Giddy minds and foreign quarrels

Giddy Minds
and Foreign
Quarrels ®®

CHARLES A.
BEARD

The Macmillan Company

327. 73

B378g

c.3

J

Giddy Minds and
Foreign Quarrels

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO
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m Giddy Minds and g
m Foreign Quarrels jj

m ANESTIMATEOF m
jj AMERICAN ||

m FO RE I GN POLI C Y ■

M by Charles A. Beard ||

m New York m

jj THE MACMILLAN COMPANY jgj

university of flomm limmies

'

Copyright, 1939, by
CHARLES A. BEARD.

All rights reserved — no part of this book
may be reproduced in any form without
permission in writing from the publisher,
except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief
passages in connection with a review written
for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

Set up and printed. Published September, 1939.
Reprinted October, 1939 (twice).

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN BOOK-STRATFORD PRESS, INC., NEW YORK

Giddy Minds and
Foreign Quarrels

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

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IN THE FOURTH ACT OF "HENRY
IV" the King on his death-bed gives
his son and heir the ancient advice
dear to the hearts of rulers in dire straits
at home:

I . . . had a purpose now

To lead out many to the Holy Land,

Lest rest and lying still might make

them look
Too near unto my state. Therefore, my

Harry,
Be it thy course, to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels ; that action, hence

borne out,
May waste the memory of the former

days.

[7]

GIDDY MINDS

Since the foundation of the American
Republic there has been an endless pro-
cession of foreign quarrels with which
giddy minds could have been busied.
The following brief citations from the
record hint at the thousands of possibili-
ties scattered through the days and years
from George Washington's Administra-
tion to the advent of Theodore Roose-
velt:

1 793-1 8 1 5, Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

18 1 5, Alliance of England, Russia, Prussia, and
Austria to hold down republican and demo-
cratic agitations.

1 817, Popular outburst at Wartburg.

1 8 19, Carlsbad decrees establish despotism in
German confederation.

1820, Revolutions in Spain and Italy.

1 821, War for Greek independence opens.

[8]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

1822, "Triumph" of Holy Alliance over demo-
cratic movements.

1827, English, Russian, and French fleets crush
the Sultans' fleet at Navarino.

1828—29, Russian war on Turkey.

1830, Revolutions in France and Belgium; up-
rising in Poland.

183 1, Insurrections in central Italy.
1838—42, British war on Afghanistan.
1840, British opium war in China.
1845, British war in the Punjab.

1847, France finishes conquest of Algeria.

1848, Revolution in France; spreads to Hun-
gary, Germany, and Austria.

1849, Violent reaction, Austrian war on Hun-
gary.

1 85 1, Louis Napoleon makes a coup d'etat in
France.

1852, Napoleon III establishes an eighteen-year
dictatorship in France.

1853, T'ai-p'ing rebellion starts in China; mil-
lions killed; great cities destroyed.

1854—56, England, France, Sardinia, and Tur-
key wage war on Russia.

[9]

GIDDY MINDS

1856—60, France and England wage war on
China.

1857, Sepoy mutiny in India; vigorous suppres-
sion.

1859—60, France and Sardinia wage war on Aus-
tria.

1 86 1, England, France, and Spain act against
Mexico.

1863, Insurrection in Poland.

1864, Prussia attacks Denmark and seizes Schles-
wig-Holstein.

1865, Insurrection in Spain.

1866, German-Italian axis treaty; Germany wages
war on Austria.

1867, Insurrection in Spain; Fenian uprisings in
Ireland.

1868, Overthrow of Spanish monarchy.
1870—71, Franco-Prussian war.

1873—75, Establishment and subsequent over-
throw of the Spanish republic.

1875, Insurrection against Turkey in Herzego-
vina.

1876, Palace revolution in Turkey and Bulgarian
atrocities.

[10]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

1877, Russia wages war on Turkey.

1 88 1, France finishes conquest of Tunis.

1882, Italy makes an axis with Austria and Ger»
many; British seize Cairo.

1883, France finishes conquest of Annam.
1885, France takes Tonkin from China by war;

Serbo-Bulgarian war.
1889, Boulangism flares up and bursts in France.
1 891, Franco-Russian Alliance.

1894, Persecution of Dreyfus begins.

1895, Japan finishes war on China; Jameson raid
in the Transvaal.

1896, Italian war on Abyssinia.

1897, Germany seizes Kiao-chau in China; mis-
sionary troubles.

1898, Bloody uprising in Milan; British re-
conquer the Sudan.

1899, Britain opens war on Boer republics.

1900, Boxer rebellion.

1 90 1, Peaceful era of Queen Victoria closes.

Until near the end of that "wonder-
ful" century of "peace, religion, and in-

[«]

GIDDY MINDS

ternauonal good faith" the Government
of the United States kept aloof from the
aggressions, wars, and quarrels of Eu-
rope. It proposed no world conferences
for correcting the wicked, settling con-
flicts, and curing unrest in the four cor-
ners of the earth. From time to time, it
is true, groups of American people held
meetings in favor of one country or
party or another, but even they did not
try to force their Government to play
the role of universal preceptor and man-
ufacturer of rules for settling everybody
and everything under threats of armed
intervention. Only in relatively recent
times has wholesale interference with
foreign quarrels and disturbances be-
come a major concern of the intelligent-

[12]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

sia, the press, and professional politicians
in the United States.

But frenetic preoccupation with for-
eign quarrels has now reached the pro-
portion of a heavy industry in this coun-
try. All our universities have funds and
endowments for teaching what is called
"international relations," and since about
1918a large part of this instruction has
been stripped of all scientific pretensions
and has been little more than propa-
ganda for the League of Nations, collec-
tive security, collaboration with Great
Britain and France, or some kind of
regularized intervention by the United
States Government in foreign controver-
sies everywhere, except perhaps at Am-
ritsar or in Syria. Hundreds of profes-

[13]

GIDDY MINDS

sors, instructors, and assistants, sustained
by endowments, lecture to students, fo-
rums, women's clubs, academies, and din-
ner parties on their favorite theme — the
duty of the United States to set the
world aright. Peace societies, associations
for the "study" of foreign affairs, coun-
cils, leagues, and committees for this and
that, with millions of dollars at their dis-
posal, are engaged in the same kind of
propaganda, openly or under the guise
of contemporary "scholarship."

In fact, advocacy of American inter-
ventionism and adventurism abroad has
become a huge vested interest. The daily
press and the radio, thriving on hourly
sensations, do their best to inflame read-
ers, listeners, and lookers with a passion

[14]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

for putting down the wicked abroad.
Foreign propagandists, often well paid
by American audiences, play the same
game. And brash young tom-tom beaters
in journalism, who know no history be-
yond a few days ago, write books on the
"inside" of this or that, all directed
profitably to the same end. How did we
get this way? This is the fundamental
question for all of us who are trying to
take bearings.

II

The era of universal American jitters
over foreign affairs of no vital interest
to the United States was opened in full

[15]

GIDDY MINDS

blast about 1890 by four of the most
powerful agitators that ever afflicted any
nation: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theo-
dore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge,
and Albert J. Beveridge. These were the
chief manufacturers of the new doctrine
correctly characterized as "imperialism
for America," and all of them were pri-
marily phrase-makers, not men of hard
economic experience.

The ideology for this adventure was
cooked up by the bookish Mahan and
was promulgated by politicians. It was
"sold" to the country amid the great
fright induced by the specter of Bryan-
ism, and amid the din of the wars on
Spain and the Filipinos. As the British
agent who framed a portion of the

[16]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

new gospel for John Hay, Secretary of
State presumably for the United States,
shrewdly observed, this was one way of
smashing the populist uprising and get-
ting the country in hand. It was not
Woodrow Wilson, the schoolmaster, who
first invented the policy of running out
and telling the whole world just the
right thing to do. It was the new men of
imperialism.

The heady ideology put forth to sus-
tain the imperialist policy may be sum-
marized as follows: America has grown
up, has acquired man's stature and put
on long pants j the frontier has passed j
the continent has been rounded outj
America must put aside childish things,
become a great big world power, follow

[17]

GIDDY MINDS

the example of Great Britain, France,
and Germany, build a monster navy,
grab colonies, sea bases, and trading posts
throughout the world, plunge into every
big dispute among European powers,
and carry "civilization" to "backward"
races.

For this creed of lunging and plung-
ing Alfred Thayer Mahan caught the
clew from Mommsen's history of Rome
and furnished the sea-power slogans. An
army of literary artists supplied senti-
mental prose and poetry. Clergymen did
their bit by citing the rich opportunity
to "Christianize" the heathen. Steel
makers and other naval merchants put
sinews of war into the propaganda chest
of the Navy League and pronounced it
[18]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

good for business — their business, at
least. Shipyard constituencies whipped
up political support. The middle classes,
terrorized by populism, applauded.

Albert J. Beveridge provided the elo-
quence: "American factories are making
more than the American people can use;
American soil is producing more than
they can consume. Fate has written our
policy for us; the trade of the world
must and shall be ours. And we shall get
it as our mother [England] has told us
how. We will establish trading posts
throughout the world. . . . We will cover
the ocean with our merchant marine. We
will build a navy to the measure of our
greatness. Great colonies governing
themselves, flying our flag and trading

[ 19 1 "

GIDDY MINDS

with us will grow about our posts o£
trade. Our institutions will follow our
flag on the wings of our commerce. And
American law, American order, Ameri-
can civilization, and the American flag
will plant themselves on shores hitherto
bloody and benighted, but by those agen-
cies of God henceforth to be made beau-
tiful and bright." Cheers, cheers, cheers.
And mighty men among the intelligent-
sia j oined the Mahan-Lodge-Roosevelt-
Beveridge storm troops in full cry,
shouting for the new gospel, while
damning Bryan as a fool, Altgeld as an
anarchist, and opponents of imperialism
as "white-livered cowards" and "little
Americans." What a Roman holiday!
Taking advantage of the national fu-
[20]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

ror over the war against Spain and the
unrest created by the populist upheaval
at home, the imperialist agitators "put
their creed over on the country" for a
brief season. As an accident of politics,
Theodore Roosevelt became President
of the United States and started his big
parade. The water-cure torture was ad-
ministered to recalcitrant Filipinos. End-
less notes were written to Kaiser Wil-
helm II. The Navy was sent around the
world. The big stick was brandished fu-
riously. The United States participated
in the conference of the great powers at
Algeciras and helped to dish Germany
in a quarrel that had no relation what-
ever to any vital interests of this coun-
try. But from the point of view of find-
[21]

GIDDY MINDS

ing outlets for "our surpluses" and
bolstering up national security, the show
was a farce. In an economic sense it
brought an enormous expense to the na-
tion, not the promised profit. In respect
of national defense, it gave us the Achil-
les heel of the Philippines.

For a time the monster demonstration
entertained the intelligentsia and the
mobs, like a Roman circus. But under-
neath it all there was a revolt. The sober
second sense of the country gradually
came to estimate it at its true worth,
that is, as a frenzy. Despite the big ca-
rousel, "pusillanimous, cowardly, con-
temptible mollycoddles" at home con-
tinued to insist on devoting attention to
the state of the American Union.
[22]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

By one of the ironies of history it fell
to the lot of Wilson, whom Theodore
Roosevelt hated like poison, to mount
the world stage and outdo Roosevelt in
using the power of the United States to
set the whole world aright. Roosevelt
had lunged and plunged here and there
— at Pekin, Algeciras, Morocco, and
other troubled spots. Wilson's ambitions
were without limit. He proposed to
make the wide world safe for the Amer-
ican brand of democracy and transform
backward places into mandated trusts for
civilization.

The lines of the Wilsonian creed of
world interventionism and adventurism
are in substance: Imperialism is bad
(well, partly) j every nation must have

[23]

GIDDY MINDS

a nice constitutional government, more
or less like ours; if any government dis-
likes the settlement made at Versailles it
must put up its guns and sit down with
its well-armed neighbors for a "friend-
ly" conference j trade barriers are to be
lowered and that will make everybody
round the globe prosperous (almost, if
not entirely) j backward peoples are to
be kept in order but otherwise treated
nicely, as wards j the old history, full of
troubles, is to be closed ; brethren, and
presumably sisters, are to dwell together
in unity j everything in the world is to
be managed as decorously as a Baptist
convention presided over by the Honor-
able Cordell Hull; if not, we propose
to fight disturbers everywhere (well,

[24]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

nearly everywhere). The American peo-
ple did not vote for exactly this in 1 9 1 6.
At the very first chance, the congres-
sional election of 191 8, they expressed
decided distrust and in 1920 they seemed
to express more than distrust. But the
intelligentsia of world affairs continued
unshaken in their faith, agitation, and
propaganda.

Although the Republican party was
dubbed "isolationist" after 1920, its
politicians in power were really nothing
of the sort. On the contrary they tried
to combine the two kinds of jitters over
foreign affairs that had recently been
sponsored by Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson. They sought to make
the most of both kinds. They played the

[25]

GIDDY MINDS

old Roosevelt-Lodge-Beveridge game of
imperialism wherever they could and
whenever they had a chance, in the Far
East and in the Near East. They turned
the Government of the United States
into a big drumming agency for pushing
the sale of goods and the lending of
money abroad, and they talked vocifer-
ously about the open doors everywhere
except at home. On the other hand, they
lectured Soviet Russia and discoursed
sagely on peace for worried mankind in
the best Wilsonian style. It was near the
high noon of Normalcy, while the Amer-
ican marines were waging peace in the
Caribbean, that the State Department
proudly arranged for the Kellogg Pact
and the powers of the earth solemnly
[26]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

renounced war forever as an instrument
of national policy.

But this experiment in combining two
kinds of jitters did not fare any better
than the experiment in taking on each
kind separately. The big drumming
game blew up. Foreign bonds to the
tune of billions went into default. The
Kellogg Pact became a gibbering ghost.
The industrial boom, fed by pump prim-
ing abroad at the expense of American
investors, burst with a terrific explosion
which produced the ruins amid which we
now sit in sackcloth and ashes.

Ill

For a brief season the American peo-
ple had enough jitters at home to keep

[27]

GIDDY MINDS

their giddy minds away from foreign
affairs, and in a quest for relief they
swept into office Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who promised to get them out of the
slough of economic despond. At first
President Roosevelt concentrated his en-
ergies on those domestic measures of
reform and salvation known as the New
Deal. He scouted the idea that world
economic conferences, tariff tinkering,
and diplomatic notes could contribute
materially to relieving the frightful dis-
tress at home. Slowly, however, he
veered in the direction of world lectur-
ing and interventionism, and now he
displays a firm resolve to interfere with
the affairs of Europe and Asia as if he
were arbiter of international relations
[28]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

and commissioned to set the world
aright. The causes of this reversal are
obscure, but the fact remains. Internal
and external changes may partly account
for it. The state of jitters in domestic
economy has not been cured by the New
Deal, despite the best of intentions. And
Great Britain, after playing Germany
off against France and treating Russia
with studied contempt, has once more
got what Henry Adams called "the
grizzly German terror" on her doorstep,
and needs American help again.

The veering tendencies of the Roose-
velt Administration are to be observed
in every phase of our foreign affairs.
At the outset Latin-American countries
were informed that the good old imperi-

[29]

GIDDY MINDS

alism of earlier times was to be re-
nounced. In 1934 the provision of the
Piatt Amendment which gave the
United States the "legal" right to mili-
tary intervention in Cuba was abrogated.
American marines were withdrawn from
various places in the Caribbean region.
Latin-American governments were al-
lowed to default on their bonds held in
the United States and to seize property
owned by American citizens, without
evoking anything stronger than diplo-
matic notes from Washington. Instead
of thundering and drawing the sword
after the style of Theodore Roosevelt
and Albert Fall, the Administration has
resorted to negotiation. Instead of send-
ing marines to collect on defaulted

[30]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

bonds, it is arranging to use public
money to revive the trade which col-
lapsed after private lending had ended
in disaster for American investors. Thus
Latin-American politicians have been
given smaller excuses for straining their
lungs over "Yankee imperialism" and
seeking counter weights in Europe.

Yet through the Latin-American ne-
gotiations, especially since 1936, the
Roosevelt Administration has evidently
been seeking to line up Latin-American
governments in defense of "democracy,"
shrewdly with an eye to developing a
"united front" against Hitler and Mus-
solini. These two disturbers of the order
in Europe are not making any demands
on the United States, but their efforts to

[31]

GIDDY MINDS

get trade and win supporters in countries
to the south of the Rio Grande furnish
points for the Roosevelt Administration's
agitation against them in Europe and
at home. Things have been brought to
such a pass that American citizens given
to alarms are imagining German planes
from Bolivia dropping bombs on peace-
ful people in Keokuk or Kankakee.

Schemes for promoting "democracy"
in Latin America have been less success-
ful. The people of the United States
have only vague ideas about the coun-
tries below the Rio Grande, but they
know enough to know that most govern-
ments in that vast region are not and
never have been democracies. At the
close of the year 1938, according to J.

[32]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

Fred Rippy, at least twelve of the twenty
Latin-American countries were governed
by dictators of their own and if the term
is interpreted broadly, "perhaps two or
three more should be added to the list."
These twelve dictators "were ruling
seventy-five million people in Latin
America — three-fifths of its population
— and dominating a land area almost
twice the size of the United States." It
would seem, therefore, that the rhetoric
of democratic solidarity in this hemi-
sphere does not get very far below the
surface of things.

In respect of Far Eastern affairs, the
Roosevelt Administration, early in its
career, made a brave gesture in the di-
rection of anti-imperialism by accepting

[33]

GIDDY MINDS

the act of Congress granting conditional
independence to the Philippines. At the
moment this maneuver was widely inter-
preted to mean that the United States
intended to withdraw its armed forces
from the Orient and fix its front upon
the Hawaiian line. Organized agricul-
ture was dead set against competitive im-
ports from the Philippines. Organized
labor was firm in its opposition to the
immigration of "our little brown broth-
ers" and to the importation of cheap
goods made by them in their island
home. Against these two forces organ-
ized business could make no headway.
From an economic point of view the
whole experiment in the Philippines had
been a costly fiasco, as more than one

[34]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

copious balance sheet demonstrated. Im-
perialism certainly did not provide the
outlets for American "surpluses" which
Senator Beveridge had promised. Be-
sides, even amateur strategists discov-
ered, as Theodore Roosevelt had done
after the first uprush of his berserk en-
thusiasm, that the Philippines were the
Achilles heel of American defense.

Nevertheless, the question of naval
bases in the Philippines has been left
hanging in the air under the terms of
the independence act, and the outburst
in Washington last winter over the pre-
liminaries to the fortification of Guam
indicates that someone in the Capital is
toying with the idea of transforming our
obvious liability in the Western Pacific

[35]

GIDDY MINDS

into what is euphoniously called "an
asset of naval power" — for exerting
pressure in Asiatic affairs. That the
Philippines, with Singapore not far
away, could be used as a lever in world
politics is obvious.

While Philippine "independence" was
being promised with a great flourish and
the American people were busy with
their jitters at home, the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration put aside the old delusion
that booming "the China trade" would
help in getting the country out of a de-
pression through the sale of "our sur-
pluses." In fact, that balloon has com-
pletely burst. For years Western mer-
chants and their intellectual retainers,
including consular agents, filled the air

[36]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

with a great noise about how much
money could be made in China as soon
as four hundred million customers got
round to buying automobiles, bath-tubs,
typewriters, radios, refrigerators, and
sewing machines. Probably a few of
these myth makers were honest. But
many among them must have realized
that this swarm of customers had neither
the money nor the goods with which to
pay for Western gadgets. However that
may be, and despite tons of diplomatic
notes, despite gunboats, marines, sol-
diers, Open Doors, and all the rest, the
trade of the United States with China
has been and remains relatively insignifi-
cant j in an absolute sense it is of no vital
importance to the United States.

[37]

GIDDY MINDS

Notwithstanding this well-known fact
the Roosevelt Administration, from the
very outset, in dealing with China has
followed rather closely the old Hay-
Knox-Hughes imperialist line, laid down
in the Open Door fiction supplied to the
United States by British negotiators —
that curious form of direct intervention-
ism that was sold to the country as "a
fair deal." Even before he was inaugu-
rated in 1933 Franklin D. Roosevelt
apparently committed himself to that
amazing fantasy known as the Hoover,
or Stimson, doctrine. We were "never"
going to recognize any conquest of terri-
tory made contrary to treaties, especially
the Kellogg "Pact." So efforts were
made to induce other co-signers of Open

[38]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

Door and peace treaties, especially Brit-
ain and France, to join in putting the
screws on Japan. But those two democ-
racies wriggled out of the net.

Later, when Japan again started to
make war on China, the President man-
aged to instigate another European
"conference," composed of governments
solemnly committed to the Open Door.
Our peripatetic ambassador-extraordi-
nary, Norman Davis, was sent over the
sea, to take part in the feast of reason
and flow of soul. When Mr. Davis re-
turned home a reporter asked him point
blank, "Was it a bust?" He could not
quite admit that, but the reporter was
right. It was a bust. Yet the Roosevelt
Administration still labors hard at tak-

[39]

GIDDY MINDS

ing the Open Door delusion seriously,
and still seems to regard it as a tangible
asset, at least in the manipulations o£
world politics.

After the Japanese invasion of China
flamed up in a major war the Roosevelt
Administration blew hot and cold, but
ended by using the affair to strengthen
its general campaign for setting the
world aright. At one time it declared
that it did not intend to keep American
forces in China for the purpose of pro-
tecting American citizens who refused to
withdraw from the war zones. Ameri-
can merchants in Shanghai emitted a
vigorous protest. Then Secretary Hull
put the soft pedal on the notion that the
Government of the United States was

[40]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

not duty bound to uphold American
rights to do business even on Chinese
battlefields, and the Administration tried
to make a national sensation out of the
Panay incident.

Yet, curiously enough, this same Ad-
ministration refused to find a state of
war existing in China and to apply the
munitions embargo to the belligerents.
Voices were heard saying that an em-
bargo would hurt China more than Ja-
pan. Perhaps that was so. Perhaps not.
Anyway, Americans made hay while the
sun shone by selling Japan enormous
quantities of munitions and raw mate-
rials of war. The Roosevelt Administra-
tion had run into a violent economic
slump and that trade was good for

[41]

GIDDY MINDS

American business. Every little bit of
profit helped in the gray days of 1937
and 1938. Even so, Japan was included
among the enemies of the United States
in the Chicago speech of October 5,

1937.

The sharp shift from focussing atten-
tion on the disturbing plight of domes-
tic economy to the concentration of at-
tention on foreign affairs is most clearly
evident in respect of European relations.
Shortly after the Roosevelt Administra-
tion opened in 1933 it took part in the
London world economic conference, for
which President Hoover and Congress
had made preparations. True to his
economic style, Secretary Hull, at this
mondial assembly, derided "isolation-

[42]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

ism," ridiculed the efforts of nations "by
bootstrap methods" to lift themselves
out of the economic crisis, declared that
each nation by domestic action could im-
prove its condition only "to a moderate
extent," and offered a plan of salvation
in lower trade barriers. But President
Roosevelt took the onus of putting a
stop to the palaver in London. The af-
fair was another failure from the outset.
If the President had waited a few
months the conference would doubtless
have worn itself out and adjourned. He
did not wait. By a sharp message to the
august assembly he exploded the works.
In so doing he declared that "the sound
internal economic system of a nation is a
greater factor in its well being than the

[43]

GIDDY MINDS

price of its currency in changing terms
o£ the currencies of other nations." After
proclaiming this policy he turned to the
business of trying to stimulate domestic
agriculture and industry by domestic
action.

For a considerable time after the ex-
plosion in London, President Roosevelt
gave his special attention to domestic
affairs. It is true that he signed the Re-
ciprocal Trade bill, so dear to Secretary
Hull's heart, and allowed the State De-
partment to set out on its crusade to
"lower trade barriers," but at the same
time he tried to keep on good terms with
George N. Peek, who believed that Sec-
retary Hull was employing sentiment —
not hard-headedness — in driving trade

[44]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

bargains. When the plan for taking the
United States into the World Court was
before the Senate, the President en-
dorsed it, but lukewarmly, and put no
heavy pressure on his party's Senators
to force ratification. The defeat of the
project gave him no sleepless nights. By
recognizing Soviet Russia he yanked the
State Department out of the high dudg-
eon stirred up in Wilson's Administra-
tion and kept going by Hughes, Kellogg,
and Stimson, and simply restored the old
policy, consecrated by usage, of main-
taining diplomatic relations with saints
and villains abroad. This looked like at-
tending to our own business.

The real reversal of American policy
and return to constant jitters over Euro-

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GIDDY MINDS

pean affairs came after the election o£
1936. In the campaign of that year
President Roosevelt gave no hint that
he intended to take a strong hand in
European quarrels. The Democratic
platform, made in his own office, de-
clared positively: "We shall continue to
observe a true neutrality in the disputes
of others j to be prepared resolutely to
resist aggression against ourselves ; to
work for peace and to take the profits out
of war; to guard against being drawn,
by political commitments, international
banking, or private trading, into any war
which may develop anywhere." This
looked like a pledge to keep out of for-
eign conflicts and wars. The pledge Pres-
ident Roosevelt confirmed in his Chau-

[46]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

tauqua address of August 14, 1936: "We
can keep out o£ war if those who watch
and decide have a sufficiently detailed
understanding of international affairs to
make certain that the small decisions of
each day do not lead toward war and if,
at the same time, they possess the cour-
age to say 'no' to those who selfishly or
unwisely would let us go to war." If
words meant anything in 1936, those
words confirmed an evident desire to
avoid meddling with the incessant quar-
rels of Europe and Asia.

Although his platform declared that
"we shall continue to observe a true neu-
trality in the disputes of others," Presi-
dent Roosevelt, in December 1936, a
little more than a month after his victory

[47]

GIDDY MINDS

in the election, moved to violate neu-
trality in connection with the civil war
in Spain. On his initiative a bill was
drafted and jammed through Congress
putting an embargo on munitions to
the Loyalist government at Madrid.
Whether he took this action at the sug-
gestion of Great Britain, or to parallel
British action in the Non-intervention
Committee, so farcical in its operations,
the upshot pointed in one direction —
intervention in European affairs. The
embargo was a violation of international
law. It was a violation of a specific
treaty with Spain. It was an insult to
the government of Madrid, which the
Government of the United States recog-
nized as de facto and de jure. It

[48]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

smoothed the way for those non-inter-
veners, Hitler and Mussolini, to destroy
that government. Whatever may have
been President Roosevelt's intention's, he
violated neutrality and entered into col-
laboration with Great Britain and France
in a fateful policy which was responsible
for the triumph of despotism, Hitler,
and Mussolini, in Spain — the very kind
of despotism and two of the biggest des-
pots that he now denounces to the world.
The pledge of the Democratic plat-
form stood written in the record. The
Chautauqua speech of 1936 stood there
also. But on October 5, 1937, President
Roosevelt went to Chicago and called,
in effect, for collective action by all the
"democracies" against Germany, Italy,

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GIDDY MINDS

and Japan. He declared that if a holo-
caust came the United States could not
avoid it and appealed to "the peace
loving nations" to put a quarantine on
aggressors. The significance of this ad-
dress was grasped immediately. Advo-
cates of collective security and collabora-
tion with Britain and France hailed it as
a sharp change of front on the part of
the President. But the counter blast of
criticism from all parts of the country
was startling and for a few weeks Presi-
dent Roosevelt lapsed into silence. Nev-
ertheless he had evidently made up his
mind that he was going to take a big
hand in European and Asiatic affairs
anyway and that the country would have
to bend to his will or break.

[50]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

Additional proof of his resolve soon
came. On January 28, 1938, President
Roosevelt sent a resounding message to
Congress on the subject of armaments.
He demanded an enormous increase in
naval outlays, with special emphasis on
battleships, and called for a mobiliza-
tion bill which had no meaning unless he
wanted a huge army that could be used
in Europe. This increase in armaments,
he said, was made necessary by the
growth of land and sea forces in other
countries which "involve a threat to
world peace and security." One week
before this bombshell message landed in
Congress, the House of Representatives
had passed the regular naval appropria-
tion bill granting the Navy substantially

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GIDDY MINDS

all that it had called for in the largest
peace-time naval appropriation in the
history of the country. Why had the
Navy Department suddenly discovered
that it needed another billion or more?
This question was put to Admiral Leahy
by a member of the House Committee
on naval affairs, and the honest old sailor
blurted out: "I am not accurately in-
formed in regard to that."

This was the cold truth. The sudden
demand for an immense increase in the
Navy had not come from the Navy De-
partment. It had come from the White
House. It was not related to defending
the American zone of interest in the
Western hemisphere. Admiral Leahy
testified that the Navy was then ready

[52]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

to defend this zone. The new bill took
on significance and utility only in rela-
tion to the President's resolve to act as a
kind of arbiter in world affairs. It is true
that the Democratic managers in Con-
gress, while pushing the bill through the
House and Senate, repudiated all "quar-
antine" doctrines and rested their case
on grounds of continental security, but
by citations from the testimony of naval
experts the opposition demonstrated the
hollowness of all such pretensions.

Victorious in securing his extraordinary
naval authorization, President Roosevelt
renewed his battle in 1939. His message
to Congress in January vibrated with
emotions connected with foreign tumults
and asserted that the United States is di-

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GIDDY MINDS

rectly menaced by "storms from abroad."
These storms, the President said, chal-
lenge "three institutions indispensable to
Americans. The first is religion. It is the
source of the other two — democracy and
international good faith." Evidently he
was clearing a way to make the next war
a real holy war. This clarion call Presi-
dent Roosevelt followed by another de-
mand for an increase in armaments on a
scale more vast.

As if undaunted by all that had hap-
pened in the previous autumn when he
had, metaphorically and yet truly speak-
ing, gone to Munich with Chamberlain
and Daladier, President Roosevelt, on
April 14, 1939, issued to the world a
peace appeal to Hitler and offered in ex-

[54]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

change another round-table on disarma-
ment and another economic conference.
All the while the Tory government in
Great Britain and the reactionary gov-
ernment in France were playing with
Hitler and Mussolini and aiding in the
destruction of the Spanish Republic.

Apparently indifferent to the real na-
ture of British and French tactics, Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Secretary Hull grew
bolder in their determination to help
Britain and France in whatever they
were doing. In the summer of 1939 they
opened a public campaign to break down
the provision of the Neutrality Act
which imposed an embargo on munitions
in case of a foreign war "found" by the
President. They had all along covertly

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GIDDY MINDS

fought this provision, without taking the
risk of officially and openly denouncing
it in the name of the Administration.
The will of the country to stay out of
foreign wars had been too strong. That
will would have to be crushed. The
President and the Secretary of State were
well aware that Congress was not likely
to give them the coveted power to name
"aggressors" and throw the country into
a conflict on the side of "peace lovers";
but they were none the less resolved if
possible to erase every line of the Neu-
trality Act that stood in the way of their
running the foreign affairs of the United
States on the basis of constant participa-
tion in the quarrels of Europe and Asia,
with war as their ultima ratio.

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AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

Now President Roosevelt's foreign
policy is clear as daylight. He proposes
to collaborate actively with Great Britain
and France in their everlasting wrangle
with Germany, Italy, and Japan. He
wants to wring from Congress the power
to throw the whole weight of the United
States on the side of Great Britain and
France in negotiations, and in war if
they manage to bungle the game. That
using measures short of war would, it is
highly probable, lead the United States
into full war must be evident to all who
take thought about such tactics.

IV

From the point of view of the interest
of the United States as a continental na-

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GIDDY MINDS

tion in this hemisphere, the Roosevelt
policy is, in my opinion, quixotic and
dangerous. It is quixotic for the reason
that it is not based upon a realistic com-
prehension of the long-time history of
Europe and Asia and of the limited
power which the United States has over
the underlying economies and interests
of those two continents. It assumes that
the United States can in fact bring those
continents into a kind of stable equilib-
rium, assure them the materials of a
peaceful economic life, and close their
history in a grand conference of the pow-
ers— perhaps as successfully as Locarno.
It assumes that somebody in the White
House or State Department can calcu-
late the consequences likely to come out

[58]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

of the explosive forces which are hidden
in the civilizations of those immense
areas.

Does anyone in this country really
know what is going on in Europe, behind
the headlines, underneath the diplomatic
documents? Is it true, as French pub-
licists contend, that the Pope, having
blessed the triumph of Franco in Spain,
is striving for a union of fascist and other
powers, for the secret purpose of liqui-
dating Soviet Russia? Has Russia just
grounds for distrusting the governments
of Chamberlain and Daladier? If Hitler
and Mussolini are liquidated either by
pressure or by war, will the outcome be a
Victorian democracy, a communistic rev-
olution, or a general disintegration? Are

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GIDDY MINDS

not the powers immediately and directly
entangled in all this strife in a better
position to adjust their disputes than
President Roosevelt and his assistants in
the State Department?

Even assuming that the United States
ought to do its best to help the "democ-
racies" in Europe and Asia, the Roose-
velt policy is quixotic in that it does not
look far beyond a temporary pacification
— a pacification that might be affected by
a mere show of force or by another war.
It does not propose any fundamental ad-
justment in the economies of nations
which would provide any guarantee of
peace after the temporary pacification,
either by pressure or by war. And if the
United States really had the knowledge,
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AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

good will, and intention necessary to
construct a formula for such a perma-
nent economic peace, it does not and can-
not have the power to force it upon other
nations. In my opinion it does not have
the knowledge, the will, or the intention.
Hence, in my judgment, it is folly for
the people of the United States to em-
bark on a vast and risky program of
world pacification. We can enjoy the
luxury of hating certain nations. We can
indulge in the satisfaction that comes
from contemplating a war to destroy
them. We can rush into a combination
that might temporarily check them. But,
it seems to me, it would be wiser to sug-
gest that those countries of Europe
which are immediately menaced by Ger-
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GIDDY MINDS

many and Italy put aside their jealous-
ies, quarrels, and enmities, and join in a
combination of their own to effect con-
trol over the aggressors. If countries
whose very existence seems at stake
will not unite for self-protection, how
can the United States hope to effect a
union among them? After temporary
pacification what? After war what? After
peace what? To these questions the
Roosevelt foreign policy makes no an-
swer. And they are the fundamental
questions.

The Roosevelt foreign policy is also
quixotic because it is based on the as-
sumption that the economy and democ-
racy of the United States are secure, that
our industry, agriculture, farmers, work-

[62]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

ers, share croppers, tenants, and millions
of unemployed are safe, that the state of
our public finances is impregnable, and
that the future of our democracy is
scatheless 3 so that we have the power to
force pacification, self-government, and
economic prosperity upon recalcitrant
nations beyond two oceans. Is the man-
agement of our own affairs so efficient
and so evidently successful that we may
take up the role of showing other coun-
tries just how to manage their internal
economies? Have we the economic and
military power required to set their sys-
tems in an order to suit our predilections,
even assuming that we could get whole-
hearted collaboration from the Tory gov-
ernment of Great Britain, the reaction-

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GIDDY MINDS

ary government of France, and the com-
munist government of Russia? If the
very idea of world economic pacification
in such circumstances is not a dream of
Sancho Panza, then I am unacquainted
with Cervantes.

V

On what then should the foreign pol-
icy of the United States be based? Here
is one answer and it is not excogitated in
any professor's study or supplied by po-
litical agitators. It is the doctrine formu-
lated by George Washington, supple-
mented by James Monroe, and followed
by the Government of the United States

[64]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

until near the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the frenzy for foreign ad-
venturism burst upon the country. This
doctrine is simple. Europe has a set of
"primary interests" which have little or
no relation to us, and is constantly vexed
by "ambition, rivalship, interest, humor,
or caprice." The United States is a conti-
nental power separated from Europe by
a wide ocean which, despite all changes
in warfare, is still a powerful asset of de-
fense. In the ordinary or regular vicissi-
tudes of European politics the United
States should not become implicated by
any permanent ties. We should promote
commerce, but force "nothing." We
should steer clear of hates and loves.
We should maintain correct and formal
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GIDDY MINDS

relations with all established govern-
ments without respect to their forms or
their religions, whether Christian, Mo-
hammedan, or Shinto, or what have you.
Efforts of any European powers to seize
more colonies or to oppress independent
states in this hemisphere, or to extend
their systems of despotism to the New
World will be regarded as a matter of
concern to the United States as soon as
they are immediately threatened and be-
gin to assume tangible shape.

This policy was stated positively in
the early days of our Republic. It was
clear. It was definite. It gave the powers
of the earth something they could un-
derstand and count upon in adjusting
their policies and conflicts. It was not
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AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

only stated. It was acted upon with a
high degree of consistency until the
great frenzy overtook us. It enabled the
American people to go ahead under the
principles of 1776, conquering a conti-
nent and building here a civilization
which, with all its faults, has precious
merits for us and is, at all events, our
own. Under the shelter of this doc-
trine, human beings were set free to see
what they could do on this continent,
when emancipated from the privilege-
encrusted institutions of Europe and
from entanglement in the endless revo-
lutions and wars of that continent.

Grounded in strong common sense,
based on deep and bitter experience,
Washington's doctrine has remained a

[67]

GIDDY MINDS

tenacious heritage, despite the hectic in-
terludes of the past fifty years. Owing to
the growth of our nation, the develop-
ment of our own industries, the expul-
sion of Spain from this hemisphere, and
the limitations now imposed upon British
ambition by European pressures, the
United States can pursue this policy
more securely and more effectively to-
day than at any time in our history. In
an economic sense the United States is
far more independent than it was in
1783, when the Republic was launched
and, what is more, is better able to de-
fend itself against all comers. Why, as
Washington asked, quit our own to stand
on foreign ground?

This is a policy founded upon our
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AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

geographical position and our practical
interests. It can be maintained by appro-
priate military and naval establishments.
Beyond its continental zone and adjacent
waters, in Latin America, the United
States should have a care; but it is sheer
folly to go into hysterics and double
military and naval expenditures on the
rumor that Hitler or Mussolini is about
to seize Brazil, or that the Japanese are
building gun emplacements in Costa
Rica. Beyond this hemisphere, the
United States should leave disputes over
territory, over the ambitions of warriors,
over the intrigues of hierarchies, over
forms of government, over passing
myths known as ideologies — all to the
nations and peoples immediately and di-

[69]

GIDDY MINDS

rectly affected. They have more knowl-
edge and power in the premises than
have the people and Government of the
United States.

This foreign policy for the United
States is based upon a recognition of the
fact that no kind of international drum
beating, conferring, and trading can do
anything material to set our industries
in full motion, raise the country from the
deeps of the depression. Foreign trade is
important, no doubt, but the main sup-
port for our American life is production
and distribution in the United States and
the way out of the present economic mo-
rass lies in the acceleration of this pro-
duction and distribution at home, by
domestic measures. Nothing that the

[70]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

United States can do in foreign negotia-
tions can raise domestic production to the
hundred billions a year that we need to
put our national life, our democracy, on
a foundation of internal security which
will relax the present tensions and
hatreds.

It is a fact, stubborn and inescapable,
that since the year 1 900 the annual value
of American goods exported has never
risen above ten per cent of the total
value of exportable or movable goods
produced in the United States, except
during the abnormal conditions of the
war years. The exact percentage was 9.7
in 1914, 9.8 in 1929, and 7.3 in 1931. If
experience is any guide we may expect
the amount of exportable goods actually

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GIDDY MINDS

exported to be about ten per cent of the
total, and the amount consumed at home
to be about ninety per cent. High tariff
or low tariff, little Navy or big, good
neighbor policy or saber-rattling policy,
hot air or cold air, this proportion seems
to be in the nature of a fixed law, cer-
tainly more fixed than most of the so-
called laws of political economy.

Since this is so, then why all the furor
about attaining full prosperity by "in-
creasing" our foreign trade? Why not
apply stimulants to domestic production
on which we can act directly? I can con-
ceive of no reason for all this palaver
except to divert the attention of the
American people from things they can

[72]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

do at home to things they cannot do
abroad.

In the rest of the world, outside this
hemisphere, our interests are remote and
our power to enforce our will is rela-
tively slight. Nothing we can do for
Europeans will substantially increase our
trade or add to our, or their, well-being.
Nothing we can do for Asiatics will ma-
terially increase our trade or add to our,
or their, well-being. With all countries
in Europe and Asia, our relations should
be formal and correct. As individuals
we may indulge in hate and love, but the
Government of the United States em-
barks on stormy seas when it begins to
love one power and hate another offi-

[73]

GIDDY MINDS

daily. Great Britain has never done it.
She has paid Prussians to beat French-
men and helped Frenchmen to beat
Prussians, without official love or hatred,
save in wartime, and always in the inter-
est of her security. The charge of perfidy
hurled against Britain has been the
charge of hypocrites living in glass
houses while throwing bricks.

Not until some formidable European
power comes into the western Atlantic,
breathing the fire of aggression and con-
quest, need the United States become
alarmed about the ups and downs of
European conflicts, intrigues, aggres-
sions, and wars. And this peril is slight
at worst. To take on worries is to add
useless burdens, to breed distempers at

[74]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

home, and to discover, in the course of
time, how foolish and vain it all has
been. The destiny of Europe and Asia
has not been committed, under God, to
the keeping of the United States j and
only conceit, dreams of grandeur, vain
imaginings, lust for power, or a desire to
escape from our domestic perils and obli-
gations could possibly make us suppose
that Providence has appointed us his
chosen people for the pacification of the
earth.

And what should those who hold to
such a continental policy for the United
States say to the powers of Europe?
They ought not to say: "Let Europe
stew in its own juice j European states-
men are mere cunning intriguers j and

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GIDDY MINDS

we will have nothing to do with Eu-
rope." A wiser and juster course would
be to say: "We cannot and will not un-
derwrite in advance any power or combi-
nation of powers j let them make as best
they can the adjustments required by
their immediate interests in Europe, Af-
rica, and Asia, about which they know
more and over which they have great
force j no European power or combina-
tion of powers can count upon material
aid from the United States while pursu-
ing a course of power politics designed to
bolster up its economic interests and its
military dominance ; in the nature of
things American sympathy will be on the
side of nations that practice self-govern-
ment, liberty of opinion and person, and

[76]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

toleration and freedom of thought and
inquiry — but the United States has had
one war for democracy ; the United
States will not guarantee the present dis-
tribution of imperial domains in Africa
and Asia} it will tolerate no attempt to
conquer independent states in this hemi-
sphere and make them imperial posses-
sions j in all sincere undertakings to make
economic adjustments, reduce arma-
ments, and co-operate in specific cases of
international utility and welfare that
comport with our national interest, the
United States will participate within the
framework of its fundamental policy re-
specting this hemisphere 5 this much, na-
tions of Europe, and may good fortune
attend you."

[77]

GIDDY MINDS

VI

Some of our fellow-citizens of course
do not believe that America can deny or
refuse to accept the obligation of direct-
ing world destiny. Mr. Walter Lipp-
mann is among them. "Our foreign pol-
icy," he has recently said in a tone of
contempt, "is regulated finally by an at-
tempt to neutralize the fact that America
has preponderant power and decisive
influence in the affairs of the world. . . .
What Rome was to the ancient world,
what Great Britain has been to the
modern world, America is to be to the
world of to-morrow. . . . We cling to
the mentality of a little nation on the

[78]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

frontiers of the civilized world, though
we have the opportunity, the power, and
the responsibilities of a very great na-
tion at the center of the civilized world."
These are ornate, glistening, masculine
words, but are they true words and what
do they mean in terms of action?

America has "preponderant power."
According to the most encyclopaedic
dictionary of the English language, "pre-
ponderant" means "surpassing in weight,
outweighing, heavier j surpassing in in-
fluence, power, or importance." It is a
word of comparison. If Mr. Lippmann's
statement has a meaning that corresponds
to exact usage, it means that America
outweighs the rest of the world, sur-
passes it in influence and power. This, I

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GIDDY MINDS

submit, is false. Mr. Lippmann's "fact"
is not a "fact." It is an illusion. America
has power in the world, but it is not pre-
ponderant anywhere outside of this hem-
isphere. A lust for unattainable prepon-
derance and a lack of sense for the limi-
tations of power have probably done
more damage to nations and the world
than any other psychological force in
history.

The same may be said of Mr. Lipp-
mann's "decisive influence." Decisive
means having the quality that deter-
mines a contest. There are some conceiv-
able contests in which America could pre-
sumably exercise a determining power.
Given the status of things in 19 17,
America probably did determine the

[so]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

combat outcome of the World War. But
in fact America did not determine the
larger outcome of the World War, either
the little phase at Versailles or the mul-
titudinous results that flowed from it.
America certainly has influence in the
world. Within its competence it may ex-
ercise a decisive influence in particular
contests. But America does not have a
decisive influence on the larger course of
European and Asiatic history.

Mr. Lippmann says that America is
to be "what Rome was to the ancient
world." That sounds big, but the test of
facts bursts the bubble. Rome conquered,
ruled, and robbed other peoples from
the frontier in Scotland to the sands of
Arabia, from the Rhine to the Sahara,
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GIDDY MINDS

and then crumbled to ruins. Does any-
body in his right mind really believe that
the United States can or ought to play
that role in the future, or anything akin
to it? America is to be "what Great Brit-
ain has been to the modern world."
Well, what has Great Britain been to the
modern world? Many fine and good
things, no doubt. But in terms of foreign
policy, Britain swept the Spanish, the
Dutch, the French, and the Germans
from the surface of the seven seas. Dur-
ing the past three hundred years Britain
has waged numerous wars on the Conti-
nent to maintain, among other things,
the balance of power. Britain has wrested
colonies from the Spanish, the Dutch,
the French, and the Germans, has con-

[82]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

quered, ruled, and dictated to a large
part of the globe. Does anyone really be-
lieve that the United States can or ought
to do all these things, or anything akin
to them?

Mr. Lippmann's new brew of Roman
grandeur and British philanthropy is of
the same vat now used by British propa-
gandists in appealing to Americans who
have a frontier "mentality." These prop-
agandists have at last learned that, be-
tween the submarine and airplane on the
one side and events in Russia, Germany,
and Italy on the other, the jig is up for
British imperial dictatorship in the <~>ld
style. So they welcome the rise of the
United States as a sea power to help
maintain "security and order," that is,

[83]

GIDDY MINDS

the British Empire. With this, for obvi-
ous reasons, French propagandists agree.
But Americans who are bent on making
a civilization in the United States and
defending it here will beware of all such
Greeks bearing gifts and set about their
own work on this continent.

Is this retreat or cowardice? Walter
Lippmann says that Americans are suf-
fering from "a national neurosis," de-
featism, and "wishing to escape from
their opportunities and responsibilities."
In my opinion the exact opposite is the
truth. American people are resolutely
taking stock of their past follies. Forty
years ago bright young men of tongue
and pen told them they had an opportu-
nity and responsibility to go forth and,

[84]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

after the manner of Rome and Britain,
conquer, rule, and civilize backward peo-
ples. And the same bright boys told
them that all of this would "pay," that
it would find outlets for their "surpluses"
of manufactures and farm produce. It
did not. Twenty-two years ago Ameri-
can people were told that they were to
make the world safe for democracy.
They nobly responded. Before they got
through they heard about the secret trea-
ties by which the Allies divided the loot.
They saw the Treaty of Versailles which
distributed the spoils and made an im-
possible "peace." What did they get out
of the adventure? Wounds and deaths.
The contempt of former associates — un-
til the Americans were needed again in

[85]

GIDDY MINDS

another war for democracy. A repudia-
tion of debts. A huge bill of expenses. A
false boom. A terrific crisis.

Those Americans who refuse to plunge
blindly into the maelstrom of European
and Asiatic politics are not defeatist or
neurotic. They are giving evidence of
sanity, not cowardice j of adult thinking
as distinguished from infantilism. Ex-
perience has educated them and made
them all the more determined to con-
centrate their energies on the making of
a civilization within the circle of their
continental domain. They do not pro-
pose to withdraw from the world, but
they propose to deal with the world as
it is and not as romantic propagandists
picture it. They propose to deal with it
[86]

AND FOREIGN QUARRELS

in American terms, that is, in terms of
national interest and security on this con-
tinent. Like their ancestors who made a
revolution, built the Republic, and made
it stick, they intend to preserve and de-
fend the Republic, and under its shelter
carry forward the work of employing
their talents and resources in enriching
American life. They know that this task
will call for all the enlightened states-
manship, the constructive energy, and
imaginative intelligence that the nation
can command. America is not to be Rome
or Britain. It is to be America.

[87]

5.
8

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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Giddy Minds
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CHARLES A.
BEARD

The Macmillan Company

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