The Franco-German war of 1870-71

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2008 with funding from

IVIicrosoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/francogermanwaroOOmolt

The Franco -German War

OF
1870-71

^1

KIKI.D-MAltSllAI. COT-NT HEI-MITII VOX MOLTKK

THE

FRANCO-GEEMAN WAR

I —

OF

1870-71

By Field-Marshal
COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE

TRANSI,AJED BY
CLARA BELL AND HENRY W. FISCHBB

WITH A MAP

NEW YORK AND LONDON
HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

TEANSLATORS' NOTE.

Except in a few instances, such as Meuse for Maas,
Treves for Trier, Alsace for Elsass, and Lorraine for
Lothringen, the names in the text and the accompany-
ing map correspond.

Our best acknowledgments are due to Captain Percy
Schletter, of the King's Regiment, for valuable assist-
ance in correcting proofs of the entire work.

PREFACE.

Field-Maeshal von Moltke began this history of
the War of 1870-71 in the spring of the year 1887, and
during his residence at Creisau he worked at it for
about three hours every morning. On his return to
Berhn, in the autumn of that year, the work was not
quite finished, but he completed it by January, 1888,
at Berlin, placed it in my hands, and never again
alluded to the matter.

The origin of the book was as follows. I had sev-
eral times entreated him, but in vain, to make use of
his leisure hours at Creisau in noting down some of
his rich store of reminiscences. He always objected,
in the same words : " Everything official that I have
had occasion to write, or that is worth remembering,
is to be seen in the Ai'chives of the Staff Corps. My
personal experiences had better be buried with me."
He had a dislike to memoirs in general, which he was
at no pains to conceal, saying that they only served to
gratify the writer's vanity, and often contributed to
distort important historical events by the subjective
views of an individual, and the intrusion of trivial
details. It might easily happen that the character of
a man which in history stood forth in noble simplicity
should be hideously disfigured by the narrative of
some personal experiences, and the ideal halo which
had surrounded him be destroyed. And highly char-
acteristic of Moltke's magnanimity are the words he

Vlll PEEFACE.

once uttered on such an occasion, and which I noted
at the time : "All that can be published of the history
of a war is necessarily colored by the event ; but it is
a pious and patriotic duty never to disturb the prestige
which connects the glory of our army with certain
high personages."

Not long after our arrival at Creisau, early in 1887,
I repeated my suggestion. In reply to my request that
he would write an account of the campaign of 1870-71,
he said: "You have the official history of the war.
That contains everything. To be sure," he added,
" that is too full of detail for the general run of readers,
and far too technical. An abridgment must be made
some day." I asked him whetner he would allow me
to lay the work on his table, and next morning he had
begun the narrative contained in this volume, compar-
ing it as he went on with the official history, and car-
ried it through to the end.

His purpose was to give a concise account of the
war. But, while keeping this in view, he involuntarily
— as was inevitable from his position — contemplated
the task from his own standpoint as Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff, and arranged events in connection with a
general scheme which could only be known at head-
quarters. Thus this work, which was undertaken in
all simplicity of purpose, as a popular history, is prac-
tically from beginning to end the expression of a pri-
vate opinion of the war from the Field-Marshal himself.

The Appendix : " On a supposed Council of "War in
the Wars of William I. of Prussia," was wi'itten in
1881. In a book by Fedor von Koppen, " Manner und
Thaten, vaterlandische Balladen" {Men and Deeds:
Patriotic Songs), which the poet presented to the Field-
Marshal, there is a poem entitled, "A German Council
of War at Versailles " (with a historical note appended),

PREFACE. ix

describing an incident wliicli never occurred, and
which, under the conditions by which the relation of
the Chief of the Staff to his Majesty was regulated,
never could have occurred. To preclude any such
mistakes for the future, and to settle once and for all
the truth as to the much-discussed question of the
Council of War,* the Field-Marshal wrote this paper, to
which he added a description of his personal experience
of the battle of Koniggratz. It is this narative which,
shortly after the writer's death, was published in
the Munchener Allgemeine Zeitung, in the somewhat
abridged and altered form in which the Field-Marshal
had placed it at the disposal of Professor von Treit-
schke the well-known historian.

Count Helmuth von Moltke,

Major and Adjutant to his
Imperial Majesty.

Beklin, June 25th, 1891.

* He alludes to it on p. 218, footnote.

CONTENTS.

Fighting on the Frontier.

Preparations for "War ....

The Engagement at Weissenberg (August 4tli)

The Battle of Worth (August 6th)

The Battle of Spicheren (August 6th)

The German Army wheels to the Eight

The Battle of Colombey— Nouilly (August 14th)

The Battle of Vionville— Mars-la-Tour (August 16th)

The Battle of Gravelotte— St. Privat (August 18th)

New Distribution of the Army

The Army of Chalons ....

The Battle of Beaumont (August 30th)

The Battle of Sedan (September 1st) .

FA6E

2
12
15
19
26
30
35
50
64
66
77

n.

The Advance on Paris and Capitulation op Metz.

The Sortie from Metz (August 26th) .... 103

The Battle of Noisseville (August 31st) ... 106

Change of Administration in Paris .... 114

General Vinoy's Eetreat ..... 117

The Third Army and the Army of the Meuse march on Paris 120

The Investment of Paris (September 19th) . . . 125

The First Negotiations for Peace .... 129

The Taking of Toul (September 23rd) .... 130

The Siege of Strasburg (September 28th) ... 132

Operations round Paris to the 18th of October . . 139

CONTENTS.

The Battle of Artenay (October 10th)
Engagement at Orleans (October 11th)
The Taking of Soissons (October 15th)
The Storming of Chateaudun (October 18th)
A Sortie towards Malmaison (October 21st)
The Storming of Le-Bourget (October 30th)
Sortie from Metz on Bellevue (October 7th)
Capitulation of Metz (October 27th)

TASK

146
147
150
152
154
157
163
166

m.

Operations in the East and on the Loire.

New Distribution of the Army .... 167

Operations of the Fourteenth Corps in the South-East (October) 167

The Taking of Schlettstadt (October 24th) ... 174

The Taking of Breisach (November 10th) ... 175

The Taking of Verdun (November 9th) . . . 176

The Advance of the First and Second Armies in November . 178

The Engagement at Coulmiers (November 9th) . . 182

The Grand Duke's Movements .... 188

The Position of Affairs in the Second Army Corps (latter half

of November) . . . . . . . 190

Battle of Beaune-la-Eolande (November 28th) ^ . . 193

The Advance of the Army of the Loire to the Relief of Paris 198

The Battle at Loigny — Poupry (December 2nd) . . 200

IV.

Fighting round Paris.

Paris in November ...... 206

The Attempt to Eelease the Army of Paris (November 30th

and December 2nd) ..... 209

The Advance of the First Army in November . . 219

CONTENTS.

The Battle of Amiens (November 17th)

The Taking of La-Fere (November 27th)

The Taking of Diedenhof (November 24th)

The Investment of Belfort in November

Battle of Orleans (December 3rd and 4th)

The German Advance on the South, East, and "West

The Grand Duke's Battle (December 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th)

The Interruption of Serious Offensive Operations in December

The Fourteenth Corps in December

The First Army in December

The Taking of M^zi^res

Paris in December

The Fight at Le Bourget (December 21st)

The Reduction of Mont-Avron (December 27th)

PAGE

220
224
225
226
227
236
239
248
254
256
261
262
264
268

V.

Active Operations in the Provinces.

The Army of the East under General Bourbaki

The Advance on Le-Mans

Battle of Le-Mans (10th, 11th, and 12th of January)

Operations on the North of Paris during January

The Battle of Bapaume (January 3rd)

Actions on the Lower Seine . . .

Occupation of P^ronne

Battle of St. Quentin (January 19th) .

Operations at the South-eastern seat of War up to 17th of

January ....
Transfer of the French Eastern Army to the South-eastern

Seat of War, towards the end of December
Action of Villersexel (January 9th)
Battle of the Lisaine (January 15th to 17th)
The Bombardment of Paris (January, 1871)
Battle of Mont-Val4rien (January 19th)
The Bombardment of Paris till the Armistice

270
273
289
309
311
314
316
321

331

335
338
345
357
363
368

xiv CONTENTS.

VI.

The Progress of the War in the South and West.

FAOK

The Army of the South under General von Manteuffel . 374

General Hann von Weyhern's March on Dijon . . 399

Occupation of the Departments of Doubs, Jura, and Cote-d'Or 401

The Siege of Belfort ...... 402

vn.

Surrender and Peace.
The Armistice ....... 410

The Return March of the German Army . . . 416

APPENDIX.

Memorandum on the Councils of War said to have been

held during the Wars under King Willlim . 423

THE FRANCO-GERMAIN WAR.

I.

FIGHTINa ON THE FRONTIER.

The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends,
small armies of professional soldiers went to war to
conquer a city, or a province, and then sought winter
quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day
call whole nations to arms, there is scarcely a family
that does not suffer by them. The entire financial
resources of the State are appropriated to the pm'-
pose, and the different seasons of the year have no
bearing on the unceasing progress of hostilities. As
long as nations continue independent of each other
there will be disagreements that can only be settled by
force of arms ; but, in the interest of humanity, it is
to be hoped that wars will become less frequent, as
they have become more terrible.

Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of
monarchs which endangers peace; the passions of
the people, its dissatisfaction with interior conditions
and affairs, the strife of parties, and the intrigues of
their leaders are the causes. A declaration of war, so
serious in its consequences, is more easily carried by a
large assembly, of which none of the members bear
the sole responsibility, than by a single man, however
1

2 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

high his position ; and a peace-loving sovereign is less
rare than a parliament composed of wise men. The
gTeat wars of the present day have been declared against
the wish and will of the reigning powers. Now-a-
days the Bourse has assumed such influence that it has
the power to call armies into the field merely to protect
its interests. Mexico and Egypt have been swamped
with European armies simply to satisfy the demands
of the haute finance. To-day the question, " Is a na-
tion strong enough to make war ? " is of less impor-
tance than that, " Is its Government powerful enough
to prevent war ? " Thus, united Glermany has, up to
now, used her strength only to maintain European
peace ; a weak Government at the head of our neighbor-
ing State, must, on the other hand, be regarded in the
light of a standing menace to peace.

The war of 1870-71 arose from just such relations.
A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to
establish his rights by political and military successes.
Only for a time did the victories won by French arms
in distant countries give general satisfaction; the
triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they
were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge; and the
French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal
spirit of the epoch was opposed to the autocratic
Government of the Emperor ; he was forced to make
concessions, his civil authority was weakened, and one
fine day the nation was informed by its representatives
that it desired war with Germany.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR.

The wars carried on by France on the other side of
the ocean, simply for financial ends, had consumed
immense sums and had undermined the discipline of
the army. The French were by no means archiprets

PREPAKATIONS IN FEANCE. 3

for a great war, but the Spanish succession to the
throne, nevertheless, had to serve as a pretext to declare
it. The French Reserves were called to arms July
15th, and only four days later the French declaration
of war was handed in at Berlin, as though this were
an opportunity not to be lost.

One division was ordered to the Spanish frontier as
a corps of observation ; only such troops as were abso- «
lutely necessary were left in Algiers and in Civita
Vecchia ; Paris and Lyons were sufficiently garrisoned.
The entire remainder of the army : 332 battalions, 220
squadrons, 924 cannon, in all about 300,000 men,
formed the army of the Rhine. This was divided into
eight corps, which, at any rate in the first instance,
were to be directed by one central head, without any
kind of intervention. The Imperator himself was the
only person to assume this difficult task; Marshal
Bazaine was to command the army as it assembled,
until the Emperor's arrival.

It is very probable that the French were counting
on the old dissensions of the German races. True,
they dared not look upon the South Glermans as allies,
but they hoped to reduce them to inactivity by an early
victory, or even to win them over to their side. Prussia
was a powerful antagonist even when isolated, and her
army more numerous than that of the French, but this
advantage might be counterbalanced by rapidity of
action.

The French plan of campaign was indeed based on
the delivery of unforeseen attacks. The strong fleets
of war and transport ships were to be utilized to land
a considerable force in Northern Prussia, and there
engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main
body of the army, it was supposed, would await the
French attack behind the fortresses on the Rhine. The

4 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

Frencli intended to cross the Rhine at once, at and
below Strasburg, thus avoiding the gi'eat fortresses;
and also, at the start, preventing the South-Grerman
army, which was destined to defend the Black Forest,
from uniting with the North-Grermans. To execute
this plan it would have been imperative to assemble
the main forces of the French army in Alsace. Rail-
way accommodation, however, was so inadequate that
in the first instance it was only possible to carry 100,-
000 men to Strasburg ; 150,000 had to leave the rail-
ways near Metz, and remain there till they could be
moved up. Fifty thousand men were encamped at
Chalons as reserves, 115 battahons were ready to march
as soon as the National Guard had taken their places
in the interior. The various corps were distributed as
follows : —

Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki — Nancy.

First Corps, Marshal MacMahon — Strasburg.

Second Corps, General Frossard — St. Avoid.

Third Corps, Marshal Bazaine — Metz.

Fourth Corps, General Ladmirault — Diedenhofen.

Fifth Corps, General Failly — Bitsch.

Sixth Corps, Marshal Canrobert — Chalons.

Seventh Corps, General Felix Douay; — Belfort.

Thus there were only two corps in Alsace, and five
on the Moselle ; and, on the day of the declaration of
war, one of these, the Second Corps, was pushed for-
ward close to the German frontier, near St. Avoid and
Forbach. This Second Corps, however, received in-
structions not to engage in any serious conflict.

The regiments had marched out of quarters incom-
plete as to numbers, and insufficiently equipped.
Meanwhile the reserves called out to fill their place had
choked the railway traffic ; they crowded the depots,
and filled the railway stations.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH AEMY. 5

The progress to their destination was delayed, for it
was often unknown at the railway stations where the
regiments to which the reserves were to be sent were
at the time encamped. When they at last joined they
were without the most necessary articles of equipment.
The corps and divisions had no artillery or baggage,
no ambulance, and only a very insufficient number of
officers. No magazines had been estabhshed before-
hand, and the troops were to depend on the fortresses.
These were but ill-supphed, for in the assured expecta-
tion that the armies would be almost immediately sent
on into the enemy's country they had been neglected.

In the same way the Staff-officers had been provided
with maps of Germany, but not of their own provinces.
The Ministry of War in Paris was inundated' with
claims, protestations, and expostulations, and finally it
was left to the troops to help themselves as best they
could. On se debrouillera was the hope of the authori-
ties.

When the Emperor arrived at Metz, a week after the
declaration of war, the regiments were not yet com-
plete, and it was not even exactly known where whole
divisions were at that time encamped. The Emperor
ordered the troops to advance, but his Marshals de-
clared that the condition of the troops made this
impossible for the time being.

It was gradually dawning upon them, that instead
of attacking the enemy in his country, they would have
to defend their own. Rumor had it, that a strong
army of the enemy had assembled between Mayence
and Coblentz ; instead of sending reinforcements from
Metz to Strasburg, they were ordered to proceed from
the Rhine to the Saar. The determination to invade
South Germany was already abandoned ; the fleet had
sailed round, but without any troops to land.

6 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Germany had been surprised by the declaration of
war, but she was not unprepared. The possibility of
such an event had been foreseen.

When Austria had separated her interests from those
of the other German States, Prussia undertook the sole
leadership, and paved the way to more intimate rela-
tions with the South-German States. The idea of
national unification had been revived, and found an
echo in the patriotic sentiments of the entire people.

The means of mobilizing the North-German army
had been reviewed year by year, in view of any changes
in the military or political situation, by the Staff, in
conjunction with the Ministry of War. Every branch
of the administration throughout the country had been
kept informed of all it ought to know of these matters.
The Berlin authorities had hkewise come to a confiden-
tial understanding with the army chiefs of the South-
German States on all important points. It had been
conceded that Prussia was not to be reckoned on for
the defence of any particular point, as the Black Forest
for instance ; and it was decided that the best way of
protecting South Germany would be by an incursion
into Alsace across the central part of the Rhine ; which
could be backed up by the main forc^ assembled at
that point.

The fact that the Governments of Bavaria, Wiirtem-
berg, Baden, and Hesse, denuding their own countries
as it were, were ready to place then* contingents under
the command of King William, proves their entire con-
fidence in the Prussian generals.

As soon as this understanding was arrived at the
other preparations could be made. The orders for
marching, and travelling by rail or boat, were worked
out for each division of the army, together with the
most minute directions as to theii* different starting

DISTEIBrXION OF THE GEKMAN AEMY. 7

points, the day and horn- of departm-e, the duration of
the journey, the refreshment stations, and place of
destination. At the meeting-point cantonments were
assigned to each corps and division, stores and maga-
zines were established ; and thus, when war was de-
clared, it needed only the Royal signature to set the
entire apparatus in motion with undistui-bed precision.
There was nothing to be changed in the directions
originally given ; it sufficed to carry out the plans pre-
arranged and prepared.

The mobilized forces were divided into thi'ee inde-
pendent armies on a basis worked out by the general
of the Prussian staff.

The First Army, under the command of General von
Steinmetz, consisted of the Seventh and Eighth Corps,
and one division of cavahy; 60,000 men all told. It was
ordered to encamp at Wittli'^h and form the right wing.

The Second Army, under tne command of Prince
Frederick Charles, was 131,000 strong, and constituted
the central army. It consisted of the Third, Fourth,
and Tenth Corps of Guards, and two divisions of
cavalry. Its meeting-point was in the vicinity of
Hombiir^x p.riA N"unkirr>hon.

The Thii'd Army, under the command of the Crown
Prince of Prussia, was to form the left wing, near Lan-
dau Rv^ Rastatt, a strength of about 130,000 men. It
consisted of the Fifth and Eleventh Prussian, and the
First and Second Bavarian Corps, the Wiirtemberg and
the Baden Field Divisions, and one division of cavalry.

The Ninth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the
Hesse divisions, was united with the Twelfth Royal
Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men, and
was encamped before MnvpTipp, to reinforce the Sec-
ond Army, which was thus brought up to the strength
of 194,000 men.

8 THE FBANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

The three armies combined numbered 384,000 men.

There were still the First, Second, and Fourth Corps,
100,000 men ; but they were not at first included, as
the means of railway transport were engaged for
twenty-one days.

The 17th Division and the Landwehr troops were
told off to defend the coast.

During the night of July 16th the Royal order for
the mobilization of the army was issued, and when His
Majesty arrived in Mayence a fortnight later, he found
300,000 men assembled on and in front of the Rhine.

In his plan of war, submitted by the Chief of the
Gi-eneral Staff, and accepted by the King, that of&cer
had his eye fijj:ed, from the first, upon the capture of
the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of more
importance in France than in other countries. On the
way thither the hostile forces were to be driven as
persistently as possible back from the fertile southern
states into the narrower tract on the north.

But above all the plan of war was based on the
resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever found,
and keep the German forces so compact, that a superior
force could always be brought into the field. By what-
ever special means these plans were to be^accompUshed,
was left to the decision of the hour ; the advance to
the frontiers alone was pre-ordained in every detail.

It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be
laid for a prolonged period and carried out in every
point. The first collision with the enemy changes the
situation entirely, according to the result. Some things
decided upon wiU be impracticable; others, which
originally seemed impossible, become feasible. AU
that the leader of an army can do, is to get a clear view
of the circumstances, to decide for the best for an un-
known periods and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.

THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. 9

The departure of the French troops to the frontier,
before they were thoroughly prepared for service in
the field, which is a very serious step to take, was
evidently ordered for the pui'pose of suiprising the
German army, with the forces immediately at com-
mand, and thus interfering with the formation of their
advance. But in spite of this, the German command-
ers did not deviate from their purpose of massing
their armies on the Rhine and crossing that river.
The railway transport of the troops of the Second and
Third Corps, however, was to end at the Rhine ; thence
they were to march on foot into the cantonments pre-
pared on the left bank of the river. They moved in
echelon, advancing only so many at a time as would
make room for the division behind them, as far as the
line marked by the towns of Bingen, Diii'kheim, and
Landau.

The final advance towards the frontier was not to
be undertaken until the divisions and corps were all
collected, and provided with the all-necessary baggage
train ; and then proceed in a state of readiness to con-
front the enemy at any moment.

The assembling of the First Army appeared to be
less threatened, as its route lay through neutral ter-
ritory, and was protected by the garrisons of Treves,
Saarlouis, and Saarbriicken, the German outposts on
the Saar.

The First Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at
Wadern, in the first days of August. The Second Army,
which meanwhile had been increased to a strength of
194,000 men, had pushed forward its cantonments to
Alsenz-Giinnstadt, at the termination of the Haardt
Mountains, a position which had been thoroughly
reconnoitred by an ofiicer of the Staff, and where the
troops might boldly await an attack.

10 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were recon-
noitring the country in front. The regiments and
squadrons of the Third Ai"my were still gathering on
both banks of the Rhine.

The French so far had made no serious attempt at
Saarbriicken ; Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel was able to
successfully withstand their petty attacks with one
battalion and thi*ee squadrons of cavalry.

It had meanwhile been observed that the French
were moving further to the right, towards Forbach
and Bitsch, which seemed to indicate that the two
French corps, known to be drawn up at Belfort and
Strasburg, might purpose crossing the Rhine and
marching on the Black Forest. It was therefore of
very great importance to set the Third Ai^my moving
at the earliest opportunity, first to protect the right
bank of the Upper Rhine by an advance on the left ;
secondly to cover the progress of the Second Army
towards that point.

A telegraphic order to that effect was dispatched on
the evening of July 30th, but the Colonel in command
of the Third Ai*my Corps desired to wait for the arrival
of the Fourth and its baggage train. In spite of this
hesitancy the Second Army was ordered to proceed
towards the Saar, where the French were showing much
uneasiness.

The time had gone by when they might have taken
advantage of their over-hasty mobilization ; the condi-
tion of the men had prohibited any action. France
was waiting for news of a victory ; something had to
be done to appease public impatience, so, in order to
do something, the enemy resolved (as is usual under
such circumstances) on a hostile reconnoissance, and
it may be added, with the usual result.

On August 2nd three entire divisions were sent for-

FIGHTING IN ALSACE. 11

ward against three battalions, four squadrons, and one
battery in Saarbriicken. The Emperor himself and
the Prince Imperial watched the operations. The
Third Corps advanced on VolMingen, the Fifth on
Saargemiind, the Second on Saarbriicken.

The Germans evacuated Saarbriicken after a gallant
defence and repeated sorties, but the French did not
cross the Saar. They may have convinced themselves
that they had wasted their strength by hitting in the
air, and had gained no information as to the resources
and position of the enemy.

After this the French generals hesitated for a long
while between contrary resolutions. Orders were
given and recalled on the strength of mere rumors.
The left wing was reinforced on account of a current
story that 40,000 Prussians had marched through
Treves, the Guards received contradictory orders, and
when a small German force showed itself at Lorrach in
the Black Forest, it was at once decreed that the
Seventh Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus the French
forces were spread over the wide area between the Nied
and the Upper Ehine, while the Germans were advanc-
ing in compact masses on the Saar.

This scattered state of the army finally induced the
French leaders to divide their forces into two distinct
armies. Marshal MacMahon took provisional com-
mand of the First, Seventh, and Fifth Corps, the latter
being withdrawn from Bitsch. The other divisions
were placed under Marshal Bazaine, with the exception
of the Guards, the command of which the Emperor
reserved to himself.

It had now become a pressing necessity to protect
the left wing of the advancing Second German Army
against the French forces in Alsace ; the Third Army
was therefore ordered to cross the frontier on August

12 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

4th, without waiting any longer for the batteries to
come up. The First Army, forming the right wing, was
already encamped near Wadern and Losheim, three or
four days' march nearer to the Saar than the Second
Army in the centre. They were ordered to concentrate
in the neighborhood of Tholey and there await further
orders. In the first place this, the weakest of the two
divisions, was not to be exposed single-handed to an
attack of the enemy's main force ; and secondly, it was
to be used for a flank movement in case the Second
Army should meet the enemy on emerging from the
forests of the Palatinate.

To execute this order, the First Army had to extend
its cantonments in a southerly direction as far as the
line of march of the Second Army, and evacuate its
quarters near Ottweiler. This was a difficult matter
to accomplish, as all the towns and villages to the
north were billeted, and quarters had also to be found
for the First Corps, now advancing by the Birkenfeld
route. General von Steinmetz therefore decided to
march his entire forces in the direction of Saarlouis
and Saarbriicken. The Second Army had assembled,
and was ready for action on August 4th, and received
orders to take the field on the farther side of the
wooded zone of Kaiserslautern.

THE BATTLE OF WEISSENBUEG.

(August 4th.)

On this day the united corps of the Third Army,
consisting of 128 battalions, 102 squadrons cavalry,
and 80 batteries, which had been encamped behind the
River Klingsbach, crossed the French frontier, and
advanced on a wide front to the banks of the Lauter,
from Weissenburg to Lauterburg. This stream offers

THE BATTLE OF WEISSENBUEG. 13

opportunities for a strong defence, but on August 4th.
only one weak division and a cavalry brigade belong-
ing to the First French Corps covered this point, the
main body of that corps being still on the march
towards the Palatinate.

The Bavarians, forming the right wing, encountered
a lively resistance before the exposed walls of Weissen-
bui'g the first thing in the morning. But very soon
after the Prussian corps crossed the Lauter further
down the river. General von Bose led the Eleventh
Corps up the Geisberg, in order to outflank the French
right wing, while General von Kirchbach, with the Fifth
Corps, advanced against the enemy's front. Thirty
field pieces had at the same time been drawn up against
the railway station of Weissenburg. That and the
town were subsequently taken, after a bloody combat.

By ten o'clock General Douay had ordered a retreat,
which was seriously threatened by the movement
against the Geisberg ; and the castle of that name, a
very formidable fortress, was most obstinately de-
fended, to enable the French to retire. The grenadiers
of the 7th King's Regiment stormed it repeatedly, with
immense loss, but in vain ; nor did the garrison sur-
render until, with the greatest difficulty, artillery had
been dragged to the summit.

The French division, which had been attacked by
three German coips, effected a retreat, after an obsti-
nate struggle, though in great disorder, having suffered
much loss. Its gallant commander had been killed.
The Germans had also suffered a proportionately con-
siderable loss : 91 officers and 1460 men killed. General
von Kirchbach had been wounded while fighting in the
foremost rank.

The 4th Division of cavalry had met with much delay
in the course of a four miles' march by the crossing of

14 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

the columns of infantry. It never arrived on the field,
and aU touch of the enemy now retiring to the west-
ward was lost.

Uncertain as to the direction whence a fresh attack
of the French might be expected, the Third Ai'my ad-
vanced on the 5th of August by diverging roads in
the direction of Hagenau and Reichshofen ; but were
ordered to proceed only so far as would be needful to
reunite with the corps in a short day's march.

The Crown Prince intended to let his men rest the
next day, so as to enable him to lead them to a renewed
attack as soon as the situation was made clear. But
already, that same evening, the Bavarians, on the right,
and the Fifth Corps in the centre, had a sharp encoun-
ter with the French, who were drawn up behind the
Saner in considerable numbers.

It was to be assumed that Marshal MacMahon had
brought up the Seventh Corps from Strasburg, but it re-
mained to be seen whether he intended to join Marshal
Bazaine in the neighborhood of Bitsch, or if he meant
to accept battle at Worth, after securing his retreat on
that point. It was also possible that he might com-
mence the attack. The Crown Prince, to secure a pre-
ponderating force, therefore determined to coUect his
forces in the neighborhood of Sulz on August 6th.
The Second Bavarian Corps received special instruc-
tion to watch Bitsch with one division ; the other divis-
ion was to attack the enemy in flank on the western
bank of the Sauer, as soon as they should hear heavy
firing at Worth.

Marshal MacMahon had done his utmost to coUect
his three corps in their entirety, and he reaUy intended
to arrest the advance of the Germans by an immediate
attack. A division of the Seventh Corps, which had but
just been sent to Miilhausen to strengthen the defence

BATTLE OF WORTH. 15

of Alsace, was at once recalled to Hagenau, where it
formed the right wing of the strong position held by
the First Corps behind the Saner, and in front of
Froschwiller, Elsasshaussen, and Eberbach. On the
left the division of the Fifth Corps, commanded by
Lespart, was expected from Bitsch ; the rest of that
corps was to come up from Saargemlind, by Rohrbach.
Meanwhile Ducrot's division formed a rear flank.

Neither the German nor the French leaders expected
the attack before the following day, but where the con-
tending forces are so close upon each other, as in this
case, the conflict may occui' at any moment, even
against the wish of the commanders.

BATTLE OF WORTH.

(August 6th.)

After a good deal of skirmishing between the out-
posts during the night, the Commander of the 20th
Grerman brigade thought it expedient to secure the pas-
sage over the Sauer river, which lay just in front and
was a serious obstacle. The bridge over it to Worth
had been destroyed, but the sharp-shooters waded
through the stream, and at seven o'clock entered the
town, which the French had left unoccupied.

They soon became aware of the fact that they
were confronting a numerous enemy in a strong po-
sition.

The broad meadows by the Sauer all lie within
range of the commanding heights on the right ; and
the long range of the Chassepot rifle must here prove
invaluable. On the other side of the river the plain
was dotted with vineyards and hop-gardens, thus
offering great advantages for defensive purposes.

The preliminary combat at Worth was hardly of

16 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

thirty minutes' duration ; but as tlie artillery of both
sides had taken active part in it, the signal was given
for the Bavarian Division, under Hartmann, to come up
from Langensulzbach, and they soon engaged the left
flank of the French in a fierce conflict. The French,
on their part, had attacked Gunstett on their right,
where they were confronted by the advancing Eleventh
Corps.

The battle was now raging opposite Worth, as well to
the north as the south, the Fifth Corps being likewise
engaged ; and it became imperative to seriously engage
the enemy's centre to prevent them from turning all
their force on the German flank.

The artillery were brought up, and by ten o'clock 108
guns were in position on the eastern slopes of the Sauer,
and had opened fire.

Some infantry waded through the river, breast high,
but this attack, undertaken with inadequate numbers,
failed, and it was only by strenuous efforts that a foot-
hold was obtained on the other side.

The Crown Prince sent orders that nothing was to
be done that would bring on a battle on that day ; but
by this time the Fifth Corps was so seriously engaged
that the fight could not be stopped without grave con-
sequences: General von Kirchbach'^ therefore deter-
mined to continue the battle on his own responsibility.

The frontal attack was an undertaking of great diffi-
culty, and could hardly succeed unless seconded by an-
other in flank ; and at this juncture the Bavarians, in
accordance with the Crown Prince's orders, ceased hos-
tilities, and retired in the direction of Langensulzbach.

There remained, however, the Eleventh Corps on
the left, ready for immediate action. They seized the
Albrechts-hauser farm and pressed forward into the
Niederwald.

THE BATTLE OF WORTH. 17

In front of Worth, the battle was a succession of
attacks on both sides ; the aggressor each time getting
worsted, in consequence of the nature of the country.
By degi'ees, however, all the battalions, and at last the
artillery of the Fifth Corps were got across to the west
bank of the Sauer ; the Eleventh Corps having previ-
ously secured a good basis there for further advance.

About this time, notwithstanding the evident unfa-
vorable nature of the ground, two regiments of cuiras-
siers and one of lancers of Michel's brigade made a
determined attack on the G-erman infantry, near Mors-
bronn, just as it was wheeling to the right. But the
men of the 32nd Regiment, without looking for cover,
received while deployed the advancing force of about
1000 horse with a steady fire, which did great execu-
tion. The cuirassiers especially suif ered immense loss.
Only a few broke through the line of firing and gained
the open ground ; many were taken prisoners in the
village, the remainder rode madly off towards Walburg.
There they encountered the Prussian 13th Hussars, ex-
perienced further losses and disappeared from the field.

The infantry of the French right wing succeeded in
driving in the most advanced parties of the enemy at
Albrechts-hauserhof, but their further progress was
stopped by the newly-unmasked artillery.

When finally the last battalions had crossed the
Sauer, the Eleventh Corps made its way through the
Niederwald, fighting for every foot of ground. The
northern edge of the forest was reached by 2.30, and
there the Eleventh were joined by the left wing of the
Fifth Corps. The burning village of Elsasshaussen
was taken by storm, as also the little thicket south of
Froschwiller, after a gallant defence.

Thus crowded together in a limited area, the situa-
tion had become one of eminent danger to the French.
2

18 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

Tlieir left flank, it is true, still held out against the
renewed attack of the Bavarians, who had re-entered
the action, but the centre and the right flank were
closely pressed, and even their safe retreat was seri-
ously threatened. Marshal MacMahon therefore tried
to regain the open by a powerful counter-attack to the
south. By this he succeeded in repulsing the German
troops posted to the east of Elsasshaussen, who were
thrown into confusion, and in part driven back into
the Niederwald, but only to be at once re-assembled
and brought back to the attack. Here the French
cavalry again made an attempt to change the fortunes
of the day. The division under Bonnemains, notwith-
standing the unfavorable nature of the ground, threw
itself on the open front of the adversary, suffered ter-
rible losses, and was scattered before it had really got
home.

The Wiirtembergers now advanced from the south,
while the Bavarians marched down from the north.
General von Bose, though twice wounded, led as many
of his division as he could collect to storm the burning
town of Froschwiller, which was the enemy's last post.
The artillery advanced to a point within range of grape-
shot and thus cleared the road for the infantry which
was pushing forward from all sides. Tlie French kept
up a steady and gallant resistance until 5 o'clock, and
then retreated towards Reichshofen and Niederbronn,
in great disorder.

At the Falkenstein stream, Lespart's Division, just
arrived on the field, made a short stand, but these
fresh forces offered only brief resistance, and were
swept away in the general rout.

This victory of the Third Army had been dearly
paid for ; 489 officers and 10,000 men were laid low.
The loss on the French side is not exactly known, but

THE BATTLE OF WOETH. 19

they left 200 officers and 9000 men as prisoners, be-
sides 2000 draught-horses and 33 guns.

The demoralization of the French troops must have
been so complete as to render them unmanageable.
Only one brigade of Lespart's Division took the road
to Bitsch, to join the main army at St. Avoid ; all that
remained following an irresistible impulse, fled wildly
in a south-western direction towards Zabern.

As the General in command of the Thii'd Army had
not foreseen a battle on August 6th, the 4th Division
of cavalry had not left its quarters in the rear, and
was therefore unable to follow in pursuit ; nor did it
arrive at Gunstett until 9 o'clock in the evening. But,
in order to be at hand at any rate for the next day.
Prince Albrecht, who was in command, marched on
during the night as far as Eberbach; after a three
hours' rest he set forth again, and after covering nine
miles (German), came upon the rearguard of the enemy
near Steinberg, at the foot of the hills. Without in-
fantry it would have been impossible to go further,
but the presence of the division had scared the enemy.
The First Corps had resumed their march during the
night, and reached Saarburg, where it joined the Fifth
Corps. Thus the French had a start of five miles,
and continued retreating on Luneville, unmolested
by the Germans.

BATTLE OF SPICHEEEN.

(August 6th.)

Let us now turn to the events which occurred, on
that same 6th of August, on another part of the theatre
of war.

The Second Army, protected on its southern flank by
the Third Army, had moved to the westward, while the

20 THE FEAJ^CO-GEKMAN WAE.

corps that had remained behind were brought up by
railway. Its front column had, on the 5th, reached the
hne between Neunkirchen and Zweibriicken, marching
unchecked through the defiles of the forest-zone of
Kaiserslautern. The cavalry, skirmishing in French
territory, reported that the enemy was retreating. All
seemed to indicate that the French were preparing to
await, in a strong defensive position, the attack of the
Germans. The nearest position of the kind that offered
was on the other side of the Moselle, where Metz and
Diedenhofen secured both wings.

It was decided that if the French were found there,
the First Army was to engage the enemy in front, while
the Second made a circuit south of Metz, so as to force
the enemy either to retire or to accept battle. In case
of defeat the Second Army was to fall back on the
Third, now advancing over the Vosges.

The extended position of the First Army in a south-
erly direction towards the Saar, which had not been
intended by the Commander-in-chief, had brought its
left wing into contact with the line of march laid down
for the Second, and they crossed each other at Saar-
brlicken on the 6th. Thus there was no lack of
strength at that point, but as a battle ^on that day was
neither expected nor probable, a simultaneous arrival
of troops had not been prearranged, and the several
sections arrived there by different routes and at differ-
ent hours.

The 14th Division of the Seventh Corps reached
Saarbriicken first, towards noon on the 6th.

General Frossard, who considered his position there
one of great risk, had left the night before, without
waiting for permission to retreat, and had retired with
the Second Corps on Spicheren, where they threw up
entrenchments. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Corps

THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN. 21

were in a position to his rear, at distances of from two
to four miles, and the Guards were not more than five
miles behind. The Emperor was, therefore, fully able
to collect five corps for a battle in the vicinity of Co-
cheren, or, on the other hand, to support Frossard with
at least four divisions, if the General thought his posi-
tion strong enough to hold.

The range of hills which rise quite close to Saar-
briicken can be made a formidable obstacle to crossing
the Saar. It was known that the French had evacu-
ated these points, but General von Kameke thought it
prudent to occupy them at once, in order to secure the
debouching of the columns in rear. When, in the
forenoon, two squadi'ons of the 5th Cavalry Division
had disappeared on the di-ill-ground on the further
bank, they met with a hot fire from the Spicheren hills.
But as it seemed highly probable, from the previous
attitude of the French, that they were only the rear-
guard of the retiring enemy. General von Kameke
ordered an immediate attack, especially as he was
promised help. General von Zastrow, as soon as he
observed that the 14th Division had entered upon a
serious engagement, sent forward the 13th. General
von Alvensleben also ordered up all that could be
spared of the Third Corps to Saarbriicken, and Gen-
eral von Goeben directed the entire 16th Division to
advance on that point. Generals von Doring and von
Barnekow had turned their forces in the direction
whence the fighting was heard, from Dudweiler and
Fischbach respectively, even previous to receiving
orders to that effect.

The position occupied by the French was one of ex-
treme advantage. The centre was protected by the
Red Mountain (Der rothe Berg), a precipitous and al-
most inaccessible cliff, while the steep slopes on both

22 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

sides were densely wooded. To the left a group of
buildings, the iron-works of Stiering-Wendel, formed
an additional post of defence.

Had the strength of the enemy been fuUy known the
attack would certainly have been delayed until the 14th
Division had completely formed up. As a matter of
fact, at the beginning of the fight, about noon, only the
brigade under Francois had come up, and this, with the
purpose of facilitating an attack on the enemy's centre,
which was well placed, turned first on his two flanks.
At first it made some progress. The 39th Regiment
drove the sharp-shooters of the enemy out of the
Grifert woods, but then exposed themselves to the
merciless fire of a French battalion drawn up on the
further side of a deep hollow. On the right the 3rd
Battalion, together with the 74th, seized the wood of
Stiering. But the enemy's superior strength soon dis-
played itself in violent counter-attacks, and when von
Woyna's Brigade appeared on the field it was required
to lend support on both sides. Thus, at an early stage,
a mixing of battalions and companies began which
increased with every repulse, and made the control of
the battle a matter of the gi-eatest difficulty. Added
to this it happened that three Generals in succession
came up to the scene of the conflict, and each in turn
took the command.

At about 1 o'clock, when the wings were advancing,
the Fusilier Battalion of the 74th Regiment had also
pushed forward under a severe fire across the open
ground at the foot of the Rotheberg, and under such
cover as they could established themselves at the foot
of the cliff. When, at about 3 o'clock, the Prussian
artillery compelled the foe to move their guns further
up the hill, the Fusiliers, with General von Francois
at their head, began the ascent of the rock. The French

THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN. 23

Chasseurs, evidently taken by surprise, were driven
from the outer entrenchments with clubbed rifles and
at the point of the bayonet. The 9th Company of the
39th Regiment followed close upon the Fusiliers, and
the gallant General, leading their attack, fell, pierced
by five bullets. Nothing daunted, the small body of
Fusiliers made good their position on the narrow spur
of the cliff.

Nevertheless a crisis had set in. The 14th Division
was extended over three-quarters of a mile ; its left
wing had been repulsed by greatly superior forces into
the wood of Gif ert, the right wing was hard pressed at
Stiering. But at this moment, nearly four o'clock, the
heads of the 5th and 16th Divisions arrived, shortly
after their batteries, which had been sent ahead, had
been brought into action.

The left wing, now strongly reinforced, again ad-
vanced. General von Barnekow led efficient help up
the Rotheberg where the Fusiliers had almost ex-
hausted their ammunition, and the French were driven
out from their entrenchments. FinaUy, after a deter-
mined struggle, the Geraians also succeeded in taking
possession of the western part of the Gif ert Wald, wiiile
the right wing had fought its way to Alt- Stiering and
drew near to the enemy's line of retreat, the Forbach
highway. General Frossard had, however, observed
the danger at this point, and reinforced his left wing
to the strength of a division and a half. These ad-
vanced to the attack at five o'clock. The Germans had
no complete force to oppose them, so all their previous
advantages were lost.

If the 13th Division could here have made a decisive
attack, the battle would have been ended.

This division had reached Puttlingen at 1 o'clock
and was not more than a mile away from Stiering,

24 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

having marched four (German) miles. When the noise
of the fighting at Saarbriicken was heard, the advanced
guard moved forward to Rossel; this was at four
o'clock. It would seem that the roar of cannon was
not distinguishable in the woods of Rossel ; the officers
were under the impression that the combat was over,
and the division bivouacked at Volkingen, which place
had been previously appointed as the end of its march
by the Commander of the corps at a time when he was,
of course, unable to foresee the change in the situation.

The French attack had meanwhile been brought to
a stand by the seven batteries in position on Folster
Hohe; the infantry then succeeded in making fresh
progress, under the personal leadership of General von
Zastrow.

The nature of the ground entirely prohibited the
twenty-nine squadi'ons of cavahy, which had arrived
from all directions and were drawn up out of the range
of fire, from taking part in the action. The Hussars
tried in vain to ride up the Rotheberg, but in spite of
incredible difficulties Major von Lyncker finally gained
the summit with eight guns, amid the loud cheering
of the much-distressed infantry. The guns, as each
one came up, at once opened fire, returning the fire of
three French batteries ; but quite half of the gunners
were shot down by the French tirailleurs, who were
under cover, at about 800 paces off. A small strip of
gi^ound in front was indeed wrested from the enemy,
but the narrow space allowed of no deployment against
the wide front of the French.

But effectual assistance was coming from the right.
General von Goeben ordered all battalions of the 16th
Division, not yet engaged, towards Stiering, where the
fortunes of the day were sealed. While one part of
these troops attacked the village, the others, turning

BATTLE OF SPICHEKEN. 25

off from the high road, entered the ravine of the Spi-
cheren woods, and in a hand-to-hand encounter di'ove
the French off the ridge leading to the Rotheberg and
repelled them in the direction of the Forbach Height.

Even as late as seven o'clock did Laveaucoupet's
division, supported by part of Bataille's, come out to
attack and invade the much-disputed position in the
Gifert forest, but the danger threatening the French
left wing from the Spicheren wood crippled this move.
By nightfall the French were in full retreat over the
plateau.

To protect his night-quarters General von Schwerin
occupied Stiering at about nine o'clock, while the
French call to retreat was sounding from the heights.
This was only done, at many points, after a hand-to-
hand fight. The advanced guard of the 13th Division
marched out to Forbach but did not occupy it, having
been deceived by a troop of di'agoons in possession.

General Frossard had in any case given up the idea
of retreating via the seriously threatened Forbach and
St. Avoid route, and retired with his three divisions
on Oetingen. The darkness, and the impossibility of
manoeuvring large bodies of cavalry in such a country,
saved him from further pursuit.

General von Steinmetz ordered the re-organization
of the German forces that same night. Some of them
had marched as much as six miles (German) in the
course of the day ; two batteries, arriving from Konigs-
berg by rail, had immediately set out for the battle-
field; but the Germans, notwithstanding, had at no
time attained the numerical strength of the enemy in
this engagement, which had been begun with insuffi-
cent forces. Only thirteen batteries could be brought
into action in the limited space, and the cavalry was
excluded from all participation. It was only natui'al,

26 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

under the circumstances, that the losses in attack were
greater than those of the defence. The Prussians lost
4871, the French 4078 men. A matter of gi*ave signifi-
cance was the fact that a considerable number of un-
wounded French prisoners were taken in this action.

In strong contrast to the good fellowship and help-
fulness of the Prussian generals, and the eagerness of
their troops, was the strange vacillation of the divis-
ions behind General Frossard's line ; only three, indeed,
were sent forward to his support, and only two came
up when the fight was already ended.

It has been asserted that the battle of Spicheren
should never have taken place where it did, as it frus-
trated plans on a larger scale. It certainly had not
been anticipated, but, generally speaking, a tactical
victory rarely fails to coincide with a strategic policy.
Success in battle has always been thankfully accepted,
and turned to account. The battle of Spicheren pre-
vented the Second French Corps from retiring un-
harmed; it brought the G-ermans in touch with the
enemy's main force, and it gave the superior com-
mand a basis for fresh plans of action.

THE GERMAN ARMY WHEELS TO THE RIGHT.

Marshal MacMahon, in his retreat, had taken a route
which entirely severed his connection with Marshal
Bazaine.

As he was not pursued he could have used the rail-
way on the LuneviUe Metz line to effect his union with
the French main army ; for on the 9th it was still open,
but rumor had it that the Prussians were already in
Pont-a-Mousson, and the state of his troops prevented
the Marshal from risking another engagement.

His First Corps, therefore, turned southwards, and
marched on Neuchateau, whence Chalons could be

THE WHEEL TO THE EIGHT. 27

reached by railway. The Fifth Corps was being shifted
to and fro by contradictory orders from the Emperor's
head-quarters. First it was to proceed to Nancy, then
to go in an opposite direction towards Langres. On
arriving at Charmes it was ordered to Toul, but at
Chaumont another order sent the corps to Chalons
with the rest. General Trochu had drawn up the
newly-formed Twelfth Corps at that point, and be-
hind this line the Seventh Corps managed to get away
from Alsace and reach Rheims by rail via Bar-sur-
Aube and Paris.

Thus by August 22nd a reserve army was formed,
consisting of four corps and two cavalry divisions,
under the command of Marshal MacMahon, who, being
twenty-five miles away, was, however, unable to render
immediate assistance to Marshal Bazaine, who stood
, directly in the line of the advancing enemy.

When the news of the double defeat of August 6th
reached the Imperial head-quarters, the first impression
there was that it would be necessary to retreat on
Chalons with Bazaine's army, and the Sixth Corps,
sections of which were already on the road to Metz,
were ordered to retrace their steps. But this decision
was presently changed. The Emperor had not merely
to consider the foreign enemy, but public opinion in
his own country. The sacrifice of entire provinces at
the very beginning of a war which had been undertaken
with such high anticipations, would have provoked the
unbounded indignation of the French people. There
were still 200,000 men who could be brought together
on the western bank of the Moselle, with a strong
fortress to support them, and though, even then, the
enemy would have the superiority in numbers, his
army was posted along a line of twelve miles. His
troops had yet to cross the Moselle, and this would

28 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

necessitate a disjunction which might weaken them at
that decisive point.

The generals of the Third Grerman Army did not
know of the disorderly condition of the defeated enemy,
nor even the direction of its retreat. It was supposed
that the French would rally on the other side of the
Vosges for renewed resistance ; and as it was impossible
to cross the mountains, except as a narrow front, the
German advance was very cautious, and by short day
marches only. Though the distance between Reichs-
hofen and the Saar is only six miles in a straight line,
that river was only reached in five days.

Nothing was seen of the enemy, except in the small
but inaccessible villages which close in the mountain
roads. Bitsch was avoided by a fatiguing circuit,
Lichtenberg was captured by surprise, Liitzelstein had
been abandoned by its garrison, Pfalzburg was being
besieged by the Sixth Corps, and Marsal capitulated
after a short resistance.

The German left wing, having no enemy before it,
could be brought into closer connection with the centre,
and in order to get the three armies on a same front,
they were ordered to wheel to the right. The advance
of the First and Second Armies had, however, to be de-
layed, as the Third did not reach the Saar until August
12th. The whole movement was thus arranged. The
Third Army was to proceed by Saarunion and Dieuze,
and then southward ; the Second via St. Avoid and
Nomeny and southward; the First was to take the
road by Saarlouis and Les Etangs, that is in the direc-
tion of Metz.

The cavalry divisions, which were reconnoitring far
to the front, reported the enemy as retreating all along
the line. They fought close up to Metz, and on both
sides of the Moselle, forcing the sections of Canro-

THE WHEEL TO THE EIGHT. 29

bert's corps, which had again been ordered to proceed
from Chalons, to retire.

All these observations indicated that a large army
was encamped beyond Metz. From this it might
equally be inferred that the enemy intended a further
retreat, or that an attack was to be made, by the whole
French force, on the right wing of the Grerman army,
while the crossing of the Moselle still inevitably divided
it from the left wing.

The Army head-quarters restricted itself, in the main,
to issuing general instructions, the execution of which
was left to the commanders on the scene of war ; but in
this instance it was deemed necessary to regulate the
movements of each separate corps by direct orders.
On August 11th the head-quarters of his Majesty were
therefore transferred to St. Avoid, in the front lines,
and between the First and Second Armies, so as to
allow of immediate action with either of these bodies
at any moment. The three corps of the First Army
advanced towards the Nied, a German stream, on
August 12th, only to find that the French had evacu-
ated that position. Three corps of the Second Army
marched forward to Faulquemont and Morhange on
a same front, while two others retired a short distance.

On the next day the Second Army reached the Seille
and occupied Pont-a-Mousson without encountering
the enemy.

The extraordinary inactivity of the French made it
seem probable that they might not make a stand, even
at Metz, a notion corroborated by the reports of the
German cavahy, which was pursuing its observations
as far as Toul and the road to Verdun ; but there was
still a possibility that the enemy meant to throw him-
self, with 200 battalions, on the Fu'st Ai-my, now in
his immediate proximity. The two corps forming the

30 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

right wing of the Second Army were therefore ordered
to halt for the present, a httle way to the south of
Metz, so that they might be ready to attack the French
flank in case of necessity. If the enemy chose to turn
upon these corps, then that order was to hold good for
the Fu'st Army.

Meanwhile the other corps of the Second Army pur-
sued their route southwards to the Moselle; if the
enemy should attack them with superior forces, after
they had crossed the river, their orders were, in case
of need, to fall back on the Third Army.

So much caution was not deemed essential by all of
the leaders ; the French were abeady in full retreat,
they must not be allowed to escape without further
check, and the Grerman Army ought forthwith to strike
a decided blow. The French had, indeed, already
resolved on a further retreat ; but, when the Seventh
Corps became aware of their retrograde movement,
during the afternoon, a fight began on the German
side of the Moselle, which, by the voluntary interven-
tion of the nearest divisions, developed into a battle in
the course of the evening.

BATTLE OF COLOMBEY-NGUIJiLY.

(August 14th.)

The Commandant of Metz had declared his inability
to hold that fortress a fortnight, if left to his own
resources ; and the intrenched position on the Nied,
taken up for the protection of the city, had been found
disadvantageously situated, so the French commander
hoped to take up a more favorable position at Verdun.

Strategic necessity outweighed even political regard
for public opinion, and the Emperor, although he had
transferred the command-in-chief to Marshal Bazaine,

BATTLE OF COLOMBEY-NOUILLY. 31

remained with the army, for it would have been im-
possible for him to return to Paris under such cir-
cumstances.

Very early in the morning of the 14th August be-
gan the removal of the extensive baggage train through
the streets of the city, and towards noon the Second,
Fourth, and Sixth Corps set out, while the Third Corps
remained in its position behind the deep vaUey of the
Colombey stream, to cover the retreat.

When, at four o'clock, the movements of the enemy
became known, General von der Goltz threw the front
columns of the Seventh Corps across his path, and
seized Colombey and the Chateau d'Aubigny, on the
right flank of the French. But, upon hearing the first
sound of cannon, the French columns immediately
turned about, fully equipped for battle, and eager,
after their previous defeats, to change their fortunes
by a determined struggle. Castagny's division at once
marched, with greatly superior force, upon the small
detachment holding the isolated position of Colombey,
which only held its o\nti by a determined effort.

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the First Army
Corps came by both highways from Saarbriicken and
Saarlouis ; and their batteries, being ahead, at once took
part in the engagement. The infantry following,
ascended the eastern slopes of the plateau of Bellecroix,
by way of Lauvallier, and also drove the enemy out of
the woods at the east of Mey. But at this point the
stand made by the French Third Corps brought about
a lull.

The 13th, 1st, and 2nd Divisions had meanwhile fol-
lowed up their advanced guard, the last two having
been kept in readiness by General von Manteuffel ever
since his outposts had reported that the enemy was
moving. General von Zastrow, too, arrived on the

32 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAR.

field, and undertook the command of the left. Very
soon sixty field-pieces came into action against the
enemy. General von Osten-Sacken succeeded in car-
rying the 25th Brigade through the hollow of Coincy,
and led them up the slope of the plateau. The copse
of fir-trees on the road to Bellecroix was taken by
storm, surrounded on three sides, again lost in a bloody
conflict, and then recaptured. Soon afterwards two
batteries succeeded in establishing themselves on the
western side of Planchette and driving the French
back to Borny ; still the most violent conflict was rag-
ing on both sides.

But now the German right was in danger of being
out-flanked. General Ladmirault, upon hearing that
Grenier's division had been driven out of Mey, im-
mediately set out to its relief with his other two
divisions, regained possession of the village, and
advanced on the road to Bouzonville. General von
Manteuffel had meanwhile taken the necessary precau-
tions to remain master, at all hazards, of that part of
the Vallieres stream which covered the right flank.
The 1st Brigade was drawn up behind Noisseville, as a
reserve for general emergency, the 4th, and part of the
artiUery of the First Corps, were sent to face General
Ladmirault at Poix, on the Bouzonvilte road, while the
remaining batteries were to enfilade him in his advance
from their positions on the southern slopes to the east
of Nouilly. On the left Gliimer's division had all this
time held their ground at Colombey, but now, at seven
o'clock in the evening, the brigade under Woyna came
to their assistance, and took possession of the woods
to the west. A very welcome reinforcement by the
Second Army, retained at the Seille, now arrived.

The 18tli Infantry Division, after a heavy march,
had bivouacked near Buchy in the afternoon, but when

BATTLE OF COLOMBEY-NOUILLY. 33

General von Wrangel was informed that firing was
audible in the direction where the First Army was
known to be, he at once set his troops in motion
towards that point. He drove the enemy out of
Peltre, and, in conjunction with Von Woyna's brigade,
occupied Grigy, somewhat to the rear of the French
position at Borny.

The 2nd Division, on the right wing, had also pushed
on the line of battle towards Mey, by way of Nouilly
and the adjacent vineyards ; Mey and the neighboring
woods were taken from the enemy before nightfall.
The French had not proceeded further than Villers
I'Orme, and from thence retreated, all along their line,
in the direction of Grigy. The Prussians, as they
retired, were only disturbed by heavy firing from the
forts, especially from that of St. Julien, which kept it
up till after dark.

The Germans lost by the engagement of August 14th
5000 men, among them 200 officers ; the French lost only
3600 men, their Third Corps being the heaviest sufferer.
The vicinity of a great fortress of course prevented the
reaping of the fruits of victory by immediate pursuit.

It was for this reason, indeed, that the Fu*st Army
had not been prepared to fight on that day, though the
possibility of a battle had been anticipated. Although
the Second Army had only been able to send one divis-
ion to the aid of the Fii'st at that late hour, its assault
on the left flank of the enemy had not failed of its
effect.

The manner in which the battle was begun debarred
it from being directed by one chief.

The advanced guard of the foui* divisions were the

troops principally engaged. The battle was checkered

by many critical moments ; some small detachments,

sometimes out of reach of immediate support, boldly

3

34 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

attacked a superior foe ; and the result might have been
serious if the enemy had made more decisive use of
their compact formation. It must, however, be ad-
mitted that their Third Corps received no support
from the Gruards standing close in theu' rear ; while,
on the other hand, all the Prussian commanders, who
were within reach, were again distinguished by that
esprit de corps and mutual helpfulness which had ani-
mated them in the previous engagements.

A large share of the success of the day must be
attributed to the artillery. Hurrying along in front
of the advanced guard, the artillery aided them very
effectively in driving the French from their position
before Metz, and driving them back under cover of its
forts, even before the main body had time to come up.

But for this protection the Grermans would have had
some trophies to show for their victory at Colombey-
Nouilly, but the Commander-in-chief was very well
satisfied with the results obtained. The retreat of
the enemy had been intercepted, and a day had been
gained to effect the crossing of the Second and Third
Armies over the Moselle.

(August 15th.) Early in the morning of the 15th the
cavalry had ridden forth to the outworks of Metz, but
saw nothing of the enemy on this side of the fortress.
A few shells thrown into the camp of Longueville
scared the Imperial head-quarters away from that
point.

King William had ridden over to the First Army,
and immense clouds of dust were observed rising on
the other side of the fortress^ it could no longer be
doubted that the French were in retreat, and that the
Second Army was now free to cross the MosoUe with
train and baggage.

The First Corps of the First Army had to remain

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE — MARS-LA-TOUR. 35

south of Metz at Courcelles, to protect the railway
lines, the other two were withdrawn on the left towards
the Seille ; they were to cross the river higher up, so
as to avoid a separation of the forces by the fortress.

The French had started again on the march, inter-
rupted yesterday, but proceeded no further than about
a mile from Metz on August 15th. Their cavalry only
went a little further ahead, by the two roads to Ver-
dun.

The Third Corps of the German Second Army trav-
ersed the Moselle at Noveant, where the bridge was
found intact, and by a flying bridge of boats ; its artil-
lery, however, was forced to make a detour by Pont-a-
Mousson.

It was not until late at night that the troops were
all across and encamped close to the left bank. One
division of the Tenth Corps was left at Pont-a-Mousson
and the others advanced to Thiaucourt. The cavalry
went even further towards the Metz-Verdun road,
and encountered that of the French near Mars-la-Tour.
Several small engagements took place, but when, early
in the afternoon, twenty-four Prussian squadrons had
assembled, the French thought it wise to retreat on
Vionville. The Guards and the Fourth Corps had
crossed at Dieulouard and Marbache, higher up the
river.

The Third Army was drawn up in the line of Nancy
and Bayou. On this day an attempt to seize the for-
tress of Diedenhofen by surprise, proved a failure.

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE — MARS-LA-TOUR.

(August 16th.)

The generals of the Second Army, like the rest, were
of opinion that there were no more serious engage-

36 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

ments to be anticipated on the Moselle, and therefore
two corps, the Third and the Tenth, were ordered to
proceed northwards on the road to Verdun, via Gorze
and Thiaucourt, on August 16, while the others were
hastened westwards towards the Meuse.

The French retreat from Metz was, however, not
effected on that day. Its heavy baggage blocked every
road, and in the forenoon three divisions still remained
behind in the Moselle valley. The Emperor alone had
departed at an early hour on the road by Etain, which
was comparatively safe. He was escorted by two
brigades of cavahy. As the right wing of the army
could not yet follow, the start was postponed until the
afternoon, and the left wing, who were ready, sent back
again into their bivouacs. But they were disturbed
by Prussian shell as early as nine o'clock in the morn-
ing.

Major Korber had advanced with four batteries close
up to Vionville, under cover of the cavahy, and the
French dragoons, surprised by their fire, fled in con-
fusion through their own infantry-camp. These, how-
ever, at once seized their arms and formed into line,
while their artillery opened a heavy fire. Unsupported
at first by infantry, the Prussian gUAS withdrew ; but
matters soon became serious.

General von Alvensleben, fearing to lose sight of
the enemy, had started again with the Third Corps
after a short night's rest. The 6th Division was march-
ing on the left flank, by Onville ; the 5th, on the right,
proceeded through the long forest valley, on the way
to Gorza. This valley was found unoccupied by the
enemy, who indeed had taken very few precautions.

The advanced guard encountered the French di-
vision under Berge on the open plateau south of Fla-
vigny, and General von Stiilpnagel soon discovered

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE — MAES-LA-TOUE. 37

that lie had to do with an enemy whom it would take
all his strength to beat. At ten o'clock the 10th Bri-
gade marched to the attack and opened fire on the
enemy with twenty-four guns.

Both sides now assumed the offensive. The Prus-
sians, on the right, fought their way with varying for-
tunes through the wood, often in hand-to-hand encount-
er, and, towards eleven o'clock, succeeded in reaching
the projecting spur of the wood of St. Arnould oppo-
site Flavigny. Their left wing, on the contrary, was
repulsed ; even the artillery at that point came near to
being overthrown. The 52nd Regiment finally re-
gained the lost ground, paying heavily for its valor.
The 1st Battalion lost every one of its officers, the col-
ors passed from hand to hand as its bearers were suc-
cessively shot down, and the commander of the brigade,
General von Doring, feU mortally wounded. General
von Stiilpnagel rode in the line of fire, encouraging
the men, while General von Schwerin collected the
remnant of his troops bereft of their leaders, and held
the height of Flavigny, whence the French finally
retired on the General having been reinforced by a
section of the Tenth Corps from Noveaut.

On the supposition that the French had already
begun their retreat, the 6th Division was sent forward
to Etain by way of Mars-la-Tour, to obstruct, if pos-
sible, the northern road to Verdun. When they
reached the height of TronviUe, whence they could see
how things really stood, they wheeled to the right in
the direction of Vionville and Flavigny. Their artil-
lery, in advance, formed a formidable line of fire, and
thus prepared the attack ; by half-past eleven the 11th
Brigade had taken possession of VionviUe in spite of
heavy losses. From thence, and from the south, in
conjunction with the 10th Brigade, an attack was

38 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

directed on the town, now in flames. The different
divisions were much mixed, but by taking advantage
of every rise in the ground for cover, the regimental
officers got theii* men steadily forward, in spite of
heavy fire from the French infantry and guns. Fla-
vigny was taken by assault, and one cannon and a
number of prisoners fell into the hands of the brave
Brandenburgers.

Vionville, Flavigny and the northern end of the
forest of St. Arnould were now the points of support
of the Prussian forces facing to the east ; their line was
nearly a mile long, and the entire infantry and artil-
lery were in one Une and engaged in hot fight. The
5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions and part of the 37th
Brigade were engaged in an independent fight near
Tronville.

The position of the French was one of great advan-
tage. Their left flank was protected by the fortress
of Metz, the right by formidable batteries along the
old Roman road, and a strong force of cavalry ; they
might safely await an attack on their centre.

Of coui'se, the march towards Verdun, even under
cover of a strong rear-guard, had to be abandoned. If
the Marshal had been resolved to pi;oceed, he would
have had to engage and get rid of the enemy in front
of him.

It is difficult to decide, from a purely military stand-
point, why this alternative was not taken. There was
hardly a doubt that only part, and probably only a
small part, of the German armies could as yet have
crossed the Moselle, and when in the course of the day
the divisions that had remained at Metz arrived, the
French were decidedly the stronger. But it seems
that the Marshal's first object was not to be forced
■ away from Metz ; almost his entire concern was for

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE— MAKS-LA-TOUE. 39

the left wing. By constantly reinforcing this flank, he
massed the Gruards and part of the Sixth Corps in front
of the Bois des Ognons, from whence no attack was
made. We are tempted to fancy that political reasons
alone induced Bazaine, thus early in the game, to
attach himself to Metz.

Meanwhile the Prussians slowly but surely made
their way beyond Flavigny and Vionville, and, assisted
by a heavy fire from the artillery, compelled the right
wing of the Second French Corps to retire on Rezon-
ville, a movement which turned into a flight when the
French Generals Bataille and Valaze had been killed.

To regain the lost ground the French Cuirassier
Guards turned resolutely on the pursuers, but their
attack was cut short by the rapid fire of two com-
panies of the 52nd Regiment, drawn up in line, who
did not fire till within 250 paces of the enemy. The
cavalry parting to the right and left rushed into the
fire of more infantry behind ; 243 horses were left on
the field, and only the remains of the regiment escaped
the pursuit of two hussar regiments from Flavigny.
A French battery in front of Rezonville had hardly
time to discharge a few shots before it was surrounded.
The Prussians could not, indeed, carry off the guns,
having no horses to spare; but the Commander-in-
chief of the French army, who himself placed the guns
in position, was for several minutes in imminent dan-
ger of being taken prisoner.

The 6th Division of Prussian cavalry had also been
ordered to the front ; after passing through the lines
of artillery and forming line as well as the limited
space permitted, they found themselves face to face
with fresh and well-ordered troops. Marshal Bazaine
had taken the precaution of substituting the Grenadier
Guards Division for the defeated companies of the

40 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Second Corps, having at last brought them up from
his disengaged left wing, but not without filling the
vacancy by a division of the Thii-d Corps. Thus the
Prussian cavalry, on nearing, was received with such
overwhelming fire from musketry and artillery that it
pulled up short, and then slowly retired, its retreat
being covered by two squadrons of Uhlans, who
repeatedly attacked the advancing enemy. The heavy-
horse did no actual fighting, but the artillery had
gained time and opportunity to advance on a line
from the skirt of the woods to Flavigny.

It was now two o'clock. So far General von Alven-
sleben had deceived the enemy with regard to the
slender number of his troops by incessant assaults.
But the battle was now at a standstill, the battalions
visibly thinned, their strength reduced by four hours of
hard fighting, and the infantry had almost exhausted
its supply of ammunition. There was not a battalion,
not a battery left in reserve all along the exposed line.
There was nothing to be done but to maintain and
defend the positions so hardly won.

The left wing was in especial danger, being under
the fire of the heavy artillery posted on the Roman
road. Their greatly superior numbers permitted the
French to extend their right wing, threatening thus to
encircle the Prussians.

Marshal Canrobert, in the French centre, had dis-
cerned the right moment to press forward on VionviUe
with all his forces. At this critical instant the Ger-
mans had only a small portion of the 5th Cavalry Di-
vision available to check him. Two brigades had been
dispatched to cover the German left, and of the 12th
Brigade, which remained in the rear of VionviUe, two
squadrons had been sent to the woods of Tronville.
The two regiments, the Magdeburg Cuirassiers and

BATTLE OF VIONYILLE — MAKS-LA-TOUK. 41

Altmarkische Lancers, ordered to face- Canrobei-t's
forces, were therefore only three squadi-ons, that is
800 horses.

General von Bredow first crossed the valley below
Vionville in column, and then wheeling to the right he
traversed the eastern slope, after having drawn up
both regiments on the same front. Being received
with heavy infantry and artillery fii-e, he made a de-
termined attack on the enemy's lines, riding down the
foremost, breaking through their fire and securing the
guns and the drivers. The second line of the French
again could not withstand this onslaught, and even
their remoter batteries prepared to limber up.

But the triumph and excitement of success carried
the small body of horse too far, and after an advance
of 3000 paces they found themselves surrounded by
the cavalry of the enemy, which attacked them from
all sides. There was not space enough for a second
charge, and so, after several encounters with the French
cavalry, the brigade was forced to cut its way back
through the French infantry, who followed them up
with numerous volleys. Only one-half of the men
reached Flavigny alive, where they were re-organized
into two squadi'ons, having succeeded by their devoted
bravery in stopping the French from further attack
on Vionville.

At three o'clock four of the German divisions were
advancing towards the Tronville woods. Barby's
cavalry brigade, placed to keep watch on the western
side, had to retire before the enemy's fire, and the in-
fantry occupying the forest also had to yield to superior
strength ; the batteries which were drawn up between
Vionville and the wood were attacked in their unpro-
tected rear at the opening of the forest, and were like-
wise forced to retire. But it took the French a full

42 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

hour to conquer the obstinate resistance of the four
Prussian battahons.

At the subsequent roll-call, near Tronville, it was as-
certained that the 24th Regiment had lost 1000 men
and 52 officers, while every officer of the 2nd Battalion
of the 20th Regiment was killed. Half the 37th
Brigade, who had backed up their comrades volunta-
rily since noon, took possession of Tronville and pre-
pared it for an obstinate defence. It was not till near
three that the Third Corps, which had been fighting
for seven hours almost single-handed, received any
efficient assistance.

While the Tenth Corps was on the route to Thiau-
court, its advanced guard heard heavy firing from the
direction of Vionville, and the General in command,
von Voigts-Rhetz, immediately set out for the battle-
field. Having personally ascertained how matters
stood, he gave the necessary orders to the troops in
rear.

Here again the artillery opened the attack. Its fire
stopped the advance of the enemy on both sides of
the Tronville woods, especially when the batteries of
the Third Corps simultaneously reopened fire. Half
an hour later the first infantry of von "^oyna's brigade
appeared on the field, drove the enemy back into the
wood, and finally, assisted by the Diringshofen's bri-
gade, took possession of the northern outskirts. The
right wing of the Third Corps had also been rein-
forced.

The 32nd Brigade of the Eighth Corps, on being
called upon to assist the 5th Division, immediately ad-
vanced from the Moselle via Arry, though fatigued by
a long march. The lltli Regiment joined the brigade,
and three batteries were sent ahead to commence opera-
tions ; this force emerged at five o'clock from the forest

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE — MAES-LA-TOUE. 43

of St. Arnould. They at once made an assault on the
heights of Maison Blanche, but, though renewing their
attack three times, failed to take up that position in
the teeth of Marshal Bazaine, who had greatly strength-
ened his lines in front of Rezonville. Then the French,
in their turn, assumed the offensive ; but they too were
unable to establish themselves on the hill, which was
fully exposed to the well-du'ected fire of the Prussian
artillery, and they again retraced their steps. Minor
struggles for this position were renewed on both sides,
but were always frustrated either by the German or
the French artillery ; and the fight on the right had
become more or less stationary.

The fact that on the left two French divisions had
retired, abandoning the woods of Tronville to a few
newly-arrived Prussian battalions, can only be ex-
plained by a report having reached Bazaine's head-
quarters that the enemy was harrying the right fiank
of the French near Hannonville.

The enemy referred to was Wedell's brigade, which,
having started for Etain according to orders, on reach-
ing St. Hilaire at noon, received instructions to pro-
ceed to the field of battle.

General von Schwartzkoppen selected the highway
to Mars-la-Tour, with a view to falling on the enemy
either in the rear or in flank. The French in the
interim had extended their reinforced right wing to
the valley, west of Bruville, where three divisions of
cavahy were drawn up.

Thus, when General von Wedell's brigade, no more
than five battalions strong, advanced to the attack from
both sides past TronviUe, which the French themselves
had fired, he found himself in front of the extensive
line of the 4th French Brigade.

The two Westphalian regiments advanced steadily

44 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

under the storm of shell and fire of mitrailleuses, when
they suddenly reached the edge of a deep ravine. This,
however, they soon traversed, but when they had
scaled the opposite bank they were met by a murderous
shower of bullets from the infantry, which were every-
where close upon them. After almost every one of the
officers and generals had been killed, the remnant of
the battalions fell back into the ravine ; 300 men were
taken prisoners, being unable to ascend the steep
southern slope after the fatigue of a six-mile march.
Those who escaped mustered at Tronville around the
bullet-riddled colors which Colonel von Cranach, the
only officer who still had a horse under him, brought
back in his own hand.

Seventy-two officers and 2542 men were missing, out
of 95 officers and 4546 men — more than half. The
French pressed after the defeated enemy, but were
checked on the right by the dauntless attack of the
1st Dragoon Gluards, though that regiment was re-
duced by 250 horses and nearly all its officers gone ;
and on the left by the 4th Squadron of the 2nd
Dragoon Gruards, who faced three times their number
of Chasseurs d'Afrique.

But there now appeared on the op^n ridge of Ville
sur Yron a large force of cavahy. These were Le-
gi-and's division and the Guard Brigade de France in
four compact masses, overlapping each other to the
right.

The Grermans had only 16 squadrons left, who now
joined Barby's brigade ; they were drawn up in two
bodies to the left of Mars-la-Tour. A little in advance
of them stood the 13th Dragoons, to receive the charge
of the squadron of the Guards.

The dragoons charged the French first line — the
hussar brigade, which had ridden through between

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE — MAKS-LA-TOUR. 45

the intervals of the Prussian regiments ; but soon after-
wards General von Barby appeared with the remainder
of his forces on the height of Ville sur Yron, and at
haK-past six o'clock the bodies of cavahy came into
collision.

A mighty cloud of dust concealed the ensuing hand-
to-hand encounter of 5000 mounted men, swaying to
and fro, fortune gi*adually deciding for the Prussians.
Greneral Montaigu was taken prisoner severely
wounded, and General Legrand fell while leading his
di'agoons to the assistance of the hussars.

The Brigade de France allowed the enemy to ap-
proach within 150 paces, and then the Lancer Regiment
rushed upon the Hanoverian Uhlans; but the latter
outflanked them, and received unforeseen assistance
from the 5th Squadron of the 2nd Dragoon Guards,
who, on their return from a reconnaissance, plunging
over fences and ditches, fell upon the French in flank,
while the Westphalian Cuirassiers at the same time
broke their front. The Chasseurs d'Afrique tried in
vain to hinder the movements of the Hanoverian
Dragoons, who more and more enclosed them; the
clouds of dust began to move in a northerly direction,
and the entire French cavalry drew away towards the
valley of Bruville, where they had still five regiments
of Clerembault's cavalry. The General ordered one
brigade to cross the valley, but the fleeing hussars and
some misunderstood signals threw them into confusion.
They were borne back, and not until the infantry
charged upon the Prussian pursuers in the covered
valley did the latter desist from the pursuit.

The Prussian regiments quietly reformed and then
withdi-ew at a walk to Mars-la-Toui-, followed at a gi^eat
distance by part of the Clerembault's division.

This, the greatest cavalry combat of the war, had

46 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

the effect of making the French right wing give up all
further attempts to act on the offensive. The Grermans
moui-ned the loss of many superior officers, who always,
at the head of thek men, had set them a splendid
example.

Prince Frederick Charles had now hastened to the
field of battle. The day was nearly at an end, darkness
approaching, and the battle won. The Prussians in
the evening stood on the ground which in the morning
had been occupied by the French. Though General
von Alvensleben had in the first instance been under
the impression that he would have only the French
rear-guard to deal with, he did not hesitate in the
attack when he found the entire army before him.
With his single corps he kept up the fight till the after-
noon, and drove back the enemy from Flavigny to
Eezonville, a distance of more than half a mile. This
was one of the most brilliant achievements of the war.

Thanks to the valuable assistance of the Tenth Corps
the battle could be carried on through the afternoon
on the defensive, but only by most decided counter,
attacks from the cavalry, and the unflinching tenacity
of the artillery.

To renew a challenge to the enemy,^who still gi'eatly
outnumbered the Grermans, would now have been rash-
ness, and as they could hope for no further assistance,
might have jeopardized the success so dearly paid for.

The troops were exhausted, most of their ammunition
spent, the horses had been saddled for fifteen hours,
and without fodder. A part of the batteries could only
be moved at a slow pace, and the nearest Prussian
troops on the left bank of the Moselle, the Twelfth
Corps, were a day's march distant.

Notwithstanding aU this, an order from the Com-
mander-in-chief, issued at seven o'clock, decreed a

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE — MAHS-LA-TOUE. 47

renewed attack by all troops on the positions occupied
by the enemy. The Tenth Corps was quite incapable of
responding to this demand, but part of the artillery and
a smaU force of infantry went forward on the right. The
batteries succeeded in ascending the much-disputed
plateau south of Rezonville, but only to be exposed to
the fire of infantry and artillery on both sides, and
fifty-four guns of the French Guards alone, di-awn up
beyond the valley, were taking them in flank. The
Prussian batteries were compelled to retreat, but two
brigades of the 6th Cavalry Division were still pressing
forward, hardly able to see what they were doing in
the increasing darkness. They too came within range
of the same fire, and withdrew with great loss.

Fighting did not entirely cease until ten o'clock,
when both sides had lost 16,000 men. Neither could
make any attempt at pursuit. The Grermans reaped
the fruits of this victory only in its results. The
troops, worn out by a twelve hours' struggle, encamped
on the victorious but bloody field, immediately opposite
the French lines.

Those corps of the Second Army that had not taken
part in the battle had marched on towards the Meuse,
the advanced guard of the Fourth Corps on the left wing
being directed on Toul. This fortress, commanding a
railway line of importance for the further progress of
the German army, was reported to be but insufficiently
garrisoned, and it was resolved to take it by surprise.
But the fire of field artillery only proved futile. Stone
bastions and a wide moat made it impregnable. An
attempt to batter down the gates by shot and thus gain
an entrance proved a failure. Finally the undertaking
was given up, and not without some loss on the part
of the Germans.

At the Army head-quarters in Pont-a-Mousson it

48 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

was known by about noon that the Third Corps was
engaged in a serious conflict, and that the Tenth and
Ninth had moved up to its assistance. The full sig-
nificance and the far-reaching consequences of this
information were recognized at once.

The French evidently had been stopped in their
retreat, but it was to be presumed that they would
again make strenuous efforts to effect it.

The Twelfth Corps was therefore ordered to set out
for Mars-la-Tour as early as three o'clock next morn-
ing, and the Seventh and Eighth Corps were to stand
in readiness at Corny and Arry.

The bridge over the river was to be constructed
with all dispatch dui'ing the night. The Commander-
in-chief of the Second Army at Grorze ordered the
Guards to go at once to Mars-la-Tour and take up a
position on the left of the Twelfth Corps.

The execution of these orders was facilitated by the
foresight of the generals, who had in the course of the
day received news of the battle that had been fought.
Prince George of Saxony at once placed his division
on the road to Thiaucourt, and the Prince of Wiirtem-
berg collected the infantry of the Guards in their
northern cantonments to be in readiness for an early
march.

(August 17th.) On August 17th at daybreak, the
French outposts were still observed occupying the
entire Une between Bruville and Rezonville. In their
rear there was a stir and much signalling, which might
indicate an intended attack or preparations for retreat.

The King arrived from Pont-a-Mousson at Flavigny
as early as six o'clock. The reports sent in to head-
quarters until noon by the reconnoitring cavalry were
somewhat contradictory ; they did not make it clear
whether the French were concentrating at Metz, or

PBEPAEATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTIOIT. 49

retreating by the two still open roads via Etain, and
Brierg. Hostile movements had nowhere been ob-
served.

By one o'clock, after a skirmish on the way, the head
of the Seventh Corps had reached the northern skirt of
the Bois des Ognons, opposite which the French subse-
quently abandoned G-ravelotte. The Eighth Corps
stood ready at Gorze, the Third, Ninth, and Tenth had
remained in their positions, the Twelfth and the Gruards
were marching on. By the next day the Grermans
could count on having seven corps and three cavalry
divisions at their disposal ; for the present no attack
was to be made.

In preparing for the forthcoming battle on August
18th, two possible issues were to be anticipated. To
this end, the left wing was dispatched in a northerly
direction past Doncourt towards the nearest of the
routes still open for the retreat of the French. If the
enemy were already retiring they were to be at once
attacked and detained; the right wing would foUow
to support the left.

In case the enemy was encountered at Metz, the left
wing was to turn eastwards and outflank the French
on the north, while the right was to keep them engaged
in fighting until this movement was accomplished.
The battle, under these circumstances, could not be
decided until late in the day, owing to the widely turn-
ing movement of a portion of the force. A peculiar
feature of the case was that both parties had to fight
with changed front and break up their lines of com-
munication. The consequences of victory or defeat
would thus be greatly enhanced or aggravated, but
the French had the advantage of a larger field for
action and of reserves behind them.

A decision was arrived at, and by two o'clock orders

50 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

were issued to the left wing at Flavigny to advance in
echelon. The movements of each corps during the bat-
tle were to depend on the reports brought into head-
quarters. The King then returned to Pont-a-Mousson.

As early as nine o'clock in the morning the Saxon
division of cavalry had come up to the west of Conflans,
on the road to Etain, and reported no enemy visible
except a few scouts. Still, this only proved that the
French had not begun their retreat on the 17th.

The Twelfth Corps, behind and to the left of its
cavalry, arrived at Mars-la-Tour and Puxieux dur-
ing the day, and the Guards moved on to Hannonville
on the Yron before nightfall. The Second Corps,
which ever since it left the railway had followed in
the wake of the Second Army, reached Pont-a-Mousson,
and was ordered to proceed by Buxieres at four in
the morning.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE — ST. PRIVAT.

(August 18th.)

Marshal Bazaine had not thought it advisable to
proceed to Verdun now that the Germans were so close
on the flank of such a movement. ..He preferred to
assemble his forces at Metz, in a position which he
rightly supposed to be almost impregnable.

Such a position was afforded by the range of hills,
bordering on the west of the valley of Chatel. That
side facing the enemy sloped away like a glacis^ while
the short and steep decline behind offered protection
for the reserves.* The Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth
Corps were placed on the ridge of the hills between
Roncourt and Rozerieulles, a distance of one mile and
a half (German) ; thus there were eight or ten men to
every yard of ground.

BATTLE OF GKAVELOTTE — ST. PEIVAT. 51

A brigade of the Fifth Corps stood at Ste. Ruffine, in
the valley of the Moselle, the cavalry in the rear of the
two wings.

The positions of the Second and Third Corps were
hastily intrenched, batteries and covered ways were
established, and the farm-honses in front prepared for
defence. To approach this left wing from the west it
was necessary to cross the deep valley of the Mance.
The Sixth Corps, on the other hand, had no engineering
tools ; and it is indicative of the general ill equipment
of the French that, merely to convey the wounded to
the rear, in spite of the enormous baggage-train, pro-
vision wagons had to be unloaded and their contents
bui'nt. This corps was therefore unable to construct
such defences on the side overlooking the forest of
Jaumont as were necessary to strengthen the right
wing. This would undoubtedly have been the place
for the Guards, but in liis fear of an attack from the
south Marshal Bazaine kept them in reserve at Plappe-
viUe.

The King again arrived at Flavigny at six o'clock on
the morning of the 18th. All officers in command were
ordered to report directly to head-quarters, and Staff-
officers of Army Head-quarters were dispatched in all
directions to watch the progress of the engagement.

The Seventh Army Corps, forming the pivot upon
which the intended wheel to the right was to be effected,
occupied the Bois de Vaux and Bois des Ognons ; the
Eighth, under the personal command of the King, halted
at Rezonville ready to proceed to the north or east, as
might be required. The Ninth Corps on its left ad-
vanced towards the Marcel, while the Third and Tenth
formed the second line. The Guards and TweKth
Corps moved in a northerly direction.

A serious delay occurred when the Twelfth Corps of

52 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

the Second Army, which was stationed on the right, was
commanded to form the left wing, by the crossing of
the two on the march. The Saxon troops did not get
through Mars-la-Tour until nine o'clock, and till then
the Guards could not follow.

The advanced guard of the Twelfth Corps had mean-
while reached Jarny, and proceeded as far as Briey
without encountering the enemy.

Before this could be known, the authorities at head-
quarters had been convinced that at least the main
forces of the enemy were still at Metz ; misapprehension,
however, prevailed as to the extension of their lines,
and it was thought the French front did not reach
beyond Montigny. The Gleneral in command of the
Second Army was therefore instructed not to proceed
farther northward, but to join the Ninth Corps in
attacking the enemy's right wing, and move in the
direction of Batilly with the Guards and the Twelfth
Corps. The First Army was not to attack in the front
until the Second was ready to strike.

In obedience to this Prince Frederick Charles ordered
the Ninth Corps to march on to Verneville, and in case
the French right wing should be found there, to open
battle by bringing a large force of artillery into action.
The Guards were to continue their advance via Don-
court to reinforce the Ninth as soon as possible. The
Twelfth were to remain at Jarny for the present.

A little later fresh reports came in which indicated
that the Ninth Corps, if proceeding in the manner
ordered, would come upon the French centre, instead
of their right wing. The Prince therefore determined
that the corps should postpone the attack till the
Guards had done so at Amanvillers. At the same time
the Twelfth Corps was pushed on to Ste.-Marie-aux-
Cheues.

BATTLE OF GEAVELOTTE — ST. PKIVAT. 53

But while these orders were being given, the first
heavy firing was heard at Verneville. This was at
twelve o'clock.

The two corps on the left had, of their own accord,
taken an easterly direction without waiting for orders,
and the Third Corps moved up behind the Ninth at the
farm of Caulre.

General von Manstein, in command of the Ninth, had
observed from near Verneville a French encampment
at Amanvillers, apparently in a state of quietude.
From that point of view the great masses of troops
on their immediate left at St. Privat were not visible.
Mistaking this camp for the right wing, he determined
to act on his first orders and take the foe by surprise.
Eight of his batteries at once opened fire.

But it did not take the French troops long to move
into the position assigned to them. The independent
action of a single corps naturally exposed it not only
tO' the fire of the troops opposite, but to an attack in
flank.

To obtain some shelter on the field, the Prussian
batteries had taken up a position on the shoulder of
the hill below Amanvillers facing the south-east, where
they were exposed from the north, on the flank, and
even in the rear, to the fire of French artillery, as well
as to the concentrated fire of their infantry.

To meet this, the battalions nearest at hand were
ordered forward. They took possession of the eastern
point of the Bois de la Cusse on the left, and on the
right seized the farm-houses of L'Envie and Chantrenne,
forcing their way into the Bois des Genivaux. Thus
the line of battle of the 18th Division gained a front of
4000 paces.

Its losses were very great, for the French with their
long-range Chassepot rifles could afford to keep out

54 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

of range of the needle-gun; the artillery especially
suffered severely. One of the batteries had already
lost forty-five gunners when it was attacked by French
sharpshooters. There was no infantry at hand to
retaliate, and two guns were lost. By two o'clock all
the batteries were almost Jwrs-de-coinhat, and no relief
arrived till the Hessian division reached Habonville,
and brought up five batteries on either side of the rail-
way, thus diverting on themselves the concentrated fire
of the enemy. The batteries of the 18th Division,
which had suffered most, could now be withdi-awn in
succession, but even in their retreat they had to defend
themselves against their pursuers by grapeshot.

The artillery of the Third Corps and the Guards were
likewise sent to the assistance of the Ninth, and those
of the damaged guns that were still fit for service were
at once brought into line. Thus a front of 130 guns
was drawn up before Verneville as far as St. Ail, and
its fire soon told upon the enemy. Now, when the
Third Corps was approaching Verneville and the 3rd
Brigade of Guards had reached Habonville, there was
no fear that the French would break through the line.

The main force of the Guards had arrived at St. Ail
as early as two o'clock. General von Pape at once saw
that by wheeling to the east he would not encounter
the right wing of the French, which was to be out-
flanked, but would expose his own left wing to the
forces occupying Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes. The first
thing to be done was to gain possession of this village
— almost a town. It was strongly occupied and well
flanked by the main position of the French army ; but,
in obedience to superior orders, he must await the
arrival of a co-operative Saxon contingent.

The advance guard of this corps had already reached
the vicinity of Batilly, but was yet half a mile distance

BATTLE OF GEAVELOTTE — ST. PKIVAT. 55

from Ste. Marie, so its batteries could not be placed in
position west of the town until three o'clock. But as
the Guards had sent most of their own artillery to the
support of the Ninth Corps, this was substantial aid.

Ten batteries now opened fire upon Ste. Marie, and
by the time it was beginning to tell the 4-7th Brigade
of the Twelfth Corps came up. At half -past three the
Prussian and Saxon battalions stormed the town from
the south and west and north, amid vociferous cheers,
and without further returning the fire of the enemy.
The French were driven from the place, and a few
hundred were taken prisoners.

The Saxons tried to follow them up, and a hvely
infantry engagement ensued, north of Ste. Marie,
which masked the artillery. As soon as the brigade
had been ordered to retire, the batteries re-opened fire,
and the repeated efforts of the French to regain the
lost position were frustrated.

Soon afterwards the Ninth Corps succeeded in taking
and holding the farm of Champenois, but aU further
attempts, by isolated battalions or companies, to force
their way on against the broad and compact centre of
the French were, on the face of it, futile. Thus, by
about five o'clock, the infantry ceased fire, and the
artillery only fired an occasional shot. Fatigue on both
sides caused an almost total suspension of hostihties
in this part of the field.

The Commander-in-chief decided that the First Ai*my
should not engage in serious assault until the Second
stood close to the enemy ; but when the day was half
spent and brisk firing was heard about noon from
Vion^dlle, it was to be supposed that the time for action
had arrived ; still, for the present permission was only
given to send forward the artillery in preparation for
the fight.

56 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Sixteen batteries of the Seventh and Eighth Corps
accordingly drew up to the right and left of the high-
way running through Grravelotte. Their fire was in-
effective, as they were too far from the enemy;
besides, they were suffering from the fire of the French
tirailleurs who had established themselves in the
opposite woods. It became necessary to drive them
out, so here again there was a sharp skirmish. The
French had to abandon the eastern portion of the
Mance valley, and the artillery, now increased to twenty
batteries, was able to advance to the western ridge
and direct its fire against the main position of the
enemy.

The battalions of the 29th Brigade followed up this
advantage. They pressed forward into the southern
part of the Bois des Grenivaux on the left, but were
unable to effect a connection with the Ninth Corps,
occupying the north of the forest, as the French could
not be driven from the intervening ground. On the
right various detachments took possession of the
quarries and gravel pits near St. Hubert.

The artillery meanwhile had got the better of the
French guns ; several of their batteries were silenced,
others prevented from getting into position. The
French fire was in part directed on the farm of St.
Hubert, on which the 30th Brigade were gi-adually en-
croaching. This well-defended structure was stormed
at three o'clock close under the face of the enemy's
main position, and in spite of a tremendous fire. The
31st Brigade had also got across the valley, but an
attempt to reach the farms of Moscow and Leipzig,
over the open plain enclosed by the enemy on three
sides, proved a failure and resulted in great loss. The
26th Brigade had taken possession of Jussy, on the
extreme right, thus maintaining the connection with

BATTLE OF GEAVELOTTE — ST. PKIVAT. 57

Metz, but found it impossible to cross the deep valley
of EozerieuUes.

The advanced detachments of the French had been
repulsed on all sides, the farms in their front were
burning, their artillery appeared to be silenced, and,
viewing the situation from Gravelotte, there remained
nothing but pursuit. General von Steinmetz there-
fore, at four o'clock, ordered fresh forces to the front
for a renewed attack.

While the Seventh Corps occupied the border of the
wood, four batteries, backed by the First Cavalry Divi-
sion, made their way through the narrow ravine ex-
tending for about 1500 paces east of Gravelotte. But
as soon as the advanced guard of the long column
came in sight, the French redoubled their rifle and
artillery fire, which had till now been kept under. One
battery had soon lost the men serving four of its guns,
and was hardly able to return into the wood ; a second
never even got into i^osition. The batteries under
Hasse and Gruiigge, on the other hand, held their own
at St. Hubert in spite of the loss of seventy-five horses
and of the firing from the quarries in their rear.

The foremost regiment of cavalry wheeled to the
right after leaving the hollow way, and gaUoped
towards Point-du-Jour, but the enemy, being com-
pletely under cover, offered no opportunity for an
attack. Evidently this was no field for utilizing the
cavahy, so the regiments retired through the Mance
valley under a heavy fire from all sides.

This ill success of the Germans encouraged the
French to advance from Point-du-Jour with swarms
of tirailleurs, who succeeded in diiving the Prussians
back from the open ground as far as the skirts of the
wood. The bullets of the Chassepots even reached
the hill where the Commander-in-chief was watching

58 THE FEA2JC0-GEKMAN WAK,

the battle, and Prince Adalbert's horse was shot under
him.

Fresh forces were now at hand and drove the enemy-
back to his main position. St. Hubert had remained
in the hands of the Germans ; and thongh the survivors
there were only sufficient to serve one gun, still every
attempt to cross the exposed plateau proved a failure.
Thus hostilities ceased at this point also, at about five
o'clock in the afternoon, allowing the weary troops on
both sides to take breath and reorganize.

King William and his staff rode over to the hill on
the south of Malmaison at about the same hour, but
could see nothing of the situation of the left wing,
which was more than a mile away. The French ar-
tillery had ceased firing along the centre, from La Folie
to Point-du- Jour ; but to the northwards the thunder
of artillery was louder than ever. It was six o'clock,
the day was nearly at an end, and decided action must
at once be taken. The King therefore ordered the First
Army to advance once more, and for that purpose
placed the Second Corps, just arrived after a long
march, under the command of General von Steinmetz.

Those battalions of the Seventh Corps which could
still do good service, except five, which were kept in
reserve, were again sent up the Mance valley, and the
battalions from the Bois de Vaux came to their support
towards Point-du-Jour and the quarries. The Second
Corps of the French army thus attacked was now rein-
forced by Guard Voltigeur Division. All the reserves
were brought to the front. The artillery was more
rapidly served, and a destructive musketry fire was
directed on the advancing enemy. Then the French
on their side made an attack. A strong body of rifle-
men dispersed the smaller parties who were lying in
the open, destitute of commanders, and drove them

BATTLE OF GEAVELOTTE — ST. PEIVAT. 50

back to the wood. There, however, their advance was
checked, and there was still another army corps ready
for action.

The Second Corps, the last to come np by rail to the
seat of war, had up to this time followed in the wake
of the army by forced marches, but had not yet fought
in any engagement. It had started from Pont-a-Mous-
son at two p.m. and, taking the road by Buxieres and
Rezonville, arrived south of Gravelotte in the evening.
The Pomeranians were eager to get at the enemy with-
out delay.

It would have been better if the Chief of the Staff,
who was personally on the field at the time, had not
allowed this movement at so late an hour. A body of
troops, still completely intact, might have been of
great value the next day ; it was not likely this evening
to effect the issue.

Eushing out of Gravelotte, the foremost battalions
of the Second Corps pushed forward to the quarries,
and up to within a few hundred paces of Point-du-
Jour ; but those following were soon entangled in the
turmoil of the troops under fire south of St. Hubert,
and any further advance towards Moscow was arrested.
Darkness was falling, and friend became indistinguish-
able from foe. So the firing was stopped; but not
until ten o'clock did it entirely cease.

The advance of the Second Corps resulted in some
good, however, for these fresh troops could occupy the
fighting line for the night, while the mixed companies
of the Seventh and Eighth Corps were enabled to re-
form in their rear.

The whole course of the engagement had conclusively
proved that the position of the French left wing, made
almost impregnable by nature and art, could not be
shaken even by the most devoted bravery and the

60 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

greatest sacrifices. Both parties were now facing each
other in threatening proximity, and both fully able to
re-open battle next morning. The success of the day
must depend on events at the other end of the French
line.

The Prince of Wiii'temberg, standing at Ail, believed
that the hour had come for an attack on the French
right at about a quarter past five ; but that wing ex-
tended much further north than the line of his Guards,
further, indeed, than the French Commander-in-chief
himself was aware of. Though the Saxons had partici-
pated in the capture of Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes, the
Crown Prince deemed it necessary to assemble his
corps at the Bois d'Auboue, to attack the enemy in
flank. One of the brigades had to come from Jarny,
and one from Ste. Marie ; so, as the corps was late in
getting away from Mars-la-Tour, it was not expected
to be on the field for some hours yet.

The 4th Brigade of Foot Gruards, in obedience to
orders, proceeded in the direction of Jerusalem, im-
mediately south of St. Privat. As soon as General
von Manstein,in command of the Ninth Corps, observed
this, he ordered the 3rd Brigade of Guards, which had
been placed at his orders, to advance from Habonville
towards Amanvillers.

Between these two brigades marched the Hessians,
but it was not till half an hour later that the 1st Divi-
sion of Guards joined from Ste. Marie, marching on
St. Privat, on the left of the 2Dd. This attack was
dii'ected against the broad front of the French Fourth
and Sixth Corps. Their fortified positions at St. Privat
and Amanvillers had as yet hardly felt the fire of the
German batteries, which had found sufiicient employ-
ment in replying to the enemy's artillery outside the
villages.

BATTLE OF GKAVELOTTE — ST. PRIVAT. 61

Several ranks of riflemen, one above the other, were
placed in front of the French main position, on the
hedges and fences in a slope up the ridge. At their
back towered St. Privat, castle-like, with its massive
buildings, which were crowded by soldiers to the very-
roof. The open plain in front was thus exposed to an
overwhelming shower of projectiles.

The losses of the attacking Guards were, in fact,
enormous. In the course of half an hour five battal-
ions lost all, the others the greater part of their
officers, especially those of the higher grades. Thou-
sands of dead and wounded marked the track of the
troops, who, in spite of their losses, pressed forward.
The ranks, as fast as they were thinned, closed up
again, and! theii' compact formation was not broken
even under the leadership of young lieutenants and
ensigns. As they got nearer to the enemy the needle-
gun did good service. The French were di'iven from
all their foremost positions, where, for the most part,
they did not await the final struggle. By a quarter-
past six the battalions had advanced to within 600 to
800 paces of Amanvillers and St. Privat. The troops,
weary from long combat, halted under the steeper
slopes offering some, though small, protection, and in
the trenches just abandoned by the enemy. Only four
battalions now remained in reserve at Ste. Marie, be-
hind the German line, which now extended to a length
of 4000 paces. Every charge of the French cavalry
and of Cissy's division had been persistently repelled
with the aid of twelve batteries of the Guards, which
had now put in an appearance, but the German troops,
reduced, as they were, by untold losses, had to face
two French corps for thirty minutes longer before
reinforcements came to their aid.

It was nearly seven o'clock when, to the left of the

62 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Guards, two brigades of the Saxon infantry arrived
on the field ; the other two were still assembling in the
forest of Auboue; their artillery, however, had for
some time kept up a lively fire on Roncourt.

When Bazaine, at three o'clock, received word that
the Germans were extending the line to enclose his
right wing, he ordered Picard's division of the Grena-
dier Guards, posted at Plappeville, to advance to the
scene of action. Though the distance was no more
than a mile through the wooded valley on the right of
the highway, his all-important reinforcement had not
yet arrived at seven o'clock, and Marshal Canrobert,
who was hardly able, by the most strenuous efforts,
to check the advance of the Prussians, decided to rally
his troops closer to the fortified town of St. Privat.
The retreat from Roncourt was to be covered by a
small rear-guard, as the border of the Bois de Jaumont
was to be held.

Thus it happened that the Saxons found less resist-
ance at Roncourt than they expected, and entered the
town after a short struggle, together with the compa-
nies of the extreme left of the Guards ; part of them had
previously been diverted from the road to Roncourt
to assist the Guards, and marched dir^ect on St. Privat.

There terrible havoc was worked by the twenty-four
batteries of the two German corps. Many houses were
in flames, or falling in ruins under the shower of shell.
But the French were determined to defend this point,
where the fate of the day was to be decided to the last.
The batteries belonging to their right wing were placed
between St. Privat and the Bois de Jaumont, that is,
on the flank of the advancing Saxons. Others faced
the Prussians from the south, and as the German
columns came on side by side they were received by a
shower of bullets from the French rifles.

BATTLE OF GEAVELOTTE — ST. PKIVAT. 63

All these obstacles were defied in the onward rush,
though again under heavy losses, some stopping here
and there to fire a volley, others again never firing a
shot. By sundown they stood within 300 paces of St.
Privat. Some detachments of the Tenth Corps, who
were on the road to St. Ail, now joined them, and the
final onset was made from every side at once. The
French still defended the burning houses and the
church with gi-eat obstinacy, till, finding themselves
completely surrounded, they surrendered at about
eight o'clock. More than 2000 men were taken prison-
ers, and the wounded were rescued from the burning
houses.

The defeated remnant of the Fourth French Corps
retii^ed towards the valley of the Moselle, their retreat
being covered by the brigade occupying the Bois de
Jaumont and by the cavahy.

Only at that period did the Grenadier Guards put
in an appearance, drawing up the artillery reserves
east of Amanvillers. The German batteries at once
took up the fight, which lasted till late in the night,
and Amanvillers also was left burning.

Here the retirement of the Fourth French Corps had
already commenced, screened by repeated severe on»
slaughts ; the right wing of the Guards and the left of
the Ninth Corps had a hvely hand-to-hand encounter
with the enemy. Still the town remained in the hands
of the French for the night. Their Third Corps main-
tained their position at Moscow until three o'clock, and
the Second until five o'clock in the morning, though
engaged in constant frays with the outposts of the
Pomeranian Division, who eventually took possession
of the plateaus of Moscow and Point-du-Jour.

This success of the 18th August had only been made
possible by the preceding battles of the 14:th and 16th.

64 THE PEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

The French estimate their losses at 13,000 men. In
October 173,000 were still in Metz, which proves that
more than 180,000 French engaged in the battle of the
18th. The seven German corps facing them were
exactly 178,818 strong. Thus the French had been
diiven out of a position of almost unrivalled natural
advantages by a numerically inferior force. It is seK-
evident that the loss of the aggressors must have been
much greater than that of the defence ; it amounted
to 20,584 men, among them 899 officers.

Though the war establishment provides one officer
to every forty men, in this battle one officer had been
killed to every twenty- three ; a splendid testimony to
the example set by the officers to their brave men, but
a loss which could not be made good during the course
of the war. During the first fortnight of August, in
six battles the Germans had lost 50,000 men. It was
impossible at once to find substitutes, but new com-
panies were formed of time-expired soldiers.

The first thing to be done that same evening was to
move on the foremost baggage train, and the ambu-
lance corps from the right bank of the Moselle ; ammu-
nition was also served out aU round. In Rezonville,
which was crowded with the wounded, a little garret
for the King and quarters for the Staff had with much
difficulty been secured. The officers were engaged
throughout the night in studying the requirements
which the new situation created by the victory per-
emptorily demanded. AU these orders were placed
before his Majesty for approval by the morning of the
19th.

NEW DISTRIBUTION OF THE AEMY.

The siege of Metz had formed no part of the original
plan of campaign ; it had been intended to station a

REDISTEIBUTION OF THE FOECES. 65

corps of observation in the vicinity of this fortress,
while the main army should advance on Paris; the
reserve division, consisting of eighteen battalions, six-
teen squadrons, and thirty-six guns, detailed for that
duty, was now near at hand.

Under existing circumstances, however, the town
must be invested, and this necessitated a complete re-
distribution of the army.

A special army was formed for that purpose under
the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisting
of the First, Seventh, and Eighth Corps of the former
First Army, the Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth
Corps of the Second Army, the reserve division and
the 1st and 3rd Cavahy Divisions, in all 150,000 men.

The Ninth and the Twelfth Corps of The Gruards,
and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were placed
under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony,
and called " The Army of the Meuse " ; it was 138,000
strong. This and the Third Army, amounting to
223,000 men, were directed to advance against the
Trench reforming at Chalons^

The besieging force was still weaker than the block-
aded enemy. It was to be expected that the French
would renew their efforts to force their way westward.
Prince Frederick Charles' main forces were therefore
to remain on the left bank of the Moselle.

All these orders were signed by the King and dis-
patched to the officers in command by eleven o'clock.

Prince Frederick Charles now directed the Tenth
Corps to occupy the woodland districts of the Lower
Moselle as far as St. Privat, while the Second was to
take up its position on the high ridge between that
point and Moscow. The Seventh and Eighth Corps
joined them on the right, the first-named encamp-
ing on both sides of the IFpper Moselle. The First
5

66 THE FEANCO-GERMAK WAE.

Corps stood near Pouilly, to the left and right of the
Seille, especially commissioned to protect the great
magazines, which were to be established at Remilly
and Pont-a-Monsson. The 3rd Reserve Division pro-
ceeded to the vicinity of Retonfay, north-east of Metz.
The Ninth and Third Corps encamped at Ste. Marie and
Verneville in reserve. All these troops immediately
began to throw up earthworks and dig trenches, while
bridges were thrown over the Moselle above and below
the fortress.

The corps belonging to the Army of the Mense were
also set in motion, the Twelfth assembling at Conflans
and the Guards at Mars-la-Tour ; the Fourth Corps,
which had not been ordered to Metz, had already
reached Commercy.

The Third Army, after crossing the mountains and
leaving a Bavarian brigade to blockade Toul, had
advanced in three columns. Its foremost corps had
ah'eady reached the Meuse, but were obliged to encamp
there for two days, to cross with the rest of the Meuse
army near that point. Its cavalry meanwhile patroUed
the territory as far as Chalons and Vitry, and there,
for the first time since Worth, renewed acquaintance
with the enemy. The French encountered were only
outposts on the Marne railway linCj^'who retired as
soon as the transport service was finished.

THE AEMY OF CHIlONS.

Meanwhile a French army had formed at Chalons,
consisting of 166 battalions, 100 squadrons, and 380
guns, belonging to the First, Fifth, Seventh, and
Twelfth Corps.

The division originally stationed on the Spanish
frontier formed its nucleus, to which were added four
regiments of marine infantry and two divisions of

THE POSITION OF THE FBENCH. 67 .

cavalry, tlius constituting a very superior force. Gen-
eral Trochu, who had been made Governor of Paris,
had taken with him eighteen battalions of the Garde
Mohile^ they having behaved in such a refractory
manner that it would have been rash to confront them
with the enemy.

The Emperor had arrived in Chalons and placed
Marshal MacMahon in command of the newly-formed
army. At the Imperial head-quarters it was supposed,
and with good reason, that Marshal Bazaine was re-
treating from Metz. The army of Chalons could easily
unite with that of Bazaine by proceeding to Verdun,
only a distance of a few days' marches, and the com-
bined armies might indeed have held their own
against the victorious Germans. MacMahon, on the
other hand, had to provide for the defence of Paris,
and that capital, no less than his own right flank, was
threatened by the advance of the Crown Prince of
Prussia's army to the Meuse.

To enable MacMahon to decide whether he should
advance or again retire, it was necessary that the
direction taken by Marshal Bazaine should be known.

On the 18th Bazaine had sent word that he had
maintained his position in a battle near Rezonville,
but that the troops, before marching further, must
have food and ammunition. From this it seemed only
too probable that the communications of the Army of
the Rhine were already threatened, and MacMahon
determined to march on Rheims, whence he could
either reach Paris, though by a somewhat roundabout
way, or turn back and effect a junction with the other
army.

But when it became known that the Crown Prince
of Prussia's army had not even been near Metz, and
that Prussian cavahy had akeady appeared before

68 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAR.

Vitry, the Marshal recognized the danger of such an
undertaking. He therefore determined to march on
Paris, and very wisely refused to obey the order of the
Empress and the Ministerial Council when they desired
him to take the other course. Outside Paris he could
risk a battle with advantage, since the fortifications,
even in the event of defeat, guaranteed a safe retreat
and made j^ursuit impossible.

Additional reports from Metz did not help to clear
up the situation there. Even on the 18th " they had
held their ground," the narrative ran, " the right wing
alone had changed front ; the troops required two to
three days' rest," but the Marshal " was still determined
to press forward in a northerly direction," and fight
his way to Chalons, via Montmedy and Ste. Menehould,
" i/"" this road was not too strongly held by the enemy.
In that case he would march on Sedan, and even by
Mezieres on Chalons.

But Bazaine might already have begun this move-
ment, so MacMahon, who would not desert his com-
rades, abandoned the idea of marching directly on
Paris, and, on the 23rd, took the road to Stenay.

This sudden decision left no time for the dispositions
necessary for such an undertaking. 4-t the end of the
first day's march the troops arrived, late in the evening,
on the banks of the Suippe Eiver in a pouring rain.
They lacked every necessary, and two corps were en-
tirely without food. The Marshal was therefore forced
to move further northward to Rethel, where large
victualling magazines had been established, and whence
stores could be sent after them by rail. Even on the
third day's march the army had made little progress
eastward. The left wing was left at Rethel, the right
got as far as the Aisne, near Vouziers. On August
26th the main force was still standing between Attigny

THE AEMY IN THE EAST. 69

and Le Chene, on the Ardennes canal, while the Seventh
Corps and a regiment of hussars were posted in front
of Vonziers to cover the right flank„

While the French army was thus making a wide
detour to the east, the Grerman forces, which had been
put in motion at the same time, were marching in a
straight line westward.

According to orders issued from head-quarters at
Pont-a-Mousson, the advance on the enemy, who was
supposed to be at Chalons, was to be effected in such
a manner as to give the Third Army, marching on the
left of the Army of the Meuse, a day's start, so as to
attack the French wherever they might make a stand,
both in front and on the right flank, and thus force
them off the Paris route to the northward. The two
armies were to converge as they advanced, and to reach
the line of Ste. Menehould and Vitry on the 26th.

On the first day's march, the troops being still twelve
miles apart, they reached the Meuse ; on the second
day, the 24th, they were in a Hue formed by St. Dizier,
Bar le Due, and Verdun. The attempt to take Verdun
and Toul on their route proved futile.

The 4th Cavalry Division, which had greatly ex-
tended its reconnoitring expeditions, brought in im-
portant news even on that early date. The Rhenish
dragoons had discovered that Chalons and the camp
at Mourmelon were deserted, and, though the stores
in camp had been burnt, they found plenty of loot. A
letter, written by a French officer, had been intercepted,
which intimated that MacMahon purposed to relieve
Metz; and another stated that MacMahon was en-
trenched at Rheims with 150,000 men ; this was cor-
roborated by the Paris newspapers.

On the 25th the Army of the Meuse formed a line
reaching from Sommeille to Dombasle, while the fore-

70 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

most columns of the Third Army were already on the
route to St. Menehould and Vitry, one day ahead of
the prescribed order. The small fortress of Vitry,
having been previously vacated by a battalion of
Mobiles, surrendered to the 4th Cavahy Division. This
battalion, of 1000 men, fell into the hands of the 6th
Cavahy Division riding towards Dampierre as they
were marching to Ste. Menehould to take the railway
to Paris.

The 5th Cavalry Division reached Ste. Menehould,
and the 12th followed as far as Clermont, patrolling
the neighborhood up to Varennes, within two miles of
the French outposts at Grand Pre, but without learn-
ing anything about the operations of the French army.

Reconnoitring to any gi'eat distance on the right of
the army was made difficult by the forest of Argonnes,
which it would have been rash for the cavalry to
traverse unaided by infantry. The inhabitants of that
district also became troublesome. The Government
had provided them with arms, and organized a general
rising. The Germans, who up to that period had made
war on the Emperor alone, were now forced to use
their arms against the people. The Franc-tireurs,
though not affecting the operations on a large scale,
were a source of much annoyance to sm^ll expeditions ;
and as it naturally harassed the soldiers to feel that
they were not safe by day or night, the character of
the war became more embittered, and increased the
sufferings of the people.

A Paris telegram, sent via London, arrived this day
at head-quarters at Bar le Due. It stated that Mac-
Mahon was encamped at Eheims and anxious to effect
a junction with Bazaine.

It is always a serious matter to abandon, without
the most pressing necessity, a once settled and well-

THE GEEMAN ADVANCE. 71

devised plan for a new and unprepared scheme. It
would have been unjustifiable to entirely change the
line of march on the ground of rumors that might,
after all, prove unfounded. Endless difficulties must
result from such a course ; the arrangements for bring-
ing up baggage and reserves would have to be cancelled,
and the confidence of the troops in their commanders
was liable to be shaken if they were called upon to
perform fruitless marches. The orders issued at eleven
o'clock next day, therefore, directed only a slight devia-
tion from the route laid down towards Rheims instead
of Chalons. The cavalry, on the right wing, however,
was ordered to advance to Buzancy and Vouziers,
where a thorough insight into the situation might be
obtained.

In war, probabilities alone have often to be reckoned
with; and the probability, as a rule, is that the enemy
will do the riulit tlnng. It could not be thought prob-
able that the French army would leave Paris unpro-
tected and march by the Belgian frontier to Metz.
Such a move seemed strange and somewhat foolhardy ;
stiU it was possible. The Chief of the Staff, recogniz-
ing this fact, worked out a scheme of marches that
same day, by which the three corps of the Army of the
Meuse, together with the two nearest Bavarian corps,
could be brought together in the vicinity of DanviUers,
on the right bank of the Meuse, within three days.

These forces, with the two reserve corps left at Metz,
which could be brought into action, would constitute
a force of 150,000 men, who might give battle there,
or compel the enemy to do so a little further on at
Louguyon. Even without this reserve the advance of
the French could be checked before they could cross
the Meuse, while some other corps of the Third Army
was brought up.

72 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

This plan of action was soon to be carried out.
Fresh news arrived that same afternoon. The news-
papers let out the secret by publishing vehement
speeches delivered in the National Assembly to the
effect " that the French General, leaving his comrade
in the lurch, was bringing the curses of the country
upon his head."

It would be a disgi-ace, they said, to the French
nation to leave the brave Bazaine unsuccored; from
all this, and considering the effect of phrases on the
French, it was to be expected that military considera-
tions would give way to political. A telegram from
London, quoting the Paris Temps^ reported that Mac-
Mahon had suddenly resolved to hasten to the assist-
ance of Bazaine, though an abandonment of the road
to Paris placed the country in danger.

The King, before night, approved of the march to
the right, and the necessary orders to the commanders
of the corps were dispatched that night.

On the 26th his Majesty moved his head-quarters to
Clermont. The Crown Prince of Saxony had set out
for Varennes early in the morning with the Twelfth
Corps, while he ordered the Gruards to Dombasle, and
the Fourth Corps to Fleury.

The cavalry, sent forward in every direction, found
that the enemy had evacuated the Suippe Valley and
had not yet entered that of the Meuse ; that Buzancy
and Grrand Pre were in the hands of the French, and
that their Seventh Corps were encamped in consider-
able force on the heights of Vouziers.

A small detachment of cavalry proceeded to that
point for observation, and theii* mere appearance
occasioned an almost unaccountable excitement.

General Douay, quartered at Vouziers, received the
most exaggerated reports, and must have thought that

MACMAHON'S MOVEMENTS. 73

a general attack by the G-erman army was imminent.
The Seventh Corps was kept under arms the entire
night, though it was raining in torrents, and the Mar-
shal resolved to advance towards Vouziers and Buzancy
with all his forces next morning. Thus the march to
the east was brought to an end as early as the 27th,
but it was soon discovered that these rumors were
unfounded.

The German generals were not less interested in
gaining a thorough knowledge of the enemy's move-
ments than the French staff was in knowing those of
the Germans. If the enemy had handled their cavalry
well on their right flank, a surprise like that above
mentioned would have been impossible, but the 1st
French Cavalry Division was placed on the left, where
there was no danger whatever, and the 2nd were in
their rear.

It seemed as though they had paid less attention to
repelling an attack than to evading one, and reaching
Montmedy, the point of rendezvous with Bazaine,
unobserved.

At this period, when the advance of the G^ermans
from the south could no longer be doubted, it would
have been best for the French to tui-n against them
and strike a decisive blow, or at least to clear them
out of the way of their own line of march. If they
had failed in this, they would at any rate have learned
that their undertaking was impracticable and its con-
tinuation sure to lead to a catastrophe.

It must, however, be admitted that the German
cavalry formed an almost impenetrable screen. The
Marshal could not know that the Germans were eche-
loned from Vitry to Varennes (a distance of eight
miles), and were not at all in a position to attack him
on the spot.

74 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAH.

(August 27tli.) On this day, as soon as the Marshal
had discovered his error, he continued his march, with
part of his troops at least. The Seventh and Fifth
Corps were directed to cover the movement at Vouziers
and Buzancy, the Twelfth advanced to Le Chene and
the 1st Cavalry Division to Beaumont, probably to
ascertain when Marshal Bazaine would arrive. The
First Corps and the 2nd Cavahy Division remained
by the Aisne.

The Saxons, the foremost of the German corps, had
received explicit orders to proceed to Dun on that day,
and occupy the right bank of the Meuse as far as
Stenay in order to secure a crossing. They reached
Stenay at three o'clock in the afternoon, and sent an
advanced post across the river.

The cavalry hung on to the heels of the enemy and
followed all their movements, often engaging in small
skirmishes. The departure of the Fifth French Corps
from Buzancy for Le Chene was at once discovered,
and so was the advance to Beaumont ; the Saxon cav-
alry division was in consequence sent on that evening
to Nouart. The Bavarian Corps reached the Clermont-
Verdun road, the 5th Ste. Menehould ; the other corps
of the Third Army followed by forced marches north-
wards. ""

It now seemed certain that it would be possible to
meet the enemy on the left bank of the Meuse. Word
was sent to the army before Metz, that the two corps
asked for were no longer required, but they had mean-
while set out.

The latest dispositions made by Marshal MacMahon
indicated that he was making a last effort to proceed
on the pre-arranged lines. He was moving in echelon
on the northernmost road to Metz, but had left a strong
reserve corps on the Aisne to check a possible attack.

OBDERED TO EELIEVE BAZAINE. 75

Wlien lie now learned that nothing had been seen of the
Army of the Rhine at Montmedy, but that it was still
at Metz, he resolved on retreat, and, after giving orders
to that effect for next morning, reported his intentions
to Paris.

From thence, during the night, came the most urgent
remonstrances. The Minister of War telegraphed, "If
you leave Bazaine in the lurch, revolution will break
out," and the Ministerial Council issued a peremptory
order to relieve Metz. The troops in front of him,
they said, were only part of the investing army ; the
Crown Prince of Prussia was still several days' march
in the rear, and Greneral Vinoy had already started
from Rheims with the newly-formed Thirteenth Corps
to protect Paris.

The Marshal silenced his military convictions and
issued new orders, but the troops had started betimes.
The change of route gave rise to mucli confusion ; the
roads were bad, and quarters for the night were not
reached until darkness had long set in ; the men were
weary, wet to the skin, and depressed in spirits.

(August 28th.) Hardly two miles' progress had been
made east. The Twelfth Corps stood at La Besace,
the First was on the way to Le Chene, the Seventh
had halted at Boult aux Bois, its commander having
been misinformed that two Prussian corps were occu-
pying Buzancy, a little further on. On the strength
of this report the Fifth Corps advanced on that town,
by way of Bar, but went on to Bois-des-Dames in the
afternoon. These movements were not interfered
with. The G-erman cavalry had express orders to re-
strict itseK to reconnoitring, and, while following the
French as closely as possible, not in any way to check
or press them. In consequence of these orders, the
Saxon cavalry evacuated Nouart on the approach of

76 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

the enemy. The Grermans were not yet prepared for
action till the Third Army had arrived ; and the rear
of that force, formed by the Sixth Corps, had only
just reached Ste. Menehould.

(Ang:ust 29th.) It was therefore decided that a non-
offensive attitude should be preserved. Even on the
29th a decisive move was deferred until the 30th.

The Marshal, in his head-quarters at Stonne, had
been informed that the Germans occupied Dun, and
that the bridges over the Meuse had been destroyed.
The French had no pontoon-train, and there were no
means of crossing the river excepting lower down, at
Mouzon and Villers. His Twelfth Corps and the 1st
Cavahy Division succeeded in effecting their passage
at these points ; the First Corps and the 2d Cavalry
Division proceeded to Roncourt.

The Seventh Corps, delayed in its progi'ess by skir-
mishing on its right flank, did not reach its quarters
at La Besace, but bivouacked at Oches. The Fifth
Corps was to proceed to Beaumont, but the staff officer
carrying the order fell into the hands of the Prussian
cavalry, together with his escort. General de Failly
therefore marched to Stenay, according to his original
instructions.

Up to this time the cavalry of the Saxon corps
alone had come into contact with the enemy, but the
Guards now relieved it at Buzancy, while the cavalry
recrossed to the left bank of the Meuse at Dun. Their
advanced guard at once took possession of the wooded
spur to the north-east of Nouart, repelled the French
cavahy, and pressed ahead to Champy, where they
encountered a strong force. This was Lespart's divis-
ion. The purpose of the reconnoissance had been
attained, and the advanced guard withdrew. The
French having meanwhile received fresh orders from

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT. 77

MacMahon, marched off at the same time in a northerly
direction.

Four corps of the Third G-erman Army were now
within two miles of the rear of the Army of the Meuse.
The 5th Cavalry Division stood at Attigny across the
enemy's lines of communication ; the 6th was following
on the heels of the French, and, besides other exploits,
had taken Boucq with a dismounted party. The Royal
head-quarters were now established at Grand Pre, and
upon receipt of the various reports it was decided to
attack the French on the following day, before they
could cross the Meuse. The Army of the Meuse was
to press forward towards Beaumont, the Third to take
the route between that place and Le Chene. To insure
the simultaneous arrival of both bodies, the right wing
was not to move until ten o'clock, while the left began
the march before six o'clock. Only those sections of the
train absolutely necessary for battle were to follow.

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT.

(August 30th.)

On the 30th of August, at ten o'clock, the King pro-
ceeded to Sommauthe rid Buzancy.

Both Bavarian corps were marching by the same
route, the Fifth Corps advanced in the centre towards
Oches, the Eleventh and the Wiirtemberg division
were on the way to Le Chene, the Sixth to Vouziers.
The Fourth Corps on the right was advancing by
Belval, and the Twelfth followed the course of the
Meuse, with the Guards as a reserve in the rear.

Marshal MacMahon had issued orders that his entire
army was to concentrate this day on the right bank
of the Meuse, only the baggage and ambulance were
to remain.

78 THE FKANCO-GEKMAJST WAE.

This First Corps and the 2nd Cavahy Division had
left Roncourt at the early hour of seven ; they crossed
at Reniilly, pontoon bridges had been thrown over for
the infantry.

The Seventh Corps at Oches struck camp still earlier,
at four o'clock, but as its commander insisted on tak-
ing the entire train, even empty wagons, it formed a
column of two miles in length, and seven of its battal-
ions were forced to march off the road to protect them.
The rear-guard, consisting of one brigade, was unable
to start before ten o'clock. This long procession soon
came into contact with the Prussian cavalry and the ar-
tillery following, who by their fire forced the brigade to
retire. Not till one o'clock could the march to La Besace
be resumed, and as heavy firing was constantly heard
from Beaumont, General Douay conceived it right to
abandon the road to Mouzon and take that to Remilly.

The Fifth Corps, as had been foreseen, was destined
to cover the withdrawal of the other two. These troops
had reached the vicinity of Beaumont only at four
A.M., and were thoroughly exhausted by the fighting
and night march.

General de Fa illy therefore determined to give his
men time to cook a meal before proceeding. Pre-
cautionary measures seem to have been altogether
neglected, though he must have known that the enemy
was near at hand, and at half -past one, while the officers
and m.en were at dinner, the Prussian shell dropped
into the lines of the incautious enemy.

The two corps on the German right had to move
upon four quite separate columns through the woods,
and over roads made heavy by rain. The Crown
Prince of Saxony therefore ordered that neither of the
columns should attempt to attack before the support-
ing column was ready to assist.

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT. 79

The Fourtli Corps had got off very early, and after
a short rest proceeded on its way at ten o'clock.
When at noon the advanced gnard of the 8th Division
left the forest, they discovered, from their elevated
position, the camp of the enemy about 800 paces away,
employed as above described. Greneral von Scholer
would not lose such an opportunity ; at all events the
presence of his force could not long be concealed, so
he made it known by the fire of guns.

He was soon made aware that he had attacked an
enemy of superior strength. The French immediately
took up arms and sent swarms of riflemen to the front,
who, with their long-ranged Chassepots, did great ex-
ecution, especially among the artillery. The main body
of the 8th Division had meanwhile come up, and ere
long the 7th Division appeared on the right. The
French attacked these too with great impetuosity, and
could only be repulsed with the bayonet. Presently,
however, the foremost battalions of both divisions
made their way into the French camp in front of
Beaumont, into the town itself, and finally into a
second camp north of that place. Seven guns, of
which the teams were missing, and which continued
firing up to the last moment, a number of gunners,
wagons a,nd horses, fell into the hands of the assailants.

Whilst thus, at two o'clock, the infantry were for a
time in action, fourteen batteries of the Fourth Corps,
drawn up on the heights north of Beaumont, were en-
gaged in a duel with the French artillery. The Saxon
artillery soon came up on the right, and the Bavarian
on the left. This formidable artillery line, constantly
advancing in echelon, presently silenced the mitrail-
leuses, and at three o'clock the remaining French bat-
teries also went out of action.

The Second Bavarian Corps had advanced on La

80 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

Thibaudine, on the left of the Prussian Fourth, when
it was suddenly attacked by a strong body of French
coming from the west.

These belonged to Conseil Dumesnil's division of
the Seventh French Corps, and were " still proceeding
to Mouzon, according to their original marching
orders. They were no less surprised than the Bava-
rians, who attacked them in front and flank. They
gave up all hope of cutting their way through, and at
about four o'clock beat a hasty retreat northwards,
leaving two guns behind.

The Bavarians had in the meantime taken possession
of the Farm of Thibaudine, and the Prussians of Har-
noterie. The wooded hills prevented a clear view of
the surrounding country ; the enemy had completely
disappeared.

General de Failly was making strenuous efforts to
collect his scattered forces at Mouzon, under cover of
his rear-guard stationed at La Sartelle ; and Greneral
Lebrun, of the Twelfth French Corps, sent an infantry
and a cavalry brigade and three batteries back across
the Meuse to his assistance.

The 8th Division, headed by the 13th Brigade,
worked wearily through the dense forest of Grivodeau,
on its way to operate against this ne^ defensive posi-
tion. This was at five o'clock. On emerging from the
wood the battalions, who had fallen into some confu-
sion, were received by a heavy fire at short range.
The riflemen made several fruitless attempts to ad-
vance, and the dense underwood prevented a closer
formation of troops in rear. By the time the Saxon
Corps had succeeded, by gi'eat exertions, in extricating
itself from the forest and swamp by the Wamme, and
finally reaching Letanne, the impracticability of further
progi'ess in the Meuse valley became apparent, since

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT. 81

French batteries, in impregnable positions, commanded
the low ground beyond the river. The troops there-
fore ascended the plateau, and followed the 8th Divis-
ion through the Grivodeau woods, increasing the force
on the northern border, where, however, the develop-
ment of a broader front was impossible. At about
six o'clock the infantry engagement ceased for a time
at this point.

The 14th Brigade had come into line on the left of
the 13th, followed by the 8th Division, in two columns.

The 93rd Eegiment had stormed the hill to the
north-east of Yoncq, and pursued the enemy to the
foot of Mont-de-Brune. The Anhalters captured four
mitraiUeuses and eight guns, some of them with their
entire teams.

When, at half -past five, the artillery were in position,
and at the same time the 27th Regiment was approach-
ing, General Zychlinski advanced to the main attack.

The French occupied the entirely isolated hill-top
with a strong body of troops ; their batteries faced the
Bois de Givodeau on the east, whence an assault was
imminent, but when the 93rd and the 2nd Battalion of
the 27th advanced on them from the south they changed
front towards their aggressors, and opened upon them
a heavy fire. The Fusilier battalion was at the same
time approaching from the west. Regardless of their
losses, the assailants eagerly scaled the hiU-sides, with
the brigadiers and colonels at their head. Six French
guns were seized while in action, in spite of a brave
resistance from the gunners and their escorts, the
enemy was pursued as far as the Roman road, and
four more guns, completely horsed and equipped, which
had been abandoned by the French, fell into the hands
of the victorious troops.

The three battalions hurried on towards Mouzon,
6

82 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

without waiting for the 14th Brigade, who were fol-
lowing in rear, but they suddenly found themselves
threatened by a cavalry charge.

Marshal MacMahon had recognized the fact that the
best thing he could do was to effect as orderly a retreat
as possible from the left bank of the Meuse ; the rein-
forcements sent across had akeady been recalled.
The 5th Cuirassier Regiment alone remained. When a
little to the north of the Faubourg de Mouzon, they
came within range of the shot of the advancing Prus-
sians, and fearlessly faced the enemy.

The 10th company of the 27th Regiment received
the first onslaught. The men, without rushing for-
ward, waited for the signal of their leader, Captain
Helmuth, and when the enemy was within short range,
fired a volley. Eleven officers and 100 men fell, includ-
ing their brave commander, who was killed fifteen yards
in front of his men. The survivors rushed back to the
Meuse, and, as all the pontoon bridges had been re-
moved, they tried to gain the opposite side by swim-
ming.

The French were still in front of Mouzon in consid-
erable numbers, and the batteries of the Fourth Corps
now arrived one by one, and opened a heavy fire on
them. Two Bavarian batteries took "^ the bridge at
Villers, lower down the river, and stopped the way.
Then the suburb was taken, after a fierce encounter in
and about the houses, and here too the bridge was
occupied. The enemy, deprived of every means of
retreat, received the 8th Division, emerging from the
valley of the Yoncq, with a hot fire, but were gradually
driven back to the river. The French sections in front
of the Bois de Grivodeau, too, were hopelessly commit-
ted, and when the 7th Division and Twelfth Corps
charged upon them, were dispersed, in spite of an

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT. 83

obstinate resistance. When darkness set in the French
gave up the fight on this side of the Meuse. Many of
the stragglers were taken prisoners, others hid them-
selves in the copses and farm-houses, or tried to escape
by swimming the river.

In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the loss of
the assailants far exceeded that of the defenders. The
Army of the Meuse lost 3500 men, the Fourth Corps
being the principal sufferer. The French estimated
their loss at 1800 killed; but 3000 prisoners, mostly
wounded, fell into the hands of the Germans, with 51
guns, 33 ammunition and other wagons, and a mili-
tary chest, containing 150,000 francs. And, what was
worse, this battle had forced them on to most unfavor-
able ground.

While the Fourth Corps had fought the battle of the
day almost single-handed, the Saxon cavalry had made
good progress on the right bank of the Meuse, and
reconnoitred towards Mouzon and Carignan. The
Guards had reached Beaumont, and General von der
Tann, with the First Bavarian Corps, was at Roncouft,
marching by way of La Besace, with some slight skir-
mishing on the way. The Second Corps concentrated
at Sommauthe, the Fifth at Stonne, the Eleventh at
La Besace. Thus seven corps now stood in close com-
munication between the Meuse and the Bar.

The King rode back to Buzancy after the battle, as
all villages in the vicinity had been turned into hos-
pitals. Here, as previously at Clermont, was felt the
great inconvenience of inadequate lodging for hundreds
of iUustrious personages and their suites, when, for
once in a way, and for military reasons, head-quarters
were established in a small village, instead of in a large
town.

Quarters for those officers whose duty it was to

84 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

prepare the necessary orders for the morrow, were
only found late at night, and with considerable diffi-
culty.

The orders, worked out during the night, were that
two corps of the Army of the Meuse should cross over
to the right bank on the 31st, to prevent the further
progress of the French to Metz via Montmedy, should
such a movement be undertaken. Two corps of the
besieging army were posted at Etain and Briey. The
Third Army was to continue northwards.

As circumstances now stood, it already seemed pos-
sible that the Army of Chalons might be compelled to
retire to neutral territory, and the Belgian Govern-
ment was therefore asked, through diplomatic chan-
nels, to look to their disarmament should this come to
pass. The German troops had orders to at once cross
the Belgian frontier should the enemy refuse to disarm.

While the Fifth French Corps were still fighting at
Beaumont, and before the rest of the army had crossed
the Meuse, General MacMahon had given orders that it
was to concentrate on Sedan.

He did not intend to offer battle there, but it was
indispensable to give his troops a short rest, and pro-
vide them with food and ammunition. Later on he
meant to retreat via Mezieres, whither General Vinoy
was just then proceeding with the newly-formed
Thirteenth Corps. The First Corps, which had arrived
at Carignan early in the afternoon, detached two of its
divisions to Douzy in the evening to check any further
advance of the Germans.

Though pursuit immediately after the battle was
prevented by the intervening river, the retreat of the
French soon assumed the character of a rout. The
troops were worn out with their efforts by day and
night, in continuous rain, and with but scanty sup-

EETKEAT ON SEDAN. 85

plies of food. The marching to and fro, to no visible
purpose, had undermined their confidence in their lead-
ers, and a series of defeats had shaken their self-reli-
ance.

Thousands of fugitives, crying for bread, crowded
round the wagons as they made their way to the little
fortress which had so unexpectedly become the central
goal of a vast army.

The Emperor Napoleon arrived there from Carignan
late in the evening ; the Seventh Corps reached Floing
during the night of the 31st, but the Twelfth Corps
did not arrive at Bazeilles until the following day.
The Fifth Corps mustered at the eastern suburb of
Sedan in a shocking condition, followed in the after-
noon by the First, which drew up behind the Grivonne
Valley after many rear-guard actions with the G-erman
cavalry. It was impossible to proceed to Mezieres
that day ; but the Twelfth Corps had that same even-
ing to face the Germans at Bazeilles, where the sound
of firing announced their arrival. Even the order to
destroy the bridges there and at Donchery was neg-
lected, owing to the worn-out condition of the men.

(August 31st.) The Gruards and the 12th Cavahy
Division, which formed part of the Ai-my of the
Meuse, had crossed that river at Pouilly, by a pontoon
bridge constructed at Letanne, and then scoured the
country between the Meuse and the Chiers. Following
close upon the rear of the French and harassing them
till they reached their new position, they succeeded in
taking many of the stragglers. The Gruards crossed
the Chiers at Carignan and halted at Sachy; the
Twelfth fell back on the Meuse near Douzy, while its
advanced guard pushed on past Francheval. The
Fourth Corps remained at Mouzon.

The 4th Cavahy Division of the Third Army took

86 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAIL.

the direct route to Sedan, drove back the French out-
posts from Wadelincourt and Frenois, and from
thence took possession of the railroad under the fire
of their artillery. The 6th Cavalry Division, on the
left, reached Poix, on the way to Mezieres.

When the First Bavarian Corps reached Remilly
before noon, it came under the heavy fire from the
opposite side of the river, and at once brought up its
batteries in position on the near slope of the valley.
A furious cannonade ensued, in which finally sixty
guns engaged on the side of the Bavarians. The
French now only tried to blow up the railway bridge
south of Bazeilles, but the well-directed shots of the
4th Jager battalion di-ove off the men, the Jagers threw
the powder-barrels into the river, and at midday crossed
the bridge. The battalion entered Bazeilles in the face
of a shower of bullets and occupied the northern
quarter of the straggling little town.

Thus the Twelfth French Corps was forced to draw
up between Balan and La Moncelle, where, after being
reinforced by batteries from the First Corps, it faced,
with an expenditure of considerable forces, the bold
little troop of Germans.

General von der Tann did not think it expedient,
however, to engage, on that day and'^at that point,
in serious conflict with an enemy in a concentrated
position, and, seeing that there was no chance of being
reinforced, he withdrew from Bazeilles at about half-
past three, without being pursued.

Meanwhile two pontoon bridges had been laid, with-
out interference from the French, at Allicourt. These
and the bridge south of Bazeilles were barricaded for
the night, while eighty-four guns secured the passage.

The Eleventh Corps marched towards Donchery, to
the left of the Bavarians, followed by the Fifth. The

THE GEKMAN ADVANCE. 87

advanced guard found the village unoccupied, and
spread itself on the other side of the river. Tvi^o more
bridges were thrown across below Sedan before three
o'clock, whilst the railway bridge above, which was
unprotected, was destroyed.

The Wiirtemberg and the 6th Cavalry Division on
the extreme left, came in contact with the Thirteenth
French Corps, which had just arrived at Mezieres.

The King removed his head-quarters to Vendresse.

In spite of long and sometimes forced marches in
bad weather, with little by way of supplies beyond
what could be requisitioned, the Army of the Meuse
on the east, and the Third Army on the south, were
now close in front of the combined forces of the French.

Marshal MacMahon must have known that the only
chance of safety for his army, or even part of it, was
to continue immediately the retrograde movement on
that day, September 1st. Of course the Crown Prince
of Prussia, who held the key to every passage over the
Meuse, would have fallen on the flank of the retiring
army, and would have pursued it to the frontier, a
distance of little more than a mile. That the attempt
was not risked is probably owing to the state of the
worn-out troops. They were as yet incapable of a
retreat in close order; they could only fight where
they stood.

The Grermans, on their side, still believed that the
enemy would make for Mezieres. The Army of the
Meuse was instructed to attack them in their position
and detain them there ; the Third Army to press ahead
on the right side of the river, leaving only one corps
on the left bank.

The rear of the French was protected by the fortress
of Sedan. The Meuse and the valleys of the Givonne
and the Floing offered formidable obstructions, but

88 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

this line of defence must be obstinately held. The
Calvary of Illy was one of their most important points,
strengthened as it was by the Bois de la Garenne in its
rear, whence a ridge extends to Bazeilles and offers
protection in its numerous dips and shoulders. The
road ran past Illy, should it become necessary to enter
neutral territory. Bazeilles, on the other hand, which,
as regards situation, formed a strong point of appui
for the line facing the Grivonne, stands on a promon-
tory, which, after the loss of the bridges across the
Meuse, was open to attack on two sides.

BATTLE OF SEDAN.

(September 1st.)

In order to co-operate with the Army of the Meuse
and hem in the French in their position, General von
der Tann sent his first brigade over the pontoon
bridges towards Bazeilles by four o'clock in the morn-
ing in a thick mist. The troops attacked the town,
but found the streets barricaded, while they were fired
on from every house. The company at the head
pressed forward to the north gate, suffering great
losses, but the others were driven out of the western
part of BazeiUes, while engaged in street fighting, on
the arrival of the 2nd Brigade of the French Twelfth
Corps. However, they kept possession of the build-
ings at the southern end of the town and from thence
issued to repeated assaults. As fresh troops were
constantly coming up on both sides, and the French
even were reinforced by a brigade of the First and one
of the Fifth Corps, the murderous combat lasted for
many hours with wavering success ; the fight for the
Villa Beurmann, situated near the end of the high
street and commanding its whole length, was especially

BATTLE OF SEDAN. 89

fierce. The citizens took active part iu the struggle,
and they too had to be shot down.

The strong array of guns drawn up on the left ridge
of the valley of the Meuse could not be brought to bear
on the crowded streets of Bazeilles, now blazing in
several places, but when, at eight o'clock, the 8th
Prussian Division had arrived at Eemilly, General von
der Tann ordered his last brigade into action. The
walled park of Monvillers was stormed and an entrance
gained to Villa Beuraiann. The artillery crossed the
bridges at about nine o'clock, and the 8th Division were
required to give their aid in a struggle begun by the
Bavarians at La Moncelle, to the south of Bazeilles.

Prince George of Saxony had dispatched an ad-
vanced guard of seven battalions from Douzy in that
direction at five o'clock in the morning. They di'ove
the French from La Moncelle, pressed ahead to Pla-
tinerie and the bridge situated there, and, in spite of a
hot and steady fire, took possession of the houses on
the other side of the Givonne, which they immediately
occupied for defensive purposes. Communication with
the Bavarians was now established and the battery of
the advanced guard drawn up on the eastern slope ; but
the brave assailants could not be immediately rein-
forced by infantry.

Marshal MacMahon had been struck by a splinter
from a shell at La Moncelle at 6 a.m. He nominated
General Ducrot as his successor in command, passing
over the claims of two senior leaders. When General
Ducrot received the news at seven o'clock, he issued
orders for concentrating the army at Illy, and for an
immediate retreat upon Mezieres. Of his own corps
he dispatched Lartigue's division to cover the passage
at Daigny ; Lacretelle and Bassoigne were ordered to
assume the offensive against the Bavarians and Saxons,

90 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

SO as to gain time for the rest of the troops to retire.
The divisions forming the second hne immediately
began to move towards the north.

The Minister of War had appointed General von
Wimpffen, recently back from Algiers, to the com-
mand of the Fifth Corps, vice General de Failly, and
had also empowered him to assume the chief command
in case the Marshal should be disabled.

General von Wimpffen knew the army of the Crown
Prince to be in the neighborhood of Donchery, he re-
garded the retreat to Mezieres as an impossibility, and
was bent on the diametrically opposite course of forc-
ing his way to Carignan, not doubting that he could
rout the Bavarians and Saxons, and so effect a junc-
tion with Marshal Bazaine. When he heard of the
orders just issued by General Ducrot, and, at the same
time, observed that an assault upon the Germans in
La Moncelle seemed to turn in his favor, he deter-
mined, in an evil hour, to exercise his authority.

General Ducrot submitted without any remon-
strance ; he was perhaps not averse to being relieved
of so heavy a responsibihty. The divisions of the
second line who were about to start were ordered back ;
and the weak advance of the Bavarians and Saxons
were soon hard pressed by the first lihe, who at once
attacked them.

By seven in the morning one regiment of the Saxon
advanced guard had marched to the taking of La
Moncelle ; the other had been busy with the threatening
advance of Lartigue's division on the right. Here the
firing soon became very hot. The regiment had
marched without knapsacks, and neglected previously
to take out their cartridges. Thus they soon ran
short of ammunition, and tl^e repeated and violent on-
slaught of the Zouaves, directed principally against

BATTLE OF SEDAN. 91

the unprotected right, had to be repulsed with the
bayonet.

On the left a strong artillery .line had gradually
been formed, and by half -past eight o'clock amounted
to twelve batteries. But Lacretelle's division was now
approaching on the Givonne lowlands, and dense
swarms of tirailleurs forced the Grerman batteries to
retire at about nine o'clock. The gunners withdrew
to some distance, but then turned about and re-opened
fire on the French, and after driving them back into
the valley returned to their original position.

The 4th Bavarian Brigade had meanwhile reached
La Moncelle, and the 46th Saxon Brigade was coming
up, so the small progress made by Bassoigne's division
was checked.

The right wing of the Saxon contingent, which had
been hardly pressed, now received much-needed sup-
port from the 24th Division, and they at once assumed
the offensive. The French were driven back upon
Daigny, and lost five guns in the struggle. Then join-
ing the Bavarians, who were pushing on through the
valley to the northward, after a sharp fight, Daigny,
the bridge and farmstead of La Eapaille were taken.

It was now about ten o'clock, and the Guards had
arrived at the Upper Givonne. They had started be-
fore it was light, marching in two columns, when the
sound of heavj" firing reached them from Bazeilles and
caused them to quicken their step. In order to render
assistance by the shortest road, the left column would
have to cross two deep ravines and the pathless wood
of Chevallier, so they chose the longer route by ViUers-
Cernay, which the head of the right column had passed
in ample time to take part in the contest between the
Saxons and Lartigue's division, and to capture two
French guns.

S2 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAB.

The divisions ordered back by General Ducrot had
ah'eady resumed their position at the western slope,
and the 14th Battery of the Guards now opened fire
upon them from the east.

At the same hour (ten o'clock) the Fourth Corps and
the 7th Division had arrived at Lamecourt, and the
8th at Remilly, both situated below BazeiUes ; the ad-
vanced guard of the 8th stood at the Remilly railway
station.

The first attempt of the French to break through to
Carignan eastwards had proved a failure, and their re-
treat to Mezieres on the west had also been cut off, for
the Fifth and Eleventh Corps of the Third Army, to-
gether with the Wiirtemberg division, had received
orders to move northward by that route. These
troops had struck camp before daybreak, and at six
o'clock had crossed the Meuse at Donchery, and by
the three pontoon bridges further down the river.
The advanced patrols found the road to Mezieres clear
of the enemy, and the heavy shelling, heard from the
direction of Bazeilles, made it appear probable that
the French had accepted battle in their position at
Sedan. The Crown Prince, therefore, ordered the two
corps, that had arrived at Brigne, to march to the
right on St. Menges ; the Wiirtembergers were to re-
main to keep watch over Mezieres. General von
Kirchbach then pointed out Fleigneux to his advanced
guard as the next objective, to cut off the retreat of
the French into Belgium, and maintain a connection
with the right wing of the Army of the Meuse.

The narrow roadway between the hills and the river
leading to St. Albert, about 2000 paces distant, was
neither held nor watched by the French. It was not
till the advanced guard reached St. Menges that they
encountered a French detachment, which soon with-

BATTLE OF SEDAN. 93

drew. The Germans then deployed in the direction
of Illy, two companies on the right taking possession
of Floing, where they kept up a gallant defence for
two hours without assistance against repeated attacks.

The first Prussian batteries that arrived had to exert
themselves to the utmost to hold out against the larger
force of French artillery drawn up at Illy. At first
they were only protected by cavalry and a few com-
panies of infantry, and as this cavalry managed to
issue from the defile of St. Albert, it found itself the
misleading object of attack, for the Margueritte Cav-
alry Division halted on the lUy plateau. General
Galliffet, commander of the division, at nine o'clock
formed his three regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique and
two squadrons of Lancers into three divisions, and
gave the order to charge. Two companies of the 87th
Eegiment were the first in the line ; they allowed the
cavalry to approach within sixty paces, and then fired
a volley which failed to stop them. The 1st Division
rode on a little further, then wheeled outward to both
flanks, and came upon the fire of the supports estab-
lished in the copse. The Prussian batteries, too, sent
a shower of shrapnel into their midst, when they finally
retired to seek protection in the Bois de Garenne, while
a trail of dead and wounded marked their way.

About half an hour later, that is at ten o'clock, and
at the same time when the assaults of the French in
Bazeilles and at Daigny were being repulsed, fourteen
batteries of the Eleventh Corps were erected on and
beside the hill range south-east of St. Menges ; those of
the Fifth Corps were soon added to this artillery park.
Thus, with the powerful infantry columns advancing
upon Fleigneux, the investing fine di'awn around
Sedan was nearly completed. The Bavarian corps
and the artillery reserves remaining on the left em-

94 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAR. '

bankment of the Meuse, were considered strong enough
to repel any attempt of the French to break through
in that direction. Five corps were standing on the
right bank, ready for concentric attack.

The Bavarians and Saxons, reinforced by the ad-
vanced guard of the Fourth Corps, issued from the
burning town of Bazeilles and from Moncelle, and
di-ove sections of the French Twelfth Corps, in spite
of a stubborn resistance, from the east of Balan back
to Fond de Givonne.

Having thus taken possession of the spur of Illy,
while awaiting a fresh attack of the French, the most
necessary step now was to reform the troops, which
were in much confusion.

As soon as this was done the 5th Bavarian Brigade
advanced on Balan. The troops found but a feeble
resistance in the village itself ; but it was only after a
hard fight that they were allowed to occupy the park
of the Castle, situated at the extreme end. From
thence, soon after midday, the foremost battaUon got
close to the walls of the fortress, and exchanged shots
with the garrison. The French were now trying to
take up a position at Fond de Givonne, and a steady
fire was opened on both sides. At ^ one o'clock the
French had e\adently received reinforcements, and
when, after the artillery and mitrailleuses had done
some preliminary work, they assumed the offensive,
the 5th Bavarian Brigade was driven back for some
little distance, but assisted by the 6th, regained its old
position after an hour's hard fighting. Meanwhile the
Saxon corps had spread itself in the northern part of
the valley towards Givonne. There the foremost com-
panies of the Guards were already established, as also
in Haybes. The Prussian artillery forced the French
batteries to change their positions more than once,

BATTLE OF SEDAN. 95

and several of them had ah'eady gone out of action.
To gain an opening here, the French repeatedly tried
to send ahead large bodies of tirailleurs, and ten guns
were got into Givonne, after it had been occupied, but
these were taken before they could unhmber. The
Prussian shells also fell with some effect among the
French troops massed in the Bois de la Garenne,
though fired from a long range.

After the Franctireurs de Paris had been diiven out
of Chapelle, the cavalry of the Guard advanced through
Givonne and up the valley, and at noon the hussars
had succeeded in establishing a connection with the
left wing of the Third Army.

The 47th Brigade of that body had left Fleigneux to
ascend the upper valley of the Givonne, and the retreat
of the French from Illy in a southern direction had
ah'eady begun. The 87th Regiment seized eight guns
that were being worked, and captured thirty baggage
wagons with their teams and hundi'eds of cavalry
horses wandering riderless. The cavahy of the ad-
vanced guard of the Fifth Corps captured General
Brahaut and his staff, besides a great number of in-
fantry and 150 pack horses, together with forty am-
munition and transport wagons.

At Floing there was also an attempt on the part of
the French to break through ; but the originally very
insufficient infantry posts at that point had gradually
been strengthened, and the French were di'iven from
the locality as quickly as they had entered. And now
the fire from the twenty-six batteries of the Army
of the Meuse was joined by that of the Guards' bat-
teries, which took up their position at the eastern
slope of the Givonne valley. The effect was over-
whelming. The French batteries were destroyed and
many ammunition wagons exploded.

96 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

General von Wimpffen at first thought the advance
of the Germans from the north a mere feint, but
recognized his mistake when he himself proceeded to
the spot towards noon. He therefore ordered the two
divisions in the second line, which was behind the
Givonne front of the First Corps, to return to the
height above Illy and support General Douay,

On rejoining the Twelfth Corps he found it in fuU
retreat on Sedan, and urgently requested General
Douay to dispatch assistance in the direction of
Bazeilles. Maussion's brigade proceeded thither at
once, followed by Dumont's, as their position in the
front had been taken by Conseil Dumesnil's division.
All these marches and counter-marches were executed
in the space south of the Bois de Garenne under fire
of the German artillery on two sides. The retreat of
the cavalry heightened the confusion, and several
battalions returned to the doubtful protection of the
forest. General Douay, it is true, when reinforced by
sections of the Fifth Corps, retook the Calvaire, but
was forced to abandon it by two o'clock ; the forest,
at the back of the Calvaire, was then shelled by sixty
guns of the Guards.

Liebert's division alone had up to now maintained
its very strong position on the hills north of Casal.
The assembling in sufficient strength of the German
Fifth and Eleventh Corps at Floing, could only be
effected very gradually. At one o'clock, however, part
of them began to scale the hill immediately before
them, while others went round to the south towards
Gaulier and Casal, and more marched down from
Fleigneux. These troops became so intermixed that
no detailed orders could be given ; a fierce contest was
carried on for a long time with varying fortunes. The
French division, attacked on both flanks, and also

BATTLE OP SEDAN. 97

shelled, at last gave way, and the reserves of the
Seventh Corps having ah-eady been called off to other
parts of the battle-field, the French cavalry once more
devoted themselves to the rescue.

General Margueritte, with five regiments of light
horse, and two of lancers, charged out of the Bois de
Garennes. He fell among the first, severely wounded,
and General Galliffet took his place. The charge was
over very treacherous ground, and even before they
could attack, the ranks were broken by the heavy
flanking fire of the Prussian batteries. Still, with
thinned numbers but unflagging determination, the
squadrons charged on the 43rd Infantry Brigade and
its reinforcements hurrying along from Fleigneux.
Part of the German infantry on the hill-side were
lying under cover, others were fully exposed in groups
of more or less strength. Their foremost lines were
broken through at several points, and a detachment of
these brave troops forced their way past eight guns,
through a hot fire, but the reserves beyond checked
their further progress. A troop of cuirassiers, issuing
from Gaulier, fell on the German rear, but encounter-
ing the Prussian hussars in the Meuse Valley galloped
off northward. Other detachments forced their way
through the infantry as far as the narrow way by St.
Albert, where the battalions holding it gave them a
warm reception; others again enter Floing only to
succumb to the 5th Jagers, who fell on them front and
rear. These attacks were repeated by the French
again and again, and the mm^derous turmoil lasted for
half an hour with steadily diminishing success for the
French. The volleys of the infantry fired at short
range strewed the whole field with dead and wounded.
Many fell into the quarries or over the steep preci-
pices, a few may have escaped by swimming the

98 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

Meuse ; and scarcely more than half of these brave
troops were left to return to the protection of the for-
tress.

But this magnificent sacrifice of the splendid French
cavalry could not change the fate of the day. The
Prussian infantry had lost but few in cut-and-thrust
encounters, and at once resumed the attack against
Liebert's division. But in this onslaught they sus-
tained heavy losses ; for instance, the three battalions
of the 6th Regiment had to be commanded by lieuten-
ants. Casal was stormed, and the French, after a
spirited resistance, withdrew at about three o'clock to
their last refuge, the Bois de Garennes.

When, between one and two o'clock, the fighting
round Bazeilles at first took a favorable turn for his
army, Greneral von Wimpffen returned to his original
plan of overthrowing the Bavarians, exhausted by a
long struggle, and making his way to Carignan with
the First, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps ; while the Seventh
Corps was to cover their rear. But the orders issued
to that effect never reached the generals in command,
or arrived so late that circumstances forbade their
being carried out.

In consequence of his previous orders, Bassoigne's
division with those of Coze and Grandchamp had
remained idle. Now, at about three in the afternoon,
the two last named advanced from Fond-de-Givonne,
over the eastern ridge, and the 23rd Saxon Division,
which was marching in the valley on the left bank of
the Givonne, found itself suddenly attacked by the
compact French battalions and batteries, but with the
aid of the left wing of the Guards and the artillery
thundering from the eastern slope, they soon repulsed
the French, and even followed them up back to Fond-
de-Givonne. The energy of the French appears to

BATTLE OF SEDAN. 99

have been exhausted, for they allowed themselves to
be taken prisoners by hundreds. As soon as the hiUs
on the west of the Givonne had been secured, the Grer-
man artillery established itself there, and by three
o'clock twenty-one batteries stood in line between Ba-
zeilles and Haybes.

Bois de Grarennes, where many corps of all arms had
found refuge and were wandering about, still re-
mained to be taken. After a short cannonade the 1st
Divisit>n of Guards ascended the hills from Givonne,
and were joined by the Saxon battalions, the left wing
of the Third Army at the same time pressing forward
from Illy. A wild turmoil ensued, some of the French
offered violent resistance, others surrendered by thou-
sands at a time, but not until five o'clock were the
Germans masters of the fortress.

Meanwhile long columns of French could be seen
pouring down on Sedan from all the neighboring hills.
Irregular bands of troops were massed in and around
the walls of the fortress, and shell from the German
batteries on both sides of the Meuse were constantly
exploding in their midst. Columns of fire soon began
to rise from the city, and the Bavarians, who had gone
round to Torcy, were about to climb the palisades at
the gate when, at about half -past four, flags of truce
were hoisted on the towers.

The Emperor Napoleon had refused to join with
General von Wimpffen in his attempt to break through
the German lines ; he had, on the contrary, desired him
to parley with the enemy. On the order being re-
newed, the French suddenly ceased firing.

General Reille now made his appearance in the pres-
ence of the King, who had watched the action since
early in the day from the hill south of Frenois. He
was the bearer of an autograph letter from the Em-

100 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

peror, whose presence in Sedan had till now been un-
known. He placed his sword in the hands of the
King, but as this was only an act of personal submis-
sion, the answer given to his letter demanded that an
officer should be dispatched hither, fully empowered to
treat with Greneral von Moltke as to the surrender of
the French army.

This sorrowful duty was imposed on Greneral von
Wimpif en, who was in no way responsible for the des-
perate straits into which the army had been brought.

The negotiations were held at Donchery during the
night between the 1st and 2nd of September. The
Germans were forced to consider that they must not
forego the advantage gained over so powerful an enemy
as France. When it was remembered that the French
had regarded the victory of German arms over other
nationalities in the light of an insult, any act of un-
timely generosity might lead them to forget their own
defeat. The only course to pui'sue was to insist upon
the disarmament and detention of the entire army,
but the officers were to be free on parole.

General von Wimpifen declared it impossible to ac-
cept such hard conditions, the negotiations were
broken off, and the French officers returned to Sedan
at one o'clock. Before their departure they were given
to understand that unless these terms were agreed to
by nine o'clock next morning, the bombardment would
be renewed.

Thus the capitulation was signed by General von
Wimpffen on the morning of the 2nd, further resist-
ance being obviously impossible.

Marshal MacMahon had been very fortunate in be-
ing disabled so early in the day, or he would have
been inevitably compelled to sign the capitulation, and
though he had only carried out the orders forced upon

BATTLE OF SEDAN. 101

him by the Paris authorities, he could hardly have
sat in judgment, as he afterwards did, on the comrade
he had failed to relieve.

It is difficult to understand why the Germans want
to celebrate the 2nd of September when nothing re-
markable happened but what was the inevitable result
of the previous day's work ; the day when the army
really crowned itself with glory was the 1st of Sep-
tember.

This splendid victory had cost the Germans 460
officers and 8500 men. The French losses were far
greater; 17,000 were killed, the work principally of
the strong force of German artillery. Twenty-one
thousand Frenchmen were taken prisoners in the
course of the action, 83,000 surrendered ; 104,000 in aU.

These, for the present, were assembled on the Pen-
insula of Iges, formed by the Meuse. As they were
absolutely destitute of supplies, the Commandant of
Mezieres allowed them the use of the railway as far
as Donchery.

Two corps d'armee were to effect and escort the
transport of the prisoners, who were taken off 2000 at
a time by two roads, one to Etain, and the other by
Clermont to Pont-a-Mousson, where they were taken
in charge by the army investing Metz, and forwarded
to various places in Germany.

Three thousand men had been disarmed on Belgian
territory.

The trophies, taken at Sedan, consisted of three
standards, 419 field-pieces, and 139 guns, 66,000 stands
of arms, over 1000 baggage and other wagons, and
6000 horses fit for service.

With the surrender of this army, Imperialism in
France was extinct.

II.

ADVANCE ON PARIS AND CAPITULATION OF

METZ.

While one half of the German army was thus en-
gaged in victorious progress, the other half remained
a fixture before Metz.

The foremost hue of outposts of the besieging army
was over six miles long. Thus an attempt of the col-
lected forces of the enemy to break through would
have met with but slight opposition at the outset. It
was all the more expedient to fortify the isolated G-er-
man positions. These works, the clearing of the bat-
tle-fields in the neighborhood, the close watch kept
over every movement of the enemy, the construction
of a telegraph line connecting the various staff quar-
ters, and the erecting of hutments, kept the troops
and their leaders amply occupied. Besides the care
of the wounded, attention had to be paid to the sick,
whose number was daily increased oy the rough
weather and insufficient shelter. The provisioning of
the troops was, however, made easier by their station-
ary attitude, and the troops were now amply supplied
by their friends at home.

The first days of the siege went by without any at-
tempts to break out on the part of the French. They
too were busy reorganizing, collecting ammunition and
supplies.

On the 20th of August, Marshal Bazaine wrote to
Chalons : " I wiU give due notice of my march if I am

THE SOKTIE FKOM METZ. 103

able to attempt it." On the 23rd he reported to the
Emperor : " If the news of the extensive reductions in
the besieging army are corroborated, I shall begin the
march by way of the fortresses on the north in order
to risk nothing."

THE SOETIE FEOM METZ.

(August 26th.)

On the 26th of August, when the army of Chalons
was still fifteen miles distant from the canal of the
Ardennes, and their advance on Metz was as yet un-
known. Marshal Bazaine collected his main forces on
the right bank of the Moselle.

This movement had not escaped the notice of the
outposts, and the field telegraph at once communicated
the information to head-quarters.

To support the 3rd Reserve Division at Malroy, ten
battalions of the Tenth Corps crossed the Meuse to
Argancy, on the right bank. The 25th Division held
itself in readiness at the bridge of Hauconcourt, and
the First Corps closed up towards Servigny. In the
event of the escape of the French towards the north,
the Third, Fourth, and parts of the Ninth Corps were
to arrest their progi-ess at Diedenhofen.

The crossing of the river by pontoon bridges from
the island of Chambiere seriously delayed the French ;
their Second, Third, and Fourth Corps had, however,
formed in close order between Mey and Grimont, by
about noon. Their advanced guard succeeded in
throwing back the German outposts to the south-east
of Metz at several points, but instead of entering upon
a general attack. Marshal Bazaine called all the com-
mandants of the corps to a conference at Grimont.
The Commandant of Metz then explained that the

104 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

heavy ammunition at their disposal would suffice for
one battle only, that when it was exhausted they would
be imprisoned between the German armies without
the means of defence ; the fortress, he continued, was
not defensible in its present state, and could not stand
a siege if the army were to be withdi-awn. All this
might have been — nay, must have been, known to the
Commandant before he entered upon the movement.
It was especially impressed upon the generals, " That
the best service they could render to their country
was to preserve the army, which would be of the
greatest importance if negotiations for peace should
be entered into." The generals present all spoke
against the continuation of the march ; and the Com-
mander-in-chief, who had refrained from expressing
any opinion in the matter, gave the order to retire at
four o'clock.

The whole affair of the 26th of August can only be
regarded in the light of a parade manoeuvre. Bazaine
reported to the Minister of War that the scarcity of
artillery ammunition made it " impossible " to break
through the German lines, unless the enemy were
forced to retreat by attacks in the rear, from outside.
Information as to the " voice of the people " in Paris
was urgently requested. ""

There is no doubt that Bazaine was influenced, not
only by military, but by political considerations ; still
the question remains, Could he have acted differently
in the prevailing confusion! From the correspond-
ence referred to and his behavior in the battles before
Metz, he was evidently strongly opposed to quitting
the fortress. Under shelter of its walls he could main-
tain a considerable army in good order till the right
moment. At the head of the only unimpaired army
in France he might find himself in a position of greater

THE SOKTIE FROM METZ. 105

power than any other man in the country. This army
must, of course, first be freed from the bondage in
which it was now held. Even if it should succeed in
breaking through the lines, it would be greatly weak-
ened ; and it was not inconceivable that the Marshal,
as the strongest man in power, might be able to offer
a price which should induce the enemy to allow him
to march out. For if at last peace were to be con-
cluded, the Germans would no doubt ask: Who in
France is the authority with whom we are to negotiate,
now that the Empire is overthrown, and which is
strong enough to give a guarantee that its pledges
will be kept I That the Marshal, if his plans had been
carried out, would have acted otherwise than in the
interest of France is neither proved nor to be assumed.

But ere long, a number of men combined in Paris,
who, without consulting the nation, constituted them-
selves the Government of the country, and took the
direction of its affairs into their own hands. In op-
position to this party, Marshal Bazaine, supported by
his army, could come forward as a rival or a foe ; nay,
and this was his crime in the eyes of the Paris Gov-
ernment, he might restore the authority of the Emperor
to whom he had sworn allegiance. Whether he could
thus have spared his country even longer misery and
greater suffering need not be discussed. But that he
was subsequently accused of betraying his country
arose, no doubt, from the national vanity of the
French, which demanded a " Traitor " to account for
defeat.

Soon after this demonstration — for it was nothing
more — of the besieged army, the besieging army was,
in fact, reduced, for the Second and Third Corps were
sent to Brisy and Conflans, by orders from head-quar-
ters. To be sure, from that point they could attack

106 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

either of the French Marshals, as might prove requisite ;
and the Thirteenth Corps, formed of the 17th Division,
hitherto retained to defend the coast, and of the Land-
wehr, was ah'eady within a few days' march of Metz.

Meanwhile Marshal Bazaine seems to have recog-
nized the fallacy of his expectations of the release of
his army by negotiations with the enemy; he now
decided to make his way out, weapon in hand. The
troops were supplied with three days' rations, and the
commissariat with arms from the magazines of the
fortress. That the attempt should again be made on
the right bank of the Moselle was only to be expected ;
the main forces of the enemy being intrenched on the
left. It would have been very difficult to traverse the
mountainous region, cut up by deep passes, and they
were sure to encounter the army of the Crown Prince
on the march to Paris. East of Metz, on the other
hand, there was ample space for the full development
of his army. Thence to the south there was open
country, offering no cover to the enemy, whose lines
were weakest on that side. The march to the north
and along the Belgian frontier offered more danger and
greater obstacles, and yet the Marshal had selected
this very road. The Army of Chalons was also march-
ing in that direction ; their approach Was reported, and
on the 31st of August, when Marshal MacMahon's
forces reached Stenay under such disastrous circum-
stances, Bazaine's army issued from Metz.

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE.

(August 31st.)

Of the forces then assembled on the right bank of
the Meuse, the Third Corps was to cover the right
flank of the others while they were advancing; one

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE. 107

division was ordered to surprise the enemy in the
south-east, the other three divisions were to march on
Noisseville. Three pontoon-bridges were constructed
for the rest of the army, and exits prepared towards
the heights of St. Julien. The Fourth and Sixth
Corps were to cross at six o'clock and take up a posi-
tion to the right of the Third, from the town of Mey,
past Grimont to the Moselle ; the Second Corps and
the Guards were to follow and form a second line in
their rear. The artillery reserves and the cavalry
were expected to reach the other side of the Moselle
by ten o'clock ; the baggage trains were collected on
the Isle of Chambiere. Thus there should have been,
by twelve o'clock, five corps ready to attack the Ger-
mans along a mile and a half, from Retonfay to
Argancy, where only two German divisions held the
line.

As early as seven o'clock in the morning Montaudon's
division issued from Fort Queuleu, and proceeding
eastward, drove the German outposts back on Aubigny.
But this sham attack did not deceive the Germans.
The stir in the French camp had been observed quite
early, and when the mist cleared off and large bodies
of French troops were seen moving in front of Fort
St. Julien, an attempt to break through to the north
was confidently expected, and measures were immedi-
ately taken to prevent it.

The 28th Brigade of the Seventh Corps was dis-
patched to reinforce Courcelles ; thus the 3rd Brigade
of the First Corps could be brought nearer to Servigny.
The troops of the Tenth Corps, which could be spared
from the line of defence on the left bank, were again
set moving to return to the right, and the Ninth Corps
made ready to begin the intended retreat. The Third
Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division were recalled from

108 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAR.

Brisy and sent to the plateau of Privat ; the Second
was to prepare to march at any moment.

The attempt of the French on this occasion proved
even less successful than on the 26th ; the routes of
the Fourth and Sixth Corps met at the bridges, and
they only reached their rendezvous at one o'clock,
though it was but half a mile beyond ; they then re-
nounced the idea of an immediate assault and set about
cooking their dinners. A few skirmishes at Aubigny
on the east and on the north towards Eupigny came
to nothing. The Gruards did not arrive till three
o'clock ; the artillery and cavalry were still absent.

As everything had now quieted down, the Germans
came to the conclusion that the attack had been in-
tended for the following day. Not to waste their
strength, a pai't of the reinforcements had already
been sent back, when, at about four o'clock, the French
guns suddenly opened a heavy fire.

It appears that the Marshal had again assembled all
the generals at Grimont, this time to inform them of
his plan of attack. It was evident that the French
could not advance towards the north before they had
cut their way through by an attack on the eastern
side, and covered their right flank ; |or even if they
succeeded in breaking through the German lines be-
tween Malroy and Charly, they could get no further
so long as the Germans were at Servigny, and as their
fire swept the plain by the Moselle, which, at that
point, is no more than 5000 paces broad, the Marshal
could not in any case reckon on getting through with
his artillery reserves, which did not arrive on the field
until six o'clock ; or, indeed, with the baggage trains
he had left on the Isle of Chambiere. The cavalry
corps was still defiling, and could not arrive until nine
o'clock in the evening.

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE. 109

The French commander's orders were based on these
calculations.

Marshal Le Boeuf received orders to advance with
the Second and Third Corps on both sides of the valley
of Ste. Barbe, and outflank the 1st Prussian Division
at Servigny, from the south ; while the Fourth Corps
attacked them in front. The Sixth Corps was to at-
tack the Reserve Division at Charly-Malroy. Marshal
Canrobert was to command these two corps, the Guards
being kept as reserves.

Thus Greneral von Manteuffel had first to oppose
Marshals Le Boeuf and Canrobert with a small force
against a very superior enemy. This might be done
either at Ste, Barbe, a position that was difficult to
outflank, in the line of Servigny — Poix — Failly, which,
though more exposed, was favorable to the use of
artillery. The latter was selected on the advice of
General von Bergmann, in command of the artillery
and the Landwehr Brigade brought up from Antilly,
where its place was taken by the 25th Division. Ten
batteries advanced to within 1000 paces of the villages
occupied by the infantry. Their fire was so superior
to that of the French that the enemy's batteries were
soon silenced. The French attack from Rupigny, sup-
ported on the flank by three batteries, was for a long
time repelled, and as the Prussians had not yet been
driven back on Ste. Barbe, the Sixth French "Corps
deferred for the present any serious attack on the
Reserve Division at Malroy-Charly ; Marshal Canrobert
received orders to advance, for the time being, only
against the village of Failly, the northern stronghold
of the Servigny position.

Tixier's division therefore set out at 7.30 in the
evening from ViUers L'Orme, but met with a most
obstinate resistance at FaiUy. The East-Prussians,

110 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

though attacked on two sides and pelted with bullets,
maintained their position, and for a time were engaged
in a hand-to-hand encounter, till the Landwehr Brigade
came to their assistance from Bremy.

South of Servigny the French fared far better than
in this angle between two bodies of the enemy ; their
Second and Third Corps, at that point, had only the
3rd Brigade of the First Prussian Corps to deal with
as it advanced from Retonfay. Montaudon's and
Metman's divisions had pressed on as far as Nouilly,
in the valley of the Vallieres; Clinchant's brigade
stormed the brewery in the teeth of a heavy fire, and
by seven o'clock had compelled the defence of Noisse-
ville to retire. Montoy and Flanville were also taken
possession of, and the advanced guard of the 4th
Brigade thrown back on Coincy and Chateau Aubigny.
The batteries of the 1st Division, after withstanding
for a long time the fire of a strong force of tirailleurs
from the southern valley, were forced, at about seven
o'clock, to retire in echelon to the position held by the
infantry at Poix-Servigny, keeping oif the pursuing
enemy with grape-shot.

But at Poix-Servigny they now found the Prussians
had made a stand, although outflanked on their left.
Potier's brigade ascended the northern slope of the
Vallieres valley, but found it impossible to reach Ser-
vigny. A moment later Cissey's brigade rushed up
from the west, and seized the cemetery outside the
village. The French Fourth Corps made a move
against the centre of the Prussian position, but with-
out success, for those battalions of the 2ud Brigade
which had hitherto been kept in reserve met the attack.
The attempt to break through between Poix and Ser-
vigny was met by the last reserve battalions of the
2nd Brigade with a counter attack, in which all the

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE. Ill

troops at hand at once joined. Amid beating of drums
they fell on the French, forced them out of the cem-
etery, and drove them over the slope.

To reinforce the troops thus engaged, the 3rd Bri-
gade had, at about half -past eight, marched on Noisse-
ville, whence they drove out the small detachment
they found in possession, but they subsequently
yielded to superior numbers, and withdrew to St.
Marais.

The din of battle had now ceased on all sides, and
the fight seemed to be ended. The infantry of the 1st
Division found quarters in the villages, the artillery
had bivouacked, when suddenly, at nine o'clock, a
strong body of French were seen through the dark-
ness marching on Servigny. This proved to be
Aymard's division ; it advanced without firing a shot,
and surprised the detachment which occupied the
place, ejecting them after a fierce hand-to-hand fight.
This attack remained unobserved for some time, even
by the troops nearest at hand ; but they then rushed
to arms, and, pouring in from all sides, drove the
French back beyond the churchyard, which was now
held by the Germans.

It was now ten o'clock. The 1st Division had kept
its ground against an enemy of superior strength ; but
the French had found their way across the unoccupied
ground between the 3rd and 4th Brigades, and threat-
ened the German flank at Servigny from their position
at Noisseville.

(September 1st.) The 18th Division, by a night
march, crossed from the left to the right bank of the
Moselle at four o'clock in the morning and reinforced
the two wings in the line of Malroy, Charly, and Bois
de Failly, sending a brigade to each. The 25th Di-
vision could now retire from Antilly to Ste. Barbe,

112 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

where, with the 6th Landwehr Brigade, it formed the
reserve of the Poix-Servigny position.

On the morning of the 1st of September a thick
mist still shi'ouded the plain, where all troops stood
ready for action.

Marshal Bazaine again pointed out to his generals
that, first of all, Ste. Barbe was to be taken, that place
being the key to the northern route they intended
to pursue ; and he added, " failing this, we must
stand by our own position." He evidently meant,
the position under shelter of the cannons of Metz,
and this shows great lack of confidence in his own
success.

The 3rd Brigade had deployed on the Saarlouis
route as early as five o'clock, to forestall the fui-ther
progress of the French on the left flank of the 1st
Division. Twenty guns swept the plain in the direc-
tion of Montoy, and when Noisseville had been for
some time under the fii-e of the artillery of the 3rd
(German) Brigade, at seven o'clock the 43rd Regiment
stormed the village. A violent fight ensued in and
about the houses ; two French brigades engaged in the
combat, and after a long struggle the regiment was
again repelled. The battalions of 4:he 3rd Brigade
arrived just as the fight was over, but the attack was
not renewed.

When the plan of Marshal Bazaine's attempt was
made evident, the 28th Brigade started from Coui'celles
at six in the morning to reinforce the First Corps ; its
two batteries silenced those of the French at Montoy
and then fired on Flanville. The enemy soon began
to abandon the burning village, into which, at nine
o'clock, the Ehinelanders marched from the south and
the East-Prussians from the north. Marshal Le Boeuf
ordered Bastoul's division to make another charge on

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE. 113

Montoy, but the deadly fire of the Prussian artillery
compelled them to turn back.

The 3rd Brigade had meanwhile taken up a position
parallel with Retonfay, where it was joined by the
28th. The 3rd Cavalry Division was reinforced by the
Hessian Horse Brigade, and these troops, with the artil
lery, which was made up to 114 guns, formed a ram-
part against any further progress of the Second and
Third French Corps.

Everything was now quiet on the right wing
of the French army; but the Fourth Corps had
been enjoined to await their advance before renew-
ing the attack on the artillery defences and village
intrenchments of the French line from Servigny to
Poix, as its strength had been tested the day before.
At eleven o'clock, after Noisseville had been severely
bombarded, the 3rd Prussian Brigade, supported by
the Landwehr, advanced from the south and com-
pelled the French to withdraw from the bm'ning vil-
lage.

Marshal Canrobert, commanding the northern attack,
had drawn up his batteries at ChieuUes by half -past
eight, and their fire, seconded by that of the artiUery
of the fortress, drove the Grermans from Eupigny for
a time ; but the village was soon retaken.

Tixier's division made two fruitless attempts to
seize Failly, when the 36th Brigade of the 18th Di-
vision, which had just arrived, combining with the
Reserve Division, assumed the offensive, and at ten
o'clock di-ove the French back over the Chieulles
stream. They made still another onslaught on Failly,
but a sharp flanking fire made this too a failure.

Marshal Le Boeuf, though he still had two divisions
at his disposal, retreated before the advance of the 3rd
Brigade on his right flank ; and when Marshal Bazaine
&

114 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

heard of this he ordered a cessation of hostilities at all
other points at about midday.

The 137,000 French of the Army of the Rhine, who
had issued from Metz on August 31st, had been re-
pulsed by 36,000 Prussians. For the first time in this
war the attack had been opened by the French, while
defence feU to the lot of the Glermans. That the Ger-
mans lost 3400 men against 3000 on the French side,
must be attributed to the superior quality of the
Chassepot rifle. But the effects of the Prussian artil-
lery proved decisive, and enabled Manteuffel to main-
tain an unshaken resistance.

The Seventh Corps remained on the right of the
Meuse, where the invading line was now strengthened
by the arrival of the Thirteenth Corps with the Grand
Duke of Mecklenburg.

The Second and Third Corps were again drawn up
on the left bank of the river. On the same day and at
the same hour, when the destruction of one French
army was completed at Sedan, the other returned to
almost hopeless interment in Metz. Thus the issue of
the war had already been decided after only two
months' duration; though the war itself was far
from ended.

THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTKATION IN PAKIS.

When, in the night of the 4th of September, the
news of the defeat at Sedan and the Emperor's sur-
render became known in Paris, the Legislative Body
met for a series of sittings in rapid succession to select
an Adminstrative Committee. Eiotous mobs cut these
deliberations short by forcing their way into the Cham-
ber and proclaiming the Eepublic here and at the
Hotel de Ville, amidst the acclamations of the people.
Though the troops were under arms in their bar-

THE PEOVISIONAL GOVEENMENT. 115

racks, the Government till now in power offered no
resistance; the Empress left Paris; General Trochu
and several members of the Minority in the Chamber
combined to form a Government, which they styled
"The Government of National Defence and War."
"War to the bitter end" was their motto, and the
entire nation was called to arms. Not an inch of ter-
ritory, not a stone of the fortresses was to be yielded
up to the enemy.

A Government, devoid of legitimate foundation,
must achieve some manifest success, and could not
afford to allow the war to end in peace.

Notwithstanding all previous reverses, France was
too rich in resources to find herself defenceless yet.
General Yinoy was still in the field. The dispersed
members of all the corps, the marine troops, and the
Gendarmerie could rally around him. There was, too,
the " Territorial Militia," numbering 468,000 men, an
institution due to Marshal Niel, whose far-seeing work
of reorganization had been cut short only too soon.
Then the Garde Nationale could be called out, as well
as 100,000 newly levied recruits. France was thus
able to send a million men to the front, without reck-
oning Franctireurs and volunteer corps.

Four hundred thousand Chassepots and 2000 guns
lying in store would arm these troops, and the work-
shops of England, as a neutral power, were ready to
complete their outfit as a matter of business.

Such means of war, backed by the active patriotism
of the nation, might offer a prolonged resistance if
governed by a powerful will. That will was Gam-
betta's.

As Minister of War, by the French system of govern-
ment, he was, at the same time. Commander-in-chief,
and he certainly would not resign the command. For

116 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

a victorious G-eneral at the bead of the army, under a
Republic, would at once have become Dictator in his
stead.

M. de Freycinet, also a civilian, served under G^am-
betta as a sort of Chief of the Gleneral Staff, and the
energetic, but dilettante, commandership exercised by
these gentlemen cost France very dear. Grambetta's
rare energy and unrelenting perseverance availed,
indeed, to induce the entire population to take up
arms, but not to du'ect these masses on a uniform
plan.

Without giving them time to be drilled into fitness
for the field, he sent them out with ruthless cruelty,
insufficiently prepared to carry out ill-digested plans
against an enemy on whose firm solidity all their
courage and devotion must be wi'ecked. He prolonged
the struggle with great sacrifice on both sides, without
turning the balance in favor of France.

But the German army had still great difficulties to
overcome.

The battles it had won had cost it dear ; the loss in
officers especially was irremediable. Half the army
was detained before Metz and Strasburg. The trans-
port and guard of more than 200,000 p^soners required
the services of a large part of the new levies in Ger-
many. The frontier fortresses had not indeed hindered
the invasion of the German army, but they had to be
invested or kept under observation to secure commu-
nications with the rear, the forwarding and victualling
of troops, and every advance into the enemy's country
demanded increased supplies of arms. After the battle
of Sedan only 150,000 were available for further oper-
ations in the field. There could be no doubt that they
must be directed against Paris, as the seat of the new
government and the centre of gi-avity, so to speak, of

GENEEAL VINOY'S RETEEAT. 117

the whole country. On the very day of the capitula-
tion of Sedan, arrangements were made for the advance.
To spare the troops, the movement was to be ex-
ecuted on the widest possible front, for of the French
corps, only the Thirteenth could detain them. Still,
Blanchard's division alone of that corps was still at
Mezieres ; the other two had but just begun their
march when they received orders to retui'n.

GENEEAL \TNOY'S EETEEAT.

Greneral Vinoy's first anxiety was — very rightly — to
reach Paris with the least possible loss. This was not
very easy to accomplish, for the Sixth Corps (Prus-
sian), which had taken no part in the battle of Sedan,
was at Attigny in such a jDOsition that, between that
place and Laon, it could intercept any line of the
French retreat by reaching the spot before, or as soon
as the enemy. General von Tiimpling, with the 12th
Division, had taken possession of Rethel by the even-
ing of September 1st, thus closing the high road to
Paris. Only extraordinary forced marches and a suc-
cession of happy circumstances could save from de-
struction Blanchard's division, which had already spent
aU its ammunition in small conflicts.

General Vinoy supplied the troops with several days*
rations, enjoined a strict observance of order and dis-
cipline, and during the night of September 2nd began
his retreat to Rethel, where he expected to find Crea's
division ; this, however, availing itself of the part of
the railway which was stiU undestroyed, had already
gone on to Soissons.

It was still quite early when the French column
came into collision with the 5th and presently with
the 6th Prussian Cavalry Divisions, without being
seriously attacked. It was not till about ten o'clock,

118 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

and within a mile and a half of Rethel, that the French
General learned that that place was in the hands of
the Grermans, and decided on making a detour by
Novion-Porcien. He sent his rear guard against the
enemy's horse artillery, but seeing hardly anything
but cavalry in front, they soon resumed the march.
They reached Novion, where they bivouacked, at about
four in the afternoon.

Greneral von Hoffmann had taken up a position at
Rethel, awaiting the French, of whose approach he had
been warned. Having ridden out in person, he became
aware of their deviation from the route, and at four in
the afternoon marched on Ecly, where he arrived late
in the evening. Part of his troops reconnoitred the
country round Chateau Porcien.

General Vinoy, on learning that this road too was
closed, left his bivouacs at half -past one in the morn-
ing, leaving the fires burning, and set out for a second
night's march in pouring rain and total darkness.

At first he took a northerly direction, to reach Laon
at any rate by the cross-roads. Knee-deep in mud and
often alarmed, but without coming into collision with
the enemy, he arrived at Chateau Porcien at half-
past seven in the morning, and halted sf or a couple of
hours. The state of the roads compelled him now to
proceed in a southerly direction, and when the head
of his column reached Seraincourt, the sound of firing
told him that the rear had been attacked by the Ger-
mans.

The Prussian cavalry had, early in the day, dis-
covered the French line of march, but when this
important information reached him, General von Hoff-
mann had left Ecly. He had already started to look
for the enemy at Novion-Porcien, where he was nat-
urally to be expected after his first night-march, but

GENERAL, VINOY'S RETREAT. 119

at half -past nine had found the place deserted. Thus,
during the forenoon, the German and French division
had crossed on the road at a distance of about a mile
apart. The thick weather had prevented them seeing
each other. General Vinoy got, this day, as far as
Montcornet, in what condition may be imagined. The
12th Division (German) had persevered in its westward
march, but had only come up with the rear of the fast-
retreating enemy, and took up quarters in Chaumont-
Porcien.

This march of the enemy ought not indeed to have
remained unobserved and unchecked under the eye of
two cavalry divisions, but these were, it must be
owned, called off at an unfortunate moment.

It was, in fact, in consequence of a report that the
French forces were assembled at Rheims, that the
Commander-in-chief of the Third Army had ordered
the immediate return of the Sixth Corps and the two
divisions of cavalry. These at once relinquished the
pursuit, and General von Tiimpling ordered his two
infantry divisions to march at once on Rheims ; the
11th, which was holding Rethel, set out forthwith.
General von Hoffmann, on the contrary, followed up
the French, on his own responsibility, as far as was
possible without any cavalry to overtake them. It
was not till the following day that the 12th reached
the Suippe.

(September 4th.) General Vinoy made his way
northward again, beyond Marie, where he received the
news of the Emperor's surrender and the outbreak of
the revolution in Paris. It was now of the greatest
importance that he should arrive there, and by the
13th he had reached the capital with the two other
divisions of his corps from Laon and Soissons.

120 THE FE.'^JfCO-GERMAN WAB.

THE THIRD AEMY AND THE AEMY OF THE MEUSE MAECH

ON PAEIS.

While all this was going on, the Germans, on the
4th September, had begun their advance on Paris.
The fii'st thing to be done was to re-form the mass of
troops assembled in the cramped space by Sedan. The
Third Army, of which the Eleventh and the First
Bavarian Corps were still there, had to make two long
marches to the front in order that the Army of the
Meuse could occupy their old lines in its rear.

The news of the great concentration of troops at
Rheims was soon proved to be unfounded. So early
as on the 4th, companies of Prussian horse had entered
the excited and hostile city, the 11th Division arrived
that afternoon, and on the following day the German
King's head-quarters were established in the town
which had seen so many French kings crowned.

On the 10th of September the Third Army had
reached a line from Dormans to Sezanne, and the
Sixth Corps had pushed forward to Chateau Thierry.
The Army of the Meuse, after faihng in an attack on
Montmedy, occupied a line between Rheims and Laon.
Cavalry sent far in advance protected^ this exception-
ally wide marching front. They everywhere found
the inhabitants in a very hostile frame of mind ; the
franctireurs attacked with conspicuous daring, and
could only be ejected from several villages by a dis-
mounted force. The roads were in many places broken
up and the bridges destroyed.

At the approach of the 6th Cavalry Di\dsion, Laon
capitulated. Some small detachments of troops of the
line were taken prisoners, with twenty-five guns, 100
stand of arms and stores were plundered, and 2000
Gardes Mobiles dismissed to their homes on parole.

THE GEKMAN ADV.iNCE. 121

Friend and foe were still collected in large numbers
in the courtyard of the citadel when the powder maga-
zine blew up, having probably been intentionally fired,
and did great damage, both there and in the town.
The Prussians had fifteen officers and ninety-nine men
kiUed and wounded; among the wounded were the
General of Division and his staff officer. The French
lost 300 men ; the commandant of the fortress was
mortally wounded.

On the 16th the Army of the Meuse stood on the
Ourcq, between Nanteuil and Lezy, the 5th Cavahy
Division was at Dammartin, the 6th had advanced
beyond Beaumont, sending patrols as far as St. Denis.
The Third Army occupied the ground from Meaux to
Comte Eobert. Strong pontoon bridges had been
thrown over the Marne at Trilport instead of those
which had been blown up, and by the 17th, the Fifth
Corps had ah-eady reached the Upper Seine.

To secure the pontoon works at Villeneuve-St.-
Georges, the 17th Brigade was sent down the right
bank of the Seine towards Paris, and at Mont Mesly
was met by Crea's division, ordered out by General
Vinoy to bring in or destroy a large store of supplies.
The fight which ensued ended in the French being
driven back under shelter of the guns of the fort at
Charenton.

The Second Bavarian Corps also arrived on the Seine
on this day and bridged it over at Corbeil. The 2nd
Cavahy Division were observing Paris from Saday.
The King removed his head-quarters from Chateau
Thierry to Meaux. The complete investment of Paris
was now imminent.

The works completed by Louis Philippe effectually
protected the city from being taken by storm. The
armament consisted of 2627 guns, including 200 of

122 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

the heaviest calibre of naval ordnance. Each had 500
rounds of shot, and there were 3,000,000 kilogi'ammes
of powder in the magazines. In numerical strength,
besides the Thirteenth Corps arrived from Mezieres, a
new corps, the Fourteenth, had been raised in Paris
itself. These 50,000 troops of the hne, with 14,000
highly efficient and trustworthy marines and sailors,
and about 8000 gensd'armes, customs officers, and
chasseurs, formed the kernel of the defence. There
were besides 115,000 Gardes Mobiles which had been
called into the capital at an earlier date. The National
Guard was divided into 130 battalions which, how-
ever, being defectively equipped and ill-disciplined,
could only be employed in the defence of the inner
circle of walls. The volunteers, though numerous,
proved for the most part useless.

On the whole, the besieged force may be reckoned
at 300,000, twice as many as the besiegers as yet on
the spot, who had only about 60,000 men available,
with 5000 cavalry and 124 field batteries. There were
five floating batteries on the Seine and nine section-
built gun-boats, originally intended for the Rhine ; on
the railway line a few guns were mounted on armor-
plated cars. ^

Great difficulties attended the victualling of two mill-
ion human beings for any length of time ; however,
the French had succeeded in bringing 3000 oxen, 6000
pigs, and 180,000 sheep into Paris, with considerable
stores of other provisions, so that they were sure of
holding out for six weeks at least.

The commands issued from the head-quarters at
Meaux were that the Army of the Meuse should invest
the capital on the right bank of the Seine, and the
Third Army on the left bank. As a general rule, the
troops were to remain beyond the range of fire from

THE GERMAN ADVANCE. 123

the forts, but, short of that, were to keep as close as
possible so as to reduce the line of blockade. The
connection of the two armies was to be secured above
Paris by several bridges across the river, and below
the city, by the cavahy occupying Poissy. The Third
Ai'my were to scour the country about Orleans. In
case of any attempt to relieve the capital, it was to
march up within a short distance and then, leaving
the blockade to the weaker forces, to use all its strength
to defeat the enemy. Without some relief from the
outside, the mere investment of the city must reduce
it to capitulate, though probably not for some weeks,
or even months. The most obvious alternative was a
bombardment.

At the time when Paris was fortified, it was incon-
ceivable that the improvements in artillery would
double or treble the range of fire. The outworks,
especially to the south, were at so short a distance
from the main work that the latter could easily be
reached by the fire of heavy batteries.

The Grermans have been blamed for not having
recourse at an earlier date to this form of attack ; but
this shows a deficient appreciation of the difficulties in
the way. It may safely be asserted that an attack on
a large fortified place in the heart of the enemy's
country must always be impossible so long as the in-
vader is not master of the railways or waterways, to
bring in endless supplies of the necessary materiel. Its
mere conveyance by ordinary highways, even for a
short distance, is a gigantic undertaking. At this
period the Grerman army had the control of only one
railway on French soil, and this was fully occupied in
the transport of supplies for the forces in the field ;
food, reinforcements, and arms to bring in; the
wounded, sick, and prisoners to carry back. Even

124 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

this ended at Toul ; and the attempt to construct a
ceinture line outside that fortress was rendered impos-
sible by the nature of the ground. A scarcely inferior
obstacle was the complete destruction of the Nanteuil
tunnel, which would probably take many weeks to
restore.

Even then, for the further transport beyond Nan-
teuil of 300 heavy guns, with 500 rounds of shot, 4500
large wagons would be needed, such* as were not in
use in the country to be traversed, and 10,000 horses.
Thus a bombardment was, in the first instance, not to
be thought of, and, in any case, the object of it would
not be to destroy Paris, but to exert a final pressm^e on
the inhabitants; and this would be more effectual
when a long blockade had shaken the resolution of the
besieged than it was likely to be at the beginning.

(September 8th.) In obedience to the supreme com-
mand, the Generals of Division began the march on
the enemy's capital. By the 18th the Army of the
Meuse, by a deviation to the left, had brought the
Twelfth Corps as far as Claye, the Guards to Mitry,
and the Fourth Corps to Dammartin, one march from
Paris.

AU the villages beyond St. Denis were occupied by
the French. It seemed as though the^lockade on the
north side would be opposed, and the Crown Prince of
Saxony took measures to follow up and support the
Fourth Corps, which led the way, on the following day.
The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, hastening on to
Pontoise, were reinforced by two companies of Jagers
and a pontoon train, and, after constructing a bridge,
they crossed the Oise.

The Fifth Corps of the Third Army passed over the
Seine at Villeneuve-St.-Georges and advanced to Palai-
seau and the Upper Bievre. The advanced guard

INVESTMENT OF PAHIS. 125

came into collision with the French cavalry brigade
under Bernis. The (German) 47th Regiment at once
proceeded to attack, and stormed the waUed farm-
steads of Dame-Rose and Trivaux. But on the south-
ern skirt of the wood of Meudon the whole of the
Fourteenth Corps was drawn up ; on its left stood a
division of the Thirteenth Corps. The regiment retired
on Petit-Bicetre without being pursued, and there took
up a defensive position.

The 2nd Bavarian Corps marched from Corbeil by
Longjumeau to a line parallel with the Fifth, and on
the right the Sixth occupied both banks of the Seine.
These corps, too, had several brushes with the French.

The Wurtemberg Division at Lagny and Gournay
was to cross the Marne forthwith, and so establish
communication between the two armies.

INVESTMENT OF PAKIS.

(September 19th.)

On the 19th of September the Fourth Corps, advanc-
ing to St. Brice, met with no opposition ; they drove
out the enemy's troops from the neighboring villages
under cover of the heavy guns of St. Denis, and ad-
vanced on the Lower Seine. The Guards followed
them as far as Dugny, and took possession of the
Moree, which was dammed up at its confluence with
the Marne, and afforded good protection for the invest-
ing lines along a considerable distance. Fui'ther to
the left the Twelfth Corps took up a position on the
Marne, and on the left bank of that stream the Wiir-
temberg Division advanced to Champigny.

On this day the Fifth Corps of the Third Army
advanced to Versailles in two columns. The 47th
Regiment was again told off to cover the march on

126 THE FBANOO-GEEMAN WAK.

the French front. The enemy evidently were anxious
to remain masters of the important heights in front of
the fortifications of Paris, and it was still early in the
morning when two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps
(French) marched out of the neighboring wood of
Meudon on Petit-Bicetre and Villacoublay. Sup-
ported by a strong force of artillery, which set the
farm -buildings of Petit-Bicetre on fire, they drove back
the German posts ; but at Villacoublay the Fifth pres-
ently came up to Abbaye aux Bois to support the
Second Bavarian Corps.

The left flank brigade of the Bavarians had crossed
the columns marching on Versailles in the valley of
the Bievi'e ; but the sound of fighting on the field of
battle induced General von Dietl to advance with his
detachments, which had come up singly, on both sides
of the high road to Bicetre. By charging at the same
time with the Prussians, who were still fighting in the
Bois de Garenne, they succeeded in repulsing the
French at Pave-blanc. Meanwhile the enemy, by
half -past eight, had formed a front of fifty guns, and
three regiments of foot advanced to renew the attack
on Petit-Bicetre and Bois de Garenne. They were
received with a destructive musketry fire, and not even
General Ducrot's personal influence could persuade the
troops, who were young recruits, to go forward. The
Zouaves posted at the farm of Trivaux were finally
thrown into such confusion by the German shell that
they fled wildly back on Paris.

The General had to give up the attempt. His di-
visions retired in evident disorder on Clamart and
Fontenay, under cover of the artillery and of the
cavalry, which had steadily stood fire; the German
foot pursued them. The Bavarians stormed Pave-
blanc under a heavy fire of their guns, the Prussians

' SIEGE OF PARIS. 127

retook Dame-Rose after a short struggle, and forced
their way past the farm of Trivaux into the wood of
Meudon. The French still held the heights of Plessis-
Piquet, which were to them of such vast importance
and easy of defence, as well as the bastion at Moulin-
de-la-Tour, where nine batteries were at once placed in
position, and their fire commanded the whole of the
western field of operations.

The main body of the Bavarians had meanwhile
advanced to the south, and, marching on, after nine
o'clock, on Fontenay aux Roses, they came under a
hot fire from the hill, as well as a flanking fire from a
fort on Hautes-Bruyeres. Being informed of the situa-
tion at the scene of conflict on the plateau of Bicetre,
General von Hartmann at once sent forward a detach-
ment of artillery as a reinforcement, and gave orders
for the 5th Brigade to effect communication on the
left, at Malabry. As soon as this brigade had deployed
under a hot fire of Chassepots and artillery between
Pave-blanc and Malabry, Greneral von Walther pro-
ceeded to attack Plessis-Piquet. After making a
short stand, the artillery retired round the park wall,
and then the infantry came out from the wood of Ver-
rieres, and, after a brief but sharp struggle, took pos-
session of the southern mill. After half an hour's fir-
ing, the Bavarians advanced on Hachette by rushes,
and broke into the park of Plessis. The French kept
up a hot fire from the fort of Moulin de la Tour on the
spots seized by the Germans, by which the Bavarian
field batteries suffered severely ; but they still effect-
ively supported the further advance of the infantry,
who now got close in under the earthworks. However,
the defenders were already on the point of retiring,
and when the Bavarians got up, at about three o'clock,
they found the place deserted and guns left in position.

128 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

Caussade's division had left Clamart to marcli on
Paris ; Maussion's had abandoned the hill of Bagneux,
in consequence, it was said, of mistaken orders, and
Hugues' division was with difficulty brought to a stand
at the Fort of Montrouge.

The Bavarian Corps now took up the position it had
won on the plateau of Bicetre to the right of the Fifth
Corps. The fight had cost the Bavarians 265 men and
the Fifth Corps 178 ; the French lost 661 killed and
above 300 prisoners.

The condition in which the French Fourteenth Corps
returned to Paris caused such dismay that General
Trochu found himself obliged to withdraw a division
of the Thirteenth from Vincennes for the defence of
the city fortifications.

It was subsequently supposed that it would have
been possible to capture one of the forts as early as on
this day, by forcing a way in upon the heels of the
enemy ; and so very appreciably shortening the siege.
But the forts did not open their gates to shelter fugi-
tives, to whom those of the capital were always open.
The scaling of walls eighteen feet high can never be
done without much preparation. Besides, such peri-
lous attempts cannot be made to order ; they can only
be achieved in a propitious moment by those who are
on the spot. In this case almost certain failure would
have endangered the important success just obtained.

The Fifth Corps had meanwhile proceeded on its
Way to Versailles ; a few National Guards, who had
collected at the entrance to the town, were driven off
and disarmed by the German Hussars. The 9tli Di-
vision held the eastern road out of the town, the 10th
was encamped at Rocquencourt, and strong outposts
were placed on the Bougival-Sevres line. The 18th
Brigade, which remained at Villacoublay to support

riEST NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. 129

the Bavarians in case of need, was only moved for-
ward at nightfall.

The 3rd Division of the Bavarian Corps was left
on the heights opposite Plessis-Piquet, its outposts
extending towards the wood of Meudon, where the
French were still in possession of the chateau, and the
sappers at once converted the trenches at La Toui'-
du-Moulin so as to front north. The 12th Division
was encamped at Tousenay, and to the rear as far as
Chatenay.

The main body of the Sixth Corps had taken up a
position at Orly, its outposts extending from Choisy-
le-Roi past Thiais to Chevilly. Maud'huy's division
attempted to repulse them at this village, but without
success. A brigade of the same corps at Limeil, on
the right bank, was engaged in skirmishing with the
French at Creteil. Within touch, further to the right,
the Wiirtemberg Division occupied the banks of the
Marne from Ormesson to Noisy-le-Grand, and behind
that place the pontoon bridge at Goui'nay assured
communication with the Saxon Corps.

Thus on the 19th of September the blockade of
Paris was complete on all sides. Six army corps on a
line of eleven miles were di'awn up immediately in
front of the enemy's capital, in some places within
range of his guns, and protected in rear by a large
force of cavalry.

FIRST NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.

In full expectation of a battle to the north of Paris,
the King had ridden out to join the Gruards, and in the
evening head-quarters were moved to Ferrieres.

Here Monsieur Jules Favre made his appearance to
negotiate for peace on the basis of " not a foot of soil."
He believed that, after so many victories and such

130 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

heavy losses, the Germans would be satisfied with a
sum of money. It need not be said that such pro-
posals could not be considered, and only the possibility
of granting an armistice was seriously discussed.

It was to the political interest even of Germany to
afford the French the opportunity of establishing a
government by their own free and legalized election ;
a government which should have full right and powers
to conclude a peace ; for the self -constituted Goveim-
ment at that time ruling in Paris was the offspring of
a revolution, and might at any moment be strangled
by a revolution. But, from a military point of view,
every pause in the operations of war was a disadvan-
tage. It would give the French time to push forward
their preparations, and by raising for a time the siege
of Paris, would enable the capital to obtain the most
necessary supplies.

The armistice could, therefore, only be granted in
consideration of an equivalent. To secure supplies to
the invading army, Strasburg and Toul, which inter-
cepted communications by railway, must be given up.
The siege of Metz was to be maintained; but with
regard to Paris, either the blockade was to continue,
or, if it were raised, one of the forts which commanded
it was to be held by the Germans. The Chamber of
Deputies was to be at full liberty to meet at Tours.

These conditions, especially the surrender of the
fortified towns, were absolutely rejected by the French,
and the negotiations broken off. A week later Toul
and Strasburg were in the hands of the Germans.

THE TAKING OF TOUL.

(September 23rd.)

As soon as the German coast seemed free from any
danger of an invasion of French troops, the 17th Di-

THE TAKING OF TOUL. 131

vision, left on guard there, was ordered to join the
forces in France. It arrived before Toul on Septem-
ber 12th.

This place, in itself impregnable, but commanded by
neighboring heights, had till now been invested by
part of the troops of the Third Army, and shelled by
the guns seized at Marsal and with field-guns, but
without any particular effect. The infantry, on the
other hand, had established a footing behind the rail-
way embankment and in the suburbs quite close to the
foot of the glacis, so that sorties were rendered almost
impossible. In view of these circumstances haK the
division was ere long sent to Chalons, where sixteen
battalions and fifteen squadrons were barely sufficient
to deal with the extremely hostile demeanor of the
country people, to keep the roads open and keep open
communications with Germany. Thus only seven
battalions, four squadrons, and four field-batteries
were left outside Toul.

On the 18th there arrived from Nancy by railway
ten guns of 15 cm. bore and sixteen of 12 cm. bore.
It was decided to direct the attack on the place, on its
western face, which was enfiladed from Mont-St.-
Michel, and to breach the south-west bastion ; but first
an attempt was to be made to reduce the place by the
shorter process of an artillery attack.

On the night of the 23rd platforms for the siege
artillery were constructed by the infantry ; three on
Mont-St.-Michel, seven on the heights on the left bank
of the Moselle, and one on the right bank. Next
morning sixty-two guns opened fire, and by half -past
three the white flag was flying from the Cathedral.

The place surrendered on the 23rd, on the same con-
ditions as had been granted to Sedan. A hundred and
nine officers were released on parole, 2240 rank and file

132 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

were taken prisoners. Six companies took possession
of the city that evening ; on the whole, it had suffered
little.

Twenty-one hea\^ guns, about 3000 stand of arms,
and large stores of provisions and forage were seized.

THE SIEGE OF STRASBURG.

(September 28th.)

Immediately after the victory at Worth, the reduc-
tion of Strasburg became a primary object to the G-er-
mans. This strong position, as a bridge-head com-
manding the Ehine, was a standing threat to Southern
Germany.

When Marshal MacMahon evacuated Alsace, only
three battalions of the line were left with the com-
mandant of Strasburg. Stragglers escaping from
various regiments engaged at Worth, the remnants of
some four battalions and relief detachments, and of
the Garde Mobile and National Guards, had, however,
increased the garrison to 23,000 men. There was a
complete absence of engineers, but 130 marine infantry
formed a company of trustworthy men ; the armament
of guns was also ample.

So early as on the 11th of August ""the Baden con-
tingent had been detailed to observe Strasburg. Not-
withstanding their small number, they had advanced
unchecked on the plain known as Ruprechts Au, as
far as the Rhine and the canal; had occupied the
village of Schiltigheim, almost within rifle range of
the fortifications ; and, after preparing it for defence,
pushed forward into the suburb of Konigshofen.

In the course of eighteen days the Landwehr Guard
arrived, under the command of General von Werder,
and the 1st Reserve Division, with one cavalry

THE SIEGE OF STEASBUKG. 133

brigade, 46 battalions, 24 squadrons, and 18 field-bat-
teries ; followed by a siege-train of 200 field-pieces and
88 mortars, with 6000 foot artillery and ten companies
of sappers and miners ; 40,000 men in all.

The unloading of the guns brought from Magdebui'g,
Coblentz, and Wesel was begun on August 18th by a
detachment of the Railway Battalion, at the station of
Vendenheim.

The engineers' depot was established at Hausberge,
a gun-carriage depot at Lampertsheim, and magazines
were constructed. The city was blockaded on all
sides, and a field telegraph kept up communication
between the posts.

To attain the desired end with the least possible
delay, an attempt was made, contrary to the advice of
General Schultz, of the engineers, though with con-
sent from head-quarters, to force the town to surrender
by means of a bombardment. The request to remove
the women and children had to be refused.

The erection of the batteries for bombardment in
the dark, wet nights was attended with gi-eat difficul-
ties. Meanwhile only the field-guns could fire on the
fortress; however, the batteries whose armament of
heavy pieces was complete were able to open fire on
the night of the 24th-25th ; and part of the town was
soon in flames. Kehl, on the right bank of the river,
was also set on fire by shell.

The Bishop of Strasburg came out to the outposts
at Schiltigheim to crave quarter for the citizens.
Much as the injury of a Grerman town was to be
regretted, as the Prelate was not empowered to make
terms, the firing had to be continued through the night
of the 25th, when it was at its hottest. At the same
time, it was fully acknowledged at head-quarters in
Mundolsheim that the end would not be attained by

134 THE FBANCO-GEKMAN WAB.

these means, and that the more dehberate method of a
regular siege must be tried. G-eneral von Mertens was
placed in command of the engineering operations,
General Decker of the artillery.

During the night of the 29th-30th of August the first
parallel was opened very near the glacis, and thence
extended from the Rhine and Marne canal, past the
churchyard of St. Helena, to the Jewish cemetery at
Konigshofen.

The number of batteries on the left bank of the
Rhine was soon increased to 21; on the right bank to
4 ; so that 124 guns of the heaviest calibre were ready
in intrenched positions to begin the duel with the
guns of the fortress. Further preparations for attack
were directed against bastions Nos. 11 and 12 on the
north-west salient of the fortress. In the night of
August 31st the second parallel was occupied without
opposition. A strong sortie of fourteen companies of
the garrison was driven back at daybreak on the 1st
September from the island of Waken, and from Kron-
burg and Konigshofen.

The forts now opened a sharp fire, sending such a
storm of projectiles down on the siege works that they
had to be abandoned, till at about nine Q'clock the Ger-
man artillery had silenced the French guns. A second
attack followed on the 3rd September, which was not
repulsed before it had reached the second parallel.

A short truce was granted at the request of the com-
mandant, to allow of the burial of the dead lying out-
side the trenches. And on this day a grand feu-de-joie
announced to the besieged the fall of Sedan.

Incessant rain had filled the trenches of the second
parallel, 2400 paces in length, ankle-deep with water,
and it was not till the 9th that they were completely
repaired. Five batteries from the first parallel were

THE SIEGE OF STEASBUEG. 135

moved to the front. Special batteries had to be con-
structed for the attack of lunette No. 44, which flanked
all the siege works. These soon silenced its guns, and
it was abandoned by the French.

The Germans had now got 96 mounted field-pieces
and 38 mortars in full fire, at a very short range.

Each gun fired twenty grape-shot a day and ten
shrapnel every night. The large Finkmatt Barracks
were destroyed by fire, and the Steinthor Gate was so
much injured that it had to be buttressed up with
sandbags. The garrison withdrew the guns behind
the parapet, and only fired their mortars. Neverthe-
less, to carry on the siege works the sap-rollers had to
be called into requisition.

When the French discovered that mining galleries
had been constructed in front of lunette No. 53, Cap-
tain Ledebour was let down by ropes into the trenches,
and with the help of his sappers removed the charges
of powder.

During the night of the 13th, the crest of the glacis
between lunettes 52 and 53 was reached. The crown-
ing of the covered way was begun, by means of double
saps with traverses, and finished in four days.

The attack henceforth was exclusively directed
against bastion No. 11.

To divert the water from the moat the sluices by the
Judenthor (gateway) must be destroyed. They were
invisible from any part of the scene of operations, and
the work could only be very inefiiciently done by artil-
lery at a distance of a quarter of a mile. Detachments
of the 34th Fusilier Regiment, therefore, on the 15th,
marched on the sluices under a heavy rifle fire from
the besieged, and destroyed the dam.

The island of Sporen was at the same time occupied
by the Baden Corps.

136 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

When the mortar-batteries had for the most part
been moved up to the second parallel, the guns were
also advanced to the second position, and the rifle-pit
detachments did such execution by their excellent
practice that the French never dared show themselves
by daylight.

The inner wall of lunette No. 53 could only be hit
by indirect fire ; but 1000 shells made a breach, and on
the 19th of September two mines were fired which
blew up the counterscarp and laid it level with the
water-line. The Germans immediately began laying a
fascine-made dam across the moat. A party sent
over in boats found the work abandoned. The gorge
was closed under heavy fire from the ramparts, and
the parapet turned so as to oppose the fortress.

The next lunette. No. 52, was merely an earthwork,
and the attack had akeady been pushed forward as
far as the edge of the moat, but blinded saps had first
to be thrown up and covered in with rails, as a protec-
tion against the heavy fire of shell from bastion No. 12.

The construction of a dam of fascines or earth, more
than sixty paces across, and in water more than breast-
high, would have taken a long time ; so it was decided
to make a cask-bridge of beer-barrels, of which a
quantity had been found in Schiltigheim. This work
was begun at dusk on the 21st, under no better pro-
tection than a screen of boards to prevent observation,
and it was finished by ten o'clock. Here again the
defenders had not expected that the waU would be
scaled, and this lunette too was immediately prepared
for further attack. Both lunettes were now furnished
with batteries of mortars and guns to silence the fire
from the ravelins and counter-guards of the front of
attack, against which five dismounted guns and coun-
ter-batteries were also directed.

THE SIEGE OF STKASBUKG. 137

During the night of the 22nd the Germans advanced,
partly by a flying sap and partly by the sap-roller
from lunette No. 52, and at once proceeded to take up
a position on the crest of the glacis in front of counter-
guard No. 51. A breaching fire was opened against
the eastern side of bastion No. 11, and the western side
of bastion No. 12, and the splinters of stone compelled
the French to abandon the counter-guards. The walls
of bastion No. 11 feU in on the 24th, after a shelling of
600 rounds. The breach in the earthwork at the angle,
which remained standing, was postponed till the storm-
ing of the place.

In bastion No. 12 it was more difficult to make a
breach, because of the limited means for observing the
effect of the fire. It was not till the 26th that a breach
of thirty-six feet wide was made, after firing 467 minie
shells. And even now, to really storm the place, the
deep moat surrounding the bastion must be crossed.

News of the fall of the Empire had by some means
reached Strasburg, but G-eneral Uhrich would not
listen to the prayers of the citizens that he would
put an end to their sufferings. The Eepublic was
proclaimed.

The siege had lasted thirty days, but the place was
still well supplied with food and stores ; the garrison
was not materially weakened by the loss of 2500 men,
but their heterogeneous elements prevented any action
in large bodies outside the walls. From the first the
small blockading force had been allowed to approach
close to the works; and the one moment when the
artillery of a fortress has the advantage over the enemy
had not been fully utilized.

The German artillery had proved much the stronger,
both as regards materiel and in its advantageous
employment. Under protection of its fire the sappers

138 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAB.

and infantry carried on the works with equal conrage
and caution, never swerving from the object in view.
The storming of the inner wall was now imminent,
and no relief from outside could be hoped for.

On the 27th of September, in the afternoon, the
white flag was seen flying from the Cathedral tower ;
firing ceased and the engineering works were stopped.

At two in the morning the capitulation ^as signed,
on the same conditions as at Sedan. Five hundred
officers and 17,000 men were made prisoners, but the
officers, if they chose, were free on parole. The Na-
tional Guards and franctireurs were dismissed, after
laying down arms and pledging themselves to fight no
more. All the cash in the bank, 1200 guns, 200,000
small arms, and considerable stores proved valuable
trophies.

At eight o'clock in the morning of the 28th com-
panies of Prussian and Baden troops mounted guard
at the gates (the National, the Fischer, and the Auster-
litz gates). The French garrison marched out at the
National Gate, General Uhrich at their head. At first
the march was conducted in good order, but before
long numbers of drunken men broke the ranks and
refused to obey, or threw down their arms. The pris-
oners were taken first to Rastatt, under the escort of
two battalions and two squadrons.

The old German town, which had been seized by
France in time of peace nearly 200 years before, was
now restored by German daring to German rule.

The besiegers had lost 39 officers and 894 men. The
city, of course, had suffered considerably. Four hun-
dred and fifty houses were utterly destroyed, 10,000
inhabitants were roofless, nearly 2000 killed and
wounded. The museum and picture gallery, town
hall, theatre, new church, gymnasium, Commandant's

PAEIS IN OCTOBER. 139

residence, and a public library of 200,000 volumes had
been burnt.

The noble Cathedral showed many traces of shot,
and the citadel was a heap of ruins. Under the wreck
of the west front of the fortifications lay shattered
guns.

The fall of Toul and of Strasburg made a not unim-
portant change in the conduct of the war. Consider-
able forces were now free for other uses, and transport
by railway could be effected much nearer to the armies.

The materiel which was no longer required at Stras-
burg could not indeed be at once employed for the
artillery attack on Paris ; it needed considerable addi-
tions, and was to do duty meanwhile in the reduction
of several smaller places.

The newly-opened railway line was used at once to
convey the Landwehr Guards Division to assist in
blockading Paris. A new army corps, the Fourteenth,
was created out of the Baden Division with a brigade
composed of the 30th and Sith Prussian Eegiments,
and one cavalry brigade ; and this, under the com-
mand of Greneral von Werder, marched on the Upper
Seine. The 1st Reserve Division remained in occupa-
tion at Strasburg.

OPERATIONS ROUND PARIS TO 18TH OF OCTOBER.

The Government, in the now closely-blockaded capi-
tal, could not make themselves heard and obeyed in
the provinces. They therefore decided on sending
two of their members to the scene of dehberations at
Tours.

Even these could only quit Paris in a balloon. One
of these delegates was Gambetta, whose restless energy
soon made itself conspicuously felt, and for as long as
the war lasted.

140 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

Monsieur Thiers, meanwliile, had visited every Eu-
ropean court to invite some intervention in favor
of France. After the failure of the attempt of Sep-
tember 19th the feeling in Paris was against any great
offensive demonstrations ; but the troops of the line
still remained outside the walls under protection of
the forts. The divisions of the Thirteenth Corps were
encamped on the south side and on the plains of Vin-
cennes; the Fourteenth were at Boulogne, Neuilly,
and Clichy, behind the Seine, with Mont Valerien in
their front. This fort was held by two battalions of
the line, after the Gardes Mobiles had fled, on the 20th,
from that perfectly impregnable stronghold, in great
disorder back into Paris. The northern front of the
city was still defended by the G-ardes Mobiles.

On the German side the posts of the Army of the
Meuse, which were to be occupied and defended under
all circumstances, extended from Chatou, along the
Seine, to the heights of Montmorency, and from the
Moree and the skirts of the forest of Bondy as far as
the Marne. In connection with these were the lines
of the Wiirtemberg contingent from Noisy-le-Grand,
across the Joinville peninsula to Ormesson. To fill
the gap from thence to Villeneuve-St.-Georges the
Eleventh Corps arrived from Sedan \>n the 23rd, and
the 1st Bavarian Corps occupied Longjumeau for
security against Orleans. The Sixth Corps could now
be transferred to the left bank of the Seine, where the
line of defence extended along the wooded heights
south of Paris to Bougival.

The head-quarters, occupied by the King and the
Third Ai'my, were at Versailles ; those of the Army of
the Meuse were transferred to Vert-Galant. Numer-
ous bridges connected the various portions of the
forces, telegraphs and signal lights insured their rapid

PAKIS IN OCTOBEE. 141

concentration, and every movement of the French was
watched from posts of observation.

There was no lack of quarters for the men. Every
village was deserted; but the difficulty of obtaining
supplies was all the greater. The fugitive inhabitants
had di'iven off their cattle and destroyed their stores ;
only the wine-cellars seemed inexhaustible. For the
first few days all the food needed had to be drawn from
the commissariat stores, but ere long the cavalry suc-
ceeded in obtaining fresh provisions. High prices and
good discipline made traffic safe. Only the advanced
companies had to bivouac or build huts, many within
range of the fort guns, some even within that of the
French rifles. Near St. Cloud, for instance, no one
could show himseK without becoming a mark for the
Chassepots behind the shutters of the houses opposite.
The sentries here could only be relieved at night, and
sometimes had to remain on duty two or three days at
a time. The posts of the Bavarians at Mouhn-la-Tour
were also much exposed, and the officers on their
rounds were always subjected to a sharp cannonade.
Le Bourget, which stood within the line of inundation,
was especially liable to a surprise. It had been taken
on the 20th by a battalion of Guards, at whose ap-
proach 400 Grardes Mobiles had fled, leaving all their
baggage. Only one company was left there, as it
was close under the heavy fire of the neighboring
fort.

Some minor sorties from St. Denis met with no suc-
cess ; but detachments of the Sixth Corps (German)
vainly endeavored to take up positions in the hamlet
of Villejuif or the earthworks on Hautes-Bruyeres.
They made their way in several times, but always had
to retire under the fire of the neighboring forts of
Bicetre and Ivry, and the superior numbers of Maud'-

142 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

huy's division. The French then placed heavy guns
in Bicetre.

(September 30th.) Early on this day a cannonade
of an hour and a half s duration from the southern
forts announced a sortie in that direction. By six
o'clock two brigades of the Thirteenth Corps (French)
had deployed near Thiais and Choisy-le-Roi. Strong
parties of tirailleurs di'ove in the outposts of the Sixth
Corps, and forced the field-guns between those two
villages to retire ; but then the fire of the infantry in
occupation checked any further attack on the part of
the French. Further to the west a third brigade got
into Chevilly and seized the buildings of a manufac-
tory on the road to Belle-Epine ; still their determined
attack failed to get possession of the whole village.

The 11th Division, in their quarters in the rear, took
alarm, and advanced to the support of the 12th. The
factory was recovered from the French, and the Prus-
sian batteries now opened fire, and worked such havoc
among the enemy as they retired on Saussaye, that
under the further attack of the infantry they fled in
the greatest disorder to Hautes-Bruyeres and Villejuif .
A brigade which had forced its way into L'Hay was in
the same way repulsed, leaving 120 prisoners, for the
most part unwounded. In the farmstead at the north
end of Chevilly, however, the French still held their
ground with great obstinacy. Not till they were com-
pletely surrounded, and had made an ineffectual
attempt to force a way out, did they surrender, to the
number of about 100.

The whole attempt was defeated by about nine
o'clock, and Greneral Vinoy vainly endeavored to incite
the diminished battalions at Hautes-Bruyeres to return
to the charge.

These few morning hours had cost the Sixth Corps

QUIETUDE AT VEKSAILLES. 143

28 officers and 413 men ; and the French several times
as many.

Two simultaneous feint attacks on Sevres and on
Mesly, on the right bank of the Seine, came to noth-
ing. The German outposts, at first driven in, returned
to their posts by about nine o'clock.

After thus failing to force an exit to the south by
this sortie, the garrison proceeded to secure the posi-
tion they held by outworks. They fortified Villejuif
and extended their lines from Hautes-Bruyeres, past
Arcueil to the Mill of Pichon, so that the Bavarian
outposts had to be withdrawn somewhat nearer to
Bourg-la-Reine.

But throughout the first half of the month of Octo-
ber the garrison of Paris restricted itself, for the most
part, to daily cannonades. Gruns of the heaviest cali-
bre were directed on the smallest objects. It was
waste of ammunition, just as though their object was
to get rid of the stores they had by them. If one of
the gigantic minie shells happened to fall on a picket,
the destruction was of course terrific; but on the
whole they did little execution.

Apart from the noise, to which they soon became
accustomed, at Versailles, whence none of the resi-
dents had fled, it might have been a time of perfect
peace. The admirable discipline of the German troops
allowed the townsfolk to pursue their business undis-
turbed ; the hosts were well paid for the soldiers quar-
tered on them, and the country people could cultivate
their fields and gardens in peace. At St. Cloud every
room was kept in the same order as when the Imperial
family had left it, till the sheUs from Mont-Valerien
reduced that delightful palace, with all its treasures of
art, to a heap of charred ruins. It was the French
fire too which wrecked the Chateau of Meudon, the

144 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

porcelain factory of Sevres, and whole villages in the
neighborhood. And, without any necessity, the
French themselves felled half the Bois de Boulogne.

The blockade was considerably strengthened between
the 10th and 16th of October, when the 17th Division
arrived from Toul to relieve the 21st at Bonneuil, and
the 21st took up a position between the Bavarian and
the Fifth Corps, in the line from Meudon to Sevi'es,
while the Landwehr Guards Division came to occupy
St. Germain.

These movements were observed from Paris, and, to
clear up the situation, General Vinoy advanced, at
nine o'clock on the 18th, with about 25,000 men and
280 guns, on the position held by the Bavarian Corps.

Four battalions of Gardes Mobiles, protected by the
fire of the forts, proceeded to attack Bagneux, and
forced their way over the battered-in fortifications
into the heart of the place, whence the German defend-
ers retired to Fontenay, when, at eleven o'clock, the
10th Regiment of the line (French) had also come up.
Reinforced by a fresh battalion, and supported by an
effective flanking fire from Chatillon, they now made
so firm a stand that the enemy could make no further
progress, but began to put Bagneux in a state of de-
fence. Meanwhile the 4th Bavarian Division had
formed up, and by about 1.30 General von Bothmer
came up from Sceaux and from Fontenay, on both
sides at once, on Bagneux. They climbed over the bar-
ricades erected by the French, who, however, still
offered an obstinate resistance in the northern part of
the village.

A French battalion had also made its way into
Chatillon, but the Bavarian battalion on guard there
held its own until assistance came, and the enemy was
driven out of the place after a sharp conflict.

SORTIE OF OCTOBER 18TH. 145

A third brigade seized Clamart, which at that time
was not included in the Grerman intrenched Hnes ; but
they failed to climb the slopes leading to Moulin-de-la-
Tour, although the Germans occupying the plateau
there were under fire from the fort.

General Vinoy had convinced himself that a suffi-
cient force was prepared to make head to him at every
point, and at three o'clock he decided on giving up the
struggle. The French detachments gi'adually disap-
peared behind the forts, and had all vanished by dusk.
The Bavarians returned to their former positions, and
the force at Bagneux was strengthened to two bat-
talions.

France had all this while been arming with zealous
haste. Armies of considerable strength were being
massed at Rouen and at Evreux, at Besan^on, and
especially beyond the Loire, of very various compo-
sition, no doubt, and with a serious lack of profes-
sional officers to drill and discipline them. Great bat-
tles were therefore to be avoided ; the enemy was to be
harassed by constant small engagements.

Thus, towards the end of September, General Dela-
rue had already advanced from Evreux with his troop
of scouts (Eclau'eurs de la Seine) close on St. Germain.
But the 6th Cavalry Division, supported by two Ba-
varian battalions, drove these, too, back across the
hue to Dreux.

The woods in front of the 5th Cavalry Division
were full of detachments of the French, who were,
however, repulsed without much difficulty to Ram-
bouillet and Epernon.

Matters looked more serious to the south of Paris,
where the 4th Cavalry Division were observing the
Loire.

The newly-formed French Fifteenth Corps had as-
10

146 THE FRANCb-GERMAN WAR.

sembled at Orleans, in three divisions, 30,000 strong,
and they occupied the whole forest belt on the right
bank of the Loire. To avert the danger here of being
outflanked, the First Bavarian Corps and the 22nd
Division of the Eleventh had, as has already been
mentioned, started to march on Arpajon and Mont-
chery as soon as they were released from Sedan ; and
on the 6th of October they were placed, with the 2nd
Cavalry Division, under the command of Greneral von
der Tann.

THE BATTLE OF ARTENAY.

As soon as General von der Tann had received
instructions to act on the offensive against Orleans,
he marched, on the 9th of October, to the vicinity of
St. Peravy without meeting any serious opposition,
and on the 10th advanced on Artenay. The 4th Cav-
ahy Division covered the right flank, the 2nd remained
near Pithiviers, where the French had collected in
great force.

But General La Motterouge had on the same day
advanced to Artenay with the Fifteenth Corps
(French), having the wood in his rear occupied by
Gardes Mobiles, so the advanced guards of the two
armies met at a short distance to the north of the goal
of their march.

While the Bavarian light horse, on the right, drove
the French cavahy before them, the infantry deployed
across the road close to Dambron. The 22nd Division
(German) marched on Dambron with a cavalry division
on each flank. Under the fire of the Bavarian bat-
teries, the French had turned off towards Artenay,
where the Germans were ready to receive them. At-
tacked in front and threatened by bodies of horse, at
about two o'clock, leaving their tents behind them,
they began a retreat, which soon degenerated into

THE ENGAGEMENT AT OELEANS. 147

flight. The cavahy seized four field-guns, and took
above 250 prisoners. Six hundred more, who had
reached Croix-Briquet, surrendered there to the Ba-
varian infantry.

The German troops had made a long march ; Gen-
eral von der Tann therefore called a halt in and around
Artenay, and only the advanced guard went on to
Chevilly, to proceed to Orleans next day.

THE ENGAGEMENT AT ORLEANS.

(October 11th.)

The 22nd Division, only 6000 strong, set out on
October 11th, on the right of the advancing forces, and
drove the French out of several villages partly prepared
for defence ; it was not till about ten o'clock that they
met with any serious opposition, from an intrenched
position at Ormes.

The French commander, after the disaster at Ar-
tenay, decided on a retreat behind the Loire, and to
cover it he placed about 15,000 men on the ground on
the right bank of the river, which possessed many
essentials towards a good defence.

General von Wittich first marched his 44th Brigade
against the French position at Ormes, and then opened
fire from seven batteries. His left wing, supported by
the Bavarian right, made their way but slowly over
the plain to the east of the enemy's position, and vari-
ous enclosures and buildings had to be stormed and
taken as they advanced. This threatening movement
on their right flank, however, shook the firmness of
the French, and, after some hours' hard fighting, they
began to yield. No sooner was this observed by the
Germans than two batteries were brought up to within
800 paces, and the 83rd Regiment stormed the place at

148 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAH.

two in the afternoon, but with much loss. Detach-
ments of the 43rd Brigade had meanwhile reached the
road in the rear of Ormes, and took 800 prisoners.
The villages, orchards, and vineyards which line the
road to Orleans for above a mile on either side were
serious obstacles to the advance of the Grermans, and
the division did not arrive at Petit-St.-Jean till three
o'clock ; there they stormed the most advanced build-
ings.

The Bavarian Corps, which had met with a stout
resistance at Saran, pushed forward to Bel- Air, but
with great loss, especially among the artillery. Here
the nature of the gi'ound did not allow of the align-
ment of the guns, and the attack came to a standstill ;
at half -past four the French were still holding their
own at Les Aides, till the advance of the 4th Bavarian
Brigade on Murlins threatened to cut off their retreat.
Then they again made a stand behind the railway em-
bankment, 1000 paces in front of the town, and the
station and gas works had also to be taken by storm.

It was five o'clock when General von der Tann led
his Reserve Corps, the 1st Bavarian Brigade, to a
decisive attempt on Grand-Ormes. The 32nd Prussian
Regiment crossed the embankment on the left flank of
the French, who now retired to the suWrb of St. Jean.
The 1st Bavarian Regiment, hurrying up in its rear,
was received with a hot fii-e at the gate of the town ;
but aU the officers led the advance, and by seven
o'clock they had reached the market-place.

The French hurried down to the bridge over the
Loire, the 43rd Prussian and the 1st Bavarian Bri-
gades seized the principal buildings and the passages
across the river ; but as darkness fell they gave up all
further advance and bivouacked on the squares in the
town.

OCCUPATION OP ORLEANS. 149

The day had cost the Grermans 900 men, the 3rd Ba-
varian Brigade having suffered most. But their hard-
won victory had gained security to the investing
troops ; and 5000 rifles, ten locomotives, and sixty rail-
way carriages were welcome spoil.

The French rear-guard had lost in small skirmishes
and retreats alone 1800 prisoners ; but it had covered
the retreat of the main body of the Army of the
South for a whole day against superior forces, with
praiseworthy determination. In an open field, where
the skilful wielding of compact masses is indispen-
sable, it would soon have been defeated ; but in street
fighting, under shelter of the houses, unflinching per-
sonal courage is all that is needed, and even the recruits
of the newly created French army did not lack that.

On the following day the 1st Bavarian Division took
possession of the suburb of St. Marceau, on the fur-
ther side of the Loire, and advanced to the Loiret.
The 2nd Cavalry Division scoured the district of So-
logne, the 4th on the right bank kept a lookout to the
westward. The Fifteenth Corps (French) had con-
tinued to retire to Salbris and Pierrefitte, beyond the
Sauldre.

It might certainly have been wished that they could
have been followed up to Vierzon and Tours, to de-
stroy the vast stores of arms at the first-named town
and disturb the Provisional Grovernment in the other.
But it must not be forgotten that, though the French
forces had been discomfited at Artenay, favored by
the nature of the locality, they had escaped total rout
by retreat. A new French corps d'armee, the Six-
teenth, had come into existence at Blois, below Orleans,
and at Gien, above that city ; it had come into col-
lision with the German cavalry by the wood of Marche-
noir and before Chateaudun, and the inhabitants and

150 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

volunteers appeared so full of confidence that it was
to be supposed they counted on fresh support.

So the invaders were compelled to confine their
operations to the occupation of Orleans and the line
of the Loire ; and for this purpose the Bavarian Corps,
with the 2nd Cavalry Division, seemed a sufiicient
force. The 22nd Infantry and the 4th Cavalry Divis-
ion were recalled to the Third Army, but on their re-
turn march they were to disperse the volunteers who
had made their appearance at Chateaudun and Char-
tres.

Greneral von der Tann had the bridges over the
Loiret and the Loire prepared for the march, stages
were established to Longjumeau, and the Bavarian
Eailway Corps set to work to restore the line to Ville-
neuve.

THE TAKING OF SOISSONS.

(October 15th.)

Soissons still hindered the free use of the railway
from Rheims, which had been re-opened by the fall
of Toul. This fortress had been battered by artillery
without success when the Army of the Meuse marched
past it on the way to Paris, and since then it had only
been kept under observation till October 6th, when
eight Landwehr battalions, four squadrons, two bat-
teries, two companies of pioneers, and four of fortress
artillery completed the blockade.

Soissons, with its walls eight metres high, was quite
impregnable, and damming up the waters of the Crise
would preserve it from attack on the south. The
south-west front, on the other hand, had only a dry
moat, with no counterscrap of masonry ; here, too, the
town was commanded by Mont-Marion, rising to a
height of ninety metres at a distance of less than a

TAKING OF SOISSONS. 151

quarter of a mile. On this side, therefore, the artillery
was preparing to attack at close quarters, when, on
the 11th of October, 26 Prussian siege-guns arrived
from Toul, with 170 rounds of ammunition and 10
French mortars ; the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg took
over the command.

In a clear moonlight night the artillery was got up,
with the help of the infantry, on to the heights at St.
Grenevieve and BeUeu; and the batteries on Mont-
Marion were constructed and armed. They opened
fire simultaneously at six in the morning of the 12th
of October.

The besieged answered with great spirit but small
results, and the accurate fire of the Prussian artillery
soon reduced the French front to silence.

A small breach was visible by next day, and the fire
from the fortress was evidently much enfeebled ; but
the Commandant decidedly rejected the demand that
he should capitulate. On the 14th he increased the
number of guns on his south front, so that the bat-
teries on St. Grenevieve had a hard struggle. The
French also labored hard to restore the damaged for-
tifications, brought more guns up to the ramparts, and
filled up the breach with abatis.

But on the 15th these repairs were soon demolished
again by the Prussian artillery, and a breach forty
paces wide was made. As the fortress still kept up a
brisk fire, it was determined to bring the field-batteries
within 900 paces of the walls; but at eight in the
evening, when this was just begun, the Commandant
opened negotiations and surrendered the place on the
same terms as Sedan. The garrison marched out next
morning, for the most part drunk. A thousand of
Gardes Mobiles were dismissed on parole, 3800 soldiers
were made prisoners.

152 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

The attack had cost 120 men ; 128 guns and 8000
small arms were seized as plunder, besides vast stores
of provisions.

THE STORMING OF CHATEAUDUN.

(October 18th.)

In obedience to instructions, Greneral von Wittich
marched on Chateaudun in the afternoon of the 18th,
with the 22nd Division. The French troops of the line
had already been ordered to retire on Blois, but about
1800 National Gruards and volunteers remained, under
cover of barricades and waUs, to receive the enemy.
The infantry attack was also made more difficult by
the nature of the ground, and four batteries had to
keep up a hot fire for some little time.

It was not till dusk that a general attack was at-
tempted. The defence inside the town made a desper-
ate resistance. House by house had to be seized,
the fighting went on late into the night, and a large
part of the place was set in flames. The volunteers
finally retired, leaving 150 prisoners and abandoning
the inhabitants to their fate ; and these, though hav-
ing taken part in the struggle, werq^ let off with a
fine.

At noon on the 21st, the division marched on Char-
tres, where 20,000 French were said to have assembled.
The G-ardes Mobiles and Marine Infantry advanced to
attack, but were repulsed by the fire of seven batteries.
The General in command deployed both brigades to
the south of the city, and with the assistance of the
cavalry, who had been joined by the 6th Division,
completely surrounded it. The fate of Chateaudun
had been a warning to the municipal authorities, and
at three o'clock an agreement was come to, by which

THE STORMING OF CHATEAUDUN. 153

the troops were to be withdrawn, the National Gruards
to lay down their arms, and the gates to be thrown
open.

General Wittich's orders were to remain at Chartres
for the present, while the 6th Cavalry Division was to
occupy Maintenon, and so cover the investing army to
the west of Paris.

Operations had been no less active in the north.
The Saxon Cavahy Division, supported by a part of
the Army of the Meuse, had in the early part of Octo-
ber driven the franctireurs and Oardes Mobiles be-
yond the Oise and the Epte on Amiens, taking some
hundi'eds of prisoners. But fresh swarms were con-
stantly coming on, and had to be attacked at Breteuil,
Montdidier, and Etrepagny, so that no less than eleven
battalions, twenty-four squadi'ons, and four batteries
(Grerman) were by degrees employed in protecting the
besieging force on this side of the capital. But by the
end of the month the French forces were so regularly
disciplined and in such numbers, that for a time the
Germans could only hold and defend the Hne of the
Epte.

To the south-east also, in the forest-land of Fon-
tainebleau, the volunteers were hostile, particularly to
requisition parties of cavalry; and at Nangis they
thi'eatened to obstruct the transport of siege-guns. A
small force of Wiirtembergers seized Montereau, which,
though barricaded, was not defended ; the inhabitants
gave up their arms, and the victors marched on No-
gent. This town was held by a large body of Gardes
Mobiles. After breaching the walls of the churchyard,
the "Wiirtembergers, in the face of a hot fire, made their
way into the place. The French still offered a stout
resistance, but finally retired on Troyes, leaving 600
dead and wounded.

154 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

The small flying column rejoined its division, hav-
ing traversed twenty-seven miles (German) of country
in six days.

SOETIE TOWAEDS MAIiMAISON.

(October 21st.)

The French capital had now been invested for more
than a month, and it seemed not impossible that after
such long inactivity it would be reduced to surrender
by famine. All the sorties hitherto attempted had
only di'iven the enemy out of the closest vicinity ; a
new effort was to have a grander object in view. It
was to cross the Seine below Paris at Bezons and Car-
riere, and to effect a simultaneous attack on the posi-
tion of the Fourth Prussian Corps on the heights of
Ai'genteuil from the south, and from St. Denis on the
east. The advance on Eouen was to pass by Pontoise
thi'ough a district not yet altogether exhausted of sup-
plies ; the Army of the Loire was also to proceed by
railway to Rouen by Le Mans, thus forming a com-
bined army of 250,000 men.

The Prussian Fifth Corps, it was true, commanded
the crossing of the Seine immediately in flank ; out-
posts had several times been seen at Rueil. As a pre-
liminary step. General Ducrot undertook to repulse
this force with 10,000 men and 120 field-guns. Thus
an intrenched hne from Yalerien and Carrieres would
close the peninsula on the south.

Perhaps, in the face of much-dreaded public opinion
and the growing restlessness of pohtical parties in
Paris, it was more a craving to be doing something
than any serious hope which gave rise to such far-
reaching schemes. Considerable difficulties had to be
met in attacking the enemy's lines, and greater must

SOETIE OF OCTOBER 21ST. 155

inevitably arise if their attack should succeed. It was
vain to think of getting through with miles of bag-
gage-trains, which were indispensable to victual an
army. Serious embarrassment would ensue when the
troops had consumed the three days' rations they could
carry with them. To live on the produce of the soil
the army must be dispersed ; but with the enemy at
its heels a close order of march was indispensable.
And, in any case, it is hard to see what would have
been gained by withdi^awing from Paris the forces
which had been assembled for its defence. Success
could only have been hoped for if an army from with-
out had been so close at hand as to be within immedi-
ate touch of the troops marching out.

However, on the 21st of October, after Mont Valerien
had all the morning kept up an ineffectual fire, Gren-
eral Ducrot advanced at about one o'clock to attack
the position of the Prussian 19th Brigade occupying
the line of Bougival — Jonchere — Fohlenkoppel. Four-
teen French field-batteries deployed on either side of
the Rueil and at the southern foot of Valerien ; the
infantry advanced in five columns in the rear of this
artillery front.

On the German side only two batteries could at first
engage in the unequal duel, and one of these, at Villa
Metternich, had very soon to retire. The French guns
advanced to within 1400 paces of Bougival, and at
thi'ee o'clock four companies of Zouaves rushed out of
Rueil. Being received with a hot fire, they inclined to
the left, throwing themselves into the park of Malmai-
son, and without opposition seized the Chateau of
Buzanval and the eastern slope of the deep ravine of
Cucufa. And here one of their batteries was brought
into the fighting line to support them.

While the main body of the 9th Division (German)

156 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

advanced from Versailles on Vaucresson, the lOth de-
ployed by the ravine and at Villa Metternich. The
infantry fire lasted for above an hour, and did much
havoc among the French. When at about four o'clock
they seemed sufiiciently shaken, and a reinforcement
of the Landwehr Gruard had come up from St. Germain
on the left, the German left wing advanced from
Bougival over the hill of Jonchere, forced a way into
Malmaison in spite of violent opposition, and followed
the retreating Zouaves as far as Rueil. The right
wing at the same time turning the head of the Cucufa
ravine, advanced behind the eastern ridge and di'ove
out the enemy, seized the battery of two guns, and
occupied the Chateau of Buzanval.

The French now retired on all sides, firing ceased
by six o'clock, and the 10th Division, which had kept
the enemy's advance in check single-handed, returned
to their old position.

The struggle had cost the Germans 400 men. The
French, on the other hand, had in this luckless enter-
prise left 500 dead and wounded, and 120 prisoners.

Soon after this the French began to throw up earth-
works within 800 paces of the line of the Guards Corps ;
and on the morning of the 28th, General Bellemare,
under cover of the darkness, advanced on Le-Bourget
with a force of several battalions.

The companies in occupation, taken completely by
surprise, could only retire before such overwhelming
numbers, on Pont-Iblon and Blanc-Mesnil. The French
barricaded themselves into the place and prepared it
for an obstinate defence. A German battahon made a
vain attempt that evening to drive them out ; it was
repulsed with heavy loss. They were equally unsuc-
cessful next day with the fire of thirty field-guns which
went up by Pont-Iblon. Now, however, the Crown

BATTLE OF LE-BOUEGET. 157

Prince of Saxony issued imperative orders to the
Guards to recapture Le-Bourget without delay.

STORMING OF LE-BOURGET.

(October 30th.)

Nine battalions of the 2nd Division of Guards and
five batteries were therefore assembled under the com-
mand of Lieutenant-General von Budritzki at Dugny,
Pont-Iblon and Blanc-Mesnil for a general attack on
the place. After the artillery had opened the attack,
at about eight in the morning, from the banks of the
Moree, the infantry advanced. The country lay per-
fectly open, and they were under fire, not merely from
Le-Bourget, but from the heavy guns of the fort.
Queen Elizabeth's Grenadiers, at the head of the centre
column, nevertheless made a successful assault at about
nine o'clock, surmounting the barricade at the northern
entrance, and getting into the village through a breach
promptly made by the sappers. The Emperor Francis's
Grenadier Regiment advanced on the west and took
possession of the park. A hot street-fight ensued, the
French firing from the houses, and the colonels of both
regiments — Colonel von Zaluskowski and Count Wal-
dersee — both fell. The farms on the left of the road,
which had been walled in, were stormed one after an-
other, in spite of a determined defence ; the windows
of the church, though walled up to a considerable
height, were scaled, and a hand-to-hand fight continued
inside it. The guns of the Guards forced a way into
the glass-works.

At half -past nine the French tried to bring up rein-
forcements from Aubervillers and Drancy; but the
left German column had meanwhile seized the railway
embankment, placed a detachment of the Emperor

158 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

Alexander's Regiment to hold it, and forced a way into
the village from the south. Two batteries had taken
up a position on the Mollette and their fire drove back
the French, and even compelled them to evacuate
Drancy.

At ten o'clock the French still held the buildings on
the north of the Mollette. They were now attacked
from the south. The 4th Company of the Alexander
Regiment crossed the stream and found their way
through one of the breaches made by the sappers into
the yard where the French had collected their forces.
The bayonet and clubbed arms had to be used against
them, and here their colonel — Colonel de Baroche — was
killed.

Although by this time — eleven o'clock — the three
attacking columns had met in the heart of Le-Bourget,
the enemy continued the struggle in houses and gar-
dens with embittered desperation till the afternoon,
while all the forts on the north front of Paris shelled
the place. It was not till half -past one that the attack-
ing forces could retire in companies to their respective
quarters. Two battalions remained to occupy Le-
Bourget.

The desperate resistance of the French showed how
important they considered this post. "The victory had
cost the 2nd (German) Division of Guards 500 men.
The enemy's loss is not known, but 1200 prisoners
were taken.

This new disaster added to the dissatisfaction of the
inhabitants of Paris. The revolutionary factions,
which at all times lurk in the French capital, came
threatening to the front.

Highly-colored reports could no longer conceal re-
peated failures ; respect for the Government was fast
dying out. The authorities were accused of incapacity,

THE STATE OF PAEIS. 159

nay, of treason. Noisy crowds demanded to be sup-
plied with arms, and a part of the National Guard even
joined in the tumult. The Hotel de Ville was sur-
rounded by a mob shouting Vive la Commune, and
though other troops dispersed these gatherings, the
ringleaders, though well known, went unpunished.

On the 31st of October uproarious masses again
paraded the streets. As General Trochu had forbidden
the sentries at the Hotel de Ville to use their arms, the
rebels forced their way in. The Ministers were their
prisoners till the evening, when a few battahons who
had remained staunch liberated them.

Monsieur Thiers, who had returned from his fruitless
journey to the European Sovereigns, thought it was
time to re-open negotiations with Versailles. The
King was still perfectly willing to grant an armistice,
but it was impossible to accede to the conditions de-
manded by the French, namely, that the city should
receive a supply of food, so hostilities had to take their
course.

At this time, towards the end of October, the situa-
tion on the Moselle had assumed an aspect which
essentially modified that of the whole war.

By the exchange of German prisoners for those
French who had fought at Sedan, the news of the sur-
render of Metz, which had immediately followed, was
generally known. But Marshal Bazaine had declared
that the Army of the Rhine was ready to defend the
country against the invaders, and public order against
evil passions — a clause which certainly could be inter-
preted in more ways than one.

It could on'ly have been a satisfaction to the Ger-
mans, politically speaking, if there had been in France
a supreme authority, besides the pretentious and feeble
Government in Paris, with whom to agree as to the

160 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

termination of the war. Permission was therefore
given for the admission to Metz of a representative of
the exiled Imperial family. As the Marshal was unable
to show any credentials as holding such an office, Gren-
eral Bourbaki was allowed to pass through the Glerman
lines on an embassy to London, where, however, the
Empress Eugenie declined to intervene in the already-
disastrous affairs of France. The General then placed
his services at the disposal of the National Defence
Government at Tours.

Meanwhile, the army which had been imprisoned in
Metz since the battle of Noisseville remained in an atti-
tude of expectation. The necessary provisions for
70,000 inhabitants, including the country-folk who had
taken refuge in the city, had originally been enough to
last three months and a half; those for the regular
garrison were calculated for five months, but for the
whole Army of the Rhine they had supplies for only
forty-one days, and there were oats for twenty-five
days only.

The supplies for the troops could, indeed, be recruited
by purchase from the abundant stores of the citizens ;
but ere long smaller rations of bread were served out,
and horses had to be slaughtered for meat, so that most
of the cavalry regiments were reduced to two squad-
rons.

On the German side, victualling 197,326 men and
33,136 horses was a matter of great difficulty. The
outbreak of cattle-plague in Germany restricted the
importation of live beasts to those procurable from
Holland or Belgium. The meat supply had to be sup-
plemented by tinned provisions ; and increased rations
of oats had to take the place of hay and straw.

The losses of the army had hitherto been made good
from the reserves, but the transport of the prisoners

SORTIES FEOM METZ. 161

from Sedan alone required the services of fourteen bat-
talions of the blockading force. Thus it had not yet
been possible to provide sufiS.cient accommodation be-
hind the trenches. The raw, rainy weather had come
on early in the season, and a quarter of the men were
still roofless ; so that, by degrees, the sick in hospital
reached the alarming number of 40,000.

Although fifty heavy guns had been brought up from
Germany, they were ineffectual against such a fortress
as Metz, since, in consequence of the superior calibre
of the fort guns, they could only be fired at night, with
frequent change of position. There was nothing for
it but to hope for the best, and have patience.

For four weeks already had the besieged been con-
suming their stores. To replace them in some degree,
and, at the same time, to revive the spirit of the troops
by some sort of action, the supreme commander decided
on fetching in all the provisions to be found in the vil-
lages within the line of blockade, under cover of the guns.

At noon on September 22nd, Fort St. Juhen opened
a heavy fire on the outposts of the First Corps (Ger-
man). Strong detachments of infantry next advanced
on the villages to the east, di'ove in the pickets, and
returned to Metz with the stores they had seized. But
a similar attempt on the villages to the north was less
successful. Most of the wagons had to return empty,
under the fire of the Prussian batteries, quickly brought
into position to receive them. At last, on the 27th, a
sortie for the same purpose was made to the south-
ward, which led to a series of small conflicts, and the
capture of a company, who were surrounded in Pelore
by a much stronger force. A simultaneous sally on
the left bank of the Moselle was baffled by the fire of
the artillery of the besieging force which was hurried
to the spot.
11

162 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

Diedenhof en, on the north of Metz, had hitherto only
been kept under observation by a small force, which
could not hinder the garrison from scouring the country
as far as the neighboring frontier, taking many prison-
ers, seizing several wagon-loads of supplies, and even
diverting a whole train of provision trucks into the
fortress by the railway from Luxembourg, which they
had restored.

In point of fact, the Army of the Ehine, now distant
only a day's march, would have found an important
base in Metz, if the blockade could only have been
broken through. Prince Frederick Charles therefore
took good care to strengthen the investing lines to the
north, on the right bank of the Moselle. On October
1st the Tenth Corps took up the position hitherto held
by Rummer's Eeserve Division, which was transferred
to the left bank of the river. The First, Seventh, and
Eighth closed up to the right, and the Second occupied
the space between the Seille and the Moselle; the
troops in front of Diedenhofen were also reinforced.

The Marshal had, in fact, once more determined to
fight his way to the northward, and on both sides of
the river. New bridges were constructed behind St.
JuHen and from the Island of Chambiere, the nearest
German outposts were driven off to the west and north
by a series of daily skirmishes. Under cover of the
fort guns the French estabHshed themselves firmly in
Lessy and Ladonchamps. The troops who were to be
left in Metz were expressly selected ; the others tested
as to their marching powers. Light-signals were ar-
ranged with Diedenhofen, and all measures taken for
a sortie on the 7th.

Then the French commander suddenly changed his
mind, and the proposed enterprise collapsed into a
foraging party.

SOKTIES FROM METZ. 163

For this, indeed, large forces were set in motion ; the
Garde Voltigeur Division, the Sixth Corps, and the
Fourth in the woods of Woippy. The movement was
also to be supported by the Third Corps on the right
bank of the river.

Four hundred wagons were in readiness to carry off
the stores from the large farms lying north of Ladon-
champs.

SOETIE FROM METZ ON BELLEVUE.

(October 7th.)

Although the start from Woippy, planned for eleven
o'clock, was not effected till one, the Landwehr com-
panies on outpost were driven in by superior numbers,
and as they defended their positions till their ammuni-
tion was exhausted, they also lost a considerable num-
ber of prisoners. But the artillery of the Landwehr
Division prevented the removal of the stores ; the 5th
Division attacked the French in flank and drove them
back on Bellevue, where a hot fire ensued on both
sides.

The French Third Corps had advanced by the right
bank of the Moselle on Malroy and Noisseville. Here,
too, the outpost line retired ; but in their rear stood
the Tenth and the First Corps, ready for action. The
two commanders at once perceived that this attack
was only a feint. Although threatened himself, Gren-
eral von Voigts-Rhetz moved his brigade, the 38th,
across the Moselle at Argancy by half -past two to sup-
port the Landwehr Division, and as General von Man-
teuffel sent him supports to Charly, the 37th Brigade
followed.

No sooner had the first reinforcements arrived than
General von Kummer assumed the offensive, seized

164 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

the farm from the French after a sharp struggle, just
as they were about to retire, and then, supported on
the right by a detachment of the 5th Division, got into
Bellevue by about six in the evening. Ladonchamps,
however, was still in the hands of the French. The
19th Division and the Reserve advanced on this place
late in the evening. The Castle-yard, surrounded by
a moat, was carefully intrenched, and strongly de-
fended by infantry and guns. The darkness precluded
effective artillery action, and the attack failed ; but all
the other points previously held by the Germans had
been re-occupied.

The day had cost the Prussians 1700 killed and
wounded, besides 500 reported missing. The French
loss was given out to be no more than 1193.

This attempt on the part of the French might be
regarded as tentative, and preliminary only to a real
struggle to break through ; perhaps it was so intended.
The Grerman troops therefore remained in the positions
they had occupied at the end of the day, in expectation
of renewed fighting on the morrow.

The forts did in fact re-open fire on the farm build-
ings early on the 8th, while the German batteries
directed theirs on Ladonchamps. Strong columns also
advanced along the right bank of th6 Moselle, but no-
where attempted a serious attack. The Prussian
troops therefore presently retired to their quarters.

The artillery duel was carried on for the next few
days, but with diminished energy. Constant rain made
all field operations very difficult and increased the
sufferings of the men on both sides. In Metz the lack
of victuals was becoming very painfully felt. Even
on the 8th the Commandant had announced that his
stores would not last more than twelve days. A council
pf war, held on the 10th, was, however, of opinion that

SOKTIES FROM METZ. 165

the greatest service the Army of the Rhine could do
to the country was to hold out as long as possible,
since they thus kept a large part of the enemy's forces
employed outside Metz.

The Marshal now sent General Boyer to negotiate at
Versailles, but he was to demand a free exit for the
army and emphatically refuse the terms granted to
Sedan.

The state of affairs in Metz was perfectly well known
to the Germans. The number of men who were taken
willing prisoners while digging potatoes increased
every day. They reported that riots had broken out
in the city, in which even the soldiers had taken part,
and that the officers in command had been compelled
to proclaim the Republic. And when the Empress
had declared that she would never give her consent to
any cession of French territory, no further political
negotiations were possible with the Generals of the
Army of the Rhine.

On the 20th the distribution of stores came to an
end within the fortress, and the troops for the most
part subsisted on horse-flesh. The original stock of
20,000 horses was reduced by a thousand a day. The
want of bread and salt was severely felt, and the soaked,
clayey ground made living in camp almost unendura-
ble.

After the failure of the deputation to Versailles,
the imperative necessity of negotiating with the Com-
mander-in-chief of the besieging army was recognized
by a council of war held on the 24th.

The first interview came to nothing, as the Marshal
stiU stipulated for free egress, withdi'awing if required
to Algiers, or else for an armistice and the admission
of stores. The Germans insisted on the surrender of
the fortress and the march out of the garrison as

166 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

prisoners of war, and on these conditions the capitu-
lation was signed on the evening of the 27th of
October.

THE CAPITULATION OF METZ.

On the morning of the 29th the Prussian flags were
hoisted on the great outworks of Metz. At one o'clock
the French troops marched out by six roads in perfect
silence and good marching order. At each gate a
Prussian army corps stood to take the prisoners, who
were immediately placed in bivouacs that had been
prepared for them, and supplied with food. The offi-
cers were allowed to keep their swords and to return
to Metz for the time; provisions were immediately
sent in.

Marshal Bazaine set out for Cassel.

In the course of the day the 26th Brigade (German)
took up quarters in Metz. No injury had been done
in the city, but the state of the camp showed what the
troops had suffered during a siege of seventy- two days.

The Germans during that time had lost 240 officers
and 5500 men in killed and wounded.

Six thousand French officers and 167,000 men were
taken prisoners, besides 20,000 sick who could not be
at once removed — about 200,000 in all. Fifty-six Im-
perial eagles, 622 field, and 2876 fortress-guns, 72
mitrailleuses, and 260,000 small arms fell into the
hands of the Germans.

The prisoners were transferred by way of Treves
and Saarbriicken under the escort of Landwehr bat-
talions, and as these would have also to guard them
when on foreign soil, their return was not to be reck-
oned on.

III.

OPERATIONS IN THE EAST AND ON THE LOIRE.

NEW DISTEIBUTION OF THE AEMY.

The capitulation of Metz, which Prince Frederick
Charles had brought about under such serious diffi-
culties, had materially improved the prospects of the
war for Germany.

At head-quarters at Versailles, even before the catas-
trophe, but in confident anticipation of it, decisions
had been arrived at as to the destination of the forces
it would release for service, and communicated to the
Commander-in-chief.

The First, Seventh, and Eighth Corps, with the 3rd
Cavalry Division, were henceforth to constitute the
First Army, under the command of General von Man-
teuffel. Their orders were to advance on Compiegne
and secure the blockade of Paris on the north. But
they had other duties to fulfil ; they were to occupy
Metz and lay siege to Diedenhofen and Montmedy.

The Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Corps, with
the 1st Cavalry Division, were to constitute the Second
Army under Prince Frederick Charles, and were or-
dered to advance on the Middle Loire.

opeeations of the foueteenth coeps m the

SOUTH-EAST.

(October.)

Since the faU of Strasburg the newly-formed Four-
teenth Corps had been employed in keepmg up com-

168 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAR.

munications between the armies before Metz and the
forces detained in blockading Paris.

General von Werder had no gi'eat battle to look for-
ward to, bnt a succession of small engagements. To
prepare each of his four brigades for independent action
under such circumstances, he detailed cavalry and
artillery to each.

In this formation the corps crossed the Vosges
Mountains, by the two roads past Schirmeck and Barr,
driving swarms of French franctireurs out of the nar-
row passes without great loss of time. But on emerg-
ing from the highlands they at once met with serious
opposition.

General Cambriels had been at Epinal with about
30,000 men ever since the beginning of October, and
under cover of this force several battalions of National
Guards and Gardes Mobiles had been formed in the
south of France.

On the 6th, General von Degenfeld, with the ad-
vanced guard of the Baden contingent, marched up to
St. Die by both banks of the Meurthe. The column
was a weak one and beset on all sides by far superior
forces, yet after repeated attacks it succeeded in taking
the villages held by the French.

The struggle, which lasted seven hburs, ended with
the eccentric retreat of the enemy on Rambervillers
and Bruyeres. It had cost the Germans 400 and the
French 1400 men. The Baden Division bivouacked on
the field, and then found that the French had aban-
doned St. Die.

General Cambriels had, in fact, collected all the forces
at his disposal in intrenched positions at Bruyeres.
The Baden Brigade advanced on these on the 11th,
drove the Guards Mobiles and volunteers out of the
villages in front of it, climbed the hills on each side of

FIGHTING ON THE MEUETHE. 169

the town, and forced their way into the town with
inconsiderable loss. The French retired to the south-
ward, on Remiremont.

From the small resistance made by the enemy,
though so far superior in numbers, Greneral von Werder
supposed that they would hardly make a stand before
reaching Besancjon, so he immediately ordered a cessa-
tion of pursuit, though somewhat early in the day, and
concentrated his forces on Epinal, which was taken by
the Germans after a short fight. From thence depots
were established, and telegraph lines opened to Lune-
ville and Nancy, magazines were formed, and the bag-
gage trains, which had followed the corps from Zabern
by Blamont to Baccarat, were brought up. The rail-
way by the bank of the Moselle remained useless for a
long time, in consequence of its demolition by the
French.

General von Werder was now anxious to obey the
instructions he had received on September 30th to
march by Neuf chateau, on the Upper Seine, but a tele-
gram from head-quarters instructed him first to rout
the enemy near him under General Cambriels.

The corps accordingly marched forthwith on Vesoul,
via Conflans and Luxeuil, and learnt that the French
had halted at the Ognon, taken up quarters there, and
received reinforcements.

General von Werder determined to attack at once.
He ordered that the passages over the river should be
secured on the 22nd of October ; further decisions were
postponed till the reports should be brought in.

The 1st Baden Brigade came up on the right by nine
o'clock, reaching Marnay and Pin without having en-
countered the French ; they secured the bridges, and
then halted according to orders.

On the left wing, the franctireurs were driven out

170 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

of the wood by the 3rd Brigade, which also stormed
Perrouse, and at about half -past two seized the bridge
over the Ognon at Voray.

In the centre the van-guard of the 2nd Brigade
entered Etuz after a slight skirmish, but had to retire
at eleven o'clock to the northern bank, before the
enemy's flank attack from out of the woods. After-
wards, when the main force came up and the artillery
opened fire, the place was taken for the second time.
But a prolonged firing ensued, the French making an
obstinate stand in front of the passage over the river
at Cussey.

Before this, indeed, orders had been dispatched to
the 1st Brigade to move up on the southern bank from
Pin in the enemy's flank and rear. But they only
reached the ground at six o'clock, when the battle was
over. When two batteries had swept the bridge over
the Ognon with a heavy fire, the French hastily retired,
pursued by the Baden men ; they were again driven
out of their positions to the rear, but when night fell
still remained in possession of several posts in front
of Besan(;on.

The Germans had lost 120 men, the French 150 and
200 prisoners. In opposition to G-ambetta, who was
himself at Besangon, General Cambriel-s positively re-
fused to renew the advance, and would only consent
to maintain his strong position under the walls of the
fortress.

Parties sent out to reconnoitre on the right reported
the presence of French forces at Dole and Auxonne,
the van-guard probably of an Army of the Vosges
under Garibaldi, which was assembling on the Doubs.
General von Werder disregarded it, and on the 26th
moved his corps to Dampierre and Gray.

Beyond the Saone all the roads were broken up, the

FIGHTING ON THE MEUETHE. 171

woods choked with abatis, and the whole population
in arms. But the franctireurs and Grardes Mobiles
were dispersed without difficulty, and a column march-
ing without any precautions was driven back on the
Vingeanne, where 15 officers and 430 men laid down
their arms.

From further reports and the information of the
prisoners it was known that Dijon was strongly gar-
risoned. In expectation, therefore, of an attack from
that side, the Fourteenth Corps (German) assembled
behind the Vingeanne, whence, early on October 30th,
General von Beyer marched on Dijon with the 1st and
3rd Brigades.

Filled with apprehension by recent events, the Na-
tional Guard in Dijon had already laid down their
arms, the Gardes Mobiles and troops of the line had
retreated to the southwards ; still the inhabitants were
assured that the forces would be brought back to
defend them. About 8000 men were on the spot, but
they insisted on their General pledging himself to fight
only outside the walls.

The advanced posts on the Tille were driven in by
the advanced guard of the Baden contingent ; the vil-
lage of St. Apollinaire and the neighboring heights
were taken with a rush at noon, in spite of a hot fire.
Meanwhile the main body (German) had come up, and
by three o'clock six batteries had opened fire. The
vineyards and various enclosures in the neighborhood
of Dijon, and especially the park to the south, which
was strongly barricaded, gave the defence a great
advantage. Nevertheless, the Baden infantry moved
steadily forward and closed in on the northern and
eastern suburbs by a wide encircling movement.

On this side a fierce combat ensued, in which the
populace took part. House after house had to be

172 THE FEANCO-GEBMAN WAE.

stormed, but the attack came to a standstill at the
deep river-bed of the Suzon, which borders the city
itself on the east. It was four o'clock, and the struggle
could not be ended before dark. General von Beyer
therefore broke it off ; the battahons were withdrawn,
and retired to quarters in the adjacent hamlets ; only
the artillery kept up its fire.

The Germans had lost about 150 and the French 100
men ; but 200 French were taken prisoners.

In the course of the night a deputation came out to
beg that the town might be spared ; they undertook to
furnish supplies for 20,000 men, and to guarantee the
neutrality of the inhabitants.

The Baden brigades took possession of Dijon on the
31st.

Meanwhile fresh instructions had reached General
von Werder. He was to cover the left flank of the
Second Army advancing to the Loire to protect both
Alsace and the troops besieging Belfort, where two
reserve divisions had now arrived. The Fourteenth
Corps, while occupying Dijon, was to retire to Vesoul
and check the gathering of French troops round Be-
sangon and at Langres. Some offensive movement on
Chalons and Dole was also insisted on.^ The difficulty
of General von Werder's position was not fully appre-
ciated at Versailles. At Besan^on alone there were
45,000 French, under the command of a new leader,
General Crouzat. Garibaldi had collected 12,000 be-
tween Dole and Auxonne ; lower down the Saone valley
a fresh corps was forming of 18,000 men, and 12,000
National Guards and Gardes Mobiles threatened the
flank of the isolated German Corps from Langres.

But the French, instead of attacking this division
with overwhelming numbers — spread out as it was
over a distance of twelve miles (German) from Lure to

THE FEONTIER FORTS. 173

Dijon and Grray — were haunted by a fear that the Ger-
mans, reinforced from Metz, might be planning an
attack on Lyons. Greneral Cronzat, leaving a strong
garrison in Besan^on, consequently marched on
Chagny, where, on November 12th, he was reinforced
by 50,000 men from the south. Graribaldi's volunteers
moved up to Autun to protect Bourges.

General von Werder meanwhile had occupied Vesoul,
and the town was fortified on the southern side.

The only event of importance which remains to be
mentioned, in October, was the attack on the French
forts in the rear of the German army.

At the beginning of this month the newly constituted
4th Reserve Division, of fifteen battalions, eight squad-
rons, thirty guns, and a company of sappers and
miners, had assembled at Baden, and crossed the Rhine
at Neuenburg.

The neighborhood was first cleared of franctireurs,
Mulhouse was occupied, and, by the desire of the
municipal authorities, the excited inhabitants, all fac-
tory hands, were disarmed.

General von Schmeling was instructed to besiege
Neu-Breisach and Schlettstadt, and at once sent one of
his brigades to invest each of these places. On October
7th the East Prussian Landwehr invested Breisach, and
the field batteries shelled the town, but without effect.
The other brigade, after dropping some necessary de-
tachments, reached Schlettstadt with a small force,
but was supported by troops from the depots along the
road, so that 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries
invested the place. At the same time 12 companies of
fortress-artillery and 4 companies of pioneers arrived
from Strasburg with the necessary siege materiel, and
a park of fifty-six heavy guns was established at St.
put ; the Engineers' park was located at Kinzheim.

174 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

TAKING OF SCHLETTSTADT.

(October 24tli.)

At the beginning of the blockade, inundations and
marsh land rendered Schlettstadt unapproachable on
the east and south, and partly on the north. The place
itseK was impregnable, with high walls and a wet ditch,
armed with 120 guns and garrisoned with only 2000
men, for the most part Gardes Mobiles. They lacked
casemates, and on the west front the vineyards and
hedgerows favored a close attack, while the railway
embankment was a ready-made parapet for the first
parallel.

To divert the attention of the besieged from this
front, a battery was constructed on the 20th at the
Kappel Mills on the south-east, from which fire was
opened on the barracks and magazines, and on the
sluice which prevented the inundations.

When, by the evening of the 21st, the infantry posts
had advanced to within 400 paces of the glacis, the
construction of the first parallel was proceeded with
that night, behind the railway, and six batteries were
placed at only 1000 metres from the ramparts.

The garrison fired in the dark on the entire zone of
attack, but almost without effect. By the morning
the trenches were two feet wide and three and a half
feet deep, and 20 heavy guns and 8 mortars were ready
to open fire.

A hot artillery duel now began with the fortress,
which replied very steadily. The battery at the Mills
did very perceptible execution by its reverse fire against
the west front, and several guns and embrasures were
severely damaged. The town was fired at several
points, and the defenders' fire gradually ceased.

During the night, which was very stormy, the

TAKING OF SCHLETTSTADT. 175

attacking batteries kept up their fire, the parallel was
widened, and two new batteries were begun.

But at daybreak on the 2'4th the white flag was seen
flying, and a capitulation forthwith signed, by which
the town surrendered with its garrison and all its stores.
The Commandant begged the Germans to take posses-
sion at once, as the greatest disorder reigned within
the town. The public buildings were being plundered
by the mob and drunken soldiery, and a powder maga-
zine was on the point of being blown up. The German
battahons promptly restored order, extinguished the
flames, and led away the prisoners.

Seven thousand stand of arms fell into theii' hands,
besides the fort artillery and a large quantity of stores.
The siege had only cost the Germans twenty men.

Schlettstadt was occupied by the depot troops, and
the battalions released from that duty retired into
South Alsace, three of them strengthening and com-
pleting the blockade of Breisach.

TAKING OF BEEISACH.

(November 10th.)

This fortress, lying in the plain and of very sym-
metrical construction, was surrounded by dry ditches
of solid masonry, and not to be taken by a surprise.
The garrison of about 5000 men had well-protected
quarters in the bomb-proof casemates of the ravelins.
Fort Mortier, standing near the Rhine, and constructed
for an independent defence, effectually commanded the
ground whence the intended attack must be made on
the north-west front of the fortress. To this end 12
heavy guns were brought up from Rastatt to Alt-
Breisach, where the right bank of the Rhine commands
the fort at effective vicinity.

176 THE FEAXCO-GEEMAN W-\E.

It was not till the end of October that the siege-guns
aiTived at Alt-Breisach from Sehlettstadt, and as soon
as the infantiy had advanced closer to the place, and
all ^^reparations were complete, fii-e was opened on the
fortress on November 2nd from Wolfganzen, Biesheim,
and Alt-Breisach, m all 24 hea^y guns.

By thi-ee o'clock a large part of the town was in
flames, and detachments of infantiy were engaged
hand-to-hand with the Fi-ench posts at the foot of the
glacis. Fort Mortier had suffered severely; still, an
attempt to storm it was repulsed, but at six o'clock it
capitulated, lying almost in mins. Only one gun re-
mained in serviceable condition.

Two mortar batteries were erected to shell the main
work, the defence was now more feeble, and on No-
vember 10th Breisach surrendered on the same terms
as Sehlettstadt, but the garrison was allowed to march
out with all the honors of war.

The fortress was almost uninjui'ed, but the town was
for the most part buimt down or badly damaged. The
GeiTQans had lost only 70 men ; 108 guns, 6000 smaU
arms, and large quantities of stores fell into their hands.
While these strongholds in Alsace-Lorraine were
thus reduced by the Germans, Verdun still intercepte(^
the line of railway which formed thfe shortest line of
communication with Oermany.

TAKING OF VEEDUN.

(November 9th.)

This place too was made impregnable by high waUs
and deep moats ; but, on the other hand, it was sur-
rounded by hiUs which commanded and defiladed it, and
at the foot of these hills villages and ^dneyards favored
an approach to within a short distance of the outworks.

TAKING OF VEEDUN. 177

It was armed with 140 gnns and abundantly vict-
ualled, and the gan-ison, which had been supplemented
by escaped prisoners, was 6000 sti-ong. A bombard-
ment by field-artillery had ah*eady proved perfectly
ineif ectual. For a long time Verdun was only under
observation, at fii'st by cavalry, and aftei^wards by a
small mixed force. At the end of September the 65th
Eegiment and 12 companies of the Landwehr were
collected under G-eneral von Gayl before the east front.
It was not tin October 7th that 2 companies of forti-ess-
artillery came up, with some French guns of position
from Toul and Sedan. The infantiy now advanced to
within a few hundred paces of the west and north
fronts and there took up a position. Under this cover
the construction of the batteries was begun on the
evening of October 12th.

The soppy state of the ground after heavy rain, and
the rocky subsoil, very thinly covered, made the work
uncommonly difficult, yet by next moiTiing fifty-two
guns could open fii-e. But the fortress rephed with
such effect that before noon two G-emian batteries were
silenced on the C6te-de-Hayvaux to the west.

In the coui'se of this thi-ee days' artillery duel, 15
Grerman guns were placed out of action, the aitillery
lost 60 men, and the infantry 40. The disabled guns
on the walls were constantly replaced by fresh ones.

The gai'rison, who were far stronger than the be-
siegers, now assumed the offensive. Dui'ing the stormy
night of the 19th-20th, the pickets on the hiU of Hay-
vaux were overpowered, and all the guns spiked. On
the 2Sth a stronger sortie was made. The French
swarmed up Mont-St.-Miehel to the north, destroyed
the breast-works and casemates of the batteries, from
which, however, the guns had been run back. Another
party stormed Hayvaux, and as the soaked state of
12

178 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

the ground prevented the guns from being withdi-awn,
they were all totally disabled. The villages in the
neighborhood were also occupied by the French.

It was now self-evident that the means hitherto
brought to bear on the reduction of Verdun were quite
inadequate. But on the surrender of Metz the First
Army was able to send up reinforcements. At the end
of the month 5 battalions and 2 companies of pioneers
and several of artillery arrived, bringing with them
Grerman materiel.

The siege-park now had 102 guns and abundant
ammunition, so preparations were at once made for a
regular attack.

But for this the garrison did not wait. After an
armistice had been granted, the place capitulated on
November 8th, and the garrison, with exception of the
local National Guards, were taken prisoners. The
officers were dismissed with their swords on parole,
and it was agreed that the materiel in store should be
restored on peace being concluded.

THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST AND SECOND ARMIES IN

NOVEMBER.

When the First Army had been ordered to reinforce
the siege of Mezieres the 1st Infantry Division ad-
vanced on that place, the 3rd Brigade was sent forward
by railway to Soissons, and on November 15th invested
the small fortress of La-Fere. The rest of the First
Corps reached Rethel on the same day. The Eighth
arrived at Rheims, and the 3rd Cavahy Division at
Tagnon, between the two. The Seventh Corps was
still fully engaged in guarding the prisoners and in
investing Diedenhofen and Montmedy.

Of the Second Army, the Ninth Corps and 1st Cav-
alry Division had reached Troyes by the 10th, the

THE ADVANCE OF THE GERMANS. 179

Third had got to Vendeuvi^e, the Tenth to Neuf chateau
and Chaumont. The important railway junctions
there and at Bologne were occupied, and the demohtion
of the hue to Blesme was repaired, so as to open new
communications. The health of the Grerman forces
had improved conspicuously dui-ing a series of short
marches along good roads with abundant supplies ; but
a telegram from Versailles now ordered a hasty ad-
vance.

The Government in Paris being helpless, the Dele-
gates at Tours were displaying increased activity.
Gambetta, as Minister both of War and of the Interior,
was exercising the power almost of a Dictator, and the
warlike energy of this remarkable man had achieved
the feat of placing 600,000 soldiers and 1400 guns in
the field in the course of a few weeks.

In the Arrondissements the National Guards were
formed into companies and ba,ttalions; then in each
Department formed into brigades; and finally they
were amalgamated with the troops of the hne and
Gardes Mobiles into stiU larger bodies.

Thus, in the course of October, a new Seventeenth
Corps took up a position at Blois, another, the Eight-
eenth, at Gien, and a third, under Admiral Jaures, at
Nogent-le-Rotrou ; then* movements being protected
by General d'AureUe de Paladines, whose troops had
recrossed the Loire. A large force was in Picardy
under General Bourbaki, another at Rouen under
Briand, and a third on the left bank of the Seine under
Fiereck.

The detachments of the German investing army,
which were pushed forward to the south, west, and
north, met on all sides strong forces of the enemy,
which they had indeed repulsed in many small en-
counters, but could not follow up to the bases. For

180 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

this the arrival of the army released from the siege of
Metz was needed, and this was not to be looked for
before some time in November, while a general advance
on Paris of all the French forces in the month of Octo-
ber looked imminent.

In consideration of the inferior strength of General
von der Tann's division, now holding Orleans, at the
council of war held at Tours it was decided to seize
that important place. The attack was to be chiefly
delivered from the west. The French Fifteenth Corps
— two divisions and one cavalry division — -therefore
assembled at Mer, on the northern bank of the Lower
Loire, and the main body of the Sixteenth behind the
forest of Marchenoir. The remainder of the two corps
were to support the attack by Gien on the Upper Loire.
Any further advance was not projected, at any rate
for the present ; on the contrary. General d'Aurelle's
instructions were to form an intrenched camp at Or-
leans for 200,000 men.

General von der Tann's reconnoitring parties to the
westward everywhere met detachments of the French,
which were indeed driven back in various skirmishes
on the woods of Marchenoir, and without much diffi-
culty, but which betrayed the vicinity of large forces.
On the whole, an attack on the investing army on the
south-west of Paris seemed the likeliest event, since
this would imperil both the German head-quarters in
Versailles and the siege-park at Villacoublay ; and the
German reinforcements from the east would be longest
in reaching the scene of the struggle.

The French forces to the west of Orleans were already
extended over a wide stretch of country from Beau-
gency to Chateaudun. The volunteers grew bolder
every day, and the people more hostile.

At last, to get some more accurate information, Count

THE AEMIES ON THE LOIKE. 181

Stolberg, on November 7th, made a reconnoissance in
force. Three regiments of the 2nd Cavahy Division,
two batteries, and a few companies of Bavarian in-
fantry marched by Ouzouer and drove the enemy out
of Marolles, but they found the skirt of the forest
strongly defended.

General Chanzy had his immediately available troops
sent to St. Laurent-des-Bois. A sharp fij'e ensued,
lasting about haK an hour, which proved very fatal to
the Bavarian infantry ; and then, as the great superi-
ority of the French was evident, the Q-ermans retired.

As a matter of fact, both the French corps were
already in full retreat on Orleans. On the 8th they
held the wood, with their right wing occupying Messas
and Meung, their left Ouzouer. The Fifteenth Corps
was then to proceed to the Mauve and the Sixteenth
to Coulmiers. Their van-guards were at Bardon and
Charsonville respectively. Both the French cavalry
divisions were marching northward on Prenouvellon
to outflank the Bavarian right wing, with a force of
ten regiments, six batteries, and several hundred volun-
teers, thus cutting off its retreat on Paris.

To meet this the Bavarian Cuirassiers started for St.
Peravy, the 2nd Cavalry Division for Baccon, and,
further south, the 2nd Bavarian Infantry Division
advanced from Orleans on Huisseau and St. Ay.

But an attack was threatening the German rear from
the considerable force at Gien. It was the last moment
in which they could hope to extricate themselves from
so critical a position ; General von der Tann issued the
necessary orders that same evening. However desir-
able it might be to keep possession of Orleans, he
could not accept battle in such thickly wooded country,
which would so seriously impede the efficiency of his
relatively strong artillery and cavalry, and where he

182 THE FBANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

might easily be hemmed in. The Greneral, however,
determined to meet the most immediately threatening
hostile force in the open ground by Coulmiers, by
which he would be nearer to the 22nd Division at
Chartres, and could call on it for support.

Even before this Greneral von Wittich had asked and
obtained permission to retire on Orleans, but on the
9th he had only reached Voves, with his cavalry at
Orgeres ; thus he could not take any direct part in that
day's fighting.

The Second Army was still on the march from Metz,
and on this day its van had but just arrived at Troyes.

ENGAGEMENT AT COULMTEES.

(November 9th.)

Left thus to its own resources, the First Bavarian
Corps struck camp in the night, and on the morning
of the 9th had formed on a narrow front on the skirt
of the wood between Chateau Montpipeau and Rosieres,
with the village of Coulmiers in front. The Bavarian
Cuirassiers on the right wing protected the retreat at
St. Sigismond, the 2nd Cavalry Division was posted
in brigades along the front, with detachments well in
advance and infantry posts ready in support. Only a
small detachment remained in Orleans after the bridge
over the Loiret had been destroyed, to protect the
numerous sick and wounded in the field hospitals, and
occupy the city, at any rate, till the fight was decided.

The first reports brought in that morning were of
the advance of a strong column of French from Cra-
vant, on Fontaines and Le-Bardou. This was Rebil-
lard's brigade, which, as it seemed, meant to turn the
Bavarian flank and march on Orleans. To oppose it
on the bank of the Mauve, General von der Tann, at

BATTLE OF COULMIEES. 183

about nine o'clock, sent the 3rd Brigade in a southerly-
direction to Prefort, about half a mile distant, and as
at the same time a sharp contest had begun at the
outposts near Baccon, the 1st Brigade marched to La
Renardiere. The remainder of the corps were left in
and behind Coulmiers. The General's intention was
to assume the offensive at this point, by attacking
the French left flank if, as seemed probable, the enemy
should direct his chief attack on the passage of the
Mauve. To this end, also, the cavalry of the right
German wing was ordered to retire on Coulmiers.

But the superior strength of the French allowed of
their reconnoitring much further to the left. While
General d'Aurelle with the Fifteenth Corps detained
the Bavarians to the south of the road from Ouzouer
to Orleans, General Chanzy advanced with Barry's
division against their centre and caused Jaureguiber-
ry's to attack their right; and the strong force of
cavalry under General Reyan took the road to Patay,
thus threatening the communications with Paris.

This movement of the French Sixteenth Corps com-
pelled General von der Tann, at the very beginning of
the engagement, to dispatch the 2nd Brigade, which
had been his reserve, to prolong his right wing to the
northwards towards Champs, thus obtaining touch
with the 4th Cavalry Brigade. The Bavarian Cuiras-
siers, retiring according to orders from St. Peravy to
the southward, by eleven o'clock came up with Reyan's
cavalry, which, however, was content with a mere
cannonade.

Meanwhile the advanced posts of the Bavarians had
been driven in by the enemy's superior numbers. The
1st Jager Battalion in Baccon retreated on La-Riviere,
after hampering the advance of the French horse bat-
teries past Champdry for some httle time. It was here

184 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

joined by the 2nd Battalion ; but these were presently
in difficulties. Peytavin's division had closely pursued
them past Baccon, brought five batteries up on La-
Riviere, and then attacked the burning village from
three sides at once. After a stout resistance, the
Jagers retired in good order on Renardiere to join the
1st Brigade, where General Diett had taken up a posi-
tion for defence.

When, after abandoning Baccon, Barry's division
had continued its march past Champdiy, its batteries
deployed opposite Coulmiers and in front of Saintry,
preparing for the attack by strong ranks of tirailleurs.

The 4th Bavarian Brigade occupied the park, extend-
ing to the west ; the stone bridge further in front was
held by two battalions, two others were sent to the
right, to the farmsteads of Ormeteau and Vaui'ichard,
so as to keep up some sort of communication with the
2nd Brigade. One battery to the south and foui' to
the north of Coulmiers were protected by the 5th
Cavalry Brigade.

Thus, at noon, the Bavarian Corps was spread out
over a mile of ground, from Renardiere to the front of
Gemigny, with only three brigades. But as the French
right wing remained inactive, the br|_gade dispatched
to Prefort was ordered back to Renardiere.

When the French Corps had taken up a position
opposite the thin Bavarian line, they attacked in ear-
nest, at about one o'clock.

The Jagers had indeed repulsed the enemy's first
rush on Renardiere, but this position was no longer
tenable with only four battalions against the whole of
Peytavin's division. At about one o'clock General von
Diett retired unmolested, under cover of an intermedi-
ate position between two detachments, on the wood of
Montpipeau and occupied its border. Here he was

BATTLE OF COULMIEES. 185

joined by the 3rd Brigade, which, had advanced from
Pref ort, and found Renardiere ah'eady evacuated. The
French had pursued, but timidly, and now found them-
selves under fire from six batteries between the end of
the wood at La-Planche and Coulmiers, so their right
wing advanced no further.

In the centre Barry's division, at about this time,
had driven the Bavarian Jiigers out of the stone quar-
ries in front of Coulmiers. Not till three o'clock did it
advance to a renewed general attack on the 4th Brigade,
which, however, was repulsed by the fire of the German
guns and the repeated charges of the 5th Cavalry
Brigade.

Meanwhile, d' Aries' brigade of the Fifteenth Corps
(French), after leaving Renardiere, arrived to the south
of Coulmiers, and its batteries also opened fire on that
place. The Bavarian guns were compelled, before the
rush of the French tirailleurs, to come into action fui'-
ther in the rear, while the infantry drove the French
out of the park at the point of the bayonet.

But after four hours' fighting this single brigade
could scarcely hold out against three French brigades.
Of the whole corps only two battalions remained intact
as a reserve at Bonneville, no reinforcement was to be
looked for from outside, and on the right wing the
French threatened to cut the communications with
Chartres as well as with Paris. At four in the after-
noon, Greneral von der Tann gave order to cease firing
and retii'e by brigades on Artenay from the left wing.

Fresh troops at this moment forced their way into
the park of Coulmiers. Colonel Count von Ysenburg
held the eastern outlets from the village, and led his
troops in reciprocal support back to Gremigny in good
order.

It now proved of the greatest importance that the

186 THE FKANCO-GERIVIAN WAE.

2nd Brigade had been able to maintain its position in
front of this village, thus covering their further retreat.

At noon, Greneral von Orff, on reaching Champs and
Cheminiers, had found them occupied by Deplanque's
brigade (French). First he silenced their artillery with
his own, then he deployed his four battahons for action,
with the 4th Cavalry Brigade on the right wing.

Eeyan's cavahy ere long came up between these two
villages, after they had given up their two hours' can-
nonade on the Bavarian Cuirassiers and had been
driven out of St. Sigismond by dismounted hussars.
But this body of horse soon got away from the fire of
Bavarian guns and moved off to the westward, it was
said because they mistook Lipowski's volunteers,
skirmishing at some distance to the north, for German
supports. And when the Bavarian horse batteries
opened fire on Champs, from the north-east, the French
abandoned the place, at about two o'clock, in great
disorder.

General von Orff now brought the artillery up to
within 500 paces of Cheminiers, and marched the in-
fantry up between the guns.

Admiral Jaureguiberry, however, by arriving in
person, succeeded in rallying the wavering troops, and
this attack failed. The French batteries soon com-
pelled the Bavarian horse batteries to retire.

When, at about three o'clock, Bourdillon's brigade
and the reserve artihery of the Sixteenth Corps
(French) also arrived at Champs, and news was brought
of the state of affairs at Coulmiers, General von Orff
refrained from all further attack, and directed all his
efforts to maintaining his position as stoutly as possible
in front of Gemigny. Unshaken by the fire of the
numerous French batteries, the httle brigade repulsed
their repeated attacks.

BATTLE OF COULMlERS. 187

Thus the 4th Brigade was enabled to retire from
Coulmiers on Gremigny and St. Peravy, and the 1st, to
the eastward, on Coinces unmolested by the enemy.
The 2nd Brigade followed to Coinces, while the 3rd
formed the rear-guard as far as St. Sigismond, where
it halted and bivouacked. The cavahy covered the
retreat on all sides.

After a short rest the retreat of the main body was
continued during the night, by very bad roads. Ar-
tenay was reached by the morning. Orleans was
evacuated, and the detachment left there rejoined its
corps. The stores were conveyed by railway back to
Toury; but one ammunition column, 150 prisoners,
and the sick who could not be moved, feU into the
hands of the French.

Out of 20,000 men, against 70,000 French, the Ger-
mans had lost 800 in killed and wounded ; the enemy's
loss was nearly twice as gi-eat.

From Artenay, on November 10th, the 2nd Brigade
was entrusted with the security of the further march
on Toury, where limited quarters might be occupied.
Thither too came the 22nd Division from Chartres, and
took up a position at Janville, alongside of the Bava-
rian Corps. General von der Tann had extricated him-
self from a difficult position with much skill and good
fortune. There was no pui'suit. General d'Aurelle
restricted himself to awaiting further reinforcements
in a strong position before Orleans.

The French were in more active preparation, how-
ever, on the Upper Loir and the Eure.

The Second Army Corps (German) had arrived
before Paris on the 5th ; its 3rd Division was included
in the investing line between the Seine and Marne ; the
4th moved on to Longjumeau.

As soon as the Landwehr Guard occupied the penin-

188 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAR.

sula of Argenteuil, a brigade of the Fourtli Corps was
available for service on the north side of the capital.
On the south, the 17th Division at Rambouillet, the
22nd at Chartres, and the Bavarian Corps, which had
retired on Ablis, with the 4th and 6th Cavalry Di-
visions, were formed into distinct corps of the Third
Army and placed under the command of the Grand
Duke of Mecklenburg, with orders to advance first on
Dreux.

THE GEAND DUKE'S MOVEMENTS.

On the 17th of November the 17th Division marched
by Maintenon. On the left, a French detachment was
driven back across the Blaise ; and when a few com-
panies of marines, who attempted to block the high-
road, had been disposed of, Oeneral von Tresckow
marched into Dreux that evening. The struggle had
cost the Grermans 50 men, the French 150 and 50
prisoners.

Prince Frederick Charles, whose forces had now been
assembled to face the enemy outside Orleans, expressed
a wish that the Grand Duke's army should advance on
Tours via Le Mans. The Grand Duke, therefore,
marched on Nogent-le-Eotrou, which, being the central
rendezvous of the French divisions, ^would probably
be the scene of an obstinate resistance.

After several skirmishes the Grand Duke's force
reached this town, but when, on the 22nd, he prepared
to storm it from three sides, it was found that the
French had already evacuated it. At the same time
orders arrived from head-quarters, instructing him to
retire at once on Beaugency to join the right wing of
the Second Army, which must immediately be rein-
forced in view of the superior strength of the French.
" The forces already concentrating before Orleans are
to postpone all hostilities till this support arrives.

ADVAlfCE ON TOUES. 189

The small opposition offered by the French on the Enre
and Huisne shows that no serious danger threatens on
that side ; the enemy in that quarter need only be kept
under observation by cavahy." Even a day's rest was
prohibited, and the march was to be conducted with
the utmost speed.

On the 23rd, the divisions had closed up on their
leading troops, when the Grand Duke, on the 24th,
moved on Chateaudun and Vendome ; but the Bavarian
Corps only got as far as Vibraye, while the two Prus-
sian divisions withdi'ew from the country about La-
Perche, and the cavahy found the whole hne of the
Loire already occupied.

In fact, the French had sent up a brigade of the
troops massed behind the woods of Marchenoir by rail-
way to Vendome, expressly to protect the Government
at Tours, while General de Sonis had advanced with
the rest of the Seventeenth Corps on Brou. Here, on
the 25th, his van met an ammunition column and
pontoon train of the Bavarian Corps. At first only
the 10th Cavalry Brigade could attack the French, but
when, soon after, 2 companies and 8 guns had occupied
the bridge over the Loir at Yevres, the wagons were
got through Brou in safety, and the enemy could not
continue its march till the cavalry had filed off.

The Bavarian Corps had meanwhile advanced on
Mondoubleau and St. Calais, not, to be sure, the short-
est route to Beaugency, but still straight on Tours.
The two divisions had only reached Vibraye and
Authon.

The appearance of a hostile force at Brou was deemed
of sufficient importance to justify a detour by that
place, postponing for the present the advance on the
Loire. But when the 22nd arrived at Brou, on the
26th, they found that the enemy had already retired

190 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

during the night. The Government at Tours had
ordered the whole of the Seventeenth Corps to march
on Vendome for their protection. However, when the
German cavahy had made their appearance at Cloyes
and Freteval, General Sonis had supposed he could not
advance any further along the Loir and made a detour
by Marchenoir. But two night marches so upset the
newly-recruited troops, that swarms of stragglers
wandered about the neighborhood all day, and could
only with difficulty be re-assembled at Beaugency.

To obtain some unity of plan and action, the Grand
Duke was now, by command from head-quarters, placed
under Prince Frederick Charles's orders, and General
von Stosch was dispatched to undertake the duties of
Chief of the Staff to the army-section. This, by the
Prince's orders, was to march on Janville with all
speed, whither some troops of the Ninth Corps would
be sent to meet it, by way of Orgeres.

The Grand Duke therefore marched, on the 27th,
with both divisions, on Bonneval, where he found a
squadron of the 2nd Cavahy Division. The Bavarian
Corps which, after finding Brou abandoned, had
marched on Courtalain, proceeded to Chateaudun.
Having thus accomplished a junction with the Second
Army, the exhausted troops were allowed a day's rest
on the 28th, in quarters on the Loir.

THE POSITION OF THE SECOND AEMY IN THE LATTEE PAKT
OF NOVEMBEK.

Prince Frederick Charles had hastened the advance
of his forces as much as possible, but they had met
with several obstacles. The roads were broken up.
National Guards and franctireurs were on the watch,
and even the country-people had taken up arms ; how-
ever, by November 14th, the Ninth Corps with the

BETWEEN P.iEIS AND ORLEANS. 191

Cavalry Division had reached Fontainebleau and gone
on to Angerville. The Third Corps was following on
Pithiviers. Of the Tenth, the 40th Brigade was left at
Chaumont, to maintain communications with the Four-
teenth Corps ; the 36th reached Montargis and Beaune-
la-Rolande on the 21st ; the two brigades following in
rear had a sharp encounter on the 24th at Ladon and
Maizieres. In this, 170 French were taken prisoners,
who belonged to a corps which, as General von Werder
had already reported, was proceeding under General
Crouzat's command, from Chagny to Gien by railway.
The order of battle was found on an officer who was
taken prisoner.

That while the Grand Duke's forces were marching
up, the Second Army, but now fully concentrated, had
been very near considerable forces of the enemy, was
sufficiently ascertained by several reconnoissances.

On the 24th some troops of the Ninth Corps were
sent forward along the highroad. A few shells
prompted the French to evacuate Artenay, pursued by
the cavalry as far as Croix-Briquet. Early in the same
day a detachment of aU arms from the Third Corps
had advanced on NeuviUe-aux-Bois. Two detachments
of the 38th Brigade had marched on Bois-Commun and
Bellegarde, but all such attempts were met by very
superior numbers of the enemy.

It was ascertained that the French position before
Orleans extended for eight miles (German), from the
Conie to the Loing ; and the massing of troops, espe-
cially on their flank, made it highly probable that they
purposed advancing by Fontainebleau on the rear of
the besieging army. StiU, this was not so evident as
to justify Prince Frederick Charles in leaving the great
highways from Orleans to Paris unguarded. However,
to enable him to lend his left wing timely support

192 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

in ease of need, he di'afted off the 5th Infantry and
1st Cavahy Divisions to Boynes, to be near the Tenth
Corps, which was weak, and the 6th Division occu-
pied Pithiviers in their stead. Their quarters at Ba-
zoches were assigned to the Ninth Corps. Finally,
the Grand Duke was commanded to reach Toury by
the 29th, with the head of his column, at least. These
arrangements were all carried out in due course.

Immediately after the success at Coulmiers the
Army of the Loire seems only to have thought of
defending itself against a counter-blow. It retu-ed on
Orleans, threw up extensive earthworks, for which
marine artillery was even brought up from Cherbourg,
and awaited the arrival of further reinforcements.
The Twentieth Corps, aheady spoken of, 40,000 strong,
joined the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth at
Gien, with one division of the Eighteenth newly
assembled at Nevers, and the volunteers under Cathe-
lineau and Lipowski.

Thus the French Army round Orleans numbered
200,000; the Germans opposed to them at the time
only 45,000 infantry.

Gambetta ere long was urgent for renewed offensive
operations. As General d'Aurelle raised objections to
an advance by Pithiviers and Malesherbes, the Dic-
tator himself took matters in hand. On the night of
the 23rd he telegraphed orders from Tours that the
Fifteenth Corps were at once to assemble at Chilleurs-
aux-Bois and reach Pithiviers in the course of the 24th.
The Twentieth were to march on Beaune-la-Rolande,
and then both were to advance via Fontainebleau on
Paris. The General pointed out that, according to his
estimate, 80,000 Germans must be encountered in an
open country, and that it would be wiser to await their
attack in an intrenched position. No help, indeed,

BATTLE OF BEAUNE-LA-KOLANDE. 193

would thus be afforded to the besieged capital, and
even the strengthening of the right wing must be
postponed ; while it was the advance of the Eighteenth
and Twentieth Corps on the 24th which led to the
fight already mentioned at Ladon and Maizieres.

In consequence of information received from Tours
on the 26th, General Crouzat ordered the advance, on
the 28th, of the two corps he commanded — the Eight-
eenth on Juranville du-ect, the Twentieth to the left
by Bois-Commun — for a general attack on Beaune-la-
Eolande. The Fifteenth Corps was moved up for
support to Chambon, and Cathelineau's volunteers
to Courcelles.

As we have seen, on that very day the Grrand Duke's
forces had come up on the extreme right of the Second
German Army. On the left, the 38th Brigade of the
Tenth Corps was at Beaune, the 39th at Les-Cotelles ;
the 37th, with the corps artillery, had advanced to
Marcilly.

BATTLE OF BEAUNE-LA-ROLANDE.

(November 28th.)

The French attack on November 28th failed in its
dual delivery, and the two actions had little influence
on each other. On the right, the head of the Eight-
eenth Corps met the outposts of the 39th Brigade at
an early hour, close to Juranville and Lorcy. After
a stout resistance, they were driven in by about nine
o'clock on Les-Cotelles and beyond the railway em-
bankment at Corbeilles, where they took possession of
the park.

The French could now deploy on the open country

before Juranville, and following up the Germans with

strong hues of tirailleurs marching straight before

them, they got into Corbeilles and drove the invaders

13

194 THE PKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

out to the north aud west. In front, meanwhile, a
reinforcement from the reserve at Marcilly had reached
Les-Cotelles, and Colonel von Yalentini had on his side
attacked Juranville with the 56th Regiment. The
artillery could give no assistance. The French made
an obstinate resistance, and not till noon did they
begin to retreat, though the fighting still continued
round some solitary houses. But when strong col-
umns came up from Maizieres and Corbeilles, the Ger-
mans were compelled to abandon the conquered vil-
lage, but they carried off: 300 prisoners.

By two o'clock the greater portion of the French
Corps deployed by Juranville to attack the position
held by the 39th Brigade, who had retired on Long-
Cour. But not having prepared their attack by artil-
lery fire, it came to nothing under that of five Prus-
sian batteries.

The first attack on Les-Cotelles was also repulsed,
but being repeated an hour later, the Germans had to
abandon the position, and fifty men were taken pris-
oners. A gun, which had lost seven of its gunners,
had sunk so deep in the muddy ground that the few
men left could not drag it out.

StiU, the Eighteenth French Corps made no further
way, but as dusk came on, was satisfied with an inef-
fective cannonade, and finally the 39th Brigade was
able to maintain its position abreast of Beaune.

On the left wing of the French line of battle the
attack had also from the first been of a general charac-
ter, the 2nd Division of the Twentieth Corps having
advanced on Beaune, and the First on Batilly. But
it was near noon before the arrival of another portion
of the 3rd Division in reserve enabled them to drive in
the German advanced posts from Bois-de-la-Leu to the
cross-roads north-west of Beaune. The 38th Brigade,

BATTLE OF BEAUNE-LA-ROLANDE. 195

too, soon found itseK under fire from the enemy's guns,
now following it up from Pierre-Percee on the north.

The retreat had to be continued along the Roman
road, by which a gun, of which the men and horses
had for the most part perished, fell into the enemy's
hands. About the same time the 2nd French Division
ascended the heights to the east of Beaune, and further
back Colonel von Cranach was enabled, first to get in
hand the 57th Regiment near La-Rue-Boussier, their
retreat being covered by the batteries that were hurry-
ing up from Marcilly, and then to prevent the enemy
from returning to the charge. These entirely ceased
to advance any further, for they were suddenly
threatened on their own flank by the 1st Division of
the Prussian cavalry retiring from Boynes, and were
under fire of the horse batteries.

Meanwhile the 16th Regiment found itself com-
pletely isolated in Beaune and shut in on three sides
by the enemy.

The town, which was surrounded by the remains of
a high wall, and the churchyard were, as far as pos-
sible, prepared for defence. The French, after being
driven back by the first attack of heavy fire, began
bombarding the town. Their shells burst through the
walls of the churchyard and set a few buildings on fire,
but even then every attempt at storming was stead-
fastly repulsed.

In the meantime, Greneral von Woyna had supplied
his batteries with fresh ammunition, and while occupy-
ing Romainville on the right, he took up a position
opposite the copse of Pierre-Percee, so that by three
o'clock he was able to lead these companies up to the
east of Beaune.

About this time assistance came with the arrival of
the Third Army Corps. While the 6th Division were

196 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

still pressing on towards Pithiviers, the 5th had already
that morning rallied beyond that place. The first
news from Beaune had sounded so far from alarming,
that the corps artillery retired to their quarters.
Nevertheless, in consequence of the increasing boom-
ing of guns and a later announcement of a serious
encounter. General von Alvensleben gave the word for
the corps to advance; General von Stiilpnagel had
already spontaneously set out with the 5th Division.
The 6th followed, and dispatched a battalion to observe
towards Com'celles ; but Cathelineau's body of volun-
teers remained inactive.

Part of the 52nd Regiment, which was marching at
the head of the column, turned off to the right, and,
supported by artillery, opened fire about 4.30 on Ar-
conviUe and Batilly. Another part penetrated into
Bois-de-la-Leu and the copse near La Pierre-Percee,
where they recaptured the gun they had lost there
before. Four batteries took up their position on the
road from Pithiviers, behind Fosse-des-Pres, and fired
on the French, who still stood firm on the west side of
Beaune ; but they were by this means entirely dis-
persed and pursued by the 12th Regiment as far as
Mont.-Barrois.

After dark the Tenth Corps encamped near Long-
Coui', Beaune, and Batilly, and the 5th Division in
their rear; the 6th had remained at Boynes, where
the 1st Division of cavalry also found accommoda-
tion.

General von Voigts-Rhetz had held his ground
against the enemy in the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande,
with 11,000 men against 60,000, and with three bri-
gades against six divisions, until help reached him
towards evening. This action cost the Germans 900
and the French 1300 men in killed and wounded ; but

BATTLE OF BEAUNE-LA-ROLANDE. 197

1800 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the
Grermans.

By the evening the French Twentieth Corps had
retreated as far as Bois-Commun and Bellegarde ; the
Eighteenth, on the contrary, had taken up their posi-
tion near Vernonille and Juranville, in fact, directly in
front of the Tenth Grerman Corps, on the ground they
had gained from them. They were justified in expect-
ing that the fighting would recommence on the mor-
row.

Prince Frederick Charles, therefore, directed the
Tenth and Third Corps to assemble fully prepared on
the 29th. The Ninth received orders to advance with
two brigades towards Boynes and Bazoches, and the
remaining troops were to follow as soon as the Grand
Duke's contingent should have reached the road to
Paris.

In the course of the day his advanced guard, the 4th
Division of cavalry, reached Toury, his infantry
arrived at Allaines and Orgeres. The 6th Division of
cavalry, who were marching on the right flank, met
with their first opposition at Tournoisis.

Meanwhile Greneral Crouzat had been warned from
Tours, by a report which reached him on the evening
of the 28th, to prepare to meet another attack, and he
thereupon recalled his right wing. On the 30th both
corps made a move to the left, in order to be in the
proximity of the Fifteenth. For the purpose of dis-
sembling this lateral movement, some companies went
in a northerly direction and met reconnoitring parties
of the German Tenth and Third Corps, with whom
skirmishes took place at Maizieres, St. Loup, and Mont
Barrois; however, soon after, an advance of the left
wing of the French Army was observed.

The French Government at Tours had received news

198 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

from Paris that General Ducrot would attempt, on the
29th, to break through the Grerman investing lines
with 100,000 men and 400 guns, and endeavor to con-
nect with the Array of the Loire in a southerly direc-
tion. The balloon that had carried this dispatch had
descended in Norway, from whence the communica-
tion had been forwarded. It was concluded from this
that the General was already vigorously engaged, and
that help must be no longer delayed. By Gambetta's
desire, M. Freycinet submitted to the council of war,
caUed by General d'Aurelle, a plan for the advance of
the whole army on Pithiviers. In the event of a refusal,
he had with him a decree to supplant the Commander-
in-chief.

It was decided in the first place to execute a wheel
to the right with the left wing, Chilleurs-aux-Bois
forming the pivot of the movement. Having by this
means taken up a position facing Pithiviers, the corps
on the right wing, which was now on the same line,
had to await orders to advance. The Twenty-first
Corps were to be led towards Vendome as a protection
to the left flank.

THE ADVANCE OF THE AEMY OF THE LOIRE TO THE
EELIEF OF PARIS. ^

Consequently, on the 1st of December the Sixteenth
Corps moved forward in the direction of the railway
at Orgeres ; the Seventeenth followed as far as Patay
and St. Peravy.

Opposite to these, on the right wing of the Second
German Army, the 17th Division of the Grand Duke's
Corps had arrived at Bazoches, the 22nd at Toury, and
the Bavarian Corps in the neighborhood of Orgeres.
Thus the French first met the Bavarians. Attacked
in front by a far superior force, and threatened by

ATTEMPT TO EELIEVE PARIS. 199

Michel's division of cavalry in the flank, the 1st Bava-
rian Brigade were forced to retreat at three o'clock
towards Villepion. The 2nd Brigade, which approached
from Orgeres, halted to the west of Nonneville, and
the 4th marched up between Villepion and Faverolles,
where the Bavarians, in spite of heavy losses, succeeded
in holding their own for a long time. On the right
wing, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, with four guns of his
battery which could still do good service, brought the
enemy's advance to a standstill, but under the personal
leadership of Admiral Jaureguiberry the French fought
their way into Villepion. As night drew on, and the
want of ammunition was becoming serious, the 1st
Bavarian Brigade went to Loigny ; the 2nd, however,
got back to Orgeres by five o'clock, where the third
arrived in the evening, whilst the 4th joined company
at Loigny.

The engagement cost both sides about 1000 men,
and only the foremost of the Bavarian divisions had
been forced back for a short distance.

This result, and the news from Paris, aroused in
Tours fresh hopes of victory. As will be seen further
on, a sortie had been successfully effected out of Paris
through the investing hues, and the village of Epinay
had been held for a short time. Thereupon it was
concluded that this was the village of the same name
which lay to the south near Longjumeau, and that as
soon as the Ai-my of Orleans should effect a junction
with that from Paris there would be scarcely any fur-
ther obstacle. Cathelineau's Volunteer Corps was
directed at once to guard the forest of Fontainebleau,
and the ensuing annihilation of the Germans was an-
nounced to the country.

The army from Orleans, however, had barely gained
half a day's march in the direction of Paris, and the

200 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

right wheel of the left wing had to be continued. The
Sixteenth Corps was to try and reach the line between
Allaines and Tomy by the 2nd of December; the
Seventeenth were to follow, and the Fifteenth, march-
ing from Chilleurs past Artenay, were to join the right.
The Grand Duke, on hearing the report of the great
force with which the enemy was approaching, deter-
mined to march to meet them with the whole con-
tingent. The requisite orders were issued at eight
o'clock to the forces, who were already standing pre-
pared in camp. The Bavarian Corps was directed to
take up a position near Loigny, with its left wing at
Chateau-Groury ; the 17th Division to march directly
from Sautilly to Lumeau, and the 22nd from Tivernon
to Baigneaux. The cavahy had to undertake the
protection of both wings.

THE BATTLE AT LOIGNY — POUPEY.

(December 2nd.)

The Bavarian Corps was still engaged in advancing
from Maladerie when the French ascended the heights
to the west of Loigny. The 1st Division therefore
advanced via Villeprevost, and the 2;id occupied the
line between Beauvilliers and Goury.

General Chanzy had set out from Terminiers at eight
o'clock, with the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, for Loigny and
Lumeau. The first followed in reserve, and Michel's
division of cavalry covered the left flank. In spite of
the hot fire of the defenders, the 2nd Division had by
nine o'clock advanced close upon Beauvilliers, but then
they had to fall back before the onset of the Bavarians,
who now, on their side, attacked Loigny. When,
however, at 10.30 the whole French Corps advanced
deployed on a large front from Nonneville to Neuvil-

BATTLE OF LOIGNY — POUPRY. 201

liers, they had to retreat with great losses. They niet,
nevertheless, with a warm reception at Beauvilliers,
where the firing of the artillery of the German corps
put a stop to the enemy's movements.

The battle surged backwards and forwards until, at
11.30, the 2nd Bavarian Brigade joined in the fray.
The 4th Division of cavalry charged the left wing of
the French, and Michel's division fell back on the
Seventeenth Corps. This caused numerous prisoners
to be taken by the German troopers. In the meantime
the Bavarian infantry had marched to Ferme-Morale,
but found themselves under such destructive fire that
they were forced to turn back. Thereupon the horse
batteries on the flank enfiladed the enemy's wing with
such effect, even firing the farm, that General von Orff
found himself able to take possession of it.

At Beauvilliers, meanwhile, the 2nd Division had
only with great difficulty resisted the vigorous on-
slaughts of the French, whose riflemen had already
approached so close that the batteries were compelled
to retire. But the success of the right wing soon
spread to the left. Charging from Beauvilliers, as well
as from Chateau-Goury, the Bavarians drove Jauregui-
berry's division back to Loigny.

Shortly after noon the firing of the French became
again remarkably energetic, especially against Chateau-
Goury. The battalions on the left wing of the Bava-
rians were forced back upon the park.

During these events the two Prussian divisions had
continued their advance. The artillery of the 17th
pressed on in order to engage the enemy, while the
infantry reached Lumeau in time to prevent its occu-
pation by the opposing forces. Dense masses of French
infantry fought their way up quite close to the place,
but they were finally driven back by a well-directed

202 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

fire of musketry and shell; whereupon the division
attacked the right flank of the French.

The 22nd Division also marched past Baigneaux
towards Anneux, and joined in the pursuit of the re-
treating enemy. A number of prisoners and a battery
were taken from the French, who, after a vain attempt
to make another firm stand near Neuvilliers, at last
fled towards Terminiers in utter disorder.

After this conclusion of the fighting at Lumeau,
Greneral von Tresckow was able to go to the assistance
of the left wing of the Bavarians, which was hard
pressed. Under cover of the fire of eight batteries, the
33rd Brigade moved against the flank of the French
forces, which were now making a fierce attack on
Chateau-Goury. Being thus taken by surprise, they
retired upon Loigny. Here, too, the Mecklenburg
battalions, together with the Bavarians, cut their way
through, and it was only in the churchyard, which was
situated on a hill at the west end of the village, that
an obstinate resistance was made for some time longer.
The French, as they retired on Villepion, suffered
from a destructive fire from eighty guns posted close
together at Loigny.

At 2.30 General von der Tann caused the whole of
his 1st Division, after they had been provided with
fresh ammunition, to advance once more ; this move-
ment, however, was brought to a standstill by the fire
of the enemy.

Michel's division also moved up to oppose the ad-
vance of the cavalry on the right wing, but turned
back as soon as it came within range of the horse bat-
teries.

Where his right wing was exposed. General Chanzy
had sent a few battalions to take up a forward position
near Terre-noire. Behiiid them a brigade of the Seveji-

BATTLE OF LOIGNY — POUPRY. 203

teenth Corps had arrived at Faverolles, and to the right
of Villepion the Papal Zouaves advanced against Vil-
lours.

Greneral von Tresckow now sent forward his last
reserves. Two battalions of the 75th Regiment broke
through the position at the first charge, and in con-
junction with all the troops engaged, drove back the
French column to Villepion.

The approach of darkness brought the fighting here
to a close.

While the French Sixteenth Corps had been fighting
alone with great persistence all day, the Fifteenth,
according to orders, had advanced past Artenay, on
the high-road to Paris. There, they were only opposed
by the 3rd Brigade of German cavalry. This was
attacked by midday, near Dambron, by the French 3rd
Division, which formed the left flanking column, while
the other two divisions kept much further to the right.

As soon, therefore, as this information from the
cavalry reached General von Wittich, he moved off
with the whole of the 22nd Division from Anneux, in
the direction of Poupry. The head of the column
succeeded in reaching the place at the double, and in
driving back the enemy, who had already broken in
there and in the belts of forest to the north. Six bat-
teries then came into position, resting to the south on
Morale. The French deployed between Dambron and
Autroches, and carried on a persistent fire while the
remaining divisions came up. After an encounter
with the troops from Poupry, they attacked with their
right wing the smaU copses which lay near, in front of
the forest-land to the north, placed the artillery in the
gaps, and began at three o'clock an attack from thence.
This, however, came to grief under the fire of grape-
shot of the defenders, and of a threatened charge by

204 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

the 3rd Brigade of cavalry, which General von Colomb
had set in motion in the open country to the west of
Dambron. In the same way an attack on Morale, by
the left wing from Autroches, miscarried. But, at
four o'clock, the French advanced along the whole line,
preceded by a swarm of tirailleurs. They were repulsed
at Poupry, and likewise at Morale, at which latter place
two companies of sappers joined in the fight ; on the
other hand, their right wing broke through into the
forest, and compelled the Germans to retreat. But the
Prussian battahons, who were in reserve, advanced
from Poupry, and drove the enemy back into the
scrub, where they still had to defend themselves against
an attack by the cavalry.

The fighting was now stopped by the approach of
night. The 22nd Division remained under arms till
eleven o'clock in the position which they had seized,
and then went back to Anneux. The 3rd Division of
cavalry went for the night to Baigneaux. The 17th
Division remained in position near Lumeau, having
Loigny to their front, which they occupied in concert
with the Bavarians, who extended further to the right
as far as Orgeres.

The day had cost the French 4000 killed and
wounded, and the Germans fully as many ; but 2500
unwounded prisoners, eight guns, one mitrailleuse, and
a standard belonging to the enemy were left in their
possession.

On the French side, the Fifteenth Corps returned to
Artenay, and there received orders to occupy the posi-
tion previously taken up on the skirt of the wood,
with a division to be stationed there for its defence.

Thus the intended advance of the left wing of the
Army of Orleans failed. The Sixteenth Corps, lacking
the support of the Seventeenth, had indeed lost ground,

BATTLE OF LOIGNY — POUPRY. 205

but kept its place in the foremost line at Villepion,
FaveroUes, and Terminiers. It was therefore left to
G-eneral Chanzy to make one more attack on the right
wing of the Germans on the following day.

This consisted of five corps, and stood close in front
of the enemy ; further reinforcements could not for the
present be given, but the Commander-in-chief thought
that the moment had now come to put an end to the
incessant danger to the investing lines from the south.

On the 2nd, at midday, the order came from head-
quarters for all the forces to attack Orleans, and in the
course of that day Prince Frederick Charles gave the
requisite instructions to this end.

It is here necessary to go back a little in order to see
how circumstances developed events during November
at various other points.

IV.

FIGHTING ROUND PARIS.

PAEIS IN NOVEMBER.

The report, which became known on the 14th
November, of the happy result of the action at Coul-
miers on the 9th, had raised new hopes in Paris. No
one any longer doubted that the enemy would find it
necessary to send large forces in that direction, which
would considerably weaken the investing hues, particu-
larly in the south.

In order to assist the hoped-for rehef by independent
action when the time came, three armies were formed
out of the garrison of Paris.

The first, under General Clement Thomas, consisted
of 226 battalions of the National Guard, in round
numbers 130,000 men. They were to defend the city
walls and maintain peace in the city. The second,
under General Ducrot, included the most trusty
elements, particularly the troops which had hitherto
constituted the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Corps.
This army was divided into three corps and one di-
vision of cavalry, consisting of fully 100,000 men and
more than 300 guns. They were intended for active
service in the field, and for making sorties on the in-
vesting forces. The third army, under General Vinoy,
70,000 strong, consisted of six regiments of the Garde
Mobile, and one division of cavalry ; and Maud'huy's
infantry division was also distributed among them.
They were to support the more important sorties by
making feints against the foremost besieging Unes.

PREPAEATIONS IN PARIS. 207

Besides these, 80,000 of the Garde Mobile were in the
forts, and 35,000 men at St. Denis under Admiral de la
Ronciere.

The available fighting power consequently amounted
to above 400,000 men.

The garrison exhibited a remarkable activity in
small night engagements. The heavy guns in the place
would carry as far as Choisy-le-Roi, and even to
Beauregard, near Versailles. They worked hard in the
trenches on the peninsula of Gennevilliers and con-
structed a military bridge. Several things showed
that the French intended to make an attempt on the
west. But since, as long as the Second Army was
still incomplete, the greatest danger threatened the
Germans from the south, their Commander-in-chief, as
already mentioned, kept the Second Corps behind the
Yvette from Villeneuve to Saclay. On the north of
Paris the corps of Guards spread themselves out to
the left towards Aulnay, the Twelfth crossed to the
south bank of the Marne, and the Wiirtemberg Di-
vision moved to the position left vacant by the Second
Corps between the Marne and the Seine.

On November 18th the summons came to Paris from
Tours to effect a prompt connection with the Army of
the Loire, somewhat prematurely, as we know, since
that army was still deliberating about merely defensive
measures.

In Paris, arrangements were, indeed, being made for
a great sortie. But as the earlier attacks on the centre
of the Sixth Corps had shown that this had been con-
siderably strengthened by fortifications at Thiais and
Chevilly, it was decided to reach the uplands east of
Joinville and from thence to turn off to the south.
The attention of the Germans was to be diverted by
means of attacks in the opposite direction.

208 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

On the 18tli, the day on which the Army of Orleans
had vainly endeavored to press on towards Beaune-la-
Eolande, General Ducrot assembled the Second Paris
Army in the neighborhood of Vincennes, and the Third,
with Hugues's division, occupied Mont-A^Ton on the
following day. As, however, the construction of
bridges at Champigny and Bry was not yet completed,
battle was postponed till the 30th ; but it was left to
the leaders of the minor engagements to carry them
into effect simultaneously or separately. Accordingly,
Maud'huy's division collected during the night of the
29th behind the redoubt at Hautes-Bruyeres, and
marched towards L'Hay before daybreak.

Warned by the heavy firing from the southern forts,
General von Tlimpling had ordered the 12th Division
to get under arms early in their positions, and the 11th
to assemble at Fresnes.

The French, favored by the darkness, made their
way through the vineyards into L'Hay ; yet they were
successfully driven back by the Germans with the
bayonet and clubbed arms.

After continuing the firing for some time, the French
renewed their onslaught at 8.30, but without success ;
and then the defenders, reinforced from the reserve,
replied with a vigorous charge. At"- ten o'clock the
enemy retreated to Villejuif.

Admiral Pothuau had at the same time advanced
up the Seine with the Marine Infantry and the Na-
tional Guard. A vedette at Gare-aux-Boeufs was sur-
prised and taken prisoner, Choisy-le-Roi was fired upon
by field-guns, artillery, and some gun-boats, which
appeared on the Seine. Meanwhile, as the Grenadiers
of the 10th Regiment (German) were on the point of
making an attack on their side, General Vinoy stopped
the fighting.

SORTIES FROM PARIS. 209

This demonstration cost the French 1000 men and
300 uninjured prisoners; the Prussians, who were
under cover, lost only 140 men. Still, the forts kept
up fire till midday, and then the enemy were allowed
a short truce, in order to carry away their numerous
wounded.

Against the centre of the Fifth Corps also a strong
force of infantry had advanced at eight o'clock, upon
Garches and Malmaison, and had driven in part of the
outposts. But they soon met with opposition from
the battahons, and at noon retreated into Valerien.

THE ATTEMPT TO RELEASE THE ARMY OF PARIS.

(30th November and 2nd December.)

On the 30th November the Second Paris Army
opened the battle which was to decide the fate of the
capital.

To prevent the concentration of the Germans towards
the real attack, the investing lines were engaged against
sorties at almost every point.

General Ducrot ordered SusbieUe's division of his
Second Corps to march to the south. These had
already reached Rosny by three o'clock in the morning,
crossed over the Marne at Creteil by a flying bridge,
and from thence, briskly supported by the neighboring
forts, opened fire on the Wiirtemberg Division, whose
outposts had been pushed forward as far as Bonneuil
and Mesly.

General von Obernitz had to maintain an extended
position, his 1st Division, being near ViUiers, on the
peninsula of Joinville, his 2nd at Sucy-en-Brie, and his
3rd at Brevannes. The division had been placed under
the General in command of the Army of the Meuse,
who had received orders from Versailles to increase

14:

210 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

his strength considerably by the addition of the Twelfth
Corps, or even of some troops of the Corps of Guards.

In consequence of the enemy's enormous numbers
on Mont-Avron, the Saxon Corps believed themselves
immediately threatened on the right bank of the Marne,
and requested to be immediately transferred to the left ;
but the Crown Prince of Saxony gave orders that the
whole of the 24th Division should assemble there on
the following day.

Thus, for the present, no help could be rendered to
the Wiirtembergers but by means of the wing of the
Second Corps, which was posted at Villeneuve, instead
of the 7th Brigade of infantry, who were sent near
Brevannes to Valenton.

The fire of three German batteries, on their way to
that town, first brought the advance of the French
Division to a stand. The attempt of the Wiirtem-
bergers to take Mont-Mesly completely failed at the
outset ; but after the artillery was brought into play
they succeeded in taking the hill by twelve o'clock, and
the Prussian battalions made their way into Mesly.
The Wiirtemberg troopers attacked the enemy's retreat-
ing guns with great success. At 1.30 the re-opening
of the fire from the forts announced, the end of this
sortie. It cost the Germans 350 men, and the French
1200.

During this time the centre of the Sixth Corps had
not even been disturbed. General Vinoy, who had not
been informed of the advance of Susbielle's division,
as soon as its retreat was noticed, opened a rapid fire
on Ivry and the adjoining works, which was augmented
by gun-boats on the Seine, and armor-plated batteries
on the railway. Then Admiral Pothuau advanced
against Choisy-le-Roi and Thiais. He once more set
his marines to diive out the Prussian outposts from

SORTIES FROM PARIS. 211

Gare-aux-Boeufs. But the further advance failed, and
General Vinoy recalled his troops, after which the
fighting at Mesly ceased, and only the thunder of
artillery continued till five o'clock.

After a preliminary cannonade from Valerien the
Garde Mobile advanced against the centre of the Fifth
Corps as early as seven o'clock. They were, however,
repulsed by the outposts, and supports who were in
readiness, and retired at eleven o'clock.

Further towards the north of Paris a sharp skirmish
took place. At midday the Fort de la Briche, sup-
ported by field-guns and a floating battery, opened a
heavy fire on the low-lying village of Epinay, on the
right bank of the Seine. At two o'clock Haurion's
brigade advanced, two companies of marines pressed
into this place along the bank of the river, and drove
out the garrison, which consisted of only one com-
pany* A second also retii-ed from the base of the for-
tifications in a northerly direction towards Ormesson.
At three o'clock in the afternoon, the village, with a
few obstinately defended farms on the further side of
the mill-race, fell into the hands of the French.

Meanwhile the troops of the Fourth Army Corps
had assembled, and estabhshed seven batteries on the
heights above. The infantry rushed into the village
from all sides with loud cheers, and after a fierce
street-fight recovered possession of the lost posts ; and
it was this transitory victory that was to raise such
great hopes in Tours. The losses on both sides
amounted to 300 men.

These were all mere feints to facilitate the chief
action; and whilst the investing troops were thus
engaged and attracted to various points, two corps of
the French Second Army at 6.30 in the morning
crossed the bridges at Joinville and Nogent which had

212 THE FEAJ^CO-GEEMAN WAE.

been completed during the night. After repulsing the
German outposts they both deployed, and completely
covered the peninsula between Champigny and Bry.
The Third Corps had taken the road along the north
bank of the Marne, towards Neuilly, to cross the river
there, thus at the same time threatening the position
of the Saxon Corps, who therefore detained the 47th
Brigade on the right bank, though it had been sent to
the assistance of the Wiirtembergers. Consequently
only two Grerman brigades, spread over three-quarters
of a mile, were left to face the two French corps
on the left bank, with the Saxon 48th at Noisy, and
the Wiirtemberg 1st between Villiers and Chenne-
vieres.

At ten o'clock Maussion's division advanced towards
the Park of Villiers. Supported by the Saxon divis-
ions from Noisy, the Wiirtembergers repulsed a first
attack, but in following it up met with heavy losses.
The French batteries of two divisions and those of the
Artillery Reserve formed line in front of the park.
On their right wing Faron's division, which had met
with no slight losses, occupied Champigny, and was
drawn up for defence in front of this position.

General Ducrot's original idea had^ been to prolong
the engagement on the peninsula until he could be
joined at Noisy by his Third Corps. But as news
arrived that at eleven o'clock they were still beyond
the Marne, he ordered a general attack by the two
other corps to commence at once.

On the left their advance was checked for a consid-
erable time by the German batteries between Noisy
and Villiers, and when Colonel von Abendroth ad-
vanced with six companies of the 48th Brigade from
both those places to attack in force, the French retired
to the vineyards on the western slope of the plateau,

SOETIES FKOM PAKIS. 213

even leaving two guns, which, however, the Saxons
could not take away for want of horses.

In the centre Berthaut's division tried to pass south
of ViUiers, but, under a fire from five batteries sta-
tioned there and at Cornilly, their ranks were so much
thinned that they fell back before the advance of a
Saxon battalion.

On the right wing, the guns which had been brought
up for the defence of Champigny had at last been
compelled by the Grerman artillery to withdi*aw, and
had again sought cover further north, near the lime-
kilns. A division of infantry had advanced along the
river to Maison-Blanche, but in the meantime the 2nd
Wiirtemberg Brigade, although itself attacked at Sucy,
had dispatched two companies and a battery to Chen-
nevieres as reinforcements. Moving forward from
the Hunting-lodge, the Wiirtembergers took 200 French
prisoners at Maison-Blanche; though, on the other
hand, the attempt to scale the heights before Cham-
pigny with the companies assembled at Cornilly failed
with heavy losses. However, on the renewal of the
flank attack from the Hunting-lodge, Faron's division,
which had already been seriously shaken, was obliged
to retreat to Champigny.

General Ducrot decided to be content, for that day,
with having established a firm footing on the left bank
of the Marne, and he brought up sixteen batteries to a
position in his front, to secure the ground he had
gained. On the following day the attack was to be
renewed by all three corps.

The Germans, on their part, had to congratulate
themselves on having held firm against superior num-
bers. And so in the afternoon the fighting gradually
died away, until it broke out again in the north.

The French Third Corps, marching up the right

214 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

bank of the Marne, had left a strong force in Neuilly,
and had diiven back the outpost of the Saxon 23rd
Brigade. Under cover of six batteries the construc-
tion of two miUtary bridges below Neuilly was begun
at ten o'clock, and finished by noon. Just at this time
it happened, as we have seen, that the French on the
plateau were retiring, so the passage did not take place
until two o'clock in the afternoon. Bellemare's divis-
ion marched along the valley to Bry, where they joined
the left wing of the Third Corps. A regiment of
Zouaves, trying to ascend the heights from that side,
lost half its men and all its officers. Notwithstanding
this, Greneral Ducrot decided to bring his increased rein-
forcements to the renewal of the attack on Villiers.

Reinforced by four battalions, the divisions advanced
in this direction, although the artillery had not suc-
ceeded in battering down the park wall; repeated
onslaughts of infantry were repulsed, and finally the
French retreated into the valley. Simultaneously
with this, Berthaut's division failed in an attack on
the railway and Faron's in one on the Hunting-lodge.
Not till darkness had set in did the firing cease on
both sides.

In the direction in which the French Third Corps
had been fighting in the morning, the Crown Prince
of Saxony had collected the 23rd Division near Chelles ;
but as soon as the enemy's true plans could be
known, he sent off a detachment of the 47th Brigade
and part of the artillery corps to the threatened posi-
tion held by the Wiirtembergers. In the same way
General von Obernitz, as soon as the fighting at Mesly
was over, dispatched three battalions to the Hunting-
lodge. At night orders came from head-quarters for
the Second and Sixth Corps to send reinforcements to
the position where the investing lines were in danger

ATTACKS FKOM WITHOUT. 215

and the 7tli and 21st Brigades arrived at Sucy on the
following day, the 1st of December.

The attempt on the part of the French to break
through without help from outside was already con-
sidered as fairly hopeless, and it was only the fear of
popular indignation which caused the Third Army to
remain any longer on the left bank of the Marne. In-
stead of attacking, the French began to intrench them-
selves, and in order to clear the battle-field a truce
was arranged. The thundering of the artillery of
Mont-Avron must serve for the present to keep the
Parisians in a good humor. The Germans also worked
at strengthening their positions, but suffering from
the sudden and extreme cold, they withdrew at least
part of their troops to quarters further to the rear.

The command of the whole of the German Army
between the Marne and the Seine was handed over to
General von Fransecky. The Commander-in-chief of
the Army of the Meuse had already arranged that
Prince George, with all the available troops of the
Twelfth Corps, should take Bry and Champigny by
surprise in the early morning.

With this object, on the morning of the 2nd of
December, the 24th Division assembled at Noisy, the
1st Wiirtemberg Brigade at Villiers, and the 7th Prus-
sian at the Hunting-lodge.

The foremost battalion of the Saxon Division drove
back the enemy's outposts by an unexpected rush,
took 100 prisoners, and after carrying a barricade, en-
tered Bry. Here the fighting took the form of fierce
action round the houses, in which the 2nd Battalion
of the 107th Eegiment lost nearly all its ofiicers. Nev-
ertheless, they held their ground, in spite of the heavy
fire from the forts in the northern parts of the village.

The Wiirtembergers also seized Champigny, but

216 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAR.

soon met with fierce resistance from the enemy, who
were sheltered in the buildings. Bois-de-la-Lande,
previously occupied, had to be abandoned, and Gen-
eral Ducrot himself determined to attack. The strong
lines of artillery on his front came into action at about
nine o'clock, and two divisions deployed behind them.

Meanwhile, the battalion of fusiliers of Colberg's
Regiment marched once more from the Hunting-lodge
on Bois-de-la-Lande, and took possession of it at the
first onslaught. The French, who were firing steadily
from the railway embankments, di'ove back the Pom-
eranians with clubbed rifles and at the point of the
bayonet. A brisk fight was carried on at the same
time near the lime-pits, where at noon 160 French laid
down their arms. Whilst the 6th Wiirtemberger and
the 9th Prussian batteries were by degrees brought
into action against Champigny, General Hartmann
succeeded in getting as far as the Bry road. As, how-
ever, the batteries were prevented by their own troops
from firing, and were suffering, too, from the projec-
tiles from the forts, they were withdrawn behind the
slope of the valley near the Hunting-lodge. At two
o'clock the 1st Wiirtemberg and the 7th Prussian Bri-
gades had established themselves in the line from the
churchyard of Champigny to Bois-de^a-Lande.

Meanwhile, the French divisions, under Bellemare
and Susbielle, had reached the battle-field from the
right bank of the Marne. The two (German) battalions
at Bry, having already lost thirty-six officers and 638
men, were compelled on the approach of the enemy in
very superior force to evacuate the village and retire
on Noisy, but not without taking 300 prisoners with
them. The remainder of the Saxon forces held Vil-
liers, where the batteries still available also took up a
position.

THE FIGHT AT CHAMPIGNY. 217

When, at two o'clock, the French were leading a
strong body of artillery to this point, four batteries of
the Second Corps rushed out of the hollow near the
Hunting-lodge at full gallop, and opened fire at 2000
paces on their flank. In scarcely ten minutes the
French batteries retired and the Prussians went back
to their sheltered position. Several of the enemy's
battalions which, at about three o'clock, attempted
a renewed assault on Villiers, were repulsed with less
difficulty, and at five o'clock the fighting ceased. Only
the French kept up a fire of field and fortress artillery
until after dark.

General Ducrot had received information, in the
course of the day, that the Army of the Loire was
marching on Fontainebleau, and he therefore deter-
mined to maintain, if possible, his position outside
Paris.

During the night of the 3rd December, provisions
had been procured, also additional teams and ammu-
nition for the batteries; but the advance of support
from without was by no means confirmed.

The troops were completely exhausted by the disas-
trous fighting they had gone through, and the Com-
mander-in-chief was justified in dreading a repulse on
the Marne from the enemy's invigorated forces. He
therefore ordered a retreat, the troops being informed
that the attack should be renewed as soon as they were
once more in a condition to fight.

Soon after midnight the divisions were already
drawn up behind the outposts, and the baggage trains
were sent back first. At noon the troops were able to
follow over the bridges at Neuilly, Bry, and Joinville.
Only one brigade remained to protect the passage.

The retreat was very skilfully covered by a series of
smaU. attacks on the German outposts. The French

218 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAH.

batteries had opened fire at Le-Plant an^ Bry by day
break, and the withdrawal of the enemy's army was
completely hidden by the thick mist.

General Fransecky assembled the Saxon and the
Wiirtemberg Divisions in fighting order at Villiers and
Coeuilly, the 7th Brigade with the artillery of the
Second Corps and two regiments of the Sixth at Chen-
nevieres, intending to wait for the expected reinforce-
ment of the 4th, which was to come from the Sixth
Corps. The 23rd Division received orders from the
Crown Prince of Saxony to cross to the left bank of
the Marne, whilst the corps of Gruards had in the mean-'
time extended their outposts to Chelles.

Matters remained so on the 3rd, with the exception
of petty frays, and at four o'clock in the afternoon the
troops returned to quarters. But early on the 4th, as
the patrols rode out towards Bry and Champigny, they
found these places vacated, and the peninsula of Join-
ville deserted by the enemy.

The French Second Army, which had been severely
reduced and its discipline much shaken, turned back
to Paris ; by their own statement they had lost 12,000
men. The G-ermans had lost 6200 men, but took up
the position again that they had previously held in the
investing lines. ""

This determined attempt on the part of General
Ducrot is the most serious effort that was made to
break out of Paris. It was directed towards what was
at the moment the weakest point of the investment,
but only met with good results at the commencement.*

* A legend was subsequently circulated that the voice of one General
at one of the German councils of war had, in opposition to all the others,
prevented the removal of the chief head-qiiarters from Versailles. Apart
from the fact that during the whole course of the invasion no council of
war was ever held, it never occurred to any member of the King's mili-
tjiry suite to set so bad an example to the army.

ADVANCE OF THE FIKST GEEMAN AEMY. 219

THE ADVANCE OF THE FIKST AEMY IN NOVEMBEK.

The newly-formed army in the north of France had
not remained inactive. Rouen and Lille were their
chief centres. In front of Lille, the Somme with its
fortified passages at Ham, Peronne, Amiens, and Ab-
beville afforded a field equally advantageous for attacks
in front or for a secure retreat. The advance of the
French in independent columns had, indeed, on various
occasions, been checked by detachments of the Army
of the Meuse, and they were not strong enough to rid
themselves permanently of that incubus.

We have already seen how, after the fall of Metz,
the Second Army retked towards the Loire, and the
First into the northern departments of France.

A large portion of the First Army was detained as
far back as the Moselle by the transport of the numer-
ous prisoners and by the watch kept at the fortresses
which interrupted the communications with Germany.
The whole of the Seventh Corps were either in Metz
or before Diedenhof and Montmedy. Of the First
Corps, the 1st Division had been withdrawn to Rethel,
the 4th Brigade had been carried forward by railway
beyond Soissons to the investment of La-Fere, and the
3rd Division of cavalry had been sent on towards the
Forest of Argonnes. The remaining five brigades fol-
lowed with the artillery on the 7th November.

Marching on a wide front, they had ah'eady reached
the Oise, between Compiegne and Chauny, on the 20th.
In front of the right wing the cavalry, supported by a
battalion of Jagers, came across the Garde Mobile at
Ham and Guiscard, but the French forces retired to
Amiens on the advance of the infantry columns. It
was understood that 15,000 men were there, and rein-
forcements continually joining them.

220 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

On the 25tli the 3rd Brigade reached Le-Quesnel.
Of the Seventh Corps, the 15th Division succeeded in
getting beyond Montdidier, and the 16th as far as
Breteuil, whence they estabhshed communication with
the Saxon forces at Clermont.

On the 26th the right wing started for Le-Quesnel,
the left for Moreuil and Essertaux. The cavalry made
incursions across the Somme, the right bank of which
they found occupied by the French. The enemy's
attitude showed that they restricted themselves to the
defence of that position. General von Manteuffel
thereupon determined to attack, without waiting for
the arrival of the 1st Division, which had been inex-
plicably delayed on the way by railway from Rethel.
But he wanted first, on the 27th, to concentrate his
available forces on a smaller front, as they were spread
out over an extent of four miles. But the battle was
unexpectedly fought on that same day.

THE BATTLE OF AMIENS.

(November 17th.)

General Farre, with his 17,500 men divided into three
brigades, stood on one side of Amiens, on the south
bank of the Somme, at Villers-Bret'bnneux, and at
Longueau, on the road to Peronne, keeping possession
of the villages and the copses on his front. Besides
these there were 8000 Gardes Mobiles haK a mile in
front of the town in intrenched positions.

In accordance with the instructions from head-quar-
ters, General von Goeben had arranged that the 15th
Division should take up their quarters at Fouencamps
and Sains on the 27th; the 16th at Rumigny and
Plachy, and in the villages fui-ther back ; the Artillery
Corps at Grattepanche. The Eighth Corps had to as-

BATTLE OF AMIENS. 221

semble before Amiens between the Celle and the Noye,
standing at least half a mile from the First Corps, and
divided from them by the Noye and the Avre. General
von Bentheim, on the other side, had directed his
advanced guard, the 3rd Brigade, to find quarters north
of the Luce.

At an early hour the Germans seized the fords of
the stream at Demuin, Hangard, and Domart. At ten
o'clock they moved forward in order to occupy the
quarters intended for them, and as the enemy were
already in possession, a fight began which gradually
increased in magnitude.

The wooded heights on the north bank of the Luce
were taken without any particular resistance, and
maintained in spite of several assaults by the French.
The artillery advanced in the intervals. On the left
the 4th Regiment seized the village of Gentelles, on
the right the 44th Regiment rushed up to within
300 paces of the left wing of the French position, and
by a vigorous onslaught carried by storm the earth-
works at the railway cutting east of Villers Bretonneux.
Soon after midday a strong force of the enemy drew
up at Bretonneux and in Cachy, directly opposite the
3rd Brigade, which was extended nearly a mile.

On the left wing of the Germans the 16th Division
had by eleven o'clock already reached the quarters
assigned to them, and had driven the enemy out of
Hebecourt, as well as out of te woods north of this
place towards Dury. When the Eighth Corps was
called out on the left bank of the Noye, the 15th Di-
vision was moved from Moreuil along the left bank of
the Noye by way of Ailly to Dommartin, and the ad-
vanced guard from Hailles marched on Fouencamps.

Thus it happened that before noon, between the two
corps, the roads from Noye and Montdidier were left

222 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAR.

completely exposed on the German side, while a French
brigade was standing at the fork of the road at Lon-
gueau, though, in fact, it remained absolutely inactive.

This interval was at fii'st screened only by the
numerous retinue and the staff of the Commander-in-
chief ; and then it was to some extent filled up by the
battalions constituting the escort of the head-quarters.
As, however, at ten o'clock the French on their side
commenced an attack on the 3rd Brigade, General von
Manteuffel ordered the 15th Division to join in the fight
as far as possible on the right wing.

After a steady defence, the companies of the 4th
Regiment were driven back out of the Wood of Han-
gard towards the slope of the hill in front of Demuin,
and subsequently, after having fired away all their
ammunition, the defenders of Gentelles were driven
back to Domart.

General von Strubberg, instructed from the ca.mp
beyond the Luce, had sent four batteries in this direc-
tion, which crossed the Avre, but came under such a
hea\"j^ fire from the Wood of Gentelles that their fur-
ther advance was prevented, and they had to change
front on the copse. Behind them, however, the other
detachments of the 30th Brigade pressed forward to
St. Nicolas on the right bank, and to Boves on the left,
and with the help of the 29th Brigade di'ove out the
French from the heap of ruins.

Meanwhile a part of the 1st German Division, who
were retiring, had come up behind the 3rd Brigade.
The position of the artillery was considerably strength-
ened, the guns were directed against the earthworks
south of Bretonneux. As further support the Crown
Prince's Regiment marched out and the French were
again soon driven out of the Bois-de-Hangard. The
East Prussians, who were following, crouched behind

BATTLE OF AMIENS, 223

the earthworks, several detachments of the 4th and
44th Regiments gradually collected there from the
neighboring woods, and di'ove the enemy from this
position. Thirteen batteries now silenced the French
artiUery, and, after they had fired for some time on
Bretonneux, the place was, at four o'clock, seized by
the Prussians, who came in from all sides with di'ums
beating. The French in the town only opposed them
at a few places ; for the most part they hurried over
the Somme at Corbie under cover of the darkness, and
with the loss of 180 nnwounded prisoners.

When, somewhat later. General Lecointe advanced
with the reserve brigade on Domart, he found the place
already in possession of the 1st Division, so turned
back. The French only succeeded in holding Cachy
till late in the evening.

The troops of the First Corps were accommodated
for the night in the hamlets to the south of the Luce,
the outposts remained on duty on the north bank, and
Bretonneux also was occupied.

On the left wing of the battle-field the 16th Division
had advanced on Dury, had driven the French out of
the neighboring churchyard, but had been forced to
retire from an attack on the enemy's lines of intrench-
ment, which were extensive and strongly defended.
They bivouacked behind Dury.

It was night before General von Manteuffel received
news of the enemy's complete defeat. Early in the
morning of the 28th the patrols of the First Army
Corps found the ground clear of the enemy as far as
the Somme, and all the bridges across the river demol-
ished. By noon General von Goeben returned to
Amiens, and the citadel capitulated two days later with
400 men and 30 cannon.

One pecuharity of the battle of the 27th November

224 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

is the small extent of the battle-field in proportion to
the number of the troops' engaged. G-eneral Farre,
with 25,000 men in round numbers, covered a front of
three miles from Pont-de-Metz south of Amiens to the
east of Villers Bretonneux, with the Somine close on
his rear. As the Germans attacked on about the same
length of front, there was a break in their centre. The
danger caused by this gap was not taken advantage
of during the morning through the inactivity of the
enemy, and it was then nullified by the occupation of
St. Nicolas.

The superiority of numbers was on the side of the
Germans, for, although of the 1st Division in their
rear, only the Crown Prince's Regiment could take
part in the fighting, they were 30,000 strong.

The 3rd Brigade had borne the brunt of the battle,
losing 630 men and 34 officers, out of a total of 1300.
The French also lost 1300 kiUed, besides 1000 reported
missingo Part of the National Guard threw down their
arms and fled for their homes. The main body of the
French Corps retired on Amiens.

Immediately after the battle the First Army was
reinforced by the 4th Brigade, which had been brought
from La-Fere.

THE TAKING OF LA-FERE.

(November 27th.)

This little fortress had become quite important, since
it closed the line of railway passing through Rheims,
whether to Paris or to Amiens. Lying in low open
ground, well watered by the Somme and its tributaries,
it is difficult of access; otherwise, the fortifications
were restricted to a wall standing apart, with small
earthworks lying close in front of it, and it was entirely

LA-FEKE AND DIEDENHOF. 225

exposed to view from the heights situated on the east
at a distance of not more than 1500 metres.

The brigade had temporarily invested La-Fere on
the 15th November, and when the siege-train arrived
from Soissons with thirty-two heavy guns, seven bat-
teries were constructed and armed dm-ing the night of
the 25th on the heights abeady mentioned. On the
following morning these opened fire, and on the 27th
the place capitulated ; 2300 Gardes Mobiles were taken
prisoners, and the most serviceable of the 113 guns
were carried to Amiens to arm the citadel. The
Seventh Corps, which was to have supported the Fu-st
Army, meanwhile never appeared in sight, because
they still had further work to do on the Moselle ; on
the 13th November the gi-eater part of the 14th Divis-
ion had only reached Diedenhof.

THE TAKING OF DIEDENHOF.

(November 24th.)

This fortress, being shut in on aU sides by hills, was
entirely without bomb-proof space ; the direct approach
from the south was, on the other hand, rendered more
difficult by inundations, and on the west and north by
marsh lands. General von Kameke therefore decided
to await the results of a heavy bombardment before
making a regular attack. Batteries were erected on
both banks of the Moselle, and on the morning of the
22nd eighty-five guns opened fire. At first the fortress
answered briskly. In the following night, to lay the
first parallel, the infantry advanced to within 600 paces
on the west front, but, in consequence of pouring rain
and the condition of the ground, the work made but
small progress. However, on the 24th at midday the
Commandant sent in negotiations for the sui'render of
15

226 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

the place. The garrison, 4000 men strong, with the
exception of the National Guard stationed in the place,
was captured and sent to Germany. One hundred and
ninety-nine guns, besides a considerable amount of
provisions, arms, and ammunition, fell into the hands
of the victorious troops.

The 14th Division was now required to lay siege to
the forts on the northern frontier, which would occupy
it for some time. The 13th Division was, by orders
from head-quarters, directed to commence operations
in the south of France.

THE INVESTMENT OF BELFOET IN NOVEMBEE.

On the south-east of the seat of war Belfort had
become the centre of continuous small engagements
between French scouts and the rear of the Fourteenth
Corps, who, under General von Werder, stood near
Vesoul.

However, when the divisions which up till then had
been standing before Strasburg, had been relieved by
a new contingent from Germany, the troops that were
at Neu-Breisach were available, and these forces
marched in the direction of Upper Alsace, while the
1st Reserve Division had reached Belfort by the 3rd
November, and by the 8th had effected the preliminary
investment of that place. The larger half of the 4th
Eeserve Division had marched to combine with the
Fourteenth Corps at Vesoul, a detachment under Gen-
eral von Debschitz occupied Montbeliard, and the 67th
Regiment held Mulhouse and Delle.

If we glance back at the German successes during
November and the general military position towards
the end of the month, we see the grand sortie from
Paris repulsed in the north, the danger of being
hemmed in done away with by General von Man-

BATTLE OF ORLEANS. 227

teuffel's victory at Amiens; in the east, Diedenhof,
Breisach, Verdun, and La-Fere taken, Montmedy and
Belf ort surrounded ; and in the south Prince Frederick
Charles preparing to attack the French army at Or-
leans.

BATTLE or OELEANS.

(December 3rd and 4th.)

"When the telegraphic order was received by the
Second Army, soon after noon on the 2nd of December,
the Prince on the same day assembled the Tenth Corps
at Beaune-la-Rolande and Boynes, the Third at Pithi-
viers, and the Ninth at Bazoches-les-Gallerandes. By
evening the collected forces had their marching orders.

The attack was expected to take place two days later.
The Third Corps was first to advance on Loury by
way of Chilleurs-aux-Bois ; the Tenth only on Chil-
leurs ; the Ninth, however, were to attack Artenay at
half -past nine. The 1st Division of cavalry, supported
by the infantry on the left wing, was to keep a lookout
over the Yonne, the 6 th was to follow the right wing.
The Grand Duke, to whom it had been left to plan his
own march on the west of the road to Paris, ordered
the 22nd Division to assist in the attack on Artenay,
the Bavarian Corps to advance on Lumeau, the 17th
Division to remain at Anneux. The 4th Division of
cavalry was to scour the country on the left flank.

Already by nine o'clock in the morning on the 3rd
of December the Third Corps met eight battalions and
six batteries of the French at Santeau. The 12th
Brigade and the artillery of the 6th Division, who had
been marched up in the rear of the foremost battalions
in the column of route, therefore formed line at La-
Brosse. After a few rounds, one of the batteries of
the left wing had to be withdi-awn from the battle,

228 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

which had now commenced ; on the right, on the con-
trary, the Artillery Corps came up by degrees, and by
noon seventy-eight Prussian guns were in full action.

The French, yielding to such superior strength,
retired on Chilleurs ; but, after the Grerman batteries
had advanced within 2000 paces of that place and their
right flank had been threatened by an assault from the
Jager battalions, they commenced a retreat towards
the forest, and at three o'clock part of the 5th Division
followed them up by the path which led to the south,
and the 6th by the high-roads. As these had been
obstructed in several places, it was six o'clock in the
evening before the clearing by Loury was reached.

On the right brisk musketry-fire was heard in the
direction of Neuville, and an announcement also arrived
that on the left the French were occupying Nancray.

In consequence of this, some of the reserve forces
that had remained at Chilleurs were brought up as a
support, one regiment was fronted towards the west, a
second towards the east, and, under cover of the out-
posts on the south, the remainder of the troops biv-
ouacked and went into quarters at Loury.

The Ninth Corps had at first assembled at Chateau-
Graillard, on the road to Paris, and then advanced along
the high-road and against Villereau by way of Dam-
bron.

At Assas they met the French, who were soon driven
back by the guns, and vanished towards Artenay. At
about ten o'clock an obstinate duel was opened with
the batteries of the 2nd Division (French) in position
at this place, in which part of the corps' artillery bore
a part, seconded presently by the batteries of the 22nd
Division, which had come up to Poupry. General
Martineau slowly retreated in echelon before the over-
whelming fire of 90 guns, the artillery leading the way,

FIGHTING ROUND ORLEANS. 229

on La-Croix-Briquet and Ferme-d'Arblay. By twelve
o'clock the Germans were in possession of Artenay,
and after half an hour's rest they renewed the attack.
It was a long and obstinate duel of artillery and in-
fantry alike, while the 22nd Division pushed hard on
the French left flank. At two o'clock their guns were
silenced, the left wing column of the Ninth German
Corps took the farm of Arblay, and the centre drove
the enemy down the high-road, fighting persistently,
past La-Croix-Briquet to Andeglou, where, under cover
of the Marine ordnance, resistance was kept up till
dark.

General Puttkamer had brought up five batteries to
within 800 paces of Chevilly, and the 22nd Division
was advancing on the burning village, when the gen-
eral in command gave the order to halt, the Grand
Duke doubting the wisdom of a night attack on an
intrenched position. But when, soon after, a patrol
of hussars announced that it was already evacuated,
General von Wittich ordered his men to take posses-
sion.

The troops bivouacked, under a heavy snow-storm,
in and to the rear of La-Croix-Briquet.

At the first advance the Ninth Corps had sent a
detachment of four battalions of Hessians against St.
Lye on the left. They had met the enemy at La-Tour,
and had driven him back on St. Germain, but could
not drive him out again.

When the Tenth Corps, marching round by Pithi-
viers, reached Chilleurs at about three o'clock, in the
rear of the Third Corps, part of the 20th Division went
on in the direction of the battle at Neuville, which, in
the evening, became audible at Loury. Darkness had
already come on and precluded the use of artillery, but
the infantry broke into the village at several points.

230 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

However, they found the streets barricaded, and met
with obstinate resistance, so the attack had to be post-
poned till the following day.

The Fifteenth French Corps had alone received the
onslaught of three Prussian corps. Strong contingents
of the Army of the Loire, posted to the right and left
of the Fifteenth Corps, made but feeble efforts through-
out the day to support it. General Chanzy alone, at
about two o'clock, ordered the 2nd Division of the Six-
teenth Corps to advance when he heard firing from
Artenay, though he had that morning begun his retreat
on St. Peravy and Boulay. But this reinforcement
met the Prussian 17th Division, which, coming up
from Anneux, was on the point of joining in the fight
at Andeglou, and with it the Bavarian Corps advancing
from Lumeau. Their strong artillery, in position at
Chameul and Sougy, soon forced the French to retire.
First Douzy and then Huetre were taken, and the
chateau of Chevilly occupied by the 17th Division.
Here, too, darkness put an end to the fighting. The
troops of the right wing encamped at Provencheres,
Chameul, and other places to the rear.

Thus the German Army had made its way without
much fighting to within two miles of Orleans. The
French, indeed, had maintained their ground till even-
ing in the neighborhood of Neuville, but the detach-
ments stationed there were ordered to retire in the
course of the night. They were to get into the Pithi-
viers road by Rebrechien, and make a circuit by Orleans
to Chevilly. But they thus came under the fire of the
Third German Corps, encamped at Loury, and fled in
disorder back into the wood, whence they attempted
to reach their destination in detachments.

It was only to be expected that the French would
stoutly defend their intrenchments at Gidy and Cer-

FIGHTING ROUND OELEANS. 231

cottes, on the following day, if only to keep open their
retreat on Orleans. On the 4th, therefore. Prince
Frederick Charles ordered the Grand Duke's forces
and the Ninth Corps to attack both points from all
sides. The Third Corps was to advance from Loury
on Orleans, and the Tenth, again forming the reserve,
was to follow on Chevilly.

General d'Aurelle had returned in the evening to
Saran. Here he saw the 2nd Division of the Fifteenth
flying past in complete rout, and heard that the 1st,
too, had failed to make a stand at Chilleurs. The
corps of the right wing were altogether shattered by
the battle of Beaune, and those of the left no less by
the fight at Loigny. The French General saw the
danger of being driven on the Loire, with undisciphned
hordes, and thus blocking the only passage across the
river at Orleans. He decided therefore on a divergent
retreat. Only the Fifteenth Corps was to retire by
Orleans; General Crouzat was to cross the Loire at
Gien, General Chanzy at Beaugency. Then their re-
union must be attempted beyond the Sauldre. The
necessary dispositions were made during the night,
and communicated to the Government. From the
Green Table at Tours, indeed, counter-orders came
next morning, to maintain the position at Orleans,
which was, in fact, already given up ; but the General
adhered to his own determination.

On December 4th the Third Army Corps (German)
marched out of Loury in two columns, one by the high-
road and one by Vennecy. Both reached Boigny by
noon, having met none but deserters.

A detachment was sent on to Neuville on the right,
and captured seven deserted guns and stands of arms.
To the left, another detachment occupied Chezy, on
the Loire. After a short rest the main columns ad-

232 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

vanced, and by two o'clock the 6th Division reached
Vaumainbert, which was occupied by part of the
French Fifteenth Corps. Although the country was
not open enough to allow of the employment of artil-
lery, the place was taken by the Brandenburgers, in
spite of the stout resistance of the French Marine
Infantry, and the fire of the batteries on the heights
to the north of St. Loup could now be directed on that
suburb of Orleans.

The 5th Division had meanwhile come up behind
the 6th and taken part in the fight.

The Twentieth French Corps, which was still at
Chambon, in the eastern part of the forest opposite
Beaune-la-Eolande, had received orders at four in the
morning, from Tours direct, to march on Orleans.
Contradictory orders had previously arrived from Gen-
eral d'Aurelle, but nothing further had been heard.
General Crouzat had, as a precaution, sent his train
across the Loire at Jargeau, and then marched in the
direction he was ordered to take. When, at half -past
two, at Pont-aux-Moines, he met the detachment march-
ing on Chezy, he determined to fight his way across ;
but as General von Stiilpnagel reinforced his two bat-
talions by bringing up the rest of his division, the
French gave up the attempt and withdrew to the other
side of the river, crossing again at Jargeau.

On the German side the attack on St. Loup was un-
successful ; and since from the site of the battle he got
no news of the other corps, and darkness was coming
on. General von Alvensleben postponed any further
attack on the city till the following day.

To the north of Orleans the Ninth Army Corps
(German) had advanced from La-Croix-Briquet on the
intrenched position at Cercottes. At about one o'clock
the foremost detachments of infantry entered the place.

FIGHTING ROUND OELEANS. 233

The 2nd Division of the French Fifteenth Corps was
driven by the fire of the artillery into the vineyards
outside the town. Here the infantry alone could con-
tinue the struggle. The French defended every tena-
ble spot, and in the railway station just outside Orleans
especially held their own with great persistency. The
station and the deep cutting through which the road
ran were fortified with barricades and rifle-pits, and
armed with naval guns. It was not till nightfall, at
about half -past five, that they abandoned this position,
but renewed the contest a little further back. To
avoid street-fighting in the dark. General von Manstein
put a stop to the battle at about seven o'clock, till
next day.

The advanced guard of the 17th Division of the
Grand Duke's forces had found Gidy intrenched and
strongly occupied. But at the approach of the Ninth
Corps the French abandoned the position at about 11
o'clock, leaving 8 guns behind them. The German
Division, to avoid the wood, now marched to the west,
on Boulay, whither the 22nd and the 2nd Cavalry
Division followed as a reserve.

They here found the Bavarian Corps and the 4th
Cavalry Division engaged in a fight, having already
driven the French out of Bricy and Janvry. When
the artillery had for some time been engaged, General
von der Tann stormed the position, at about twelve
o'clock. But the French did not wait for this ; they
beat a hasty retreat, leaving some of their guns in the
trenches. The 2nd Cavalry Division followed in pur-
suit.

The 4th Hussars, of the 5th Brigade, galloping past
Montaigu, charged a French unlimbered battery and
seized all the guns ; another at Ormes was brought out
of action by a horse battery. From thence a strong

234 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

body of French horse suddenly appeared on the left
flank of the 4th Brigade, as these were crossing the
road to Chateaudun. But Blucher's hussars, with a
sharp swerve, drove the enemy through the village
and back on Ingre.

The 4th Cavalry Division was placed to watch on
the Grand Duke's right flank; and the hussars here
charged 250 men of the 2nd Life Guards, forming the
escort of a baggage-train on the road to Chateaudun,
and took them all prisoners.

While the Germans were thus converging on Orleans
from the north and east, the French Seventeenth Corps
and the 1st Division of the Sixteenth were still in the
field at Patay and St. Peravy. General Chanzy had
assembled the latter at Coinces, and, to protect himself
against their threatened attack in flank. General von
der Tann drew up his 3rd Infantry Brigade, with the
cuirassiers and artillery reserve, on a front towards
Bricy. The 4th Cavalry Division marched on Coinces,
where General von Bernhardi, leaping a wide ditch,
with four squadrons of Ulilans, di'ove a body of French
horse back on St. Peravy, without their stopping to do
more than fire one volley. Other squadi'ons of the 9th
Brigade charged the French tirailleurs, and pursued
the cavalry till they had fallen back o'n a strong body
of infantry. The 8th Brigade was observing Patay,
and after that place had come under the fire of a bat-
tery and been abandoned. General Chanzy gave up aU
further attack and retired behind the wood of Montpi-
peau.

The 2nd Cavalry Division now made for the Loire
immediately below Orleans. Its artiUery destroyed a
bridge at Chapelle over which a baggage-train was
passing, and compelled the troops which were march-
ing on Clery, along the further bank, to fly back to

FIGHTING ROUND ORLEANS. 235

Orleans. Two military railway-trains from thence
were not to be stopped by the firing, but one from
Tours, in which, as it happened, was Glambetta himself,
returned thither with all speed.

The Bavarian Corps, meanwhile, had advanced on
the high-road, and the 22nd Division, in touch with
the Ninth Corps, on the old Chateaudun road ; the 17th
Division on La-Borde between the other two. This
division was called upon at about 3.30 to take the vil-
lage of Heurdy, which was stoutly defended ; and when
the Bavarians from Ormes had turned to the right on
Indre, it proceeded by the high-road towards St.-Jean-
de-la-RueUe. Having overcome all opposition there,
too, the head of the division reached the gates of Or-
leans at about six o'clock.

General von Tresckow there negotiated with the
military authorities the formal occupation of the town.
An agreement was arrived at by ten o'clock, and
shortly after midnight the Grand Duke marched in
with the 17th Division, followed by the 2nd Bavarian
Brigade.

The bridge over the Loire was forthwith secured,
the French not having had time to blow it up. The
rest of the troops found quarters to the west and north
of the city.

The peremptory orders from the Government to
hold Orleans had shaken General d'Aurelle's original
determination. When the greater part of the Fifteenth
Corps (French) arrived there in the forenoon, he wanted
to renew the attempt at resistance. But the necessary
orders could not be transmitted to the corps on the
right wing, nor carried out by those on the left ; and
by five o'clock the General in command was convinced
of the futility of any further conflict. The artillery of
the Fifteenth Corps was fii'st transferred to La-Ferte-

236 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAR.

St.-Aubin; the infantry followed. The Twentieth
Corps, as we have seen, was at Jargeau ; the Eighteenth
had recrossed the Loire at Sully ; the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth moved off westward in the direction of
Beaugency, but remained on the right bank of the
river.

The battle, which had lasted two days, had cost the
Germans 1700 men ; the French lost 20,000, of whom
1800 were taken prisoners. Their large army, lately
massed before Orleans, was now split up into three
separate bodies.

THE GEEMANT ADVANCE ON THE SOUTH, EAST, AND WEST.

The troops were too much exhausted for immediate
pursuit in any direction.

It was decided that the 6th Cavalry Division, rein-
forced by an infantry detachment of the 18th Division,
should follow up the enemy to the southward only,
ascertain his whereabouts, and destroy the connection
of the railways from Bourges, Orleans, and Tours at
the Vierzon junction. These cavalry troops were in
quarters to the north of the city ; the French Fifteenth
had a long start of them, and their ^main body had
reached Salbris, when, two days after the battle, on
December 6th, General von Schmidt arrived by a forced
march at La-Ferte-St.-Aubin. Here he found a detach-
ment of the 18th Division, which had already driven
the French rear-guard back on La-Motte-Beuvron, and
was now ordered to retire on the Loiret. Only two
companies of the 36th Eegiment and one of pioneers
joined the advance, and followed the cavahy partly in
baggage- wagons and on gun-limbers.

On the 7th, under orders from Tours, the French
left the high-road and executed a flank movement of

GENERAL GEEMAN ADVANCE. 237

four miles in an easterly direction to Aubigny-Ville.
The cavalry, supported to the best of their power by
their artillery and the small infantry force, had a smart
fight with the French rear-guard at Nouan-le-Fuzelier,
and again in the evening at Salbris, in which the
French finally had the best of it. The neighborhood
being very thinly populated, the division had to get
back in the dark to Nouan, to find shelter from the
bitter winter night.

Long before daybreak on the 8th, the French rear-
guard had left Salbris to avoid a further encounter
with the enemy, whose strength they greatly overesti-
mated.

After some slight skirmishes the cavalry division
reached Vierzon that evening. The telegraph wires
were cut and the railway line torn up in several places,
70 goods' vans were armor-plated, the direction of the
enemy's retreat reported, and any offensive movement
on the part of the French from that side was regarded
as most improbable.

The division had fulfilled its task ; it was now ordered
to leave one brigade as a corps of observation, and to
advance on Blois with the rest. General von der
Grroeben maintained his positions at Vierzon and Sal-
bris till the 14th.

The winter campaign of this 6th Cavahy Division
was exceptionally fatiguing. It was almost impossible
to move excepting along the high-roads, and they were
frozen so hard that it was often necessary to dismount
and lead the horses. The inhabitants of the Sologne
district were extremely hostile, the advanced troopers
were shot down in every village. The French forces,
on the other hand, made but a feeble resistance.
Numerous prisoners and large quantities of abandoned
materiel bore witness to a hasty retreat, in many cases

238 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

to desperate flight. Nevertheless, in spite of mucli
purposeless inarching and counter-marching, the corps
of the right wing had by December 13th succeeded in
joining the Army of Orleans at Bourges.

The state in which they arrived may be gathered
from the telegraphic Corresiwndence Urgente of the
Government with General Bourbaki, who, when Gen-
eral d'Aurelle was deprived of the command in chief,
took that of these three corps.

Monsieur Freycinet, who was no doubt kept well
informed by the country peojole, assured General Bour-
baki that only a weak force of cavalry stood in front
of him, and repeatedly urged his advancing on Blois.
The General replied that if he were to make the at-
tempt, not a gun, not a man of his three corps would
ever be seen again. His intention was to retreat at
once from Bourges on St. Amand, and if necessary
yet further to the rear ; the only danger was that he
might be attacked before he could accomplish this, and
be involved in disaster.

The Minister of War himseK went to Bourges, but
he too renounced all idea of an offensive movement
when he saw the disorder of the troops. "C'e.s^ encore
ce que fai vu deplus tristeP It was with great difficulty
that he persuaded the corps not to retreat at once, but
to await the course of events, under cover of a detach-
ment pushed forward on Vierzon.

On the day when General Schmidt entered Vierzon,
the Fifteenth Corps was in the neighborhood of Hen-
richemont, at about an equal distance with himself
from Bourges. The Eighteenth and Twentieth Corps
were at Aubigny-Ville and Cernay, from two to three
marches away.

It can scarcely be doubted that, if the 18th Division
had followed the advance of the 6th Cavalry Division,

THE GEAND DUKE'S BATTLE. 239

the Germans might have taken possession of Bourges
and of the vast military stores there.

To the east of Orleans the Third Corps had marched
up the river on Chateauneuf. They only met parties
of stragglers till the 7th, when two divisions of the
Eighteenth French Corps attempted to cross to the
right bank of the Loire at Gien. This resulted in an
engagement between the advanced guards at Nevoy,
with the result that these divisions retreated across the
bridge in the course of the night and continued their
march on Bourges.

THE GKAND DUKE'S BATTLE.

(December 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.)

The Grand Duke's forces were in a position close to
the retreating left wing of the French. In contrast to
the disorder of the right wing. General Chanzy, cer-
tainly the most capable of all the leaders whose duty
it became to fight the invaders in the open field, had,
in a great measure, restored the discipline and spirit
of his troops. They were not only able to make a
stand, but could even attack the enemy. They had,
indeed, been considerably reinforced by the newly-
formed Twenty-first Corps and by Camo's division.
The latter formed the advanced guard at Meung ; be-
hind it were the Sixteenth Corps at Beaugency, the
Seventeenth at Cravant, and the Twenty-first at St.
Laurent, by the woods of Marchenoir.

On the day after the fight the Grand Duke gave the
troops a day's rest; only the cavahy pursued the
French. The 4th Cavalry Division reached Ouzouer ;
the 2nd, arriving at Meung, met a strong force of in-
fantry.

240 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAB.

On the 7th, the Grand Duke's forces advanced on a
very wide front. The 17th Division, on the left wing,
marched on Meung, where its artillery opened a duel
with that of the enemy. Towards four o'clock, a Meck-
lenbui'g battalion carried Langlochere by storm, but
found itseK threatened on both sides by the approach
of the enemy's columns. On the left Foinard was ere
long taken and a gun seized, while on the right the 1st
Bavarian Brigade advanced on La Bourie. Here, al-
most at the same moment, the 2nd Cavalry Division
came up by by-roads from Renardiere, having driven
the enemy out of Le-Bardon by the fire of its guns.
The Bavarians now marched out to meet the mass of
French approaching from Grrand-Chatre. They fought
a hard battle till nightfall, supported by the horse bat-
teries, ending in the retreat of the French on Beau'
mont.

During this conflict of the left wing, the Grand
Duke's Army, the 1st Bavarian Division, had marched
a considerable distance on Baccon, and the 22nd on
Ouzouer ; and then, finding the French offered a deter-
mined resistance, the Grand Duke decided on closing
up his forces to the left.

(December 8th.) To this end the 22nd Division
advanced to the south of Ouzouer on Villermain.
After repulsing the swarms of tirailleurs which attacked
their left flank under cover of a fog. General von Wit-
tich directed his march on Cravant, to effect a junc-
tion with the right wing of Bavarians who were ah'eady
engaged in a hot struggle. They had repulsed the en-
emy's advance from Villechaumont, and had advanced
with the 2nd Division along the road from Cravant to
Beaugency ; when all three French divisions charged
afresh, the Bavarians retreated on Beaumont. Here
they found support from the former and 17 batteries,

THE GEAND DUKE'S BATTLE. 241

which were gi^adually brought into the fighting hne.
Their fire and an impetuous attack from three Bava-
rian brigades at last forced the enemy to fall back, and
the position in the high-road was recovered.

The French now, on their side, brought up a strong
body of artillery, and the Seventeenth Corps prepared
to advance on Cravant. But the 22nd German Divis-
ion had already arrived there at about one o'clock,
after taking Beauvert and Layes, with the 4th Cav-
alry Division on their right and the 2nd on their left.
So when, at about three o'clock, the dense French
columns advanced on Cravant, they were checked by
an impetuous attack of the 44th Brigade, which had
joined the Bavarians, and soon driven out of Layes,
which they had taken on their way. The five batteries
nearest to Cravant had suffered so severely meanwhile
that they had to be withdrawn.

When at last, at about four o'clock, the Bavarian
battalions advanced to storm the height in front of
them, they were met by fresh troops of the enemy, and
after losing the greater part of their officers were com-
pelled to retreat on the artillery position at Beaumont.
Finally, however, the French abandoned Villechau-
mont.

On the left wing of the Grand Duke's forces the 17th
Division had pursued the retreating French beyond
Vallees and Villeneuve, and then at about half -past
twelve had attacked them at Messas. The defence
was obstinate, and it was not till dusk that they suc-
ceeded in carrying the place. The artiUery directed
its fire on dense masses assembled by Vernon, the
infantry stormed the hill of Beaugency, and finally
forced then* way into the town, where a French bat-
tery fell into their hands. Camo's division then retired
on Tavers, and even after midnight General von
16

242 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Tresckow attacked Vernon, whence the French, taken
quite by surprise, fled to Bonvalet.

The Commander-in-chief of the Second Army
(German) had intended to march the Third, Tenth,
and Ninth Corps on Bourges, from Gien, Orleans, and
lastly from Blois. But the Grand Duke's force in its
advance on Blois by the right bank of the Loire had
met with unexpected resistance and a two days' en-
gagement. At the army head-quarters at Versailles
it was regarded as indispensable that the Grand Duke
should immediately be reinforced by at least one divis-
ion. Telegraphic orders to that effect were dispatched
at ten in the morning of December 9th. The Ninth
Corps, which was already on the march along the left
bank and had no enemy in front, could not give the
required support, as all the bridges over the river had
been blown up. The Third Corps was therefore or-
dered to leave only a detachment at Gien, as a corps
of observation, and to march back on Orleans. The
Tenth Corps was to call in the detachments it had
posted to the east of the city and advance on Meung.
Thus, on the 9th, the Grand Duke was still actually
facing eleven French divisions with four divisions of
infantry, quite unsupported. Early next morning
General Chanzy proceeded to the attack.

(December 9th.) The two Prussian divisions at
Beauvert and Messas stood firmly awaiting the French
charge. The two Bavarian divisions, having sustained
great loss, were left at Cravant as a reserve, but soon
had to be absorbed in the fighting line, when at seven
o'clock strong columns of the French were seen ad-
vancing on Le Mee.

Dense bodies of tirailleurs were repulsed both there
and at Vernon, and came under the fire of the devoted
German artillery, which silenced the French guns and

THE GEAND DUKE'S BATTLE. 243

then opened fire on Villorceau. In spite of a stout de-
fence, this village was taken by about half -past ten by
the Bavarian infantry. The French advance on Ville-
chaumont in gi^eatly superior force was also repulsed,
with the assistance of three battalions and two batteries
of the 22nd Division. The Thuringians then stormed
Cernay, where 200 French laid down their arms, and
one of their batteries lost its team and carriages.

On the right wing, by a misunderstanding, the Ger-
mans evacuated Layes and Beauvert, and the French
marched in. However, with the support of the 2nd
Bavarian Brigade, the enemy was again driven out
of both places. Further to the north, the 4th Cavalry
Division was observing the movement of a French
detachment marching on Villermain.

The French made renewed efforts by midday, ad-
vancing again on Cravant in strong columns ; but this
movement Greneral Tresckow r;>ttacked in flank, from
Messas. He left only a weak detachment in Beaugency
and secured the villages on the left on the way to
Tavers. The main body of the 17th Division advanced
on Bonvalet, reinforced the hardly-pressed Bavarians
in Villorceau, and occupied Villemarceau in front of
that place. Here the division had to maintain a severe
struggle, at about three o'clock, with the strong col-
umns of the French Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps.
The infantry rushing on the enemy with cheers suc-
ceeded, however, in repulsing him and holding their
ground in spite of a hot fire. At the same time three
Bavarian battalions, with cavalry and artillery, had
marched up from Cravant and had driven the French
out of Villejouan. Further to the right a battalion of
the 32nd had taken possession of Ourcelle. A line
from thence to Tavers marked the ground so labori-
ously wrung from the French,

244 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAH.

The battle ended with the retreat of the enemy on
Josnes and Dugny.

On this day the Third Corps were on the march to
Orleans. The Ninth could take no part in the fight-
ing but by the fire from their artillery on Meung and
Beaugency, from its position on the left bank. It
was not till near Blois that they met some French
detachments. Fifty men of one of the Hessian bat-
talions stormed the fortified castle of Chambord a little
way from the river, and there took 200 prisoners and
twelve ammunition wagons with their teams.

Of the Tenth Corps only the infantry at the head
had reached Meung, but it had sent forward a regi-
ment of hussars with eight batteries, which arrived at
Grand Chatre by about three o'clock in the afternoon.

The Commander-in-chief of the Second Army now
ordered the Bavarian Corps to retire on Orleans, to
recruit after its heavy losses. But even when rein-
forced by the Tenth Corps, the Grrand Duke still had
to meet an enemy of double numerical strength, and
instead of pursuing he had rather to think of defend-
ing his position.

(December 10th.) Before daybreak G-eneral Chanzy
renewed his attack, which even the Bavarians were
presently required to repel.

At seven in the morning the French Seventeenth
Corps rushed in dense masses on Origny, took 150
prisoners, and forced their way into Villejouan. This
advance was met by the 43rd Brigade at Cernay on
the front, and by the 4th Bavarians with six batteries
at Villechaumont ; while on the right flank G-eneral
von Tresckow marched on Villorceau and Villemarceau.
In this last village two of his battalions, supported by
four batteries, resisted every onslaught of the French
from Origny and Toupenay. At noon the main body

THE GEAND DUKE'S BATTLE. 245

of the 17tli Division advanced to repossess themselves
of Villejouan. Here the French made an obstinate
stand. The fighting, with great loss on both sides,
was continued till four o'clock, and then fresh troops
of French came up to recover the position the Germans
still held in one single farmstead.

All the artillery of the Prussian Division had, how-
ever, deployed to the south of ViUemarceau; they
were joined by two horse batteries of the Tenth Corps,
and the batteries of the 22nd Division also opened an
effective fire. The concentric fire of all these guns
put an end to any further attack of the Seventeenth
French Corps.

Beaugency was now occupied by part of the Tenth
Corps. During the past few days the German left wing
had had a firm position on the Loire to depend upon,
but on the right such a point had been whoUy lacking.
The French had nevertheless made no attempt to take
advantage of their superiority by extending their front.
Not till this day did they march on the unprotected
German flank. The greater part of the Twenty-first
Corps was deployed opposite to it, between Poisly and
Mezieres, and at half-past ten the strong columns
advanced on Villermain. The Bavarians were com-
pelled to form in a bow-line, with the 2nd Brigade,
from Jouy to Coudray. Seven batteries were brought
into that line, and on its right wing the 4th Cavalry
Division stood in readiness. Before two o'clock 2 more
horse batteries and 4 batteries of the Tenth Corps ar-
rived from Cravant, and joined them there with three
brigades as a reserve. The fire of over a hundred Ger-
man guns made the French take their artillery out of
action at about three o'clock, and separate weak attacks
by their infantry were repulsed without difiiculty by
the Germans, who awaited them in resolute defence.

246 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

The French losses in this four days' battle are un-
known. The Grand Duke's force lost 3400 men, of
which the larger half belonged to the two Bavarian
divisions.

The Grand Duke had held his own against three
corps of the enemy, till the first supports could come
up, and this he owed to the bravery of his troops,
more especially of the artillery. This alone lost 255
men and 356 horses. The guns were brought into
such requisition that at last almost all the steel guns
of the light batteries of the 22nd Division, and most of
the Bavarian, were rendered useless by the burning
out of their breech blocks.

The Third Corps had on this day just arrived at St.
Denis, and the Ninth at Vienne, opposite Blois ; but
here too the bridge over the Loire was blown up.

On the French side. General Chanzy had learnt from
the telegi'aphic correspondence of General Bourbaki
with the Government at Tours, that nothing had come
of Bourbaki's attempt to divert part of the German
forces against himself. The long delay led him to fear
an attack from their whole force; he had therefore
decided on a retreat, which resulted in the removal of
the Assembly from Tours to Bordeaux.

At the Grand Duke's head-quarters a fresh attack
was decided on for December 11th. The villages in
front had been left strongly occupied, and it was only
at noon that the enemy's retreat became known. They
were at once pursued on the left by the Tenth Corps,
and on the right, south of the woods of Marchenoir,
by the Grand Duke's force. On the north, the 4th
Cavalry Division was engaged in scouting.

A thaw had followed the hard frost, making the
march equally difficult for both armies. The Germans
found the roads blocked with abandoned wagons and

THE GKAND DUKE'S BATTLE. 247

cast-away arms; the bodies of men and horses lay
iinburied in the fields, and in the villages were hun-
dreds of wounded quite uncared for. Several thou-
sands of stragglers were captured.

The orders from the army head-quarters at Versailles
were for a pursuit, which should render the enemy
incapable of further action for some time to come;
but not beyond Tours. The Second Ai-my was then
to muster at Orleans and the Grand Duke's forces at
Chartres, and the troops were to have the rest they
needed. From the first point constant and strict
watch could be kept on Greneral Bourbaki's army, and
to this end a connection was to be made with Gen-
eral von Zastrow, who was to go to Chatillon-sur-
Seine on the 13th, with the Seventh Corps. Still, no
operations were to extend beyond Bourges and Nevers.

The Second Army was accordingly next marched on
the Loir, and by the 13th held the line of Oucques —
Conan — Blois, that town having been found evacuated.

On the 14th, the 17th Division marched on Moree,
and on the Loir past Freteval. A fight ensued at
both these points. Though the French had advanced
so far, they seemed to intend making a firm stand on
the Loir, where they had occupied Cloyes and Ven-
dome in great strength.

To attack with success, Prince Frederick Charles
began by collecting all his forces. The Third Corps,
hurrying after the army by forced marches, was in the
first instance to fill the interval between the Grand
Duke's forces and the Tenth Corps, which was with-
drawn from Blois and Herbault on Vendome.

But when, on the 15th, the Tenth Corps marched
in that direction, the main body met with such a de-
termined resistance close in front of Vendome that
it could not be overcome before dark. The troops

248 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

therefore retired to quarters in the rear of Ste. Anne.
A left flanking detachment had found St. Amand occu-
pied by a strong force, and had halted at Gombergean.
The Third Corps had advanced in the course of the
day on Coulommiers, near Vendome, had fought the
French at Bel-Essert, and di'iven them back across the
Loir and established communications. The Grand
Duke, in obedience to orders, acted at first on the
defensive. The Ninth Corps, after the restoration of
the bridge at Blois, was at last able to follow the army,
leaving a brigade in occupation.

A greatly superior force was now assembled oppo-
site the enemy's position, and a general attack was
decided on ; but to give the troops a much-needed rest
it was postponed till the 17th, and meanwhile, on the
16th, General Chanzy withdrew.

It had certainly been his intention to hold the Loir
Valley still longer ; but his generals assured him that
the condition of the troops would not aUow him to
prolong the struggle. He accordingly gave the order
for the retreat of the army at daybreak on Le-Mans,
by Montoire, St. Calais, and Vibraye.

Thus, in the early morning, the Tenth Corps found
the French position in front of Vendome abandoned,
and entered the city without opposition. On the
French left wing only, where marching orders had not
yet arrived, General Jaures made an attack on Frete-
val, but in the evening he followed the other corps.

THE INTEERUPTION OF SERIOUS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
IN DECEMBER.

On the 17th of December general orders had been
issued from Versailles to the Armies both to the north
and south of Paris.

Now that General von Manteuffel had crossed the

THE SITUATION IN DECEMBEE. 249

Somme, and Prince Frederick Charles the Loir, the
Germans held possession of almost a third of France.
The French were driven back on every side ; and in
order not to split up their forces, it was thought
advisable that the Germans should concentrate into
three principal divisions. The First Army was there-
fore to assemble at Beauvais, the Grand Duke's forces
at Chartres, the Second Army near Orleans ; the troops
were to have some needful rest, and their efficiency
to be restored by the arrival from Germany of fresh
reliefs and equipment. If the French made any new
move, they were to be allowed to approach as close as
possible, and then be driven back by a strong attack.

The Second Army had but little prospect at present
of overtaking the enemy beyond the Loir; and the
reports from the Upper Loire now necessitated a
sharper lookout in that direction. News came from
Gien that the posts established at Ouzouer on the
Loire had been driven in ; and it seemed not unlikely
that General Bourbaki would take the opportunity of
advancing by Montargis on Paris, or at least on Or-
leans, which at this moment was occupied by only a
part of the First Bavarian Corps.

Prince Frederick Charles had got rid of his enemy,
probably for some little time, and he decided, in obedi-
ence to orders from Versailles, to remain with his
forces in an expectant attitude at Orleans. Only the
Tenth Corps was to be left to keep watch on the Loir.
To secure support at once, for the Bavarian Corps in
any case, the Ninth Corps, on its arrival from Blois at
La-Chapelle-Vendomoise, on the 16th, was ordered to
march on Beaugency that day, and on Orleans on the
morrow. It covered eleven German miles in twenty-
four hours, in very bad weather. The Third Corps
followed it up.

250 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

However, it was soon known that the enemy's de-
tachment which had been at Gien did not form part
of a large body of troops, and was intrenching itself at
Briare for its own safety. So the Germans retired into
comfortable quarters, the First Bavarian Corps at Or-
leans, the Third there and at Beaugency, the Ninth in
the plain of the Loire and up as far as Chateauneuf,
with a strong post at Montargis.

The Bavarian Corps was then transferred to
Etampes, to recover at their leisure, to recruit their
numbers, and make good their clothing and equipment.
Nor were the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's forces in
a condition to pursue General Chanzy beyond the
Loir. Six weeks of daily marching and fighting had
tried them to the utmost. The dreadful weather and
the state of the roads had reduced their clothing and
boots to a miserable state. A reconnoissance beyond
the Loir showed that the French could only be over-
taken by long and rapid marches. So the Grand Duke
allowed his troops a long rest, from the 18th, in the
villages on the left bank of the river.

Of the Third Army, General von Rheinbaben, on
the contrary, had the three brigades of the 5th Cavalry
Division at Courtalin, Brou, and Chai'tres reinforced
by 5 battalions of Guard Landwehr and 4 batteries.
A letter from the Chief of the General Staff at Ver-
sailles had pointed out that this cavalry might probably
be employed with great success in attacking the flank
and rear of the enemy's retreating columns, and the
Crown Prince had already given orders that they
should advance on Brou in full strength on the 15th.
In contradiction to these, the division obeyed an order
which reached them on the 16th from the Grand
Duke, under whose command they had not been placed,
to take up a position on the Yeres.

THE SITUATION IN DECEMBER. 251

On this day the patrols had found the roads open to
Montmirail and Mondoubleau, but there was a body of
French infantry in front of Cloyes, which retired after
a short fray. On the left, communications were estab-
lished with the 4th Cavalry Division. On the 17th,
the 12th Cavalry Brigade entered Cloyes, already
evacuated by the French ; on the 13th they advanced
on Arrou, and only General von Bartz marched on
Droue with a force of all arms, where he surprised the
French at their cooking, and carried off much plunder.

On the 18th, the 12th Brigade still found a few strag-
glers there, but the other two brigades marched a little
way to the westward on La-Bazoche-Gouet and Ar-
viUe, whence the enemy had quite disappeared. To
the south of ArvUle a battalion of the Guard Land-
wehr drove the French infantry out of St. Agil.

With this the pursuit ended on the 19th. The
division retired on Nogent-le-Rotrou by the Grand
Duke's desire, and subsequently undertook the obser-
vation of the left bank of the Seine at Vernon and
Dreux.

The Grand Duke's forces left their quarters on the
Loir on the 21st. The 22nd Division occupied Nogent-
le-Roi, and the 17th Chartres, till the 24th of the month.
The 4th Bavarian Brigade rejoined its own corps at
Orleans.

During the remainder of December only the Tenth
Corps had any fighting, having been detailed to keep
watch beyond the Loir from Blois and Vendome.

Two brigades were marched on Tours on the 20th.
On the further side of Monnaie they met the newly-
formed troops of General Ferri-Pisani, 10,000 to 15,000
strong, and which were advancing from Angers on
Tours.

The soaked gi'ound made it most difficult to deploy

252 THE TEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

the artillery and cavaliy. The cavalry, indeed, could
do no more than pursue the retreating French in deep
columns along the high-roads, thereby suffering se-
verely from the enemy's fire, delivered at very short
range.

On the following day General von Woyna advanced
unopposed, with six battalions, on the bridge at Tours.
A light battery was driven up on the bank of the
river and dispersed the masses firing from the oppo-
site shore, but it would have cost too many lives to
storm the city, which, since the removal of the seat of
Government, had ceased to be of any gi-eat importance.
The detachment was recalled to Monnaie, and the 19th
Division went into quarters at Blois, the 20th at Her-
bault and Vendome.

From thence, on the 27th, a detachment of two bat-
talions, one squadron, and two guns marched past
Montoire on Souge on the Braye, and there met a
greatly superior force. General Chanzy had, in fact,
marched a division of the Seventeenth Corps on Ven-
dome to draw the Prussians away from Tours. Be-
hind St. Quentin tl;ie weak Prussian detachment found
itself hemmed in between the river and the cliff, en-
closed on every side, and under heavy fire. Lieuten-
ant-Colonel von Boltenstern succeeded, however, in
cutting his way through. Without firing a shot the
two Hanoverian battalions rushed on the dense body
of tirailleurs who cut off their retreat, and fought their
way out hand-to-hand. Through the gap thus made
the guns followed, after firing a round of gi'ape-shot,
and notwithstanding losses to the teams they were got
back to Montoire. The squadron also charged through
two lines of riflemen and rejoined the infantry.

As a result of this incident General von Kraatz,
after collecting the remainder of the 20th Division

FKENCH ATTACK ON VENDOME. 253

from Herbault, determined to enlighten the situation
by a fresh reconnoissance. Four battahons were to
advance from Vendome, and the 1st Cavah-y Brigade
from Freteval was to scout towards Epuisay. On this
day, however, General de Jouffroy was marching on
Vendome to attack it with two divisions.

When, at about ten o'clock, the reconnoitring force
from Vendome reached the Azay, they came under a
hot fire from the opposite slope of the valley. Soon
after this six French battalions attacked them in fiank
from the south, and repeated notice was brought in
that considerable forces of the enemy were marching
on Vendome direct, from the north of Azay by Epse-
reuse. General von Kraatz perceived that he would
have to face a planned attack from very superior
numbers, and determined to restrict himself to the local
defence of Vendome. Under cover of a battalion, left
to maintain its position at Huchepie, he achieved the
retreat of the detachment in perfect order, and it then
took up a position on the railway embankment to the
west of the city.

Further to the north the French columns, advancing
past Espereuse, had already reached Bel- Air. A bat-
talion hastening up from Vendome occupied the cha-
teau, but being outflanked on the right by a superior
force was obliged to retire, and likewise took up a posi-
tion behind the railway. At about two o'clock the
French attacked this position in dense masses of sharp-
shooters, but came under the fire of six batteries
posted on the heights behind Vendome, which di'ove
back their right wing. A column advanced, along the
left bank of the Loir from Varennes, to attack this line
of guns, but hastily retreated out of range of their fire.

The attacks on the railway from Bel- Air and Tuile-
ries were a more serious affair ; eight companies placed

254 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

there, however, repelled them. At four o'clock the
French once more advanced in strength; fortune
wavered for some time, and at last, as darkness fell,
they retired.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade, with two companies and a
horse battery, had marched on Danze. Captain Spitz,
with a small number of his Westphalian Fusihers, fell
on two batteries which had been drawn up there, and
captured two guns and three limbers. With these and
fifty prisoners General von Liideritz returned to Frete-
val by about one o'clock, after pursuing the enemy as
far as Epuisay.

The French attempt on Yendome had utterly failed,
and they now retreated to a greater distance. General
von Kraatz, however, was ordered, with an eye to a
greater enterprise to be. described later, to remain in a
state of preparation on the Loir.

THE FOUKTEENTH CORPS IN DECEMBER.

In the south-eastern scene of war the French had at
last decided on some definite action.

Garibaldi's Corps, assembled at Autun, advanced on
the 24th ; the detachments marched by Sombernon and
St. Seine, with various skirmishes ai^d night attacks,
close up to the front. Cremer's division advanced on
Gevrey from the south. But as soon as reinforcements
had reached Dijon from Gray and Is-sur-Tille, the
enemy was driven back, and now General von Werder,
on his part, ordered the 1st Brigade to march on Autun.
General Keller arrived in front of the town on Decem-
ber 1st, driving the French before him. Preparations
had been made to attack on the following day, when
orders came for a rapid retreat. Fresh detachments
were needed at Chatillon, where those posted to pro-
tect the railway had been surprised, at Gray, against

FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH-EAST. 255

sorties by the garrison of Besan^on, and also to ob-
serve Langi'es.

The Prussian Brigade marched on Langres with two
cavalry regiments and three batteries, and on the 16th
they met the French not far from Longeau, in number
about 2000. The French were repulsed, losing 200
wounded, fifty prisoners, two guns, and two ammuni-
tion wagons. General von der Goltz had, in a day or
two, surrounded Langre«, driven the Gardes Mobiles
posted outside into the fortress, and occupied a
position on the north for the protection of the rail-
ways.

In the country south of Dijon fresh massing of the
French troops had now been observed. To disperse
these General von Werder advanced on the 18th with
two Baden brigades on Nuits. In Boncourt, close to
the town on the east, the advanced guard met with
lively opposition, but carried the place by noon. The
French, assisted by their batteries drawn up on the
hills west of Nuits, offered an obstinate defence in the
deep railway cutting and by the Meuzin. When the
main body of the brigade came up at two o'clock Gen-
eral von Gliimer ordered a general attack. The in-
fantry now rushed across the open plain, with great
loss, especially in superior officers, against the enemy,
who was well under cover and who, firing at short
range, was not driven back on Nuits till four o'clock,
after a hand-to-hand struggle. At five o'clock they
abandoned the place to the German battalions.

The Germans had met Cremer's division, 10,000
strong, which had lost 1700 men, among them 650 un-
wounded prisoners. The Baden divisions, too, had
lost 900 men. They encamped for the night on the
market-place of the town and in the villages to the
eastward.

256 THE PRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Next morning the French were found to have re-
treated still further, but the Germans were not strong
enough for pursuit. The Fourteenth Corps had already
been obliged to spare seven battalions for the invest-
ment of Belfort. General von Werder therefore re-
turned to Dijon, where he assembled all the forces still
left to him with those of General von der Goltz from
Langres, waiting to see whether the French would
renew the attack. But the month of December ended
without any further disturbance.

THE FIEST AEMY IN DECEMBER.

"While the Second Army was fighting on the Loire,
General von Manteuffel, after the siege of Amiens, had
marched on Rouen.

General Farre was indeed at Arras, in the rear of
this movement, but the disorder in which his troops
had retired after that battle made it probable that he
would do nothing, at any rate for the present. The
3rd Brigade, too, was left in Amiens with two cavalry
regiments and three batteries, to occupy the place and
protect the important line of railway to Laon.

, The outlook on the west was more serious than on
the north, for there, at this juncture, French forces
threatened to interfere with the investment of Paris.
General Briand was at Rouen with 20,000 men, and
had advanced his leading troops as far forward as the
Epte, where, at Beauvais and Gisors, he met the
Dragoon Guards sent in from the Army of the Meuse
and the Saxon Cavalry Division. The detachment of
infantry which had escorted the cavalry had lost 150
men and a gun, in a night attack.

When the First Army reached the Epte, on Decem-
ber 3rd, the two cavalry divisions joined the march,
and the French retired behind the Andelles. The

THE AEMIES IN NORMANDY. 257

Eighth Corps arrived near Rouen, after skirmishes on
the road, and found an intrenched position abandoned
at Isneauville; and on December 5th General von
Goeben entered the chief city of Normandy. The 29th
Brigade advanced on Pont-Audemer, the First Corps
crossed the Seine higher up, at Les-Andelys and Pont-
de-l'Arche. Vernon and Evreux were occupied, num-
bers of Gardes Mobiles having retreated by railway to
Liseux. On the northern bank the Dragoon Guards
reconnoitred as far as Bolbec, and the Uhlans found
no French even in Dieppe.

The French had retired to Le-Havre, and a consider-
able force had been conveyed, in ships that were in
readiness, to Honfleur, on the other bank of the Seine.
The 16th Division continued its march, reaching Bolbec
and Lillebonne on the 11th.

The orders from head-quarters at Versailles had been
transmitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and, in
obedience to these. General Manteuffel now decided on
leaving only the First Corps on the Lower Scire, and
returning with the Eighth on the Somme, where the
French in Arras were now becoming active.

Besides making this evident by various small en-
counters, on December 9th they had attacked a com-
pany detailed to protect the reconstruction of the rail-
way at Ham, surprising it at night, and taking most
of the men prisoners ; and on the 11th several French
battalions advanced as far as La-Fere.

To check their fui'ther progress, the Army of the
Meuse sent detachments to Soissons and Compiegne.
General Count von der Groeben took up a position at
Roye with part of the garrison from Amiens, and on
the 16th encountered the 15th Division at Montdidier,
which immediately retired on the Somme.

Only the citadel of Amiens was now held by the
IT

258 THE PEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

Germans; General von Manteuffel, who liad not
approved of the evacuation of the town, ordered its
immediate re-occupation. The inhabitants had, how-
ever, remained peaceable, and on the 20th the 16th
Division, which had given up the attack on Le-Havre,
arrived via Dieppe.

A reconnoissance action by Querrieux made it cer-
tain that great numbers of French were drawn up on
the bank of the Hallue, and General von Manteuffel
now concentrated the whole corps at Amiens. Rein-
forcements might shortly be expected, for the 3rd
Eeserve Division was on the march, and had already
reached St. Quentin. The First Corps was also ordered
to send another brigade from Rouen to Amiens by
railway, and the General in command determined to
attack at once with 22,600 men, his only available
force.

"General Faidherbe had assembled two corps, the
Twenty-second and Twenty-third. His advance on
Ham and La-Fere, intended to divert the Prussians
from attacking Le-Havre, had succeeded. He next
turned on Amiens, and had advanced to within two
miles (German). He now stood, with 43,000 men and
eighty-two guns, fronting to the west behind the
Hallue. Two divisions held the left bank of this
stream, for 1^ miles from its confluence at Daours up
to Contay, and two beyond, at Corbie and Franvillers.
The Somme secured their left flank.

On December 23rd General von Manteuffel, with the
Eighth Corps, advanced on the road to Albert. The
3rd Brigade of the First Corps formed his reserve. He
intended to keep the French busy with the 15th Divis-
ion on their front and left wing, and outflank their
right with the 16th Division. The unexpected exten-
sion of the French right wing prevented this, and it

BATTLE ON THE HALLUE. 259

became a front-to-front battle along the whole line.
The commanding height of the eastern bank gave the
French a superior artillery position, and the villages
lying at the foot had in every instance to be stormed.

The French had withdi*awn their outposts to this
line when, at eleven o'clock, the head of the 15th Divis-
ion reached the copse at Querrieux, and brought up a
battery. Two battalions of the 29th Brigade took the
place at midday at the first onslaught, crossed the
stream, drove the French on the further bank out of
Noyelles; but they now found themselves under an
artillery and infantry fire from all sides. The East
Prussians stormed up the slope at about four o'clock,
and took two guns which were being served, but were
forced to retire to the village before the advancing
masses of the French.

Soon after midday, too, Fechencourt was carried on
the left, and Bussy on the right ; and the enemy, after
a feeble resistance, was diiven back across the stream.
Here, on the other hand, the German artillery could at
first do nothing against the strong and well-posted
batteries of the French. Vecquemont, however, was
stormed, though stoutly defended, and street-fighting
lasted till the afternoon.

The 15th Division, against the intentions of their
leader, had become involved in the fight before the
16th, operating more to the left, could afford them any
assistance.

It was not till four o'clock that the 31st Brigade ar-
rived at Behencourt, and, crossing the river by flying
bridges, di'ove the French back into the village, where
they still offered a firm resistance, but finally had to
give way. The 32nd Brigade, on the extreme left, got
across the Hallue and into Bavelincourt.

Thus all the hamlets on the river were in the hands

260 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

of the Germans ; but the short December day was clos-
ing in, and further progress must be postponed till the
morrow. Even in the dark the French made several
attempts to regain the positions they had lost, particu-
larly about Contay, where they overlapped the German
position. But their attacks were repulsed both there
and at Noyelles. They succeeded indeed in getting
into Vecquemont, but were diiven out again, and then
the Prussians, pursuing them across the stream, also
carried Daours, so that finally the Germans held every
passage of the Hallue.

The battle was over by six o'clock. The troops re-
tired into quarters in the captured villages, placing
outposts near every egress.

The attack had cost the Germans 900 men; the
defence had cost the French about 1000, besides 1000
unwounded prisoners taken into Amiens.

At daybreak on the 24th the French opened fire on
the Hallue cutting.

Having ascertained that their numbers were almost
double those of the Germans, it was decided this
day to act only on the defensive, awaiting the arri-
val of reinforcements and intrenching themselves in
the positions gained. The army reserve was pushed
forward on Corbie to threaten the French left flank.

But at two o'clock in the afternoon General Faid-
herbe was already retiring. His insufiiciently-clothed
troops had suffered fearfully through the bitter winter's
night, and were much shaken by the unfavorable issue
of the fight. He therefore led them back under shelter
of the fortresses. When, on the 25th, the two Prussian
divisions and the cavalry pursued them beyond Albert,
and then almost as far as Arras and up to Cambrai,
they found no compact force at all, and only captured
some hundreds of stragglers.

TAKING OF MEZIERES. 261

When General Manteuffel had disposed of the enemy,
he sent General von Mu'us to invest Peronne, while he
himself returned to Rouen.

By drafting off six battalions as a reinforcement to
Amiens, the First Army Corps was left with only two
brigades. The French had 10,000 men on the right
bank, and 12,000 on the left bank of the Lower Seine.
And these forces had come very close to Rouen ; on
the south side within two miles. Meanwhile, however,
the 2nd Brigade had again been sent up from Amiens,
and on its arrival the hostile force was once more
driven back.

THE TAKING OF MEZIERES.

On the northern field of war, before the end of the
year, the siege of Mezieres was brought to an end.
After the battle of Sedan the Commandant had to send
out provisions from the stores of the besieged town
for the maintenance of the large number of prisoners,
and it was, therefore, for the present exempted from
attack. After that the fortress precluded the use of
the railroad ; still it was only kept under observation
till the 19th of December, when, after the disaster of
Montmedy, the 14th Division fell back on Mezieres.

The garrison numbered only 2000 men, but it was
effectually seconded without by volunteers, who were
extremely active in this broken and wooded country.
The town was not completely invested till the 25th.

Mezieres stands on a spur of the mountains, sur-
rounded on three sides by the Moselle, and shut in by
high ground. The construction of the fortress, which
was strengthened by Vauban, was not calculated to
resist modern artillery. There was an outer rampart
at a distance of from 2000 to 3000 metres from the
inner wall, and although the long delay had been

262 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

utilized to make good tlie weak points by throwing up
earthworks, a bombardment could not fail to be fatal
to the defence.

When Verdun had surrendered, heavy artillery had
to be brought by rail from Clermont to a position close
under the southern front of the fortress. The only
hindrance to the erection of the batteries was the state
of the soil, which was frozen to a depth of twenty
inches ; but at a quarter past eight on the morning of
the 31st of December eight field-guns opened fire.

At first the fort replied vigorously, but by the after-
noon its artillery was silenced, and the white flag was
hoisted next morning.

The garrison were taken prisoners ; large stores and
132 guns fell into the hands of the Germans. But the
chief advantage gained was the opening of another line
of railway to Paris.

PAEIS IN DECEMBER.

In Paris G-eneral Ducrot had been busily employed
in making good the losses sustained at Villiers. A
part of the greatly reduced First Corps must be kept
in reserve, the Second Army was redistributed. A
sortie by the peninsula of Gennevillers and the heights
of Franconville had not been approved by the Govern-
ment. They expected confidently to see the Army of
Orleans appear ere long under the walls of the capital,
and steps were being taken on the 6th of December to
facilitate a junction, when a letter from General von
Moltke announced the defeat of General d'Aurelle and
the occupation of Orleans. A sortie to the south
would thenceforth be aimless, and after long discussion
it was at last decided to break through the enemy's
lines on the north by a great collective effort.

The little stream of the Moree offered some protec-

PAKIS IN DECEMBER. 263

tion on that side, but only so long as the ice would
not bear. And there were but three German corps,
amounting to 81,200, over an extent of forty-five
kilometres (twenty-seven miles English).

Earthworks were constructed in preparation between
Bondy and Courneuve, the forts to the north were
armed with heavier guns, and a battery was mounted
on Mont-Avron. Ninety rounds of ammunition were
served out to each man, with six days' rations : and
four days' fodder for the horses. They were forbidden
to carry their kit, but the camp bedding was to be
taken. The day at first fixed was December 19th, but
it was postponed till the 21st.

Thus, during great part of the month, the investing
army remained almost undisturbed by the defenders.
Regular food, warm winter clothing, and abundant
supplies through the unfailing punctuality of the mails,
had kept the troops in a thoroughly satisfactory
condition.

The preparations of the garrison for a new offensive
did not escape the notice of the besieging forces.
Deserters brought reports of an imminent sortie. On
the 20th information came from the posts of observa-
tion that a large force was assembling at Merlan and
Noisy-le-Sec, and early on the 21st the 2nd Division of
foot-guards were, by order of the Commander-in-chief
of the Army of the Meuse, in readiness to cross the
Moree. Part of the 1st Division remained in reserve
at Gonesse ; the rest were to be relieved by the 7th,
and brought into action. On the right wing the Land-
wehr Division of Guards occupied the country between
Chatou and Carrieres-St.-Denis ; on the left a brigade of
the Saxon Corps held Seran. The 4th Infantry Division
of the Second Corps were drawn back on Malnoue
to support the Wiirtembergers in case of need, as they

264 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

were to make a stand against the French at Join-
ville.

To divert the attention of the Germans from the true
point of attack, a brisk fire was to be opened early in
the day from St. Valerien ; a considerable force was to
engage the right wing of the Gruards, General Vinoy
was to lead the Third Army against the Saxons, and
Admiral de la Eouciere was to fall upon Le-Bourget.
This place, which was a standing threat, must at any
rate be seized, and not till then was General Ducrot to
cross the Moree, near Blancmesnil and Aulnay, with
the Second Paris Army.

THE FIGHT AT LE-BOUEGET.

(December 21st.)

Le-Bourget was held by only four companies of
Queen Elizabeth's Regiment (German) and one bat-
talion of foot guards. When the mist rose at about a
quarter to eight, the little force found itself under fire
from the forts and several batteries, as well as from
the armor-clad railway carriages. Within half an hour
strong columns of the French were marching up from
east and west. To the east the village was defended
for some time against seven French iDattalions, and on
the other side, five were brought to a standstill close
to the church by the rapid fire of the Germans ; but
some of the marine fusiliers made their way into the
place from the north. Pressed on all sides by superior
numbers, the defence was concentrated at the southern
end of the village. The party holding the churchyard
tried to force their way through to this point, but some
of them were taken prisoners in the attempt. The
French advanced step by step under great loss, and
did not succeed in obtaining possession of the glass-

FIGHTING AT LE-BOURGET. 265

works. Five fresh battalions of the French reserve
marched up from St. Denis to the gas-works, and
battered down the garden-wall, but still could not
break the steady resistance of the Germans.

At nine o'clock they were reinforced by one company,
and at ten o'clock by seven more, who, in a bloody
hand-to-hand struggle, fought their way to the church-
yard and gas-works. By eleven the last of the assail-
ants were routed, and Le-Bourget, in the expectation
of a fresh attack, was occupied by fifteen companies.
Two batteries of field artillery, which had been busy
by the brook, were brought up to defend the village.

Meanwhile General Ducrot had waited in vain for
the signal which should have announced success at
Le-Bourget. He had pushed the advanced guard of
his army past Bondy and Drancy, when he was warned
by the disastrous issue of the struggle on his left to
give up the attack on the line by the Moree.

The triumphant exploit became a mere cannonade,
to which the German field-guns replied as far as possi-
ble. By noon the French had retired.

They had lost, by their own account, about 600 men.
The German Guards had sacrificed 400, but they car-
ried off 360 prisoners. In the evening the outposts
resumed their old positions.

The various feints of the Parisian garrison had had
no result, and produced no alteration in the plan pur-
sued by the German Commander-in-chief. Their ad-
vance from St. Denis to Etains had been repulsed,
and two gun-boats on the Seine were driven back by
the fire of four field batteries on Orgemont. The tri-
fling sortie on Chatou was scarcely heeded. General
Vinoy had indeed led a larger force along the right
bank of the Marne, but that was not till the afternoon
when the fight at Le-Bourget was over. The Saxon

266 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

outposts retired to the intrenched position near Le
Chen ay. One of the German battahons in quarters
there drove the enemy out of Maison-Blanche that
same evening, another attacked Ville-Evrart, where
fighting went on till midnight ; they lost seventy men,
but brought in 600 prisoners. Next morning the
French abandoned Ville-Evrart, under the fire of the
German artillery posted on the heights on the opposite
side of the river.

Paris had now been invested for three months. A
bombardment — never a satisfactory mode of action —
could have no decisive effect against so large a place ;
and the Germans were, in fact, well aware that nothing
could reduce it but a regular siege. But the engineer-
ing siege- works must wait till the artillery were in a
position to second them.

It has akeady been shown that the fortress artillery
had been first employed against those forts which in-
terrupted the communications in the rear of the army.
There were indeed 235 heavy pieces standing ready
for action at Villacoublay ; but it had proved impossi-
ble as yet to bring up the necessary ammunition for
an attack which, when once begun, must on no account
be allowed to flag. ^

By the end of November, railway communication
had been opened with Chelles, but the greater part of
the ammunition had meanwhile been deposited at
Lagny, and would now have to be forwarded by the
cross-road. The ordinary country carts with two
wheels proved totally unfit for the transport of shell,
and only 2000 four-wheeled carts could be requisitioned
for many miles round. Hence 960 more were brought
from Metz with horses sent from Germany, and even
the teams of the Third Army were called into requisi-
tion, though they were almost indispensable just then

FIGHTING AT LE-BOURGET. 267

as remounts towards the efficiency of the army on the
Loire. Finally, all the horses of the pontoon trains,
of the field bridging troops, and the columns of in-
trenching tools were taken for the transport ser-
vice.

A new difficulty arose when the breaking-up of the
ice necessitated the removal of the pontoon-bridges
over the Seine.

The roads were so bad that it took the wagons nine
days to get from Nanteuil to Villacoublay and back.
Many broke down under their loads, and the drivers
constantly took to flight. And at this juncture the
Chief of the Staff gave the artillery another task to be
carried out forthwith.

Though the besieged had not hitherto succeeded in
fighting their way through the enemy's lines, they now
proposed to extend their operations so as to repel the
besiegers till the circle became so thin that it could be
broken. On the south side the German lines already
extended beyond Vitry and Villejuif to the Seine ; and
on the north, between Drancy and the Fort-de-1'Est,
there was an extensive system of trenches and batteries
reaching to Le-Bourget over a distance of 1000 metres,
which in part might be dignified as regular siege-works.
The hard frost had indeed arrested their construction,
but they were armed with artillery and occupied by
the Second Army. Hence the most favorable ^om^-
cVappui for a sortie to the east, as well as to the north,
was the commanding eminence of Mont-Avron, which,
with its seventy heavy guns, stood out in the Marne
valley like the point of a wedge between the northern
and southern German lines.

268 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

THE REDUCTION OF MONT-AVRON.

(December 27th.)

To drive the French from this position fifty heavy
guns from Germany, and twenty-six from La-Fere
were brought up under the command of Colonel
Bartsch. By the exertions of a whole battalion as a
working party, two groups of batteries were erected,
in spite of the severe frost, on the western slopes of
the hills behind Raincy and Gagny, and on the left
ridge of the Marne Valley near Noisy-le-Grrand, thus
threatening Mont-Avi'on on each side at a distance of
from 2000 to 3000 metres.

At haK-past eight on the 27th of December these
guns opened fire. A heavy snow-storm interfered
with accurate aim, and prevented any observation of
the execution done. Mont-Avron with the forts of
Nogent and Rosny replied promptly and rapidly.

The German batteries had lost two officers and
twenty-five gunners, several gun-carriages had broken
down under their own fire, and everything pointed to
the conclusion that no result would be obtained on that
day. But the firing had been more effectual than the
men supposed. The fine weather on the 28th allowed
of greater precision; the Prussian fire proved most
telling, making fearful havoc of the strong but exposed
French infantry garrison. Mont-Avi*on was silenced
and the forts only kept up a feeble fire. General
Trochu, who had commanded in person, ordered the
troops to abandon Mont-Avron, and it was so effect-
ually disarmed in the course of the night by the energy
of Colonel Stoffel that only one disabled gun was left
on its fiank.

On the 29th the French guns were silenced, and th©

MONT-AVEON ABANDONED. 269

hill was deserted, as the Germans had no intention of
occupying the position. Then* batteries were now
tui'ned on the forts, which suffered severely, and on
the earthworks near Bondy.

Before the year was out the besiegers succeeded in
storing the most indispensable ammunition in Villa-
coublay. The siege operations were entrusted to
General Kameky, the artillery was under the command
of General Prince Hohenlohe. The batteries had long
been finished, and by the dawn of the new year 100
guns of the heaviest calibre were ready to open fii*e on
the southern fortifications.

V.

ACTIVE OPERATIONS IN THE PROVINCES.

THE AEMY OF THE EAST UNDER GENERAL BOURBAKI.

Wnn^E the French forces were engaged in constant
fighting, in the north, on the Seine and the Somme, in
the south, on the Loire and Saone, General Bourbaki's
army had kept out of sight. Since the 8th of Decem-
ber, when the 6th Division of cavalry had reported its
presence at Vierzon, aU trace of it had been lost. It
was, of course, of the greatest importance to the Ger-
man Commander-in-chief to know the whereabouts of
so large an army; only the Second German Army
could learn this, and on the 22nd received instructions
to reconnoitre.

To this end General von Rantzau set out from Mon-
targis towards Briare, where he found that the French
had abandoned their position; in the course of the
next few days he met them, and was defeated.

The Hessians were reinforced to a strength of three
battalions, four squadrons, and six field-pieces, but
were nevertheless withdi-awn to Gien on the 1st of
January. The French had displayed a force of several
thousand Gardes Mobiles, twelve guns, and a body of
marine infantry. A noticeable fact was that some of
the prisoners taken belonged to the Eighteenth French
Corps, which formed part of the Fu'st Army of the
Loire.

A regiment of the 6th Division of cavahy, sent out
to reconnoitre on the road to Sologne, returned with

BOUEBAKI'S MOVEMENTS. 271

the report that a strong force of the French were
marching in column on Aubigny-Ville. On the other
hand, two diivers, who had been taken prisoners, de-
clared that the troops from Bourges were already being
moved by railway, and the newspapers pointed to the
same conclusion ; still, too much weight could not be
attached to mere rumor as against a circumstantial
report. At Versailles it must be assumed that the
First Army of the Loire had not moved from Bourges,
and that General Bourbaki, after recuperating his
forces, would act in concert with General Chanzy.

These two armies might attack the Germans at Or-
leans on both sides, or one might engage and detain
them there, while the other marched to relieve the
capital.

This, in fact, was what General Chanzy proposed.
Since the 21st of December he had been resting in
quarters in and about Le-Mans, where railways from
four directions facilitated the arrival of new detach-
ments. His troops had no doubt great difficulties to
contend with. For lack of billets for so large a force
some had to camp out under tents in the snow, and
suffered severely from the intense cold. The hospitals
were full of wounded, and small-pox broke out. On
the other hand, these narrow quarters were favorable
to the redistribution of the companies and the restora-
tion of discipline. The news from Paris, too, urged
the General to prompt action.

General Trochu had sent word that Paris could not,
unaided, repel the enemy. Even if a sortie should
prove successful, the necessary provisions could not
be carried through, and nothing but the simultaneous
arrival of an army from without could secure supplies.
Now General Chanzy was quite ready to march on
Paris, but it was indispensable that he should first

272 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

know exactly what Generals Bourbaki and Faidherbe
were doing.

Of course, the concerted action of the three gi'eat
Army Corps could only be planned and ordered from
head-quarters. The General therefore sent an officer
of his Staff on the 23rd December to Gambetta at
Lyons, to express his opinion that only a prompt and
combined advance could prevent the surrender of Paris.
But the Minister believed that he knew better. The
first news of a quite different employment of Bour-
baki's army only reached Chanzy on the 29th, when
Bourbaki was already on the march. Nor did Gam-
betta's reply convey either distinct orders or sufficient
information. "Vous avez decime les Mecklembour-
geois, les Bavarois n'existent plus, le reste de I'armee
est deja envahi par I'inquietude et la lassitude. Per-
sistons et nous renverrons ces hordes hors du sol, les
mains vides." * The plan of the Provisional Govern-
ment was to be that "which would most demoralize
the German army." f

Under such obscure instructions from head-quarters,
General Chanzy, trusting to his own forces, determined
to make his way to Paris unaided ; but he soon found
himself in serious difficulties.

The Germans had no time to lose if they wished to
profit by their position between the two hostile armies,
advantageous so long as those armies were not too
close upon them. The simultaneous attacks, on the
31st of December, at Vendome on the Loir, and at
Briare on the Loire, seemed to indicate that they were
already acting on a concerted plan.

* " You have decimated the Mecklenburgers, the Bavarians are wiped
out, the rest of the army is a prey to uneasiness and exhaustion. Let us
4>efsevere, and we shall drive these hordes off the land, empty-handed."

t <^ui dǤmoralisera le plus I'arm^e Allemande.

CHANZY'S ADVANCE. 273

On New Year's Day orders were telegraphed to
Prince Frederick Charles to recross the Loir and march
against General Chanzy without delay, as being the
nearest and most imminently dangerous enemy. To
effect this the Second Army was strengthened by the
addition of the Thirteenth Corps of the Grand Duke
of Mecklenburg (17th and 22nd Divisions) and the 2nd
and 4th Divisions of cavalry. The 5th Cavalry Divis-
ion was dispatched to protect the advance on the left
flank.

Only the 25th (Hessian) Division was to be left in
Orleans to receive General Bourbaki, and to keep a
lookout on Gien. To provide against a possible ad-
vance of the Ai'my of the Loire, General von Z astro w
was posted at Armangon with the Seventh Corps ; the
Second Corps was detached from the besieging force
and sent forward towards Montargis.

Prince Frederick Charles expected to get three of his
corps on the Vendome-Moree line by the 6th of Janu-
ary, and to move the Thirteenth from Chartres on Brou.

THE ADVANCE ON LE-MANS.

The Germans had hoped to find the enemy in winter
quarters; but General Chanzy had provided against
surprise by strong outposts. Nogent-le-Eotrou on his
left was held by General Rousseau's division, and a
large force of volunteers; strong detachments were
posted from Vibraye and St. Calais, as far as the Braye
stream, where General Jouffroy had come to a stand
after the last action at Vendome ; on his right he had
General Barry at La-Chartre, and de Curten's division
at Chateau-Renault.

The wings of the German army came into collision
with these forces on the 5th of January.

General Baumgarth, on the German left, had brought

AC

274 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

three battalions, two regiments of cavalry, and two
batteries, as far as St. Amand. The 57th had stormed
Villeporcher, on the road to Chateau-Eenault, had re-
tired before four battalions of the French, and then
had recaptured and held it. This much, at any rate,
was now clear : a not inconsiderable force of French
was assembled in front of the left wing of the German
army, now marching westward. In following up this
movement General Baumgarth was now deputed to
insure its safety, and with this object was reinforced
by the addition of the 6th Cavalry Division, and the
1st Cavalry Brigade.

The 44th Brigade on the right, in its advance on
Nogent-le-Rotrou, had had a sharp encounter. They
stormed the enemy's position at La-Fourche, and seized
three guns, with a large number of prisoners. The
main body of the corps reached Beaumont-les-Autels
and Brou, but the cavahy failed to penetrate the woods
to the north of Nogent.

(January 6th.) By six in the morning the advanced
guard of General Baumgarth's detachment was on the
march to Prunay, but the main body could not follow,
ha^dng to face a strong attack at about half -past nine.
With a view to observing the enemy, the German in-
fantry were opened out to great intervals between
Villeporcher and Ambloy, and only a small reserve
remained at La None. The engagement soon assumed
wider proportions, and the Germans with difficulty
maintained the Les-Haies — Pias line, being seriously
threatened by the envelopment of their left wing,
which the 6th Cavalry Division were now able to join,
but could only come into action with one horse battery.
The reserve, however, moved up along the high-road
to Chateau-Renault and repulsed the French, who had
already made their way into Les-Haies. But when

BETWEEN ORLEANS AND LE-MANS. 275

they renewed the attack in close columns and brought
up foui' batteries against the place, the Germans were
obliged to retii'e behind the Brenne.

Meanwhile the 16th Regiment, which had ah'eady
got as far as Ambloy on the march to Yendome, had
turned back to St. Amand to support Greneral Baum-
garth, and the 38th Brigade of infantry deployed be-
tween Neuve St. Amand and St. Amand with a strong
force of cavahy on each wing. But as by some mis-
take the town was evacuated, the Greneral of the 6th
Division of cavahy, Duke William of Mecklenburg,
ordered a retreat. The infantry had already come to
a stand at Huisseau and there found quarters. The
advanced guard fell back on Ambloy; the cavalry
partly on Ambloy and partly on Villeromain.

During the engagement at St. Amand the Tenth
Corps had advanced on Montoire, in two columns,
along the left bank of the Loire, leaving a battalion
before Vendome on the right, to secure the egress of
the Third Corps at this spot.

When the 20th Division reached St. Rimay, at about
one o'clock, they found the hills on the opposite side
of the Loir occupied by Greneral Barry's troops. All
the German batteries were brought up to the southern
ridge of the valley and soon drove the French off the
broad slopes ; but the defile of Les-Roches in the front
remained quite unassailable. The ruined bridge at
Lavardin, lower down the stream, was therefore made
practicable with pontoons. The 19th Division had
meanwhile reached that place, several battalions
crossed from the south to attack Les-Roches, and easily
dislodged the French. As darkness came on, prevent-
ing any further advance, the corps found quarters in
and about Montoire.

The General in command of the Third Corps had

276 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

intended this day to make a lialt before Vendome, and
only push forward his advanced guard as far as the
Azay; but this detachment met ere long with such
stout opposition, that the main force was compelled to
advance to their assistance. General de Jouffroy, with
the idea of helping General de Curten, had started to
renew the attack on Vendome, so the advanced guard
of the 5th Division, on reaching Villiers at about half-
past one, found the 10th Battalion of Jagers, which
had been marching at the same time along the right
bank of the Loir, engaged at Villiers in a sharp fight
which had already lasted four hours. They brought
their two batteries up to the plateau to the north of
the village, and the 48th Regiment made its way to
the ridge of the lower Azay valley, though its broad
meadow slopes were swept by the French long-range
rifles and the artillery which fired down the valley.
And here the French sent over swarms of sharp-shoot-
ers to continue the attack.

The 8th Regiment (German) was presently brought
up, and after a short fight on the right took possession
of Le-Gue-du-Loir ; then further reinforcement arrived
in the 10th Infantry Brigade, and by degrees the
Prussian guns numbered thirty-six. The French artil-
lery could not face their fire, and within half an hour
it was turned on the infantry. At about half -past four
the German battalions got across the vaUey, seized the
vineyards and farms on the opposite hills, and stormed
Mazange. Under cover of the darkness the French
retired to Lunay.

Further to the right (German) the 6th Division, on
leaving Vendome at eleven o'clock, found the battalion
left by the Tenth Corps at Courtiras fighting hard
against a very superior force of the French. The 11th
Brigade advanced upon the Azay intrenchment, though

BETWEEN OKLEANS AND LE-MANS. 277

not without heavy loss, and when, at about half-past
three, the 12th also came up, the artillery was brought
to bear upon the place ; Azay was stormed, the river
was crossed, and they established themselves on the
heights beyond. The French repeatedly returned to the
charge, but were successfully repulsed, and by five
o'clock fighting was over and the French driven back.

The Third Army Corps took up quarters between
the Azay stream and the Loir. A detachment was
told off to occupy Danze, higher up the river. They
had lost thirty-nine officers and above 400 men, but
had also taken 400 prisoners.

In the course of the day the Ninth Corps crossed the
Upper Loir at Freteval and St. Hilaire, without opposi-
tion, and proceeded along the high-road to St. Calais,
as far as Busloup. The Thirteenth remained at Un-
verre, Beaumont, and La Foui'che.

Prince Frederick Charles had not been led into any
change of purpose by the attack on St. Amand and
the obstinate fight at the Azay. The Thirteenth Corps
were expected to reach Montmirail, and the Eleventh
to be at Epuisay, both by the 11th of January ; the
Third were to continue the attack on the French at
Braye. But after the reverse experienced at St.
Amand, the presence of a strong French force on the
left flank could not be suffered to pass unnoticed.
Duke Wilham was given verbal orders, at the head-
quarters at Vendome, to return forthwith to St. Amand
with the 6th Division of cavahy, and General von
Voigts-Rhetz was ordered to support General Baum-
garth, if necessary, with his whole corps.

The country between the Loir and the Sarthe,
through which the Germans must march, offers pecul-
iar difficulties to an invading force and great advan-
tages for its defence.

278 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

The roads leading to Le-Mans are all intersected at
right angles by numerous streams flowing through
broad and somewhat deep meadow valleys. Groves,
villages, and country-houses with walled parks cover
the cultivated high ground ; vineyards, orchards, and
gardens are enclosed by hedges, ditches, or fences.
Hence almost the whole burthen of the struggle in
view had to be borne by the infantry; there was no
space for deploying cavalry, and the use of artillery
must be extremely limited, since in a country so closely
overgi'own only one gun could be brought to bear at a
time. The enemy's centre could only be approached
by four high-roads, and the communications between
the columns, starting at least six miles apart, were
confined to the cross-roads, which were almost impass-
able from the severity of the season and the hostility
of the inhabitants. Anything like mutual support
was, at first, quite out of the question.

Under these conditions their movements could only
be guided by general instructions, and the officers must
be left free to act on their own responsibility. Special
orders for each day, though they were indeed issued,
might, in many cases, be impossible to execute. The
Commander-in-chief could not foresee in what relation
the various corps might stand to e^h other after a
day's fight. Reports could only come in at a late hour
of the night, and the orders previously drawn up often
came to hand when the troops, to utilize the- short day,
had already set out on the march.

(January 7th.) In obedience to orders from head-
quarters. General Voigts-Rhetz sent that part of the
19th Division which had already reached Vendome
back to the support of St. Amand. The 38th Brigade
had reached this place early in the day, and General
von Hartmann, who had taken the command of it,

BETWEEN OELEANS AND LE-MANS. 279

marched out, the cavahy forming a right and left wing,
by the high-road to Chateau-Renault.

The advancing column found the enemy at Ville-
chauve, at about midday. A thick fog prevented the
employment of the artillery, and it was at the cost of
many killed that Villechauve, Pias, and some other
farms were seized from the French. Villeporcher and
the adjacent hamlets were in their possession, and at
about two o'clock they came out and attacked on the
high-road with a force of several battalions. The
weather had cleared, and it was soon evident that this
move was only intended to screen the beginning of a
retreat of the French to the westward.

The Germans were quartered on the spot, and the
reinforcements sent to their aid remained at St. Amand.

The Tenth Corps,waiting for their return, did not quit
their quarters at La-Chartre; only the 14th Brigade
of cavalry went on to La-Richardiere to maintain com-
munication with the Third. But they did not succeed
in taking the village with only dismounted troopers.

General von Alvensleben hoped to come upon the
French on that side of the Braye, and to get round
their left wing so as to join the Tenth Corps, who had
promised him assistance. The Third Corps made their
way towards Epuisay, leaving one brigade at Mazange,
and as soon as news reached them on the march, that
the French had abandoned Lunay and Fortan, that
brigade also proceeded to Fortan.

Epuisay was found to be strongly occupied, for the
advanced guard of the Ninth Corps, retreating from
Busloup, had just arrived there. It was not till half-
past one that the French were expelled from the little
town, having barricaded the streets; and even after
crossing the Braye they fought hard, under shelter of
various villages and farmsteads.

280 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

A long fusillade on both sides was kept up through
the thick fog ; but at last, at about four o'clock, the
12th Grerman Brigade got forward to the ridge of the
valley. The 9th Brigade took possession of Savigny
without meeting any serious opposition, and Souge
was stormed in the dusk.

The corps had lost forty-five men and taken 200
prisoners. It found quarters behind the Braye, but
placed outposts on the western bank.

The Ninth Corps retired for the night to Epuisay,
though two corps lost their way in one of the few roads
in the neighborhood. On the right, the 2nd Division
of cavalry went off to Mondoubleau, to join the Thir-
teenth Corps. The French retreated to St. Calais.

The order from head-quarters, that the Thirteenth
Corps were to march on Montmirail, had been issued
on the hypothesis that it would have reached Nogent-
le-Rotrou by the 6th, whereas it had in fact, as has
been shown, remained at La-Fourche, Beaumont, and
Unverre. The Grand Duke, who had expected a stout
resistance, did not set out to attack Nogent till the 7th.
When the 22nd Division reached the spot, they found
all the villages deserted in the valley of the Upper
Huisne, and entered the town without any fighting, at
about two o'clock. They took up quarters there ; the
4th Cavalry Division went to Thirion-Gardais, and
only the advanced guard went to search for the enemy.
They found the wood by Le-Gibet strongly occupied
by the French, and did not succeed in getting there till
night-fall. The French retired to La-Ferte-Bernard.

The 17th Division had at first gone with the reserve ;
but at one o'clock, in consequence of the reports
brought in, the Grand Duke diverted it to Autlion on
the south; and in order to follow instructions from
head-quarters as closely as possible he pushed at least

BETWEEN OKLEANS AND LE-MANS. 281

a detachment of two battalions, two cavalry regiments,
and one battery on towards Montmirail, under the
command of Greneral von Ranch.

(January 8th.) Finding, on the morning of the 8th,
that the French had made no further attempt on St.
Amand, Greneral von Hartmann, at nine o'clock, sent
back the troops told off for his support. At ten
o'clock he received instructions to join the Eighteenth
Corps also ; but the French still held Villeporcher and
the wood lying behind it, and were also di*awn up
across the road to Chateau -Renault in a very ad-
vantageous position behind the river Brenne. The
General perceived the necessity of making a stand at
this spot, and took the best means to that end by act-
ing himself on the offensive. Supported by the fire of
his battery, and with the cavahy on either flank, six
companies of the 6th Regiment marched on Ville-
porcher, drove the defence into the wood of Chateau-
Renault, and took 100 prisoners. On the left, the 9th
Uhlans rode down the Chasseurs d'Afrique. Not till
darkness had set in did General von Hartmann retire
in the direction of Montoire.

General von Voigts-Rhetz had already set out from
thence very early in the day. The night's frost had
covered the roads with ice, which greatly impeded any
movement. The road on the right bank of the Loir
was in many places broken up. It leads up and down
a series of abrupt hollows, and on emerging from these
the advanced guard found themselves face to face with
a force of about 1000 Gardes Mobiles, who had taken
up a position in front of La-Chartre. Their mitrail-
leuses were soon forced to a hasty retreat by the fire
of two field-pieces, but it was only after a prolonged
struggle that the German infantry, moving with diffi-
culty, succeeded in entering the town, where they took

282 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

up their quarters. Two battalions, whicli were sent
further on the road, had to fight for their night's lodg-
ing ; all through the night shots were being exchanged
with the French in the neighborhood, and 230 prison-
ers were taken.

The 39th Brigade, which left Ambloy in the morning
to follow the corps, only got as far as Souge.

General von Schmidt was sent to the right, to estab-
lish communications with the Third Corps. He was
met at Vance by a brisk fire. The squadron which led
the van made way for the horse battery, and a volley
of grape-shot di'ove the dismounted cuirassiers behind
the hedges for shelter. When two more guns could
be got into position, a few rounds of canister dispersed
a long column of French cavahy in every direction.

Colonel von Alvensleben pursued the French cavalry
with the 15th Eegiment of Uhlans till they came upon
a body of infantry guarding the stream of Etang-fort.
The brigade stayed at Vance, after putting about 100
French out of action.

Of the Third Corps, the 6th Division had gone for-
ward by St. Calais. The French tried to line the
trenches on greatly cut-up roads ; but they did not
await a serious attack, and made off, for the most part
in carts which were in waiting. The 5th Division,
proceeding in a parallel line on the left, met with no
opposition ; but the state of the roads made the march
very difficult. The corps halted at Bouloire. The 9th,
coming up behind them, entered St. Calais.

The Grand Duke had moved both divisions of the
Thirteenth Corps on La-Ferte-Bernard. On their way
they came across none but stragglers, but they found
the roads in such a state that not till four in the after-
noon did they reach the town and settle into quarters.
The French had retired to Connerre. The 4th Cavalry

BETWEEN OELEANS AKD LE-MANS. 283

Division was to secure the right flank on the further ad-
vance, but could not get as far as Belleme ; on the other
hand, General von Rauch's detachment, dispatched
to Montmu-ail, surprised the French in Vibraye, and
took possession of the bridge there over the Braye.

By the evening of that day the forces forming the
German right and left wings were at an equal distance
from Le-Mans, on the single high-road which leads
across from La-Ferte-Bernard by St. Calais and La-
Chartre ; the Third Corps was fui'ther in advance, with
an interval of a long march. A closer combination of
the forces could only be assui-ed by a further advance
along the converging highways. Prince Frederick
Charles therefore issued an order, at ten o'clock that
evening, for the Tenth Corps to march next day to
Parigne-l'Eveque, the Third to Ardenay, and the Thir-
teenth as far ahead as Montfort, each sending an ad-
vanced guard beyond those points. The Ninth was to
follow in the centre, while General von Hartmann was
to protect Vendome with the 38th Brigade and the 1st
Division of cavalry.

But the mere distance was too gi-eat to allow of the
wings being brought so rapidly to the points desig-
nated; and on the 9th of January snow-storms, ice-
bound roads, and a thick fog still further impeded
their progress.

(January 9th.) General von Hartmann marched his
infantry brigade on Chateau Renault, and entered the
town by one o'clock. Curten's division (French) had
started early in the day for St. Laurent.

The Tenth Corps, though incomplete, retreated this
day, in two columns ; General von Woyna's detachment
was to march from Pont-de-Braye by Vance, the re-
mainder of the corps from La Chartre via Brives, to
meet at Grand-Luce.

284 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

The 20th Division had scarcely set out, by this
route, from L'Homme, when they came under a sharp
fire of shell and bullets. In this place there happened,
for once, to be room for three batteries to advance, but
in the heavy snow-fall aim was out of the question.
The German infantry, however, by degrees drove the
French out of various hamlets and farmsteads, and
back across the Brives. To pursue them beyond that
stream a bridge must have been thrown across, with
some loss of time, and then Chahaignes would have
had to be seized.

But in the narrow valley which lay before them they
expected some rather hot work. The nature of the
road was such that the artillerymen and cavahy had
to dismount and lead the horses. The Greneral in
command rode on a gun-carriage; his staff went on
foot. Some horses which had fallen in front stopped
the way for the column ; the artillery were then sent
back to try next day to come on by the Vance road.

To facilitate the march of the 20th Division, General
von Woyna had been instructed to deviate from his
direct road and attack the enemy's left. When he ap-
proached the hollow, there was no sound of fighting
there, and the detachment was turned back at Vance ;
but at Brives, at about half-past three, the main
column met with fresh resistance, being received with
a brisk fire from the heights north-east of the village.
Not even the infantry could move beyond the high-
road, so there was no alternative ; they must march
straight on. Meanwhile, however, the 30th Brigade
came up and drove off the enemy.

It was half-past six in the evening, and quite dark,
when Colonel von Valentin! set out for St. Pieri'e with
four battalions, and there took 100 French prisoners
and a loaded baggage-train of 100 wagons.

BETWEEN OKLEANS AND LE-MANS. 285

The Tenth Corps spent the night with its van as far
forward as Brives and Vance, but its rear straggled as
far back as the valley of the Loir. Nor had the 14th
Brigade of cavalry been able to make any headway.

Of the Third Corps, the 6th Division had proceeded
by the high-road, beyond Bouloire, with the artillery
corps ; the 5th had moved on, on the left, by cross-
roads.

The advanced guard of the Third Corps, after a smart
brush, had expelled the French from a position in front
of Ardenay, but at two o'clock had to repel a deter-
mined attack there. After General de Jouffroy had
withdrawn to the south of St. Calais, General Chanzy
had pushed the division under Paris forward from
thence towards Le-Mans. He had taken up a position
near Ardenay, occupying the chateau on the right, and
placing four guns and two mitrailleuses on the left
close to La-Butte. To oppose these there was only
room on the road for two German field-pieces, which,
however, in the course of half an hour had silenced the
mitrailleuses, and then carried on the unequal contest
with the greatest obstinacy. At about four o'clock five
companies of the 12th Brigade stormed the chateau,
while others, crossing the meadow-land to the right,
forced their way through a clump of trees to La-Butte.
As night came on the French tried to effect a general
attack along the high-road ; but this was repulsed, and
the Brandenburgers, defying the steady firing of the
defenders, took La-Butte and Ardenay wdth a rush
and loud cheers, without firing a shot. The French
were driven back into the valley of the Narais, losing
many prisoners.

On the right a detachment, consisting of one bat-
talion, two squadrons, and two guns, had advanced with
the 6th Division. They drove before them numbers

286 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

of franctireurs, but at La-Belle-Inutile they met
with more serious resistance. The post had already
been carried by the 24th, who possessed themselves of
a large ammunition and provision train, and took
above 100 unwounded prisoners. Count zu Lynar
then prepared the village for defence.

The 5th Division had met with no opposition, but
the state of the roads had seriously delayed its prog-
ress. It was not till the afternoon that the head
reached the Narais at Gue de I'Aune and took up
quarters, there and to the rear as far as St. Mars de
Locquenay. The advanced guard went on, however,
to La Buzardiere, thus forming the van of the whole
army ; Parigne-l'Eveque, on their left flank, was in the
hands of the French.

The Ninth Corps had followed the Third to Boulou^e.

No orders from head-quarters had as yet reached
La-Ferte when, at nine in the morning, the Grand
Duke marched on Connerre with the Thirteenth Corps.
Soon after midday the 17th Division came upon the
French near Sceaux, and after an obstinate struggle,
advancing all the time, drove them first out of the vil-
lages and then off the road. The French, who had
retreated to Connerre by forced night marches, lost
above 500 prisoners in this small affair. But the short
day was closing in and the advanced guard halted at
dusk at Duneau. A detachment, on going further,
found Connerre occupied by the French, and many
watch-fires were blazing in the valley of the Due.
The main force of the German infantry found quar-
ters in and around Sceaux.

Ranch's detachment, being ordered to rejoin the
corps, took possession of Le-Croset, and of the bridge
over the Due near that village, and then expelled the
French from Thorigne.

BETWEEN OELEANS AND LE-MANS. 287

The French stayed in Connerre only till the evening ;
then, leaving a company in occupation, they continued
their retreat. This inevitably led them from the left
bank of the Huisne through the quarters taken up by
the Third German Corps, who were disturbed all night
by wandering detachments of French soldiers, even at
Nuille, where the head-quarters of the division were
established.

On the extreme German right the 4th Division of
cavalry had occupied Belleme, after driving out the
French battalion, which had likewise been ordered
thither.

By this day the centre of the Second Army Corps
had also got within two miles of Le-Mans, fighting all
the way ; while the two wings were still at some dis-
tance behind. As it was probable that the French
would give battle in some strong position beyond the
Huisne, it seemed advisable to await the arrival of the
Tenth and Thirteenth Corps ; on the other hand, this
was giving the French time to collect their forces also.
By attacking at once, two of their divisions, now at
Chateau Renault and Le-Chartre, could scarcely be
brought up quickly enough, and the rest of their army,
now concentrating on Le-Mans, were involved in fight-
ing at a disadvantage on all sides. Prince Frederick
Charles therefore sent the Third Corps to scour the
country beyond Ardenay ; the Tenth was to advance
on Parigne, and the Thirteenth on St.-Mars-la-Bruyere,
though that place could scarcely be reached from the
positions actually occupied by the corps that night.

As we have seen, the army assembled near Le-Mans
was still acting on the offensive on January 6th;
General Jouffroy advancing on Vendome, and Curten
on St. Amand. But on the 7th the French found
their whole front, ten miles in length, reduced to the

288 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAK.

defensive. General Rousseau, on the left wing, had
evacuated Nogent-le-Rotrou, and, without being hardly
pressed, began his retreat by a night march to Con-
nerre. In the centre, the crossing of the Braye was
wrested from General Jouffroy; he retired from St.
Calais, not on Le-Mans, but to join General Barry to
the south. On the right, General de Curten abandoned
Chateau-Eenault, and set out, unpursued, on the road
past Chateau-du-Loir. To bring about some concerted
movement of the three divisions of his right wing,
General Chanzy placed them under the superior orders
of Admiral Jaureguiberry ; he sent the Paris Division
on to Ardenay by the road General Jouffroy had
abandoned, and reinforced General Rousseau on the
left, by ordering three di\dsions to support him on
either side of his line of retreat. General Jouffroy
was to return to Parigne-l'Eveque, and a division was
sent to meet him there and at Change.

General de Curten succeeded on the 9th in checking
the progress of the left German wing for some time
close to Chahaignes ; but Paris's division was driven
back on Ardenay, and General Rousseau, thus sur-
rounded, abandoned Connerre the same evening. The
two divisions of the right wing withdrew to Jupilles
and Nuille-Pont-Pierre.

Under these circumstances General Chanzy's com-
mands were that on the 10th Jouffroy's divisions
should fall back on Parigne-l'Eveque, and the Paris
Division march once more towards Ardenay. He sent
the remaining three divisions of the Twenty-first Corps
to meet General Rousseau, with instructions to retake
Connerre and Thorigne.

These intended attacks on both sides gave rise to
the fierce battle which, on the German side, was fought
by the Third Corps single-handed.

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 289

BATTLE OF LE-MANS.

(lOth, 11th, and 12tli of January.)

(January 10th). The fight at Parigne and Change. —
As, owing to the nature of the country, deep columns
could not deploy without great loss of time. General
von Alvensleben advanced on a wider front of small
subdivisions, moving with intervals in front of and
between Gue-de-1'Aune and Ardenay, with the 9th and
11th Infantry Brigades next to Change. On his right
the 12th marched along the high-road to Le-Mans ; on
his left the 10th was to start from Volnay if Parigne
were found abandoned by the French, and leaving that
place on their left, were also to make for Change.

Parigne had, in fact, been deserted by the French,
but had been re-occupied before daj^break by De-
planque's division ; and before the German troops had
started, the far-advanced posts, towards the wood of
Loudon, were smartly attacked by the French. The
greater part of the 9th Brigade had to be brought up
by degrees between Blinieres and the edge of the wood,
but only seven guns could be brought into play against
the strong French artillery. General von Stiilpnagel
decided to reserve his strength for the struggle at
Change, and not to carry on a sustained contest here,
which must be decided as soon as the 10th Brigade on
the left should make its appearance.

This brigade, delayed by the difficulties of the march,
did not reach Challes till noon; but it brought two
batteries to strengthen the German artillery, which
now cleared the way for the infantry attack on Parigne,
which stood on high ground. In half an hour the bat-
talions rushed on the place with shouts of " Hurrah
for Brandenburg," taking a gun which the enemy had

290 THE FEANCO-GEEM-iN WAE.

abandoned, and two mitrailleuses still being served.
When the French retiu-ned to try to recover them they
were repulsed, and lost another field-piece, two colors,
and several wagons. After losing 2150 prisoners they
fled to the shelter of the forest of Ruaudin. To keep
a watch here. General von Stiilpnagel left two bat-
taUons at Parigne, and proceeded at once to Change in
two columns. In front of this village, at about three
o'clock, the 11th Brigade had met with a violent resist-
ance by the Gue-Perray from the other brigades of
Deplanque's division. The 35th Regiment of the 2nd
Battalion lost nine officers and above 100 men in a
severe struggle at Les-Gars. The General in command,
who was on the spot, dislodged both flanks of the
enemy from strong positions, and on the left two com-
panies succeeded in crossing the stream at La Gou-
driere.

These at four o'clock came into contact with the
advanced guard of the 9th Brigade, which Colonel
Count von der Groeben had brought on from Parigne,
taking possession of the Chateau of Girardrie on the
way. As the two companies of the 11th Brigade sent
up to the right reached Auvigne at the same time,
the " General Advance " was sounded. Auvigne was
stormed, the bridge north of Gue-la-Hart was crossed,
and that village taken after a hard fight. About 1000
prisoners were again taken from the flying French.

It was already dark, and Change, the goal of the
struggle, was not yet won. But when a barricade
outside the village had been demolished, it was found
that the 10th Brigade were already in possession.
This brigade, on its way along the high-road from
Parigne, had met with resistance both at Chef-Raison
and PaiUerie. Having only two guns, they failed to
silence the French artillery, but General von Stiilpnagel

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 291

left a battalion here too, to watch the enemy, and hur-
ried forward with part of the brigade to support the Ger-
mans at Gue-la-Hart ; the rest were to attack Change.

Here the French had already been for the most part
dismissed to quarters, but they soon formed and offered
a determined resistance. There was a long and fierce
street-fight, which ended in about an hour's time, by
the whole garrison of 800 men, who had crowded into
the market-place, surrendering as prisoners.

The 12th Brigade had at last got off from Ardenay,
but not till eleven o'clock ; they proceeded unchecked
along the high-road as far as St. Hubert, where they
seized an abandoned commissariat train. Having
aligned themselves with the rest of their corps, they
halted for a while, but soon after they were attacked
by French artillery ; and the enemy again advancing
along the high- way. General von Buddenbrock like-
wise advanced to the attack, and drove the French out
of Champagne, some across the Huisne, and some back
on the hills behind the village. Two guns then suc-
cessfully defied the fire of the French artillery near
Lune-d'Auvours, and the infantry expelled them from
that shelter also.

Further to the right a German battalion had taken
St.-Mars-la-Bruyere after a slight skirmish, and was
subsequently joined there by General Count zu Lynar.

Thus the Third Corps had by this time taken more
than 5000 prisoners and many valuable trophies, by
equal skill and good fortune ; it had indeed left 450
men for dead.

The Tenth Corps had started that same day from
Vance and Brives, and had reached Grand-Luce ; but
Dot till two o'clock, unobstructed by the French, but
along very heavy roads. Here they took up their
quarters. The Ninth Corps remained at Nuille.

292 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

Of the Thirteenth Corps the 17th Division had con^
tinned its advance along the left bank of the Huisne,
and had found Connerre aheady deserted by the
French. But on the further side of the river, the
heights of Cohernieres, the railway station and the
wood on the north, were occupied by the 2nd Division
of the French Twenty-first Corps. General von Ranch
led two battalions to attack them from the south, while
from the east the 22nd Division was brought up, hav-
ing crossed the Huisne at Sceaux and gone on to Beille
along the right bank. The French made a stout resist-
ance, and the fight lasted with varying fortunes till
darkness came on. The Chateau of Couleon and sev-
eral villages at the foot of the wooded hills were taken
by the Germans, but the French maintained their hold
on the heights and their position at Cohernieres.

The 17th Division had meanwhile continued their
advance, along roads frozen till they were as smooth
as glass, and reached La-Belle-Inutile ; the 22nd passed
the night at Beille.

This division had that morning sent a detachment
to Bonnetable, whither the 4th Cavalry Division had
already proceeded. The 12th Cavahy Brigade followed
as far as Belleme. Colonel von Beckedorff then
marched forward to Chanteloup, whence he drove out
the French in spite of an obstinate defence.

General Chanzy had resolved on a decisive engage-
ment before Le-Mans. Cui'ten's division had not yet
arrived, and only a part of Barry's had come up, still
the army from the camp at Coulie amounted to 10,000
men. The right wing of the French position rested on
the Sarthe ; the centre extended above a mile along the
Chemin-aux-Boeuf s, and the left, making a slight bend,
rested on the Huisne. Barry's division, already weak-
ened by reverses, and General Lalande's National

BATTLE OP LE-MANS. 293

Guards — an ill-disciplined and ill-armed troop — were
placed on the right, where the danger was least. De-
planque's and Roquebrune's divisions, with Desmai-
son's brigade and Jouifroy's division, held the centre
and the left, Jouffroy facing General von Alvensleben.
Behind this line Bouedec's division and Colonel Marty's
troops were placed in reserve. These 50,000 to 60,000
men, under Admiral Jaureguiberry, very sufficiently
defended the position between the two rivers, which
was well protected by earthworks at the most impor-
tant points. Five other divisions, under the command
of General de Colomb, stood on the other side of the
river, about two miles distant, the Paris Division at
Yvi*e ; Gougeard's still occupying the heights of Au-
vours to the north of Champagne, Rousseau's at Mont-
fort and Pont-de-Gesnes, Collin's in a bow-shaped
position at Lombron, while ViUeneuve's, quite on the
flank, faced Chanteloup.

(January 11th.) On this day the Third German
Army Corps was standing exactly opposite the main
body of the French forces. It could not for the pres-
ent hope for any support from the corps on its wing,
and had a hard struggle before it.

On the left, the Tenth Corps was stiU at Grand Luce
that morning, and on the right the Thirteenth Corps
had been detained on the previous day by the obsti-
nate resistance of the French, who had held their own
between Les Cohernieres and La Chapelle, and occu-
pied Le Chene in their front.

The 22nd Division had been thrown into great con-
fusion in the course of the struggle in the wood, and
it was not tiU they had been reformed and the enemy's
position had been reconnoitred by both the Generals
of Division that the fighting could be renewed, at
about eleven o'clock.

294 THE PRAlfCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Two battalions of the 17tli Division and one battery
had been left in a post of observation in front of Pont-
de-Gesnes, on the southern bank of the Hnisne; on
the northern side, the Mecklenburg battalions stormed
Cohernieres in the afternoon, and after a sharp con-
test, in conjunction with the Hessians forced their way
to the westward as far as the Gue and on towards
Lombron at about four o'clock.

Further to the right, two companies of the 90th Eegi-
ment of the 22nd Division had meanwhile taken Le
Chene, in spite of a stout defence ; the 83rd Regiment,
after a sharp fire from the guns, had taken the farms
of Flouret and La Grande Metairie. Colonel von
Beckedorff, on being relieved at Chanteloup by the
4th Division of cavalry, had diiven the French out of
St. Celerin and advanced to La-Chapelle-St.-Remy, to
the right of the division, which occupied a large extent
of ground behind the points it had seized.

The Mecklenburg Grenadiers had held their own for
a long time at Le-Gue and La-Brosse against superior
numbers attacking from Pont-de-Gesnes ; and the
main body of the 17th Division retired that evening
on Connerre.

But the more completely General von Alvensleben
was thrown on his own resources, the'^more important
it seemed to keep the troops in close connection. A
strong force of the enemy was on his flank, nay, almost
in his rear, on the hiUs of Auvours, and only kept at
bay by the 12th Brigade, which, being thus engaged,
could not at present advance to his assistance.

And it was there that the battle began. The French
had repossessed themselves of Champagne, and their
artillery formed line under cover of the ridge. When
their fire had been somewhat checked by four of the
German guns, two battalions advanced to the attack.

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 295

It was not till eleven o'clock, after an obstinate con-
test, that the French were driven back to the heights,
and the bridge over the Hnisne was taken. Greneral
von Buddenbrock now placed two battalions in a post
of observation, sent a third to Lnne-d'Anvonrs, and by
noon returned with the rest of the brigade to rejoin
the corps.

Meanwhile the conflict had been raging with such
fury all along the front that, at twelve o'clock, Prince
Frederick Charles sent orders from St. Hubert to Gen-
eral Voigts-Rlietz, to proceed with all speed to the
field with the Tenth Corps; and at the same time
General von Manstein was instructed to seize the
heights of Auvours with the Ninth.

It was one o'clock before the advanced guard of the
Ninth marched up the hollow way through deep snow-
drifts. They were followed by two battalions of the
12th Brigade, bringing up two batteries with the great-
est difficulty. The German infantry plunged into the
wood, which was full of French soldiers, in the direc-
tion of Villiers ; the 11th Regiment of Fusiliers seized
three mitrailleuses that were being served, and as soon
as the French had abandoned the position, turned
them on the wood.

Further to the left, at about three o'clock, two bat-
talions of the 85th Regiment were detached from the
main body of the 18th Division, to proceed to the
western end of the ridge, supported by the Jagers and
two batteries which were posted at Les-Hetres. To
protect them two companies moved on to La-Lune,
hindering the French from crowding down on the high-
road. But in opposition to this movement the French
opened a severe fire from their elevated batteries
behind Yvre ; notwithstanding this, the Holsteiuers on
the left rushed on a French battery and seized three of

296 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

its guns. On the right they took possession of a
neighboring farmstead ; and soon after five the French
had vanished from the high ground to the western
ridge.

Here, however, a strong counter-attack had to be
met that same evening, for part of Grougeard's divis-
ion marched up the slope from Yvi'e. Their further
advance was effectually stopped ; but they could not
be prevented from remaining there for the evening and
night. Still, by this struggle the 18th Division had
kept open the rear and flank of the Third Corps. It
was again required that evening to secure the crossing
of the Huisne during the night for use next day ; so
three battalions and one battery went down to the
northern bank and repulsed the French troops in pos-
session of the bridge. The division had lost 275 men.

Greneral von Alvensleben had postponed the advance
of the Third Corps till eleven o'clock, hoping for the
arrival of the 12th Brigade.

During the night the French completed the works
on the skirts of the wood and took up a position
there ; they also occupied the high bank on the oppo-
site side of the river, where they had brought up sev-
eral batteries. Thus a direct attack would involve
heavy loss, and it was impossible tb outflank such
extensive lines. General von Alvensleben therefore
decided on advancing, at fh'st only against the enemy's
left wing, and sent forward the 11th Brigade. The
10th and 9th remained in reserve for the present, at
Change and Gue-la-Hart. The 12th, released at Mont-
Auvours, were also advancing, but by a cii'cuitous
route, because the high-road was everywhere com-
manded by the batteries above.

The 11th Brigade, scarcely 3000 strong, followed the
course of the Grue-Perray streamlet, round the northern

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 297

end of the wood. To protect it against the French
columns which threatened it from the heights, the
35th Regiment formed line on the brook and occupied
the Chateau of Les- Arches. The 20th tried to get for-
ward by the cattle-path, and while holding the Cha-
teau of Les-Noyers and the bridge there over the
Huisne, drove off the French by sheer hard fighting,
as far as Les-G-ranges. But they presently returned
with so strong a force that the whole brigade was
gradually brought up into the firing line. Les-Grranges
was lost and retaken several times with heavy loss,
particularly of officers ; but the Brandenburgers fought
steadily on.

On their left the 10th Brigade now made its appear-
ance, having come up from Change at one o'clock. By
two, the 52nd Regiment had possession of the farm of
Le-Pavillon, of the wooded slope in front and the farm
of Grand- Anneau, but their loss was severe. Strong
columns of the French coming up from Pontlieue were
driven back, two batteries were got forward under
heavy fire from the Chassepots to within 800 paces of
Le Tertre, and yet the 12th Regiment did not succeed
in getting into the farmstead till two battalions of the
9th Brigade had come to their assistance from Change.
The position was taken by storm at about five o'clock,
with the help of the 8th Regiment of the Grrenadier
Life Guards. The 52nd Regiment, having spent all its
ammunition, had to be taken out of action, but the
battalion of Grenadiers rushed down on the cattle-
path, taking two French guns which were firing on
them, after a desperate conflict; but the enemy's
repeated attempts to recover them were steadily frus-
trated. A battery which the French were bringing up
on the western side of the wood was driven back by
rapid volleys.

298 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

"WTien it was found that the 35th Regiment must be
brought back from the Gue-Perray to support the
20th, the French recovered possession of Les-Arches.
Here the 12th Brigade had arrived from Auvours at
two o'clock, only three battalions strong; the 64th,
however, recaptured the chateau after a short fight.
The overwhelming storm of fire from the artillery and
musketry on the opposite side of the river hindered
the Germans from getting up their guns, and it was
only with great difficulty and the loss of many gun-
ners that the pieces were brought away again; but
every attack on the position by the French from Yvre
was steadily repulsed.

It was now quite dark, but the firing had not ceased.
The Third Corps had taken 600 prisoners, but had
lost 500 killed. It had fought its way into the heart of
the French position, and its outposts were in close
proximity to the enemy's front. And now, though
late, strong reinforcements arrived.

The Tenth Corps had moved from Grand-Luce to
the westward early in the day, to block the high-road
from Tours to Le-Mans, but the frozen state of the
ground again delayed them on the way, so that they
only reached Teloche in the afternoon.

The sound of firing to the northward left them in
no doubt that General von Alvensleben was fighting a
great battle. The orders sent from head-quarters at
St. Hubert reached General Voigts-Rhetz at noon ; but
he then judged, and very rightly, that his assistance
would now be more effective on the enemy's flank than
on the field where the Third Corps were engaged. So
in spite of the exhausted state of his men, who had had
no hot meal on the way, he at once pushed forward.

To protect himself against Curten's division, prob-
ably at Chateau-du-Loir, he dispatched one battahon

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 299

to Ecommoy. It was received with firing from tlie
houses, surrounded in the darkness, and compelled to
withdi-aw from the place ; but it kept the road clear in
the rear of the corps.

The head of the 20th Division found Mulsanne feebly
defended, and di'ove the detachment back beyond the
cutting of La Monnerie.

The nature of the country here afforded great ad-
vantages to the French. Ditches and fences were good
cover for firing from, farmsteads and copses excellent
positions for defence. Only eight guns could be
brought to bear against the enemy's artillery; but
nevertheless four battalions (Westphalians and Bruns-
wickers) persistently repelled the French, and by night-
fall had got as far as Point-du-Jour. The conflict only
ceased at the cattle-path by Les-Mortes-Aures. Here
the French held the whole plain before them, by the
continuous running fire, kept up from behind lines of
shelter-trenches rising one above the other.

The battle wavered for a long time, but the German
left presently gained ground. The 1st Battahon of the
17th Eegiment rushed on the enemy, who returned
their fire at the shortest possible range, and then made
for the wood ; and when the drums of the 1st Battalion
of the 56th Eegiment were heard at Point-du-Jour,
beating the charge, the French carried away their
mitrailleuses and evacuated Les-Mortes-Aures.

This battalion had received orders to end the struggle
at the point of the bayonet. Captain von Monbart led
the attack at the double in close order ; all the com-
panies at hand joined in it, and in spite of a steady fire
from the cover of the wood, La-Tuilerie was carried by
half -past eight ; and here the brigade reformed, while
the 37th stood ready to support it at a spot beyond
at Mulsanne. The French vanished in the darkness.

300 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAR.

The constant roll of wheels, the noise of departing
railway trains, and a confusion of cries announced
their flight. Still the prisoners, who were brought in
in numbers, all agreed that a strong force was encamped
in the woods. Watch-fires blazed there through the
night, and instead of resting, the troops must have
been preparing to meet a fresh attack. By about half-
past ten the outposts reported the approach of a strong
force of the French from Pontlieue.

Hitherto the Germans had only had to deal with
National Guards under General Lalande at this point,
a force not much to be relied on ; but the Admiral now
sent Bouedec's division against La-Tuilerie, with Gen-
eral Roquebrune's to support their advance.

The battalions in the first lines were under fire for
above an hour in a perfect storm of projectiles, but no
serious attack was attempted.

According to French reports, their officers strove in
vain to induce their troops to advance ; they constantly
gave way. And a subsequent effort with the Garde
Mobile was equally fruitless.

Still, there was to be no rest. At two in the morn-
ing the din of fighting again made itseK heard on the
right. Deplanque's division had been disturbed by a
flanking force of the 40th Brigade,'' who had been
marching along the road from Euaudin to Pontlieue,
to be at hand in case of need ; without returning the
enemy's fire, they had attacked the detachment holding
Epinettes and took possession of it, close to the cattle-
path.

(January 12th.) Only the Third and Tenth Corps
could be reckoned on for the inevitable battle next day.
The other two could only afford indirect assistance by
keeping part of the French forces otherwise engaged.

Of the Thirteenth Corps the 17th Division was to

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 301

proceed via Lombron to St. Corneille, without allowing
themselves to be drawn into a fray with the enemy-
still occupying the banks of the Huisne ; the 22nd was
ordered from La-Chapelle to Savigne. The little river
Gue could easily be held, and part of the artiUery was
left at Connerre with the 7th Brigade of cavalry.

In their advance the Germans found that the enemy
had already abandoned Lombron, Pont-de-Gesnes, and
Montfort. Scattered arms and equipment betrayed
how hastily they had fled.

Several stragglers were brought in, and it was not
till reaching the Merdereau, at about noon, that the
17th Brigade met with any opposition. An attack
from all sides dislodged the French from the Chateau
of Hyre and from St. Corneille at about four o'clock,
and 500 French were taken prisoners. They were then
driven back behind the Parance, where the advanced
guard halted at dusk.

Colonel von Beckedorff's detachment of the 22nd
Division had marched on Chanteloup from Sille, re-
pulsing the French on La-Croix, where a large body of
their troops made a stand. But when, after a long
delay, the main body of the division arrived, the Ger-
mans attacked at once. Whole regiments of French
here laid down their arms, and 3000 men surrendered,
with several officers.

An attempt of the German cavalry to get across the
Sarthe to break up the railway communication was,
however, unsuccessful.

The force occupying the ridge of Auvours had sur-
rendered in a body. The 35th Brigade marched up to
Villiers, but patrols sent ahead brought news that the
French had retired behind the Huisne. •

When the noise of fighting at St. Corneille was heard
at midday, the brigade was ordered to proceed north-

302 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN "WAE.

ward to support the ITtli Division engaged there. The
84th Eegiment, passing by La-Commune, lent valuable
assistance in the attack on Chateau-Hyre. Outposts
were left by the Parance for the night, but the main
body of the brigade returned to Fatines, and the 36th
took up quarters between Villiers and St.-Mars-la-
Bruyere.

By the battle of the previous day the French position
before Le-Mans had been forced ; but they still stood
firm behind the Huisne, and as their left wing had
been driven back on their centre, that point had been
considerably strengthened. StiU, the stream must be
crossed, the steep slope must be climbed, where every
hedge of the terraced vineyards was held by strong fir-
ing lines, and where the heights were crowned with
batteries. The ford by Yvre, on the left, was very
strongly protected, and the ground in front of the wood
of Pontlieue had been made impassable in many places
by abatis. Against such a position the artiUery could
do little, and the cavahy nothing, while deep snow
hampered every movement of the infantry. Greneral
von Alvensleben therefore decided for the present on
acting only on the defensive with his right wing, while
with his left he prepared to support General von
Voigts-Rhetz in his advance.

The troops were roused from their short rest at six
in the morning. Two companies of French were mak-
ing their way towards the bridge at Chateau-les-Noyers
with powder-bags, but they were compeUed to retreat,
leaving the explosives behind them. At about eight
o'clock the French made a determined attack on the
outposts of the 12th Regiment, quartered in the wood,
and drove them in as far back as Le-Tertre. Again
the fight raged furiously round this farmstead, which
was almost demolished by shell. One by one the last

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 303

battalions of the lOth Brigade were drawn into the
struggle, while detachments whose ammunition was
exhausted were ordered out of it. Only four guns
could fire with any effect, but by eleven o'clock the
French volleys gradually died away, and they were
seen to retire on Pontheue. The battalions of the left
wing pursued, and came out on the Parigne road in
immediate touch with the Tenth Corps.

General von Yoigts-Ehetz had left two battalions at
Mulsanne, for protection from Ecommoy ; the whole
corps, after many unavoidable detachments had been
detailed from it, was assembled by about half -past
seven to march forward on Pontlieue. The main body
of the 20th Division was to diverge along the Mulsanne
road to go to La-Tuilerie. Three battahons of the 19th
Division were to meet at Ruaudin to strengthen the
detachment occupying Epinettes, while two battalions
and the 14th Cavalry Brigade took the road to Parigne,
with the corps' artillery, which could be of no service
in the plain further to the left.

Reinforcements had meanwhile arrived at Ruaudin,
and Greneral von Woyna made his way without hin-
drance through the woods to La-Source, where he
halted at one o'clock, having formed line on the 20th
Division. These had already brought a heavy battery
into action, driving back the French mitraiUeuses be-
yond Pontlieue. On the right, a hght battery of the
19th Division was brought up to La-Source, and ten
horse-artillery guns as far as the Parigne road. The
atmosphere was, however, so thick that their fire could
only be directed by the map.

At two o'clock Greneral von Kraatz advanced in close
column on Pontlieue, whither General von Woyna was
now also marching. The southern side of the village
was taken after a short struggle 5 but on the further

304 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAB.

side of the Huisne the French held the houses along
the river-bank, and just as the Grermans had reached
the bridge it was blown up. The demolition, however,
was not complete, and the foremost battalions got
across over the debris to get at the enemy. Two made
their way down the high street, one turned to the left,
to the railway station, whence came the sound of sig-
nals for departing trains. There was nothing to hinder
the iron railway -bridge from being blown up, and by
this means many prisoners were taken, besides 150
provision wagons and 1000 hundred-weight of flour.

The artillery were next directed to fire on the town
of Le-Mans.

Meanwhile the detachments which had become mixed
up in the fight in the wood had reformed, and joined
the Third Corps. After a ration of meat, the first for
three days, had been served out to all the troops, the
10th Brigade resumed its march. The battahon of
Brandenburg Jagers crossed the river by the paper-
mill of L'Epau, and two batteries at Chateau-Funay
contributed to the fii'ing on Le-Mans.

When, soon after, the infantry entered the town, a
fierce struggle began in the streets, blocked as they
were by the baggage-trains of the French. Access to
the houses had to be cleared by artiHery ; a large num-
ber of French were taken prisoners, and a vast quantity
of supplies seized. The fighting went on till night-fall,
and then the Tenth Corps and half of the Third took
up alarm quarters in the town. The 6th Division took
possession of Yvre, which the enemy had abandoned,
and placed outposts at Les-Noyers and Les- Arches on
the further side of the Huisne.

The actions fought by the French on this day had
been arranged for the sole purpose of giving the army
time to set out.

BATTLE OF LE-MANS. 305

On learning from Admiral Jaureguiberry that every
effort to get the troops to advance had failed, and that
the last reserves were shattered, Greneral Chanzy had,
at eight that morning, issued orders for a general re-
treat on Alen^on. Here the Minister of War had
arranged for the simultaneous arrival of two divisions
of the Nineteenth Corps from Carentan.

The march of the Second Army on Le-Mans had
been a series of seven days' incessant fighting. It had
fallen at a season when the winter was most severe.
Smooth ice and snow-drifts had hampered every move-
ment. Bivouacking was out of the question; the
troops had to seek their night quarters often at a dis-
tance of some miles in their rear ; their re-assembhng
in the morning wasted precious hours, and then the
shortness of the day prevented their taking full ad-
vantage of their successes. Whole battalions were
employed merely in guarding the prisoners. The roads
were in such a state that baggage could not be brought
up ; officers and men alike marched in insufficient cloth-
ing and on reduced rations. But spii'it, endurance,
and discipline had conquered every difficulty.

The Germans had sacrificed in this prolonged strug-
gle 3200 men and 200 officers, the larger half belonging
to the Third Corps alone. Several companies fought
under the command of non-commissioned officers.

The French estimated their losses at 6200 men, and
20,000 taken prisoners; seventeen guns, two colors,
and an abundant supply of materiel remained as
trophies in the hands of the \actors.

After such severe efforts the troops imperatively
needed some rest. The orders from head-quarters
were that the operations were not to be extended be-
yond a certain area of country; aod the Second Army

might almost immediately be required on the Seine

20

306 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

and the Loire. Prince Frederick Charles therefore
determined to follow up the retreating enemy with
only a small force.

On the French side, if each corps was to have an
independent road for escape to Alen^on, two corps
must necessarily start to the westward. And on the
evening of the last day's fight the Sixteenth Corps had
reached Chauffour on the Laval road, and the Seven-
teenth was at Mayenne on the way to Conlie, each
protected by its rear-guard. The Twenty-first was
assembled at Ballon, to the east of the Sarthe. From
these points all were to march northwards. General
Chanzy still deluded himself with the hope of getting
on by Evreux to the assistance of the besieged capital.
He would have, indeed, to make a wide circuit — a bow
to which the Germans could easily have formed the
string in a much shorter time ; and in the condition in
which his troops now were, across a country where all
arms could be brought into action, they must have
been annihilated. In short, the conquered army was
already driven to the west of the Sarthe.

After distributing rations to men and horses. Gen-
eral von Schmidt set forth at midday on the 13th with
four battalions, eleven squdarons, and ten guns, and
reached Chauffour after some skirmishing. The Thir-
teenth Corps (German) advanced to the Sarthe, the 17th
Division sending their outposts across the river at
Neuville, and the 22nd driving the French out of
Ballon, whence they retired completely routed to Beau-
mont. The Twenty-first Corps (French) had taken up
quarters this day at Sille. The National Guards from
Brittany fled wildly to Coron, and thence back into
their own province. They were joined by the troops
left in camp at Conlie, after they had plundered the
camp. The Seventeenth Corps also went off, without

PUKSUIT NORTHWAEDS. 307

halting by the Vegi'e, as they had been ordered to do,
but marching straight on to Ste. Suzanne. The Six-
teenth withdrew on Laval, leaving Barry's division at
Chassille to protect theu' rear. Numbers of abandoned
baggage- wagons, and cast-away arms, testified to the
condition of the defeated army.

On the 14th the French were driven out of Chassille.
The Sixteenth Corps were by this time in dire confu-
sion; they retired during the night to St.-Jean-sur-
Erve. In the camp at Conlie 8000 rifles had been
abandoned, with 5,000,000 cartridges, and various
other warlike stores.

The Grand Duke had marched on AlenQon along the
right bank of the Sarthe. The French advanced guard
of the 22nd Division made a slight stand at Beaumont
and lost 1400 prisoners.

On the following day General von Schmidt made
further progress on the road to Laval, but he found
that the French had concentrated at St. Jean and had
posted a strong force of artillery on the heights beyond
the Erve. The Oldenburg Regiment forced its way as
far as the church of the little town, and the Bruns-
wickers drove the enemy back on Ste. Suzanne, higher
up the river, but there the pursuit ended.

Although Barry's and Deplanque's divisions had
now no more than 6000 fighting men, by the French
estimate, and Curten's division had not yet come up,
the German force at hand was very considerably in-
ferior. The rest of the Tenth Corps was moving up
to their support, but had as yet only reached Chassille.
A battahon proceeding from Conlie came into conflict
at Sille with the Twenty-first Corps (French) assembled
there, and sustained heavy loss. The 22nd Division
of the Thirteenth Corps also met with serious oppo-
sition before reaching Alen^on, from the National

308 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

Gruards and Volunteers under Lipowski ; so the attack
on the town was postponed till next day.

But on the following morning the French position
in AlenQon was evacuated, as well as Sille and St.
Jean. The places were at once occupied by the G-er-
mans, and Greneral von Schmidt marched on, close to
Laval. Numerous stragglers from the retreating army
were taken prisoners.

Curten's division had now reached the western bank
of the Mayenne, and there the remnants of the Army
of the Loire re-assembled. Reduced to half its origi-
nal strength, and very greatly demoralized, it would
be liors de combat for some time to come, and the
object of the German march on Le-Mans was fully
attained.

To the north of Paris, however, the French were
again preparing to attack. It was needful to withdraw
those divisions of the First which were still on the
Lower Seine, in the direction of the Somme; and
orders came from head-quarters that the Thirteenth
Corps of the Second Army should march on Rouen.
On the Upper Loire two French detachments had been
sent to attack the Hessians holding positions about
Briare, and had di'iven them back, on the 14th, to
Ouzouer; while from Sologne cam^ a report of the
advance of a newly-constitued French Army Corps —
the Twenty-fifth.

The Glerman Ninth Corps, after evacuating and raz-
ing the camp at Conlie, was therefore sent to reinforce
Orleans. The remainder of the Second Army, the
Third and Tenth Corps, with the three cavalry divis-
ions— about 27,000 foot, 9000 horse, and 186 guns —
were assembled under Prince Frederick Charles round
Le-Mans. The cavalry, placed as a corps of observa-
tion in the front and on the flanks, had several small

OPEEATIONS ON THE SOMME. 309

skirmishes, but no further serious hostilities were
attempted.

The 4th Cavahy Division held Alengon on the right,
and on the left Gleneral von Hartmann entered Tours
without any opposition.

OPEEATIONS ON THE NOKTH OF PAEIS DUKING JANUAEY.

At the beginning of the New Year a considerable
part of the First Army (German) was engaged in in-
vesting Peronne, which would have afforded a safe
passage for the debouching of the French over to the
southern bank of the Somme. General Barnekow had
laid siege to the little town with the 3rd Reserve Divis-
ion and the 31st Brigade of infantry. Hitherto it had
only been kept under observation by cavahy, but re-
cent circumstances had raised it to importance. So
much of the Eighth Corps as was available on the
Somme formed, for the protection of the besiegers
on the north, a wide curve from Amiens as far as
Bapaume.

The First Corps, posted at Rouen, at first consisted
only of three brigades; but the Fourth was on the
march from Peronne, where it had now been relieved.
No reinforcement of the First Army had been effected ;
the 14th Division, after reducing Mezieres and taking
Rocroy, had received fresh orders from Versailles
which transferred it to another field of action.

General Faidherbe had concentrated his troops from
the rest-camp south of Arras, behind the Scarpe, and
had begun his forward march on 2nd January. He
advanced with the Twenty-second Corps to the rehef
of Peronne through Bucquoy. The Twenty-third fol-
lowed by the high-road to Bapaume. As early as
haK-past ten the Derroja Division of the former corps
obliged the 3rd Cavahy Division, as well as those

310 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAK.

battalions of the 32nd Brigade which had been at-
tached to it, to retire on Miraumont, pursuing it, how-
ever, only as far as Achiet-le-Petit.

The other diAdsion, unded General Bessol, had only
advanced towards Achiet-le-Grand in the afternoon.
There he was opposed for several hours to two com-
panies of the 68th, a detachment of hussars, and two
guns, who retired towards evening on Avesnes. The
French did not pursue, but established outposts at
Bihucourt.

Payen's division had deployed at Behagnies, on the
high-road, and its batteries opened fire on Sapignies,
where, however. General von Strubberg had posted
five battalions. These met the attack, and at two
o'clock entered Behagnies with a rush, took 240 pris-
oners, and prepared the village for defence. The
enemy withdrew to Ervillers, and there once again
showed front, but attempted no further attack.

The other division of his Twenty-third Army Corps,
consisting of mobiUzed National Guards, under General
Eobin, had pressed forward on the left on Mory.
There was only one battalion and a squadron of hus-
sars to oppose them. By extending their line on the
heights of Beugnatre, they succeeded in deceiving the
enemy as to their numerical strength. The latter
marched and counter-marched, and also brought up
artillery, but did not attempt an attack, and remained
at Mory.

The 30th Brigade and the 3rd Cavalry Division took
up their position for the night in and about Bapaume.
The 29th Brigade occupied the neighboring villages on
the right and the left of the Arras road.

BATTLE OF BAPAUME. 311

BATTLE OF BAPAUME.

(January 3rd.)

General Faidherbe had brought his forces close up to
a position covered by the siege of Peronne. His four
divisions consisted of fifty-seven battalions, opposed
by only seventeen German battalions. He decided on
the 3rd to push on in four columns to Grevillers, Bief-
villers, on the high-road, and to Favreuil on the east.

But General von Goeben was not inclined to give up
his position at Bapaume. During the occupation of
Favreuil, General von Kummer brought up the 30th
Brigade in front of the town, and behind it the 29th,
of which, however, three battalions were left in the
villages to left and to the right. A reserve was estab-
hshed further to the rear, at Transloy, whither the 8th
Rifle Battalion, with two batteries, was detached ; and
General von Barnekow received orders to hold three
battalions and the 26th Division of foot in readiness
at Sailly-Saillisel, without raising the blockade. Then
the division under Prince Albrecht, Jun. — three bat-
talions, eight squadrons, and three batteries — advanced
on Bertincourt, near to the battle-field. In this order,
in severe cold and gloomy weather, they were to await
the attack of the French.

General Count von der Groeben had already sent the
7th Cavalry Brigade against the enemy's right flank,
but it did not succeed in forcing its way through those
villages that were occupied by the enemy's infantry.

At Beugnatre, the right wing of the Robin Division
was met by so sharp a fire from two battalions of the
65th, and two horse artillery batteries that had joined
them from Transloy, that it withdrew again on Mory,
and the garrison of Favreuil was reinforced by two

312 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAB.

battalions and two batteries against the approach of
the Payen Division, which was marching down the
high-road to the east of that place. The first French
gun that came out of Sapignies was immediately de-
stroyed, but several batteries soon became engaged on
both sides, and the French entered Favreuil and St.
Aubin.

The 40th Regiment advanced to these places at noon
from Bertincourt, and, after a lively action, occupied
them ; yet had to evacuate Favreuil again, and a bat-
tery of horse artillery took up a position alongside of
the 2nd Regiment of Uhlans of the Guard close to
Fremicourt, which secured the right of the division.

On the left, Bessol's division had driven the weak
garrison out of Biefvillers. The 1st Battalion of the
33rd Regiment, which had set out to retake that place,
became hotly engaged; it lost all but three of its
ofl&cers, and had to retire upon Avesnes. The Derroja
Division had also taken part in this fight. The French
now brought a strong force of artillery to the front,
and extended their firing-line to the south nearly as
far as the road to Albert.

Therefore, at midday, Greneral von Kummer decided
to confine himself to the local defence of Bapaume.
With some sacrifice, the artillery covered the move of
the infantry thither. The 1st Heavy Battery, which
was the last to withdi'aw, lost 2 officers, 97 men, and
36 horses ; their guns could only be got away with the
help of the infantry.

The 29th Brigade now prepared for an obstinate
defence of the old city wall. The 30th was posted be-
hind the place, and the French advanced leisui-ely as
far as the suburb. Then there was a cessation of hos-
tilities. Greneral Faidherbe hoped to take the toAvn by
further investing it, without exposing it to the horrors

BATTLE OF BAPAUME. 313

of a bombardment su(^li as precedes the taking of a
place by storm. A brigade of the Derroja Division
endeavored to advance through Tilloy, but met there
with stubborn resistance from the Rifle battahon and
two batteries which had arrived from Peronne, At
the same time, twenty-four guns of the batteries that
were posted behind Bapaume opened fire on the ad-
vancing columns, which then withckew, at half-past
three, by the road to Albert. They soon resumed the
attack, and succeeded in entering Tilloy. All the
neighboring batteries now opened fire iipon this place.
Greneral von Mirus, who, when the 3rd Cavalry Divis-
ion had passed through Miraumont, had been left be-
hind there, seeing no enemy in his front, but hearing
the fighting at Bapaume, advanced from the west,' and
General von Strubberg from the town, to resume the
attack. The French did not await their arrival, and
were driven both out of the suburb and Avesnes. The
French detachments encamped for the night at Grevil-
lers, Bihucourt, Favreuil, and Beugnatre, thus sur-
rounding Bapaume on three sides. The day had cost
the Germans 52 ofiicers and 698 men, and the French
53 officers and 2066 men.

But only by di'awing on every available resource of
the Eighth Army Corps had it been possible to with-
stand the preponderating attack of the enemy. It had
not yet been possible to provide fresh ammunition,
and General von Goeben decided to immediately shift
the battle-field to behind the Somme. This movement
was being executed when the patrols brought informa-
tion that the enemy was also evacuating its neighbor-
ing position.

The French troops, as yet unaccustomed to active
service, had suffered extremely from the day's fighting
and the severe cold of the ensuing night. General

314 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

Faidherbe could perceive that the forces before Peronne
had been withdrawn to Bapaume, and that the Ger-
mans thus reinforced would assume the defensive.
His first object, the raising of the siege, had been ob-
tained, and the Greneral thought it best not to endan-
ger his success by a second encounter. He led his
corps back in the direction of Arras.

Of the German cavaky, the 8th Cuirassiers succeeded
in breaking through a French square. The 15th
Division withdrew behind the Somme to close under
Peronne, and the Saxon cavahy joined the right wing
at St. Quentin.

ACTIONS ON THE LOWEE SEINE.

Exactly at the same time the other corps of the
First Army was engaged with the enemy on the Lower
Seine, The French had not taken up any new posi-
tion on the right bank of the river, but they held the
wooded heights of Bois-de-la-Londe, which surround
the southern defile of the Httle river-peninsula of
Grand-Couronne. Here General von Bentheim, with a
view of gaining ground in this direction, had posted
half of the First Army Corps, and advanced on the 4th
of January on Les Moulineaux. Before daybreak Lieu-
tenant-Colonel von HliUessem surprised the enemy's
outposts, stormed the fort of Chateau Eobert-le-Diable,
and took prisoners those who had sought refuge amid
the ruins of the castle ; and the heights of Maison Bru-
let were scaled under a heavy fire from the enemy, who
lost two guns on this occasion. After renewed fight-
ing at St. Ouen, the French withdrew on Bourgachard
in the afternoon, pursued towards six in the evening
by half a squadron of dragoons, two guns, and a com-
pany driven on wagons, who took from them two 12-
pounders set up on the approach to Rougemontier,

FIGHTING ON THE LOWEE SEINE. 315

disabling the gunners and capturing an ammunition
wagon.

After a slight skirmish, the enemy had been driven
out of Bourgtheroulde and thrown back in the direc-
tion of Brionne. However, the French right wing at
Elbeuf had, during the night, hastily withdrawn from
a position rendered precarious by the wavering of the
remaining detachments. The affair had cost 5 officers
and 160 men. The loss of the French must have been
equal, besides which they lost 300 prisoners and 4
guns.

General Roye posted his troops behind the Eille
on the Pont-Audemer — Brionne line, but the Grermans
now held Bourgachard, Bourgtheroulde, and Elbeuf
strongly garrisoned, with three battalions in readiness
at Grand-Couronne for further security. The other
troops returned to Rouen. / An attempted passage of
the French from the northern bank of the Somme had
already been averted at Fauville, whence they again
withdrew to Harfleur.

Meanwhile it had not escaped the observation of the
Eighth Army Corps that this time the French did not
seek to intrench themselves in the northern forts, but
that they halted south of Arras, thus betraying an in-
tention to shortly renew the attack on the investing
forces of Peronne.

General von Goeben therefore decided to pass over
to the northern bank of the Somme, to their protec-
tion, and to take up a flank position whose front the
enemy would have to cross in its advance.

On January 6th, after the troops had had one day's
rest, and the ammunition had been replenished, the 30th
Brigade advanced on Bray, the 29th on Albert. In
close vicinity to the enemy was the 36th Cavalry Divis-
ion at Bapaume, behind them the cavahy brigade of

316 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

the Guard. To secure the left flank Lieutenant-Colonel
von Pestel occupied Acheux, and the 3rd Reserve
Division of the investing corps advanced west of the
position on Feuilleres. The Corps Artillery remained
meanwhile on the left bank of the Somme, for it
almost seemed as if the enemy were preparing an at-
tack on Amiens.

But during the next day the French did not under-
take anything of importance, and on the 9th Peronne
feU.

OCCUPATION OF PEEONNE.

For fourteen days this little place had been invested
by eleven battalions, sixteen squadrons, and ten bat-
teries. Flooded meadows on one side, and on the other
walls with medieval towers had secured it against sur-
prise ; yet it was commanded on all sides by overhang-
ing heights.

Still the fire of fifty-eight German guns had not done
much damage, and in any case must soon have been
given up for want of ammunition ; the fire with capt-
ured French materiel remained without result. The
fort continued its fire, and its garrison of only 3500
men even attempted sorties. As before mentioned, on
the day of the battle of Bapaume, a portion of the
besieging troops had been obliged to Vithdraw to the
support of the Eighth Army Corps, and in the un-
certainty as to the result of this fight it had been
necessary to take precautions for the parking of the
siege materiel. The troops that remained behind were
in marching order, and part of the heavy guns had
been withdrawn. But the garrison of the place kept
on its guard.

Two days later a siege-train of fifty-five heavy guns
arrived at La-Fere. A second, of twenty-eight, laden
with French ammunition, was on the way from Me-

OCCUPATION OF PEKONNE. 317

zieres. The preliminaries of a regular siege were ac-
complished, and when at last, on the 8th of January, a
large ammunition-transport arrived, the Commandant
was summoned to give up a defence that had become
hopeless.

On the 10th of January General von Barnekow en-
tered the fortress so amply provided with arms, am-
munition, and provisions. The garrison were made
prisoners.

On the 7th of January, his Majesty the King had
summoned General von Manteuffel to another part of
the theatre of war, and had given the supreme com-
mand of the First Army Corps to General von Goeben.

Freed from all care as to Peronne, his only mission
thenceforward was the protection of the siege of Paris.
For this purpose the Somme, whose passages were all
in the hands of the Germans, formed a natural bul-
wark, behind which even the attack of a superior
enemy could be met. And some reinforcements now
arrived for the Eighth Army Corps. The peaceful
condition of the Lower Seine permitted of two infan-
try regiments and two batteries being sent from thence
to Amiens. At head-quarters an infantry brigade of
the Meuse Ai'my Corps was held in readiness, which in
case of need was to precede them by rail.

It was still a matter of uncertainty where the enemy
would strike the first blow. General von Goeben,
therefore, spread his forces behind the Somme on a
ten-mile line, still holding the places he had acquired
to the front of the river, so that if needful he could
proceed to attack. In the middle of the month, the
portions of the Ninth Army Corps under the command
of General Count von der Groeben occupied Amiens,
Corbie, and the Hallue line in a flank position. The
15th Division, holding Bray, took up its quarters south

318 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

of this place. Next to them, on the left of Peronne,
were the 36th Reserves, to the right the 16th Division,
and the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade, holding Roi^el
and Vermand, in front. The 12th Cavahy Division
was at St. Quentin.

The French Army had already begun to move on the
Cambrai high-road, and its Twenty-second Corps had
forced back the 3rd Cavalry Division first out of Ba-
paume and Albert and then back on the Hallue. The
Twenty-third followed the same road, and their goal
really appears to have been Amiens. But a reconnois-
sance had enlightened them as to the difficulty of
attacking in that direction, besides which a telegram
from the War Minister announced that the Paris Army
would make a last supreme effort to break the bonds
of the blockade, and the Army of the Nord was enjoined
to draw, as far as possible, the attention of the enemy's
forces towards itself and away from the capital.

According to these orders, General Faidherbe decided
to advance on St. Quentin without delay, whither the
Isnard Brigade was already marching from Cambrai.
The attack on the right wing of the Germans, consist-
ing for the time being solely of cavalry, endangered
their communications, while the vicinity of the north-
ern forts offered the French Army shelter, and also
gi'eater liberty of action.

But General von Goeben had foreseen this with-
drawal of the enemy on the left, and had concentrated
all his forces to meet it.

The convalescents who were fit for service were
attached. Only weak detachments were left at Amiens,
and through the approach of the Thirteenth Corps,
from the Sarthe to the Lower Seine, it was easy to
transfer the 3rd Grenadier Regiment and a heavy bat-
tery to the Somme.

ADVANCE ON ST. QUENTIN. 319

The withdrawal of the French from Albert and the
march of their army corps on Comhles and Sailly-Sail-
lisel were soon reported by the reconnoitring of the
cavah-y. A newly-formed Pauly Brigade occupied
Bapaume, and the Isnard Brigade entered St. Quentin,
when Greneral zur Lippe, according to orders received,
retired on Ham. At this juncture, General von Goe-
ben set out in an eastern direction, using the roads on
both banks of the Somme so that he might the sooner
come up with the enemy.

(January 17th.) On the 17th, the 12th Cavalry Bri-
gade advanced on La-Fere, the 16th on Ham. The
3rd Reserve Division and the Cavalry Brigade of the
Guard arrived at Nesle; the 15th Division and the
Corps Artillery, at Villers-Carbonnel. An Army Re-
serve had been formed out of the troops last from
Rouen, which followed to Harbonnieres. On the north-
ern bank, the detachment under Count von der Groe-
ben advanced close to Peronne,

The four French divisions had so far advanced on
Vermand that they were enabled to effect a junction
next day at St, Quentin. The Twenty-third Army
Corps was to retire straight upon the town, the Twenty-
second to cross the Somme lower down, and take up a
position south of St. Quentin.

(January 18th.) On the German side, the 16th and
the 3rd* Reserve Division advanced on Jussy and
Flavy, on the southern bank of the Somme, the Army
Reserves on Ham. The 12th Cavalry Division at Ven-
deuil found the country east of the Oise stiU free from
the enemy.

On the other hand, the 15th Division was to cross
the Somme at Brie, and advance, together with the
troops of General Count von der Groeben, on Vermand
and Etreillers, with a view of obtaining touch of the

320 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

approaching enemy. General von Kummer had been
enjoined, in case he found that the French had taken
up a position, merely to watch them and foUow them
should they retire north, but should they march
towards the south, to attack them in force.

At half -past ten, the 29th Brigade came up on this
side of Tertry with the rear-guard of the Twenty-
second Corps and its train. The hussars broke
through one of the screening battalions, drove the
wagons in the greatest disorder back on Caulaincourt,
but had to abandon prisoners and loot under the fire
of the approaching infantry. The French brigade had
changed front, and now advanced to the attack of Tres-
con. This was resisted by the 65th Eegiment and
three batteries until after two o'clock, when G-eneral
du Bessol, who had just arrived on the scene of action,
ordered the march on St. Quentin to be resumed.

The Twenty-third had also halted and detached a
brigade against the left flank of the 15th Division.
This, however, on reaching Cauvigny Farm, came
upon the German battalions, which, after protracted
firing, pursued the retreating enemy and entered Cau-
laincourt at half -past three, making 100 prisoners and
capturing fourteen provision wagons.

Meanwhile Count von der Groeben had hastened
forward at the sound of firing. The General realized
that he could help most efficaciously by marching
straight on Yermand. Four battalions marched on
Poeuilly, which was occupied by the enemy, and when
the 4th Grenadiers came up to the assault the French
retreated, losing some prisoners. Many Gardes Mo-
biles were dispersed by the Uhlans. But at Vermand
the whole of the Twenty-third Corps had begun its
march.

Count von der Groeben therefore posted his troops

BATTLE OP ST. QUENTIN. 321

behind the Poeuilly ground, thereby occasioning the
retiring troops to immediately front whenever pressed.
The 15th Division had taken up quarters at Beauvois
and Caulaincourt.

The sole aim which the French Generals appear to
have had in view on that day was to reach St. Quentin.
They neglected the opportunity of falling with their
two corps upon the single 15tli Division. The Twenty-
third Corps passed the night in and westward of St.
Quentin, and likewise the Twenty-second, after cross-
ing the Somme at Serancourt, south of that town. A
further advance either on Paris or on the German
line of communications depended, now that the Ger-
mans were so close upon them, on the issue of a bat-
tle ; and this, General Faidherbe wished to await at St.
Quentin.

It was important that he should make a stand there,
in case the Paris Army succeeded in breaking through
the blockade. The ground offered certain advantages
— the heights in front of the town facilitated firing and
offered covered shelter to the reserves. Although the
Somme divided the army in two halves, the Bridge of
St. Quentin secured to both mutual aid. The enemy
also occupied two sides of the river, and including the
now newly-joined Isnard and Pauly Brigades, they
counted 40,000 men, against an enemy numerically
weaker. The Germans, all counted, numbered 32,580
combatants, nearly 6000 being cavahy.

BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN.

(19th January.)

General von Goeben had ordered the general attack
for the 19th.

General von Barnekow advanced along the southern
21

322 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

bank of the Somme (during the occupation of Seran-
court) with the 16th, and the 3rd Reserve Division
from Jussy on Essigny; the 12th Cavahy Division
advanced on the road which led to La Fere.

The French columns were still marching to take up
their position so as to have the town on their rear ;
and they already occupied Grrugies. While the 32nd
Brigade marched north to Essigny — the Reserve Divis-
ion halting behind the place — the 31st Brigade started
at a quarter to ten for Grugies.

This attack was flanked by the French brigade under
Gislain, which had meanwhile occupied the positions
of Contescourt and Castres. Its front was met by the
brigades under Foerster and Pittie.

The fii'e of the approaching German batteries was
at once returned vigorously from Le-Moulin-de-Tout-
Vent. At eleven o'clock the second battalion of the
69th Regiment formed into company columns, to cross
the entirely open ground towards the heights between
them and Grugies; but the attempt, which was re-
newed four times, was frustrated by the annihilating
cross-fire of the enemy. The isolated battalion was
nearly exhausted, and only on being joined by six fresh
companies of the 29th Regiment did it succeed in forc-
ing the French back, after a desperate hand-to-hand
fight ; but the latter made a stand before Grugies and
its sugar factory.

On the right wing, the 12th Cavahy Division had
preceded the others on the La-Fere road. The French
brigade under Aynes, which had hitherto been held
in reserve, pushed forward at the double to meet it, and
as Count zur Lippe could dispose of but one battalion
of infantry, the movement was arrested at Cornet-
d'Or. But when, at noon, they were joined by rein-
forcements from Tergnier, the Saxon Rifles stormed

BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN. 323

the park on tlie high-road, and the Schleswig-Holstein
Fusihers stormed La-Neuville. The French, after los-
ing many prisoners, were vigorously pursued back to
the outskirts of St. Quentin, the first place which
afforded them shelter.

Meantime, the 31st Brigade was engaged in a hot fire
on both sides of the railway line before Grugies ; behind
its right wing was posted the 32nd, in the valley near
the high-road, where it suffered severely from the
enemy's shrapnel. On the left, the advancing detach-
ment had not succeeded in entering Contescourt ; and
now the French at Grugies made so determined and
overwhelming an attack, that the 16th Division had to
be withdi'awn as far as Essigny.

When, after twelve o'clock. General Faidherbe joined
the Twenty-third Corps, he had every reason to hope
that the Twenty-second Corps would be able to main-
tain its position. But certainly the most important
result was to be looked for on the northern portion of
the battle-field.

Here Robin's division had taken up a position be-
tween Fayet and Francilly. The brigade under Isnard
had joined it on the left, the brigade under Lagrange
of Payen's division extended its line as far as the
Somme. At Gricourt the Michelet brigade remained
behind in reserve, and the brigade under Pauly secured
the communications in rear.

As early as eight o'clock General Count von der
Groeben (on the German left) set out on the Roman
road from Poeuilly with eight battalions and twenty-
eight guns ; on the left the cavahy brigade accompanied
the march.

The East-Prussians immediately drove the French
out of Holnon and Selency, and then advanced against
Fayet and up the heights of Moulin-Coutte. A gun

324 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

that was being served, ammunition wagons, and many
prisoners were then taken from the enemy.

By degrees the twenty-eight guns all reached the
mill on the height and opened a duel with the artillery
of Robin's division. But after half an hour the ammu-
nition failed, for the wagons which had been sent on
the previous day to the Eighth Corps had not yet come
up to the relief. The batteries, which were, moreover,
suffering from the fire of the infantry, had to retire on
Holnon, and as Francilly was still occupied by the
enemy in flank and rear, a further advance was tem-
porarily postponed.

On the right, General von Kummer with the 15th
Division had ah'eady begun the march from Beauvois,
and had reached Etreillers at ten. The King's Hus-
sars, after driving back the enemy's horse, di*ew up
near to L'Epine-de-Dallon, and the 29th Brigade en-
tered Savy. North of that place three batteries opened
fire against the artillery of Pay en's division, and then
the 65th Regiment advanced to the attack of the sur-
rounding woods. The smaller one to the south was
taken, but here, as at Francilly, the Isnard Brigade
established itself in the larger one to the north.

At noon the brigade under Lagrange advanced on
the small wood and soon entered it, but was again
driven back by the 65th.

The 33rd Regiment was posted in readiness to secure
the threatened right flank of the 29th Brigade, and
with those already under fire was joined by two heavy
batteries which had just come with the Corps Artillery
from Savy. At the same time the 30th Brigade ad-
vanced from Roupy on the right of the 29th.

Meanwhile, Colonel von Massow had, at one o'clock,
again assumed the offensive against the much more
advanced enemy's left. Six companies of the 44th

BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN. 325

Regiment advanced on Fayet, and opening fire at the
shortest range, drove the French from the field. They
were followed by two batteries, who resumed action
against the great artillery position at Moulin-de-Cepy.

General Paulze D'lvoy, who saw his communications
with Cambrai in such imminent danger, had already
summoned the brigade under Michelet from its reserve
post, west of the town, and thus reinforced now ad-
vanced on Fayet. Those Prussian detachments that
were in the place had to be withdrawn to Moulin-
Coutte ; but the further advance of the enemy towards
this height was met by a flank attack on Selency, and
at the same time the farm of Bois-des-Roses was car-
ried. The French again withdrew on Fayet.

There, at Francilly, and in the northern stretch of
wood, they held their own until half -past one, while
at that time, on the G-erman side, the three brigades
had been brought up into the fighting line. The Army
Reserve had, indeed, advanced from Ham on Roupy,
but General von Goeben, who had from that spot
observed the slow progress of the 16th Division, had
already sent this Reserve through Serancourt to its
relief at eleven o'clock.

Colonel von Boecking, with his three battalions,
three squadrons, and two batteries, advanced from
there against Contescourt. Hastening forward with
the cavalry, he brought his artillery into action ; the
41st Regiment, upon its arrival, immediately moved
forward to the attack. In communication with the
battalion of the 19th Regiment which was already on
the spot, the French were at one o'clock driven out of
that place and out of Castres, with the loss of many
prisoners, towards the heights of Grugies. Against
these heights the fire of the artillery was now directed,
having gradually been increased to thirty guns.

326 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

So as to yet further dispute the position, General
Lecomte reinforced Grislain's brigade by several bat-
talions withdrawn from the brigades of Pittie and
Aynes.

The East-Prussian Regiment succeeded, nevertheless,
by half-past two o'clock, although itself attacked on
all sides, in hurling back the enemy into the hollow in
front of Grugies.

Colonel von Boecking's vigorous attack was conspic-
uous along the whole line.

With a view to again undertaking a general advance,
General von Barnekow now ordered up his last reserves
from Essigny, when towards three o'clock Pittie's bri-
gade unexpectedly pressed forward along the line of
railway. With his right under the fire of the artillery
posted at Castres, he allowed his left to be surprised
by the charge of five squadrons of the reserve cavalry
at Urvilliers. Simultaneously Colonel von Hartzberg
now advanced with the 32nd Brigade, and drove the
enemy back to Moulin-de-Tout-Vent.

But Foerster's brigade, south of Grugies, had held
out stubbornly, although now seriously threatened on
the left from Giff ecourt, as well as by the 12th Cavahy
Division. With the retreat of Pittie's brigade now
completely exposing their left flank, and their last
troops exhausted by a long struggle, the French found
themselves finally forced to vacate their hard-contested
position.

The 31st Brigade advanced along the railway line as
far as the sugar factory, and Colonel von Boecking
drove the last French detachments out of Grugies.
He then opened his attack upon Moulin-de-Tout-Vent
with his artillery. Up these heights the 41st Battalion,
ordered up from Essigny, and the 32nd Brigade ad-
vanced in a combined attack. The French did not hold

BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN. 327

out much, longer, and were soon in retreat. The entire
German front, with the 12th Cavahy Division on its
right, moved forward on to the town, which now also
suffered from the fire of the artillery posted at Gauchy.
The cavalry repeatedly broke through the retreating
portions of the enemy's force ; and the railway station
and suburb, in which was found the rear-guard only of
the Twentieth French Corps, fell after a short struggle.

Whilst on the southern portion of the field of battle
the action took this turn, the attack on the northern
side had also been renewed.

Already by two o'clock the 28th Regiment from
Roupy had carried the farm-house of I'Epine-de-Dallon,
on the Ham road ; and almost simultaneously Count
von der Groeben's infantry came up to resume the
offensive.

Whilst on the right some companies of the 4th and
44th Regiments opposed the debouching of the French
out of the extensive woods. Major von Elpons, with
six companies of the Crown Prince Grenadiers, ad-
vanced from Holnon and Selency upon Franeilly, and,
notwithstanding the hot fire of the defenders, forced
an entrance into this most straggling village, in which
many prisoners were made. As, however, the East-
Prussian Regiment advanced yet further south of the
Roman road, it had in its turn to sustain a formidable
attack.

To cover their threatened line of retreat, Michelet's
brigade from Foyet once -more advanced, and Pauly's
brigade also marched upon Moulin-Coutte. This posi-
tion, which had in the meantime been strengthened by
artillery, was, however, obstinately contested by the
44th Regiment, and when the Grenadier companies
poured in from the left of the Roman road, the enemy's
attack was here again repulsed.

328 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

Meanwhile the 29th Brigade, followed by the 30th^
had begun to move on St. Quentin, having the 33rd
Regiment on its right and the 65th Regiment on the
left. The latter regiment now took complete posses-
sion of the more extensive of the woods, and forty-
eight guns were driven up on both sides of the road
from Savy. The further advance of the infantry was
effected in company column and in extended order, for
the troops were suffering severely from the heavy
grenade fire brought to bear upon them by the French.
Howeverj the Lagrange and Isnard brigades did not
await the assault, and at four o'clock retired on St.
Quentin with the loss of one gun.

The French artillery once more came into action at
Rocourt, but at five o'clock had quickly to abandon
the position, and the French now confined themselves
to the defence of the barricaded entrances into the
suburbs of St. Martin.

Six Prussian batteries were brought up against
these, and the 29th Brigade was for some time engaged
under a hot fire of the strongly manned buildings and
gardens ; whereupon several companies from Rocourt
established themselves in the suburb, in which street-
fighting was still continued, even when Lieutenant-
Colonel von Hiillessem had succeeded in crossing the
bridge over the canal, and entered the town itself.

By four o'clock, General Faidherbe had already con-
cluded that the Twenty-third Corps would in all prob- .
ability be unable to hold its position. Under these
circumstances, his choice was limited between a night
retreat, or throwing himself into St. Quentin. He had
not yet come to any decision, when he met in the town
Greneral Lecointe, who reported that he had abandoned
the defence of the left bank of the Somme. Thanks to
the resistance still offered by the Twenty-third Corps

BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN. 329

on the north, the Twenty-second was enabled to re-
tire unmolested on Le-Cateau.

The officer in supreme command now ordered Geu'
eral Paulze d'lvoy to retire on that place, but the latter
only received the order at six in the evening, when the
brigades on the right wing — Pauly's and Michelet's —
had already been routed in the direction of Cambrai.
The more obstinately the two remaining brigades now
defended the subui'b of St. Martin, the more critical
for them must prove the result of the action. Attacked
in rear by the battalion under Colonel von Boecking,
the gi'eater portion were made prisoners. The 41st
Eegiment alone took 54 officers and 2260 men prisoners,
besides capturing 4 guns. General Faidherbe only
escaped a similar fate through the instrumentality of
the inhabitants.

The action only ceased at haK-past six that evening,
and the troops passed the night in the town and in the
captured villages.

The hard-won victory had cost the Germans 96 offi-
cers and 2304 men; 3000 wounded Frenchmen were
found on the scene of action, and the number of un-
wounded prisoners exceeded 9000.

According to theory, pursuit should invariably fol-
low on a victory — a law recognized by all, and particu-
larly acquiesced in by novices ; and yet, in practice it
is seldom observed. Military history points to few
examples, such as the well-known one of La-Belle-
Alliance. It requires a very strong and pitiless will to
impose fresh exertions and dangers upon a body of
troops who have marched, fought, and fasted for ten
or twelve hours, instead of the longed-for rest and
food. But given the existence of this supposed will,
pursuit will yet depend on the circumstances under
which the victory has been obtained. It wiU be diffi-

330 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

cult of execution when all the units on the field of
battle, as at Koniggratz, have become so intermixed
that it requires hours to again reform them into tactical
bodies ; or when, as at St. Quentin, all, even the troops
last committed to action, have become so entangled
that not one single tactically complete infantry force
is available. "Without the support of such a body,
cavahy at night will be delayed by every obstacle and
every small post of the enemy, and by itself can sel-
dom fulfil the task.

General von Goeben did not pursue the enemy till
the following day. His advanced cavahy fought up to
the suburbs of Cambrai and the glacis of Landrecies,
without meeting with any resistance, and they brought
in merely some hundred stragglers. The infantry
divisions pursued within one mile (thi*ee English) of
Cambrai. Against this fortress nothing could be un-
dertaken through want of siege material, and there
was no military advantage to be derived in extending
further north. Among the news to hand, it transpired
that a considerable portion of the French Northern
Army had retired upon Lille, Douai, and Valenciennes.
As fresh enterprises were consequently not to be ex-
pected, General von Goeben brought ^lis force back to
the Somme, where towards the end of the month they
entered upon their winter quarters, between Amiens
and St. Quentin.

On the Lower Seine, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg
had entered Eouen with the Thirteenth Corps on the
25th, after having encountered on the march only a
few franctireurs. Although General Loysel had in-
creased his force to nearly 30,000 through the reinforce-
ments from Cherbourg, he had remained entirely in-
active.

General von Goeben had in view the transfer to the

SIEGE OF BELFORT. 331

Army of the Somme of that portion of the First Corps
still before Rouen; but this was disapproved of by
telegram from head-quarters, who, on political grounds,
ordered its further retention there.

OPERATIONS AT THE SOUTH-EASTERN SEAT OF WAR UP TO
17TH OF JANUARY.

Investment ofBelfort. — At the south-eastern seat of
war, the forces detailed to operate against Belf ort had
only been gradually brought together under cover of
the Fom'teenth Army Corps.

The town is surrounded by a bastioned enceinte.
The citadel, standing upon high rocks, has the advan-
tage of a great command, and for more effective fire
its surrounding works are terraced. On the left bank
of the Savoureuse newly erected lines of works pro-
tected the suburb and railway station. On the adjacent
heights to the north-east the forts of La-Miotte and
La- Justice, connected to the main work by continuous
lines, enclosed a spacious intrenched camp. The two
forts of Les-Perches might certainly have threatened
the safety of the site, approaching the citadel as they
do on the south, to within only 1000 metres, from
whence the works on the left bank of the river come
under the direct fire of its guns. But here two walled
forts had been erected before the advent of the enemy,
and besides these the adjoining woods and positions,
as for instance Perouse and Danjoutin, had been in-
trenched ; nor was the fortress deficient in bomb-proof
places. It was armed with 341 heavy guns, and pro-
visioned for five months. As immediately after the
opening of the campaign the Seventh French Corps
had vacated Alsace, only about 5000 Gardes Mobiles
remained behind in Belf ort, whose garrison, however,
increased by the National Guard, now exceeded 17,000.

332 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

The far-seeing Commandant, Colonel Denf ert, exerted
all his resources mainly in the occupation in force of
the zone in his immediate front. The advanced detach-
ments were every day assigned fresh operations, which
the artillery of the fortress had to support at extreme
ranges.

Opposed to him. General von Tresckow could, in the
first place, only dispose of twenty weak Landwehr
battalions, five squadrons, and six field batteries, mak-
ing an aggregate of barely 15,000. At first, he had to
confine himself to a mere investment. The troops
intrenched themselves in the distantly radiating vil-
lages, and were called upon to repel many sorties.

Orders had been received from army head-quarters
to undertake the regular investment of the fortress.
To Greneral von Mertens was entrusted the direction
of the engineer duties, and to Lieutenant-Colonel
Scheliha, the command of the artillery.

The difiiculties of the undertaking were apparent.
The rocky nature of the soil could not but increase the
labor of throwing up earthworks, and the cold season
was approaching. The assault could only be delivered
successfully on the south of the main work — the for-
midable citadel. At this period only fifty heavy guns
were available, and the infantry was not even strong
enough to efiiciently invest the place on all sides.

Under these circumstances, it was left to the discre-
tion of Greneral von Tresckow to attempt the possibility
of reducing Belfort by mere bombardment. Towards
this purpose the attack was chiefly directed on the
western side, in which quarter, after the enemy's gar-
rison had been driven out of Valdoye, the infantry
occupied Essert and Bavilliers, as well as the adjacent
wooded heights.

On December 2nd, seven batteries were constructed

SIEGE OF BELFOKT. 333

on the plateau between these two villages, by 3000 men,
under cover of two battalions. The hard-frozen ground
added to the difficulties of the task ; yet, notwithstand-
ing the moonlight night, these operations would appear
to have escaped the attention of the besieged. When
on the following morning the sun had dispersed the
fog and lit up the fortress, fire was opened upon it.

The fortress replied at first but feebly, but afterwards
with increasing vigor, from the entire line of works,
up to within 4000 metres of the forts of La-Miotte and
La-Justice, and the losses in the trenches were con-
siderable.

Nevertheless, four fresh batteries were constructed
in advance of Bavilliers, and on the fall of La-Tuilerie
the infantry pressed on until within 150 metres of the
enemy's most advanced trenches.

They succeeded also in causing a conflagration within
the town; but the ammunition was soon exhausted,
whilst from the high citadel an effective fire was un-
ceasingly kept up, and there were constantly renewed
sorties on the part of the garrison to be repelled. It
was now clear, after all previous attempts had failed,
that no assault could prove successful unless systemat-
ically carried out.

Colonel von Ostrowski, to the south, had, on Decem-
ber 13th, carried the French positions of Adelnans and
the wooded heights of Le-Bosmont and La-Brosse. To
the east of the latter place two batteries, and on the
northern skirt four additional batteries had been
thrown up, not without great difficulty arising from
thaw having bogged the soil. On January 7th fifty
guns opened fire.

The superiority of the artillery of the attack was
soon manifest. Fort Bellevue suffered severely, and
the fire from Basses-Perches was entirely silenced.

334 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

But more important than all, the village of Danjoutin,
strongly garrisoned and intrenched by the enemy,
opposed all further advance. During the night of the
8th January, seven companies attacked this position
on the northern side, at the same time occupying the
railway embankment. With empty riiEles, the Land-
wehr posted themselves against the hot fire of the
French, and broke into the streets up to the church
itself. The supports hastening from the fort were
driven back at the railway embankment, but the fight
went on around the buildings in the southern quarter
of the village till towards noon. Of the defenders,
twenty ofS.eers and 700 men were taken prisoners.

Typhus and small-pox had broken out in Belf ort ;
but with the besieging force also the number of the
sick reached a considerable figure, caused by arduous
work undertaken in inclement weather.

As a rule, the battahons could only muster 500
strong, and this led General von Tresckow to devote
half the number to securing the investment from with-
out, principally on the south.

Trustworthy intelligence estimated the French
strength at Besangon at 62,000. Although hitherto
entirely inactive, they now evinced a strong desire to
press on to the relief of the hard-pressed fortress, by
the line of the Doubs.

The fortified castle of Montbeliard was held by one
battalion, and armed with heavy guns. Between the
Doubs and the Swiss frontier, at Delle, General
Debschitz had taken up a position with eight battahons,
two squadrons, and two batteries, and General von
Werder concentrated the Fourteenth Corps at Noroy,
Aillevans, and Athesans, to oppose in strength any
movement on the part of the garrison.

From January 5th onwards there were fought before

FREYCINET'S TACTICS. 335

Vesoul a series of engagements, in which the besiegers
advanced from the south and west up to within a dis-
tance of one mile of that town. There could be no
doubt that very considerable forces were engaged in
these operations. East of the Ognon, the enemy's
posts were advanced as far as Rougemont, although in
lesser force. In these actions 500 were taken prisoners ;
and it was at once evident that besides the Eighteenth,
also the Twenty-fourth and Twentieth Corps formed
part of Boui'baki's army ; and this circumstance sud-
denly threw a new light upon a totally changed phase
of the war.

TRANSFEE OF THE FRENCH EASTERN ARMY TO THE SOUTH-
EASTERN SEAT OF WAR, TOWARDS THE END OF DECEM-
BER.

As had been foreseen at army head-quarters at Ver-
saiUes, an attempt had been made to bring about a
combined action between the forces of Chanzy and
Bourbaki. As we have alreadj^ seen, the advance of
the former (Chanzy) was met by Prince Frederick
Charles, akeady on the Loir, and Bourbaki had pre-
pared his advance by Montargis to the relief of Paris.
But he delayed its execution until the 19th December,
when the Second German Army had already returned
to Orleans, from its expedition to Le-Mans. General
Bourbaki then perceived the fact that the Second
Army would, upon his further advance, fall on his
flank, and he the more readily fell in with another
plan, devised by Monsieur de Freycinet, and favored
by the Dictator Gambetta.

This was for the Fifteenth Corps to remain at
Bourges and to secure that place by intrenched posi-
tions at Vierzon and Nevers; the Eighteenth and
Twentieth were to proceed to Beaune by railway, and^

336 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAR.

in conjunction with Garibaldi and Cremer, 70,000
strong, to occupy Dijon. The newly-formed Twenty-
fourth Corps was also to be moved by railway from
Lyons to Besangon, where, in combination with the
forces already there, it would attain a strength of
50,000. Co-operating then with the "victorieux de
Dijon," it would be easy to raise the siege of Belfort,
"meme sans coup ferir." It was considered that the
mere presence in that place of this large force, greatly
exceeding, as it did, 100,000, would preclude any at-
tacks upon the Northern forts ; in any case, there was
the certainty of cutting through the enemy's various
hues of communication, and later on, the prospect of
a combined action with Faidherbe.

The movements by rail from the Loire to the Saone
had already commenced by December 23rd. In the
absence of aU preparations, many interruptions in
the traffic naturally occurred, and the troops suffered
severely from the intense cold and from want of neces-
sary comforts. After Chagny and Chalons-sur-Seine
had been reached, and it was ascertained that the Ger-
mans had akeady evacuated Dijon, it was decided to
again embark the troops so as to bring them nearer to
Besan(,'on, whence arose a fresh delay ; and it was only
in the beginning of the new year that the Eastern
Army was in readiness, between Dijon and Besan^on.
The Fifteenth Corps was also ordered up, but it took
fourteen days to get so far.

The comprehensive plan of Freycinet, and his san-
guine expectations, had been favored by the circum-
stance that the transfer of a large contingent of the
army to a distant place in the seat of war had been
kept from the knowledge of the Second Army, as well
as from that of the Fourteenth Corps and army head-
quarters, for a fortnight. Rumors and newspaper

NEW PHASE OF THE WAR. 337

articles had no doubt somewhat before this given inti-
mations, but General von Werder's telegram of the 5th
January was the first really authentic announcement,
by which it was known beyond doubt that the Germans
now stood face to face with a changed aspect of the
situation. In Versailles, arrangements were at once
made and steps taken for the formation of a new
Southern Army,

There was available for this purpose the Second
Corps at Auxerre, under General von Zastrow, which
during this period of uncertainty had constantly oper-
ated between the Saone and Yonne, according as the
one or the other appeared to be threatened. The
supreme command of these two corps, to which was
afterwards added the Fourteenth, was entrusted to
General von Manteuffel. General von Werder could
not be immediately reinforced, and for a time the
Fourteenth Corps was thrown upon its own resources.

Notwithstanding their advantage, the French did
more manoeuvring than fighting. General Bourbaki
aimed at surrounding the left wing of the Fourteenth
Corps, and thus entirely cutting it off from Belfort.

On 5th January the Eighteenth Corps had advanced
by Grandvelle, and the Twentieth by Echenoz-le-Sec,
on Vesoul ; but, as we have seen, they had there met
wdth opposition, and as the corps diverging to the right
to Esprels heard that Villersexel was occupied by the
Germans, the Commander determined upon a still more
easterly and circuitous route. On the 8th the two
corps of the left wing marched off to the right, the
Eighteenth to Montbozon, the Twentieth to Rouge-
mont ; the Twenty-fourth went back on Cuse. At the
same time General Cremer received orders to move
from Dijon on Vesoul. On the 9th, therefore, the
Twenty-fourth and Twentieth Corps lay near Ville-
22

338 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

chevreux and Villargent on the Arcey-Villersexel road,
whilst the head of the Eighteenth Corps reached that
latter place and Esprels.

Greneral von Werder had no alternative but to follow
this flank movement in all haste. He ordered the
Baden Division to Athesans, the 4th Reserve Division
to Aillevans, and von der Goltz's brigade to No^'oy-le-
Bourg. The trains were marched on Lure.

ACTION OF VILLEESEXEL.

(January 9th.)

On January 9th, at seven in the morning, the Reserve
Division was sent from Noroy on to Aillevans, and
commenced bridging the Ognon, to admit of the con-
tinuation of the march. A flanking part of the 25th
Regiment, sent to operate on the right, was fired on at
Yillersexel, and the attempt to carry the stone bridge
at that place failed shortly after. The French had
occupied, with two and a half battalions, the town,
situated on a height, on the further bank of the river.
Shortly afterwards reinforcements came up on the
German side. Two batteries opened fire upon the
place and upon the still advancing enemy. The 25tli
Regiment crossed the river and brokeNinto the walled-
in park and into the castle. At one o'clock the French
were driven out of the town, with the loss of many
prisoners, and a cessation of hostilities ensued.

The Prussian contingent had been seriously threat-
ened in flank by the advance from Esprels of the 1st
Division and the reserve artillery of the French Eight-
eenth Corps. General von der Goltz, however, op-
posed them by occupying the village of Moimay.

He also sent to Villersexel nine companies of the
30th Regiment, to the relief of the 25th Regiment, so

ACTION OF VILLEKSEXEL. 339

as to allow the latter to rejoin its own division in the
forward march. His combined brigade was eventually
to form the rear-guard to the entire column.

General von Werder, who observed the considerable
force in which the French moved on Villersexel from
the south, had concluded that there was less to be
gained by forcing his own passage across the Ognon
than by opposing that of the French, who saw in it
facilities for a nearer approach to Belfort. He there-
fore recalled the infantry already issuing from the
southern quarter of the town, and sent it with the
batteries to the northern side of the river. Here the
main body of the 4th Reserve Division took up a de-
fensive position, and the Baden Division was stopped
in its march at Arpenans and Lure, to come to the
reinforcement it now stood greatly in need of.

It was already evening when large columns of the
French advanced on Villersexel and sheUed the town
with their artillery.

Favored by the darkness, the French found their
way into the park and castle, from which the German
garrison had already been withdrawn ; and as the
general condition of things did not seem to necessitate
the occupation of Villersexel, the commanding officer
ordered the evacuation of the place. Though hard
pressed by the enemy, this move had been nearly com-
pleted, when orders arrived from General von Werder
to hold the town.

At once four battalions from the Reserve Division
advanced to the renewed attack. The 25th Regiment
turned about at the bridge over the Ognon and joined
them. The Landwehr rushed into the lower floor of
the large castle, but the French defended the upper
floors and the cellar. On the stairs and in the passages
of the already burning buildings there ensued a hot

340 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

and changeful combat, and the fight was maintained
in the streets. Not till the General in command was
left to his own free will, and ordered a cessation, were
dispositions made at one o'clock in the morning for
gradual retirement, which was completed by three.
The Reserve Division then recrossed the bridge at
Aillevans, and occupied St. Sulpice on its right.

Greneral von der Goltz had contested Moimay until
evening.

Of the Fourteenth Corps only 15,000 had been en-
gaged, of whom 26 officers and 553 men were killed.
The French losses included 27 officers and 627 men ;
but they left behind in the hands of the Germans 700
unwounded prisoners. Those who chiefly took part
in these operations were the Eighteenth and Twentieth
Corps; the Twenty-fourth Corps, on account of the
fighting behind it, had discontinued its march from
Arcey to Sevenans. Detachments of the gradually in-
coming Fifteenth Corps moved from the south in the
direction of Belfort.

On the morning of 10th January, General von Wer-
der massed his corps in the vicinity of Aillevans, ready
to engage the enemy should the latter attempt an
advance on Villersexel. But an attack was not made,
and thus the march was resumed thai same morning.
As a matter of fact, the French in three corps were as
near to Belfort as the Germans were with three divis-
ions. To cover the retreat, the Reserve Division took
up a position at Athesans, and on the following day
all the commands had reached and occupied the Lisaine
line. On the right, by Frahier and Chalonvillars, stood
the Baden Division ; in the centre, the Reserve Brigade,
between Chagey and Couthenans ; on the left, the Re-
serve Division, at Hericourt and Tavey. On the south.
General von Debschitz watched from Delle, and Colonel

ADVANCE ON THE LISAINE. 341

von Bredow from Arcey; and to the west, at Lure,
was Colonel von Willisen, with the detachment from
Vesoul of eight companies, thirteen squadrons, two
batteries.

It would, in fact, have been possible to pass between
the enemy and Belfort.

The French leader had, under the intoxicating
impression of a victory, resigned himself to inactivity.
" Le General Billot," he reported to the Grovernment at
Bordeaux, "a occupe Esprels et s'y est maintenu."
We know that he was never attacked there at all, and
that he did not succeed in driving away General von
der Goltz from the vicinity of Moimay. " Le General
Clinchant a enleve avec un entrain remarquable Viller-
sexel ; " but the fight of the 9th was, as regards the
Germans, maintained with only a portion of the Four-
teenth Corps, to secure the right flank in the march of
the main body. Wliilst, then, these moves were zeal-
ously continued, the French army remained stationary
for two days, ready for action and with the confident
expectation that the enemy, described as beaten, would
return to the attack.

Only on the 13th did the Twenty-fourth Corps
advance on Arcey, the Twentieth on Saulnot, and the
Eighteenth follow up to Sevenans. The Fifteenth was
to support an attack on Arcey by Ste. Marie.

General von Werder had utilized this interval, and
preceded the troops to test the possibility of taking
up a position on the Lisaine, and to take counsel with
General von Tresckow.

An inspection showed that at Frahier the Lisaine
becomes an unimportant streamlet, flowing through a
broad grassy hollow, and thence to Chagey through
steep wooded slopes. At Hericourt the valley opens
out into a wide plain, which is, however, commanded

342 THE PRANCO-GEEMAN WAR.

by the rocky heights of Mont-Vaudois. Lower down
the wooded heights follow the river as far as Mont-
beliard, which forms a strong base where the line closes
by the Allaine.

The wooded nature of the plain, west of the Lisaine,
would necessarily increase the assailant's difficulties
in deploying large masses, and with a long artillery
column. It is true that during the prevailing severe
cold the river was everywhere frozen over ; but only
two high-roads ran in the direction by which the
French army in the valley were marching down the
stream on Montbehard and on Hericourt. The other
ways down were narrow, hollow roads, rendered diffi-
cult by frost.

General von Tresckow had already occupied the
most important position with siege-guns, the Castle of
Montbeliard with six, and the neighboring height of
La-Grange-Dame with five heavy guns. Seven of
them were placed on Mont-Vaudois and near Heri-
court; besides these, twenty-one others commanded
the valley of the Allaine as far as Delle, on the south.

All the troops that could be spared from the invest-
ing force were withdrawn from before Belfort. Still
there remained the important consideration that the
available forces might not suffice to entirely cover the
whole of the Lisaine line. The right wing was the
locally weakest portion of the whole position, but here
there was- the least danger of the enemy's main attack,
for the many needs of the numerous but inadequately
equipped French army made the nearest possible vicin-
ity of one of the railroads a necessity. The Vesoul
line, over Lure, was broken in many places, and the
Besan^on line led to the strong left wing. The country
north of Chagey might therefore be held by weaker
forces, and a reserve was formed out of the largest part

THE LINE OF THE LISAINE. 343

of the Baden Division, which was distributed in rear
of centre and left between Mandrevillars, Brevilliers,
and Charmont.

The respite accorded by the enemy was turned to
account with the utmost eagerness for the digging of
rifle-pits, the building of batteries, the restoring of
telegraph and relay lines, the improvement of roads,
and the providing of victuals and ammunition.

(January 13th.) On the morning of the 13th the
posting of the 3rd Reserve Division was begun at
Arcey, Ste. Marie, and Gonvillars. They were in-
structed to withdraw before a superior force, but to
hold their own long enough to entail the deployment
of the French columns. The duel with the widely
dispersed French artillery was therefore prolonged for
some time ; then, after a three h<j)urs' obstinate resist-
ance, a new position was taken up behind the stream
of the Rupt, and the retreat on Tavey delayed until
four in the afternoon. The advanced guard of Gen-
eral von der Goltz, after a whole brigade had deployed
against it, also took up a position on the same level,
at Couthenans.

Along the Allaine line the French had not succeeded
in driving General von Debschitz's detachment south
of Dasle and Croix.

(January 14th.) On the 14th, General von Willisen,
with fifty dismounted dragoons, drove back the enemy
who were advancing on Lure, and then retired with
his detachment on Ronchamp.

The French army did not, even on that day, under-
take a serious attack. It lay massed with the Fifteenth,
Twenty-fourth, and Twentieth Corps, and hardly a
mile (German) from the German left and centre. The
right was supposed by General Bourbaki to rest upon
Mont-Vaudois. His plan was to cross the Lisaine

344 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

above this place in force, and to facilitate the front
attack by surrounding the enemy. The Eighteenth
Army Corps and the division under Cremer were told
off for this purpose. The di*awback to this judicious
arrangement was that the two above-mentioned detach-
ments, destined by the officer in supreme command
to open the fight on the 14th, had to advance by
the longest line of march. On this day the leading
troops of the Eighteenth Army Corps barely succeeded
in reaching Lomont, by difficult hill and woodland
passes, and the Cremer brigade had only then begun
to advance from Vesoul. A postponement to the 15th
was thereupon determined.

On the German side, a general attack of the superior
enemy was hourly expected, and Oeneral von Werder
felt himself bound to telegraph the extreme seriousness
of his position to Versailles. The rivers, being frozen,
were passable, and the duty of covering Belfort cur-
tailed the liberty of his movements and endangered the
existence of his corps. He earnestly prayed that a
decision might be arrived at as to whether Belfort was
still to be held.

At the army head-quarters it was considered that
any further withdrawal of the Fifteenth Army Corps
would have the immediate effect of liaising the siege
and causing the loss of the considerable materiel which
had been provided for it; that it was impossible to
foresee where such a line of action would end; and
that it could but delay the co-operation of the army
advancing by forced marches under Oeneral von
Manteuffel. At three o'clock p.m. on the 15th of
January a positive order was conveyed to General von
Werder to accept battle in front of Belfort. He was,
as was only fair, relieved of the moral responsibility
of the consequences of a possibly disastrous issue.

BATTLE OF THE LISAINE. 345

But before this order could reach him, the General had
already decided on its execution.

BATTLE OF THE LISAINE.

(January 15th to 17th.)

(January 15th.) On the morning of the 15th of
January, the French Fifteenth Army Corps, with two
divisions augmented by artillery, advanced on Mont-
behard, a third followed in reserve. The East-Prussian
Landwehr battahons, which had pushed forward as far
as the farm of Mont-Che vis and Ste. Suzanne, held
their position for a long time, advanced to the attack
of their own accord, and drove the heads of the enemy's
columns back upon the stream of the Rupt. But when
the latter, during the afternoon, posted themselves in
force along the edge of the wood, they were at two
o'clock ordered back to the left bank of the Lisaine.
The neighboring town of Montbeliard, entirely com-
manded by the surrounding heights, was voluntarily
evacuated, and the fortified castle alone held. But east
of Montbeliard General von Gliimer with the 1st Baden
Brigade took up a position, and had four field-batteries
besides siege-guns brought up to the plateau of La-
Grange-Dame.

Towards the close of the day the French, after con-
tinuous but ineffectual bombardments from eight bat-
teries, took possession of the town, but did not make
any further advance.

Neither had they succeeded in crossing the Lisaine
at Bethoncourt. An officer and sixty men, who sought
cover within a walled cemetery from the sharp fire of
the defenders, were taken prisoners.

Further to the north the French Twenty-fourth
.Corps continued to advance, but it was two o'clock be-

346 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

fore their columns succeeded in deploying out of the
wood. Four battalions did, indeed, succeed in enter-
ing and occupying the \dllage of Bussurel, situated on
the western bank of the Lisaine, but their further
advance was frustrated by the fire of the defenders
posted behind the railway embankment and by that of
the Baden battalions and batteries drawn from the
main reserve.

Hericourt, but one mile from Belfort, on the great
high-road of Besancon, became a place of importance
in the German line. Here the enemy on the hither
side of the Lisaine was met by the right wing of the
4th Eeserve Division.

The little wooded height of Mougnot, which forms
a sort of bridge-head at the narrow gorge through
which the road passes, had been fortified by abatis,
batteries, and rifle-pits, the town in the rear prepared
for defence, and the base of the heights on either side
studded with artillery. Four East-Prussian Landwehr
battalions were joined on the right by the Reserve
Brigade, which held the slopes of Mont-Vaudois as far
as Luze.

At about ten o'clock the French artillery deployed
on the open heights close to the line of approach in
the neighborhood of Tremoins. Upon their infantry
advancing on the left over Byans, the detachment
which till then had been left at Tavey went back to
Hericourt in reserve, and the enemy's first attack on
Mougnot was repulsed by the garrison and by the fire
of sixty-one guns on the further bank of the river.
The attempt was not repeated on that day, and the
French confined themselves to a sharp but ineffectual
cannonade.

According to the instructions left behind by Greneral
Bourbaki, the French were to await the result of the

BATTLE OF THE LISAINE. 347

great encircling movement which was to be carried
out by General Billot with the Eighteenth and by the
Cremer divisions. As, however, these latter had not
yet put in an appearance, the main reserve had to be
brought forward left of Coisevaux to secure G-eneral
Clinchant's flank.

The orders from head-quarters had only reached the
Eighteenth Corps at midnight. The latter had, more-
over, to effect a heavy march over deeply snowed-up
woodland paths. This entailed intercommunications,
not only between the wing-columns of the 1st and 3rd
Divisions, but even with the division under Cremer at
Lyoffans. This division had, by dint of the greatest
exertion, reached Lure during the night, and could not
get beyond Beverne until nine in the morning. A
fresh delay was occasioned by the order to bring up
in front of the infantry the artillery (even the reserve
artillery, which brought up the rear), and thus it hap-
pened that the Eighteenth Corps did not succeed in
deploying two of its divisions against Luze and Chagey
till between 12 and 2 p.m.

The 1st Division occupied Couthenans with one bat-
talion, and brought up five batteries on the decline
behind the heights to the north of that place.

But the fire from the bank on the other side of the
river prevented their further ascent, and after the lapse
of a short time several of these detachments had but
two guns left fit for action, although the Germans,
with regard to the difficulty of procuring fresh ammu-
nition, had used it as sparingly as possible. At three
o'clock there was a pause in the firing, which was
resumed on the arrival of reinforcements, when the
artillery of the Twenty-fourth Corps took part in it.
An infantry attack on a larger scale was not yet at-
tempted.

348 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

There was scarcely more purpose in the movement
of the 3rd Division against Chagey, which was only
occupied by a Baden battalion ; yet it was here that
the enveloping movement of the German right wing
by way of Mont-Vaudois was to take place. The
wood adjoining the first houses of the village and its
steepness was the only difficulty attached to the descent
of the hill. Two French battalions suddenly appeared
from the gorge that lay south of it and drove in the
Baden outposts ; the further attack was to be supported
from Couthenans on the south, but the infantry ad-
vancing from thence found itseK forced to turn back
by the fire from the opposite bank. Only after a
renewed effort did the Zouaves succeed in entering
Chagey, where a hard fight began amid the houses.
Meanwhile two Baden battalions arrived, who, at five
o'clock, di'ove the enemy out of the villages back into
the wood. Fresh reinforcements hastened to their
support from the reserve near at hand, the short win-
ter's day was over, and during the night the French
attempted nothing further. The 2nd Division of the
French corps had only arrived as far as Beverne, the
cavalry had not moved from Lyoffans.

The Cremer division had, despite its late arrival at
Lure, continued the march in the'' early morning.
After the above-mentioned halts and intercommunica-
tions the 9tli Brigade advanced on Etobon, and there
at noon an engagement took place with a detachment
of General von Degenfeld. When the 2nd Brigade
came up, the first moved forward through the Wood
of Thui-e, to cross the Lisaine above Chagey. The
roads had first of all to be partly made practicable by
pioneers, which occasioned considerable delay. The
2nd Brigade then followed in the dark, leaving a recon-
noitring party behind at Etobon. A fresh collision

BATTLE OF THE LISAINE. 349

with some Baden contingents determined General
Cremer to extinguish all the watch-fires. His troops
remained under arms throughout the hard winter night.

On the German side, all 'who were not told off for
guard found shelter in the neighboring villages, only
the pioneers were kept at work with their pickaxes.
The actions had cost both sides about 600 men, with-
out bringing about any decisive result ; but every day
was a gain to the defenders.

General von Werder, on the heights north of Heri-
court, had received constant reports as to the issue
from the head-quarter Staff officers, who had been
posted in various places, by which the reinforcements
from the reserves could be regulated. Still the reserve
ammunition was a cause of anxiety, as a transport
announced from Baden had not yet arrived.

General Bourbaki informed his Government that he
had taken Montbeliard (of course without the castle),
occupied the villages on the west bank of the Lisaine,
and that he would attack on the 16th. He had learned
from General Billot that the German right wing ex-
tended far across Mont-Vaudois, whence he gathered
that they had been considerably reinforced ; he esti-
mated the enemy at 80,000 to 100,000 men. Meanwhile
he looked forward to obtaining good results by extend-
ing the encircling movement further to the west.

(January 16th.) At half -past six on the morning of
the 16th the Germans once more got under arms in
the same positions as the previous day.

The French began the attack with their right wing
again. From the loop-holed houses they fired on the
Landwehr company stationed at the castle of Mont-
beliard, causing some loss among the latter as well as
among the working gunners. The summons to sur-
render was disregarded, and the fire of the fort artillery

350 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

used to sucli good purpose against two batteries that
had just appeared on the neighboring height, that these
were obhged to retire, leaving behind them two guns.
Neither could they advance from a new position they
had taken up at the farm of Mont-Chevis, where they
were reinforced by three batteries, for the fire from
La-Grange-Dame, although they continued the can-
nonade until dark. No attempt was made from Mont-
beliard to break the German line.

Further to the left the reinforced 1st Division of the
French Fifteenth Corps advanced on Bethoncourt. At
one o'clock the fire of their artillery from Mont-Chevis
and Byans obliged a Baden battery to limber up, and
it was then brought to bear on the village. Meanwhile
large bodies had been massed in the neighboring forest,
and at three o'clock advanced out of it. General Glii-
mer had abeady sent reinforcements to the threatened
spot. Two determined attempts to carry the place by
rushes close up to the position were frustrated by the
annihilating artillery and rifle fire of the defenders.
A third attack with a whole brigade, at four o'clock,
was not even permitted to approach. The losses on
the French side were considerable, the snowy field was
strewn with the slain. Some unwounded prisoners
were also taken.

One division of the Twenty-fourth French Army
Corps had taken up a covered position in the woods
behind Byans, and as they had already occupied Bus-
surel on the previous day, the German line of defence
in the rear of the railway embankment appeared to be
threatened from the immediate vicinity. The General
in command therefore sent General Keller, with two
Baden fusilier battalions and one heavy battery, from
Brevilliers in this direction. The latter joined the two
battalions who had been engaged on the slope of the

BATTLE OF TEE LISAINE. 351

hill since morning. The fire from five of the enemy's
batteries was soon silenced by the unerring grenades
of the German guns. At noon the French artillery
retired from Byans, leaving here also two guns, which
could only be brought away later. The infantry, one
division strong, had only threatened to break the line,
without proceeding to carry it out.

The Twentieth Corps brought up two divisions
against the Hericourt — Luze line. A thick fog covered
the valley, and the early cannonade was at first scarcely
answered by the Germans. To obtain some insight
into the plans of the enemy, two companies of the for-
mer had advanced on the height west of St. Valbert,
surprising the opponents who were advancing from
Byans with so rapid a fire that they turned back. But
soon after, at half -past nine, several battalions from
Tavey attempted to carry the Mougnot. Two attacks
were frustrated by the steady resistance of the Land-
wehr battalions, and a third attempt directed against
the southern defile of Hericourt had no result. About
four o'clock the infantry again massed against the
Mougnot, but renouncing further attacks under the
fire from Mont Salamou confined themselves till even-
ing to an ineffectual cannonade.

At Chagey two divisions of the Eighteenth Corps
found themselves face to face with the Germans. They
did not attempt anything.

The slackness with which, on the 16th January, the
action against the whole front from Montbeliard to
Chagey was conducted, points to the conclusion that
the French were everywhere awaiting the issue of the
plan of encircling the German right wing.

This task now devolved on General Cremer. The
2nd Division of the Eighteenth Corps joined him at
Etobon.

352 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

Two divisions advanced thence on Chenebier, where
General von Degenfeld was with two battahons, two
batteries, and one squadron. There could be no doubt
as to the result. At eleven o'clock the Penhoat divis-
ion of the Eighteenth Corps advanced from the west
to encircle northwards, and Cremer's division, for the
purpose of barring the defenders' retreat on Belfort,
advanced from the south, the wood of La-Thure cover-
ing his approach. The batteries of both divisions were
brought up on its northern edge, where they opened
fire. After firing had continued for two hours, the
masses of infantry advanced from three sides. Under
General Cremer's personal guidance the Baden fusiliers
were driven from the south to the north of the village,
and as here the surrounding movement through the
wood of Montedin had become practicable. General von
Degenfeld was, after an obstinate resistance, obliged
to begin the retreat in a northerly direction through
Frahier. Thence he again turned south-east and took
up a position in front of Chalonvillars, on the high-
standing mill of Rougeot, where, at six o'clock, he was
joined by Colonel Bayer with strong reinforcements.
The French did not pursue ; the Cremer division, which
had lost 1000 men, retired, on the contrary, on the
wood of La-Thure, while the Penhoat"-di vision confined
itself to the occupation of Chenebier.

Accordingly the German line of defence was not
broken on this day ; still, its extreme right wing had
been driven back to within three-quarters of a mile of
Belfort.

The fortress celebrated the victory of French arms
by a feu-de-joie, but made no serious attack on the
investing forces, akeady weakened by the dispatch of
reinforcements, who, however, on their side, quietly
continued the construction of batteries.

BATTLE OF THE LISAINE. 353

General von Werder, desirous above all of setting
the scene of action back to his right wing, could only
hold in reserve four battalions, four squadi'ons, and
two batteries, bringing up these from the least exposed
places, and even from Belfort, to Brevilliers and Man-
drevillars. At eight o'clock in the evening General
Keller was ordered to retake Chenebier. To this
end he left Mandi-evillars with two Baden battalions,
reached Moulin-Eougeot at midnight, and found Fra-
hier abeady occupied by Colonel Bayer.

(January 17th.) On the morning of the 17th, eight
battalions, two squadi'ons, and four batteries had as-
sembled there. Three of these detachments advanced
on the northern, three on the southern part of Chene-
bier ; the others remained in reserve at the mill, where
also three 15-pounders had been set up.

At half-past 4 a.m. the first coluifin, advancing in
breathless silence, surprised an outpost of the enemy
at Echevanne, but it was unavoidable that the rifle fire
at Chenebier should draw the attention of the French
to the danger by which they were menaced. Even
north of the place, in the wood, the Germans met with
serious resistance ; and the danger that in the dark-
ness and the dense undergrowth their troops might fall
on each other obliged them to withdi*aw them to the
outer edge of the wood.

The other column, advancing through the valley of

the Lisaine, had advanced at the double as soon as the

first shots were heard. The 2nd Battalion of the 4th

Baden Regiment rushed with cheers into the southern

part of Chenebier, where a wild fight ensued. But

daybreak showed that the heights on the west of the

village were strongly occupied, and that columns of

all arms were approaching from Etobon. At 8.30

Colonel Payen was compelled to retire from the half-
23

354 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAB.

conquered village, and take up a position at the wood
of Feiy, to cover the road to Belfort through Chalon-
villars ; he took with him 400 prisoners.

At the same time the right column, strengthened by
a battalion of the reserve, had renewed the attack on
the wood, and in a battle which lasted for two hours,
with heavy losses on both sides, at last took possession
of it. But the attempt to get into the barricaded and
strongly-defended village was vain.

A destructive fire met every attack ; one single round
of mitrailleuse, for instance, killed twenty-one of the
assailants. At three o'clock in the afternoon Greneral
Keller therefore collected his troops at Frahier, where
they were supported by four batteries.

With such inferior strength, and after failing in this
attempt, it was useless to think of driving the enemy
beyond Chenebier ; the only thing to do was to hinder
his further advance on Belfort. The end was fully
achieved ; the French did not pursue. Instead of out-
flanking the Grerman right, they seemed chiefly con-
cerned for their own left. They defended Chenebier
stoutly, but gave up all further offensive movements.

In the expectation of such an attack succeeding,
Greneral Bourbaki's plan seems to have been to engage
the enemy in front only, and so detain him. Even
during that night the Germans were alarmed at
Bethoncourt and before Hericourt, while they, on
their part, disturbed the French at Bussurel and in
the wood of La-Thure. The infantry fire went on for
hours, and numerous detachments had to spend the
cold winter's night under arms. In the morning two
divisions of the Eighteenth Corps (French) advanced
on Cliagey and Luze, supported by the Army Reserve
artillery, but they could not come up with the Grer-
mans, so several repeated attacks on those places were

BATTLE OF THE LISAINE. 355

without result. Firing went on incessantly from one
o'clock. In front of Hericourt there was a mutual
shelling, and Bussurel, held by the French, was in
flames.

To drive the French out of Montbeliard, the town
was fired on from La-Grange-Dame and from the
chateau till the inhabitants begged that it might be
spared, declaring that the position was abandoned,
which subsequently proved to be false. Ten battalions
of the French Fifteenth Corps advanced from the
woods in the forenoon, and tried to push on past Mont-
beliard, but suffered severely from the flanking fire of
the heavy guns at La-Grange-Dame ; only a few got
into the valley of the Lisaine. The western road from
Montbeliard, and the hills immediately in front of it,
remained in the hands of the French, but the attack
ceased at about two in the afternoon.

Further to the south. General von Debschitz's posts
in front of AUaine had easily checked the advance of
the French detachments.

The Germans were now convinced that no further
attack would be attempted.

The condition of the French troops, not yet inured
to war, was, in fact, serious. They had been obliged
to bivouac in bitter weather, sometimes under arms,
and for the most part without food. Their losses were
enormous, and the superior officers who were invited
to meet the Generals at three in the afternoon, in the
neighborhood of Chagey, expressed their objections to
a yet more extensive movement to the left, since sup-
plies would be impossible, and there would be danger
of the Germans cutting off the communications from
the side of Montbeliard. On this came the news that
the heads of General von Manteuffel's corps had already
reached Fontaine-Frangaise, and was near to Gray.

356 THE PRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

Under these circumstances General Bourbaki
thought he must decide on a retreat. He telegraphed
to the Government that by the advice of his Generals,
and to his deep regret, he had been compelled to take
up a position further in the rear, and only hoped that
the enemy might follow him. Hence this experienced
General can have felt no doubt that his army, after
faihng in the attack on the Lisaine, could only escape
a very critical position by a steady retreat.

(January 18th.) On the morning of the 18th the
Germans were in the positions they had secured the
day before, and under arms, the French in full force
along the whole front. It was a significant fact that
they were busily employed on the construction of
earthworks. They had evacuated Montbeliard the
evening before, and now held the country to the west
of the town strongly manned and fortified.

During this day nothing occurred but a shelling and
small skirmishes. General Keller had come up on the
right German wing with reinforcements, and as the
enemy retired to Etobon in the afternoon he was able
to re-occupy Chenebier. Further north. Colonel von
Willisen again marched on Ronchamp. Coutenans
was taken possession of in the centre, and the enemy
driven out of Byans by artillery fire ; but, on the other
hand, the Germans could not yet penetrate the woods.
On the southern bank of the Allaine General von
Debschitz's detachment drove the enemy back beyond
the line of Exincourt — Croix.

In the three days' fighting on the Lisaine the Ger-
mans had lost 1200, the French from 4000 to 5000
men.

In spite of many detachments having to be drafted
off, and of the threatening attitude of the enemy, the
siege-works were uninterruptedly carried on outside

BOMBAEDMENT OF PAKIS. 357

Belfort, and as soon as the investing forces were again
reinforced Gleneral von Werder followed the retiring
French to Etobon, Saulnot, and Arcey.

THE BOMBAEDMENT OF PAKIS.

(January, 1871.)

In the place of the Second Corps, now engaged with
the Army of the South, the First Bavarian Corps had
come up, of which Grambetta had said, " Les Bavarois
n'existent plus." It had made such good use of its
time of rest south of Longjumeau that by the begin-
ning of the New Year it was already 17,500 strong,
with 108 guns. It was drawn up between the Sixth
Prussian Corps and the Wiirtemberg Division on both
banks of the Seine. The Wiirtembergers extended
from Ormesson to the Marne, and between that river
a,nd the Sausset were the Saxons, so as to diminish the
front of the Guards' Corps now that the Moree was
frozen over and afforded no protection.

The observation of such a huge stronghold made
great demands on the endurance of the troops.

By extending their works more and more outside
Villejuif and Bruyeres, the French threatened to out-
flank the Second Bavarian Corps. To avert such an
attack the Sixth was obliged to keep a strong detach-
ment constantly in readiness at L'Hay.

The supports on the south could not in any way be
protected against the fire of the heavy fortress guns,
nor the outposts against that of the Chassepots. They
consequently could often not be relieved for several
days, and the relief was usually effected at night. The
less the success of the French arms in the open field,
the more lavish were they in the expenditure of ammu-
nition from their works.

358 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

Mont-Valerien hurled its giant shells to a distance
of from seven to eight kilometres (from four to five
miles English), but this perpetual cannonade, to whose
din the ear was soon accustomed, did little damage.

The Artillery Attack on the Southern Front. — Till
Mont-Avron was carried, the Germans had only been
able to bring field-guns to bear against the French
fortress artillery. But early in January their prepara-
tions had at last got so far forward that seventeen
batteries, which had long been completed, could be
armed with heavy guns against the southern front.
A battery stood apart on the left wing in the park of
St. Cloud, to the north of Sevres; four more, close
together, on the steep slope of the hill to the west of
Meudon; five crowned the plateau of Moulin-de-la-
Tour, where the mill, serving to guide the aim of the
French, had been blown up. Four more batteries were
constructed in a lower position between Fontenay and
Bagneux. Two, between Chevilly and La-Rue, pro-
tected the German troops against a flank movement
from Villejuif, with the field artillery of the Second
Bavarian and Sixth Corps. Covered ways were pre-
pared, and intermediate depots were supplied with
ammunition from the great magazines at Villacoublay.

Colonels von Rieff and von Ramni conducted the
artillery attack under General von Kameke and Gen-
eral Prince Hohenlohe; General Schulz directed the
engineering works. The men served twenty-four
hours in the batteries, and then took two days' rest.
The officers had but one day's rest.

The heavy guns were brought into position behind
masked batteries on January 3rd by daylight, without
any interference ; in all the others by night, after the
outposts had been di-iven in. Thus, on the morning
of the 4thj 98 guns were ready to open fire : 28 on Issy,

BOMBAEDMENT OF PAPJS. 359

28 on Vanves, and 18 on Montrouge ; 10 against tlie
emplacements between the first two forts. But a thick
fog hid every object, and it was not tiU January 5th,
at 8.30 in the morning, that the signal was given for
opening fire.

The enemy replied at once. There were in Fort
Valerien 106 guns, in Issy 90, in Vanves 84, and in
Montrouge 52 ; there were about 70 in the sectors of
the ramparts which came under fire and at ViUejuif,
16-cm. guns for the most part ; so the attack at first
was under great difficulties. But when, at about noon,
all the batteries had opened fire, the situation gradually
improved, and the greater accuracy of the Grerman aim
began to teU. Issy was almost silenced by two o'clock,
nine guns were destroyed in Vanves and had lost thirty
gunners ; only Montrouge stiU replied with any vigor.
The artillery from the ramparts now opened fire, but
the forts never again got the best of it. Some gun-
boats coming up by Point-du-Jour very soon had to
retire.

The field-guns of the Second Bavarian and Sixth
Corps were also so effective that no attack was at-
tempted from the works at ViUejuif, nor was a shot
fired on the batteries at Bagneux. A number of parapet
guns and the long-range Chassepots looted from the
French did such good service that the enemy were
driven further and further in. The German outposts
took possession of the trenches of Clamart, and in the
course of the night turned their front towards the
forts.

Only a few 15-cm. shells were thrown into the city
as a serious announcement ; the first thing to be done
was to batter down the outworks, and for some few
days all the firing was directed on them. The most
serious counter-attack was from Montrouge and from

360 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

a mortar-battery in a very advantageous position be-
hind the high railway embankment to the east of Issy ;
next, from the south front of the ramparts, almost a
mile (German) long in a straight line. Foggy weather
on some days necessitated a suspension or entire cessa-
tion of firing. But meanwhile the German advanced
lines were from 750 to 450 metres nearer to the fortifi-
cations. New batteries were constructed further for-
ward, and armed with thirty-six guns out of those left
in the rear.

(January 10th.) The French garrison were all this
time very active. On January 10th they succeeded in
the dark hours in carrying the weakly-occupied posi-
tion at Clamart. They placed three battalions in the
place, and dug a shelter-trench of 1200 metres towards
Chatillon.

(January 13th.) The Second Army of Paris was
still encamped outside the town to the east and north,
from Nogent to AuberviUers. After some small alarms,
on the evening of the 13th some strong detachments
advanced, under cover of a hot fire from the forts from
Courneuve and Drancy on Le-Bourget. But the troops
in occupation were on the alert, and being reinforced
at once by several companies, repulsed the repeated
attempts of the French to storm it till two o'clock in
the morning.

(January 14th.) On this day the French renewed the
attempt on Clamart with 500 marine infantry and
several battalions of the National Guard. When these
last had assembled at the railway station near, with
a great deal of noise, their advance was reported
soon after midnight. The fight lasted about an hour,
and ended with the retreat, or flight, of the attacking
party. Patrols pursued them close up to the trenches
of Issy.

RETALIATION FROM THE FORTS. 361

The distance was so great that the fire from the
ramparts had not yet perceptibly moderated. Battery
No. 1, isohited in the park of St. Cloud, suffered most,
being shelled by two batteries, from Poiut-du-Jour and
from Mont-Valerien. The steep slope behind the bat-
tery made it easy for the enemy to take aim. The
breastwork was repeatedly breached, and it was only
the most zealous devotion which enabled the struggle
to be continued at this point. The French also poured
a heavy fire into batteries Nos. 19 and 21, pushed for-
ward into a particularly dangerous position under
Fort Vanves. The fire from the ramparts, coming
from a long range to the breastwork, was plunging and
breaking through the platforms, and a great many
gunners were wounded or killed. The powder maga-
zine blew up in two of the batteries, wounding both
the officers in command, besides several other superior
officers.

To the east of Paris, the fifty-eight German guns
placed there after the reduction of Mont-Avi'on were
opposed to 151 of the French. The Germans, never-
theless, soon proved their superiority ; the forts only
occasionally opened fire; the French withdrew their
outposts to the works, and altogether vacated the
peninsula of St. Maui*. By degrees the heavy siege-
guns could be removed from hence to the banks of
the Moree.

The forts to the south had meanwhile suffered se-
verely. The ruin at Issy was visible to the naked eye ;
fire broke out repeatedly, and the powder magazine
had to be cleared out at great risk in the night of
January 16th. Fort Vanves had lost seventy men ; it
opened fire usually every morning, but soon became
silent. Montrouge, on the contrary, on some days
fired as many as 500 rounds from eighteen guns. But

362 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

here, too, the casemates no longer afforded any shelter^
and one of the bastions was a heap of ruins.

In spite of the steady fire from the ramparts, part
even of Paris was distressed by the 15-cm. shells. An
elevation of 30 degrees, through a peculiar contrivance,
sent the shot into the heart of the city. From 300 to
400 shells were fired daily.

Under the pressure of public opinion the G-overn-
ment, after repeated deliberations, decided on another
great enterprise, to be directed this time against the
German batteries at Chatillon. The assembled Gen-
erals agreed, indeed, that such sorties could promise
no results without the co-operation of an army out-
side; but, on the 8th, Gambetta had announced the
" victory " of the Army of the North at Bapaume, and
had promised that both the Armies of the Loire should
advance. Hereupon General Trochu advised that they
should at least await the moment when the investing
army should be weakened by detailing further detach-
ments ; but he was opposed by the other members of
the Government, especially by Monsieur Jules Favre.
He explained that the Maires of Paris were indignant
at the bombardment, that the representatives of the
city must be allowed some insight into the military
situation, and, above all, that negotiations ought long
since to have been entered into.

Finally, on January 15th, it was determined that the
German lines should be broken through at Montretout,
Garches, and Buzanval.

While confusion and dissensions thus prevailed in
Paris, the unity of the German nation was proclaimed
at Versailles under the Emperor Wilham.

ATTACK ON MONT-VALERIEN. 363

BATTLE OF MONT-VALEEIEN.

(January 19tli.)

The sortie was to be effected on January 19tli. On
that day, as we have seen, General Faidherbe marched
on St. Quentin, on the way to Paris, and the army
which was to make the sortie was standing on the
eastern and northern fronts of the capital. The at-
tempt to break through was, however, made on the
opposite side. In fact, the peninsula of Gennevilliers
was the only ground on which large masses of troops
could be deployed without being exposed for hours,
while they were being assembled, to the fire of the
German artillery.

Two days previously the mobilized National Guard
had relieved the divisions told off for the sortie, from
the positions they held ; 90,000 men in three columns
were to attack at the same time. General Vinoy on
the left, supported by the fire from the rampart, was
to carry the height of Montretout ; General Bellemare
in the centre was to advance on Garches; General
Ducrot on the right, on the Chateau of Buzanval.

The attack was to begin at six in the morning, but
blocks occurred at the bridges of Asnieres and Neuilly,
as no explicit orders had been issued for crossing them.
When, at seven o'clock, the signal to advance was made
by gun-fire from Mont-Valerien, only the head of Gen-
eral Vinoy's force was formed up, the other columns
had not yet deployed, and the last detachments tailed
back as far as Courbevoix. Before they had reached
the rendezvous the left wing was already marching
fifteen battalions on St. Cloud.

These at first met only isolated posts and patrols,
eighty-nine men in all, who rushed into the gorge of

364 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

the work of Montretout, and there made a stand for
some time ; they then fought their way out with great
bravery, but some of them were taken prisoners.
There, and on the north of St. Cloud, the French at
once prepared for defence.

The centre column, under Greneral Bellemare, also
took possession without difficulty of the hill of Maison-
du-Cure.

Not till now, nearly nine o'clock, did the first sup-
ports of the German outposts appear on the scene.
Till within a short time the patrols had been able to
report nothing but thick fog; but reports from the
right and left wings announced that a serious attack
was threatened on the whole front from St. Cloud to
Bougival. The Fourth Corps were called out, and
G-eneral von Kirchbach joined the 9th Division. To
the German right, in the park of St. Cloud, stood the
17th Brigade, to the left, behind the Porte-de-Long-
boyau, the 20th ; the other troops of the corps advanced
from their quarters at Versailles and the villages to
the north of it on Jardy and Beauregard. The Crown
Prince ordered six battalions of the Landwehr Guard
and a Bavarian brigade on Versailles, and himself rode
to the Hospice of Brezin ; the King went to Marly.

The French meanwhile had seized the foremost
houses at Garches, and made their way here and there
through the breaches in the east wall into the park of
the Chateau of Buzanval. The 5th Jager Battalion,
supported by single companies of the 58th and 59th
Regiments, drove the enemy back on Garches, occu-
pied the cemetery on the north, and still reached the
advanced posts at La-Bergerie in good time. The
other divisions under General von Bothmer carried on
a persistent fight, by order from head-quarters, on the
skirts of the park of St. Cloud, merely to gain time.

FIGHTING AT ST. CLOUD. 365

By haK-past nine they had repnlsed an attack by Belle-
mare's column, stopped the advance of the French up
the Eue-Imperiale of St. Cloud, and even returned the
attack from the Grille-d'Orleans and the Porte-Jaune.
It was in vain that five French battalions tried to
storm La-Bergerie. A squad of engineers had tried
with great self-sacrifice to demolish the wall which
surrounded the enclosure, but the dynamite was frozen
and would not explode, and the Jagers held the posi-
tion steadfastly throughout the day.

The attacks of the French had hitherto been at-
tempted with no help from their artillery. That of
Greneral Vinoy had been seriously delayed by running
into the centre column, and now lingered in the rear
to meet a possible attack at Briqueterie. General Belle-
mare's batteries tried to get up the slope of the hill
of Grarches, but the exhausted condition of the horses
compelled them to take up a position at Fouilleuse.
Meanwhile the batteries of the 9th Division (German)
came up one by one, and by noon thirty-six guns had
opened fire. In St. Cloud a hot street-fight was going
on. General Ducrot alone, on the French right wing,
had opened the battle with his strong force of artillery,
which he got into position on both sides of Rueil. The
tirailleurs then advanced, and made their way through
the park of Buzanval to the western waU, but were then
driven back by the 50th Eegiment of Fusiliers.

At half -past ten the chief attack was made at this
point, and supported by part of the central column.
Only a non-commissioned of&cer's detachment met the
attack at Malmaison, but at the eastern road from
Bougival, at La-Jouchere and Porte-de-Longboyau, it
found the 20th Infantry Brigade, which had already
been reinforced. General von Schmidt still kept the
reserve of the 10th Division in the rear at Beauregard.

366 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

A murderous fire from the well-protected Grerman in-
fantry checked the rush of the French, and converted
it by midday into a steady fire action, the German
artillery joining in with great effect. Two batteries of
the 10th Division at St. Michel were strengthened by
two of the Guards' brought up from St. Germain to
Louvenciennes ; a third advanced on Chatou and di'ove
an armor-plated train on the station north of Rueil
to retire rapidly on Nanterre. Four batteries of the
Fourth Corps finally opened fire from Carrieres, with-
out heeding the guns of Valerien, shelling the compact
masses of French infantry, who still held Rueil in the
rear.

At two o'clock the French decided on renewing the
attack. When two of their batteries had bombarded
Porte-de-Longboyau a brigade marched on this place,
and a second on the western wall of the park of Buzan-
val ; a third followed to give support. Equally bold,
but equally unsuccessful, was the attempt of a party
of engineers, one officer and ten men, to blow up part
of the wall ; they were all killed. The attacking col-
umns had advanced to within 200 paces, but now thir-
teen companies met them from the German side, and,
firing on them at the most effective range, stopped
their advance, and presently routed the French in spite
of a valiant effort on the part of their officers.

They found, however, a good support in the park-
wall, which had been prepared for defence with great
skill and with the utmost rapidity. The attack of some
companies from Brezin and La-Bergerie on this wall
was repulsed with heavy loss.

But the strength of the French attack was already
broken. Even by three o'clock a retreat was observ-
able in the left wing, and as dusk fell they began gi-adu-
ally, in the centre, to withdi-aw from the heights of

FIGHTING AT ST. CLOUD. 367

Maison-du-Cure. When Colonel von Kothen pursued,
with a small force, several battalions indeed fronted,
and even attempted a counter-attack ; but timely sup-
port arrived from La-Bergerie, Garches, and Porte-
Jaune, and, seconded by the fire of the batteries, the
Grermans continued the pursuit. The King's Grena-
diers drove the enemy almost as far back as Fouil-
leuse.

Still, the Germans had not succeeded in repossess-
ing themselves of the works at Montretout. The chief
difficulty arose from their having been unable to ad-
vance through the town of St. Cloud. As, however,
these positions were indispensable for the protection of
the right wing, General von Kirchbach gave orders
that they were to be carried either that evening or
early next morning.

General von Sandrart decided on immediate action,
and at eight that evening five batteries advanced to
the attack. Only a few French were found in the
earthworks, and these were taken prisoners ; but in the
town the struggle was severe. Finally the Germans
had to restrict themselves to blockading the houses
occupied by the enemy. The French also held the wall
of the park of Buzanval all through the night. The
Landwehr Guard and the Bavarian Brigade were there-
fore assigned quarters in Versailles, to form a strong
reserve close at hand in case of need on the following
day. The remainder of the troops withdi'ew into their
former quarters.

At half-past five General Trochu had ordered a
retreat. He perceived that a prolonged struggle could
not succeed, especially as the National Guard were
mutinous. The brave defenders of St. Cloud were for-
gotten in these orders ; they did not surrender till the
day after, when artillery opened fire on the houses they

368 THE PKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

had occupied. Even the park- wall was held till the
following morning.

The French attack of January 19th had failed before
reaching the enemy's main position. The reserves in
readiness on the German side had not been brought
into action. The Fifth Corps alone had driven in an
enemy of four times its own strength. It lost 40 offi-
cers and 570 men; the French loss in killed and
wounded was 145 officers and 3423 men, besides 44 offi-
cers and 458 men taken prisoners.

When the fog lifted, at about eleven o'clock on the
morning of the 20th, they were seen retreating on
Paris, in long columns, across the peninsula of Grenne-
vilhers.

THE BOMBAKDMENT OF PAEIS TILL THE AKMISTIOE.

After the repulse of this last struggle for release on
the part of the garrison, the bombardment was renewed
on the north as well as the south and west.

The siege-guns no longer needed against the smaller
fortresses and on the Marne were parked to this end at
Villiers-le-Bel. The Army of the Meuse had prepared
abundant material for constructing batteries, and re-
quisitioned above 600 wagons. Already twelve bat-
teries were placed in lines betweeii Le-Bourget and
Lac-d'Enghien, and the guns were mostly brought up
at night. By January 21st eighty-one heavy guns
were ready for action, and Colonel Bartsch opened fire
at nine that morning on La-Briche, Double-Couronne,
and Fort-de-l'Est.

The forts, now exposed to the fire of 143 heavy guns,
replied briskly, and on the foUowing day the thick
weather prevented the Germans from opening fire again
till the afternoon. But the ground in front was clear
of the French, and the outposts of the German Guards

THE BOMBAKDMENT CONTINUED. 369

and Fourth Corps took possession of Villetaneuse and
Temps-Perdu.

In the course of the night fire was opened on St.
Denis, with every endeavor to spare the Cathedral, and
many places were set in flames.

By the 23rd the steady fire of the Germans had per-
ceptibly reduced the vigor of the French artillery.
La-Briche was silenced, and the other forts only fired
an occasional salvo.

During the night of the 25th four batteries were
advanced to within from 1800 to 1200 metres of the
enemy's outworks. Engineering works could now be
begun, and a row of new batteries was constructed, for
which, however, there was never any need.

The effect of this six days' bombardment was de-
cisive.

The forts had suffered greatly. On this side — unlike
the south front — they lacked the support of the ram-
parts behind them, and they had, too, no bomb-proof
space. The temporary galleries were shattered by
shell, the powder-magazines were in the greatest dan-
ger, and the garrisons were devoid of shelter. The
inhabitants of St. Denis fled to Paris in crowds, and
the insufficient security of the battered works were no
longer a protection against assault if the city held out
any longer.

The attack on the north front had cost the Germans
one officer and twenty-five men; the French stated
their loss at 180.

The fire of the forts on the east front was kept
under, and the Wiirtemberg Field Artillery was enough
to prevent the French from again getting a foothold
on the peninsula of St. Maur.

The south front meanwhile suffered more and more
from the steady bombardment. The ramparts and the

370 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

mortar-pits behind the railway were still active, but in
the forts the barracks were in ruins, partly battered
in and partly burnt down, and the men had to take
shelter in the empty powder-magazines. The ramparts
were too much choked for free circulation, the para-
pets afforded no protection. In Vanves the gaps were
filled up with sand-bags ; in Issy, on the southern cur-
tain, five blocks of casemates in the outer wall were
demohshed. Even the isolated ravelin-walls of Vanves
and Montrouge were destroyed, forty guns dismounted,
and seventy gun-carriages wrecked.

The whole situation of France, political and mili-
tary, and above all that of Paris, was such as to cause
the Government the gravest anxiety.

Since the return of Monsieur Thiers from his diplo-
matic tour it was certain that no mediatory influence
would be exerted by any foreign power. The suffer-
ings of the capital were now very great. Scarcity and
high prices had for some time been a bm-then to the
inhabitants ; their provisions were exhausted, and even
the army stores of the garrison had been encroached
on. Fuel was lacking in the bitter cold, and petroleum
was an inefiicient substitute for gas. When the long-
deferred bombardment began on the south side of
Paris, the people took refuge in tha, cellars or fled to
the remoter quarters of the town ; and when the north-
ern side was also shelled the inhabitants of St. Denis
crowded into the capital.

The great sortie of the 19th had proved a total fail-
ui-e, and no relief was to be hoped for from outside
since Gambetta had sent news of the defeat at Le-
Mans. The Paris Army, of whose inactivity he com-
plained, was reduced to a third of its original strength
by cold, sickness, and desertion. The horses had to be
killed to provide meat for the inhabitants, and General

THE CONDITION OF PAEIS. 371

Trocliu declared any further offensive movements to
be quite hopeless ; the means even of passive resistance
were exhausted.

Hitherto the Grovernment had been able to keep the
populace in a good humor by highly-colored reports,
but now the disastrous state of affairs could no longer
be concealed. Everything they could do was wrong.

There was a large body of people in Paris who were
but little affected by the general distress. Those mem-
bers of the civilian class who had been equipped for
the defence of their country were fed and well paid by
the authorities, without having too much to do for it.
They were joined by all the dubious social elements,
whose interest it was to foment disorder; these had
been quite content with the state of affairs as they had
been on September 4th, and these formed the mob
which was presently to assume the hideous aspect of
the Commune. Ah-eady some popular gatherings had
been only dispersed by force of arms, and even a part
of the National Gruard had given signs of some muti-
nous outbreak.

The revolutionary clubs, too, supported by the press,
demanded further active measures, even a sortie en
masse of all the inhabitants of Paris. Thus the feeble
Government, dependent as it was on popular favor
alone, was under pressure from the impossible demands
of an ignorant mob on the one hand, and, on the other,
the inexorable coercion of facts.

There was absolutely no escape but by capitulation ;
every delay increased the necessity, and left them at
the mercy of harder terms. Unless all the railways
were at once thrown open for the delivery of supplies
from a considerable distance, the horrors of famine
were imminent for more than two million souls ; and
later it might not be possible to meet it. Yet no one

372 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

dared utter the fatal word surrender, no one would
take the responsibility of the inevitable.

A great council of war was held on the 21st. As all
the elder Generals pronounced any further offensive
measures to be quite impossible, it was proposed that
the younger military authorities should be consulted,
but no decision was arrived at. As, however, some
one must be made answerable for every misfortune.
General Trochu, hitherto the most popular member of
the Government, was degraded from his position as
Governor, and the chief command was entrusted to
General Vinoy. General Ducrot resigned his com-
mand.

All this did nothing to improve the situation, so on
the 23rd Monsieur Jules Favre made his appearance
at Versailles to negotiate at any rate for an armistice.

The German Emperor was ready to meet this re-
quest; but of course some guarantee must be given
that the capital, after obtaining supplies, would not
renew its resistance. All the forts were to be given
up, including Mont-Valerien and the city of St. Denis,
and the disarmament of the ramparts was demanded
and acceded to.

All hostilities were to be suspended on the evening
of the 26th, so far as Paris was concerned, and all
ways of ingress to be thrown open. A general armis-
tice of twenty-one days was to begin from the 31st of
January, exclusive, however, of the departments of
Doubs, Jura, and Cote-d'Or, and of the fortress of Bel-
fort, where, at the time, operations were being car-
ried on, in which both sides were equally hopeful of
success.

This armistice gave the Committee of National
Defence time enough to call a freely-elected National
Assembly together at Bordeaux, whose business it

TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE. 373

would be to decide whether the war should be con-
tinued, or on what conditions peace could be concluded.
The election of the deputies was unimpeded and unin-
fluenced even in the parts of the country occupied by
German troops.

The regular forces of the Paris garrison, troops of
the line, marines, and Gardes Mobiles were to lay down
their arms at once ; only 12,000 men and the National
Guard were to retain them for the preservation of
order. The garrison were interned for the time of the
armistice; afterwards they were to be regarded as
prisoners. As to their transfer to Germany, where
every possible place was already overflowing with
prisoners, that question was postponed in expectation
of a probable peace.

The forts were occupied on the 29th without opposi-
tion.

The French Army gave up 602 guns, 1,770,000 stand
of arms, and above 1000 ammunition wagons ; the for-
tress surrendered 1362 heavy guns, 1680 gun-car-
riages, 860 limbers, 3,500,000 cartridges, 4000 hun-
dred-weight of powder, 200,000 sheUs, and 100,000
round-shot.

The blockade of Paris, which had lasted 132 days,
was over, and the greater part of the German forces
detained outside the walls were released to end the war
in the open field.

VI.

THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH AND

WEST.

THE AKMY OF THE SOUTH UNDEK GENERAL VON MAN-
TEUFFEL.

The two army corps under Greneral von Manteuffel
consisted altogether of fifty-six battalions, twenty
squadi'ons, and 168 guns. When he arrived at Chatil-
lon-sui*- Seine on January 12th, the Second Corps was
on the right, and the Seventh on the left of Noyers,
extending to Montigny over ten miles (Grerman). One
brigade, under General von Dannenberg, which had
already had several frays with portions of the French
Army of the Vosges, had advanced on Vilaines to cover
the right flank.

Several good roads led from these quarters converg-
ing on Dijon ; to Vesoul, on the contrary, the roads
were bad, and deep in snow down the southern slopes
of the wild plateau of Langres. The Commander-in-
chief, nevertheless, took this fine of^ march, to afford
G-eneral von Werder indirect assistance at least, as
soon as possible, by coming up in the rear of the enemy
who threatened him.

The advance was between the two towns of Dijon
and Langres, both strongly occupied by the French.
"Wooded heights and deep ravines separated the
columns and prevented any mutual support ; each had
to provide for its own safety on every side. The troops
had severe fatigues to encounter, and badly as they
needed rest none could be granted, nor could the evil

ADVANCE ON THE DOUBS. 375

plight of their boots and the horses' shoes be in any
way remedied.

On January 14th the march began in a thick fog
and bitter cold, along roads frozen as smooth as glass.

To keep up the supplies was absolutely essential,
and the 8th Brigade had from the first to be left in the
rear to secure the all-important railway line from
Tonnerre by Nuits and Chatillon, until communications
could be established via Epinal.

On the very first day the advanced guard of the
Seventh had a fight before Langres. A detachment of
the garrison of 15,000 men was repulsed on the fortress
with the loss of a standard, and a detachment was
therefore left behind to observe the place. Under its
protection the corps marched past the fortress next
day, while the Second advanced as far as the Ognon.

The weather changed during the night of the 15th.
Fourteen degrees of frost (Centigrade) gave way to
storm and rain. The water lay on the frozen roads,
and it was with the greatest difficulty that the Seventh
Corps reached Prauthoy and the Second Moloy, closing
up to the left.

On the 18th, the left wing advanced on Frettes and
Champhtte, to the south-east, the right assembled at
Is-sui'-Tille, and its advanced guard, after marching
fifty kilometres (thirty-one EngUsh miles), reached the
bridges at Oray. On the flank and rear of the corps
there had been some fighting, but the heavy march
across the mountains was over, and they were in the
cultivated valley of the Saone.

G-eneral von Manteuffel had already received news
of the happy issue of the first day's fighting on the
Lisaine. Later telegrams from General von Werder
reported that the French Army of the East would prob
ably be obliged to retire under difficulties, and the

376 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

German General at once determined to cut off its re-
treat on the Doubs below Besan^on.

The defeated French Army was still greatly superior
in number to the German force, and the troops must
again be called upon for severe exertions. They
must again cross a thinly-populated and mountainous
country, where it would be a matter of great difficulty
to procure food and the shelter needful during the bit-
ter winter nights. They must also leave hostile forces
in the rear, under very insufficient observation at
Langres, Dijon, and Auxonne. However, in spite of
every obstacle, the advance in this new direction was
begun on the 19th.

The first difficulty might be the crossing of the
Saone, here very deep and sixty metres wide, and full
of drifting ice ; but the advanced guard of the Second
Corps had found Gray abandoned by the French and
both the bridges uninjured, and had taken possession
of the place. The head of the Seventh Corps crossed
the river by the railway bridge at Savoyeux, which
was found intact, and by a pontoon bridge thrown
across higher up.

On the following day both corps advanced in a
southerly direction, the Seventh on Gy, the Second on
Pesmes. Here they crossed the Ogdon after driving
off by artillery fire a French detachment, which tried
to oppose the construction of the bridge.

On the 21st, the advanced guard found Dole occu-
pied by the enemy. General von Kobhnski attacked
at once ; in spite of a violent street-fight, in which the
townspeople took part, the grenadiers of the Second
Regiment made their way through the town and seized
a train on the other side, of 230 wagons of provisions
and necessaries, intended for Besan^on, and left stand-
ing in the railway station. As the Doubs was thus

BOURBAKI'S MOVEMENTS. 377

crossed at this point, so the Seventh Corps forced a
passage across the Ognon at Marmay and Pin.

Greneral von Werder had been told off to follow close
on the heels of the French retreat, and while he held his
own in front of the Fourteenth Corps, the 2nd Baden
Brigade had advanced on the right wing on Etobon,
while Colonel von Willisen and his twelve squadi'ons
had marched on by Lure. On the left, Colonel von
Zimmermann with the East-Prussian Landwehr had
driven the French out of Ste. Marie. These detach-
ments everywhere found cast-away arms and portions
of equipment, and hundreds willingly gave themselves
up as prisoners.

During the next few days Greneral von Werder
effected a general change of front to the left and south.
The right wing held Villersexel, and it was the left
wing only that met the enemy at Isle-sur-Doubs, and
afterwards in greater numbers, at Clerval and Baume-
les-Dames.

General Bourbaki had quitted the Lisaine on the
18th. The Twenty-fourth Corps (French) alone were
left on the Doubs with orders to defend the defiles in
the steep mountain-path of Lomont on the east of
Clerval, towards the north ; all the other troops with-
drew between the Doubs and the Ognon, with Cremer's
division as a rear-guard. The Ognon might have
formed a natural cover for the right flank of the French
Army, and orders had been given for the destruction
of all the bridges ; but we have seen how little they
had been obeyed.

On the 21st the Fifteenth and Twentieth Corps had
arrived in the neighborhood of Baume-les-Dames, the
Eighteenth at Marchaux ; and here, having Besangon
close in his rear. General Bourbaki was anxious to
await the next step of the enemy. In order to con«

378 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

centrate his forces more completely, the Commandant
of the place was desired to send up all the battahons
he could spare of the Gardes Mobiles, on Blamont, so
as to release the Twenty-fourth Corps. Nine battalions
of the mobilized National Guard had before this reached
Besan^on, and might have relieved the corps, but they
were armed with Enfield rifles, for which there was no
ammunition in store. Thus they would only have
added to the mouths to fill, and General RoUand had
simply sent them back again. The Commissary-Gen-
eral declared that it was impossible for him to continue
any longer to bring up the supplies ordered for the
maintenance of the army, and what proved decisive
was the news received this day that not only was the
line of the Ognon lost, but that the Germans had
crossed the Doubs. Under these circumstances the
French Commander-in-chief determined to continue
his retreat on Besangon and there cross to the southern
bank of the Doubs so as not to be compelled to give
battle with the river in his rear. The train was sent
off during the night, but above all things the Fifteenth
Corps was ordered at once to take possession of Quin-
gey, and hold that position to the last man, to keep
open the communications of the corps with the interior.
All the other corps were to concentrate round Besan-
gon, even the Twenty-fourth, which consequently gave
up the Lomont passes.

General Bourbaki reported his situation to the Min-
ister of War, who held out hopes of support from that
portion of the Fifteenth Corps now remaining on the
Loire. Assistance could have been more easily and
effectually given from Dijon.

The Government had concentrated a very consider-
able force on that town to replace Cremer's division,
which had joined the Army of the East, and to defend

BOURBAKI'S MOVEMENTS. 379

the ancient capital of Burgundy as a point-d'appui for
the operations of General Bourbaki. A corps of 20,000
men was to hold the place; a very inappropriately-
named Army of the Vosges, more than 40,000 strong,
was to manoeuvre in the field. But all this did little
to hinder the toilsome advance of the Grermans over
the mountains. The detachments forming a corps of
observation allowed themselves to be driven in by
General von Kettler, who followed the movements of
the corps on the right flank, and they retired on Dijon.

Colonel Bombonnel, at Gray, urgently but vainly
begged for assistance to enable him to defend the
passages of the Saone ; his applications were refused
because Dijon was in too great peril, and it was not
till the Prussians had already crossed the river that
Garibaldi began to move.

He advanced on the 19tli in three columns on Is-sur-
Tille, where only a part of the 4th Infantry Division
were now left. But he moved forward only a mile
(German). Garibaldi did no more than observe a
reconnoissance party which advanced to meet him,
from the hill at Messigny, and he then retired on Dijon
with his troops, to the sound of the Marseillaise.

However, at General von Manteuffel's head-quarters
the enemy was held in too small estimation, when
General von Kettler was simply ordered to go and
" take Dijon."

The city had been fortified with the greatest care.
Strong earthworks and other works of defence pro-
tected it to the northward ; more especially had Talant
and Fontaine-les-Dijon been converted into two in-
dependent forts and armed with heavy guns which
commanded every approach on that side. The whole
constituted a position which could be held against a
much larger force than the five and a half battalions

380 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

of the 8th Brigade with which General Kettler advanced
to the attack.

Fighting at Dijon, January 21st and 22nd. — They had
reached Turcey and St. Seine, and on the 21st advanced
in two columns from the west on Dijon, still three
miles away ; from Is-sur-TiUe on the north. Major von
Conta was approaching with a small reinforcement.
Some companies of volunteers, indeed, the "Franc-
tireurs de la Mort," the " Compagnie de la Revanche,"
and others, had been driven out of the villages on the
way without any great difficulty, and beyond the deep
ravine of the Suzon ; the village of Plombieres on the
right had been defended with spirit and stormed, and
Daix carried on the left ; but in front of the fortified
position of the French, and under fire of theu* heavy
batteries, the bold advance was forced to come to a
standstill. Major von Conta had also marched on,
through continuous fighting, but failed to come up
with the brigade before dark. General von Kettler,
recognizing the enormous superiority of the French,
finally restricted himself to repulsing their sorties.

The French had lost seven officers and 430 men in
prisoners alone ; but the battle had also cost the bri-
gade nineteen officers and 322 men. The troops had
performed a severe march in bad weather, along heavy
roads, and had no hot food either before or after the
fight ; and ammunition too could only be supplied by
a column which was expected to come up next day.
Nevertheless General von Kettler did not hesitate to
remain for the night in the position he had gained,
immediately in front of the enemy, and then to seek
quarters in the nearest villages.

The French allowed him to do so without any serious
opposition. Such complete inactivity made General
von Kettler suspect that the main body of the French

A DESPEKATE ATTEMPT. 381

had perhaps retked by Auxonne to the support of the
Army of the East, and he determined to bring them
back on Dijon by a renewed attack.

On the 23rd, at eleven o'clock, by a flank march along
the enemy's front, after his advanced guard had routed
a detachment of Grardes Mobiles, he reached the farm
of Valmy on the Langres road, and advanced on that
place with his two batteries against the village of
Pouilly, which was walled and strongly occupied.
Here, as was almost always the case when they had
buildings to defend, the French made a stout resistance.
The 61st Regiment had to storm each house in turn,
and it was not till the chateau was in flames that the
strong party of defenders, who had taken refuge in
the top story, surrendered to the Germans.

Beyond this place the enemy were found to have
intrenched themselves between Talant, which had been
regularly fortified, and a large factory-building on the
high-road. Here the German advance was checked till
the remainder of the regiment came up from Valmy,
and the defenders were diiven in at various points,
and back on the suburb.

It was evident that the French were still at Dijon
in full force ; but now unfortunately a tragic episode
took place, for the storming of the factory was insisted
on — a huge building, almost impregnable for infantry
unaided. When all the senior ofiicers had been killed,
a first-lieutenant, whose horse had been shot and he
himself wounded, took the command of the 2nd Bat-
talion. No sooner had the 5th Company, only forty
strong, appeared from the neighboring quarry, than
they came under a hot fire from all sides. Their leader
was at once wounded, and the sergeant who carried
the colors fell dead after a few steps ; so did the second-
lieutenant and the battalion adjutant, who again raised

382 THE FKANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

the standard. It wa passed from hand to hand, first
to the officers, then to the men ; every bearer fell. The
brave Pomeranians nevertheless rushed on the build-
ing, but there was no entrance on that side, and at last
the under-officer retreated on the quarries with the
remnant of the little band. Here, for the first time,
the colors were missed. Of their own accord they
went out again in the darkness to seek them, but only
one man returned unwounded. It was not tiU after-
wards that they were found by the French, shot to
ribbons, in a pool of blood, under the dead.

These were the only German colors lost throughout
the war, and only thus were these lost.

Of the French, eight officers and 150 men were taken
prisoners, and the brigade had again lost sixteen offi-
cers and 362 men. It mustered at Pouilly, and re-
mained under arms till eight o'clock to be prepared for
possible pursuit; then quarters were found in the
neighboring villages.

The Movements of the Army of the South. — The order
to take Dijon could not be executed; but the bold
advance of this small brigade had reduced the hostile
army to inactivity, so that General von Manteuffel
could advance unopposed.

His intention was to reach the enemy's line of retreat
to the south of Besan^on.

There were but few roads to the south of France
available for troops, through the ravined and terraced
hills of the western Jura. The most direct connection
was by the road and railway to Lons-le-Saulnier, on
which Quingey and Byans were important points to
guard. Further to the east, by a wide detour, a road
runs by Ornans, Salins, and Champagnole to St. Lau-
rent and Morez.

On the other hand, several ways centre in Pontarlier,

FIGHTING ON THE DOUBS. 383

traversing the rocky passes, peculiar to that formation,
known locally as Cluses ; they are breaches in the long
ridge, connecting the lateral valleys. From Pontarlier
one road only runs past Mouthe and in suspicious
proximity to the Swiss frontier.

(January 22nd.) On this day the advanced guard
of the 13th Division marched from Audeux to St. Vit,
and, after breaking up the railway and plundering
several loaded wagons, down the river on Dampierre.
On their way four bridges over the Doubs were found
uninjured and were occupied. The advanced guard
of the 14th Division advanced from Emagny to observe
Besan(?on. The Second Corps, diverging on Dole, sent
reconnoitring parties out beyond the river.

(January 23rd.) The concentric movement of all the
contingents of the German Army was continued.

General Debschitz, approaching from the north, in
passing Roches found only the abandoned camping-
place of the Twenty-fourth French Corps. The 4th
Reserve Division occupied L'Isle without opposition,
and met no resistance till it reached Clerval and
Baume.

On the Ognon the Baden Division drove the French
out of Montbazon.

In the centre of the army the Seventh Corps pushed
the advanced guard of the 14th Division forward on
Dannemarie, near Besangon. A fight ensued which
resulted only in a cannonade, lasting till night. The
13th Division, on the contrary, which had crossed the
Doubs at Dampierre, advanced on Quingey.

Only one French brigade had been able to come up
by railway, for want of rolling stock, and the last trains
were received at the Byans station with Prussian shell.
These troops were in such evil plight that they
were unable even to place outposts. They abandoned

384 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

Quingey almost without a struggle, and their retreat,
almost a flight, on Besan9on and beyond the Loue,
stopped the advance of reinforcements already on the
way. Thus 800 prisoners and a train of 400 convales-
cents fell into the hands of the Prussian advanced
guard, who at once broke up the railway at Abbans-
dessous.

On the right wing, the head of the Second Corps had
advanced in the valley of the Loue on the southern
bank. Various cuttings on this road had been pre-
pared for defence, but were undefended. It was not
till it reached Villers-Farlay that it met a strong
detachment of the enemy.

On the evening of this day, of the French forces the
Twentieth Corps was on the north of Besangon and
the Eighteenth on the west, at the distance of about a
Grerman mile. Cavalry, artillery, and the train were
passing through the town or encamped on the glacis
of the fortress. The Twenty-fourth Corps was on the
march hither, and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the
Fifteenth were in possession of the southern bank of
the Doubs at Baume and Larnod ; but the 1st Division
had not succeeded in holding Quingey. Thus the most
direct and important line of communications of the
army was cut, and its position, by this fresh disaster,
seriously aggravated. Projects and counsels from
Bordeaux, on which it was impossible to act, abounded,
but did not mend matters ; and on the 24th General
Bourbaki summoned the superior officers to a council
of war.

(January 24th.) The Generals declared that they
had scarcely half their number of men under arms,
and these were more inclined to fly than to fight.
General Pallu alone thought he might answer for the
men of the army reserve. The Commissary-General

A COUNCIL OF WAB. 385

reported that, unless they could seize the stores in the
place, the supplies in hand would last for four days at
most. G-eneral Billot was in favor of attempting to
fight a way through to Auxonne, but he declined to
take the command-in-chief, which was offered him.
The exhaustion of the troops and their insubordination,
which was evidently increasing, gave little hope of the
success of offensive operations. So there was no alter-
native but to retire on Pontarlier, as the Commander-
in-chief had proposed.

This, even, was seriously threatened. To clear the
country to the northward General Bourbaki ordered
the Twenty-fourth Corps to advance once more and
hold the passes of the Lomont. On the south the Fif-
teenth was to defend the deep mountain ravine of the
Loue, and General Cremer was more especially to
cover the retreat of the army on the right flank which
was most threatened. For this difficult task a division
of the Twentieth Corps was placed under his command,
as well as his own force, and the army reserve, as the
most trustworthy of the troops. The Eighteenth and
the remainder of the Twentieth were to await march-
ing orders at Besan^on.

At the German head-quarters, where of course the
plans of the French could not be known, various con-
tingencies had to be reckoned on.

If the French remained at Besan^on there would be
no need to attack them there; the place was not
adapted for a large army, and its supplies could not
hold out long. That they would again attempt to
advance northwards was scarcely likely ; they would be
leaving all their resources in their rear, and must
encounter the larger part of the Fifteenth Corps (Ger-
man) on the banks of the Ognon.

An attempt to cut a way past Dijon seemed, on the

386 THE PEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

whole, more probable. But this would be opposed at
St. Vit by the 13th Division, at Pesmes by Colonel
von Willisen's detachment, and finally by General von
Kettler.

Thus the retreat on Pontarlier seemed the most
likely course ; and to hinder their advance on that side
must be the duty of the Second Corps, so long as the
Seventh was employed in observing the main body of
the French collected at Besangon, and in checking
their sorties on both sides of the river.

The Commander-in-chief therefore confined himself
to giving general instructions to the superior officers,
expressly authorizing them to act on their own judg-
ment under such circumstances as could not be fore-
seen.

Greneral von Werder was ordered to advance by
Marnay and obtain touch with the Baden Division and
von der Goltz's brigade, and distribute them in the
first instance along the right bank of the Doubs. The
4th Reserve Division was to restore the bridges at
L'Isle and Baume, and cross over to the left bank.
Colonel von Willisen joined the Seventh Corps to sup-
ply the lack of cavalry. The Second Corps was as-
sembled behind Villers-Farlay.

(January 25th.) Extensive reco^moissances were
arranged for next day. That of the Seventh Corps
resulted in a sharp skirmish at Vorges. The head of
the Second Corps met the French at Salins and at
Arbois, but found that they had not yet reached
Poligny.

(January 26th.) The advanced guard of the Second
Corps marched on Salins. The forts of St. Andre and
Belin, on high ground near that town, fronted on
Switzerland, but they also commanded the plain to the
south and west in the enemy's line of march. Salins

FKENCH KETEEAT ON PONTARLIEK. 387

is a strong key commanding the road to St. Laurent,
and as long as it could be held would at the same time
secure the retreat of the columns marching from Be-
sangon on Pontarlier.

The two field batteries of the advanced guard could,
of course, do little against the heavy guns of the forts ;
but the fusiliers of the 2nd Regiment advanced in
rushes of small detachments up the narrow ravine,
scaled the steep walls on that side, and, supported by
the two battalions of grenadiers, forced their way, by
about half-past two, into the railway station and
suburb of St. Pierre. They lost 3 of&cers and 109 men.

Soon after this G-eneral von Koblinski arrived, via
St. Thiebaud, with the 42nd Regiment. As, in conse-
quence of the representations of the Maire, the Com-
mandant had abandoned the idea of bombarding the
town, the advanced guard could take up its quarters
there ; the main body of the 3rd Division retreated from
under the fire of the forts on Monchard, and the defile
was closed against all comers. It would have to be
turned on the south.

On that side the 4th Division already occupied Ar-
bois, its head marching on Pont-d'Hery ; it found Po-
ligny and Champagnole on the right still unoccupied.

The Seventh Corps had reconnoitred both banks of
the Doubs, and had found the enemy in strong posi-
tions at Busy and at Vorges.

The 4th Reserve Division advanced along the south-
ern bank as far as St.-Juan-d'Adam, near Besan(,'on ;
the remainder of the Fourteenth Corps marched on
Etuz and Marnay.

General von Kettler's report of the fighting on the
21st and 23rd determined G-eneral von Manteuffel to
make a renewed attempt on Dijon. He detailed Gen-
eral Hann von Weyhern to this duty, placing him in

388 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAB.

command of the 8th Brigade, with Colonel von Wil-
lisen's troops and Degenfeld's Baden brigade.

On the French side, Greneral BressoUes had started
on the 24th, in obedience to orders, to take possession
of the passages of the Doubs and the defiles of Lomont.
At first, with d'Aries' division, he had marched on
Baume ; but as d'Aries could not succeed even in driv-
ing in the Glerman outposts from Pont-les-Moulins, he
retired on Vercel. In consequence of this, on the
morning of the 26th, Carre's division, which had found
the defiles of the Lomont unoccupied, also retired on
Pierre-Fontaine. Comagny's division had already re-
treated on Morteau, and was quietly making its way
on Pontarlier.

Greneral Bourbaki was greatly disturbed by this
failure of his right wing ; more than was needful, per-
haps, since, in fact, only one German division stood to
the north of him, which at most could di'ive his rear-
guard back on Pontarlier, while the main force of the
enemy threatened him far more seriously on the west.
He nevertheless ordered a renewed advance, on the
26th, of the Twenty-fourth Corps, which was now to
be supported by the Eighteenth. But the march
through Besan^on of the Eighteenth Corps alone, over
streets covered with ice, took up the whole of the day
which should have been devoted to the attack, so that
nothing came of the scheme.

The Army Reserve had reached Ornans, and had
formed up. The two other divisions advanced on the
road to Salins, but heard, while on the march, that the
Germans had just carried that place. They therefore
occupied Deservillers and Villeneuve-d'Amont, to keep
open the roads from thence to Pontarliers.

The War Minister, meanwhile, had emphatically
refused his consent to the general retreat of the army,

FRENCH RETREAT ON PONTARLIER. 389

without any regard to the imperative necessities of the
case.

The military dilettanteism which fancied it could
control the army from Bordeaux is characteristically
expressed in a telegi'am of the afternoon of the 25th.
Monsieur de Freycinet gives it as his "firm convic-
tion"* that if General Bourbaki would collect his
troops, and, if necessary, come to an understanding
with Graribaldi, he would be strong enough to fight his
way out, either by Dole, or by Monchard, or by Grray,
or by Pontarlier (north of Auxonne). The choice was
left to him.

Still more amazing was the suggestion that if, indeed,
the state of the troops prohibited a long march, they
should take the railway from Chagey, under the eye,
no doubt, of the pursuing enemy.

But such communications could only avail to shake
the brave commander's seK-confidence. The disastrous
reports which poured in from all sides, and the state
of the troops, which he had seen for himself as the
Eighteenth Corps marched through the town, crushed
his last hope and led him to attempt his own life.

The Commander-in-chief had of course to bear the
blame of the total failure of a campaign planned by
Freycinet; his dismissal from the command was al-
ready on its way. Greneral Clinchant was appointed in
his stead, and under these disastrous circumstances
took the command of the army.

All the generals were, no doubt, most anxious to
avoid bringing their weary and dispirited troops face
to face with the enemy. Every line of retreat was
closed, excepting only that on Pontarlier. The new
Commander-in-chief had no choice but to carry out
the plans of his predecessor. He at once ordered the

* Conviction bien arret^e.

390 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAB.

further marcli. He liimself proceeded to Pontarlier.
In that strong position he hoped to be able at least to
give the troops a short rest. No large body of the
Germans had been met with so far, the ammunition
columns had got safely through, and if they could but
reach the defiles of Vaux, Les-Planches, and St. Lau-
rent before the enemy, and hold them, there was still a
possibility of escape to the southwards.

On the evening of the 27th PouUet's division was at
Levier, nearest to the Grermans, the two other divisions
under General Cremer, with the Fifteenth and Twen-
tieth Corps, were echelonned on the road between Or-
nans and Sombacourt ; the Eighteenth Corps was alone
on the eastern road by Nods. The Twenty-fourth, in
a miserable condition, extended to Montbenoit, with its
head at Pontarlier ; two divisions were still in Besan^on.

On this day General von Fransecky collected the
main body of the Second Corps at Arbois, and rein-
forced General du Trossel's lines at Pont d'Hery.

The Fourteenth Corps relieved the 14th Division of
the Seventh Corps at St. Vit; this advanced to the
right of the 13th Division into the ravine of the Loue,
which the French had already abandoned.

On the north. General von Debschitz held Blamont
and Pont-du-Roide, while General von Schmeling kept
watch on Besan^on from St. Juan, and General von
der Goltz marched on Arbois to form a reserve.

(January 28th.) Suspecting that the French were
akeady on the march by Champagnole on St. Lau-
rent, General Fransecky, to cut off that line of retreat,
advanced on the following day in a southerly direction
with the Second Corps.

General du Trossel reached Champagnole without
opposition, and sent his cavalry down the road on
Pontarher. Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky arrived

FKENCH KETEEAT ON PONTAKLIEE. 391

at Nozeroy with a squadron of the 11th Dragoons, and
found the place occupied ; but he seized fifty-six com-
missariat-wagons, and stole the field treasure-chest,
taking the escort prisoners.

The 5th and 6th Brigades advanced on Pohgny and
Pont-du-Navoy.

' The 13th Division of the Seventh Corps, being re-
lieved at Quingey by the Baden troops, assembled at
La-Chapelle, while the 14th advanced on Deservillers.
Its head, at Bolandoz, did not meet the enemy, but
found his camp-fires still smouldering, so that the main
body of the French was not overtaken that day.

General Clinchant had in fact moved his corps closer
on Pontarlier. But it soon became evident that sup-
plies could not be counted on for any long stay. Gen-
eral Cremer received orders that night to advance at
once on Les-Planches and St. Laurent with three
cavalry regiments, akeady on the road to Mouthe.
The mountain roads were deep in snow, but he reached
the points designated, by a forced march, by the next
afternoon. The Twenty-fourth Corps and a brigade
of PouUet's division followed next day, this last plac-
ing two battalions to occupy Bonnevaux at the entrance
to the defile of Vaux. On the evening of the 28th the
rest of the French army was distributed as follows :
The Eighteenth Corps was behind the Drugeon at
Houtaud close before Pontarlier ; the 1st Division of
the Fifteenth had advanced to Sombacourt, beyond the
stream, the 3rd Division was in the town. On the left
the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the Twentieth Corps held
the villages from Chaffois to Frasne, and on the right
the Army Reserve occupied Byans.

General von Manteuffel had ordered a general ad-
vance for the 29th on Pontarlier, where the French at
last must certainly be found.

392 THE FE.iNCO-GERMAN WAE. '

(January 29tli.) General Koblinsky, of the Second
Corps, had set out from Poligny before daylight.
When he reached Champagnole and had assembled the
whole of the 5th Brigade, he advanced at about seven
o'clock. General du Trossel with the 7th Brigade
reached Censeau without finding the enemy.

On the right Colonel von WedeU had marched from
Pont-du-Navoy on Les-Planches with four battalions
of the 6th Brigade. He found only dismounted troop-
ers, posts probably left by General von Cremer, who
were easily dispersed by the Jagers. Detachments
were then sent out on all sides, and everywhere met
with scattered troops ; but at Foncine-le-Bas the head
of the Twenty-fourth Corps was found, and Colonel
von Wedell now cut off their line of retreat, the last
that had been left open.

With the rest of the Second Corps General von Hart-
mann marched unopposed on Nozeroy.

The 14th Division of the Seventh Corps had not
received the order to advance on Pontarlier till some-
what late; it did not start from Deservillers till the
afternoon, and only reached Levier at three o'clock,
where, at the same hour, the head of the 13th Divis-
ion also arrived from Villeneuve-d'^mont, the state
of the roads having greatly delayed them on the
march.

The advanced guard of three battahons, haK a
squadron, and one battery, had met only stragglers on
their way, and General von Zastrow commanded them
to advance on the Drugeon. Through the woods on
the left of the road compact detachments of the French
were retiring on Sombacourt, and Major von Breder-
low, with the 1st Battahon of the 77th Eegiment, made
a flank movement on that village. The 2nd Company,
under Captain von Vietinghof, made its way in by

NEWS OF THE AEMISTICE. 393

Sept-Fontaines with loud cheers, and was at first sur-
rounded by a strong force of the enemy ; however, the
other companies soon came to its assistance. The 1st
Division of the Fifteenth Corps (French) was com-
pletely routed without the reserve close at hand in
Byans having come to its support. Fifty officers,
including two generals, were taken prisoners, with
2700 men; ten guns, seven mitrailleuses, forty-eight
wagons, 319 horses, and 3500 stand of arms fell into
the hands of the Hanoverian battalion which was left
in occupation of Sombacourt.

The remainder of the advanced guard had meanwhile
advanced on Chaffois, where the road opens out from
the mountain gorge into the broad vaUey of the Dru-
geon. The place was occupied, as we have seen, by
the 2nd Division of the Twentieth Corps (French).

Colonel von Cosel attacked at once. Three com-
panies of the 53rd Regiment surprised the French
picket and seized the first houses in the village, but
then the mass of the French Eighteenth Corps stopped
their further advance. By degrees all the forces at
hand became engaged, as well as the reinforcements
brought up from the main body of the 14th Division.
The fight had lasted with great obstinacy for an hour
and a half, when suddenly the French ceased firing
and laid down their arms. They appealed to the ar-
mistice already agreed on.

Monsieur Jules Favi'e had, in fact, telegraphed to
Bordeaux at a quarter past eleven on the night of the
28th, that an armistice of twenty-one days had been
concluded, without adding that, with his consent, the
three eastern departments had been excepted from it.
The information, in this imperfect form, was trans-
mitted to the civil authorities by the Chambers at
12.15 at noon of the 29th ; but Monsieur Freycinet did

394 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

not forward it to the military authorities, whom it
principally concerned, till 3.30 in the afternoon.

Thus could General Clinchant, in all good faith,
transmit to General Thornton, in command of the di-
vision at Chaffois, a message which, as regarded the
Army of the East, was altogether incorrect. He at once
sent a staff officer to the Prussian advanced guard, who
were still firing, requiring them to cease on the strength
of the official message.

General von Manteuffel, at Arbois, had received, at
five in the morning, full particulars from head-quar-
ters of the terms of the armistice, by which the army
in the south was to continue operations till further
orders. General orders announcing this to all the
troops were at once sent out, but did not reach the
Seventh Corps till evening.

Nothing was known there of any armistice; how-
ever, the news might be on the way, and General von
Zastrow granted the temporary cessation of hostilities,
and even released his prisoners, but without their
arms.

Chaffois, with the exception of a few farmsteads,
remained in the hands of the 14th Division (German),
who found such quarters there as they might ; the 13th
retired to the villages from Sept-Fontaines to Deser-
villers.

(January 30th.) In full confidence in the news from
the seat of Government, General Clinchant, on the
30th, stopped the retreat of his army. The newly-
appointed Commander of the Twenty-fourth Corps,
General Comagny, also gave up his intended attempt
to cut his way with 10,000 men through Colonel von
Wedell's small brigade at Foncine. The other corps
remained, after the unfortunate issue of the evening's
fight, close pressed at Pontarlier ; but detachments of

A MISAPPEEHENSION. 395

troopers were sent out one by one on the roads to Be-
sangon and St. Laurent, to establish a line of demarca-
tion, and also to keep up communications with the
fortress and with the south.

After receiving the general orders at about eleven
at night, General Zastrow informed the French in his
front of the resumption of hostilities, but restricted
his immediate demands to the complete evacuation of
Chaffois, which was agreed to. Otherwise the corps
remained where it was, and inactive.

General du Trossel, of the Second Corps, had set
out very early from Censeau, but the appearance of a
French flag of truce, and his fear of offending against
the law of nations, here too occasioned considerable
delay. The woods of Frasne were not clear of the
French till evening. Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky
made his way into the village with quite a small force,
and took the twelve officers and 1500 men who held it
prisoners, with two colors. The 5th Brigade then also
arrived at Frasne ; the rest of the corps occupied the
same quarters as on the previous day.

A flag of truce had also been sent to Les-Planches,
but Colonel von Wedell had simply dismissed the
bearer. The outposts of the Foui'teenth Corps did the
same.

On the north of Pontarlier, General von Schmeling
advanced on Pierre-Fontaine, General von Debschitz
on Maiche.

(January 31st.) On the morning of this day the
French Colonel Varaigne made his appearance at Gen-
eral von Manteuffel's head-quarters at ViUeneuve to
propose that a cessation of hostilities for thirty-six
hours should be agreed upon, till all doubts could be
removed ; but this was refused, as the German General
had no doubts whatever. Permission was granted for

396 THE FRANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

a direct application to Versailles, but it was at the
same time explained that the movements of the Army
of the South would not be suspended till the arrival of
the answer.

On this day, however, the Second Army Corps
marched only on Dompierre on a line with the Seventh,
its advanced guard pushing forward to the Drugeon
on Ste. Colombe and La-Riviere. Thence, in the even-
ing, a company of Colberg's Grenadiers crossed the
steep mountain ridge and descended on La Planee,
where it took 500 prisoners. On the right a flanking
detachment of two battalions and one battery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe marched unopposed up the
gorge from Bonnevaux to Vaux, taking 2 officers and
688 men prisoners. The French then abandoned the
defile of Granges-Ste.-Marie and retired on St. Antoine
in the mountains.

The corps had found every road strewn with cast-
away arms and camp utensils and had captured 4000
men in all.

As soon as the enemy had been informed that hos-
tilities were resumed, the 14th Division of the Seventh
Corps extended on the left along the Drugeon as far
as La-Vrine, whence a connection was eifected with
the 4th Reserve Division of the Fourteenth Corps at
St. Gorgon. The 13th Division advanced on Sept-
Fontaines. Pontarlier was now completely surrounded,
and General von Manteuffel had fixed February 1st for
the attack. The Second Corps was to advance from
the south-west, the Seventh from the north-west ; Gen-
eral von der Goltz was to remain at Levier with a
reserve force.

Meanwhile the French Commander-in-chief had con-
ceived doubts as to whether the communications from
Government were perfectly correct. The passes over

FIGHT AT LA-CLUSE. 397

the mountains to the south were now lost, and an
escape in that direction was no longer to be hoped for.
General Clinchant had already sent back the baggage
and ammunition columns, the sick and the exhausted,
through La-Cluse under shelter of the forts of Joux
and Neuv. And when in the afternoon a message from
Bordeaux announced that in fact the Army of the East
had been excluded from the armistice, the Commander-
in-chief called a council of war. Every Greneral present
declared that he could no longer answer for his troops.
He himself therefore went out the same evening to
Les-Verrieres, to conclude negotiations he had aheady
opened, by which on the following day, February 1st,
the army was to cross the frontier into Switzerland by
three separate roads.

To cover this retreat, the Army Reserve was to hold
Pontarlier till all the baggage-trains had crossed the
ridge at La-Cluse, and the Eighteenth Corps was to
occupy a position between the two forts. Fortifica-
tions were at once begun. So much of the Fifteenth
Corps as had failed to get beyond Morez with the
cavalry was to try to cross into Switzerland at any
available point.

(February 1st.) When the advanced guard of the
Second Corps (German) marched on Pontarlier from
Ste. Colombe it met with but slight resistance at the
railway station. Colberg's Grenadiers took possession
of the town without a struggle, took many prisoners,
and then found the roads beyond entirely blocked by
guns and wagons.

They were toiling along with great difficulty through
deep snow. Just in front of La-Cluse the road winds
up between high walls of rock to a large cirque formed
by the Doubs, which is completely commanded by the
fortified castle of Joux on an isolated knoll of rock.

398 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

On debouching into this valley the foremost companies
were received by a hot fire. Four guns, dragged up
with the greatest difficulty, could do nothing against
the heavy guns of the fort, so the French themselves
attacked.

Colberg's Fusihers had meanwhile scaled the heights
to the left, followed by the 2nd Battalion of the regi-
ment and a battalion of the 49th, who drove the French
out of the farmsteads and rifts on the plateau. The
steep cliff on the right was also scaled, several files of
the 49th Eegiment clambered down the slopes above
La-Cluse, and Colberg's Grenadiers advanced to the
foot of Fort Neuv.

To take the castle by storm was obviously impossi-
ble, and the nature of the country is such as almost to
prohibit the escape of a defeated enemy. Of the French
twenty-three officers and 1600 men were taken, and
400 loaded wagons ; of the Oermans nineteen officers
and 365 men were killed, mostly of Colberg's regiment.
The troops spent the night on the field.

As no large force could be brought into action at
La-Cluse, General von Fransecky had ordered the main
body of the corps to march to the south on Ste. Marie.
To avoid the necessity of crossing ^the chain of the
Jura, General von Hartmann marched first on Pontar-
lier to avail himseK of the better roads from thence,
but there he was detained, the fight at La-Cluse having
assumed unexpected proportions. The Seventh Corps
and the 4th Reserve Division also, which had reached
the Doubs at noon, were equally unable to get at the
enemy.

During the whole day the French columns were
crossing the Swiss frontier. The Army Reserve in
Pontarher was from the beginning carried away by
the tide of baggage-wagons and di'ivers, and only joined

GENERAL WEYHEEN'S MAECH ON DIJON. 399

the Eighteenth Corps on reaching La-Cluse. During
the night they both followed in the general line of re-
treat. Only the cavalry and a few hundred men of
the First Division of the Twenty-fourth Corps reached
the department of I'Ain, the next to the south ; 80,000
French crossed on to Swiss soil.

General Manteuffel had transferred his head-quar-
ters to Pontarlier. Only then, and not till night, did
he hear from Berlin of the agreement between General
Clinchant and the Swiss Colonel Herzog.

General von Manteuffel had achieved the important
success of his three weeks' campaign through a suc-
cession of fights, but without a pitched battle since
quitting the Lisaine, simply by marches ; such marches,
indeed, as none but well-seasoned troops could have
accomplished under bold and skilful leadership, under
every form of f atigile and hardship, in the worst season
and through a difficult country.

Thus two French armies were now prisoners in Ger-
many, a third interned in the capital, and the fourth
disarmed on foreign soil.

GENERAL HANN VON WEYHEEN'S MAECH ON DIJON.

It only remains to glance back on the advance on
Dijon, which had been entrusted to the command of
General Hann von Weyhern on January 26th.

On that same day Garibaldi was appealed to, to take
some energetic measure against Dole and Mouchard.

To support him, the Government, indefatigable in
the evolution of new forces, were to send 15,000 Gardes
Mobiles under General Crouzat from Lyons to Lons-
le-Saulnier, and a Twenty-sixth Corps in course of
formation at Chatellerault was to be detached to
Beaune. As it was beyond doubt that General von
Manteuffel had marched with a strong force, to cut off

400 THE FKANCO-GEKMAN WAK.

the communications of the Army of the East, an order
was transmitted on the 27th to the Commander of the
torces in the Vosges, to leave only from 8000 to 10,000
men in Dijon and to advance at once with the main
body beyond Dole.

But the General was anxious for Dijon ; he occu-
pied the principal positions on the slopes of the Cote-
d'Or and detached a small force to St.-Jean-de-Losne,
behind the Canal-de-Bourgogne. Nothing had as yet
been seen of 700 volunteers who had marched on
Dole.

Langres had shown a little more energy, several, and
often successful, sorties of small outpost companies and
depot troops had been led out from time to time.

General Hann von Weyhern's purpose of attacking
Dijon from the south had to be abandoned, because
the bridge over the Saone at St.-Jean-de-Losne had
been destroyed. He, therefore, on the 29th crossed
the river at Apremont, and on the 31st assembled his
detachment at Arc-sur-Tille. Here again General
Bordone, the Chief of the General Staif of the Army of
the Vosges, vainly appealed to the supposed armistice.
On the 31st, General von Kettler marched as an ad-
vanced guard on Varois. To cut off the enemy's com-
munications with Auxonne, a detachiQent on the left
held the bridge over the Ouche at Fauverney. The
first shells drove the French back on their intrenched
position between St. Apollinaire and Mirande.

When the attempt to bring about an armistice had
failed. General Bordone determined to evacuate Dijon
in the course of the night and retire on to really neu-
tral ground. Thus, on February 1st, the head of the
advanced guard found the outworks abandoned, and
General von Kettler marched in without any opposi-
tion, just as the last train of French troops moved out

OCCUPATION OF THE DEPAHTMENTS. 401

of the railway-station. Sombernon and Nuits were
also occupied on the 2nd.

OCCUPATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE DOUBS, JUEA,
AND COTE-D'OE.

Nothing now remained for General von Manteuffel
but to effect a military occupation of the Departments
he had invaded, and to protect them from without.

General Pelissier was still within their limits, having
reached Lons-le-Saulnier from Lyons with the 15,000
Gardes Mobiles joined by the battalions sent back
from Besan(jon by General Eolland, numerically a by
no means insignificant force, but of no gi'eat practical
use. The commanders were recommended to retire
and avoid further bloodshed ; and they did so, as soon
as some detachments of the Second Corps (German)
advanced on Lons-le-Saulnier and St. Laurent. Others
occupied Mouthe and Les-AUemands, where twenty-
eight guns had been abandoned by the French. The
Swiss frontier was watched by eight battalions for
security. The forts of Salins, the little fortress of
Auxonne, and Besangon from the east side, were kept
under observation.

Although the Department of Haute-Marne was in-
cluded in the armistice, the commandant of Langres
had refused to recognize the authority of the Govern-
ment. So this place had to be invested, and perhaps
besieged. General von der Goltz was first ordered to
march on it, and General von Krenski was already
advancing with seven battalions, two squadrons, and
two batteries with a siege train from Longwy, which
he had reduced to capitulation on January 25th, after
a bombardment of six days' duration. But it was not
called into requisition at Langres.

General von Manteuffel aimed at no further tactical
26

402 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

results ; lie was anxious to save Ms troops from further
losses, and to afford them all possible respite after
their unusual exertions. Not till now was the baggage
brought up, even that of the staff officers having been
necessarily left behind during the advance through the
Jura. The troops were distributed for the sake of com-
fort in roomy quarters, but in readiness for action at
any moment, the Second Corps in Jura, the Seventh
in Cote-d'Or, the Fourteenth in Doubs. But the siege
of Belfort was to be stringently carried on.

THE SIEGE OF BELFORT.

Immediately after the battle on the Lisaine the forces
investing Belfort were increased to 27 battalions, 6
squadrons, 6 field batteries, 24 companies of garrison
artillery, and 6 companies of sappers and miners ; in
all 17,602 infantry, 4699 artillery, and 1166 engineers
=23,467 men, with 707 horses and 34 field-guns.

While the town was invested on the north and west
by only a few battalions, the main force was assembled
to the south and east.

On January 20th, the batteries on the east opened a
hot fire on Perouse. Colonel Denfert inferred that an
attack was imminent, and put four battalions of his
most trusted troops into the village, Vhich was forti-
fied for an obstinate defence.

At about midnight, two battalions of the 67th Regi-
ment advanced from Chevremont without firing a shot
on the Haut-Taillis wood. Only inside it there was a
determined struggle, but the French were driven back
on the village, and the sappers immediately intrenched
the skirt of the wood towards Perouse under a heavy
fire from the fort.

Half an hour later two Landwehr battalions advanced
from Bessoncourt to the copse on the north of the

SIEGE OF BELFOET. 403

village. They were received with a sharp fire, but
made their way onward over abatis, pits, and wire-en-
tanglements, driving the enemy back into the quarries.

A brisk fire was now opened on both sides, but the
67th presently renewed the attack, and without allow-
ing themselves to be checked at the earthworks, forced
their way into Perouse. They took possession of the
eastern end of the straggling village at about half-
past two, and the party defending the quarries find-
ing themselves threatened, retreated. At five o'clock,
Colonel Denfert surrendered the western part of the
position, which was now occupied by the Germans.

They had lost eight officers and 178 men ; the French
left five ofiicers and ninety-three men prisoners.

(January 21st to 27th.) The next day the first
parallel was thrown up along a front of 1800 metres
from Donjoutin to Haut-Taillis. Five battalions and
two companies of sappers were engaged in this work,
and undisturbed by the French; but the rocky soil
prohibited its being constructed of the usual width.

General von Tresckow already believed that he might
proceed to storm the two forts of Perches. Two half-
closed redoubts with perpendicular ditches cut three
metres deep out of the rock, casemated traverses and
bomb-proof block-houses in the gorge, insured protec-
tion for the defenders. They were armed with seven
12-cm. guns in each. The works were connected by
trenches, behind which a reserve force was in readiness.

On the right flank this position was protected by a
battalion and counter-batteries in Le-Fourneau; on
the left the wood, which was not more than 600 paces
distant, was cleared, and wire-entanglements between
the stumps formed an almost impenetrable obstacle.
In front the gentle slope of the hill was under the
cross-fire of the two forts.

404 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

As soon as the construction of the parallel was suffi-
ciently advanced, on the evening of the 26th, to allow
of its being occupied by larger detachments, the storm-
ing was begun. Two columns of one battalion, one
company of sappers, and two guns proceeded to the
attack at daybreak on January 27th. Two companies
of Schneidemiihl's Landwehr Battalion advanced on
the front of Basses-Perches and threw themselves on
the ground within sixty to 100 metres in front of the
works. A party of sharp-shooters and a few sappers
got to the ditch and unhesitatingly leaped in ; the two
other companies, going round the fort to the left, had
reached the rear, and here too the men jumped into
the ditch of the gorge. But the French, who had been
driven out of their shelter-trenches, had now re-assem-
bled, and the battalion advanced from Le-Fourneau.
All the forts of the place opened fire on the clear and
unprotected space in front of the parallel, and an at-
tempt to cross it on the part of the reserve force failed.
The 7th Company of the Landwehr Battalion were
surrounded by superior numbers, and after a brave
struggle were for the most part taken prisoners. Most
of the men in the ditch were still able to escape.

The advance of the right column against Hautes-
Perches also failed. It had to cross 1000 metres of
open ground. An attempt to smTound the fort did
not succeed; it was im}3ossible to get through the
abatis and other obstacles under the fire of the French.

This disastrous attempt to storm the place cost 10
officers and 427 men ; the slower engineering operations
had to be resumed.

(January 28th and February 15th.) As the Germans
got nearer to the forts the flying sap could be carried
forward about 300 metres every night without any
opposition from the enemy. In spite of all the diffi-

SIEGE OF BELFOET. 405

culties caused by the nature of the soil, by February
1st the second parallel had been advanced half-way to
the forts of Les-Perches.

As the Fort-de-la- Justice was a particular hindrance
to the works, two batteries had to be constructed to
the east of Perouse to bear upon it. Four mortar-bat-
teries on the flank of the parallel could now fire on
Haute and Basse-Perches at very short range. Three
batteries were also placed in the Bois-des-Perches to
attack the castle, and one on the skirt of the wood by
Bavilliers against the main work. Henceforward 1500
shell a day were fired on the fortress and outworks.

But the progi^ess of the attack became more and
more difficult. General Debschitz, by retiring, had seri-
ously reduced the working strength of the besieging
force. The loss in sappers was particularly serious,
and two new companies had to be brought up from
Strasburg. The bright moonlight lighting up the
sheets of snow far and wide made it impossible to pro-
ceed with the flying saps. Sap-roUers were called into
requisition ; the heads of the saps had to be protected
by sand-bags and the sides by gabions, while the earth
for filling had often to be brought from a long distance
in the rear.

On the top of this, on February 3rd, a thaw set in,
and the water from the slopes filled the trenches, so
that all intercourse had to be across the open gi-ound.
Torrents of rain damaged the finished works ; the para-
pet of the first parallel gave way in places and the ban-
quette was washed away. The arming of the batteries
was most laborious with the ground in such a state,
and the teams of the columns and field artillery had to
be employed in bringing in ammunition.

Several guns had become useless by overheating,
while the enemy, by rapidly running out their guns,

406 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAE.

firing, and then running them back again, greatly dis-
turbed the work. Not merely was it necessary to
continue the shelling of Les-Perches during the night,
but a brisk rifle fire had to be kept up. Only now
and then did the batteries newly placed in the parallels
succeed in silencing the guns of Hautes-Perches. Gun
epaulments were erected to front Fort Bellevue,
and the fortified railway station and Fort-des-Barres
brought into action again. That under such toil and
the unfavorable weather the health of the troops must
have suffered severely need not be said ; the battalions
could often only muster 300 men for duty.

Meanwhile, however, the artillery of the attack had
become very much stronger than that of the defenders,
and, in spite of every obstacle, the saps were pushed
on to the edge of the ditch of Les-Perches.

On February 8th, at one in the afternoon. Captain
Roese had the sap rollers flung into the ditch of Hautes-
Perches, sprang into it with five sappers, and rapidly
scaled the parapet by the steps hewn in the escarp.
He was immediately followed by the trench-guard, but
no French were surprised excepting a few in the case-
mated traverses.

The situation of the garrison of the fort had in fact
become most critical. Ammunition could only be
fetched under the enemy's fire, water only be had from
the pond at Vernier, and only boiled inside the works.
Colonel Denfert had already given orders to conceal
the materiel. Unseen by the besiegers, those guns of
which the carriages could still be moved had been
withdrawn, and only one company left in each fort,
who, in case of a surprise, were to fire and escape.
Nothing was to be found in the abandoned works but
wrecked gun-carriages and four damaged guns. This
fort was at once so adapted that its front should face

SIEGE OF BELFOKT. 407

the fortress, but at three o'clock the main work opened
such a destructive fire on the lost positions that the
men were forced to take shelter in the ditches.

The garrison in Basses-Perches attempted some re-
sistance, but supported by a reserve they soon retired
on Le-Fourneau, leaving five guns and much battered
ordnance.

Here also the fire from the main work at first pre-
vented the work of restoration, but four 15-cm. mortars
were at last brought into the fort, and two 9-cm. guns
placed on the spur of the hill to the westward, now
directed their fire on Le-Fourneau and Bellevue.
During the night of the 9th the works were connected
by a shelter-trench 624 metres long, and thus a third
parallel was established.

By this time they were in a position to direct the
immediate attack on the castle, and on this the bat-
teries in the Bois-des-Perches and those in the second
paraUel opened fire. Moitte, Justice, and Bellevue
were shelled simultaneously. General von Debschitz
had returned, and the investing corps was by this
means again reinforced to its full numbers, and all the
conditions were improved by the return of the frost.
By the 13th ninety-seven guns were mounted ready
in the third parallel.

The town had suffered terribly from the prolonged
bombardment. Nearly all the buildings were damaged,
fifteen completely burnt down ; also in the adjoining
villages 164 houses had been destroyed by the defend-
ers themselves. The fortifications showed not less
visible signs of destruction, particularly the castle.
The stone facing of their walls had crumbled into the
ditch. Half of the mantleted embrasm-es had been
shattered, the expense powder magazines had been
blown up, and a number of casemated traverses broken

408 THE FKANCO-GERMAN WAE.

through. The guns in the highest positions could only
be reached by ladders. The original strength of the
garrison had been 372 officers and 17,322 men, but
they had lost 32 officers and 4713 men, besides 336
citizens. The place was no longer tenable ; in addition
to this came the news that the army by whom they
expected to be relieved had laid down their arms.

Under these circumstances General von Tresckow
summoned the Commandant after such a brave defence
to surrender the fort, with a free retreat for the garri-
son, this stipulation having the sanction of his Majesty.
The French Government themselves had given the
Commandant permission to accept these terms ; how-
ever, Colonel Denfert insisted that he must have a
more direct order. To procure this an officer was sent
to Basle, whilst there was a provisional armistice.

On the 15th a treaty was signed at Versailles, which
extended the armistice to the three departments which
till then had been excluded from it, and also to Belf ort ;
but the 1st article demanded the surrender of that
place.

After the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the gar-
rison, in the course of the 17th and 18th, with its arms
and trains, left the precincts of the fort, and passed to
L'Isle-sur-Doubs and St. Hyppolyte on French terri-
tory. The march was effected in echelons of 1000 men
at intervals of 5 km., the last accompanied by Colonel
Denfert. The provisions which had been stored in the
fort were carried after them in 150 Prussian baggage-
wagons. At three o'clock in the afternoon on the 18th
February, Lieutenant-General von Tresckow entered
the place at the head of detachments of all the troops
of the investing corps.

They found 341 guns, of which 56 were useless, 356
gun-carriages, of which 119 were shot to pieces, and

EVACUATION OF BELFOKT. 409

22,000 stand of arms, besides considerable supplies of
ammunition and provisions.

The siege had cost the Germans 88 officers and 2049
men, 245 of whom were released from imprisonment
by the capitulation. Immediately the work of restor-
ing and arming the fort began, and the leveUing of the
siege-works.

VII.

SURRENDER AND PEACE.

THE AKMISTICE.

On the basis of the agreement of the 28th January
a line of demarcation was drawn, from which both
parties were to withdraw their outposts to a distance
of 10 km. The line ran south from the mouth of the
Seine as far as the Sarthe, crossed the Loire at Saumur,
following the Creuse, turned eastward past Vierzon,
Clamecy and Chagny, and then met the Swiss frontier,
after passing to the north of Chalons-sur-Saone and
south of Lons-le-Saulnier and St. Laurent. The de-
partments of Pas-de-Calais and du Nord, as well as the
promontory of Havre, were particularly excluded.

The remainder of the forts held by French troops
within the provinces of which the G-ermans had taken
possession were allowed a radius in proportion to their
importance.

In carrying out the details of the agreement a liberal
interpretation was in several places allowed. The
assent of those members of the National Defence Com-
mittee who were in Paris was obtained ; but the dele-
gates at Bordeaux, who had hitherto conducted the
war, at first held aloof, and, indeed, as yet had not
been informed of the stipulations. Gambetta, how-
ever, suspended operations, but could give the com-
manders no more precise instructions.

G-eneral Faidherbe was thus without orders with
regard to the evacuation of Dieppe and Abbeville.

BELIEF OF PAEIS. 411

General von Goeben, however, deferred taking posses-
sion. On the west of the Seine, the Grand Duke was
forced to announce that the non-recognition of the hne
of demarcation would result in an immediate recom-
mencement of hostihties.

The Commandant of the garrison at Langres also
raised difficulties, and only retreated within his rayon
on the 7th February, as, later on, did General Eolland
in Besangon. Auxonne refused to surrender the rail-
way. Bitsch, which had not been worth the trouble
of a serious attack, rejected the convention ; the in-
vestment had therefore to be strengthened, and only
in March, when threatened with a determined attack,
did the garrison abandon its peak of rock.

Also the volunteers did not acquiesce at once, and
there were skirmishes with them in various places.
But after the conditions were finally settled, no more
serious quarrels took place between the inhabitants
and the German troops during the whole course of the
armistice.

All the German corps outside Paris had occupied
the forts lying in their front, more particularly the
Fifth that of Mont-Valerien, and the Fourth the town
of St. Denis. The ground between the forts and the
walls remained neutral ground, which only civihans
were allowed to cross, along particular roads placed
under control of German examining troo.

In their anxiety as to the indignation of the people,
the French Government had so long hesitated to pro-
nounce the word capitulation that now, even with free
ingi-ess of supplies, Paris was threatened with an out-
break of real famine. The unnecessary stores in the
German magazines were therefore placed at the disposal
of the authorities. The Commander-in-chief, the Gov-
ernment authorities, and the mihtary inspectors re-

412 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

ceived orders to place no difficulties in the way of the
repairing of the railways and roads in their districts,
and they were even allowed to make use of the rail-
roads which the invaders used to supply their own
army, under German direction. Nevertheless, the first
provision train only arrived in Paris on February 3rd,
and it was the middle of the month before the French
had succeeded in remedying the prevalent distress in
the capital.

The G-erman prisoners were at once given up. The
surrender of arms and military materiel followed by
degrees, also the 200 million francs ransom imposed
on the city.

But it was still doubtful if the party of war " a ou-
rance " in Bordeaux would agree with the arrangement
of the Paris Government, and if at last the National
Assembly, which was about to be convened, would
accept the conditions of peace made by the conquerors.
Such measures as were necessary in case the war
should break out again were therefore taken on the
French as well as on the German side.

The distribution of the French army at the close of
the armistice was not a favorable one.

By General Faidherbe's advice the whole Army of
the North was disbanded, as being too weak to face
the strength of the forces that stood opposite to them.
After the Twenty-second Corps had been transported
by sea to Cherbourg, the Army of Bretagne, under
General de Colombo, was made up of this, with the
Twenty-seventh and part of the Nineteenth Corps, and
including Lipowski's volunteers, CatheUneau's and
others, amounted to 150,000 men. General Loysel,
with 30,000 ill-armed and inexperienced Gardes Mo-
biles, remained in the trenches before Havi^e.

General Chanzy, after his retreat on Mayenne, had

PEECAUTIONAKY MEASURES. 413

made a movement to the left, in order to assist in a
new plan of action with the Second Army of the Loire,
with its base at Caen, which, however, was never car-
ried out. The Eighteenth, Twenty-first, Sixteenth,
and Twenty-sixth Corps stood between the Lower
Loire and the Cher from Angers to Chateauroux, about
100,000 men strong, the Twenty-fifth under Greneral
Pourcet at Bourges, and General de Pointe's corps at
Nevers. The Army of the Vosges had withdrawn to
the south of Chalon-sur-Saone, and the remainder of
the Army of the East assembled under General Cremer
at Chambery as the Twenty-fourth Corps.

The total of all the field troops amounted to 534,452
men. The volunteers, even the most reliable, were
dismissed, and the National Guard were for the present
regarded as incapaUes de rendre aiiciin service a la
guerre. In the barracks, the manoeuvi'ing camps, and
in Algiers there were still 354,000 men, and 132,000
were on the muster-rolls as recruits in 1871, but had
not yet been told oif .

If the war should be persisted in, a plan for limiting
it to defensive measures in the south-east of France
had been suggested, for which, however, according to
the report sent on February 8th by the Committee of
Inquiry to the National Assembly, scarcely more than
252,000 men in fighting condition were available. The
fleet, besides, had given up so considerable a number
of its men and guns for service on land, that it was no
longer able for any great undertaking at sea.

On the German side the first consideration was to
restore the troops to their war-standing, and make
good the stores of materiel.

The forts round Paris were at once armed on the
fronts facing the city walls. In and between these
stood 680 guns, 145 of which had been taken from the

414 THE FBANCO-GEEMAK WAK.

French ; they were more than enough to keep the rest-
less population under control. A part of the forces
which till then had been occupied with the siege, being
no longer required, were removed, in order that all the
troops might have better accommodation. Besides, it
seemed desirable to strengthen the Second Army which
faced the enemy's principal force ; in consequence the
Fourth Corps marched on Nogent-le-Rotrou, the Fifth
on Orleans, and the Ninth, which was relieved there,
on Vendome ; so that now the quarters of this army
extended from Alengon to Tours, and up the Loire as
far as Gien and Auxerre.

The First Army was in the north with the Eighth
Corps on the Somme, and on both sides of the Lower
Seine ; in the south the Army of the South occupied
the line of demarcation from Baume to Switzerland,
and the country in the rear.

At the end of February the invading field-army
standing on French ground consisted of: —

Infantiy . 464,221 men with 1674 guns.
Cavahy . 55,562 horses.

Troops in garrison : —

Infantry . 105,272 men with 68 guns.
Cavahy . 5,681 horses, n

Total . 630,736 men and 1742 guns.

Reserve forces left in Germany: —
3,288 officers.
204,684 men.
26,603 horses.

Arrangements were made, that in case of a recom-
mencement of hostilities, the strongest resistance could
be made at all points. The armistice had nearly
reached its end, and the troops had already been more

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. 415

closely collected to be ready to advance first of all on
the offensive, towards the south, when the clerk of the
Council announced that the armistice was extended to
the 24th, and again prolonged to midnight on the 26th.

Considerable difficulties had arisen from the differ-
ences of opinion with regard to the election of the
National Assembly, between the Government in Paris
and the Delegation at Bordeaux. The Germans wished
to see the choice, not of a party, but of the whole
nation, expressed by a free suffrage. But Gambetta
had ruled, contrary to the conditions of the armistice,
that all those who, after December 2nd, 1851, had held
any position in the Imperial Government should be
regarded as ineligible. It was not till the Parisian
Government had obtained a majority of votes by dis-
patching several of its members to Bordeaux, and till
the dictator had resigned on the 6th February, that
the voting went on quickly and unhindered.

The deputies were already assembled in Bordeaux
by the 12th. M. Thiers was elected chief of the execu-
tive, and went to Paris on the 19th with Jules Favre,
determined to end the aimless war at any cost.

Negotiations for peace were opened, and after five
days' violent debating, when at last the Germans con-
sented to restore Belfort to the French, the prelimi-
naries were signed on the afternoon of the 26th.

France agreed to surrender to Germany a part of
Lorraine and Alsace, with the exception of Belfort,
and a war indemnity of five milliards of francs.

The evacuation of the places that the Germans had
taken was to begin immediately on the ratification of
the treaty, and be continued by degrees in proportion
as the money was paid. As long as the German troops
remained on French soil they were to be fed at the
expense of France. On the other hand, no further

416 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

requisitions were to be made by the G-ermans. Imme*
diately after the first evacuation the French forces were
to retire behind the Loke, with the exception of 40,000
men in Paris and the necessary garrisons in the for-
tresses.

After the ratification of these preliminaries, further
terms were to be discussed in Brussels, and the return
of the French prisoners would begin. Thus the armis-
tice was prolonged to the 12th of March ; but it was in
the option of either of the belligerent powers to end it
after the 3rd March by giving three days' notice.

Finally, it was stipulated that the German Army
should have the satisfaction of marching into Paris,
and remaining there till the ratification of the treaty ;
but they would restrict themselves to the quarter of
the town lying between Point-du-Jour and the Rue du
Faubourg-St.-Honore. This was occupied on the 1st
March, after a parade in Longchamps before his
Majesty of 30,000 men, consisting of 11,000 of the
Sixth, 11,000 of the Second Bavarian, and 8000 of the
Eleventh Army Corps. On the 3rd and 5th of March
they were to have been relieved by other detachments
of the same strength, but M. Thiers succeeded by the
1st March in getting the National Assembly at Bor-
deaux to accept the treaty, after the" deposition of the
Napoleonic dynasty had been voted. The exchange
of ratifications took place in the afternoon of the 2nd,
and on the 3rd the first detachment marched back into
quarters.

THE KETUEN MAECH OF THE GEEMAN AEMY.

By the Third Article, the whole of the land between
the Seine and the Loire, excepting Paris, was to be
evacuated with as little delay as possible, by both
armies J the right bank of the former river, on the

EETURN MAECH OF THE INVADEES. 417

other hand, was only to be cleared after the conclusion
of the definitive treaty of peace. Even then the six
Eastern departments were still left in possession of the
Germans as a pledge for the last three milliards ; not,
however, occupied by more than 50,000 men.

The order of march was drawn up at head-quarters,
with a view no less to the comfort of the troops than
to the reformation of the original order of battle, and
the possibility of rapid assembly in case of need.

The forces told off for permanent occupation of the
ceded provinces marched thither at once.

The reserve and Landwehr troops in Germany were
disbanded, as well as the Baden contingent, which,
however, for the present remained there as a mobilized
force. The army head-quarters in Lorraine, Rheims,
and Versailles were broken up, and their authority
handed over to the generals in command, but in order
to maintain order in the rear of the army, the Sixth
and Twelfth Corps, as well as the Wiirtemberg Field
Division, were placed under the immediate command
of the army head-quarters.

By March 31st the army had taken possession of the
newly-acquired territory, bounded on the west by the
Seine from its source to its mouth.

The First Army was in the departments of Seine-
Inferieure and Somme, the Second in front of Paris,
in the departments of Oise and Seine-et-Marne, the
Third in the departments of Aube and Haute-Marne,
the Army of the South in the last hostile districts.
The forts of Paris on the left bank were given up to
the French authorities ; the siege-park and the captured
war materiel had been carried off. In consideration
for the wishes of the French Government, in order
that the National Assembly might be allowed as early
as possible to sit at Versailles, the head-quarters were
27

418 THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

broken up and transferred to Ferrieres, even sooner
than had been agreed. On the 15th March his Majesty
left Nancy for Berlin.

All the troops that were left before Paris were placed
under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony,
and General von Manteuffel was nominated Com-
mander of the Army of Occupation.

At the moment when Prance had freed herself by a
heavy sacrifice, an enemy of the most dangerous char-
acter appeared from within : the Commune in Paris.

The 40,000 men who had been left there proved
themselves unequal to the task of keeping the rebellious
movement under control ; even during the siege it had
on several occasions betrayed its presence, and now
broke out in open civil war. Large masses of people,
encouraged by the National Gruard and the Oarde
Mobile, took possession of the guns and set themselves
up in armed opposition to the Grovernment. M. Thiers
had already, by the 18th of March, summoned to Ver-
sailles such regiments as could still be trusted, to with-
draw them from the dangers of party influence, and
for the protection of the National Assembly there.
The French capital remained destroyed, and plundered
by the French troops.

The Germans could have easily and quickly put an
end to the matter, but what Government would allow
its rights to be established by foreign bayonets I The
German Commanders-in-chief hmited themselves to
forbidding any rebellious disturbances within their
own district, and to prevent any further marching into
Paris from outside. The work of disarming, which
had commenced, was interrupted; the troops of the
Third Corps were drawn closer to the forts, and the
outposts were replaced along the line of demarcation,
where 200,000 men could be collected within two days.

THE COMMUNE IN PABIS. 419

The anthorities in Paris, however, announced that
any attempt to arm the fronts facing the Grermans
would result in an instantaneous bombardment of the
city. The rebels, however, were fully occupied in
destroying and burning, and in executing their supe-
riors in the interior of Paris. They did not turn against
their foreign enemy, but against the Government
chosen by the nation, and prepared for an attack on
Versailles.

The leaders of the State who were there, bound by
the conditions. of the treaty, were almost defenceless;
meanwhile the Germans were prepared and willing to
march up a reinforcement of 80,000 men, troops from
Besan^on, Auxerre, and Cambrai ; and their transport
would be furthered by the German troops in occupation
of the districts through which they would have to
pass.

The releasing of the prisoners had, on the contrary,
been reduced. And these were, for the most part, the
best disciplined of the forces ; but they might not im-
probably join the hostile party, so at first only 20,000
troops of the line were set free.

General MacMahon marched on April 4th with the
Government troops towards Paris, and entered the city
on the 21st. As they then were engaged for eight
days in barricade fighting, and troops of fugitives
threatened to break through the German lines, the
Third Army was ordered to form in closer order. The
outposts advanced almost to the gates of the city, and
barred all communication through them until, at the
end of the month, Paris was again in the control of
the Government.

In the meantime, the negotiations commenced in
Brussels and continued in Frankfort were making
rapid progress, and by the 10th of May the definite

420 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAR.

treaty of peace, based on the preliminaries, was ready
to be signed. The ratification on both sides followed
within the appointed time of ten days.

Thus a war, carried on with such a vast expenditure
of force on both sides, was brought to an end by in-
cessant and restless energy in the short period of seven
months.

Even in the first four weeks eight battles took place,
under which the French Empire collapsed, and the
French Army was swept from the field.

Fresh forces, massive but incompetent, equalized the
original numerical superiority of the Germans, and it
needed twelve more battles to secure the decisive siege
of the enemy's capital.

Twenty fortified places were taken, and not a single
day passed without a struggle, great or small.

The war had cost the Germans many victims ; they
lost : 6247 officers, 123,453 men, 1 flag, and 6 guns.

The total losses of the French were incalculable ; in
prisoners only they amounted to : —

In Germany . . 11,860 officers, 371,981 men.
In Paris . . 7,456 " 241,686 "
Disarmed in Switz- ^

erland . . 2,192 " 88,381 "

21,508 officers, 702,048 men.

107 flags and eagles, 1915 field-guns, and 5526 fort-
guns were captured.

Strasburg and Metz, which had been alienated from
Germany in a time of weakness, were reconquered,
and the German Empire had risen anew.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

MEMORAJSTDUM ON THE COUNCILS OF WAR SAID TO HAVE BEEN
HELD DURING THE WARS UNDER KING WILLIAM.

In the accounts of historical events, as they are handed down
to posterity, mistakes assume the form of legends which it is
not always easy subsequently to disprove.

Among others is the fable which very circumstantially
ascribes the great decisions taken in the course of the German
campaigns, before and in 1870-71, to the consultations of
councils of war previously convened.

For instance, the battle of Koniggratz.

I can relate in a few lines the circumstances under which an
event of such far-reaching importance had birth.

The Master of the Ordnance, Feldzeugmeister Benedek, had,
in his advance to the northward, to secure himself against the
Second Prussian Army marching on the east over the moun-
tains of Schleswig. To tliis end four of his corps had one
after another been pushed forward on his flank, and had all
been beaten within three days. They now joined the main
body of the Austrian Army, which had meanwliile reached
Dubenetz.

Here, then, on June 30th, almost the whole of the Austrian
forces were standing actually within the line of operations
between the two Prussian armies ; but the First was already
fighting its way to Gitschin, designated from Berhn as the
point on which they were to concentrate, and the Second had
also advanced close on the Upper Elbe ; thus they were both
so near that the enemy could not attack the one without the
other falling on his rear. His strategic advantages were nulli-
fied by the tactical disadvantage.

424 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAE.

Under these circumstances, and having ah-eady lost 40,000
men in previous battles, General Benedek gave up the advance,
and during the night of June 30th began his retreat on Konig-
gratz.

The movement of six army corps and four cavalry divisions,
marching in only four columns, which were necessarily very
deep, could not be accompHshed in the course of a single day.
They halted in close order between Trotina and Lipa; but
when on July 2nd they were still there, it was owing to the
extreme fatigue of the troops, and the difficulty, nay, impossi-
bihty, of withdrawing so large a body of men beyond the Elbe,
under the eyes of an active enemy and by a limited number of
passages. In fact, the Austrian general could no longer
manoeuvre ; he must fight.

It is a noteworthy fact that neither his advance on Dubenetz
nor his retreat on Lipa was known to the Prussians. These
movements were concealed from the Second Army by the Elbe,
and the cavalry of the First at that time constituted a useless
mass of 8000 horse remaining with the corps. The four
squadrons attached to each infantry division were of course
not able to effect the reconnoissance, as subsequently was done
in 1870 by a more advantageous plan of formation.

Thus at head-quarters at Gitschin, where the King was,
nothing certain was known. It was supposed that the main
body of the hostile army was still advancing, and that it would
draw up in a position with the Elbe in its front and the wings
at the fortress of Josephstadt and Koniggratz. There were
these two alternatives — either to outflank this strong position,
or attack in front.

By the first the communications of the Austrian Army
would be so seriously threatened at Pardubitz that it might be
compelled to retreat. But to secure such a movement the
Second Prussian Army must take the place of the First and
cross over to the right bank of the Elbe. At the same time
the flank movement of the First Army, close past the enemy's
front, might easily be interfered with, if passages enough had
been opened.

In the second case, success could only be hoped for if an

APPENDIX. 425

advance of the Second Army on the right wing of the enemy's
position could be combined with the attack in front. For this
it must be kept on the left bank.

The separation of the two armies, which was for the present
intentionally maintained, allowed of either plan being followed ;
but mine was the serious responsibility of advising his Majesty
which.

To keep both open for the present, General von Herwarth
was ordered to occupy Pardubitz, and the Crown Prince to
remain on the left bank of the Elbe, to reconnoitre along that
river as weU as the Aupa and the Metau, and remove all
obstacles which might oppose a crossing in either direction.
At last, on July 2nd, Prince Frederick Charles was ordered, in
the event of his finding a large force in front of the Elbe, to
attack at once. But, on the evening of that day, it was
announced to the Prince that the whole Austrian Army had
marched on the Bistritz ; and, in obedience to instructions, he
at once ordered the First Army and the Army of the Elbe to
unite close in front of the enemy by daybreak next morning.

General von Voigt-Rhetz brought the news at eleven o'clock
in the evening to the King at Gitschin, and he sent him over
to me.

This news settled all doubts and lifted a weight from my
mind. " Thank God ! " I said, sprang out of bed, and hastened
across to the King, who was lodged on the other side of the
Market Place.

His Majesty also had gone to rest in his little camp-bed.
After a brief explanation on my part, he said he fully under-
stood the situation, decided on giving battle next day with all
three armies at once, and desired me to transmit the necessary
orders to the Crown Prince, who was at once to cross the Elbe.

The whole interview with his Majesty had lasted barely ten
minutes. No one else was present.

This was the Council of War before Koniggratz.

General von Podbielski and Major Count Wartensleben
shared my quarters. The orders to the Second Army were
drawn up forthwith and dispatched in duplicate by two differ-
ent routes before midnight. One, carried by General von

426 THE FEANCO-GERMAN WAR.

Voigt-Rhetz, informed Prince Frederick Charles of the steps to
be taken ; the other was sent direct to Koniginhof .

In the course of his night-ride of above six miles (German),
Lieutenant-Colonel Count Finckenstein had to pass the out-
posts of the Fii'st Army Corps, which was most to the rear.
He handed to the officer on duty a special letter to be forwarded
immediately to the general in command, ordering an immediate
muster of the troops and an independent advance, even before
orders should reach him from the Crown Prince.

The position of the Austrians on July 3rd had a front of
not more than a German mile. The Prussian armies advanced
on it in a semicircle of about five miles in extent. But while
in the centre the Fu'st and Second Corps of the First Ai"my
stood before daylight close in front of the enemy, on the right
wing General von Herwarth had to advance on the Bistritz
from Smidar, in the dark, by very bad roads, above two miles ;
and on the left, orders from head-quarters could not even reach
the Crown Prince before four in the morning. It was there-
fore decided that an engagement was to be fought with the
centre to detain the Austrian Army for some hours.

Above all, any possible offensive move on the part of the
enemy must here be met, and for this the whole Third Coi-ps
and cavalry stood at hand ; but the battle could only be decided
by a flank movement by both the Prussian wings at once.

I had ridden out early to the heights above Sadowa with
my of&cers, and at eight o'clock the King also arrived there.

It was a dull morning, and from time to time a shower fell.
The horizon was dim, far on the right the white clouds of
smoke showed that the head of the First Army was already
fighting some way off, outside the villages on the Bistritz. On
the left, in the woods of Swip, brisk rifle-fixing was audible.
Behind the King, besides his staff were his royal guests with
their numerous suites of adjutants, equerries and led-horses,
in number as many as two squadrons. An Austrian battery
seemed to have selected them to aim at, and compelled him to
move away with a smaller following.

Soon after. Count Wartensleben and I rode through Sadowa,
which the enemy had already abandoned. The van-guard of

APPENDIX. 427

the 8tli Division had drawn np the guns under cover of the
tirailleurs who had been sent forward, but several shells fell
there from a large battery at the skii-t of the wood. As we
rode down the road we admired the coolness of a huge ox
which went on its way heedless of the shot, and seemed deter-
mined to charge the enemy's position.

The formidable array of the Thii'd and Tenth Austrian
Corps' artillery opposite the wood now prevented any attempt
to break through it, and I was in time to countermand an
order which had been given to do so.

Meanwhile, further to the left, General von Fransecky had
already acted on the offensive. After a sharp struggle he had
driven the enemy out of the Swip woods, and got through to
the fui'ther side. Against him he had the Fourth Austrian
Corps ; but now the Second and part of the Third Corps turned
on the 7th Division ; fifty-one battalions against fourteen. In
the thick brushwood aU the detachments had got mixed, indi-
vidual command was impossible, and, in spite of our obstinate
resistance, whole troops were taken prisoners and others dis-
persed.

Such a rabble rushed out of the wood at the very moment
when the King and his staff rode up ; his Majesty looked on
with some displeasure,* but the wounded officer who was trying
to keep his httle troop together at once led them back into the
fight. In spite of heavy losses, the division got possession of
the northern side of the wood. It had drawn down on itself
very large forces of the enemy, which were subsequently miss-
ing in the positions they ought to have defended.

It was now eleven o'clock. The head of the First Army
had crossed the Bistritz and taken most of the villages along
its banks ; but these were only the enemy's outposts, which he
had no serious intention of guarding. His main corps held a
position in the rear from whence, with 250 guns, it commanded
the open plains which the Prussians must cross in order to
attack. On the right, General von Herwarth had reached the

* I have a history of the war, published at Tokio, in the Japanese lan-
guage, with very original illustrations. One of these has for its title,
" The King scolding the Army."

428 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAR.

Bistritz, but on the left nothing was yet to be seen of the
Crown Prince.

The battle had come to a standstill. In the centre the First
Army was still fighting round the villages on the Bistritz ; the
cavalry could not get forward, and the artillery found no good
position to occupy. The troops had been for five hours under
the enemy's hottest fire, without food, for there had not been
time to prepare it.

Some doubt as to the issue of the battle existed probably in
many minds ; perhaps in that of Count Bismarck as he offered
me a cigar. As I was subsequently informed, he took it for a
good sign that of two cigars I cooUy took the best.

The King asked me at about this time what I thought of
the prospects of the battle. I replied, " Your Majesty to-day
will not only win the battle, but decide the war."

It could not be otherwise.

"We had the advantage in numbers,* which in war is never to
be despised ; and our Second Army must come up in the flank
and rear of the Austrians,

At about 1.30 a white cloud was seen on the height crowned
with trees and visible from afar, on which our field-glasses had
been centred. It was indeed not yet the Second Army, but
the smoke of the fire opened on its advance. The joyful shout,
" The Crown Prince is coming ! " ran through the ranks. I

* During a long peace the sphere of action of the War Minister's
department and the General Staff were not distinctly defined. The pro-
viding for the troops in peace was the function of the former, and in war-
time a number of official duties which could only be superintended by
the central authorities at home. Thus the place of the Minister of War
was not at head-quarters, but at Berlin. The Chief of the General Staff,
on the other hand, from the moment when the mobilization is ordered,
assumes the whole responsibility for the marching and transport already
prepared for during peace, both for the first assembling of the forces and
for their subsequent employment, for which he has only to ask the con-
sent of the Commander-in-chief — always, with us, the King.

How necessary this severance of authority is, I learnt in June, 1866.
Without my knowledge the order had been given for the Seventh Corps
to remain on the Rhine. It was only by my representations that the
16th Division was also moved up into Bohemia, and our numerical supe-
riority thus brought up to a decisive strength.

APPENDIX. 429

sent the desired news to General von Herwarth, who, meanwhile,
had carried Problus from the Saxons in spite of a heroic defence.

The Second Army had started at 7.30 in the morning ; only
the First Corps had waited till about 9.15. The advance by
bad roads, in part across the fields, had taken much time ; the
ridge of hills stretching from Horenowes to Trotina, in the
march, if efficiently held must be a serious obstacle ; but in
their eager pursuit of Fransecky's division the enemy's right
wing had wheeled to the left, so that it lay open to some extent
to an attack in the rear.

The Crown Prince's progress was not visible to us, but at
about haK-past three the King ordered the advance of the
First Army.

As we came out of the wood of Sadowa we found still a part
of the great battery which had so long prevented us from
debouching there, but the teams and gunners lay dead by the
wrecked guns. There was nothing else to be seen of the
enemy for a long way round.

The Austrian retreat from the position, stormed on both
sides, had become inevitable, and had, in fact, been effected
some time since. Their capital artillery, firing on to the last
moment, had screened their retreat and given the infantry a
long start. Crossing the Bistritz seriously delayed the prog-
ress, especially of the cavalry, so that only isolated detach-
ments came up with the enemy.

"We rode at a smart gaUop across the wide field of battle,
without looking much about us at the scene of horror. On
the other side we joined our three armies, which had at last
pushed through the narrow place from various directions, and
got much mixed. It took twenty-four hours to remedy the
confusion and reform the companies ; pursuit was at that
moment impossible, but the victory was complete.

The exhausted men at once sought a spot to rest on in the
villages or the open country, where best they might. Any-
thing that came to hand by way of food was of course taken ;
my wandering ox probably among the rest. The death-cries
of pigs and geese were heard ; but necessity knows no law,
and the baggage-wagons were natm-aUy not on the spot.

430 THE FEANCO-GEKMAN WAR.

The King, too, remained at a hamlet on the field. Only I
and my two officers had to ride five miles back to Gitschin,
where the oificers were.

We had set out at four in the morning, and had been four-
teen hoiu's in the saddle. In the sudden emergency no one
had thought of providing liimself with food. An Uhlan of
the 2nd Regiment had given me part of a sausage ; bread he
had not got. On om* way back we met the endless train of
provision and ammunition wagons, often extending all across
the road. We did not reach our quarters till midnight. There
was nothing to eat even here at tliis hour, but I was so ex-
hausted that I thi-ew myself on my bed in my great-coat and
scarf, and f eU asleep instantly. Next morning new orders had
to be di-awn out and laid before his Majesty at Horitz.

The great King had struggled for seven years to reduce the
might of Austria, and his more fortunate and more powerful
grandson had achieved it in as many weeks. The campaign
had proved decisive in the first eight days from June 27th to
July 3rd.

The war of 1866 was entered on not because the existence
of Prussia was threatened, nor in obedience to public opinion
and the voice of the people : it was a struggle, long foreseen
and calmly prepared for, recognized as a necessity by the
Cabinet, not for territorial aggrandizement or material ad-
vantage, but for an ideal end — the estabhshment of power.
Not a foot of land was exacted from conquered Austria, but it
had to renounce all part in the hegemony of Germany.

The Imperial family alone were to blame if the old Empire
had now for centuries allowed domestic polities to override
German national politics. Austria had exhausted her strength
in conquests south of the Alps, and left the western German
pro\'inces unprotected, instead of following the road pointed
out by the course of the Danube. Its centre of gi-avity lay
out of Germany ; Prussia's lay within it. Prussia felt itself
called upon and strong enough to assume the leadership of
the German races. The regrettable but unavoidable exclusion
of one of them from the new Empire could only be to a smaU
extent remedied by a subsequent alliance. But Prussia has

APPENDIX. 431

become immeasurably greater without Austria, than it was
before with Austria.

But all this has nothing to do with the legends of which I
was speaking.

One has been sung in verse, and in fine verse too.

The scene is Versailles. The French are making a sortie
from Paris, and the generals, instead of leading their troops,
are assembled to consider whether head-quarters may safely
remain any longer at Versailles. Opinions are divided, no
one dares speak out. The Chief of the General Staff, who is
above all called on to express his views, remains silent. The
consternation seems to be great. Only the War Minister rises
and protests with the greatest emphasis against a measui-e so
injurious from a pohtical and mihtary point of \'iew as a re-
moval. He is warmly thanked by the King as being the only
man who has the courage to speak the truth freely and fear-
lessly.

The truth is that, while the King and his whole escort had
ridden out to the Fifth Army Corps, the Chamberlain in his
over-anxiety had the horses put to the royal carriages, and this
became known in the town ; and this indeed may have excited
all sorts of hopes in the sanguine inhabitants.

Versailles was protected by four army corps. It never
entered anybody's head to think of lea\dng it. I can positively
assert no Council of War was ever held either in 1866 or
1870-71.

Excepting on the march or on days of battle, an audience
was regularly held by his Majesty at ten o'clock, at which I,
accompanied by the Quartermaster- General, laid the latest
reports and news before him, and made our suggestions on
that basis. The Chief of the War Cabinet and the Minister
of War were also present, and, so long as the head-quarters of
the Third Army were at Versailles, the Crown Prince also, but
aU merely as listeners. The King occasionally required them
to give him information on one point or another ; but 1 do not
remember that he ever asked for advice concerning the opera-
tions in the field or the suggestions I made.

These, which I always discussed beforehand with my staff

432 THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

oflficers, were, on the contrary, generally maturely weighed by
his Majesty. He always pointed out with a military eye and
an invariably correct estimate of the position, all the objections
that might be raised to their execution ; but as in war every
step is beset with danger, the plans laid before him were in-
variably adopted.

THE END.

l/i'

'J

0^^

University of California

SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388

Return this material to the library

from which it was borrowed.

lOOM 11/86 Series 9482

I|l||l 11 Mil III III III III I

J I '' I Li II,' A A

3 1205 01022 6635

UC SOUTHERN '^^^'OJililfllllJilS^

A A 000174 968 8