Germany And Eastern Europe Since 1945

1 09 973

The development of Western Germany
from the fall of the German Reich in 1945
to the conclusion of treaties by the West
German Government with both the
Soviet Union and Poland and talks with
the East German Government on the
probiem of Berlin is detailed in full. Em-
phasis is also given to the division of
Germany into different zones of occupa-
tion and the establishment of two sep-.
arate German states during the Cold-War
confrontation of East and West.

Map on cover: Courtesy of The Macmillan
Company from Recent History At/as by Martin
Gilbert (Cartography by John Flower). Copyright
1966 by Martin Gilbert.

KEESING'S RESEARCH REPORT

GERMANY AND

EASTERN EUROPE

SINCE 1945

From the Potsdam Agreement

to Chancellor Brandt's

"Ostpolltlk"

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
New York

COPYRIGHT 1973 KEESING'S PUBLICATIONS, LIMITED

This book published simultaneously in the

United States of America and in Canada

Copyright under the Berne Convention

All rights reserved. No part of this book

may be reproduced in any form without the

permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

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Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-7729
SBN 684-13190-0 (Trade cloth)
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Maps on pages 9 and 57 are 1945 and 1949 by the New York Times Company.
Reprinted by permission.

Map on cover: Courtesy of The Macmillan Company from Recent History Atlas by Martin
Gilbert (Cartography by John Flower). Copyright 1966 by Martin Gilbert.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ix

I. FROM THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT TO

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN
STATES, 1945-49 1

(1) The Potsdam Agreement 1

(2) Developments in the Soviet Zone, 1945-46 12

(3) Paris Conference of 1946 13

(4) Moscow Conference of March-April 1947 18

(5) Mutual Accusations between Soviet and

U.S. Commanders, 1947 24

(6) Growing Tension between Soviet Union and
Western Powers, 1948 28

(7) German Currency Reform and the Berlin
Blockade, 1948 31

(8) Western Powers' Negotiations with the Soviet

Union on the Berlin Question, 1948 42

(9) Establishment of Separate Municipal
Governments in East and West Berlin, 1948 45

(10) The 1949 "Occupation Statute" for the

Western Zones of Germany 47

(11) Elections for "People's Congress" in the

Soviet Zone, 1949 48

(12) Soviet Agreement with Western Allies on lifting
of Berlin Blockade and of Western Counter-
Blockade, 1949 49

(13) Establishment of Federal Republic of Germany,

1949 50

(14) Proclamation of German Democratic Republic 52

II. INTEGRATION OF WESTERN AND EASTERN
GERMANY INTO WESTERN AND

EASTERN BLOCS 58

(1) East German Agreements of 1950 58

(2) Three-Power Conference in New York, 1950 62

(3) Prague Meeting of Cominform Ministers, 1950 64

(4) Elections to East German "Volkskammer," 1950 67

(5) Dr. Adenauer Rejects Herr Grotewohl's

Proposal, 1950 70

(6) Four-Power Meeting in Paris, 1951 73

(7) New Soviet Proposals for German Peace Treaty,

1952 75

(8) Four-Power Exchanges on Germany, 1952-53 76

(9) Berlin Conference, 1954 83

(10) Integration of Western Germany into Western

Bloc, 1952-55 86

(11) Integration of Eastern Germany into Eastern

Bloc, 1956 96

(12) The East Berlin Rising of June 1953 100

(13) Adenauer Government's Statements on
Reunification, 1953 103

III. FROM DR. ADENAUER'S VISIT TO
MOSCOW TO DR. ERHARD'S POLICY
STATEMENTS, 1955-65 108

(1) Dr. Adenauer's Visit to Moscow, 1955 108

(2) The "Hallstein Doctrine", 1955 129

(3) Renewed Soviet Criticism of Federal Policies,

1957 130

(4) Trade and Consular Agreements of 1958 140

vi

(5) The "Rapacki Plan", 1958 144

(6) The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 148

(7) Exchanges on Reunification of Germany, 1959 160

(8) The Berlin Crisis of 1961 Eastern Peace
Proposals 167

(9) Berlin Passes Agreements of 1963-66 188

(10) Soviet Protest against Franco-German Treaty

of 1963 188

(11) Chancellor Erhard's Policy Statements,

1964-65 191

IV. FROM DR. ERHARD'S PROPOSALS FOR
RELAXATION OF TENSION TO
HERR BRANDT'S "OSTPOLIT1K" TREATIES,
1966-71 198

(1) West German Proposals of 1966 for Relaxation

of Tension in Europe 198

(2) Kiesinger Government's Exchanges with

Eastern Germany, 1967-69 208

(3) Brandt Government's Talks with East German
Regime, 1969-70 229

(4) Treaty between Western Germany and the

Soviet Union, August 1970 260

(5) Treaty between Western Germany and Poland,
November 1970 272

(6) Ratification of West German Treaties with

Soviet Union and Poland, 1972 285

(7) Agreements on Status of West Berlin, 1971 297

(8) Traffic Treaty between West and East German
Governments, 1972 310

INDEXES 313

Vll

INTRODUCTION

Winston Churchill said, in his speech at Fulton, Missouri, on
March 4, 1946:

"From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic an iron
curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all
the capitals of the ancient States of Central and Eastern Europe
Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and
Sofia. All these famous cities and the populations around them lie
in the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another not
only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure
of control from Moscow. . . .

"The Russian-dominated Polish Government have been encour-
aged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and
mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and
undreamed of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which
were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been
raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are
seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. . . .

"An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build
up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of occupied Germany by
showing special favours to groups of left-wing German leaders. . . .

"If, now, the Soviet Government tries by separate action to build
up a pro-Communist Germany in their areas this will cause new
serious difficulties in the British and American zones and will give

ix

the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction
between the Soviets and the Western democracies. Whatever con-
clusions may be drawn from these facts and facts they are this
is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it
one which contains the essentials of permanent peace."

The "German Question", and especially the problem of Berlin,
continued to be a cause of potential open conflict during the period
of the "cold war" in the 'fifties and 'sixties, and it was almost 25
years after the end of World War II before tension in this area began
to relax. The survey given in this book traces this development from
the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 to the efforts of Chancellor Brandt
of the German Federal Republic to find a modus vivendi for his
country with those of Communist Europe.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research report is based on information contained in Keesing's
Contemporary Archives and derived from a variety of sources,
among which the following are the most important:

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Die Welt, Hamburg Welt der
Arbeit, Cologne Frankfurter Rundschau Der Tagesspiel, West
Berlin Federal Government Bulletin, Bonn Neues Deutschland,
East Berlin Soviet Weekly Times, London Guardian, London
Manchester Guardian Daily Telegraph, London Neue Zurcher
Zeitung Le Monde, Paris New York Times New York Herald
Tribune.

Federal Press and Information Office, Bonn U.S. Information
Service Soviet Embassy Press Department, London Polish Em-
bassy Press Department, London.

xi

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE
SINCE 1945

From the Potsdam Agreement

to Chancellor Brandt's

"Ostpolitik"

1. THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT

World War II formally ended with Germany's unconditional sur-
render to the Allies on May 7, 1945.

Under an agreement reached at the Yalta Conference in early
February 1945 and embodied in the "Crimea Declaration", the four
major Allied Powers (the Soviet Union, the United States of America,
the United Kingdom and France), each occupied a separate zone in
Germany.

On June 5, 1945, the following joint statement was issued on the
zones of occunation:

The Allied Powers defined their policy on the treatment of Ger-
many at the Potsdam Conference of July 17-Aug. 1, 1945, as shown
in the following extracts from the Potsdam Agreement.

"The Allied Armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany
and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes
committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their
success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed. Agreement has
been reached at this Conference on the political and economic prin-
ciples of a co-ordinated Allied policy towards defeated Germany
during the period of Allied control. The purpose of this agreement is
to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany. German militarism
and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement
together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to as-
sure that Germany will never again threaten her neighbours or the
peace of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or
enslave the German people. It is their intention that the German
people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual recon-
struction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their
own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for
them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful
peoples of the world.

"I. Political and Economic Principles governing the Treatment of
Germany in the Initial Period of Allied Control

A. Political Principles

1. In accordance with the agreement on control machinery in
Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions
from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union and the French Republic, each in his own zone of oc-
cupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole,
in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable there shall be uniformity of treatment
of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the
Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany
and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be
used for military production. To these ends:

(fl) All German land, naval, and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D.
and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, in-
cluding the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military

schools, war veterans' organizations, and all other military and quasi-
military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which
serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be com-
pletely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to pre-
vent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism.

(6) All arms, ammunition and implements of war, and all spe-
cialized facilities for their production, shall be held at the disposal of
the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all air-
craft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be pre-
vented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered total
military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what
they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare
and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy
and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist party and its affiliated and
supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure
that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and
militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German po-
litical life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful co-operation
in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitlerite regime
or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political
opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal,
administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or
carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or
war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders,
influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations
and institutions, and any other persons dangerous to the occupation
or its objectives, shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than
nominal participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile
to Allied purposes, shall be removed from public and semi-public
office and from positions of responsibility in important private under-
takings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who by their
political and moral qualities are deemed capable of assisting in devel-
oping genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to
eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the
successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the
principles of democracy, of justice under law and of equal rights for
all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed

towards the decentralization of the political structure and the devel-
opment of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany
on democratic principles, and, in particular, through elective councils,
as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of
military occupation.

(ii) All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and
ublic discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout

(iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced
into regional, provincial and State administration as rapidly as may
be justified by the successful application of these principles in local
self-government.

(iv) For the time being no central German Government shall be
established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central
German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall
be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, com-
munications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act
under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security,
freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious
institutions respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military
security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. Economic Principles

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential the production
of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, as well as all types
of aircraft and seagoing ships, shall be prohibited and prevented.
Production of metals, chemicals, machinery, and other items that
are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled
and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peace-time needs to
meet the objectives stated in Para. 15.

Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be
removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by
the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Govern-
ments concerned, or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date the German economy shall be
decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive
concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by
cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German economy primary emphasis shall
be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic
industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as
a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be estab-

lished in regard to: (a) mining and industrial production and alloca-
tion, (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing, (c) wages, prices and
rationing, (d) import and export programmes for Germany as a whole,
(e) currency and banking, central taxation and Customs, (/) repara-
tions and removal of industrial war potential, (g) transportation and
communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken where appropriate
of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy,
but only to the extent necessary: (a) to carry out programmes of in-
dustrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of
approved exports and imports; (b) to assure the production and
maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the
occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany, and essential to
maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the
average of the standards of living of European countries. (European
countries means all European countries excluding the United King-
dom and the Soviet Union) ; (c) to ensure in the manner determined
by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential com-
modities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced
economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports;
(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial inter-
national transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim
of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of
achieving the other objectives named herein; (e) to control all Ger-
man public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental
institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls
established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery
shall be created and the German authorities be required to the fullest
extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such
controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that
the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any
breakdown in them will rest with themselves. Any German controls
which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be
prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken: (a) to effect essential
repair of transport; (b) to enlarge coal production; (c) to maximize
agricultural output; (d) to effect emergency repair of housing and
essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to
exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned
external assets not already under the control of the United Nations
which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to
enable the German people to subsist without external assistance.

In working out the economic balance of Germany the neccessary
means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control
Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current produc-
tion and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for
such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products
referred to in Para. 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

"II. Reparations from Germany

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be com-
pelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and
suffering she has caused to the United Nations, and for which the
German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement
on reparations was reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals
from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from
appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of
Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United King-
dom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the
Western zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from
its own zone of occupation the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally
from the Western zones:

(a) IS per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital
equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and
machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German
peace economy and should be removed from the Western zones of
Germany in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash,
zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other com-
modities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unneces-
sary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the
Western zones to be transferred to the Soviet Government on repara-
tions account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be
made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western
zones on account of reparations must be determined within 6 months
from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon
as possible and shall be completed within 2 years from the deter-

mination specified in Para. 5. The delivery of products covered by
Para. 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shaU be made
by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within 5 years of the date
thereof. The determination of the amount and character of the
industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace
economy, and therefore available for reparation, shall be made by
the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission
on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final
approval of the Zone commander in the zone from which the
equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to
removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equip-
ment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance
with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of Para. 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of
reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in
the Western zones of occupation in Germany, as well as to German
foreign assets in all countries except those specified in Para. 9 below.

9. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United
States renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of
German enterprises which are located in the Eastern zone of occupa-
tion in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria,
Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured
by the Allied troops in Germany. . . .

"III. Territorial Changes

With regard to territorial changes, the Potsdam Conference agreed
to the transfer of territory to the Soviet Union and to Poland as
follows:

A. Konigsberg transferred to Russia

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government
that, pending the final determination of territorial questions at the
peace settlement, the section of the Western frontier of the U.S.S.R.
which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the
eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-
Goldap, to the meeting-point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish
Republic and East Prussia. The Conference has agreed in principle
to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate
transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Konigsberg and the area
adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the
actual frontier. The President of the United States and the British

Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of
the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. . . .

B. Provisional Polish Western Frontier on Oder-Neisse Line

The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of
Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the
Crimea Conference, the three heads of Government have sought the
opinion of the Polish Provisional Government in regard to the acces-
sion of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive.
The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the
Polish Provisional Government have been received at the Conference
and have fully presented their views. The three heads of Government
reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier
of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three heads of Government agree that, pending the final deter-
mination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories
east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swine-
miinde, and thence along the Oder river to the confluence of the
western Neisse river, and along the western Neisse to the Czecho-
slovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed
under the administration of the U.S.S.R., and including the area of
the former Free City of Danzig, shall be under the administration of
the Polish State, and for such purposes should not be considered as
part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.' "

The accompanying map, which was issued on Aug. IS with the
authority of the U.S. State Department, shows the final allocation of
zones of occupation in Germany between Great Britain, the United
States, the Soviet Union and France, reached in agreement among
the four Powers. It also shows: (a) the provisional western Polish
frontier and (6) the Soviet-Polish partition of East Prussia, as agreed
upon at the Potsdam Conference.

The British Zone included the whole of the industrial Ruhr, the
Northern Rhineland, Westphalia, Hanover, Oldenburg, Schleswig-
Holstein, the great port of Hamburg, the German Frisian islands
(Sylt, etc.) and Heligoland. The leading cities, in addition to Ham-
burg, included Cologne, Essen, Diisseldorf, Duisburg, Dortmund,
Wuppertal, Hagen, Solingen, Aachen, Bonn, Munster, Hanover,
Brunswick, Wilhelmshaven, Emden, Kiel and Liibeck.

The Soviet Zone included Brandenburg west of the Oder, West-
ern Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Saxony, Prussian Saxony, Thuringia

8

and Anhalt. The chief cities (excluding Berlin, which is garrisoned
jointly by the four Powers) are Leipzig, Dresden, Halle, Chemnitz,
Zwickau, Kottbus, Dessau, Weimar, Jena, Gotha, Magdeburg, Erfurt,
Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund and Schwerin,

The delimitation of the Russian Zone implied the withdrawal of
British and American troops from areas west of the Elbe, which at
the time of Germany's surrender was in effect the line of demarcation
between the Red Army and the Anglo-American armies. On July 1

Germany, showing the Allied zones of occupation (indicated by the national
flags), the provisional western frontier of Poland, and the Soviet-Polish partition
of East Prussia. (New York Times.)

of all kinds, labour, personnel and specialist and other services for
use in Germany or elsewhere, as the Allied representatives may

Hint* "

direct."

2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ZONE, 1945-46

In the Soviet zone of Germany, the most important developments
during 1945 were (a) the admission of "anti-Fascist" political par-
ties, among which the Communist Party and sections of the Social
Democratic Party, in April 1946, merged as the Socialist Unity Party
(SED), and (b) the land reform which ended the domination of
agriculture by large land-owners.

Political Parties: Marshal Zhukov, Military Governor of the Rus-
sian zone, issued a proclamation on June 10, 1945, restoring political
freedom to all anti-Fascist parties, whose programmes as in the
British, U.S., and French zones had to be presented to the occupa-
tion authorities for approval. Free trade unions were also permitted.
As a result, the Social-Democratic, Communist, Liberal-Democratic,
and Christian Democratic parties emerged as the leading political
organizations.

The Communist Party, meeting in Berlin on June 25, issued a
manifesto, signed by Wilhelm Pieck and other Communist leaders,
which said: "We consider it incorrect for Germany to open the path
for implanting the Soviet system because such a path does not corre-
spond with the conditions of the development of Germany at this
moment. We consider that the real interests of the German people,
under present conditions, dictate another path, that of establishing an
anti-Fascist democratic regime and a democratic parliamentary
republic with all democratic liberties."

Land Reform and Distribution: One of the most important devel-
opments in the Soviet zone was the introduction, under the direction
of Herr Hornle (Secretary for Agriculture in the zonal administra-
tion), of far-reaching measures of land reform, aimed primarily at
destroying the power of the East Elbian Junkers. In a report on
Dec. 8, Herr Hornle announced that the land reform had been com-
pleted by the breaking up of great estates in Saxony, Brandenburg,
and Mecklenburg (described as "the chief prop of Fascism and
militarism"); that about 7,000 large estates aggregating 4,122,000
acres had been redistributed among 281,000 peasants, while 63,000
families deported from Poland and Czechoslovakia had also been
settled; and that the average size of the new farms, of which there
were over 220,000, was from 17-20 acres. The former Junker owners
were, it was stated, under detention in camps on Riigen.

12

Formation of Socialist Unity Party
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED)

A meeting of representatives of the Communist and Social Demo-
cratic Parties decided in Berlin on Dec. 21, 1945, to set up a com-
mittee to consider proposals for a fusion of the two parties.

A Social Democratic conference in Hanover on Jan. 8, 1946,
almost unanimously rejected such a fusion, and Dr. Kurt Schumacher,
the Social Democrats' leader in the U.S. zone, stated at the same
time that all Social Democrats would reject it, as they regarded the
Communists as the representatives of a foreign imperialist power.

Nevertheless the SED was formally set up in Berlin on April 22
with Wilhelm Pieck of the Communist Party and Otto Grotewohl of
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as joint chairmen. This fusion
had been preceded by a plebiscite held in the U.S., British and French
zones of Berlin on March 31, 1946, when 82 per cent of the SPD
members taking part voted against fusion. No such plebiscite was
held in the Soviet sector.

3. PARIS CONFERENCES OF 1946
Divergent Views of Soviet Union and Western Powers

At a Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
the Soviet Union, Britain and France in Paris between April 25 and
May 16, 1946, the problem of Germany was placed on the agenda
at the special request of France.

Mr. Byrnes, the U.S. Secretary of State, criticized the present work-
ing of the Potsdam Agreement, saying that, while German industries
were being dismantled in fulfilment of one of the Potsdam decisions,

another important decision, to treat Germany as an economic unit,
was not being fulfilled. In view of the fact that Germany was at
present "split into four water-tight zones" and that the Powers had
"no clear picture before them of the political future of Germany", he
proposed: (1) that, with the aim of clarifying the policies and prin-
ciples agreed on at Potsdam, the Ministers should appoint special
full-time deputies who would present to the Foreign Ministers at their
next meeting answers to the following questions (a) whether the
industrial resources of the Ruhr and Rhineland, whatever the politi-
cal future of those territories, would remain part of the German eco-
nomic structure, (b) whether German industrial resources would be

13

used for the benefit of Germany as a whole and not restricted to the
limits of the four Zones, (c) whether agreement could be reached
within 90 days for setting up central German administrations to help
keep Germany an economic unit, (d) whether the existing zonal
boundaries would remain simply as boundaries between areas of mili-
tary occupation and not as barriers to trade, and (e) whether tenta-
tive agreement could be reached as regards Germany's western
frontiers; (2) that the special deputies should consider die prepara-
tion of a draft peace treaty for Germany, in which Germany would
be treated as a whole, for consideration by an Allied conference in
November next.

Mr. Bevin, the U.K. Foreign Secretary, who supported Mr. Byrnes'
viewpoint, likewise declared that Germany should be treated as a
whole, and that her frontiers, both eastern and western, should be
considered together, adding that other countries, notably Holland and
Belgium, should be consulted before any decision was reached as to
the future of Western Germany in view of the fact that their economic
life would be largely affected by the arrangements made in that area.
He stressed in particular the need, when considering the Potsdam
decisions in relation to the treatment of Germany as an economic unit,
for an examination into German export and import capabilities and
into the liability of the Allies for feeding Germany as a whole.

Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, said he could accept
neither Mr. Byrnes' nor Mr. Bevin's proposals, declaring that there
was no need for the appointment of special deputies as suggested by
Mr. Byrnes and that the Allied Control Council in Berlin was fully
adequate to deal with the matters raised. He further stated that
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Belgium should be heard in connection
with any settlement for Germany. The subject was then dropped and
the conference disbanded.

At a further meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers in Paris
between June 14 and My 13, 1946, the question of Germany was
again considered.

Mr. Molotov held that 25 years was inadequate to secure Ger-
many's disarmament and demilitarization, and suggested a 40-year
period. "Experience," he said, "has shown that the short period of
time during which restrictions on Germany's armaments were enforced
after the first World War proved absolutely insufficient to prevent
Germany's renascence as an aggressive force endangering Europe
and the world. Only 20 years had passed since the end of the first
World War when Germany unleashed a second World War. It is
obvious that the peace-loving nations are interested in keeping her
disarmed as long as possible." Continuing, Mr. Molotov demanded

14

reparations from Germany to the Soviet Union to the amount of
$10,000,000,000 (2,500,000,000), declaring: "The Soviet Gov-
ernment insists that this amount be exacted without fail, because it
is but a small portion of the enormous damage suffered as a result
of German occupation." Mr. Molotov also criticized conditions in the
Western zones of Germany, declaring that land distribution had not,
as in the Soviet zone, been carried out effectively, that German indus-
trial cartels and monopolies were not being broken up, and that
demobilization of the German forces was proceeding slowly; at the
same time he protested against an order in the American zone stop-
ping further reparations deliveries. He asked specifically that the
Allied Control Council for Germany should set up two special com-
mittees, (1) to verify without delay the execution of the Allied Gov-
ernments' decisions on the disarmament of the German armed forces,
(2) to carry out, within a definite time limit, practical measures to
eliminate all German industries which could be used for military
production and arms manufacture. As regards the political structure
of Germany, he argued against a loose federalism such as that advo-
cated by France, pointed out that the Potsdam decision to set up a
central German administration had so far not been implemented, and
maintained that the Ruhr, though it should be placed under four-
Power control, should not be detached from the Reich.

Mr. Bevin, on July 10, emphasized that policy towards Germany
should be considered from a short-term and a long-term angle, and
said that on the solution of short-term problems depended largely
those of a long-term character. There was, he declared, no disagree-
ment on the main purpose of keeping Germany demilitarized and
permanently incapable of aggression. On short-term problems Britain
stood by the Potsdam decision, and attached the greatest importance
to the provision that Germany should, during the occupation period,
be treated as a single economic unit. He pointed out that the failure
to implement the economic conditions of the Potsdam agreement was
costing the British Government $320,000,000 (80,000,000), and
the American Government $200,000,000 (50,000,000), a year in
their zones of occupation; emphasized, with respect to the British
zone, that this state of affairs could not continue, and that the expen-
diture was incurred because the zone was not receiving surplus indig-
enous resources from other parts of Germany; declared that this
was largely due to the refusal of the Soviet authorities to agree to
a common export-import programme covering the whole of Ger-
many; strongly criticized the present sharp division into zones,
though upholding the principle of a long occupation of Germany;
and urged (a) that Germany should be treated as an economic whole,
with equitable distribution of indigenous resources throughout the
four zones; (b) that surplus resources in any zone should be made
available to meet requirements elsewhere in Germany; (c) that if

15

such surplus from current production in any zone was not required,
it should be exported as reparations, provided there was no deficit
in payments in any other zone. Mr. Bevin strongly refuted Mr. Molo-
toy's suggestion that disarmament was lagging in the British zone,
pointing out that die British authorities had recently issued a report
showing that demilitarization and demobilization were in fact pro-
ceeding apace.

The German question was further discussed at length on July 11,
and again revealed fundamental disagreement on major issues, Mr.
Molotpv resisting suggestions by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin for an
investigation in the Soviet zone, as well as the western zones, on the
dismantling of German industrial plants, and for a special body of
Ministers' deputies to consider the whole question of Germany. At
the same time Mr. Molotov continued to insist on $10,000,000,000
reparations to Russia from Germany. In this connection Mr. Byrnes
and Mr. Bevin pointed out that no such figure had been accepted in
the past, at Potsdam or elsewhere; that, if it were seriously pressed,
all previous estimates and policies about Germany's future would be
shattered; and that Soviet insistence on this amount would leave little
prospect that Germany could subsist otherwise than by some form of
external assistance. Mr. Bevin again urged that Germany should be
treated as an economic whole and that surplus resources in one zone
should be used to make good deficits in others.

In a speech on U.S. policy towards Germany Mr. Byrnes said in
Stuttgart on Sept. 6, 1946:

"The U.S.A. is firmly of the belief that Germany should be admin-
istered as an economic unit and that zonal barriers should be obliter-
ated as far as economic life and activity in Germany are concerned.
The conditions which now exist in Germany make it impossible for
industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying Powers
agreed were essential for a minimum German peace-time economy.
Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry are to be reached, we
cannot continue to restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons
and ideas throughout Germany. The barriers between the four zones
are far more difficult to surmount than those between normal inde-
pendent States. The time has come when the zonal boundaries should
be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied for security
purposes by the armed forces of the occupying Powers, and not as
self-contained economic or political units. That was the course of
development envisaged by the Potsdam Agreement, and is the course
of development which the U.S. Government intends to follow to the
full limit of its authority. It has formally announced its intention to
unify the economy of its own zone with any or all of the other zones

16

willing to participate. So far only the British Government has agreed
to let its zone participate. . . .

"It is the view of the U.S. Government that the German people,
under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsi-
bility for the running of their own affairs. More than a year has
passed since hostilities ceased. The German people should not be
forced to live in doubt as to their fate. It is the view of the U.S.
Government that the Allies, without delay, should make clear to the
German people the essential terms of the peace settlement which they
expect the German people to accept and observe. It is our view that
the German people should now be permitted and helped to make the
necessary preparations for the setting up of a democratic German
Government which can accept and observe those terms. At Potsdam,
specific areas which were a part of Germany were provisionally
assigned to the Soviet Union and Poland, subject to the final decision
of the Peace Conference. At that time, these areas were being held
by the Soviet and Polish armies. We were told that Germans in
large numbers were fleeing from them and that it would, in fact,
because of the feelings aroused by the war, be difficult to reorganize
their economic life if they were not administered as integral parts
of the Soviet Union, and of Poland. The Heads of Government agreed
to support at the peace settlement the Soviet proposal concerning
the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of Konigsberg and the area
adjacent. Unless the Soviet Government changes its views on the
subject, we will stand by our agreement. With regard to Silesia and
other Eastern German areas, their assignment to Poland by Russia
for administrative purposes had taken place before the Potsdam
meeting. The Heads of Government agreed that, pending the final
determination of Poland's western frontier, Silesia and other Eastern
German areas should be under the administration of the Polish State
and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet
zone in Germany. However, as the Protocol of the Potsdam Con-
ference makes clear, the Heads of Government did not agree to
support at the peace settlement the cession of any particular area.
The Russians and the Poles suffered greatly at the hands of Hitler's
invading armies. As a result of an agreement at Yalta, Poland ceded
to the Soviet Union territory east of the Curzon Line. Because of
this, she asked for a revision of her northern and western frontiers.
The U.S.A. will support such a revision in Poland's favour. How-
ever, the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland must be determined
when the final settlement is agreed upon."

Mr. Byrne's speech was strongly assailed in France and Poland.

In France, the Press of all shades of opinion condemned it, declar-
ing that the U.S.A. had forgotten the sufferings to which France and

17

other occupied nations had been subjected by Germany and was
apparently more concerned with helping Germany to become strong
again.

In Poland, the semi-official Rzeczpospolita emphasized that Poland
would not discuss any revision of her western frontier; the Socialist
Robotnik declared that "Mr. Byrnes stands before our eyes not only
as die champion of Germany but as our obvious adversary"; and the
Polish Deputy Premier, Mr. Gomulka, declared on Sept. 8 that -the
former German territories now absorbed into Poland "are, and always
shall remain, Polish". Whilst no official comment on Mr. Byrnes's
speech was forthcoming from Moscow, it was strongly criticized by
papers in the Soviet zone of Germany, Neues Deutschland (organ of
the Socialist Unity Party) declaring that the federalization proposals
would lead to a "breaking-up of Germany's anti-Fascist forces which
would only benefit reaction".

In contrast to Mr. Byrnes's statements in his Stuttgart speech,
Marshal Stalin, in an interview on Oct. 23, 1946, declared that the
Soviet Union considered the Western frontiers of Poland permanent.

4. MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF MARCH APRIL 1947
Allies 9 Failure to reach Agreement

The four Ministers (Mr. Bevin, M. Bidault, Mr. Marshall and Mr.
Molotov) met in Moscow from March 10 to April 24, 1947, to
consider Allied policy in Germany, including preparations for a
German Peace Treaty. No agreement was reached in seven weeks of
discussion.

Mr. Molotov, on March 11, alleged that in the Western, and
particularly the British, zones the Potsdam decisions for the complete
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany were not being imple-
mented, saying that war industries were not being destroyed, that
factories were not being dismantled for reparations, and that, espe-
cially in the British zone, German military formations were being
maintained. He suggested that a plan for the elimination of all
Germany's war potential should be drawn up by July 1.

Mr. Bevin, on March 12, strongly refuted these allegations, saying
that Mr. Molotov was apparently referring to the Dienstgruppen,
consisting of 80,000 men under British supervision, of whom 20,000
were employed in clearance of mines and 60,000 in timber work,
road repairs, etc., adding that over 3,000,000 Wehrmacht members

18

had been disbanded by the British authorities; the Dienstgruppen,
he said, were being gradually replaced by ordinary civilian labour.
He asked Mr. Molotov whether it was true that, as some reports had
suggested, German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union ran into
millions, and whether some had been induced to join the Soviet
forces; also asked for precise information as to the rate at which
prisoners in Russia were being repatriated; and drew attention to the
steps taken in the British zone to destroy German cartels and monopo-
lies and to bring basic industries under control of the zonal authori-
ties. He also asked for an assurance that the German warships
handed over to Russia for destruction had in fact been destroyed,
and said that he could not agree to Mr. Molotov's proposal for a
joint plan to eliminate German industrial war potential by July 1
until he knew whether Germany was to be treated as an economic
whole or not, and until a fresh study had been made of the peace-
time level which would be fixed for German industry. Mr. Molotov
replied that the Soviet Union was willing to provide figures regarding
German prisoners of war if the other Powers would do likewise, and
agreed that the Allies should strive for the economic unity of Ger-
many. He was not, however, satisfied as to the steps taken in the
Western zones for the abolition of cartels and monopolies.

Statements on the progress of denazification in the British, Ameri-
can, and Soviet zones were made on March 13 by Mr. Bevin, Mr.
Marshall, and Mr. Molotov.

During the following week the questions principally under discus-
sion were the economic organization of Germany and reparations.

Mr. Marshall proposed on March 17 that the Foreign Ministers
should issue a directive to the Allied Control Council to undertake
the merger of the four zones into a single economic unit.

Mr. Molotov, on the same day (March 17), put forward the
Soviet Union's reparations claims. After emphasizing that the Pots-
dam decisions required that Germany should be treated as a single
economic unit, he declared that the economic fusion of the British
and U.S. zones, and the French action in unilaterally separating the
Saar from the rest of Germany, constituted an infringement of those
decisions and presented the Allied Control Council with a fait
accompli. He advocated that the Ruhr should be placed under four-
Power control.

On March 18 the TASS Agency published a hitherto secret pro-
tocol on German reparations which was signed at Yalta by President
Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

19

This stated that reparations from Germany were to be exacted by
the following methods: (1) "bulk removal within 2 years from the
surrender of Germany of Germany's natural wealth (equipment,
machine-tools, ships, rolling-stock, German investments abroad,
shares of industrial, transport, navigation, and other German enter-
prises, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose
of destroying Germany's war potential"; (2) annual deliveries of goods
from current production for a period to be fixed; and (3) the use of
German labour. The protocol showed that the American and Soviet
delegations agreed that the total sum for reparations under (1) and
(2) should be $20,000,000,000 of which 50 per cent should go to
the U.S.S.R. The British delegation, however, was of opinion that
pending consideration of the reparations question by a Reparations
Commission which, under the protocol, was to sit in Moscow, no
definite figure should be mentioned.

The protocol was referred to by Mr. Molotov on March 18 when
justifying Russia's reparations claims, but its validity was opposed
both by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Marshall, in a short statement, declared that the U.S. Govern-
ment held the view that the Yalta agreement on reparations had been
superseded by the Potsdam agreement, which spoke only of repara-
tions in the form of industrial capital equipment and German assets
abroad. "At Potsdam", he said, "the idea of attempting to fix a dollar
value on property to be removed from Germany was dropped."

On March 21 the Foreign Ministers turned to consideration of
the German political structure.

Criticizing the British, American and French plans for the federali-
zation of Germany, Mr. Molotov maintained that such plans aimed
at the destruction of Germany as an independent State, which the
Soviet Union could not approve.

The Soviet proposals were set forth as follows:

"The task of creating a provisional political organization for Ger-
many must be solved on the basis of the following principles:

(a) The German political system must have a democratic char-
acter, and the organs of power must be formed on the basis of
democratic elections.

(b) The Hitlerite centralization of the State administration, which
destroyed the Landtage and the autonomous administration of the
Lander, must be liquidated, and the decentralization of administra-

20

tion be restored which existed before the Hitler regime, with the
restoration of the Landtage and the setting up of two all-German
Chambers.

(c) A Provisional German Government must be set up which,
while ensuring the political and economic unity of Germany, would
simultaneously assume responsibility for the fulfilment of Germany's
obligations to the Allies.

On the basis of the above it is proposed:

(1) As a first step toward the formation of a Provisional German
Government, to establish central German administrative departments
on finance, industry, transport, communications and foreign trade, in
accordance with the Potsdam decisions.

(2) To charge the Control Council with working out a provisional
democratic Constitution, drawing into the work the democratic par-
ties, the free trade unions and other anti-Nazi organizations, and
representatives of the Lander.

(3) To hold elections in accordance with the provisional German
Constitution, after which a Provisional German Government should
be formed.

(4) In accordance with the Potsdam decisions, to charge the
German Government as one of its basic tasks with the eradication
of the remnants of militarism and Fascism, the thorough democratiza-
tion of Germany, and the realization of measures for the restoration
of German economy, as well as the unconditional fulfilment of obli-
gations to the Allies.

(5) A permanent Constitution must be approved by the German
people."

On the State structure of Germany the proposals were as follows:
"(1) Germany should be restored as a unified democratic Repub-
lic, with an all-German Parliament consisting of two Chambers and
an all-German Government, while ensuring the Constitutional rights
of the Lander comprising the German State.

(2) The President of the German Republic should be elected by
Parliament.

(3) Over the whole territory of Germany an all-German Consti-
tution established by Parliament should operate, and in the Lander
the Constitutions established by the Landtage.

(4) The German Constitution, as well as the Constitutions of the
Lander, should be based on a democratic foundation.

(5) The all-German Constitution and the Land Constitutions
should ensure the free formation and activity of all democratic politi-
cal parties, trade unions and other public democratic organizations
and institutions.

(6) All German citizens, without distinction of race, sex, language
and religion, should be ensured democratic rights, including freedom

21

of speech, press, religion, public meeting and association, by the
all-German Constitution and the Land Constitutions.

(7) The Parliament and the Landtage will be elected on the basis
of a universal, equal and direct electoral law with secret voting and
the proportional system.

(8) The local government organs, district and communal coun-
cils, will be elected on the same democratic basis as the Landtage."

On March 22, in view of the fact that no appreciable progress
had been made on the German question, the Council of Foreign
Ministers set up a sub-committee consisting of General Lucius Clay
(U.S.A.), Lt.-Gen. Sir Brian Robertson (Britain), Mr. Vyshinsky
(Russia), and M. Herve Alphand (France) to co-ordinate and com-
pare all the proposals which had been submitted by the different
delegations. On March 25 the Foreign Ministers considered the pro-
cedure to be adopted for calling the peace conference with Germany,
but failed to reach agreement on the procedure to be followed and
the States to take part.

On April 10 the Council of Foreign Ministers turned to consider-
ation of the German-Polish frontier.

Revision of the existing provisional frontier in Germany's favour
was advocated both by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bevin, who quoted
statements by Marshal Stalin at the Potsdam Conference to show that
he did not consider the present frontier as final and that the definitive
settlement should be made at the Peace Conference. Mr. Marshall
agreed that the southern part of East Prussia, and industrial Upper
Silesia, should remain Polish; emphasized, however, that the division
of the remaining territory, which was largely agricultural, required
consideration of the needs of both the Polish and German peoples;
and proposed that a Boundary Commission should be set up repre-
senting the "Big Four" and Poland which should recommend (1)
revision of the pre-war Polish-German frontier which would com-
pensate Poland fairly for the territory ceded to Russia east of the
Curzon Line; (2) "economic arrangements appropriate for assuring
that raw materials and heavy industrial resources from the area in
question which are vital to the European economy shall fairly serve
that need, including particularly the need of Poland." Continuing,
Mr. Marshall emphasized that the final frontier should be drawn so
as to avoid unnecessary and unjustified economic upset, to minimize
irredentist pressure in Germany and to ensure that it would not be
a cause of later international friction, and declared: "The new fron-

22

tiers must be adequate to give Poland resources at least as great as
she had before the war and capable of maintaining her peoples at
a good standard of life. But the needs of Germany have also to be
considered. Before the war the German area now under provisional
Polish control contributed over a fifth of Germany's total food sup-
ply. If Germany must in the future import two-fifths or more of her
food supply from abroad, the German economy will have to be
industrialized to an even greater extent than before the war, or Ger-
many will become a congested slum in the centre of Europe. The five
to six million Germans who have been evacuated from areas in the
east will, for the most part, have to depend on industrial employment
for their livelihood. I agree with M. Bidault that there is danger in
requiring an eventual German population of over 66,000,000 to live
within the confines of a smaller Germany."

Mr. Bevin said that after the last war many people felt that the
Polish frontiers were pushed too far east, that now there was a danger
that they might be pushed too far west, and that the British delega-
tion at Potsdam had felt "grave doubts" in agreeing even to the pro-
visional Oder-Neisse frontier. Like Mr. Marshall, he drew attention
to the danger of an overcrowded and over-industrialized Germany
in a restricted area, and urged that Upper Silesia should be incor-
porated into Poland but that the agricultural area eastwards from
Stettin should be returned to Germany.

Mr. Molotov declared that the Soviet Government, as stated by
Marshal Stalin himself, considered the present Polish-German fron-
tier as final; maintained that the Peace Conference should merely
"formalize" the agreement made at Potsdam; pointed out that accord-
ing to the Allied Control Council a total of 5,678,936 Germans had
been removed from the disputed areas and replaced by 5,000,000
Poles; and asked how this could now be reversed.

The Polish Foreign Office, on the same day (April 10), issued a
statement uncompromisingly rejecting the suggestions put forward by
Mr. Bevin and Mr. Marshall and declaring that the contested terri-
tory was essentially Polish in spite of long years of attempted Ger-
manization; that Poland must have priority over Germany in
rehabilitation; and that concessions to Germany, so far from remov-
ing the danger of German aggressive aspirations, would only be a
stimulus to Germany's spirit of revenge.

Mr. Marshall, on April 14, proposed that the Foreign Ministers
should immediately appoint plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of a
four-Power treaty to ensure German disarmament and demilitariza-
tion for a 40-year period after the signing of the peace treaty, as had
been proposed by his predecessor, Mr. Byrnes. This was agreed to

23

of speech, press, religion, public meeting and association, by the
all-German Constitution and the Land Constitutions.

(7) The Parliament and the Landtage will be elected on the basis
of a universal, equal and direct electoral law with secret voting and
the proportional system.

(8) The local government organs, district and communal coun-
cils, will be elected on the same democratic basis as the Landtage"

On March 22, in view of the fact that no appreciable progress
had been made on the German question, the Council of Foreign
Ministers set up a sub-committee consisting of General Lucius Clay
(U.S.A.), Lt.-Gen. Sir Brian Robertson (Britain), Mr. Vyshinsky
(Russia), and M. Herv6 Alphand (France) to co-ordinate and com-
pare all the proposals which had been submitted by the different
delegations. On March 25 the Foreign Ministers considered the pro-
cedure to be adopted for calling the peace conference with Germany,
but failed to reach agreement on the procedure to be followed and
the States to take part.

On April 10 the Council of Foreign Ministers turned to consider-
ation of the German-Polish frontier.

Revision of the existing provisional frontier in Germany's favour
was advocated both by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bevin, who quoted
statements by Marshal Stalin at the Potsdam Conference to show that
he did not consider the present frontier as final and that the definitive
settlement should be made at the Peace Conference. Mr. Marshall
agreed that the southern part of East Prussia, and industrial Upper
Silesia, should remain Polish; emphasized, however, that the division
of the remaining territory, which was largely agricultural, required
consideration of the needs of both the Polish and German peoples;
and proposed that a Boundary Commission should be set up repre-
senting the "Big Four" and Poland which should recommend (1)
revision of the pre-war Polish-German frontier which would com-
pensate Poland fairly for the territory ceded to Russia east of the
Curzon Line; (2) "economic arrangements appropriate for assuring
that raw materials and heavy industrial resources from the area in
question which are vital to the European economy shall fairly serve
that need, including particularly the need of Poland." Continuing,
Mr. Marshall emphasized that the final frontier should be drawn so
as to avoid unnecessary and unjustified economic upset, to minimize
irredentist pressure in Germany and to ensure that it would not be
a cause of later international friction, and declared: "The new fron-

22

tiers must be adequate to give Poland resources at least as great as
she had before the war and capable of maintaining her peoples at
a good standard of life. But the needs of Germany have also to be
considered. Before the war the German area now under provisional
Polish control contributed over a fifth of Germany's total food sup-
ply. If Germany must in the future import two-fifths or more of her
food supply from abroad, the German economy will have to be
industrialized to an even greater extent than before the war, or Ger-
many will become a congested slum in the centre of Europe. The five
to six million Germans who have been evacuated from areas in the
east will, for the most part, have to depend on industrial employment
for their livelihood. I agree with M. Bidault that there is danger in
requiring an eventual German population of over 66,000,000 to live
within the confines of a smaller Germany."

Mr. Bevin said that after the last war many people felt that the
Polish frontiers were pushed too far east, that now there was a danger
that they might be pushed too far west, and that the British delega-
tion at Potsdam had felt "grave doubts" in agreeing even to the pro-
visional Oder-Neisse frontier. Like Mr. Marshall, he drew attention
to the danger of an overcrowded and over-industrialized Germany
in a restricted area, and urged that Upper Silesia should be incor-
porated into Poland but that the agricultural area eastwards from
Stettin should be returned to Germany.

Mr. Molotov declared that the Soviet Government, as stated by
Marshal Stalin himself, considered the present Polish-German fron-
tier as final; maintained that the Peace Conference should merely
"formalize" the agreement made at Potsdam; pointed out that accord-
ing to the Allied Control Council a total of 5,678,936 Germans had
been removed from the disputed areas and replaced by 5,000,000
Poles; and asked how this could now be reversed.

The Polish Foreign Office, on the same day (April 10), issued a
statement uncompromisingly rejecting the suggestions put forward by
Mr. Bevin and Mr. Marshall and declaring that the contested terri-
tory was essentially Polish in spite of long years of attempted Ger-
manization; that Poland must have priority over Germany in
rehabilitation; and that concessions to Germany, so far from remov-
ing title danger of German aggressive aspirations, would only be a
stimulus to Germany's spirit of revenge.

Mr. Marshall, on April 14, proposed that the Foreign Ministers
should immediately appoint plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of a
four-Power treaty to ensure German disarmament and demilitariza-
tion for a 40-year period after the signing of the peace treaty, as had
been proposed by his predecessor, Mr. Byrnes. This was agreed to

23

by Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault, but Mr. Molotov asked that the pro-
posed treaty should be broadened to include a number of other
matters, e.g., denazification, four-Power control of the Ruhr, land
reform, the liquidation of cartels and reparations deliveries. Mr.
Marshall argued that these matters had no place in the treaty pro-
posed, which was intended only as a first and basic step to ensure
the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. After further dis-
cussion the Foreign Ministers' Council ceased consideration of Ger-
man problems on April 15 without having arrived at any agreed
decisions.

5. MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET
AND U.S. COMMANDERS, 1947

Colonel Tulpanov, a Soviet political official, in an address to a
Socialist Unity Party conference in East Berlin on Sept. 21, 1947,
stressed "the fundamental difference between our Socialist State and
the capitalist character of the other occupation Powers 9 '; called on
the party to "figfrt ruthlessly its internal enemies and German reac-
tionaries"; and also violently attacked Britain and the U.S.A., declar-
ing that "American monopolistic capital" was "trying to whip up
Germany into the bloody massacre of imperialist war".

General Lucius Clay, the American C.-in-C. in Germany, there-
upon announced at a Press conference on Oct. 28, that the American
Military Government would abandon its policy of avoiding political
controversies and would launch a campaign against Communism
throughout the U.S. zone of Germany.

Hitherto, General Clay explained, it had been the American prac-
tice to be silent in public on the subject of Soviet attacks against the
U.S.A. However, the reply of Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet
C.-in-C., to his (General Clay's) protest against Colonel Tulpanov's
speech had been "unsatisfactory". "I do not intend," General Clay
continued, "to enter into a series of recriminations and charges
between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but I feel strongly about the
U.S. form of democracy and its attributes of freedom of speech and
the Press, and equally strongly that such freedoms do not exist under
Communism. I intend to defend the principles in which we believe."
Emphasizing that the new policy had been decided in Berlin and
had not been discussed during his recent visit to Washington, General
Clay declared: "I am not to be put in a position where the German

24

people have the opportunity of hearing about only one system of
Government. We have always tried to spread the advantages of our
type of democracy. We have tried to avoid making unfavourable
comparisons with other types of political philosophy, but we will no
longer avoid them."

Colonel Gordon E. Textor, chief of the Information Control Divi-
sion of the U.S. Military Government, stated the same day that the
American propaganda offensive against Communism would be inaug-
urated within a week; that it would be directed through the Military
Government newspaper Neue Zeitung, the three official magazines,
and the five American-controlled radio stations at Berlin, Bremen,
Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich; that the radio networks would be
assisted by three short-wave transmitters capable of covering the
whole of Germany, including the Soviet zone; and that the campaign
would be directed by a central planning board.

On Nov. 9 it was authoritatively stated in Berlin and Diisseldorf
that the British Military Government had decided against joining the
U.S. campaign.

Marshal Sokolovsky's Attacks on Allied Policy in Western Germany

Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet member of the Allied Control
Council, made a statement on Nov. 21, 1947, at a meeting of the
Council strongly criticizing American, British and French policy in
the Western zones of Germany. The statement, published in the
Tdgliche Rundschau (organ of the Soviet Military Government), was
made on the eve of Marshal Sokolovsky's departure for London as
a member of the Soviet delegation at the conference of the Council
of Foreign Ministers meeting to consider the German and Austrian
peace treaties.

The statement commenced by alleging that "practically no pro-
had been made in the demilitarization of Western Germany
the American, British and French authorities, and went on to
ge inter alia that "remnants of German military formations are
being retained in the British zone under the guise of so-called labour
corps"; that military training of German youth, by American instruc-
tors, was proceeding in the U.S. zone in various sports organizations
despite the Allied Control Council's ban on all such training; that

25

elimination of German military and naval bases was proceeding with
slowness in the Western zones (Marshal Sokolovsky alleging in this
connection that the British authorities had not demilitarized the Kiel
naval base) ; and that "on the pretext of the need to develop peace-
time economy" the American and British authorities had left intact
important sections of German armaments plants scheduled for demo-
lition, e.g., parts of the Bayerische Motorenwerke factory at Munich
and of the Messerschmitt plant at Augsburg, declaring that "lists of
factories scheduled by the American and British authorities for elim-
ination consist mostly of enterprises of secondary importance". "The
sabotage of demilitarization and the preservation of war potential in
both the British and American zones," said the statement, "could
have no other purpose than the conversion of these zones into a
military base of Anglo-American imperialism in the heart of Europe"
Allegations were also made that the decartelization measures decided
on by the Allied Control Council were not being effectively imple-
mented in the Western zones.

The statement was strongly critical of the bi-zonal economic fusion
in Western Germany, maintaining that in effecting this arrangement
the British and U.S. authorities had acted contrary to the decisions
of Potsdam and Yalta, and saying that "the only explanation (of the
bi-zonal fusion) is that the overriding purpose was to eliminate Ger-
man industry from the world market as a rival of the British and
American monopolies, while at the same time preserving Germany's
war potential". Continuing, the statement said: "Viewed from the
political aspect, all the above-mentioned separatist measures of the
British and American authorities constitute nothing but the realiza-
tion of a programme aimed at splitting Germany. These actions,
which lead to the liquidation of Germany's unity, found their con-
tinuation in the Marshall Plan, which aims at subjugating the econ-
omy of the American, British and French zones to the American and
British monopolies, and at converting these regions of Germany,
primarily the Ruhr, into a military and industrial base of Anglo-
American imperialism in Europe with a view to utilizing it as a means
of pressure on European States which refuse to be enslaved by the
American-British monopolies."

General Clay, the U.S. member of the Control Council, at a press
conference on Nov. 23 before leaving for London to attend the
Foreign Ministers' conference, said that he did not wish to make
countercharges or to indulge in recriminations since he did not wish
to add to the "strains and stresses" of the London Conference, but
declared that the Russian statement constituted a "misrepresentation
of known facts".

26

Establishment of German Economic Council and
Executive Council

The establishment of a German Economic Council, in connection
with the economic fusion of the British and U.S. occupation zones in
Western Germany, in May 1947, and the subsequent setting up of
an Executive Council, approximating to the status of a Cabinet, for
the two zones, were strongly objected to by the Soviet Union.

The agreement on the economic fusion of the U.S. and British
zones with effect from Jan. 1, 1947 which had been signed on Dec.
2, 1946 contained a preamble stating that the fusion "should be
regarded as the first step towards the achievement of the economic
unity of Germany as a whole" in accordance with the principles laid
down at Potsdam, and that both the U.S.A. and Britain were ready
to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union and France with a
view to extending the arrangements to their zones.

At a meeting of the Allied Control Council in Berlin on Jan. 20,
1948, however, Marshal Sokolovsky insisted that the decisions were
a contravention of the Potsdam Agreement, had been carried out
without the consent of the Allied Control Council, and were a step
towards the further splitting of Germany and the setting up of a West
German State; he consequently asked for the abandonment of the
scheme, and at the same time alleged that three German politicians
in particular bore responsibility for the acceptance of the Anglo-
American proposals Dr. Konrad Adenauer, the Christian Demo-
cratic leader in the Western zones, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the Social-
Democratic leader in the West, and Herr Jakob Kaiser, chairman
of the Christian Democratic Union. The U.S. and British members
of the Council strongly denied Marshal Sokolovsky's allegations both
in respect of the alleged political implications and of the alleged part
played by the German politicians named, reiterating that the pro-
gramme was purely economic in character.

The Economic Council, increased to 104 members in February
1948, was in effect an economic Government for the U.S. and British
occupation zones, and its establishment was accompanied by that of
a Ldnderrat (Upper House), in which each Land (or State) was
represented by two members.

German Lander Governments had first been set up in the U.S. zone
in September-October 1945, and in the British and French zones
during 1946.

27

6. GROWING TENSION BETWEEN SOVIET UNION
AND WESTERN POWERS, 1948

The Soviet delegation on the Allied Control Council for Germany,
headed by Marshal Sokolovsky, walked out of the Council at its
meeting in Berlin on March 20, 1948, after accusing the Western
Powers of undermining the quadripartite control of Germany and of
seeking to make the position of the Control Council impossible.

The walk-out arose from a memorandum presented to the Council
by Marshal Sokolovsky in connection with a Conference of the
Western Powers on Germany held in London in February. The memo-
randum protested at the fact that the conference had been called
without the knowledge of the Control Council; complained that the
Council had not been informed of the results of the conference despite
the fact that it had dealt with such important subjects as the State
structure of Germany, control of the Ruhr, reparations and the
inclusion of Western Germany in the Marshall plan; emphasized that
the questions discussed in London fell within the competence of the
Council as the supreme authority for Germany set up by the Allies
under the Potsdam Agreement; and called on the American, British
and French representatives to state the directives they had received
as a result of the London Conference.

The American, British and French members of the Control Coun-
cil (Generals Clay, Robertson and Koenig), while agreeing that the
Soviet request was legitimate, pointed out that the London Con-
ference had made recommendations without taking decisions; stated
that they had received no directives as a result of the London Con-
ference; and emphasized that the Council had received no information
regarding developments in the Soviet zone of Germany. Marshal
Sokolovsky thereupon read a statement which, after describing the
response to the Soviet request as "unsatisfactory", accused the
Western Powers of pursuing a policy directed against the Potsdam
Agreement and "contradicting four-Power decisions and the purposes
of the occupation of Germany".

Despite the Soviet walk-out, the Soviet Military Government, on
March 23, sent out notices convening meetings of the Control Coun-
cil's sub-committees for the following day. The American, British
and French authorities, however, announced that they could not
participate in any further quadripartite meetings (excluding those of
the four-Power Kommandatura, which was not affected by the Soviet
action and continued to function normally as the Allied administering
body for Berlin) until the Council had met to consider the position
28

created by Marshal Sokolovsky's announcement of March 20. On
March 30, when the Council was due to have met for a routine meet-
ing, Marshal Sokolovsky made no attempt to convene such a meeting,
it being stated in Berlin that the Council would not meet until April
10, when it would be convened by General Clay as chairman for the
month.

Mr. Marshall, in a press statement in Washington on March 25,
emphasized that the U.S.A. "intends to continue to fulfill its respon-
sibilities as a member of the Control Council and as a joint occupant
of the city of Berlin"; he added that for three years the U.S. Govern-
ment had attempted to secure the effective political and economic
unification of Germany, declared that these attempts had been frus-
trated to a large extent by the tactics of the Soviet representative on
the Control Council, and said that the Soviet boycott of the Council
"could only be construed as an intention, which the U.S.A. does not
share, to renounce efforts to obtain four-Power agreement on policies
for Germany".

The Soviet Military Government informed the U.S., British and
French authorities in Berlin on March 31 that, as from April 1, new
and more stringent traffic regulations would come into force with
respect to road and rail traffic between the Western zones and Berlin.

It was stated that nationals of the Western Powers, whether mil-
itary or civilian, would, with their families, have to present documents
certifying their identity and the fact that they belonged to the Allied
administration in Berlin; that these documents must be presented at
the frontiers of the Soviet zone; that persons not connected with the
Allied administration would, when entering or leaving the Soviet
zone, have to be in possession of passes issued "in accordance with
previously established procedure"; that goods belonging to the U.S.,
British, and French military authorities and intended for the Western
zones would be allowed through specified "check points" only with
the authorization of the Soviet authorities in Berlin; that all property,
exclusive of personal property, would be examined at these "check
points"; and that the new regulations would be applicable to traffic
both entering and leaving Berlin, whether by road or rail. The U.S.,
British, and French authorities, in a reply the same evening, protested
against the new regulations as a unilateral violation of established
procedure.

In consequence of the new Soviet regulations, all Allied rail traffic
between Berlin and Western Germany was cancelled on April 1 by

29

the U.S. and British authorities and replaced temporarily by special
air services for passengers and freight, using the Gatow and Tempel-
hof airfields (by quadripartite agreement the American, British, and
French authorities shared an international 10-mile-wide air "corridor"
between Helmstedt, on the Anglo-Soviet zonal frontier, and Berlin).
The previous night the Russian authorities had established "check
points" at various places on the Helmstedt-Marienborn-Berlin Auto-
bahn and at Marienborn, on the Soviet side of the zonal border, had
held up 2 American and 1 British military trains after Russian officials
had been refused permission to board the trains to inspect passengers'
identification papers. In Berlin itself the Russians also instituted
"check points" on roads leading into the U.S., British, and French
sectors, traffic being stopped and papers examined.

The situation remained unchanged the following day, when the
French authorities fell into line with the Americans and British and
likewise cancelled all trains between the French zone and Berlin.
Food trains, however, continued to reach Berlin from Western Ger-
many without interference by the Soviet authorities, whilst U.S. and
British Dakotas, also without interference, continued to fly quantities
of foodstuffs to Gatow and Tempelhof for the British and American
sectors of Berlin. Conferences took place in the latter city between
Generals Clay and Robertson, whilst after a 10-hour meeting of the
Kommandatura the Soviet representative, Colonel Yelisarov, an-
nounced that the "check points" between the Soviet sector of Berlin
and the other Allied sectors would be abolished.

American troops in Berlin took their first retaliatory action on
April 3 when they threw a cordon round the headquarters of the
railway system for the Soviet zone (which is in the U.S. sector) and
refused to allow any Russians to enter the building. In addition, U.S.
troops established a "check point" on the main road between Berlin
and Potsdam, where Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet Military Gov-
ernor, had his residence, causing Russian officials to make a long
detour. When the Soviet authorities protested to General Clay, the
latter replied that he could take no note of the protest until the "free
entry of American trains into Berlin" had been solved.

In correspondence with the Soviet Deputy Military Governor, re-
leased on April 4, Brigadier-General Gailey (U.S. Army) maintained

30

that at a meeting in Berlin on June 29, 1945, between Marshal
Zhukov and British and American officials, it had been "clearly un-
derstood that the U.S. forces in Berlin would have free and un-
restricted use of the established corridors," and that it was only on
this understanding that the American troops had withdrawn at the
time from such areas as Saxony and Thuringia, subsequently in-
corporated in the Soviet zone.

A certain abatement of the tension occurred on April 4, when the
U.S. cordon round the railway building in Berlin was withdrawn after
Soviet guards had evacuated the premises, contacts between the U.S.
and Soviet officers and officials being of an amicable nature. Further-
more, it was reported from Berlin that special British bus services
between the city and Helmstedt were running normally, that road
traffic was not seriously affected by the Russian traffic control mea-
sures, and that travellers on the Autobahn were encountering no
delay provided their papers were in order. From Frankfurt-am-Main
it was announced that the U.S. special air services to Berlin were
being suspended since freight trains were getting through to the city
without trouble.

7. GERMAN CURRENCY REFORM
AND THE BERLIN BLOCKADE, 1948

Currency Reform in Western Zones of Germany

On June 18, 1948, in a proclamation by the British, French and
U.S. Military Governors, currency reform measures were announced
for the three Western zones of Germany.

The long-awaited reform was the result of discussions between
the British, U.S., and French Governments, carried on almost con-
tinuously since Marshal Sokolovsky had walked out of the Allied
Control Council on March 20, and followed previous long but fruit-
less efforts to obtain a four-Power agreement covering the whole of
Germany. The new scheme, which had been discussed by Generals
Clay, Robertson, and Koenig with the Prime Ministers of the Lander
and the German Bi-zonal Economic Council and Landerrat in Frank-
furt on June 14-15, followed the main lines agreed upon by the
experts of the four Powers before the discussions ended with the
Russian walkout for political reasons.

31

In his letter to Marshal Sokolovsky of June 18 informing the latter
of the decision to introduce a new currency into the British Zone,
Sir Brian Robertson, the British Military Governor, declared after
referring to unsuccessful four-Power negotiations on currency reform:
"The economy of the British Zone is suffering acutely from the evils
of inflation and of economic stagnation which our quadripartite pro-
posals for financial reform were designed long ago to eradicate, and
I feel that I am not justified in waiting any longer before taking
remedial measures." After stating that the British sector of Berlin
remained unaffected "in view of the special circumstances of quadri-
partite government" in the city, which he had "no wish to disturb
unless this becomes unavoidable", General Robertson expressed the
hope that it would "be possible for the occupying Powers to agree
at an early date to reintroduce a single currency for the whole of
Germany, as well as to take the other measures of economic unity
to which we have always attached so much importance". Similar
letters had been sent to Marshal Sokolovsky by Generals Clay and
Koenig.

On June 18 Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet Military Governor,
issued a proclamation denouncing the separate currency reform in
the Western zones; prohibiting the circulation of the new currency
in the Soviet zone and in Berlin which, the proclamation said, "lies
in the Soviet zone and forms economically part of it" and likewise
prohibiting the import both of old and new notes from the Western
zones into the Soviet zone and Berlin; and threatening punishment
for any such imports, which would be regarded as "economic
sabotage".

The Western currency reform, Marshal Sokolovsky declared, was
being carried put "against the wishes and interests of the German
people" and "in the interests of the American, British, and French
monopolists", adding: "The separate currency reform completes the
splitting of Germany. It is a breach of the Potsdam decisions and
the control mechanism for Germany which envisaged die treatment
of Germany as an economic whole. The Western Powers are trying to
excuse themselves by claiming that it was impossible to agree on
a four-Power currency reform for the whole of Germany. By this
move they are simply trying to deceive public opinion. In the Control
Council the Soviet representatives took every possible opportunity
of reaching agreement on a common currency reform. It is clear
that the Western representatives used the discussions in the Control
Council as a cover, under cloak of which they prepared in secret
for separate currency reform. The American, French, and British

32

monopolists in the Western zones are supported in their policy of
splitting Germany by the big German capitalists and the Junkers
who helped Fascism to power and prepared the second world war.
Separate currency reform strengthens the political and economic
position of these reactionaries and harms the working people. The
introduction of two currencies in Germany will mean that trade
relations within the country will be destroyed. Inter-zonal trade will
become in practice trade between two separate States, since two
different currencies will be used. The prerequisites for free passenger
traffic and goods traffic between the occupation zones will be
destroyed."

Soviet Restrictions on Inter-zonal Traffic

Prior to the above announcement the Soviet authorities in Berlin
had ordered that all passenger train traffic between the Soviet and
the Western zones would be halted at midnight of June 18-19, that
all motor traffic for Berlin on the Hanover-Berlin Autobahn (the
only road link between Berlin and the West) would also be stopped,
and that nobody would be allowed to cross the frontier into the Soviet
zone on foot.

The German Economic Commission for the Soviet Zone, in a state-
ment issued the same night, also denounced the separate currency
reform in the Western zones as "a decisive step towards the splitting
of Germany" and "the final breach of the agreement reached at
Potsdam that Germany should be treated as an economic unit", de-
claring that the Western areas would as a result become "mere
colonies of American capital"; it added that Berlin would "cease to
be the capital of Germany" and that its "untenable position" could
"only be resolved by a close link with the Eastern zone of Germany",
and appealed "to the entire German people not to allow themselves
to be misused for these anti-democratic and anti-German policies".

A meeting of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin, which General
Ganeval, the French Commandant, had called for June 18 to discuss
the currency reform, was cancelled after the Russians had announced
that they would not attend it.

The Berlin City Assembly, in an extraordinary session on June 19,
approved a resolution, supported by the Social Democrats, Christian
Democrats, and Liberal Democrats, and against Socialist Unity Party
opposition, protesting against Marshal Sokolovsky's proclamation

33

and the "Diktat of the Soviet military authorities", and asking that
Berlin should not be included in a one-sided currency reform for
either Western or Eastern Germany, and that only an agreed four-
Power reform measure should be applied in the city; the resolution
rejected the contention of Socialist Unity Party members that Berlin
should be joined economically with the Soviet zone as the city's
"natural hinterland".

General Robertson replied on June 31 to a letter by Marshal
Sokolovsky of the previous date in which the latter had described
the Western currency reform as "illegal", had claimed sole Soviet
responsibility for currency matters in Berlin, and had announced a
forthcoming currency reform in the Soviet zone, including Berlin.

On the same day the Russian-licensed German news agency re-
ported that the German Economic Commission for the Soviet zone
had, at a special meeting, passed a currency reform law for that
zone and had submitted it to Marshal Sokolovsky for his approval.
Mr. Maletin, chief of the financial division of the Soviet Military
Government, in a statement published by the official Tagliche Rund-
schau, repeated Marshal Sokolovsky's contention that there could be
only one currency in Berlin and that Berlin was economically part of
the Russian zone, and declared that the attempt to introduce two
currencies would meet with determined counter-measures from the
Soviet authorities. Nevertheless, later the same night Marshal Sok-
olovsky informed General Robertson that he would accept the
latter's invitation for four-Power talks on currency reform for Berlin.
This conference, attended by financial experts from the four Allied
Powers, took place on June 22, but subsequent U.S. and British
statements said that it had "produced no positive results" and that no
further meeting had been arranged.

As a counter-move the British, U.S., and French authorities in
Berlin announced in proclamations later the same morning that the
new Deutsche Mark would be introduced into the Western sectors
of the city, and that Russian orders that the Soviet zone currency
reform should apply to the whole of Berlin were "null and void" in
the Western sectors, the announcement describing the action of the
Soviet Military Administration as "an attempt to usurp for itself the
authority to dominate the economic affairs of Berlin". At the same
time all banks and shops in the Western sectors, except food and
34

chemists 9 shops, were ordered to close and a temporary moratorium
declared.

Soviet Decision to introduce New Currency into Eastern
Zone and Berlin

In the early hours of June 23 Marshal Sokolovsky issued an order
introducing currency reform both for the Soviet zone and for Greater
Berlin.

In view of the acute conflict between the Western Powers and the
Soviet Union, and the technical difficulties arising for the population
put of the divergent measures of both sides, great tension prevailed
in Berlin, especially since, through the Soviet restrictions on inter-
zonal traffic, all barge traffic from the British to the Soviet zone had
stopped since June 21, road traffic had remained completely blocked,
and the movement of U.S. military freight trains to Berlin had been
suspended since that date by orders of General Gay, following the
Russian refusal to pass a train carrying U.S. army supplies. Only a
small number of British goods trains were able to enter die Soviet
zone at the Russian check-point at Marienborn, the city being other-
wise completely isolated from the West except for air traffic, both
the British and U.S. military authorities instituting on June 21 special
air services to and from the city to maintain passenger traffic and the
flow of army supplies.

Marshal Sokolovsky, in a proclamation to the people of Berlin
on June 24, declared that the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin had
"to all intents and purposes" ceased to exist as an organ for the ad-
ministration of the city, as it was no longer a suitable intrument for
the control of currency reform.

Meanwhile the situation grew more serious when rail traffic on
the one-track line from Berlin to Helmstedt, the Western Allies' only
rail link with the West, was cut off by the Russians in both directions
early on June 24 on the pretext of "technical trouble", thus stopping
even the limited movement of British goods trains to Berlin which
had still been maintained, and cutting off all further supplies for the
British, U.S., and French forces and the German population of their
sectors. At the same time the Russian authorities in Berlin announced,
ostensibly because of shortage of coal owing to "insufficient supplies
from the West", that there would be no further deliveries of electric

35

current from the Soviet sector and from the Soviet zone to the
Western sectors, and stopped all coal, food, and other supplies from
the Soviet sector to the three Western sectors, including deliveries
of fresh milk.

The British authorities ordered on June 25 the complete cessation
of all goods traffic between the British and Soviet zones, thus depriv-
ing the latter of all coal and steel supplies from the West; it was
stated that this measure had been taken because the Russians had
failed to return 16,000 goods trucks to the Western zones.

General Clay declared at Frankfurt on June 24, 1948, that
"nothing short of an act of war can drive us out of Berlin", adding
that no Soviet "pressure tactics" nor any new East German Govern-
ment which might be created by the Russians would halt the U.S.-
British-French project to develop Western Germany politically and
economically.

Mr. Bevin gave a brief account of the events in Berlin in a state-
ment to the House of Commons on June 25.

He confirmed that the Soviet decision to introduce a new currency
into their zone and Berlin was acceptable to the Western Powers if
the Soviet zone currency was to be issued in Berlin under four-Power
control a condition in accord with all the existing four-Power agree-
ments but that the Russians did not accept this and insisted that the
issue should be under their sole control. "To have accepted this,"
Mr. Bevin declared, "would have been tantamount to the abandon-
ment of our rights in Berlin. The Western Powers have had no
alternative but to introduce a special currency in the Western sectors
of Berlin distinct from the new currency in the Western zone. . . .
There will therefore be very shortly two currencies in circulation in
Berlin".

General Robertson on June 26, 1948, sent a letter to Marshal
Sokolovsky calling on the latter to restore communications between
the city and the Western zones immediately.

Saying that he had not hitherto protested against the various
restrictions because they had been described by the Soviet military
administration as temporary and as designed to protect the currency
of the Soviet zone pending the introduction of currency conversion
in the latter, General Robertson continued: "Now, however, I learn
that the Soviet military administration has announced that all traffic

36

on the railway between Helmstedt and Berlin is suspended on tech-
nical grounds and that no alternative route will be made available.
Simultaneously, barge traffic on the canals has been stopped. Under
arrangements in force among the occupying Powers, the British
authorities are responsible for contributing supplies for the population
of Berlin. I am able and willing to continue to discharge this respon-
sibility provided that my freight trains and barges are free to pass
between the Western zones and Berlin. The interruption of essential
freight cannot be held to be a measure necessary to protect the
currency position in the Soviet zone. I therefore request that arrange-
ments be made by the Soviet administration to restore normal traffic
communications to and from Berlin immediately. I wish to make it
clear that if they are not so restored, and undue and avoidable suf-
fering is thereby inflicted upon the German population, it will be
because I have been deprived by you of the means to sustain them."

The Soviet authorities in Berlin issued on June 29 the text of
Marshal Sokolovsky's reply.

Saying that the Soviet measures were only temporary, the letter,
which was conciliatory in tone but was, on the other hand, modified
by many qualifying passages, reiterated that Hie Soviet military
authorities had been forced to take these measures to avoid en-
dangering the economy of the Soviet zone; stated that the reopening
of frontier traffic for Germans with valid inter-zonal passes had
already been ordered; but insisted that the restrictions for motorcar
traffic on the Autobahn must be maintained to prevent the illegal
import of money from the West. With regard to railway traffic on the
Helmstedt-Berlin line, Marshal Sokolovsky said that it had to be
stopped because of technical difficulties, that the Soviet transport
authorities would, however, take all measures to remove these diffi-
culties, that Berlin's food supplies would last for several weeks, and
that it was hoped that it would meanwhile be possible to restore rail-
way communications "as soon as possible".

On June 30 Mr. Bevin made a further statement in the House of
Commons on the situation in Berlin. In his speech he rejected the
Soviet argument that the fault lay with the Western Powers who had
repudiated the Potsdam agreement. Mr. Bevin stated inter alia:

"It is the Soviet Government which has consistently failed to
operate the Potsdam agreement, and destroyed, up to the moment,
die possible unity of Germany. . . .

"The Potsdam agreement provided for the economic unity of Ger-

37

many, but this was constantly rejected by the Soviet Union at con-
ferences in Paris, Moscow and London. There is a claim by Russia
that they should share in the administration of the Ruhr, and some
people thought that this had been agreed upon at Potsdam. There
is no agreement of the kind. We have declined to put the Ruhr
under four-Power control while the rest of Germany is to be left to
single-Power control. The Council of Foreign Ministers in London
last year demonstrated to the full that while the Soviet Government
kept up lip-service to German unity, they were determined to destroy
it by continuing to insist on policies and programmes which made
unity impossible. . . ."

On the same day Mr. Marshall issued the following statement in
Washington:

"We are in Berlin as a result of agreements between the Govern-
ments on the areas of occupation in Germany, and we intend to stay.
The Soviet attempt to blockade the German civilian population of
Berlin raises basic questions of serious import, with which we expect
to deal promptly. Meanwhile the maximum use of air transport will
be made to supply the civilian population."

At a meeting of the Allied Chiefs of Staff on July 1 Colonel Kalinin,
Soviet Chief of Staff in the Berlin Kommandatura, announced that
Russian representatives would no longer attend any meetings of any
organizations of the Kommandatura.

The main reason for the Soviet decision was the introduction by
the Western Powers of the new Western currency in Berlin, "a city
which is part of the economic system of the Soviet zone".

A statement issued by the British H.Q. in Berlin denied the validity
of the Soviet contention that the introduction of the currency reform
in the Western sectors gave the Russians the right to declare the
Kommandatura to be dissolved.

After consultations between the Western Powers, British, U.S.,
and French Notes on the Russian blockade of Berlin, all in similar
terms, were handed to the Soviet Ambassadors in London, Washing-
ton and Paris on July 8. The British Note, whose text was published
on July 10, said inter alia:

"The rights of the U.K. as a joint occupying Power in Berlin derive
from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. The
international agreements undertaken in connection therewith by the

38

Governments of the U.K., U.S.A., France, and the Soviet Union de-
fined the zones in Germany and the sectors in Berlin which are
occupied by these Powers. They established the quadripartite control
of Berlin on a basis of friendly co-operation, which H.M. Govern-
ment earnestly desire to continue to pursue. These agreements implied
the right of free access to Berlin. . . .

"Berlin is not a part of the Soviet zone but is an international zone
of occupation. ..."

The Note went on to declare that H.M. Government "will not be
induced by threats, pressure or other actions to abandon" the right
of free access to Berlin. The Note concluded:

"H.M. Government are ready ... to participate in negotiations in
Berlin among the four Allied Occupying Authorities for the settle-
ment of any question in dispute arising out of the administration of
the city of Berlin. It is, however, a pre-requisite that the lines of
communication and the movement of persons and goods between the
U.K., the U.S., and the French sectors in Berlin and the Western
zones shall have been fully restored."

The Soviet replies, being in similar terms to the British, U.S. and
French Notes, were delivered in London, Washington and Paris on
July 14.

The Soviet Note reiterated its former statement that "the Berlin
situation has arisen as a result of the violation by the U.S.A., Great
Britain and France of the agreed decisions adopted by the four
Powers in relation to Germany and Berlin, expressed in the carrying
out of a separate currency reform, the introduction of special cur-
rency notes for the Western sectors of Berlin, and the policy of
dismembering Germany. . . ."

The Soviet Note continued:

"The U.S. Government declares that it occupies its sector of Berlin
by right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany, referring
in this connection to the four-Power agreement in relation to Ger-
many and Berlin. This only confirms that the existence of the above-
mentioned right in relation to Berlin is bound up with the obligatory
fulfilment by the Powers of the quadripartite agreements concluded
between them in relation to Germany as a whole. In accordance with
these agreements, Berlin was envisaged as the seat of the supreme
authority of the four Powers occupying Germany, and agreement was
reached on the administration of Greater Berlin under the direction
of the Control Council. Thus the agreement on quadripartite adminis-
tration of Berlin is an inseparable part of the agreement on quad-
ripartite administration of Germany as a whole. When the U.S.A.,
Britain and France, by their separate actions in Western Germany,

39

destroyed the system of quadripartite administration of Germany
and began to create in Frankfurt a capital for a Government of
Western Germany, they thereby undermined the legal basis on which
rested their right to participate in the administration of Berlin. . . ."

The Note concluded:

"As regards the declaration of the U.S. Government that it will
not be induced by threats, pressure or other actions to abandon its
right to participate in the occupation of Berlin, the Soviet Govern-
ment does not intend to enter into a discussion of this declaration,
for it has no need of a policy of pressure since, by violation of the
agreed decisions on the administration of Berlin, the above-mentioned
Governments are themselves reducing to nought their right to par-
ticipation in the occupation of Berlin. The U.S. Government, in its
Note of July 6, expresses readiness to begin negotiations between
the four Allied Powers for an examination of the situation in Berlin,
but passes over in silence the question of Germany as a whole.
While not objecting to negotiations, the Soviet Government deems it
necessary to declare that it cannot link the start of these negotiations
with the fulfilment of any preliminary conditions, and that, secondly,
quadripartite negotiations could only be effective if they were not
confined to the question of the administration of Berlin, since this
question cannot be separated from the general question of quadri-
partite control in relation to Germany."

The Soviet Notes thus made it clear that the Soviet blockade of
the Western sectors of Berlin was entirely based on political grounds,
dropping the reasons which had earlier been given, viz., "technical
difficulties" and the necessity of "repairs" to rail and river com-
munications.

On July 9 and 13 further Russian road traffic restrictions were
announced. On July 20 the Soviet authorities declared that "in the
desire to alleviate the position of the population" they would, on
instructions from the Soviet Government, themselves accept respon-
sibility for feeding the population of the whole of Berlin. The
announcement also said that the Soviet Government had for this
purpose made available 100,000 tons of bread grain and other food-
stuffs from Russian stocks, and that measures had been taken by
the Soviet military authorities to buy further food in Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and other countries.

40

A British official statement on the same day described the Russian
offer as "pure propaganda", and pointed out that there was no food
shortage in the Western sectors, and that, on the contrary, the British
and U.S. air lift was bringing in the equivalent of the entire con-
sumption of these sectors.

The lack of understanding between the Government of the Soviet
Union and the Western Powers was shown in a speech by Mr.
Churchill on July 10 when he referred to the Berlin crisis as follows:

"The free democracies of the West are awaiting the Soviet reply
to the joint Note that has been sent to the Kremlin. This Note makes
it plain that we will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed out of
Berlin by the inhuman attempts of the Soviet Government to starve
the 2,500,000 Germans in the British and American zones. They
were our enemies in the war, but we are now responsible that they
should not be treated with cruel severity. If we were to yield on this
grave issue we should, in my opinion, destroy the best chance now
open to us of escaping a third world war. With Russia we are dealing
not with a great nation that can expres sits free will, but with 13 men
in the Kremlin who have made themselves the masters of the brave
Russian people and who rule them with far more dictatorial authority
than was ever shown by any Russian Tsar since the days of Ivan the
Terrible. No one can tell what these 13 oligarchs in the Kremlin will
do. ... The safest course for us and other Western democracies is to
pursue, as we are doing, a plain, fair and straightforward policy based
on our undoubted rights and on those instincts of humanity which
forbid us either to leave the Germans of Berlin, who have cou-
rageously stood with us, to Soviet vengeance or to let them all be
starved to death."

Introduction of Eastern "Deutsche Mark"

A decree issued by Marshal Sokolovsky on July 23 announced
that all stamped Eastern mark notes were to be exchanged on July
25-27 against notes in a new currency to be issued by the "German
Issue Bank" (Deutsche Notenbank)\ the latter was the new name
conferred on the German Issue and Transfer Bank (Deutsche
Emissions- und Girobank) when the power to issue notes was vested
in it by the German Economic Commission on July 22, its seat being
at the same time transferred from Potsdam to Berlin.

The British, French and U.S. military authorities in Berlin an-
nounced on July 24 that they agreed to accept the new Soviet

41

currency in the Western sectors of the city, but the policy followed
by the Russians in carrying out the exchange operation led to serious
financial and economic difficulties, both on the part of the Berlin
city administration and of industrial and commercial undertakings
situated in the Western sectors, and compelled the Western Com-
mandants to take special financial emergency measures.

8. WESTERN POWERS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION ON THE BERLIN QUESTION, 1948

On July 26, 1948, Mr. Bevin presided at the Foreign Office in
London over a conference of U.S. and British representatives to
consider the joint reply to the Soviet Note of July 14 on the Berlin
crisis.

It was announced on July 28 that complete agreement had been
reached in the London discussions on the form and method of the
three-Power reply to the U.S.S.R. and on the joint approach to be
made to that country by Britain, the U.S.A. and France in con-
nexion with the Berlin situation.

Following conversations at the Kremlin with Mr. Molotov on
July 31 and with Marshal Stalin on Aug. 2 on the Berlin situation,
Western envoys in the Soviet capital Mr. Frank Roberts (personal
representative of Mr. Bevin), General Bedell Smith (U.S. Ambas-
sador) and M. Yves Chataigneau (French Ambassador) on the
instructions of their Governments, had a series of further meetings
with the Soviet leaders at intervals during the ensuing six weeks.

As a result of these meetings, an agreed four-Power directive was
sent to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany Marshal
Sokolovsky and Generals Clay, Robertson, and Koenig instructing
them to discuss certain technical problems. Accordingly, the Com-
manders-in-Chief and their deputies met on Aug. 31 at the Allied
Control Council's H.Q. in Berlin for the first time since Marshal
Sokolovsky walked out of the Control Council on March 20. It was
authoritatively stated that the four-Power directive embodied an
agreement that the blockade should be lifted and that the Eastern
mark should be the single currency for Berlin, with the proviso that
it should be subject to four-Power authority, the Commanders-in-
Chief being given the task of transferring this agreement in principle
into a workable technical arrangement. Until Sept. 7 the Military

42

Governors continued to meet daily, but on the latter date the talks
were discontinued pending fresh instructions from the Governments
concerned.

On Sept. 20 the Berlin situation was considered by Mr. Bevin,
Mr. Marshall, and M. Schuman at a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, and
on Sept. 22 identical Notes, drawn up in Paris, were sent to the
Soviet Ambassadors in Paris, London and Washington for transmis-
sion to Moscow.

The Soviet reply to these notes was presented in the Western
capitals on Sept. 25. It said in part:

". . . As a result of negotiations held in Moscow in August, the
four Governments reached an understanding that the following mea-
sures would be carried out simultaneously, provided the four Com-
manders-in-Chief in Berlin reached an agreement concerning their
practical implementation.

"First, the recently introduced restrictions of transportation and
trade between Berlin and the Western zones, as well as of movement
of freight to and from the Soviet zone, would be lifted.

"Secondly, simultaneously with this, the German mark of the
Soviet zone would be introduced as die only currency for Berlin,
while the Western mark would be withdrawn from circulation in
Berlin.

"At the same time agreement was reached to the effect that the
introduction of the Soviet zone mark as the only currency for Berlin,
and a number of functions in regard to the subsequent regulation of
currency circulation in Berlin, would be under quadripartite control.

"The four Commanders-in-Chief were accordingly instructed to
work out concrete measures for implementing the understanding
achieved in Moscow, and the continuation of negotiations in Moscow
on other issues .connected with the situation in Germany was
envisaged.

"Negotiations among the four Commanders-in-Chief, held in Ber-
lin early in September, were not completed in view of the fact that the
U.S.A., Britain and France referred certain differences that arose
among the Commanders-in-Chief for joint examination with the
Soviet Government in Moscow. The above-mentioned differences
concerned three issues on which the Soviet Government's stand is as
follows:

"1. The Soviet Government insists on the establishment of control
by the Soviet Command over the transportation of commercial car-
goes and passengers by air between Berlin and the Western zones,
and similarly over transportation by rail, water and highway. The
air routes cannot remain outside this control, since the four Govern-

43

ments reached an understanding that the agreement should envisage
the establishment of appropriate control over money circulation in
Berlin and trade between Berlin and the Western zones.

"2. The Soviet Government believes it necessary strictly to adhere
to the agreement reached by the four Governments in Moscow con-
cerning the quadripartite financial commission and its functions with
regard to the introduction and circulation of a single currency in
Berlin. It cannot agree to such an extension of function of the finan-
cial commission as would result in the latter's intervention in the
regulation of money circulation in the Soviet zone as a whole.

"3. The Soviet Government expressed consent to the wish of the
Western Governments concerning the establishment of quadripartite
control over Berlin's trade with the Western zones and third coun-
tries, including the issuing of appropriate licences, thus removing the
difference which existed on this issue.

"All the above clearly shows the real attitude of the Soviet Govern-
ment on the subject of the regulation of the situation in Berlin on a
mutually acceptable basis. In these conditions it depends upon the
U.S.A., Great Britain and France whether the negotiations will be
disrupted or whether a satisfactory agreement will be reached by the
four Powers."

On the following day (Sept. 26) Mr. Bevin, Mr. Marshall and
M. Schuman met again at the Quai d'Orsay to consider the Soviet
Note of Sept. 25, issuing a joint statement that in view of the fact that
the Soviet Government, "in violation of the understanding between
the four Powers, has chosen to make public unilaterally its version of
the negotiations", and in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the
Soviet Note, the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and
France had decided to refer the Berlin dispute to the U.N. Security
Council.

A resolution, presented to the Security Council by its President
on Oct. 25, 1948, received 9 votes in favour but was opposed by the
U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine. The Soviet veto meant (hat the resolution
could not be carried, and, after debate, the Council adjourned.

A comprehensive account of the Western Powers' negotiations with
the U.S.S.R. on the Berlin question was contained in a U.S. White
Paper a 25,000-word document issued on Sept. 27. It showed
that after the envoys' first meeting with Marshal Stalin on Aug. 2
there was hope of reaching agreement; that these hopes, however,
diminished at subsequent meetings with Mr. Molotov; that agreement

44

in principle was reached, when Marshal Stalin was again consulted
on Aug. 23, on the setting up of a four-Power Financial Commission
in Berlin but that when the discussions moved to Berlin new Soviet
demands were put forward which led to the final breakdown of
negotiations.

9. ESTABLISHMENT OF SEPARATE MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENTS IN EAST AND WEST BERLIN, 1948

Six days before municipal elections were due to take place in the
Western sectors of Berlin, Marshal Sokolovsky intervened personally
for the first time in the Berlin crisis when, on Nov. 29, 1948, he
addressed identical letters to Generals Robertson, Clay and Koenig,
the text of which was published the same day by the Soviet News
Bureau.

The letter said that the Soviet Command "cannot refrain from
drawing attention to the dangerous measures which are being carried
out in the Western sectors of Berlin to disorganize and split the City
administration, and which are being supported by the Military Com-
mandants of the Western sectors", and continued: "As you are
aware, the Soviet military authorities have repeatedly drawn attention
to the necessity of preserving the unity of Berlin, the capital of Ger-
many, and have insisted on the carrying out of unified democratic
elections in the whole of Berlin. These proposals have, however, been
allowed to go unnoticed." The letter alleged that the elections of
Dec. 5 would not be carried out "with due attention to democratic
freedoms but under conditions of force and of police persecution of
democratic organizations", and that they aimed at "the removal of the
unified municipal adminstration and the creation of a separate City
Council in the Western sectors so that the Western military authorities
will be able to order and dictate as they please without control, and to
support openly reactionary elements in the City". "Those elements
in the Magistrate it declared, "which are aiming at a split, and enjoy
the support of certain occupation officials, have for a long time been
attempting to disorganize the work of the Magistral as a unified
municipal organ. They are trying to exclude democratic representa-
tives in close touch with the broad masses of the Berlin population.
The Soviet Command does not intend to show tolerance to the anti-
democratic elements of the Berlin Magistral in their activities for the
splitting of German administrative organizations in Berlin, and will
continue to contribute to the preservation of the unity of Berlin and

45

the creation of conditions which assure to all democratic representa-
tives normal activity in the Berlin organizations of self-government."

On the same day Herr Ottomar Geschke, a vice-chairman of the
City Assembly and one of the leaders of the Socialist Unity Party,
issued a proclamation calling a meeting of the Assembly at the State
Opera House (in the Soviet sector) for the following day (Nov. 30),
and this meeting, attended by only the 26 SED members of the City
Assembly, unanimously passed a resolution by the Berlin "democratic
bloc" repeating the latter's allegations that the majority of the mem-
bers of the Magistral had disregarded the "most elementary vital in-
terests" of the City and neglected their duties under the City Constitu-
tion, declaring the existing Magistral "deposed", and setting up a new
provisional Magistral "to safeguard unified administration and sup-
plies and to prepare general democratic elections in the whole of
Berlin".

This new Magistral elected Herr Fritz Ebert (son of the late
Friedrich Ebert, the first President of the Weimar Republic) as pro-
visional Chief Burgomaster, and took over the Berlin municipal
headquarters in the Soviet sector.

The setting-up of this Magistral in East Berlin was strongly con-
demned by the British and U.S. Commandants in Berlin as a "flagrant
violation of the existing Constitution of Berlin and of quadripartite
agreements pertaining to the City".

Generals Robertson, Clay and Koenig replied to Marshal Sok-
olovsky's letter on Nov. 30 in identical terms, strongly refuting the
latter's charge that the Western Powers were responsible for the
present situation.

In the municipal elections held on Dec. 5, 1948, in the Western
sectors of Berlin, 86.2 per cent of the electorate took part, and the
percentages gained by the three contending parties were
Social Democrats 64.4

Christian Democrats 1 9 .4

Liberal Democrats 16. 1

Only 3 per cent of the votes cast were invalid.

The elections thus represented an overwhelming vote of confidence
in the anti-Communist parties, and in addition gave the Social
Democrats, who had taken the most determined stand against Soviet
policy, an absolute majority in the new City Council.

46

The Soviet authorities announced on the same date that they
regarded the elections as "unconstitutional" and the election results
as "invalid", and that they would not recognize the newly elected
Western Magistral

The new City Assembly for the Western sectors on Dec. 7 elected
Professor Ernst Reuter as Chief Burgomaster. With the setting-up
of new administrative headquarters for the Berlin municipality in
the American sector on Dec. 6, the division of the city into two
separately administered parts was completed. .

On Dec. 21 the three Western Commandants announced at a
special meeting at the Kommandatura building in the U.S. sector of
Berlin that the Allied Kommandatura would "resume its work forth-
with", thus replacing the quadripartite Kommandatura by a "tripar-
tite" one. This was the first meeting of the Kommandatura since the
Soviet representative walked out of that on June 16, 1948.

10. THE 1949 '"OCCUPATION STATUTE"
FOR THE WESTERN ZONES OF GERMANY

The Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Britain and France announced
in Washington on April 8, 1949, that they had reached complete
agreement on "a whole range of issues now pending in Western Ger-
many", and in particular on the text of an "Occupation Statute".

This Statute, published on April 10 and communicated the same
day to the West German Parliamentary Council in Bonn, stated in
its first paragraph:

"During the period in which it is necessary that the occupation
continue, the Governments of France, the U.S.A. and the United
Kingdom desire and intend that the German people shall enjoy self-
government to the maximum possible degree consistent with such
occupation. The Federal State and the participating Lander shall
have, subject only to the limitations of this instrument, full legislative,
executive, and judicial powers in accordance with the Basic Law
and with their respective constitutions."

In its second paragraph, the Statute specified the areas reserved
by the occupation authorities, notably disarmament and demilitariza-
tion; foreign affairs; and displaced persons and refugees.

The three Western Commandants in Berlin signed on May 14,

47

1949, a new charter, which came into immediate effect, granting
wide legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the City Assembly
of Western Berlin, and extending to the City Assembly a similar
measure of responsibility to that conferred on the German Parlia-
mentary Council in Bonn by the Occupation Statute for Western
Germany.

11. ELECTIONS FOR "PEOPLE'S CONGRESS"
IN THE SOVIET ZONE, 1949

Elections for a new "People's Congress" were held on May 15-16
in the Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin, voting
being for a single list of candidates drawn up by the "People's Coun-
cil", and no opposition candidates being permitted. The electors
were required merely to give an affirmative or negative answer as to
whether they were in favour of "German unity and a just peace", and
to approve the single list of candidates presented. The candidates
were drawn from the various Communist-dominated parties of the
Eastern Zone, notably the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and included
a number of nominees of the recently formed "National Democratic
Party". The American, British and French authorities in Berlin, in
a joint statement on April 22, declared that no facilities would be
given in Western Berlin for the "People's Congress" elections, on the
grounds that the results of these elections were "already settled in
advance", that the various "parties" presenting candidates were in
every case dominated by the Communists, and that the Soviet
authorities had, in December 1948, declined the opportunity offered
for a free election in which all Berlin citizens could participate.

The new "People's Congress" of 1,525 membejte, 'claiming to be
"representative of the German people", met on M&y 29-30 at the
State Opera House in the Soviet sector of Berlin. It approved a "Con-
stitution" for the whole of Germany which had been passed by the
"People's Council" on March 19, and issued a manifesto calling for
a peace treaty based on the Yalta and Potsdam principles, the re-
establishment of German unity through a Provisional German Gov-
ernment, participation by such a government in the peace treaty
negotiations, and the abolition of zonal barriers to trade, currency,
and transport.

48

12. SOVIET AGREEMENT WITH WESTERN ALLIES

ON LIFTING OF BERLIN BLOCKADE
AND OF WESTERN COUNTER-BLOCKADE, 1949

The Tass Agency announced on April 26, 1949, that the Soviet
Government had made known to the U.S. Government its willingness
to raise the blockade of Berlin if the Western Powers counter-
measures were lifted simultaneously and a definite date set for a
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the whole
question of Germany.

Dr. Jessup, the U.S. representative at the United Nations, who
saw President Truman on the same day, confirmed reports that he
had had conversations at Lake Success with Mr. Malik about the
Russian blockade of Berlin, and said that the Russians had offered to
end the blockade on certain conditions.

Following further diplomatic activities and after a meeting of the
delegates of the four Powers in New York on May 4, it was officially
announced that complete agreement had been reached "on all the
main questions of principle"; that "all restrictions imposed in Ger-
many which have been the subject of conversations" would be
mutually lifted, though certain details were still under consideration;
and that a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers would be
held "after an interval" to "consider questions relating to Germany
and problems arising out of the situation in Berlin, including also the
question of currency in Berlin". The communique added that the
four representatives were "hopeful that the remaining matters of
detail can be adjusted in a very short period of time", and that if
these details were speedily arranged a further communique embody-
ing the agreement would be issued simultaneously in the four coun-
tries on the following day. Later it was officially announced that the
blockade would be lifted on May 12 and that the Foreign Ministers
would meet on May 23.

The final communique issued in London, Paris, Moscow and
Washington on May 5 read as follows:

"The Governments of France, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States have reached the following
agreement:

"(1) All restrictions established since March 1, 1948, by the
Soviet Government on communications, transport, and trade between

49

Berlin and the Western zones of Germany, and between the Eastern
and Western zones, will be lifted on May 12, 1949.

"(2) All restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Gov-
ernments of France, the U.K. and the U.S.A., or any of them, on
communications, transport, and trade between Berlin and the Eastern
zone, and between the Western and Eastern zones of Germany, will
also be removed on May 12, 1949.

"(3) Eleven days subsequent to the removal of the restrictions
referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), namely, on May 23, 1949,
a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers will be convened in
Paris to consider questions relating to Germany and the problems
arising out of the situation in Berlin, including also the question of
currency in Berlin."

The Soviet blockade of Berlin, and the Western Powers' counter-
measures, ended at one minute past midnight on May 12, 1949, when
British and American lorries and military vehicles crossed the Soviet
zonal frontier and proceeded to Berlin without interference along the
Helmstedt-Marienborn-Berlin Autobahn. Soon afterwards the first
British-U.S. train from Bielefeld and Frankfurt to Berlin likewise
crossed the zonal border at Marienborn station.

The joint U.S.-British airlift, which had since June 26, 1948, car-
ried more than 2,000,000 tons of essential supplies (mainly coal,
food and liquid fuel) to West Berlin, did not end until Sept. 30, 1949.

13. ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, 1949

The German Parliamentary Council authorized under the London
Six-Power Agreement of 1948 to draw up a Basic Law (Provisional
Constitution) for a German Federal Republic comprising the 11
States (Lander) of the American, British and French zones, com-
menced its work in Bonn on Sept. 1, 1948, under the presidency of
Dr. Konrad Adenauer, leader of the Christian Democratic Union in
Western Germany.

The Council finally approved the Basic Law drafted by it on
May 8, 1949, by 53 votes to 12 after the rejection of a Communist
proposal that the Parliamentary Council should accept an invitation
from the "People's Council" in the Soviet zone for conversations on
the restoration of German unity. The Basic Law was specifically
approved as a Constitution of a provisional character pending the

50

adoption of a definitive Constitution for a unified Germany.

The Federal Republic of Germany was officially proclaimed by
Dr. Adenauer at Bonn in the afternoon of May 23, 1949.

The Federal Republic was the first democratic State to emerge in
Germany since the f aU of the Weimar Republic and comprised about
two-thirds of the population and about half the territory of the
former German Reich, the population being about 45,000,000.

On Sept. 12, 1949, the Federal Convention (consisting of the
members of the Bundestag and the Landtage of the German States)
meeting in Bonn, elected Professor Theodor Heuss, the leader of the
Free Democratic Party, as the first President of the Federal Republic.

The Bundestag, on the proposal of the Federal President, on
Sept. 14 elected Dr. Adenauer, the leader of the largest Parliamentary
party, as Federal Chancellor.

A Coalition Cabinet was formed by Dr. Adenauer from Christian
Democrats, Free Democrats, and members of the German Party.
After announcing the members of his Cabinet, Dr. Adenauer made a
statement to the Bundestag on the Government's policy.

Turning to external affairs, Dr. Adenauer declared that Germany
could not accept the Oder-Neisse line as its eastern border, this
declaration being cheered by the whole House with the exception of
the Communist members. Recalling that at Potsdam the U.S.A.,
Britain and Russia had decided to defer the final settlement of the
western frontier of Poland until the peace conference, he declared:
"In no circumstances can we agree to the one-sided annexation
of this territory by Russia and Poland. . . . We shall never cease to
prosecute, in a proper and legal manner, our claims to this territory."
As regards Germany's relations with her neighbours, he said: "We
are sincerely prepared to live in peace with our Eastern neighbours,
particularly Russia and Poland, but we expect them to acknowledge
our rights, and to allow our fellow-countrymen in the Soviet zone
and Berlin, as well as further east, to live in freedom according to
their tradition, upbringing and convictions."

Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the Social-Democratic leader, like Dr.
Adenauer, declared that Germany could not accept the Oder-Neisse
line as her definitive Eastern frontier.

Soviet and "Satellite" Protests to U.S.A., Britain and France

The Soviet Government presented a Note to the U.S., British and
French diplomatic representatives in Moscow on Oct. 1, 1949, declar-

51

ing that the formation of the West German Government represented
"not only a violation of obligations for preserving the unity of Ger-
many, but also of obligations for the conclusion of a peace treaty
with Germany, inasmuch as the formation of a separate West Ger-
man State leads to delay in the conclusion of a peace treaty".

The Note recapitulated the decisions taken by the Western Powers
in Germany since 1946 and reiterated the previously expressed Soviet
view that all these developments constituted a violation of the Pots-
dam decisions. "For its part", the Note continued, "the Soviet Gov-
ernment has conducted an unswerving struggle against the splitting
of Germany, insisting, in accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam
Conference, on the setting up of all-German economic agencies as the
first step in the formation of an all-German democratic Government.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw attention to the
extremely serious responsibility which rests with the U.S. Government
in connexion with the policy in Germany pursued by the U.S.A.
jointly with Great Britain and France, which has led to the formation
in Bonn of an anti-popular separate Government that adopted a hos-
tile attitude to the decisions of the Potsdam Conference on the democ-
ratization and demilitarization of Germany. . . . The Soviet Govern-
ment considers it necessary to state that a new situation has been
created in Germany which renders of particularly great importance
the fulfilment of the tasks for the restoration of the unity of Ger-
many as a democratic and peace-loving State, and for ensuring the
fulfilment by Germany of the obligations laid on her by the Potsdam
Agreement of the four Powers."

The Hungarian Government on Oct. 4, and the Romanian, Czech-
oslovak, Polish, and Albanian Governments on Oct. 6, likewise sent
Notes of protest to the Western Powers at the establishment of the
Western German Government.

14. PROCLAMATION OF GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The decision to form a "German Democratic Republic" in Eastern
Germany was announced in Berlin on Oct. 5, 1949, after a meeting
of the Presidium of the Soviet-sponsored "People's Council" and
leaders of the "bloc of democratic parties in the Soviet zone", held
under the chairmanship of Herr Wilhelm Pieck, the veteran Com-
munist leader and joint chairman of the Socialist Unity Party. The
announcement issued after the meeting was as follows: "The forma-

52

tion of a separate Western German State, the Occupation Statute, the
dismantling operations which are contrary to international law, the
refusal of a peace treaty, and the control exercised by the High Com-
missioners . . . have revealed the serious national emergency brought
about in Germany by the dictatorial policy of the Western Powers.
To safeguard the national interests of the German people by national
self-help, the German People's Council, which was elected by the
German People's Congress on May 30, 1949, is hereby requested
to declare itself a Provisional People's Chamber, under the articles
of the Constitution adopted by the People's Congress and Council,
and to create a constitutional Government of the German Democratic
Republic. The Presidium of the German People's Council has decided
to convene the Council in Berlin on Oct. 7, 1949."

The "German People's Council" accordingly met in the former
Air Ministry in Berlin on Oct. 7 and unanimously adopted the fol-
lowing proclamation: "The German People's Council proclaims itself
the Provisional People's Chamber (Provisorische Volkskammer) in
accordance with the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic
adopted by the Council on March 19, 1949, and approved by the
German People's Congress, on May 30, 1949."

The Council also unanimously adopted a manifesto stating:

"On the basis of the Constitution approved by the German People's
Congress in Berlin by all parties and mass organizations which
participate in the German People's Council, the German Democratic
Republic has been established unanimously. The Provisional German
Government which will be formed in accordance with the Constitu-
tion will seek as its main aim the struggle for peace and the unity
and sovereignty of Germany.

"Four and a half years have passed since the guns became silent.
The hopes of the German people for the preservation of their eco-
nomic and political unity, for the democratic anti-militarist trans-
formation of Germany, and for the conclusion of a peace treaty,
solemnly promised to them in the Potsdam Agreement, have been
deceived. Germany has been split as a result of the imperialist policy
of the Western Powers. . . . The German people has been refused
a peace treaty. Instead, the Western zones have had foisted on them
the Occupation Statute, which maintains the occupation for an indefi-
nite period. By the creation of the separate Bonn State the splitting
of Germany has been completed.

"The separate Bonn Government has the task of including Western
Germany in the Atlantic Pact military bloc, and of converting the
youth of the separate State into mercenary troops of American imper-

53

ialism. In order to fulfil this task, German Fascism and militarism
are openly increasing in Western Germany, and revanchist ideas are
revived, a warning of which has been given by the first sittings of the
Bonn Parliament."

Appealing to "every German man and woman, irrespective of party
and outlook" and without regard to "political or social position", to
support the aims of the "National Front of Democratic Germany",
the manifesto outlined the aims of the Front inter alia as follows:

"(1) Restoration of the political and economic unity of Germany
by the elimination of the separate West German State, . . . and the
formation of an all-German Government of the German Democratic
Republic.

"(2) The speediest conclusion of a just peace treaty with Ger-
many. Withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany within a
short time after the signing of the peace treaty.

"(3) Complete and unconditional recognition of the Potsdam
decisions on the democratization and demilitarization of Germany,
as well as of Germany's obligations in regard to other peoples, stip-
ulated in those decisions.

"(4) The restoration of the complete sovereignty of the German
nation, with recognition of the right to an independent foreign policy
and to independent foreign trade. Free and independent development
of the German Democratic State and the German people after the
conclusion of the peace treaty.

"(5) An irreconcilable struggle against the instigators of a new
war in Germany. Prohibition of war propaganda in the press and
radio and at meetings. Irreconcilable struggle against drawing Ger-
many into aggressive military blocs, into the European Union and the
North Atlantic Pact.

"(6) Merciless and active struggle against the traitors to the Ger-
man nation the German agents of American imperialism, the
criminal supporters of the splitting of Germany and the enslavement
of her Western regions and the separatists who support the imper-
ialist policy of splitting Germany.

"(7) Unlimited support for the forces throughout the world which
are fighting for peace, equality, and friendship among the peoples.
The co-operation and friendship of Germany with all peace-loving
peoples and countries which recognize the national interests of
democratic Germany.

"(8) Immediate re-establishment of the unity of the capital of
Germany, Berlin, and immediate restoration of normal life in the city.

"(9) A single currency for the whole of Germany; unhindered
trade and economic co-operation; free movement of the population
and goods between all the Lander and zones of Germany. . . ."

54

Herr Pieck announced at the meeting that the Landtag elections
which had been expected to take place this autumn would not be
held, but that elections to a new Volkskammer would be held on
Oct. 15, 1950.

A Landerkammer, the Upper House of the new Parliament, was
elected at a meeting in Berlin of the members of the Landtage of the
five Lander of the Soviet zone.

Following a notification by Herr Johannes Dieckmann (the newly-
elected President of the Chamber) of the formation of the Volks-
kammer, General Chuikov, chief of the Soviet Military Administra-
tion in Eastern Germany, announced on Oct. 10 that the Soviet
Government had decided to transfer to the "Provisional Government
of the German Democratic Republic" the functions hitherto apper-
taining to the Military Administration, and that in place of the latter
a Soviet Control Commission would be established "charged with
exercising control over the fulfilment of the Potsdam and other joint
decisions of the four Powers in respect to Germany".

At a joint session of both Houses on Oct. 11, which was attended
by high Soviet officials and members of the military missions of the
"satellite" States of Eastern Europe, Herr Wilhelm Pieck was
unanimously elected first President of the "German Democratic
Republic", and at the same time took the oath as prescribed in the
Constitution of May 1949.

Addressing the joint session after his election, Herr Pieck claimed
that the new Government had the right to speak for the whole of
Germany, and called on the West German Bundestag and the West
German Federal Government "to realize the danger in which the
German people finds itself in face of the policy of the Western
Powers", and not to give further support to the tetter's measures. "If
the Bundestag and the Federal Government do that," he added, "we
will draw nearer each other, finally remove the division (of Ger-
many), and create unity, so that Germany will not be made a colony
and a deploying ground for a new imperialist war." He also appealed
to the people of Western Germany not to allow themselves "to be
misled by the agitation against the East" and to "unite with the
people of the East in the creation of the National Front, the pre-
requisite for the victory in the common struggle". After attacking
the Western Powers on the lines of the manifesto of Oct. 7, he praised
the Soviet Government's decision to hand over to the new Govern-
ment the administrative functions of the Soviet Military Adminis-
tration.

55

Hen Grotewohl became head of the new East German Govern-
ment and presented his Cabinet on Oct. 12, 1949, with Herr Walter
Ulbricht as a Deputy Premier.

In his policy statement to the Volkskammer the same day, Herr
Grotewohl reiterated the points laid down in the manifesto of the
"National Front".

He stressed that the foreign policy of his Government would be
based on friendship with the Soviet Union; declared that "the Oder-
Neisse Line is a frontier of peace" and that it was "criminal to think
of the possibility of plunging Germany into a war with a view to
changing that frontier"; and strongly attacked the Western Powers,
repeating the allegation that they were responsible for the "splitting"
of Germany. Whilst not expressly claiming for the new Government
jurisdiction over the whole of Germany, he declared that it would
not accept the division of the country and would continue the struggle
for Germany's reunification.

On Oct. 16 it was announced in Berlin that the Soviet Union and
the new East German State would exchange diplomatic missions and
subsequently diplomatic recognition was also extended to the latter
by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

Dr. Adenauer protests at Establishment of
German Democratic Republic

Dr. Adenauer, the West German Federal Chancellor, declared
on Oct. 7 that the East German Republic was "without legal basis",
since it had no backing from the people. In an official statement he
said:

"The Eastern State was created without contact with the popula-
tion of the Eastern zone, who received no opportunity to voice
their will. The Eastern zone Government does not represent the will
of the Eastern zone population, and it can even less claim to speak
on the affairs of Germany as a whole. The Federal Republic of
Germany, in face of the attempt to subjugate the 18,000,000 in-
habitants of the Eastern zone in an even stronger degree to foreign
influence, must do everything in its power to give the Eastern zone
population spiritual and moral assistance."

General Robertson, Mr. McCloy and M. Francois Poncet, the
Allied High Commissioners in Western Germany, issued a statement
on Oct. 10 likewise denouncing the East German Republic as having
no legal basis and no title to representation.

56

"GERMAN
DEMOCRAT!

The map shows the areas under the control of the German
Federal Republic (the West German Government) and the
German Democratic Republic (the East German Govern-
ment). The Federal Republic of 1949 comprised the British,
American and French occupation zones, whilst the Democratic
Republic was established in the Soviet zone. (New York
Times)

57

II. INTEGRATION OF WESTERN AND

EASTERN GERMANY INTO WESTERN AND
EASTERN BLOCS

1. EAST GERMAN AGREEMENTS OF 1950

Agreement on Oder-Neisse Frontier between Governments of
Poland and German Democratic Republic (Zgorzelec Agreement)

It was announced in Warsaw and East Berlin on June 7, 1950, that
a delegation from the German Democratic Republic, headed by Herr
Walter Ulbricht, then Deputy Prime Minister, had visited Warsaw
on June 5-6 for talks with the Polish Government, and that as a
result the following agreements had been reached:

(1) An agreement on the demarcation of the Polish-German
State frontier on the Oder-Neisse line;

(2) an agreement on trade and payments for 1950, providing for
an increase in the volume of trade of over 60 per cent as compared
with 1949;

(3) an agreement on the provision of Polish credits to the German
Democratic Republic;

(4) an agreement in respect of technical and scientific co-
operation, "providing for mutual utilization of experience in methods
of production, and for the mutual provision of technical aid";

(5) a cultural agreement providing for "the exchange of achieve-
ments in the fields of science, exchange of scientific works and belles
lettres, and co-operation in the spheres of the cinema and radio",
58

and for the exchange of "information on curricula and organization of
education and physical training".

In addition, the communique said that both delegations had ex-
changed information concerning the Polish six-year plan and the
five-year plan of the German Democratic Republic, and had decided
to commence in August the negotiation of a long-term trade agree-
ment "for the purpose of planned development of trade".

The agreement recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent
frontier between Eastern Germany and Poland, and thus formally
ceding to Poland the former German territories occupied by her since
the end of the war, was published at the same time and said in part:

"The basis of the further development and strengthening of good-
neighbourly relations and friendship between the Polish and German
peoples lies in the demarcation of the inviolable frontier of peace and
friendship existing between both States along the Oder-Neisse. In this
manner the German Democratic Republic confirms the statement of
Prime Minister Grotewohl made on Oct. 12, 1949 [when, on becom-
ing Prime Minister, he had declared the Oder-Neisse line to be "a
frontier of peace"].

". . . Both parties have decided within the space of a month to
carry out the demarcation of the frontier along the Oder-Neisse, and
likewise to regulate the questions of minor frontier traffic and of
navigation in the waters of the frontier zone".

The agreement on the Oder-Neisse frontier aroused deep resent-
ment in Western Germany, where the Federal Government issued a
statement on June 9 strongly denouncing it.

"The German Federal Government," the statement said, "does
not recognize the demarcation line laid down in the agreement which
the present Communist Government, imposed on the population of
the Soviet Zone, has concluded with the Polish Government. The so-
called Government of the Soviet Zone has no right to speak for the
German people, and all its agreements and arrangements are null and
void. The decision on the Eastern territories at present under Soviet
or Polish administration can and will be made only in a future peace
treaty with the whole of Germany. The German Federal Republic,
as the spokesman of the whole German people, will never agree to the
alienation of these purely German territories against all principles of
right and humanity. In future peace negotiations the Federal Govern-
ment will seek a just solution of this question between a really dem-
ocratic Poland and a democratic, united Germany."

59

However, a frontier demarcation agreement implementing the
Oder-Neisse line agreement of June 6 was signed at Zgorzelec
(Gorlitz) on the Neisse River (Zgorzelec, the town's eastern part,
being Polish, and Gorlitz, its western part, German) on July 6, 1950,
by Mr. Josef Cyrankiewicz and Herr Grotewohl, the Polish and
East German Prime Ministers.

Delimitation Agreement Further Frontier

Herr Dertinger, the Eastern German Foreign Minister, and Dr.
Skrzeszewski, permanent head of the Polish Foreign Office, signed an
agreement at Frankfurt-on-Oder on Jan. 27, 1951, finally delimiting
the East German-Polish frontier. The agreement signified the East
German Government's final acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line as
Germany's eastern frontier, and, speaking after the signature, Herr
Dertinger declared that any attempt at revision of the Oder-Neisse
frontier would mean war and would be as much against the national
existence of Poland as against the vital interests of the German
Democratic Republic.

In West Berlin it was reported that under the delimitation as finally
agreed upon the Eastern German Government had ceded to Poland
the four-mile-wide western strip of Usedom Island in the Oder
estuary north of Stettin (Szczecin) the eastern part of which had
already been taken over by Poland earlier. It .was claimed by the West
German press that the agreement contravened that section of the
Potsdam Declaration under which the Soviet, U.S. and Britich Gov-
ernments affirmed that the final delimitation of the western frontier of
Poland should await the peace settlement with Germany.

7955 Reaffirmation of Agreement

A joint statement was issued on July 6, 1955, the fifth anniversary
of the Zgorzelec Agreement, by the Polish and East German Govern-
ments declaring that the frontier between Poland and Germany had
been "definitely and irrevocably" fixed on the rivers Oder (Odra)
and Neisse (Nysa). The statement added that there was "complete
unanimity" between the two Governments on this matter, and that
both Governments had "recorded their unflinching determination to
combat, in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, all
attempts to disturb the friendly relations between them".
60

East German Czechoslovak Declaration on Finality of

Expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia

East German Hungarian Declaration of Friendship

Cultural, Technical and Financial Agreements

with Czechoslovakia and Hungary

Following the arrival in Prague on June 21, 1950, of an Eastern
German delegation, led by Herr Walter Ulbricht and Herr Handke,
the Minister for Foreign Trade, it was announced on June 23 that the
following joint declaration had been signed by Mr. Zapotocky, the
Czechoslovak Premier, and Herr Ulbricht:

"Both Governments are convinced that their joint obligation to
maintain and secure peace is being helped and strengthened by the
fact that there are absolutely no disputes or open questions which
remain to be settled between the two countries. Our two States have
no territorial claims on each other, nor are there any claims for
alteration of the present frontier, and the two Governments desire to
emphasize that the resettlement of Germans from the Czechoslovak
Republic has been settled in an unalterable, just and permanent
manner".

In addition to the declaration, both countries signed (1) a cultural
agreement envisaging the exchange of scholars and writers; (2) a sci-
entific and technical agreement providing for exchanges of scientific
knowledge and technical experts, and the interchange of processes,
patents, and technological methods; (3) a financial agreement under
which Czechoslovakia granted a short-term credit to Eastern Ger-
many to enable the latter to buy certain Czechoslovak goods. A con-
vention regulating frontier traffic would, it was stated, be signed with-
in two months, and it was also agreed to negotiate a five-year trade
agreement in the autumn.

The declaration constituted the final acceptance by the Eastern
German Government of the expulsion of over 2,000,000 Sudeten
Germans from Czechoslovakia since the end of the war, of whom
the majority had gone to Western Germany, about 800,000 to East-
ern Germany, and the remainder to Austria.

Immediately after the signing of the agreements, Herr Ulbricht and
the other Eastern German delegates left Prague for Budapest, where
it was announced on June 24 that the Eastern German and Hungarian

61

Governments had signed (1) a two-year cultural agreement; (2) a
five-year scientific and technical agreement, both agreements being on
the same lines as those concluded between Eastern Germany and
Czechoslovakia; (3) a financial agreement; and (4) a trade agree-
ment.

2. THREE-POWER CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK, 1950

The U.S., British and French Foreign Ministers, respectively Mr.
Dean Acheson, Mr. Ernest Bevin and M. Robert Schuman met in
New York on Sept. 12-18, 1950, to review the international situation.

The official statement issued in New York on Sept. 19, dealing
with Germany announced important decisions on ( 1 ) the forthcoming
ending of the state of war, (2) permission for the establishment of
new mobile police formations in the Federal Republic, (3) a revision
of the Occupation Statute, especially in the field of foreign affairs, and
(4) modifications to the agreement on prohibited and limited indus-
tries in Germany, including the immediate removal of existing restric-
tions on shipbuilding for export and of the "ceiling" for steel produc-
tion as far as required for the defence effort of the West. The state-
ment also announced that any attack against Western Germany or
Berlin from any quarter would be treated by the Western Allies as an
attack upon themselves, but indicated that no decision had yet been
reached on the question of integrating German forces within a unified
Western army. The statement was in part as follows (with cross-
headings inserted):

"Pending the unification of Germany, the three Governments con-
sider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German
Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled
to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people
in international affairs. They reaffirm their desire, of which they
have already given many proofs, to integrate the Federal Republic
into the community of free nations. They are convinced that the
overwhelming majority of the German people want to take part in
building the European community and strengthening its common
civilization. It appears to them that the time has now come to take
a new step towards the attainment of these aims.

Ending of State of War. In the spirit of the new relationship which
they wish to establish with the Federal Republic the three Govern-
ments have decided, as soon as action can be taken in all three coun-

62

tries in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements,
to take the necessary steps in their domestic legislation to terminate
the state of war with Germany. This action will not affect the rights
and status of the three Powers in Germany, which rest upon other
bases. . . .

Western German Security. The three Ministers have given serious
consideration to the problem of the security of the Federal Republic
in both its external and its internal aspects. They recognize the fact
that outright military units have been created in the Soviet zone of
occupation, and this fact together with recent events in Germany
and elsewhere have given rise to a situation of great concern. The
Allied Governments consider that their forces in Germany have, in
addition to their occupation duties, also the important role of acting
as security forces for the protection and defence of the free world
including the German Federal Republic and the Western sectors of
Berlin. To make this protection more effective the Allied Govern-
ments will increase and reinforce their forces in Germany. They will
treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any
quarter as an attack upon themselves.

The Ministers are fully agreed that the creation of a German
national army would not serve the best interests of Germany or
Europe. They also believe that this is the view of the great majority
of the German people. The Ministers have taken note, however,
of sentiments recently expressed in Germany and elsewhere in favour
of German participation in an integrated force for the defence of
European freedom. The question raised by the problems of the
participation of the German Federal Republic in the common defence
of Europe is at present the subject of study and exchange of views.

As regards internal security, the Foreign Ministers recognize the
necessity for ensuring that the German authorities are enabled effec-
tively to deal with possible subversive activities. To this effect the
three Ministers have agreed to permit the establishment of mobile
police formations, organized on a Land provincial basis, but with
provisions which would enable the Federal Government to have
adequate powers to make effective use of all or part of this force
in order fully to meet the exigencies of the present situation. The
High Commission and Allied forces in Germany will render such
assistance as may be feasible in the rapid establishment of this force.

Revision of Occupation Statute. The new phase in the relations
between the Allies and the Federal Republic will be marked by
major extensions of the authority of the Federal Government. To
make this possible, the occupying Powers are prepared to amend
the Occupation Statute while maintaining the legal basis of the occupa-
tion, and the Federal Republic will be expected to undertake certain
commitments and other actions consonant with its new responsibilities.

In the field of foreign affairs the Federal Government will be

63

authorized to establish a Minister of Foreign Affairs and to enter
into diplomatic relations with foreign countries in all suitable cases.
In other fields, and particularly in relation to internal economic
matters, far-reaching reductions will be made in existing controls,
and the present system of review of German legislation will be
modified. In certain cases the Allied powers will cease as soon as
the Federal Government has given undertakings on taking suitable
action. The High Commission will promptly begin discussions with
the Federal Government to work out the necessary agreements for
such undertakings. . .

Prohibited and Limited Industries. The Foreign Ministers have
also agreed that a review of the prohibited and limited industries
agreement shall be undertaken in the light of the developing relation-
ships with the Federal Republic. Pending this review the High Com-
mission has been instructed to remove forthwith all restrictions on
the size, speed, and number of commercial cargo ships built for
export and to allow steel to be produced outside the present limitation
where this will facilitate the defence effort of the West."

3. PRAGUE MEETING OF COMINFORM MINISTERS, 1950
A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Cominform countries
and the East German Republic was held at Prague on Oct. 21-22,
1950, on the initiative of the Soviet Union to discuss questions arising
out of the decisions on Germany taken by the New York conference
of the British, U.S. and French Foreign Ministers. A communique
was issued on Oct. 22 strongly attacking the tripartite statement of
Sept. 19 and putting forward counter-proposals.

The communique declared that it was "clear ... that the principal
question at the Conference of the three Ministers was the question
of the re-creation of the German Army and of the remilitarization of
Germany", and said that the New York decisions contained "a threat
to Europe", that they were "another gross violation of the obligations
which these nations assumed under the Potsdam Agreement", and
that they were "contrary to the interests of all peace-loving peoples,
including the national interest of the German people".

(1) Termination of the State of War. Dealing with the principal
points in the New York statement, the Prague communique described
the decision to end the state of war as "hypocritical through and
through". It asserted that the stipulation that the termination of
the state of war should not affect the rights and status of the three
Powers in Germany meant that the validity of the Occupation
Statute was intended to be prolonged "for a period of indefinite

64

length, in order to extend their (the Western Powers') rule in Western
Germany as long as possible". Referring to the New York announce-
ment that the Western Powers would increase their forces in Ger-
many, the statement said that there was "no need to prove" that this
decision had been "evoked by nothing less than the ever-growing
aspirations of these Powers in Europe", and continued: "It is
clear that the false phrases about the so-called 'termination' of the
state of war with Germany are merely a screen to conceal the policy
of the Powers who head the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance.
These Powers want to untie their hands so that they may use Western
Germany, its manpower and material resources, in their imperialist
interests for the realization of their strategic plans, behind which
are the aspirations of the U.S. ruling circles for world supremacy.
On the pretext of terminating the state of war with Germany they
strive to create the conditions for the open inclusion of Western
Germany in the aggressive grouping of the so-called North Atlantic
Alliance, and to transform Western Germany completely into an
instrument of their aggressive military strategic plans in Europe."

It was also evident, the statement went on, that the question of
terminating the war with Germany had been "dragged in, in order
to delay as long as possible the conclusion of a peace treaty . . . and
thus to postpone the unification of Germany", and it was "not
fortuitous" that nothing about a peace treaty had been mentioned
in the New York statement, although the four Powers had at Potsdam
assumed the obligation to prepare such a treaty, which was now
being "evaded on all kinds of pretexts". This, the communique
affirmed, showed that "the present policy of the United States, Britain
and France, grossly violating the Potsdam Agreement, runs directly
counter to the interests of all peace-loving peoples of Europe".

(2) Level of Industry. Dealing with the New York decision to
review the agreement on prohibited and limited industries, the com-
munique noted that "not a single word is said about prohibiting
the restoration of war industry as required by the Yalta and Potsdam
Agreements, as well as by subsequent four-Power agreements", and
that the New York statement permitted steel production outside
the established limits for the purpose of war production. "Thus,"
the Prague statement went on, "in the communique of the three
Ministers the ban on German war industry, regarding which firm
decisions of the four Powers were unanimously adopted, is in fact
lifted."

On the question of German armed forces the communique said:
"The principal question discussed at the New York conference of
the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and France was
the question of the re-establishment of the German Army". Alleging
that there were "456,000 men in German and foreign military
formations in the Western zones of Germany and the Western sectors

65

of Berlin, including displaced persons, and in various police units",
and that most of them were "former soldiers and officers of the
Hitlerite army", the communique continued; "The arming of these
units and formations, their organizational structure and army train-
ing, the training of officer personnel for them in special schools, their
participation in military manoeuvres together with the occupation
troops of the Western Powers, proves that these formations and units
are in fact army formations."

The Prague communiqu6 closed by making the following proposals
"for the speediest possible conclusion of a peace settlement for
Germany":

"(1) The publication by the United States, Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union of a statement that they will not permit the
remilitarization of Germany, nor permit her to be drawn into any
kind of aggressive plans, and that they will unswervingly carry out
the Potsdam Agreement for the formation of a united, peace-loving,
democratic German State.

(2) The removal of all restrictions in the path of the development
of German peace economy and the prevention of the restoration of
German war potential.

(3) The immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany
involving the restoration of the unity of the German State in accord-
ance with the Potsdam Agreement, and with the provision that the
occupation troops of all Powers be withdrawn from Germany within
one year after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

(4) The creation of an All-German Constituent Council on a par-
ity basis, consisting of representatives of Eastern and Western
Germany, to prepare the formation of a provisional democratic peace-
loving all-German sovereign Government, and to submit correspond-
ing proposals for joint approval by the Governments of the U.S.S.R.,
the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, and which, until the formation
of an all-German Government, is to be taken into consultations on
the working out of the peace treaty. Under certain circumstances a
direct questioning of the German people regarding this proposal may
be carried out."

On Nov. 3, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister,
handed to the British, U.S. and French Ambassadors in Moscow
(Sir David Kelly, Admiral Alan Kirk and M. Chataigneau) identical
Notes proposing another session of the Council of Foreign Ministers
to discuss the demilitarization of Germany.

66

The Western Powers, replying to the Soviet Note on Dec. 22, 1950,
suggested that four-Power discussions should deal not only with the
question of Germany but also "the principal problems whose solution
would make possible a real and lasting improvement" in relations
between the Powers.

The Soviet Government, however, insisted on Dec, 30 that such
talks should be confined to the demilitarization of Germany and
"other questions concerning Germany 9 '.

4. ELECTIONS TO EAST GERMAN "VOLKSKAMMER* 9 , 1950

Elections to the East German Volkskammer (Lower House) were
held in the Soviet Zone of Germany, excluding the Soviet sector of
Berlin, on Oct. 15, 1950. On the following day Dr. Steinhoff, the
Minister of the Interior, announced that an overwhelming majority
of votes had been cast for the single list put forward by the "National
Front".

The elections had been strongly denounced by the Federal German
Government and the Bundestag in Bonn.

In a White Book published by the Western German Government
on Sept. 8 it was declared that the East German elections would
be "faked from top to bottom". Specifically, the White Paper pointed
out that a voter had no choice but to vote for the "single lists", as his
only alternative was not to drop the ballot paper into the urn, thus
risking observation; that a candidate could be declared ineligible
after his election if he was accused of an offence against "the political
foundations of the anti-Fascist democratic order"; that the nominat-
ing party or organization could then automatically name a new candi-
date who would be officially considered elected; that the new
Parliament could at any time elect by simple majority vote as many
"supernumerary" members as it liked; that the inter-party agreement
for a single party list was a direct breach of the East German Consti-
tution, which laid down that elections should be carried out according
to the principles of proportional representation; and that the new
electoral law omitted a previous provision for the supervision of the
elections by representatives of all parties.

In a statement approved by all parties except the Communists, the
Bundestag on Sept. 14 denounced the elections as "neither free nor
democratic"; appealed to all democratic countries to help the German
people in its fight against Communism; charged the Soviet Union with

67

crimes against humanity by her attitude towards the treatment of
German prisoners of war and deportees, and her disregard for the
sufferings of refugees; and put forward the following five requests
to the Federal Government:

"(1) To keep the German people and the world continuously and
accurately informed of the state of lawlessness under the Communist
dictatorship in the Soviet Zone;

(2) formally to ask the Occupation Powers to sponsor free, gen-
eral, equal, secret, and direct elections to an all-German Parliament
in all four Zones, under international control;

(3) to initiate criminal proceedings in the Federal Republic
against all persons participating in crimes against humanity com-
mitted in the Soviet Zone;

(4) to take action against all persons who are engaged in carrying
out the decisions of the third party congress of the Communist-
controlled Socialist Unity Party and of the 'National Congress'
which aimed at violence against the Federal Republic;

(5) to strengthen by all economic and political means the resis-
tance of Berlin to Communist dictatorship, as evidence of the deter-
mined and unremitting resolve of the Federal Republic to secure the
unification of the whole of Germany in a free country based on
law (Rechtsstaat)."

Prior to the adoption of the resolution. Dr. Adenauer, on behalf
of the Federal Government, had declared that both the preparation
and the execution of the East German elections were "not only in
contradiction to genuine democratic conditions but also in defiance
of the Constitution of the so-called Democratic German Republic
itself". He affirmed that the "single list" of the "National Front"
had only been brought about through pressure and compulsion;
announced that the elections would not be recognized by the Federal
Republic; and declared that the Federal Government would support
by every means in its power "the will of the people of the Soviet
Zone to free themselves from the yoke of the Socialist Unity Party
and to express by means of a free vote their membership of the
Federal Republic". At the same time he appealed to the world to
support the re-unification of the whole of Germany and the recogni-
tion of democratic fundamental rights in all parts of Germany, and
added: "We appeal to all Germans to stand together in determina-
tion and unity for the unification and freedom of Germany, against
all attempts at Communist domination by violence".

Herr Jakob Kaiser (the Federal Minister for All-German Affairs)
emphasized the need for actively defending the Federal Republic
against the Communist aim of conquering the whole of Germany In
this connection he suggested that as an answer to Communist infiltra-
tion the laws against illegal Communist activities should be strictlv
applied. J

68

Both Dr. Adenauer and Dr. Schumacher, the leader of the Opposi-
tion, broadcast on Oct. 13 messages of goodwill and encouragement
to the Germans of the Eastern Zone.

Describing the East German elections as a "swindle", the Federal
Chancellor said that a voting system which did not allow the citizen
to express his political opinions freely and without danger to life
and limb was no election at all, but a "shocking violation both of
civic rights and of human dignity". The election result, he declared,
could never be interpreted as giving the present rulers the right to
speak in the name of the population of the Zone, let alone in the
name of the German people, nor could it be regarded as an acceptance
by the inhabitants of the Communist system. The election was "an
act of political blackmail which neither bound nor inculpated its
victims", and he was convinced that in unfettered elections the
overwhelming majority would vote against the Communist system
and for a free democratic Germany. The Federal Government, he
said, would spare no effort to achieve the unity of the nation in free-
dom and justice, and was conscious of its special responsibility to the
"oppressed inhabitants of the East".

The new East German Volkskammer met for the first time in the
Soviet sector of Berlin on Nov. 8 and re-elected as its president Herr
J. Dieckmann (Liberal Democrat), with Herr Hermann Matern
(Socialist Unity Party), Herr Ernst Goldenbaum (Democratic
Farmer), Lt.-General Vincenz Miiller (National Democrat), and Herr
Gerald Getting (Christian Democrat) as vice-presidents.

Herr Grotewohl, the outgoing Premier and leader of the Socialist
Unity Party, was empowered to form a new Government.

In his policy statement to the Volkskammer Herr Grotewohl
stressed the close political and economic co-operation between the
East German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union; denounced
the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council of Europe, and the Schuman
Plan (for the integration of West European coal and steel resources,
which led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity the first of the three European Communities), confirmed
the agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia concerning the
Oder-Neisse line and the Sudetenland; opposed any remilitarization
in Western Germany as "a threat to the Soviet bloc"; and reiterated
the support of his Government for the Prague declaration [see above],

69

adding that they intended to take the initiative in arranging consulta-
tions between representatives of Eastern and Western Germany on
all questions connected with the formation of a Constituent Council,
on which both parts of the country would be equally represented.

5. DR. ADENAUER REJECTS
HERR GROTEWOHL'S PROPOSAL, 1950

It was announced in Berlin on Dec. 3 that Herr Grotewohl, the
East German Prime Minister, had written to Dr. Adenauer, the
Western German Chancellor, on Nov. 30, 1950, proposing con-
versations between the two Governments on the formation of an
all-German Constituent Council as proposed in the Prague Decla-
ration [see page 66]. Herr GrotewohPs letter was worded as follows:

"In view of the fact that the maintenance of peace, the conclusion
of a peace treaty, and the restoration of the unity' of Germany
depend primarily on mutual understanding among Germans them-
selves and we consider that such mutual understanding is possible
since the whole of the German people desires a peaceful settlement
all peace-loving Germans would welcome the formation of an
all-German Constituent Council, on the basis of parity, consisting
of representatives of Eastern and Western Germany, which would
prepare for the establishment of an all-German sovereign demo-
cratic and peace-loving Provisional Government and would submit
to the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain
and France appropriate proposals for joint approval. At the same
time it would consult those Governments pending the establishment
of an all-German Government, in the period of the working out of
a Peace Treaty. Under certain conditions a referendum could be
held among the German people on this proposal. We consider that
an all-German Constituent Council could take upon itself the pre-
paration of the conditions for the holding of all-German elections to
a National Assembly. The formation of an all-German Constituent
Council would create the pre-requisites for the immediate commence-
ment of negotiations on the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, and at the
same time the Council could carry out preparations for the formation
of a Government.

"The German Democratic Republic is prepared to enter into
negotiations in the spirit of honest mutual understanding on all ques-
tions connected with the formation and tasks of an all-German
Constituent Council. Wide circles of the population of Eastern and
Western Germany consider that the next step in deciding national
and vitally important questions of our people must be to submit

70

a joint German proposal for the consideration of the four occupying
Powers. Proceeding from this desire of the peace-loving population,
the Government of the German Democratic Republic is ready to
begin negotiations between the two Governments on the formation
of an all-German Constituent Council. We propose, for this purpose,
that each Government appoint six representatives. Agreement on
the place and time could be reached between the Secretaries of
State of the Prime Ministers."

As no immediate reply was forthcoming from Bonn, Herr Grote-
wohl's letter was followed on Dec. 11 by an invitation to Dr. Ade-
nauer from the East German radio to speak over that network to
the Germans in Eastern Germany; on Dec. 24 by another appeal
from Herr Grotewohl to Dr. Adenauer for joint negotiations on the
unification of Germany, published in an article signed by Herr
Grotewohl in Neues Deutschland (organ of the Socialist Unity
Party); and on Dec. 30 by a letter from Herr Dieckmann, President
of the East German Volkskammer, to Herr Ehlers, chairman of the
West German Bundestag, likewise appealing for negotiations and
urging that a reply should be made to Herr Grotewohl's offer.

It was not until Jan. IS that Dr. Adenauer, in a statement approved
by the Federal Government and all the parties in the Bundestag
except the Communists, replied to the proposal at a press conference
which was attended by other Western German Ministers, including
Herr Jakob Kaiser, the Minister for All-German Questions. In his
statement, which was broadcast, Dr. Adenauer, while avoiding any
direct reply to the East German Government, indirectly rejected
Herr Grotewohl's proposal and re-stated the conditions under which,
in the Federal Government's view, Germany should be unified and
all-German elections held.

After recalling that the West German Government had "since
its formation worked for the restoration of the unity of Germany
in peace and liberty", Dr. Adenauer referred to the two "practical
and precise" proposals which had been made, first in its declaration
of March 22, 1950, on the holding of all-German elections for a
Constituent Assembly, and later in the similar Bundestag resolution
of Sept. 14, 1950, which had been handed to General Chuikpv on
Oct. 9 through the intermediary of the Western High Commissioners
but had so far remained unanswered; Herr Grotewohl himself, he
pointed out, had not replied to either of these proposals, and could

71

not therefore complain if the Federal Government had taken some
weeks to answer his letter of Nov. 30.

Dr. Adenauer went on to say that ten days after the receipt of
Herr Grotewohl's letter the East German Government had passed
the so-called "law for the protection of peace", which was contrary
to all principles of justice and democracy and was an instrument
of "mental and physical terror", and that no regime executing such
legislation could be willing to have free elections. Dr. Adenauer also
declared that those who had renounced the German areas east of
the Oder-Neisse line were not qualified to speak of re-uniting Ger-
many; denounced the People's Police in the Soviet Zone whose
number, he said, were continually increasing as "a menace to the
German people" because of its military character and because it
was "a tool serving foreign designs"; and affirmed that no such
police formation existed in Federal territory, and that "any freely-
achieved all-German solution has no room for a party instrument
guided by a foreign Power".

The Federal Government, Dr. Adenauer continued, agreed with
all Germans that "nothing should be left undone to re-establish
German unity in liberty and peace", but it could enter into discussions
only with those "willing to recognize and guarantee a form of
government which respects liberty, the protection of human rights
and the preservation of peace". Therefore, he declared, the following
conditions must be fulfilled for the holding of all-German elections
for an all-German Constituent Assembly; (1) German citizens in
the Soviet Zone must be guaranteed personal liberty and security
consonant with the rule of law; (2) political liberty, including the
right to hold meetings, to form political associations and to carry
on political activities, must be re-established in the Soviet Zone;
(3) the People's Police in the Soviet Zone must be disbanded.

Finally, Dr. Adenauer rejected the allegation in Herr Grotewohl's
letter that "the re-militarization of Western Germany and its inclusion
in the plans for war preparations" had widened the division of Ger-
many. This division, he said, was due only to the introduction in the
Soviet Zone of a system of government which was "contrary to
German tradition and to the German character, which robs the
population of the Zone of any possibility of freely shaping its political,
economic and social life, and by which it has been cut off from
mixing freely with its kin in the West". Although the division of
Germany had been still more aggravated through the formation of
a strong "People's Police" force, the Federal Government as was
well known to the authorities in the Soviet Zone had hitherto
refrained from any similar measures.

Dr. Schumacher (the Social Democratic leader), in a broadcast

72

on Jan. 21, defended the Federal Government's attitude towards
Herr GrotewohTs offer; condemned the Grotewohl letter as a propa-
ganda move timed to produce all-German talks before a possible
four-Power conference; and described the proposals as being not
in the interests of Germany but in those of the Soviet Union. "The
real aim of the Soviet Union," he added, "is to get reparations from
Western Germany. The Soviet Union wants these .reparations out
of Western Germany's current production after having plundered
its own zone."

6. FOUR-POWER MEETING IN PARIS, 1951

Further Note exchanges were continued during January and Feb-
ruary, 1951. On Feb. 6 the Soviet Government presented identical
Notes to the Ambassadors of France, Great Britain and the U.S.A.
in Moscow in reply to the Western Powers' Notes of Jan. 23, in
which it again charged the Western Powers with "remilitarizing"
Western Germany, but, subject to conditions, expressed willingness
to consider matters other than Germany and agreed to a preliminary
conference in Paris to discuss the agenda for the proposed meeting
of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The principal points of the Soviet Note were as follows:

(1) The Soviet Government considered that there should be no
further delay in summoning the Council of Foreign Ministers.

(2) At the same time it referred to the "dangerous significance"
of the "far-reaching negotiations" which had taken place in recent
months between the Western Powers and the Bonn Government
of Dr. Adenauer"; attacked what it described as "General Eisen-
hower's negotiations with the Government of the revanchist Adenauer"
on the inclusion of a "revived German Army" in the North Atlantic
Pact; and declared that General Eisenhower's appointment as
Supreme Commander in the West "in no way tallies with the official
declarations of a striving for peace" by the Western nations. It went
on to declare that "revanchists of the type of Adenauer and Schu-
macher and militarists from among Hitler's followers" were "strength-
ening their influence and domination" in Western Germany, and
added that "the increase in the armed forces and the armaments
race" taking place in the U.S.A. and many European countries
"much increased the tension in the international situation".

73

(3) Regarding the Western Powers' inquiry whether the U.S.S.R.
would agree to discuss questions other than that of the demilitari-
zation of Germany, the Soviet Government considered it possible
that the Council of Foreign Ministers could discuss such questions
"in the order stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement".

(4) It was suggested that the preliminary conference of repre-
sentatives of the four Powers should confine itself to drafting an
agenda for the subsequent meeting of the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters, and to deciding upon the order in which the items should be
considered.

(5) No objection was made to the convening of such a prelimi-
nary conference in Paris.

The British, U.S. and French replies to this Soviet Note, couched
in identical terms, were presented in Moscow on Feb. 20. After
repudiating the accusations contained in the Soviet Note, and re-
peating the Western view that the present international tension was
caused primarily by "the existence of the huge armaments main-
tained by the Soviet bloc, which includes forces in Eastern Germany",
the three Powers emphasized their willingness to commence pre-
paratory four-Power discussions in Paris without delay.

The Soviet reply was handed to the British, U.S. and French
Ambassadors on March 1. It was announced at the State Department
in Washington that it constituted an acceptance of the Western
Powers' proposals that preliminary four-Power discussions should
commence in Paris on March 5.

The preliminary conference of representatives of the four Powers
accordingly opened in Paris on March 5.

At the commencement of the Paris discussions the representatives
received a request from the Eastern German Government asking
that the question of a German peace treaty be placed on their agenda.
Prior to the commencement of the discussions, the Allied High
Commissioners in Bonn had announced on Feb. 22 that Dr. Ade-
nauer would be informed "to the fullest possible extent" of any
four-Power discussions on Germany, and that consideration would
be given to any views that the German Federal Government might
wish to present.

However, on June 21, 1951, after 74 meetings the Paris con-
ference broke down owing to failure to reconcile the proposals put
forward by the Western Powers on the one hand and those of the
Soviet Government on the other.

74

/. JNEW SOVIET PROPOSALS
FOR GERMAN PEACE TREATY, 1952

On March 10, 1952, the Soviet Government presented identical
Notes to the British, French and U.S. diplomatic representatives
in Moscow, urging immediate four-Power talks to draw up a draft
peace treaty with Germany.

After pointing out that, although seven years had passed since
the end of thejwar, "Germany still has no peace treaty, is partitioned,
and remains in a position of unequal rights in relation to other
States", the Soviet Government declared that "the need to expedite
a peace treaty with Germany is dictated by the fact that the danger
of the restoration of German militarism, which has twice precipitated
world wars, has not been eliminated as the decisions of the Potsdam
Conference still remain unfulfilled"; that the peace treaty must
"ensure the elimination of the possibility of a revival of German
militarism and aggression", and at the same time "establish for the
German people lasting conditions of peace which will facilitate the
development of Germany as a united, independent, democratic and
peace-loving State"; and that the framing of the treaty "must be
carried out with the participation of Germany, as represented by an
all-German Government". The Notes added that, "in proposing
this draft for discussion, the Soviet Government at the same time
expresses readiness to consider other possible proposals on the
question".

The attitude of the German Federal Republic towards the Soviet
Note was defined by Dr. Adenauer in a speech at Siegen (North
Rhine-Westphalia) on March 16.

Whilst saying that the Soviet Note marked "a certain progress",
and emphasizing that no possibility of achieving a peaceful under-
standing should be ignored, the Federal Chancellor declared that
in no circumstances should the building up of Western defence and
of European integration be delayed. "The aim of German policy,"
said Dr. Adenauer, "is, now as hitherto, that the West should become
so strong that the Soviet Union will enter into reasonable counsel
with it. I am firmly convinced and the latest Soviet Note is fresh
proof of it that, if we continue along this road, the time is not so
distant when Soviet Russia will declare herself ready for such reason-
able counsel."

After stating that he would have an opportunity of discussing the
Soviet Note with the Western allies in Paris, Dr. Adenauer went on
to say that he would like, from the Russian side, three clarifications

75

of particular points raised in the Note, viz., (1) what the Soviet
Government means by "an all-German Government", (2) how the
problem of "German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line" was
intended to be solved, and (3) the question of German national
armaments. As regards the first question, he declared that an all-
German Government could only be brought about as a result of
free and secret elections, while, as regards the second question, the
Soviet answer would be "very illuminating". On the third point, the
Russian proposals were, he said, impracticable in view of the devel-
opment of arms technique; since 1945 such great progress had been
made in military research that Germany could not, if only for
financial and material reasons, build up for herself a national
armament, and this part of the Soviet Note was accordingly "a scrap
of paper".

In conclusion, Dr. Adenauer declared that the major aims of his
policy were the preservation of peace in Europe and the world, the
reunion of Germany, and "the new order in Eastern Europe", by
which he meant a peaceful settlement of the disputed Oder-Neisse
frontier in co-operation with Poland, and the clarification of Ger-
many's contacts with the other East European States.

The East German Parliament (Volkskammer), meeting on March
18, unanimously adopted a resolution approving the proposals con-
tained in the Soviet Note, and calling on the West German Govern-
ment to accept those proposals. Herr Grotewohl, the East German
Premier, declared that all-German elections should be preceded by
the convening of an all-German commission; described the im-
pending visit of the U.N. Special Commission on Germany as an
"unjustified interference in German internal affairs"; interpreted the
Potsdam decisions as having fixed the German-Polish frontier on the
Oder-Neisse line, and as having envisaged the return of the Saar to
Germany; and described the Oder-Neisse frontier as a "permanent
frontier of friendship", declaring that his Government was pledged
to prevent any "chauvinistic agitation" against it.

8. FOUR-POWER EXCHANGES ON GERMANY, 1952-53

Replies of the British, French and U.S. Governments drawn up in
identical terms to the Soviet Note of March 10 were presented in
Moscow on March 25, 1952. The Soviet Government's reply to the
Western Powers' Notes was presented to the British, French and
American Ambassadors in Moscow on April 9.

76

It rejected a Western proposal that the special U.N. Commission
on Germany should "verify the existence of conditions" for the
holding of all-German elections, on the ground that the U.N. Charter
precluded United Nations "interference" in German affairs, but
proposed, instead, that the question of all-German elections should
be studied by a four-Power commission consisting of representatives
of the four occupation Powers Great Britain, the United States,
France and the Soviet Union. In other respects the Soviet Note
reiterated the original Soviet proposals of March 10, maintaining
inter alia that Germany should possess her own national forces,
that she should be forbidden to enter into any "coalitions or
alliances" with other Powers, and that the Oder-Neisse frontier
should be regarded as definitive. In proposing a four-Power investi-
gation into all-German elections, the Soviet Government declared
that "the question now being decided is whether Germany is to be
established as a united, independent, peace-loving State ... or
whether the split in Germany, involving the danger of war in Europe,
shall remain in force".

The replies of the Western Powers to the above Soviet Note on
Germany were presented in Moscow on May 13. The principal
points of the Western Notes were that the U.S., British and French
Governments were ready to begin negotiations on German unity,
the election of a free all-German Government, and the conclusion of
a peace treaty with that Government when understanding had been
reached on the scope of the negotiations and the fundamental
problems to be examined; that they would prefer the inquiry to be
held by the U.N. Commission on Germany and not, as proposed
by the Soviet Government, by a four-Power Commission; that they
were, however, willing to consider alternative suggestions; and that
they would not be deflected from their purpose of establishing a
European Defence Community which would include the German
Federal Republic.

The series of Note exchanges between the Western Powers and
the U.S.S.R. on Germany was continued on May 25, on which date
the Soviet Government handed to the U.S., British and French Am-
bassadors in Moscow its reply to the Western Notes of May 13. The
Soviet Note, which was presented on the eve of the signing of the
contractual agreements between the Western Powers and the German

77

Federal Republic, was divided into three sections: (1) a section on
what was described as "the urgency of solving the German problem"
and "the dragging out by the Western Powers of the exchange of
Notes on this question"; (2) a section concerning "separate agree-
ments of the Western Powers with Western Germany and their
attempts to evade the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany";
and (3) the proposals of the Soviet Government on the German
question.

The first section consisted essentially of a complaint that the U.S.,
British and French Notes of May 13 showed that the Western
Powers declined to discuss without further delay the question of a
German peace treaty and the formation of a united Germany, and
that those Powers desired to delay the conclusion of a peace treaty
and German unification. The second section was devoted to a
denunciation of the contractual arrangements between the Western
Powers and the German Federal Republic, in which connexion the
Soviet Note alleged, inter alia, that those arrangements constituted
a violation of the Potsdam Agreement, that they in fact continued
the Allied military occupation while ostensibly abolishing the Occu-
pation Statute, that they had paved the way for a renewal of
German militarism and "revanchism", and that the objective of the
European Defence Community was to include the Federal Republic
in the "aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization". In the third
and final section, the Soviet Government again proposed immediate
four-Power meetings on the German question, and reiterated its
previously expressed view that such meetings should be based on
the Potsdam Agreement, that the Oder-Neisse frontier should be
recognized as final, that Germany should be permitted to have her
own armed forces, and that she should not be allowed to form
alliances with any countries with which she had formerly been at war.

The Note exchanges between the Western Powers and the Soviet
Government on the subject of Germany continued throughout the
summer of 1952, both sides reiterating their former proposals and
repudiating each other's arguments.

West German Six-Point Programme for German Unification,

July 1953

Prior to a Washington conference of the Foreign Ministers of Great
Britain, France and the United States, the German Federal Gov-

78

ernment handed to the Allied High Commissioners in Bonn the
text of an "immediate programme" which, it was suggested, should
form the basis of discussions on the unification of Germany. The
programme was handed to the Allied High Commissioner on July
9, 1953, with the request that it should be forwarded to the Foreign
Ministers in Washington and also to the Soviet Government, and
consisted of the following six points:

(1) The opening of the zonal frontiers between East and West
Germany.

(2) The abolition of the "no-man's-land" established by the
Communists along the East German zonal frontier.

(3) Free movement of German citizens throughout the territory
of Germany.

(4) Freedom of the Press and of public assembly throughout the
country.

(5) Freedom for political parties to operate in all parts of
Germany.

(6) Guarantees of personal liberty for all citizens, and protection
against arbitrary power and terrorism.

Washington Conference of Western Foreign Ministers, 1953

The U.S. Secretary of State (Mr. John F. Dulles), the British
Acting Foreign Secretary (Lord Salisbury) and the French Foreign
Minister (M. Georges Bidault) met in Washington from July 10-14,
1953, to discuss the international situation.

A communiqu6 issued on July 14 contained the following passages:

Unification of Germany. "The three Ministers have given further
consideration to the problem of the reunification of Germany. The
grave events which took place recently in Berlin and in the Soviet
Zone once again gave proof of the will to independence and the
indomitable determination for freedom of the inhabitants of these
areas. These developments have confirmed the view of the Ministers
that the early reunification of Germany, in accordance with the
legitimate aspirations of the German people, would be a great con-
tribution to the easing of international tension.

"The three Powers have made sustained efforts to reach this goal.
They have, hi recent years, addressed several Notes with constructive
proposals to the U.S.S.R., the last dated Sept. 23, 1952, to which

79

no reply has yet been received. These Notes responded to the over-
whelming desire of the German people to see unity re-established in
freedom, as reflected most recently by the resolution of the German
Bundestag of June 10 of this year."

Proposed Four-Power Meeting on Germany. "Early and orderly
progress in this direction requires the co-operation of the Soviet
Government. Mindful of the special urgency which recent events
have given to the question of the unification of Germany, the three
Powers have resolved to make a new effort to bring to an end the
division of Germany. The three Governments have therefore decided,
in consultation with the German Federal Government, to propose
a meeting in the early autumn of the Foreign Ministers of France,
the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. to discuss
directly the first steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution
of the German problem, namely, the organization of free elections
and the establishment of a free all-German Government."

Soviet Proposals for Peace Conference and All-German
Government, August 1953

A Soviet Note on the subject of the unification of Germany was
presented to the United States, Great Britain and France on Aug.
15, 1953, in which it was suggested that a peace conference should
be convened within the next six months to draw up a peace treaty
for Germany, and that a provisional all-German Government should
be formed to hold free elections.

The Note, a 14-page document, recapitulated at great length the
previous Note exchanges on Germany between the Western Powers
and the U.S.S.R.; asserted that the Western Powers had not yet
replied to the Note of March 10, 1952, in which the Soviet Govern-
ment had suggested certain basic conditions for a draft peace treaty
with Germany [see above]; and attributed responsibility for this
delay to the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France.

The Soviet Note urged that "practical steps aimed at the settle-
ment of the German problem" should be taken "immediately" by
the four Powers concerned, and in this connexion put forward the
following proposals:

Convening of a Peace Conference. "The Soviet Government is
of the opinion that such a conference, with the participation of all
the States concerned, could be convened within the next six months.
... All preliminary work to prepare a peace treaty with Germany
could be carried out within this period. It it important to ensure

80

the participation of representatives of Germany at all stages of the
preparation of a peace treaty and at the peace conference. Until the
establishment of a provisional all-German Government, representa-
tives of the existing Governments of Eastern and Western Germany
could take part in the preparation of a peace treaty."

Establishment of Provisional All-German Government. Holding
of All-German Elections. "With the object of restoring the unity of
Germany on a peace-loving and democratic basis, the Soviet Govern-
ment proposes that the Parliaments of the German Democratic Re-
public and the German Federal Republic, with the broad participation
of democratic organizations, should form a provisional all-German
government. Such a government could be formed by direct agreement
between Eastern and Western Germany, so as to replace the existing
Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic. Should this be difficult at the present time, a
provisional all-German government could be formed with the reten-
tion for a period of the Governments of the German Democratic
Republic and the German Federal Republic. In this case, the
provisional all-German government would in the first stage possess
only restricted functions. Even in such a case, however, the formation
of a provisional all-German government would be a real step forward
on the road to the unification of Germany, which should receive its
full completion in the establishment of an all-German government
on the basis of really free all-German elections."

Tasks of a Provisional All-German Government. "(1) The
provisional all-German government should be able to solve such
urgent questions of all-German importance as the representation of
Germany at the preparation of a peace treaty, and its representation
in international organizations; the prevention of the drawing of Ger-
many into coalition or military alliances directed against any Power
whose armed forces took part in the war against Hitlerite Germany;
questions of German citizenship, of ensuring the free activity of
democratic parties and organizations, and of preventing the existence
of Fascist, militarist, and other organizations hostile to democracy
and the preservation of peace; the expansion of trade relations
between Eastern and Western Germany; questions of transport, postal
and telegraphic communications; questions of the free movement of
persons and goods, irrespective of established zonal frontiers; the
development of economic and cultural relations between Eastern and
Western Germany; and other questions affecting the interests of the
whole German people.

"(2) The main task of a provisional all-German government
should be the holding of free all-German elections, as a result of
which the German people themselves, without the intervention of
foreign Powers, would solve the question of a social and State system

81

for a democratic Germany. The provisional all-German government
should draw up a draft electoral law which would ensure the truly
democratic nature of the all-German elections, the participation of
all democratic organizations in the elections, and the prevention of
pressure on the electors from the big monopolies. The recognition
of the advisability of verifying the existence throughout the whole
of Germany of the conditions necessary for the carrying out of
democratic elections, as well as the adoption of measures to ensure
such conditions, would depend upon this free settlement.

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary that France, the
U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. should take steps to hold
the all-German elections in conditions of real freedom, excluding any
pressure whatsoever from foreign Powers during the holding of
these elections."

In reply to the Soviet Note of Aug. IS, and also to an earlier
Note of Aug. 4, the British, American, and French Governments
presented identical Notes in Moscow on Sept. 2 inviting the Soviet
Union to a four-Power meeting at Lugano (Switzerland) on Oct. 15
to discuss both the German and the Austrian treaties.

In a statement in Bonn on Aug. 17, Dr. Adenauer commented that
the latest Soviet Note was essentially the same as that of March 10,
1952. Whereas, however, the earlier Note had been directed against
the alleged "aggressive" designs of the NATO, that of Aug. 15 had
concentrated against the E.D.C. treaty, a move which, Dr. Adenauer
said, was designed to influence the forthcoming elections in the
Federal Republic. The Federal Chancellor added that a peace treaty
on the lines desired by the Soviet Union might lead to the reunifi-
cation of Germany but would leave her with a restricted national
army and with no guarantees either of neutrality or security. To
accept such a treaty would mean "suicide" for Germany, which,
within a short time, would inevitably be "drawn under by Russian
suction". As regards the Soviet suggestion that a provisional all-
German Government might be formed by the West and East German
Governments, Dr. Adenauer declared that neither the Federal
Government nor any of the democratic parties in the Bundestag
recognized the regime in the Soviet zone as representative of the
popular will, and rejected all contact with it. He nevertheless sup-
ported the holding of a four-Power conference, if only to learn the
"real intentions of the Kremlin" on the future of Germany.

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9. BERLIN CONFERENCE, 1954

After further Note exchanges, the proposal for a four-Power
meeting of Foreign Ministers at Lugano was ignored by the Soviet
Union in Notes published on Nov. 4, 1953, when the Soviet Gov-
ernment reiterated its previous demands.

On Nov. 24, however, it expressed readiness for such a con-
ference and suggested Berlin as its venue. Following acceptance
of this proposal by the Western Powers on Dec. 7, meetings even-
tually took place in Berlin from Jan. 25 to Feb. 18, 1954.

At these meetings Mr. Molotov proposed a Collective Security
Treaty, which was, however, declared to be unacceptable by the
Western Foreign Ministers primarily because in their view it
relegated a settlement of the German problem to the indefinite
future, and because it implied the abandonment of the European
Defence Community and the North Atlantic Treaty.

Three-Power Statement on Berlin Conference

The following agreed statement on the Berlin Conference was
issued simultaneously in London, Washington and Paris on Feb. 19
by the British, U.S. and French Governments:

"The major problem facing the Berlin Conference was that of
Germany. The three Western delegations urged that the reunification
of Germany should be achieved through free elections leading to the
creation of an all-German Government with which a peace treaty
could be concluded. They put forward a practical plan to this end.
Their proposals were not accepted by the Soviet delegation, even
as a basis for discussion, and they were forced to the conclusion that
the Soviet Government is not now ready to permit free all-German
elections or to abandon its control over Eastern Germany.

"The three Western Governments will continue their efforts to
achieve German reunification in freedom and by peaceful means.
In the meantime they have suggested certain measures which could
reduce the effect of the present division of Germany and its con-
sequences for Berlin. They have proposed (hat the three Western
High Commissioners should study these questions with the Soviet
High Commissioner.

"The three Governments reaffirm their abiding interest in the
security of Berlin, as expressed in the tripartite declaration of May 27,

83

1952. They will do all in their power to improve conditions in Berlin
and to promote the economic welfare of the city."

West German Reaction to Berlin Conference Dr. Adenauer's
Support for Western Proposals Bundestag Debate and Resolution

The West German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, addressed
a mass meeting in Berlin on Feb. 23, 1954, following the ending of
the four-Power conference of the British, American, French and
Soviet Foreign Ministers.

Dr. Adenauer, whose speech was broadcast to Eastern Germany,
said that the four-Power conference had shown (1) that the Soviet
Union intended to maintain the status quo in Germany and, "in due
course", to dominate the whole of Europe; (2) that an isolated
solution of the German problem, without reference to other world
problems, was impossible at the moment; (3) that the four Powers'
agreement to hold talks on the Far East and disarmament could help
to end the "cold war" and might thus benefit Germany indirectly,
even if by a "roundabout route"; and (4) that the unity and deter-
mination of the Western Powers were even greater at the end of the
conference than at its beginning.

After expressing his belief that "the future is not hopeless if we
have the unshakable conviction that in the end good will triumph
over evil, if we have patience and endurance, and if the German
people achieve moral unity and are helped by the free world", the
Federal Chancellor declared that the Soviet refusal to make any
concessions on Germany was based not on strength but on fears for
the future of its "satellite empire" in Europe and on its belief that
"any loosening of the pressure within the sphere of its power con-
stitutes a risk". It was necessary, he continued, to get rid of any
"self-deception", and those who maintained that more should have
been offered to the Soviet Union "completely misunderstood" the
situation.

After declaring that the "positive success" of the negotiations
lay in the fact that the Western allies had "never before been so
firm and united as now", Dr. Adenauer said: "Germany has every
reason to be grateful to the three Western Foreign Ministers. They
presented our case so clearly, so logically, and with such warmth
that German negotiators could have done no better. ... In every
way they served the cause of peace and freedom." Mr. Molotov's
proposal for the neutralization of Germany, he added, would in fact
lead to the Sovietization of Germany, and the Soviet Foreign Minister
had "deliberately demanded the impossible to exclude the possibility
of any positive result".

84

"Nothing forces us more to build up a genuine security system
in Western Europe", Dr. Adenauer continued, "than the very con-
ceptions of the Soviet Foreign Minister. . . . The purely defensive
security system represented by the E.D.C. . . . contains elements
from which we can develop a collective security system covering the
whole of Europe and giving the Soviet Union the security desired
by it. We must remove any doubt that Germany will ever get accus-
tomed to the existence of two separate German States. In particular,
we must make it quite clear to the Soviet Union that the Pieck-
Grotewohl regime has not the slightest prospect of preserving its
existence in an all-German future by such methods as the formation
of a provisional Government or all-German committees." In conclu-
sion, the Federal Chancellor emphasized that Germany remained "at
the side of the West", that she would continue to adhere to the policy
of European integration, and that "we stand for a policy which by
every means and every path, even indirectly, aims at the reunification
of Germany in freedom and peace".

The Federal Chancellor made a further statement in the West
German Bundestag on Feb. 25, when opening a debate on the Berlin
Conference.

Dr. Adenauer drew five conclusions from the conference, which
he listed as follows: (1) To check the Soviet aim of achieving
hegemony in Europe, it had become more than ever necessary to
unify Europe, to integrate her resources, and to establish the E.D.C.
(2) The Federal Republic "must consolidate its internal structure
based on freedom and law, and develop the spiritual and material
strength needed to prevent the Sovietization of the whole of Ger-
many". (3) The Federal Government must "demonstrate by word
and deed" that the German people would never resign themselves to
the partition of Germany. (4) As the Berlin conference had shown
that the German problem could not be solved in isolation, the
Federal Government should welcome any attempts at removing con-
flicts in other parts of the world, since any relaxation of international
tension resulting therefrom would also affect the German question.
The Federal Government would itself endeavour to contribute to a
general detente leading to new negotiations on Germany, and, spe-
cifically, would advocate the development of a collective security
system, based on the free consent and equality of all its members,
which would lead the U.S.S.R. to relax its control over Eastern
Germany. (5) All possible measures would be taken by the Federal
Government to ease the burdens borne by the population of Eastern
Germany and Berlin.

Analysing the results of the conference, Dr. Adenauer said it was

85

"the bitter truth that German reunification had been prevented by the
Soviet Union", and declared that all the Soviet proposals had been
aimed at undermining the United Nations and setting up in its place
a "directorate" of the great Powers, including Communist China. He
described Mr. Molotov's proposal for the formation of an all-German
Government before the holding of free elections as an attempt to
"insinuate a Trojan horse" into the all-German State; reiterated that
the Soviet proposal for Germany's neutralization would mean her
eventual Sovietization; and paid a tribute to the Western Foreign
Ministers and to the solidarity of the Western allies in terms similar
to those of his Berlin speech.

Herr Erich Ollenhauer, the leader of the Socialist Democratic
Opposition, declared that the Russians knew that free all-German
elections would mean the end of the Socialist Party and of Com-
munist influence in the Soviet Zone, and they therefore sought to link
the holding of elections with Germany's position in such a system.

At the end of the debate the Bundestag unanimously approved an
all-party resolution which regretted that no progress had been made
towards solving the German problem at Berlin, and attributed this
failure to the intransigence of the Soviet Government. It also de-
clared that the Bundestag would do everything possible to free the
18,000,000 inhabitants of Eastern Germany and to secure the
country's reunification in peace and freedom.

10. INTEGRATION OF WESTERN GERMANY
INTO WESTERN BLOC, 1952-55

The gradual recognition of the German Federal Republic as a
partner in the Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance
(NATO) during 1952-55 led to increasingly hostile reactions by the
East European bloc, including the German Democratic Republic.

The steps by which the Federal Republic was integrated in the
Western Alliance were:

(1) The replacement of the Occupation Statute by contractual
arrangements in May 1952.

(2) The signing of the European Defence Community Treaty and
related protocols in Paris in May 1952.

(3) The ratification of the European Defence Community Treaty
by the Federal Government in March 1953 and February 1954.

(4) The signing of a treaty of friendship between Western Germany
and the United States in October 1954.

86

(5) The agreements on the entry of Western Germany into the
Western European Union and NATO in October 1954.

(6) The ending of the occupation regime and the recognition of the
full sovereignty of the Federal Republic in May 1955.

(1) Occupation Statute replaced by Contractual Arrangements
between Federal Republic and Western Powers

At a meeting in Bonn on May 22, 1952, between Dr. Adenauer
and the Allied High Commissioners agreement was reached on the
contractual arrangements ending the Occupation Statute, restoring
sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and bringing Western
Germany into the European defence system to be established through
the European Defence Community.

The contractual arrangements, known as the Bonn Conventions,
were signed in Bonn on May 26 by Dr. Adenauer, Mr. Eden (the
U.K. Foreign Secretary), M. Schuman (the French Foreign Minister)
and Mr. Dean Acheson (the U. S. Secretary of State).

(2) The European Defence Community Treaty

The European Defence Community (E.D.C.) Treaty was formally
signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, by Dr. Adenauer and the Foreign
Ministers of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg,
together with a treaty of guarantee between the E.D.C. and the
United Kingdom, also signed by Mr. Eden, and a tripartite declara-
tion signed by Mr. Eden, Mr. Acheson and M. Schuman (for Britain,
the United States and France respectively).

The E.D.C. was defined as a "supra-national community . . . with
common institutions, common armed forces and a common Budget
. . . within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion". The E.D.C. would have a Council of Ministers; a Board of
Commissioners; an Assembly; and a Court of Justice. The duration
of the treaty would be 50 years, unless a "new situation" arose
which would necessitate a review by the contracting parties.

Hostile Reactions in Eastern Germany

A violent campaign against the contractual agreements between
the German Federal Republic and the Western Powers was launched

87

in Eastern Germany during the weeks immediately preceding the
signing of those agreements in May 1952, this campaign being
marked by denunciations of Dr. Adenauer and the Federal Govern-
ment, by appeals to the Parliament and people of Western Germany
not to conclude the agreements, and by calls for mass demonstrations
in the Federal Republic against Dr. Adenauer's Government and the
"Western imperialists". The East German President (Herr Wilhelm
Pieck) declared in a May Day speech in Berlin that it would "be-
come necessary for the German Democratic Republic to organize
the armed defence of our country" if the West German population
did not prevent "the conscription of youth for the service of American
imperialism", whilst the East German Premier (Herr Grotewohl)
declared in a statement on May 8 that the signing of the contractual
agreements would "produce in Germany the same conditions as exist
in Korea" and might involve the "danger of a fratricidal war of
German against German". A still more violent denunciation of the
then impending contractual agreements was made on May 12 by the
East German Vice-Premier, Herr Ulbricht, who threatened Dr.
Adenauer and his Cabinet Ministers with "reprisals at the hands of
the German people" if they signed the agreements, and declared that
all members of the West German Parliament supporting the agree-
ments would be "blacklisted" and would one day be "suitably pun-
ished"; asked what consequences the signing of the agreements would
have for Berlin, Herr Ulbricht (who was speaking at a press con-
ference) declared that the consequences would be apparent in the
city "on the very day after they are signed".

Immediately following the signing of the contractual agreements
in Bonn on May 26 the East German Government took a number of
measures designed, in effect, to "seal off" the Soviet Zone from West-
ern Germany and also to hamper communications between the
Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic. These measures,
taken on May 27, comprised (a) the creation of a "security zone"
five kilometres (about three miles) in width, along the entire 350-
mile frontier of Eastern Germany with the Federal Republic, extend-
ing from the Baltic Sea to the Czech border; (b) the establishment of
a similar "security zone" of the same width along the Baltic coast;
and (c) the cutting-off of telephonic communications between the
Soviet Zone and the Western sectors of Berlin. In announcing these
measures, the East German Government declared that entry into the

88

"security zones" would be permitted only to residents of Eastern
Germany in possession of special permits issued by the "people's
police" (Volkspolizei); that these measures were aimed at making
it more difficult for "agents and spies" from Western Germany to
enter the territory of Eastern Germany; and that the measures were
"transitional" in character and would be withdrawn when Germany
was reunited. At the same time it was announced that persons res-
ident in Western Germany or Western Berlin who wished to enter the
Soviet Zone (for visits to relatives, etc.) would in future need special
permits issued by the East German authorities. (Hitherto West Ger-
mans could travel to Eastern Germany on inter-zonal passes issued in
the Federal Republic, whilst Berliners whether resident in the West-
ern or Eastern sectors could enter the Soviet Zone provided they
carried their normal identity papers.) These restrictions were further
tightened on June 24, when the East German authorities, without
previous warning, suspended the issue of passes to West Berliners
wishing to visit the Soviet Zone; although this measure was de-
scribed as "temporary", all existing passes were declared invalid
and the three offices in East Berlin which had previously issued these
passes were closed down. No restrictions, however, were placed on
the movement of persons from West to East Berlin, or on road travel
between the Western sectors and the Federal Republic along the
Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn.

The national committee of the East German "National Front" (the
organization representing all the political parties in the Soviet Zone)
issued a statement on May 21 accusing the Western Powers of "prov-
ocations" along the zonal frontier, and declaring that it had become
"unavoidably necessary" to form a national army in Eastern Germany
"for the defence of the democratic achievements of the German
Democratic Republic".

The establishment of the so-called "security zone" along East Ger-
many's frontier with the West, carried out by the Volkspolizei, was
accompanied by the ruthless eviction of people from their homes and
farms, their deportation to other parts of Eastern Germany, the
felling of trees, hedges and other "obstacles" along the frontier, and
in many cases by the ploughing-under of crops and fertile agricultural
land; as a result of these measures, there had been created by the
end of June a "no-man's-land" between Eastern and Western Ger-
many extending from the Baltic to Czechoslovakia. Despite intensive

89

patrolling of the frontier by armed Volkspolizei, many thousands of
East Germans living in the "security zone" managed to cross the
frontier into Western Germany, where they were temporarily accom-
modated in camps.

Addressing the West German Bundestag on June 18, 1952, Dr.
Adenauer denounced the "brutal terror" exercised by the Russians
and their East German "puppets" against the inhabitants of the
"security zone"; announced that 7,500 refugees had already arrived
in the Federal Republic and were being cared for; and said that many
thousands of others who had been unable to escape were being
deported to the interior of Eastern Germany. He also denounced as
"plain lies" the East German excuse that the "security zone" had
been established as a defence against West German "saboteurs"
and American military "threats"; emphasized that these allegations
were "completely baseless and untrue"; and declared that the Soviet
and East German measures had two purposes, (a) to complete the
separation of Eastern Germany from the free world and incorporate
it politically and economically in the Soviet bloc, and (b) to repress
the resistance of the East German people by acts of terror. After the
Chancellor's speech, all members of the Bundestag (except the Com-
munist deputies) joined in adopting a resolution protesting strongly
against the measures which had robbed Germans in the frontier zone
of their homes and means of livelihood; calling on the free world to
take note of these events; and asking the free nations to assist the
Federal Republic in giving succour and support to the refugees.

It was stated in Bonn on June 25 that the Federal German Gov-
ernment were appealing to the British and U.S. High Commissioners
to station troops on the zonal frontier with Eastern Germany, in view
of the fact that the Federal police were too few in numbers to give
full protection in the frontier areas. This appeal was reinforced by the
West German Minister for All-German Affairs (Herr Kaiser), who,
after a visit to the frontier districts, urged on June 27 that British
and American armoured and infantry units should be moved to the
frontier to prevent the East German people's police from creating
conditions bordering on civil war.

(3) Ratification of E.D.C. Treaty by Western Germany
After lengthy debates in the various national Parliaments, the
90

treaty establishing the European Defence Community was ratified
during the early months of 1954 by the Parliaments of Western Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg that is, by four
of the six E.D.C. countries.

In the Federal Republic, two Bills ratifying the Paris agreement on
the E.D.C. Treaty and the Bonn Conventions were approved by the
Bundestag on March 19, 1953, and the required amendment to the
Federal "Basic Law" (Constitution) on Feb. 26, 1954, against the
votes of the Social Democrats but, in the case of the constitutional
amendment, with the necessary two-thirds majority (334 votes to
144).

Legislation for the ratification of the E.D.C. treaty and the Bonn
Conventions had been introduced in the Bundestag on July 9, 1952,
by Dr. Adenauer. In his speech, the Federal Chancellor declared
that the E.D.C. aimed at making war impossible between the Euro-
pean peoples, that the automatic assimilation of the foreign and
economic policies of its member-States would lead to a European
federation, and that Germany was faced with three choices: (1)
acceptance of the treaty and union with the West, (2) rejection of the
treaty and union with the East, or, alternatively, the "neutralization"
of Germany, and (3) deferment of a decision with a view to starting
new negotiations a course which, he said, would be regarded by
Germany's E.D.C. partners as a "veiled rejection" of the treaty.
After emphasizing that Germany could not be a "no-man's-land"
in the prevailing tension between East and West, Dr. Adenauer
refuted the argument that German ratification of the treaty would
dispose Russia to a "hot" war in place of the existing "cold" war;
a highly armed totalitarian State, he argued, would not be deterred
from aggression by the weakness of others, and Hitler would never
have risked a war if the other Powers had looked to their defences in
time. Germany, because of her geographical position, needed allies,
as Bismarck had recognized, and today, more than ever before,
she must look to allies for the preservation of her freedom. "By
acceptance of the treaties," the Chancellor declared, "we shall serve
the creation of a new Europe, the reunion of Germany, and, above
all, the cause of peace and freedom."

(4) West German Treaty with United States

On Oct. 29, 1954, Dr. Adenauer and Mr. Dulles signed in Wash-
ington a new treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between
Western Germany and the United States. On the same day Dr.

91

Adenauer addressed the National Press Club in Washington, and in
the course of his speech gave a warning against early negotiations
with the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, he outlined a
four-point programme, based on the strength and unity of the West-
ern nations, aimed at an eventual non-aggression agreement with the
Soviet bloc.

"The peoples of the West," said Dr. Adenauer, "must first secure
their peace and freedom by combining for their common defence.
They must create sound and stable economic conditions, and guar-
antee human freedoms and social security to everyone. They should
prepare for the future by giving their forms of association a purely
defensive character, endowing them with all the elements requisite
for collective security. Finally, as a regional group . . . they should
jointly enter into a relationship to be settled by arrangements
(Abmachungen) with the Soviet bloc, a relationship which would
offer security against aggression to all those participating in it. In this
connexion we must make it quite clear that any continuation of the
Soviet attempts to bolshevize by force whole nations and parts of
nations against their expressed will are not designed to bring about
that relaxation of tension which the Soviet leaders describe as their
foremost aim. . . . The free world will find Germany able and ready
to co-operate with all her strength in the realization of this pro-
gramme, and for the preservation of peace and freedom."

"We in Germany," the Federal Chancellor said, "have a special
interest in die normalization of the free world's relations with the
Eastern bloc, because only through such a normalization can Ger-
many's reunification in peace and freedom be brought about. But let
us beware of illusions. We in Germany are particularly well informed
about the difficulties that must be surmounted before there is an
easing of tension with the Communist-dominated world." In this
connexion he dwelt at length on the recent elections in Eastern
Germany and said that on the day before the elections the East Ger-
man Ministry of Information had issued a directive to the Press in
the Soviet Zone to the effect that commentators should be prepared
for 97.3 per cent of all the votes going to the "National Front" list,
though "certain deviations" might be expected. He referred also to
the fact that no provision had been made on the ballot-papers for the
electors to register a "yes" or "no", and to the marching of people
to the polling stations en bloc\ denounced the East German elections
as an "electoral fraud" of "unheard-of proportions"; and added:
"Here we have the most recent example of what the Russians mean
when they talk of 'free and democratic 9 elections."

Speaking of the mass emigration of refugees from Eastern to West-
ern Germany, the Federal Chancellor stated that a total of 2,300,000

92

persons had left Eastern Germany and East Berlin for the West, of
whom 1,149,973 had done so between the establishment of the
Federal Republic and Sept. 30, 1954, whilst 420,890 had done so
between the death of Marshal Stalin and Sept. 30, 1954. After deal-
ing with the reasons for this exodus, Dr. Adenauer declared: "You
will understand now why Germany is largely immune to the tempta-
tions of Communism, and why an overwhelming majority of all
Germans sharply condemn any political adventures with the East.
We know very well that the normalization of our relations with the
Eastern bloc is one of the great unsolved problems, and that we must
constantly seek a solution. But we also know that extreme caution
and vigilance are essential."

(5) West German Accession to W.E.U. and NATO

Following decisions taken at a Nine-Power Conference in London
from Sept. 28 to Oct. 3, 1954, agreements were signed in Paris on
Oct. 23, 1954, inter alia admitting the German Federal Republic to
the Western European Union (previously known as the Brussels
Treaty Organization) and to NATO.

These agreements included:

(a) a protocol on the termination of the occupation regime in
Western Germany;

(b) a convention on the presence of foreign forces in the Federal
Republic, providing for the continued stationing on Federal ter-
ritory of European and United States armed forces, and con-
taining a protocol on "control of armaments", noting inter alia
the West German Government's declaration "not to manufacture
atomic, biological or chemical weapons" and listing a large
number of armaments, the manufacture of which in Western
Germany would be subject to control; and

(c) a protocol on Western Germany's accession to NATO.

The Paris Agreements were finally agreed to by the German Fed-
eral President, Dr. Heuss, on March 24, 1955, after they had been
approved by the Bundestag on Feb. 27 against the votes of the
Social Democrats.

(6) Ending of Occupation R6gime in Western Germany

On May 5, 1955, the occupation regime in Western Germany was
ended and the German Federal Republic attained full sovereignty

93

and independence as a result of the agreements signed in London
and Paris.

At the same time the Federal Republic became a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Western European
union.

At an open-air ceremony held on May 5, Dr. Adenauer read the
following proclamation:

"Today, nearly ten years after the military and political collapse
of National Socialism, the occupation regime has ended in the
Federal Republic. With profound satisfaction the Federal Govern-
ment confirms that we are a free and independent State. What has
long been in preparation on a basis of growing confidence has now
become a legal reality. We are free among the free, joined in genuine
partnership with the former occupying Powers.

"Together with the Federal Government, 50,000,000 free citizens
of the Federal Republic remember at this moment the millions of
Germans who are forced to live separated from us, deprived of justice
and the rule of law. We say to them: 'You belong to us. We belong
to you. Our joy at our regained freedom will be marred until that
freedom is granted to you also. You can always rely on us, for we
and the free world will not relax our efforts until you, too, have
regained your human rights and are able to live with us peacefully,
reunited in a single State. 9

"In this hour we recall the many Germans who still have to endure
the hard lot of prisoners-of-war. We shall do all in our power to
bring about the hour of their release.

"Freedom carries with it responsibilities. At home there can be
only one path for us the path of a State based on the rule of law,
democracy and social justice. In the world there is only one place
for us at the side of the free peoples. Our aim is a free and united
Germany in a free and united Europe."

The German Federal Republic thereby gained the right to rearm
within the framework of NATO, all prohibitions on armaments being
lifted except those on weapons which the Federal Republic had
voluntarily undertaken not to manufacture.

East German Reaction to Paris Agreements

The East German Government issued a declaration on March 25,
1955, announcing that it had begun to take "measures to protect the

94

German Democratic Republic" as a result of the ratification of the
Paris agreements by the West German Government.

The East German declaration stressed that the unification of
Germany could only be attained by the cancellation of the Paris
agreements. It continued: "The [West German] Federal Parliament,
by ratifying the Paris agreements, and President Heuss, by signing
them, have ignored the demand of the German people for unity and
peace. At the same time the Adenauer Government seeks to create
the impression that ratification of the agreements is favourable to
the reunification of Germany, and that negotiations will shortly be
held on the solution of the German problem. The Government of
the German Democratic Republic cannot permit this misleading
statement to go unanswered. . . .

"The German people must realize that the Western Powers, Dr.
Adenauer and the Federal Parliament, by ratifying the agreements,
are destroying the possibility of negotiations on the peaceful reunifica-
tion of Germany. ... By pressing the Paris agreements through, the
Western Powers and Dr. Adenauer have proved that they reject
the reunification of Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis,
and that they are ready to sacrifice reunification for the inclusion of
Western Germany in an aggressive pact system.

"Exactly contrary action has been taken by the Soviet Union and
the People's Democracies, with their declarations on the ending of the
state of war with Germany . . . and with their proposals for the
creation of a system of collective security in Europe. The Govern-
ments of the U.S.S.R. and of the German Democratic Republic have
repeatedly declared their readiness to negotiate. They have at the
same time announced that the ratification and implementation of the
Paris agreements would make negotiations on the reunification of
Germany impossible. . . ."

Herr Grotewohl, speaking at a Berlin demonstration on May 8,
1955, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the overthrow of Nazism,
reiterated that the cancellation of the Paris agreements was "the
necessary pre-condition for the reunification of Germany". He an-
nounced at the same time that the Volkspolizei [the para-military
police force in Eastern Germany, estimated at 100,000 to 120,000
strong] would be "developed into an effective instrument of defence".

Herr Grotewohl outlined his Government's policy for the reunifica-
tion of Germany as follows: (1) annulment of the Paris agreements;
(2) "an immediate understanding between the two parts of Germany

95

on the removal of militarism, and on the preparation of free all-
German elections to a National Assembly"; (3) a joint request to
the four Powers (Britain, France, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) by the
East and West German Governments for "the speedy conclusion of
a peace treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation troops"; (4) con-
tinuous consultations between East and West Germany on "all ques-
tions of economic, social, and cultural co-operation".

After declaring that Eastern Germany would "take all necessary
measures to defend herself against the West German militarists and
neo-fascists", Herr GrotewoM referred to the Warsaw Conference
which had been convened for May 11. "The pact to be concluded in
Warsaw," he said, "will serve peace and bar the way to aggression in
Europe. The history of the last few decades will not be repeated. This
time the military expansion of the American and West German
militarists will be brought to a decisive halt in its very first stages. . . ."

Herr Grotewohl said that the conclusion of the Austrian State
Treaty defining Austria's independence and neutrality and signed on
May 15, 1955, by the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers had
"shown the way to the solution of the German problem", adding in
this connexion: "Austria will tolerate no foreign military bases on her
territory and will enter into no unilateral military alliances. . . . The
solution of the German problem on this basis is possible if the right
conditions are created. This means for Western Germany the steering
of an independent course and the removal of the Paris agreements."

11. INTEGRATION OF EASTERN GERMANY
INTO EASTERN BLOC, 1956

Soviet Recognition of East German Sovereignty

Even before the Paris agreements of October 1954, it had been
announced in Moscow on March 25, 1954, that the Soviet Govern-
ment recognized the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign and
independent State conducting its own internal and external affairs;
that the functions of the Soviet High Commissioner in Eastern Ger-
many would be limited to security questions and to liaison with the
Western Allied authorities on all-German questions; and that Soviet
occupation forces would remain in Eastern Germany under four-
Power agreements.

Mr. Georgi Maximovich Pushkin, a former Ambassador in
Budapest, was appointed Soviet Ambassador to the German Dem-
ocratic Republic and High Commissioner in Germany on July 19,
1954, in succession to Mr. Semeonov, who had assumed ambas-
sadorial status in September 1953. On Aug. 6, 1954, the Soviet Gov-
96

eminent annulled all decrees and ordinances issued by the Soviet
military authorities in Eastern Germany between 1945 and 1953.

The West German Bundestag unanimously adopted a resolution
on April 7, 1954, refusing to recognize the right of the Soviet Union
"to create an East German State", and emphasizing that the Federal
Government was the only freely-elected body of its kind in Germany
and therefore had the sole right to represent the German people.

On April 8, 1954, the three Western High Commissioners in
Bonn, on behalf of the British, French and U.S. Governments, issued
a declaration in connexion with "the statement issued on March 25
by the Soviet Government purporting to describe a change in its rela-
tions with the Government of the so-called German Democratic
Republic". This stated (1) that the Soviet statement "does not alter
the actual situation in the Soviet zone", where the Soviet Government
"still retains effective control"; (2) that Britain, France and the
U.S.A. would continue to regard the U.S.S.R. as the Power respon-
sible for the Soviet zone of Germany, but would not recognize the
sovereignty of the East German regime nor deal with it as a Govern-
ment; (3) that they would continue to regard the German Federal
Government as "the only freely elected and legally constituted Gov-
ernment of Germany".

Conclusion of Warsaw Treaty, 1955

The Soviet Union reacted to the conclusion of the Paris agreements
by sending out invitations, on Nov. 13, 1954, to 23 European coun-
tries and the U.S.A. to attend a conference on "the safeguarding of
peace and collective security in Europe". The only countries to accept
the invitation, however, were the Communist States of Eastern
Europe, whose representatives attended a conference in Moscow
from Nov. 29 to Dec. 2.

The conference ended with the signing of a declaration stating that
the creation of a West German Army and the inclusion of Western
Germany in NATO would constitute a threat to the security of the
eight countries represented at the conference, and that, if the Paris
agreements were ratified, these countries would meet again "to adopt
measures for safeguarding their security".

Ministers from eight countries the Soviet Union, Poland, Czech-

97

oslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and
Albania subsequently held a three-day conference in Warsaw on
May 11-13, 1955, which resulted in (1) the signing of a 20-year
treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between
these countries, and (2) the creation of a unified military command
for the armed forces of all these countries except Eastern Germany,
whose participation would be "examined later". Marshal Ivan Koniev,
of the Soviet Army, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the joint
armed forces.

The major speech at the conference was made by Marshal
Bulganin, Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., who strongly denounced
the remilitarization of Western Germany under the London and
Paris agreements. Extracts from his speech are given below:

"At the Moscow Conference (of November-December 1954) the
Governments of the countries represented here agreed to reconsider
the situation in the event of the Paris agreements being ratified. Now
this necessity has arisen. The ratification of the Paris agreements has
become a fact. As a result, the West German militarists have been
given the right to recruit a standing army and to supply it with all
types of modern weapons. . . .

"The Paris agreements, therefore, are putting means for new
aggression into the hands of yesterday's aggressors. . . . Ten years
after the end of the Second World War, Western Germany with the
help of the United States, Britain and France, is becoming the main
seat of war danger in Europe. It is becoming a member of the
aggressive North Atlantic bloc and also of the West European
military union directed against the Soviet Union and the people's
democracies. . . ."

Formation of "People's Army" and Ministry of National Defence
in Eastern Germany

A law creating a "National People's Army" in Eastern Germany,
and at the same time setting up a Ministry of National Defence, was
unanimously passed by the East German Volkskammer on Jan. 18,
1956. The official text stated that the National People's Army would
consist of "ground, sea and air forces necessary for the defence of the
German Democratic Republic", and that the army's numerical
strength would be "limited in accordance with the tasks of defending
the territory of the German Democratic Republic, defending its
frontiers, and air defence".

98

The law was introduced in the Volkskammer by Herr Willi Stoph
(Deputy Premier in the East German Government), whose appoint-
ment as Minister of National Defence was announced on Jan. 20.
Herr Stoph declared that the "strengthening of the defences of the
German Democratic Republic" had become necessary as a result of
Western Germany's entry into the "aggressive North Atlantic pact",
the establishment in Western Germany of "a mercenary army under
the supreme command of U.S. NATO generals", and the "transfor-
mation of Western Germany and West Berlin into a NATO war
base".

A proposal that the two German States should formally pledge
themselves to refrain from the use of force against each other was
made in the Volkskammer on the same day (Jan. 18) by Herr
Grotewohl.

After declaring that "both parts of Germany must realize the
danger of the policy of NATO and of military pacts", Herr Grote-
wohl called upon the "progressive forces" in Western Germany "to
join with us immediately in seeking a way to release Germany from
the deadly policy of American militarism". He put forward the fol-
lowing proposals:

(1) Both German States should (a) support a European Col-
lective Security Treaty; (6) urge a reduction in the number of for-
eign troops; and (c) "pledge themselves in treaty form to refrain
from all use of force against each other, and to use only peaceful
methods in their efforts for the reunification of Germany".

(2) All "propaganda and preparations for atomic war on German
soil" should be brought to an end. The two German Governments
should reach "joint agreement on the renunciation of the atom bomb
and on the mutual renunciation of the manufacture of atomic
weapons".

(3) The German Democratic Republic and the German Federal
Republic should "make efforts to normalize their relations with
each other, and conclude relevant agreements in the various fields
of economic and cultural life".

Herr Grotewohl reiterated his Government's earlier proposal for
the formation of an All-German Council in which these matters
could be discussed.

East German Army admitted to Joint Military Command
of Warsaw Treaty Powers, 1956

Following the creation of a "National People's Army" in Eastern
Germany, a formal request for the admission of the German Dem-

99

ocratic Republic to the joint command of the Warsaw Treaty Powers
was made by Hen Ulbricht to the Prague meeting of the Political and
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty which took place on
Jan. 27-28, 1956.

The Prague meeting decided in favour of Herr Ulbricht's request
and announced in a communique that contingents of the new East
German Army would be incorporated in the unified command of
the Warsaw Treaty Powers, and the East German Defence Minister
would become a deputy commander under Marshal Koniev.

12. THE EAST BERLIN RISING OF JUNE 1953

Prior to these developments, serious disturbances amounting to
an anti-Communist rising had taken place in East Berlin and other
cities in Eastern Germany.

In a statement on June 11, 1953, the East German Government
announced a series of measures "designed to correct the mistakes
made by the Government and the administrative services in various
fields, and to improve the standard of living of the workers and
intellectuals, together with the farmers, craftsmen and other sections
of the middle class". It was admitted that "mistakes" in the distri-
bution of ration cards, the collection of agricultural produce and
the collection of taxes had resulted in a "difficult situation" which,
however, would be "immediately corrected".

Demonstrations on June 16, 1953, by East Berlin workers pro-
testing against an increase in their working "norms" developed on
the following day into mass demonstrations against the Soviet occu-
pation authorities and the Communist regime, in which tens of
thousands of workers took part. Strong forces of Soviet tanks and
infantry were called out, a curfew and martial law restrictions im-
posed by the Soviet Commandant in East Berlin and many arrests
made. Similar anti-Soviet and anti-Communist demonstrations oc-
curred at the same time in many East German cities, a number of
demonstrators being killed and injured in clashes with Soviet troops
and the Communist "People's Police".

When it was becoming apparent that the People's Police were
losing control of the situation, the Soviet Commandant in Berlin

100

(Major-General Dibrova) sealed off the Eastern sector from the rest
of the city and called out strong forces of Soviet tanks, armoured
cars and lorry-borne infantry to restore order. Later in the day he
imposed a curfew from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m., banned all demonstrations
and announced that groups of more than three persons would be
liable to arrest and immediate punishment under martial law regula-
tions. The curfew and other restrictions were maintained by the
Soviet authorities for nearly a month, being lifted on July 13, 1953.

The East German News Agency announced on June 25 that 25
people had been killed and 378 injured in the disturbances.

Reports of mass arrests of anti-Communists, and of the execution
of many demonstrators by the Soviet military authorities, continued
to reach Western Germany during the last fortnight of June. No
statements on these reprisals were issued either by the Soviet zonal
authorities or the East German regime, except for an official an-
nouncement by the East German News Agency (June 18) that the
Russians had executed a West Berliner, Willi Goettling. It was stated
that General Dibrova had ordered Goettiing's execution on the
ground that he had acted "on the orders of a foreign Power as an
active organizer of provocations and disturbances in the Soviet
sector of Berlin".

Economic Concessions by East German Government

In a speech on June 24, 1953, Herr Grotewohl said that "fascist
bandits and Western provocative elements" could not have met with
success in East Berlin "if the dissatisfaction of the working masses
had not provided the inflammable material". After declaring that
"the guilt for the events of the past days rests with us", and not solely
with "Western agents", he admitted that serious food shortages had
been caused by the Sight of "hundreds of thousands" of fanners to
Western Germany; that the Government had pursued a mistaken
policy in concentrating on industrial production at the expense of
consumer goods; and that there was widespread and justified dis-
satisfaction with the existing economic conditions. Herr Grotewohl
added the Government had "drawn the necessary conclusion" from
its mistakes and would take immediate measures to ameliorate the
condition of the people.

101

West German Reactions to Uprising in Eastern Zone

The Soviet suppression of the East Berlin uprising aroused intense
indignation in the German Federal Republic.

The Bundestag decided on July 1, 1953, to commemorate the
East Berlin uprising by making its anniversary (June 17) a
memorial day each year. During the debate, Dr. Adenauer said that
although definite figures were not available, there was reason to
believe that 62 people in Eastern Germany had been sentenced to
death and 25,000 imprisoned after the uprising.

Dr. Adenauer, Herr Kaiser (Federal Minister for All-German
Affairs) and members of both Houses of the Federal Parliament
visited West Berlin on June 23, 1953, to attend the funeral service
of seven victims of the uprising of July 17. Dr. Adenauer, in a
funeral oration at the graves of the victims, gave a solemn pledge
"in the name of the whole German people" that the Federal Gov-
ernment "will not rest or desist until Germans behind the Iron
Curtain are free and united with us in freedom and peace".

U.S. Food Aid for Eastern Germany

In a message to Dr. Adenauer on July 10, 1953, President Eisen-
hower offered $15,000,000 of American foodstuffs (grain, sugar,
lard, and other commodities) to relieve the serious food shortage
in Eastern Germany, and simultaneously appealed to the Soviet
Government to co-operate in its distribution. The offer was rejected
by the Soviet Government and also by the East German Government.

In response to President Eisenhower's message, Mr. Molotov pre-
sented a Note to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on July 12 saying
that the President was "incorrectly informed about the situation in
Eastern Germany" and had obtained his information from "sources
such as the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany and Adenauer, the
Bonn Chancellor, who are among those chiefly responsible for the
violation of public order in East Berlin". The offer of U.S. foodstuffs
for the East German people was described as "behaviour which
would offend even the population of a colony, let alone the people of
a lawful democratic government", and as "a propaganda manoeuvre
which has nothing in common with the true interests of the German

Herr Grotewohl issued a statement on the same day describing
President Eisenhower's offer as "an insult", "a provocation'*, and

102

an attempt "to use U.S. aid in order to organize espionage rings" in
Eastern Germany.

Despite the Soviet rejection of his offer, President Eisenhower
nevertheless ordered large quantities of foodstuffs to be despatched
by sea and air to Germany, for distribution by the authorities in
West Berlin. Depots and stockpiles were accordingly established by
the West Berlin City Government, which invited people in East Berlin
and in the Eastern zone to collect food parcels from the Schoneberg
Town Hall and other distributing centres.

The food distribution programme was launched on July 27 and
ended on Oct. 10, 1953, during which period over 3,000,000 people
from East Berlin and other parts of Eastern Germany crossed to the
Western sectors and collected food parcels for themselves and for
their families. At the end of the 11 -weeks' programme a total of
5,000,000 food parcels had been distributed, and it was estimated
that 80 per cent of the people of East Berlin had obtained two
rations per person. Of the total number of East Germans crossing
into the Western sectors to collect parcels, 34 per cent were from
East Berlin and 68 per cent from other parts of Eastern Germany.

13. ADENAUER GOVERNMENTS STATEMENTS
ON REUNIFICATION, 1953

The Adenauer Government had meanwhile repeatedly declared
its insistence on the ultimate reunification of Germany on the basis
of free elections to be held in Western and in Eastern Germany.

Five-Point Declaration of German Foreign and International Policy

A five-point declaration of the aims of the Federal Government's
foreign and international policy, drawn up by the Government parties,
was approved by the Bundestag on June 10, 1953, with the support
of all Opposition parties except the Communists. The five points
were as follows:

(1) Free and democratic elections for the whole of Germany.

(2) The subsequent formation of an all-German Government.

(3) The conclusion of a peace treaty between the Allied Powers
of the last war and a reunited Germany.

103

(4) The settlement of all territorial questions in this peace treaty.

(5) Freedom for an all-German Government to enter into any
arrangements with other countries which were consistent with the
aims of the United Nations.

The Federal Chancellor denied rumours that he had tried to
"torpedo" four-Power talks, and stressed that he was in favour of
such talks if they offered a reasonable prospect of success. However,
he said, the Soviet Union wished to draw up a peace treaty on the
basis of the Potsdam Agreement, which would mean (1) that Ger-
many would not be able to take part in the peace negotiations, (2)
that the four Powers would retain permanent economic, political and
mUitary control over Germany, (3) that Germany would be barred
from entering into international alliances, and (4) that the present
German frontiers would be regarded as permanent and unchange-
able.

Re-election of Dr. Adenauer

The Bundestag was dissolved on July 29, 1953, in preparation for
general elections, which were held on Sept. 6 throughout the Federal
Republic.

The election campaign was fought predominantly on questions of
foreign policy and, in particular, on the question of European unity
and Germany's role therein. On Sept. 4, shortly before polling day,
the Federal Chancellor submitted a memorandum to the Western
Powers proposing (1) the conclusion, within the framework of the
United Nations, of a general security pact between Russia and her
European allies on the one hand and the European Defence Com-
munity, in alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on
the other; (2) the development of trade relations between Western
and Eastern Europe.

Dr. Adenauer said that he recognized that Russia might feel the
need for some form of security against the possibility of an attack
from the West, and suggested that such security could best be
obtained by a European pact along the lines he had proposed. Refut-
ing the Soviet contention that the E.D.C., linked with NATO, would
constitute a threat to the Soviet Union, he emphasized that the
armaments of the E.D.C. member-countries would be circumscribed
and internationally controlled, and that Germany herself, as a mem-

104

her of the E.D.C., would have only 12 divisions. "The Soviet Govern-
ment," he added, "has itself described its fear of an attack on the
U.S.S.R. and its desire for peace as the mainspring of its policy. It
is not credible that Russia can really feel herself threatened by the
creation of the European Defence Community, including 12 German
divisions. It is possible that she fears the U.S.A. and the world-wide
influence it exercises. If for this reason there is really a subjective
Russian need for security, the West is ready to meet it without
prejudice to the West's own need to remember its own security." To
satisfy the "possible security needs" of the U.S.S.R. Dr. Adenauer
therefore suggested that the alliance of the six E.D.C. countries, after
being linked to NATO, should "enter into treaty relations with the
regional alliances of the Eastern bloc, within the framework of a
superstructure to be developed within the United Nations". After such
a relationship had been achieved, trade between Eastern and Western
Europe should be expanded to the greatest possible extent, since "eco-
nomic development and political security go hand in hand".

The Social Democrats the principal Opposition party opposed
what they described as the "little Europe" concept advocated by Dr.
Adenauer, asserted that the Federal Republic was in a position of
inequality both in the European Defence Community and the Coal
and Steel Community, and maintained that full British and Scandi-
navian participation was essential in any projects of European co-
operation and integration. Hen Ollenhauer, the party leader, declared
during the election campaign that the reunification of Germany was
the overriding consideration, and that a unified Germany should not
commit herself to an alliance with either the East or the West.

These proposals were denounced by Dr. Adenauer, who declared
that they would mean "the end of Germany", said that to leave it
to the four Powers alone to determine Germany's future place in
the world would be tantamount to saying that "Germans should
mount the gallows with bowed heads", and criticized equally strongly
the proposal that West German representatives should "sit down
at the council table with the Pankow persecutors of their German
brothers and sisters in the Soviet Zone". Replying to Dr. Adenauer's
criticisms on Aug. 31, Heir Ollenhauer stressed that the Social Dem-
ocrats continued to reject the participation of the East German
Government as an equal partner in the discussions on the future of
Germany, but maintained that the holding of free elections in all
four Zones required "certain technical arrangements" for which it
was indispensable to have discussions with East German representa-
tives, just as the two sides had already discussed railway and postal

105

questions and interzonal traffic. He added that the elections them-
selves must be placed under international control and denied that
there had been any change in his party's policy, saying that its aim
remained the holding of free elections and German co-operation with
the four Powers in any negotiations for reunification.

The elections in the Federal Republic, which were held in a calm
and orderly atmosphere, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the
Christian Democrats headed by Dr. Adenauer, whose majority was
the greatest in German parliamentary history.

Speaking later in the evening from the balcony of the Bonn Rat-
haus, from which he addressed a torchlight procession in his honour,
Dr. Adenauer declared that his aims for his new term of office were

should we not rather speak of the liberation of our brothers in the
Eastern zone? Our aim must be the liberation of the 18,000,000
Germans in the East who are at present under the yoke of Soviet
oppression and slavery .... Let us close our ranks and work
together for this aim. Our policy is the peaceful achievement of Ger-
man unity, the liberation of our brothers in the East, and a united
Europe. . . . When the 18,000,000 Germans in the Soviet Zone have
been liberated, a free and united Germany will be able to take her
place in a united Europe."

In a further press statement on Sept. 8, Dr. Adenauer stressed that
the main purpose of the E.D.C. was to make any future war between
Germany and France impossible and that the E.D.C. was in no way
directed against the Soviet Union. He also declared that the question
of the former German territories in Eastern Europe must never lead
to a war between Germany and Poland, and added: "It must be the
aim of German policy to restore friendly relations with a free Poland.
The German Eastern territories could then possibly be administered
under a German-Polish condominium or placed under the United
Nations."

The Federal Government's Press Office in Bonn announced on
Sept. 9, 1953, that Dr. Adenauer would retain the post of Foreign
Minister in the new Government to be formed concurrently with the
Chancellorship.

106

At a summit conference of the Heads of Government of the Four
Powers (President Eisenhower, Marshal Bulganin, Sir Anthony Eden
and M. Edgar Faure) in Geneva, the four leaders agreed inter alia on
July 23, 1955, that "the reunification of Germany by means of free
elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests
of the German people and the interests of European security".

107

m. FROM DR. ADENAUER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
TO DR. ERHARD'S POLICY STATEMENTS,
1955-65

1. DR. ADENAUER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 1955

The Soviet Government issued a declaration on Jan. 15, 1955,
expressing its readiness to "normalize" its relations with the German
Federal Republic on condition that the Paris agreements were not
ratified. This declaration was followed on Jan. 25 by a decree, issued
by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, ending the state of war
between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, which had existed since the
German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

The Soviet declaration made the following three points:

(1) "The most important and urgent matter for settling the Ger-
man problem is to solve the task of restoring German unity. In order
to carry out this task, talks are necessary between the U.S.A., Britain,
France and the Soviet Union, on the question of restoring the unity
of Germany on the basis of free all-German elections. Such talks
would lose all point and would become impossible if the Paris agree-
ments were ratified."

(2) The Soviet Union, which had "good relations with the Ger-
man Democratic Republic' 9 was "likewise prepared to bring about
normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and the German Federal
Republic" with the aim of "promoting better mutual understanding
and the search for more successful ways of carrying out the task of
restoring German unity".

108

(3) "If the Paris agreements are ratified, a new situation will be
created in which the Soviet Union would concern itself, not only
with further strengthening friendly relations with the German Demo-
cratic Republic, but also, through the joint efforts of the peace-loving
European States, with helping to strengthen peace and security in
Europe."

The declaration said that the ratification of the Paris agreements
would "draw the German Federal Republic into adventurist plans
for preparing a new war", "establish the division of Germany for
long years to come", and "be an obstacle in the way of the peaceful
restoration of German unity". It added: "There are still possibilities,
which have not been utilized, of reaching agreement on the question
of German unification with due consideration for the legitimate
interests of the German people, and for the holding in 1955 of free
all-German elections with this end in view. Such possibilities exist
if the main obstacle that now stands in the way of German reunifica-
tion the plans for the remilitarization of Western Germany and its
inclusion in military groupings is removed. The German people
should be given the opportunity, by free general elections throughout
Germany, including Berlin, to express their will freely, so that a
united Germany can again arise as a great Power occupying a worthy
place among the other Powers. . . .

"The Soviet Government considers it possible, in the event of
assent by the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal
Republic, to come to an understanding on the establishment of
appropriate international supervision over the holding of all-German
elections. In this connexion, no section of Germany must be bound
by any conditions of separate agreements regarding its participation
in military groupings. . . .

"The German people must make a choice. They must choose the
road they are to follow. One road leads to the restoration of German
unity and the establishment of normal relations with all European
States. This road precludes participation by any section of Germany
in military groupings directed against other States, and can best be
ensured by Germany's participation in a system of European col-
lective security. The other road, on to which the Paris agreements
are dragging the German people, leads to the division of Germany,
the restoration of militarism in Western Germany, and the inclusion
of Western Germany in the plans for preparing a new war."

An official statement issued in Bonn on Jan. 16 described the
Soviet declaration as a new move in the "continuing struggle of the
Soviet Union" to prevent the unity of the Western world. It denied

109

in toto the allegation that the Paris agreements would mean the
remilitarization of Western Germany; declared that negotiations with
the Soviet Union on the reunification of Germany had no chance of
success unless it were based on an "alliance of free peoples"; and
recalled that the Soviet Government itself, at the Berlin Conference
of 1954, had refused free all-German elections and had blocked
"every step towards the reunification of Germany in peace and
freedom".

The decree issued on Jan. 25, 1955, by the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, ending the state of war between Germany and the
U.S.S.R., contained the following passages:

"Having in view the strengthening and extension of peaceful and
friendly mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the German
Democratic Republic, based on the recognition of the principles of
sovereignty and equality; taking into consideration the opinion of
the Government of the German Democratic Republic; and taking
into account the interests of the population of both Eastern and
Western Germany, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet declares:

(1) The state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany is
terminated, and peaceful relations are being re-established.

(2) All judicial restrictions occasioned by the war in respect of
German citizens who were regarded as citizens of an enemy State
are abolished.

(3) The declaration on the ending of the state of war with Ger-
many does not alter her international obligations, and does not affect
the rights and obligations of the Soviet Union which derive from
existing international agreements of the four Powers concerning
Germany as a whole."

Great Britain had terminated the state of war with Germany on
July 9, 1951, France on July 13, 1951, and the United States on
Oct. 24, 1951. Many other Allied countries had taken similar action,
but the Soviet Union and East European countries had remained
technically at war with Germany.

It was officially stated in Bonn on Jan. 26 that the Soviet termina-
tion of the state of war would be a practical step towards the
restoration of normal Russo-German relations only if the Soviet
Government were to agree to "really free elections for the whole
of Germany", and to the negotiation of a peace treaty with a free
all-German Government. The hope was expressed that the Soviet

110

Government, as a first step towards the normalization of relations,
would release all German prisoners of war and civilians still in its
custody.

Soviet Invitation to Dr. Adenauer to visit Moscow

The Soviet Government presented a Note to the Federal German
Government on June 7, 1955, (transmitted by the Soviet Embassy
in Paris to the West German Embassy in that city) inviting Dr.
Adenauer to visit Moscow, and proposing the normalization of rela-
tions between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic.

After declaring that the interests of peace and European security,
as well as those of the Soviet and German peoples, called for the
normalization of relations, the Note continued: "The experience
of history shows that the preservation and strengthening of peace
in Europe depends to a decisive degree on the existence of good
relations between the Soviet and German peoples. ... In the years
when friendly relations and co-operation existed between our peoples,
it was of great benefit to both countries. Conversely, hostile relations
and wars between pur peoples have brought them untold misery,
privation and suffering. It was the Soviet and German peoples that
suffered most of all in the two World Wars. . . .

"The Soviet Government cannot fail to draw the attention of the
Federal Republic to the fact that certain aggressive circles in some
countries are harbouring plans to set the Soviet Union and Western
Germany against each other, and to prevent an improvement in
their relations. Another war would turn Germany into a field of battle
and destruction. Such a war on German territory, involving modern
means of mass destruction, would be even more cruel and devastating
in its results than any past war. Developments must not be allowed
to follow this course. The impending danger can be averted if normal
relations, based on mutual confidence and peaceful co-operation,
are established between our countries. The Soviet Union, in spite of
all the sufferings inflicted upon her during the recent war, has never
let herself be guided by feelings of revenge against the German
people. . . .

"The Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that the
establishment of normal relations between the Soviet Union and the
German Federal Republic will contribute to settling outstanding issues
concerning the whole of Germany, and thereby help to solve the
principal national problem of the German people the re-establish-
ment of the unity of a democratic German State. . . .

"The Soviet Government also attaches great importance to more
stable relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic

111

in the field of trade. It is appropriate to recall that the Soviet Union
and Germany carried on extensive and mutually advantageous trade
in the past, with the commodity turnover amounting at times to
one-fifth of the total foreign trade of both countries. The Soviet Union
has extensive trade relations with the German Democratic Republic.
Trade between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany
is of a limited and unstable nature. However, the pre-requisites exist
for the development of extensive trade and the establishment of mutu-
ally advantageous economic relations between the Soviet Union and
the Federal Republic provided there are normal relations between
them. The Soviet Union, with its highly developed industry and ex-
panding agriculture, considers it possible to enlarge substantially its
volume of trade with Western Germany.

"Cultural interchange can also play an important part in nor-
malizing relations between our countries. Scientific, cultural and
technical ties between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and Germany are
of long standing. They have enriched the intellectual life of both
peoples and have had a favourable effect on European cultural devel-
opment as a whole. These traditions can serve to promote scientific,
cultural and technical co-operation between the two countries.

"The Soviet Government believes that the abolition of the Occu-
pation Statute in Western Germany, and the decree of the Supreme
Soviet ending the state of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany,
provide the necessary conditions for establishing normal and direct
relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic.
In view of this, the Soviet Government proposes to the Government
of the German Federal Republic that direct diplomatic, trade and
cultural relations should be established between the two countries.

"Considering it desirable for personal contact to be established
between the statesmen of the two countries, the Soviet Government
would welcome a visit to Moscow, in the near future, of Chancellor
Adenauer and any other representatives whom the Federal Govern-
ment might wish to send, in order to discuss the establishment of
diplomatic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and the
German Federal Republic, and to examine the relevant issues."

An official statement in Bonn said that the Federal Government
welcomed the Soviet Union's proposal to establish diplomatic, trade,
and cultural relations between the U.S.S.R. and the German Federal
Republic. It added that the Note "raises various questions which
require prior examination", and that it was hoped that an eventual
meeting between Dr. Adenauer and the Soviet leaders would "appear
appropriate". No statement was issued by Dr. Adenauer himself.

The Federal Government's reply to the Soviet proposal for the
normalization of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the German

112

Federal Republic was presented on June 30, 1955, to the Soviet
Ambassador in Paris (Mr. Vinogradov) by the Federal German
Ambassador (Herr von Maltzan). After stating that the Federal
Government was "in agreement" with the Soviet proposal for dis-
cussions on the establishment of diplomatic, commercial, and cultural
relations between the two countries, it added: "In present circum-
stances, it appears to the Federal Government advisable that the
subjects which are to form the basis of this discussion should first
be defined and their order clarified. It proposes, therefore, that
informal discussions should take place between the Embassies of the
two countries in Paris on these questions."

It was pointed out in Bonn that the Federal German Government
did not propose to make any preconditions for a meeting with the
Soviet Government (e.g., on the question of German prisoners of
war still held in the Soviet Union) ; that, although the German Note
had made no mention of the invitation extended to Dr. Adenauer
to visit Moscow, this did not mean that the Federal Chancellor had
declined the invitation; and that the text of the German Note had
been made known beforehand to the British, American and French
Ambassadors in Bonn.

A Soviet Note welcoming the German Federal Government's
willingness to discuss the establishment of diplomatic, trade and
cultural relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic
was transmitted to the German Ambassador in Paris on Aug. 3 by
the Soviet Ambassador. It suggested that the talks between the Soviet
Government and the German delegation headed by Dr. Adenauer
should be held in Moscow "at the end of August or the beginning
of September"; said that the Soviet Government "proceeds from the
premise that establishment of diplomatic, trade and cultural relations
between the two countries will naturally not be bound by any pre-
liminary conditions on the part of one side or the other"; and added
that the Soviet Government had no objection to the German sug-
gestion that Herr von Maltzan and Mr. Vinogradov should have
informal discussions in Paris "for the purpose of specifying the ques-
tions which are to be discussed and studied during the talks in
Moscow".

The German reply, presented to Mr. Vinogradov by Herr von
Maltzan on Aug. 12, suggested that the Soviet-German talks should

113

begin in Moscow on Sept. 9. It accepted the agenda suggested by
the Soviet Government (i.e. the establishment of diplomatic, trade
and cultural relations) but, in addition, proposed that the two Gov-
ernments should also discuss (1) the question of German unity, and
(2) the release of those Germans who were still held in the U.S.S.R.
or in "the Soviet Union's sphere of influence". The German Note
stressed that the Federal Government was of the opinion that these
two questions could not be separated from the question of establishing
diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In a further Note on Aug. 19, the Soviet Government agreed that
the Moscow talks should begin on Sept. 9. It added: "As regards
the question of Germany's national unity ... the Soviet Government
sees no obstacles to an exchange of views on this issue or on other
international questions of interest to both parties". No specific men-
tion was made of the question of German prisoners of war.

Adenauer-Bulganin Discussions in Moscow Agreement on

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Soviet Undertaking

to return 10,000 German Prisoners

Discussions between the Chancellor of the German Federal Re-
public, Dr. Adenauer, and the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R.,
Marshal Bulganin, were accordingly held in Moscow from Sept.
9-13 and resulted in an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the two countries. Marshal Bulganin also gave
an undertaking that the Soviet Government would return to Germany
nearly 10,000 prisoners who, he stated, had committed war crimes
on Russian territory during the Second World War.

The first day's discussions (Sept. 9) were devoted to statements
by Marshal Bulganin and Dr. Adenauer, summaries of which are
given below.

Marshal Bulganin said: "The Soviet Government has agreed to an
exchange of views on the question of establishing German unity. In
doing this we must take note of those serious obstacles which have
arisen as a result of the ratification of the Paris Agreements, under
which the German Federal Republic has undertaken certain military
alignments and the remilitarization of Western Germany is being car-
ried out. The Soviet Government has always recognized that the solu-
tion of the problem of reuniting Germany must be first and foremost
the affair of the Germans themselves. In this respect account should

114

be taken of the actual conditions which have arisen with the existence
of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic
Republic. . . . The Soviet Government has supported, and continues
unswervingly to support, the establishment of a united Germany
as a peaceful and democratic State. It expresses the hope that the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the
German Federal Republic will help to solve unsettled questions in
which both sides are interested. It proposes the establishment of such
diplomatic relations and an agreement on the setting-up of a Soviet
Embassy in Bonn and a Federal German Embassy in Moscow."

An agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations, Marshal
Bulganin added, would "greatly contribute to the development of
trade between our two countries on the basis of appropriate long-term
agreements".

Dr. Adenauer urged that the talks should be held in "an atmo-
sphere of unreserved frankness" and that the delegates should make
every effort "to get at the heart of matters". He did not think that
normal relations could be achieved only by outlawing war, creating
security systems, and establishing "so to speak, in a mechanical way,
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations", but by examining
the causes which rendered the present relationship between the two
countries abnormal, and by making all possible efforts to remove
those causes.

Raising the question of German prisoners of war still in Soviet
hands, "a question by which hardly any German family remains
unaffected", Dr. Adenauer emphasized that he was raising the issue
solely from humane considerations. He declared in this connexion:
"The thought is intolerable that, more than ten years after the end
of hostilities, men who in one way or another were drawn into the
whirlpool of warlike events should be kept from their homes, families
and normal peaceful occupations. Do not think I want to be provo-
cative if I say that the establishment of normal relations between our
States is inconceivable as long as this question is unresolved. It is
not a precondition that I am setting I am speaking of normalization
itself. Let us end a situation that is a daily source of remembrance
of a sorrowful and dividing past".

Turning to the question of German unification, the Chancellor
said that both delegations were agreed that the division of Germany
created an intolerable situation, that German unity must be restored,
and that this was the responsibility of the four great Powers. He
added: "Here also I must repeat that I propose no conditions but
speak of normalization itself. The division of Germany is abnormal;
it is contrary to divine and human right and against nature. . . .
I know that I am speaking for all Germans, not only for the popula-
tion of the Federal Republic, in requesting you to dedicate all your
energies to a rapid solution of this problem. . . . There can be no real

115

security in Europe without the restoration of German unity. We
must eliminate this dangerous potential crisis in which passions can
so easily be inflamed". The four great Powers, Dr. Adenauer con-
tinued, would be discussing this question at the forthcoming Geneva
meeting of Foreign Ministers in October, and he had no intention
of confusing the Geneva discussions by bilateral talks independent
of the four-Power negotiations. "But I am in duty bound," he added,
"to avail myself of the opportunity offered by this meeting to repre-
sent to you urgently the full seriousness of this question, and to discuss
it with you so as to facilitate your task at Geneva."

Referring to the objection, that a reunified Germany might be
regarded as a source of danger to the Soviet Union, Dr. Adenauer
pointed out that it must be left to the free decision of an all-German
Government and an all-German Parliament whether Germany should
join any alliance. He added: "If the Soviet Union, as a result of
the reunification of Germany, should anticipate an impairment of
her security, we are perfectly willing to collaborate in a security
system which will do away with such preoccupations. It would appear
to be right to consider, simultaneously with the deliberations on the
re-establishment of German unity, a security system for Europe."

Dr. Adenauer emphasized that neither NATO nor the Western
European Union were instruments of aggression; that peace was the
primary objective of the entire German people; and that all Germans
were fully aware, from their own experiences, of the terrible destruc-
tion which modern warfare entailed. They were also aware that
atomic warfare "gives mankind the possibility of complete destruc-
tion, of which we can only think with a shudder". The Chancellor
added: "You will find no one in Germany, neither responsible poli-
ticians nor among the people, who even toys with the idea that the
great political problems of today can be solved by a war. New means
to overcome conflicts and differences must be found means based
on international solidarity and international co-operation."

In conclusion, Dr. Adenauer said that his Government shared the
Soviet view that the establishment of diplomatic, economic and
cultural relations would be of advantage to the two countries.

The discussions on Sept. 10 centred on the question of Germans
still held in the Soviet Union. Marshal Bulganin declared in this con-
nexion that no German prisoners of war remained in Soviet territory,
but that 9,626 "convicted war criminals from the former Hitlerite
Army" were serving sentences for crimes committed in the U.S.S.R.
during the war. He emphasized that if the question of these men was
to be examined, it was essential that the German Democratic Republic
(Eastern Germany) should be represented in the discussions equally
with the Federal Republic.

116

Marshal Bulganin, after dwelling on the sufferings caused by the
Nazis during the war, said that the Soviet people could not under-
stand why attempts were being made in Western Germany to repre-
sent these war criminals as "innocent martyrs". If this question was
to be examined, representatives of both parts of Germany would have
to participate hi the discussions. "But," Marshal Bulganin added,
"since it seems that the German Federal Republic does not consider
it desirable to discuss this matter with representatives of the German
Democratic Republic, it is clear that discussion of this question is
inappropriate during these negotiations."

Dr. Adenauer said that no one would deny the enormity of the
crimes committed by the Nazis in the Soviet Union during the war,
nor the sufferings and privations inflicted upon the Soviet people.
The overwhelming majority of Germans felt disgust at the crimes
committed by the Wehrmacht in Russia, but it should also be borne
in mind that Soviet troops had "committed certain acts" on German
soil, and that "terrible things" had happened during the Soviet
advance into Germany.

Mr. Khrushchev intervened at this point to protest at Dr.
Adenauer's "offensive" allegation that Soviet troops had committed
acts of brutality in Germany, which he denied categorically. Declaring
that the Soviet Army had performed a "sacred duty" in carrying the
war into Germany after driving the German armies from the U.S.S.R.,
he added: "We fully understand the sufferings and sorrows of mil-
lions of German people who have heard nothing of the fate of their
relatives. But who is to blame for the fact that these people have not
returned to their families? Many Germans were killed in the war, but
even more Soviet citizens perished. Who is to blame? We are not
guilty. It was not we who crossed the border. It was not we who
started the war." Mr. Khrushchev added, however, that bitterness
and revenge were "bad counsellors" and that "we must look to the
future, which demands the establishment of friendly and normal
relations between the German and Soviet people". As regards the
reunification of Germany, he said: "You [Dr. Adenauer] must under-
stand our position. We honestly and repeatedly warned you that the
Paris Agreements and the entry of the German Federal Republic into
NATO would block a solution of this problem in the near future."

Mr. Molotov said that the German people had not been able to
overthrow Hitlerism by themselves, and owed Hitler's downfall to the
Soviet Union's prosecution of the war.

At a further session on the same day, Dr. Adenauer made an
explanatory statement on his reference to "certain acts" committed by
the Soviet forces in Germany. According to Moscow Radio, the
Federal Chancellor spoke as follows:

117

"Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Molotov have said that I stated that
the Soviet Army, after arriving in Germany, committed crimes. I
state categorically I have checked it from notes taken by the Sec-
retary of State, Dr. Hallstein that I did not use this word delib-
erately and intentionally. I said that during the entry of the [Soviet]
troops terrible things happened. It would be proper not to delve more
deeply into these matters."

Dr. Adenauer continued: "Mr. Molotov said that the Germans
were incapable of ridding themselves of Hitlerism. Do not take
offence at what I am going to say now. It does not concern the Soviet
Union alone, but a number of other countries also. Why, after 1933,
did the Great Powers make it possible for Hitler to grow in strength?
That is the crucial question. When I think of the honours accorded
to Hitler by the Great Powers for instance, at the Berlin Olympics
I ask you to understand that I really cannot control my feelings.
I will never forget how Hitler, with impunity, got away with every
violation of international treaties. This turned Hitler into a hero
in the eyes of certain stupid Germans, while others were reduced to
despair. They must have seen, as I saw from 1933 onwards, how
this man was allowed to grow to such dimensions. We I mean the
Federal Government and our Parliament are the unfortunate heirs
to all that. Since Germany suffered much from the war, we must
try to rebuild Germany. We must try once more to win the confidence
of foreign Powers, as well as your confidence. I know it is a difficult
task, but it must be solved."

As regards NATO, Dr. Adenauer was quoted as saying: "I am
convinced that, providing the Great Powers conduct negotiations in
the future in a sober manner, everything that has been achieved in
NATO can indeed must become an instrument of a European
security system. I think that this should be the aim of a comprehen-
sive and soberly-pursued policy."

Appealing for an on-the-spot survey of the problem of prisoners of
war, Dr. Adenauer said: "We think that we know quite a few cases
where Germans taken as prisoners of war were sentenced for crimes
committed after the cessation of hostilities. We wish for nothing more
than that you should study this question together with us. Do not let
us return home with a statement that the Soviet Union altogether
refuses to discuss this question with us."

Referring to the Soviet insistence on East German participation in
the P.O.W. question, the Chancellor added: "As soon as we are
convinced that we are meeting the representatives recognized by the
population of the Soviet zone, we shall sit down with them at the
same table. ... We hold that the Government of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic cannot claim to represent the 17 or 18 million Ger-
mans living in the Soviet Zone "

118

After further discussions on Sept. 12-13 a communique was issued
in the evening of Sept. 13 announcing that agreement had been
reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic, and that letters to
this effect had been exchanged between Dr. Adenauer and Marshal
Bulganin.

The communique said that the talks had taken place "in an
atmosphere of mutual understanding" and that there had been "a
broad and frank exchange of views on the question of the mutual
relations between the U.S.S.R. and the German Federal Republic".
It continued: "Agreement was reached ... on the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and, to this end,
on the setting-up of Embassies in Bonn and Moscow, and on the
exchange of Ambassadors. Both delegations agreed that the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations will contribute to the development of
mutual understanding and co-operation between the Soviet Union
and the German Federal Republic in the interests of peace and
security in Europe. The parties start from the assumption that the
establishment and development of normal relations between the Soviet
Union and the German Federal Republic will further the settlement
of pending problems affecting the whole of Germany, and must thus
help the solution of the principal national problem of the German
people the re-establishment of a unified, democratic German State.
In confirmation of the agreement reached, the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Chancellor of the Ger-
man Federal Republic have exchanged letters, the text of which is
annexed. The parties also agreed that negotiations between the Ger-
man Federal Republic and the Soviet Union on the development of
trade should be opened in the near future."

The text of the letters exchanged between Dr. Adenauer and
Marshal Bulganin was released at the same time. In identical terms,
they recapitulated, in effect, the wording of the communique and
stated that the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations
would take effect after ratification by the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet and by the Federal German Bundestag.

On the same day (Sept. 13) Moscow Radio broadcast the text of
statements made by Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Molotov at the final
session of the conference. Marshal Bulganin's statement related to
Soviet displaced persons in Western Germany, whilst that of Mr.
Molotov related to the distribution of anti-Communist literature in

119

the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries by balloons released
in Western Germany, allegedly by U.S. organizations.

Marshal Bulganin's statement was worded as follows: "Hundreds
of thousands of peaceful Soviet citizens were forcibly deported to
Germany during the war by the Hitlerite Army from the territories of
the Soviet Union it temporarily occupied. Many perished in com-
pulsory labour camps in Germany. After the defeat of the Hitlerite
Army, the majority of the captured Soviet citizens returned home.
But a not inconsiderable number were retained, mainly in Western
Germany.

"According to existing information there remain on the territory
of the German Federal Republic over 100,000 such Soviet citizens,
in many cases described as being without nationality. The majority
of these unhappy people, separated by force from their homeland
and families, have no permanent occupation, residence or means of
subsistence. They suffer from serious privations and destitution. They
remain in a foreign land as dependent men without rights. Many
cases are known to us of displaced Soviet citizens who do not accept
their lot of being gaoled on the territory of the German Federal
Republic.

"Certain organizations hostile to the Soviet Union, supported by
the relevant authorities, are waging spiteful propaganda and impeding
the repatriation of these persons, frightening and terrorizing those
who wish to return home. At the same time inadmissible attempts
to make use of these persons for politically criminal purposes are
continuing. We consider that the position which has arisen in the
German Federal Republic in connexion with displaced Soviet citizens
is abnormal and is opposed to the principles of humanity and of
freedom of the individual.

"The Soviet Government considers it a duty to take up the
defence of these Soviet citizens, who in certain cases have misbehaved
against their country. We hope that they will reform, and we will
not call them to account severely for offences committed by them.
In drawing attention to this matter, we hope that the Government
of the German Federal Republic will take the necessary measures
and afford its co-operation for the return home of displaced Soviet
citizens."

Mr. Molotov's statement was worded: "According to reports by
Soviet airmen flying both on internal and international routes, there
are uncontrolled flights of large balloons with loads attached to them.
The balloons are about eight metres in diameter and 16 metres high.
Investigations of balloons picked up on the territory of the Soviet
Union show that the weight of the loads attached reach up to 300
kilograms. It is known that such balloons are released from Western

120

Germany with the aim of spreading in the Soviet Union and in a
number of other European countries leaflets and propaganda litera-
ture hostile to those States.

"According to the findings of competent Soviet aviation experts,
such balloons are dangerous to air transport. . . . According to in-
formation to hand, these balloons are released from Western Ger-
many by American organizations. This was openly stated on Aug. 16
by the American radio station in Munich, which said that a large
number of such balloons had been released on Aug. IS by the
American 'Crusade for Freedom' organization.

"In drawing the attention of the Federal Chancellor to this matter,
the Soviet Government expects that the necessary measures will be
taken in the German Federal Republic for the cessation of these
activities and for the elimination of the danger created by the bal-
loons to aircraft flying on the internal lines of the Soviet Union and
on international lines over the territories of the U.S.S.R. and a
number of European States."

Before leaving Moscow for Bonn on Sept. 14, Dr. Adenauer gave
a press conference at which he announced that he had sent a second
letter to Marshal Bulganin stressing (1) that the establishment of
diplomatic relations had in no way changed the Federal Government's
opinion that a final settlement of Germany's frontiers must await the
conclusion of a peace treaty; and (2) that the Federal Government
had not changed its position that the German Federal Republic was
the only legitimate Government of all Germany. He also announced
that both Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev had given him
assurances that the repatriation of the 9,626 Germans still held in
the Soviet Union would begin immediately.

The relevant paragraphs of the Chancellor's second letter to Mar-
shal Bulganin were as follows:

"The establishment of diplomatic relations between the German
Federal Republic and the U.S.S.R. constitutes no recognition of the
existing territorial situation on both sides. The final definition of the
frontiers of Germany remains reserved to the peace treaty.

"The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union
implies no change in the juridical position of the Federal Government
in relation to its right to represent the German nation in international
affairs, and in regard to the political conditions in those German
regions which lie at present outside its effective sphere of sovereignty."

Dr. Adenauer said at his press conference that the establishment
of diplomatic relations would be a stabilizing influence for peace in

121

Europe, and would end a state of affairs which had been a marked
factor of insecurity in the European situation and which could not
have continued indefinitely. He added: "I want to declare very
emphatically that no secret agreements or understandings of any
kind have been arrived at between the Soviet Union and ourselves.
Nor was any suggestion made to us during the negotiations that we
should abandon our treaty obligations under NATO and the Western
European Union."

A "very important and welcome result" of the talks had been the
assurances of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev that the 9,626
Germans held in the U.S.S.R. "as they put it, war criminals"
would be immediately repatriated. Some of these men would be
granted an amnesty by the Soviet Government and returned to Ger-
many in freedom, whilst others, in so far as the Soviet Government
believed them to have been guilty of grave crimes, would be handed
over to the German authorities so that the Federal Government could
deal with them under German law. "I believe," Dr. Adenauer said,
"that much suffering, misery, and pain will thereby be alleviated, not
only for the 10,000 persons here in the Soviet Union but also for
their numerous dependents at home. Marshal Bulganin has authorized
me to tell you that already, before we arrive in Bonn, this operation
[the repatriation of the P.O.W.s] will be set in motion."

The Chancellor went on to say that the German delegation believed
that a fairly large number of Germans over and above the 10,000
to be repatriated still remained in the Soviet Union. Marshal
Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev had said that they knew nothing of
such persons, but had added, however: "If you [the Chancellor]
are in a position to give lists of them, we promise you that we will
investigate the matter and that we will deal with these Germans in
the same way as with the prisoners of war." Dr. Adenauer added:
"We shall now have to examine the lists again. They are prepared
from letters which the persons in question have sent to relatives in
the Federal Republic, giving their camp, number and other details.
After the declarations which we have received, I do not doubt that
the Soviet Government will fulfil this solemnly-given promise."

As regards German reunification, Dr. Adenauer said: "It was
declared from the Soviet side that the four Powers that is, including
Russia had the obligation to bring about the restoration of German
unity. The three Western Powers take the same view." After stressing
that nothing had been done to anticipate the forthcoming four-Power
talks in Geneva, he expressed the hope that the Geneva conference,
and others that might follow it, would consider and decide upon the
restoration of German unity "with all speed".

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the German
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union was unanimously approved
122

by the Federal German Cabinet on Sept. 19, after Dr. Adenauer's
return from Moscow.

Dr. Adenauer gave another press conference in Bonn on Sept. 16
at which he reiterated his conviction that it would have been wrong
to refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet leaders, he said, had shown themselves extraordinarily
sensitive on questions of prestige, not for themselves but for their
country, and would have regarded the rejection of diplomatic rela-
tions as an insult. In view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. was "one
of the most powerful States on this earth", covering one-sixth of
the globe, he believed that the German delegation had done right in
agreeing to diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Regarding the reputation of prisoners of war, the Chancellor said
that both Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev had given their
word of honour that these men would be immediately returned to
Germany. That had been "a great human success". "Throughout
the entire negotiations," he added, "and in the internal discussions
in our delegation, the thought of the prisoners affected us continually
often oppressively. What would have happened if we had ended
the talks without an understanding, if none of the prisoners could
have returned to their homeland and their relatives? That was for
us a very essential aspect of the entire negotiations."

After stressing that the Soviet Union, like the three Western
Powers, had accepted the restoration of German unity as an obliga-
tion. Dr. Adenauer expressed his conviction that the Soviet leaders
earnestly desired a period of peace. He declared in this connexion:
"They are concerned whether, while carrying the monstrous burden
of armaments, they can master the great domestic tasks before them.
They want a period in which they can spend less on armaments.
They remain Communists; they believe they are right; we cannot
convince them, nor they us."

Dr. Adenauer repeated that the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between the Federal Republic and the U.S.S.R. had in no way
changed the Federal Republic's loyalty to its treaty obligations under
NATO and the W.E.U. Moreover, the Soviet representatives had not
asked that the Federal Republic should leave these organizations.

An official announcement was issued in Moscow on Sept. 15
declaring that the Soviet Government regarded Germany's present
frontiers as final. It was worded as follows: "At a press conference in
Moscow on Sept. 14, the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic
made a statement on questions relating to the frontiers of Germany.
The Soviet Government regards the German Federal Republic as a

123

part of Germany. The other part of Germany is the German Dem-
ocratic Republic. In connexion with the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Repub-
lic, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to state that the ques-
tion of the frontiers of Germany was solved by the Potsdam
Agreement and that the German Federal Republic is carrying out
its jurisdiction on the territory under its sovereignty."

The Moscow agreement was unanimously approved by the German
Federal Government on Sept. 19 and by the Bundestag on Sept. 23,
1955, and ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet two days
later.

Dr. Adenauer, opening the debate in the Bundestag on Sept. 22,
reiterated that the Federal Republic's loyalty to the West was undim-
inished. "Germany's partnership with the West," he declared, "goes
beyond politics. It is rooted in her indissoluble membership in the
circle of Christian Western culture. Speaking for myself, and for the
populations of Western and Eastern Germany, I solemnly declare:
Germany is part of the West, of its spiritual and social structure and
its historical traditions. The Government will not relax its efforts
towards European integration and the defence of freedom. Rather
will it intensify these efforts."

After reviewing the background of the Moscow negotiations, die
Chancellor declared that his decision to exchange Ambassadors with
the Soviet Union was "not to be put on a level with a friendly treaty
relationship". The Soviet leaders, he said, had pointed out to him
that they maintained diplomatic relations with States with which
they had substantial political and ideological differences, and the
absence of relations between Bonn and Moscow was an "anomaly"
which made it impossible to represent German interests vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. The German delegation, he emphasized, had told
the Soviet leaders that a normalization of relations between the two
countries could "on no account mean the legalization of the anomal-
ous state of Germany's present partition". The Federal Chancellor
added: "There is no inconsistency between pur decision to establish
diplomatic relations and the line of our foreign policy, which we are
determined to pursue under all circumstances."

Moreover (Dr. Adenauer continued), the exchange of Ambassadors
with the Soviet Union did not mean any change in the Federal
Government's attitude to the East German regime, which was not
formed on the basis of truly free elections, had no real popular man-
date, and was rejected by the overwhelming majority of its own
people. "The Federal Government alone is authorized to speak for
all Germany," he declared. "The member-States of NATO have

124

adopted this position in a joint declaration, and all other States of
the free world have adopted it expressly or by implication. . . .
The treaty of Sept. 20 between the Soviet-zone Government and the
Soviet Union [see below] changes nothing in the existing position.
The Soviet-zone Government has no sovereignty, and there is no
question of recognizing it. I must make it clear that in the event of
recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic by third
parties with whom the Federal Government has official relations, we
should consider this as an unfriendly act calculated to intensify the
division of Germany."

The Chancellor went on to refer to the exchange of letters between
the East German and Soviet Foreign Ministers which accompanied
the East German-Soviet Treaty of Sept. 20, 1955, under which
responsibility for surface communications between Berlin and West-
ern Germany, except for the traffic of Western forces, was assigned
to the German Democratic Republic. Dr. Adenauer said that this
was contrary to the four-Power agreement of June 20, 1949, ending
the Berlin blockade, under which the Soviet Government had under-
taken specific responsibilities for inter-zonal traffic and Berlin traffic.
The new Russian move was intended to force the Federal Govern-
ment to negotiate with, and eventually to recognize, the East German
regime, but this it was not prepared to do. Dr. Adenauer said that
the Federal Government had drawn the attention of the three West-
ern Powers to this matter, and had asked them "to take the necessary
steps".

In conclusion, Dr. Adenauer claimed that "in extraordinarily diffi-
cult negotiations" they had "made what was humanly and politically
possible out of a given situation", adding: "I am not unmindful of the
complex problems raised by the Moscow decisions. It is not by
avoiding risks, however, that the difficult political problems of our
country can be solved or the reunification of Germany achieved."

Herr Ollenhauer (the Social Democratic leader), speaking for the
Opposition, welcomed Dr. Adenauer's efforts to secure the release of
German prisoners in the Soviet Union, and announced that his party
had decided to approve the Moscow Agreement because they wished
"to exploit the possibilities of an active reunification policy offered by
the normalization of relations between Bonn and Moscow".

Herr Ollenhauer maintained that the Moscow talks had shown
that the Paris Agreements were not the key to German reunification,
and that the Russians would refuse to allow Germany to become
united as long as the Federal Republic adhered to NATO. "This
is exactly the situation," he added, "which we Social Democrats
warned you would arise even before the Paris Agreements were
ratified." The Federal Government's argument that membership in
the Atlantic alliance would force the Soviet Union to abandon East-
ern Germany had been "utterly disproved", and, far from facilitating

125

the reunification of Germany through alliance with the West, Dr.
Adenauer's policy had resulted in a Soviet victory and the worsening
of the prospects for German reunification.

The Social Democrats, Herr Ollenhauer continued, were disturbed
over the future relationship between the two German Governments
in the new situation. They disputed the "democratic legitimacy" of the
East German regime, and agreed that no diplomatic contacts should
be established with it. "All-German talks", as proposed by the Soviet
Union, would involve the risk of Germany being treated in the same
way as Poland and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps of sharing their fate.
Herr Ollenhauer expressed regret, however, at the Chancellor's state-
ment with regard to the Federal Government's attitude towards third
countries recognizing the East German regime. "The Chancellor him-
self has said often enough," he declared, "how long and hard is the
way to the recovery of the world's confidence in the German nation.
When he now says, almost in the manner of an ultimatum, that the
Federal Government will regard the establishment of diplomatic
relations by third Governments with the German Democratic Repub-
lic as an unfriendly act, I ask myself who is served by such strong
language. Certainly not the German nation. Such words are liable to
open old wounds and endanger new friendships. . . ."

In conclusion, Herr Ollenhauer called for a more determined
Western initiative to restore German unity; suggested that the Fed-
eral Republic should withdraw from NATO, and that the Great
Powers should agree on a European security system satisfactory to
all member-countries; and declared: "The Chancellor has taken in
Moscow a step towards greater freedom of action in German foreign
policy. The Paris Agreements gave him the right to do so, and we
approve this step. Our attitude towards the Government's foreign
policy in the new period now opening will be determined by the use
he is going to make of this freedom."

In unanimously approving the Moscow Agreement, the Bundestag
also adopted two all-party resolutions.

The first resolution took note of Marshal Bulganin's personal
promise to release German prisoners of war still in the Soviet Union,
and expressed the "certain expectation" that this promise would be
kept.

The second resolution (a) endorsed the Chancellor's statement that
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union did
not imply West German recognition of the present frontiers of Ger-
many pending their determination in a peace treaty; that the German
Federal Republic was the only legitimate German regime in inter-
national affairs; and that there would be no recognition of the East

126

German regime; (i) reiterated the demand for (he reunification of
Germany.

Soviet Repatriation of German Military and Civilian Prisoners

In accordance with Marshal Bulganin's promise to Dr. Adenauer,
the repatriation of 9,626 Germans imprisoned in the U.S.S.R. on
charges of war crimes began in October 1955, a total of 5,863 being
returned between Oct. 6 and Oct. 20, comprising 3,890 former pris-
oners of war and 1,973 civilians. Of those repatriated, 1,256 were
sent to Eastern Germany, but some of them succeeded in escaping
later to Western Germany.

On Oct. 20, however, the repatriation of the P.O.W.s was sud-
denly stopped, and was not resumed until Dec. 11. Although no
official announcement was made on the German side attributing any
blame to the Soviet authorities, the hold-up was attributed in the
West German press partly to delays in the Soviet-German discussions
on the detailed arrangements connected with the establishment of
embassies in Bonn and Moscow, and partly to Soviet demands for the
repatriation of 100,000 Soviet nationals allegedly held in Western
Germany. This assumption was confirmed by the fact that, following
German agreement to the proposed appointment of Mr. Valerian
Zorin as Soviet Ambassador, and a German statement on the repatri-
ation of Soviet nationals, it was announced by the Soviet authorities
on Dec. 8 that further transports of prisoners were on the way.

Earlier Soviet Releases of German Prisoners

Between Sept. 25, 1953, and Nov. 27, 1953, about 4,500 Germans
who had been imprisoned on charges of war crimes had been returned
by the Soviet Union to Eastern and Western Germany, under an
agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the East German Government.
About 5,000 more were released between Dec. 28, 1953, and the
beginning of January 1954.

The most prominent German general released during 1953 was the
former Field-Marshal von Paulus, commander of the German Sixth
Army at Stalingrad, and leader of the Free German Movement
formed in Moscow amongst German officers in captivity. His release
was announced on Oct. 26, 1953.

On Jan. 19, 1955, the Soviet High Commission officially an-
nounced the release of Field-Marshal Ferdinand Schorner, who com-

127

manded the German forces in Czechoslovakia at the end of the war,
and of Vice- Admiral Hans Voss, chief naval liaison officer at Hitler's
wartime headquarters.

The mass release of German prisoners from Soviet prison camps
was not resumed until September, 1955, in which month nearly
1,100 soldiers and civilians returned to Eastern or Western Germany.
These releases immediately preceded those under Marshal Bulganin's
promise to Dr. Adenauer.

It was officially announced in East Berlin on Dec. 22, 1955, that
the East German Government had granted an amnesty to 2,616 war
criminals whom the Soviet authorities had handed over a considerable
time earlier to the custody of the authorities in Eastern Germany.

Soviet Demand for Return of Soviet Refugees in
Western Germany

Following Marshal Bulganin's allegation that more than 100,000
Soviet nationals were "detained" in Western Germany, the Soviet
Committee for Return to the Homeland (which had its offices in East
Berlin) requested the German Federal authorities on Oct. 31, 1955,
to assist in repatriating these Soviet citizens. The East German News
Agency announced that Major-General Michailov, chairman of the
committee, had written to that effect to the Federal Minister of the
Interior, Dr. Schroder.

In a statement on Dec. 2, Herr von Brentano, the West German
Foreign Minister, told the Bundestag that the Federal Republic
would not hold back any Soviet citizens who wanted to return to the
U.S.S.R.

"It is beyond dispute," Herr von Brentano declared, "that no
Soviet citizen will be hindered by us from returning to the Soviet
Union if he wishes to go. If the Soviet Union doubts this, we shall
gladly let them see for themselves that no Soviet citizen or any one
is prevented from returning if he wishes to do so." The statement was
made in reply to a question by Dr. Gille (Refugee Party), who quoted
an article in Izvestia suggesting that the return of Soviet citizens from
Germany was a condition for resuming the repatriation of German
prisoners from the Soviet Union, which had stopped suddenly on
Oct. 20 [see above].

In reply to a Soviet Note of March 9, 1956, which alleged that
large numbers of Soviet citizens were being held against their will
in camps and prisons in the Federal Republic, the German Federal

128

Government completely denied this allegation but stated that it was
prepared to release 31 Russians who were at present serving sen-
tences in West German prisons, and to hand them over to the Soviet
authorities for repatriation.

The German reply said that 51 Russians serving sentences in the
Federal Republic had asked to be repatriated; that in 31 cases
the judicial authorities of the Lander concerned had agreed to the
release of the Russians before completion of their sentences; and that
the other 20 applications were still under consideration.

With regard to displaced persons and refugees from the U.S.S.R.
now living in Western Germany, the German Note pointed out that
all such persons enjoyed the protection of the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees; that they had been given rights equivalent to
those of German nationals; that they possessed international travel
permits enabling them to leave Germany at any time; and that the
Federal Government would "respect" the request of any foreigner
for repatriation and would help him to leave Germany. The Note also
offered that if any of these displaced persons or refugees were unde-
cided and wished to talk the matter over with a Soviet representative,
a meeting could be arranged. It declined, however, a Soviet request
for a complete list of all these refugees, and for the visit of Soviet
representatives to refugee camps, without the individual refugees'
consent.

According to the authorities in Bonn, there were about 30,000
refugees from the Soviet Union in Western Germany, as well as
50,000 refugees from the former Baltic States and those areas of
Poland annexed by the U.S.S.R. after the Second World War.

2. THE "HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE", 1955

Dr. Adenauer's remarks in the Bundestag on Sept. 22, 1955, on
the consequences of any establishment of diplomatic relations with
the East German regime by third countries (see above) were followed
by the decision, officially announced in Bonn on Dec. 9, 1955, that
the German Federal Republic would break off diplomatic relations
with all countries which recognized the East German regime, and
would refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with any Communist
country except the Soviet Union.

This decision later became known as the "Hallstein Doctrine"
after Dr. Walter Hallstein, then State Secretary in the Federal Foreign

129

Ministry. Before 1967 the "Hallstein Doctrine" was enforced three
times:

(1) In 1956 the German Federal Government recalled its Charge
d' Affaires from Damascus on learning that Syria had agreed to the
opening of a Consulate by the East German Government.

(2) In 1957 the Federal Government broke off diplomatic relations
with Yugoslavia when that country recognized Eastern Germany.
(The diplomatic relations were resumed in January 1968.)

(3) In 1963, when the Government of Cuba had agreed to establish
full diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, the German Federal Government broke off diplo-
matic and consular relations with Cuba.

In addition the German Federal Government withdrew its eco-
nomic aid to the United Arab Republic in 1965, after an official visit
to Egypt by Herr Ulbricht.

The "Hallstein Doctrine" was for the first time tacitly abandoned
when the Federal Government decided on Jan. 31, 1967, to establish
diplomatic relations with Romania.

However, it was still applied in June 1969, when the Federal Gov-
ernment suspended its relations with Cambodia after the latter had
established full diplomatic relations with the German Democratic
Republic. The Federal Republic reacted similarly in July 1969, when
the new Government of South Yemen recognized Eastern Germany.

On the other hand the Federal Government merely recalled its
Ambassador for consultations when in April 1970 Somalia estab-
lished diplomatic relations with the G.D.R. Later, the West German
Government ignored the establishment of such relations with Eastern
Germany by a number of other Governments, the first of which was
that of the Congo (Brazzaville) in January 1970.

3. RENEWED SOVIET CRITICISM
OF FEDERAL POLICIES, 1957

Letter by Marshal Bulganin to Dr. Adenauer, February 1957

The text of a personal letter sent by Marshal Bulganin to Dr.
Adenauer was published in Bonn on Feb. 10, 1957.

"More than a year has passed," wrote Marshal Bulganin, "since
extensive and frank negotiations took place in Moscow between the

130

Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic, as a result of which
diplomatic relations were established between our two countries . . .
I would like to tell you, with the same frankness which marked our
talks in Moscow, that my colleagues and I are not satisfied with the
course which relations between our two countries have taken since
then ... I will also not conceal that we watch with anxiety how, in
the German Federal Republic, a strengthening is taking place of
those forces which, with support from abroad, are preventing better
relations between our countries, and which desire to impel the Federal
Republic on to the dangerous path of military adventures.

"You may point out to me, as did the German delegation during
the Moscow negotiations, that in Western Germany there are neither
the forces nor the politicians who want an aggressive war. We see,
however, the role which is contemplated for the German Federal
Republic and its armed forces by the organizers of the North Atlantic
Pact. They wish to use the Federal Republic for an aggressive war
against the interests of the German people. . . .

"We are aware of the fact that there are forces which, with all the
means at their disposal, are preventing the normalization of relations
between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic. For
the sake of their narrow and selfish interests, these forces are trying to
incite a policy which would lead to a military conflict with the Soviet
Union and other Socialist countries. This may be seen very clearly
from the constant demands addressed to the Federal Republic for a
speedy establishment of strong armed forces, and for increased expen-
diture on rearmament and the maintenance of foreign troops. . . .
In addition, the use of West German territory as a concentration area
for an atomic war is being prepared quite openly. . . .

"The policy of the Soviet Government is based on peace and co-
operation with all States. . . . We are convinced that all international
problems can be settled peacefully through negotiations between
the interested countries. The Soviet Union adheres inviolably to
these principles in its relations with the Federal Republic and other
countries. We are convinced that Germany's greatness, and the full
unfolding of the creative genius of the German people, can be
achieved only in peaceful development.

"To a large degree there are sufficient prerequisites for an extensive
development of mutually advantageous economic relations between
the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic
has an industry developed in all fields, and may count on big and
favourable orders from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the
Soviet Union can sell goods to the Federal Republic in which West
German industry and agriculture are interested. We raise the ques-
tion of trade relations with the Federal Republic because the Soviet
Union believes that they provide a solid basis for the improvement
of political relations between States. . . .

131

"The strengthening of trust and of friendly co-operation between
our countries would without doubt facilitate the unification of Ger-
many, which the German people regards as its most urgent national
task. ... We sympathize with these justified desires, and are ready
as always to support the German people in solving this all-German
task. The reunification of Germany will not, however, be brought
nearer if people ignore the fact of the existence of two German States.
A solution of the German problem can be found only through a
rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the
German Federal Republic. It is equally clear that the remilitarization
of Western Germany, the limitation of the democratic rights of its
peoples, and the continuation of an unfriendly policy toward neigh-
bouring peace-loving countries, are not serving the reunification of
Germany.

"Before the day of reunification comes nearer, many difficulties
will have to be overcome. All interested States will have to unite
their efforts. The sooner this happens, the better. The Soviet Govern-
ment for its part, is ready to lend its support to the Governments
of both German States in solving the problem of reunification. An
improvement in relations between our countries will be very useful
in this respect . . .

"We are of the opinion that the tune has come for the Governments
of both our countries to undertake definite steps for an improvement
of relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal
Republic, in conformity with the agreed decisions taken during the
Moscow talks in 1955, and on the basis of the modest but never-
theless useful experiences of mutual relations in various fields since
then.

"In particular, the following urgent questions should be discussed:
(1) a substantial increase in trade between both countries, and the
conclusion of a trade treaty; (2) the conclusion of an agreement on
cultural and scientific co-operation; (3) a consular agreement which
would lay down the rights of both sides in the protection of the
interests of their nationals, thus facilitating the solution of questions
concerning the repatriation of nationals of both countries.

"I would like to emphasize that we obviously do not consider it
proper to limit our relations to economic, cultural and scientific
co-operation. We attach great importance to the opinion of the
German people in the discussion of important international problems.
In talks with the German Democratic Republic we have already
reached mutual understanding on such important questions as rearm-
ament, European security and other problems in which both the
Soviet and the German peoples are equally interested. We are of the
opinion that a rapprochement in the standpoints of the Soviet Union
and the German Federal Republic in these questions would be very
profitable.

132

"We hope that the points of view outlined above will be examined
by the Federal Government in a spirit of friendly and constructive
co-operation. It goes without saying that I and the other members of
the Soviet Government will gladly and carefully examine any pro-
posals which you may care to make toward the strengthening of our
relations . . ."

In a broadcast on Feb. 13, Dr. Adenauer said that although dis-
cussions between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic might
profitably be held on certain subjects, it was essential for the Ger-
man people to bear in mind "clearly and distinctly" (1) ^t there
was "only one German State", and that the "so-called Democratic
Republic" was "not a State but an occupation zone under Soviet rule,
whose people must have their freedom restored to them"; (2) that the
Federal Government had no aggressive intentions whatsoever, and
none of its allies had attempted to encourage any such intentions. If
this were understood by the Soviet Union, as the German people
sincerely hoped, "many difficulties could be overcome more easily".

Soviet Denunciation of NATO Bases in Western Germany and of

Provision of Atomic Arms for West German Forces

Dr. von Brentano's Attack on Soviet Policy

The Soviet Government again attacked Western Germany's par-
ticipation in the Atlantic Pact in a strongly-worded Note sent to the
German Federal Republic on April 27, 1957.

After referring to the "concentration by the Western Powers of
various types of nuclear weapons on the territory of the Federal
Republic", and to the "preparations for equipping the West German
Army with atomic weapons", the Soviet Note spoke of the "justified
anxiety" among the population of Western Germany at the conse-
quences which an atomic war would entail "for the German people,
for the neighbours of Germany, and for Europe as a whole". It
went on:

"The equipping with atomic weapons of the Army of the German
Federal Republic the only European State whose Government
demands a revision of the present frontiers in Europe would sharply
aggravate international tension and increase the danger of war. . . .

"The atomic arming of the German Federal Republic is sometimes
claimed to be necessary for ensuring the security of the country.
Such assertions have nothing in common with the real state of affairs.

133

Instead of exerting efforts to ease international tension, and to facil-
itate agreement on disarmament and the prohibition of weapons of
mass destruction, attempts are being made to ensure the security of
the Federal Republic on the basis of the 'policy of strength'. . . .

"It is quite obvious that the conversion of the Federal Republic into
a NATO atomic base is bound in the event of war to make Western
Germany the immediate object of retaliation by all types of modern
weapons, including rocket weapons. There is no need to dwell in
detail on the consequences this would entail for the Federal Republic,
which has such a density of population and concentration of industry
that the vital centres of the country could be paralysed by a single
hydrogen bomb . . . Germany would become one vast graveyard. . . .

"One cannot evade the question of the consequences which the
equipping of the West German Army with atomic weapons would
have for the restoration for Germany's national unity. If the policy
pursued by the Federal Republic a policy of remilitarization, acces-
sion to aggressive military blocs, and suppression of democratic
freedom has created great obstacles to the unification of Germany,
the equipping of the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons and the con-
version of Western Germany into a centre of atomic war in Europe
would strike an irreparable blow at the national reunification of the
German people. . . ."

The tone of the Soviet Note, and in particular the threats and
menaces contained therein, aroused intense anger and indignation in
the Federal Republic, which was expressed by Dr. von Brentano
(the Foreign Minister) in a press statement on April 29.

Dr. von Brentano described the Soviet Note as "grotesque",
"incomprehensible", and "an unparalleled interference in West Ger-
man affairs", saying that the references to the catastrophic effects of
atomic weapons could only be regarded as "a massive threat and an
attempt at intimidation with a view to separating the Federal Republic
from its allies". He declared that the Soviet Union's objective was to
"obtain a monopoly of nuclear weapons so that it can hold this
continent in everlasting servitude", referring in this connexion to the
"savagery" with which the Soviet Army had crushed the people's
uprising in Hungary in November 1956.

After stressing that the Federal Republic was the only country in
the world which had voluntarily renounced the right to manufacture
atomic weapons, Dr. von Brentano called upon the Soviet Union
to make constructive proposals for disarmament instead of threat-
ening the Federal Republic. In this connexion he declared that the
U.S.S.R. " has not made one single serious effort in all these years to

134

solve this problem on a basis acceptable to freedom-loving people".
He reiterated that the Federal Republic would provide for its own
security with atomic weapons if Russia continued to block an inter-
national agreement for all-round disarmament. Refuting the allegation
that Western Germany had become the "main weapons depot of
Europe", Dr. von Brentano contrasted the 20 NATO divisions (in-
cluding the five half-formed West German divisions) with the 22
Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany, the 75 "satellite" divisions, and
the 153 divisions in the Soviet Union itself. He added: "It simply
defies comprehension that anyone possessing such superiority can
talk about the Federal Republic having become 'Europe's main
weapons depot'."

In reply to the Soviet Note of April 27, the German Federal
Government sent a sharp Note to Moscow on May 22 declaring that
it would not accede to "a one-sided, completely unjustified demand
by a foreign Government to render accounts". It rejected all the
allegations contained in the Soviet Note, and reiterated that the
Federal Republic had the "legitimate right" to ensure its national
security with atomic weapons if the U.S.S.R. continued to block an
international agreement for controlled disarmament.

After drawing the Soviet Government's attention to a unanimous
Bundestag resolution of May 10 calling on all nations possessing
nuclear weapons to discontinue tests and to agree to a controlled
disarmament system, the West German Note observed that the
U.S.S.R.'s attitude at the London disarmament talks was "hardly
encouraging" and that it was the only Government which had "up to
this day refused any really effective control". Emphasizing that the
NATO forces in Western Germany had a purely defensive mission,
it declared that "only those who would irresponsibly risk attacking
that [Atlantic] community have any reason to fear it or the weapons
in its possession". In addition, the Note "emphatically repudiated"
the allegation that West German policy would unleash an arms race;
stressed that the Federal Government rejected any idea of changing
Germany's present frontiers by force; and rejected the Soviet asser-
tion that the provision of atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr would
make German reunification impossible.

The West German Note again emphasized that the Federal Repub-
lic had voluntarily renounced the manufacture of atomic weapons,
and stressed the Federal Government's desire for a ban on all nuclear
and thermo-nuclear weapons as part of an all-round disarmament
plan, and its willingness to do all in its power to promote that
objective.

135

A further Soviet Note was presented in Bonn on June 27, being to
a large extent a recapitulation of the earlier Note of April 27. It was
described by an official German spokesman as "impossibly sharp and
polemical" in tone and as approaching "the limit of what is customary
in diplomatic exchanges".

This Soviet Note accused the Federal Government of "striving to
obtain atomic arms from abroad" for the Bundeswehr, and of "eva-
sive statements intended merely to calm the West German electors
so that the country may later find itself confronted with the fait
accompli of atomic armaments". It also accused the Federal Govern-
ment of taking "a negative view of the proposals on disarmament
which have a direct bearing on Germany, such as the creation in
Europe of a zone of inspection to include both parts of Germany . . .
and the reduction and subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops from
German territory". After reiterating at great length the allegations
contained in the earlier Soviet Note, the Note stated that those who
pursued the policy of arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons
"run the risk of going down in history as the grave-diggers of German
unity".

Bulganin-Adenauer Correspondence on Relations between
Western Germany and Soviet Union

In a letter to Marshal Bulganin on Feb. 28, 1957, the Federal
Chancellor agreed that talks should be held between the two coun-
tries at an early date for an expansion of trade relations, increased
scientific and cultural co-operation and a consular convention.

The Federal Chancellor defended Western Germany's membership
in NATO against Marshal Bulganin's allegations of the allegedly
"aggressive" character of that organization, and emphasized that
its role was entirely defensive. As regards German citizens in the
U.S.S.R., he pointed out that the Soviet Government had agreed in
1955, during his (the Chancellor's) talks in Moscow, to repatriate all
German nationals still in the Soviet Union. While this had been done
in the case of prisoners of war, it had not been carried out in the
case of civilians in which connexion Dr. Adenauer referred par-
ticularly to German scientists who were working at the nuclear experi-
mental station at Sochum, on the Black Sea. On the question of
German reunification, he reiterated that free all-German elections
must be held in preparation for an all-German Parliament and Gov-
ernment^and appealed to Marshal Bulganin to "liberate 17,000,000
Germans" in the Eastern Zone. By doing so the Soviet Government

136

would render "an inestimable service to the cause of friendly co-
operation between our two countries" and would best serve the cause
of peace and European security.

In reply to this letter, Marshal Bulganin informed Dr. Adenauer
on March 18 that the U.S.S.R. was ready to enter into negotiations
with the German Federal Government on the subjects of trade rela-
tions, cultural and scientific co-operation and a consular convention,
and proposed that talks should open at an early date in Moscow or
Bonn. As regards Western Germany's membership in NATO, Mar-
shal Bulganin observed that "we continue to adhere to different view-
points". On the question of reunification, he reiterated the Soviet
view that the unity of Germany could be achieved only by direct
negotiations between Western and Eastern Germany and a rapproche-
ment between the two German States.

A West German Note to the Soviet Government, presented on
April 17, agreed that negotiations on trade, cultural, scientific and
consular matters should be held in Moscow "forthwith", and pro-
posed that any agreements reached should be signed in Bonn. It
was accompanied by a further letter from Dr. Adenauer to Marshal
Bulganin in which the Federal Chancellor pointed out that the Soviet
Premier had made no reference in his latest letter to the repatriation
of Germans in the U.S.S.R., despite the fact that he (Dr. Adenauer)
had raised this matter in his letter of Feb. 28.

After saying that he would "not go into the unfounded, severe
accusations that have repeatedly been made against the Federal
Republic in official declarations of the Soviet Government and are
continually being repeated", Dr. Adenauer stated: "The aspirations
of the entire German people for the re-establishment of its national
unity cannot be nullified by a reference to the alleged existence of
two German States. It is unrealistic to describe the so-called German
Democratic Republic, whose governmental power was not established
by legitimate means and which is rejected by the overwhelming
majority of the population, as a reality in the life of the German
people".

A Soviet Note of May 23 proposed that negotiations on the above-
mentioned subjects should open in Moscow on June IS. As regards
repatriation, the Note said: "The U.S.S.R. has fully completed the
repatriation of German subjects who had been convicted in the

137

Soviet Union and of whom mention was made in the [Moscow]
talks with the Federal German delegation in 1955. This does not
preclude the possibility of discussing certain practical questions
affecting undertakings to repatriate individual German subjects from
the Soviet Union, and also the connected question of the repatriation
of Soviet displaced persons who are still in the Federal Republic".

The West German reply, published on June 10, did not reject
the Soviet proposal for the opening of talks on June 15 but made the
Federal Government's acceptance conditional on the simultaneous
holding of discussions on the repatriation of German civilians still
held in the U.S.S.R. The Note maintained that Dr. Adenauer had
been given a firm assurance by Marshal Bulganin, during the Moscow
talks in 1955, that all German nationals in the Soviet Union who
could be traced on the basis of German lists would be repatriated.
It pointed out, however, that only 9,600 prisoners of war had been
returned to Germany, and expressed the Federal Government's con-
viction based on its researches and the repatriation applications
received that "many thousands" of German civilians were still held
in the U.S.S.R. against their will.

As a result of the impasse between the West German and Soviet
points of view on the repatriation question, no further proposals were
made by either side during 1957 for talks on trade, cultural, scientific
and consular matters.

Joint Soviet and East German Communique on
West German Remilitarization and German Reunification

A delegation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party
visited Eastern Germany from Aug. 7-14, 1957, for discussions with
the East German Government and leaders of the Socialist Unity
Party.

A joint communique which was published on Aug. 14 said in part:

West German Remilitarization. "The Soviet Union and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic consider it essential to declare that the
stationing of American atomic weapons in Western Germany and
other countries of Western Europe, and the decision of the organs
of the North Atlantic bloc to equip European member-countries of
NATO with atomic weapons, intensify the threat to peace and to the
security of the countries of Europe. . . . The Government of the
German Federal Republic, by tolerating and encouraging the dis-

138

position of atomic weapons of the Western Powers in Western
Germany and by preparing the arming of the Bundeswehr with atomic
weapons, is transforming the territory of the German Federal Repub-
lic into a main base of NATO for the waging of atomic war in
Europe. Such actions of the German Federal Republic not only
threaten the security of the peoples of Europe but are also fraught
with mortal danger for the population of Western Germany itself,
which in the event of war being unleashed by the NATO bloc would
inevitably, as a result of the irresponsible policies of their ruling
circles, be exposed to destruction by the concentrated blows of
up-to-date nuclear weapons.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic, in the
name of peace in Europe and in the name of the future of millions of
Germans, appeals to the Powers to renounce the introduction of
atomic weapons in Germany. Once again it offers to the Federal
Government an agreement to ban atomic arms from the armies of
both German States and not to permit the manufacture of nuclear
weapons in Germany. The Soviet Government fully understands and
supports these proposals of the German Democratic Republic. . . ."

German Reunification. "Both sides unanimously agree that the
vital question affecting the German nation is the restoration of its
unity, and is first and foremost a matter for the German people
themselves. With this object in view the German Democratic Repub-
lic considers it essential first of all to come to an agreement with the
Federal Republic over a common policy on the following matters:

(1) A ban on stationing or manufacturing any kind of atomic
bomb or weapon on German territory, and banning all atom war
propaganda.

(2) The withdrawal of both German States from NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, the mutual abolition of compulsory military service,
and an agreement on reciprocal limitation of the strength of their
forces.

(3) A joint or separate appeal to the four Powers for the early
withdrawal of their forces from the whole of Germany by stages.

Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and German
Federal Republic on these matters would create the basis for the
setting up of a German Confederation.

"The Soviet Union supports these proposals. . . . The Soviet
delegation declared that the U.S.S.R. was willing in all ways to
contribute to a rapprochement and achievement of mutual under-
standing between the German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic, bearing in mind especially that the Soviet Union
is the only great Power which has diplomatic relations with both
German States. . . .

"The present German Federal Government, ignoring the interests
of the German people, hinders the establishment of good relations

139

between the German Federal Republic and the U.S.S.R. . . . The
main obstacle to the reunification of Germany as a peace-loving and
democratic State is the present policy of remilitarization in Western
Germany and her conversion into a military atomic base of the
aggressive North Atlantic bloc. This policy of militarization is accom-
panied by the suppression in Western Germany of the democratic
forces opposing preparations for a new war, as is strikingly illustrated
by the banning of the German Communist Party [on orders by the
Federal Constitutional Court in August 1956]. This policy deepens
the rift between the two German States and threatens European peace
and the security of the German people itself.

"Both sides consider it necessary to declare that there can be no
question of the reunification of Germany at the expense of the
interests of the German Democratic Republic and the social gains
of its working people. There is only one way of peacefully solving
the German problem that of rapprochement and talks between the
two German States now in existence. There can be no settlement of
the questions affecting Germany as a whole without the participation
of the German Democratic Republic . . . The peoples of the Soviet
Union see in the German Democratic Republic an impregnable
bastion of European peace. In view of the situation obtaining at
present in Western Germany, the German Democratic Republic is
called upon to play a particularly important role in the maintenance
of peace in Europe, . . ."

4. TRADE AND CONSULAR AGREEMENTS OF 1958

Following further protracted negotiations, agreements on trade,
shipping, and consular relations were initialled in Moscow on
April 8, 1958, between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet
Union. Informal arrangements were also concluded on the repatri-
ation of certain groups of German nationals in the U.S.S.R. and of
Soviet nationals in Western Germany.

Talks between a German delegation led by Dr. Rudolf Lahr and a
Soviet delegation headed by Mr. Vladimir Semeonov (a Deputy
Foreign Minister and formerly High Commissioner in Eastern Ger-
many) had opened in Moscow on July 23, 1957. In a Note of July 6,
however, the Soviet Government said that while the number of Ger-
man nationals still in the Soviet Union was "quite insignificant", and
while the repatriation question would be better left to the Red Cross
organizations of the two countries, this "does not exclude the pos-
sibility that some practical questions might arise . . . with regard to
the carrying-out of measures for the repatriation of individual Ger-
man citizens from the Soviet Union or of the return of displaced

140

Soviet nationals from the Federal Republic, and these questions could
be the object of specific discussions during the forthcoming talks".
This statement was regarded by the Federal Government as implying
that the U.S.S.R. would no longer insist on the exclusion of the
repatriation question from the agenda.

Nevertheless, when the talks opened on July 23 the Soviet delega-
tion refused to discuss repatriation, and the discussions were sus-
pended on July 31 after the West German Government had recalled
Dr. Lahr for consultations. Following an exchange of Notes between
Mr. Gromyko and Dr. von Brentano the talks were resumed on
Aug. 14, but in view of continued Soviet insistence on excluding the
subject of repatriation Dr. Lahr was again recalled to Bonn on
Aug. 16. The talks were again resumed on Aug. 26, but a further
breakdown occurred when Mr. Semeonov, in a letter to Dr. Lahr
published on Sept. 3, stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to
discuss a trade and consular agreement but maintained her original
assertion that no repatriation problem existed. Mr. Semeonov added
that if Western Germany insisted on its proposal to suspend the
talks on trade and consular questions because of the Soviet attitude
on the repatriation question, the Federal Government "would have
to bear full responsibility for the breakdown of the talks and the
attendant consequences".

After a prolonged deadlock, which coincided with Federal elec-
tions in Western Germany, the talks were resumed on Nov. 14, 1957,
and from then onwards continued without interruption.

The agreements initialled on April 8, 1958, comprised (a) a
three-year trade and payments agreement; (b) a protocol on trade
exchanges in 1958; (c) a general agreement on commerce and
navigation; (d) a consular convention; (e) an agreement on repatri-
ation. In addition, the two delegations made verbal declarations giv-
ing further details of the repatriation arrangements, but it was stated
in Bonn that it had been agreed that these declarations would not be
published in the Soviet Union.

The joint communique gave the following details of the various
agreements:

Long-term Trade and Payments Agreement. This was concluded
for the three-year period 1958-60, and laid down lists of goods for
Soviet-West German trade exchanges, as well as the procedure for
trade and payments between the two countries. Aimed at making
the commercial relations between the two countries "more stable
and lasting", it provided for a considerable annual expansion of
mutual trade, which by 1960 would amount to some 1,200,000,000

141

roubles, or about 1,260,000,000 Deutsche Marks approximately
double the 1957 figure. The total volume of deliveries agreed for
the period 1958-60 would amount to 3,000,000,000 roubles, or
about 3,150,000,000 DM. The lists of goods would be specified and
extended each year by supplementary agreements between the two
countries, and it was therefore expected that total trade exchanges
would exceed the above-mentioned amounts within the three years.

The lists of goods annexed to the agreement provided that the
Soviet foreign trade organizations in the German Federal Republic
would place large orders for various kinds of machinery and equip-
ment for supply to the U.S.S.R. within the three-year period. These
orders would include equipment for the mining and steel industries,
heavy forges, automation machinery, heavy machine-tools for the
metallurgical industries, equipment for chemical industries (in
ticidar for the manufacture of artificial fibres), equipment for wh
ships and floating factories, cables, chemical products, certain
products, and other goods, including certain consumer goods. In
return, the Soviet Union would supply Western Germany with timber,
cellulose, oil and oil products, wheat, coal, asbestos, manganese and
chrome ores, machinery and equipment, cotton, flax, hemp, tobacco,
certain chemical products and a number of raw materials.

Trade Protocol for 1958. This laid down the exact lists of com-
mercial exchanges for the current year.

Agreement on General Questions of Commerce and Navigation.
This provided for most-favoured-nation treatment in Customs and
other matters connected with the export and import of merchandise.
It also regulated shipping questions, and provided for the setting-up
of a Soviet trade representation in Western Germany, defining its
legal status.

Consular Convention. This placed consular relations between
the two countries on a treaty basis, ensuring the effective protection
of nationals of both countries, as well as of their trade and shipping
interests. It was stated that its practical effect would be confined for
the time being to the consular departments of the Federal German
Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, but it would
form the basis of the activities of any consulates which might be set
up in future.

Repatriation. The communique said: "During the talks on ques-
tions relating to the reciprocal repatriation of nationals of the two
countries, it was agreed that the Soviet authorities would give fav-
ourable consideration to applications by individual German nationals
for exit permits from the U.S.S.R. to the German Federal Republic.
Conversely, the German Federal authorities would give the same
treatment to applications from Soviet nationals now in the Federal
Republic and wishing to leave for the Soviet Union. Both sides
declared . . . that they supported the principle of reuniting families

142

separated by the Second World War, and agreed that they would act
in accordance with their respective legislation. They also agreed that
co-operation between the two Red Cross societies would be
continued."

The verbal Soviet declaration on the repatriation question said
that, in addition to the arrangements mentioned in the communique,
the Soviet authorities would examine and decide "in a positive way"
the "practical questions arising in connexion with applications of
those German nationals who possessed German nationality on June
21, 1941 [the date of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union], were
still in the Soviet Union, and wished to leave for the German Federal
Republic with their wives and children". The sole "decisive criterion*'
for these people would be their possession of German nationality at
the above date.

It was added (a) that the Soviet delegation had "taken note" of
the statement made by the German delegation that the German
Federal Republic was likewise willing to examine "in a positive
manner" the practical questions arising from applications by Soviet
nationals in Western Germany wishing to be repatriated to the Soviet
Union; and (6) that this arrangement would apply to all Soviet na-
tionals who were at present in Western Germany owing to the war,
as well as to their spouses and children.

The Soviet declaration reiterated that both sides would try ^to
reunite families separated by the war; would act in accordance with
their legislation; and had agreed to continued co-operation between
the Soviet and West German Red Cross societies.

The verbal German counter-declaration took note of the Soviet
statement and confirmed the willingness of the German Federal
Republic to accede to applications by Soviet nationals wishing to leave
Western Germany for the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mikoyan's Visit to Western Germany
Signing of Trade and Consular Agreements

Mr. Anastas Mikoyan, the First Vice-Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers, arrived in Bonn on April 25, 1958, to sign the
Soviet-German trade agreements and consular convention at the
Federal Foreign Ministry. Dr. von Brentano signed for the German
Federal Republic. During his stay in Bonn (April 25-26) Mr.
Mikoyan had discussions with Dr. Adenauer, Dr. von Brentano,
Professor Ludwig Erhard (Federal Minister for Economic Affairs),
and Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, president of the Bundestag.

Mr. Mikoyan said on April 25 that the Soviet Union was ready to
guarantee that if the territory of the Federal Republic were free of

143

nuclear and rocket weapons, the Soviet Union would refrain from
using such weapons against objectives in Western Germany, even
in the event of a military conflict in which the Federal Republic
participated. He repeated this statement at a press conference on
April 26 and also expressed the view that the opportunities presented
by the "Rapacki Plan" [see below] were seriously under-estimated in
Western Germany.

A communique issued in Bonn on April 28 stated that Mr.
Mikoyan and the German Ministers had re-emphasized that they
would do all in their power to ensure the implementation of the
agreements signed in Moscow, and also of the verbal agreement on
repatriation. It had also been agreed that talks would be held later
in the year to place cultural, scientific, and technical relations between
the two countries on a firmer footing. Soviet-West German relations
in general and the present international situation had also been dis-
cussed, and both sides had emphasized that their respective Govern-
ments would do their utmost to ensure that existing problems were
solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and by peaceful means,
on the basis of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

5. THE "RAPACKI PLAN", 1958

A proposal for an "atom-free" zone in Central Europe had been
put forward by the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Rapacki, in
the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 3, 1957. In a debate on dis-
armament Mr. Rapacki declared that "if the two German States
agree to impose a ban on the production and stockpiling of atomic
and thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish People's
Republic is prepared simultaneously to impose a similar ban on
its own territory". The Czechoslovak Government subsequently asso-
ciated itself with this proposal and announced its willingness to ban
nuclear weapons on its own territory on the same conditions i.e.
that both Western and Eastern Germany should agree to such a ban
on the territories of the two German States.

The so-called "Rapacki Plan" was discussed by the Polish and
Soviet Foreign Ministers (respectively Mr. Rapacki and Mr.
Gromyko), who met in Moscow on an initiative by Poland, from
Jan. 28 to Feb. 1, 1958.

144

The communique issued afterwards said that both sides agreed that
Mr. Rapacki's proposal constituted "an attempt to take a real step
forward towards an understanding between East and West, the
relaxation of tension and the lessening of the danger of war".

After saying that Poland and the Soviet Union regarded as "with-
out foundation the argument put forward by some circles . . . that
an alleged short-coming of the [Rapacki] plan was its lack of clarity
on the question of controls", the communique went on: ". . . The
Soviet Government . . . declares its readiness to participate in the
examination and implementation of an effective control system in
the proposed zone."

The Polish proposals for an "atom-free" zone in Central Europe,
covering the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany
and Western Germany, were amplified in a memorandum issued in
Warsaw on Feb. 15 and handed by Mr. Rapacki to the Ambassadors
of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France,
Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, and also to the Charges
d' Affaires of Canada and Denmark. The memorandum was also
conveyed to the West German Government through the intermediary
of the Swedish Government.

The memorandum contained a "more detailed elaboration" of Mr.
Rapacki's proposals originally made at the U.N. General Assembly,
and expressed the hope that they might "facilitate the opening of
negotiations and the reaching of an agreement on this subject".

Full agreement with the new proposals was notified to the Polish
Government by Czechoslovakia on Feb. 27, and by the Soviet Union
on March 3. A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry (Mr.
Leonid Ilyichev) had previously stated that the Soviet Union was
willing to undertake all the commitments in the Rapacki Plan, pro-
vided that the U.S., British and French Governments "do the same".
No replies from the Western Powers were received in Warsaw by the
end of March.

By May 1958, however, the Rapacki Plan had been rejected by
Britain, the U.S.A. and France, as well as by other NATO countries
and by the Defence and Armaments Committee of the Western
European Union Assembly.

The Rapacki Plan was discussed in Bonn during a four-day

145

Bundestag debate on foreign affairs and defence on March 20-25,
1958.

While Dr. Erich Mende, chairman of the Free Democratic par-
liamentary group, said that the second Rapacki Plan should receive
serious consideration, Dr. Adenauer took the line that the Rapacki
Plan should not be discussed at a time when the decisive question
was whether or not the Federal Republic wanted to remain a member
of NATO.

Dr. Adenauer pointed out that the Soviet Union the potential
enemy of NATO was equipped with nuclear weapons and guided
missiles. If an important section of NATO did not have equally
strong arms, NATO itself would "lose its importance and its pur-
pose". If the Federal Republic were to refuse to participate in these
developments in armament techniques, contrary to a request by
NATO, the Federal Republic would for all practical purposes have
left the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A country with the economic potential of Western Germany, and
in her geographical position, could not remain in isolation; if a world
catastrophe occurred, she would be involved irrespective of whether
she was armed or unarmed. "In the interests of our self-preservation,"
he added, "we have the duty to do all we can to prevent any such
catastrophe. This we can do only if we remain in NATO and
strengthen the Organization but not if we weaken it by refusing to
fulfil obligations arising from our membership."

Dr. Arndt, for the Social Democrats, said that to equip Western
Germany with atomic weapons would entail the danger of an in-
creased concentration of Soviet atomic weapons in Eastern Europe,
and especially in Eastern Germany, and would also result in intensi-
fied Soviet pressure on the European peoples and the population
of Eastern Germany. German reunification could be achieved only
by way of a limitation of armaments, and a decision for equipping
the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons would almost certainly be a
decision against reunification.

It was his party's conviction, he said, that Western Germany should
contribute to the creation of a "zone of relaxation" in Central
Europe.

At the conclusion of the debate on March 25 the Bundestag
adopted, by 270 votes to 165 (mainly of the Social Democrats), a
resolution which said inter alia:

"In conformity with the requirements of this defence system
[within NATO] and having regard to the armament of the possible

146

enemy, the armed forces of the Federal Republic must be equipped
with the most modern weapons so that they may be able to carry out
the obligations assumed by the Federal Republic within NATO, and
to make an effective contribution to the safeguarding of peace."

The resolution reiterated that free elections must form the basis of
German reunification; and rejected the proposals for the conclusion
of separate peace treaties with Eastern and Western Germany, as well
as negotiations with the present regime in the Soviet Zone or a
Confederation with that regime.

Revised Rapacki Plan

On Nov. 4, 1958, at a press conference attended by Polish and
foreign journalists, Mr. Rapacki announced changes in the "manner
of introducing a denuclearized zone in Central Europe". He ex-
plained that the modifications were intended to meet the objections
raised against the proposals contained in his original plan and the
revised proposals made on Feb. 14, 1958, and that they had been
agreed to by the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

Mr. Rapacki suggested that there would be two stages in the
implementation of his Government's plan. These were as follows:

"1. A ban would be introduced on the production of nuclear
weapons in the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. ... At the
same time, appropriate measures of control would be introduced. . . .

"2. The implementation of the second stage would be preceded
by talks on the reduction of conventional forces. This reduction
would be effected simultaneously with the complete denuclearization
of the zone, and would be accompanied by appropriate measures of
control."

Following Mr. Rapacki's statement on Nov. 4, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd,
then British Foreign Secretary, stated in the House of Commons on
Nov. 19 that, while he thought that the Polish Government and its
Foreign Minister were "absolutely sincere" in putting forward these
proposals, "the factor which must govern our view of this matter is
whether any plan for disengagement will be acceptable if it changes
the balance of military security to the disadvantage of either side".

Thereafter, no further exchanges took place on the Rapacki Plan
between the Governments concerned.

147

6. THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1958-59

An international crisis over the status of West Berlin and the
occupation rights of the Western Powers in that city arose during
November 1958, following M. Khrushchev's announcement that the
U.S.S.R. intended to transfer all its functions and responsibilities
connected with the City of Berlin to the East German Government,
and his suggestion that the Western Powers should do the same.
The crisis developed as follows.

Bundestag Resolution on Reunification

The Bundestag unanimously passed on July 2, 1958, an all-party
resolution calling for the appointment by the U.S.A., the Soviet
Union, Great Britain and France of a four-Power working group to
prepare joint proposals for the solution of the German question.
The resolution was based on a suggestion made by the Austrian
Federal Chancellor (Dr. Raab), who had disclosed at a press con-
ference on April 25 that he had proposed to the U.S. and Soviet
Ambassadors the creation, at a "Summit" conference, of a four-
Power commission charged with examining the conditions for all-
German elections and drawing up a draft electoral law.

East German and Soviet Notes on Reunification

The East German Government issued a declaration on Sept. 5,
and at the same time sent Notes to Britain, the U.S.A., France, the
Soviet Union and the German Federal Government, proposing (1)
the setting-up by the four Powers of a commission to start work on
the terms of a peace treaty with Germany; (2) the establishment by
Eastern and Western Germany of a second commission which would
be charged with working out a common German attitude on this
question.

The Soviet Government sent identical Notes on Sept. 18 to the
U.S., British and French Governments, as well as Notes to the East
German and West German Governments. In all of these it supported
the East German proposal for the immediate conclusion of a peace
treaty with Germany, which, it said, the U.S.S.R. had itself pre-
viously advocated. It also approved the East German proposal for the
148

setting-up of a second commission consisting of representatives of the
two German States, and expressed the Soviet Government's willing-
ness "to give such a commission any assistance it requires".

Western Replies to U.S.S.R. and Western Germany

In identical replies to the Soviet Government, delivered on
Sept. 30, Britain, France and the U.S.A. expressed their willingness
to discuss the question of German reunification with the Soviet Union
within a four-Power working group, as suggested by the German
Federal Government.

The Notes reiterated the Western view that German reunification
through free elections and the setting-up of an all-German Govern-
ment should precede the negotiation of a peace treaty. They accord-
ingly rejected the Soviet proposal to entrust the question of German
reunification to a commission of East and West German repre-
sentatives. In this connexion the Western Notes said that only a
Government set up in accordance with the wishes of the German
people could "undertake obligations which inspire confidence in
other countries and are regarded by the German people themselves as
just and binding". Moreover the Notes said, the German repre-
sentatives who would participate in discussions on a peace treaty
preceding reunification could never bind a future all-German Gov-
ernment to carry out their decisions.

New Bundestag Resolution

The Bundestag and most members of the Federal Government
held a three-day session in Berlin in Oct. 1-3, 1958, at which the
following resolution was unanimously approved:

"(1) The Bundestag formally protests against the continued per-
secution of the people of Eastern Germany, a persecution which
has led to more than 3,000,000 of them seeking refuge in the Federal
Republic. It would be an act of political reason as well as of common
humanity to give the people of Eastern Germany the right to decide
their own future and to return to the German community.

"(2) The Bundestag protests in particular against the cold-
blooded refusal of the East German r6gime to allow free movement
across the inter-zonal frontier. Because of this, traffic has declined by
85 per cent since last year.

149

"(3) The Bundestag, in company with the Governments of the
Lander and of Berlin, will continue to ensure a humane reception of
East German refugees and their swift integration into the life of
the Federal Republic. It appeals to every West German to give East
Germans the welcome they deserve, so that the world may realize
that they support the ideal of unity by deeds as well as words.

"(4) The Federal Republic will continue to regard itself as the
guarantee of German democracy and the German right to reunifica-
tion. This does not absolve the great Powers from their responsibility
for promoting reunification, which can only result from the freely
expressed wishes of the whole German people.

"(5) The Bundestag reaffirms its proposal for a standing four-
Power committee on the German question, which can work out what
steps have to be taken to reunify Germany."

Dr. Adenauer stated in a broadcast on Oct. 2 that the Federal
Government would try to find a solution to the German question by
means of diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Federal
Chancellor accordingly had a meeting on Oct. 14 with Mr. Andrei
Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, but their talk produced
no result.

Mr. Khrushchev's Proposal for Change in

Status of Berlin Soviet Responsibilities in East Berlin

transferred to East German Government

In a speech on Nov. 10, 1958, at a reception for a Polish Govern-
ment delegation led by Mr. Wladyslaw Gomulka, which was visiting
Moscow for Soviet-Polish discussions, Mr. Khrushchev made the
following statement on the Soviet Union's intention to transfer con-
trol of East Berlin to the East German Government:

". . . At present the Western press writes a lot about the fact that
the German Federal Republic is about to propose to the Soviet
Union, the U.S.A., Britain and France a new four-Power conference
to solve for the Germans and despite the Germans the question
of unifying their country. But this is the continuation of the old,
unrealistic policy which contradicts common sense and has no legiti-
mate basis. No Powers have the right to interfere in the internal
affairs of the German Democratic Republic, or to dictate their will
to it.

"We quite understand the natural desire of the German people
150

for reunification of their motherland. But the German military and
their American patrons only use these national sentiments for a
purpose which has nothing in common with German unity or with
ensuring a stable peace in Europe. In fact, the military circles of
Western Germany are following the road of deepening the division
of the country, and of preparing military adventures. If the West
German Government tried to solve the question of German unity, not
by words but by deeds, then it would take the only road which
leads to that goal the road of establishing contacts with the German
Democratic Republic

"The German question if this means unification of the two
German States now in existence can be solved only by the German
people themselves through the rapprochement of those States. The
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is another matter. This
is a task which must be solved in the first instance by the four Powers
which were members of the anti-Hitler coalition, in co-operation with
Germany's representatives. The signing of a German peace treaty
would help the normalization of the whole situation in Germany and
in Europe as a whole. The Soviet Union has been proposing, and still
proposes, to tackle this matter without delay.

"When one speaks of the four Powers' obligations with regard to
Germany, one must speak of the commitments emanating from the
Potsdam Agreement. . . . The Powers taking part in the anti-Hitlerite
coalition undertook clear-cut and definite commitments to eradicate
German militarism, to prevent its revival for ever, to take all mea-
sures to ensure that Germany should never again threaten her neigh-
bours or the maintenance of world peace. The parties to the Potsdam
Agreement also recognized the need to put an end to German fascism,
to bar for ever the road to its revival in Germany, and to put an
end to all fascist activity or propaganda. An important part of the
Potsdam Agreement was the commitment to liquidate the dominance
of cartels, syndicates and other monopolies in the German economy
i.e., those forces which had brought Hitler to power and which
encouraged and financed his military adventures. . . .

"What have we got now, more than 13 years after the Potsdam
Conference? Nobody can deny that the Soviet Union has been
observing all these agreements irreproachably. They have been car-
ried out fully in the Eastern part of Germany, the G.D.R. Let us now
look at the way in which die Potsdam Agreement is being imple-
mented in Germany's Western portion, the G.F.R., responsibility for
whose development rests with the three Western Powers. One must
say straightaway that, far from being eradicated in Western Germany,
militarism is rearing its head higher and higher.

"The Powers which should have fought against the rebirth of
German militarism drew Western Germany into the aggressive mil-

151

itary bloc created by them NATO. They are doing everything to
aid the growth of German militarism and to create in Western
Germany a large army . . . which, according to the calculations
of the German militarists, will become stronger than the armies of
Britain and France. . . . The German Federal Republic already
has U.S. rockets which can be equipped with nuclear warheads. In
the economic aspect, too, Western Germany is literally flying at the
throat of its West European allies. All its economic resources are
being placed at the service of rising German imperialism.

"To whichever of the basic propositions of the Potsdam Agreement
we turn those concerning the demilitarization of Germany, and the
prevention of a resurgence of fascism we unavoidably come to the
conclusion that these propositions, to which were attached the signa-
tures of the U.S.A., Britain and France, have been violated by those
countries.

"What then has remained of the Potsdam Agreement? Virtually
one tiling only has remained: the so-called four-Power status of
Berlin that is, that Article according to which the three Western
Powers have the possibility of holding sway in West Berlin; of
turning that part of the city into a kind of State within a State;
and of making use of this to carry on from West Berlin subversive
activity against the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union
and other Warsaw Pact countries. On top of everything, they enjoy
the right of unhampered communication between West Berlin and
Western Germany by air, rail, road and the waters of the German
Democratic Republic, which they do not even wish to recognize. . . .

"The question arises: Who profits from such a situation and why
do not the United States, France and Britain violate also this part
of the four-Power treaty? The matter is quite clear. . . . They are
clinging to it in every possible way because the agreement on Berlin
is beneficial to the Western Powers . . . The Western Powers would
naturally have nothing against extending such Allied privileges
ad infinitum, although they have long ago abolished the legal basis
on which their presence in Berlin rested.

"Has not the time come for us to draw the necessary conclusions
from the fact that the most important points of the Potsdam Agree-
ment relating to the securing of peace in Europe . . . have been
violated, and that certain forces continue to direct German militarism
against the East, as before World War II. Is it not time to revise
our attitude to this part of the Potsdam Agreement and to reject it?
The time has evidently come for the Powers which signed the Pots-
dam Agreement to abandon the remnants of the occupation regime in
Berlin and thus make it possible to create a normal atmosphere in
the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union,
for its part, will hand over to the sovereign German Democratic

152

Republic those functions in Berlin which are still wielded by Soviet
organs.

"Let the United States, France and Britain form their own rela-
tions with the German Democratic Republic and come to an agree-
ment with it if they are interested in certain questions relating to
Berlin. As for the Soviet Union, we shall observe as sacred our
obligations which stem from the Warsaw Treaty and which we have
confirmed to the German Democratic Republic many a time. Should
any aggressive forces attack the German Democratic Republic, which
is an equal partner of the Warsaw Treaty, we will consider it as an
attack on the Soviet Union and on all the parties to the Warsaw
Treaty. We shall rise to the defence of the German Democratic
Republic, and this will mean the defence of the basic security interests
of the Soviet Union, of the entire Socialist camp and of the cause
of peace throughout the world."

Mr. Khrushchev's statement of Nov. 10 confirmed an earlier state-
ment made on Oct. 27 by Herr Ulbricht (First Secretary of the East
German Socialist Unity Party), in which Herr Ulbricht said: "The
whole of Berlin lies within the territory of the German Democratic
Republic. The whole of Berlin belongs to the area under the sov-
ereignty of the German Democratic Republic. The authority of the
Western occupying Powers no longer has any legal basis in Berlin."
The East German Foreign Ministry had asserted on Oct. 30 that the
present system of guaranteed communications for the Western Powers
between Berlin and Western Germany depended on "a temporary
and exceptional agreement".

A Pravda article of Nov. 18 rejected the firm stand which the
Western Powers had taken up in defence of their rights in Berlin
[see below]. "In the post-war period," Pravda wrote, "the occupa-
tion of West Berlin has been constantly used by the Western Powers
as a venomous weapon with which to poison the atmosphere in
Europe. It is now high time for a radical solution of the Berlin
problem in the interests of strengthening peace and international
security. . . . Even if the agreements on occupation which are no
longer valid are recalled, it must be said that Berlin was never
regarded as a special fifth zone of occupation. The Western Powers
created in Berlin an artificial situation ... in order to take advantage
of the unlawful presence of their troops in the city and to create
there a base for subversive activity against the German Democratic
Republic, the Soviet Union, and the other Socialist countries. Such
a situation is ... intolerable "

153

Reactions in Western Germany

The Federal Government issued a statement on Nov. 12 saying
that any unilateral renunciation by the U.S.S.R. of international
agreements on the four-Power status of Berlin would dangerously
increase political tensions, affect Soviet-German relations and involve
a breach of international law which would seriously put in question
the value of Soviet contractual undertakings. After recalling the
repeated guarantees of the defence of Berlin given by the Western
Powers, the statement said that "the Federal Government, the Ger-
man people, the population of Berlin, and the entire free world have
confidence in these declarations and in the effective protection which
they pledged".

Dr. Adenauer said on Nov. 16 that Mr. Khrushchev's threats had
created "a dangerous situation not only for Western Germany but
for the whole world". He added, however, that he did not wish "in
any way to respond to Mr. Khrushchev's provocation", and that the
West German Note to Moscow would be left as drafted and would
not be sharpened. After thanking the Western allies for their prompt
reaction to the Soviet challenge, he gave a warning against doing
anything which might create the impression that the four-Power
status of Berlin was to be "whittled away" from the West German
side; in this connexion he deprecated the demand of Herr Brandt
(then Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin) that the deputies repre-
senting the city in the Bundestag should receive full voting rights.
The Chancellor added that the question of counter-measures would
arise only in the case of an actual blockade of Berlin, either by the
Soviet or the "zonal" (i.e. East German) authorities; in such an
eventuality inter-zonal trade would "run into difficulties".

Mr. Smirnov had a further meeting with Dr. Adenauer on Nov. 20,
at which the Federal Foreign Minister (Dr. von Brentano) was also
present.

An official statement said that the Ambassador had informed the
Chancellor of the intentions of the Soviet Government with regard
to the status of Berlin; the Soviet Embassy, however, issued a
separate statement in which it was claimed that Mr. Smirnov had
informed Dr. Adenauer "of the steps his Government intends to take
to liquidate the occupation statutes concerning Berlin". This, how-
ever, was denied by a Federal Government spokesman, who said
that Mr. Smirnov had merely explained Mr. Khrushchev's statement.

154

Asked if the meeting had helped to relax tension, the spokesman
replied in the negative but said that there was no cause for alarm
while the matter was still under discussion. He described the political
and diplomatic offensive against West Berlin as "very serious", but
did not think that the situation would become "acutely dangerous".
Dr. Adenauer said in Munich on Nov. 21 that Mr. Smirnov had
expressed the belief that Western Germany would welcome the free-
ing of Berlin from occupation forces. He (Dr. Adenauer) had
answered that the Allied troops were regarded by the people of West
Berlin as protectors of freedom, and that it was most important that
they should remain in the city.

The Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin (Herr Brandt) made the
following statement in the City Assembly on Nov. 20:

"We shall master what lies ahead of us with determination and
confidence. Our daily work and our free order are secured. Let me
reiterate to the world that 3,500,000 people live here 2,250,000 of
them in West Berlin who want only to live in freedom and to
complete their work of peaceful reconstruction. We have no weapons,
but we have a right to live and we have good nerves. Presumably
there will be some further tests of our nerves, but that will neither
confuse nor disconcert us.

"Free Berlin belongs to the free West. We Berliners will not allow
ourselves to be parted from our friends, just as our friends will not
allow themselves to be parted from Berlin. ... We are not made of
the stuff that is blown over by a gust of wind. For this the people
of Berlin have had too many experiences."

Dr. von Brentano flew to West Berlin on Nov. 23 for discus-
sions with Herr Brandt, whilst on Nov. 25 he presided over a meeting
of the West German Ambassadors in London, Washington, Paris,
Moscow and Rome, who had been summoned to Bonn for
consultations.

Reactions in Eastern Germany

Herr Grotewohl, the East German Prime Minister, said in a press
statement on Nov. 12 that Mr. Khrushchev's speech had "further
paved the way for a settlement of the German problem", but refused
to make any "sensational comment". He added that the major task of
his Government was the securing of peace and that "the problem

155

of the status of Berlin is not the major problem; it is a problem, but
only one of many in Germany today".

On the same day (Nov. 12) the East German Government sent
Notes to 60 other countries, through the East German Embassy in
Moscow, asking them to recognize the German Democratic Republic
and to reject the suggestion that the Federal Republic was the only
legitimate government in Germany.

Herr Ulbricht said in an interview on Nov. 25 that Eastern Ger-
many was prepared to negotiate with the Western Powers about
their right of access to West Berlin; there was no point in fearing
that the Communists would blockade the city because "the possibility
of negotiations exists".

Soviet Notes on Revision of Status of Berlin Proposed
"Free City" Status for West Berlin

The Soviet proposals for Berlin were formally handed to the
British, French, U.S. and Federal German Ambassadors by Mr.
Gromyko on Nov. 27, after the latter had visited East Berlin for
discussions with Herr Grotewohl, Herr Ulbricht, and Dr. Bolz, the
East German Foreign Minister.

The principal Soviet proposal was that West Berlin should become
a demilitarized Free City, with Britain, France, the Soviet Union and
the U.S.A., and possibly the United Nations, guaranteeing its status.
Under a separate agreement, Eastern Germany would guarantee
communications between West Berlin and the outside world, in re-
turn for an undertaking by West Berlin not to tolerate "subversive
activity against Eastern Germany". If by the end of six months no
agreement had been reached on this proposal between the Soviet
Union and the Western Powers, the Soviet Government would carry
out its plans in agreement with Eastern Germany, which would
then be able to exercise full sovereignty by land, sea and air over the
approaches to West Berlin.

At a press conference in Moscow on Nov. 27, Mr. Khrushchev
denied that the six-months' period mentioned in the Soviet Notes
constituted an "ultimatum". He added, however, that a Western
refusal to agree to the Soviet proposal "will not stop us from execut-
ing our plans" since there would be "no other way out".
156

West German Reply to Soviet Note

The German Federal Government's reply to the Soviet Note was
delivered in Moscow on Jan. 5, 1959. It rejected a "free city" status
for West Berlin and denied the right of the Soviet Union to change
the city's existing status by unilateral action.

After rejecting the idea of a "Confederation" between Western
and Eastern Germany, the Federal Government strongly repudiated
the Soviet allegations that West Berlin was being used as a "spy
centre" by the Western allies and that the Federal Republic was
pursuing a policy of "militarism" and "revanchism" vis-d-vis the
East European countries and the Soviet Union. In the latter con-
nexion it stressed the great disparity between the strengths of the
Soviet armed forces and the West German Bundeswehr, and recalled
that the Federal Republic had solemnly renounced the use of force
to achieve political ends. Apart from its justified desire that a future
peace treaty should bring about a just and reasonable settlement of
Germany's eastern frontiers, the Federal Republic had no political
objectives in the East and desired only to establish good-neighbourly
relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Statement by Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin

In West Berlin itself, Herr Brandt had previously issued a state-
ment on Nov. 27, 1958, making the following points:

(1) The Soviet plan for "free city" status "aims at having West
Berlin cleared of Allied troops but remaining surrounded by Soviet
divisions. It means, further, that the legal, financial and economic
attachment of Berlin to the Federal Republic would be cut away
and replaced by dependence on the Eastern bloc. This is unbearable."

(2) The Western Powers had "on repeated occasions given solemn
assurances that they would exercise their rights and duties in Berlin
until the division of Germany has been removed".

(3) There was "no isolated solution" of the Berlin question, which
could only be solved in the context of an overall German settlement,
including that of reunification.

(4) It was "the recognizable goal of Communist policy to make
the whole of Berlin part of the so-called German Democratic Repub-
lic; no amount of talking can divert attention from this".

(5) The people of Berlin, "trusting in their friends throughout
the world", would "continue to work in constructing the capital of

157

Germany and making their contribution toward ensuring the main-
tenance of legality and of the free democratic order in Berlin".

East German Support for Soviet Proposals

In a Note to the Soviet Government on Jan. 7, 1959 (in reply
to the Soviet Note of Nov. 27), the East German Government an-
nounced its willingness "to recognize a demilitarized free city status
for West Berlin" and its readiness "to assume appropriate pledges
in common with other countries".

The Note stated that, "with the establishment of a demilitarized
Free City of West Berlin, the German Democratic Republic would
ensure West Berlin's communications with all parts of the world and
take all necessary measures to guarantee unhampered passenger and
goods traffic to and from West Berlin". It added: "The most essential
and urgent steps to be taken to eliminate the centre of provocation
which West Berlin represents are, in the opinion of the Government
of the G.D.R., the ending of the illegally maintained occupation of
West Berlin by the three Western Powers, the withdrawal of foreign
troops from West Berlin, and the ending of the 'cold war' policy
being pursued there against the G.D.R. and other Socialist
countries. . . ."

After welcoming the Soviet decision to transfer its functions in
Eastern Germany to the G.D.R., the Note said that the East German
Government was "prepared to negotiate all matters related to the
settlement of the West Berlin question". . . . The "democratic
Magistrature of Greater Berlin" [i.e. the municipal authorities in
East Berlin] was also prepared "to conduct negotiations with the
West Berlin Senate and to conclude appropriate agreements".

Statement by Tass Agency

The Tass Agency had meanwhile issued a 4,000-word statement
on Dec. 11, 1958, on behalf of the Soviet Government, reiterating
that the U.S.S.R. would not agree to talks on German reunification
"without the Germans and behind their backs", but at the same time
stating that "the Soviet Union would not refuse to discuss the con-
clusion of a peace treaty, which, in its view, falls within the com-
petence of the four Powers". It added that if the Western Powers
"do not wish to co-operate with the U.S.S.R. in solving this problem,
nothing remains for the Soviet Government but to relieve itself of the
functions connected with maintaining the occupation regime in
158

Berlin and to conclude a corresponding agreement with the Govern-
ment of Eastern Germany". An assurance was given that the Soviet
Union "does not want to cause any damage to the prestige of the
Western Powers" and that it was prepared, together with other
Powers, "to guarantee [West] Berlin's free city status and non-
interference in the political and economic affairs of western Berlin".

Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1959

Agreement having been reached between the four Powers on the
holding of a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva, such a conference
took place between May 11 and June 20, 1959.

The conference was presented on May 14 with a detailed "West-
ern Peace Plan" for a settlement of the Berlin question, German
unification and European security. This plan was amplified on
May 26 by detailed Western proposals providing for the unification
of Berlin after free elections.

These proposals were followed by counter-proposals made by
Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on June 10, but these
were immediately rejected by the Western Foreign Ministers.

The conference adjourned on June 21 without agreement having
been reached.

The resumed Foreign Ministers' talks in Geneva on July 13-
Aug. 5, 1959, were held in private, and the final communique stated:

"The Conference of Foreign Ministers considered questions relat-
ing to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the
question of Berlin.

"The positions of the participants in the conference were set out
on these questions. A frank and comprehensive discussion took place
on the Berlin question. The positions of both sides on certain points
became closer.

"The discussions which have taken place will be useful for the
further negotiations which are necessary in order to reach an
agreement."

No such negotiations, however, took place in 1959-60, a Summit
Conference of the Heads of Government of the Western Powers and
the Soviet Union, scheduled to begin in Paris on May 16, 1960,
breaking down at its very beginning in consequence of a strong Soviet

159

protest against "U.S. reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory"
arising out of the shooting down of a U.S. aircraft (U-2) in the
Soviet Union on May 1.

7, EXCHANGES ON REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, 1959

During a visit to Eastern Germany from March 4-11, 1959, Mr.
Krushchev had discussions with Herr Grotewohl, Herr Ulbricht
and other East German leaders. A joint communique on these talks
issued on March 11 stated (1) that a peace treaty should be signed
with both German States, or with a German Confederation, should
it be formed; (2) that the German Democratic Republic was pre-
pared to guarantee free access to West Berlin from both east and
west, and to respect its status as a demilitarized Free City; (3) that
the Soviet Union was prepared to join in guaranteeing the inde-
pendence and security of West Berlin. Both Governments called for
a summit conference with the participation of Poland, Czechoslovakia
and the two German States.

Herr Ollenhauer, leader of the Social Democratic Party in Western
Germany, had a meeting in East Berlin on March 9 with Mr.
Khrushchev, at the latter's invitation. After his discussion with
Mr. Khrushchev (held at the Soviet Embassy) Herr Ollenhauer said
that they had agreed that all problems should be solved by peaceful
negotiations, and were confident that acceptable solutions could be
found given good will on both sides. Whilst there were differences
on the question of German reunification, he had received the impres-
sion that Mr. Khrushchev was not prepared to go to war over Berlin
and was seeking a peaceful solution.

Allied Declaration on German Reunification

East German Proposal for German "Confederation"

Rejection by Federal Republic

A 12-point declaration setting forth the common policy of the
British, French, U.S. and Federal German Governments on the
question of German reunification was issued in West Berlin on
My 29, 1957. It was signed by the three Western Ambassadors to
the Federal Republic and by Dr. von Brentano (the Federal Foreign
Minister) as representing "the only Government qualified to speak
for the German people as a whole".

160

The declaration said inter alia that "the reunification of Germany
remains the joint responsibility of the Four Powers who in 1945
assumed supreme authority in Germany." ... It reiterated the West
German call for a freely elected all-German Government and for an
all-German National Assembly. The Government of a reunified
Germany, the declaration said, "should be free to determine its
foreign policy and to decide on its international associations." -. . .

The declaration also contained the following passages:

"The Western Powers have never required as a condition of Ger-
man reunification that a reunified Germany should join the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. It will be for the people of a reunified
Germany themselves to determine through their freely elected Gov-
ernment whether they wish to share in the benefits and obligations of
the treaty.

"If the all-German Government, in the exercise of its free choice,
should elect to join NATO, the Western Powers ... are prepared to
offer, on a basis of reciprocity, to the Government of the Soviet Union
and to other countries of Eastern Europe which would become parties
to a European security arrangement, assurances of a significant and
far-reaching character. The Western Powers are also prepared, as
part of a mutually acceptable European security arrangement, to
give an assurance that, in the event of a reunited Germany choosing
to join NATO, they would not take military advantage as a result
of the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

"The reunification of Germany, accompanied by the conclusion
of European security arrangements, would facilitate the achievement
of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Conversely, if a begin-
ning could be made towards effective measures of partial disarma-
ment, this would contribute to the settlement of outstanding major
political problems such as the reunification of Germany. Initial steps
in the field of disarmament should lead to a comprehensive disarma-
ment agreement, which presupposes a prior solution of the problem
of German reunification. The Western Powers do not intend to enter
into any agreement on disarmament which would prejudice the
reunification of Germany.

The declaration concluded: "The four Governments continue to
hope that the Soviet Government will come to recognize that it is
not in its own interest to maintain the present division of Germany.
The Western Powers are ready to discuss all these questions with
the Soviet Union at any time that there is a reasonable prospect of
making progress. At such time there will be many points relating
to the procedure for German reunification and the terms of a treaty
of assurance which will require to be worked out by detailed negotia-

161

tion. In advance of serious negotiations, the Western Powers cannot
finally determine their attitude on all points. Nor can they contem-
plate in advance the making of concessions to which there is no
present likelihood of response from the Soviet side. . . ."

Two days before the Allied declaration was issued, the Prime
Minister of Eastern Germany (Herr Grotewohl) had sent a mem-
orandum to all diplomatic representatives accredited to the German
Democratic Republic proposing that the two German States should
enter into a contractual relationship as a "confederation", while at the
same time retaining their present administrative arrangements. Herr
Grotewohl laid down the following conditions as pre-requisites for
such a "confederation": (1) the Federal Republic should withdraw
from NATO and the Democratic Republic from the Warsaw Pact,
armed forces in both parts of Germany should be strictly limited, and
conscription should be abolished in the Federal Republic; (2) both
German States should request the great Powers to arrive at a com-
mon agreement for the phased withdrawal of their forces from Ger-
man territory; (3) no nuclear weapons should be stored in any part
of Germany and all "nuclear war propaganda" should be strictly
forbidden.

Herr Grotewohl reiterated the Soviet thesis that reunification could
not be achieved through free all-German elections but only through
a gradual rapprochement between Eastern and Western Germany.
He proposed that the "confederation" should be established by treaty
between the two German Governments, and that it should take the
form of an All-German Council, recruited from both German Parlia-
ments, which would endeavour to achieve conformity in matters of
trade, currency, transport and communications, the status of Berlin
and other matters of common concern. This Council would be an
advisory body and would make recommendations to both German
Governments, which could accept or reject them. The lifting of the
ban on "democratic organizations" in Western Germany i.e. the
West German Communist Party and the Communist-controlled "Free
German Youth" organization was among the conditions mentioned
by Herr Grotewohl as a pre-requisite for an all-German "con-
federation".

The East German proposals were rejected out of hand by all
parties in the Federal Republic. Dr. Adenauer, in a statement on
July 28, said that Herr Grotewohl's proposal for a "confederation"

162

between Eastern and Western Germany was "absolutely out of the
question" and that the Federal Government could never agree to a
step which would "strengthen the slavery of 17,000,000 people in the
Soviet zone".

The Soviet Tass Agency described the four-Power declaration
on German reunification as "another scrap of paper added to the
documents on the German question". It said that the Western
Powers, "realizing that their proposals on the German question are
unacceptable, want to exploit them as a counter-move to the Soviet
disarmament proposals".

Social Democratic Plan for European Security and

German Reunification Criticism by Federal Government

Social Democrats reject East German Proposal for Joint Action

The national executive of the Social Democratic Party (the
Opposition party) and the executive of the Social Democratic parlia-
mentary group in the Bundestag unanimously adopted on March 18,
1959, a plan for the reunification of Germany and the relaxation of
tension and security in Europe. The urgency of the proposals was
stressed in the light of the Soviet demands concerning the status of
West Berlin.

The Social Democratic plan was divided into three parts, dealing
respectively with (1) military relaxation and European security;
(2) the political and economic integration of Germany; (3) reunifi-
cation.

On the political and economic integration of Germany the plan
proposed that, as the restoration of German unity by a freely-elected
National Assembly pre-supposed a gradual rapprochement in stages,
joint organs should be set up, without, however, affecting the respec-
tive powers in both parts of Germany during the interim period. The
necessary arrangements should be made either between the four great
Powers, or by those Powers jointly with both parts of Germany within
the framework of a peace treaty, or directly between the two German
Governments within the framework of a settlement laid down by the
four Powers. It was indispensable, however, that such arrangements
should safeguard human rights and essential liberties in both parts
of Germany pending the introduction of an all-German Constitution.
Existing economic systems, foreign trade relations, and long-term
treaties would remain unaffected for the time being unless expressly

agreed otherwise. Both German Governments should subscribe to a
policy of full employment and of guaranteeing social development.

The proposed political and economic phases were:

First Stage Political integration would begin with an All-German
Conference at which both German Governments would be equally
represented. This conference would have the task of regulating
internal affairs, without, however, affecting the functions of consti-
tutional organs in either part of Germany. The All-German Confer-
ence would be informed of all legislative proposals presented in the
West German Bundestag or the East German Volkskammer, and
must give its opinion. An All-German Court would be set up by the
Conference to safeguard uniformity in the interpretation of human
rights and basic freedoms; it would be a supreme court and its
decisions would be final.

Economic integration would begin with the creation of joint insti-
tutions on a basis of parity; the lifting of present embargoes and
quota regulations for inter-zonal trade by the Federal Republic;
expansion of inter-zonal commercial exchanges; and the opening of
additional inter-zonal traffic routes.

An All-German Investment Fund would be set up, as well as a
Bank for Inter-German Settlements. The fund would plan and
finance investments in the sphere of transport and power or aimed
at adjusting the two economies, whilst die bank in addition to
clearing payments between the two parts of Germany would handle
pensions and similar payments.

Second Stage An All-German Parliamentary Council would be
established on a basis of parity; its members would be separately
elected in both parts of Germany and would enjoy parliamentary
immunity throughout the country. It would legislate especially for
railways, roads, inland navigation, posts and telegraphs, and increased
production. It would also prevent the abuse of economic power and
would regulate patents and trade-marks. Either German Government
could appeal within a fixed period against any decisions of the
Council, which would decide on such appeals and could overrule
them by a two-thirds majority.

Economic integration would be accelerated by the development of
an All-German Market and the introduction of an official rate of
exchange for the East and West German currencies, as well as the
abolition of import quotas for internal German trade by the German
Democratic Republic.

Third Stage The powers of the All-German Parliamentary Coun-
cil would be increased to enable it to draft legislation on taxation and
financial matters for the whole of Germany, on social legislation in
both parts of the country, and for the creation of a Customs and
currency union.

Provision would also be made for all-German referenda on legisla-

164

tive proposals if requested by at least one nrillion electors. If either of
the two Governments should object to the result of a referendum,
there would be a second one a year later; if this confirmed the pre-
vious decision, the latter would be final. No referendum could be
held if it aimed at restricting human rights and basic liberties, changes
in property rights, or the abolition of the existing legislative or
executive organs in either part of Germany.

The All-German Parliamentary Council would be empowered to
enact legislation for the election of a National Constituent Assembly,
which would require approval by a two-thirds majority of the votes
cast. If such a majority in the Council was not forthcoming, legislation
of this kind could be enacted by a referendum if approved by a
two-thirds majority of the votes cast. The National Assembly, when
formed, would supersede the All-German Parliamentary Council
and would proceed to draft and adopt an all-German Constitution.

During the various stages Berlin would become the seat of the
all-German institutions.

Reunification. After the all-German Constitution had come into
force, there would be free and secret elections throughout Germany
for an all-German Parliament, which would then form an all-German
Government.

The Federal Government issued a statement on March 20 com-
menting on the Soviet Democratic plan for German reunification.

While promising that the Government would give the plan "careful
examination", the statement made the following critical comments:

(1) the proposed "military relaxation", without making it directly
dependent on political advances, would weaken the defensive strength
of the West and lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe;

(2) there was no controllable undertaking guaranteeing that each
stage would be automatically followed by the next one, everything
being left to the arbitrary discretion of the East German Govern-
ment as far as the manner, extent and speed of reunification were
concerned; (3) implementation of the plan implied recognition of
the "Pankow regime" [i.e. the East German Government], contrary
to numerous unanimous resolutions of the Bundestag; (4) the Fed-
eral Government was opposed to holding free all-German elections
only after the framing of the new Constitution, since this would con-
stitute a serious danger to the democratic development of a future
all-German State.

The Federal Foreign Minister (Dr. von Brentano) reaffirmed in
Washington on March 28 that the only way to bring about Ger-
many's reunification was through free democratic elections; no other

165

"stages of reunification" could be considered until such elections had
taken place.

East German Proposal for Joint Action
Rejection by Social Democrats

The central committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party
sent a letter to the West German Social Democratic Party on April 3
welcoming its proposals for a German peace treaty and German
reunification, and appealing for "normal and comradely relations"
between the two parties. The Social Democratic executive, however,
decided on April 6 not to reply to the Socialist Unity Party and to
reject any joint action with that party.

Social Democratic Leaders' Visit to Moscow

Professor Carlo Schmid, deputy chairman of the Social Dem-
ocratic Party, and Herr Fritz Erler, deputy chairman of its parlia-
mentary group, visited Moscow on March 11-16 for talks with
Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders.

At a press conference in Bonn on March 18, Professor Schmid
and Herr Erler quoted Mr. Khrushchev as saying that, once Soviet
troops had withdrawn from Eastern Germany, they would not inter-
vene if the East German population decided that it desired a different
form of government, even if violence were used; this would not apply,
however, if the West interfered in Eastern Germany or was "the
cause of the trouble". As regards free elections or other all-German
matters, Mr. Khrushchev had said that the U.S.S.R. would respect
any agreements reached between the two German States. On the
other hand, he was also quoted as saying that he was opposed to all-
German elections at any time, because "fifty million West Germans
would impose their will on seventeen million East Germans", which
would mean that "the majority, but not freedom, would prevail".

Professor Schmid and Herr Erler indicated that Mr. Khrushchev
was really pressing for two separate peace treaties with East and
West Germany; these treaties could contain features in common, as
well as other clauses suited to the different wishes of the two German
States. Failing this, a treaty would in any case be signed between
the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany. As regards reunification,
the two Social Democratic leaders quoted Mr. Khrushchev as saying
that "nobody really wants the reunification of Germany at this
moment nobody at all".

166

Herr Grotewohl's Letter to Dr. Adenauer

In a letter on April 8, the East German Prime Minister (Herr
Grotewohl) appealed to Dr. Adenauer to agree to joint action by
both Governments at the forthcoming four-Power conference at
Geneva. The letter reiterated the East German proposal for a com-
mission of representatives of both States which would work out a
joint attitude towards a peace treaty, and suggested that repre-
sentatives of the Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic
should meet without delay to work out the necessary joint proposals.

A spokesman in Bonn stated on April 9 that no reply would be
sent to Herr Grotewohl's letter.

8. THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961
EASTERN PEACE PROPOSALS

The East German Government announced on Aug. 30, 1960,
that it had issued instructions about the access by West Germans to
the Eastern sector of Berlin during the next five days. From mid-
night of Aug. 30-31 until midnight of Sept. 4-5 only those West
German citizens with valid residence visas would be permitted to
cross into the Eastern sector, and anybody attempting to contravene
the order would be liable to the penalties provided under the East
German criminal code. The restrictions, it was stated in the announce-
ment, were to prevent the "misuse of the traffic links and territory
of the German Democratic Republic for the organization and prop-
agation of militaristic and revanchist meetings". This referred to
rallies planned to be held in West Berlin from Sept. 1-4 by the
German Association of Ex-prisoners of War and Missing Persons'
Relatives and the German Federal Refugees' Association. The ban
did not apply to citizens of West Berlin.

The announcement also contained a warning by the East German
Government to the Western Powers not to permit "the misuse of the
air corridors to West Berlin for the transport of military and
revanchist elements".

Following talks with Herr Brandt, then Chief Burgomaster of
West Berlin, the three Western Commandants in the city protested
to General Zakharov, the Soviet Commandant, on Aug. 31 against
the restrictions imposed by the East German Government, which they
described as "a flagrant violation of the right of free circulation"

167

within the city of Berlin and "a direct contravention" of the agree-
ments of June 20, 1949, between the Western and Soviet Govern-
ments [i.e. the agreement ending the Soviet blockade of West Berlin].

After a Cabinet meeting in Bonn under the chairmanship of
Professor Erhard, in the absence of Dr. Adenauer, a statement was
issued on Aug. 31 condemning the East German action in Berlin as
"illegal" and rejecting the allegations that the refugees' and ex-
Servicemen's organizations due to hold rallies in Berlin were
"militaristic" and "revanchist".

The restrictions were extended on Sept. 1 to the border between
Eastern and Western Germany, where a number of West German
citizens travelling to West Berlin were stopped because their papers
showed that they had been born in the former German territories
beyond the Oder-Neisse Line. Later the same day the West Berlin
Senate announced, however, that anyone turned back at the zonal
frontiers would be transported to West Berlin by air free of charge.

The temporary ban on the entry of West Germans into East Berlin
was lifted on Sept. 5, 1960, but later the same day the official East
German News Agency issued a statement asserting that the German
Federal Government were planning "new provocations" in West
Berlin, and describing a meeting due to take place on Sept. 9 between
Professor Erhard and Herr Brandt as "an open challenge to the
people of Berlin". The Agency's statement added that Herr Ulbricht
(the East German Communist leader and Deputy Premier) had
already declared that no representative of the Government in Bonn
had "any business to be in Berlin".

This was followed by the imposition of new restrictions on free
travel in Berlin on Sept. 8, when the East German Council of Min-
isters approved regulations under which West German citizens would
in future need a permit for any entry into East Berlin. The permit,
it was stated, could be obtained only by East Berlin citizens acting
on a West German's behalf, or by the West German himself, and
must be applied for at "the appropriate offices of the German Peo-
ple's Police" [i.e. the East German police]; three-monthly permits
might be granted for repeated entry into East Berlin.

The East German News Agency, which announced that the order
would come into effect at midnight on Sept. 8-9, said that the East

168

German Government, after discussing the "continued misuse of West
Berlin for incitement for revenge", considered it "necessary to draw
attention emphatically to the fact that under the Potsdam Agreement
any Nazi, militaristic and revenge-seeking activity and propaganda
was forbidden, and German militarism and Nazism should be
eradicated. True to the Agreement, the State organs of the German
Democratic Republic are taking the necessary measures, which are
exclusively directed against West German and West Berlin revenge-
seeking politicians, whose activities endanger peace".

On Sept. 13 the East German radio announced that the East Ger-
man Government would no longer recognize the validity of the West
Berlin passports held by citizens of West Berlin. An East German
decree stated that West Berliners wanting to travel to Eastern Ger-
many, as distinct from transit travel to the Federal Republic, would
henceforth require an identity card with a special East German permit
attached to it. A Government spokesman in Bonn described the East
German measure as another "conscious and arbitrary barrier" likely
to cause disquiet.

The Czechoslovak and Polish military missions in West Berlin
stated on Sept. 15 that their countries had followed the East German
example of no longer recognizing West Berlin passports held by West
Berliners, and that the latter would have to possess visas on a paper
attached to their West Berlin identity cards for visits to Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland.

Herr Brandt stated on Sept. 8, 1960, that, during the earlier
frontier restrictions from Sept. 1-4, 1,061 West Germans had been
turned back by the East German police; of these, 610 had reached
Berlin by air, and altogether there had been 4,000 more visitors to
West Berlin than in the same period in 1959. Herr Brandt added that
everything necessary to meet Communist pressure must be agreed in
complete accord with all involved, including the Western Allies, and
that if the Communists regarded their current pinpricking as a "dress
rehearsal", the same must be true of Western counter-action.

Soviet Note to Federal Government

On Feb. 17, 1961, the Soviet Government sent a Note to the
German Federal Government on the question of a German peace
treaty and the Berlin situation.

169

After alleging that agitation for a revision of Germany's existing
frontiers was growing in the Federal Republic, that "extensive mil-
itary preparations" were on foot in Western Germany, and that West
Berlin was being used "for subversive activities against the German
Democratic Republic", the Note went on:

"As is known, Soviet proposals envisage the solution of the prob-
lem of West Berlin as a free city on the basis of a peace treaty with
the German States. This opens for the German Federal Republic
broad opportunities for safeguarding its interests in West Berlin,
inasmuch as its representatives would appear as a party in the peace
negotiations. In any case, the Soviet Government ... is prepared to
display maximum understanding of the wishes of the Federal Gov-
ernment and to take them into account during negotiations with all
other parties concerned.

"An entirely different situation would arise if the Federal Govern-
ment were to continue to insist on its negative position with regard
to a peace treaty with Germany. By this very fact it would deny
itself the possibility of direct defence of its interests. . . .

"Should no peace treaty with both States be concluded within the
agreed time-limit, the Soviet Union, together with other nations
wishing to do so, will sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic
Republic. That will also mean ending the occupation regime in West
Berlin, with all the attendant consequences. In particular, questions
of communications by land, water and air passing through the ter-
ritory of the German Democratic Republic will in that case be settled
only on the basis of appropriate agreements with the German
Democratic Republic".

Declaring that the U.S.S.R. had "no wish to dictate" to Western
Germany and "stretches out the hand of friendship to the entire
German people", the Note added: "The Soviet draft of a peace treaty
with Germany is not an ultimatum. Should the Government of the
Federal Republic disagree with any particular point of our draft, it
is welcome to make its own suggestions or put forward a draft peace
treaty of its own. The Soviet Government is prepared to discuss any
constructive proposals of the Federal Government which would take
account of the present situation and contribute to concluding a peace
treaty. . . . Whether or not this problem will be adjusted with the
participation of the German Federal Republic depends on the Federal
Government alone. . . ."

Herr Brandt visited the U.S.A. from March 11-20 and discussed
the Berlin question with President Kennedy on March 13; after the
meeting Herr Brandt said that the President had "reiterated the
determination of the United States, in co-operation with its Allies, to
preserve and maintain the freedom of West Berlin, to which it is

170

committed, and to defend the Allied position in the city, upon which
the preservation of that freedom in large measure depends".

Mr. Khrushchev's Memorandum to President Kennedy in Vienna

On June 3-4, 1961, President John F. Kennedy had talks with
Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. Among other questions they also dis-
cussed the problems of Germany and Berlin. During their meeting
Mr. Khrushchev presented to President Kennedy a memorandum
dealing with the question of a German peace treaty and a settlement
of the Berlin question.

The memorandum proposed the calling "without any delay" of a
conference to conclude a peace treaty with the two German States;
recapitulated the proposal to make West Berlin a "free demilitarized
city", if necessary under U.N. guarantee; and reiterated that access
to the proposed free city would have to be negotiated with the East
German Authorities. In order "not to drag out the peace settlement",
it was proposed that the two German States should "explore the pos-
sibilities of agreement on questions falling within their internal com-
petence", the Soviet Government expressing the view that "a period
not exceeding six months" would be adequate for such talks, should
the two German States fail to reach agreement, "then measures will
be taken to conclude a peace treaty with both German States or with
one of them".

East German Reactions

The Soviet Government's proposals on Germany and West Berlin,
as set out in the memorandum to President Kennedy, were conveyed
to Herr Ulbricht on June 7 by the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin.
The Tass Agency stated that Herr Ulbricht had expressed "cordial
gratitude to the Soviet Government for its consistent peace-loving
policy on. the settlement of the German problem in the interests of
safeguarding and consolidating peace".

The restrictions imposed in August 1960 on West Germans enter-
ing East Berlin were fitted by the East German authorities from mid-
night of Feb. 15. The official announcement stated that the regula-
tions under which West Germans had required special visas to enter
East Berlin had been "simplified and eased", without giving details;
it was understood, however, that visas would no longer be necessary

171

and that West Germans entering the Eastern sector would only be
required to produce their identity cards, as was the case before the
restrictions were introduced.

At a press conference on June 15, Herr Ulbricht expressed con-
fidence that the Berlin question would be settled within a year, declar-
ing that "a peace treaty will come and West Berlin will be a free city
with its neutrality guaranteed". In reply to questions, he said that
the German Democratic Republic would control all communications
with West Berlin after the conclusion of a peace treaty; that the
Western Powers would have to negotiate on details of traffic arrange-
ments; and that the G.D.R. was ready to give "realistic guarantees"
of continued access to West Berlin by land, air and water.

West German Reactions

Speaking on June 1 1 at a Hanover rally of some 300,000 refugees
from Silesia, Dr. Adenauer said that Mr. Khrushchev's memorandum
to President Kennedy showed that the Soviet Government's sole
concern was to maintain the situation in Europe resulting from the
Second World War. Rejecting the Soviet proposal that the Federal
Republic and Eastern Germany should reach an agreement within
six months on a peace treaty, in default of which the U.S.S.R. would
sign a separate treaty with Eastern Germany, Dr. Adenauer declared:
"The Federal Government will never agree to this Russian demand;
we want self-determination and freedom for the whole German
people".

The German Federal Government's reply to the Soviet Note of
Feb. 17, 1961 [see page 169], was presented in Moscow on July 12.

The West German Note declared that it was "an indisputable fact
that, in spite of the events which have followed in the wake of the
Second World War, the German people continue to exist as an
entity. . . . Any policy that disregards this fact in attempting to
settle the German problem cannot claim to be considered as realistic".
After pointing out that the German people as a whole were still
denied the possibility of a common national order, although the war
had ended 16 years ago, the Note said that a "sober appraisal of the
situation" led to the conclusion that this state of affairs could only be

172

changed if the German people were allowed to exercise the right of
self-determination.

With regard to the urgency of concluding a German peace treaty,
as stressed in the Soviet Note, the Federal Government said that this
"presupposes the existence of a Government capable of acting, and
legitimized by a democratic decision of the German people, whose
authority would apply to the entire German people. Such a Govern-
ment can only be established by the German people if it has been
enabled to exercise the right of self-determination through a free
expression of its will. Hence the timing of the conclusion of a
peace treaty with Germany depends upon the readiness of the
U.S.S.R. to grant the German people the exercise of the right to
self-determination".

After emphasizing that a separate peace treaty with only one
part of Germany would violate the right of self-determination of
peoples a right recognized as one of the basic principles of the
U.N. Charter, to which the Soviet Government had subscribed the
Note continued: "A peace treaty with a German Government gen-
erally recognized and formed on the basis of the right of self-
determination of the German people would settle all problems con-
cerning Germany, including that of the German frontiers. The ques-
tion of Berlin . . . would also be settled, since Berlin could then
fulfil its natural destiny as the capital of Germany." On the other
hand, a peace treaty based on the partition of Germany would not
help to lessen tension but would increase it, since it would perpetuate
the division of the country.

As regards the Soviet Government's call for counter-proposals
from the Federal Government [contained in the Soviet Note], the
West German reply said that the U.S.S.R. would only regard pro-
posals as "constructive" if they were based on the inevitability of the
partition of Germany. Proposals founded on such a premise, however,
could not be called "constructive" since they could never lead to a
lasting peace; only proposals which did away with the partition of
Germany could be regarded as a constructive contribution to a gen-
eral peace settlement. Such proposals had been put forward by the
Western Powers on many occasions, but without avail, the most
recent being at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1959.

Continuing, the Federal Government declared its readiness to
subscribe to any agreement on general controlled disarmament which
might be reached by the great Powers; rejected the Soviet allegation
that it was ready to use force to change the existing frontiers; and
stressed that there were no nuclear weapons under the control of the
Federal Republic, which had specifically abandoned by treaty the
right to produce them. The Soviet allegations of militaristic inten-
tions on the part of Western Germany (the Note added) were the

173

less understandable inasmuch as all the Bundeswehr forces were
integrated in NATO, which pursued no aggressive aims and was
formed solely for the defence of the West.

In conclusion, the Federal Government reiterated its wish to
achieve the reunification of the German people in peace and freedom
exclusively by peaceful means, and declared that it had no intention
in the forthcoming Federal elections of creating any feeling of enmity
amongst the population towards the Soviet Union, as it was its basic
policy to refrain from any action which might increase international
tension.

Bundestag Declaration

A declaration appealing "to the world and before history" for a
peace treaty based on the right of self-determination of the whole
German people was read in the West German Bundestag on June 30
by its president, Dr. Gerstenmaier, in the presence of Dr. Adenauer,
members of the Federal Cabinet, and representatives of the Lander
Governments.

In presenting this declaration issued with the support of all par-
ties represented in the Bundestag -Dr. Gerstenmaier pointed out
that all efforts at a solution of the German question had failed be-
cause the Soviet Union, "while speaking incessantly of a peace treaty,
obviously only intends to sit down at the conference table when it is
certain that the partition of Germany has ... been made permanent
and the recognition of Pankow [i.e. of the East German regime]
achieved". Dr. Gerstenmaier emphasized that the right of self-
determination was claimed for the entire German people, and not
only for the 52,000,000 Germans in the Federal Republic.

Dr. Adenauer visited West Berlin on July 12 for talks with Herr
Brandt and the West Berlin Senate. A communique was issued after
the talks stating that there was complete identity of views between
the Federal Government and the West Berlin authorities on the Berlin
question, and emphasizing the following points: "(1) The presence
of the Western Powers in West Berlin is based on an unaltered legal
position and should be maintained; (2) West Berlin's integration
in the economic, financial and judicial system of the Federal Republic
represents a pivot of the city's independent existence; (3) there
should be no restrictions on free access to or from West Berlin, nor
any interference with the city's communications with the West; (4)

174

any agreement on Berlin must take into account the clearly-expressed
wishes of the city's population; (5) Berlin should continue to be a
meeting-place for all Germans."

East German "Peace Plan"

The East German Volkskammer unanimously adopted on July 6,
1961, a "German Peace Plan" presented by Herr Ulbricht, chairman
of the East German State Council.

In a speech Herr Ulbricht said that the German Democratic
Republic supported Mr. Khrushchev's memorandum to President
Kennedy and was determined to follow the course outlined therein.
After noting that the East German State Council had sent an urgent
appeal to the Federal Government and the Bundestag for negotiations
on a peace settlement and German reunification, he asserted that any
further delay in concluding a peace treaty and making West Berlin a
demilitarized free city represented "a growing danger for the German
people, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechosolvakia and all other
European nations, as well as the American people". If the "Bonn
Government" continued to resist a peace treaty and carried on its
"policy of revanche and rearmament", the conclusion of a peace
treaty with the German Democratic Republic alone would be
"inevitable"; such a separate peace treaty would "confirm in law the
existing frontiers, reinforce the international status of the G.D.R.,
including its admission to the United Nations, and lead to the removal
of the centre of provocation in West Berlin and its abuse as a base
in the cold war".

After alleging that the Western Powers had "violated" the Potsdam
Agreement, which constituted "the basic charter for the aims of the
occupation of Germany", and asserting that a right of occupation
detached from these aims and extending for an indefinite period did
not exist under international law, Herr Ulbricht said that the present
"occupation regime" in West Berlin had neither in law nor in fact
anything to do with the aims of the anti-Hitler coalition. A peace
treaty would extinguish occupation rights under international law on
the whole territory of the G.D.R., "i.e., also in West Berlin", and the
G.D.R. was under no obligations deriving from the "anachronistic
occupation law" in West Berlin which "the three Western occupation
Powers have created for themselves".

Herr Ulbricht continued: "The freedom and security of the pop-
ulation in West Berlin will, under our proposals, be secured by the
strongest imaginable international guarantees. For this it will be
necessary, however, that West German militarism and the revanchist

175

politicians from Bonn ... are removed from West Berlin. The con-
clusion of a peace treaty with the G.D.R. would free the population
of West Berlin of the obligations imposed by the separate occupation
regime and enable it to decide its status within a demilitarized free
city of West Berlin. ... We have no intention of interfering with
West Berlin affairs. I repeat . . . that the right of a demilitarized
free city of West Berlin to determine its own order and freedom
and to decide its own affairs will in no way be affected . . . and that
we are willing to guarantee its communications with west, east, north,
and south. However, we demand one thing West Berlin must cease
to be a base for the cold war.

"The G.D.R. is willing to negotiate a settlement of all questions
arising from the ending of the occupation regime in West Berlin and
the conclusion of a peace treaty, as far as they affect the sovereignty
of the G.D.R. This is a concession by the G.D.R. . . . , and the
Western Governments should reasonably accept that the G.D.R. will
not tolerate a violation of its sovereignty."

The East German "Peace Plan" contained the following proposals:

(1) The setting-up of a German Peace Commission consisting of
representatives of both German Parliaments and Governments, with
the task of reaching agreement on all-German proposals for a peace
treaty and on "a goodwill agreement aiming at an immediate improve-
ment of their relations".

(2) (ff) Such an agreement might contain the following provisions:
(i) both German States would renounce nuclear arms and agree on
the immediate ending of further rearmament; (ii) both would agree
on the strength, armament and location of their defence forces
pending the conclusion of a general disarmament agreement; (iii)
both would suppress all "war and revanche propaganda"; (iv) neither
of them would interfere in the social order of die other, and each
would "regard the decision on the other's social order as an act
of self-determination of the other's population"; (v) both would
support a non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Treaty coun-
tries and the NATO countries, as well as the creation of a nuclear-
free zone in Central Europe; (vi) both would take measures to
expand trade between them, foster cultural relations, and facilitate
and improve traffic between the two German States.

(&) All discussions in the Peace Commission would be based on
the principle that neither side would "impose its will on the other".

(3) A peace treaty should make it impossible for Germany ever
to start a new war, but should also secure for the German people
"permanent peace and full equality in the family of nations". German
proposals for a peace treaty should therefore include the following:

(i) Both German States would undertake to renounce any threat

176

of force, or use of force, in their international relations, to settle
international disputes by peaceful means only, and to follow a policy
of peaceful coexistence between peoples and States;

(ii) both would support the creation of a militarily neutral Ger-
many, the inviolability of this neutrality being guaranteed by the
principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition. The treaty would
regulate the strength, armament and location of the defence forces
of both German States, who would renounce nuclear weapons and
support general and complete disarmament;

(iii) the existing German frontiers would be confirmed and the
inviolability and sovereignty of each German State guaranteed;

(iv) ell "war and revanche propaganda" would be banned, all
"Nazi, militaristic and revanchist organizations and associations" for-
bidden, and persons who had committed crimes against peace, crimes
against humanity and war crimes would be banned from occupying
leading posts in public life;

(v) the contracting parties would recognize the full sovereignty
and self-determination of the German people, "including the right
to bring about Germany's reunification as a peaceful State without
foreign interference";

(vi) all contracting parties would support Germany's co-operation
in UNO and other organizations on a basis of equality and, pending
Germany's reunification, would support the admission of both
German States to the United Nations;

(vii) both German States would be granted full freedom for the
development of their economy, shipping and access to world markets.

(4) Until Germany's reunification, West Berlin would have the
status of a neutral free city. No "espionage, diversionist and sub-
versive activities or hostile propaganda against other States" would
be permissible in West Berlin as a demilitarized free city, and "any
kind of warmongering and any activity of militarist and Fascist
organizations" would be banned. The people of West Berlin would
be guaranteed the inviolability of the city's status as a neutral free
city and freedom to decide on their internal and external affairs. Com-
munications would be guaranteed through agreements with the
German Democratic Republic.

(5) "Because of the existence of two German States with different
social orders", reunification could only be achieved through the crea-
tion of a German Confederation "aimed at their co-operation on the
basis of peaceful coexistence and creating the pre-requisites for reunifi-
cation in a peaceful, democratic and neutral State". The organs of the
German Confederation would make recommendations to the two
German Governments, including the following:

(i) implementation of the provisions of a peace treaty throughout
Germany;

(ii) the gradual ending of the obligations derived from member-

177

ship of different military groupings, withdrawal from these alliances
and withdrawal of foreign troops and bases;

(iii) agreement on the military neutrality of both States as the
basis for a future neutral unified Germany;

(iv) general disarmament of both States "as a German contribu-
tion to world disarmament";

(v) the foreign relations of both States to be based on the U.N.
Charter, and both to become members of international organizations
and conventions;

(vi) aid to economically under-developed countries "without any
form of colonialism";

(vii) extension of relations between both States in the spheres of
economy and trade, culture, science and technology, and sports,
and removal of obstacles to free traffic;

(viii) preparation of a democratic Constitution for a unified Ger-
man State, and the holding of "general, free and secret democratic
elections" for an all-German Parliament;

(ix) the formation of an all-German Government with Berlin as
its capital.

In a telegram on June 28, the East German State Council had
appealed to the Bundestag and the Federal Government to agree
without delay to the opening of negotiations between representatives
of both States on the questions of a peace settlement and reunifi-
cation, so as to ensure jointly that the national interests of the
German people would be safeguarded in a peace treaty.

The West German Government Bulletin commented on July 4
that the Soviet Union had rejected all constructive proposals made
by the three Western Powers and the Federal Government with the
aim of achieving a permanent and just peace settlement; that negotia-
tions for a peace treaty could be carried out on the German side only
by an all-German Government elected by a free decision of the whole
German people; that "functionaries imposed on part of the German
people by a foreign Power cannot speak on behalf of the German peo-
ple or part of it"; and that a just settlement of the German question,
ensuring peace in Europe, could only be achieved by granting the
entire German people the right of self-determination.

Mr. Khrushchev's Broadcast on Germany and Berlin, August 1961

In a televised broadcast on Aug. 7, Mr. Khrushchev declared inter
alia that West Berlin must "not be allowed to become another
178

Sarajevo" and called upon the Western Powers to "sit down sincerely
at the conference table" and "clear the atmosphere". Mr. Krushchev
spoke in part as follows:

"The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would make it
possible to normalize the situation in West Berlin. . . . Should West
Berlin be made a free city, that would not affect either the interests
or the prestige of any State. We propose that it should be stipulated
in the peace treaty that the free city of West Berlin be granted free-
dom of communications with the outside world. We agree to the
establishment of the most effective guarantees for the independent
development and security of the free city of West Berlin. We stand for
the freedom of West Berlin, but not on the basis of the maintenance
of the military occupation status. . . .

"Both the Yalta Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement clearly
established that the occupation of Germany must help the German
people to eradicate militarism and Nazism. The Western Powers
violated all the principles agreed upon at Yalta and Potsdam. The
conspiracy by the Western Powers in 1946 on the merger of the two
occupation zones was the beginning of the division of Germany and
the restoration of the power of the militarists and revenge-seekers in
Western Germany. The Western Powers finally and unilaterally tore
up the Potsdam Agreement by setting up a separate West German
State, concluding the Paris Agreements, and including Western Ger-
many in NATO. It is not accidental that a special tripartite occupa-
tion status was established for West Berlin in this connexion. By
this tripartite occupation status the Western Powers themselves con-
firmed that they had destroyed the foundation of their occupation
regime in West Berlin under international law and that this regime
rests solely on armed force.

"If the Western Powers persist in refusing to sign a German peace
treaty we shall have to settle this problem without them. The other
day a conference of the first secretaries of the Communist and
Workers' Parties of the Warsaw Treaty countries took place in
Moscow. They exchanged views on matters involved in preparing for
a German peace treaty. The communique says that if the Western
Powers continue evading the conclusion of a German peace treaty,
the States concerned will be compelled to conclude a peace treaty
with the German Democratic Republic.

"It goes without saying that in that case the G.D.R. would attain
full sovereignty and therefore the question of the use of communica-
tions with West Berlin running across its territory would have to be
decided by agreement with the G.D.R. Government. As for the
agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers on the
question of access to West Berlin concluded during the occupation
period, they would become null and void.

179

"Some might say, however: 'But is it all that necessary to sign
a peace treaty with Germany now? Why not wait another two or
three years, or even more, for the conclusion of this treaty? Perhaps
that would eliminate tension and remove the danger of war?' No, this
line of action is impermissible. The truth must be faced: the Western
Powers are refusing to conclude a peace treaty with Germany on an
agreed basis. At the same time they threaten with war and demand
that we should not conclude a peace treaty with the G.D.R. They
want nothing more nor less than to impose their will on the Socialist
countries.

"To them the question of access to West Berlin and the question
of the peace treaty as a whole is only a pretext. If we renounced the
conclusion of a peace treaty, they would regard this as a strategic
break-through and would widen the range of their demands at once.
Tliey would demand the elimination of the Socialist system in the
G.D.R. They would set themselves the task of annexing from Poland
and Czechoslovakia the territories restored to them under the Pots-
dam Agreement. And were the Western Powers to attain all this, they
would advance their main claim the abolition of the Socialist system
in all countries of the Socialist camp. . . . That is why the question
of a peace treaty cannot be postponed. . . ."

East German Refugee Exodus to West Berlin

An immediate result of the Berlin crisis was a very great increase
in the number of East German refugees seeking asylum in West
Berlin, the exodus being on a scale unprecedented since the 1953
uprising in Eastern Germany. Thousands of refugees, the majority of
whom registered at the Marienfelde reception camp, crossed into the
Western sectors every day throughout July 1961, the total figure for
the month being 30,444; some 15,000 more sought asylum in West
Berlin during the first fortnight of August before the East German
authorities sealed the Berlin border [see below].

[Figures published in July by the West German Ministry of
Refugees showed that over 2,600,000 refugees had fled from East
Germany between 1949 and June 30, 1961.

Over 300,000 refugees had fled from Eastern Germany during the
18-month period from Jan. 1960 to June 1961, prior to the exodus
during July and the first part of August. In addition to many young
people, they included large numbers of factory workers, former inde-
pendent craftsmen and shopkeepers, fanners, policemen, doctors,
dentists, lawyers, university professors and teachers, resulting as
admitted by the East German authorities in serious labour shortages

180

and in a severe shortage of skilled professional men, notably in the
medical, dental, and teaching professions.]

The Berlin Wall
East German Authorities close Berlin Border

At 2:30 a.m. on Aug. 13, 1961, the East German authorities
sealed off the border between East and West Berlin, and also between
West Berlin and the surrounding East German territory, leaving only
13 official crossing-points open. A special broadcast said that these
measures had been taken in agreement with a decision by the Political
Advisory Council of the Warsaw Treaty Organization; that they
would remain in force until the conclusion of a peace treaty; and that
they had been taken "in the interests of peace in Europe and of the
security of the G.D.R. and of the other Socialist States".

The East German decree imposing the above restrictions alleged
inter alia that the "Adenauer Government" was "systematically
carrying out preparations for a civil war with regard to the G.D.R.";
that East German citizens visiting the Federal Republic were being
"increasingly subjected to terroristic persecutions"; that "West Ger-
man and West Berlin espionage organizations are systematically
luring G.D.R. citizens and carrying out a regular slave traffic"; and
that "the aim of this aggressive policy and sabotage is to extend the
domination of the militarists from the G.F.R. to the G.D.R." For
these reasons it had been decided to take the following measures:

(1) "To put an end to the hostile activities of the revanchist and
militarist forces in Western Germany and West Berlin, the same con-
trol is to be introduced on the borders of the G.D.R., including the
border with the Western sectors of Berlin, as is normally carried out
along the borders of every sovereign State."

(2) Citizens of the G.D.R. would need special permits for cross-
ing the border into West Berlin "until West Berlin is turned into a
demilitarized neutral free city".

(3) West Berlin citizens might enter "Democratic Berlin" (Le. the
Eastern sector) on presenting West Berlin identity cards. Entry would
be refused, however, to "revanchist politicians and agents of West
German militarism".

(4) "As regards visits to Democratic Berlin by citizens of the
G.F.R., former decisions on control remain in force. These decisions
do not affect visits by citizens of other States" to East Berlin.

(5) "As regards travel abroad by West Berlin citizens along the

181

communication lines in the G.D.R., former decisions remain in force"
(Le. there would be no interference with communication routes link-
ing West Berlin and the Federal Republic).

(6) The decree "in no way revises former decisions on transit
traffic between West Berlin and West Germany via the G.D.R."

As a result of the closing of the border except for the official
crossing-points, the flood of refugees from East Berlin dwindled to
a trickle; nevertheless, some 1,500 succeeded in escaping into West
Berlin during the day across backyards, gardens and bombed sites,
and in some cases by swimming canals and the River Havel. Steel-
helmeted East German border guards, People's Police, and factory
"fighting squads" were strongly reinforced along the entire border,
tanks and armoured cars brought up at some places, roads dug up
with pneumatic drills and barbed-wire fences erected.

The Brandenburg Gate, one of the 13 official crossing-points still
remaining open, was sealed by the East German authorities on
Aug. 14, when armed People's Police accompanied by armoured cars
took up positions on the East Berlin side of the Gate; the East Ger-
man News Agency said that the measure was only "temporary 39 and
had been taken because of "West Berlin provocations aimed at violat-
ing the border at the Brandenburg Gate". During the night of
Aug. 17-18 a concrete barrier up to 6ft. high and topped with barbed
wire was erected in the Potsdamer Platz by Communist "shock
workers"; similar concrete barriers were raised at other points along
the sector boundaries, apparently designed to fill in existing gaps
between the crossing-points.

The following additional restrictions were imposed by the East
German authorities during the night of Aug. 22: (a) the establish-
ment of a "no-man's-land" of 100 metres 9 width on both sides of the
border, coupled with a warning to West Berliners not to approach
within that distance "in the interests of their own safety"; (i) reduc-
tion of the number of crossing-points to six (three for West Berliners,
two for West Germans, and one for foreigners and diplomatists); and
(c) an announcement that West Berliners would not be allowed to
enter East Berlin without special visas, in order to prevent the entry
of "spies and provocateurs" into the Eastern sector. It was stated that
such visas would be issued at two offices to be opened at S-Bahn
stations in West Berlin, but the West Berlin Senate announced that
such offices would be immediately closed if attempts were made to set
them up.

182

The Western Allied commandants immediately denounced the
"no-man's-land" order as "effrontery", and on the following day
about 1,000 U.S., British and French troops patrolled up to the
sector boundaries within the 100-metre radius with tanks, armoured
vehicles and anti-tank guns.

Meanwhile, however, the East German Government had pro-
ceeded to extend the concrete wall and barbed-wire fences so as to
surround the whole of West Berlin, with the number of authorized
crossing-points remaining strictly limited.

Reactions in Western Germany and West Berlin

Dr. Adenauer declared on Aug. 13: "Those in power in the Soviet
zone have tonight begun, in open violation of the Four-Power agree-
ments, to seal off West Berlin from its surroundings. This measure
has been taken because the regime forced upon the people by a
foreign Power is no longer able to master its internal difficulties. . . .
The arbitrary action by the Pankow regime has created a serious
situation. Together with our Allies we are taking the necessary
counter-measures. . . ."

Herr Brandt wrote in a letter to President Kennedy on Aug. 16:
"The measures taken by the Ulbricht regime . . . have almost entirely
destroyed what remains of the four-Power status (of West Berlin).
Whereas previously the commander of the Allied forces in Berlin pro-
tested against parades by the so-called (East German) People's
Army, they have now had to be content with a delayed and not very
forceful demarche following the occupation of East Berlin by the
People's Army. The illegal sovereignty of the East Berlin regime has
been tacitly recognized ... I consider this a very grave stage in
the post-war history of this city. . . .

"By means of the (East) German People's Army the Soviet Union
has achieved half of its proposals for a Free City. The second half is
only a question of time. . . ."

Herr Brandt went on to plead for the creation of a three-Power
status for West Berlin, and also for a "demonstrative reinforcement"
of the U.S. garrison in West Berlin.

Herr Brandt told a gathering of nearly 300,000 West Berliners
on Aug. 16 that the situation was the most serious with which the
city had been faced since the 1948 blockade.

183

Addressing great crowds outside the Schoneberg Town Hall (the
City Hall of West Berlin), Herr Brandt declared that the Western
commandants' protest was "good but not good enough", and dis-
closed that he had written to President Kennedy [see above] saying
that "Berlin expects not merely words but political action". "What
has happened in the past few days in Berlin," he said, "is a new
edition of the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler; in the coming
weeks and months Berlin must not become another Munich".

The West German Bundestag held an emergency session on the
Berlin situation on Aug. 18, when statements were made both by
Dr. Adenauer and by Herr Brandt.

Dr. Adenauer said that by closing the Berlin borders the East
German regime had given the entire world a "clear and unambiguous
declaration" of its "political bankruptcy". Despite the "unending
patience" shown by the Western Powers and the Federal Republic,
the Soviet Government had shown that it believed existing problems
could be solved by "illegal acts and threats". Western solidarity
was essential in face of the common danger, and the North Atlantic
alliance must counter the Soviet threats by preparing "measures
which are necessary for the maintenance of our security and free-
dom"; in this connexion the Federal Republic would increase her
own military preparedness within the NATO alliance to support
and complement the efforts of the Western Allies, who had already
taken such steps.

The Chancellor reiterated his Government's willingness to support
all efforts for four-Power negotiations on Berlin and Germany;
emphasized that the Federal Government had never held that the
Berlin problem could be solved by military measures; expressed the
hope that negotiations would soon begin on the Berlin problem; and,
on behalf of the West German Government, appealed to the Soviet
Union "to return to a realistic appraisal of Slings at this critical
moment". He emphasized that the right of the German people to self-
determination could constitute the only basis for a change of rela-
tions between the Soviet and German peoples, adding in this con-
nexion that the mass flight of East Germans was indicative of what
they really thought about their regime.

Herr Brandt said that "intervention by international institutions"
had become necessary in face of the "flagrant breach of human
rights" committed in Berlin by the East German regime. Urging
"convincing non-military counter-measures" by the West, he de-
clared: "The City Government of [West] Berlin believes it would be
good if visible signs of the Allied presence and of Allied rights were
to follow, and above all if political initiatives were taken. . . . The
Soviet Union must not believe that it can strike us in the face and that

184

we will keep on smiling." He emphasized that the West Berlin City
Government was not addressing any reproaches to the Western Allies
in demanding "convincing non-military counter-measures"; it would,
however, "think nothing of counter-measures which would set off
resounding laughter from the Potsdamer Platz to Vladivostok".

Statistics relating to Incidents at Berlin Wall

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the building of the
Berlin Wall on Aug. 13, 1971, a West Berlin body known as the
"Working Group 13th August" published various statistics relating
to attempts by East Germans to escape into West Berlin and Western
Germany.

According to these, 2,838 East Germans had been arrested while
attempting to cross the Berlin Wall during the period of its existence,
of whom some 1,500 had been imprisoned for attempting to flee from
the G.D.R.; in the same period there had been 65 certified cases of
people being killed by East German border guards along the West
Berlin border. However, some 30,000 people had succeeded in cross-
ing either the fortifications around West Berlin or the border between
Eastern and Western Germany.

The working group also claimed that 45,000 members of the East
German forces were at present engaged in guarding the borders, with
15,000 of them around West Berlin; since the erection of the wall,
2,314 members of the East German armed forces were claimed to
have fled from Eastern Germany, and 526 of those who escaped in
the period up to the end of June were said to have come to West
Berlin.

Mr. Khrushchev's and Herr Ulbricht's
Statements on Germany and Berlin

Mr. Khrushchev visited the German Democratic Republic in
January 1963 for the sixth congress of the East German Socialist
Unity Party, which was held in East Berlin on Jan. 15-21.

On the question of Germany and Berlin, Mr. Khrushchev said:

"It may appear at first glance that nothing has changed since we
raised the question of a German peace treaty. . . . Four years have
gone by, but there is no peace treaty. . . . Some people may be in-
clined to say that the time has been wasted, that the Socialist coun-
tries have gained nothing by raising the question of a German peace

185

treaty. But those who think so fail to see, or do not understand, the
changes that have occurred. . . .

"The position of the German Democratic Republic has grown
stronger. For a long time your Republic did not have all the neces-
sary resources to protect its sovereignty effectively. Its border with
West Berlin was an open gate which subversive forces used without
hindrance and with impunity, not only to squeeze the lif eblood out of
you and rob the working people of the Republic of milliards of marks
every year, but also to undermine the very foundations of Socialism.
On Aug. 13, 1961 [the day on which erection of the Berlin Wall
began] a stop was put to these abuses. . . .

"The problem of the German peace treaty is not really what it was
before the defensive measures were taken on the G.D.R.'s border
with West Berlin. This does not mean, of course, that the Socialist
countries have lost interest in concluding a peace treaty. On the con-
trary, the question is of vital importance. . . .

"The Socialist countries agree to a peace treaty being signed with
the two German States or with one of them. They propose that West
Berlin be granted the status of a free city under the peace settlement.
They are willing to provide this free city with the most reliable
guarantees of non-interference in its affairs guarantees of freedom
for the population of West Berlin to choose whichever social and
political system they prefer. The United Nations should be the guar-
antor. It may be recalled that the German Democratic Republic, the
Soviet Union, and their Socialist allies have even consented to foreign
troops staying in West Berlin for a fixed period under the U.N.
flag "

In his speech at the congress, Herr Ulbricht put forward a seven-
point plan for the "normalization" of relations between the German
Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. Admitting
that the Western Powers had "certain prestige interests" in West
Berlin which must be taken into account, he advocated like Mr.
Khrushchev the conversion of West Berlin into a "peaceful, neutral
free city" with the co-operation of the United Nations. On relations
between the G.D.R. and the G.F.R., Herr Ulbricht proposed a pact
between the two German States based upon the existence of differing
social systems, and including the following clauses:

(1) Each German State should recognize the other, respect its
political and social system, and renounce the use of force in any form.

(2) The two States should respect each other's existing frontiers
and renounce any attempt to change them.

(3) Both States should renounce the possession and use of nuclear
weapons.

186

(4) Rearmament should be halted and defence budgets frozen.

(5) Each State should recognize travel documents carried by
citizens of the other as a precondition for the normalization of travel
between the two German States.

(6) Normal cultural and sporting contacts should be restored.

(7) An agreement should be signed for the expansion of trade
between the two States.

The congress adopted a new statute for the Socialist Unity Party
which, unlike its predecessor, made no mention of German reunifica-
tion but envisaged a confederation between two "equal and sovereign"
German States and the "free city" of West Berlin.

President Kennedy's Berlin Speech

President Kennedy of the U.S.A., in the course of a visit to the
German Federal Republic, visited West Berlin on June 26, 1963.
After touring the city in the company of Dr. Adenauer and Herr
Brandt, and inspecting the Berlin Wall, the President made a short
speech at the Schoneberg Town Hall, saying:

"Two thousand years ago the proudest boast in the world was
Civis Romanus sum. Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest
boast is Ich bin ein Berliner.

"There are many people in the world who do not understand what
is the great issue between the free world and Communism. Let them
come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere
that we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin.

"Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect;
but we never had to put up a wall to keep our people in. I know of
no city which has been besieged for 18 years and still lives with the
vitality, force, hope and determination of this city of West Berlin.
While the wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the
failures of the Communist system, we take no satisfaction in it, for it
is an offence not only against history but against humanity. . . .

"In 18 years of peace and good faith this generation of Germans
has earned the right to be free, including the right to unite their
family and nation in lasting peace with the goodwill of all people.
When the day finally comes when this city will be joined as one in this
great continent of Europe, the people of West Berlin can take great
satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front line for almost
two decades. . . ."

187

9. BERLIN PASSES AGREEMENTS OF 1963-66

Between 1963 and 1966 the West Berlin Senate and the East
German Authorities approved several agreements on passes which
enabled West Berliners to visit their relatives in East Berlin.

The first passes agreement was signed on Dec. 13, 1963, permitting
the issue of passes valid for one day for Christmas or New Year
visits to East Berlin between Dec. 20, 1963, and Jan. 5, 1964.

The second agreement, which was signed in East Berlin on Sept.
24, 1964, laid down that visits by West Berliners to their relatives in
the Eastern sector of the city would be possible during four periods
of 14-16 days each during the year. The agreement was subject to
renewal after 12 months.

On March 10 and Sept. 8, 1964, the East German Government
announced other concessions: (1) West Berliners travelling through
Eastern Germany to a foreign country would be allowed to stay for
up to 72 hours in some East German towns on the main railway
routes. (2) Elderly East Germans were allowed to visit relatives in
West Berlin and Western Germany.

On Nov. 25, 1965, a new passes agreement was signed in West
Berlin, regulating the issue of visitors' passes on the lines of the 1964
agreement. The agreement also provided for additional family visits
by West Berliners in cases of special "hardship" (death of a relative,
serious illness, etc.). The validity of the new agreement was limited'
to March 31, 1966, but the agreement was later extended to June
30, 1966.

10. SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST
FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY OF 1963

A Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation came officially into
force on July 2, 1963, when Dr. Schroder, the German Federal
Foreign Minister, and M. Roland de Margerie, the French Ambas-
sador in Bonn, exchanged the documents of ratification, following
parliamentary approval of the Treaty in both countries.

Notes protesting in strong terms against the Franco-German Treaty
were handed by Mr. Gromyko on Feb. 5 to the French and West
German Ambassadors in Moscow.

Extracts from the Note to Western Germany are given below:
188

"It is generally known that the Government of the German Federal
Republic has for a number of years been stubbornly fitting keys to
open nuclear arsenals. It makes no secret of the fact that it is ready
to subscribe to any plan, whether it be the establishment of so-called
'multilateral NATO forces' or atomic partnership on another basis, if
only it can get nuclear weapons at its disposal. . . . Regardless of the
way in which nuclear weapons might come into the hands of the
Bundeswehr, whether directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union would
regard this as an immediate threat to its vital national interests and
would be compelled to take the necessary measures dictated by such
a situation. . . .

"The Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell partic-
ularly on that part of the [Franco-German] Treaty which provides for
the extension of its operation to West Berlin. This clause can only
be regarded as deliberately provocative. . . . West Berlin is not and
cannot be part of the territory of the Federal Republic. The jurisdic-
tion of the authorities of the Federal Republic does not and cannot
extend to that city, and the Federal Government has no right to speak
on behalf of West Berlin in international affairs. . . .

"The attempt to bring West Berlin which is situated on the
territory of the German Democratic Republic within the sphere of
the Franco-West German Treaty cannot have any force in inter-
national law. But the fact that such an attempt is being made provides
additional proof that the Government of die German Federal Re-
public is seeking allies, not for peace, but for complicity in satisfying
its expansionist claims. . . .

"The fact that the German Federal Republic, 18 years after the
Second World War, does not have diplomatic relations with many
States of Eastern Europe including Poland and Czechoslovakia, the
victims of Nazi rapine emphasizes the entire falsity of the

first victims of Nazi rapine emp

assurances regarding the desire of the Federal Republic for recon-
ciliation with the peoples of States which were formerly enemies of
Germany in the war.

"The Soviet Government ... has more than once proposed to the
Federal Republic that it should put an end to this mistrust engendered
by the past. It has urged, and continues to urge, the Federal Govern-
ment to march in step with the States which are guided in inter-
national affairs by the principles of peaceful coexistence, all-round
co-operation and the peaceful settlement of disputed questions. But
the Government of the Federal Republic unfortunately turns a deaf
ear to these calls "

Rejection of Protest by Western Germany

The West German Government replied to the Soviet Note on
March 29, 1963.

189

The Federal Government's reply declared inter alia that the Soviet
Note "completely misunderstands the character, significance, and
aims" of the Franco-German Treaty, which was "not directed against
any people or any State" but expressed "the wish of the German and
French peoples finally to remove the national differences between
them". It rejected as "absurd" the Soviet statement that the Treaty
had been concluded because of "the old unquenchable thirst for dom-
ination over other States and nations, for carving up the map of the
world again after their own pattern", and described as "equally ab-
surd" the allegation that Federal Germany was pursuing a "policy of
unleashing a thermo-nuclear war and involving the principal NATO
members in it on the side of the German Federal Republic".

The Note continued: "As should be known to the Soviet Govern-
ment, the Federal Government voluntarily renounced in 1954, within
the framework of the Western European Union, the production of
atomic, biological or chemical weapons. She has placed all her fight-
ing forces under NATO, which is a purely defensive alliance. In the
circumstances the Soviet allegation that die Federal Government is
planning a war for the restoration of the frontiers of the Hitler Reich
appears* particularly untruthful, all the more since it comes from a
Government which disposes of a vast arsenal of atomic weapons,
which has steadily refused to accept control of disarmament mea-
sures and nuclear tests, and which threatens the Federal Government
with powerful and concentrated blows by its rocket and nuclear
weapons."

After recalling that the German forces under NATO command
could only be used for self-defence, that the Federal Republic had
committed itself in 1954 to conducting its policy in accordance with
the U.N. Charter, and that it had repeatedly undertaken to settle all
differences with other countries by peaceful means, the Note de-
clared: "The Federal Government refrains from refuting in detail the
misleading, incriminating and insulting statements in the Soviet Note,
of which there are too many." Rejecting the Soviet assertion that the
Franco-German Treaty was a "deliberate provocation" because it
also referred to West Berlin, the German Note stated that for a long
time the Federal Government had provided for the application to
Berlin of treaties concluded with other countries; this, however, was
expressly made subject to the consent of the Allied authorities in
Berlin in deference to Berlin's special status, "which the Soviet Union
is flagrantly violating by her unilateral and illegal measures in East
Berlin, especially through the construction of the Berlin Wall".

As regards the Soviet complaint that the Franco-German Treaty
had been concluded without authority from the "so-called German
Democratic Republic", the Note declared: "In concluding this Treaty
... the Federal Government has in fact acted on behalf of the whole

190

German people. It would have been perfectly willing to ask the Ger-
mans in the so-called German Democratic Republic whether they
desired this reconciliation, and it is absolutely certain that the over-
whelming majority of them would have agreed to the Treaty. Un-
fortunately any consultation with those Germans living in the so-
called German Democratic Republic is impossible under the regime
supported by the Soviet Government."

The West German reply went on: "The Soviet Government ac-
knowledges the rights and obligations conferred upon it by the four-
Power agreements. In this connexion the Federal Government refers
particularly to the responsibility of the four Powers to bring about
the reunification of Germany by free elections, the achievement of
which ... the head of the Soviet Union had himself undertaken at the
1955 Geneva Conference. The Federal Government . . . regrets that
the Soviet Government has evaded this obligation again and again
in recent years. . . ."

In conclusion, the Note rejected the Soviet allegation that the Fed-
eral Government had disregarded appeals for co-operation and the
peaceful settlement of differences, and declared that the Federal Gov-
ernment was willing to investigate any course which could improve
relations between the two peoples.

11. CHANCELLOR ERHARD'S POLICY STATEMENTS, 1964-65

Dr. Adenauer resigned as Federal Chancellor at the age of 87 on
Oct. 11, 1963, and was succeeded by Professor Ludwig Erhard who
on Oct. 17 formed a new Cabinet composed of Christian Democrats
(including members of the party's Bavarian wing, the Christian Social
Union) and Free Democrats.

Dr. Erhard's New York Policy Statement, June 1964

The German Federal Chancellor's activities during the months
from January to July 1964 included official visits to all the capitals
of the six member-countries of the European Economic Community
as well as to Canada, the United States and Denmark.

During his visit to New York Dr. Erhard addressed the Council
of Foreign Relations on June 11, 1964, calling for:

(a) "Complete and free travel between East and West" supple-
mented by "exchange of publications" and in particular by intensified
"economic and cultural contacts";

191

(b) Going "beyond the realm of ideologies" to foster contacts with
"all thinking, open-minded people not addicted to dogma" in the
countries behind Europe's Iron Curtain; and

(c) Elimination of "one of the most dangerous trouble spots" in
Europe by permitting a divided Germany to reunite in peace and
freedom.

The Chancellor said in the course of his speech: "German reunifi-
cation through self-determination is in the best interest of the people;
it is in the best interest of all East European peoples. At any rate, it
offers better guarantees of security and prosperity than the current
kind of imperialism based on terror and suppression still practised in
the Soviet Zone of Germany. We hope, and there are beginning to be
slight indications to justify this hope, that this conviction is gaining
ground even in the Soviet Union."

On Czechoslovakia he said: "I state here clearly and explicitly
the Munich agreement of 1938 was torn to pieces by Hitler. The
German Government has no territorial claims whatsoever with regard
to Czechoslovakia and separates itself expressly from any declarations
which have given rise to a different interpretation."

On Poland he said, after mentioning the disputed Oder-Neisse line:
"The German Government feds that the German-Polish border
should be established in a peace treaty in accordance with the Pots-
dam Agreement, a treaty that can only be concluded with an all-
German Government. Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany
have a common interest that this condition be established, which will
make it possible for the two peoples to live together in peace."

Stressing that he wanted more, not less, relaxation of East-West
tension, he suggested that the Soviet Union might extend the principle
of peaceful coexistence by agreeing to a "coexistence of ideas". The
Federal Government as well as the whole German nation, he said,
was devoid of "cold war" concepts and ready for any meaningful talk.
"Nobody," he declared, "is thinking of Germany going it alone. There
will be no new 'Rapallo' just as there will be no new 'Munich'." [By
concluding the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union in April
1922, for the mutual renunciation of reparations and the establish-
ment of diplomatic and economic relations, the Republican Govern-
ment of Germany had antagonized the Western Allies.]

The following joint communique (cross-headings inserted) was
issued on June 12 after the talks in Washington between President
Johnson, Mr. Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Dr. Erhard and Dr.
Schroder (the Federal Foreign Minister) :

192

Germany and Berlin. "Every suitable opportunity should be used
to bring nearer the reunification of Germany through self-determina-
tion. So long as Germany remains divided, Europe will not achieve
stability.

"The President and the Chancellor noted the Soviet Government's
announcement that it signed today a treaty of friendship, mutual
assistance, and co-operation with the so-called German Democratic
Republic. They agreed that no unilateral move by the Soviet Union
could in any way affect the rights of the three Western Powers or
modify the obligations and responsibilities of the Soviet Union with
respect to Germany and Berlin. They stressed that the Soviet Govern-
ment would be solely responsible for the consequences of any attempt
at interference with Allied rights that might result from implementa-
tion of the new treaty. They also reaffirmed that until Germany is
unified, only the freely elected and legitimately constituted Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany -and no one else can speak
for the German people.

"The President restated the determination of the United States to
carry out fully its commitments with respect to Berlin, including the
maintenance of the right of free access to West Berlin and the con-
tinued freedom and viability of the city.

Eastern Europe. "The President and the Chancellor stressed the
importance of improving relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.
The President said that the United States fully supports the actions
of the Federal Republic directed towards this goal. They also ex-
pressed the conviction that measures designed to reduce the threat
of war and to bring about arms control serve to promote the goal of
German reunification. . . ."

In Washington on June 13 Dr. Erhard stated his conviction that the
question of German reunification was, to Washington, not just "a dis-
tant objective" but "a matter that had to be dealt with daily".

He discounted any suggestion of a new West German approach to
the Soviet Union in the near future, saying: "We are all aware that
this cannot be solved by any single action overnight and that it is
part of a process."

Re-election of President Liibke
Soviet Protest at Election in West Berlin

Dr. Heinrich Liibke was re-elected President of the German Fed-
eral Republic for a second five-year term at a meeting of the
Bundesversammlung (the Federal Convention, consisting of the mem-

193

(6) Going "beyond the realm of ideologies" to foster contacts with
"all thinking, open-minded people not addicted to dogma" in the
countries behind Europe's Iron Curtain; and

(c) Elimination of "one of the most dangerous trouble spots" in
Europe by permitting a divided Germany to reunite in peace and
freedom.

The Chancellor said in the course of his speech: "German reunifi-
cation through self-determination is in the best interest of the people;
it is in the best interest of all East European peoples. At any rate, it
offers better guarantees of security and prosperity than the current
kind of imperialism based on terror and suppression still practised in
the Soviet Zone of Germany. We hope, and there are beginning to be
slight indications to justify this hope, that this conviction is gaining
ground even in the Soviet Union."

On Czechoslovakia he said: "I state here clearly and explicitly
the Munich agreement of 1938 was torn to pieces by Hitler. The
German Government has no territorial claims whatsoever with regard
to Czechoslovakia and separates itself expressly from any declarations
which have given rise to a different interpretation."

On Poland he said, after mentioning the disputed Oder-Neisse line:
"The German Government feels that the German-Polish border
should be established in a peace treaty in accordance with the Pots-
dam Agreement, a treaty that can only be concluded with an all-
German Government. Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany
have a common interest that this condition be established, which will
make it possible for the two peoples to live together in peace."

Stressing that he wanted more, not less, relaxation of East-West
tension, he suggested that the Soviet Union might extend the principle
of peaceful coexistence by agreeing to a "coexistence of ideas". The
Federal Government as well as the whole German nation, he said,
was devoid of "cold war" concepts and ready for any meaningful talk.
"Nobody," he declared, "is thinking of Germany going it alone. There
will be no new 'Rapallo' just as there will be no new 'Munich'." [By
concluding the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union in April
1922, for the mutual renunciation of reparations and the establish-
ment of diplomatic and economic relations, the Republican Govern-
ment of Germany had antagonized the Western Allies.]

The following joint communique (cross-headings inserted) was
issued on June 12 after the talks in Washington between President
Johnson, Mr. Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Dr. Erhard and Dr.
Schroder (the Federal Foreign Minister) :

192

Germany and Berlin. "Every suitable opportunity should be used
to bring nearer the reunification of Germany through self-determina-
tion. So long as Germany remains divided, Europe will not achieve
stability.

"The President and the Chancellor noted the Soviet Government's
announcement that it signed today a treaty of friendship, mutual
assistance, and co-operation with the so-called German Democratic
Republic. They agreed that no unilateral move by the Soviet Union
could in any way affect the rights of the three Western Powers or
modify the obligations and responsibilities of the Soviet Union with
respect to Germany and Berlin. They stressed that the Soviet Govern-
ment would be solely responsible for the consequences of any attempt
at interference with Allied rights that might result from implementa-
tion of the new treaty. They also reaffirmed that until Germany is
unified, only the freely elected and legitimately constituted Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany -and no one else can speak
for the German people.

"The President restated the determination of the United States to
carry out fully its commitments with respect to Berlin, including the
maintenance of the right of free access to West Berlin and the con-
tinued freedom and viability of the city.

Eastern Europe. "The President and the Chancellor stressed the
importance of improving relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.
The President said that the United States fully supports the actions
of the Federal Republic directed towards this goal. They also ex-
pressed the conviction that measures designed to reduce the threat
of war and to bring about arms control serve to promote the goal of
German reunification. . . ."

In Washington on June 13 Dr. Erhard stated his conviction that the
question of German reunification was, to Washington, not just "a dis-
tant objective" but "a matter that had to be dealt with daily".

He discounted any suggestion of a new West German approach to
the Soviet Union in the near future, saying: "We are all aware that
this cannot be solved by any single action overnight and that it is
part of a process."

Re-election of President Liibke
Soviet Protest at Election in West Berlin

Dr. Heinrich Liibke was re-elected President of the German Fed-
eral Republic for a second five-year term at a meeting of the
Bundesversammlung (the Federal Convention, consisting of the mem-

193

bers of both Houses of Parliament) in West Berlin on July 1, 1964.
The decision to hold the presidential election in West Berlin was the
subject of Soviet protest Notes to Britain, France and the U.S.A. on
June 26.

The Notes reiterated the Soviet view that West Berlin was not
part of the Federal Republic, which fact had been recognized by the
Western Powers when endorsing the Federal Constitution; described
the holding of the election there as "a new provocation" on the part
of the Federal Government; and said that "the claims laid by the
authorities of the Federal Republic to West Berlin, which is an inde-
pendent political entity, and their hostile activities in (hat city against
the interests of other States" were "a direct and overt violation of
international law" and "a manifestation of the dangerous policy pur-
sued by the revenge-seeking circles. . . ." "No Parliament in history,"
the Notes added, "has ever left the bounds of its country to hold
presidential elections abroad." After accusing the Western Powers of
"ambiguity" in their policy as regards West Berlin and of "toeing
the line of the West German authorities in this matter", the Notes
reiterated the Soviet Government's commitments to "ensure the
inviolability of the borders of the German Democratic Republic".

At the opening of the session the President of the Bundestag, Dr.
Gerstenmaier, who also presided over the Bundesversammlung, said
in reply to the Soviet protest that the election was taking place in
Berlin "neither because of a wish to cause provocation nor through
annoyance caused by the East German Communist r6gime's con-
tinued provocation". On the contrary, what had brought the
Bundesversammlung to Berlin was "solely our loyalty to this city,
to the whole people, and to our own history". Dr. Gerstenmaier
described the Soviet claim that the presidential election was being
held "abroad" as "an insult to the whole German people".

Dr. Erhard's Policy Statement of Nov. 10, 1965

In his first policy statement to the Bundestag on Nov. 10, 1965,
after his re-election as Federal Chancellor, Dr. Erhard re-defined his
Government's attitude on both foreign and domestic affairs, dealing
in particular with the question of the reunification of Germany, East-
West relations, the Western Alliance and disarmament.
194

Recalling the achievement of sovereignty by the German Federal
Republic and its accession to NATO in May 1955, Dr. Erhard
reviewed the changes which had occurred since then, notably (a)
the achievement of independence by a large number of "young na-
tions"; (Z>) the "loosening of the inner cohesion" of the two big
Power blocs both in the East and in the West; (c) the emergence
of Communist China as an independent political factor; and (d) a
"softening-up" in the relationship between the two great Power
groups, though as yet insufficient to be called "a genuine detente".

These changes, he continued, had not, however, affected the ques-
tion of the continued division of Germany, and the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the Federal and the Soviet Govern-
ments in 1955 had not led to "the restoration of a democratic
German State", which had at that time been described as "the chief
national problem of the entire German nation". After declaring that
this was due solely to the fact that the U.S.S.R. did not want the
reunification of the German people in freedom, Dr. Erhard pointed
out that no effect had been given to the directive issued by the Heads
of Government of the four Powers on July 23, 1955, which laid
down that "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections
shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the
German people and the interests of European security".

Dr. Erhard expressed his views on Soviet policy with regard to
German unification as follows:

In 1958 the U.S.S.R. had announced its intention of separating
the city of Berlin from Western Germany and transforming it initially
into a third independent part of Germany and later into part of "the
Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany". This intention, however, had not
been carried out because of "the firm stand of our Allies, our own
firm will, and above all the gallant attitude of the Berliners". The
future of Berlin would, he declared, rest on the following principles
and demands: (a) "the presence of the three Allies in Berlin"; (6)
"unrestricted free access to Berlin"; (c) Berlin's forming part of free
Germany; and (d) respect for "the unequivocal will of the Berliners"
as the basis of any agreement on Berlin.

The Chancellor maintained that the Soviet Union, while using
the concept of peaceful coexistence, still intended to have the present
state of affairs sanctioned, and that in particular (a) it aimed at the
destruction of the Western security system by the use of offensive
means; (&) it attempted to obtain recognition of the "Soviet Zone"
[i.e. the German Democratic Republic] throughout the world; (c)
it claimed that the German people's desire for reunification impaired

195

a detente in international affairs; and (d) it described reunification
as a matter to be settled between "the two German States" and
intended to divest itself of its obligations as one of the four responsible
Powers.

Announcing the forthcoming publication of a White Paper on the
subject, Dr. Erhard re-defined his Government's attitude as follows:

"The Federal Government insists that the entire German people
shall decide its destiny in self-determination and that the four Powers
honour their obligation. . . .

"The Federal Government has repeatedly declared its readiness
to the Soviet Union to take steps to improve mutual relations even
if immediate agreement could not be reached on the most important
problem between us and the Soviet Union reunification. It has indi-
cated that it would be prepared to talk about many things among
them, for instance, security guarantees in the event of reunification.
I sought immediate talks with the Soviet leaders, and, in fact, ex-
Chairman Khrushchev was ready to come to Bonn. However, the
Soviet Government persists in its error that a divided Germany is of
greater advantage to the Soviet Union than a reunified one. We want
it to know, however, and we have stated it before, that the German
people and any all-German Government will be ready to provide
safeguards that no danger will arise to Russia and our Eastern
neighbours from the reunification of Germany.

"The Federal Government will do everything in its power to con-
solidate the inner cohesion between the two parts of our divided
people, but let this be clear to everybody will not pay any political
price for it. In particular, we shall not be ready to agree to any
measures calculated to impair the conditions for reunification in free-
dom. For we have to stand up for our countrymen in the [Soviet]
Zone as well, and for their great hope that one day they may finally
be able to live under a free and democratic system in a reunified
Germany. We pay all the more tribute to our countrymen for their
reconstruction achievements in the Zone, as those achievements were
made under the most difficult conditions and under an unworthy and
sterile social system.

"A regime which, to protect its own existence and to subjugate
people, resorts to erecting a wall in the divided capital of Berlin and
to surrounding itself with barbed wire and watch-towers condemns it-
self and cannot but meet with rejection and contempt.

"The Federal Government has, since its inception, upheld its right
to be the sole representative of all Germans. That means that we
would regard any recognition or international upgrading of the Zone
as an unfriendly act directed against the restoration of German unity.
We shall not slacken in our efforts to prevent such a development

196

even at the risk of appearing here and there to be a disturbing ele-
ment. How would other nations act if they were in our situation? I
am sure that no nation with a history of its own would be ready to
give up its unity and its right.

"Soviet propaganda holds against us that our wish that the Soviet
Union should grant our countrymen the right of self-determination
introduces an element of tension into world affairs. This agitation
presents the facts the wrong way round. For, if the Soviet Union were
to grant the Germans in the Zone the right of self-determination and
thus make the reunification of our nation possible, it would indeed
remove an essential obstacle to a lasting relaxation of tension between
East and West. We do not want less detente, but more.

"It may be a long way; a way that may require privation and
sacrifice. Yet we shall go it. At its end there will be a peace treaty,
negotiated and concluded by a freely elected all-German Government.
It is only by, and in, such a treaty that the final boundaries of Ger-
many can and must be determined, since, according to valid legal
authority, Germany continues to exist within her boundaries of
Dec. 31, 1937, as long as a freely elected all-German Government
does not recognize different boundaries. Reunification of Germany
means peace in Europe."

Reaffirming his Government's wish to improve its relations with
Eastern European countries, the Chancellor expressed his belief that
"reunification policy, security policy and foreign policy are one*' and
that German security policy must be aimed at a "peaceful balance of
interests".

197

IV. FROM DR. ERHARD'S PROPOSALS
FOR RELAXATION OF TENSION
TO HERR BRANDT'S "OSTPOLIT1K"
TREATIES, 1966-71

From 1966 onwards the Government of the German Federal
Republic made efforts to enter into negotiations with countries in
Eastern Europe in order to improve mutual relations.

The first of these efforts was made in March 1966 by the Christian
Democratic Government of Dr. Erhard, but the standpoints of West-
ern Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union, Poland and
Czechoslovakia on the other were still far apart.

The period of the Grand Coalition between Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats from December 1966 to October 1969 was
marked by the first attempts of the West German Government, with
Dr. Kiesinger (CDU) as Chancellor and Herr Willy Brandt as Vice-
Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to negotiate with the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) (or Eastern Germany) at
ministerial level.

1. WEST GERMAN PROPOSALS OF 1966
FOR RELAXATION OF TENSION IN EUROPE

Identical Notes were sent by the German Federal Government on
March 25, 1966, to all countries with which it had diplomatic rela-
tions, as well as to the countries of Eastern Europe, containing pro-
posals for world peace, general disarmament, and the relaxation of
international tension.

198

The West German Note contained six specific proposals, namely:

(1) All non-nuclear States belonging to military alliances in the
East or the West should renounce the production of nuclear weapons
and submit to international control.

(2) The Federal Government was ready to join any agreement
for the staged reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. Such an agree-
ment would have to include all Europe and be linked with "the
solution of political problems in Central Europe".

(3) The handing over of fissionable material to countries outside
Euratom should be controlled by the International Atomic Energy
Commission in order to prevent the use of the materials for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons.

(4) The Federal Republic was ready to exchange formal declara-
tions with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechosolvakia and any other
East European State whereby each side would give an undertaking
to the other not to use force in the settlement of international disputes.

(5) To "dispel mistrust with regard to alleged German aggressive
intentions", the Federal Republic also proposed bilateral agreements
with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria on the exchange of military observers to attend
manoeuvres of armed forces.

(6) The Federal Government was prepared to participate "in a
constructive spirit" in a world disarmament conference or any other
such conference which promised success.

The West German Note also included the following passages.

Relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. "Despite the fact that
the Federal Government has made particular efforts to cultivate rela-
tions with Poland, the country which suffered most of all among
the East European nations in the Second World War, it has made
but little progress in this direction. Although the Polish Government
is obviously interested in more lively trade between Germany and
Poland, it has hitherto not given any indication that it is interested
in achieving a conciliation between the two nations. Rather does
it hamper the cultural contacts we seek, stand for the continued
division of Germany, and at the same time calls upon the Federal
Government to recognize the Oder-Neisse line, though it is generally
known that, under the Allied agreements of 1945, the settlement of
frontier questions has been postponed until the conclusion of a peace
treaty with the whole of Germany and that, according to international
law, Germany continues to exist within its frontiers of Dec. 31, 1937,

199

until such time as a freely elected all-German Government recognizes
other frontiers.

"If, when the occasion arises, the Poles and the Germans enter
into negotiations on frontier questions in the same spirit that led
to the conciliation between Germany and her Western neighbours,
then Poles and Germans will also find their way to agreement. For in
this question neither emotions nor the power of the victor alone, but
rather reason, must prevail.

"In recent years the Federal Government has established official
relations with Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. It is en-
deavouring to create such relations with Czechoslovakia as well and
would welcome a renewal of more friendly relations between the
people of that State and the German people.

"In the opinion of the Federal Government the Munich Agreement
of 1938 was torn asunder by Hitler and no longer has any territorial
significance. The Federal Government, therefore, does not assert any
territorial claims against Czechoslovakia; it stresses that this is
the official statement of German policy.

"The policy pursued by the Federal Government is neither
revanchist nor restorative. It is looking forward, not backwards, and
its aim is an equitable European order on the basis of peaceful agree-
ments an order in which all nations can live together freely and as
good neighbours

The Soviet Attitude. "The Government of the U.S.S.R. has an-
nounced time and again that it does not want war. The Federal Gov-
ernment presumes that the Soviet Union really means this, but the
value of Soviet assurances is diminished by quite unambiguous and
massive threats like those frequently made against the Federal Repub-
lic, as, for instance, in the Note communicated by the Soviet Gov-
ernment on Feb. 5, 1963, which states: It is not hard to imagine
that in the event of a thermo-nuclear war the mighty and con-
centrated blows of rockets and nuclear weapons will inevitably come
down over Western Germany and that that country would not survive
a third world war.*

"Such language reveals a mentality which the Federal Government
can only view with concern. And it has all the more reason as the
Soviet Union does, in fact, possess the strongest ground forces in
Europe and, furthermore, has at its disposal a very large arsenal of
nuclear and hydrogen bombs, rockets, as well as a fleet of nuclear
bombers and guided-missile submarines. . . ."

Reply of Soviet Government

The Soviet Government's reply to the West German Note was not
presented in Bonn until May 17. Running to over 3,000 words, it
described the Oder-Neisse frontier as "final and unalterable", said
200

that it was "not by courtesy of the German Federal Republic that the
European States and their frontiers exist", and described the Federal
Government's "talk about the frontiers of other European States" as
"absolutely senseless". After alleging that Western Germany was
trying to create a "Bonn-Washington axis", the Soviet Note said that
the whole policy of the German Federal Government was "sub-
ordinated to one purpose to obtain the status of a nuclear Power
and to try ... to restore the German Reich with all its pretensions".
The Note stated in particular:

"Violating the obligations ensuing from the Potsdam Agreement,
the Government of the German Federal Republic formed an army
(the Bundeswehr), half a million strong, which is being adapted for
nuclear missile warfare. It closely links its policy with the policy of a
non-European State, the United States of America. . . .

"The G.F.R. ranks second among the NATO countries, after the
United States, in the level of military expenditure. . . . Hundreds
of openly Nazi, militarist and revanchist organizations are active in
the Federal Republic. They receive ostentatious political, moral and
material support from Government bodies and from highly-placed
officials. Citizens of the Federal Republic are being poisoned literally
from childhood with the venom of militarist and revanchist ideas,
which also colour school syllabuses, literature, the Press, films and
television. Hitler officers and generals bring up the soldiers of the
Bundeswehr on those ideas. . . .

"Even in a Note which the Government of the G.F.R. would
like to present as a 'peace initiative', it has ... put forward a
thesis . . . claiming that 'Germany continues to exist within the
frontiers of Dec. 31, 1937'. This gives away the secret of the whole
policy of the Government of the German Federal Republic. . . .

"The Government of the Federal Republic is quite familiar with
the commitments undertaken by the U.S.S.R., the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other
member-countries of the Warsaw Treaty to prevent new aggression
by German militarism and to guarantee the stability of the frontiers
that have taken shape. . . .

"The frontier along the Oder and Neisse, established by the PotSr-
dam Agreement and in the Zgorzelec Treaty concluded between
Poland and the German Democratic Republic, is final and unalter-
able.

"The Federal Government presents almost as a 'gesture of good
will' its statement that the territoral provisions of the 1938 Munich
Agreement now have no significance whatsoever. . . . However, it is
worth noting that the Government of the G.F.R. obviously does not

201

want to denounce that document of coercion and aggression or to
recognize its complete invalidity from the very outset. . . .

"The Government and people of the G.F.R. must be clearly aware
that any encroachments on the frontiers of the German Democratic
Republic, Poland or Czechoslovakia will meet with a crushing rebuff
from the U.S.S.R., the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslo-
vakia and the other European States that are allied with them. . . ."

After saying that the West German Note "does not say a single
word about its attitude to the idea of concluding a treaty on the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", the Soviet Note went on:
"It is glaringly obvious that the Government of the G.F.R. is hushing
up a possibility which non-nuclear States have for acquiring nuclear
weapons namely, through existing military groupings of Powers.
This, of course, is not an accidental omission. It is common knowl-
edge that the Government of the Federal Republic . . . wants . . .
to find a loophole for access to nuclear weapons for the G.F.R."

As regards the West German proposal that mutual guarantees
should be given not to resort to the use of force in solving inter-
national problems, the Soviet Note said: "In considering [this]
offer the Soviet Government cannot but draw attention to the con-
tradictory character of the pronouncements of the Federal Govern-
ment. On the one hand it declares that it will never resort to force
in settling the German problem. This can only be welcomed. Yet at
the same time the Government of the G.F.R. stresses that there will
be neither lasting peace nor security in Europe or, in other words,
that there will be war until a settlement of the German issue in
accordance with the demands of the G.F.R. . . ."

After saying that the Soviet Union "approaches the German
national problem with understanding" and that the key to this prob-
lem was "in the hands of the two German States", the Soviet Note
ended by setting out the Soviet Government's own proposals for
"improving the international situation, strengthening peace, and
developing peaceful co-operation among States". These proposals, in
which it was hoped that Western Germany would co-operate, were:

(1) Immediate conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, in accordance with U.N. decisions, which would
"stop all loopholes to such proliferation".

(2) Dismantling of military bases on foreign territories and the
withdrawal of foreign armed forces from those territories.

(3) Dissolution of military blocs, including both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Government would be ready to take part
"in working out a system of reliable guarantees for the security of
European States".

(4) The Soviet Government supported the East German proposal
that both German States should renounce nuclear weapons and
reduce their armed forces and armaments. It also supported the

202

Polish proposals (i.e. the Rapacki Plan) for a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe [see page 144].

(5) The easing of tensions between the States of Eastern and
Western Europe by developing co-operation between them, thereby
helping to end the "cold war" and creating "a climate in which
it would be easier to solve urgent problems agitating the European
peoples, including the German people".

(6) A conference of European States to discuss, on an all-
European basis, "questions concerning European security, including
military disengagement, the reduction of armaments, and the develop-
ment of peaceful, mutually-beneficial contacts among all European
States".

(7) The Soviet Government had approved the application of
the German Democratic Republic for membership of the United
Nations and would also support any application for U.N. member-
ship by the German Federal Republic.

(8) A German peace settlement "taking due account of the
situation that actually exists in Europe. . . . With a German peace
settlement, a system of European security could also cover West
Berlin, which is an independent political entity." . . .

Polish and Czechoslovak Replies

The Polish Government's reply to the West German Note was
handed on April 29 by the Polish Ambassador in Copenhagen, Mr.
Romuald Poleszczuk, to the West German Ambassador for con-
veyance to the Federal Government. Copies were sent to all Gov-
ernments with which Poland had diplomatic relations.

Like the Soviet Note, that of the Polish Government emphasized
that the Oder-Neisse frontier was final and beyond discussion. Saying
that the German Federal Government had "had the boldness to ask
Poland to renounce her sovereign rights to an important part of her
territory", it accused the Federal Government of presenting the
situation "in a way which is at variance with historical truth". Like
the Soviet Note also, the Polish Note emphasized the suffering caused
to the Polish people by the German invasion in 1939, declaring that
the memory of the Second World War among the Polish people was
"strong and ineffaceable". Extracts from the Polish Note are given
below.

"The [West German] Note . . . contains the absurd argument
that Germany continues to exist within her 1937 frontiers. The
Government of the Polish People's Republic has repeatedly pointed

203

out that such a position is devoid of any foundation, and once more
rejects it categorically.

"The frontier on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse is final. It was
established at the Potsdam Conference by the decision of the vic-
torious Powers, on behalf of the anti-Nazi coalition, with the voice
of Poland having been taken into consideration. That decision, con-
stituting an act of historical justice, was immediately implemented,
inter alia, through the realization of the provisions relating to the
resettlement of the German population from the Western and North-
ern territories restored to Poland. As regards the peace conference
as incontestably follows from the wording of the Potsdam Agreement
it was left the task of only a formal confirmation of the Polish
Western frontiers.

"It is today a universally known and recognized fact that the
Polish Western and Northern territories are an integral part of
Poland, just as Poland is part of Europe. The Polish-German fron-
tier has been finally delimited on the basis of the agreement concluded
in 1950 at Zgorzelec between Poland and her neighbour, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic. This frontier cannot be the subject of any
discussions or bargains and, therefore, of any claims by the German
Federal Republic. . . ."

After saying that Poland was linked with the German Democratic
Republic [Eastern Germany] "not only by an understanding but also
by close ties of friendship and co-operation", the Polish Note said
that conditions for the full normalization of relations between
Poland and the German Federal Republic would only materialize
when the G.F.R. "recognizes without reservations the existing fron-
tiers of Poland on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse and renounces once
and for all its claims to the Polish Western and Northern territories".

The Polish Note ended: "The renunciation of territorial claims
against Poland; recognition of the frontier on the Oder and
Neisse; recognition of the Munich Agreement as null and void, not
because Hitler invalidated it by his perfidy and crimes, but because
it sanctioned the rape of Czechoslovakia and was a stage in the
policy of conquest; recognition of the existence of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic as an equal German State and a partner for the
unification of Germany; a clear answer to the question of what that
unified Germany should be like; the renunciation of armaments and,
in particular, the abandonment of the intention to gain access to
nuclear weapons; a constructive approach to even partial and gradual
solutions aimed at relaxation in Europe that is the real and only
road towards the consolidation of security and peace. . . ."

The Czechoslovak Government's reply to the West German Note
was presented on May 6.

204

The Czechoslovak Government said that it had examined the
German Note "particularly from the point of view as to whether
and how far it constitutes a change in the policy hitherto pursued
by the German Federal Republic" but had found that the Federal
Government had "again made quite openly territorial demands
against peace-loving European States and, without regard to the
undeniable facts of post-war developments and international basic
principles", had claimed the right to speak for the whole German
nation. It continued:

"As long as the German Federal Republic bases its policy on the
non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic as an inde-
pendent and sovereign State, all its proposals lack any real sub-
stance. ... If the Federal Government now declares that it desires
good relations with all its neighbours, and if it contends that it has
tried in various ways to improve its relations with the States and
peoples of Eastern Europe, this contradicts its whole policy towards
the Socialist countries."

After describing the attitude of the Federal Government to the
Oder-Neisse border with Poland as "especially clear proof of the
anti-peace, revanchist character and political aims of the German
Federal Republic", the Czechoslovak Note went on: "Of basic im-
portance is the Federal Government's attitude towards the so-called
Munich Agreement. It continues to maintain that . . . [this Agreement]
was legally concluded and had lost its validity only by the subse-
quent aggression of Nazi Germany, i.e. by the total occupation of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939. It therefore again refuses to reject
the Munich dictate morally, legally and politically as a criminal act
of Nazi aggression. If the Federal Government wants to achieve a
real improvement in the relations between Czechoslovakia and the
German Federal Republic . . . then it must unconditionally condemn
the so-called Munich Agreement and expressly recognize that it was
invalid from the beginning."

After refuting the German proposals for disarmament measures
as "being based on just as unrealistic conceptions as the whole
policy of the Federal Government", the Note referred to continued
efforts by the Government in Bonn to obtain access to nuclear
weapons within the framework of NATO, and declared: "Numerous
statements by Government pfficals . . . prove that the German
Federal Republic regards a joint NATO nuclear force only as an
interim stage on the way to the direct possession of nuclear weapons,
to be used as a means to pursue its power policy with the principal
aim of bringing about a revision of the results of the Second World
War." In conclusion the Note alleged that the abnormal position
in the mutual relations between the two countries was solely a result
of the Federal Republic's policy, which had rejected Czechoslovak

205

proposals and continued with its "negative attitude" towards the
resumption of normal diplomatic relations.

An official spokesman in Bonn commented on May 6 that the
Czechoslovak Note "evaded an objective discussion" of the concrete
German proposals, but expressed the hope that an occasion would
present itself for further elucidation of the German Note to the
Czechoslovak Government.

1966 Exchanges between SPD and SED
Unsuccessful Negotiations on Joint Meetings

Also during 1966, there were repeated but in the end unsuccessful
efforts by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the Social Dem-
ocratic Party (SPD), then in opposition in the Federal Republic, to
arrive at a "dialogue".

Herr Ulbricht first invited Herr Brandt, chairman of the SPD and
then Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin, on Feb. 8, 1966, to talks
to be held both in Eastern and in Western Germany. The reply of the
SPD, dated March 18, 1966, agreed in principle to discussions be-
tween all parties on both sides but raised a number of critical ques-
tions on the attitude of the SED; Neues Deutschland, the SED organ
in East Berlin, published it on March 26, together with a reply from
the SED proposing that public meetings should be held in May in
Karl-Marx-Stadt (formerly Chemnitz) and in Essen, and be
addressed by speakers of both parties.

The SPD replied on April 14 with the proposal that Herr Brandt
and the SPD's deputy chairmen, Herr Fritz Erler and Herr Herbert
Wehner, should speak in Karl-Marx-Stadt between May 9 and 13,
and that the SED should send representatives to a meeting in
Hanover between May 16 and 20.

The Federal Government agreed to this proposal on April 20 but
reiterated that discussions between the two Governments were out
of the question.

Herr Ulbricht explained on April 21 that his aim in the talks
would be to pave the way step by step for a system of bilateral
agreements between the G.D.R. and the G.F.R. with a view to
eventual "confederation". However, at preparatory talks held be-
tween representatives of the two parties in Berlin on April 29-30,
1966, the SED asked for a postponement of the proposed meetings

206

until after the Land elections in North Rhine-Westphalia in July,
asserting that their delegates would be "endangered" by visiting the
Federal Republic. Nevertheless, following further exchanges between
the negotiators of the two parties, they announced in a joint com-
munique on May 26 that they had agreed on meetings in Karl-Marx-
Stadt on July 14 to be addressed by the SPD leaders, and in Han-
over on July 21 to be addressed by SED representatives, and that
both meetings would be extensively covered in the Press, radio and
television on both sides.

Herr Brandt replied immediately, declaring that because some of
the questions posed by the SPD had now elicited a negative reply from
the SED it was all the more necessary to pursue all efforts to obtain
easier conditions on the human level for Germans living in both parts
of Germany, on the principle that even in a divided Germany "much
could be done". Addressing the SPD congress in Dortmund on
June 1, he declared that the Communist plans for a confederation
were "of no help to those who wanted to achieve German unity in
freedom", and that the Communists should "bury any hope they may
still have" of inducing the SPD "to flirt with the 'popular front'
tiger". He acknowledged that there had been "significant economic
development" in Eastern Germany in recent years and, though he
insisted on the continued responsibility of the four Powers for Ger-
many, on the West German claim to sole representation of all
Germans, and on non-recognition of the G.D.R., he said that this
ought not to hamper an "internal German settlement" of problems.
While rejecting the idea of confederation he said he favoured a
policy of easing life in divided Germany step by step.

Herr Brandt, Herr Wehner, and Herr Erler, who should have
addressed the meeting in Karl-Marx-Stadt on July 14, gave on that
day on the West German radio and television an outline of their
planned speeches, and on the following day Herr Brandt wrote a
letter to all SPD members denouncing Communist plans "to by-pass
the SPD leadership" and penetrate local SPD organizations in what
they called "the second phase". The letter concluded: "The con-
frontation [with the SED] requires the firm unity of the party and,
if it is to be successful, confidence in the SPD leadership."

Neues Deutschland on Oct. 22, 1966, published "six questions"
by the SED Central Committee to the SPD, to which Herr Wehner
replied the same day by putting four counter-questions, while also
on Oct. 22 the SPD executive, Party Council and Control Commis-

207

sion approved a joint statement repeating that in the SPD's view the
regime in the other part of Germany could be recognized neither as
democratic nor as legitimate under international law, but emphasizing
that the time was ripe for discussing in both parts of Germany the
basic questions of German policy "openly and in public"; the party
also remained ready to discuss with SED representatives "far-
reaching technical arrangements" aimed at easing the effects of the
country's division and means to overcome this. After this no further
negotiations between the two parties took place.

2. KIESINGER GOVERNMENT'S EXCHANGES
WITH EASTERN GERMANY, 1967-69

Formation of "Grand Coalition" by Christian Democrats and

Social Democrats Dr. Kiesinger replaces Dr. Erhard as

Federal Chancellor

The two-party coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Free
Democrats, which had endured for five years, came to an end on
Oct. 27, 1966, with the resignation of all four Ministers of the Free
Democratic Party. On Nov. 29 the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) approved a coalition between the CDU and the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), and on Nov. 30 the SPD parliamentary
party voted in favour of the coalition. On the same day Dr. Erhard
tendered his resignation from the Chancellorship to President Liibke,
who accepted it on Dec. 1.

The coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Social
Democrats described in political circles and in the West German
Press as the "grand coalition" was the first occasion in the 17-year
history of the Federal Republic that the Social Democratic Party had
been in power.

Dr. Kiesinger, the CDU leader, was elected Federal Chancellor on
Dec. 1, while Herr Brandt, the leader of the SPD and Chief Burgo-
master of West Berlin, was appointed as Foreign Minister in addition
to taking the Vice-Chancellorship.

In a press statement, Dr. Kiesinger described himself as an "old
European" and said that he would do all in his power to help bring
about the unification of Europe as speedily as possible. As regards
Eastern Europe, it was his intention "in all sincerity" to seek to

208

create "the best and most peaceful relations with the countries of
the East, but bearing in mind the difficult problem of the division
of Germany".

Dr. Kiesinger made his first policy statement in the Bundestag
on Dec. 13 in a lengthy speech which covered both domestic and
internal policy. In the field of external affairs, Dr. Kiesinger dealt
inter alia with relations with Eastern Europe, and in particular with
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Extracts from Dr. Kiesinger's speech
are given below (cross-headings inserted).

Germany and Eastern Europe. "For centuries Germany was the
bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. We would like to
fulfil this role in the present age and are therefore interested in
improving relations in all fields of economic, cultural and political
life with our Eastern neighbours who have the same desire, and
even of opening diplomatic relations with them whenever the circum-
stances allow it.

Germany and Poland. "Wide sections of the German people
have a lively desire for reconciliation with Poland, whose tragic his-
tory we have not forgotten and whose desire to live in a State with
secure frontiers we understand better than before, in view of the
present fate of our divided people.

"But the boundaries of a reunified Germany can be laid down
only in an agreement concluded freely with an all-German Govern-
ment, an agreement creating conditions approved by both peoples
for a lasting and peaceful relationship of good neighbourliness.

Germany and Czechoslovakia. "The German people would also
like to reach agreement with Czechoslovakia. The Federal Govern-
ment condemns the policy of Hitler, which aimed at the destruction
of the Czechoslovak State. It agrees with the view that the Munich
Agreement, which came into existence under the threat of force, is
no longer valid.

"However, there are still problems requiring a solution, such as
that of the right to nationality. We are aware of our duty to protect
the Sudeten German people, like all refugees and expelled persons,
and we take this duty seriously."

During 1968 the two parts of Germany, the German Federal
Republic (G.F.R.) and the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.),
for the first time in their history both declared their readiness for talks
at ministerial level. [Previous talks on interzonal trade, inland
navigation, etc., had always been conducted at "technical level", i.e.

209

by officials.] An offer by Herr Horst Solle, East German Minister
for Foreign Trade, to meet Professor Karl Schiller, West German
Minister of Economic Affairs, for talks on trade between the two
sides had been accepted by Professor Schiller, who announced on
Aug. 16 that he was ready to meet Herr Solle in East Berlin or any
other German city without any preliminary conditions for such talks.
Dr. Kiesinger, the Federal Chancellor, had explained on Aug. 17
that such a meeting was in line with proposals previously made by
him to the East German regime.

Herr Ulbricht's Proposals Exchange of Letters
between Dr. Kiesinger and Herr Stoph

These proposals had developed out of statements made on both
sides from time to time, and an exchange of letters between Dr.
Kiesinger and Herr Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the G.D.R., during 1967.

Herr Ulbricht (Chairman of the Council of State of the G.D.R.)
had proposed on Sept. 1, 1964, that "the two German States" should
take some first steps towards a relaxation of tension between them,
including (a) separate declarations rejecting the possession, produc-
tion, testing, or stationing of nuclear weapons; (b) an application to
the signatories of the Potsdam Agreement to declare the whole of
Germany an atom-free zone and to withdraw any nuclear weapons
stationed in Germany; and (c) a reduction in military Budgets.
These steps, Herr Ulbricht said, could be followed by others, such as
a solemn rejection of the use of force, urging the NATO and Warsaw
Pact member-States to conclude a non-aggression agreement, support
for the Polish proposal for freezing nuclear arms in Central Europe,
and readiness to accept international control by representatives of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to supervise disarmament measures
on German territory.

In his New Year message of Dec. 31, 1966, Herr Ulbricht stated
that it was impossible to unite the Socialist G.D.R. and the Federal
Republic, which he asserted was "dominated by monopoly capital",
but that it was imperative that they should coexist peacefully with a
view to later confederation. To this end he proposed 10 steps, as
follows:

210

(1) The two German States should establish normal relations
with each other.

(2) They should conclude a non-aggression treaty.

(3) They should solemnly recognize the existing frontiers in
Europe.

(4) They should agree to halve arms expenditure.

(5) They should renounce nuclear weapons.

(6) They should encourage normal relations between all European
States and the German States.

(7) They should make a declaration of neutrality, to be guaran-
teed by the great Powers.

(8) They should pledge themselves to respect West Berlin as a
separate and independent territory.

(9) The G.D.R. and the West Berlin Senate should conclude a
treaty in which the Senate would pledge an ending of the "cold
war" against the G.D.R. and the G.D.R. would guarantee the transit
routes through its territory to West Berlin.

(10) The two German States should establish a joint commission
to investigate to what extent the clauses of the Potsdam Agreement
guaranteeing peace and democracy in Germany had been imple-
mented in each of them. This joint commission should make pro-
posals for further measures which might be found necessary.

Dr. Kiesinger on his part issued a statement on April 12, 1967
shortly before the SED was due to hold its seventh congress in East
Berlin reiterating his previously expressed wish to achieve a relax-
ation of tension between East and West but, by implication, refusing
any recognition of the G.D.R. as a separate State. His statement was
supported by all parties in the Bundestag.

Dr. Kiesinger listed as immediate steps to be taken to that end
between the two parts of Germany: (a) improvements in travel
facilities, including pass arrangements in Berlin and between neigh-
bouring areas on both sides, as well as easier payment transfers,
receipt of medical supplies and of gifts, and family reunions; (b) an
expansion of inter-German trade, partly by means of increased public
guarantees and credits, and involving the exchange of power (in
particular electricity), the establishment of new communications, and
postal and telephone improvements, including the restoration of tele-
phone services between East and West Berlin [then cut off by the
East German regime] (c) agreement on trade, technical, and cultural
exchanges; the removal of bureaucratic obstacles to contacts between
universities, research institutes and scientific societies; and the gradual

211

introduction of free exchanges involving books, periodicals, news-
papers, youth visits, sports and cultural organizations.

The official East German news agency in a statement the same
day criticized the proposals on the ground that they contained no
indication that the Chancellor had abandoned his Government's
claim to be the sole representative of all Germans or of its "intention
to annex the G.D.R." Herr Ulbricht nevertheless said on April 16
that the proposals proved that sooner or later the two Governments
would have to negotiate as equal partners as had always been main-
tained by the Government of the G.D.R. and at the opening of the
SED congress on April 17 he proposed that Dr. Kiesinger and Herr
Stoph should meet with delegations at a place to be agreed upon
to discuss further steps and to conclude agreements.

On May 11, 1967, it was officially announced in Bonn that the
Federal Government had received a letter from Herr Stoph. [No
such announcement had previously been made in respect of earlier
communications received from the East German Government.] It
was disclosed the next day that Herr Stoph had, in his letter dated
May 10, proposed a meeting with Dr. Kiesinger either in East Berlin
or at the Chancellor's office in Bonn to "open direct negotiations with
the aim of concluding agreements" on a number of points similar to
those stated above by Herr Ulbricht.

After it had been officially stated in Bonn on May 12, 1967, that
a reply would be sent to Herr Stoph, Dr. Kiesinger declared on
May 14 that he would pursue his efforts to achieve negotiations with
the object of improving conditions "on a human level". The Bundes-
tag agreed on May 17 to the establishment of a special committee of
Cabinet Ministers of both coalition parties to draft a suitable reply,
and this was given on June 13 in the form of a letter to Herr Stoph
personally, unanimously approved by the Cabinet the same day in
respect of its form and contents. The principal parts of this letter read
as follows:

"Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received your letter of May 10.
Unfortunately it does not deal with my Government's statement of
April 12. I enclose the text. The meaning and the purpose of this
statement was: so long as basic differences of opinion prevent a just
solution to the German question, we must, in the interests of peace
of our people and of a relaxation of tension in Europe, seek internal

212

German arrangements which further as far as possible the- human,
economic and intellectual relations between Germans in East and
West.

"But you say: all or nothing. You raise demands for the political
recognition, in international law, of the division of Germany, a
division which contradicts the will of the people in both parts of our
Fatherland. You make acquiescence to these demands a condition for
talks. If I were to adopt your procedure I would have to demand an
immediate, secret and internationally controlled referendum. In the
present situation, however, such a confrontation would lead us no
further.

"On the other hand, I think it is necessary to have discussions
on how we can prevent the Germans in a period of enforced partition
from growing apart. . . . Life in divided Germany must be made
more bearable. It is the duty of all responsible people to contribute
to this with all their powers.

"The well-being of our people demands that the tensions in Ger-
many should not be increased but lessened. ... It is certainly not our
purpose to exercise tutelage over the people in the other parts of
Germany. Only so long as these people are prevented from express-
ing their will about the destiny of our nation without any doubt, is
the free Federal Government obliged to speak for them."

Reiterating his Government's "solemn renunciation" of the use
of force for the attainment of political ends, Dr. Kiesinger stressed
that the other side would also have to renounce the use of force,
and concluded: "The reality which you and I have to recognize is the
will of the Germans to be one people. I therefore propose that emis-
saries, to be appointed by you and myself, should start talks, without
preliminary political conditions, on such practical questions of co-
existence among Germans as are contained in my statement of
April 12."

Dr. Kiesinger's letter was not published in Eastern Germany, and
it was not until Sept. 18, 1967, that Herr Stoph replied, restating
the East German point of view and enclosing with his letter a draft
treaty of six articles "to establish normal relations between the
G.D.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany", worded as follows.

"Article 1. The G.D.R. and the G.F.R. establish normal relations
with each other.

"Article 2. The relations between the Socialist G.D.R. and the
G.F.R., which are the relations between sovereign States of the
German nation striving for peaceful coexistence and gradual rap-
prochement, are based upon the generally recognized principles of
international law.

213

The Governments of the two German States conclude an agree-
ment on the renunciation of force.

The Government of the G.D.R. and the Government of the G.F.R.
pledge themselves to base their relations upon the following
principles:

Respect for sovereignty, equality of status, and non-intervention in
internal affairs.

Respect for the territorial integrity of the States of Europe.

Recognition of the existing frontiers in Europe, including the
Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the G.D.R. and the
G.F.R.

Recognition of West Berlin as an independent political unit.

Recognition of the nullity from the very beginning of the Munich
Agreement [of 1938].

Renunciation by both German States of any form of access to
nuclear weapons, or the stationing of nuclear weapons on their
territories.

"Article 3. For the establishment and cultivation of normal rela-
tions between the G.D.R. and the G.F.R., such direct contacts shall
be established as are normal between States.

"Article 4. On the basis of mutual advantage and with the aim
of achieving a regularized peaceful coexistence, the necessary agree-
ments shall be concluded in the fields of the economy, trade, posts
and telecommunications, transport and other spheres.

"Article J. The Government of the G.D.R. and the Government
of the G.F.R. pledge themselves that the two German States shall
make further contributions towards guaranteeing European security,
in particular in the form of the renunciation of access to nuclear
weapons in any form, and their stationing.

Article 6. The Governments of the two German States declare
their readiness to open negotiations aimed at a peaceful solution
of the German problem, after they have normalized their relations,
after the implementation of agreed disarmament, after the conclu-
sion of an agreement on European security, and under the condition
that militarism, neo-Nazism and the power of the monopolies have
been overcome."

In his letter Herr Stoph proposed that Secretaries of State from
Bonn and East Berlin should make "technical preparations" for a
meeting of the Chancellor and himself. He repeated, however, that
the unification of Germany could only be based on "an understanding
between the two German States and their Governments in carrying
out the task of overcoming militarism, neo-Nazism and the power of
monopolies", and added that West German membership of the
214

European Economic Community was "diametrically opposed to this
process of unification".

In a statement made on Sept. 29 the Federal Chancellor declared
that he was in principle in favour of a plebiscite to be held through-
out Germany, in which Germans would answer the question whether
they wished to live in one or in two States.

Herr Stoph said the same day, with reference to Dr. Kiesinger's
letter, that he was ready to start negotiations at the level of Secre-
taries of State for the purpose of dealing with the establishment of
formal relations, the conclusion of a bilateral treaty renouncing the
use of force, and recognition of the existing frontiers.

Neues Deutschland stated on Oct. 4, 1967, that Dr. Kiesinger's
letter would not be published in the G.D.R., and reiterated the two
conditions for any all-German talks: (a) final abandonment by the
Federal Government of all claims to the sole representation of Ger-
mans and (b) acceptance of talks as between equal partners between
the Heads of Government of both German States. Herr Ulbricht
repeated on Oct. 9 that his Government was ready for talks on a
treaty establishing normal ties between the two German States and on
mutual renunciation of the use of force.

Dr. Kiesinger, however, said in Berlin on Oct. 1 1 that any recog-
nition of the Communist German "part-State", whether step-by-
step or immediate, constituted a "mortal danger", and denied that
his coalition Government had any intention of moving in that
direction.

Herr Otto Winzer, the East German Foreign Minister, said on
Nov. 16, 1967, that the exchange of letters between Dr. Kiesinger
and Herr Stoph did not of itself provide a basis for negotiations on
terms of equality; that "the whole world including Dr. Kiesinger
knows that a change in the territorial status quo cannot be achieved
by peaceful means"; and that, although the Chancellor was talking
of the "renunciation of force", his "clinging to the old revanchist
targets" clearly implied war. Neues Deutschland stated on Dec. 20
that, while Western Germany was not to be regarded as a foreign
country, there were "two States of the German nation".

Dr. Kiesinger declared in the Bundestag on March 11, 1968, inter
alia: "The Federal Government is ready to negotiate with the Gov-
ernment in East Berlin, and the themes discussed could include the

215

renunciation of force. I myself am ready to meet Herr Stoph. But
the other side must abandon its attempts to couple such talks with
the demand for recognition in international law."

Herr Ulbricht, in reply, rejected the Federal Government's point
of view and attacked Dr. Kiesinger personally in a television state-
ment on March 11.

The question of eventual West German recognition of the Oder-
Neisse frontier was raised at an SPD conference in Nuremberg on
March 18, when Herr Willy Brandt, the Federal Foreign Minister,
said "present circumstances amounted to the recognition or respecting
of this frontier "pending a settlement through a peace treaty", this
formula being approved by the conference on March 20.

Further East German Proposals

The State Council of the G.D.R. on June 25, 1968, addressed a
declaration to the "people and Government of Western Germany"
which largely repeated the earlier East German proposals, as follows:

(1) The Governments of the two German States undertake to
accede immediately to the international Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves to prevent a nuclear war.

(2) Conclusion of a treaty valid under international law between
the Government of the G.D.R. and the Government of the G.F.R.
which prohibits the storing of nuclear warheads on the territories of
the two German States.

(3) Conclusion of a treaty valid under international law between
the Government of the G.D.R. and the Government of the G.F.R.
on the non-application of force in relations between the two German
States.

(4) Conclusion of a treaty valid under international law between
the Government of the G.D.R. and the Government of the G.F.R.
on the recognition of the status quo and the existing frontiers in
Europe.

The Volkskammer (the East German Parliament) authorized the
G.D.R. Council of Ministers on Aug. 9 to conclude treaties on the
basis of these proposals with the G.F.R. and to nominate a Secretary
of State for the required negotiations. At the same time the Volks-
kammer approved a proposal by Herr Ulbricht for negotiations be-
tween the two countries' Ministers of Economic Affairs. It was as a
216

result of this decision that Herr Solle offered to meet Professor
Schiller [see above].

Herr Ulbricht's political proposals, approved by the Volkskammer
at the same time, envisaged:

(a) The establishment of normal diplomatic relations among all
European States, with the two German States being drawn in grad-
ually with equal rights;

(6) The admission of "both German States" to the United
Nations and its organizations;

(c) The signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the Bonn
Government;

(d) The conclusion of a single agreement on the renunciation
of the use of force between the G.D.R. and the G.F.R.;

(e) The recognition of the existing frontiers in Europe and of the
the status quo;

(/) The conclusion of a treaty on the normalization of relations
between the two German States; and

(g) An exchange of properly authorized missions, provided the
Federal Government abandoned (i) its claim to sole representation
of all Germans, and (ii) the Hallstein Doctrine.

G.D.R. Claims for Postal and Railway Charges,
and for Refund of Road Transport Tax

In addition to exchanges between Herr Ulbricht, or Herr Stoph,
and Dr. Kiesinger, East German Ministers had individually ap-
proached their West German counterparts with a view to negotiations
on specific East German financial demands.

Herr Rudolf Schulze, G.D.R. Minister of Posts and Tele-
communications, wrote in October 1966 to Herr Richard Stiicklen,
then Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, and Senator
Schiitz of West Berlin, demanding negotiations on posts and tele-
communications involving payment to the G.D.R. of amounts claimed
to be due for services in transit across G.D.R. territory. The Federal
Government ignored this letter, regarding it as an attempt to achieve
negotiations at ministerial level, which would involve recognition of
the G.D.R., in a matter which in the West German view could be
settled satisfactorily through the existing "technical" contacts.

After another letter dated April 26, 1967, from Herr Schulze to

217

Dr. Werner Dollinger, the new Federal Minister of Posts and Tele-
communications, had been received but returned unopened by the
latter Ministry on April 28 in terms of standing instructions dating
from 1959, the Federal Government decided on May 17, 1967,
that letters from G.D.R. Ministers should be accepted. On June 14,
however, the Federal Government rejected the East German demand;
it accepted the need for certain payments, but refused to recognize
the territory of the G.D.R. as an independent postal area and main-
tained that payment could not be demanded at international rates.

Herr Siegfried Bohm, the Minister of Finance of the G.D.R., in a
letter to Herr Strauss, the Federal Minister of Finance, demanded on
Nov. 22, 1967, that the transport tax imposed by the G.F.R. on road
transports should be abolished to the extent to which it also covered
mileage in East German territory and that the amount hitherto levied
(more than 120,000,000 East German marks) should be paid to the
East German Finance Ministry. Herr Bohm wrote a similar letter to
Herr Heinz Striek, the West Berlin Senator for Finance, claiming
110,000,000 East German marks. Herr Bohm's letters, however,
received no reply.

New Interzonal Trade Agreement (1969-75) between

Eastern and Western Germany Settlement of Dispute

over West German Fuel Tax

An agreement on interzonal trade between the two parts of Ger-
many up to Dec. 31, 1975, was concluded on Dec. 6, 1968, through
an exchange of letters in East Berlin between the negotiators on both
sides, Herr Willy Kleindienst (Western Germany) and Herr Heinz
Behrendt (Eastern Germany).

The Federal Minister of Economics, Professor. Karl Schiller,
announcing the conclusion of the agreement on that date, explained
that it had been made possible by a decision of the Federal Cabinet
on Dec. 4 to compromise with the East German regime on a number
of controversial points, which had so far held up a settlement of the
long-drawn-out negotiations. The four principal points of the agree-
ment, which was also announced on tie same day in East Berlin,
were as follows:

(1) The Federal Government would pay to the German Dem-
ocratic Republic over the clearing account 120,000,000 account units

218

(one unit being equivalent to DM 1 and the total of DM
120,000,000 being equal to U.S. $300,000,000) in two instalments
of 60,000,000 a/u's each on Dec. 31, 1968, and Dec. 31, 1969,
respectively. This payment was meant to compensate the East Ger-
man regime for losses which it claimed to have incurred through a
fuel tax imposed by Western Germany, which was said to have
affected East German earnings from fuel deliveries to the Federal
Republic.

In conjunction with this it was agreed that Eastern Germany
would accept supplies of capital equipment and machinery from
Western Germany up to the total amount of the compensation pay-
ment, and would moreover resume its fuel deliveries, under fresh
annual quotas of DM 30,000,000 for diesel oil and DM 20,000,000
for petrol for which no West German compensatory payments would
be made.

(2) The annual quotas for machinery, motor vehicles and elec-
trical goods were increased by both sides to reach by 1975 double the
quotas for 1968, the Federal Republic thus stepping up its deliveries
from DM 300,000,000 in the latter year to DM 650,000,000 by
1975 by means of annual increases of DM 50,000,000; whilst the
German Democratic Republic would also raise its deliveries by
DM 50,000,000 annually from DM 200,000,000 in 1968 to DM
550,000,000 in 1975.

(3) The "swing" on the clearing account, hitherto fixed at
200,000,000 a/u's, would in future be adjusted to actual East German
deliveries and would amount to 25 per cent of West German pur-
chases in the previous calendar year, thereby facilitating credit
arrangements for East German purchases.

(4) The existing provision under which any debit balance on the
clearing account had to be settled as at June 30 of each year was
dropped, with the intention of facilitating long-term arrangements
in interzonal trade.

The West German initiative in proposing a compromise, to which
the East German authorities responded positively, was considered to
have political implications in addition to its economic aspects.

Professor Schiller said that in the exchange of letters Herr Klein-
dienst had emphasized the importance of the agreement. He [Pro-
fessor Schiller] declared that new conditions had been created for
long-term and continuing trade relations between both parts of
Germany, and added: "We regard these arrangements as our con-
tribution for an all-round improvement of relations, which is indis-
pensable to the economy of both sides and for the unhindered
settlement of their commercial exchanges. I think I may say that

219

the Federal Republic has done its share in its efforts to assist internal
German trade, which has created a new basis for business. It is now
up to the other side to make the next move."

In East Berlin the agreement was also welcomed by Neues Deutsch-
land as a step which would remove existing trade restrictions and
was in the interests of the two commercial partners.

1968-69 Exchanges on Status of West Berlin

A protest from the Soviet Government to the U.S.A., Britain
and France in February 1968 concerning certain activities of the
German Federal Government in West Berlin was followed in March-
June by a series of East German restrictions affecting the overland
access routes to that city. These steps led to protests to the Soviet
Union from the three Western Powers and to the imposition by
NATO countries of counter-measures against East German citizens.

Soviet Protests against Federal Cabinet and
Bundestag Meetings in West Berlin

Mr. Pyotr Abrassimov, Soviet Ambassador to the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, in Notes of Feb. 14 to the U.S., British and
French Ambassadors in Bonn alleged that in the past year the
German Federal Government had "systematically extended" its
"illegal activity" in West Berlin by holding "regular Parliamentary
Weeks" and meetings of the Cabinet and Bundestag committees,
establishing various Ministries and offices employing more than
20,000 civil servants, and planning to build an official residence
for the Federal Chancellor. Furthermore, it had claimed the "exercise
of the privileges of State power" in West Berlin, whose Chief Burgo-
master, Herr Klaus Schiitz, had been elected president of the
Bundesrat.

"The Soviet Union," the Notes concluded, "will not tolerate West
Berlin's integration in the Federal Republic in any form, or its
utilization for purposes which cannot be reconciled with a normaliza-
tion of the European situation and a strengthening of European
security. ... I hope that these considerations will be properly under-
stood, and that the Western Powers will take the necessary measures

220

to protect the status of West Berlin as a special political structure
from the illegal attacks of the German Federal Republic."

Dr. Kiesinger, the Federal Chancellor, visited West Berlin on
March 5-6 to attend a "Parliamentary Week", which had opened on
March 4 and consisted of meetings of all Bundestag committees and
the three parliamentary parties; on March 6 Dr. Kiesinger also pre-
sided over a Cabinet meeting.

Addressing the CDU parliamentary group on March 5, he
stressed that the Federal Government had no intention of provoking
a new crisis over Berlin. He also said that he had on March 1 told
Mr. Tsarapkin, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, that the Federal
Government rejected his accusations of "revanchist intentions to
annex West Berlin"; that, on the contrary, it wished to maintain the
present status of the city and respected the rights of its Western allies
in West Berlin; and that the Bundestag was legally entitled to come
to the city.

Mr. Abrassimov had on March 4 issued a press statement con-
demning the "Parliamentary Week" as unlawful.

The statement declared: "West Berlin is situated outside the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic, is not within the jurisdiction of its
organs, and cannot be either a Land or a protectorate of the West
German State. ... By organizing provocations in West Berlin the
Government of the Federal Republic is assuming full responsibility
for all the possible undesirable consequences of these actions."

East German Restrictions on Travel and
Goods Traffic to and from West Berlin

Under four decrees issued on June 11, 1968, the East German
Government imposed the following additional restrictions on all West
German and West Berlin citizens and goods:

(1) All West Germans travelling across Eastern Germany to
West Berlin and vice versa would be required to possess a passport
and a transit visa (the charge for the latter being raised to DM5
for each crossing).

(2) West Berliners travelling through East German territory to
or from Western Germany would need an identity card and a tran-
sit visa (also costing DM 5).

221

(3) West Germans wishing to visit Eastern Germany would re-
quire a passport and entry and exit visas (costing DM5 each), but
those on a day visit to East Berlin and carrying a passport would
only need a day permit (costing DM 5).

(4) West Berliners wishing to visit Eastern Germany would re-
quire an identity card and an entry visa. [No provision was made for
West Berliners visiting East Berlin for a day, as the previous pass
arrangements for such visits on public holidays and on compassionate
grounds had not been extended, the East German authorities having
failed to react to West Berlin proposals for such an extension.]

(5) An "equalization tax" would be imposed from July 1 on the
transport of goods to and from Western Germany and West Berlin
by lony, train or barge, the rate of tax varying according to the
nature of the goods and the length of the transit route. Coach pas-
sengers would also be taxed.

(6) Goods accompanied by official documents referring to West
Berlin as part of Western Germany would not be admitted.

(7) The transport through East German territory of printed
matter issued by the National Democratic Party (NPD) or other
"neo-Nazi material" was prohibited and East German Customs au-
thorities were ordered to refuse access to motor vehicles carrying
such material.

(8) The minimum amount which Western visitors were obliged
to change into East German marks would be raised from DM 5 to
DM 10 a day, except for day visits to East Berlin.

Colonel-General Friedrich Dickel (the Minister of the Interior),
explaining the new measures to the Volkskammer on June 11, alleged
that the passage of Emergency Laws in the Federal Republic had
created "a new situation".

The East German Government issued an order on March 10 ban-
ning members of the NPD and other persons "engaged in any kind of
neo-Nazi activity" from staying on, or travelling through East German
territory.

The East German Minister of the Interior issued another order
on April 13 extending the March 10 ban to Ministers and senior
officials of the Federal Republic.

Herr Giinther Diehl, the Federal Government's chief spokesman,
denounced the East German measures on June 11 as "part of a long-
term political plan which aimed at giving the [East German] regime
the character of an independent sovereign State".

Meanwhile Dr. Kiesinger had visited West Berlin on June 13 for
talks about the East German restrictions with Herr Klaus Schiitz, the
222

Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin, and with members of the West
Berlin Senate and the House of Deputies. Later the same day he told
a press conference that Federal assistance to West Berlin would in-
clude improved financial aid on a permanent basis, incentives for
industrial investment in the city, compensation for payments incurred
in respect of East German visa charges and transport taxes and in-
creased subsidies for an expansion of air flights between the Federal
Republic and West Berlin which was under discussion with the
Western Powers.

Herr Brand fs Talk with Mr. Abrassimov

Herr Brandt, who because of the East German measures had pre-
maturely returned from an official visit to Yugoslavia, crossed from
West to East Berlin on June 18, 1968, for an eight-hour talk with
Mr. Abrassimov. Herr Brandt had told a press conference in West
Berlin on June 15 that the Federal Government would make a direct
approach to the Soviet Government over the latest East German
traffic restrictions, and a Foreign Ministry official in Bonn stated on
June 18 that the meeting, at which "questions of mutual interest"
were discussed, had resulted from an invitation to Herr Brandt in his
capacity as chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party
from Mr. Abrassimov in his role as a member of the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist Party.

In a press statement in Bonn on June 19 Herr Brandt said that his
talks with Mr. Abrassimov had covered Berlin and Soviet relations
with Western Germany, but denied that the latest East German
restrictions constituted a "new Berlin crisis". Earlier the same day,
however, he had declared to members of the SPD parliamentary
group that he had warned Mr. Abrassimov that the East German
decree was "creating real damage and would place a heavy burden
on efforts to reduce world tensions".

Federal Measures against East German Barge
Traffic through Federal Territory

The Federal Minister for Transport, Herr Georg Leber, announced
at a press conference on July 1 that the Federal Government had
informed the East German authorities that no further East German

223

barges would be allowed to pass through West German territory in
transit to other countries until an agreement on transit traffic on
German inland waterways had been concluded.

Soviet and East German Protests at Decision to hold

West German Presidential Election in West Berlin
Dr. Heinemann elected President of Federal Republic

The decision of the then President of the West German Bundestag,
Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier announced in Bonn on Dec. 18, 1968
to hold the 1969 West German presidential election in West Berlin,
as had been done on three previous occasions, evoked strong protests
from the Soviet and East German Governments, both to the Federal
Republic and to the Governments of the United States, Britain and
France, and led to repeated sporadic interference in the pre-election
period with road traffic between Western Germany and West Berlin,
which lies 110 miles inside the territory of the German Democratic
Republic.

The date for the presidential election was subsequently fixed at
March 5, 1969, by Herr von Hassel, the new President of the Bundes-
tag, who announced the decision on Feb. 12 after consultations with
Dr. Kiesinger, Herr Brandt, the parliamentary party leaders, and
Herr Schiitz.

The Foreign Ministry in Bonn received on Feb. 6 a lengthy tele-
typed Note from the East German Government bearing no signature
but only the address "Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the G.D.R."
protesting at what it described as the "misuse of West Berlin for the
policy of annexation and revenge of the ruling circles in the Federal
Republic", denouncing the holding of the presidential election in
West Berlin as a "deliberate, serious provocation", and saying that if
the election was held in Berlin the Federal Government would have
to bear "full responsibility for the consequences that would follow (he
measures which the authorities of the G.D.R. would be forced to
take". A communication in similar terms was received the following
day by Herr Schiitz; signed by Colonel-General Dickel, the East Ger-
man Minister of the Interior, it described the proposal to hold the
West German presidential election in West Berlin as "a flagrant
violation of existing international agreements".

224

At the request of the G.D.R. Government, the East German
Minister of the Interior issued a directive on Feb. 8, effective from
Feb. 15, which (a) barred all members of the West German Federal
Assembly (Bundesversammlung), the body which elects the West
German Federal President, from travelling across the territory of the
G.D.R. until further notice; (b) barred the transport through the
G.D.R. of all working material (documents, etc.) for the proposed
West German presidential election in Berlin; and (c) barred all mem-
bers of the West German armed forces and members of the defence
committee of the West German Bundestag from crossing G.D.R. ter-
ritory to or from West Berlin until further notice. Accusing the
German Federal Government of a "gross violation of the Potsdam
Agreement", the decree stated that the proposal to elect the West
German President in West Berlin "violates international law" and
was fresh evidence of the Federal Republic's intention to "continue
its aggressive actions to annex the independent political entity of
West Berlin to the West German State".

Hen Gimther Diehl issued a statement on Feb. 9 emphasizing that
the East German authorities had no right under international law
to challenge the agreed status of Berlin, which was under the quad-
ripartite protection of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United
Kingdom and France. The East German attempt to prevent the elec-
tion of the President in West Berlin, Heir Diehl added, introduced
"a new element of tension" into East-West relations and was "tanta-
mount to a violation of the status of Berlin".

The Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, Mr. Tsarapkin, called on Feb. 13
on the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Kiesinger, and presented a strongly-
worded statement by the Soviet Government protesting against what
was termed the "provocative intention" of the Government of the
German Federal Republic to hold the presidential election in West
Berlin.

On Feb. 14 the Czechoslovak news agency (Ceteka) issued a
statement by the Government in Prague likewise describing the pro-
posed meeting of the Federal Assembly in West Berlin as "illegal and
provocatory". A similar statement by the Polish Government on Feb.
11 had described the decision to choose the West German Head of
State in "the separate political unit of West Berlin" as a "significant
example of the efforts of West German cold war circles to increase
tensions in Europe".

225

A new development occurred on Feb. 21 when Die Wahrheit, the
party journal of the SEW (Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin)
the new name adopted by the former "SED West Berlin" on Feb.
15 published an interview with the chairman of that party, Herr
Gerhard Danelius, in which the latter intimated that the G.D.R.
Government was willing, in return for the cancellation of the Federal
Assembly meeting in West Berlin, to permit the issue of passes for
West Berliners enabling them to visit East Berlin at Easter. On the
same day Herr Ulbricht, in his capacity as First Secretary of the
central committee of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), sent a letter to
Herr Brandt, in his capacity as chairman of the Social Democratic
Party in the G.F.R., saying:

"We have heard that within the SPD the question is being discussed
of raising in the [Federal] Government the question of transferring the
Federal Assembly to a West German city. If the Social Democratic
Ministers could bring about such a decision of the Federal Govern-
ment and the President of the Bundestag, this would mean a relaxa-
tion of tensions. As West Berlin is a separate political entity, the West
Berlin Senate might in this event approach the G.D.R. Government
about the granting of facilities for West Berlin citizens to visit the
capital of the G.D.R. [i.e. East Berlin] at Easter 1969. We are in-
formed that the G.D.R. Government is willing to examine such a
proposal in a positive manner."

In Herr Brandt's absence in the United States, the letter was
received by his deputy, Herr Herbert Wehner, and immediately trans-
mitted to Dr. Kiesinger and Herr Schiitz.

On Feb. 22-23 Dr. Kiesinger and Mr. Tsarapkin had two meetings
within 48 hours. At their first meeting, on Feb. 22, the Soviet Am-
bassador had received from the Federal Chancellor the West German
Government's rejection of the Soviet statement of Feb. 15 protesting
at the decision to hold the presidential election in West Berlin.

At the meeting on Feb. 23 the Soviet Ambassador indicated that,
if the Federal Government abandoned its plan to hold the presidential
election in West Berlin, the East German authorities would be pre-
pared to issue passes to West Berliners at Easter for visits to relatives
and friends living in East Berlin. Following the first Kiesinger-
Tsarapkin meeting, the Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin had visited
Bonn on Feb.- 22 for talks with the Federal Chancellor, and after the
second Kiesinger-Tsarapkin meeting Herr Schiitz informed Dr. Kie-
226

singer that the West Berlin Senate was ready to have discussions with
the authorities in East Berlin.

The Federal Government's deputy spokesman, Herr Conrad Ahlers,
indicated on Feb. 23 that although the Soviet offer was regarded as
"encouraging", the Chancellor had made it clear that there could be
no question of holding the presidential election elsewhere than in
Berlin unless a "concrete result" was achieved which would include
"lasting and positive arrangements" for the movements of Berliners
between the two halves of the city.

From Christmas 1963 until Whitsun 1966, the East German au-
thorities had issued passes to West Berliners allowing one-day family
visits to East Berlin at special seasons Easter, Whitsun, Christmas,
and for a period in the autumn. Negotiations to reach a further agree-
ment, however, broke down in 1966 (the last such arrangements were
concluded in Easter and Whitsun of that year), and since then West
Berliners had only been permitted to visit East Berlin in cases of
special hardship, i.e. for urgent humanitarian and family reasons
such as death, severe illness, etc.

Herr Brandt, in his reply of Feb. 25 to Herr Ulbricht's letter of
Feb. 21, declared that no discussions were possible "between the
SPD and you" on the Federal Assembly and the venue of its meeting
but that, because of the importance of contributing to an under-
standing, his party fully supported the efforts of Herr Schiitz to bring
about a solution of the problems of the people of West Berlin. On
the same day (Feb. 25) an exchange of letters took place between
Herr Schiitz and Herr Stoph, the East German Prime Minister, fol-
lowed by a meeting in East Berlin on Feb. 26 between Herr Horst
Grabert, head of the West Berlin City Government's Chancellery, and
Dr. Michael Kohl, East German Under-Secretary of State. No agree-
ment was reached, however.

At a special meeting of the West Berlin Senate earlier the same
day Herr Schiitz had formulated his views as follows: "(1) We are
principally interested in reaching comprehensive arrangements which
will alleviate the life of Berliners in the divided city. (2) It is there-
fore not only a question of passes for visits in the traditional sense,
and an isolated discussion about this or that period by-passes the
crux of the problem. (3) We do not aim at any short-term results
but are concerned with bringing about a freer movement for the

227

people of Berlin, and thereby a long-term stabilization. This would
satisfy the interests of both sides and would be a practical contribu-
tion to the reduction of tensions in Germany and in Europe."

A statement by the East German Press Office after the meeting
between Herr Grabert and Dr. Kohl quoted the latter as having re-
peated the willingness of the G.D.R. Government to issue Easter
passes for visits by West Berliners to East Berlin, but as having in-
sisted that its demand for the presidential election to be held else-
where had to be met unconditionally. In reply to an invitation by
Herr Grabert to Dr. Kohl for further talks in West Berlin on Feb. 27,
Dr. Kohl wrote that any further discussions would serve no purpose
unless the West Berlin Senate declared beforehand that the West
German Federal Assembly was not going to take place in West Berlin.

Mr. Abrassimov presented a Note on Feb. 28 to the East German
Foreign Minister, Herr Otto Winzer, accusing the West German
authorities of 'flagrant abuse of the communication routes" linking
Berlin to the Federal Republic; requesting the G.D.R. authorities to
"examine the possibilities of taking the necessary measures" to curtail
such "unlawful activities"; and promising the support of the Soviet
Union and all socialist countries for such action.

Further talks were held by Dr. Kiesinger on March 1, firstly with
Mr. Tsarapkin and then with the ambassadors of the three Western
Powers.

Dr. Kiesinger said afterwards on television that his talk with Mr.
Tsarapkin had "unfortunately" been "without result", and gave a
warning that "we will have to face the war of nerves which will con-
tinue strongly during the next few days".

Between March 1 and 4 the interzonal Autobahn was repeatedly
closed by the East German authorities, while Soviet and East German
troops were engaged in military manoeuvres in the area.

In East Berlin another meeting took place in the afternoon of
March 4 between Herr Grabert and Dr. Kohl, at the latter's invita-
tion, in an attempt to reach an eleventh-hour agreement between the
East and West German authorities. According to subsequent state-
ments by Herr Schiitz and by the G.D.R. Press Office, the East
German side had repeated its previous offer to grant West Berliners
passes for one-day visits to relatives in East Berlin at Easter, and to
228

discuss after Easter the possibility of further visits, provided the
presidential election was not held in West Berlin. This offer, however,
was again considered insufficient by the West Berlin Senate as well
as by the Federal Government, Dr. Kohl being informed accordingly
the same evening. It was pointed out in Bonn that only a "lasting
solution" permitting free movement between the two parts of Berlin
would have been regarded as acceptable.

On March 5, 1969, the Federal Assembly, which was held in
Berlin as planned, elected Dr. Heinemann President of the German
Federal Republic.

3. BRANDT GOVERNMENT'S TALKS
WITH EAST GERMAN REGIME, 1969-70

Ostpolitik of Brandt Government

In the sixth general election in the German Federal Republic held
on Sept. 28, 1969, no party obtained an overall majority. Agreement
on the formation of a coalition between the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) was announced on
Oct. 3 by Herr Brandt and Herr Walter Scheel (the FDP leader)
a decision which meant that the Christian Democrats would go into
Opposition for the first time in the 20 years of the Federal Republic.

On Oct. 21 the new Bundestag elected Herr Brandt as Chancellor
of the German Federal Republic.

In a press statement after his election Herr Brandt said that one
of the main tasks of his Government would be to react "positively"
to the interest of the Polish Government in beginning talks, in which
connexion "we should welcome it if we succeeded in opening dip-
lomatic relations between the Federal Republic and Poland in the
foreseeable future".

On Oct. 28 Herr Brandt made a statement of his Government's
policy to the Bundestag, in which he outlined his policy towards
Eastern Germany as follows:

"This Government," said Herr Brandt, "works on the assumption
that the questions which have arisen for the German people out of
the Second World War and from the national treachery committed
by the Hitler regime can -find their ultimate answers only in a Euro-

229

pean peace arrangement. However, no one can dissuade us from our
conviction that the Germans have a right to self-determination just
as has any other nation. The object of our practical political work in
the years immediately ahead is to preserve the unity of the nation
by ending the present deadlock in the relationship between the two
parts of Germany.

"The Germans are one not only by reason of their language and
their history, with all its splendour and its misery; we are all at home
in Germany. And we still have common tasks and a common respon-
sibility: to ensure peace among us and in Europe.

"Twenty years after the establishment of the Federal Republic of
Germany and of the G.D.R., we must prevent any further alienation
of the two parts of the German nation that is, arrive at a regular
modus vivendi and from there proceed to co-operation. This is not
just a German interest: it is of importance also for peace in Europe
and for East-West relations. . . .

"The Federal Government will continue the policy initiated in
December 1966, and again offers the Council of Ministers of the
G.D.R. negotiations at Government level without discrimination on
either side, which should lead to contractually agreed co-operation.
International recognition of the G.D.R. by the Federal Republic is
out of the question. Even if there exist two States in Germany, they
are not foreign countries to each other; their relations with each
other can only be of a special nature.

"Following up the policy of its predecessor, the Federal Govern-
ment declares that its readiness for binding agreements on the re-
ciprocal renunciation of the use or threat of force applies equally
with regard to the G.D.R.

"The Federal Government will advise the United States, Britain
and France to continue energetically the talks begun with the Soviet
Union on easing and improving the situation in Berlin. The status of
the City of Berlin under the special responsibility of the Four Powers
must remain untouched. This must not be a hindrance to seeking
facilities for traffic within and to Berlin. We shall continue to ensure
the viability of Berlin. West Berlin must be placed in a position to
assist in improving the political, economic and cultural relations be-
tween the two parts of Germany. . . .

"The Federal Government will promote the development of closer
political co-operation in Europe with the aim of evolving step by
step a common attitude in international questions. Our country needs
co-operation and co-ordination with the West and understanding with
the East. The German people need peace in the full sense of that
word also with the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the European
East. We are prepared to make an honest attempt at understanding,
in order to help overcome the aftermath of the disaster brought on
Europe by a criminal clique. . . .

230

"In continuation of its predecessor's policy, the Federal Govorn-
ment aims at equally binding agreements on the mutual renunciation
of the use or threat of force. Let me repeat: this readiness also
applies as far as the G.D.R. is concerned. And I wish to make it
unmistakably clear that we are prepared to arrive with Czecho-
slovakia our immediate neighbour at arrangements which bridge
the gulf of the past

"Today the Federal Government deliberately abstains from com-
mitting itself to statements or formulae going beyond the framework
of this statement, which might complicate the negotiations it desires.
It is well aware that there will be no progress unless the Governments
in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact countries adopt a co-operative
attitude."

During the next four months there were a number of developments
in connexion with the proposed negotiations between the two German
States.

Herr Stoph on Relations between Eastern and Western
Germany Call for Normalization of Relations

In a speech on Nov. 12, 1969, Herr Stoph, the East German Prime
Minister, said that the only way to break the deadlock on the German
question was for the two German States to establish normal relations
with each other, and declared that the Government of the G.D.R.
was ready to negotiate with the Government of the German Federal
Republic on this basis.

As a result of the West German Bundestag elections of September
1969, said Herr Stoph, a Government formed by the Social Demo-
crats and the Free Democrats had come to power "for the first time
in the history of the Bonn State". Although the new West German
Government had expressed "contradictory and ambiguous views"
about die policy it intended to pursue, some points had nevertheless
emerged "which hint at a more realistic assessment of the situation
created in Europe as a result of the Second World War".

"Willy Brandt," said Herr Stoph, "is the first West German
Chancellor to speak, in a Government declaration, of the existence
of two German States. Though this declaration appears to us to
have been made some 20 years too late, it represents at least some
progress. But words alone cannot convince us. Precise political deeds
have to follow. The policy of the new West German Government

231

can only be judged by whether it is prepared to respect the inviolabil-
ity of the. frontiers existing in Europe, to throw overboard completely
the bankrupt 'Hallstein Doctrine', and to renounce once and for all
the presumptuous claim ... to be the sole representative of the
German people. . . .

"Nobody can deny that the German Democratic Republic and the
German Federal Republic are two independent States, which have
existed side by side for more than 20 years. Consequently, their re-
lations and their normal inter-State co-operation can only develop
if they are free from any discrimination, that is, if they are based on
the principles of international law. Consequently, the establishment
of normal relations between the G.D.R. and the German Federal
Republic is an indispensable necessity.

"Progress in this question can only be attained on the basis of
political realities. The Government of the G.D.R. continues to be
prepared to hold negotiations, on an equal basis, with the Govern-
ment of the G.F.R. on the establishment of relations in international
law.

"As far as the relations between the G.D.R. and the separate
political entity of West Berlin are concerned, our attitude is suffi-
ciently well known. It is above all in the interests of the citizens of
West Berlin that the Bonn Government should renounce its inter-
ference in the affairs of this separate political entity, which has never
belonged to the West German Federal Republic and will never
belong to it."

East German Proposal for Negotiations

Correspondence between Herr Ulbricht and

President Heinemann Proposed Draft Treaty

The East German Volkskammer passed a resolution on Dec. 17,
1969, in (he following terms: "The German Democratic Republic
advocates taking up relations with the West German Federal Repub-
lic on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The relations should be
governed and secured by agreement valid under international law."
It was added that the Council of State and the Council of Ministers
had been authorized to "take the necessary measures" to this end.

On the following day, Dec. 18, two senior East German officials
Dr. Michael Kohl, a State Secretary, and Herr Hans Voss, a depart-
mental head at the East German Foreign Ministry arrived in Bonn
bringing a personal letter from Herr Ulbricht, Chairman of the State
Council of the G.D.R., to the West German Head of State, President
232

Heinemann. The latter's reply to Herr Ulbricht was conveyed to the
East German representatives, and the text of the two letters was made
public on Dec. 21, as follows:

Herr Ulbricht to President Heinemann. In writing to President
Heinemann, said Herr Ulbricht, he was "actuated by the desire to
contribute to the securing of peace in Europe and to make possible
the establishment of equal relations between the German Democratic
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in conformity with
the principles of peaceful coexistence". "Living next to each other
peacefully," the letter continued, "and achieving good neighbour-
liness between the two German States, require that their relations be
established on the generally recognized norms of valid international
law. That can only be advantageous for the relaxation of tensions in
the heart of Europe, for which the German Democratic Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany bear an especially high respon-
sibility to their own citizens and to the people of Europe. Therefore
I take the liberty of transmitting to you a Treaty Concerning the
Establishment of Equal Relations between the German Democratic
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany 9 , which has been
approved as a draft by the State Council of the German Democratic
Republic."

After stating that he had empowered Herr Stoph and Herr Otto
Winzer (the East German Foreign Minister) to conduct the negotia-
tions on behalf of the G.D.R. for the signing of the proposed treaty,
and proposing that these negotiations should begin in January 1970
if possible, Herr Ulbricht concluded: "I voice the expectation that
you, Mr. Federal President, and I will do what we can to ensure that
the establishment of equal international relations between both Ger-
man States be reached in businesslike negotiations."

President Heinemann to Herr Ulbricht. After acknowledging the
receipt of Herr Ulbricht's letter, President Heinemann replied: "I
agree with you that we bear a high responsibility for relaxation of
tensions in Europe. I, too, feel obliged, as does the Federal Govern-
ment, to work for peace, relaxation of tensions and co-operation. It
is in our mutual interest to protect the unity of the German nation.
Therefore I welcome the readiness expressed by you to start

"In conformity with the requirements of the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, I have sent your letter and its annex
[i.e. the proposed draft treaty] to the Federal Government. It is for
the latter to study your proposals and to take up a position thereon
with the speed required by the issue."

233

The text of the proposed draft treaty between the G.D.R. and
the G.F.R. annexed to Herr Ulbricht's letter was made public in East
Berlin on Dec. 21 by Neues Deutschland. It consisted of nine Articles,
as follows:

Article 1. "The treaty partners agree to the establishment of nor-
mal equal relations between the German Democratic Republic and
the German Federal Republic, free of any discrimination and on the
basis of generally recognized principles and norms of international
law. Their mutual relations are based in particular on the principles
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of State fron-
tiers, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage."

Article 2. "The treaty partners mutually recognize their present
territorial existence within the existing borders, and the inviolability
thereof. They recognize the frontiers which came into existence in
Europe as the result of the Second World War, in particular the
frontier between the German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic, and the frontier on the Oder and Neisse between
die German Democratic Republic and Poland."

Article 3. "The treaty partners pledge themselves to renounce the
threat and use of force in their mutual relationship, and pledge them-
selves to solve all disputes between themselves in a peaceful way and
by peaceful means.

"Both sides pledge themselves to refrain from all measures con-
trary to the stipulations of Article 1 which would discriminate
against the treaty partner; they will, without delay, repeal laws and
decrees contrary to this treaty, and will revise relevant court decisions.
They will in the future avoid any discrimination against the treaty
partner."

Article 4. "The German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons or any
form of control over them. They pledge themselves to take steps
towards negotiations on disarmament. Neither chemical nor biological
weapons may be produced, stationed or stockpiled on the territory
of the two German States."

Articles. "The German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic shall establish diplomatic relations with one an-
other. They will be mutually represented in the capitals Berlin and
Bonn by embassies. . . ."

Article 6. "Relations on specific questions will be agreed upon
separately."

Article?. "The German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic pledge themselves to respect the status of West
Berlin as an independent political entity, and to regulate their rela-
tions with West Berlin in accordance with this status."

234

Articles. "The German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic shaU apply, without delay, ... for admission as
full members in the United Nations Organization. . . ."

Article 9. "The treaty shall be concluded for 10 years. It is sub-
ject to ratification, and comes into force one month after the exchange
of the ratification documents. The treaty will be deposited with the
Secretariat of the U.N. Organization for registration in accordance
with Article 102 of the U.N. Charter."

In making public the text of the proposed draft treaty, Neues
Deutschland said that it had done so because, it asserted, parts of the
document had been disclosed by the West German Press "taken out
of context or distorted".

Herr Brandt's Statement on Relations between
Western and Eastern Germany

Relations between the German Federal Republic and the German
Democratic Republic formed an important part of Herr Brandt's first
Report on the State of the Nation submitted to the Bundestag on
Jan. 14, 1970, in his capacity as Chancellor. Herr Brandt, who said
that "there must, there can, and finally there will be negotiations
between Bonn and East Berlin", spoke on this subject as follows:

"Twenty-five years after the unconditional surrender of the Hitler
Reich, the concept of the nation is the bond around divided Germany.
A nation combines historical reality and political will. It embraces
and implies more than a common language and culture and more than
a State and social structure. It rests on a people's enduring sense of
solidarity. Nobody can deny that in this sense there is and will be
one German nation as far as we can think ahead. The G.D.R. in its
Constitution also professes itself to be part of this German nation.

"We must have a historical and political perspective when we
discuss the state of the nation, when we reaffirm the German people's
claim to self-determination. History, which has divided Germany
through her own fault, will decide when and how that claim can be
satisfied. But as long as the Germans muster the political will not to
abandon that claim, the hope remains that later generations will live
in a Germany whose political order all Germans can help to shape.

"In a European peace arrangement, too, the national components
will play their role. But the path that leads to German self-determina-
tion within such a peace arrangement will be a long and thorny one.
Its length and labours must not restrain us from seeking, in the pres-

235

ent phase of history, if that is possible, regular neighbourly relations
between the two States in Germany.

"However, the two State and social structures that have now been
existing on German soil for more than two decades, reflect com-
pletely different and incompatible ideas of what the unity of Germany,
what a common future, should look like and how it could be reached.
Nobody should entertain the delusive hope of being able to evade
the frictions that are unavoidable because Germany is not only
divided as a State, but because there are two completely different
social systems confronting each other on her soil. On this point we are
agreed with Ulbricht there can be no intermingling, no dubious
compromise, between our own system and what has become a set
order on the other side. . . ."

After repeating his Government's intention to reach a modus
vivendi and subsequent co-operation with Eastern Germany, as
declared in his policy statement of Oct. 28, 1969 [see above], Herr
Brandt said:

"We are faced with a remarkable development. The States of
the Warsaw Pact except for the G.D.R. have understood, though
with some qualifications, the good will of the Federal Government.
They have pointed out that words must be followed by deeds. It
is our conviction that this rule should be complied with everywhere.

"There are leading elements in the G.D.R. who excel themselves
in making ever new demands. One has to admit that they certainly
do not lack obstinacy. Let me give three examples:

"(<z) The G.D.R. Government demands of us recognition under
international law. The other member-States of the Warsaw Pact
expect us to conclude treaties with the G.D.R. which naturally
must be just as binding as those concluded with them.

"(6) The G.D.R. demands of the Federal Government that it
reconsider the Paris Agreements and that it reduce or even liquidate
its commitments under the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact States maintain that anyone who seeks to put the
reduction or the dissolution of existing alliances on the agenda would
block a European security conference. ... I need not stress that as
far as the Federal Government is concerned neither the Paris treaties
nor our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance are matters for
discussion.

"(c) The G.D.R. Government declares that it recognized the
Oder-Neisse line definitively as a peace frontier 20 years ago, and
that it did so 'on behalf of all Germans, that is, also on behalf of
the West German population 5 . I do not know whether this declara-
tion pleased the Government of Poland. Its logic would be that

236

Poland's western border is no subject for us. After all that I have
heard, such is not the People's Republic of Poland's view. . . .

"There must, there can, and finally there will be negotiations
between Bonn and East Berlin. . . . But on our part there are some
guiding principles which cannot be renounced:

"Firstly, the right of self-determination;

"Secondly, the striving for national unity and freedom within
the framework of a European peace arrangement;

"Thirdly, the ties with West Berlin without impairing the Four
Powers' responsibility for the whole of Berlin;

"Fourthly, the Federal Government respects, and will continue to
respect, the rights and responsibilities of the Three Powers as regards
Germany as a whole and in Berlin. We have no thought of tampering
nor of letting any one tamper with these rights and responsibilities.
These include commitments both for the Federal Government and
for the Governments of the Three Powers. I have worked in Berlin
long enough to know that there are things for which our shoulders
are too weak and regarding which the Federal Republic has no
interest in claiming unrestricted sovereignty for itself. Nothing that
we are trying to do in our relationship with the G.D.R. will touch
the rights of the Three Powers referred to. . . ."

After pointing out that the German Federal Republic was firmly
linked to the West, and the German Democratic Republic to the
East, Herr Brandt continued: "I shall not . . . enter upon a futile
debate as to why this has come about, and who is to blame for it.
Most of us have their answer; some things will still occupy the
historians. Governments have to proceed from the facts as they find
them; they have to look ahead and study how today's conditions can
be developed into a better future.

"In doing so, let us all realize that outside our nation there are
not many people in this world who are enthused by the thought that
the 60,000,000 and the 17,000,000 Germans the economic poten-
tial of the one and of the other, let alone their armies might merge.
But there is no use in quarrelling about this now. I only want to
make clear what I take to be the truth: despite everything, the unity
of the nation exists. The unity of the Germans depends on many
factors. It does not in the first place depend on what the Constitution
says but on what we do. It does not in the first place depend on what
the treaties provide but on how far we can win other States as our
friends. It depends less on what was enacted at Potsdam in 1945 but
rather on overcoming the division of Europe in the seventies, the
eighties and if need be the nineties. . . .

"In this connexion there is no longer only one German question.
Talking of Germany one must speak ... of several German questions
which must receive individual consideration, and not as one tried
to do in the fifties be given one and the same answer. Nowadays

237

each of these questions must receive its own answer, though not
separate, and, above all, not isolated from one another.

"The fate of the Eastern provinces and of their people, the ex-
pellees, the people who have remained there, of those who have
settled there and of those who have since been born there; the
Soviet-occupied zone which became the G.D.R.; the three Western
zones which came to be the Federal Republic of Germany neither
of them provisional creations any more, both of economic impor-
tance and most closely linked to one of the two super-Powers; and,
not last, the reality of West Berlin, part of a four-Power city, subject
to the Three Powers' unrestricted sovereignty. In addition, and on
behalf of these Three Powers, the ties between West Berlin and the
economic, financial and judicial system of the Federal Republic, as
well as its representation abroad by the Federal Government.

"This, briefly sketched, is the position. ... In the face of this
situation the question arises: Which are the objectives towards which
German policy should strive?

"The first answer is that those parts of Germany which today live
in freedom must be kept free. . . . The second answer is that we must
solve all problems only by peaceful methods. The third answer is that
we must make our contribution in order that more human rights be
granted and practised.

"Here, logically, the question arises: How can these objectives be
achieved today by German policy? They cannot be attained any
longer by the traditional means of the nation-State, but only in
alliance with others. In future there will be no political settlements
of significance outside of alliances, security systems or communities.
In future German problems of importance can be dealt with not in
terms of the nation-State and in traditional fashion, but only through
gradual endeavours for a European peace arrangement. So it is a
matter of seeing and respecting realities not in order to put up
with existing wrongs in resignation, but rather in order to remove
the divisive character of Europe's frontiers. . . .

"The Federal Republic remains a Western State by its ties and
conviction. The G.D.R. remains an Eastern State by its ties and the
will of its leaders. These are the facts. They must not keep us from
organizing neighbourly relations and from proceeding from con-
frontation to co-operation. This international objective implies an
important task for the Germans both here and on the other side. The
Federal Government is resolved to assume its share of the respon-
sibility, with all ensuing consequences. . . .

"East Berlin has taken offence at our statement that the two Ger-
man States cannot be foreign countries to each other. This, they
contend, is of no consequence in international law. I do not now
want to go any further into that After all, there are closer family

238

ties between people living in Leipzig and Hamburg than between peo-
ple living in Leipzig and in Milan or Warsaw. . . .

"The Government of the G.D.R. says that it is ready for nego-
tiation. We, too, are ready, as we are ready for negotiations with
other members of the Warsaw Pact. The Federal Government pro-
poses to the Government of the G.D.R. negotiations on the exchange
of declarations renouncing the use of force, such negotiations to take
place on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. The exchange
of views on this subject with the Soviet Union haying begun, ... we
think it practical to enter upon appropriate negotiations also with the
Government of the G.D.R. Such negotiations would provide a useful
framework for a broad exchange of views on all questions relevant
to an orderly relationship between the two sides. In this connexion
it is not possible, of course, for one side to say this is my draft
treaty, take it or leave it. If that be the G.D.R.'s attitude, there could
only be rejection.

"In our opinion it would serve an understanding if a direct ex-
change of views on all subjects of interest to either side took place
prior to formulating details. Such is the customary practicable pro-
cedure which, for example, is used at the moment between the Fed-
eral Republic and the Soviet Union. Such an exchange of views or
negotiations however one likes to call them could start soon. Each
side must be free to bring up all points which it wishes to discuss. I
shall soon make a corresponding proposal to the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the G.D.R.

"The Federal Government will be guided in this by the following
principles:

(a) Both States have the obligation to preserve the unity of the
German nation. They are not foreign countries for one another.

(b) Furthermore, the generally recognized principles of inter-
national law must apply, especially exclusion of any distortion,
respect for territorial integrity, obligation to settle all disputes peace-
fully and respect for each other's borders.

(c) This also includes the undertaking not to seek to change the
social structure existing on the territory of the other contracting
party by force.

(d) The two Governments and their plenipotentiaries should aim
at neighbourly co-operation, especially in the technical field; under-
standings to facilitate such co-operation could become the object of
governmental arrangements.

(e) The Four Powers' existing rights and responsibilities regarding
Germany as a whole and of Berlin shall be respected.

(/) The Four Powers' endeavours to bring about arrangements
for an improvement of the situation in and around Berlin shall be
supported.

239

". . . In conclusion, I can state on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment that our attitude is determined by a dispassionate and realistic
assessment of the situation. This means that the Federal Govern-
ment enters upon the negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland,
the G.D.R. and others in the firm resolve to hold serious negotiations,
and is desirous of the most positive development. It also means
that it does not entertain any illusions concerning the difficulty of
these negotiations, and that in view of the firm positions which it
maintains and continues to maintain it cannot exclude the possi-
bility of failure, although it certainly does not wish these negotiations
to fail. The Federal Government, however, submits itself and the
other Governments I have mentioned to the test of the earnestness
of the efforts for detente and peace. . . ."

Correspondence between Herr Brandt and
Herr Stoph on G.D.R.-G.F.R. Negotiations

Herr Brandt sent a letter to Herr Stoph on Jan. 22, 1970, suggest-
ing that the Governments of the Federal Republic and the G.D.R.
should open negotiations "on the exchange of declarations on the
renunciation of force"; stating that the Federal Government was "will-
ing to begin negotiations at any time"; and adding that Herr Egon
Franke, the Federal Minister for Internal German Relations (Inner-
deutsche Beziehungeri), was available "for initial talks in which the
course and progress of negotiations can be agreed".

"These negotiations," wrote Herr Brandt, "which should take
place according to the principle of non-discrimination, should pro-
vide an opportunity for a wide-ranging exchange of views on the
settlement of all outstanding questions between our two States,
among them questions of equality in relations. Each side must be
free to bring forward all those considerations, proposals, principles
and drafts that in its view appear proper. Discussions and negotia-
tions on these should be possible without any pressure of time."

Herr Stoph, in his reply to Herr Brandt (delivered in Bonn on
Feb. 12), suggested that talks between them should take place on
Feb. 19 or 26 "in the building of the Council of Ministers in the
capital of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin" [i.e. in East
Berlin].

The East German Prime Minister emphasized that "direct nego-
tiations" should aim at bringing about "peaceful coexistence and

240

a treaty on normal relations between the two German States on the
basis of the generally recognized rules of international law' 9 . It was
essential, however, for the G.D.R. and the G.F.R. to "recognize and
respect each other for what they are, namely, sovereign subjects of
international law with equal rights"; without such recognition the
negotiations could have no positive results. Herr Stoph expressed
regret that Herr Brandt had not taken up Herr Ulbricht's suggestion
[made in the latter's letter to President Heinemann] for the conclu-
sion of a treaty between the two German States.

Herr Brandt wrote to Herr Stoph on Feb. 18 accepting the latter's
invitation to visit East Berlin for talks, but suggesting, in view of the
Federal Government's commitments, that these should take place in
the second or third week of March rather than on the dates in Feb-
ruary proposed by Herr Stoph. Herr Brandt's reply was unanimously
approved by the Federal Cabinet, and was sent after the Chancellor
had had a meeting the previous day with his predecessor, Dr.
Kiesinger, which was described as "very harmonious". The Christian
Democratic Opposition announced on Feb. 18 that it supported the
Federal Government's decision to enter into talks with the G.D.R. on
all questions affecting the coexistence of Germans, including
renunciation of force.

There ensued preparatory talks between high officials from both
sides on March 2-12, during which it emerged that Herr Brandt
intended to travel to East Berlin via West Berlin, where he planned
to hold a press conference. The East German Government, however,
took the line that a visit to West Berlin which, it reiterated, was not
part of the Federal Republic by the Federal Chancellor would be
"a mere provocation and as such unacceptable' 9 , and that it would
burden or disturb the proposed Four-Power talks on the status of
Berlin [see page 298].

In the circumstances the Federal Government proposed that the
meeting between Herr Brandt and Herr Stoph should take place not
in East Berlin but in Erfurt, and the East German Government agreed
to this proposal.

First Brandt-Stoph Summit Meeting in Erfurt

Herr Willy Brandt, the German Federal Chancellor, and Herr
Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German
Democratic Republic, met on March 19, 1970, in Erfurt (Eastern

241

Germany) the first such meeting between the Heads of Govern-
ment of the two States since their foundation after the end of World
War II.

After crossing the East German border at Gerstungen, where Herr
Brandt was formally welcomed by G.D.R. Government officials, the
train carrying the Chancellor and his party arrived in Erfurt at 9.30
a.m. on March 19, being welcomed by Herr Stoph. Some 2,500
people, mostly young, were waiting outside the station, and as both
leaders were crossing the station forecourt and entering the Erfurter
Hof hotel opposite the station the onlookers broke through the police
barriers shouting "Willy, Willy, Willy Brandt". When the crowd con-
tinued to call for him, Herr Brandt briefly appeared at an upper
window to acknowledge their welcome.

Some 40 Western press representatives had arrived with the Chan-
cellor, but the East German authorities, who stated that they had
issued press permits to 350 correspondents from 42 countries, re-
fused them to the majority of the Western pressmen.

During the opening session of the talks, which lasted until 12.30
p.m., Herr Stoph and Herr Brandt read lengthy prepared statements
[see below]. Resumed at 3 p.m., the talks were interrupted an hour
later when Herr Brandt, accompanied by the East German Foreign
Minister, Herr Otto Winzer, left to visit the former concentration
camp at Buchenwald, where he laid a wreath at the memorial to those
killed by the Nazi regime. On his return Herr Brandt and Herr Stoph
conferred privately for two hours.

Statement by Herr Stoph

In his opening statement Herr Stoph proposed that both sides
should enter into discussions on the draft treaty between the G.D.R.
and the G.F.R. which Herr Ulbricht had sent to President Heinemann
in December 1969 [see above], and that they should consider the
following seven questions of principle:

(1) The establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the
German States on a basis of equality and non-discrimination. The
G.F.R. should abandon any claim to represent all Germany.

(2) Non-intervention in the foreign relations of other States and
the formal renunciation of the "Hallstein Doctrine".

242

(3) Agreement on the renunciation of the use of force between the
G.D.R. and the G.F.R. and, on the basis of international law, rec-
ognition of their territorial integrity and the inviolability of their
existing national frontiers in accordance with Article 2, Section 4
of U.N. Charter.

(4) Both German States to seek membership of the United Nations.

(5) Renunciation of any attempt to acquire or control nuclear
weapons in any form. Renunciation of the production, use or stock-
piling of biological and chemical weapons. Reduction of armaments
expenditure by SO per cent.

(6) Discussions to be held on residual matters arising out of the
Second World War.

(7) Settlement by the G.F.R. of all debts and restitution obliga-
tions to the G.D.R.

Before listing the above demands, Herr Stoph, after welcoming
Herr Brandt, expressed regret that the talks were not being held in
Berlin "as originally agreed", and continued: "Our meeting is un-
doubtedly an event of political importance. For the first time since
the establishment of the G.D.R. and the G.F.R. the two Heads of
Government have met to consider the normalization of relations be-
tween their two independent sovereign States. . . . Both Governments
have the responsibility of ensuring that never again does a war begin
on German soil. ... On behalf of the G.D.R. I can assure you that
our entire policy is directed to the maintenance of peace, and towards
this end the Chairman of the State Council of the G.D.R., Herr
Ulbricht, sent to President Heinemann of the G.F.R. on Dec. 17,
1969, a draft treaty designed to establish equality of rights and non-
discrimination between us based on international law. This draft
treaty offers an opportunity to establish at last a relationship of
equality and peaceful coexistence.

"Over the last 20 years we have repeatedly taken various initia-
tives, but ... successive Federal Governments have failed to respond
or have brusquely rejected them. The Federal Republic believed
that by accelerating rearmament, and by undermining the G.D.R., it
could achieve its aim of reversing the results of the Second World
War. This policy has failed, and we hope that the sole remaining op-
portunity of establishing a relationship of peaceful coexistence based
on international law will be used and this chance not be wasted again.
. . . We are not here to discuss secondary or tertiary matters, as the
present abnormality in the relations of our States is very dangerous.
... In our draft treaty we require from you no more than we offer.
This is real equality and non-discrimination. To say that it would be

243

a matter of the capitulation of one side or the other is a complete
twisting of the truth, nor does prestige enter into it. It is a matter of
ensuring peace. Barriers and obstructions designed to support a
policy aimed at changing the status quo, the alteration of frontiers and
the revision of the results of World War II must be removed.

"In the change of government and the defeat of the CDU/CSU
coalition we have seen the rejection of this dangerous policy by the
broad mass of the West German people, and we hope that your Gov-
ernment will give heed to this expression of will. . . . The development
of the G.D.R. as a modern socialist State cannot, and will not, be
stopped You yourself have stated in the Bundestag that arrange-
ments cannot be made with the members of the Warsaw Pact without
also coming to an arrangement with the G.D.R. on the basis of
equality of rights and non-discrimination. It would correspond to this
realization if normal international, that is to say diplomatic, relations
between us were now to be established, which would be in the Euro-
pean interests of both the G.D.R. and the G.F.R

"In your letter of Jan. 22, 1970, you expressed your willingness
to negotiate with the G.D.R. on the basis of equality of rights and
non-discrimination. It should follow from this that both States in
their relations should recognize themselves for what they are, namely
sovereign entities under international law. . . . This should lead to
the recognition of the sovereign equality of the G.D.R. being ex-
pressed in a treaty valid in international law. ... I therefore wish to
ask you in the name of the G.D.R. whether you, on behalf of the
Federal Government, are ready to take this step and begin negoti-
ations on the basis of our draft treaty for the establishment of normal
diplomatic relations, with the aim of signing such a treaty as soon as
possible. . . .

"We cannot ignore, and are very concerned, that concurrently
with expressions by Federal representatives of the desire to lessen
tension and regulate relations, dangerous and aggressive military
plans directed against the G.D.R. and other socialist States are being
made and perfected . . . [by] the Federal generals and the Federal
Minister of Defence. . . . And when Herr Schmidt, the Minister,
urges more rapid rearmament, the G.D.R. and her allies cannot
ignore such a development. This ... is a matter of war or peace. . . .
There can be no true peace until policies aimed at the revision of the
status quo and of European frontiers are abandoned. . . . What can
we make of statements made in the Federal Republic that recognition
of the results of the Second World War must await a peace treaty?
Those who await a peace treaty, and at the same time prevent its
negotiation, and yet in 1970 still refuse to recognize existing frontiers,
can only intend to keep the door open for their revision. . . .

"Although you refer to 'internal German affairs' and indeed have
a Ministry with that name, such a term has become meaningless after
244

the division [of Germany] and your signature of the Paris Treaties,
and it reveals political intentions incompatible with a normal relation-
ship on a basis of equality between our States. Internal German
relations cannot exist after the integration of the Federal Republic
in the NATO system under the Paris Treaties . . . , the acceptance
of which had not only an anti-national but an imperialist character.
Article 2 of the Treaty on Germany retained for the Western Powers
their rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole, and Article
7 proclaimed as the aim of the signatories the integration of the
G.D.R. into the monopolistic social system of the Federal Republic
and into the Western imperialist pact system. . . . Equally untenable
is the Federal Republic's stand on four-Power responsibility for the
G.D.R. and its capital, Berlin. The G.D.R. is neither a four-Power
nor a three-Power responsibility, but an independent sovereign social-
ist State. The phrase 'internal German relations' implies the old claim
to subject the G.D.R. to tutelage. . . . This is unacceptable to us and
cannot be discussed . . . [and] you had better cease such attempts to
treat us in this manner. . . .

"Until the Federal Government became integrated with NATO,
we kept open our border with the West in the hope that a realistic
policy would be followed by the G.F.R. But the abuse of this open
border for the unscrupulous fight against the G.D.R. cost our citizens
more than DM 100,000,000,000 (10,000,000,000) . . . , and we
trust the Federal Government will understand that payment of its
debt and the settlement of its obligations for compensation to the
G.D.R. are an indispensable condition.

"Relationships between any two States always have a special
character, as witness those between the G.F.R. and Austria or
Switzerland, which are different from its relations with France. But
the general rules of international law are the fundamental basis of
relations between all States, and this applies equally to relations
between the two independent and sovereign German States. . . .
We are not simply 'all Germans'. . . . There are now two German
States, whose citizens live under completely different conditions . . .
and fundamentally incompatible social systems. . . . You yourself
have said that there could be 'no mixing, no foul compromise 9
between the opposing social systems in the G.D.R. and the G.F.R.
Indeed the two States cannot be united . . . , and mutual acceptance
of this fact could help in the establishment of internationally valid
relations between the G.D.R. and the G.F.R. Naturally, as socialists
we are interested in the victory of socialism in all countries and thus
in the Federal Republic. . . . But this is not a question of today or
tomorrow . . . , and in the given circumstances there is no other way
to ensure peace than the establishment of peaceful coexistence on
the basis of international law.

"In a recent speech you referred to a modus vivendi between us,

245

but this very term infers only a provisional agreement, based ou the
assumption that the existing situation that is, the present balance
of power between socialist and imperialist countries makes it im-
possible to achieve more far-reaching aims and intentions ...
a sort of interim solution under which one accepts pro tempore the
existence of a socialist State but continues the hostile policy against
the G.D.R. and waits for a change in the international climate in
order to cross non-recognized frontiers. This is neither realistic nor
a policy of peace. ...

"Further, one cannot talk of normalization of relations when it is
the practice of your Government to damage the G.D.R. and discrim-
inate against it on the international level. Instructions are officially
issued by your Foreign Minister to your representatives aimed at
obstructing relationships between other States and the G.D.R., and
even preventing the setting up of commercial offices . . . ; attempts
are made to exclude the G.D.R. from international organizations . . .
[such as] the World Health Organization; and your Government
carries out discrimination against the G.D.R. by calling for the con-
tinued existence of the 'Allied Travel Office in West Berlin', even
against the wishes of some NATO States. . . . The maintenance of the
claim of being the sole representative of the German people and of
the Hallstein Doctrine contradicts your declared intention that you
would no longer discriminate against the G.D.R. . . . This claim must
be finally and unconditionally dropped. Please note that the G.D.R.
and its allies will act against all attempts by the Federal Government
to prevent the G.D.R. from developing its international relations and
to exert pressure on other States [in this respect]. . . ."

After saying that if the draft treaty put forward by his Government
were concluded it would be "the first step in the right direction for
25 years", Herr Stoph proposed that the treaty be discussed "with
the aim of establishing international relations between the G.D.R.
and the G.F.R. on a basis of equality". He proposed that they should
also discuss the above-mentioned seven points and continue their
talks at a further meeting in the G.F.R. near the East-West German
border.

Statement by Herr Brandt
Herr Brandt in his statement spoke as follows:

"No one need be surprised if I view many things quite differently
from what has been said. ... In a few weeks 25 years will have
passed since the National Socialist regime of violence ended in the
collapse of the German Reich. This event unites us round this table,

whatever else may divide us Many will regret that after 1945 the

German people could not go forward as one nation, but we cannot

246

undo the past. The situation demands that we make progress towards
peace and seek ways of improving the lot of the human beings in
Germany. . . .

"German policy after 1945 flowed from the differing policies of the
Powers which had defeated and occupied Germany, ihe East-West
confrontation overshadowed Germany and divided Europe. We can-
not redress this division, but we can strive to lessen its worst effects
and actively help in a development which aims to fill up the ditches
which divide us in Europe and thereby in Germany. Although I
consider myself free of the nationalism of earlier times, I nevertheless
believe in the continuing and living reality of the German nation.
Bonds of a common history, language, culture, family ties, and all
the other imponderables which give us a sense of belonging, are them-
selves a reality. A policy which denied their existence would fail.
This fact is just as basic as the fact that within the actual frontiers
of Germany in 1970 there exist two German States which must live
together. There are deep differences between us on social organization,
but this should not prevent us from seeking in the perspective of a
European peace order a regulated form of peaceful coexistence. . . .

"It should be our task to harmonize the interests of our two States,
as well as those of the Powers with which our States are allied, in
a way which will benefit peace and the people. The present relation-
ship between us is the more regrettable in that dealings between ordin-
ary people in both German States are depressed well below the level
normally existing between foreign States and their citizens. This
negative situation ought to be loosened up and, if possible, overcome.
My Government's aim is detente instead of tension, ensuring peace
instead of military confrontation. . . .

"It is unusual as between States that we should meet today without
the normal preparation by officials and start with summit talks, but
the problems before us are so great that only at governmental level
can a start be made. This shows our joint responsibility: for what-
ever we do or do not do, we can no longer shelter behind history in
general or Hitler in particular. ... It is clear that the situation be-
tween East and West cannot be materially improved while tension
continues in the heart of Europe . . . , and I hope that the Govern-
ment of the G.D.R. is prepared to look forward and avoid becoming
a prisoner of our dark past.

"It cannot be denied that a relationship of a very special character
exists between the inhabitants of our two States such as does not
normally exist between other friendly or allied States. . . . Our dif-
ferences are also different from those between foreign peoples, and
stem from the basic unity of the nation. There are other joint features.
Both the G.F.R. and the G.D.R. are members of highly armed and
opposing Pact systems facing each other heavily armed on German
soil. They help to bring about an equilibrium of force in Europe,

247

which has prevented the outbreak of war over the years and has given
a measure of security. But true peace, and security of a lasting nature,
can only be assured through a European peace order which would
end the confrontation of the two blocs and the mutual antagonism of
the two German States. ... We are both equally determined that no
future war should start from German soil again. Neither German
State has either the right, or the possibility, of using force, or the
threat of force, to achieve any ends. A democratic, peace-loving,
united Germany can never be brought about through war or civil
war. . . .

"There is a further matter on which there should be no misunder-
standing. No agreements between our two States can affect, or re-
place, the existing rights of the Four Powers under the Four-Power
Agreement on Germany of 1944. The same applies to our agreements
with the Three Powers as it does to those of the G.D.R. with the
Soviet Union. . . . These agreements, however, need not and should
not prevent us from reducing the existing barriers between us.

"My reference to the Four-Power Agreement, and our agreements
with the Three Powers, is made specifically in reference to Berlin.
We have no wish to change the existing status of Berlin as long as
the German question remains unresolved. . . . The fact that West
Berlin is not administered by the Federal Republic has not prevented
the Three Powers from delegating certain tasks to the Federal
Government, for example the representation of West Berlin abroad,
and the fostering of its economic viability. In effect West Berlin does
not differ in economic, financial, legal and cultural matters from the
Federal Republic, and neither the Three Powers, nor the Federal
Republic, nor the ordinary Berliner would want to see any change in
the status of West Berlin as defined by the Four Powers. ... It is up
to the Four Powers to decide how they will exercise their supreme
powers in Berlin. Should an agreement between them lead to an im-
provement in the present position, we would welcome it. But I must
make it crystal clear that, as far as my Government is concerned, all
efforts to normalize relations and reduce tension in Central Europe
are inextricably bound up with the normalization and reduction of
tension in and around Berlin.

"The Federal Government has examined the draft treaty forwarded
on Dec. 18, 1969, by the Chairman of the State Council of the
G.D.R. to the Federal President, though we are opposed to the pub-
lication of draft treaties, particularly when there has been no previous
discussion of the articles they contain. The Federal Government
wants to try to enter in the first instance into an exchange of views,
and for this reason has not produced a counter-draft. The goal of
this preliminary exchange of views should be to determine whether a
basis for negotiations exists, at the end of which there would be an
agreed settlement of our relations

248

"My ideas about the nature and objectives of any negotiations to
be conducted between us were transmitted to you in my letter of
Jan. 22, 1970, as follows:

(1) Both States have a duty to preserve the unity of the German
nation. They are not foreign to each other.

(2) The normal recognized principles of law between States
should apply, in particular those of non-discrimination, respect for
territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of all disputes, and respect for
each other's frontiers.

(3) This includes the obligation not to seek to alter the social
structure of the other by force.

(4) The two Governments should aim at good-neighbourly co-
operation, particularly through collaboration in the technical and
professional spheres.

(5) The existing rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers for
Germany as a whole, and for Berlin, should be respected.

(6) The efforts of the Four Powers to reach agreements on the
improvement of the situation in and around Berlin should be
supported.

"I also informed you on Jan. 22 that we should agree on the
mutual renunciation of the use of force, and that we should jointly
declare that in their mutual relations and in questions of European
and international security our two States would be guided by the
general principles and aims of the U.N. Charter. We would therefore
have to settle our differences solely by peaceful means. We should
also commit ourselves, in accordance with Article 2 of the U.N.
Charter, not to use force or the threat of force in questions of Euro-
pean security and in our mutual relations. Consolidation of the rela-
tions between our two States on a contractual basis would assuredly
help to bring about a conference for the furtherance of security and
collaboration in Europe.

"In your draft treaty there is a point concerning the participation
of both States in international organizations. In my policy statement
of Oct. 28, 1969, 1 had already announced that the Federal Govern-
ment planned to participate more actively in other international
organizations, and I also said that our and our friends' attitude
towards the international relations of the G.D.R. would depend on the
attitude of the G.D.R. Government itself. I propose that we discuss
these matters in the course of our meetings later on. Progress in this
respect would serve to utilize more than hitherto the capabilities of
our people, our economy and our science for the benefit of peace,
development, and the fight against hunger in many parts of the world.
In order to be able to help effectively in this respect we should also
aim at a balanced reduction of forces and weapons in the East and
the West

"More than documents is required to normalize relations. Normal-

249

ization must bring benefits to the ordinary man on either side. . .
We must first and foremost do all that is in our power to relieve
human hardship. To quote two examples: we must find ways and
means to unite children and parents still separated; we should enable
engaged couples separated by the border to get married. The decline
in our mutual trade has, much to my satisfaction, been stopped, but
we should instruct our departments concerned not to be satisfied with
the figures achieved. We should also strive for greater economic and
technical exchanges; co-ordinate our planning for the construction
of trunk roads; open additional frontier crossing-points; and provide
other facilities in communications such as a speeding-up of passenger
trains, creation of uniform freight-handling arrangements with
through tariffs, improved technical collaboration of the two railway
authorities, and improvements in inland navigation. To help improve
communications between persons and firms with their partners in the
other part of Germany we should arrange for the extension of tele-
phone, telegraph and telex facilities and overcome existing difficulties
with clearing accounts.

"Finally, I think of the numerous practical and administrative prob-
lems arising from the existence of the border and creating local
problems. It would certainly be an improvement if ordinary visits,
cultural exchanges and sports meetings between the two German
States and in Berlin could take place at least to the extent that
already exists between Federal Germany and several East European
States. This would be a modest beginning, but we must begin some-
where if we seriously think of a normalization and if treaties are not
to be mere words. Beyond this I state quite openly that it is my view
that a real normalization must contribute to the breaking down of
frontier barriers and walls, which symbolize the deplorable special
character of our situation."

After declaring that he could not accept Herr Stoph's views on
various aspects of the Federal Republic's internal development, on
certain political groups and personalities, and on the role of the
G.F.R. in the Atlantic alliance, as well as the particular role played
by Herr Schmidt, the Federal Minister of Defence, Herr Brandt went
on: "We are a loyal member of the Alliance to which we belong, as
you are on your side. There is unlikely to be any change in our
position in this regard until the Western and Eastern alliances pro-
duce changes in attitude affecting Europe as I hope they will.

"You have twice asked whether I am prepared to begin formal
treaty negotiations. I have replied that we are prepared to examine
whether die time has come to negotiate and I hope it has on all
matters which either side has raised, or will raise, during these talks.
My starting-point is that our relations must be built on the basis of
non-discrimination and equality. None of us can act for the other,

250

and none can represent the other abroad. ... It must be the goal of
both States to aim at a specially close relationship. . . .

"I have not come to Erfurt to demand the loosening of any ties
the G.D.R. has with others, nor to demand any change in its social
system. I would naturally reject any similar demands on the G.F.R.
The Constitutions of both our States envisage the possibility of a
unitary German State. This is also reflected in the treaties which we
have with the three Western Powers and which you have with the
Soviet Union. ... It should be quite clear that nothing in these treaties
nor in our intentions and aims should alter this perspective, which
derives from the right of self-determination. Thus I remain convinced
that expressions such as 'recognition based on international law'
and 'non-intervention in internal affairs' are out of place in the
context of a relationship of equality between the G.F.R. and the
G.D.R.

"Your statement and mine show there is a long and arduous road
to travel. . . . We cannot ignore what separates us, but we should
place in the foreground those areas where agreement might be possi-
ble. That we should have exchanged such formal preparatory state-
ments is an indication of the extraordinary circumstances which have
brought the Heads of Government of the two German States together
for the first time. However, we should perhaps now exchange our
views in a more confidential manner, which experience shows does
help matters. . . . This would also conform with the method used by
both the Soviet and Polish Governments in their discussions with the
Federal Government."

In conclusion, Herr Brandt invited Herr Stoph to a meeting in the
Federal Republic in May for further discussions and suggested the
nomination of delegates to prepare for this, to examine the proposals
made by both sides, and to draw up a list of questions to be con-
sidered at the second meeting. This list, Herr Brandt said, might
form the basis for discussing the further procedure, especially the
future tasks of their delegates or commissions.

A joint communique published at the end of the talks announced
that Herr Stoph had accepted Herr Brandt's invitation for a further
discussion in Kassel (Western Germany) on May 21, 1970.

Second Brandt-Stoph Summit Meeting in Kassel

Statement by Herr Brandt

The Kassel meeting, held at the Wilhelmshohe Schlosshotel, opened
with a statement by the Federal Chancellor, who in the course of his

251

speech outlined a 20-point treaty which, he proposed, should be
concluded between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic
Republic on a basis of equality.

Herr Brandt expressed the hope that "in spite of all our differences
of opinion we shall be able to achieve progress both in matters of
principle and on practical questions". Addressing Herr Stoph, he
went on:

"Our meeting in Erfurt was without doubt an event of political
significance, as you, Mr. Chairman, said in your opening statement
at the time. It was keenly followed by our population, and attracted
much attention in all those countries who take a special interest in
what happens in Germany. This places a great duty and responsi-
bility on us. We can only meet it if, as I said in Erfurt, we continue
to search for areas where it will be possible to achieve progress for
peace and for the people in Germany. . . .

"We both know that the way to a settlement of our relations will
be long and arduous. We should not render it even more difficult
by making unfounded reproaches and accusations, as has frequently
been the case since Erfurt. The fact that we are meeting here today
something that we have both equally helped to bring about should
be proof enough that on both sides the will to reduce tensions is not
lacking.

"I do not think it would be right to burden our meeting with
polemical statements. I therefore confine myself to assuring you that
the insinuations and imputations cast on my Government almost
every day will neither be helpful nor make us abandon our convic-
tions. . . . My Government has never concealed the fact that its
attitude to the G.D.R.'s international relations is conditional upon
the development of relations between the two parts of Germany. . . .

"Our attitude implies neither tutelage nor presumption. It reflects
our efforts to improve the relationship between the two States in Ger-
many step by step. Certainly, it would have been useful if in Erfurt
we had agreed to appoint representatives and come to initial arrange-
ments. But it is not too late to do that now.

"I have repeatedly proposed to you, Mr. Chairman, that we open
negotiations for a contractual settlement of relations between our
two States on a basis of equality. And I have also said that any
mutual discrimination should be excluded by such arrangements.
I formally underline this readiness. But if there is so much talk about
discrimination ... it must be mentioned that the G.D.R. has con-
stantly tried to thwart the Federal Government's efforts to improve
its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

"As I pointed out in Erfurt, the Constitutions of the two German
States are based on the unity of the nation. Neither of them envisages

252

division as a permanent state. I feel that we cannot achieve a mean-
ingful arrangement of relations with each other without making
allowance for these constitutional principles. This brings me to our
actual task.

"I see no point in telling each other that one cannot take the
second step before the first, and in arguing what the second or third
should be before having taken the first one. To me it is in each case
the next possible step that matters. As things stand at present, that
next step can only be negotiations between our two Governments on
practical and also political problems and that in itself would be a
great deal.

"The purpose of such negotiations ought to be to place relations
between the two States in Germany on a contractual basis, both in
the interest of the people and of peace and for the sake of the future
of the nation. The Federal Government is prepared to do so.
Naturally, such a treaty . . . can only be concluded on the basis of
equality and non-discrimination. . . .

"In Erfurt I expounded on the matters to be settled. I left no
doubt .that contractual arrangements must be consistent with the
special situation prevailing between our two States, but legally they
must be as binding as similar agreements which each party concludes
with third States. I also made it clear that we intend neither to
bypass the rights of the Four Powers, which continue to have effect,
nor to recognize the division of Germany under international law.

"However, I cannot believe that the demand for formal recogni-
tion is all that the Government of the G.D.R. can contribute to our
negotiations, especially as it has failed to this day to indicate more
specifically how it visualizes these relations. If the G.D.R. had nothing
to offer other than charges and accusations, demands and conditions,
then we would not be living up to the significance of this meeting,
to the expectations of our people, and to our far-reaching task.

"In the hope and the assumption that this is not the case, I suggest
that we today reach agreement on the opening of negotiations and
on details of procedure. The arrangements I have in mind should
include a treaty forming the basis for the relationship between our
two States."

After referring to the proposed draft treaty between the G.D.R.
and the G.F.R. which Herr Ulbricht had sent to President Heinemann
in December 1969, and to the principles whicb he [the Federal
Chancellor] had elaborated in his letter to Herr Stoph in January and
at Erfurt, Herr Brandt set out the Federal Government's "concepts
of the principles and elements of a treaty regulating relations between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic on a basis of equality", as follows:

(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, "whose Constitutions are oriented to the unity of

253

the nation", would conclude a treaty regulating relations between the
two States in Germany, improving contacts between the populations
of the two States, and helping to eliminate existing disadvantages.

(2) The agreement should be submitted to the respective legisla-
tive bodies of both sides for approval.

(3) Both sides should "proclaim their desire to regulate their rela-
tions on the basis of human rights, equality, peaceful coexistence and
non-discrimination".

(4) Both sides should undertake "not to use or threaten to use
force against each other, and to resolve all existing mutual problems
by peaceful means. This includes respect for each other's territorial
integrity and frontiers."

(5) Both sides should respect the independence and autonomy of
each of the two States in matters relating to their internal sovereignty.

(6) Neither of the two German States could act on behalf of or
represent the other.

(7) "The two contracting parties declare that war must never
again originate in Germany."

(8) They would undertake to refrain from any actions likely to
disturb the peaceful coexistence of nations.

(9) The two sides should "reaffirm their intention to support all
efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control that will enhance
European security".

(10) The treaty "must proceed from the consequences of the
Second World War and the particular situation of Germany and the
Germans, who live in two States, yet regard themselves as belonging
to one nation".

(11) "Their respective responsibilities towards the French Repub-
lic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
which are based on the special rights and agreements of those Powers
with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole, shall remain
unaffected."

(12) "The four-Power agreements on Berlin and Germany will
be respected. The same applies to the links that have grown between
West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Both sides under-
take to support the Four Powers in their efforts to bring about a
normalization of the situation in and around Berlin."

(13) The two sides would "examine the areas where the legisla-
tion of the two States collides", and would "endeavour to eliminate
such collision so as to avoid creating disadvantages for the citizens of
the two States in Germany". In doing so they would "start from the
principle that. the sovereign authority of both sides is limited to their
respective territories".

(14) The treaty should provide for increased possibilities for
travel between the two States and for freedom of movement.

254

(15) A solution should be found for the problems arising from the
separation of families.

(16) The local authorities in the border areas should be enabled
to solve existing problems on a good-neighbourly basis.

(17) Both sides should reaffirm their readiness to intensify and
extend their co-operation in various fields, e.g. transport and travel,
posts and telecommunications, exchanges of information, science,
education, culture, environmental problems and sport, to their
mutual advantage, and to open negotiations to this end.

(18) As regards mutual trade, the existing agreements, commis-
sions and arrangements would continue to apply. Trade relations
should be further developed.

(19) The two Governments should appoint plenipotentiaries with
the rank of Minister, and with permanent representatives, who would
be "given working possibilities at the seat of the respective Govern-
ments and be afforded the necessary facilities and privileges".

(20) On the basis of the treaty to be concluded between them, the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
would make the necessary arrangements for their membership of
and participation in international organizations.

"These proposals," Herr Brandt added, "together with the draft
treaty proposed by the G.D.R. and other statements and suggestions
that we have both put forward or intend to put forward, should be
the subject of our further exchanges of views "

Statement by Herr Stoph

Herr Stoph spoke as follows: "We have come to the Federal
Republic in order, for our part, to do everything once and for all to
bring about relations between the G.D.R. and the G.F.R. on a basis
of equal status and validity under international law, and in doing so
to make a significant contribution to peace and security in Europe."
Addressing Herr Brandt, he went on:

"Since my meeting with you in March, Mr. Chancellor, the stand-
point of the German Democratic Republic has gained new and lasting
support. . . . Additional States have entered into diplomatic relations
with the G.D.R. It is apparent that the chances of the defenders of
the 'Hallstein Doctrine' are fading. In the Federal Republic, too,
there are growing numbers of people who are speaking up, with good
reason, for the establishment of relations under international law
between the G.F.R. and the G.D.R. . . .

"We have come to Kassel to receive a clear answer to the question
of whether the Government of the G.F.R. has studied thoroughly
our concrete, constructive proposals, and whether it is now ready to
conclude with the Government of the G.D.R. a treaty on the estab-

255

lishment of equal relations on the basis of international law. In the
name of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic
I declare that we are ready to prepare and to sign such a treaty
without delay. This would be the most suitable way to ensure rela-
tions between our States which could lead to the establishment of
peaceful coexistence between the German Democratic Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany.

"It stands in contradiction to the most elementary interests of
European peace when a State in the heart of our continent refuses to
give international recognition to a neighbouring State, when it ignores
its sovereign equality, when it questions its frontiers, and when it
wishes to alter the territorial status quo. I should like to stress most
strongly that recognition of the G.D.R. under international law and
of the status quo in Europe is not simply a legal question, or a
question of the prestige of the G.D.R., but a basic condition for
peace and security in Europe. . . .

"Let us call a spade a spade. Those who refuse to accept inter-
national law as the basis for the relationship with another sovereign
State obviously pursue aims which are contrary to international law
and to the elementary principles of humanity. The refusal to recognize
the G.D.R. and its frontiers under international law forces us to
conclude that the intention is to keep the way open for aggressive
acts against the frontiers of the G.D.R. and against its social
system. . . .

"The slogan about 'liberating the Soviet Zone' which has been
enunciated by others, and not only by Christian Democratic poli-
ticians, still echoes in our ears. After 20 years of a hostile policy by
the G.F.R. with regard to the G.D.R., words alone about under-
standing and equal rights, promises about peaceful intentions, are
not sufficient to bring about normal relations.

"Now a word with regard to West Berlin. In the past weeks the
Government of the G.F.R. has emphasized in a sharpened form its
illegal claim to West Berlin. Here it must be clearly stated that the
independent political entity of West Berlin, which lies in the middle
of the G.D.R. and in its territory, has never been a part of the G.F.R.
and never will form a part of the G.F.R.

"The Governments of the three Western Powers have also repeat-
edly confirmed that West Berlin is not a province of the Federal
Republic, and that it may not be governed by the Federal Govern-
ment. If your Government, Chancellor Brandt, believes that it can
bargain with or about West Berlin, then I must remind you that the
Federal Government has no sort of rigjits or responsibilities in and
for West Berlin; and that it therefore has nothing to bargain about
in this matter. . . .

"At our first meeting in Erfurt, and in the subsequent weeks, you,
Chancellor Brandt, have repeatedly spoken about equality and non-
256

discrimination. However, what has happened, particularly in the
field of international relations, can only be described as a campaign
for non-equality and discrimination against the G.D.R."

Herr Stoph then went on to criticize what he alleged to be West
German opposition to the G.D.R.'s full participation in the World
Health Organization and also in the work of the U.N. Economic
Commission for Europe. As regards Herr Brandt's assertion that the
G.D.R. had repeatedly tried to hinder the Federal Government's
attempts to improve its relations with East European countries,
Herr Stoph declared: "If anybody is disturbing relations between
the G.F.R. and the socialist States, it is your Government itself. It
is the Federal Government which refuses to recognize the results of
the Second World War; which refuses to recognize the final nature
of the Oder-Neisse frontier; which refuses to recognize that the
Munich Agreement of 1938 was invalid ab initio"

Herr Stoph continued: "These specific cases raise the question
as to what the Federal Government really means by 'equality 9 . Does
it understand as equality that the Federal Republic should regard
only itself as a subject of international law, while it refuses the same
right to the sovereign G.D.R.? Does it regard it as equal that the
Federal Republic should claim all the rights of a sovereign State in
its international relations, but at the same time should attempt to
deny the G.D.R. the same elementary rights? Does it understand it
as equal that it should . . . cling to the claim to be the 'sole repre-
sentative of Germany', even if it does not use this phrase?

"We should like to have your answer, Chancellor Brandt, to the
following questions:

"Are you ready to give your active support to the preparation of
a European Security Conference in which all States of our continent
may participate with equal rights?

"Are you ready to recognize, finally and without reservations, the
status quo in Europe and the frontiers of Europe, and to conduct your
international policy on the principle of non-intervention?

"Are you ready to abandon the claim to sole representation [of the
German people] and instead to act in accordance with the principle
of equality?

"Are you ready to aid peace and security in Europe by agreed
steps towards disarmament?

"Are you, above all, ready to conclude a treaty on the establish-
ment of equal relations under international law between the G.D.R.
and the G.F.R.? . . .

"The G.D.R. stands by its constructive proposals. Our proposals
have been tabled and I should like to declare once again: We are
ready immediately to conclude a treaty on the establishment of equal
relations under international law between our States. . . . The G.D.R.
would consider it most regrettable if an uncomprehending 'no' from

257

the Federal Government were to make it impossible at the present
time to establish such relations between the G.D.R. and the
G.F.R "

There were formal sessions between the West and East German
delegations during the day, as well as personal meetings between
Herr Brandt and Herr Stoph. The Kassel meeting, like that at Erfurt,
ended, however, without any agreement on the political issues divid-
ing the two German States, no communique being issued.

At a news conference in Bonn on May 22 Herr Brandt said that
he and Herr Stoph had agreed to continue their exchange of views
at a later date; "that no concrete agreements emerged" [at Kassel],
the Chancellor added, "shows once more how deep is the gulf that
separates the two parts of Germany, and how much patience we must
exercise". Herr Brandt pointed out, however, that the Kassel talks
should not be seen in isolation, but in the wider context which in-
cluded the negotiations in Moscow and Warsaw [see below].

Other 1970 Developments in East-West German Relations

Between the Erfurt and Kassel meetings of the German Federal
Chancellor, Herr Brandt, and the Chairman of the East German
Council of Ministers, Herr Stoph, in March and May several smaller
steps were taken by the Federal Government to improve the general
climate between the two countries.

Agreement on Postal Payments and Telecommunications

Negotiations held in Bonn between the Federal Ministry of Posts
and the East German Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications
resulted on April 29, 1970, in a partial agreement under which:

(a) The Federal Post Administration undertook, retroactive to
Jan. 1, 1967, and until 1973, to pay to the East German authorities
DM 30,000,000 as an annual lump sum compensation for the costs of
inter-German postal communications as well as those from Western
Germany through the G.D.R. to other East European countries;
two earlier West German payments of DM 16,900,000 and
DM 5,000,000 would be set against this total. The question of com-
pensation for the period before 1967 remained open. In earlier

258

abortive negotiations in 1967, the East Germans had demanded total
payments of DM 1,800,000,000 [see above, page 217].

(b) The number of telephone lines between Eastern and Western
Germany would be increased from 34 to 74, and of telex lines from
19 to 35. Details of the improvement of communications between
East Berlin and West Berlin remained unsettled, although Herr
Georg Leber, the Federal Minister of Communications, expressed
the hope that the effect of the new arrangements would also benefit
Berlin.

West German Measures to balance Inter-German Trade

The Federal Government decided on April 30 to take the follow-
ing measures to reduce the large West German surplus in trade with
Eastern Germany:

(a) With effect from July 1, sales to Eastern Germany were made
less profitable by the imposition of a value-added tax of 6 per cent;
hitherto no such tax was levied on such sales.

(b) With effect from May 1, purchases of industrial goods from
Eastern Germany were made cheaper by raising tax preferences from
5 per cent to 11 per cent.

It was hoped to achieve thereby more speedily a balance in inter-
German trade, which had hitherto shown a rapidly growing deficit
for the G.D.R. and a corresponding surplus for the G.F.R., the total
imbalance accumulated to the end of 1969 having reached about DM
500,000,000.

West German Revocation of "Safe-Conducf Law

The Act of 1966 granting safe-conduct in the Federal Republic
to certain representatives of the East German Socialist Unity Party
who migftt have been previously connected with the prevention of
flights of Germans from the G.D.R. to the West (a punishable act
under West German law) was formally abolished under legislation
approved by the Bundestag on May 7, with the CDU/CSU members
abstaining, and by the Bundesrat on May 15, with Bavaria abstaining.

The 1966 Act, which had been passed in connexion with the
abortive proposal that SPD leaders should address an SED meeting
at Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz) and SED leaders an SPD meeting
at Hanover, had aroused strong hostility on the part of the East
German and Soviet Governments.

259

4. TREATY BETWEEN WESTERN GERMANY
AND THE SOVIET UNION, AUGUST 1970

After prolonged negotiations between the West German and Soviet
Government, a treaty on the renunciation of 'force was signed in
Moscow on Aug. 12, 1970, by Herr Brandt and Mr. Kosygin, the
Soviet Prime Minister.

Herr Brandt had first called for the conclusion of such a treaty
in October 1967, when he was Foreign Minister in the Kiesinger
Government.

Speaking on Oct. 8, 1967, at the Free University of Berlin, Herr
Brandt called for "sincere friendship" between the German Federal
Republic and the Soviet Union and, on behalf of the Federal Gov-
ernment offered to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of
force. Four days later Mr. Tsarapkin proposed to Herr Brandt an
exchange of mutual renunciation-of-force pledges between the Ger-
man Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic.

In a Note on Nov. 21, 1967, however, the Soviet Government
claimed that, as a member of the #nti-Hitler coalition of World
War H, it possessed, under Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter,
the right of intervention in Western Germany in the event of the
"resumption of aggressive policies by a former enemy State", The
relevant paragraphs of the Soviet Note said inter alia:

"The U.N. Charter contains a number of passages dealing spe-
cifically with the rights and duties of the States of the former anti-
Hitler coalition. Article 107 of the Charter states: 'Nothing in the
present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any
State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any
signatory of the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of
that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action'.

"In addition Article 53, Paragraph 1, which deals with enforce-
ment action for the maintenance of peace by the Security Council,
states that this does not affect 'measures against any enemy State
as defined ... in Article 107, or in regional arrangements directed
against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such State'.

"Thus the acts undertaken by the States of the anti-Hitter coalition
and the agreements concluded by them retain their full ^validity under
the U.N. Charter. As a result relevant measures can be taken against
the resumption of aggressive policies by a former enemy State."

In a statement sent on Dec. 8, 1967, not only to the West German
Ambassador in Moscow but also to the Ambassadors of the United
States, Britain and France, the Soviet Government demanded that
Western Germany should recognize the existing frontiers in Europe;
abandon its claim to represent all Germans; renounce all access to

260

nuclear weapons; renounce the claim that West Berlin was part of
the Federal Republic; and recognize that the Munich Agreement of
1938 was null and void ab initio. The Note also accused the Federal
Government of fostering a "rebirth of fascism and militarism" in
Western Germany. The Soviet accusations were rejected by the West
German Government on Dec. 22, 1967, and by the three Western
Powers on Dec. 29, 1967.

The West German reply recalled the repeated criticisms of the
Federal Republic's internal and foreign policies expressed by the
Soviet Government, which the Federal Government had "not deemed
to require an answer" as in its view mutual polemics would not lead
towards a relaxation of tension. The Federal Government expressed
regret that the Soviet statement should give an "utterly distorted
picture" of German internal policies and of the Federal Government's
principle of seeking to achieve its aims by peaceful means only, as
was well known throughout the world.

The West German Government had meanwhile asked the Soviet
Government on Dec. 14, 1967, in an aide-memoire, whether it was
still interested in a continued exchange of ideas on the mutual
renunciation of force, and reaffirmed its willingness to take part in
further discussions. In its reply, handed to die Foreign Ministry
in Bonn by Mr. Tsarapkin on Jan. 29, 1968, the Soviet Government
stated that the answers received from the Federal Government to
the Soviet proposals had not gone to the root of the matter because
they had not been based on acceptance of the Soviet demands [see
above]. The Soviet Government insisted that a renunciation-of-force
agreement would have to be concluded between Western and Eastern
Germany on the same basis as with the other socialist countries, and
accused the Federal Government of underestimating the threat of
neo-Nazism in Western Germany.

The Federal Government's reply, handed to Mr. Tsarapkin on
April 9, 1968, set out proposals for negotiations with "every member-
State of the Warsaw Pact", including "the other part of Germany",
on an exchange of declarations on the renunciation of the use of
force for the settlement of outstanding problems. The non-aggression
pacts thus concluded, it said, while not to be regarded as a final
settlement of European issues, would prepare the ground for a
peaceful solution of these problems. The Federal Government also
declared itself ready to sign a nuclear non-proliferation treaty; to
negotiate with the Czechoslovak Government on the Munich Agree-
ment; to oppose firmly all right-wing extremism; and to continue
to respect the four-Power status of Berlin. On the other hand it
repeated its earlier stand that Germany's eastern frontier could only
be established by a final peace treaty concluded with a united German
Government, and rejected Soviet assertions that the U.S.S.R. had a
right to intervene in Western Germany on the basis of provisions of

261

the Potsdam Agreement and the U.N. Charter [see above], as these,
in the Federal Government's view, had been overtaken by the
effluxion of time.

In a further aide-memoire presented in Bonn on July 5, 1968, the
Soviet Government said that if the German Federal Government
was seriously interested in an agreement on the renunciation of force
it must recognize the existing frontiers in Europe, "draw the neces-
sary conclusions from the fact that two independent German States
exist", abandon claims to nuclear weapons, and recognize the in-
validity of the Munich Agreement ab initio. The Soviet Government
described the Federal Government's Note of April 9 [see above] as an
attempt "to avoid the question of concluding a settlement binding in
international law on the renunciation of force in relations with the
German Democratic Republic" and to "evade recognizing the existing
frontiers in Europe". The aide-memoire also claimed that "under the
terms of the Potsdam Agreement the Oder-Neisse frontier was laid
down once and for all and cannot be the subject of any discussion or
*** *******

Without notifying the German side, and in disregard of the arrange-
ment to treat the exchanges as confidential, Izvestia published all
the Soviet documents on July 11-13, 1968. The German Federal
Government thereupon published its own proposals to the Soviet
Union on the mutual renunciation of force on July 12, 1968.

Herr Brandt, in a press statement on the latter date, declared in
reply to Soviet suspicions that "everybody should know that after
what has happened the whole German people desires nothing more
than the disappearance for all time of violence or threats of violence
in relations between States". The Soviet Government, he went on,
seemed to hold the view that such a renunciation of force and of
the threat of force could not be agreed as long as the G.F.R. did
not accept unconditionally all the unilateral Soviet demands. In
its aide-memoire the Soviet Government had demanded the right,
even after a solemn mutual renunciation of force and the threat of
force, to use force unilaterally against the partner of such a renun-
ciation, on the basis of "long superseded provisions of the U.N.
Charter on the relations between lie victors and the vanquished in
the Second World War". Expressing regret that the aide-memoire
"practically ignored" the arguments of the German Federal Govern-
ment, Herr Brandt said that, "instead of a quiet and factual discus-
sion of the problems", it contained "long polemical sections attacking
the Federal Government, the unjustifiabHity of which is clearly shown
in the documents now published". He added: "We reject violence as
a means in international and internal German disputes. We are and
we will remain ready to affirm this unconditionally by solemn mutual
commitments vis-d-vis each member of the Warsaw Pact."

The protracted "dialogue" between the Federal Republic and the

262

Soviet Union was temporarily interrupted by the Soviet and Warsaw
Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, but on Sept. 4,
1968, Mr. Tsarapkin presented another Soviet aide-memoire which
demanded inter alia that the Federal Government should abandon
its previous East European policy and recognize the German Dem-
ocratic Republic. Dr. Kiesinger, who was visiting Afghanistan at the
time, said at a press conference in Kabul on Sept. 13 that "after the
Czechoslovak adventure" the Soviet Government wanted to compel
the Federal Republic to recognize the G.D.R. and to abandon all
idea of a reunified Germany.

In a speech on the same day (Sept. 13, 1968) Herr Brandt declared
that the Soviet thesis of a right of intervention in Western Germany
in terms of Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter previously put
forward by the Soviet Government in its Note of Nov. 21, 1967 [see
above], and repeated by Moscow Radio on Sept. 11, 1968 was
"without substance" both juridically and politically, as the pro-
visions of those Articles of the U.N. Charter had been superseded
by the fact that Western Germany was a member of NATO. Herr
Brandt described the Soviet reference to these Articles as "a massive
attempt at intimidation".

Mr. Gromyko, however, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly
on Oct. 3, 1968, while reiterating the Soviet criticisms of West
German policy, again returned to the proposal for talks between
the two Governments on the conclusion of an agreement for the
renunciation of the use of force. Dr. Kiesinger replied to this proposal
in a speech at Ludwigshafen on Oct. 6, 1968, in which he offered
to resume the "dialogue" with the Soviet Union which had been inter-
rupted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In his speech Dr. Kiesinger
rejected the allegation that his Government's policy was directed
against the vital interests of the Soviet Union; stressed that only a
peaceful understanding with the Soviet Union could solve the prob-
lem of the division of Germany; and declared that the Federal
Republic was prepared to make every constructive contribution
towards peace in Europe "as long as the unconditional capitulation
of the German people is not demanded". In a subsequent statement
in the Bundestag on Oct. 16, 1968, Dr. Kiesinger reiterated (hat "we
want to continue our peace policy towards the countries of Eastern
Europe in spite of all disappointments".

The next positive step, however, did not take place until July 5,
1969, when Herr Georg-Ferdinand Duckwitz, State Secretary in the
West German Foreign Office, handed to Mr. Tsarapkin a document
which related to the "dialogue" between the two countries and con-
tained a reply to the Soviet aide-memoire of July 5, 1968; no state-
ment was issued on the contents of the document.

In a statement to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on July 11, 1969,
Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union had repeatedly made it

263

clear that the German Federal Republic had the same opportunities
as other countries to bring about normal relations with the Soviet
Union. "The difficulties," he went on, "are not created by us. The
point is that the G.F.R. wants to obtain an improvement in our rela-
tions by making us abandon the principles of our European policy.
But this is out of the question. Our people, like other peoples in
Europe, will remember for a long time what aggressive German
imperialism inflicted on them during the Second World War."

"A change in our relations," Mr. Gromyko continued, "is only
possible if fie G.F.R. follows the road of peace. For this, revanchist
plans will have to be replaced by the realization that the future of
the G.F.R. . . . lies in peaceful co-operation with all countries,
including the Soviet Union. On this basis the Soviet Government is
willing to continue the exchange of views with the G.F.R. on the
renunciation of force, as well on other questions affecting Soviet-
German relations. ... It goes without saying that in such exchanges
the Soviet Union will fully take into account the interests of our
allies. . . ." After reiterating the Soviet stand on the question of
West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko added: "We will take no steps which
will effect the just interests of the German Democratic Republic and
the special status [of Berlin]."

Following the formation of Herr Brandt's Government and the
new Chancellor's statement on his wish to bring about an under-
standing with the Soviet Union, Dr. Helmut Allardt, the West Ger-
man Ambassador in Moscow, on Nov. 15, 1969, presented a West
German Note proposing the resumption of talks in Moscow on the
renunciation of force by the two countries. It was announced in
Bonn on Dec. 7, 1969, that the Soviet Government had agreed to a
West German proposal that talks should begin in Moscow on the
following day. An initial 90-minute meeting accordingly took place
on Dec. 8 between Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Allardt, no statement being
issued.

In a statement on Dec. 10 the West German Foreign Minister,
Herr Scheel, said that the meeting on Dec. 8 between the Soviet For-
eign Minister and Ambassador Allardt had "served to clarify a num-
ber of questions arising from previous exchanges on a renunciation-
of-fprce agreement", and that German-Soviet discussions on this
subject would continue.

Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Allardt had two further meetings on Dec. 1 1
and Dec. 23, on which no official statements were issued. On Jan. 27,

264

1970, Herr Conrad Ahlers (the Federal Government spokesman)
announced in Bonn that Herr Egon Bahr, State Secretary in the
Federal Chancellor's office, had been appointed to conduct on the
German side "a very special phase" of the Moscow talks which, it
was hoped, would "carry the somewhat broad discussions into con-
crete negotiations".

The Soviet-West German negotiations were continued in Moscow
on Jan. 30, when a six-hour meeting took place between a Soviet
delegation headed by Mr. Gromyko and a West German delegation
headed by Herr Bahr and including Dr. Allardt. Herr Bahr had two
further meetings with Mr. Gromyko on Feb. 3 (a three-hour talk at
which Mr. Semyonov, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, was also
present) and on Feb. 6, again for over three hours. On Feb. 13
Herr Bahr had a meeting with Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister,
lasting about an hour and a half.

On his way for a visit to India, Thailand and Singapore, Herr
Scheel made a stopover in Moscow on Feb. 12 to discuss with Herr
Bahr the progress of the German-Soviet talks; he was also welcomed
by Mr. Semyonov and other members of the Soviet delegation taking
part in the talks.

On March 22 a communique was issued stating that from Jan. 30
to Feb. 18 and from March 3 to March 21 an exchange of views had
taken place in Moscow between the two delegations.

Herr Bahr visited Moscow on May 11, 1970, for a third round of
exploratory talks with Mr. Gromyko, which lasted from May 12 to
May 22 and which were partly conducted with Mr. Valentin Falin,
head of the European department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. On
leaving the Soviet capital on May 22, Herr Bahr told journalists that
all remaining problems in connexion with the preparatory talks had
now been settled, that both sides were in a position to start formal
negotiations, and that he would be making a "positive report" in
Bonn on the progress of his discussions in Moscow. The official com-
muniqu6 issued on the same day said that the exchanges of views
between the two Governments on the question of a treaty on the
mutual renunciation of force continued.

Guidelines for negotiating renunciation-of-force agreements with
the Soviet Union as well as with other East European countries were
approved by the German Federal Cabinet on June 7 at a special
session. The official spokesman, Herr Ahlers, stated that the Federal

265

Government would seek negotiations based on observance of the
following principles:

(1) "Relations between the German Federal Republic and the
U.S.S.R. shall be based on the principle of the renunciation of both
the use and the threat of force in exactly the same way as is already
the case between the G.F.R. and the three Western Powers. This
also applies to the inviolability of the territorial integrity of all States
and their frontiers. The threat of force or the use of force will also
have to be excluded with regard to differences of views or disputes
which continue to exist after the conclusion of a treaty renouncing
force."

(2) "The Federal Government's attitude on the question of Berlin
remains unaffected. It proceeds from the assumption that the four-
Power negotiations about Berlin will affirm the close ties between
Western Germany and West Berlin, as well as unhindered access to
West Berlin. Without such a safeguard a treaty on the renunciation
of force will not be able to come into effect."

(3) "Existing treaties and agreements with third countries will
not be affected by the envisaged agreement. This also applies to the
German Treaty" [i.e. the London and Paris treaties on Western
Germany],

(4) "The Germans' right of self-determination would not be
affected by the non-aggression pact. The [Federal Republic's] Basic
Law, including its preamble [which envisages all-German elections],
remains outside the negotiations."

(5) "The Federal Government proceeds from the assumption that
the agreements at which it aims with the Soviet Union, Poland and
other Warsaw Pact countries, especially the settlement of its relations
with the G.D.R. on the basis of the 20 points proposed by it at
Kassel, will lead to the establishment and development of normal
relations, and regards this policy for a better co-existence of the
peoples and the security of peace in Europe as one whole."

(6) "The Federal Government notes with satisfaction that this
policy is being approved and supported by the three Western Powers
and the member-countries of the Western European Union."

On June 5 a deputy Federal Government spokesman, Herr
Riidiger von Wechmar, had made the following statement in reply
to a question by the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU):

"The Federal Government is firmly of the view that renunciation-
of-force agreements should not prejudice the material premises of
existing points of dispute. . . .

"The Federal Republic is clear about the current goals of the

266

Soviet Union's policies for Germany and Europe. For its part, the
Soviet Union knows the Federal Government left no doubt about it
during the discussions in Moscow that there can be non-aggression
agreements only in so far as our renunciation of force cannot be
presented by the Soviet side as a renunciation of our efforts to, bring
about a just and lasting peace arrangement in Europe; to realize
the German people's right of self-determination and of free political
development, as is self-understood in a democracy. . . .

"It must not be possible to characterize our declared peaceful
goals as territorial claims and as an infringement of the renunciation-
of-force agreement."

The following written statement on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment was issued at the same time (i.e. on June 5), in response to a
question by the Christian Democratic opposition, regarding the
Soviet Union's reservation of unilateral intervention rights vis-d-vis
the Federal Republic:

"Mutual renunciation of force may not be qualified, let alone made
valueless, by one side's reservation of force. In our judgment of the
legal situation, the Soviet Union possesses no intervention rights
vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Germany. The three Western
Powers have expressed their joint agreement that none of the vic-
torious Powers has unilateral intervention rights vis-d-vis the Federal
Republic of Germany. And the Soviet Union has never expressly
asserted that it possesses unilateral intervention rights vis-d-vis the
Federal Republic of Germany, even though it has expressly stated
that Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter are valid and applicable.

"The basis for the bilateral relationship between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Three Powers is contained in the Final
Act of the London Conference, in which the Three Powers, without
mentioning Articles 53 and 107, following a corresponding commit-
ment by the Federal Republic of Germany, state that they 'will, in
their relations with the Federal Republic, adhere to the principles
contained in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter'. The Three Powers made
this statement only after the establishment of a contractually settled
relationship of confidence with the Federal Republic."

Finally, the statement said that there was "nothing to be added"
to a declaration made by Chancellor Brandt to the Bundestag on
Jan. 16, 1970, "to the effect that the Federal Government, hi its
relations with the Soviet Union, is striving for a status similar to the
status we have by virtue of the interpretations and assurances on the
part of the Western Powers".

The preparatory talks having been concluded, it was announced
in Bonn on July 16 that both Governments had agreed to open
formal negotiations on the treaty in Moscow on July 27. On the

267

latter date Herr Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, arrived
in the Soviet capital, where he was received by Mr. Gromyko, the
chief Soviet negotiator.

Opening their discussions on July 28, 1970, the Soviet and West
German delegations continued their negotiations on the treaty for
10 days at a number of full meetings, as well as tete-&-tte talks
between the two Foreign Ministers. Final agreement on the treaty
was reached on Aug. 7, when it was initialled at a private ceremony
by Mr. Gromyko and Herr Scheel, the latter returning the same day
to Bonn. It was announced in that city on Aug. 9 that Herr Brandt
had accepted a Soviet invitation to visit Moscow for the formal
signing of the treaty.

Dr. Kiesinger, the CDU leader, said on Aug. 9 that there should
be "no hectic rush" in signing the treaty and that the Opposition
should be given sufficient time to examine it.

Herr Brandt, accompanied by Herr Scheel, arrived in Moscow on
Aug. 1 1 the first visit of a West German Chancellor to the Soviet
capital since that of Dr. Adenauer in 1955. During a three-day stay
in Moscow (Aug. 11-13) Herr Brandt signed the treaty in the
Kremlin on Aug. 12, Mr. Kosygin being the Soviet signatory; had a
meeting with Mr. Brezhnev and talks with Mr. Kosygin; laid a wreath
at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin Wall; and
attended a dinner given in his honour by the Soviet Government.

The following communique was issued on the talks between Herr
Brandt and Mr. Kosygin:

"The two sides are convinced that the treaty they have signed
opens up favourable prospects for the successful development of
peaceful co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic
of Germany in various fields, in the interests of the peoples of both
States.

"They expressed confidence that the treaty would help to strengthen
security in Europe, to solve problems existing there, and to establish
peaceful co-operation among all European States, irrespective of the
difference in their social systems. The Governments of the U.S.S.R.
and the Federal Republic of Germany will contribute towards the
realization of steps which serve these aims.

"The two sides also had a detailed exchange of views on a number
of current problems of the present international situation.

"Both sides found it desirable to continue the exchange of views
on questions of mutual interest at appropriate levels.' 9

268

Finally, the communique stated that Mr. Kosygin had "gratefully
accepted" an invitation by Herr Brandt to visit the Federal Republic,
and that this visit would take place at a date to be arranged later.

Provisions of the Treaty

The treaty consisted of five Articles preceded by a preamble. Its
text was as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties;

"Seeking to promote the consolidation of peace and security in
Europe and throughout the world;

"Convinced that peaceful co-operation among States on the basis
of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
accords with the aspirations of the peoples and the general interests
of international peace;

"Noting that the agreed measures previously taken by them, in
particular the conclusion on September 13, 1955, of the agreement
on the establishment of diplomatic relations [see page 119], have
created favourable conditions for new important steps directed
towards the further development and strengthening of their mutual
relations;

"Desiring to express in contractual form their determination to
improve and extend co-operation between them, including economic
relations as well as scientific, technical and cultural contacts, in the
interests of both States;

"Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany regard the maintenance of international
peace and the achievement of the relaxation of tension as a major
objective of their policies.

"They affirm their desire to promote the normalization of the
situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations be-
tween all European States, and in so doing proceed from the actual
situation existing in this region.

Article 2. "The Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.S.R.
shall be guided in their mutual relations, as well as in matters con-
cerning the safeguarding of European and international security, by
the aims and principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations.
Accordingly, they will settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful
means and undertake, in accord with Article 2 of the U.N. Charter,
to refrain from the threat of force or the use of force in any matters
affecting security in Europe and international security, as well as in
their mutual relations.

269

Article3. "In conformity with the foregoing aims and principles
set out above, the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany
share the realization that peace in Europe can ordy be maintained if
no one disturbs the present frontiers.

"They undertake to respect the territorial integrity of all States
in Europe within their existing frontiers;

"They declare that they have no territorial claims whatsoever
against anybody, and will not assert such claims in the future;

"They regard as inviolable now and in the future the frontiers of
all States in Europe as they are on the date of the signing of this
treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line, which forms the western
frontier of the Polish People's Republic, and the frontier between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic.

Articled "The present Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the
Federal Republic of Germany does not affect any bilateral or multi-
lateral treaties and agreements previously concluded by them.

Article 5. "The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall
come into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of rati-
fication, which will take place in Bonn."

The treaty was drawn up in the Russian and German languages,
both texts being equally authentic.

Herr Scheel's Letter to Mr. Gromyko
Federal Government's Letter to Western Powers

The texts were also made public on Aug. 12 of (a) a letter by
Herr Scheel to Mr. Gromyko on the question of German unity, and
(6) a letter sent by the German Federal Government to the U.S.,
British and French Governments. Herr Scheel's letter to the Soviet
Foreign Minister was worded as follows:

"In connexion with today's signature of the Treaty between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has
the honour to state that this Treaty does not conflict with the political
objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of
peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in
free self-determination."

The German Federal Government's letter to the three Western
Powers read:

270

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the
honour, in connexion with the forthcoming signing of the Treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, to state the following:

"The Federal Foreign Minister has, in connexion with the negotia-
tions, disclosed the viewpoint of the Federal Government with regard
to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers towards Germany
as a whole and Berlin.

"As a peace treaty settlement is still outstanding, both sides have
worked on the basis that the intended Treaty does not affect the
rights and responsibilities of the French Republic, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

"The Federal Foreign Minister has declared in this connexion:

The question of the rights of the Four Powers is in no way
connected with the Treaty which the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intend to conclude, and
is not affected by it.'

"The Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
has declared in this connexion:

"The question of the rights of the Four Powers will also not be
affected by the Treaty which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Federal Republic of Germany intend to conclude. This is
the attitude of the Soviet Government in this matter. 9 "

The U.S., British and French Governments, who had been apprised
by Bonn of the contents of the treaty, delivered identical messages
to the West German Government on Aug. 11 approving the treaty
which was to be signed in Moscow between the Federal Republic
and the Soviet Union.

West German Opposition's Objections

The Bundestag Opposition's main objections to the treaty were
listed in a communique issued by the CDU presidium on Aug. 26,
1970, as follows:

(a) The Germans' right to self-determination was endangered;
(b) the determination of frontiers must be reserved for a peace
treaty; (c) concrete improvements in inter-German relations in
particular greater freedom of movement for people and ideas had
not as yet been guaranteed; (d) the question of the security of
West Berlin and its future remained unclarified; and (e) the Govern-

271

ment's policy, which was at the basis of the treaty, was threatening
the foundations of Western integration and the policy of the Western
Alliance.

5. TREATY BETWEEN WESTERN GERMANY
AND POLAND, NOVEMBER 1970

Steps towards Normalization of Relations
Polish Insistence on Finality of Oder-Neisse Frontier

The appointment of Herr Brandt as Chancellor of the German
Federal Republic was followed by a West German initiative for the
normalization of relations between the G.F.R. and Poland, as stated
above. Herr Brandt told the new Bundestag in his policy statement
on Oct. 28, 1969, that the Federal Government intended to transmit
to the Polish Government a proposal for the opening of talks between
the two countries, "thereby responding to the comments made by
Wladyslaw Gomulka on May 17, 1969". In Mr. Gomulka's state-
ment of the latter date, to which Herr Brandt referred, the Polish
leader had expressed the readiness of the Polish Government to con-
clude an agreement with the German Federal Republic provided the
G.F.R. "recognizes without any reservations the existing Polish
frontier on the Oder and Neisse as final and inviolate".

Speaking in Warsaw on May 17, Mr. Gomulka had referred to the
Budapest appeal for an all-European conference on collective security
and peace which had recently been made by the Warsaw Pact Powers.
He accused successive West German Governments of having "stub-
bornly blocked for many years every initiative aimed at detente and
at lasting peace and security in Europe" citing in this respect the
fate of the Polish proposal for an atom-free zone in Central Europe,
and of the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between NATO
and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Nevertheless, Mr. Gomulka continued, there had for some time
been "tendencies in certain circles of the German Federal Republic
which seem to indicate an intention to give a slightly different direc-
tion" to Bonn's eastern policy. He had in mind "certain statements
made by the leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party"
at that party's congresses in Bad Godesberg (April 1969) and
Nuremberg (March 1968), "particularly those made by Willy Brandt,
Vice-Chancellor of the G.F.R. and chairman of that party".

After emphasizing that "the touchstone of the policy of pie German
Federal Republic is, will be, and always has been the attitude of the

272

West German Government to the recognition of the existing frontiers
in Europe, including the frontier of the Oder and Neisse, as final, and
to the recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign
German State with equal rights", Mr. Gomulka went on:

"In his speech at the Social Democratic Party congress in Nurem-
berg on March 16, Willy Brandt is reported to have said that he
regards it as necessary to recognize or respect the Oder-Neisse line
until a settlement in a peace treaty. This meant, he explained, that
his party wanted to renounce the use of force and to be reconciled
with Poland, even before the peace treaty if this was possible. . . .
The substance of Brandt's attitude to the question of the frontier on
the Oder and Neisse was also reiterated in a resolution by the
Nuremberg congress. . . . One cannot fail to appreciate the fact
that ... the formula of the Social Democratic Party on the recogni-
tion by the German Federal Republic of the Oder-Neisse frontier
constitutes a step forward compared to the stand taken on this issue
by all previous Governments of the G.F.R. . . ."

Nevertheless, Mr. Gomulka continued, "even if one were to assume
that the Bonn Government will accept Vice-Chancellor Brandt's
Nuremberg formula, this would in fact change nothing in the present
state of affairs. A change can only occur when the Government of the
G.F.R. recognizes without any reservations the existing Polish fron-
tier on the Oder and Neisse as final and inviolate. . . ." After saying
that the G.F.R. was seeking to avoid recognizing the existing frontier
as definitive because the Potsdam Agreements laid down that final
delimitation of Poland's western border would have to await a peace
conference, Mr. Gomulka declared:

"There are no obstacles of a legal nature to the recognition by the
German Federal Republic of the existing Polish western frontier as
final. We are ready to conclude such an inter-State agreement with
the G.F.R. at any time, just as we concluded such an agreement
with the German Democratic Republic 19 years ago. If, however, the
Government of the G.F.R. maintains that the conclusion of such a
treaty with Poland would be in contravention of the Potsdam Agree-
ments, we suggest that it should ask the Governments of the Soviet
Union, France, Great Britain and the United States whether the
German Federal Republic has the sovereign right to conclude a treaty
with Poland in which the existing Polish frontier on the Oder and
Neisse is recognized as final. If Western Germany wants to exist
peacefully with other European countries, if it wants real reconcilia-
tion with the nations of Europe, it must recognize the present political
map of Europe. . . ."

The Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin, Herr Schiitz, visited Poland
in mid-July, and on returning to Berlin wrote an article for the
Hamburg weekly Die Zeit advocating the normalization and progres-

273

sive expansion of relations between Poland and the German Federal
Republic; while in Poland Herr Schiitz visited Warsaw, where he
had talks with the Polish Foreign Minister, Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski;
he also visited Cracow, the Poznan International Fair and the site of
the Nazi extermination camp at Oswiecim (Auschwitz), where he
laid a wreath in memory of the 2,000,000 Jews murdered there in
the Second World War. On Sept. 1, the 30th anniversary of the
German attack on Poland which started World War II, President
Heinemann appealed in a television broadcast for "a new start 9 ' in
relations between Poland and the G.F.R., saying that "that which has
been achieved to our great satisfaction with our former historic
enemy, France, remains an unfulfilled task in the case of our eastern
neighbours, and especially Poland".

On NQV. 25, 1969, following Herr Brandt's assumption of the
Chancellorship the head of the West German trade mission in War-
saw, Dr. Heinrich Box, handed a Note to the Polish Deputy Foreign
Minister, Mr. Jozef Winiewicz, which, it was understood, offered
"comprehensive negotiations" between the West German and Polish
Governments. The contents of the Note were not published, but it was
described in West German and Polish press comments as a follow-up
to Herr Brandt's policy statement to the Bundestag and also as a
response to Mr. Gomulka's speech of the previous May.

The Polish Government's acceptance of the West German offer of
talks between the two Governments was conveyed to the West
German Foreign Ministry on Dec. 22 in a note handed over by
Mr. Waclaw Piatkowski, head of the Polish trade delegation in Bonn;
like the West German Note to Poland, its contents were not made
public. On the same day (Dec. 22) the Polish Prime Minister, Mr.
Cyrankiewicz, told the Seym of Poland's willingness to enter into
talks with Bonn, but reiterated that the "starting-point for a process
of normalization of relations" between the two countries was "recog-
nition of the Oder-Neisse frontier as final".

The Negotiations

Herr Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, announced on
Jan. 27, 1970, that the Polish Government had agreed to a proposal
by the German Federal Government that talks should open between
274

the two countries "on all questions of interest"; he added that the
talks would begin in Warsaw on Feb. 5 and that the Federal German
delegation would be led by Hen Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, State
Secretary in the Federal Foreign Ministry [in which Herr Duckwitz
was the second-ranking official].

Talks between the Polish and West German Governments the
first high-level negotiations between Poland and Western Germany
since the Second World War accordingly took place in the Polish
capital on Feb. 5-6, the West German delegation being led by Herr
Duckwitz and the Polish delegation by Mr. Jozef Winiewicz, the
Deputy Foreign Minister. It was stated in Bonn that the talks had
been "frank, factual and useful" and that they would be continued
in Warsaw in the second week of March.

Herr Duckwitz and Mr. Winiewicz met for a second round of
talks in Warsaw on March 9-11; a third round, also in the Polish
capital, on April 22-24; and a fourth round in Bonn on June 8-10.
No statements on these talks were issued, but after the Bonn discus-
sions in June a joint communique said that the conferees had "con-
cluded the phase of exploratory exchanges of opinion" and that the
talks would be continued in July.

Herr Duckwitz and Mr. Winiewicz accordingly held another round
of talks in Warsaw on July 23-25, followed by a further round in
Bonn on Oct. 5-7. A joint communique after the latter meeting said
that the negotiations had reached an advanced stage and that Herr
Scheel, the Federal Foreign Minister, would visit Warsaw at the
beginning of November for final talks with the Polish Foreign
Minister, Dr. Jedrychowski.

At a meeting in Bonn on Oct. 26 of the parliamentary party
executive of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Chris-
tian Social Union the Bavarian wing of the CDU it was decided
not to accept the Federal Government's invitation to send an observer
to Warsaw in November for the negotiations to be carried out be-
tween Herr Scheel and the Polish Foreign Minister. [The CDU/CSU
had also refused an invitation to be represented in the West German
delegation which negotiated the treaty with the Soviet Union see
above.] Dr. Rainer Barzel, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary
group, said there were three reasons why the party had declined the
invitation to be represented at Warsaw: (1) the Federal Government
had obviously already determined its policy towards the treaty with

275

Poland; (2) there was not the necessary degree of common outlook
between the Government and the Opposition; (3) the Federal Gov-
ernment had committed itself so firmly in the treaty with the Soviet
Union that it had no room for negotiations in the Warsaw talks.

The CDU/CSU parliamentary group had previously issued a state-
ment on Oct. 15 which, while emphasizing the necessity for an un-
derstanding and reconciliation with Poland, declared that "future
European solutions must not be obstructed by the political cementing
of demarcation lines and borders" and that "everything must be done
to make them gradually less rigid" [an obvious reference to Poland's
western border on the Oder-Neisse line, although this was not spe-
cifically mentioned]. The statement added: "Until a freely agreed
and enduring settlement is achieved, Poland can rely on being secure
in its present form so far as the Federal Republic is concerned. Peace
treaty settlements must not be anticipated either intrinsically or for-
mally; the whole German people must be able to act in free self-
determination." After saying that a policy of reconciliation and
understanding should include the security of human and minority
rights a clear reference to the "ethnic Germans" still living in Po-
land the statement advocated the early establishment of diplomatic
relations between the Federal Republic and Poland, intensified con-
tacts between the two countries in the economic, cultural and other
spheres, and the creation of a Polish-West German chamber of
commerce.

Commenting on the CDU/CSU statement, the Polish newspaper
Trybuna Ludu, organ of the United Workers' (Communist) Party,
said that it reiterated the "bankrupt thesis of the allegedly temporary
character of our western frontier", and emphasized that recognition
of the Oder-Neisse border was essential to a normalization of rela-
tions between Poland and Western Germany. Without recognition of
this border as final, said Trybuna Ludu, there could be no diplomatic
relations between Warsaw and Bonn.

Early in November Warsaw Radio declared, in reply to the argu-
ment by some quarters in Western Germany that under the Potsdam
Agreements the German borders could be recognized only by an
all-German Government, that this had not prevented the Federal
Government from recognizing, by treaty and under international law,
the western frontiers of Germany, e.g. with Belgium in 1956 and
with the Netherlands in 1960.

Herr Scheel arrived in Warsaw on Nov. 2 for the final stages of
talks on the treaty, which began on Nov. 3 and concluded on Nov.
14. During his 11 days in the Polish capital Herr Scheel had a
number of meetings with Dr. Jedrychowski, both in private and in

276

plenary sessions, the detailed provisions of the treaty being worked
out by delegations which included Herr Duckwitz on the West Ger-
man side and Mr. Winiewicz on the Polish side. At the conclusion
of the meetings on Nov. 14 the Polish Government's spokesman, Mr.
Romuald Poleszczuk, told journalists that the negotiations had been
successfully concluded and that "the text of a treaty on the founda-
tions for the normalization of relations between the Polish People's
Republic and the German Federal Republic has been finally agreed".
He added: "The talks were intensive and difficult, but their success-
ful conclusion has confirmed the will and desire of the two sides to
. . . prepare foundations for the opening of a new stage in mutual
relations between the two countries." A statement in broadly similar
terms was made by the German Federal Government's spokesman,
Herr Riidiger von Wechmar.

While in Poland Herr Scheel visited on Nov. 8 the site of the
Auschwitz (Oswiecim) extermination camp. In signing the memorial
book at Auschwitz, Herr Scheel wrote: "In the face of these horrors,
this inhumanity, it must be our task to preserve the highest values
the dignity of Man, and peace between nations."

Herr Scheel returned to Warsaw on Nov. 18 to initial the treaty
on behalf of the German Federal Republic, while Dr. Jedrychowski
initialled it on behalf of Poland. Speeches were made by both Foreign
Ministers at the ceremony.

Dr. Jedrychowski expressed the Polish Government's conviction
that the treaty would be "a lasting foundation for the normalization
of mutual relations" between the two countries, and that it would
open "a new, successful and fruitful era for both sides in the rela-
tions between the two countries and societies". He went on: "At
the same time, the treaty is a contribution by our two States to the
cause of strengthening security and peace in Europe. It will promote
the normalization of European relations based on co-operation, un-
derstanding and mutual advantage of the European nations, irres-
pective of the political differences and differences of system existing
between them.

"During the negotiations agreement was reached on a number of
specific problems involved in the initiation of the process of normal-
ization after the treaty comes into force. These are difficult problems
because they stem from a particularly difficult past. But on these

277

problems, too, mutual understanding has been reached and results
have been achieved which, I think, will contribute to the building of
normal relations between our countries. . . ."

Herr Scheel said that the Federal Government also regarded the
treaty as "a decisive step in German-Polish relations which should
make possible the overcoming of the painful past and the develop-
ment of normal friendly relations between our two countries". He
went on: "There has been hard bargaining on the wording of indi-
vidual clauses. At the same time, however, these German-Polish
negotiations have been carried out, by and large, with the intention
of achieving results acceptable to both parties and of respecting their
points of view and interests. They have been carried out with the
awareness that what was involved has been a historical turning-point
in the relations between our two States and that a smoothing of the
way towards a lasting settlement between our peoples is important
for all Europe

"A hard struggle is ahead," said Herr Scheel, "before the treaty
receives the approval of the competent parliamentary bodies of the
Federal Republic of Germany and of the German public. ... I re-
gard this as a normal procedure vital for a genuine German-Polish
reconciliation. The Federal Government will continue its present
policy undeterred; and I am confident that it has the approval of a
broad majority of our people "

At the end of his speech Dr. Jedrychowski announced that the
treaty, which, he said, was "of tremendous importance" to both
countries, would be signed by the two Heads of Government, Herr
Brandt and Mr. Cyrankiewicz.

The Treaty Provisions

The provisions of the treaty between Poland and the Federal
Republic of Germany were published simultaneously in Bonn and
Warsaw on Nov. 20. Under Article 1 both countries expressed their
mutual agreement that the existing boundary-line on the Oder and
the western Neisse constituted the western frontier of Poland; they
also reaffirmed "the inviolability of their existing frontiers now and
in the future" and declared that they had no territorial claims against
each other. Article 2 pledged both countries to settle any disputes
between them exclusively by peaceful means and not to resort to
the threat or use of force.

Consisting of a preamble and five Articles, the text of the treaty
was as follows:

278

"The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of
Poland,

"Considering that more than 25 years have passed since the end
of the Second World War, of which Poland became the first victim
and which inflicted great suffering on the nations of Europe;

"Conscious that in both countries a new generation has meanwhile
grown up to whom a peaceful future should be secured;

"Desiring to establish durable foundations for peaceful coexistence
and the development of normal and good relations between them;

"Anxious to strengthen peace and security in Europe;

"Aware that the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the ter-
ritorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in Europe within their
present frontiers are a basic condition for peace;

"Have agreed as follows:

Article I

"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic
of Poland state in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line,
the course of. which is laid down in Chapter IX of the Decisions of
the Potsdam Conference of Aug. 2, 1945, as running from the Baltic
Sea immediately west of Swinemiinde, and thence along the Oder
River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the
western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, shall constitute the
western State frontier of the People's Republic of Poland.

[The Polish text defined Poland's western frontier as "running from
the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinoujscie and thence along the
Odra River to the confluence of the Lusatian Nysa river and along
the Lusatian Nysa to the Czechoslovak frontier".]

"(2) They reaffirm the inviolability of their existing frontiers now
and in the future and undertake to respect each other's territorial
integrity without restriction.

"(3) They declare that they have no territorial claims whatsoever
against each other and that they will not assert such claims in the
future.

Article II

"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic
of Poland shall in their mutual relations, as well as in matters of
ensuring European and international security, be guided by the pur-
poses and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

"(2) Accordingly they shall, pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the
U.N. Charter, settle all their disputes exclusively by peaceful means
and refrain from any threat or use of force in matters affecting
European and international security and in their mutual relations.

279

Article III

"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic
of Poland shall take further steps towards full normalization and a
comprehensive development of their mutual relations, of which the
present treaty shall form the solid foundation.

"(2) They agree that a broadening of their co-operation in the
sphere of economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other rela-
tions is in their mutual interest.

Article IV

"The present treaty shall not affect any bilateral or multilateral
international arrangements previously concluded by either Contract-
ing Party or concerning them.

Article V

"The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into
force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
shall take place in Bonn."

The treaty was drawn up in the German and Polish languages,
each text being equally authentic.

Polish Statement on "Ethnic Germans" in Poland
West German Notes to Western Powers

On the same day on which the treaty was initialled, the Polish
Government communicated to the German Federal Government a
statement on "measures for a solution of humanitarian problems",
referring specifically to the position of ethnic Germans, or those who
considered themselves to be such, still resident in Poland.

Recalling that in 1955 the Polish Government had recommended
the Polish Red Cross to conclude with the Red Cross of the German
Federal Republic an agreement on the reunion of families, the state-
ment said: "Under that agreement roughly a quarter of a million
people left Poland up to 1959. Between 1959 and 1969 an additional
150,000 people departed from Poland under normal procedures. In
carrying out measures to reunite families, the Polish Government has
been guided above all by humanitarian motives. However, it could
not, and still cannot, agree that its favourable attitude regarding

280

such reunions be exploited for the emigration of Polish nationals for
employment purposes.

"To this day, there have remained in Poland for various reasons
(e.g. close ties with their place of birth) a certain number of persons
of indisputable ethnic German origin and persons from mixed families
whose predominant feeling over the past years has been that they
belong to that ethnic group. The Polish Government still holds the
view that any persons wHo, owing to their indisputable ethnic Ger-
man origin, wish to leave for either of the two German States may do
so subject to the laws and regulations applicable in Poland.

"Furthermore, consideration will be given to the situation of
mixed and separated families as well as to such cases of Polish
nationals who, either because of their changed family situation or
because they have changed their earlier decision, express the wish
to be reunited with near relatives in the Federal Republic of Germany
or in the German Democratic Republic. . . .

"According to the inquiries so far made by the Polish authorities,
some tens of thousands of people may fall under the criteria possibly
entitling them to leave Poland for the G.F.R. or the G.D.R. The
Polish Government will therefore issue appropriate instructions for
careful examination of whether the applications submitted are justi-
fied, and for their early consideration.

"The Polish Government will authorize the Polish Red Cross to
receive from the Red Cross of the G.F.R. lists of the persons whose
applications are held by the German Red Cross in order that they may
be compared with the lists held by the appropriate Polish authorities
and carefully examined.

"Co-operation between the Polish Red Cross and the Red Cross of
the G.F.R. will be facilitated in any way necessary. The Polish Red
Cross will be authorized to receive from the German Red Cross
explanatory comments on the lists, and will inform the German Red
Cross of the outcome of examinations by the Polish authorities of
transmitted applications. The Polish Red Cross will further be
authorized to consider jointly with the Red Cross of the G.F.R. all
practical questions that might arise from this action. . . .

"As regards the traffic of persons in connexion with visits to rel-
atives, the appropriate Polish authorities will, after the entry into
force of the treaty, apply the same principles as are customary with
regard to other States of Western Europe."

The German Federal Government on the same day (Nov. 18)
presented Notes verbales to the British, U.S. and French Govern-
ments pointing out that in the negotiations between the Federal
Republic and Poland it had been made clear by the G.F.R. that the

281

treaty "does not and cannot affect the rights of the French Republic,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America
reflected in the known treaties and agreements" [on Germany, i.e. the
Potsdam Agreements]. The Federal Government also pointed out that
it could "only act on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany".

In identical replies on Nov. 10 the three Western Powers noted
with approval the initialling of the treaty and agreed with the Federal
Government that "the treaty does not and cannot affect the rights or
responsibilities of the Four Powers" with regard to Germany.

Herr Brandt on the Treaty Statement by Parliamentary Opposition

The West German Chancellor, Herr Brandt, made the following
statement on the treaty in a radio and television broadcast on
Nov. 20:

"The treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
People's Republic of Poland is a moving document for both peoples.
It is to close a dark chapter of European history. It is to open a new
one. The time has come to draw a line and start anew.

"More than 30 years have passed since the Second World War
began with the German attack. The Polish people had to endure un-
told suffering. The war and its consequences have imposed infinite
sacrifices on both nations, on us Germans too. Now it is a matter of
shaping a peaceful future for our two countries and peoples.

"Those who have lost relatives, those who have been deprived of
their homeland, will find it hard to forget. And we others must under-
stand and respect a burden they carry for all of us.

"Yet, in this very hour, I must ask those of our countrymen who
have been expelled from their native homes not to persist in bitterness
but to look ahead to the future. It means a great deal that many
families now have the prospect of receiving in their midst relatives
from whom they have been separated for many years, and that it
should be possible for them to revisit the birthplaces and graves of
their ancestors in their former homeland.

"I am in favour of the treaty with the People's Republic of Poland
because it creates the foundation for a peaceful future. It offers us
die chance for understanding and co-operation. To the Polish people
the treaty gives the assurance that they can live within secure bound-
aries. And as far as we are concerned, it should enable the principle
of renunciation of force to be applied to all of Europe.

282

"Only history will tell whether, as we hope, this will mark the
beginning of real reconciliation such as, in the West, we have for-
tunately achieved with our neighbour France.

"The treaty does not of course mean the retrospective legitimation
of injustice. It does not, therefore, mean the justification of expulsion.
What we want, a quarter of a century after the war, is to make a
serious attempt at putting a political end to the chain of injustice.

"And as regards Poland's western frontier: there can be neither
detente nor secure peace in Europe unless and without affecting the
rights of the Four Powers with regard to Germany we proceed
from the situation as it is, as it has now been for 25 years.

"It is not that, today, our nation is abruptly required to make a
sacrifice. It had to make it long ago as a consequence of Hitler's
crimes.

"We can only hope that this treaty will constitute an inspiring
step towards a better Europe; a Europe where frontiers will no
longer separate. That is what the youth of our countries expect. We
wish to spare them, if possible, the burden of the past. For their
sake, we want to begin anew."

The CDU/CSU parliamentary group on Nov. 25 issued a state-
ment defining its attitude to the treaty.

It re-emphasized that the policy of the CDU/CSU was aimed at
achieving understanding and reconciliation with Poland, but ex-
pressed the view that the treaty appeared to be in conflict with the
Basic Law (the Federal Constitution), the agreements with "our
allies", and the Federal Republic's responsibility for the rights and
the destiny of the whole of Germany, and that "a final frontier set-
tlement" for "both German States" would in fact decide this ques-
tion for the whole of Germany and thus confirm its division into two
States. The statement also referred to a declaration by Mr. Gomulka
on Nov. 24, according to which the speed of "the normalization of
relations between the Federal Republic and the Socialist countries"
was in part dependent on the recognition by the Federal Republic of
the German Democratic Republic as a State with equal rights and on
the admission of both German States to the U.N.; the CDU/CSU
therefore asked the Federal Government to clarify whether "norma-
lization of relations" with Poland would depend on or presuppose
recognition of the G.D.R. The CDU/CSU went on to ask "the people
of Poland and all our European neighbours" to understand "our
duty and resolve to insist on the German people's right to free self-
determination and a settlement for the whole of Germany by means
of a peace treaty".

283

The CDU/CSU Bundestag group on Dec. 4, 1970, unanimously
approved a resolution which was laid before the Bundestag on the
same day. This contained provisions for a suggested treaty with
Poland, which, based on the Oder-Neisse line and without prejudice
to a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, would create a
modus vivendi.

Such a treaty would cover (a) obligations binding under inter-
national law for the settlement of all disputes by exclusively peaceful
means; (b) freedom of encounter for people of all social classes, as
well as the binding and concrete settlement of all humanitarian
questions with the aim of formally and materially sai
human rights and the rights of groups (in terms of the
Convention on Human Rights); (c) increased exchanges in the
of culture, art and science, the expansion of trade, and the intensifica-
tion of technological and economic co-operation; and (d) the as-
sumption of full diplomatic relations, with the Federal Republic also
representing West Berlin.

Signing of the Treaty

Hen Brandt flew to Warsaw on Dec. 6, 1970, for the signing of the
treaty, accompanied by a West German delegation which included
representatives of the Social Democratic and Free Democratic parties
(the parties of the governmental coalition) and church, youth and
trade union representatives; the Christian Democratic Union, though
asked to join the official delegation, again refused to do so, though
reiterating its desire for reconciliation and understanding with
Poland.

The treaty was formally signed on Dec. 7 at the Radziwill Palace
the seat of the Polish Council of Ministers by Herr Brandt and
Mr. Cyrankiewicz, among those attending the ceremony being the
two Foreign Ministers, Dr. Jedrychowski and Herr Scheel.

Prior to the signing ceremony Herr Brandt had laid wreaths at the
Tomb of the Polish Unknown Soldier and at the monument commem-
orating the Jewish rising in the Warsaw ghetto during the wartime
Nazi occupation. [The ghetto was razed to the ground after a three-
weeks 9 siege and all Jews still remaining alive were sent to the gas-
chambers.] During his visit to the ghetto memorial Herr Brandt fell
on his knees and remained kneeling for half a minute before rising;
after his return to Bonn he explained that by his gesture "I wanted to

284

ask pardon in the name of our people for a million-fold crime which
was committed in the misused name of the Germans".

While in Warsaw Herr Brandt had talks with Mr. Cyrankiewicz
and Mr. Gomulka and took part in a joint press conference with
the Polish Prime Minister after the signing ceremony; Mr. Cyrankie-
wicz said at this press conference that the treaty represented "a
mutual victory over the past" and "a victory for peace and security
in Europe". Before Herr Brandt flew back to Bonn a joint com-
munique was issued stating that (1) Poland and the Federal Republic
of Germany would raise their respective trade missions in Bonn and
Warsaw to the status of embassies when the treaty had come into
effect upon ratification; (2) Mr. Cyrankiewicz would visit Bonn at a
date to be determined; (3) both Governments would "normalize"
their relations still further by increasing economic, scientific, tech-
nological and cultural co-operation between them.

6. RATIFICATION OF WEST GERMAN TREATIES
WITH SOVIET UNION AND POLAND, 1972

The procedure for the ratification by the German Federal Parlia-
ment of the treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany on the
one hand and the Soviet Union and Poland on the other was ren-
dered difficult for the coalition Government of Social Democrats
(SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) by the persistent unwillingness of
the Opposition Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU) to accept the treaties in their existing form and
by the fact that the Opposition held a majority of seats in the
Bundesrat (Upper House of the Federal Parliament), while the
Government had only a slender majority in the Bundestag (Lower
House).

First Reading of Ratification Bills in Bundesrat

Drafts of the ratification Bills were submitted to the Bundesrat on
Dec. 13, 1971, together with various supporting documents.

The latter included four "declarations in the context of the treaty"
made by Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister during the
negotiations in Moscow which preceded the signature of the treaty

285

with the U.S.S.R. According to the text of these statements, dated
July 29, 1970, Mr. Gromyko had declared that (a) the concept of
recognition (of present frontiers) had been dropped; (fr) if two
States (i.e. the two German States) voluntarily decided to unite or to
correct their frontiers, it would not occur to the Soviet Union to
criticize, since this was a question of sovereignty; (c) on the question
of the possible future reunification of Germany both sides' positions
were clear, and "we could make a treaty which would bury all plans
for the reunification of Germany", in which case "any utterance
about reunification would be in conflict with the treaty"; and (d)
as regards the settlement of disputes, the word "exclusively" [by
peaceful means] stood in the text of the treaty and "we have not
envisaged any exceptions".

The first reading of the ratification Bills in the Bundesrat took
place on Feb. 9, when a resolution introduced by those Lander Gov-
ernments headed by the CDU/CSU [i.e. Baden-Wiirttemberg,
Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein]
was also passed, by 21 votes to 20 (the Opposition's majority in the
Upper House), in which the final decision was made dependent on
clarification by the Federal Government of a number of doubts and
objections. Among those speaking in the debate were both Heir
Brandt and Hen Walter Scheel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Heir Scheel referred to improvements in relations between the
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and between the Federal
Republic and Poland since the signature of the treaties, alluding in
particular to the conclusion of the four-Power agreement on Berlin
[see page 298], the avoidance of the recognition in international law
of frontiers, and the establishment by treaty of the renunciation of
the use of force as the basis of Western Germany's relations with the
Soviet Union. Herr Scheel also warned against distorted interpre-
tations of the significance of the treaties by those opposed to them
and the damaging effect which such interpretations would have.
With regard to the question of the "recognition" of the European
Economic Community by the Soviet Union, he said that this had
nothing to do with the treaties; anyone who wished to do business
with the EEC would necessarily have to enter into agreement with it.

Dr. Helmut Kohl (CDU), the Premier of Rhineland-Palatinate,
announced in the name of the CDU/CSU Lander Governments that
they would reject the ratification Bills in die Bundesrat if, as hitherto,
the Federal Government were unable to give a clarification of the
points at issue. He maintained that the current public discussion
of the treaties was being falsified to an increasing degree by the

286

Federal Government's argument that any rejection or criticism of
the treaties, however objectively based, would involve incalculable
risks and dangers. Dr. Kohl admitted that a failure to ratify the
treaties would temporarily involve difficulties but said that responsi-
bility for this risk must be borne by the Federal Government and the
parties which formed it. In his opinion the treaties suffered from
ambiguity, and out of responsibility for peace one could not agree to
treaties which clearly carried in themselves the germ of future
conflicts.

Herr Brandt, dealing with the alleged ambiguity of the treaties,
stated that the Soviet Union naturally had a different conception of
the future of Europe from that held in Bonn but denied that there
was any reservation on the part of the U.S.S.R. or any open or
concealed disagreement. Nobody, the Chancellor said, who compared
the text of the treaty with the Soviet Union with the demands made
in the Soviet Government's memorandum of November 1967 and its
aide-memoire of July 1968 would be able to maintain that account
had been taken exclusively of Soviet demands.

The resolution passed by the Bundesrat listed 12 principal objec-
tions to the treaties, which were answered by the Federal Government
in a statement approved at a Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 16; the
statement was submitted to the Bundestag together with the resolution
of the Bundesrat, the ratification Bills, and accompanying documents.

First Reading of Ratification Bills in Bundestag

The ratification Bills and supporting documents were first debated
by the Bundestag on Feb. 23-25; no vote was taken at the end of the
debate, which was opened by Herr Scheel after Herr Brandt had de-
livered the "Report on the State of the Nation, 1972".

Herr Scheel said that the treaties had already stood the first test:
without them there would have been no Berlin settlement. Com-
menting on the provisions of the treaties, he maintained inter alia
that the undertaking to abstain from the use of force contained in
both of them meant that the Soviet Union was no longer able to
invoke an alleged right of intervention under Articles S3 and 107 of
the U.N. Charter; furthermore, no legal bases for existing frontiers
were created by the treaties, nor was any view on the frontiers' origin
expressed in them.

On the question of German reunification Herr Scheel stated that a
policy aiming at a state of peace in Europe in which the German
people would recover its unity in free self-determination did not

287

violate the provisions of the German-Soviet treaty; this followed
from the letter on German unity which Herr Scheel had addresed to
the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time of the signing of the treaty,
and which had been accepted by the Soviet side without contradic-
tion. Herr Scheel also referred to the provision in both treaties where-
by treaties previously concluded by the contracting parties would
not be affected; this included the 1952 Bonn Convention on Rela-
tions between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many [see page 87], in which the signatory States set out their
agreement that "an essential aim of their common policy is a freely
negotiated peace settlement for the whole of Germany" and that
"the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await
such a settlement".

Dr. Barzel said that in the event of a rejection of the treaties the
Opposition did not fear a "disaster", because not only did NATO
safeguard peace and democracy but it was known in Moscow, as
in Washington, London and Paris, that the agreements could be
approved as a modus vivendi by the Opposition, subject to (a) a
positive attitude by the Soviet Union towards die EEC; (ft) the
inclusion of the right to self-determination in the agreements; and
(c) the agreed intention, which would be binding on both sides, to
restore freedom of movement in Germany by stages. Dr. Barzel
accused the Government of presenting for parliamentary approval
a set of agreements which was incomplete because it neither settled
nor solved the core of the problem the situation of the Germans in
Germany; he also asserted that the agreements gave the Soviet
Union, Poland and the G.D.R. all or almost all that they wanted,
but brought about "no progress for the Europeans and the Germans".

Dr. Gerhard Schroder (CDU), a former Minister of Foreign
Affairs, accused the Government of dropping the Eastern and German
policies jointly pursued by the parties up to 1969, though he con-
ceded agreement with regard to the affirmation of the right of self-
determination of all Germans, peaceful relations, understanding and
co-operation with Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union, and
abstention from the threat or use of force. Dr. Schroder rejected
Herr Scheel's contention that the Government had chosen precisely
the point in time which was the most suitable for the?* achievement of
a result acceptable for both sides, and maintained that the Govern-
ment could have negotiated longer with greater patience instead of
hastily seizing what little was being offered.

Dr. Schroder referred to "not only differences but opposed view-
points" in the interpretations of the treaties by the Government and
by their treaty partners; though the Government had claimed that the
treaties should lead to a modus vivendi, they were represented in the
East and also to some extent in the West and in the Third World
as a recognition of the status quo and thereby of the division of Ger-

288

many. In Dr. Schroder's opinion, the commitment of the three West-
ern Powers in the German Treaty [i.e. the 1952 Bonn Convention]
that they would contribute to a peaceful solution of the German
question was not increased but diminished by the new treaties, and
he also expressed fears as to the long-term effect of the Government's
Ostpolitik on the solidarity of the West, the balance of power in
Europe, and the security of Germany.

Herr Helmut Schmidt, then Minister of Defence, declared that
since 1969 the Western Alliance had set its mind on linking defence
with a policy of ditente\ by rejecting the treaties the Federal Republic
would put itself in opposition to its allies. Denying Dr. Schroder's
assertion that a rejection of the treaties would be without substantial
consequences, Herr Schmidt maintained that such a course would
lead to difficulties in the Alliance and the danger of a crisis of con-
fidence with the Soviet Union, resulting in a renewed Berlin conflict.

At the end of the debate the ratification Bills were referred for
examination to the foreign affairs and legal committees of the
Bundestag.

The foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag approved the
treaties on April 25, following (i) a ruling of the legal committee on
April 12 that the treaties conformed to the Constitution, and (ii) an
opinion transmitted by the inter-German affairs committee on the
same day that the positive effects of the signing of the treaties were
already obvious and that this gave reason to expect that ratification
would lead to a further detente in Europe, and thereby favourably
affect the development of relations with the G.D.R.

Federal Government's Majority in Bundestag
reduced by Defections Soviet "Concessions"

Under Article 77 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law (Constitu-
tion), legislation not approved by the Bundesrat could be enacted only
after it had obtained an absolute majority in the Bundestag.

As the result of a number of defections, both from the FDP and
from the SPD, during the early part of 1972, it appeared uncertain
whether the Government would obtain the necessary 249 votes in the
Bundestag for approval of the treaties' ratification.

During March and April 1972 the Soviet Government took a
number of steps which were generally interpreted in the West as
concessions made in the interest of assisting the ratification of the

289

treaties in Western Germany. Nevertheless the Soviet clarifications
did not fundamentally change the Bundestag Opposition's attitude.

At a session of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee on
March 16, Herr Brandt announced that in the course of the ratifica-
tion procedure in the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviet would take
"official note" of Herr Scheel's letter on German unity handed over
at the time of the signature of the German-Soviet treaty; the Chancel-
lor also revealed that the Soviet Union was prepared, after ratification
of the treaties by Bonn, provisionally to sign a renewal of the Soviet-
West German trade agreement which had lapsed in 1964, and that
the new version would include West Berlin. This trade agreement
was subsequently initialled in Moscow on April 7.

Pravda on Feb. 20 published an article in which it was asserted
that, contrary to the view expressed by opponents of the West
German-Soviet treaty that there were discrepancies between its
Russian and German texts, both versions were equally valid. Fur-
thermore, in a speech before a trade union congress in Moscow on
March 20 Mr. Brezhnev stated: "The Soviet Union by no means
ignores the situation which has come into being in Western Europe,
including also the existence of such an economic grouping of capitalist
countries as the Common Market. . . . Our relations with the mem-
bers of this grouping will depend on 'the extent to which they for
their part recognize the realities which have arisen in the socialist part
of Europe, in particular the interests of the Comecon countries."
[Recognition of the EEC had been one of the demands made by the
Opposition in Bonn see above.]

Narrow Defeat of "Constructive Vote of No Confidence"

The CDU/CSU Bundestag group, following a decision by the
presidium and executive of the CDU, decided on April 24 to enter
against Herr Brandt a "constructive vote of no confidence" which
simultaneously proposed the election of Dr. Barzel as Federal
Chancellor. This was the first occasion in the history of the Federal
Republic that the Opposition had decided to attempt such a move,
made under Article 67 of the Constitution.

The reasons for moving the vote of no confidence were primarily
the Government's Ostpolitik, which was alleged to be endangering
the security of the Federal Republic, but also the condition of the
Federal finances; it was moreover maintained that the outcome of
a Landtag election in Baden-Wiirttemberg [in which the Christian
Democrats secured an overall majority] had conclusively shown that

290

the Government had no majority in the country and that the treaties
could not be ratified in their present form.

The "constructive vote of no confidence" took place on April 27
in the course of a debate in the Bundestag which had begun on
April 26.

Herr Brandt, speaking on the first day of the debate, accused the
Opposition of "excessive polemics" and repudiated the CDU/CSU
interpretation of the Baden-Wiirttemberg election result. He said
that his Government's foreign policy was "the attempt certainly
not easy but, I think, successful to bring German policy into line
with the prevailing international tendencies"; the Federal Republic's
policy towards the Eastern bloc was closely interlocked with the
policy of her Western allies, and therefore created "not less but more
security for our people". With specific reference to the treaties, Herr
Brandt denied the existence of any secret agreements and criticized
the use made by the Opposition of alleged extracts from the negotiat-
ing records relating to the Moscow treaty, which had been sent
anonymously to a number of CDU/CSU deputies earlier in the
month.

Dr. Barzel said with regard to the alleged extracts that it was the
Government which through its spokesman had first commented on
the contents of these papers. He maintained that the Soviet Govern-
ment's willingness for further talks on the treaties was as incontest-
able as its determination to come to an arrangement with the Federal
Republic, and reaffirmed the Opposition's belief in the importance
of improving relations with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia through treaties on the renunciation of the use of force.

Herr Brandt described the vote of no confidence on April 27 as an
attempt on the part of the Opposition to emerge from "the irrespon-
sibility of [giving] a sterile 'no' to the vital questions of our people"
but with the risk of a bitter responsibility for the Opposition if it
should succeed. . . . After referring to a traffic treaty with Eastern
Germany, which had been completed the previous night, and asking
if anyone wished to endanger what had been achieved in inter-
German relations, Herr Brandt affirmed his conviction that the Gov-
ernment would continue in office after the vote and alluded to the
possibility of an attempt to define areas of common responsibility
with the Opposition.

The "constructive vote of no confidence" taken on April 27 fell
short by only two votes of the necessary absolute majority of 249
votes; 247 votes were cast in favour of the motion and 10 against,
with three abstentions.

291

Formulation of Joint Resolution

Between April 28 and May 10 a number of discussions were held
between representatives of the three political parties, while in the
latter part of this period the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, Mr.
Valentin Falin, was also consulted. These discussions led to agree-
ment on a joint resolution to be adopted by the Bundestag [see below].

Following consultations on May 3 to examine the demands of the
CDU/CSU for "recognition" of the EEC by the Soviet Union, incor-
poration of the right of self-determination in the agreements, and
binding agreements on freedom of movement between the two Ger-
man States, Herr Brandt and Dr. Barzel agreed on May 4 to postpone
the ratification debate until the following week, and a group of
experts drawn from the three parties was formed to draw up a draft
of a joint text of the proposed resolution.

It was agreed on May 5 that the negotiating documents covering
the discussions with the Soviet Union might be inspected by Herr
Kurt Birrenbach, a CDU deputy, who was received at the Foreign
Ministry on the evening of May 5 and again on May 6.

On May 9 confusion was caused by a report that the Soviet Gov-
ernment had refused to accept two passages in the text of the resolu-
tion, the first of which stated that "the treaties do not anticipate a
peace settlement for Germany by treaty and do not create any legal
basis for the frontiers existing today", and the second that "the rights
and responsibilities of the four Powers with regard to Germany as a
whole and to Berlin are not affected by the treaties" [see below].

However, during the night of May 9-10 the Soviet Ambassador was
received for talks at the Foreign Ministry, after which a Foreign
Ministry spokesman stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to
accept the joint resolution in the formulation agreed by all parties;
in an overnight letter to Dr. Barzel, Herr Scheel confirmed that all
Soviet doubts had been resolved and that the entire text of the resolu-
tion would be accepted by the Soviet Government without alteration.

Second Reading of Ratification Bills in Bundestag
Text of Joint Resolution

In spite of these developments, the CDU/CSU moved in the
Bundestag on May 10 that the ratification debate should be post-
poned. In the ballot in which the Berlin deputies also participated
(as this was a procedural matter) 259 votes were cast in favour and
259 against, but under the rules of the Bundestag the motion was
thereby rejected. However, it was decided by inter-party agreement

292

later in the day that the vote on the ratification Bills should in fact
be postponed for a week until May 17.

Herr Brandt said during the debate on May 10 that when the
treaties came into effect the Federal Republic would be able to
pursue an Eastern policy on the same terms as other Western
countries; the immediate result would be that the Berlin agreement
would come into effect and humanitarian improvements would be
achieved in relations with the G.D.R., while there could also be an
agreement with Czechoslovakia, as well as diplomatic relations with
Hungary and Bulgaria and greater economic, technical and cultural
co-operation with the Soviet Union.

The Chancellor thanked the Opposition for its efforts to reach
agreement with the Government, and stated that there were no
longer any differences of opinion with the Soviet Union on the text
of the joint resolution. In the course of his speech he also assured the
Soviet and Polish Governments that the passage in the resolution
in which it was stated that the treaties created no legal basis for
existing frontiers did not devalue the recognition of the Oder-Neisse
frontier by the Federal Republic contained in the Moscow treaty.

On May 15 the CDU presidium approved by 27 votes to one,
with one abstention, a statement which listed the clarifications which
had been achieved with regard to the treaties and affirmed that the
joint resolution was clear in its meaning and that "we act in accor-
dance with the treaties if we base our policy on this resolution".
However, the CSU parliamentary group in a meeting held on the
same day voted unanimously in favour of a rejection of the treaties,
and, if necessary, a vote against them in the ballot. At the end of a
meeting which began on May 16 and continued on the following day
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group finally voted by a large majority
in favour of a proposal, supported by Dr. Barzel and originally put
forward by Professor Walter Hallstein, that the Opposition should
abstain in the vote on the treaties.

In an introductory report Dr. Barzel had recommended approval
of the treaties on the ground that earlier objections had been met
as a result of the Opposition's efforts, but this viewpoint was rejected
by Herr Strauss, speaking on behalf of the CSU, and it was reported
that on the evening of May 16 it was apparent that important
sections of the CDU/CSU, including the entire CSU, wished to vote
in favour of the joint resolution but against the treaties.

293

In the course of the same meeting Dr. Kohl promised that he
would advise the CDU/CSU Land Governments not to raise objec-
tions to the treaties on the second reading of the ratification Bills by
the Bundesrat.

Voting on the ratification Bills and on the joint resolution took
place in the Bundestag on May 17, the results being as follows:

For Against Abstentions

Treaty with Soviet Union 248 10 238

Treaty with Poland 248 17 231

Joint Resolution 513 5

In the voting on the joint resolution all 518 members of the
Bundestag were permitted to take part, whereas on the treaties
themselves the 22 Berlin deputies were not allowed to vote.

The text of the joint resolution was as follows:

"In connexion with the voting on the treaty between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of
Aug. 12, 1970, and the treaty between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the People's Republic of Poland concerning the basis
for the normalization of their mutual relations of Dec. 7, 1970, the
German Bundestag declares:

"(1) One of the determining aims of our foreign policy is the
preservation of peace in Europe and of the security of the Federal
Republic of Germany. The treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, in
which the contracting parties solemnly and wholly renounce the use
and the threat of force, are intended to serve these aims; they are
important elements of the modus vivendi which the Federal Republic
of Germany seeks to establish with its Eastern neighbours.

"(2) The Federal Republic of Germany has assumed in its own
name the obligations which it undertook in the treaties. In this
respect the treaties proceed from the frontiers as existing today, the
unilateral alteration of which they exclude; the treaties do not antici-
pate a peace settlement for Germany by treaty and do not create any
legal basis for the frontiers existing today.

"(3) The inalienable right to self-determination is not affected by
the treaties. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which
aims at a peaceful restoration of national unity within the European
framework, is not inconsistent with the treaties, which do not
prejudice the solution of the German question. By the demand for
the realization of the right to self-determination the Federal Republic

294

of Germany does not make any territorial claim or a claim for an
alteration of frontiers.

"(4) The German Bundestag states that the continuing and unre-
stricted validity of the Bonn Conventions and of the related arrange-
ments and declarations of 1954, as well as the continued validity of
the agreement concluded on Sept. 13, 1955, between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are
not affected by the treaties.

"(5) The rights and responsibilities of the four Powers with regard
to Germany as a whole and to Berlin are not affected by the treaties.
The German Bundestag, in view of the fact that the final settlement
of the German question as a whole is still outstanding, considers as
essential the continuance of these rights and responsibilities.

"(6) As regards the significance of the treaties, the German
Bundestag furthermore refers to the memoranda which the Federal
Government has submitted to the legislative bodies together with the
Bills for the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties.

"(7) The Federal Republic of Germany is firmly embedded in the
Atlantic Alliance, upon which, now as before, its security and free-
dom depend.

"(8) The Federal Republic of Germany, together with its partners
in the [European] Community, will unwaveringly pursue the policy
of European unification, with the aim of developing the Community
progressively into a political union. In this connexion the Federal
Republic of Germany proceeds on the assumption that the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries will enter into co-operation with
the E.E.C.

"(9) The Federal Republic of Germany confirms its firm resolve
to maintain and develop the ties between Berlin (West) and the
Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with the four-Power
agreement and the German supplementary agreements. It will also in
the future ensure the city's viability and the welfare of its people.

"(10) The Federal Republic of Germany advocates the normaliza-
tion of the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the G.D.R. It proceeds on the assumption that the principles of
detente and good neighbourliness will be fully applied to the relation-
ship between the people and institutions of both parts of Germany."

The action of the Bundestag in approving the ratification Bills was
welcomed on May 18 by, inter alios, leaders of both Eastern Germany
and Czechoslovakia.

Herr Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the East German Socialist
Unity Party, described the approval by the Bundestag as an important
step for the success of movements towards detente in Europe; with
the ratification of the treaties, he said, the results of the Second

295

World War and of post-war developments had been embodied in
international law. Dr. Gustav Husak, First Secretary of the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party, declared that the time had now come for
the restoration of "normal neighbourly relations on our western
frontier".

Second Reading of Ratification Bills in Bundesrat
Signature of Legislation by President Heinemann

The foreign affairs committee of the Bundesrat on May 18 passed
a resolution recommending the Upper House to allow the Bills to go
through without an appeal to the mediation committee and also to
endorse the joint resolution of the Bundestag. This course of action
was followed by the Bundesrat on the following day, the representa-
tives of SPD or SPD/FDP Lander Governments voting against an
appeal and those of the CDU/CSU Land Governments abstaining
(20 votes in favour, with 21 abstentions); the joint resolution was
endorsed unanimously.

President Heinemann on May 23 signed the ratification Bills which
came into force 24 hours after their publication in the Official Gazette
on the following day. Previously on May 19, the joint resolution of
the Bundestag had been handed by Herr Scheel to the Ambassadors
of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and
France, while the Polish Government was also notified.

Ratification of Treaties in Soviet Union and Poland
Exchange of Instruments of Ratification

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on May 31 unanimously
ratified the treaty between tihe Soviet Union and Western Germany,
the foreign affairs committee of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet
having unanimously recommended ratification on April 17.

In a statement before the Presidium on behalf of the Soviet
Government on May 31, Mr. Gromyko said that the main significance
of the treaty lay in the fact that it drew a line under a long period of
strain in Soviet-West German relations. He stated that "of special
importance is the recording of the commitments of the two sides
concerning the existing State frontiers in Europe, which is the basic
question of European security", and that "of basic importance is
the problem of establishing normal relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the G.D.R. in line with generally recog-
296

nized international standards". A positive solution to the problem
of the admission of both the Federal Republic and the G.D.R. to the
United Nations, he said, "would make it easier to settle many com-

Slex problems essential for improving the situation in central
urope".

The Polish Council of State unanimously ratified the treaty between
Western Germany and Poland on May 26.

Mr. Stefan Olszowski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, said
at a joint meeting of the foreign affairs and justice committees of
the Seym (Parliament) on May 25 that in the treaty Western Ger-
many had recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier as being inviolable and
final; it constituted, he maintained, "a final recognition in inter-
national law", while "from the viewpoint of international law as
well as with regard to the obligations resulting from the treaty
none of the reservations contained in the unilateral Bundestag resolu-
tion has binding force 9 '.

The treaties came into force with the exchange of the instruments
of ratification in Bonn on June 3 between Western Germany and the
Soviet Union and between Western Germany and Poland.

7. AGREEMENTS ON STATUS OF WEST BERLIN, 1971

Four-Power Agreement on Status of and Access to West Berlin

Western Proposals for Four-Power Talks
on Improving the Situation in Berlin

Identical Notes were presented on Dec. 16, 1969, by the British,
French and U.S. Ambassadors in Moscow to the Soviet Government
proposing four-Power discussions on improving the situation in Ber-
lin, and in particular guaranteeing free access to the city. It was
understood that the proposal, which was made after full consultation
with the West German Government, called for talks to be held first of
all at official [i.e. less than ambassadorial] level at a place and time
to be agreed on with the Soviet Union. Press reports made it clear
that the Western aim was to improve movement both between Berlin
and Western Germany and between the two parts of Berlin itself.

This move followed an earlier similar approach by the three West-
ern Powers to the Soviet Government on Aug. 7, 1969, when the

297

British, French and U.S. Ambassadors, after consultation with the
German Federal Government, proposed talks with the Soviet Union
on improving the situation in Berlin and the problems arising out of
the division of the city, access to West Berlin and relations between
Western and Eastern Germany in general. This step had been
prompted by a statement of Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister, made on July 10, 1969, to the Supreme Soviet, in which he
said that if Russia's former wartime Allies were to make an approach
on the problem of Berlin, taking into account the interests of Euro-
pean security, "they would discover on the part of the Soviet Union
a readiness to exchange opinions with the object of eliminating now
and forever complications around West Berlin".

A Government spokesman in Bonn on Aug. 7 described the new
Allied approach as a test of whether the Soviet Union was really
prepared to talk about these issues. The Allies, he said, had indicated
that the Federal Government was ready to initiate talks with Eastern
Germany on ways of improving relations between them if the East
Germans agreed, and the Federal Government hoped that the Gov-
ernment in East Berlin could now be persuaded to open talks on an
improvement of relations between the two parts of Germany and the
two parts of Berlin.

The Soviet reply, given to the three Western Ambassadors on
Sept. 12, agreed that the question of Berlin should be discussed by
the four Powers, but did not suggest a time and place or make any
proposals. The Western recommendation that West and East German
representatives should meet to improve road and rail access to the
city and communications generally was merely "noted".

Conclusion of Agreement

Talks on problems relating to Berlin between the British, French
and U.S. Ambassadors to Western Germany and the Soviet Ambas-
sador to the German Democratic Republic eventually took place
from March 1970 onwards, and at the 33rd meeting on Aug. 25,
1971, it was announced officially that the draft text of a settlement
had been agreed upon.

The principal points of this quadripartite agreement, the official
text of which was released on Sept. 3, 1971, were as follows:

298

(1) The four Governments declared that they "will strive to promote
the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in
the relevant area. . . . There shall be no use or threat of force and
disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means. . . . The four
Governments will mutually respect their individual and joint rights
and responsibilities which remain unchanged."

(2) With regard to the question of free access to West Berlin the
Government of the U.S.S.R. announced that "transit traffic by road,
rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic
Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western sectors
of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded.
It will receive the most simple, expeditious and preferential treat-
ment provided by international practice."

(3) The Government of the U.S.S.R. declared: "Communications
between the Western sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these
sectors will be improved. Permanent residents of the Western sectors
will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate,
family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under
conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering
these areas. . . ."

(4) On the status of West Berlin the three Western Powers agreed
as follows:

"(a) The ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking
into account that these sectors continue not to be a constituent part of
the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it. The
provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and
of the Constitution operative in the Western sectors of Berlin which
contradict the above have been suspended and continue not to be in
effect.

"(6) The Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundes-
versammlung [joint session of Parliament], the Bundesrat [Upper
House] and the Bundestag [Lower House], including their commit-
tees and Fraktionen [Parliamentary party groups], as well as other
State bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany, will not perform
in the Western sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which
contradict the provisions of paragraph (a).

"(c) The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will
be represented in the Western sectors of Berlin to the authorities of
the three Governments and to the Senate by a permanent liaison
agency."

(5) On the question of diplomatic representation the three Western
Powers declared:

"The Governments of the French Republic, the United King-
dom and the United States of America maintain their rights and
responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests

299

of the Western sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents,- in-
cluding those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security
and status both in international organizations and in relations with
other countries.

"The three Governments will authorize the establishment of a
Soviet consulate-general in the Western sectors of Berlin accredited
to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments."
(6) In a final Quadripartite Protocol the four Governments agreed
that they would proceed on the basis that the agreements and arrange-
ments concluded between the competent German authorities would
enter into force simultaneously with the quadripartite agreement.

The Protocol itself would enter into force on the date of signature.

The final protocol was signed on June 3, 1972, at a ceremony at
the former Allied Control Council in West Berlin by the U.S. Sec-
retary of State, and by the British, French and Soviet Foreign
Ministers.

After the signing of the final protocol Mr. Gromyko paid an
official visit to Bonn on June 3-4 the first such visit to Bonn by a
Soviet Foreign Minister since the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and Western Germany in 1955.

Herr Brandt's Visit to the Soviet Union, September 1971

Following the signing of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin,
Herr Brandt had talks with Mr. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, at the
Crimean resort of Oreanda, near Yalta, on Sept. 16-18, 1971.

A joint communique was issued on Sept. 18 stating that "in a
spirit of complete loyalty to their allies' 9 the two sides had discussed
a wide range of international problems. The treaty between Western
Germany and the Soviet Union, it was stated, "already . . . facilitates
an improvement of the political climate between the two States and
is exerting a favourable influence on the entire course of European
affairs".

Reference was also made in the communique to the signing of the
quadripartite agreement on Berlin described as "a major step along
the road of easing European and international tensions", and to the
prospects for the normalization of relations between Western and
Eastern Germany, which "today appears to be possible and of much
importance". In this latter context, the two leaders said that the
entry of both German States into the United Nations and other inter-

300

national institutions would be an important step towards detente in
Europe.

The development of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union
and the Federal Republic of Germany had also been thoroughly
discussed between Herr Brandt and Mr. Brezhnev, both sides coming
to the conclusion that "extensive possibilities" existed for co-operation
between the two countries "in the most diverse fields"; agreements
on an expansion of trade relations and scientific, technical, cultural
and sports ties, as well as exchanges between youth organizations,
were foreseen, whilst it was stated that a joint commission would be
set up to develop economic co-operation.

In conclusion it was affirmed that both sides believed that "the
practice of exchanging views and of consultations at various levels,
now taking shape between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic
both on questions of bilateral relations and on international problems,
is useful and should be continued".

In an interview given to The New York Times, Herr Brandt said
that it was incorrect to assume that the Federal Republic was devel-
oping a special relationship with the Soviet Union, and he declared:
"We have not become friends of the Soviet Union or of its system,
but rather have become partners in a businesslike contract, just as
other Western States who are treaty partners of the Soviet Union."

West Berlin Agreement between Eastern and Western Germany, 1971

Herr Stoph's Proposals for Political Settlement

rejected by West Berlin Breakdown of Talks on Easter Passes

for West Berliners Partial Restoration of Telephone Links

Herr Stoph, the G.D.R. Prime Minister, announced during a meet-
ing on Feb. 4, 1971, with Herr Danelius, chairman of the West Berlin
Socialist Unity (Communist) Party, that his Government was pre-
pared to conclude an agreement with the West Berlin Senate guar-
anteeing the access routes on condition that the Federal Republic's
"political presence" in the city was abolished.

An official statement issued after the meeting said that particular
attention had been paid to the normalization of relations between the
G.D.R. and West Berlin, and that it had been emphasized that the
interests of European security demanded the recognition of the
special status of West Berlin, "which does not belong to the Federal

301

Republic and cannot be ruled by it". Noting "the existence of condi-
tions which, if utilized, would make it possible, to change West Berlin
from a centre of constant conflicts and tension into a city which
could contribute towards the strengthening of peace", Herr Stoph
and Herr Danelius had stressed the great importance of the four-
Power talks; emphasized their determination to contribute towards
peace and detente and to briag about a situation which would "accord
with the needs of the West Berlin population and the legitimate
interests and sovereign rights of the G.D.R."; and agreed that the
fundamental condition of any improvement in the West Berlin
situation was the ending of the Federal Republic's "political pres-
ence" and the cessation of all "revanchist, militarist and anti-peace
activities" in the city.

Herr Stoph, the statement continued, had declared that strict
compliance with the status of the "independent political entity of
West Berlin" could bring about a positive change in the relationship
between the city and the G.D.R., making possible "mutually advan-
tageous agreements in the fields of trade, science, transport and other
areas which would be of particular benefit to the West Berlin
population". Under the "appropriate circumstances" the G.D.R.
Government would be ready to examine the question of concluding
the necessary agreements with the West Berlin Senate, which would
allow for economic, scientific, technical and cultural links between
West Berlin and all States, including the Federal Republic. Moreover,
the G.D.R. Government would then be able to allow West Berlin
citizens to visit the G.D.R., including East Berlin, in accordance with
the legal stipulations. The G.D.R. Government would also be ready
to conduct negotiations with the West Berlin Senate on the mutual
transit of persons and goods and, in accordance with the usual inter-
national norms and practices, to conclude a regular agreement on the
following questions: guarantees for the transit traffic of West Berlin
citizens and goods to and from all States; the greatest possible simpli-
fication of transit traffic, including arrangements for sealing freight
in transit through the G.D.R.; and frontier regulation, which could
apply, amongst other points, to the little enclave of Steinstiicken, an
isolated part of West Berlin situated a few hundred yards inside the

G.D.R;

In an exchange of letters published in West Berlin on Feb. 16,
Herr Danelius wrote to Herr Schutz suggesting a meeting between
them to discuss Herr Stoph's proposals, but Herr Schutz replied that
there was no need for an intermediary if the G.D.R. Government was
serious about wishing to talk to the West Berlin Senate, and reiterated
his view that the Senate continued to look for reasonable settlements
within the framework of the four-Power talks.

302

As his next step, Herr Stoph, in a letter to Herr Schiitz on Feb. 24,
suggested the opening of direct talks between his Government and the
West Berlin Senate on visits by West Berlin citizens to the G.D.R.
The text of the letter was as follows:

"The Government of the G.D.R. attaches great importance to the
present efforts to bring about detente in the centre of Europe, and to
normalize the situation of West Berlin. . . . Some questions connected
with a possible settlement affect directly the relations of West Berlin
with the G.D.R. Naturally the G.D.R. Government and the West
Berlin authorities must primarily see to it that these questions are
settled in the most favourable manner.

"In the name of the G.D.R. Government I propose to you the
opening of negotiations between the G.D.R. Government and the
West Berlin Senate on the question of visits by the citizens of your
city to the G.D.R., including its capital [i.e. East Berlin]. Under-
standably, an agreement on this question can [only] be implemented
in case agreements on other questions regarding West Berlin, which
are being discussed in relevant negotiations, come into force.

"The concrete conditions for an agreement could be discussed by
our representatives at the negotiating table. However, the G.D.R.
Government declares its readiness to solve the questions of visits in
such a way that West Berlin citizens would enjoy the hospitality of
the G.D.R. on the same basis as other visitors to the G.D.R.

"If the negotiations on all questions relating to West Berlin have
not been concluded by Easter, the G.D.R. Government will consider
the question of making it possible for West Berliners to visit the
G.D.R. before, during and after Easter. This is naturally on the
assumption that the West Berlin authorities, for their part, make
efforts to guard the city from unnecessary complications which would
make more difficult such investigation. . . ."

Herr Schiitz, replying on Feb. 25, said that the West Berlin
Senate was interested in a normalization of relations, and hoped
that the four-Power talks would reach a successful conclusion. His
letter to Herr Stoph continued:

"To this end, the Senate is ready to participate in the negotiations
proposed by you on visits by West Berliners in the framework of the
competence of the Senate and with the agreement of the three Powers.
These negotiations could begin in the general interest, and taking into
consideration the bigger issues, as soon as the current four-Power
negotiations, which cannot be forestalled, have reached an appropri-
ate stage." Welcoming the suggestion that West Berliners might be

303

able to visit the G.D.R. during the Easter period, Herr Schiitz sug-
gested that talks between the two sides should begin as soon as

The talks opened on March 6 with a five-hour meeting in East
Berlin between Herr Giinter Kohrt, State Secretary in the G.D.R.
Foreign Ministry, and Herr Ulrich Miiller, head of chancellery of the
West Berlin Senate,

A second meeting between full delegations led by Herr Kohrt and
Herr Miiller respectively took place in West Berlin on March 12 and
was followed by a statement by Herr Schiitz.

According to Die Welt, Herr Schutz said that the G.D.R. delegation
had aimed at reaching a "general and lasting settlement" but that
the West Berlin side had only been "able, willing and in a position
to discuss a settlement for Easter". Longer-term arrangements, Herr
Schutz added, could only be made when the Powers responsible for
Berlin had themselves reached an agreement in principle on the
Berlin question.

The third meeting again took place in East Berlin on March 27,
it being agreed to continue the talks in West Berlin, but in a surprise
announcement on April 2 the East German Government Press Office
stated that the G.D.R. would not grant any facilities for visits by
West Berliners to East Berlin and the G.D.R. during the Easter
holidays.

The statement put the responsibility for this on the West Berlin
Senate and said that the East German proposals for a general agree-
ment on relations, including visits by West Berliners to the G.D.R.
and East Berlin, were being maintained.

Herr Schutz on the same day expressed regret at the East German
refusal to permit visits to relatives over Easter. In recent weeks, he
said, he had stated time and again that he was not willing to under-
mine the four-Power negotiations, but that West Berlin continued
to be ready for special arrangements. He hoped that it was now clear
both in East Germany and in the Soviet Union that the Senate
"could not be blackmailed" and that nobody would be permitted
"to interfere in West Berlin's internal affairs", including the ties
between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, which were "un-
renounceable".

304

In spite of this development, a fourth meeting between Hen Kohrt
and Herr Miiller was held in West Berlin on April 17, on a proposal
by Herr Kohrt on April 5, which was accepted by the West Berlin
side.

Meanwhile, based on an agreement of July 31, 1970, between
the G.D.R. and West Berlin, telephone links between the two parts
of Berlin were restored on Jan. 31, 1971, for the first time since
May 1952, the new service comprising five lines in each direction.
This was increased by the installation of 10 further telephone lines
on either side on April 8.

Talks between East and West German Governments
on Mutual Relations

Talks had meanwhile opened in East Berlin on Nov. 27, 1970,
between the State Secretary at the Federal Chancellor's office, Herr
Egon Bahr, and the State Secretary of the Council of Ministers of
the G.D.R., Dr. Michael Kohl, on the basis of an agreement between
the two Governments which had been announced in Bonn and East
Berlin on Oct. 29, 1970, and provided for "an official exchange of
views on questions the settlement of which would help towards a
detente in central Europe and would be of interest to both States".

The deputy spokesman of the Federal Government in Bonn, Herr
Rudiger von Wechmar, stated on Oct. 29 that the agreement was
the result of discussions in Bonn on Oct. 28-29 between two East
German Government delegates and Professor Horst Ehmke, Minister
without Portfolio for special duties at the Federal Chancellery; that
the East German delegates had also been received by Herr Brandt,
the Chancellor; and that the exchanges of views would presumably
take place "at the middle level". It was still undecided which concrete
subjects would be dealt with, but the Federal Government was taking
as its starting-point the 20 points enumerated at the Kassel meeting
between Herr Brandt and Herr Stoph.

The Federal Government spokesman, Herr Conrad Ahlers, ex-
plained on Nov. 2 that in view of Mr. Gromyko's [the Soviet Foreign
Minister's] talks in East Berlin and with Herr Scheel in Frankfurt on
Oct. 29-30, the four-Power talks on Berlin, and the Erfurt and Kassel
meetings of Herr Brandt and Herr Stoph, the Federal Government
considered it quite possible to enter into a discussion of the Berlin
question with the G.D.R. Government even before the four-Power

305

talks had ended, provided the Western Powers would give them a
mandate for this. Stressing the close co-operation between the West-
ern Powers and the Federal Government on the Berlin talks, he said
that in the proposed discussions between Bonn and East Berlin it was
intended to find out the extent of the difficulties and problems be-
tween them in a way similar to the preparations for the Moscow
Treaty between Federal Germany and the Soviet Union and the then
projected West German-Polish Treaty; this meant that competent
officials from East Berlin and Bonn would prepare what, at a later
stage, might be dealt with in ministerial negotiations. Herr Ahlers
reiterated, however, that there was a restriction of the subjects which
could be discussed with the G.D.R., though this did not exclude talks
on traffic to and from West Berlin, but any negotiations in connexion
with the four-Power discussions on Berlin could only take place
when the four Powers or the three Western Powers considered such
negotiations between the Federal Republic and the G.D.R. as
"feasible".

Following initial discussions on Oct. 29, Herr Bahr and Dr.
Kohl had nine further confidential talks, held partly in East Berlin
(Dec. 16-23, 1970; Jan. 26, 1971;Feb. 17; March 8; and March 31)
and partly in Bonn (Jan. 15; Feb. 3; Feb. 26; and March 17). After
the first and second talks Herr Bahr and Dr. Kohl were assisted by
other officials of their Governments, several of the talks lasting from
five to nearly seven hours. After the 10th talk Herr Bahr said that
they had dealt with traffic between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R., in-
cluding traffic on inland waterways crossing the G.D.R. and traffic
through the F.R.G. of importance to the G.D.R. for its communica-
tions with Western countries. Berlin transit questions had not been
discussed, as the Federal Government had to wait for the "green
light" from the three Western protecting Powers negotiating with
the Soviet Union.

Herr Brandt's Reaffirmation of Link between Berlin

Settlement and West German Ratification of Treaties

with U.S.S.R. and Poland

In reply to Opposition criticisms of his Government's Ostpolitik,
Herr Brandt, on the occasion of his visit to West Berlin and his talks
with Herr Schiitz [see above], issued a statement on Jan. 30, 1971,
306

reaffirming that the Federal Government regarded a satisfactory
Berlin settlement as "an essential, even a decisive, element for effec-
tive d&ente in Europe".

There was, Herr Brandt said, complete agreement between the
Federal Government and its Western partners and allies, especially
the three protecting Powers, on the criteria for a Berlin settlement,
and the co-operation between the four Western Governments worked
"excellently". The Chancellor stressed that the Federal Government
had from the beginning made it clear to the Soviet Union, "un-
mistakably and beyond doubt 9 ', that an indissoluble link existed
between a satisfactory Berlin settlement and the ratification of the
Moscow treaty a link which had been made equally clear to the
Soviet Government by the chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs
committee, Dr. Gerhard Schroder (CDU), during a visit to Moscow.
Referring to the hindrances to traffic between Western Germany and
West Berlin, Herr Brandt said that a Berlin settlement must contain
not only the right of unhindered access to, but also of unhindered
assembly in, West Berlin.

In an interview published by Der Spiegel on May 24 Herr Brandt
again referred to the link between a satisfactory settlement of the
Berlin question and the Federal Republic's ratification of the Moscow
treaty with the Soviet Union, frequently referred to in Western
Germany as the "Berlin Junktim", saying in this connexion: "Perhaps
as a Government we have not done enough to contradict that am-
biguous word. We have never created what you [the interviewer] call
a Junktim, certainly not a legal Junktim and not one in the sense
that a State such as the Federal Republic of Germany could lay
down pre-conditions for the improvement of relations vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. We have made all this perfectly clear in Moscow, but
we have equally clearly and honestly pointed to the internal link be-
tween the [German-Soviet and German-Polish] treaties and a satis-
factory Berlin settlement. We did this even before signing the [Soviet]
treaty, and at the time it was quite understood [by the other side].
If it should not be possible to reach an understanding on Berlin . . .
this would, unfortunately, only show that there can also be no
decisive progress in other matters, especially as far as questions
connected with a European security conference are concerned."

307

Agreements

between West and East German Governments and
between West Berlin Senate and East German Government

During the talks which led to the four-Power agreement on Berlin
of Sept. 3, 1971 [see page 298], negotiations continued between Herr
Bahr, the Federal State Secretary, and Dr. Kohl, the East German
State Secretary.

After the conclusion of the four-Power agreement, these negoti-
ations dealt with the facilitation of transit traffic between West Berlin
and Western Germany, while parallel talks were held between Herr
Giinter Kohrt, State Secretary at the G.D.R. Foreign Ministry, and
Herr Ulrich Miiller, head of the Chancellery of the West Berlin
Senate, on the access of West Berliners to East Berlin and the G.D.R.
and the problem of West Berlin enclaves in East German territory.

Three agreements were eventually initialled in Berlin on Dec. 11,
1971, viz:

(a) "Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Government of the German Democratic Repub-
lic on the Transit Traffic of Civilian Persons and Goods between the
Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin (West)."

The agreement laid down, inter alia: "Transit traffic will be facil-
itated and unimpeded . . .

"Transit travellers will be issued with visas at the border crossing
points of the G.D.R."

For transit traffic of civilian goods, conveyances would be fitted
with seals before departure.

The G.D.R. authorities would confine themselves to the examina-
tion of the seals and accompanying documents.

Misuse of the agreement would be deemed to have occurred if a
transit traveller while using the transit routes "unlawfully and cul-
pably violates the generally applicable regulations of the G.D.R.".

Western Germany would pay to the G.D.R. an annual lump sum
covering the cost of maintaining roads, facilities and installations
used for transit traffic, as well as visa fees, tax compensation and
compensation for the G.D.R.'s loss of certain revenues. The annual
lump sum for the period 1972-75 was fixed at DM 234,900,000
(about 28,000,000).

(b) "Agreement between the Senate and the Government of the
308

G.D.R. on Facilitation and Improvement of Travelling and Visiting",
containing the following main provisions:

Permanent residents of West Berlin would be able to visit East
Berlin and Eastern Germany for a total of 30 days per year on one
or several occasions.

Visits in excess of 30 days might be permitted "for urgent family
and humanitarian reasons 9 '.

(c) "Agreement between the Senate and the Government of the
G.D.R. on the Settlement of the Question of Enclaves by Exchange
of Territory."

Five areas totalling about 15.6 hectares (about 39 acres) were
to be given by West Berlin to the G.D.R. in exchange for three areas
aggregating about 17.1 hectares (approximately 42 acres).

Rights of private individuals and corporations to land, buildings
and installation in the areas to be exchanged would not be affected
by the agreement; claims for compensation would be settled by the
side on whose territory the lands, buildings and installations were
situated prior to the exchange of territory.

In addition, new agreements on postal services and telecommunica-
tions, signed in East Berlin on Sept. 30, 1971, by the Ministries of
Eastern and Western Germany provided inter alia as follows:

(1) The agreement concluded on April 29, 1970, whereby the
West German Government agreed to pay the East German authorities
an annual lump sum totalling DM 30,000,000 (about 3,600,000)
as compensation for the costs of inter-German postal communications
would be extended to 1976, while for the period prior to that covered
by the 1970 agreement a lump sum of DM 250,000,000 (about
30,000,000) would be paid as compensation, this sum also cover-
ing the East German claims against the West Berlin Senate.

(2) The number of telephone lines between Eastern and Western
Germany was to be increased by 30 lines in each direction by Dec. 31,
1971, and by a further 16 lines by March 31, 1972; in the case of
telephone lines to and from West Berlin a further 60 lines in each
direction were to be brought into operation by Dec. 15, 1971, in
addition to the existing 15 in each direction. By Dec. 31, 1974,
subscriber trunk dialling would be gradually installed between Eastern
and Western Germany and a partial introduction of this system was
also foreseen for telephone links with West Berlin.

309

In an explanatory note to the agreements as published by the
Federal Press and Information Office it was stated that they were
the first settlement between the competent German authorities as de-
fined by the quadripartite agreement.

All these agreements concluded between the West and East Ger-
man Governments and between the West Berlin Senate and the East
German Government entered into force simultaneously with the four-
Power signature of the final protocol on June 3, 1972 [see page 300].

8. TRAFFIC TREATY BETWEEN WEST AND
EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENTS, 1972

As the result of further negotiations conducted between Jan. 20
and April 26, 1972, a Treaty between the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the German Democratic Republic on Questions of Traffic
was initialled in Bonn on May 12 and signed in East Berlin on May
26, 1972.

Under the treaty, the contracting States undertook "to the greatest
possible extent to allow, to facilitate, and to organize as expeditiously
as possible the traffic in and through their sovereign territories, cor-
responding to normal international practice on the basis of reciprocity
and non-discrimmation". The traffic would be subject to the law of
the State in which it occurred, as far as the treaty did not provide
otherwise.

For rail traffic, the International Agreements on Rail Passenger
and Luggage Traffic and on Rail Goods Traffic, together with their
supplementary agreements, would apply to the conveyance of travel-
lers and luggage and to goods traffic respectively.

For inland navigation, on the basis of mutual agreement, permis-
sion for the use of waterways would not be required. Differences of
opinion which might arise as to the application or interpretation of the
treaty would be clarified by a joint commission, delegations to which
would be led by authorized representatives of the Ministries of Trans-
port of both States.

The treaty would remain in force for an indefinite period, although
it could be terminated five years after its entry into force provided
notice was given three months before the end of the calendar year
in question.

The text of the main treaty was supplemented by protocol notes, an
310

exchange of letters between Herr Bahr and Dr. Kohl, and a "Notifi-
cation of the G.D.R. on Travel Facilitations".

Protocol Notes. These stated that the proposed commission could
"at the proper time also discuss questions of the further facilitation
and expeditious organization of passenger and goods traffic. Sug-
gestions to that effect require the decision of the Governments or
their relevant authorities or organs." It was also affirmed that the
Federal Republic and the G.D.R. agreed to take up negotiations "at
the proper time" on air traffic agreement [a question which had been
specifically excluded from the current traffic treaty].

Exchange of Letters. In these it was stated that after the signing
of the treaty the Federal Republic would apply for accession to the
international rail traffic agreements mentioned above, which would
not be applied until membership with equal rights of the Federal
Republic and the G.D.R. in these agreements had been achieved. The
legal position of the railway lines in West Berlin [which are run by the
East German authorities] would be unaffected by membership in the
agreements, as would existing agreements of the Federal Republic.

Notification of the G.D.R. on Travel Facilitations. This notifi-
cation stated that at the request of. G.D.R. citizens the relevant
authorities of the G.D.R. would allow the visit several times a year
of relatives and friends from Western Germany; West German
citizens could also visit Eastern Germany for commercial, cultural,
sporting, religious or other reasons, provided that there existed invi-
tations from the corresponding institutions or organizations of the
G.D.R.. Furthermore, tourist journeys by citizens of Western Ger-
many into the G.D.R. would be made possible by agreements between
the tourist offices of the two States.

The use of passenger cars for journeys into the G.D.R. would be
allowed to a greater degree than hitherto, and the limit of duty
exemption on presents taken on journeys into Eastern Germany
would be raised. It was also stated that the G.D.R. Government
would make possible travel to Western Germany by G.D.R. citizens
in "urgent family matters" a phrase which Dr. Kohl defined at a
press conference at (he time of the signing of the treaty as including
births, deaths, weddings and serious illnesses.

In their declarations at the signing of the treaty both Secretaries of
State said that the terms of the treaty were to be applied analogously
to West Berlin.

After approval by the West German Bundestag and the East Ger-
man Volkskammer the treaty was to come into force by an exchange

311

of Notes; a corresponding Bill was approved by the Council of Min-
isters of the G.D.R. on May 31, 1972.

Easter and Whitsuntide Visits of West Berliners to East Berlin
and Eastern Germany

The ADN news agency on Feb. 22 published a decision of the
East German Socialist Unity Party Politburo and Council of Min-
isters "as a gesture of good will" temporarily to put into effect at
Easter (March 29-April 5) and Whitsun (May 17-24) the agree-
ments on transit traffic and on the access of West Berliners to East
Berlin and Eastern Germany, which had been concluded in imple-
mentation of the four-Power agreement on Berlin.

At the office of the Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin it was
announced on April 10 that according to information received from
the G.D.R. authorities 449,597 West Berliners had visited East
Berlin or Eastern Germany during the Easter period, of whom
264,959 paid visits lasting several days; the East German authorities
requested DM 4,900,000 (about 600,000) as lump-sum payment
by the West German Government for the visits. After the Whitsuntide
visits the G.D.R. authorities revealed that 626,009 West Berliners
had visited East Berlin and Eastern Germany during the period, and
asked for an overall payment in return of DM 7,160,295 (about
870,000).

The Easter visits were the first which West Berliners had been
allowed to make to East Berlin for six years and to Eastern Germany
for more than 20 years.

312

SUBJECT INDEX

All-German Constituent Council
Prague Declaration, 1950, 66
East German proposal, 1961, 70
Allied Control Commission, 1945, 10
Allied Control Council, Berlin, 14, 15,

23, 26ff., 31, 42

Atom-free zone in Central Europe
(proposal) see Rapacki Plan
Atomic Weapons

Not to be manufactured by West-
ern Germany, 93
Use by West German Army
opposed by Soviet Govern-
ment, 1957, 133; 1963, 189ff.
Atom-free zone in Central Eu-
rope (Rapacki Plan), 1958,

144XE*

East German proposal for renun-
ciation, 1967, 214; 1969, 234;
1970, 243
Austrian State Treaty, 1955, 96

Basic Law (German Federal Consti-
tution), 1949, 50

Amendment, 1954, 91
Berlin (see also West Berlin)

Division under Potsdam Agree-
ment, 1945, 1

Traffic regulations, Soviet strin-
gency, 1948, 29ff., 33

Western Powers' negotiations
with U.S.S.R., 1948, 42

Blockade, 1948, 49

Establishment of separate munic-
ipal governments in East and
West, 1948, 45

Municipal elections in West Ber-
lin, 1948, 46

East Berlin rising, June 1953
100

Crisis of 1958-59, 148

Khrushchev proposal for change
in status, 1958, 150, 155

"Western Peace Plan", 1959, 159

Crisis of 1961, 167

Adenauer-Brandt communique,
1961, 174

Berlin Wall, 1961, 18 Iff.

Khrushchev proposal for free city
status for West Berlin, 1963,
186

President Kennedy's speech,
1963, 187

Passes agreement, 1963-66,
188ff.

Quadripartite agreement, 1970,

298ff.

Berlin Four-Power Conference of
Foreign Ministers, 1954, 83,
110

Bonn Conventions (on relations be-
tween Western Powers and
Western Germany), 1952, 97
288
Bundestag (Western Germany)

Election of President and Chan-
cellor, 1949, 51

Denunciation of East German
elections, 1950, 67

Unanimous resolution on "Soviet
intransigence,", 1954, 86

Elections, 1953, 104ff.

Resolutions on reunification,
1958, 146, 148

Resolution on refugees, 1958,
149ff.

Declaration on peace treaty,
1961, 174

Ratification of Soviet and Polish

treaties, 1972, 285ff.
Bundesversammlung (Federal Assem-
bly)

Berlin meeting, 1964, 193ff.;
1969, 225

CDU

see Christian Democratic Union
Christian Democratic Union (Western
Germany), 106, 191, 198, 208,
229, 271, 275, 283ff.
Collective Security Treaty

Soviet proposal, 1954, 83
Cominform, Ministers' meeting, 1950,

64ff.
Communist Party

banned in Western Germany,

1956, 140
Confederation (of two German

States)

SED plan, 1963, 187
Consular Agreement between West-
ern Germany and Soviet
Union, 1958, 140ff.
Crimea Declaration, 1945, 1
Currency

Reform in Western Zones, 1948,

31ff.

Prohibition of Western currency
circulation in Soviet Zone and
Berlin, 32, 43

313

Currency (cont.) Trade agreement with Eastern

Reform in Soviet Zone, 1948, 34, Germany, 1968, 218ff.

41 Treaty with Soviet Union on re-

Curzon Line, 17 nunciation of force, 1970

Czechoslovakia ^ 260ff., 269ff.

(see also Munich Agreement of Treaty with Poland on frontiers

1938) and co-operation, 1970, 272ff..

East-Gennan-Czechoslovak dec- 278ff.

laration, 1950, 61, 69 Four-Power rights in Germany

Dr. Erhard's statement, 1964, Scheel letter, 1970, 270ff.

192 France

West German policy statement, Treaty of Co-operation with Fed-

1966, 204 era! Republic of Germany

Dr. Kiesinger's statement, 1967, 1963, 188ff.

209 Free Democratic Party (Western Ger-

many), 51, 191, 208, 229

Geneva Four-Power Conference of
Foreign Ministers > 1959 > 159,
ta Geneva 17 Summit Conference, 1955,

** GermanDemocratic Republic
inhhtml9ffl 232ff Proclamation, 1949; 52ff.

Ulbncht proposal, 1969, 232ff., Agreements with Czechoslovakia

nitwit TuvMvrcai i Q7ft -7ff ' and Hungary, 1950, 61

Brandt proposal, 1970, 253ff. Recognition by Soviet Union,

Ngrntion by Western

ficion of treaty, 1952-54, -ers, 1954,7

^
86ff., 90S. 1964>

Fnp Ulbricht proposals on relations

* Vr** n^mriprfltic Partv between "two German States",

see rree jjemocrauc rariy IQ^T omff. IQ< OITP?

Federal Republic of Germany TriS^ Sf^J2 i'ti! w^t r

Establishment, 1949, 50 Tr 5? e agree ? 1 / ?P* ^^ Western

Sration into Western Bloc, ^ Germany, 1968, 218ff

ll52-53 86 German Economic Council, 1947, 27

Treaty of Friendship with U.S.A. German Executive Council, 1947, 27

1954 86 Ooriitz Agreement

Full so'vereignty achieved, 1955, ^ Zgorzelec Agreement

05 e J Grand Coalition (Federal Republic

Recognition of West German of Germany), 1966-69, 198,

Government by Western Powers 208

- Hallstem DocMnc, 129ff, 217, 232,

of Germany", 1954, 97 24Z ' ^^

Diplomatic relations with Soviet Intervention Right (under U.N.

Union, 1955, 115, 122ff. Charter), Soviet claim, 1967,

Trade and consular agreements 260ff

with Soviet Union, 1958, West German repudiation, 1970,

140ff. 267
Franco-German Treaty, 1963,

188ff. Kommandatura, Quadripartite, Ber-

Kiesinger policy statement, 1967, lin, 1, 28ff., 33

209 Dissolution, 1948, 35, 38

314

Kommandatura, Tripartite, Berlin
Establishment, 1948, 47

Lander Governments

Establishment, 1945-46, 27
Ldnderkammer (Eastern Germany)

Election, 1949, 55
Landerrat (Western Germany), 1948.

27,31

London Conference, 1948, 28, 50
London Nine-Power Conference,
1954, 93

Maps

Occupation Zones, 9
German Federal Republic and
German Democratic Republic.
57
Marshall Plan

Marshal Sokolovsky's strictures,

1947, 25, 28
Moscow Agreement

on establishment of diplomatic
relations between Soviet Union
and Western Germany, 1955,
119ff.

Moscow Conference, 1947, 18ff.
Moscow Conference, 1954, 97ff.
Munich Agreement of 1938

Dr. Erhard's New York state-
ment, 1964, 191ff.
West German note, 1966, 199
Soviet note, 1966, 200ff.
Dr. Kiesinger's statement, 1967,

209

"Invalid ab initio"
East German claim, 1967, 214
East German claim, 1970, 257
Soviet claim, 1967, 261
Soviet claim, 1968, 262

National Democratic Party

(Eastern Germany), 1949, 48
National Democratic Party

(Western Germany), 1968, 222
National Front (Eastern Germany),

68, 89, 92
NATO

see North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization
New York Three-Power Conference,

1950, 62

Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968, 217

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

West German accession, 1954,

86,93

Soviet strictures on West Ger-
man membership, 1957, 133ff.

Nuclear weapons

see Atomic weapons
Occupation Statute for Western

Zones, 1949, 47, 53
Revision, 1950, 62
Replacement by contractual ar-
rangements of Federal Repub-
lic, 1952-55, 78, 87, 93
Occupation zones

Creation, 1945, 8ff.

Fusion of British and U.S. zones,

1947, 27
Map, 9
Oder-Neisse Line

Crimea Conference agreement,

1945, 8

Declared permanent by Stalin,

1946, 18

Moscow Conference, 1946, 23

Rejection by West German lead-
ers, 1949, 51

Zgorzelec Agreement, 1950, 58ff.,
69,76

Dr. Erhard's New York state-
ment, 1964, 192

West German note, 1966, 199ff.

"Final and unalterable", Soviet
statements, 1966, 200 ff.; 1968,
262

Polish statement, 1966, 203ff.

East German proposal for recog-
nition, 1967, 214

SPD Statement, 1968, 216, 273

East German demands for recog-
nition, 1969, 234; 1970, 257

Brandt statement, 1969, 236

West German recognition in
treaty with Soviet Union,
1970, 270

Polish demand for West German
recognition, 1969, 272ff.

West German recognition in
treaty with Poland, 1970,
278ff.
Ostpolitik

Brandt policy statement, 1969,
229

Brandt Report on the State of
the Nation, 1970, 235ff.

Brandt-Stoph Erfurt meeting,
1970, 241ff.

Brandt-Stoph Kassel meeting,
1970, 25 Iff.

West German-Soviet treaty on
renunciation of force, 1970,
260ff., 285ff.

West German-Polish treaty,
1970, 272ff., 285ff.

315

Ostpolitik (cont.)

West Berlin agreement, 1971,

SOlff.
East-West German traffic treaty,

1972, 310ff.

Paris Agreement, 1952

see European Defence Com-
munity

Paris Conference, 1946, 13ff.

Paris Four-Power Meeting, 1951,
73ff.

Paris Summit conference of heads
of government, breakdown,

1960, 159
Peace Conference

to settle definite frontiers,
1947, 22

Soviet proposal, 1953, 80ff.
Peace Treaty

Preparations for, 1947, 18

Communist proposal for im-
mediate conclusion, 1950, 66

Grotewohl proposal, 1950, 70

Soviet proposals, 1952, 75

Soviet proposals for preparation,
1953, 80

East German proposal, 1958, 148

Soviet note, 1961, 170

Khrushchev proposal to Pres-
ident Kennedy, 1961, 171

West German reply to Soviet
note, 1961, 172ff.

Bundestag declaration, 1961, 174

East German "Peace Plan",
1961, 175ff.

Renewed Khrushchev proposal,

1961, 178ff.

Khrushchev speech, 1963, 185ff.

Soviet note, 1966, 203
People's Congress, Eastern Ger-
many, Election, 1949, 48
Poland

Frontiers, 1945, 8, 17, 22ff.

Statement on Oder-Neisse line,
1966, 204

Dr. Kiesinger's policy statement,
1967,209

Treaty with Western Germany
on frontiers and co-operation,
1970, 272ff., 278ff.

Ethnic Germans, Polish state-
ment, 1970, 280ff.

Brandt visit, 1970, 284
Postal charges

East German claims, 1966-67,
217ff.

316

Agreements between Eastern and
Western Germany, 1970, 258;
1971, 209

Potsdam Agreement, 1945, 1, 7,
lOff., 20, 37ff., 74, 75, 151ff.,
279

Prague Declaration, 1950, 66

Prague Meeting of Cominform Min-
isters, 1950, 64ff.

Prisoners of war

Repatriation of Germans from
the U.S.S.R., 1955, 114ff., 123,
126ff., 138

Railway charges

East German claims, 1966-67,

217ff:

Rapacki Plan, 1958, 144ff., 203
Rapallo, 1922 Treaty of, 192
Refugees from Eastern Germany,

1949-54, 92ff.

Bundestag resolution, 1958, 149ff.
1960-61 Exodus, 180
Escapes, Aug. 13, 1961, 182ff.
Escapes, 1961-71, 185
Relaxation of tension in Europe

West German proposals, 1966,

198ff.
Ulbricht New Year message,

1967, 210ff.
Brandt policy statement, 1969,

229ff.
Remilitarization

Federal Republic of Germany,

1950, 65ff.; 1955, 93ff.
Bulganin letter, 1957, 130
Further Soviet strictures, 1957,

133ff.

Joint Soviet-East German com-
munique, 1957, 138ff.
Bundestag resolution, 1958,

146ff.

Soviet note, 1966, 20 Iff.
German Democratic Republic.

1955-56, 95, 98ff.
Reparations from Germany

Provisions of JPotsdam Agree-
ment, 1945, 6ff.
Sokolovsky memorandum, 1948,

28
Repatriation of German nationals

from U.S.S.R., 142ff.
Reunification of Germany

Soviet proposal, 1952, 75ff.
Four-Power exchanges, 1952-53,

76ff.

West German programme, 1953,
78ff.

Western Foreign Ministers' Wash-
ington meeting, 1953, 79ff.

Soviet proposal, 1953, 80ff.

Adenauer statements, 1953, 103ff.

Joint Soviet-East German com-
munique, 1957, 138ff.

Bundestag resolutions, March

1958, 146ff.; July, 1958, 148ff.
East German and Soviet notes,

Sept. 1958, 148

'Western Peace Plan", 1959, 159

Allied declaration, 1957, 160ff.

Grotewohl "confederation" pro-
posal, 1957, 160

Social Democratic Party plan,

1959, 163ff.

East German "Peace Plan, 1961",
175ff.

SED "confederation" plan, 1963,
187

West German note to Soviet
Union, 1963, 191

Dr. Erhard's New York state-
ment, 1964, 191ff.

Dr. Erhard's statement to Bundes-
tag, 1964, 194ff.

Ulbricht rejection of reunifica-
tion, 1967, 210ff.
Road Transport Tax

East German claims, 1966-67,
217ff.

Safe Conduct Law, 1966
abolished 1970, 259
Security Zone

creation by East German Gov-
ernment, 1952, 88ff.
SED

see Sozialistische Einheitspartei

Deutschlands
SEW

see Socialist Unity Party of West

Berlin
Social Democratic Party

see Sozialdemokratische Partei

Deutschlands
Socialist Unity Party

see Sozialistische Einheitspartei

Deutschlands
Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin

(SEW), 226

Sole representation of all Germans.
West German claim, 190, 212,

217, 242
Soviet citizens in Germany

Marshal Bulganin's statement.
1955, 120, 128ff.

Soviet Union

Frontiers, 1945, 7

Recognition of German Demo-
cratic Republic, 1954, 96

Annulment of military decrees in
Eastern Germany, 1954, 96

Ending of state of war with
Germany, 1955, 108, 110

Diplomatic relations with West-
ern Germany, 1955, 114ff.

Treaty with Eastern Germany on
West German-Berlin traffic,
1955, 125

Trade and consular agreements
with Western Germany, 1958,
140ff.

Protest against Franco-German
treaty, 1963, 188ff.

Treaty with Eastern Germany,
1964, 193

Intervention rights claim under
UN. charter, 1967, 260

Intervention rights claim under
U.N. charter, West German re-
jection, 1968, 261ff.

Treaty with Western German"'
1970, 260ff.

"Concessions*' in connection witfl
1970 treaty, 1972, 289ff. n

Brandt visit, 1971, 300ff.
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands

Majority rejection of merger with
Communists, 1946, 12ff.

Vote against West German acces-
sion to W.E.U. and NATO,
1954, 91, 93ff., 104

Opposition to atomic weapons,

1958, 146

Reunification of Germany plan,

1959, 163ff.

Rejection of East German reuni-
fication plan, 1959, 166

Partner in Grand Coalition, 1966-
69, 198, 208

Exchanges with SED, 1966, 206ff.

Soviet Communist Party invita-
tion to talks, 1968, 223

Partner in coalition with FDP,
1969, 229

SED letter on West Berlin dis-
pute, 1969, 226 :
Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschi
lands

Formation, 1946, 13

Col. Tulpanov's address, 1947, 14

317

agreement, 1971,

Ostpolitikfcont.)
West Berlin

301ff.
East-West German traffic treaty,

1972, 310ff.

Paris Agreement, 1952

see European Defence Com-
munity

Paris Conference, 1946, 13ff.
Paris Four-Power Meeting, 1951,

73ff.

Paris Summit conference of heads
of government, breakdown,
1960, 159
Peace Conference

to settle definite frontiers,
1947, 22

Soviet proposal, 1953, 80ff.
Peace Treaty

Preparations for, 1947, 18
Communist proposal for im-
mediate conclusion, 1950, 66
Grotewohl proposal, 1950, 70
Soviet proposals, 1952, 75
Soviet proposals for preparation,

1953, 80

East German proposal, 1958, 148
Soviet note, 1961, 170
Khrushchev proposal to Pres-
ident Kennedy, 1961, 171
West German reply to Soviet

note, 1961, 172ff.
Bundestag declaration, 1961, 174
East German "Peace Plan",

1961, 175ff.
Renewed Khrushchev proposal,

1961, 178ff.

Khrushchev speech, 1963, 185ff.
Soviet note, 1966, 203
People's Congress, Eastern Ger-
many, Election, 1949, 48
Poland

Frontiers, 1945, 8, 17, 22ff.
Statement on Oder-Neisse line,

1966, 204

Dr. Kiesinger's policy statement,

1967, 209

Treaty with Western Germany
on frontiers and co-operation,
1970, 272ff., 278ff.

Ethnic Germans, Polish state-
ment, 1970, 280ff.

Brandt visit, 1970, 284
Postal charges

East German claims, 1966-67,
217ff.

316

Agreements between Eastern and
Western Germany, 1970, 258;
1971, 209

Potsdam Agreement, 1945, 1, 7,
lOff., 20, 37ff., 74, 75, 151ff.,
279

Prague Declaration, 1950, 66

Prague Meeting of Cominform Min-
isters, 1950, 64ff.

Prisoners of war

Repatriation of Germans from
the U.S.S.R., 1955, 114ff., 123,
126ff., 138

Railway charges

East German claims, 1966-67,

217ff:

Rapacki Plan, 1958, 144ff., 203
Rapallo, 1922 Treaty of, 192
Refugees from Eastern Germany,

1949-54, 92ff.

Bundestag resolution, 1958, 149ff.
1960-61 Exodus, 180
Escapes, Aug. 13, 1961, 182ff.
Escapes, 1961-71, 185
Relaxation of tension in Europe

West German proposals, 1966,

198ff.
Ulbricht New Year message,

1967, 210ff.
Brandt policy statement, 1969,

229ff.
Remilitarization

Federal Republic of Germany,

1950, 65ff.; 1955, 93ff.
Bulganin letter, 1957, 130
Further Soviet strictures, 1957,

133ff.

Joint Soviet-East German com-
munique, 1957, 138ff.
Bundestag resolution, 1958,

146ff.

Soviet note, 1966, 20 Iff.
German Democratic Republic,

1955-56, 95, 98ff.
Reparations from Germany

Provisions of JPotsdam Agree-
ment, 1945, 6ff.
Sokolovsky memorandum, 1948,

28
Repatriation of German nationals

from U.S.S.R., 142ff.
Reunification of Germany

Soviet proposal, 1952, 75fL
Four-Power exchanges, 1952-53,

76ff.

West German programme, 1953,
78ff.

Western Foreign Ministers' Wash-
ington meeting, 1953, 79ff.

Soviet proposal, 1953, 80ff.

Adenauer statements, 1953, 103ff.

Joint Soviet-East German com-
muniqu6, 1957, 138ff.

Bundestag resolutions, March

1958, 146ff.; July, 1958, 148ff.
East German and Soviet notes,

Sept. 1958, 148

"Western Peace Plan", 1959, 159

Allied declaration, 1957, 160ff.

Grotewohl "confederation" pro-
posal, 1957, 160

Social Democratic Party plan,

1959, 163ff.

East German "Peace Plan, 1961",
175ff.

SED "confederation" plan, 1963,
187

West German note to Soviet
Union, 1963, 191

Dr. Erhard's New York state-
ment, 1964, 191ff.

Dr. Erhard's statement to Bundes-
tag, 1964, 194ff.

Ulbricht rejection of reunifica-
tion, 1967, 210ff.
Road Transport Tax

East German claims, 1966-67,
217ff.

Safe Conduct Law, 1966
abolished 1970, 259
Security Zone

creation by East German Gov-
ernment, 1952, 88ff.
SED

see Sozialistische Einheitspartei

Deutschlands
SEW

see Socialist Unity Party of West

Berlin
Social Democratic Party

see Sozialdemokratische Partei

Deutschlands
Socialist Unity Party

see Sozialistische Einheitspartei

Deutschlands
Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin

(SEW), 226

Sole representation of all Germans.
West German claim, 190, 212,

217, 242
Soviet citizens in Germany

Marshal Bulganin's statement.
1955, 120, 128ff.

Soviet Union

Frontiers, 1945, 7

Recognition of German Demo-
cratic Republic, 1954, 96

Annulment of military decrees in
Eastern Germany, 1954, 96

Ending of state of war with
Germany, 1955, 108, 110

Diplomatic relations with West-
ern Germany, 1955, 114ff.

Treaty with Eastern Germany on
West German-Berlin traffic,
1955, 125

Trade and consular agreements
with Western Germany, 1958,
140ff.

Protest against Franco-German
treaty, 1963, 188ff.

Treaty with Eastern Germany,
1964, 193

Intervention rights claim under
UN. charter, 1967, 260

Intervention rights claim under
U.N. charter, West German re-
jection, 1968, 261ff.

Treaty with Western Germany,
1970, 260ff.

"Concessions" in connection with
1970 treaty, 1972, 289ff.

Brandt visit, 1971, 300ff.
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands

Majority rejection of merger with
Communists, 1946, 12ff.

Vote against West German acces-
sion to W.E.U. and NATO,
1954, 91, 93ff., 104

Opposition to atomic weapons,
1958, 146

Reunification of Germany plan,
1959, 163ff.

Rejection of East German reuni-
fication plan, 1959, 166

Partner in Grand Coalition, 1966-
69, 198, 208

Exchanges with SED, 1966, 206ff.

Soviet Communist Party invita-
tion to talks, 1968, 223

Partner in coalition with FDP,
1969, 229

SED letter on West Berlin dis-
pute, 1969, 226

Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutsch-
lands

Formation, 1946, 13

Col. Tulpanov's address, 1947, 14

317

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (conl.)

People's Congress election, 1949,
48

Volkskammer elections, 1950,
67ff.

Joint Soviet-East German com-
munique, 1957, 138ff.

Proposal for joint action with
West German Social Demo-
crats, 1959, 166

Sixth congress, 1963, 185

Ulbricht's seven-point plan for
normalization of relations with
Western Germany, 1963, 186ff.

Exchanges with West German
SPD, 1966, 206ff.

Seventh congress, 1967, 211

Revocation of West German Safe-
Conduct Law, 1970, 259
SPD

see Sozialdemokratische Partei

Deutschlands
Sudeten Germans

East German-Czechoslovak decla-
ration on finality of expulsion,
1950, 61, 69

Territorial Changes, 1945, 7ff.
Trade

Agreement between Western Ger-
many and Soviet Union, 1958,
140ff.

East-West German agreement,
1969, 218ff.

West German measures to bal-
ance inter-German trade, 1970,
259
Traffic

Interzonal restrictions, 1948, 33ff.;
1952, 88ff.

Berlin-Western Germany, German
Democratic Republic responsi-
ble, 1955, 125

Interzonal frontier, Bundestag
resolution, 1958, 149

East German restrictions on ac-
cess to East Berlin, 1960, 167ff.

Berlin border closed, 1961, 18 Iff.

Berlin passes agreements, 1963-
66, 188, 227

1968 Restrictions, 221ff.

Autobahn closure, 1969, 228
Brandt policy statement, 1969, 229

Visits from Western to Eastern
Germany, negotiations, 1971,
301ff.

318

Agreement on traffic between

Western Germany and West

Berlin, 308ff.
Agreement on visits from West

Berlin to Eastern Germany,

309
Traific Treaty between Eastern

and Western Germany, 1972,

31 Off.
Treaties

Franco-German Treaty, 1963,

188ff.
East German-Soviet Treaty, 1964,

193
West German-Soviet Treaty,

1970, 269
Polish-West German Treaty.

1970, 272ff., 278ff.
Ratification of 1970 treaties,

1972, 285ff.
Joint Bundestag resolution on

1970 treaties, 1972, 292ff.
East-West German Traffic Treaty,

1972, 310ff.
Two German States (see also Ost-

politik)
Referred to in Bulganin letter,

1957, 132
Ulbricht New Year message,

1967, 210ff.
Neues Deutschland, Dec. 20.

1967, 215

First mutual talks, 1968, 209
East German proposals, 1968,

216ff.
Brandt policy statements, 1969,

229ff.
Stoph policy statement, 1969,

23 Iff.
Brandt-Stoph meetings, 1970,

241ff.

Unification

see Reunification of Germany
United Nations Security Council

Soviet veto against resolutions on

Berlin, 1948, 44
United States

Treaty of Friendship with West-
ern Germany, 1954, 86, 91ff.

Volkskammer (Eastern Germany), 55,
67ff., 76

War, State of,

ending by Western Powers, 1950,
63, 64ff.

ending by Soviet Union, 1955, clause in East German draft

108, 110 treaty, 1967; 214; 1969, 225

Warsaw Treaty, 1955 Dispute over status, 1968, 220ff.

Conclusion, 96, 97ff. East German protest, 1969, 225

Admission of Eastern Germany, SED letter, 1969, 226

99ff . Four-Power agreement on status

Moscow Conference, 1961, 179 and access, 1971, 297ff.

Decision to close Berlin border, Agreements between Eastern and

1961, 181 Western Germany, 1971, 30 Iff.,

Commitments, Soviet note, 1966, 308ff.

201ff. Visits of West Berliners to East-
Washington Conference of Western ern Germany, 1972, 312

Foreign Ministers, 1953, 79ff. Western European Union

West Berlin West German entry, 1954, 87, 93
Status, 1958-59 crisis, 148ff.

" F 1958,?56''' S Viet Pr POSa1 ' Yalta Conference, 1945, 1,17, 20
Soviet Note on Franco-German

treaty, 1963, 189 Zgorzelec Agreement, 1950, 58ff., 201,

"Independent political unit," 204

319

INDEX OF NAMES

Abrassimov, Pyotr, 220, 223, 227

Acheson, Dean, 62, 87

Adenauer, Dr. Konrad, 27, 50ff., 56,
68ff., 82, 84ff., 87ff., 90ff.,
94ff., 102, 104ff., 108ff., 129,
130, 133, 136ff., 143, 146, 153,
162, 167ff., 172, 174, 183ff.,
187, 190

Ahlers, Conrad, 226, 265ff., 305ff.

Allardt, Dr. Helmut, 264

Alphand, Herv6, 22

Aradt, Dr. Adolf, 146

Bahr, Egon, 265, 305ff., 308, 311

Barzel, Dr. Rainer, 275, 288, 290ff.

Behrendt, Heinz, 218

Bevin, Ernest, 14ff., 18ff., 22ff., 36ff.,
41, 43ff., 62

Bidault, Georges, 18, 23ff., 79

Birrenbach, Dr. Kurt, 292

Bohm, Siegfried, 218

Bolz, Dr. Lothar, 156

Box, Dr. Heinrich, 274

Brandt, Willy

Chief Burgomaster of Berlin,
1958-66, 155, 157, 166, 169ff.,
174, 183ff., 187

Vice-Chancellor and Foreign
Minister, 1966-69, 198, 206,
208, 216, 223, 226ff., 260ff.
Federal Chancellor, 1969- ,
229, 231, 235ff., 240ff., 264,
266, 269, 272ff., 278, 282,
284ff., 290ff., 300ff., 305ff.

Brezhnev, Leonid, 268, 290, 300

Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai A., 98,
107, 114ff., 130, 136ff.

Byrnes, James F., 13ff., 23

Chataigneau, Yves, 42, 66

Chuikov, Marshal Vasili Ivanovich,

55,71
ChurchiU, (Sir) Winston Spencer, vii,

19,41
Clay, General Lucius, 22, 24, 26,

28ff., 31, 35ff., 42, 45ff.
Cyrankiewicz, Josef, 60, 274, 278,

284ff.

Danelius, Gerhard, 226, 301ff.
de Margerie, Roland, 188
Dertinger, Georg, 60
Dibrova, Major-General P.A., 101
Dickel, Col.-General Friedrich, 222,
224

320

Dieckmann, Johannes, 55, 69, 71

Diehl, Gtinter, 222, 225

Dollinger, Werner, 218

Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand, 263, 275

Dulles, John Foster, 79, 91

Ebert, Fritz, 46

Eden, (Sir) Anthony (later Lord

Avon), 87, 107
Ehlers, Herman, 71
Ehmke, Professor Horst, 305
Eisenhower, President (General),

Dwight D., 10, 73, 102ff., 107
Erhard, Dr. Ludwig, 143, 168, 191ff.,

194, 198, 208
Erler, Fritz, 166, 206ff.

Falin, Valentin, 265, 292
Faure, Edgar, 107
Franke, Egon, 240

Gailey, (U.S.) Brig.-General, 30
Gerstenmaier, Dr. Eugen, 143, 174,

194, 224

Geschke, Ottomar, 46
Gille, Dr. Alfred, 128
Goettling, Willi, 101
Goldenbaum, Ernst, 69
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 150, 272, 274,

285

Getting, Gerald, 69
Grabert, Horst, 227ff.
Gromyko, Andrei, 66, 141, 144, 156,

159, 263ff., 269, 285, 296ff.,
300, 305if.

Grotewohl, Otto, 13, 56, 59ff., 69ff.,
76, 88, 95, 99, lOlff., 155ff.,

160, 162, 167

Hallstein, Dr. Walter, 118, 129ff.,

293
Heinemann, President Gustav, 224,

229, 232ff., 242ff., 253, 274,

296

Heuss, President Theodore, 51, 93, 95
Honecker, Erich, 295
Hornle, Erwin, 12
Husak, Dr. Gustav, 296

Ilyichev, Leonid, 145

Jedrychowski, Dr. Stefan, 274, 277ff.,

284

Jessup, Dr. Philip C., 49
Johnson, President Lyndon B., 193

Kaiser, Jakob, 27, 68, 71, 90, 102

Kelly, Sir David, 66

Kennedy, President John F., 17 Iff.,

175, 183ff., 187
Khrushchev, Nikita, 117ff., 121ff.,

148ff., 155ff., 160, 166, 171,

175, 178ff., 185ff., 196
Kiesinger, Dr. Kurt Georg, 198,

208ff., 210ff., 221ff., 224ff.,

228, 241, 263, 268
Kirk, Admiral Alan, 66
Kleindienst, Willy, 218ff.
Koenig, General Marie-Pierre, 10,

28ff., 3 Iff., 42, 45ff.
Kohl, Dr. Helmut, 286ff., 294
Kohl, Dr. Michael, 227ff., 232, 305ff.,

308, 311

Kohrt, Gunter, 304ff., 308
Koniev, Marshal Ivan, 98, 100
Kosygin, Alexei N., 260, 265, 268

Lahr, Dr. Rudolf, 140

Leber, Georg, 223

Lloyd, Selwyn, 147

Liibke, President Heinrich, 193, 208

McCloy, John J., 56

Maletin, Pavel, 34

Marshall, George, 18ff., 22, 29, 38,

43ff.

Matern, Hermann, 69
Mende, Dr. Erich, 146
Michailov, Major-General, 128
Mikoyan, Anastas, 143ff.
Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 14ff., 18ff.,

42, 44, 83ff., 102, 117ff.
Montgomery, Field-Marshal Bernard

L., 10

Muller, Ulrich, 304, 308
Miiller, Lieut.-General Vincenz, 69

OUenhauer, Erich, 86, 105, 125ff., 160
Olszowski, Stefan, 297

Piatkowski, Waclaw, 274
Pieck, Wilhelm, 12ff., 52, 55, 88
Poleszczuk, Romuald, 203, 277
Poncet, Frangois, 56
Pushkin, Georgi Maximovich, 96

Raah, Dr. Julius, 148

Rapacki, Adam, 143ff.

Reuter, Professor Ernst, 47

Roberts, Frank, 42

Robertson, Lieut-General Sir Brian,

22, 28ff., 3 Iff., 34ff., 42, 45ff.,

56

Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano,

19
Rusk, Dean, 193

Salisbury, Lord (Gascoyne-Cecil, Rob-
ert Arthur James), 79
Scheel, Walter, 229, 264ff., 269,

275ff., 284, 286ff., 290, 296,

305

Schiller, Professor Karl, 210, 217ff.
Schmid, Professor Carlo, 166
Schmidt, Helmut, 250, 289
Schorner, Field-Marshal Ferdinand,

127
Schroder, Dr. Gerhard, 123, 188, 193,

288ff., 306
Schulze, Rudolf, 217
Schumacher, Dr. Kurt, 13, 27, 51, 69,

72ff.

Schuman, Robert, 43ff., 62, 87
Schutz, Klaus, 217, 220, 222, 226ff.,

273ff., 301ff., 304ff.
Semeonov (or Semyonov), Vladimir,

96, 140, 265

Skrzeszewski, Dr. Stanislaw, 60
Smirnov, Andrei, 150, 154ff.
Smith, General Bedell, 42
Sokolovsky, Marshal Vasilid Danilo-

vich, 24ff., 27, 28, 31ff., 41ff.,

45ff.

Solle, Horst, 210, 217
Stalin, Marshal Joseph V., 18ff., 19,

22, 42, 44ff., 93
Steinhoff, Dr. Karl, 67
Stoph, Willi, 99, 210ff., 217, 227,

231, 233, 240ff., 301ff., 305
Strauss, Franz-Josef, 218, 293
Striek, Heinz, 218
Stucklen, Richard, 217

Textor, Colonel Gordon E., 25
Truman, President Harry S., 49
Tsarapkin, Semyon Konstantinowich,

225ff., 228, 261
Tulpanov, Colonel, 24

Ulbricht, Walter, 56, 58, 61, 88,
100, 129, 153, 160, 168, 171,
175ff., 185ff., 206, 210, 212,
215, 226ff., 232ff., 236, 242,
253

Vinogradov, Sergei Alexandrovich,

113
von Brentano, Heinrich, 128, 134ff.,

141, 143, 154ff., 160, 165
von Hassel, Kai-Uwe, 224
von Maltzan, Dr. VoUrath, 113

321

von Paulus, Field-Marshal Friedrich, Winiewicz, Jozef, 274., 277

127 Winzer, Otto, 215, 228
von Wechmar, Rudiger, 265, 277, 305

Voss, Hans (G.D.R.), 232 Zakharov, General Matvei V., 16

Voss, Vice-Admiral Hans, 128 Zapotocky, Antonin, 61

Vyshinsky, Andrei, 22 Zhukov, Marshal Georgi

tinovich, 10, 12, 31

Wehner, Herbert, 206ff., 226 Zorin, Valerian, 127

322

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