, 6.

vii. 1, 3, 6, 7. Viil. 2, 13. ix. 7, 13, 21.

δόξειε 1. ii. 4. vi. I, 14. Vii. IO, 17.

ITI, i. 20. vi. 7. ix. 3. X. 3, 10. xii.

3. IV. i. 31. ii. 1. iii. 7, 14. iv. 1.

vii. 8. ix. 2. VI. xii 3. WIL ii. το.
vil. 3. VIIL. ii. 1, viii. 2. xiv. 4. ΙΧ,
L 8. il. 4. ili. 3. iv. 4, 6. vii. 2, 7.
Vili. 6. ix. 10. X. 2, 5. χὶ. 5. X.i. 2,
IV. 4. Vil. 2,5, 9. Vili. 4. ix. 14, 15,
16. €oxe VII. iv. 5. ΙΧ. x. 3. X.
li, 1. ix. 18. δοκεῖν I. iii. 2. V. vi.
1. VIL iii. 13. δοκοῦσι I. x. 10.
IIL. ii. 14. iii. 7. v. 9. viii. 1, 10.
x. I. Xi. I. IV. i. 4, 20, 30, 38, 39.
ii. 18, 25, 35. Υ͂. 5. vi. I, 7. Vii. 14.
Vili. 3. ix. 9. VI. viii. 4. VII. x. 2.
VIIL iv. 4. viii. σ᾿. ix. 5. IX. vii. 1.
viii. 6. x. 6. xi 3. X. v. 1. Vi. 3.
vii. 6. viii. 10. ix. 16. δοκοίη III.
ii. 7. δοκοῦν IIL. iv.3. δοκῇ III. v.
8. [X.vi.2. δόξει V.ii. 4. δόξαιεν
ΙΧ, ii. 5. Xi ix. 18. δόξασι VII. ix.
4. δοκούσας Liv. 4. δοκοῦντες III.
viii. 17. δοκούσης ΤΙ. iii. 13. δο-
κοῦντος 111. xi. 2. ΙΧ. viii. 6. δο-
κουσῶν X. ν. 11. δοκοῦσαι VIL. xii.
1. δοκοῦσαν ΓΧ.]. 8. δοκούντων ΙΧ.
ἦγ. 8. δόξαντα IX. vi. 1.

δοκιμάζοντες IIT. x. 9, δεδοκιμασμένον

VILL. iv. 3.

δοκιμασία VILL xii. 6.

SodowAdxou VII. vi. 3.

δολοφονία V. ii. 13.

δόξας 1. iv. 4. δόξαν 1. vii. 2. viii. 2.

ITI. ii. 3. IV. ix. 5. VIL. ii. 3. iii. 3.
ΙΧ. xi. 6. δόξαις 1. xi. τ. VI. xi. 6.
δόξα ΠῚ. ii. 10, 13, 15. IV. iii. 35.
VI. v. 8. ix. 1,3. VIL ii. 4. iii. 9, 11,
13 X.iv.6. δόξῃ 111. ii. τ΄, 15.
VL. iii. 1.x. 1,3. VIL ii. 7. ix. 1, 2.
δόξαι X. vii. 6. vili. 12. δόξης LV. iii.
28. vii. 12, 13. V.ix.9. VI. iii. 4.
ix. 3. VIL. ii. 7. iii. 4, 10.
δοξάζειν ILI. ii. 11,14. δοξάζουσι VIT.
iii. 4. δοξάζομεν 111, ii. 12, 13. δο-
ξάζει ΓΝ. iii. 22. δοξάζοντες VIL. iii.
4. δοξαζόντων VIL. iii. 3.
δοξαστικοῦ VI. v. 8. xiii. 2.

δόρυ IIT. i. 17.
δόσις IV... 7. IX. ii. 5. δόσεως IV. i.

20, 38. [X.i.8. δόσει IV. i 1, 8, 11,
12, 18, 24, 29, 38, 39. iv. 2. δόσιν Π].
vii. 4. IV.i. 1, 24,29. δόσεις IV. i.
35. δόσεσι IV. i. 23.

Soréos V. vi. 7. δοτέον IX. ii. 1, 3.

δοτικοὶ IV. i. 37.

dovrAawaria V. li. 13.

δουλεία V. v. 6.

δουλεύειν X. i. 2.

XX11

δουλικὸν IV. iii. 20.

δοῦλος VIII. xi. 6, 7. δούλους VIII. x.
4. δούλοις ibid.

δρᾶν Ψ 111. xiii. 2. IX. χὶ, τ. X. ix. 14.
δρῶν Υ1Π. xiii. 2. ΙΧ. v. 3. δρῶμεν
Χ. ν. 4. δρῶντας II. v. 7. VII.
xii. 9. δράσαντος Υ ΠΙ. xiii. 10, 11.
δράσαντι IX. vii. 5. δράσαντας IX.
vil. 1. δρᾷ. xi. 2. δρῶσι LIT. viii.
4,5,11. IV. iii. 21. V. viii. το. VII.
viii. 4. X.v.4.ix.12. δέδρακεν VIII.
XIV. 4.

δρομικὸν I. xii. 2.

δρόμου IT. vi. 7.

δριμὺ 111. viii. ro.

δυνάμεθα IT. 11.9. IX.ix. 5. X. vii. 2.
δύναται IT. ii. 8. iv. 4. ILL. vii. 8.
IV. i. 26, 31. ii. 5. V.i. 15. v. 12,
14. VII. iii. 10. vii.6. VII. v. 2.
X. vii. 4. δυνησόμεθα I, ii. 9. ix. 7.
δύνανται III. viii. 7. IV. iii. 21. V.i.
15. VI.v. 5. VII. vii. 5,6. VIII.
xiii. 4. δύνασθαι II. v. 5. IV. iii. 29.
VI. v.1. xii.g. VIL. χὶ. 4. X. ix. 14.

δυνάμενοι ITT. viii. 7, 21. X. ix. 16.
ἐδύναντο X.ix. 19. δυνάμενος VIII.

ΧΙ, 9. δυναμένῳ ibid. δυναμένων
VIL. xiv. 5. δυνάμενον VIL. iii. 9.
VIII. xi. 7. δύνηται VII. ii. 8. δύ-
vurolIV.v.7. V.ix. 16. IX. x. 3.
X. viii. 10. δυναμένους IV. v. 13.
δυναμένοις X. ix. 21.

δύναμι: I. xiii. 12. V.i. 4. ii. 6. VWI.
xii.9, 10. IX. 9,7. δυνάμεως I. viii.
15. VI. xii. 8,10. VII. x. 4. xii. 6.
X. viii. 4. ix. 10. δυνάμει IV. vii. 12.
IX. vii. 4. ix. 7. X. ix. 18. δύναμιν
I, xiii. 11. V. vii. 1,2. VI. vii. 4.
VIII. x. 5. xiv. 4. X. i. 1. ix. 12,
22. δυνάμεις 11.1. 4. v. 3, 2, 5, 6.
VI. xi. 2. X. ix. 18. δυνάμεων I. ii.
3,6. xii. τ. Vii. 4. X. ix. 18.

δυναστείαν LV. iii. 18. δυναστείας VIII.
it. X. vii.6. δυναστεῖαι IV. iii. 18.
δυναστείαις X. vi. 3.

δυναστεύειν X. vi. 4. δυναστεύοντες IV.
iii. 19.

8urdory VILL. xiv. τ. δυνάστην X. viii.8.
δυναστῶν X. viii. 10.

δυνατὸν I. ix. 4. IIL. iii. 13. v. 14.
VIII. xiii. 9.xiv. 3. IX. iii. 3. X. viii.
ro. δυνατοὶ II. v. 2, 5. δυνατώτεροι
VII. i. 2. δυνατὰ IIT. iii. 13.

dvo I. xiii. ro. 11. vi. 6,7, 15. viii. i. 7.
ix. 2. V. ii. 13. iii. 5. iv. ro. v. 9.

INDEX VERBORUM.

vii. 1. ix. 8. VI. i. 5. xiii. 2. VII.
lil. 6. xiv. 3. VITT.i.2. IX. iv. 6.
X.v.4. δυοῖν V, ni. 5. VI. v. 8.
δυσὶ IV. i. 29, 38. V. iii. 4, 9. iv. 10.
Vi.v.6. Π.Σ τ. IX. x. 6.

δυσαφαίρετον I. v. 4.

δυσγενὴς I. viii. 16.

δυσδιάλυτοι IV. v. 10.

δύσελπις ILM. vii. 11.

δύσερις 11. vil. 13. TV. vi. 9. δυσέριδες
IV. vi. 2.

δύεκολος II, vii. 13. IV. vi. 9. δύσ-
κολοι IV. 6, 2. δυσκολώτεροι VITTI.
Vi. I.

δύσπειστοι VII. ix. 2.

δυσπραξίαι 1. xi. 6.

δυστυχῶν IX. xi. ς.
Vi. 2.

δυστυχημάτων 1. x. 3.

δυστυχίαι I.x.3. δυστυχίαις VIL. xiii. 3.
VITI.i.2. TX. xi. 1, 2.

δυσχεραίνει III. xi.8. IV. viii. 10. VIII.
xii. 2. [X.ix.6. δυσχεραίνουσι IIT.
vi. 11. δυσχεραίνων ΠῚ. i. 13. IV.
vi. 9. δυσχεραίνοντες IV. viii. 3. δυ-
σχεραῖνον X. ix 10. δυσχερανεῖ IV.
vi. 3, 7.

δυσχερῆ VIL.i.5. X.v. 10, δυσχερῶν
IX. iv. 9.

δωρεὰς IV. ii. 15.

δωρεῖται VIII. xiii. 7.

δώρημα I. ix. 2.

δωροδόκῳφ VIII. xiv. 4.

δώρου IV. ii. 18. δῶρα IV. ii. 15.

δυστυχοῦντι X.

E

ἐὰν II. v. 2, 3. vi. 4. ΠΙ. iii. 13. v. 8.
viii. 16. IV. i. 19, 25. iii. 7. vi 8.
vii. 5. V. i. 5, 6. iii. 9. iv. 2, 7. ν. 8.
viii. 11. ix. 3. VII. i. 5. vi. 1. ix. 3.
xiii. 3. xiv. 6. VIII. iii. 3, 4. iv. 1.
v. 1. vi. 6. vii. 4. viii. 3. xiii. 2. EX.
ii. 1, 5. iii. 3. viii. 9. xi. 3. X. iid 2.
Ve 3, 4

ἐάν ye IID. v. 14.

fap I. vii. 16.

éaréoy I. xiii. 14.

ἐᾷ V. xi. 2. ἐῶμεν V. vi. 5.

ἐγγίνονται IT. 1. 3. ἐγγίνεται IL. i. 2.

ὀγγύη V. ii. 3.

ἐγγνητὴς V. v. 14.

ἐγγὺς III. x. 7. V. xi. 7. VIL. vii. 2.
VIII. viii. 1. ἔγγιον IX. viii. 2. ἐγ'
γύτερον IT. viii. 7.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ἔγειρε III. viii. 10.

&yepow ITT, viii. 10.

ἐγκαλεῖ IX. i. 2. ἐγκαλοῦσι TX. viii. 1.
ἐγκαλέσει VILL. xiii. 8. ἐγκαλέσειεΙΧ.
iii. 1. é@yxadoly VIII. xiii. 2. éy-
καλεῖν LX. iti. 2. ἐγκαλῶν VILL. xiii.
4. ἐγκαλεῖται IV. i. 21.

ἐγκλήματα. 111. 6. VIII. xiii. 2,5, 11.
ὀγκλήμασι LX. i. 6, 7.

ἐγκληματικὴ VIII. xiii. 4.

ἐγκατέλιπε V. ii. 5.

ἐγκράτεια IV. ix. 8. VIL. i. 6. ii. 6, 7,
11. ili. 2. v. 9. Vi. §. Vii. 4. ix. 5,6.
xX. 3, 5. ἐγκρατείας VIL. i. 4. xiv. 9.
ἐγκράτειαν VII. i. 1. iv. 6. vii. 6.

ἐγκρατὴς III. it. 4. VI. i. 6. ii. 6. iii.
2. vii. 4. ix. 1, 2, §, 6. IX. viii. 6.
ἐγκρατοῦς I, xiii. 15, 17. ἐγκρατεῖ
VI. ix. 1, 2, 3. ἐγκρατῆ VIL. i. 6.
ili, 1. iv. 4. ¢yxparets VIL. iv. 1.
Vii. I.

ἐγκυκλίοις I. v. 6.

ἐγκώμια 1. xii. 6, 7.

ἐγχειροῦσι IIT. 111. 13.

ὀγκεχρωσμένον IT. iii. 8.

ἔγω IX. xi. 5.

ἐδωδῇ ITT. x. 7.

ἤθελεν LX. vi. 2.

ἐθίξεται IL. i. 2. ἐθισθείη ΤΙ. i. 2. IV.
1.31. €0lfpII. i. 2. ἐθίζοντες 11. i.
5. ἐθιζόμενοι 11. i. 7. ii. 9. ἐθίζεσθαι
11. i, 8. X. ix. 9. ἐθισθῆναι 111.
xii. 2. X. ix. 11. ἐθιζομένοις VII.
v. 3.

ἐθισμοῦ VII. x. 4. ἐθισμῷ I. vii. 21.
ἐθισμοὶ III. xii. 2.

ἔθνει I. ii. 8.

ἔθος VII. v. 4. xiv. 4. ἔθους I. i. 1, 3.
VII. v. 3. χ.4. ἔθει Χ. ix. 6. ἔθη VII.
v. I. ἔθεσι]. iv. 6. Χ. x. 6, 10, 23.

εἰώθασι II.vi. 9. VII. i. 3. VILL. vi. 6.

x. 1. IX. viii. 5.
εἰ V.v.6.ix.2. VI. iii. 2. WIL iii. 2,
9. Vi. I.

εἰ δὲ μὴ VIL. i. 5.

εἰ μὴ VI. vii. 4. xiii. 7. VII. xiii. 7.
VIII. iii. 9. iv. 2. xiv. 1, X. iii. 4, 12.
vi. 8. viii. 9.

εἴγε VII. ii. 4.

εἰδοποιὸν X. iv. 3.

εἶδος I. vi. 8, το. V. ii. 12. iii. 17. iv.
2. VL. viii.4,9. WIL. v. 9. vii. 3.
VIII. i. 7. vii. 1. x. 3. IX. viii. 6.
ΣΧ. iv. 1, 2, 4. v. 2. εἴδει VIII. 1. 7.
iii. 1.ν. 5. ΙΧ. ν. 3. X. iii. 10, 11,

XX111

13. iv. 3. v. 1, 2,8. εἴδη I. vi. 1.
VI. xiii. 2. VIL. i. 1. VILL. iii. 1. iv.
4,6.x.1. XK. iv. 3.

εἰδῶμεν 1. vi. 4. 11. ii. 1. εἰδὼς 1. vi. 16.
ID. iv. 3. Π|. i. 14. ix. 4. Vivir.
ViL 7. viii. 3, 8. ix. 9. xi. 2. VI. vii.
7. villi. 4. ὙΠ. i. 6. x. 3. IX. ii. 5.
X. ix. 15. εἴσεται IX. viii. 2. ἱδεῖν
Π.1. 4. VI ix. 4. VIL v.13. X.
vill. 10, dec TIT. i. 13. V. x. 5
εἰδείη VI. i. 2. vii. 7. ἴδωσι VI. vii.
§. εἰδότος II. ix. 2. X. ix. 17. εἰδότι
IIT. i. 20. WIII. viii. 6. εἰδότα V.
ix. 4, 6. VIL. iii. 14. εἰδόσι Χ. vii- 3.
εἰδότων VI. vii. 7. VIII. viii. 2. οἷδε
IX. xi. 3. εἰδῆσαι VIII. 11]. 8. εἰδυῖαι
VIII. viii. 3. εἰδείημεν IV. vii. 1.
εἰδέναι 1. 111. 7. xiii. 7. II. iv. 3. III.
i, 17. V. ix. 15. VL. vii. 3, 5. viii. 4.
xii. 2. VIL. iii. 3. x. 2. X. i. 4. iii
12. ix. 1, 19, εἰδότες ITI. v. 22. V.
viii. 3. VI. vii. 7. VII. iii. 1. ἔδοι
ΠῚ. x. 6. IV. viii. 6. VII. i. 31.
ἰδὼν IT. x. γ. εἰσόμεθα I. vi. 14.

εἴκε V. ν. 3.

εἴκαζον ΤΊ. vi. 14.

εἰκὸς VIII. iii. 8. ΙΧ. χ, 4. Χ. viii,
13.

εἰκότως 1. ix. 9. xiii. 13. IV. i 44. 1X.
i. 6, 7. Viii. 2, 10. xii. 1.

ἔοικε I. vii. 2, 12, 15. viii. 17. X. 10. xi.
3. 5. xi. 8. xiii. 11,15. III. i. 10, 12,
14. ii. 9, 17. iii. II, 15. iv. 5. V. 4. 7s
Vili, I, 10, 12, xi. 6. xii. 1,6. IV.
li. 5- iii. 1, 16, 35. iv. I, 4, 6. Vi. 4;
7. Vil. 10. ix. 1. VIL xii. 7. xiii, 1.
VIL. iii. 13. vi. 1. x. 3, 4. VIII. i. 3,
5. V. §. Vi. 2, 4. Vili. 3, 4. ix. 1. x. 6.
Xi. 5. Xili. 5, 11. xiv. 2. IX.i. 5,7.
iv. 1, 2. Vv. I, 3. Vii. I, 4, 6. ix. 2, 7,
9. x. 6. xi. 3. X. ii. 2, 5. iii, 13. iv. 1.
3. V. 7. Vi. 6. VIL 11, 13. ix. 19.
ἐοίκασι 1. v. 1, 5. vi. 7. Π].1. 6. VI.
xiii. 4. VII. ix. 3. VIII. v. 3. viii. 2.
ix. 4,5. xii. τ. X. i. 4. iii. 4. viii. 12.
ix. 20. ἐῴκει VIL. i. 3.

εἰλικρινοῦς X. vi. 4.

εἶναι VI. viii. 1. ΙΧ. xii. 2. ἐσμὲν ΙΧ.
vil. 4.ix.9. ὄντων Ν]. 1. 5. ἐσομέ.
vou VI. ii.6. ἔστω VL iii. τ. ἔσον-.
rau VI. vii. 4. ἐσόμενον X, ix. 11.
ἔμεναι VII. x. 4.

εἴπερ 1. vi. 5,6. vii. 10. viii. 13. ix. 5.
x. 3,14. ΠῚ. ix.3. IV. iii. 14. ix.
4. V.iv.7. vi. 6. vil. 4. ἰχ, 9. VIL

XX1V

i. σ. ii, 2. v. 3. xii. x. VII. vi. 3. vii.
7.ix. 5. xiii. 2,7. WII. ii. 3. xi. 1.
IX. viii. 7. ix. 5. X. iv. 3. vii. 9. viii.
3, 4. ix. 17, 19.

εἰρήνην X. vii. 6.

εἴρων IL. vii. 12. IV. vii. 3. εἴρωνα
IV. iii. 28. εἴρωνεφ IV. vii. 14.
εἰρωνεία II. vii. 12. εἰρωνείᾳ IV. vii.
16. εἰρωνείαν IV. iii. 28.
εἰρωνενόμενοι TV. vii. 16.

εἷς 1 vi. 5. V. iii. 14. VII. ii. 5. v. 4.
IX. iii. 3. vii. §. X. ix. 14. ἕν 1. vi.
3,7. 8, 12, 13. Vii. 3. viii. 7. IT. vi. 5.
III. xi. 3. IV. i. 5. iii. 9. V. ii. 12.
ili, 17. iv. I. V. 13, 15. Vii. 6. ix. 4.
VI. i. 5, 6. VII. iii. 9. VIII. i. 5, 7.
ii, 4. IX. x. 3. KX. ix. 15. μία I. vi,
4. vi. 16. Il. i. 2. viii. 8. V. vii. 5.
VI. vii. 4. VII. iii. 9. X. iii. 3. v.
11. ἐνὸς 1. vi. 12. X. ix. 12, 16.
μιᾶς 11. viii. τ. μιᾷ 1. vi. 3. VI. xiii.
6. ἑνὶ]. ii.8. Ii. 7. V. ii. 6. iii.
9. lv. ro. v. 11. ἔνα IV. i. 32. V. i.
13. VI. vii. 3. VIII. vi. 2. IX. x.
5. play Iii. 4. vi. 4, 9, 1. viii.
14. 11. viii. 7. WII. xiv. 8. IX.
viii. 9.

εἰσάπαξ IV. ii. 15.

εἰσαῦθις I. vii. 7.

εἰσφέρων LV. ii. 20.
iv. 2.

εἶτα 1. vii. 17. ΠῚ. i. 23. viii. 7. IV.
iii. 36. v. 8. V. v. 8. VIL. ii. 1. vi. 3.
xiii. 2. IX. i. 6. ii. 5. X. ix. 23.

εἴτε 111. iti. 4.ν. 19. IV.viii.1o. VIII.
ix. 5. Χ v. II. vii. ¥. ix. 11,17.

εἴτις VII. iv. 5. εἴτι X. ix. 22. εἴτῳ
X. v. 5, 10.

ἕκαστος I. iii. 5, IT. iii. 17. v. 17. vii,
5. VIII. ii. 2. vii. 6. xiii. 2. LX. iv,
3,4. Vi. 4. viii. 6. X. iv. 10. vii. 9.
ix. 13.15. ἑκάστη X. ix. 22. €xa-
στον I, iii. 4, 5. vi. 16. Vii. 5, 15. viii.
13. X. 7. Xi. 2, 4. xii. 2. I. ix. 7.
IIT. vii. 6. xii. 3. IV. i. 6, 17. vii. x.
V.i, 12. ii. 11. vii. 6, 7. ix. 16. VI.
Vii. 4. viii. 7. xi. 2. xii. 3. VII. iii.
9, 10. iv. 5, 6. xi. 1. χὶν. 9. VIII.
iii. r. vii. 2. IX. iv. 2. X. ii. τ. ix.
15. éxdorov I. vii. 11. IX. viii. 6.
X. v. 10. ix. 21. ἑκάστης I. vii. 1.
ITI. v. 23. VII. xii. 5. xiii. 2. ἑκά.
orn IV. iii. 14. ἑκάστην II. iv. 5.
V. ii. ro. vi. r, VIT. iv. 6. WITT. xi.
I. xili, τ. X. iv. 7. v. 2,6. ἕκαστοι

IV. vi. 8.
εἰσενεχθέντα V,

INDEX VERBORUM.

ΠῚ. iii. 7. IV. iii. 35. IX. xii 2. X
v. 2. ἑκάστῳ I. viii. το. I. ix.2
ITT. iv. 3, 4. v. το. IV. i. 6. VII. ἃ
2. iii. 6. v. 4. Vil. I. X. 6. xi. 4. IX
ix. 10. X. iv. 10. v. 8. vi. 5. Vil 9.
viii, i. ix. 14, 16. ἕκαστα 1. iii. 4, 7.
ΤΙ. ii. 4. vii. x. ix. 8. ILL i. 10,15,
20. iii. 16. iv. 4. V. 10, 12, 22. Vii
6. xii. 4. IV. iii. 15. v. 13. vi. §. vil
5. V. vii. 1, 6. VI. vii. 4, 7. Vii 2, 5.
xi. 3, 4. xii. 7. xiii. τ. VIL. iii 6, 9,
11. v. 1. vi. 5. IX. iv. §. X. v. 2.
ix. I, 20. ἑκάστων IIL. v. 7. IX. iv.
2. ἑκάστοις I. vii. 18. ILI. iv. 4, §.
IV. ii. 16. vi. 5,5. [X.i. 9. ii. 7, 9,
xii. 2. ἑκάστους 1. ii. 6. VILL ix. 3.
ἑκάστας I. vii. 22. X. ix. 23.

ἑκάτερος IT. viii. 3.111. x. 2. VILL. iii.
6, 8. v. 5. xiv. 1, 2. ΙΧ. vi. 2. éxd-
τερον ΤΊ. viii. 3. V. iii. 13. Vill. 3.
ix. 2. VI. i. 5,6. VII. vi. 7. IX. vi
2. ἑκατέρας II. vii. 16. V. v.- 19.
ἑκατέρου II. vi. 5. IV. vii. 6. VILi
6. xii. 4. VIII. iii. 9. xii. 7. éxd-
τέραι Χ. v.7. ἑκάτερα VL. xi. 7. X.
iv. 2. ἑκατέραν VII. i. 4. ἑκατέρῳ
VIIL iii. 8, 9. vii. 2. xiv. 2. éxdr-
epo LX. viii. 3.

ἑκατόμβοια V. ix. 7.

ἐκβολὰς III. i. 5.

ἐκγόνων I. x. 5. VIII. xi. 2. ἐκ γόνον:
I, x. 4.

ἐκδεχόμεθα IV. i. 5.

ἐκεῖ V. x. 5. WII. viii. 4. ἐκεῖσε IX.
iv. 9.

ἐκεῖνος I. iv. 7. IT. vii. 8. V. ii. 4.
VIL. iv. 4. viii. 4. VIII. vii. 6. ἐκ.
εἴνο II. ii. 3, 1Π|. 1.11. IX. iv. 4.
ἐκείνου J. x. 6. V.v.8. ix. 6. xi. 4
VIUIL. ii. 3. vii. 6. IX. iii. 2. iv. 1. v.
3. viii. 2. ἐκείνης VIL viii. 9. ix. 6.
xii. 8. xiii. 8. VII. vi. 7. XX. iv. 3
ἐκείνῳ V. v. 8. ix. 13. VII. iv. 2.
VIII. xii. 2. ΙΧ. i. 5. v. 3. ἐκείνῃ
VI. xiii. 8. VIII. x. 5. ἐκεῖνον VIIL
iv. 1. ἐκεῖνοι ITI. viii. 16. VIII. iv.
6. vili. 4. ἐκείνων 11. ix.6. IV. iii.
16,21. V. ii. 9. vii.6. VI. viii. 3.
VIL. iv. 4. VIII. ii. 3, 4, 6. v. §. xii.
2, 3. IX. iii. tix. 5. ἐκείνοις 1. xi.
ς. IV. iii. 26. VIII. xiii. το. CX. xi.
4. ἐκείνους IX, vii. 2. ἐκεῖνα 1. v.
8. V.iii.6. VII. iii. 3. xii. 3. ἐκείνην
V. iv. 3. κακεῖνα V. iii. 6.

ἐκθέουσι VII. vi. 1.

INDEX VERBORUM. XXV

ἐκκαγχάζουσι VII. vii. 6.

ἐκκρούουσι 111. xii. 7. ἐκκρούει VII.
xiv. 4. Χ, v. 4.

ἐκλέξασθαι X. ix. 20.

ἐκλογὴν X. ix. 20.

ἑκούσιος Ὗ. ii. 13. ἑκούσιον ITI. i. 6,13,
20. ii. 2, 16. ν. 4, 17, 19. xii. 2, 3.
V. iv. 14. v. 5. viii. 2, 3. ix. 1, 2, 8.
xi. 5, 7. ἑκουσίου IIT. ii. 1, 2. V. iv.
13. ἑκουσίῳ III, xii. 1. V. viii. 2.
éxovola ITT. i. 4, 6, ro. ii. 2, v. 6, 7.
xii. 4. V. ii. 13. ἐκούσιοι IIT. v. 1,
15,20,21, 22. ἑκουσίων V.viii.5. IX.
i. 9. ἑκουσίοις ILI. i. 1, 6, 10. IV.
ix.6. Ὕ. ἱν. 1. ἑκουσίως ITT. i. 22,
23. v.19. V.xi.6. IX. viii. 6.

ἐκπεσεῖν 11]. i. 17.

ἐκστατικὸς VII. i. 6. viii. §. ἐκστα-
rudy VII. ii. 7. ἐκστατικοὶ VII.
viii. 2.

ἐκτὸς I. viii. 2, 3, 6, 15. x. 3, 15. IL.

ix, 3. IL. i. 10, 11. IV. ili. 10, 35.

vit xiii. 2. X. viii. 4, II.

Ἕκτωρ ILI. viii. 2, 4. “Ἕκτορος VIT. i.
1. “Exropa IIL. viii. 2.

ἑκὼν ITT. i. 5, 6, 13. v. 4, 13, 14. IV.
ix. 6. V. viii. 1, 3, 11. ix. I, 4, δ, 6,
9. xi. 2,3. VI.v.7. VIL. x. 3. ἐκ-
ὄντες ΠΙ.γν. 14. V.ix.2. VIL. xiii.
3. ἑκόντι VILL. xiii. 9. ἑκοῦσαν V.
ix. 2. ἑκόντος V. ix. 5. ἑκόντα V.
ix. I, 4, 5,10. xi. 3. VIL. ii. 5. X.
ix. II.

ἐλάττων IV. iii. 25. ἔλαττον ΤΙ. vi. 4.
vii. 12. viii. 2. IV. vii. 9, 14. V.L
10. iii. I, 4, 14, 15, 16. iv. 6, 11, 13,
14. V. 17, 18. vi. 4. xi. 7. VIII. xiii.
4. xiv. 3. X. vii. 5. viii. 4. ἐλάττο-
yos V. iv.6,9. VII. viii. 2. ἐλάττο-
νιΎ. ἷν. 8. VII. xiii. 1. ἐλάττω Π.
ii. 6. IV. i. 18, 19. vii. 3,4. V. vii.
5. VI.i.2. VIII. ix. 2. IX. xi. 2.
ἐλαττόνων IV. i. 19. iil. 7, 17.

ἐλαττουμένῳ VIII. xiv. 3.

ἐλαττωτικὸς V, ix. 9. x. 8.

ἔλαφον IIT. x. 7.

ἐλαφροτέροις 1. xi. 3.

ἐλάχιστον IV. ii. 21. VIII. x. 3. A-
axlorov I. vii. 8. IV. ii. 9. ἐλάχιστα
11. ix. 4. ἐλαχίστοις V. iii. 4, 5,
8, 10.

ἐλεγχείην IIL. viii. 2.

ἐλέγχεν VIL. ii. 8.

*EXénp ΤΙ. ix. 6.

ἐλεῆσαι IT. v. 2. vi. το, III. v. 15.

VOL. IT.

ad

ἔλεος IIT. i. 16. ἐλέον 111. ἱ. 1. &

eov II. ν. 2.

ἕλει ILI. viii. 11.
ἐλευθερία X. viii. 4. ἐλευθερίαν. iii. 7.
ἐλευθέριος 11. viii. 2. IV.i. 1,6,12, 14,

23, 24, 26, 31. ii. 3, 10. ἐλευθερίου
IT. vii.6. IV.i. 7, 14,18. viii.5. X.
vi.4. ἐλευθερίῳ IV. viii. 5,7. WIT.
ix. 2. X. viii. 4. ἐλευθέριον I. viii.
12, IV.i. 19, 20.ii. το. Vz. vi. 4.
VITL. vi. 4. ἐλευθέριοι TH. vi. 4. IV.
1.10, 11, 35. ἐλευϑθέριοις I. viii. 12.
ἐλευθερίους X. vill. 7. ix. 2. ἐλευ-
Bepiwrépa VILL. xiii.6. ἐλευθεριώτερον
IV.i. 19. ἐλευθεριώτεροι IV. i. 20.
ἐλευθεριώταται ITT. x. 11.

ἐλευθεριότης IT. vii. 4. IV.i. 18. ii. 1.

iv. 1. ἐλευθεριότητος IV. i. 1, 24, 25
ti, 1, 10. ἐλευθεριότητι IV. 1. 44.
ἐλευθεριότητα I. xiii. 20. II. vii. 8.
vii. 5. IV. i. 10, 22.

ἕλκει VIL. vii. §. IX. iv. 9. ἕλκοι

VIII. viii. 6. ἑλκόμενος VIT. vi. 2.

ἑλκύσαι VII, vi. 2.
ἑλλέβορον V. ix. 15.
ἐλλείπειν 11. vi. 16. ἐλλείπει IT. vi. 5.

vii. 4, 15. 111. vii. το. IV. i. 20. iii.
12 V.x.6. ἐλλείπων IT. vii. 2, 8,
10, 13,14. IV. iii. 35. VIL. vii. 2,
5. ἐλλείποντες IL vii. 3. III. xi. 7.
ἐλλεῖχον I, vii. 17. VITIi.2. A-
λείποντα II. ii. 6. ἐλλείπουσι IT.
vii, 4. viii. 2. TL. vii. 12. IV. i. 38,
39. iii. 8. ἐλλείποντας 11. ix. 7. IV.
v. 13. ΙΧ. vig. ἐλλειφθὲν V. x. 5.

ἔλλειψις 1. iii. 7. I. vi. 10, 12, 14, 20

vii. 4, 6, 7, 10. viii. 6. IV. ii. 4. iv.
2, 4. V. 5. Vii. 15. viii. 2. V. v. 18.
ἐλλείψεως II. ii. 7. vi. 4, 9, 19, 20.
V. v.18. ΥἹ. 1. τ. ἐλλείψει IV. i.
38. ii. 21. ἔλλειψν IL. vi. 8, 15, 19.
viii. 1. ix. 1,9. ITI. x. 3. IV. v. 3,4.
V. v.10, ix. 17. VLi.r. ἐλλείψειϑ
II. vi. 18. viii. 2. IV. i. 3, 29. v. 14.
VIL. vii. 2.

ἔλλογα X. ii. 1.
ἐλπίζει IX. ii, 5. ἐλπίζουσι IX. iv. 9.
ἐλπίδα]. ix. το. VIII. viii. 2. LX. v. 3.

ἐλπίδες IX. iv. 5. X. 1, 7. ἐλπίδας
VIII. iii. 4.

ἔμβαλε III. viii. x.

ἐμβλέποντες X. iv. 9.

ἐμβρύοις I. xiii. 11.

ἐμμελὴς LV. viii. 1. ἐμμελέστερον IV.
vii. 9.

xxVl

dupedOs 1. x. 11. IV. iii. 21. viii. 3.
ΙΧ. x. 1.

éupeverixds VIT. i. 6. viii. 5.x. 3. ἐμ-
μενετικὸν VIL. ii. 7. ἐμμενετικοὶ VII.
ix. 2.

ἐμμένει VII. viii. 1. 1Χ. 1,5. x. 4. eu
μένων Ν Π. ii. 7. ix. 1,5. ἐμμένουσι
XII. vii. 8. ix. 4. ἐμμεῖναι ITM. i. το.
ἐνέμεινεν VIL. ix. 4. ἐμμενόντων VII.

X. 4.

᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς VIII. i.6. ᾿Εμπεδοκλέους
VIL. iii. 8, 13.

ἐμπειρία ILL, viii.6. X.ix.19. ἐμπει-
plas 11.1, τ. IL. viii. 7. VI. viii. 5,
6.xi1.6. X.ix.19. ἐμπειρίαν 111. vi.
11, VI. viii. 5. VIL. vi. 3 X. ix.
16. ἐμπειρίᾳ X. ix. 18.

ἔμπειρος . viii. §. ἔμπειροι VI. vii. 7.
X. ix. 20. ἐμπείρων VI. xi. 6. ἐμτεί-
ροις X, ix. 21.

éprodifecI.x.12, VIL. xi.§. ἐμποδίζηται
VOL. xiii. 2. ἐμποδιζομένη VIL. xiii. 2.

ἐμκοδιστικὴ VII. xiii. 2.

éurddcos VIT. xiii. 4. ἐμπόδιον VIL. xi.
4. ἐμπόδιοι ΙΧ. x. 2. ἐμποδίους X.
Vv. 3. ἐμπόδια X. viii. 5. ἐμποδίων
III. xi. 8.

ἐμποδὼν IV. vii. 16. V. v. 7.

ἐμποιοῦσα lV. v. το. ἐμποιοῦντα lV.
Vv. 2.

ἔμπροσθεν VIII. i. 7.

ἐμφαίνεσθαι 1. vi. 11.

ἐμφανέστατον 111. vii. 4.

ἐμφανίζειν X, iii. 11.

ἔμφρονα 1. x. 13.

ἐμψύχου IX. vii. 3. ἔμγνχον V. iv. 7.
vi. 7. VIII. xi. 6.

ἐναλλὰξ V. iii. 11.

ἐναντίος IIT. vii. 11. VII. viii. 4. 5.
ἐναντία 1. xiii. 15. II. viii. 5, 8. III.
iv. 3. IV. i. 24. V.i.4,5,19. VIL.
i. 1. lil, 10. iv. 5. xiv. 2, 6, ἐναντίου
I. x. 9. 11. ix. 3. VILL. viii. 7. Χ. fi.
2,5. ἐναντίας 1. χ, 4. IV. νἱ. 2. V.
i. 5. VIO. iii. 10. ix. 5. VIII. i. 6.
Χ. 2. X.i.2. ἐναντίον I. xi. 5. xiii.
15. II. iii. 6. viii. 7. ix. 5. IV. i. 44.
V.iv. 6. VI. ii. 4. VIL. ix. 5. xiii. 1.
xiv. 2,4. VIII. viii. 7.x. 2. X. ii. 2.
ἐναντίαι 1. x. 9. II. viii. τ. IV. i. 24.
VIL. xiv. 2. ἐναντίων I. vi. 8. IL. iii.
9. III. iii. 4. V.i. 4. VILL. viii. 6.
ἐναντιώτερα II. viii. 7, 8. ἐναντίοις
VII. xii. 2.

ἐναντιότης 11. viii. 4.

INDEX VERBORUM.

évayriobrac III. ii. 5. ἐναντιοῦσθαι IIT.
xiii. 7. ἐναντιοῦνται X.ix.10. ἔνα»-
τιουμένους K. ix. 12. ἐναντιούμενον
I. xiii. 16.

ἐναντίως II. vii. 4. V. iv. 6. VII.
xiv. 2.

ἐναντίωσις LV. vi. 7.

ἐναργῶν]. ἵν. 3. ἐναργέστερον I. vii. 9.

ἐναργῶς VIL ii.2. X. iii. 2. viii. 10.

ἐνδεὴς ILI. xi. τ. VIII. viii. 6. xiv. 1.
IX. ix. το. X. iv. 1, 2. vi. 2. ἐνδεὲς
L. vi. 15. ἐνδεοῦς VIL xiv. 4. ἐνδεᾶ
I. vii. 7. ἐνδεεῖς VILL v. 3. X. iii. 6.
ἐνδεέσι VILL. xiv. 1. ἐνδεεῖ VIII.
xiv. 2.

ἔνδεια IT. viii. 6. ἐνδείας I. ii. 6. OI.
xi. 3. [IV.i. 20. VIL.iv. 4. ΝΊΠ. xiv.
2. ἔνδειαι Χ. ili. 7. ἔνδειαν X, iii. 6.

ἐνδείκνυσθαι 1. iii. 4.

ἐνδέχεται 1. viii. 9. ix. 11. x. 4. I. iv.
2. V. v.15. Vii. 4. Vili. 3. ix. 3, 4, 9.
xix. VI. ii. 6. iii. 1. v. 3. vi. 2. xii.
6. VIL. iii. 14. x. 1. xiii. 7. VIII. iv.
2. vi. 2, 3. IX. iii. 4. viii. το. X. iii.
4. vii. 8. viii. 9, 11. ix. 6. ἐνδέχοιτο
V. ix. 4. ἐνδέχονται VIL i 5. v. 3.
ἐνδέχεσθαι 1. v. 6. VI. iti, 2. VIL i.
ἡ. xi. 3. IX. x. 5. ΣΧ. iv. 4. ἐνδέ.
xnrac VILL. viii. 3. IX. if. 1, το.
ἐνδεχόμενον IX. i. 7. ἐνδεχόμενα VI
i. 5. iii. 1. vi 1, 2. VIL xiv. 3. IX.
vi. 2. ἐνδεχομένου VII. ii. 6. iv. 1,
6. v. 8. xi. 4. ἐνδεχομένων V. vii. 4.
VI. i. 6. iv. 4. ν. 3.

ἐνδεούσης VII. xii. 2.

ἔνδοξοι 1. viii. 7. ἐνδόξοις TV. ii. 14.
ἐνδόξων IV. vii. 2. ἔνδοξα IV. vii. 14.
VIL. i. 5.

ἐνεῖναι VII. xiv. 18. ἐνῇ VIL. iii. το.
ἐνοῦσα ὙΠ. iii. 10. ἐνούσης: VIL
ii. I.

᾿νδυμίωνα X. viii. 7.

ἕνεκα I. vii. τ. IL. ii. 2. vi. τ. vib. 11.
ix, 2. III. i. 16, 18. iii. 15. vii. 2, 5,
6. viii. 12. ix. 3. IV.i. 12, 14, 20, 35,
40, 43. ii. 6, 20. 11. 15. vi. 8. vii. 5,
10, 11,14. V.ii. 4. Viil. 3,6. WI. ii.
4 5. ν. 6. xi. 4. xil. 1, 7, 8. xiii. 8.
VI. viii. 4. x. 3. xiii. 7. VILL. i. 3.
6. iv. 4. ν. 5. Vii. 6. ix. 5. DXi. 3,
iv. 1, 3. vii. 2. viii. 1,2, 9. X. ii. 2.
vi. 6. vii. 6.

ἕνεκεν VII. xii. 1.
ἐνέργεια I. vii. 14, 15. viii. 8. ix. 7.
* xiii, x. 1Π|. xii. 7. VID. xii. 2, 3.

INDEX VERBORUM.

xiii. 2,7. X. xiv. 8, ΙΧ. vii. 6. ix. ς,
6. xil. 1. X. iv. §, 9. v. 6. vi. §. vii.
I, 2, 7, 8. viii. 7. ἐνεργείας 1. i. 5.
viii. 2. ix. 9.x. το. IL. i. 4, 8. III.
vii. 6. VII. xii. 6. X. iv. 10, 11. v. 1,
3, 5. Vi. 6. viii. 4, 5, 8. ἐνεργείᾳ I.
viti. 9. IX. vii. 4. ix. 7. X. iv. 8, 9.
Vv. 2, 5. ἐνέργειαν I. vii. 13, 14. viii.
9. X. 2. xili. 6. VII. xii. 3. VIII. v.
1, IX. vii. 6. ix. 7. X. iv. 6, 8, 11.
Vv. 2, 3, 6, 8. vi. 2, 3, 7. Vii. 7. ἐν-
ἔέργειαι 1. i. 2. viii. 3. x. 9, 13. IL. ii.
8. 1Π..ν. 1, το. VII. xii. 2. xiii. 2,
7. DL iiii.v. 7,11. vi. 4. vii. 6.
Vili, 1. ἐνεργειῶν Ii. 2. Ii. 7, X.
v. 6, 11. vi. 2. vii. 3. ἐνεργείαις I. viii.
14.x.12. IV. ii. 6. X. v. 3, 6. vi. 8.

ἐνεργεῖ IT. iii. 3. VIL. iii. 6, το. X. iv.
9,10. ἐνεργῇ X. iv. 7. v. 4. ἐνερ-
yew I. xiti. 12. ΤΠ. v. 12. ix. 5. VI.
xii. §. VIlI.v.1. [X.ix. 5. X. iii. 4.
iv. 5, 9. V. 4. Vili. 7. ἐνεργοῦντα I.
X.15. ἐνεργῶνγΥ. ii. 2. X. viii. 13.
ἐνεργοῦντες III. v. τ΄. TX. xii. 3. X.
V. 2. Vili. 10. ix. 18. ἐνεργοῦμεν IX.
Ix. 9. ἐνεργούσης X. iv. §. ἐνεργή-
σαντες IT. i. 4.

ἔνθα VIL. iii. 9.

ἐνθάδε V. vii. 2.

ἔνθεν VI. v. 5.

ἐνιαυτὸν IX. viii. 9.

ἐνιαχοῦ TX. i. 8.

ἔνιοι 1. iv. 3. viii. 17. IL. ii. 14. vi. 4.
IV. i. 39. I. iv. 7. ix. 2. VI. vii. 7.
VIL. iii. 3, 4. vii. 8. VIDLi.5. X.
ix.16. ἔνιαι VII. vii. 2. xi. 3. xii. 1.
xiii. 2. VIII. viii. 3. ix. 5. ἐνίων 1.
viii. 16. IDI. iii. 1. V. x. 4. VI. vi.
x. VIL. xiii. 2. ἐνίοια II. viii. 5. 1Π.
i. 7. v.15. xi. 4. V. vii. 2. VIL. iii.
7.v. 3. VILL. xiii. 6. ΤΧ. 1. 6. ἔνια
I, xiii. 9. Π. vi. 18. III. i. 8. vi. 3.
xi.2. IV. viii.9,10. VI. vii. 4. xi.
1. VIL. i. 3. iii. 7. iv. 5. v. 1, 6. xi
5. xii. 4. Χ. iv. 9. viii. 2.

éviore 111. i. 1,7,9,16. IV. i. 3, 35,
38. v. 13. vil. 15. VIL v. 7. x. 2.

_ VILL. ii. 2, 4. iv. 1. viii. 6. x. 5. IX.
i. 2, 5. xi. 6.

ἐνιστάμενοι Χ. ii. 4.

ἐνισχύες X. ix. 14.

évveaBoluw V. ix. 7.

ἐννοεῖν IX, vi. 2.

ἔννοια 1X. xi. 2. ἔννοιαν IX. xi. 5. X.
vii. 1. ix. 4.

XXVli

ἔνοχος VIT. ii. το.

ἐνταῦθα IV. ii. 17. iv. 6. viii. 1. VI.
Vil. 1,7. xiii. 1. VIL. iv. 6. vi. 2.
viii. 4. VIII. viii.6.x.6. IX. i.2. xi. 1.

ἐντεῦθεν V. iii. 6. VI. iii. 2. x. 4. VII.
x.4. X. viii. 7.

ἔντιμοι ITT. viii. 1. ἔντιμα IV. iii. 27,
ἐντίμοις IV. iii. 36. ἐντιμότερον IV.
iii. 19. ἐντιμοτάτας I. ii. 6. ἐντιμό-
τατα IV. ii. 15.

ἐντυγχάνουσι IV. vi. 1. ἐντυγχάνοντες
IX. x. 6. ἐντύχωσι 1Π. iii. 13.

ἐνυπάρχειν VIIL i, 3. ἐνυπάρχουσα X.
iv. 8.

ἐξ I. vi. 6, 7.

ἐξαγωγῆς V. v. 13.

ἐξαίφνης IIT. ii. 2. viii. 15.

ἐξακριβοῖ X. v. 5. ἐξακριβοῦν 1. vi. 13.
xiL 7. xiii, 8, ἐξακριβοῦσι X. v. 2.
ἐξακριβοῦσθαι X. ix. 15.

ἐξαμελουμένων X. ix. 14. ἐξημέληται
X. ix. 13.

ἐξηργηκότι I. viii. 9.

ἐξεῖναι VITI. xiv. 4.
VILL. xiii. ro.

ἐξελαύνει VIL. xiv. 6. ἐξελαύνουσι VIII.
i. 4. ἐξελαυνόμενα III. viii. 12.

ἐξελέγχονται IV. iii. 36.

ἐξετάζει IX. vi. 4. ἐξετάζειν 1. iv. 4.

ἐξῆς Π. vii. 9. IV. i. 1.

ἕξις IT. iil. 5. vi. 1, 3, 15. Vil. 13. ix. 9.
IV. ii. 6. iv. §. v. 1, 4. vii. 12. V. i.
4, 5,20. x. 8. VI. i. 6. ii. 2, 6. iii.
4, iv. 2, 3, 6. v. 8. viii. 1. xii. το.
xiii. 2, 4, 5. VIL. i. 2. ii. 6. viii. 5.
ΧΙΪ, 2. xiii, 6. X. iv. 8. vi.2. ἕξεως
Ill. v.17. viii. 15. IV. ii. 4. v. 14.
ix, 2. VI. ii. 4. iv. 2. v. 8. xii. 1.
VOT. x. 4. xii. 2, 3. xiii. 2, VIII. v.
5. X.ix.2r. eel. viti.g. IV. i.
19. vill. §.ix. 1. WHI. v. 5. ἕξω I.
Vili. 9. xiii. 20. III. iv. 4. vii. 6.
viii. 15. IV. iii. 2. vi. 4. vii. 7. V.
i. 3. VI. v. 4, 6. xiii. 4. VIL. iii. 7.
xu. 2. ΝΙΠ. v.1, 5. vi. 5. ἕξεις I.
1.7, 8. ii. 2. v. 1, 2, 6. viii. 2, III.
Υ. 12,21, 22. IV. ii. 22. v. 15. vi. 3.
V.i.§. VI. i. 3. xi. 2. xii. 1. xiii. 1.
VII. v. 1. vii. 3. ix. 5. x. 5. xii. 1.
X. ix. 21. ἕξεων 1. xiii. 20. IL. iii
1. III. v. 20, 22. V.i.4. VII. i. 4.
xiv. 2.

ἐξίστησι 111. xii. 2,3. ἐξίσταται VII.
ix. 1. éornxe VII. vi. 6.

ἐξὸν VILL xiii. 3.

ἐξῆν III. v. 14.

XXV111

ἐξορίζειν X. ix. 18.

ἐξουσία VIII. x. 6. xiv. 4. ἐξουσίαις: I.
v. 3. ὙΠ]. vi. ς. vill. 2. ἐξουσίας
Χ. viil. 4.

ἔξω ΤΠ. i. τι. VI. iii. 2. v. 5.

ἔξωθεν LIT. i. 3, 12. V. viii. 7.

ἐξωτερικοῖς I. xiii. 9. VI. iv. 2

ἐπαγγελιῶν IX, i. 6.

ἐπάγγελλοι X. ix. 20. ἐπαγγέλλονται
X. ix. 18. ἐπαγγελλόμενος IX. 1. 2, 4.

ἐπαγωγὴ V1. iii. 3. ἐπαγωγῆς. iii. 3.
éwaywyy I. vii. 21.

éwaveruxds IV, iii. 31.

ἐπαινετὸς lV. vii. 6,8. VIL. 11. 7. ἐπαι-
very IL. ix. 9. IV. v. 14. vi. 3. VI.
xii. 9. ἐπαινετὸν 1. xii. 2. II. vii.
11. ix. 2. IV. vii. 6. V.x.1. IX.
viii. 10. éraweral X.v. 6. ἐπαινε-
rots IX. viii. 11. ἐπκαινετῶν 1. xii. 1,
5. VIL. 1.6. éwawerdsI. xiti. 20.
ἐπαινετὰ 11. vii. 11. ἐπαινετωτάτη
VIII. i. 1.

ἐπαινεῖ 1. xii. 4. ἐπαινοῦσι 1X. viii. 7.
X. iii. rz. @wawoduer I. xii. 2. xiii.
15, 20. II. vii. 8. ix. 7. IV. iv. 4. v.
13. ἰχ. 2. V.x.4r. VIIL i. 3, 5.
ἐπαινοῦντες IV. iv.4.vi.1. V.x.1.
VIL. iv. 5. éwaw fra: IV. 111. 31. ἐπαι-
γεῖσθαι I. xii. 2, 5. ἑπαισούμεθα IT.
Vv. 3,5. ἐπανεῖται II. v. 3. vi. 12.
vil. 14. IL. ii. 13. ix. 2. [V.i. 1.
iv. 5. v. 3. ἐπαινοῦνται IIT.i.7. IV.
i. το. ἐπαινουμένων VIII. viii. 4.
ἐπαινέσειε ΤΥ. ix. 3.

Exawos J. xii. 4, 6. IV. i. 8. vil. 13.
X. viii. 7. ἔπαινοι IIT. i. 9. ἐπαίνων
I. xii. 3. ΠΙ. i. 1. ἐπαινοὺς I. xii. 3.

ἐπακολουθεῖν I.x.9. ἐπακολουθῇσαι 1.
vi. 7.

ἑπακουσομένων X. ix. 10,

ἐπὰν V. iv. 10,

ἐπαναγκάζοντας IX. vi. 4.

éwavagopa V. ii. 5.

ἐπανέλθωμεν I. vii. 1.

ἐπανισοῖ V. iv. 8 VILL. xiv. 3.

ἐπανιτέον 1. x. 6.

ἐπανόρθωμα V. vii. 7. x. 3, 6.

ἐπανόρθωσω IX. iii. 3.

ἐπανορθωτικὸν V. iv. 6.

ἐπανορθοῦν V. x. 5.

ἐπαρκεῖ VIII. xiii. 11. ἐπαρκοῦσι VITI.
xii. 7. ἐπαρκέσαι X. ix. 16. . éwap-
κεῖν 1V.i.17. VILL. xiii. 4. xiv. 1, 4.
IX. ii. 8.

ἐπαχθὴς X. ix. 12

INDEX VERBORUM.

ἐπεὶ I. vi. 3, 4. Vii. 3. xii. x. IL ii. i
v. I. vii. 16, ix. 4. ΠῚ. i. 13. viil.
11. IV.i. 31. Vii. 9, 12. ii. 9. Hib
I, 3. Vi. 1, 6. Vii. 5. ix. 3, 11, 15.
VL. i. 1. iv. 3, 5. Vi. I. vill. 6. ix. 3,
4. VILi. 3: iii. 5, 6, 13:0} 3 ΕἼ:
I. Vi. 2. Vii. 2, Vili. 4. ix. 2, 5, 6
xii 1, 2, 4, 5, 7. xiii. 3, 6. xiv. 3, 8.
VIIL iv. 4. IX. ii. 7. iv. 7. ΣΧ. τ. 5.

ἐπειδὰν I. x. 2, 12. [X. i. 3, 5. X.1V. 7-

ἐπειδὴ I. iii. 6. iv. τ. vii. 6. X. 15. Xai
14. ΠΙ. ii. 16. VI. ii. 2. xii. το. EX.
ix. 4. X. vi. 1. ix. 9.

ἐπεισάκτου ΙΧ. ix. 5.

éxeralliv.3. WI. xii. 5. VIL iii. 2.

ἐπεκτείνονται 1. vii. 7.

ἐπελθεῖν IV, vii. 1. X. ix. 23. ἐπέλ-
θωμεν X. i. 4.

ἐπερωτᾷν Χ. ii. 2.

ἐπήβολος I. x.14. ἐπήβολοι I. viii. 9.

éxndparo VILLI. xii. 11.

ἐφ᾽ ὦν V. iv. 12. ἐφ᾽ 6 V. v. 8. ΙΧ.
Vili. 9.

ἐπιβάτην II. vi. 2.

ἐπιβλέψειε VIL. iii. 9.

ἐπιβούλευσας V. viii. το.

ἐπιβουλος VIL. vi. 3. x. 3. ἐπιβουλότεροι
VIL. vi. 3.

ἐπιγινόμενον X. iv. 8. éxrcywouerye 11.
ili. I.

ἐπίγραμμα 1. vill. 14.

ἐπιδεικνύμενος IV. ii. 20

ἐπιδέξιος IV. viii. το. ΙΧ. xi. 3. ἐπι-
δεξίου IV. viii. 5.

ἐπιδεξιότης IV. viii. 5.

ἐπιδέχεται I. iii. 4. VIII. 1. 7.
ἐπιδήλως VIL. 111. 7.

ἐπιδιδόασι X. ν. 2.

ἐπιδικάζονται IT, vii. 8.

ἐπίδοσις IL. viii. 8. ἐπιδόσεις 1. vii. 17.

ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν VIL. i. 3.

ἐπιείκεια V. x. 1,8. ἐπιεικείας . x. 1.
ἐπιεικείᾳ X. v.6. ἐπιείκειαν IV. 1. 39.
ΙΧ. v. 4.

ἐπιεικὴς III. vi. 3. vii. 8. IV. ix. 6. V.
iv. 3. ix.9. x. 8. VIL. x. 3. xiv. 8.
VIII. vii. 2. xiv. 4. ΙΧ. viii. 1, 6, 8.
xii, 3. X.v. 6. ἐπιεικοὺς IV. ix. 4.
V.x. 1,6. VI. xi. 1. ἐπιεικὲς IV. ix.

7 V.x. 1, 2,3 8 xr. ΧΟ, τ᾿
ix. 12. ἐπιεικεῖ IV. i. 24. viii 5.

IX. ii. 5. iv. 2, 5. ix. 7. ἐπιεικῇ IV.
vi. 4. ix. 6. V.iv. 3. VI. xi. 1, 2.
IX. iv. 10. x. 6. X. vill. 10. ix. 11.
ἐπιεικεῖς VILI. ii. 4. iv. 2. xi. 5. xii

INDEX VERBORUM.

y. IX. iv. 7. vi. 2. ἰχ. 5. xix X.
ix. 3, 5, 14. ἐπιεικῶν I. xiii. 13.
VIIL viii. 2. ΙΧ. ix. 3. xii. 3. X. v.
ΣΙ. ἰχ. 10. éreeecxéo LI. v. 3, VIII.
xii. 6. ΙΧ, vi. 3. X. vi. 4. ix. 11.
ἐπιεικέστερος IX. iii. 4. ἐπιεικέστερον
Vix. τ. ἐπιικεστάτων VIL x. 3.

ἐπιζητεῖ VILL. xiv. 4. ἐπιζητεῖν 1. iii. 4.
wi. 15. vil. 18. éwefyrodcac I. vi. 15.
ἐπιζητοῦσι]. vii. 19. VIIL.i.6. ἐπι-
ζητεῖται LX. vii. τ. ix. 2. X. ii. 4. vi. 3.
ἐπιζητούμενον I. x. 6. ἐπιζητοῦνται
IX. xi. 1. ἐκιζητητέον I. iii. 1.

ἐπίθετοι III. xi. 1.

ἐπιθυμεῖ IIT. xi. 1. xii. 9. ἐπιθυμεῖν
IM. i. 24. ὙΠ. iv. 4,5. ἐπιθυμῆσαι
11. vi. 10. ἐπιθυμῇ LX. v. 3. ἐκιθυ-
povor IV.i. 34. ΙΧ. iv. 8. ἐπιθυμῶν
II. ii. 4. xi. 6. VIL. iv. 4. v. 7. vii. 3.
ἐπιθυμοῦντι 171. xii. 4.

ἐπιθυμήματα TIL. x. 6. ἐπιθυμὴ
ΠῚ. x. 5.

ἐπιθυμητικὸν 1. xiii. 8. III. xii. 8, 9.

ἐπιθυμία ILI. ii. 3, 5. xi. 3, 6. xii. 6.
VIL. iii. 10, 11. iv. 4. Vi. I, 3. ἐπι-
θυμίας ΤΙ. i. 7. VIL. ii. 4, 6. vi. I, 5.
vii. 1, 3. ix. 2, 6. xii. 2,7. X. viii. 7.
ἐπιθυμίαν II. v. 2. I. i. 21, 23, 25.
ii. 3. viii. 11. xii. 6. V. ii. 4. VIL.
vi. 4. Vii. 2. ix. 2. ἐκιθυμίᾳ IIT. ii. 3.
ἐπιθυμίαι VII. i. 6. ii. 6. iii. 7. X.v.6.
ἐπιθυμίαις III. xi. 3. VII. vi. 2. xii. 2.
IX. viii. 4.

ἐπικαλούμενος VII. iv. 5.

ἐπίκληροι VIII. x. 5.

ἐπικουρία VILL. xiii. 11. xiv. 2,4. EX.
xi. 3. ὀπικουρίας IX. xi. 1.

ἐπιλανθάνονται IX. iv. 9.

ἐπιλέγει IL vi. 9.

ἐπιλείπει IV. i. 30, 34. ᾿

ἐπιληττικοῖς VIL. viii. 1. ἐπιληπτικὰς
VII. v. 6.

ἐπίλυτον III. i. 13. ix. 2.
ἐπιλύτον 11]. ii. 5.

ἐπιμέλεια X. viii. 13. 1Χ. 17. ἐπιμελείας
I.ix.4. IV.i. 36. X. ix. 9,15, 17.
ἐπιμέλειαν 1. ix. 8. XX. 1x. 13, 14.
ἐπιμέλειαι X. ix. 14. ἐπιμελείαις VI.
i. 2.

ἐπιμελεῖται VILL. xi. 1. ἐπιμελουμένου:
Χ. viii. 13. ἐπιμεληθείη X. ix. 16.
ἐπιμεληθῆναι III. v. 9. Χ. ix. 16.
ἐπιμελούμενον IV. i. 21. ἐκιμελοῦνται
ΙΧ. vii. 1.

ἐπιμελὲς ΙΧ. vii. 1.

ΤΩΡ

X. ν. 5.

ΧΧῚΧ

ἐπιμελῶς 11. iv. 6.

ἑἐπυόσοις ITT. iv. 4.

ἐπιπειθὲς I. vii. 13.

ἐπιπίνεω VIL ii. 10,
ἐπιπολάζοντος LV .viil. 4. ἐπιπολαζούσαΞ
I. iv. 4.

ἐπιπολαιότερον I. v. 4.

ἐπιπολαίως IX. v. 2.

ἐπιπολὺ 111. iii. 10. IV. i. 37.
ἐπίπονον IX.x.2. ἐπίπονα IIL, vi. 13.
ἐπιπονώτερα LX. vii. 7.

ἐπιπόνως ΙΧ. vii. 7.

ἐπισκεπτέον, vii. 7. xiii. 1,5. V.vii. 7.
VI. xiv. 1. VIII. xiii. 9. X. ix. 18.
ἐπισκεψώμεθα]. xii τ. VIILi.7. ére
σκέψασθαι]. vi. 1. VII. xi. 2. X. ix.
22.

ἐπίσκεψω I. v. 7.

ἐπισκοπεῖν I. vi. 16. ἐπισκοποῦντι IV.
ili. 15. ἐπισκοποῦσι III. i. 1. iii. 11.
ΙΧ. ix. 7.

ἐπιστάμεθα VI. iii. 2. ἐπιστάσθαι 11].
v.8. VII. iti. 5,13. IX.i 5. ἐπί-
oraprac VIL. iii. 4. IX. 1.7. ἐπι
στάμενον VIL. ii. 1. iii. 4. ἐπιστήσασι
VI. xii. 8. ἐπίσταται VI. iii. 4.

ἐπιστήμη. vi. 4. 11.νἱ.9. V.i.4. VI.
i. 2. iii. I, 2, 3 4. ν. 3. Vi. I, 2. Vii.
3,9. ix. 1, 2. VIL ii. 4. iii. 4. ἐπι-
orhuns VI. iii. 4. vii. i. ix. 3. VII,
ii. 1, 3. 111. 8, 14. ἐπιστήμῃ VI. x. 1.
4. VIL. iii. 5. ἐπιστήμην ITT. viii. 6.
VI. iii. 4. vi. 2. VII. ii. 3. iii. 3, 6,
ἡ. Xili. 2. ἐπιστήμαι X. ix 15, 16.
ἐπιστημῶν I. i. 3, 5. ii. 3, 6, 7. X. 9.
ΠῚ. iii. 8. V. i. 4. VI. vii. 2.x. 1.
X. ix. 18. ἐπιστήμαις 1. vi. 15. ἐπι-
στήμας ILI. iii. 9. VI. xiii. 5.

ἐπιστημονικὸν VI.i.6. VIL. iii. 13.

ἐπιστήμων Il, vi. 8. VIL iii. 12. ἐπι-
στήμονι IV. ii. 5.

ἐπιστητὸν VI. iii. 2,3. Vi. i. ἐπιστητοῖ
VI. vi. 1.

ἐπισφαλέστερα VILL i. 1.

ἐπίταγμα VII. vi. 1.

ἐκιτακτικὴ VI. x. 2.

ἐπιτάττει VI. xii. 3. xiii. 8. ἐπιτάξαντος
V.ix. 11. ἐπσιταχθὲν 11. vi. 5.

ἐπιτείνει VI. i. 1.

ἐπιτελεῖ 11. vi. 9. IX. i. 2. ΣΧ, viii. 4.
ἐπιτελοῦσι TX. i. 6. ἐπιτελεῖται X,
ix. 20. ἐπιτελουμένου ILI. iii. 11.

éxcrepweis IX. iv. 5.

ἐπιτηδεύειν X. ix. 9.

πιτηδεύματα Χ. ix. 8. ἐπιτηδευμάτων

XXX

IV. iii. 35. X. ix. 13,14. ἐπιτηδεύ-
μασι X. ix. τι.

ἐπιτιθέναι X. ix. 10.

ἐπιτιμᾷ ID v.15. ἐπιτιμήσαι111.ν.1ς.
ἐπιτιμῶσι LX. viii. 1. ἐπιτιμῶνται II.
v. 16. éwirysiperacibid. ἐπιτιμῶμεν
ΠῚ. v. 15.

ἐπιτίμησις I. xiii. 18.

ἐπιτίμια IIT. v. 8. viii. 1.

éxsrowond V.i. 6. VIEL xi. 5. IX. ii. 3.
ἐπιτοπλέον V. xX. 4.

ἐπιτρέπειν VITI. viii. 5. IX. i. 5. ἐπι-
τρέψαι]. ix. 6. érirpépecar VI. vii. 4.
éwirpéparrosIX. 1.9. ἐπετράφθηϊχ.
i. 9.

ἐπιτυχεῖν IT. vi. 14. ἐπιτύχωσω VII.
ii. 8. ἐπιτευξόμεθα 1. vi. 4.

ἐπιφανὲς IV. v. 1.

ἐπιφανῶς IV, ili. 36.

ἐπιφέρει I. x. 12. IIL. vi. το. ἐπιφέροι
X. ili. 2. ἐπιφέρουσι IV. ii. 22. ἐπι-
φέρομεν LV. i. 3. ἐπιφέροντες VI. xi. 2.
ἐπιφευκτὸν VILL. xiv. 4.

ἐπιχαιρεκακία ΤΠ. vi. 18. ἐπιχαιρεκακίας
I. vii. 15.

ἐπιχαιρέκακος I]. vii. 15.

᾿Επίχαρμος LX. vii. 1.

ἐπιχειρῶν IV. 11. 13. ἐπιχειροῦσι TV.
iii. 36.

ἕπεται 11. iii. 3. v. 2. ID. ii. IV.
8,12, 24. ΙΧ. vii. 7. X. i 1. iii.
12. iv. 9. ἕποιτο VII. i. 1. ἕτον-
ται X. vi. 11. ἕπεσθαι IX. viii. 2.
ἑπόμενος IX. vili. 7. ἑπόμενον IX.
xii. 4. ὁπόμεναι IV. i. 24. ἑπομένοις
Lv. 7. ἑπομένη I. vii. 12. ἑπόμενα
I, vii. 21.

ἐπονείδιστος TIL. x. 10. ἑπονείδιστον
ΠῚ. xii. 2. ἑπονειδίστονε X. iii. 8.
ἔπη VIL. iii. 8.

etme VIII. xi. 1. εἴπ VII. Υἱ τ. εἴποι.
μεν VIL. iv. 4. εἴποι]. viii. 12. IV.
viii. 10. V.iv. 9.x. § VI. i. 2.
Vil. v. 4. VII. ii. 4. εἴπομεν L
viii. 13, 15, 17. ix. 9. Χ. 9, 13. Xl

4. xiii. 17. If. ii. 3. iii. 5.

IV. ii. 6. iv. 4. LX. iii. 1. v.
X. vi. 2. εἰπεῖν V. iv. 5. ix. 8

4. Vi.1. 2. VII. xiv. 3. VII. viii.
5. IX. iv. 5. vi. 3. X. vi. 6. viii. 5.
εἴσχωμεν ILI. v. 23: IV. vii. 1, 6. ix,
8. edxoev VI. vii. 4. ὙΠ. iv. 6.
εἴτων V. ii. 2.%.5. XK. viii. 11.
εἴποντι I. iv. 7. εἴποντες IV. viii. 3.
VL i 4. xiii. 3.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ἐρανιστῶν VITI.ix.6. ἐρανιστὰς IV. ii.
20.

ἐραστὴς LX. i. 2. ἐραστοῦ VILL. iv. 1.
ἐραστῇ ἰυϊὰ. ἐραστὴν VILL. viii. 6. IX.
i. 3. ἐρασταὶ VILLI. viii. 6.

ἐρᾷ 1. viii. 14. IX. v. 3. ἐρᾶν VIII.
i. 6. vi. 2. ΙΧ. v. 3. x. 5. ἐρώμενος
IX. i. 2. ἐρωμένῳ VILL iv. 1. ἐρώ-
μενον VIII. viii. 6. IX. i. 3. ἐρῶσι
ΙΧ. xii. 1.

ἐργάζονται II. vi. 10. ἐργαζόμενοι IV.

i. 40.

ἐργασίαν VIII. ix. 5. ἐργασίας IV. i.
40.

ἔργον. vii. 10, 11, 14, 19. IL vi. 2, 3,
9. ix. 2. IV. ii. 6, ro. iii. 27. V.
i. pape clyde VL. i. 6. ii.
3, 6. vii. 6. xii. 6. VIL. xi. 4. xii.
ΑἹ. ΙΧ. vii. 3,4,6. X.
20. ἔργον ΙΠ. v. 17.
IX. vii. 3. Epye 1. vii.
i. 6, 12, 18. &pya I. i 2.

ps
oO
EER AD

IX. viii. 2. X. viii. 12. ix. 20. ἔργων
I. vii. 19. xii. 6. IV. ii. 16. V. iii.
14. VIII. xiv. 1. X. i. 3. viii. 12.
ἔργοις IT. iii. τ. vi. 9. 1Π. vii. 12.
X. i. 4. viii. 12. ix. 20.
ἐργῶδες IX, vii. 7. x. 4. ἐργωδέστερον
I. xiii. 8. ἐργωδέστερα TX. ii. 10.
ἐρεῖ IV. iii. 21. IX. viii. 6. X. ii. 4.
ἐροῦσι VI. vil. 4. ἐροῦμεν 1. x. 8, τό.
II. vii. 16. IV. ii. 4. VIL xiv. 9.
εἴρηται I. v. 6. viii. 4. ix. 7. IL. v.
6. ix. 3. ΠῚ]. ti. 15. iv. 1. v. 21.
vil. 7, 13. ix. 2 IV. i. 23, 29, 33.
li. 12, 15, 20. 11]. 18, 37. V. 13. Vi
6,9. V. iii. 9. v. 7. Vi 3. vii 3.
VI. iv. 6. viii. 8. xi. 7. xii. το. VIL
i. 4. Vi. §. x. §. xii. 7. xiv. 4, 9.
VIIL i. 7. v. 1, 4. vi. 6, 7. vii. 6.
ix. 1. xii. 1. xiii. 1. xiv. 3. DXi
I, 3, 7. it. §, 6. 111. 3, 4. iv. 2. γ 1.
Vili. 2, 11. ix. 5,7. X.iv. 3. v. 5.
vi. 2, 5, 8. Vii. 1. ix. I, 11, 16, 23.
εἰρῆσθαι IX. x. 1. εἰρήσθω I. vi. 6.
ID. iti, rz. IIL. iti. 20. «~IV. i gs.
Υ. ν. 19. VII. iii. 14. VII. xiv. 4.
IX. xii. 4. X. iii. 13. viii. 3. εἰρή-
cOway IV. v. 15. εἴρηνται LIL. viii.
17, IV. vii. 1. εἔρηκε V. ix. 1.
εἰρήκαμεν 11. iit. 1, vi. 3. εἰρη-
κότες VI. i. 1. εἰρημένος 1. ν. 2.
IV. iii. 3. εἰρημένον VI. i. 3. VIL

INDEX VERBORUM.

lv. 5. X. 2. εἰρημένῃ ILI. viii. 8. V.
ii. 8. εἰρημένον VI. vili. 5. εἰρημένα
IV. i. 32. vii. 13. VIII. iii. 7. IX.
ἵν. 7. X.i.4. εἰρημένων 1. xii. 7.
Tid. i. 14. ii. 16. ix. 7. ΙΝ. viii. 4.
V. 1, 20. vili, 1. xi τ. VIL vii. 5.
xiii. 6. VIII. ii. 4. IX. iv. 6. X. iii.
I. Vi. 1. ix. 14. εἰρημέναις: VI. i. 1.
εἰρημένοις I. vill. 12. IIT. v. 5. elpn-
μέναι IV. vi. 3. viii. 12. VIII. vi. 7.
εἰρημένην V.v. 2.

ἐρήμης LV. iv. 4.

ἔριν VILL. i. 6.

“Eppaly III. viii. 9.

ἐρυθραίνονται lV. ix. 2.

"Epvécos III. x. 10.

ἐλθεῖν TV.1. 31. VIII. viii. 7. ἔλθωσι
ITT. iii. 11. ἐλήλυθε V. iv. 13. v. 10.
VI. viii. 4. x. 4. ἐληλυθέναι IX,
iv. I.

ἐσθὴς IV. vii. 15.

ἐσθίειν IIT. xi. 3.

ἐσθλὸς I. iv. 7. ἐσθλὰ IX. xii. 3. ἐσθ-
λῶν ibid. ἐσθλοὶ II. vi. 14.

“Eorepos V. i. 15.

ἑστιᾶν IV. ii. 11, ἑστιῶν IV. ii. 20.

ἔσχατον ITT. iii, 11, 12. VI. viii. 2, 9.
VIL iii. 13. ἐσχάτου VI. viii. 8, 9.
xi 4. ἔσχατα VI. xi. 3. ἐσχάτων
VI. xi. 2, 3,4. WIL. ii. 5.

ἑταιρικὴ VIII. v. 3. ἑταιρικῇ VIII. xi.
5. xii. 4, 6. ἐταιρικὴν VIII. xii. 1.
IX. x. 6.

éraipov VIII. ix. 3. xii.8. ἑταίρῳ IX.
ii, 1, 3. ἑταῖροι VILL. xii. 4. ἑταί-
pos VIII. xii.2 IX. ii.3,7. éral-
pous IX. ii 9.

ἕτερος IIT. i. 13. VIL. iii. 1. iv. 2. TX.
ix.10. ΧΟΥ͂Σ. 11. ἑτέρου 1]. ν. 17.
xi. 7. IV.iii.31. V. iit 12. ix. 9.
VIIL vi 7. X. 2, 3 vi. 6. ἕτερα
L vi. 3. vit. 3 ΠῚ iv. 4. xi. 2. V.
ii. 9. WI. i 5. VIL. xiv. 5. VIII.
i. 7. iii. 5. vii. 1. ix. 3. xib 7. IX.
i. 4. ii, Ziv. g XX. iti. ΣΙ. iv. 4.
v. I, 2. Vi. 2, 3, 4. ἕτερον 1. ii. 1.
iv. 3. vii. 4. xili. 16. IL. viii. 7, IT.
i. 14. vi. 12. vill. 16. xi. γ. OV. i.
20. ii. 9, 12. V. 12, 17. Vie 9. Vill. 3,
10. ix. 12. ΧΙ. VI. i. 5. iv. 1, 2,
5. ν. 4. Vil. 4. ix. 3. xdi. 7. xiii. 1.
VII. i. 2, 4. vii. 2, 4. viii. 1. ix. 5.
xii. 3. xiv.8. VIII. vi. 7. vii. 1. xii.
8. IX. viii. 6. ix. 1. X. ii. 2. iii. 4.
érépas Li. 4. V.ii.ar. VI. xi. 4.

ἐσθῆτι IV. iii. 36.

XXX]

xii. 8. ἑτέρα 11. viii. 8. V. fi. 7. x.
8. VI. vii. 4. xii.4. VII. iii. 9.
VIIL vii. 1. X.iv.2.v. 8. ἑτέρῳ
V.v. 17. vi. 6. ix.g. X. iv. 3. ix.
15, 16. ἑτέρᾳ VII. xiv. 8. ἑτέραν
VIl.ix. 5. X. v. 4. vii. 6. ἕτεροι I.
lil. 3. vi. 11. viii. 6. xiii. 3. VIL.
iii. 4. ix. 2,7. WIHT. vi. 5. xii. 3.
ἕτεραι ILL. viii. 1. VIIL vii.r. X.
iii. 10. iv. 2.v. 7. ἑτέρων IIT. ii. 7.
IV.i. 39. V.v.g. VILL. xiii. το.
IX. iv. 8,9, 10.ix.§. X.v.1, 3, 8,
9. ἑτέροις 111. xi.2. K.v.2. éré
pars VIII. iv. 3. ἑτέρους IV. i. 30.
VII. i. 6. iv. 2.

ἑτέρωθεν IV. i. 34.

ἐτὶ 1. ii. 7. iii. 6. v. 5. vi. 3, 4. vii. 2,8,
9, 16. viii. 16. xiii. 17. 11. i. 4, 6. ii.
4. lil. 3, 5, 7, 8, 10. iv. 3. ν. 4, 5. Vi.
4, 14, 16. viii. §.ix.2. IITL.i. 9, 19,
26. IV. i. 22. ii. 8. iii. 7. iv. 4. vii.
8. V.il. 4, 5. iii. 7. v. 5. vi. 1. viii.
10. ix. §, 8, 9, 11, 12. xi. 2, 4, 5. VI.
iii. 3. viii. 4, 7. ix. 3, 7. xii. 6. xiii.
8. VILi.7. ii. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11. iii. 6,
7,9. V. 3. Vi. 2, 3,4. X. 2. xi. 2, 3, 4.
xii 3. xili. 4. xiv. 5. VIII. i.1, 5.
iii. 8. vi. 4. vii 4, 5,6. IX. iii. 3.
Vil. 7.x. 3. X.v. 3. vii. 2. viii. 7.

εὖ I. iv. 2, 5, 7. vii. 10, 14, 15. viii. 4,
9. x. 9, 12. IT. i. 5, 6. iii. 5, 9, 10.
iv. 3, 5, 6.v. 2, 3. Vi. 2, 9, 10, 17, 18.
vii. 15. ix. 2, 8, 9. ΠῚ. iv. 4. v. 17.
IV. i. 6, 7, 8, 16, 31. iii. 24, 25. viii.
7 V.i 16. v.6. VL ik 3. v. 1, 2.
vii. 4, 6.viii. 4. ix. 3,4, 7. x- 3. VILLI.
viii. 3, 4. xi. 1. xii. §. xiii. 2, 4, 8, 9.
xiv. 4. IX, ii. §. vii 1, 2, 7. ix. 2.
x. 5. xi. 1,6. X. iv. §. ix. 20.

εὔβουλία VI. ix. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7. εὐβου-
Mas VIL ix. 1.

εὔβουλος VI. vii. 6.

εὐγενείας I. viii. 16. εὐγένειαν V. iii. 7.

εὐγενὲς X. ix. 3. εὐγενεῖς IV. iii. 10.
εὐγενέσι IV. ii. 14.

εὐγνώμων VI. xi. 2.
xi. I.

εὐδαιμονεῖν 1. iv. 2. ix. §. IIL. fi. 9.
ΙΧ. ix. §. X. viii. 8. εὐδαιμονήσειν
I. vii. §. εὐδαιμονεῖ X. viii. 8. εὐδαι-
μονήσοντα X. Vili. 9. εὐδαιμονήσοντι
IX. ix. 10.

εὐγνώμονας VI.

XXXIl

εὐδαιμονία I. vii. 5, 8. viii. 14. xii. 7.
xiii. τ. VII. xiii.2, IX.ix.5. X.
iii. 1. vi. 2, 6, 8. vii. 1, 6, 7. viii. 3,
7,8. εὐδαιμονίας I. iv. 2. vii. 5. x.
9, 14. χὶϊ. 1. xiii. 1. V.i13. X.vi.
1, 6, 8. vii. 7. viii. 8. εὐδαιμονίᾳ 1.
vili. 17. VII. xiii. 3. X. vii. 3. εὖ-
δαιμονίαν 1. iv. 2. v. 1. vii. 5, 7, 9.
Vili. 5, 14. ix. 2. xX. 2, 7, 15. xii. 4.
xiii. 5,6. VI. xii.s5. VII. xi. 2. xiii.
2,4. X. vi. 2. vii. 6.

εὐδαιμονίζεν I. x. 7. εὐδαιμονίσειε I.
v. 6. εὐδαιμονίζει 1. ix. 11. εὐδαι-
μονίζομεν I. xii. 4. εὐδαιμονιζόμενον
XK. vi. 4. εὐδαιμονιστέον I. x. 1.

εὐδαιμονικὸς I. viii. 16. εὐδαιμονικὰ Χ.
vi. 3. εὐδαιμονικωτέρα X. νἱ. 7. εὐ-
δαιμονικωτάτη Χ. viii. 7.

εὐδαιμονισμὸς IV. vii. 13.

εὐδαίμων 1. ix. 19. x.2,4,14. VI. xii.
1. ὙΠ. xiii.2. X. vi. 6. viii. το, 13.
εὔδαιμον ἵ. ix.g. εὐδαίμονι I. x. 11.
IX. ix. 2,3. εὐδαίμονα I. vii. 16. viii.
4.x.3,8,15. WI. xiis5. VIL. xiii.
2,3). [X.ix.1,5. X.i.s. viii. 11.
εὐδαίμονας 1. xi. 5,6. xiii.12. X. viii.
7, 11. εὐδαιμονέστατος X. vii. 9.
εὐδαιμονέστατον X. viii. 132. εὐδαι-
μονέστερος III. ix. 4.

εὐδιαλυτοὶ VILL. iii. 3.

εὐδοκιμοῦσι X. vi. 3. εὐδοκιμοῦντας X.
ix. 20.

Εύδοξος 1. xii. 3. X. 11. 1.

εὐεκτικῷ X. γι. 9. εὐεκτικὸν V.i. 5. xi.
7. εὐεκτικὰ Υ.ἷ. 5. ΥἹ. xii 1. εὐὖ-
εκτικῶν V.i. 5.

εὐέλπιδος ITT. vii.11. εὐέλπιδες III. vi.
11. viii. 13, 14. εὐελκίδων TIL viii.
16.

εὐεξία V.i. 5. εὐεξία» IIT. xi. 8,

εὐεργεσίας IV. iii. 25. VIII. i. 1. xi. 1.
xiv. 2. IX.ii. 3. X.ix.14. edep-
yeolg VIII. xiii. το.

εὐεργετεῖν IX. ix.2.xi.1. εὐεργετοῦντι
VIII. xiv. 3. εὐεργετεῖσθαι IV. i. τό.
VIIL xiii. 8. εὐεργετεῖται VILL. xiii.
9. εὐεργετήσαντας IX. vii. 1. εὐ-
εργετησόντων IX. ix. 2. εὐεργετού-
μενος IV, iii. 24. εὐεργετηθεὶς LX. v.
3. εὐεργετηθέντα VILL. xiii. 9. εὐ-
epyernOévras IX. vii. 1.

εὐεργετημάτων VITI. xi. 2.

evépyera: IX. vii. 1. εὐεργετῶν VIII.
xiii. το, IX. vii. 4. εὐεργέτῃ IX. ii.
I. vii. 5. evdepyéracs IX. ii. 7. vii. 7.

INDEX VERBORUM.

εὐεργετητικὰν IX. xi. 5

εὐετηρίας VILI.i. 1. εὐετηρίαν I. viii.6.

εὐζωΐα I. viil. 4. ;

εὐηκοώτερον I. xiii. 17.

εὐημερίας I. viii. 17. X. viii. 9.

Ednvos VII. x. 4.

εὐθαρσῶς IIT. vi. 4.

εὐθήρατον ITT. i. 11.

εὐθὺς 1Π.1.8. iii. 2. vi. 18 V.x.4. VL
v. 6. xiii. τ. VIL 11. 9. vi. 1. VIII.
mi. 2,7. IX. iii. 3.

εὐθὺ VIL. vii. 4.

evlaros IV. i. 31. εὐιατότερος VIL. ii.
10. eviarorépa VIL x. 4.

εὐκατάφοροι II. viii. 8.

εὐκαταφρονητοὶ IV, vii. 15.

εὐκοινώνητος IV. i. 26.

εὐκόλως I. x. 12.

εὐλάβειαν LV. i. 10.

εὐλαβεῖται IV. vii. 8. εὐλαβούμενος: IV-
iv. 8. εὐλαβοῦνται IX. xi. 4 εὐὖλα-
βήσεται IV. vii. 8. εὐλαβητέον IX.
XL 6.

εὔλογον 1. vi. 15. Vill. 7. ix. 2, §. V.ix.
2. VIL.xiv.3. IX. ili. τ. Xv. 8.
vi. 4. Vii. I, 3. Vili, 13. ix. 19. εὖ-
λογώτερον I. xiii, 11.

εὐλόγως VI. xi. 2. VIL xii. 6. VIIL
iii. 7. xiii. 2. X. iv. 10.

εὐμετάβολος I. x. 14. VII. xiv. 8. εὖ-
μετάβολον 1. x. 7.

εὐμετάπειστοι VIL, ix. 2. εὐμετάπειστος
VII. viii. 4.

εὐνῆς ILI. xi. 1.

εὐνοεῖν VIII. ii. 4.

εὔνοια IX. v.1, 2,3, 4. εὔνοιαν VITI.
ii, 3. IX. v. 3.

εὐνομίαν ITI. iii. 11.

εὖνοι VIII. ii. 4. vi. τ. IX. v. 2, 3. εὖ-
vos VIII. v. 3. εὔνους VILL. ii. 3. LX.
Vv. 3.

εὐπαθείας VIII. viii. 1. εὐπαθείαν TX.
xi. 6.

εὐπαρακολουθήτου IT. vii. 11.

εὐπειθὲς IIT. xii. 7, 8, εὐπειθεῖς X. ix.

εὔπεπτα VI. vii. 7.

εὐπορεῖ LX, iv. 7.

εὐπορίας VIII. vii. 4. ΙΧ. v. 3.

εὐπραξία I. viii. 4. VI. ii. 4, 5. v. 4.
εὐπραξίαι 1. x. 3. xi. 6.

εὕρεσις VIL ii. 12. εὑρέσεως IIL. iii. 5.
edpéoes III. iii. 11.

εὑρετὴς I. vii. 17.

INDEX VERBORUM.

Ed’peri8ns V.ix.1. VI. viii. 4. VIII. i.
6. Εὐριπίδου TIL i. 8.

Εὔριπος IX. vi. 3.

εὑρίσκειν IL.vi. 16. X.ii. 1. εὕρων III.
x. 7. εὑρεῖν IX, x. 6.

εὐσθενοῦντα J. ix. 11.

evoroxla VI. ix. 1, 2.

evouverla, VI. x. 2.

εὐσύνετοι VI. x. 2,4. εὐσυνετώτεροι Χ.
ix. 21.

εὐσχημόνως I. x. 13.

εὐσχημοσύνην LV. viii. 6.

εὐσχήμονα IV, viii. 3.

εὐτεκνίας I. viii. 16.

εὐτραπελία II, vii. 13.

εὐτράπελος IL. vii. 13. IV. viii. 19. εὐὖ-
τράπελοι IV. viii. 3, 4. X. vi. 3.
εὐτραπέλοις VILL.iv.1. εὐτραπέλους
VIII. iii. 1. vi. 5.

εὔτροποι IV. viii. 3.

εὐτυχῶν LV. iii. 18. εὐτυχοῦντες LX.
xi. 1. εὐτυχούντων IX, ix. 2.
εὐτυχήματα LV. iii. 19,21, 36. evru-
χημάτων I, x. 12.

εὐτυχέσιν Χ. ix. 6.

εὐτυχία V.i. 9. VIL. xiii. 3. εὐτυχίας
IX. xi. 5,6. εὐτυχίαν L. viii. 17. IV.
iii. 18. VIL. xiii. 4. εὐτυχίαις IV. iii,
26. IX. ix. 2. xi. 1, 2, 5.
εὐυπέρβλητον IV, ii. 19.

εὐφιλοτίμητα TV, ii. 11.

εὐφυὴς ΠΙ. v. 17. εὐφυέστατος VI.
xiii. 6.

εὐφυΐα III. v. 17.

εὐχερῶς IV. i. 16, 34, 35.

εὔχεσθαι V. i. 9. εὔχονται V.i. 9.
ηὔξατο 111. x. 16.

εὔχρηστα Χ. ix, 21.

εὐωχίαν VIL. ν. 2.

νἐφάπτεται IIL. ix, 5.

ἐφαρμόττειν .iv.2. ἐφαρμόττεν 7] .νἱῖ. 1.

ἐφεξῆς VIL. iv. 1.

ἔφεσις ILI. v. 17.

ἐφημέρου 1. vi. 6.

ἐφίεται ΤΠ. viii. 7. ix. §. xiii. 2. IX.
2.4. Χ,11.1, 4. ἰν. 2. ἐφίενται II.
v. 17. IV. 1. 39, iii. 10, 35. VIILi.
4. Vili. 1, 2. ix. 5. IX. vi. 2, 3. vii. 1.
xii.1. X. iv. 10. vi. 3. vii. 7. ἐφί-
εσθαι I.i. r.iv. 1. VIII i. 6. v. 2.
Χ. vii. 7. ἐφιέμενος VIII. viii. 6. X.
i. 3. ἐφιέμενον IV. iv. 3. ἐφιέμενοι
VIII. vi. 5. ἐφιέμεναι 1. vi. 15. ἐφιέ-
μερα X. ii. 1. ἐφιεμένονς LX. vi. 4.
ἐφιεμένοις X. ix. 19,

VOL, II.

ΧΧΧΊΪ

ἐχθαίρειν IV. vi. 5. εχθαίρουσι Χ. ix.
12.
ἐχθρὰν VIII. i. 4. ἐχθρῶν IV. iii. 31.
ἔχεως VIL. vii. 6.
ἔχομεν I, xiii. 3. Π|.ν.2. OI. v.6. VI.
xiii. 1. ἔχει 1. ii. 2. iii. 2, 3. iv. 7.
Vi. 15. Vill. 12. x. 3. Xi. 3. xii. 7, 8.
IL. i. 1, 7. ii. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8. iii. 5. iv.
2, 3. Vi. 3. vil. 8. IL. i. 4. vi. 3. vii.
8,12. IV. i. 31. ii. 14, 15, 18. iii. 18.
V.i. 4. iii. 6, 14. V. 11, 12. vi. 3. Vii.
2, 6. ix. 13. x. 1, 2,5. VL. v. 6. viii.
2, 3, 4. xi. 6. xii, 1. xiii. 1. VII. ii.
11. iit, 6, 11, 13. Vi. 6. vii. 2, 6. viii.
1. χ, 3. xii. 3. VIII. iv. 1. vi. 7. x. 4.
xii. 6. xiii. 6. IX. i. 4. ii. 1, 2, 5. iii. 1.
iv. 4. ix. 3, 10. xX. §. xi. §. xii,r. X.
Vili. 12, ix. 12. ἔχωσιν. iii. 6. v. 12.
ΙΧ. iii. 1. ἔξει 1171. ν. 17. χ 7. IV.
iii, 18. viii. το. V.v.12. VI. iii. 4.
VIL xii. 5. [X.i.8. ἔχοντας III. ix.
6. V.ix.14. VIII. viii. 6. ἔχοντες
I. ii. 2. vi. rq. IL. i. 4. D1. i. 5. viii.
7,8 IV. iii. 18,20,21. VI. xii. ro.
VIL. iii. 2. viii. 2. IX. i. 9. iv. 9.
ἔχειν L iv. 4. ix. 5. x. 4. xii. 2, 8.
xiii. 18, 19. Π iv. 3. vii. 8. ID. i.
13. ix. 3. IV. i. 21. iii. 17, 32, 35.
iv. 1.ix.6. V.i. 16. ii. 12. iv. 8, 13,
14. vil. 4.xi.7. VI. i. 5, 6. ii. 2. iii.
2. iv. I, 6. Vv. 3, 8. Vi. I, 2. vii. 6, 7.
X. 3.xi. 1, 2, 5, 6. xii. 3. xiii. τ. VIL.
ii. 6, 8. iii. 2, 7, 13. V. δ, 7. Vi. 7.
vii.1.xiv.4. VIII. v. 3. vii. 3. xiii.
4, 10. xiv.1,3. IX.i.9. iii. 5. iv. 4,
§, 10. vii. 6. ix. 3.χ. 6. X.i. 2. ii.
1. iii, 12. v. 6. vi. 6. Vii. 1, 3, 7. ix.
1,2 ἔχοντα 1. Υ. 6. vii.17. IL. iv.
3 ULv.17. V.ix.16. VL 5. vii.

4. xii. 7. VIL. ii. 3. iii. 5, 6. iv. 2.
v.5 ΧΟ 1. ἰχ. 7. ἔχοντος I. vii.

13. ΠΙ.χίϊ. 2. V.iv.rx. VI.i. 5, 6.
VIL.vi.7. K.iv.5. ἔχον». vii. 13.
xiii. 9, 10,19. IV.i. 25. ii. 19. vil.
1. V. vii. 1,2, χὶ. 9. VLL 5. ἔχουσι
I. vii. 23. 1Π. νὶ. 9. II. vi. 4. vii. 12.
vili. 12. xii.5. IV.i.4.v.8,10. V.
ii. 6.iv. 2.ix.17. VI.iv.4. WH. ix.
2.X.5.Xiv.5,7. VIII. iii. 4,6.v.1.
viii. §. ΙΧ. ii. 6. iii. 3.ix. 5. X.v.6.
viii. 7.ix. 4. ἐχόντων]. χὶ. 2. VI.
ν. 8. X.i.2.iv.8. ἔχοι]. χὶ. 2. IV.

ΐ. 22. I[X.iv.10. ἔσχηκε Π.Ὶ]. 1.
ἔσχομεν 1.1.4. εἶχεν 11.1.7. ΙΧ.

ig. QxplLiv. 3. ΠῚ. ἰχ,4. IV.i

XXXIV

17,21. VIILii. 3. ἔχων II. iv. 3.
vii. 12, 13 ILI. iii. 1. ix. 1. xi. 8.
IV. i. 5,6. V.i. 15. iv. 5. ix. 9, 10.
x. 8. xi. 4. ΠῚ. xi. 8. VI.i. 2. VI.
ii. τ. iii. 5. ix. 6. x. 3. VIII. i. 1.
IX.i. 2.v. 3. X. iii. 12. vit. 4. ἕξουσι
Il. iv. 6. V.iii.6. VIL. v. 4. ἔχουσαι
ΠῚ vii. 11. ἔχοντι II. vii. 1. V. iv.
11. VIII. xii.2. TX.i.9. ἔχοιμεν
V. ii. 6. ἐχόμενον V. x. 1. ἔχουσα
VL. ii. 3. vii. 3. ἔχεσθαι]. xii. 5.
ἑκτέον IX. iii. 5. ἐχόντοιν IX. viii. 2.
ἐχομένοις IX. ix. 8. ἔχουσαν X.
ix. Il.

‘Ew IX, i, 4.

‘Egos V. i. 15.

ws I, x. τ. IL. iii, 11. xi. 3. V. vi. 8.
VIM. iii. 6. vii. 5. viii. 6. XX. iii. 3.
iv. 8.

Z

Ζεὺς VI. viii. 4. Ad IV. iii. 25. IX. ii.
6. Ala VIL. x. 4.

ἔζεσεν ILI. viii. 10.

ζῆλον IT. v. 2.

ζημία Viiv. 5,6. ζημίας V. iv. 6, 14.
ζημίᾳ V. iv. 4.13. ζημίαις X. ix. 9.
Sypuot V. xi. 3. ζημιούμενος V. ii. 4.
ζημιοῦσθαι V. iv. 13, 14.

ζῆν I. iii. 7. iv. 2. vii. 12. viii. 4. ΠῚ.
ix. 4. xiL 8. IV. i. 5, 35. iii. 23, 39.
ΜΝ. το. Vi.v.1. VIL xiii. 7, VII.
i,t. IX, iv. 1, 3, 8. vii. 4. viii. 6.
ix. 5, 7,9. Χ, 2. ΧΙ]. 2. ΧΙ, 4. iii.
12. iv. 10, 11. vil. 4, 8. viii. 7. ix. 8,
i. ζῶντα. ν.6. X.ix10. ζῶντι
Ι. vii. 6. χ.3. X. vi. 2. viii. 7. {2 1.
ΧΙ. IV. vii. 5. ΙΧ. 1χ. 9. Χ. ix. 13.
ζώντων I. x. 12. ζῶντες IIL v. 1ο.
Vil. ν.6. X.ix.4. ζῶσι IIL. xii. γ.
VIII. iii. 5. ἔῶν KX. ix. 7. ζῶντας 1.
x. 7. xi. 4. IV. ix. 3.

ζητεῖ I. vi.8. VI. ix. 2,3. ζητεῖν III.

iti. 11. VLix.1. VILiii2. VII.
vil. 2. IX.x.5. ἕητῶν ILL. iif. 17.

ζητοῦμεν V. ii. 1. VI. xiii. τ. X. Vii.
6. ζητούντων X. vii. 8. ζητεῖσθαι
VUIL xii. 7. ζητοῦσι 1. ν. 5. V.iv.7.
v.6. VL vii. 5. viii. 4. ix. 2. VIII.
vi. 4, 5. villi. 3. IX. iv. 9. xi. 1.
ἐζήτει 1. ἵν. 5. VI. xiii. 3. WII. iii.
13. ζητουμένανυ I. v. 4. ζητούμενον
L v. 8. vii. 1, 3. ix. 7. χ. 11. Vz vi.
4. Syretracl. vi. 13, vii. 12. HHI. iii.

INDEX VERBORUM.

14. ζητουμένων I. vii. 23. ἐζητοῦ.
μεν I, xiii. 5. ζητούμενα L xiii. 8.

ζήτησι: L. xiii. 4. IDL iii. 12. VL ix. 3. -
ζητήσεως I, vi. 1.

ζητητέα VI. ix. 4.

ζωὴ TX. ix.g. Kiv. 10. seis Lx.
12,13. ζωὴν L vii. 12,14. IX. ix. 8.

ἑῶον VIL. xiv. 5. ζώφΙ. vii. 12. X. v. 8.
ζῶα ILL, ii. 2. x. 8, το. xi. 7. X. v.41.
viii. 8. ζώων L ix. 9. IDL i 22.
VL vii. 4. VIl.v.1. vi. 6. VOILi. 3.
X. viii. 8. ζώοις IL iii. 7. VILL xii.
7 IX. ix. 7.

H

ἡ V.L 20. x. 5,6. VIIL iii 1, 6. iv. 6.
x. 5. X. v. FO.

ἡγεῖσθαι X. Vii. 1. ἡγούμενον ITT. iii. 17.
ἡγούμεθα VIL. v. 5.

ἤδη L iii. 3. x. 3. 11. iv. 1. vi. 3. OL
iii, 17. vi. τ. V. i. 16. vi. ᾿. Vili. 11.
ix. 3.x. 2. xiii. 6. VIL. iit. 9. xiv. 4.
X. vi. 7.

ἥδεται ITT. xi. 8. IV.2. 28. CX, iv. 9.
ἶχ. 6. χ. 3. Χ. ἢ. 2. ἱν. 9. ἥδεσθαι
I. viii. το. IV. i. 25. VIL ix. 6. IX.
iv. 10, ΣΧ. iti. 2, 4,6.iv.4. ἡσθῆναι
Il. vi. ro. IX. viii.9. X. iii. 4, 10
ἥδονται 711. viii. 12. VIII. iv. 1. IX.
ix.9. x1.5. ἤσθη ΙΧ. ἷν. το. hot}
σεται lV. iii, 17. ἡδόμενος ITT, x. 10.
X. iii. 12.

ἡδονὴ IL 111, 2.v.2. HI. x. 7. xi. 5.
xii. 2. VII. xi 3, 4, 5. xii. 5. xiii. 2,
7. xiv. 4,6, 8. VILL ii. 1. iv. r. IX.
v. 3. X. ii. 3. iii. 1,5, 6, 12, 13. iv.
I, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. ν΄. 2, 3, 5,
7, 8. ἡδονῆς L vi. 11. viii. 6, 12.
IT. ii. 7. ix. 4. 1Π. i. ox. IV. vi. 8.
VII. vi. 4. xi. 1, 2,4. xii. 3, 6. xiv.
2,9. VILL iii. 5. v.2.ix.5. IX.i
4. ix. 4. xii.4. Ki 4. ik τ. tii 13.
iv. 4, 10. V. 2. Vi. 4. ix. I, 10. ἡδονῇ
I. xii. 5. I. τὲ, 8, το. X.k 1. tii. 4.
v. 6. ἡδονὴν L iv. 3. v. 2. vii. 5.
viii. 12. II. iii. 1, 7. vii. 15. ix. 6.
Ii. v. §. xi. 6. xii. 2. IV. i 35. v.
10. vi. I. vii. I. Viti. 12. V. ik. 6.
VL v. 6. ὙΠ. iii. 1. v. 7. ix. 3, 4.
xi, 3. xii. 3, 6. xiii. 1, 2,5, 6. xiv. 8.
VHT, ii. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7. iv. 2, 4, 6. vi
7. ix. §. xili. 3. IX. t% 3,4,8.x. 2.
X. i. 2, 3. i. ¥, 2, 3, 5. 18. 2, 3, 4, 6,
11, 12. iv. 1, 4, 11. Vv. 4. Wit. 3, 8.

INDEX VERBORUM. XXXV

ἡδοναὶ 1, vi. το. VII. xi. 4. xii. 1, 2, HOous I. xiii. 20. IV. viii. 3. VI. i. 4.
7. xiii. 2, 6. xiv. 1, 3. ΣΧ. iii. g, 10, li. 4. VIL. xiii. 11. X. i. 1. ii. 1. viii.
12. V. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11. ἡδονῶν IT, 2,3. ἤθη IL. ii. 1. IV. i. 35. vii. 14.
ii. 9. iti. 1. IT. x. 1,11. xi. 4. VII. vill. 3. VILi.:. VIM. i. 7. iv. 1.
ii. 3. iv. 2, §. vii. 2, 3, 6. ix. 2. xiii. X. ix. 14. ἠθῶν VI. xiii. τ. IX. i. 3.
2. xiv. 1. X. iii. 6, 8. v. 2. vi. 8. ἤθεσι X. ix. 5.

ἡδοναῖς IX. viii. 4. X.i. 2. 111. 2. 'χ. | Ancora I. xiii. 12, 17]. ii. 6. IV. i. 13,
10. ἡδονὰς IT. iii. 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11. 21. iii. 32. VILL. v. 3. x. 3. xi. 6.
vii. 3. viii. 8. III. x. 1, 2, 8. xi. 5,7, IX. xi. 5. X.i 2.

8. IV.i.35.vi.7. VIL iv. 1,4. vi. | ἤξεϊ IL. iii, 16. xii. 17. ἥξομεν IT.
5. vii. 1. viii. 4, 5. ix. 6. xi. 2, 4. ix. 5.

VIL. viii. 6. X. fii. 7. v. 3, 110 vir. | ἠλίθιος ID. ii, 7. iii. 2. IV. ii. 13. iii.

Vii. 3. ix. 4. 3. ἠλιθίου IV. i. 31. ἠλίθιον X. vi.
ἡδέως ITT. ix. 5. IV. i. 13, 24. ii. 8. iii. 6. ride IV. iii. 35, 36. v. 5.
25. xili. 7. LX. iv. 5. ix. §. ἡλικίαν 1. ili. 7, VIII. xii. 4. IX. ii. 9.

ἡδὺς I. viii. 9. II. vii. 13. IV. vi. 9. ἡλικία IV. i. 31. VIII. iii. §. ἡλικία
VIII. iii. 2. vi.6. IX. ix. 4. ἡδεῖα VI. xi. 6. ἡλικίᾳ IV. ix. 32. ἡλικίαις
VII. iv.1. IX. vii. 6. ix. 5,6, το. VI. xi. 6. WII. x. 6.
xi. 2. ἡδὺ I. viii.ro. I. iii. 7. vii. 11, | ἡλικιῶται VIII. xi. 5.
13. ix. 6. IID. i. 11. iv. 6. ix. 3. xi. | ἤλιξ, ἥλικα VIL. xii. 4.
7. IV. i. 13. vill. 7,12, VI.v.6. VIL. | ἡμέρα 1. vii. 16. ἡμέρα1Π. x. 2. VIII.
tii. 2, 10. Vi. 1. vii. 8. xi. 4. xii. 2. iii. 5.
xiv. 6,7, 8. VIII. ii. 1, 2. iii. 2, 4,5, | ἡμέτερον 111. xi. 2.
7. iv. I, 2, 4, 5. Vs 2, 4. Vi. 3, 4, 7. | ἡμιπόνηρος VII. x. 3.
xii. 6,7. IX. iti. 1. iv. 5. v. 3. vii. 5. | ἡμισείας V. iv. 8.
ix. 4,7,9,10. χὶ. 3. X.ix.8. ἡδέος ἥμισυ I. vii. 23. xiii 12. V.v. 15.
TI. iii. 7. 1Π. ii. 5. xi. 5. xii. 6, 7. ᾿Εράκλειτος IL. iii. 10. VIL. iii. 4. VIII.
VIII. v. 2. vi. 5. X.ix.4. ἡδεῖ VIL i,6. X.v. 8.
xi. x. VIIL. iii. 5.v.2. ἡδὺν VII. ἠρέμα IIT. 1. 16. IV.v.14. VII. iii. 4.
ΧΙ. 2. K.ii.3. ἡδεῖαν ΙΧ. xi. 5. vii. 3. IX. viii. 9. X. ν. 4.
ἡδεῖς VIIL iii. 1, 3, 4, 6. iv. 1. v. 3. ἠρεμαία VII. ii. 4.
Vi. 4, 5. Vil. 6. xiii. 1. KX. vi.3. ἡδέα | ἠρεμίας II. iii. 5. ἠρεμίᾳ VIL. xiv. 8.
I. vill. 11. ILL. i. 11, 25. iv. 4. xi. 2, | ἡρωικὴν VIL. i. τ.
8. VIL. ii. το. v. 1. ix. 7. xi 2,4. | ‘Howddou 1. iv. 7.
xiv.7. VIIL.iii.§5. iv. 8,10. LX.ix. | ἡσυχία X. ix. 15.
5. ΣΧ. ας 111. 8. iv. 7. v. 9, 10. vi. | ἡσύχιοι 1Π. vii. 12.
5. deta L viii. 2,13. VII. xii. 2. | ἧτταν VII. vii. 2.
IX, iv. 5.ix. 5. X. vi. 3. ἡδέων 1Π. | ἡττᾶσθαι VIL. vil. 1,4. ἡττῶνται VII.
ix. 2. xi. 5, 6,8. VIL. iv. 2, 3, 5. vii. vii. 8. viii. 2.
2. xi. 5. xiv. 7. VIII. vi. 4. IX.ix. | ἧττον. viii. 16. xi. 2. xiii. 16. ΤΙ. iii.
5, 7,9. ἡδέσι VIL. xii.2. ἡδίων VIT. 8. vi. 10. vii. 3, 8. ix. 3,6,8. IIL. i.

xiii. 7. X.v.4. ἥδιον ΙΧ. χι. 6. X. 27. ii. 6, το. ili. 8. ν. 7, 19. vii. I, 3.
ν. 8. ἡδίστη VIL. xiv. 8. X. iv. 5, viii. 15. ix. 4, 6. Χ. 1. χὶ. 7. xii. 4.
vii. 2. ἥδιστον 1. viii.14. IX. vii. 6. IV. i. 9, 10. iv. 2, 5. v. 13. vi. 80. V.
X.vii.9. ἡἠδίω ΠῚ. xi. 2. X. vii. 3. ix. 16. x. 4. xi. 8. VI. v. 7. xi. 6.
ἥδυσμα IX. x. 2. VII. ii. ro. iii. 4. vi. 3 . ix. 5. X. 4.
ἠθικὰς I. xiii. 20. X.viii. 3. ἠθικῆς 11. VITI.i. 7. iv. 2. v. §. vi. 1, 7. ix. 2.
ii. VI. ii. 4. xiii. 6. ΣΧ. viii. 4. IX. vii. 5,6. X. i. 3. ii, 2. iii 2, 3.

ἠθικὴ TL. Lr, tik 1. ix. 1. WI. ii. 2. vi. 8. viii. 10. ix. 16.
VII. viii. 4. VII. xiii. 5,7. ἠθικῶν | $rrovIV. viii. 10. ἥττους VIL. vii. 1.
Ti.2. Υ. χὶ. το. ΥἹ. 1.4. X. viii.
4. ἠθικὴν IL. νἱ. 2. VI. xii. 6. VII. Θ
xi. 2. ἠθικοῦ VI. xiii. 2.

ῆθος I. tii. γ. IV. i. 31. vii. 1. ὙΠ. Χ. | θαλάττῃ 111. vi. 8, 11. θαλάττης X.
1. IX. iii. 1, 2, 3. ΧΙ. 3. ΣΧ. ix. Ι, 8. Vili. 10.

XXXVi

θαλάττιοι ITI. iv. 11.

Θαλὴν VI. vii. 5.

θάνατος ITT. vi. 6. viii. 9. ix. 4. V. ii.13.
θάνατον IIT. vi. 3, 7, 10, 11. viii. 9.
IV. ix. 2. θανάτῳ III. ix. 4.

θαῤῥαλέα ILI. vii. 1, 4, 13. ix. 1.

θαῤῥαλέοι 111. viii. 13. θαῤῥαλέῳ VIL.
1X. 2.

θαῤῥεῖ ITT. vi. 5. θαῤῥοῦσι III. viii. 13.
θαῤῥῶν ITT. vii. 5. θαῤῥεῖν II. i. 8.
vii. 2. ITI. vii. 7, 10,11. θαῤῥῇσαι II.
vi. 10.

θάρρη IT. vi. 2.

θάρσος IT. v. 2.

θάτερον V. iv. 10. xi. 8. VII. xiv. 8.
θατέρου V. iv. 10. v. 8. VI. v. 8.
VIII. vii. 2. θάτερα V. i. 6.

θᾶττον IV. v. 7. VIII. xii. 7.

θαυμάζουσι I. iv. 3. θαυμάσειεν X. viii.
11. θαυμάζεσθαι IV. ii. 20.

θαυμαστικὸς IV. iii. 20,

θαυμαστὸς V.i.15. θαυμαστὴ. ii.10.
θαυμαστὸν IV. ii. το. VIL. iii. 6. vii.
6. X.v. 11. θαυμαστὰς Χ, vii. 3.
θαυμαστὰ VI. vii. 5

θέαμα 1. viii. 10.

θεατὴς I, vii. 19.

θεάτροις X. ν. 4.

θεωμένους IX.vii. 1. τεθεάμενος I.vi. 16.

θεῖος X. vii. 8. θειότερα VI.vii.4. θείαν
I. ix.1. VILir. θειότερον], ii. 8,
Xil. 4. θεῖας X, ix. 6, θειότατον Χ.
vi. 1. θείων X. vii. 1. θειοτάτων I.
ix. 3. θεῖον I, ix, 3. xii. 8. VIL i. 3.
ΧΗΣ, 6. ΣΧ, vii. 1, 8. θειοτάτους I.
xii. 4.

θέλουσαν Ὗ. ix. 1.

θεμιστεύων X. ix. 13.

Θέογνις IX. ix.7. Θέογνιν X. ix. 3.
Θεοδέκτου VII. vii. 6.

θεόπεμπτος I. ix. 3.

θεὸς 1. vi. 3. VI.ii.6. VII. χὶν. 8. IX.
iv. 4. θεοῦ VIL.i. 2, WII. vii. 5. X.
viil. 7. θεοῖο VII. i. 3. θεὸν I. xii. 5.
Geol VI. vii.2. VII. i. 2. θεῶν. ix, 2.
VI. xiii. 8. X. viii. 7, 13. θεοὺς 1.
xii. 3,4. IV.ii.r1. VII.iv.s. VILL
Vii. 6. xii. §. xiv. 4. IX.i. 7. X. viii.
7. θεοῖς IV. ii, τό. 11}. το, V. vii. 3.
ix. 17. VIIL.ix.5. IX.ii.8, X.viii.8.

θεόσδοτον I. ix. 2,

θεοφιλέστατος, θεοφιλέστατον X. viii.
13.

θεραπεία VIII. iv. 1. θεραπεία» VILL. i
2. X. viii. 9,

III. vi. x. ix. 3.

INDEX VERBORUM.

θεραπεύματα X. ix. 21.

θεραπεύει IX. v. 3. θεραπεύειν X. ix.21,
θεραπεύων VIII. xiv. 4. X. viii. 13.
θεραπεύοντα I. xiii. 7. IIT. iv. 6.
θεραπευόμενος VIII. iv. 1.

θερμαίνεσθαι IIT. v. 7.

θερμασίας III. x. 11.

θερμὸν X. v. 9. θερμῷ VILL. viii. 7.
θερμὰ ITT. iv. 4.

θερμότητα VII. vi. 1.

θέσι 1. ν. 6.

θετέον I, vii. 13. χ, 2. X. vi. 2.

θέτω IV. iii. 25.

θεωρεῖν]. xi. 1. θεωροῦνται]. vii. 21.
θεωρηθείη 1. χ, 6. θεωρήσει 1. x. τι.
θεωρήσαιμεν I. xiii. 1. θεωρητέον I.
xiii. 8, IL. ii. 6, θεωρήσωμεν II. vi.
4. VII. vi. 1. θεωροῦντι X. ν. 8. viii.
6. θεωροῦν X. iv. 8. θεωρῆσαι IV.
li.§. VIL. xi.1. X.vii.s. ix, 1, 21,
23. θεωροῦμεν VI. i. 5. θεωρεῖν VI.
iil. 2. iv. 4. V. 5. vii. 4. VII. xii. 2,
5. IX.ix.5. X. vii. 2, 4. viii. 8, 9.
θεωρῶν VIT. iii. 5. x. 3. θεωρηθέντων
X. ix. 22. θεωρήσαντες VI. v. 1.
θεωροῦντα VIL. iii. 5.

θεωρήματα X. iv. 10. θεωρημάτων LX.
iv. 5.

GewpnrixhX. vii. 1, 7. viii. 7. θεωρητικῇς
VI. ii. 3. θεωρητικῷ X. ix. 16. θεω.
ρητικὴν X. vii. 4. θεωρητικὸς 1, v.
2, 7.

| GewplalV, ii. το. X. viii. 7,8. θεωρίαν

X. iv. 5. viii.8. θεωρίας II. ii.r. VIL
iii. x. X. viii. 8.

θῆλυ VIL, vii. 6.

θηρίου VII. i. 2. vi. 7. xiv. 4. θηρίοις
VI. xiii. 1. θηρίων VI. vii. 4. θηρία
ΠῚ. viii.10, 11. VI. ii. 2. VIL iii. 11.
vi. 6. xi. 4. xii. 7. xiii. 5,

θηριότης VIL. i. 1. ν. 5. vi. 7. θηριότητα
VI. i. 1.

θηριώδης VIT. i. 3. v. 8. θηριῶδες ΤΠ,
X. ΣΙ. θηριώδεις IIT. x. 8, VII. ν. 2,
3, 5, 6. vi. 6. θηριώδει VIL i 2.
θηριώδη VIL. v. 6.

θησαυροῦ IIT. iii. 5.

ϑητικοὶ IV. iii, 29.

θιασωτῶν ΤΠ. ix. 5.

θλίβει L x, 12.

θνήσκω. τεθνᾶσι 1. viii. 16. reOveds I
x. 6. τεθνεῶτι 1. x. 3. ILL. vi. 6.
τεθνεῶτα I. x. 3.

θνητὸν X. vii. 8, θνητοῦ VIL. it. θνητὰ
X. vii. 8.

INDEX VERBORUM.

θρασύδειλοι IIT. vii. 9.

θρασννόμενοι IIT. vii. 9.

θρασὺς II. ii. 8. vii. 2. viii. 2, 3. ITI.
vii. 7, 8,12. VIL ἰχ. 2. θρασὺν IT.
viii. 2, 3. θρασεῖς III. vii. 12.

θρασύτης II. viii. 6, 7. θρασύτητι IL.
Vili. 5.

OperrixhvI.vii.12. θρεπτικοῦ]. xii.6.
θρεπτικὸν I. xiii. 14.

θρηνητικὸς IX. xi. 4.

θρίξ VIII. xii. 2. τριχῶν VIL v. 3.

θυμιαμάτων TIT. x. 5.

θυμοειδεῖς ITT. viii. 10.

θυμὸς IIT. ii. 3,6. viii. 10, 11. WIL. vi.
2, 3- θυμοῦ IIL. viii. 10, 11,12. V.
viii. 9. VII. i. 7. iv. 2, 6. vi. 1.
θυμῷ 1. iv. 7. Π. iii. το. ILL. viii. 10,
V. viii. 9. VII. vi. 4. θυμὸν IIL i. 21,
23, 26. ii. 3,6. viii. 10,12. IV. v. 10,
V. viii. 8. VII. vi. 3, 5. θυμοὶ VIT.
iii. 7. θυμοὺς VII. v. 5.

θυμώδης VIL. vi. 3.

θύρας V.i. 7. θύραις VII. vi. 2.

θυσίαι TV. ii. 11. WII. ix. 5. θυσίας
VIII. ix. 5.

θύειν V. vii. 1. θύεται TX, ii. 6.

I

lards VII. viii. r. ἰατοὶ X. ix. 21.

ἰατρείας VII. xii. 1. xiv. 4,6. larpeias
Π. iii. 4. VII. xiv. 4.

ἰατρεύει I. vi. 16. larpetorvra VII.xiv.7.
larpedew V. ix. 16. ἰατρεύεσθαι VIL.
xiv. 7.

larpexh I. vi. 4. VI.i. 1. vii. 4. x. 1.
xii. §. xiii 8. ἰατρικῆς. i. 3. xiii. 7.
Il. ii. 4. Χ. ix. 15,17. ἰατρικῇ 1.
vil. 1. V. xi. 7. ἰατρικὴν IIL. iii. 8.
VI. xii. 1, 2.

larpexwrepos I. vi. 16.

ἰατρὸς I. vi. 16. IL. iii. rz. X. iv. 6.
ix. 15. ἰατροῦ V.v. 9. ἰατρῷ ΤΧ. ii.
1. ἰατρὸν IV. vii. 13. V. ix. 15.
VI. iv. 6. ἰατρῶν 1. xiii. 7. IT. iv. 6.
V.v.9. ἰατροῖς Il. v. 14. ἰατροὶ
X. ix. 16, 18.

ἰδέα I. vi. 3. ἰδέας I. vi. 2, 10, 13.
ἰδέᾳ IX. v. 3. ἰδέαν 1. vi. 2, 4,9, 11,
16. viii. 12, V.i 7.

ἰδιογνώμονες VII. ix. 3.

ἴδιος VIL. 111. 12. ἰδίων IV. i. 17. ii. 15.
VI. viii.9. ἰδία 111. iv. 5. VIIL xii.
7. ἰδίᾳ ΠῚ, ν. 7. ἴδιον I. vii. 12.
III. i. 13. V. iii. 8. ν. 7. ἴδιοι IID

XXXVli

xi. r. ἰδίας Π]. xi 4. ΣΧ. ix. 15.
ἐδίου VIL. iv. 2.

ἰδιῶται X. viii. 10. ἐδιώταις IIL viii. 8.
ἰδιώτας IV. i. 30.

ἱδρύμενον T. x. 8.

ἰέναι IV. ni. 27. V.iv. 7. IX. xi. 6.

ἵερον V.v.7. lepGIV. ii. 17. tepalV.
I. 42.

ἐθεῖα V. v. 3.

ἱκανὸς 1X. x. 2. ἱκανοὶ IX. x. 5. ἱκανῷ
VII. i. γ. ἱκανὸν I. iv. 4. vii. 20.
VII νι... IX.i.7. X. viii. το.
ix. 2,9. ἱκανοῖς III. iii. 19. ἱκανὰ
V.vi. 7. ἱκανῶν IX. x. 2.

ἱκανῶς 1. iit. 1. iv. 6. ν. 6. x. 15. xi. 2.
xii.8. ILix.1. V.v.15. x. 1. VI.
xii. 2, 1.1. ς. IX.i4. X. iii. 13.
vii. 4. ix. I.

Ἴλιον VI, 11, 6.

ἵμαντα VIL. vi. 3.

ἱμάτιον VIL. vii. 5.

bal.v.5. 11. νἱῖ. 11. IV. iii.3x. V.
v.7. viii.6. VII. ii. 8. VIIT. ii. 3. xi.
I. vili, 8. ΣΧ, vii. 6.

ἱππικὴν 1.1.4. ἱππικῶν Li 4.

ἱππὸς I. viii. 10. ἵσπου ΤΠ. vi. 2. X. v.
8. ἵππῳ. vii. 13. ἵππον]. ix. 9.
Il. vi.2. VIII. xi. 6.

lodge V. v.14. VIII. vi.6. IX.i τ.
ἰσάζειν V. iv. 4. VIII. xiii.1. ἰσάζῃ
VIL. xiv. 8. ἰσασθῆναι V. v. 8, 9, 13.
ἰσασθῇ V. v. 12. ἰσασμένον V. Υ. 12.
lodgowroVITT. viii. 5. ἰσάζοντες VIII,
xiii. I.

ἰσάριϑμα VIIL. iii. x.

loax6s.I. vi. 3.

ἴσασι VI. ix. 2.

ἰσόῤῥοπος TX. i. 7.

ἴσος V.i. 8. ἴσου ΤΙ. vii. 4. V.v. 18.
vi.§. VIII. x. 6. xi. 5. IX.i.9. X.
viii. 4. lons IV. ii. το. toyVIL. xiii. .
1. ἴσον Π. vi. 4, §. viili.2. V.i. 8.
ii. 8, 12. iii. 2, 3. iv. 3, 6, 8, 9, 14. ν.
8, 10, 14, 15. viii. 11. VI. viii. 4.
VILL. v. 5. vii. 3. ix. 3. xiii. 7. xiv. 1.
IX. ii.§. toe V. iii. 6. ν. 12. ΨΊΠ.
xX. 3, 6.xi.5. ἴσαι V.iv.12. WIII.
x. 1. ἴσα V. iii. 6. Vv. 10. vii. 5.
ἴσων V.iv. 10. V. 9. Vi. 4. ἴσοις V.
iv. 3. ἴσας VI. v. 6. ἴσου VIII. xiii.
1. ἴσην VILL. xiii. 11.

loérns V .iii. 6, 8. ν. 12, 14. viQ. VIII.
v. §. vii. 2. viii. 5. IX. viii. 2. ἰσό-
tyros V. v.14. ἰσότητι VILL. xiii. 1,
ἰσότητα V.v.6. VIII. vi. 7. xiii. 1.

XXXVILL

ἵστημι. ἑστηκὸς IL. ii. 3. στήσεται VL
viii. 9.

ἰσχυρίζεσθαι IV. iii. 27.

ἰσχυρογνώμονες VII. ix. 3. ἰσχυρογνώ-
μονας VIL. ix. 2.

ἰσχυρὸς II. ii. 8. ἰσχυρῷ VI. xiii. 1.
ἰσχυρὸν I. xii. 2. X. ix. 12. ἰσχυρὰ
VIL. ii. 4. iv. 4. xiv. 6. ἰσχυρὰς VII.
ii. 4, 6. ἰσχυρῶν VIL. vii. 6. ἰσχν-
ρότατοι I. viii. 9. ἰσχυρότατον VIL.
ii. 5.

ἰσχυρῶς VI. xiii. 1.

ἰσχὺν IL. ii. 6. VWI. v. 1.
ἴσχνος II. ii. 6, 8.

ἰσχύει 11. iv. 4. ἰσχύῃ X ix. 6. ἰσχύειν
X. ix. 3. ἰσχύοντες IIT. viii. 8.

ἴσως I. iv. 4, 5. Vi. 1, 13, 16. Vil. 9, 17.
viii. 9, 16. ix. 3. xi. 5. xii. 7. xiii. 8,
16,17. IL. vi. 7. ix. 7. 11.1. 1,6,
8, 16, 21, 24. li. 11. iii. x. iv. 5. Vv.
10. ix. 5,6. IV. viii.g. V. ii. 11.
vii. 4. ix. 17. VI. viii. 4. WII. viii.
3. xiii. 2, 4,6. WIIL. ii. 3. iv. 4. vi.
2, 4. Vii. 6. viii. 6, 7. xiv. 4. ΙΧ. i.
7, 8. ii. 4. vii. 3. viii. 3, 9. ix. 3, 5.
xX. 3 5. x6. V.i-4, 2. ii. 4. Vi. 4.
vii. 4. Vill. I1. ix. 5, 9, 15, 16, 18, 21,
22.

ἱτητικώτατον ITT. viii. 10,

ἰχθύσι VIL vii. 4.

K

καθάπερ I. i. 4, §. ii. 2. ili. 7. Vi. 11.
Vii. 11. Vili, 15, 17. ix. 11. X. 9, 13.
Xi. 3. xii. 4. xiii. 10, 15. II. ii. 1. iit.
10. ix. 3. IIL. iii. 15. vii. 7,13. IV.

V. ix. It.

i. 33. 11.1. ἀν. τ. V. vi. 6. VL 1.

iv. 5. xiii. 2. VII. i. 2, 3. ii. 4. 111. 8.
iv. 3, σ. V. 5. Vi. 1,3. WILL. v. 4. ix.
I. X. §. Xi. 1. Xili. 1, 5, 9. XIV. I, 3,
4. IX. i. 1, 3, 7, 9. ii. 6, 8. iii. 5. iv.
2. V. 3, 4. Vi. 2, 4. Vii. 1. Vili. II. ix.
5, 6, 7,8, 10. x. 1. X. iii. 3, 8. v. 10.
vi. 2, 5,8. ix. 1, 11, 16, 18.

καθαριότητι KX. ν. 7. Vil. 3.

καθεύδειν I. ν, 6. X.vili.7. καθεύδων
VII. x. 3. καθεύδοντος VII. iti. 12.
καθεύδοντα VIL. iii. 7. καθεύδοντι I.
Vili. 9. X. vi. 2. καθεύδοντες VIIL
Vv...

καθιερεύσας VII. v. 3.

καθιστᾶσαι VIL. xii. 2.
VII. xii. 2.

καθὸ VII. xiv. 8,

καθεστηκυίας

INDEX VERBORUM.

καθόλου I. vi. 1, 3. Xi. 2. IL. id. 4. Vil.
1. ΠΙ. 1. 15. IV. vi. 6. v.19. V.
vii, 6. x..4, 5,6. VI. iii. 3. vi. I. Vil
4. viii. 7. xi. 4. WIL. iit. 6, 9, 10,11,
12. IX. ii. 5. X. ix. 15, 16.

καὶ yap VIL. vi. 2. WIII. ix 1.

καὶ δὴ VII. x. 4.

καινὰ X. iv. 9. καινῶν IV. vill. 6.

καίπερ. νἷ. τ. IL. ii. 5. IL ii.7. V.
x. 8. IX.iv. 7.

καίτοι], vi.t5. 1Π|.ν. 7. χ. 3. V.v.
3. vil. 1,4. X. ix. 18.

καιρὸς I. vi. 3. Il. vii. 16. καιροῦ.
vi. 4. καιρὸν IT. ii. 4. Ill. i 6.
καιροῖς 111. ix. 5.

καίει V. vii. 2.

κἀκεῖ. ix.15. VI. viii.g. VIL. iv.6.

κἀκεῖνος VII. vi. 2. κἀκεῖνο X. ix. 16.
κἀκείνῃ VIII. vi. 7. κἀκείνου LX. i.
4. κἀκείνην X. iv. 3. κἀκείνους IX.
Χ. 4.

κακηγορεῖν V. 1. 14.

κακηγορία V. ii. 13.

κακία 11. iii. 6. vii. 10. ITI. v. 2, 19.
V. i. το. VI.v. 6. VII. 1. 1,2. iv. 2.
Vv. δ. Vi. 4. Wii. 1, 3. κακίας II. v. 3,
4. vi. 14. Π]. ν. 17. vi. 4. IV. i. 3.
Ψ. ἡ. 19. ii. 10. vii. 7. χ. 7. VILL
2,4. V. §. Vi. 7. Vili. 1. WILL. vil. 4.
IX. ix.6. κακίᾳ VIII. x. 3. κακίαν
Lil. ii. x4. VIL. i. 3. iv. 6. xi. 2.
κακίαι 11.ν. 3. ΠῚ. v.45, 20. IV. ii.
22. κακιῶν II, vi. 15. viii. 3. ix. I.
Ii. v. 16. IV. i 45.

κακολόγος IV. iii. 31.

κακοπαθεῖν I. v.6. X. vi. 6.

κακοποιεῖν IIT. v. 17.

κακοποιοὶ LV, iii. 35.

κακὸς 1. xii. 12. IL. iii. 7,10. IV. vii.
10. VIl.vi.7. κακοῦ ΠΠ.νϊ.2. V.
iii. 15.iv.6. κακῷ IIL. ii. 10. v. 18,
19. VWILxiv.2. X.ik§. κακὸν 1.
x. 3. IL. vi.14. ΠῚ. iv. 2, 6. vi 6.
vii. 13. IV.i.5, 44.iii.35.v.7. V.
i. 10. lit. 15. xi.8. VI.ix. 4. ὙΠ.
iv. 6. xi. 1. xiii. 1, 7.xiv.2. XX. ii,
5. κακοὶ 1Π. 1. 6,7. Vv. §.vi.14. ITI.
i. 14. IV. iii. 35. VILI.iv.2. κακῶν
J. ix.3. 11.1χ.4. 111.1.4. V.i το.
νἱ. 4. IX. xi.5. X.ii5. κακοῖς ΓΗ͂.
v.3 V.ix.17. κακὰ 1Π1.1}. 11. vi
2,3. IV.iii.30. VL v.4. VIL. ii.9.
vi. 7. xiv. 9. κάκιον VIL vi.7. κά-
κιστος V.i,18. κάκιστον VIIL. x, 2.

κακουργοῦντες III. τ. 10.

INDEX VERBORUM.

κακουργία IX. 11}. 2.

κακῶς I. x. 9. IL. i. 6. iii. 9, 10. v. 2
IM. xii. 6. IV.i. 6. V. ii. 2. v. 6.
VI. ii. 3. ix. 3. X. ii. 5. iii. 8. ix. 20

καλεῖν VIL. xiii. 4. VILL x. 2. ΙΧ. xi.
5. καλοῦμεν IV. i, 3. VIL i. 1.
καλέσωμεν II. vii. το. καλοῦσι IT.
viii. 3. V. iii. 13. iv. 7, VI. xii. 9.
VII. ix. 2. IX. ii. 7. viii. 4. x. 6.
καλεῖται III. xii. 5. IV. ii. 4. V.i. 7.
iv. 6. v. 15. vii. 7. καλοῦνται IV. vi.
I. καλουμένη VI, xi. 1.

κάλλος IV. iii. 5. κάλλους I. viii. 16.
κάλλει Χ. vii. 7.

καλοκαγαθίας IV. iii. 16. καλοκαγαθίαν
X. ix. 3.

καλὸς VI. xii. 9. ΙΧ. iv. 4. καλὴ 1. x.
12. καλὸν, x. 12. 1Π. iii, 7. ix. 2.
IIT. i. 4. v. 2. vi. 3, 10, 12. vii. 6, 13.
Vili. §, 11, 12, 14. 1X. 4. xi. 8. xii. 9.
IV. i. 17, 35. ii. 21. vi. 6, 7. vii. 6.
ix. 4. VIII. i. §. viii. 6. xiii. 8. ΙΧ.
vii. 5, 6. vili. I, 5, 7,9, 10. XL 5, 6.
X. viii. 9. ix. 8,10. καλοῦ IL. iit. 7.
ITT. vii. 2, 6. viii. 3. IV. i. 12,14, 34.
ti. 7,20. V.ix.g. LX. viil. 6,11. X.
ix. 4,10. cad@TILi.7. IV. vi. 8.
IX. ii. 5. X.ix. 9. καλῆς IV. i. 14.
καλοὶ IV. iii. 5. καλαὶ I. viii. 13.
IV. i. 12, 35. VII. xiv. 1. καλῶν].
iv. 6. viii. 9. ix. 8. x. 14. xii. 6. 17.
iii, 1. ΤΙ]. 1. 7, x1. IV. iii. 35. VI.
xii. 7. VIL.iv.5. VII1.i. 5. IX. vii.
6. X. tii. 10. v. 6. vii. 1. καλοῖς IV.
iv. 3. VI. xiii. 3. [X.ix.6. καλὴν
VIL ix. 4. LX. viii. 9. καλαῖς I. viii.
12. καλὰ I. iii, 4. viii. 15. IED i 11,
23. iv. 4. v. 3,7. IV. i. 7, 8. iii. 33.
VI. xii. 1. VIII. vi. 7. xiii. 8. IX.
vili.7. X. vi. 3. viii.10. καλὰς VIII.
i. 2. IX. viii. 7. κάλλιον 1. ii. 8.
VIII. xiii. 1. IX. ii. 8. viii. 10. ix. 2.
xi. 1,6. X. ix. 18. καλλίους X. vii.
7. κάλλιστοι I. viii. 9. κακλίστη
IV. ii. 18. καλλίστην VIII. i. 6.
κάλλιστον 1. viii. 14. ix. 6. x. 13.
Il. v. 17. IV. ii.9. X.iv. 5. κάἀλ-
hora 1. ix. 5.x. 11,13. TOL iii. 11.
IV. if. 16. IX. viii. 6, 7. X. viii. 11.
καλλίστοις III. vi. 8. IV. iii. 10.

Καλυψὼ II. ix. 3.

καλῶς I. i. 1. iii, 5. iv. 6. vii. 14, 17,
20, 22. viii. 2, 13. xii. 5. ΠΙ|.:. 21.
v.17. IV.i. 25. V. viii.g. VI. v. 1.
x, 3. xii. 3. VIII. vii.6. IX. i. 4.

XXX1X

viii. 9.x. 2. X. i. 3. ii. 5. iii. 4. iv.
4. V. 10, Viil. 11, 13. 1x. 6, II, 17,
21, 23.

κάμνει X. iv.g. κάμνοντα VII. vii. 5.
ΙΧ. ii. 1. καμνόντων VIL. xii. 1.
κἀμνουσι 11. iv. 6. X. iii. 8. κεκμη-
κόσι 1. xi. 5. κεκμηκότας I. xi. 5.

κἂν IV. v.7. vi. 7. V.ix. 4.x. 5. VI.
xiii, 7,8. ΙΧ. xi. 2. Χ, vill. 13.
ix, 12.

κανονίζομεν IT. iii. 8.

κάνων ITT, iv.5. V. x. 7.

καπνοῦ IT. ix, 3.

Καρκίνου VIL. vii. 6.

καρπίμων TV, ii. 33.

καρπῶν VIII. ix. 5.

καρτερεῖν VII. v. 5. vii. 4.

καρτερία VII. i. 6.x. 5. καρτερίας VII.
i, 4. vii. 4.

καρτερικὸς VII. vii. 1, 4. καρτερικὸν
VIL i. 6. iti. τ. καρτερικοὶ VIL.
iv. 2.

καρτερικῶς X. ix. 8.

καταβέβληνται I. v. 8.

καταδεέστεροι VIII. vii. 4.

καταζῆν 1. x. 10.

κατακλίσει LX, ii. 9.

κατακούσωσι X. V. 3

κατέκτα V. ix. 1.

κατακώχιμον X. 1x. 3.

κατειλημμένα K. ix. §.

καταλείπειν 1V.i.18. κατέλιπον X, ix.
19. καταλιπεῖν VII, ii. 12. κατα-
λείπηται VII. i. ς.

καταλλάττονται 11]. ix. 6.

κατανοοῦσι X. Vv. I.

καταπέλτην ITI. i. 17.

καταπλὴξ IT. vii. 14.

κατεσκεύαζον 1. vi. 2. κατασκενάσασθαι
IV. ii. 16.

κατασκευαὶ LV. ii. 11.

κατασμικρίζοντες VILI. xiii. 10.

κατατρίβοντας 111. x. 2.

καταφανὴς II]. vii 10. καταφανέστερον
ΣΧ. iv. 1.

κατάφασις VI. ii. 2.

καταφεύγοντες II. iv. 6.
V.iv. 7. X. vi. 3, 4.

καταφάναι VI. iii. 1.

καταφρονεῖ IV, iii. 22. καταφρονοῦσι
IV. iti. 21. καταφρονεῖν 11. ii. 9.
καταφρονούμενοι Χ. i. 3.
καταφρονητικὸς LV, iii. 28,
καταφυγὴν VIII. i. 2.

κατίδωμεν IT. vii. 11.

καταφεύγουσι

xl INDEX VERBORUM.

κατεσθίειν VIT. v, 2.

κατέχουσι IV. ν. 8, 1ο. κατεῖχε VII. v.
ἡ. κατέχειν VII. vii. 6.

κατηγορούμενον I, vi. 13.

κατηγορίαν I. vi. 4. κατηγορίαις I.
vi. 3.

κατήκοον I, xiii. 18.

κατορθοῦν I. viii. 7. IT. vi. 14, 18. xar-
ορθοῦσα VIL. ix. 6. κατορθοῦται IT.

vi. 12.
κατορθωτικὸς IT. ili. 7.
κάτω IT. i. 2.

καῦσιν V. ix. 15.

καχεξία Vii. 5. καχεξίαν V. i. 5.

κεῖται ΠΙ. v. 18, κείμενος V. i. 14.

κελεύει V. xi. 1. VILL 2. κελεύων.
i. 14. ἐκέλευε VIL. vi.2. IX. i. 5.

Κελτοὺς IIL. vii. 7.

κενὴν 1. ii. 1.

κεραμεῖς VILL. i. 6.

κερδαίνειν IV. i. 43. V. ii. 4. iv. 13, 14.
xepdalvovac LV. i. 43. ἐἑκέρδανεν V.

ii. 5.

κέρδος. iv. 5,6, 13. VILiv. 5. VIII.
xiv. 2. IX.i.4. κέρδου: IV.i. 41,
43. Vii. 12,13, 14. V. ii. 6. iv. 4, 6,
14. VII. i. 7. iv. 2, 6, κέρδη 111.
ix. 6.

Kepxéwy VII. vii. 6.

κεστὸν VII, vi. 3.

κεφαλαίου IT. vii.5. κεφαλαίῳ IT. ix. 7.

κεφαλὴν VI. vii. 3.

κήδη ΙΧ, ii. 7.

κιβδηλεύουσι CX. iii. 2.

κιθαρίζειν I. viii. 14. IL. ἃ, 6.
ρίζοντες IL. i. 4.

κιθαριστοῦ I. vii. 14.
4, 6.

κιθαρῳφδῷ IX, i. 4.

κίμβικες LV. i. 30.

κινδυνεύῃ LV. iii. 23. κινδυνεύοντας X.
viii. 7. ἐκινδύνενον IT. viii. 9.

κίνδυνος ITT. viii. 9. κινδύνῳ ILL. vi. 8.
κίνδυνον IIT, viii. 11, 22. κινδύνων

κιθα.

κιθαρισταὶ IT, i.

ΠῚ. vii. 12. κωδύνοις 177. viii. 13.
VIL xiii. το. κωδύνους ITI, viii. 1,
10. ix. 6.

κινεῖ VI 11, 5. κινεῖν TIL i. 6. VII.
iii, 10. κινῆσαι, xiii. 15. κιηθή-

σεται 1. x. 14. κινεῖσθαι 11. v. 4. X.
i. 4. κινούμενα V. vii. 1. κινουμένῳ
VI. xiii. 1.

κίνησι IV. iii. 34. VIL ii. 4. X. iv.
23. κινήσεως VII. xiv. 8. X. iv. 3.
καήσει ILI, iii. 4. VIL. xiv. 8. χίνη:-

ow X, iii. 4. iv. 2, 4. κιαήσεις IV.
viii, 3. VII. xii. τ. X. iii. 4. κινή.
σεων 1, xiii. 13. IV. viii. 3. VI.
xiv. 2.

κινητὸν V. vii. 4.

κίονος X. iv. 2.

kloonpy IIL 1. 17.

κλεὶς V. i, 7.

κλείουσι V. i. 7.

κλέπτης V. Vi. 1, 2.

κλέκτει V. xi. 6. ἔκλεψεν. vi. 2. VII.
vi. 3.

κληρονομία» VII. xiii. 6.

κληρωτὸς VIII. x. 2.

κλίνη Vi. Υ. 15. κλῖναι V. v.15, 16.

κλοπὴ IT. vi. 18 V., ii. 13.

κνήμης LX. viii. 2.

κοῖλον 1. xiii. 10.

κοινὸς VII. iv. 2. κοινὴ I. vi. 2. vii.
12. xiii. 12. IL iii.7. IX. viii. 7.
κοινὸν IL. vi. 3, 11. vii. 12. IL ii. 7.
ΠῚ. ii. 3. IV.i. 41. ii. 7,11. Voi
11. ii. 11. vii. 7. VI. viii. 2, 3.
VILL. xi. 6. xii. 7. xiv. 3. IV. i. 2.
li. 9. 111,4. κοινοῦ X.ix. 15. κονῷ
I. xiii. 11. xiv. 3. κοινῇ I. vi. 13.
ΠῚ. v.21. V.iir3. VIII ix. 4.
IX. vi. 1, 3. XK. ix. 14. κοινὴν Χ.
ix.14. xowallTIT. χί. τ. VIL. vi. 2.
X. ἰχ. 14. xowdlV. ii. 15. VI. xi.
2. VIII. ix.1,2.xi.8. ΙΧ. viii. 2.
xowéy V. iv.2. VIII. xiv. 3. X.ix.

xoyra V. Vii. 4.

15. Kowbrepos VIII. xii. 6. κουό-
τερον VIIL xii. 7. xowordry IIL. x.
10.

κοινότητα IX, ii, 9.

κοινωνεῖ]. xiii. 8, 1Π1.1]. 2. χ. 8. X.
vili.8. κοινωνεῖν IV. vi. 1. VI. ii.

2. ΙΧ, ix. το. κοινωνοῦσι 1. xi. 5.
ΨΟ. 12. ΨΙΠ.. ἰχ, τ. IX. xii. 2, 3.
κοινωνῆσαι I. ix. 9. VIII. xi. 7.
ἐκοινώνησε IX. i. 9. κοινώνησασι IX.
i. 7. κοιψωνοῦμεν Χ. ii. 4.

κοινωνία V.v.9,10,12,14. VIII. ix. 4.
Χ. 4. ΧΙ]. 7. IX.xii.1. κοινωνίᾳαΥ.
ἡ. 13,16.5Ὁ.. WIlLix.1. χὶϊ. :. xiv. 2.
κοινωνίαι VII. ix. 4, 5,6. κοινωνίαις
Υ. ν. 6. viii. 6ὅ. WIII.ix. 1,6. κοι-
γωνία» ΤΙ. vii. 11. IV. viii. 12. ΙΧ.
i. 4. κοινωνιῶν ὙΠ]. ix. 5.

κοινωνικαῖς VIII. xii. 1.

κοινωνοὶ Ve. v.12. κοινωνῳ Vii 17.
κοινωνῶν V. vi. 4.

κολάζουσι IIT. v. 7,8. κεκολάσθαι ΠΤ.
xii.6. κολάζεσθαι X.ix. το. κολα.

INDEX VERBORUM.

σθῆναι V. v. 4. κεκολασμένον ΠῚ.
xii. 8.

κόλαξ 11. vii. 12. IV. vi.g. WIT.
Vili. 1. κόλακος Χ. 111. 11. κόλακες
IV. iii. 29. κόλαξιν IV. i. 35.

κολάσεις 17. iti. 4. IID. i.2. XX. ix.
Io.

κολοιὸν VITI. i. 6.

κομιδῇ ITT. v.12. IX.iv.7. X.i. 2.
κομιδῆς LX. vii. 2.

κομιζόμεθα 11. 1. 4. κομίσαι IIT. i. 3.
κομίσαντες I. vi. 2. κομιζέσθαι VIII.
xiii. 7. κομιουμένους LX. vii. 1. κο-
μιμούμενος VIII. xiii. 11. κομιεῖσθαι
IX. ii. ς.

κοσμοῦντα IV. iii. 36.

κοσμιότητα IT. viii. 8.

κόσμος IV. ii. 16. 111. 16. VI. vii. 4.
κόσμου IIT. 1.1.3. X. 1. 4. κόσμῳ
VI. vii. 3.

κουφίζονται IX. xi. 2.

κοῦφα VI. vil. 7.

κρᾶσιν VII. xiv. 6.

κρατεῖ VII, viii. 5. κρατεὺ VIL. ii. 1.

vii. 1, 4. IX. viii. 6. κρατεῖσθαι
VII. ii. 3. v. 5,7. κρατοῦνται VII.
iv. 5.

κράτιστος IX. iii. 5. κρατίστη V.i. 15.
X. iv. 7. vii. 2. κράτιστον Χ. ii. 1.
iv. 5. vii. 8. ix. 14. κρατίστην Χ.
Vii. 1. κράτιστοι 111. viii. 13. xpa-
τίστους ITI. ix. 6. κράτιστα ILL. viii.
7. ΣΧ. Vi. 4.

κρέα VI. vil. 7. κρέασι VII. v. 2.

κρείττων I. v. 5. V. vii.g. X. vi.7.
vii. 8. κρεῖττον I. xii. 5. V. v. 8.
x.2. VII. ii.3. VIII. viii. 3. IX.
ix. 3. X. ii. 3, 4. κρείττους ITT.
viii. 9. ὙΠ. vii. 1.

κρηπῖδος X. iv. 2.

Ἐρητῶν I. xiii. 3.

κρίνομεν IT. ix. 6. ἔκρινεν V. ix. 12.
κρίνεται V. viii. 9. X. viii. 12. xpl-
νειν IID. 1.1. VI. x. 3. X. ix. 21.
κρίναντες 111. iit. 19. κρίνει I. iii. 5.
viii. 13. ΠῚ. ἐν. 4. κρίναι X. ix, 20.
κρινεῖ 171. v.17. κρῖναι X. ix. 20,21.
κρίνας V. ix. 13. κρίνουσι Χ, 111. 2.
V. 2. Vill. 11. ix. 20. κρῖνον X. iv. 8.

xplois 1. ix. 8. 1Π1.χ. 9. IV.v.13.
V. vi. 4. ix. 12. VIxi.r. xploe
VIII. viii. 2. κρίσεσι IV. 1. τ.

κριτὴς I. iil. 5.

κριτικὸε VI. xi. 2. κριτικὴ VIL x. 2.
xi. I.

VOL. I.

f

xi

κεκτῆσθαι IV. iii. 32. κτησάμενοι IV.
i. 20. IX. vii. 7. κεκτημένους X.
Vili, 11. κεκτημένοις VIII. i. 1.

κτείνει V.ix. 11. κτείνῃ V. iv. 4.

κτῆμα ΤΥ. 11. το. Υ΄ νὶ. 8, TX.ix. 5.
κτήματα V. vi. 9. κτημάτων IV. i.
17. κτήματος IV. ii. το.

κτῆσις IV, i. γ. κτήσεως IV. i. 23. X.
vi. 3. κτήσει I. viii. 2.

κτητὸν I. vi. 12. κτητὰ I. vi. 14.

κυβερνητικῆς II. ii. 4. κυβερνητικὴν
IIL iii. 8.

xuBeurhs IV. i. 43.

κύκλου IT. ix. 2. κύκλῳ ΠῚ. ix. 3.

Κυκλωκπικῶς Χ, ix. 13.

κύματα III. vii. 7. κύματος ΤΙ. ix. 4.

κυμινοπρίστης IV. i. 39.

Κυπρογενοῦς VII. vi. 3.

κυριεύων VIII. x. 5.

κύριος IIT. i. 4. ν. 8. κύρια VI. ii. 1.
xiii. 2,8. ὙΠ. iii. 9, 13. κυρίαν
VIL xiii. 1. κύριοι ITT. i. 3. v. 9, 17,
22. viii. 4. κύριαι 1. ix. 14. 1]. ii.
I. κυρίοις V. £13. κυριωτέρα VI.
xii. 2. κυριωτάτης I. ii. 4. κυριώ-
τερον I. vii. 13. X. vill. 5. κυριώ-
rara ]. viii.2. 11Π.}.18. VIL.i. 5.
xupwordrots ITT. i. 18. κυριώτατον
IX. viii. 6. κυριωτάτῳ IX. viii. 6.
κύριον VIII. xiii. 11. IX. ix. 7. X.
Vii. g. Viil. 12.

κύριως I. xiii. 19. VI. xiii. 1, 2, 6.
VI. iii. 13. xii. 3. VIII. iv. 4.
IX. ix. 7, X. v. 11.

κυρτὸν I, xiii. το. III. vi. ro.

κυούσας VII. v. 2.

κύνες IIT. x. 7. VIL. νἱ 1. κύνας 111.
Viil. 4.

κωλυτικὰ I. vi. 8.

κωλύει 1. χ. τς. ILI. ἰχ. 6. IV.i. 19.
V. ii. το. v. 8. xi. 8. VIL. iii. 6. x.
2. xiii. 2. VID. iv. 3. ΙΧ. vi. 4.
X. iii, 3. ix. 16. κωλύσοντες ITI. v.
ἡ. κωλύουσι LV. viii.9. κωλύεσθαι
IV. ix. 3. κωλύουσα VIL. ii. 6. iii.
10. κωλυόμενον VIL, iii. 9.

κωμῳδιῶν IV, viii. 6.
κωμῳδοῖς LV, ii. 10.

A

λαγωῶν ITT. x. 7.

λαθραῖα V. ii. 13.

Λακεδαιμονίων 1. xiii. 3. IIT. iii.6. X.
ix.13. Λακεδαιμονίοις IX. vi. 2.

xii

Λάκωνες: LV. iii. 25. VIL.i.3. Δακώνων
IV. vii. 15. Λάκωσι III. viii. 16.

λαμβάνειν 11.11.8. IV.i. 7,9, 29, 39,
40. V.v.8 VI. x.3. λαμβάνομεν
11. 1.4. λαμβάνουσι 1Π1.νυ]. 6. IV.iL
9, 33, 34,40. VIL ix. 2. VIII. xiv.
I. λαμβάνοντας IV. 1. 42. ἐλάμ-
Baye IX. i. 5. λάβωμεν IV. iii. 1.
λαβεῖν. ii. 8. IL. vi. 4. ix. 2. [Π,
ii. 12. γ. 17. V.v.1q4 VI. ix. 1.
VILI. vi. 3. xiii. 10. IX.i.9. X. iv.
2. λάβοι Liv. 7. VIL. χ. 4. X. iv.
I. ἐλάβομεν 11. 1.4. λάβωσι V. iv.
8. λαβὼν V. viii. 3. ἔλαβεν V. ix.
13. λάβοιμεν VI.v.1r. ΙΧ. viii. 3.
λαβόντας VI. xii. 7. λάβῃ VI. xiii. 2
λαβόντα VIII. xii. 2. ἔλαβον IX. i. 7.
λαβοῦσα X. vii. 7. ληψομένῳ IT. vi.
ἡ. λήψεται IV. i. 15, 17, 24, 31.
εἴλήφθω Υ. ἱ. 8. ληφθῆναι V. xi. 8.
εἷληφὼς VI. ix. 4. xiii. 6. εἰλήφασι
VIL. xiii. 6. λαμβάνοντι IV. i. 8. Υ.
ix. 10. λαμβάνοντες ΤΥ. ἱ, 10. ΙΧ.
i. 9. λαμβάνοντα IV. i. 30, 31. λαμ-
βάνει ΤΥ͂.1..1. V.x. 4. VILL ix. 3.
λήψονται IX. viii. 9. ληφθείη I.vii. 10,

ληπτέος I. vii. 7. ληπτέον IT. vi. 7. vii.
1.ἷχ.4. V.ii.7. VLi.7. VII. vi. 6.

λαμπρύνεται TV.ii. 20. λαμπρυνόμεναι
IV. ii. 4.

λαμπρῶς IV, ii. 11.

λανθάνει 11. ἷχ. 8. V.i.7. VI. iii. 2.
VIL. viii. 1. λανθανέτω Liv. 5. λα»-
θάνουσαν VILI. ii. 4. λανθάνειν IV.
iii. 28. Vi. 4. λανθανόντας VITL. ii. 4.
λανθάνουσα VIII. ii. 4. IX. ν. τ.
λαῶν VIII. vii. 1.

λέγω I. xiii. 11. I. v.2.vi. 5. το. IV.
vi. 8. V. viii. 3. VI. vi. 2. xii. 7.
VII. iii. τ, 2. iv. 2. v. 2, 7. xiv. 7.
X. iii. 4. λέγει ΠῚ. ii. rx. x. 4. IV.
vii. §. V.iii9.xi.9. VI.i.1. VO.
iii, 10.x.4. λέγομεν I. iv. 1. vii. 4,
6. viii. 2. ix. 9. x. 3. xiii. 6, 20. IZ.
iv. x. VI. 9. vii. 5. viii.8. II. ii. 2.
vi. 4. X.2, §. xii. 8. IV.i. 2, 23, 42.
ii, 2.v. 11. vil. 7. Vi. 3, 13. iv. 6.
VL til. 3. Vv. 1, 2. X. 1, 4. Xi 2. xii.
7. VIL iii. 5. iv. 2, 3, 6. vi. 6. ix. 1.
xi, 1. ΣΧ. νἱ. 7. λέγουσι]. iv. 2.
viii. 7. I. iii. 5. IV. iii. 36. V. iii.
7.ix. 15, VI. viii. 2,6. VIL. iii. 8.
iv. 6. v. 2. xiii. 3. WII. ii. 3. iv. 4.
IX. viii. 3. ix. 4. X.i.2. iii. 2, 6.
iv. 4. €AéyouerI, vi.2. II. vii. 8.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ix. 4. ἔλεγε VI. xiii. 3. λέγοι HT
v. 7. X. iii. 8. λέγοιεν Χ. ii. 4.
λέγῃ V. x. 5. λέγωμεν. iv. 1. v. 1.

II. vii. 9. 1Π.. x. 1. ΡΣ. 1. VELi.
4. iii, I. xii. 4. λέγωσι X. ii. 4.
λέγειν 1. vi. 5, 7. Vil. 9. X. 15. Ii.

li.
vii. 14. vill. 1, 3, 5,6. ix. I. V.i3.
v. 3 WIL. i. 1. iii, 8,13. WVIIL iv.

4.x.1. IX. vii. 1. viii. 5. X. ii 1.
iii. 4. iv. 5. ix. 21. λέγων IV. viii.

10. V. ix. 1. λέγοντα I. vi. 7. VIL.
i. 1. λέγοντος VILi. 3. Aéyorres I.
xiii. 20. ILI. vii. το. TIL. i. 17. ii. 3.
IV. vii. 14. X. ii. 5. ix. 18. λέγουσι
I. viii. 8. x. 2. ILL. iv. 2, 3. IV. viii.
3. VIL. xiv. x. λέγοντας 1. iii. 4.
iv. 3. λέγεται. vi. 1, 2, 3, 9, 12.
viii. 10. xiii. 9, 13. Π. iv. 4, 5. vi
18. vii. 8, 14, 16. ILL. i. 21. v. 20.
vi. 3. xi. 5. IV. i. 19, 44. iL 3. iii.
10. viii. 10. V.i. 8. ii. 13. iv. 5, 12.

v.17. ix. 11. X. 3. xii. I. ΧΙ, 6.
VIL. iii. 5. iv. 3. v. 8. ix. 6. WII. ii.

3- V. 5. IX. viii. 6. ΣΧ... 3. iv. 4. v.

10. ix. I. λεγόμεθα 11. Υ. 2, 3, 4ν 5.

λέγονται 1. viii. 3. ILI. viii. 1. ix. 2.

ΣΧ. 2, 3. xi. 3. IV.i. το. iii. 20. vii. 4.
VII. i. 7. iv. 3. VIII. v.1. IX. x. 6.
X, ix. 15. λέγοιτο I. iii. 1. vi. 9.
viii. 2. IIT. vi. το. IV.v.2. X. ii.
9. λεγέσθω ΤΙ. vil. 12. VI. i. 6.
λέγηται V. i. 6. λεγόντων VIIL
viii. 2. \éyero L. vi. 3. Adyowro
X.v. 11. λεγομένων 1. iii. 4. viii.
1,2. D1. xi.4g. IV. v.13. λεγο-
μένης I. vii. 13. λεγόμενοι 1. ix,
10. λεγομένη IT. vii. 7. XX. vii 4.
λεγομένου IIT. i. 19. IV. iv. 4.
λεγομένοις ITT. x. 9. λεγόμενον V. v.
8. VIL. v. 2,9. vir. X. ii. 4. λε-
γόμενα VIL. i. 7. xi. 5. ΣΧ. iti. 13.
λεγομένους VIL. iv. 2. VIII. iii. δ.
λεχθεισῶν 1. i. 5. λεχϑέντων VIE.
viii. 3. AexOdvral. v. 8. x. 16. λεχ-
θεῖσιν I. vi. 8. λέγεσθαι 1. vi. 8. vii.
13. IL. ii. 3. viii τ. 1Π..}ὃ. 15. Vii
6. IX. ix. το. K.ii. 5. λεχϑῆναι
I. vii. 9. λεχθέντι I. viii. 5. λεχθὲν
I. xi. 2. V.ix.g. ΙΧ. x. 2. xi.2. Χ.
vii. 9. λεχθεῖσαν IV. i. 44. ἐλέχθη
IV.iv.1. Χ. ν. τι. νὶ. 6. Vi. 5.
VII. viii. 1. λεκτέον ITM. i. 6. iii, 2.
V.ii.9. VI. xii. 3,8. VIL. i. 1, 4.
iii. 7. iv. I. V. §. Xil. 3. XIV. 3.

INDEX VERBORUM. xh

λείπειν V.i. 14. λείπεται I. vii. 13. I.
ν. 6. VI. v. 4. vi. 2. ix. 3. X. viii.
7. λείπωνται 1Π]. viii. 9.

λειτουργίαν VILL. xiv. 1. λειτουργίαις
IX, vi. 4.

Λεσβίας V.x. 7.

λευκὸν VI. vii. 4. λευκὰ X. iii, 8. λευ-

κότερον I. vi. 6.

λευκότητος I. vi. 11.

λέων IIT. x. 7,

λήγει VIIT. iv. 1. ληγούσης ibid.

λήθην. v.8. ARO Lx. το. V. viii.
ro. VII. v. 1.

V. iv. 2. vi. §. xi. 2,9. VI.i. 1, 5, 6.
ii. 2. v. 8. xiii. 4, 5. WII. i. 6. ii. 1.
lil. 3. iv. 2, 5. vii. 8. viii. 2, 4, 5. ix.
6.x.2. IX. vii. 1. viii. 6. X. v. 3.
λόγοι 1. iii. 6. iv. 5. v. 8. vi. 11. I.
ii. 3. VIL. xiv. 5. EX. 1.6. X. i 3.
li. I. ix. 3, 14. λόγων IT. vii. 11.
IV. vi. 1. viii. 12. IX. viii. 3. ix. 10.
X. i. 4. λόγοις 1. iii. 1. xiii. 9. IT.
vii. t. IV. vii. V.xi.g. VI. iv.
2. VILx.2. IX. viii2. Χ. v. 3.
viil. 12. λόγους I. vi.8. VI. xiii. 5.
VIL. iti 8. X. viii. 12. ix. 18.

λήκυθος IV. ii. 18. λελογχωμένον ITT. i. 17.
ληπτικὸν IV. i. 20. ληπτικοὶ IV. i. 34. | λοιδορεῖν IV. viii. 9.
λῆψι TV. i. 7,15, 24. λήψει]. vii. 4. | λοιδόρημα IV. viii. 9.
IV. i. 8, 29, 38. iv.2. λῆψιν ΠῚ. vii. | λοιπὸν]. vii. 13. V.iv.1. VII. xiv. 9.

4. IV. i. 24, 40. X. vit. λοιπαὶ X. v.11. λοιπὴν X.

λῃστὴς IV. i. 43. Vi vi. 1. λῃστῳν | Vill. 9. λοιπαῖς ἴ. vii. VIII. i. 2.
ΙΧ. ii. 4. λοιπὰ I. vii. x. xii. 8. ITI. iii. 7. v.

λίαν 1. ix. 6. xi. 1. III. xi. 3. IV. ii. 18, 19. xi. 7. VIII. 1. 1. iit. 7, 9, ‘
22. ViL 11,15,16. ὙΠ. iv. 5. IX. IX. viii.2. X. viii. 8. λοιπῶν 1. ix. 7.

iv. 10. X. vi. 6. ix. 20. IL. vii. 9. ILI. i. 5. iii. 9,11. WI. i. 4.
λίθος IT. i. 2. λίθου V. x. 7. λίθον | XK. iv. 3, 10. ix. 17, 18. λοιποὶ 11. i.
ITT. i 17. v. 14. λίθων X. iv. 2. 6. VIII. xii.g. X.vii.g. λοιποῖς
λιθουργὸν VI. vii. 1. IIL. iii. 4. WIL. xii. 7. xiii. 1. IX.
λογίζεται VI. ix. 2,3. X.v.§. λογί- | i. 1. ii. 9. ἦν. 2, λοιπὰς VIII. iv. 1.
σωνται VI. v. 2. λογίζεσθαι VL. i. 6. ΙΧ. xii. 1.
X.v. 5. λυμαίνεται]. x. 12. λυμαίνονται Χ.Υ. 5.
λογικῶν IT. vii. 16. λυμαὶ X. v. 10.
λογισμῷ VIL. i. 6. λογισμὸν IIT. i. 26. λνκεῖν IV. vi. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8. viii. 3, 7.

xii. 7. VI. vii. 6. VII. ii. 10. vi. 6.
vii. 8. λογισμοῦ ITT. viii.15. VI. ix.
4. VII. i. 6.
λογιστικὸν VI. i. 6.
λόγος I. vi. 5, 8, 16. vii. 2. viii. 1, 8.
II. ii. 2, 3, 4. ΠῚ. v. 21. vii. 2, 5.
vili. 12. xi. 8. xii.9. IV. v. 3. V.
Hi. 10. ix. 1. VIL i. 1, 2, 3. id. 4.
viii. 9. xi. 4. xii. 5,6. VIL. ii. 2, 8,
12. iv. 2. vi. 1. Vili. 4. X. ii. 3. Vi. 1.
ix. 5,6, 12. λόγου I. v. 3. vii. 14.
ix. 7. xiii. 15, 17,18. I. ii. 4, 5. iii.
§. IM. ii. 17. viii.15. IV. iii. 11. V.
iii. 3, 8. VI. iv. 2, 3, 6. v. 4, 6, 8. vi.
I. ix, 2, 3. xii. 10. xiii. §. VIL. ii.
9. fil. 10. Vi. 1. ix. 2. ΙΧ, viii. 6. Χ.
ix. 7. AéywI. vii. 13. viii. 4. x. 10.
xiii. 10,15, 17. ID. i. 7. vi. 15. ix.
8. IIL. xii. 7,9. IV. v. 13. vii. 4, 7.
V. iii. 1ς. χ. :. VIL. iii. 11. ix. 1, 5.
ΙΧ. xi.3. X. ii. 3. ix. 5, 7, 9, 10.
λόγον 1. iii. 7. iv. 4. Vi. 11. vii. 13,
14. X. 4, 15. xiii. 9, 15, 16, 18, 19.
It. ii. 2. iv. 6. vi. 17. LIE. xii. 8.

λυπήσει ΤΥ vi. 8. λυπούμενος IL iii.
1 1Π.ΐ1.132. IV.i. 27. VIL vi. 4.
λυπεῖσθαι ΤΙ. iii. 2, 9. Vil. 15. xi. 5, 6.
IV. i, 25. ν. 6. VIL. ii. 7. [X.iv.1o0.
xi.3. λυπηθῆναι 11. ν. 2. νὶ. το. Χ.
ili. 12. λυπεῖται II. vi. 1ς. IIL χὶ 6,
8. IV.i. 28. IX. iv. ro. ix. 7. xi. 3.
λυπήσεται TH. ix. 4. IV.i. 25. Av-
πουμένους 111. x. 2. λυποῦνται VII.
ix. 3. λυπούμενοι IX. iil. 4. xi. 2.
λυπούμενον IX. xi. 4. λυποῖτοκ, iii.
6. λυπεῖ X. v. g.

λύπη IT. iii. 3. v. 2. ILD. xii. 2. VII.

iv. 4. xiii. 1, 7. xiv. 2. X. ii, 5. iii. 5.
λύπης IT. ix.4. ITI. xi.6. IV. v.10.
VIO. xi. 1. xii. 1, 2, 7. xiv. 2, 4, 9.
IX. ix. 8. xi. 4. X. iii. 13. λύπῃ 1].
iii. 8. Xi icv. §. ix. 10. λύπην
IL. iii. . vii. 15. ILI. iv. 6. viii. 11.
xi. §. xii. 1,3. IV. vi. 7. vii... VI.
v.6. VII. iii. 1. vii. 3, 5. ix. 3. xiv.
4,6. IX. xi. 2, 4. X. fi. 2. iii. 6.
λυπῶν VII. vii. 6. xiv.7. X. iii. 6. ᾿
v.§. Adwas III. vii. to. ΙΧ. ix. 8.

xliv

λύπας I, x. 12. IL iii. 1,5, 6, 10, 11.
vil. 3. IIL x. 1. xi.5. IV. vi. 7.
VIL. iv. 1, 3. vii. 1, 2. xi. 2. XX. ix.
4,10. λῦπαι VIL. xiv. 2. X. v. 5.

λυπηροῦ 11. iii. 7. ΠΙ. ii. 5. λυπηρᾶς
X.v. 5. Auwnp@ VILL. v. 2. λυπηρὸν
ΠῚ. i. 7. vii. 13. viii. 4. ix. 3, 4.
IV. i. 13. VI. v. 6. vii. 8. VII. xiv.
5, 8 ὙΠ]. v. 2. vi. 4. IX. iv. 5.
xi. 4. λυπηρὰν ITD. i. 19. λυπηρὰ
IIL i. 9, 25. ix. 2,4. Χ. !. 2. Υ. 9.
ix. 8. λυπηρῶν VII. iv. 3.

λύσις VII. ii. 12. xiii. τ.

λυσιτελοῦς VITI. iv. 2.

λυτροῦσθαι V. vii. 1.
ii. 4.

λυτρωτέον ΙΧ. ii. 4. ;
λύεται. ix. 9. xi. 6. VIL iii. 12. xii.7.
λύοιτο VIL. xiii. 6. λύηται VIL. i. 5.
λῦσαι VIT. ii. 8. λυσάμενον ΙΧ. ii. 4.
ἔλνε VII. xiii. 1.

λωποδύτης IV. i. 43%

Ageroy 1. viii. 14.

M

pabquarixds VI. Viii.6. μαθηματικοὶν.
iii, 13. VI. viii. 5. μαθηματικοῖς ΥΙ.
viii. 9. VIL. viii. 4. μαθηματικοῦ I.
lil, 4. μαθηματικαὶ ILI, iii. 12. X.
ii. 7. μαθηματικῶν I. xiii. 18.

μάθησω I. ix. 3.

μαθητὸν 1. ἰχ. τ. VI. iii. 3.

μαινόμενος IIT, i, 17. iii. 2. vii. 7. μαι-
γόμενον VIL. iii. 7. μαινόμενοι VII.
vi. 6.

μάκαρ IIT. v. 4.

paxaplfovrac 1. ix. 10. μακαρίσειεν 1.
x. 3. μακαρίζειν I. x.7. μακαρίζομεν
I, xii. 4. μακαρίζει 1. xii. 4.

μακάριον 1. vii. 16. vili. 16. ix. 3. x. 7,
12. xi.5. ὙΠ. χὶ. 2. IX. ix. 3,6.
X. vili. 9. μακαρίους I. x. 10, τό.
IX.ix. 9. XX. viii. 7. μακαριώτερον
I. x. 12. μακαρίων. x. 13. μακά-
posl.x.14. Π1. ν. 4. [X.ix.5. X.
viii. 8. μακάριοι VIII. v. 3. vi. 4.
μακαρίοις IX. ix. 1. μακαριωτάτη IX,
ix. 9. paxaply ΙΧ. ix. το. X. vii. 7.
μακαρίου X. Vv. 11.

μακαριότητι X. viii. 7.

μακαρίως 1. x. 4.

μακρὸν 1. xi. 2. μακρότερον III. x. 10.

μαλακία ILL. vii. 13. VIL. i. 6. νἱΐ. 5, 6.
x, 5. μαλακίας VIL i. 4. vii. 3.

λυτρωθέντι ΙΧ.

INDEX VERBURUM.

μαλακὸς VII. vii. 1, 5,7. μαλαχῳ VIL
vii. 4. μαλακοὶ VIL. iv. 2, 3.

μάλιστα 1. ii. 4. iv. 4. V. 2. Vil 5.
viii, 2, 13. ix. 2, 6, II. xX. 10, II.
xili. 2,12. I. ii. 8, 9. iii. 7. ix. 4,
6,7. ITI. i. 18. ii. 13. vi 10. viii.
I, 3, 6,7, 8. ix. 4. x. 11. ΧΙ, 6, 8.
xii. 6. IV.i. 11, 21. ii. 15. iii 7,9,
10, 11, 17, 18. v. 10. VL 4, 14. VY.
ἱ. 15. VI. ii. 6. vii. 6. viil. 3. xi. 1.
VIL. i. 1, 3,5. vi. 4. vii. 8. VOL
I, 3, 4. iii. 4, 5, 6, 7. iv. I. Vv. 2, 4.
vi. 1. vii. 6. viii. 5, 6. X. 3. Χ, I.
xii. 2,5. IX. i. 8. ii. 7, 8. iii. 4. iv.
I, 3,4, 5. Vii. 3. Vili. 1, 2, 5, 6. ix.
9. xi. 5, 6. xii. 1,2, MX. i rid,
2,12. iv. 4, 7, 10. V. 4. Vil. 4, 9.
viii. 7, 13. ix. 10.

μᾶλλον I. ii. 2. v. 4, 6, 8. vi. 6, 12, 14,
16. vii. 2. xi. 2, 4, 5. Xii. I. xili. 7.
II, i. 8. ii. 4. iii. 8. vi. 10. vil. 8, 11.
viii. 5, 6, 7, 8. ix. 3,8. II. 17, 8,
10, ii. I, 9, 10, 13. iii. 8, 9. ν. 15;
17. vil. I, 3, 10, 13. Vili. g, 15. ix.
I, 4. X. 2, 5. XL 4, 5, 8. xii I, 2.
IV.i. 1, 3,7, 8, 9, 14, 20, 27, 37. 42.
44. ii. 3» 9» 16. ili. 20, 28, 30, 33»
25, 37. ἵν. 2, 3, 4, 5. Vs 4. 7, 3, 10,
12, 13, 14. Vi. 3. vii. 1, 6, 8, 9, 10.
Vili. 3, 4, 6.1x.1,2,7. V.i. 7.1}. 4.
iii. 16. v.14. Vi. 9. Vil. 7. ix. 16.
ΧΙ, iii. 4. vii. 7. viii. 9. ὙΠ. iii. 4.
iv. 3. Vi. 2. vii. I, 3. ix. 3, 5. Χ. 4.
xi, 4. xii. 3, 5. xiv. 3. VIIL i. 4,7.
vi 3. vi. 4. Vil. 2. viii. I, 3, 4. ix. 3
xii. I, 2, 6. 7. LX. ii 1, 3. iii. 2, 3.
V. 3. vii. I, 3; 7. viii. 3, 6, 9. ix. 2,
§. Xi. 1. ΧΙ 1. XK. ii, 1. iii. 2, 3.
v: 2, 3, 4, 8. vi. 2, 3. Vii. 3, 4, 8.
viii. 4, 7,8, 10. ix. I, 9, 14, 15, 18,
19, 22, 23.

pavOdvew 1. ii. 6. VI. x. 3,4. ΤΠ]. xii.
5. μαθόντας 11. i. 4. μανθάνομεν 11.
i. 4. VI. xii. 2. μαθεῖν 111. v. 7.
μαθόντες VII. iii. 8.

μανίας VIL. iii. 7. μανίαν VIL. v. 3, 6.

μανότητα V. 1. 5.

μαντευόμεθα X. Vv. 4.

μάντο IV. vii. 13.

Mapyelry VI. vii. 2.

μαρτυρεῖ 1. x. το. 1Π. i. 5. paprupote
VI. xiv. 5. μαρτυρεῖσθαε 111. v. 7.

μαρτυρίοις II. ii. 6.

μαστιγοῦσθαι ILI. vi. 5.

μάταιος IV. vii.10. μάταιον L vi. το,

INDEX VERBORUM.

ματαίαν 1, ii. 1.
iv. 4.

ματαίως 1. iii. 6.

μάχης III. viii. 4. μάχην Χ. ix. 15.
μάχαι V. iii. 6. VIII. xiii. 2. X.
Vii. 6.

μάχιμοι TIT, viii. 12. μαχιμώτατοι III.
viii. 8.

μάχεται 1. viii. 11. xiii. 15. μάχσιτο
ΝΠ. iv. 5. μάχονται III. viii. 8.
ἐμάχετο VIL. iit. μάχεσθαι 1]. iii.
10.

μέγα 1. iv. 3. IL. viii. 4. IV. ii. 6, το,
17, 18. ili. 14, 15, 30, 34. VI. ix. 4.
VILii. 6. VII. xii. 4. IX. viii. 9.
μεγάλην 1. ii. 2. vii. 23. II. vii. 8.
IV. iii. 37. IX. viii. 9. μεγάλαις I.
ix. 11. IV. iii. 17, VIL. xiii. 3. μέ-
yada I. 6, 12. 1]. vii. 7. ΠῚ. iii.10.
IV. i. 42. ii. ς. 1.1. IX. xi. 5.
μεγάλας I. x. 12. μεγάλων 1. x. 14.
Ill. i. 7. IV. iii. 3,6, 7, 9, 20, 27.
XA. vill. 9. μεγάλου 11. viii. 4. IV.
iv. 1. μεγάλαι IIT. xii. 7. IV. ii. 6.
μεγάλοις IV. i. 24. ii, 32. μεγάλῃ
IX. iii. 4. μεγάλους Χ. ix. 3. μεγάλῳ
EV. ii. 17. iii. 5. μεγάλοι LV. iii. 11.
μεγάλη IV. iii. 27. μεγάλης IV. vi.
18. péyoral.v.6. Il. vi.6. IV.
li. 15, 21. WII. vii. 6. xii. 5. xiii.
10. LX. viii. 7. X. vi. 2. μέγιστον
I. ἰχ 6. Π].ν. 17. IV. iii. 10, 18.
IX. ix.2. 1Π..}. 1. ἰχ. 2ο. μεγίστῳ
ΠῚ. vi. 8. μεγίστων III. ix. 4. IV.
iii. 9, 14. μεγίστου .ἶγ. τι. VIII.
xi. 2. ypeylorousIV.i.43. μέγαν
IV. iii. 26.

μεγαλοκίνδυνος IV. iii. 23.

μεγαλοπρέτεια IT. vii. 6. IV. ii. το, 15.
μεγαλοπρεπείας IV ii. 1. μεγαλο-
τρέτειαν IT. vii.8. IV. ii. 18. iv. 1.

μεγαλοπρεκὴς 1]. vii. 6. IV. ii. 3, 5,7,
13, 15, 20. μεγαλοπρεποῦς IV. ii. 6,
10, 16,19. μεγαλοπρεπῆ IV. ii. 10.
μεγαλοπρεπὲς IV. ii. 10. μεγαλο-
πρεπέστερον LV.ii. 10. μεγαλοκρεπέ-
στατον LV. ii. 17.

μεγαλοπρεπῶς IV. ii. 10.

μεγαλοψυχία Τ|. vii. 7. IV. iii. 1, 5, 16,
27. μεγαλοψνχίαν 11. vii.8. IV. iii.
19. iv. 1. peyadropuxlg IV. ili. 37.

μεγαλόψνχος I. x. 12. IV. iii. μεγαλό-
ψυχοι IV. iii. 11,20. μεγαλοψύχῳ
IV. iii. 15. μεγαλοψύχον IV. iti. 12,
14, 30, 34. μεγαλόψυχον IV. iii. 13,

ματαιότερον I.

xlv

14, 16, 21. μεγαλοψυχοτέρους IV.
lii. 19.

Μεγαρεῖς IV. ii. 20.

μέγεθος IV. ii. 1, 10, 14. μεγέθει. x.
12. TI. vii. 1. IV. ii. 1, 4, 10. iii. 5.
VII. vi. 6. VIII. xi. 2. IX. ii. 2. vi.
2. X. vii. 7. μεγέθη VI. x. 1.

μεθίστησι VIL. x. 5. μεθιστᾶσι VIL.
lil. 7. μεταστῆσαι Χ. ix. 5.

μέθοδος 1. 1. 1. ii. 9. μέθοδον V. i. 2.
μεθόδῳ]. vii. 18.

μεθνσκόμενοι 11]. viii 14. μεθνσκομέ-
vos VII. viii. 2.

μεθύουσι 111. v. 8. μεθύων III. i. 14.
μεθυσθῆναι 111. v. 8.

μεῖζον. ii. 8. vii. 8. xii. 4. 11. vii. 12.
viii. 2. IV.i. 44. V. iii. 15, 16. iv.
8. v. 18. xi. 8. ΧΙ, x. ΙΧ, viii. 9.
X. viii. 3. μείζονος IV. iii. 14. V.
ili. 16.iv.9. μείζω IV. ii. 21. iii, 17.
vi. 8. vii. 4, 10. V. vii. 5. xi. 8.
μείζους IV. iii. 16. X. viii. 5. μειζό-
vow IIT. i, 4. IV. iii. 6. vii. 8.

μεῖον V. i. το.

μελαγχολικοὶ VIT, vii. 8. x. 4. xiv. 6.
μελαγχολικὸς VII. x. 3.

μελέτην VII. x. 4.

μελετώντων ITT. v. 11.

μελλητὴν IV. iii. 27.

μέλλουσι IX. x. 4. μέλλωσιτΧ. xi. 5.
μελλήσειε 11. iv. 5. μέλλων ITI. vi.
5. IV. ii. 21, X. tii 12. μέλλον 1.
x. 15. μέλλοντα Υ 111. xiv. 2. μέλ-
Aovros LX. vii. 6. μελλόντων ΙΧ. iv.
5. μελλούσης V.v. 14.

wéroslV.ii. 21. μέλεσι Π1.χ.4. LX.
ix. 7. μέλη Χ. iv. 10.

μέλει IV. iii. 31. V.xi.8. VII. x. 3.
VIII. x. 4. μέλειν IV. iii. 28.

μεμνῆσθαι 1. vii. 18.

μέμφονται VIII. xiii. 4.

μέμψεις VILLI. xiii. 2.

μένος ILI. viii. 10.

μένει. Χ. 7. VIII. xii. 5. IX. 1. 3. vi.
3,6. μείναι I. vi. 2. μένουσι IIT.
viii. 16. VIII. iv. i. vi. 7. viii. 5.
μένοντα III. viii.9. μένειν V. v.14.
VII. ii. 4, 8 VIII. vii. 6.

μέντοι ]. xiii. 15. V.iii. 7. WIL. 4, 8.
VI. viii. 1. WIL. iii. 6.

μερίσαιτο V. ix. 13.

μεριστόν 1. xiii. το. μεριστὰ V. li. 12.
μεριστῶν IX. iv. 4.

Μερόπη IIT. i. 17.

μέρος V.i. 19. ii. 1, 3,9, 12. V. 15. Vi,

xlvi

8. xi. 6,9. VL i. 6. v. 1. vii. 2.x. 1.
xil. §. VII. iii. 6. ἐν. 1,2. X. ix. 23.
μέρους 11. vii. 1. X.iv. 2. μέρει lV.
viii. §. V. ii. 1, 3,6,9. VID. xi. ς.
X. iv. 3. μέρη 1.1.6. x. 11. Vz. ii.
9,13. WIL i. 5. VII. ix. 5. μερῶν
II. x.1. μέρεσι X. iv. 2. μεροῖν
VI. v. 8.

μεσιδίους V. iv. 7.

μέσος II. vii. 8, 12, 13,14. IV. iii. 8.
vi. 9. vil. 4, 6. viii. 10. VII. vii. 2.
ix. 5. μέση II. viii. 1. ix. 9. IV. v.
14. vi. 32. μέσον II. vi. 4. vii. 10.
viii. 3, 4, 5, 6. ix. 2,5. IV. i. 31, 36.
iv. 4,6.v.1.vi.9. Vii. 1. iii. 1, 3,
4, 12. Iv. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14. V. 10,
17. VILi. x. ix. 5. VII. viii. 7. X.
i. 2. μέσου IT. vi. 9, 13. viii. 4, 7.
ix. I, 3,4,7,9. IV.v. 1. viii. 2. V.
iv. 7, 10. v.17. xi.7. WII. viii. 7.
μέσῳ 1]. viii. 7,8. μέσης IT. vii. 8.
ΓΝ. ν. 14. μέσῃ 11. viii.r. IV. viii.
5. μέσην IV. vi. 4. μέσαι II. viii. 2.
μέσους IV. iti. 26. μέσα II. vi. 6.
VIL. i. 2.

μεσότης 11. vii. 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20.
vii. ix. 1. III. vi. 1. vii. 13. x. 1.
IV. i. r.iv. 1, σον. 1. vii. x. Vii 1.
v. 17. μεσότητος II. ii. ἡ. vi. 9, 20.
viii. 1. IV.i. 24. iv. 4. μεσότητι I.
vi. 15. μεσότητα II. vi. 18, 19. vii.
10. μεσότητες II. vii. 11, 14, 16.

Ill. v. 21. IV. viii. 12. μεσοτήτων
VLi. τ᾿. μεσότητας IV. vii. 1.

μέσως II. v. 2. IID. vii. 12. xi. 8.

μεταβαίνει 10.1.36. VIII. x.3. μετα.
βαίνων I. vii. 2. μεταβαίνουσι VIII.
x. 3. μεταβῆναι VI. xiii. 5.

μεταβάλλει VII. ix. 2, 5. μεταβάλλοι
IV. i. 332. μεταβάλλουσι VIII. x. 3.
μεταβάλλειν Viv. 11. X. iid. 4.

μεταβολὴ VII. xiv. 8. VIII. iii. 5.
μεταβολαὶ 1. ix. 11. μεταβολὰς I. x.
4, 15.

μεταδίδωσι X. vi. 8. μεταδιδόναι. v.
8. IX. xi. 5.

μετάδοσις V. v. 6. μεταδόσει V. ν. 6.

μετακινῆσαι VII. x. 4. peraxwe'ra: V.
X. 7.

μεταλαμβάνειν V. ix. 3. μεταλαμβά.
vouotl&. Xi. 2. μεταλάβοιμεν X. ix. 5.

perapedela IIT. i. 13,19. μεταμελείας
IX. iv. 10.

μεταμελητικὸς VIL. viii. i. μεταμελητι-
‘kop VII. vii. 2.

INDEX VERBORUM.

μεταμελόμενος TIT. i. 13.

μεταξὺ VI.i τ. VII. iv. 5. vii. 1.

μεταπεῖσαι X.ix.7. μεταπείθωνται VIL
ix. 3. μεταπεισθεὶς VII. ii.10. pera-
πεισθῆναι ibid.

μεταπίπτει VIII. iii. 5. μεταπίπτειν
VIII. vi. 7. μεταπίπτοντες VILL. iii.
5. μεταπιπτούσης VILL. iii 5.

μεναῤῥεῖ IX. vi. 3.

μεταῤῥυθμίσαι Χ. ix. 5.

μεταφέρομεν V.x. 1. μεταφέρων LX. v.
3- μετενηνέχθαι III. xii. 6.

μεταφορὰν III. vi.3. V.xi.9. VIL v.
9. VL 6.

μέτεστι IV. ii. 14. V.ix.17.

μετίεναι I. vii. 22.

μετέπειτα Χ. iv. 9.

μετέχει I. xiii. 18. μετέχειν 1. xiii 17.
VIL. xiii. 6. X. viii. 8. μετέχονσα L.
xiii. 15. μετασχεῖν VI. viii. 4. μετέ-
χουσι LX. iv. 7.

μετρεῖ V.v. 10. μετρηθῇ V. iv. 6.
μετρεῖται IV. 2. V.v.1§. IX.i
2,7. μετρεῖσθαι V. v. 11. μετρεῖν
VIM. xiii. 10.

μετρίας IIT. xii. 8. VII. iv. 3. μέτριον
I. vi 3. IV. iii. 26. iv. 4. μετρίῳ
ΠῚ. i. 7. μετρίου I. vi. 4. μετρίοις
IV. i. 35. ii. 3. μετρίων IV. 11}. 7.
X. νὰ. το. pérpalV.iv.1. X. viii.
11. μέτριοι V. ix. 9.

μετρίως ITT, χὶ. 8. IV.i. 25. iii. 17,18.
vii. 17. ΣΧ. viii. Ir.

μέτρον 11]. iv. 4. V. v.14. WII. xiii.
10, 11. ΙΧ. i, 2. iv. 2. ix. 3. X.v.
10. μέτρα. vii. 5. μέτροις V. vil.
5. μέτρῳ VILL. xiii. 11.

μέχοι 1. ii. 6. IV. v.13. V. ix. 17.
VIL. vi. 2. vii, 2. xiv. 2.

μηδαμόθεν IV. i. 30.

μηδαμῶς IV. x. 7.

μηδὲ VII. xiii. 7. VIII. v. 3.

μηδεὶς IIT. i. 7.v. 17. TX. vill. 2. pe
δεμιᾶς 11. ii. 7. μηδεμίαν VII. xii. 6.
X. iii. 12. μηδενὸς 1. vii. 5, 7. IV.
iii. 25. vii. 5,7, 10. VIII. vii. 4.
μηδενὶ IIT. i. 7. μηδὲν]. viii. 9. x. 5.
xi. 6. IL it. 7. IIL i. 3, 10, 12, 13.
Vili. 13. ix. 6. xi. 7. xii. 7. IV. i. 34,
39. iii, 34. V. γ. 11, 14. VIL. vi. 2.
VIL. ii. 3. iii. 6. vii. 2. ix.6. ΠῚ.
viii, 3, 6. xi 6, 8. xiv. 1, 3. UX.
i, 4, 6. ii, 2. iv. 10. vii, 2. XQ
iv. 5. vi. 3. μηδένα VII. ii. 3. ΙΧ,
i, 7.

INDEX VERBORUM.

μηδέποτε]. vii.4. VI. vi. 2. VIII. iv.
3. IX iii. 5. Χ iii. 12.

μηδετέρα VI. xii. 4. μηδετέρῳ X. ii. 5.
μηδέτερον I.iv.7. VII. xiv. 5. VIII.
iv. 2. X. ii. 5. μηδετέρων X. ii. 5.

μηδοτιοῦν I. xi. 1.

μηκέτι VILL. iii. 3, ΙΧ. iii. 1.

μῆκος X. vii. 7.

μήλων TIT, x. 5.

μὴν 1. vi. 6. viii. 12. x. 14. ID. ii. 7.
Vv. 14. Vi. 11. ix. 3. xi.2. IV. i. 22.
iti. 13, 17, 18, 35. Vv. 7. VI. v. 7.
VIII. viii. 3.

μηνύει 1. xiii. 18. IX. vii. 4. μηνύειν
I. xii. 5. X. ii. 1. μηνύουσι 11.

ili. 4.
μήποτε VIII. vii.6. X. i. 3. iii. 2.
μήπωΎΥ. vi. 1.
μητρικὴν TX. ii. 8.
μητρὶ VIII. viii. 3. ΙΧ. 11. 8. μητέρα

V.ix.1. VIl.v.3. μητέρες VIII.

viii. 3. xii. 1. LX. iv. 1. viii. 7. μη-

τέρας IX. iv. 1.
μητροκτονῆσαι ΠΙ. i. 8,
μιαιφόνος X. vii. 6.
μικροκίνδυνος IV. iii. 23.
μικροπρέπεια II. vii. 6. IV. ii. 4.
μικροπρεπὴ LV ii. 21. pixpomperes LV.

ii. 8

μικροὶ lV. iii. 5. μικρὸν I. viii. 9. xi. 5.
xiii. 13. ΠΕΡΙ. 1. 111. 9. iv. 3. viii 4.
ix. 8. III. ix. 3. χ. 9. IV. ii. 18. iii.
18, v. 13, 14. viii. 4,6. VI. xii 7.
xiii, 5. VIII. x. 3. xi.6. ΙΧ. iv. ro.
vi 4. ix. 4. X. v. 9. vii. 8. viii.
4.ix.19. μικρὰ 1. x. 12. IL vii.
6, 8. 1Π. ix. 6. iv. 1. vi. 8. vii.
15. VILL. xiii. το. X. viii. 7. μικρὰν
IV. vi.7. μικροῦ 11. viii. 4. IV.i. 41.
μικροῖς TV. i. 24, 29. ii. 3, 20. ili, 17.
μικρῷ IV. i. 31. ii. 21. VII. iv. 2.
μικρᾶς ΙΧ. viii. 9. μικρῶν IV. iii. 4,
7» 32.

μικρότητι 1. x. 12. IX. ii. 2.

μικροψυχία IT. vii. 7. IV. iii. 37.

μικρόψνχος IV. iii. 7, 12, 35.

μικτὴ IV. ix. 8. ΙΧ, xi. 4. μικτὰν Χ.

ii. 3. μικταὶ TIT. 1.6. X. iii. 2.
Μιλήσιοι VIL. viii. 3. Μιλησίους ibid.
Μίλωνι 1]. vi. 7.

μιμεῖται IIT. vii. 8. ἐμιμεῖτο LIT. iii. 18.

μιμοῦμενος VII. vii. 5. μιμεῖσθαι ΙΧ.
xi, 4. μιμοῦνται IV. iil. 21.

μισεῖν Xi. τ. 1χ. 6. μισεῖ VI. viii. 4.
μισοῦνται IX. iv. 8.

xlvui

μισητὸν IV. viii. 7. μισητὰ I. x. 13.
ITI. xi. 4.

μισθὸς. vi. 7. IX. 1.6. μισθὸν LX. i.
7. μισθοὺς X. ix. 3.

μίσθωσις Υ. ii, 13.

μναῖ 11. vi 7. V.v.15. μνῶν Viv. 15.
ρῶς I. vi. 7. V. vii. 1.

μνείαν VIL. i. 4. ΙΧ. iii. 5. μνεῖαι ΙΧ.
ἦν. 5.

μνήμη ΙΧ. vii. 6. μνήμην VIL. iii. 11.
μνῆμαι X. iii. 7.

μνημονεύειν IV. ili. 25. X. iii. 12.

μνησίκακος IV. iii. 30.

μοῖραν I, ix. 1.

μοιχεία 11. vi 18. V. i. 14.

μοιχεύει V. ii. 4. xi. 6. ἐμοίχευσεν.
ii. 5. iv. 3. vi. 2. μοιχεύειν 1]. vi.
18. V.i. 14.

μοιχὸς V. vi. 1,2. μοιχοὶ {Π1. viii. 11.

μολίβδινος V. x. 7.

μόλις LV. iii. 25.

μοναδικοῦ V. iii. 8.

μοναρχίαι VIIL x. 2. μοναρχίας VITI.
X. 3.

μονάρχοις IIT. vi. 8.

μονάδος X. iv. 4.

μοναχῶς II. vi. 14.

μόνιμος ΠΙ. iii 7. vii. 2. μόνιμον I.
x. 7. VIIL iii. 6. vi. 7. μονίμοι
VILL. viii. 4, 5. μόνιμα IX. i. 3.
μονιμώτεραι I.x. το. poryoraracibid.

μόνος ΓΝ. iii. 20. μόνη V.i. 17. VII.
x.8 VIL iv. 3. X. vii. 5. μόνον
I. iii. 2. vii. 3. viii. x. II. ii. 8. vi.
Ι. vil. τ. IIL v. 15. IV. ii. 1,
12 Υ͂. 1. 3, 15. iii. 8. iv. 3, 9.
Vv. 4. Vil. §. Vill, II, 12. ix. 9. xi.
4. VLi. 2, 3. v. 8. vii. 3. viii. 2.
x. 2. xii. 3. xili. 5. VIL. iii. 2. iv.
2, 3,6. v. 6, 7, 9. vi. 1, 6. ix. 5.
x. 2. xiv. 3,8. VIII. i. 3, 5. iv. 1.
xi. 7. ΙΧ]. 8.ν.3. Xi. 4. iv. 3.
Vill, 11. Χ. 21. μόνους VIII. v. 2.
μόνας VII. xiii. 6. μόνην VIL. iv. 6.
VIII. i. 2. μόνοι VI. viii. 2. μόνῳ].
ii, 8. vii. 6. μόνῃ 1. vi. 3. VILLI.
xXili. 2, X. ix. 13. μόνου VI. ii. 6.

᾿ μονούμενον 1. vii. 7. X. ii. 3. μονού-

μενα 1. vi. 10.

μονώτην 1. vii. 6. IX. ix. 3. μονώταις
VIII. v. 3.

μόριον 1. xiii. 12. V.ix. 17. X.ix.
18. μορίου VI. xi. 7. xii. 4, 5. xiii.
7,8 Σ. νἱ. 7. μόρια]. xiii, 10, 15.
VIIL ix. 6. μορίων 1. vii. rr. Vii.

xlvili

13. VI. i. 5. ii. 6. WII. iii. ro.
μορίοις ΤΠ. ix. 4.

μουσικὸς ΙΧ. ix. 6. K.iv. 10. μουσικοῦ
X. iii. 10. μουσικὸν Χ. iii. το. μου-
ous X.ix. 14. μουσικὴν X. ix. 20.
μουσικοὶ IT.iv. 1. μουσικὰ IT. iv. 1.

μοχθηρία TT. v. 4. VIL. xii. ro. VIL.
iv. 5. v. 8. viii. 1, 4. μοχθηρίας ITI.
i.15. V. 1, 14. ii. 2. IX. iii. 5.
μοχθηρίᾳ V. i, 18. VII. i. 4. ii. 4.
VIIL. viii. §. xiv. 4. pox Onplay V. ii
5, 10. viii. 8. IX. iii. 3. iv. 8, 9, 10.

μοχθηρὸς TTT. i.14. V. viii.9. VIII.
x. 3. IX, iii. 3. μοχθηρὰ I. v. 7.
IX. xii. 3. X.v. 6. μοχθηρὸν V. viii.
ro. VIII. x. 3. IX. ii. 5. viii. 7.
ix. 7. μοχθηροῦ IV. i. 31. μοχθηρῷ
VIII. xiv.4. IX. viii.8. μοχθήρας
VIT. v. i. μοχθηραὶ VIL. xiv. 2. po-
χθηροὺς VIII. i. 7. μοχθηροὶ VIII.
viii. 5. x. 3. IX. iv. 9. xii. 3. po
χθηρότερος LX. viii. 3.

μυθεύεται I. ix. τι.

μυρεψικὴ VIT. xii. 6.

μυριάκις IT. i. 2.

μυριάδων TX. x. 3.

μυριοπλάσια VII. vi. 7.

μύρων TIT. x. 5.

μῦς ΝΠ. v. 6.

μυστικὰ ITT, i. 17.

μωραίνειν VIL. iv. 5.

N

val IIT. v. 2.

vaod Χ. iv. 2.

νανπηγικῆς 1. i. 3.

νῆα IT. ix. 3.

veavexh VIL. iv. 4.

νεαρὸς I. 111. 7.

νεμεσητικὸς 11. vil. 15.

νεμεσις ΤΊ. vii. 15.

νέμει V. vi. 6. ix. 10. νέμουσι VIII. x.
3. vepew V. vi. 4. VIII. xiv. 2.
IX. viii. 11. νείμας V.ix. 8. νεῖμαι
V. ix. 15. νέμεσθαι VIII. xiv. 1.
IX. ix.10. γέμωνται V. 111. 6. νεμό-
μενα Ν, ix. 15. γενεμημένης VILL. iv.
6. νενεμημένων I. viii. 2.

Νεοπτόλεμος VIL. ii. 7. ix. 4.

νέος 1. 1]. 5,7. ΠΙ. xi.r. VI. viii. 5.
νέων TI, i. 8. iii. 2. IV. ix. 3. VIII.
iii. 4, 5. vi. 4. Χ. ix. 2. νέοι VI.
viii. 5,6. VIIT. iii. 5. vi. 1. νέου X.
ix. 8. νέοις VII i. 2. X. ix. 8.

INDEX VERBORUM.

γέους X. 1. 1. ix. 9. νέα IV. ix. 3
νεώτερον VIII. vii. 1.

vebrns VII. xiv. 6. νεότητι ibid.

νηπίου 11. iii. 8.

νικᾷν IIT. ii. 8. VIL. vii. 4. νενικηκέναι
ΠῚ. viii. 12. νικῶσι 1. viii. 9. γινῶν-
res VII. ix. 4. γενικηκὼς VIL. iv. 2.

νίκη Ii. 3. VIL. iv. 5. νικῆς VILL. ix.
5. νίκην VIT. iv. 2.

Νιόβη VIL. iv. 5.

νοέῃ 1. ἵν. 7. νοήσω IL. viii. 4. νοήσῃ
I. iv. 7. νοῆσαι VII. ix. 4. VIII. i.
2. voeiy IX. ix. 7,9. νοοῦν IX. iv.
4. νοοῦμεν IX. ix. 9.

vohoews IX. ix. 7.

γνοητικῶν VI. ii. 6.

νοητὸν X. iv. 8.

»ομὴ V. il. 11. νομῆς ΤΠ]. viii. 11.
νομίζων VIL. iii. 2.

νομικὴ VIII. xiii. 5, 6. νομικὸν V. ix.
12.

vousos V, i, 8,12. νόμιμον V. i. 8. i.
8. vii. 1, 4. νομίμου V. x. 3 νομί-
pow V. ii. 10, 11. Vil. 6. νόμιμα V.
i 12. Χ, ix. 14.

νόμισμα V.v.10,11,14,15,16. ΙΧ.
i. 2. iii. 2. X. viii. 7. νομίσματι
ΙΝ. i. 2.

νομιστέον 1. xiii. 16.

νομοθεσία VI. vili. 3. νομοθεσίας X.
ix. 22.

νομοθετοῦσι 11.1.2. V.vii. 1. vopo-
θετούσης 1. ii. 7. ἐνομοθέτησεν. x.
5. γομοθετοῦντας Χ. ix. 10. »νομο-
θετῆσαι Χ. ix. 20. νενομοθέτηται V.
li, FI.

νομοθέτης V.x. 5. X.ix. 5. γομοθέτῃ
V. x. 4. νομοθέτὰς I. xiii.3. νομο-
θέται IL. i. 5. IV. viii.g. ΝΙΠ. 1.4.
ix. 4. νομοθέτου 1Π1.ἷ. φ. νομοθετῶν
ITT. ν. 7.

νομοθετικὸς X. ix. 14, 18,21. ropobe-
τικὴ VI. viii. 2. νομοθετικῆς V. i. 12.
νομοθετικῷ X. ix. 17.

νόμος IV. viii. το. V.i. 14. ii. το. iv.
3, 13. Vi. 4,9. Χ. 4, 5. xi 2. Χ.
ix.12. νόμου V.x. 6, χ τ. VIEL.
ΧΙ. 7. νόμῳ. iii. 2. Viv. 11. χ. 4.
vopor V. ii. 3, vi. 9. x. 3, 8. xi. 2.
VI. xii. 7. VIII. xiii. 5. νόμοι V. i.
13. ix.15. IXi8. X. ix. 20,
νόμων 1. xiii, 2. III. viii. τ. VII. x.
3. X. ix.9,14, 17, 20,21. νόμοις
Ill. v. 8 VII.x.4. X.ix.8,2 ce
νόμους VIT. x. 3.

INDEX VERBORUM.

νοσεῖ IIT. v. 14. νοσεῖν ibid. νοσῶν
ibid. γοσήσας I. iv. 3.

νοσήματα VII. vi.6. νοσημάτων VIL.
Vill. I.

γοσηματώδης VIT. v. 8.
VIL. v. 3, 5, 6.

νοσηματωδῶς VII. v. 4.

νόσον III. vi.3, 4. V. xi. 8. VII. ν. 6.
vil 6. »όσου 171. ν. 15. νόσῳ. vi.
4. νόσους VIL. i. 3. Vv. 3,6. νύσοις
ΠῚ. vi. 8, τ΄.

νοσώδη VII. xi. 5. xii. 4.

νουθέτησις I, xiii. 18.

νοῦς I. vi. 3,12. IL. iii.7. VI.i.1.
ii. §. iii. I. vi. 2. vii. 3, 4. viii. 9.
xi. 4, 5,6. VIl.vi. 7. IX. viii. 8.

νοσηματώδεις

X. vi. 4. vii. 1, 2. viii. 132. νοῦ Χ.
vii. 7. Vili. 3.1x.12. vg VI. viii. 9.

IX. viii. 8. γοῦν I. vii. 5. III. i. 5.
lil. 2, vii. x. VI. vi. 2. xi. 2, 5, 6.
xiii. 2, IX. viii. 6. X. vii. 9. viii. 13.
ix. 11. νόον VIL. vi. 3.

νῦν I. v. 2. vi. 4, 13. x.6,10. 1]. vii.
5,9. ULi.rov. 5.x.1. xii 5. V.
v.14. VILi.§. xiii.4. VIL. iii. 7.
IX.i 2 iv. 4. ΣΧ, ii §. iv. 4. vit. 9.
ix. 3

Ξ

ξενίας IX. x. 1.

ξενικὴν Ν ΠῚ. iii. 4. xii, 1.

ξένων TV. ii. 15.

Ἐπνοφάντῳ VII. vii. 6.

ξηρανθεῖσαν VIII. i. 6.

ξηρὸν VII. iii. 6. ξηρῷ VIII. viii. 7.
ξηρᾶς III. xi. 1. ξηρὰ VIL. iii. 6.
ξύλων IT, ix. 5.
ξυνιέναι V. ix. 15. ξυνιέντας Χ, i. 4.

O

ὄγκῳ X. vii. 8.

ὅδε. ἥδε VI. xi. 8. τοδὶ VIL viii. 7. ix.
Ι. ταδὶ VIL, iii. 2.

ὁδὸς I. iv. 5.

ὁδοὺς VIII. xii. 2.

ὀδυρόμενος IV. ii. 21.

ὅθεν I. v. 1. vii. 17. viii. 17. ix. 1. xiii.
12, ID. i. 1. wi. 9. vii. 8. III. i. 9.
vill. 6, 10. χ. 8. IV.i. 7, 15,17, 24,
31, 33, 40, 42, 43. iv. 2,3.ν. 9. V.
ix. 10. VILii.4, VIII. i.3,6.v. 1.
vil. 6. xi. 1. xii. 3. IX. ix. 1. xis.
xii. 3. X. v. 1.

VOL, 11.

xlix

ὀθνεῖον Υ 111. xii. 8. ὀθνείῳ VIII. ix. 3.
xii. 6. ὀθνείων IV. vi. 5. IV. ix. 2.
3. ὀθνείοις LX. iii. 5.

olaxlf{ovres X. i. 2.

οἰκεῖος I. iii. 5. οἰκεία X.v. 2, 6, 8.
οἰκεῖον I. v. 4. vii. 18. IV.i. 9. viii. 5.
V.iv.5. VLii γ. VULi. 3x1.
xi. 2. IX. ii. 9. iii. 4. vii. 3, 7. ix. 5.
x. 2. X. iii. 4. v. 2, 5. vii. 9. ix. 8.
οἰκείου X. ii. 4. οἰκείαν I. vii. 15.
VIUI. viii. 2. X. vi. 5. vii. 7. οἰκεῖαι
VILL. iii. 6. X.v. 5. οἰκείων IV. iii.
7. Xv. 5. οἰκεῖα 1. vir. VIII. i
7. IX.i. 9. ii. 7. vii. 2. οἰκείου: IV.
v. 6. οἰκείοις V. i. 15. οἰκείας ΙΧ,
ix.5. X.ix.4. οἰκειότερον I. vi. 13.
ix. 3. xii. 7. οἰκειότεροι VITI. xii. 4,
6. οἰκειότεραι X. v. 6. οἰκειότατον
III. ii. 1.

οἰκειότητα VIL i.5. ΙΧ. ii. 9.

οἰκείως TV.i.4. IX. x. 5, 6.

οἰκέτης V. ix. 11.

οἰκήσεων VITI. x. 6.

οἰκία 1. vii.1. V. ν. 8, 15. WIL. xii. 7.
X.v. 1. οἰκίας V. v.16. οἰκίᾳ V. v.
10,15. WIL. xi. 4. οἰκίαν V. v. το.
οἰκίαις VIII. x. 4. X. ix 14.

οἰκοδομεῖν 11. i. 6. οἰκοδομοῦντες ITI.
i: 4.

οἰκοδόμησις 1]. xi. 4.

οἰκοδομίας V. x. 7.

οἰκοδομικὴ VI. iv. 3. X. iv. 2. olxodo-
μικῇ 1. vii. 1.

οἰκοδόμος V. ν. 8, 10. οἰκοδόμον V. ν.
8. οἰκοδόμοι IT. i. 4, 6.

οἰκονομία VI. viii. 3. οἰκονομίας VI.
viii. 4.

οἰκονομικὸν V. vi. 9. xi. 9. οἰκονομικὴν
Ι, ii. 6. οἰκονομικῆς I. i. 3. οἰκονο-
μικοὺς VI. ν. 5.

οἰνηρὰ V. vii. 4.

οἴνου V. v. 3. VIL. viii. 2. olvor V. ix.
15. ofp VILLI. ii. 3. οἴνοις VIL. xiv.
2. olvouvs IIT. x. 9.

οἰνοφλυγίας ITI. v. 15.

οἰνώμενος VIL. iii. 13. x. 3. οἱἰνωμένον
VIL. iii. 12. οἰνώμενον VIL. iii. 7.
οἰνώμενοι VII. xiv. 6.

οἴεσθαι 111. viii. 13. IV. ix. 6. οἴεται
III. ii. 8. V. viii. ro. ix. 6. VI. vii.
2. VIL ii. 2. iii. 2. vii. 5. VIII. xiv.
1. [Xi 9. ib. 5. οἰηθείη IIL. i. 17.
X. iv. 10. φήθη IIL. viii. 6. V. viii.
6. οἰόμεθα I. vii. 7. x. 13. IV. ix. 3,
4. VIL v. 5. vii. 2. xi. 5. IX. iii, 5.

Ϊ INDEX VERBORUM.

X.v. 1. vil. 3. ᾧετο 1. xii. 5. VI.
xiii. 3,5. VIL ii. 1. X. ii.1, 2. viii.
11. οἴονται 11. iv.6. IV.iirr. V.
ix. 14, 15, 16. VI. viii.4. VIL. iii. 3.
xii. 3. xiii. 1,6. VIIL. 1, 2, 5. viii. 2.
xiii. 3,6. xiv.1. IX. ii. 5, 7. iv. 8.
ix. 4, 5. xii. 2. X. vi. 4. ix. 6, 10.
οἰόμενος LIT. v.17. 1V. ii. 20, 21. iii.
34. VIL ix. 7. IX. ii. 5. QSovro I.
iv. 3. X. ix.20. οἴωνται IX. iii. 1.
οἰόμενοι IV. iii. 21. vi. x. VIII. i. 7.
X.i. 2. οἰητέον X. iii, 8, vi. 4. viii.
9. ix. I.

οἷος LV. iii. 24, 33. vii. 5. WII. viii. 4.
ix. 5,6. VIII. vii.6. IX. iii. 4. οἷον
I. iv. 3. vi. 3, 4, 10, 14. vii. 3, 20.
Vili. 9, 10, 16. x. 3. xiii.9. 11. i. 2, 4.
ii. 8. v. 2. vi. 2, 6, 10, 18. viii. 6, 7,
8. IIL. i. 3, 4, 16, 17, 24. ii. 7, 8,9.
iii. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16. v. 8, 17. Vi. 3,
8. viii. 2. ix. 3. x. 2, 3, 11. Xi. I.
IV. i. 17, 40, 42. ii. 3, 10, II, 15, 20.
ili, 16. vi. 4. Vil. 13, 14, 15. viii. 3.
V.i. 4, 6, 7, 14. li. 5. iii. 9. iv. 5, 12.
V. 4,9, 11, 13. Vi. I, 2. Vii. I. viii. 3,
6, 8. ix. 9,17. xi. 1. VI. i. 2. ii. 6.
v. I, 6. vii. 1,4.x. 1. xii, 7. VIL. ii.
7. iii. 7,9. iv. 2, 5. V. 2, 3, 7. Vii. 6.
Vill. I, 5. ix. 2, 4. xi. 4. xiv. 1, 4.
VIL. i. 7. iv.1. vi. 7. vii. 1,2, 5, 6.
vill. 6. ix. 5. x. 1,4. xi.6. xii. 1,2.
IX, i. 1, 4. ii. 1, 4. iv. 8. v. 2. vi. 1,
2. Vil. 7. Vill. 1,2. X. 111. 4, 12. iv.
2, 8, 10. v. 1, 2,5. ix. 18. οἷα 1].
iv.4. IID. viii.6. IV. ii. 11. viii. 1,
5. οἵων ID, 111. 5. off VI. viii. 9.
ola VIII. vi. 4.

οἱονδήποτε IIT. v. 19.

old wep VII, viii. 3.

οἷόν re I. viii. 9. ix. 5,9. III. iii. 13. v.
17. IV.i. 21. iii. 16. V.x.4. VI.
xiii.6. VIT.ii.r. VIITL.i.7. CX. iii.
4. iv. 10. v. 3. Vi. 4. X. 4. X. iii, 12,
ix. 5, 7.

ὀκνηροὶ IV. iii. 35.

ὀκνοῦντα IX. xi. 5.

ὀλιγάκις ΚΤ]. ix. 5.

ὀλιγαρχίαν VIII. x. 3,5. ὀλιγαρχίαις
VOL x. 5.

ὀλιγαρχικοὶ V. iii. 7.

ὀλίγος 1. vii. 6. ὀλίγον ΤΠ. vi. 7. VII.
xii. τ, VIII. vi. 4. viii. 5. IX. viii. 9.
ὀλίγας IIT. xii, 7. ὁλίγα 1]. vi. 6.
IV. ii. 20. iii. 23,24. VIII. i. 6. IX.
ΧΙ. §. ὀλίγοι 1. viii. 7. IIL. xi. 3.

VIIL. iii. 8. χ.3. IX.x.3. ὄλίγῳ!.
x14. VIII. vi. 3. ὀλίγον VIL. viii.
2. déAlyos VII. ix. 5. ὀλίγου: ΙΧ.
x. 5,6. X.ix. 17. ὀλίγων IV. iii.

27.

ὀλιγωρία VII. vi. 1.

ὀλιγωρήσει LV, iii. 17.

ὀλυγώρως ΤΥ. i. 34.

ὁλόκληρος IV, i. 38. ὁλόκληρον IV.

Vv. 7.

ὅλον IIT. xii. 4. V. ii.g. iii. 11, 12. iv.
8. v.18. X.iv.1,4. ὅλοις 1. viii. 7.
ὅλον V. ii. 3. Sky Ve i. 9. iv. 12.
ὅλων X. iv. 4. ὅλης V. ii. 3, 9, 10.
11. VI. xii.5. X.iv.2. ὅλην V. il.
6,7, 10, viii. 3. xi. 4. ὅλα V. ii 9.

ὀλοφυρτικὸς IV, iii. 32.

Ὀλύμπια VII. iv. 2.
viii. 9.

ὅλως 1. iv. 6. vii. 3, 5,6, 10, 11. Vili.
10. x. 3. xii. 2. xiii, 18. IL ii 7.
v. 2. vi. 10, 20, vii. 1. Π|Ι. i. 14.
ii. 9, 11. vi. 4. xi. 8. V. 11. 8. v. 9.
xi.6. VI. v. 2. vii.2.x.1. VIL ii
1. vi. 6. viii. I. ΧΙ]. 4. XIV. 2. 4.
VIII. vii. 1. xii. 6, 8. IX. v. 4. viii.
4, 5,9. xi.4. X. ix. 7, 9, 10, 12, 20,
22.

ὄμβρου VIII. i.6. ὄμβρων IIT. iii. 5.

Ὅμηρος IIT. iii. 18. viii. 2, 10. xi. 4.
V. ix. 7. VI. vii. 2. VIL 1. 1. vi. 3.
VIII. x. 4. xi. 1.

ὁμίλεῖ LV. vi. 5. ὁμιλήσει IV. vi. 6, 8.
ὁμιλεῖν X. ΤΣΟῚ. ὁμιλοῦντα X. iil. 31.
ὁμιλοῦντες LV. vii. 1. ὁμιλητέονΥ᾽ ΠΙ.
xiv. 3.

ὁμιλία TV. viii. x. ὁμιλίας IV. viii. το.
VIII. iii. 4. ὁμιλίαις IV. vi. 1, 7.
VU. vi.x. IX. xii. 3.

ὄμμα VI. xi. 6. ὄμματι VI. xii. το.

ὁμογενῶν ΙΧ. ii. 10,

ὁμογνωμονεῖ IX. iv. 3. ὁμογνωμονοῦσε
IX. viii. 2. ὁμογνωμονῶσι LX. vi. 1.
ὁμογνωμονοῦντας LX. vi. 1.

ὁμοδοξία IX. vi. 1.

ὁμοεθνέσι VIII. i. 3.

ὁμοήθεις VIII. iv. 1. ὁμοηθέστεροι VIII.
xii. 6.

ὁμοιοπκαθεῖν I. v. 3.

ὅμοιος VII. vii. 5. viii. 2. ὁμοίου VIII.
i.6. ὁμοία VI. xiii. 2. VILL iii. 9.
ὅμοιον IT. iv. 3, 6, 19. vi. 19. TOL wi.
3. IV.ii. 15. V.vi.8. VI xii. x, 8.
VO. vi. 7. viii. 3. ix. 2. WII. i. 4,
6.iv. 4. IX.i. 4. vi. 3. vii. 2 ΣΧ.

Ὀλυμπίασν 1.

INDEX VERBORUM. li

ix. 18. ὁμοίῳ IX. iii. 3. ὁμοίαν VIL.
iv.6. ὅμοιοι IV. iii. 21. VIL. ix. 6.
ΝΙΠ. iti. 7. iv. 6. vill. 5. ὅμοιαι
VIL. iii. 6. ὁμοίων 11. i.7. VIII.
ii, 3,6. XK.iv. 8. ὁμοίοις VIII. xii.
6. ὁμοίους VIII.i.6. ὅμοια V. vii. 5.
ὁμοιότερον IT. viii. 7.

ὁμοιότης II. viii. ς. VIII. viii.5. ὁμοι-
ότητα 1, vit. τι. III. vi. 4. xii. 5.
V.vi.4. xi.g. VILis. VIL iv. 2,
6. v. 5. ix.6. WII. i. 6. iii 7. iv.
4. ὁμοιότησι VI. iii. 2.

ὁμοιοῦται VILI. xii. 4. IX. iv. 6. ὁμοι-
oo Gar TX, iii. 3. ὁμοιούίμενοι IX. xii.
4. ὡμοιῶσθαι VIII. iv. 6. ὡμοίωται
ΠῚ. viii. 3

ὁμοίωμα VIII. iv. 1. X. viii. 8. ὁμοιώ-
ματα VITT. x. 4.

ὁμοίως I. i, 1. 111. 1. iv. 2. vi. 13. Vil.
1, 18, 20. vill. 12. 1x. 6. X. 12. xi
3, 6. xii. 4,6. II. i. 6, 7. 11. 6, 7, 9.
v. 2. vi. 2, 7, 12. Vii. 16, Vill. 2.
III. iii. 9, 14. iv. 4. V. 2, 3, 9, 15,
18, 19, 20, 22. Vii. I, 4, 5. ix. I. x.
1, 2, 4, 7. xii. 3. IV. i. 24. ii 2. iii.
17, 35: vi. 3, 5,8. Vil. I. Vii τ. V.
i. 14. iii. 10. v. 2, 18, 19. vi. 2. vii.
4, 5, 7. Vill. 3, 4, 11. Ix. 2, 3, 15.
VII. iii. 1, 8, 13. ἦν. 6. vii. 2, 6.
xiv. 6. ὙΠ]. ii. 2. iii. 1, 6. iv. 1.
vi. I. vii. 2, 3. viii. 6, 7. ix. 1, 5.
xii. 6. xiii. 1,8. xiv. 1. IX. ii. 1, 6,
8. iii. 1. vii. 6. ix. 9. X. ii. 2, 5.
111. 10. iv. 3, 6, 9. V. I, 2,4, 5, 6, 7»
9. Vii. 4.

ὁμολογεΐται 1, iv. 2. VII. xiii. 1. ὁμο-
λογοῦσι VIL.ii.3. ὁμολογῶν IV. vii. 4.
ὁμολογοῦντες V. viii. 10. ὡμολόγησε
VIL. xiii. 9. ὁμολόγησαν IX. i. 6.
ὁμολογούμενον I, vii. 9. X. vii. 2.
ὁμολογουμένην 1. vii. 3. ὁμολογούμενα
I. ix. 8.

ὁμολογουμένως Χ. ii, 2. V. 2. Vii. 3.

ὁμολογίαις IV. vii. 7. ὁμολογίαν 11.
xii. 1. xiii. 6.

ὁμόλογοι ITT. vi. 9.

ὁμολόγως VIL. ii. 3.

ὁμονοεῖν IX. vi. 1, 2, 4. ὁμονοοῦσι TX,
vi. 2, 3.

ὁμόνοια VIII. i. 4. IX. vi. 1, 2, 3.

ὁμοκαθεῖς VIII. xi. 5.

ὁμοφωνεῖ 1. xiii. 17.

ὁμωνυμίαν V. i. 7.

ὁμωνύμοις 1. vi. 12.

ὁμωνύμως Ὗ. 1. 7.

ὅμως I. vi. 10. vill. 15. Χ. 12. ΠῚ. ν.
14. V.v.14. vii. 3.xi.7. WI. xii.
2.xili.r. WIT. iv. 2,5. xi 3. IX.
i.g. X. vil. 4.

ὀνειδίζεται LX. viii. 4. X. iii, 11. dvet-
δίσειε TIT. v.15. ὀνειδιζόμεναι VIL.
xi, 5. ὀνειδιζομένου IX. viii. 6.

ὄνειδος LX. viii. 4. ὀνείδους IIT. viii, 3.
ὀνείδη 11. viii. τ. IV.i. 41, 43. li. 22.

ὀνήσεται LX. viii. 7.

ὄνομα 11.1.1. JIL. i. 13. ii. 7. xii. 5.
IV. vi. 4. V.iv. 5. VI. viii 3. ὁὀνό-
ματος II. vii. 3. LII.xi.7. IV. ui. 1.
VIL. xiii. 6. ὀνόματι .ἷν. 2. V. ii.
6. Vi. v. 5. ὀνόματα V. iv. 13.

ὀνομάζεται V.iv. 9. ὠνομάκασιν Υ 1].
xi, 2. ὠνόμασται 1]. vi. 8 IV.i.
39. VL. 9. ὠνομάσθαι IV. v. 6.

ὀνομαστῶν LY. iii. 27.

ὀνοματοποιεῖν II. vil. 11.

ὄνοι 1171. viii. 11. ὄνοις X. v. 8.
ibid.

ὀνύχων VIT. v. 3.

ὀξεῖς III. vii. 12. IV.v.9. VIL. vii. 8.
ὀξέσι VII. xii. 2.

ὀξύτητα 1. v. 8.

ὀξυφωνία IV. iii. 34.

ὁπλίζω. ὡπλισμένοι ILL viii. 8.

ὅπλα III. xii. 3. Vii. 14. ὅπλοις ITI.
viii. 7.

ὁποῖος III. v.7. ὁποῖα III. viii.7. V.
vi. I. ὁποίᾳ V. iii. 2.

ὁποιαοῦν IX. viii. 5. ὁποιφοῦν VII. ix.
1. VIII. iv. 2. ὁποιᾳοῦν VIL. ix. 1.

ὅποσον VII. i. 40.

ὅποτε IIT. i. 10.

ὁποτερανοῦν V. ix. 16.

ὁποτέρως V. v. 18.

ὅπου IV. i. 17. iii. 27.

ὀπυίουσιν. ὀπυίονται VIL. v. 4.

wosl. vii. 19, 22. LV.i. 17,21. iii. 18,
31. vi.9. VIL iv. 4. xiii.8. VIL. xiii.
2. VIII. xiii.9. X. vi. 6, ix. 22.

ὁπωσδήποτε 111. v. 18.

ὁράματα Χ. iii. 7. iv. 7.

ὅρασις Χ. iv. 1. ὁράσεως Χ. iv. 4.

ὁρᾷ VI. xiii. 8. VIII. ix.9. ὁρᾷν]. vi.
10. x. 1,7. IIL. iv. 5. VII. xiv. 5.
IX. xi. 2. xi. x. Χ. ii. 1. iii. 12.
ὁρῶμεν 1. ii. 6. xiii. 16. Π. ii. 6. vi.
2. V.i. 3. VIL. iii. 7. ὁρῶσι. vii.
2. VI. xi. 6. ὁρᾶσθαι VI. xiii. 1.
ἑωράκασι VIII. ii. 4. ὁρῶν VIII. iv.
r TX. ix. 1.

ὀργανικὰ IIT. i. 6.

ὄνους

li INDEX VERBORUM.

ὀργανικῶς I. ix. 7.

ὄργανον ΝΠ. xi. 6. ὀργάνῳ IIL i. τό.
ὄργανα 1. vii. 3. IIT. iii. 14. ὀργάνων
I. i. 4. Vili, 15.

ὀργὴ IV. v. 2. V. viii. 10. dpyfs IV.

v.10. VII. iv. 32. ὀργὴν IT. v. 2.
vii. 10. IV. v. 8, 10,15. V. ii. 5.

xi.2. ὀργῇ VII. vi. 4. ὀργὰς I. i. 7.
IV. v. 1.

épyloas V. viii. 9. ὀργισθῆναι 11. v. 2.
vi. 10. ix. 2. X.iii.g. ὀργιζόμενος
II. v. 3. IL.i. rq. IV.v. 3,6. VOL.
Vii. 3. ὀργιζόμεθα IT. v.4. IV. v.14.
ὀργίζεσθαι IIT. i. 24. VII. vi. 4.
ὀργιζόμενοι 11ι. viii. 12. IV. v. 5.
ὀργίζονται IV. v. 8, 10. ὀὁὀργιστέον
ἯΙ. ix. 7. IV. v. 13.

ὀργίλος IT. vii. 10. ὀργίλοι IT. i. 7.
IV. v. 8, 9.

ὀργιλότης I. vii. 10. IV. v. 2.
ὀρέγεται ὃν. τ. VIII. xiii. 2. IX. iv.
3 Xi. 4. ὀρέγονται IV. iv. 5.
VII. v. 3. xiii. 3. ΙΧ. i. 4. viii. 4.
X.iv. 10. dpéyecOa: IT. vii. 8. II.
i, 24. IX. viii. 6.ix.9. ΣΧ. iv. 9.
ὁρεγόμεθα LIT. iii. το. ὀρεγομένῳ 111.
xii. 4: ὀρεγόμενον IIT. xii. 6, X. ix.
10. ὀρεγόμενοι VIII. viii. 2. ix. 5.
ὁρέξεται TIT. xi. 8. ὠρέγετο IV. iii.
45. Speydueros IV. vii. 12.

ὀρεκτικὸν 1. xiii. 18. dpexrixds VI. ii. 6.

ὁρεκτοῦ ITT. iii. 19.

ὄρεξις ITI. iii. 19. xii. 6. 7. VI. ii. 1,2,
4,5,6. VIII. viii. 7. ὄρεξιν 1. ii. τ.
IIT. viii. 3. VI.ii 2. ΙΧ. ν. 1. dpé-
fe VIL ii. 2,3. ὁρέξεις 1. 111, 8. V.
xi. 9. ὀρέξεων X. v. 6. ὀρέξεσι 11.
vii. 8. VII. vi. 2.

ὀρθοδοξεῖν VIT. viii. 4.

ὀρθὸς IT. ii. 2. 171. v. 21. xi. 8. Vi ix,
5. VLi.1, 2, 3. xiii.4, 5. ὀρθὴ 11.
iii. 2. VI xi. 1. xiii. 7. VII. x. 4.
ὀρθὸν I. x.g. 11]. ii.2. V. xi. 2. VI.
1.1. xil. 6. xiii. 4, 5. VII. iv. 2. viii.
4,5. X.viii. 8. ὀρθοῦ VI. xiii. 5.
ὀρθῶ VIL. iii.to. ὀρθῆς X. ix. 8, 9.
6pOG IV. i. 13. VI. ii. 4. VII. ix. 1.
ὀρθὴν I. vii. 19. VI. ii. 2. xii. 8. Χ.
ix. 11, 14. ὀρθὰ 171]. vii. 11. ὀρθαῖς
VIL v. 6.

ὀρθότης VI. ix. 3, 4, 6, 7.

ὀρθοῦντες IT. ix. 5.

ὀρθῶς]. viii. 9. xiii. 15. ITT. ii. 3, 13.
iv. 2,4. IV. i. 12. ii. 13. iii. 20. v.
13. V.L 14. x. 2, 4,5. VL ii. 6.

ix. 3, 4. xiii. 3. VIL 11. VIEL ix.
i. xiv. 2. X. vi. 6. vill. 13. ix. 12,
20,

ὁρίζονται IT. iii. τ. viii. 5. II. vi. 2.
IX. iv. 1. ix. 7. dploece ΤΊ. vi. 15.
ὁρίζεται 171. vii. 6. IV. ii.6. ix. x. UX.
Vili. 2. ὀρίζωνται VIL xiii. 4. ὡρῖσθαι
X. iii. 1. ὥρισται. viii. 2. VI. ix.
3. ὠρισμένον IX, ii. 6. ix. 7. xX. 3.
ὡρισμένα Ὗ. ἱ. 12. ὡρίζοντο V.v. 1.
ὡρισμένων ΙΧ. x. 3. ὡρισμένῃ IL vi.
15. ὡρισμένη Χ. iii. 3. ὁριστέον IV.
viii. 7.

ὁρισμὸς V.ii. 6, VIII. vii. 5.

ὁρμᾷ VII. vi. τ. ὁρμᾶν 111]. viii. 11.

ὁρμὴν IIT. viii. το. ὁρμαὶ, xiii. 15.
ὁρμαῖς X. ix. 12.

ὀρνέοις Ψ111. i. 3.

ὀρνίθεια VI. vii. 7.

ὅρος I. vii. 7. V. iii. 11,13. ΜΙ. 1,
4. VII. xiii. 4. ὅρου V. iii. 12. Spor
VI. ix. 5. VII. iii. 13. ὅρων VI. viii.
9. xi.4. VIL Vv. 5.

ὅσιον]. vi. 1.

ὁσαχῶς IT. iii. 5.

ὀσμὴ 111. x. 7. ὀσμὴν III. x. 5. ὀσμαῖς
ΠῚ. x. 5, 6, 7.

ὅσον 1.111, 4. vii. 18,19. xiii. 8. 11. ix.2.
ΠῚ. ix. 5. [V.v.3. V. iv. 12.v.9. ix.
15. VIL. iii. 6. vi.2. VIII. ix. 1.x. 6.
xi, 1, 7. xiii. 11. IX. i. 8, 9. viii. 3,
6. X. vii. 8. viii. 8. ὅσα I. vi. 10.
IT. i. 4. iii. 5. IIT. i. 4. ii. 8. 111, 8.
v. 7,9. vi. 4, 10. IV.i. 12, 22, 24.
ii, 11, 14, 15, 16. 111. 28. vi. 9. vii.
11. Υ. 1. 9. 11. 6, 11, 12. vii. i viii.
5,8, 12. VI. iii. 4. vii. 4. xii. 1, 8.
VII. i. 6, 7. iii. 7. iv. 4. vi. 4. x. 5.
IX... 5. X. vii. 20. viii. 4,7. ὅσαι
1.1.4. WI. x. 2. [V.ii.4. VII. vi.
2.xii. x. VIII. xii.r. ὅσῳ. Χ. 2.
xiii. 7. ILI. iii. 8. viii. 4, 16. ix. 4.
VIL. xi. 4. VIII. i.1. vi. 1. xii. 6,7.
IX. i, 4. iii. 2, 3. vill. Χ. vii. 4, 8.
viii. 5. ὅσοι 1.1. 5. 11Π1.ν.)γ. VOL.
iv. 5. VIL. ii. 4. IX.x.5. ὅσων
IV.i.2. ΥἹΌΣ 5. vii.6. VIL xiv.
2. VIII. xili.4. ὅσου. x.16. IX.
i, 8,9. ὅσοις V. iv. 13. vi. 4. VIL
v.4. ὅσας IV. vi. 7. VI. i. 2.

ὅπερ 11. ix. 5. ILI. viii. 9, 16. x. 9.
IV. ix. 2. V. iii. 3, 11, 12, 14. ν.
10, 12. ix. 9. VI. ii. 2. ἱν. 3. VIL.
xiii. 1, VIL iii9.v. 3. IX.i 5.
li. 5, 6. iil. 1. iv. 1, 3. v. 2. Vii, >

INDEX VERBORUM.

X.v.5. ὅνπερ. iv. 2.
iii. 2. VIIL xii. 6.
Boris VIL. iv. 4. ἥτις VI. iv. 3. VIL.
iv. 6. Sry V. vi. 7.

ὁστισοῦν Χ. ἰϊ. 4. ὁντιναοῦν VIII. ix.
3. Χ,ἷν. 1. ix. 17. ὁτιοῦν 1. xi. 5.
11. vi. 18. ITT. i. 123. v. γ. IV. vi. 2.
VII. xii 2. X. iii. 9. vii. 2. ὀτφοῦν
X. ii. 2. iv. 2,4. ν. 4. ὁτουοῦν VL
x. 1. OX. vi. 1.

ὄσφρησις X. v.7. ὀσφρήσεως X. iii. 7.
ὅταν II. iv. 4. II.i.7. iii. 17. viii. 9,
14. x.6. xi. 1. IV. iii. 23. v. 10.
V.iv. 4,6,7,8,14. V. 12, 13. Viii. 1,
2,6, 7, 8,9, 11. x. 5. xi. 2. VI. iii.
2,4. V. 2. Vii. 5.x. 3. xiii. 4. VII.
i. 3. ii. 8, 10. iii. 9, 10. Vi. 2. ix. 2.
xiv. 3,5,8 VIIL.iv.1. vi. 4. vii. 2.
xii. 5. xiv. 1. IX.i. 4. iii. 1,5. v.
3, 4. VI 1,2. ix 1. xi. 5. Xi. 3.
iv. 2. v. 6.

SreI. x. 4,7. IL iii. 5. vi. 11, 18. vii.
8.ix.2,7. ILL i. 6.iii. 14. vii. 4, 5.
xi. 1, 8. xii. g. IV. i. 12, 22. v. 5.
V.x.1. VL ix.6, VILi 7. TX.
δ. Vi. 2.

οὗ IV. iii. 27. ‘V. vii. 5.

οὐδαμῇ X. viii. 8.

οὐδαμῶς]. χ, 9. IV. iii. 15. V. vii. 3.
οὐδέ. i. 11, 15, 16, 21. V. 10. Vili. 10.
ix. 8. V. i. 4. ii. 2. vii. 5. ix. 3, 6,
9. xi. 4. VI. ii. 6. iv. 2. ix. 3. xiii.
8. VII. i. 2. ii. 5. iv. 6. xii. 6. xiii.
6. xiv. 2. VIII. iii. 4. xi. 6. LX. ii.
6. iii. 4. iv. 7,8, 10. x. 5. X. iii. 3.
iv. 5, 6.

οὐδεὶς I. v. 6. vii. §. viii. 12. ix. 11. x.
13. xii. 4. IT. iv. 5. ΠΙ.}. 5,6, 17.
ii, 8, 11. iii, 3,6, 11. ν΄. 4, 7, 15. Vi
6. x. 4. xii. 4. IV. iii. 3. v. 10. vi.
8. V. ix. 6. xi. 3,6. VI.1.6.¥. 3.
vii. 6. xi. 5. VII. ii. 11. iv. 2. vi. 4.
VIII. i. 1. v. 3. xiii. 2. TX. v. 3. ΣΧ.
iii, 12. iv. 9. ix. 18. οὐδεμία VI.
iv. 3. ix. 3. VII. iv. 5. xi. 3,4
xiii. 2, οὐδὲν I, i. 5. iii. 7. vi. 5.
vii. 11. Vili. 12. ix. 9. X. 10. xiii. I0,
12, 16. I. i. 2,7. ii. 1, 3. iv. 3, 6.
ix. 8. ITI. i. 6, 22, 23. 11. 10, 15, 16.
iii. 6. v. 7, 19. Vi. 6. Vili. 11, 16. ix.
' 3,4, 6. x. 2, 9. xii. 2,5. IV.i. 19,
34, 35. ii. 3. iii. 2, 15, 30. Vill. 10.
ix. 5. V. i. 2. iv. 3. v. 16. Vi I, 6.
vii. 1. viii. 3. ix. 9,15, 17.x. 2. VI.
i, 2. ii. 5, 6. viil.x. WIL ii. 6, 10. 111,

ἅπερ VII.

᾿ jill

8. x. 2. xiii. 3. VIII. v. 3. xi. 6. xii.
8. IX. iii1, 3. X. ii. 3. iii. 12. v.
10. Vi. 4. Vii. 5, 7. Vili. 8. ix. 14, 16.
οὐδένα 1. x. τ. VIT.ii. 1.iv.4. X. ii.

2. iv. 1. οὐδεμίαν IT. ii. 4. V. ii. 2,
5. VII. iv. 4. οὐδενὸς I. vii. 13.

ΨΙΠ. χ. 2. ΣΧ. iii. 7. iv. 1. 2. vi. 2.
Vil. 7. Vili. 6. οὐδενὶ ITT. xi. 8. VII.

li. 4. X. 3. ΙΧ. iv. 7.x.6. οὐδεμιᾶς
VI. ii. 2. xii. 1, VII. xii. 6. οὐδεμίᾳ

VI. xii. 5

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον IX. iv. 3. Χ, ii. 2.

οὐδέποτεϊ. vii. 5. x. 13, 14. 11. vi. 18.
IV. ix. 6.

οὐδέτερον LV. i. 31. X. iii. 4. οὐδέτερα
IV.ix. 5. otderdpous I. viii. 7. ovde-
τέρων X. v. 6.

οὗ évexa V. viii. 6. VL ii. 4. v. 6. xd. 4.
VI, viii. 4. x. 3.

οὐκέτι IIT, v. 14.

οὐκοῦν VI. ix. 6.

ob μὴν TX. ii. ro.v.1. X. ii. 5. iii. 1,
9. V. 7. Viii. 9. ix. 16, 19.

οὕπω I. ix. 10. V. vii. 7. viii. 3, 8. VI.
ix. 3. xii. 7. xiii. 6. VII. iii. 8.

οὐρανίων IX. vi. 1.

οὐρανὸν VII. 1. 6.

οὐσία I. vi. 2. IV.i. 30. οὐσίας LV. i.

5. οὐσίαν II. vi. 17. ILD. xi. 8. IV.
L. 5, 19, 20, 23. LX. iii. 3.

ore V. ix. 6.

οὕτω 1. vii. 11, 15, 16. viii. 3, 9, 13.
ix. §. xi. 3. II. i 4, 7, 9. iv. 4, 6.
vi. 7, 8. ix. 6,9. ILLi. 11. v. 14.
xl. 9. IV, i. 5. ii. 6. 111, 24. iv. 2.
vii. 5,6. V. ili. 6.ν. 12, 14. vi I.
xi 4. VI xiii. x. VII. 1. 5. iii 6, 7,
8. iv. 6. viii. 1. xii. 3. VIIL iii. 3.
vi. 4. X. 3. Xi. 3. iv. 1,3. IX.i. 8.
ii, 7. iii. §. iv. 10. V. 3. Vi. 2. Vii. 1.
viii. 4, 6. 1x. 1, 10. x. 6. xii. τ. Χ i.
2. ii. 5. iii. 3, 9. iv. 10. V. I, 10. Vi. 4.

οὕτως 1. v. 6. vi. §, 16. vil. 10, 14. ix.
5. X. 2, 10, 14,15, 16. xii 8. xiil. 1,
7,15, 18. II.i. 7, 8. ii. 7, 8. iv. 2,
6. vi. I, 2, 9,19, 20.Vii. 8. Viii. 2, 4.
ix. 2, OI. iv. 2, 3. v. 14, 16, 21, 22.
vi. 11. vil. 8. vili. 11. xi. 8. xii. 8.
IV. iii. 18, 32. vii. 1, 3. ix.6. V. iii.
11. V. 12, 16, 17. Vili. 1, 2,ix, 1. VI.
i. 2, 4. V. 1. X. 3. xili. 2. WII. i.2,
4. iii. 13. vi. 1. ix. 5. xiv. 2. VIII.
iv. I, v. 1, 3.X.3. IX.i.2, 7. ii. 5,
10. iv. 10. X.1. 2. ii. 1. iv, 3. v. 6.
vii. 8. viii. 13 ix. 7, 11, 14.

liv :

οὕτωσι IT. i. γ.

ὀφείλημα VIII. xiii. 6. ΙΧ. ii. 5.

ὀφείλει 11. ii. 3. VIIL. xiv. 4. IX. ii.
4. ὀφείλεται VIII. xiv. 4. IX. vii.
1. ὀφείλουσι IX. vii. 1. ὀφείλοντες,
ὀφειλόντων ibid. ὀφείλοντας IX. ii.
8. ὀφείλοντα VIIT. xiv. 4.

ὄφελος 11. ii. 1. VID. i. 3. xiv. 1.

ὀφθαλμιῶσι Χ. iv. 8.

ὀφθαλμοῦ L vil. rr. 11. vi. 2. ὀφθαλ.-
μὸν II. νἱ.2. ὀφθαλμοὺς I. xiii. 7.

ὀχληθεῖεν IX. v.3. ὀχληθέντες [X.xi.5.

ὀχληρὸν LV. vii. 14. ὀχληρότατοι IV.
v. 10.

ὄψις 1. vi.r2, VIII. iv. τ. Χ. ν. 7.
ὄψεως III. x. 2. VI. xiii. τ. IX. v.
3. ὄψει IX. χὶ. 4. ὄψιν ITI. v. 17.
VI. xii. τ. X. iv. 9.

ὄψα 111. x.9. ὄψων 11. x. 5. ὄψοις
VI. xiv. 2.

ὀψοποιητικὴ VII. xii. 6.

éyood yos LIT. x. 9.

Il

wdyxaxo I. viii. 16.

παγχάλεπον VIII. viii. 6.

παθήμασι 11. vii. 14. viii. 2.

καθητικοῦ X. iv. 8. παθητικοὶ 1]. v. 2.

πάθος I. iii. 7. 11. iii. 8. vi. 18. 111.
viii. 12. IV. v. 2. ix. 3. V. iv. 4, 6.
vi. 1. viii. 12. VII. i. 6. ii. 2. iii, 13.
vii. 8. viii. §. ix. 2. VIIL iii. 5. v. 5.
IX. viii. 6. X.ix.7. πάθους LV. v.
3, 5. ix. 2. VII. iii. 12. iv. 6. v. 5.
vii. 8. πάθει 11. iii. 3. IV. ix. 1, 3.
VII. ii. 2. iii. 13. vii. 3. VIII. v. 5.
X. ix. §. πάθη 1]. iii. 3. v. 6, 10, 12.
vii. 14. ΠΙ.1. 1,27. V. viii.8. VIL.
i. 5. VIILi.7. [X.i£ 6. X. iii. 6.
παθῶν 1. xi. 4. πάθεσι I. iii. 6. IL.
vi. 16,ix. 1. WII. iii. 7, 8. IX. viii.
4,7. X. iv. 3. viil. 1, 2.

παιδαγωγοῦ IIT. xii. 8.

παιδεία ΤΠ, ili. 2. παιδείας V. ii. 11.
VIII. xi. 2. παιδείαν V. ii, 11. παι-
δεῖαι X. ix. 15.

παιδεύουσι X. i. τ. παιδευθέντες VIII.
xii. 6. πεπαιδευμένος 1. iii. 5, πεπαι-
Seupévou 1. iit. 4. IV. viii. 4. παι-
δευθῆναι VILL. xii. 5. παιδευθήσονται
X. ix. 14.

παιδιὰ IV. viii. τ΄. VII. vii. 7. X. vi.
6. παιδιᾶς IV. viii. 1,5. X. vi. 6, 7.
παιδιᾷ 11. vii. 11, 13. IV. viii.4. X

INDEX VERBORUM.

vi. 6. καιδιὰν X. νἱ. 6. παιδιῶν X.
vi. 3. παιδιαῖς IV. viii. 12.
παιδικοῦ ΙΝ. 11.18. παιδικαῖς IX. iii.
4. παιδικὰς IIT. xii. 5. παιδικὸν X.
vi. 6.

παιδίον VIL. vi. 2. wacdlov VII. v. 7.
X. iii. 12. παιδία TIT. xii.6. VIL. xi.
4. xii. 7. X. iii. 12.

καιδιώδης VIL. vii. 7.

παίζειν X. vi. 6. παίσας Til. i. 17.
walfovres LV. viii. 3.

waisT.ix.10. ITI. xii.6. VI. viii. 6.
VIL. 1.1. IX. 111.4. παῖδες 1. viii.
16. III. i. 22. ii. 2. VIIL iv. 4. Χ.
vi. 4. παῖδας Til. vi. 5. παῖδα ILI.
xi. 8. παίδων VII. v. 3. X. ix. 13.
παισὶ VI. xiii. 1. ΣΧ. vi. 4.

παλαιὰν I. viii. 3. παλαιοὶ I. viii. 7.
παλαιῶν IV. viii. 6. παλαιοῦ Χ. ix. 5.

πάλης II. vi. 7.

πάλι I, vii. 1. x. 4,8,14. V.v.7. WI.

lii. x. xiii, τ. VII. ili. 12.

πάμπαν IV. iii. 15,17. WII. xiii. 5.
VIII. xiii. 6.

πάμπολυ II. i. 8.

παμφάγον VII. vi. 6.

wavaloxys I. viii. 16.

πανάριστος 1. iv. 17.

πανουργία VI. xii. 9.

mwavovpyous VI. xii. 9.

πανταχόθεν ITT. xii. 7.

πανταχοῦ V. vii. I, 2, 5.

παντελοῦς IV. iii. 17, 20.

παντελῶς 1. v. 3. x. 2. X. vii. 6.

πάντῃ I. x. 11, 15.

παντοδαπῶς I. x. 4.

πάντοθεν IV. i. 40.

παντοῖαι 1. ix. 11. παντοίαις X. viil. 1.
παντοίας L. xi. 2. IX. ii. 2.

πάντοτε LX. iv. 4.

wards I. x. 11,15. IV. iii. 23. viii. 4.

πάνυ II. vii. 3. IU. ii. 12, 13. x. 9. xi.
7. IV.i. 11, 30. VIIL iii. 4. iv. 5.
vi. 1, 5,6. xiii. 3. IX. vil. 6. x. 2.
Χ. li. 4. ν. 4.

παρὰ 1. 1. 2,5. V. vii. 3

wapaBdd\ew VII. xiii. 6.

παραγγελίαν IT. ii. 4.

παραγίνεται L. ix.1, 3. Π.1.4. IV.i.38.

παράδειγμα 1. vi. 14. Xiil. 3.
παραδείγματα VIII. x. 4.

παραδιδόντες X. ix. 18.

«αράδοξα VI. ii. 18.

wapawei II. x.3. παραινοῦντας X.vii.8.

παρακαλεῖ 1. xiii. 15. παρακαλεῖν X. ix.

INDEX VERBORUM. lv

10. wapaxéxAnrat X. iv. 9.
κλητέον IX. xi. 5.
wapaxarabjxcyn V.il. 3. παρακαταθήκην
V. viii. 4. παρακαταθήκας X. viii. 7.
παράκλησις I. xiii. 18.
παρακολουθεῖ 11. iii. 7. ΠΙ. ii 15.
παρακούειν ΝΠ]. vi. 1.

ταρα-

παραλαμβάνομεν LIT, 111. 10. παραλα-
βόντες TV.i. 20. παραλαβόντων ΙΧ.
" vil. 7.

wapadelwe: V.x.5. παραλείπουσι I. vi.
15. παραλιπόντων X. ix. 22.

παραλόγως V, viii. 7.

παραλελυμένα I. xiii. 15.

παρημελημένη Χ, iv. 9.

παραμεμίχθαι X. vii. 3.

παραμνθητικὸν LX, xi. 3.

παράνομος V.i. 8, 11, 12. παράνομον
VI. i, 8. ii. 8, 9. παράνομα I. xi. 4.

παραπλήσιον 1 iii, 4. ΠῚ. viii.r2. IV.
ix.2. VIl.vi.7. [X.ix.10. X.v.5.

πκαραπλησίως IV. 1.1.1. VLxiii. 1. VIL
v.11. ΙΧ. ix. το.

παρασείσαντι LV, ili. 15.

παρασκευάζει X. Vii.6. παρασκενάζουσι
VI. xiv. 5.

wapackeuys 111. viii. 15. παρασκευαῖς
Ill. viii. 9.

παραστάτην V. ii. 5.

wapardrrovres III. viii. 5.

παραφέρεται 1. xiii. 15. παραφερόμενον
I. xiii. τό.

παραφυάδι 1. vi. 2.

παρεκκλῖνον II. i. 1.

παρῆν VI. viii. 4.

rapéxBawe VIII. x. 3. παρεκβαίνων
11.1χ. 8. IV.v. 13. παρεξέβημεν I.
v. I.

wapéxBacts VIII. x. 2. παρεκβάσεις
VITI.x.1. wapexBdocow VIII. xi.6.

πάρεργα I. vii. 19.

παρέχει I.x.4. παρέχουσι X. vi. 3.

παρίησι IX. viii. 1. παρετέον X.i. 2.

παρόδῳ IV. ii. 20.

καροιμία VIII. ix.1. παροιμίαν VIII.
iii. 8. παροιμίᾳ VIL. ii. 10. wapor-
plac IX. viii. 2.

παροιμιαζόμενοι V. 1. 15.

παροίχεται ΙΧ, vii. 6.

παρόμοιοι III. viii. 13.

παρορᾶν IV. iii. 30.

παρορμῆσαι X. ix. 3.

παρουσία IX. xi. 2, 3, 5,6. παρουσίας
TX. v. 3.

παῤῥησίαν IX. ii. 9.

παῤῥησιαστικός TV, iii. 28.

πάρφασις VII. vi. 3.

πάρων V.x. 5. παροῦσα 1]. ii. 11. πα-
ρὸν I. xiii. ro. VII. iii. 2. VIII.
lll. 5. παρόντος II. ii. 5. VIII. ix.
5. IX. iv. 6. vii. 6. παρούσης VII.
lil, 13. ΨΙΠ.Ὶ:. 7. X. v. 3. παρόντι
I. x. 13. Χ. ἵν. 11. παρόντωνΥΥ.

τῶ: Π. ii. 3- vi. 8. II. i. 14. v. 15. ix.
3: ΧΙ. 1. 2. IV. i. 39. iii. 6. V.
ix. 3. χ. 4. VIL ii. 5. VII. vi. 4.
1X. 4. IX. vii. 3. viii. 8. xi. 4. Χ.
ix. 15. πᾶσα. 1. 1, 4. iv. 1. xiii.
8. I1.1. 6. iii. 5, το. vi. 2,9, 18.

lili, 12. x.9. IV. ii 15. VI.

iii. 3. iv. 4. ἅπας VIII. i. 3. X.
viii. 8. way I. iii. 5. xii. 2. xiii. 7,
10. II. i. 8. iv. 3. vi. 18. ID. ii. 16.
iii. 1,7. ΧΟ 11. IV. ἢ. 40. ii. 11.
iii. 19. v. 9. viii. 8, V. vii. 3. ix. 2.
xi. 9. VIL iii.10o. IX. x. 3. ἅπαν
WI. i. 13. V.ix. 1,2. xi. 7. παντὸς
I. vi. 8. vii. 17, 23. TT.i. 5. ix. 2.
VI. ii. 3. ΝΠ. 1}. 9. πάσης 11. ii.
8.vi.g. IIL. vii.6. VI. vi. 1. παντὶ
I. vii. 10, 12.

rr. «VOL. vii. 3. doy IT. iii. 3.
ix. 3. ἁπάσῃ. vii. πάντα].
Lox. ii. 1. iv. 7. vil. 3, 11. xiii. 17.
Π ii. 7. iii. 7. vi. 18. viii. 14. ΤΠ.
i. II, 18. ii. 10. vi. 3. vii. 10. viii.
io. xi. 4Ἢ IV. i. 2. ii. 14, 20, 21.
ν. 7, 14. Wi. I, 2 V. ν. 10, 15. vii.
2. ix. 17. VIL.i.6. στάντες]. vii.
1. xh. 8. Π.1.6,7. 1Π.:. rr. v.
17. viii. 5. IV. 1 39, 40. iii. 29.
VI. iii. 2. ἅπαντες IIL. i. 5. πᾶσαι
I. νἱ. 15. ΤΙ. vii. rr. viii. 1. IV. i.
43. Vili. 12. VI. ix. 2. πάντων.
i. 4. iv. 1. vii. 8, 14. Χ 11. OL. vi.
3. ΠΙ|Ι. iii 1. xi. 6. IV. vii. 1.
ἁπάντων 1. vi. 4. πασῶν VIL. vii. 3.
ἁπάσαις 1. i.4. 1Π]. ix. 5. ἅπασι 1.
lid, 1. vi. 11. vil. 18, 20. xiii, 1.
IV. ii. 12. KX. ix. 6. πᾶσι]. iv. 3
ix. 4. IL. iii. 7,8. vi. §. vii. 11, 13,
15. ix. 6,9. IL. vii.r. IV.i. 30.
viii, 10. V.vi.g. τάσαις I. vi. 3.
TI. viii. 1. wdvras V. i. 3. vii. 4.
ἁπάσας I, iv. 4. ἅπαντα I. vi. 12.
viii. 5,14. ΠῚ. i 17. IV. v. 7.
ἅπαντας 1. vi. 15. X. 13. χὶ, 3. πά-
gas I. x. 13. I. ii. 7. vii. 3. ΠῚ.

lv1 INDEX VERBORUM.

x. 3. ΓΝ. 1.1. πᾶσα». vii. 5. ix.
6. IL.iii.g. IDL. ix. 4. IV. iii. 18.
Υ. χί τ. VIL v. 6.

πάσχει 11]. νἱ!. 5. V. v.14. ix. 6, 9.
xi. 3,5. πάσχομεν V. viii. 3. σά-
oxover ΙΧ. iv.9. πάσχειν IT. v. 5.
IV. i. 7,8. V.ix. 3. χ. 9. VIL iv.
5. VIIL xiv. 4. IX. vii. 1, 6, 7. ix.
2, πάσχων IIT. i. 3. πάσχοντος II.
x.2. πάσχον V.iv.12,.v.9. ἔπασχε
V. iv. 12. v. 9. πάσχοντες VIII.
xiii. 4. παθεῖν Π. ix. 6. III. viii.7,
8. ἔκαθον II. ix. 6. 111. viii. 16.
παθόντι IIl.i.8. V.iv.5. IX. vii.
5,6. πάθωσι. iii. 25. wabdw IV.
iii. 25. πάθοι V. v. 3. VIII. ii. 4.
ἔπαθεν. xi. 5. VIII. xiii. 9. πα-
θόντα VIII. xiii. 9. παθόντος VIII.
xiii. 10,11. παθόντες VIII. xiii. 10.
IX. vii. 1. παθόντα: TX. vii. 1. πει-
σομέθα III. v. 7. πεισομένου X. iv.
7. πεισομένων IX, ix.2. πεπονθὼς
IV. iii. 24. V.ix.3. πεπόνθασι ΐ.
iii. 25. IX.iv.1. πέπονθε IX. v. 3.
πεπονθότας LX. Vii. 2. πεπονθὸς LX.
Vii. 4.

κατάξαι LLI.viii.7. V.ix. 14,16. VILL.
ix.3. σατάξειεν ITT. ἰ. 17. πατάξαντι
V. iv. 5. ἐπάταξεν V. ii. 5. v. 4.
πατάξῃ V. iv. 4.

πατέρα V. viii. 3. VII. iv. 5. vi. 2.
VII. vii. 1. ix. 3. x. 4. xiv. 4.
IX. ii. 4. πατὴρ V. viii. 3. VIII. xi.
2. πατρὸς I. xiii. 18,19. VIII. x.
4. πατρὶ VIII. vii. 1. x. 4. xiv. 4.
ΙΧ. ii. 1, 6, 8.

πατρικὴ VIII. x. 4. xi. 2. X. ix. 12.
πατρικὴν ΙΧ. ii. 8. πατρικῆς VIII.
xii. 2. πατρικὸν. vi. 8.

πατρίδος IX, viii. 9.

παῦλα IV. v. 1ο. :
παύει IV. ν. το. παύεται ITI. iii. 17.
παύεσθαι VII. vi. 2. ἐπαύσατε VII.
ii. 10. wavovracIV.v. 8. VIIL. iii.
3, 5. παύσεται [1]. v. 14.
κειθαρχεῖ 1. xiii. 17. LX, viii. 8. πει-
θαρχεῖν X.ix. 4. πειθαρχήσειν Χ. ix.
10. πειθαρχοῦσι X. ix. 9.
πειθαρχικὸν I. xiii. 18.

κείσει LIL. iii, 11, πείθεται 1. xiii. 18.
IX. viii. 6. πείθεσθαι VI. xii. 2. TX.
ii 1, πεισθῆναι Til. v. 7. ἐπείσθη
VIL. ii. 7. ix. 4. πίθηται Ἰ. iv. 7.
πέπεισται VII. viii.4. πεπεῖσθαι VII.

‘ li. 10, viii. 4. πεπεισμένος VIL. ii.

10. πεπεισμένοι X. i. 2. ἐπέπειστο
VII. ii. το.

πεινῆν 111. ν.}. πεινῶντες III. viii. 11.
πεινῶσι 1Π]. x. 6.

πείνης VII. iv. 3.

πειρᾶται V.iv. 4. πειρῶνται Χ, iii. 4.
ix. 21. πειραθῶμεν Χ. Ἶχ. 23. πειρώ-
μενοι VII. vii. 6. πειρατέον 1, ii. 3.
Vii. 21,22. I]. ii. 5. vii.11. LX. ii.g.
iv. το. X. ix. 2, 17.

πέλας 1]. vii. 15. IV. ii. 22. vii. 13.
ΙΧ. vi. 4. viii. 7. ix. 5.

wévas IV. ii. 13. ‘VIII. viii. 6.

πενίᾳ VIII. i. 2. πενίαν» III. vi. 3, 4.
vii. 13.

πένεσθαι IV. i. 35. πενόμενος I. iv. 3.

πέντε III. viii.r. V.v.15,16. VI. iii.1.

wéva: IV. v. το.

χέρας I. iv. 5. III. vi. 6.

πεπερασμένου IIT. vi. 14.

περὶ cum genitivo IV. i. 1, 45.

περὶ cum accusativo IV. i. 1, 3, 6. viii.
12. VI. iv. 4. v. 7.

περιάπτου I, viii. 12.

περιγίνεται 11. iv. 3.

περιγεγράφθω I. vii. 17.

περιγραφῇ I. vii. 17.

περιέλκειν 11.11.1. περιέλκεται VIL.
ili, 12.

περίεργοι LX, x. 2.

περιέχει Vii. 11. περιέχοι 1, ii. 7.
περιέχεται VI. iv. 2.

Περικλέα VIL. v. 5.

περιλαβεῖν 1. 11. 3. IIT. ix. 7. V.ii. 6.

περίλυπος IV, ii. 18.

περιορᾶν LV. v. 6.

περιμάχητα LX. viii. 4, 9.

πιριπίπτιντα VIL. xiii. 3. περιπεσεῖν
1 ὄχ. 11. περιπεσόντες III. viii. 16.
περιπέσῃ I. x. 14.

περιποιοίτο IX. viii. 5. περιποιούμεθα
X. vii. 5. περιποιούμενος 1X. viii. 9.
«περιποιουμένη X. vii. 6.

περισσοὺςν 1. viii. 4. περιττὰ VL. vii. 5.

περιτίθησι X. ix. 15.

περιφερείᾳ 1. xiii. 10,

περιχαρὴς LV. iii. 18.

Πέρσαις V. vii. 2. VIII. x. 4.

Περσικὴ VIII. x. 4.

πῇ 1. xiii. το. VII. viii. 3. xiii. 1. DX.
viii, 3. ix. 4.

πηλίκον V. vi. 8.

πεπηρωμένοις 1. ix. 4.

πήρωσις. ii.13. πήρωσιν IIL v. τς.
πηρώσεις VII. i. 3. v. 1. vi. 6.

INDEX VERBORUM. lvil

πιθανολογοῦντος I. iii. 4.

πιθανώτερον I. vi. 7.

πιθανότητα 1. vi. 15.

πικροὶ IV. v.10. mwexpalil.iv. 4. X.
ili. 8. πικροῖς ΤΙ. xii. 2.

τίνειν ITT. xi. 3.

πίπτει 11.11.4. weoctvV.xi.8. VIIL.i.6.

πιστεύομεν VI. iv. 2. πιστεύουσι VI.
viii. 6. VII. iti. 4. πιστεύειν VII.
iii. 4. xiv. 3. VIII. iv. 3. IX. ii. 1.
τιστεύσαι VIII. iv. 3. πιστεύοντες
VIII, viii. 2. ἐπίστευσε IX. i. 9.
πιστεύωσι Iv. 5. πιστεύσαιμεν lV.
Vii. I. πιστεύονται Χ. 1. 4. were
orevxact VIII. i. 7. πιστευθῇ VIIL
iii. 8. πιστεύῃ VI. iii. 4.

πιστὸν IX. viii. 2. πιστοὶ X.i. 3. we
στότερα Χ. ii. 4

Πιττακὸν IX, vi. 2.

πλάνην I. iit. 2, 3. πλάναις VIIL. 1. 3.

Πλάτων I. iv. 5. IT. iii. 2. X. ii. 3.

πλειστάκις VII, xiii. 6.

πλεονάζει IT. vi. 5.

πλεοναχῶς ΙΝ. iv. 4. V.i.6. VIL. ix. 4.

πλεονεκτεῖ V. ii. 2. ix. 12. πλεονεκτῇ
V.il. 2. ἐπλεονέκτει Υ͂. ix. 9.

πλεονέκτης Ὗ. i. ὅ, 9, 10. ll. 4. πλεο-
νέκται IX, viii. 4.

πλεονεξία V. ἱ. 10. πλεονεξίας ΓΧ. vi. 4.

πλευρᾶς IIT, iii. 3.

πλευρῖτιν V, xi. 8.

πληγῆς IT. v. 15.

πλήθΘΟΙ IV. i. 23. VI. viii. 5. IX. x.3.
πλήθους VIII. x. 3. IX. x. 3. πλήθει
II]. xi. 3. IV.i.19, VIII. xii. 2.
«-λήθεσι ITT. viii. 9.

κλησθῇ ILI. xi. 3.

πλεμμελὲς 1. ix. 17.

“πλὴν! vi. 10. xiii. 13. 1Π| iv. 13. vii. 8.
ΠῚ. iii. 17. ix. 5. x. 5,7. IV.i. 29.
ili. 28. vi.5. V. ix. 16. VI. xiii. 1.
VII. x. 6. IX. vi. 4.x.6. X. iii. 8.
v. 5, 11. vi. 6. viii. 7.

πληροῦντες III, xi. 3.
VII. i. 6.

πληγῇ V. iv. 4. πληγῆναι V. v. 4.
πεπληγμένος 1]. vii. 6.

πλησίον V. v. 17. ix. 14.

πλοῖον I. i. 3.

πλοῦν 11. ix. 4. VIII. ix. 5.

πλουσίῳν 111]. viii. 6. πλούσιον X. viii.
II. sdovctous IV. i. 35.

wdovreix TV.1. 20. VIII. x. 3. X.iii.9.
πλουτοῦσι TV. i. 21. VIII. i. 1. πλου-
rowres IV. iii. 10.

VOL. IT.

πληρούμενον

πλοῦτος 1.͵...ν. 8. IV. i. 6. tii. 18.
πλούτου I. vili. 15. πλούτφιΙν. i. 6,
20. πλοῦτον I. iii, 3. iv. 3. vii. 3.
IV. ii. 20. iii. 18, V. iii. 7. VIL iv.
2. VIII. x. 5.

wAwrfpes VIII. ix. 5.

πνίγῃ VIL. ii. 10.

πόθεν IV. i. 34. X. iv. 3. ix. 18.

ποθεῖτα I, vii. 9. ποθῇ ΙΧ. v. 3.

πόθον 11. ii. 2.

ποι IIT. i. 3. ΣΧ. iv. 3.

ποιεῖ I, vii. 7, 16. x. 12. IL. ii. 6. vi. 2.
ΠῚ. viii. 2. xi. 5. xii. 2. IV. iii. 16,
19. v. 13. V. v. 8. vi. §. ix. 11. Χ. 3.
xi. 5. VI. ii. 5. viii. 5. xii. 5, 6, 8,
10. xiii. 7. WII. ii. 7. vi. 4. x. 3.
xiv. 3,7. VIII. x. 5. xi.1r, 3. IX.
iv. §. xi. 2. ποιουμένοις I. iii. 7,
ποιησόμεθα I. v. 7. ἐἑποίουν 1. vi. 2.
ποιεῖται I. ix. 8. ποιῆσαι I. ix. 8.
IL. iv. 2. IID. viii. 7. IV. viii. 3. V.
v. 11. VI. viii. 5. X. ix. 3. ποιεῖν.
X. 13. Xi. 5, 6. xiii. 2. ID. i. 4. ii. 8.
vi. 18. IV.i. 7, 8, 34, 37. ii, 19, 21.
iil. 24, 35. Vii. 3, 5. Vili. 8. Vi. 14.
ix. 9, 10, 11, 14,16. VI. ii. 6. xii. 1.
VII. ix. 6. VIII. ν. 1. xiii. 8. xiv. 4.
ΙΧ. i. 5, 7. ii. 5, 7. ili. 3. vi. 4. vii. 1,
71x. 2,3.x1.6. X. ii. 2. vii. 8. viii.
7. ix. 17. ποιοῦντες IL. i. 4. iv. 6.
ix. 7. VIII. iii. 9. ix. 5. xiii. 4. IX.
i. 6, 7. ποιοῦσι IT. 1, 5. iv. 6. ix. 5.
III. v. ro. viii. 14. Χ. 9. IV. i. 35.
VI. xii. 4, 5. VII. iii. 7. IX. xii. 2.
X.v. 5. ποιεῖσθαι 11. iii. 1, VIII.
xii. 10. ποιήσῃ 1. ἵν. 2. IX. ii. 5.
X. iv. 2. ποιοῦμεν IT. vii.g. Χ. ν. 4.
ἐποίησε III. x. 7. ποιήσει I. x. 12.
III. iii. rx. IV.i. 24. ii. 10, 20. vi.
5. viii. 8, 10. VI. vii. 7. IX. vii. 6.
ποιοῦντος TV. i. 16. ποιοῦντι IV. ii.
12. vi. 7. VI. iv. 4. πεποίηκε VII.
i. 1. ποιησαμένους VII.i. τ. ποιούν-
των Ν]]. ἵν. 2. πεποίηται Χ. ix. 20.
πεποιῆσθαι X.ix. 13. ποιῇ lV. ii. 19,
21. ποιῶν IV. iil. 3, 5. 11, 5. VIL.
vi.4. X.iii. 12. ποιοῦσα VI. xii. 3.
ποιοῦντας VI. xii. 7. ποιοῦν V. iv.
12. Vv. 9. ποιοῦνται . ν.6. ποιῆσαν
V.v.14. ποιουμένῳ VIL iv. 4. ποιή.
σοντος X.iv. 7. πεποιηκότι IX. vii.
6. πεποιηκότες ΙΧ. vii. 2. X. ix. 18.
ποιοῦντα VIII. xiii. 2. ποιήσας VIII.
xiv. 4. IX. vii. 4. X.v.5. πεποιή-
κασι VIII. xii. 5. ποιήσαντι VIII.

lyin

xii. 2. ποιήσαντα IX. vii. 4. ποιού-
μενοι VITI. ix. 3. ποιήσειε VIL. iv. 2.
vi. 7. ἐποίει IV. iii. 7. vii. 14. V.
iv. 12. v. 9. Vil. 3. ποιήσωσι IV.
iii. 25. ποιήσαντος IV. iii. 25. ποιή-
σουσι VII. xii. 5. IX. ix. 2. xi. 1.
ποιησαίμεθα X. ili. 12. ποιοῖτο X.
vii. 6. ποιητέον I. vii. το. VII. i. 4.
VIII. xiii.9. ΙΧ. 1. 7. χ. 1. ποιῆται
IV. i. 20.

ποιήματα ΙΧ. vii. 3.

ποιήσις VI. iv. 1, 2,5. ποιήσεως VI.
iv. 5.v. 1,4. X. iv. 2.

ποιητὴν VIL. xiv.8. ποιητὰ IX. vii. 3.

ποιητικὴ VI. iv. 3,6. ποιητικοῦ X.iv. 8.
ποιητικῆς VI. ii. 3,5. iv. 2. ποιητικὸν
V.i. §. wocnrixats VIL. iii. 9. ποιητικὰ
I. vi. 8. V. i. 12.1.11. VIII. vi. 1.

ποιητὸν VIL. ii. 5. iv. 1.

ποικίλος I. x. 14.

ποιμένα VIII. xi. I.

wola V.i. 1. X. ix. 23. rola τις. ix. 7.
11. vi. 1, 4. V. ii. 7. ποῖόν τι X, iv. 1.
ix. 20. ποίας]. 11.6. 11.1. 8. ii. 1.
Ix Κ΄. 1. 1. X. viii.7. ποίῳ
I. vi. 2,3. ποῖα]. vi. το. ΠῚ. i. ro.
iii. 20. v. 23. vi. 6. IV.iii. 1. V.
vil. 7,5 VILi2.v.1. vii. 7. WII.
iii, 1. iv. 1. X. ix. 20, 21, 23. ποῖον
I. vii. 19. xii. 2. 117. i. 9. ii. 16. V.
vii. 4. ποιοὺς 1. ἰχ. 8. VIII. iii. 1.
X. iii. 2. ποίοις IL ix. 7. IV. v. 13.
X. ix. 20,21. ποίου] Π.1. 9. ποίων
IIT. i. 10. ποῖοι IIT. ii. 11. v. 20.
viii. 17. ποίαν X. v, 11.

ποιότητες, ποιοτήτων Χ. iii. 1.
πολεμεῖν VII. νἱ. 1. X. vii.6. πολε-
μοῦμεν Χ. vii. 6.

πολεμικὴ Li. 4. πολεμικοῖς ITI. vi. 4.
vill. 6. ΓΝ. 1. τ. X. vii. 6. πολεμι-
κώτατα 1. Χ. 13. πολεμικὸν IX. ii. 1.
πολεμικαὶ Χ. vii. 6, 7.

πολέμιον TIT. 1.17. πολεμίων V. xi. 8.
πολεμίους 11. vi. 2. Χ. vii. 6.
πολέμου 11]. viii. 6. πολέμῳ I. vi. 4.
ΤΙ. vi. 8. ix. 4. πόλεμον ITI. vi. το.
VIII. ix. 5. X. vii. 6.

πόλις IV, ii. 15. V.v.6. xi. 3. WII.
x. 3. IX. viii. 6.x. 3. πόλεως I. ii.
8. VIIL ix. 5. x. 3. xii. 7, IX. x.
ἡ. wodel. ii. 8. VI. xiii. 8. VII.
x. 3. X. ix. 13. πόλῳ ΙΝ. ii. 1. V.
xi. 3. VI. viii.2. πόλεις IV. i. 42.
VIIL. i. 4. iv. 4. IX. vi. 1,2. X. ix.
23. πόλεων X. ix. 12. πόλεσι I. if.

INDEX VERBORUM.

6, 8. IL.i.5. ΤΠ] vi.g. VIIL iv. 4.
X. ix. 14, 19.

πολιτεία IT. i. §. X. ix. 23. πολιτείας
IL. i. 5. V. ii. 12. VI. viii. 4. VIII.
X. 1,3. X.ix. 22. πολιτεία» VIII.
x. I. πολιτείαι V. vii. 5. VIII. x. 1.
πολιτείαις VIII. xiv. 3. πολιτειῶν» IIT.
iii. 18. ὙΠ]. xi. 1. X.ix. 21, 23.

πολιτεύεσθαι VI. viii. 2. X. vii. 6.
πολιτεύονται X. iX. 23. πολιτεύ.

owro III. iii. 6.
ix. 18.

πολίτῃ V.ii. 11. πολίτην VILL. ix. 3.
πολῖται ITT. viii. τ. VIII. χὶ. ς. va
λίτας I. ix. 8. xii. 2. 11.1. ς. πολέ.
ταις I. vii.6. ΥἼΠ. ἰχ. 2. IX. ii. 9.
X. vii. 6.

πολιτικὸς I. v. 1. xiii. 2, ILI. iii. 11.
X. viii. 4. πολιτικὴ I. ii. 5, 9. iii. 2.
xiii. 7. III. viii.1. VI. vii. 4 viii. 1,
2, 3. ix. 4,5. IX.vi. 2. πολιτικῆς
I. tii. 5. viii. 15. ix. 8. xiii. 4. V.
ἢ. 11. WIT. ix. 4,6. Χ. vii. 6. ix.
18,19. πολιτικὴν Liv. 1. VI. vii. 3.
ΧΙ. 8. VIL xi.r. VITLix.5. πολι
τικῶν Tiv.6. X.ix. 18. πολιτικοῦ
Ι.ν.4,6. V.vi.g. vii. 1. X. vii. 6.
πολιτικὸν I. vii. 6. xiii. 7. V.vi 4,
9. VIL. xii.7. [X.ix.2. πολιτικῷ
I. xiii. 8. πολιτικῇ 11. iii. το. V. i.
13. ΙΧ. 1.1. πολιτικὰ IIL. viii. 9.
X. ix. 18. πολιτικοῦς VILv.5. ΣΧ.
ix.18. πολιτικοὶ VI. viii. 4. ΣΧ. ix.
19. πολιτικαὶ VIII. xii x. X. vii. 7.
πολιτικοῖς X. vii. 6. ix. 20.

πολιτικῶς IX. x. 6.

πολλάκις I. iv. 3.x. 7,8. I. i. 4. iv. 3.
VIL viii. 13. IV.ii.3. ΝΟΣ 5, 15.
x.3. VIII iii.s.v.4. ΙΧ. Σ. 2. ib
6. X vi. 5.

πολλαχοῦ V. v. 4.

πολλαχῶς IT. vi. 14. DI. xi. 4. V.ix
Il.

πολλοστῶς X. v. 11.

πολυειδὲς IV. i. 38.
xii. 2.

Πολύκλειτον VI. vii. I.

πολύκοινον I. ix. 4.

πολύξεινος IX. x. 1.

πολυπράγμονες VI. viii, 4.

πολὺ. xi. 4. IL. vi. 7. ix. 5. TI. xii.
7. ΙΝ.1. 32.ν.14.- ιν. ς. VL
vii. 4. VIII. iii. 5. vii. 4. x.6. ΙΧ.
iii. 4. X. v. 4, 5. vii. 8. viii. 4. πολ-
λῶν]. 1, 3. Χ. 12,14. χί, 2. ΥΠ.Χχ.

πολιτευόμενοι X.

πολυειδὴςε ΥΠ|.

INDEX VERBORUM,

4. xiii. 2. VIII. vi. 2. vii.5. IX.
iv. 9. X. i. 3. viii. 5, 9. πολλὰ Li.
3. Vil. 23. Vili, 15. X. 12, xili. 7.
Il. vi. 6. vii. 2. III. vii. 7. viii. 6,
11. ix. 3. xii. 2 IV. i. 35. ii. 19,
20. Υ. 2 ix. 3. Vz. ii. 10. vii. 6.
viii. 3. VIL. ix. 2,6. VIIL xi.8. LX.
i. 9. iv. 8. viii. 9. X. iii. 12. vill. 2.
πολλοῖς L iii. 3. Vili. rr. LIT. iv. 5.
VI. viii. 4. VIL. xiv. 5. VIII. vi. 2,
3,7. IX.iv.7. x. 2, 4,5. X. vill. 11.
ix. 8. πολλοὶ. iv. 2. v. 2, 3, 8. vill.
7. ILiv.6. IIL vii. 9. xi.g. 1.1.
35, 37, 38 ili. 22. iv. 4. V. i. 15.
VIL. vii. 1, 5, 6, vili. 2. ix. 2. xiii.
5. VIIL ii. 4. iv. 1. vi. 3. viil. 1, 2.
xiv. 4. IX. vii. 1. viii. 4, 5,11. ix. 4.
x. 6. X. vi. 3.ix. 9, 14. πολλοὺς I.
v. 3. Π.Ὶϊ. 8. 1Π. viii. 13. IV. iii.
28. VIIL.vi.2. IX. viii. 4. x. 6.
X. i 2. ix. 3, 17. πολλαὶ 1. vi. 4.
ix. 11. I.iiro. VI. vii. 4. VIL
xi. 3. X. iii. 7. iv. 3. Υ. 11. πολλὰς
I. x. 4,12. IV.iv.3. VII.v.1. IX.
li. 2. vii 9. πολλαῖς I. x. 12. πολλῷ
I. x. 14. IV.i. 40. VIII. iv. 3. xod-
Ady IT. ii. 8. 1Π. xii. 6. VI. viii. 4.
X.i. 2. πολὺν. ν. το. VI.ix. 2, 6.
IX. viii.9. πολλοῦ IX. i. 9. viii. 4.
word V.i. 7. πλείων II. viii. 4. VIII.
1.1. πλεῖον I. vii. 23. xiii. 8. 11.1.1.
vi. 4. viii. 5,7. III. xi.3. V. iil. 4.
ix.9. VIII. viii. 6. xiv.1,2. IX.
viii. 4. X. vii. 5. πλείους 1. vii. 15.
Vii. 7, ΙΧ.χ. 2. Xivirr. πλείω
L vii. 1, 3,19. I. ii. 6. vii. 11. IV.
v.7,11. VLic2. VIIIL.i. 7. iv. 4.
ix.2. IX.i. 4. iv. 6. vili.g. X. iv. 1.
τλέον 11. ἰχ. 8. IV.v. 4. V.i. το. ii.
9. iii. 2, 14. iv. 6, 11, 13, 14. ν. 17.
vi. 4, 6. ix. 8, 9, 10, 13, 15. xi. 7.

VI. viii.4. VIII. xi. 4. xiii. 7, 11.
xiv. 1. IX. viii. 11. πλειόνων IIT.

fii. 11. IV. iii. 24. [X.x.5. X. viii.
5. πλείονος V.iv.6. VIII. xiii. 3.
«πλεῖοσιν V. xi. 4. X. viii. 6. πλείστη
ΤΙ. viii. 5. VII. xii. 6. πλεῖστον I.
viii. 5. IT]. iv. 5. VIII. vii. 4. x. 2.
xi.8. πλείστην I. ix. 8. πλεῖστα I.
viii. 7. VII.i.5. VIEI.x.3. πλείστων
I. iv. 2. IV. viii. 4. WII. vii. 1.x. 4.
wrelorov1V.ii. το. VIII. x. 3. πλεῖ-
ora: IX. 1. 1. πλείσταις X. ix. 13.
«λείστους VIII. xiii. 8. IX. x. 1, 3.
πλείστοις VILL. i. 3. LX. vii. 1. πλεῖ-

hix

oro lV. vii. 13. VII. xi.2. VOL x.1.
IX. x. 3.

πολυφιλία VIII. i. 5.

πολύφιλον ΙΧ. x. 1. πολύφιλοι IX. x. 6.
πολυφιλώτατον ΙΧ. x. 5.

πολυχρόνιον I. vi.6. VIL x. 4. IX. vii
6. πολυχρόνια IV. ii. 16.

πολυωφελὲς I. iii. 7.

πονεῖ V.vi.6. VII. xiv. 5. πονεῖν VI.
i. 2. X. vi. 6. πονήσῃ VIL. vii. 5.
πεπονῆσθαι 1. xiii. 2. πεπονημένοις 1.
Xi. 7.

πονηρία VII. viii. 1. πονηρίαν V. ii 2.
xi.g. VII. xiv. 8.

πονηρὸς: ITI. v. 13. V.xi. 5. VII. x. 3,
4. xiv. 8. πονηροῦ IX. ii. 5. vii. 1.
πονηρὸν IX. iii. 3. πονηροὶ. viii. 8.
πονηροῖς VII. x. 4. πονηροὺς IV. i.
42.

πόνος IIT. ix. 3. πόνοις 1.νἱ. 4. LX. vi.
4. πόνους IL. ii. 8.

Πόντον VII. v. 2.

wopOodvras lV. i. 42. wewopOnxévau VI.
li. 6.

πορίζειν IV.i. 34. LX. ix. i. πορίζουσι
IV.i. 35. VILL iii. 2. v. 1. viii. 6.
woplfovres VIII. ix. 5. πορίζων ΗΠ].
Xiv. 3. ποριζόμενοι VIII. ix. 4. πο-
ρίσασθαι X. ix. 3. πεπόρισται IX. i.
2. πορισθῆναι ITT. iii, 13.

πορνοβοσκοὶ IV. i. 40.

πόῤῥω 177. viii. 16. xi. 7. V.i.7. VII.
v.6. VIII. xii.4. X.ix. 20. ποῤ-
pwrépw IT. viii. 4.

πορφύραν IV, ii. 20.

wooayas V. i. 8.

πόσον 11. ix. 7,8. IV.v.13. VIII.
vil. 3. IX.x. 3. πόσαι IIT. v. 23.
V.v.1§. πόσα Til, i. 16. V. v. το.
vi. 7. ποσῷ 1. vi. 3. πόσου IV. ii. 9.

wore Χ, iii. 2. viii. 6.

πότε. ix. 15. VIII. xii. 1, 4.

ποτὲ I. ii. 3. vi. §. vii. 1,12. III. v.
17. viii. 2. ΙΝ]. 39. ν. 5. V. ix. 8.
IX. iv. 4. xii. 2.

πότερον I. iv. 5. vii. 11. ix. 1. X. I.
xiii, 10. IIT. i. 4, 23. xii. 5. IV. viii.
7. V.ii. I1.ix. 1, 3,8 χὶ. 1. VI
ix. 1. VIZ. iii. 1,2. iv. 1. vi. 7. ix.
1. VIII. i. 7. ii. 2. iv. 6. viii. 1. UX.
1Χ. 2. X.3. xi 1,2. X. iv. 11. viii.
δ. ποτέρου ILI. xii. 5. [X.i.5. πό-
repal. xii. 1. IL. iii. 1. VIII. xiii.
10. IX. ii. 1,4. X. viii. 7. ποτέροις
IX. viii. 2.

lx INDEX VERBORUM.

ποτέρως V. viii. 10.

Πουλυδάμας IIT. viii. 2.

ποδὸς 1. vii. 11.

aparypall. vi. 4,6. πράγματος 1. iii.
4. IL. vi. 5, 8. viii. 7, 8. V. viii. 10.
x. 4. VIL. iii.6. πράγματα IL. iv. 4.
V. iii. ς. χ. 7. πραγμάτων IV. vi. 1.

πραγματεία IT. ii. 1. iii. 10. πραγμα-
relay II, iii. 9.

τραγματεύεσθαι X. vi.6. πραγματεύ-
ονται 1. xiii. 7, IV. i. 43.

πρακτέον Il.ii. 1. [V.ix.4. πρακτέα
IV. ix. 5.

πρακτικὸς. ix.10. V.v.17.x.8. VII.
X. 2. πρακτικοὺς I.ix. 8. πρακτικὴ
I. vii. 13. I. iii.6. VI. ii. 2, 5. iv.
2. Vii. 7. Vili. 2. xiii. 7. πρακτικοὶ
I.v. 4. xii.6. V.i.3. wpaxrexal 11].
Υ͂. 21. πρακτικαῖς 1.11.7. VI. xi. 4.
πρακτικὸν LV. iii. 2). πρακτικῆς VI.
ii. 3. πρακτικοῦ VI. il. 3. πρακτι-
κὴν 1. ν. 4, 6. πρακτικὰς VI. xii.
10. πρακτικῶν X. vil. 5,6. πρακτι-
κοῖς Χ. Vili. 12. wpaxrixwrepo VI. vii.
7.xil 1. πρακτικωτέρου: VI. xii. 7.

πρακτὸν L vi. 13. vii. 1. VIL ii. 5. iv.
I. V. 3, 6. Vil. 6, Vili. 2,8. πρακτὰ
Lvi.q. VI.v.6.xi.3. VIL iii. 6.
IX. vi. 2. πρακτῶν I. ii. 1. iv. 1. vii.
1,8. 11.11.3. DL iii.7,15. V.x.
4. VI.v. 6. vii. 6. xii. 10. πρακτοῖς
X. ix. 1.

πρᾶξι: Li, 4. iii. 6. vii. ro. II. vi.
18. Iil.i.15,18,20. V.iv.4. VI.
iv.1,2,5. VIL xiv. 8. VI.vii.7. X.
viil.9. πράξεως 1Π1.1.6. IV.i. 14.
V.ix.9. VI. ii. 1, 2, 4, 5. Vs 3, 4.
VOLi.2. wxpdteLviir. I. iii. 3.
ΠΙ.1.13. IV. iii 1ς.1χ. 6. VI. ii.
4. VILii.9. πρᾶξιν 111. i. το. v.
11. viii. 3. VII. xiv.7. IX.vii. 5,6.
vili.9. X.vii. 5. πράξεις 1. i. 2. vii.
II, 14. Vili. 2, 3, 11, 13. xii. 2. Π.
ii. 1. lil. 3, 8, 9. vi. 10, 12. vii. 1.
II. i. 6, 10, 27. iil. 15. v. 1,22. IV.
1, 12.11.1. .1,. 1. VIL viii. 3. xiv.
4. VIII. i. 2.ὄ 1.6. IX. ii. 6, 7. viii.
7,10.1x.5. Χ. vi. 3. vii. 6. viii. 5,
7. πράξεων 1.1. 3, 5. iii. 5. II. vi.
18. vii. 11. IIT. ii. 1, iii. 15. v. 5,
22, IV. iii. 35.viii.12, VIL. iii. 13.
X. vii. 7. πράξεσι]. viii. 12. I. ii.
3. vi. 16. viii. 2. χ. 1. III. i. 6, 7.
Υ.19. IV.viir. VLicr. WIL viii.
4 IX.ix.6, X. i. 3. viii. 1.

πρᾷος I. xiii.20. [V.v.3,4. πρᾳοι 1]
i. 7. πρᾷον IT. vii. 10. πρᾷους II.
ix.7. IV. v.13. πράου V.i. 14.

πρᾳότης IV. v.1,3. πρᾳότητα IL. vii.
10 IV.v.1. TUX.iv.1. πρᾳότητι
IV. v. 12.

κρᾶσις Y. ii. 13.

πράττει IIT. i. 6, 16,17. ii. 4. γ. 13, 17.
vii. 5,6. IV.vii.5. V.i.17. VIL
i.6.ii.9,10. IX. iv. 3. viii. 1,8. X.
ix. 18. πράξῃ 111.1.γ. V. viii. 6.
πράττειν I, ii. 7. iv. 2. viii. 4, 15. X.
13. IL. ii. 2. ἦν. 3,5. IIL i. 6, 14.
ili. 13. v.2,7,19. IV.i. 7,8. iii. 28.
ix.4,7. V. viii. 4. ix. 3. VI. v. 6.
Vili. 4. ix. 2. X. 2. xii. I, 6, 7, 9. ΧΕΙ,
1,7. VIL. ii. 1, 3, 5, 9. ili. 5,6, 9.
IX. iv. 8. vii. 4. viii. I, 5, 7, 9. X. 2.
X. vi 3. vii. 2. viii 4, 6, 7, 10, 11.
ix. 1, 10, 11. πράττουσι 1. iii. 7. vii.
1. Il. iv. 1, 4,6. vii. 15. ID. i. t1-
v. 18. viii. ri. IV. iii. 21. V. viii. 1.
VI. viii. 2. xii. 7. πράττεται]. vii. 1.
viii. 15. Π|. ἰν. 3. ΠΙ.ϊ.4. V.14.
VIII. x. 4. πράττοντες 1. viii.g. IL.
i. 4,7. πράττεσθαι]. xi.4. VWI. xii.
8. πράττομεν]. xii. 8. 17. iii. τ. IM.
i.23. V.vili.3,5. X.viiL 3. apdr-
rovrc III. i. 10. πράττοντας ΠῚ. ii. 4.
iv. 1. ΠΙ. ν. 7. VI. xii. 7. VIII.
viii, 3. X. viii. 13. πράττων IL iv.
3,4. ΠΙ. 1.3. VU. ii. 10.ix. 4. TX.
viii. 7. πράττῃ 11. iv.3. IV. vii. 5.
V. viii. 1,3,11. VIL. xiv. 8. πράξειε
IT. iv. 5. IV. ix.6. πράττηται 1].
vi.20. πρᾶξαι IIT.i.4. IV. i. 39.
ἷχ. 7. V.ix.16. VI v. 3. WII. i.
2. vi. §. IX. viii. 10. πράξαντος III.
i. 4. πράττονται Il. i. 6. πράξας
III. i. 13. πέπραχε ibid. πράττοντα
IID. i. 17. IV. ii. 12. ix. 7. πρα-
χθέντα III. ii. 8. πράττοι IV. i. 22.
VIL vii. 3. πράξει I. viii. 9. x. 11,
13. IID. i. 22. iii. 17. IV.ix.6. V.
iii. 2. πράσσοντας VI. viii. 4. πρατ-
τόμενον VII. xiv.8. xparrévras VIL.
xiv. 7. πραττομένων ]. xii. 7. πρατ-
τόμενα V. vii. 6. 1x. 15. πραχθῇν.
Vil. 7. wpaxOjvacibid. πεπραγμένα
VL. ii. 6. πράξουσι VIL. iii. 4. πράτ.
τωσι 1Π. xi. τ. IX. vi. 1. πεκρα-
γμένων IV. iv. 5. πεπραγέναι IX.
vili.6. πεπραγότας Χ. villi. 11. πράτ-
rovrosIX.iii.2, πέπρακται LX. iv.9.

πρεκόντως IV, li. 13, 16.

INDEX VERBORUM.

πρέπει lV. ii. 14. πρέπουσα IV. ii. 1.
πρέπον IV, ii. 2, 5, 6,17. vi. 8. X.
Vili. I. πρέπουσαι IV. ii. 6. πρέ-
ποντα lV. viii.4. πρέπειν LV. ii. 12.

τρεπκωδέστατον LV, ii. 9.

πρεσβυτέρῳ Υ 111.ν]1.1. 1Χ.11.9. πρεσ-
βύτερον IV. ix. 3. πρεσβυτέρων VI.
xi. 6. πρεσβυτέροις VIII. i. 2.

κρεσβύται 111. vi. 1. πρεσβύταις
VILL. iii. 4.

πρεσβυτικοῖς VIII. vi. 1.

Πριαμικαῖς I, x. 14.

Πριάμου I. ix. 11. Πρίαμον VIT.i. 1.

πρὶν V. v. 16. vii. 7. VII. ii. 2. vi. 1.
VIII. iii.8. IX. i. 9.

wpo ILI. ii. 17. vii. 12.

προαγαγεῖν I. vii. 17. προηγμένων X.
ix. 18.

προαγωγεία Υ͂. ii. 13.

προαίρεσις 1. 1. 1. iv. 1. III.ii. 3,5, 7,
9, 10, 13, 17. 11. 19,20. VI. ii. 2, 4,
6. xiii. 7. VII. x. 3. VIII. v. 5. xiii.
Ir, X. viii. 5. προαιρέσει I. vii. 2.
II. i.15. ii.5. IV. vii. 12. VII. viii.
t,ix.1. VIII. xiii. 11. προαίρεσιν
I. xiii. 4. IID. ii. 2,6. V. v.17. VI.
xii. 7,8. VIL. iv. 3. vi. 7. vii. 2. viii
3.Χ.2. ΙΧ,1.7. X.ix. τ. προαιρέ-
σεις 11. γ. 4. προαιρέσεως II. ν. 4.
11Π|..11.1,2,15. V. vi. 1. vili. 9,11.
xi 5. VI.ii.4. VIII. v. 5.

«προαιρεῖται III. ii.8. V.v.1,8. VI. ii
6. IX.ix. 5. προαιρεῖσθαι III. ii. 7,
11,14. VIL. iv. 3. VILL xiii. 8.
X. ix. 14. προαιρούμενοι I. v. 3.
προαιρουμένων 1. xiii. 15. VIL. vii. 3.

᾿ προαιρούμενος II. iv. 3. 1Π|. ii. 4.
VIL. ii. το. iii. 2. προαιρούμενον IIT.
iii, 17. IV.iv. 3. προαιρούμεθα.
ii. 9, 12,13. προαιροῦνται VIL. iv. 4.
X.iv. 2. προαιρῶνται 1Χ. vi. 1. προ-
αἱρήσεται IV. vi. 7. προελόμενοι V.
viii. 5. προέλοιντο ΠῚ. iii. 18. X, ix.
19. προέλοιτο LI. viii. 15. προελό-
μενος V.viii. 11. προειλόμεθα V.
ix. 8.
προαιρετικὸς V.x.8. προαιρετικὴ 11. vi.
15. VI. ii. 2.
προαιρετὸν III. ii. 16. tii. 17. VI. ii. 6.
πτροαιρετοῦ 171. iii. 19. προαιρετῶν
ITT. ν. 1.
προαισθόμενοι VIL vii. 8.
πρόβατα V. vii. 1. προβάτων VIII.
ΧΙ. I.
προβουλεύσας V. viii. 8. προβουλευσά-

lxi
μενοι V. villi. 5. προβεβουλευμένον
111. ii. 16.

προγαργαλίσαντες VIL. vii. 8.
προγενεστέρων Χ. ix. 23.
wpoylverac III, ii. 15. προγενομένην

προγινωσκομένων VI. iii. 3.

πρόγονοι VIII. xi. 2. προγόνων IV. ii.
14. προγόνοις VIII. xi. 2.

προδήλοις III. viii. 15.

προδόντι X. iil. 9.

προδιεργάσασθαι X. ix. 6.

προεγείραντες VIL. vii. 8.

προϊδόντες VII. vii. 8.

προϊέναι VIL. ii. 8. προείσι I. ii. 1. vii.
7. προϊοῦσι IV. i. 28.

προειρημένα III. viii. 13. X. vi. 1. viii.
12. προειρημένων 1. vii. 18. προειρη-
μένοις V. i. 2.

προελθόντος VIII. xii. 2.

προέσει IT, vii. 4.

κροετικὸν IV. i. 20.

προετικῶς LV. ii. 8.

προέχοντα 1Χ.1.8. προέχουσι X.vil. 7.
προέχοντες I. v. 2.

προησεθὶς IX. v. 3.

προθυμεῖσθαι LX. xi. 6.
VII. xiii. 2.

προθύμως IV. iii. 26. IX. xi. 5, 6.

προΐενται ΤΥ... 9. προεμένῳ 111. v. 14.
προϊέμενοι LX. i, 7. προϊεμένου IX.
i. 5. προϊέμενος ibid. προήσεται LX.
viii. 9, 10. πρόοιντο LX. viil. 9.

προκείμενον IX. iv. 2. προκειμένου X.
Vili. 3. προκειμένων 1. xiii. 8.

προλαβόντος IX. i. 5. προλαβόντες IX.
i, 6.

προλυπηθέντας X. iii. 6.

προνοητικὴν VI. vii. 4.

προνοίας V. Vill. 9.

προορῶντα IIT. viii. 11.

προκέτεια VII. vii. 8.

προπετῆ 11. vii. 8. προπετεῖς III. vii.
12.

προπηλακιζόμενον IV. v. 6.

προπηλακισμὸ V. ii. 13.

wposlV.i. 35. ili. 10,12. V.ii. 11, 15.
v. 12, 15. vi. 4,6. x. 7. xi 6. VII
I, 5. xii. 3. xiii. 4. VIL. ii. 4. vi. 3.
vii. 6. xiii, 4. VIII. iii. 3. πρὸς Ere-
ρον V. i. 15, τό. 17, 18, ii. 6. πρός
τι VI. ii. 5. πρὸς χρήματα ΙΧ,
χ. 7.

προσαγορεύει VIII. x. 4. προσαγορεύ-
ουσι VIII. ix. 1. προσαγορεύειν VII,

προθυμοῦνται

lx

i. 3. προσαγορεύομεν VI. v. 5. προσ-
αγορεύονται IV. i. 5. vill. 3, 4.

προσαναιροῦσι X. 1. 3.

τροσάντου: I. vi. I.

προσάπτομεν IV. i. 3.

προσγένοιτο VII. iv. 4.

προσδεῖν X.ix.19. προσδεήσει, iv.7.
προσδεῖσθαι 1. viii. 17. VIL. xiii. 4.
προσδεομένη 1. viii. 15. προσδεῖται
ΤΥ}. 12. χ 9. VII. xiii.2. ὙΠ].
iii, 8. x. Δ. προσδέονται VILL. i. 4.
lii. 4.

τροσδιομολογείσθω IT. ii. 3.

χροσδιοριζόμεθα VIL. iii. 4.

προσδοκώμενα ITT, i. 9.

προσδοκία IX. vii.6. προσδοκίαν IIT.
Vi. 2.

πρόσεστιν. Xi. 3. προσῇ V. Vili. 2.

προσεκιτιθέντες VIL. iv. 6.

προσέρχονται ITT. viii. 11.

προσέχειν VI. xi. 6. K.v. 3.

προσηγορία IX. viii. 4. προσηγορίαις
IV. i 39.

προσήκει LV. vi. §.ix.1. VIII. v. 3.
viii. 3. προσήκειν VIII. xiv. 1. X.
ix.14. προσήκοντος VIII. xiii. 4.

τρόσθεσις III. v. 22. πρόσθεσιν VII.
iv. 3. v. 8.

προσθετέον I, x. 15. V.ix.5. VIII.
ii. 4.

προσίεται ΙΧ. xi. 4.

προσκείσθω V.iv. 12. wpocxeioOa V.
xi. 4.

wx pooxexpouxéres IX. iv. 1,
προσλαμβάνων V. ii. 4. προσλαβόντα
IV. vi. 4. προσλαβοῦσα LIT, viii. 12.
προσοφλὴσει LV. iii. 24.

προσκαίου LX, v. 2.

προσκαίως LX. v. 2.

προσποιεῖται VIII. viii. 1. προσποιού-
μένοι LV. vil. 15. προσεποιεῖτο IX.
iii. 1. προσποιούμενος LV. vii. 10.
προσποιοῦνται lV. vii. 13. X. viii. 4.
προσποιήματι IV, vii. 1.

προσποίησις IL. vii. 12, προσποιήσεως
IX. iii. 2.

προσποιητικὸς III. vii. 8. IV. vii. 2.
προσπταίσματος V. xi. 8.
προσπταίσαντα V. xi. 8.

πρόσταγμα III. xii. 8.

πρόσταξις X. ix. 12. mxpoordtews VII.
vi. 1.

wpoordrre V.i.14. ii, 10. προσταττό-
μενα V. ii. 10. προσταττομένων IT. iv.
6. προστάξει II. vi. 7. προστάττοι

INDEX VERBORUM.

IIL. i. 4. προστάξῃ III. v.21. προσ-
τάττοντες III, viii. 5.

προστιθεὶς V. ii. 14. προστίθεται II.
iii. 5. προστιθέμενον 1. vii. 8. προσ-
τιθεμένης 1. vii. 14. προσθεῖναι 1.
ΥἹ. 17. Π| νἱ. 9. VW.iv. 11. προσ-
τιθέασι VI. xiii. 3. προστιθέντες VII.
iv. 2,6. προσέθηκεν. ἵν. 8. προσ-
ΤΕΘΝ.ἶν. 10. προσετέθη V. iv. 10.
προστεθέντος X. il. 3. προστιθεμένην
X. ii. 3.

προσφέρεσθαι VI. i. 2.

προσφόρου X. ix. 15.

πρότασις VII. tii. 12. mwperdcews VI.
xi, 4. προτάσεων VIL iii. 6.

πρότερον I. v. 8. vi. 2, x.6,7. IL i.
4.v. § III. vii. 7, 12. viii. 3. IV.
v. 13. vi. 6. V. ii. 8. iv. 14. ν. 1,
17. Vi. 3, 6. viil. 3. 1χ. 9. xi. 5. VI.
1.1, 5. VIL. i. 4. ii. 5. iv. 5. vii. 1.

ix.r. VOL. iii. 8. xii. 7, IX i. 2.
v.1. Σ. wi 2, 8. vii. 2,9. προτέροι

ΠῚ. xii. 5. V.iv. 2. προτέρων X.
ix. 22.

προτιθέμεθα 1. 111, 8, προτιθέται VI.ix.
4. προτεθέντα Χ. ix. 17.

προτιμᾶν I. vi. 1.

τροτρέπεσθαι Χ, ix. το. προτρέπονται
Χ. 1. 4. προτρέπεται IIL. v. 7. προ-
τρέψοντες: III. v.7. προτρέψασθαι X.
ix. 3.

προὐπαρχὴν IX. ii. 5.

προῦπάρχει lV. ii. 14. προὔπάρχεν I.
ix.4. X.ix.8. προὐπάρχουσι V.ix.14.

προφανῇ II. viii. 15.

wpopépovras X. iii. 8.

πρώην 11. iii. 5.

Πρωταγόραν IX. 1. 5.

πρωτεύουσι IV. iii. 27.

πρῶτος IIT. viii. 8. πρῶτον 1. vii. 17,

20. 11. ii.6. iv. 3. ix. 3. ID. i 22.
ii, 11, 12. Vv. 23. vill. 1. LV. iii. 1.

V. i. 3. v. 8. ix. 1,12. ΝΕ. 4. ix. 4.
xii. 4. WIL. i 5. iii. 1, 8. xii. 1. xiv.
4. X. iv. 9. ix. 22. πρῶτοι IIT, viii.
8. IX.ix. 4. πρώτοις IV. iv. 1, 4.
VII. x. 2. πρώτον V. iii. 9. πρώτων»
VI. xi. 4. πρώτας VII. vi. 6.

πρώτως VIII. iv. 4. vii. 3.

πτῆσις X. iv. 3.

πτώσσοντα III. viii. 4.

Πυθαγόριοι I. vi. 7. ΤΠ. vi. 14. .ν.1.

wixa VIL. vi. 3.

πυκνότης V. i. 5.

πύκταις III, ix. 3

πυκνότητος ibid.

INDEX VERBORUM.

πυκτικὸς X. ix. 15.

πῦρ ILi.2. V. vii. 2.

wupérrovri X. Vv. 9. ix. 15.

aww VI. ix. 4, 6.

πωλεῖν V. iv. 13. πωλοῦσω V. vii. 5.

πῶς I. iii. 8. vi. 1, 12, 16. X. 7. xili. 16.
IL. ii. 1, 2. iv. 1. v. 3. vi. 3. vii. 16.
ix. 1,7. 1Π.1- 16, 17. ii. 12. iii. 6,
8, 11, 14,17. ν. 23. IV.i 34. ii. 9,
21.v.13. V. vi. 3.ix.15.x.1. VI.
viii. 4. xii. 7. WII. ii. 1. iii, 1, 2, 12,
14. lv. 5. X. §. xii. 7.xiv.9. VIII.
ii. ii. 4. xii. 8. IX. iii. 4. viii. 3.
X. ii. 4. iii. 5. iv. g. viii. 4. ix. 7, 18,
20, 23.

πως J. vi. 8. viii. 9. ix. 1. xii. 2. xiii.
7,18. IL. iii. 2. iv. 3. v. 4. vi. 20.
viii. 1,8. ΠῚ. iii. 13. ν. 17, 20. IV.
iv. 5.ix. 2. V. i. 10, 12. v. ro. ix.
15. xi. 4. VL iii. 4. xiii. 1,4. VII.
ili. 7, 10. iv. 4. Vi. 1. Xiii. 5. xiv. 2.
VIII. vii. 1. xii, 3. ΙΧ. vii. 4. ΣΧ.
ix. 8.

P

ῥαβδώσεως X. iv. 2.

Ῥαδαμάνθυος V. v. 3.

ῥάδιον I. viii. 15. ΤΊ, vi. 14. ix. 2,7, 8.
ΠῚ. i. ro. xii. 2. IV. i. 20, 23, 30,
39. ili. 21, 26. v. 13. 1K. 14, 15.
VIII. iv. 3. vi. 2, ΙΧ. ii. 2.ix.5. X.
ix. 5, 20.

ῥᾳδίως I. iv. 7. x. 14.

ῥᾷων IX. ii. το. ῥᾷον IV. i.9. VIL-x.
4. IX. ix. 5.

pé@oraIl.ix.g. ΠῚ. 1.11. VIII. x. 3.

ῥαθυμεῖν VIL i. 2.

ῥέζω. ἔρεξε V. ν. 3.

ῥέπειν Χ.Ὶ1. 2. ῥέπωσι VIT. vii. 1.

ῥηθήσεται ΤΊ. ii. 2. vii. 6, 9. IV. i. 14.
ῥηθέντων VII. iii. 7. ῥητέον ΤΙ. vi. 2.
vii. Ir, WI. xii. 2.

ῥητῇ X. ix. 20. ῥητοῖς VIII. xiii. 6,
7, 9.

ῥητορικὸν I. iii. 4. ῥητορικὴν 1. ii. 6.

ῥήτωρ IX. iii. 11.

ῥίζαν VIII. xii. 3.

ῥῖνας IIT. viii. ro.

ῥίπτει IIL. xii. 3. Ὑ. 1. 14. ῥίψαι IIT.

v.14. ῥίπτων 11. 1.1, 2. plpas V.

ii. 2.

ῥόδων TIT. x. 5.

ῥοπὴν 1. ii. 2. vii. 23. x. 12. xi. 3. X.
i,t.

ῥνκαίνουσι I. viii. τό.

=

σαθρῶς I. x. 8.

Σαρδαναπάλῳ I. v. 4.

σάρκινοι IIT. ix. 3.

σαρκὸς V.i. 5. σαρκὶ ibid.

Σάτυρος VIL. iv. 5.

σαφηνείας 11. vii. 11.

σαφὲς VI.i.2. σαφέστερον VI. xii. 8.

σεῖος VII. i. 3.

σεισμὸν IIT. vii. 7.

σεμνὸν IV .iii.26. VII. ii. 6. VIII.i. 6.

σεμνύνεσθαι IV. iii. 26.

σημαίνειν IIT. viii. 10. onpalvovres VI.
vii. τ. VII. iv. 4.

σημεῖον 11. iii. 1. V.ii.2. VI. v. 2,
8. vill. 5. xi. 1,6. xiii. 4. VII. iii.
8. iv. 2. xii. 2. xiii. 5. VIII. viii. 3.
X. vi. 4. viii. 8. σημείῳ VIII. i. 7.
viii. 2.

σθένος IIT, viii. ro.

Σικνωνίοις IIT. viii. 16.

Σιμωνίδῃ IV. i. 27.

σιναμωρίᾳ VII. vii. 6.

ournpa V. vii. 5.

σιτία II. ii. 6.

σιτίοις IIT. v. 9.

σίτου V. v. 13.

σκαπτῆρα VI. vii. 2.

σκεπτέον 1. viii. 1. 11. v. 1. V.i. 1.
VI. viii. 4. xiii. 1. VII. iii. 1.

σκεπτόμεθα IT. ii. 1. σκέψαιτο LV. ii.
9. VI. viii. 6. σκεψώμεθα I. vi. 9.
σκέψασθαι IL. ii. x. VII. vi. 1.

σκεῦος X. V. 2.

σκέψις]. xiii. 4. Vii. 2. σκέψεως].
ix. 23. VII. iii.2. ΜΙΠ. !. 7.

σκληροὶ IV. viii. 3.

σκοπεῖν II, if. 4. ix. 4. X. viii. 12.
σκοποῦμεν IIT. ii. 15. σκοπῶν IV. ii.
21. σκοπεῖ VIIT. x. 2. σκοποῦσι
111. iii. 1. oxoweiracl. iii. 2. σκο-
woupévas V.x.1. oxowoly VIII. x. 2.

σκοπὸς III. xii. 9. VIL i. 1. xii. 9.
σκοποῦ 11. vi. 14. σκοπὸν I. ii. 2.
VI. xii. 6, 9.

Σκύθαι 111. iii. 6. Σκνθῶν VIL. vii. 6.

σκυτέως I. vii. 11.

σκυτῶν 1. x. 13.

σκυτοτόμος V. v. 8, 12.
ibid. σκυτοτόμῳ IX. i. 1.
pov I. x. 3. Υ. v. 10, 12.

σκῶμμα IV. viii. 9.

oxawrew LV. viii. 4,9. σκώπτοντα lV,
viii. 7. σκωπτόμενον IV, viii. 3.

σκυτοτόμον
σκυτοτό-

lx

i. 3. προσαγορεύομεν VI. v.5. προσ-
ayopevorra LV. i. δ. viil. 3, 4.

wpocavatpovos X. 1. 3.

τροσάντους I. vi. I.

προσάπτομεν IV. i. 3.

προσγένοιτο VII. iv. 4.

προσδεῖν X.ix.19. προσδεήσει I. iv.7.
προσδεῖσθαι. viii. 17. WII. xiii. 4.
προσδεομένη 1. viii. 15. προσδεῖται
L. viii. 12.x.9. WII. xiii. 2. VIII.
iii. 8. x. 2. προσδέονται VIII. i. 4.
ili. 4.

προσδιομολογείσθω IL. ii. 3.

προσδιοριζόμεθα VI. 111. 4.

προσδοκώμενα IIT. i. 9.

προσδοκία LX. vii.6. προσδοκίαν IIT.
Vi. 2.

πρόσεστιν. xi. 3. προσῇ V. viii. 2.

προσεπιτιθέντες VII. iv. 6.

προσέρχονται LIT. viii. 11.

προσέχειν VI. xi. 6. X.v. 3.

προσηγορία IX. viii. 4. Ἐπροσηγορίαις

IV. i. 30.

προσήκει TV. vi. §.ix.1. VIII. v. 3.
viii. 3. προσήκειν VIII. xiv. 1. X.
ix. 14. προσήκοντοεν 1]. xiii. 4.

τρόσθεσις IIT. v. 22. mwpbcGeow VII.
iv. 3. v. 8.

προσθετέον I. x. 15. V.ix.5. VIII.
ii, 4.

προσίεται IX. xi. 4.

τροσκείσθω V.iv. 12. προσκεῖσθαι.
xi. 4.

προσκεκρουκότες IX. iv. 1.
προσλαμβάνων V. ii. 4. προσλαβόντα
IV. vi. 4. προσλαβοῦσα IIL. viii. 12.

προσοφλὴῆὴσει LV. 111. 24.

προσκαίου LX. v. 2.

προσπαίως IX. v. 2.

προσποιεῖται VIII. viii. 1. προσποιού-
μενοι LV. vil. 15. προσεποιεῖτο IX.
iii. 1. προσποιούμενος IV. vii. 10.
προσποιοῦνται ΤΥ. vii. 13. X. viii. 4.
προσποιήματι LV. vii. 1.

προσποίησις IL. vii. 12. προσποιήσεως
IX. iii. 2.

προσποιητικὸς III. vii. 8. IV. vii. 2.

xpoorralsuaros V. xi. 8.

προσπταίσανρτα V. xi. 8.

πρόσταγμα ITT. xii. 8.

πρόσταξις X.ix.12. προστάξεως VII.
vi. 1.

προστάττει Υ. 1. 14. ii, 10. προσταττό-
μενα V. ii. 10. προσταττομένων IT, iv.
6. προστάξει 11. vi. 7. προστάττοι

INDEX VERBORUM.

TIl.i.4. προστάξῃ 1Π1. v.21. προσ-
τάττοντες III. viii. 5.

προστιθεὶς V. ii. 14. προστίθεται ἢ].
ili. 5. προστιθέμενον I. vii. 8. προσ-
τιθεμένης 1. vii. 14. προσθεῖναι 1.
ΥἱΣ.17γ. Π. νἱ. 9. V.iv. 11. προσ-
τιθέασι VI. xiii. 3. προστιθέντες VII.
ἦν. 2,6. προσέθηκενΥ. ἵν. 8. προῦσ-
ΤΕΘΝ ἷν. 10. προσετέθη Υ. iv. 10.
προστεθέντος X. ii. 3. προστιθεμένην
Χ. ii. 3.

προσφέρεσθαι VI. 1. 2.

προσφόρου X. ix. 15.

πρότασις VII. tii. 13. προτάσεως VI.
xi, 4. προτάσεων VIL. iii. 6.

πρότερον I. v. 8. vi. 2, x.6,7. IL. i.
4-v. § ILE. vii. 7, 12. viii. 3. IV.
Vv. 13. viL 6. V. ii. 8. iv. 14. Vv. 1,
17. Vi. 3, 6. Vill. 3.ix.9. xi. 5. VI.
11, § VIL. i. 4. ii. δ. iv. 5. vii. 1.

ix.r. VII. iti. 8. xii. 7. [Xi 2.
γ. 1. XX. wi. 2, 8. vii. 2,9. προτέρου

IIT. xii. 5. V.iv. 2. προτέρων X.
ix. 22.

πκροτιθέμεθα 1. 111. 8. προτιθέται VI.ix.
4. προτεθέντα Χ. ix. 17.

προτιμᾶν I, vi. 1.

τροτρέπεσθαι X. ix. το. προτρέπονται
X. i. 4. προτρέπεται III. v. 7. προ-
τρέψοντες III. v.7. προτρέψασθαι X.
ix. 3.

προὐπαρχὴν IX, ii. 5.

κροὔπάρχει lV. ii. 14. προὔπάρχειν I.
ix.4. X.ix.8. προὔπάρχουσι V.ix. 14.

προφανῇ III. viii. 15.

προφέροντας X. iii. 8.

πρώην IT. iii. 5.

Πρωταγόραν ΙΧ. i. 5.

τρωτεύουσι IV, iii. 27.

πρῶτος ITI. vili.8. πρῶτον I. vii. 17,
20. IH. ii.6. iv. 3. ix. 3. UL. 22.
iii, 11) 12. V. 23. Vili. x. = IV. iid. 1.
V.i. 3. v. 8. ix. 1,12. ὙΙ. 1. 4. ix. 4.
xii. 4. VIL. i. 5. iii. 1, 8. xii. 1. xiv.
4. ΣΧ. iv. 9. ix. 22. πρῶτοι OL viii.

8. ΙΧ. ἰχ. 4. πρώτοις IV. iv. 1, 4.
VII. χ. 2. πρώτου V. iii. 9. πρώτων»

VI. χὶ. 4. πρώτας VIL vi. 6.
πρώτως VIII. iv. 4. vii. 3.
πτῆσις X. lv. 3.
πτώσσοντα IIT. viii. 4.
Πυϑαγόριοι I. vi. 7. If. vi. 14. V.v.1.
wixa VII. vi. 3.
πυκνότης V. i. 5.
πύκταις 111. ix. >

πυκνότητος ibid.

INDEX VERBORUM. Ixlll

πυκτικὸς X. ix. 15.

wip Ii. 2. V. vii. 2.

wupérrovrt X. Vv. 0. ix. 15.

ww VI. ix. 4, 6.

πωλεῖν. iv.13. πωλοῦσω V. vii. 5.

ws I. iii. 8. vi. 1, 12, 16. x. 7. xiii. 16.
I. ii. 1, 2. iv. 1. v. 3. vi. 3. vii. 16.
ix. 1,7. ILi. 16, 17. ii. 12. iii. 6,
8, 11, 14,17. v. 23. IV. i. 34. ii. 9,
21.0.13. V. vi. 3.ix.15.x.1. VI.
viii. 4. xii. 7. WIL. ii. 1. iii, 1, 2, 12,
14. ἵν. 5. X. 5. xii. 7. xiv.g, VIII.
i. 1. ii. 4. xii, 8. IX. iii. 4. viii. 3.
X. ii. 4. iii. 5. iv. 9. viii. 4. ix. 7, 18,
20, 23.

πως I. vi. 8. viii. 9. ix. 1. xii. 2. xiii.
7,18. IL. iii. 2. iv. 3. v. 4. vi. 20.
viii. 1,8. IT. iii. 13. v.17, 20. IV.
iv. 5. ix. 2. V. i. 10, 12. v. ro. ix,
ἴδ. χὶ, 4. VI. iii. 4. xiii. 1,4. VII.
lil. 7, 10. iv. 4. vi. 1. xiii. 5. xiv. 2.
VUI. vii. 1. xii. 3. ΙΧ. vii. 4. &.
ix. 8.

P

ῥαβδώσεως X. iv. 2.

Ῥαδαμάνθυος V. v. 3.

ῥάδιον 1. viii. 15. 11. vi. 14. ix. 2,7, 8.
ITT. i. το. xii. 2. IV. i. 20, 23, 30,
39. tii. 21, 26. v. 13. ix. 14, 15.
VIII. iv. 3. vi. 2. LX. ii. 2.ix.5. X.
ix. 5, 20.

ῥᾳδίως I. iv. 7. x. 14.

ῥᾷων IX. ii. 10. ῥᾷον IV. i. 9. VIL x.
4. IX. ix. 5.

ῥᾷστα]. ix.9. TIL. 1.11. VIII. x. 3.

padupety VI. i. 2.

ῥέζω. ἔρεξε V. v. 3.

ῥέπειν Xi. 2. péwwor VII. vii. 1.

ῥηθήσεται IT. ii. 2. vii. 6,9. IV. i. 14.
ῥηθέντων VII, iii. 7. ῥητέον ΠῚ. vi. 2.
vil. 11. VI. xii. 2.

ῥητῇ X. ix. 20. ῥητοῖς VIII. xiii. 6,
7. 9.

ῥητορικὸν I, iii. 4. ῥητορικὴν I. ii. 6.

ῥήτωρ IIT. iii. 11.

ῥίζαν VIII. xii. 3.

pevas ITT. viii. ro.

ῥίπτειν IIL. xii. 3. Υ. ἱ. 14. ῥίψαι IIL.

γ. 14. ῥίπτων IT. i. 1, 2. plyas V.

ii. 2.

ῥόδων TIT. x. 5.

ῥοπὴν 1. ii. 2. vii. 23. x. 12. xi. 3. X.
i. I.

ῥνυπαίνουσι I. viii. 16.

=

σαθρῶς I. x. 8.

Σαρδανακάλῳ I. v. 4.

σάρκινοι IIT. ix. 3.

σαρκὸς V.i. 5. σαρκὶ ibid.

Σάτυρος VII. iv. 5.

σαφηνείας IT. vii. 11.

σαφὲς VI.i.2. σαφέστερον VI. xii. 8.
getos VII. i. 3.

σεισμὸν IIT. vii. 7.

σεμνὸν IV .iii.26. VII. ii. 6. VIII. i. 6.
σεμνύνεσθαι LV. iii. 26.

σημαίνειν ITT. viii. το. σημαίνοντες].
vii. τ. VII. iv. 4.

σημεῖον IV. iii. 1. Vii. 2. VI. v. 2,
8. vill. §. xi. 1, 6. xiii.g. VIL. iii.
8. iv. 2. xii. 2. xiii. 5. VIII. viii. 3.
X. vi. 4. viii. 8. σημείῳ VILLI. i. 7.
Viii. 2.

σθένος 111. viii. 10.

Σικνωνίοις IIT. viii. 16.

Σιμωνίδῃ IV, i. 27.

σιναμωρίᾳ VII. vii. 6.

σιτηρὰ V. vii. 5.

σιτία ΤΙ. ii. 6.

σιτίοις IIT. v. 9.

σίτου V. v. 13.

oxanripa VI. vii. 2.

σκεπτέον I. viii. 1. Il. v.31. V.i. 1.
VI. viii. 4. xiii. 1. VII. iii. 1.

σκεπτόμεθα 11. 11. 1. σκέψαιτο lV. ii.

VL. viii. 6. σκεψώμεθα I. vi. 9.

σκέψασθαι 11. iit. τ. WIL. vi. τ.
σκεῦος X. v. 2.

σκέψις I. xiii. 4. V.i. 2. σκέψεως I.
ἷχ. 3. VII. ἢ. 2. VOT i. 7.

σκληροὶ IV, viii. 3.

σκοπεῖν 11. ii. 4. ix. 4. X. viii. 12.
σκοποῦμεν 171. ii. 15. σκοπῶν IV. ii.
21. σκοπεῖ VIII. x. 2. σκοποῦσι
1Π. iii. 1. σκοπεῖται ]. iii. 2. σκο-
πουμένοις. X.1. σκοποίη VIII. x. 2.

σκοπὸς IIT. xii. 9. VIL i. 1. xii. 9.
σκοποῦ 11. vi. 14. σκοπὸν I. ii. 2.
VI. xii. 6, 9.

Σκύθαι ITT. iii. 6. Σκυθῶν VIL. vii. 6.

σκυτέως I, vii. 11.

σκυτῶν 1. x. 13.

σκυτοτόμος V. v. 8, 12.
ibid. oxuvroréuy TX. i. 1.
pov I. x. 2. V. v. 10, 12.

σκῶμμα lV. viii. 9.

oxawrew lV. viii. 4,9. σκώπτοντα lV.
Vill. 7. σκωπτόμενον IV. viii. 3.

σκυτοτόμου
σκυτοτό-

Ixiv

Σόλων 1.χ. 3. Χ. νἱῖϊ. 11. Σόλωνα
I. x. 1.

σοφία 1. viii.6. VI. iii. 1. vi. 1, 2.
Vili. 2, 3, 4, 5. XL 7. X. Vii. 3.
σοφίαι VI. vii. 4. σοφίαν 1. xiii. 20.
VI. vi. 2. vii. 1, 4. X. vii. 3. σοφίας
VI. xii. 3. xiii. 8.

σοφισταὶ IX. i. 7.

σοφιστικὸς VII. ii. 8. σοφιστικαὶ X. ix.
18. σοφιστικῶν X. ix. 20.

Σοφοκλέους VIL. ii. 7. x. 4.

σοφὸς 1. xiii. 20. VI. viii. 6. xi. 5. X.
vii. 4. Vili. 12. σοφὸν 1. xiii. 20.
IV. vii. 13. V.ix. 15. VI. vii. 1, 2,
3,4. σοφοῖ: 1.ἷν. 2. σοφοῦ VI. vi.
Ι. IX. ii. 8. σοφοὶ VI. viii. 56. σο-
gods VI. vil. 2, 5. σοφώτερος Χ. vii.
4. σοφῶν X. viii. 11. σοφῷ X. viii.
13. copwrdras VIII. vii. 4.

σπάνιος VII. i. 3. σπάνιον II. ix. 2.
VIL. i. 3. σπανίας VIII. iii. 8.

σπέρμα X. ix. 6.

Σπεύσιππος I. vi. 7. WII. xiii. 1.

στευστικὸς IV. 111. 34.

σπουδάζει IV. ii. 15. σπουδάζουσι LV.
i. 3. σπουδάζοντος LV. iii. 32. σπου-
δαστέον 1. vii. 22. σπονδάζῃ X. vi. 6.
σπουδάζων IV, iii. 34. σπουδάζοντες
VI. iv. 5. σπουδάζειν VIII. i. 4.
ΙΧ. vi. 6. σπονδαστὸν VIII. xiv. 4.
ἐσπουδάκασι IX, vill. 4. σπουδάζοι
ΙΧ. viii. 5. σπουδάζοντα IX. viii. 7.

σπουδαῖος 1. vili. 13. ΠῚ. iv. 4, 5. V.
it. 6. ὟΠ.χ. τ. VIII vi.6. IX.
iv. 2. viii. 10, 11. ix. 2, 6, 7, 40.
X. vi. 6. σπουδαία 1. xiii. 12. VI. ii.
2. VILii.6,7. IX.ix. 5. σπου-
δαῖον I. xii. 2, II. vi. 2. ix. 2. III.
v.19. V.ix.6.x. 1. VI. ν. 2. xii.
7. VII. ix. 5. xiv. 4. IX. ii. 5.
σπουδαίον I. vii. 14. VII. xiii. 7.
IX. viii.9. σπουδαῖοι IT. iv. 6. v. 3.
σπουδαίῳ IIL, iv, 4. VIII. xiv. 1.
IX. ii. 1. iv. 3. ix. 7. X. v. 10. vi.
5. σπουδαίων IV, iii. 17. ΜΠ]. 1. 6.
iv. 5. IX. ix. 5, το. X. ix. 14.
σπουδαῖα V.x. 1. X. iv. 6. vi. 3, 7.
σπουδαίᾳ X.v.6. σπουδαίοιν V.x 2.
σπουδαίοις VI. xii. 2. σπουδαίους
VII. x. 3. IX. x. 3. σπουδαίας VII.
xi. 5. σπουδαῖαι VIT. xiv. 4. X. vi.
4. σπουδαιοτέραν ΣΧ, vi. 7. σπου-
δαιότατον Χ. iv. §. σπουδαιοτάτην
VI. vii. 3.

σπουδὴν X. ili. 12. σπουδῇ Χ. vii. 3.

INDEX VERBORUM.

σταδίῳ 1. iv.5. X. iv. 3.

στασιάζει IX. iv.9. cracugew IX. τὶ,
4. στασιάζουσι IX. vi. 2.

στάσιμος LV. ili. 34.

στάσιν VITI. i. 4.

στέργει IX. vii.4. orépyov X. ix. 8.
στέργειν IV. vi. 4,5. VIII. xiii. 6.
ἔστερξε VI. iv. 5. στέργουσι VIII.
iii, 2. xii. 2. IX. v. 2. vii. 7.
oréptwot VIII. iv. 1. orépyovras
VIIL. iv. 4. στέργοντες VILL xii. 6.
IX. vii. 2. X.ix.14. ἔστεργον ΙΧ.
ἱ, 3.

ἐστερημένα X. viii. 8.

στερίσκεται VI. ii. 6.

στέφανος III. ix. 3.

στεφανοῦνται I. viii. 9.

στιγμῆς Χ. iv. 4.

στοχάζονται VIII. ix. 4. στοχαζόμενοι
IV. viii. 3. V.i.13. στοχαζόμενος
IV. vi. 9. στοχαζόμενον IT. ix. 3.
στοχάσεται IV. vi. 6.

croxacrixds VI. vii.6. στοχαστικὴ IT.
vi. 9, 13. ix. I.

στρατηγικὴ I. vi. 4. στρατηγικῆς 1. i.
2. στρατηγικῇ 1. vii. 1. στρατηγι-
κὴν I. i. 4.

στρατηγικώτερος I. vi. 16.

στρατηγὸν I. x. 13. LX. ii. 1.
γοῦ IX. ii. 8.

στρατιῶται 111. viii. 6,9. στρατιώτας
ITT. ix. 6.

στρατοπέδῳ I. x. 13.

orparo VI. viii. 4.

στραφεὶς V, ix. 16.

orpugvol VIII. v. 2. vi. 1.

συγγένειαν Χ. ix. 14.

συγγενὴς VIII. xi. 4. σνγγενῇ VIT.
111.1. σνγγενὲς IT. xii.7. Ψ11.ν]. 2.
σνγγενεῖς VIII. xii. 4. IX. ii. 7.
σνγγενῶν VILL. xii. 7. σνγγενέσι TX,
il.g. ouyyeveordry X. vill. 7. σνγ-
yeveordry Χ. viii. 13.

στρατη-

σνγγενικὴ VIII. xii. 2. συγγενικὴν
VIII. xii. 1.
σνυγγένεσθαι V. ix. 14,16. σνγγένοιτο

Υ. vi. 1.

συγγνώμη 111.1.7,15. VI.xi.s. ΝΠ.
ii. 4. Vi. 2. συγγνώμης III. i, 1.
συγγνωμὴν VI. xi. 1.

σνγγνωμονικὸς TV. v. 4. συγγνωμονι-
coy VI. xi. τ. VII. vii.6. συγγνω-
μονικὰ V. viii. 12.

σνγγνώμων VI. xi. 2.

συγγραμμάτων X. ix. 21.

INDEX VERBORUM.

σνγγυμνάζουσι IX. xii. 2.
σνγκομιδὰς VIII. x. 5.
συγκρίνειν IX. ii. 9.
σνγκυβεύουσι IX. xii. 2.
σνγκυνηγοῦσι IX. xii. 2.
ovyxalpew IX. x. 5. σνγχαίρονσι IX.
iv.9. ovyxalporra IX. iv. 1.
συγκεχυμένως VII. 1. 6.
ouvéfevxra: X. Vill. 3. συνεζεῦχθαι X.
iv. 11.
συζευξις V, iii. 12. v. 8.
συζῆν lV. vi. 1. vii. τ. VIIL iii. 5. v. 3.
vi. 4. IX. ix. 3, 7, 10. x. 3, 4, 5. Xi.
1,2. συζῇ X. vill. 8. συζῶσι VIIL
iii. 4. συζῶντες VIII. τ. 1, 3.
συλῶντας LV. i, 42.
συνειλημμένα II. vi. 18.
συλλήβδην Υ. i. 15.
συλλογισάμενος VII. vi. 1. συλλογιστέον
I. xi. 5.
συλλογισμὸς VIL iii. 3. VIL. ii. 8. συλ-
λογισμῷ VL. iii. 3.ix. 5. συλλογισμοὶ
VIL xii. ro.
συλλυπεῖν IX. xi. 4.
συμβαίνει 1. xii. 3. xiii. 13. 11. viii. 7.
ITl.i.s.iv.2. ΙΝ΄.}. 21.ν. 8. Vz.
iti. 13, 14. νὴ}, 8. χ. 2. VI. xiv. 1.
VIL ii. 9. iii. 10. xii, 1. xiii. 1. xiv.
7. VIII. xiii. 8. 1X.1i. 3. iv. 1. v. 2.
vi. 4. Vii. 3. viii. 9. xi. 6. X. iii. 7.
Vv. 4, 5,9. συμβαίνοι ΙΧ.1. 8. συμ-
βαίνειν I. 111, 3. vii. 6. x. 4. ΧΙ. 4.
VIL. iii. 13. ΙΧ. xi. 2. Χ. vili. 2.
συμβαίνοντα 1.x. 12. Χ. Ιχ. 16. oup-
βαινόντων I. xi, 2. συμβαίνουσι IT.
vii. 15. VIL. ii. 12. v. 3. xii. 3. Xiv. 4.
συνέβη ITT. viii. 9. V. viii. 6. συμβῇ
IE. viii. 14. V-x.5. συμβαίνῃ IV.
i. 25. συμβέβηκεν. viii. τ. VII. xii.
6. IX. vii. 3. συμβεβηκὸς ITI. x. 5,
7. V. viii. 1, 3, 4. IX. 3,15, 16. xi. 8.
VL iii.4. ΜΗ. iii. το. ix. 1. xi. 3.
xii, 2. xiv. 4, 7. VIII. iii. 2, 6.iv. 5,
6. viii. 2,7. X. νἱῖ. 8. συμβεβηκότι
L vi. 2. συμβαίη V. xi. 8.
συμβάλλεται VII. xiv. 3. συμβάλλεσθαι
I.xi.1, 6. IV.iii 19. X. ix. 14, 19.
συμβάλλεται IIT. i. 10. συμβαλλο-
μένου ΤΠ. i. 12. συμβάλλει VIL. vi.
7. συμβαλλόμενος LV. viii. 10. συμ-
βαλλόμενοι VIII. xiv. 1.
oupBluv IX. xi. τ.
συμβιοῦν IV. v.13.
βιωτέον ΚΙ. xii. 8.
συμβλητὰ V. ν. 10.

VOL. II.

IX. iii. 4. συμ-

lxv

συμβολαίων IX. i. 9.

συμβούλους IIT, iii. 10.

συμμαχεῖν IX. vi. 2.

συμμαχίαι VIII. iv. 4.

συμμένει. v.6,8. συμμένουσι V. v. 6.

συμμεταβάλοι 1. x. 4.

συμμετρία X.iii. 3. συμμετρίαν. ν. 14.

σύμμετροι lV, iii. 5. σύμμετρα IL. ii. 6.
V. v. 14, 15.

συμπείθει IV. v. το:

συμπεραίνεσθαι 1. iii. 4. συμπερανθὲν
VII. ii. 8. iii. 9.

συμπεράσματος I. viii. 1. VI. ii. 4.

συμπαραλαμβάνουσι 1. viii. 6.

συμπίνουσι LX. xii. 2.

συμπίπτειν ΙΧ. χ. Κ. συνέπεσεν II. vii.6.

συμπλέκοντες IV. i. 3.

συμπλοϊκαὶ VIII. xii. 1.

σύμπλους VIII, ix. 1.

συμπορεύονται VIII. ix. 4.

συμπράξαιεν LX, v. 2, 3.

συμφανὲς I. ix. 7.

συμφέρει ΠΙ. ii. 12, VIL. iii.6. X.ix.
15. συμφέρεν IX, viii. 6. συμφέρον
Il. iii. 7. IV. vi.6. V. vii. 5. VI.ix.
7. VIII. i. 6. iii. 4. ix. 4. x. 2, 4.
IX. vii. 4. συμφέροντα IL ii. 3. ΠῚ.
irs. V.i.17. VI. v.1. vii 5. IX.
Vi. 2, 3. συμφέροντος II. iii. 7. V.i.
13. VILL. iv. 4. ix. 4,5. συμφέροντι
IV. vi.8. VIII. iv. 2. ἰχ. 4. coupe
φερόντων IX, vi. 1.

συμφιλοσοφοῦσι IX. xii. 2.

συμφοιτητὴν VIII. xii. 8.

ουμφοραῖς 1. ix. 11.

σνμφνέστερον IV. i. 37.

συμφῦναι VIL. iii. 8.

συμφωνεῖν vii. τ. ΠῚ. xii.9. X.viii.
12.

σνσαγαγόντι Χ. ix, 20. συνηγμένων X.
ix. 23.

συναγωγαὶ Χ. ix. 21.

συνᾳδει L.viii.1. X.ix. 20. συνᾳδόντων
X. viii. 12.

συναισθανόμενοι TX. ix. 9. συναισθάνε-
σθαι IX. ix. το.

συναίτιοι IIT. v. 20.

συνακολουθοίημεν I. x. 8.

συναλγεῖν IX. x.5.xi.2. συναλγεῖ IX.
iv.2. συναλγοῦσι [X.iv.9. συναλ-
yotrra ΙΧ. ἷν. 1. συναλγοῦντας ΙΧ,
xi. 4. σνναλγοῦντων IX. xi. 2.
συναλλάγμασι 11.1. γ. V. ii. 12. iv. 1,
3. viii. το. X.vili. 1. συναλλαγμάτων
V. ii. 13.

lxvi

δυναλλάξας VIII. xiii. 8. συναλλάξωσι
VIII. xiii. 5. συναλλάξαντας VIII.

συνάπτει VILL. iii.7. συνάπτουσι VIII.
iv. 5.

συναριθμεῖται Π.ἷν. 3. συναριθμουμένην
I. vii. 8.

συνηρτημέναι X. Vili. 3.

συνανξανομένη LX. xii. 3.

συναύξει X. v. 2. vii. 7. συναύξουσι X.
vy. 2. συναύξοντα X. Υ. 2.

συνάχθεσθαι IX. ix. 5.

σύνδεσμος VIII. xii. 7.

σννδιάγειν VILL. v. 3. xiii. 3. LX. iv. 5.
συνδιάγοντα IX. iv. 1.

συνδούλου VIL. v. 3.

συνδυάζει V. iii. 11. συνδυάζεται IV.i.
30. VIII. iv. 5.

συνδναστικὸν VIII. xii. 7.

σύνεγγυς IIL. ii. 7. V.i.7. VIII. xii. 4.
X. v. 6.

συνειδότες Liv. 3. συνίδοιμεν Χ. ix. 23.
συνιδόντες IV. vii. 1.

ouvely X. 1x. 7.

συνείρουσι VIL. iii. 8.

συνεπικοσμεῖν I. x. 12.

συνεπόμενος LV. vi. 8.

συνεργεῖν LIL .viii. 11. συνεργοῦντα ΙΧ.
xi. 6.

συνεργὸς I. vii. 17.
συνεργοὺς X. vii. 4.

συνερχομένων 111.1]..2. συνελθεῖν Υ 111.
ix. 4.

σύνεσις VI. ΧΙ, 3,4. χὶ. 2. σύνεσιν I.
xiii, 20. VI.xi.2,5. VIII. xii. 2.
συνέσεως X. ix. 20.

συνετὸς I. xiii. 2. WI. xi. 2. συνετοὶ
VI. x. 1,2. συνετοὺς VI. x. 1. xi. 2.

συνεχὴς V.iii.9,14. VII.viii.1. συνεχεῖ
Il.vi. 5. cuvexeorépa IX. ix.6. συν-

συνεργὰ I. ix. 7.

exéorara I. x. 10. συνεχεστάτη X.
vii. 2.

συνέχει V. v.6, 11,13. VIII. xii. 7.
συνέχειν VIIT. i. 4.

συνεχῶς VIII.vi.4. IX. ix. 5. X.iv.9.
vi. 6. vii. 2.

συνηγορῆσαι I. xii. 5.

συνήδεται LX.iv.§5. συνήδεσθαι ΓΧ.Χ. 5.

συνηδύνειν LV. vi. 6, 7, 8. συνηδύνοντος
IV. vi. 9. .

συνηθείᾳ VIII. vi. 3. συνηθείας VITI.
iii. 8.iv.1. IX. 111. 5.v.2. X.ix.19.
συνήθειαν IX. v. 3.

συνήθεις IV. vi. 5. VIL xiv. 5. VIII.

INDEX VERBORUM.

συνήθη
X. ix. 8.

συνημερεύειν Ὺ ΠῚ. iii. 5. v. 2, 3. Vi. I.
xiii. 3. IX. ix.3.x.4. συνημερεύ-
ovres ΙΧ. xii. 2. συνημερεύσουσι LX.
iv. 9.

συνθέλουσι LX. v. 2.

σύνθεσις Χ. iv. 2.

συνθετὸν X. Vill. 3. συνθετοῦ X. vii. 8.
viii. 3.

συνθήκῃν. Υἱϊ. 4. συνθήκης VHT. xi.
7. συνθήκην V. Vv. 11. Vil. 5.

συνιέναι VI. x. 3, 4.

συνικνεῖσθαι I. x. 5. συνικνουμένων I.
xi. 2.

συνίσασι Χ. ix. 20.

συνέστηκεν VI. vii. 4. VIL xii. 2.

σύνοδοι, συνόδους VIII. ix. 5.

συνῳκείωται VILL. xii. 2. συνῳκειῶσθαι
X. i. 1. v. 2. viii. 2. συνῳκείωνταε
VIII. xii. 4.

συνοικοῦσι VIII. xii. 7.

συνεωράκασι IIL viii. 6.

σύνοροι VIII. x. 3.

συνουσίας VIII. ix. 5.

συντείνει IV. vii. 7.
xii. 9.

συντελεῖν I. vi. 12.

συντεθῇ V. iii. 11.

συντομώτερος X. Vi. I.

σύντονος LV, iii. 24.

συντέθρακται LI. iii. 8.

σύντροφον VILL. xii. 4. σύντροφοι 111.
xii. 6.

συνῳδοὶ x. i. 4. συνῳδὸς I. vii. 8.

συνώνυμος V. il. 6.

σύρματα X. v. 8.

συστενάζουσι IX. xi. 4.

σύστημα II, viii. 6.

συστοιχίᾳ 1. vi. 7.

συστρατιῶται VILL.ix.5. συστρατιώτας
VIII. ix. 1.

σφαῖρα IV. ii. 18.

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι ITT. i. 17.

σφάλλεσθαι VI. ΧΙ 1.

σφάττων V. xi. 2.

σφετέροις Χ. ix. 14. σφετέρους X. ix.
18.

σφόδρα IIL. i. τό. xi. 8. IV. 1. 18. v.
14. VIL i.1, 3. iv. 4. Vil. 3. xiv. 1.
VII. vi. 2. IX. viii. 9. x. 5. Χ.
Vv. 4.

σφοδραῖ IL. xii. 7. VII. xiv. 4,5. sgo-
δρᾷ VII. xiv. 6.

σφοδρότητα VII. vii. δ.

ouvrelyorra V1.

INDEX VERBORUM.

σφοδρῶς IT. v. 2.

σχεδὸν 1. iv. 2. v. 4. viii. 4. ΤΠ, vii.
10. V.v.i. vii. 1. V. ii. 10. x. 2.
VIL xi. 5. ΙΧ, iv. 8 Xv. 5.

σχῆμα V. v. 12. χ. 7. VIII. x. 4.
σχήμασι IIT. x. 3.

σχόλαζον VIII. ix. 5. σχολάζωμεν X.
vii. 6.

σχολαίως IX. xi. 6.

σχολαστικὸν Χ. vii. 7.

σχολῇ X. vii. 6.

σώζει 1]. ii.6. VI. ν. 6. VIL. viii. 4.
VIIL xiv.3. ΙΧΟΣ 1. X. ix. 23.
σώζειν I. ii. 8. σώζεται II. ii. 7.
VIL. vii. ς. σωϊζούσης 11. vi. 9. σώ-
gowro TIT. i. 4. σώζουσαν VI. v. 5.
σώζεσθαι VIIL. ii. 3. IX. iv. 3. vii. 2.
σώζοιτο VIII. i. 1.

Σωκράτης IL. viii. 6. IV. vii. 14. VI.
xiii. 3, 5. VII. ii. 1. iii. 12.

σῶμα I, viii. 2.xiii. 7. 11. ἰν. 6. IT v-
16. x.11. VWI.i.2. WIL. iii. 7. xiv.
6. VIIL xi.6. X. iii. 6. viii. 4, 9.
σώματι lL. vi. 12. IV. iii. 5. VI. xiii.
1. VIL. xiii. 2. σώματος 1. xiii. 6, 7,

10, 15. ID].v. 15. Χ. 2. σώμασι I.
xiii. 16. σώματα ITD. viii. 8. IV.

viii. 4. σωμάτων IIT. iv. 4. X. vi. 3.
σωματικαὶ Π1. χ. 2. VII. xiii. 6.xiv.1,
3. σωματικὴν VIL. xiv. 4. σωματι-
κῶν I. xii. 6. IZ. iii. 1. VIL. iv. 2.
xiv. 1,2. X.vi.8. σωματικὰς 11].
x. 3. VIL. iv. 3. vi. 5. vii. 2. viii. 4.
ix. 6. xii. 7. X. vi. 4. σωματικὰ Ιν.

ix. 2.0 WII. iv. 2. ix. 7. ΣΧ. iii. 6.
σωματικοῖς VII. ix. 5. σωματικαῖς

IV. viii. 4.

σωτηρίας 111. i. 16. vili. 9. ΙΧ. vii. 1.
σωτηρίᾳ 1. vi. τ. ΠῚ. 1. 5,17. owrn-
play III. vi. 11. V. ii. 6.

σωφρονεῖν X. ii. 2. iii. 2.

σωφρονικοὶ VI. xiii. 1.

σωφρόνως IT. iv. 3. X. viii. 11. ix. 8.

σωφροσύνη II. ii. 7. vii.3. Π]. x. 1, 3,
8. VII. v. 9. vi. 6. vii. I. ix. 5.
σωφροσύνης II. ii. 7. vi. 20. ΠῚ. x.

I. xii. 10. σωφροσύνῃ II. viii. 6, 8.
VII. iv. 6. σωφροσύνην I. xiii. 20.

VI. v. 5. VIL. iv. 2.

σώφρων]. xiii. 20. II. iii. 1. iv. 4, 5.
viii. 2. IIT. ix. 5,8.xi. 9. IV. i. 1.
iii. 4. VIL. ii. 6. vii. 2. viii. 4. ix. 6.
xi 4. xii. 7. X. ii. 1. vii. 4. σώφρο-
yosI. xiii. 17. IDI. xii. 9. V.i. 14.
VIL. ii. 6. ix. 6. xii. 7. σώφρονα 1.

lxvil

i. 4. ἷν. 1, 3,4,5. IV.iv.4. VILi.
6. iv. 3, 4. vi. 6. xii. 7. IX. viii. 5.
σώφρονες II. i. 4, 7. ii. 9. iv. 1, 4.

III. x. 2,3. X. viii. 7. σωφρόνας
11. iv. 1. IDL. x. 4. σώφρονι Χ.
Vili. 4.

T

τἀγαθὸν I. i. 1. v. 4. vi. 3. Vi. 1, 10.

xii. 5. ILiv.2,4. WII. ii. x, 2.
IX. iii, 3. iv. 3,4. X.i. 2. ii. 1, 3.
iii. 4, 13. τἀγαθοῦ Lvi. 11. IL. iv.
1. τἀγαθὰ 1. iii. 3. vi. 9. III. ii. 1.
VI. ii.9. VIIL ii. 3, 4. iii. 1, 6. v.
I. vii.6. IX. iv. 1, 3, 4. V. 3. Vili. 2.
ix, I, 2, 4.

τἀληθὲς 1. iii. 4. viii. 1.
VIL ii. 3. VIL. xiv. 3.

τἄλλα IV. i. 12. iii. 18. VI. xiii. 1.

τἀναντία VIL. ii. 9.

ITT. iv. 4, 5.

τάξει. vii. 7. τάξι. Ν.1ἱ,. 11. ΣΧ. ix.

ταπεινοὶ IV, iii. 29. ταπεινοῖς IV. iii.

26.
τάττει III. χὶϊ. 9. τάττειν [X, i. 8.
τάττων X. ix. 12. τάττουσι I. viii.
17. τάξαι TID, viii. 4. ΙΧ. i. 5,9.
τάξῃ IV. v. 3. τάξειε VILL xii. 1.
τάττωσι TX.i. 9. ταχθεῖσα X. ix. 23.
τεταγμένῃ V. ti. 10. τεταγμένανΥ.
χὶ. 2. WI. χιὶ. 7. τέταχθαι X. ix. 8.
ταὐτὸ VI. vii. 4. viii. I. x. 2. ΧΙ. 2.
xiii. 1. VIL. iii. 2. xiii. 4. VIII. xii. 3.
ΙΧ. ii.7. X. iv. 8.v. 6,7. ταὐτοῦ
VIIL vi. 7. ταὐτὰ Ι΄. ii. το, 16.
V. ii. 9. vii. 5. VID. iv. 4. VILE. vi. 4.
ix. 1,2. [X.ii.6.iv.1. ταὐτὸν 11].
ii, 2, 11,15. V.ii. 9, αἴ. vi. 8. ix.
8, 16. χ 1,2. VLi.6. ταυτῇ VL
viii. 3. ΥἹΙΠ. ii. 7. IX. iv. 6, 7.
ix. 10.

ravrérns VILL. xii. 3.

τάφῳ LV. ii. 16.

τάφρων IIT. viii. 5.

τάχα 1. v. 6. vi. 14. Vil. 10. x. 6. xi.
Δ. xiti. 1. VIII. ii. τ. IX. vii. 1.
viii. 2. ΣΧ. ix. 17, 21, 23.

raxéws IV. i. 30. v. 8. WILL iii. 5, 9.
vi. 7. X. iii. 4.

τάχος X. iii. 4.

ταχὺ. viii. 1. TV. i. 34. VI ix. 2,6.
VU. viii. 2. VIIL vi.:. ταχεῖα VIL.
iii. 5,9. ταχεῖς VIL. vi. 1.

Ixviii

ταχυτὴς IV. iii. 34. ταχυτῆτα VIL.
vi. 1. vii. 8.

τείνουσαι VI. xi. 2.

τέκνον V. vi. 8. τέκνα V.vi.g. VIL.
iv. 5. VII vii. 1, 2. ix. 2. xii. 2, 3.
τέκνων Ix. 3. Il1.v.5. WII. x. 4.
τέκνοις 1. vii.6. VIII. vii. 2. xii. 5.
X. ix. 14.

rexvoroey VIII. xii. 7.

rexvorodtas VIII. xii. 7.

τέκτων 1. vi. τό. vii. 10.
Vii. FI.

τέλειος VII. xiii. 2. τελεία III.v. 17.
X. iv. 1, 2, 3, 5. vil. 1, 7. vill. 7.
τέλειον I. vii. 3, 4, 6, 8. χ. 15. X.
iii. 4. iv. 4. vii. 7. τελείου L ix. ro.

τέκτονος I.

Χ, ν. 11. redelasI.x. 10. V.i 15.
xi.7. τελείῳ I. vii. 16. χ. 14. 1Π.

Υ. 19. τελείαν I. Χ. 15. xiii. τ. ὙΠ.
vi.t. X.iv.2. rAealL vii. 3. V.
i115. WIII. iii. 6,9. τελείων I. xii.
7. VIIL. xiii. 2. K.iv.4. τελείοις
I. xiii, 1. τελειότερον I. ii. 8. vii. 4.
τελειότατον I. vii. 3. τελειοτάτην I.
vil. 15. τελειοτάτη Χ. iv. 5.

τελειοῦσαι X.v. 2,11. τελειώσει Χ. iv.
I. τελειωθήσεται Χ. ἷν. 1. τελειοῖ
X. iv. 6, 8, 10, 11. γ. 2. τελειοῦσθαι
Χ, ν. 1. τελειουμένων VIL. xiv. 4.
τελειουμένοις IT. i. 3. τελειωθῇ Χ.
ix. 22.

τελείωσιν VILL. xii. 3.

τέλος I. ii. 1. iii. 6. v. 4, 6 vil. 1, 8.
vill. 3. ix. 3, 8.x. 1, 7,15. IDL.i6.
ii. 9. iii. 11, 16. V. 1, 17, 18, 19, 20.
vi. 2, 6. ix. 3. VI. ii. 5. v. 2, 4. vii.
6. ix. 7.x. 2. xi. 6. xii 10. xiii. 7,
VI. xi. 5. xii. 3. X. iv. 8. vir, 6.
ix. 1. τέλους IIT. ii. 9. iii. 11. iv. 1.
v. 1,17, 22. VIL xi.1. X. iv. 2.
vii. 7. τέλει III. vii. 6. τέλη 1.1. 2,
3> 4, 5.00. 8. vil. 3. ΠῚ iii. 11, 16,
20. VIIT.it2. redXovI.i. 2. ID.
iii. 11. τέλεσι VIL. xi. 4.

τελευταία VII. iii. 13.

τελευτῶσαν VII. x. 4. τελευτήσοντα
I.x.15. τελευτήσαντι I. x. 4. τε-
λευτήσαντα I. x. 11. τελευτησάντας
I. xi. 4.

τέμνειν V.ix.16. τεμνόμενος X. iii. 6.
τετμημένης V. iv. 8.

τέρπει X. iv. 9. Vv. 9. τέρπειν LV. viii.
7. τέρποντι VIIL xiii. 3.

τέρψιν IX, i. 4.

rerdpVI, xii. 6.

INDEX VERBORUM.

τετράγωνος I. x. 11.

τέτταρα V. iii.9. rérrapow V. iii. ς,
8, 9.

τεχνάζειν VI. iv. 4.

τέχνη 1.1. 1. IL i. 6. iii το. VL iii.1.
iv. 3,4, 5, 6.v. 2, 3,7-vi. 1. WIL.
xi. 4. xii. 6. τέχνης I. vi.9. VI v.
7. vii.1. WII. xi. 4. xii. 6. X.v.1.
τέχνῃ L vii τ. V.xi. 8. Viv. 7.
τέχνην. vi. 16, ἰχ. 6. 11.11.4. VL
iv. 5. τεχνῶν Li. 2. vii. 17. Ii.
4. iv. 2,3. V.iv.42.v.9. τέχναις
Vi vii.r. τέχνας 11. iv. 3. I. iii
9. VI. vil. I.

τεχνικῷ X. ix. τό.

τεχνίτῃ I.vii.to. VILI.xi.6. τεχνῖται

11. vi. 9. τεχνίτας I. vi. 15. X. 13.
τεχνιτῶν IX. vii. 3.

τηλικοῦτοι VIII. iii. 4. τηλικοῦτον 1.
vi. 15. τηλικαῦτα ]. xi.6. τηλικού-
τους IV. ix. 3.

τῇ μὲν, τῇ δὲ VIL xiii. 3.

τηνικαῦτα 1. x. 3.

τηρούντων ΙΧ, Υἱ. 4. τηρηθείη ΨΜ1Π,.1.1:.

τητώμενοι I, viii. 16.

τίθεμεν 1. vii. 7, 14. Viil. 2. x. 15. xii.
6. VIiliv.4. ΣΧ. νἱ. :. θέσθαι.
x. 6. τιθῇ V. iii. 9. τιθέντες I. vi.
7. VIII. xii. 7. X. iii. 4. OctyL vi.
10, Vii. 11. xiii. 11. ἐτίθεμεν I. ix. 8.
ἐτίθεσαν X. ix. 20. τιθέναι IT. i. 27.
θέμενοι 17]. iii. 11. τιθέμεθα ITT. v.
20. θείημεν IV. iii. 10. θέσαν VL
vii. 2. τιθέασι VILL. i. 6. iii. 4. ΙΧ.
iv.1. ἔθεμεν VIL. iv. 2. xi.2. θετέον
VIL. iii. 1. τιθέντας VII. i. 5.

τίλσεις VIL. v. 3.

τιμᾶ IV. iii. 23. IX.i.9. τιμῶσι I. v.
4. 1Π.ν.7. [X.i.9. τιμηθησόμενοι
IV. iii. 36. τιμωμένῳ Lv. 4. τιμᾷσθαι
Lv.5. IV. iii. 18.iv. 3. VILL. viii.
I, 2. xiv. 3. τιμῶντος ΓΜ... 15. τι:
μῶντα IV. i. 20. τιμῶν IV. i. 26.
τιμῶντας X. Vili. 13. τετιμῆσθαι ν.
14. τιμώμενοι VIII. vili.2. τιμῶνται
VIII. xi. 3. τιμᾶται VIII. xiv. 3.
τιμώμενα X.Vi.4g. τιμητέος LV. iii.20.
τιμῆσαι TX. i. 5. ἐτίμα IX. 1. 9.

τιμῇ LV. ii. 18. iii. 27. VILL viii. 2.
τιμὴν 1. iv. 3. Vv. 4, 5. vil. 5. IL vii
7,8. IV. tii. 11, 18, 37.1v. 5. V.
ii. 6. VII. iv. 2,5. VIII. viii. 2.
xiv.3. IX.ii.9. τιμαὶ 1. vi. 1Ο. Χ,
3. LI. vi. 9. ἰχ. 3. reefs I. vi. 11.
IL. νἱῖ. 8. 1Π71.νἱ}}.2ώ. IV. iii-11,15,

INDEX VERBORUM.

19. iv. 2, 3, 5. Vii. 11. V. ii. 12.
VII. i. 7. iv.2,6. VIII. viii. 2. xiv.
2. τιμὰς ITT. i. 2. vii. 1. IV. iii. 10,
17,18. VIII. ix. 5. IX. ii.8. viii. 9,
10. X. vii. 6. τιμὴ IV. iii. 10, 17,
18, V. vi. 7. VIL iv. 5. VIIL xiii.
2,3 LX.i.7. τιμαῖς VIII. xiv. 4.
IX. viii. 4.

τιμήματι VILL. x. 3. τιμημάτων VILL.

τιμίων I. xii. 1, 7.
X. vi. 4, 5. vu. 8.

τιμιωτέρα 1. xiii. 7. τιμιώτερον VIL
iL 2. ΙΧ. 111. 2. τιμιώταται I. x. 10.
τιμιώτατον IV. ii. το. τιμιωτάτων
VI. vii. 3, 5.

τιμιότητι X. Vil. 8.

τιμοκρατία VIII. x. 2, 3. τιμοκρατίας
VIII. x. 3.

τιμοκρατικὴν ΠΙ. x. 1. xi. 5.
κρατικῇ VIII. x. 6.

τιμωροῦνται LIT. v.7. τιμωρούμενοι IIT.
viii. 12. τιμωρεῖσθαι IV. v. 12.

τιμωρητικὸς IV. v. 4.

τιμωρία ΙΝ. v. 10. τιμωρίας ΙΥν. 11.
V.ix.12, ΣΧ. ἰχ. 4. 10. τιμωρίαν
VIL. vi. :.

roves VII. x. 2. τινῶν V. iii. 4. Twas
VL. vii. 2. τισι VIII. vi. 4. Χ. ν. 7.
rot Viv. 11. ΙΧ 1, 8. τισὶν V. iii.
4. iv. 5. Vv. Ie

τμῆμα, τμήματι V, iv. 8.

τοίνυν Ὗ. iii. 4. v. το, 17. VIL. vi. 5.
ΙΧ, ii. 5.

τοιόσδε LV. vii. 12. τοιάδε, i. 20. ii.
13. LX. ii. 1. τοιόνδε II. v. 20. VI.
ΧΙ, 10. WII. iii. 6. τοιᾶσδε TIT. xi.
1. VII. xiv. 7. τοιοῖσδε X. ix. 15,

τοῖχον V. xi. 6.

τοιχωρυχεῖ V. xi. 6.

τοκιστὰς LV. i. 40.

τολμηρὰ IIT. viii. 11.

τομὴν V. ix. 5.

τόξοται 1. ii. 2.

τόποι, τόποις VIII. x. τ. τόπῳ], vi. 3.
Χ. iv. 3.

τοσαδὶ V. v. 10.

τοσοῦτον I. iii. 4. vi. 16. vii. 18. x. 16.
xi. 5. I.vii.15.ix. 9. II. ix. 7.
IV. v. 3. V.iv.12.v.9,15.ix.15. VI.
xiii. 1. VWIIL iii. 4. ix. 1. xii. 7. xiv.
4. IX. i. 5, 8, 9. xii. 4. τοσούτους
1X. x. 5. rocotrovIX.i.9. τοσαύτη
VIII. xiii. 11. τοσαύτην. iii. 2. τοσ-
airalV.i.4as5. VIL iii.14. VIII.

τιμο-

lxix

xiii.4. X.viii.10. τοσούτων IV.
iii. 7, ΨΙΠ. xiii. 4. τοσούτῳν 111].1.
2. IX. i. 4. viii. 1. X. vii. 8.
réreI.x.2,7. Π|.ἰν. 2. 1Π|.1. 6. v.
14. V.iv.8. VIII. vii. 2.
τοὐναντίον V. v.18, VI. iv. 6. X.i. 2.

Υ. δ.
τοὔνομα IV.ii.1.v.9. 7ὺν. τι. VI.
x. 4.

τουτέστι V, iii. 12.

τραγηματίζοντες X. v. 4.

τραγῳδίαις I. xi. 4.

τραύματα IIL. ix. 4.

τρεῖς I. v. 2. I. vii. 11. IV. viii. 12.
τρῖων 11. iii. 7. viii. 1. V. viii. 6. VI.
vi. 2. VIII. ii. 3. τρία Π|.ν. τ. VI.
1.1. vi.2. ὙΠ... τ. ὙΠ]. iii. 1.
x. I,

τρέφεσθαι I. xiii. 11. WILL. viii. 3. rpe-
φομένοις 1. xiii. 11. τραφῆναι VIII.
xii. 5. Χ ΙΧ. 11. τραφέντα Χ. ix. 8.

τρέχειν V.ix.16. δραμεῖν IT. vi. 2.

τριγλύφου Χ. iv. 2.

τρίγωνον VI. iii. 9. v. 6.

τριηραρχεῖν IV, ii. 11.

Tpinpdpxy IV. ii. 2.

τρίτος I. v. 2,7. τρίτη ΝΠ]. x. 1.
τρίτον V. iii. 9. τρίτον IL. iv. 3.
VII. xi. 3.

τριττῶν VILLI. xiii. 1.

τριχῇ 1. viii. 2.

τρίψεως III. x. 11.

τρόπος VII. ii.2, IX. viii. 10. τρόπον
I, i. 4. iii. 4. vi. 8. vii. 19. viii. 10.
x. 13. UL. vii.g.ix. 4. II. iii. 11.
IV. i. 32. V.i. 3, 4, 13. V. 17, 19.
x. 2.xi.10. VI i. 5. iii. 4, 5. xiii.
1. VII. iii. 7. v. 5, 8.x. 2,3. X. iv.
6, 8. τρόποι IV. i. 38. VIL. iii. 6.
τρόπους III, viii. τ. VII. iii. 6.

τροπῶν 111. 111. 4.

τροφὴ . ν.12. X.v.8. τροφῆς ΠῚ.
xi.z. ΨΙΠ. xi. 2. IX. ii. 8. Χ. ix.
9,13. τροφῇ 1. νἱ. 4. V. v.10. IX.
x. 2. τροφὴν IL. ii. 8 V.v. 1ο.
VI. iv. 2. XX. ii. 1. iii. 6. viii. 9.
ix. 8. ;

τροχιζόμενον VII, xiii. 3.

τρυφὴ VII. vii. 5. τρυφῆς VIL i. 4.

τρυφῶν VIL. viii. 5.

Τρώεσσι ITT. viii. 3.

τρώξεις VIL v. 3. τρώσῃ V. viii. 6.
τρώσαντας IIT. viii. 10.
τυγχάνοιμεν 1. ἰϊ. 2. τυγχάνουσι I. τ.
32.0.1. 1. ΙΡ΄ὔ νἱ. 1. VILL xiii. 4.

Ixx

τυχεῖν I. viii.1q4. x. 4. ID. ix. 4.
VI. ix. 5,6. X. ix. 8,9. τετυχήκασι
II. vii. 3. τυγχάνειν IT. viii. 7. VI.
xii. 9. τευξόμεθα II. viii.g. ἔτυχε
111.1ν.2,3.ν.14. V.v.18.ix.9. VII.
xiii, 2. IX.i.2. τυγχάνει TI. xi.5. V.
iii. §.vii.7. VI. ix.5.xi.7. WIL viii.
6. IX.i4. X.ix. τς. τέτευχε III. xi.
7. τυγχάνων IV, iii. 17. WII. xiii.
2. τύχωσι IV. iii. 21. V. iv. 7.
τυγχάνῃ IX. i. 4. τεύξεται VI. ix. 4.

τευξόμενοι V. iv. 7. τυγχάνομεν
VI. i. 1. τύχῃ VII. iii. 10. ix. 2.
τεύξεσθαι VILLI. viii. 2. τευχότων I.

x. 14. xiii. 13. IDL. x. 2. xi. 2. IV.
iii, 17, IX.ix.3. τυχόντα I. x. 15.
171. xi. 3. τυχὸν IIT.iv. 4. VI. xii.
10. X. iii 5. τυχοῦσι IV. i. 17. vi.
8. VIL. xiv. 6. rvydvIV.i. 36. X.
vi. 8. τυχόντος Χ. 11, 5. ix. 17.
τευκτικὴ VI, ix. 4.

Τυδείδης ΠῚ. viii. 2.

τύπῳ. ii. 3. iii. 4. xi. 2. IL. ii. 3. vii.
5. I. iii. 20. ν. 21. ἰχ. 7. Vii. 3.
X. vi. 1. τύποις X. ix. 1.

τύπτει V. viii. 3. τύπτειν V. i. 14.
τύπτοι V. viii. 3. WIL. vi. 2. vii. 3.
τύπτοντες ILI. viii. 5. τύπτεσθαι ITI.
ix. 3. τυπτόμενον V. viii. 3. τυπτό-
μενοι IIT. viii. 11.

τυραννικὴ VIII. x. 4.

τυραννὶς VIII. x. 2,3. τυραννίδι VIII.
xi. 6. τυραννίδα VIII. x. 3. rupar-
νίσι VIII. xi. 8.

τύραννος 11]. ἷ. 4. V.vi.5. VIII. x. 2,
3. τύραννοι V.vi.7. τυράννους IV.
i. 23, 42. τυράννοις X. vi. 3.

τυφλῷ IIL ν. 15.

τύχη 17]. 11... ΥἹ. ἐν. 5. τύχης 1. vi.
ΣΙ. 11.1ν.2. 1Π.1Π]} τ. WIT. xiii.
2, 4. τύχῃ I. ix. 6. IV. i. 21.
τύχην I. ix. 1, 5. χ, 12. VIL iv. 5.
τύχαι 1. χ. ar. τύχαις 1, ix. 11.

x. 8, 9, 1[45ϑον τύχας I. x. 7, 11, 13.
xi. I.
τυχόντως IV, iii. 22. IX. viii. 9.

Y
ὑβρίζει VII. vi. 4. ὑβρίζειν V. i. 14.
ὑβρίζων VII. vi. 4.
ὕβρις VII. vi. 1.
ὕβριν 111. vi. 5. IV. iii. 32.
ὑβρισταὶ IV. iii. 21,
ὑγιάζειν V. ix. 16. ὑγιάσει IIL. iii. 11.

ὕβρει VIL. vii. 6.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ὑγιαίνει». viii. 14. I. ii.9. VWI. xii.
2. X. iil. 9g. iv. 6. vili. 9. ὑγιαένομεν
Til. ii. 9. ὑγιαίνων V.i. 4. ὑγιαί-
γοντι X. συ. 9.

ὑγίεια 1. i. 3. vii. 1. V.xii.5. X. iv.
6. ὑγιείας 11. ii.6. IT. i.24. V.i
4. VI. xiii. 8. ὑγίειαν I. iv. 3. vi.
16. ΤΙ. ii.6. 1Π. χὶ. 8. V. ix. τς.
VL ν. 1. vii. 7. xii. 2, 5. VII. xii. 4.
X. ili. 3.

ὑγιεινὸν V. xi. 7. VI. vil. 4. ὑγιεινὰ
IL. ii.3. 1Π|. ἵν. 4g. V.i4. VI. vii.
7. xii. τ, WII. xii 4. X. 1. 8.
ὑγιεινῶν VI. x. 1.

ὑγιεινῶς V. i. 4.

ὑγιὴς OL ν. 14. ὑγιοῦς VIL xiv. 7.

ὑγρᾶς ITT. xi. τ. ὑγρῷ VIII. viii. 7.

ὑδέρῳ VII. viii. 1.

ὕδωρ VII. ii. 10. ὕδατα VI. viii. 7.

υἱὸν TIT. i.17. VILL. vii. 1. xiv. 4.
vig VIII. vii.1. xiv. 4. υἱεῖς VIII.
x. 4. X. ix. 18. υἱέσι VIII. vii. 2.
x. 4. υἱῶν VIII. xi. 2.

ὑλακτοῦσιν VII. vi. 1.

ὕλη 1]. viii. 11. V.x. 4. ὕλην. iii.
I. vii. 18. I. ii. 3.

ὑμνούμεναι IX, x. 6.

ὑπάλλαγμα V. γ. 11.

ὑκαναστάσει IX, ii. 9.

ὑπάρχει I. iv. 7. viii. 14. x. 10, 16. 111.
v. 19. Vi. 12. ix. §.x. το. IV. iii.
20. Vv. 7. Vil. 2. V. vi.g. ix. 10. VI.
1.5. VIL. iii. 7. VILL. iii. 7. v. 5. vi.7.
IX. iv. 5, 7. viii. 2. ix. 3,4, 5. X. iii. 4.
vii. 8. viii. 8, 13. ix. 6. ὑπάρχουσι VI.
xiii. τ. VIII. xii. 6. ὑπάρχειν 1. viii.
§.ix.7. V. iii. 7. ix. 7. VI. xiii 1.
VIII. iii. 7, 9. xii. 7. IX. iv. 5, 7. ix.
I, 10. x. 4. X. iii 2. viii 9, το.
ὑπάρχοι X. vi. 2.ix. 21. ὑπάρχῃ LX.
1. 3. ὑπάρξουσι VI. xiii.6. ὑπάρξειεν
IX. vi. τ. ὑπάρξαι 1. ix.4. V.ix. το.
ὑπάρξει I. x. 11,16. ΨΊΠ. vig. IX.
lil, 5. ὑπάρξας IV. iii. 24. ὑπαρ-
χούσῃ VI. xiii. 6. ὑπάρχοντα I. viii.
1. IV. i. 34. vii. 4. IX. i. 3. ii. 9.
ix. 8. ὑπάρχουσαν I.viii.g. ὕὅπαρ-
xov I.x.7. I[X.ix.9. ὑπαρχόντων
I. x. 13. IV. ii 12. vii. 2, το. V.
Vili. 3. X.ix. 5. ὑπηργμένων VIII.
Xiv. 4. ὑπάρχοντος X. iv. 7.

ὑπείκειν X. ix. 7.
ὑπεναντίον V. x. 2.
ὑπὲρ V. v. 4.

ὑπεραγαπῶσι IX. vii. 2.

INDEX VERBORUM.

ὑπεραποθνήσκειν IX. viii. 9.

ὑπερβάλλει II. vii. 4. IV. i. 29. ii. 20.
iii. 3. ὑπερβάλλουσι II. vii. 4. viii.
2. I. vii. 12. xi. 4. IV. i. 38, 40.
iii. 8. ὑπερβάλλειν 11. vi. 16. IV. i.
18, 23, 31. 1.6. ὙΠ. iv. 5. ὑπερ-
βάλλοντα IT. ii. 6. ὑπερβαλλόντων
Il. vii. 2. ΠῚ. νὶ!. 7. VIL. vii. 7.
ὑπερβάλλων IT. vii. 2, 8, 10, 13, 14,
15. II. vii. 7, 10. IV. i. 23. ii. 20.
iii. 35. VILL. xiii. 2. ὑπερβάλλουσαν
VIL. xiv. 4. ὑπερβάλλουσα VII. vi.
5. xiii, 4. ὑπέρβαλλον VII. x.
4. ὑπερβάλλουσαι IV. ii. 4. ὑπερ-

βάλλοντες IV. viii. 3. ὑπερβάλ-
Aovras VII. i. 3. iv. 2. ὑπερβάλλον-

ros VIII. xiv. 4. ὑπερβαλλουσῶν VIT.
vii. 6.

ὑπερβεβλημένως 11]. x. 4.

ὑπερβολὴ 11. vi. 10, 12, 14, 19, 20. Vi.
35 4, 6, 7, 10, 13. viii. 6,8. III. xi.
5. IV. i. 38. id. 4. iv. 2, 4. v. 2.
vii. 1§. viii. 2. V. v. 18. ix. 17.
VIL. iv. 5. xiv. 2. IX. iv. 6.x. 5.
ὑπερβολῆς LI. ii. 6, 7. vi. 4, 9, 19, 20.
IV.i. 38. ΝἹ. 1. τ. ὙΠ. vir. ὑπερ-
βολῇ ΤΥ. ν. 9. VII. xiv. 2. VIII.
vi.2. X.viii.g. ὑπερβολὴν 1]. vi.
8, 15, 19. viii. 1. ix. 1,9. ITI. x.
4. IV.v.12. Viix.r7. ΜΙ... 1.
VII. i. 2. iv. 2. viii. 3. xiv. 2, 7.
IX. iii. 5.x. 1. ὑπερβολαὶ II. vi. 18.
IV. i. 3, 29. v. 14. VII. iv. 5. vii.
2. ὑπερβολὰς II. viii. 2. IV. vii. 9.
V. v.12. VIL. iv. 3, 4. vil. 2. xii.
7. xiv. 4. IX. 1. 6.

ὑπερέχει II. νἱ. 9. IV. ii. τ. V. iv. 8,
10, 11,12. X. vii.8. ὑπερέχον IV.
1.9. WITT. xii. 5. ὑπερέχεται 1].
vi.6. V.iv.ir. ὑπερέχεν IV. iii.
21, 25, 26. ὑπερέχοντος IV. iii. 24.
ὑπερεχομένον ibid. ὑπερεῖχε V. iv.
10. ὑπερέχοντι VITI. vi. 6. xiv. 2.
ὑπερέχηται VILL. vi. 6. ὑπερεχόμενος
VIII. vi. 6. viii. τ. ὑπερέχουσι VITI.
vii 4. IX. vii.6. ὑπερέχων VIII.
x. 2.

ὑπερόπται IV. iii. 18, 21.

ὑπεροχὴ 1. vii. 18. ὑπεροχῆς I. vii. 14.
ὑπεροχῇ IV. iii. 19. VIII. xi. 1, 3.
ὑπεροχὴν V.v. το. VIII. vii. 1, 2.
xiii. 1. xiv. 1. ὑπεροχαῖς VIII.
xiii. 1.

ὑπερτείνει 1Π1,1.7. ὑπερτείνῃ 111. viii.
9. IX. ii. 5. xi. 4.

lxxi

ὑπερφιλῶν IX. i. 2.

ὑπηκόους 1. xiii. 2.

ὑπηρεσίαι VIII. vi. 3.

ὑπηρετεῖν IV. iii. 26. ὑπηρετοῦσι VITI.
vili. 5. ὑπηρετητέον IX. ii. 1.
ὕπνος I. xiii. 13. ὕεκνον 1. xiii. 12.
ὕπροις ibid.

ὑπὸ 1. 1. 4.

ὑπόγυια IIT. vi. ro.

ὑπόδημα I. x. 13. V.v. 8. ὑποδήματα
V.v. 10. ὑποδημάτων ΙΧ. i. 1.
ὑποδοχὰς IV. ii. 15.

ὑποζνγιον X. ix. 10.

ὑποθέσεως IV. ix. 7. V. v.15. ὑποθέ
σεις VIL. viii. 4.

ὑπόκειται 11. iii. 6. ὑποκείσθω IT. ii. 2.
V.i.3 VILL §. ὑποκειμένην 1. iii.
I. vii. 18. ὑποκειμένων V. i. 5.

ὑποκρινομένους VIT. iii. 8.

ὑποκρίσει IIT. x. 4.

ὑποκριτὴν IIT. ii. 8. ὙΠ]. iv. 6.

ὑπολαμβάνειν VIL. ii.9. ὑπολαμβάνοντα
VIL. ii. 1. ὑπολαμβάνων VIT. ii. 1.
ὑπολαμβάνουσι 1. iv. 2. VIII. ii. 4.
IX. iv. 2, 7. ὑπολαμβάνει I. v. 1.
viii. 9. ὑπολάβοι]. ν.6, 8. ὑπολαμ-
βάνοντες I. vii. 5. ὑπέλαβε V. viii.
9. ὑπολάβῃ IX. iii. 2. ὑπολαβεῖν -
X. viii. 11. ὑπειληφέναι 1. Χ. 7. ὑπει-
λήφαμεν X. viii. 7. ὑπειλήφασιν ibid.
ὑπκοληπτέον VII. i. 4. iii. 8. iv. 6.
X. viii. 12.

ὑπόληψις VI. vi. 1. ix. 7. VII. ii. 4.
ὑπολήψει VL iii. 1. ὑπόληψιν VI. v.
6. VII. iii. 4, 11.

ὑπολοίπου VII. xii. 2.

ὑπομενετικώτερος IIT. vi. 6.

ὑπομένει IIT. vii. 6, 13. IV. viii. 8.
VIIL xiv. 3. IX. xi. 4. ὑπομένων
I. ii. 7. 1.1. ΠῚ. vii. 5. ὑπομέ-
νειν LI. ii, 8,9. ILL. viii. 1, 14. ix.
2. x1. 5. ὑπομένωσι 1Π]. i. 7. ὑπο-
petvacibid. ὑπομενεῖ 111. vii. 2. ὑπο-
μένουσι III. vii. 9. IV. i. 41, 43.
ὑπομείναι TIT.i.7. VIII. νἱ. 4. ὑπο.
μένοντος VII. xiv. 7. ὑπομένῃ VIII.
xiii. 9. ὑπομένοντας X. νἱϊΐ, 7. ὑπο-
μενετέον ITT. i. 9.

ὑπόνοια IV. viii. 6.

dworredover III. viii. 16.

ὑποσημαίνει lV. ii.1. ὑποσημαίνει» ITT.
ii. 17.

ὑποσχέσεις IX. i. 4.

ὑποθεμένου IT. iv. 2.
xii. 9.

ὑποτεθέντα VI.

ΙΧΧῚ]

ὑποτυπῶσαι 1. vii. 17.

ὑπκουργία IX. i. 7.

ὑποφαίνεται 1. vi. 8.

ὕστερον 1. vi. 2. vii. 17. IT. i 4. vii.
5,6. Π]. xi. 5. IV. ii. 4. ix. 8.
V. ii. rt. iv. 14. vii. 7. VIL. i. 4.
IX. vii. 2. X. iv. 1, 9.

ὑφάντης I. vi. 16. ὑφάντῃ ΙΧ. i. 1.

ὑφηγημένον IL. vii. 9.

Φ

φαγεῖν ΤΠ. νἱ. 7. VIL.v.7. gayov VIL.
v. 3. φαγόντι Χ. iii. 9.

φαίνεται I. i. 2. ii. 5, 8. iii. 4. v. 4,6,
8. vi. 16. vii. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12.
viii. 5, 15. ix. 3. xi. I, 2. xii. 2, 4,
17, 18. xiii. 12, 15. 11. iii. 7. viii.
2,5,8 IIL. i. 8. i. 2, 16. iii, 12.
iv. 3, 4, 5. v. 6, 17, 18, 19. ix. 3.
x. 1,7. IV. i. 41. iv. §. vi. 9. vii.
9, 10, 15, 17.ix.2.x.1. VI. vii. 4.
xii. το. VIL. xiv. 3. VII. v. 3. vii.
3. X. I, 4, 5, 6. xi. 1. xii. 8. xiv. 3.
IX. i. 8, 9. iv. 7, 10. v. 1. Vi. 2.
vii. 1. viii. 11. xi. 2. xii. 1. ΣΧ. iv.
II. Vv. 1, 7, 10. vi. 4, 6. vii. 8. viii.
3. ix. 18. φανεῖτα VI.v.6. φανείη
X.v. 2, 3, 8. vill. 7, 11. φανοῦνται
X. viii. 7. gdaivaroLiv. 7. IV. iii.
15. VIII. xii.3. X.viii.7. φαίνον-
ται ον. 3. xi. 6. xii. 3. IDI. viii. 6,
16. x. 8,9. IV. iv. 6. vii. 14, 16.
VI. xiii. 1. VIL. ix, §. xii. 1. xiv. 3.
VIII. ii. 4. v. 2. vi. 5, 7. viii. 6.
ix. δ, 6. χὶϊ, 1. IX.ii. 7. X. ii.s.
ix. 3, 18, 20, 21. φανῇ VIL. xiv. 3.
VIL, iii. 8. φαίνηται IIL. iii. 13.

Φαίνεσθαι 111. vii. 8. WII. xiv. 4.
φαινομένῃ V. viii. 10. φαινόμενον

ΠῚ. ii. 7. iv. 3,4. VII. ii. 2. III.
Vv. 10. φαινομένου ILI. iii. 11. iv. 3.
v.17. φαινόμενα 17]. viii. 14. VII.
1.5. [X.iv. 1,2. X. iti. 8. φαινό.
μεναι X. Vv. 10. φαινομένοις VIL,
ii. 2.

drapes VIT. v. 7.
Vv. 2.

φανερόμισον VI, iii. 28.

φανερὸν 11. iii. 7. V. ii. 6, 10. ix. ro.
x. 8. xi.1,7. VI. iii. 2. vii. 4. viii.
8.xil. 10, VIL. ii. 2. iv. 1. vi. 3. viii.
4. 5. ΧΙ. 7. ὙΨΙ1Π.1. 2. X. ii. 2.
φανερῶν I. iv. 3. φανεροῖς ΤΙ, ii. 6.
φανερὰ LV. iii. 36. vii. 15,16. Vii

Φάλαριν VII.

INDEX VERBORUM.

5. φανερώτερον IV. i 28. VIII. x.
2. IX.ix. 8. φανερωτέρων II. ii. 8.
φανερώτατα VI. vii. 4. φανεροὶ IV.
v. 8. φανερὰν VIL. ix. 5.

φανερόφιλον IV. iii. 28.

φανερῶς IV. iii. 28.

φαντασία VIL. vi. τ. φαντασίας ITI. v.
17. φαντασίαν VII. lik, 11. Gar
raolg VII. vii. 8.

φαντάσματα I. xiii. 13.

φαρμακεία V. ii. 13.

φαρμακεύειν V, ix. τό.

φάρνγγα 1Π. x. ro.

φάσις VI. ix. 3. φάσεσι VI. xi. 6.

φάσκων VITI.i.6. φάσκοντες VIL. xiii.
3. xiv. 5.

φαῦλος IV. i. 31. iii. 15. V.iv. 3. VI.
ix. 4. xii.9g. VII. viii. 5. ix. 4. xiv.
2. IX. iv. ro. viii. 1. φαύλη]. xiii.
13. VIL ii. 6, 7. viii. 5. φαῦλον IV.
ix. 7. V.iv. 3. xi.8. VII. xiv. 5. X.
i. 2,ix. 10. φαῦλου DI.i. 7. IV.
ix.6. IX. viii. 4. φαύλης I. i. 5.
VII. xiv. 4. φαύλφ III. iv. 4. IV.
vii. 10. IX. iil. 3. φαύλῃ X. v. 6.
φαῦλοι Π. ν. 3. VIL. xiv.6. VOL
iv.6. [X.iv. 10. X.v.4. φαῦλαι
II. iii. 5. VII. i. 6. ii. 6. iv. 5. xi. 3.
xii. I. xiii. 2. φαῦλαϊ. x. 13. IO.
iii, τ. vi. 18. IV. ix.6. V.xi7. VI.
viii. 7. VII. i, 6. xii. 4. Χ. ix. 11.
φαύλων VII. i. 6. xiii. 2. xiv. 4.
VIII. viii. 5. UX. iv. 7. xii.3. X.i.
2.ix.4. φαύλοις ΠΠ1.ν.3. IV. ix. 4.
VIL iv. 2. IX. iv. 7, 8. viii. 7. ix.
6. X. ii. 4. vi. 4. φαύλους VIIL. iv.
2 ΙΧ. νἱ. 4. φαύλας VIL. ii. 6. ix.
5,6. xii. 4. X. viii. 7. φαυλότατοι
IV.i. 4. φαυλότατα VIL. ii. 5.

gavrérnsVIT.vi.7, VIII.x.3. φαυλό-
tyre X. v. 6.

Φειδίαν VI. vii. 1.

φειδωλοὶ IV. i. 39.

dépewI. x. 13. IV. iii. 21. φέρῃ 1. x.
12. IV.vi.7. οἵσει Ix. 11. ἐνεγ-
κεῖν IT, vi. 2. φέρουσι VIII. vi. 4.
ἔφερον X. ix. 3. φέρομεν III. xii. 5.
IV. iv. 4. v. 1. φέροντι Υ. τ. 14.
φέροντας Χ. vill. 12. φέρεσθαι IT. 1,
2. Χ. 11. 1. φερόμενος 1.1, 2. φερό.
μενα IIT. viii. ro.

φεύγει Π. vi. 8. VIL iv. 4. xi. 4. xii. 7.
xiv. 2. IX. xi.4. φεύγοι VIL xiii
7. φεύγων II. ii. 7. 1Π. vii. 13.
VIL. iv. 3. φεύγειν II. iii. 5. LIT. vii.

INDEX VERBORUM. ~ Lexi

13.vili.g. IV. 11. 15. V.i.15. VIL.
lii 10, yil. 3. xii. 7. VIII. v. 2.
φεύγουσι ITT. iv. 6. viii. 9, 14, 16.
VITI. xiv. 4. IX. iv.8,9. X.i. 1. ix.
4. φεύγοντα IIT. yii. 13. φεύγοντες
IIL. viii. 4. IV. vii. 14. X. ii. 5.
φυγεῖν IIT. ii. 12. φνγέεν 1Π. viii.
4. φευκτέον IX. iv. 10.
φευκτὸν IIT. xii. τ, WII. iv. 6. xiii. 1.
ΣΧ. 1, 2. gevary VII. xiii. 1. gev-
xrat VII. vi. 5. φευκτὰ 111. i. 26.
X. ii, 5. φευκτῶν VIL i. τ. X.
Υ. 6.
φήμη VII. xiii. 5.
φημὶ VII. x.4. φησὶ I. iii. 2,10, TTI.
ΧΙ 1. Vix 7. VI. iv. 5.vii.2. IX.
ix. 7. φαμὲν I, vii. 14. viii. 14. xiii.
18. ILix7. OULii.g. IV.v. 13.
V.ir2iir. VILi 1. vii. 6. xi. 1.
xii.g. VII. ii. το, 11. ἦν. 6. X. ii. 4.
iv. 7. φασὶ 1. xiiti.12, Il. ix.4. ΠΙ.
i. 17. vil. 7. IV. i. 39. V. iv. 8, 14.
vi.6. VI. vii. 4, 5. ix. 2. xiii. 3.
VIL. i. 2, 6, 7. ii. 1, 3. V. 2. Vi. 3. Xi.
I, xii. 3. xiv.5. WII. i. 6. ii. 3. ix.
4. Xil. 3, 5. Xili. 10. xiv. 1. IX.i. 5.
vi. 1. Vill. 2,ix. 1, ΣΧ, ii, δ. iii. 2. ix.
10. φαῖεν ITI. vii. 4. VII. xiii. 6.
φάναι 1. xiii. 19. TTT. i. 24. VI. ii. 2.
VII. ii. 9. xii. 32. ἔφη IX. i. 4.
φήσειε VII. ii. 5. φαίη ILM. i. 11. ii.
7. VI. xiii.8. VIL. xiii.r. EX.v.3.
vil. 2. φήσει IIL.viii. 2. pacay V.
v. 1. ΙΧ. i. 6. ἔφαμεν VI. i. 4.
φατέον IIT, i. το. ἐν. 4.ν. 5. V. viii.
4. Χ.ν.ΙΙ.
φθαρτικὴ VI. ν. 6.
φθαρτὰ VIL. xiv. 8.
φθείρει IT. 11.6, ΠΤ, xii.2, VIL.viii. 4.
X. v. 3. ix. 23. φθείρεται IT. i. 6.
il. 7. ili, 1. φθείρεσθαι 1]. ii. 6.
φθειρούσης 11. vi. 9. φθείρειν IV. i.
5. φθείρουσι X. v. 5
φθίσει VII. viii. 1.
φθονερὸς 11. vii. 15.
φθόνος II. vi. 18. φθόνον II. vii. 15.
φθόνον Il. vii. 2. X. vi. 5.
φθορὰ IV. i. §. Σ. 111. §. φθοραὶ IT. ii.
8. VIII. x.1. X.v.10. φθοραῖς ITT.
vi. 12.
φιλαλήθης IV. vii. 8.
φιλανθρώπους VIII. i. 3.
φιλαρέτῳ L viii. το.
«ίλαυλοι X. ν. 3.
piravros IX. viii.6. φίλαυτον 1X. viii.
VOL, I.

3, 5, 7, 11. φιλαύτοις IX. viii. 4.
φιλαύτους IX, viii. 1, 4, 5-

φιλεῖντν. νἱ. 5. VIL ἱν. 5. VIILii.2.
iii. 7. vii. 2. viil. 1, 5.4. xiii. 1. IX.
ili, I. vii. 1, 6. viii. 1, 2. φιλοῦνται
IV. i. rx. φιλεῖ VIII. ii. 2. v. 5.
φιλῇ IX. i. 3. ἐφίλουν EX. i. 3.
φιλοῦσι VIII. ii. 2, 3. iii. 1, 5. ν. 5.
Vii. 1. viii. 3, 6. xii. 2,3. ΙΧ. v. 3.
vii. 2. xi. 4. φιλεῖται VILLI. iii. 2.
φιλεῖσθαι VIII. 1. 2. vii. 2. viii. 1, 2,
3, 6. IX. iii. 2. vil. 6. φιλοῦντες
VILLI. iii. 1, 2, 3. v. δ. vii. 1. φι-
λοῦντι VIII. iii. 7. φιλοῦντα VIII.
xiii. 2. φιλούμενος VIIL. iii. 2. φι-
λουμένοιΞς VIII. v. 5, φιλητέον IX.
iii. 3. viii. 2.

φιληδέσιν VIII. iv. 4. x. 6. xi. 1.

φίλησις VIII. v. §. vii. 2. ΙΧ. v.14.
Vil. 2,6. φιλήσει VIIL ii. 3. Xv. 1.
φίλησιν VIII. vii. 2. φιλήσεις VIII.
lil. I. Vii. 1.

φιλητικὸς IIT. x. 2.

φιλητὸς VILL. iii. 8. Φιλητοῦ VITT.i.2.
φιλητὸν VILL. ii. 1, 2. ν. 4. DXi. 2.
ili, 3. iv. 9, 10. vii. 5,6. φιλητοὶ
VIIL iii. 9. φιλητοῖς VIII. iii. 1.
gtAyrovs VILL. viii. 6. φιλητὰ VOL.
i. 2. iii. 7. XK. v. 9.

φιλία IL vii. 13. ΤΠ]... 4, 7. ii. 3: iii.
3) 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 iv. 3+ Vs 4) 5: vi. I.
vii. 2. Vili. 2, 4, 6. ix. 1. ΧΙ. 3, 4, 8»
6, 7. xii. 1,6, 7. xiv. 1,3. ΙΧ. i 7.
iv. 5, 6. V. I. Vi. 2. xii, 1,3. φιλίας
IV. vi. 5. VI. xiv.9. ΥΙΠ. i. 1, 4,
7. lil, 1, 3, 9. iv. 4, 6. v. 1. vie I.
vii. I, 2. viii, 4. xi. 6, 7. xiii. 2, 5,
11. xiv. 2,4. IDX.i. 3. ill. 1, 3. iv.
6. v. 3. X. I, 5. xii. 4. X. Vi 1. ix.
1. φιλίᾳ IV. vi. 4. VIIL. i. 4. iv. 3.
vi. 4. Vii. 3. ix. 3. xii. 7. xili. 2. xiv.
1. ΙΧ. v.31. φιλίαν 11. ν. 2. VIII.
ii. 3, §. V. I. vi. 2. xiv. 1, 3. ΙΧ. ].
I. iii. 5. iv. 1. v. 3. χ. 6. φιλίαι
VIII. iii. 1, 2. iv. 1. vi. 4, 7. Vil. I.
ix. 6. xi.8 IOX.i3.iv. 3. φιλιῶν
VILL. ix. 2. xiii. 1. φιμίαις VILLI. vii.
2. xiv. τ. IX. i. τ. iii. 4.

φιλικὸν VIII. i. 4. ΙΧ. iv. 9. φιλικοῦ
ΙΧ. x. 32. φιλικὴν VIL. xiii. 6. φι-
λικοὶ ΠῚ. v. 2. φιλικὰ VILL. iii. 9.
vi. 1. xii. γ. ΓΣ. ἐν. 1. vii. 6. viii. 2.
φιλικώτατον IX, x. 3.

φιλικῶς Υ1Π. v.1. IX. iv. 10, vi. 1.

φιλίππῳ I. viil. 10,

lxxiv INDEX VERBORUM.

φιλοδικαίῳ 1. viii. 10. φιλοτοιοῦτος 1. viii. 10. grAoracobrou
φιλοθεώρῳ I. viii. 10. IV. iv. 4 φιλοτοιούτων 111. xi. 4.
φιλοικοδόμοι K. V. 2. φιλοφίλων VITL. viii. 4.

φιλοκάλοις 1. viii. 11. φιλόκαλον IV. | φιλοχρήματοι LV. i. 37.

iv. 4.

φιλοκίνδυνος IV. iii. 23.

φιλοκόλακες VIII. viii. 1.

Φιλοκτήτης VIL. vii. 6. φιλοκτήτῃν Π.
ii. 7. ix. 4.

φιλομαθὴς X. iv. 10.

φιλομαθία IIT. x. 2.

φιλόμουσοι X. Vv. 2.

φιλομύθους IIL. x. 2.

Φιλόξενος III. x. ro.

Φιλοπάτωρ VII. iv. 5.

φίλος Π. vii. 13. VII. vi. 1. WII. v.
5. vii. 6. viii. 1. IX. iii. 3, 5. iv. 5,
10. V. 3. Vill. 2. ix. 7, 10. xi. 2. X.
ii. τ. iii, 11. φίλου VIII. xiii. 9.
xiv. 1. IX.1. 7. viii. 1. ix. 2, §, ro.
xi.6. φίλῳ VIIL. ii. 3, 6. vii.6. xii.
8. xiii. 2,7. IX. ii τ. iti. 4. φίλον
IV. iii. 29. vi. 4. WII. i. 3. v. 5. vi.
2. xii. 8. xiii. 9. xiv. 1. DX. iii. 3.
iv. I, §. xX. 5. Viii. 2. ix. I, 10. x. 6.
xi. 1,2, 5,6. xii2. K.ix. 18. φίλε
VII.x.4. φίλοι]. viii. 16. VIII.
iii. 3, 5, 6, 9. iv. 2, 4, 5, 6. Vi. I. Vii.
4, 5, 6. viii. 4, 5. xiii. x, 2. IX. iii.
I, 4. ἵν. δ. vill. 9. x. 6. φίλων 1.
vii. 7. vill, 15. xi. 1, 6. xiii. 18.
ITI. iii. 13. IV.1.43. WILT. i. 1, 4.
iv. 3. Vili. 4. ix. 1. xiii. 1. IX. iv. 1.
Vill. 2, 9. ix. I, 3, 4, 5, 10. X. 3. Xi.
I. 2,5,6.xii.2. XK.ix. 18. φίλοιν
I.vi.r. φίλοις]. vii. 6. ITI. x. 2.
IV.v.10. ὙΠ]. iii.6, 7, 9. v. 3. vi.
4,5. vill. §. IX. iii. 5. xi. 4. xii. 1.
X.ix.14. φίλους I. vi. 1. vii. 7. xi.
3. VIILi.1, 2, 5,6, 7. ii. 4. iii. 8.
iv. 2, 4. Vi. 4. ix. 1,3. LX. iii. 1, 4.
iv. I. V. 3. Vi. 4. ix. 2, 4.x. 1, 4. xi
3.4, 5. Χ. vii. 6. φίλφ IX. iv. 1.
vill. 9, 10. φιλτάτοις X. ix. 10.

φιλοσοφεῖν II, iv. 6. φιλοσοφοῦντες
ibid. φιλοσοφοῦντος VII. xi. 1.

φιλοσοφία X.ix. 29. φιλοσοφίας. vi.
13. IX.i. 7.

φιλοσόφους I. vi. 1.

gudorexvérepat IX. viii. 7.

φιλοτιμία IL, vii. & Π.χ.2. IV.
iv. 5. φιλοτιμίαν IV. iv. 5. VIIL
viii. 1.

Φιλτόιμος, φιλοτίμου II. vii. 8, φιλό-
τιμον ΤΙ, vii. 8. IV. iv. 3, 4.

φοβερὸν ITI. vii. 1. φοβερὰ ΤΙ. ii. 9.
ΠῚ. vi. 2. vii. 3, 7, 8, 9, 13. Vili. 14.
ix. 1. X. viii. 7. φοβερῶν IL. ii. 9.
ITI. vi. 6. xii. 2. φοβερώτερον VII.
vi. 7. φοβερώτατον ITT. vi. 6.

φοβεῖται IIT. vi. §. vii. 11. φοβεῖσθαι
IL. i. 7. vii. 2. IL. vi. 3, 4. vii. 3,
10. Vili. 11. φοβούμενος ΤΊ. ii. 8. v.
3. III. vi. 3. vii. 5. φοβούμεθα ΤΙ.
v.4. ILI. vi. 2,3. φοβηθῆναι IT. vi.
10. φοβήσεται ILL. vii. 2. φοβοῖτο
1Π. vii. 1. φοβούμενοι III. viii. 9.
IV, ix. 2. φοβουμώνο IV. iii. 28.

PoBos lV. ix. 1. PbSpIV.ix.2. K.ix.
4. φόβον Il. v. 2. 1Π1.2. 4. vi. 2.
vii. 4. IV.i 39. V.viil. 4. φόβοις
IIL, viii.15. φόβους I.vii. 2. II.
vi. I. ix. 1.

Φοινίσσαις LX, vi. 2.

φόνοι X. vii. 6.

φορὰ X. iv. 3.

φορτικὸς X.vili. 7. φορτικὸν LV. iii. 27.
φορτικοὶ IV. viii. 3. φορτικώτατοι I.
Vv. 2.

φρονεῖ IX.iv.3. φρονεῖν 1.νἱ. το, VII.
χὶ. 4. X.vii. 8. φρονέοντος VIL. vi.
9. φρονοίην VI. viii. 4.

φρόνησις I. viii.6. VI. iii. τον. 3, 8
vi. I, 2. Vii. 6, 7. Vili. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9.
ix. 7. X. 2, 3. xi. 7. xii. 3, 6, 10.
xiii. 1,2, 5. X.vili.3.1x. 17. φρο-
vhoews 1. vi. 11. VI.v. 1, 7, 8. xiii.
2,3,6,7. VILii.5.x.2. ΣΧ. ii. 3.
viii. 3. ix. 12. φρονήσει VL x. 1.
xiii.6. WIL. xii. 5. X.vili.3. φρό-
ynow I. xiii. 20. VI. v. 6, 7. vi. 2.
Vil. 3. X. 3. Xi. 3. xii. 6, 7. xiii. 4.
X. viii. 3. φρονήσεις VI. xiii. 3.

φρόνιμος IL.vi.15. VI.v. 2. vili. 4, 5.
xi. 2. WII. ii. 5. x. 3, 2. Xi. 4. Kil.
7. φρόνιμον VI. vii. 4. xi. 3. Xi. 2,
10. xiii. 6. VIL. i 7. x. 1. mi. 7.
φρόνιμοι VII. x. 2. φρονίμου VLv.1.
vii.6. VILii.5. φρονίμων I. v. 5.
VI. ix. 7. xi.6. φρόνιμα VI. vii. 4.
X.ii. 4. φρονίμους VLV. I, 2, §. Vii.
§. xi. 2. xii. 9. ὙΠ. :. 7.

φροντίζειν LV. i. 34. vi. 5. φροντίζοντες
IV. vi. 2.

φνγὴ VI. ii. 2. φνγὴν IIL. viii. 3.
φνγὰς IL iii. 7. VI. vii. 1.

INDEX VERBORUM., lxxv

φυλακὴ IV. i. 7. xX
φυλακτικὸν LV. i, 20. φυλακτικὰ I. vi.
8. V. i. 13. χαίρει TIT. x. 2. xi. 7. VIL. xi. 4. xiv.

φύλαξ V. vi. 5.

φυλάττειν IV.i. 39. φυλάξασθαι ITI.
Vili. 7. φυλακτέον IT. ix. 6.

φυλέται VIII. ix. 5. φυλέταις IX. ii. 9.

φυλετικαὶ VIII. xii. 1.

φῦναι IIT. v.17. ἔφυ 111. v.17. πέφυκεν

8. [X.ix.6. X.v.10. χαίρει I.
ili. 2, 9. vii. 15. ITD. x. 3, 6,7, 11.
xi. 4. VII. v. 2. ix 5. xi. 2. xiv. 5.
VIL vir. ΙΧ. vii. 6. X. i. 1. iii.
12. Vili, 13. ix. 6. xalpwor VIII. vi.
1,4. χαίρουσι III. x. 5, 7, 9. xi. 4.

I. vii. 11. viii. 14. ix. 5, 7. x. 12.
ΧΙ, 14. IL. ii. 6. iii. 5. 111. v. 17.
VI. xii. 8. VIII. vi. 2. ix. 3. X. iv.
8. πεφύκασι]. vii. 22, I. iii. 4.
X. ix. 4. πεφυκέναι. xii. 2, II. v.
17. VILL xii. 3. πεφυκότα I. xiii.
10. VIII. xii. 3. πεφυκὸς 1. xiii. 15.
VL i. 5. 1X. ix. 3. πεφυκότων IT. i.
2. wepuxdocIl.i. 3. πεφύκαμεν IT.
viii. 8. ix. 4. ἐπεφύκει V. vi. 9.

φυσικὸς VI. viii. 6. φυσικὴ IT. xi. 1,
14. VL xiii. 1,2. VII. viii.g. φυσικὸν
IL. v. 19. xi. 2. V. vii. 1. ix. 12.
IX, vii.4. Χ. ii. 4. φυσικὴν VIL.
Xil. 2. φυσικῆς VILL. xiv. 4. φυσικοὶ
VIL. xiv.5. φυσικῶν VII. x. 4. φυ-
owas VI. xiiil.6. φυσικαῖς 11]. xi. 3.
VIL νἱ. 2. φυσικὰ V. vii. §. viii. 7.
VI.xi. 5. ἼΠ.:.γ. X.v.2. φυ-
σικαὶ VI. xiii.r. VII. vi.6. φυ-

VIL. ix. 3. xii. 2. xiv. 2, 5. WIII.
iv. 2. Vi. I. Vili. 2. xiii. 3. IX. xi. 4.
χαίροιεν VIII. xii. 7. Exape IV. vii.
10. χαίρων 1. viii. 12. IL iii. Σ΄
IV. vii. 12. IX.v. 3. χαίροντα 1.
viii. 12. χαίροντες III. x. 3. xi. 7.
VIL xi. 4. xiv.8. [X.ix.6. X.v
10. xalpovras ITT. x. 4,5,6. VIII
Vv. 3. χαιρόντων IV, viii. 4. yai-
ρονσαι VITTI. viii. 3.

χαλεπαίνει VIL. vi. 1. χαλεπαίνειν IV

v. 1. xaderalvovras II. ix. 7. IV. v.
II, 13.

χαλεπὸς IX. ix. 5. χαλεπὸν IL, iii. 8.

vi. 14.1%. 4,7. ΠΙ.]. 9. ἰχ. γ. IV.
iii. 16, 26. V.i. 18. ix. 15. IX. x. 5.
X. ix.8. yarterolIV. v.12. χαλε-
ποῦς ῦ.ν.11. χαλεπὰ Π]|. v.8. VI.
vii. 5. χαλεπώτερον IL. iii. το. IIL

i. 9. ix, 2.
χαλεπότης 11. v.5.vi.2. χαλεπότητα
V. ii. 2.
χαλινοποιητικὴ Li. 4. v. 8. vii. 1, 5.
xii. 8. xiii, 8. D1. i. 11.
χαλκείων V. ix. 7,
χαμαιλέοντα 1. x. 8.
χαρὰν IT, v. 2.
6. | χαρίεις IV. viii.g, 10. VIII. xiii. 2.
Χ. 4. xii. 2, 3. xiv. 4, 7. IX.ix.7. | χαρίεντες I. iv. 2. v. 4. xiii. 7. IV.
X. ix. 6. φύσει I. iii. 2. vi. 2. vii. 6. vil. 16. Viii. 4. : χαριέστεροι IV. Vii.
viii. 11. ΠῚ, 2, 3, 4. v. 5. ILL. iii. 14.
4. ἵν. 3. Υ. 15, 18,19. V. v.11. vil. | χαρίζεται IX. viii. 6. χαρίζονται IX.
2, 3» 4, 7. Vill. 3. x. 4. VI. vii. 5. Vili. 4. χαρίζεσθαι IX. iii.5. χαριζό-
xi. 5. xiii. τ. VIL. iv. 5.v. 1, 3, 6. μενον, χαρισαμένῳ . γ.7. χαριστέον
x. 4. Xli. 2. ΧΙ. 6. xiv. 7,8. VIII. IX. ii. 3. χαριζόμενος IX. viii. 6.
xi. 2. xii, 7. ΙΧ ix. 3, 5, 7, 9, 10. | xdpsIV.i8. χάριτος V. v. 7. ix. 12.
X. v. 6. vii. 9. ix. 6,14. φύσιν]. | ydow Lig. IV. vii. 13. VI. xii. 2,

σικωτάτη IIT. viii. 12. φυσικώτερον
VIL. vi.2. VIII. i. 6. EX. vii. 2. ix. 7.

φυσικῶς ΝΠ. iii. 9.

φυσιολόγων VII. iii. 12.

φύσις 1. iii. 4. xiii. 15. I. vi. 4, 9.
ΠῚ. iii.7. V.v.19. x. 6. VII.v.4.
xiii, 6. xiv. 8. VIII.v. 2. X. viii. 9.
φύσεως VI. xi.6. ὙΠ. v. 6. vi. 1, 6.

ix. 5. I1.i. 3. iii. 5. IML. i. 7. v. 15.
xi. 3. xii. 2. ViI.vii.5. ΥἹ. ἵν. 4.
vii.4. VIL. vii. 6. x. 4. xi. 4. xii. 3.
xiv. 5,6,8. VIII. xii. 7. [X.xi.4. X.

ro. VIII. ix.4. xii.7. ΙΧ. i. 4. 1, 1.
iv. I. vii 1. ΧΙ. 2. ΣΧ, i. 2. vi. 6.
ix. 10. χάριτας LX. vii. 1. χαρίτων
Υ. ν. 7.

iii. 6. vii. 1. φύσεις VIL. ν. 1. ΧΙ, 1. | χαῦνος IV. iii. 6, 13, 35. χαῦνοι IV
φυτικὸν [. xiii, 18, gurexg@ I. xiii. 11. iii. 26. -
φυτοῦ X. vi. 2. φυτοῖς I. vii. 12. χαυνότης IL, vii. 7. χαυνότητος IV.
φωνὴ IV. iii. 34. φωνῆς ΠῚ. x. 7. iii. 37.

φωνῇ ibid. φωνὴν ix. 6, χειμῶσι IIT. i. 5.

Ixxvi

xelp V. ix. 11. χειρὸς. vii.rr. VIII. | χρήσιμος VI. xii. 2. VII. iii. 3. vi.

xiii. 6. χεῖρα V. viii. 3. WILL. xiii. 6.
χειρὶ V. ix. 14.

χειροτέχναι VI. viii. Δ.

χειροτονητέον 1X. 11. 1.

χείρων IT. ni. 4. IV. vii.17. VL xii. 3.
VIL. vii. 3. VIL. xiv.1. χείρονι VITI.
xiii. 1. χεῖρον IIT.i.6. IV. iii. 37.
vii. r. V.i14. x. 8. xi 7. χείρους
III. viii. 4,16. IV. iii. 35. v.12. VIL.
vii. 1. χείριστῃ VIII. x. 2. xi. 6.

χελίδων 1. vii. 16.

χιόνι 1. Vi. 11.

χορηγῶν IV. ii. 20. κεχορηγημένον
I, x. 15. κεχορηγημένων Χ. vii. 4.
κεχορηγημένους Χ. vill. 11. χορηγεῖν
IV. ii. 11.

χορηγίας X. viii. 4.

χρεία LIL. 111. 14. 1.1.6. V.v. 11, 13.
IX. xi. 6. X. viii. 4, 6. χρείας: V. v.
11. VIL.vi.1. xpela V.v. 13. VIII.
1.1. IV. xi. 6. χρεῖαν V.v.15. VIL.
iv. 2. χρείαις VILL. xiii. 10. X. viii.

χρεὼν I, ii, 6. iii. 4.x. 1. IX. viii. 2.
X. vill. 7.

χρὴ 1. vii. 18. xiii. το. VI. xii. 7. IX.
iii. 3. viii. 11. X. vii. 8. viii. 12.
xphoas VIII. xiii. 7.

χρήματα ll. vii.6. IV. i. 2,5, 6,7, 14,
20, 21, 26. ii. 1.01.9. V.ii-6. VII.
iv.5. WILL. ix. 3. xiv. 3. IXi.7.
vii. 7. viii. 9. χρημάτων IT. vii. 4.
IM. iii. 13. vi.g. IV.i. 1,7, 24. iv.
2.vi.9. V.ii.12,iv.2. VIL. iv. 2.
VIII. ix. 5. xiv. 1. X. viii. 4. χρή-
μασι 111. x. 2. IV.ii. τ. V. ii. 2.
IX, viii. 4.

χρηματίζεσθαι VILI. xiv. 3.
χρηματισμὸν VII. xii. 4.

᾿ χρηματιστὴς 1. v. 8. -

χρηματιστικὴν 111. iii. 8.

χρῆσθαι]. x. 13, II. ii.6. ILI. v. 22.
viii.7.x.9. IV.i.6. V.i.rg. VWI.
x.3. VULiti7. VII. νἱ. 5. X. ix.
2. χρῶνται VIII. x. 4. χρησάμενον
Ι, ΙΧ. 11. ἐχρησάμεθα 11. i. 4. χρη-
σάμενοι IL. i. 4. xpfraclV.i.6. .
iii.g.iv.3. ΥἹ. Χ. 3. xiii.8. VII.x.
3 χρήσεται ΙΝ .ΐ.6. χρώμενοι lV.
vii. 16. VIII. xiii. 4. χρωμένης I.

ii. 7. χρώμενος IT. iii.to. Vi 18.
VIL. iii. 5. χρωμένων VII. xii. 3.

VII. xi. 6. χρώμενον VIL. iii. 6.
χρωμένη X. ix. 23. χρωμένῃ VII. x.
4- xenoréow I. xiii.9, IX. iii. 4.

INDEX VERBORUM.

3. Vi. 6.

χρησίμη 1. vii. 19. χρήσιμον I. ν. 8.
vi. 3. ΠΙῚ.1. 2. ὙΠ|.]. 2. iti. 1, 3.
iv. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. Vi. 3, 4, 7. Vill. 6.
xii. 6, 7. xiii. 1, 4, 5.11. IX. i. 3.
lit, X. V. 3. Vil. 6. χρήσιμοι VI. xii.
1. VIII. vi. 5. viii. 6. IX. vii. 2.
χρήσιμα 1. 1χ. 7. xpyoluwvIV.i. 6.
VIII. vi. 4. IX. vii. 6. xi. 2. χρησί-
μους VITL. ii. 4. vi. §. ΙΧ. ix. 4.

᾿ χρησιμώτατοι X. i. 4.

χρῆσις 1. χ. 12. IV. 7. Vii 15. ii.
10, 13. χρήσει 1. Υἱϊ. 9. χρῆσιν
IX. ii. 9. v. 3. x. 2.

χρησταὶ VIL. ii. 6.

χρονιζομένην IX. v. 3.

χρόνιος VIII. iv. 1.

χρονιωτέρας X. v. 5.

χρόνος I. vii. 16,17. χρόνου II. i. 1.
IV.v.10. VIL viii. 5. VIL iii. 8.
xii 2. X.iv. 2. χρόνῳ. vi. 3. x.
14. VILL. iv. 3. vi. 3. X. iv. 2, 3,4.
χρόνον I. iii. 17. x. §,15. Π. ix. 7.
ILI. viii.16. IV. v. 3, 7, 10,11, 13.
VI. ix. 2, 6. xii.1. VIII iii. 9. vi.
4. Vill. §. xii. 8. xiii. 6. ΙΧ. viii. 9.
X.iv. 1. χρόνοις X.v. 6.

χρύσεα V. ix. 7.

χρυσὸς IV. ii. t0. χρυσοῦ, χρυσὸν Χ.
v. 8.

χρώμασι IIT, x. 3.

χυλῶν ITT. x. 9.

χώρας IT. vii. 8.

χωρίζεται IV, i. 38. χωρίσαντες I. vi.
9. “χωρισθῇ V. vi. 8. χωρίζονται VI.
xiii. 6. χωρίζεσθαι X.v.7. χωρι-
σθέντες VIII. vii. 5. κεχωρίσθαι Χ.
Vv. 7. κεχωρισμένοι VILL. τ. 1. κε-
χωρισμένη X. viii. 3.

χωριστὸν 1. vi. 13.

χωρὶς ὙΠ]. xiv. 4. X. ii. 3.

χωρισμὸν X. iv. 11.

Vv.
I

Ψ

ψέγομεν ΤΡ iv. 3. Ὗ'΄. 11. 2. ψέξει TX.
vili.§. ψέγειν Χ. 1. 3. γέγοντε IV.
iv. 4. ψεγόμεθα ΤΙ. v. 3,5. ψέγεται
II, v. 3. vi. 12. ix. 8. IV. v. 5, 13.
V. viii. 2. VILiv.2. γέγονται OL
ἱ. γ. VIiLiv. 5. ψέγωνται IV. iii.
41. ψέγοντες IV. iv. 4. ψέγων Χ.

is:
ψεκτὸς 11. ix. 8. IV. v. 13. vii. 11.

INDEX VERBORUM. )xxvil

ψεκτὸν III. xi. 5. IV. vii. 6. V. xi.
7. ψεκτοὶ IV, vii. 6. yexrai IV. v.
4. vi. 3. Χ, ν. 6. ψεκτὰ I. vii. 11.
ψεκτῶν VIL. i. 6. ii. 4. iv. 6.

ψεύδεσθαι VIL. ix. 4. ψευδόμενος VIT.
ii. 7, 8. ψευδομένοι LV. vii. 6. ψευ-
δομένων IV. vii. 1.

ψευδής. ψευδεῖ VI.ix.5. VII. ii 7. ix.
1. ψευδοῦς VI. iv. 6. ypevdH VI.
ix. 5.

ψευδομαρτυρία V, ii. 13.

ψεῦδος IV. vii. 6,8. VL ii. 3. ψεύδει
I. viii. 1. ΠῚ. iiro.v.4. IV. vii.
10, 12. ψευδοῦς VII. xiv. 3.

Yetorns IV. vii. 12.

ψηφίζεται VIL. x. 3.

yiguopaV.x.7. VI. vili.2. ψηφίσμα-
ros V. x. 6. ψηφίσματα VIL. ix. 3.

ψηφισματώδη V. vii. I.

γψιμμυθίῳ 1. vi. 11.

Yoyoul.x. 11. ψόγοι TID i. 9. ψόγων
IM. i. 1.

ψοφήσῃ VIL. v. 6. vi. 1.

ψυχὴ VI. iii. τ. IX. iv.g. viii. 2. ψυ-
xfs I. vii. 14, 15. ix.7. xiii. 1, 6, 7,
8, 11, 13, 15, 16. II. iii. 5. ΠῚ. v.
15. V.xi.g. VI.i. 3, 4, 5, 8. xi. 7.
xii.6,10. IX. viii.g. yuyy 1. vi.
12, xiii. 16. I.v.1. VIL ii.r. VII.
xi. 6. ψυχὴν I. viii. 2, 3. I. iv. 6.
VI. iii. 9. IX. iv. 3. X. ix. 6.

ψνχικαὶ TT. x. 2. ψυχικῶν 1. viii. 10.
xii. 6. ψυχικὰς 1. viii. 2.

ψύχους VIL. iv. 3.

QO

ὧδε 11. vi. 4. VII. iii. 9.

wot V. ix. 14, 16. VIL. fii. 2.

ὠμοῖς VII. v. 2.

ὠνεῖσθαι V. iv. 13. ὠνοῦνται V. vii. 5.

ὡὠνὴ V. ii, 13.

ὠνίοις IX. i. 8.

ὥρα X.iv. 8. ὥρας VII. iv. 1.

ὡς IV. vii. 13. viii. 2. V. ii. το. iii. 6.
vii. 3.ix.12, Ὑ]Ι. 1.1. ὙΠ. ἱ. 4. vi.
5 7- Vili. 2. xX. 3. xii. 2.

és IV. viii. 1. V. viii. 3. ix. 4. xi. 2.
VI. ix. 6. VII. iii. 2.

ws ἂν IT. vi. 20.

ὡσαύτως 11. iii. 11, V.ii.g. VIL. iv. 4.

Vv. 4.
ws ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ 1. 111. 4. DT. i. 9

ὥσπερ I, iii. 1. iv. §. vii. 10, 14. viil.
9, 12. ix. 1Ο. xii. 3. xiii. 7, 17, 18,
19. IL. i. 4. ii. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7. iv. 1, 6.
Vi. 9, 20. vil. 11. vill. 2,4. Π1.1. 17.
lll, II. iv. 4, 5. V. 5, 14,17, 20, 22.
viii. 4,8, 10, xi. §. xii. 8. IV. i. 20,
23. ii. 1,6, 12, 15, 20. iii. 27, 37. iv.
1,2, 4. ViL 12. viii. 3. V.1i.7. iv. 8,
9. V. 1, 11, 13. vi. 8. vil. 2. viii. 35
10. ix. I, 3, 13, 16. x. 7: xi. 4, 7» 9.
VI. iii. 3. iv.6. v. 7. vii. 2, 3. viii. 2,
8. x. 3. xii. 1,2, 7. xiii. 1,8. VII.
1. 2, 5. 11. 1. iil. 13. iv. 2, 6. Vv. 3, 4,
&. vi. 1, 2, 6,7. vii. 6, 8. viii. 1, 2,
3. 1x. 3, 5. X. 3,4. ΧΙΪ, 3. xiii. 1, 2.
xiv. 4, 5, 6,8. VIII. iv. 4. v. 1. vi.
2.xL1,6. IX. ii. 3. iv. 5, 9. v. 3.
Vi. 2, 3. Vil. 3. Vili. 6. ix. 5, 10. X. 3.
xi. 2. xii. 1. X.ii. 1. iii. 4, 9. iv. 7,
9. V. 7, 8, 11. Vi. 4. Vili. 7, 13. ix. 4,
10, 14, 17, 20

ὥστε 1. ii, 1,7. Vi. 2,10. vii. 1, 3. viii.
2, 11. xi. 5,6. IL iii. 2, 10. vii. 15.
vil. 5. DI. v. 2, 10. xi. 6. xii. 3.
IV. ii. 6. ix. 5,6. V. 1. 8, 13. ii. 5,
9. iii. 9. iv. 4, 6, 12, 14. V. 10, 12,
17. vi. 4. viii. 2, 10. ix. 2,9. x. I, 7.
xi. 4. VI. i. 6. ii 2. iv. 2. v. 2, 6.
Vii. 2, 3, 7- 1X. 4, 5. xi. 6, xil. 7» 10.
xiii. 2. VIL. 1, 2. ii. 6, 9. lii. 6, 7,8,
11. vi. 1, 3. Vii. 3. viii. 5. ix. 1, 3.
X. 3. Xi. 2. ΧΙ. 2, 7. xiv. 3, 8.
ὙΠ1. i. 2. iv. 1. viii. 4. xiii. 9. xiv.
4. EX. vii. §. viii. 7. ix. 9. xii. 1.
X. v. 4, 6. viii, 7, 8, 13.

ὠφέλεια ΤΥ͂. νἱ. 9. VIII. iv. 2. xiii. 11.
ὠφελείας IT. vii. 13. VIIL v. 3. vi.
7. viii. 6. ὠφελείᾳ VUL xiii. 4, το.
ὠφελείαις VIII. xiii. 1.

ὠφελεῖ IV. i. 32. ὠφελεῖται VIIL. xi.
6. xili. 11. ὠφεληθῇ 1Χ. 1. 8. ὠφε-
λήσει IX, viii. 7, ὠφελήσειν IX. xi.
5. ὠφελεῖσθαι IX. xi. 6. ὠφελοῦν-
ται X. vi. 3. ὠφελουμένῳ VIII. xiv.
3. ὠφεληθήσεται I. vi. 16.

ὠφέλιμον V. ix. 17. VI. ix.6. VIII.
ili. 4. xiii. 8. ὠφελίμου V. v. 18.
ὠφελίμοις IX. vi. 4. ὠφέλιμα VI. vii.
5. VII. x. 2. xiii. 8. Χ. ix. 21.
ὠφέλιμοι ΤΥ̓.1. 11. WILL. iii. 4, 6.
ὠφελίμων 1. vi.9. IV. iii. 33. ὠφε-
λιμώτερος VITT. xiv. 1. ὠφελιμώτε-
ρον VIII. vii. 2.

ὠχριῶσι LV. ix. 1.

ΤΙ.
INDEX

OF

GREEK WORDS COMMENTED UPON.

ἀβέβαιος ii. 310.
ἀγαθοί ‘nobles’ i. 93-
ἀγόραιος ii. 262.
ἀθανασία ii. τό.
ἀΐδιον ii. 10.
αἰδώς in Hesiod i. 87, 508.
αἱρετόν and φευκτόν ii. 316.
αἴσθησις i. 453.
αἰσχροπραγεῖν il. 58.
ἀκόλαστος li. 54.
ἀκρίβεια i. 392, 427, 452, il. 10.
ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι li. 13.
ἀκρόχολος ii. 82.
ἀλεκτρυών i, 124.
᾿Αλήθεια, work of Protagoras i i, 123.
ἄλλος idiomatic i. 484.
ἀμετρία li, 319.
ἀναβολή il. 277.
ἀναισθησία i L 512.
ἄνθρωπος: ii. 210. fem. il. 213.
ἀόριστος i. 203-4) 425, il. 304.
ἀπείπασθαι ii, 280.
ἄπειρον, ἱέναι els i. 424.
ἁπλῶς and ward πρόσθεσιν i i. 492, ii
135. ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά ii. Lor.
ἀπό ii. 205.
ἀποδέχεσθαι ii. 258, 260.
ἀπολαυστικός i. 435.
ἀπομάσσω il, 311.
ἀποπροηγμένα i, 318.
ἀπορίαι i, 381, 396.
ἀρετή i. 389, 451, 457, 479.
ἄρρενα ‘masculines’ i, 123.
ἀρχή i. 388, 394, 433. γνώσεως καὶ
γενέσεως 472. ἐν ἀρχῇ ii. 249.
ἀρχιθέωρος ii. 67.
ἀρχιτεκτονικός i, 423.
ἄσωτος ii. 68,

αὐθάδης ii. 85.
αὐθέκαστος ii. 87.
αὐλοί i, 446.
adrapxes i. 197.
301.
αὑτούς, δὲ ii, 283. καθ᾽ il. 255.
αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ τῶν li. 294-
ἀφαιρέσει, ἐν, &c, ii. 171.

βάναυσος ii. 67.

βάρος ii. 309.

βίαιος i. 437-

Blos i. 434, 451.
βούλεται ii. 58, 81, 272.
βούλησις li. 23.
βωμολόχος ii. 90.

γαστρίμαργος li. 50.
γένεσις i. 236, 422.

γένος I i. 428.

γνώμη ii. 178.

γνώριμα ἁπλῶς, ἡμῖν i. 433.

δέ in apodosis iL. 423.

δέον i. 424.

δειλοί ‘commonalty ’ i. 93.
δεινός ii. 185.

δεκάζω i. 513.

3¢ αὑτῶν ii. 116.

διαβάλλω ii. 259.

διαγωγή li. 90.

διάθεσις i. 506.

διαιρετόν 1. 499.

διάκειμαι i. 497.

διαμένω ii, 286.

“διάνοια ii, 174.

διάτασις ii, 292.
διαψεύδομαι ii. 287.

δίκαιον etymology of ii. 114.

αὐτάρκεια i. 447, 1

INDEX OF WORDS COMMENTED UPON.

δικαιοπραγία ii, 122.

διόρθωμα ii. 113.

διότι ii, 170,

διπλάσιον i. 440.

δίψαι ii. 246.

δοκεῖ i. 345.

duds, δυὰς ἀόριστος i. 440.
δύναμις i, 232 sqq. ‘art’ i. 422.

ἐγγνητής, νόμος ii. 121.

ἐγκύκλιοι λόγοι i. 4.37.

ἐγκώμια i. 472.

ἐθισμός i. 453.

ἔθος i. 482, ii. 343.

el8os i. 443.

εἶναι i. 503, ii. 104.

εἴρων ii. 86.

ἐνέργεια i. 231-252. etymology 233.
this and δύναμις Megarian 234.
‘energy’ 388, ii. 296. ἐνέργεια
τῶν ἀρετῶν ii, 26.

ἐντελέχεια i. 235.

éfaywyh i. 334, ii. 121.

ἐξακριβόω ii. 329.

tis 1. 241, 389, 466, ii. 204.

ἐξουσία ii. 339.

éEwrepixol λόγοι i. 398-409.

ἐπαγωγή. 453.

ἑπαρκέω ii. 286.

ἐπείσακτος li. 102.

ἐπίδειξις i. 120.

ἐπίδοσις i, 512.

ἐπιεικής, ἐπιείκεια ti, 139, 272.

ἐπιζητέω i. 455.

ἐπιθυμίαν λαμβάνειν ii. 228.

ἐπιπολάζω i, 432.
ἐπιστήμη i. 423. ἐπιστήμων ‘ artistic’
ii. 68.

ἔργον i. 192, 449. τὰ ἔργα ii. 208.
ἔρως etymology ii. 292.

ἐσθλοί ‘nobles’ i. 93.

ἔσχατον ii. 168, 172.

ἑταιρική ii. 307.

εὐδαίμων i. 467.

εὐθηνοῦντα i. 462.

εὔροια i. 322.

εὐτράπελος ii, go.

ζωή 1. 434.

4 in questions i. 422.

ἡ indefinite ii, 111, 182.
ἥδεσθαι and ἡσθῆναι ii. 320.
ἤδη ii. 170.

Ixxix

ἡδονὴ οἰκεία and ἀλλοτρία ii. 328.
ἦθος i. 482.

θεῖος i. 426.

θεοφιλής ii. 342.

θέσις i. 436.

θεωρέω ii. 154, 203.

θηλέα ‘feminines’ i. 123.
θυμός ii, 42.

ἰδέα prob. Democritean word i. 202,
443. ‘form’ ii. 100.

ἴστασθαι i. 424, ii. 173.

ἴσως i. 421.

καθόλου i. 439.

καί ‘or’ ii. 152.

καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου ii. 40.

κακοί ‘ commonalty ’ i. 93.

καλόν i. 427, ii. 9.

καλοκἀγαθία ii. 75, 183.

κάρδοπος i. 124.

καταβέβληνται i. 438.

κατάστασις ii. 236.

κατέχω li, 215.

κατοκώχιμος li. 344.

κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου ii. 40.
504.

κίνησις i, 236.

κλείς 11, 100.

κληρωτός ii. 270.

κοινόν i. 486. κοινότερον 504.

κρίσις ii. 58.

κύριος i. 425, ii. 299.

κενώτερον i.

Λεσβία οἰκοδομὴ ii. 140.

λογικός i. 509.

λογιστικόν ii. 149.

λόγος i. 487. ‘inference’ ii. 163.
forms of λόγος classified by Prota-
goras i. 123. ὀρθὸς λόγος i. 487.
λόγον ἔχειν i. 401. κατὰ λόγον i.
79, 450. μετὰ λόγου i. 450, ii.
102.

μαθηματικά, τὰ i. 478.

μακάριος i, 467).

μάλιστα i, 421.

μανθάνειν ii. 177.

μαντεύομαι i. 435.

μέθοδος i, 421.

μελαγχολικοί Hi. 223.

μεσότης, μέσον ἱ, 252-263. μέσος δικα-
στής ii. 114.

μεσίδιος ii, 114.

lxxx

pndérepos il. 259.
μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός ii. 111.

νέμεσις i. 87, 508.
νοῦς παθητικός and τοιητικός i. 297.
νοσώδης ii, 238.

ξένος ii. 306.

ὁ inserted and omitted ii. 183.

ὅδε ‘individual’ 1. 450.

ὅλη ἀρετή ii. 183.

ὁμόνοια ii. 293.

ὁμώνυμα i. 444.

ὅπερ ii. 156.

ὀργανικός ii. 8.

᾽Ορθοέπεια, work of Protagorasi. 123.
ὅρος, Eudemian term i. 61, ii. 147.
ὅσιον i. 440.

ὅταν with aorist ii. 120.

οὗ ἕνεκα i. 497.

οὐσία i. 502.

πάθη. 388.

καιδεία, i. 428.

παιδεραστία ii. 214, 292.

πάνυ, ob πάνυ, οὐδὲ πάνυ fi. 59.

παρά. 430.

παρέκβασις ii. 270.

πάσχον li. 119, 3276

περίαπτον i. 458.

ἹΠέρσαις, ἐν ii. 127.

Πλάτων with and without article 1.432

πλοῦς δεύτερος i. 013.

ποίησις distinguished by Prodicus
from πρᾶξις i. 125.

ποιητικαῖς ii, 206.

ποιοῦν li. 119, 327.

πότερον i. 422.

wpayparelai. 486.

πρακτάϊ. 424. πρακτικός 449.

τρᾶξις distinguished by Prodicus from
wolyocs i. 125. In Eudemus 422. ii.
150.

πράττειν εὖ i. 431.

τροαίρεσιξ il. 15.

προηγμένα i. 318.

προΐεσθαι ii. 20.

προσκρούω ii. 288.

προὐπαρχή ii. 285.

τροὐπάρχω ii. 70.

σεμνότης ii. 85.

σκεύη ‘neuters’ i. 123.

. σκοπός Eudemian term, ii. 147.
σοφία ii. 164.

INDEX OF WORDS COMMENTED UPON.

σοφιστής i. 106-114.

σοφοί i, 431.

στασιάζω ii, 291.
στρατιῶται ii. 41.
σνγγράμματα il. 349.
συλλογιστέον 1. 469.
συμβάλλομαι 1. 470.
συμβεβηκός ii. 259.
συμμετρία ii. 320.
συμφέρον ii. IT.

σύν in composition ii. 40.
συναίτιος ii. 31.

συνάπτω ii. 257.
συναριθμεῖσθαι i. 448.
σύνεσις ii. 176.

συνεχές L. 423. :
σύνθετον, τὸ ii. 239.
σννώνυμος ii, IOS.
σχεδόν i. 421.
σωφνροσύη ii. 47.

τέλειον i. 101, 230, 451.

réXos i. 221-231, 422, 468. “ morality’
of an action ii. 7, 36. τὸ κατὰ τὴν
ἕξιν τέλος ibid.

τεχνάζειν li. 157.

τέχνη i. 422, 423, 430.

τί ἣν εἶναι i. 502.

τις frequently omitted ii. 8, 46.

τοιούτων περὶ, ἐκ i. 428.

τομαὶ καὶ καύσεις li, 321.

ὑβρίζω ii. 218.

ὕλη, πρώτη and ἐσχάτη i. 235. ΟΡ-
posed to form 427.

ὑπάρχοντα 1. 454.

ὑπερβολή ii. 262.

ὑπόθεσις ii. 226.

ὑποκείμενον i, 427, ii. 99. ὑποκείσθω
i. 487.

ὑφηγεῖσθαι 1. 506,

etymology 160.

φαινόμενα li. 107.

φαντασία ii. 30, 216.

φάρυγξ il. 49.

φευκτόν and αἱρετόν 11. 315.
φιλαυτία ii. 300.

φιλόκαλοι, φιλοκαλεῖν i, 457.
φρόνησις i. 184, 4435 iL I 58, 238.
φρόνιμος i. 501.

φύσει i. 458. φύσις i. 482.

χαρίεις ii. 276.

ψευδόμενος ii. 200,
ψνχή 1. 295-303.

IT].

INDEX OF MATTERS.

* Actuality,’ i. 231-252,

#schylus, ii, 12.

Agathon, i. 127.

Albinus, preetor, i, 342.

Alcidamas of Elsa, i. 123, 126.

Alexander the Great, i. 326, 400.

Amafinius, i. 347.

Anacreon, i. 83.

Anaxagoras of Clazomens, i. 104, 120,
141, 282, 455. His ‘happy man,’
il. 241.

An axandrides of Rhodes, ii. 231.

Anaximenes of Miletus, i. go.

Andronicus Rhodius, i. 6. His recen-

‘sion is ‘our Aristotle,’ i.13. Prin-
ciples on which it was made, i. 18,

Antimerus of Mende, i. 115.

Antipater, Stoic, i 308. Another, i. 344.

Antiphon of Rhamnusz, i. 109.

Antisthenes, 1 172, 173.

Anytus, accuser of Socrates, i. 116, 163.

Apellicon, i. 7.

Apollodorus, i. 2, 181.

Apollonides, Stoic, i. 345.

Aquinas, Thomas, i. 374.

Aratus, i. 337.

Archedemus, Stoic, i. 308.

Archelaus, philosopher, i. 150, 161,285.

Archytas, pseudo-, i. 103.

Arete, i. 175.

Aristippus of Cyrene, i, 170, 174,

Aristophanes, Clouds quoted, i. 107,
114, 123, 143.

Aristotle, Dates of life, i. 2.

I. General. Period of composi-
tion of his works, i. 3. Employed
his school in co-operation, 4, 71.
Fate of his writings, according to
Strabo, 5-13. Used proems, 22.
Sometimes ends with a line of

VOL. IL

poetry, 48 Deferred treating of

Justice, 51. Most of his works un-
finished, 69. Order of his extant
writings, 71. Often begins with a

historical sketch, 74. His tone and
style of writing, 216. Deficient in
humour, 217. Made philosophy
scientific, 220. Introduced tech-
nical formule, 189, 221. Con-
stantly defers metaphysical ques-
tions, 271, 276. Order of his
writings, 272. Promised works on
Physiology of Plants, and on Health
and Disease, 69, 274. His Meta-
physics, a fragment, 275. His merits
as a Physicist, 278. Was unappre-
ciated by Cicero, 8. His Dialogues
prized by the ancients, 15. Cata-
logue of his works by Diogenes,
15. His Ethics soon superseded,
372. Preservation of his works,
373. Study of him in the Middle
Ages, 374, 376. Translated into
Latin, 374. Recognised as the
great Encyclopsdist, 375. His
phraseology adopted into modern
languages, 388, Why he is worth
being studied, 389. His ethical
method, 392-397. Was he a
dogmatist } 397. In Pol. vii. i. has
given us an extract from one of
his own dialogues, 406. Virtually
separated ethics from politics, 409.
His loose writing, ii. 48, 50, 262,
285. Junctures in his works, i.
44; id 32, 94, 248, 280, 211. In-
terpolations, i. 448; ii 51, 254,
304.

II. Aristotle's relation to Plato.
Was he Plato’s pupil? i. 181.

ay

Ixxxil

Codified the results of Plato, 182.
His debt to Plato, 189-199. Cri-
ticises him, 199-215. Criticises
Idea of Good, 205-213. His early
polemic against Plato, 213. His
captious and unsatisfactory attitude
towards him, 189, 397. Sets aside
Republic and Laws, ii. 350 Sug-
gestions adopted from Plato :—
on Education, ii. 314. Courage, ii,
32, 33, 37. Liberality, ii. 61.
Communities arise from mutual
needs, ii. 117. Money, ii. 110.
ἀγχίνοια, ii 174. φρόνησις and
σύνεσις, ii. 177. Questions about
Friendship, ii. 252, 253. Fluctua-
tions of bad men, ii, 290. Intel-
lectual pleasures, ii. 322. Proper
and foreign pleasure, ii. 328.
Archers, i. 424. Mathematicians,
ib, μαντεύομαι, i. 436. ἔργον, 1. 449.
τετράγωνος, i. 466. ἀριστεῖα, i. 471.
Oculist, i. 474. Derivation of ῆθος,
i, 483. Dye of education, i. 493.
Boxer who eats much, i. 500.
Crooked timbers, i 513. Tuning
lyre, ii. 147. ‘Mind's eye,’ ii. 181.
Corruptio optimi, ii. 187. σεῖος ἀνήρ,
ii, 194.

III. Logic. Aristotle prided him-
self on being the discoverer of the
Syllogism, i, 263. Logic not a part
of philosophy, i. 272.

IV. Metaphysics. Unity of
Thought and Being, ii. 304.
His nominalism, i. 212, Four
Causes, i. 221. The Potential and
the Actual, i. 231-252. Absolute
and Relative Knowledge, i. 433.
ἀρχαί, how obtained, i. 453. Know-
ledge better than search, ii. 337.
Metaphysics identical with Theo-
logy, i. 288. Aristotle’s ideas of
God, i, 288-295. He is indetermi-
nate on the question of a future
life, 1, 300-303.

V, Physics. His physical trea-
tises, i. 274. Nature, i. 279-285.
Chance, i. 280. Necessity, i, 281.
Teleology,i. 283. Chain of Nature, i.
285. Manand Nature,i 286. Hea-
venly Bodies, i. 273,287. Stars more
divine than map, ii. 166. Secular
catastrophes, i. 289. Nature desires
good, ii, 267. Makes nothing in

INDEX OF MATTERS.

vain, i. 424. Man and nature, iL
283.

Life defined, i. 256. Life sweet,
ii. 304. Scale of life, i. 295.
Senses of brutes, ii. 48. Moral
qualities of brutes, ii, 187, 207, 218.
Purer senses, ii, 330. Separate
senses and common sense, ii. 172.
Sleep and dreams, i. 476. Youth
like wine, ii. 246. Psychology a
branch of physics, ii. 206. Aris-
totle’s psychology a development of
Plato’s, i. 193. Soul, i. 295-299.
Division of mind, i. 421. Resem-
blance of subject and object, ii. 149.
Two kinds of reason, i, 297-299.
Permanence of mental states, i.
465. Attention, ii 327. Immorta-
lity, 1. 299-303.

VI. Ethics. Four treatises on, i.
19. Aristotle’s ethical method, i.
392-397. Advance on Plato—
accumulation of experience and new
formule, i, 189. Abstract terms
ethicised, i. 221. Virtue not pre-
dicable of God, i. 293. Boys have
no virtue, i. 462. No doctrine of
moral obligation,i. 378. Condemns
suicide, ii. 37, Evil self-destruc-
tive, ii. 82.

Book 1. End, Chief Good, Hap-
piness; Psychology — Doctrine
of τέλος, i. 221-231, Partly
Cyrenaic, i. 229. Ends in Plato,
1. 446. Chief good must be
αὕταρκες (Platonic), i. 191. Can.
not be added to (Platonic), ἐδ.
Cannot be painful, ii. 263. To
be found in man’s €pyor({ Platonic},
i, 192. Happiness, i, 250.

Book 2. Habit, and Defini-
tion of Virtue.—Virtue can be
taught, i, 167. Doctrine of
habit implicitly Socratic, ἐδ.
Habit second nature, ii, 231.
ἕξις, L 241. ‘ Mean’ (Platonic),
i, 255. Ignorance, ii. 11.

Book 3. Will and the Virtues:
Courage, Temperance,—Will, i,
286. Question of Free-will not
entered on, i. 377. List of
Virtues, i. 214.

Book 4. Liberality, Magnifi-
cence, Great-souledness, Ambi-
tion, Mildness, θιλία, ἀλήθεια,

INDEX OF MATTERS.

εὐτραπελία, αἰδώς, Anger, ii.
216.
Book 5. Justice.—Aristotle

deferred writing on, i. 50. Re-
lation of the Eudemian account
of, to Aristotle, ii. 95. Natural
and Conventional, ii. 126. Justice
ἃ proportion, ii. 109, 110, 124.

Book 6, Moral Standard and
Intellectual Virtues, —¢pdérnors
partly Platonic, i. 193. φρόνιμος
as standard, Cynic, i. 172.

Book 7. Incontinence and
Moral struggle; Pleasure, —
Practical Syllogism, i. 263-270.
Three motives, ii. 1 50.

Books 8-9. Friendship,—
partly suggested by Plato, i. 197.
Book 10. Pleasure; Specula-
tion; Transition to Politics,—
Pleasure, i. 247-250. Promi-
nence of Pleasure suggested by
Cyrenaics, i. 178. Plato’s view
of, i. 195. Pleasure and pain, i.
490. Pleasure not chief good,
ii, 234. Amusements, ii. 333.
Philosophy above morality, ii.
338. Duty of aspiration, ii. 337.

VII. Politics. Political ideas in
Eth. Nic.,i. 410-413. Ethics subor-
dinate to Politics, i. 426. Philosophy
the end of state, i. 228. Necessity
of Politics to Ethics, ii. 343-351.
Law universal, ii. ro1, 141. Divi-
sion of the science, ii. 168. Best
form of government, ii. 128. Ty-
ranny worst form, ii. 125. Various
forms, ii. 269-272. State prior in
idea to family, ii. 275. Limited
size of state, ii. 306. Legislation
higher part of Politics, ii. 347.
Praises Sparta, ii. 345. Bad Political
Economy, ii. 66. Value and Price,
ii 118. Money, ii.119,121. Slavery,
1 386. Slave, ii. 334. Contempt
for potentates, ii. 341.

VIII. Rhetoric and Art. His ac-
count of the rise of Rhetoric, i. 122.
Regarded it as the art of Composi-
tion, 1.124. The Ludicrous, ii. 92.
Law of art, i. 256. Artistic view of
virtue, ἰδ. Musical ear, i. 258; ii 303.

IX. Religion. Practical religion
not discussed by him, i. 27. Provi-
dence, i. 223, 294; ii, 342. God,

xxx

i, 288-295 ; ii. 247. ‘The gods,’
ii, 128, 275. God's life is thought,
ii. 330. This doubted in the Great
Ethics, i. 36. Prayer, ii. rot.

X. Lost Writings. ‘ Dialogues,’
i. 9, II, 15, 401-409. Συναγωγὴ
τεχνῶν, i. 122, Dialogue called
Eudemus, i. 301. Περὶ Ποιητῶν,
iL 403. Πολιτικός, &., i 405.
Νήρινθος, or Koply6os, i. 407. ‘ Exo-
teric’ writings, i. 399. Πολιτεῖαι, ii.
350.

XI. Spurious Writings, De Ῥὲν-
tutibus εἰ Vitiis, i. 20, 39. See
also Eudemian Ethics and Magna
Moralia. De Mundo, i. 18 De
Aenophane, &c., i. 138 De Motu
Animalium, i. 264. Categorie, i.

ἱ

440.

Arnold, Dr., quoted, i. 390.

Arrian, i, 361,

Aspasius, 1. 33.

Athenians, no naval feeling, ii. 3§.
Their social freedom, ii. 345.

Athenodorus, Stoic, i. 308. Another,
ἰδ. 345.

Atticus, Platonist, i. 32.

Aurelius, Marcus, i. 364-366.

Averroes, i. 299, 374.

Bacon, quoted, i. 10; ii, 335. His
‘ believing Christian,’ i. 323. His
disparagement of Aristotle, i. 278, -
396. His ‘forms,’ i. 502.

Balbus, Lucilius, 1. 344.

Barea Soranus, i. 348.

Bentham, i. 369.

Berkeley, ‘ Theory of Vision,’ i, 240.

-Bernays, his theory of the ‘ Exoteric

discourses,’ i. 401-407.
Bias of Priene, i. go.
Boethius, i, 11.
Brasidas, 1]. 127.
Buckle, quoted, i. 381,
Buddhism, i. 386.
Burke, quoted, ii. 38.
Butler compared with the Stoics,

i 320. His ‘self-love,’ ii. 300.
Quoted, ii. 335.

Ceranus, Stoic, i. 348.
Callicles, i. 150, 151.
Cannibalism, 11, 213.
Carneades, Academic, i. 341.
Casaubon, i. 65.

ἼΧΧΧΙΡΥ

Cataline, ii. 59.

Cato the Censor, i, 341.
Utica, i. 344.

Chorus, comic and tragic, ii 71.

Chrysippus, Stoic, i. 315, 316, 322,
326, 330, 333; 11. 200.

Cicero,—no real acquaintance with
Aristotle, i.8. Mentions Eta. Nic.,
i. 9. Mentions ‘Commentaries,’ i.
399. Quotes Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, i.
122. Hears Posidonius, i, 344. His
philosophy, i. 346. Quoted, i. 462.

Cleanthes, i. 308, 313-315. His hymn,
i, 328, 338.

Cleobulus of Lindus, i. 92.

Clitomachus, i. 342.

Comedy, new, ii. ΟἹ.

Comte, his ‘ Religion of Humanity,’
i. 384. Compared with Aristotle,
i. 386.

Convention and Nature, i. 150-152;
ii, 126-127.

Corax, i. 122,

Coriscus, name used as example, i. 133.

Corruption, human, i. 358, 511.

Crantor, Academic, i. 219.

Crates, of Thebes, i. 174, 313.

Critolaus, Peripatetic, i. 341,

Cronus, Megarian, i. 313.

Customs, variety of, ii. 127.

Cynics, i. 171-174, 196, 318,

Cato of

Dante, quoted, i. 375, 438.

Darwin, Mr., his genesis of the Moral
Nature, i. 383.

Delian epigram, i. 458.

Demetrius, Peripatetic, i. 345.

Democritus of Abdera, i. 104, 141,
150, 159, 279, 285, 307, 492.

Demodocus of Leros, ii. 225.

Dicearchus of Messana, quoted, i. 89.

Diogenes Laertius, his catalogue of
the writings of Aristotle, i 11, 17.

Diogenes of Sinope, i. 173.

Diogenes of Babylon, i. 308, 341.

Diogenes of Seleucia, i. 308.

‘ Duty,’ i. 263, 324, 424.

Beclesiastes, traces of Stoicism in, i.
336.

Editors of Aristotle, their additions
and interpolations, i. 18, 43, 44, 45,
47, 65, 71.

Education, systematic, begins with
the Sophists, i. 121.

INDEX OF MATTERS.

Egnatius Celer, i. 348, 361.

Eleatic ‘ one,’ i. 442,

Empedocles, i. 141, 279, 282, 283;
ii, 149.

Epaphroditus, i. 361.

Epicharmus, quoted, ii. 337.

Epictetus, i. 360-364.

Epicurism, contrasted with Stoicism,
i. 311. In the Roman world, i 346.

Epicurus, i 301. Grote’s defence of,
i. 212.

Ethics, not a separate science before
Aristotle, i. 74. Eras of Morality,
i, 76. Origin of Morals, i.75. Un-
conscious era, i. 79. Influence of
the Sophists upon Morals, i. 143.
Predominance of Ethics in Post-
Aristotelian philosophy, i. 305.
Supersession of Aristotelian Ethics,
i, 372.

Eubulides, Megarian, ii. 200.

Eudemusof Rhodes, pupil of Aristotle,
i, 31. Ancient notices of, i. 31-33.
Names of his writings, i. 32.

Eudemian Ethics, origin of name, i. 42.
Neglected by commentators, i. 20.
Commencement of, examined, i. 23.
Contents and characteristics of, i.
24-31. Quoted as the work of
Eudemus by Aspasius, i. 33. Sepa-
rate Ethics from Politics, i. 26.
Religious tone of, i 27-29. En-
deavour to improve upon Aristotle,
i. 28; ii. 40. Deficient in clearness,
i. 31. Cannot have been written
by Aristotle, i. 69.

Three books common to them and
the Nicomachean Ethics, i.25. Refer
to Budemian Ethics, i. 57. Not
referred to in Eth. Nic. X., i. 50.
Supposed references tothem in other
works of Aristotle, 1, 52-57. Re-
ferred to in Fudemian treatise, i. 59.
Differ in doctrine and formule from
Eth. Nic., i. 62-65. Hypotheses
concerning them, i. 64, 65. Trea-
tise on Pleasure (Book VIL), i. 65,
195, 250. Theory of Justice (Book
V.), ii 96. Full of logical formule,
li. 99, 150. Of subject of incon-
tinence, ii. 135. Of physiology, ii.
130, 171, 206, Differ from Aristotle,
ii. 98, 107, 157, 176, 180, 184, 240.
Resemble or quote Eth. Nic., ii. 137,
138, 173, 181, 182, 186, 206, 209,

INDEX OF MATTERS.

219, 230, 233, 234, 241, 245, 247.
Resemble or quote Eth. Fud., ii. 98,
100, IOI, 104, 129, 130, 146, 147,
148, 150, 151, 167, 168, 183, 184,
185, 194, 198, 209, 212, 219, 226,
228, 232, 235, 243. Borrow from
Organon, ii. 153-156. Metaphysics,
ii, 156-158, 167, 201. De Animd,
IL 149, 1§0, 152, 162. Politics, ii.
109, 110, 113.

Eudoxus of Cnidus, i 2183 ii. 242,
315, 316.

Euthydemus, i. 170.

Euxine, ii. 213.

Evenus of Paros, ii. 251.

‘Evolution’ theory, i 382.

Freedom of Will, i. 377.

Fritzsche, Dr., Editor of Zudemian
Ethics, i. 32. Thinks Book V. Aris-
totle’s, VI. and VII. Eudemian, i.
66. On the style of Eudemus, ii.

169.

Gender, transition to neuter, i. 466.

Goats sacrificed to Theban Zeus, ii.
127, 286.

Goethe, views of, i. 168, 246. Quoted,
11, 142, 246.

Good, chief, great question of Greek
ethics, 1. 102, 152.

Gorgias of Leontium, i. 119, 122, 125-
127, 130, 134, 137-142.

Hampden, Bishop, quoted, ii. 193.

Harper, story of, ii. 282.

Hegel, his Moralitat and Sittlichkeit,
1. 78, 450; 11, 200,

Hegesias, i. 178.

Heiresses, ii, 271.

Heraclitus of Ephesus, i. 104, 202,
307. His pride, i 430, ii. 203.
On anger, i. 493. On senses, il.
207. Harmony of opposites, ii.
253. Tastes of the ass, ii 331.

Herbert, George, quoted, ii. 337, 341.

Herillus, Stoic, i. 308.

Hermseum, ii 41.

Hesiod, morality of, i. 86-89, 252.

Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, i. 83.

Hippias of Elis, i. 119, 120, 125,
147.

Hobbes, ii 60.

Homer, morality of, i. 84-86. Plato’s
opinion of, i. 84, 439.

lxxxv
Honow, i. 435, 436; ii. 74, 266, 279.

Imperfect tense, in reference to some-
thing previously said, ii. 126, 208,
288. To general occurrences, i. 432.

Individual merged in State, i. 151.

Instruments, ii. 273.

Isocrates, i, 111-113, 119, 1383 ii.
337.

Jealousy, notion of divine, i. 91.
Josephus, i. 336.

Jowett, Professor, quoted, i. 181. *
Justinian, i. 368.

Kant, antinomies of, i. 140. Subjec-
tive idealism of, i. 141. Charges
Aristotle with eudeemonism, i. 224 ;
and with imperfect definition of
virtue, i. 258. His theory of
pleasure, i. 249; of foundation of
morals, i. 338. On freedom, ii.
20. On love of enemies, ii. 34.
On kindness versus justice, ii. 64.

Laconia invaded by Thebans, ii. 76.

Lelius, C., i. 342.

‘Law,’ in morals, i. 259-262. Roman
law and Stoicism, i. 366-370.

Lightfoot, Canon, on St. Paul and
Seneca, i. 337.

Locke, quoted, ii. 323.

Lucilius, epistles of Seneca addressed
to, i. 353.

Lucretius, i. 346.

Lyceum, Aristotle's place of teaching,
i 2.

Marcellinus, friend of Seneca, i. 359.

Maxims, basis of popular morality, i.
83. Of the Seven Sages, i. 92.

Mayo, Dr. Thomas, quoted, ii. 191.

Megarians, on the actual and poten-
tial, i 234. On the ‘one,’ i. 442.

Melitus, or Meletus, accuser of So-
crates, i. 164.

Milesians, ii. 225.

Mimnermus of Colophon, i. go.

Monopsychism, Averroes’ doctrine of,
i, 299.

Monotheism, i. 329.

Moralia, Magna, origin of name, i. 42.
Neglected by commentators, i. 20.
Contents and characteristics of, i.
34-39. Contain matter from Theo-

Ixxxvi

phrastus, i. 35. Quoted, i 512; ii
189, 197.
Mosaic code, retaliation enjoined by,
ii, 117.
Mothers, love of, ii. 267, 288.
Musonius Rufus, Stoic, i. 349, 361.
Mysteries, i, IOI,

Neleus of Scepsis, i. 9.

Neoptolemus, ii. 198.

Nicomachus, father of Aristotle, i. 33.
Son of Aristotle, i. 40, 41. Perhaps
edited his father’s Kthics, i, 42.
Mentioned by Cicero, i. 9.

‘ Obligation,’ i. 379.

‘One,’ i. 441.

Opinion of the many, Aristotle’s rela-
tion to, i. 102,

Peetus, i. 350.

Paley, i. 283.

Panetius, i. 325, 343.

Parliaments, French, ii. 22.

Parmenides, i. 141.

Patricius, quoted, i. 104, 376.

Paul, Saint, born in the headquarters
of Stoicism, i. 337. Stoical terms
in his speech at Athens, i. 338.
In his epistles, i. 339-340. Not
known to Seneca, i. 340.

Peripatetic School, decline of, i. 12~
13. Tendencies after the death of
Aristotle, i. 14-15, 26. Imitation
of the style of Aristotle, i. 30.
Approximation to Stoics, i, 38.
Worked in co-operation with Aris-
totle, i, 71.

Perseus, Stoic, i. 308.

Petit, Samuel, i. 33.

Phanias, pupil of Aristotle, i. 32.

Pharisees, influenced by Stoicism, i.
336.

Philetas of Cos, ii. 200.

Philo, Megarian, i. 313.

Philolaus, i. 233.

Phocylides, i. 252.

Pindar, morality of, i. 97-99. His
eschatology, i. 98.

Pittacus of Mitylene,i. 90; ii. 28, 293.

Plato.

I. General. Dialogues exhibit
successive phases of his mind, i.
179, 180. Not dogmatic, i. 180,
181. A poet and dialectician, i.

INDEX OF MATTERS.

182. His presentation of Socrates,
i158. Histone, i. 216. His un-
technical language, i. 220.

II. His doctrine of Jdeas, i. 200-

205. Origin of the doctrine, i.
201. Not a settled theory with

him, i. 200. Attacked by himself
in Parmenides, i. 201. Idea of
Good, i. 204. A principle for
ethics, i 205, 445. Criticised by
Aristotle, i. 205-213 ; ii. 436-443.

III. Physics. Matter, an ‘unde-

fined duad,’ i 154. Heavenly
bodies, i. 287. Purer senses, ii.
330. Division of mind, i. 168,
193.

IV. Ethics and Politics. Con-
tempt for unphilosophic virtue, i
79. Different moral points of view
in the Republic, i. 77. Develops
the principle of Socrates, i. 183.
Treats of the cardinal virtues, +d.
Separates Wisdom from the rest, i.
184. Unifies the virtues, i. 186.
Identifies virtue with knowledge, i.
119, and vice with ignorance, 4.
Future rewards and punishments,
i, 188. Influenced by Pindar, i.
188, His theory of pleasure, i.
247, 248. Not chief good, ii. 234,
317, 320. Intellectual pleasures,
ii. 322. Justice, ii. 104. Justice
a proportion, ii, 109. Implies its
contrary, ii. 137. Injustice worse
than being injured, ii. 142. In-
justice better if voluntary, i. 169.
‘Pigeon-house,’ ii, 203. Praise
of Sparta, ii. 345. Community of
wives from Cynics, i. 174.

V. Religion. Providence, ii. 342.
Prayer, 11. 101. Being made like
to God, i. 194. Eschatology, i. 188.
His influence on the Stoics, i 333,

334-

VI. Art, full of law and har-
mony, i. 255. His view of Rhe-
toric, i. 129.

VII. Doubtful Works. Hippar-
chus, i. 83. Menexus, i. 468. Tepe
δικαίου, ii. 26.

Plutarch, i. 6, 7, 9, 306, 316, 322; ii.
62.

Polemo, i. 219, 313.

Polus of Agrigentum, i. 123, 152.

Polygnotus, painter, i. 313.

INDEX OF MATTERS.

Pompey, i. 344.

Porphyry, on Andronicus, i. 6, 19.
On the three ethical treatises, i. 32.

Posidonius, Stoic, i. 343.

Poste, Mr., quoted, i. 71 ; ii. 226.

Present tense in quotations, i, 432.

‘ Principles’ in morals, i. 270.

Prodicus of Cos, i. 124. His apologue,
L 145.

Proportion, arithmetical, ii. 113.

Protagoras, i. 116, 118, 123. On
grammar, 1124. Not an eristic, i.
134. His boast, ἐδ. His philo-
sophy, i 135-137. His teaching
virtue, 1, 144. First taught for
money, ii. 282.

Protarchus, i. 281.

Protasis, complex, i. 469.

Pythagoras, his metaphor, i. 434.

Pythagoreang, i. 103, 159, 217, 253,
260, 296, 442; ii, 116, 261.

Ransom, ii. 127.

Renouvier, quoted, i. 104, 173.

Rhetoric, created by Sophists, i. 122-
127. General considerations on, i.
127-129. Roman tendency to, i.
346.

Rubellius Plautus, i. 349.

Salt, proverb about, ii 258.
Sardanapalus, his epitaph, i. 435.
Sceevola, i. 367.

Scythian malady, ii. 222,

Seneca, i. 350-360.

Seven wise men, i. 89-92.

Sextius, Stoic, 1. 347.

Shakespeare quotes Eth. Nin, i. 430.
On courage, ii. 43. Murderers, ii.
46. ‘Kept not time,’ ii. 71. Anger,
ii. 81. Love, ii. 292.

Sicyonians, ti. 44.

Sight, ii. 323.

Simonides of Ceos, i. 77, 83, 93, 94,
512; il 62.

Socrates, i. 143, 155-171. On courage,
ii. 40, Various opinions, ii, 188,
195, 107.

Solon, i. 90, 91, 230, 302, 462-468.
Called ‘the first Sophist’ by Iso-
crates, i. 113.

Sophists, Grote’s defence of, i. 105,
153. History of the name, i 106-
114. Not merely a few particular
persons, i, 114. Plato's view of,

Ixxxvil

i. 116-118. Itinerant teachers, i.
118. Their gains, i. 119. Their
rhetoric, i, 122-127. Earlier and
later Sophists, 130-133. Their
eristic, i. 133-134. Not a philo-
sophical sect, i, 134. Essence of
Sophistry, i.142, Their influence
upon morals, i, 143-151. Aris-
totle’s view of, i. 152. Summary
with regard to, i. 154.

Sophocles, quoted, i. 465; ii. 199.

Sositheus, comic poet, i 314.

Sotion, Stoic, i. 347.

Spengel, Professor Ludwig, his theory
as to the three ethical treatises, i.
21. On the Great Ethics, i 33,
39. On the order of Aristotle’s
writings, i. 273. Quoted, i, 488,
501.

Speusippus, i, 217, 218, 462; ii. 207,
234, 237-240, 315.

Spheerus, Stoic, i. 308.

Spinoza, i. 371. Quoted, ii 337.

Stewart, Dugald, i. 379.

Stilpo, Megarian, i 313.

Stoics, their Semitic origin, i 307-310.
Formation of their doctrine, i. 305—
335. Reaction of their doctrine
on the East, i. 335-340. Stoicism
in the Roman world, i. 340-350.
Merits and defects of Stoicism, 1.
370.

Suicide, i. 335, 359 ; ii. 141.

‘Suitable,’ 1, 325.

Swedenborg, his clairvoyance, i. 156.

Sybarites, ii. 222,

Syllogism, do we always reason in?
ii, 216.

Symonds, Mr. J. A., quoted, i. 81, 91,
98.

Tennyson, quoted, ii, 224.

Thales of Miletus, i. 90; ii. 166.

Theatres, sweetmeats in, ii. 329.

Theodectes, ii. 320,

Theognis of Megara, i. 92-95. Quoted,
iL 103, 344.

Theophrastus, i. 8, 12, 31, 25, 42, 398.

Thrasea, i. 350.

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, i. 77,
149, 151.

Thucydides, i. 108, 114, 125, 154.

Tickling, ii, 223.

Tigellinus, i. 349.

Tisias, 1, 122,

[xxxvill INDEX OF MATTERS.

Tyler, Mr. T., on Ecclesiastes, quoted, | Xenocrates, i. 218, 313, 456.
L 336, 337. Xenophon, i. 110, 114, 155, 157, 162,
Tyndall, Professor, his criticism on 163, 164, 170, 504; ii. 275.
Aristotle, i, 278.

Utility, i. 378. Zalecus, his law of retaliation, ii.
117.
Vatican Scholium, ii 240. Zeno, founder of Stoica, i. 308, 312,

313
Wordsworth, quoted: Duty, i. 260. | Zeno, of Sidon, i. 208,
Happy Warrior, ii. 45.

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INDEX.

A dbbey & Overton's English Church History 14

A bmey's Photography ....cccccccccccssccees evecee IO
A cton's Modern Cookery.....c.ccses cocssceceese 20
A. EK, 27. 8. Essays Of ἁ .....6.νοονοοοοοσοονοοο τ΄. "2
Allen's Flowers and their Pedigrees ..... . ir
Arnotts Elements of Physics.......006 0 corre 0
Alpine Club an of Switzerland .......... eo 17
Guide (The) ......cccccsescees γεν νουθδν δος 17

A meos's Jurisprudence .....csccccrescccssccssens o §
Primer of the Constitution.......... 5

50 Years of English Constitution 5
Anderson's Strength of Materials .......s00 . ΣΟ
A neta τ Organic Chemistry ........00 10
Arnolds (Dr.) Lectures on Modern History 1
Miscellaneous Works ...... 15
SEFMONS ..cccocscscseeee sevevves IS

SSS ει, (T.) E. lish Literature Covecccveces 6
Atelier (The) du ys φΦοοοθοοοθυφοροοθυοοοοόοϑοθθθ 18

Atherstone Priory.....ccccccssecccsscssccees coves 18
Autumn Holidays ofa Country Parson... 7

Ayre's Treasury of Bible Knowledge ...... 20

Bacon's Essays, Whately ..ccoccccere cause Ὁ
Life and Letters, by Spedding ... 5
Promus, edited by Afrs. Pot? ...... 5
Wl ...crcccccccccccccees cocevceceseons 5

Bagehot's Biographical Studies ΦΘΦοοθθδϑδοθθθθοῦ 4
Economic StudieS ..cccccsscosesccse 21
Literary Studies ..... erccceccscrccsce Θ
Bailey's Festus, & Poem ,.......esccccessosccees 18
δα π᾿: James Mill and J. S. Mill .sccsscese 4
Mental and Moral Science ....... . 6

on the Senses and Intellect ......... 5
——— Emotions and Will.........00 tosccseee 5
17

17

10

10

Baker's Two Works on Ceylon ....cscccsceeee
Ball's Alpine Guides ..........006 isdeascueusess
Ball's Elements of Astronomy ....cc.ceseoses
Barry on Railway Appliances .....cccccssese
Bauerman's Tea eacua seedeueisuesacen 10 & 11
Beaconsfeld’s (Lord) Novels and Tales 17 & 18

22 WORKS published by LONGMANS & -€0.

Beaconsfield's (Lord) Speeches ..... δονουδε νον
Wit and oe ὁκόταν
Becker's Charicles and gece seuepesieests

g
Blackiey's German-English Dictionary......
Blozam & Huntington's Metals ............
Boultdee on Articles... eecovscsces
‘s History of the English Church...

ba | Bwr COV me

10
14

14
Bourne's Works on the Steam Engine...13 ἃ 14

Bowdler’s Family Shakespeare ........csecce
Bramiley-Moore' s Six Sisters of the Valleys.
Brasmston & Leroy's Historic Winchester .
Brandes Dict.of Science, Literature, ἃ Art
Brassey's British Na #eacesons ΦουοθοοοθοοοροθοΦθὺ
-————— Sunshine and Storm in the aie ‘
-——_—-— Voyage in the ‘Sunbeam’.
Bray's Elements of Morality ......0.0+. errr
Browne's Exposition of the 39 Articles...
Browns: 3 odern England . φοοθυθοϑοφοθύθ
Buckie's History of Civilisation ......c0+ss00s
Buckton's Food and Home Cookery. coveccnes

Health in the House ............12 ἃ

‘Bull's Hints to Mothers ......ccrsccses
ternal Management of Children .

ter’s Family oe e@esceesosecsooesséees
Burton's Home Farm....

φοφοοθοδοδθοοθθοθοθοδοδοουθοθθθθοϑθο

Cabinet La
Calvert's Wi e's Manual Geeeanssegzetoosecgeoseses
Capes’ $ Age of the Antonines...... eatecese sece
Early Roman ee avcvccess ΠΝ
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