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■ AH

The
European War

March to September

AnthonylArnoux, Ph. D., LL. B.

VOLUME II.

PRIVATELY PRINTED
Boston, 1916

• - > ;

Anthony Arnoux

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Campaign in the "West Page
Prom Arras to Sea

Chapters I 9

n 22

m 28

IV 34

V 42

VI 46

In Champagne

Chapter VH 51

The Argonne to Alsace

Chapters Vin 56

IX 61

The Campaign in the East

March and April in Galicia

Chapter X 66

The Freeing of Galicia

Chapters XI 74

XII ..... . 81

xin 85

XIV 91

The Polish and Russian Campaign
The Invasion

Chapters XV 95

XVI 99

XVn 104

XVIII 109

XIX 122

Italy Goes to War
The Treachery

Chapters XX 125

XXI ...... 132

The Campaign

Chapter XXTT 136

314999

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
The Dardanelles
Naval Attacks

Chapter XXIII 141

The Land Attack

Chapters XXIV 148

XXV 154

XXVI 163

The Minor Campaigns

Caucasus — Serbia — Suez Canal
and Egypt — ^Africa — German
East Africa 168-175

The Naval War on All Seas

Chapter XXVIII 175

The Submarine Warfare

Chapter XXIX .184

The Aerial Warfare

Chapter XXX 191

Political History of Europe
Before the War

Chapter XXXI 197

Political History of Europe

During the War

Chapter XXXH 220

Appendix

Statistics of Italy 225

List of Ships Sunk by Submarines . . . * 242

A Glance at Militarism 250

THE EUROPEAN WAR

MARCH TO SEPTEMBER

The Campaign in the West

CHAPTER I.

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

For the sake of convenience in description, we shall
divide this campai^ into two sections, the first of
which, the northern, begins at Westende on the Belgian
sea coast and continues southeastwardly to Ypres ; thence
curving southwardly to Arras. At Arras the southern
division begins; the line first running south as far as
Noyon and thence running by irregular courses east-
wardly to Belfort. The reason these two divisions are
made is because it permits us most conveniently to
handle the correlated offenses of both the Allies and the
Germans on the Ypres and Arras front separately from
those in Champagne, the Argonne, Yosges and Alsace
to the east ; thus making for clearness in comprehension
of the military manoeuvres between March and the
first of September.

These two sets of manoeuvres, both in a topographical
sense and in a military sense, are sharply divided. The
objective of the Gterman operations in the northern sec-
tion was the conquest of the seaports, of Dunkirk
and Calais, and the objective of the Allies' operations in
this same region was the turning or piercing of the Ger-
man left wing so as to compel its retreat, firstly, from
Lille, its base in northern France, and, secondly, from
the Belgian territory held by it.

The operations further to the east affected only the
French territory, the German offensives in this section
were aimed at crushing the French army if possible,
while the French offensives were aimed more at resisting
this process than in attempting any seizure of strategic
points which would necessitate a German retreat of more
than local significance. These two characteristics of
the military significance of the fighting on the Germans'
left wing and on their center and right continued all
through the period we have under consideration; and
the keeping of this difference in objectives in mind will

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

greatly conduce to a proper understanding of the strat-
egy which was practised by both sides during the spring
and summer of 1915.

The German line in the Ypres and Arras region began
at a small place known as Nieuport, two miles south-
west from Westende, and thence ran as a general course,
southeasterly to Ypres.

The Belgian coast here is a broad field of hill-high
sand dunes, which extend far down the coast into
France. The little places along the shore were, in times
of peace, summer resorts, which enjoyed a wide-spread
international popularity: particularly was this true of
the baths of Westende which was one of the most aristo-
cratic resorts in Europe, near enough to Ostend to par-
ticipate in the somewhat Bohemian pleasures of that
famous resort, and yet far enough away (seven miles)
to be completely free from the presence of the more
objectionable visitors to that place.

To the southeast of Ypres (the territory around which
town was sufficiently described in the first volume) lies
the Arras region, which is better known under the
name of *'the Artois.'* The German line in this dis-
trict began at Armentieres on the Belgian frontier south
of Ypres and ran north and south to Bapaume, which
is sixteen miles southeast of Arras. The whole length
of the line is a little more than forty miles.

The Artois contains a number of important industrial
towns, such as Bethune, Aire, Bapaume, Lillers, St. Pol
and Hestin; but its greatest reputation is that of a
pasture and farming land. The cultivation is largely
intensive and the many small holdings produce enormous
quantities of those wonderful vegetables, in the produc-
tion of which France outranks any country in the world.
The larger farms produce grain of various kinds, as well
as hops, which are particularly renowned among the
French breweries.

The Artois has had a varied history. It first belonged
to the Counts of Flanders and then passed into the pos-
session of France through the marriage of Philip Augus-
tus to Isabella of Hainault. The House of Burgundy
attained it in the Fourteenth Century, and later, through
the marriage of a Burgundian heiress to the Archdiie
Maximilian of Austria, it passed to the Hapsburgs ; and
from the Austrians to the Spanish in 1634, from whom
the French took it in 1659 and have since held it.

When the month of March opened on this line, the

--\

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

first flush of early Spring was in the air. The rain,
which had been almost constant during February, ceased,
and the ground, which was, except in the sandier por-
tions towards the seashore, a sea of mud, began to dry
up. The desultory fighting which had been going on
without interruption during the winter continued dur-
ing the early days of March with little change; this
fighting, whUe costing a high price in lives, had little
military significance, and resulted in no change of posi-
tions on the part of the contending forces of even the
slightest importance. But this comparative inaction
was but a prelude to the most important movement
which the British forces, as a unit, had undertaken up
to that time during the war.

As early as the 19th of February, 1915, Sir John
French had communicated to General Sir Douglas Haig
a secret memorandum in which instructions were given
for a forward movement to be launched at the earliest
opportune moment. The reasons for this were many:
firstly, there was the necessity for substituting some
more vigorous and appealing form of action than the
monotonous trench fighting which had lasted during
the whole winter, in order to keep up the spirit of his
own troops and, secondly, there was the necessity of
stilling voices in France which were murmuring at the
comparative inaction of the British forces and complain-
ing of their insufficiency in point of numbers to accom-
plish any result. Moreover, as the British press, and, to
some extent, the British War Office, had announced con-
tinuously during the winter that the British armies
would begin in the spring a great forward movement,
which would have most important military consequences
favorable to the Allies, the British public was on tip-toe
with expectation and clamorously demanding a fulfill-
ment of these promises.

On March 8th the final instructions were issued by
the British headquarters to the division commanders,
and March 10th was fixed as the day upon which this
concerted attack should be made. The immediate ob-
jective of this attack was to be the village of Neuve
Chapelle near La Bassee, from which it is about four
miles north and about eleven miles west to Lille. The
real objective was lille. This village lies in a flat,
marshy country much cut up by dikes, which are, of
course, a characteristic feature of the landscape in Ar-
tois, but to the east of the point where the village lies,

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

thp land rises slowly towards a ridge which curves west-
ward from Fromelles through Aubers to a point directly
^w>osite and to the east of Neuve Chapelle, known as
TTftiite Pommerau, whence it runs to the southward,
T-vinff slightly to the place known as lilies. This
^\lffe runs away northeast from Fromelles to within
r* o miles of the southwest of Lille and along its crest

'^The capture of this road probably would have meant
^x. + +ViA ftprmans would have been unable to continue
S*p J^ssion of LiUe. particularly as behind tWs lidge
s a railroad to Don which was necessary to the Ger-
^^^ chain of communications. This ridge approaches,
^^^^i^Baute Pommerau, to within a short mile of the vil-
f^J^oi Neuve Chapelle, which village was, therefore,
IvT key to its possession. The ground between Haute
iSfxnmerau and Neuve Chapelle was comparatively easy,
^rSen only by a wood called the Bois du Biez about
^ If a mile from Neuve Chapelle, between which wood
rl that village ran a small stream, the River des Layes,
*^^ing from northeast to southwest, but presenting no
^?fficulty in its crossing. On the west of the village ran
S^^main road from Estaires to La Bassee. The German
1 wfes began to the north of the village at Pont Logy and
JTti to the fortification known as Port Arthur, a little to
tlh^ south of the center of the village of Neuve Chapelle,
an<i we^*® only about 100 yards from the line of the Bri-
tisli which was also the case in the intervening distance.
'Priym. Pont Logy northward the German trenches curved
a little to the eastward, and the distance grew much
irreater between the opponents, as was also the case to
th€J southeast of Port Arthur. Prom Port ^irthur a
seeond line of German trenches ran northeast along the
eastern bank of River des Layes to a point known as
tiie Pietre Mill, almost directly opposite Aubers on the
ridge, and distant perhaps three-quarters of a mile- there-
from at the northern extremity.

The Germans had also established entrenchments in

the Bois du Biez, still further to the east of River des

tiayes and almost directly in front of the very important

point of Haute Pommerau, whose situation has already

been described.

In accordance with their established custom, the Ger-
mans kept their first line defenses with few men, and at
the time of the attack on Neuve Chapelle had only about
four battalions in the front line at and around that vil-

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

lage. Large reserves were held behind their main lines,
it being possible to throw those reserves wherever their
presence might be necessary by means of existing and
excellent lines of communication, these have been a dis-
tingoishing feature of the Glerman scheme of field for-
tifications and entrenchments.

The action opened at half past seven in the morning
and began with the most powerful bombardment of the
German trenches that had, up to that time, been seen in
this war. Indeed, it is said, and credibly, that during
the engagement at Neuve Chapelle the British artillery,
which was supported by the French, fired more shells
than had been consumed in the entire Boer War. The
effect of this bombardment is described by eye wit-
nesses on both sides as being terrible. A constant rain
of heavy shells and shrapnel forced the Germans to hide
in their trenches and prevented their observing the
enemy, while the discharge of the shrapnel had the fur-
ther effect of preventing re-enforcements from the rear
from reaching the Germans in the first line trenches, as
the intervening territory became a death zone which it
was impossible for troops to pass.

The effect of the bombardment was terrific, the Ger-
man trenches were badly cut to pieces, burying their
occupants in their ruins, the wire entanglements before
them were swept away, and, what was equally important,
the morale of the surviving defenders was shaken to such
an extent that these latter, at the moment the infantry
advanced, were unable to oppose even a perfunctory
resistance.

This was true along the whole line of attack, except
at the northern extremity, where the results achieved
were much less important; which lack of results, how-
ever, was to exercise the greatest possible effect upon the
final issue of the battle, and to which lack may be most
fairly attributed the failure of the movement in its
broad lines and the non-attainment of either its immedi-
ate objective, the possession of the road leading along
the Aubers Bidge to Lille, or its ultimate objective, the
capture of Lille itself.

The number of guns engaged in this bombardment is,
as close as can be now estimated, about 400 heavy pieces,
re-enforced by innumerable small calibre weapons. For
thirty-five minutes this bombardment lasted, the last few
minutes being the most intense period. According to
the testimony of persons present, during the last few

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

minutes the discharge of the heavy pieces was so rapid
and so continuous that the effect produced upon the ear
of the listener was that of a machine gun of enormous
size, so continuous, regular and unabating was the vol-
ume of sound. The bombardment once finished, the in-
fantry advanced to the attack, which was made simul;
taneously on the village of Neuve Chapelle from two
sides; on the northwest, where the 4th Army Corps,
under General Rawlinson, attacked; and on the west
and southwest where the Garhwali Brigade, of Indian
troops, attacked.

The southwestern attack was the most successful and
the Indians captured the first line of German breast-
works in a very few minutes. The 25th brigade also
was successful, and pushed forward into the village of
Neuve Chapelle, though here the resistance was more
sustained. In the northeastern attack, however, the
23rd Brigade was unable to perform the part assigned
to it in this battle, because it was on this front that the
preliminary artillery bombardment had failed to destroy
the wire entanglements in front of the German trenches,
and consequently this brigade, the defense at this point
being much more energetic, was held up in front of these
entanglements and cut to pieces by a terrific fire of rifle,
machine gun and shrapnel bullets. The terrible charac-
ter of the fire which the brigade sustained can be esti-
mated by the fact that one battalion of the Second Scot-
tish Rifles, (the Cameronians), lost 850 men out of a
thousand in less than twenty minutes. The other regi-
ments also suffered heavily, and the brigade was not able
to break through but was compelled to lie down in the
open and call on the artillery behind it to destroy the
wire entanglements; not until this was done were the
British able to take the first line of the German trenches.
But even with these taken, they were in little better sit-
uation, since the German artillery in the rear immedi-
ately began to shell the captured trenches.

In the meantime the 25th Brigade and the Indian
Brigade to the south had pushed forward into the vil-
lage, which was an appalling spectacle reduced to com-
plete ruin as a result of the bombardment. It even
tore up the village churchyard and disinterred the long-
buried dead.

The arrival of these troops in the village enabled forces
to be thrown to turn the left flank of the Germans in
front of the 23rd Brigade which, we have seen, was in

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

great difficulty; and the result of this manoeuvre was
that the remnant of the 23rd was brought into a posi-
tion of safety.

Street fighting took place for a considerable time in
the ruins of the village, and it was not until the Ghurkas
had made a house to house inspection, using their ku-
kuris freely, that the German resistance in the village
itself was overcome. After the conquest of the village
the united British forces then moved forward to the east-
ward towards the River des Layes and the Bois du Biez
During the fighting in the village the British artillery
along the old front had been firing at long range upon
movements of reserve troops which the Germans had
been endeavoring to throw forward to Neuve Chapelle,
and had been remarkably and peculiarly proficient in
preventing the bringing up of these reserves, even at a
very considerable distance, ten to twelve miles from
the field of action. Consequently, after the village was
captured, for some time, the British troops which took
part in its capture were enabled to manoeuvre freely.
For four and a half hours they occupied themselves with
consolidating the positions already won and attempting
to restore their lines of communication from front to
rear, — which in their turn were being commanded by
German artillery fire directly from the top of the Au-
bers Ridge, — and await reenforcements. This delay of
four and a half hours was one of the contributing causes
which prevented the capture of the Aubers Ridge and
the success of the movement. Sir John French, how-
ever, lays it to the slowness with which the commander
of the 4th Army Corps brought his reserve brigade for-
ward. But the truth probably is that when the British
at eleven o'clock succeeded in entering the village and
driving the Germans out, they were so physically ex-
hausted by the hard fighting which had taken place that
neither they nor any other troops could have followed
up this advantage immediately. Moreover, the lines of
communication from their front and rear being under
fire, it would have been an extremely costly and danger-
ous operation to bring up the reserves until the British
artillery had silenced the German artillery on the Au-
bers Ridge.

The British artillery which had so distinguished itself
in the morning in preventing the Gtermans from bring-
ing up re-enforcements to their hard-pressed troops,
about noon ceased firing, which was promptly taken ad-

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

vantage of by the Germans to re-enforce their third line
defenses, not only with troops but with light artillery,
which, on a second attack by the British had a most de-
cisive effect in stopping permanently their advance. At
this stage of the battle, from eleven o'clock to half past
three in the morning, it was most important that the
heavy fire of the British artillery should be continued in
order to protect the advance already achieved, to destroy
the German opposing artillery, and thereby permit re-en-
forcements to come up to the British in the village, but
this was not done. As this British artillery was neces-
sarily several miles distant to the westward from Neuve
Chapelle, and absolutely under the control of the British
Commander-in-Chief, who had ample time in which to
inform himself as to the causes of its inactivity during
the four and a half hours that it was silent, it does not
seem either just or generous in that Commander-in-
Chief to attempt to shift the blame for the failure of
the British attack of Neuve Chapelle to other shoulders.

At half past three in the afternoon the positions were
as follows ; The British held the village of Neuve Cha-
pelle and the ground south thereof through and includ-
ing the field fortification of Port Arthur on the main
road running north to Estaires. North of that the line
changed to almost directly north and they held the road
from Neuve Chapelle to its juncture with the road called
Rue Tilleloy running towards Armentieres and the line
crossing this road and running north to the Rue de
Bacquot which runs parallel to the Rue Tilleloy already
mentioned. The whole front was just under three miles.

At half past three the second attack began. One sec-
tion of the British forces, the extreme left of the line,
attempted to advance to and take the Pietre Mill. But
this force was soon checked by machine gun fire from
the German third line of defense and from the mill it-
self. Another and simultaneous thrust was made at
the cross-road northwest of Pietre while another thrust
was also made directly at Haute Pommerau, which
was, as has been said, the critical point on the Aubers
Ridge. This attack was held up near the bridge across
the River des Layes by heavy machine gun fire both
from the opposite bank of the river and from the Ger-
man trenches in the intervening space between this
bridge and the Aubers Ridge, and the British were
forced to fall back. The Indian troops moved on the
Bois du Biez to the south of this bridge, but they, too,

— I

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

fell into difficulties. The German trenches in front of
the wood were protected by wire entanglements which it
was necessary for the Indians to break through in order
to advance, in which breaking through they failed, with
extremely heavy losses, particularly among the Garh-
walis.

This repulse ended the afternoon attack and the Brit-
ish forces remained in about the same positions already
outlined, though the Gtermans attacked fitfully several
times during the night, and the British artillery made
an attack upon the bridge over the River des Layes
which it was necessary to capture in order to make any
further advance upon the Aubers Ridge. Re-enforce-
ments were sent for to the 1st Corps at Givenchy. This
1st corps had during the day delivered an attack south
of Neuve Chapelle from Givenchy, but its operations
and its results were of no particular importance.

The next day, Thursday, March 11th, as the real ob-
jective of this movement had not been attained, the Brit-
ish commanders resolved to renew the attack on the
Aubers Ridge and early in the morning the same two
forces, the 4th Division and the Indians, which had led
the fighting in the battle of the day previous, moved
forward to the attack. The British forces had, a few
moments before this movement began, repulsed a Ger-
man attack on portions of their line with comparative
ease and really heavy losses to the attackers, the attack
having been delivered from the general direction of
Pietre.

The British, in this advance, suffered rather heavily
from a cause which should have been obviated, being
entirely the result of their own carelessness and inatten-
tion to those necessary details which very often, as in
this case, largely influence the success or failure of mili-
tary movements. The day before in their successful at-
tack which resulted in the occupation of Neuve Chapelle,
the Grerman artillery, shelling the country behind Neuve
Chapelle, had cut the telephone communications between
the English batteries on the line behind Neuve Chapelle
and the military artillery observers in advance. The
result was that until these were repaired and communi-
cation between the observers and the batteries re-estab-
lished, it was impossible for the British artillery, unless
directed from air-craft, to fire with such nice accuracy
so as not to hit their own men advancing and at same
time to be effective upon the enemy. On this particular

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

day, direction from the air was impossible owing to the
condition of the weather. The 4th Division and the
Indian Corps in their opening attack advanced for a
short distance towards the Pietre Mill and towards the
wood of Biez and then were held up by Gterman fire from
the ruins of the houses and other temporary shelters of
various kinds which the Germans were able to use for
defense purposes which were scattered around on the
eastern outskirts of the village. It was clear that until
the artillery in the rear had shelled the whole terrain in
front of the British lines, it would be impossible for the
line to make a successful advance. Hand-to-hand fight-
ing ensued and the British stormed and took quite a
number of the houses and other shelters out of which
the Germans had made improvised defenses, as shown
above. But then a fatal thing occurred: the British
artillery in the rear, which by this time had opened up
fire for the purpose of shelling the German positions in
front of the British advance, continued its fire and, as
a result of the British capture of these shelters, was shel-
ling its own men. This fire was not stopped as it should
have been, for some reason which we do not know, as
the excuse of broken telephone wires and the impossi-
bility of aerial communication does not seem to be a suf-
ficient one, in view of the fact that these advance lines
were a scant three miles from the artillery positions,
which distance could have been covered by a mounted
man or even a pedestrian, in a comparatively short
space of time. The loss among the British for this cause
was heavy and ultimately the advance parties were
obliged to abandon the points of vantage they had taken
and rejoin the main line which then fell back to its ori-
ginal positions of the early morning. This ended the
day's fighting, except that during the afternoon the
German artillery on the Aubers Ridge opened upon the
British positions at Neuve Chapelle and to the north
and south thereof with considerable strength, and in-
flicted some losses, but it was not able to force the aban-
donment of the British positions.

The next day, Friday, March 12th, the movement,
as far as it had the character of the British offensive,
was over. During the night the Germans brought up
re-enforcements from other points on the line, and on
that morning began a counter-attack on Neuve Chapelle
at about five o'clock, reducing the role of the British
troops to that of the defensive. This German attack

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

was directed against the extreme right and the extreme
left of the British positions and was carried out mostly
by Bavarians and Saxons. Both of these attacks were
unsuccessful and resulted in considerable loss to the as-
sailants, with no compensating gain of ground.

About the middle of the morning the British launched
a counter-attack on Pietre MUl and the bridge head over
the River des Layes, with orders to break down the po-
sitions around the German field fortifications at any
cost ; and very violent hand-to-hand fighting ensued with
alternate gains and losses on the part of the combatants,
but which ultimately terminated in a British repulse
with, perhaps, the heaviest losses of the fighting, so far,
in proportion to the number of men engaged.

Northeast of the village the Germans' counter-attack
did for a time attain a measure of success and they suc-
ceeded in entering the British trenches, but they were
unable to hold this position and in a few hours were
driven out. This attack and counter-attack continued
all the afternoon, although the whole operation had the
character of the German offensive ; and when night came
the British Commander-in-Chief, being convinced that
nothing further could be done for the time being, gave
orders to suspend any further offensive and to attempt
to consolidate the position already taken.

It is fair to say that this gain was made over ground
which had been turned by the Germans into successive
lines of deeply buUt and well defended trenches, and
was, therefore, more difficult to capture than the measure
of its area would seem to indicate.

On Saturday, the 13th, the Germans opened the day
with a heavy bombardment of the British positions and
kept this up practically all day. In addition to this ar-
tillery assault there were several small counter-attacks
during the morning and a heavy one towards four
o'clock in the afternoon which the British troops man-
aged to repulse, although, owing to weariness from the
fighting of preceding days and the necessity for constant
digging in order to maintain the positions already won,
this was done with difficulty.

Sunday, the 14th, the artillery duel continued, but
there were no infantry attacks on either side, and the
fighting of Neuve Chapelle can be considered to have
finished this day. The ultimate result was that the Bri-
tish had gained 300 to 400 yards of ground. The price
which this gain cost them was 190 officers and 2357 men

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

of the rank and file killed outright, 359 officers and 8174
men wounded, 23 officers and 1723 men missing. The
price was too heavy for the result achieved. Prom a
military standpoint, the operation was a complete fail-
ure, in that it did not achieve any of the objects for
which it was undertaken. The only thing that it did
show was that if the British were willing to pour out
blood like water, out of all proportion to the results
achieved, they could at a given point force back the
German lines a very short distance ; but as the German
defenses extended in successive lines for many miles
northward, a gain of a few thousand yards on a two
mile front, at a cost of between 12,000 and 13,000 men,
(the whole front extending east and west several hun-
dred miles) indicated that the cost in men alone to drive
the Germans to the French boundary at this rate of loss
would far exceed the entire effective force of both the
French and German army added together and multi-
plied by three. It, therefore, became evident that oper-
ations of this character were so expensive as to be out
of consideration.

In summing up the whole of the fight, one British
authority, says :

'*It must be admitted that the battle was as creditable
to the Germans as to the British. The British massed
secretly large forces and an over-powering weight of ar-
tillery and fell upon a small force of unsuspecting Ger-
mans and pressed a way for themselves through the
enemy's first line of defenses. In this phase of the bat-
tle it is business-like organization which we have to com-
mend on the British side; the infantry could not help
winning those battered trenches. The second phase of
the battle was the converse of the first. It showed the
organization of that which brought about the fatal delay.
The Germans are entitled to congratulate themselves
upon the ready skill and tenacity with which they took
much of the British blunder on the first day and the suc-
cesses which attended their efforts. They could not help
losing their first line of defense. Only determined
fighters could afterwards have saved, as they did, the
Aubers Bidge and the road to Lille. ' '

'*0n the whole it gave this much to the British side,
that it stopped for a time the attacks of the Germans,
but it exercised no equally substantial influence over the
subsequent cost of the campaign.

''The German losses during the three days of battle

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were about equal to the British ; 30 officers and 1657 men
were captured, about 2000 were killed and 8000 to 9000
wounded."

This summary was written by a British military offi-
cer of the highest standing, a comparatively short time
after the battle.

How very different this reads from the extraordinary
accounts sent forth by the London press agencies to the
United States concerning this fight at the time of and
immediately subsequent to the fight; which accounts
were subserviently printed with the usual accompaniment
of startling headlines in the American press without the
slightest attempt at control or editing; preferring, as
that press always does, the sensational and the improb-
able to the credible and the true.

CHAPTER n.

While this fighting was going on at Neuve Chapelle,
the British forces to the north of Neuve Chapelle made
supporting attacks in the night between March 11th and
12th on the German positions at TEpinette, a little vil-
lage northeast of Neuve Chapelle, near Armentieres,
which they captured. The casualties here were slight
on both sides and the British, after taking the position
successfully, resisted the (Jerman counter-attack.

On Friday afternoon another supporting attack was
launched by the British on the German positions to the
southwest of Wytschaete. This effected practically
nothing. As said, these attacks were merely supporting
attacks to the main attack at Neuve Chapelle.

North of this last mentioned place lies the village of
St. Eloi, immediately south of the Comines Canal and
some 3% miles south of Ypres on the road leading from
Ypres to Armentieres which runs north and south, and
also at the junction of an east and west road as well as
to a third road running southeast to Wanaton.

The British position on the 14th of March ran through
the outskirts of the village on the east, then turned
southward on the south of the village, gradually run-
ning more to the westward. A large mound occupied
the southeast corner of the British position inside their
line. The German lines faced this line it its entirety.
On the afternoon of the 14th, which was a foggy day,
the Germans took advantage of this fog and concentrated
a large force of artillery in front of the village, and
towards five o'clock in the afternoon opened a heavy
bombardment of the entire British position in the village
itself and to the north and southwest of it. Prior to
this, by mining operations, the Germans had succeeded
in placing a mine of great force under the mound al-
ready spoken of, and when the bombardment of the Bri-
tish positions by the artillery was at its height, this mine
was exploded, sending the mound skyward and resulting
in great confusion among the defending forces. This
confusion was taken advantage of by the (Germans to
launch an infantry attack, which, of course, continued
to be protected by its artillery and which attack resulted

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in the British being obliged to execute a general retire-
ment just before dark, leaving not only their trenches
but a considerable portion of the village in the hands
of the Germans.

Towards two o'clock in the morning, the British
launched a counter-attack and followed it up an hour
later with a second counter-attack in support of the first,
and had the satisfaction of recovering in these two at-
tacks that portion of the village which the Germans had
previously taken in the late afternoon, but did not re-
capture their original positions to the east of the village
nor in the vicinity of the mound. The fighting here was
very severe because the German infantry had erected
barricades along the village streets and mounted ma-
chine guns upon them; consequently the British casual-
ties were extremely high. The Princess Patricia Light
Infantry, a Canadian regiment, suffering most severely.

In this fighting at St. Eloi the British lost very heavily
both in the original attack and in their partially suc-
cessful counter-attacks. Their total losses may be com-
puted at about 4000 killed and wounded, 1000 prisoners,
and 1000 to 1500 missing. The Germans losses, on the
contrary, while heavy in proportion to the number of
men engaged, did not exceed 3000 to 3500.

The following day, Monday, small attacks continued,
and on Wednesday, the 17th of March, the Germans
launched another vigorous attack in the effort to recover
their position in the village, which they had lost; but
this was unsuccessful.

After the conclusion of this fight at St. Eloi the whole
line from Ypres to the south of Neuve Chapelle relapsed
into quietness, which was not broken for nearly a month,
till the Germans launched an assault upon the extreme
left of the British line in early April. This assault,
however, was not a serious one, and resulted in no change
of positions, though it caused the usual large number of
casualties.

After the fighting above described ceased, a period of
almost complete inaction ensued which lasted until
about the middle of April and was only broken by minor
movements which need only be hastily glanced at. The
activity of the air men during this period, however, was
quite remarkable on both side, and many raids were
made, the favorite points of attack being, for the Allied
air-craft, the submarine bases which the Germans had
established along the Belgian coast, particularly at Zee-

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brugge and Ostend; while the German aviators paid
particular attention to the French seaboards of Dun-
kirk and Calais. During this time also the British and
French fleets operating in the channel off the Belgian
coast paid attention to these submarine bases of the Ger-
mans, which were bombarded several times more or less
violently. It is, however, doubtful whether outside of
causing a loss in lives, these bombardments or air attacks
accomplished any serious or at all irreparable damage
to the towns which suffered.

On March 11th the Belgians who occupied the extreme
left of the Allied line took a small fort east of Lombart-
zyde and subsequently took the defensive advance to
Scherrbakke where there was some fighting.

On the 23rd of March a Belgian force did cross the
Yser, but was unable to maintain its position there.

In the early part of April the Germans made a thrust
to the south from their position south of Dixmude. The
objective of this movement was Fumes, but success was
prevented by the French artillery which held up the
German advance until a few days later, on April 6th,
the Belgian force succeeded in driving it back to
Neroken. During all this period from the middle of
March to the middle of April Ypres continued to be
bombarded, and the final ruin of the justly celebrated
Cloth Hall, one of the most interesting and picturesque
buildings of Europe, and of the Cathedral, was accom-
plished. In fact, the whole town was almost leveled
to the ground and the few remaining inhabitants were
taking refuge and living in the cellars. As an instance,
however, of the power of human beings to accustom them-
selves to almost anything, it may be mentioned that those
inhabitants who remained grew so accustomed to the
dropping of large calibre shells in their immediate vicin-
ity that on the testimony of really credible witnesses who
were in the town from time to time during this period,
they grew so careless that an explosion even in their im-
mediate vicinity did not cause them even to look at the
point from which the sound of the explosion came. The
children remaining, of whom there were quite a number,
appeared also totally indifferent to the bombs.

The writer was told by a personal friend, who was in
Ypres several times during the latter part of March and
the early part of April, that on one occasion when he was
there towards eight or nine o'clock in the morning a
shell fell near a house at the side of which some four or

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

'five children were playing. The shell exploded and the
house and the children vanished, he seeing the scene of
the catastrophe but a few moments after the fall of the
shell. In the afternoon of the same day he was again
in Ypres and saw the same spot and saw children play-
ing unconcernedly in the debris of the house wrecked
in the morning, and on the very spot where their little
comrades had perished a few hours earlier.

The ruined condition of Ypres is typical of the ruined
condition of most of these villages along the front in
Flanders and France, as far south as La Bassee.

The middle of April it became evident to the com-
mander of the British forces facing the Germans south
of Ypres that his opponents were about to begin an of-
fensive, and remembering, perhaps, the maxim of Nap-
oleon, that the best defensive is an offensive, he resolved
to anticipate their action.

Hill No. 60 is located on the railroad running from
Ypres south to Comines about three miles to the south-
east of Ypres and about an equal distance to the north-
east of St. Eloi. This hill forms part of the Klein Zille-
beke ridge, and is its highest point. The ridge itself is
cut through by the railroad. This word **hiir' must be
taken in a relative sense as really **Hill No. 60" in any-
thing but a flat country would not be designated by this
title, being only 62 feet high ; but in so flat a country as
that immediately to the south of Ypres the 62 feet there
are equivalent, in a more broken country, to many times
that number of feet. The summit of the hill is open
and was usually cultivated with the sides covered by
woods. The great importance of this hill was that the
Germans, holding as they did the slopes and the sum-
mit, could watch what was going on in the flat country
to the west of them where were the British trenches, and
could signal to their heavy artillery, posted near Zand-
voorde further to the east on an elevation, the direction
to aim.

The distance between the Gterman trenches on the
slopes of this hill and the British trenches at the bottom
was only some 50 yards. Another thing was that the
elevation of Zandvoorde was one of the keys in the Gter-
man line to the east of Ypres and by capturing Hill 60
and planting artillery on it, it might be possible to force-
the Germans to evacuate that hill. The British prepared
for this offensive by mining operations which extended
under Hill No. 60, which operations escaped the notice

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of the Germans. It seems a curious fact, as the British
official report states that five galleries were used in this
mining operation and it was unusual for so large a num-
ber of galleries to be driven without the noise of the
work attracting the attention of those against whom the
work was directed. However, the Germans did not no-
tice these mining operations but at 7 P. M. of April 17th
all the mines were fired together, with the result that
the German trenches on the west side of Hill No. 60 went
up into the air. Hardly had the clouds resulting from
the explosion of the mines lifted themselves into the air
before the British artillery to the west commenced to
pour in shells and shrapnel on the ruins. An infantry
attack had been prepared, and as soon as the artillery
had pounded the remaining first line trenches to pieces,
the signal for its advance was given. This attack, com-
posed of the West Kents and the Scotch Borderers, as
far as the first trenches were concerned, had compara-
tively easy work, but on reaching the conmiunication
trenches the Germans, who, naturally, had been thrown
into considerable disorder by the explosion of the mines
and the subsequent artillery pounding, rallied and very
severe hand-to-hand fighting took place, in which hand
grenades and bombs played a prominent part. The en-
emy, however, was unable to stand and the British forces
succeeded in taking and holding the first line of the Ger-
man trenches with the communication trenches leading
from them to a short distance after a very hot 20-minute
fight. Then in its turn the German artillery commenced
to pound the positions won by the British attack, and
though the two regiments which had made the attack
held their positions for the night in spite of very heavy
losses, in the early morning they were compelled to fall
back to the craters occasioned by the explosion.

Early on April 18th the (Jermans delivered two coun-
ter-attacks which were repulsed, by a liberal use of
machine guns by the British. In spite of these repulses,
the Germans rallied again and again to the attack and
the fighting continued all day, with the result that to-
wards evening the Germans succeeded in recovering the
southern portion of the hill and the British were pushed
back to the other side of the crest. Then heavy re-en-
forcements were brought up to the British and they in
their turn made an attack which resulted in their gain-
ing some ground, practically reaching the positions from
which they had been driven in the morning.

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All through the next day incessant artillery fighting
and bomb and hand grenade fighting took place
on this southern slope of Hill No. 60, with results of
minimum importance.

On the 20th the action, as far as the artillery was con-
cerned, became more violent on the German side, and the
intervening country, and Ypres itself was subjected to
the firing of pieces of the heaviest calibre. On Hill No.
60 itself two assaults were made in the afternoon by the
Gtermans, which were repulsed by a very liberal use of
machine guns. Nevertheless the struggle continued all
through the night and on the 21st it was found the Ger-
mans had again gained a foothold on the hill. The British
counter-attacked and nearly cleared the hill of the enemy,
and in spite of a heavy bombardment, maintained the
positions they had won at such great cost.

Hill No. 60, though small, will always remain famous
in military annals as a result of the four days' fighting.

During the time that this struggle was taking place,
on Hill No. 60, there had been considerable activity
among the air forces of the several combatants in places
further west along this front and in Belgium, but, as
usual in these aerial attacks, the amount of the damage
done was extremely uncertain. The attacker always re-
ports great material results from the attack, which re-
ports are promptly denied by the attacked; and this
characteristic has been true of all this class of fighting
from the beginning of the war to the present time. It
may be seriously doubted whether anything of real im-
portance has been achieved by the attacks of air-craft
using bombs at any time during the war at any place.
Some few unfortunate civilians have been killed, but this
can hardly be termed a military result of importance.

Air-craft have undoubted value for scouting purposes
or locating the positions of the enemy, for directing the
fire of artillery, for photographing the terrain behind
the lines of the enemy and for watching the movement
of troops in the country of the enemy's lines: but here
their value and their utility seem to end.

The spectacular combats in mid-air attract the atten-
tion and arouse the interest of the casual readers of war
news, but after all, these combats are more spectacular
than useful and savor more of the theatrical, than of the
military art.

CHAPTER m.

On Thursday, April 22nd, an event of considerable
importance took place. The Germans, who had, prior to
this date, perfected an apparatus for the manufacture of
a poisonous gas, used it on this day with success.

Before proceeding to a description of the battle of this
day, a little retrospection may be advisable in view of
the intense clamor raised by the British concerning this
use of poisonous gas. In August of 1914 Professor Tur-
pin, a French scientist, conducted experiments on flocks
of sheep in the Bois du Bologne, Paris, with a gas which
he had invented and which he hoped would be practical
for French military use in destroying their opponents.
The experiments were partially successful, sufficiently
so, in fact, to justify an attempt to use this gas for the
purpose for which Prof. Turpin designed it. Accord-
ingly, in September, 1914, the French did attempt its
use, as was reported with many additions and much color-
ing in the American, British and French newspapers
of last September. The experiment was made in two
places, in Champagne and in the Argonne, and we were
regaled with descriptions of its terrible effect; how it
struck down the Germans in masses; particularly how
one soldier died in the act of lighting a cigarette, hold-
ing the cigarette in his lips and the extinguished match
in his hand three-quarters advanced towards its end,
standing upright and gazing with fixed and visionless
eyes.

These experiments, stripped of the war corres-
pondent's romances, however, did not prove successful.
The French apparatus for the use of this gas was not
sufficiently safe in that it was as liable to drive the turp-
inite on the French troops as it was on those of the
enemy. Efforts were made to remedy this, but unsuc-
cessfully, and hence the use of turpinite was abandoned.
But it was not abandoned because its use was in contra-
vention of the spirit of the Hague Conference of 1899,
nor because, as one Englishman states, it was in contra-
vention of the mal-practices condemned by the most
civilized thinkers of Greece and Some, by Christian
teachers and almost all international lawyers since

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Orotius. This English statesman was speaking of the
use of gas by the Qermans but there is, of course, a self-
evident distinction between the use of the same means
by the British or their Allies, and their use by their op-
ponents since the British have introduced this new prin-
ciple in warfare, that any acts done by the British, no
matter what they are, are legitimate ; whereas, the same
acts done by their opponents are the height of cruelty
and barbarity. Curiously enough, there being so much
sentimentality and mock-humanitarianism extant in the
world, the British have been able to persuade the bulk
of the population of one supposedly neutral but very
sentimental nation that this proposition (false on its
face) is true.

On the morning of the 22nd the position of the British
and their French Allies in the northern section of the
salient of Ypres, which was the first section attacked
by gas, was about as follows :

From the Yperlee Canal at Steenstraate, west of Bix-
schoote, around the North of Langemarck to the road
leading from Ypres to Poelcappelle was held by French
colonial troops, Turcos and other Algerians, Tunisians,
Senegalase or other negroes. The Canadians occupied
a position next to them, from the road leading from
Ypres to Poelcappelle to the railroad running from
Ypres to Roulers, which it reached near Zonnebekke.
From this point, Zonnebekke, to the south of the rail-
road, the British troops held the line to the outskirts of
Becelaere, whence the line ran to Hill No. 60 and to the
canal from Ypres to Comines.

Behind these forces so dispo<)ed there were consider-
able reserves which were so placed as to be able to reach
any point of the salient that w^is threatened, not only
with men but with guns.

For the success of the Germans' plan it was necessary
that the wind should blow from their trenches towards
the enemy, and this condition prevailed at about five
o'clock of the afternoon of Thursday, the 22nd of April.

An aviator was the first to give the alarm, reporting
that yellow-greenish smoke was rising all along the Ger-
man front from Bixschoote to Langemarck. The Tur-
cos were the first to perceive this smoke, which, accord-
ing to their story, was white, rising some few feet from
the ground, and in front of which was a greenish mist
which rose considerably higher than a man, and which
was blown by the wind towards them, being thick enough

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not to be readily dissipated by the air currents, but at
the same time in large measure translucent. On this
mist reaching them, the Turcos began to first cough, spit
blood, and then to suffocate. Out of the mist suddenly
appeared detachments of the enemy equipped with In-
dia rubber respirators which fastened around the neck,
which respirators contained a cloth soaked with some
chemical solution to neutralize the effects of the gas.
The Turcos, of course, were completely taken by surprise
and in a large measure paralyzed and thrown into con-
fusion, which confusion spread with considerable degree
to the French troops further in the rear. The result was
that the Turcos and the other French troops abandoned
their ground and retreated in considerable disorder,
leaving many hundred prisoners and 50 guns of various
calibres in the possession of the enemy, besides suffering
were heavy casualties.

The German force pushed onward and captured a
battery of guns in the wood west of St. Julien, belong-
ing to the 2nd London Battery of heavy artillery.
Everywhere on the whole front, on the Yperlee Canal
to Dixmude the Germans were attacking, and, what
was more important, by the retreat of the French the
left flank of the Canadian Division (whose position has
been already described) was turned the enemy being en-
trenched at right angles thereto thus cutting them off
from Ypres. A gas attack had been made on the Can-
adians, but the wind at this point of the line was not
so favorable as it was at that point of the line where
the Turcos had been stationed, and consequently, though
the Canadians felt some effects of the gas, the full effect
was not achieved upon them.

But a German infantry attack followed this some-
what abortive gas attack, and the situation of the Can-
adian troops became extremely precarious. The first
two assaults of the Germans were beaten off and then the
left of the brigade was withdrawn from the front of
Poelcappelle until it arrived at a position west of the
road leading from that place to Ypres, which line it
then attempted to hold until the French troops were
rallied and re-enforcements from the rear were brought
forward to fill the gaps between Ypres and St. Julien.
This the Canadians, to their great credit, succeeded in
doing. But they did even more than this, and by a gal-
lant counter-attack succeeded in defeating the German
project of capturing Ypres. This counter-attack had

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for its object the recovery of the wood west of St. Julien
and the recapture of the ^uns lost there. As this action
was probably the most gallant performed by any British
troops during the war from the beginning to the present
time, the Canadian forces participating in this charge
are entitled to be specifically mentioned: they were the
16th Battalion of the 3rd Canadian Brigade and the
10th Battalion of the Second Brigade. They re-took the
wood, and by so doing relieved the pressure and saved
the French to the west of the canal, and further saved
four battalions of the 5th Corps who were between St.
Julien and the canal in a most dangerous situation. Ow-
ing, however, to the fire which the German artillery im-
mediately concentrated on this wood, it was impossible to
hold it, but the object which these Canadian troops had
in view was achieved, and they were able to retire with
the consciousness of having heroically performed their
duty under the most adverse circumstances that can
well be imagined.

Another force of Canadians, those of the 2nd Brigade,
which rested on the railroad line from Ypres to Roulers,
near Zonnebekke, and a British force east of Zonnebekke,
had also been violently attacked and the fighting here
kept up all day and all night ; the crux of the fighting
coming at 1.30 A. M. on Friday morning, but they held
firm. At 4 A. M. on Friday this Canadian force occu-
pied a position about 2500 yards long on the Gravensta-
fel Ridge but was gassed by the Germans, with the re-
sult that portions of the force retreated temporarily
from their positions. While this was going on, an at-
tempt was made by the Germans to break through the
Allied line south of the wood west of St. Julien, and the
fighting here was very severe. Charge after charge by
both sides was gallantly delivered and was gallantly re-
sisted. In this fighting the 4th Battalion of the 1st
Canadian Brigade particularly distinguished itself. By
eleven o'clock on the 23rd, the Allied line had been driv-
en in so that it ran from St. Julien almost due west for
about a mile, then curved to the southwest, then to the
north, and reached the Ypres- Yperlee Canal near
Boesinghe. Across the canal Lizeme was in the posses-
sion of the Germans.

The whole of Friday the battle raged along the battle
fronts with great violence, and the inhabitants of Ypres
behind the lines began to abandon the place, thinking
its capture imminent. But the British and French line

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to the north of the town held firm during that day, and
even made a little progress south of Pilkem and along the
Ypres-Yperlee Canal, but this progress was short-lived
and gradually the Canadians were drawn to the north-
east of St. Julien. The fighting continued into the
night, but abated towards its middle. About 3 A. M.
on the 24th the German artillery fire which had ceased
for a time, was suddenly violently renewed and a gas
attack was then made to the east of St. Julien. Although
this was not successful, it compelled a general retirement
of the 3rd and 2nd Canadian Brigades, though they did
manage to link connections again with each other and
with the line to the right and left of them, just to the
east of St. Julien. At noon the Germans delivered a
general assault on the village of St. Julien in the direc-
tion of Poelcapelle and the village was carried by this
assault. The entire Canadian force and the French
were thrown to the west of St. Julien and the village
fell completely into the hands of the enemy.

A counter-attack in the afternoon by the British was
unsuccessful in its object of re-taking the village. The
Canadian losses in this fighting were extremely severe,
and when night fell, they were on the Passchendaele
road from Fortuin to Gravenstafel. From Gravenstafel
to Broodseinde the line was held by some British troops.
The territorials held the line from Fortuin to Boesinghe
with the regular brigade. Behind them, however, an-
other regular brigade was coming up accompanied by
the Lahore division, as well as several other battalions
of Indian troops. In the afternoon the French had
made a gallant attack on Pilkem and almost recovered it,
but were driven back. General Foch, however, the
ablest of the French commanders, had arranged to con-
centrate fresh troops between Woesten and Crombeke,
and to this concentration and its influence on the fight-
ing of the next two days, probably Ypres owes the fact
that it was not taken.

While speaking of General Foch, it is perhaps perti-
nent to say that during the entire war this French
general has distinguished himself above all the generals
either of the French or British armies by his remarkable
strategy, his fertility of resource and his wonderful and
almost instinctive power of doing the right thing at the
right time, which power he combines with an almost
superhuman coolness in critical and dangerous situa-
tions. In all the varied circumstances to which a year's

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hard fighting has exposed this general, he has invariably
risen to the necessity of each situation, and it is perhaps
not too great a eulogy to say that he is by all odds the
ablest strategist and commander that the Allied armies
have produced.

CHAPTEB IV.

Sunday, the 25th of April, at 4:30 in the morning,
the British made an attack on St. Julien and the woodbsi
around it with a brigade plus two batteries. This force
reached the village near the edge of the woods, but there
the German machine guns brought it to a halt, which
halt continued all day, the British being unable to ad-
vance in the face of this withering machine gun fire and
the German infantry unable to turn it out of its position.
Some idea of the fierceness of the fighting at this point
may be gathered from the fact that the British during
that day threw in no less than 15 batteries, besides con-
siderable artillery to the support of this one force.

Further to the east, at Gravenstafel, there was also
hard fighting from two o'clock Sunday afternoon. At
night-fall the British here were obliged to retreat, and
by midnight had fallen back as far as the eastern bank
of the Haanebeeke rivulet. At Broodseinde, directly
south from Gravenstafel, the fighting was hard all day
Sunday, but here the British did better than elsewhere
and held their position, though violently shelled in ad-
dition to the heavy infantry attacks. Along and to the
west of the Yser-Yperlee Canal, from Boesinghe to
Woesten and Crombeke, the French held the line, and
held it gallantly, supporting several German attacks all
Sunday and Sunday night ; and Monday morning found
them still in their original positions, though badly cut
up.

The Belgians, still further to the west, (south of Dix-
mude), were severely attacked on Sunday night, but
they also held their ground. On Monday, the 26th, the
British moved the Lahore Division of Indian troops
north of Ypres, where the fighting was most severe ; and
also threw what was left of the 7th Canadian Brigade
into the line. During this day the British were driven
back from Broodseinde, and the British force on the
Haanebeeke was thrown back to the west side of that
stream. The Germans, in possession of the village of St.
Julien, were able to launch attack after attack from that
village towards the Ypres- Yperlee Canal, having in
front of them remaining Canadians, to whose stub-

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born resistance at this point it is partly due that Ypres
was not captured. The position of the British at this
point on this front became desperate. As their salient
was being forced in more and more, and therefore be-
came exposed to fire of the enemy's artillery on three
sides, strong measures had to be taken to disengage the
troops from their desperate position. Accordingly
about ten o'clock in the morning a regular brigade un-
der Greneral Riddle, and the Lahore Division, moved on
Fortuin under orders to re-take St. Julien and the woods
around it. When this attack was delivered, the French
beyond the Yser-Yperlee Canal were delivering an as-
sault on Lizeme, supported by Belgian artillery and
also had engaged the Germans who had forced their way
to the west bank of the canal.

At Boesinghe another advance movement was being
made towards Pilkem by French colored troops. The
idea of this movement was for all these forces to move in
unison. When the attack was delivered, however, the
Germans again made use of gas and this broke up the
attack of the French colored troops on Pilkem, as they
received the full force of the gas. The Indian troops
and General Riddle's Brigade attacking St. Julien suc-
ceeded in taking the outskirts of that village, but were
held up there until General Riddle fell, about half past
three, after which this force was obliged to fall back and
abandon the ground taken. That night the Allied line
of battle was further driven back until it ran from the
station at Zonnebekke westward to the Gravenstafel
ridge, then southwest to the western side of the Hanne-
beeke River to a point a little to the east of St. Julien,
whence, curving around this point, it proceeded to a
point on the Ypres-PoelcappeUe road and thence ran
to Boesinghe on the Yser-Yperlee Canal and on the rail-
road from Ypres to Bruges. Here it crossed the canal
and ran northward to Lizeme to the west of the canal,
which was held by the French whose line continued
northward until it joined that of the Belgians still fur-
ther to the west, towards the channel coast.

The following day what was left of the Lahore Div-
ison of Lidian troops, and the French who touched on
their position on the left, made another attempt to at-
tack the Germans, but this was defeated and no progress
was made. The Germans again used gas to halt this

OTlllSiCEim

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

Both sides were now nearly exhausted, and the next
day, (Wednesday, the 28th) the whole line rested, ex-
cept that the French made a successful advance move-
ment on Lizerne to the west of the canal, north of Boes-
inghe, and managed also to get a footing in the hamlet
of Het Sast on the east bank of the canal between these
two places.

Sir John French, the next day, was about to withdraw
his forces from the line of Boesinghe-Zonnebekke, owing
to the fear he had that their communications would be
cut as a result of the capture of St. Julien by the Ger-
mans. General Foch, however, with great difficulty per-
suaded the British (Jeneralissimo to hold his position for
a short time longer because General Foch intended, af-
ter re-enforcing the French troops north of Lizerne, to
make a vigorous attack on the Germans from Lizerne
and from Het Sast. Except for artillery duels on the
29th, north of Ypres, neither side moved.

On the 30th General Foch carried out his promise and
the French forces under General Putz made a most vig-
orous attack on the Germans from the two places above
mentioned as a base. This attack was partly successful
and the Germans were forced back a considerable dis-
tance in the vicinity of Pilkem. Some artillery and some
prisoners were captured; heavy losses being inflicted
upon the Teutonic troops. But this attack was fruitless
for the reason that from Het Sast south towards Ypres,
upon the canal, the Germans had most strongly installed
themselves and established several lines of defensive
trenches which it would be impossible to take rapidly,
and as long as these remained untaken the British posi-
tion was gravely menaced. General French therefore
sent an order on May 1st for the British troops to with-
draw, which retreat was carried out more or less in good
order.

Sir John French has been considerably criticized by
military experts for this retrograde movement, but it
was thought that it was necessary at this time, because
the English troops were exposed to gas attacks by the
Germans on three sides and, further, were not then
equipped with respirators and other devices which
enabled them, later, to come through these attacks prac-
tically without injury.

Two gas attacks were made this day by the Germans

-^
1

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

at Hill No. 60 and at Neuve Chapelle, but as wind con-
ditions were not favorable, these attacks accomplished
little.

The early part of Sunday, the 2nd of May, passed
quietly, but in the late afternoon another attempt was
made by the Germans to force a passage through the
Allied line between Boesinghe on the Yser-Yperlee Canal
and Zonnebekke on the railroad from Ypres to Eoulers.
At one point south of St. Julien, and at another between
Fortuin and Zonnebekke, the British line was forced
back, but the timely arrival of reserves which came up
from Potijze enabled the British to return to the charge
and to retake their abandoned trenches. Some bayonet
fighting, in which both sides claimed the advantage, took
place on either flank of this main attack.

On Monday, the 3rd, the Germans renewed the attack
on the British lines by delivering a feint attack between
St. Julien and Pilkem, on which the Allied artillery
opened and halted, whereupon the Germans as-
saulted the northern side of the salient and forced the
British in the village of Gravenstafel to fall back to the
northwest of that village. Night attacks followed these
day attacks, but accomplished little. During the night
the British fell back again and constituted a new line
beginning at the French trenches to the west of the road
running from Ypres to Langemarck and running to the
Haanebeeke stream to a point thereon known as the
Frezenberg road. From here it turned south, running
to the east of Hooge and curving southward to the fam-
ous Hill 60. All the area to the east of this, which had
been the scene of the violent combats described hereto-
fore in the past few days, was thus abandoned. Mean-
while, south of Dixmude to the west of the French po-
sition, there had been severe fighting between the
Germans and the Belgians, in which the Belgians showed
remarkable tenacity and managed to hold the enemy.

May 5th was characterized by hard fighting between
the Germans and French along the Ypres- Yperlee Canal,
where the Germans stopped a vigorous attack by the
French under General Putz which had for its object to
drive them back across this canal. This fight continued
more or less violently for the next ten days. The
French abandoned infantry attacks and endeavored to
force their way forward on the line from Lizeme to
Boesinghe and Steenstraate and the banks of the canal.
Early in the morning of May 5th a gas attack was made

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

upon Hill 60 by the Germans, which resulted in a
British retreat. The Germans followed, standing gal-
lantly up under severe punishment by the British artil-
lery, and took the trenches on the north of the hill and
carried this movement as far forward as the British
trenches in the direction of Zillebeke. Attack and coun-
ter-attack in this section followed all day, and the
struggle was probably as severe as fighting well could
be. Both sides lost heavily, and apparently without
consciousness of their losses, the fighting being of a des-
perate hand-to-hand character which gave no oppor-
tunity for the combatants to even look around. The
result was that when the night fell the Germans had
made a further gain and had taken the crest of the hill.
During the night the British dealt a violent counter-
attack against the German positions on the crest of the
hill but were repulsed ; and the Germans then attacking,
the British fell back, so that the early morning of May
6th found the Germans in possession of Hill 60 and the
supporting trenches to the northward.

While these events were taking place around Hill 60,
there had been attempts on the part of the Germans to
pierce the British line along the Ypres-Roulers Bail-
road, but these were unsuccessful.

May 7th was a comparatively quiet day, but the
struggle on May 8th more than made up for any quiet-
ness of the preceding day. This day of May 8th was
probably as animated as any prior day in this move-
ment. The struggle began with a Gierman artillery
attack on the British positions north and south of Frez-
enberg, which is a small village lying between Zonne-
bekke and Ypres, almost directly north of Westhoek, and
about three-quarters of a mile to west of the Haanebeeke
river. This artillery attack caused numerous losses to
the British, and when a little later the enemy's infantry
attack was launched against the British front between
the Ypres-Poelcappelle and the Ypres-Menin road, one
to the north and another to the south of the Ypres-
Boulers railroad, (these two roads forming the two sides
of a triangle and the British line the base), the British
line broke and would have been totally overwhelmed had
it not been for the devoted gallantry of a Canadian
regiment, the Princess Patricia Light Infantry, whose
courage and daring momentarily saved the situation. A
little while later another portion of the British line
broke, necessitating the retirement of the whole line,

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

and the consequent capture of Frezenberg by the Ger-
mans. But the British were not yet beaten and after a
short time a counter-attack by them was launched, and
after very fierce fighting Frezenberg was recovered, but
only momentarily. The Grermans immediately concen-
trated a heavy artillery fire upon this point and the
British were again forced to retire, which they did to a
line running north and south of Velorenhoek, a hamlet
about a mile to the west of Frezenberg. About a mile
north of this hamlet lies the village of Wieltje, and in a
short time the Germans not only captured Wieltje but
other forces came through the Bellewaarde Woods and
threatened the British position on that side also. Re-en-
forcements were promptly sent to Wieltje and after a
very hard fight this place was recaptured near midnight
by the British and the tension on the north removed.

The next day the Allies, acting in concert, attempted,
by a general offensive on the fronts from Armentieres
to Arras, to relieve the pressure on this Ypres front,
and undoubtedly did compel the withdrawal of German
troops from the Ypres front; to which circumstances
it may be partly attributed that the German attack on
Ypres at this time was not successful.

All this day the fight continued on all sides of the
town, but the only marked advance by the Germans was
the capture of the Chateau de Hooge, a point to the west
of the Bellewaarde Woods on the Menin- Ypres road.

The next day there was considerable fighting north
and south of this Menin- Ypres road, following an ar-
tillery attack, which fighting was indecisive, though on
the north side this attack destroyed the British trenches
and forced the British to abandon the Bellewaarde Woods
completely.

The next day, the 11th, the Germans bombarded
Ypres itself, though there were some skirmishes south
of the Menin road. This bombardment continued all
through Wednesday but on this day particular atten-
tion was paid to the British trenches which led the Bri-
tish to believe that a determined assault would be made
soon ; this idea induced them to bring up practically all
their reserves into the fighting line, particularly the
center.

Thursday, May 13th, opened with a very heavy bom-
bardment by the Germans of the British line. The
weather was abominable, which added to tk« British dis-
comfort. Early in the morning the British forces, cross-

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

ing the Ypres-Roulers railroad, were forced to fall back
about a quarter of a mile, as a result of the strength
of the bombardment. The rest of the line, however,
held firm. In the afternoon a counter-attack was de-
livered by the British, which was successful for a time,
and regained the positions abandoned in the morning,
but was unable to hold them as the Germans immediately
opened a very heavy artillery fire on the British, forcing
them again to withdraw. Nightfall found the enemies
in practically the position of the early afternoon. This
was the last serious fighting at this portion of the line
for some time.

Further north, a little later, the French, under Gen-
eral Putz, on May 15th, attacked the hamlets of Steens-
traate and Het Sast. This movement was performed
by Zouaves and Algerian native troops, and was success-
ful, the Algerians taking Steenstraate, and the Zouaves
Het Sast. The Germans that night counter-attacked at
both places, but after severe fighting, in which there
were many casualties on both sides, this counter-attack
was thrown back. This was the last hard fighting in
this section of the line and from this date, on the west
bank of the Ypres-Yperlee Canal may be considered to
have been clear of the Germans.

While these things were taking place here, further to
the west there were minor engagements between the
Germans and the Belgians from time to time, but which
were without any particular significance or any real
effect on the main battle. In addition to this, the ports
of the Belgian coast, which the Germans had already
transformed into submarine bases, were bombarded oc-
casionally by French and British warships; the bom-
barders reporting that they had inflicted great damage
and the bombarded stating that the bombarders had
accomplished but little. The presumption is that the
bombardment of a land position from the sea inflicts
no very great amount of material damage.

These Belgian ports, as well as points in the interior
of Belgium used by the Germans for munition depots
or supply points, were from time to time attacked by
Allied air-men, and the same claims and counter-claims
made by both sides as to the results of these attacks.
Though not specifically mentioned in the description
of the fighting in and around Ypres, there was, during
the entire period of this conflict (to which history will
probably give the name of the Second Battle of Ypres)

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

continuous activity by the aircraft on both sides and
many interesting and exciting mid-air conflicts took
place, but as these had no real effect on the issue of the
battle, the exigencies of space forbid more than this brief
mention of them.

In summing up the second battle of Ypres, it may be
said that the Allies owed the fact that Ypres was not
taken to the splendid courage and brilliant fighting
qualities of the Canadian troops present on this field;
and among the Canadian regiments which should be
cited as having particularly distinguished themselves,
should be mentioned the Princess Patricia Light In-
fantry, which at the beginning of this battle had effective
about 1500 men and came out of it with 150 fighting men
and a few stretcher bearers; thus losing 90 per cent of
its effective, a record which is perhaps unequalled in the
annals of war.

CHAPTER V

We will now turn our attention to the fighting whieh
began May 9th to the south of Ypres. The most north-
em portion of these fights was again fought in the same
terrain as that on which the battle of Neuve Chapelle
in March (hereinbefore described) had taken place, and
was part of a French and British oflfensive which began
a little to the south of Armentieres and extended to just
north of Arras. It will be remembered in the account
of the battle of Neuve Chapelle that the Aubers Bidge
was indicated as the ultimate objective of the British
in that battle, and the reasons why the position of this
ridge was so important were indicated and the ridge
itself described. The only real result of this battle of
Neuve Chapelle accruing to the British was that the
village of Neuve Chapelle itself had been captured,
enabling them to launch the oflfensive which they were
now about to undertake against the Aubers Ridge, from
a starting point near the Aubers Ridge. The action
began on the west, the British concentration taking place
from Bethune to Armentieres, and opened with an artil-
lery attack which commenced at daybreak the morning
of May 9th. This artillery attack lasted about an hour,
and towards 6 o'clock the infantry attack began by an
advance north of Promelles by a portion of the 4th
British Corps who carried the first German trenches at
the point of the bayonet and pressed on nearly to Hau-
bourdin, a suburb of Lille. But at this time the Ger-
mans launched a counter-attack from the city of Lille
itself, which forced them back and recovered all the
ground which the British troops had gained in that first
rush.

Further south, on the line from Neuve Chapelle to
Festubert, (a village to the southwest of Neuve Chapelle)
another British attack, composed of the 1st Corps and
the Lidian contingent, was hurled in the direction of
Aubers. This attack, like the other attack, was at first
successful. The Indians got across the River des Layes
and captured a position in front of the village of From-
elles, a little to the northeast of Aubers, which village,
with. Aubers itself and the first line of German trenches

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

on the heights of the ridge of the same name, had been
pounded to pieces by the British artillery attack. But
the Germans had merely retreated to their second line
trenches, and as soon as the British had reached their
former first line trenches, they, by a counter-attack,
aided by a very large number of machine guns, succeed-
ed in throwing back in some confusion the British punch
at their center, and forcing the enemy to fall back to
practically the same positions from which they started,
with the result that the attack was called off.

On the morning of May 10th the 4th and 1st British
Corps were drawn back close together and an attack on
the Aubers Bidge, upon a front running from Neuve
Chapelle to Givenchy, was determined upon. But it
was resolved that this attack would not be made until
the British artillery had more thoroughly prepared the
ground for the infantry advance than had been the case
the day before. To this end artillery re-enforcements
were hurried to this front and the offensive fixed for the
night of the 12th. For various reasons, however, this
was subsequently postponed until the night of the 15th.
This interval was occupied by more or less vigorous ar-
tillery duels between the combatants, and in this in-
terval the Canadian Division was brought down from
Ypres and thrown into the battle line, presumably be-
cause the British commanders knew that these troops
could be relied upon to advance without flinching. The
assault was to be delivered from a point to the south
of Neuve Chapelle on the road to La Bassee, known as
Richebourg-rAvoue, and another little hamlet to the
southwest of this point on the road towards Pestubert,
known as La Quinque Rue, and thence to Festubert.
The country between here and the foot of the Aubers
Ridge was flat and intersected at intervals by ditchesf
of more or less width and depth, but which were largely
concealed by grass. Comparatively little protection
was afforded to the enemy by trees or by other natural
defenses. A few houses were scattered over this flat
land, which had been converted by the Germans into
block houses and equipped with machine guns. The
real German defenses were along three lines of trenches
which intervened between the British and the Aubers
Ridge, and which were constructed with all the refine-
ments known to the art of field fortification.

This time night was chosen for the assault and about
midnight on the 15th the British left their trenches and

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

advanced to the assault. The first misfortune happened
to the Indians who were advancing through Richebourg-
TAvoue and who were held up at that point for some
time by the intensity of the infantry and machine gun
fire of the Germans. South of these came the 2nd Divi-
sion, whose left reached the first line of German trenches
but was obliged to halt there to wait for the Indians
to disentangle themselves and to come up, so as not to
break connection with them.

The center and right of this 4th Division were more
fortunate, as they penetrated for about 600 yards, on
an 800-yard front, into the German second line of
trenches, but these advances were only gained at the
price of numerous losses on the part of the assailants.

Towards three o'clock in the morning, the 7th Division
was launched to the attack from Festubert, and this at-
tack succeeded so well that by seven o'clock this division
had advanced to the east of La Quinque Rue, but was
not in touch with the 2nd Division in the north from
whom it was divided by the enemy's field fortifications.

An attack against the German rear lines of communi-
cation, launched from La Quinque Rue, was made early
in the morning, but did not succeed. The attack of the
Indians to the north which, as has been said, was un-
successful, was completely suspended. During the rest
of the day the British endeavored to connect the flanks
of the 2nd and 7th Divisions.

Towards evening the Germans counter-attacked, and
the advance points of the 7th Division were driven in
on the main body of the salient.

Next morning. May 17th, in the midst of a driving
rain, the British again attemptd to advance, and in the
case of the 7th Division in front of Festubert were suc-
cessful. This division pressed along southward to the
German trenches and the 2nd Division to the north
fought its way towards Violaines; while still further
the left wing (the Indian corps) threw itself upon Es-
taires, and this joint movement attained a considerable
degree of success in that it captured practically the en-
tire first line of German trenches and, in a number of
places, the second and third lines as well ; while, in a few
places, the British had reached the foot of the Aubers
Ridge.

On the 18th the advance continued on the part of the
British and by night they had advanced to a point some
1200 yards north of their original line of departure

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

along the Festubert-La Quinque Bue road. But this was
the culmination of their efforts and the battle the next
day was recognized as having been finished by the with-
drawal of the 2nd and 7th Divisions. For the second
time Aubers had not been attained.

Some minor fighting concluded the battle. On Thurs-
day, the 18th of May, the Canadians gained a little
ground northeast of the Festubert-La Quinque Bue
road, and the next day they repulsed several severe
counter-attacks from the direction of Chapelle St. Boch.
But on the 23rd the Germans made a strong counter-
attack in an effort to break through the Canadian posi-
tion at Festubert, but this was unsuccessful, as was a like
counter-attack on the night of the 24th and 25th.

The battle was now completely over, and as a net re-
sult the British had gained on a four-mile front an
average width of 300 to 350 yards. But this had cost
them from 6000 to 7000 men, and it may be doubted
whether this comparatively trifling advantage was worth
the price paid for it in human life and in human suf-
fering.

Sir John French so often in his reports talks of tht
moral superiority which the British achieve over the
Germans. His very first report, in August of 1914,
lays claim to this superiority, and in his report of the
last battle, of Aubers and Festubert, he again lays claim
to the same moral superiority. But to the neutral ob-
server this appears to be unproven because an army
which had established moral superiority over its enemy
would hardly have retired as consistently and as con-
tinuously before that enemy as has been the case of the
British army from August 1914 to the end of this par-
ticular battle.

CHAPTER VI

South, of Neuve Ghappelle on a 25 to 30 mile line
separating that village from the town of Arras, during
the month of April, there had been the usual indecisive
and uninteresting trench fighting intersi)ersed with hand
grenade combats and occasional infantry skirmishes be-
tween the French and their Qerman opponents, but
nothing had taken place which materially influenced the
positions of the respective contending forces. And this
condition of affairs continued during the month of April
and into the early part of May. But this apparent
calm sealed, in reality, extensive preparations by Gen-
eral Joffre for an offensive against the Qerman position
on this line.

By May 8th, French troops in large numbers had been
concentered on the national highroad which ran south-
ward from Bethune to Arras. At this time the German
lines were on all sides of Arras, but the western side
of Arras itself was but a salient exposed to heavy ar-
tillery fire and had, in fact, been several times bombarded
and was nearly destroyed as a city.

North of Arras the Qerman line had been pushed a
considerable distance to the west, the most westerly
point of this line being the viUage of Carency which
had been turned by the Gtermans into defensive field
fortifications of great strength ; and to the north of Car-
ency, Loos, which was a little northwest of Lens, had
also been similarly fortified. The end of this German
line was La Bassee which had by this time completely
lost the semblance of a town, so many times had it been
bombarded by the French and English in their efforts^
which had been unsuccessful, to destroy the German
field fortifications there.

South of Arras the German line again curved to th€
west. The immediate objective of this French attack,
which was delivered practically along the whole line
already set forth, was the capture of Lens, which was an
important point not only because it was the center of
the French coal mining district, but also because at it

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

concentrated several railroads and many high roads,
with the consequence that it played an extremely im-
portant part in the (German line of communications.

The French attack was made in two directions, from
Arras in the south, whence it proceeded northeasterly
in the general direction of Lens, and from Bethune,
whence it proceeded southwest ; also towards Lens, where
it was intended that the two columns should unite in the
event they succeeded in breaking through the German
lines.

The first point of shock was Carency and the attack
began, as usual, with artillery preparation. The object
of artillery preparation is three-fold: first, to destroy
that class of defenses such as wire entanglements, etc.,
etc., which intervene between advancing troops and the
enemy's first line of defenses; second, to destroy and
render untenable the first line of defenses ; and, thirdly,
by means of a fire trained beyond the first line of de-
fenses and between it and the second line of defenses,
or such points in the rear as reserves may be known to
be stationed at, to prevent aid being brought to the first
line of defenses from the rear thereof. Li addition to
these three, there is a collateral object; that of destroy-
ing the morale of the opposing troops so that when the
infantry rush, which follows the artillery preparation,
comes, these troops being depressed and dejected —
stunned as it were — ^by the artillery fire, will not put
up so strong a resistance as they would otherwise.

The concentration of artillery on Carency was per-
haps the heaviest which had been known to that time on
the western front. Prom official sources we know that
the French had concentered along a line of not more
than six or seven miles to the westward of this town
1050 guns of various calibres. These opened in chorus
as soon as day broke on May 8th and this bombardment
continued about four hours, when towards nine o'clock
in the morning the infantry advance was ordered.

According to the testimony of eye witnesses, the ef-
fects of this bombardment were terrific. Trenches were
blown into the air and their defenders battered out of
all semblance of humanity, while the ground in front
of the French artillery positions seemed like a field
traversed by gigantic furrows.

The infantry attack after such preparation was taken
part in by four French army corps and was success-
ful. During the first day, the French advanced

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

steadily and took trench after trench from the Germans,
the movement finally culminating in the capture of the
town of Carency with its garrison of considerable
strength, with much artillery of all kinds and more
munitions of war than had been captured by the French
in any action against the Germans since the battle of
the Aisne.

While these things were taking place at Carency, the
same day the French further north made an advance in
the direction of Loos, which, as it will be remembered,
is a little to the northwest of Lens. This advance was at
first successful and material gains were made by the
French all along the line, but a German counter-offen-
sive delivered almost immediately succeeded in recap-
turing most of the ground lost, and consequently there
was but little net gain for the French in this operation.
South of Carency the advance was also not so success-
ful, though the French line was pushed forward to the
outskirts of Souchez. This ground was steadily fought
over from May 30th to June 17th without intermission or
respite. There was not an hour of truce nor an in-
stant of repose. The heat was great and the men fought
almost stripped. Both sides lost heavily, but the morale
of the troops of neither was in the slightest degree im-
paired. The struggle was to a very large degree a hand
to hand fight of desperate intensity. To the east of Arras,
however, the French attack beat itself in vain against the
German defensive.

On all these points fighting continued almost without
intermission for the remainder of this month, the most
important points of conflict being those points which
figured so often in the bulletins at this time, — Souchez,
Neuville, Angers, Lorette Heights and the Labyrinth;
and the struggle for which places lasted for weeks.

Space forbids the narration of the ebb and flow of
the fighting in this sector, since points on this long line
changed hands during the period of the next two or
three months a dozen times; for instance at the famous
Labyrinth, the village of Souchez, the cemetery of which
was taken and retaken no less than nineteen times, while
the sugar refinery, a little further to the east, changed
hands almost daily for a period of several weeks.

At the beginning of July the French had made a gain
on this front of perhaps, at its greatest distance from

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

west to east, three miles, but which averages, necessarily,
much less. This had been accomplished at an awful cost
to both sides.

The whole operation can be characterized as a ** nib-
ble, '* and bore no resemblance to the strong drive so
often and so constantly announced officially and unoffi-
cially from London during the early Spring. And this
gain, important as it may hereafter prove, is fairly said
tjO be counter-balanced by the Gterman advance in the
Ypres sector.

From July onward to September 1st the operations
on this front dwindled away to a form of trench fight-
ing which differed but little from that of the monotonous
days of the preceding winter, and present no features
of interest to the reader. One day so greatly resembled
the other that the only incidents reported were an occas-
ional gain of a few feet of trenches by one combatant
or the other, an artillery duel of more or less violence,
(principally less) ; in short, a dull monotony of routine
fighting in which the great object of both sides was to
conserve as far as possible their resources both of men
and of materials.

Prom the first of May until towards the end of Au-
gust, the French port of Dunkirk on the Channel, far
behind the Allied lines, as well as two or three other
smaller towns in the same region, were somewhat mys-
teriously bombarded by a German gun of enormous cali-
bre from a point, the location of which remains unknown
to this day. From the distance at which the German
lines were from this town, it is certain that this gun
could not have been closer to Dunkirk than a distance
of 21 miles, and was, perhaps located even two or three
miles further off. The effect of this bombardment was
more moral than otherwise. A few of the population of
Dunkirk were killed and a few buildings damaged, but,
on the whole, its material result was insignificant. It
was, however, of the greatest interest to learn that it
was possible for a piece of artillery to be used effectively
at anything like this distance, as nothing similar had oc-
curred before in the annals of war; which fact opens
up a great vista of possibilities in the future, when guns
of this character are more nearly perfected and become
more numerous, since then it would be entirely feasible
to conduct an effective bombardment of a place from a
distance of over twenty miles ; a thing which only a few
years ago would never have been dreamed of as being

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

even within the limits of possibility. Too technical to
be treated of here, an analaysis of the trajectory of the
projectile fired from this giant piece would be most in-
teresting to those of my readers who are mathematically
inclined. One fact which is understandable by the non-
technical reader, and may be of interest, however, u
that this projectile must have reached a height of at leasl
eight miles from the mouth of the cannon from whidi
it was fired in order to have covered this distance ; and
nothing made by human beings has been established,
even mathematically, to have attained this height from
the earth, heretofore.

South of Arras to the great angle of the line at Bebu-
court from March 1st to September 1st, comparatively
little occurred. In the early days of June the French
launched an attack on the town of Hubertine, some 13
miles to the southwest of Arras, in which they scored
an unimportant advantage and took a few prisoners;
while about this same time a few miles southeast of
Noyons, north of the Aisne, the French made another
attack on the German positions and again captured a
few prisoners.

Towards the end of June, south of Noyons, fighting
began around the so-called Quennevieres Farm, in which
the French gained an initial success and captured the
farm.

During the next three or four weeks this portion of
the line was the scene of considerable activity, the (Ger-
mans making several counter-attacks in an endeavor to
re-capture the position, but failing therein.

CHAPTER Vn

IN CHAMPAGNE

During the whole month of March, on this portion of
the line, there was but little to record, though between
Sheims and the Argonne the French offensive, which had
been raging in the Champagne district and the plain of
Chalons and its neighborhood since late in January, still
gave some signs of life and still strove intermittently to
push north in the plain of the Chalons, with the object
of interposing a French force between the Gterman arm-
ies in front of Verdun in the east, and in front of Bheims
in the west. A line of railroad runs south from Sedan
reaching Vouziers and, turning west, runs in that direc-
tion from the north of Bheims towards the Channel. If
the French had been successful in cutting this line, which
was their object, the (lerman army in front of Bheims
would have been cut off from eastern communication;
the French would have been upon their left flank and
would have been reaching out towards other lines of com-
munication in the rear, which would have placed this
army in a somewhat precarious position.

But though for weeks, more or less action took place
in this campaign, and LeMesne, Perthes and Beausejour,
and the neighborhood, were the scenes of continual fight-
ing, the French made little or no progress. The fiercest
of this fighting took place in the early part of March,
when the French made an attack on the Oerman
position between the Sabot Wood and Perthes. Souain
and Perthes are connected by a road which runs
nearly all the way on the crest of the hills be-
tween these two places. The Gterman trenches extended
north of this road, while the French ran to the south
thereof, partly protected by the ground. In order to
make the French position secure, it was necessary to
capture the crest line which ran east and west through
this Sabot "Wood and which was strongly fortified by the
Germans.

On March 7th an infantry attack was made on this
German position, after the usual preliminary bombard-
ment. This assault was delivered both from the west and
from the southwest. The western attack was brought to

IN CHAMPAGNE

a standstill on entering the Sabot "Wood, by tremendous
fire from machine guns. The southwestern attack was
more successful and resulted in the capture of both the
German first and second line trenches, and even advanced
beyond this point, but was thrown back, and the French
installed themselves in the captured German second line
trenches. During the night of the 7th the Germans at-
tacked the French in this position continually, hoping to
regain the lost ground. On the 8th hard fighting took
place, and the French held their ground. The next few
days were spent in consolidating the position, and on the
14th a further attack was made on the German positions
to the east, but unsuccessfully.

A second attack was made on the 15th and after hard
fighting the French were successful and the Ger-
mans evacuated the Sabot Wood completely. Elsewhere
on the line the policy of nibbling, which Joffre had inau-
gurated, was continued, but this also produced no results
of the slightest strategic importance. This policy of
nibbling was simply a plan of making a series of attacks
at widely separated points, at which points the attackers
would mass large forces of infantry supported by very
heavy concentrations of artillery, under the fire of which
the first German trenches were to be rushed. The as-
sailants were then to face these trenches about and in
them resist counter-attacks which the Germans would find
themselves obliged to make. This policy would, it was
supposed, cost the Germans far more men than it would
the Allies, and, by so doing, would weaken the German
defense, already weaker than the Allies in point of num-
bers.

The inventors of this nibbling strategy, however, did
not explain why their assaults could be accomplished at
comparatively little expense in point of casualties, nor
why the German attacks upon the new positions which
these assaults won would be so much more costly to the
Germans than the assaults had been to the Allies.

This plan further contemplated a fresh attack on any
point of the line from which it was found that the Ger-
mans had sent troops to reenf orce the German line at any
point which the Allies were engaged in attacking. To ac-
complish this successfully, we suppose two things: firstly,
that the Allies at the original attacking point would be
able to identify the fresh troops brought against them,
and that the General Staff of the Allies knew exactly the
positions on this long line of all the German troops in or-

IN CHAMPAGNE

der that they might be able to gradually determine what
point in the line opposed to them had been weakened by
the withdrawal of such troops; secondly, it necessitated
the power on the part of the Allies to hold their lines
permanently at points in great numerical superiority to
the Germans, or else to be able to concentrate at any time,
at any point in the line, a large force very quickly. Unless
either one of these alternatives were performed by them,
they could not hope to attack successfully the weakened
point of the German line.

To the Allied mind, the objective of these nibbling of-
fensives was not so much to pierce the German line as to
keep up a continual wearing-down process which, if per-
sisted in for a long enough time, would so weaken the
German line that it would have to give, practically all
along this front.

The correctness of this view depended on whether or
not the British and French General Staffs were accurate
in their contention that the German resources in men had
reached their zenith and would thenceforth decline, since,
if this was not true, the Germans could at any time throw
fresh troops from new levies into this western line and
replace the losses caused by this attrition policy of the
Allies.

The history of the past six months shows that the Al-
lies were completely mistaken in their estimate of Ger
many's lack of power to renew its forces; because, dur-
ing this time, Germany has held the western line, to all
intents and purposes, in exactly the position it was on
March 1st, 1915; has waged a campaign against Russia
which has forced that nation to a most disastrous retreat ;
while her ally, Austria, (the supposedly decrepit) haji
been able to aid her efficiently in the enterprise against
Bussia and has held back the Italian army on the south.

One great misfortune of the Allies all through this
war has been that, with the exception of Prance, they
have been intoxicated by the sense of their own import-
ance and have continuously and extraordinarily under-
estimated their opponents' resources, both in men, money
and ingenuity. The result of all of which has been dis-
astrous to themselves; since wars are won by fighting
with the arms and not with the tongue.

This condition of quiescence continued on this portion
of the western front practically all the month of May,
and the only incidents of any importance were a few
skirmishes in the angle between the Oise and the Aisne

IN CHAMPAGNE

Rivers in the vicinity of Tracy-le-Val ; further to the east
in the forest of Le Pretre, to the north of Pont-a-Mons-
son in what has now come to be known as the St. Mihiel
salient, the French, in a fight lasting intermittently for
several weeks, gained considerable ground. And this
was the sum total of the Allied reply to the victories in
Galicia.

It will be remembered that several months before, in
an interview which, though at first denied, was after-
wards admitted to be substantially correct, Lord Kitch-
ener, the British Minister of War, and the man respon-
sible for the recent organization of Britain's new armies,
to which the title of ** Kitchener's Millions" had been
given by the British Press, and accordingly grasped by
the American, had said that the war would begin about
the first of May. On this statement of Lord Kitchener's,
for the whole winter the English Press and American
copyists teamed with allusions to the coming of the spring
as the beginning of a great drive which was to hurl the
German army out of France and Belgium in confusion
and disorder, and was to redeem England's promise to
Belgium of August and September, 1914.

On June 1st, 1915, this promise remained unfulfilled.
The British then held, as they had held for months, but
a trifle more than thirty miles of the 500 miles of this
western front, and this they held with great difficulty.
True it is that a force whose strength cannot be accurate-
ly given had been thrown into France from England,
composed of half -drilled boys, lacking in officers who had
ever seen a battlefield or who had ever led their men
even into a skirmish. This is not said in disparagement
to the individual courage of those troops; it is merely
said to point out the reason why these half-baked bricks
had to be held in France for several months and, to a
large extent, drilled and trained by French officers who
had smelt powder ; because it is a fact that these English
troops were so drilled and so trained, and that a special
organization of French officers was formed to supply de-
ficiencies of the training which had been given these men
in England.

This was not Kitchener's fault, considering the extra-
ordinary manner in which he had been forced by the
British government to raise men to defend Great Britain
plunged in the greatest war of history. By a form of so-
licitation they dragged the honor and dignity of the na-
tion in the gutter in that most disgraceful advertising

IN CHAMPAGNE

campaign, wherein a British subject was solicited to do
as a favor that duty which the State should have com-
pelled him to do as its right ; thus putting the supreme
service to one's country in the same class of commodity
as a soap or a particular kind of cigarette, or the bar-
gains in the ladies' shops.

It was, in truth, marvelous that Kitchener achieved
what he did in raising troops for Great Britain, and it
may be said that his achievements were made in spite of,
and not with the aid of, this most remarkable exhibition
of cowardice on the part of the British government.

This advertising campaign was probably unique
in the world's history: it appealed not only to men
themselves to enlist, but appealed to the women of Great
Britain to make them enlist ; appealed to the clergymen
to use their influence upon their male parishioners for a
like end, to masters to procure the enlistment of their ser-
vants, to wives to send away their husbands, dangling
before their eyes the separation allowance, greater than
those husbands' earnings, etc., etc.

Every art and device of advertising which experience
has shown to be successful in inducing the public to pur-
chase a new baby food or other article that appeals to the
popular imagination, was used.

The occasion called for other and more dignified
methods, which would have required an infinitely smaller
expense and produced an infinitely greater result, and
would have savored less of the methods of the advance
agent of a circus. * ' By their fruits shall ye know them, ' '
and the fruits of this British advertising campaign for
men, which had begun months beforehand, resulted, on
June 1, 1915, in the British holding thirty odd miles of
the western front ; the French holding over five hundred
miles ; but the French had not resorted to a campaign of
publicity to raise an army.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

The fighting in the Forest of the Argonne during the
month of March was confined almost entirely to artillery
duels and to mining operations, these latter being out of
proportion in their number on this front owing to the
topography of the country.

The Forest of Argonne, which is the name given to the
entire region stretching, roughly, from Suippes to near
Apremont, is at once one of the most difficult and import-
ant fields of campaign in the French line. The object of
the German army here is to force its way forward
through the forest, past Valmy and Triaucourt, so that
the line, instead of running to the east as it now does
would run almost directly south from the vicinity of
Charnyto Beauzee, and even further to the east of Beau-
zee ; the ultimate design being to connect this line with
the line at St. Mihiel, and to complete, thereby, the sur-
rounding of the fortress of Verdun, which is the most
important point on the battle line in France. No con-
quest of France can be really made until this position is
in the hands of the invader. It is to-day what it always
has been, the key to Paris and to the heart of France.

In the early part of the struggle, just before the Battle
of the Marne, the German line had nearly reached the
above described position leaving only the gap of less than
30 miles between Beauzee and the point nearest to it on
the German line to the east to be closed ; but, subsequent
to the Battle of the Marne, as my readers know, the Ger-
man line had retreated considerably to the northward.
A reference to the map in the first volume will show the
distance more plainly than words.

In March, as has already been said, the fighting was
of a very confined character ; the forest was full of snow,
and when, later, in April, the thaw set in, infantry fight-
ing then became almost impossible and consequently it
was not until fairly late in May that any real infantry
fighting took place.

About the 20th of May, the French began an attack
on the German positions in the center of the forest, pre-

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

paring the way by artillery preparation as usaal, and on
the 22nd made an infantry attack on these positions. For
a couple of days the fighting continued rather severely
and culminated in a general action all along the line on
the 23rd. This, however, finally resulted in the French
being repulsed and falling back to their original positions
with very heavy losses in proportion to the number en-
gaged.

For several days after this intermittent attacks were
made by the French which resulted in little, if any, gain
for them.

With the coming of June the fighting resumed its us-
ual character and all the early portion of the month
passed without any serious attack by one side or the
other, though it must also be remembered that continu-
ous bitter trench fighting was going on through this en-
tire period and that this form of fighting is relatively
high in casualties.

Late in the month the Germans made an attack on the
French positions on the east of the Forest, and here, for
the first time in the Argonne, they employed the gas
which had been used further to the west. This fighting
lasted for nearly a week and resulted in small German
gains at various points along this portion of the Argonne
front, but finally the fighting reverted to its previous
character of intensive trench fighting, in which asphyxi-
ating bombs, flaming liquids and mines play so exten-
sive and so deadly a part. But this calm was not for
long.

In the early days of July the Germans began a general
offensive, and in a combat which lasted for more than a
week and which progressed from artillery and rifle fire
to close hand to hand fighting with bayonet and grenade,
the French trenches between Binarville and La Four de
Paris were captured after fighting as intense perhaps as
witnessed anywhere on this front during the war. It is
difficult to decide which was the most admirable, the in-
trepidity of the German advance or the desperate resis-
tance of the French. Certain it is that this fighting was
honorable alike for victor and vanquished.

Besides the capture of these trenches, the Germans
took in the neighborhood of 3000 prisoners; the most
considerable number they had taken for some time, and,
with these prisoners, a large quantity of artillery and
supplies of all kinds.

This success was followed up in the following week by

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

an offensive launched by the Germans at Yienne-le-
Chateau, where, after capturing the hill called La PiUe
Morte, an elevation of strategic importance well fortified
and defended, they also took over 3000 French prisoners
and again captured artillery and supplies.

In this action also the fighting was distinguished by
the extreme tenacity of the attack and obstinacy of the
defense.

On the 19th of July a rather weak attempt was made
by the French to re-capture this lost position, but this
effort was not crowned with success.

This completed the activity for this month, both sides
being apparently exhausted.

At the commencement of August, however, a new
struggle began in the Argonne, wMch lasted well through
the month and centered around the road from Vienne-le-
Chateau to Binarville ; the Gtermans endeavoring to force
forward towards the strategic center of this district, St.
Mihiel, threw themselves with ardor upon the French
defenses. For the next two weeks the fighting here was
continuous and desperate ; every form of military activity
being used. Artillery duels were succeeded by infantry
attacks characterized by hard hand to hand fighting with
the bayonet and with grenades. The line wavered to and
fro ; one moment the Germans gaining and the next mo-
ment the French by counter-attacks succeeding in forc-
ing them back. Finally the troops of the Crown Prince
succeeded towards the 18th of the month in momentarily
piercing the French lines at one point, though the ma-
jority of the attacks failed, but the French brought up
large re-enforcements and succeeded by a final desperate
effort in ousting the Germans from the positions which
they had so gallantly won.

From this time on, to the end of August, the fighting
on this front continued hard and relentless, but with for-
tune favoring neither side ; — one day the Germans being
the aggressors and the next the French. When the rec-
ord of the period under consideration closed, the line was
still swaying to and fro with no indication of the ultimate
result. The whole result of the summer campaign had,
however, now been in a slight degree favorable to the
Germans. They had not only held, but in sections of the
line they had improved, their positions though they were
still far from their strategic object of forcing the line
southeastward to meet the salient at St. Mihiel, and thus
close the circle around the Verdun.

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

To the east of the Verdun, and from that point south-
ward, the possession by the Qermans of the line to St.
Mihiel, which constitutes the so-called St. Mihiel salient,
has been, since it fell into the hands of the Germans late
in 1914 until the present day, a continual sore in the
French side. The fortress of Verdun, which is situated
in the extreme northern point of the loop formed by the
German line herein was, by the very existence of this line,
cut from rail communication with the rest of France, ex-
cept by the single line running due west from the fort-
ress and passing through Claremont-en-Argonne. One
of the highways leading westward ran so close to the Ger-
man positions to its north as to be incapable of use ; which
left, therefore", only the road to the south through Soiliy
and thence to Belnoue to the west of Bar-le-Duc, as the
highway by which the fortress could reach the rest of
France.

To drive back the German line from St. Mihiel north-
eastward in the direction of Mars la Tour was of the
highest importance to the French, while, on the other
hand, it was of equal importance to the Germans to hold
their position here even though it might be impossible to
advance therefrom. Consequently, in this region attack
succeeded attack.

The whole month of March until about the middle of
April the French continued the offensive in this district,
that is, from the north of Verdun to the south of St.
Mihiel, which they had begun in January and in which
they had been, to a degree, successful, foot by foot, tree
by tree, driving back their enemy.

By the mid^e of April Lamorville was altogether in
their possession, and the fighting in this region had, ex-
cept for occasional bombardments at long range, moved
out into the open country beyond Les Eparges. From
the east side of the forest here the ground falls in a fair-
ly steep descent until it rises again towards Les Eparges
to a ridge over a thousand feet high, which is a part of
the Hautes de Meuse and commands the plain of the
Woevre, and in the middle thereof the French had at-
tained a position from which it was comparatively easy
for them to guard against unexpected attack, as it was
impossible for the Germans to concentrate troops in the
region which separated the forest from Les Eparges.

Li the forest of Apremont and Le Bois Le Pretre there
had been almost continuous fighting to the south of Les

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

Eparges and the heights of the Meuse northeast of St.
Mihiel. In this part of France the fighting in the forest
had superseded the fighting in the forts, which both sides
had been long ago forced to abandon for the alternative
of concealed and disguised batteries. And there were
acres and acres of these forests, not only here but aU
along this portion of the line, where every single tree
had been cut clean off by the storm of shells and where
even the ground itself was torn and battered by the great
projectiles, till it was like a roughly plowed field.

By the end of April the French had advanced so that
they held the northern edge of the Bois le Pretre, and
along the front northwestward to the Bois du Mort Mare,
a distance of 10 or 12 miles.

By the middle of July the French had advanced on
an average on the whole of this front about two miles.
In the Bois Brule and the Bois Dailly the French were
also gaining and were slowly pressing the enemy back-
ward.

Further south around St. Mihiel there had been some
desperate fighting, but the positions remained the same
on the line running eastward towards St. Mihiel. To-
wards Pont-a-Mousson the desperate deadlock of the win-
ter still continued, and appeared to be no nearer a deci-
sion than it had been six months before.

CHAPTER rX

Such was the situation in the last days of May when
the Germans began an offensive along this entire front,
in which the fighting was particularly bitter around Les
Eparges and which resulted in the Germans considerably
ameliorating their position in this sector, particularly to
the southwest of Les Eparges and to the east of the so-
called Grande Tranchee de Calonne. They also attempt-
ed an advance in the Bois le Pretre, but here the French
largely owing to their numerical superiority, succeeded
in not only repulsing the German attack but in gaining
ground on the western part of the ridge themselves.

These attacks and counter-attacks covered a period of
about two weeks, after which quietness settled upon this
line until towards the end of June, when the French be-
gan a movement which had as its object the re-capture
of the position lost at Les Eparges. This attack began
about noon on the 27th of June by a violent artillery fire
directed against the German positions at Les Eparges
beyond the Tranchee, and in the course of the afternoon
two simultaneous attacks were launched, one of them on
the German position southwest of Les Eparges and the
other east of the Tranchee ; these attacks the Germans re-
pulsed. In the afternoon the French again attacked;
this time the attack was directed against the whole of
the Gterman northern front, but this was thrown back.
During the night of the 28th the French brought up
some more heavy guns to support their artillery against
the two German positions already referred to, and at
dawn of the 28th opened a very murderous fire on the
entire line, on both the front and rear lines of the Ger-
mans. Early in the morning an infantry attack was
made by the French against the German positions on the
Les Eparges ridge, which was launched from the Son-
vaux gorge, but this the Germans succeeded in repulsing.
During the course of this day, four other attacks were
launched against these same positions.

During the night of the 28th the French artillery
opened against the German line from Combres to beyond
the Tranchee, but only attacked with infantry to the east
of th^ Tranchee.

On the 29th the German positions were violently
shelled by the French artillery, and an infantry attack

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

was launched on Les Eparges about noon, with the
strongest force that the French had hitherto employed.
The fighting all the afternoon was very heavy and both
sides suffered tremendous casualties. In the late after-
noon and the whole night the French shelled the entire
German positions vigorously, and not only these German
positions but the roads leading to them and the villages
situated on the easterly side of the Cotes Lorraines. The
object of this shelling was to prevent re-enforcements
from coming up to the Germans, as part of the district
shelled was b^^hind their lines.

The next day, the last of June, the fighting was hard
all day and the losses were again considerable on both
sides. Towards evening the attacks slackened and the
succeeding day was rather quiet ; but fighting again be-
gan on the second of July, accompanied by a violent
preliminary bombardment, the French having strength-
ened their force of artillery on this front. This bom-
bardment continued not only during the day but all the
ensuing night, and on the 3rd of July the fighting was
the most violent of the offensive. Repeated infantry at-
tacks were made by the French, each of them preceded
by a violent bombardment, especially with shells con-
taining asphyxiating gases and accompanied by show-
ers of hand grenades.

Four desperate charges were made by the French on
this day at Les Eparges, but were repulsed. The next
two days (the 4th and 5th of July) were rather quiet,
only artillery duels being made.

On the 5th of July two attempts were made by the
French to break through the German positions, but un-
successfully. The 6th was begun with a very heavy ar-
tillery bombardment of the Gterman positions by the
French and these were followed by the heaviest infantry
attacks which this movement had seen, which followed
one another in rapid succession the whole of the day, but
against which the (Jerman line stood firm.

On the 7th more artillery duels followed but with less
violence. On the 8th and 9th a repetition thereof took
place. During these three days there were no infantry
attacks.

On the whole, in this operation the French gained some
ground, but it was comparatively insignificant in amount
and of little strategic importance, though at one point of
the front they did win, and held, a location from which
their artillery could command the plain of the Woevre

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

and embarrass the advance of the German troops from
the east. The casualties in this fighting were extremely
heavy.

From the end of this offensive this part of the line re-
verted to trench fighting of an uninteresting character,
though extremely sanguinary. French and German
trenches were not a great distance apart, and in many
places so close that hand grenades could be and were
hurled from one trench to the other.

No further incidents of any importance occurred on
this line to the time this record closes.

Further south, at about the same time, in Bois le
Pretre where, as has been said, the French had made a
considerable advance in their offensive which had ended
on the 30th of May and obtained possession practically
of the entire forest, or wood, the Germans in their turn
attacked in the early days of July.

This Bois le Pretre is an extensive wooded territory
which stretches northwest of the village of Pont-a-Mous-
son to the ridge which rises in a sharp curve from the
Moselle valley to a height of 500 or 600 feet along the
Moselle River. The slope in the direction of Pont-a-
Mousson, as far as the Fey-en-Haye-Norroy road is known
to the Germans in its entirety as **Priesterwald,'' while
the French only call the southern half of the wood by the
title of **Bois le Pretre," the northern part being called
Bois Communaux by them.

This Bois le Pretre is a typical Lorraine forest; the
roads are few in number and poorly made, and the thick
undergrowth prevents any movement except on these
roads. But by this time the artillery of the belligerents
had torn this forest well to pieces and had mowed down
many of the trees. The ridge extends from the Fey-en-
Hayes-Norroy road to the wood on the east which is the
highest point of this wooded territory, on the summit of
which Croix des Carmes is situated, and along this ridge
the German positions extended. On their capture of
the southern portion of this wood and a gain of ground
on the western part of the ridge, the French had built
out six or seven consecutive positions with a total depth
of about 500 feet.

On the 4th of July, in the afternoon, after preliminary
mining operations and an artillery bombardment, the
Germans delivered an attack on this position from the
section thereof bordering on the Moselle River, and in^
their first rush penetrated the French position to the ex-:

O .J

• 4

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

tent of about 800 feet and blew up five French block
houses with their garrisons, and then proceeded to drive
further into the French position, with the result that
they re-captured practically the entire position which the
French had taken from them during the prior months.
By the evening the operation was finished. The French
in this affair lost about 1000 prisoners, besides a very
considerable quantity of artillery of various kinds and an
engineer depot with its supplies.

The next day the French rather feebly counter-at-
tacked but were repulsed. Desultory fighting followed
until the middle of July, the Germans retaining the cap-
tured points. The middle of July the French, finding
they were unable to make any great advances, gave up
the effort and from this time forward the fighting here
degenerated into trench fighting with an occasional art-
illery duel, and so continued until the end of the period
we have under consideration.

Further east, in Alsace, during March, April and May,
there was continuous but scattered fighting. Here again
the topography played a very considerable part. In
this rough broken country which gradually rises in height
until at the eastern end of the mountains, where they
run into the Alsatian plain, the fighting at times took
place at an elevation of from 3000 to 4000 feet above
the sea, where heavy artillery could be of very little use.
To describe these isolated combats would be almost im-
possible ; suffice it to say that the terminating mountains,
those that border the Alsatian plain, were the scenes of
the most desperate struggles. The reason of this was
that the French desired to capture those points of obser-
vation from which they could see the operations of the
Germans in the plain stretching to the eastward, which
desire the Germans had every reason to prevent. One
of these vantage points, for instance, was the Hartsman-
weiler-Kopf which in these fights changed hands no less
than six times; one day being in the possession of the
French and a few days later in that of the Germans.

This struggle continued unabated for months. The
principal events in this region were the capture of Met-
zeral by the French in the last days of June, which at the
time it was thought might pave the way to the capture
by the French of the important position of Colmar, but
which did not, because the Germans massed troops along
the line near Neubreisach-Mulhausen which prevented
Jiheir advancing further. The struggle over Ban-de-Sapt

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

which lasted for several days in early July resulted in a
brilliant French success in which they took over 800 pris-
oners, and which the Gtermans, though they counter-at-
tacked, were unable to re-take.

Towards the last of July the French made a night at-
tack from this captured position and again inflicted a
rather severe defeat on their German adversaries, taking
over 800 men, but were not so fortunate in another at-
tack on the Lingekopf-Barrenkopf line, in which they
were thrown back with severe losses.

Isolated struggles continued unremittingly, sometimes
won by one side and sometimes by the other, but these
produced no results of any importance.

At one time in August the French opened a bombard-
ment of Muenster, but this did not continue long. Other-
wise, there were no incidents of sufficient importance to
be chronicled, though the fighting was continuous and
fierce.

In the period from March to September, on this west-
ern line, it cannot be said that either side gained any
serious advantage. It is true that the Allies did on the
Artois front make some slight gains, and it is true that
in the Alsace-Lorraine region the French advanced per-
ceptibly to the eastward, but these gains for the Allies
were fully offset by the Gterman gains on the Ypres front
and in the Argonne Forest.

The hold of the Germans on the industrial portion of
Northern France was not shaken, nor was their posses-
sion of the Minette district disturbed, so that, in survey-
ing the situation generally, it can be said that during
these six months the respective positions of the combat-
ants suffered no modification of any strategic or economic
importance, and that, to all intents and purposes, the ad-
versaries found themselves in exactly the same general
situation on the first of September that they had been
six months previous.

e$5

The Campaign in the East

* • •

CHAPTER X

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

On the first of March, as will be remembered from
the prior volume, the Russian line in Galicia began on
the Vistula at the Russian border, directly north of Tar-
now, and, in a general sense, ran directly south through
Tamow to the southern side of the Carpathians, the
mountain range which divides Galicia from Hungary,
thence running eastwardly and along the southern side
of the crest of this range until it reached the western
border of the Austrian Crown Lands of Bukowina,
whence thence ran along the boundary of this province
almost directly north to a point near Stanidau and
thence to the east to the Russian border.

At several points south of the Carpathians the Rus-
sian advance guards had established themselves in Hun-
garian towns and viUages.

In Central Galicia the fortress of Przemysl, which the
Russians had been besieging for months, stiU held out.

March opened badly for the Austrians. In its early
days Stanislau in Eastern Galicia, one of the few im-
portant points in that section which remained in their
hands, was captured by the Russians, and the Austrian
forces driven therefrom to Kolomea to the south of
Delatyn a point a little to the north of the Bukowina
border. Thus all of Eastern Galicia passed into the
hands of the invaders.

An offensive movement was begun very late in Febru-
ary by the Austrians, which had as its objective the re-
lief of Przemysl; which offensive, though carried out
with considerable force and with a mixed army of Ger-
man and Austrian troops ; the Germans being thrown in
to give steadiness to the Austrians, as this fighting was
of a diflPerent character from the fighting in the moun-
tains ; and under German commanders, did succeed in
making an advance in the direction of the Tilicz Pass,
knd also in the direction of Sanok on the south-

MARCH AND APRIL IN GAUCIA

em railway of Galicia which runs, in a broad
sense, from Sandec by winding courses through
Sanok, Sambor and Stryj to Stanislau. Gorlice,
towards the western end of this offensive, was the first
place captured north of the Carpathian passes, and from
here the offensive moved towards Sanok, but was just
to the south of Sanok, to the railroad running through
it, when, on March 22nd the fortress of Przemysl, which
had held out for the last two weeks short of food and
with its ammunition exhausted, was surrendered by the
Austrians.

Prior, however, to this surrender, the garrison had
destroyed much of the artillery, a considerable portion
of the fortifications, and most of the military stores of
various kinds, as well as the ammunition which the fort-
ress contained.

The Russians, who had sacrificed many tens of thous-
ands of men, both in the earlier assault on the fort and
in the attempt to take it by assault in the second siege,
were naturally very greatly elated by the first, and, to
the present time the only, successful effort in besieging
a strong place which the Russian army and its com-
manders had shown themselves capable of.

Accounts differ widely as to the booty secured by the
Russians in the capture of this stronghold. The Rus-
sians themselves at the time put the number of prisoners
taken at 132,000, besides 2000 cannon and innumerable
quantities of rifles and other implements of war, as well
as a quantity of ammunition, stores, provisions, etc.,
too vast to be computed. There is, however, more than
good reason to suppose that these figures were subjected
to that usual Russian exaggeration which has character-
ized all Russian utterances, official and non-official, dur-
ing this war, particularly the war bulletins; and it is
probable that in this case, as in others, the Russians in-
cluded the civilian inhabitants of the town, some 60,000, ^
in the number of prisoners taken by them. The Aus- *
trians admitted that at the time of the surrender of the
fortress there were some 32,000 valid troops within its
enclosure, besides a considerable number of wounded,
as well as some 15,000 to 18,000 Russian prisoners of
war, who had been captured in the various fights around
the fortress during the time of its siege. There can be
little doubt that the Russians also counted these prison-
ers of war among the number of prisoners taken by
them.

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

On the whole, it would seem a fair estimate to say
that the number of fighting men belonging to the armies
of their opponents, wounded and unwounded, sick or
well, which were captured by the Russians at this time,
was in the vicinity of 60,000.

But the main importance in the capture of Przemysl
was not so much in the number of prisoners taken with
the fortress, or even with the taking of the fortress it-
self, as in the strategic importance of removing from
the rear of the Russian armies operating to the south and
to the west of this fortress a point which could be util-
ized by the enemy for such attacks ; and, further, of re-
leasing a very considerable number of Russian troops,
from 175,000 to 200,000, which the siege of this fortress
had held immobile ; for use in the battle lines which were
pushing their iway towards Hungary and the west.
Consequently, the capture of this fortress appeared to be
destined to have a rather decisive effect upon the entire
Russian plan of campaign against Austria and its ally,
Germany.

The defense of this fortress had been a fairly good
one, but, as was said in the first volume, in the relief of
this western fortress in the early days of October, by the
Austrians (which relief permitted them to establish com-
plete communication with its defenders ( a capital mis-
take was made by the Austrians in that they drew upon
the stores of provisions and ammunition which it con-
tained for supplies for an offensive against the Russians
further to the east, and thereby, within a comparatively
short time, used up munitions of war and other supplies
which they had not withdrawn them from the fortress,
would have made its holding for at least a year, with a
garrison equal in strength to that which it contained, a
comparatively easy matter. But this withdrawal of
these supplies starved out the garrison before it had
stood even a siege of half that length of time, so that,
in large measure, the capture of the fortress of Przemysl
by the Russians was due to the Austrian lack of fore-
sight.

It is probably true that the Austrians expected to be
successful in their offensive further to the east, and that
they, therefore, would have ample time to bring supplies
from the west to replace those taken ; but they were dis-
appointed in this hope of success in the east and were

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

driven back to the west, and their communication with
the fortress severed, before they were able to accomplish
any reprovisioning.

This illustrates that the unexpected often happens in
military operations; another illustration of which fact
even more striking was to be given by the future progress
of events in Galicia, — this time at the expense of the
Russians. The Russians naturally expected that the re-
moval of the presence of these Austrian forces in their
rear would enable them to complete the conquest of Gal-
icia, to take Cracow, to pour their forces through the
passes of the Carpathians into Hungary and conquer
that fertile land; and they had good reasons for these
expectations, apparently. But Providence which, after
all, regulates the affairs of men, had planned otherwise.

After the fall of Przemysl, the Russian forces which
had been around it were hurried forward to the Carpa-
thians, particularly to the Russian front at the DuMa
Pass, through which it was the intention of the Russians
to pour the bulk of their forces upon the Hungarian
plains.

These Carpathian passes are not all similar. The
general idea of a pass is realized in many of them, but
there are others, like the Lupkow, which is more a dis-
trict through which easy communications are possible,
than it is that of a pass in the ordinary sense of the term.
For instance, through the Lupkow region half a dozen
ways are feasible for armies, whereas through the DuMa
Pass there is only one pass from the north to the south
valleys, with only one steep rise to the crest of the ridge
on the north and an equally steep descent on the southern
side.

Another peculiarity of these Carpathian passes is that
between the Dukla and the Uzsok Passes the rivers do
not run as they do in all the other sections, north and
south through the mountains, but east and west, parallel
to the mountains, in valleys running also parallel to the
mountains. The mountains in this section are much
lower than in the other sections and these valleys, there-
fore, of less depth ; consequently, this section favors the
development of a more continuous battle-front along
And across the whole range of mountains.

As a consequence of this topographical difference, the
heaviest fighting in the Carpathians in March and April
took place along this front.

Further to the east of Lupkow, at the Rosztoki, Uzsok

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

and Wyszkow Passes, the . mountains are much higher
and wider, and, except for the narrow openings through
which the passes run, do not afford any opportunity for
continuous fighting.

The strongest Russian position at the time of the fall
of Przemysl was at the Dukla Pass, of which they held
both the northern and southern sides, the latter as far
as the Hungarian town of Bartfeld; and it was here
and to this point that the Russians directed most of those
troops which the fall of Przemysl had set free for operar
tions in other spheres, and launched a most desperate
attack southward.

On the southern slopes of this pass and on the sides
of the hills leading southward, the Austrians had es-
tablished field fortifications of considerable strength,
from which they were able to command the Russians in
the valley below, and during the months of fighting
which followed these were utilized to the fullest advan-
tage for inflicting such punishment upon the enemy as,
with their aid, the Austrians could administer. In spite
of assault after assault by the Russians on these posi-
tions and on the Austrian frontal positions just south
of Bartfeld, the ground gained by the Russians was
negligible. The Austrian line held firm.

The daily incidents of the fighting need not be told
because these incidents consisted almost entirely of
many hand-to-hand engagements scattered over a wide
front, and never in any one particular engagement be-
tween large bodies of troops, although the numbers of
the troops in all the engagements, in the aggregate, were
very considerable. The main point to be emphasized,
and which was characteristic of the struggle in this re-
gion from the fall of Przemysl to May 1st, was that the
Austrian line managed to hold back the overpowering
masses of Russians that were hurled at it continuously
with all the energy and desperation that animated the
Russian commanders, who knew that Russia's entry into
Hungary must be then forced or postponed indefinitely.

In the middle of March the bulk of the Austrian forces
were in position between the Uzsok and Lupkow Passes,
and the Russians made their grand attack here. After
heavy fighting, about the 26th of March they reached
Zboro on the south of the Carpathians, and by April 2nd
they reached the village of Cigielka on the southeast
flank of the Austrian position near Bartfeld.

On March 23rd the main attack was delivered and

•MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

heavy fighting took place for the possession of the crest
of the mountains south of Jasliska and to the west of
the Lupkow Pass, in which many thousands of Austrians
were captured.

During the next few days the Russians gained ground
in all directions here and finally another general battle
along the entire line from the laipkow to the Uzsok be-
gan in the night of March 28-29, and continued for a
couple of days, the result of which was that the Russians
gained ground and captured over 5000 Austrians, be-
sides very considerable quantities of artillery.

This pressure continued the following night and on
March 30th a stab was made at the Austrian lines of
communication to the south, which developed severe
fighting between Dvemik and Nasieczna, which also
ended in an Austrian defeat. This fighting took place
in deep snow.

By April 1st the Russians had so advanced that they
controlled the crest of the Carpathians in this region.
In the meantime the Russians were making a further
movement from the north on to the Smolnik-Kalnica line,
which resultd in the capture of Vola Michova on the
railway, and was followed by the capture of Cisna on
April 4th.

On the main line very heavy snowfalls took place on
April 2nd and 3rd, which held up the fighting; but on
April 4th the advance was resumed upon the entire
line. The Rosztoki-Gome Pass was taken and the Hun-
garian villages in the valley of the Siroka also fell into
the hands of the Russians.

From April 5th to April 7th or 8th the Austrians who
had been reenforced by a few German troops, managed
to hold their lines firm, but on April 9th the Russian
advance was resumed, with the result that the Austro-
Germans were repulsed along the entire length of the
principal chain of the Carpathians in the region of the
Russian offensive, which line was more than 70 miles
long from the Dukla to the Uzsok Passes. The Russians
were completely triumphant everywhere, except on the
lower end of the line near the Uzsok Pass. A battle at
this Uzsok Pass began on the 10th of April. On the 11th
severe fighting took place northwest and northeast of the
pass, which ended in a deadlock on or about April 14th ;
whereupon the Russians undertook to adance from Szek-
tin towards Berezna, which advance, if successful, would
have meant their seizing the line of communication be-

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

tween the Uzsok and Ungvar Passes and would have com-
pelled the Teutonic Allies to evacuate their positions
on the southerly slope of the Uzsok.

The Russians had been reaching forward from Volo-
sate, to the east of the Uzsok Pass, where fighting con-
tinued up to April 21st the result of which was in the
nature of a draw.

There were, of course, during this period skirmishes
all along the line of the mountains, but these it is im-
possible to mention in detail. To the east of Uzsok, ex-
cept as mentioned, the principal fighting was in the
Orawa valley, where the Germans attempted to get pos-
session of Koziowa. This fighting dragged through
April.

From April 20th onward there was little fighting in
the main regions of the Carpathians.

The weather had changed from cold to warm and the
snow had begun to melt, with the result that the rivers
overflowed their banks ; such roads as there are became
mere mud and any movement of troops was, for the
next few weeks, almost impossible in these mountains.

Further to the east, north of Czemowitz in Bukownia,
there was some fighting. It will be remembered that
Czernowitz was recaptured on February 20th by the
Austrians, when the Russians withdrew to the northern
bank of the River Pruth. About the middle of March
the Russians attempted an offensive from this point
against Czemowitz and crossed to the south bank of the
river to a place known as Ludihoricza; their main posi-
tion on the northern bank being Oldzuczka. At this
time their main line in this sector ran from Novo Sielcic
in the abutting Russian province, along the northern
bank of the Pruth, through Bojan and Mahala to Old-
zucka, thence running northeast to Sadagora.

On the 21st the Austrian attacked the Russian posi-
tions between Oldzucka and Sadagora, and on the 22nd
the Russians surrendered the latter town. The fight
continued several days and finally the Russians were de-
feated on March 27th and retreated to Bojan, from which
town they were turned out on April 10th, though they
subsequently returned for a brief period.

In the early part of March the Austrians made a cav-
alry raid towards Cholim without much result.

Zaleszczyki, on the Dniester, was, during this time,
the scene of some hard fighting which had as its object
the capture of this town, an important center of roads,

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

on a railroad, with several bridges across the Dniester.
Near here the Dniester forms a canyon, to some degree
like those of the western rivers, about 300 feet deep. On
March 23rd the Austrians made an attack with the ob-
ject of turning the Russian positions near the town,
but this was unsuccessful. Another attack was made on
April 10th, and another on April 17th, but these also
were unsuccessful, though the attack of April 17th
nearly achieved its object. The Russian counter-offen-
sive, made on April 4th, which crossed the Dniester, was
badly cut to pieces and the Russians were obliged to re-
cross the Dniester after suffering very heavy losses, and
to bum the bridge which they had constructed for their
crossing.

Along the line of the Dunajec, from Tarnow south to
the Carpathian Mountains, which form the western line
of the Russian advance into Galicia, little happened dur-
ing the Spring.

CHAPTER XI

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

As we are now about to discuss one of the most im-
portant military movements which has taken place in
the History of the world's wars, it will be well to give
in detail, exactly as it can be done, the exact position
of the Russians on May 1st, 1915, in Galicia and in Buk-
owina.

'In a general sense it may be said that the Russian
line at Qiat time began at Opatowie, where the River
Dunajec flows into the Vistula; it followed the eastern
bank of that river down to the point where the River
Biala, in its turn, flows into the Dunajec, just to the
northwest of Tamow, at the town of Biala; thence ran
south along the River Biala through the town of Grybow
to the Carpathian Mountains; and thence crossed the
road to Bartfeld near Hungary; thence turning and
running northeast to Zboro and Polyanka; from which
point it followed the crest of the Carpathian ridge east-
ward to the boundary of the Austrian Crown Lands of
Bukowina ; with salients at intervals reaching down from
the crest of the ridge into Hungary.

The principal passes were all, on their northern ends,
at least, in the hands of the Russians, and the southern
ends of most of them were, to all practical intents and
purposes, also in the Russian control. At the frontier
of Bukowina the line turned northeast and continued
in that direction until the Pruth River was reached,
when it turned and followed the northern bank of this
stream to the Russian frontier.

All of Galicia comprised within this line was in Rus-
sian hands. A Russian governor administered the af-
fairs of the province from Lemberg and Russian law
had been introduced. The Orthodox church had even
begun proselyting by its well known mildly persuasive
methods among the portion of the population which,
prior to the contest, had not been affiliated with that
sect. Russian Schools, in many places, had been estab-
lished, and that language introduced as far as possible.
The pre-existing Austrian educational institutions had
been either discontinued or affiliated with these new

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

Russian schools. The University at Lemberg had been,
to a considerable extent, remodeled and the Russian
language introduced as the vehicle by which its instruc-
tion was conveyed.

The population of Galicia contains many Jews, and in
order to prove to them the truth of that tender solicita-
tion which the Czar of Russia had expressed in his pro-
clamation to the Jews in Poland in the Autumn of 1914,
wherein this autocrat styled the Hebrews his *'Dear
Jews," the Russians had even introduced the pogrom
and in many places, notably Lemberg, Stryj and Tarno-
pol, the Jews had suffered the most violent and humili-
ating treatment. When the history of the Russian oc-
cupation of Galicia comes to be written in detail, there
wUl be probably no sadder chapter in it than that which
deals with the atrocities and barbarities inflicted by the
Muscovite upon the Jewish portion of its population.
Necessarily, the details cannot here be given, because
though, at the present time, we know much, we do not
begin to know all. But it is to be hoped that one day
this story of the infamies perpetrated by the rude Rus-
sian soldiery at the command of their superiors upon
the Jews in Galicia will be written in order that the
gross hypocrisy of the Czar's proclamation alluded to
may be shown clearly to the world.

The Polish portion of the population were also treated
with great severity; in fact, it may be said that in all
the numerous ethnic elements which combine to form the
population of Galicia only the Ruthenians had any rea-
son to be satisfied with the change. These Ruthenians,
who are among the most ignorant and most miserable
white people in the world, of almost arrested intellectual
development, for many years prior to this invasion had
been made the subjects, by the Russian Church, of a
religious propaganda, to carry out which a special ec-
clesiastical organization had been organized by that
church with headquarters in the .city of Chocim. Prom
this conveniently located city it had directed the pro-
paganda and had, to some degree, brought back into the
fold of the Orthodox Russian Church these Ruthenians
who, by blood, by race, and by intellectual development,
are Russian Moujiks. These also had been most valuable
auxiliaries to the Russian army in its original advance
into Galicia.

For some time before the first of May the Russians
had noticed that a large Austro-German force was being

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

concentrated to the west of the line of the Dunajec and
Biala Rivers ; but though thus warned with characteristic
short-sightedness, had not taken the necessary measures
to concentrate sufficient troops on this front to meet the
onslaught which was about to be made.

In fact, all through this Galician campaign, from the
early days of its inception until this time, the Russian
offensive had been one which was so strategically un-
sound that, had it been encountered by first-class troops
in sufficient quantity to face the hordes of the Musco-
vites, it is certain that long before this offensive would
have broken down, though not perhaps so ignominiously
as it was destined to ultimately. The strategy of the
Grand Duke Nicholas had been, from the first, weak.

In choosing Eastern Galicia (the Lemberg district) as
the primary objective of his offensive, this commander
sacrificed the militarly sound to the spectacularly un-
sound. Looked at from any standpoint of strategy,
from the very moment of the first invasion of Galicia the
brunt of the Russian attack should have been directed
against Cracow, because of the far more important re-
sults that would necessarily follow from the capture of
this city. It would have opened the door at once to an
invasion of Silesia in Germany and to the east would
have delivered Galicia even more thoroughly into Rus-
sian hands. But the desire to wear easily gathered lau-
rels of victory, and to be able to pose before the eyes of
the world as an ever-successful commander, led this gen-
eral to ignore the basic principle of strategy — ^that a blow
to the enemy should be delivered where it wiU most ef-
fectually injure his major or his alternative plan of
campaign and at the same time advance the army hold-
ing the offensive to a definite strategic end.

It is true that Eastern Galicia was easy of conquest.
It is true that in this easy conquest the Russian invaders
had the help of an admirably organized corps supplying
information among the civilian Ruthenian population,
which sacrificed the interests of its own country to aid
those of the invading stranger, and which, as the sequel
will show, reaped the usual reward of traitors.

A glimpse at the topography of the country through
which the Dunajec flows may be interesting. In this
particular part of the Carpathian Mountains the river
has cut for itself a deep channel between high walls of
rock. As it approaches the point where the Biala flows
into it, its valley widens considerably and is interspersed

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

with islands which render its crossing more eai^. From
this confluence of the Dnnajec and the Biala, to the
point where the Dnnajec flows into the Vistula twenty
miles distant, the river is so deep as to be practically
nnfordable. The valley continues to broaden and on
this stretch of twenty miles is from six to seven miles
wide, with a range of low hills on each side of the valley
covered with woods for from two to three miles in depth.

In May the Austrians occupied the western ridge of
these hills, in the main, from the Vistula to the point
where the Biala flows into the Dunajec, though at some
points the Russians had crossed the river and had seized
the opposite bank, holding thereon the village of Badlow.
From the confluence of the Biala and the Dunajec to
the town of Gromnik, fourteen miles to the soutii, the
armies occupied the general line of this stream. The
bridges over both rivers had all been destroyed prior to
May 1st; though, in the case of the railroad bridge near
the junction of the two rivers, enough of it remained to
make crossing feasible.

From Qromnik to the south the positions of the Teu-
tons still ran along the banks of the Biala for about
twelve miles to a point a little south of Bobova, where
the Austrian line crossed over to the east side of the
Biala and continued to run south from Ciezkowice, then
turned southeast and ran to Gorlice and thence to Mal-
astow, from whence it ran almost directly south to Kon-
ieczna, to Zboro, and further south still to a point to the
west of Bartfeld. The Russian line followed this gen-
eral line to Bartfeld, where it turned east, running to
Eurime and Mezo Laborcz, and then generally along
the crest of the Carpathians to the Bukowina border.

It wfll be observed that this Russian position in its
broad lines was that of a right angle whose shorter side
ran &om the Vistula to Bartfeld, and whose longer side
ran from Bartfeld to the Bukowina border.

The Russian army in Galicia, at this time, must have
been close to a million and a half men. This refers to
the army that was actually in Galicia on May 1st, and
does not include the forces which were subsequently
brought up and thrown into Galicia in the hopes of sav-
ing that province to Russia.

General Von Mackensen, who had distinguished him-
self in the Polish fighting, was the supreme commander
of the Austro-German armies, and had under him about
twenty-four army corps, or s<»newhere in the vicinity of

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

875;000 to 900,000 men. But he also possessed what was
probably the most formidable force of artillery which
the world had, up to that time, ever seen assembled at
once for the support of any army. The disadvantage
of the Russian forces was that they were more or less
scattered all the way along this long line, and thus their
position was not coherent ; which fault may be considered
one of the most glaring pieces of incompetency that the
Russian commander-in-chief had ever been guilty of.

The Russian field commanders included Ivanoff, prob-
ably the most competent Russian general, Radko, Dmit-
rieff and Viusioflf, but was nothing like so well protected
with artillery as the Germans, though numerically far
superior.

On May 1st the German artillery opened at all points
along the line from the northern to the southern boun-
daries of Galicia, but it soon became evident that the
strength of the assault was to be thrown in the attack on
Gorlice, a town of some importance, in southwestern
Galicia, in the possession of the Russians; and by May
2nd there were concentrated on this short front, it is
said, some 1500 guns, of which 500 were of heavy caliber.
Perhaps never before were troops called upon to stand
such a bombardment. The object of this attack was to
break through the shortest side of the right angle of the
Russian line running from the northern Galician border
to the southern, and to pour through this gap, thus
made, sufficient forces to march from west to east along
the line of the Carpathians, and, in so doing, to roll up
the Russian battle line which ran from west to east in
these mountains: a daring manoeuvre which Stonewall
Jackson had once executed with success in the American
Civil War, on a much smaller scale, but which had never
been attempted heretofore in the history of war on a
scale so enormous and so far-reaching.

This gap which was successfully plowed, did more,
however, than permit this manoeuvre to be made. It
broke for all time the continuity of the Russian armies
and divided the Russian forces, from the day the wedge
was driven through their lines into the vicinity of Gor-
lice, into two sections; the one operating from Warsaw
southward to north of Gorlice and the other operating
from Gorlice eastward to the line of the Carpathians and
then northward through Lemberg to the Russian border,
and from that day to this never have these two forces of
the Russian army been able to rejoin their shattered line.

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

The taking of Gorlice, therefore, by the GlermanB,
which was done a few days later, after an artillery bom-
bardment had destroyed the Russian entrenchments, the
wire entanglements and other defenses before them, was
the most important event of the entire war in the east up
to the present time ; and the real success of the Teutonic
armies which has now, in the Autumn of 1915, become
so well marked and so clearly apparent, may be said to
date from this one event, the capture of Gorlice and the
breaking of the Russian line in front of it.

This event has influenced not only the entire history
of the eastern campaign but also that of the western and
of the Dardanelles, and has most materially affected the
strategy of the war in Europe regarded as a whole. There
have been other battles in the war more spectacular, in
which greater numbers of men were engaged, in which
the casualties were far more numerous, but there has
been none, which has had any influence on the whole
course of the war, at all comparable to this capture of
Gorlice. The Battle of the Marne was important, but
it only affected the development in the western cam-
paign: the Battle of Tannenburg, in East Prussia, was
important, but it merely shattered the first Russian ad-
vance on German territory: the Battle of the Mazurian
Lakes in late January of 1915 was also a battle of great
importance, but that, too, only exercised an influence
on the eastern campaign itself, and that influence was
limited to relieving Russian pressure on the northern
portion of the eastern battle line.

But the result of the fighting at Gorlice meant the re-
capture of Lemberg, the re-capture of Przemysl, the
breaking forever, apparently, of the grand battle line
of the Russians, the re-capture of Warsaw, the complete
capture of Poland, and all the other advances which the
Teutonic forces have since made in the eastern field of
operations; while it meant, further, the discouragement
of the Allies in the West, the necessity of their increas-
ing their forces on that line, and brought about the gen-
eral confusion which reigned among the Allies on Sep-
tember 1st, 1915.

France depended on Russia to be a great factor in
the land fighting, and this hope began to fade from the
day Gorlice was taken, and faded continuously there-
after as thq Russian defeat in the eastern campaign be-
came more and more marked, untU, at the end of that
campaign it has so completely faded that no sane Prench-

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

man now expects the Russian army, henceforth^ to be an
important factor in the present war. All of these things
can be dated from the capture of Gorlice by the Austro-
Qerman armies in the early days of May, 1915.

One more thing can also be accredited to this capture
of (xorlice : it started the exposure of the absolute mill*
tary incompetence of the Russian commander-in-chief,
the Grand Duke Nicholas.

CHAPTEEXn

On May 1st, the Teutonic forces quietly took up a po-
sition between Oiezkowice and Senkova. Opposite to
them were the Russians, whose line ran in the south-
easterly direction from Giezkowice, with the heights of
Yiatrovka, Pustki and Kamieniec forming the main
point of their defense. At Gorlice they held a very
strong strategic point in the mountains rising to the
east of the town near the River Ropa. To the south-
ward was the mountain group whose hills ranged from
1500 to 2000 feet in height; the most important among
them being the Zamczysko Mountain. Southwest of
Malastow was the mountain of Magora and the mountain
of.Ustogora, each about 2500 feet in height, which
formed the strong point of the Russian line in this vicin-
ity. The evening of May 1st was without much in-
cident, the Austro-Qerman batteries opening on the Rus-
sian line at the usual hour and apparently indulging
in the routine evening bombardment. The Russians
were heedless of this manoeuvre and took no unusual
precautions, in spite of the fact, which they knew at this
time, that during the preceding days there had been
larger enforcements of artillery received by the Austro-
Gterman line facing them. What happened was really
this : the Austro-Oermans had concentrated on this com-
paratively short line probably the largest number of
pieces of artillery, in proportion to the distance, that had
ever been concentrated; and about 6 o'clock on the fol-
lowing morning this concentration of artillery unmasked
and a tremendously heavy attack on the Russian lines
was begun. This attack continued for between four and
five hours, during which time the Russians, with their
customary exaggeration, stated that some 700,000 shells
were fired on their position — ^probably this is three times
the truth. At all events, this artillery bombarded with
such force as to completely destroy the Russians in the
first line of trenches, comparatively early in the attack.
When these first line trenches had been destroyed, with
the wire entanglements and other defenses in front of
them, the artillery turned its attention to the second line
and destroyed that, at the same time, in so doing, estab-
lishing a zone of artillery fire between the first and sec-
ond line trenches which no human being could pass alive.

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

About 10 o'clock in the morning this bombardment
had destroyed the Russian positions so as to make an in-
fantry attack feasible, and this was accordingly delivered
all along the line, with the result that after some of the
heaviest fighting probably seen in this war, the entire
Russian first and second lines, including the town of
Gorlice, were carried, and the Russians forced back to
the Biecz-Lipinki-Bednarka front; which front runs
along the heights of Kobylanka; Tatarowka, Lysa Gora
and Rekaw were the principal strategic points. Reck-
oned in miles, this advance covered perhaps five over a
front of perhaps fifteen.

South of Senkova, where a like bombardment took
place, the Bavarians delivered an infantry attack at
about the same time and with a like result, so that in the
evening the entire area of the Zamczysko Heights had
been conquered and the Bavarians had driven forward
their line to the village of Bednarka; while further
south the mountains of Magora, in the Austro-Gora
group had also changed masters.

The capture of the town of Gorlice was particularly
important as Gorlice was one of the centers of the pet-
roleum districts in Galicia, for the lack of which the
Germans and Austrians had been suffering ever since
the Russian conquest of Galicia and which had impeded
and hindered the mobility of their armies on all fronts.

The Russians, in their retreat, endeavored to set fire
to the oil wells and destroy the tanks, power stations,
etc., but were only partially successful, so that a couple
of days after the town changed masters, and the Austri-
ans re-entered into their own, by dint of hard work
some supplies of petroleum were already being drawn
from this area by the victorious Teutons.

The 8th Russian Army, which was charged with the
defense of Gorlice was very badly cut to pieces, and it
is no exaggeration to say that on the day of May 2nd it
lost more than half its effective.

Further north towards Tarnow the Russians were in
possession of three heights, those of 402, 419 and 469:
these heights taking their designation from numbers
given them on the Austrian topographical map ; and the
recapture of these heights was necessary for the Austro-
Germans in order to make any advance against Tarnow
itself.

On May 2nd, at this point of the line, as elsewhere, a
very large number of pieces of artillery were concentra-

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

ted and very early in the morning this Austrian artillery
opened fire from Mt. Val, on the western bank of the
Dunajee River, against Hill 419. About eleven o'clock
an infantry attack by Tyrolean troops was delivered
against this hill, but was unsuccessful for the reason that
another hill (412) which was also in Russian hands, was
able, by a cross &ce, to drive back the attacking column.

The next day. May 3rd, this hill and Hill 419 were
heavily bombarded. Then the Austrian infantry ad-
vanced and attacked Hill 412, with the result that the
Russian position on Hill 419 became untenable. The
Russians, therefore, fell back to Hill 269 which they sub-
sequently abandoned when the retreat became general.

During the night of May 1st and 2nd, protected by a
very heavy artillery fire, Austrian engineers succeeded
in throwing a pontoon bridge across the Duhajec near
the village named Olszyny over which the Austrian in-
fantry rapidly moved across so that by evening the Aus-
trians were established on a wide front on the eastern
bank of the Dunajee, had seized the railroad between
Tamow and Szczucin and broken connections between
the Russian armies to the north and south of the point
at which it seized the railroad. And this break in the
Russian communications was most important in its in-
fluence on the fortunes of the Russian army.

Near Gorlice the Teutonic army, which had pierced
the Russian lines, turned, part to the southeast and be-
gan moving in the direction of the DuMa Pass, while
another part, marching directly to the east, began
to move directly forward against the Russian po-
sitions at Biecz and to the south thereof. The first army
then began in very short order an attack upon Dembica
and Rceszow. The effect of these two manoeuvres was
to compel the Russians ultimately to abandon their line
along the Vistula River, which in turn forced the line
further to the north to retreat from Tamow.

Continuing, however, in the southern section there
was hard fighting between May 3rd and 4th for the hills
between the Biala and the Vistula. On May 3rd the
Prussian Guard captured these hills, while still further
to the south the Russian position at Zagorzany was car-
ried by the Hungarians, which victory opened the road
towards Jaslo to the victorious Teutons. South of this
the Bavarians forced their way forward along the Bed-
narka-Zmigrod to Krempna, which town they took on
May 4th, forcing the Russians to evacuate all of Northern

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

Hungary in their possession, west of the Impkow Pass.

Jaslo itself now became untenable. Further in the
north, on May 4th, a vigorous second offensive was
launched in the direction of Tarnow from Tuchow to
the south of it, on the Biala Biver, which pushed for-
ward so strenuously and so rapidly that it became ap-
parent before the evening of that day to the Russian
commander, that a retreat all along the Russian line
from the River Vistula to the Carpathian Mountains^
was inevitable, and accordingly preparations began to be
made for this retreat.

During these three days, May 2nd, 3rd and 4th, the
Russians lost over 30,000 in prisoners alone, with casual-
ties probably totaling twice that number.

8ft

CHAPTER Xin

On May 5th the Austro-German forces which were
in position south of the Carpathians in Hungary, ex-
tending from Bartfeld to the Uzsok, whose line was at
right angles to the German line operating north and
south in Galicia, began to push the Russian line in North-
em Hungary backward aU the way from Bartfeld to the
TJzsok Pass ; and by thus forcing them backward towards
the Carpathian Passes, throwing them upon the Russian
armies retreating from the west from GbrUce, the former
Russian line in that vicinity.

Running to the north, this same day most of the
ground between the Dunajee and the Biala, between
Tamow and Tuchow, to the south, had been occupied by
the Austrians, who had also crossed the Dunajee, and
captured positions on the east bank of this river to the
north of Tamow, and by this manoeuvre cut the com-
munications between the Russian force south of the point
at which they crossed the river and those to the noiiJi of
them up to the Polish frontier and in Poland. The ef-
fect of this was to force another retreat of the entire
Russian line, which now fell back in considerable con-
fusion to Dembica in the north, to the east of Jaslo in
the center, and to Rymanow and Bukovsko in the south,
where a determined effort was made to hold the positions
until the Russian troops which had been in Northern
Hungary, Bartfeld and the Dukla Pass, should be able
to escape northward.

This movement finally culminated in the capture of
Tamow on May 6th ; its complete evacuation by the Rus-
sian armies which had held this place, and their retreat
to the north and northeast.

The next day brought added pressure on the entire
Russian front, and the evening of May 9th found that
the Russians across Galicia had swung still further east-
ward on this southern extremity, so that the line now
ran nearly straight from Szczucin to a point in the Car-
pathians to the west of the TJzsok Pass.

One feature which distinguishes this Qerman offensive
was the lightning-like manner in which it was operated.
Never before in the history of the war, perhaps, had
large forces of troops and large bodies of artillery been

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

moved from place to place with anything like the start-,
ling quickness with which they were manoeuvred on this
occasion. Some of the Glerman regiments marched as
much as 40 miles a day, not for one but for several days
in succession, fighting from time to time.

On May 9th the Russian line made an attempt to
stand, but their position had no coherence and was strat-
egically weak, with the result that on May 10th, not be-
ing able on this line to stand the attack of the Oerman
assault, a general Russian retreat was begun, and mid-
Galicia was lost. This retreat was necessarily to the
west bank of the San River, and was carried out in con-
siderable confusion. Here again extreme rapidity char-
acterized the advance of the German forces in pursuit.
The western front of Przemysl was reached by one of
the Austrian army corps on May 14th, only thirteen
days after its offensive began at Gorlice. The remain-
der of the attacking force came up a little later, con-
verging to a common center from the northwest and
southwest. This advance was not achieved without in-
cident, but the various details of the capture of the iso-
lated towns from time to time would extend this story
to too great a length, so that only the main features can
be sketched.

The movement against the Russians troops on the
southern side of the Carpathians, by attacking the pas-
ses through these mountains, was eminently successful.
By May 6th the Russian troops in the entire region of
the Lupkow Pass became carried away in the flood of the
Russian retreat from the westward. On May 7th the
Virava-Nagy-Polena line, which they had won some
weeks earlier at the cost of so many lives, had to be aban-
doned, and thus Hungary was nearly freed from their
presence.

On the 8th these troops had fallen completely to the
east of a north and south line drawn through Sanok.
At the same time, it must be said that the Russian
troops that fell back from the Carpathian Passes, fought
with desperate bravery, and to this bravery and the sub-
sequent events may be attributed the fact that this Rus-
sian rout did not end in complete disaster, and that the
main Russian army operating in Galicia itself was able
to fall back upon the San River line with any semblance
of order.

The San River divides Galicia into two almost equal
parts. It joins the Vistula a little to the north of Sand-

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

omierz, and then flows southeasterly through Grodzisko
to Jaroslav, where it turns and runs for a distance al-
most southerly to Przemysl, where it again turns and
runs almost directly to the west to Dynow, thence south
through Sanok and southeast towards the foothills of
the Carpathians, which it reaches a little to the north-
west of XJzsok Pass. This river, it will be remembered,
was conquered with great di£Sculty by the Russians in
their early invasion and only after considerable time
was spent on the task of forcing its passage. The river
presents many natural difficulties both in its depth and
width, and these obstacles were, during this campaign,
rendered more difficult to overcome by the fact that the
bridges over this stream were nearly everywhere blown
up or otherwise destroyed.

The Austro-Germans' advance to the San River had
been made in three sections; the first section marched
in a general direction from Tarnow to Jaroslav, the sec-
ond section came slightly northeast from the direction
of Gorlice through Sanok towards Przemysl, while the
third section was composed of those Austro-German
troops which had been holding the southerly slope of
the Carpathians, and which advanced north and north-
east on Przemysl. The first section was the earliest to
force the crossing of the San, which it did on May 15th
at Jaroslav, and, in spite of desperate Russian resistance,
succeeded in establishing itself upon the eastern bank
of that river and spread north and south along that
bank. Other Teutonic forces, once the foothold was at-
tained on this eastern bank, succeeded in their turn in
crossing the river to the north at Sieniawa. When the
crossing of the river at these points was completed, these
troops divided into three groups, one of which advanced
slightly to the northeastward in the direction of Rawa
Ruska, which, as my readers will remember, was the
scene of very hard fighting during the Russian advance
into Galicia in August and September of 1914. Another
section moved to the southeast of Jaroslav towards Jaw-
orow and aided in the movements on Lemberg; while
the third section moved northwest towards Grodzisko and
along the San towards the point where this river flows
into the Vistula, and, in conjunction with other troops
which joined it from the west, took part in the clearing
of this promontory of Galicia which juts forward into
Poland — ^the so-caUed *'neck" of the Vistula.

The army that moved towards Rawa-Ruska had, ap

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

we will hereafter see, a most important and, to a large
extent, decisive influence in aiding in the success of the
wedge that was subsequently driven through the line of
the Russian left wing. The final position of this army
at Rawa-Buska not only permitted an attack from the
north on Lemberg, but more than that, forced the Rus-
sians to retreat to the east of Lemberg and broke the con-
tinuity of the Russian line even in retreat. The success
of this manoeuvre has played, since this time, a very
important part in this whole Polish and Galician cam-
paign. To the central section which advanced from the
west towards the River San, fell the task of taking the
fortress of Przemysl from the Russians, who had cap-
tured it some few weeks before. And while its center
was thus taking up its position, the southern section,
coming through the passes of the Carpathians, was driv-
ing towards Przemyd. and Stryj all those Russian forces
which formerly had occupied the crest of these moun-
tains. Przemysl itself did not resist very long. The
Russians, since their capture of this famous stronghold,
had made every effort to strengthen its defenses, which
had been seriously damaged by the work of destruction
wrought thereon by the Austrian troops before its sur-
render but except for a slight defense along the line of
the outer ring of forts, the Russians were unable to hold
off the enemy, and on May 17th the fortress was invested
from three sides; by the Bavarians on the north and by
the Austrians on the west and south; but these forces,
not having with them their heaviest artillery, were ob-
liged from this date to about May 25th to remain quiet
in the position whidi they had won.

During this time, however, the Russians attempted a
counter-offensive, which lasted from May 21st to 25th,
from the north and northeast, and attempted to cut the
lines of communication of the German forces which had
crossed the San to the north. This offensive was at first
attended with some measure of success, and the Teutonic
forces were obliged to fall back to the left bank of the
River San, with the loss of some prisoners and artillery.
This movement culminated in the capture of Sieniawa on
May 27th, when the Russians won a victory of consider-
able importance. But in this northern section, on May
24th, the Austro-Gtermans had resumed their offensive
and captured Wysocko, Makovisko, Bobrowka and Rady-
. mno, which forced the Russians to fall back to the east-
em bank of the San.

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

On May 25th the San was again crossed at Badymno,
and on the following day Nienovice was taken, while
farther north the German advance was pushed as far
east as Zapalow-Korzenica, and after a few days stub-
bom fighting the Glermans reached and took the village
of Naklo, but were unable to take the highlands south
of it, which would have enabled them to cut off the Rus-
sian retreat from Przemysl towards Lemberg. South
of Przemysl, from the 15th onward, there had been hard
fighting. Here the Russian line ran from Nizankowice
to the northeast of Sambor. This position was hard
fought over, the trenches therein being in alternate pos-
session for a time. However, finally by May 19th, the
Austrians troops had completely driven in the Russian
forces and had advanced to within six miles of Moseiska
and were threatening to cut off from the south the Rus-
sian retreat along the railroad from Przemysl to Lem-
berg. The Russians, however, threw heavy re-enforce-
ments from the direction of Lemberg, and were able to
open an offensive in this sector, which for two or three
days held up this Austrian advance, which was resumed
about May 25th and was pushed simultaneously from
the north and south of the German forces; so that on
May 30th the ends of the Austro-German lines surround-
ing Przemysl were only about ten miles apart on the
east, and the railway from Przemysl to Grodek and Lem-
berg was within range of the fire of the heavy Teutonic
srtUlery.

Returning to Przemysl, Port No. 7 was attacked by
the Austrians the night of May 30th, which attack con-
tinued to the afternoon of the following day. This Fort
No. 7 is on the east of Przemysl. This attack, however,
was unsuccessful.

The same day the Bavarians in the north began a
bombardment of the northern sector of the outer ring
of forts around Przemysl (Nos. 10-A, 11-A and 11), and
continued this bombardment the following day until the
afternoon, when these forts were stormed by the Bavar-
ians and taken.

The next day, May 31st, the trenches east of Fort 11
were captured by the Teutonic forces, and Forts 10 and
12 were bombarded by very heavy artillery.

On June 2nd the Bavarians captured Fort 10, and 1 1 ^
Pmssian Grenadier Guards Fort No. 12. That night
the village of Zuravica, within the ring of outer defenses
of Przemysl, was taken by these same forces.

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

In the sonthwesty while these things had been going
on, the Austrian troops had also broken through and
had captured Zasanie on the left bank of the San. For
several days the Russians had seen that this fortress
could not be held for any great length of time, and had
been hurriedly sending their munitions of war, supplies
and troops to the eastward.

The night of June 2nd saw this operation completed,
the Russians fled and early in the morning: of June 3rd
the Teutonic forces entered the town in triumph. The
Russians had taken this fortress on March 22nd, and
were obliged to evacuate on June 2nd, so that their ten-
ure had been but little over nine weeks. But this nine
weeks the Jews of Przemysl, who form a very large per-
centage of its population, will long have reason to re-
member, as during that period no less than two semi-of-
ficial pogroms took place, to say nothing of the continual
and daily persecutions which were favored, apparently,
by the Russian commanders.

The fall of Przemysl completed the Russian debacle
in Central Galicia.

While these events were taking place in the north,
another event of possibly even greater significance was
taking place in the south. A portion of the German
forces of the third section, which succeeded in moving
northeast to Przemysl had continued their march straight
to the east, following the line of the railroad running
across Galicia from Sandec to the border of Bukowina,
and had taken in succession the important towns of
Lisko, Chyrom and Sambor, and had finally advanced
to and taken the extremely important railroad center of
Stryj. The Russians attempted to Sresist here, well
knowing the importance of this place, and the effect that
its fall would have on their hold on the city of Lemberg
and their general position north and east ; but the Aus-
tro-Germans brought up their heavy batteries and on
May 31st opened fire against them, with the result that
after a short bombardment which destroyed their de-
fensive works, the entire Russian line here was obliged
to fall back behind the line of the Dniester River.

The capture of the two strategic points of Przemysl
and Stryj, closes what may be termed the second phase
of the Austro-German offensive against the Russians in
Galicia ; the first being the forcing of the Dunajec River
to the West.

CHAPTER XIV

We will now consider the third phase, the capture of
Lemberg. Lemberg to the west was defended by a line
of lakes and marshes which run along the small river
Vereszyca from north to south, and which is usually
referred to as the Grodek line. To the south it is de-
fended by the line of the Dniester, which is extremely
strong, comprising as it does a broad and deep river
running swiftly in what may be described as a canyon
with abrupt sides, and therefore most easily defended
by any force wishing to resist its passage by an enemy.
On the north, however, as has been already observed in
connection with the attack on Lemberg by the Russians,
the line of defense runs from Rawa-Ruska, and Rawa-
Ruska had already, as a matter of protection, been oc-
cupied by another Austro-German force. The attack
on Lemberg opened along the line of the railroad run-
ning to the westward from it through Grodek and Wisz-
nia to Przemysl, but was desperately defended by the
Russians.

At the same time a portion of the Austro-German
forces which were on the Rawa-Ruska line commenced
to move south from that point on Lemberg, while the
Austro-German forces to the south of the Dniester made
strenuous efforts to advance. For a few days, however,
this advance was slow and the Russian forces near the
northern border of Central Galicia, in the vicinity of
XJlanow and Rudnik to the northwest of Sieniawa, at-
tempted to relieve the pressure towards Lemberg by a
counter-offensive which lasted three or four days their
object being to cut the railroad from Tamow to Jaroslav,
which was an essential element in the line of communi-
cation of the Austro-Gterman army. This attack, how-
ever, though, gaining initial successes, was on June 4th
halted at the Leng River by the Teutonic forces where-
after the Russians retreated; the next day the whole
of their advance was lost. Mosciska, on the railroad
from Przemysl to Lemberg, was reached by the Teutons
moving from the southwest on June 14th. The slowness
of this advance can be attributed to the necessity of
resting the Teutonic troops, whose rapid advance to and
strong efforts at the second siege of Przemysl required a

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

brief period in which to recuperate. While this was
going on, however, a new concentration of artillery took
place around Jaroslav, and on June 12th a violent bom-
bardment of the Russian positions enabled the Austri-
ans to cross the San in two directions; one force pro-
ceeding to the north and occupying Sieniawa and Cies-
anov, while the other moving easterly proceeded through
Krakovic, capturing Lubaczow, Niemirowo, Jaworow
and Sadova; thus clearing the whole of the country
north and northeast of Przemysl of the enemy.

During the time occupied in this eastward movement,
the forces proceeding to the north continued in that di-
rection and on June 16th crossed the Russian frontier »
their advance now being due north. The other section
of this army, after seizing Jaworow, as heretofore stated,
at the head of the railroad running from Lemberg to
that town, moved steadily forward through ScMp in the
direction of Janow.

The two armies which had met at Moseiska, had also
made progress during this time, and on June 16th as
one army took contact with the retreating Russians about
three miles west of Grodek whom it drove across the
river Vereszyca, the line of defense which has already
been described, and during the night took by assault
the town of Grodek.

The army in the north which had advanced across the
Russian border, continued this advance and on June
17th captured Tamogrod, Erzeszow and Narol, and the
next day established themselves on the Tanew River, a
strategic position of great importance since it could be
held, owing to the character of the ground beyond its
northern bank, with very small forces. To the west of
the San River in this sector the Russians had been driven
back practically to the line of Opatow River and thus
the whole of the banks of the San and Vistula was free
from the Muscovite.

While these things were taking place in the north,
heavy fighting was going on to the east of Stryj on the
southern bank of the Dniester, where the Germans made
several attempts to cross this river. For several days
hard fighting took place around Zydaczow and Mikola-
jow, but the real attack began on June 5th at Zuravno,
on which day this town was captured. The next day
Bukaczovce, an important strategic point on the nortti
bank of the river, was taken, and on the same day Kal-

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

usz, further to the south, was occupied. The objective
of this movement was to capture Halicz and Stanislau
from the east and to turn the Russian positions along
the river with a force which was in the vicinity of Zurav-
no. The battle began all along this line on June 8th
and finished on the 10th when the Austro-Gkrmans were
driven back across the Dniester line, losing rather heav-
ily.
However, on June llth, these forces returned to tHe

fray and re-captured Zuravno, following up this success
the next day by advancing beyond this point to Boganz-
na. Further to the east the Glermans had succeeded in
taking possession of the south bank of this river along
the entire line from Jazupol to Zaleszczyki, crossing it
at several points, particularly in the neighborhood of
Nizniow ; and on June 16th the positions were about as
described along the Dniester River.

But events of more importance were happening in the
north. At this time the Russian position defending
Lemberg was, roughly, from Magierow to Laszczow, and
thence to Kolodruby on the Dniester.

On June 18th the Austro-Germans assaulted this
whole line and though comparatively unsuccessful in
the middle, were successful in the north, so that on the
20th the town ZoUdev was occupied, by which capture
the Russian position on the north was turned and its
defenders were obliged to fall back on their last line of
defense in front of Lemberg.

But the Russians had seen that Lemberg, could not be
held, and had several days before begun to send out of
that city everything of value that was transportable;
using here the same tactics that they used at Przemysl
and were destined to use at all the Poli&b cities, that is,
to render the captured city as little valuable to the enemy
gaining its possession as possible.

On the 21st the Russians were on a line running from
Zoltancz Pass through Eoliukw to the north of Brzuch*
ovic, while to the west of Lemberg their position was
along the line of the River Szczerszec. The battle fought
here lasted all day, and during the night the Russians
fell back to the immediate outskirts of Lemberg and
fought a delaying action a portion of the next day, but
were driven back and through the city which the Aus-
tro-German forces occupied on Tuesday, June 22nd, at
four o'clock in the afternoon. Thus terminated the
Russian possession of this, the largest, city in Oalicia.

THE FREEING OF GAUCIA

The Bufledan Governor had retired from the town sev-
eral days before. The rest of the story of the redemp-
tion of Oalieia can be briefly told, and consisted merely
of a cleaning np operation which took perhaps a montii
and would be of little attraction to the reader after the
events we have just chronided, since it was in the nature
of routine manoeuvres. The Russian troops moved
steadily towards their frontiers, being turned out of
position after position by the Austro-German forces
flushed with victory.

The next move was directly to the east of Lemberg
and the railroad to Busk and Brody, while on a genertd
north and south line from this railroad to the Carpathi-
ans the Austro-Germans moved steadily forward, dis-
lodging the Russians from their positions along the riv-
ers which parallel each other in this extreme eastern
part of Galicia. The line along the Dnieper Biver from
Dunajow to Halicz was cleared, then the line along the
Zlota and Dnieper further to the east was taken, and
finally the Russians were hurled to the eastward of the
Stripa; then the line of the Stripa was seized, and findly
the Bussians were driven back to the eastward of the
line of the Sireth and from their arrival on its banks, un-
til the end of the period we have under consideration, no
fighting of any importance or of any significance took
place. The Austro-Gtermans were content to hold this
line, leaving the town of Tarnopol and a very narrow
strip of territory south from that town to Jezierzany in
Russian hands, for the strategic reason that this river
afforded a better holding line than could be found for a
great distance to the east.

Thus was Galicia cleared of the Bussians.

The Polish and Russian

Campaign

CHAPTER XV

THE INVASION

In the early Spring the German forces in Poland south
of the Vistula formed a line beginning in a general sense
with the junction of the Bzura with the Vistula, south
along that stream to Sochaczew and thence across coun-
try to Skiemiewice, and thence south to the Pilica River,
whose course the line followed southward to the Galician
border.

Not much took place along this front during the
month of March, both armies being content to maintain
their respective positions in the trenches which they had
made towards the end of December and which had, dur-
ing the intervening time, been developed into quite
elaborate fortifications.

North of the Vistula there was, however, consider-
ably more fighting on the Niemen and Narow fronts.
The fortress of Ossowiec had been bombarded for a con-
siderable period but had managed to resist until the mid-
dle of March, when, thaws commencing, and the coat of
ice which enveloped this boggy country beginning to
disappear, the Germans were obliged to draw back their
heavy artillery before the ground became so heavy as to
become impassable.

On March 27th the cannonading ceased, but was re-
sumed on April 11th, and on April 14th an attempt was
made to take the outskirts of the fort by assault, but was
unsuccessful, and the siege of Ossowiec came to an end..

Along the Orzec and the Ormula Rivers the usual
routine of trench war-fare kept up, but presents nothing
sufficiently interesting to dwell on.

Along the Niemen much the same condition prevailed ;
the only important movement being that on March 27th
the Germans advanced from Ealvaria to Krajno and met
the Russians in a passage between the town of Zimnow

THE INVASION

and Lake Dusiec. This lake the Glermans crossed in or-
der to reach the Russian position, but the Russians hav-
ing been forewarned of this movement were able to defeat
it and inflict severe punishment on the Teutonic invad-
ers. Otherwise, for a considerable time, fighting con-
tinued to preserve the general character of trench war-
fare.

At the northern end of the line, where the end of
Prussia juts forward like a narrow finger, between Rus-
sia and the Baltic Sea, the Russian troops began a move-
ment on March 17th from Tauroggen towards Memel
and after a fight on the border with German troops,
whom they defeated, they entered the town of Memel
in the evening of that day. Street fighting took place
and the town was bombarded in retaliation and the
population were rather badly treated. This advance
was in the nature of a raid and the Russians did not
maintain their positions long. A considerable force of
Germans was sent to relieve the town on March 22nd;
the Russians were compelled to evacuate it, and were
hurled backward over their border, and Northern Prus-
sia was cleared again of the Russian troops.

On March 23rd the Russian town of Polangen, near
the Prussian frontier, was bombarded by the German
fleet, and on March 28th the Russian port of Libau was
also bombarded ; the latter bombardment being the more
serious of the two.

The district between Memel, Tilsit and Tauroggen
was the scene of inconsequential skirmishes during the
latter part of April.

Towards the end of the month a general attack against
the Baltic provinces was launched. These Baltic prov-
inces had been for years one of the great granaries of
Eastern Europe. A noticeable portion of their inhabi-
tants were Germans or descendants of Germans, and
composed the upper class of the population — ^landholders
and merchants; the great majority of the population,
however, were either Ethonians or Letts.

Since the Russian raid on Memel at the end of March,
there had been more or less fighting around the town of
Tauroggen across the Russian border. At the end of
April a considerable German force was concentered be-
tween Tilsit and Jurburg, which was estimated at one
and a half corps of infantry and about the same number
of cavalry. This unusually large proportion of cavalry
was due to the necessity that the advance should be rapid

THE INVASION

and there being facilities, the infantry could be brought
up, following the cavalry, in motor cars. This force ad-
vanced in three columns, the main body moving along
the road from Tauroggen to Shavli, but on the left a
large force of cavalry moved from Tilsit towards Mura-
vio, where, by taking the railroad, they cut Libau off
from any communication to the eastward.

On April 29th a fight took place between the Germans
and Russians at Shavli, and the Russians, being beaten,
fell back towards Metau.

On April 30th the Germans captured Muravio and
Badzilishki to the east of Metau, and on May 1st Qer-
man cavalry patrols appeared on the outskirts of Libau.

On May 3rd was the fight of Bossienie and on May
5th and 7th the Russians repulsed a German advance
towards Metau in the center and forced them to evacuate
their position near Janishki to the south of Metau. A
new German column, however, had been launched from
Memel and moved along the seashore towards Libau,
and on May 8th the Germans entered this city, from
which the Russians had fied, and captured it and have
succeeded in holding it up to the present time.

In the center, however, the Germans did not fare so
well. An offensive by them had been made towards the
east, northeast of Bossienie, which succeeded on May
8th, (the same day Libau was taken) in reaching the rail-
road station of Cejy on the railroad running from Vilna
to Shavli; thus threatening to out-flank the Russian
troops to the west, and at the same time to cut from the
north the railroad connecting with the main line of the
railway running from Warsaw to Petrograd. This
force, however, was attacked by the Russians and de-
feated on the same day that they reached the railroad
station, and rather badly cut to pieces, and forced to re-
treat north to a point near Krakinov where, on May 9th,
a battle was fought which also resulted adversely to the
Germans who began to retreat further the next day, but
were not followed up energetically by the Russian
forces.

The effect of this retreat was to clear all the country
to the east of the Rivers Yindava and Dubissa of the
Germans, so that the Russians were able to resume rail-
road communication on May 14th between Riga and
Mitau. At this time the only real fruit of this German

THE INVASION

invasion of the Baltic provinces was the possession of
Idbau and the country to the east of it as far as the
two rivers mentioned.

The Russians thought the invasion was to stop here,
but the course of subsequent events considerably dis-
appointed this hope though for some time no very ener-
getic efforts were made by the Germans to advance still
further.

The probable object of this manoeuvre at this time
was to give so much occupation to the Russians in the
extreme north, that they would be unable to send re-en-
forcements to the Galician front where at this time the
Austro-Glerman offensive was in full swing.

CHAPTER XVI

In the account of the history of the redemption of Gal-
icia, it will be remembered that we pointed out that an
Austro-Gkrman army had moved to the northward from
Sieniawa through Gieszanov across the Russian border,
had captured Krzeszow and Tamogrod and had finally
taken up a position along the Tamow River extending
from Ulanow on the San River and stretching to the east-
ward to Narol. It will also be remembered that a por-
tion of the Austro-Gterman army which had attained
Rawa-Ruska was left there when tiie attack was made on
Lemberg from the north. This army did not remain
long in this position at Rawa-Ruska, but even before
Lemberg fell had moved north and northwest and, in its
turn, crossed the Russian border; then advancing into
Russia, seized Tomaszow and extended its line from east
to west of that place, finally making a junction on its
left wing with the army extending along the Tanew.

The objective of this united army was the two cities
of Lublin and Cholm on the railroad which runs from
Warsaw through Ivangorod and these two towns east-
ward, to Kovel and ultimately to Kieff, and was in con-
tinuation of the movements of separation of the grand
Russian line which began at Gorlice in Western Galicia.

When the wedge was driven through at Qorlice, the
Russians, to the north of the point of entrance of that
wedge into the Russian line, had moved in a general
sense northward while the Russians to the south and east
of the wedge were those who had moved to the eastward
towards Przemysl and Lemberg, in which retreat they
were joined by the troops from the Carpathians and
those in Central and Eastern Galicia. It was important
to prevent their making a northward movement so as
to bring themselves again in contact with the main line
of the Russian army stretching through Eovno, Warsaw
and Ivangorod to the south ; and this had been accomp-
lished in the first instance by the movement from Jaro-
slav to Rawa-Ruska, and the driving of the wedge which
we have now under consideration was to make this sep-
aration a permanent one and one which it would be im-
possible for the Russians to recover from. « ,

This position then, which by June 22nd, (the dat^ h-.

■1 » -

THE INVASION

Lemberg fell) represented a front of about 75 miles long,
extended from the pcnnt where the Biver Tanew joiDed
the Biver San, to the town of Mikolajow on the Dniester.
The eastern portion of this line does not enter into our
story to any great degree, because the troops which ad-
vanced from Bawa-Buska eventually moved to the east-
ward and took Sokal, thus stretching their line to the Bug
Biver and separating themselves from the lines running
southeastward to the Dniester. The exploits of this por-
tion of the line, after the fall of Lemberg, have been
narrated in their place in the account of tiie campaign
in Galicia.

During their occupation of Galicia, the Bussians in
the winter of 1914-1915 had built a line of railway south
of Lublin which connected with the Galician railways at
Bozapadow on the San, a little north of XJlanow, as well
as another line also running southward from Cholm to
Balzec northwest of Bawa-Buska, and had thus put their
Polish railway ^stem, which is the most highly devel-
oped in the Bussian Empire, into complete uniaa with
the railroad system of Galicia. This they had done for
the purpose of facilitating their control of the conquered
territory and of the movement of troops, supplies and
ammunition calculating that it would be to their advan-
tage. As will be seen, the sequel made the construction
of these two lines an advantage to their enemies and not
to the Bussians.

The pre-existing lines of the Bussian railroad in South-
em Poland came no nearer at any point to the Austrian
frontier than 40 miles between the Vistula and the Bug.
Further to the east, Brody, on the extreme eastern border
of Galicia, is the only place where the Bussian railroad
system linked up with the Austrian before the war.

The general Bussian position at this time was that
the bulk of their forces were concentrated in Central
Poland with a very strong line running southward from
this main position to near the Galician border; that be-
tween this Bussian position and the Bussian position fur-
ther to the east, in Volhynia, an Austro-German wedge
had been driven which completely separatd these Bus-
sian forces from each other. The Austro-Gterman move-
ment northward was a repetition of the same movement
which the Austrians initiated at the commencement of
their campaign against Bussia, and which was treated
of in the first volume. My readers wiU remember the
lack of success of this early movement and the conse-

100

^
\

THE INVASION

quent Austrian retreat, in confusion and disaster. But
this time this ending was not destined to be the portion
of the Austro-Oermans, so that here was one occasion in
which history did not show its traditional propensity to
repeat itself.

The right wing of this army extending from near So-
kal towards Ulanow remained in about this position dur-
ing all the first part of the Austro-Gterman offensive
against Lublin and Cholm, until the Austrian defeat
which took place in the vicinity of Krasnik about July
7th.

Now, returning to the Austro-German center and left
wing, that is, that part of the line running westward
from Narew and Rawa-Buska to the Tanew and the San
Bivers. A forward movement of this line began on June
28th, and on July 1st reached the environs of Krasnik
and the rivers Por and Volika, the average rate of ad-
vance having been about ten miles a day.

On July 2nd, the Austrians, who had taken Krasnik,
attempted to move forward towards Lublin, but encoun-
tered the Bussian forces, which were too strong for them,
and after a battle which lasted all that day, they were
obliged to fall back to the town of Krasnik, which town
they evacuated that evening; but on the next day a hot
fight re-captured the place from the Bussians, whom they
drove into the forests north and northeast of the town
and back on the village of Budzin.

On July 5th the Austro-Qermans carried this village
by storm, and also made a considerable advance to the
north of Krasnik. On the evening of this day there was
severe fighting near Yilkolaz where the Bussians
launched a counter-attack which was successful and had
the effect of holding up further advances north of Kras-
nik for some time. A general battle began along the Kras-
nik- Vilkolaz-Lublin road ^ and along the Bystrzyca and
Kosarzewka rivers, where the Bussians attacked in force
and were reasonably successful, to the extent that they
broke through the Austro-Gterman line near Urzendowka
to the northeast of Krasnik, and had the Austrians not
shown a capacity for stubborn resistance, it is probable
that serious defeat would have been inflicted upon them.
But this attack advanced no further and the Bussians
were obliged to take up a position along the line of the
Urzendowka Biver and to remain contended with having

101

THE INVASION

for the time being halted the Austro-Gterman advance
in this section.

For nearly a week after this severe fighting, both lines
remained quiet; the Austrians waiting for re-enforce-
ments to reach them, and the Russians occupying them-
selves with strengthening their positions. On July 15th,
however, fighting again began, but not on the western
end of this offensive, on the contrary, an attack was
delivered by the Austro-Gtermans on the extreme eastern
end of the line. This movement opened with severe
Austro-Cterman pressure on the Russian positions around
Sokal, in Northeastern Oalicia, which resulted in that
town being taken on July 19th and in the Russians
withdrawing towards Tartakow to the east, and nearer
to the Russian border.

The Russians on the 20th made a counter-attack on
Sokal but this attack was repulsed and the Russians
were never able to re-take the place. The possession
of Sokal protected the right flank of the Austro-German
forces, and enabled the movement hereinafter described
to be successfully executed. This movement was launched
from the north of Zamosc, a few miles south of Erasnos-
taw, a place almost midway between Lublin and Cholm,
and a little to the south of the railway connecting those
two places, where the Austro-€^rmans massed a large
number of heavy batteries, bombarded their opponents'
trenches at a given point, and followed up this bombard-
ment with heavy infantry attacks. This battle opened on
July 17th, and may be said to have lasted until the 27th
each day showing some advance, but which advance, ow-
ing to the nature of the country traversed, was necessarily
slow. Erasnostaw itself was taken at the end of the fight-
ing and then the left wing of the army which had been
manoeuvering to the north of Exasnik, advanced from
that point, also fighting, and finally on July 30th entered
triumphantly into the important town of Lublin thus
gaining possession of the railroad uniting north and
south Poland. The town of Cholm was taken a few
days afterwards and with it the control of the railroad
northward to the fortress of Brest-Litovsk ; so that by
the early days of August the entire quadrangle between
the Vistula and the Bug on the east and west, the Gali-
cian border, and the railroad running from Lublin to
Cholm on the south and north, respectively, had passed
into the hands of the Austro-C^rmans. The Russian
armies which had defended them retreated partly north-

102

THE INVASION

ward along the Bug, and partly northwestward in the
general dirction of Warsaw. This completed the con-
quest of this portion of Poland.

103

CHAPTER XVn

While these things were taking place on the line of
the Lublin-Cholm quadrangle, events of great interest
were taking place in Central Poland. . Ivangorod, War-
saw, Novo Gteorgievsk, Sierock, Pultnsk, Bozan, Ostro-
lenka, Lomza, Osoviec and Grodno, form an almost con-
tinuous line of fortresses from Southern Poland to the
Narev River. Any natural defenses had been carefully
taken advantage of in the selection of the sites of these
fortresses, with the exception, perhaps, of one or two
cities which, by reason of their size, had attained great
importance before the construction of this chain of fort-
resses was begun. But, in such cases, (as, for instance,
that of Warsaw which itself was reasonably strong),
subordinate fortresses, such as Novo Georgievsk, had
been constructed for their protection.

Behind this first line of fortresses was the great fort-
ress of Brest-Litovsk to the east, which was supposed to
be able to defend the River Bug, and which probably
would have been, in connection with this more westerly
chain of fortresses, had those defenses been supplement-
ed by a strong, well-organized army. Ivangorod, War-
saw and Novo Georgievsk defended the Vistula. Sie-
rock, Pultusk and Ostrolenka defended Warsaw on the
north and the Narev River ; while Osoviec defended the
passage of the Bobr. A well organized railroad system
connected the principal of these fortresses with the sur-
rounding country both to the east and west, and also
with each other. Ivangorod had been attacked unsuc-
cessfully several months before, and the so-called siege
of Osoviec (which was in reality a bombardment from
the northerly side only) had ceased but a few weeks be-
fore the movement of which we are about to treat
opened.

The general scheme of the new Austro-German attack
against this line of fortresses, and the territory in which
they stand which is generally known as the Polish salient,
began in the middle of July and had the object of forc-
ing the Vistula line and taking Warsaw by concentric
attack. Simultaneously with this attack a serious

104

THE INVASION

attack be^n in the north, which will be hereafter des-
cribed, and also the attack on the Lublin-Gholm line,
which we have already dealt with.

The Germans had carefully prepared their offensive
and were particularly well equipped with heavy artillery
and machine guns, thoroughly provided with the neces-
sary explosives, and also used the existing railroad lines
in that portion of Poland which was in their hands, and
those that they had constructed with much care and
difficulty during the Spring and early Summer of the
year, in supplement to the already existing railroads,
with great skill. So that, though attacking the enor-
mous Russian army which had been gathered from all
quarters of the Russian Empire to defend the line of the
Vistula, with numerically inferior forces they were able
to overcome this superiority in numbers of the Russians,
by a masterful use of these railroads in rapidly con-
centrating upon any point of the front a force of troops
superior to those of their adversaries, this superiority
being not only in numbers but also in morale, discipline
and leadership. Opposed to them was an army numeri-
cally far superior operating in its own country with the
advantage of numerous strongholds by way of support,
and composed of well-meaning troops. Unfortunately
for them they were led by probably the most incompe-
tent leader who has appeared on the pages of modern
history, the Grand Duke Nicholas, who, in the brief space
of four short months, succeeded in dissipating, for all
practical purposes, an army which in its total aggregate
must have numbered 4,000,000 men at a minimum and
most probably was considerably larger; lost more fort-
resses than any other general in the world's history dur-
ing an equal time, besides more stores and artillery than
any other commander up to the present time has suc-
ceeded in doing.

In prisoners alone this leader led so well that over
one million of his own men were taken by his adversary
between May 1st and September 1st. If there was a strat-
egic blunder to be perpetrated, it can be said that this
commander rose to the occasion and perpetrated it. The
theory of a strategic retreat which was invented and used
to save this incompetent reputation, or, as the Chinese
say, "face,'' is a mere piece of fiction of the imaginative
order. No retreat can be strategic unless it has a pur-
pose, and the aimless and continuous retreat of the Rus-
sians, surrendering stronghold after stronghold, which

105

THE INVASION

lasted from the day the cannon opened on the crossing
of the Dunajec iUver to even the present writing, had no
objective or no end towards which it was working.

The Grand Duke has been represented as having adopt-
ed the plan of campaign which the Russians adopted
against Napoleon during his famous advance to the cap-
ture of Moscow and to have had the design of luring the
Teutonic forces into the interior of Russia, there to hold
them until the Russian winter with all its severity fell
upon them, when they would be attacked by a partly re-
organized, partly newly created, Russian army. But the
first thing to be observed is that the myth of Napoleon
having been defeated by the winter was invented subse-
quent to the retreat from Moscow, and that, as a matter
of fact, what defeated his purpose in invading Russia
was the failure of his lines of communication, and noth-
ing else. The story so often told of the retreat of the
Grand Army overwhelmed by the snow and cold of the
Russian winter, has no historical foundation in fact.
Snow did not fall at all, as Napoleon himself says in his
account of this retreat written within a few months after
it actually occurred, until he himself had nearly reached
Warsaw ; nor did the retreating French troops who fol-
lowed him have difliculties with snow until they were
within a comparatively short distance of the Russian
frontier. Afterward, Napoleon, when at St. Helena, seek-
ing an excuse for his defeat, and not wishing to avow his
strategic mistake in the campaign, created this myth of
the snows, but any reader of history can find the refuta-
tion of this fable in the contemporary diary of Napoleon
himself.

These facts must have been known to the Russian mil-
itary commanders.

The German army had passed the previous winter ex-
posed to the full rigors of the Polish winter, which the
Russians said in the Autumn of 1914, would compel
them to evacuate Poland ; and had not only not evacuated
Poland but had driven their lines further and deeper in-
to the heart of that country. The fight at Lodz took place
in the midst of these wintry rigors, as did the severe
fighting of December, 1914, to January, 1915. So that
it was clearly apparent to the Russian commander-in-
chief that neither snow nor cold was a potent weapon in
favor of the Russians against the Germans.

From the foregoing it is, therefore, clearly seen that
the Russian (General Staff did not adopt the plan adopted

106

THE INVASION

by the Russians against Napoleon, for the extremely
simple reason that the Russians of that time adopted no
plan whatever; and, further, the Russian Cteneral Staff
knew that the Germans could stand a winter campaign
in Russia because they had already stood it. These two
facts mi^ this theory of the lure by the Russians of the
Germans into the interior of Poland for any strategic
object absurd. The real reason why the Russians re-
treated into the interior of Poland, abandoning fortress
after fortress, was because they were defeated wherever
they made a stand and forced to retreat; because they
could not stand the unrelenting, continuous and ceaseless
pressure of the Cterman armies upon their line, even
though holding the interior line which was the shortest
and the easiest defended.

About the middle of July, then, the main offensive
against this Polish chain of fortresses opened. In the
dlistrict of Przasnysz, which had been the scene of hard
fighting up to the middle of March, and which is in the
proximity of the railroad running from Mlawa to Novo
Georgievsk, where the Germans occupied a line stretch-
ing northeast and southwest south of Mlawa-Chorzele,
with its center on the elevations on which stood the vil-
lage of Granty, preparation for the offensive began on
July 9th with the making of advance saps for the con-
centration of artillery. In three days all was ready and
at daybreak on July 13th all the artillery started a bom-
bardment of the Russian trenches about half a mile dis-
tant, which was kept up for about three hours. Towards
eight o'clock the infantry advance began and captured
a strategic point (Hill 164) to the west of Mlawa-Ciech-
anow Railroad, while the left wing occupied the village
of Dunsk. From both sides the Germans closed in on
Przasnysz and that town was occupied by them on July
14th. The Russians fell back in the direction of Ciznov
and attempted by cavalry charges to hold up the Ger-
man advance, but did not succeed, and on July 16th Ciz-
nov was taken by the Germans. The Russians attempt-
ed to make a stand near Gome without success and on
the 18th the (German advance guards got within the
range of the artillery of Novo Gfeorgievsk and occupied
the northern bank of the Narev from this point, to Pul-
tusk-Rosan and Ostrolenka, holding the line of the Bobr
and the Narev between the last two points, and on the
same day began an attack on some of the bridge-heads
on its line. The crossing of Narev was soon effected at

107

THE INVASION

several points. During the next week the Germans sur-
rounded the fortress of Novo Gteorgievsk and opened
their attack on the various fortresses along the banks of
the Narev from Ostrolenka to the south. By this isola-
tion of Novo Gborgievsk the (Germans eliminated the pos-
sibility of any relief to Warsaw from that strong fort-
ress, which was supposed to be, as was Brest-Ldtovsk,
untakeable.

The siege of this fortress was confided to a special
body of troops under command of the general who had
been so successful in reducing Antwerp in the early days
of the war. The siege proper may be said to have begun
on July 20th, and its history from that time until its fall
late in August consists of a daily record of small German
advances which brought them nearer and nearer to their
goal.

On the fall of this fortress, the Germans took, all told,
about 95,000 prisoners, and in the neighborhood of 900
cannon, the most important booty they had to that time
taken in Poland.

It is exceedingly curious that Novo Georgievsk, which
was at least as strong a fortress as Przemysl, was unable
to resist a length of time comparable with that in which
the Austrian fortress held off its assailants ; and this fact
illustrates most strikingly either the extreme eflSciency
of the Gterman besiegers of Novo Georgievsk as compared
with the Russian assailants of Przemysl, or the extreme
tenacity of the defenders of Przemysl as compared with
the defenders of Novo Gteorgievsk. That one of the
strongest fortresses in the world, on which within the
past few years money had been spent like water by the
Russian government, to bring the defenses of the strong-
hold to the highest point of eflSciency, which was amply
equipped with the best modem artiUery, and contained
ammunition in such abundance that at the time of its
capture by the Germans there was enough left for the
ordinary needs of a year's defense, should have been
captured speedily, does not reflect great credit upon the
Russian military authorities or its defenders.

After surrounding the fortress as stated, the German
forces which had come from the north and had here
formed a junction with another German force which had
moved from Plock along the northern bank of the. Vis-
tula, moved southwest upon Warsaw.

108

CHAPTER XVni

In the center of the Warsaw front, the winter quiet-
ness had lasted practically up to the middle of July,
though of coijrse there had been some activity, but none
which materially influenced either the strategy of the
campaign or the positions of the respective combatants.
The Germans, simultaneously with the offensive to the
north of the Vistula which has been hereinbefore de-
scribed, began a movement which extended all along the
line from the Vistula River to the point where the Aus-
tro-Gterman armies in the center took contact with the
same armies which were attempting to take Lublin and
Cholm.

The first part of this line was known as the Bzura Ri-
ver line, and here the Russians had managed to with-
stand for a considerable period of time Gterman assaults
both in the early attempt on Warsaw and during the
succeeding winter. Without much fighting, on July
19th, owing to the result of the pressure to the north and
to the south of this line, the Russians retreated there-
from, thus transferring the activity west of Warsaw from
this Bzura River line to the line which ran north and
south through Blonie, and then swung over from Nadar-
zyn to Piaseczno, and thence to Kalvaria on the Vistula.
Of course this retrogressive movement was not effected
all at once, particularly as far as the retreat on the south-
em front is concerned ; and this movement was not com-
plete until some time after July 19th. The Germans at-
tacked the Blonie line, the name given to the line above
described on July 25th and 26th, but were not fortunate
in their assault. The crux of operations was then trans-
ferred a little to the south. Here, on July 29th, the
Germans performed one of the most interesting and im-
portant feats of the attack on Warsaw, and succeeded in
crossing the Vistula River at a point some eighteen miles
to the north of the fortress of Ivangorod, where the Ra-
domka River flows into the Vistula. These troops which
performed this manoeuvre were detached from those
which had been destined for the attack on Ivangorod
which had advanced from the southwest through Kielce
to Radom on one line and along the Pilica from Tomas-
zow on the other. Hard fighting ensued, which took

109

THE INVASION

place principally around the village of Kobylnica. The
Russians had considered the Vistula a protection against
any invasion from the west, since the river is both deep
and varies from 800 to 1200 yards in width between
Ivangorod and Warsaw, and which between these towns
is not crossed by any permanent bridge. The eastern
bank being higher than the western from which the Ger-
mans must necessarily launch any attempt to cross the
stream, the Russians considered that such crossing would
present such natural difficulties that with reasonable
forces on the higher banks of the river, the eastern, it
would be impossible for the €^rmans to cross. But they
reckoned erroneously, and the Germans, after sending
an advance guard to the eastern bank of the river on
pontoons, succeeded in throwing bridges over the stream.
The Russians, when they saw that the stream had been
successfully crossed, detached forces from their army
defending Warsaw, in order to oppose the advance of
these Germans who had crossed the Vistula northwester-
ly on the east bank of that stream towards Warsaw ; but
these troops were unable to get to the threatened points
in time. By the first of August the Germans had thrown
80,000 men across the river and 120,000 more (three Aus-
trian corps) were rapidly effecting the crossing as well.
Consequently, the Russians who had advanced from the
army defending Warsaw fell back and finally formed
a junction, on August 4th, near Gora-Kalvaria, with a
portion of the army defending Warsaw on the western
bank of the river, which abandoned their positions there
during the night, crossed the Vistula on pontoons and
retreated in the direction of Brest-Litovsk.

The closing scenes of the Russian defense of Warsaw
were not remarkably heroic. On July 31st there was
some fighting near Blonie and near Brwinow, which re-
sulted in the Russians being driven in further towards
the defenses of Warsaw itself.

During the next day the Germans moved slightly to the
eastward, and began an assault on the Russian position
directly to the south of Warsaw ; Grojec and Suzk being
the principal scenes of action. Here again the Russians
were defeated.

It had previously become apparent to the Russians that
Warsaw could not be held much longer and for some time
they had been sending out of that city everything port-

110

THE INVASION

able of the slightest value. Days before the exodus of the
civil population had begun — ^at first voluntarily, and
afterwards, particularly in the case of the Jews of some
financial standing, compulsorily.

Fighting continued on the line around Warsaw for the
next two days, and finally, with the fall of Ivangorod
on August 4th, came an immediate necessity to withdraw
from Warsaw completely, since the fall of Ivangorod
uncovered the western flank of the Russian army operat-
ing around Warsaw.

During the night of August 3rd and 4th the retreat
began, the Germans being held back as much as possible
by rear-guard actions. The Russian forces which occu-
pied the triangle between Blonie, the Vistula River and
Warsaw, withdrew in a northeasterly direction to aid in
the defense of the River Narev. The line of retreat ol
those in the southern sector has already been indicated.
Those in the city itself crossed to the suburb of Praga
on the east bank of the Vistula as rapidly as possible,
80 that in the early morning of August 5th the city was
completely evacuated; and it was at this time that the
bridges across the Vistula, between Warsaw and Praga,
were blown up in the hope of arresting the German pur-
suit.

The Germans entered the town at six in the morning,
and thus realized one of the objectives of their advance
into Poland. The city was calm and still possessed the
great bulk of its population, in spite of the compulsory
exodus of some of the civilian population during the last
ten days. There was little street fighting and the Ger-
man entrance and possession may be said to have been
a quiet one. A municipal government was immediately
organized and in a few days the city resumed a normal
aspect.

As a remarkable instance of the thoroughness with
which the Germans organized their conquest of the cen-
tral portions of Poland and of the city of Warsaw itself,
it may be remarked that within two weeks after their en-
try into this capital of Poland, an express train began to
run daily between Liege in Belgium and Warsaw in Po-
land without changes.

It may here be said that the manner in which the Ger-
mans have organized territory conquered by them during
this war reflects the highest credit upon their power of
organization and of administration. The mails and the
other ordinary conveniences of life have been rapidly and

THE INVASION

efficiently established; in many cases more efficiently
than they ever were under the prior possessors of the
territory. Even such details as the registration of vital
statistics, the preservation of the public health, the or-
ganization of hospitals and other instruments for the
treatment of disease ; in a word an entire civil adminis-
tration has been well and efficiently organized in a per-
iod of time so short as to make the results achieved al-
most incredible.

In certain portions of the territory, notably Southern
Belgium, where the population has not co-operated with
the organization to that degree which it has elsewhere,
the government has been correspondingly drastic and
severe; but with this exception it may be said that the
government organized by the Germans in conquered ter-
ritory has been both reasonable and humane.

Ivangorod lies 50 miles to the southeast of Warsaw,
and against this, towards the middle of July, a general
movement was executed by the Germans from the gen-
eral direction of the Opatow and Kielce line, which
through the remaining days of July advanced steadily,
though the advance was disputed from time to time, by
the Russians, and this advance in its progress successive-
ly captured Grabowiec, Kazanow, Badom, the junction
of the Badomka River, Glowaczew, Granice and Kozien-
ice ; until by the end of the month the Austro-German
armies captured the outward defenses of the fortresses
on the right bank of the Vistula and brought their ar-
tillery to bear on Ivangorod itself.

The Vistula and the Wieprz form the defenses of this
fortress on the west and on the south and create a strong
position which possibly could not have been taken. But
a portion of the German army which, as we have seen,
crossed the Vistula at the point where the Radomka
meets that stream, instead of proceeding northwesterly
towards Warsaw with the main body, turned south then
easterly and fairly rapidly covered the distance separat-
ing itself from the fortress. This force opened, on Aug-
ust 1st, a violent bombardment against the northern out-
er forts on the east bank of the river, and on the same
day took some of them by storm.

The next day the bombardment continued, and other
forts, both on the northern side of the stronghold, on
the east bank, and the outer forts on the west bank of the
river, fell.

On August 3rd the bombardment of the main enceinte

112

THE INVASION

began and on the morning of August 4th, Ivangorod sur-
rendered. A number of prisoners were captured here,
as well as considerable artillery and supplies of war. The
effect of the fall of Ivangorod was, as we have seen, to
bring about the immediate fall of Warsaw, as it uncov-
ered the western flank of the army defending that capi-
tal.

On August 6th the course of the Vistula from Novo
Georgievsk to Ivangorod had fallen into the enemy's
hands, together with the railroad from Lublin to Cholm
and slU the country to the west and south of this line.
The Russian troops expelled from Ivangorod and points
to the south made their way, as rapidly and in as good
order as they could under the circumstances, towards
Brest-Litovsk.

North of Warsaw, on the Narev, heavy fighting con-
tinued heavily along the Narev line which, as we have
seen, was forced by Germans some time before. This por-
tion of the Russian defenses in Poland was not taken un-
til some little time after the fall of Warsaw.

While Warsaw was being captured, the Germans to
the north of this city were attacking the chain of fort-
resses running from Sierock to Grodno, in the north,
which prevented their advancing to the railroad running
from Warsaw northeastwardly to Petrograd and stop-
ping communication between those two cities. Of these
fortresses Lomza was occupied first; General Falcke's
armies entering that town on the 10th of August, while
Sierock changed masters one day thereafter. On this
line the German forward movement was very slow and
this prevented their being able to cut off that portion of
the Russian army which escaped from Warsaw and re-
treated northeastwardly towards Bialystok. The siege
of Osoviec to the northwest of Bialystok had again been
undertaken and this time the bombardment was much
more severe than during the first siege, but this valiant
little fortress held out beyond the time at which this rec-
ord closes. The history of the siege of Osoviec shows
what the Russians could have accomplished with their
chain of fortresses in Central Poland had all of them
been as intrepidly commanded as was this rather minor
defense. Whoever conducted this defense certainly
proved himself to be head and shoulders above any other
Russian fortress commander, and was a ray of capacity
in the Russian darkness of military incompetence.

Ostrolenka, on the Narev, fell in the middle of August,

113

THE INVASION

and the capture of this place and Lomza permitted the
Germans to march to th^ east in the direction of the
Bobr-Narev line, south of Lomza. The Russians at-
tempted to make a stand on the strongly fortified sec-
tions of the Caerwony-Brok position, but were defeated,
and this defeat opened the way for the advance towards
Bialystok positions hereafter referred to.

Further to the north, above Grodno, on the River Nie-
men, just a little west of the point where the river turns
to the west, was the important Russian fortress of Eovno
which covered Vilna to the east and the railroad to Petro-
grad. Early in July the Gtermans commenced an ad-
vance in the general direction of Kovno, and by August
10th after considerable hard and bloody fighting in the
intervening territory, succeeded in surrounding the fort-
ress and in cutting off its lines of communication in every
direction except to the east towards Vilna, also in get-
ting their heavy artillery in a position for a siege. Kovno
was considered one, of the strongest of the Russian fort-
resses, and consists of the usual enceinte with a ring of
main forts eleven in number surrounding it and the town,
at distances varying from two to four miles. The town
itself is located on the left bank of the Niemen, where
the Niemen is joined by the Vilia and a mile or so below
the point where the Niemen and Jessia flow together.
The ring of forts not only surrounds the town but also
these two river junctions and the railroad bridge across
the Niemen. Three of the forts are to the east ; one covers
the railroad bridge, and seven protect the southern and
western sides of the town.

The first serious attack took place on August 8th when
a bombardment commenced in the early morning with
16-inch guns, and was followed by an infantry attack
which lasted two hours and resulted in a temporary re-
pulse for the Germans. This was followed by another
attack at noon which was more successful, and towards
nightfall by a third attack which took the village of Piple,
the strategic point in the attack on which was the section
to the front of the southwest between the Niemen and
the Jessia. This assault was followed by a bom-
bardment which lasted a couple of days. Here,
as in Osoviec, the Russian resistance was much more de-
termined than it was in the case of the fortresses further
to the south, though it only lasted a few days. After
very severe fighting on the 16th and 17th of August the
€^rmans who had battered with their artillery the ex-

114

THE INVASION

terior defenses on this and prior days succeeded in taking
and storming these exterior lines of def enses, and on the
18th of August finished the siege by taking the enceinte
by storm. The Russians lost here more than 25,000 pris-
oners and over 1000 cannon, but nevertheless, were able
to withdraw a large portion of the defending forces along
the line of the railway eastwardly towards Vilna. The
€^rmans immediately launched columns in their pursuit,
and heavy fighting took place at the crossing of the Nie-
men River to the east of Kovno along the line of the rail-
road leading to Vilna, between Kovno and Eoshedary ; in
which both sides suffered heavy losses, but, as an ultimate
result of which, the Russians were forced to fall back
further in the direction of Vilna, which in the last days
of August, when reached by the €^rmans, was being
hastily evacuated by its civil population and stripped of
all portable articles which by any possibility could be
valuable to the German invaders, since its fall was seen
to be but a question of a short time. Meanwhile, and be-
tween the fall of Kovno and the end of the month, heavy
fighting was proceeding on the line south of that place,
towards Grodno. Pitched battles were fought at Mari-
ampol and Gudele, while a force which moved from the
westward was endeavoring to force the line of the Nie-
men River between Kovno and Olita ; which object, how-
ever, was not accomplished at the time that the period
under consideration closes.

Further south, about the time that operations first be-
gan against Kovno, a force moving from Augustowo had
fought its way eastward towards Grodno, a fortress fully
equal in strength to Kovno or to Brest-Litovsk. Here,
however, operations had proceeded more slowly than they
had further to the north ; the Russian resistance here be-
ing even more stubborn than at Kovno. However, slow-
ly but surely the Russian outer defenses were taken one
after the other, and the Russians, foot by foot, driven
in to the defenses proper of the fortress, which eventually
shared the fate of the other Polish fortresses and passed
from Russian into Gterman possession on the first of Sep-
tember.

By this capture of Grodno, the Russian second line of
defense was completely pierced as all of the fortresses
to the west had by this time fallen. The German army
could boast a greater string of trophies taken in the brief
space of two months, (since that period covers all the
time which was consumed from the real opening of the

115

THE INVASION

Gterman oflfensive in Central and Northern Poland until
their conquest of the first line of Russian defenses was
absolutely complete) than possibly any army has ever
before taken in any military campaign of modem times.

Many of these fortresses were not earnestly defended,
and had they been in the hands of competent leaders at
the head of well-trained and disciplined troops, such a
conquest would have been almost beyond the limits of
possibility, because, as we have seen in the case of the
siege of Przemysl, (where the Russians for a very consid-
erable time were supplied with heavy artillery) the
heavy artillery of the assailant is not the only factor ; the
quality of the defenders counts for much.

We have now described the events which took place
in the conquest of Poland, except those which happened
in the area of the triangle of which Bialystok is the nor-
thern apex, from which one side runs to Warsaw, another
side to Gholm and the third side from Cholm through
Brest-Litovsk to Bialystok.

Almost directly east of Warsaw, and on the north and
south line of Bialystok to Cholm, lies the Russian fortress
of Brest-Litovsk on the River Bug; which fortress, by
many military authorities, was considered the strongest
fortress in Russia.

The Germans who captured Warsaw immediately be-
gan operations to force the crossing of the Vistula River.
The Russians in Praga (a suburb of Warsaw, on the
eastern bank of the Vistula) for a couple of days main-
tained a stubborn resistance, but finally the Germans
succeeded by a free use of artillery in dislodging them
from their positions there. This dislodgment of the
Russians was helped by the fact that above Warsaw the
Germans succeeded in crossing the river with a fairly
considerable force, which then turning south commenced
an infantry attack upon the defenders of Praga. The
Russians thereupon fell back and eventually began a
general retreat towards Brest-Litovsk, hotly pursued by
the Germans. In the meantime the mixed force of Aus-
trians and Germans which had captured Ivangorod, also
began to move forward towards Brest-Litovsk, along the
raUway running from Ivangorod northeast to Lukow,
while a third mixed force of Austrians and Germans
moved to the northeast from Lublin. At first these three
movements were separated, but before many days these
armies took contact with each other and from this moment
forward advanced on Brest in an unbroken front. The

116

THE INVASION

point of junction may be roughly described as the rail-
road running from Siedlce through Lukow to Parczew.

A fourth force moved northward from Gholm along the
line of the railroad running from Gholm almost directly
north towards Brest-Litovsk, but this force did not fuse
with the others until Brest-Litovsk was nearly invested.

The Gterman army moving from Warsaw succeeded in
a short time in occupying Minsk, the junction of the
branch railroad, connecting the railroad from Warsaw to
Bialystok and the railroad from Warsaw to Ivangorod ;
thereafter this army moved through Kahiszyn to Siedlce.
While this army was covering this district, the Ivangorod
army had moved through Noszczanka, Lipiny, Badzyn,
and Stanin, to Lukow; and between Lukow and Siedlce
the right wing of the Warsaw army and the left wing of
the Ivangorod army joined ; and near here, too, the right
wing of the Ivangorod and the left wing of the Lublin
army took contact in the vicinity of Kakolownica, to-
wards which point the Lublin army had made its way
through Lubartow, Ostrow and Wohyn.

Brest-Litovsk was now effectually cut off from com-
munication with the west. The Russians fought rear-
guard actions almost continually during this retreat but
were not able anywhere to make a sufl&cient stand to hold
back the German advance, and two weeks after Warsaw
was taken the German advance guards had reached with-
in thirteen miles of Brest-Litovsk on the southeast in
the direction of Podlcsie. A very few days later the
entire Teutonic army stood in front of the fortress.

In the meantime, Bialystok had been struck at by the
forces which had succeeded in forcing the Ostrolenka-
Sierock chain of defenses, which had advanced from both
the west directly on Bialystok, and also from the south-
west of that point, crossing the Biver Bug near MaUdn,
and then swinging their right wing from Ciechanowice,
finally capturing Bielsk on the railroad connecting Brest-
Litovsk and Bialystok, which capture cut the communi-
cations between Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok.

At the same time, another force had advanced east
from Siedlce and cut this railroad a day or two later,
a little to the northeast of Siemiabycze, so that Brest-
Litovsk was absolutely isolated from all communication
from the outside world, except by the railway lines run-
ning to the east towards Pinsk and towards Baranowit-
shi.

The position at Bialystok grew so difficult that the

117

THE I^A^ASION

Bussians, in order to avoid having their forces there en>
tirely surrounded, evacuated the town and retreated di-
rectly to the eastward towards Slonim.

It may be here remarked that all through this Polish
campaign of July and August, 1915, the Russians pur-
sued the policy of evacuating, after a perfunctory resis-
tance, their strongholds, and in their retreat therefrom
devastating as far as possible the country through which
they passed, so as to make it as difScult as possible for
the pursuing enemy.

At Brest-Litovsk itself, after the main armies arrived,
siege operations began and lasted for about a week. This
fortress of Brest-Litovsk was regarded by the Russians
as the most powerful stronghold of their Empire, stand-
ing, as it does, at the junction of the two rivers, the Bug
and the Nukovhots, whereby it is protected. It lies on
the right bank of the Bug, here considerably higher than
the left bank and steep as well, besides which the river
turns here from the north to northeast. The town is about
a mile from the fortress. The inner fortifications have
a circumference of about four miles, while the field works
outside of them, which had been kept in excellent condi-
tion, (money having been spent upon them lavishly)
were of much greater circumference. The Russians had
announced their intention of making a determined stand
at this point, as well as at Bialystok, but on August 19th,
like the Arabs in the poem, they folded their tents and
silently stole away.

Previous to this, although there had been some fighting
in the outer circumference, it was not what could be
termed severe, and this Russian decision to retreat from
the strongest fortress of the Empire can only be viewed
with the utmost astonishment. Their stated reason for
this retreat was that all communications from this fort-
ress in any direction except to the east having been cut
off, the fortress itself became worthless as a defense and,
furthermore, communication to the east was threatened
by the Austrian forces which, after taking Kovel had ad-
vanced northeast of that town, and was moving towards
the railroads towards Slonim and Pinsk.

The German troops entered this fortress in triumph
on August 25th, and the Russian first line of defense
had completely fallen by this capture. For many weeks
before this first line of defense was taken, we were in-
formed in the Allied press that it was untakable and that
when once the Russians, in their retreat from Galicia and

118

THE INVASION

from Western Poland reached this line, it would be
found to be a rock upon which the German invaders
would dash themselves in pieces. This rock did not last
seven weeks from the time its actual assault was begun.

The Russians' second line of defense begins at Biga,
and thence runs along the Duna Biver to Dunaberg and
from thence, following the railroad from Vilna, through
Baranowitshi, Pinsk and Rowno. And to this second line
of defenses the entire Russian army from the north to the
south began to fall back in more or less disorder ; Grod-
no being the only point which still held out, and which
fell only a few days afterwards.

So we thus leave the German army in possession, at the
first of September, of the Bussian first line of defense.

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk, as said, the Bussian
army commenced to fall back in the last wcelr of August
to the Russian second line of defense to the east of Brest-
Litovsk itself, and the Austro-German forces entereri the
region of the marshes, and to the east of the line running
from Bialystok to Brest-Litovsk entered the only forest
which now remains in Europe where the bison still roams
in liberty.

Further north, on the 26th, the Russians evacuated
the fortress of Olita, which was immediately seized by
the German troops which had crossed the Niemen near
Meretch, and which now directed themselves against the
railroad running between Vilna and Grodno. The main
attack upon the Russian positions was near Orany, where
some fighting took place which was of considerable im-
portance, the town finally falling into German hands
on the 31st day of August, and which ultimately lead
to the capture of Grodno hereinbefore described.

A glance remains to be given to the operations to the
south which took place from and after the time of the
fall of Brest-Litovsk during the few remaining days of
the period under consideration, as these were of consid-
erable importance.

Brest-Litovsk fell on the 25th of August, but two days
before that time, on the 23rd of August, the Austrians
had entered Kovno and with the possession of this place
began a movement on the so-called triangle of the Vol-
hynian fortresses, Lutsk, Dubno and Rovno, which were
the center and the pivot of the Russian armies under the
command of General Ivanhoff.

THE INVASION

Another force of Austrians was at this time operating
on the Eiver Styr on a frontal attack on the fortress of
Lutsk.

The fall of Kovel and of the town of Vladimir Volyn-
sky made necessary the abandonment of the line of the
Upper Bug and of the Zlota Lipa in Galicia to the south
as the line of the Middle Bug having been pierced by
the capture of Kovel it would have left the Russian
forces on the Lower Bug without support.

On August 28th the Austrians assaulted the Russian
positions at Oologory and took them ; the Russians fall-
ing back to Bialykamien.

The following day the Austrians captured Zlochoff,
and another Austro-German army crossed the Zlota Lipa
at Brzezany, while in the south a movement against
Buczacz was inaugurated. The result of this pressure
was that the Russians hurriedly abandoned the line of
the Upper Bug and Zlota Lipa and fell back first to the
line of the Strypa and then to the line of the Sereth.

A concentric movement against Rovno now began,
which was launched from Kovel through Lutsk and from
northeastern Galicia through Dubno. And on August
29th a fierce battle commenced on the entire front run-
ning from Bialykamien to Radziechoff, and continued
on the two following days, the Russians here showing
unusual powers of resistance.

But on the 31st of August the fight finished with a
Russian defeat. The Austro Grerman forces captured
Lutsk and crossed the Strypa River, which necessitated
a Russian retreat along the whole front to a distance of
about 30 miles to the eastward.

On September 1st Brody fell into the hands of the
Austro-Germans.

It may here be remarked that this capture of Poland,
like that of Northern France, had an economic as well
as military significance. It is in Poland that there are
located the great centers of the Russian textile industry
and the principal metallurgical establishments of the
Empire. A large percentage of the coal mined in Rus-
sia is produced here, and, besides, Poland is one of the
centers of the cattle-raising industry of Russia, as well
as being important agriculturally.

While perhaps Poland does not bear quite so great im-
portance to the Russian Empire as does the industrial
territory in the north to France, the German possession
of it has had such considerable effect that this occupa-

120

THE I^4VASION

tion is alleged by the Russian Treasury officials to be the
cause of the very considerable drop in Russia's revenue
which has taken place since the time the Germans be-
came masters of the ancient territory of Sobieski.

121

CHAPTER XIX

In the extreme north, from the middle of May until
towards the middle of July, the German and Russian
armies faced each other on a front of about 150 miles
running between Libau and Kovno. The dividing line
between the lines was, roughly speaking, formed by three
rivers, the Vindava, the Venta and the Dubysa. The
town of Shavli, located at about the central point in this
line, was the scene of the most active operations. Prev-
iously on June 14th the Germans had begun an offensive
against this town and succeeded in taking the town of
Kuze but were unable to smash the Russian defenses be-
tween that place and Shavli. Prom this time until the
middle of July there was little fighting in this region.

On July 13th a new offensive against Shavli was
opened by the Germans. The Vindava, a stream about
fifty yards wide with forest-lined banks, was first crossed
at Niegraden, and then between Muravjevo and Kur-
shany, these crossings being effected without serious dif-
ficulty. The Germans were particularly strong in cav-
alry and threw large forces of this arm forward in front
of their infantry to screen its advance. The left wing
of the German forces which ran north and east from the
Vindava had for its objective, Mitau, its movement on
which was supported by another army which was moved
along the sea-shore against Goldingen and Windau.

On July 15th this offensive against Mitau captured
Prauenburg, while a couple of days later Doblen was the
scene of a fight which the Glermans won, and, advancing
rapidly, found themselves on July 18th within a few
miles of the town of Mitau. This town is on the railroad
between Riga and Shavli, and occupies a strong defen-
sive position protected by two rivers and with a forest
several miles broad on its southern side.

On July 26th the Germans, who had been advancing
along the seashore, and who had occupied Goldingen and
Windau turned east from these places, crossed the Vin-
dava, and came upon the railway from Vindau and Mi-
tau, which they followed and reached the River Aa east
of Mitau, at Bowsk, thus completing the line around
Mitau.

On August 1st the Germans stormed and captured the

122

THE INVASION

town of Mitau and cut off all direct communication be-
tween Biga and Shavli.

During the time that these events were taking place,
at or near Mitau, the Russian troops between Mitau and
Shavli had fallen back to the eastward as the result of
an attack which was made upon them by German troops
which had crossed the river Dubysa near Bossienie to
the south of Shavli, whose operations were aided by an
attack on this position directly from the west through
Telshe and Triszky. The effect of these joint attacks
was to drive the Russians along this line rather rapidly
to the eastward, so that on July 23rd this Russian army
had retreated as far as Shadoff, and eventually fell back
towards the Duna River line, the Germans in pursuit.

On the 25th the German pursuers arrived in front of
Posvol and Ponieviesh, and on August 2nd reached the
railroad leading from this last named place to Dunaberg,
at a point about 15 miles to the eastward of Ponieviesh.

In the beginning of August the civilian population of
Riga received orders to leave ; and the evacuation of the
city and the removal therefrom of such supplies as might
be of use to the Germans immediately began and was
pursued with vigor for the next few days, the Russians
not expecting that the city could be successfully defended
for any time. Then suddenly, and for some reason which
is unknown to us even at the present time, the pressure
of the Germans on this city from the south relaxed.
There are some who believe that this relaxation took
place because the Germans hoped to force this line of
the Dwina, which forcing the fall of Riga would have
been brought about by naval attacks on the city and its
coast from Riga Bay. In fact, one such attack was made
on August 9th, but resulted in a draw.

Ten days afterwards, August 19th, was the date of
the famous naval battle of Riga Bay which is probably
unique among naval encounters, in that, it never took
place. My readers will, however, remember how the
British and American press at that time teemed with ac-
counts of the destruction of a German battle cruiser, be-
sides two light cruisers and nine torpedo boats and de-
stroyers by a Russian fleet assisted by British submar-
ines, in the waters of this Bay. But, after much editor-
ial wisdom had been expended in sage deductions re-
garding the power of recuperation of the Russian fleet
from the naval disasters of the Russo-Japanese war, and
those that had befallen it in this war, an official Russian

123

THE INVASION

bulletin, three weeks later, dissipated the myth which
had been created by British correspondents of London
papers in St. Petersburg on the evening of the 19th of
August, which bulletin recited that in place of losses of
any battle cruisers or light cruisers or even humble de-
stroyers and torpedo boats, the Germans had sunk them-
selves, to block certain passages between the islands in
Riga Bay, several small craft. On this extremely un-
stable foundation the whole structure of the great Rus-
sian naval victory in the Bay of Riga had been con-
structed.

About the 20th of August the Germans made an ad-
vance in the center to the east of Mitau against the
Dwina, and after strenuous resistance carried the bridge-
heads of Lennewaden and Freidrichstadt, the Russians
losing heavily both in casualties and prisoners. On these
bridgeheads being carried, the Russians hurriedly re-
treated across the Dwina, destroying those two bridges
in their retreat.

Another attack was made simultaneously upon the
bridgehead at Jacobstadt, which was also carried, the
Russians being driven to the northern bank of the Dwina,
after which hostilities languished on this front until
after the first of September.

124

Italy Goes to War

CHAPTER XX

THE TREACHERY

In the year 1882 Italy entered the Dual Alliance of
Austria and Germany, thus forming that alliance which
thereafter was known as the Triple Alliance by the
treaty signed May 20th, 1882. The reason why Italy
separated herself from her Latin sister France was be-
cause in the Spring of 1881 Prance occupied Tunis with
a military force, establishing a French Protectorate over
that country by the Treaty of Bardo signed in that same
year.

Italy had long considered the northern coast of Africa,
from the Eastern Algerian frontier to the frontier of
Egypt, as territory which one day or other was destined
to belong to her. In addition to the national and popu-
lar feeling in regard to these countries, there had been
for a quite a number of years a large Italian emigration
to them and at the time of the annexation of Tunis to
France about 75,000 Italians were living within the ter-
ritorial limits thereof. The result of this annexation by
France was that the Italian ministry of the day fell, and
Depretis, who then became prime minister, though he
saw that the only way in which Italy *s interests in the
Mediterranean could be preserved against France and the
French activity along its coasts, was by cultivating close
relations with Germany and with the hereditary enemy
Austria, still clung to the idea that it would be possible
to cultivate a renewed friendship with France. This
course, however, was opposed by the best Italian public
opinion, and Mancini, the then Foreign Minister, early
in 1882 opened diplomatic pourparlers on the subject
with Austria.

These negotiations dragged over a considerable time
as Austria desired Italy, once and for all, to recognize
formally the full validity of the Austrian possession of
Trieste and the Trentino ; while, on the other hand, Aus-

125

THE TREACHERY

tria was not willing to guarantee to Italy a like posses-
sion of the formal Papal States.

Austria's title to Trieste and the Trentino was beyond
reproach, but a political party of small importance but
great noisiness had been organized in Italy in prior
years, which had as its reason for existence the idea that
all Italian-speaking territories contiguous to Italy should
form a part of Italy politically. This would have in-
cluded the Austrian territory, or a large portion of the
Trentino, the Swiss Canton of Tescino, tiie French island
of Corsica, Nice, and the French coast as far as Nice.

This test of language was a sophistry ; none of the Aus-
trian territory coveted had for centuries formed part of
Italy politically, and all its interests, commercial, politi-
cal and economic, were best served by remaining parts
of the Austrian Empire ; nor was there any popiUar de-
mand for such annexation in these territories. A few
Italian emigrants in Trieste formed there a vociferous
but small minority, who, not unnaturally, demanded the
annexation of Trieste by Italy, though the great bulk of
the city's population were adverse.

Trieste is a sea port of importance which owes that
importance to the fact that through it goes practically
all the foreign commerce of the great Austro-Hungarian
Empire. As an Italian port, it would lose the handling
of all of this business, which would not be replaced by
any correspondingly large, and, consequently, the popu-
lation would find themselves in the situation of the Ital-
ian ports such as Genoa, Naples, Bari and Palermo, which
have a hard struggle to maintain their maritime and
commercial importance.

But these substantial advantages (leaving out of con-
sideration the history of Trieste and the Trentino) meant
nothing to the imaginative Italian who was willing to
sacrifice the economic good of the population of those
regions for a more or less glittering and tawdry idea.
The Irredentists had, on several occasions, stirred up
grave riots in Borne and in other parts of Italy.

That veteran agitator. Garibaldi, had, in the latter
stages of his career when he was at odds with Victor Em-
manuel, Cavour and the government of Italy, joined
himself to this party and had brought with him a con-
siderable following of those red-shirted enthusiasts which
had followed him in the war of Italian liberation. After
his death his descendants followed in his footsteps, the
members of this family seeming to be bom to be political

126

THE TREACHERY

agitators, though all of the ability of the family departed
with the first and greatest of the name. These Irredent-
ists were destined to play a not inconsiderable part in
the melodrama of May 1915.

On March 17, 1887, a second treaty between Italy and
Austria was signed, and, at the same time, a parallel
treaty or understanding was entered into with Great Bri-
tain, by which joint action in the Mediterranean by the
British and Italian fleets was arranged for in the event of
any disturbance; and, from this time forward, Italy
acted in complete accordance with British desires in the
Mediterranean problems.

This Alliance was again renewed in June, 1891, for a
period of twelve years ; and once more, in 1902, also for
a period of twelve years, to run from 1903. However,
before the end of this last period was reached, the rela-
tions between the members of the Triple Alliance were
nothing like as cordial as they had been, on account of
the failure of the Teutonic members of this Alliance to
give effective support to the Italian policy in the Medi-
terranean, and also on account of the discords which,
during this last period, had arisen between Italy and
Austria over questions affecting what may be broadlv
caUed ''The Balkans.''

On the other hand, the relations with France during
this time had grown steadily better, and the influence of
kindred bloods was commencing to have a decided effect
upon Italian popular opinion and political action

Then came the war made by Italy upon Turkey, and
the protection of Turkey by Austria and QermaTiy v\rho
declined to admit the right of Italy to make any attack
upon Turkey in Europe. As France created no difficul-
ties in this war, popular opinion swung still more strong-
ly in her favor, but in the middle of January, 1912, this
tendency was arrested suddenly on account of the ener-
getic protests of the French against the stoppage of the
steamers Carthage and Manouba. This stoppage was
for the purpose of inspection of the cargo of both vessels,
in order to see whether or not such cargoes contained mu-
nitions of war, etc., destined to Northern Africa. These
incidents assumed serious proportions, but were finally
referred to the Hague Tribunal for decision, which body
held that Italy had been correct in her actions.

At this time also the bulk of Italian feeling towards
England was seriously chilled by the attitude of the Brit-
ish public and press in regard to the warlike action of

127

THE TREACHERY

Italy in Northern Africa, which was intensified by the
vituperative attacks of the British Liberal members upcHi
Italian military preparedness and the value of her army.
The result of this growth of hostility towards both
Prance and Great Britain was that when the Triple Al-
liance was renewed on December 7, 1912, for the fourth
time, there was no opposition to it in Italy, but the subse-
quent course of events in the Balkans was destined to
again change the Italian attitude.

For some time Italy had been considering that the
lower Dalmatian coast should belong to her, and the lim-
its of her claims embraced the present Principality of
Albania. This view her Allies did not agree with. In
view of their refusal to permit her to extend in this direc-
tion, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the
Austrians added to her resentment.

At the time war broke out, the Marquis di San Giulia-
no was Foreign Minister of Italy, and immediately there-
after a meeting took place between himself and the Ger-
man Ambassador, at which Signor Salandra, the Prem-
ier, was present ; wherein, among other things, the Ger-
man Ambassador was informed by Italy **that Austria
had no right, according to the spirit of the Triple Alli-
ance Treaty, to make such a move as she has made at Bel-
grade without previous agreement with her allies. Aus-
tria, in fact, from the tone in which the note is conceived
and from the demands she makes, demands which are of
little effect against the pan-Serb danger, but are pro-
foundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly to Russia, has
shown clearly that she wishes to provoke a war."

Flotow was therefore told that '4n consideration of
Austria's method of procedure and of the defensive and
conservative nature of the Triple Alliance, Italy is under
no obligation to help Austria if, as a result of this move
of hers, she should find herself at war with Russia."

And on July 27th and 28th the government dispatched
notes to both Berlin and Vienna, which declared that if
Italy did not receive adequate compensation for Aus-
tria's disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, **the Triple
Alliance would be irreparably broken."

These notes also raised the question of Austria ceding
to Italy her Italian provinces as a recompense for her
disturbance in the Balkan situation.

On the 4th of August Italy made a formal declaration
of neutrality in the war and in this declaration of neu-
trality she asserted that, according to the terms of the

128

THE TREACHERY

Triple Alliance, Austria had not embarked upon a defen-
fliye war, and therefore the condition of the treaty which
required the participation of Italy did not arise,

San Giuliano's illness, which had by this time beerun
and which terminated in his death on Oct. IGth^ possibly
had something to do with the fact that this claim of Italy
for compensation by the cession by Austria of the Italian
provinces had not been taken up, but more probably the
real reason was that San Giuliano never had in mind the
making of so wide-extending a demand as was made by
Sonnino, who succeeded him in the Italian Foreign Office
in November. It is also stated that at this time, August
1914, the Italian army was in bad condition, lacking ar-
tillery, ammunition and other equipment, and conse-
quently, was in no position to take the field.

On December 9th Sonnino sent a note to Austria in
which, among other things, he said :

**The actual military advance of Austria-Hungary in
Serbia constitutes a fact which must be an object of ex-
amination by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernments on the basis of the stipulations contained in
Article VII of the Triple Alliance. From this article
derives the obligation of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, even in the case of temporary occupations, to come
to a previous agreement with Italy and to arrange for
compensations. The Imperial and Royal Government
ought, therefore, to have approached us and come to an
agreement with us before sending its troops across the
Serbian frontier.*'

The note further demands a stable pledge that Aus-
tria-Hungary would not acquire any of the Serbian ter-
ritory, and attempts to point out the importance to Italy
**of the full integrity and of the political and economic
independence of Serbia,'' and demanded immediate en-
trance upon definite negotiations, stating that Italian
public opinion was directly occupied with ''Italian na-
tional aspirations."

The Austrian reply to this was unsatisfactory and the
Italian Foreign Minister replied by insisting upon the
rights secured to Italy under Article VII of the Triple
AUiance Treaty. In view of its importance, this article
may be perhaps quoted in full :

''Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view
the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial
status quo in the East, engage themselves to use their
influence to prevent all territorial changes which might

129

THE TREACHERY

be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers
signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will
give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten
each other concerning their own intentions and those of
other Powers. Should, however, the case arise, that, in
the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo
in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts
and islands in the Adriatic or the Aegean Seas becomes
impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action
of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hun-
gary or Italy should be obliged to change the status quo
for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation,
such occupation would only take place after previous
agreement between the two Powers, which would have to
be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensa-
tion for all territorial or other advantages that either of
them might acquire over and above the existing status
quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful
claims of both parties."

The result of this was that the Austrian Foreign Min-
ister, in reply stated his willingness to discuss the ques-
tion of compensation, but this was negatived almost im-
mediately by a change in the Austrian Foreign Office and
the accession of Baron Burian to the Austrian Portfolio
of Foreign Affairs, which resulted in Austria's adopting
a much firmer position ; in effect, refusing to accept the
Italian claims for the cession of any Austrian territory
at aU, and suggesting that if compensation were to be
given, Italy should find it in Albania,

Prince von Bulow, who has been Chancellor of the Ger-
man Empire, and who had married an Italian wife, a
member of a very prominent and politically influential
Italian family, was now put forward by Germany in an
effort to arrange the threatened deadlock between Italy
and Austria. His first effort was to induce Italy to be
satisfied with the cession to it by Austria of the Trentino,
but Sonnino refused this and insisted on the cession of
Trieste as well, stating that no arrangement could be
made which would satisfy Italy unless both of these ter-
ritories were ceded. Then Prince von Bulow asked Italy
to formulate her entire demands, which Sonnino refused
to do untU Austria would agree lliat the only basis of ne-
gotiations should be ''the cession of territories actually
in possession of the Monarchy;" refusing to define this
phrase which might have meant anything, and included
much territory, on the basis of language, (the Irreden-

130

THE TREACHERY

list test) not comprised in the Trentino and Trieste.
Much discussion followed and on February 12th Son-
nino terminated negotiations and warned Austria that
any military action undertaken in the Balkans against
Serbia or Montenegro would be regarded by Italy as a
violation of the 7th Article of the Triple Alliance Treaty
hereinbefore quoted; and would result in Italy's resum-
ing her liberty of action in order to safe-guard her own
interests.

Further negotiations followed, but Sonnino remained
firm in his demands for a time.

131

GHAFTEBZXI

On March 10th, however, Sonnino f ormnlated three
conditions under which farther negotiations mnst be con-
ducted:

First — ^That abatAute secrecy should be preserved;

Second — Whatever agreement might be reached should
be immediately carried into effect; and,

Third — ^That the whole i)eriod of the war, as far as the
scope of Article VII was involved, should be covered.

Vienna balked at these conditions; particularly the
second, which provided that the terms of such agreement
as might be reached should take effect at once ; and re-
fused to accept its requirements, so that a deadlock en-
sued. This deadlock Prince von Bulow attempted to
break, offering that Germany should guarantee the faith-
ful performances of the terms of any agreement arrived
at; in reply to which Sonnino reaffirmed the essential
condition and stated that it was quite possible that at the
end of the war Germany might not be so situated as to
be able to give effect to her guarantee.

The negotiations dragged on, and finally, on March
27th, Burian made the first offer to the Italian govern-
ment, which consisted in the cession of certain territories
in South Tyrol ; but Sonnino refused this, called the ces-
sion offered ''a strip of territory" and stated that this
offer did not meet any of Italy's demands. This was
followed up by a more definite offer by Burian, to which
Italy did not reply, which resulted in Burian 's asking
for Italy's counter-proposals. Accordingly, on the 8th
of April, Italy formulated her demands as follows :

I. — The Trentino, with the boundaries fixed for the
Kingdom of Italy in 1811.

II. — ^A new eastern frontier including Gradisca and
Gorizia.

III. — ^Trieste and its neighborhood to be formed into
an autonomous State, with complete independence from
Austro-Hungarian nde ; with Trieste a free port.

IV. — The Curzolari Islands on the Dalmatian coast to
be ceded by Austria.

132

THE TREACHERY

V. — ^Immediate occupation of ceded territories by
Italy.

VI. — The Italian sovereignty over Vallona and its
region to be recognized by Austria.

VII. — ^All Austrian claims in Albania to be renounced

VIII. — ^A general amnesty.

On the 17th of April the Austrian reply was received.
The second, third and fourth articles were absolutely
rejected. The fifth article was not accepted; the sixth
and seventh articles were left open for argument; and
the eighth article was accepted.

Further negotiations followed, but produced little re-
sult as neither side was willing to make any concessions
or to recognize the reasonableness of the position of the
other side ; and finally, on May 3rd, 1915, Sonnino sent
to Vienna a formal denunciation of the Italo-Austrian
Alliance.

So much for the history of the negotiations, but one or
two observations remain to be made on them.

It will be noticed that Sonnino 's definite demands of
the cession of definite territory were first made when the
Austrian military situation in Galicia, then being invad-
ed by the Russians, had become difficult, and that his de-
mands increased in proportion to the Russian advance
into Austrian territory. It may further be said that,
historically, the Kingdom of Italy never had, and has
not at this day, any right, political, legal, or moral, to
the territories to which she lays claim, and that the de-
mand for them was merely an impertinent taking ad-
vantage of the difficult position in which Austria-Hun-
gary found herself at the time when the demand was
made; and, further, it may be confidently predicted
later that in a period of greater calm, when the facts are
all known (many of them being now obscure) this de-
mand of Sonnino 's will be regarded as nothing more or
less than a repetition on the part of a nation, of Jack
Shepard's famous demand in the good old days, to trav-
elers on the York road, of **Your money or your life!''

Public opinion in Italy was, up to the end of March,
strongly in favor of Italy's continuing the wise policy
of neutrality which she had declared at the beginning of
the war. Italy is a poor country and perhaps more
heavily burdened with taxation of all kinds and charac-
ters than any other of the European countries of any
importance. Her commerce and her industries are lan-
guishing and her educated classes were fully aware of the

133

THE TREACHERY

fact that neither economically nor politically was she in
position to embark on a doubtful and dubious adventure ;
and until that time these classes had been able to curb
the demand among the dregs of the populace and their
Irredentist allies for energetic action of one character or
another; which demand on the part of this portion of
the Italian population was undoubtedly stimulated by the
distribution of largesse among them in its most primitive
form, by representatives of those Powers of Europe who
had most interest in seeing Italy embark in the war upon
their side.

Furthermore, a sentimental crusade had been started
by a certain school of erotic romancers and poets, to have
Italy take up arms on behalf of her great Latin sister,
France. The most prominent representative of this
school was the degenerate Gabrielli^'Annunzio.

Popular movements, and for the matter of that all
movements, political and otherwise, have occasionally had
at their head what the French call **un triste heros," but
it may be doubted whether any political movement of im-
portance, in modem times, has ever been led by so sad a
hero as this bard of the cess-pools, nor by a leader whose
personal character was so utterly beyond the pale, to
prove which only one incident in his career need be
mentioned, which is his blackmailing Eleanora Duse,
the great Italian tragedienne, with her own love letters to
him, which he offered to return to her for money or other-
wise threatening to sell them to the press.

But on the progress of events between the end of March
and the declaration of war by Italy upon Austria, this
poetic charlatan had the greatest influence, in that he
was able to make himself the voice of the Lazzeroni and
of the debauched and the violent elements of the Italian
populace, who, having nothing to lose in any way them-
selves, were desirous of seeing Italy embark on a course
of political and military action which then and to-day
seems bound to set back the clock of economic progress
in Italy for a hundred years and more. Thus he was one
of the instruments by which the triumphant sentiment-
ality (not sentiment) was assured.

We do not know, as yet, with any degree of positive-
ness, the forces that were at work in this period more
worthy of serious consideration than this mountebank,
but such serious forces must have been at work or else
the hesitation of the King to embark on this vague and
uncertain adventure, the opposition to such a course of

134

THE TREACHERY

Giolitti, the veteran of Italian politicians, and the carry-
ing away from the position theretofore assumed by it of
the entire Italian Chamber and Senate, could not have
been brought about.

To-day we can only see the scum that floated on the
surface of the Italian political cauldron in those six
weeks, which conceals from us the deeper forces which
were at work to produce this result. We can only sur-
mise that all the forces of discontent in Italy, (and they
are many) united not so much with the object of forcing
Italy into this war, as the object of bringing about a poli-
tical and social revolution in that kingdom, and that the
conservative classes were at the last moment forced to
divert this stream of discontent into a new channel ; that
the declaration of war upon Austria furnished the new
channel, and thus saved the Italian State.

On May 9th Giolitti returned to Rome to try to stem
the tide.

On May 13th, knowing that Giolitti held the majority
in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, Salandra
resigned. This precipitated the crisis, and the King
summoned Signor Marcora to form a Cabinet. But this
was impossible, and on the 15th the King refused to ac-
cept Salandra 's resignation.

Giolitti foreseeing defeat left Rome on the 17th and his
so-doing so disorganized his supporters that when the
Italian Parliament met on May 20th Salandra was mas-
ter of the two Chambers, and forced the passage of the
bill whereby extraordinary powers were conferred upon
the government in case of war.

On May 22nd a general mobilization was ordered, and
on May 23rd a declaration of war against Austria was
issued. The Italian army was then sent forward to what
may prove to be another Adowa.

135

CHAPTER XXn

THE CAMPAIGN

When the Italian General Staff contemplated the at-
tack on Austria, a glance at the map showed them that
this frontier fell into three great divisions; the Trent-
Cadore front, the Carnia front and the Isonzo front. Be-
hind the Trent-Cadore and behind the Carnia front lay
the tempting prizes of Trent and Trieste which were
Italy's real object in entering the war, and for which she
chose, as she thought, the fitting moment when Austria
was hard pressed by the Russians in Galicia.

The Trent salient is like all salients; it possesses the
advantage of being a point from which a strong offensive
can be launched ; but it also possesses the disadvantage
of being subject to lateral pressure on both sides which
would render it untenable in the event that this pressure
is not successfully withstood.

The Cadore front, the northeast section of the Trent
front is impossible, owing to its extremely mountainous
nature, for the launching of any important offensive
from the Italian side.

The Carnia front is difficult also for the Italians to
penetrate, while the Isonzo front is difficult in the upper
and middle reaches of the Isonzo River which flows
through a mountainous country; but the lower portion
of this stream flows through a fairly level country pre-
senting no very great difficulties.

Italy's strategic task, then, was to press the war on
and to make her strongest effort towards the east, to
break through the Isonzo position and to take Trieste.
The pressure on the north was necessary to avoid an of-
fensive being launched from that direction by the Aus-
trians, which, if done successfully, would have rendered
the Italian position on the Carnic front untenable, as
they thus could have been attacked from the northwest
by the Austrians who had advanced from the north.

The Austrian line along this frontier was and is rather
weak as Austria does not dispose of enough troops to hold
the border in force, but this line has the advantage of ex-
tremely good natural defenses which had been strength-
ened by all the artifices of the art of fortification ; besides

136

THE CAMPAIGN

which, military railroads had been constructed behind
the defenses all along these fronts, wherever feasible, by
means of which it is possible to move troops and artil-
lery rapidly from one point of the line to another, as the
necessities of the campaign might require ; and thus ex-
treme mobility for this comparatively slender force was
obtained.

One more natural fact, however, constituted an even
greater diflSculty for the Italians, which was that practi-
cally along the entire line of their frontier, from west
to east, the ground sloped upward from the Italian ter-
ritory to the Austrian frontier, and that, consequently,
the Italian troops had to fight up-hill continually, which,
in itself, was a disadvantage ; but the main disadvantage
lay in the fact that the Austrians everywhere occupied
a dominant position, from whence their artillery could do
tremendous execution upon the Italian troops advancing
upwards.

This is true of the entire line, except a small portion of
the lower Isonzo which has been already described.

The Italian army presents one remarkable force, — the
so-called Alpini, of some twenty-six battalions; picked
troops of magnificent physique, trained and habituated
for mountain war-fare, in which they have become ex-
ceedingly expert, being as much at home on the ice of the
glaciers or on the crags of the precipitous Dolomites, as
they are on gently sloping hillsides. They are perhaps
the most magnificent mountain troops in the world, not
excepting the French Alpins.

Another remarkable force is the Bersagliere, the pick
of the Italian infantry, and most wonderful marchers.
These number twelve regiments, or, approximately, 36,-
000 men, and the brunt of the campaign waged by Italy
was to fall on these two forces, in the Trentino and Car-
nic fronts, as the regular infantry, unaccustomed to work
in the mountains, would be of comparatively little use
in this rough country, particularly pitted against such
a force of men accustomed to the mountains from child-
hood as Austria was able to raise among the Tyroleans
and place along these borders.

Another force of some importance to Italy, which also
could be reckoned as among her best troops, were her 15
battalions of mountain artillery who did yeoman service
in this campaign, but who are not sufficiently numerous
to really become a decisive factor in the mountain fight-
ing.

137

THE CAMPAIGN

On May 23rd9 Italy formally declared a state of war
against Austria-Hungary and was to exist from the fol-
lowing day, and on the following day both countries
opened hostilities. The Austrians made an attack with
aeroplanes and warships in various places on the Adriat-
ic coast, and, among other exploits, bombarded the ar-
senal of Venice, doing little damage. On the other hand,
the Italian troops opened in an offensive on three fronts
against the Austrian frontiers, which they crossed at
several points; one army opening an attack against the
Trent salient from the southwest, along the Lago di
Qarda and up the Adige Valley, while another moved
through the Dolomites from the east, from the Ampezzo
to the Brenta valleys, and a third from the Stebvio Pass
to Lago di Qarda from the west. Another force advanced
towards Pontebba near the upper Drave Valley, with
the object of cutting communications between Vienna
and the Trent region, which it would have achieved had
it been able to cut the railroad runniug through the Pus-
terthal, a long narrow valley running from east to west
in Austrian territory almost parallel to the Italian fron-
tier and not very far distant therefrom. From the neigh-
borhood of Udine a third army moved across the Italian
frontier in the direction of the Isonzo River, a stream
flowing almost north and south from a point to the east
of Pontebba to the Adriatic.

By June 15th the Italian army on this front was ap-
proaching Qorizia on the east bank of the river, the firat
point which they had reached on the Austrian first line
of defense. Prior to this time, however, they had taken
Tolmino, Plova, Gradisca, Sagretto and Montfalcone,
places of some importance which commanded the cross-
ings of the river, and had sought further north to cap-
ture the railroad which runs southward from Assling to
Montfalcone and thence to Trieste, in order to cut off
communication between Trieste and the north by this
line, but in which they were not successful.

Up to this time their operations on this front had not
resulted in even feeling out the Austrian position. In
the taking of the towns mentioned, minor combats had
taken place, which had resulted usually in Italian vie
tories, . wherein they had captured some few Austrians,
but in these operations there was nothing to indicate the
ultimate results of the campaign.

Once arrived at this first Une of Austrian defenses,
the Italian offensive, much to the surprise of its com-

138

THE CAMPAIGN

manders, struck a barrier as firm as a rock. For months
thereafter, by artillery and aerocraft attacks, by bom-
bardments, by infantry assaults, and by every form of
assault known to the artifices of war, the Italian army
tried to break this barrier, but it remained, and has re-
mained from June 15th to September 1st, when this rec-
ord closes, immovable and untakable.

At several points on the line which they have attained,
the Italian forces are within twenty miles of Trieste,
which city is in plain sight of their army from more than
one point on its front; but in spite of every effort, and
in spite of an enormous waste of men and materials,
barely a foot of this distance has been won by the Ital-
ian forces from the moment these forces took contact with
the Austrians' first line of defense to the present day.

On this front the Italian campaign has been an utter
and an absolute failure. The Austrian line of defense
may be possible to pierce, but not by General Cadoma
and his legions.

On the other sectors they were even more unfortunate.
On the middle front, the Camic, which faces the Dolo-
mite Alps, in spite of the best efforts of those really good
troops, the Alpini and the Bersaglieri, little or no pro-
gress has been made, and the frontier has been really
barely crossed.

In these mountains are interspersed, from point to
point, Austrian fortresses ; and of these not one had been
taken by September 1st. This shows the sterility and
fruitlessness of the Italian campaign on this front. On
the Trent front some little progress has been made, the
result of incessant, obscure and un-named skirmishes;
but the distance of twenty miles between the frontier to
the city of Trent has nowhere been traversed for more
than five miles. Riva, on Lago di Garda, five miles from
the Italian frontier, and the first place of importance in
Austrian territory, still remains Austrian; while the of-
fensive through the Stebvio Pass has not, as yet, suc-
ceeded in getting through the Pass.

Towards Borgo, the northwest point of this western
frontier of Italy and Austria, where an attempt was
made to break through from Neumarkt to the north of
Trent, not one foot of ground has been won.

Considered as a whole, this Italian offensive may be
dismissed as inoffensive. It is doubtful whether any

139

THE CAMPAIGN

military operation involving so large a number of men,
has continued for so long a time, in modem history, and
produced such utterly insignificant, and, strategically,
such worthless results.

The Austrian losses cannot be estimated, except very
vaguely ; but it can be reasonably inferred, from the po-
sitions occupied by their troops, and the fact that they
are, as a general thing, receiving and not delivering as-
saults, that these losses do not by any means equal those
of the Italians.

Like the French, the Italians do not publish any ac-
count of their losses, but from such scattered informa-
tion as has reached us these can be estimated as some-
where in the vicinity of 200,000 to 225,000.

What developments this Austro-Italian campaign
holds for the future, are extremely problematic, and the
only manoeuvre which seems to offer any possibility of
creating a campaign of any interest is the assumption by
the Austrians, aided by the German troops, of an offen-
sive against the Italians. But for various reasons there
seems no ground for supposing that such an offensive will
be undertaken ; more particularly as Italy has never de-
clared war upon Germany, nor has Germany upon her ;
and, officially at least, long after September 1st, 1915,
these two nations were at peace. One result of this will
be, necessarily, that neither will send troops against the
other until war between them is declared.

Here it may be said that the question of the exact pres-
ent condition of the relations between Gtermany and
Italy constitutes a puzzle which seems without solution.

140

The Dardanelles

CHAPTER XXin

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

On March 1st Fort Dardanus was bombarded by the
Triumph, the Ocean and the Albion, from the Straits,
and the same night mine sweepers supported by destroy-
ers swept the straits nearly up to Eephez Point, at the
very beginning of the Narrows. That same day the
French warships bombarded the Bulair Isthmus from the
Gulf of Saros.

On March 2nd the Ganopus, an old battleship which
had figured in the battle of the Falkland Islands against
Admiral Spree's squadron, the Swiftsure and the Corn-
wallis, got in closer to Fort Dardanus and again shelled
it. These battleships were hit by the fire of the Tekke
battery located on the peninsula just below Eilid Bahr,
but suffered only slight casualties. The Allied squadron
was joined the same day by a Russian cruiser, the As-
kold. The French were again active in the Gulf of
Saros.

On March 3rd Fort Dardanus was again bombarded
by a squadron of several battleships and on March 4th
marines were landed at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr to
destroy these partially ruined towns, but found Turkish
infantry hidden in the ruins and received a warm recep-
tion, particularly the party at Kum Kale who were dri-
ven back to their boats. The British casualties in this
affair were about fifty.

Various minor attacks on Turkish land positions took
place this same day.

On March 5th a serious attack on the main defenses
of the Narrows was begun, the fire of the ships being
concentrated upon the three Turkish batteries; — ^the
first the Bumeli Medjidieh of two 11-inch and four 9.4-
inch guns, besides several smaller guns; the second the
Hamidieh II., of two 14-inch guns; and the third the
Namazieh, consisting of one 11-inch, one 10.2-inch, eleven
9.4-inch and three 8.2-inch guns, besides several smaller

141

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

pieces. This latter battery was one of the strongest of
all the Turkish batteries and commanded the Straits at
their narrowest point from the seaward side of Eilid
Bahr, near which were also located the other two batter-
ies.

The Queen Elizabeth, with two other battleships, the
Inflexible and the Prince George, took their positions in
th Gulf of Saros west of the forts and bombarded these
three batteries. Though the Queen Elizabeth fired a
large number of shots from her 15-inch guns, the damage
done to these batteries does not appear to have been very
great.

The next day, March 6th, an attack was made on the
batteries at and near Chanak, on the eastern side of the
Narrows, the idea being JSrst to disable the batteries on
the western, or European, side, and then those on the
eastern, or Asiatic, side. The batteries attacked were
the Hamidieh I. of two 14-inch and two 9.4-inch guns,
and the Hamidieh III. of two 14-inch and one 9.4-inch
guns and several smaller pieces. In this bombardment
the Queen Elizabeth, the Agamemnon and the Ocean par-
ticipated at a range of about 12 miles from the outside
of the Gallipoli Peninsula. A strong Allied squadron,
composed of the Vengeance, the Albion, the Majestic, the
Prince George and the Suffren, entered the Straits and
engaged Fort Dardanus and the other batteries in its vic-
inity. The artillery fighting was quite fierce and both
sides scored several hits, the Fort Rumeli Medjidieh sud-
denly participating in the bombardment, which showed
that the Queen Elizabeth, in her bombardment of it
across the peninsula the preceding day, had not damaged
it greatly.

The results of this action were comparatively unim-
portant, however. The following day the Agamemnon
and the Lord Nelson advanced into the Straits and bom-
barded the forts near Kilid Bahr, paying particular at-
tention to Fort Rumeli Medjidieh and Fort Hamidieh I.

The French squadron, the Gaulois, the Charlemagne,
the Bouvet and the Suffren, advanced further into the
Straits and bombarded Fort Dardanus. Most of the
ships were hit but no great damage was done to any of
them or to the forts.

On the 8th the Queen Elizabeth and four other battle-
ships went into the Straits and again shelled Fort Med-
jidieh. After this, for several days, no further attack
was undertaken though mine sweeping was kept up dur-

142

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

ing the period. It had become evident that the various
bombardments of the Turkish forts at long range, by the
Allied fleet, which had been going on for some time, had
fallen far short of accomplishing their purpose. The
batteries at the Narrows were st2l capable of replying
vigorously and had apparently suffered no damage of
moment, and by tacit consent it was resolved to pursue
this plan no further and to wait until an army, which
was being gathered, should be brought to the scene of ac-
tion in order to support the operations of the fleet.

On March 10th and 11th the Allies were obliged to
again shell the batteries at Eum Eale and Sedd-el-Bahr,
which they had previously destroyed, since the Turks,
having taken a position in the ruins, were directing and
firing light guns therefrom.

On the 13th the light cruiser Amethyst was badly
damaged at Sari Siglar Bay at the entrance to the Nar-
rows, the casualties being over fifty.

On the 16th a trawler was hit by Turkish fire and
destroyed in the Straits.

While these things were taking place in the Dardan-
elles themselves, subsidiary operations were going on on
the coast of Asia Minor where, on the 5th of March, the
East India battle squadron of the British Navy ap-
peared in the harbor of Smyrna and bombarded the chief
fort, Yeni Kale, for several hours, with no particular
results; while the Sapphire shelled troops on the shore
of Adramyti.

On the 6th of March the bombardment of Smyrna was
renewed and continued for several hours; both sides scor-
ing several hits. This bombardment was, however, not
followed up.

Meanwhile, the Russian warships in the Black Sea had
given several spectacular performances in attacking the
Turkish coasts at various points, the most melodramatic
of which was the much-advertised and much head-lined
attack on the Black Sea defenses of the Bosphorous,
which apparently consisted (from the reports of eye-wit-
nesses) of the Russian men-of-war throwing shells to-
wards the shore from a point so distant from that shore
that their guns could not carry to it. Nevertheless, this
performance served to furnish many a head-line in the
newspapers of Great Britain and America.

A little while before March 6th, the Allies had suf-
fered a great disappointment : they had intended to en-
list the land forces of Greece in their attack upon the

143

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

Dardanelles and had intrigaed with the various political
factions of that country, looking towards that end. M
Venezelos, the Qrecian Prime Mmister, was more or less
apparently, in sympathy with this project, but his policy
in this respect was not sustained by King Constantino,
who wished to maintain an attitude of neutrality, he not
being certain of the issue of the war, M. Yenezelos,
finding himself opposed by the King, resigned on March
6th, and his successor declared in favor of a policy of
stricter neutrality.

The French government had, prior to March 11th, con-
centrated an expeditionary force in North Africa under
the command of General d'Amade. On March 15th this
entire force was in the Aegean Sea in transports. A
British force, consisting of the 29th Division and the
Boyal Naval Division, with the Australian and New Zea-
land Divisions, a Territorial Division, to which some In-
dian troops were added, was gotten together, placed in
transports and brought to the Mand of Lemnos by March
20th. This Island of Lemnos, which is located about
fifty miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles, belonged
to Qreece, and, according to the famous declaration of
the Hague Convention, so often quoted, though not ap-
plying, in the case of Belgium, the territory of a neutral
power was inviolate ; but the Allies, without even going
through the formality of requesting the consent of Greece
which she could not have given and remained neutral,
occupied it. Gen. Hamilton, the British Commander, on
arriving at the scene of action on the 17th of March, on
whose arrival the Allies had planned a general combined
attack on the Turkish defenses of the Dardanelles by
both land and sea, found that in the haste and hurry of
preparing the transports, the weapons, the equipments
and the munitions first required had been very carefully
packed in the bottoms of the holds of the transports, and
that these transports would have to be completely un-
loaded before the supplies of all kinds necessary to the
attack could be gotten at. Consequently, Gteneral Ham-
ilton was obliged to order the return of most of the trans-
ports to their base point for the necessary changes in the
manner of their loading to be made, there being no fac-
ilities for this operation at Lemnos, before the attack
could be made.

On this announcement being made to Admiral de Bo-
beck, who had succeeded Admiral Garden in the com-
mand of the Allied Fleet on the 16th of March, that Ad-

144

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

miral announced his intention of proceeding to the attack
on the Straits of the Dardanelles with all the naval forces
at his command, on the next day, March 18th, without
waiting for the land forces to be ready.

Accordingly at about eleven o'clock on the morning of
March 18th, in bright, clear weather, and with a smooth
sea, the attack was begun upon the Straits by the Queen
Elizabeth, the Inflexible, the Agamemnon, the Lord Nel-
son, the Triumph and the Swiftsure, which took a posi-
tion about 3^ miles from the mouth of the Straits be-
tween the village of Krithia, which will hereafter figure
in our account of the land attack on the Peninsula itself,
and the village of Erenkeui on the main-land, from
whence they opened a long range fire on the defenses of
the Narrows.

The Triumph and the Swiftsure advanced further up
the Straits and engaged the batteries at Fort Dardanus,
at Kephez Point and at Suandere. The defenses of the
shore replied vigorously and the artillery duel became
very fierce. The town of Chanak was set on fire and
other villages along the shore were destroyed. The
French squadron, at about half past twelve, consisting
of four ships, the Suffren, the Gaulois, the Charlemagne
and the Bouvet, moved up past the British squadron
to a position oflf Kephez Point, and also began to bom-
bard the forts. The bombardment by these two squad-
rons kept up for a couple of hours, by which time aU the
forts had ceased firing, which made those on board the
ships believe that they had been destroyed so completely
as to be silenced.

A relief squadron, consisting of the Vengeance, the Ir-
resistible, the Albion, the Ocean, the Swiftsure and the
Majestic, at about three o'clock, came into the Straits
when the battleships which had participated in the first
part of the bombardment began to withdraw. The
French battleship Bouvet, which was to the side of the
Straits was at this time hit three times on the port side
and twice on the starboard side. An explosion followed
and in a couple of minutes she went to the bottom in 36
fathoms of water, a little north of Erenkeui. About 560
men went down with her.

The British at the time stated that she had been sunk
by a mine, which may be true, but it now seems more
probable that she was sunk by gun-fire. The sight of this
disaster stimulated the attack of the Allied squadrons,
which was begun again at a few minutes after three and

145

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

continued for several hours. About an hour after begin-
ning the attack, the Irresistible, a British battleship, was
badly injured either by a mine or by gun-fire — ^the exact
cause being unknown — and sank a couple of hours later;
during which interval she had managed to get to the en-
trance of the Straits. Nearly all of her crew was saved,
a result due largely to the ^dlantry of the Commander
of the destroyer Wear, who brought his vessel to the Ir-
resistible under a concentrated fire, and took off most of
the crew.

A short time before the Irresistible was sunk, it was
seen that another of the French battleships, the Gaulois,
was in great difficulties. She had been badly hit by Tur-
kish fire and was almost an absolute wreck, but her sister
ships managed to take off her crew and to tow her in safe-
ty to Tenedos, from whence she was sent to Malta, where,
later, she was repaired sufficiently to allow her to be
towed to the French naval port of Toulon.

Just before the Qaulois got into difficulties the British
battleship Inflexible was badly hit, with resultant casu-
alties. She was not, however, at this time, damaged suf-
ficiently to put her out of action, but somewhat later she
was struck by a mine which exploded and damaged her
irreparably, so that she had to fall out of the line and
make for Tenedos in her turn. This island she reached
in almost a sinking condition. She was subsequently
sent to Malta and there repaired sufficiently to be sent
home.

After these events, the bombardment continued un-
abated; the forts replying with vigor, and at about six
o'clock the Ocean, another British battleship, was sunk
in deep water, but whether this result was to be attribut-
ed to a mine or to gun-fire, is even at this late day un-
certain. It would appear to have been more probable
that the disaster was caused by gun-fire, because the great
majority of the crew was saved, and had the damage been
done by a mine there would hardly have been time to get
them off the vessel, being, as she was, in deep water.

Soon after this, darkness fell on the sea, and the squad-
rons withdrew.

The British Admiralty, a few days later, issued a state-
ment wherein they made the following remarkable claim,
which, in view of the history of this bombardment, must

146

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

be elai?sed with the best efforts of the Russian official bal-
letins:

* * The power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by
superiority of fire appears to be established."

How such a remark could be made of a bombardmeni
which had cost the attacking fleet five units, and which
bombardment had not silenced any of the forts of the
enemy, is one of those things which cannot be understood.
The proof of the puddiug is the eating, and the eating in
this case consisted of the fact that never from this time,
has there been any serious naval attack made upon the
Dardanelles defenses.

From this date until April 25th nothing of any moment
happened in this sphere of naval action. From time to
time desultory bombardments of isolated positions on the
Turkish shore were made by single vessels of the Allied
fleet, but there was no concerted action, and the results
of these bombardments were insignificant.

On April 17th the British lost submarine B15. Two
days before this the Majestic and the Swiftsure bom-
barded Gaba Tepe, on the Peninsula. Several hostile
visits of warships were made to Enos on the Aegean, near
to the Turko-Bulgarian frontier, without any apparent
object.

147

CHAPTER XXIV

THE LAND ATTACK

Sir Ian Hamilton, soon after his arrival, went to Egypt
to oversee the re-loading of the expeditionary transports,
but returned to the Island of Lemnos on the 7th of April.

The group of islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles
comprises the Babbit, the Imbros, the Tenedos and Lem-
nos islands, and is bound to play a great part in the his-
tory of the Near East in the future, as it is on the pos-
session of these islands that Great Britain relies to check
the Russians, in the event that the Allies are successful
in this war. These islands, except the Babbit group,
were, up to October, 1914, in the possession of Greece,
by virtue of the Treaty of London. The largest of the
Babbit group is only 9% English miles from the entrance
to the Dardanelles, and about five miles from the town
of Yeni Shehr on the coast of Anatolia. Its topography
makes it, though small, an excellent site for coast bat-
teries, while on its southern coast a naval harbor and
base for small vessels, submarines, torpedo boats and
destroyers, could be created with great ease. Entry in-
to and exit from the Dardanelles could, without difficul-
ty, be controlled from this island.

Imbros is about 12% miles, at its nearest point, from
the Turkish fortress Sedd-el-Bahr and only thirteen
miles from the main channel entering the Dardanelles,
and on this island batteries could be erected which would
most effectually support those on the largest of the Babbit
Islands in controUing the entrance to the Dardanelles;
and further batteries on these two islands, acting togeth-
er, could establish a cross-fire on this entrance.

Lemnos is 41 miles from the entrance to the
Dardanelles and is exactly in the position it should be
to form a naval base for operations against this Strait,
and fortifications could be established here which would
support those on Babbit and Imbros Islands. Between
Imbros and Lemnos islands the passage is but thirteen
miles and easily controllable by batteries on the shores
of these islands.

Prom the foregoing it will be readily seen that Great
Britain, even though as a result of the war the Bosphor-

148

THE LAND ATTACK

ous and the Dardanelles should pass into the possession of
Bussia, would still, holding these islands, be in a position
to stop that passage absolutely at any time it might enter
into her plans to do so. With the Dardanelles open and
it and Constantinople in Russian hands, if Russia
ever developed a merchant marine in the Black Sea of
any very considerable extent, and sought to transport
the products of her empire in her own bottoms, and thus
avoid paying toll to Great Britain's maritime power.
Great Britain would undoubtedly find this a cause for
such action as she (Great Britain) has invariably taken
against any power showing signs of becoming a maritime
rival in the last 200 years. Of these powers whose mar-
itime commerce she has destroyed by direct or indirect
means, the United States is perhaps the most melancholy
example.

At present in these islands Great Britain is thoroughly
established and Greece, their lawful possessor, exercises
no authority, civil or military. This violation of neu-
trality, being made by Great Britain, has of course pro-
voked no adverse comment from the American press.
But Russia is cognizant of the situation and has twice
made representations to the British government on this
subject, and it may be that, in the event of Allied vic-
tory, the possession .of these islands would be one of the
causes which will produce a war among the present
Allies analogous to the second Balkan War.

By April 25th all preparations for military attack
were comipleted and in the early morning of that day the
attack was delivered. As has already been said, the topog-
raphy of this peninsula is peculiar and affords strong
natural defenses to its defenders, particularly available
in the case of an advance into the peninsula of any force
which might land on its shores, traversed as it is by suc-
cessive reaches of hills opposing the path of an invader:
which natural defenses had been skilfully taken advan-
tage of by those directing the Turkish defense.

The two points chosen for the landing were the Sedd-
el-Bahr for the British and Kum Kale for the French,
which points are just at the entrance of the European
and Asiatic sides thereof.

We will deal with the French landing on the Asiastic
side first.

Supported by heavy fire from the Allied warships,
the French succeeded in making a landing between Kum
Kale and Yeni Shehr and then sought to advance from

149

THE LAND ATTACK

these points along the road which leads to Erenkeui,
Kephez and Chanak. The French were, however, not
particularly successful in this advance and although
they continued for a short period to make an effort to
force their way in the direction of Chanak, it soon be-
came apparent that they were unequal to the task.

It will be remembered, however, how the press
at this time reveled in the descriptions of the
French victories on the site of ancient Troy, and drew
interesting and entertaining parallels between the situa-
tion in 1914 and the days when Achilles and Hector op-
posed each other on the same plains. Unfortunately for
the trath of these narrations, the most advanced posi-
tions of the French were never anywhere near the scene
of the battles that Homer sang.

Eventually the French were obliged to retreat and
to re-embark on their ships, losing rather heavily both
in the retreat and getting off to their transports. They
were then taken over to the European side of the Straits
and landed at Sedd-el-Bahr and Tekke Bumu, to support
the British efforts to advance towards Krithia ; and from
that day forward the Asiatic side was left undisturbed
by the tread of alien feet.

Such was the situation on May 5th, by which time the
British commanders had discovered that the Turks were
an enemy whom it was not well to under-estimate ; a
fact which the British and its copyist press, the Ameri-
can, had not up to that time discovered, nor did they for
some time thereafter.

On May 5th, after the hard fighting hereinbefore des-
cribed, the Allied commanders were hard pressed for
re-enforcements and it was no longer found possible to
keep the two expeditionary forces separate, as had been
the original intention ; and it therefore became necessary
to mix the French and the British without regard to
their nationality, so as to make one compact and thor-
oughly homogeneous force. A general advance was re-
solved upon because it had become apparent that the
positions they had held were so circumscribed as to be
useless and Krithia was made the objective of this ad-
vance. Accordingly, on May 6th the effort to reach
Krithia began and on that day and the two following
days the fighting was extremely fierce. Senegalese and
Tirailleurs opened the fighting and had the honor of
leading the advance. With their drums and bugles

150

THE LAND ATTACK

sounding a charge, these rushed forward, a Aock of
skirmishers which seemed for one moment to cover the
entire ridge of Eerevesdah and reached the first Tur-
kish redoubts which formed the defenses at that hill.
Hardly had they reached the Turkish positions before
the Turkish artillery opened, supplemented by machine
gun fire, and overwhelmed the French troops. These
recoiled, were rallied, rushed forward once more, and
were again repulsed. By that time the fighting had be-
come general all along the line, extending along the
whole front of Kerevefidah and from thence across the
peninsula to the point known as Gully Beach, but, being
broken by the topography of the country into isolated
groups, the fighting was a succession of larger or smaller
skirmishes.

On the 7th and 8th of May fighting of this character
continued, attack and counter-attack succeeded each
other without intermission, and continued practically
until the morning of May 10th, when the Allied com-
manders were able, for the first time, to relieve a por-
tion of the forces on the fighting line since those forces
had landed on the peninsula eighteen days before. The
net result of this five days battle had been a gain of 600
yards on the right of the British, and 400 yards oh the
left and in the center. Krithia was still far away.

The position after the 10th was that the opposing
fronts stretched parallel from the sea to the Straits with
but very little scope left for tactics, in view of the un-
broken lines of barbed wire and Turkish trenches which,
one behind the other, stretched across this space. The
limit of what could be attained by the Allies from attack-
ing with their forces was reached, and siege or trench
warfare of the type common on the western front was
bound to, and did, supersede manoeuvre battles in the
open.

The British front was then divided into four sections.
Skirmishes took place fitfully up to May 18th, when
the Turks delivered a violent assault on the British po-
sitions with forces which the British and French esti-
mated at 30,000, which forces were, it is said, under Field
Marshal von Sanders himself. The struggle continued
for three or four days unabated, with frightful losses on
both sides, but without producing any definite result.
Both the Allied and the Turkish lines rested at the con-
clusion of the battle, practically in the same position that
they were at its opening.

151

THE LAND ATTACK

The next three or four days were spent in negotia-
tions for a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of
burying the dead, which, in this climate, is an absolute
necessity, as otherwise the liiring would soon all be pois-
oned, and on May 24th a four days' armistice was agreed
upon, which was afterwards prolonged for another couple
of days.

From this time forward, on this front, which may be
described as a straight line running from a point on the
Dardanelles themselves, from a little northeast of De
Tott's Battery, northwardly to a point on the coast of the
Aegean Sea near Beach Y to the north of Gurkha Bluff,
the positions have not changed since the end of May.
Both sides have dug themselves in thoroughly and both
fronts are defended not only by the trenches, but by
auxiliary defenses of all characters, so that the situation
has Regenerated into an absolute deadlock. From time
to time, half-hearted assaults have been made by one or
the other of the combatants upon their opponent's posi-
tion, in which the Allies have the advantage of being to a
considerable degree supported by the fire of their fleet.
But the result has been the same. In fact, it can be said
that since the end of May, during the three months of
June, July and August, neither side has advanced in a
straight line to the opponent's side a distance equal to
100 yards ; and this demonstrates clearly that while it is
still possible for the Allies to dislodge the Turks, it is
impossible for them to do so within the range of reason-
able and permissible sacrifices of men. On the other hand,
while the Turks could probably drive the Allies' troops
from this tip of the peninsula, they also would lose so
heavily from the fire of both the troops and the ships
that the loss would be out of proportion to any advan-
tage gained thereby.

Such operations as the Allies have conducted have
been for the purpose of gaining possession of a hill known
as Eljed Tepe, from which they thought, if they could
place heavy guns thereon, they could easily silence the
forts of Kilid Bahr; though a careful survey of the
ground raises a question as to whether or not their the-
ory is correct. The Turks, however, took no chances
and have defended this elevation successfully. The net
distance which the Allies have advanced from their land-
ing places in a straight line on this Sedd-el-Bahr front

152

THE LAND ATTACK

does not, at its farthest point, exceed 3% miles, and this
advance has only been achieved at the cost of tens of
thousands of lives.

153

CHAPTER XXV

On the 25th of April there were supposed to be about
125,000 Turkish troops at or near the Dardanelles, but
these were not equipped with as much field artillery ov
as many machine guns as were proportionate to this num-
ber of troops, and consequently much of the fighting
was done with infantry, which under ordinary circum-
stances would have been done by artillery or machine
guns.

The Turkish troops engaged here were mostly Ana^
tolian peasants, strong, hardy, used to and contemptuous
of hardship, who were able to get along with compara-
tively little food and water, and who, in addition to these
qualities, have the greater quality of being natural
bom soldiers, careless of death or suffering.

The plan of the Allies contemplated two main land-
ings, the first on the extreme tip of Gallipoli Peninsula,
on each side of Gape Helles, and the other on the western
side of the peninsula to the north of Gaba Tepe. This
plan then was for the forces that landed at the tip of the
peninsula to attack Erithia and the heights of Acha Baba
at the northeastward, while the forces disembarked at
the second landing were to advance across the hills sep-
arating the Sari Bahr and the Kilid Bahr towards the
town of Maidos, where the plan contemplated that both
forces would unite. To the landings at the tip of the
peninsula which were five in number the Allies gave the
names of S, V, W, X and Y. V, W and X were to be
the main landings, while the landings at S and Y were,
according to Sir Ian Hamilton the Commander-in-Chief,
'Mesigned mainly to protect the flanks, to decimate the
forces of the enemy and to interrupt the landing of its
re-enforcements. ' ' Beach * ' S " was just under De Tott 's
battery at Eski Hissarlik Point, which battery built years
before was in ruins. This point was commanded by the
fire of the Turkish batteries from the Asiatic coast.

Beach **V" was very close to Cape Helles and quite
near the fort of Sedd-el-Bahr ; according to Sir Ian
Hamilton this was ''a sandy beach about 300 yards
across, facing a semi-circle of steeply rising ground, as
the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim
flanked on one side by an old castle and on the other

154

THE LAND ATTACK

side by a modem fort." This beach was 10 yards wide
and 350 yards long, beyond which were grassy slopes
150 feet high. The castle referred to had already been
made a ruin by the prior bombardments of the. fleet,
while the TurMsh fort was practically useless for the
same reason.

Beach ^^W" was between Cape Helles and Cape Tekke
and **was a strip of deep powdery sand some 350 yards
long and from 15 to 40 yards wide ; situated immediately
south of Tekke Bumu, where a small gully running down
to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs." On either
flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but in
the center a number of sand dunes afford a more grad-
ual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. This ridge,
however, was commanded by two strong Turkish fleld
works on the heights above it.

Beach **X" was on the other, or northern, side of
Cape Tekke and was a strip of sand some 200 yards long
by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. This also was
commanded by Turkish fleld fortiflcations above it.

Beach ** Y" was directly west of the village of Krithia
and was a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumb-
ling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high. This was not
defended by the Turks.

We will now describe the operations which took place
at these landings.

Two feints, on Beaches S and Y were intended to be
delivered at dawn, while Beaches V, W and X were to be
bombarded by the fleet for a time and then the troops
landed; the time of which landing, it was expected,
would be about half past flve in the morning.

At flve o'clock a British squadron consisting of the
battleships Swiftsure, Implacable, Comwallis, Albion,
Vengeance, Lord Nelson, Prince George, and the cruisers
Euryalus, Talbot, Minerva and Dublin, preceded by a
flotilla of mine sweepers, took up their position facing
the end of the peninsula and the bombardment began.
A few minutes after the force which had been designated
for the flght to be delivered at the **S" Beach, below De
Tott's Battery, moved forward, and had a slight set-back
owing to the swift current in the Straits which rendered
its debarkation from the transports to smaller vessels
which could approach the shore a difficult operation ; but,
by half past seven, this force was on shore and carried
an enemy trench which it found on the beach. These
troops then fought their way up the cliff slowly, and

155

THE LAND ATTACK

reached De Tott's Battery about ten in the morning, and
immediately dug themselves in.

In the afternoon they were attacked by a force of the
enemy consisting of two battalions, which the British re-
pulsed with the aid of the fleet. Another attack was
made by the enemy on the following day, with a like re-
sult, and on the 27th the British turned over this posi-
tion to the French who had been withdrawn from the
Asiatic shore. This was perhaps the most successful of
all the landings.

Taking up now the other feint on Beach Y, which, as
has been said, was directly west of Krithia on the Aegean,
and not on the Dardanelles, the battleship Goliath and
two cruisers, the Amethyst and Sapphire, and some
transports with the troops on board, arrived at their po-
sitions about daylight. Here the Turks were surprised
and the landing was not opposed, so that it was easily
carried out. The cliffs, however, were very steep and it
was i>r\]y after some difficulty that the troops succeeded
in reaching their top. When the top was reached, in
compliance with their orders, this force, which amounted
to two battalions, started to march back along the coast
in order to effect a junction with the force which was
to be landed at Beach X, nearer to Cape Tekke. How-
ever, these two battalions did not proceed very far in
this direction before they encountered a force of Turkish
infantry, which they immediately attacked. Hard fight-
ing followed, and the progress of the two battalions
halted. A little later the Turks brought up re-enforce-
ments from the direction of the village of Krithia. The
Allied forces then started to entrench, as they were al-
most out-flanked, and in a very precarious and danger-
ous position ; almost surrounded, as they were, by super-
ior forces of the enemy who had brought up fleld guns
which were inflicting heavy losses upon the landing party
who were in such a position as regards the sea that the
guns of the ships were of no avail to them. The Turk-
ish attacks increased in strength, during the afternoon
and evening, and the fighting contiaued all night.

It was in this fighting that the British commanders
discovered that the much-despised Turk was in reality a
fighter fully equal to their men, and from this time we
may note the increasing respect with which the Turkish
soldier is spoken of in the reports of the British com-
manders.

Ee-enf orcements were sent for, but they did not arrive,

156

THE LAND ATTACK

and by seven o'clock the following morning the British
situation was a desperate one; they had fought contin-
uously since the middle of the day before, and were worn
out. Under these circumstances, the British troops be-
gan to retreat with the design of re-embarking as rapidly
as possible.

As soon as they got to near the top of the cliffs the
guns of the fleet were able to play upon their enemies
and prevent them from following ; which saved the Brit-
ish, who were taken off to their transports again, and
this landing was a complete failure.

We will now take up the main landings. The first
was made at Beach X, just north of Cape Tekke. This
landing had one advantage, in that the cliff behind the
beach on which it took place, was low and, consequently,
the warships were able to shell thoroughly the Turkish
defensive works on top of that cliff and make it impos-
sible for the Turks to oppose the landing itself, and for
this reason the British were able to disembark their forces
with very little loss of life. After landing, the Brit-
ish advanced for about 1000 yards or so into the inter-
ior, when they were heavily attacked by the Turks and
the British right wing, which was rather exposed, came
under the fire of a field battery near Krithia. This
Turkish attack forced the advancing British to give
ground at first, but the British were re-enforced and ul-
timately succeeded in carrying the top of the hill where
about noon they were joined by British troops who had
landed at Beach W on the other slope of this same hill ;
which landing will be hereafter described.

The Turks now began a series of vigorous attacks on
this united force and succeeded in driving them almost
to the edge of the cliffs over-hanging the sea, but here
the British managed to entrench themselves and held
their ground with resolute determination. At night-fall
their trenches extended for about half a mile around
their landing place, and included therein the hill won
earlier in the day.

Beach W on the other side of this same hill, to the
south, was the scene of very hard fighting. The landing
at this point had been foreseen by the Turks who had
prepared in every possible way to resist it. Sea mines
had been strewn off the shore, complicated with concealed
barbed wire in the shallow waters, and land mines and
a broad wire entanglement had been constructed the
whole length of the beach on the edge of the sea. Suit-

157

THE LAND ATTACK

able crevices and holes in the cliff had been searched out
and machine guns concealed therein which commanded
the beach, and on the hills surrounding it were strong
field fortifications which also commanded it and were
protected by barbed wire entanglements. From these
field fortifications wire entanglements had been so ar-
ranged as to make communication between Beach W and
Beach V further to the east impossible until the field
fortifications had been taken.

The forces designated to attack at this point were in
position at four o'clock, and at five the battleships ac-
companying them began to bombard the beach and its
defenses with a concentrated fire which contiaued for
over an hour.

At six o'clock small boats started for the beach in a
column of eight. The boats in the center made straight
for the middle of the beach, a few went nearer to Cape
Helles, while eight boats aimed for certain rocks at the
Cape Tekke end of the bay, (the left) on which it was
possible to attain a precarious footing. To this action
of these eight boats may be attributed the final capture of
this beach.

The Turks held their fire until the first boat reached
the beach, when the beach was swept by a burst of fire
from all sides. The men in the first boats were practi-
cally all killed, but the few who were still alive behaved
with desperate gallantry and throwing themselves on the
wire entanglements at the edge of the sea, managed to
hack their way through.

For a time it looked as though the landing was to be
a failure, but it was saved by the force from the eight
boats already mentioned, which had landed on the
rocks beneath Cape Tekke. These had managed to turn the
end of the wire entanglements spoken of and opened a
rapid enfilading fire upon the enemy, while others climbed
up the cliff side and searched for the machine guns hid-
den in the crevices thereof, and managed to silence the
majority. This had the effect of giving the force in the
center of the beach a breathing spell, which they im-
proved by falling back to the left under the rocks of Cape
Tekke and re-forming, when they rushed the hill side in
front of them.

Another portion went to the right, and, under the
rocks of Cape Helles, managed to form and to advance

158

THE LAND ATTACK

up the clifif at that point but were finally stopped by wire
entanglements stretching from the Turkish field fortifi-
cations to the edge of the cliff.

By nine o'clock the Cape Tekke cliffs had been seized.
Heavy re-enforcements had been brought up and were
landing on the beach. These also climbed up the rocks
of Cape Tekke and by ten o'clock had captured, in con-
junction with the original forces, three lines of Turkish
trenches and took connection, as has already been shown,
with the force which had landed at Beach X, to the north,
about noon.

However, the Turkish field fortifications were still in
Turkish hands and these had to be captured in order to
make the position tenable. From one to two o'clock in
the afternoon these were bombarded by the fleet and
about two o'clock the British infantry advanced to the
attack. The fighting was very hard, the Turks resisting
with desperation, and the casualties were enormous. Nev-
theless, about four in the afternoon the British carried
the field works completely. Then it became necessary to
try to send a portion of this force to help that British
force which had landed on Beach V, and though re-en-
forcements had by this time arrived for the British, the
Turkish opposition to this attempt was extremely vigor-
ous and they counter-attacked incessantly so that it was
impossible for the British to^move from this Beach W
to the aid of those on Beach V to the south, near Sedd-
el-Bahr ; therefore, the British at Beach W were obliged
to entrench on the ground already won until the morn-
ing.

During the night the Turks continued their attacks,
though driven back repeatedly, and gave the British no
rest, so that these, though re-enforced during the night
from troops landed on Beach X to the north of Beach W,
had all they could do to hold their positions until the
morning.

The landing on Beach V, which lay between Cape
Helles and the fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, was the most diffi-
cult operation of all. This beach possessed all the de-
fenses of Beach W, in addition to others even more form-
idable. It had no convenient ledges of rock on the ends
whereof a foothold could be won, the cliffs of the Cape
Helles end, towards Beach W, being so steep as to be im-
possible of ascent, while on the cliff at the other end were
the ruins of a fort and a village, where sharpshooters in
advantageous positions swarmed. Another ruin between

159

THE LAND ATTACK

the shore and the village was also fall of sharpshooters,
while on the road in front of the bay was another ruin
which commanded the entire landing and which was also
used as cover for snipers. The grassy hillsides all around
the landing were foil of hidden sharpshooters; barbed
wire entanglements had been used in profusion and on
the crest of the hills were Turkish trenches. All of
these things made it possible for the Turks to pour in on
this landing place an extremely heavy rifle and machine
gun fire, which swept the beach from end to end. Be-
hind the first slopes rose a high hill known as 141, which
also commanded the landing place and was covered with
entrenchments, snipers and machine guns.

In view of the extreme difficulty which had been fore-
seen in making a landing at this place, the British com-
mander had selected a collier, the River Clyde, and had
her arranged to convey the troops who were to remain
concealed within and protected by her steel hull until
the time came when they could be advantageously em-
ployed. This was done by cutting doors in her sides
which gave access to long gang planks sloping towards
her bow. If she was gotten in sufficiently close to the
shore so that the water was wadable, the problem of get-
ting on shore from the gang planks was simple, but,
otherwise, lighters were to be placed between the steamer
and the beach so as to form a bridge.

About 2000 troops were on board this vessel, and com-
prised the bulk of the attacking force. Provision had
been made for the first assault to be delivered by men
who were to be sent ashore, as in other cases, in open
boats.

At dawn the attack opened with a bombardment from
the Albion. Then 32 open boats were sent to shore. The
Turks here, as elsewhere, reserved their fire, and not a
shot was heard until the first boat touched the beach. The
moment this happened a murderous fire broke forth
from every quarter, with the result that the attack by the
boats was completely wiped out ; almost none of the oc-
cupants of these boats surviving ; not more than 15 or 20
men in all. Not a single boat ever returned, and it is
said that in all the records of the British Army and Navy
there is no like tale of slaughter so instant and complete.

While these things were going on, the River Clyde had
come up and beached herself, bow on, near a reef of
rock, but not at the point which had been selected, and in
water too deep for the troops to wade ashore. Two

160

THE LAND ATTACK

lighters which had been prepared, in view ot this pos-
sible contingency, to form the bridge on which the troops
would move ashore, were run out ahead of the collier and
secured; but, in the hurry, a gap was left between the
two which fact subsequently cost the lives of many gal-
lant men.

The troops were then called upon to come ashore. The
first company which responded to this call rushed down
the gang-plank, leaped into the first lighter and tried to
reach the shore, but the gap between the first and sec-
ond lighters was too broad to jump. Some of the men
jumped and some of the men fell into the sea, many be-
ing hit, because by this time the Turkish fire, which had
opened as soon as the River Clyde had been perceived,
had grown in intensity and was a perfect storm of pre-
jectiles.

Those who either scrambled or fell into the sea were
nearly all drowned, the weight of their equipment drag-
ging them. Some few got ashore, and these took shelter
under a low sandy bank which rose for about four feet at
the point where the beach and the grassy slopes behind
it joined.

The lighters then drifted into a worse position, and,
more troops rushing forward to disembark, the confus-
ion became intensified, but through the gallant efforts of
the sailors communication was finally re-established be-
tween the shore and the River Clyde. Then a third com-
pany attempted to land, but the Turks had brought
heavy artillery to bear, and this company was practically
wiped out, in its passage from this lighter to the shore,
by shrapnel. More battleships were brought up, includ-
ing the Comwallis and the Queen Elizabeth, who bom-
barded the shore for some time. Then another attempt
was made to land the troops from the Clyde and a con-
siderable number of men, including Brigadier-General
Napier, got into the lighters. Hardly had they done so,
when the line connecting the two vessels broke and the
one nearest the Clyde swung around in deep water leav-
ing a wide and impassable gap between them.

The Turks took advantage of this accident to shell
both lighters, with the result that a large number of their
occupants were killed, including General Napier.

By this time it was eleven o'clock, and 1000 men had
attempted to land from the River Clyde, of whom barely
150 had succeeded. Fully half had been killed. There
still remained on the Clyde about 1000 men, but as the

161

THE LAND ATTACK

Turkish fire had grown so strong that it was certain
death to attempt to pass from that vessel to the shore, it
became clear that nothing more could be done while the
daylight lasted, and the Commander-in-Chief sent ordera
to suspend any landing operations until darkness fell.

The other troops on the battleships who were intended
to re-enforce those of the Clyde, had the landing been
carried out successfully, were sent off to Beach W where
re-enforcements had also been called for.

All the rest of the day the Turks attacked the Clyde
with artillery, but, owing to the fact that the calibre of
the artillery which they had on the shore at this point
was comparatively small, little damage was done to her,
though her sides were pierced by four shells.

This Turkish fire continued until sunset and then com-
pletely ceased. About eight o'clock in the evening, with-
out a shot being fired against them, the men still remain*
ing on the Clyde came ashore. Efforts were then made
to clear the territory immediately abutting upon the
beach, but without success as in each attack the British
were repulsed. It was then determined to await the
coming of the day before making any attempt to advance
inland.

182

CHAPTER XXVI

While these events were taking place at the tip of the
peninsula, the Australians and New Zealanders were
making their attack a little to the north of Gaba Tepe,
in greater force than had been attempted at any other
point. The battleships Queen, London, Prince of Wales,
Triumph and Majestic, and the cruiser Bacchante, to-
gether with a number of destroyers and trawlers, and
the whole fleet of transports took part in this attack. At
one o'clock in the morning of April 25th the squadron
reached the point from which the disembarkation was to
be made and at 1:20 the order was given to lower the
boats and the picket boats which were to tow them, and
at 2 :05 the order was given for the first 1500 men to em-
bark; another 2500 men being held in readiness to fol-
low up this first 1500 at the earliest possible moment.

By three o'clock the embarkation was completed and
the squadron moved slowly towards the shore, the picket
boats with their tows following behind them. At about
four o'clock when the squadron was about 2500 yards
from the shore the picket boats were ordered to move
forward and went past the line of battleships with their
tows. The battleships did not bombard the coast before
the landing, because there was a hope of making a sur-
prise. At a few minutes of five, when the boats were
close in shore, the enemy opened fire with rifles and ma-
chine guns and inflicted a number of casualties on the
occupants of the advancing boats; but these persisted,
and reached the shore. The Australians leaped out and
charged the Turkish entrenchments on the beach, which
they carried, forcing their defenders to flee.

From the beach rose a steep cliff covered with under-
growth. A Turkish trench was located about half way
up this and poured in a continuous fire not only on the
defenders of the beach below but on the boats which were
approaching the shore with the other 2500 troops. The
Australians already landed determinedly clambered up
the cliff and after a hot fight cleared the Turkish trench
on the cliff-side and followed this up by a rush for the
top, which they succeeded in gaining. But here they

163

THE LAND ATTACK

were obliged to halt, because the Turks brought up field
guns and opened upon the Australians at the edge of the
cliff.

Delay was also caused by the fact that the Turkish
warships in the Dardanelles began firing shells across
the peninsula at the beach upon which the Australians
were landing. This caused considerable casualties and
also forced the transference of troops from the transports
to the small boats, which was still going on (the second
and first Australian Brigades having also arrived on the
scene of action on transports) to be effected further out
from the beach.

It was very fortunate that the Australians were cap-
able of irregular fighting themselves, also because the
nature of the ground here made that obligatory and also
required initiative in the individual man. This initia-
tive was, however, pushed too far, since small bodies of
the Australians pressed a very long way into the penin-
sula and these were either taken prisoners or killed, as
they never returned.

The battle now degenerated into a series of isolated
skirmishes, in which the Australians had the upper hand
and pushed the Turks back; but no connected account
of this can be given.

Towards two o'clock, however, when 12,000 Austral-
ians had landed, as well as a couple of batteries of artil-
lery, the battle had assumed a more coherent form. The
Turks had at this time about 20,000 men on or near the
firing line. The Australians were occupying a position
from a point known as Fisherman's Hut, a little south
of Chailak Dere, to a point about a mile north of Gaba
Tepe. That afternoon the Turks made charge after
charge and the Australians were unable to advance,
though once or twice they made counter-attacks of no
particular importance.

At 5 P. M. the Turks made an attack in great force
and pounded the Third Brigade hard. This attack was
supported by artillery and was successful to the point
that the Australians contracted their line. The Turks
continued bringing up more men and during the night
they attacked frequently and gave the Australians no
rest. The casualties on both sides were remarkably
heavy. At daybreak the Australians found themselves
in a fair position but their line was more contracted than
it had been the night before. This line they held all the
next day.

164

THE LAND ATTACK

On April 26th, by which time large re-enforcements
had been landed at all points, the Allies attempted an ad-
vance from the southern tip of the peninsula, which was
successful, to the extent of capturing the fort of Sedd-el-
Bahr, though this advantage was purchased at a great
cost in lives. This was followed by hard fighting on the
next day, but this fighting was so confused that only the
result can be given, which was that the Allies made an
advance of practically 1% miles from their landing and
controlled the tip of the peninsula for that distance.

On the 28th the Australians advanced, from the points
which they had won at landing, a reasonable distance in
the direction of Sari Bahr.

The next few days were most remarkable for the ex-
ploits of the British submarine E-14 in the Sea of Mar-
mora where it sank a transport and a Turkish gun-boat,
but on the 30th the British AB-2 was sunk, in attempt-
ing to enter the Sea of Marmora, by the Turkish batter-
ies defending the entrance of that sea.

From April 30th to May 6th continuous streams of
troops were re-enforcing the Allies in Gallipoli and on
May 6th, thinking themselves strong enough to force the
issue, they delivered battle in the southern section of the
peninsula. The objective of this attack was Krithia and
Achi Baba; that Achi Baba which they had expected to
take by evening of the first day and which, seven months
afterwards, was still in the hands of their enemies.

The battle for Krithia continued three days and con-
cerning this, as the other land actions on the Gallipoli
Peninsula, not much can be said as no consecutive ac-
count of the incidents of the fight is possible, since this
battle, like the others in this campaign, differs from or-
dinary battles in that it was broken up into a series of un-
connected struggles of isolated units. This form of battle
is remarkably prolific in casualties but has no sequence
or continuity.

On May 8th fighting ended and the gains by the Al-
lies were slight.

From May 8th the character of operations completely
changed. The assaults gave place to a slower advance
prepared with care and methodically conducted.

The southern part of the peninsula of Gallipoli, as far
as Kilid Bahr, where the narrowing of the Straits and the
works on the two banks prevented the passage of the
fieet, presents the form of a triangle. The base of this
triangle, between Gaba Tepe and Kilid Bahr, is 7y2 miles

165

THE LAND ATTACK

Midway rises the tip of Achi Baba about 750 feet high,
the outlying defenses of which stretch across the penin-
sula and constitute a very powerful defensive position.
The ground in front of the position slopes gently, and
artillery, as well as infantry fire, is able to sweep it as
though it were the glacis of a fort. The narrowness of
the front precludes the possibility of manoeuvre and
only admits of the works of the enemy being attacked
and carried by frontal assaults.

The Turks had thoroughly organized their resistance.
The region was honeycombed with deep entrenchments
backed by machine guns and barbed wire and other ob-
stacles. From this point on, the fighting on the southern
front was entirely of trench character, like that which
prevailed in the west.

But one or two incidents remain to be noticed. The
Allied fieet, as has already been said, delivered no attack
on the forts of a serious character from the time of the
March fiasco, but it was nevertheless destined to lose sev-
eral of its units, though it confined itself to merely guard-
ing the entrance of the Straits and an occasional attack
on the Turkish land defenses in support of troop operar
tions.

The first of these units so lost was the Goliath, an old
battleship of 11,000 odd tons, which was torpedoed by
the Turks in the Dardanelles between De Tott's Battery
and Kilid Bahr; about 500 of her crew were lost with
her.

On May 26th and May 27th respectively, the Triumph
and the Majestic, two British battleships, the one of 12,-
800 tons and the other of 14,000 tons, were torpedoed and
sunk outside of the Straits of the Dardanelles between
the mouth thereof and the Island of Tenedos by a Ger-
man submarine, which had made the long voyage from
German base around the British Isles and through the
Straits of Gibraltar, and which arrived off the mouth of
the Dardanelles the very same day on which it secured
its first victim, the Triumph.

Later on in the summer this loss was partly avenged
by a British submarine which, on August 9th, torpedoed
the Turkish battle^ip Barbarossa, which sank carrjdng
down with it many of its crew. The onlj^ other navcJ
loss of any importance in this campaign, up to the time
this record closes, was that of the Marlotte, a French
submarine which was sunk in these Straits on July 26th.

The Australians, whom we had left on the top of the

166

THE LAND ATTACK

cliffs above the so-called Anzac Cove, during the next
six months made many efforts to take or capture the Ana-*
farta District, but always, without success, though they
inflicted and received much punishment in their efforts.
The skirmishes here so closely resembled each other that
the story of one is the story of all. Suffice it to say
that when this record closes on the first of September the
Australian position, though slightly ameliorated and
with a slightly greater area of ground held, had not pro-
gressed, strategically, one iota from what it was at night-
faU on the 27th of April.

This whole attack upon the Dardanelles has been one
of the maddest mUitary conceptions of modem history,
and to this original madness of conception has been add-
ed tactical blunder after blunder. In the original landing
the division of the forces into five units, when one or at
most two, would have been the correct number, weakened
the attack, and on this initiatory blunder, like Pelion on
Ossa, have been piled almost daily blunders of greater or
lesser magnitude. So that it is possible to say almost
with confidence that the expedition will never achieve its
end, that is, to force the Straits of the Dardanelles and
the Sea of Marmora and capture Constantinople, in spite
of the enormous number of lives which it has cost.

167

The Minor Campaigns

CHAPTER XXVII

Caucasus.

On the whole during the six months' period under con-
sideration but little of interest occurred on the Caucasian
front.

Till the beginning of May in fact there was no fighting
of any consequence whatever as a result of the deep snow
which blocked the mountain passes as well as their ridges
and the high plateaux and valleys.

In the early day^ of May, however, operations on an
important scale began and resulted in a Turkish defeat
near Olti. This name, though the name of a town, is also
the name of a region and it is probable that when used
in the bulletins it refers to the region and not to the town.
In this fighting about an army corps on each side was
engaged and after a couple of days the Turks gave
ground and finally retreated, leaving a considerable num-
ber of prisoners in the hands of the Russians. Near
Tabriz a little later there was also some fighting which re-
sulted in the Russians getting possession of the South
Pass and of some villages beyond it.

Prom this time on the fighting was general and usually
resulted in Russian advantages which arose from the fact
that the Turks had withdrawn many of their troops from
the Caucasian campaign to use in the defense of Con-
stantinople. However, the Russian advance was slow.

Towards the end of May the Russians had advanced
far enough in the Van region to occupy Baslan. In early
June rather heavy fighting took place in the Olti region
with no marked result. About the middle of June the
Turks inaugurated an offensive in the region which final-
ly culminated in a Turkish victory, the Russians losing
heavily and also having much material of war taken, the
scene of this Russian defeat being about 55 miles west of
Kars.

Late in June the Russians occupied the town of Got,
twenty-five miles north of Lake Van driving the Turks

1()8

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

out. Fighting also took place near Britis about the same
time. This fighting continued intermittently the rest of
June and the early part of July. About the middle of
July it became much livelier, particularly to the north
and south of Lake Van, and also in the Olti region, the
Russians appearing to have the upper hand. All the rest
of July and the early part of August was more quiet,
possibly owing to the fact that in response to calls from
their other front for re-enforcements both the Turks
and Russians withdrew troops from this front.

About the middle of August the Russians attempted to
take the offensive but this effort was soon broken and
the Turks, following up their advantage, thus gained,
forced the Russians backward along the whole front and
finally on August 16th recaptured the town of Van, a
very important point only, however, to lose it again on
the next day. Hard fighting then took place around this
city for the next few days but the Russians clung obstin-
ately to the town. After this burst of activity the cam-
paign languished on the whole front until the time our
record closes.

Serbia.

During the entire period under consideration almost
no military events took place on this front. The Austri-
ans merely maintained a sufficient number of men on the
northern side of the Danube to prevent the Serbians from
invading their southern provinces had they been so dis-
posed and the exchange of a few cannon shot at long
range from time to time marked the extent of the fight-
ing.

On two or three occasions in the spring and summer
an Austrian cannonade of more than usual violence was
directed at Belgrade from the other side of the river but
beyond killing a few civilians and doing considerable ma-
terial damage to the buildings of the city, these artillery
attacks produced little or no effect.

All the spring and most of the summer Serbia was af-
flicted by a continuation of the frightful epidemic of ty-
phus of which mention was made in the last volume, and
which continued its ravages among the Serbian popula-
tion. How many tens of thousands died of this fearful
plague will probably never be known, but the mortality
must have totalled a very considerable percentage of the
population of the country. To the ravages of the typhus
were added the miseries of a great shortage of food. The

169

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

preceding summer the fighting had prevented the final
steps in the cultivation of the crops and their harvesting,
owing to the absence from the fields of practically all
the male population and though the women did their ut-
most, necessarily the absence of the men had unfortunate
results.

Great efforts were made by private British efforts to
afford relief in all ways to the stricken country, and with
a very considerable measure of success. This success of in-
dividual or co-operative private effort on the part of the
British stands out in striking contrast to the public or
government activities of Great Britain all through the
war. The government seems paralyzed in everything it
attempts through a fear of offending King Mob on whose
votes it depends for its continuance in office, while the
private individual sees the thing necessary to be done and
does it efficiently.

In this noble work of alleviating human suffering the
British were joined by the kind hearted of many other
nations, among which our own played a not altogether
inconspicuous part.

Too much cannot be said of the courage and devotion
of the physicians and nurses who participated in this
work of relief. These literally took their lives in their
hands and many of them accomplished triumphantly the
great sacrifice whereof the Master has spoken so beauti-
fully.

Along the northern border of Montenegro and in the
abutting portions of Bosnia there was almost continual
irregular fighting between the Montenegriens and Aus-
trians all the spring and summer. These skirmishes were,
however, without military importance or significance and
their details need not detain us.

Suez Canal and Egypt.

After the repulse of the Turkish attack on the Suez
Canal described in the first volume, very little took place
in this sphere of action.

From time to time unimportant skirmish fighting oc-
curred between the Turkish troops which after their de-
feat by the British had retired into the desert in the gen-
eral direction of El Arish, and reconnoitering parties of
the British forces, but these merely served the purpose of
keeping the opposing forces in occasional touch with each
other. Thus the spring and summer passed away with-
out the initiation of any serious offensive by other side.

170

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

In July a short lived Turkish oflfensive, supported to
some degree by the local Arabs was launched against the
well known British port and town of Aden. At first the
British troops in the hinterland behind the city were
obliged to retire and the possibility of the capture of the
town had to be envisaged. However, the Turkish attack
was apparently lacking in virility and was not pushed
home rapidly, so that time was afforded for the British to
strengthen their forces from India. When this was ac-
complished the Turks apparently thought that a further
attack would be attended with considerable difiSculty and
withdrew.

Little occurred in Egypt during the six months under
consideration except that here as in India there was con-
siderable unrest among the native population which un-
rest in Egypt expressed itself in several attacks on the
British-made sultan, none of which succeeded in their ob-
ject.

The Holy War solemnly proclaimed by the Sultan had
little effect on the followers of Mahomet throughout the
eastern world. Many explanations are offered for this
faflure, the most probable of which is that the probabili-
ties of Turkish success in the conflict had not become suf-
ficiently well defined. The very important British ad-
vance from the Persian Gulf into Mesopotamia which had
for its real objective the capture of Bagdad remains to be
glanced at.

The expeditionary force under Lieutenant Gteneral Sir
Arthur Barrett consisted, apparently, of three Indo-Brit-
ish infantry brigades, a brigade of Indian cavalry and
artillery and auxiliary services in proportion — ^in all
probal)ility some 18,000.

In the first volume we followed the progress of this
force up to December 9th when it defeated the Turks and
Arabs opposing it at Kuma, at the junction of the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers and captured the town. For the
next months the expedition was occupied in consolidat-
ing the position thus won and in subduing the rather
primitive tribes in the vicinity of that town, so that it did
not resume its march forward until sometime in March.
We are almost totally ignorant of the events occurring in
this forward march, but we do know that at the end of
June the expedition had after considerable fighting with
the Turks who sought to oppose its march, reached Shaiba
well above Kuma, and that a month later Amara was
taken after severe fighting, while towards the beginning

171

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

of September a brief report from the commander an-
nounced that the main body of the expedition, proceeding
along the Tigris had reached Kut-el-Amara about 95
miles from its objective, Bagdad.

Africa.

The campaign against the various German colonies in
Africa by the French and British was between the first
of March and the first of September pushed to a conclu-
sion as regards all of these colonies except German East
Africa.

The details of these campaigns are lacking to a consid-
erable degree owing to the causes set forth in the first vol-
ume, but in general it may be said that the British direct-
ed their principal efforts against German Southwest Af-
rica, while the French directed their campaign against
the Cameroons.

General Botha, that general who distinguished himself
greatly in fighting against England during the Boer war,
and subsequently accepted the situation to his political
advantage and who became the head of the ministry, was
commander-in-chief of the British.

It must be remembered that the Germans in Africa
were completely cut off from any communication with the
outside world from the very early days of the war, and
were thus compelled to completely rely on themselves and
had no opportunity to replenish their stores of provisions,
munitions of war or ammunition from any sources, facts
>vhich worked necessarily to their considerable disadvan-
tage.

General Botha directed the British campaign with con-
siderable skill and first captured Swakopmund, the most
important point in German Southwest Africa.

In connection with this capture a considerable clamor
was raised by the British concerning the poisoning of six
wells by the Germans with arsenical cattle wash, and
Gteneral Botha stated that the German commander in-
formed him that he was acting under orders from home
in poisoning such wells. It afterwards turned out, how-
ever, that the attention of General Botha had been called
to the fact that these weUs were so poisoned by the Ger-
man commander himself and an explanation of the
poisoning by accident was given. The very fact that Gen-
eral Botha was so advised by his opponent removes the
possibility that this poisoning was done with any expecta-
tion or desire to injure the British troops, since had such

172

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

hope or desire existed no warning would have been given
to the British by th German commander.

This whole affair reflects no credit on General Botha.

After the capture of Swakopmund General Botha's
forces pressed onward and about the first of May inflict-
ed a severe defeat on the Germans near Gibson, taking
in addition to the town, a couple of hundred prisoners,
a railroad train, transport wagons, and some artillery.

This success was followed up by General Botha by an
unopposed entrance on May 12th of Windhoek, the capi-
tal of the Colony which capture put the entire Colony
practically into the hands of the British. No resistance
was made by the Germans for the reason that their stock
of ammunition was very greatly depleted and hence any
attempt to defend the town would have been hopeless.

This situation of affairs a month later, on July 8th,
brought about the unconditional surrender of the Ger-
man forces in Southwest Africa to General Botha, much
of the time intervening between this date and the fall of
Windhoek having been passed in negotiations looking to
this surrender and comparatively little fighting having
taken place.

The campaign against the Cameroons was mostly car-
ried on by the French, though occasionally their troops
received aid from the British. The principal events in
this campaign of which we have any knowledge are, the
taking of Esoka by the French on May 11th. The cap-
ture of Monso after heavy fighting occurred on May 24th.
This place was taken by the French colonial troops after
taking position after position and the capture was a se-
vere blow to the Germans as the bulk of their white
troops in the colony were made prisoners, besides which
large quantities of stores and munitions of war fell into
the hands of the French. After this capture, the French
began an offensive movement toward Besam to the south-
west of Tormis. The capture of Gama, an important
station on the Benne River on June 12th, followed. No-
thing further of importance has happened in this field of
operations since.

German East Africa.

The campaign here by the British which had begun in
September 1914 by a German attack on Monitassa,
was repulsed at Gazi, some twenty-five miles from Moni-
tassa itself.

The British with a force of some 6000 white and Indian

173

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

troops early in November, 1914, began an attack on Tanga
and Jassuii which captured Jassin very late in Novem-
ber, but were unsuccessful in their attack on the import-
ant port of Tanga. Jassin was subsequently recaptured
by tiie Qermans.

Some fighting also took place at Shirati on Lake Vic-
toria Nyanza in January and really heavy fighting oc-
curred at Kamuga on tiie lake in March, the Germans
losing and being driven back with considerable loss.

From March to June the main British forces were en-
gaged in concentrating for an attack on Bukota, an im-
portant town on the opposite side of the lake from Shir-
ati. This attack took place on June 22nd, the Gtermans
having about 400 rifles opposed to 5000. Naturally there
could be but one result. The British took the town, and
obtained possession of its wireless station, their main ob-
jective.

Various other attacks and counter-attacks occurred
during the summer, but unfortunately the details of these
operations are almiost completely lacking.

It is safe to say, however, that on September 1st, the
British had made little real progress in the conquest of
this Qerman colony, the only one of Germany's colonies
at that time remaining unconquered.

General Christian de Wet, one of the leaders of the re-
bellion in South Africa against the British government,
who won fame as one of the ablest generals of the Boers,
in the Boer War, was captured by the South African
forces, was tried for treason and found guilty thereof
on June 21st and sentenced to six years' imprisonment
together with a fine of ten thousand dollars. Some of the
other leaders of this rebellion were shot as traitors, while
others were sentenced to imprisonment, in the final settle-
ment of this unsuccessful rebellion.

174

The Naval War on all Seas

CHAPTER XXVm

In the last volume the plan was followed of dividing
the War of the Seas into sections according to the oceans
upon which the combats occurred. This plan it is not feas-
ible to follow in this volume, for the reason that there
was comparatively little naval activity during the period
which we are considering.

Some portion of this naval activity, has been treated
of in the. campaigns with which it was connected, as, for
instance, the sinUng of the British and French warddps
in the Dardanelles. The submarine warfare against mer-
chant vessels and its consequences wUl be treated, of in
the chapter following and hence will not be discussed
herein.

During the very early days of March there was little
or no naval activity. On the 10th of March, 1915, Hie
United States was excited by the entry of the German
auxiliary cruiser Prince Eitel Fritz into the harbor of
Newport News. This cruiser had been engaged in a com-
merce destroying voyage which extended over the Atlan-
tic and Pacific Oceans, covering more than 30,000 mUes
therein. In this cruise she had sunk three British vessels
(two steamers and one sailing) , three French vessels (one
steamer and two sailing), one Russian sailing vessel, and
one American sailing vessel, the WiUiam P. Frye. This
latter vessel was sunk on January 28th, after the crew
had been removed; the Frye carrying a cargo of wheat
'*to order'' for the British Isles, which the Commander
of the Prince Bitel Fritz judged to be contraband.

This sinking of the William P. Frye gave rise to con-
siderable friction between the United States and Ger-
many, which is not fully settled at the time liiese words
are written.

It does not seem to the writer fitting, at the present
time, to enter into any discussion of l^e issues raised by
various actions of Germany or Austria, or by Great Bri-
tain or France, which affected the United States and
which have given rise to diplomatic correspondence be-
tween these countries and the government of the United

175

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

States. This is not because the writer has not fairly well
defined opinions on these matters, which are largely
questions of international law, but because in most of
them the facts have not been ascertained as yet with that
positiveness which is necessary in order to found a reas-
onable opinion thereon or to make a correct application
of the principles of international law thereto. At some
future time it is the writer's purpose to discuss these
questions from the standpoint of law and not of senti-
mentality or of partisanship. This explanation is given
at this point so that not only the writer's position will
be understood, but also his avoidance of a discussion of
these topics here, particularly in relation to submarine
warfare.

The Eitel Fritz, after her arrival at Newport News,
for some days announced an intention of again seeking
the high seas after such repairs as were necessary to the
vessel were made, but finally on April 7th the Captain
decided not to attempt to pass the six or seven Allied
cruisers which were waiting for his vessel outside of the
three mile limit, and, consequently, the ship was interned
by the government of the United States until the end of
the war.

At Corsewell Point, Wigtownshire, Scotland, on March
11, the British auxiliary cruiser, Bayano, was sunk by a
German submarine while engaged in patrol duty. This
vessel was a converted merchantman of about 3500 tons ;
and with her about 190 men went down.

Juan Fernandez Island, the island which tradition
identifies as the island upon which Alexander Selkirk
(the man whose adventures gave Defoe his idea of Robin-
son Crusoe) was shipwrecked and remained several years,
a couple of centuries or so ago, lies about 400 miles to
the west of the coast of Chili and belongs to that repub-
lic. At the time of the naval battle of the Falkland Is-
lands, which took place, as my readers will remember,
on the 8th of December, 1914, and which resulted in the
destruction of the German squadron under Admiral
Spree, one vessel of that squadron, the Dresden, succeed-
ed in making its escape, although chased by the fleetest
of the British cruisers present at this fight, and dis-
appeared from sight; running to the westward towards
the Straits of Magellan. From that time until the 9th
of March her whereabouts were unknown though a dozen
British warships hunted every inch of the east and west
coasts of lower South America for her. From time to

176

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

time she was reported at various places, such as Punta
Arenas on the coast of southern Chili: but, as it subse-
quently turned out, there was no truth in these reports.

The Dresden was the only Gterman warship known to
be at large in the South Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans,
and in order to make the boast of the British Navy good,
that they had swept the German Navy from the ocean,
it was necessary to find and destroy the Dresden at all
costs ; and this necessity may possibly be the explanation
of the untoward event which subsequently took place.

On March 9th, 1915, the Dresden appeared in Cum-
berland Bay, and, sending a boat ashore, asked per-
mission of the Chilian Governor of this Chilian territory,
the Island of Juan Fernandez, to remain in the waters of
Chili for a space of eight days, in order to make repairs
to her engines which had been damaged in her voyagings
since the battle of the Falkland Islands. This request,
however, the Governor of the Island refused, and ordered
her captain to take the Dresden out of the waters of Chili
within twenty-four hours. At this time the Dresden was
anchored between four and five hundred yards from the
shore, and thus over 2% miles inward from the line on
the waters which mark the limit of the jurisdiction of
the Republic of Chili.

The captain of the Dresden, however, did not see fit
to obey this order, and, at the expiration of this time the
Chilian Governor notified the captain of the Dresden that
the Dresden was interned in accordance with the rules of
international law.

The captain of the Dresden, in compliance with the
order of internment given to him by the Governor, an-
chored his ship fore and aft and began to put her in or-
der for a long stay. This happened on the 11th of March.

On the 14th of March, three days later, at nine
o'clock in the morning a British Squadron com-
posed of the Glasgow, Kent, and the auxiliary cruiser
Oroma, appeared in the oflSng. On these vessels being
sighted, the Governor put out from the Island towards
the Glasgow to inform her captain of his action and of
the fact that the Dresden was interned. The Dresden
was at this time flying a flag of truce. The Governor,
however, was unable to proceed to the British ships and
to delivier his statement because the British ships im-^
mediately opened flre on the Dresden and moved in with-
in a few hundred yards of her and well into Chilian wa-
ters, signalling to her captain to surrender. The Dres-

177

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

den made no reply to the gon-fire of the British, and,
the British desire to capture or destroy his vessel was
so great that they paid no attention to the fact that they
were in Chilian waters, the captain of the Dresden blew
up the magazine of the ship, thereby sinking her.

The point at which she sank was, by actual measure-
ment thereafter, determined to be under 400 yards from
the shore of the Island. The British made prisoners of
a portion of the crew; but, well knowing that their ac-
tion was a gross violation of international law, since the
capture was effected in the territory of a neutral power,
landed most of these prisoners at Valparaiso, in Chili, on
their arrival at that point.

On this violation becoming known to the Gk>vemment
of Chili, that government addressed a formal protest
against this violation of its territory and of its neutrality,
to the British government, which resulted on the 15th of
May in a full and complete apology by the British gov-
ernment for its violation of Chilian waters and for the
action of its naval officers. This of course disposed of
the matter as far as Chili was concerned, but did not re-
store the lives of the German sailors killed in the attack
on the Dresden, nor did it replace the Dresden in her
former position.

The pseudo sentimentalists who are so extremely fond
of criticizing every act of warfare of the Germans which
results in the death of non-combatants, or, in many cases,
of combatants, and who disturb the otherwise calm air
with their periodic shrieks of * ' murder, ' ' etc., might find
in the death of these German sailors an opportunity for
vehement denunciation of another power than Germany
should they so desire. It is probable, however, that that
power being the ** mother country,*' their extreme sense
of obligation and inferiority to that country will stifle
their natural impulse to hysteria.

During the rest of the month of March little happened
on the high seas. The British fleet continued to patrol
the North Sea and to guard the entrance of the Mediter-
ranean as far as possible, while the German main battle
fleet still remained in its harbors.

On April 11th Newport News again became the. center
of excitement on the arrival of another Gterman auxili-
ary cruiser, the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which had left New
York Harbor nearly eight months before, just after the
war broke out, since which time she had been cruising as
a commerce destroyer in the South Atlantic and else-

178

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

where, and had not touched at a single port. During the
course of this cruise she had destroyed fourteen enemy's
ships of various kinds, which ships, with their cargoes,
were estimated to be of a value exceeding $7,000,000.

On April 5th the Turkish cruiser, the Medjidieh, a
small vessel of 3432 tons which had been built in America
in 1903, struck a mine in the Black Sea, according ta
Russian reports, and was sunk.

On the 15th of April, following the example of the Eitel
Fritz, the captain of the Kronprinz Wilhekn also notified
the United States of his desire to have his vessel interned
for the remainder of the war, which was done.

Several minor actions took place about the middle of
April between hostile flotillas of destroyers and torpedo
boats off the Belgian coast, but the results of this fighting
are not very definitely known.

On April 29th France suffered her second heaviest na-
val loss during the war, when her armored cruiser Leon
Gambetta was torpedoed by an Austrian submarine, the
T7-6, in the Straits of Otranto, where this cruiser was
performing patrol duty with squadrons to which it was
attached, in order to prevent the Austrian warships from
coming out of the Adriatic. The Gambetta went to the
bottom rapidly, and of her crew of 600 men comparative*
ly few were saved. The Admiral of the squadron, her
captain and all her officers went down with her.

On May 1st a fight took place between a German and a
British fiotilla of destroyers in the North Sea, which, af-
ter several hours' combat, resulted in a victory for the
British flotilla, which sank two of the German destroy-
ers, themselves losing one.

A week later the Gfermans evened the score, sinking
a British destroyer off Zeebrugge, Belgium, and captur-
ing her crew.

On May 9th the Russians accomplished, or rather said
they had accomplished, a most marvellous feat, by sink-
ing with their Black Sea fleet two Turkish transports in
the Sea of Marmora. As this Black Sea fleet was never
doser to the northern entrance to the Bosphorous than
three or four miles, it becomes a little difficult to under-
stand how this fleet could have sunk vessels in the Sea of
Marmora, which is many miles to the south of that north-
em entrance. The Russian fleet did, however, sink a
number of Turkish merchant vessels in the Black Sea it-
self on this and succeeding days.

An Austrian destroyer squadron operated along the

179

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

Italian Adriatic coast about the middle of the month and
did considerable damage to the towns along the shore
besides sinking an Italian destroyer near Barletta.
Finally an indecisive combat between this flotilla and an
Italian squadron took place after which the Austrian flo-
tilla returned to its base.

On May 27th the British auxiliary cruiser, the Princess
Irene, blew up off Sheerness, in which disaster several
hundred men lost their lives. The explosion bears a
marked resemblance to that on the battleship Bulwark
on the first day of the year. The suggested reason in the
case of the Princess Irene, which was being employed as
a mine ship and on other analogous duty, was that the
careless handling of explosives was the cause of the dis-
aster.

An Austrian destroyer squadron operated along the
combat in the Adriatic on May 28th, the Austrians sink-
ing an Italian destroyer, while an Austrian submarine
fell a victim to the Italians.

In the early days of June an Italian squadron cruised
along the Austrian Dalmatian coast and besides destroy-
ing cables and lighthouses sank several Austrian mer-
chant vessels. Another Italian squadron of larger ves-
sels on June 6th and the two or three days following,
bombarded the railroad between Cattaro and Bagusa,
and shelled Montefaleone.

On the 11th of June a small Turkish cruiser sank a
Russian torpedo boat destroyer in the Black Sea.

Very little happened in the Baltic during the month
of May or in the early days of June, until June 4th when
the Russians beat off a fleet of German transports, which
with an escort of destroyers and small cruisers had at-
tempted to enter the Bay of Riga ; one of the transports
was sunk. The next day in the Middle Baltic an engage-
ment took place at long range between German and Rus-
sian squadrons, in which no very great damage was done.

A naval fight took place in the Adriatic on June 16th,
when an Austrian light sqaudron attacked the Italian
coast near the mouth of the Tagliamento River. Upon
being in its turn attacked by an Italian squadron, the
Austrian flotilla retired, and after a running fight suc-
ceeded in gaining the harbor of Pola. Monopoli was
shelled about this time by an Austrian destroyer.

An Italian squadron aided by some French ships be-
gan, about June 18th, a systematic bombardment of the
various Austrian islands on the Dalmatian coast and suc-

180

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

<ieeded in doing very considerable damage. Some of these
islands were afterwards occupied by Italian troops for a
time. Towards the end of June there were skirmishes
in the Baltic between German and Russian destroyers
with no particular results.

At the end of July a battle occurred between German
and Russian squadrons in the Baltic, between the Island
of Oeland and the Courland Coast. The Russian squad-
ron was both much larger in point of numbers than the
German and also contained heavier ships, so that after a
half hour's fight the German squadron sought refuge in
flight, losing one of their units, the mine layer Albatross,
which was wrecked by the Russian fire and beached by
her crew. The Russian squadron then sailed northward
and fell in with a German destroyer flotilla, of which,
after a brief battle, it sank one. In one of these actions
the Russians reported that they had sunk the German
battleship Pommern, but this subsequently turned out to
be one of those mistakes so prevalent in Russian bulletins,
induced probably by over enthusiasm.

On the 6th of July Italy, by proclamation of a block-
ade, closed the Adriatic to merchant vessels of all nations.

On July 7th the Italians suffered their first naval loss
of importance, when their armored cruiser Amalfi, built
in 1904, the largest and most modern of the Italian navy,
of this class, was torpedoed and sunk by a Austrian sub-
marine in the Adriatic, with considerable loss of life,
which was followed eleven days later by a like misfor-
tune to the armored cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi, in the
same sea. The Garibaldi, however, was a smaller vessel,
of 7350 tons displacement and considerably older, she
having been laid down in 1897.

The Koenigsberg, which, as my readers will remember,
took refuge in the Rufigi River, on the coast of Gterman
East Africa, and had forced her way so far up the
stream as to be out of the range of the guns of the Bri-
tish cruisers pursuing her (who drew too much water to
follow her) but which had been supposed to have been
destroyed thereafter by guns landed from these cruisers,
was actually destroyed. It appears that the attacks in
November and December upon her, were not successful
and that the Koenigsberg had managed to work her way
still further up the stream, in the channel of which she had
sunk a couple of merchant vessels which formed a barrier
between her and the British cruisers below her. In June,

181

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

the Eoenigsberg being still undestroyed and still in the
hands of the Germans, the British government sent the
monitors Severn and Mersey, which had been used there-
tofore in the bombardment of the Belgian coast, to the
east coast of South Africa, where they were joined by the
British warship Weymouth and an Australian cruiser.
The reason for sending these monitors there was that
they drew even less water than the Eoenigsberg and could
consequently go up the river to her position, without
diflSculty.

On July 4th the two monitors attacked the Eoenigs-
berg, while two other warships bombarded the shore po-
sitions which had been created for her defense. Several
days fighting took place, and the Eoenigsberg was finally
destroyed completely on July 11th.

From this time onward, while the general activities of
the several navies of the contending powers did not dim-
inish greatly, in patrolling, etc., but few actual combats
took place.

On July 26th a Oerman torpedo boat was destroyed by
the British off the Belgian coast; on which day the
French also lost the Marlotte, (a submarine) in the
Aegean, near the Dardanelles.

On August 9th the British lost the destroyer Lynx in
the North Sea, she striking a mine ; while the next day,
August 10th, the India, an auxiliary cruiser of 7900
tons, was blown up by the Germans off the Swedish
coast. The same day the old Turkish battleship, the Bar-
barossa, was torpedoed, or ii} reported to have been tor-
pedoed, by a British submarine near the Dardanelles,
and a few days later the Meteor, a German auxiliary
cruiser, on finding herself surrounded by the British,
ivas blown up by her crew ; earlier on the same day the
Meteor had sunk the English patrol boat, Bamsey, by
shelling.

In all of these latter catastrophies to vessels, there was
comparatively little loss of life. The larger warships, by
midsummer, had become thoroughly accustomed to sub-
marine attacks and adopted measures which appear to
have been more or less efficient in rendering their attacks
nugatory, and, as can be readily seen from the list of ves-
sels lost during the months of July and Augpist, with the
exception of the two Italian armored cruisers, there was
none of very great importance, and none whose loss
could not be readily supplied.

The main fleets of the contending nations distinguished

182

THE NAVAL WAR ON ALL SEAS

themselves by very prudently remaining within harbors
where they could be protected from submarine attacks*
The North of Scotland was the base for the British
fleet, and Eiel and the canal connecting it with the North
Sea, as well as Wilhelmshaven, the German bases.

Except for the Dardanelles, and at the entrance to
the Adriatic, the French Navy, during this period, was
not much in evidence, while the Italian Navy, after the
torpedoing of the Garibaldi, took no part whatever in
the active naval hostilities against Austria or the other
enemies of the Entente Cordiale. The naval fighting last
summer was a distinct disappointment to those who
hoped to see the question of the comparative efficiency
of the submarine against the battleship tested in action
and in fact, the naval events recorded during the last six
months may be said to be distinctly uninteresting, with
very few exceptions.

183

The Submarine Warfare

CHAPTEE XXIX

It may be well to review the causes which led Germany
to order her submarine fleets to attack British merchant
vessels.

On January 26, 1915, Germany adopted a measure of
conservation, for the civil population only, by means of a
company organized for such purposes, of all food stuflfs
in Germany. This company was authorized by the law
creating it to take over aU stocks of food anywhere in the
Empire in private hands, excepting a specified amount,
which amount varied with the particular food, and to
sell it to the people of the Empire in fixed quantities per
head. The government of Germany hoped, by this legis-
lation, to procure evenness of distribution in all parts of
the Empire, and also to control the prices of foods, and
to prevent an undue advance therein by private dealers.

Great Britain, immediately upon hearing that a gen-
eral policy of conservation had been adopted, and before
by any possibility the government of Great Britain could
have actually seen the legislation affecting the subject,
asserted, with characteristic disregard of the facts, that
this was a confiscation of the food stuffs in Germany for
military purposes ; whereas, in point of fact, none of the
food stuffs handled by the company above described were
to be used by the military authorities for any purpose.
However, the facts troubled the British government lit-
tle; the pretext was all that was wanted. This pretext
afforded, the British government placed all food stuffs
of any kind upon the list of contraband of war, and gave
orders to the vessels of her navy to seize the mercantile
marines of neutral countries proceeding to Germany with
cargoes of this character ; and, going further, ordered the
seizure of neutral ships proceeding to neutral ports with
such cargoes, unless the ultimate destination of such car-
goes was clearly proved not to be Germany or Austria.

This absolutely illegal and arbitrary action by Great
Britain was followed by the establishment of a blockade
of the waters adjacent to the British Isles, and the north

184

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

ern and western coasts of France, by Germany, on Feb-
ruary 4th, at which time Germany warned the neutral
powers that it was her intention to sink, without notice,
all British, French or Russian mercantile ships found
within that area after the 18th of February, 1915. And
this was followed by a proclamation, on the 24th of Feb-
ruary, including the Irish and North Channels and the
Orkney and Shetland Islands within the scope of the
blockade.

On March 1st Mr. Asquith announced in the House of
Commons that it was the intention and purpose of Great
Britain and France to cut Germany off from all trade
with all the rest of the world, and stated that the British
and French governments would, therefore, hold them-
selves free to detain and take into port ships, carrying
goods to presumed enemy destination or of enemy owner-
ship or origin. This is perhaps the most sweeping asser-
tion of national ownership of the seas ever made by Great
Britain. The neutral countries protested against these
acts, but with little result, as the chief neutral power
which possessed the means of making this protest effect-
ive did not use this means against the chief violator of the
rights of neutrals. Great Britain, but supinely, and ap-
parently designedly, acquiesced by implication at this
time, and subsequently, to the tortuous acts of the British
government, to the detriment of the agricultural, com-
mercial and maritime interests of its own people.

The month of March was largely occupied with these
various negotiations on the part of the neutrals to secure
the right to use the oceans. But, in the meantime, the
two principal adversaries continued their attack upon
each other ; and during the month several neutral vessels,
particularly the Swedish steamer **IIanna'' and the
Dutch steamer ** Media '^ were torpedoed by German sub-
marines.

Early in April the attack on British mercantile vessels
was extended by the Germans so as to include the traw-
lers which supplied fish to the British population; the
German argument being that as the British government
had inaugurated a campaign of starvation of German
civilian population, any measures that the Gterman gov-
ernment might take in attacking the food supply of the
British were, under the circumstances, justifiable.

Extreme activity of these submarines all around the
British coast continued during this month. It is impos-
sible in this narrative to do more than cite vessels of im-

185

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

portance sunk by the submarines, or those that gave rise
to international complications. A list, which is believed
to be reasonably complete, of all the vessels sunk by the
submarines, with the date of their sinking and their na-
tionality and tonnage, will be found in the appendix.

The losses suffered by their mercantile marine during
the opening days of this submarine campaign roused the
British to energetic action to grapple with this new peril
which was both a danger to their food supply and also
very destructive to their mercantile vessels; which de-
struction affected them the more inasmuch as there then
was, and still is, a considerable shortage of tonnage for
the British carrying trade, since vessels aggregating
many hundreds of thousands of tons, which originally
were engaged in commercial voyages, had been taken over
by the British government and its Allies for military
purposes of one kind and another, or were engaged in
carrying munitions of war at very high rates from the
United States to England, France and Bussia, and thus
as effectively withdrew from ordinary commercial uses,
as though they had been taken over for military pur-
poses by the governments themselves.

The British Channel was honeycombed with various
devices (more or less fanciful descriptions of which have
been, from time to time, given in the press) for the cap-
ture of submarines. These, however, as far as we can
judge, have not been particularly efficacious, and a tor-
pedo boat destroyer or an equivalently light vessel, heav-
ily-armed, is still the most potent foe of the submarine.

One distinguishing feature of the submarine is its ex-
treme vulnerability to gun-fire. Small two or three inch
guns, such as even the merchantmen had been in recent
months carr3dng, can send the largest and strongest sub-
marine to the bottom, owing to the peculiarities neces-
sary in her construction.

The rather fantastic and imaginary stories of nets,
snares, and other mechanical devices, which have been
said to have been efficacious in the British and Irish
Channels in destroying submarines, can be difionissed
without much comment. They either never existed or
they have almost totally failed in their object.

On May 7th the first important incident which caused
international complications took place. The famous Cun-
arder, Lusitania, sailed from New York for Liverpool
on the fiirst of May. Prior to its sailing, advertisements
in the principal newspapers of the United States had

186

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

been inserted by the German Embassy at Washington^
wherein Americans were warned that ^'travelers sailing
in the war zone in ships of Great Britain or their Allies
do so at their own risk." Comparatively little attention
was paid to these notices by the travelling public.

On May 7th the Lusitania was torpedoed by a German
submarine, said to be the XJ-39, a few miles off the Old
Head of Kinsale, Ireland, and sank about eighteen min-
utes after she was torpedoed. In addition to neutral pas-
sengers, the Lusitania carried 1500 tons of cargo, among
which were munitions of war which were destined for use
by Great Britain against Germany. About 1150 persons
were drowned on this occasion. Much excitement was
caused in the United States by this sinking, owing to the
fact that there were many American citizens on this ves-
sel. American opinion had previously been skilfully
excited by the Falaba, Gushing and Gulflight cases. Dip-
lomatic negotiations over this matter were entered into by
the President of the United States on the 13th of May,
and continued thereafter for some time.

During the rest of the month submarines continued to
destroy British merchant ships within the limits of the
war zone indicated by Germany's original proclamation,
in considerable numbers, and the British did everything
in their power to cause the cessation of these attacks.

In June and July the campaign continued and even
grew warmer. In this month occurred the most extra-
ordinary incident which had, so far, taken place in sub-
marine warfare, which was a battle between two submar-
ines, wherein one sank the other. This battle took place
on the 17th of June in the Adriatic. The Ital-
ian submarine Medusa was cruising under water
in the northern Adriatic when her captain con-
cluded to go to the surface, after first taking the custom-
ary observations through the periscope to satisfy him-
self that the waters were clear of any enemy. Within
a comparatively few feet of him was cruising an Austrian
submarine, of whose presence near the Medusa her cap-
tain was ignorant, as was the Commander of the Austrian
submarine of the fact that the Medusa was in the vicinity
of his vessel.

Shortly after the Medusa came to the surface, the cap-
tain of the Austrian submarine was also moved to emerge,
but on raising his periscope above the surface of the wa-
ter he discovered the Medusa was very near. To see, with
this Gaptain, was to act, and submerging again complete*

187

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

ly he immediately torpedoed the Medusa which was still
unsuspiciously cruising under the surface of the waters.

On the 19th of June the German Admiralty officially
announced that the submarine U-29, commanded by Capt.
Weddingen, which had been destroyed some weeks before
and which was the submarine which sank the Cressy and
her sister ships early in the year, had been rammed and
sunk by a British t^nk steamer flying the Swedish flag,
after the tanker had been ordered to stop.

"While the submarine warfare was carried on with great
vigor during this month, no other incidents of interna-
tional or general interest occurred.

On the 9th of July the Cunarder Orduna narrowly es-
caped from being sunk near Queenstown. A submarine
attacked her and missing her by only a few feet, after-
wards shelled her.

All through this month and the early part of August
the British continued to lose their merchant vessels in
considerable number, but they also claim that during this
period they sank or destroyed many of the German sub-
marines.

On August 13th the British transport, the Royal Ed-
ward, was torpedoed in the Aegean Sea, over one thous-
and men being lost ; and on August 19th the White Star
Liner, Arabic, was sunk near Fastnet on the Irish coast,
by a submarine. This incident also gave rise to diplo-
matic conversations between the United States and Ger-
many.

Much bitter feeling was aroused in Great Britain by
the adoption of the submarine campaign against her by
Germany, and in the early portion of the submarine cam-
paign it was proposed to deny the captured officers of the
crews of the submarines the honors of war ; Mr. Winston
Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, suggesting
this procedure. Full effect was given thereto, and the of-
ficers and crews of submarines were, for a few weeks,
treated as criminals and subjected to prison confinement
and prison discipline. On information of this procedure
reaching Germany, the German government picked out a
number of British officers among the British prisoners
of war in German hands, equal in numbers to the officers
and crews of submarines who were prisoners in the hands
of the English, who were deprived of the honors of war,
and applied to these British officers the same treatment.

After a few weeks, however, and just before Winston
Churchill fell from power in the Admiralty, at the time

188

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

of the British Cabinet crisis, Great Britain aban-
doned this policy as regards the treatment of
submarine prisoners, and the cause therefor having
ceased, Germany abandoned her policy of retaliation.

The question of the greatest interest in this entire sub-
marine campaign is how far did Grermany succeed in
carrying out her proposed object of interfering with the
free movement of munitions of war and of food stuflfs
from foreign countries to Great Britain in commercial
bottoms ? This question can only be, at the present time,
imperfectly answered, for the reason that we are not at
all certain that Great Britain has given a complete list
of all the ships belonging to her sunk by the Germans.

Taking the imperfect statistics that we have at our
disposal, however, and remembering the mercantile ton-
nage at the time of the declaration of war, we would
have, approximately, the following result:

At the time war broke out there were registered as be-
longing to the United Kingdom a total of 8510 sailing
vessels, with a net tonnage of 902,718 and 12,382 steamers
with a net tonnage of 10,992,073; or a general to-
tal of 20,892 vessels with a net tonnage of 11,894,791. Up
to the first of September the Germans had destroyed an
approximate total of 900,000 tons of the total tonnage
stated above; leaving 11,000,000 tons still available, ap-
parently, for Great Britain's commerce; but this avail-
ability is more apparent than true. Approximately 3,-
500,000 of this tonnage is being used by the British gov-
ernment for various purposes connected with the war,
the movement of troops, the carriage of supplies, etc.
etc. ; which only leaves about 7,500,000 tons available for
ordinary commercial purposes.

In ordinary years, in addition to her own tonnage, the
commercial interests of Great Britain drew to her ports a
gross tonnage of 63,790,257, of which Germany and Aus-
tria supplied 17,000,000, and the minor maritime powers
of the world the rest. But in the last year it is entirely
improbable that, owing to the submarine menace, and for
other reasons that the remaining tonnage was anything
like as much as it was the year before, and it is probable
that, in place of the 46,000,000 tons of that year, last year
did not see more than 35,000,000 tons, or a grand total
of about 55% of the ordinary tonnage aiding Great Bri-
tain to move her commerce. So that it may be concluded
at the present time, both directly by the vessels it de-
stroyed, and indirectly by the vessels it frightened away

189

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

from the coast, the submarine warfare conducted by Ger-
many has very materially injured the movement of muni-
tions, bread stuffs and manufactures to and from Great
Britain. This is borne out by the fact that ocean freights
in general, all over the world, have very materially ad-
vanced in the past year and indicate a great scarcity of
available tonnage for commercial purposes.

The maritime policy so successfuUy pursued by the Un-
ited States since the Civil War has resulted in the United
States possessing no mercantile marine, and this has re-
sulted in her suffering seriously in the last six months in
her power to transport her products, agricultural and
manufactured, to such foreign countries as she is still
permitted to have free commercial relations with, by
Great Britain.

It may be computed that the increase in freights paid
by the American exporter, or paid by the foreign im-
porter of American goods, in the last year alone, would
have paid for ten years of subsidy to American ship
owners, which would have enabled enough ships to be
built and operated under the American flag to avoid the
humiliating position as regards her mercantile marine
which the United States occupies to-day, and this money
would have remained, in its entirety, in American
pockets.

This, however, presupposes also that the United States
government would not have tacitly admitted that Great
Britahi owned the high seas.

190

The Aerial Warfare

CHAPTER XXX

It will be impossible, in a work of this character, to do
more than to describe the exploits of the airships during
the six months' period under consideration; leaving the
question of the merits of the respective types of air ma-
chines and of the value, from a military standpoint, of
air raids, to the technical writer. The first of these sub-
jects is highly technical and it does not seem as though the
experiences of the last few months have been sufSciently
ample to base a judgment as to the best type of air-craft
which is the type most efficient in inflicting material dam-
age on the enemy.

Regarded from the standpoint of scouting purposes
and of the obtaining of information, all of the various
types seem to be successful ; but regarded from the stand-
point of inflicting damage upon the fortifications and
military works of the enemy, as well as from the stand-
point of terrorization, the question is very open as to
which vehicle of aerial navigation produces the greatest
result.

This, necessarily, involves also omitting any discussion
of the questions raised by air raids on undefended towns.

On March 3rd the German aerial squadron bombarded
Warsaw, and on March 4th the French, in the same man-
ner, bombarded the German powder magazine at Bott-
weil. On March 5th several German machines operated
at Calais and in the surrounding districts.

On March 7th the French government issued an official
statement showing the activity of the French airmen dur-
ing the war, and, according to this, this branch of the
French military service had made over 10,000 aerial re-
connaissances up to that time, had been 18,000 hours in
the air, and had traveled more than 1,200,000 miles. This
report is interesting, as indicating the extent to which
the aircraft has been used in this war.

On March 9th a British aeroplane dropped bombs on
Ostend; and on the 12th German airmen bombarded
Osowiec, in northern Poland.

191

THE AERIAL WARFARE

On March 17th a German airship attempted to sink a
British coasting steamer, the Blonde, in the North Sea,
and unsuccessfully fired five bombs at her.

On March 18th Calais was again raided, and on March
20th Deal was also bombarded from the air.

On March 21st a Zeppelin raid was made upon Paris,
with slight damage. On March 23rd an attack was made
upon the British steamer Pandion at sea by an aeroplane,
and on the following day the British freighter Teal was
also bombarded in the same fashion. On that day, the
24th, the British made a raid on the Antwerp shipyards,
reporting that they had destroyed one German submarine
and damaged another.

On the 26th the French attacked Metz and were re-
ported to have killed three soldiers.

On March 27th and 28th the Germans raided Calais and
Dunkirk again, while on March 31st the Allies made one
of the largest raids, so far, in the war, in point of the
number of airships, on Thourout, Belgium, and killed
and wounded quite a number of German soldiers. The
same day the fortress of Ostrolenka, Poland, was attacked
by fifteen German aeroplanes which dropped over 100
bombs thereon.

April opened with an attack by the French and British
on Hoboken, a German submarine base near Antwerp,
and the next day the French attacked with a large squad-
ron the barracks and aeroplane hangars at Vigneulles
behind the German lines northeast of St. Mihiel, and a
joint fleet of British and French airships attacked Mul-
heim and Nurrenberg.

On the 4th the Germans attacked Nieukirk, near Ypres,
an unusual number of fatalities attending this raid. The
next day Mulheim was again attacked by the French.

On the 7th of April a squadron of Austrian aviators
attacked the town of Pedgoritza in Montenegro, damag-
ing many buildings and causing from sixty to seventy
casualties.

On the 13th the French made another raid on Vigneulr
les; and on the night of the 14th of April the Germans
made a night raid over the Tyne District of England,
but this raid was rendered nugatory owing to the fact
that the authorities were able to warn the inhabitants of
the region in time to plunge the whole country in dark-
ness, which baflBed the pilot of the Zeppelin.

On April 15th fifteen French aeroplanes attacked the
German military headquarters at Ostend, and on the

192

THE AERIAL WARFARE

same day another squadron bombarded Frieburg in
Briesgau and caused very numerous fatalities.

On the 16th the east coast of England was again at*
tacked early in the morning by two Zeppelins. Lowes-
toft in Kent, Maiden and Daganham, the latter place
about eleven miles from London, received the most atten-
tion; very little damage, however, resulted. The same
day a German raid on Amiens inflicted much damage
and many casualties. The French again raided Metz
and its environs, and the same day a combined British
and French fleet raided a number of the Rhine towns.

On the 17th of April Strassburg was bombarded by
the French, and Amiens by the Germans. Li both cases
there were a considerable number of fatalities.

On the 19th two French squadrons attacked the rail-
road along the Rhine, and bombarded the Mulheim and
Habsheim railroad stations. Mannheim was also bom-
barded.

On the 20th an aeroplane fight took place between two
French and British squadrons on the one side and a large
German squadron on the other, between Basle and M!i3-
hausen on the Rhine, which the German squadron won,
and drove the Allied squadron back to the west.

Bialystok, Russian Poland, was attacked the same day
by a German squadron, which dropped 100 bombs and
caused many fatalities and much material damage.

On the 21st of April, British aviators attacked Ghent.

For the next few days a comparative lull occurred, but
on the 26th of April the Germans again attacked Calais
with Zeppelins and caused many casualties. The next
day the British raided Belgian towns behind the German
lines while the French attacked Chambray and Arnavaille
and the Mauser rifle factory at Oberdorf .

On the 28th the Germans attacked Nancy and the Al-
lies Oberdorf, where there were many fatalities, and the
hangars of the dirigibles at Friedrichshafen, near Lake
Constance.

On April 30th another Zeppelin raid on England took
place ; most of the points attacked were in Suffolk, and
no casualties were reported.

The early part of May was comparatively quiet, though
every day minor raids took place. On the 9th, however,
the British raided the towns on that portion of the wes-
tern front in the immediate vicinity of Lille, and the
next day the Zeppelins raided the two English towns of
Westcliffe and Southend-on-Sea in Essex, but very little

193

THE AERIAL WARFARE

damage resulted. On the 17th Bamsgate, England, was
visited by the Zeppelins. Here, little damage was done.

On the 22nd of May bombs were again dropped on
Paris by Qerman aviators who disguised their aeroplane
as a French machine and were successful in pasdng
through the French air patrol in this manner.

On May 24th the Austrians raided Venice, Porto Cor-
sini, Ancona and Barletta, while the Qermans again visit-
ed Paris on the following day.

On the 26th of May Southend-on-Sea, in Essex,
was raided by Zeppelins for the second time, but little
damage resulted. The Allies raided the aerodrome at
Gtontrobe, near Ghent, this same day, with, it was report-
ed, a large number of casualties among the soldiers guard-
ing the aerodrome and the practical destruction of the
aerodrome itself.

On the 27th Ostend was raided by the Allies and it was
reported fifty soldiers were killed. A large fleet of French
aeroplanes attacked the important German manufactory
of explosives at Ludwigshafen.

On May 29th the Austrians attacked Venice, doing
some damage.

On May 31st London was again raided by night by the
Zeppelins, the casualties, however, being small.

On June 3rd a very large fleet, 29 in all, of French
aeroplanes attacked the headquarters of the German
Crown Prince and on the next day, June 4th, the east
and southeast coasts of England were again raided, the
same vicinities being attacked two days later when five
persons were killed.

On June 8th the Austrians again raided Venice.

On June, 15th Carlsruhe was raided by the Allies, with
many civilian casualties resulting.

On June 21st the Austrians again attacked Bari and
Brindisi ; and, on the 25th the station of Douai near Ar-
ras was attacked by the French; and the next day the
British attacked Roulers, Belgium, causing the explosion
of a large ammunition depot and the killing of a number
of German soldiers.

On the 27th the French again visited Friedrichshafen
in an effort to destroy the Zeppelin hangars.

On July 3rd Harwich, England, was raided by German
aeroplanes which also bombarded a British torpedo boat
destroyer; and ten days later a French squadron of 85
aviators attacked the railroad station of Vigneulles in the
east ; while another squadron, at the same time, bombard-

194

THE AERIAL WARFARE

ed the railroad stations in the vicinity of Idlle. The raid
on Yigneulles was repeated on the 19th.

On the 20th of July the French were very active ; one
squadron of 38 bombarded the railroad station of Con<
glaus, and a squadron of six bombarded Colmar,^ while
another squadron bombarded the railroad station of
Challerange, south of Vousiers.

On the 27th the Austrians attacked Verona with air-
craft ; but little damage was done.

On August 9th 28 French aeroplanes bombarded the
stations and factories of Saarbrucken, northeast of Metz.
The next day, the 10th, a large fleet of Zeppelins bom-
barded the English east coast.

On August 17th London was again raided ; about forty-
six persons were injured or killed.

On August 25th the Austrians bombarded Brescia ; 62
French aeroplanes bombarded Dillengen on the Bhine
and another large squadron, on August 26th, of French,
British and Belgian aeroplanes bombarded the Mont
Huest Forest.

On the 26th occurred the first hit by a bomb dropped
by an aeroplane upon a vessel. This feat was accom-
plished by the leader of a British Aeroplane Squadron,
Commander Bigsworth, who sank a German submarine
off the Belgian coast by dropping a bomb upon it, accord-
ing to the British official report. It is fair to say, how-
ever, that the Germans deny that this bomb sank the
submarine, although they admit it struck it.

On August 28th the German aeroplanes made another
attack upon Paris, but were repulsed. A combat in mid-
air took place between the attackers and the French de-
fending squadrons.

One result of the summer's campaign in aeroplane
fighting has been to show that the guns which were speci-
aUy devised for the bringing down of air-craft have, so
far at least, failed to fulfill the purposes for which they
are devised. Numerous types of this gun have been in-
vented and have been used extensively, particularly in
defending London, but the number of aeroplanes brought
down by their use has been remarkably small ; so gmall,
in fact, as to justify the statement that those guns are,
as a defense, almost disregardable. The best defense
against an air-craft raid seems to be the opposing of
defending aircraft to the attacking.

There have been many romantic incidents reported in
the papers of fights in mid-air, in which most thrilling

195

THE AERIAL WARFARE

and wonderful deeds of bravery have been reported to
have been done, but the larger portion of these are ap-
parently due to the fervent imagination of press corres-
pondents who are obliged to find exciting stories where-
with to regale their readers in order to justify their own
utility. No doubt great courage, coolness and bravery
have been shown in many cases by the aviators, but, like
most brave men, these are disinclined to talk; besides
which, the army regulations of moit of the contending
powers impose on them a discreet silence as to their
exploits.

196

Political History of Europe

CHAPTER XXXI

BEFORE THE WAR

Amoug the very important diplomatic documents
which have seen the light of day since the first volume of
this work was published are those which have been pub-
lished under the title of ** European Politics during the
decade before the war by Belgian Diplomatists. This
volume comprises the dispatches of the representatives of
Belgium at the three principal capitals of Europe in the
ten years before the war, and though not in point of time
dealing with the period primarily under consideration in
this volume, yet as they were not available at the time
the first volume was issued and as they are of great value
in casting light on the history of the period preceding the
war I have thought that some space could and should be
devoted to them here.

In reading the following extracts from this correspond-
ence it should be carefully borne in mind that they are
written by professional diplomatists of years standing,
actually on the spot where the events they narrate took
place, possessing through their diplomatic positions un-
paralleled access to the facts, and with the great advan-
tage of being completely detached from the consequences
of these facts, and of being completely unprejudiced in
regard to them.

Bearing these facts in mind it becomes most interesting
and most significant that these disinterested, informed
and competent observers all bear identical testimonies,
and arrive at similar convictions. Which conviction may
be briefly stated to be that Sir Edward Grey was for all
this period a deliberate and persistent conspirator against
the legitimate interests of Germany, whether they were
commercial, diplomatic, territorial, maritime, or politi-
cal.

Moreover, these documents fix on his shoulders — and
remember they are the records of the observations of ab-
solutely disinterested persons — ^the blame for the present
war largely.

197

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

The writers of most of these reports were Count de
Lalaing, Belgian minister to Great Britain, M. A. Leghait
and Baron Quillaume, Belgian ministers to France, Baron
Greindl and Baron Beyens, Belgian ministers to Berlin.
Very occasionally a report is cited written by a charge
d'affaires.

The first report is dated in February, 1905 and the last
on July 2, 1914, so that these reports cover very nearly
ten years.

These reports speak for themselves so that comment is
unnecessary.

London, February 7, 1905.

.... The enmity of the English public towards the
German nation is long standing. It seems to be based on
jealousy and fear; on jealousy, because of the economic
and commercial plans of Germany; on fear, in the
thought that British supremacy at sea, the only suprem-
acy to which England can lay claim, may one day be dis-
puted by the German fleet. This state of mind is being
fostered by the British press, regardless of international

complications.

• • • •

London, February 7, 1905.

.... But the chauvinistic spirit is spreading among
the English people, and the papers are slowly misleading
public opinion, which has already been influenced so far
as to think that Germany has no right to increase her
naval forces and that her naval budget constitutes a pro-
vocation for England.

« « « «

London, April 1, 1905

.... The visit of the Emperor to Tangiers has not
failed to evoke unfriendly articles in the press, which is
happy to have occasion to give vent to its ill-feeling to-
wards the sovereign of a country that is a commercial
rival of England, that wants to create for itself a navy of

the first order.

• • • •

London, April 1, 1905.

.... This British susceptibility in regard to Berlin
has existed for a long time, but it is not reassuring to
have to state that it is increasing instead of diminishing.

Ct. de Lalaing.

198

BEFORE THE WAR

Paris, May 7, 1905.
.... However that may be, the confidence which had
been re-established in the Franco-Qerman relations has
disappeared, and matters are back at the point where
they were about twenty years ago.

A. Leghait.

• • • •

Berlin, August 5, 1905.
.... The causes of the rivalry between England and
Germany are too profound to be ameliorated by declara-
tions of well-meaning people. The English are not wil-
ling that their commerce and power at sea should be
placed in jeopardy. The gigantic progress of Germany
is a perpetual menace to England, and she will not re-
frain from using any means in order to put a stop to

this expansion.

• • • •

Berlin, August 5, 1905.
.... Wherever England can cause Germany em-
barrassment she at once seizes on that occasion. Signifi-
cant in this connection is the unconcealed assistance
which the English lent to the rebels in German Southwest
Africa by acknowledging them as belligerents, and by
prohibiting the transit of foodstuffs and munitions for
the German troops through Cape Colony.

L. d'Ursel.

• • • •

Berlin, September 23, 1905.

.... For years a campaign has been conducted in the
English newspapers, headed by the National Review, in
favor of a rapprochement between England and Russia.
Since the conclusion of the Franco-English agreement,
French diplomacy has been making active endeavors in
this direction. According to persistent rumors the nego-
tiations are still progressing. Certain symptoms cause
me to believe that they demand the closest attention. I
have learned that the idea of putting a Russian loan on
the market in England is no longer rejected by the great
financiers at London. Only a short time ago the English
bankers would not have consented even to discuss such a
possibility.

Yesterday I asked Baron von Richthofen what was to
be thought of the rumors that were abroad. He replied
that there certainly existed in England a current favor-
able to a rapprochement with Russia, above all in the up-
per circles and in high places.

199

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

Berlin, September 23, 1905.

.... The Triple-Alliance under the leadership of
Germany has given ns thirty years of European peace.
It is now weakened by the state of disintegration in which
the Austro-Hungarian Empire finds itself. The new Tri-
ple Entente between France, England, and Russia could
not supplant it. It would, on the contrary, be a cause of

perpetual unrest.

• • • •

Berlin, September 30, 1905.

.... The general tone of the press campaign which
is being conducted in England shows that the rapproche-
ment with Russia is not desired from any pacific motives
but with hostile intentions against Germany. It is to be
feared that the King of England shares this sentiment.

Greindl.

« • « •

London, January 14, 1906.

.... As regards England she is whole-heartedly fav-
oring Prance ; as Sir E. Grey said in a speech : ** England
will do all in her power to improve her relations with
Germany, but this rapprochement is always dependent
on good terms between Germany and Prance."

Of late the Minister of Poreign Affairs has repeated at
various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited
in London that Great Britain had engaged herself to-
wards Prance in the Moroccan question and that she
would meet her obligations fully even in case of a Pranco-
German war and at all costs.

Van Grootven.
« • • •

Paris, March 6, 1906.

.... King Edward VII arrived in Paris on Saturday
evening and went to stay at the British Embassy. Besides
that, and this is the interesting point, he received M.
Loubet and M. Delcasse yesterday at luncheon.

This mark of courtesy towards M. Delcass6 at this mo-
ment is very much discussed. It is generally considered
as a very significant demonstration which is disconcerting
on account of the extent and the gravity of the conse-
quences which it may have.

If any doubts could still exist as to the intentions of
Great Britain they have been dispelled.

A. Leghait.
200

BEFORE THE WAR

Berlin, April 5, 1906.

.... It can no longer be doubted that it was the King
of England who, without sanction of the government,
drove M. Delcasse into a bellicose policy and who gave
him the promise, which he could not have kept, to land
100,000 British soldiers in Holstein.

The invitation extended by the King to M. Delcass6 at
the time of his passage through Paris can only be inter-
preted as a provocation.

IF ANY DOUBT COULD STILL HAVE EXISTED
THE SINGULAR STEP TAKEN BY COLONEL BAR-
NARDISTON WITH GENERAL DUCARNE WOULD
HAVE DISPELLED IT.

There really is in England a court policy beside and

independent of that of the responsible Ministry.

Greindl.
• • • •

Berlin, July 16, 1906.

.... What has transpired of the recent pourparlers
is such as to confirm this suspicion. According to the
Morning Post, England and Russia propose an under-
standing in order to give their consent to the construction
of the Mesopotamian railway, on the condition that Rus-
sia be authorized to link her Caucasian railway to it and
that England gain control of the new line from Bagdad
to the Persian Gulf. Such an agreement, if it really
should be concluded, would be the acme of impudence.
The Sultan is an independent Sovereign ; he gave the con-
cession for the railway in Mesopotamia to a German bank.
No foreign Power has the right nor even the feeblest pr*i
text to interfere in this entirely internal affair of Turkey.
Yet the plan exists. Lord Lansdowne recently declared
in the House of Lords that in 1903 he tried without suc-
cess to internationalize the Bagdad railway, and ever
since its beginning England has sought to thwart that
enterprise.

She endeavored to put her hand on Koweit, the only
natural terminal port for the line unless an artificial and
probably poor harbor be created at great expense in the
swamps of the Shatt-el-Arab.

She at least favored the insurrection of the Arabs by

supplying arms and munitions to the insurgents.

Greindl.
• • • •

London, February 8, 1907.
.... United in their sentiment of ill-will towards Em-

201

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

peror William, on the eve of the recent elections in Ger-
many the British public counted on a victory of the op-
position and on the triumph of the socialistic elements —
one might even say that the public,without distinction of
parties, was hoping for such a result. Even the Conserva-
tive press, in spite of its pronounced antagonism to
socialism, announced with ill-disguised satisfaction that
the Social Democrats were going to put a check on the
Imperial policy, interior as well as colonial. The Liberal
and the Radical papers prophesied that the attempts at
a personal regime, which were a danger to European
peace, would be branded by the German nation at the
polls, and that at last events would cause the Emperor
and his too complaisant Chancellor to think. As regards
the English socialists their confidence in the success of
their German comrades was complete.

^1 ^ ^1 ^ Count de Lalaing.

Berlin, February 9, 1907.

.... I have been greatly surprised to see that serious
newspapers abroad are attributing a bellicose meaning to
the short address which the Emperor made on the even-
ing of February 5th to the crowd which came to give him
an ovation when the main results of the polling had be-
come known. I had the honor to send you the text of
that address in my report of the day before yesterday.
Nobody here has thought of interpreting the words of his
Majesty in the sense of a threat directed against foreign
Powers. The habitual style of the Emperor is too well
known for people to be under any misapprehension as
to the import of his speeches. Nor is it right to doubt the
sincerity of His Majesty's pacific intentions. He has
furnished sufficient proof of them during a reign of
eighteen years.

It seems to me that people abroad, too, ought to know
what to believe in this matter. I question myself also as
whether the alarm displayed is quite genuine. Is it not
rather the continuation of that campaign of vilification
undertaken years ago in the press of Paris, London, and
St. Petersburg, and in which during the last weeks the
Temps, the semi-official organ of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, has particularly distinguished itself t

• • • • Greindl.

Paris, February 10, 1907.
.... The Sovereigns of England left Paris yesterday
to return to London.

202

BEFORE THE WAR

Paris, February 10, 1907.
.... In his conversations with M. Cl^menceau and
the Minister of War the King emphasized the necessity

of keeping strong the forces of Prance on land and at sea.

• • • •

Paris, February 10, 1907.

.... The fact can hardly be glanced over that these

tactics, outwardly intended to avoid war, threaten to lead

to considerable displeasure at Berlin, and to provoke the

desire to try everything in order to extricate Germany

from the grasp in which she is held by the English policy.

• • • •

Paris, February 10, 1907.
.... It is realized here so well that France is in a
delicate situation and has been dragged into a dangerous
game, that all the semi-official organs and other serious
papers are keeping silent on this occasion and that none
of them dares to show pleasure in this new demonstra-
tion of English friendship.

A. Leghait

• • • •

Berlin, March 28, 1907.
.... French arrogance is becoming again what it was
during the worst days of the second Empire and the
cause of this is the entente cordiale. It has increased still
more since it appears that the negotiations between Lon-
don and St. Petersburg, to which without doubt France

has not been a stranger, are going to lead to an entente.

• • • •

Berlin, April 8, 1907.
.... The telegram adds that it was not quite clear
what concession France could make to Germany in the
matter of the Bagdad railway. This railroad would be
built some day and Germany was nowise in a hurry, as
seemed to be believed. Besides, the construction of the
railway was a Turkish affair which concerned Germany
only in so far as the concession had, in a legitimate man-
ner, been given to a financial group in which German
capital was predominant.

Thus you perceive. Sir, that France is making preten-
sions as in 1870, to a right of intervention in affairs
which are in no way her concern, and she imagines that
she possesses a right of veto over agreements concluded
between independent Powers.

We have recently had our own experiences, to our cost,
of this return to the traditions of the second Empire, or

203

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

rather of the general French policy. Every time in the
course of history when France thought herself strong she
has tried to arrogate to herself supremacy over the whole
world. Now it is the entente cordiale with England that
gives her this confidence.

Instances are accumulating. You know that Denmark
is absolutely a free-trade country. Her custom duties
are purely fiscal. She proposes to lower them still more,
and in order that the revenues of her treasury do not suf-
fer therefrom, she proposes to raise the duty on wines,
but only in a very moderate degree. Nothing is more
justified. Wine is an article of luxury and it is just to
demand from the well-to-do classes a sacrifice destined to
increase the general welfare. I learn indirectly, but from
an absolutely reliable source, that the French Minister at
Copenhagen has nevertheless approached tlie Danish Gov-
ernment with representations formulated in an imperious
tone and accompanied by threats of reprisals. The French
procedure is all the more unusual as Denmark is bound
to France by no treaty and the French customs tariff im-
poses a prohibitive duty on agricultural products which
form the only Danish articles of export.

What has happened in Brussels, Berlin, and Copen-
hagen are perhaps not isolated cases. It is probable that
elsewhere, also, France has reverted to her old conduct of
not respecting her obligations when they annoy her and

of demanding subservience to her will everywhere.

• • • •

Berlin, April 18, 1907.

.... The visit which the King of England is to make
to-day to the King of Italy at Gaeta does not reveal any-
thing either. Italy's understanding with England and
France is also a fact, in spite of the Triple Alliance. It
dates from the day when Italy came to an agreement with
these Powers in the matter of the division of interests in
the Mediterranean. If this understanding had not ex-
isted before, it would have come about of its own accord,
when the entente cordiale between France and England
was concluded. How could Italy in case of a conflict de-
fend her extensive coast against the combined British and
French fleets? And what could her German and Austro-
Hungarian allies do to protect her?

This zeal in uniting Powers, whom no one is menacing,
for alleged purposes of defense, can with good reason seem
suspicious. The offer of 100,000 men made by the King
of England to M. Delcass6 cannot be forgotten in Berlin.

204

BEFORE THE WAR

We ourselves have to record the singular overtures made
by Colonel Bamardiston to General Ducame and who
knows if there have not been other similar intrigues
which have not come to our knowledge t

Greindl.

• • • •

Berlin, June 8, 1907.
.... As Count de Lalaing rightly says, the King of
England is personally directing a policy, the ultimate aim
of which is the isolation of Germany. His action corres-
ponds with the sentiments of the nation, misled by an un-
scrupulous press, the sole interest of which consists in a
large circulation and which is therefore only anxious to
flatter the passions of the populace. It is not only the
cheap papers that lower themselves to such a part. For
years the Times has pursued a campaign of vilification
and slander. Its Berlin correspondent, who has every op-
portunity to be well-informed, nourishes the hatred of the
English against the Germans by imputing to the Imperial
Government ambitious schemes the absurdity of which is
self-evident, and by accusing it of shady manoeuvres of
which it has never thought. Nevertheless, the English
public believes in them without wincing, because these
inventions correspond with its prejudices. How could
the anti-German current be turned by the very small
group of more conscientious and more clear-sighted
writers t The great majority of the English
journalists who accepted the hospitality of Germany be-
long without a doubt to this select group. One has been
preaching to converts.

Greindl.

• • • •

Berlin, January 27, 1908.

.... Where has M. Delcass^ seen Germany endeavor-
ing to impose her supremacy on other nations t We are
her close neighbors, but for twenty years I have never
observed in the Imperial Government the slightest desire
to abuse its strength and our weakness. I wish that all
the other Great Powers had used the same consideratiou

towards us.

• • • •

Berlin, January 27, 1908.

.... Under what circumstances t When was the peace
of Europe menaced except by the French ideas of re-
venge t

206

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

Berlin, May 30, 1908.
The Triple Alliance has yarded the peace of the world
for thirty years, because it was directed by Germany,
who was content with the political partition of Europe.
The new grouping menaces peace because it is composed
of Powers which desire a revision of the status quo so
much that they have quelled the hatred of centuries in

order to bring about the realization of that desire.

• • • •

Berlin, June 12, 1908.

.... The real thoughts of the Powers banded together
by England in order to isolate Germany are not to be
found either in the speeches of the Sovereigns or in the
articles of the semi-official or inspired papers. Their real
aims are so far removed from their conventional lan-
guage that they cannot avoid betraying them by indis-
cretions. If one wishes to know them it is only necessary
to read the admonition addressed by Le Temps to the
King of Sweden. The Paris paper considers the friendly
sentiments manifested by His Majesty for Germany as
an offense against Bussia, of which Prance has to bear
the consequences. « • • •

Berlin, March 31, 1909.

.... The state of mind which prevails in England re-
calls that which existed in France from 1866 to 1870. At
that period the French believed that they had the right
to prevent Germany from re-establishing her unity, be-
cause they believed that it constituted a menace to the
preponderance on the Continent which Prance had been
enjoying until then. In the same way the refusal [of
Germany] to bind herself by treaty to be at the mercy
of England is considered in London to-day an unfriendly
act and a menace to peace.

Berlin, April 17, 1909.

.... Germany and Austria-Hungary are retaining,
or rather tolerating, Italy in the Triple Alliance because
her official withdrawal would mean a loss of prestige,
and also because in it is seen the chance of not having
her for an adversary in the case of a conflict. But that
is all that is hoped of her.
is hoped of her. • • • •

Berlin, March 3rd, 1911.

Quite recently, the President of the French Senate,
when handing the peace prize to M. d'Estoumelles de
Constant in the presence of a numerous audience and

206

BEFORE THE WAR

under solemn circumstances, spoke more openly of the
** revanche" than has been done for years.

The French press warmly applauded the measures ta-
ken in the matter of the Muidung fortifications. What
M. Pichon is blamed for is not that he embarked rather
thoughtlessly on this adventure, but that he failed in it.

The French papers daily discover reasons for imputing
some wrong or other to Qermany. That has become a
habit, but recently the movement has doubled its energy.

It would seem that M. Delcasse was called into tiie
Cabinet in consideration of this state of the public mind.
The Foreign Affairs were not entrusted to him; that
would have been a provocation, but everything was done

that was possible without smashing the windows.

• • • •

Paris, March 4th, 1911.
.... I also learn that in Germany along the French
frontier a regular propaganda is incessantly being car-
ried on in order to cause desertions from the Imperial
army for the benefit of the Foreign Legion.

Berlin, March 20th, 1911.
.... The speech of Sir Edward Grey did not confine
itself to empty phrases, as on previous occasions. It was
accompanied, or rather preceded, by action. For years
the English press has made the arrogant pretension to
control and even to interdict the completion of the Bag-
dad railway, that is to say to put her hand on an enter-
prise which concerns only Turkey, the company to which
the concession was granted, and indirectly the German
Government which supported the latter.

Paris, July 2nd, 1911.
.... It cannot be disputed to-day that the attitude of
the Government of the Eepulic has caused or at least
made possible the landing of the Spanish at Larache and
the despatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir.

• • • •

Paris, July 8, 1911.
.... The chances to come to an understanding with
Germany will be much smaller if England takes part in

the conversations.

• • • •

London, July 8, 1911.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Asquith is emphasiz-
ing the new situation which might affect the interests of
England in a more direct manner. The thought that
Agadir might in certain contingencies become a naval

207

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

base for the German fleet is apt to cause anxiety to the
Government of the United Kingdom.

The press recalls that if Great Britain had waived her
interests in Morocco in favor of France, it was because
the Bepublie on her part gave England a free hand in
Egypt, but tiiiat England never thought of allowing Ger-
many to get a footing in Morocco.

• • • •

Paris, July 24, 1911.
.... For those, however, who admit that France went
to Fez without serious reason, the fact is dear that she
will hardly go out of Fez, or will see herself compelled to
go back there again and that she thereby has violated the
spirit of the act of Algeciras. If Germany in face of these
&cts claim a '' compensation," it means that she does not
propose to make France draw back and that she has for
her part no intention of establishing herself in Agadir
but she thinks that the Government of the Bepublie has
disturbed a balance of forces which had been agreed upon
and that she is demanding her share.

• • • •

Paris, July 28, 1911.

.... Germany cannot make war on account of Mor-
occo nor in order to obtain the additional compensations
which she is claiming by reason of France's acquisition
of a more or less definite foothold at Fez.

I have on the whole less confidence in the desire for
peace of Great Britain who rather enjoys seeing the
others devouring one another. But in the present case it
would be difficult for her — ^if not impossible — ^not to in-
tervene ^'manu militari."

Yet England's internal situation is at present very pre-
carious and the Liberal party is in power.

As I have thought from the first day the situation cen-
ters in London. There alone can it become grave. The
EVench will give way on all points in order to have peace.
It is different with the English who will not be found wil-
ling to compromise on certain principles and demands.

• • • •

London, November 18, 1911.
.... When I returned to my post last September I
learned from various sources that some weeks before that
time the political situation had been considei^d so grave
that the British Government thought it necessary to take
extraordinary precautions. I was informed through reli-

208

BEFORE THE WAR

able sources that the officers of the active army had sud-
denly been called back from their furloughs, that horses
had been bought for the cavalry, and that the North Sea
squadron had immediately been put on war footing.

• • • •

London, November 28, 1911.
.... German version. This may be summed up in a
few words: on June 30th, Germany informed the signa-
tory Powers of the Algeciras Act of the despatch of the
'* Panther" to Agadir for the protection of German sub-
jects threatened by natives. The Imperial Government
aimed at no territorial conquest. On July 21st, Sir Ed-
ward Grey demanded of Count von Mettemich an ex-
planation for the continued presence of the vessel in the
Moroccan port, adding that if the Franco-German nego-
tiations should fail, ^e Agadir question would become
acute and demanding that England take part in the ne-
gotiations. The German demands seemed to be unaccept-
able to France.

• • • •

London, November 28, 1911.
.... For the rest. Sir Edward Grey said that there
was no secret treaty with France.

• • • •

.... Sir Edward Grey spoke the truth when
he said that he was willing to do everything in
his power in order to improve the relations between Ger-
many and England. The present friendships of Great
Britain to which he intended to remain faithful did not
prevent him from contracting new ones. Far from trying
to disturb the recent negotiations between Gtermany and
Prance he was very glad of the success attained. He un-
derstood Germany's need of expansion and had no inten-
tion to thwart her. He even indicated the region in which
Germany 's colonial activity could take place. England had
no plans for extending her possessions in Africa. (Is it
proposed to barter our colonies away according to the
principles of the new international law as practised at
London and unfortunately elsewhere too? Morocco,

Tripolis, Persia.)

• • • •

Berlin, December 6, 1911.
.... Thus he makes a rapprochement with Germany
conditional on the inclusion of his French and Russian
friends, as if it were not notorious that no French Gov-

209

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

eminent would dare to lend itself to such an attempt
which public opinion in Prance would repudiate.

• • • •

.... Sir Edward Grey in qualifying the alarm shown
on the continent as * Apolitical alcoholism" tried with a
word play to pass over the embarrassment which the rev-
elations of Captain Faber are causing him; but he did
not deny their correctness as he would certainly not have
failed to do if he had been able to. His silence is equiva-
lent to a confirmation. In default of other information
it must be considered as an established fact that the plan
has been discussed in London of aiding France in a war
with Grermany by landing an English corps of 150,000
men. There is nothing in this which ought to surprise us.
It is the continuation of the singular proposals which
were made a few years ago to General Ducame by Col-
onel Bamardiston, as weU as of the Flushing intrigue.

Was it not also claiming a right of veto against Ger-
many's enterprises when a hue and cry was raised be-
cause a German cruiser had cast anchor on the roadstead
of Agadir, whereas England had not moved a muscle
when watching the progressing conquest of Moroccan
territory by Prance and Spain and the overthrow of the
Sultan's independence?

England could not do otherwise. She was bound by
her secret treaty with France. The explanation is very
simple but is not such as to assuage German irritation.
Prom this it follows that at the same moment when the
act of Algeciras was being signed, at least three of the
Powers who participated were contracting obligations
among themselves which were incompatible with their

public promises.

• • • •

Berlin, December 9, 1911.
.... What is most apparent from the speech of Sir
Edward Grey is that he wishes to continue the policy of
the Triple Entente in the spirit in which he has practiced
it until now, — ^that is to say — in a spirit hostile to Ger-
many.

• • • •

Berlin, December 9, 1911.
.... There is no more harmony between the peoples
than there is between the Governments. The English
continue to be jealous of Germany's expansion. The Ger-

210

BEFORE THE WAR

mans, who six months ago were by no means hostile to

England, have become so now.

• • • •

Berlin, October 18, 1912.
.... It was not the fault of the Imperial Government
that the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina found no better solution in 1909. The Grer-
man Government caused the offer to be made to the Cab-
inet of Paris of a concerted action at Petersburg in order
to induce Russia to change her attitude. This collabora-
tion having been declined by M. Pichon, the Cabinet of
Berlin decided to make the demarch, which is known,
single-handed. I think it is useful to reestablish the truth
on this historical point, which I learned recently at the

French Embassy.

• • • •

Berlin, October 24, 1912.
.... The Ambassador of France, who must have spe-
cial reasons for saying so, has repeatedly told me that the
greatest danger for the maintenance of European peace
consists in the lack of discipline and in the personal pol-
icy of the Russian agents abroad. They are almost with-
out exception ardent Pan-Slavists, and to them the re-
sponsibility for the present events must be attributed to
a great extent. They will, that cannot be doubted, se-
cretly instigate their country to intervene in the Balkan

conflict.

• • • •

Berlin, November 30, 1912.
.... There is no doubt that the Emperor, the Chan-
cellor, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are

passionately pacific.

• • • •

Berlin, November 30, 1912.
. . . . M. Sassonov has given up struggling against the
Court party, which wants to draw Russia into a war, al-
though the Russian Empire is undermined by the revolu-
tion and its military preparations are still insufficient.

• • • •

Paris, February 14, 1913.
.... The new President of the Republic is at present
enjoying a popularity in France such as has been un-
known to his predecessors. Only to mention the last two,
the election of M. Loubet was rather badly received by
the public and that of M. Fallieres caused only indiffer-
ence.

211

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

Paris, February 14, 1913.

.... This popularity is caused by various elements:
his election has been ably prepared; it is realized that
during his ministry he managed adroitly to bring France
to the fore in the European concert ; he used a few happy
phrases which left an impression. But above all one
must see in this a manifestation of that old French
chauvinism which had disappeared for long years but has
gained fresh force since the incidents of Agadir.

M. Poincare is from Lorraine and misses no occasion
to mention it. He was the collaborator and originator of
M. Millerand's militarist policy. Finally, the first word
which he pronounced on hearing of his electioin to the
Presidency of the Republic was the promise to watch
over the maintenance of all means of national defense.

• • • •

Paris, February 19, 1913.
.... The Minister does not consider the measures
taken by Germany as a hostile step, but as a precaution-
ary measure for the future. Gtermany feared to find her-
self in a confiict with Russia and France, and perhaps
also with England, at a time when the help which Aus-
tria might lend her would be very much restricted by the
Dual Monarchy's necessities in resisting the group of

the Balkan States.

• • • •

Paris, February 21, 1913.
.... The news of the impending nomination of M.
Delcasse as Ambassador at Petersburg burst here yester-
day afternoon like a bomb. The papers reported it at the
same time with the text of the message of the President

of the Republic.

• • • •

Paris, February 21, 1913.
Here lies the danger of M. Poincare 's presence at the
Elys6e in the troubled times through which Europe is
passing at present. It was under his ministry that the mil-
itarist and slightly chauvinistic instincts of the French
people awoke. His hand could be seen in this change.

• • • •

Paris, March 3, 1913.
.... I am not in a good position here to fathom Ger-
man public opinion ; but I observe every day how public
sentiment is daily growing more distrustful and more
chauvinistic in France.

212

BEFORE THE WAR

Everyone you meet assures you that an early war
with Germany is certain, inevitable. It is regretted but
must be accepted. The demand is that all measures
capable of increasing the defensive power of France be
voted immediately and almost by acclamation. The most
reasonable people maintain that it is necessary to arm
up to the teeth in order to frighten the enemy and pre-
vent war.

• • • •

Paris, March 3, 1913
.... Last night I met M. Pichon, who repeated to
me those same words: it is necessary to arm more and

more to prevent war.

• • • •

Berlin, March 18, 1913.
.... In this they are also encouraged by the ambigu-
ous attitude of Russia. The representatives of the Bal-
kan States at Berlin are to-day no longer making any
secret of the close ties which have never ceased to exist
between their Governments and the Cabinet of St. Peters-
burg. The latter alone was informed about the alliance
concluded between them and they did not march before
they had Russia's approval. Russian diplomacy is, as it
were, holding that of the allies in leash. From Russia
they receive their instructions, from Russia they will
take their orders. But Russian diplomacy itself has
varied much since the beginning of the hostilities. When
in a communicative mood, the French Ambassador at
Berlin did not conceal from me how little one could count
on the brilliant but changeable mind of the politicians
who conduct the Empire allied to France, for they were
playing a double game even with the latter. M. Cambon
complained in particular at various times, of the influence
which M. Iswolski stiU retained, because he was pursuing
a policy of personal revenge against Austria-Hungary
and would endeavor to spoil the game whenever she
would seem to be on the point of winning it.

• • • •

BerUn, April 4, 1913.

The incident of Scutari is, no doubt, the gravest

from the European point of view that has happened
since the outbreak of the Balkan hostilities. It can be
easily understood that the King of Montenegro persists
in his resistance to the demands of Austria-Hungary and
the pressure of the Powers. He is running the risk of
losing his crown through his military failures, and has

213

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

no chance to keep it in the face of an internal re-
volution which will, be the probable consequence of the
despair of his subjects, unless they come to regard him
as a victim of Austro-Hungarian policy. But he can-
not continue the siege of Scutari without the co-operation
of the Serbs. The arrogance and contempt with which
the latter are receiving the complaints of the Cabinet
of Vienna can only be explained by the support which
they expect to find in St. Petersburg. The Servian
Charge d 'Affairs here said recently that his Government
would not have proceeded as it did for six months, re-
gardless of the Austrian threats, if it had not been en-
couraged by the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, a
diplomat of M. Iswolski's school. It must be admitted
that the events have, so far, justified the adventurous
audacity of thie Cabinet of Belgrade.

It cannot be doubted that Paris is tired of these tergi-
versations, but France submits, though cursing them, to
the consequences of the alliance and allows herself to be

drawn along a path which may lead to a general war.

• • • •

Paris, April 16, 1913,
.... But these facts will doubtless show also — as I
have repeatedly had the honor of reporting to you — that
the public mind in France is becoming more and more
chauvinistic and imprudent. Measures should be taken
to stop this current which the Government has actually
been encouraging since the incidents of Agadir and the
accession of the Poincar^-Millerand-Delcasse Cabinet.

The Journal of this morning publishes in this con-
nection an article by Victor Margueritte, entitled : * * To
the frontier," to which I take the liberty of drawing your
attention.

• • • •

Paris, June 12, 1913.

Thus it is certain to-day that provisions are going to
be introduced in the French legislature which the coun-
try will probably not be able to bear for a great length
of time. The burdens of the new law will be so heavy
for the population, the expenditure which it involves so
exorbitant, that the country will soon protest, and France
will be confronted with this alternative: renunciatioii
which will be insufferable to her, or war within a short
time.

The responsibility of those who have brought the coun-
try to this pass will be heavy. The people are following

214

BEFORE THE WAR

them in a sort of madness, in a frenzy which is interest-
ing but lamentable. It is forbidden to-day, on pain of
being considered a traitor, to utter the slightest doubt
of the necessity for the adoption of the three years'
service. Everybody realizes that the nation as such is
far from being in favor of the reform which is in pre-
paration; everybody comprehends the danger which
threatens the future ; but one closes one 's eyes and goes
on.

The propaganda in favor of the three years' law by
which chauvinism was to be reawakened was admirably
prepared anl conducted ; at the outset it helped the elec-
tion of M. Poincare to the Presidency of the Republic ;
it is still pursuing its work, heedless of the dangers
which it entails ; great uneasiness prevails in the country.

• • • •

Paris, January 16, 1914.
.... I have already had the honor to tell you that
it was MM. Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand, and their
friends who invented and followed the nationalistic, mili-
taristic and chauvinistic policy, the revival of which
we are witnessing. It is a danger for Europe — and for
Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril which is menac-
ing the peace of Europe to-day ; not that I have the right
to suppose that the Government of the Republic intends
to disturb it deliberately — I am rather inclined to be-
lieve the contrary — ^but because the attitude which the
Barthou Cabinet has assumed is in my opinion the princi-
pal cause of the growth of militaristic tendencies in Ger-

many.

• • • •

Paris, January 16, 1914.
. . . . M. Cailloux, who is the real Prime Minister, is
known for his sentiments in favor of a rapprochement
with Germany ; he knows his country thoroughly and is
aware of the fact that aside from the political leaders, a
handful of chauvinists and people who do not dare to
declare their thoughts and their preferences, the major-
ity of the French, of the peasants, merchants, and man-
ufacturers, are bearing only with impatience the exces-
sive expenses and personal burdens which have been im-
posed on them.

• • • •

Paris, March 10, 1914.
.... It is not a secret to anyone that the fall of the
Barthou cabinet was very painful to the President of

215

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

the Republic who did not mistake its meaning, under-
standing perfectly that his own person was involved.
The necessity under which he found himself, owing to
the defection of several politicians on whom he had
believed he could count, to entrust the power to M. Cail-
laux while nominally investing M. Doumergue with it,
put him very much out of humor. He had a strong dis-
like for the personality of the Minister of Finance whose
worth, but also all of whose weaknesses, he knows. He
saw in that necessity a check for the military and
nationalistic policy which he has systematically followed
from the day when he was placed at the head of the
Government as Prime Minister.

Together with MM. Delcasse, Millerand, and several
others, he preached incessantly the political and military
rehabilitation of France, in conjunction with the closest
and most intimate relations with Russia. He went to
St. Petersburg as Prime Minister ; he will go there again
in a few months as President of the Republic.

He recently sent M. Delcasse to whom he entrusted
the mission of endeavoring by all possible means to exalt
the benefits of the Franco-Russian alliance, and to in-
fluence the great Empire to increase its military pre-
parations.

• • • •

Berlin, April 24, 1914.
.... For us, the most interesting point in connection
with the visit of the Sovereigns of Great Britain is to
know whether the British Government would be as in-
clined to-day, as three years ago, to range itself by the
side of France in the case of a conflict of the latter with
Germany; we have had the proof that a co-operation of
the British army and the despatching of an expeditionary
corps to the Continent have been considered by the mili-
tary authorities of the two countries. Would it be the
same to-day and would we still have to fear the entry
of British soldiers in Belgium in order to help us de
fend our neutrality by flrst compromising it?

• • • •

Paris, May 8, 1914.
.... It cannot be denied that the French nation has
become more chauvinistic and more self-confldent during
the last few months. The same well-informed and com-
petent people who, two years ago, showed lively appre-
hension at the mere mention of possible difficulties be-
tween France and Germany, have changed their tone to-

216

BEFORE THE WAR

day. They say they are certain of victory; they make
much of the progress, which is undeniable, made by the
army of the Republic, and they say they are sure that
at least they will be able to hold the German army in
check long enough for Russia to mobilize her army, to
concentrate her troops, and to throw herself on her west-
em neighbor.

• • • •

Paris, May 8, 1914.
.... An experienced and high diplomat said re-
cently: **If a grave incident were to occur one of these
days between France and Germany, the statesmen of the
two countries would have to exert themselves to have
it peaceably settled within three days or there will be

war."

• • • •

Paris, June 9, 1914.

.... The press campaign in faVor of the three years'
law was extremely violent during these last days. All
means were tried to influence public opinion and it was
even wanted to compromise the person of General Joffre.
The French Ambassador at Petersburg has also, contrary
to all custom, taken an initiative which is rather danger-
ous for France's future.

Is it true that the Cabinet of Petersburg imposed on
France the adoption of three years' law, and that it is
to-day using all its weight in order to secure its main-
tenance ?

I have not been able to obtain any light on this delicate
point, but it would be all the graver because the men
who guide the destinies of the Empire of the Czar must
know that the effort which is thus being demanded of
the French nation is excessive and cannot be sustained
for any length of time. Should the attitude of the Cab-
inet of St. Petersburg be based on the conviction that
the events are sufficiently near at hand to use the tool
which it intends to put into the hand of its ally ?

• • • •

London, June 11, 1914.
.... The formation of the Ribot Cabinet has, con-
sequently, been received with lively satisfaction, for it is
thought that only the application of the three years' law
can put the Republic in a position to fulfill the agree-
ments which tie her to her ally, Russia, and her friend,
England.

217

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

Berlin, June 12, 1914.
.... It seems to-day from the speetaele which Prance
is presenting to us that the Cabinet Barthou presumed
too mfuch on the strength and the sentiments of the coun-
try in demanding from it the reintroduction of the three
year's military service, and that the Germans are right
in thinking so. The BVench people have not on this oc-
casion shown the patriotic abnegation of which they have
given proof under other circumstances. This is doubtless
due to the propagation of socialistic ideas in the lower
classes of the nation. However that may be, it is a ques-
tion whether the Cabinet Barthou did not act with too
much precipitation ; whether badly informed on the real
intentions of the Imperial Government when it put the
project of the law concerning the army increase on the
table last year, they were right in replying at once by
the law concerning the three years' service, instead of
assuring themselves first that the increase of the effective
strength of the German army was really an arm directed
against France. In short, I believe, as Mr. von Bethmann
HoUweg said from the rostrum of the Reichstag, that the
danger of a Balkan Confederacy which would later on
paralyze a large part of the Austrian forces was the
dominant reason for the German law of 1913. Some
weeks after this law was introduced, the Balkan Con-
federacy ceased to exist, but the Imperial Government
saw itself face to face with another danger which it had
not forseen: the introduction of a law augmenting the
effective strength of the French army, followed by a
violent campaign of speeches and newspaper articles di-
rected against Germany.

• • • •

Berlin, June 12, 1914.

. . . . M. Barthou and M. Poincare would, thus, per-
haps have done better if they had examined with more
coolness whether there was no better means of ensur-
ing peace between France and Germany than competition
in armaments and increasing effective strength, the bur-
den of which the former is not capable of bearing as
long as the latter.

Another reproach which might be made against the
French supporters of the three years' service is that they
constantly draw Russia into the discussion of this inter-
nal affair : Russia, whose political aims remain impenetra-
ble, Russia who is directing the Dual Alliance to her ex-

218

BEFORE THE WAR

•elusive profit, Russia who is likewise and at an appaling
rate increasing her armament without being threatened

by Germany !

• • • •

Berlin, July 2, 1914.
.... What must be taken into account is the ex-
asperation caused at Vienna by the crime, by the con-
fession of the assassins as to the origin of the bombs
which had been sent from Belgrade, and by the incauti-
ous language of some papers of that capital which tried
to justify the crime in describing it is the well-deserved
punishment for the oppression which Servian elements
and Servian national feelings had had to suffer in Bosnia.
The Pachitch Cabinet, which closed its eyes in order not
to see the hot-bed of the anarchist propaganda in Bel-
grade, must not be surprised that it is requested to act
with energy against the guilty instead of continuing to
treat them with such blind tolerance.

210

Political History of Europe

CHAPTER XXXn

DURING THE WAR

On March 9th the House of Commons of Great Britain
authorized the government to take control of the engin-
eering trade of tiiat country, in order to increase the out-
put of war munitions, and on the 15th of March, Lord
Eitchener, discussing the war situation in the House of
Lords, expressed great anxiety over the slowness with
which war materials were being manufactured in Great
Britain. Up to this time the British government had not
had an adequate supply of war munitions arriving in suf-
ficient quantities, and regularly, to its field armies, which
was one of the prime necessities to the successful action
of those field armies.

The English working man, upon whom the Liberal
party largely depends for its supply of votes, had been
up to this time making more money perhaps than he had
ever before done in ti^e course of his life, and much of
this he was passing into the tills of the dram shops. So
great, indeed, had grown this evil, that in some portions
of industrial England men only worked three days in the
week, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and spent Sat-
urday and Sunday in getting drunk and Monday and
Tuesday in sobering up. This was particularly true in
the Midlands, in Yorkshire, and in the manufacturing
districts of Scotland.

Necessarily the result of this abstention from labor re-
flected itself in the output, and those in England respon-
sible for the conduct of the war saw that stringent meas-
ures of some sort would have to be taken to grapple with
this evil. The Liberal party, however, was afraid to leg-
islate directly against the evil, in spite of the fact that
its leaders recognized it, since such legislation would af-
fect the peculiar form of pleasure most indulged in by
so many of their constituents. Various temporizing
measures were proposed, but none enacted into law.
Finally it was thought that the evil could be gi*appled

220

DURING THE WAR

with by a social crusade against it, and the King of Great
Britain, on the 31st of March, announced that he was
ready to forbid the use of intoxicants in the Boyal house-
hold and to give them up himself, as an example to the
people of England. This example was followed by some,
but not to any great extent by the classes to whom the
example was intended especially to appeal. Later the
King was followed by Lord Eatchener in this self denial,
and a general agitation took place throughout the King-
dom along these lines.

On Apnl 18th, for example, over ten thousand Protest-
tant churches observed what was known as *'The King's
Pledge Sunday" and many thousands of persons signed
a pledge to abstain from intoxicants during the war. As
against this, however, when Mr. Lloyd George, later in
the month, proposed to increase the taxes on alcoholic
drinks, many hundreds of thousands of British subjecti
protested informally through their representatives in
Parliament.

On April 3rd the British government took possession
of all the motor manufacturing plants, and on April 12th
began the transferring of men from the working forces
of the municipalities to factories making munitions of
war.

During this month an organized effort was made to en-
roll women for war service ; the women being supposed to
pledge themselves to undertake various forms of labor in
England which are usually done by men.

These various halting measures produced no great re-
sults.

Acute political agitation relative to the conduct of the
war by the government had been for some time going on,
the centers of which agitation were Mr. Winston Church-
ill the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Lloyd George,
Field Marshal Sir John French, Lord Kitchener, and
various other prominent members of the government.
Space forbids giving a complete history of this move-
ment; sufiSce it to say that at its real crisis the brunt of
the attack was directed against Mr. Winston Churchill ;
he being charged as having instigated the invasion of
GallipoU Peninsula, which he was accused of mismanag-
ing from the beginning. It then became known that the
relations between Lord Fisher, a practical naval man,
who was First Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Churchill
were decidedly strained.

On May 12th, in the House of Commons, a Liberal

221

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

member asked the Prime Minister whether '*in view of
the war and in view of the steps necessary to be taken,
in order to grapple with the re-arrangement of industrial
and social life, consequent upon a prolonged struggle, he
would consider the desirability of admitting into the
ranks of the Ministers leading members of the various
political parties in the House." To which question Mr.
Asquith replied that the step suggested was ''not in con-
templation'' and he was unaware of any public demand
for such a step. This answer produced discontent, not
only in the ranks of the parties opposed to the Cabinet,
but also amidst its supporters, and a new alignment of
parties was in process of being made when a crisis was
precipitated by a cause quite independent of this politi-
cal movement, the resignation of his office as First
Lord of the Admirality by Lord Fisher. The First Lord,
Winston Churchill, had a tendency to assume technical
responsibilities and to over-ride his expert advisors,
which was the main cause in producing Lord Fisher's
resignation.

There was also the prospect of a discussion of the sup-
ply of shells to the army, which was scheduled to come on
before the House the week following this resignation.
Which was also causing the government the gravest anxi-
ety concerning its power of continuing in office.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Asquith reversed him-
self in his determination not to constitute a coalition
Cabinet, and, taking the bull by the horns, on May 19th
announced to the House of Commons that ''steps were
in contemplation which involved the reconstruction of
the government on a broader personal and political
basis." At the same time he stated, for the benefit of the
Liberals, that this reconstruction of the Cabinet was not
to be taken as indicating any surrender or compromise
on the part of any persons of their political purposes and
ideals.

The constitution of this new coalition Cabinet took a
long time, and it resulted in a Cabinet of twelve Liberals,
eight Unionists, one Labor member, and Lord Kitchener.
The principal changes were that Winston Churchill
ceased to be the First Lord of the Admiralty, being suc-
ceeded by Mr. Balfour, a former Premier, and Mr.
Churchill being translated to the rather ornamental po-
sition of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Lord
Haldane left the Cabinet entirely, and the Lord Chancel-
lorship was given to Sir S. Buckmaster. An assistant,

222

DURING THE WAR

i¥ith equal authority, was given to Sir Edward Grey, in
the person of Lord Landsdowne, who was made a Agis-
ter without Portfolio. Lord Gurzon, the former Viceroy
of India, became Lord Privy Seal; Mr. Bonar Law and
Mr. Chamberlain, the son of the famous Joseph, were
given Cabinet portfolios ; while Sir Edward Carson, who,
at the outbreak of war, was leading the Ulsterites in their
resistance of the Home Bule Bill, became Attorney Gen-
eral.

A new Ministry was created, that of Minister of Mun-
itions, which was filled by Mr. Lloyd Gteorge ; his place
as Chancellor of the Exchequer being taken by Mr. Mc-
Eenna.

The new Cabinet took office on June 11th, supported
by the hopes of the public.

On June 21st a second war loan was introduced, which
closed on July 10th, whereby something like £600,000,-
000 was realized.

On June 29th the government introduced the National
Registration Bill, which had as its object to discover
what the adults in the country, or what practically every-
one in the United Kingdom, between the ages of sixteen
and sixty-five, was already doing, and whether he or she
were skilled in and able and willing to perform any other
than the work in which he or she was at the time em-
ployed ; and, if so, the nature of such alternative work a3
they could do, the object of this being to, as it were,
mobilize the industrial and physical forces of the coun-
try. Great hopes were raised by the passage of this bill,
which, unfortunately for Great Britain, have not been
realized.

On July 15th 200,000 Welsh coal miners struck, in
direct defiance of the orders issued by the government ;
thus showing the disorganization prevalent in England ;
and, in its results, showing the impotency of the govern-
ment to cope with any resistance to its own laws or or-
ders. This strike was not ended until July 25th, when,
through the personal influence of Lloyd George the min-
ers returned to work.

Signs of disintegration in the coalition Cabinet began
to make themselves noticed at this time, and this disin-
tegration and disorganization continued to grow through
the summer.

In France, during April, a movement began against in-
toxicants, which decreased in strength later.

In Germany, at the end of March, the returns from the

223

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

second war loan showed that $2,265,000,000 had been sa1>-
scribed.

On August 1st the Chancellor announced that the Teu-
tonic Allies, after a year of war, had gained 78,385
square miles of hostile territory.

In neither France nor Germany, in this period, were
there any cabinet changes of importance, nor any poli-
tical events of any significance. Political events in Italy
have been treated of sufficiently in the chapter devoted
to Italy's going to war.

Of course, during all this period, there were rumors
without number, started by the combatants, in regard
to the political and economic situation of their opponents,
but in hardly any case did these rumors have any sub-
stantial basis in fact.

During a considerable portion of this time the Allies
were occupied in making a paper partition of the Turkish
Empire, which subsequent events proved was a trifle pre-
mature. The entire period was marked by ceaseless vSli-
fication of the several combatants by the others based,
in some cases, upon the most impudent forgeries and
the most tortured distortions of facts. It is perhaps
needless to say that the American Press, as a whole,
ceaselessly promulgatd any of the villifications which
bore the London trade mark to its readers.

The situation in the Balkans occupied public attention
for much of the time ; the future actions and affiliations
of those States being made the subject of much specula-
tion. In this volume, however, the Balkan situation will
not be gone into, as it will more appropriately find a
place in the next, when Bulgaria's entry into the war is
dealt with.

During the period under consideration numerous
movements of greater or less (principally less) impor-
tance took place, looking to the establishment of peace.
None of these were, however, sufficiently serious to be
worthy of an extended mention. One very regrettable
fact, however, was prominent in many of these attempts
at re-establishing normal conditions throughout the
world, which was their being undertaken and "pro-
moted" (to use a financial word) by persons who had
more their own glorification as an object than the re-es-
tablishment of peace.

224

Appendix

STATISTICS OF ITALY

The present constitution of Italy is an expansion of
the *Statuto fondamentale del Regno,' granted on March
4, 1848, by King Charles Albert to his Sardinian sub-
jects. According to this charter, the executive power
of the State belongs exclusively to the sovereign, and
is exercised by him through responsible ministers ; while
the legislative authority rests conjointly in the King
and Parliament, the latter consisting of two chambers
— an upper one, the Senate, and a lower one, called the
'Camera de' Deputati.' The Senate is composed of the
princes of the royal house who are twenty-one years of
age (with the right to vote when twenty-five years of
age), and of an unlimited number of members, above
forty years old, who are nominated by the King for life ;
a condition of the nomination being that the person
should either fill a high office, or have acquired fame in
science, literature, or any other pursuit tending to the
benefit of the nation, or, finally, diould pay taxes to the
annual amount of 3000 lire, or £120.

In 1914 there were 404 senators exclusive of six mem-
bers of the royal family. The electoral law of June 30,
1912, made the suffrage almost universal for men 21
years of age, only denying the franchise to those younger
than 30 who have neither performed their military ser-
vice nor learnt to read and write. The number of depu-
ties is 508, or 1 to every 71,000 of the population (cen-
sus 1911). In 1913 the number of enrolled electors was
8,672,249 (24 per 100 inhabitants without distinction
of sex or age) exclusive of the electors temporarily dis-
franchised on account of military service. For electoral
purposes the whole of the Kingdom is divided into 508
electoral colleges or districts, and these again into several
sections. No deputy can be returned to Parliament un-
less he has obtained a number of votes greater than one-
tenth of the total number of inscribed electors, and than
half the votes given. A deputy must be thirty years old,
and have the requisites demanded by the electoral law.
Incapable of being elected are all salaried Government
officials, as well as all persons ordained for the priest-
hood and filling clerical charges, or receiving pay from

225

STATISTICS

the State. Officers in the army and navy, ministers,
under-seeretaries of State, and various other classes
of functionaries high in office, may be elected, but their
number must never be more than 40, not including the
ministers and the under-secretaries of State. Deputies
are to receive £240 annually of which £160 will be direct
payment, and the remainder will be represented by a
current account with the railways and post office, de-
fraying travelling and postal expenses.

Lower House, elected October, 1913; Constitutional-
ists, 318; Radicals, 70; Bepublicans, 16; Socialists, 77;
Syndicalists, 3; and Catholics, 24.

The duration of a Parliament is five years, and it must
meet annually; but the King has the power to dissolve
the lower House at any time, being bound only to order
new elections, and convoke a new meeting within four
months. Each of the chambers has the right of intro-
ducing new bills, the same as the Government; but all
the money bills must originate in the House of Deputies.
The ministers have the right to attend the debates of both
the upper and the. lower House ; but they have no vote
unless they are members. No sitting is valid unless an
absolute majority of the members are present.

The executive power is exercised, under the King, by a
ministry divided into 12 departments which are :

President of the Council and Minister of the Interior.

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Minister for the Colonies.

Minister of Justice and of Ecclesiastical Affairs.

Minister of the Treasury.

Minister of Finance.

Minister of War.

Minister of Marine.

Minister of Public Instruction.

Minister of Public Works.

Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

The administrative divisions of Italy are provinces,
territories (circondari), districts and communes. There
are 69 provinces : of which 60 are divided only into terri-
tories (circondari), 5 into territories and districts and
four only into districts (the districts being found in the
province of Mantua and the 8 provinces of Venetia).
There are 205 territories and 71 districts. The districts
have been de facto suppressed, though still nominally

226

STATISTICS

existing as administrative divisions. The territories
and districts are divided into communes.

Iq 1914 (January 1) there were 8339 communes. The
two principal elective local administrative bodies are
the communal councils and the provincial councils. Ac-
cording to the law of May 21, 1908 (amended June 19,
1913), each commune has a communal council, a muni-
cipal council and a syndic. Both the communal coun-
cils and the municipal councils vary according to the
population, the members of the latter being selected by
the former from among themselves. The syndic is the
head of the communal administration, and is a Govern-
ment official ; he is elected by the communal council from
among its own members, by secret vote. Each province
has a provincial council and a provincial commission,
the numbers varying according to population. The
council elects its president and other officials. The pro-
vincial commission is elected by the council from its own
members. It conducts the business of the province when
the latter is not sitting. Both communal and provincial
councillors are elected for 4 years. The communal
council meets twice and the provincial once a year in
ordinary session, though they may be convened for ex-
traordinary purposes. All communal electors are eli-
gible to the council except those having an official or
pecuniary interest in the commune. Electors must be
Italian citizens resident in the province, twenty-one years
of age, able to read and write, be on the Parliamentary
electoral list, or pay a direct annual contribution to the
commune of any nature or comply with other conditions
of a very simple character.

In 1911 the number of enrolled Administrative elec-
tors was 4,011,038 (11.2 percent, of population), As a
result of the amended law of June 19, 1913, the number
of these electors wiU be very considerably increased.

The following figures show the increase of the popu-
lation of the present territory of the Kingdom of Italy
from 1816 onwards in round numbers: —

Tear (Jan. 1) Population Year ( Jan. 1) Population

1816 18,383,000 1882 28,460,000

1848 23,618,000 1901 32,476,000

1862 25,000,000 1911 34,671,377

1872 26,801,000

The number of foreigners in Italy in 1901 was 61,606 ^
11,616 were Austrians, 10,757 Swiss, 6,953 French, 8,768
English, 10,745 Germans, 1,503 Russians, 2,907 Ameri-
cans (United States), 763 Greeks, 1,400 Spaniards, and

227

STATISTICS

the rest mainly Turks, Belgians, Swedes and Norwegians,
Dutch, Egjrptians, Argentines, Brazilians.

The popidation of Italy is in general i>erfectly homo-
geneous. According to statistics of 1901, the exceptions
are : about 80,200 of French origin ; 11,400 of Teutonic
origin; 90,000 of Albanian origin; 31,200 of Greek ori-
gin; 9,800 of Spanish (Catalan) origin; 80,000 Slavs.

llie population over 15 years of age in 1911 was 22,-
817,755; of these 8,039,129 were unmarried, 12,613,993
were married, 2,147,325 were widowers or widows, and
17,308 were returned as State unkown . Of the whole
population, 19,789,718 or 57.3 percent, were unmarried;
12,629,930 or 36.5 percent, were married; 2,151,168 or
6.2 percent, were widowers or widows, and 100,961 were
returned as State unknown.

Number of proprietors in Italy, 1901 : proprietors of
lands, 1,045,113; of building, 823,442; of lands and
building, 2,241,578; total, 4,110,133. Proprietors of
lands and building (4,110,133), per 100 of population,
12.7; proprietors of lands (3,286,691), per square mile,
29.7.

The Roman Catholic Church is, nominally, the ruling
State religion of Italy; but the power of the Church and
clergy is subordinated to the civil government, and there
is freedom of worship to the adherents of all recogni^d
religions.

The census returns of 1901 were as follows : —

Profession Total Per cent.

Roman Catholic 31,539,863 97.12

Evangelical Protestant 65,595 0.20

Greek Church 2,472 0.01

Israelite 35,617 0.11

Other professions 338

Not professing any religion . . 36,092 0.11

Not known 795,276 2.45

32,475,253 100.00

Of the Protestants, 22,500 belonged to the Waldensian
Church of Piedmont, about 10,000 to the other evangeli-
cal Italian Churches, and 30,000 to foreign Protestant
bodies.

The suppression of the religious corporations began
in 1855, and was completed by the law of June 19,1878,
which extended the measure to the city and province of
Rome. The method followed was simply the abolition
of the legal status of religious corporations, so that they
<;ould not hold property. Thus mortmain land was set

228

STATISTICS

free for agriculture and for buying and selling, while
the State profited by relief from burdens and by direct
taxation of the land thus freed £rom mortmain. Dis-
possessed monks and nuns received life pensions ; houses
which had been used for schools or for hospitals, etc.,
were, with restrictions, made over to the communes; in
Bome, the hospitals, etc., were assigned to the various
charitable institutions; everywhere the churches of the
corporations necessary for public worship were pre-
served, as were monumental, artistic, and other corpora-
tion buildings. Of the monastic edifices some were OC'
cupied by the State, others assigned to communes or pro-
vinces. The corporations of Lombardy were privileged
by the treaty of Zurich, and their lands and houses were
left to the disposal of their individual members. All
other immovable corporation property was sold, but the
equivalent revenue (after certain deductions, including
a 30 per cent, tax) was inscribed in the public debt book!
The administration of the revenue from the proceeds of
land destined for charity or instruction now belongs to
the communes; that £rom monastic parish church prop-
erty in Rome, to the parish churches ; that from property
of foreign religious orders, in Bome (400,000 lire) to
the Holy See; while the remainder is administered by
two institutes which pay the pensions and other dues,
and provide (1) for beneficent work and for worship in
Bome, and (2) for worship in the rest of Italy.

The State regulates public instruction, and maintains,
either entirely or in conjunction with the communes and
provinces, public schools of every grade. Every teacher
must have the qualifications required by law.

Schools in Italy may be classified under four heads,
according as they provide: (1) elementary instruction;
(2) secondary instruction — classical; (3) secondary in-
struction — ^technical; (4) higher education.

The total Budget of State funds by the Ministry of
Public Instruction in 1912-13 was £5,618,738 (of which
£27,934 was extraordinary) ; as much more being pro-
vided by communes, provinces, foundations, etc.

In the last 46 years there has been an increase of 156
per cent, in school attendance.

Percentage of illiterates : —

Over 6 years Over 21 years

Year Male female Male Female

1911 32.6 42.4 34.7 48.5

According to the census of 1911 the smallest percen-
tage of illiterates above six years was in Piedmont, male

229

STATISTICS

9.1, female 12.8 (male and female 69.6), Since then
there has been much improvement, and now there are
circondari (arrondissements), e.g. Domodossola Pallan-
za, and Yarallo in the province of Novara, and others
in the provinces of Turin, Gomo, Guneo, etc., where aU
young people twenty years of age can read and write.

Statistics of various classes of schools : —

Elementary
Schools

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230

STATISTICS

Italy has 5 courts of Cassation, (4 of which have jur-
isdiction exclusively in civil mlatters), and is divided
for the administration of justice into 20 appeal court
districts, subdivided into 162 tribunal districts, and
these again into mandamenti, each with its own magis-
tracy (Pretura), 1535 in all. In 12 of the principal
towns there are also Pretori urbani (14) who have juris-
diction exclusively in penal matters. For civil business,
besides the magistracy above-mentioned, Concilatori,
have jurisdiction in petty plaints.

In Italy legal charity, in the sense of a right in the
poor to be supported by the parish or commune, or of
an obligation of the commune to relieve the poor does
not exist. Public charity in general is exercised through
the permanent charitable foundations, called 'Opere pie,'
reg^ated by the law of July 17, 1890.

Direct taxes are those on lands, on houses and on in-
comes derived from movable capital and labor. The
tax on lands, amounts to about 96 million lire. That on
houses is at the rate of 12.5 per cent, (with three-tenths
additional) of the amount taxable which is two-thirds of
the real annual value in the case of factories, and three-
fourths in the case of dwelling houses. The tax on in-
comes from movable wealth was raised to 20 percent, of
the amount taxable. The amount taxable in the case of
incomes varies from the whole income to fifteen-fortieths
according to various conditions. The communes and
provinces also tax lands and buildings. The State
grants to the communes one-tenth of the proceeds of
the tax on incomes as compensation for other communal
revenues made over to the State by various laws.

The principal indirect taxes are: the customs duties,
the octroi, the taxes on manufactures, the salt and to-
bacco monopolies, lotto.

Total revenue and expenditure for 1912-1913 :

Total Revenue Total Expenditure Difference

Lire Lire Lire

2,698,620,121 2,615,20(8,705 83,411,416

The capital (nominal) of the consolidated and redeem-
able debt amounted to 13,329,361,597 lire.

In the financial year 1911-12 the revenue from the
State property was : — ^Railways, 32,498,614 lire ; ecclesi-
astical, 511,051 lire; from fixed capital, 8,718,928 lire;
from the Cavour Canals, 3,165,725 lire; various, 4,909,-
541.

The extent of the land frontier of Italy is as follows :
French frontier 300 miles; Swiss 418; Austro-Hungar-

231

STATISTICS

ian 484; frontier of San Marino 24; in all (exclusive of
San Marino) 1202 miles. The coast line of tike peninsula
measures 2,052 miles; of Sicily, 630; of Sardinia, 830;
of Elba and the small islands, 648; the total length of
coast is thus 4160 miles.

On the Continental frontier of Italy the principal
passes of the Alps are defended by fortifications. The
basin of the Po is also studded with forlified places, the
chief strong places in the region are the following:
Cassale, Piacenza, Yerona, Mantua (these two belong to
the old Austrian Quadrilatral), Venice, Alessandria. On
the coasts and islands are the following fortified places :
Vado, Genoa, Spezia, Monte Argentaro, Gaeta; works
in the Straits of Messina, Taranto. To the north of
Sardinia a group of fortified islands form the naval sta-
tion of Maddalena. Rome is protected by a circle of
forts.

Service in the army (or navy) is compulsory and uni-
versal. The total period is 19 years, beginning at the
age of twenty. The young men of the year are divided
into three categories; the first being posted to the per-
manent army ; the second also to the permanent army but
with * unlimited leave'; and the third, that is those ex-
empted from active service, to the territorial militia. The
second category men form what is called the * comple-
mentary force'.

The term of service in the ranks of the permanent
army is two years for all arms. After passing through
the ranks, the men are placed on * unlimited leave,' i. e.,
they are transferred to the reserve, in which they remain
until they have completed a total of eight years' service.
Prom the reserve the soldier passes to the mlobile militia,
the term of service in which is four years. After com-
pleting his time in the mobile militia he is transferred
to the territorial militia, in which he remains seven
years; thus finishing his military service at the age of
39.

The second category recruits are regarded as belong-
ing to the permanent army for the first eight years of
their service. During this period they receive from two
to six months' training, which may be spread over sev-
eral years. They then pass to the mobile militia, and
afterwards to the territorial militia, the periods of ser-
vice in each being the same as in the case of the first
category soldiers. The men allotted to the third cate-

232

STATISTICS

gory, who are posted at once to the territorial militia,
receive 30 days' training.

In Italy each regiment receives recruits from all parts
of the country, and the troops change their stations by
brigades every four years. On mobilization regiments
would be filled up by reservists from the districts in
which they are quartered at the time. Beliefs are so
arranged that at least half the reservists shall have pre-
viously served in the unit which they would join on
mobilization.

The field army consists of 12 army corps and three
cavalry divisions. The army corps consist of two divi-
sions, except the IXth army corps, in the Roman district,
which has an additional division. There are two bri-
gades of infantry each consisting of two regiments of.
three battalions, and a regiment of field artHlery (five
batteries) to each division, which has a war strength of
14,156 officers and men, 1399 horses, and 30 guns. There
is a regiment of fileld artillery (six batteries of six guns) ,
two or three heavy batteries, a cavalry regiment, and a
regiment of Bersaglieri, to each army corps. Cavalry
divisions each consist of two brigades of two regiments,
and of two horse artillery batteries.

Each regiment of Bersaglieri (light infantry) consists
of three battalions of infantry and one battalion of cy-
clists, the cyclists being intended to supplement the caval-
ry in the field. The Alpini are frontier troops, specially
organized to defend the mountain passes leading into
Italy; the consist of eight regiments (26 battalions) of
Alpine infantry, and two regiments of 36 mountain ar-
tillery batteries. There are, furthermore, one regiment
of horse artillery of eight batteries, two regiments of
heavy artillery of 10 batteries each, and 10 regiments
of fortress artillery : The engineers are organized as six
' regiments : two consist of pioneers, one of pontoon troops,
one of telegraph troops, one of sappers and miners, and
one of railway troops. The aeronautical service consists
of a '* specialist battalion'' of five companies, of an ex-
perimental section, of a ** flying battalion" of two com-
panies, and of a growing number of field squadrons of
seven aeroplanes each.

The Carabinieri are a force of military police. They
are recruited by selection from the army, and they re-
main in the ranks of the force until they have completed
three years' service. They then serve in the reserve of
the carabinieri for four years, after which they are trans-

233

STATISTICS

ferred to the territorial militia for the remainder of
their service, and are reckoned as a part of the army.

The strength of the field army (12 army corps and
independent cavalry) is about 400,000 combatants. The
nominal strength of the mobile militia is 326,000, but the
numbers put into the field would not perhaps exceed
200,000. The * complementary' troops should be suffi-
cient to maintain the strength of the first line and mobile
militia in the field. The territorial militia is strong
numerically, but only about half the number, viz.: the
first category men who have passed through the army
and mobile militia could be made use of, should its ser-
vices ever be required.

The arm of the Italian infantry is the Mannlicher
Garcano rifle, a magazine weapon of 6.5 m. m. calibre^
The territorial militia has the old Vetterli. The field
artillery is being rearmed with the De Port gun and
carriage, calibre 7.5 cm., model 1912.

The following table gives the peace establishment of
the Italian army in 1913, exclusive of troops in Africa —

Horses
OfBlcers Men and Mules

Administration, staff, military

schools, etc 1,284 1,962 2,442

Infantry, 389 battalions, and 88
district headquarters 7,627 162,000 6,205

Cavalry, 150 squadrons, and 29
depots 1,006 27,416 25,467

Artillery, 263 batteries, 110 com-
panies, 51 depots, etc 2,359 49,256 23,084

Engineers, 82 companies and 10

companies engineer train .... 630 11,099 1,284

Medical, 12 companies 769 3,712 81

Commissariat, 12 companies .... 452 3,978 420

Carabineers, 12 legions 709 30,087 5,362

Total 15,172 289,500 64,345

The total military budget of Italy for 1913-14 amount-
ed to £14,222,000. In 1908, extra credit of no less than
£8,920,000 was granted, to be spread over nine years;
this amount was to be spent on the re-armament of the
artillery, guns for permanent works, fortifications, rail-
ways, barracks, mobilization stores, and horses.

The Italian navy estimates for financial years ending
June 30th were : —

£ £

1911-12 . . 7,802,488 1909-10 . . 6,685,440
1910-11 . . 6,950,988 1908-09 . . 6,335,880

234

STATISTICS

For the purpose of local naval administration and de-
fence the Italian littoral is divided into three depart-
ments : 1, Spezia ; 2, Naples ; 3, Venice ; 4, Taranto. The
vessels are apportioned, for administrative purposes,
between the four deparhnents. There are torpedo sta-
tions all round the Italian coasts, the head stations be-
ing at Genoa, Spezia, Maddalena, Oaeta, Messina, Taran-
to, Brindisi, Ancona, and Venice.

Summary of the Italian navy : —

Completed at end of
1913 1914 1916

Dreadnoughts 3 4 6

Pre-Dreadnoughts 11 8 8

Armored cruisers 10 9 9

Protected cruisers 12 13 16

Torpedo gunboats, etc 10 10 10

Destroyers 35 35 46

Torpedo Boats 86 86

Submarines 20 25

235

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236

STATISTICS

The personnel consists of 1927 officers (comprising
one admiral, 23 vice and rear-admirals, 232 captains
and commanders, 444 lieutenants, 218 sub-lientenants
and midshipmen, 108 engineer-constructors, 312 engin-
eers, 259 sanitary officers, 200 commissariat officers, 157
officers of the Corpo Beale Equipaggi) ; and 38,000 men
(sailors, gunners, mechanicians, etc.) Both naval and
military officers are attached indifferently to the aerial
service.

The systems of cultivation in Italy may be reduced to
three: — 1. The system of peasant proprietorship
(coltivazione per econmia o a mano propria) ; 2. That
of partnership (colnia parziaria) ; 3. That of rent
(affitto). Peasant proprietorship is most common in
Piedmont and Liguria, but is found in many other parts
of Italy. The system of partnership or colonia parziar-
ia, more especially in the form of mezzadria, consists in
a form of partnership between the proprietor and the
cultivator. This system is general in Tuscany, the
Marches, and Umbria. It is almost unknown in the
Basilicata, little practised in Apulia, Calabria, and Sar-
dinia, and has been entirely abandoned in the two most
advanced centres of cultivation in the South, viz: —
Barese and the province of Naples. Various modifica-
tions of the system exist in different parts of Italy. The
system of rent (affitto) exists in Lombardy and Yenetia.

In the census of February 10, 1901, there were 6,411,-
001 males and 3,200,002 females of nine years of age and
upwards described as engaged in agriculture.

The area of Italy comprises 70,811,000 acres. Of this
area, 51,309,310 acres are under crops and 11,272,339
acres are forests.

The principal crops for 1912 were as follows : —

Acreagre Produce in cwts

Wheat 11,746,838 88,754,293

Barley 603,421 3,600,195

Oats 1,253,772 8,085,335

Rye 304,674 2,641,848

Maize 3,935,945 49,320,404

Rice 359,385 8,648,732

Beans 1,474,825 7,914,721

Various Pulses 1,852,500 4,624,464

Potatoes^ 711,854 1,507,969

Sugar Beetroot! 133,380 1,714,987

Vines 11,022,368 131,523,700

Olives 5,712,122 11,998,025

^Produce in tons.

237

STATISTICS

In 1912 Italy exported 42,951 and imported 55,896 cat-
tle ; exported 34,092 and imported 2,803 sheep ; exported
621 and imported 572 goats; exported 23,904 and im-
ported 1,935 swine.

Silk cnltnre, though flourishing most extensively in
Piedmont and Lombardy, is carried on all over Italy.
The average annual production of silk cocoons in the five
years, 1909-13, is estimated at 50,800,000 kilogrammes,
and of silk, at 5,118,000 kilogrammes (in 1876, 1,293,000
kilos.)* In 1913 the estimated silk cocoon crop was 82,-
000 kilogrammes, as against 47,470,000 kilogrammes in
1912.

In the year 1898-99 there were only four sugar fac-
tories, with an output of 5,972 metric tons; in 1911-12
there were 37, their output being 158,663 tons.

The value of the output of industrial chemical pro-
ducts in 1912 was 181,000,000 lire (in 1893, 26,134,000
lire).

The forest area (exclusive of chestnut plantations) is
about 4,000,000 hectares. The yield from the forests
is valued at 124,132,000 lire (£4,965,280.)

Production in metric tons (1 metric ton=2,204 lbs.,
or 1,016 metric tons=l,000 English tons) of metallic
ores and other minerals in 1912.

Produo- Metric
Ores, Etc. tive mines tons Lire Workers

Iron 27 582,066 12,406,837 1,730

Manganese 5 2,641 99,160 121

Copper 7 86,001 1,583,921 798

Zinc 149,776 18,286,272

Lead 94 41,680 7,785,369 14,797

Lead and zinc 300 6,400

Silver 1 27 77,200 68

Gold 2 2,366 66,356 78

Antimony, argentiferous 2 1,878 112,246 294

Mercury 8 88,200 4,370,400 945

Iron and cuprous pyrites 11 277,585 5,966,819 2,400

Mineral fuel 42 663,812 6,111,004 3,927

Sulphur ore 368 2,504,408 29,600,684 17,^6

Asphaltic and bituminous

substances 18 181,946 3,012,348 1,784

Boric acid 7 2,309 900,510 464

Totals (including graph-
ite, petroleum and —

other minerals) .... 656 94,213,223 46,064^

^Exclusive of 2^53 workers in non-productive mines. Of
the total number of workers, 1,558 were female.

238

STATISTICS

On December 31, 1911, the number of vessels and
boats employed in fishing was 28,402, with an aggregate
tonnage of 78,981. These numbers include 47 boats of
458 tons engaged in coral fishing. There were 127,792
fishermen, of whom 6,447 were engaged in deep-sea or
foreign fishing. The value of the fish caught in 1911
(excluding foreign flushing) was estimated at 24,265,000
lire; the value obtained from tunny-fishing was 4,111,-
000 lire and from coral fishing 75,320 lire, the quantity
being estimated at 8,456 kilogrammes.

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289

STATISTICS

The Italian industrial census of June 10th, 1911 is as
follows : Establishments, 243,985 ; the numiber of employ-
ees, 2,305,698 ; and the aggregate horse-power, 1,573,774.

COIOIEROE

SpecUl trade (in sterling
exclusive of precious metal) Precious Metals (in sterling)

Year

Imports

Exports

Imports

Exports

1912
1913

144,164,000
145,511,000

95,846,000
100,157,000

1,036,000
841,000

1,659,000
3,211,000

Length of State railways 8,540 miles (June 30th,
1913) ; all the railway lines 11,015 miles.

In 1911-12 the total receipts were 574,570,293 lire ; in
1912-13, 604,381,000 lire (provisional).

In the year 1911 there were 10,238 post offices.

On June 30, 1911, the telegraph lines had a length of
31,726 miles, and the wires, 193,182 miles. There were
7,882 telegraph offices, of which 5,944 were State offices
and 1,938 railway offices. There were, in the year, 15,-
240,129 private telegrams sent inland; and 1,646,761
private international telegrams.

The telephone service in 1911 had 76,061 abounds.
There were 237 urban systems and 499 inter-urban sys-
tems with 19,439 miles of line and 37,761 miles of wire.
Total number of conversations in the year 5,432,372. In
1907 the telephone service passed to the direct working
of the State.

State notes and bank notes in circulation in lire : —

STATE NOTES

1908 1909 1910 1911 1912

485,671,090 432,924,715 442,119,195 485,290,695 498,973,615
BANK NOTES

1908 1909 1910 1911 1912

1.862,557,800 1,931,668,450 2,026,847,950 2,193,381,850 2,212,881,000

There is no national bank in Italy. According to the
law of August 10, 1893, there are only three banks of is-
sue: the Banca d 'Italia, the Banca di Napoli, the Banca
di Sicilia. Assets and liabilities of those banks on Decem-
ber 31, 1912 :

240

STATISTICS

ASSETS

Lire

Cash and Reserve 1,624,557,088

BiUs 802,827,022

Anticipations 170,253,717

Credits 138,370,360

Deposits 2,855,447,602

Various securities 567,678,478

Total 6,159,114,267

UABIUTIES

Lire

Capital 302,000,000

Notes in Circulation 2,212,381,000

Accounts current, etc 331,627,753

Titles and valuables deposited . . 2,855,447,602

Various 457,657,912

Total 6,159,114,267

On January 30, 1912, there were 862 co-operative
credit societies and popular banks, 1,140 rural banks,
207 ordinary credit companies, and seven agrarian credit
institutions, and (January, 1913) 11 credit foncier com-
panies, of which four were in liquidation, with 719,422,-
250 lire of *cartelle fondiarie' in circulation, and with
649,092,867 lire of 'mutui conammortamento.'

The following table gives statistics of the savings
banks at the end of 1912 : —

Total Deposits Repayments

Offices Depositors Deposits during^ year during^ year

Lire Lire Lire
Post-office say-
ings banks... 9,799 5,780,010 1,948,561,882 965,512,895 889,319,895

Ordinary sav-
ings banks... 186 2,363,832 2,492,046,838 1,216,589,799 1,187,178,180

On December 31, 1912, the savings deposited with the
co-operative credit societies amounted to 705,711,116,
and ordinary credit companies to 560,730,438 lire.

On August 12, 1912, a law came into operation es-
tablishing life assurance as a State monopoly. The ex-
isting insurance companies were allowed to continue
their operations for 10 years under certain conditions.
The State activities in connection with life insurance
is guided by the National Insurance Institute.

The money, weights, and measures of Italy are the
same as those of France the names only being altered to
the Italian form.

241

STATISTICS

The lira of 100 centesimi ; intrinsic value, 25.22-V^. to
£1 sterling.

The coin in circulation consists of gold 10-lire and 20-
lire pieces; of silver 50 cent. 1-lire, 2-lirey and S-lire
pieces; nickel 20 cent, pieces, and bronze 1, 2, 5, and 10
cent, pieces. Nickel coin is being substituted for bronze
to a large amount. Bank notes of 50, 100, 500 and
1,000 lire are in circulation, also small notes, issued by
the State, for 5, 10, and 25 lire.

The Italian possessions in the Bed Sea are constituted
as the Colony Eritrea with an area of about 45,800
square miles, and a population estimated at 450,000.

Another possession is the Colony and Protectorates of
Italian Somaliland which has an area of 139,430 square
miles and a population of about 400,000. They extend
along the east coast of Africa. The principal occupa-
tion of the people is cattle raising.

The Italian concessions of Tientsin under the agree-
ment with China of June 7, 1902 lies on the left bank
of the Peiho and had an area of about 18 square miles
with a native population of about 17,000. It contains
a village and salt-pits.

Tripoli fell under Turkish domination in the Sixteenth
century and, though in 1714, the Arab population se-
cured some measure of independence, the country was
in 1835 proclaimed a Turkish villayet. In September,
1911, a quarrel broke out between Turkey and Italy,
and the latter invaded Tripoli and established an army
there. On Nov. 5, 1911, a decree was issued annexing
Tripoli, and on February 23, 1912, the Itidian chamber
passed the bill which ratified the decree of annexation,
and in October 18, 1912, the Treaty of Ouchy was
signed, by which the sovereignty of Italy in Tripoli was
established. The entire territory is estimated at about
406,000 square miles and a population of about 523,176
natives.

LIST OF SHIPS SUNK BY SUBMARINES.

FEBRUARY.

Date and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

18 — ^Dinorah,

French

4,208

20— Behidge,

Norwegian

7,000

20 — Cambank,

English

3A12

20 — Downshire,

English

365

23— Oakby,

English

1,976

24— R^in,

Norwegian

1,844

24 — Western Coast,

English

487

24^Deptford,

English
242

1,008

APPENDIX

Date and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

24 — ^Harpalion,

English

6,867

24 — Rio Parana,

English

4,015

24 — Branksome Chine,

English
MARCH.

2,026

5 — ^Noorsedyk,

Dutch

2,118

7 — ^Bengrove,

English

3,840

9 — ^Princess Yietoriai

English

1,108

9 — Tang^fltan,

English

3,738

9 — ^Blackwood,

English

1,230

9 — Gris Nez,

French

208

11 — Aiigaste ConBelly

English

2,952

U — ^Floranza,

English

4,600

11 — Adenwen,

English

3,798

12 — ^Haana,

Swedish

372

12 — ^Headlands,

English

2,988

12 — Andalusian,

English

2,346

12— Indian City,

English

4,645

IS— Hartdale,

EngUsh

3,839

13 — ^Invergyle,

English

1,794

14 — Atlanta,

English

519

15— Fingal,

;English

1,567

15 — ^Darham Castle,

English

8,228

16 — ^Leeuwarden,

English

990

16— Hyndford,

English

4,286

17 — Glenartney,

English

5,201

17 — Rivaulx Abbey,

English

1,166

18 — ^Bluejacket,

English

3,515

19 — ^Beeswing,

English

2,002

21 — Caimtorr,

English

3,588

21 — Concord,

English

2,861

24 — ^Delmira,

English

3,459

27 — Medea,

Dutch

1,235

27— Falaba,

English

4,860

27 — ^Agnila,

English

2^14

28— Vosges,

English

1,095

29 — ^Flaminian,

English

3,500

30— Crown of Castile,

English

4,506

31— The Emma,

French

1,617

31 — Seven Seas,

Enplish
APRTT,.

632

1 — ^Jason,

English

176

1— Nov,

Norwegian

137

1 — Gloxinia,

English

145

1— The Nellie,

English

109

2 — ^Lockwood,

English

1A43

2 — Southpoint,

English

3,837

2 — Pacquerette,

French

400

4 — Olivine,

English

634

243

APPENDIX

Date and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

4 — ^Hermes,

Russian

1,019

4 — City of Bremen,

English

782

5 — ^Northlands,

English

2,776

5 — ^Acantha,

English

171

7 — Zarina,

English

154

8 — Chateaubriand,

French

2,247

9 — General de Sonis,

English

2,190

9 — ^Elmina,

English

4,792

10 — ^Hapalyce,

English

5,940

10— The President,

English

647

11— Frederick Franck,

French

973

12— Wayfarer,

English

9,509

14 — ^Ptarmigan,

English

780

14— Rapid,

English

170

14 — ^Resto,

English

169

l^^-Rio,

English

117

14 — Mercia,

English

175

14 — Ferret,

English

157

14 — Stirling,

English

165

14 — ^Horatio,

English

174

14 — Argentina,

English

177

18 — EUispontos,

Greek

2,989

18— Vanilla

English

158

21— Frack,

Russian

210

21 — Envoy,

English

156

22— Ruth,

English

3,461

22 — St. Tiawrence,

English

196

26— Recolo,

English

176

28— LiUdale,

English

129

28— Embla,

English

161

28— Mobile,

English

1,915

29— Eildon,

English

608

29— Chorbury,

English

3,220

29— Laila,

Norwegian
MAY.

753

1— Edale,

English

3,110

1— EUida,

Swedish

1,124

1 — Svorono,

Russian

3,102

2 — ^Baldwin,

Norweigan

599

2 — Europe,

French

4,769

2 — ^America,

Norwegian

2,305

2— Fulgent,

English

2,008

2 — Columbia,

English

118

2 — Sunray,

English

165

2 — Cruiser (trawler).

English

155

2 — ^Martaban,

English

148

2— Elsa,

Swedish

1,180

2 — ^Mercury,

English

222

2— St. George,

English

229

244

APPENDIX

Oa^ and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

2 — St. Louis,

English

211

2 — Aberdon,

English

497

2— Emblem,

English

167

3 — ^lolanthe,

English

180

3— Hero,

English

173

3 — Northward Ho,

.English

180

3 — ^Hector,

English

179

3 — Progress,

English

273

3 — Couguet,

English

176

3— Bob White,

English

180

3 — Scottish Queen,

English

126

4r— Rugby,

English

206

4 — Uxbridge,

English

164

4 — Sceptre,

English

166

6 — Stratton,

English

383

5 — Minteme,

English

3,018

5 — ^Earl of Latham,

English

132

6 — Cathay,

Danish

4,070

6 — Candidate,

English

6,868

6 — Centurion,

English

6,946

6— Truro,

English

836

6 — ^Merry Islington,

English

147

6— Don,

English

168

7 — ^Lusitania,

English

31,660

7 — Bennington,

English

131

8 — Queen Wilhelmina, English

3,690

8 — ^Hellenic,

English

180

8 — Drumcree,

English

4,062

19 — ^Dumfries,

English

4,121

19 — ^Lucerne,

English

198

20— Chrysolyte,

English

222

20— St. Georges,

French

165

20— Crimond,

English

173

22 — Minerva,

Norwegian

2,413

26 — Morwena,

English

26— Betty,

Danish

1,267

28— Ethiope,

English

3,794

28— Tullochmoor,

English

3,620

29 — Dixiana,

English

4,127

30— Soborg,

Danish

1,333

30— Glenlee,

English

2,660

30— Cysne,

Portuguese

623

30— Mars,

Russian
JUNE.

234

1 — Saidieh,

English

1,984

2 — Victoria,

English

210

2 — Cubano,

Norwegian

2,805

2— Delta B,

Belgian

220

3— Hirold,

English
246

183

APPENDIX

Date and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

3 — Horace,

English

141

3 — ^E^conomyy

English

183

3— Penfeld,

French

794

3 — ^Lapplandy

Swedish

1,417

3— Cyrus,

English

1,032

3 — ^lona,

English

2,085

3 — ChrysoprasuSi

English

119

3 — ^Lowestoft,

English

172

4— Eben Ezer,

English

4— Ena May,

English

110

4 — Strathbran,

flnglish

163

4 — George and Mary,

English

110

4 — ^Kathleen,

English

198

4 — Evening Star,

English

120

4 — Cortes,

English

174

4 — Sunnet Head,

English

371

6 — Dogberry,

English

213

6 — ^Persmunon,

English

255

5 — Gazehoundy

English

138

5— Curlew,

English

134

5 — ^Bardolph,

English

215

6 — Arctic,

EngUsh

169

6— Sunlight,

English

168

6— Star of West,

English

6 — ^Dromio,

English

208

6— Adolf,

Russian

594

7 — ^Menapier,

Belgian

1,425

7 — Trudvang,

Norwegian

640

7 — Superb,

Norwegian

1,393

7— GHttertind,

Norwegian

376

7— Pentland,

EngUsh

183

7 — Saturn,

English

7 — ^Nottingham,

English

1,033

8— Cardiff,

English

163

8— Qui Vive,

English

170

8— Edward,

English

146

9 — ^Lady Salisbury,

English

889

»— Ema Boldt,

English

210

9— Letty,

EngHsh

339

9 — Tunisian,

English

4,220

9 — Castor,

English

182

9 — ^Velocity,

English

186

10 — ^Intrepid,

English

180

10 — Strathcaim,

Enirlish

2,807

10 — Thomasina,

Russian

1,869

10— Otheo,

Swedish

979

— Dania,

Russian

1,689

— James Lyman,

English

640

— ^Britannia,

English

232

— Waago,

English

164

246

APPENDIX

Date and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

2 — ^Leuctra,

English

3,027

2— Plymouth,

English

165

3 — Crown of Tndia,

English

2,056

13— Bellglade,

Norwegian

665

13 — Diamant,

French

3,445

3 — Cocoa Mental,

Danish

340

13 — ^Dnranger,

Norwegian

2,280

4 — ^Hopemounty

English

3,300

15— Argyll,

English

280

5— Petrel,

English

265

5 — ^Explorer,

English

156

16 — Japonica,

English

145

15 — Verdlandi,

Swedish

947

16 — Strathnaim,

English

4^36

16— TraflPord,

English

234

6 — Desabla,

English

6,000

17— Tumwell,

English

4,264

1»— Dulcie,

English

2,000

21 — Carisbropk,

English

2,352

23 — 7 fishing vessels.

English

1,316

23— Truma,

Norwegian

1,557

23 — Tunisania,

English

4,220

23— Leo,

Russian

480

27— Edith

EngUsh

1,210

27 — ^Indrani,

English

3,640

28 — Armenian,

English

8,825

28 — ^Dumfriesshire,

English

2,565

29 — Scottish Monarohj

English

5,043

30 — Cambuskenneth,

Norwegian

1,925

30— Gjeso,

Norwegian

1,004

30— Krotka,

Norwegian
JULY.

880

1 — Lomas,

English

3,048

1— Thistlebank,

English

2,430

1 — Sardomene,

Italian

2,000

2— Welbury,

English

3,591

2 — Inglemoor,

English

2,754

2 — Caucasian,

EngUsh

2,965

2— L. C. Tower,

English

290

3 — Richmond,

English

3,214

3 — Craigard,

English

3,286

3 — ^Larchmore,

English

4,355

3 — Renfrew,

English

3,488

3— Gadsby

English

3,497

3 — ^Boduognat,

Belgian

1441

4 — Carthage,

French

5,275

5 — ^Fiery Cross,

Norwegian

&— Guido,

English

2,145

9 — Anna,

Russian

247

APPENDIX

Date and Name.

Nationality.

Tons.

9 — ^Marion lig^tbody

, Russian

10 — ^Ellsmore,

English

1170

10— Clio,

Italian

10 — ^Naardas,

Norwegian

15 — ^Bym,

Norwegian

16— Balwa,

English

23 — ^Rubonia,

Russian

5,434

24— Star of Peace,

English

Trawler

25 — Danae,

French

1055 !

25— Firth,

English

406

25 — ^Henry Charles,

English

Trawler

25— Kathleen,

English

Trawler

25 — ^Activity,

English

Trawler

25 — ^Prosper,

English

Trawler

25 — ^Leelanaw,

American

1,924

26— Fimreite,

Norwegian

3,819

26 — Grangewood

English

3,422

26— Harboe,

Norwegian

Trawler

26— Harbitz,

Norwegian

Trawler

27— Rosslyn,

English

Trawler

27— Celtic,

English

Trawler

27 — Cydoma,

English

Trawler

27— Gadwell,

English

Trawler

27 — Strathmore,

English

Trawler

27 — ^Honoria,

English

Trawler

27 — Cassio,

English

Trawler

27 — ^Hermione,

English

Trawler

27— Sutton,

English

Trawler

27— Nogill,

Danish

28— Hogarth,

English

1,231

28 — Sagndalen,

Swedish

28— Westwood Ho,

English

Smack

28 — ^Mangara,

English

28 — Icemi,

English

Trawler

28— Salacia,

English

Trawler

28 — Emma,

Swedish

28— Maria,

Danish

28 — Neptunis,

Danish

28— Lena,

Danish

29 — ^Princesse Marie

Jose, Belgian

1,952

29— Fortuna,

Swedish

303

30— Prince Albert,

Belgian

1,810

30 — Tron dh jemsf jord,

Norwegian

2,730

31 — Iberian,

English
AUGUST.

5,^3

2 — Clintonia

English

3,838

2 — ^Benvorlich,

English

3,381

2— Fulgens,

English

2,501

8 — Glenravel,

English

1,092

248

APPENDIX

Date and Name.

Nationality.

8 — Malmland,

Swedish

8 — Ocean Queen,

English

9— Mai

Swedish

10 — ^Jason

Danish

10 — Westminster,

English

10— Harbor Wiper,

English

10 — ^Benardna,

English

10 — Geiranger,

Norwegian

11 — Oakwood,

English

11 — Moma,

Norwegian

11 — ^Francois,

French

11 — ^Toung Admiral,

English

11 — George Crabbe,

English

11 — ^Illustrious,

English

11— Calm,

English

11 — Trevire

English

11 — Welcome,

English

11 — Utopia,

English

11— Baltzur,

Russian

13 — Jacona,

English

13 — Osprey

English

13 — Snmmerfield,

English

13 — Aura,

Norwegian

13— Thrush,

English

13— Humfrey,

English

14 — Cairo,

English

14 — I*rincess Caroline,

English

14 — Isodoro,

Spanish

17 — Ameshyst,

English

IS-

English

IS—

English

18 — Dunsley,

English

18 — ^Peria Castillo,

Spanish

18 — Sverresborg,

Norwegian

19 — Arabic,

English

19 — Grodno,

English

19 — Serbino,

English

19 — Magda,

Norwegian

20 — Restormel,

English

20 — Baron Eskine,

English

20— City Qf New York,

English

20 — Samara,

English

20— Gladiator,

English

20— Bittern,

English

20— Ben Brachie,

English

20— Bras,

Norwegian

21 — Carterswell,

English

21 — Daghestan,

Belgian

22— Cober,

English

Tons.

3,779

Trawler

189

Trawler

1,081

4,279

1,612

2,212

Trawler

3,000
Trawler

2,438

Trawler

1,621

888

Smack

1,605
1,920
674
15,801
1,955
2,205
1,063
2,118
5,585
2,790
3,172
3,359
1,797
3,908
1,351
4,000
2,818
3,060

249

APPENDIX

A aLANOE AT mLTTASISM.

One word has been much of late on the lips and in the
minds of many well intentioned people, militarism. This
word seems to express in itself to the minds of these good
people all the qualities which are supposed to be antag-
onistic to political and mental liberty, to the growth of
nations -along what they term democratic or humani
tarian lines, to the rights of any but the stronger, in fact
to all aspirations for freedom in any form of either in-
dividual or nation.

What then is militarism, is it a physical condition or a
state of mind f

Is it the physical condition of preparedness for war
by a nation f or the existence in the minds of the
people of a nation of a desire for conquest, a lust for
dominion, a yearning for commanding their neighbors
and forcing them to' do their will f

Let us assume then that this is a state of mind pri-
marily, and basically.

To be of any importance, however, any state of mind
must find some expression and it is by induction from this
expression that we can ascertain the extent to which any
given people is of this state of mind, a fact which there
is no other method of ascertaining, since there exists no
other measure applicable.

Now it is often charged with the utmost vehemence that
Germany is and has been for many years a nation of more
militaristic mind than Great Britain, than France, than
Bussia, or than Austria. Let us apply the test of the
physical expression of militarism to these four nations
and see what results we can draw therefrom.

The two forms of this physical expression by nations
are the army and the navy, and the expenditures thereon.
Taking up the physical expressions relating to the army
first, we find in 1913 that the peace armies of these five
nations were;

Eussia 1,290,000

Germany 870,000

France 720,000

Austria 390,000

Great Britain 254,000

Per million inhabitants of all kinds, the number of
soldiers was:

France 18,321

Germany 13,405

Eussia 8,062

250

APPENDIX

Austria 7,895

Great Britain 5,656

These nations spent on their armies in 1913 :

Russia $317,800,000

Great Britain 135,700,000

France 191,431,000

Germany 183,090,000

Austria 82,300,000

The per capita cost in these several countries of main-
taining the army was in 1913 :

Great Britain $3.02

France 4.87

Germany 2.82

Russia 1.99

Austria 1.67

The average cost of maintenance, etc., of a soldier in
each of these countries was in 1913 :

Great Britain $881

France 266

Russia 246

Austria 211

Gtermany 210

So that Germany had neither the largest army abso-
lutely nor did she have the largest army relatively to the
number of her population, nor did she spend the largest
amount of money on her army in 1913.

If we turn to the Navy the figures run as follows :

Peace strength of navies :

Great Britain 137,500

Germany 66,783

France 60,621

Russia 52,463

Austria 17,581

The number of sailors per million inhabitants was :

Great Britain 3,056

France 1,542

Germany 1,029

Austria 356

Russia 328

and the gross cost of maintenance of these navies was as
follows:

Great Britain $224,140,000

Russia 122,500,000

France 119,571,000

Germany 111,300,000

Austria 42,000,000

251

APPENDIX

and per capita of total population :

Great Britain $4.98

France 3.04

Germany 1.71

Austria 0.85

Bussia 0.77

The average cost per sailor to each country was as
follows :

Austria . 2,386

Russia 2,333

Prance 1,973

Germany 1,667

Great Britain 1,630

and the cost per capita to the several countries for both
army and navy combined was as follows :

Great Britain $8.00

France 7.91

Germany 4.53

Russia 2.76

Austria 2.52

By not one of these tests is Germany found to have
been predominant in her physical manifestations of her
militaristic state of mind.

There is, however, another physical test to be applied
which is of importance and this is epitomized in the an-
swer to the question how often in recent history have
these several nations waged war? It can be fairly said
that it is- obvious that a militaristic nation wages war
more frequently than a non-militaristic. Wars waged
during the last 100 years— 1814-1914 :

Great Britain 31

France 26

Russia 8

Germany 4

Austria 3

But perhaps a hundred years is too long a period, since
the dove of peace was completely absent for the early
part of the 19th century.

Let us therefore only consider the period since the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, the period as the good
people tell us of the rapid spread of democracy, the in-
crease of knowledge, the diffusion of education, etc., etc.
In these 43 years then we find these nations waged war as
follows :

Great Britain 18 times

France 10 ''

252

APPENDIX

I Russia 3

Qermajiy '*

Austria "

We now, therefore, arrive at the rather peculiar result
that not only in the last hundred, but also in the last 43
years, the nation accused of the greatest militarism has
waged the fewest wars, but also that in no other physical
sympton of this terrible militarism is this nation predom-
inant.

The moral protector of small nations (by annexation)
has waged war oftenest, Russia has the largest army,
France the most soldiers in proportion to her population,
the latter country also spending the most per capita on
her army, etc., etc.

•V

253

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