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FIREARMS CONTROL REGULATIONS ACT OF 1975
(Council Act No. 1-142)
94-2
HEARING AND DISPOSITION
STANFORD
IIBRARIES
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
THE 'DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NlNETy-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H. Con. Res. 694
TO DISAPPROVE THE FIREARMS CONTROL REGULATIONS
ACT OF 1975
AUGUST 25, 1976
Serial No. 94-24
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D G2': 9V-iV
/FIREARMS CONTROL REGUUTIONS AQ OF 1975
(CouncO Act No. 1-142)
P94-66
Q<^_0 STANFORD
HEAEING AND DISPOSITION
BBFOKB THE
COMMITTEE ON
THE 'DISTRICT OF COLUpiA
HOUSE OF REPfiESENTATITES
NINETY-FODBTH CONQKESS
SDCOND SESSION
ON
H. Con. Res. 694 - -
AUGUST 25, 1976
Serial No. 94-24
.„tN1 ^'^'^
3. GOVEBNHBNT FRINTING 3fl
WASHINQTON : 1SI«
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COMMITTEE ON THE DISTEICT OF COLUMBIA
CHABLBS C. DIOOa, Jb., Michigan, Chairman
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
W. a. (BILL) 8TCCKEY, In., Oeorgla
RONALD V. DELLCMS, CallfoTDia
THOMAS M. REES, CallfarDla
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, DeleEite,
District ot Columbia
JAMBS E. MANN. South Carolina
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky
HRRBERT E. HARRIS II, Virginia
DAN DAXIEL, Virginia
HELEN S. METNER, New Jersey
HENRX J. NOWAE, New York
PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana
GILBERT QDDE, Maryland
WILLIAM H. HARSHA. Oblo
STEWART B. McKINNEY. Connecticut
EDWARD O. BIESTER, Jft., PcnaaylTanl
TOM RAILSBACK. Illinois
ROBERT W. DANIEL, Jb.. Virginia
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Oblo
Bdwibd C. Silvesibb, Jr., Staff Director
RoHi O. Mabxin, Oeneral Oomuet
Mabk Mathis, iHttortta Oovntel
jAMia T, Clibk, Ltgiilative Ooantel
OiltB MlcIVEH, staff CouniEt
Daniel M. Fbieuan, StaW Counsel
DOBOTHT Anoebbon. Staff Atiittant
Edwahd L, Cleveland, Blaff Attittant
DOHOVAN Qay. Staff Attittant
DiEiVA Obbald. Staff Aartitant
Kbbbt O. Holuan. Staff Aiiiitant
WiLBUB O. HroHia, Jr., Staff Aiilttant
BARBtHA Jacrhom, Staff Anittant
QWKNDOLiN KIUBHODOH, Staff Assistant
Haboi Uosbaxe, rStalT Assistant
Nelson F, Rtuehsnydeb, StaU AsiiSIonl
Inez Sodntbeb, Staff Assistant
Jacqueline E. Wells, Staff Assistant
Joan Willodobbi, StafT Assistant
JAUEB M. ChbihtIaN, Deputy Minority Countel
WILLIAM Chandlbb, Legltlatlve Staff Aisiilant
David C. Patch, Legiilalive Staff Atfiilant
Cabol B. Thomfbdn. Legiilative Staff Assistant
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CONTENTS
H, Con. Res. 694, 2d Sess. (by Mr. Eon Paul), to disapprove the District of
Columbia Firearms Control Regulations Act which was adopted by the *■»<•
District of Columbia Council. 1
H. Con. Bes. 716 (by Mr. Ron Paul) , (identical to H. Con. Bee. 691) 1
H. Con. Res. 763 (by Mr. Paul et al.) on September 21, 1976 1
H. Res. 1447 (by Mr. Paul) on July 26. 1976 120
H. Res. 1474 (by Mr. Aahbrook) on August 10, 19T6___ _ 120
H. Res. 1481 (by Mr. Paul et al.) on August 10, 1976 120
H. Res. 1560 (by Mr. Paul et al.) on September 21, 1976 119
FirearmB Control Regulations Act of 1975 (Council Act No. 1-142) and
Report of the Council of the District of Columbia 1-66
STATEMENTS
Asbbrook, Hon. John M., a Representative In Congress from the State of
Ohio 100
Fauntroy, Hon. Walter E __ 68
Qude, Hon. Gilbert 67
McKlnney, Hon. Stewart B 69
Paul, Hon. Ron Paul, a Representative In Congress from the State of
Texas, accompanied by Rufus Peckham, a citizen of the District of
Columbia 70, 97
RIsber, John R., Jr., Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia 102, 107
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Kates, Don B., Jr., article entitled, "Why a Civil Libertarian Opposes Gun
Control" 93
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, American Law
Division, Charles Doyle. Legislative Attorney, opinion re validity of
Council's Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975 (Act No. 1-142) 89-93
Melcber, Hon. John, a Representative in Congress from the State of Mon-
tana, statement 69
Risher, John R., Jr., Corporation Counsel (for Mayor Walter E. Wash-
ington), letter dated June 29, 1976. to Cbairman Di^s 106
Washington Hon. Walter E., Mayor, District of Columbia, statement 105
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
atizen's rights 79
Council act invalid 77
Council Act No. 1-142 100
Corporation Counsel's opinion 108
Council prohibition In Home Rule Act 107
Effect of legislation 80
Experiences in other countries 72
Firearms regulations 109
History of police regulations 108
Home Rule Act prohibition 100,111,112
H.R. 12261 101
Library of Congress opinion 72.78,101,116
OKioses gun control act 70
Penalty provisions HI
Procedure question 79
Regulation or sUtute 112, 113
Reservations of congressional authority 115
Review of Council acts 114
APPENDIX
Chronology 119
Additional disapproval resolntlona 120
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FIREARMS CONTROL REGULATIONS ACT OF 1975
TUESDAY, AUanST 25, 1876
House or Representatives,
Committee on the District of Columbia,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :10 a.m., in room 1310
Longworth House Office Building, Hon, Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chair-
man of the committee) _presiding.
Present : Representative Diggs, Delegate Fauntroy, and Representa-
tives Mann, Harris, Gude, McKinney, Blester, and Whalen.
Also present: Edward C. Sylvester, Jr., staff director; Ruby G.
Martin, general counsel; James T. Clark, legislative counsel; Mark
Mathis, minority counsel; and James Christian, deputy minority
counsel.
The Chairman. The meeting will come to order. The pending busi-
ness before the committee this morning is House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 694, a resolution of disapproval introduced on July 30, 1976, by
the gentleman from Texas, Congressman Ron Paul, to disapprove the
District of Columbia Firearms Control Regulations Act which was
adopted in the D.C. Council on the 29th of January 1976, signed by the
Mayor on the 23d of July, and transmitted to the Speaker on the 26th
of July.
[The documents referred to follow :]
(H. Can. Res. «S1, 84tb Cong.. 2d BesB., Introduced b; Mr. Paul on July 30, ISTS]
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Resolved t>y the House of Repretentativei (the Senate concurring). That the
Congress disapproves of the action of the District of Columbia Council described
as follows: The Firearms Control R^nlations Act of 1&T5 (Act 1-142) passed
by the Council of tbe District of Columttla on June 29, 1976, signed by the Mayor
of the District of Columbia on July 23. 19T6. and transmitted to the Congress on
July 2T. Id76, pursuant to section 602(c) of the District of Columbia Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act,
[H. Con. Res. 716, identical to H. Con. Res. 694, was introduced by Mr. Panl
(for himself, Mr. Kindness, Mr. Hall of Texas, Mr. Symms, Mr. Collins of
Texas, Mr, Ashbrook, Mr. Ketcbum, Mr. Melcher, and Mr, Rousselot), on
August 23, 1976]
FH, Con. Res. 763, Identical to H. Con. Res, 694, was introduced by Mr. Paul (for
himself. Mr. Kindness, Mr. Hall of Tesas, Mr. Symms, Mr. Collins of Texas,
Mr. Ashbrook. Mr. Ketcbum. Mr. Melcher, Mr. Rousellot, Mr. Kelly, Mr.
Hughes, and Mr. Lott), on September 21. 1976]
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2
[COHHITTEE PBIBT]
FIREAEMS CONTROL REGULATIONS
ACT OF 1975
(Council Act No. 1-142)
AND
REPORT OP THE
COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT
■ OP COLUMBIA
AS REFEiUt£D TO TH£
COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT
OP COLUMBIA
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
NINETT-FOUETH CONGEESS
SECOND SESSION
w
JULY 26, 19T«
Serial No. S-11
Printed tor the use of tbe Committee on the Dliitrlct of Colambla
V.B. OOVERNKENT PBINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : ISTt
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CONTENTS
Letter of IVansmtttal
Record of Council vote
Council Act 1-U2 ,
Coimcil report
House District Committee staff summu?-.
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4
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Council op the District of Columbia,
Washington, D.C., July 26, 1976:
Hon. Carl Albert,
Speaker of the House,
U.S. House of Representatwes,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I have the honor to transmit to you, in accord-
ance with section 602(c) of the D.C. Self- Government and Govern-
mental Reorganization Act, Public Ijaw 93-198, a copy of an act
adopted by tne Council on June 29, 1976, and signed by the Mayor
July 23, 1976. Act 1-142 would protect the citizens of the District from
loss of property, death, and injury, by controlling the availability of
firearms in the community.
Attached to the act is a docket for si^ature of the Clerk of the
House by the expiration of the 30-day review period. In the event dur-
ing this period the House adopts a resolution disapproving such act,
please so advise the Council on the docket sheet, noting the resolution
number and signature of the House Clerk.
To begin the count of the 30-day review by Congress, it would be
appreciated if your ofHce would acknowledge receipt of this document
on the tissue copy attached.
Sincerely yours,
Sterling Tucker,
Chairman.
Enclosures.
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AN ACT 1-142 In the Council of the District of Columbia. July 23, 1976 To
protect tbe Citizens of the District from iosa of property, death, and injuiy,
bj controlling the availability of firearms In the community
Be it enacted by the C&uricil of the District of Columbia, That this
act may be cited as the "Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975."
Sec. 2. Findings and purpose.
The Council of the District of CoJumbia finds that in order to
promote the health, safety and welfare of the people of the District
of Columbia it is necessary to:
(1) Req^uire the registration of all firearms that are owned by
private citizens:
(2) Limit the types of weapons persona may lawfully possess;
(3) Assure that only qualified persons are allowed to possess firearms ;
(4) Regulate deadly weapons dealers ; and
(5) Make it more difficult for firearms, destructive devices, and
ammunition to move in illicit commerce witJiin the District of
Columbia.
TITLE I — DEFINITIONS
Sec. 101. As used in this act the term —
(1) "Acta of Congress" means (A) an Act to control the possession,
sale, transfer, and uae ofpistols and other dangerous weapons, in the
District of Columbia (Dangerous Weapons Act), as amended, ap-
proved July 8, 1932 (D.C. Code, sec. 22-3201, et seq.); (B) Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (Title VII,
Unlawful Posaeasion or Receipt of Firearms (82 Stat. 236; ISU. S.C.
Appendix)); and (C) an Act to Amend Title 18, United States Code,
to Provide for Better Control of the Interstate Traffic in firearms
Actotl968(S2Stat. 12]3;18U.S.C.921,etseq.).
(2) "Ammunition" means cartridge cases, shells, projectiles (in-
cluding shot), primers, bullets, propellant powder, or other device? or
materials designed, redesigned, or intended for u^e in a firearm or
deatructive device.
(3) "Antiquefireaim" means —
(A) any firearm (including any firearm with a matchlock,
flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system)
manufactured in or before 1898; and
(B) any replica of any firearm described in subparagraph (1)
if such replica —
(i) is not designed or resdesigned for using rimfire or
conventional centerfire fixed ammunition, or
(ii) uses rimfire or conventional ammunition which is no
longer manufactured in the United States and which is not
readily available in the ordinarj' channels of commercial
trade.
(5)
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(4) "Chief" means the Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police
Department of the District of Columbia or his designated agent.
(5) "Crime of Violence" means a crime of violence as defined in
section 1 of the Act of July 8, 1932, as amended (D.C. Code, sec,
22-3201), committeed in any jurisdiction, but does not inchide
larceny or attempted larceny.
(6) "Dealer's license" means a license to buy or sell, repair, trade,
or otherwise deal in firearms, destructive devices, or ammunition as
provided for in Title TV of this Act.
(7) "Destructive device" means —
(A) an explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade,
rocket, misUe, mine, or similnr device;
(B) any device by whatever name known which will, or is
designed or redesigned, or may be readily converted or restored
to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other pro-
pellant through a smooth bore barrel, except a i-hotgun.
(C) any device containing tear gas or a chemically similar
lacrimator or stemutator by whatever name known;
(D) any device designed or redesigned, made or remade, or
readily converted or restored, and intended to stun or disable a
person by means of electric shock;
(E) any combination of parts designed or intended for use in
converting any device into any destructive device; or from which
a destructive device may be readily assembled: Provided, That
the term shall not inclucfe —
(i) any pneumatic, spring, or B-B gun which expels a single
projectile not exceeding .18 inch in diameter;
(ii) any device whidi is neither designed nor redesigned
for use as a weapon;
(iii) any de\ice originally a weapon which has been re-
designed for use as a signaling, line throwing, or safety
device; or,
(iv) any device which the Chief finds is not likely to be
used as a weapon.
(8) "District" means District of Columbia.
(9) "Firearm" means any weapon which will, or is designed or re-
designed, made or remade, readily converted or restored, and in-
tended to, expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an ex-
plosive; the frame or receiver of any such device; or any firearm
muffler or silencer: Provided, That such term shall not include —
(A) antique firearms: and/or
(B) destructive devices;
(C) any device used exclusively for line throwing, signaling, or
safety, and required or recommended by the Coast Guard or
Interstate Commerce Commission; or
(D) any device used exclusively for firing explosive rivets, stiui
cartridges, or similar industrial ammunition and incapable for
use as a weapon.
(10) "Machine gun" means any firearm which shoots, is designed to
shoot, or can be readilv converted or restored to shoot:
(A) automatically, more than one shot by a single function of
the tri^er;
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(B) seminutomaticallj', more than twelve shots without manual
reloading.
(11) "Organization" mean^ any partnership, company, corporation,
or other business entity, or any group or association of two or more
persons united for a common purpose.
(12) "Pisto!" means any firearm originally designed to be fired by
use of a single hand.
(13) "Registration certificate" means a certificate validly issued
pursuant to this act evincing the registration of a firearm pursuant
to this act.
(14) "Rifle" means a grooved bore firearm using a fixed metallic
cartridge with a single projectile and designed or redesigned, made or
remade, and intended to be fired from the siioulder,
(15) "Sawed-off shotgun" means a shotgun having a barrel of less
than 18 inches in length; or a firearm made from a shotgtm if such
firearm as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or
any barrel of less than 18 inches in length.
(16) "Shotgun" means a smooth bore firearm using a fixed shotgun
shell with either a number of ball shot or a single projectile, and
designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired
from the shoulder.
(17) "Short barreled rifle" means a rifle having any barrel less
than 16 inches in length, or a firearm made from a rifie if such firearm
as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or any barrel
of less than 16 inches.
(18) "Weapons offense" means any violation in any jurisdiction of
any law which involves the sale, purchase, transfer in any manner,
receipt, acquisition, possession, having under control, use, repair,
manufacturer, canying, or transportation of any firearm, ammunition,
or destructive device.
TITLE n — FIREARMS AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES
Sec. 201. Registration Required, (a) Except as otherwise provided
in this act, no ])erson or organization shall within the District receive,
possess, have under his control, transfer, offer for sale, sell, give, or
deliver any destructive device, and no person or organization shall,
within the District possess or have under his or its control any firearm,
unless such person or oi^anization is the holder of a valid registration
certificate for such fireaim. In the case of an organization, a registra-
tration certificate shall be issued (1) only to an organization which
has in its employ one or more commissioned special police officers or
other employees licensed to carry firearms, and which arms sucli
employees witli firearms during such employees duty hours and (2)
only to such organization in its own name and in the name of its
president or the chief executive.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not applv to —
(1) Any law enforcement officer or agent of the District or the
United States, or any law enforcement officer or agent of the
government of any State or subdivision thereof, or any member
of the Armed Forces of the United States, the National Guard
or Organized Reserves, when such officer, agent,{or member is
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authorized to possess such a firearm or device while on duty in the
performance of official authorized functions.
(2) Any person holding a dealer's license: Provided, That the
firearm or destructive device is —
(A) acquired by such person in the normal conduct of
(B) is kept at the place described in the dealer's license;
and
(C) is not kept for such person's private use or protection,
or for the protection of his business,
(3) With respect to firearms, any non-resident of the District
participating in any lawful recreational firearm-related activity
m the District, or on his way to or from such activity in another
jurisdiction: Provided, That such person, wiieuever in possession
of a firearm, shall upon demand of any member of the Metr^oli-
tan Police Department, or other bona fide law enforcement officer,
exhibit proof that he is on his way to or from such activity, and
that his possession or control of such firearm is lawful in the
jurisdiction in which he resides: Provided further, that such
weapon shall be unloaded, securely wrapped, and carried in open
view.
Sec. 202. Unregisterable Firearms. No r^istration certificate shall
be issued for any of the following types of fireanns:
(a) Sawed-off shotgun;
(b) Machine gun;
(c) Short^barreled rifle;
(d) Pistol not validly registered to the current registrant in the
District prior to the effective date of this act; and
(e) Pistol not possessed by the current registrant in conformity with
the regulations in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this
act.
Sec. 203. Prerequisites to registration; application for registration.
(a) No registration certificate shall be issued to any person (and
in the case of a person between the ages of 18 and 21, to the person
and his signatory parent or guardian) or organization unless the Chief
determines that such person (or the president or chief executive in the
case of an organization) :
(1) is twenty-one years of age or older: Provided, That the Chief
may issue to an applicant between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one
years old, and who is otherwise qualified, a registration certificate if
the application is accompanied by a notarized statement of the
applicant's parent or guardian —
(A) that the applicant has the permission of his parent or
guardian to own and use the firearm to be registered ; and
(B) the parent or guardian assumes civil liability for all damages
resulting from the actions of such applicant in the use of the
firearm to be registered : Provided further, that such registration
certificate shall expire on such person's twenty-first birthday;
(2) Has not been convicted of a crime of violence, weapons offense,
or of a violation of this act;
(3) Is not under indictment for a crime of violence or a weapons
offense ;
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(4) Has not been convicted within five years prior to the application
of any —
(A) violation in any jurisdiction of any law restricting the use,
possession, or sale of anv narcotic or dangerous drug; or
(B) a violation ot section 2 of the Act of July 16, 1912 (D.C.
Code, sec. 22-507 (197^)), regarding threats to do bodily harm,
or section S06 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code, sec.
22-504 (1973)), regarding assaults and threats, or any similar
F>rovision of the law of any other jurisdiction so as to indicate a
ikelihood to make unlawful use of a firearm;
(5) Within the five year period immediately preceding the applica-
tion, has not been acquitted of any criminal chaise oy reason of
insanity or has not been adjudicated a chronic alcoholic by any court,
Provided, That this paragraph shall not apply if such person shall
present to the Chief with the application, a medical certification
indicating that the applicant has recovered from such insanity or
alcoholic condition and is capable of safe and responsible possession of a
firearm;
(6) Within the five years immediately preceding the application,
has not been voluntaiy or involuntary committed to any mental
hospital or institution; Provided, That this paragraph shall not apply,
if such person shall present to the Chief with the applicant a medical
certification that the apphcant has recovered from whatever malady
prompted such commitment;
(7) Does not appear to sufler from a physical defect which would
tend to indicate that the applicant would not be able to possess and
use a firearm safelj- and responsibly;
(8) Has not been adjudicated negligent in a firearm mishap causing
death or serious injury to another numan being;
(9) Is not otherwise ineligible to possess a pistol under section 3 of
the Act of July 8, 1932 (D.C. Code, sec. 22-3203);
(10) Has not failed to demonstrate satisfactorily a knowledge of the
laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to firearms and the safe
and responsible use of the same in accordance with tests and standards
prescribed by the Chief; Provided, That once this determination is
made with respect to a given apphcant for a particular type of firearm,
it need not be made again for the same applicant witn respect to a
subsequent application for the same type of firearm; and
(11) Has vision better than or equal to that required to obtain a
valid driver's license under the laws of the District of Columbia;
Provided, That current licensure by the District of Columbia, of the
applicant to drive, shall be prima facie evidence that such applicant's
vision is sufficient and, Provided further, that this determination need
not be made more than once per year per applicant.
(b) Every person applying for a registration certificate shall provide
on a form prescribed by the Chief :
(1) The full name or any other name by which the applicant is
known,
(2) The present address and each home address where the applicant
has resided during the five year period immediately preceding the
application.
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(3) The present busmcMs or occupation and any business or occupa-
tion in which the applicant has engaged during the five-year penod
immediately precedmg the apphcation and the addresses of such
busines-?es or places of employment.
(4) The date and place of birth of the applicant.
(5) The Hex of the appHcant.
(6) Whether (and if so, the reasons) the District, the United States
or the government of any State or subdivision of any State has denied
or revoked the appHcant's license, registration certificate, or permit
pertaining to any firearm.
(7) A description of the applicant's role in any mishap involving
a firearm, including the date, place, time, circumstances, and the
names of the person injured or killed.
(8) The int«nded use of the firearm.
(9) The caliber, make, model, manufacturer's identification number,
serial number, and any other identifying marks on the firearm.
(10) The name and address of the person or organization from whom
the firearm was obtained, and in tne case of a dealer, his dealer's
license number.
(11) Where the firearm will generally be kept.
(12) Whether the applicant has applied for any other registration
certificates issued and outstandii^.
(13) Such other information as the Chief determines is necessary
to carry out the provisions of this act.
(c) Every organization applying for a registration certificate shall —
(1) with respect to the president or chief executive of such
organization, comply with the requirements of subsection (b) ;
and
(2) provide such other information as the Chief determines is
necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.
Sec. 204. Fingerprinting, pictures, personal appearances.
(a) The Chief may require any person applying for a r^istration
certificate to be fingerprinted if, m nis judgment, this is necessary to
conduct an efficient and adequate investigation into the matters
described in section 203(a) and to effectuate the purpose of this act:
Provided, That any person who has been fingerprinted by the Chief
within five years prior to submitting the apphcation need not, in the
Chief's discretion, be fingerprinted ^ain if he offers other satisfactory
proof of identity.
(b) Each applicant, other than an organization, shall submit with
the application two full-face photographs of himself , 1^ by 1 J^-inches
in size which shall have been taken within the thirty-day period
immediately preceding the filing of the application.
(c) Every applicant (or in the case of an organization, the president
or chief executive, or a person authorized in writii^ by him), shall
appear in person at a time and place prescribed by the Chief, and may
be required to bring with him the firearm for which a reigistration
certificate is sought, which shall be unloaded and securely wrapped,
and carried in open view.
Sbc. 205. ApiMication under oath; fees.
(a) Each applicant (the president or chief executive in the case of
an organization) shall sign an oath or afiSrmation attesting to the
truth of all the information required by section 203.
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(b) Each application required by this title shall be accompanied
by a non-refundable fco to be established by the Mayor; Provided,
That such fee shall, in the judgment of the Mayor, reimburse the
District for the cost of services provided under this title.
Sec. 206. Filing times for new purchase and firearms entering the
District; previously registered firearms.
(a) An application for a registration certificate shall be filed (and
a registration certificate issued) prior to taking possession of a firearm
from a licensed dealer or from any person or organization holding a
registration certificate therefor. In all other cases, an application for
registration shall be filed immediately after a firearm is brougtit into
the District. It shall be deemed compUance with the preceding sentence
if such person personally communicates with the Nletropolitan Police
Department {as determined by the Chief to be sufficient) and provides
such information as may be demanded : Provided, That such person
files an application for a registration certificate within 48 hours after
such communication.
(b) Any firearm validly registered under prior regulations must be
registered pursuant to this act in accordance with procedures to be
promulgated by the Cliief. An application to register such firearm shall
be filed pursuant to this act within 60 days of the effective date of
this act.
Sec. 207. Issuance of registration certificate.
(a) upon receipt of a properly executed application for a registration
certificate, the Chief, upon determining through inquiry, investigation,
or otherwise, that the applicant is entitled and qualified under the
provisions of this act, thereto, shall issue a registration certificate.
Each registration certificate shall be in duplicate and bear a unique
registration certificate number and such other information as the
Chief determines is necessary to identify the applicant and the firearm
registered. The duplicate of the registration certificate shall be delivered
to the applicant and the Chief shall retain the original.
(b) The Chief shall approve or deny an application for a registration
certificate within a 60 day period beginnmg on the date the Chief
receives the application, unless good cause is shown, including non-
receipt of information from sources outside the District government;
Provided, That in the case of an application to register a firearm
validly registered under prior regulations, the Chief shall have 365
days after the receipt of such application to approve or deny such
application. The Chief may hold in abeyance an application where
there is a revocation proceeding pending against such person or
organization.
(c) Upon receipt of a registration certificate, each applicant shall
examine same to ensure that the information thereon is correct. If
the registration certificate Ls incorrect in any respect, the person or
oi^anization names thereon shall return it to the Chief with a signed
statement showing the nature of the error. The Chief shall correct the
error, if it occurred through administrative error. In the event the
error resulted from iufonnation contained in the application, the
applicant shall be required to file an amended application setting forth
the correct information, and a statement explaming the error in the
original appUcation. Each amended application shall be accompanied
by a fee equal to that required for the original application.
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(d) In the event the Chief learns of an error in a registration certifi-
cate other than as provided tn subsection (c), he may require the holder
to return the refristration certificate for con-ection. If the error re-
sulted from information contained in the application, the person or
oi^anization named therein shall be required to file an amended
application as provided in subsection (c).
(e) Each registration certificate issued by the Chief shall be ac-
companied by a statement setting forth the registrant's duties nnder
this act.
Sec. 208- Additional Duties of Registrants.
Each person and organization holding a registration certificate, in
addition to any other requirements imposed by this act, or the Acts of
of Congress, shall:
(a) notify the Chief in writing of :
(!) the loss, theft, or destruction of the registration certificate or of
a registered firearm (including the circumstances, if known) immedi-
ately upon discover}" of such loss, theft, or destruction ;
(2) a change in any of the information appearing on the registration
certificate or requiied by section 203 of this act ;
(3) the sale, transfer or other disposition of the firearm not less than
forty-eight hours prior to delivery, pursuant to such sale, transfer or
other dispostion, including —
(A) identification of the registrant, the firearm and the serial
number of the registration certificate ;
(B) the name, residence, and business address and date of
birth of the pei'son to whom the firearm has been sold or trans-
ferred; and
(C) whether the fireann was sold or how it was otherwise trans-
foired or disposed of.
(b) Return to the Chief, the registration certificate for any firearm
which is lost, stoen, destroyed, or othenvise transferred or disposed of,
at the time he notified the Chief of such loss, theft, destruction, sale,
transfer, or other disposition.
(c) Have in his possession, whenever in possession of a firearm, the
registration certificate for such firearm, and exhibit the same upon the
demand of a member of the Metropolitan Police Department, or other
law enforcement officer.
Sec. 209. Revocation.
A registration certificate shall be revoked if —
(1) any of the criteria in section 203 of this act are not currently
met:
(2) the registered firearm has become an unregisterable fireann
under the terms of section 202 of this act, or a destructive device ;
(3) the information furnished to the Chief on the application
for a registration certificate proves to be intentionally false ; or
(4) there is a violation ov omission of the duties, obligations or
requirements imposed by section 208 of this act.
Sec. 210. Procedures for denial or revocation.
(a) If it appears to the Chief that an application for a registration
certificate should be denied or that a re^stration certificate should be
revoked, the Chief shall notify the applicant or registrant of the pro-
posed denial or revocation, briefly stating the reason or reasons there-
for. Service may be made by delivering a copy of the notice to the
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applicant or registrant personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the
place of residence identified on the apphcation or registration with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by
mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail to the residence address
identified on the application or certificate, in which case service shall
be complete as of the date the return receipt was signed. In the case of
an oi^anization, service may be made upon the president, chief execu-
tive, or other officer, managing agent or person authorized by appoint-
ment or law to receive such notice as dascribed in the preceding sen-
tence at the business address of the oi^anization identified in the
application or registration certificate. The pei-son serving the notice
shall make proof thereof with the Chief in a manner prescribed by him.
In the case of service by certified mail, the signed return receipt shall
be filed with the Chief together with a signed statement showing the
date such notice was mailed; and if the return receipt does not purport
to be si^ed by the person named in the notice, then specific facts
from which the Chief con determine that the pei-son who signed the
receipt meets the appropriate qualifications for receipt of such notice
set out in this subsection. The applicant or registrant shall have 15
days from the date the notice is served in which to submit further
evidence in support of the application or qualifications to continue to
hold a registration certificate, as the case may be: Provided, that if the
applicant does not make such a submission within fifteen days from
the date of service, the applicant or registrant shall be deemed to have
conceded the validity of trie reason or reasons stated in the notice, and
the denial or revocation shall become final.
(b) Within ten days of the date upon which the Chief receives such a
submission, he shall serve upon the applicant or registiant in the
manner specified in subsection (a) notice of his final decision. The
Chief's decision shall become effective at the expiration of the time
within which to file a notice of appeal pursuant to the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code, sec. 1-1501,
et. seq.) or, if such a notice of appeal is filed, at the time the final
order or judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
becomes effective.
(c) Within seven days of a decision unfavorable to the applicant or
registrant becoming final, the applicants or registrant shall (1) peace-
ably surrender to the Chief the firearm for which the registration
ceitificate was revoked in the manner provided in section 704, or (2)
lawfully remove such firearm from the District for so long as he has an
interest in such firearm, or, Qi) otherwise lawfully dispose of his interest
in such firearm.
Sec, 211. Certain information not to be used as evidence
No information obtained from a person under this title or retained
by a person in order to comply with any section of this title, shall
be used as evidence against such person in any criminal proceeding
with respect to a violation of this act, occurring prior to or con-
currentlv with the fifing of the information required by this title:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to any violation of section
85S of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code, sec. 22.2501) or section
703 of this act.
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TITLE III-— ESTATES CONTAINING FIREARMS
Sec. 301. Rights and responsibilities of executors and admin-
istrators.
(a) The executor or administrator of an estate containing a firearm
shall notify the Chief of the death of the decedent within thirty days
of his appointment or qualification, whichever is earlier.
(b) Until the lawful disti-ibution of such firearm to an heir or legatee
or the lawful sale, transfer, or disposition of the fiieai-m by the estate;
the executor or administrator of such estate shall be charged with the
duties and obligations which would have been imposed by this act
Upon the decedent, if the decedent were still alive: Provided, That
such executor or administrator shall not be liable to the criminal
penalties of section 705.
TITLE IV LICENSING OF FIREARMS BUSINESSES
Sec. 401. — Prohibitions, exceptions.
(a) No person or organization shall manufacture any firearm,
destructive device or parts thereof, or ammunition, within the Dis-
trict; Provided, That persons holding registration certificates may
engage in hand loading, reloading, or custom loading ammunition for
his registered firearms: Provided Jurtker, that such persons may not
hand Toad, reload, or custom load ammunition for others.
(b) No person or oiganization shall engage in the business of selling,
purchasing, or repairing any firearm, destructive device, parts therefor,
or ammunition, without first obtaining a dealer's license, and no
licensee shall engage in the business of selling, purchasing, or repairing
firearms which are unregisterable under section 202 of this act,
destructive devices, or parts therefor, except pursuant to a valid
work or purchase order, for those persons specified in section 201 (b) (1)
of this act.
Sec. 402. Eligibility for dealer's license; application for same; fee.
(a) Any person eligible to register a fireann under this act, and
who, if a registrant, has not previously failed to perform any of the
duties imposed by this act; and, any person eligible under the Acts of
Congress to engage in such business, may obtain a dealer's license, or
a renewal thereof, which shall be valid for a period of not more than
one year from the date of issuance. The license required by tliis act,
shall be in addition to any cither license or licensing procedure re-
quired by law.
(b) Each application for a dealer's license and each application
for renewal thereof shall be made on a form prescribed by the Chief,
shall be sworn to or affirmed by the applicant, and shall contain —
(1) the infonnation required by section 203(a);
(2) the address where the applicant conducts or intends to
conduct his business;
(ii) whether the applicant, prior to the effective date of this act,
held a license to deal in deadly weapons in the District; and
(4) such other information as the Chief may require, including
fingerprints and photographs of the applicant, to carry out the
purposes of this act.
(c) Each application for a dealer's license, or renewal shall be
accompanied by a fee established by the Mayor; Provided, That such
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fee shall in the judgment of the Mayor, reimburse the District for
the cost of services provided under this title.
Sec. 403. Issuance of a dealer's license, procedure.
(a) Upon receipt of a properly executed application for a dealer's
license, or renewal thereof, the Chief, upon determining through
further inquiry, investigation, or otherwise, that the applicant is
entitled and qualified under the provisions of this act thereto, shall
issue a dealer's license. Each dealer's license shall be in duplicate and
bear a unique dealer's license number, and such other infoiTnation
as the Chief determines is neccssarj- to identify the applicant and
premises. The duplicate of the dealer's license shall be delivered to
the applicant and the Chief shall retain the original.
(b) The Chief shall approve or deny an application for a registration
certificate within a 60-aay period beginning on the date the Chief
receives the application, unless good cause is shown, including non-
receipt of information from sources outside the District Government.
The Chief may hold in abeyance an application where there is any
firearms revocation proceeding pending against such person,
(c) Upon receipt of a dealer's license each applicant shall examine
the same to ensure that the information thereon is correct. If the
dealer's license is incorrect in any respect, the person named thereon
shall return the same to the Chief with a signed statement showing
the nature of the error. The Chief shall correct the error, if it occurred
through administrative error. In the event the error resulted from
information contained in the application, the applicant shall be re-
iluirL'd to Ci[e an amended application explaining the eiTor in the
original application. Each amended application sliall be accompanied
by a fee equal to that required for the original application.
(d) In the event the Chief learns of an error in a dealer's license,
other than as provided in subsection (c), he may requiie the holder to
return the dealer's license for correction. If the error resulted from
information contained in the application, the person named therein
shall be requu-ed to file an amended application as provided in sub-
section (c).
(e) Each dealer's license issued by the Chief shall be accompanied
by a statement setting forth a dealer's duties under this act.
Sec. 404. Duties of licensed dealers; records, reports.
(a) Each person holding a dealer's license, in addition to any other
requirements imposed by this act, the Acts of Congress, and other
law, shall —
(1) display the dealer's license in a conspicuous place on the
premises ;
(2) notify the Chief in writing —
(A) of the loss, theft, or destruction of the dealer's license
{including the circumstances, if known) immediately upon
the discovery of such loss, theft, or destruction;
(B) of a change in any of the infurmatioa appearing on the
dealer' .s license or required by section 402 of this act imme-
diately upon the occurrence of any .such change:
(3) keep at the premises identified in the dealer's license a true
and current record in book form of —
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(A) the name, address, home phone, and date of birth of
each employee handling firearms, ammunition, or destructive
devices;
(B) each firearm or destnictivt* device received into invea-
tory or for repair including tiie —
(i) serial number, caliber, make, model, manufacturer's
number {if any), dealer's idontificntion number (if any),
registration certificate number (if any) of the firearm,
and similar descriptive information for destructive
devices;
(ii) name, address, and dealer's license number (if any)
of the person or oi^anization from whom the firearm or
destructive device was purchased or otherwise received;
(iii) consideration given for the firearm or destructive
device, if any;
(iv) date and time received bv the licensee and in the
case of repair, returned to tne person holding the
registration certificate; and
(v) nature of the repairs made.
(C) each firearm or destructive device sold or transferred
including the —
(i) serial number, caliber, make, model, manufac-
turer's number or dealer's identification number, and
registration certificate number (if any) of the firearm
or similar information for destructive devices;
(ii) name, address, registration certificate number or
license number (if any) of the person or organization to
whom transferred;
(iii) the consideration for transfer; and,
(iv) time and date of delivery of the firearm or
destructive device to the transferee:
(D) ammunition received into inventory including the —
(i) brand and number of rounds of each caliber or gauge;
(ii) name, address, and dealer's license or registration
number (if any) of the person or organization from whom
received ;
(iii) consideration given for the ammunition; and
(iv) date and time of the receipt of the ammunition;
(E) ammunition sold or transferred including —
(i) brand and number of rounds of each caliber or gauge;
(ii) name, address and dealer's license number (if any) of
the person or organization to whom sold or transferred;
(iii) if the purchaser or transferee is not a licensee, the
registration certificate number of the firearm for which the
ammunition was sold or transferred;
(iv) the consideration for the sale and transfer; and
(v) the date and time of sale or transfer;
(b) The records required by subsection (a) shall upon demand be
exhibited during normal business hours to any member of the Metro-
politan Police Department.
(c) Each person holding a dealer's license shall, when required by
the Chief in writing, submit on a form and for the periods of time
specified, any record information required to be maintained by sub-
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section (a), and any other information reasonably obtainable there-
from.
Sec. 405. Revocation.
A dealer's license shall be revoked if —
(a) any of the criteria in section 404 of this act is not currently
met, or
(b) The information furnished to the Chief on the application for a
dealer's license proves to be intentionally false; or
(c) there is a violation or omission of the duties, obligations, or
requirements imposed by section 404 of this act.
Sec. 406. Procedures for denial and revocation.
(a) If it appears to the Chief that an application for a dealer's
license should be denied or that a dealer's license should be revoked,
the Chief shall notify the applicant or registrant of the proposed
denial or revocation briefly slating the reason or reasons therefor.
Service may be made as provided for in section 210(a) of this act. The
applicant or <!paler shall have fifteen days from the date of service
in wliich to submit further evidence in support of the application or
qualifications to continue to hold a dealer's license, as the case may be:
Provided, That if the applicant or dealer does not make such a sub-
mission witliin 15 days fiom the date of service, the applicant or dealer
shall be deemed to have conceded the validity of the reason or reasons
stated in the notice, and the denial or revocation shall become final.
(b) Witliin 10 days of the date upon which the Chief receives such
a submission, the Chief shall serve upon the applicant or registrant
in the manner provide<l in section 210(a) of this act notice of liis
final deci:>io:i. The Chief's decision shall become effective at the
expiration of the time within which to hie a notice of appeal pursuant
to the Disfciict of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C.
Code, sec. 1-1501, et seq.) or, if such a notice of appeal is filed, at the
time the final order or judgment of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals becomes eifective.
(c) Within 45 days of a decision becoming effective, which is
unfavorable to a licensee or to an applicant for a dealer's license, the
licensee or applicant shall —
(1) if he is eligible to register firearms pursuant to this act,
register such fireainis in his inventory as are capable of registra-
tion pursuant to this act;
(2) peaceably surrender to the Chief any firearms in his inven-
tory which he does not register, and all destructive devices in his
inventory in the manner provided for in section 604;
(3) lawfully remove from the District any firearm in his inven-
tory which he does not register and all destructive devices and
ammunition in his inventory for so long as he has an interest in
them ; oi'
(4) otherwise lawfully dispose of any firearms in his inventory
which he does not register and all destructive devices and ammuni-
tion in his inventory.
Sec. 407. Displays, employees.
(a) No licensed dealer shall display anv firearm or ammunition in
windows visible from a street or sidewa&. All firearms, destructive
devices, and ammunition shall be kept at all times in a securely locked
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placp affixed to the premises except wlien being shown to a customer,
Deing; repaired, or otherwise being worked on.
(b) No licensee shall knowingiy employ any person in his estabii^h-
ment if such per?.on would not be eligible to register a firearm under
this act.
Sec. 408. Firearm marking'^.
No licensee shall sell or ofTer for sale any firearm which does not have
imbedded into the metal portion of such fii-earm a unique manufac-
turer's identification number or serial number, unless the licen>ee
shall have imbedded into the metal porfioii of such firearm a unique
dealer's idenlilicaliou number.
t^Ec. 409. Ccrtniii inrnrmjilion not to b" used as evidence.
Nc infonuaUDti obtained from o.- ruUiined by a licouniid dealer to
comply with this title shall be used as evidence against such licensed
dealer in any criminal proceeding with respect to a violation of this
act occurring prior to or concurrently with the filing of such informa-
tion; Provided, That this section shall not applv to any violation of
section 858 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code, sec. 22-2601), or
of section 703 of tliis act.
TITLE V S.M.B AXD TRANSFER OF riHE.\RMS, DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES,
AND AMMUNITION
Sec. 501. Prohibition.
No person or organization shall sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of
ony fireann, destruclive device or ammunition in the District except
as piovided in sections 502 or 604 of this act.
Sec. 602. Permis-iible sales and transfers.
(a) Any person or oi^anization eligible to register a firearm may sell
or otherwise transfer ammunition or any firearm, except those which
are iinregisterable under section 202 of this act, to a licensed dealer.
(b) A;iA- licensed dealer may sell or otherwise transfer ammunition
and any firearm or destructive device which is lawfully a part of such
licensee's inventory to —
(!) any nonresident person or business licensed under the Acts
of Congress and the jurisdiction where such person resides or
conducts such business;
(2) any other licensed dealer;
(3) any law enforcement ofiicer or agent of the District or the
United States when such officer or ^ent is on duty, and acting
within the scope of his duties when acquiring such firearm,
ammunition, or destructive device, if the officer or agent has in
his possession a statement from the head of his agency stating
that the item is to be used in such officer's or agent's official duties.
(c) Any licensed dealer may eel! or otherwise transfer a firearm
except those which are unregisterable under section 202 of this act, to
any person or organization possessing a registration certificate for such
firearm; Provided, That if the Chief denies a registration certificate,
he shall so advise the licensee who shall thereupon (1) withhold
delivery until such time as a registration certificate is issued, or, Bt the
option of the purchaser, (2) declare the contract null and Void, in
which case consideration paid to the licensee shall be returned to the
purchaser; Provided further that this subsection shall not apply to
persons covered by subsection (b).
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(d) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (f), no licensed dealer
shall sell or otherwise transfer ammunition unless —
(1) the sale or transfer is made in person; and
(2) the purchaser exhibits, at the time of sale or other transfer,
a valid registration certificate, or, in the case of a nonresident,
proof that the weapon is lawfully possessed in the jurisdiction
where such person resides;
(3) the ammunition to be sold or transferred is of the same
caliber or giiage as the firearm described in the registration
certificate, or other proof in the case of nonresident; and
(4) the purchaser signs a receipt for the ammunition which (in
addition to the other records required under this act) shall be
maintained by the licensed dealer for a period of one year from
the date of sale.
(e) Any licensed dealer may sell ammunition to any person holding
an ammimition collector's certificate on the effective date of this act;
Provided, That the collector's certificate shall be exhibited to the
licensed dealer whenever the collector purchases ammunition for his
collection; Provided further that the collector shall sign a receipt
for the ammunition, which shall be treated in the same manner as
that required under subsection (d)(4) of this section.
TITLE VI — POSSESSION OF AMMUNITIOS
Sec. 601. No person shall possess ammunition in the District ot
Columbia unless :
(a) He is a licensed dealer pursuant to Title IV of this act.
(b) He is an officer, agent, or employee of the District of Columbia
or the United States of America, on duty and acting within the scope
of his duties when possessing such ammunition.
(c) He is the holder of a valid registiatioo certificate for a firearm of
the same guage or caliber as the ammunition he possesses,
(d) He holds an ammunition collector's certificate on the effective
date of this act.
TITLE VII — GENERAL PEOVISIOMS
Sec. 701. Pledges and loans.
(a) No firearm, destructive device, or ammunition shall be security
for, or be taken or received by way of any mortgage, deposit, pledge,
or pawn.
(b) No person may loan, borrow, give, or rent to or from another
person, any firearm, destructive device, or ammunition.
Sec. 702. Except for law enforcement persoimel described in section
201(b)(1), each registrant shall keep any firearms in his possession
unloaded and disassembled or bound oy a trigger lock or similar device
unless such firearm is kept at his place of business, or while being used
for lawful recreational purposes within the District of Columbia.
Sec. 703. Firing ranges.
Any person operating a firing range in the District, shall in addition
to any other requirement imposed bv law, register with the Chief, on a
form prescribed by him, which shall include the business name of the
range, the location, the names and home addresses of the owners and
principal officers, the types of weapons fired there, the number and
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types of weapons normally stored there, the days and hours of opera-
tion, and such other information as the Chief shall require.
Sec. 704. False information, forgery, alteration.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person purchasing any firearm or
ammunition, or applying for any registration certificate or dealer's
license under this act, or in giving any information pursuant to the
requirements of this act, to knowingly give false information or offer
false evidence of identity.
(b) It shall be unlawful for anyone to forge or alter any application,
registration certificate, or dealer's license submitted, retained or
issued under this act.
Sec. 705. Voluntary surrender; immunity.
(a) If a person or organization within the District voluntarily and
peaceably delivers and abandons to the Chief any firearm, destructive
device or ammunition at any time, such delivery shall preclude the
arrest and prosecution of such person on a chaise of violating any
provision of this act with respect to the firearm, destructive device, or
ammunition voluntarilj' delivered. Delivery under this section may
be made at any police district, station, or central headquarters, or by
summoning a police officer to the person's residence or place of
business. Every firearm and destructive device to be delivered and
abandoned to the Chief under this section shall be unloaded and
wrapped in a package, and, in the case of delivery to a police facility
the package shall be carried in open view. No peison who delivers and
abandons a firearm, destructive device, or ammunition under this
section, shall be required to furnish identification, photographs, or
fingerprints. No amount of money shall be paid for any firearm, de-
structive devices, or ammunition delivered and abandoned under this
section.
(b) Whenever any firearm, destructive device, or any ammunition
is surrendered under this section or pursuant to section 210(c)(1),
the Chief shall inquire of the United States Attorney and the Corpora-
tion Counsel for the District whether such firearm is needed as evi-
dence; Provided, That if the same is not needed as evidence, it shall
be destroyed.
Sec. 706. Penalties.
Any person who violates any provision of this act shall upon
conviction for the first time be fined not more than $300 or be im-
prisoned for not more than ten (10) days, or both. Any subsequent
conviction for a violation of this act shall he punishable by a fi,ne of
$300 and by imprisonment of not less than 10 days nor more than 90
days.
Sec 707. Public education program.
The Chief shall carry on a suitable publicity program designed to
inform the citizens of the District of the provisions of this act and the
rights and obligations created by it.
Sec. 708. Repealers.
(a) District of Columbia Regulations Nos. 68-15 and 69-7 (Articles
50 to 55 inclusive of the Police Regulations of the District of Columbia)
are hereby repealed.
(b) Regulation 74-33 approved December 1, 1974, (relating to
bounty payments for the turning in of firearms) is repealed.
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(c) Article 9 of the Police Regulations of the District of Columbia
is repealed to the extent such article is in conflict with the provisions
of this act.
Sec. 709. Conflict with Federal law.
Nothing in this act shall be construed, or applied to necessarily
require, or excuse noncompliance with any provision of any Federal
Law. This act and the penalties prescribed in section 605 of this act,
and the penalties prescribed in section 605 of this act, for violations of
this act, shall not supersede but shall supplement all statutes of the
District and the United States in which similar conduct is prohibited
or regulated.
Sec. 710. Applicability of District of Columbia Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.
The provisions of the District of Columbia Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (D.C. Code, sec. 1-1501 et seq.) shall apply to each pro-
ceeding, decision, or other administrative action specified in this act,
unless otherwise specifically provided.
Sec. 711. Savings clause.
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of this act and the
application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated
or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 712. Effective date.
This act shall take effect pursuant to the provisions of section 602(c)
(1) of the District of Columbia Self- Government and Governmental
Keoi^anization Act.
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Council op the Distbict^of Columbia
REPORT*
To: Members of the Council.
From: Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law, David A
Clarke, Chairperson
Date: April 21, 1976.
Subject: Bill No. 1-164, the "Firearms Control act of 1975."
The Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law, to which Bill
No. 1-164 wa:s referred, having considered the same, reports favorably
on the bill as amended.
BACKQRODND OF THIsJlBOISLATION
Bill No. 1-164, as amended, evolved from a series of '^n control"
bills which have been introduced in this Council. On February 11,
1975, CouQcilmember John Wilson introduced the first bill (Bill No.
1-24) to amend the D.C. Police Regulations, Articles 50 through 55,
dealing with comprehensive firearm bans, registration and licensing.
On March 11, 1975, Councilmember Polly Shackleton introduced
Bill No. 1-42, the "District of Columbia Handgun Control Act of
1975", which would have defined new crimes in the D.C. Code involv-
ing a comprehensive ban, except in certain circumstances, on handguns
or handgun ammunition in the District of Columbia. On June 6 and 7,
1975, your committee conducted extensive public hearings concerning
the above-described bills and concerning the more general issue of
firearm controls. A copy of the notice and the witness list for such
public hearings is attached hereto as "Exhibit A". Councilmember
Wilson, who participated in the conduct of the aforementioned hear-
ings, on July 22, 1975, introduced Bill No. 1-] 64 in lieu of his previous
bill, in order to amend the D.C. Police Regulations, Articles 50 through
55. Your committee concentrated its attention to Bill No. 1-164 which
basically was aimed at reforming the current, firearm registration and
licensing regulations. In its major parts, original Bill No. 1-164 would
have (1) expanded the registration and reporting requirements cur-
rently placed on firearm owners and/or dealers, (2) substantially
increased the fees for registering firearms and for obtaining a license to
deal in firearms, (3) placed specific duties on personnel of the Office of
Corporation Counsel to prosecute and to monitor the firearm regula-
tions, (4) increased the penalties for violatii^ the police firearm
regulations, (5) abolished judicial discretion in the process of meting out
punishment for violation of the firearm regulations, and (6) mandated
that the Chief of Police conduct an active campaign to seize all pro-
hibited firearms. After lengthy research with regard to original Bill
No. 1-164 and refinements of gun controls in the District of Cohtmbia.
your committee conducted a roundtable discussion and preliminary
mark-up on Tuesday, April 6, 1976 to consider an amendment in the
nature of a substitute to Bill No. 1-164. On Thursday, April 15, 1975,
s approved by the Council's Judiciary Committee »nd
lereatter made some chnnges In the MU Itself before
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your committee conducted a mark-up of such amendment. The
reported Bill No. 1—164, as amended, is the product of the foregoing
deUbera.tions by your committee.
THE PDEPOSE OF THIS LEGISLATION
The goals of this legislation are twofold: (1) to reduce the poten-
tiality for gun-related crimes and gun-related deaths from occurring
within the District of Columbia; and (2) to strengthen the capacity
of the District of Columbia government to monitor the traffic in
firearms and ammunition within this jurisdiction. Bill No. 1-164, as
amended, would circumscribe the persons eligible to register firearms
in the District of Columbia and would delineate the t\'pes of firearms
which could not be registered within the District of Columbia. The
bill sets forth new and stringent criteria in order to relegate guns
with legitimate uses in an urban area to demonstrably responsible
types of persons. This legislation would also place more expansive
reporting duties upon all firearm owners and dealers. This increased
accountability would fortify the government's abilitv to keep track of
the guns which are within the District of Columbia. The increased
penalties for violation of these new regulations are designed to deter
avoidance of the new requirements.
THE NEED FOR THIS LEGISLATION
Tour committee finds that, with reference to the possession, sale,
6iirchase and control of any firearm or destructive device in the
listrict of Columbia, the design and scope of the current D.C.
Police Regulations, Articles 50 through 55, have not been sufficiently
effective in reducing the potentiaUty of gun-related deaths and gun-
related crimes from occurring within the District of Columbia, and
there is a need to significantly improve the capacity of the District
government to monitor the traffic of firearms within this jurisdiction.
The easy availability of firearms in the United States has been a
major factor contributing to the drastic increase in gun-related violence
and crime over the past 40 years. The number of deaths attributed to
firearms grows each year. Since 1900, more people have been killed
by private citizens using firearms than were killed in all our wars.
One out of every 100 deaths in the United States is the result of a
firearm. Guns are responsible for 69 deaths in this country each day.
Approximately 25,000 gun-deaths occur each year and 200,000
individuals are wounded Dy firearms during this same period. Close to
3,000 accidential deaths are caused by firearms (V, of the victims are
under 14 years of age). For every intruder stopped by a homeowner
with a firearm, there are 4 gun-related accidents within the home.
The nationwide statistics dealing with handguns are even more
sta^ering. The number of handguns alone in the U.S. is estimated
to be as high as 40 million. (Congressional findings in Proposed Federal
Firearms Act of 1976— H.R. 1119S). That's approximately 1 handgun
for every 5 citizens in this country. And the supply of handguns may
be increasing by as much as 2% million each year.
A crime committed with a pistol is 7 times more likely to be lethal
than a crime committed with any other weapon. Over the last several
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years, ^tati^tics have shown that handguns are used in roughly 54%
of all murders, 60% of robberies, 26% of assaults and 87% of all
murders of law enforcement officials. In 1973, the FBI reported 19,510
murders in the United States, 53% of these homicides were committed
with handguns. From 1964-1973 firearms were used to commit 95%
of the slayings of police officers— 613 by handguns, 104 by rifles and
101 with shotguns. {Statement of D.C. Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy).
In 1973, Detroit police reported 751 deaths from all criminal homi-
cides, 24 more than tlie total number of civilians killed in Northern
Ireland during the entire 5>j years of their civil strife. The picture in
the District of (Columbia is not bright either. The Metropolitan Police
Department reported a record 285 murders in the District of Columbia
during 1974. Handguns were responsible for 155 of these homicides.
In other violent crimes in which firearms were used in 1974-1975,
handguns accounted for 88% of the robberies and 91% of the assaults.
Contrary to popular opinion on this subject, fireaims are more
frequently involved in deaths and violence imiong relatives and friends
than in premeditated criminal activities. Most murdei-s are committed
by pieviously law-abiding citizens, in situations where spontaneous
violence is generated by anger, passion or intoxication, and where
the killer and victim are acquainted. (Murder and Gvn Control,
AmerKan Journal of Psychiatry, 128 Jan. 1972:456 No. 7). Twenty-five
percent of these murders occur within families.
In addition to the inability of the present D.C. firearms law to reduce
the potentiality for gun-related violence, the present regulations have
not been sufficiently effective in efficiently monitoring the traffic of
firearms and ammunition in the District. The Metropolitan Police
Department reports that during the period of 1968-1975, 57,755
firearms were registered in the District of Columbia.' Of this total,
41,015 were handguns. However, in spite of the present regulations,
less than % of 1% of the total number of firearms (1974) used in
crimes and recovered by the police were registered in D.C. (Statement
of Maurice J. CvUinane, Chiej oj Police, Metropolitan Police Department
bejore Committee on Judiciary and Criminal Law — 1075). Ajiproxi-
mately 12% of the firearms recovered from all ciimes in D.Ci arc then
registered and only 1.7% of the above-mentioned firearms are regis-
tered by the person from whom they were recovered. In addition,
pistols have become easy for juveniles to obtain, although the existmg
Filiations prohibit possession of pistols by juveniles.
The startling statistics presented here emphasize the inability of
the present law to cope with the problems of gun control in the
District of Columbia. This bill, as amended, will strengthen the
District Government's role in firearm control by:
(1) making pistols and shotguns not registered according to the
regulations in effect prior to the effective date of this bill unregisterable
in a reasonable endeavor toward eventually freezing the pistol and
shotgun population within the District of Columbia.
(2) providing more appropriate penalties for violation of these
K^ulations.
(3) providing a more stringent pre-ciearance procedure to prevent
the acquisition, possession and use of firearms by disqualified persons.
< The total number at flrcanne reeittered In the District ol Columbia es ol 11 :00 >.m.,
Mtirch 26, 1976. wss 61,089. This Includea flreanns owned and used by the Metropolltai
FoUce Department
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(4) providing for annual registration, which will enable the District
^ Government to better monitor the traffic in firearms and provide
~ additional revenue (from annual license and permit fees) to implement
tiiis comprehensive program of gun control.
(5) providing for a program of education in the District of Columbia
designed to inform the community of the provisions of this act.
; Your committee realizes the most effective gun control must eventu-
" ally be applied at the national level. In the absence of such national
- action however, it becomes necessary for local governments to act to
- protect their citizens, and certainly the District of Columbia as the
•■ only totally urban stat«like jurisdiction should be strong in its
approach.
IMPACT ON EXISTING LEGISLATION
A. Effect Upon Titk 33. D.C. Code and Related Authority Questions
Bill No. 1-164 as amended, the "Firearms Control Regulations Act
of 1975", is enacted for the purpose of amending the existing District
of Cohimbia Police Regulations. Specifically affected are Articles 50
throusrh 55 of those Regulations. Tnis bill does not amend or conflict
with the provisions of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the D.C. Code. It
specifically provides as much in section 902.
The authority for the Council of the District of Columbia to amend
the aforementioned D.C. Police Regulations stems from not only the
plenarj- delegation of section 302 of the D.C. Self-Govemment and
Governmental Reorganization Act (hereinafter "Home Rule Act") (87
Stat. 787, D.C. Code, sec. 1-124} but also from the second sentence of
section 404(a) of that Act (D.C. Code, sec. l-444{a)), which vests the
■Council of the District of Cohimbia with all functions granted to its
predecessor District of Columbia Council, including but not limited to
the police regulatory powers provided for in the Act of January 26,
1887 (D.C. Code § 1-224), the health and welfare regulatory powers
Provided for in the Act of February 26, 1892 (D.C. Code § 1-226), the
rearm regulation powers provided for in the Act of June 30, 1906
(D.C. Code § 1-227), and the penaltv-creating powers provided for in
the Act of December 17, 1942 (D.C.'Code § l-224a).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has rendered a lengthy opinion delineating the relationship
between the plenar\' power of Congress over District affairs and
delegated the local government's powers (based on the pre-Home-
Kule Act delegations) in the area of firearm control. In Maryland and
District of Columbia liifle and Pistol Association,, Inc. v. Washington,
142 U.S. App. D.C. 375, 442 F.2d 123 (1971), the U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld the authority of the former D.C. Council to promul-
gate the current gun control regulations.
Those seeking a declaration of invalidity in that case claimed that
the Congress had pre-empted the area of gun control bv the passage
of An Act to Control the Possession, Sale, Transfer and Use of Pistols
and Other Dangerous Weapons in the District of Columbia (47 Stat.
650) (codified in Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the District of Columbia
Code), and that, in the passage of those Regulations the old Council
was treading on ground the Congress had reserved for itself. The
Court closely examined the legislative history of the various statutes
noting that the J932 statute was a substantial re-enactment of an
1892 statute (Act of July 13, 1892, 27 Stat. 1 16) predating the delega-
26
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tion of firearms regulatory powers. ' The Court went on to note liiat
Congress failed to repeal the regulatorv powers when it passed the
Ift:i2 Act (now codified in Title 22 of the"D.C. Code) finding therefrom
and from the rest of its examination "a satisfj'ing assurance that
Congress, having dealt with some aspects of weapons control, left
others for regulation by the District. Indeed . . . [the Court couldj not
fathom any other purpose to be achieved bv leaving Section 1—227
in force." (442 F.2dat 131). The Court set forth the text as follows;
The important cotuideration, we think, Ls not whether the
legislature and municipabty have both entered the same field,
but whether in doing so they have clashed. Statutory and local
regulation may coexist in identical areas although the latter, not
inconsistently with the former, exacts additional requirements,
or imposes additional penalities. The test of concurrent au-
thority, this court indicated many years ago, is the absence of
conflict with the legislative will. As the court declared in French
V. District of Columbia, where (t]he subject [is] peculiarly within
the scope of the [expressly delegated) police powers of the mu-
nicipality, the exercise of authority ought not to be questioned
unless clearly inconsistent with the expressed will of Congress.
Bill 1-164, as amended, would not clash at all with any provision
of Chapter 32 (or any other part) of Title 22 of the Code. Chapter 32
was not enacted to afford the right to possess or carry weapons.
Absent some legislation to the contrary, one could possess and carry
e gun. Rather Chapter 32 was enacted to restrict the ability to
possess and carry a gun.
Far from being in conflict with it, Bill 1-164 applies to present
day conditions, the same approach the 72nd Congress tooK with
respect to 1932 conditions. Bill 1-164, as amended, does not permit
anything which Chapter 32 was desired to prohibit.
The Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia argued in
his brief in Maryland and D.C. Rijie and Pistol Association, Inc. v.
Washington. That "since neither the Act of July S, 1932 [codified in
Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the Code], nor any other Act, desJs with the
registration of pistols by private owners. Article 51, section 1 [of the
Police Kegulations, prohibiting possession without registration), is
not in confUct with any congressional enactment . . . Merely be-
cause the District of Columbia Council has added to the very limited
congressional enactments relating to possession and transfer of weap-
ons in the District of Columbia, does not mean that the additions are
in conflict with the original limited provisions of the 1932 Act."
(Brief of Appellees, p. 14)
Thus it is clear that Bill 1-164, as amended, was within the author-
ity of the former D.C. Council to enact had it seen fit to do so.
There is no "expressed will of Congress" in the Home Rule Act to
repen! the earlier delegations of gun control authority to the city.
Any repeal would have to be by implication, and it "is a well-settled
rule of statutory construction that there is a presumption against
repeals by implication. See, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, sec.
2014 (3rd Ed., 1943).'
' -Vil d[ June .10, 1000 (D.C. Code, sec. 1-227 (1973)).
' arlrt tor Apiirllppii, MnrulanA and B.C. Rifle and Ftttol AiteelaUen, Ine. T. WatMnatan,
VS M'O. V.C. No. 22.f>27 (1069). p. 17, dtluE United Btalet T. Oreathoutt, 168 U.S. SOI
(IS97).
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The legislative history of the Home Rule Act clearly iiidicates that
it was the intent of Congress to transfer to the new Council the full
and immediate power of the old Council in this area. Both section
321 (b) of S. 1435, as reported by the Senate Committee on the District
of Columbia, and the second sentence of section 404(a) of H.R, 9682,
as reported by the House Committee on the District of Columbia,
contain transfers of the authority of the old Council to the new. Both
of the Reports indicate an intent to carry forth the old authority-
Senate Report No. 93-219 says at p. 3: "The powers of the present
Council and Mayor-Commissioner are transferred to the new Council
and Mayor." House Report No. 93-482 says on p. 21 : "Section
(sic] (a) [of section 404] provides that the powers and functions of the
present Council and Commissioner are transferred to the new Council
and Mayor." Neither of these bills included at the time of their report
to their respective houses the contents of section G02(a)(9) of the
Home Rule Act. That was added in conference, and thus the "except
as otherwise provided in this Act" language of the second sentence of
section 404(a) was not directed to section 602(a)(9). It was more
Erobably directed to delegations by the Home Rule Act of authority
eld by the old Council to other agencies [S. 1436, as reported, pro-
vided m the very next section (sec. 322) for functions subdelegated by
the old Council and Mayor-Commissiioner were not to be considered
as transferred pursuant to section 321 of the bill but to be recoupable
bv specific Council or Mavoral action]. The gun control powers
delegated to the city bv D.'C. Code, sections 1-224, l-224a, 1-226,
and 1-227 conferred on the old Council by section 401(1), 401(2), and
401(4) of the Reorganization Plan Numbered 3 of 1967 were not
subdel^ated by the old Council nor were they reassigned by the
Home Rule Act.
It would be absurd therefore to now counclude that the Home Rule
Act, designed and understood by all to have expanded the authority
of the local legislature, to have repealed the powers delegated earlier,
"It is axiomatic that a statute must not be construed to produce an
absurd result." See Lange v. United States, 143 U.S. App. D.C. 305,
307-308, 443 F. 2d 720, 722-723 (1971).*
Furthermore, Congressional Delegate Water E. Fauntroy, former
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Judiciary of the Committee
on the District of Columbia of the United States House of Representa-
tives, submitted for the record a legal memorandum (Exhibit B) sup-
porting this Council's authoiity to pass Bill No. 1-42, which, as men-
tioned earlier, would have amended the current firearms law in the
District of Columbia by creating a statutory ban on handguns within the
District of Columbia. And Attorney Harley Daniels, former Counsel
to the Subcommittee on the Judiciary of the Committee on the Distiict
of Columbia of the United States House of Representatives, also
testified in support of this Council's authority to enact Bill 1-42. By
contrast, Bill \o. 1-164 as reported herein, amends the current police
regulations passed by the former D. C. Council. The scope of Bill No.
1-164, as amended, is significantly more clearly within the ambit of
authority of this Council than Bill 1-42.
t o( Columbia, Diitrict ot Columbia r. Smith, et al.,.
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The following analysis of the major impact of this bill upon the cur-
rent firearma regulations illustrates the point further.
B. More Stringent Provisions Regarding Firearm Registration
Bill No. 1-164, as amended, abolishes the dual system under the
current r^ulations whereby persons who own rifles or shotguns must
both register and get a license for such firearms. Under the bill, a
uniform system of registration is lequired whereby the Chief obtains
not only the same data about the firearms and their owners as he does
under tne current regulations; but, in addition, the Chief is authorized
to obtain information which supplements the current data w^hich he
lawfully obtains. For example, under the bill, an applicant would have
to inform the Chief as to purpose for which he or she intends to use the
firearm.
The bill would require annual registration of firearms as opposed to
the current, one-time registration requirement.
The bill would give the Chief 60 days within which to rule upon a
registration application in contrast to 30 days under the current
regulations.
The new regulations formulated in this bill would expand the
existing pre-requisites to be met by any person in order to register his
firearm. For example, the class of convicted persons ineligible to
register a firearm has been enlarged in this bill. The bill disqualifies
anyone from registering who within the 5 years preceding the applica-
tion for registration was convicted of any weapons offenses {as defined
in the bill), violation of any narcotics or dangerous drug laws, or viola-
tion of any laws regarding assaults or threats so as to indicate a likeh-
hood to make unlawful use of a firearm. The current regulations have
only a three-year disqualification period for persons convicted of
offenses similar t« those listed above. Unlike any provisions in the
existing regulations, the bill disqualifies anj' person from registering
who was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital within the Jive
years prior to the application or who was adjudicated by any court to
be insane or to be a chronic alcoholic within the five years prior to the
application. The bill requires a medical certification of cure of the
foregoii^ maladies prior to a registration certificate ever being issued
by the Chief to such persons.
The bill changes the current fee schedule for registration certificates.
The public record indicates that the $2.00 fee for a registration certifi-
cate under the current regulations does not even approximate the cost
to the District of Columbia to administer the existing gun control
registration system. This bill directs that the Mayor set the fee for
registration at whatever amount will meet the cost to the government
for administering the registration system.
Just as in the current gun regulations, the bill generally will not
aJlow destiuctivo de\'ices, sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, or short-
barreled rifles to be registered. Of course, the bill rect^:m2es that on-
duty federal and local law enforcement officers axe permitted to
possess the above noted weapons. Cf. D.C. Code §22-3214.
The bill adds a new category of generally uiu-egisterable firearms in
the District of Columbia, namely pistols not registered and shoteuns
not re^stered and licensed pursuant to the relations ia effect
immediately prior to the effective date of this bill. Such provitdon
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denotes a policy decision that handguns and shotguns have no legiti-
mate use in the purely urban eni'ironnient of the District of Colom-
bia while at the same time avoiding any conflict with constitutional
doctrines which might require compensation for materials declared to
be illegal but which were legally possessed prior to the declaration.
Moreover, the bill reflects a legislative decision that, at this point in
time and due to the gun-control tragedies and horrors enumerated
previously in this report, pistols and shotguns are no longer justified
in this jurisdiction. During the Congressional review period of thirty
legislative days, there will oe adequate time for any current possessor
of a pistol or shol^m, who is otherwise eligible, to register the same
and uius be edible for registration under the new regulations. Under
section 203(c) of the bill, and Article 52, section 414 of the current
regulations, his or her application cannot be used to prosecute him or
her for illegal possession. If there is any fear that possibly there will
be a flurry of lirearm purchases or registrations of currently unregis-
tered pistols and shotguns in the District of Columbia prior to this
bill completing the full legislative process, it should be noted that the
Police Department can provide the Council with daily statistics
concerning recent registrations of firearms and with less frequent
reports on the inventories of local firearm dealers. If the basis for the
above-noted fears becomes a reality based on law enforcement reports,
then this Council or the Congress can take further appropriate action
prior to the bill being enacted.
Another innovation of the re^stration provisions of this bill would
bo the requirement in section 203(a)(10) whereby applicants would
have to demonstiate to the Chief that they are knowledgeable of the
District of Columbia firearms laws and that they can safely use the
firearm which they seek to register.
C, Expavded Licensure Provisions
BiU No. 1-164, as amended, creates two classes of business licensees
whereas only one class now exists. The impact of such classification is
to freeze at the current level of fourteen the number of dealers who can
seU r^sterable firearms to the public.
The bill would extend from the current 30 days to 60 days the time
allotted to the Chief to rule upon applications for licenses.
The bill requires that applicants for licenses meet the same expanded
eligibihty requirements as are placed on persons applying for a regis-
tration certificate.
A major revision contemplated in this bill is the establishment of a
process whereby a licensed dealer can dispose of his inventory inthe
event that he receives an unfavorable response to his application for
renewal of his license. This is to avoid any constitutional problems of
confiscation. The current regulations do not address the situation of
what a dealer should do if his license is revoked. Under the provisions
of this bill, if a denial or revocation becomes final, than the dealer
would have to do any one of the following; register any r^sterable
firearms in his possession, surrender to the Cmef those firearms not
registered plus all destructive devices, or lawfully dispose of or reoiove
from the District of Columbia any firearms in which he has an interest.
Bill No. 1—164 as amended contemplates more accountability in the
reporting requirements than are presently required of licensees under
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Article 54, sec. 5(c) of the D.C. Police Ri^ulatioits. Whereas a licensed
dealer is currently required to submit "periodic" reports, Bill No.
1-164, as amended (sec. 410), would require the maintenance of very
detailed monthly records by the licensee. The licensee would be
required to keep the records curient and to open them to inspection
upon demand by the Chief.
D. Delineatitm of ScUe^ or Transfers of Firearms
In both this bill and the current regulations, the rai^ of firearms
which may be generally sold or transfened coincides with the range ol
firearms which may be lawfully registered in the District of Columbia.
However, Article 5 of Bill No. 1-164 provides that all sales and trans-
fers of registerable firearms be accomplished only through a licensed
dealer to a qualified purchaser.
E. Ammunition Transfers
Article 6 of Bill No. 1-164 substantially follows Article 53 of the
current D.C. Police Regulations. Beyond this, section 602 of the bill
sets out in detail the precise univeiso of lawfully possessors of firearms
ammunition; namely, licenseeSj authorized government personnel,
certified collectors, and registrants of firearms of the same caliber as
the ammunition posscs,sed.
F. Registration of Firing Range Operators
Section 703 provides that for the first time in this jurisdiction that
firing ranges shall be registered with the Chief.
G. Expanded Enforeemeiit Provisions
Under the present Regulations (Article 55, sec. 2) no penalty will
befall a person who voluntarily surrenders to the Police a firearm
which is not registered, so long as a proclaimed amnesty peiiod is in
effect. This bill would abolish the cun-unt amnesty and redemption
regulations and allow foi' sunender of firearms to the Chief at any
police station and at any time. The same provision is made regarding
the vohintarv surrender of ammunition.
This bill also provides in section 80.3 that the Chief of Police publi-
cize certain aspects of the Police regulations concerning firearms.
These matters mclude: the elements of lawful possession, the limita-
tions placed on holdei-s of permits, the provisions for enforcement of
the regulations, the provisions for voluntary surrender, and the
means oy which persons may aid the Police in enforcing the firearms
regulations.
The bill sets a new mandatory minimum penalty of 10 days im-
prisonment and a $300 fine for violation of certain key sections of the
bill (section 201 (re: prohibition of possession of a destructive device
or unregistered firearm), section 401 (re: prohibition of engaging in
firearms business without firearms business license), section 501 (re:
limitations on sale or transfer of firearms), section 601 (re: Hmitations
on the sale of ammunition), and section 602 (re: limitations on the
possession of ammunition)). Under the current regulations there arc
no such mandatory sentencing provisions. The Committee reluctantly
rejected higher penalties in an effort to remain ^vithin the delegated
powers of D.C. Code, sees. 1-224, l-224a, 1-226, and 1-227 so as to
be certain of the Council's authority.
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The foregoing conoid ered, it should be apparent that this bill
would not cause a confiscation law, would not amend any existing
gun laws beyond the current D.C. Police Regulations governing
firearms, and would take nothing away from sportsmen and collectors.
EXECUTIVE POSITION
The Executive Branch position on Bill 1-164 is far from clear.
From the time of its introduction on July 22, 1975 until March, 1976,
there was no communication from the Branch on this particular bill.
On March 17, 1976, the Chairperson of your Committee sent a
copy of a working draft containing most of the provisions of this
bill, as amended, to the then Acting Corporation Counsel and to the
Chief of Police inviting general comments, criticisms, and recommenda-
tions specifically requesting in each case certain infonnation (Exhibit
C). Copies of the letters were sent to the Mayor's Special Assistant
for Legislation. It was requested that any information be provided
bj' March 23, 1976 at a roundtable discussion to be conducted by
your committee.
On March 23, 1976, a memorandum was received from the Acting
Corporation Counsel the only critical comment of which was directed
to a provision of the draft which would have limited prosecutorial
plea bargaining (Exhibit D). That pi-ovision is not part of the bill
as amended.
On March 23, 1976, a memorandum was also received from the
Chief of Police claiminginability to complete the statistical data and
analysis by that time (Exhibit E). The March 23, 1976 meeting was
cancelled.
On March 30, 1976, a six page memorandum was received from the
Chief of Police responding to so many of the specific requests cou-
taine<l in the letter of March 17, 1976 as addressed themselves to
standards and procedures used in the enforcement of current regula-
tions and to statistics (Exhibit F).
On April 6, 1976, when a mark-up session of your committee had
been called, a memorandum was received from the Mayor's Special
Assistant for Legislation indicating "a number of legally objectionable
and administratively defective provisions" injthe working draft— a
nearly identical version of which was moved at that meeting as an
amendment in the nature of a substitute (Ehxibit G), The memoran-
dum indicated that the Executive Branch was preparing a draft bill
for the Coounittee's consideration "in the very near future". At the
meeting, Mr. Chauncey Williams of the Office of Legislation declined
to cite what the Executive Branch found to he legally objectionable
and/or administratively deficient. The only "much needed change"
in the existing law which Mr. Williams would identify was the require-
ment that persons register their firearms within forty-eight hours of
arrival in the city. That meeting was recessed to give Mr. Williams a
chance to ascertain by what time the Executive Branch could produce
its draft bill. When the meeting resumed, Mr. Williams was unable to
state a time but responded to an inquiry as to the ability of being
ready in a week by saying that it could be done if one person worked
upon the matter full time. The Committee thereupon set the matter
over to April 15, 1976 requesting that it be provided with the Execu-
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live Branch's draft bill and other materials by the close of business on
April 14, 1976.
No draft bill or other response from the Executive Branch was
received by or on April 15, 1976 other than further response from the
Chief of Police addres^iii" the two sections of the Bill (203 and what
is now 410) which had been specifically mentioned in the letter of
March 17. 1976 (Exhibit H). Mr. Robert Greenberg of the Office of
General Counsel of the Metropolitan Police Department appeared at
the mark-up session on April 15, 1976 and was of great assistance. Of
the 27 points in the Chief's memorandum, the Committee made
amendments consistent with the Chief's comments to the amend-
ment-iii-the-nature-of-a-svibstitute before it in all respects except the
following five (in none of which are the Committee's positions any
less stringent than the current regulations) :
(1) The Committee rejected the su^estion that persons convicted
of violation of provisions of the bill be later permitted to register fire-
arms after a period of disqualification similar to that required of those
convicted of narcotics offenses. Your committee felt that one violation
of the provisions of the bill was so serious as to indicate a permanent
disability to safely and lawfully handle firearms.
(2) Your committee rejected the su^estion that persons voluntarily
entiering mental hospitals should be as ineligible as those committed
invol-antarily. Your committee feels that mere admission to a mental
hospital does not indicate incapacity and that the fact of the volun-
tariness may indicate more of a presence of mind than an involuntary
commitment.
(3) Your committee and the Executive Branch representatives
present at the meeting were unable to formulate at the meeting Miy
more specific standards for a disabling physical defect than are in the
current regulations and which would be continued by the bill,
(4) The committee declined to make production of the firearm at a
station at the time of application mandatory but chose to vest the
Chief with discretion as in the current regulations. The Committee did
not want to encoiirage guns on the streets in any fashion and felt that,
if law enfoicement needs dictated such production, the discretion af-
forded the Chief enables it.
(5) Your committee rejected the suggestion that one charged with a
misdemeanor of assaidt or threats should, by virtue of being so chained,
be ineligible to legister a firearm. Your committee accepted the idea of
disquahfications upon indictment because there is a judicial finding of
probable cause. Your committee was here concerned with the inter-
dependent eligibility-to-register and revocation sections which, if the
Chief's su^cstion were adopted, could unfairly result in a citizens'
registration being revoked merely upon a charge of assault by another
citizen.
In the last footnote of the document, the Chief says: "These com-
ments, as previously noted, were specifically requested. While we
believe arinptioii of f he suggestions made would greatly improve §§ 203
and 408, we continue to believe the bill to be similarly deficient else-
where to preclude supporting its passage, (Memorandum of Judy
Rogers to Councilman Clarke dated April 6, 1976)."
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Nevertheless, after repeated invitation, no representative of the
Kxccutive Branch would specify any objection or deficiency other
than as hereinbefore mentioned.'
FISCAL IMPACT
The bill would permit the Mayor to set application fees for firearm
registration and firearms business licenses at whatever is needed to pay
costs of administering the provisions of the bill. Therefore its admin-
istration would entail no cost except approximately $2,500 for publica-
tion of information pursuant to the publicity program mandated by
the bill.
There would be a net savings, as the current registration fee is set at
$2.00 by the current regulations. The Chief of Police estimated that
cost at $20.00 to register a gun. At the current rate of about 4,000
registrations per year, we are now sustaining a loss of about $72,000
per year. Thus the fiscal efEect of passage of this bill over the next five
years would be approximately a plus $357,500.
($72,000 X 5 = $360,000 - $2,500 = $357,500).
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 101 of the bill sets forth the definitions of essential terms
used in the bill.
Subsection (a) of section 201 provides for a general ban on destruc-
tive devices and directs that no person shall own, possess, or have
under his control a firearm in the District of Columbia without a valid
lustration certificate beinj; issued therefor to such person. In the
case of an organization which owns any firearm, section 201 directs
that dual registration be obtained both in the name of the organiza-
tion and in the name of the president or chief executive of such organi-
zation. Thip provision is intended to establish personal responsibility
at a h^h level within the organization for compliance with this Article.
Subsection (b) of section 201 of the bill would provide an exception for
licensees in that they would not be bound by the general registration
requirements in subsection (a) with respect to firearms kept by them
purely as inventory in their businesses.
Section 202 describes certain firearms which are unregisterable.
namely any sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, short-barreled rifle and
pistol not regitteied, or shotgun not registered and licensed, to the
applicant pursuant to the regulations in effect immediately prior to
the effective date of this biil.
Section 203 identifies the criteria and processes by which persons
and chief executives in any organization owning firearms shall con-
form in order to obtain a registration certificate. Subsection (a) of
section 203 lists the criteria which must be met by applicants regis-
tration certificate. The personal criteria set forth in subsection (a) of
section 203 are designed to promote a situation in the District of
> Tlie heaiiuss □□ BlUa 1-24 sad 1-42. the then Coi
tlie Coimrirs authority to pees eithpr of those rne«siin
tlona beTond the Kcope of Ihe old Cnimcirii luthnrlt; to
Counwl hHS not addresned the authortt.v to ennet Bill 1 ,
nnthorltr to enact Bill 1-164. Bi amended. Ib treated In the section of this Report o
"Impact OD EilHtlns Leglalatlon". Eupca.
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Columbia wherein registerable firearms, being lethal by nature, can
only be rogistered to peiNons whose pei^soiial and social histories do
not indicate a susceptibility on their ports to use any firenrm in a
manner wliieh would be dangerous to themselves or to other persons.
Subsection (b) of section 203 specifies the data which each applicant
must provide for the Chief prior to his issuing any registration certifi-
cate. Tlie burden is upon the applicant to provide the factual data
required by subsection (b) to the Chief in order that the Chief be able
to pei'foriTi his duties under this bill. Subsection (c) of section 203
proiiibits any information contained in an application from beii^
used as evidence in a crivinal pi-oceeding against the applicant,
except for prosecutions for perjur}- in violation of D.C. Code §22-
2501 or for violation of section 705 of this bill as amended. Subsection
(c) of section 203 also provides that if a final determination has been
made to deny the issuance of an application for a firearm, then the
applicant shall have seven day.s within which to surrender the fire-
arm, lawfully remove it from "the District of Columbia, or otherwise
lawfully dispose of such firearm. Subsection (d) of section 203 affords
the Chief the option of fingerprinting and taking a photograph of an
applicant for a firearm registration certificate. Subsection (e) au-
thorizes the Chief, whenever he deems it advisable, to require an
applicant to appear in person and to bring the firearm in question
to the police department prior to the Chief's ruling on the applica-
tion. Subsection (f) of section 203 mandates that each application be
executed in duplicate and that each application be attested to by
the applicant.
Section 204 provides that the registration certificate sheill have an
effective life-span of one year, thus establishing a system of annual
registration,
-Section 205 authorizes and directs the Mayor to set the fee scale
for any services rendered pursuant to sections 201 through 210
of this bill in order to cover the cost to the District of Columbia
government for providing such services such as the processing of
i-egistration appUcations. Section 205 specifically makes fees for
registration applications non-refundable.
Section 206 establishes strict time frames within which applications
must be filed. In particular, firearms registered or licensed under the
Police Regulations in effect prior to the effective date of this bill
must be registered within 60 days of the date upon which this bOI
becomes law. Otherwise a firearm must be registered within 48
hours after it is legally received or acquired or brought into the
District of Columbia. Of course a firearm registered pursuant to this
bill must be re-registered prior to the expiration of the registration
certificate.
Section 207 sets a sixty-day time frame within which the Chief
shall make a ruling upon an application for a registration certificate.
The Chief shall have 120 days to rule upon applications for a regis-
tration certificate which have been filed within the first sixty days
after the effective date of this bill.
Section 208 prescribes the grounds upon which a registration
certificate shall be revoked. Generally, revocation shall be caused
by n firearm becoming un regis tern hie imder section 202, by the regis-
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trant becoming ineligible for registration under section 203(a), by
failure to perfonn tlie duties set forth in section 21(1. or by tlie inten-
tional falsification of information given to the Chief by the registrant
Subsection (a) of section 209 sets forth the procedures to^ be fol-
lowed for tlie denial of a registration application or thr revocation of
a registration certificate. Subsection (a) provides diiP process protec-
tions to al! registrants or applicants affected by this Article. The pro-
vision does not alter the doctrine that ownership of a fireann is a
privilege and not a right. Subsection (b) of section 209 delineat<'s the
legally permissible options available to an applicant or registrant after
an order of denial or revocation has become final. Subsection (c) of
section 209 requires the Chief to destroy all firearms which are not
needed as evidence by any prosecutorial authorities of any jurisdic-
tion or which cannot be lawfully returned to the rightful owner thereof.
Subsection (a) of section 210 of the bill sets forth additional duties
placed upon each person who has registered a firearm pursuant to
these Regulations, Specifically', registrants shall report in writing to
the Chief concerning the loss, theft, or destruction of the registration
certificate or of the registered firearm within 48 hours of such event.
Registrants shall also report within 48 hours any change of name or
address from that recorded on the registration certificate. This latter
duty is especially noteworthy for the president or chief executive of
any oTOanizatioii which has registered its firearins. It is the intent of
this subsection to insure that the Chief is kept well-informed of any
change in the identity of the officer or an organination who is per-
sonally responsible for the oversight of the use of such organization's
firearm(s). Registrants must also inform the Chief in writing of the
sale or transfer or other disposition of the firearm by the registrant.
Simultaneous with the notice to the Chief of the loss, theft, or other
disposition of a firearm, registrants must retuTti to the Chief the
repstration certificate for any firearm which has been stolen, lost,
destroyed, sold, or otherwise disposed of. Finally, a registrant must
have in his posses.sion a valid registration certificate and an ai)plicant,
whose application has not yet been acted upon pursuant to section
207, must have in his possession his application for a registration
certificate for each firearm possessed. Such registrants and applicants
must exhibit the certificate or application, as the case may oe, upon
the lawful demand of any law enforcement officer. Subsection (b) of
section 210 directs the Chief to inform each applicant for a registra-
tion certificate of the duties which flow from the provisions of this
bill and which govern such applicant.
Section 301 of the bill establishes the duties of executors and ad-
ministrators of estates containing firearms. If the estate contains a
validly registered firearm, the fiduciary has an obligation to report the
death of the registrant to the Chief. If such report is timely, then the
registration certificate remains valid until the lawful distribution or
transfer of the firearm in question. In the case of an estate containing
a validly regLstered firearm, the fiduciary is charged with all of the
duties which this bill would have impoesd upon the decedent if he or
she were still alive, for example, the duties listed in section 210 of the
bill. In the case of an estate containing a firearm which is not validly
registered, the fiduciar}- shall have the duty to surrender the firearm
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or lawfully dispose of such firearm as provided in subsection (b) of
section 209 or in section 801 of, the bill. However the executor or
admiaistrator shall not be liable for the criminal penalties set forth in
section 802 of the bill.
Section 401 prohibits any person or organization fn>m engaging in
the business of selling, purcha-^ing, or repairing tireanns, ammunitioD,
or destructive devices without first obtaining a license and limits the
lawful scope of such business according to the class of the license issued
to the licensee.
Section 402 defines the two classes of firearms business licenses; (1)
a Class A license authorizes a business to engage in the. sale, transfer,
repair, and purchajie of firearms and ammunition to any persons or
organizations in accordance with the provisions of this biU, and (2)
a Class B license authorizes a business to engage in the sale, transfer,
repair, and purchase of firearms, ammunition and destructive devices
only where the other party to the transaction is another licensee, as
defi^ned in the bill, or specified agents of the District of Columbia or the
federal governments.
Section 403 specifies who is eligible to obtain each class of license
described in section 402, above. Class B licenses inay be issued to
persons who or to organizations whose oflicers meet the registration
eligibility requirements and do not fail to perform any of the duties
set forth in this bill. Class A licenses are "grandfather" licenses which
can only be issued to firearms businesses which have been licensed
pursuant to the D.C. regulations in effect prior to the effective date of
this bill and which qualify for a Class A license in accordance with the
provisions of this bill.
Subsection (a) of section 404 regulates the contents of applications
for firearms business licenses. Subsection (b) of section 404 provides a
qualified evidentiary immunity for information elicited in applica-
tions for licenses.
Section 405 sets a sixty-day time frame within which tbe Chief
shall make a ruling upon an application for a license. The Chief
shall have one-hundred and twenty days to rule upon applications for
a license which have been filed within the first sixty days after the
effective date of this bill.
Section 406 authorizes and directs the Mayor to set the fee scale for
any services rendered pursuant to sections 401 through 413 of the bill
in order to cover the cost to the District of Columbia government for
providing such services such as the processing of applications for
licenses. Section 406 specifically makes fees for license applications
non-refundable.
Section 407 provides that the license shall have an effective life span
of one year.
Section 408 prescribes the grounds upon which a registration
certificate shall be revoked.
Subsection (a) of section 409 sets forth the procedures to be followed
with respect to denial of a license application or the revocation of a,
license. Subsection (a) provides due process protections to all licensees
and applicants affected by this Article. Such provision does not alter
the patent reality that carrying on a firearms business is a privilege
and not a right. Subsection (b) of section 408 delineates the legally
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pennissib]e options available to an applicant or licensee after an order
of denial or revocation has become final. Subsection (c) of section 409
directs the Chief to inform each applicant for a license of the duties
which flow from the provisions of this bill and which govern the
applicant.
Section 410 specifies the types of monthly records which must be
maintained by each licensee concerning the nature of the inventories
kept and the sales, transfers, and repairs conducted in the course of his,
her or its business. The Chief is directed to monitor such records at
reasonable regular intervals. Each record is to be kept for one year
after the event recorded.
Section 411 indicates the permissible manner for a licensee to keep
or display his inventory.
Section 412 provides that all firearms with which a licensee deals
shall have identifying markings imbedded therein.
Section 413 directs that licensees shall display their licenses in a
prominent place where customers may easily see them.
Section 501 of this bill specifically limits sales and transfers of
firearms and destructive devices within the District of Columbia to the
provisions contained in sections 209(b) (re: legal disposition of firearm
after denial or revocation of registration), 502 (re: permissible sales
and transfers), and 801 (re: voluntary surrender) of tliis bill.
Section 502 defines the permissible sales or transfers within the
District of Columbia under Uie bill. Permissible sales under section 502
generally conform to the scope of the registration and licensing pro-
visions of this bill. Subsection (a) of section 502 permits the sale or
transfer of any registrable firearm to a Class B licensee Subsection (b)
of section 502 respects licit sales of any registered rifle to any Class A
licensee. Subsection (c) of section 502 allows any Class A licensee to
sell or transfer any pistol or shotgun, which is lawfully part of his
inventory on the effective date of tliis bill, to any firearms business
licensed by a non-D.C. jurisdiction so long as the delivery of the pistol
or shotgun to the purchaser or transferee is made outside the District
of Columbia. Subsection (d) of section 502 allows any Class A licensee
to sell or transfer any pistol or shotgun which is lawfully part of such
licensee's inventory on the efl'ective date of this bill to any Class B
licensee. Subsection (e) of section 502 warrants the sale or transfer of a
rifle by any licensee to any person or organization provided that at
least three days pass between the time the transaction is initiated by
the prospective transferee's e.xhibition of an application (s) to register
the subject rifle(s) to the transferor and the tune the transaction is
finally consumated by delivery of the rifle(s). The three-daj- hold on the
transaction affords the Chief the opportunity to review the registration
application of the transferee and to stop or suspend the transaction in
cases where the Chief finds cause to deny the registration application.
Subsection (f) of section 502 generally permits any licensee to sell or
transfer a firearm or destructive device to any on-duty agent or em-
ployee of the federal or District of Columbia governments when such
agent is acting within the scope of his duties in acquiring such firearm
or destructive device. Thus the only firearm purchasable by the
general public would be a rifle.
Section 601 regulates the sale and transfer of firearm ammunition
with the District of Columbia and provides generally that only
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licensees can sell ammunition to non-licensees. The necessary condi-
tions for any sale or transfer of ammunition by licensees are: (1) tie
transaction must be made in a face-to-face transaction; (2) the
purchaser or transferee must s^ a receipt for the ammunition and
return such receipt for safe-keeping by the hcensee; (3) the purchaser
or transferee must show a legally authorized registration certificate
to the licensee for the firearm for which ammunition is being sought;
and (4) the ammunition being sold or transferred must be of the
same caliber or gauge as the firearm described in the registration
certificate. The latter two conditions would not apply in two cases:
(a) where the purchaser or transferee is an on-duty agent of the
federal or District of Columbia governments who is acting within
the ricope of his duties when acquiring such ammunition, or (b) when
the purchaser or transferee is a certified ammunition collector who is
purcnasing ammunition for his collection.
Section 602 of this bill specifies the persons who may possess
ammunition within the District of Columbia; namely, licensees,
on-duty agents of the federal and District of Columbia govemmente,
holders of valid registration certificates for firearms of the same gauge
or caliber as the ammunition being possessed, and locally certified
ammunition collectors.
Section 701 provides that no firearm or ammunition may be used
as security in a transaction and that no person may loan, borrow,
give, or rent any firearm except to the person who is the registrant
for such fireann.
Section 702 specifies that all firearms shall be kept unloaded and
disassembled in the District of Columbia except when such firearms
are being used at registered firing ranges in D.C. and used at such
ranges for recreational purposes.
Section 703 requires that any person who operates a firing range
in the District of Columbia shall register the same with the Chief.
Section 704 discloses that the provisions of this bUl shall not apply
to on-duty officers, agents, or employees of the federal or District
of Columbia governments when such persons are acting within the
scope of their emplovment.
Section 705 prohibits the intentional giving of false information
in course of applying for a registration certificate or license or in the
course of supplj'ing any information pursuant to these regulations.
Section 706 also makes it unla\vful to forge or alter any application,
registration certificate, license, or temporary- evidence of registration
generated pursuant to this bill.
Section 801 provides a mechanism for the lawful surrender or
abandoning of anv firearm or ammunition to the Chief or to a Metro-
politan police officer. Section -301 provides immunity from arrest
or prosecution for any person who delivers any firearm or ammunition
pursuant to the provisions contained in such section, but section 801
does not countenance the payment of any money to anyone in return
for making such a delivery.
Section 802 s^ets out two levols of penalties for violation of the
provisions of this bill. Each violation of section 201 {re: prohibition
of possession of a destructive device or unregistered firearm), section
401 (re: prohibition of engaging in firearms business without fireai-ms
business license), section 601 (re: limitations on sale or transfer of
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firearms), section 601 (re: limitations on the sale of ammunitioD)^
or section 602 (re: limitations on the possession of ammunition) is
subject to the strict mandatory penalty of ten days imprisonment
and a $300 fine. Any other violation of the bill is subject to a penalty of
imprisonment of up to ten days or a fine of up to $300 or both.
Section 804 manciHtes a publicity program to be continuously con-
ducted by the Chief in order to inform the citizens of the District of
Columbia of the provisions of this bill and related matters.
Section 901 repeals the current firearms regulations which are to be
replaced by the provisions of this bill. This section also repeals the
regulation authori7.iiig a bounty to be paid as a redemption for fire-
arms turned in to the Chief by members of the public.
Section 902 fixes the supplementary nature of the requirements and
penalties of this bill in relation to the requirements and penalties con-
tained in statutes of the District of Columbia and of the United States
dealing with similar subject matter.
Section 903 makes the individual sections or provisions of this bill
severable from each other in terms of 3ur\'ival from any attack upon
their validity.
Section 904 provides the effective date for the enactment of this bilL
COMMITTEE ACTION
On April 15, 1975, your committee convened in order to mark-up
Chaiiperfon Clarke's amendment in the nature of a substitute to Bill
No. 1-164. On that date, your committee voted to report to the
Council a bill which was basically comprised of the Clarke amendment-
in-the-nature-of-a-substitute with the incorporation of many of the
changes suggested by the Chief of Police (as discussed in the "Execu-
tive Position" section of this report). The committee vote was as
follows: two (2) in favor (Clarke and Di.xon), none opposed. The
committee also unanimously voted to direct the staff to prepare a
draft report on the reported bill for later consideration by the com-
mittee. On Wednesday, April 21, 1976, your committee met to approve
this report and to amrm certain amendments to the reported bill of
April 15. The following amendments were approved: (1) provision in
sec. 201(b) that licensees would not be required to register their
inventories; (2) provision in sections 401 and 402(b) that destructive
devices could be sold by Class B licensees; (3) allowance in section
404(b) for evidentiary immunity for information contained on appli-
cations for licenses; (4) provision in section 410(c) to require licenses
to preserve their section 410 records for 1 year; and (5) expansion of
the limitations on ammunition sales or transfers in section 601 to alt
persons instead of merely to licensees. The foregoing amendments and
this report were amjroved unanimously; the vote being: two (2) in.
favor (Clarke and Dixon), none opposed.
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Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law
Public Hearings on Bills 1-24 and 1-42
(Bill 1-24) "To protect the citizens of the District, to the maximum
extent possible by law, fiom losa of property, death, and injury, bv
revising Articles 50-55 of the Police Regulation"; and (Bill 1-42) "To
prohibit the manufacture, sale, purchase, transfer, receipt, tran-^porta-
tion, poHSCHsion, and ownership of haudgiins in the District of Colum-
bia, except in certain circumstances."
Room 500, District Building
Wa-shington, D.C. 20004
June 6-7, 1975
OPEXING STATEMENTS
Chairperson David A Clarke, Councilmember Arlington Dixon, and
iCouncilni ember Polly Shackleton.
FRIDAY, JUNE fiTH— 10 A.M. SESSION
ATume Organiiatlon
1. Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy Memhcrof Congres.'s, Distript of Columbia.
2. Council memlier John Wilson Citv Council of the District of Columbia.
3. Chief Maurice CuUinane. Chief iif Police, Metropolitan Police Depart-
4. Mr. John W. Ilechingor Former Chairman, City Council of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Member, Democrattc
Central Committee.
5. Ms. Kay McGrath Americans for Democratic Action, Women's
National Democratic Club.
6. Mr. Ed Volk. CitiKcii.
7. C. Francis Murphy, Enquire Curpur.ation Counsel.
FRIDAY, JUXE 6TH 7:30 P.M. SEasIOS
ItfriBie Orgtniznlioti
1. Mr. James Howard Pit.'it President, Deanwood Civic Associa-
tion.
2. Mr. Allen Esworthy Citizen.
3. Mr. Idas Holmes.. (!itizcii.
4. Rev, David Bava St. Francis DeSales Church Parit* and Co-
ordinating Council, Public Safety Com-
5. Mr. Gregory T. Dini Citizen.
6. Rev. Stnndord Harris Capitol Hill Group Ministry.
7. Mr. Absolum Jordan Black United Front.
8. Mr. William P. Rich Citizen.
9. Lawrence E. Smith, Esq Federal Civic Association.
10. Mr. Frederick H. Mcintosh Citizen.
11. Mrs. .Marion A. Mcintosh Citizen.
12. Mr. George W. Brady Federation of the Citlzena Aasociation of
D.C.
13. Mrs. Ruth Webster 14th Street PAC
(41)
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SATURDAY, JUNE 7TH — 10 A.M. SESSION
tiame Organisollon
1. Mr. William Rollow D.C, Skeetshootiog Association Advisi>ry
Panel Against Armed Violence.
2. Mr, Jeas Johnson National Rifle Association.
3. Mr. Albert T, Timentel,. Citizen.
4. Mr. Richard S. Ware Citizen.
5. Mr. Priestly Manoe Wa.ihington Outdoor Sportmen's Oub.
6. Mr. Charles Hernandez Chairman, People Organized for Prugreas
and Equality (POPE).
7. Mr. William J, Saunders Principal, Eastern High School.
8. Ma. Jennie Ross. Vice Chairperson, American Civil Liberties
Union of National Capital Area.
9. Mr. E. Wayles Browne, Jr National Rifle Association and Maryland
and District of Columbia Rifle and tistol
Clubs.
10. Dr. Barbara Moulton Citizen.
House of Representatives,
Waskingtm, D.C, February IS, 1975.
Hon. Sterling Tucker,
Chairman, D.C. City Council,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Sterling: As you know, I have introduced iti the Con-
gress national gun legislation. In the process of preparing my bill, it
occurred to me that it might make .some sense for the Council to
consider gun legislation on the local level. I understand that Council-
man John Wilson has prepared and introduced legislation on the
subject, and I have prepared a bill which runs parallel to my national
legislation that you may wish to consider, together with Councilman
Wilson's legislation.
I also asked my staff to prepare a legal memorandum setting forth
the authority of the Council to enact gun legislation in view of the
limitations in the Home Rule Act. I hope that you will find this
analysis useful.
If the Council holds hearings on gun control, I should verj- much
like the opportunity to express my views on the issue.
Please let me know how I can be of help.
Sincerely yours,
Walter E. Fauntrov,
Member oj Congress.
Enclosure.
memorandum
February 13, 1975.
Subject: Authority of District of Columbia Council to Enact Gun
Control Legislation.
A-s you requested, we have researched the question of whether the
District of Columbia has the authority under its home rule charter
and other applicable laws to enact the gun control legislation you
have prepared for their consideration. It is our conclusion that the
D.C. Council possess s.ich authority.
In essence, your proposed legislation would ban the manufacture,
sale, purchase, transfer, transportation or possession of any handgun
or handgun ammunition within the District of Columbia. The
District of Columbia Self-Govemment and Governmental Reorgani-
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zation Act ("Home Rule Act") provides that "the legislative power
of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within
the District . . ." It is generally agreed that this grant to authority
is extremely broad, roughly comparable to the legislative power of a,
state legislature, and in the absence of specific limitation, would
include the authority to enact the proposed legislation.
The Home Rule Act, however, does contain a hmitation that bears
upon the Council's authority to enact a comprehensive gun control
bill. Section 602(a)(9) states, in part, that the Council shall have no
authority to "enact any act, resolution, or rule . . , with respect to
any provision of any law codified in title 22 or 24 of the District of
Columbia Code (relating to crimes and treatment of prisoners) during
the twenty-four full calendar months immediately following the day
on which the Members of the Council first elected pursuant to this
Act take office."
In our view, this provision does not preclude the Council from
enacting the proposed gun control legislation. To begin with, the
limitation is narrow in that it precludas Council enactment only with
respect to specific provisions of title 22. It does not prevent the Coun-
cil from acting with respect to criminal laws codified outside title 22.
For example, the Uniform Narcotic Dnig Act, which contains substan-
tial criminal penalties, can be found in title 33 of the D.C. Code.
Other substantial statutes having criminal penalties are scattei'ed
throughout the Code, beyond title 22 and the limitation set forth in
Section 602 of the Home Rule Act. There should be little question that
the title 22 limitation on Council authority would not apply to these
criminal laws.
The Council appears to possess authoiity independent of title 22 to
enact gun control legislation. Section 1-227 authorizes the District of
Columbia Council to make all such "unusual and reasonable police reg-
ulations . , . as the Council may deem necessary for the regulation of
firearms, projectiles, explosives or weapons of any kind in the District
Columbia." This language is broad on its face, and would appear to
give tlie Council ample authority to enact sweeping gun legislation.
See Maryland and Di<itrict of Columbia Rifle and Pittol A<<<tociatitm,
Ins. V. Washington, 442 F2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In the Rifle and
Pistol Aiiociation case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld an extensive system of gun registration promulgated
by the D.C. Council, finding section 1-227 to be broad in scope. The
reason for enactment of this provision in 1906 was based on much the
same considerations that apply today in banning the sale and possess
sion of handguns. The District Commissioners testifying on the bill
underscored the undeilying basis for its enactment:
The advantage to be gained is the freedom from accident from
indiscriminate discharge of firearms within the territory of the
District of Columbia [that] will safeguard human life and property
to a lai^e degree, which is now impossible. H.R, Rep. No. 4207,
59th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1906).
While section 1-227 would itself support Council action, two addi-
tional issues must be addressed in, determining the authority of the
Council to enact comprehensive gun control legislation. The first is
whether the limitation of the Home Rule Act with respect to title 22
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supercedes the Council's authority to proceed under section 1-227,
The Council probably could have enacted a handgun ban prior to the
Home Rule Act. There is no indication in the Home Rule Act or its
legislative history that Coi^ress intended to limit by implication
authority possessed by the Council before the effective date of this
Act. There is some evidence to the contrary. The delegation of author-
ity to the Council was intended to be broad, an intention which must
pervade interpretation of the Act. As a matter of construction, it is
sound to assume that the Council posses.ses authority, unless a specific
limitation circumscribes it. Further, Section 404(2) of the Home Rule
Act seems to indicate that all powers possessed by the Council before
January 2, 1975 would be carried forward. That section provides,
in part :
... all functions granted to or imposed upon or vested in or
transferred to the District of Columbia Council, as established
by Reoi^anization Plan Numbered 3 of 1967, shall be carried out
by the Coimcil in accordance with provisions of this Act.
The Council's authority under section 1-227 seems to survive the
title 22 limitation under the Home Rule Act,
The second question is whether the gim control provisions now con-
tained in title 22 preempt the Council's acting under Section 1-227.
Our conclusion is that that title 22 does not preclude Council initiative.
Chapter 32 of title 22 (hereinafter the "1932 Act") contains several
provisions regulating weapons in the District. In Maryland and
District of Columbia Rifle and Pistol Association v. Waslungton, 442
F 2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the pkintifT, who sought to overtuni the
Council's gun registration regulations, ai^ued that the Congress
foreclosed use of Section 1-227 by the enactment of its 1932 gun
control law for the District contained in title 22. The Court ruled
that the 1932 Act docs not preempt the Council from acting pursuant
to Section 1-227. The Court explained its holding by observing:
In 1932, Congress enacted a limited gun control law for the
District, leaving Section 1-227 untouched.
In Firemen's Irisvrance Co. of Washington v. Washington, 483 F 2d
1323 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Court upheld substantial portions of a
Council regulation on insurance despite the existence of a comprehen-
sive insurance code enacted by Congress. The Court said:
But we cannot agree that mimicipal regulation is precluded
simply because the legislature has taken some action in reference
to the same subject.
The Court further stated:
Statutory and local regulation may co-exist in identical areas
although the latter, not inconsistent with the former, exacts
additional requirements, or imposes additional penalties.
The question, then, is whether the proposed gun control measure
directly conflicts with the provisions of^the 1932 Act. In broad terms,
the proposed legislation would not alter the specific proscriptions con-
tained m title 22. No action that would be subject to criminal penalty
under the 1932 Act would be made lawful under the proposed gun law.
It is significant to note that the 1932 Act nowhere expressly creates a
right to own or pos.sess a weapon, and this is the matter directly dealt
with by the proposed legislation.
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The pui^pose of the Council act would be to "exact additional
recniiremeiits, or to impose Additional penalties", which is an appro-
pnate purpose under the Firemen's Insurance test.
To avoid potential direct conflict, Section 11 of the proposed
legislation states:
No provision of this Act shall be construed as modifying or
affecting any provision of any law codified in chapter 32 of title 22
of the District of Columbia Code.
Brtsed on the above considerations, it is our view that the Council
possesses the authority to enact the proposed gun control le^latioa
under section 1-227,
Council of the District of Columbia,
Washington, D.C., March 19, 1975.
Hon. Walter E. Fauxtroy,
Alfmber of Congress, House oj Re preset! fativcs,
Waskiwjton, D.C.
Dear Congressman' Faun'troy: You will be pleased to know that
your Bill, the "District of Colunibin Handgun Control Act of 1975,"
was introduced by Councilnioniber I'lilly Sliacklelon and wa-; referred
to the Committee on Ju<Iiciary, chaired bv Councilinember David A,
Clarke.
The subject is of such controversy that I know public hearings will
be held and I know they will bo extensive. I am pleased that you are
available to testify and we will advise your office as to dates so that
appropriate arningoinent can be made for your appearance.
Sincerely,
Sterling Tucker,
Chairman.
March 17, 1976.
Louis Robbins, Esquire
Acting Corporation Counsel, D.C. The District Bvitdivg, Washington
D.C.
Dear Mr. Robbixs: Enclosed is a copy of a working draft of an
amendment in the nature of a substitute to Councilmember John
Wilson's Bill No. 1-164, the "Firearm Control Act of 1975". The bill
amends the D.C. Police Regulation, Articles SO through 55. On
June 6 and 7, 1975, public healings were held by the Committee on
the Judiciary and Criminal J^nw concerning amendments to the cur-
rent D.C. firearm control regulations. On Tuesday, March 23, 1976,
the Committee on the Judiciiirj' anil Criminal Law will convene a
public roundtable discussion in order to obtain public comments of
certain governmental officials concerning the enclosed working draft.
Comments, ciiticisms, and/or recommendations from your ofGce
would be most welcome at the March 23 meeting. In particular, a
response to the following questions would be most helpfid to the
Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law in its deliberations.
1. Under section 801 of the working draft, could a person arrested
for a criminal offense wherein a gun is seized thereafter suiTender the
gun and avoid prosecution?
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2. Do statistics show a need for a limit upon proseciitioral discretion
in plea bargaining a firearm charge?
3. For the last 3 calendar years, how marry firearm prosecutions
were instituted in the Distiict of Columbia? How manv of the above-
de-^cribed prosecutions involved violation of tlie D.C. Police Regula-
tions, Articles 50-55? In how many of the foregoing oases was there
solely a prosecution for violation of the D.C. Police Regulations,
Articles 50-55?
4. Have the use-immunity provisions in the current Police Regula-
tions, Article 51, sec. 7, created any significant problems for your
office? The use-immunity provisions in the working <lr!ift, section
203(c) basically tracks the current immunity provisions in the D.C.
Police Regulations, Article 51, section 7, Do you foresee any significant
problems with such provisions in the working draft?
Thank you for j'our cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
David A. Clarke,
Chairperson,
Committee an the Jvdiciary and Criminal Law.
March 17, 1976.
Hon. Maurice J. Culi,inane,
Chief, Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia,
Washington, D.C.
Deah Chief Cullinane: Enclosed is a copj' of a working draft of
an amendment in the nature of a substitute to Councilmember John
Wilson's Bill No. 1-164, the "Firearms Control Act of 1975". The
bill amends the D.C. Police Regulations, Articles 50 through 55.
On June 6 and 7, 1975, as you may recall, public hearings were held
by the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law concerning
amendment's to the current D.C. firearm control regulations. On
Tuesday, March 2.1, 1976, the Committee on the Judiciary' and Crimi-
nal Law will convene a public roundfable discussion in Ronm 501 of
the District Building, m order to obtain comments from certain
government officials concerning the enclosed working draft. The
comments, criticisms, and/or recommendations of the Metropolitan
Police Department woidd be most welcome at the March 23 meeting.
I would be most appreciative of your examination of the eligibility
standards for registration in section 203 and the reporting requiie-
ments in section 408. With regard to the latter, we are concerned to
require whatever the Department needs to be able to keep track of
every ^n in the District. Also, I pose the following questions to your
office m order to obtain answers and statistics which should greatly
assist the Committee on the J\idiciary and Criminal Law in its de-
liberations.
1. How many ammunition collector's certificates have been issued
to date by the M.P.D.C under Article 53, section 5 of the D.C.
Police Regulations? How it is determined that a person is a "bona
fide collector" as provided in Article 53, section 5?
2. How many licensed firearm dealers currently operate in the
District of Columbia? How many applications for new dealer licenses
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hrtve been filed during each of the last three years? How many such
applications have been approved?
■i. Please clo-icribe the general procedures used by the M.P.D.C.
for processing the following items: (1) collector's certificates, (2)
dealers in dangerous weapons, (.1) licenses to carry a pistol, and (4)
firearm registration cerlifitatcs. How long, on the average, does it
take to process each type of certificate or license? How many per-
sonnel are assigned to processing each item listed above? Do such
pei'sonnel work on processing these items on a full-time basis?
4. What is the number of firearms registered in the District of
Columbia at this time? How many new registration applications have
been filed during each of the la-^! o vt'ar-.? How many such applica-
tions l.:tve been approved?
5. How arejireantis used bv licensed special police officers registered?
Is the icgistrant the S.P.O! ci^aniaatioii or the individual S.P.C?
C. How does the M.P.D.C". determine "a physical defect which
would make it unsafe" for aii applicam to u:-e a rifie or shotgun
pnr-nant to Article 52. sec'ion 5(<0{6) of the D.C. Police Regulations?
7. What does the M.P.D.C. do hi response to a notification sent
by an administrator or executor nni-snant to seclion 3(c') of Article 51?
S. Uiuler the cun'ent Police Keafulaliiuis, Articles 50-55, are all
owners of riilps aiul shotguns required *o icgister such firearms
puj'suaTi' to Article 51, section 1, in addition lo being required to
fossess a license i-sued pui-suant to Article 52, sections 2(b) and 5?
[ so, are there administrative difficulties in requiring both?
9. Undej- the current Police Regulations, the term "destructive
device'' includes U';ir ga-. and tear gas bombs. How does the M.P.D.C.
enrrenllv monitor commcT'ce in tear gas ;ind tear gas bombs in the
Di-;trict'of Cohimbia? Does the M.P.D.C. consider MACE to be a
tear gas. a tear gas bomb, or another type of "destructive device"?
Thank you for } our cooperation in thi> matter.
Sincerely,
David A. Clarke,
Chairperson,
Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law.
Memoraxdum
Government op the District of Columbia,
March SS, 1976
To: David A. Clarke, Chairperson, Committee on the Judiciary and
Criminal Law, Council of the District of Columbia.
From: Ijouis P. Robbins, Acting Corporation Counsel, District of
Columbia.
Subject: Firearms Control Act of 1975 Bill.
By letter dated March 17, 1976, you requested the views of this'
office concerning vour proposed substitute to Councilmember John
Wilson's Bill No. i-164, the "Firearms Control Act of 1975." The bills
would amend Articles 50 through S5 of the Police Regulations of the
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District of Columbia. You have solicited our comments with respect
to the following four queHtions:
"1. Under section 801 of the working draft, could a person arrested
for a criminal ofTense wherein a gun is seized thereafter surrender the
gun and avoid prosecution?"
No. If a person is legally arrested and charged and/or the immediate
area is searched, anything seized could not then be surrendered. There-
fore, it is our view that the defendant could not avoid prosecution
by claiming to have surrendered the firearm subsequent to his arrest.
Additionally, the provisions of section 801 clearly call for the voluntary
surrender of the gun and cites Ihe specific place where the weapon must
be surrendered. Additionally, there is the requirement that the weapon
be securely wrapped and unloaded at the time of surrender. The latter
elements would certainly not appertain at the time of an arrest.
"2. Do statisficf: show a need for a limit upon prosecutorial discre-
tion in plea bai^aining a firearm chaise?"
No. A limit upon prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining would
not constitute a limit as we would understand it, but would merely
result in a shift of prosecution discretion to the police. Such must be
the indirect result since one the prosecutor papers a case, he would be
forced to go forward with the case. It is our view that plea bai^aining
is a usefuland necessary tool.
"3, For the Ia.st three calendar years, how many firearm prosecu-
tions were instituted in the District of Columbia? How many of the
above-described prosecutions hivolved violation of the D.C. Police
Regulations, Articles 50-55? In how many of the foregoing cases was
there solely a prosecution for violation of the D.C. Police Regulations,
Articles 50-55?"
Your question is couched in terms of "firearm prosecutions" and
thus would imply possible violations of laws enforced bj' the United
States Attorney. If such be the intent of your question, it is suggested
that such inquiry he more appropriately directed to the Office of the
United States Attorney. With respect to prosecutions involving
violations of Articles 50 through 55, our statistics indicate that during
the period from July 1, 1973 through December 31, 1975, 2,472
prosecutions were instituted for violations of Article 51-1 (unregis-
tered firearms) and 2,411 prosecutions were instituted lor violations of
Article 53-2 (ammunition violations). Due to the peculiar nature of
available statistics, this office is unable to respond to the last portion
of question 3.
"4. Have the use-immunity jirovisions in the current Police Regula-
tions, Articles 51, sec. 7, created any significant problems for your
office? The use-immunity provisions in the working draft, section
203(c) basically tracks the current immunity provisions in the D.C.
Police Regulations, Article 51, section 7. Do you foresee any sig-
nificant problems with such provisions in the working draft?"
It is respectfully submitted that you intended to refer to Article 51,
section 4 of the current Police Regulations. The use-immunity pro-
visions of Article 51, section 4 of the Police Regulations have not
created any significant problems for this office. We do not foresee any
significant proolems with such provision in the working draft.
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^[EJlOR\^■^>uu
Government of the District of Columbia,
Metiiopolitan Police Department,
March 22, t976.
To: Hon. David A. Clarke,
D.C, City Council,
Tlini: JiLiAV K. Dit.as. Cily Admini-^irator.
From: MAVKrCE J. ('vlli.vane, ("iiief of Police.
Subject : Request for statistics and analysis of amendment in the
nature of a -.ubstiiule to bill l-lt>4.
Please be advised that the statir^tiral data and analysis requested
by you in yinir letter of Marcii 17, Mibject as above, and wbicb was
i-eceived on Marcb IS, cannot be com|>!eted by March 23.
The Office of General Counsel toeether with the Gun Control
Section bc^an preparinc; the desired material immediately upon
recei|)t, and will conipleic the request as expeditiously as possible.
Memorandum
March 29, 1976.
To: Hon. David A. Clarke, District of Columbia City Council.
Through: Juhan R. Dngas. City Administrator.
From: Maurice J. Cuhinaue. Chief of Police.
Subject: Substitute draft to bill No. 1-164, The Firearms Control
Act of 1975.
This is in further response to your letter dated March 17 and
supplements my memorandum dated March 19, subject as above. In
your letter you requested the Department's ". . , comments, criti-
cisms, and or recommendations , . ." especially ". . . the eligibihty
standards for registration in section 20o and the reporting require-
ments in section 40S." You al~o requested technical and statistical
<iata in an-wer to nine specific questions. That materia! is provided
below. However, due to the length and complexity of the substitute
bill, its purcnHfll operalinuiil and budget impact on the Department,
and its efTcct on D.C. law, we have not completed the analytical review
you de-ire.
The questions posed and the Department's responses follow:
I. '"I low many ammunition collector's certificates have been
i-^sued to diite by the M.F.D.C. under Article 5-1, section 5 of the
D.C. Pcli'C Regulations? How it is (sic) determined that a person is
a 'bona fide collector' as provided in Article 5-1. section 5?"
Answer. A- of March 25, 1976, there are four (4) Ammunition
Collector's Certificates issued and outstanding. The procedure
employed to determine bona fideness begins with the applicant's
subnii-sion of a P.D. Fonn 221 (Ammunition Collector's Certificate),
togcilicL- with two (2) full face photographs I'i by Vi inches taken
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within thirty (30) daj's prior to the date of the application. The
applicant is then fingerprinted and the fingei-prints are sent to the
F.B.I, for a criminal history record check. The only "proof" required
under § 5 is a notarized statement that the applicant is a bona tide
collector. After the application is submitted, a police officer visits the
premises to view the intended storage facility to determine whether
it is "safe", applying tlie same standard that is applicable to dealere
under Article 54, § 6. This same officer then makes an approval/
disapproval recommendation. The application t<^ther with the investi-
gating officer's recommendation is reviewed by the supervisor of the
Gun Control Section, and then forwarded to the Director, Identifica-
tion and Records Division, who, as the Chief's detegatee, makes tlie
final determination.
2. "How many hcensed firearm dealers currently operate in the
District of Columbia? How nianv applications for new dealer licenses
have been filed during each of tlie last three years? How many such
applications have been appi'oved?"
Answer. There are fourteen (14) licensed deadly weapons dealers
operating in the District of Columbia. The application/approval
figures for each of the last three years are:
3. "Please describe the general procedures used by the M.P.D.C.
for processing the following items: (1) collector's certificates, (2)
dealers in dangerous weapons, (3) licenses to carry a pistol, and (4)
firearm registration certificates. How long, on the average, does it
take to process each type of certificate or license? How man;- personnel
are assigned to processing each item listed above? Do sucJi personnel
work on processmg these items on a full-time basis?"
Anvwer (I). See answer to question No. 1, supra;
(2) Dealers in dangerous weapons must make application to the
Department of Licenses and Inspection. That application is then
forwarded via the Chief of Police to the Firearms Registration Section
for investigation and recommendation. Each applicant fills out an
investigative worksheet, and is fingerprinted. A local and F.B.I,
criminal history check is made to determine eligibility i^-S-, convicted
felon, prior violation of gun regulations) under the D.C Code and the
Police Regulations. The premises to be used for the dealership are
then inspected to determine whether there is compliance with Art. 54,
§6. Upon completion of the above investigation the Director, Identifi-
cation and Records Division, makes a recommendation to the Chief
of Police. The Chief of Police makes a final determination and returns
the application to Licensing and Inspections;
(3) See D.C. Register, September 3, 1974, pp. 413-421.
(4) Each person acquiring a pistol, rifle or shotgun must register it
within 48 hours after taking possession of any such weapon. Regis-
tration Is accomplished by filling out a P.D. 217 (Gun Registration
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Certificate) and paying a $2.00 fee at the Gun Re^stration Section
Office. An iiivestigatioii similar to that described in Answer #1, b
then made to determine whether the applicant is eligible to possess a
firearm. The applicant is then notified of the result of the investigation.
The following figures represent the average processing time for the
specified license or certificate:
SumUr
Ammunition citUoctor's certificate..- '30
Dealer in deadly weapons ' 30
Gun registration certificHte 5-7
Rifle/shutgun license.. , '30
Application to sell or transfer a pistol. ' 30
License to carry a pistol ' 30
• Diif to FBI criminal hlafory record eheck wbicli »TerB£eB 21 days.
There are 6 full-time employees assigned to the Firearms Registra-
tion Section, as follows:
Serneant 1
Officprs - 2
GS-4 clerks _ 3
The 2 officers conduct the investigations described above.
4. "What is the number of firearms registered in the District of
Columbia at this time? How many new registration applications have
been filed during each of the last 3 years? How many such applications
have been approved?"
Ansu^er. Total firearms registered as of 11 a.m. March 26, 1976:
61,089.
AppnMd
l»7J
..lOJ
^^
■ Include] MPDC Mviponi tntcrad into tht computtr iiin ttfiitar tor tha littini«ia 1375.
5. "How are firearms used by licensed special police officers regis-
tered? Is the registrant the S.P.O. organization or the individual
S.P.O.?"
Answer. Firearms used by commissioned special police officers are
registered in the same manner as weapons registered by other b-
dividuals. In the majoiity of cases the weapon is registered to the
special officer, though either type of registration is currently permitted.
6. "How does the M.P.D.C. determine a physical defect which
would make it unsafe for an applicant to use a rifle or shotgun pur-
suant to Article 52, section 5(c)(6) of the D.C. PoUce Regu^tions?"
At the present time anyone physically capable of qualifying for,
or cxhibitmg, a driver's permit is deemed eligible under the cited
section.
7. "What does the M.P.D.C. do in response to a notification sent
by an administrator or executor pursuant to section 3(e) of Article 51."
Answer. M.P.D.C. amends the "hard copy" and computer files to
show the weapon as part of the registrant/ decedent's estate.
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8. "Under the current Police Regulations, Articles 50-55, are all
owners of rifles .and shotguns required to register such firearms
pursuant to Article 51, section 1, in addition to being required to possess
a license issued pursuant to Article 52, sections 2(b) and 5? If so, are
there administrative difficulties in requiring both?"
Asnwer. Yes. There are no administrative difficulties associated with
dual requirement.
9. "Under the current Police Regulations, tlie term 'destructive
device' includes tear gas and tear gas bombs. How does the M.P.D.C
currentiv monitor commerce in tear ^&a and tear gas bombs in the
Distrct of Columbia? Does the M.P.^D.C. consider MACE to be a
tear gas, a tear gas bomb, or another type of 'destructive device'?"
Answer. The Firearms Registration Section makes unannounced
periodic checks of all licensed deadly weapons dealers. These checks
would include monitoring sales or stocks of destructive devices. In
addition, they, together with other members of the force, investigate
reports or indications of commence in destructive devices as they occur.
The M.P.D.C. considers MACE to be a destructive device. In an
opinion memorandum dated -lime 16, 1969 to then Chief of Police
John B. Layton, Mr. Arthur L. Burnett, Legal Advisor to the Depart-
ment, concluded the definitional language in Art. 50, §l(i) to be
absolute, prohibiting all tear gas, regardless of the form it took or
device used to deliver it to the target. ( )n June 17, 1970 the Corporation
Counsel opined that "On-Guard", a pen-like aerosol instrument was
not a destructive device because it contained neither tear gas nor
mace, but rather "Oleoresin capsicum, suspended in mineral oil and
firopelled by Freon 1 & 2." [Oleoresin capsicum is a derivative of the
ruit of fastigiaum-cayenne or African pepper by acetone extraction
and was considered by the Director of the D.C. Bureau of Laboratories
to be no more damaging than red pepper.] Then on May 31, 1972, in
another opinion, the Corporation Counsel concluded that a device
called "1st Strike-CS-Aerosol Tear Gas" was a destructive device.
The opinion did not discuss the competition of the compound, there-
fore, it is felt that the name was both descriptive and dispositive.
Thus, at the present time, all tear gas compounds including Mace
{an adulterated form of tear gas) and compounds containing chloro-
acetophenone (synonyms — phenacycholride, phenylchloromethyle ke-
tone) are proscribed by the cited section.
Memoraxdum
Government of the District of Columbia,
April 6, 1076.
To: Hon. David A. Clarke. Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary and
Criminal Law, D.C. Conucil.
From: Judv Rogers, Jr., Special A-i>^istant for Legislation.
Subject: Substitute draft to Bill No. 1-164, The Firearms Control Act
of 1975.
This memorandum is to advise you of Executive Branch views re-
garding the subslitute draft to Bill No. 1—164, The Firearms Control
Act of 1975.
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We have reviewed the proposed substitute bill and find it to contain
anumber of legally objectionable and administratively defective provi-
sions which (line does not permit \is lo set forth here. Also, we think
the proposed substitute bill extensively duplicates the existing Jaw
without affecting much needed changes.
Accordingly, we would like to nooperate with you in this matter and
we propose to prepare a draft bill for your consideration in the near
future. At that time, we would be liajjpy lo discuss our respective
concerns.
Memorandum
Government of the District of Columbia,
Metropoutax Police Department,
April 15, 1076.
To: Honorable David A. Clarke, D. C. City Council.
From : Maurice J. Cullinaue. Chief of Poliw.
Subject: Comments on Sections 20S and 408 of Substitute Draft to Bill
No. 1-104, The Firearms Control Act of 1975.
This siipplements my memoraiiduin to you dated March 29, and
briefly presents the Department's views which you specifically re-
quested ou the registration and reporting requirements in sections 203
and 40S, respectively. The provisions are discussed seriatum, and the
M.P.D.'s comments arc numbered for ease of reference.
Seclion 20S — Jteqiriremenlsjor Ileglstration
This section would appear to replace the contents of Article 51 §4
and Article 52 §§ 4 and 5. By and large, it is a recapitulation of those
sections.' But, because of the regulatory luethodology employed, the
bill creates new problems not encouistered in the Police Reg;ulations.
The bill seeks to create a single regulatory standard by which pistols,
rifles, and shotguns would be certificated. While a single standard
might nornialiy be an inipi'oveineut over ihe admittedly complicated
arrangement found in Articles 50-55 of the Police Regulations, the
District is confronted with Congre^siomilly created standards for pis-
tols and an absence of standnrds for rilics and shotguns. Thus, by
establishing a single standard the M.P.D., and protpecfive applicants
for certilication of pistols inu>t pei'form a rather complicated exercise
in mental gymnastics to iiscertain what llie bill requires over and
above tlie Code and which portions of the bill conflict with the Code
and are inapplicable.
It is strongly su^ested that pistols be dealt with separately and
rifles and shotguns be dealt with separately.
Aside from this genera! view of the bill's approach, some of the
particular changes pToposed would appear to have significant con-
sequences.
1. In § 203(a)(1) the minimum age requirement is lowered from 21
to 18. While the Department fully realizes and believes that many 18
year olds are mature, responsible and productive members of society,
two problems with such a change are noted. First, the age of majority
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in the District of Columbia is still 21. We believe there is no reason
to carve out an exception to the 21 year age of majority rule. We are
cognizant of pending legislation to effect such a change; but it is our
view that there is no compelling reason (unlike voting) to treat fire-
amis specially. If the age of majority is to be lowered to 18, then
eligibility to register a firearm should await the enactment of such
general legislation.
2. Second, the draft offers less protection to the community-at-
lai^e than the present provisions of the Police Regulations. Article
52 § 5(f) provides that the Chief has discretionary authority to issue
a rifle or shotgun license to a person in the 18-21 age group provided
there is written proof that the appHcant's parent or guardian has given
his or her permission, and more importantly, assumes responsibility
for all damages connected to the applicant's use of the weapon.' As
noted above, many 18 to 21 year ouls are capable of assuming finan-
cial responsibility for their actions. On the other hand, many are not.
It is unwise to strip from the regulatory scheme, in the absence of
lowering the general age of majonty, the financial responsibihty pro-
visions now part of the Police Regulations.'
3. Section 201(a)(1) also employs the term "natural person". We
a.ssume that the term natural person is meant to exclude business
entities, and to require every gun to be registered to a named indi-
viduaU* While we understand now it would be as.sumed that such a
r^stration system would seeminglj' facilitate tracking weapons, the
opposite would occur.
Many weapcHis used by commissioned special police officers (SPO)
are purchased and owned by the SPO's employer, whether it be in-
house or rental guard arrangement. Assuming that the supervisor or
chief of security for the employer registers the weapon, it would be-
come difficult to administratively track the weapon by the registrant's
name if the person registering the weapon were to leave. At the present
time, the M.P.D. registers these weapons in the firm president's name,
since there is less turnover in personnel at this level. Nevertheless, to
a degree we do experience this very problem.* This iutuation is exac-
erbated when a weapons violation occurs after the named registrant
leaves the firm. Since the weapon is really the firm's and not the
former employee's (but is registered in the latter's name) prosecution
is virtually impossible. We believe that in situations where a business
entity is going to employ armed guards or engage in a rental guard
service, the firearms should be registered in the firm's name, or, in the
firm's name and an individual's, thereby establishing dual responsi-
bility for the weapon. Of course, where a shop owner (as opposed to
a firm hiring its own SPO security force), seeks to register a weapon
(that will not be carried by another on the employer's property), the
re^stration should be in the name of the shopowner.
> It mar well be prel^rmble to requfn all appllcmnta I<
moeti as we ila for motor *«hlcle Ucensure.
• Artlcl? 51 1 4 of the Police Retnilatlonir alwi useii the
the nrotectlon •galDiit the u»e of required data to In
*A relateil problem oeeara when the flrm mofea, whlcli In manf Brnn occurB quite fre-
quenUy. It the rerlitratlon wai Id the Brm'ii uame an addreBK cbanse would be followed
by an ameDdment (o our reglgtratlon flies.
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4. In section 20^(a) (2) ineligibility to register a firearm is predicated
upon a conviction for a crime of violence, as defined.' The Police
Regulations presently renders a person ineligible if he has been con-
victed in any jurisdiction of a felony involvir^ the use of force against
another, or is under indictment for same.' The tlraft is deficient in two
respects. First, it appears that a disabling conviction must occur in
the District. Since the majority of states use similar definitioos for
crimes of violence,' and more importantly, because the intent of the
section is to keep weapons out of the hands of violent persons, the
situs of the conviction should be irrelevant. The "any jurisdiction"
iHiigutigc in the cited section of the Police Regulations should be in-
cluded in the draft to eliminate any doubt as to the intent of the
section. '
Second, wc believe the present r<^ulation is superior on this point
in that it disables persons under indictment for violent crimes. If the
indictment leads to conviction there is absolutely no justilication for
a loophole allowing such persons to legally obtain a deadly weapon
between the time they are chai^d and the time the judgment of
conviction is entered.' Likewise, it is our view that the interest an
indicted individual subsequently exonerated might have in registering
a weapon durii^ the pendency of proceedings is far outweighed, on
balance, by society's need to prevent violent criminals from easily
obtaining weapons. In short, the hiatus between indictment and ac-
quittal or dismissal is not too long a period to require a person to wait
before being able to register and lawfully possess a weapon.
5. Section 203(a)(2) also makes permanently ineligible persons con-
victed of violations of the piovisions of the draft. Under the Police
R^ulations, after 3 years the Chief has discretion to lift the disability
for rifles and shotguns aft«r certain conditions ate met.'" While we
believe violations of Articles 50 to 55 are serious, we do not believe
such persons should be treated the same as persons convicted or
indicted for felony crimes of violence, or treated more harshly tian
convicted diug pushers."
6. Section 203(a)(3) is defective for the reasons described in this
paragraph and items 7 through 9, injra. First, it provides for a 5 year
ineligibility for persons convicted of "weapons offenses" (except
violations of the proposed regulation). "Weapons offenses" are nowhere
defined. Other than 22 D.C. Code §§3201 et seq., and Articles 50-65,
we can think of no other "weapons offenses". If a conviction under 22
D.C- Code §§ 3201 et seq., is the intended scope of the provision, it
n In 22 D.C. Code | 3^01 (1073 «<].), eimptlng tliercfrom lamnr.
«BUlC or tbe F.B.I.'s Unlforni Crime It^porte Proeram, md certain
nber of persons chnrged with violent crimes wb
... . _ .ease, the elfett of sucli a loophole Is not Incoi
....1M>. dr*s nut trnpk ppn-ons nrreBled for violent crimes with prloi „
beeniiHe of tinsnclal limitations, ntir recidivist xtuitlea are relevant, t'or eiample. In the t
qiinrter of 1U7S. approximately ioVr of the penonH arrested lor atiEravatcd assault w<
on release procrama for prior acts of aRinnvsted assaiilt. bnrclarv. homicide, rape, or r
liery ; so were 4R% of thrise Hrrealed for burfitary : bo nere 44% of those arrested for hoi..
cide ; so were 78% of those arrested (or rape ; and so were 60% of those arrested for rob-
berj-. ThUB. more than half the persons arrraled for Tlolent-type crimes had exhibited
previous violent crime conduct warrantlne arrest. (ReclrtlTlst Report. Criminal Investlsa-
thins nivlsluu. PebPiiary 10. 1B78). Under this draft, the 50+% of repeat violent crime
nffendem (or the 4lh quarter of 1975 could legally register a gun. a clearly undesirable
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would appear to amend $22-3203 of the Code. For example, it i^ a
felony if a person convicted for maintaioinv a ban'dy house is subs^
quently twice convicted few p€>sr*s;siiig a pi:Jtol." If coii\"icted, a person
is forever barred frwn keeping or p>o**s&ina: a piv^tol." However, under
the draft bill, (if it is intended to effect an amendment in Title 22 of
the D.C. Code) that pen«n would be eligible after five j-ears from the
date of conviction. The provi-qon i< also amenable to an interpretation
that would not amend the D.C. Code. For example, if a Person wiw
Convicted of felony possession of a sand club," arguably a iveapons
offense, the applicant after five years (assuming no other disabling
events) would be able to register a rifle or shotjrun, but not a pistol
because of § 3203. While this interpretive approach is logical, clarifica-
tion as to the intended operation would be desirable.
7. Second, there is no indication whether the weapons offense must
have been committed in the District. It would be lo^cal to assume s*>
since the language "in any jurisdiction" which appears in connection
\\'ith the 5 year dis^ability for narcotics convictions is omitted in rela-
tion to weapons offenses. Weapons offenses, if sufficiently serious to
warrant excluding an applicant, is sufficiently serious wit^iout regard
to the situs of the offense.'^ Indeed, there is as close if not a more
concrete nexus with respect to weapons offenses than narcotics offenses.
In our view, they are deservii^ of equal and lasting disqualification.
8. Third, the provision is deficient because it does not exclude all
convicted drug abusers from registering firearms, only those convicted
of "narcotics" offenses. The D.C. Code denotes "narcotics" " and
certain other "dangerous drugs" " in separate chapters of the D.C.
Code. The language used could result m a serious regulatory gap.
Indeed, the failure to make the class of disqualified drug abusers
sufficiently expensive would also discriminate against narcotic abusers
versus abusers of other drugs under the federal Controlled SubstaTices
Act.'" Clearly, a convicted abuser of amphetamines is as dangerous to
society as a convicted abuser of heroin. Their treatment under this
bill should be the same. If the bill was intended to cover all drug-type
offen-ses it should be made clearer. If it was intended- not to disqualify
persons convicted under Chapter 7 of Title 33, such a policy decision
would be an egregious mistake.
9. Fourth, the Department opposes the attempt in this section to
partially decriminalize marijuana. As proposed, persons convicted of
fiossessing one ounce or less of marijuana would not be disquahfied
rom registering and possessing firearms, if otherwise eligible. We shall
not recapitulate our objections to decriminafization hero, but simply
reaffirm and incorporate those objections.'*
As otherwise pertinent, such an exclusion would be administratively
unworkable. There would be no way, at the present time, without going
through actual court records (and in some cases the triaJ tiansciipt) to
determine whether the con\-iction was for simple possession of one
u^SD.C. CndeH2T22and»Z03(3) (lOTSed.).
<*/<f., I 3203(3).
"M., i3214(L).
•^Srf. 22 D.C. Code | 3Z0:ttB) (1973 ed.) which alao IgnoreB bltus In determining vlio
■ilSD.C. Cmlf H01(n} (lB73ed.).
"Id.. ITOl(l).
" 31 tI,S.C.A. 801 et teg. Compare. J 802(18) with t S02I1).
» Sep lettpr dal?d October 20, 1675 from Chief Cullloane to Councilman aark on BID
1-44, and KcnerallT, the leglalatiTe record lor BUI 1-144.
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ounce or less. Disposition records routinely forwarded to the Depart-
ment by the U.S. Attornev. for example, would only reveal "CSA — 6
mos,— suspended" or "UNA — 4 mos. — probation." Without a large
infusion of manpower to make manual searches in cases where nar-
cotics convictions are noted, the proposed scheme would be excessively
burdensome and unreasonable.^"
10. Section 203(a)(4) di^quahhos persons acquitted of a criminal
chaise on groimds of insanity within five years preceding the applica-
tion. Again, a c|uestion arises whether the situs of the ooense matters.
Some states still adhere to the M'Nagkten ruie,^' while others have
adopted more liberal positions." The Department beheves that situs
should be irrelevant. Whatever the rule applied by the state in a partic-
ular case, the M.P.D. would only be informed of the result, not the
basis for the result. To i-equire anything beyond mere acceptance of the
states' conclusions would impose a burden similar to that noted previ-
ously with respect to decriminalization of marijuana. On the other
hand, the proposed regidation could be read to be restricted to D.C.
court determinations. However, we believe that result to be even less
desirable. The M.P.D. has not encountered any difficulty implement-
ing the insanity acquittal disqualification "by any court" under the
Police Regulations.'^ We submit the present provision relating to
acquittals by reason of insanity has not proven itself unworkable or in
need of change and should be preserved.
11. That same proviMion lengthens the period of disability from the
3 >'ears provided tor by the Police Regulations to 5 years. The M.P.D.
finds no fault with eitlier a 3-or-5 year hiatus. Rather, we believe the
underlying philosophy to be deficient. Under the present provision the
Chief may authorize pistol registration if he finds the person is,
inter alia, mentally capable of safe and responsible possesaion and use
of a pistol. Under the proposed version, qualification would become
automatic after 5 years. In neither case is a qualified medical person
required to first certify the person to be over trie "insanity" which up
to that point has precluded registration. We believe that no person
disqualified because of an insanity plea should be able to lawfully
possess a weapon until the appropriate medical authorities are sure the
condition is abated. Thus, in the absence of a medical determination
the Chief should continue to be given discretionary authority to resist
attempts to register weapons by persons whose very demeanor casts
doubt on their recovery.
12. Section 203(a)(5) disqualifies applicants who have been involun-
tarily committed to a mental institution during the 5 years preceding
the application. As noted in paragraph U, supra, we believe an appro-
priate medical authority should be required to determine recovery
n If the appllcaUDn requlnrd the appUcBnC to specify this data, the M.P.D, i
. . d to rerWy It throimh ouurt recorda.
nifSnghlen'aCait, in CiaitigcF. 200. 8 Enc Rep. 718. (1R43>.
- ,. .. „ „-__- „„ ^... ^25. 15.1 P. 2d 758 ("•'•^' ■■'-
...„., K.yon V. People, HO Cnlo. 425. 1S.1 P. Zd 758 (1915) (delusion) ; State v. Whilt.
BS N.sr. ;ia4, Slly r. M 727 (10u4> (irreslutlble Impulse) ; Durham v. U.S., 94 U.S. App.
II.C. 23R rl904). (Durham or prodiicl rule) (irhlle Dnrhatn Is no longer rolloivi-il In Ihe
liixirlftt iif Coliimhia. U.S. v. Bi«ir»er. 153 U.S. App. D.C. 1 <1»73). the £>Hrhnni rnlp l»
KtlH UKfA In some Stntes) ; People v. llemlerKOn, XS Cnl. Bptr. 77. -ISrt P. 2d n77 (l»e.l)
IdliiilnlHbeH cnpaclty) ; Model Tonal Code | 4.01 (proposed official draft 1962) (aubstantld
^.\rf, 52 15(e)(2)-
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from the condition causing dLsqualificatioii. It is quite possible a person
involuntarily committed would have been released 5 years prior to the
application and still be .a danger to himwelt or others. Moreover, this
very danger could be even more prevalent among voluntary patients,
since they may leave medical facilities at will. We believe botli volun-
tary and involuntary, patients should be disqualified, and for both
categories medical certification of cure should be required prior to
authorizing possession of deadly weapons.
13. Section 203(a)(6) restates the language found in Art. 52 § 5(c)(6)
of the Police Regulations, but extends it to include pistols as well as
rifles and shotguns. At the present time, if the applicant appears
phj-sically normal, the M.P.D. makes no further inquiry. The "physi-
cal defect" test provides Httle guidance to police officers. For example,
is a person without hands, but fitted with mechanical hands, suffering
from a physical defect within the meaning of the draft language?
Further, a physical defect connotes a permanently damaged or dis-
abled body structure. Does this mean that persons suffering from
temporary conditions, e.g., two broken hands, may still register u
weapon even thongh he is physically incapable of using such a weapon,
mncn less use it safely?
Finally, under the Police Regulations the physical defect test goes
to licensing of rifles and shotguns. We can think of many defects or
conditions affecting the safe use of a rifle that would not interfere with
use of a pistol. Is the same test to be applied without regard to the
weapon involved.
14. Section 203(a)(7) is patterned after Article 52 §S5(c)(5) and (7)
and supplements the conviction disqualifications found in §g20:j("i)(2)
and (3)." The main difference between the diaft and existing law is
the increase in the disability period and elimination of the Chief's
discretionary authority. Tfiis section should be combined witli
§203(a)(3). "Convictions resulting in a 5 year disqualification should hv
treated together for ease of reference.
We also view these crimes to be serious enough to warrant ilis-
qnaliflcation during the pen<lency of criminal charges.'-
15. Section 203(a)(10) ^ is identical to Art. 52 §5(c)(9), with the
exception of the proviso. Umlor the present regulatory scheme, one
who violates the law bring 22 D.C. Code §3203 into play (relating to
possession of a pistol) is ineligible to obtain a rilte or shotgun licence
by operation of the cited section of the Police Regulations. The draft
would permit a person disqualified from lawfully pos.sessing a pi^uA
tinder §3203 to lawfully possess a rifle or shotgun. Such a result is,
we believe, a weakening of the gun control laws in the District, and ii
serious mistake. The same rationale leading Congress to coneludi'
certain persons should not have pistols is applicable to denying such
persons permission to possess a rifle or shotgun. We oppose any relnxii-
tion of the rules prohibiting convicted persons from lawfully obtaining
weapons."
■' »«■ parainaplis *-!>. 'Hliia.
.mltsj 21
■II J kboteunit.
_, , iHrllun Ih I^kbI KUrplURSw. Sin™ M i*t
iiniler 22 D.C. Coilc i TilKt i-ollUI U"t luwrtilly iwskcbs i.u
ilmft, tliP "Hlr wraiiaiiK ILul mulii iwnlHj fw finil"!
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1 6. Scclion 203 (a) { 1 1 ) provides that tlie firearms knowledge standftrd
need only be met once by eacli applicant. We disagree iri:?ofar a.s dif-
ferent types of weapons are concerned. We believe that if a person
first registers a pistol, the test provision may be waived for subsequent
pistols. However, if that person subsequently seeks licensiu-e for ft
shotgun, he should be required to meet the standard set by this section.
17. The opening clause to §203(b) provides that the "Chief shall
endeavor to obtain" certain infoimalion. Does this mean the M.P.D.
can register a weapon after trying and failing to obtaui the enumerated
information? Moreover, the burden appears to be placctt on the De-
partment. We oppose a regulatory scheme placing such a burden on
the M.P.D. Registration and licensing of a deadly weapon in tlie
District is a privilege and it is the applicant's duty to meet the stand-
nr<is established. Thus, the section shouhl be recast to place on the
applicant the burden of furnishing the information required by the
draft.
18. Section 20:}(b)(:i) reduces the work history to be provided from
5 years to 2 years preceding the application. Inasmuch as §203(ft}
speaks in terms of 5 years for disqualification purposes, a 5 j'ear work
history period is appropriate. Such data would assist the Department
in leammg of or raise suspicions about out of state convictions, mental
institutionalization, etc., during the 5 year period.
19. Section 203(b)(6) restates the contents of Article 52 §4(b)(6).
However, the former omits an important a-spect of the latter: the
applicant is not required to provide any information concerning "any
mishap involving [a firoarmj, including the date, place, and circum-
stances and the names of persons injured or killed." Ina.smuch as
mishaps such a.s here described are grounds for disqualification under
§203(a}(8), such information should be required of each applicant.
The M.P.D. opposes the omission.
20. Section 20;i(b)(i0) asks whether the applicant is or is intending
to be an SPO or private detective. The M.P.D. already a.sks for SPO
coinmis.sion numbers and the description of intended use (e.g., geo-
graphic, temporal) of the weapon is made a part of the commis.sion
issued to the SPO. Similarly, if a private detective is going to carry a
weapon while protecting the property of a client, he too, would be an
SPO. It is our view that this section should be eliminated.*"
21. Section 203(b) (11) asks whether the applicant has possessed the
weapon since- the effective date of the bill, and if not, account for
prior possessors. This section does not appear to be of any value to
the Department.*' If the weapon had been previously registered, the
Department could account for its whereabouts. If not, most applicants
could only indicate who they purchased it from. The language in
Art. 62 §4(b)(9) is preferable.
22. The second proviso in § 203(c} should be deleted and inserted
in a more appropriate section. Section 203(c) speaks to not using re-
quired data as evidence in a criminal proceeding, with certain excep-
tions. The secon<l proviso speaks to divestiture of weapons after
denial of certification. While we agree this area is susceptible to abuse
» It uilBht be aflvlBBblP to ndd a sprtloi
rornmtlon an h» flwiiiK iie(<"8i'Bry to tarrj- (
™ThouKli not BxliPij (o mnijiirat im tl;.
tloDu or tl>e t'litlre bUl."
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under the present scheme, we are not convinced the three options
provided for are viable either. For example, one of the 'i approved
methods of divestiture appears to invite unsuccessful appHcants to
violate federal law. The proviso states in part that an unsuccessful
applicant may "remove the firearm in question from the District of
Columbia for so long as he has an interest in . . . [it]." Suppose
further that in accordance with this directive the person t^es a
pistol to Vii^nia, leaves it with a friend, and thereafter sells it to his
friend. It is a felony to sell, give, trade, transport or deliver any
firearm to any person (except certain licensed individuals) who the
transferor knows or has reason to believe is a lesident of a state otlier
than that of the transferor.^"
It is submitted that further study of this aspect of the gun control
issue would be warranted prior to enacting any legislation.
23. Section 203(d) should be left to the discretion of the Chief even
if prints had been taken within the last 5 years. Some prints are
destroyed inadvertently, or are not sufficiently clear. No one would
be hurt by such a delegation of discretionary authority.
24. Section 203(e) grants discretionary authority to require appli'
cants to appear in person with the firearm to be registered. Thiii
should be a mandator3' requirement. It would enable the personnel in
the Firearms Registration bection the opportunity to inspect weapons
for obvious defects. However, any such proWsion should explicitly
protect the Department and its employees from liability for failure to
discover any defect subsequently resulting in injury or death.
SBCTIOM 408 — REPORTING "
25. The M.P.D. opposes the monthly filing requirement imposed
by § 408(a). The M.P.D. should not be made a storage facility for
dealers' paperwork. Requiring a dealer to maintain at his place of
business certain records, and to exhibit them upon demand to a police
officer during business hours, would appear to serve the same purpose.
26. Moreover, it is submitted that § 408(a) is too rigid in its ap-
proach. A fiexible approach such as adopted by the Congress in the
Gun Control Act of 1968 would be preferable.*' If a fle.vible approach
were adopted the officials charged with enforcing the law would be
able to determine the information necessary to accomplish their mis-
sion and require same to be provided in a usable fashion. Congress
adopted this approach in § 902(d) of the Gun Control Act of 1968.^
There, the Secretarj' of the Treasury was authorized to prescribe not
only the types of records to be maintained by the licensee, but also
the types and timing of reports to be filed based on the records. We
believe such a framework would be more appropriate to achieve the
desired result.
27. In light of pari^raphs 25 and 26, § 408(b) should be deleted.
CA. tt)S2(a)(5) (Supp. 19TS).
~-ndlx B for fon.|iarlson In pilslli
A. t 921 el lev. (Supr. 1976).
A. I «(""-' "■ •»■">. T.h.
■ Apppnillx B for
L-.S.C.A.
_. _._ , „, , 5"PP. 1978). These commenU. as prevloimly noted, were UpePifl-
(TiU.v requested. While we believe adoption of the sucBestions made would preatlr laprove
II 2o;i and 40l>, we continue to believe the bill to be similarly deficleat elaewhere to pte-
Huile Hupportlne Its passa^-e. Oleniorandum ul Jud; Rogers to Councilman Clarke dated
Aiirll 6, 10T6).
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COMPMRISON OF SE
s»c.?03(ixn Aft.w«
SK.ni3<aXZ> AiI.S2h
S«.M3(lX3) - at 52 11
S«.»l3(iX*) — A>t52H
S«.M3(iX5) Art52«
■.5(tX«>.'(i)-V.
.!<tX3).<5)-
M.5(CX2>
M.5<CX2)-
«5<cX6)-.
K. bCcXS),
K. 5(cX!)-
«c. McXW.
(?)...
SfcZOViXIl) *rt.Mw
S«.203(iXlO Art 52 »
SK.2ra(b»l)_ ArLMw
StcarnXZ) _. AiLSZw
S«e.Z0JtbK3) Art.6?n
203(6X') Art. 52 1*
203(liXB>-- A>t5ii»
JOXtVS) AiLSZi*
203(liXlO)— -
i03(l>Xn> Art 52 I*
aixbxii)
203(li!(»S («)...._
203(0 ArLSI j»
a.;:;;;;::;;.*"-""
203<t) Art.S2ift
ami.-
.. OiiabUity IncrwMd ham 3 tai 5 yi lor wuponi ind
nctiom: miriliuKii and oulotStiWwMiion afl*i
,. Dli*bllit)riiK(in«dltoin3to5vrlDriiiunity acquitl
)i>iidElin piMt nudi (llBi bk,
,. OiiabHitr iKiMiid from 3 Is 5 yr; tail chanittl In
Mind panni" in rcgiitrttrH
. Prior Hoik Miloiy praviovii In
.- Omits itiMnwnl of nt
. WhiViir waipan poiHiMd by applicant iIk» mactmait of
.. Eipinds fittptiiMi ; raiiiiifn divntitur* si weapon H
.. All applianb may b< pnotwaphsd.
■A AND THE POLICE REUtLATIONS
rc.408(>XI).-.
ic408(aX2)...
ic. 408(aXS). . .
ic.4a8(aX6).-.
K. 408(b)
.- Monthly reiwrti, deal
.. Ibiit.. tmpliiyae dala.
.. Ibid., wupwis invenhMy data.
.. Ibid., (esair data.
._ Ibid.. uIh data.
munition-ialei data.
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House District Committee Staff Summary of the Council's
Gun Control Act
1-142, IN THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Be it enacted by the Council oj the District of Columbia, That this act
may be cited as the "Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975".
Section II defines the findings and purpose, including r^istration
of all firearms, owned by private citizens, hereby makir^ it more
difficult to obtain firearms.
TITLE I — DEFINITIONS
TITLE II DEALS WITH FIREARMS AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES
Section SOI — Registration required. — Prohibits persons or organiza-
tions from receiving, possessing or having under his control any
firearm unless he hijids a valid registration certificate. Organizations
may be registered if they employ persons Ucensed to carry firearms for
use during duty hours. Law enforcement agencies or Federal, State
and local governments are exempt while on duty as are persons holding
a valid dealer's license. Nonresidents who are participating in any
lawful recreational firearm activity are e-xempt, provided he keeps
the weapon unloaded and securely wrapped and in open view.
Section 202 — Unregiaterabie jirearms. — No registration certificate
will be issued for sawed-off shotgun, machine guns, short^barreled
rifles and pistols not previously registered. Pistols not possessed in
conformity with the law prior to the effective date of this act are also
unre^sterable.
Section SOS — Application and prerequisites for registration.—Ko
legistration certificate shall be issued to anyone under 21 (18 and
above with parent or guardian). The parent or guardian must assume
liabilities for damages for persons under 21. No registration will be
is.sued if:
(a) The applicant has been convicted of a crime of violence, weapons
offense, or violation of this act.
(b) The applicant is under indictment for weapon offense.
(c) The applicant has been convicted within 5 years of a narcotics
violation, physical threat, assault or use of a firearm.
(d) The applicant has been adjudicated chronic alcoholic or insane.
(e) The applicant has been involuntarily committed to a mental
hospital.
(;) The applicant has a phj-sical defect which would prohibit him
from using tlie firearm safely.
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(g) The applicant has been adjudicated negligent in a firearm mishap.
(A) The applicant does not have vision equal to that required for a
driver's license.
The applicant must demonstrate satisfactorily a knowledge of the
laws of the District of Cohimbia pertaining to firearms and a knowledge
of safe use of firearms under standards prescribed by the Chief of
Police. Everyone applying for a registration certificate must provide a
full background, including name, address, business, date of birth, sex,
previous firearm record, intended use of firearm, description of firearm,
where purchased, where it will be kept, and other information as the
Chief of Police determines necessary.
SecHon SO4— fingerprinting, pictures, personal appearances. — The
applicant shall a[)pear in person and submit photographs of himself,
and may he required to be fingerprinted and bring the firearm ^rith
him.
Section 205 — Application under oath; /ees.— Provides for an oath
and fees.
Section 206 — Filing times jor new purchase and firearm entering the
District; previously registered firearma. — Application for registration
shall take place prior to the taking possession of a firearm or inmiedi-
ately after firearm has been brought into the District. Firearms regis-
tered prior to the effective date of this act must be registered witnin
60 days of the effective date of this act.
Section 207 — Issuance of registration certificate. — The Chief of
Police shall issue registration certificates upon the determination that
the applicant is entitled. The Chief of Police shall approve or deny an
application within 60 days except for previoiisly registered firearms in
which he will have one year. The Chief of Police may correct all errors
in applications.
Section 20S — Duties of registrants. — Each registrajit must notify the
Chief of Police in writing of the loss, theft, or tiestruction of certincate,
the sale or transfer of the firearm, or change in any of the information
appearing on the certificate. Information must be provided as to the
transferee or purchaser of the firearms. The Chief of Police must also
be notified of any transfer, theft, or loss of a firearm. The registrant is
also required to keep the certificate with him whenever in possession of
the firearm.
Section 209-^Iievocali.on. — The certificate shall be revoked upon
failure to comply with Section 203 regarding eligibility criteria or upon
discovery of false information on the application. The certificate may
also be revoked for failure to report to the Chief of Police loss, theft, or
transfer of the certificate or the firearm.
Section 210 — Procedures Jor denial or revocation. — E^tab)i5>hes pro-
cedures for notification, service and time for applicant to be heard
regarding revocation or denial of a certificate. Appeals may be made
from the Chief of Police's decision pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act.
Section 211— Certain information not to be used as evidence. — Infor-
mation obtained pursuant to this title shall not be used in criminal
proceedings with respect to violation of this act.
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TITLE III — ESTATES CONTAINING FIREARMS
Executors must notify the Chief of Police upon the death of a
person who owns a firearm. The executor must comply with the act
concerning registration, but shall not be liable for cruninal penalties.
TITLE IV — LICENSING OF FIREARMS BUSINESSES
Section 401 — Prokibitions, exceptioTis. — No person or organization
i^hall manufacture a firearm, destructive device or ammunition within
the District. No person or organization shall deal in flreanus without
first obtaining a dealers license. No licensee shall deal in prohibited
firearms except with a Government agency.
Section ^02 — EHgibUity. — Anyone eligible to register a firearm and
eligible under Acts of Congress to engage in such business, may register
as a dealer. Each must fiJe ail application containing all the information
required to register a firearm and the applicant's prior activity in the
deadly weapons business and such other information as tjie Chief of
Police may require.
Section %03 — Issuance 0/ a Dealer's License Procedvre. — The Chief of
Police shall, upon investigation, issue a dealer's license or deny it within
a 60-day period. The Chief of Police may also correct errors in the
license application.
Section 4O4 — Duties of Dealers. — The dealer is required to: (1) dis-
[tlay license ; (2) nptify the Chief of Police in writing of theft or loss of a
icense; (3) notify the Chief of Police of change in the information on
the registration form; (4) keep a record book containing information
about each employee, each firearm registered and sold, name and ad-
dress of persons from whom weapons were purchased, price paid, date
and time of receipt of weapon for repair, date returned, complete in-
formation on all firearms sales, and complete information on all am-
munition sales. All of the above information must be made available
to the Police Department during business hours. The Chief of Police
may require any record information to be submitted.
Section 405 — Revocation.^A dealer's license may be revoked for
failure to keep proper records or for failure to provide adequate
information on his application.
Section 406—Procedure« for denial and revocation. — Establishes pro-
cedures for notification, service and time for applicant to be heard re-
garding revocation or denial of a certificate. Appeals may be made from
the Chief of Police decision puivsuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act. If there ia a revocation decision, he must register such firearms
which are capable of registration and surrender the rest to the Chief of
Police.
Section 407 — Displays, employees. — Dealer shall not display firearms
or ammunitions in windows. All firearms and ammunitions shall be
kept locked, except when being shown, repaired or beii^ worked on.
All dealer's employees mustibe eligible to register a firearm under this
act.
Section 408-~'Fvrearm markings. — Dealers may not sell firearms
without an identification number on them.
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Section 501 — Prohibition. — No transfer or sales of firearms shall be
made except as provided in this act.
Section 502 — Permissible sales and transfers. — Anyone may sell or
transfer ammunition or firearms except as provided by this act to a
licensed dealer. Any dealer may sell part of his inventory to a non-
resident pursuant to acts of Congress, and the purchaser's jurisdiction
or to any other licensed dealer. He may also sell to government agents
within the scope of their duty. Dealers may not seU to persons whom
the Chief of Folic* has denied a registration certificate. Anyone may
dispose of a firearm or ammunition after the Chief of Police has hem
notified and a registration certificate has been obtained.
TITLE VI — POSSEaSION OF AHHUNITIOIV
No one may possess ammunition unless he is a licensed dealer,
government agent, holder of a government registration certificate for
the weapon using that ammunition, or ammunition collector.
TITLE VII — GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 701 — Pledges and Loans. — No firearm op ammunition may
be used for a deposit, pledge, or pawn, and no person may loan,
borrow, give or rent a firearm.
Section 702 — Condition oj permitted firearms. Except for law enforce-
ment officers, each registrant shall keep all firearms unloaded and
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock, except when being used for
recreation purposes or at a place of business.
Section 70S — Firing ranges. Persons operating a range in the District
shall register with the Ciiief of Police information concerning location,
officers, type weapon fired, type of weapons stored, hours of operation
and other information as the Chief of Police may require.
Section 704— False information, Jorgery, alteration. False information
may not be given and documents may not be foiged.
Section 705 — Voluntary surrender; immunity. There shall be immu-
nity from prosecution ifor persons who voluntarily imd peaceably
surrender weapons and ammunitions. Such weapons shall be destroyed
unless used for evidence.
Section 706 — Penalties. Not more than $300.00 or not more tlian 10
days for the first offense; subsequent offenses $300.00, and 10 to 90
days or both.
Section 707 — Public education program. The Chief of Police shall
carry on a suitable public education program about this act.
Section 708 — Repealers. Repeals regulations no longer necessary.
Section 709^Confiict with Federal law. Compliance with this act
does not excuse noncompliance with Federal laws. This act does not
supersede existing statutes of the District and of the United States.
Section 711 — Savings clause. — If any provision of this act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remainder of tiiis act and the application of such provision to other
persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be
effected thereby.
Section 712 — Effective date. Thirty-day layover pursuant to Home
Rule Act.
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The Ch aibma n. It is my hope that this committee acting on the
resolution before us will acknowledge that the test of whether Con-
gress should interfere with the will of the local council, is whether
Uie legislation in question either exceeds the authority granted to
the council or impinges upon the Federal interest.
That is the question. The substantive issues have already been dis-
cussed at the local level. We have on our witness list Mr. Paul, who
will be accompanied by several people, and we also have on the witness
list Mr, Ashbrook of Ohio. While we await the arrival of those witr
nesses, the Chair intends to call upon the Corporation Counsel, Mr.
John Risher, who is here.
Mr. Whalen. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Paul is now here.
The CiiAiRMAx, Will the gentleman step up then ? I am sorry. While
Mr. Paul is taking his seat, I would like to yield to the gentleman
from Maryland, Mr. Gude, for any statement he might have.
STATEMENT OF BEFKESENTATIVE GUDE
Mr. Gti»E. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I certainly
want to thank you for calling the meeting so we can deliberate on a
resolution introduced by our colleague, the gentleman from Texas.
I am very interested in his statement and I think we should deliberate
with care on it. It is a matter that should be considered by the entire
District Committee,
Without prejudging, I would state that to state that the subject *
matter of our deliferations this morning, namely, gun control, evokes
intense passion would be to indulge in understatement. Yet we all have
to recognize that gun control does just that. If we proceed with this
fact firmly in mind, I feel we will be better able to address ourselves
objectively to the resolution of disapproval that has been introduced
by our colleague.
I think we are all aware that under the Constitution, the Congress
has the responsibility of legislating for the District. We are equally
aware that by virtue of the Home Rule Act we delegated that responsi-
bility with certain limitations to a locally elected government.
That government in an exercise of self-government and within the
limitations of the Home Rule Act has enacted a measure regulating
the use of weapons in the District. As an expression of the will of the
people in the District of Columbia, this was passed.
I feel we in the Congress should respect and not interfere with that
expression. We must not, Mr. Chairman, allow passion to rule reason
as we deliberate the matter before us. Certainly there have been and
will continue to be sharp differences of opinion over the efficacies of
any approach to gun control but we have before us a decision on the
matter which was made by a duly elected local government, a decision
with which some of us might not agree in every detail.
But nevertheless it is a decision made on the local level after
extensive debate and deliberations. I daresay that if a municipality
back in our home districts enacted such leaislation, I don't believe
that any one of us would try to introduce a bill in Consress to nullify
that legislation made by a duly constituted municipality in our own
district.
So I don't think, Mr. Chairman, we should undo on the local level
here "in the District what the Congress of the United States has really
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failed to do on the national level, namely, begin the process of ctirtail-
ine the availability of handguns.
We have a long way to go if we are ever able to achieve that goal-
Each step in this direction moves us closer to its achievement. Con-
gress still wants to play the role of the city council for the District.
We have delegated that function to the local government. IJet's
permit that local government to exercise it. For us to do so in this
mstancfl wonld not be an abdication of our constitutional
responsibility.
So I hope that the full committee will deliberate very carefully od
this, Mr. Chairman. I think this is something for which every member
of the District Committee has a responsibility.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Fauntroy ?
STATEMENT OF DELEGATE FAUBTKOT
Mr. Fauntrot. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate my remarks with
both tiiose of the chairman and of the ranking minority member, with
the chairman in reference to the statement that the only issue here is
whether the Federal interest is in any way infringed upon bv the
action of the duly-elected local body, namely the mayor and cily
council of the District of Columbia and whether that Federal interest
is so endangered that it justifies denying self-determination to the
750,000 people of the District of Columbia,
I certainly want to associate myself with the ranking minority
member as relates to the need for us to uphold the judgment of this
duly elected body. I want to disassociate myself from his remarks by
saymg that my statements hereafter are prejudgments.
They are prejudiced. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am very an-
noyed at the situation in which the citizens of the Nation's Capital
must have the judgments of their duly elected officials subject to the
whim, political whims of the country. In recent days and certainly
today, we see again the emotional question of gun control being used
as it has been over the years and as other issues have been used over
the years to deny the people of this city the basic right of self-
determination.
We in the District find ourselves the whipping boy on this question
in two regards. The Members of this Congres, when convenient, decry
the crime and violence on the streets of our Nation's Capital and ex-
aggerate that situation. When the people are afforded an opportunity
to elect public officials who, after well-considered judgment, s^k to
take at least one of the deadly implements out of the hands of citizens,
find tiiemselves being criticized and brutalized and denied self-deter-
mination on the question of that effort to be responsive and responsible
to the wishes and desires of the people of this city.
So, Mr. Chairman, I do hope that reason will prevail in the delibera-
tions which we have and in the response that we will now receive to
this action on the part of the duly elected representatives of the people
of this city.
The Chairman. Anyone else seek recognition !
Mr. McKiNNET. ,Tust briefly, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. McKinney.
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SIATEHENT OF BEFBESEKTATITE HcEIinTET
Mr. McKiNNET. It is verj seldom on this committee, since our
present chairman became chairman, that I have disagreed with him.
I tJiink I disagree, though, on the bill of the extension of prohibition
of changing the criminal code because I felt it was an infringement on
home rule.
I was not here during the debate but I did write the President a
letter suggesting very strongly, particularly after what happened to
the bill, that he veto that particular piece of legislation.
I lUSt have got to say once again that no matter how foolish our 435
heads may assume a City Council action to be, the City Council, not
Stewart McKinney, is the elected body to run the city of Washington.
My efforts on this committee will be to hopefully get the city a decent
fiscal base from which to opprate and several other things and hope-
fully we can toss our expertise to other urban problems and let Ster-
ling Tucker and the Mayor of Washington who were elected by the
people of Washington run the city of Washington.
The Chaisman. Any other comments ?
fNo response.]
The Chairman. Without objection, the statement from the gentle-
man from Montana, Mr, Melcher, will be included in the record.
We have a communication from the gentleman indicating a conflict
this morning. Otherwise, he would be here. Without objection, the
statement will be included in the record.
Without objection also the District Council hearings on the resolu-
tions will also bo included in the record.
[The documents referred to follow :]
Statement Of Corgbebsman Johb Melcheb of Montaaa
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the District of Columbia City
Council's apparent effort to combat crime b; enacting the E'irearms Control
Regulations Act In July Is ml^uided and unwise, and It should be defeated by
Congress. I nt^e this Committee to recommend passage of a disapproving
resolution by the House, as provided for under D.C.'s home rule charter.
First, it appears the Council ma; have acted out of concert with the District
of Columbia Self Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, which
denies the Council authority to take any actions "with respect to any provision
of any law codified in Title 22 or 24 of the District of Columbia Code" prior
to January 1977. Thia firearms act clearly makes reference to and supplements
Title 22.
Second, this latest D.C. firearms action creates a series of ridiculous intru-
sions on the basic rights of D.C. residents ; at the same time it does absolutely
nothing to curb crime. Congress repeatedly has declined to enact harassing
gun control legislation for the general populace of the United States because
of constitutional qnestions and the obvious lacli of results in eUminating crime.
How inappropriate it would be for Congress to stand by and allow a federal
entity to force on a small part of American citizenry a block on new handgun
possessions, registration for all legal guns, including sportsmen's rifles and
shotguns, stringent personal owner demands, extensive record-keeping and
manufacture bans. From my understanding of this act, It would be illegal tor
you to own a shotgun without registering and telling police where you kept It.
You could be fined $300 for loanli^ It or Its ammunition to a hunting partner
or for having shells in your possession not fitting your registered gnu. The
police also could have you fingerprinted. If we talked about legislation like
that in HoDtana. my couatltaeut* wonld say the police state has arrived, and
they'd be right.
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In addition, it should I>e obvloQa tliat dealing witli the crlmlnBls in om
Boclety, those who will press their evil goals with or without guns, ^th what-
ever weapon they have to intimidate, injure and murder their victims, never
could be solved b; trying to ignore the criminale tliemseives and instead trying
to manufacture a panacea throngh the ridicnloua meclianics ot gun controls.
A recent study by Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcoliol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms pretty well demonstrates that the only results of tlie D.C. la^v would be
that the D.C. hoodlum would get his illegal gun from somewhere else but law
abiding citizens would be re.-trlcted in owning a protective handgtm.
Rather than engaging in this dangerous liind of law-maliing, the D.C. Council
should be encouraged by us in Congress to strengthen its mandatory seutencing
provisions for those using a gun in committing a crime. The punishment shonld
be certain and swift for those guilty of using a gun in commission of a crime.
A severe penalty for such a criminal would soon work as prevention of crimes
involving guns.
Once again, I urge the Committee's support of a disapproving resolntlos.
We need to block this kind of precedent-setting legislation which only liaraBSeB
law-abiding citizens.
The Chairman. The Chair is delighted to welcome to the witness
chair Hon. Ron Paul, U.S. Representative from the 22d District
of Texas, The gentleman was elected in a special election and this
may be his first appearance before any congressional committee.
We are delighted to be a part of this historical event. If the gentle-
man could identify his staff, we will proceed to receive his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. EON PATTL, A EEPRESENTATIVE IK CONGEESS
FEOM THE STATE OF TEXAS, ACCOMPANIEr BY EITFUS PECK-
HAM, A CITIZEN OF THE BISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. Paul. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted
to be here. I have Mr. Rufus Peckham from the District of Columbia
here, a citizen from the District of Columbia.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Paul, you have sub-
mitted a statement to the committee.
Mr. Paul. I have a rather long, written statement that I have
submitted. I will try to summarize that in my own words. I am
indeed grateful that you are holding the hearing and have invited
me to testify on this resolution^House Concurrent Resolution 716 —
of disapproval.
This was introduced with eight cosponsors and it is an act with
respect to title 19 of the District of Columbia Code which is pro-
hibited by the Home Rule Charter. I feel as though I have received
tremendous support this week for my endeavors.
I think the mood of the Congress, both the House and the Senate,
is with me in that this was enacted — ^this was an act that should not
have been legislated by the D.C. Council.
I certainly can interpret the support from the House and the Senate
as saying that the bill should not have passed and also on my position
of no strong gun control laws.
OPPOSES OUN CONTROL ACT
I feel as though there is no authority to pass such a law as the
Firearms Control Act, I base this on three principles. I believe that
law itself taken by itself is an unconstitutional law. I think it is a
totally noneffective law. I do not think it can do what you would like
it to do, tmfortimately.
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I would like to stop crime but this will not work. I believe — and
this is the strongest position — that the procedure that was followed
is illegal. First, 1 will take the unconstitutional pounds. I believe
that the second amendment does protect the individual law abiding
citizen's right to bear arms, to keep weapons for his protection.
I dont think there is really any question about that, I believe that
I get support for the right to bear arms and not be harrassed with a
lot of regulations with the ninth amendment as well.
If you would look on my testimony on pages 2 to 4, you can look
at the tremendous list of requirements tlmt you as a Congressman
or any citizen in District of Columbia must fulfill in order to own
a weapon for his self-defense.
If you are any way at all concerned about civil liberties I would
think you would interpret this as an encroachment of your civil
liberties. For a Congressman to be fingerprinted in order to own a
defensive weapon and be living entirely within the law to me violates
his civil liberties.
I think it is rather ironic that we in the Congress when we pass laws
with regard to welfare, we do all we can to uphold the respect and
the dignity of that person who has applied. We try not to belittle
him and make him reveal every thing about himself in order to
qualify. We want to recognize his dignity.
And yet when we look at what we do to the law abiding productive
citizens of society, I think we have some serious questions to ask. If
you take, for example, the Internal Revenue Service, what they do
to the productive citizen versus what we fry to prevent — prevent the
same thing to the person who is receiving welfare, I think these
regulations demonstrate this, too.
To put the regulations on the law abiding citizen, to me is unjust.
In section 302 of the Home Rule Act, this guaranties that the law
be consistent with the Constitution. This does obligate us. We cannot
say this is a city responsibility.
Some day that may come about. But you cannot dodge that question
and say it is the City Council's responsibility. The Home Rule Act
puts it on us. Historical precedent puts it on us. There is no way in
the world that you can keep the argument that we don't have a re-
sponsibility and an obligation to look at the laws that are passed there
and rule on them, whether it is by negative and by inadvertent method
of not looking at it and letting the law come into effect or by an active
method.
I think either wav, we do have a responsibility. In the introduction
of the District of Columbia Firearms Control Act, it explicitly says
it is to limit the types of weapons persons may lawfully possess. This is
attacking the lawful, the legal, the rightful ownership of weapons and
this is to limit it.
To me that is limiting rights. I would like to address now the subject
of whether or not a law like this can be effective. It is my personal
opinion and conviction that the law causes more trouble. It is not effec-
tive. It can even be compared to what happens when you prohibit
alcohol or drugs.
It makes them illegal. They become more expensive. Those who will
break the law will certainly use them. We did learn a lesson with pro-
hibition. We did not learn a lesson that illegal drugs make prices go
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up very, very high and people commit many crimes in order to get
money to buy high priced drugs.
I would think the underworld who would make profit on black-
market guns would welcome the illegality of owning guns.
I think that the best example to demonstrate is the example of in
the thirties when we had the prohibition of alcohol how it increased
crime. I believe any gun law will increase crime and not reduce it.
There are good statistics to back this up. Even in Washington, D.C..
less than one-half of 1 percent of crime committeed with weapons
which are registered. 80 percent of the guns that they take from crimi-
nals come from outside the District. So the registration laws have
done no good at all. We cannot ignore that fact.
I am convinced also that societies that have in the past, that have
had strong gun control laws are always societies that have had less
freedom. Usually it sets the trend. The stronger the gun control laws,
in the future the less freedom we have down the road.
This is backed up by iiistory. Recently there liave been more studies
out. Many people have been converted from the idea that strong gun
control laws do any good. There was one Franklin Zimmerink who
was a well known gun control enthusiast. He has changed his opinion
on this.
He says it doesn't work after he has looked at the studies. There is a
Center for Criminal Justice at the Harvard Law School that did study
the Massachusetts Gun Law which is a tough gun law. Their conclu-
sion is that it has done no good in Massachusetts.
EXPERIENCES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Cambridge University in 1970 studied the 1920 gun law in England.
They came to the conclusion that the gun law in England does not
create less crime or less violence. New York City's gun law is tougher
than the gun law in England and yet crime and the use of weapons in
crime is much greater in New York City than in England,
Switzerland, they have no strict gun control laws. There are more
guns per capita in Switzerland than any other place in the world with
a very low crime rate. Wo cannot ignore these statistics. The Uni-
versity of Wisconsin made a comprehensive study tliroughout all our
States. They agree that strong gun laws will not reduce crime.
If there is the least chance that we are going to violate the rights
and the civil liberties of the individual and it does not do any good, we
should think seriously about the efficacy of gun laws.
More specifically to this particular law we are talking about, and
this is the one I think you must pay attention to because whether or
not you would like to give the responsibility to the City Council, the
truth of the matter is it is you, the District of Columbia committee,
that still has a tremendous amount of responsibility for what is
happening in the District of Columbia.
LIBRARY OP CONGRESS OPINION
This law is illegal. There is a statement now put out by the Library
of Congress agreeing with this. There is no question. It is a flat state-
ment that the law passed by the District of Columbia is illegal. I think
the sentiment of both the House and the Senate indicates that not only
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78
ia the mood against it but agrees that the method is not a proper
procedure.
I don't think the law will hold up, I don't think, regardless of what
you do, if it goes into effect, if it does not accomplish what some think
it will, what is going to happen is this law is going to be challenged
and it is going to be thrown out and then they are going to come back
and say you know Confess is supposed to overlook tliis, the District
of Columbia committee is supposed to overlook this.
If the law has been written so poorly and they have violated so many
things even I as a nonattorney can clearly see, they are going to come
back and say who supervised this ?
Who permitted this thing to go into law !
I think you have to look at this and consider the facts that I have
outlined in my testimony. The outline occurs from page 7 to page 17 on
the defense, my defense that this law is illegal.
It is clear that there is exclusive authority in the same area of title
22 of the District of Columbia Code found in 602(a) (9) of the Home
Kule Act. This does rive Congress and the District of Columbia Com-
mittee exclusive authority over this and the Council cannot change
title 22 of the District of Columbia Code. There is no way you can read
that into it.
Now the Council, the City Council's defense is and through their
committee on judicial and civil law, their defense is that it does not
change title 22, We are not really dealing with title 22. But there is
no argument there at all. They mention title 22 seven times in their
description.
They sent it to Congress for approval as if it were part of a change
in the criminal code, I have a copy or part of a letter put into the record
from the police chief and he makes the assumption that in there that
we are changing the criminal code.
For them to argue that we are changing police regulations and say-
ing that this is not superseding the criminal code is just not so. You
eimer have to change it or supersede it. The directions in the Home
Rule Act says that they have no authority to enact any act. resolution
or rule with respect to any provision of any law in title 22.
It could not be more clear than that. Not only this, but if you go
back — and I have substantiated this — if you look at the conference
report in the discussion of the Home Kule act and if yon look at the
floor debate when this was debated on the floor, it is explicit.
They do not have the real legal right. You might argue on the moral
justification that they should have and work for that, but that is a
different story. Right now they do not have the legal right to change
the code and there is no question in my mind that tliey have changed
the code.
If you read the bill carefully, they refer to different parts of the gun
control bill, the act, and the numwrs they refer to don't even exist.
There are three blatant errors in this law. If you want to go on record
as accepting this either by ignoring this or not disapproving it, I think
that it is a serious error because you are condoning some very, very
poor legislation.
I think it is very important to disallow this law. I think it is im-
portant to remain legally consistent. I think it is important to remain
constitutionally consistent. I think it is very important to consider tiie
fact that the law won't do any good at all, anyway.
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I think the other concern that I have is the fact that this law, when
it is on the books, you might argue that this city deserves the same
treatment as any other city but it happens to be a very, very unique
city. A gun control law like this on the books could be very detrimental
to the constitutional rights of everybody else in this county.
So I do think that it deserves serious consideration and I hope you
will agree with me on this.
Thank you.
The Chairman. We thank the gentleman. Mr. Gude, do you have
Mr. Gude. Xo questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Fauntroy?
Mr. Fauntrot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Paul, you
make the point that the City Council's authority to pass this regulation
is challenged by the Library of Congress ?
Mr. Paul. Right; I have a copy of this I will submit with my re-
port
Mr. Fauntrot. I have a copy before me and that Library of Con-
gress conclusion is that, as you see, and I quote it "An examination
of the arguments suggests that the Firearms Control Regulation Act
exceeds the authority."
To suggest and to conclude are of course quite different. Secondly,
if you read the report, earlier, in reviewing the history of the exer-
cise of legislative authority by the appointed City Council in utilizing
the police regulations as a vehicle the courts concluded that there was
no validity to the challenge registered by the Maryland and District
of Columbia Rifle & Pistol Association to the authority of the ap-
pointed City Council to act under the police regulations, an authority
which it had and which, God forbid, the President signed that bill
passed by both Houses of this Congress, the Council will continue
to have.
I wondered if you care to comment on the facts of the court deci-
sion clarifying the authority of the Council.
Mr, Paul. I believe that court decision occurred prior to the D.C.
Home Rule Act and therefore it would not have any effect.
Mr. Fauntrot. The D.C. Home Rule Act did not change the author-
ity of the Council to affect regulations.
Mr. Paul. I think that pomt would be debatable.
Mr. Fauntrot. It would be debatable if the President if he is un-
wise, signs the bill.
Mr. Paul. If you look at he introduction on the Library of Congress
argument, in the first paragraph of it it says "the conclusion of this
report is that this act is not valid."
Again, "Enactment of the Firearms Act alters the law with respect
to those areas which the Congress intended to examine in revising the
D.C. Criminal Code law and therefore is beyond the legislative au-
thority of the D.C. Council until January 2, 1977."
My strongest statement is their statement on the front page, this
act is not valid.
Mr. Fauntroy. Mr, Paul, you say that the Congress has an obliga-
tion to overturn this act. To whom does the Congress hold l£at
obligation f
Mr. Paul. Constitutional law
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Mr. FAnNTRor. So that you base that on the assumption that gun
lobbyists are right when they interpret the second amendment to mean
that it guarantees the right of individual citizens then to bear arms!
Mr. Patjl. That plus the fact that the procedure that they went
through is entirely illegal. These two would be the strongest argu-
ments, both the fact that the law is an imconstitutional law but the
obvious fact that we have a responsibility still with the D.C. legisla-
tion is strongest.
I don't think that is a debatable fact, that we have some responsi-
bility for or I would not be here. Why can a Congressman from
Texas come and even say anything unless he had scwie authority to
say something}
I can't go and talk to you about New York City.
Mr. FAnNTROT. And I certainly can't go to where?
Mr. Paul. Houston. The fact that we nave a District of Columbia
Committee dramatizes that the District is different. If you want to
change that that is another thing.
Mr. Fauntsoy. The question is to whtun do you have an obligation
to deny the citizens on a local question as to whether or not the citizens
wlio live here
Mr. Paul. I have an obligation to do what I think is right with
respect to law and fulfill the Constitution.
Mr. Fauntrot. You have indicated that you feel the law has been
violated as suggested by the Library of Congress report and as refuted
by the courts. I think this is something that can be decided in the
courts. I am sure that if this bill becomesTaw. District of Columbia and
Maryland and their rifle associations will go to court and probably
receive the same answer that they received in 1968.
You have based your other legal argument on the fact that you
believe, contrary to two Supreme Court decisions, that the second
amendment protects the rights of individuals to bear arms and that,
contrary to the judgment of two supreme courts who have sat in judg-
ment on this question, that it does not refer exclusively to the right
of the colonies or the States to develop militias and maintain them.
Mr. Paul. I would disagree with that. I think there is strong prece-
dent that shows that the individual has the right to maintain arms.
Mr. FAtmTROT. Maybe we will go to court and have the Supreme
Court do — decide that. We better do that
Mr. Paul. I am in good company for the last 200 years.
Mr. Fauntrot. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the land
and it is an assumption that they have refuted explicitly. Finally,
Mr. Paul, you mentioned that one of the problems with the efforts on
the part ot people to withhold handguns from at least some segments
of society that feels that the only access to manhood is through the
barrel of a gun, that many of these efforts have been unsuccessful.
You cited the New York law. You cited the law in Massachusetts.
You cited the fact that in the District of Columbia, because there is
not a national gun control measure that would prevent the manu-
facture, sale and possession of gims outside the District of Columbia,
that 80 percent of those used here in the commission of crimes come
from outside the District of Columbia.
You make the point and acknowledge the point, and I want to
agree with you, that until we can do something nationally about the
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proliferation of guns in the country, we are going to have a difficult
time allowing people in jurisdictions like the District of Columbia
who want to control guns, who elect people whom they can judge every
4 years and put out of office if they do not translate their beliefs into
public policy, despite the fact that these people want this kind of
legislation, they pass to protect at least 20 percent, that they will not
be truly successful in exercising tbeir corrective will until we have ft
national legislation.
Mr. Paul, I think that you should at least consider giving some
attention to my analogy with the strong national law enforcement
against the use of the marihuana and the importation of illicit drugs.
It does not do any good. You still have many, many more people
(aking drugs.
I am totally convinced that this is one of the most common causes
of crime, because this drives the prices of drugs up so high and those
people needing the drugs then must go out and rob and kill because
of a national law,
I think that you will create the same type of atmosphere of black-
market in guns that you have in drugs and that you had in alcohol.
It just does not work,
Mr. Fatjntkot. I could not help but think as you made that point
that you would be a strong advocate for the legalization of heroin
and cocaine and the other drugs that are as you say responsible for
the use of guns and make this eountiy the most dangerous country
in the world in which to live.
I happen not to agree with the legalization of hard drugs. I think
we just don't agree on the question of home rule or gun control.
Mr, Paul. How about alcohol ?
Do we agree on that ?
Mr. Fatjntroy. For my personal view, I think anybody who pickles
his brains in alcohol or drugs is unwise.
Mr. GuDE. If the gentleman will yield at that point, I think if a
man had the foresight about 5,000 years ago when the first grapes
were trodden and they developed wine to prohibit alcohol, that maybe
we could have been successful. But it has become such a part of our
social context that that isn't possible any more.
But I don't know why we should do the same thing with marihuana
and heroin and introduce these problems further now into society
than they are already.
I agree with the gentleman.
Mr. FAnNTROT, Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we end on a light
note but the fact is that guns are the cause of a great deal of misery
and death in this country. We are the most homicidal nation in the
world. I take very seriously the effort on the part of this Congress
to deny a freedom loving, nonviolent people who express their will
through duly elected representatives the right to govern themselves
on a simple matter of police regulations.
I fail to see how they infringe or invoke the obligation of Congress-
men to protect the Federal interests within this jurisdiction.
The Chaibmax, Mr, McKinney, do you have any questions?
Mr. McKinney. Not really. Mr. Chairman. T would say that I think
that my colleague from Texas has probably done an exceedingly
thorough job on the legal implications of the City Council's action.
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I would have to suggest that, though I totally disagree with inter-
fering with the city's actions, I would have to agree that I think
that tlie City Council, unfortunately due to the box we put them in
in Congress, looked long and hard to find a vehicle, a pretty poor
vehicle at that, to pass Uiis particular piece of legislation.
It is my hope, as I said in my opening statement, that the President
will veto what I consider our ridiculously rash actions in both the
Senate and the House the other day and that then the City Council
will have an even better vehicle with which to make changes.
But I have to state again to the gentleman, and I know he may
find it difficult to understand, but I joined this committee, which gives
one a great deal of credit, 6 years ago to abolish it. I certainly would
hope that my chairman would be head of an urban committee.
But my entire intent before I leave this place is to have the word
"D.C." taken off the front of the door. The only place that D.C.
belongs in this city is down on the white building on Pennsylvania
Avenue, or wherever it is placed.
I will continue to work that vray. So, even though I have to admire
your homework on some of the legal implications of the method used
by the City Council, I would have to say that I would allow them that
same mistake as I do all six of my mayors who make their same
mistakes.
The Chairman. Mr. Mann, do you have any questions ?
Mr. Mann. Thank you very much.
I am strongly supportive of the home rule concept as I would be
strongly supportive of the mayors in my district who acted according
to the law. You know, there has been much talk and much effort in
the Congress recently with reference to the control of the exercise of
regulatory power.
Time and again we say that that regulatory power is a power that
is delegated pursuant to statutory enactment and that it must be
exercised in accordance with the intent of the Congress or the enact-
ing body. Here is where we run into trouble on this action taken by
the District of Columbia Council. The action on the floor of the House
and the Senate yesterday- — regarding H.R. 12261 — is, in my judg-
ment, regrettable from one rather unusual standpoint and that is
that it will probably result in a complacency or a disinterest to the
point that this committee may not get around to acting because of the
problems of a quorum.
The same problem could exist in the Senate. I think that the action
of the House with reference to the amendment did not necessarilj'
accomplish the purposes intended in that it was intended to be retro-
active and in my judgment the validity of that may be questioned.
It will be prospective in that if the President does sign the bill, it
will clear up this question of whether or not the council can promul-
gate regulations on this subject.
COCNCn, ACT INVALID
Can it promulgate such regulations now ?
I think that the Library of Congress is eminently correct. A mere
look at title 22 shows that the title deals witli the possession of fire-
arms, firearms dealers, the traditional or ordered areas of firearms
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control. And yet the Council, through the regulatory power, has
sought to amend that statute and they can't pass any regulations with
reference to that statute because we deprived tliem of that privilege
by reserving jurisdiction with reference to title 22.
So they can say well, they did not try to do it by regulation. They
did it bj a statutory enactment, with even less authority to do so,
but not m the subject areas covered by titles 22, 23, and 24. So we here
find ourselves confronted with an invalid act on the part of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and regardless of our attitude toward home rule
or gun control, we are dealing here with the preservation of orderly
process, legal processes and we must support what the congressional
intent was.
The congressional intent cannot be, I submit, other than that
title 22 dealt with the matter of guns, weapons, gun control and the
authority with reference to those subjects was reserved by the
Congress.
The statement of the gentleman from Texas does credit to a doctor
who qualifies for forensic law or whatever they call it. But he of course
is strongly supported in language that frankly is unusual for lawyers,
even with the congressional reference service.
LIBRART OF GONORE8B OPINION
My friend from the District of Columbia suggests that the word
"suggests" is not strong enough hut I suggest that the other langua^
here is stronger than one usually finds on legal questions wherem
it says:
The fact that gun control legtxlBtion for the Wstrlct of Colnmbia was then
contained In title 22 makes it Inconceivable that Congress did not Intend to
preserve the status qno in the area of weapons control
In the beginning they state "the conclusicm of this report is that
the act is not valid."
So, I appreciate the efforts being made by the gentleman. I share
his objective in that I do not believe that this Congress, regardless
to how we feel about the extension of authority over criminal laws,
this Congress can sit here and permit a circumvention of its intent.
We are not exercising our authority. We ai-e not assuming the
responsibility that was given to us when we preserved the right of
titles 22, 23, and 24. I can understand the efforts of the District of
Columbia to want to exercise the powers that it is eager to exercise.
But in this instance, they tiod on forbidden ground and I cannot
sit here and permit the law to be so twisted. I hope that we do have
an opportunity to specifically send that message by a disapproval
resolution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Biester?
Mr. BiESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up
on what Mr. Mann had to say. I guess the most interesting part of
your testimony bears upon the legal question and the Library of Con-
gress memorandum. Is there a Library of Congress memorandum on
the issue of firearms constitutionality?
Mr. Paul. Not with regard to this law, I don't have one in my
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Mr. BiEBTER. You did not ask the Library of Congress about itt
citizen's bights
Mr. Pacl. No.
Mr. BiEBTER. On that constitutional question that you did not ask
the Library about, it is your opinion or your belief that no govern-
ment in the United States has the power to control the right of a
citizen to own any arms ?
Mr. Paul. My personal opinion would be that if a law-abiding
citizen is using a weapon where he never harms somebody else and
causes violence, then no, thd government would not have the right to
interfere.
Mr. BiESTEH. He could own a machine gun, a howitzer, a mortar?
As long as he never used them he could own them and no government
could encroach on that?
Mr. Pacl. According to the Constitution, my interpretation
Mr. BiESTEB. With respect to the question of legality which I think
is the key question here, to what extent is this a matter which ought
to be resolved by this committee and the Congress and to what extent
is this a matter which ought to be resolved by our court system !
Do you think we should decide exclusive of the courts?
Mr. Paui_ I think that we have a responsibility to review the laws
that are passed by the D.C. Council, that we have jurisdiction over,
yes. This certainly falls into that category.
Mr. B1E8TER. In your review of the legal aspects of this, have you
come to any conclusions as to which step by the Congress would lead
to the earliest resolution of the legal question by the courts?
That is probably an unfair question.
Mr. Paul. I am not even sure if I understand what you mean by
your query.
PROCEDURE QUESTION
Mr. BiESTER. If we believe that the key question here is the legality
of this process and if we agree that at least sranewhere along the way
the best forum for making that determination lies in the courts, then
it would be of interest to me to discover that would be the most
efficient and most rapid way to set a case in which that judgment
might be made.
Mr. Paul. "Well, I would not concede the assumption that we should
let it be determined in the courts. T would say that we have a re-
sponsibility to look at it and decide whether it was created illegally
or not. If it was, we should disallow it.
If it is the opinion of the House that it was very proper and legal
and had not violated the intent of Congress, then I would say vote
on it and show that they want to permit this and then go ahead and
test it in the courts.
But I think our responsibility is very clear, that we should look at it.
I would have to admit if I was just going at this strictly constitutitai-
ally and strictly because I think it is totally ineffective, the Congress
would not support me.
But with the facts that we have here and with the votes that we
have had so far, I think it is obvious that the intent was incorrect as
far as the Council was concerned.
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EFFECT OF LEGISLATION
Mr. BiESTER. With rpspect to the legislation itself, I gather that
there are a number of kinds of persons or classes of persons who are
not permitted under this legislation to own or possess a firearm.
Do you believe that a person who had been involuntarily committed
to a mental institution for the previous 5 years should be allowed to buy
as many firearms as he might wish ?
Mr. Paul. I would be very careful with them because some of the
involuntary admissions to mental institutions can occur very care-
lessly. Sometimes eccentric individuals end up in mental institutions
and they have never caused harm in society, never have done anything
violent. I draw my line when that individual is either there threaten-
ing violence or creating violence, yes, then it is the absolute obli^tion
of the State, the government, local, Federal, what not, to restrain the
violence.
Mr. BosTER, That is often too late, though, is it not!
Mr. Paul, Well, it is often too late if you destroy the Constitution
and civil liberties of all individuals by taking away their right and
you end up with a country that does not protect civil liberties.
That is what I am concerned about.
Mr. BiESTER. How about a person who has been acquitted of murder
by reason of insanity within the last 5 years? Should that person be
allowed to buy as many guns as he wants?
Mr. Paul. If he committed violence such as murder, he certainly
should have restrictions.
Mr. BiESTER. So you would agree with the D.C. legislation with
respect to that aspect?
Mr. Paul. If he had been convicted of murder?
Mr. BiESTER. No ; he was acquitted by reason of insanity.
Mr. Paul. If he committed the violence, you got to restrain him.
That is what the responsibility is.
Mr, BiESTER, If he is committed — you would agree, then, with tlie
D.C. legislation in that respect?
Mr. Paul. In that one you mentioned or any other one that puts
restraints on individuals who become criminals, whether it is a sane
individual or insane individual? As soon as he creates the violence or
threatens to — the violence, then there must be restraints.
Mr, BiESTEB. Supposing he does not have sufficient vision to get a
driver's license, should he be allowed to buy as many rifles as he
wishes ?
Mr. Paul. As long as he does not cause violence-
Mr. BiESTER. How do you know ?
Mr. Paul. How do you know you won't cause violence going dovm
the streets ?
Mr. BiESTER. That is why I don't own arms.
Mr. Paul. What about your automobile, alcohol ?
Mr. BiESTER, Let me come back to my question. Do you think that
somebody who can't see well enough to drive ought to be able to buy
as many rifles with a range of over a mile as he wants to?
Mr. Paul. If he has not committed violence the same way he can
buy a bottle of beer. You do not put everybody into pens because of the
potential that they might do or you don't have a free society anymore.
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Mr. BiESTER. The D.C. Code is not talking about putting them into
puis. It is talkine about telling a person who can't see well enough to
drive that he cairt own certain firearms. My question is whether you
agree with that, and I take it you do not?
Mr. Patil. I disagree with that.
Mr. BiESTEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, we
Mr. pADL. May I have permission for Mr. Peckham to leave his
testimony ?
The Chairman. Without objection, I was going to include Mr. Peck-
ham's testimony in the record following your testimony.
Without objection it is so ordered.
[The documents referred to follow :]
Pbbpared Statement or Rbpeksbhtativb Rom Paul
X. THE TUEASMB OOSTBOL ACT OF lOTG 18 ITtlOOITSTITnTIOnAL
1. The second amendment to tbe United States Conatltution declares tbat "A
well regulated Militia, being necessair to the security of a free State, the right
of tbe people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Tbe ninth ameod-
ment states tbat "Tbe enumeration In tbe Constitution, of certain rights, shall
Dot be construed to den; or disparage others retained by the people." Aitide I,
Section 8, Clause IT of the Constitution prorldea that the Congress shall have
power "To exercise exclusive Lieglslatlon in all Cases whatsoever, over sucb
District (not exceeding ten Miles sgoare) as may, bf Cession of Particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the
United States. . . ."
2. Let me begin by fllscnsaing the last provision first. This provision, granting
exclusive authority over the District, was added to the Constitution because of
tbe indignities and personal threats that Members of the Continoital Congress
suffered In Philadelphia in 1783 at the hands of disgruntled soldiers. At that
Mme, the local authorities could not come to the aid of Congress, and the Mem-
Iters had to flee the city. In Federalist No. 43, James Madison wrote that "The
indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries
its own evidence with it. . . . Wlthont it . . . tbe pnblic authority might be
insulted and Its proceedings interrupted with impunity. . . ."
3. I raise this lasne, not to attack home rule in the District of Columbia, but
to call attention to the fact that the Firearms Control Act passed by the City
Council contains no exemption for Members of Cuigress. Section 201(b) of the
Act contains the list of persons exempted, and Memt>ers of Congress do not
appear on that list. It would seem, then, that any Member elected for the first
time after this law goes into effect, or any present member without a legally
registered handgnn or pistol, would 1>e prohibited from bringing any pistol or
handgun into the District of Columbia.
4. Furthermore, the Act would subject a Member of Congress to the same
complex registration process that the Act Imposes on all law-abiding residents of
the District of Columbia, For the information of the Memtiers who are x»resent
at this hearing, here is a list of the things a person is required to do In order
to register a gun under this gun control law :
Pertotu teeking to register a gun mu»t :
(1) be 21 years of age. or 18 and have the permission of their parents, who
most assume all civil liability ;
(2) not have been convicted of a crime of violence, a weapons offense, or a
TioIatlMi of this Act ;
(3) not be under indictment for a crime of violence or a weapons offense;
<4) be free of convictions for C years past of any drug law, or of any threat
to do bodily harm, assault, ''or any similar provision of tbe law of any other
jnrlsdlction so as to indicate a likelihood to make unlawful use of a firearm."
(Section 203[a1 [4] [B]) ;
(S) not have been acquitted of any criminal charge by reason of insanity for
tbe previoua 5 years ;
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(6) not bave been adjudicated a chronic alcobollc by any Court for tbe
prevlona 5 years ;
(7) not bave been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to any mental
institution for the previous 5 years ;
(8) not appear to eufCer from a handicap that would "tend to indicate that
the applicant would not be able to possess and use a firearm safely and responsi-
bly." (SecUon203(a)(7]);
(9) not have been Judged negligent in a firearms accident causing death or
serious Injury ;
(10) be eligible under present law to passess a pistol;
(11) pass a test on D.C. firearms laws devised by the Cliiet of Police;
<12) have vision equal to that reuulred to obtain a valid driver's license In
D.C;
(13) provldehlsfullname to the Chief of Police;
(14) provide his present address and each address for the previous 5 years;
(15) provide tiis present business address and each business address for the
previous G years ;
(16) provide his date and place of birth ;
(17) record his or her gender;
(18) provide information concerning any denial or revocation of registration,
permit, or license of a firearm ;
(19) provide a description of any serious firearm accident involving the
applicant ;
(20) provide Information on the intended use of the firearm ;
(21) provide the caliber, make, model, manufacturer's number, serial numbo',
and identifying marks on the firearm ;
(22) provide the name and address and other identification of the person from
whom tbe gun was obtained ;
(23) tell where the firearm will be kept;
(24) tell whether the applicant has anilled for any other registration
certificates ;
(25) provide "such other information as the Chief determines is necessary";
(26) provide 2 "full face" photographs, 1%" by 1%", taken within the 30-day
period preceding the date of application ;
(27) appear in person when applying and, if required, to bring' the firearm
being registered ;
(28) sign an oath attesting to the truth of all information provided ;
(29) pay a fee set by the Mayor,
5. In addition to this comprehensive set of requirements, the Chief of Police
may, at his discretion, require the fingerprinting of applicants. If this Is the tyi>e
of harassment that this Committee wishes to Impose on Members of Congress,
not to mention the people who live in the District of Columbia day In and day
out, then I would suggest that this Committee and this Congress take no action
to stop this law from becoming effective. If, however, the integrity of the Con-
gress is to be preserved and Its Members are to be allowed freedom from such
unnecessary and irresponsible harassment, then this law most be disapproved by
the Congress within the thirty (30) legislative days provided by the Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act. If this Act Is not In actual
ciHifllct with the Constitution on this point. It is at least in confilct with the
spirit of the Constitution and the legislative history of the provision of the
(^institution which retains exclusive authority over the Federal District to
Congress.
6. Let us now consider the second amendment to the Constitution which has
been quoted above.
7. According to Section 302 of the Self-Govern ment and Governmental Re-
organization Act, the governing instrument of the District of Oolnmbia Council,
the "legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of
legislation within the District consistent with the Constitution of the United
States and provisions of this Act. . . ." Since the City Council acts only by
the permission of this Congress, which has retained exclusive authority over the
District, it Is Constitutionally barred from passing laws infringing upon the
right to keep and bear arms. This amendment has been narrowly construed to
mean that the Congress or its agents can take virtually any action to control
private ownership of weapons, despite the plain meaning of the words. The
Amendment says ; the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 1>>
"Infringe," according to the Oxford English Dictionary, which quotes from
Jefferson and Blackstone to lUnstrate the usage of this word, is to "break In
wGoogIc
tipon or encroach." It Is not neceasarr for a light to be totally destroyed or
annihilated for It to be Infringed. A right can be Infringed by reetrlctlng It
only a. little. The blBtory of gun control legislation in this coontry shows a
gradually Increasing Infrlogement of the right to keep and bear arms.
8. Any literate Individual who has any doubts that the Firearms Control Act
would Infringe on the right to keep and bear arms has not read even thelntrodac-
tion to the Act, in which the purposes of the Act are described as follows : to
"limit" the tyxKS of weapons persons may lawfully possess" ; to "assure that
only qualifled persons are allowed to possess firearms" ; and "to make it more
difficult for Biearms, destructive devices, and ammunition to move In illicit
commerce within the District of Columbia." The express purxK)se of this law is
to infringe upon the right to keep and tiear arms. The issue is whether the City
Council, acting pursuant to Section 302 of the Self-Qovernment and Govern-
mental Reorganization Act, can legitimately pass this law. If the language of
the Constitution means anything at all, the Council cannot pass it. It is the duty
of this Congress, which is itself barred from enacting a piece Of legislation like
this, to strike down this Act before the residents of the District of Columbia are
subjected to its onerous provisions.
9. The ninth amendment to the Constitution, quoted above, makes it abimdantly
clear that unenumerated rights are retained by the people. It is not sufficient
to argue, as many gim control advocates have argued, that the second amend-
ment Is applicable only to the National Guard, an organization which was not
created until the twentieth century. This delitierate misconstruction of the
second amendment's meaning still faces the problem of what to do with the
plain meaning of the ninth amendment. The federal government Is a government
of delegated powers ; nowhere in the Constitution is the federal governm^it given
the authority to pass gun control laws. Tbe speclflc Constitution limitations on
the federal government are written into the Self -Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act.
n. TSB nBEABus coniitta. rcouiations act or i9tb is uxeoai.
1. In section 601 of the Self-Go vemment and Governmental BeorganizaticHi
Act, Congrese has retained plenary power over the Distriiit of Columbia to
enact any legislation for the District on any subject, whether within or witboat
tbe scope of the l^lslative power granted to the Council, including legislation
to amend or repeal any law In force in the District
2. In addition to this retention of plenary l^slative authority, Congress
reserved to Itself exclusively many areas of law, including Title 22 of the District
of Columbia Code. This specific denial of authority to the City Council is found
in Section 602(a) (9), which states that: The Council shall have no authority
to . . . enact any Act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provisi(m of TiUe
23 of the District of Columbia Code (relating to criminal procedure), or with
respect to any provision of any law codlited in Title 22 or 24 of the District of
Golnmbia Code (relating to crimes and treatment of prisoners) during the
twenty-fonr full calendar months immediately following the day on which the
members of the Council first elected pursuant to this Act take office.
3. The first elected City Council members took office on January 2. 1975.
Obviously, the twenty-four month period had not expired when the District
government passed this law in July, and it still has not expired. So tbere is no
question that the exclusive authority which Congress retained over Title 22 still
remains. The qnestion which now must be answered Is this : does the Firearms
Control Regulations Act of 1975 constitute "any act, resolution, or rule with
respect ... to any provision of any law codified in Title 22 or 24 of the District
of Colnmbia Code"? Tbe City Council answers in the negative. Let us examine
their argument.
4. The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law, a Com-
mittee of the District of Columbia Council, maintains that "This bill does not
amend or conflict with the provisions of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the D.C. Code.
It BpedflcaUy provides as much in Section 902." (For those who are not familiar
with the D.C. Code, let me say that Chapter 32 of Title 22 U the Chapter that
deals with weapons. )
5. Tbe first thing that should be pointed out is that the Self- Government and
Governmental Reorganization Act does not use the language "amend or oonfiiet"
when it denies authority to the City Council over criminal laws. The language of
the Act is much broader — as broad as language can be. It says, and I repeat, that
tbe City Council "shall have no authority to . . . enact any act, retotutUm, or
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84
rule toith respect to . . . any provUion of anj/ (ow codified in Title 22 . . ."
(emphaBia added). I want to emphasize the fact that tbe words "no", "any", and
"with respect to" are used, and not "amend or conflict," as the City Council ap-
parently believes. The word "any" Is used Four times in subsection (9) and the
words "with respect to" twice. It la difficult to conceive of a formulation that is
more sweeping in its scope or broad in its meaning than the formulation that ap-
pears in Section e02(a) (9).
In the opinion hnnded down in the ci=e MarMland and B.C. Rifle and PUtol
A»mciation,Itic.\. Wa«Ain(r(mt ef ol., 442 F. 2d 123 (February 24, 1071) the Conrt
declared. The flmt and perhaps most Important indication of congressional intent
springs from the words in which the statute Is cast . . . Absent strong reason for
a contrary reading, our function is to lake this language for what It plainly says,
for "(t)here ia . . . no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes." {U.S. v. American Trucking A»»ociatiiyns, 310 U.S. 334, 543 [1940].)
6. The legislative history of this section In tbe Self -Government and Govern-
mental Reorganization Act corroborates this understanding of the words in Sec-
tion e02(a)(9). For example, in the Conference Report on tbe bill, S. 1435,
Report Number 93-703, the I'onferees expl.iin that "The House Amendment
[the "major provisions" of which were adopted by the Conference substitute]
contained provisions, not in the Senate bill, providing . . . (3) the Council could
not change building height timitattons nor change D.C. criminal laws or tbe
organization and jurisdiction of the D.C. court." Any change at all in the crim-
inal laws, it the language of the Conference Report means anything, is prohibited
Changes that result in more severe laws or new penalties or the creation of new
offenses are prescribed, just as are any changes that would meliorate tbe severity
of the laws.
7. If one wishes to trace the legislative history back farther, he will find that
this particular restriction on the power of the District City Council was not a
part of the bill (H.R. 9682) reported from the District of Columbia Committee.
Rather, tbe restriction was added during debate on the Floor of the House,
October 10, 1973.
8. The restriction on the power of the City Council first appeared as part of
an amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 9682, the bill reported by
the D.C. Committee. The snbstitute wjs >ponsored by Ifi members of the D.C.
Committee, only eight of whom are still on tbe Committee. At the time there was
a great deal of confusion about the Committee amendment, and serious questions
were raised about the manner in which it was prepared and offered, but that is
immaterial at this point. What are important are the descriptions given b;
Brock Adams and Thomas Rees, sponsors of the amendment containing the pro-
vision restricting the Council's "authority over criminal laws." Mr. Adams said,
"it prohibits tbe Council from changing certain specific titles of the District of
Columbia Code. These are the titles of the District of Columbia Code wbich deal
with tbe District of Columbia criminal laws." (CongresHonal Record. October 10,
1973, Page 3363S.) Thomas Rees, another sponsor of the Amendment had this to
say ; "If individuals are worried about crime in the District, there is another
Congressional reservation on Page 90, which is number (8) on line 5, which says
that the City Council cannot enact any ordinance that affects In any way Titles
22 or 24 of tbe District of Columbia Criminal Code." iCongregsional Record,
October 10, 1973, Page 33647.) The language of the Self-Go vemment and Gov-
ernmental Reorganization Act itself is plain enough, but there can be absolutely
no doubt about its meaning when one considers the descriptions of the section in
question made by sponsors of the section itself. These descriptions, let me point
out, were made during debate in the House, and the House passed the bill with
tbe understanding that the language ''with respect to" means exactly what It
says 1 that the City Council cannot enact any ordinance that affects in any way
Titles 22 or 24 of the District of Columbia Criminal Code."
9. Therefore, the entire legislative history of this restriction on the authority
of the City Council confirms the plain meaning of the words found in section
602(a)(B), that the Council has no authority to enact any legislation whatso-
ever with respect to Title 22 of the D.C. Code. The opinion of the present
Committee of the District of Columbia, most of whose Members did not serve
on the D.C. Committee in 1973, regarding the proper interpretation of the
language of Section 602(a)(9) of the Self -Go vemment and Governmental Re-
organization Act Is. I might add, totally irrelevant, whatever that opinion
might be. If anyone cannot understand the plain meaning of the sectioa, let
him examine its legislative history. It is improper and inadmissible for a Com-
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86
mittee uutlateraly to render an opinion on the meaning of language enacted by
the entire Congress — language that is amtntakable In Its interpretation.
10. The second point that ought to be made about the statement contained
in the Report ot the Committee on the Juditlarj and Criminal Law Is tbla;
Section T09 of the Gun Control Act, which provides that "This act and the
penalties prescribed In Section 605 [Note: there is no section 605 In the Art]
of this act, for violations of this act, sball not supersede bat shall supplement
all statutes of Uie District and the United States in which similar conduct Is
prohibited or regulated," renders the entire act an absurdity. How do two
lilfferent laws supplement each other without one superseding tie other? If one
law, for example, mandates one year imprisonment for an otCense, and another
law mandates two years for the same offense, one must supersede the other.
There is no possibility of supplementation in such a situation.
11. To apply this principle to the instant case, Chapter 3201 of 'Htle 22 of
the D,G, Code defines a "sawed-olf shotgun" as "any shotgun with a imrrel less
than twenty Inches in length." The Firearms Control Regulations Act, how-
ever, defines a "sawed-oR shotgun" as a "shotgun having a barrel of less than
18 inches in length . . ." How, may T ask you, is this Firearms Act going to
supplement Chapter 3201 of Title 22 on the matter of what constitutes a "sawed-
off shotgun"? If the new Firearms Act is enforced at all in this regard, then
it is superseding, not supplementing Title 22 of the District of Columbia Code.
12. Lest anyone thinli that this is the only example that can be given in
which the Firearms Act supersedes provisions of Title 22 of the D.C. Code, I
hasten to cite several others. The definitions of "pistol" and "machine gun" are
also different in the Firearms Act from Title 22 of the D.O. Code. The registra-
tion requirements Imposed in the Firearms Act are far different from those
provisions fonnd In Chapter 3206 of lltle 22 of the D.C. Code. The regulations
and recordkeeping requirements imposed on gun dealers are far different in
the Firearms Control Act from what they are in Chapters 3208, 3209, and
3210, of Title 22 of the D.C, Code. Chapter 3215 of Title 22 describes the penalties
for violations of the weapons laws of the District : up to 31,000 in fines and np to
one year in jail, or both, unless specifically provided otherwise in Chnpter ^.
The Firearms Control Act, on the other hand, contains penalties of up to $300
In fines and up to 10 days in prison for the first offense, and mandates penalties
of a $300 fine and at least 10 and no more than 90 days in prison for subsequent
offenses. Now, if we are to understand that the Firearms Control Act does
not supersede the D.C. Code, Title 22, Chapter 3215, then what are we to con-
clude when a person, convicted of his second offense, may be sentenced to five
days In prison under the Code, but must be sentenced to ten days in prison nnder
the Firearms Control Act? Has the Firearms Act supplemented or snperseded
the Code? I believe the answer is obvious.
13. Chief of Police, Maurice J, Culllnane, displayed some awareness of the
problem in his letter of April 15, 1978, to Councilman David A. Clarke. Chief
Cnllinane pointed out :
• • • because of the regulatory methodolt^y employed, the bill creates
new problems not encountered in the Police RegnlatiMis. The bill seeks to
create a single regulatory standard by which pistols, rifles, and shotguns
would be certificated, while a single standard might normally be an Im-
provement over the admittedly, complicated arrangement found in Articles
80-55 of the Police Regulations, the District is confronted with Congres-
slonally created standards for pistols and an absence of standards for rifles
and shotguns. Thus, by establishing a single standard, the M.P.D., and
pposi)ective applicants for certification of pistols must perform a rather
complicated exercise in mental gymnastics to ascertain what the bill re-
quires over and above the Code and which portions of the bill conflict with
the Code and are Inapplicable.
It ic obvions that Chief Culllnane recognizes the fact that this bill is, In fact.
legislation "with respect to" Title 22 of the D.C. Code, and also In conflict with
the Code.
14. If the Firearms Act dianges the present provisions of the D.C. Code in
any way — and I have jnst mentioned several ways In which it does — then It is
in fact Bupersedln;; the D.C. Code. The section of the Firearms Act that seeks
to allow the Act to run through a louphole by claiming that it supplements
rather than supersedes present D.C. law is either h nullity or it makes the
Firearms Act itself of no elTect.
15. The third point that ought to be made about Section 709 of the Firearms
Act. whi^ claims that the Act supplements rather than supersedes Federal
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law and the D.C. Code, 1b tbat it, la iteelf, is an admiaston that the Firearms
Act Is legislation enacted "with respect to" proviaiona of law In Title 22 of the
D.C. Code, an action speciflcally prohibited by Section 602(a)(9) of the SeU-
Govemment and Governmental Reorganization Act. By Including Section 709
In the Wreanns Act, the City Council obviously Intended to make an end-run
around the express intent of Oongress to reserve all authority over criminal
laws in the District of Columbia for itself. However, not only does the end-run
fail, it constitutes an explicit admission that the Firearms Act is in fact an act
"with respect to" Title 22 of the D.C. Code.
16. Let as continne with our examination of the argument for the legality
of the Firearms Act. It is speciflcally argued that authority for enacting the
Act may be found In Section 302 of the Self-Go vemment and Governmental
Reorganization Act. However, we have already seen that Section 302 places an
express Constitutional limitation on the authority of the City Council. It Is
further argued that authority flows from the D.C. Cade, Title I, Chapters 224,
226, and 227. However, if one esamiues those Chapters of the Code, one will
And ttiat Chapter 224 deals with penalties for violations of building regula-
tions, for violations of leashing regulations tor large dogs, and tor police regu-
lations dealing with such things as pawnbrokers. Junk dealers, the storage of
flammable substances, street vendors, fees for hackney carriages, herds of
animals in the streets of the District, littering, fireworks and explosives, and
loud noises suc^ aa horns and cries.
17. Chapter 226 grants the Council authority to make "all sucii reasonable
and usual police regulatlmis ... as the Council may deem necessary for the
protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and the
protection of all property within the District of Columbia." The question arises
then, whether the Mrearms Act is such that it is, in fact, "necessary for the
protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons ..." in the
District of Columbia. Tbat question will be treated below, under the third
heading.
18. Chapter 227, the last of the Chapters cited in the argum^it for the
legality of the Firearms Act. Is the only Chapter cited which speciflcally author-
izes the Council to make "all such usual and reasonable police regulaUona . . .
as the Council may deem necessary tor the regulation of flrearms, projectiles,
explosives, or weapons of any kind in the District of Columbia." It is upon
this Chapter in the D.C. Code that the argument for the legality of the Fire-
arms Act primarily rests. However, no authority is given in this Chapter or
in any other Chapter cited by the Committee for imposing penalties for viola-
tions of these firearms regulations. The penalty- Imposing power cited by the
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal I.^w is found in Title
I, Chapter 224(a). However, If one looks at that Chapter, one will Qnd that
it grants authority "to prescribe reasonable penalties of fine not to exceed
$300 or Imprisonments not to exceed ten days [the Firearms Act contemplates
Imprisonments up to 90 days]. In lieu lOf or In addition to any fine, for the
violation of any building regulation . , ., any regulation promulgated under
authority of section 1-228, and any regulation promulgated under authority of
section 1-22, and any regulation promulgated under authority of section
1-226." There is no penalty-making power granted in l-224(a) for violations
of Section 1-227, the section dealing specifically with flrearms regulations.
19. The argument for legality. If valid, would result in anomalous and absurd
conclusion. The anomaly lies in the fact that if this Chapter authorizing the
Council to enact police regulations can be used to justify the Firearms Act,
then a regulation made pursuant to one Chapter of the D.C. Code can over-
turn, not another regulation, which would be entirely proper, but a Chapter of
the Code. To use the analogy of Constitutional law and statutory law. It wonld
be comparable to repealing or superseding part of the Constitntinn by passing
a new statute. It is a well-established legal principle that laws can only be
changed or superseded by laws of a similar nature. Regulations cannot super-
sede statutes, and statutes cannot supersede constitutions. The argument that
police regulations made pursuant to Title 1. Chfp'er 227 of the Code can change
other provisions of the Code Is absurd. TTie City Council Is not comijetent to
make any law "with respect to" Title 22 of the Code, and it Is doubly prevented
from changing Title 22 by means of imposing new police regulations. As the
Court in Maryland antf D.C. Rifle and Pistol A»60ciaiion, Inc. v. Waghinglon
et al. declared, "To be sure, a municipal regulation camiot permit an act which
the statute forbids, or forbids an act which the statute permits." (442 F.2d 123,
130) [February 24, 1971]).
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87
ao. Those who argne for the lesalitf of the Firearme Act point ont tliat "In
Slaruland and DUtrict of Cotumi/ia Rifle and tH»tut Association, Inc. v. Washing-
ton, 142 U.S. App. D.C. 375, 442 F.2d 123 <1971), the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld
the authority of tbe former D.C. Conncil to promnlfftte the current gun control
regulations." The plaintlfTa argued in that case that in passage of those gun
control regulations, the former Council was trpading on ground that the Congress
had reserved to itself. They lost the case. What relevance this Court decision
has to the question at band is not clear, for it was In reference to the former
Council, not the present Council. The powers of the present Council have been
explicitly circumscribed by Section 602(a) (9) which eipressly prohibits tamper-
ing in any way with any provision of Title 22 of the D C Code. It would be
perverse if a Court were to hold at this time 'subsequent to passage of the Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act that the Council could act
in conflict with the eapress intention of Congress to reserve to itself control over
the criminal laws of the District ot Columbia. The citation of this obsolete Court
decision is, then, irrelevant. About t^e only statement that the Court made in
that decision that is worth considering is that "the exercise of authority (by
the Cit}' Conncil) ought not to be questioned unless clearl7 inconsistent with
the expressed will of Congress." Sioce the Firearms Act is clearly inconsistent
with the expressed will of Congress to retain exclusive authority over criminal
laws, then the authority of the City Council to pass that act is void.
1. Sixty rears ago the liberals, who by today's standards might be considered
conservative, were leading a campaign to outlaw the manufacture, sale, and
trauBportatlon of goods that they believed were responsible for an untold num-
ber of deaths, broken homes, and a great deal of human misery in general. In
1919 they succeeded, and added the 18th amendment to the Constitution, pro-
hibiting the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, and exportation of
intoxicating liquors. The Prohibition lasted 15 years, until its repeal in 1933.
During the 15-year period Prohibition was In effect, organized crime emerged In
America as a force to be reckoned with. But the only reason organized crime
became so powerful Is that the federal government created the conditions in
which it could flourish.
2. Gun control laws are the Prohibition laws of the latter half of the 20th
century. They are aimed at controlling gnns, not beverages, but the mythology
that surrounded the Uqnor control laws applies. In both cases, some inanimate
objects (firearms or beverages) are regarded as the cause (not the instrument)
of many evils. Hesponaibility is shifted from persons to objects, and laws are
directed away from persons abusing or misusing firearms or beverages and
toward the firearms or beverages themselves. In so prohibiting or curtailing traf-
fic or commerce in goods that are desired by great numbers of people, the gov-
ernment creates a situation in which the people who want guns or beverages
must buy in black markets, that is, markets that have been outlawed. Because
these markets and transactions are illegal, the people most likely to flourish in
them are not the law-abiding citizens, but persons who have no compunction
about operating outside the law, When guns are outlawed, only outlaws will sell
guns. If the D.C. Police Department thinks it has a difficult time now coping with
the gray market In gnns that already exists, they will have a much more difficult
time If this law goes into effect. Instead of meliorating the crime problem, the
Firearms Control Act would greatly aggravate it. Organized crime would flourish
in the District, just as it did throughout the nation during the era of Prohibition.
The only people who will abide by this law are those who are law-abiding any-
way, those whom It Is allegedly designed to protect. It will not and cannot protect
them, since it will result In their disarmament. It certainly will not result in the
disarming of the criminal element.
8. A new study by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms clearly indi-
cates that the Firearms Control Act will not be able to achieve its stated pur-
pose of "protect [ing] the citizens of the District from the loss of property, death,
and injury by controlling the availability of firearms in the community." What
will be controlled, of course, are legally registered firearms, but they are only
a small fraction of the gun population of the city anyway. The A.T.F. study in-
dicates that over 80% of the traceable hand guns seized in the District from mid-
February through July originated outside the District of Columbia. The
conclusion of the study is that tough local gun controls do not cut off the BU[4)ly
of handgnns but alraplr increase the ntunber of nnregistered guns Imported from
otber areas.
4. What the Firearms Control Act will do, tJien, follows a pattern set by all
legislation that interferes with the fnnctionlng of the market. By creating tbe
black market conditions in which crime can flourish, the Act will actually exacer-
bate the crime problem, not allegiate it. Then, in order to "correct" the new, en-
larged crime problem, the District and/or Cou^resa will be pressured into still
more restrictive measures, Including, perhaps, national legislation outlawing com-
merce in or possession of flrearms. After all, in IH21 the U.S. Supreme Court de-
clared that the Congress may enact nationwide legislation to the extent necessary
to make local District laws effective. (Cohen* v. Virsinia 19 U.S. 264), I do not
wish to imply, of course, that nationwide gun control would be any more effective
than local gun control, because it would not. Effectiveness Is the excuse that
would be used to Justify a nationwide law. Whether the law Is local or national
in scope It would be equally Ineffective. One reason being, of course, that crim-
inals are not legally required to register their guns. (Hoynes v, U.S. 390 U.S.
85. ) And the other being that the laws of economics do not stop at the boundaries
of the District of Columbia.
5. Another indicattou of tlie Ineffectiveness of gun control laws, including laws
such as the Firearms Control Act, which contains mandator; sentencing provi-
sions, is the study recently conducted by the Center for Criminal Justice at
Harvard Law School. On the question of whether or not a mandatory prison
sentBiee for violations — which is more severe than the mandatory sentence
in the Firearms Control Act — reduced the availability of flrearms, the study
concluded : "There is no clear evidence that the general circulation of firearms
in Massachusetts has declined."
On the more important question of whether the crime rate was reduced by
the stiff Massachusetts law, the Harvard stady has this to say : Crime data
for early 1976 have reinforced this analysis ; there has been a visible break
in the growth of robbery in Boston. While that reduction has extended to fire-
arm robbery, the drop In firearm robbery has not been any more extensive than
drops In other forms of robbery. Thus, the proportional role of firearms In
robbery has shown greater stability, but no clear redaction.
The Harvard study goes on to say: Within that broad framework, however,
we must recognize a brief shift In weapon choice during the period around
the time Bartley-Fox [the Massachusetts law] was taking effect. The use of the
flrearms in robbery declined during the first six months of 1975. This did not
produce any drop In total (or armed) robberies during that period — other
weapons took up the slack and the proportional contribution of weapons to
robbery actually increased slightly during the same period.
The study concludes, however, that this shift has "dissipated" and that "no
effect on the level of firearm use in robbery has occurred . . ."
6. If one wonders about the effect of the Massachusetts law on assaults, the
Harvard study points out ; "... the proportion of assaults which involved fire-
arms dropped significantly In 1975, beginning In March ... A further reduction
in this proportional figure has occurred In early 19TG. Firearm assaults showed
a small Increase over 19T5 ; non-firearm assaults, however, Increased explosively
over the same period." As for homicide, "no clear drop in firearm assanlt deaths
tias been demonstrated to date."
7. The Harvard study also points out that Franklin ZLoirlng, who has con-
tributed so much to the mythology surrounding gun control laws by arguing
that guns cause crime, has changed hla position to one emphasizing that It is
not the guns but the criminals who cause crime.
8. This revision of preconceived ideas is not limited to people in this country.
In 1970, Cambridge University In England conducted a study of the 1920 BriUsh
gun control laws banning private ownership of handguns and concluded that
the law has had no effect on the level of violence in England. The authors of
the Cambridge study point out that New York City has more restrictive gun
laws than does England, but suffers from a far higher crime rate than England.
Switzerland on the other hand, has the world's highest rate of per capita gun
possession, bnt a minimal rate of violence.
9. A third study that ought to be mentioned here is one conducted last year at
the University of Wisconsin. The authors of the Wisconsin study scrutinized
the gun laws of every State of the Union and compared them to all relevant
demograiidiic, economic and other statistl-al data. They concluded that — and
I quote — "gun contiol laws have no indlvldnal or collective effect In redncing
the rates of violent crime."
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The Wisconsin study goes on to refute the argimieat, which I mentioned above,
that looal guD laws are ineftective only because adjacent jurisdictions have lax
gun laws. The authors point out that for about fifty-flve yearB, New Torb State
and Canada have had somewhat restrictive laws on handguns. Canada and
New York border American States having lax gun laws, yeC the homicide rate in
Canada is less than half New York State's and less than one-quarter New York
City's. There Is a difference between the Canadian and New York State laws,
however. In Canada, it is comparatively easy for a law-abiding citizen to get a
Xtermit to keep a handgun in his home or business.
10. One wonders how much argimient and evidence Is needed before the gun
prohibitionists begin to realize that gun control cannot reduce the crime rate,
but, in fact, may increase it. My own opinion is that some gun prohibitionists will
never be convinced simply because Chey have developed a monomaniacal vendetta
against firearms. I certainly hope that such is not the case in the present esample
of a gun control law. I would remind everyone, however, that one of the predeces-
sor bills to the Firearms Contol Act ol 1975 would have banned toy guns, too.
In view of the fact that less than one-half of one percent of all the guns seized
by the D.C. police last year in connection with crimes were legally registered, it
seems both futile and absurd to imx>ose further registration requirements. Over
99.6% of all the guns seized were not registered ; I fail to see how creating stlffer
r^stration procedures Is going to lower that percentage any. I also cannot
understand how making registration more difficult than It already is will reduce
crtme, since the criminals obviously do not register their guns. The only sensible
reason that one could favor gun control laws — and I hope this is not the reason
the D.C. Council favors the Firearms Control Hegalations Act — would be to
disarm the innocent population so that the criminals and the government conld
prey on them at will. An article presenting this argument appeared In the June/
July Issue of The Civil Liberties Review. I have Included it as an appendix: to my
teBtlmoay.
I have argued for the uncontsitutlonallty, the Illegality and the futility of the
Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1976. I believe that if any one of these
arguments is valid, this Committee and this Congress ought to disapprove the
E*irearms Act and prevent its provisions from becoming effective. Not only is the
Integrity of the Constitution and the Home Rule Charter called into question by
this Act, but the safety of the residents of the District of Colombia will be furtber
endangered if it becomes law. I strongly urge you to act quickly to protect the
Uvea, property and safety of the people of the District of Columbia by disapprov-
ing this bill.
Thank yon.
The Libbabt of Congress,
CONQBBSSIONAL RESEAKCH SERVICE.
WasMnglon, D.C, AuguH 18, 1976.
Fdeasmb Control Rboulations Act of 1979 : Is the Actt a Vaud Exeroibb or
THE ArTBoBmr GaAnTED ar Sections 1-224, 1-226, 1-227 (Rbottlation or
FiBEABMe, EXPtOBIVES AND WEAPONS) OF THE D.C. CODB. OB IS IT A VIOLATION
OF Sectioh fl02(a)(9) or the District of Columbia Self-government anh
GovEBNMENT Reorganization Act (87 Stat. 894-95(1973))
inteoddction
The Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975. D.C. Act No. 1^142, approved
July 23, 1976 raises questions as to whether the Act is the valid exercise of
authority granted by D.C. Code Sec 1-227. 1-226, 1-224 or a violation of the
limitation imposed on the legislative authority of the D.C. City Council by sec-
tion 602(a) (9) of the District of Columbia Self- Government and Government
Hcoreanliation Act, 87 Stat 894-95(1973), D.C. Code Sec. l-147(a) (9) (Supp.
II). The conclusion of this report is that the Act Is not valid.
Section 602(a) (9) provides:
The Conndl ^lall have no authority . . . to —
(9) enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of title 2S
(relatinc to criminal procedure), or with respect to any provision of any law
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codlfled In title 22 or 24 (relating to crimes and treatment of prisoners) during
tbe twenty-four full calendar months immediately following Che daj on which
the members of the Council first elected pursuant to this Act take office.
Sections 1-227, 1-226 and 1-224 of the D.C. Code state :
Section 1--327 Begulationt relative to firearms, expUttive*. and weapon*.
Tbe District of Columbia Council is hereby authorized and empowered to
make, and the CommlBsloner of the District of Columbia is hereby authorized
and empowered to enforce, all such usual and reasonable police rpg^ulationg, in
addition to those already made under sections 1-224, 1-225, and 1-226 as the
Council may deem necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectiles, explo-
sives, or weapons of any kind in the District of Columbia.
Section 1S26 Regulations for protection of life, health, and property.
The District of Columbia Council is hereby authorized and empowered to ■
make, and the Commissioner of the District of Columbia is hereby authorized
and empowered to enforce, all such reasonable and usual police regulations in
addition to those already made under sections 1-224, 1-225, as the Council may
deem necessary for the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of
all persons and the protection of all property within the District of Columbia.
Section i^Zi Police reffulationi authoriged in certain cages.
The District of Columbia Council is hereby authorized and empowered to
make and modify, and the Commissioner of the District of Columbia is hereby
authorized and empowered to enforce, usual and reasonable police regulations
in and for said District as follows :
First. For causing fnll inspection to be made, at any reasonable times, of tbe
places where the business of pawnbroking, junk-deallng, or second-band clothing
business may be carried on.
Second. To r^ulate the storage of highly inflammable substances in the
thickly populated portions of the District.
Third. To locate the places where licensed vendors on streets and public places
shall stand, and change them as often as the public interests requite, and to
make all necessary regulations governing business.
Ninth. To regulate or prohibit loud noises with boms, gongs, or other instru-
ments, or loud cries, upon the streets or public places, and to prohibit the use
of any fireworks or explosives within such portions of the District as it may
think necessary to public safety.
Eleventh. To prescribe reasonable penalties for tbe violation of any of the
regulations in this section mentioned ; and said penalties may be enforced in
any court of the District of Columbia having Jurisdiction over minor offenses,
and in tbe same manner that such minor ofFeuses are now by law prosecuted
and punished.
BACKOBOUND
Congress enacted legislation governing the carrying and selling of firearms
In the District in 1892. 27 Stat. 116. Several years later it passed legislation
governing the "killing of wild birds and wild animals in the District of Colum-
bia," 34 Stat. 808(1906) which included language similar to that currently
contained In D.C. Code Sec. 1-227.
When the basic provisions of title 22. chapter 32 of the D.C. Code replaced
the 1892 legislation, tbe District's regulatory authority under the 1906 Act was
left unchanged, 47 Stat. 650(1932), as amended, D.C. Code sees. 22-3201 to
22-3217.
In 1968. the District promuigateii police regulations covering the possession,
registration and sale of firearms and destructive devices. D.C. Police Regis.
arts. 50-55. The Maryland and District of Columbia Rifie and Pistol Association
challenged the validity of the '68 regulations on the ground that In enacting
D.C. Code sees. 22-3201 to 22-3217 Congress had preempted the field and with-
drawn the delegation of legislative authority granted by D.C. Code see. 1-227.
They contended, alternatively, that tbe regulations exceeded the authority
granted by the 1906 legislation which they argued should be read narrowly to
permit only regulations associated with hunting of wild birds and animals.
The United States Court of Appeals rejected both of these arguments, Mary-
land and District of ColumUa Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v, WatMnston,
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442 F. 2d. 123 (D.O. Cir. 1S71). It noted that broad language contained in section
1-227 does not suggest tlie narrow Interpretation otfered and that by subsequently
repealing all of the 1006 statute except the firearm regulation provision Congress
intended Bection 1-227 to be Interpreted as broadly as its language. The Court
also observed with respect to the preemption issue :
The Important conaideration, we think, la not whether the legislature and
mimlclpalitr have both entered the same fleid, but whether in doing so they have
clashed. Statutory and local regulation may coexist in identical areas although
the latter, not inconsistently with the former, exacts additional requirements,
or imposes additional penalties. The test of concurrent authority, this court
indicated many years ago, is the absence of conflict with the legislative will ....
We find, too, from the fact that section 1-224 was not repealed, either in 1932
when tbe gun control law was passed or in 19SS when the 1906 wildlife legislation
was repealed, a satisfying assurance that Congress, having dealt with some
aspect* of weapons control, left others for regulation by the District. Indeed, as
we have pointed out. we cannot fathom any other purpose to be achieved by
leaving section 1-227 in force. We are aware of a brief observation In the legis-
lative history of the 1932 act that It would effect a "comprehensive program of
[gnn] control," but we cannot accept that as an expression of intent to preempt
tbe entire field. Examination discloses that the 1982 act Is not comprehensive
with respect to riSes and shotguns, and the regulations under review demonstrate
i clear design to leave the areas preempted by the statute unaffected. Id. at
130-32.
When Congress delegated broad general legislative authority to the City
Conncdl in the District of Columbia Self-Go vemment and Government Reorgani-
zation Act, it restricted its grant by providing that :
The Council shall have no authority . . . to —
(8) enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of title 23
(relating to criminal procedure), or with respect to an; provision of any law
codified in title 22 or 24 (relating to crimes and treatment of prisoners) during
tbe twenty-four full calendar months immediately following the day on which
th» members of the Council first elected pursuant to this Act take office, 87 Stat.
894-95(1973. D.C. Code Sec. l-147(a) (9).
TtilB subsection was added to the bill by House sponsors during debate. 119
Cong. Bee. 33363(1973). Under its provisions, one at the sponsors noted, "the
City Council is prohibited from making any changes in the criminal law appli-
cable to the District. The conference committee, "agreed to transfer authority
to the Council to make changes in Titles 22, 23 and 24 uf the District of Colombia
Oxie, effective January 2, 1077. ... It Is the intention of the CouCerees that
their respective legislative committees will seek to revise the District of Colum-
bia Criminal Code prior to the effective date of the transfer of authority referred
to." H.H. Rep. No. 93-702, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 75(1973). We have been unable
to locate any further express indication of Itgislative intent as to the meaning
of aectinn 602(a)(9). Other than the language of section 404(a) there Is no
express Indication as to whether the limitation applies to D.C. Code Sec. 1-227 ;
Subject to the limitations specified in title VI of this Act [which Includes
sec. 602(a)(9)], the legislative power granted to the District by this Act is
vested in and shall be exercised by the Council in accordance with this Act.
In addition, except as otherwise provided in this Act all functions granted to
or Imposed upon, or vested in or transferred to the District of Columbia
Council, as established by Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1967, shall he
carried out by the Council in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 87
Stat 787(1978).
ABGUUENTS THAT THE ACT IS BEYOND THE AUTHORITT OP THE council.
Congress reserved to itself legislative jurisdiction over criminal law and
procednre in the District of Columbia until January 2, 1077 by enactment of
section 602(a)(9). This fact is established by the legislative history cited
above and the statements contained in this year's House committee report on
the MU to extend that date. H.R. Rep. No. 04-1418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Any act which prohibits under criminal penalty the control, transfer, offer
for sale, sale, gift or deliver of destructive devices such as explosives, poison
gas bombs, tear gas, and tasers; the manufacture of firearms within the District
of Columbia 1 and the possession of pistols acquired after the effective of the
Act Involves the exercise of criminal legislative Jurisdiction.
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By enacting section 602(a) (ft) Congress imposed a moratorium over the
Council's legislative authority over matters covered by tlties 22, 23 and 24 so
that the Congress could revise the District's criminal law and procedure includ-
ing especially those matters currently contained within the three titles. The
District of Columbia weapons control statutes are currently all found within
title 22 iucludine provisions for licensing weapons dealers, licensing those who
carry pistols and prohibiting possession of certain firearms and weapons. 'Hiis
is the law which Congress Intended to freeze by enacting section 602(a)(9).
Enactment of the Firearms Control Act alters the law with respect to those
areas which Congress Intended to examine in revising the D.C. criminal law
and is therefore within the limitation of that sectiou and beyond the l^lslative
authority of the D.C. City Council until January 2, 1977.
Tlie Firearms Control Regulations Act Is an act with respect to title 22 because
It is an act containing "general and permanent laws relating to the District
of Columbia" which will have to be placed In the D.C. Code, 1 D.S.C. Sec. 203,
and the most, in fact only, logical repository for those previous is chapter 32
of title 22,
The Firearms Control Regulations Act Is an act with respect to title 23 because
it deals with many of the same subject matters contained in chapter 32 of title
22 : circumstances under which a pistol may be lawfully possessed, compare
D.C. Code sec. 22-3202 with D.C. Act No. 1-142, sec. 201, 202(d), 202(e), 706;
licensing of those who deal in weapons, compare D.C. Code sees. 22-3200, 22-3210
with D.C. Act No. 1-142 sees. 401-409; regulation of the transfer of firearms
compare D.C. Code sees. 22-3208 with D.C. Act No. 1-142 sees. 501, 802
The Firearms Control Regnlfltions Act is an act with respect to title 22
because it replaces and repeals D.C. Police Regulaitlons Arts. 50-51 which deals
with the same subject matter as chapter 32 of title 22. Maryland and DUtrict
of Columbia Rifle and Piitol Agsociation, Znc. v. Washington, 442 F. 2d 123
(D.C. Clr. 1971).
The Firearms Control R^nlatione Act is an act with respect to title 22
l)ecause the City Council intended it to supplement chapter S2 of title 22 as la
evidenced by a comparison of the findings and purpose of the Act with the title
of the 1932 Act whlc^ became chapter 82 of title 22 : compare, "An Act to control
the possession, sale, transCer, and nse of pistols and other dangerous weapons
in the District of Columbia. . ." 47 Stat. 650(1932) with D.C. Act No. 1-142,
sec. 2.
The Firearms Control Regulations Act is an act with respect to title 22 becanse
even if the Council could have passed reflations containing the same provisions
as an exercise of municipal i^siatlTe authority under D.C. Code sees. 1-224,
1-226, 1-227 it Chose to enact a statute under legislative authoritj first delegated
in the District of Columbia Self Government and Government Reorganization
Act, 8T Stat. 774 (1973), D.C. Code sec. 1-124 (Supp. II).
The Firearms Control Regulations Act is an act with respect to title 22
because no argument to the contrary is tenable. As noted earlier, even If the Act
coutd have been promulgated as police regulations under the authority of D.C.
Code sees. 1-224, 1-226 and/or 1-227, the Council did not elect that approach.
However, it seems more reasonable to conclude that section 802(a)(9) limits
the authority granted by D.C. Code sees. 1-224, 1-226, 1-227. The legislative
history indicates that section was Intended to freeze D.C. criminal law until
Congress could work a general revision. Congress could not have therefore
intended to prohibit amendments to titles 22, 23 and 24 covering things like
firearms control, rape, assault etc. bnt permitting the identical provisions to be
validly enacted under the authority of D.C. Code sees. 1-224, 1-226, 1-227. More-
over, in spite of the fact that the lanenege used in the Act, "An Act to protect
the citizens of the District from loss of property, death, and injury ... in order
to promote the health, safety and welfare of the people of the District of
Columbia. . , ." suggests that the authority of D.C. Code sec. 1-226, ". . . police
regulations ... for the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of
all persona and the protection of all property within the District of Columbia"
was used, the Council's selection of penalties In excess of those permitted for
regulations enacted tinder D.C. Code sees. 1-226, 1-224 negates any argument
that the Act was passed pursuant to authority vested by those sections. (D.C.
Code Sec. l-224a provides that the maximum penalties established for violation
of D.C. Code sees. 1-224. 1-226 may exceed Imprisonment for 10 days ; second
and subsequent offenders of D.C. Act No. 1-142 are punishable by Imprison-
ment for not more than 90 days. D.C. Act No. 1-142, sec. 706) .
The Act cannot be classified as primarily regulatory with only those criminal
provisions which would be necessaiy to enforce any regulatory scheme because
in Its regulatory aspects the Act by and large simply reproduces the Police
R^tolatlons found in ArticleB 60-66 onto which new criminal prohibitions have
been grafted, e.g., prohibitions against varions and snndTr destructive devices,
against possession of pistols by D.C. residents acquired after the effective date
of the Act, and against mannfacturlng firearms within the District. Finally,
the validity of tl^e Act cannot ()e supported by reference to Maryland and
Dittrict of Columbia Rifle and Pittol Association. Inc. v. WoihingtoK, 442 F.
2d. 123 (D.C. Cir. 1971). That case arose prior to the Home Rule Act and dealt
with the issue of whether in the absence of an express limitation Congress had
preempted the District's municipal legislative atithoritr. The Firearms Control
B«sulatlons Act's validity tums on the applicability of secUon 602(a)(9), an
express reservation of the legislative anthority the District would otherwise
have been delegated.
ABODMENTB THAT THE ACT IB WITHin THE COXn<CII,'B ACTHOBFTZ
The limitation of Becdon 602(a) (9) Is a restriction on the legislative autjior-
ity, most comparable to ttiat exercised by a state legislature, which the Home
Rale Act vested In the City Cooncil. It does not restrict the Council's authority
to enact municipal ordinances. If it did, Ctmgress couW have and would have
made that clear either in the Act or its legislative history.
The Firearms Control Regulation Act is regulatory in natnre not criminal.
Host regulatory schemes provide minor criminal penalties for violation. Two
of the principal differences between regulatory and criminal provlsitms are the
extent of noncriminal matter included and the severity of the penalties Imposed.
The basic thrust of the Firearms Act is administrative, r^ulatory. Maximum
penalties of 10 days and $300 are the kind of sanctions that support the adminis-
trative dealings of municipality with its businessmen and citizens; they are not
tlie liind of penalties one establishes as a crime control measure.
Section 602(a) (9) restricts amendments to title 22, 23 and 24. The Firearms
Act does not amend any of those sections.
Finally, If Coi^ress fails to disallow the Act, it would serve as a further
indication that section 602(a)(9) was not intended to restrict D.C. Code Sec.
1-227 or even gun control regulation under Its general legislative powers.
An examination of the arguments suggests that the Firearms Control Regula-
tions Act exceeds the legislative authority delegated to the City Council. Con-
gress in enacting section 602(a) (9) intended to freeze those areas of criminal
law and procedure contained In titles 22, 23 and 24. "The fact that gun control
l^lslation for the District of Columbia was then contained In title 22 makes
It inconceivable that Congress did not intend to preserve the status quo in the
area of weapons control.
Of course, Congress could enact the provisions of the Firearms Control
Regulations Act, or in the absence of federal le^iaiatlon the City Gotmdl coold
enact them after January 2, 1977,
Chableb Dotle,
Legiilative Attorney,
American Law Division.
[From Tbe CIvU Ubarties Bsvlew]
Why a Civil Usbbtabiah Opposes Ottit Contbol
(By Don B. Kates, Jr.*)
I am frequently asked: how can a civil libertarian oppose gun control? My
reply is : bow can a civil libertarian trust the military and the police with a
mcHiopoly on arms and with the power to determine which civilians may have
them? I consider self-defense a human right— and one that is particnlarlj vital
for women who choose to live without "male protectors" In an Increasingly vio-
lent society. I also tear that enforcement of even a partial prohibition on hand-
Louis UniTcralty School of Law and Ih In private
'Rg B student be did dvll rl^bts work in tbe Soatb,
nod Arthur KIdot, aud drafted dvll rights leglsla-
— . .;e. He siibBequenllj was a member of the California
AdTlaDi7 Cammtttee to the Civil Rights CommlBBiou. He bas acted aa a pollee lenl adviser
and coiualtml on flrearma to California legtsJatlve committees. HU articles liave b««n
pnbUshed In police and Drearmi technical Joumala.
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puis would take an immenBc tol! In human liberty and bring; abont a sharp In-
crease In repugnant police practices as well aa bnndreds of thousands of jail
sentences.
If aa both British and American studies assure ns, gun prohibition has no as-
certainable effect upon violence, then it seems that Its rationale Is revulsion
against the handgun as a symbol and antagoiilsm toward the conservative but
generally lawablding people who value that symbol. Such a rationale, however,
is no more acceptable than the conservative's argument against homosexuality:
"I don't do it and I don't like people who do— so It oi^ht to be Illegal."
Advocacy of controversial political or social views frequently provokes violent
antagonisms. Although they are usually unwilling or politically unable to overtly
suppress these views, officials can covertly withdraw police protection, leaving
the job to such gronps as the Ku SXai Klan, the White Citizens Council, the
Storm Troopers, the Cherry Society, and the Black Hand.
What might have happened to dvll rights workers if there had been strict
gun control in the Sonth is exemplified In the 1969 machine-gunning of several
hundred marchers by rtght-wlng extremists in Mexico City. Both the possession
of automatic weapons and the act of murder are as strictly forbidden by law in
Mexico as they are In the U.S. Nevertheless, the police made no arrests— either on
the scene or wben the attackers later invaded hospitals to finish off the wounded.
Bven assuming that gun prohibition would be enforced against right-wing ex-
tremists also, tbe effect Is to render dissenters defenseless without meaningfully
preventing lethal attacks upon them. A group of Klansmen or other neo-faaclsts
will hesitate to attack someone they know to be armed or to fire-bomb hia house,
because they don't want their members to risk injury or death. Even though they
may be unarmed, they will not hesitate to attack If they know that their intended
victim is also unarmed and that the police will not defend him. No one had guns
In the hostile mob which bnmed the headquarters of the Marxist W. E. B. DnBolB
Club In 1966 while New York City police looked on. But the DuBols Club mem-
ber who had to pull a pistol on the mob in order to get out of the burning club-
house was Immediately arrested for gun possession. Needless to say, no members
of the mob were arrested.
During the civil rights turmoil in the South, Klan violence was bad enough ;
it might have been worse with gun control. It was only because black neighbor-
hoods were full of people who had guns and could fight back that the Klan didn't
shoot up civil rights meetings or terrorize blacks by shooting at random from
Moreover, civil rights workers* access to firearms tor self-defense often caused
southern p<^ce to preserve the peace as they would not have done if only the Ku
Kluxers had been armed. I remember how Elansmen broke up a series of march-
ers In a Louisiana town with hideous violence and head-bashing while the police
looked on in benevolent neutrality. The unarmed marchers' appeals to the gover-
nor for state police protection were in vain. After many weeks of heavy Injuries
to the marchers a black man shot one of several Klansmen who attacked him
vrith clubs. The state police arrived the next day, and there was no further
violence.
Contrast an Incident that occurred in Madrid on November 6, 1975. A meeting
of opposition reform parties was broken up and Ita participants severely beaten
by right-wing gunmen. The victims could offer no resistance, since Spanish law
strictly forbids civilian possession of handguns {except by right-wing thugs with
permits). Falangist policy follows the gun laws of Nazi Germany and fascist
Italy, under which Jews and political oMwnents were disarmed and left helpless
against mob violence in the early lfl30s. As Hermann GOring said In 1933, "Cer-
tainly I shall use the police— and most ruthlessly— whenever the German people
are hurt ; but I refuse the notion that the police are protective troops for Jewish
stores. The police protect whoever comes into Germany legitimately, but not
Jewish usurers."
Not only political and racial minorities but also women would be handicapped
by gun restrictions. Throughout history women's status has been fixed, and their
self-determination curtailed, by male authority figures to whom they had to look
for protection. Today, as women increasingly choose lifestyles Independent of
male protection, their ability to protect themselves in a violent society becomes
more Important. Obviously, in most situations It is futile and perhaps dangerous
for a woman to resist a male attacker. Armed defence la even more dangerons,
since a rapist will invariably get a gun away from a woman and use It on her —
or so moat movie and television scripts tell us. It seems that a woman who
doeen't have a male to protect her had better just "He back and enjoy it" and
hope her attacker doesn't Intend to murder or mutilate her afterward.
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Men — even police chiefs— who voice anch ojdnlons, however, are uanally sur-
prisingly abort on specific eiamples. I have researched the subject in detail and
iMve found no case in which a rapist was able to disarm bis victim. Those who
are famtUar with the martial arts know liow extraordinary dangerous it is to at-
tempt to disarm anyone — even an untrained person. Police training emphasizes
that this maneuver should be avoided, unlesB the alternative Is immediate death.
If women defend tliemselvea with firearms leas frequently than they could, it
is only becauae they have been brainwashed by the steacly stream of propaganda
generated by males. The Eisenhower Commission Firearms Taak Force Report,
for example, contemptuously dismisses women in « single sentence : They are
"less knowledgeable than men about guns and generally are less capable of self-
defense." (To make certain they stay that way, the commission recommends ban-
ning liandguns.) Having trained women to handle guns and liaving studied police
training for women, I know that they are at least as capable of combat shooting
as are men. In a met^ianlcal age which has largely rendered irrelevant male-
female differences in strength, the concept that women are incapable of using
firearms is an anachronism. I have investigated over 150 cases In which women
rejected this notion. It is noteworthy that in 80% of the cases studied, women
chose to defend themselves with liandguns. Such weapons are infinitely preferable
to long guns becauae they are more portable and maneuverable and far less
letbaL Here are some abbreviated example :
California, 1968: A Loe Angeles woman shot and seriously vrounded an at-
tempted rapist who broke into her house. Police later charged him with two other
rapes.
California, 1S70; An armed Modesto woman storekeeper who had wonnded
armed robbers on two other occasions captured a third.
Maryland, 1970: Knocked to the street by punches in the face and stomach by
a mugger who told her, "You know what I want," a Baltimore woman drew her
pistol and gave him a bullet In the neck instead.
Maryland, 1971 : A Baltimore woman shot to death a man who bad raped her
and threatened to kill her children if she called the police.
Tennessee, 1972 : When a Chattanooga woman drew a pistol, the man who was
preparing to rape her left In too great a hurry to collect the clothes he had Just
taken off. He was later traced and apprehended through identification found in
bis abandoned clothing.
Florida, 1073 : Although she was seriously wounded by a burglar who stabbed
her several times, a Barstow woman ahot him to death.
Kansas. 1974: Commenting, "I don't think you want to do that," a Wichita
storcowner's wife drew a pistol on two armed robbers. They departed In haste.
West Virginia, 197B : A retired schoolteacher awakened to find an armed burglar
in her bedroom. Knocking his gun away. She seized her own pistol and shot him
to death.
Oun prohibitionists deny the value of civilian posseBsion of firearms In com-
batting crime. They cite the Elsenhower Commission's conclusion that "the gun
is rarely an effective means of protecting the home against either the burglar or
the robber : the former avoids confrontation, the latter confronts too swiftly." But
the report, unlike many people who cite it, makes clear that this conclusion aHtllea
only to householders, and specifically to those householders who do not have fire-
arms immediately at hand because a criminal attack is completely unexpected.
Robbers do not "confront too swiftly" for armed storekeepers, who, the report
admits, foil appreciable numbers of them each year. And, although it offers no
figures on the success rate of citizens who carry arms for self-defense, the report
admits that this practice (which it deplores) does allow for some resistance to
Like much gnn control propaganda, the report does not discuss the utility
of guns In defending houaeholders against political or other criminal attacks
which they have reason to expect. But among over one hundred people murdered
by Ku Kluxers in the 19S0-6G era, I can recall only one who was armed. While
his gun did not prevent that civil righta worker's death. It lay down covering fire
which allowed his wife and children to escape the Klansmen who surrounded their
their burning house. The shots also disabled a Klan car through which the FBI
was able to trace, catch, and convict the murderera.
The Elsenhower Commission report admits that there are no comprehensive
Statistics on the number of lives saved by armed citizens. Its negative conclusioa
on the ability of armed householders to defend themselves Is based on a limited
study, conducted in only two cities and over two short periods of time, of the
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number of criminals killed by armed honaebolders. M7 own study, which ia na-
tional in scope and covers hundreds of incidents, shows that bonseholders and
others against whom crimes fire attempted Injure far more criminals than tbej
kill, and capture without shooting far more criminals than tbey wonnd. Hote-
over, at least balf of th« Incidents I studied were not cases of self-defense bnt a
householders coming to tbe aid of their aeigbbors — an issne which the Biseobower
Commission report ignores.
The hundreds of Incidents reported by the national gun magazines, culled bf
readers from their local newspapers, repreisent only the tip of an Immense Ice-
berg. The local newspapers do not publish every case of dvHian self-defense re-
ported to police, and certainly the gun magazines' readers do not dieck every
newspaper or clip every item they see. Far more Importantly, the vast majority
of such instances are never reported to the police — because the near Wctim cannot
proTlde an adequate description of the criminal and/or because tbe citizen pos-
sessed or carried bis gnn illegally.
One rougb indication of the frequency of such Incidents ia the fact that hundreds
of thoosands of felony arrests are made eacb year by ofF-duty police. A trained
officer doubtlessly is more capable of pursuing and arresting a robber or a rapist
than is an ordinary [terson who is armed. Bnt an off-duty officer is no more likely
to encounter such a situation. Perhaps a better Indicator Is the apparent success
of civilian firearms defense training. In 1968, after Orlando, Florida conducted
a highly publicized shooting course for over 6,000 women, it became the only dty
with a population over 100,000 which showed a decrease In crime. Rape, a^^gra-
vated assault, and burglary were reduced by 90%, 25%, and 24% respectively.
After a slmillarly publicized program for retail merchants in Highland Park,
Uicbtgau, armed robberies dropped from a total of 80 in a four-month period to
zero In the succeeding four months. Ia Detroit, after grocers received flrearms
training and shot seven robbers, the number of armed robberies dnvpeA by
almost 90%.
The Eisenhower Commission's view that crime will cease when Its Tictlms are
deprived of the means of self-defense reflects the commission's privileged white
intellectual membership and their elitist disregard for those who cannot afford
to move to "safe" neighborhoods or the high-security apartment buildings. lUs
constitntes the easy pacifism of those who may never need a gou for self-defense
because they can obtain armed security services or special police protection
whenever they need it.
A very different view is taken by nnderprivlleged and/or minority people who
lack the wealth to flee the areas in which the police have given up on crime con-
trol. They know that the only real protection they have Is that which they provide
themselves. Studies and surreys have repeated^ established that blacks are the
most frequent victims of crime, are most afraid of crime, and are most likely to
keep and carry guns for self-defense regardless of the law. Indeed, the only in-
depth study of the question concludes tiat even the high rate of firearms prosecn-
tlon against blacks will not stop them from carrying guns for self-defense so long
as ghetto areas continue to be plagued by violence.
Selectively misleading American statistics and mlsrepresentationB of British
experience have led many people in this country to believe that banning handguns
would reduce violence. Guns make an easy scapegoat for problems which would
othervrise be Insoluble short of radically reshaping the mores and Institutions
which produce violent people. Demands for gun prohibition allow ns to Ignore oup
own unwillingness either to make the necessary fundamental changes or to accept
and live with a violent society. Criminological studies both In the U.S. and in
England overwhelmingly demonstrate that peaceful societies do not need handgun
prohibition and violent societies will not benefit from it.
Handguns were banned In England In 1B20. The only Indepth study of that
prohibition, conducted at Cambridge University in 1970, concluded that it has had
no ascertainable effect on violence. The prohibition was obeyed only because
England was so peaceful In the 1920s that firearms were not necessary for aell-
defense. The Cambridge study reports that Britain has remained peaceful despite
the fact "that 50 years of very strict controls on pistols baa left a vast pool of
tll^al weapons." The study notes that although New York City's firearms controls
are more stringent than England's, New York has far more violence. On the other
hand. Switzerland's firearms violence rate Is negligible even though it has the
world's highest rate of gun possession among civilians.
A 1975 study at the University of Wisconsin concluded that "gun control laws
have no Individual or collective effect in reducing the rate of violent crime." Tb\B
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study involred a compnteriMd comparlsoo between each state's gna control laws
and Its crime data. It took Into account demographic, economic, radal, and other
Tariables relatli^ to gait control effectlTeneas which could be quantified
statlsticBllT-
Qnn control propagandists have evaded the same conclusions of many prevlons
Btudies by arguing that violence persists onlf because ezietlng state prohibitions
JuHt bave not been able to get rid of enough pistols. To test this theory, the
Wisconsin study examined handgun ownership statistics and fonnd no correlation
between bigh civilian pistol ownership and violence.
Without the societal changes necessary to diminish violence, an effective hand-
gun ban woDld drive people to the far more lethal long guns for wlf-defense or
for criminal purposes, liioee who wish to carry their weapons could, working
for a few minntea with a hacksaw, reduce long guns to handgun slee. Tbns a
iiandgnn ban would make the shootings In onr Tl<dent society as deadly as th^
are in England without reducing their incidence.
However erroneously, millions of Americans teei that th^ have the constltn-
tional right to own gons or tliat guns are necessary for their perstmal secniity.
The sign freijuentlj dil^pia^ed in their homes and stores. "They'll get my gna
when they pry it from my cold, dead fingers," undoulitedly exaggerates the
degree of their resistance to gnn prohibition. But experience with the far more
enforceable prohibitions on liquor and marijuana indicates that millions of
people would be alienated by what they deem a tyrannical law, and that those
who believe they can get away with it will disobey the law. British police, nn-
hampered by the Fourth Amendment, have nevertheless been nnable to stem
illegal arms traffic — even with the special search and other powers which anc-
ce»slve gon prohlblticsi bills have gtvoi them. The British army has t>een unable
to enforce gtm laws in Northern Ireland, even with mass street searches and
random raids in homes.
In this connby, even partial enforcement of a handgun probibiUon wonld
result In lai^e ntunbers of snoopers and Informers, "stop and frisk" laws, no
knock" searches, and other repugnant [tollce practices. The result of aacti in-
vasioni of privacy would probably be the jailing of hundreds of thousands of
otherwise law-abiding citizens who wonld react to gun prohibition with the same
self-rigbteoua spirit against tyranny tltat greeted liquor and marijuana pro-
hibitions. In a free society, Hiose who wonld restrict the peoide bear the burden
of proving probable benefit Hie proof would not need to be great in order to
ban that whicli few people value ileeply. But mere specnlatlon — against the
weight of the evidence — cannot justify banning that which is valued as deeJAy
aa SMne 40 mlllian Americans value their handguns.
Such a band is not desirable in itself. It would be virtually unenforceable, and
would not be worth the enormous costs In dvil liberties of even partial enforce-
ment As the Wisconsin study concludes ; "If the law cannot control such highly
visible criminal activity as drug trafOc, gambling, and prostitution, with their
continuing sales of CMnmodlties and services to the general public, then it seems
unlikely that it could control the one^me sale of an item that can last for
geaerationa. The basic question la, then, are we willing to make sociological
and economic Investments of nuA a tremendous nature In a social experiment
for wMcA there is no empirical support 7"
Statkuknt or Hcrus W. Pkoehaic, Jb.
My name is Rufus W. Feckham, Jr. I am a tiUrd generation native Washing-
tonian and I have resided in the District of Columbia all of my adult Ufe. I am
an attorney by profeasion and I am one of those who derive much pleasure
from the recreational and sporting use of firearms. I own a modest collection
of contemporary firearms and I Iiave berai Issued a federal fire arms license as
a collector of curios and relics by the U.S. Treasury Department
OPPOSES omnrcn. act
I ai^>ear here today to urge you most respectfully to disapprove the D.O. City
Council's Art No. 1-142, cited as the Firearms Control Begidationa Act of 1975.
In my humble opinion, and conceded even by some of the proponents, this act
will do absolutely nothing to curi) vi<dence in onr city much less remove firearms
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bxttu the bands of the criminal elemoit It will only haraBS and eventuany
disarm honest citiiena and lecitimate sportamen.
However, what I believe should l>e of even more concern to yon, the GonKress,
Is the fact that the City Council has apparently acted in complete defiance of
yonr statutory mandate! Section 602(a)(9) of the District of Colombia Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act enacted by the Congress
specifically mandates inter alia that the City Council shall have no authority to
"enact any act, resolution, or rule . . . with respect to any provision of any law
codified in title 22 ... of the District of Columbia Code . . ." for at least two years
following the Council's first taking office. Title 22 Section 3208 of the District of
Columbia Code (1973 Edition) provides a procedure which a resident mnst follow
If be wishes to acquire a pistol. The City Council, however, In complete disregard
of this Congressional direction has now flatly prohibited the ownership of pistols
to everyone — including members of Congress — not already in lawful possession
of them on the eifeetive date of its Act. Gentlemen, was it really yonr Intent to
allow the local City Coundl to prohibit you and your sooa-to-be-elected colleagnes
from keeping a pistol In your Washington homes if you so desired?
To summarize the legal arguments; I respectfully suggest that the City Coun-
cil's action was flagrantly in excess of its Jurisdictional anthorlty as limited by
Section 602 (a) (9) of the aforesaid Self-Government Act.
Now let me outline some of the more highly objectionable features of the
Council's Act
OBJEcnon TO codkcil act ho. 1-142
Section 201 (a) would prohibit the possession of tear gas or similar irritants as
they are destructive devices as defined under Section 101(T)(C). Many other-
wise defenseless women and elderly people own these devices for tbeir self pro-
tection and many have saved themselves from grave bodily harm and possibly
death by their timely defensive use. Why should these devices be outlawed?
They rarely, if ever, have lasting ill effects and far more dangerous substances
are sold openly in hardware stores and super marhets, e.g. concentrated lye and
other highly toxic substances packaged in aerosol canisters and used to clean
atoTes, ovens and oUier bousehold appliances.
jSeclion 202 of the Council's Act would prohibit any further owuereblp of pis-
tols and I have already referred to its questionable legality.
Section 203 and 20i provide for firearms registration procedures which are un-
necessarily burdensome, complicated and Involved. The District of Columbia
already has a firearms registration procedure and It certainly seems to be ac-
complishing its Intended purpose quite adequately. What need is there to change
the present system?
Section 205 requires a fee to be Imposed on all applications for firearms regis-
tration certlflcates. But no where is an amount spedfled except that it shall
"reimburse the District for the cost of the services provided." This section opens
the door to a veritable host of [>ossible excesses. Is a whole new and costly
bureaucracy to be established to supervise lawfnl firearms owners? If so the cost
could well be staggering and it would all fall on the hacks of legitimate firearms
owners: S^ per certificate, $10, fSO, $100 or even higher, who knows? "The word-
ing is certainly vagnie.
Also, it is by no means clear just when or bow often firearms mnst be rer^is-
tered. Is an initial registration certificate valid until the firearm is transferred
or otherwise disposed of or must all firearms be reregistered periodically? Some
City Council sources are reputed to have stated that this act requires annual
reregistration of all firearms. If this is to be the case then a truly crippling fi-
nancial blow will be struck at collectors, hunters and other sportsmen such as
skeet shooters and competition rifie or pistol shooters to whom multiple fire-
arms ownership is quite commonplace. Not only is reregistration (absent a
change in ownership) unnecessary and time consuming for the police department
(which surely has more important things to do) it is blatantly and shocUngly dis-
criminatory against those of modest means.
Section SOS provides for the reregistration of flrearms already r^stered. Can
the City Council otter any possible reason for this duplication of effort and
expense?
Section 301 pertains to estates containing firearms. But there is no provision
for estates containing pistols. What happens to them? Are they to be forfeited or
confiscated? Many District of Columbia collectors have valuable pistol collec-
tions. What happens to this property when tbey die? Are their estates and their
legatees to be denied this valuable property by legislative whim and caprice?
90
Wbat aboat tlie estate and inhetitance taxes on tUa iHwrtyl b tte pddic
treasmy to be dHiied this lawful reroiiK? I have no anawer and ntithex,
apparmtlj, did the Oty CooncU.
T^tle IV, Seelion iOI et teq of a» CfXOKil'a Act pertalna to locallT licensed
dealers, wtii<!h I am not. so I will refrain from conuneat i^an It.
Section 502 tontrols sales and dranafera. Subpart (a), however, iHtihlldtB any
sale or transfer of pistols. Is a collector or otlier owner of a Taloable plat<d or
pistols to be forcrer probibited from realising bis profit on his sound inTcatmeDt?
Also, this sectioo prohibits any sale of firearms or ammimifion between private
parties despite their being lawfully entitled to acquire them. ThlB OMaaa that
a flrearms owner wishing to sell or otherwise dispoae of tbem can s^ them tnlr
to a licensed dealer and at the dealer's price. This seems a grosslr unfair restraint
on a firearms owner's ri^I to sell his property if he choeea.
SecttoM 701(b) piotiibits the loan ot fireanns or anunnnltlrai reg^i^Icss of Qie
qnalification and etigitriJity of the borrowo-. Thus a fliQier conld not loan hia
qualified son a bunting rifie to go on his first hunting trip. Nor could I loan my
fellow Bkeet shooting ndghbor a box of skotgnn ahdis to take to the nungc U Ite
should have the misfortune to be tonporaril; out ot than. Surdy audi a Itaiah
restiictlmi serres no mefnl purpose.
Section 702 tequlres that firearms be kept disassembled or bound by tria;er
lo<^B. In the first place, reTolvers and lever action rifies Aould not be diaaaaeiu-
bled except by qualified gunsmiths. Trigger locks will not deter a tUd am^ are
they even available for all makes of fiiearma. Note, taowevw, that this require-
ment is inaivlicable to firearms kept in one's place of budneaa. Can it be that the
City CouDdl places more value on commerce than It does on Hie sanctity of one's
borne and bmilyT Apparently so because this sectton dearly impUes that It to
permiasable to use a firearm to protect and defend your commercial inteieata
but not your home or your wife or your cbildr«) I Surely merchants in ttadr
stores are not entitled to a hi^er d^ree of self-ivoteclion than families in Ottir
homes '. This is unconscionable to say nothing of a denial of the equal protectlcm
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution!
In the interest of conserving your valuable time I have only referred to tlte
more repressive, onjnst. unnecessary and In my view illegal features at thto
poorly conceived and ill advised City Council action. Other witnesses will no
doubt call other objectionable points to your attention.
In its statement of purpose the City CooncU stated that its intent was to pro-
tect the dtiaens of the District. I believe the tme intent of this Act was more
accurately stated In an editorial in the tFaaAtafftoK Pott of August 30, 1978,
which stated in part that ". . . gnns (are) a dangerous and nnw(dc4Kae force
in the commnoity." If this [a the true state of affairs thm It is aziontatic that
gun owners are also unwelcfane and that if this repressive act is permitted to
become law then a great many ^w abiding District of Columbia gun ownen wfll
have no (dioice but to make tbeii homes elsewhere and thweby e^eu furOier
erode this dty's shrinking tax base .
In the name of common sense and on behalf of all legitimate firearms owners
in Washington I urge the GcHtgress to disawirove the City Cooadl's unwise
Rdfcs W. Pecksak, Jr.
The CoAHOtAx, We want to thank the gentleman for articulating
his position on this matter. I am sure tiiat me dialogue today has beoa
educational to the members of the committee on the substantive issaes
and also it has afforded an opportunity to discuss some of the legal
dilemmas and even some of the procedural aspects of this matter that
will have a bearing on the ultimate decision of the committee.
I hope that the gentleman is able to remain to hear the testimony
of our colleague, Mr. Ashbrook, and also the testimony of the Corpo-
ration Counsel, who has a different view with respect to the legal
interpretation.
Mr. GcDE. Despite what differences we may have, I think there is a
difference of opinion in the committee as to whether these matters
should be decided by the courts or decided by Congress.
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But our colleague is not even a bona fide freshman. He took his
se^ by a special election and yet he is working hard to represent his
constituents. I see that he campaigned on a tJieme of putting big
government on a diet. I hope he is successful in the right places in that
effort.
I want to thank the gentleman for representing his constituency.
The Chairman. The Chair now calls the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Ashbrook, to the witness chair. The gentleman has prepared a state-
ment, a rather short statement and he may proceed as he wishes.
stateheut of hoh. john h. ashbrook, a befbesentativx
is conoeess from the otate of ohio
Mr. AsHBBOOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I listened to my col-
leagues' testimony and the questions of the members of this able com-
mittee and I guess I feel a little bit like the fifth husband of Zaza
Gabon I know what I have to do but I am not sure how to make it
interesting.
[Ijaughter.]
Mr. Ashbrook. I introduced House Eesolution 1474 to disapprove
the Firearms Control B^:ulations Act of 1975 enacted by the District
of Columbia Council on July 23, 1976.
I'm opposed to that enactment because I regard it as a monstrous
imposition on the law-abiding citizens of the District of Columbia, and
because these regulations were adopted illegally by the City Council
in complete and flagrant disregard of the congressional injunction
against amendments to the D.C. Criminal Code.
HOHE RULE ACT PROHIBITION
That prohibition is very clear. It forbids the Council from enacting
any law or regulation, "with respect to any provision of any law
coaified in title 22 of the D.C. Code," which pertains to criminal
offenses, including firearms laws. The language "with respect to" is
not limited to enactments which repeal, or conflict with title 22. The
lagnuage states broadly the intention of Congress to prevent any
amendments, that is to say, any provisions which change or add to tm
congressionally-enacted criminal laws relating to fireanna.
The fact is that no resolution of disapproval should be needed
against a law passed by the Council illegally, exceeding its jurisdic-
tion. Such a law is null and void to begin with.
The Council, however, tried to circumvent that restriction by assert-
ing that its regulations somehow were not related to the criminal
code. The Council made various self-serving declarations that its bill
was "not to be construed as amending title 22," that it was only amend-
ing the police regulations, and so forth. That position was and is
transparently abrord.
COUNCIL ACT NO. 1-142
Among other things, the Council banned the future possession of
handguns except by those persons now in the District who already
were registered owners, and made it a crime for a person to loan any
firearm in his own home to protect himself against a brealan.
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In so doing the Council effectively amended numerous provisions of
title 22. It B.mended section 3203, which defines when possession of a
handgun is unlawful, section 3204, which defines unlawful carrying of
a handgun — and specifically excludes carrying in one's home, as well
as section 3214, which enumerates weapons prohibited from private
The Council can call these police regulations, or an^hing they like.
Those are distinctions without a difference; they stUl are de facto
amendments to title 22. And that is not within the Council's statutory
power.
HJI. 12261
For tiiat reason I was pleased to see that the House last Monday
adopted an amendment to H.R. 12261, a bill to extend the duration of
this jurisdictional limitation, which made it absolutely clear that the
language of section 602(a)(9) of the D.C. Home Rule Act means
precisely what it says.
When the Congress said that the City Council could pass no law,
"with respect to," any provision of the criminal code, that is what
it meant. It is ridiculous to suppose that the Congress intended to
give the City Council a free ticket to evade that restriction by calling
something a "police regulation."
It is unfortunate that Monday's corrective action by the House
should even have been necessa^. The language of the D.C. Home
Sule Act is plain enough. But I think it is well that the House has
spoken so that there can De not even a possibility of misunderstanding.
UBBARY OF CONQRESS OPINION
On this point in particular I would like to offer for the record a
legal opinion which I have received from the American Law Division
01 the Congressional Research Service regarding the validity of the
Council's new gun regulation. The opinion concludes that the Coun-
cil's action is in fact an amendment to title 22, and is therefore in
violation of section 602(a)(9). [The opinion appear heretofore on
pp. 89.]
The CRS research further makes it clear that a 1971 court case
upholding the authority of the previous City Council to enact gun
control regulations dealt with an entirely different situation.
That City Council, appointed by the President, was authorized by
Congress to enact any police regulations that did not "clash" or "cmi-
flict" with the congressionally-enacted criminal laws.
That is no longer the case. The District of Columbia Home Rule
Act, passed in 1974, sought to maintain the status quo with regard to
criminal laws in the District, and the City Council elected under the
provisions of the Act is proscribed from making any kind of changes —
even non-conflicting ones— with respect to matters covered in title 22.
I think our colleague, Mr. Fauntroy, pointed out that it was a sug-
gestion and not a conclusion, but I think any other opinion would
hold it up and it would be supported by a court.
In view of that opinion I would respectfully suggest to this com-
mittee that its consideration of any concurrent resolution under sec-
tion 602(c) of the Home Rule Act is not appropriate, since that
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section relates only to Council enactments "with respect to" provi-
sions of law codified in titles other than 22, 23 or 24.
Since the Senate yesterday passed H.K. 12261, it appears that fur-
ther action by the. House may not be necessary. If this bill is signed
by the President, it would automatically nullify the regulations whidi
the Council passed on July 23.
This is because the prohibition in section 602(a) (9) of the District
of Columbia Home Rule Act is explicitly referenced to the first 48
months immediately following the Council's election to office, a time
period which began in January 1975.
I thank the committee for its time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Since the gentleman is a
distinguished member of the bar, I wondered if he had the time to
remain while we ask the corporation counsel to deliver his testimony
which is essentially on the legal point.
Mr. AsHBROOK. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Then both of you could be subject to questions
from the panel.
Mr. AsHBROOE. I would be glad to defer to whatever format the
chairman would like. To answer your question, yes, I will remain and
I will be available.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Risher, if you will take
a witness chair, please render your testimony, Mr. John R. Risher,
Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia Government.
He is accompanied by Mr. George W. Porter, Assistant Corpora-
tion Counsel, District of Columbia Government.
Mr. Risher, you have a statement. Without objection, the entire
statement will be placed in the record at this point, Mr, Risher.
Mr. Risher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The document referred to follows :]
Pbbpabed Stateueht of John B. Bibhix, Jb., Corporation Coxjv^el, D.C.
Hr. Chairman and members of the committee, I ai^reciate this opportunity
to appear before this Committee to dlscnss the legal analysis which led me to
advise the Mayor that there "is no vompelling reason to find [act 1-142] legally
objectionable." (Statement of The Hon. Walter E. Washington, Mayor of the
District of Columbia, upon approving Bill 1-164, . . . July 23, 1976, p. 3.) As of
thlH date, I have not received — and therefore have not had an opportunity to
review — any detaOed presentation that argues in support of a contrary conclu-
sion. Accordingly, the views which I present today do not serve as a substitute
for a rebuttal.
It is my understanding that there is but a single issne before the Committee,
today, namely the legal one of whether, because of section 602(a)(9) of F.L.
93-196, the Coundl was prohibited from enacting tbe subject measure. Secti<m
602(a) (9) 1b but one of the many esplicit limitations imposed by the (!k>ngress
in its grant of "Home Rule" to the citizens of the District of ColumMa. It explic-
itly prohibits the City's legislature from :
,"enact[ing] any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of
title 23 of the District of Columbia Code (relating to criminal procedure), or
with respect to any provision of any law codified In title 22 or 24 of the District
of Columbia Code (relating to Crimes and treatment of prisoners [prior to
January 3, 1977] ) .■' 87 Stat. 81.1.
The legislative history of this provision Is quite scanty: Indeed, the provision
was not contained In H.R, 9056 when that Bill was reported out of this Com-
mittee. Thereafter, the provision was inserted (along with others) in this
Committee's "substitute print". See Newman & Depuy, "Bringing Democracy
to the Nation's I^st Colony: The District of Columbia Self-Govemment Act."
24 Amer. D.L. Rev. 537. 649-00 (1975), hereinafter "Newman ft Dq)uy". Yet,
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lOS
despite itB mMser leglslatlTe hlstwy. it does appear that the ptirpon of Ota
meaBDre was to asanage tbose who apprehended that the District's new le^ila-
tore might "mak{e] the code and sancUms more lenleot." Background and
LeglalatiTe Hiatorr of U.R. 11286, aud Related Bills Culminating hi the EHstrlet
of Colomhla Beif-Goremmait . . . Act, Wd Coog., 2d Bess. (Honse Committee
on the District of Columbia C«Hnmittee Print), p. 1779 (19Te), herelnaAer
'■Committee Print". See, aim, ibid., pp. 1703, 2171. It therefore Is perhaps Ironical
that the argnment against the subject measure Is that It seeks to make the laws
pertaining to the poesesaioiL of weapons more stringent, rather than lenient.
In other words the argumrat against the measure concedes the measure cannot
be said to be prohibited by the ^Irit of section 602(a} (&).
Nox, as I eball demtntstrate, can It be said that eiactment runs counter to the
letter of secUim 602(a)<S). However, before addressing that Issue directly,
I should refer to the letter of June 29, 1OT6, whicli I, as Acting Mayor, trans-
mitted to this Committee, and a copy uf which is attached. There. In objecting
to an extension of the period during whld) the Coimidl would be pndiitrited
from addressing the provisions of title 22, I oMnmented t]iat although section
602(a) <9) explicitly motions only titles 22, 23, and 24, it Is my c^tnl«i that
the legislative hlBtory of the Act indicates this proMbltliHi was Intended to
apply to all criminal provMona in the Code. lUd, pl 2. (Emphasis added.)
My oidnlon that the provision is to be broadly CMistraed, of course, is not
onlversally held; Indeed, It Is rejected by two of the principal legal advisors
who aided in the drafting of the "Home Role" Charter. Newman & Depuy, »«pra,
n>> 649-00. Moreover, as I noted in my letter, my view serves to exacerbate
many of the problems confronting the District, as certain new criminal laws
are vital, in any event, It therefore cannot be said that— although I, as a
matter of policy, favor a narrow construcHwi of section 902(a) <9) — I have
allowed my policy desires to obscure what my legal training dictates.
It Is against this background-^-and the fact that during fiscal year 197S there
were 69S cases of aggravated assault, 3,406 cases of robbery and 183 homicides
committed in the District by use of revolvers and pistols — that I turn to the
sole Issue I am addressing. My analysis rests upon the reasoned premise that
In granting the District "Home Rule" the Congress did not diminish the District's '
police power. In other words, my anaiysiB does not rest, to any extent, upon any
concept of an increase in police power atithority under "Home Rule".
Since 1887, the District has been "authorized and empowered to make and
modi^ . . . and enforce [certain] uaiial and reasonable police regulations . . ."
D.C. Code, g 1-224; see also D.C. Code, |J1-224b, b, 1-226. And, In 1906, Con-
gress amplified this grant of authority when It explicitly authorised the local
government to regulate firearms by enacting the followliig provisions, codified
since then as D.C. Code, 1 1-227 :
"The District of Colnmbia Council Is hereby authorized and empowered to
make, and the CommisBloner of the Dfetrict of Columbia Is hereby anthorieed
and empowered to enforce, all such usual and reasonable police regulations. In
addition to tbose already made under H 1-224, 1-226, and 1-226 as the Council
may deem necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectilee. exploslvefl, or
weapons of any kind in the District of Columbia." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, acting pnrauant to this eiiiicit authority, on July 19, 1968, the
existing firearms regulations (D.C. Police Regs., Articles 60-66) were adopted,
(l^ese regulations were amended into their present form on January 30, 1909.)
Soon thereafter a nonprofit corporation, suing oi) behalf of Its members, sought
from the United States District Court a judgment that the regulations were
wUro virvt, i.e. beyond the authority of the City to enact. However, the regula-
tions were sustained in the District Conrt for the District of C!oiumbla In
Maryland and Diatriet of Oohimtiia Rifle ond Pittal Attooiatiim* v. WatMngton,
294 P. Supp. 1166 (D.D.C. 1069) ; that ruling rested on the above-quoted pro-
visions of D.C. Code, section 1-227.
In an opinion affirming the District Court, the United States Court of Appeals,
EHstrict of Columbia Circuit, concluded ; "Section 1-227 authorized passage of
the regnlationa under attack. We discern no exertion of Congressional preroga-
Hvee disabling the District of Colnmbia Council from adopting them." 142 U.S.
App. D.C. 375; 442 F. 2a 123, 182 (1971).
The rtiallenge to the regulations in that case was rested npon essentially the
same objections that have been advanced with respect to the Firearms Control
Regulations Act of 1975. Therefore, it is appropriate to repeat some of the reason-
ing employed by the Court o< A^teals, whldi it acknowledged included many of
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tlie ewme consideratlDiiB resolTed by Dittrict of Columbia t. John R. Thompton
Co.. 846 U.S. 100 (19S3). Ibid. 442 F. 2d at 126. n. 14.
After redtlng the history of the relevant legislation, the Court of Appeals
". . . appellant's ar^ment that even if Section 1-227 origltially empowered
the District to promulgate the regulationa under scrutiny, Congress foreclosed
further exercise of the power by the enactment of its 1932 gun control law for
the District [D.C. Code, 88 22-3201-22-3217.1 That law requires, among other
things, the iicenaing of persona carrying pistola and of dealers in certain types
of weapons, and makes possession of pistols by certain classes of persons a crime.
The regulation before us go further, in the main by adding rifles and shotguns
to the licensing requirement, by exacting firearms registration, and by restricting
tbe sale of amiannltlon. Appellees claim that the regulations legitimately supple-
ment the statute in areas Congress left untouched.
"While the District is invested with broad authority to prescribe local regula-
tions, the ultimate power to legislate for the District resides solely In Congress.
Many years ago, Congress granted the District relative autonomy, but briefly
thereafter constituted it a municipal corporation, and established a relationship
with It comparable to that commonly existing between municipalities without
home rule and their parent states. So It Is that principles analogous to those well
established in the law governing municipal corporations come into operation in
this case.
"Congressional enactments prevail over local regulations in conflict with them,
of course, and Congress may at any time withdraw authority previously delegated
to tbe District, and any regulations dependent on the delegation then lapse. But,
Just as clearly. Congress may indulge the District in the exercise of regulatory
powers, enabling It to provide for Its needs as deemed necessary or desirable.
Section 1-227 is such a grant, as we have held, and tbe remaining Inquiry Is
whether Congress, by enacting the 1032 gun control law preempted tbe field so
as to thereafter preclude the regulation of firearms by the District.
"Appellant contends that it did, arguing that congressional legislation on a
partlcnlar subject thwarts additional regnaltion of that subject by tbe District.
In our view, however, appellant's thesis suggests far too much. To be sure, a
municipal regulation cannot permit an act which the statute forbids, or forbid
an act which the statute permits. Nor Is there room for local regulation where the
legislature has dealt with the subject In such manner as to indicate plainly that
no further action respecting it is tolerable. But we cannot agree that municipal
regulation is precluded simply becanse the legislature has taken some action in
reference to tbe same subject.
"The important consideration, we think, U not whelker the legislature and
municipality have both entered the name field, hut whether in doing go they ha-ve
etashed. Statutory and local regvlation may coexist in identical areas although
the tatter wit inconHstently with the former, exacts additional requirements, or
imposes additional penalties. Tbe test of concurrent authority, this court indicated
many years ago. Is the absence of conflict with the legislative will. As the court
declared in French v. District of Columbia, where It]he subject flsl peculiarly
within the scope of the [expressly del^ated] police powers of the municipality,
the exercise of authority ought not to be questioned unless clearly inconsistent
with the expressed will of Congress."
"We are aware of a brief observation in the legislative history of the 1932 act
that it would effect a 'comprehensive program of (gun] control', but we cannot
accept that as an expression of Intent to preempt the entire field. Examination
discloses that the 1932 act is not comprehensive with respect to rifles and shot-
guns, and the regulations under review demonstrate a clear design to leave the
areas preempted by the statute unaffected." (Emphasis added and footnotes
omitted. ) Ibid., 442 F.2d at 129-32.
A Himilar principle has been enunciated by the Supreme Court of Texas In
Otty of Sweetwater V. Geron, 380 8.W. 2d550 (1964). In that case the court added
futher emphasis to the last point in concluding: "Although broad powers
granted to home role cities by the Constitution, Article XI, Section 6, Vernon's
Ann. St., may be limited by acts of the Legislature, it seems that should the
Legislature decide to exercise that authority, its intention to do so should appear
with unmistakable claritv." Ibid, at 562.
I therefore respectfully submit tliat the flrearms regulations that are now
before you for approval or disapproval "legitimately supplement the statute in
areas Congress lett untouched", (to quote the language of the United States
ogle
105
Court of ifpeals In Man/land and DUtriot of CoUimiia Rifie AsaooititUm, 4ti
r. 2d at 130) . In otlier words, as waa true of the regnlations considered there by
the coorts. the subject provtsions do not "permit an act which the stattrte for-
bids, or forbid an act which the statute permits." They do no depend tor their
authority upon any provision of title 22, nor do they modify or affect any of the
felony proviBions of any portitKi of the D.C. Code.
In closing, I stat« but the obvious : It is not to be presumed that Congress —
in granting "Uoine Rule" — Intended to restrict the ability of the people of tbis
City to provide for their safety. Yet, it is encb an Inconsistent syllo^m whi<A
must be fasbloned to support the argument that section 602(a) (&) [ovAIblted
enactment of the subject measure. Clearly, the measure does not fall within
tbe prohibition of section 6Q2(a) (9).
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Statbuekt or Hon. Waltes B. Wabhinoton, &Utob of the Dibtmct of
Coi-uuBiA, Upon Approving Bill 1-164, the Fibeabus Contbol Bkotjlatiokb
Act July 23. 1976
Today I bare approved Bill 1-164, tbe "Firearms Control Begulatlons Act"
The bin Is an effort by tbe Oovemment of the District of Columbia — within the
limitations of the Charter — to meet the need to protect Its residents and its
visitors from both the anguish and fear that firearms produce. It Is an important
step in the right direction. It represents a step taken with the understanding
that no system of firearms control can be fully effective without appropriate
controls at the regional and national levels. However, the fact that others must
also assist obviously does not serve as a valid reason why the City Oovernment
should not do its part to reduce the human misery and toll caused by tbe pos-
sion of handguns by certain persons in our community.
The bill will ban possession of handguns by anyone except police officers
and special police, tmless the weapons are registered with the City when the
law takes effect ; new bandguns may not thereafter be registered. Possession of
sawed-off shotguns, short-barreled rlfies and machine guns will continue to be
lUegaL
It should be noted that the measure does not bar ownership or possession of
shotgtms and rifles, Hovev-v. ft dnoB renulre that any firearm validly registered
under prior regulations must be registered pursuant to the new law ; an appli-
cation for re-registration is to be filed within sixty days.
Measures such as this one raise Issues concerning the rights and prlvll^es of
private Individuals in onr society. Our mall has been particularly heavy on
tbe gun control Issue in the past weeks. The letters have ranged from those who
want no controls to those who want outright confiscation of all firearms. The
majority of letters have stressed Individual concern for personal safety. I
understand these concerns. But, as law enforcement officers have stressed, a
gun in the hands of anyone other than a law enforcement officer or the mili-
tary does not provide genuine protection for any of us.
I have considered all of the substantial arguments raised against gun control,
and I'm not tndl'^pr- nt tn any. But. the Hme has come when it must be con-
cluded that the lessons of recent history demonstrate that this government
must provide the best program of gun control within the limits of its powers.
In short, we regard this measure as a sound att^npt to curtail the source
of weapons In the City. Tbe City Council has worked closely with my staff in an
effort to pass a bill which addresses these concerns and many of the argu-
ments of those who oppose gun controL The measure which It passed, this
Bill — is administratively acceptable. I appreciate tbis effort by the CoundL
And althonght there la same concern about tbe administrative costs and incon-
venience of the re-registration provisions of this measure, these concerns are
not, in my opinion, of so serious a nature as to warrant disapproval of the Bill.
Finally. I would add a word to those who disagree with the action the City
Government has taken. I ask your cooperation and support of our efforts to do
what we can to assure the safety and protection of the residents of this com-
munity and tbe many visitors to the nation's capital. We know this Bill is not
a panacea ; it Is Just a beginning of a long process in this nation. In the opinion of
the Chief of Police the BlH represents, on l)alance, a clear improvement over
current law and would foster public safety. In the opinion of the Corporation
Counsel there Is no compelling reason to find the Bill legally objectionable. As
the Chief Executive of the District of Columbia, I think It Is my duty t<
^.ooglc
dre Bill and I ask the commnnity to support the City Ooremment In tta action
tcMlay wtilch bas but one purpose, tbat is the protection of the safety and welfare
of Its dtlzens and visitors.
Thb District or Colcmbia,
Washtngtm, D.C., June 29, 1976.
Hon. Cbablbb C. Dioos,
Chairman, Committee on the Dittriel of Columbia, V.8. Bou»e of Repretenta-
tives, Washington, B.C.
DuR Mk. Chaibuan: The Government of the District of Columbia has for re-
port H.R. 12261, a bin "To extend the period during which the Council of the
District of Columbia is prohibited from reyising the criminal laws of the District."
The blU would amend section 602(a)(9) of the District of Columbia Self-
Oovernment and Governmental Reorganization Act [D.C. Code, Sl-147(a)(9)
(Snpp. II, 197S) ] by extending by two years the period during which the Council
U prohibited from taking any action with respect to the provisions In titles 22,
23, and 24 of the D.C. Code (relating to criminal offenses, criminal procedure,
and prisoners). Under current law, the Council would assume such authority on
January 3, 1977. This bill would postpone the Council's assumption of this au-
thority to January 3, 1979.
The IMstrlct Is strongly opposed to this hill. The right of the people, acting
through their elected representatives, to determine the laws which govern them
Is a fundamental principle of democracy. This right Is presently denied to the
cltliens of the District with respect to the enactment of criminal laws and pro-
cedures — matters which are of paramount concern to the people of a city faced
with the increasing incidence of crime that has plagued all urban areas. Further
postponement of this right would be inconsistent with the concept of self-
government.
The District of Columbia I<aw Bevlalon Commission has begnn the compre-
hensive task of modernizing the criminal laws of the District and has made
dgnlflcant progress with a limited staff. The District thoroughly agrees that such
a major revision should not be undertaken without the benefit of the Commis-
sion's recommendations. However, there are a numtwr of additions to the criminal
lawB which are urgently needed to enable the District to meet the challenge of a
changing society. A number of such provision^ proposed by the District have been
pending before this Committee — for example, proopsals to prohibit the unauthor-
ized use of credit cards, to include mobile homes within the scope of the bur-
glary statutes, and to make it unlawful to obtain telecommunication services
through misrepresentation. The enactment by the Council of provisions similar to
these would not interfere with the work of the Commission. Nor can It be pre-
sumed that the Council requles the result of the Commission's study before it
should be permitted to enact anch legislation.
In addition, the prohibition in section 602(a)(9) of Qm Self-Qovemment Act
raises doobts as to the Council's authority to amend criminal provisions located
in titles of the D.C. Code other than those specifically mentioned. The Corpora-
tion Council is of the opinion that the legislative history of the Act indicates
this prohibition was intended to apply to all criminal provisions in the Code. To
avoid the danger of subsequent Judicial invalidation of legislative enactments
containing criminal sanctions, the District has postponed consideration of a
number of important proposals. For example, the enactment of an occupational
safety and health act In the District, to fulfill the requirements of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, P.L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1690, has been delayed
to 1977, because the Act requires such a local law to include criminal sanctions
at least as effective as those In the Federal law. A further delay of two years
would jeopardize the District's implementation of a State Occupational Safety
and Health Act Plan under that Act. Moreover, this bill would delay the enact-
ment of laws urgently needed to strengthen the tax avoidance provisions in title
47 of the D.C. Code, to reduce this source of revenue loss by the District.
In conclusion, the continuation of this prohibition on the people of the Dis-
trict to govern themselves In this most important area would be contrary to the
spirit of the Self-Govern ment Act and the principle of self-determination, and
would be detrimental to the urgent needs of the District to respond to the chal-
lenges of crime. Therefore, the District Government is opposed to the enactment
of B.B. 12261.
Sincerely yours,
JoHir R. RiSHBS, Jr.,
Corporation Countel, D.O.
(For Mayor Walter B. Washington).
ogle
STATEHEITT OF TOEIT B. BISHEIt, JR., COBFOSATION COTTM EL,
DISTKICT or C0L1THBIA GOVEBJTHEFT, ACCOMPANIED BT
OEOROE W. FOETEK, ASSISTANT COBFORATION COIINSSL
Mr, BiSHBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might state my appreci-
ation to you and the other members of this committee for tMs oppor-
tmiity to appear before you to discuss the legal analysis which led
me to advise the Mayor of the District of Columbia that there is no
compelling reason to find the subject piece of legislation legally
objectionable.
As of this date, I have not received and have not had on opportu-
nity to review any detailed presentation that argues for a conclu-
sion contrary to that which I have given. I however will try in a very
few brief statements throughout the course of my presentation thas
morning to answer some of what I consider to be the more significant
arguments which may suggest that a different conclusion is valid.
In any event, my written statement which has been submitted to you
cannot be considered as a substantive rebuttal.
COUNCIL PROHIBrnON IN HOME RUtB ACT
It is my imderstanding that there is but a single issue before this
conunitt«e today ; namely, the legal one of whether because of sec-
tion 602(a) (9) of Public Law 93-198, which is often referred to as
the home rule bill, the Council of the District of Columbia was pro-
hibited from enacting the subject measure.
Section 602 (a) (d) is one of the many explicit limitations contained
in the Home Eule Act imposed by Congress. It explicitly prohibits the
City Council or the city's legislature, if you will, from enacting "any
act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provwion of title 23 of
the District of Columbia Code (relating to criminal procedure), or
with respect to any provision of any law codified in title 22 or 24 of
the District of Columbia Code (relating to crimes and treatment of
prisoners) " prior to January 3, 1977.
Let me go back over that provision because there is something which
is apparent on the face of it which to the best of my knowledge no
one has really commented upon and certainly no one has commented
on this very significant language during the course of the testimony
today.
The first portion of that section which I have just read prohibita
any action by the city "with respect to any provision of title 23." It
does not say with respect to any provision of title 22, 23, or 24. It says
only with respect to any provision of title 23.
Then it goes on to say "or with respect to any provision of any
law codified in title 22 or 24." Why did not the Congress just simply
strike the first part of that phrase and extend the prohibition to any
provision of title 22, 23, or 24?
Why did it make the distinction in language and say the prohibi-
tion applies "with respect to any provision of title 23," but with re-
spect to any provision of law codified in titles 22 and 24?
I will come back to that particular point. Its significance I think
should be self-evident and that is the prohibition with respect to title
23 applies to subject matter that is — it applies to the subject matter of
title 23 and the Council therefore shall not touch upon that matter.
^.oogle
108
The provisions with respect to 22 and 24 is with respect to the par-
ticular provisions of those titles and not with respect to their subject
matter.
The legislativehistory of section 602(a) (9) of course is quite scanty.
Indeed the provision was not contained in this committee's version
of the bill that was reported to the House but was not found until
the committee's substitute was thereaf er submitted.
Yet despite the meager legislative history of the provision, there is
no doubt in my mind that the purpose of it was to assuage the appre-
hensions of those who fear that the District's new legislature might
make the code and sanctions more lenient.
It therefore is perhaps ironic that it was concern that the District's
ffovemment might make tlie criminal provisions more lenient that
fed to the enactment, but the argument which is being used against
the validity of the enactment is that it does the contrary ; it makes the
provisions more stringent. I would suggest that the argument against
the validity of the measure on its face concedes that the measure at
least is not inconsistent with the spirit of section 602 (a) (9) .
I believe, as I shall demonstrate, it cannot be said that the enact-
ment runs counter to the letter of the law, to the letter of section 602
(a)(9). Before addressing that issue, I should make reference to a
letter which I submitted to you as acting mayor on June 29, 1976, a
copy of which is attached to my prepared text.
TTiere I objected to the measure which would extend the prohibition
against the city's enactment of criminal legislation form January 1977
to 1979. In that letter, I also stated in commenting with respect to the
provisions of 602(a)(9) that it was my opinion that the legislative
history of the act, not of just that provision, indicates that the pro-
hibition was intended by the Congress to apply to all criminal provi-
sions codified in the code.
COBPORATION COUNSEL'S OPINION
My legal opinion is that — and it is binding on all agencies of the
District of Columbia government except and unless the courts should
rule otherwise or laws should be enacted to the contrary — the prohibi-
tion contained in 602(a) (9) is to be broadly construed. That is not a
universally held opinion. Indeed, as I note in my statement, the prin-
cipal l^;al advisers to this committee when it was drafting what we now
know as the self-government act have argued quite persuasively that
602(a) (9) limits the council only to the extent of literal language of
that provision, and that is tlie Council may not pass any measure
which purports to amend title 22, 23, or 24. 1 take a far broader posi-
tion legally.
My policy position as a citizen of the District of Columbia and a
member of its executive branch is that the restriction should not be
there.
But my legal position tells me that notwithstanding what my druth-
ers are, 1 must accept the conclusion that it is to be broadly and not
just narrowly construed. It is against this background that I turn to
the precise legal issue.
It cannot be said that Congress in giving to the District of Columbia
Sivcrnment home rule intended to diminish the police powers of the
istrict of Columbia prior to home rule status.
)y Google
109
My ftnalysis of the legal issue therefore does not rest upon any argu-
ment or any concept that with home rule came broader powers. My ar-
gument instead resta upon the reasoned premise that the city now has
under home rule no less police power authority than it enjoyed prior
to home rule.
HisroBY Of police keoulationb
Since 1887, shortly after the District of Columbia was divested of
hcnne rule authority, in the 19th century, the District has been author-
ized and empowered to make and enforce certain usual and regular
police regulations.
In 1906 the Congress amplied this grant of authority to the District
of Columbia government when it explicitly authorized that local gov-
ernment to regulate firearms by enacting what has been in the code
since 1906, the provisions of the district of Columbia Code, section 1-;
237, the provisions of which have not been mentioned by any of the wit-
nesses who proceeded me this morning. What does 1-227 provide? It
provides as follows and I quote :
Tbe District of Columbia Council is hereby autborized and empowered to make
and enforce, all such UBual and reasonable police regulatlooB, in addition to those
already made under Sections 1-224, 1-226 and 1-^6 as the Council may deem
necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectiles, explosives, or weapons of
any kind in the DUtrict of Columbia.
FIREASHS REGULATIONS
Sine© 1906, the city has had that explicit authorization to, a^in, in
the language of the statute, enact, any measure "the Council may
deem necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectiles, explosives,
or weapons of any kind." It was pursuant to this explicit authority
that the City Council in 1968 enacted the present firearms regulations.
Those regulations were of course challenged through the courts of the
District of Columbia, the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia,
the court of general jurisdiction at that time, in a civil action known
as Maryland and the District of Columbia Rifle and Pistol Association
versus the District of Columbia.
Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals sus-
tained the authority of the City Council, that pre-horae rule City
Council, to enact the present regulations. Parenthetically I might note
that if one compares the subject act with the present regulations that
have been in existence for now in excess of 6 years since prior to enact-
ment of the Home Rule Act, one will see that the dissimilarity between
the scope of those provisions is not substantial.
That aside. Back to the court decision {Md. and D.C. Rifle c6 Pistol
AssTL V. WashiTigrion). That particular court challenge was based upon
the same proposition which is being urged today and that is that the
city lacked tne authority, because of the congressional enactments
found in chapter 32 of title 22, to enact any regulations with respect
to gun control.
To state the argument differently, the plaintiffs in that action, the
opponents of the regulation, argued that Congress had preempted the
field in enacting subsequent to 1906 the gun control measures which
were contained m chapter 32.
As I at length set forth in my written statement Judge G'asch in the
district court and a unanimous panel of the U-S. Court of lAppeate for
^.ooglc
110
the District of Columbia rejected these arguments — concluding in the
language of the court of appeals as follows :
Section 1-227 autborlzed passage of the regTilationa under attack. We discern
no exertion of Goi^resslonal preroKatives disabling the District of Coiumttia
Council from adopting them. (142 U.S. App. D.C. 375 ; 442 F. 2d 123. 132 (1971) )
I can summarize the court's reasoning and will by stating that what
the court concluded was that Congress nad not intended to preoccupy
the field, if you will, of gun control.
What Congress had decided in its wisdom was to pass certain felony
provisions with respect to gun control.
It had decided to do so some 27 years after it had authorized the
District of Columbia to enact, pursuant to its police powers, certain
nonfelony provisions. The court of appeals concluded, and I think
that the reasoning is simply far too persuasive to have been said to
have been countered by anything heard today, that Congress had no
intent to say to the citizens of the District of Columbia that you there-
fore may not legislate then with respect to other matters with respect
to gun control that we have not touched by felony provisions.
In short, Mr. Chairmun, prior to enacting the Home Rule Act, the
Congress knew that it had given to the District of Columbia govern-
ment the explicit authority to enact comprehensive measures pertain-
ing to weapons of any kind.
The Congress knew that the courts of the District of Columbia, the
Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, had sustained this exer-
cised police power by the District of Columbia. The Congress knew
that the Home Rule Act would provide all powers theretofore exer-
cised by the District of Columbia could continue to be exercised by the
successor government of the District of Columbia.
Yet the Congress chose not to place any provisions within the con-
text of the Home Rule Act or within the context of the legislative his-
tory — I am using that term very, very embracively and broadly —
would indicate that it was taking away from the District of Columbia
a power which it had given to the District of Columbia 70 some years
prior to granting it home rule.
I therefore respectfully submit that the firearms regulation that is
now before you cannot be said to constitute a transgression upon any
provision of law that the Congress has said the District of Columbia
government may not enact legislation with lespect to.
These provisions do not depend upon any provision found in either
title 22, 23, or 24 or their authority. Nor do they modify or affect any
of those felony provisions. Indeed, the explicit authority permitting
their enactment is that which has existed for some 70 years.
In closing I would therefore state the obvious. It is not to be presumed
that the Congress in granting home rule intended to restrict the ability
of the District of Columbia, the people of the District of Columbia, to
provide for their safety.
Yet it is such a syllogism, such an internally inconsistent syllogism
which must be fashioned to support the argument that the subject leg-
islation is somehow prohibited by any provision of the charter.
I would close, Mr. Chairman, by noting that as I read the explicit
statements of Mr. Dent before the House on Monday of this week,
he made it c^uite clear as I think we must all agree necessarily is the
case, that his measure, if enacted into ptfflitive law, would not serve
as a congressional veto of the subject legislation.
)y Google
HI
It would have no legal import on the subject legielation. The charter
quite explicitly provides how the Congress may disapprove legislation
enacted by the city. Mr, Dent's measure does not pertain to any matter
which is before the legislature of the right now. It speaks only in
futuro and not retrospectively.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Ashbrook, do you have
any comments or questions of counsel !
Mr. Ashbrook. I think it is very appropriate, Mr. Chairman, that
we do lay out contrasting points of view and let the committee strike
at them. I am impressed by the arguments. In most of my legislative
career I have been arguing for the short end of the stick so I know
sometimes how hard it is tohang on.
HOUB BUUG ACT FBOHIBITIOK
Let's go through the two major points you made, first as to 602
(a) (9). I think it is very clear if you read that they were separating
23 from 22 and 24 only for the purposes of indicating that 23 relates
to criminal procedure where 22 and 24 relate to the criminal code.
It was a very legitimate reason. If you look at the conference report,
they were in tandem. The conference report refers to 22, 23, and 24
with no separation. The report says the City Council is prohibited
from making any changes in the criminal law applicable to the
District.
It goes on "agreed to transfer authority to the Council to make
changes in titles 22, 23, and 24," no separation, "effective January 1,
1977. I would suggest that your effort to say that there was a separa-
tion between titles 22, 23, and 24, really isn't much to hang on to be-
cause they were separated for the reasons stated.
One refers to criminal procedure while the others "relate to crim-
inals and treatment of prisoners."
There can be no doubt that what we are talking about in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Act is something that relates to a crime. I would
say very quickly to your second point, it would seem to me that first
we must be clear that while you used the regulations under section
1-227 to hang your hat on, the Council did not choose to enact the
regulation, it chose to enact a statute.
That should be made very clear. The second point is even if theyl
were to try to say it was a regulation, the penalties go far beyond
anything authorized by Council in 1-227.
FENALTT FROVISIONS
Tou are talking about penalties of 10 days and up. That is not what
you are talking about in the statutory provisions enacted by council.
You are talking about penalties far beyond anything authorized in
the regulations.
Third : Your point here that the Congress did not presume, let me
throw that hack at you, I see no way to argue that the Congress would
presume to freeze criminal actions under titles 22, 23, and 24 until 1977.
But as you argue, it would allow the Council to do the same thing
by regulations. To me that argument just does not make any sense at
all. There is no way you can convince me the Congress would carve
wGoogIc
out this area and say there will be no actions until Januarr, 1977 but
as you say, then for one reason or another, allow the District of
Columbia to do precisely the same thing by regulations.
REOTTLATION OR STATUTE
You are having it both ways. You are talking about a regulation
but thmr enacted a statute. You are talking about the presumption on
a regulation where I think the Congress clearly intended to freeze
all areas of the District of Columbia cnminal law.
Last, in trying to refer to the regulations that you say in effect
Congress continued, previous regulations, did not prohibit ownership
of firearms. Previous regulations did not get into this vital issue.
The statute that was passed did get into this issue. I think on maybe
all four points, you have a basic difference. I think it is very clear,
at least to me, that the Congress would not freeze this area, freezing
all of titles 22, 23, and 24—1 don't think you can separate them — and
then allow the Council by regulation to do what it is clearly said
should not be done.
I think you have done a very good job, but I respectfully would
say I don't think it would stand up.
The Chairman. Mr, Gude !
Mr. Gude. No comment, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Mann?
Mr. Mann. I will pass for the moment, Mr. Chairman,
The Chairman. Mr. Blester ?
HOME BTJLS ACT
Mr. BiESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder whether we could
have an answer to this question. I assume there is a general repeal of
laws in the home rule charter. If there is, would not the authorization
of 1906 have been at least implicitly repealed by the prohibition set
forth in section 602?
If that is the case, then the original grant of authority no longer
pertains and the thread of continuity would not be there.
Mr. Ejsher. The fact of the matter is that not only was there not a
repeal, there is an explicit provision in the charter that continues in
full foree and effect, all laws, statutes, rules, regulations of the District
of Columbia that existed as of the date of the city's succession into
charter form of government.
Mr. BiESTER. Then it is subject to the limitations specified in title
VT. That section begins with subject to the limitations specified in title
VI of this act, the legislative power granted.
Mr. RisHER. I understand your question. There is no question but
that title VI contains certain limitations. Those limitations, I would
suggest to you, without single exception, predated the enactment of
home rule, every single limitation to be found in title VI.
Mr, BiESTER. If I understand your argmnent, it is that Congress
granted certain general authority to the District, the then District
Government, 1906, to dispose of regulations involving firearms and
that it is merely a logical extension of that grant of authority which
is being exercised ^ the Council in these regulations.
My question is : Is it that original grant of authority in 1906 that
is limited to whatever the state of the law was in the city adopttwl
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pursuant to that gnsxt of authority as of the date of ad(^ti<Hi of tiie
charter?
The charter provides that there is a limitation on expansion of
action in the criminal code and provides in section 761 dealing with
rules of construction to the ext^it that any provisions of Uiis act are
inconsistent with the provisions of any other law, the provisions of
this act shall prevail and shall be deemed to precede the provisions of
Bnch law.
It seems to me there was a freeze imposed on further extension of
the 1906 authorization when we adopted the charter.
Mr. RiBHER. Perhaps I did not understand the question the first
time I responded. The conclusion is the same. The reason for it is more
persuasive. The charter now in section 714 of the Self-Govemment
Act, section 71i(a) provides that any statute, regulation, or other
action shall be held — shall continue into effect past the succession, the
date of succession to home rule, self-government status.
All of my arguments, as I explicitly stated in my statement, rest
upon the premise that the District had the authority prior to obtain-
ing its current standing and its current authority; and while under
home rule the District has greater authority. I don't have to look to
that reservoir of greater authority to find authority for this measure.
The District has had the police authority to enact measures of this
type since 1906. Section 714(a) begins by saying that all statutes in-
cluding the act of Congress in 1906 coaified as D.C. Code in 1-227
as a statute shall remain in force and shall have the full force and
effect that they had prior to the achievement of home rule status.
Mr. BiESTER. There is a phrase left out there which I think is im-
portant and that ia "except to the extend modified or * * *."
Mr. AsHHRooE. That is exactly what I was going to say. The Council
is correct when it carries forward the authority. What he is overlook-
ing is we are not talking about the authority, we are talking about a
congressional reservation which of course is exactly what 602(a) (9)
ia. There is a direct congressional reservation in titles 22, 23, and 24.
It is already clearly— it has clearly been shown that under the regula-
tion they went beyond anything that was already on the books so it
in effect is a new statute and falls within that area.
Mr. BiESTER. I am getting close to being clear in my own mind. The
regulation could continue in the form it was adopted prior to the
adoption of the charter.
Mr. AsHBROOK. 1-227!
Mr. BiESTER. Yes.
Mr. AsHBBOOE. Sure.
Mr. BiESTEB. The statutory power to create regulations would sub-
sist as long as it was not inconsistent with or had been modified by law,
and the charter in the limitations in article 6 modifies, it seems to me,
that statute.
RXGTILATION OR STATUTE
Mr. Abhbrook. Plus, I would ask the counsel, whether or not he
thinks that is a regulation. I allege that it is a statute that has the
effect of a statute, that the counsel does not even refer to it as a regula-
tion. The Council itself elected to call it a statute. They went far
beyond any of the statutory punishment or penalties that were allowed
in 1-227 and it has every earmark of a statute, regardless of what you
call it
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114
Yet they are trying to hang it on to the 1-227 and say it is a regula-
tion under the existing power of 1906. I think it is a statute and it is
clearly criminal and Congress did not presume them to allow them to
do by regulation what they could not do by statute.
I think they have it both ways wrong but that is what makes court
cases.
Mr. BiESTER. I should give counsel the opportunity to respond.
Mr. RiBHEK. Let me first respond to that which was stated last. The
first comment that I might make with respect to the statute- regulation
argument is that about a month ago, I submitted a draft of an intended
opinion which I will probably not release until Monday of next week,
of 26 pages, that addresses Uie question of whether the Council may
act by act or resolution.
I think that the views that I set forth in that opinion have been
accepted unanimously by the members of the Council. The charter
very clearly says the Council shall use only two forms by which to
express itself, acts or resolutions. Section 602(2) does refer to regula-
tions as well as acts. But the Council acts as a legislative body by
passing acts or adopting resolutions. But because we are so technical
and mmdful of the nice legal arguments in the District of Columbia
f>vemment, we decided to call this subject piece of legislation the
irearms Control Regulations Act of 1975.
So I say to the gentleman from Ohio that we address him on both
scores,
Mr. AsHBROOK. Would you answer the one remaining question?
Would you not stipulate that the Council has penalties in excess of
those permitted in regulations !
Mr. RisHES. The term regulation has no applicable technical basis
to any enactment of this Council. What the former Council did by
regulation, this Council does by act.
Mr. Abhbrook. Except you are trying to hang it on to the 1-227.
Mr. RisHER. Not trymg to hang it on, sir, trying to rest it firmly.
[Laughter.]
Mr. AsHBROOE. If you are going to hang it on to that authority,
then you have to limit yourself to the penalties under those sections
and you went far beyond any penalties allowed under those regula-
tions under the District of Columbia Code.
The Chatbman, The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Harris ?
Mr. Hakris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also suffer from a legal
education, and I have really just one question and I think it is to
Mr. Ashbrook.
REVIEW OF COUNCIL ACTS
Is it your contention that the function and authority to determine
the legal authority of an act of the District Council is in Congress or
in the courts or in both ?
Mr. Ashbrook. I would say in the first instance, in answer to my
colleague from Virginia, since it is a special relationship and we do
have a District of Columbia Committee, in the first case, it would
probably be the Congress. Automatically it would probably rest in a
decision of the courts.
In this particular area, I think it is clear that the Congress reserved
to itself legislative jur^diction over criminal law and procedure until
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January 1977. I would answer in the affirmative. The Conncil went
ahead and made enactment. If the Council does nothing about it, then
I assume that the authority would have to be tested in court.
In the first instance, the Congress should have a whack at it.
Ultimately the courts would have a whack at it in any case.
Mr. Harris. If I understand your answer, the authority to deter-
mine the legal authority of the Council with regard to any act it takes
is in both Congress and the courts ?
Mr. AsHBBOOK. Yes. In the first case, it is in Congress.
Mr. Harris. I was limiting the question very specifically as to the
legal authority the Council has in acting. I am not talking about all
the other thin^ that I think Congress must take into consideration
with regard to its responsibility to review ordinances.
I am talking about the legaX aspects. Do you feel that that remains
in Congress also !
Mr. AsHBRooK. I am one of those who thinks that the Council acted
without authority, I would hope that the Congress would redress ihtd
action. In the end if we do not, I would assume in response to my
colleague, that some citizen would then challenge the law that was
enacted without proper jurisdiction.
But I think the action we took Monday, I would say, again, in
response to your question, is an indication that the Congress did
think that there was some effort here to act beyond what they could
legally do under the delegation of authority we gave them.
Mr. Harris, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RiBHER. Mr. Chairman, might I add a comment in further re-
sponding to Mr. Harris' question !
The Chairman. Certainly.
Mr. ItiBHSR. I think that the use of the term "reservation" in speak-
ing with reference to the provisions of section 602 is an unfortunate
one. My comment is that as I said before the District of Columbia
government had no authority to do any of the things which are really
prohibited by section 602 at any time during the 20th century, just to
show you how far back that goes, or earlier.
RESERVATIONS OV CONGRESSIONAL ADTHORITr
The provisions, in section 602, I would suggest, do not constitute,
therefore, reservations of concessional authority as much they con-
stitute limitations on the Council.
I think that is why title VI speaks broadly and generically by use
of the caption "Reservation of Congressional Authority." The intro-
duction of section 602 is phrased "Limitations on the Council,"
I think that is indeed what they are. The Council has all legitimate
legislative powers except those which it may not implement because of
certain limitations placed upon the city by the Congress, But it can't
he said that the Congress reserved to itself the vast reservoir of powers
that only legislatures can enact; that is inconsistent with the notion
of home rule. The delegation in section 302 of the Self-Govemment
Act is with respect to all legitimate matters of legislation. That is the
language. Then throughout the act, essentially in section 602, you see
a limitation on that broad delegation to be found in section 302.
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Mr. AsHBHOOK. No. 1, what is the reason for a limitation? The
reason is to make sure the District of Columbia does not act in areas
where the Congress itself had deemed and reserved, if you will, tran-
scending interest. Title VI, if you look at the largo type, the Corpora-
tion Counsel read the limitations.
The large tray says reservation of congressional authority. It says
to enact or repeal any act of Congress. We referred to limitations
based on what the Congress had already done. In response to your
question, we did not give absolute home rule. We reserved the con-
gressional interest. If you look through those lines, you will find
Congress, the Speaker of the House, Chairman of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the reasons for the limitations were cited in title VI at
the heading.
I would honestly say respectfully it is a distinction without a
difference.
The Cmawmah. Mr. Whaien.
Mr. Whalen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before proceeding with my question, Mr. Chairman, let me just
reiterate my firm support of the Home Rule Act. I sincerely believe
that the Congress should not reject actions taken by the D.C. Council
absent some compelling reasons. Now Dr. Paul in his testimony cited
three arguments in opposition to the act passed by the D.C. Council.
I am going to just comment on them, not in the order in which
they were presented. First, he indicated that such an act is futile and
unenforcible, I think there might be some merit to this argument
but it seems to me that this is a decision that rests with the D.C.
Council, not the U.S. Congress. If it is a mistake, it is a mistake for
them to make.
Second, he raised the question of the constitutionality of such action.
Now I am not burdened with a law degree so I am not competent to
respond to that argument.
It does seem to me, however, that we have had gun legislation either
in the form of municipal ordinances or State laws for many years and
to my knowledge, the Federal courts have not ruled that such legis-
lation is unconstitutional.
So it seems to me it gets down to the third point that Dr. Paul
made and that is that the act contravenes the provisions of the so-
called home rule bill. This seems to be suported by a document which
has been released by Mr. Charles Doyle of the Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress.
UBRABY OF CONORE59 OPINION
Have you had a chance, Mr. Risher, to analyze this! Could you
comment on the conclusion? Let me just read the conclusion for the
record. He indicates :
An esamination of the argument snggeats that the flrearmB control reguIatlonB
Act exceeds the legislative authority delegated to the city council. Congresa in
enacting Section 602(a) {9) intended to freeze those areas of criminal law and
procedure contained In Titles 22, 23 and 24. The fact that gun control legislation
for the District of Columbia was then contained in Title 22 makes it incon-
ceivable that Congres did not intend to preserve -the status quo in the area of
weapons controL
Mr, Risher. To answer your first question, I became aware of the
document during Mr. Paul's testimony. I quickly read through it
117
during the course of Mr, Aahbrook's testimony. So I have read it and
I thiuK notwithstandbiff the shortness of time, I understand it. Just to
fet into the language that you just read by way of excerpt from the
ocument, I must disagree with tne language.
I think it argues for a conclusion that was preordained. The lan-
guage if I understood you correctlv said
Mr. Wbalen. You say the conclusion was preordained, on the basis
that this study was apparently commisioned oy one who opposes this.
I would argue that that does not necessarily mean that the conclusion
would be written to conform with those views.
Mr. KisHER. That was not my suggestion, sir. The basic premise of
the argument is that if a matter is mraitioned in title 22, 28 or 34,
therefore that matter comes within the proscription or the limitation
of section 602(a) (9) and I don't think the literal language of 602
{a){9) allows anyone to say that.
That was the point I was making when I read that particular pro-
vision. The first line of the first clause of that provision says that the
Council may not enact any act, rule or resolution with respect to any
provision of title 23, Then it goes no to say or with respect to any
provision of law codified in provisions 22 or 2t The rhetorical ques-
tion I raised in my statement is, Why did the Congress state the limi-
tation in 602 ( a ) in two clauses and why not j ust one ? Why was not tiie
first clause written with respect to any provisions of title 22, title 23
or title 24? It was not written that way. My analysis of just the lan-
guage is that that first clause prohibits any act, resolution or rule with
respect to any subject matter that is addressed by title 23 of the code.
The second clause, the wording of which is quite different, contains
a limitation only with respect to particular things which are either
permitted or prohibited by the language of titles 22 and 24.
The chairman told me before we began this morning that mv state-
ment is esoteric. Therefore, this analysis is not included in it because
it is a fairly sophisticated one but I think it is a valid one : the lan-
guage in the concluding paragraph of the Library of Congress report
says that the subject legislation by the District of Columbia is illegal
because it pertains to matters contained in title 22 of the District of
Columbia Code. But the prohibition in 602(a)(9) insofar as it per-
tains to titles 22 and 24 does not extend to the subject matters of 22 or
24. It does not extend, in other words, to what is contained in 22 or 24
by way of subject matter references. The subject matter prohibition is
contained in title 23.
Title 24, to give you an example, refers to the authority of the Com-
mission of the District of Columbia over the Director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, how many guards must be there, and what-have-
you.
I am sure this Congress did not intend that the District of Colum-
bia would have no authority to do anything with respect to the opera-
tions of that correctional complex prior to 1977 as the prohibition in
602(a) (9) now reads. That subject matter of prisoners and their treat-
ment which is the titles for title 24 certainly cannot be said to be beyond
the authority of the District of Columbia government.
It is beyond the authority, the question is who is going to run the
prisons? The rule of reason creeps in here also. You can go through
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22, 23, and 24 and find similar provisions which lead you to make such
comments and analrsea
Mr. Abhbbook. You are hanging your hat on 24 but 22 clearly relates
to crimes. The statute which you enacted which is a statute relates to
crimes under 22 and it is not logical to think that the Congress would
freeze 22, 23, and 24 in the areas of criminal statutes, di&rentiating
a regulation and allow you by the back door to hang a criminal statute
on a regulation.
I thmk we have already stipulated it is a criminal statute. It has all
of the thrusts of a statute and yet in this case I think the District of
Columbia Corporation Coimsel is trying to say we enacted a regula-
tion. I just don't think it will wash.
The Chairman. Mr. Gude !
Mr. Gude. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, the House
19 in session. We have a quorum calland we are going to be under the
5-minute rule as I understand it on the student loan program. I am
very concerned about some of the amendments to that bill.
Mr. Biester just spoke to me and he said he is not ready to vote. I
don't think it would oe appropriate to take a vote at this time. I would
like assurances that there will not be any action.
The Chairman. The gentleman is correct. I will call a recess, sub-
ject to the call of the Chair.
J Whereupon, at 12 :15 pjn., the committee adjourned, subject to the
of the Chair.]
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APPENDIX
Chbokology
June 29, 1976 — Firearms Control BegulatlonB Act of 1&7S, adopted by Conscil of
the DlBtrict of Columbia (Conndl Act No. 1-142).
July 23, 1976 — Approved by Mayor.
Jnly 26, 1976 — Transmitted to Speaker. Bec^Ted by Speaker.
July 27, 1976 — Referred by Speaker to Honse District Committee.
July 28, 1976— Received by Committee.
Jol^ 29, 1976— H. Res. 1447 <re8olntiOD of dlsaMtroval) introdoced by Congress-
man Paul; referred to Committee.
July 30, 1976— H. Con. Res. 694 (concnrrentresolutlon of disapproval) Introduced
by OongieBsmaa Paul ; referred to Committee.
August 10, 1976— H. Res. 1474 (resolution of dlsapprovial) Introduced by Cod-
Eressman Ashbrook ; referred to Committee.
August 23, 1976 — H. Res. 1481 (resolution of disapproval) Introduced by Con-
gressman Paul et al. ; referred to Committee.
August 23, 1976 — H. Con. Res. 716 (concurrent resolution of disaivroTal) Intro-
duced by Congressman Paul et aL ; referred to Conunittee^
August 25, 1976— Committee taearlng held on H. Con. Rea. 691. No Committee
vote taken as no quorum, and House met as hearing ended.
September 1, 1976 — Committee meeting scheduled. No qnoram.
September 8, 1976 — Committee meeting cancelled when no quorum available pw
whip check.
September 17, 1076 — Committee meeting scheduled. No quorum In morning or
afternoon.
September 21, 1976 — Committee meeting scheduled. No qnomm.
September 21. 1976 — H. Con. Res. 763 (concurrent resolution introduced by
Congressman Paul et al. ; referred to Committee.
September 21, 19T6— H. Bes. 1660 (resolution of disapproval) introduced by
Congressman Paul et al. ; referred to OtMumlttee.
S^itember 22, 1976 — Speaker Bustalned Chairman's point of order against ttae
consldcd^tion of H. Res. 1481 by the House.
September 24, 1976— Congren not having disapproved, Ooandl Act No. 1-142
became effective (D.C. Law 1-86). Subsequently November 22, 1979) the
Couttdl extended the effective date for re-reglsterlng flrearms to Decem-
ber 31, 1976.
(lU)
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ADDITIONAL DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS
(H. Km. 1447, e4tb Cong.. 2d seil., by Mt. Paul on Znlf 2S, 1976]
RESOLUTION
Retolved, That the Honae of ItepreeentattveB dlsapproTeB of the action of the
District of Colambla Council described as follows : The FlrearmB Control Rega-
latlons Act of 1975 (Act 1-142) passed by the Council of the District of Colum-
bia on June 29, 1976, signed b7 the Mayor of the District of Columbia on July 23,
1976, and tranamltted to the Congress on July 27, 1978, pursuant to section 602 (c)
of the District of Colombia Self-Govenunent and Govemmental BeorganizadoD
Act
[H. B«t. 1474, 94th Cong., 2a uu-, b; Mr. Athbroflk on ADpllt 10, 1976]
RESOLUTION
Retolved, That the House of Rei^esentatlTea disapproves of the action of the
District of Columbia Council described as follows : The Firearms Control Segn-
lations Act of 1975 (Act 1-142) passed by the Council of the District of Colum-
bia on June 29, 1978, signed by the Mayor of the District of Columbia on July 23,
1976, and transmitted to the Congress on July 26. 1976, pursuant to section 602(c)
of the District of Columbia Setf-OoTemment and Oovemmental Reorganization
Act
-. -', Mt. Klndneu, Mr, Hall at
t TeuM, Mt. Asbbrook, Mr. Eetebiun, Mr. ^Uelcher.
una DIE. AouHEEiDCf oD Auguflt 83, 19761
RESOLUTION
Resolved, That the House of RepresentatiTes disapproves of the action of the
District of Columbia Council described as follows : The Firearms Control Regn-
laUona Act of 1975 (Act 3-142) passed by the Council of the Mstrict of ColnmWa
on Jnne 29, 1976, signed by the Mayor of the District of Columbia on July 2S,
1976, and transmitted to the Congress on July 26, 1978, pursuant to section e02(c)
of the District of Columbia Self-Oovemment and Govemmental ReorganiEatlon
Act.
(120)
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