Full text of "The guilt of William Hohenzollern"

See other formats

THE LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE GUILT OF WILLIAM HOHENZOLLERN

THE GUILT OF WILLIAM
HOHENZOLLERN

KARL KAUTSKY

LONDON: SKEFFINGTON V SON, LTD.
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, ST. PAUL'S, E.G.

College
Library

sis

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

PREFACE 7

I. — WHO ARE THE GUILTY ? .... 15

II. — THE ISOLATION OF GERMANY 18

III. — GERMAN PROVOCATIONS .... 27

IV. — AUSTRIA 31

V. — THE BALKAN CRISES 37

r VI. — THE SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR . . 43
I VII. — MATERIALS RELATING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE

WAR 48

VIII. — SERAJEVO 52

IX. — WILLIAM'S MONARCHICAL CONSCIENCE . . 60

X. — THE CONSPIRACY OF POTSDAM ... 65
XI. — THE CONSPIRATORS AT WORK —

WILLIAM'S INSISTENCE .... 74

AUSTRIA'S HESITATION .... 82

A FALSE CALCULATION .... 95

THE HOODWINKING OF EUROPE . . 100
XII. — THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA —

THE DELIVERY OF THE NOTE . . . 109
THE LOCALIZATION OF THE WAR . .116
THE SABOTAGE OF THE PEACE EFFORTS . 120
THE BEGINNING OF UNCERTAINTY IN GER-
MANY 135

XIII. — ITALY 146

XIV. — ENGLAND —

UP TO JULY 29TH 158

JULY 29TH 167

1154414

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

XV. — LAST EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE . . 179

XVI. — THE MOBILIZATIONS 190

XVII. — THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA —

THE PREPARATION FOR THE DECLARATION

OF WAR 202

THE REASON FOR THE DECLARATION OF WAR 206

THE OPENING OF THE WAR BY RUSSIA . 212
XVIII. — THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON FRANCE —

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF FRANCE . .219

THE MYSTERIOUS AIRMEN . . . 224
XIX. — THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON BELGIUM —

THE BREACH OF FAITH A POLITICAL

BLUNDER 233

— THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE BREACH OF FAITH 239

XX. — THE WORLD REVOLUTION .... 249

XXI. — THE WORLD-WAR AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE . 257

APPENDIX 270

PREFACE

AFTER the Revolution of November gth, 1918, I was
requested by the People's Commissioners to enter the
Foreign Office as a collateral Secretary of State. One
of the first tasks which I set myself was to ascertain
whether incriminating material had been removed from
the archives, as many at that time feared would be the
case. I saw nothing to confirm this suspicion. On
the contrary, the first materials which I obtained to test
it showed that important materials were at hand. I
proposed to the Commissioners that, as a beginning,
the documents relating to the outbreak of the war
should be published. We owed that to the German
people, who had a right to learn the truth about those
who had hitherto guided the course of the State. It
was, I urged, also necessary because nothing else could
so clearly bring home to the incredulous foreigner our/^ fa-
complete breach with the old regime.

The Commissioners agreed with me, and entrusted'
me with the collection and editing of the documents.
My past record was, I hope, a warrant that no incon-
venient material would be suppressed. The only reser-
vation made was that I should not, like Eisner, issue
the separate documents according as they came to light,
but should wait until they all lay ready to hand.
Politically, this was not quite the most desirable plan,
for it necessarily meant the postponing of the pub-
lication and of its favourable influence on foreign countries.
But it cut the ground from under the champions of the
old regime, who could not say that we were garbling
the material, and producing documents torn from their
context, to which no evidential force could be attached.

8 Preface

I recognized the justice of this view and acted
accordingly.

When, in December, my party colleagues, Earth,
Dittmann and Haase, left the Government, I also
resigned my post as State Secretary, but declared my
willingness to proceed with the collection and editing
of the war-documents. On this I received the following
missive, dated January 4th :

" ESTEEMED COMRADE,

" In reply to your communication of January
2nd, the Imperial Government requests you to continue
your activity as joint-editor of the documents relating to
the outbreak of the war.

" For the Imperial Government,

" EBERT."

The term " joint-editor " refers to the practice in
vogue during those weeks of associating a Majority and
an Independent Socialist in all the higher offices, and
Quarck had been appointed along with me.

This practice ceased with the withdrawal of the
Independents from the Government. Quarck' s joint-
editorship also shortly came to an end, and I remained
sole editor.

But I need hardly say that I did not execute alone
the whole of this great task. Before I had obtained
other help, my wife, who had, indeed, for past decades
been associated with the planning and execution of
almost all my works, came loyally to my aid. Before
long, however, a special editorial bureau was found to
be necessary.

The work had to be speeded up, and, besides this,
I had literary work to do in connection with the Depart-
ment of Socialization. In December, Quarck and I

Preface 9

had already appealed to Dr. Gustav Mayer to let us call
upon him for more workers in the collection and arrange-
ment of the documents than I was able to give. He
cordially agreed, although he was thus obliged to lay
aside other tasks in which he was interested. At his
instance we also obtained the services of Dr. Hermann
Meyer, Archivist of the Secret Archives of State, for
archival work, and then, at the beginning of February,
as the work accumulated and a speedy conclusion became
desirable, we engaged also Dr. Richard Wolff and
Fraulein N. Stiebel, cand. hist.

I feel it my duty to thank all of the above, and
particularly the two gentlemen first mentioned, for the
valuable and devoted labours which they gave to this
great undertaking.

They put it in my power to inform Count Brockdorff-
Rantzau, on March 26th, that the collection was prac-
tically completed and could at once be set up in type.
There were, indeed, a number of points still to be
settled : thus, the dates of dispatch or reception of
certain documents could not at the moment be accu-
rately fixed. But these and other matters, such as a
table of contents, etc., could be added during the process
of composition.

It was necessary to go to press as soon as possible
if we wished, before the opening of peace negotiations,
to lay before the world the clearest evidence that the
German Government, which should conduct these
negotiations, had nothing whatever in common with
that which had declared war.

But the Government clearly took another view.
They postponed the publication, and issued, instead of
these documents, a report on the outbreak of the war
in the White Book of June, 1919, to which reference

10 Preface

is made in the present work, and which reveals anything
but a breach with the policy of the fallen Government.

While my colleagues and I were awaiting instruc-
tions to send the collection to the printers, we occupied
ourselves in the completion of the work and in giving
it the finishing touches. As, however, the hopes of a
speedy permission to go to press became ever more remote,
I could not withhold my colleagues from the other
urgent duties which were calling them. At the begin-
ning of May they concluded their work on the docu-
ments. I knew, however, that I could reckon on their
immediate services as soon as we received orders to print.

Yet even after the signing of the Peace Treaty these
orders were delayed.

At last, one fine day in the middle of September,
I was rung up on the telephone about this matter — not,
indeed, by the Foreign Office, but by a newspaper,
which wanted to know whether it was true that Herren
Mendelssohn, Montgelas and Schiicking were to publish
my collection, and not myself. I could only reply that
I knew less of it than did the inquirer. I only heard
of it through the newspapers.

The Government was, in fact, so wanting in good
faith as to give to others, without even informing me of
the fact, the publication of the collection of documents
undertaken by me and carried out under my direction.

To this day the reasons for throwing me overboard
have never been clear to me. The Government has
never given any.

Their proceedings created so much bad blood that
they found themselves compelled to call in. Professor
Schiicking and Count Montgelas came to me at the end
of September with the assurance that what they intended
to publish was exclusively my collection, in which not a

Preface 11

line should be altered without my consent. I was
also to receive every facility for seeing the work
through the press. They begged me to sanction the
publication.

These two gentlemen were therefore, to all intents
and purposes, merely commissioned to subject my work
to a supervision which I had no reason to shun, and to
attend to all those minor details which are necessarily
associated with the printing of a work of this class, and
which I was glad to leave in their hands.

As I was not at all concerned about my own per-
sonality, but very much about the work in hand, I saw
no reason to sulk in a corner, and I declared myself
willing to co-operate in the work provided the material
went to press at once.

This, too, was promised me, and so this collection
of documents of the Foreign Office about the outbreak
of the war, which had almost become a myth, has at
last made its appearance.

Naturally, in the course of the work I had not con-
tented myself with merely stringing the material
together. I felt compelled to bring into relation with
each other all the revelations offered by a mass of nearly
nine hundred documents, and to bring out their con-
nection with the remaining and already-known material
connected with the outbreak of the war. I did this
not as a partisan, but as an historian, who is simply
anxious to discover how things came about.

I undertook this work in the first instance merely
for my own satisfaction. An historian cannot collect
materials without inwardly working over them. But
the more the work progressed, the more keenly I desired
that it should not be done for myself alone, but for the
great mass of the public, who would have less time and,

12 Preface

for the most part, less opportunity than I to work care-
fully through the huge mass of mateiial.

Thus it was that the present volume took shape.
In its essential features it has been ready for months.
I have, however, continually delayed its publication,
a proceeding also demanded by the constant necessity
for working-in and dealing with new materials which
cropped up, especially in the German White Book of
June, and the publications of Dr. Gooss.

It cost me much self-denial not to bring out my
work in view of the flood of revelations about the war
which were poured forth during the past few months.
It was not easy to be silent where I had so much to say.

In view of the constant delays of the Government,
I should have felt myself justified in letting my book
appear even before the publication of the documents,
the collection of which had been so long completed.

Since I laid down my post as Collateral Secretary, I had
not worked in the archives of the Foreign Office as one
of its officials, but as an independent historian. As
proof of this, I may observe that since that date I have
received no salary or remuneration of any kind.

An historian who makes use of archives owes no
account to any superior authority of the use he may
make of the fruits of his labours.

If, in spite of all this, I kept silence, it was not due
to any juristic but rather to political considerations.
The whole political advantage which might accrue to
the German people in the eyes of its former enemies
through the publication of these documents was only
to be looked for if they were published by, not against,
the Government. No doubt, in the last resort, the
publication would have had to take place, even in the
latter case. The situation of our internal politics would

Preface 18

have demanded it. But so long as there was any possi-
bility that the Government would itself publish these
documents, I did not wish to anticipate it with my
elaboration of the material.

And now they have in fact appeared, and I have
no longer any reason for delay.

I have no doubt that my views will be much con-
tested— there can be no view of the war to which every-
one would assent. And no language is more ambiguous,
none is so much intended to be read between the lines,
as that of diplomacy, with which we are here almost
exclusively concerned. The Kaiser alone discards all
diplomatic methods of expressing himself. The clear-
ness of his utterances leaves nothing to be desired. And
his marginal comments afford the rare satisfaction to
a people of seeing, for once, an Emperor in undress.

Yet, in spite of all diplomatic disguises, the Austrian
documents have brought about an almost unanimous
agreement as to the guilt attaching to Austrian state-
craft. For anyone who has reached the point of rightly
estimating this fact, the language of the German docu-
ments will not present much difficulty in enabling him
to pass judgment on German statecraft as well.

In view of all that has now become so clear, the
temptation was strongly felt to show how sorely the
German people were misled, especially by those in the
ranks of the Majority Socialists, who so violently
attacked the position of myself and my friends during
the war, and who defended most strongly the war-policy
of the Imperial Government. Truly, of their concep-
tions there remains to-day nothing but a heap of broken
crockery.

But just for this reason it is hardly necessary at the
present day to do battle with David, Heilmann, and

14 Preface

others. Moreover, if one did so, it would be at cost
of the strict exposition of the facts, and it was to be
feared that a publication which appeals to all who
sincerely desire to know the truth about the origin of
the war might, through such a polemic, take on the
partisan or even personal character, which I desired to
avoid. I have, therefore, confined polemics to cases
where it was required, in order to make clear the situa-
tion of affairs, and have as far as possible avoided
recrimination. That this work will, nevertheless, in-
volve me in fresh controversy, I am well prepared to
discover.

But whatever attitude one may take towards it,
I trust that every reader of the documents here pub-
lished will keep one thing in mind : They testify to the
thoughts and deeds of German statesmen, not of the
German people. The guilt of the latter, so far as they
are guilty, consists only in this, that they did not con-
cern themselves sufficiently about the foreign policy of
their rulers. But this is a fault which the German
people shares with every other. It was in vain that
more than half a century ago, at the foundation of the first
International, Marx proclaimed it to be the " duty of
the working classes to master for themselves the
mysteries of international statecraft, in order to keep an
eye on the diplomatic proceedings of their Governments/'

Hitherto this has only been achieved in very imper-
fect measure. The present war, with its dreadful
consequences, points the working classes more sternly
than ever to the fulfilment of this duty.

As a slight attempt in that direction, I offer the
present work.

K. KAUTSKY.

Berlin, ist November, 1919.

The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

CHAPTER I

WHO ARE THE GUILTY ?

SINCE the outbreak of the world- war one question
has exercised every mind : Who brought upon
us this frightful calamity ? In what persons or what
institutions are we to find its originating cause ?

This is not merely a scientific question for the his-
torian ; it is eminently a practical one for the politician.
Its answer is a death-sentence for the guilty — not in
the physical sense but certainly in the political. Per-
sons and institutions whose power has produced any-
thing so fearful must be politically flung to the dead ;
they must be divested of all power.

But just for this reason, because the question of the
origination of the war is not an academic but a highly
practical one with far-reaching consequences for the
organization of public life, the real authors of it have
from the beginning sought to cover up their traces.
In this attempt they have found eager helpers in all those
who, though not themselves involved in any responsi-
bility, have an interest in maintaining the power of
the guilty persons and institutions.

This fact has long operated to render very difficult
the discovery of the true authorship of the war. On

16 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the other hand, a practical interest in the cause had its
effect in sharpening the critical insight of the opposing
parties, so that there were not a few who came on the
right track at the beginning. Thus the fog began slowly
to dissolve, until the latest publication of documents
by the Austrian and German Foreign Offices dispersed
it altogether. We are now in a position to see clear.

And yet one cloud lies still before our eyes. It is
alleged to be a profound piece of Marxian philosophy.
Marx taught that the course of history is guided not
by particular persons or institutions, but in the last
resort by economic conditions. Capitalism in its most
developed form, that of finance, everywhere creates
imperialism — the impulse towards forcible extension
of the territory of the State. This law governs all
States — all are warlike by nature, and from this condi-
tion the world-war proceeded. No individual persons
or institutions are guilty, but Capitalism as a whole :
this it is that must be combated.

That sounds very radical, and yet it works in a very
conservative sense wherever this idea governs practical
effort. For Capitalism is merely an abstraction, derived
from the observation of numerous individual phenomena,
and affording an indispensable aid in the attempt to
investigate these in the law of their mutual relations.

But one cannot fight an abstraction except theoreti-
cally. It cannot be fought in the field of practice.
Practically, we can only fight the individual phenomena.
The theoretic comprehension of the nature of Capital
does not relieve us from the necessity of this practical
struggle — on the contrary, its function is to further it,
inasmuch as it enables us to bring together the details
of the struggle in a systematic connection, and thereby
to shape it more effectively. At the same time it always

Who are the Guilty ? 17

remains a struggle against definite institutions and per-
sons, as the bearers of definite social functions.

From the Marxian standpoint, therefore, one can at
most say that the object of the struggle is not the
punishment of the individuals against whom it is
directed. Every man is merely the product of the
conditions in which he grows up and lives. It is unjust
to punish even the worst of criminals. The task of
society is rather to take from him the possibility of
doing further mischief, to make him, if possible, a
useful, not a mischievous, member of society, and to
remove those conditions which made him what he was
and gave him the possibility and the power of doing
harm.

And this is the position which a Marxist should
take up towards the authors of the world-war. But it
is by no means the Marxian doctrine that we should
divert investigation from the guilty persons by dwelling
on the impersonal guilt of Capitalism.

Marx and Engels never contented themselves with
general disquisitions on the destructive effects of capital.
They were just as much concerned with tracing out
the working of particular institutions and parties, and
their political leaders, such as Palmerston and Napoleon.
To follow the same course in regard to those who brought
about the world-war is not only our right, but our duty ;
and that not alone from a consideration of foreign but
also of home politics, so that the return of the persons
and institutions guilty of this fearful ruin shall be made
for ever impossible.

CHAPTER II

THE ISOLATION OF GERMANY

IT has been objected that the last days before the
outbreak of war should not alone be considered
in deciding the question as to where the guilt lies. We
must, it is said, go further back, in order to discover
how the contending elements were formed. In doing
this, we shall find that imperialism, and the movement
for extension of territory, characterized all the Great
Powers, and not Germany alone.

Very true ; but this movement of extension does
not wholly explain the wlord-war, the peculiarity of
which is that all the Great Powers and several of the
smaller ones took part in it, and that all the world
united itself against Germany. To show how this
came about is the problem we have to deal with. The
mere word " imperialism " does not take us any further.

The uprise of imperialism at the close of the nine-
teenth and beginning of the twentieth century is marked
by the fact that, far and wide, the Great Powers began
to come into conflict with each other. First we had
France with Italy, and then with England ; America
with Spain, and also with England ; England with the
Boers, with whom all the world sympathized ; and.
finally, Russia with Japan, behind whom England
stood.

During that period Germany was the least affected

The Isolation of Germany 19

by these international conflicts, which sometimes broke
out in war.

Germany had, indeed, in 1871, committed the great
mistake of tearing Alsace and Lorraine against their
will from France, and thus driving France into the
arms of Russia. The French passion for revanche,
for reunion with their disruptured and enslaved brethren,
began, in the course of time, to take a milder form ;
all the more as the prospects of the French in a war
with Germany grew ever worse ; for the population of
France remained almost stationary, while that of Ger-
many rapidly increased, and on this account alone the
latter gained a constantly growing superiority over France.
In 1866 the territory of what became later the German
Empire numbered forty million inhabitants ; that of
France thirty-eight millions. In 1870 if France had
had to do, as she hoped, with Prussia alone, her enemy
would have numbered only twenty-four millions. But
in 1910 the population of France was only thirty-
nine millions, as against sixty-five millions in
Germany.

Hence the alarm of France at the thought of a war
with the overpowering strength of Germany — an alarm
still evident in the conditions of the Peace of Versailles.
Hence, also, the need of the alliance with Russia.

Through the hostility which prevailed between Ger-
many and France, Russia, after 1871, felt herself in the
position of arbitrator between the two, and therefore
master of the whole of continental Europe. Trusting
in that position, Russia ventured in 1877 to make war
on Turkey, and found in the end that she was only
checked in the exploitation of her victory by England
and Austria. In the Berlin Congress of 1878 Bismarck
had to decide between these Powers and Russia. He

20 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

made himself independent of the Tsar and supported
Austria and England.

From that date Russia turned away from Germany
and established ever closer relations with France, so
that Bismarck, in spite of his strong Russian sym-
pathies, was ever more directed towards Austria. With
Austria, in 1882, he associated Italy as an ally, when
the French occupied Tunis, and thus deeply wounded
the Italian imperialists who had been casting their eyes
on that country.

England remained in " splendid isolation " outside
of both combinations, but rather inclining to the Triple
Alliance than towards the Russo- French Entente.
Differences had arisen with France in connection with
African aspirations (Morocco and more particularly
Egypt, with the Sudan). In regard to Russia, her old
hostility over the question of Turkey, and particularly
of India, was continually finding fresh nourishment.
On the other hand, England was always on friendly
terms with Austria and Italy, and stood in no pro-
nounced opposition to Germany, whose leader, Bismarck,
had inflamed England's conflicts with Russia on the
one hand, and with France on the other, in order to play
between them the role of arbitrator and of the tertius
gaudens. This was not, from the moral point of view,
a very lofty policy, but it was a most fruitful one for
the economic prosperity of Germany. It spared Ger-
many all wars, at the very period of the uprise of im-
perialism, and enabled her to enlarge her industry, her
commerce, and also her colonial possessions, by exploiting,
without taking part in them, the imperialistic conflicts
of the other Powers.

Thus we see that even in an epoch of imperialism it
was possible for a Great Power to pursue another than

The Isolation of Germany 21

a warlike policy. It is true that such a policy demanded
statesmen with some stuff in their heads and with suffi-
cient independence to assert themselves against those
interested in an imperialistic policy of force. Nor were
the latter more wanting in Germany than elsewhere ;
they were, in fact, strengthened by the success of the
peace policy. The fabulous upgrowth of Germany in
the economic sphere at the end of the nineteenth and
beginning of the twentieth century provided the means
for powerful military armaments, and it created a class
of force-loving industrial magnates, particularly in the
iron industry. With these associated themselves those
old partisans of the policy of force, the Junkers, and the
greater part of the intellectuals, who were professionally
engaged to proclaim the warlike glory of the Hohen-
zollerns and to inoculate the whole youth of Germany
with the virus of megalomania.

Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, pursued the old policy
of maintaining peace amid all the imperialistic conflicts
of the surrounding world. But when Prince Biilow,
in 1897, became at first Foreign Minister, afterwards
(1900) Chancellor, and with him Tirpitz became Chief
of the Admiralty, we saw a completely new orientation
of our foreign policy — the transition to a world-
policy, which meant, if it meant anything at all, the
establishment of the German domination of the
world.

In the measure in which these tendencies came more
and more into the light, they produced also a complete
alteration in the attitude of the world towards Germany.
Formerly the world was imperialistically divided, and
Germany, on the principle, divide et imp era, was the
most powerful factor in it ; henceforth all mutual
opposition among the various States was absorbed in

22 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the one great mass of opposition to Germany, who
seemed to threaten all of them.

The beginning of this fateful change in German world-
policy is to be found in the Navy Bill of 1897, which led
to the competition in armaments with England, and
which was only comprehensible on the supposition that
its ultimate goal was the overthrow of England's supre-
macy at sea. And, in fact, this has been often enough
avowed by pan-German organs and politicians as the
task of German naval preparations.

In this way public opinion in England was intensely
excited against Germany.

England won the dominion of the seas in the time of
the Napoleonic wars, and no Power has since undertaken
to challenge it. Shortly after the Peace of Vienna
this dominion had markedly changed its character.
During the first decades of the nineteenth century Eng-
land was still in large measure an agrarian country,
which could support its own population, if need were.
Far different was the case a little later. As the most
industrialized of all countries, England saw herself
compelled to rely, more than any other territory, not
merely for raw materials but for food, on abundant
imports from oversea.

Even in 1850, England, Wales and Scotland alone,
not including Ireland, had a rural population as numerous
as that of the towns. In the year 1911 the town popu-
lation of England and Wales amounted to 78 per cent.,
in Scotland to 75 per cent., of the total inhabitants of
the country.

In the eighteenth century England was a corn-
exporting country. Even during the early part of the
nineteenth century its home production in corn nearly
covered the home demand. In the decade 1811-1820

The Isolation of Germany 23

the yearly average import of wheat was only 400,000
quarters. In 1850 an import of nearly 4,000,000
quarters was required. This was increased tenfold by
1909, while the home production was only 7,000,000.
Shortly before the war fully 84 per cent, of the wheat
needed in England was imported from other lands.

But this whole import was carried by sea. This
meant that in case of war England would be delivered
over to starvation so soon as her supremacy at sea was
gone. This supremacy, which at the beginning of the
nineteenth century was hardly more than a means
for the extension and preservation of her colonial em-
pire— imperialistic objects, to speak in modern language
— became ever a more and more indispensable condition
for the maintenance of her national independence.
Supremacy at sea became for the British people not
only an imperialistic but a democratic demand ; at
least pending a general disarmament and abolition of
all warfare — pacifist objects which, precisely because
of the dangers attaching to war, became very popular
with the English populace, not Socialists alone but
also Liberals. Since the idea of supremacy at sea made
its way not only into imperialistic but also into demo-
cratic sections of the people, it took on a very liberal
complexion. It was not Protectionist nor Monopolist,
but had Free-Trade affinities, according to the principle
of the Open Door.

Thus England contrived during the whole of the
nineteenth century that no other Power should cast
a threatening glance upon her naval supremacy. Ger-
many alone began this threatening policy, at the close
of the nineteenth century, when England's supremacy
was demanded, as a matter of life and death, far more
imperatively than in the time of Napoleon I.

24 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Anyone who knows England and the English must
be aware that the German naval programme was alone
sufficient to bring round ever increasing sections of
the English population to the notion that Germany must
at any cost be made to put a stop to her naval prepara-
tions, even through a war, if not otherwise — a war
which, thanks to Germany's former policy, also threat-
ened to array against her Russia and France.

Herr von Biilow, who inaugurated this fatal policy,
himself confesses that it threatened Germany with war.
In his book on " The Policy of Germany " which ap-
peared in 1916, he writes :

" During the first ten years after the introduction
of the Navy Bill of 1897 and the beginning of our
ship-building, an English policy p, pursued with re-
lentless determination, would no doubt have been
in a position forcibly to prevent the development
of Germany as a Naval Power, and to make us in-
capable of doing harm before our claws, in naval
matters, were grown. . . . And in the eighteenth
month of the war the ' Frankfurter Zeitung ' confirms
the view that when it had come to a settlement by
force of arms England had sorrowfully to perceive
that, in spite of all her schemes of encirclement, she
had missed the right moment when she could have
reduced her dreaded competitor to insignificance." —
Page 40.

So the naval policy was undertaken at the peril of
inciting England to war with Germany. If it did not
at once come to that, it was no fault of German policy ;
it was the restraint of England, which, instead of vio-
lently striking down the threatening foe in war, preferred

The Isolation of Germany 25

the so-called " encirclement " policy, that is to say, the
promotion of that isolation of Germany which her own
world-policy had brought about.

The lamentable effects of the equally senseless and
provocative naval policy of Germany were intensified
by her obstinate sabotage of all attempts at an inter-
national understanding as to a general limitation of
armaments, and at the settling of international con-
flicts by peaceful methods through courts of arbitration.

This was clear even at the first Hague Conference
of 1899, which was concerned with the above objects.

" // was just at the time when the Hague Con-
ference was sitting that the German Kaiser made his
speech at Wiesbaden, in which he declared that a
' well-ground sword ' was the best guarantee of peace"*

At this Conference the German delegate could not
be got to vote for obligatory arbitration even in cases of
demands for compensation or of juridical controversies.
Even these insignificant limitations of the settlement
of international conflicts by force were wrecked on the
opposition of Germany, which, later on, rejected all
attempts to arrive at a limitation of armaments.

What wonder that hatred of Germany spread through-
out the world, not only among the rival Imperial Powers,
but also among the champions of international peace
and freedom !

The role which Tsarism had hitherto played as the
worst enemy of the European democracy now fell
more and more to the German military monarchy. A
more senseless policy could hardly have been conceived.
It stood condemned not only from the point of view

* Fried : " Handbook of the Peace Movement," p. 171.

26 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

of international Socialism, but also from that of any
Imperialism which should try to take account of the
existing position of forces. A reasonable imperialistic
policy for Germany would never have been such as
to call forth simultaneously the enmity both of Russia
and of England, the two Powers which, with Germany,
dominated Europe. It must, on the one hand, to gain
its ends against Russia and her ally, France, have
enlisted the support of England, which meant, above all,
the abandonment of her naval competition. And this
would have meant, in accordance with the character
of English policy, the triumph of the principle of the
Open Door throughout the whole world — a principle
which offered the most brilliant prospects to German
industry.

But this would not, indeed, have been a policy
after the hearts of the ironmasters, monopolists and
militarists. The grand object of these was extension
at the cost of England. In that case, however, it was
necessary to come to an understanding with Russia.
Germany, in alliance with Russia and thus more fully
ensured against danger from France, might with an easy
mind have taken up the naval competition with England.
In case of war the English could do Germany no great
harm. They might occupy her colonies, suppress her
ocean-trade, but could not starve her out. Germany,
on the contrary, with the help of Russia on land, would
have been able to wreck the foundations of England's
world-position and to achieve what Napoleon I. had
in other wars in vain endeavoured to effect, namely,
the occupation of Egypt and an advance on India.

It was sheer insanity to attempt the overthrow
of England, not in union with Russia, but in war with
with Russia, France, and with the whole world.

CHAPTER III

GERMAN PROVOCATIONS

FOR the moment, German policy did not mean war
with the whole world. It did, however, involve
the danger of such a war. The stronger the encircle-
ment, the more complete the isolation of Germany, the
more necessary it became, in her own interests, to avoid
any provocative action that might entangle her in war.

The Marxist who contends that imperialism would
have brought about a war in any case, whatever policy
Germany had pursued, is like one who should defend
a pack of silly boys for amusing themselves by throwing
matches into a cask of gunpowder. The boys, he
maintains, are not to blame for the devastating ex-
plosion which followed their practices, it is the circum-
stance that there was powder in the cask. Had there
been water in it, nothing would have happened. No
doubt. But in our case the boys knew there was powder
in the cask — they had put a good deal of it in themselves.

One might indeed say that the greater Germany's
isolation, and the more threatening the danger of a
world-war, the more her provocations increased.

The growing danger itself had the effect of intensifying
the bitterness on both sides ; it formed a new
impulse towards the increase of armaments and thereby
towards the strengthening of warlike influences. It
fatally increased the number of those who believed

28 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

war to be unavoidable, and who therefore urged that
it should be let loose, as a preventive war, at the moment
when circumstances were favourable to Germany and
embarrassing to the enemy.

In Germany, step by step with her military prepara-
tions, grew also the confidence in her strength. This
displayed itself in many circles as a veritable megalo-
mania, basing itself on the history of Prussia, which for a
century and a half had, with the exception of Jena,
nothing but victories on its record.

The pan-German section in particular exceeded all
bounds in the provocations it uttered. These were of
serious significance, for the pan-Germans were the leading
element in those circles of society which formed the
ruling class in Germany and from which its Government
sprang.

The mischief was still more increased by the per-
sonality of the Kaiser, whose mind was militarist through
and through, and at the same time superficial, excessively
vain, and devoted to theatrical effect. He never shrank
from demonstrations and speeches of the most chal-
lenging kind when he believed that they would impress
those around him.

We have already noted that in the days of the first
Hague Conference he declared that, as against courts
of arbitration and disarmament, a well-ground sword
was the best guarantee of peace.

One year later (July 27th, 1900), when troops were
embarking for China at Bremerhaven, he laid down the
following beautiful principles of warfare :

" No quarter is to be given. No prisoners are to
be made. . . . As the Huns under their King Attila
made a name for themselves a thousand years ago . . .

German Provocations 29

so now let the name of German go down in China
for a thousand years, so that a Chinaman will never
again dare even to look askance at a German."

If later on, in the world-war, the German methods
of warfare were set down to a system of cruelty thought
out in cold blood, and Germans got the name of Huns,
the German people have their Kaiser to thank for it.

While through such utterances the German people
were made abhorrent in the eyes of all humane thinkers,
William, at the same time, did not hesitate to fling
down his challenge to the imperialists of other lands.
He began in 1896 with his telegrams to the Boer presi-
dent, Kruger, in which William at the outset of the con-
flict between England and the Boers assured the latter
of his friendship.

Shortly afterwards, in 1898, he declared himself
the patron and protector of the three hundred millions of
Mohammedans in the world. That included the Moham-
medans in French Algeria as well as those living under
English rule in Egypt and India, the Mohammedans in
Russia, and those whom Russia was threatening inTurkey.

It was merely a continuation of this policy of provo-
cation when in Tangier in 1905, as France began to
take an active interest in Morocco, William promised
his support to the Sultan against anyone who should
threaten his independence, and later, in 1911, in connec-
tion with the same dispute, suddenly sent a war-ship to
the Moroccan harbour of Agadir.

On both occasions the peace of the world was en-
dangered. The situation was not improved by the fact
that always, when the time came for the threat to be
made good, William lost courage and left in the lurch
those to whom he had pledged his protection. Thus it

so The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

was in Morocco, and thus, most discreditably, in the
case of the Boers. And this contributed to add con-
tempt to the hatred with which Germany was regarded.
In these conflicts the antagonists on both sides were
imperialists. In the war of mighty England against
the little Boer Republic, the public opinion of the whole
civilized world had unanimously taken part with the
smaller and weaker party. In the case of Morocco,
the working classes of both Germany and France were
fully agreed in opposition to their Governments, and
contributed not a little to the maintenance of peace.
And through this attitude of the Socialist proletariate,
the incalculable, abrupt and provocative element in
German world-policy was to some extent reduced.

CHAPTER IV

AUSTRIA

THE German Government, however, was not con-
tented to play the fool in its own house alone.
It felt impelled to make itself accountable also for the
stupidities of Austrian policy, which likewise threatened
to kindle a world- war, not indeed for objects oversea,
but in relation to the independence of States in Europe
itself, which were directly threatened by Austria.

The world-policy of Germany had brought it about
that she had now scarcely a friend among the independent
and durable States in Europe. Even relations with Italy,
her ally, had grown cool. Two States alone were on
terms of close friendship with Germany — two States
which had lost their vitality and could only maintain
themselves by powerful help from without — Austria
and Turkey.

The Habsburg State, like that of the Sultan of Con-
stantinople, was a State of nationalities which main-
tained itself not through the common interests of these
nationalities, not through its superiority in well-being
and in freedom, but solely through military force. This
type of State was growing ever more irreconcilable with
modern democracy, which was developing irresistibly
under the influence of modern means of communication.

Austria and Turkey, at least Turkey in Europe, were

82 The Guilt of WUliam Hohenzollern

thus irretrievably doomed to perish. So little did the
statesmen of Germany understand this, that it was
precisely these Powers on which they chose to lean.
But indeed what others had their world-policy now left
to them ?

Both these States stood in a position of traditional
hostility to Russia, which was always straining towards
an outlet on the Mediterranean, towards Constantinople,
but which had learned by repeated experiences that
this goal could not be directly arrived at. Russia
decided therefore on a circuitous route, by dissolving
Turkey into a collection of small independent States,
of which it was hoped that, related as they were by
religion, and also in part — in the case of Serbia and
Bulgaria — by language, to the Russian people, they
might become vassal States of the Tsardom. In oppo-
sition to the Austrian and the Turkish Governments,
Russia therefore favoured the movement for independ-
ence in the Balkans, and therefore advanced on the
inevitable course of historical progress, while the other
Governments set themselves against it. The same
monarch whom his own subjects cursed as a hangman
and the Tsar of Blood was hailed in the Balkans as
the Tsar of Deliverance. Russian imperialism, indeed,
would not have attained its object among the Balkan
peoples. The more their strength and their independ-
ence of the Sultan increased, the more independent they
tended to become as against the Tsar also. They felt
themselves drawn to him so long only as they needed
his protection, so long as their independence was
threatened from another side.

This other side, in the decades immediately pre-
ceding the war, was revealing itself more and more as
Austria. In view of the national movements which were

Austria 88

growing up at home among the Rumanians and Yugo-
slavs, who were particularly oppressed by the ruling
classes in Hungary, a strong Serbia and Rumania seemed
to the leaders of Austro- Hungarian policy a highly
dangerous development. To the agrarian party in the
Monarchy — and again more particularly to the Hun-
garian section — the. agrarian export territories of Serbia
and Rumania were a thorn in the flesh. Finally, to the
imperialists, militarists, bureaucrats and capitalists of
Austria, who all desired to control the road to Salonika,
the existence of an independent Serbia appeared an
obstacle which they could not but desire to remove.

The policy of all these Austrian elements forced Serbia
and Rumania into the arms of Russia.

While the Austrian statesmen believed that they had
to crush Serbia in order to bolt the door against
Russian intrigues in the Balkans, the true state of the
case was exactly the reverse. It was just through
Austria's hostility that Russian influence was
strengthened.

To eliminate it, the leaders of Austrian policy would
have had to pursue a policy of concessions to the Serbs
and Rumanians in Austria, and also towards the neigh-
bouring States of Serbia and Rumania. Such a policy
was impossible to the rulers of Austro-Hungary. To
save the State on these lines they would have had to
act contrary to their own interests of the moment.

If the national democratic and proletarian opposi-
tion in Austria failed to bring about the downfall of these
rulers, then Austria was doomed, just as Turkey was ;
and doomed also was anyone who had bound himself
to this State for weal or woe.

At the same time Austria felt itself as a Great Power,
wished to behave as if it were independent, and made

34 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

continued attempts at an independent policy, which
grew ever more futile according as difficulties increased,
within and without.

Nor was the situation helped by any personal quality
in the Government of the State. At its head stood a
monarch who had never been noted for intellectual
ability, to whom age and a series of heavy blows of fate
had made repose imperative, and whose regime had
taken on the character of senility. But it was his mis-
fortune that the peoples of Austria took no account of
this need of repose, and that their revolt against the
impossible State into which they were compressed grew
continually more violent. Under the influence of this
growing unrest in the realm, the Emperor's senile need of
repose gave rise to the most contradictory phenomena ;
among other things, it brought about some astonishing
capitulations. But these had not the desired effect in
calming the popular mind, for they only touched indi-
vidual points, they made nothing but patchwork. Of
any radical reform the regime was incapable.

If concessions did not effect the desired end in pro-
ducing peace, then the need of repose brought about a
recourse to extreme harshness, so that the disturbers of
the peace might be suppressed by force. And if this
was in the first instance directed to home affairs, foreign
politics were also affected by it. In Austria home and
foreign affairs were very closely related, from the fact
that of the eight nationalities represented in the realm
only two dwelt wholly within its borders — the rest were
to a great extent outside it, and in some cases were
organized in independent national States. The national
movements of Rumanians, Ruthenes and Poles had their
influence on Austrian foreign policy, and still more those
of the Italian and Yugo-Slav Irredenta.

Austria 35

To all this we must add that besides its Emperor,
Austria obtained a second ruler in the person of the Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand, who in 1896 became heir to the
throne, just about the time when Germany was embark-
ing on her fatal naval policy. The imperialistic tenden-
cies which at this period seized on all the Great Powers,
began from that date to be felt in Austria too. Austria,
however, could have no designs on oversea dominion.
Austrian imperialism, like the Russian, sought to extend
its territories on land. That was best to be attained
in the south by conquering the road to Salonika, a
policy which required that Albania and Serbia should
be turned into an Austrian colony. What no State in
Europe had dared to attempt since 1871, since the
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine — the forcible incorporation
against its will of a politically independent population
— this was what the senile though extensive Power of
Austria now undertook to accomplish through the
systematic maltreatment of the small but youthfully
vigorous State of Serbia.

Franz Ferdinand, young, energetic and even reckless,
who knew no need of repose, no vacillations between
concession and suppression, but built on force alone,
became the incorporation of these imperialist tenden-
cies, which he was able to emphasize all the more since,
as the Emperor grew older, the influence of his
heir with the army and on foreign policy increased.
Since 1906, when Goluchowski was superseded by
Aehrenthal, foreign policy was directed by Franz
Ferdinand.

Ignorant braggarts, he and his tools did not shrinz
from the grossest provocations, caring nothing that
they were thus challenging Russia, the protector of
Serbia, and endangering the peace of the world. Why

36 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

should they care, so long as the big German brother with
his mighty, mailed fist stood behind them ! And he
stood behind them because his own position in the world
was threatened, if the only military Power of any conse-
quence on whose support he could reckon were to suffer
loss in power or prestige.

CHAPTER V

THE first of the frivolous acts by which Austria
endangered the peace of the world took place in
the autumn of 1908, when, without any necessity, the
regions administered by her for the Turks, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, were annexed ; a shameless breach of
treaty with Turkey, and a deep injury to the national
feeling of the Yugo-Slavs, who were necessarily most
embittered by this treatment of the Bosnians as chattels
who could at will be exchanged or carried off. The
danger of a world-war became imminent, for Russia
saw herself forced back in her Balkan policy without
receiving any compensation. But the other European
States, and especially England, also uttered the most
vigorous protests against this insolent tearing-up of the
Treaty of 1878. Austria must have withdrawn had not
the German Empire come to her side.

This attitude of Germany's laid the foundation for
the later world-war. Yet German politicians have,
even during this war (though before the collapse), de-
fended it. Prince Biilow, in his previously quoted work,
' The Policy of Germany," takes credit for his action at
this crisis :

" In my speeches in the Reichstag, as well as in
my instructions to our representatives abroad, I

88 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

allowed no doubt to prevail that Germany was deter-
mined under all circumstances to hold with Nibelung-
faith to her alliance with Austria. The German
sword was flung into the scales of European judgment,
directly for the sake of our Austro-Hungarian ally,
indirectly for the maintenance of European peace,
and first of all and above all for the prestige of Germany
and her position in the world." (Page 60.)

So these were the methods by which the old regime
sought to preserve peace : it never thought of restrain-
ing its ally from frivolous provocations, but only of
throwing its sword into the scales. And by this, as well
as by its sanction of a breach of treaty, it believed itself
to be working for the prestige of Germany before the
world !

Hashagen, in his little book " Outlines of World-
Policy," which appeared in the same year as Billow's,
writes in even more enthusiastic language :

" For the confirmation of the alliance on both sides
it is an inestimable advantage that the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina soon gave rise to so intense
an international resentment, not only against Austria,
but against Germany too. It was precisely this
resentment which made the bond of relation of the two
allies wholly indissoluble." (II., p. 6.)

Truly an ingenious policy, which saw, in the kindling
of an intense international resentment against oneself,
an inestimable advantage, for the precise reason that it
bound Germany fast to the inwardly bankrupt State of
Austria !

The Balkan Crises 89

The " German sword " in 1908 and 1909 kept the
peace of the world, because Russia at that time had to
swallow quietly the insult levelled at Serbia, and through
Serbia at itself. It was still bleeding from the wounds
inflicted by the war with Japan and by the Revolution.

Serbia was on March 3ist, 1909, obliged, in a humble
Note, to promise better behaviour, and to abandon its
protest against the annexation.

But Russia naturally did not accept final defeat in
the Balkans. Serbia, in her isolation, had to retreat
before Austria. Russian statecraft now succeeded in
forming an alliance among the Balkan States. A
federation of the Balkan peoples in one common Republic
had been for years the demand of the Yugo-Slav socialists.
It offered to the Balkan peoples the best conditions
for maintaining their independence, both as against
Turkey and Austria, as well as Russia.

Such a formation was not, of course, acceptable to
Russian policy. Quite the contrary. As often before,
however, Russia knew how to use for her own ends the
force springing from an idea that worked along the
inevitable lines of development. She formed an asso-
ciation not among the Balkan peoples, but among the
Balkan princes, with the object of putting an end to the
dominion of the Turks in Europe.

In October, 1912, war broke out between the allied
States of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro
against Turkey. The latter was easily defeated, and the
European Powers accepted the situation with the watch-
word : The Balkans for the Balkan peoples.

And so, in spite of the storm brewing in the south-
eastern corner, the peace of the world seemed to be
maintained. But Austria now comes on the scene again
and endangers it by giving the hated Serbia another

4u The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

kick. Serbia is obliged to relinquish the outlet on the
Adriatic which it had fought for and had won.

This time it is more serious than in 1908.

Austria, like Russia, mobilizes in February, 1913.
But mobilization means preparation for war, not war
itself. England mediates, and Russia yields once more.
Mobilization is annulled in March. Peace is preserved,
but at the cost of Serbia, and, through Serbia, of her
protector, Russia. Serbia must surrender her outlet
on the Adriatic.

And thus a new and dangerous tension is created.
Serbia endeavours to obtain compensation at the ex-
pense of Bulgaria in Macedonia. She finds allies in
Greece and Rumania. Their combined forces over-
throw Bulgaria and reduce her territory.

Yet this time also the peace of the world is pre-
served. Europe holds aloof from intervention. So it
comes on August loth, 1913, to the Peace of Bucharest.
It is hoped that the Balkans will now be at peace, and
that the peace of the world may be ensured for a long
period — just one year before the outbreak of the world-
war.

Austria, indeed, was not pleased with the Peace of
Bucharest. She requested the approval of Italy for a
" preventive defensive action " against Serbia. Italy
nipped the idea in the bud. We may suppose, with
Prince Lichnowsky, that the Marquis San Giuliano>
who described the plan as a " pericolosissima aventura "
— a most dangerous adventure — prevented us from being
entangled in a world- war in the summer of 1913. But
even in Germany, Austria found on this occasion no
friendly response. It must not be forgotten that a
Hohenzollern reigned in Rumania. Germany was,
therefore, primarily concerned to maintain the Peace

The Balkan Crises 41

of Bucharest. To this must refer the remark about
" the leaning of this lofty personage (William) towar'ds
Serbia" in the memorandum handed by Tisza to the
Austrian Emperor on July ist, 1914.*

But the rulers of Austria would not be content.
They tilted incessantly at the conditions established
by the Peace of Bucharest, and at last succeeded in
bringing Germany round to their side.

While the two Allies thus shaped the policy which
was to end in the world-war, they succeeded most
admirably in preluding it not only by alienating the
sympathies of the other Governments, but also of the
peoples. There were movements towards greater free-
dom in Croatia and in Bosnia. Austria combated them
not merely with a reign of terror, but with prosecutions
and with a propaganda which were not only so un-
scrupulous, but so ineffably stupid in their execution,
that she had to submit to have it proved against her
(especially in the Friedjung prosecution, 1909) that
she was working with forged documents, forged, more-
over, in the Austrian Embassy in Belgrade under the
aegis of Count Forgach — the same man who in 1914 was
to be fatally concerned in the Ultimatum to Serbia,
and the unloosing of the world-war. Even worse were
the " moral conquests " made in the world by Germany,
in the Zabern affair of November, 1913, immediately
before the world-war ; an affair which showed that in
the German Empire the civilian population are outlaws
in relation to the military, and that the latter com-
pletely dominate the civil Government.

At the close of the. previous century, the Dreyfus
affair in France had shown that the French military

* " Austrian Red Book on the Events that led up to the War," 1919,
I., p. 18.

42 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

were also capable of remarkable achievements in the
way of thoughtlessness and arrogance. But this affair
had ended, after a severe struggle, in the victory of
the civil Government, while in Germany the result was
the overthrow of the civil authority before the military.
Apart from this, the Zabern affair had the effect of
tearing open in France the wound of Alsace-Lorraine,
which had begun to heal. And thus Germany and
Austria went into the world-war, loaded before all
the world with the reputation of falsehood, forgery,
violence, the dictatorship of the sword, the denial of
civil rights to the annexed provinces.

CHAPTER VI

THE SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR

r I ^HE defenders of the old regime urge that in the
investigation of the question of guilt we must
not have regard merely to the few weeks before the
war broke out, but also consider the years which pre-
ceded them. We have seen that their position is in no
way improved by this consideration.

Already, for years before the war, the policy pur-
sued by the Central Powers was such that peace was
preserved, not by them but in spite of them. This
policy first took definite shape under Prince Biilow. It
was continued by Bethmann-Hollweg, under whom it
led to the catastrophe. We need not inquire how far
these men were themselves springs of action, or how
far they were mere agents of their master, who himself
was set in motion by those around him, however he
nattered himself with the idea that the whole huge
mass of the Empire was moved by his hand.

This definite connection is not to be invalidated
by pointing to the general imperialistic tendencies
then shared by all States. On the other hand, we must
not enlarge this definite connection into a generalized
statement that to strain after world-dominion, and to
seek its goal by brute force, are natural characteristics
inherent in the German people.

Imperialistic tendencies are to be found in all the

44 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

capitalistic governments of the Great Powers. Whether
they cause one or other of these Powers to go to war
or not depends on the occasion, the international situa-
tion, the resources available (its own and those of its
allies), and, not least, on the internal situation; above
all, the political force and independence of the working-
classes.

It was not always Austria and Germany which
imperilled the peace of the world. In the year 1902
I published a work on " The Social Revolution." In
this I said :

" The only guarantee for 'peace lies at present in
the dread of the revolutionary proletariat. It remains
to be seen how long this can hold out against the con-
tinual heaping up of causes of conflict. And there
are a number of Powers which have as yet no in-
dependent revolutionary proletariat to fear, and
many of them are completely dominated by a brutal
and unscrupulous clique of the High Finance.
These Powers, formerly insignificant or peace-loving
in regard to international politics, are now coming
out more and more as international disturbers of
the peace. Chief among these are the United States,
and after them England and Japan. Formerly,
Russia used to figure as head of the list of peace-
disturbers, but her heroic proletariat has for the
moment brought her down from this position. But
just as war can be enkindled by the arrogance of a
regime that knows no restraint from within, and
fears no revolutionary class at its back, so can it
also come to pass through the despair of a regime
which is falling, as was the case with Napoleon III . in
1870, and as it will perhaps be the case with Nicolas II.

The Situation before the War 45

It is by these Powers and their opposing views, not
by, let us say, the differences between Germany and
France or Austria and Italy, that the peace of the
world is to-day most deeply endangered. (I. p. 53.)

This was written under the impression made by
the war of Japan against China (1894), of America
against Spain (1898), and of England against the Boers
(1899-1902). And the war between Russia and Japan
was already in preparation. The new German policy
had then, indeed, been introduced, but its danger had
not become clear. Yet in the later editions of my
book I struck out the passage which I have just quoted,
for the consequences had then begun to ripen, and the
more these, came into full light, the more the former
peace-disturbers ceased to work as such, while the
Central Powers stepped into their place.

If we regard imperialistic tendencies as immoral,
and believe that in settling the question of guilt we
are passing a moral judgment, then we can indeed
affirm with justice that Monk and Rabbi, Central Powers
and Entente, are all tarred with the same brush. But
it is another matter when we are inquiring into the
origin of the war as a question not of morality but
of causality, and when we ask what particular policy
has brought about this particular war. On these lines
we shall arrive, not perhaps at a moral but certainly
at a political judgment, on particular persons and in-
stitutions. But only, let me add, on them ; not on the
whole people which was ruled by them, and which,
after shaking them off, must naturally develop quite
different tendencies.

The " German Professor " made the German people
hated in the days of its military supremacy and ridiculous

46 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

in the days of its defeat. He represented it as a race
of ideal heroes, far superior to the English, whom he
treated with scorn as a race of dirty shopkeepers. In
point of fact, however, the Germans are no more heroes
than any other people ; nor, on the other hand, are they
more quarrelsome bullies than their enemies in the
world-war.

One thing, at any rate, must be admitted : If the
opponents of Germany have showed at times the same
imperialistic tendencies, the same bent towards war
and conquest, then they were not morally superior to
Germany — a country so intellectual after all, in spite
of the German Professor !

One thing they well understood, especially the
English and the Americans — they knew very well how
to calculate the results of their actions. In the age of
.Imperialism they only prosecuted a war-policy when
that policy did not endanger their own country. They
had too much business capacity to conjure up a war
when war might mean their own ruin. They were solid
capitalists, not reckless adventurers who set all on a
single throw. We see, therefore, that it is false to assert
that capitalism necessarily means the lust for war with
all its perils. It only means that under certain definite
conditions.

German capitalism alone grew up under conditions
which bound it closely to the most powerful and self-
confident militarism in the world. Up to the outbreak
of the world-war there was no militarism in the Anglo-
Saxon world. France and Russia, indeed, had plenty
of it ; but neither of these felt confident of victory — the
one remembered the crushing defeat of 1870-71, and
the other that of 1904-5.

Its connection with the strongest and most arrogant

The Situation before the War 47

militarism in the world made German capitalism neglect
all sober calculation. That was the sole reason why it
not only connived at but urged on with all its might a
policy which completely isolated Germany, and at the
same time gave the deepest provocation to her neigh-
bours. It lost ail sense of what was economically
possible, and impelled its Don Quixote, militarism, into
a fight against the windmills of the Entente, in which
not only the pugnacious knight, but his confiding Sancho
Panza too, were left shattered and bleeding on the
field.

CHAPTER VII

MATERIALS RELATING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR

THE advocates of the German war-policy constantly
lay stress on the point that the " Question of
Guilt " ought not to be judged by the events that occurred
immediately before the war, and that a " scientific "
conception of the situation must reach farther back.

We have seen that by this argument nothing is
gained for the German cause. This endeavour to divert
investigation from the last weeks before the war, and
direct it to earlier periods, merely implies that the events
of those last weeks are even more incriminating than
those which went before.

Then, however, the advocates of the late German
Government, as a happy thought, hit upon a new scien-
tific consideration. Where at first the scientific historian
was told to look at things only in their wide connections,
now he was told that all one-sided evidence was faulty.
So long as all the secret archives of all nations were not
laid open, and all the statesmen concerned were not
heard as witnesses, it was impossible to form an opinion
as to the origin of the war.

Yet those who allege considerations of this kind bear
witness to their futility by their own practice, for imme-
diately after the outbreak of the war they exerted them-
selves to prove that the Central Powers were attacked
— nay, were taken by surprise by the Entente.

Materials relating to Origin of the War 49

Up to a certain point they were undeniably right :
the world, when confronted with a war, cannot wait till
all imaginable material has been brought forward for
evidence as to its origin. Every politician, when faced
with a war, must take his stand according to the material
to which he has access. He must strive to get it as
comprehensive as possible — complete it will never be,
no more for the politician of the present day than for
the historian of a later time. The latter may have
access to various secret archives that at present are
closed ; on the other hand, much evidence will be lost
to him that could be gleaned from contemporaries and.
that was not definitely set down in writing by them.

Although we cannot know everything, for all know-
ledge comes piecemeal, still it would be folly for this
reason to keep from mankind what we do know. Indeed,
this folly may become one of those political mistakes
that are worse than a crime, if the keeping back of the
material should serve to screen a system dangerous to
the nation and to mankind, and liable to hinder the
exposure of its operations.

There is no lack of material as to the origin of the
World War. At its very commencement we were
inundated with official White, Red, Yellow, Blue and
other coloured books, and the critical treatment of them
was soon set on foot. Early in 1915 there appeared
Grelling's " J' accuse," which was followed by a con-
tinuation in three volumes called " Das Verbrechen "
(" The Crime "). With great penetration he succeeded,
in very essential points, in striking the right track.

Then especially important were the " Memoirs of
Prince Lichnowsky," of August, 1916, which were not
intended for publication, but fell into pacifist hands,
which soon procured for them a wide underground

50 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

circulation. After that there came into consideration the
publications of Herr Miihlon.

Anyone who still could not see clearly after all this
must have had his eyes opened after the November
Revolution by Eisner's publication of the Report
from the Bavarian Legation in Berlin of July i8th, 1914.
Unfortunately Eisner, by this publication, committed
the imprudence of treating it rather as a journalist to
whom the effect produced was of chief importance,
than as a historian who was concerned as to the com-
pleteness and the unimpaired condition of his sources.
He brought out the Report in extracts only, and left
out passages into which some people desired to read the
German Government's love of peace.

We shall see how to estimate the love of peace that
is supposed to be expressed in the passages omitted.

New material was then contributed by Austrian and
German publications of the Foreign Offices, Red and
White Books. This Austrian Red Book, " Diplomatic
Documents relating to the Events preceding the War
of 1914 " (Vienna, 1919), which has already been quoted,
and which will be referred to as the Red Book of 1919,
affords most important explanations on the question of
the authorship of the war. On the other hand, the
reader must proceed very critically with this material
as worked up by Dr. Roderick Gooss in the form of a
book which was published in Vienna at the same time
as the above Red Book, under the title of " The Vienna
Cabinet and the Origin of the World War." As he was
unacquainted with the German documents, the author
of the Austrian commentary in places arrives at some
very controvertible and even manifestly false con-
clusions.

Before the Austrian Red Book was published, there

Materials relating to Origin of the War 51

appeared in June a German White Book, intende^ to
make an impression on the victorious nations in favour
of Germany during the peace negotiations. In reality,
it only helped to compromise anew the German foreign
policy. The reason for this we shall see later.

There has since appeared another work which forms
the chief source of the following exposition, the collec-
tion of documents relating to the authorship of the war,
brought together under my superintendence.

Any other material that has been published is supple-
mentary in details, but does not alter the general
impression.

According to all this material, how did the course
of events really proceed ?

SERAJEVO

WE have brought our statement in Chapter V.
up to the Treaty of Bucharest, and have seen
that after this peace Vienna was determined to revise
it, with the help of Germany, at the first favourable
opportunity.

The Central Powers at that time were continually
showing signs of great unrest and eagerness for action.
Germany prevailed on Turkey to the extent that a
German general, Liman von Sanders, went to Con-
stantinople in December, 1913, at the head of a German
military mission, and while he was there was appointed
to the chief command of the First Army Corps. Russia
protested energetically, but only succeeded in getting
Liman' s title altered to that of General Inspector of
the Turkish Army with the rank of Marshal.

Shortly after this, in March, 1914, the Central Powers
had the satisfaction of putting one of their own people,
the Prince of Wied, on the throne of the newly-formed
kingdom of Albania, a success, to be sure, of a very
doubtful character, as the German sovereign no later
than May deserted his troublesome subjects, and thereby
made himself and his protectors ridiculous in the face
of Europe.

/At the same time meetings between the Emperor
William and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand were

Serajevo 53

multiplied. In April they met at Miramare, and on
June I2th at Konopischt in Bohemia.

" The curiosity of the public and the interest of
the diplomats are excited by these manifestations
of a friendship which was so animated as to make
people restless. During the visit to Konopischt
the German Ambassador in London was ordered
to pacify the British Foreign Office with regard to
the presence of Admiral von Tirpitz in the Kaiser's
suite. ' Qui s' excuse, s* accuse' The Admiral evi-
dently only intended to take this change of air
in order to enjoy the fragrance of the roses in
Bohemia."

That is how a Belgian diplomat, Baron Beyens,
derides the innocence of these meetings in his book :
" L'Allemagne avant la guerre, les causes et les respon-
sabilites " (Paris, 1915, page 265). Beyens was at the
commencement of the war the Belgian Minister in
Berlin, and from thence wrote reports so sympathetic
to Germany that the German Government, which
came across them after the German troops entered
Brussels, published a series of them in the volume,
" Belgian Official Documents, 1905-1914." Meanwhile
Beyens completely changed his favourable opinion of
German policy after the Austrian Ultimatum. The
reports he wrote thenceforth have not been published
by the Berlin Foreign Office. They are to be found
in the " Correspondance diplomatique relative a la
guerre de 1914-15 " (Paris, 1915).

Notwithstanding Beyens, Herr von Jagow, in his
book on " The Causes and Outbreak of the World
War " (Berlin, 1919, page 101), says :

54 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

" The Archduke wished to show his imperial
friend the rose-blooms on his favourite Bohemian
estate."

As to what was hatched at Konopischt, William
himself could alone give authentic information. That
the meeting was not merely to enjoy the fragrance of
the Bohemian roses is testified to by a report which
Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, sent
to the Imperial Chancellor on June I7th, 1914. This
report begins with the following communication :

" Count Berchtold, after the departure of H.M.
the Emperor, had been invited by His Highness
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand to Konopischt.
The Minister told me to-day that His Highness
had expressed himself to him as extremely satisfied
with His Majesty's visit. He had exhaustively
spoken with His Majesty on all possible questions,
and could state that they had come to a complete
agreement in their views."

Unfortunately the report does not inform us what
views these were. From the following we only learn
that the policy to be followed with regard to the
Rumanians was much discussed. Further, that Francis
Ferdinand did not approve of Tisza's Rumanian policy,
as Tisza refused to allow any more concessions to the
Rumanians in the Hungarian State, to which William
in a marginal note remarks :

" He must not by his home policy, which in the
Rumanian question has influence on the foreign
policy of the Triple Alliance, do anything to call
the latter in question."

Sarajevo 55

It is certain that the Rumanian policy of Hungary
made it impossible for the Rumanian Government to
part company with Serbia and Russia and face these
states in Austria's company.

Directly after the meeting at Konopischt the Foreign
Office in Vienna set about preparing a Memorandum to
show that the state of affairs in the Balkans was in-
tolerable, and that Austria was forced to oppose Russia,
who was planning a Balkan League against the Habs-
burg Monarchy.

To this end Austria sought to win over Rumania.
The latter by this time was on very bad terms with her.

" The Monarchy up till now has confined itself
to discussing in a friendly manner the vacillation
of Rumanian policy in Bucharest ; beyond this,
however, it does not see any reason to look for serious
consequences from this change of course, which is
becoming more and more pronounced on the part
of Rumania. The Vienna Cabinet has in this
matter allowed itself to be determined primarily
by the fact that the German Government's view was
that it was a question of temporary vacillation,
the consequences of certain misunderstandings sur-
viving from the time of the crisis, which would settle
themselves automatically if treated calmly and
patiently. It is evident, however, that these tactics
of calm attention and friendly representations had
not the desired effect ; that the process of estrange-
ment between Austria-Hungary and Rumania had
not slackened, but on the contrary had been
hastened."

Nor does the Memorandum expect a " favourable
turn of affairs in the future."

56 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

In this Memorandum, as in the report referring to
Konopischt, the Rumanian question stands in the fore-
ground. The Serbian question is hardly touched. Not
by any means because the enmity of Austria towards
Serbia was less, but no doubt because she came up
against no hindrance in Berlin, while the German
Government was insisting on a friendly understanding
with Rumania. Austria, on the other hand, wishes to
give up the policy of " calm attention and friendly
representations " towards Serbia and Rumania, and
likewise towards Russia.

This State, the Memorandum continues, constituted
a danger not merely to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
but also to Germany. Russia and her ally, France,
were striving " to break the military superiority of the
two Empires by auxiliary troops from the direction of
the Balkans," and to carry out Russia's policy of ex-
pansion in opposition to German interests.

" For these reasons the directors of the foreign
policy of Austria-Hungary are convinced that it
is to the common interest of the Monarchy, and no
less to that of Germany in the present stage of the
Balkan Crisis, to oppose in good time and with
energy a development planned and fostered by
Russia which later on it would perhaps be impossible
to check." (Reprinted in the White Book on " The
Responsibility of the Originators of the War," of
June, 1919, page 68.)

This Memorandum can hardly mean anything else
than, in the language of diplomacy, the demand for a
preventive war against the empire of the Tsar.

This dangerous document was just ready when the
catastrophe of Serajevo occurred.

Serajevo 57

The heir to the throne had gone from Konopischt
to the manoeuvres in Bosnia. On this burning soil,
which had only a short time before been declared to
be annexed, manoeuvres were deliberately planned to be
held in the presence of Francis Ferdinand, and in con-
nection with them he was to make a triumphant entry,
like a conqueror, into the capital of the country. As
if it were specially intended to challenge the national
feeling, the 28th of June had been chosen as the day
for the entry into Serajevo, the " Vidov dan " (St.
Vitus' Day), a day of national mourning for the Serbians.
On this day, in 1389, on the field of Kossovo, they had
suffered a fearful and decisive defeat in a battle against
their oppressors, the Turks, and the memory of it sur-
vives to this day in the people's songs. This very day
was the one on which the foreign ruler from the North
chose to make his entry.

And in the true old Austrian manner to this provo-
cation was added an inconsiderateness of action that
amounted to frivolity.

If, in a country in which the ruling class practised
a fearful terrorism and thereby created an atmosphere
of outrage, the heir to the throne was paraded about,
care should at least have been taken to protect him.

But nothing was provided for. So great was the
stupidity and carelessness shown, that after the first
attempt at assassination, which failed, the Archduke
and his wife were again allowed to drive through the
streets to form easy targets for a second attack.

In a telegram of July 3rd, the Joint Minister of
Finance and Supreme Administrator of Bosnia, Dr. von
Bilinski, made a severe protest against the thoughtless-
ness of the responsible authorities, and especially of the
military in Bosnia :

58 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

" The other branches of the administration
(besides that of Justice) had also disclosed weak
points, the knowledge of which ought long before
to have dissuaded the Archduke Francis Ferdinand
from undertaking this journey. The Provincial
Governor (Landeschef), and the Master of the Ord-
nance, Potiorek, knew quite well that the journey
was arranged and put into execution by the Arch-
duke, in exclusive association with the Provincial
Governor, from a military point of view. . . .

"Dr. von Bilinski least of all could have assumed
that a non-military visit was to be included in the
military programme. If Dr. von Bilinski had had
any knowledge, from the reports of the Provincial
Governor, that the police were quite unequal to
their task, it would obviously have been the duty
of both of them to prevent the journey under any
circumstances." (Gooss, Vienna Cabinet, pages 46,

47-)

Soon afterwards, on July I3th, the Ministerial Coun-
cillor von Wiesner, who was dispatched to Serajevo to
inspect the documents used in the inquiry connected
with the trial of the murderers, telegraphed :

" Nothing to prove or presume complicity of the
Serbian Government in the attack or in its prepara-
tion or the supplying of weapons. Rather there are
grounds for considering this entirely out of the
question."

Thus those who were guilty of this bloody deed
were not to be looked for in the Serbian Government ;
the responsibility for it lay rather with the ignorance,

Sarajevo 59

the thoughtlessness and the shamelessly provocative
methods of Austrian despotism.

The factors which evoked the attempt on the Arch-
duke were the same as those which, in consequence of
it, led directly to the far more dreadful attack on the
world's peace.

Achilles slaughtered twelve Trojans at the funeral
of his friend Patroclus. For the funeral ceremonies of
Francis Ferdinand, for four years, many millions of men
from all the five continents were slain.

For the rulers of Austria, the killing of the most
active upholder of the existing regime ought to have been
a Mene-Tekel warning them to reform. It showed
plainly what were the fruits of a policy of force, and
warned them most urgently to substitute for this policy
one of liberty and reconciliation as the only one that
could give any vitality to a state system on the point
of collapse.

But when has any despotism ever regarded such a
writing on the wall ? It felt itself rather urged to an
aggravated terrorism, and to the employment of methods
of violence not only against its Croatian and Bosnian
subjects but also against the neighbouring Serbian State,
which was now devoted to complete destruction.

Before Wiesner's report on the authorship of the
outrage had arrived, the rulers at Vienna had already
formulated their resolve to make the Serbian Govern-
ment responsible for the deed, according to the prin-
ciple : " Give a dog a bad name and hang him."

CHAPTER IX
WILLIAM'S MONARCHICAL CONSCIENCE

T N the memorandum drawn up immediately before
the crime at Serajevo, it was in regard to Rumanian
affairs that Austria had shown herself chiefly concerned.
Now, however, Serbia moves into the foreground.
That country had only received an incidental mention
in the text of the document. A postscript was now
added, as follows :

' The present memorandum had only just been
drawn up when the dreadful events of Serajevo
took place. To estimate the full significance of
this wicked deed is hardly possible as yet. It may,
however, be said that in any case the impossibility
of bridging the gulf between the Monarchy and
Serbia is now demonstrated, as well as the danger
and intensity of the Great-Serbian movement,
which shrinks from nothing to attain its ends.

" All the more imperative is the necessity for
the Monarchy to tear asunder in the most resolute
manner the net which its opponents are endeavour-
ing to weave over its head."

In other words, Austria, or, rather, Count Berch-
told and his associates, were resolved on a war against
Serbia, and if necessary also against Russia.

William's Monarchical Conscience 61

In the face of this situation, what position did the
German Government take up ? Up to the present,
no clear answer to this question could have been given.
Did it allow itself to be dragged in tow by Austria with-
out knowing exactly where it was going, or did it act with
Austria willingly, energetically, and in full conscious-
ness of what was afoot ?

We find that its attitude in regard to Austrian policy
in the Balkans was profoundly altered by the outrage
at Serajevo.

When, in 1913, Rumania entered upon the second
Balkan war in league with Serbia, the Hohenzollern
Carol of Rumania had the Hohenzollern William of
Germany covering his rear against the Habsburg. On
that occasion Berlin was urging Vienna to hold back.

Thus, on July and, 1914, Berchtold remarked to
Tschirschky :

" When Rumania, without reference to us, and,
as she well knew, against our interests, leagued
herself with Serbia and fell upon the defenceless
Bulgaria, Germany protected Rumania, and gave
us to understand that we were not to move."
(Red Book, 1919, p. 19.)

But after Serajevo, the wrath of Austria was not
directed against Rumania and Serbia combined; it
was wholly concentrated on the latter. And the
Serbian Government, Monarchy as it was, now figured
in William's eyes as the abettor and originator of
regicide. His dynastic feeling, which had saved Ru-
mania from Austria, now urged Austria as strongly
against Serbia. Did he not abandon the projected
visit of condolence to Vienna on July 2nd because

62 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

hints from Serajevo had inspired him with the fear that
a horde of Serbian assassins awaited him in the Austrian
capital ?

The instant he heard of the crime, he sprang with-
out the least hesitation to the same conclusion as that
which Francis Joseph expressed in his personal letter
to William, received by the latter on July 5th :

" It must be the future task of my Government
to bring about the isolation and diminution of Serbia."

And it closed with the words :

" You also will, after this last and most terrible
occurrence in Bosnia, have come to the conclusion
that there can be no longer any thought of a recon-
ciliation of the opposition between Serbia and our-
selves, and that the continued peace-policy of all-
European monarchs will be threatened so long as
this horde of criminal agitators in Belgrade are allowed
to live unpunished."

But even before this letter had reached Potsdam,
William had decided that, whatever the consequences
might be, Serbia must be laid low. By the shots at
Serajevo his monarchical sympathies had been inflamed
into a stormy passion for mortal vengeance on this
race of murderers. Prince Lichnowsky was in Berlin
during the days following the outrage. He reports a
conversation with Zimmermann, who was then repre-
senting Jagow in the absence of the latter :

" One would gather from his words an unmis-
takably unfriendly feeling towards Russia, which

William's Monarchical Conscience 63

stood in our way in every direction. ... I was,
of course, not told that General von Moltke was
urging on war. I did, however, learn that Herr
von Tschirschky had been reprimanded because
he reported that he had recommended moderation
to Vienna in her dealings with Serbia." (" Meine
Londoner Mission," p. 27.)

Lichnowsky's statements are confirmed by the docu-
ments of the Berlin Foreign Office. We reproduce a
report which Tschirschky addressed to the Imperial
Chancellor on June 3oth. Its importance lies in the
marginal comments of the Kaiser, which we insert in
square brackets, marked with a " W."

" Count Berchtold told me to-day that, according
to all appearances, the threads of the conspiracy
to which the Archduke fell a victim could be traced
to Belgrade. The affair was so well thought out,
that intentionally only young people were charged
with the execution of the deed, because their
punishment would be milder [Let us hope not 1 —
W.]. The Minister spoke very bitterly about the
incitements proceeding from Serbia.

" Here, even serious people are saying that
accounts with Serbia must be settled once for
all. [Now or never. — W.] A series of demands must
be presented to Serbia, and in case she does not
accept them energetic steps must be taken. I
use every occasion of this kind in order to warn
our friends quietly, but very emphatically and
seriously, against taking any over-hasty steps. [Who
gave him any authority to do that ? That is very
stupid I No affair of his, since it is purely

64 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Austria's affair what she thinks fit to do in this
matter. Afterwards they will say, if things go
wrong, ' Germany would not let us 1 ' Tschirschky
must kindly avoid this nonsense. Serbia must be
settled with, and that soon. — W.]

" Above all things, people must be clear as to
what it is they want, for all the sentiments I have
heard expressed up to the present have been very
confused. Then the possible outcome of each
course of action must be carefully weighed, and
Austria-Hungary must realize that she does not
stand alone in the world, and that besides con-
sideration due to her Allies she must take into
account, in relation to all Serbian questions, the
general situation in Europe, and especially the
attitude of Italy and Rumania. [All this is
obvious, and mere platitudes. — W.] "

This document came back from the Kaiser to the
Foreign Office on July 4th. Thus we see that even at
that stage, and before Austria had made a demand of
any description whatever, William was resolved that
" the Serbians must be settled with, and that soon."

The idea which has found much support in Gooss's
book, that Germany was merely dragged into the Serbian
crisis in the wake of Austria, in whom she had confided
too much, falls wholly to the ground.

CHAPTER X

THB CONSPIRACY OF POTSDAM

ON July 4th, the Austrian Councillor of Legation,
Count Hoyos, came to Berlin in order to present
to William the personal letter from the Emperor Francis
Joseph to which we have already referred. Dangerous
ideas are not always set down fully on paper. The
letter had gone so far as to speak of a " diminution "
of Serbia. Count Hoyos verbally explained this ex-
pression as meaning that Serbia was to be divided up
amongst her neighbours. Hoyos, who was in the
confidence of Berchtold, expounded these plans to the
Imperial Chancellor and to the Under Secretary Zim-
mermann. They saw in this no occasion for exerting
a restraining influence on the Austrians.

The White Book of June, 1919, which we have men-
tioned above and which in reality deserves to be called
a whitewashing book, remarks indeed :

" The Viennese Ministry for Foreign Affairs
later on thought it important to put on record that
they did not share the purely personal views of Count
Hoyos in regard to the acquisition of Serbian territory
or still more the partition of Serbia"

This piece of information is not quite accurate. The
Ministry did indeed declare that Count Hoyos' views

65 5

66 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

were his own personally, but it never declared positively
that its own were different ; nor could it do so for the
simple reason that the views of the Councillor of Legation
were exactly the same as those of his chief, the Minister
Berchtold. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna
has never indeed betrayed its own views in relation to
Serbia. And even if the mere removal of Hoyos were
equivalent to a calming declaration of Austria's purposes,
this did not take place until later, until after July 5th,
the day on which the Austrian Ambassador handed to
the Kaiser the letter of Francis Joseph, and on which
the decisive conclusions were come to.

Much has been conjectured about the counsels
formed on that day, concerning which the imagination
of the world has been all the more enkindled because
so little is known about them. There is supposed to
have been a Crown-Council in Potsdam in which the
Archduke Frederick, Count Berchtold, and Conrad von
Hotzendorff took part, and at which war on Serbia,
or perhaps even the world- war, was decided on. The
White Book of June, 1919, argues that this Council
is a myth. As a proof of this, it cites Sir Horace Rum-
bold, English Ambassador in Berlin at the time of
war, who held it improbable that such a Council of the
Crown could have taken place. He comes to this opinion
not on account of, but in spite of the protestations of
the German Government.

" So great is the usual tendency of the German
Government to lying, that I am involuntarily
tempted to believe whatever assertions they deny."

It is on this honourable testimony that the White
Book of June, 1919, relies for proof of the innocence
of the former German Government. The White Book

The Conspiracy of Potsdam 67

then itself informs us what is supposed to have taken
place on July 5th in Potsdam. It repeats substantially
what the weekly paper Deutsche Politik had published
on the subject in May. This narrative sounds very
harmless.

According to it, the Austrian Ambassador Szogyeny
breakfasted on July 5th with the Kaiser William in
Potsdam, and handed him the letter of his sovereign.

Afterwards Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann
(who represented Jagow, then on his honeymoon) came
to the Kaiser and discussed the political situation.
Next day Kaiser William started on his Northern trip.
Plainly the clearest symptom that he was neither
planning nor expecting mischief.

The White Book gives a similar account, only
without mentioning the Northern trip. Instead of
this it adds :

"No particular measures were decided on, since it
was already understood that it was not possible to
refuse to Austria, in prosecuting her claim to effective
guarantees from Serbia, the support demanded by
our obligations as an ally." (Page 50.)

This also sounds harmless enough, yet it can imply
nothing else than that, in this consultation, the German
Government found it a matter of course that Austria
should demand " effective guarantees " — we know what
that means — and that Germany would join in, in accord-
ance with her obligations as an ally. To decide on special
measures about these points seems to have been quite
superfluous on July 5th !

The White Book of June, 1919, appears to reckon
on a very child-like public. It introduces its study of

5* "

68 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the subject by disputing the assertion that a Crown-
Council took place on July 5th " which decided on war
with Serbia, or, according to another version, on the
world-war." But the study which is supposed to set
us right only declares :

(1) That no Crown-Council took place, but merely

individual conversations.

(2) That the world-war was not decided on. (There

is no mention of the war with Serbia.}

It concludes as follows :

" From the telegram (of the German Government} to
Vienna of July 6th, and the personal letter of the
Kaiser William of July iqth, it is clear that in Berlin
the possibility of Russian intervention and its conse-
quences were taken into account with other factors,
but that a general war was not considered in the least
probable. And as the attached documents indisputably
show, there could have been no intention of letting
loose a European war." (Page 57.)

Lichnowsky reports on this in his memorandum :

" / learned positively that at the critical conference
in Potsdam on July $th, the inquiry addressed to us
by Vienna found the most uncompromising affirmation
from all the leading men present, and in addition it
was thought that it would be no harm even if the
result should be a war with Russia. So at least
it appears from the Austrian protocol which Count
Mensdorff received in London." (Page 28.)

Count Szogyeny, Austrian Ambassador in Berlin,
reports on his conversation with William on July 5th :

The Conspiracy of Potsdam 69

" According to his (Kaiser William's) opinion
action (against Serbia) must not be delayed too
long. Russia will, in any case, take up a hostile
attitude, but he had for years been prepared for
this ; and should it come to a war between Austria-
Hungary and Russia, we might be assured that
Germany would, with her usual fidelity, be found
at our side. Moreover, as matters now stand,
Russia is by no means prepared for war, and will
think long before appealing to arms. She will,
however, stir up the other Entente Powers against
us and will fan the flames in the Balkans.

" He understood very well that His Imperial
and Royal Apostolic Majesty, with his well-known
love of peace, would find it hard to decide on a
march into Serbia ; but when we had once recog-
nized the necessity of taking action against Serbia,
he (Kaiser William) would regret that we should
not seize the present favourable moment." (Red
Book, 1919, I., page 22.)

Dr. Gooss endeavours to question whether Count
Szogyeny was capable of giving a correct account of
the matter. And all the four authors of a memorial
on the guilt of the outbreak of war in the White Book of
June, 1919 — Professors Hans Delbriick and Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy, Max Weber and Count Montgelas — harp
on the same string.

We shall come to speak of this in another connection
later on ; for the present let us merely remark that the
communications of the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin
are in absolute agreement with what we know of William's
ideas at this period and what his marginal comments on
Tschirschky's report have already made clear to us.

70 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

But chance has given us, out of these very days, a witness
to Szogyeny's capacity for rendering an accurate report.
On the 6th, the Count had a discussion with Bethmann-
Hollweg. The latter reported it to Tschirschky and
Szogyeny sent at the same time a report of the same
interview to Berchtold. The following day Tschirschky
had occasion to compare the two reports. He telegraphed
about them to the Foreign Office on July 7th :

" The reports of Count Szogyeny corresponded
exactly with the contents of the regular telegram
sent me by your Excellency on the 6th of the
month."

It is not so easy, therefore, to put this inconvenient
witness morally out of the way.

It is true that in these discussions Bethmann ex-
pressed himself far more cautiously than his Imperial
master. But that was often the case.

One perhaps not irrelevant circumstance may be
mentioned. Szogyeny reports that before breakfast
William was very reserved. It was not till after break-
fast that he opened the murder-chamber of his heart.

We are not informed as to how the Kaiser discussed
affairs with his people after this consultation. But
we may believe the White Book of June, however
little confidence it deserves, when it says that there
was then no intention of letting loose a European war.
Only it passes in silence over the fact that Austria was
then given a free hand in the war against Serbia, even
at the peril of bringing with it a war with Russia.

In substance the German Government had already
admitted this in the first White Book published at
the beginning of the war. They then said :

The Conspiracy of Potsdam 71

" Austria must have owned to herself that it was
no longer consistent with her dignity nor with the
maintenance of the monarchy to look on inactive
at what was going on beyond the frontier. The
Imperial and Royal Government informed us of this
view and asked for our opinion. We could most
heartily assure our ally that we shared her estimate
of the situation, and that any action which she held
necessary to make an end of the Serbian movement
against the monarchy would have our approval.
We were fully conscious in saying this that any
warlike action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia
might bring Russia on the scene and thus, in ac-
cordance with the obligations of our alliance, entangle

us in war."

It would have been thoughtless to the last degree
if Bethmann and the Kaiser, on the 5th of July, had
really not looked ahead and considered the possibility
of a European war which they were conjuring up by
their procedure.

It is certainly remarkable that the Kaiser should
have started on a cruise to the North in the midst of
such a threatening situation. One thing, however, is
clear : the most frivolous of sovereigns would not have
dared to do that without having first assured himself
that the defences of "the State were prepared for all
possible emergencies. The fact that after the Council
at Potsdam he started on his summer cruise indicates
what had been decided on at this Council.

If William and Bethmann-Hollweg, as the latter
himself declared, had there and then given their assent
to " warlike measures on the part of Austria-Hungary,"
at the peril of being involved in a war with Russia, the

71 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

decks must have been cleared for action before William
set out towards the Midnight Sun.

It is thus by no means surprising that we should find
a " Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State, Freiherr
von der Bussche, for the Secretary of State Zimmer-
mann," dated August 30th, 1917. In this we read :

" In July, 1914, on the same day [July 5], after the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had handed His
Majesty the Emperor the letter of the Emperor
Francis Joseph, which had been brought by Count
Hoyos, and after the Imperial Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg and the Secretary of State
Zimmermann had been received at Potsdam, there
took place at Potsdam a council of military
authorities before His Majesty. The following took
part : His Excellency Capelle, on behalf of Tirpitz,
Captain Zenker, for the Admirals' Staff, representa-
tives of the War Office and of the General Staff.
It was resolved, in preparation for all emergencies,
to take preparatory steps for a war. Orders in
agreement with this have thereupon been issued. —
A thoroughly reliable source.

" BUSSCHE."

The information given by Herr von Tirpitz in his
" Memoirs " (1919, page 209) points in the same direction.
He reports that William, with all his optimism, found
it necessary to be armed for all eventualities :

" For this reason, on the 5th he commanded
the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg,
von Falkenhayn the Minister of War, Zimmermann,
the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

The Conspiracy of Potsdam 78

and von Lyncker, the Chief of the Military Cabinet,
to come to Potsdam. It was there resolved that
measures should be avoided which would tend to
give rise to political sensation, or would cause
special expenditure."

Then on July 6th the Emperor had a conversation
at Potsdam with Capelle, who was acting for Tirpitz,
at that time absent.

This, to the smallest details, is what Bussche notes
down. By this the darkness which hangs over the
" Separate Conversations " at Potsdam is not yet fully
removed. They certainly could not be called Crown
Councils. On the contrary, according to all appearances
William decided independently in this fatal hour. What
followed might rather be described as a Council of War.
It might also be called a conspiracy against Serbia and
Russia at the least, if not against the peace of the world.

CHAPTER XI

THE CONSPIRATORS AT WORK
WILLIAM'S INSISTENCE

HOW the harmless conversation on " the political
situation " held at Potsdam on July 5th worked
on the Austrian Government was already manifested by
the latter in the Council of the Ministry for Common
Interests, held on July yth, the protocol of which has
now been published (Red Book, 1919, pp. 25-38).

Berchtold began by declaring that the moment had
arrived to make Serbia for ever incapable of doing mis-
chief. On this question he had been in touch with the
German Government, and the latter had promised their
unreserved support in a war with Serbia.

" He was clear that military action against Serbia
might lead to war with Russia."

But better have it now than later on, for Russia's
strength in the Balkans was always growing.

Tisza agreed that there was a possibility of a war
with Serbia, but he was neither in favour of a war under
all circumstances nor of a declaration of war without
diplomatic preparation.

" He would never agree to a surprise attack on
Serbia without previous diplomatic action, as it

The Conspirators at Work 75

seemed to be contemplated, and as it was unfortu-
nately also discussed by Count Hoyos in Berlin."

So it appears that in Berlin it had even been dis-
cussed whether war should be declared on Serbia with-
out any ultimatum. Tisza prevented that. He knew
too well that such a proceeding would at the very outset
put Austria in the wrong. He wanted an ultimatum —
and one that could be carried out. If Serbia were to
accept it, a great diplomatic success would have been
obtained, and with that one could be content.

After a long discussion it was finally concluded :

" (i) That all present desired as speedy a settle-
ment as possible of the case at issue with Serbia,
whether by peace or war.

" (2) That the Ministerial Council was willing to
adhere to the view of the Hungarian Premier, accord-
ing to which mobilization should not take place
until concrete demands had been made on Serbia,
and an Ultimatum presented.

" On the other hand, all present, with the excep-
tion of the Hungarian Premier, are of opinion that
a mere diplomatic success, even if it involved a
humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that
in consequence the demands on Serbia should be
of so far-reaching a character that their rejection
was to be anticipated ; so that the way would be
made clear for a radical settlement by military
action."

This pretty scheme was the result of the discussion
of the " political situation " held in Potsdam on July 5th.
It was at once reported to Berlin, in Tschirschky's

76 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

message of July 8th, in which, among other things, he
wrote :

" Count Berchtold said, in case the Emperor
agreed to make demands on Serbia, he would advise
him by all means to draw up these in such a way as
to preclude their acceptance."

So that Berlin was informed upon this subject from
the beginning.

William did not merely approve this policy — he
urged its speedy execution ; a fact proved by his anno-
tations on Tschirschky's reports from Vienna.

The latter reports on July loth :

" [Strictly private.]

' With regard to his audience of yesterday with
H.M. the Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl,
Count Berchtold gives me the following infor-
mation :

"H.M. the Emperor discussed the state of affairs
very calmly. He first expressed his warm thanks
for the position taken by our Most Gracious Sover-
eign and the Imperial Government, and declared
he was entirely of our opinion that one must now
[Underlined by William. — K.] come to a decision
[As His Majesty's Memorandum is about fourteen
days old that will take a long time! It was evi-
dently drawn up as a basis for the actual decision. —
W.] in order to put an end to the intolerable
state of affairs with regard to Serbia. On the
significance of such a decision, Count Berchtold
adds, His Majesty is quite clear.

" The Minister hereupon informed the Emperor

The Conspirators at Work 77

of the two methods of procedure which were here in
question with regard to the approaching action
against Serbia. His Majesty had suggested that
perhaps this opposition could be bridged over.
On the whole, His Majesty was rather inclined to
the opinion that concrete demands should be made
on Serbia. [Very much so, and unambiguously ! —
W.] He, the Minister, would not fail to appreciate
the advantages of such steps. They would thereby
avoid the odium of taking Serbia by surprise, an
odium which would fall on the Monarchy, and
Serbia would be placed in the wrong. These
measures would also make a neutral attitude easier
both for Rumania and for England.

" The drawing up of suitable demands on Serbia
is at present the chief concern here. [They have
had plenty of time for that ! — W.] Count Berch-
told said he would like to know what Berlin was
thinking on the subject. He thought that among
other things an agency of the Austrian Government
could be established in Belgrade to keep an eye
upon the Great Serbian intrigues and possibly see
to the breaking up of associations and the dismissal
of some [All. — W.] of the compromised officers.
The time allowed for reply must be the shortest
possible, probably forty-eight hours. Of course,
even this short time would be sufficient in Belgrade
to get instructions from St. Petersburg. [Hartwig
is dead ! — W.] If the Serbians should accept all
the demands presented to them, that would be a
solution which would be ' very disagreeable ' to
him, and he was thinking what demands could be
presented which would be completely impossible
for Serbia to accept. [Evacuate the Saniak!

78 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Then you will have a row at once ! Austria must
by all means get this back at once and so prevent
the union of Serbia and Montenegro and Serbia's
reaching the sea. — W.]

" In conclusion, the Minister again complained
of the attitude of Count Tisza, which made it diffi-
cult for him to take energetic measures against
Serbia. Count Tisza maintained that one must
proceed in a ' gentlemanlike ' manner. [Against
murderers, after what has taken place ? — W.]
This, however, was a very difficult course to take
when such important interests of State were in
question, and especially against such an opponent
as Serbia.

" The Minister would willingly follow the sugges-
tion of the Imperial Government, to start at once
to tune up public opinion at home through the
Press against Serbia, about which Count Szogyeny
has telegraphed. This, however, in his opinion,
must be done with caution, so as not to alarm
Serbia prematurely.

" The Minister of War is going away on leave
to-morrow, and Freiherr Conrad von Hotzendorf
will also go away from Vienna for a time. This is
being done, as Count Berchtold told me, on pur-
pose [Childish ! — W.], so as to prevent any cause of
alarm. [Much the same as at the time of the
Silesian Wars. ' I am opposed to Councils of War
and deliberations, since the more timid party always
gets the upper hand ' (Frederick the Great.)— W.] "

One can see from William's marginal comments his
approval that it should be made impossible for Serbia to
submit, but also his impatience that Austria is not yet

The Conspirators at Work 79

attacking. Finally, on July I3th, the inert mass of
Austria seems to be in motion. Tschirschky reports :

" The Minister [Berchtold. — K.] is now himself
convinced that what is now required is action of
the speediest kind. [Doubly underlined by William.
— K.] He hopes to settle with Tisza to-morrow as
to the wording of the Note to be presented to Serbia,
and would then submit it on Wednesday, July I5th,
to the Emperor at Ischl, upon which its trans-
mission to Belgrade could take place without delay,
and consequently before the departure of Poincar6
to St. Petersburg."

As chance would have it, just at this time the Presi-
dent of the French Republic was paying the Tsar a visit
in his capital. The Note was to be dispatched to Serbia
before Poincar6 started (he left Paris on the evening of
July i5th).

But, for all that, the Austrians were not able to shoot
so quickly. Meanwhile Berchtold and William first
noted down the triumph of having converted Tisza to
their views.

Tschirschky telegraphed on July I4th, " strictly
private " :

" Count Tisza called on me to-day, after his con-
ference with Count Berchtold. The Count said :
Up to now he had always been the one who had
urged the necessity of caution, but every day had
confirmed his opinion that the Monarchy must
come to an energetic decision [Absolutely I — W.],
to prove that it had vital energy, and to put an
end to the untenable state of things in the south-

so The Guilt of Wttliam Hohenzollern

east. The language used by the Serbian Press
and the Serbian diplomats was, in its presumption,
positively unbearable. ' It has been difficult for
me,' said Tisza, ' to bring myself to advise in favour
of war ; but I am now convinced of its necessity,
and will be responsible to the utmost of my power
for the maintenance of the greatness of the
Monarchy ! '

" Fortunately complete agreement and deter-
mination now prevail among the authorities here.
His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph — as Baron
Burian, who recently spoke with His Majesty at
Ischl, reports — is considering the situation very
calmly, and will certainly see things through to
the very end. Count Tisza added that the uncon-
ditional attitude of Germany to the Monarchy
was decidedly of great influence for the firm stand
of the Emperor [of Austria].

" The Note to be addressed to Serbia is not to-day
to be drawn up in its final wording. This will not
be done till Sunday (July iQth). With respect to
the date of presenting it to Serbia, it has to-day
been decided rather to wait till after the departure
of Poincare' from St. Petersburg — that is, till the
25th. [What a pity!— W.] Then immediately
after the expiration of the time allowed to Serbia,
in case the latter should not unconditionally accept
all demands, the mobilization would take place.
The Note will be so drawn up that its acceptance
will be practically impossible. [Doubly underlined
by William. — K.] It would be a matter not only
of demanding assurances and promises, but of deeds.
In drawing up the Note, in his opinion, care must
be taken that it is intelligible to the general public

The Conspirators at Work 81

— especially in England — and that Serbia is clearly
and plainly put in the wrong.

" Baron Conrad at the last conference had made
a very good impression on him. He spoke calmly
and very positively. In the near future one must
certainly be prepared to hear people again complain
that we are undecided and hesitating here. It is,
however, of little importance if they know in Berlin.

" At the close Tisza pressed my hand warmly
and said : ' We will now unitedly look the future
calmly and firmly in the face.' [A man, after all !
— W.] "

One can see how completely untenable the opinion
is that William was the innocent victim of Berchtoldian
perfidy. The two confederates were worthy of one
another. And like master, like man.

On July i8th the Secretary to the Embassy, Prince
zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, as representative of the absent
Tschirschky, reported from Vienna to Jagow :

" Yesterday I was with Berchtold, who told me
that the Note in question is to be presented in
Belgrade on the 23rd. As I reported yesterday,
Berchtold hopes that the Austrian demands, about
which he did not go into detail, will not be accepted
by Serbia. He is, however, not quite sure, and
from his statements and from those of Hoyos I
have the impression that Serbia can accept the
demands. To my question as to what was to
happen if the affair should peter out in this manner,
Berchtold thought that when it came to carrying
into practice the separate postulates a considerable
latitude could be exercised. If a final clearing-up
of the relations with Serbia is really desired here,

82 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

a thing which is imperative, as Count Tisza has
shown in his speech recently, it is certainly mys-
terious why one should not have formulated such
demands as would make a breach with Serbia
unavoidable. If the matter comes to nothing, like
the shooting at Hornberg, and stops at a so-called
diplomatic success, the idea already prevailing in
this country, that the Monarchy is no longer capable
of any exhibition of strength, will be strongly con-
firmed. The consequences that this will have at
home and abroad are very obvious."

The representatives of German diplomacy in Vienna
were thus not quite satisfied with Berchtold, and had
not complete confidence in him. Not, however, because
he had urged on war, and they had warned against it,
but because they feared that " the Monarchy " was
no longer capable of any " exhibition of strength," and
the whole business, instead of ending with a rattling good
war (mit einem frisch-frohlichem Krieg) would end with
a bloodless diplomatic victory.

Unfortunately the fears which the Secretary to the
German Embassy expressed to the German Secretary of
State with regard to their Austrian ally were completely
without foundation.

AUSTRIA'S HESITATION

After the German Government had, on July 5th,
given its blessing to the war planned by Austria against
Serbia, it insisted on attacking as quickly as possible.
It was, however, no easy matter to stir Austria out of
her easy-going ways.

The Conspirators at Work 83

This was entirely contradictory to the rules of Prus-
sian militarism, which places the greatest value on swift-
ness of movement. It, however, also threatened to ruin
the diplomatic conception of the situation, which was
that Europe should be confronted with accomplished
facts before it was well aware what had happened,
while it would be difficult for Serbia to come to an under-
standing with the Powers and for the Powers to come to
an understanding with one another. Consternation
and confusion were to make it possible to fish in troubled
waters, and to lessen the danger of the Powers uniting
against the impious disturbers of the peace.

This is the reason for the short time-limit which was
to be given the Serbians for answering the Note.

Under the circumstances it appeared to be dangerous
to delay sending off the Note, as every day of hesitation
might bring new incidents, might expose the aims of
the conspirators, and so bring them to nought. The
insistency of Germany, after she had once given her
consent to the war, is therefore quite intelligible.

But the delay on the part of Austria is not so intel-
ligible. It may partly be attributed to the inveterate
Austrian slovenliness, and partly perhaps to the delay,
arising from this, of the preparations for war which had
begun in Austria immediately after the decisions
of Potsdam. On July I2th Jagow telegraphed to
Tschirschky :

" Strictly confidential instructions for Count
Berchtold.

" According to secret intelligence, Russia and
Serbia have obtained confidential information that
Austria-Hungary is quietly strengthening her gar-
risons on the Serbian and Russian frontiers."

84 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Thus not only on the Serbian frontier, but also on
the Russian, Austria was making preparations for
war.

This is of great importance in view of the discus-
sions with regard to the various mobilizations. Mobili-
zation is the most important, the most conspicuous and
the ultimate act of preparation for war, but it is not the
only one. There are also movements of troops, assem-
bling and transport of munitions of war, and recall of
officers on leave. Means of transport and similar things
can be placed in readiness before the mobilization is
announced. The latter will take place the more rapidly
and effectively, the better the rest of the preparations
for war are carried out. The Central Powers in this
respect were able, on the outbreak of war on July 24th,
to be far ahead of the others, because ever since the 5th
they had counted on the possibility of war with Russia.

In spite of this, Austria was much more behindhand
than was agreeable to the German war-politicians.
After all, she finally declared war on Russia only on the
6th of August, notwithstanding that she had ordered
the general mobilization as early as July 3ist. To add
to this, differences of opinion arose between the states-
men of the dual State of Austria- Hungary, which was
so little a homogeneous entity that its politicians knew
no other name for it than " the Monarchy."

Berchtold, as far back as July 5th, had got per-
mission for the war from Potsdam, but only on July I4th
could Tschirschky report that Budapest, too, had given
its unreserved consent. And only then did the Ministers
in Vienna begin to attempt to come to an understanding
with one another with regard to Serbia. It is remark-
able that before this even Berlin had not felt the need
of being clear as to the object of the war which had

The Conspirators at Work 85

already been approved of, and the opening of which was
being urged on.

Not till July I7th did Jagow telegraph to Tschir-
schky :

" As Your Excellency is aware from reading the
Memorandum of Count Hoyos with reference to his
conference with the Under-Secretary of State, Count
Hoyos has here declared that Austria must proceed
to a complete partition of Serbia.

" Count Berchtold and Count Tisza have re-
marked in this connection that this declaration only
expressed the personal view of Count Hoyos, and
they therefore have expressly not identified them-
selves with it ; on the other hand, they have not
apparently explained themselves any further as to
their territorial plans.

" For the diplomatic treatment of the conflict
with Serbia, it would not be unimportant to know
from the beginning what the ideas of Austro-Hun-
garian statesmen are as to the future conformation
of Serbia. This question will be of essential
influence on the attitude of Italy, and on the public
opinion and attitude of England.

" That the plans of the statesmen of the Monarchy
of the Danube may be influenced and modified by
the march of events can be looked upon as self-
evident ; nevertheless, it should be assumed that
the Vienna Cabinet, after all, has in its mind a
general picture of the aims striven after, not for-
getting the territorial aspects of the question.
Will Your Excellency be so good as to try in con-
versation with Count Berchtold to get enlighten-
ment in this matter, but at the same time to avoid

86 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

giving the impression that we wish to place hin
drances in the way of Austrian action or prescribe
limits or aims for it. What we really want is some
guidance as to whereabouts the road we are on is
likely to lead us."

This is certainly a most remarkable document.

Only think ! On July 5th the German Government
sanctions the war against Serbia, aware that it may turn
into a World War. Since then it urges for a speedy
attack, and on the iyth the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs in Vienna timidly inquires whether he
" could have some guidance as to whereabouts the road "
of the war " was likely to lead them."

And he asks this, not in order that he may frame his
own decisions accordingly — for Austria always had, and
has still, a free hand — but merely to be able to " deal
with " Italy and England correctly from the diplomatic
standpoint.

In this matter Berlin never got a clear answer from
Vienna, for the simple reason that there they did not
themselves know " where the road was likely to lead
them." The two Central Powers unchained the most
frightful of all wars without even being clear as to the
aim and object of its origination.

The answer was to be given in Vienna on July igth
in a Ministerial Council for " Joint Affairs " on " the
approaching diplomatic action against Serbia," in which
was to be stated the object of the war which it was
determined to force on. In that sitting Count Tisza
formulated the demand that the action against Serbia
should not be attended with any plans of conquest
in favour of the Monarchy. They must limit them-
selves to rectifications of the frontier required on military

The Conspirators at Work 87

grounds. He asked for a unanimous decision on this
point. As a Magyar, he wished for no increase in the
number of Serbians in the Monarchy.

Count Berchtold was of a different opinion. He
thought it was only with certain reserves that he
could associate himself with this conception of the
matter. He was also of the opinion that Austria-Hun-
gary should annex no territory belonging to Serbia, but,
on the other hand, should assign as large pieces as possible
to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and possibly also to
Rumania. Serbia must be so reduced in size " that she
would no longer be a source of danger." The situation
in the Balkans might, however, change. It might be
" that at the end of the war it will no longer be possible
for us to avoid annexation."

One can see that the views which Count Hoyos had
unfolded in Berlin on July 5th were not only his own
personal views, but were just as much those of Count
Berchtold.

Count Tisza, however, did not admit the reservations
of Count Berchtold. Count Stiirgkh thought that, even
if the occupation of Serbian territory were out of the
question, security could be obtained by the deposition
of the dynasty, by a military convention, or by other
suitable measures. As the Minister of War showed
himself to be willing to guarantee the limitation of the
annexation to strategic rectifications of the frontier
and to the permanent occupation of a bridge-head across
the Save, it was unanimously decided by the Ministers
assembled :

f That immediately at the beginning of the war
it shall be declared to the Foreign Powers that the
Monarchy is not waging a war of conquest, and has

88 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

no intention of incorporating the kingdom with
her own territory. Strategic rectifications of the
frontier which may be necessary, as well as
the diminution in size of Serbia in favour of other
States, or a temporarily necessary occupation of
Serbian territory, are naturally not excluded by
this resolution " (Red Book of 1919, pp. 65-67).

Of the whole of this programme the Powers were,
as a matter of precaution, only informed of the first
sentence, that " the Monarchy is not waging a war of
conquest." The sentences following were suppressed,
and these, in reality, contained the disclaimed pro-
gramme of Count Hoyos, and also did not exclude the
reservation of Count Berchtold, which he had so finely
clothed in the words : "At the end of the war it may
no longer be possible for us to avoid annexation."

Tisza, strange to say, was quite in agreement with
this arrangement. His object for waging war was not
the conquest but the annihilation of Serbia. Such, then,
was the direction in which the war was " likely " to lead,
according to the .intentions of the guiding spirits of the
Austrian State.

In what direction it really led was explained to the
Imperial Chancellor immediately before this, on July i6th,
by Prince Lichnowsky in an admirable expose which
may be quoted here in its entirety.

Lichnowsky wrote :

" From Count Berchtold's standpoint it is quite
comprehensible that he should aim at restoring his
position, which was badly shaken by the Peace of
Bucharest, and also the influence of the Monarchy
in the Balkans, which was diminished through the

The Conspirators at Work 89

defection of Rumania, by making use of the present
comparatively favourable opportunity for a passage-
of-arms with Serbia. The military authorities in
Austria, as is well known, have for a long time been
insisting on the need of strengthening the reputa-
tion of the Monarchy by a war. Once it was to be
against Italy, in order to drive out her irredentism ;
another time it was to be against Serbia, who by
warlike achievements a la Prince Eugene was to be
forced to renounce her evil ways and be taught
better manners. I can quite understand, as I have
said, this standpoint of those in control of the
Austrian State, and in their position would perhaps
have used the Serbian disturbances even earlier
than they did to give the South Slav question a
Habsburg solution.

" The first thing to be presumed for such a policy,
however, would be a clear programme, which rests
on the recognition that the present state of things
with regard to public and international justice
within the Serbo-Croatian family of nations — which
assigns one part of this nation, split up only by
religion and not by race, to the Austrian State,
another part to the Hungarian State, a third to the
Joint Monarchy, and finally a fourth and a fifth
to independent kingdoms — is permanently untenable.
For the endeavour to maintain the sacred status quo
under all circumstances for reasons of convenience
has often enough, and just lately at the recent
Balkan crisis, led to a complete collapse of the
political house of cards built on these foundations.

" In the first place, I now doubt whether there
has been drawn up in Vienna a plan on a great scale
which alone would afford the basis of a permanent

90 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

regulation of the South Slav question. I mean
Trialism, with the inclusion of Serbia. From my
knowledge of the conditions there, I do not even
believe that they are in a position to proceed to a
constitutional re-shaping of the Monarchy on such
lines. For to do this it would be necessary to
overcome the opposition of Hungary, which would
resist to the uttermost the cession of Croatia and
Fiume. And Vienna never produces the strong
personality alone capable of carrying out such a
programme. They only seek there to satisfy the
needs of the moment, and are glad when the many
political difficulties, which are never extinguished,
as they arise from the heterogeneous nature of the
component factors of the Empire, are so far pushed
aside that there is a prospect of dragging on a
few months longer.

" A military castigation of Serbia would hence
be of no value towards a satisfactory solution of the
so extremely difficult South Slav Question. The
most it could do would be to revive the Eastern
Question, which has been settled with so much diffi-
culty, merely in order to afford a moral satisfaction
to Austria.

" Whether Russia and Rumania will idly look on
at this, and leave Austria a free hand, Your Excel-
lency will be in a better position to judge than I
am. From the impressions I have received here,
but especially from the confidential conversations
which I have had with Sir Edward Grey, I believe
that I was right in the opinions I recently repre-
sented in Berlin with regard to the intentions of
Russia towards us. Sir Edward Grey assures me
that no one in Russia has any desire to wage war

The Conspirators at Work 91

against us. The same was said to me by my cousin
Count Benckendorff. A certain anti-German feel-
ing recurs there from time to time ; this is con-
nected with the Slav movement. Against this ten-
dency, however, there stands opposed a strong
pro-German party. Neither the Tsar nor anyone
in high authority is anti-German, and since the
settlement of the Liman question no serious discord
has arisen. On the other hand, Count Benckendorff
openly admitted that there exists a strong anti-
Austrian feeling in Russia. No one, however, has
any desire to conquer parts of Austria, such as,
for instance, Galicia.

" Whether, in view of this feeling, it would be
possible to move the Russian Government to take
the attitude of a passive onlooker on the Austro-
Serbian passage-of-arms, I have no means of
judging. What, however, I believe I can say with
certainty is, that there is no chance in case of war
of influencing public opinion here against Serbia,
even if there should be conjured up the bloody
shadows of Draga and her lover, whose removal
has long been forgotten by the public here, and
hence belongs to those historical occurrences with
which, so far as non-British countries are con-
cerned, people here are in general much less
acquainted than the average third-form schoolboy
in Germany is.

" Now I am far from suggesting that we should
throw over our alliance or our ally. I consider the
league that has established itself in the sentimental life
of both Empires to be necessary, and with regard
to the many Germans living in Austria to be the
natural form of their attachment to us. It is for

92 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

me only a question as to whether it is advisable
for us to support our comrades in a policy, or rather
to guarantee a policy which I look upon as a wild
one, since it will lead neither to a radical solution
of the problem nor to the crushing of the Great
Serbian movement. If the Austrian police and
the Bosnian provincial authorities let the Heir
to the Throne drive through ' an avenue of bomb-
throwers/ I can see in this no sufficient reason to
risk the famous ' Pomeranian grenadier ' in pro-
moting the huzzar-policy of Austria, merely in
order to strengthen Austria's self-consciousness,
which in this case, as the era of Aehrenthal has
shown, considers its supreme task to be its entire
liberation from the leading-strings of Berlin.

" If, however, it is proposed to decide our policy
by the consideration that as soon as the Great Ser-
bian movement has received its death-blow, Austria
Felix, relieved of this anxiety, will be grateful to
us for the assistance we have rendered, I cannot
suppress the question whether the national move-
ment in Hungary was stamped out when the revolt
was overthrown by the help of the Tsar Nicholas,
and by the constant requisition of the gallows after
the Hungarian subjugation at Vilagos under direc-
tion of the Imperial General Haynau, and whether
the rescue of Austria by the Tsar really laid the
foundation of cordiality and confidence between
the two empires."

Thus Lichnowsky wrote on July i6th. Of course,
all his Cassandra warnings had the usual result. They
were absolutely unheeded.

Meanwhile Poincare's departure to St. Petersburg

The Conspirators at Work 98

had taken place before the Note to Serbia was
dispatched. As we have already seen, therefore, it was
determined to delay handing it in till Poincare had left
St. Petersburg. With regard to this matter Tschirschky
reported on July I4th :

" After Count Tisza had left me, Count Berchtold
invited me to call on him in order to inform me,
in his turn, as to the result of to-day's conference.
To his great joy agreement on all sides had been
attained as to the tenor of the Note to be pre-
sented to Serbia. Count Tisza received his (the
Minister's) views in a gratifying manner, and had
even increased the severity of some of the points.
At all events, it was evidently impossible, owing
to technical considerations, to present the Note in
Belgrade before the i6th or the i8th.

" It had unanimously been held advisable in
to-day's conference to await in any case the depar-
ture of M. Poincare" from St. Petersburg before
steps were taken in Belgrade [A pity ! — W.] ;
for, if possible, it was to be avoided that in St.
Petersburg, in a whirl of champagne-sentiment,
and under the influence of MM. Poincare, Isvolsky
and the Grand Dukes a fraternization should be
celebrated, which would thereupon influence the
attitude of the two Powers, and possibly consolidate
it. It would be a good thing if the toasts could be
got over before the Note was presented. Thus the
presentation of the Note should take place on
July 25th.

" Count Berchtold, as Count Tisza had done before
him, urgently and repeatedly requested me not to
leave my Government in any doubt that the fact

94 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

of the presence of M. Poincare" in St. Petersburg
was the sole reason for the delay in presenting the
Note in Belgrade, and that they could rest completely
assured in Berlin that there was no question of
hesitation or irresolution here."

These continued assurances, that Berlin could rely
on Vienna's determination to fight, are very remarkable.

In the Vienna Cabinet Council of July igth
Berchtold also declared that he was against any un-
necessary postponement,

" As they are now beginning in Berlin to get
nervous, and news as to our intentions has filtered
through to Rome, so that he could not answer for
undesirable incidents if the matter were spun out
any further. Conrad von Hotzendorf was urging
the necessity of haste. The Minister of War declares
that everything is ready for mobilization ! "

Thus it was desired to present the Note as soon as
possible, but not before the French President had left
Russia. It is amusing to see with what care his travelling
route is now studied, and one of the two conspirators
communicates to the other his observations of the
movements of the unsuspecting wanderer.

On July 1 7th it is reported from Vienna that the
Note will be presented on July 23rd, as on that day
Poincare* is to leave St. Petersburg. From now, how-
ever, the very hour of his departure became important.

On July 2 ist the Admiral's Staff of the Navy informs
Jagow that the departure from Kronstadt is fixed for
the 23rd at ten o'clock at night. On the same day Jagow

The Conspirators at Work 95

telegraphs to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg the
question :

" At what o'clock on Thursday is the departure
of the President from Kronstadt arranged for ? "

On the 22nd Jagow telegraphed to Vienna :

" Had inquired of Count Pourtales as to the pro-
gramme of Poincare's visit. He says that the
President leaves Kronstadt at eleven o'clock at
night. By Central European time this would be
nine-thirty. If steps are taken in Belgrade to-
morrow afternoon at five, they would thus become
known in St. Petersburg while Poincare is still
there."

To this Tschirschky replied on the 23rd :

" Austrian Government thanks you for the infor-
mation. Baron Giesl has been instructed to delay
by one hour the presentation of the Note."

Thus it was that the Note was presented on the 23rd
at six o'clock in the evening.

We see from all this the nature of the anxieties that
troubled the Austrian and German Ministers on the verge
of the outbreak of the World- War.

A FALSE CALCULATION

It had been intended to make swiftly a surprise
attack, so as to confront Europe, before she was properly
conscious of how things stood, with a fait accompli,
to which its submission would be most speedily

96 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

obtained. In this way it was hoped, by a simultaneous
surprise-attack and declaration of war, to preserve the
world's peace.

This was a singular kind of peace-policy, and yet
the German White Book of July, 1919, still dares to
assert the peaceful intentions of the Imperial Govern-
ment.

These peaceful intentions are supposed to be shown
by the fact that the possibility of a war with Russia
was considered, but the probability of a general war was
not reckoned with.

The Government even hoped that Russia would
again allow herself to be intimidated, as in former Balkan
crises, when taken completely by surprise, faced by a
fait accompli, and no hope of the other party giving
way. For the rest, they trusted to luck.

On July 28th Baron Beyens reported from Berlin :

" In Vienna, as in Berlin, despite the official
assurances but recently exchanged between the
Tsar and Poincare" concerning the complete equip-
ment of the armies of the Dual Alliance, it was
firmly believed that Russia was not in a position to
wage a European war and would not dare to involve
herself in so terrible an adventure. The disquieting
internal situation, revolutionary machinations, in-
adequate equipment, poor transport facilities — all
these grounds would compel Russia to look on
impotently at the execution of Serbia. The same
poor opinion was held, if not of the French Army,
yet of the spirit prevailing in the Government
circles of France. . . .

' The opinion that Russia was not equal to a
European war prevailed not only in the heart of

The Conspirators at Work 97

the Imperial Government but was also held by the
German captains of industry specializing in arma-
ments. The most competent among them, to
adduce an example, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, assured
a colleague of mine that the Russian artillery was
far from being good and complete, whilst the Ger-
man had never been better. ' It would be madness
for Russia to declare war on Germany in these
circumstances,' he added."

This communication of Beyens is confirmed by
Szogyeny's report given above concerning his con-
versation with William on July 5th, which, in turn,
is corroborated by what Tirpitz tells of July 6th in
his " Reminiscences " :

" According to the statements which he (Kaiser
Wilhelm) made to my official representative on the
morning of July 6th in the Park of the Neues Palais
at Potsdam, the Kaiser considered an intervention
of Russia for the protection of Serbia improbable,
as the Tsar would not protect the regicides, and
Russia at the time was unfit for war, both financially
and in a military respect. Furthermore, the Kaiser
assumed somewhat optimistically that France would
put the brake on Russia, in view of the former's
unfavourable financial position and lack of heavy
artillery. Of England the Kaiser did not speak.
Complications with that State were not thought
of at all." (Page 209.)

The same opinions are expressed by Jagow in a letter
to Lichnowsky on July i8th :

' The more determined Austria shows herself, the

98 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

more energetically we support her, Russia is all the
more likely to keep quiet. In Petersburg, of course,
there is sure to be a bit of a row, but fundamentally
Russia is not ready to strike now. Nor will France
and England desire war now. In a few years,
according to all competent authorities, Russia will
be ready to strike. Then she will crush us with
her numbers ; then she will have built her Baltic
fleet and her strategical railways. Meanwhile, our
group will be growing weaker and weaker. Russia
knows this very well, and, therefore, absolutely
desires peace for a few more years. I willingly
believe your cousin Benckendorff, that Russia
does not want a war with us now. Sasonow gives
the same assurance. But the Government in Russia,
which to-day is still a friend of peace and, to a certain
extent, pro-German, becomes increasingly weaker
and Slavonic feeling more and more anti-German.
... I desire no preventive war. But when battle
offers we must not run away."

So Jagow does not believe that Russia, at the
moment, can and will wage war. He does not want to
force a preventive war exactly, but if it does come, it
will really be a piece of good fortune for the German
Empire and its allies.

This was, in those days, a widespread opinion, not
only in Austria, but also in Germany. Immediately
after the outbreak of war, Herr Paul Rohrbach, a Pan-
German magnate, and likely to be familiar with the
German General Staff's line of thought, made this
statement :

" For us — i.e.y for Germany and Austria-Hungary

The Conspirators at Work 99

— the chief anxiety was that by a temporary,
apparent yielding on the part of Russia we might
be morally compelled to wait until Russia and
France were really ready."*

It is characteristic of the eagerness for war among
these circles that when it actually broke out it was
received, not with anxiety or with grief as a fearful
catastrophe, but with jubilation as a deliverance.

On June yth, 1915, the King of Bavaria stated :

u Russia's declaration of war was followed by
that of France, and when the English then fell upon
us I said :

' I am glad, and I am glad for this reason, that
now we can settle accounts with our enemies and
that now, at last, we will obtain a direct outlet from
the Rhine to the sea.' "

Such was the desire for peace of the reigning German
princes on the outbreak of the war. But it is certain
that all were not so stupid and wanton as to long for
war. The arbitrators at the Foreign Office " risked " it,
to be sure, but hoped that events would take the turn
they did in 1909 and 1913, when Russia drew back
owing to inadequate equipment. They did not con-
sider that, this time, the Russian Empire was subjected
to a particularly severe test : she was required to
evacuate all her political strongholds in the Balkans and
to hand them over entirely to Austria.

Meanwhile, by taking prompt action, leaving Russia
no time to come to an understanding with her friends,

* "German Policy and the War," Dresden, Verlag "Das grosser e Deutschland"
(pp. 82, 83).

ioo The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Russia might soonest be brought " peaceably " to her
knees. Should she, however, offer unexpected resist-
ance the best prospects of success, also in a military
sense, were to be found in leaving the enemy as little
time as possible to make preparations.

THE HOODWINKING OF EUROPE

In all circumstances public opinion had to be lulled
to sleep until the moment had arrived. This was not
so simple. Foreign countries were to be reassured,
while, simultaneously, the home population was to be
worked up into the mood for war, which was absolutely
indispensable if their actions were not to be crippled
from the outset. And, on the other hand, neither of
the two allies seems to have really trusted the other.
Each scented " slackness " in the other, unless energetic-
ally goaded by the Press.

This occasioned many an edifying statement.

Thus, on July i8th, Jagow telegraphed to Tschir-
schky :

" To-morrow the Norddeutsche will publish some
comments on the Austro-Serbian dispute, which are
couched in intentionally mild terms in consideration
of European diplomacy. This markedly semi-
official organ must not sound a premature alarm.
Please see that this is not falsely interpreted as
German deviation from determination shown there."

Before this already, on July I5th, Berchtold sent
the following message to Szogyeny in Berlin :

" From this — to us also — undesirable delay it is

The Conspirators at Work 101

not difficult to explain the attitude of our semi-
official Press.

" Momentarily, we must, on the one hand, pre-
vent any weakening of public opinion, now favour-
able to our policy, in the Monarchy, and, on the
other hand, we must not allow thoughts of media-
tion to spring up with other Powers owing to a
language on the part of our Press by which the
situation is systematically accentuated."

The regulation of the tone of the Press was followed
by other " sedatives," the principal of which was the
departure of the military chiefs. We have already seen
that the Minister for War and the Chief of the General
Staff were sent on leave to Austria for the express pur-
pose of hoodwinking Europe.

To this William remarked that it was childish. This
is not quite comprehensible, for he himself went on fur-
lough, too, at that time.

Here we must return to the mysterious conferences
held by Wilhelm before he started on his Scandinavian
trip. These were held with the greatest secrecy possible,
so as to prevent premature alarm. The rigorous secrecy
is evidenced by the concluding sentence of the Bussche
notes of August, 1917 : " Thoroughly reliable source/'
It was, therefore, not a question of a fact generally
known in Government circles, but of one known only to
the trusted few.

Had the public learned anything of a war council,
the cat would have been out of the bag immediately ;
then all the world would have known what had been
hatched at these conferences. Just as, after the Kaiser's
interview with Bethmann, the meeting with the military
chiefs became unavoidably necessary in view of the

102 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Kaiser's imminent departure on his trip to the North, so
the anxious concealment of that meeting was not less
necessary.

His trip to the North had been planned beforehand.
Its postponement might have aroused suspicion. Now
it became a means to lull Europe into security. How
could any idea of the gravity of the situation arise
when the German Emperor and his Fleet had gone on
a cruise to the North !

On July 7th he started on his journey, from which
he did not return until the 27 th. While at sea he
remained, of course, in constant touch with Berlin.
These endeavours to hoodwink Europe produced some
peculiar fruit. Thus, on July nth, Count Wedel, one
of the Kaiser's suite, telegraphed from Bergen :

" On submitting the customary congratulatory
telegram drafted by the Foreign Office for the King
of Serbia's birthday to-morrow, His Majesty com-
manded me to inquire of your Excellency whether
such a telegram appears necessary and harmless at
the present moment/'

To this Jagow replied :

" As Vienna has not yet taken any steps what-
ever in Belgrade, the omission of the customary tele-
gram would be too remarkable and might give rise
to premature uneasiness. Recommend, therefore,
its dispatch."

So upon the dear cousin, whom they had declared a
bloodthirsty murderer, all the blessings of Heaven were
hastily called down in the tenderest terms, before the
dagger was plunged into his back.

The Conspirators at Work 103

However delightful this pleasure-cruise before the
opening of the great slaughter might have been, it finally
got on Wilhelm's nerves as the decision drew near. The
Imperial Chancellor wanted to keep him away as long
as possible, so that Europe might remain quiet and not
get wind of what was afoot. William, however, began to
fear that the burning fuse might cause a premature
explosion, leaving him and his Fleet a prey to the English
on the Norwegian coast or giving Russia a free hand
in the Baltic. He urged that they should return.

On July i8th, Jagow asked Count Wedel for an
exact statement of the Hohenzollern's course, adding :

"As we wish to localize eventual conflict between
Austria and Serbia, we must not alarm people by
premature return of H.M. ; on the other hand, the
All Highest must be within reach should unforeseen
events necessitate important decisions (mobiliza-
tion) for us also. Cruising in the Baltic might,
perhaps, be contemplated for last days of trip."

On July igth, William orders the Fleet to keep
together until the 25th, so that it " may be able to carry
out quickly the command to cut short the journey."

Bethmann, who at this critical juncture was at
Hohenfinow instead of in Berlin (also to calm Europe's
nerves ?), thereupon telegraphed to the Foreign Office
on the 2ist :

" H.M.'s Order for the Fleet to keep together
until 25th makes me fear that as soon as Ultimatum
is rejected remarkable Fleet movements might be
ordered from Balmholm (where the Kaiser then was).
On the other hand, in the event of a crisis, wrong
station of the Fleet might prove disastrous ! "

104 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Bethmann, therefore, asked for the view of the
Admiralty Staff. The latter answered on July 22nd,
that in the event of England declaring war, " an attack
upon our Fleet by the English Navy was to be counted
upon with certainty."

Jagow sent a reassuring telegram to the Imperial
Chancellor, stating that England was quite peaceable
and was allowing her Fleet, which had been assembled
for manoeuvres, to disperse.

On the 23rd the Imperial Chancellor then telegraphed
to Count Wedel, the Austrian Note would be delivered
" this afternoon," the Ultimatum would expire on the
25th, and that, for the time being, Germany would say
the whole affair did not concern her.

" Only the intervention of other Powers would
draw us into the conflict. It is not to be supposed
that this will happen at once, or that England
especially will immediately decide to intervene :
the very fact that President Poincare, leaving
Kronstadt to-day, will visit Stockholm on the 25th,
Copenhagen on the 27th and Christiania on the 2gth,
arriving at Dunkirk on the 3ist, is likely to delay
all decisions.

" English Fleet, * according to Admiralty Staff
reports, is to disperse on the 27th, and repair to
home ports. Any premature recall of our Fleet
might cause general uneasiness, and be regarded as
suspicious, especially in England."

But William has no confidence in the maintenance
of peace. On the 25th he gives the order to the Fleet
to hold itself in readiness for immediate return home.
Bethmann conjures the Kaiser to wait still. This

The Conspirators at Work 105

causes an outburst of wrath on the part of the Kaiser.
The Chancellor's telegram with William's additions
runs :

" The Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy
informs me that Your Majesty has, in view of a
Wolff telegram [Unheard of! — W.], given orders
to the Fleet to prepare immediately for the home-
ward journey. [Incredible imputation ! Never
entered my head ! ! ! On my Ambassador's report
of the mobilization in Belgrade ! This may entail
Russia's mobilization, will entail Austria's ! In this
case I must have my forces on land and sea
together. In the Baltic there is not a single ship ! !
Moreover, it is my custom to take military measures,
not according to a Wolff telegram, but according to
the general situation, and this the civilian Chancellor
(Civilian underlined by the Kaiser.— K.) has not yet
grasped. — W.]

" Meanwhile, Admiral von Pohl will probably
have submitted to Your Majesty the reports of
Your Majesty's naval attache in London, and of
the confidential agent of the Navy in Portsmouth,
according to which the English Navy is taking no
noticeable measures whatever [Doesn't need to !
It is already prepared for war, as the Review has
just shown, and has mobilized ! — W.], but is carry-
ing out, according to plan, the dispersal previously
arranged.

" As the reports hitherto received from Your
Majesty's Ambassador in London also show that
Sir E. Grey, for the present at least, is not contem-
plating a direct participation of England in a
possible European War, and will use his influence

106 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

for the localization, as far as feasible, of the Austro-
Hungarian-Serbian conflict, I venture most humbly
to recommend that Your Majesty does not order
a premature return of the Fleet for the time being."
[When Russia mobilizes my Fleet must be already
in the Baltic, so it is going home. — W.]

On July 26th, Bethmann once more besought his
Imperial master " to remain in Norway for the present,
as this would materially facilitate England's proposed
intermediary action in Petersburg, which is now visibly
vacillating." To which William remarks :

" From what is that (Petersburg's vacillation) to be
inferred ? Not from the material submitted to me."

And even before this, in reply to the desire that he
should remain in Norway, he said :

" There is a Russian Fleet ! In the Baltic there
are now five Russian torpedo-boat flotillas making
instructional cruises, all or part of which could be
stationed before the Belts in sixteen hours, blocking
the way. Port Arthur should be a lesson ! My Fleet
has marching orders for Kiel, and thither it goes ! "

One sees William reckoned with the immediate
outbreak of the world-war after the delivery of the
Ultimatum to Serbia. He therefore steamed home at
full speed, in spite of Bethmann-Hollweg. He begins
his active intervention in the war policy by snubbing his
own Chancellor, " most humbly daring to recommend,"
as if he were a bootblack, addressing him as a creature
who has not yet grasped the general situation. Military
superiority thinks it is treating the Chancellor with

The Conspirators at Work 107

especial contempt when it addresses him as a " Civilian
Chancellor/' who has not the slightest influence upon
military measures.

On the other hand, the telegram bears witness not
only to the submissiveness of Bethmann, who behaves
less like a civilian Chancellor than a civilian serf, but
also to the shortsightedness and mustiness of his policy,
which imagined it could deceive the English, for a few
days at least, as to the dangerous character of the
Austrian Ultimatum by leaving the Kaiser longer on the
Norwegian coast.

Moreover, his calculations based on Poincare's journey
also proved to be mistaken. He had hoped it would
delay all decisions on the part of the Entente, and leave
Austria a free hand in respect of Serbia beyond July 3ist.
But Poincare was in just as great a hurry to get home as
William, and, in view of the threatening situation,
rightly so. He cancelled his visits and arrived in
France on July 2Qth.

Simultaneously, Austria had been pursuing no less
zealously the policy of hoodwinking Europe. The
Austrian diplomats, however, treated the matter more
bluntly. Since the disclosure of their forgery tricks
against Serbia, their reputation for truth was quoted
almost as low as the Austrian krone is to-day. They
did all honour to this reputation by making the most
reassuring asseverations concerning their conciliatory in-
tentions immediately before the delivery of their Ulti-
matum, which was purposely couched in such brutal
terms as to appear unacceptable.

Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna, reported
on July 26th :

" Herr Schebeko (Russian Ambassador in Vienna)

108 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

has suddenly returned from a journey to Russia.
He had started on this journey only after Count
Berchtold had given the assurance that the demands
addressed to Serbia were highly acceptable."

On July 23rd the acting Foreign Minister in Paris,
M. Bienvenu Martin, reported to the French Ambas-
sador :

" M. Dumaine, whom I had charged to direct
the attention of the Austrian Government to the
uneasiness that has arisen in Europe, was assured
by Baron von Macchio, in reply to his question,
that the tone of the Austrian Note and the terms
laid down therein were calculated to effect a peaceful
solution. I do not know how far credence may be
given to these assurances, considering the usages
of the Imperial Chancellery."

The usages of diplomacy are in no country distin-
guished by excessive sincerity. But a perfidy so short-
sighted as to assert to-day something whose utter false-
hood it must itself reveal to-morrow, implies not only
such shamelessness but also such stupidity as —
Oxenstierna notwithstanding — is out of the common.

After such preparation of public opinion the
ultimatum was delivered to Serbia on the evening of
July 23rd.

CHAPTER XII
THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

THE DELIVERY OF THE NOTE

ON July 23rd the Austrian Note was delivered in
Belgrade. It was, in reality, an Ultimatum
requiring the unconditional acceptance of Austria's
demands within forty-eight hours. The Austrian
Minister in Belgrade, Baron von Giesl, had accordingly
characterized the Note as an " Ultimatum " in a tele-
gram to Belgrade, whereupon he was informed it was
only a " time-limited demarche," as its rejection was not
to be answered by an immediate declaration of war, but
at first only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations.
With such petty splitting of hairs the State wiseacres
of the Ballplatz hoped to keep up in Europe for a few
days longer the appearance of their peaceful intentions.

On July 24th the Note was to be handed to the
Powers, on the 25th Serbia had to reply. This in-
decent haste, after such long hesitation, was purposely
demanded, so as to make it impossible for Serbia to confer
with the Powers, or for the Powers to confer with one
another, and in order to preclude all intervention.

Germany at once made haste to assure all the world,
and also her own representatives abroad, that she had
no knowledge of the Note, and had not influenced it in

109

no The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the slightest, and that it was as great a surprise to her
as to the other Powers.

Thus Jagow telegraphed to the German Minister
in Stockholm on July 23rd, 2 p.m. :

" According to all appearances, Austria-Hungary,
who feels her existence threatened by the Greater
Serbia agitation, has made very serious demands
in Belgrade. These are not known to us ; we
regard them as Austria-Hungary's internal affair,
in which we have no right to interfere."

On July 24th Zimmermann telegraphed to the Am-
bassadors in Paris, London and Petrograd :

" In local diplomatic circles opinion prevails that
we instigated Austria-Hungary to send sharp Note
to Serbia, and also helped to frame it. Rumoui
appears to emanate from Cambon. If necessary,
please counter him there. We exercised no influence
whatsoever on the contents of the Note, and had
just as little opportunity as other Powers of taking
up any attitude in regard to it before publication."

In these edifying instructions only one statement
is correct : that Cambon from the very outset did,
indeed, smell a rat.

On July 24th he reported on an interview with
Jagow :

" I asked him whether the Berlin Cabinet had
really known nothing whatever of the Austrian
demands before they were transmitted to Bel-
grade. When he affirmed this statement, I told

The Ultimatum to Serbia ill

him I was greatly surprised to see him take up the
cudgels so zealously on behalf of claims of whose
extent and range he was unaware.

" ' Mind/ interrupted Herr von Jagow, ' it is
only because we are talking personally with each
other that I allow you to say that to me.' " (French
Yellow Book of 1914, No. 30.)

The same assurance was received from the virtuously
indignant Jagow by the British Charge* d' Affaires, Sir
H. Rumboldt, who reported thereon to London on
July 25th :

" The State Secretary repeated very earnestly,
that although he had been accused of having known
the entire contents of the Note, he, as a matter of
fact, had not had this knowledge." (Blue Book,
1914, No. 18.)

Cambon reported on this conversation on the same

day :

• » *

" The British Charge d' Affaires also inquired of
Herr von Jagow, as I did yesterday, whether Ger-
many had had no knowledge of the Austrian Note
before it was dispatched, and received such an
unequivocal denial that he could not pursue the
subject. But he could not refrain from expressing
his surprise at the complete carte blanche that
Germany had given Austria." (Yellow Book, No. 41.)

Sir Horace Rumboldt, who received these assurances,
was the same whose statements concerning " Germany's

112 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

habitual mendacity " are quoted in the White Book of
June, 1919, as we have already seen. Perhaps it was
at the end of July, 1914, that he first came to this
conclusion.

When the Berlin Foreign Office declared it " had
exercised no influence whatever on the contents of the
Austrian Note, and had had just as little opportunity
as other Powers to take up any attitude in regard to it
before publication " — i.e., before July 24th — it is clear
from what has hitherto been communicated that it was
uttering a conscious untruth. The German Govern-
ment had known exactly that the Note would be framed
in such a manner that no State that valued its self-
determination would be able to accept it. The German
Government was not only aware of this intention of
Austria, but approved and encouraged it.

Afterwards, indeed, the Foreign Office expressed
itself more cautiously concerning its knowledge of the
Note. It denied only the knowledge of its wording.
It had cognizance of this, it declared, no sooner than
the other Powers — i.e., only after the Note had already
been delivered in Belgrade.

Not even this excuse holds water.

Already on July 21 st Tschirschky received a copy of
the Note. He did not telegraph it to Berlin, perhaps
so that the secret of the code-key might not be
jeopardized.

He transmitted the Note by letter. It reached the
Foreign Office, therefore, only on the afternoon of July
22nd. The other Powers, however, did not receive the
Note until the 24th ; so even if we take into account,
not the contents of the Note, but only its final wording,
it is false to say that the Note was not known to Germany
sooner than to the other Great Powers.

The Ultimatum to Serbia 118

Dr. Gooss must acknowledge this awkward fact ;
he tries to extricate himself, or rather the Bethmann
Government, by declaring that the text of the Note had
been able to reach the Foreign Office in Berlin

" Only at a time in which any influencing of the
Vienna Cabinet by means of detailed conferences
and propositions was no longer possible."

In his book on the outbreak of the world-war, Herr
von Jagow states that Count Szogyeny came to him on
July 22nd, between 7 and 8 p.m., bringing the Ulti-
matum.

•

" After Count Szogyeny' s visit, a notification
of the Ultimatum from our Ambassador in Vienna,
which had meanwhile arrived, was then handed
to me." (Page no.)

This delay is surely remarkable. The Ultimatum
took over twenty-four hours to come from Vienna to
Berlin ! But even then there was time enough to pre-
vent its delivery in Belgrade, if they had wanted to do
so. Jagow asserts he at once said the Note was " amply
sharp and overshot the mark." The Imperial Chan-
cellor was, he declares, of the same opinion.

" Count Szogyeny replied that couldn't be helped
now, as the Ultimatum had already been sent to
Belgrade, and was to be delivered next morning."

And thereby Imperial Chancellor and State Secre-
tary were reassured.

114 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

In a footnote after the statements in the text of his
book Jagow casually remarks :

" Unless there had been indecision in Vienna as
to the moment of delivery, the Ambassador must
have been mistaken in this respect, for actually the
Ultimatum was not delivered until 6 p.m."

This is tantamount to saying that Jagow was deceived
by Szogyeny as to the time of the delivery of the Ulti-
matum ! He would certainly have protested against
the delivery had he known that it would take place only
at 6 p.m. and not in the morning.

But did he not know this ? We have just seen
(page 64) how eagerly Jagow endeavoured to find out
at what hour of the evening of the 23rd Poincare was
leaving Petrograd. And on the evening of the 22nd
the Secretary of State telegraphed to Vienna a statement
about this departure, which resulted in the postpone-
ment of the delivery from 5 to 6 p.m. And now he
wants to make us believe he knew nothing at all about
it, and thought the Note to Serbia was being delivered
in the morning !

On August nth, 1917, State Secretary Zimmermann
wrote to the Under-Secretary of State, von der Bussche :

" DEAR BUSSCHE,

" Objectively speaking, the statement of the
Evening News was correct, inasmuch as we did
receive the Serbian Ultimatum some twelve hours
before delivery. On the other hand, I certainly
do not recollect having blurted out this fact to an
American diplomat. A dementi may, therefore, be
made. Whether, however, this appears expedient,

The Ultimatum to Serbia us

in view of the fact of our knowledge, which, after
all, cannot be concealed eternally, I leave an open
question. Kindest regards,

" Yours,

" ZlMMERMANN."

But why this eagerness to deny all knowledge of
the Note, whose contents and wording was afterwards
defended with all energy ?

An underhand game was purposely being played,
each being assigned his part. On July aoth the Note
reached the Austrian Ambassadors, with injunctions to
deliver it on July 24th to the Governments to which
they were accredited.

Count Szogyeny thereupon took the liberty of
remarking that an exception should be made in the case
of Germany. To which Berchtold replied on July 22nd :

" The order in question had merely a formal
significance in regard to Germany. The official
delivery of our Note was to take place in Berlin
with the same formalities as in the case of the
other signatory Powers. The Note mentioned was
communicated to Herr von Tschirschky already
yesterday in strict confidence. At all events, it
has already been transmitted to Berlin by the
Ambassador."

Thus, in respect of the Note also Europe was to be
deceived by deliberate lying.

116 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

THE LOCALIZATION OF THE WAR

The German Government had very good reasons for
not letting it transpire that it had known of the Austrian
Ultimatum, or, indeed, that it was conspiring with
Austria.

It had, as we have seen, ^iven its blessing to the
war against Serbia on July 5th. It was also prepared
to " risk " the war against Russia and France — but
wanted no more than that. It counted upon Italy's
co-operation and England's neutrality. To be able
to enter the war, it needed also the enthusiasm of its
own people. Now it knew perfectly well that the great
majority of this people was peace-loving to the highest
degree, and that the sharpest opposition would spring
up when it learned that the Austrian demarche against
Serbia was not only known by the Kaiser and his
Ministers, but also approved and encouraged. This
would most seriously have jeopardized the whole scheme
from the outset.

Immediately after the publication of the Austrian
Ultimatum to Serbia, the Committee of the German
Social Democracy issued an appeal (July 25th), which
ran :

' The dogs of war let loose by Austrian Im-
perialism are preparing to bring death and
destruction upon all Europe. Although we con-
demn the doings of the Great Serbian Nationalists,
the wanton war provocation of the Austro-Hun-
garian Government calls for the sharpest protest.
Such brutal demands have never yet in the history

The Ultimatum to Serbia 117

of the world been made of an independent State,
and can only be calculated positively to provoke
war.

" The class-proud proletariat of Germany, in the
name of humanity and culture, raises a flaming
protest against the criminal doings of the war
agitators. It imperatively demands of the German
Government that it use its influence with the
Austrian Government to maintain peace."

Had the German proletariat had an inkling of the
real position of things, had it known that the " criminal
doings of the war agitators " was a pre-arranged affair
between Vienna and Berlin, it would not have been so
naive as to call upon the German Government to influence
the Austrian in the sense of peace, but would have
attacked the German Government just as unanimously
as the Austrian, and great masses of the non-proletarian
working classes would also have joined it. With such
a feeling, the German Government could not possibly
have launched a great war. The German Social Demo-
cracy could have saved the peace of the world. Its
prestige, and with it that of the German people, would
have been infinitely enhanced by the defeat it prepared
for the German Government.

To avoid this there was only one means : the
cognizance and complicity of the German Government
had to be carefully concealed.

This was no less necessary were Italy's help and
England's neutrality to be won.

Both immediately turned against Austria, as, indeed,
did all the world. It was now up to Germany to play
the part of the surprised, peaceable neighbour, whom
loyalty to her alliance summoned to the side of the

118 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

friendly Power, whose extremity the iniquitous outrage
of Serajevo had revealed, but a neighbour who was
ready to mediate and to maintain peace. Should she
thus come into conflict with the insatiable Russia —
oh, well, everybody knows the best-intentioned person
cannot live in peace if it doesn't please the wicked
neighbour.

It was only unfortunate that Germany insisted upon
saving the peace in a peculiar way : viz., by demanding
the localization of the point at issue. Could anything
have been more reasonable ? One had to strive to keep
the conflict within local limits and to prevent it assuming
larger dimensions.

The report of the Bavarian Legation in Berlin, pub-
lished by Eisner, of July i8th, runs :

' With a view to the localization of the war, the
Imperial administration will, immediately after
the delivery of the Austrian Note in Belgrade,
initiate a diplomatic action with the Great Powers.

" Pointing out that the Kaiser is cruising in the
North, while the Chief of the Great General Staff
and the Prussian Minister for War are on furlough,
it will allege that Germany was just as much taken
by surprise by Austria's demarche as were the other
Powers. (Its aim will be to bring the Powers to
the view that the settlement of accounts between
Austria and Serbia is the peculiar affair of these
two States.) "

The passages in brackets are missing in Eisner's
publication. They belong to those by the omission of
which Eisner is said to have distorted the meaning of
the report in a way. unfavourable to Germany. This

The Ultimatum to Serbia 119

can only be said by someone who imagines that the
efforts to localize the war had been a serious peace
scheme. In reality, it meant the derangement and
sabotage of every scheme for peace. The assertion that
Serbia's overthrow by Austria concerned these two
States alone implied nothing less than that in future
Austria alone had any say in the Balkans ; implied that
Russia was required to consent voluntarily to her
elimination there, to declare herself beaten before she
had fired a shot. By this striving after localization of
the conflict, Russia was faced with the alternative :
either to submit or to declare war on Austria.

The demand for localization was, therefore, just the
very way to force Russia to war.

The alternative to the localization of the conflict
was its solution through the intervention of Europe,
i.e., either through a Court of Arbitration or through
the mediation of the Great Powers not directly con-
cerned. Only this Europeanizing of the problem
afforded the prospect of the local war not becoming
a European war. But, of course, it did not afford
Austria the prospect of being left a free hand in the
military crushing of Serbia. And so the highly dan-
'gerous method of localization had to be insisted upon
with all obduracy. It signified now, as in the annexa-
tion crisis of 1909, a speculation on Russia's weakness
and on the peaceableness of England and of France.
The Bavarian report, indeed, continues :

" Herr Zimmermann assumes that both England
and France, to whom a war would hardly be desir-
able at present, will influence Russia in a peaceable
sense ; in addition, he is building on the fact that
bluff is one of the most popular desiderata of the

120 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Russian policy, and that the Russian, although
fond of brandishing his sword, is not, at the decisive
moment, fond of drawing it for others."

If, however, things turned out differently, the
demand for the " localization " of the war still afforded
great advantages. It could only fail through Russia's
claims, so that one stood before the world, or at least
before one's own people, as the Power that had wanted
peace — and hereby had encountered Russia's resistance.
Now it was attempted to denounce this Power as the
disturber of the peace.

The demand for the localization of the war was
another factor that required the strictest concealment
of the understanding between Germany and Austria.
For it is clear that Germany could not declare that the
whole conflict concerned only Austria and Serbia, to
the exclusion of every other Power, when she herself
had co-operated most energetically in the preparation
of this conflict.

We see that both Germany and Austria had every
reason to hide from the world their co-operation, from
the Potsdam decisions on July 5th down to the delivery
of the Ultimatum in Belgrade on July 23rd.

THE SABOTAGE OF THE PEACE EFFORTS

It was not easy to appear seriously concerned about
the peace and, at the same time, to secure Austria
" her " war with Serbia, as also to " localize " it — i.e.,
to place before Russia the alternative, either to declare
war on Austria or to submit to her without a struggle.

The chief thing to be done was not to allow the

The Ultimatum to Serbia 12

Powers to come to reason and to an understanding, but
continually to create new, accomplished facts before
an intervention could gain ground.

On the evening of July 23rd the Austrian Minister
delivered his Government's Note in Belgrade. Not
till the following day was it transmitted to the Govern-
ments of France, England, Italy and Russia. And on
the 25th Serbia's answer was demanded ! Paschitsch,
nevertheless, gave this answer at the desired time. It
was a detailed document that, contrary to expectations,
consented in the main to all the Austrian Government's
demands, in spite of their unheard-of severity.

And Austria ? It was officially reported from
Vienna :

" The Premier, M. Paschitsch, appeared at the
Austrian Legation in Belgrade a few minutes
before six, and gave an inadequate answer to the
Austro-Hungarian Note. Baron Giesl thereupon
notified him of the breaking off of diplomatic rela-
tions, and left Belgrade with the Legation staff at
6.30 p.m."

So a whole thirty minutes after delivery of the Note
the Austrian Legation was already on the way to Vienna.
Baron Giesl had announced the rupture of diplomatic
relations even before he could have properly read the
Serbian answer, to say nothing of examining it.

While Vienna seized upon this speed to bring about
the longed-for war with Serbia before Europe had
grasped what was afoot, Berlin displayed not the
slightest haste to enlighten Europe as to her views on
these events.

122 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

On July 27th, Herr von Jagow had the nerve to tell
the French Ambassador in Berlin that he had not yet
found time to read the Serbian answer.

It was not easy for the Great Powers to feel their
way, in view of this procedure. But, however little
time they had to come to an understanding among
themselves, one thing was immediately clear : the
world-peace was threatened in the extreme if it came to
a war between Austria and Serbia. As much as Austria
urged on this war (and Germany along with her, which,
of course, nobody knew at the time), just as much did
Russia, France and England try to prevent it. Not
because their rulers were unmitigated angels of peace
but because Russia and France were inadequately
equipped for war. And England, too, was hampered
by her Irish affairs. So far, therefore, the Central Powers
had been right in their calculations. Hence the Powers
unanimously agreed to seek to obtain from Austria an
extension of the time-limit fixed for the answer on the
one hand, and, on the other, to advise Serbia to yield.
France, as well as Italy and England — nay, even Russia
herself — exerted themselves in this direction as far as
it was possible with the shortness of the time.

With Germany's tacit co-operation, Austria refused
any extension of time. Serbia's answer, however, as
already mentioned, turned out to be extremely accom-
modating. Nevertheless, on the 25th Austria broke off
diplomatic relations, began immediately to mobilize,
and declared war on July 28th. On the 2Qth she bom-
barded Belgrade. Each of these steps was a fresh
provocation, each added something to the general excite-
ment, and raised fresh obstacles to every peaceful solu-
tion. Nevertheless, Austria unwaveringly pursued the
path she had taken, and was therein supported by

The Ultimatum to Serbia 128

Germany, who, at the same time, was overflowing with
protestations of peace.

Austria rejected all mediation proposals that were
made, none of which emanated from Germany. The
latter was satisfied with simply transmitting the pro-
posals of others, or else refusing them at the very outset
as incompatible with Austria's independence. Even
the most urgent questioning could not lure a proposal
from her, whilst England and Russia vied with each
other in trying to find a way out of the muddle.

Prince Lichnowsky has described the situation very
well :

" It had, of course, needed but a hint from Berlin
to induce Count Berchtold to be satisfied with a
diplomatic success, and to be reassured with the
Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On
the contrary, the war was urged on. It would
have been too fine an achievement ! . . .

' The impression is becoming more and more
firmly established that we wanted the war in any
circumstances. No other interpretation could be
placed upon our attitude in a question that did not
concern us directly at all. The earnest pleadings
and definite declarations of M. Sasonow, later on
the positively humble telegrams of the Tsar, Sir
Edward Grey's repeated proposals, the warnings
of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati,
my urgent advice — all were useless ; Berlin stuck
to her resolution : Serbia must be massacred."
(Pages 29, 30.)

The Tsar's telegrams may, indeed, be called
" humble." He virtually implored that he should be

124 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

spared the dreadful alternative between war or uncon-
ditional submission, both of which he equally feared,
because either threatened him with catastrophe, with
ruin.

But did not precisely these humble telegrams permit
one to expect that Russia would again, as in 1909, be
forced to her knees, and this time still more thoroughly,
if one only remained firm ?

Thus everything appeared to be going on swim-
mingly for the Central Powers.

William, in those days, still appeared aggressive
and in high spirits.

What he thought of the Austrian Note before he had
read the Serbian reply is shown by his comments on a
telegram from Belgrade of July 24th, read by him on
the 25th. It announces :

" The energetic tone and the precise demands of
the Austrian Note have taken the Serbian Govern-
ment completely by surprise." [William : " Bravo 1
We had not thought the Viennese were still capable
of that."]

The telegram continues :

" Since early morning the Ministerial Council has
been sitting under the presidency of the Crown
Prince-Regent."

William :

" His Majesty [King Nicholas] seems to have
made himself scarce ! "

His exalted German Majesty did not dream how one

The Ultimatum to Serbia 125

day many a " Majesty " would " make himself scarce "
in a very different fashion !

Telegram :

" The Ministerial Council is, however, unable to
come to a decision/'

William :

" The haughty Slavs ! " .i

At the conclusion of the telegram he observes :

" How hollow appears the whole of this so-called
Great-Serbian State business ! Thus it is with all
Slavonic States. Just stamp on the rabble ! "

Such was the language of the Peace Kaiser imme-
diately before the outbreak of the war.

Far from being unfavourably impressed by the
brusqueness of Austria, he condemned even the outward
appearance of a conciliatory spirit, even a gesture of
politeness, on the part of his ally.

On July 24th Tschirschky telegraphed from Vienna :

' To show Russia his disposition to be reason-
able, Count Berchtold sent this morning for the
Russian Charge d' Affaires."

To which William remarked on July 26th :

" Quite unnecessary ! Looks weak and apolo-
getic ; which is quite the wrong impression to give
to Russia/and must be avoided. Austria is on firm

u.. '•*

126 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

ground ; she has taken her measures, and these
cannot now, as it were, be made a subject for
discussion."

Tschirschky further quotes Berchtold :

" Austria will make no claims on Serbian terri-
tory."

This prompts William to exclaim :

" Donkey ! She must take the Sandjak, or the
Serbians will get to the Adriatic."

Berchtold :

" Austria desires no displacement of the balance
of power in the Balkans."

William :

" But that must and will come of itself. Austria
must have the preponderance of power in the
Balkans, in regard to the other smaller nations, and
she must have it at Russia's expense, or there will
be no peace."

At the close of the report he adds the comment :
" Weak."

He chafed under the necessity of restraining him-
self, at least outwardly — as required by the role assigned
to Germany.

The Ultimatum to Serbia 127

On July 26th, as William was preparing to set foot
again on German soil, Bethmann telegraphed to him :

" Should Russia prepare for conflict with Austria,
England means to attempt mediation, and hopes
to do so with French support. So long as Russia
attempts no hostile act, I believe that we must keep
quiet and aim at localization of the conflict. General
von Moltke returned from Carlsbad to-day, and
shares this view."

After the word " localization " William makes an
exclamation-mark, and on the expression about keeping
quiet he observes sarcastically :

" Quiet is the first duty of a citizen ! Keep
quiet — only keep quiet ! But a quiet mobilization
is indeed something new ! "

When it really came to mobilization, William's sar-
casm vanished.

Quite in keeping with all this is a telegram which
Count Szogyeny sent from Berlin to Vienna on July
25th. It runs :

"It is generally assumed here that in the event
of a negative reply from Serbia, our declaration of
war, combined with belligerent operations, will
immediately follow. Any delay in the beginning
of military operations is regarded here as very
dangerous, in view of the intervention of other
Powers. We are urgently advised to take action
at once, and to confront the world with a fait
accompli."

128 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Surely this meant the most urgent pressure to strike
with all speed.

In their statements concerning the origin of the war
(White Book, June, 1919), Professors Hans Delbriick,
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Max Weber, with Count
Montgelas, give to this telegram a far more innocent
interpretation. They say :

" The telegram of the Austro-Hungarian Ambas-
sador, Count Szogyeny, of July 25th, 1914, urging
the prompt beginning of military operations in the
event of a declaration of war, is in accordance with
the view already discussed that a localized and
therefore also a speedy settlement of this dispute is
the best measure to avert the spread of the con-
flagration." (Page 39.)

The telegram demands in plain terms immediate
declaration of war, combined with military operations.
The commentary of the four gentlemen transforms this
unobtrusively into a demand for belligerent operations
in the event of a declaration of war ! And the demand
that the world should be confronted with a fait accompli
becomes a desire for "a speedy settlement of the
dispute."

Such an interpretation of the telegram requires an
incredible amount of goodwill, and outside Germany
this will be hard to find. By this very free interpretation,
Count Szogyeny' s telegram of July 25th was sought
to be deprived of its inconvenient contents. But this
expedient wholly fails to work in the case of another
telegram of the same diplomat, dated July 27th.

Both telegrams came into the hands of the " Com-
mission of the Allied and Associated Governments

The Ultimatum to Serbia 129

(formed in January, 19 19) for fixing the responsibility of
the originators of the war and the penalties to be
imposed," and were published in its Report, which gives
a sketch of the origin of the war as brief as it is, in the
main, correct.

On this Report the German Government had two
courses before it. It could either have kept silence, or
it could have replied with the publication of the docu-
ments of the Foreign Office concerning the responsibility
for the war. It did neither, but commissioned the four
gentlemen named above to reply to the Report of the
Commission with a criticism, as " independent Ger-
mans." We have just had in their treatment of
Szogyeny's telegram a glimpse of their methods of
work. Perhaps it would have been more to the purpose
had " German Independents," instead of " independent
Germans," been entrusted with this task.

The second telegram of July 27th received no better
treatment. It is addressed by Szogyeny to Berchtold,
and runs as follows :

" State Secretary declared to me explicitly in
strict confidence that England's proposals for media-
tion would very shortly be brought to the cognizance
of Your Excellency by the German Government.

" The German Government most explicitly states
that it in no way identifies itself with these pro-
posals, is even decidedly against their consideration,
and transmits them only in deference to the request
of England."

This telegram is surely a very serious matter. It
behoved the four " independent Germans " to examine,
above all, whether it was in unison with the policy

130 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

pursued by Germany up to the 27th. It recalls Jagow's
telegram of July i8th, in which he stated that the mild
language of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was
only intended to mislead " European diplomacy/' and
must not influence Berchtold. The four historians pre-
ferred to adopt a different sort of procedure. They
say :

' The Commission has applied both to the former
Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and
to the State Secretary, von Jagow, and has obtained
from both the identical information that the dis-
patch [of Szogyeny, of July 27th] could not possibly
be correct. We consider the statements of these
two men to be worthy of credence."

But we may ask whether this assurance given by
the accused alone is sufficient to inspire the rest of
humanity with the same confidence in their innocence.
The trustworthiness of these two persons is precisely
what is called in question by the evidence of a man
by no means hostile to them, who had every interest
in stating the truth, and who immediately after the
interview with Jagow wrote down his statements in the
most definite form. And he wrote them repeatedly. The
passage quoted above stands at the beginning of
Szogyeny 's dispatch. It ends as follows :

" In conclusion, State Secretary reiterated his
attitude, and begged me, so as to prevent any
misunderstanding, to assure Your Excellency that
should he, as above contemplated, step forward in
the character of mediator, he was absolutely not
in favour of a consideration of the wishes of
England."

The Ultimatum to Serbia 131

Definite testimony of this kind cannot be summarily
disposed of on the vague statement of the accused,
that " it could not possibly be correct.'

But help comes to the Rescue Commission. At the
right moment Dr. Gooss throws it a plank to cling to,
and through it the Commission feels justified in declaring
that Szogyeny's most definite testimony is untrust-
worthy, because he — " had aged beyond his years ! "
(Page 39.)

It is not precisely in this way that the old regime
can rehabilitate its honour. Consider the situation at
this period. The German and Austrian Governments
were preparing a war which might turn out a matter of
life and death for these States. It was essential that
the posts of cardinal importance should be filled by men
of the highest powers. It was imperative that the two
Allied Governments should perfectly understand each
other, and that each should be accurately informed of
the other's intentions. The Austrian Ambassador in
Berlin formed the connecting link between the two
States. On his sagacity, clear-headedness and accuracy
depended the lives of nations and of governments.
Thus there are only two possibilities before us. Was
Count Szogyeny really the senile dullard that the white-
washers of William and his understrappers now make
him out ? In this case the Austrian Government acted
in an incredibly wanton and reckless manner in leaving
a dull-witted driveller in this highly important post,
while the German Government showed itself no less
wanton and reckless in entrusting, at such a crisis, the
most difficult and important functions to an idiot who
did not know what people were telling him. A more
serious indictment against both Governments is not
conceivable. The exculpation is in this case worse than

132 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the offence, for it is better for any nation to be directed
by sagacious and well-informed rogues than by honest
imbeciles. The former, at any rate, will not lead the
country into situations that imperil not only the whole
State but its leaders too. Only a blockhead would do
that. The worst case of all is, of course, where dis-
honesty, frivolity and stupidity are united. The first
alternative, therefore, the senility of Szogyeny, if a fact,
does not exculpate the German Government ; it merely
transfers the guilt to another field of its operations.

Was it a fact ? In 1914 Szogyeny was undoubtedly
an old man, seventy-three years of age, into whose
dispatches an error might occasionally creep. Much of
what he states has been proved to be entirely correct.
In the present instance, as we have already seen, his
evidence is remarkably definite. It surely, therefore,
calls for examination.

And on closer examination we discover that very
important points of his report are confirmed by the
German documents.

We find, too, that the motives attributed to Jagow,
on which he based his questionable utterance of the
27th July, correspond accurately with the direction of
the German Government's thoughts at that period.

Szogyeny reproduces their words :

" The German Government considered it of the
greatest importance that at the present moment
England should not make common cause with
Russia and France. Everything must therefore
be avoided that might snap the wire hitherto func-
tioning so well between Germany and England.
Were Germany to tell Sir Edward Grey plainly that
she declined to transmit his wishes to Austria-

The Ultimatum to Serbia 188

Hungary, which England believes will pay more
consideration to Germany's mediation, then the
above-mentioned situation, which we must abso-
lutely avoid, would arise."

One sees that the Count was certainly not a brilliant
stylist. But as regards the matter of the communica-
tion, Bethmann-Hollweg expressed himself on the same
day to just the same substantial effect, although not
from precisely the same standpoint. In a telegram to
Tschirschky he announces Grey's proposals, and con-
tinues :

" Having already rejected England's proposal for
a conference, we cannot possibly turn down a limine
this English suggestion too. If we reject every
mediatory movement, the whole world will hold us
responsible for the conflagration, and we shall be
represented as the true instigators of the war. This
would also have the effect of making impossible our
position in the country, where we must appear in
the light of having the war forced on us. Our
position is all the more difficult as Serbia has
apparently yielded to so great an extent. We can-
not, therefore, refuse the role of mediator, and
must submit the English proposal to the considera-
tion of the Vienna Cabinet, more especially as
London and Paris continue to make their influence
felt in Petersburg. Will you obtain Count Berch-
told's views on the English suggestion and also on
Herr Sasonow's desire to negotiate direct with
Vienna."

This strange mediator saw in the yielding of the
Serbs one of the difficulties of the situation — a difficulty

134 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

only if one was bent on war and at the same time wished
to pose as the party attacked. Nor does he recommend
the English proposal, he merely transmits it, and apolo-
gizes for the fact that circumstances oblige him to do so-
To London, however, he telegraphs :

" We have at once undertaken mediation-move-
ment in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward
Grey."

The result of the " mediation-movement " was that
Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28th.

England, nevertheless, made another effort to save
the peace of the world. On the 29 th Lichnowsky
reported in a telegram which we shall deal with in detail
in another connection :

" Sir E. Grey repeated his suggestion already
reported that we should take part in a mediation
d quatre, such as we had already accepted in principle.
Should, however, Your Excellency undertake the
mediation, of which I was able to show a prospect
early this morning, he would be equally well-
pleased."

The two sentences printed in italics are missing in
the copy of the telegram prepared for William. Can
that have been accidental ? It permits the assumption
that it was desired to conceal from the Kaiser that this
kind of mediation " had been accepted in principle."
This would be quite in keeping with Jagow's policy,
concerning which Szogyeny reported.

Whatever may have been the state of the case in
regard to this report, at all events German policy in the

The Ultimatum to Serbia 135

first days after the delivery of the Ultimatum aroused
even among neutrals a justified and growing mistrust
in its honesty and love of peace.

But on the 28th July we see in preparation a change
in its determined sabotage of every effort for peace.

THE BEGINNING OF UNCERTAINTY IN GERMANY

We have already learned that the German Govern-
ment did, indeed, desire war with Serbia, and did not
shrink from war with Russia and eventually with
France ; but at the same time it urgently needed to
have its own people behind it, Italy by its side, and
England not against it.

This was made uncommonly difficult by the clum-
siness and obstinacy of Austria on the one hand, and by
the sagacity of Serbia on the other.

When William read the reply given by Serbia to the
Austrian Ultimatum of the 25th, he had to confess that
thereby his cause was put very much in the wrong. At
this he was visibly displeased.

He read the reply of the Serbian Government on
July 28th, and added the comment :

" A brilliant achievement for a time-limit of only
forty-eight hours ! This is more than one could
have expected. A great moral success for Vienna,
but it removes every ground for war, and Giesl
might have stayed quietly in Belgrade. On this
score / should never have advised mobilization."

Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from declaring
in his speech from the Throne on August 4th :

186 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

" My exalted Ally, the Emperor and King Francis
Joseph, was compelled to take up arms."

Very different was the view expressed — and that
not in a casual observation — on July 28th. On that
day William wrote a letter to Bethmann-Hollweg,
already printed in the Deutsche Politik of July i8th,
1919. On account of its importance we reproduce it
here. The two very noteworthy phrases printed by us
in parentheses are omitted in the text as given by the
Deutsche Politik.

The letter runs :

" YOUR EXCELLENCY,

" After reading the Serbian reply, which I
received fthis morning, I am convinced that the
desires of the Danube Monarchy are substantially
fulfilled. The few reservations which Serbia has
made on particular points can, in my judgment,
be cleared up by negotiation. But her capitula-
tion (one of the most submissive kind) is here
proclaimed to all the world, and with it every
reason for war falls to the ground.

" All the same, we can only attach a limited
value to this scrap of paper and its contents so long
as it is not translated into action. The Serbs are
Orientals, and therefore sly, false, and masters
of evasion. In order that these fine undertakings
may be realized in truth and fact, it will be neces-
sary to exercise a douce violence. This could be
managed by Austria taking a pledge (Belgrade)
for the compulsion and execution of the under-
takings, and retaining it until the demands are
actually fulfilled. This is also necessary in order

The Ultimatum to Serbia 187

to afford to the army, which would be a third time
mobilized for nothing, an external satisfaction
d'honneur, a show of success in the eyes of foreign
countries and the consciousness of having at least
stood on foreign territory. Apart from this, if
there is no campaign it will give rise to a very bad
feeling towards the dynasty, and this would be an
extremely serious matter. In case Your Excel-
lency shares these views, I propose that we address
Austria to the following effect : The withdrawal of
Serbia (in a very submissive form) has been com-
pelled, and we offer our congratulations. In con-
sequence of this, there is naturally no longer any
reason for war. A guarantee is, however, very
necessary in order that the undertakings shall be
executed. This could be obtained by the tem-
porary military occupation of a part of Serbia.
Just as in 1871 we kept our troops in France until
the milliards had been paid. On this basis I am
ready to mediate for peace in Austria. Should
there be any contrary proposals or protests on the
part of other States, I would uncompromisingly
reject them, all the more since all of them are
more or less openly appealing to me to help to
preserve peace. I shall do this, but in my own
fashion, and shall be as considerate as possible of
Austria's national sentiment and the military
honour of her army. The latter has been appealed
to by its highest War Lord, and stands ready to
obey the summons. Therefore it must absolutely
have a visible satisfaction d'honneur, and this is a
preliminary condition of my mediation. Will Your
Excellency, therefore, prepare a proposal in the
sense outlined above for communication to Vienna ?

138 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

I have written in the same sense, through Plessen,
to the Chief of the General Staff,* who entirely
shares my opinion,

" WILLIAM I. R."

On this the Deutsche Politik comments :

" All this incontestably shows that the Kaiser
did not desire even the Austro-Serbian war."

In reality, the most one could say is that he did not
desire it at that moment. We have seen that up to this
he had been agreed as to the necessity for war, and even
urged it on. On July 25th he was still of the opinion
that one must " trample on the feet of this rabble."

Even on July 28th William was not fully aware of
the gravity of the situation. He is still playing with fire
when he demands a douce violence, a gentle pressure on
the Serbians, who, in such striking contrast to the
fanatical truth-worshippers among the Germans and
Austrians, are " sly and false." And it is very charac-
teristic of his military bias and also of his play-acting
propensities that he says : " The Army, mobilized the
third time for nothing, must now at last be given an
outward satisfaction d'honneur, a show of success."
This is " the preliminary condition of my mediation,"
on which the peace of the world depends ! The satis-
faction of the officers' vanity stands higher with him
than the peace of the world. In any case, his acknow-
ledgment of the 28th did not materialize into any serious
pressure on Austria, who declared war on Serbia that
very day, and bombarded Belgrade the next, in order
that they might not for the third time have mobilized
for nothing.

* General von Moltke.

The Ultimatum to Serbia 139

Now, as formerly, William rejected the best proposals
for getting out of the strained situation. This is shown
by his remarks on a report of July 28th from Chelins,
the German Military Plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg,
which William read on the 2Qth. It runs :

" For His Majesty : Prince Trubetzkoi, of the
Tsar's suite, made the following statement to me
to-day : ( Now that Serbia's reply has , been pub-
lished, one must acknowledge her good-will [One
might have expected that ! — W.] to meet Austria's
wishes fully and completely ; otherwise Serbia
would never have answered Austria's unprece-
dentedly sharp Note in so friendly and neighbourly
a tone, but would have simply [word unintelli-
gible]. The two points in dispute could not have
been simply accepted by Serbia without danger of
a revolution, and the desire to submit them to
arbitration [Austria cannot enter upon that. — W.].
This is a thoroughly loyal position, and Austria
would take on herself a heavy responsibility should
she bring about a European war by not recognizing
the attitude of Serbia. [That is what makes me
anxious after reading the Serbian reply. — W.]

' When I replied that the responsibility would
fall on Russia, who, after all, was outside the sphere
of conflict [Right ! — W.], Prince Trubetzkoi said :
'. . . We cannot leave our brothers in the lurch.
[Murderers of Kings and Princes ! — W.] Austria
might annihilate them [Doesn't want to. — W.], and
we cannot allow that. . . . We believe that the
German Emperor will give his ally, Austria, sound
advice not to strain the bow too far [These are
vague phrases intended to shift the responsibility

140 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

on to my shoulders. I repudiate it. — W.], to recog-
nize Serbia's good-will in the undertakings given,
and to let the disputed points go for decision before
the Powers or the Hague Arbitration Court.
[Idiotic. — W.] Your Kaiser's return has greatly
reassured us all, for we trust H.M. and desire no
war, nor does the Tsar Nicolas. It would be well
if the two monarchs were to come to an understand-
ing by telegram.' [Has been done. Whether an
understanding will result, I doubt. — W.] This is
the view of one of the most influential men at head-
quarters, and no doubt the view of the whole
environment."

We see that also on the 2Qth William still persisted in
denouncing an appeal to the Hague or a conference of
the Powers as " idiotic." On the other hand, he is him-
self doubtful whether direct negotiations of Germany
with Russia offer any prospect of success. Accordingly
he seems to anticipate a general war as something
inevitable, and is anxious, as his comments reveal, not
about this fact, but lest through Austria's stupidity he
may be burdened with the odium of having brought it
about. Nor is it always clear from Bethmann's state-
ments whether he really had the maintenance of peace
at heart, or whether, after Bismarck's fashion in 1871,
he was anxious that the others should appear as the
lamb that had troubled the water. Recollect the tele-
gram of July 27th to Tschirschky, in which he says that
we " must appear in the light of having the war forced
on us."

The telegram which the Imperial Chancellor sent to
the Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th is pitched in
the same key. He complains that, in spite of repeated

The Ultimatum to Serbia 141

inquiries, Austria has left Germany in the dark concern-
ing her intentions.

" The Serbian Government's reply to the Austrian
Ultimatum, now to hand, shows that Serbia is
willing to meet the Austrian demands to such a
comprehensive extent that in the case of a com-
pletely intransigeant attitude on the part of the
Austro-Hungarian Government a gradual estrange-
ment from her of public opinion throughout Europe
must be reckoned with.

" According to the statements of the Austrian
General Staff, an active military advance against
Serbia will not be possible until August I2th. The
Imperial [German] Government is therefore placed
in the extraordinarily difficult position of being
exposed, in the meantime, to the mediation and
conference proposals of the other Cabinets, and (if
she adheres to her present attitude of reserve in
respect of such proposals) of being covered before
the world, and ultimately also in the eyes of the
German people, with the odium of having caused a
world- war. Now on such a basis we cannot launch
a successful war on three fronts. It is imperative
that the responsibility for any extension of the
conflict to those not directly concerned should,
in all circumstances, devolve upon Russia."

Bethmann-Hollweg, therefore, advised Vienna to
reiterate her definite declaration that she did not seek
territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and desired to occupy
Belgrade and several points in Serbia only temporarily
as guarantee for the fulfilment of the Austrian demands.

142 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

" Should the Russian Government not recognize
the justice of this standpoint, it would have against
it the public opinion of all Europe, which is turning
against Austria. As a further consequence the
general diplomatic and, probably, also the military
situation would shift very materially in Austria-
Hungary's favour.

" Your Excellency will, by return, make an
explicit statement to this effect to Count Berchtold,
and suggest a corresponding demarche in St. Peters-
burg. In doing so, you must carefully avoid
arousing the impression that we wished to hold
Austria back. It is solely a question of finding a
modus operandi that will facilitate the realization
of Austria-Hungary's aim, to undermine the foun-
dations of the Great-Serbian propaganda, without
at the same time letting loose a world-war ; and, if
it cannot be finally averted, to improve for us, as
far as feasible, the conditions under which it is to
be waged."

It maybe acknowledged that it is difficult to decide
what the Imperial Chancellor had more at heart on July
28th : whether to avoid the world- war or "to improve
for us, as far as feasible, the conditions under which it
is to be waged."

William himself did not take a very accommodating
attitude in respect of the appeal for help addressed to
him by the Tsar in his first telegram of July 2gth. It
runs in the German translation :

" To H.M. THE KAISER.

" Neues Palais.

" I am glad that you are back. In this so grave
moment I implore you to help me. A discreditable

The Ultimatum to Serbia 143

war [ 1 ! — W.] has been declared on a weak country.
The indignation, which I entirely share, is tre-
mendous in Russia. I foresee that very soon the
pressure brought to bear upon me will overpower
me, and I shall be forced to take far-reaching
measures, which will lead to war. In the endeavour
to avert such a disaster as a European war, I beg
of you, in the name of our old friendship, to do
what you can to prevent your ally from going too
far. [In what does that consist ?— W.]— NIKY."

In view of the fact that William himself had just
declared there existed no cause for war against Serbia, one
might assume that this reference to the terrible con-
sequences of Austria's belligerent action must prompt
William to speedy intervention. Nothing of the sort.
Nicolas begs him to leave nothing undone to prevent
Austria from going too far ; William asks : " In what
does that consist ? "

William considers war against Serbia to be entirely
unwarranted, and yet protests by two exclamation marks
against this war being called discreditable (discreditable*
in German White Book translated by schmdhlich,
ignominious, which is too strong).

But William is not satisfied with this. In ad-
dition, he appends to the telegram the following
reflections :

" Confession of his own weakness and attempt
to shift responsibility on to me. The telegram con-
tains a veiled threat, and a request amounting to a
command to hold our ally's arm. Should your

* Unwurdig.

144 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Excellency have sent off my telegram last night,
it must have crossed this one.*

" We shall now see the effect of mine. The ex-
pression ' discreditable war ' (unwiirdiger Krieg. — K.)
does not argue a feeling that monarchs must sup-
port one another on the part of the Tsar, but a pan-
Slav view, which means fear of a capitis diminutio
in the Balkans in case of Austrian successes. The
general effect of these could be calmly awaited
before anything is done. Later, there will still be
plenty of time to negotiate, and, if necessary, to
mobilize, to do which Russia has not the slightest
cause at present. Instead of summoning us to
stop the Allies, His Majesty ought to apply to
the Emperor Francis Joseph and negotiate with
him, in order to learn His Majesty's views.

" Ought not copies of both telegrams to be sent
to London for the information of H.M. the King ?

" The ' Sozi ' t are making anti-militarist demon-
strations in the streets. This must not be tolerated,
at the present moment least of all.

" In the case of a repetition, I shall proclaim a
state of siege and have the leaders, all and sundry,
tutti quanti, interned. Instruct Loebell and Jagow
to this effect. We can no longer tolerate Soz.
propaganda at the present juncture ! "

* This was, in fact, the case. The Tsar's telegram reached Berlin on July
agth at i a.m. ; the Kaiser's telegram to the Tsar was prepared, according to a
draft of Stumm's, at 10.45 p.m. on the 28th, and handed in at the Head Tele-
graph Office, Berlin, at 1.45 a.m. It went off, therefore, after the Tsar's tele-
gram was already in Berlin ; the latter is not an answer to the Kaiser's telegram,
as one would have to assume according to the German White Book, William's
telegram being there dated the 28th at 10.45 p.m., and the Tsar's the agth at
i p.m.— K.

f Common German abbreviation for Socialists.

The Ultimatum to Serbia 145

This propaganda was directed against Austria's war
with Serbia, which William himself described as com-
pletely unjustified. In place of restraining his ally,
who is endangering the peace of the world, the Kaiser
wants " to intern tutti quanti " those who protest against
the war, and he demands that Austria should be allowed
a free hand to wage war and that the " general effect "
of her successes should be awaited before anything is
done.

CHAPTER XIII

ITALY

AT the time of the dsipatch of the ultimatum to
Serbia there still prevailed among the gentlemen
who ruled in Berlin and Vienna a reckless self-assurance
which believed that victory was already theirs, either
diplomatic victory if Russia should submit without a
fight to the capitis diminutio intended for her (as William
expressed it, meaning her shameful degradation), or
military victory if Russia allowed herself to be misled
into drawing the sword.

But this assurance was based on the expectation that
it would be possible (i) to secure the necessary approval
of the German public ; (2) to retain Italy as an ally,
and (3) to induce England to remain neutral.

Then came Serbia's reply. The more its effect was
felt, the more dubious became the general attitude towards
Austria and her backers. Thus arose that uncertainty
the symptoms of which we have just recognized.

We have seen William's indignation at the " Sozi "
(Socialists). His Italian ally had another cause for
anxiety in store for him.

Had the conspirators of Potsdam seen things as
they really were, and not as they ought to be according
to their wishes, they would have understood from the out-
set that far from reckoning on Italy's support, they
should have been prepared for her hostility.

146

Italy 147

In the Balkans, Italy was as much Austria's rival as
Russia. Indeed, the paths of Austria crossed Italy's
proposed course far more than that of Russia, since both
Italy and Austria desired to expand on the western side
of the Balkans. After the annexation of Bosnia by
Austria in 1909 there had therefore been a marked
rapprochement between Russia and Italy in Balkan policy.
Serbia also might well become a competitor with
Italian Imperialism in the Balkans. But in those days
it was still a small country, with 3,000,000 inhabitants,
that is to say, quite harmless in comparison with the
great Habsburg Monarchy with its 50,000,000 of popu-
lation.

And not only the imperialism but also the democracy
of Italy was antagonistic to Austria, who oppressed and
persecuted the million of Italians in her territories.

In reality Italy was Germany's ally only, and not
Austria's. Between the Italians and the Austrians
there was bitter enmity ; an enmity so great that as
early as 1909 the Chief of the Austrian General Staff,
Conrad von Hotzendorff, had urged war against Italy.
The temper of the Austrian staff officers and diplomats
had not been improved by the fact that in 1913 Italy
had thwarted Austria's plans for a war against Serbia.

So little did the conspirators trust their "ally" that
they considered it necessary to keep the secret of their
enterprise against Serbia most carefully from her, as well
as from the rest of the world. Italy's surprise at the
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was not only apparent,
like that of Germany ; it was genuine.

That the Italian Government was deeply incensed at
this was to be expected ; and even if they had been
willing to stand by Austria it would have been difficult
for them to do so. In Italy public opinion at once took

10*

148 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the side of Serbia against Austria. But an Italian
Government was far less its own master than a German
or an Austrian. It dared not risk a conflict with a
strongly expressed popular feeling.

In these circumstances the only way to win over Italy
might have been for Austria to afford Italy ample com-
pensation, such a compensation as the people also would
accept ; for example, the cession of the Trentino.

A policy marked by ordinary foresight would have
made sure of this point before committing itself to the
hazard of war — if it considered war necessary at all.
From their own imperialistic point of view William and
Bethmann ought to have demanded from Austria the
assurance that she was ready to make definite conces-
sions to Italy, before they promised in Potsdam unre-
served support to Austria in a war against Serbia.

But they were in too great a hurry for this. The
venture which brought about the terrible world-war was
— quite apart from all moral considerations — started
with such stupidity and levity that in Berlin they did
not even think of first binding Vienna to compensate
Italy. They never even inquired what were the objects
aimed at in a war against Serbia. It was only afterwards
that they began to think either about the war-aims
or about Italy. Ten days after the Potsdam conference,
on July I5th, Jagow telegraphed to Tschirschky in
Vienna :

" Just as Italian popular opinion is in general
Austrophobe, so it has so far always shown itself
Serbophil. I have no doubt that in a conflict
between Austria and Serbia it will be pronouncedly
on the side of Serbia. A territorial expansion of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, even an extension

Italy 149

of its influence in the Balkans, is detested in Italy
and regarded as an injury to Italy's position there.
In consequence of an optical delusion, in face of the
inevitable threat by her neighbour Austria, the
Slav danger, which is really much greater, is not
recognized. Quite apart from the fact that the
policy of the Government in Italy depends materially
upon the variations of public opinion, the above
view is that which is held by the majority of Italian
statesmen. On every occasion that there has been a
question of a threat to Serbia by Austria I have
noticed an extraordinary nervousness. If Italy
took the side of Serbia this would unquestionably
and materially encourage Russia's desire for action.
In St. Petersburg they would calculate that Italy
would not only not fulfil her pledges to the alh'ance,
but, wherever possible, act directly against Austria-
Hungary. And a collapse of the Monarchy would
also open up for Italy the prospect of gaining some
long-desired territories.

"It is therefore, in my opinion, of the greatest
importance that Vienna should come to an arrange-
ment with the Cabinet in Rome about the objects
to be pursued in Serbia, in case of a conflict, and
should keep Italy on her side, or — as a conflict with
Serbia alone does not mean a casus fcederis — strictly
neutral. By her agreements with Austria, Italy has
a right to compensation in case of any alteration
in the Balkans in favour of the Danube Monarchy.
This compensation would form the object and the
bait for the negotiations with Italy. According to
our information the cession of Valona, for example,
would not be regarded in Rome as an acceptable
compensation. Italy seems at present to have

150 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

given up altogether the desire to establish herself
on the altera sponda of the Adriatic.

" As I may state in the strictest confidence, the
acquisition of the Trentino will alone be considered
ample compensation in Italy. This morsel would,
moreover, be so dainty that it might also suffice
to close the mouth of Austrophobe public opinion.
That the surrender of a strip of the ancient territory
of the Monarchy would be very difficult to reconcile
with the feelings of the ruler and of the people of
Austria, cannot be denied. But, on the other hand,
the question is, what is the value of Italy's attitude
for Austrian policy, what price one is willing to pay
for it, and whether that price is in proportion to
the gain desired in another direction ?

" I beg your Excellency to make the attitude of
Italy the subject of a thorough confidential discus-
sion with Count Berchtold, and, if possible, to touch
on the question of compensation at the same time.
Whether in this conversation the question of the
Trentino can be raised, I must leave to your judg-
ment and knowledge of how feeling is disposed in
Vienna.

" The attitude of Italy will in any case be of im-
portance for Russia's attitude in the Serbian con-
flict. If a general conflagration should result from
the latter it would be of the greatest military im-
portance for us also.

" To avoid misunderstanding, I may observe
further that we have made no communication of
any kind to the Rome Cabinet regarding the nego-
tiations between Vienna and Berlin, and that the
question of compensation has therefore not been
discussed by us."

Italy 151

It was easy for Jagow to talk ! He ought to have
known the stupidity and stubbornness of his Austrian
friends better. They would not hear of compensation
in Vienna.

On July 2Oth Tschirschky thus reports an interview
with Berchtold :

" Count Berchtold said that in his opinion, as
things lay, the question of compensation would not
now become a real one at all. In yesterday's dis-
cussion, at Count Tisza's instigation in particular,
as he had emphasized that neither he nor any Hun-
garian Government could agree to a strengthening
of the Slav element in the Monarchy by the annexa-
tion of part of Serbia, it was decided to waive any
permanent incorporation of foreign territory. Any
valid reason which Italy might have for demanding
compensation would thus disappear. To my re-
mark that on Italy's part even the overthrow of
Serbia and the consequent extension of the influence
of the Monarchy in the Balkans would be regarded
as injuring her position and would lead to protests,
the Minister thought that this point of view was
in contradiction to the repeated declarations of
the Marquis of San Giuliano, that Italy required
a strong Austria."

After the Austrian Count had uttered this profound
piece of wisdom, he went on to talk of the principle of
nationality, which had been broken by Italy herself in
the occupation of Libya, and continued :

" If, however, in Rome they cannot imagine at
present a far-reaching Austro-Italian co-operation
as a matter of practical politics, we reply that there

152 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

is no need for anything of the sort. Austria demands
neither co-operation nor support, but simply ab-
stention from hostile action against an ally."

To the Minister, in his eagerness for action, the
Italians caused no anxiety.

" He had no illusions regarding the anti- Austrian
and pro-Serb feelings of San Giuliano and of the
Italians, but was firmly convinced that for military
reasons and reasons of domestic politics Italy could
hardly think of active intervention. Herr von
Merey (the Austrian Ambassador in Rome) believed,
and he, the Minister, considered this opinion well-
founded, that San Giuliano' s main object was to
bluff Austria and seek shelter for himself from Italian
public opinion."

After such proofs of levity and stupidity, the German
Government ought to have felt serious qualms about
entering with such an ally into an adventure which
threatened to lead to " a general conflagration."

William himself, however, remained at first still opti-
mistic.

Jagow telegraphed to him on July 25th a report from
Flotow in Rome, which had been sent off from there on
the evening of the 24th. It says :

" In a conference, fairly excited and lasting several
hours, with the Premier Salandra and the Marquis
di San Giuliano, the latter laid it down that the
spirit of the Triple Alliance Treaty demanded that
in so momentous a step by Austria she should
previously have come to an arrangement with her
allies. As this had not been done with Italy, Italy

Italy 153

cannot consider herself bound as regards any further
consequences of this step.

"Besides" (he said) "Article 7 of the Triple
Alliance Treaty (which I have not at hand here)
demands that in alterations in the Balkans the
contracting parties should previously come to an
arrangement, and that if one of the contracting
parties brings about territorial changes, the other
should be compensated.

"To my remark that, so far as I knew, Austria
had declared she did not seek territorial acquisitions,
the Minister said that a declaration to this effect
had only been given with considerable limitations.
Austria had rather declared she did not at present
seek territorial acquisitions, making a reservation
regarding any other decisions which might later
become necessary. The Minister thought that he
would therefore not be blamed if he took precau-
tionary measures in good time

" The text of the Austrian Note was composed
in such exceedingly aggressive and tactless language
that the whole of public opinion in Europe, and
with it Italy [She wanted to go quietly hunting in
Albania, and this has irritated Austria. — W.] would
be against Austria. No Italian Government could
fight against this. [Bosh 1 — W.j

" My impression is that the only possibility of
retaining Italy is promptly to promise her compen-
sation [The little thief must always be grabbing
something. — W.] if Austria is planning territorial
acquisitions or the occupation of Lovcen."

Jagow remarks on this telegram that the Italian Am-
bassador in Berlin, Bollati, had demanded compensation,

154 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

otherwise Italy's policy must be directed towards pre-
venting an extension of Austrian territory. William
underlines the word " compensation " and adds
" Albania." At the close of the telegram, however, he
makes the classic observation :

" This is utter twaddle and will all settle itself in
the course of events."

In the Foreign Office and even in the General Staff,
however, Italy's attitude was regarded with less optimism,
and William himself began, after he was on shore again,
to consider things somewhat more soberly, especially
when he saw the effect of the Serbian reply.

The German Government continued to urge Austria
to grant compensation to Italy

Flotow reported on July 25th from Rome :

" At yesterday's discussion with Salandra and the
Marquis di San Giuliano, which repeatedly led to
sharp encounters between the Marquis di San
Giuliano and myself, three points seemed to be
marked on the Italian side : firstly, fear of public
opinion in Italy ; secondly, consciousness of mili-
tary weakness, and thirdly, the desire to gain some-
thing for Italy out of this opportunity, if possible,
the Trentino."

On this Bethmann-Hollweg remarks :

" His Majesty considers it absolutely necessary
that Austria should in good time come to terms with
Italy on the question of compensation. Herr von
Tschirschky is to be told this in order that he may
inform Count Berchtold by special command of his
Majesty."

Italy 155

Flotow continues in his report :

" The possibility that Italy might eventually
even turn against Austria was not directly men-
tioned by Count di San Giuliano, but it came
out in gentle hints. ... As already reported, the
Marquis di San Giuliano, on the ground of the
composition of the Austrian Note, emphatically
championed the thesis that Austria's procedure
against Serbia was an aggressive one, that therefore
all intervention by Russia and France that might
result would not make the war a defensive one,
and that there would not be a casus fcederis. I
vigorously combated this view, if only for tactical
reasons. But Italy will probably stick to this
possibility of slipping out.

" The total result is thus : In the event of a
European conflict arising, one can hardly reckon
on Italy's active assistance. So far as it is possible
to foresee to-day, a directly hostile attitude by
Italy to Austria might be prevented by skilful
behaviour on the part of Austria."

On the 26th Flotow continues :

' The Marquis di San Giuliano continues to tell
me that Austria's procedure is exceedingly serious
for Italy, as Austria might use the same tactics
to-morrow against Italy with respect to the Irre-
denta. Italy therefore cannot give her approval
to such steps. According to confidential reports
from Bucharest, His Majesty the King of Rumania
is of the same opinion with regard to the Rumanians
living in Hungary. . . .

" The Minister still does not believe the Austrian

156 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

assurances that no Serbian territory is to be claimed.
. . . The Minister again hinted that without com-
pensation Italy would be forced to cross the path
of Austria."

Whoever wished really to serve the cause of the
peace of the world ought of course, to urge upon Austria
above all things to be content with the Serbian reply.
Instead of this, pressure was placed upon Austria to
come to an arrangement with Italy in order that she
might be stronger in the case of the Serbian war be-
coming a European conflict. The more this probability
increased, the more urgent became the admonitions
to Vienna.

On the 26th, Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphs to
Tschirschky in Vienna :

" The Chief of the General Staff also considers
it urgently necessary that Italy should be firmly
retained in the Triple Alliance. An arrangement
between Vienna and Rome is therefore necessary.
Vienna must not evade an agreement by disputable
interpretations of the Treaty, but must make her
decisions in keeping with the gravity of the situa-
tion."

The demands became more and more urgent. On
the 27th, Jagow telegraphs to the ambassador in Vienna :

" His Majesty the Kaiser considers it absolutely
necessary that Austria should promptly come to
an arrangement with Italy regarding Article 7, and
the question of compensation. His Majesty has
expressly commanded that your Excellency should
communicate this to Count Berchtold."

Italy 157

But neither the Chief of Staff nor the Kaiser himself
succeeded in overcoming the passive resistance of the
gentlemen of the Ballplatz, who had once made up
their minds to see in the Italians not an ally but an
enemy.

And like Italy, on account of this sullen perverseness,
the other ally whom Germany still had, Rumania,
also threatened to fail her.

This must have given rise to serious anxiety, and
still more the attitude of England.

CHAPTER XIV

ENGLAND

Up to July 29th

THE German Government had expected that they
would succeed in keeping England neutral if it
should come to a conflict with Russia and France. They
could rely upon open rebellion appearing imminent in
Ireland and on the fact that the pacifist idea was nowhere
stronger than in England, not only among the working
classes, but also in a considerable section of the bour-
geoisie. Even among many middle-class elements, who
had no objection to a colonial war, there was a horror
of a European war with its destructive economic conse-
quences.

Thus the German Government was justified in expect-
ing that there would be strong opposition in the English
Parliament to a war with Germany. But it forgot
this was only true of an offensive and unprovoked war.
The German naval armaments had filled the whole
population of England with increasing anxiety about a
German invasion. A war to overthrow France or even
the occupation of Belgium by Germany must strongly
arouse the English people to defend themselves.

The German Government does not seem to have
considered this possibility seriously. Their whole pro-
cedure was based upon the presupposition of English
neutrality.

158

England 159

In a report by Pourtales of a conversation with
Sasonow (on July 21) it is stated :

" In the course of the conversation the Minister
repeatedly pointed out that, according to the in-
formation at his disposal, the situation was con-
sidered serious in Paris and in London also. He
was obviously endeavouring to give me the im-
pression that in England also the attitude of Austria-
Hungary was very much disapproved."

With great determination, William remarked on
this : " He is wrong." If he had read Lichnowsky's
reports with greater attention and fewer preconceived
ideas, he would have been more cautious.

But it is correct that the English Government, on
the outbreak of the conflict between Austria and Serbia,
at first endeavoured to take up a neutral attitude in
order to negotiate between Austria and Russia.

The English King spoke to the same effect at this
time to William's brother, Prince Henry.

The latter wrote on July 28th from Kiel :

" MY DEAR WILLIAM,

" Before my departure from London, to
be exact on Sunday morning (July 26th), I had, at
my own request, a short conversation with Georgie,
who was perfectly clear regarding the seriousness
of the present situation, and assured me that he
and his Government would leave no plan untried
to localize the struggle between Austria and Serbia.
His Government had therefore made the proposal
that Germany, England, France and Italy — as you,
of course, already know — should intervene in the

160 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

endeavour to keep Russia in check. He hoped
that Germany would be able, in spite of her alliance
with Austria, to join in this plan to prevent a
European war, to which, so he said, we were nearer
than ever before. He continued in these exact
words : ' We shall try all we can to keep out of
this and shall remain neutral.' (Wir werden alles
aufbieten nicht hineingezogen zu werden und wer-
den neutral bleiben.) That this utterance was
meant seriously I am convinced, as I am of the
fact that England will remain neutral. Whether
she will be able to do so permanently I cannot
say, but have my doubts in view of the relationship
with France.

" Georgie was in a very serious mood, reasoned
logically and was most seriously and honestly
endeavouring to avert the possible world conflagra-
tion, in which endeavour he relied greatly upon your
assistance.

" I communicated the substance of the con-
versation to Lichnowsky (as early as July 26th — K.)
with the request that he would transmit it to
the Chancellor.

" Your faithful and obedient brother,

" HENRY."

The report of this conversation is not distinguished
by superfluous logic. He says the English Government
proposes that Germany, England, France and Italy
should combine to keep Russia in check, and hopes that
her alliance with Austria will not prevent Germany
from joining in this plan. It is obvious that the alliance
could only come into consideration if it was a question
of keeping Austria in check. " Georgie " probably

England 161

spoke of Russia and Austria. We will, therefore, not
at once contest the trustworthiness of the whole letter
on account of senility a la Szogyeny. As to the question
of neutrality, it is obvious that all that was said was,
we shall endeavour to remain neutral so long as we can.
Henry himself doubts whether this will be possible
permanently. William, however, saw in this a promise
binding in all circumstances.

Even before the ultimatum to Serbia he had thus
interpreted English neutrality, which he not only
expected but to a certain degree demanded as his just
right, to mean that England must restrain from any
pressure on Austria and allow the latter a free hand.

This is clear from his notes on a report by Lichnowsky
on July 22nd. We reproduce this in full, with William's
comments in brackets :

" Sir Edward Grey will, as I learn confidentially,
to-morrow tell Count Mensdorff that the British
Government will exert its influence to get the
Austrian demands accepted by the Serbian Govern-
ment, if they are modified, and made reconcilable
with the independence of the Serbian kingdom.
[It is not his duty to judge these demands, that is
the affair of His Majesty Franz Josef. — W.] He
also thinks that Sasonow will use his influence
in Belgrade in the same direction. But it is, he
thinks, a necessary premise to this attitude that
no unproven accusations a la Friedjung be pre-
ferred from Vienna, and that the Austro-Hungarian
Government should be in a position to establish
absolutely the connexion between the murder
at Serajevo and political circles in Belgrade. [That
is their own affair. — W.] Everything depends on

162 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

the way the Note is composed in Vienna, and
on the results of the investigation so far made.
It is impossible to make representations in Belgrade
on the basis of wanton statements. [What is
wanton ? How can Grey use such a word about the
venerable old gentleman ? — W.]

" I am working in the meanwhile in the en-
deavour to get them to intercede for an uncon-
ditional acceptance of the Austrian demands,
considering the legitimate demand of Austria for
satisfaction and a final cessation of the constant
troubles, even if it should not take fully into account
the national dignity of Serbia. [There is none. — W.]

" In doing this, I meet with the expectation that
our influence in Vienna has succeeded in suppress-
ing demands which cannot be fulfilled. [How
would that come within my province ? It does
not concern me at all ! What is the meaning of
' cannot be fulfilled ? ' The scoundrels have carried
on their agitation with murder and must be
humbled ! This is a monstrous piece of British
impudence. It is not my duty to prescribe a la Grey
to His Majesty the Emperor regarding the preserva-
tion of his honour. — W.] They reckon definitely that
we would not identify ourselves with demands
which obviously aim at bringing about a war and
that we will not support a policy which only uses
the Serajevo murder as a pretext for furthering Aus-
trian desires in the Balkans, and for the destruction
of the Peace of Bucharest. Moreover, Sir Edward
Grey has again informed me to-day that he is
endeavouring to exert influence in St. Petersburg
from the Austrian point of view. But it has not
made a pleasant impression here that Count

England 163

Berchtold has so far quite markedly avoided speak-
ing about the Serbian question with Sir Maurice
de Bunsen."

Jagow adds to this report of Lichnowsky's :

" Your Majesty's Ambassador in London is re-
ceiving instructions to be careful in his language,
and that we did not know the Austrian demands,
but considered them Austria-Hungary's internal
affairs, regarding which it would not be proper for
us to intervene."

On this William observes :

" Right ! This ought, however, to be told very
seriously and clearly to Grey so that he may see that
I stand no trifling. Grey is making the mistake of
placing Serbia on the same level as Austria and other
great Powers. This is unheard of ! Serbia is a
band of robbers, which must be laid hold of for their
crimes. I shall interfere in nothing which the
Emperor alone is entitled to decide. I have been
expecting this dispatch and it does not surprise me.
Regular British way of thinking, and condescend-
ingly commanding tone, which I will not have."

In this fashion did William think to gain English
neutrality. Of course his diplomats poured water in
his fermenting wine, but the material difficulty remained :
the antagonism between the Austrian and English point
of view was too great for England to have been able to
continue, as she intended, to intervene for Austria
and place a check exclusively on Russia.

164 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

This became clear at once after the publication of
the Austrian ultimatum. By the 24th July Lich-
nowsky reports :

" Sir Edward Grey has just requested me to come
to him. The Minister was obviously deeply affected
by the Austrian Note, which, in his view, surpassed
anything he had ever seen of this kind. He said
he had so far no news from St. Petersburg, and
therefore did not know how the matter was being
regarded there. He doubted very much, however,
whether it would be possible for the Russian Govern-
ment to recommend the Serbian Government to
accept unconditionally the Austrian demands. A
state which accepted such proposals would really
cease to count as an independent state. [This
would be very desirable. It is not a state in the
European sense, but a band of robbers. — W.] It
was difficult for him, Sir E. Grey, also to give any
advice in St. Petersburg at this moment. He could
only hope that a mild [! ! — W.] and calm interpre-
tation of the situation would hold the field there.
So long as it was a question of a ... localized
struggle between Austria and Serbia, the matter
did not concern him (Sir E. Grey) [Right ! — W.] ;
but the situation would at once be different if public
opinion in Russia forced the Government to proceed
against Austria.

" To my observation that one cannot judge the
Balkan States by the same standard as the more
advanced European nations [Right, that they are
certainly not. — W.] and that, therefore, a different
kind of language must be used towards them —
the barbaric style of their warfare had already

England 165

shown that — than towards Britons or Germans, for
example [Right. — W.], the Minister replied that,
although he might share this view, he did not
believe that it would be shared in Russia. [But
then the Russians are no better. — W.]

" The danger of a European war if Austria entered
Serbian soil [This will certainly happen. — W.]
would become immediate. The results of such a
war of four belligerents — he expressly emphasized
four, and meant Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany
and France [He forgets Italy. — W.] — it was quite
impossible to foresee. Whatever course the situa-
tion took, one thing was certain : that there would
be complete exhaustion and impoverishment ; in-
dustry and commerce would be ruined, and the
power of capital destroyed. Revolutionary move-
ments, as in 1848, would be the result in con-
sequence of the ruin of industry. [ I — W.]

' What Sir Edward Grey most lamented, besides
the tone of the Note, was the short time-limit;
which made war almost inevitable. He said to
me that he would be ready to make representations
with us in Vienna for a prolongation of the period
[Useless. — W.], as then a way out might perhaps
be found. [? 1 1 — W.] He asked me to transmit
this proposal to your Excellency.

;< He further suggested that in case of a dan-
gerous tension, the four Powers not immediately
concerned — England, Germany, France and Italy —
should undertake negotiation between Russia and
Austria. [This is superfluous, as Austria has already
made matters clear to Russia, and Grey can propose
nothing else. I am not intervening — only if Austria
expressly asks me to, which is not probable. One

166 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

does not consult others in matters of honour and
vital questions. — W.]

" The Minister is clearly trying to do everything
to prevent European complications, and could not
conceal his great regret at the challenging tone of
the Austrian Note and the short time-limit.

" From another source I was informed in the
Foreign Office that there was reason to assume that
Austria considerably underestimated Serbia's power
of resistance. In any case, it would be a long and
desperate struggle, which would greatly weaken
Austria and cause her to bleed to death. [Non-
sense ! it may bring England Persia. — W.] They
also claim to know that Rumania's attitude is more
than uncertain, and that it had been stated in
Bucharest that they would be against the party
who attacked."

Three points are particularly noteworthy in this
document :

Firstly, the serenity with which William still con-
templated war on July 26th. That Austria may bleed
to death in it he declares to be nonsense. The fear
that it will bring economic ruin and revolution to all
belligerents seems to him so ludicrous that he marks
the passage with an exclamation point.

Secondly, we see that William, on July 26th, when
he read Lichnowsky's report, still reckoned on Italy's
entry into the war — of course, on Germany's side.

Finally, however, it is to be noted that Grey describes
the war which he fears as one of four participants only ;
he says nothing of England. He is, therefore, endeavour-
ing to remain neutral — and he had to if he was to appear
as an intermediary.

England 167

But for the success of this intervention it was neces-
sary that Germany should also be honourably neutral.
This appeared doubtful from the very first, and in the
course of the negotiations the suspicion became stronger
and stronger that she was only using her neutral atti-
tude as a pretext to be able unostentatiously to assist
Austria, who allowed nothing to lead her from her
policy of war.

England had to reckon with the possibility that
Germany, with Austria, was pressing for a war against
Russia and France, in which, in alliance with Italy, she
could be certain of victory. If this view was correct,
then it was to be feared that Germany would be
strengthened in her bellicose tendencies by the prospect
of England's neutrality. It was therefore necessary to
warn Germany that she must not count on this neutrality.
This warning might still save peace, which was dan-
gerously threatened. It was given on July 2Qth.

July 29th.

The warning fell on prepared soil. We have already
given an account of the revulsion of feeling in Berlin,
which began on July 28th, produced by the Socialist
demonstrations against war in Berlin. Then by Lich-
nowsky's representations and Italy's perverseness, which
caused the possibility to arise that out of the joyful
war of two against two there might develop a very dis-
agreeable one of two against four.

Bethmann now endeavoured to win England by
promises.

In a conversation with Sir Edward Goschen on July
29th he observes :

168 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

' We can assure the English Cabinet — provided
its attitude were neutral — that we, even in the event
of a war, do not aim at territorial acquisitions
at the expense of France in Europe. We can
further assure them that we shall respect the
neutrality and integrity of Holland, so long as it
is respected by our opponents."

At the same time, he even then prepares the way for
the invasion of Belgium :

" As regards Belgium, we do not know to what
counter-measures the action of France in any
war that might arise might force us. But assuming
that Belgium does not take sides against us, we
would be ready, even in this case, to give an assur-
ance by which Belgium's integrity would remain
intact after the conclusion of the war.

" These conditional assurances seemed to us
suitable foundations for a further understanding
with England, for which our policy has hitherto
been continually working. The assurance of a
neutral attitude by England in the present conflict
would enable me to make a general neutrality agree-
ment in the future, of which it would be premature
to discuss the details in the present moment."

The composition of this sentence in English (would
. . . moment) gave Bethmann great difficulty. He had
first written (in German) :

" And we would be able to reply to the suggestion
of a general treaty of neutrality with a naval
understanding."

England 169

He then struck out the sentence, and wrote :

" Would create for us the possibility of looking
forward to a general treaty of neutrality in the
future. I cannot to-day go into the details and
basis of such a treaty, as England would give her
views on the whole question."

But this version also did not please him, and so he
chose the English given above.

This searching for the right expression is very
characteristic. Immediately before the war Bethmann-
Hollweg was endeavouring to induce England to abandon
France and Belgium to the superior strength of Ger-
many. He would have only had a prospect of attain-
ing this, if he gave England the most satisfactory assur-
ances regarding German world and naval policy. Even
then the prospect was not great, for, in contrast to the
promises, there was the reality of the German fleet.
Nevertheless, success might have been considered
possible. Yet even then, when Germany was advancing
towards that terrible crisis, Bethmann-Hollweg could
not decide even to mention a naval agreement as a
bait ; he could produce nothing but a vague phrase
about a " general treaty of neutrality for the future,"
which, of course, offered not the slightest guarantee
that a victorious Germany would not turn its then
irresistible superiority against England.

The offer was then very vigorously rejected by Grey
as a scandalous suggestion for the conclusion of a bar-
gain with Germany at the expense of France, whose
colonies were to be surrendered to Germany. But even
before the English Government received the news of
the proposal, it had already warned Germany seriously,

170 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

and informed her that England was ready to mediate
between Austria and Serbia, as well as Russia, but that
she could not promise her neutrality in a war between
Germany and France.

This communication, which was really a matter of
course, came upon William like a thunderbolt. Rage
and fear strove within him, and, as we shall see imme-
diately, caused him completely to lose his head. On
July 29th Lichnowsky sent two dispatches to Berlin.
In the one he said, among other things, that Sir Edward
Grey regarded the situation as exceedingly grave :

" A telegram yesterday from Sir Maurice de
Bunsen [British Ambassador in Vienna. — K.] made
an unpleasant impression upon him ; according to
it, Count Berchtold had absolutely rejected Saso-
now's proposal to empower Count Szapary [Austrian
Ambassador in St. Petersburg. — K.] to enter with
him into a discussion of the dispute between Serbia
and Austria."

The Minister then further discussed the possibilities
of mediation and an understanding to prevent the world-
war.

More important is the next dispatch :

" Sir Edward Grey has just sent for me again.
The Minister was absolutely calm, but very grave,
and received me with the words — that the situation
was coming more and more to a head. [The
greatest and most scandalous piece of English
Pharisaism that I have ever seen ! I shall never
make a naval agreement with such rascals. — W.]
Sasonow has declared that after the declaration

England 171

of war [Against Serbia. — K.] he will no longer be
in a position to negotiate with Austria direct, and
has made a request here to resume intervention.
[In spite of the Tsar's appeal to me ! I am thus
shoved aside. — W.] The Russian Government
regards the cessation of hostilities for the present as
a necessary preliminary to this mediation.

" Sir Edward Grey repeated his suggestion,
already reported, that we should take part in a
mediation a quatre, which we had already accepted
in principle. He personally thought that a suitable
foundation for mediation would be that Austria
should announce her terms — for example, after
occupying Belgrade or other places. [Good ! We
have been endeavouring to attain this for days
past. In vain ! — W.] If your Excellency would,
however, undertake mediation, a prospect of which
I held out this morning, this would, of course, suit
him equally well. But mediation appeared to him
to be urgently required if a European catastrophe
were not to result. [Instead of mediation, a serious
word in St. Petersburg and Paris, to the effect that
England is not assisting them, would at once restore
the situation. — W.]

"Sir E. Grey then said to me that he had a
friendly and private communication to make,
namely, that he did not wish our personal relations,
which had been so friendly, and our intimate ex-
change of ideas on all political questions to mislead
me, and he wished himself to be spared the reproach
[It remains. — W.] of insincerity afterwards. [Aha !
the low swindler ! — W.]

" The British Government wished, as before, to
continue our previous friendly relations, and so long

172 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

as the dispute was confined to Austria and Russia,
would stand aside. [This means, we are to leave
Austria in the lurch. Most mean and Mephis-
tophelean ! But genuinely English. — W.] But if
we and France became involved, the situation would
at once be altered, and in certain circumstances the
British Government might find itself forced to take
rapid decisions. [Taken already. — W.] In this
case, it would not do to stand aside and wait long.
[i.e., they will fall upon us. — W.] If war broke
out, it would be the greatest catastrophe which
the world had ever seen. He was far from wishing
to use any kind of threat, he only wished to protect
me from disappointments and himself from the
reproach of insincerity [Failed completely. He
has been insincere all these years down to his
latest speech. — W.], and therefore chose (to com-
municate this to me in) the form of a private
conversation.

" Sir Edward Grey added, however, that the
Government [We also I — W.] must take account
of public [Newly created 1 — W.] opinion. [If they
wish it, they can turn and direct public opinion,
as the Press absolutely obeys them. — W.j So
far, this had been, on the whole, favourable to
Austria, as the justice of a certain degree of satis-
faction was recognized, but now it was beginning
to swing round completely as a result of Austrian
stubbornness. [With the help of the Jingo Press ! —
W.]

" To my Italian colleague, who has just left me,
Sir Edward Grey said he believed if mediation
were undertaken Austria would be able to procure
every possible satisfaction ; there would be no

England 173

question of a humiliating retreat by Austria, as
the Serbs would, in any case, be chastised, and
with Russia's approval forced to subordinate them-
selves to Austria's wishes. Austria could thus
obtain guarantees for the future without a war
which would put the peace of Europe in danger.

" LlCHNOWSKY."

To this William adds the following Note :

" England is coming out in her true colours at
the moment when she thinks that we are hemmed
in like a hunted animal, and, so to speak, disposed
of. The vulgar mob of shopkeepers tried to deceive
us with dinners and speeches. The grossest deceit is
the message the King sent me by Henry, ' We shall
remain neutral, and try to keep out of this as long
as possible.' Grey gives the King the lie, and
these words to Lichnowsky are the outcome of an
evil conscience, because he feels he has deceived
us. Besides, it is really a threat, combined with
bluff, to break us from Austria and prevent mobili-
zation, and shift the guilt of the war. He knows
quite well that if he only speaks a single sharp,
serious word in Paris and St. Petersburg, and
warns them to remain neutral, both will at once
be still. But he refrains from uttering the word,
and threatens us instead ! The low cur ! England
alone bears the responsibility for war and peace,
not we any longer ! This must be made clear to
the world."

The immoderation of his language shows clearly
the high degree of disappointment felt by William at

174 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Grey's hint, which every trained politician with any
degree of judgment must have foreseen, which Prince
Henry also had expected when King George told him
he would endeavour to remain neutral as long as possible.
Already in the report of July i8th of the Bavarian
Councillor of Legation, Schon, which has been published
by Eisner, it had been stated :

" A war between the Dual Alliance and Triple
Entente would be little welcome to England at the
present moment, if only on account of the situation
in Ireland. If it comes to that, however, according
to the opinion held here, we would, nevertheless,
find our English cousins on the enemy's side, as
England fears that France, in the event of defeat,
would sink to the level of a second-rate power,
and thus the ' balance of power ' would be de-
stroyed, the maintenance of which England considers
imperative in her own interest."

William had quite forgotten this in his political
calculations, and he had interpreted the striving after
neutrality as far as possible at the stage of mediation,
which Grey held in prospect, as a binding promise of
neutrality in all circumstances, even in the event of
a war against France ; nay, he went so far as to regard
neutrality as an obligation on England's part blindly
to support German policy in St. Petersburg and Paris.

A more senseless policy can hardly be imagined.

The next day William expressed himself in even
greater detail on the English warning, in connection
with a report from Herr von Pourtales in St. Petersburg,
of a conversation with Sasonow.

The Russian Minister endeavoured to persuade the

England 175

German Ambassador to recommend to the German
Government the eagerly desired " participation in a con-
versation d quatre, to find a way of inducing Austria
by friendly means [Is the Russian mobilization a friendly
means ? — W.] to drop the demands which infringe the
sovereignty of Serbia."

This sensible proposal, which made the maintenance
of peace probable, and of which " in principle " the
German Foreign Office had expressed approval to Eng-
land, met with the opposition of the German Am-
bassador in St. Petersburg, who waived it aside with
the intelligent remark :

" Russia is demanding that we should do to
Austria what Austria is being reproached for doing
to Serbia."

On this ludicrous view, William promptly remarks,
" Very good."

Herr Pourtales then tries to persuade Sasonow to
allow Austria a free hand in Serbia :

" At the conclusion of peace there will still be
time enough to come back to the question of Serbian
sovereignty." [Good. — W.]

After the German Ambassador, with the lively
approval of his Imperial master, had worked in this
admirable fashion to mediate between Russia and
Austria, he began to speak of the Russian partial mobili-
zation, which followed the Austrian, and uttered, "No
threat but only a friendly warning."

" Sasonow declared that the cancelling of the
order for mobilization was no longer possible, and

176 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

that the Austrian mobilization was to blame for
this."

On this William writes a long essay :

' If the mobilization can no longer be cancelled
— which is not true — why, then, did the Tsar appeal
for my intervention three days later, without
mentioning the issue of the order for mobilization ?
Surely this shows clearly that even to him the
mobilization appeared premature, and he after-
wards took this step toward us pro forma to calm
his awakened conscience, although he knew that it
was no longer of any avail, as he did not feel him-
self strong enough to stop the mobilization. For
this leaves me without the slightest doubt any
longer : England, Russia and France have agreed
— taking as a basis our casus f&deris with Austria
— using the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext,
to wage a war of destruction against us. Hence
Grey's cynical observation to Lichnowsky : that
so long as the war remained confined to Austria
and Russia, England would stand aside, but only
if we and France became involved he would be
forced to become active against us, i.e., either we
are basely to betray our Ally and abandon her to
Russia — and thus break up the Triple Alliance, or,
remaining faithful to our Ally, are to be set upon
by the Triple Entente together and chastised, by
which their envy will finally have the satisfaction
of completely ruining all of us. This, in a nut-
shell, is the true, naked situation, which, slowly
and surely set in motion and continued by Edward
VII., has been systematically developed by dis-
claimed conversations of England with Paris and

England 177

St. Petersburg, and finally brought to its culmina-
tion and set in motion by George V. At the same
time, the stupidity and clumsiness of our Ally is
made a trap for us. The celebrated ' encircling '
of Germany thus finally became an accomplished
fact, in spite of all the endeavours of our politicians
and diplomats to prevent it. The net is suddenly
drawn over our heads, and with a mocking laugh
England reaps the most brilliant success of her
assiduously conducted, purely anti-German world-
policy. Against this we have proved powerless,
while, as a result of our fidelity to our ally, Austria,
she has us isolated, wriggling in the net, and draws
the noose for our political and economic destruction.
A splendid achievement, which compels admira-
tion even from one who is ruined by it ! Edward VII-
after his death is stronger than I who am alive !
And there were people who thought we could
win over or satisfy England by this or that trifling
measure ! ! ! She unceasingly and relentlessly pur-
sued her aim with notes (armament), holiday pro-
posals, scares, Haldane, etc., until she had reached
it. And we ran into the noose, and even introduced
the ship for ship ratio in naval building in the
touching hope that this would pacify England ! ! !
All warnings, all requests on my part were without
avail. Now we get what the English call thanks
for it. From the dilemma of fidelity to our alliance
with the venerable old Emperor is created the
situation which gives England the desired pre-
text to destroy us, with the hypocritical semblance
of right, namely, of helping France to maintain
the notorious balance of power, that is to say, the
playing of all European states in England's favour

178 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

against us ! Now the whole scheme must be
ruthlessly exposed, the mask of Christian readiness
for peace which England has shown to the world
must be rudely torn off, and her Pharisaic protes-
tation of peace pilloried ! And our Consuls in Turkey
and India, our agents, etc., must rouse the whole
Mohammedan world to a wild rebellion against this
hated, deceitful, unscrupulous nation of shop-
keepers. For if we are to bleed to death, England
shall at least lose India."

This philippic stamps the character of William.
After his conspiracy with Austria had brought Germany
into so fearful a position, he does not think of how to
get her out of it again, but only of the theatrical effect
of how he will ruthlessly expose the whole scheming
of his enemies, roughly tearing the mask of Christian
readiness for peace, and pilloring the Pharisaical pro-
testations of peace.

He has completely forgotten his own scheming,
which does not bear exposure at all, with its correspond-
ing " Christian readiness for peace," and " Pharisaical
protestations of peace."

But at the same time the war seemed to him already
certain. The only thing which it occurs to him to do,
after his pompous nourishes, is not to attempt to save
peace, but only to appeal for a rebellion of the whole
Mohammedan world. He is already reconciled to the
idea of Germany bleeding to death in the coming war
if only England suffers also from it. But at bottom this
whole confused note only shows that he had completely
lost his head. Italy's refusal and England's warning
knocked the Kaiser on the head, and deprived him of
the remnants of his judgment.

CHAPTER XV

LAST EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE

T^IFFERENT was the effect on the civilian Chan-
*-^ cellor. He endeavoured to save what could still be
saved. For this end, however, it was becoming urgently
necessary to evolve some other attitude to Austria than
that of " Nibelungen-fidelity." The latter 's stupidity
and stubbornness had resulted not only in a European
war threatening to break out overnight — to this they
might have reconciled themselves, as the possibility
had been reckoned on from the first — but this stupidity
and stubbornness threatened to have the result that the
Central Powers would enter the war in the most un-
favourable circumstances, without Italy, perhaps against
Italy, and against England, and burdened before their
own people with the terrible and crippling reproach
that they had wantonly provoked this dreadful catas-
trophe.

The strongest pressure had to be exerted on Vienna
to induce her to adopt a more intelligent policy at the
eleventh hour.

But this tendency was in contradiction to another,
and a militarist tendency, which, once the mobilization
had begun, considered war inevitable, and, simply
because the number of the enemy was so great, urged

179 12*

180 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

striking as quickly as possible, as the only chance of
holding their own. It was argued that by a few unex-
pected and decisive blows military preponderance might
be gained, wavering Italy perhaps won over, and
England overawed.

Two conflicting tendencies were thus fighting for the
decision, which depended on the unstable Kaiser. Hence
the contradictory phenomena just before the outbreak
of war : On the one hand, the pressure on Austria in
the direction of peace, and at the same time the precipita-
tion of mobilization and declarations of war.

Some have seen in these contradictions a deliberate
and cunning perfidy. I see in it only a result of the
confusion, which entered Germany's governing circles
after England's warning, and was still further increased
by Austria's attitude. The influence of this precious
ally must not be forgotten. A few illustrations may be
given here.

The nearer the threat of war, the more important it
was to win over Italy. As late as July 2Qth the Imperial
Chancellor was writing to Jagow :

" Is it not necessary to send yet another telegram
to Vienna, in which we state in sharp language that
we consider the way in which Vienna i<> handling
the question of compensation with Rome absolutely
unsatisfactory, and the responsibility for the atti-
tude of Italy in the event of war falls on Austria
alone ? If, on the eve of a possible European
conflagration, Vienna threatens to burst the Triple
Alliance in this way, the whole alliance will begin
to totter. Vienna's declaration that she will act
properly towards Italy in the event of a lasting
occupation of Serbian territory, is, moreover, in

Last Efforts to preserve Peace 181

contradiction to her assurances given in St. Peters-
burg regarding her territorial disinterestedness.
The declarations made in Rome are certainly known
in St. Petersburg. We cannot support as allies
a policy which is two-faced.

' I regard this as necessary. Otherwise we can-
not further mediate in St. Petersburg, and will
be simply towed in the wake of Vienna. This I
do not desire, even at the risk of being accused
of lukewarmness.

u If you have no objections, I ask you to submit
a telegram in this sense."

But urgent warnings of this nature had no effect on
the obstinate diplomats of Vienna. Berchtold persisted
in giving evasive answers, and he was surpassed in
this by the fanatical Italophobe, Herr von Merey, whom
the political wisdom of Austria had made Ambassador
to Rome. On July 2gth he wrote to Vienna, saying
that the more conciliatory Austria was, the more im-
moderate and covetous would Italy become, and on
July 3ist he complained that, contrary to his advice,
Count Berchtold had already gone three-quarters of
the way to meet Italy on the question of compensation,
under pressure from the German Government, which
was, of course, an exaggeration, for it had been impos-
sible to drag more than vague hints out of Berchtold.
Jagow had rather to complain of Merey that he did not
carry out the instructions given him on the question of
compensation.

Count Berchtold himself reported in the Ministerial
Council of July 3ist, that he had

" Hitherto commissioned the Imperial and Royal

182 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Ambassador in Rome to reply on questions of com-
pensation with vague phrases, and at the same
time constantly to emphasize that the idea of
territorial acquisitions was remote from the Vienna
Cabinet. If the Monarchy, however, should be
forced to undertake an occupation which was not
merely temporary, there would still be time to
approach the question of compensation." (Gooss,
page 305.)

With this dilatory policy, which was merely be-
fooling her, Italy was of course lost to the Central
Powers.

The escape from the danger of war had, however,
become a far more important object than the wooing
of allies.

In view of the mobilizations, this danger had become
so great that the quickest way to escape it ought to
have been chosen first. The Imperial Chancellor could
not decide on this, presumably in face of the disinclina-
tion of his master for any mediation d quatre and the
Hague Tribunal.

On the evening of July agth that celebrated telegram
from the Tsar arrived, which later aroused so much stir,
as in the German White Book, issued at the beginning
of the war, which contained all the Tsar's telegrams,
this particular one was " forgotten." It reads :

" Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly tele-
gram. In contrast to it, the official communication
made to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister
was couched in quite a different tone. I beg you
to explain the difference. [Now then ! ! — W.] It
would be well to submit the Austro-Serbian problem

Last Efforts to preserve Peace 183

to the Hague Conference. [! — W.] I rely on your
wisdom and friendship.

" Your loving,

" NICKY."
[Thanks likewise. — W.]

Thereupon Bethmann-Hollweg at once telegraphed
to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg :

" I beg your Excellency to explain the alleged
discrepancy between your language and His Majesty's
telegrams at once in a conversation with M. Sasonow.
The idea of the Hague Conference will of course be
quite out of the question in this case."

In view of this aversion from the direct way to peace,
there remained only the indirect way, that of pressure
on the heavy-handed and narrow-minded Austrians,
in whom war had already let loose all their military
instincts.

In the night of July 29th-3oth Berlin was no longer
endeavouring so anxiously, as on the 28th, to avoid the
impression "as if we wished to hold back Austria"
(C/. page 257).

On July 3oth, at 3 a.m., the Ambassador in Vienna
was given Lichnowsky's telegram with Grey's warning
and the following amplifications :

" If Austria refuses any intervention, we are thus
faced with a conflagration, in which England would
go against us, and, according to all indications,
Italy and Rumania not with us, and we two would
have to face four Great Powers. The heavy end
of the fighting would, through England's hostility,

184 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

fall to Germany. Austria's political prestige, the
honour of her arms as well as her legitimate demands
on Serbia, could be amply preserved by the occupa-
tion of Belgrade or other places. By the humilia-
tion of Serbia, she would, as against Russia,
strengthen her position in the Balkans. Under
these circumstances we must urgently and earnestly
submit to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet
that it should accept mediation under the honour-
able conditions specified. The responsibility for
the consequences which will otherwise result would
be uncommonly serious for Austria and for our-
selves."

In still stronger language is the conclusion of the
telegram sent by the Imperial Chancellor to the Ambas-
sador in Vienna at the same hour — 2.55 a.m. on July
30th — communicating a report from St. Petersburg :

" We cannot demand that Austria should nego-
tiate with Serbia, with whom she is in a state of
war. But the refusal of any interchange of opinion
with St. Petersburg would be a grave error, as it
would simply provoke the military intervention of
foreign countries, to avoid which is Austria's first
interest."

The telegram continued :

" We are, it is true, ready to fulfil the obligations
of our alliance, but we must decline to allow Vienna
to drag us wantonly, and in disregard of our counsels,
into a world-conflagration. In the Italian question

Last Efforts to preserve Peace 185

also, Vienna seems to pay no attention to our
advice.

' Please speak plainly to Count Berchtold at once
with all emphasis and great seriousness."

To this German pressure Austria offered a passive
resistance. This at last brought Bethmann-Hollweg
to desperation. On July soth, at 9 p.m., he sent a
telegram (No. 200) to Tschirschky :

" If Vienna, as is to be assumed from the tele-
phone conversation of your Excellency with Herr
von Stumm, refuses any intervention, in particular
Grey's proposals, it is hardly possible any longer to
shift the guilt of the European conflagration, which
is breaking out, on to Russia. His Majesty has,
at the Tsar's request, undertaken intervention in
Vienna, because he could not refuse to do so with-
out arousing the irrefutable suspicion that we want
the war. The success of this intervention is, how-
ever, rendered difficult by the fact that Russia has
mobilized against Austria. We have mentioned
this to-day to England, adding that we have
already raised in a friendly way in St. Petersburg
and Paris the question of stopping Russian and
French military measures, and could only take a
new step in this direction through an Ultimatum,
which would mean war. We have therefore sug-
gested to Sir Edward Grey that he should, for his
part, work earnestly in Paris and St. Petersburg
in this sense, and have just received his assurance
to that effect through Lichnowsky. If England's
efforts succeed while Vienna refuses everything,
Vienna will show that she wants a war at all costs,

186 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

in which we will be involved, while Russia remains
free from blame. The result is a quite untenable
situation for us as regards our own nation. We
can therefore only urgently recommend Austria to
accept Grey's proposal, which guarantees her posi-
tion in every respect.

" Your Excellency will at once communicate
most emphatically with Count Berchtold in this
sense, and, if possible, also with Count Tisza."

Even with this telegram it is possible to be in doubt
whether Bethmann-Hollweg was more concerned with
maintaining peace or shifting the responsibility for the
war on to Russia. But the pressure on Vienna was
there, and it ought in the end to have worked for peace.

Austria, however, met this pressure with a resistance
as stubborn as it was treacherous, for she did not hesi-
tate to deceive her German ally, as she did the rest of
the world, by giving way in appearance while in reality
she did nothing serious.

In the Vienna Ministerial Council of July 3ist, Count
Berchtold reported :

" His Majesty has approved the proposal that
the Vienna Cabinet, while carefully avoiding the
meritorious acceptance of the English proposal,
should, however, show complaisance in the form
of its reply, and in this way meet the desire of the
German Chancellor, not to offend the (English)
Government."

The Count added :

" If the matter now ended with a gain of prestige
only, it would, in the opinion of the President

Last Efforts to preserve Peace 187

(Berchtold), have been undertaken quite in vain.
The Monarchy would gain nothing from a mere
occupation of Belgrade, even if Russia were to give
her consent to it."

Berchtold gave his opinion, which was to reply to the
English proposal in a very courteous form, but to lay
down conditions, the refusal of which he could foresee,
and to avoid going into the " merits " (i.e., the matter
itself, if we translate the barbarous Austrian Parlia-
mentary jargon into German).

. Tisza agreed completely with Berchtold. He was
likewise of the opinion

" That it would be fatal to go into the ' merits '
(i.e., the substance) of the English proposal. The
military operations against Serbia had in any case
to take their course. It was doubtful, however,
whether it was necessary to make the new demands
on Serbia known to the Powers so early as this,
and he would propose to answer the English sug-
gestion by saying that the Monarchy was ready to
meet it in principle, but only on condition that the
operations against Serbia were continued and the
Russian mobilization stopped."

This practical mockery of the peace proposal met
with the unanimous approval of this precious Ministerial
Council.

That the German Government has been also held
responsible for this perfidious policy of Austria, which
caused the breakdown of all attempts at mediation,
need not surprise us, in view of their close co-operation

188 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

with their ally, and their initial support of the sabotage
of peace. They are, however, guiltless of this final sin,
which made war inevitable. Their debit account is
heavy enough without that.

After the 2Qth they sought to preserve peace. The
first obstacle that they found was, we have seen, the
Austrian Government. ,

But they found another, more powerful and nearer
at hand.

The last message of the Chancellor to Tschirschky,
the demand that Austria should be pressed to yield, of
which we have already spoken, was not delivered.
On July 3oth, at 9 p.m., the message was sent off, and
at u. 20 a second was hurried after it, saying :

1 Please do not carry out instructions No. 200
for the present."

What had happened in the meanwhile ? The answer
is given in the following telegram of the Chancellor to
the Ambassador in Vienna :

r< I have suspended the execution of instructions
No. 200, because the General Staff has just informed
me that military preparations by our neighbours
in the East force us to a more rapid decision if we
are not to expose ourselves to be taken by surprise.
The General Staff urgently wishes to be definitely
informed with as little delay as possible regarding
decisions in Vienna, especially of a military nature.
Please make inquiries at once, so that we may
receive an answer to-morrow."

This telegram also was not sent, but replaced by
another, in which the suspension of the instructions was

Last Efforts to preserve Peace 189

explained by the arrival of a telegram from the King
of England. But it is not to be doubted that the first
explanation was the true one. They were probably
afraid to acknowledge such an interference of the General
Staff with foreign policy. With it a new factor comes
into the foreground, a factor which is decisive for the
outbreak of the war.

CHAPTER XVI

THE MOBILIZATIONS

FROM the very beginning of the crisis there had
been a certain distrust in most Governments,
not only of Austria, but also of Germany, in spite of the
vigorous assurance of Berlin that they were as surprised
as the rest of the world by the Vienna Ultimatum.

The torpedoing of all attempts at intervention by
Austria and Germany up to July 2Qth, which was then
continued by Austria, now in opposition to Germany,
which, however, did not show openly — all this made the
Central Powers' love of peace seem more and more
doubtful and strengthened in the Entente more and
more the fear that they wanted a general conflagra-
tion.

On July 30th only a few foreign diplomats still
believed that Germany was seriously endeavouring to
mediate. Among them was the Belgian Ambassador
in St. Petersburg, M. de 1'Escaille, who reported on
July 30th :

" The only incontestable fact is that Germany
has endeavoured, here as well as in Vienna, to find
some means to avert a general conflict ; that she
has encountered, on the one hand, the firm resolu-
tion of the Vienna Cabinet not to yield a step, and,
on the other, the distrust of the St. Petersburg

190

The Mobilizations 191

Cabinet for Austria-Hungary's assurances that she
is thinking only of chastising and not of occupying
Serbia."

This dispatch fell into the hands of the German
Government on its way through Germany, and they
hastened to publish it, because it showed, they said,
that Germany had worked with the greatest devotion for
peace. The German Government later published
numerous other documents of Belgian diplomats from
the decade before the war, all of which spoke very
favourably of Germany's love of peace. What they prove
is one thing, namely, that it was particularly among
Belgian diplomats that the trust in German policy was
very strong.

It strikes one as all the more remarkable that the
German Government published at the same time as
these documents, others which were intended to prove
that Belgium, long before the war, had entered into a
conspiracy with England and France against Germany.

As to the distrust shown by the St. Petersburg Cabinet
— mentioned by de 1'Escaille — towards Vienna's assur-
ances that she would not harm Serbia's integrity, this
mistrust was not limited to St. Petersburg.

On July 29th Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to Tschir-
schky in Vienna :

" These utterances of Austrian diplomats no
longer bear the character of private statements, but
must appear as the reflex of wishes and aspirations.
I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government
and its varying procedure towards the different
Governments with increasing misgiving. In St.
Petersburg she declares her disinterestedness as

192 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

regards territory, and leaves us quite in the dark
regarding her programme. She feeds Rome with
meaningless phrases about the question of com-
pensation ; in London Count Mensdorff presents
parts of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania, and con-
tradicts the solemn promises of Vienna in St.
Petersburg. From these contradictions I must
make the inference that the disavowal of Count
Hoyos, given in telegram No. 83, was intended for
the gallery. And that the Vienna Government is
busy with plans which they consider advisable to
conceal from us, in order to secure in all cases
German assistance, and not to expose themselves
to a possible refusal by open announcement.

" The above remarks are intended in the first
place for your Excellency's information. I request
you only to point out to Count Berchtold that he
should avoid any suspicion being felt towards the
declarations made by him to the Powers regarding
Serbia's integrity."

In the meanwhile Bethmann-Hollweg himself had
already begun to arouse considerable mistrust. The
view became more and more general that Germany
wanted war, and thus one reached the fatal stage where
everyone prepared for war — preparations which could
be made in secret at first, but at a certain stage had to
take the form of open mobilization.

The dangers of this stage had been foreseen by the
German statesmen themselves. In the much-discussed
Report of the Bavarian Embassy of July i8th we read :

" A mobilization of German troops is to be
avoided, and we shall work, through our military

The Mobilizations 198

departments also, to prevent Austria mobilizing
her whole army, and especially the troops stationed
in Galicia, in order not to cause a counter-mobiliza-
tion by Russia automatically, which would then
force us and France to similar measures, and would
thus conjure up a European war."

Unfortunately Eisner omitted this passage. It is
intended to be evidence of Germany's love of peace. It
certainly says that Germany did not want a European
war at any price, but only the Serbian war ; it says
something else, however, namely, that if Austria mobi-
lized, this must " automatically " produce Russian
mobilization, which would then conjure up a European
war.

This " automatically " may be taken to heart
by those who say that Russia mobilized quite
without reason, and thus showed that she wanted
war.

One to whom it was a question of peace in all
circumstances ought not, of course, to have allowed a
declaration of war on Serbia. Once this fateful step
had been taken, an atmosphere of unrest was created
which produced general mobilization as a result. If it
was desired to avoid this, then at the very least they
ought to have kept within the framework of the pro-
gramme developed in the Bavarian Report : Austria
should have been prevented from mobilizing in a way
which would disturb Russia.

This they omitted to do. The Austrian mobilization
was fairly well concealed, but Bethmann-Hollweg con-
fessed even in his war speeches on August 4th, when he
talked of the Russian mobilization, and declared it not
to be justified :

194 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

" Austria-Hungary had only mobilized its army
corps which were immediately directed against
Serbia, and in the north only two army corps, and
far from the Russian frontier."

As early as July 25th Austria had begun the mobiliza-
tion of eight army corps, which must " automatically "
produce the Russian mobilization, as the German Govern-
ment well knew.

And it must also have known that the partial mobiliza-
tion, with which they began equally automatically,
would produce a general mobilization. It took place
in Austria and Russia almost at the same time — on
July 3 ist. The Russians asserted that Austria preceded
them in this step. The French Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, Paleologue, reported on July 3ist :

" In consequence of the general mobilization by
Austria and the measures for mobilization which
have been taken by Germany for the past six days
secretly but uninterruptedly, the order for the
general mobilization of the Russian Army has been
issued."

On August ist England and France then mobilized,
exactly as the Bavarian Report had foretold.

Even in German Government circles the Russian
mobilization was explained as not due to bellicose inten-
tions on the part of the Russian Government. On
July 30th the German military plenipotentiary in St.
Petersburg telegraphed :

" I have an impression that they have mobilized
here out of anxiety for coming events, without
aggressive intentions."

The Mobilizations 195

Even after the general Russian mobilization of
July 3ist Bethmann wrote to Lichnowsky in London :

" I do not consider it impossible that the Russian
mobilization may be traced to the fact that rumours
current here yesterday to the effect that we have
mobilized — absolutely false and at once officially
denied — were reported as fact to St. Petersburg."

But even though mobilizations had been for defensive
purposes only, they enormously increased the general
tension.

The danger of the situation thus grew tremendously.
Besides the diplomats, the General Staff officers now
had a word to say, at the very time that the " civilian "
Chancellor completed his swing round towards peace.
To the General Staff officer the task was not to prevent
the war, which he already considered inevitable, but
rather to win the war. The prospects of victory, how-
ever, were all the greater the more rapidly one struck
and the less time allowed the enemy to gather strength.
Thus the attempts of the Chancellor to keep the peace
only began at a point where his earlier war policy had
already brought to the forefront the greatest driving
force towards war.

By July 29th we have proofs of the intervention of
the German General Staff in politics. On this day they
sent to the Foreign Office a Memorandum, not on the
military but on the political situation, which it was
not their office to elucidate for the Imperial Chancellor.
The Report began with the following observations :

"It is beyond question that no State in Europe
would regard the conflict between Austria and
Serbia as other than a subject of general human

13*

196 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

interest if there were not involved in it the danger
of a universal political complication, which now
already threatens to unchain a world-war. For
over five years Serbia has been the cause of a
tension in Europe which weighs upon the political
and economic life of the nations with a pressure
which is really becoming unbearable. With a for-
bearance almost amounting to weakness, Austria
has hitherto endured the constant provocations
and the political agitation directed against its con-
stitution by a people who have gone from the
murder of a king in their own country to the murder
of a prince in a neighbouring land. Only after
the last ghastly crime has she resorted to extreme
means to burn out with glowing iron a cancer which
continually threatened to poison the body of
Europe. One would have thought that the whole
of Europe ought to have been grateful to her.
The whole of Europe would have breathed freely
if its mischief-maker had been suitably chastised,
and peace and order thus restored in the Balkans.
But Russia placed herself on the side of the criminal
country. It was only then that the Austro-Serbian
affair became the thunder-cloud which threatened
at any moment to break over Europe."

And so on. Such were the political lessons given by
the General Staff to the Imperial Chancellor, and received
by him most submissively. We need not waste words
on the General Staff's conception of history. Let us
only point out that the German General Staff made the
murder of the Serbian king an act of the Serbian people.
They had already forgotten that it was their colleagues
(the military) who applied this process.

The Mobilizations 197

The Memorandum then points out that Russia had
declared she wished to mobilize. Austria would thus
be forced to mobilize, not only against Serbia but also
against Russia. An encounter between the two thus
became inevitable.

" This, however, is the casus fcederis for Germany.
Only a miracle can now prevent war.

" Germany does not wish to bring about this
terrible war. But the German Government knows
that it would be fatally violating the deep-rooted
feelings of fidelity to the alliance, one of the finest
traits of German sentiment, and placing itself in
opposition to all the feelings of its people, if it were
not willing to come to the help of their ally at a
moment which might be decisive for the latter's
existence."

Germany, therefore, does not want to " bring about
this terrible war," but " one of the finest traits of German
sentiment," which the General Staff so brilliantly repre-
sented, forces it to do so — namely, fidelity to the con-
spiracy of July 5th, which is also " one of the finest
traits of German sentiment."

After this appeal to German sentiment, however, the
General Staff becomes quite unsentimental :

" According to the reports to hand, France also
appears to be taking preparatory measures for
eventual mobilization. It is obvious that Russia
and France are going hand in hand with their
measures.

" If the conflict between Russia and Austria is
inevitable, Germany will therefore mobilize, and
be prepared to enter into a war on two fronts.

198 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

' For the military measures intended by us, if
the case arises, it is of the greatest importance to
receive definite information as speedily as possible,
whether Russia and France intend to let matters
go as far as a war with Germany. The further the
progress made by the preparations of our neigh-
bours, the more quickly they will be able to com-
plete their mobilization. The military situation
is thus becoming daily more unfavourable, and
may, if our prospective opponents continue to
prepare in all quietness, lead to fatal consequences
for us."

Look at this language ! The General Staff does not,
for example, inform the Government that it has made
all preparations to mobilize, as soon as it is ordered to
do so, but commands without more ado : Germany will
mobilize as soon as the conflict between Austria and
Russia is inevitable. At the same time, it states with
equal definiteness that this conflict is only now to be
prevented by a miracle.

But according to the principles of the German
General Staff, mobilization means war. The General
Staff thus already announces a " war on two fronts,"
and demands to be let slip as quickly as possible, as the
11 military situation is daily becoming more unfavourable."

This is the meaning of this proclamation of the
General Staff to the Imperial Chancellor. With it the
central military organization raises the claim to take
the decision of questions of foreign policy into its own
hands, and to hasten on a warlike solution, even at the
very moment when the civil authority is preparing to
yield so far as to take a step, although a small one,
towards peace.

The Mobilizations 190

The Imperial Chancellor, it is true, did not abdicate
without a struggle.

While the war was still on we were told of this,
among other things, by a pamphlet, whose author con-
cealed himself under the pseudonym, " Junius alter,"
and who held the views of the war-party. There it is
said :

" Regarding the general activity of the Chancellor
immediately before the outbreak of war, one gets,
as a general impression, the fact that his endeavour
up to the last hour — regardless of the military con-
sequences— was directed towards preventing at any
price the outbreak of this war, which had long
become inevitable. In vain did Chiefs of the
General Staff, War Ministers and Admiralty
authorities, press for the order to mobilize : they
succeeded, it is true, in half convincing the Kaiser
on Thursday (July 30th) of the irrefutable necessity
of this measure, so that in the afternoon Berlin
police organs and the Lokal-Anzeiger already
announced mobilization. But the intervention of
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded in with-
drawing the decisive and saving [! — K.] order.
Still he held fast and unwavering to his hope that
with English help he must succeed in bringing
about an agreement between Vienna and St. Peters-
burg, and again two precious days were lost, which
have cost us not only a part of Alsace, but also
rivers of blood. In the same way, August ist would
have passed unused, if the highest military authorities
had not on that day finally declared that if the order
to mobilize were further delayed, they would be
no longer able to bear the heavy responsibility

200 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

resting on them. . . . Even after mobilization had
taken place, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg made a
last attempt to get the order cancelled, but it was
fortunately too late ; the military authorities, who
had more political insight in their little fingers,
had prevailed at the twelfth hour."

The accusations (!) of Herr "Junius alter" confirm
the report of July 3oth of the French Ambassador in
Berlin. M. Cambon says :

" One of the Ambassadors with whom I am on
the most intimate terms saw Herr Zimmermann
at two o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary,
the military authorities were very eager for mobiliza-
tion to be ordered, as every delay by Germany lost
her some of her advantages. But so far the pressure
of the General Staff, who see war in mobilization,
has been successfully resisted. ... I have, more-
over, the best reasons for assuming that all the
measures for mobilization, which can be carried
out before the general order for mobilization is
published, have been taken here, where they would
like us to proclaim mobilization first, in order to
shift the responsibility on to us."

Bethmann-Hollweg did not fight alone against the
premature proclamation of mobilization, that is, accord-
ing to German ideas, of war. By his side fought other
members of the Foreign Office, who knew very well
under what unfavourable international conditions Ger-
many was entering the war, and who did not want to
see the thin thread of peace, which had only been spun
at the last minute, prematurely broken.

The Mobilizations 201

Thus the Belgian Baron Beyens reported to Brussels
from Berlin on August ist :

" About 6 p.m. [should rather be 5. — K.] no
answer had arrived from St. Petersburg to the
Ultimatum of the Imperial Government. Herren
von Jagow and Zimmermann went to the Chan-
cellor and to the Kaiser to get the order for general
mobilization held back to-day. But they met the
unswerving resistance of the War Minister and the
heads of the Army, who laid before the Kaiser the
ruinous consequences of a delay of twenty-four
hours. The order was at once given."

In striking contrast to these reports is the version
given by Tirpitz in his " Memoirs." According to him,
Bethmann-Hollweg, on the last day, had appealed most
vigorously for mobilization and, in opposition to Moltke,
had insisted that a declaration of war at once take place
on the mobilization.

These contradictions still require explanation. But
one thing is certain : the perplexity in Government
circles, which began on July 29th, rapidly increased from
day to day. And so did the antagonisms among them-
selves ! Bethmann was no longer master of the spirits
he had summoned. He did not himself know how
right he was when he said in the Prussian Ministerial
Council of July 3Oth : " Control is lost and the stone is
set rolling."

THE PREPARATION FOR THE DECLARATION OF WAR

THE general perplexity was clearly seen in the
declaration of war on Russia. The latter had ordered
general mobilization at the same time as Austria, on
the morning of July 3ist. Both had stated it was only
a measure of precaution and did not yet mean war.
Negotiations were not thereby to be broken off.

For example, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna
reported to St. Petersburg on July 3ist :

" In spite of the general mobilization, I am con-
tinuing the exchange of views with Count Berchtold
and his assistants."

That Germany should mobilize in her turn after
the Russian mobilization was quite intelligible. Every
one was then mobilizing — even Holland. If Germany
had regarded mobilization simply as a precautionary
measure, as did all other nations — even France — there
would be nothing to condemn in this step.

Schon, the German Ambassador in Paris, reported
to Berlin on August ist :

" The Premier told me that the mobilization just
ordered here does not at all imply aggressive inten-

202

The Declaration of War on Russia 208

tions, and this is emphasized in the proclamations.
There is, he said, still room to continue the negotia-
tions on the basis of Sir E. Grey's proposal, to
which France had agreed, and which it is warmly
championing.

" Care has been taken to prevent encounters on
the frontier by leaving a zone of ten kilometres
between the French troops and the border. He
could not give up hope of peace."

If Germany had accompanied her mobilization with
similar assurances, negotiations could have really gone
on and finally ended peacefully. Had not Russia and
Austria mobilized in 1913 without coming to blows ?
We have seen that one of the reasons for William con-
sidering the war against Serbia necessary, although the
Serbian answer had removed every ground for it, lay
in the fact that Austria was now mobilizing for the third
time. If this happened again without the " army " —
i.e., the officers — seeing their " military honour " satis-
fied it would have evil consequences.

On August ist Tirpitz considered the declaration of
war an error. Moltke placed " no value " on it that
day, as Tirpitz observes.

Mobilization therefore did not necessarily mean war.
Demobilization could still follow it at the last moment
without this bloody result, if people came to an under-
standing meanwhile.

In the message to St. Petersburg of July 3ist, in
which Bethmann held out the prospect of Germany's
mobilizing, he complained that Russia was mobilizing,
although negotiations were still going on. Austria,
however, in spite of the negotiations, had not only
mobilized, but declared war on Serbia and bombarded

204

The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Belgrade. If this did not make negotiations impossible,
mere mobilization by Russia need not have been taken
so much to heart.

But this was not the only point in which the Imperial
Chancellor saw only the mote in the eye of Russia, and
not the beam in the eye of Austria. He demanded that
Russia should at once cease any military measures, not
only against Germany, but also against Austria, without
proposing the same for Austria. If he wanted Russia
to refuse his demand, this was exactly the way to for-
mulate it.

The message of the Chancellor appears no less pecu-
liar, however, if it is compared with the one sent off at
the same time to Schon for the French Government.
We give the two in parallel columns :

NOTE TO RUSSIA.

In spite of the fact that
negotiations are still going
on, and although we our-
selves have taken no steps
of any kind to mobilize up
to the present hour, Russia
has mobilized her whole
army and fleet, that is against
us also. By these Russian
measures we have been forced
for the security of the Em-
pire to announce a state of
threatening " danger " (or
imminence) of war (Kriegs-
gefahr), which does not yet
mean mobilization. Mobi-

NOTE TO FRANCE.

In spite of the fact that
our negotiations are still
going on, and although we
ourselves have taken no steps
of any kind to mobilize,
Russia has ordered the mo-
bilization of her whole army
and fleet, that is against us
also. We have therefore
announced a state of threat-
ening " danger of war,"
which must be followed by
mobilization, if Russia does
not within twelve hours cease
all war measures against
us and Austria. Mobiliza-

The Declaration of War on Russia 205

lization, however, must fol- tion inevitably means war.
low if Russia does not within Please ask the French Gov-
twelve hours cease every war ernment if they will remain
measure against us and neutral in a Russo-German
Austria, and give a definite war. Answer must be given
declaration on the point, within eighteen hours. Tele-
Please communicate this at graph at once the hour of
once to M. Sasonow and asking the question. Greatest
wire the hour of communi- speed most necessary,
cation.

We see the two messages agree almost word for
word, apart from the special conclusion for France,
except for one sentence : France is informed that
mobilization inevitably means war. In the text intended
for Russia, this decisive sentence, which makes the
communication an Ultimatum, is wanting.

Why was this ? The omission can be explained in
two very different ways : first, from the desire of the
General Staff not to arouse Russia prematurely, to keep
her still in the belief that in spite of the mobilization,
negotiations could be continued, and thus prevent her
hastening mobilization unduly. The omission might,
however, have arisen from the desire of the Chancellor
not to break down all bridges, in spite of mobilization.

As a matter of fact, the communication of the Ger-
man Government was not yet regarded in St. Petersburg
as an Ultimatum.

At twelve midnight Pourtales handed M. Sasonow
the Chancellor's message.

The Tsar answered it on the next day, August ist,
at 2 p.m., in a telegram to William :

" I have received your telegram. I understand

206 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

that you are proceeding to mobilize, but I should
like to receive from you the same guarantee as I
have given you, namely, that these measures do
not mean war and that we shall continue to negotiate
for the welfare of both our countries and the general
peace which is so dear to our hearts. Our long,
tried friendship must succeed with God's help in
preventing bloodshed. I anxiously await your
answer, full of confidence."

The unsuspecting " Nicky " never dreamed that his
long, tried friend " Willy " had by this time already
sent the declaration of war to him and thus opened the
war.

THE REASON FOR THE DECLARATION OF WAR

William had been in a tremendous hurry about it,
almost as quick as the Austrians on July 25th against
the Serbians.

At 12 midnight the period ended at the expiry of
which, according to the Chancellor's announcement,
Germany would mobilize, if Russia did not at once
demobilize on all fronts, while Austria went on with
her general mobilization and the war against Serbia
continued.

And by i p.m., not only was mobilization ordered,
but the declaration of war sent to St. Petersburg.

The German White Book, which gives all documents
in German, as a rule, even those originally in foreign
languages — e.g., the telegrams interchanged between the
Kaiser and the Tsar — publishes the declaration of war

The Declaration of War on Russia 2or

on Russia, so momentous for every German, shame-
facedly only in French.
Translated it reads :

" From the very beginning of the crisis the
Imperial Government had endeavoured to bring
about a peaceful solution. Obeying a wish ex-
pressed to him by H.M. the Tsar of Russia, H.M.
the German Emperor had undertaken, in agreement
with England, to act as mediator between the
Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when
Russia, without awaiting the result, proceeded to
mobilize all her forces by land and sea.

" In consequence of these threatening measures,
justified by no military preparations on the German
side, the German Government found itself faced
with a great and imminent threatening danger.
If the Imperial Government had neglected to meet
this danger, it would have endangered the safety
and even the existence of Germany. In con-
sequence, the German Government found itself
forced to turn to the Government of H.M. the Tsar
of all the Russias, with the pressing demand that
the above-mentioned military measures should
cease. As Russia has refused to meet this demand
(has not considered it necessary to answer our
demand), and by this refusal (this attitude) has
shown that her action is directed against Germany,
I have the honour, under instructions from my
Government, to inform Your Excellency as
follows :

" His Majesty, my illustrious Sovereign, accepts
the challenge in name of the Empire, and considers
himself in a state of war with Russia."

208 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

This declaration of war was accompanied by the
following telegram to Pourtales :

" If the Russian Government does not give a
satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency
will hand to them the following declaration to-day
at 5 p.m. (Central European time)."

In the declaration itself a sentence was given in two
different versions, of which the one which was in keeping
with Sasonow's answer was to be chosen.

What had been going on in St. Petersburg in the
meanwhile ?

Pourtales had communicated in St. Petersburg the
Chancellor's announcement that Germany must mobilize
if Russia did not demobilize against Germany and
Austria. He telegraphed on August ist, at i a.m.,
from St. Petersburg, regarding this :

" I have just carried out your instructions at
midnight. M. Sasonow again pointed to the tech-
nical impossibility of stopping military measures,
and endeavoured once more to convince me that
we were exaggerating the importance of the Russian
mobilization, which was not to be compared with
ours. He urgently begged me to call Your Excel-
lency's attention to the fact that the pledge given
on the Tsar's word of honour in to-day's telegram
from H.M. the Emperor Nicholas to H.M. the
Emperor and King, ought to satisfy us regarding
Russia's intentions, and pointed out that the Tsar
did not by any means bind himself in all eventu-
alities to refrain from warlike acts, but only so long
as there was still a prospect of settling Austro-

The Declaration of War on Russia 20d

Russian differences regarding Serbia. I put the
question directly to the Minister whether he could
guarantee me that, if an agreement with Austria
was not reached, Russia would be willing to main-
tain peace. The Minister could not give me an
affirmative answer to this question. In this case,
I replied, we could not be blamed if we were not
inclined to allow Russia a further advantage in
mobilization."

This is all. In the conversation also there is not
even the slightest hint of the principle so sharply em-
phasized to France, that Germany's mobilization would
be synonymous to a declaration of war. And now for
the deciding telegram, from Pourtales, which never
reached its addressee, the Foreign Office in Berlin,
dispatched from St. Petersburg on August ist, at 8 p.m. :

" After deciphering, at seven o'clock Russian time
(six Central European), I asked M. Sasonow three
times in succession whether he could give me the
declaration demanded in telegram No. 153, regarding
the cessation of military measures against us and
Austria. After he had three times answered in
the negative, I handed him the Note as commanded."

Herr von Pourtales had been in such haste to deliver
the Note, that he did not even notice that it contained
a two-fold version of Germany's reason for declaring
war. Both versions were given to the Russian Govern-
ment, an incident probably unique in the history of
declarations of war.

In the meanwhile, the Chancellor must have become
somewhat uneasy about this method of letting loose

210 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

war. Even the composition of the last sentence of the
proclamation of war had caused difficulties.
A proposal had been made to say :

" S.M. VEmpereurt mon auguste souverain, au
nom de V Empire declare accepter la guerre qui Lui
est octroyee " (" H.M. the Kaiser, my illustrious
Sovereign, announces, in the name of the Empire, his
acceptance of the war which is forced upon him ").

This was bad French, for it is only in German that
octroyieren means to " force upon," while in French
octroyer means to " grant " or " vouchsafe."

Perhaps for this reason octroyee was replaced by
forcee sur lui, which says " forced upon " in better
French.

But the difficulty lay not in the words, but in the
substance. It was felt that after all that had happened,
it was impossible to describe the war as forced upon
Germany. Only later, when the necessary " hurra "
atmosphere had been created, the courage was found
to do so. The quaint form given above was therefore
chosen :

" S.M. VEmpereur, mon auguste souverain, au
nom de V Empire releve de deft et Se consider e en etat
de guerre avec la Russie."

The " forcing of the war upon him " became a
simple " challenge to war," which the Kaiser regarded
as having broken out. In this feeble and distorted
form, the declaration of the most terrible of all wars,
which could only have been justified by the most cogent
of motives, was couched. But such could not be raised,

The Declaration of War on Russia 211

although since the beginning of the crisis it had been
Bethmann's most urgent care to put Russia in the wrong,
and shift to her the whole responsibility for the coming
war.

When the Tsar's telegram came, which recognized
Germany's right to mobilize, but contested the necessity
that mobilization should mean war, their declaration of
war must have appeared doubly unjustified ; otherwise
we could not understand why they subsequently made
the effort once more to prevent the proclamation of
mobilization which had not yet been issued. In this
they did not succeed ; it was ordered at five o'clock.
The " civilian Chancellor " was not yet at ease. We
have already quoted " Junius alter " to the effect that
" after mobilization had taken place, Herr von Beth-
mann-Hollweg made one last effort to obtain the with-
drawal of the order ; but it was fortunately too late."

This no doubt refers to the following. Although at
i p.m. the declaration of war had already been sent to
St. Petersburg, the Chancellor, nevertheless, at 9.45
p.m. laid before the Kaiser a telegram to the Tsar,
in which a way to negotiations was again opened up,
and " Willy," as William still signed himself, said :

" An immediate clear and unmistakable answer
from your (Nicky's) Government is the only way
to avoid endless misery. I must most earnestly
ask you to give your troops without delay the
order, under no circumstances to commit even the
slightest violation of our frontiers."

This telegram, handed in at the General Telegraph
Office at 10.30 p.m., nine hours after the dispatch of
the declaration of war, is probably one of the most

14*

212 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

peculiar episodes in the horrible comedy of errors and
confusion on August ist. It also aroused the liveliest
astonishment in St. Petersburg. Pourtales reported on
it, while still there, three hours before his departure for
Stockholm :

" M. Sasonow has just asked me over the tele-
phone how the following is to be explained : H.M.
the Tsar of Russia a few hours ago received a
telegram from our most gracious master, dated
10.45 p.m., and containing in its concluding sentence,
the request that the Tsar Nicholas should command
his troops in no case to cross the frontier. M.
Sasonow asks how I can explain such a request
after handing over the Note last night [the declara-
tion of war. — K.]. I replied that I could find no
other explanation than that probably the telegram
of my Emperor had really been dispatched the day
before at 10.45 p.m."

Indeed, the telegram of August ist at 10.45 p.m.
was inexplicable. The only right explanation naturally
did not enter the German Ambassador's head, and if
it had struck him, he would have been careful not to
make it public — namely, the explanation : his " most
gracious master " and his advisers had all lost their
heads.

THE OPENING OF THE WAR BY RUSSIA

As it was no longer possible for William and those
around him to undo the misfortune, which they had
brought about — for, as the German patriot " Junius

The Declaration of War on Russia 213

alter " triumphantly observes : "It was fortunately too
late " — and as the cause they had given themselves for
the declaration must, have seemed utterly insufficient,
they looked round for a pretext to make Russia the
originator of the world-war. This piece of jugglery
was performed in the Memorandum laid before the
Reichstag on August 3rd. In this document it is only,
as it were, incidentally mentioned that Germany had
said that if her demand for demobilization were not
granted, she would consider herself " in a state of war,"
and then it proceeds :

' However, before a report regarding the execu-
tion of this demand was received, Russian troops
crossed our frontiers and advanced on German
territory — to be exact, by the afternoon of August
ist — that is, the same afternoon as the above-
mentioned telegram of the Tsar was dispatched.

' Thus Russia began the war against us."

Of all the astounding arguments, produced at that
time by the German Foreign Office to justify the war,
this is probably the most remarkable. Just think !
The German Government commissions their Ambassador
in St. Petersburg to declare war on Russia at 5 p.m.
On the " afternoon of the same day, August ist,"
Russian troops cross the German frontier ; therefore,
concludes the Government, Russia has begun the war,
for — this happened at a time when there was as yet no
report in Berlin of the declaration of war in St. Peters-
burg !

According to this, a declaration of war does not take
effect from the moment it is issued, but only from the

214 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

moment when the party declaring war is informed that
the other side has received the declaration.

Did the Russians really cross the frontier before
6 p.m. — i.e., the time at which the declaration of war
was actually made in St. Petersburg ? The German
Memorandum wants this to be believed when it says
that the violation of the frontier took place " by the
afternoon."

To decide whether Russia really began the war, it
would be of the utmost importance to know exactly
the details of the violation of the frontier. If somewhere
or other two or three Cossacks crossed the frontier of
their own accord, this was not yet an incident which
justified talk of a beginning of the war " by Russia."
Such incidents happen in peace time.

How such incidents are treated is shown, for example,
by a Note sent to Berlin by Viviani on August 2nd,
protesting against violation of the frontier, said to have
been committed by German troops at different parts of
the French borders. The villages and troops concerned
were given exactly. It did not strike Viviani to do
more than offer a protest, nor to say " Germany has
begun the war against France." But it seems that on
August ist, on the Russian side there was not the
slightest violation of the frontier — at least, not before
the declaration of war.

The German Memorandum speaks of " afternoon,"
and lays special stress on this indication of time, which
is in striking contrast to its indefiniteness. In view of
the importance of the matter, it surely would have been
advisable to give the exact hour of the violation of the
frontier.

That if the German frontier really was crossed by

The Declaration of War on Russia 215

Russian troops on August ist, this could not really
have taken place in the early afternoon, is clear from the
simple fact that in the evening, at 9.45, the Chancellor
placed before the Kaiser another telegram to the Tsar,
in which the latter was requested to command his troops
to avoid any violation of the frontier. This dispatch,
as shown above, was sent off from the Foreign Office
after 10 p.m. At this hour, therefore, there cannot yet
have been any news of a crossing of the frontier ; other-
wise the telegram would have been even more super-
fluous than it was in any case, owing to the delivery of
the declaration of war.

In reality, William received the first news of the
crossing of the frontier by Russians on the morning of
August 2nd, when Bethmann informed him :

" According to a report of the General Staff
(at 4 a.m. to-day), there has been an attempt to
destroy the railway and an advance by two squadrons
of Cossacks on Johannisburg. Thereby we are
actually in a state of war."

Here at last a time and place are mentioned. And
then we find that the " afternoon of August ist," in
reality, was the " morning of August 2nd." Russian
hostilities began about ten hours after the delivery of the
German declaration of war in St. Petersburg. This is
the way " Russia began the war against us."

If, nevertheless, the German Government attributes
to these warlike operations the decisive part in the out-
break of war, it only shows how little founded their
declaration of war seemed to German statesmen them-
selves.

In the Memorandum of the German Government

216 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

of August 3rd, several times already mentioned, it is
thrust as much as possible into the background. Its
account is a model of misleading reporting.
It says :

' The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg
delivered the message to M. Sasonow entrusted to
him on July 3ist, at 12 midnight.

" An answer to it from the Russian Government
has never reached us. Two hours after the expiry
of the time-limit mentioned in this communication
the Tsar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser. ..."

Then comes the telegram already quoted.

A complete historical narrative ought of course to
have mentioned that the declaration of war was sent to
St. Petersburg before the Tsar's telegram and an hour
after the expiry of the prescribed time-limit. But there
is not a word said about it in this passage. Such an
unimportant trifle obviously can be easily overlooked.
It is really a wonder that it is copied as No. 25 in the
attached papers. It could unfortunately not be com-
pletely disposed of.

After the copy of the telegram to the Tsar, which
arrived after two o'clock, the Memorandum goes on :

" To this His Majesty replied."

And next William's telegram is given. But while
in all the telegrams from the Kaiser to the Tsar in the
Memorandum the exact hour of dispatch is given, it is
lacking in this one. No reader suspects that the " To
this " does not mean at once, but eight hours later —
10 p.m. Everyone must believe the telegram was sent

The Declaration of War on Russia 21 r

off before five o'clock. For after copying it, the docu-
ment goes on :

" As the time-limit allowed to Russia had expired,
without a reply having been received to our question,
His Majesty the Kaiser and King, on August ist,
at 5 p.m., ordered the mobilization of the whole German
Army and of the Imperial Navy. The Imperial
Ambassador in St. Petersburg had in the meanwhile
[! ! — K.] received instructions in case the Russian
Government did not give a satisfactory reply within
the prescribed period, to announce that we should
consider ourselves as in a state of war after the refusal
of our demand."

What next follows in the text of the Memorandum
we have already given above.

The " in the meanwhile " in this account is really
priceless — a model of precise statement of time. It is
worthy of the order in which the events are presented.
We have :

THE SEQUENCE IN THE
THE REAL SEQUENCE MEMORANDUM

1 p.m. — Dispatch of the 2 p.m. — The Tsar's tele-
declaration of war. gram.

2 p.m. — The Tsar's tele- No hour given. — The
gram. Kaiser's telegram.

5 p.m. — Mobilization. 5 p.m. — Mobilization.

10 p.m. — The Kaiser's tele- No hour given. — Dispatch
gram to the Tsar. of the declaration of war.

The chronological confusion of the Memorandum was
absolutely essential if it was to bring the reader to the

218 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

conclusion which prevailed in public life in Germany till
the White Book of June, 1919, namely :

Russia began the war against us. In reality, it was
otherwise. Germany began the war against Russia.
The account of the beginning of the war given by the
German Government turns things upside down.

CHAPTER XVIII
THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON FRANCE

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF FRANCE

AFTER the outbreak of war between Germany and
Russia, war between Germany and France must
have followed automatically. The German plan of cam-
paign was to dispose of France first, and then to settle
with the Russians. To enable the German armies to
begin their activity against France as speedily as possible,
that is to say, to produce a declaration of war in the west,
was the task which the General Staff laid upon the Foreign
Office. With this object the latter had sent to Paris on
July 3 ist at the same time as the announcement of
mobilization which was conveyed to Russia, a note
almost to the same effect, the tone of which, however,
as we have seen, was much more threatening. It said
definitely " Mobilization inevitably means war," and cate-
gorically demanded of the French Government that they
should say whether they would remain neutral in a Russo-
German war ; the answer to be given within 18 hours.

The intention was obvious : by setting this question
to France they wished to force her to declare at once
that she was on Russia's side ; war would then have been
declared without more ado, and by August 2nd activity
against France could have been begun.

Confiding subjects of the Kaiser have nevertheless

219

220 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

seen in this action of the German Government a proof
of their love of peace.

Dr. David, for example, thought :

" The German Government undertook the attempt at
least to confine the conflagration to the east. This is
no small factor to their credit. It was seriously in-
tended. There could be no doubt on this point.1'
("The Social-Democracy in the World- War," p. 80.)

A man who regarded the German Government with
less confidence would probably have cherished doubts
as to whether the form of the ultimatum which Germany
sent to Paris in the telegram printed above with the
demand that a statement on neutrality should at once
be made, was that which would have been chosen by any-
one who really desired her neutrality. But even the
most innocent and trusting spirit must lose all doubts
when he learns that this telegram to Schon had an appen-
dix, which the German Government very wisely did not
publish, but on the contrary marked " Secret." It was
not their fault that this appendix nevertheless became
known to the French Government, not long afterwards,
when the war was in full swing. It ran :

" If, as is not to be expected, the French Govern-
ment states it will remain neutral, your Excellency
will tell them that we must demand as a guarantee of
their neutrality the surrender of the fortresses of
Toul and Verdun, which we would occupy and
restore at the conclusion of the war with Russia.
The answer to the latter question must reach here
by to-morrow (August I. — K.) afternoon, at 4p.m.

" V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

The Declaration of War on France 221

That no French Government, even the most pacifist
with a Jaures at the head of it, could accede to this
demand, and that the question about neutrality was
not intended "to confine the conflagration to the east*'
but to force France to war at once, is obvious.

At 4 p.m. on August ist they expected to have a
ground for war against France, and at 5 p.m. the declara-
tion of war was to be handed to Russia. It was thus
hoped to be able to begin the war at the same time on
both fronts, and the front against France seemed to the
General Staff more urgent than that against Russia. On
August 4th Jagow assured the Belgian Ambassador,
Baron Beyens :

" To avoid being destroyed, Germany must first
destroy France and then turn against Russia."

It was therefore very upsetting that France's answer
was quite an unexpected one. Viviani did not refuse
neutrality, as Bethmann-Hollweg had assumed he would,
nor did he promise it, so that there was no opportunity
to produce the demand for the surrender of Toul and
Verdun ; Schon therefore had to telegraph on August ist :

" To my definite and repeated question whether
France would remain neutral in the case of a Russo-
German war, the Premier replied to me that France
would do what her interest demanded."

Schon had no instructions to meet this answer. Nor
was it easy for the Foreign Office to declare themselves,
on the strength of it, " forced to war " and " assailed by
France," which was, however, necessary if they were to
create a favourable moral atmosphere for the war.

222 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Immediately on the receipt of Schon's reply the
Foreign Office set itself to evolve a declaration of war,
and produced the following document, still dated Aug. ist :

" The German Government has from the beginning
of the crisis been striving for a peaceful settlement.
But while it was mediating between Vienna and
St. Petersburg by desire of H.M. the Tsar of Russia
and in conjunction with England, Russia mobilized
her whole army and navy. The security of the
German Empire has been threatened by this
measure, which had not been preceded by any
extraordinary military preparations in Germany.
Not to meet such a danger would mean to risk the
existence of the Empire. The German Government
has therefore summoned the Russian Government
to cease mobilizing against Germany and her allies
at once. At the same time the German Govern-
ment informed the Government of the French
Republic of this message, and in view of the known
relations of the Republic to Russia, asked for a
declaration whether France were willing to remain
neutral in the Russo-German war. To this the
French Government has given the ambiguous and
evasive answer that France will do what her
interests demand. By this answer France reserves
the right to take the side of our enemies, and is able
at any moment to take us in the rear with her army,
in the meanwhile mobilized. In this attitude Ger-
many must see a threat, especially as, although the
time limit has long expired, she has received no
reply to the summons to Russia to cease mobilizing
her forces, and thus a Russo-German war has broken
out. Germany cannot leave it to France to choose

The Declaration of War on France 228

the time at which the threat to her Western frontier
will become a reality, but being threatened from
two sides must at once begin her defence.

" I am therefore commanded to inform your Excel-
lency that : ' His Majesty the German Emperor
declares in the name of the Empire that Germany
announces she is in a state of war with France.' "

This declaration of war was not dispatched. The
reasons for this are not recorded. They probably hesi-
tated to follow up the insufficiently founded declaration
of war on Russia with a second of similar calibre to
France. With what embarrassment the declaration, just
made, of war on Russia was regarded is shown even in
the fact that they do not dare to mention it in the docu-
ment in question, but simply talk of a " Russo-German
war having broken out," as if it were some natural
happening, like the eruption of a volcano, independent
of all human determination. But on the validity of the
declaration of war on Russia depended that on France.
If Germany were attacked by Russia, then she had to
protect herself from being attacked at pleasure by
France. If, on the other hand, the German Government
were the aggressors against Russia, they became the
aggressors against France also, as soon as they declared
war on the latter merely for the reason that she intended
to do what her interests demanded.

To these considerations there might perhaps be added
another, namely, that war might have been declared on
England and Italy for the same reason as on France.
The neutrality of the former countries was also not
certain ; they also could " at any moment fall on the
rear " of the Central Powers, with their armies and fleets
in the meanwhile mobilized. It would surely have been

224 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

dangerous to give this reason as sufficient ground for a
declaration of war on France just at the moment when
they were endeavouring, on different lines, to obtain the
neutrality or the alliance of the two Powers mentioned.

In no case could it be asserted that by the French state-
ment alone Germany was already attacked and forced
to war. Yet this was what they wanted to persuade
the world to believe.

But whatever reasons decided them not to send off the
document, the fact that it was not sent at least shows
that they became convinced that France's answer, to the
effect that she would be guided by her own interests,
afforded no sufficient ground for a declaration of war.

But the declaration of war was urgently required,
now that the war with Russia was already in progress.
In their embarrassment they finally resorted to the same
means as they had taken refuge in after declaring war
on Russia, to prove that the latter had broken the peace :
they appealed to acts of war which had been begun by
the enemy.

THE MYSTERIOUS AIRMEN

The memorandum to the German Reichstag of August
3rd, which we have already mentioned several times,
was, as it states, finished at 12 noon on August 2nd.
The German Ambassador handed the French Premier
the declaration of war on August 3rd at 6.45 p.m. But
the memorandum was already able to announce :

" On the morning of the next day (August 2nd)
France opened hostilities."

Of what nature were these ?

The declaration of war on August 3rd details them :

The Declaration of War on France 225

" French troops already crossed the German
frontier yesterday at Altmiinsterol, and on moun-
tain roads in the Vosges, and are still on German
territory. A French aviator, who must have flown
over Belgian territory, was shot down yesterday
in the attempt to destroy the railway at Wesel.
The presence of several other French aeroplanes
over the Eifel territory was yesterday established
beyond all doubt. These also must have flown
over Belgian territory. French aviators yesterday
dropped bombs on the railway lines at Karlsruhe
and Niirnberg. France has thus placed us in a
state of war with her."

Now at last they had the long-desired state of war.
France, it is true, could at the same time politely produce
a list of complaints about violations of the frontier, and
Bethmann-Hollweg, in his war speech on August 4th,
had even to confess that they were not unjustified. The
French Government did not, however, make these a
cause of war ; in order to prevent violations of the
frontier by their troops they had even done what the
German Government did not do ; as early as July 3oth
they had issued orders that :

" Although Germany has made her defensive
arrangements only a few hundreds of metres from
the frontier on the whole front from Luxemburg
to the Vosges and placed covering troops in their
battle positions, we have withdrawn our troops
ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them
to advance nearer." (Yellow Book of 1914.
No. 106.)

22C The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

One may take the view of those German politicians
who assumed that France took these measures not in
the interests of peace, but only because she was not yet
ready, that is to say, out of treachery, in order to gain
time and afterwards to " fall upon the rear " of the
enemy. But whoever adopts this attitude will have to
grant that the French Government would have failed
in their own object if they began hostilities prematurely.

For this very reason the statements in the declara-
tion of war must be regarded with the greatest mistrust.
On what information is it based ?

On August 2nd at midnight the Imperial Chancellor
telegraphed to London :

" According to absolutely reliable reports France
has to-day permitted the following act of aggression
on us :

" i. French cavalry patrols early this afternoon
crossed the frontier at Altmunsterol, in Alsace.

"2. A French aviator has been shot down near
Wesel.

" 3. Two Frenchmen tried to blow up the Aachen
tunnel on the Wesel railway and were shot in the
act.

"4. French infantry crossed the frontier in Alsace
and fired shots.

" Please communicate with the English Govern-
ment to the above effect and earnestly point out to
Sir Edward Grey into what a dangerous situation
Germany is brought by these provocations, which
are a breach of good faith, and that she is being
driven to the most grave decisions. Your Excel-
lency will, I hope, succeed in convincing England
that Germany, after clinging to the idea of peace

The Declaration of War on France 227

to the last possible limits, is driven by her oppo-
nents into the role of the provoked party, who must
resort to arms to preserve her existence."

On August 3rd there was then drawn up in the
Foreign Office at 1.45 p.m. the following catalogue of
French aggressions, reported by the General Staff :

" i. Report from the Corps Commander of the
XVth Army Corps : Violations of the frontier
by the French on the evening of August ist at
Metzeral and the Schlucht pass have been estab-
lished beyond doubt. German outposts were shot
at. No casualties. — Sent off from Strassburg,
August 2nd, 9.30 p.m.

"2. Report from the General Commander of
the XVth Army Corps : In the night of August
ist-2nd the frontier was crossed by French in-
fantry opposite Markirch. The French fired first.
No casualties. — Sent off from Strassburg, August
2nd, at 5.55 p.m.

"3. The 5oth Infantry Brigade reports from
Miilhausen : August 2nd, 12.10 p.m. Enemy patrols
have crossed the frontier at Altmimsterol, near
Rath, but have gone back again.

" 4. Report from the Lines of Communication
Commandant of Cologne. Sent off on August 2nd,
at 11.45 p.m. : Enemy aeroplanes have been actively
engaged in flying over the frontier from the direc-
tion of Treves to Junkerath, and from the Dahl-
heim direction to Rheydt, and on the right bank
of the Rhine near Cologne. At Rheydt they sig-
nalled with red, white and green lights.

"5. Telegraphic report from the Chief of Staff

228 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

of the XXIst Army Corps, August 3rd, 9.40 a.m. :
Three aeroplanes and an airship (broad in front and
tapering behind) were bombarded with machine
guns early this morning above the railway station
of Saarburg, Lorraine. The aeroplanes did not
give the prescribed signals of identification.

"6. Report from the Lines of Communication
Commandant in Ludwigshafen on the Rhine of
August 2nd, evening : Two enemy aeroplanes
reported to-day (August 2nd) at Neustadt a. d.
Haardt towards 10 p.m. last night.

"7. Report from the Lines of Communication
Commandant at Wesel (received in the evening of
August 2nd) : An enemy aeroplane shot down near
Wesel."

In this compilation of August 3rd the first thing
that strikes us is that there is no mention in it of blowing
up the Aachen tunnel. For good reasons. Although
it was based on " absolutely reliable reports " it was
proved to be false the very next day. It proved to be
one of the many rumours which were current in those
days of excitement, but which ought not to have been
accepted as correct by a serious statesman without
investigation.

Even the reports of the military authorities did not
always prove correct. Thus on the morning of August
3rd at 10 a.m. the Luxemburg Minister of State Eyschen
telegraphed to Jagow :

" There is just being distributed in the town of
Luxemburg a proclamation by the General com-
manding the VHIth Army Corps, Tulff von Tscheepe,
which contains the following :

The Declaration of War on France 229

' Since France, disregarding the neutrality of
Luxemburg, as is established beyond doubt, is
opening hostilities against Germany from Luxem-
burg soil, His Majesty has issued orders that German
troops also are to enter Luxemburg.'

' This is due to an error. There is absolutely not a
single French soldier on Luxemburg soil, nor is there
the slightest sign of a threat to its neutrality by
France. On the contrary, on August ist (Saturday
evening) the rails of the permanent way were taken
up on French soil at Mont Saint Martin Longwy.
This shows that as late as this day there was no
intention of invading Luxemburg by railway."

It was of no avail. The German generals apparently
felt qualified where it suited them to " establish hostili-
ties " by the French " beyond all doubt." The pro-
clamation of General Tulff shows, however, " beyond
all doubt," that on the German side not a few patrols,
but the VHIth Army Corps had begun hostilities
against France as early as the morning of August 3rd,
by His Majesty's command, by penetrating on to Luxem-
burg soil.

That the General was acting on his own initiative
need not be assumed, although the military in those days
were already becoming very independent. For example,
the following Note from Count Montgelas was laid before
Jagow on the afternoon of August 3rd :

" The Commander-in-Chief in the Mark announces
that in view of the violations of the frontier, authen-
tically proved, he is forced to take the same
measures against the French Embassy and the
French as have already been taken against the
Russian Embassy and the Russians."

280 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

The Commander-in-Chief in the Mark then considered
himself qualified by reason of " violations of the fron-
tier authentically proved " to declare war on France
of his own accord, at least for Berlin. This was really
too mad for Jagow. He added to the Note :

" What sort of measures are these ? We are
not yet in a state of war. Diplomats are therefore
still accredited."

War was, however, not declared on the Commander-
in-Chief in the Mark, for a few hours later Schon an-
nounced in Paris that Germany was at war with France.

In her declaration of war the chief weight was laid
on the aviators. The alleged violations of the frontier
by French airmen were at least balanced by encroach-
ments on French territory by German troops, which were
reported at the same time, and of which Viviani had
already complained on August 2nd. But the aeroplanes !

Now in those days a peculiar mania had seized the
masses of the people. At night they saw aeroplanes
and airships everywhere above them, and heard bombs
explode. The Chief of Police in Stuttgart at this time
issued a warning to be calm and rational, in which he
said :

" Clouds are being taken for aeroplanes, stars for
airships, and bicycle handlebars for bombs."

In spite of the inclination to believe in such cir-
cumstances every report about aeroplanes, which were,
of course, even in the darkest night, at once recognized
as " French military aeroplanes," the Chancellor could
only quote three cases, of which one, that an " aero-
plane had been sighted over the Eifel," deserves no

The Declaration of War on France 281

consideration at all, for there were then many aeroplanes
in Germany, and who could have said, if they really
were " sighted," that those in the Eifel were French
and not German, or perhaps Belgian or Dutch that
had lost their way ?

But the case at Wesel ?

The Chancellor reported on August 2nd :

" A French military flying officer was shot down
from the air near Wesel."

The official military report of noon on August 3rd
only said vaguely :

" An enemy machine shot down near Wesel."

Nothing about the occupant, or whether he was a
civilian or an officer. But in the declaration of war it
was asserted that a military airman had attempted to
destroy the railway at Wesel.

Of this there is not a word in the report of the
Lines of Communication Commandant at Wesel.

We have just seen what weight is to be attached
to the aeroplanes sighted in the Eifel and to the attempt
on Wesel. As to the South German military aviators,
to whose misdeeds reference was made in the declara-
tion of war, they have long since been branded as empty
fictions.

As early as April, 1916, the municipal authorities
of Niirnberg made a statement :

" Nothing is known to the Deputy Corps Head-
quarters of the Illrd Bavaria Army Corps here
of the story that the stretches of railway, Niirnberg-
Kissingen and Niirnberg- Ansbach, were each

282 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

bombed by enemy aeroplanes before and after the
outbreak of war. All statements and newspaper
reports to this effect have proved to be false."

About this the Berlin Foreign Office had had earlier
information. On August 2nd, 1914, the Prussian Am-
bassador in Munich sent the following message to the
Imperial Chancellor, which is marked as arriving in the
Foreign Office on August 3rd, at 3 p.m. :

" The military report, also circulated here by
the Suddeutsche Korrespondenzbureau, that French
aeroplanes dropped bombs to-day in the neigh-
bourhood of Niirnberg has so far found no con-
firmation. Only known aeroplanes have been seen,
which were obviously not military ones. The
dropping of bombs is not confirmed, still less, of
course, that the machines were French."

It was primarily on these bombs from aeroplanes
that the justification of the German declaration of war
delivered in Paris was based. It was in every respect
a complete invention.

CHAPTER XIX
THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON BELGIUM

THE BREACH OF FAITH A POLITICAL BLUNDER

THERE still remained a hard nut for the Imperial
Chancellor to crack, the solution of the task set
him by the military : namely, the justification of the
invasion of Belgium. This invasion was, like the war
against France, decided upon as soon as hostilities with
Russia had broken out.

In 1871, Germany had annexed Alsace-Lorraine.
This was not in order to liberate the inhabitants of this
territory. On the contrary, they offered a desper-
ate resistance to being torn from France. Bismarck
demanded the annexation not for national but for
strategic reasons, with a view to obtaining a better
strategic frontier against France, in order to be nearer
Paris in a future war and to be able to threaten it more
quickly than had been the case at the outbreak of war
in 1870.

For the sake of this military advantage Germany
had immeasurably impaired her international political
position, had raised an eternal feud between herself and
France, driven the latter into the arms of Russia, roused
the armament rivalry and the constant danger of war
in Europe, and laid the seeds of the unfavourable posi-
tion in which the German Empire entered the world
war in 1914.

233

284 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

All this was done to gain a strategic advantage
which was soon to prove quite worthless. For in the
age of modern science there is no natural strategic
frontier the obstacles of which a wealthy and tech-
nically as well as economically developed State cannot
overcome by artificial means.

The new Franco-German frontier was so formidably
fortified there could be no question of a German
army penetrating it quickly. And yet this appeared to
be necessary for Germany in a war on two fronts, if
she was to dispose of France as quickly as possible, in
order to be able to turn with all her strength on Russia
alone.

It did not seem possible to break through quickly on
the Alsace front. The northern French frontier was
therefore all the more tempting. Strangely enough,
the French had only fortified the Alsace frontier very
strongly. They felt themselves so secured by Belgium
that they did not sufficiently fortify the northern frontier.
And even in July, 1914, when the danger of war arose,
and all the world was arming and concentrating troops,
the French Army devoted its attention mainly to the
east and not to the north.

The northern frontier was France's weak spot. If
Germany made a surprise break-through at this point,
she might hope to overcome all resistance in a few
vigorous blows, occupy Paris, and not only Paris but
also Calais, the sally-gate against England.

From the purely military point of view, then, the
break-through via Belgium was certainly the obvious
thing to do. It is true that the example of Alsace-
Lorraine might have shown how dangerous may be the
effect of militarist opportunism gaining the upper hand
over a far-seeing national policy, which not only considers

The Declaration of War on Belgium 235

the military but also the political and economic, and,
above all, the moral strength and driving power of a
nation.

German policy had set out to gain England's neu-
trality and Italy's co-operation in the decision by arms
of the conflict of the Central Powers with Russia and
France.

Both these ends were already questionable of attain-
ment, but not yet decided when the war broke out.
Sir Edward Grey had certainly warned Germany, but,
on the other hand, he had not been able to hold out
to France the absolutely certain prospect of his support,
in spite of all his sympathies for the French case. He
has been much blamed for this uncertainty, which some
attribute to instability, and others to duplicity. His
critics forget that he was a Minister in a parliamentary
and democratic country, and was by no means sure of
the approval of the people. Even if he found a majority
in Parliament for a war against Germany, it would have
been very doubtful if the mass of the working classes
and of the bourgeois pacifists, who, it happens, are
particularly numerous and influential in England, had
not offered an energetic resistance to war. On the other
hand, no one who knew the English to any extent could
have the least doubt that the great majority of the
nation would enthusiastically throw itself into the war
as soon as Germany, with her powerful army and grow-
ing fleet, seized Belgium and thus directly threatened
England.

Italy, however, was in the closest dependence on
England. That she would take her place by the side
of the Central Powers was no longer to be expected,
at any rate, by the beginning of August.

On August 3rd Herr von Kleist, who had been sent

286 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

on a special mission to Rome, sent the following tele-
gram from thence to the " Kaiser's Majesty " :

" To-day, Monday, at 9 a.m., I delivered your
Majesty's message to the King of Italy, in which
immediate mobilization as well as the assistance
provided for in the Treaty of Alliance was demanded.

" The King replied that he personally was whole-
heartedly with us, and up to some weeks ago had
never for a moment doubted that in war Italy
would faithfully help her allies. The tactlessness
of Austria, incredible to Italian popular feeling,
had, however, incited public opinion in the past
few weeks against Austria in such a way that now
active co-operation with Austria would let loose
a storm. The Ministry would not risk a revolt.
He, the King, had unfortunately no power, only
influence. If he dismissed the present Ministry,
no other would assume the responsibility of office.
All this, mainly because Austria was not ready to
give any definite promise for the future, by which
a change might perhaps have been wrought by
now in public opinion. Whether this was still
possible was very doubtful.

" As the people do not understand the distinction,
Italy, as a result of Austria's tactlessness, would
unfortunately fail Germany also, which gave him,
the King, great pain. He will again exert his
influence on the Ministry and report the result."

The next day Herr von Kleist had nothing more
consoling to report :

" H.M. the King received me this morning and
said : In spite of his repeated efforts yesterday,
the Government still maintains its attitude on

The Declaration of War on Belgium 28T

neutrality. At the present time the people would
only regard active assistance to the allies as help
for Austria's plans for expansion on the Balkans
[Our war against France has nothing to do with
this. It is, besides, our side and not Austria's,
that she is to be fighting on. — W.], plans from
which Austria has so far never once definitely
pledged herself to refrain. The people will always
confound Germany with Austria [If the Govern-
ment does nothing to prevent this, of course they
will ; but it is stupid. — W.] ; therefore the Govern-
ment would be risking rebellion if they gave active
assistance to Germany at the present time. [A
deliberate lie! — W.] He, the King, must repeat
that he is unfortunately powerless, as the view of
the Government is shared by the majority of the
Deputies. Even Giolitti, who is friendly to the
Triple Alliance [? ? — W.], and has just returned,
thinks that there would not be a casus fcederis,
but that the country needs rest, and must remain
neutral, as there is no liability to give active help.
[The unmitigated scoundrel 1 — W.] The Govern-
ment intends to be armed for all eventualities.
To my answer, that, as the possibility of assistance
had thus disappeared, they were evidently thinking
of menacing Austria, there being no other eventu-
ality before them, the King said : ' One never
knows what the men in the Government will do.'
[That is to say, he is dropping out entirely. — W.]
For the moment the King thought that nothing
would happen."

The description of Giolitti as "an unmitigated
scoundrel " is almost surpassed by the description of

238 The Guilt of William Hohenzollem

the King himself, who, in a letter on August 3rd, in-
formed the Kaiser that the Italian Government did not
recognize a casus fcederis in the war which had just
broken out. The letter was signed :

" Thy Brother and AUy,

" VITTORIO EMANUELE."

To "AUy" William added "Impudence," and to
the name of the King the small but very expressive
word " Rascal." On August 3rd, then, even the most
frivolous and ignorant of optimists could no longer
reckon on Italy's active assistance. Victor Emanuel's
concluding remarks even left it to be feared that Italy
might take an active part against Austria and Ger-
many. England's attitude was therefore bound to
have the greatest influence on Italy, as she depended
on her in so many things.

This was a further consideration which ought to
induce them not to irritate England by the occupation
of Belgium. There was, in addition, the consideration
that by this occupation Germany's prestige must suffer
enormously in the eyes of the whole world. For Bel-
gium's neutrality was not of the usual kind, like, for
example, that of Greece. It was solemnly documented,
and Prussia was one of the Powers guaranteeing it.
With her invasion of Belgium she was committing not
only a breach of neutrality but also of faith.

The greater the confidence that has been placed in
one who gives his word, the greater is the fury against
him and the contempt for him if he breaks it. Up to
August, 1914, the majority of Belgians trusted Germany
and were friendly towards her. After the invasion they
became her most furious foes.

But not only in Belgium was the deepest indignation

The Declaration of War on Belgium 239

aroused by the breach of faith which was followed by
the slaughter of thousands of Belgians and the appalling
devastation of the whole country ; it aroused all
civilized countries, and deprived Germany of the last
friends she still had in them.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE BREACH OF FAITH

The invasion of Belgium was not only as morally
condemnable as it was intelligible from a military point
of view ; it was also a profound political blunder.

But the soldiers commanded and the civilian politi-
cians had to obey. To them only fell the thankless
task of justifying the breach of faith in the eyes of the
world. They did not make too great mental efforts
over it. On this occasion they were again content
to follow the convenient example of Berchtold, which
he had set when dealing with Francis Joseph — i.e.,
pretending that one was forced to war by the hostile
acts of others.

And in the case of Belgium, the Imperial Chancellor
only held the noble office of a letter-carrier.

On July 29th the Foreign Office received a draft,
drawn up by Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff
himself, under the date July 26th, for a letter to the
Belgian Government, which, after a few editorial altera-
tions made by the Chancellor, Stumm and Zimmermann,
was sent off the same day by Jagow, not to the Belgian
Government, but to the German Ambassador in
Brussels.

It ran :

" The Imperial Government has received reliable
reports regarding the intended advance of French

240 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

forces on the Meuse from Givet to Namur. They
leave no doubt of France's intention (after com-
bining with an English expeditionary force) to
advance against Germany through Belgian terri-
tory. The Imperial Government cannot resist the
fear lest Belgium, with the best intentions, will
not be able to prevent without help a French
(-English) advance with sufficient prospects of
success for ample security to be given against
the threat to Germany. The law of self-preserva-
tion demands that Germany should anticipate
the enemy attack. It would therefore fill the
German Government with the greatest regret if
Belgium should see an act of hostility against her
in the fact that the measures of her enemies force
Germany, in her turn, to invade Belgian territory
as a defensive measure. To prevent any miscon-
ception, the Imperial Government makes the fol-
lowing statement :

" i. Germany intends no hostilities against Bel-
gium. If Belgium is willing to adopt a benevolent
neutrality towards Germany in the war which is
imminent, the German Government will pledge
itself, at the conclusion of peace, not only to
guarantee the possessions and independence of the
kingdom completely, but is even ready to meet
in most benevolent fashion any claims by the kingdom
for territorial compensation at the expense of France.

"2. Germany pledges herself, under the above
condition, to evacuate the kingdom as soon as
peace is concluded.

"3. In the case of a friendly attitude on the part
of Belgium, Germany is ready, by arrangement with
the Royal Belgian authorities, to purchase for cash

The Declaration of War on Belgium 241

all things required for her troops, and make good
all damage which might be done by German troops.

" Should Belgium offer a hostile resistance to the
German troops, in particular to impede their advance
by the resistance of the Meuse fortresses or by
destroying railways, roads, tunnels and other works,
Germany, to her regret, will be forced to regard the
kingdom as an enemy. In this case, Germany will
not be able to assume any obligations to the king-
dom, but would have to leave to the decision of
arms the later arrangement of the relation of the
two States to one another.

" The Imperial Government confidently hope
that this contingency will not arise, and that the
Royal Belgian Government will know how to take
measures to prevent the occurrence of events such
as those mentioned. In this case the friendly tie
that unites the two neighbouring States would be
drawn more closely and permanently."

To this text was appended the following passage,
drafted by Moltke :

" An unequivocal answer to this communication
must be made within twenty-four hours after
delivery, otherwise hostilities will be opened
immediately."

Jagow, however, considered this too rude. He
deleted this sentence in the communication to the Belgian
Government, and substituted the following instructions
for the German Minister in Brussels :

" Your Excellency will at once communicate this
in strict confidence to the Belgian Government and

242 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

request an unequivocal answer within twenty-four
hours.

' Your Excellency will at once inform me by
telegraph of the reception accorded to your dis-
closures and of the definite reply of the Royal
Belgian Government."

As already mentioned, Herr von Moltke's com-
munication was immediately accepted by the Foreign
Office and dispatched with few editorial alterations.
These are of no consequence ; only one is worthy of
note. The Chief of the General Staff obviously held
the view that England would enter the war simul-
taneously with France ; he, therefore, spoke of informa-
tion which, like all information of a similar kind, of
course leaves no doubt as to the intention of a " Franco-
English " advance through Belgian territory. But the
Foreign Office considered this too risky. It still hoped
for England's neutrality. Stumm, therefore, deleted
the words placed in brackets in the above copy, and
contented himself with the " indubitable" establishment
of the intention of a French advance through Belgium.
It is only a matter of a couple of words, but their manipu-
lation is very instructive. It showed how the General
Staff understood the art of fabricating for stock com-
plaints of French or Franco-English acts of hostility
which made the war or the breach of neutrality inevit-
able, before such acts were even possible ; these com-
plaints were then brought forward as soon as they were
needed. This method was actually followed. The docu-
ment composed on July 26th, edited and dispatched on
the 2gth, was not immediately submitted to the Brussels
Government. At that time the world was not yet pre-
pared for the Franco-German war.

The Declaration of War on Belgium 248

Jagow sent the document in a sealed envelope
through a King's Messenger to Brussels to the German
Minister, Herr von Below-Saleske, with the following
covering letter :

" I respectfully request Your Excellency to keep
securely sealed the enclosure accompanying this
order, and not to open it until you are instructed
to do so by telegram from here. You will confirm
by telegram the receipt of this order and the
enclosure."

Thus the necessity which, according to Bethmann's
pathetic assurance in his great war speech of August 4th,
knows no law was already carefully and deliberately
concocted on July 2Qth, and put away " securely sealed "
on ice, so that it could be brought out when it was
needed.

The need arose on August 2nd. Not until then did
it become urgently necessary for the General Staff that
Germany's security should be most dangerously threat-
ened by the intended penetration of the French into
Belgium. Then Jagow telegraphed to the Minister in
Brussels :

' Your Excellency will at once open enclosure
to Order No. 88 and carry out instructions con-
tained therein this evening at eight o'clock, German
time. In the Imperial Government's declaration,
however, the words ' not only ' and the sentence
beginning with ' It is even ready ' are to be omitted
under No. i.

" Also, the answer is to be demanded, not within
twenty-four hours, but within twelve hours — i.e.,

16*

244 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

by 8 a.m. to-morrow. Please assure the Belgian
Government most emphatically that every doubt
is precluded as to the correctness of our information
concerning French plan, notwithstanding promises.

" Belgian answer must be to hand here by
2 p.m. to-morrow, German time. Your Excellency
will, therefore, instantly wire answer hither, and,
in addition, transmit it immediately upon receipt
to General von Emmich, Union Hotel, Aix-la-
Chapelle, through a member of Imperial Legation,
preferably the Military Attache, by automobile.

" Belgian Government must receive impression
as though entire instructions in this matter had
reached you only to-day. Leave it to your dis-
cretion to suggest to Belgian Government that it
may withdraw with troops to Antwerp, and that
we, if there desired, could take over protection of
Brussels against internal disturbances."

The history of the Ultimatum to Belgium clearly
reveals the mechanism by means of which the reasons of
the German declarations of war in the first days of
August were prepared.

Anyone who follows its operations must " receive
the impression " as though the " entire " facts estab-
lished by the German Government in those days were
the more deeply untrue the more they are confirmed
by repeated asseverations that they were absolutely
" reliable " and " indubitable."

It was a terrible tragedy of moral collapse that
ushered in the war.

But, at the same time, the satyr-play * was not to
be lacking.

* Referring to the epilogue in lighter vein which followed a trilogy in the
great tragic drama. (Translator's note.)

The Declaration of War on Belgium 245

The " assembling " of French troops on the Belgian
frontier was intended to impress the naive Germans,
whose senses were already befogged by the war-intoxica-
tion of the August days. But it was also desired to
convince England that they were forced to invade
Belgium. For this, stronger arguments were needed.
And what straws were not snatched at then ! The
legendary airmen had again to come to the rescue.
We have already communicated the text of the German
declaration of war on France. In this it is remarkable
that it emphasizes the statement that several of the
airmen had notoriously violated Belgian neutrality by
flying over Belgian territory.

It was, however, not to be expected that these
intangible airmen would make any particular impres-
sion in England. Efforts had to be made to reach firm
ground. Perhaps the automobile would succeed where
the aeroplane failed.

On August 2nd the President of the Local Govern-
ment in Diisseldorf telegraphed to the Imperial Chan-
cellor :

" The Landrat of Geldern telegraphed yesterday
local Battalion reports that early this morning
eighty French officers in Prussian officers' uniform
vainly attempted to cross the frontier near Walbeck
with twelve automobiles. On inquiry, Landrat
further states Adjutant of local Battalion sub-
sequently reports that report respecting eighty
French officers has been, in the main, confirmed.
Cars remained behind on Dutch territory. One
officer who had advanced retreated before armed
opposition."

Let us assume for a moment that the report was,

246 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

" in the main," correct, and not the product of the
heated imagination of a few excited frontier guards.

Then the case in question was, primarily, a violation
not of Belgian but of Dutch neutrality.

But, further, what, according to the report, had the
frontier guards seen ? Twelve automobiles with eighty
occupants in Prussian officers' uniform. One of them
who got out and stepped across the frontier was received,
strange to say, not, like the Captain of Kopenick, with
respect, in view of his uniform, but with armed opposi-
tion. At the same time, the guards at once observed
that the eighty men in the cars had no right to wear their
uniform. But they also knew, without further investi-
gation, that the disguised men were not, say, Dutchmen,
but Frenchmen — nay, French officers, who had driven
through Belgium to Holland, and then to the German
frontier. To get through Belgium and Holland without
attracting notice, these gentlemen, instead of travelling
in mufti, had obviously preferred to don Prussian
uniform !

The whole story was just as senseless as that of the
French doctor (reported on the same day), who, with
two other Frenchmen, was caught at Metz in the act
of poisoning wells with cholera bacilli. Later on, they
no longer dared to make use of this story, but on
August 2nd Jagow managed not only to take it seriously
but even to make it the subject of diplomatic action.
He telegraphed the story of the cholera bacilli to Rome
with the order to circulate it in the local press. And
to the Ambassador in London and the Ministers in
Brussels and the Hague he sent the following telegram :

" Please inform Government there that eighty
French officers in Prussian officers' uniform, with

The Declaration of War on Belgium 247

twelve autos, this morning attempted to cross the
German frontier near Walbeck, west of Geldern.
This means the gravest conceivable violation of
neutrality by France."

The German Foreign Office must have lost its head
completely, to make itself thus ridiculous in the eyes
of foreign countries.

Geldern, moreover, is situated near Wesel, where
the French airmen were supposed to have been brought
down. The military in that frontier district appear to
have been particularly nervous and apt to see ghosts.

But General Emmich went still farther than Jagow.
He gave the reason for the invasion of Belgium in a
proclamation which ran :

" Our troops acted under the compulsion of an
unavoidable necessity, Belgian neutrality having
been violated by French officers who, in disguise,
entered Belgian territory in automobiles, in order
to reach Germany." (Quoted by Dr. E. J. Gumbel
in his pamphlet, " Vier Jahre Luge " (" Four
Years of Lies "), page 9.)

In his war speech of August 4th Bethmann-Hollweg
was not ashamed to make use of this silly pretext for
the invasion of Belgium. He acknowledged that the
attack on Belgium " contravenes the dictates of Inter-
national Law," as also that the French Government had
declared in Brussels that it was willing to respect Bel-
gium's neutrality so long as their opponent respected it.
He forgot to remark that Jagow had declined to make
the same declaration. He continued :

" We knew, however, that France was ready for
the invasion,"

248 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Yes, indeed, we knew already on July 2gth that
France was ready for the invasion on August ist !

" France could wait, but we could not, and a
French attack on our flank on the Lower Rhine
might have proved disastrous. We were therefore
forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg
and Belgian Governments."

Here there is no more talk of Belgium's neutrality
having been already violated. The fundamental reason
given for the invasion is now only this : " We could
not wait," and that, indeed, was the sole reason.

With lying and perfidy the way was paved for war
in the beginning of July, with lying and perfidy in the
first days of August the war was begun. The sequel
was the inevitable consequence of the introduction.
And thus again was proved the truth of that curse which
clings to wrongdoing — that evil propagates itself by
begetting more evil. Government and Army Command
were never rid of the lie in which they had once involved
themselves, and had to pile up the edifice of falsehood
ever higher and higher, until on November Qth, 1918,
it fell in with a crash.

CHAPTER XX

THE WORLD REVOLUTION

r I ^HE whole war-policy of William and his men had,
from the outset, been built up upon false premises.
They had decided to join in the Serbian adventure in
the expectation that it would bring an easy triumph
over Russia and, no doubt, also over France. Both
Powers, inadequately equipped, would either quietly
accept the blow dealt by Austria to Russian power in
the Balkans, or, should they be provoked to war, would
easily be conquered, as Germany had Italy and Rumania
at her back and England would remain neutral. Thus,
in any case, Germany would win glory and power, while
if the conflict eventuated in war, territorial aggrandise-
ment was also in prospect.

On July 2Qth, however, the calculation turned out
to be false. It was now to be apprehended that, in the
event of war against Russia and France, Rumania and
Italy would not take part, and that, above all, England
would offer active opposition. The game now threatened
to become dangerous. Henceforth Bethmann strove to
get out of it with a whole skin, but now it was too late-
Austria had already begun war against Serbia, and, with
her own mobilization, had started the race in war-
preparations. When Bethmann wished to get out of
this dangerous stadium, he encountered the opposition
of the Austrian Government, and of the German General

249

250 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Staff, which now saw only one way out of the strained
situation : to strike with all possible speed. And
finally he completely lost his head and poured oil upon
the fire he desired to extinguish. Thus out of the
frivolous Serbian adventure grew the terrible tragedy of
the world- war.

But Moltke's military calculations at the end of
July proved to be as false as Bethmann's diplomatic
calculations at the beginning.

A rapid blow could only secure the victory on the
condition that Belgium submitted, and permitted the
German Army to pass through without offering resist-
ance. Then a German victory was probable, precisely
for this reason, that the ground given for the German
invasion of Belgium was a fabrication — i.e., the French
had no strong forces stationed on their northern frontier.

If Belgium offered no resistance, the German Army
Command might expect, after a few decisive blows, to
advance with all speed to Paris and Calais, to force
France to make peace, and, no less, England, whose
entrance-gate, Dover, came within the field of the long-
range German guns, which commanded the passage
across the Channel. To dispose of Russia would then
be no longer a difficult task.

Belgium, however, did offer resistance. It was, of
course, broken, but it gave the French time to strengthen
their northern frontier. The German advance was
stopped in the Battle of the Marne, and thus the military
prospects of victory were annihilated, as the political
had already been. The continuation of the war against
the superior force that henceforth grew from day to day
could but result in Germany's bleeding to death, as
William had already foreseen on July 3ist, 1914, two
days before he declared war on Russia. In regard to the

The World Revolution 251

terrible struggle only one question remained — whether
Germany's opponents were to bleed to death along
with her. In the case of Russia this noble aim has been
fully achieved. Not quite so completely did it succeed
with France and Italy, still less with England, and not
at all with America and Japan, who, on the contrary,
gained enormously.

And it is fortunate that the war did not cause the
whole world to bleed to death, for who, then, would have
been left to feed the victims and to bind their wounds ?

From the day on which Belgium decided upon resist-
ance and England entered the war, Germany's position
was desperate.

The German General Staff at once recognized this,
and drew its conclusions, in its own fashion, there and
then. This is proved inter alia by a memorandum which
the Chief of the General Staff sent to the Foreign Office
on August 5th, and in which the war policy is laid down
— a fresh proof that the leader of German policy was
now the Chief of the General Staff, and not the Imperial
Chancellor, who, henceforth, had only to carry out the
orders of the former. The memorandum runs :

" England's declaration of war which, according
to reliable information, was intended from the outset
of the conflict, compels us to exhaust every means
that may contribute to victory. The grave situa-
tion in which the Fatherland finds itself makes it
an imperative duty to employ every means likely
to damage the enemy. The unscrupulous policy
pursued against us by our enemy justifies us in
sticking at nothing.

' The insurrection of Poland has been prepared.
The seed will fall on fertile soil, for even now our

252 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

troops are being welcomed in Poland almost as
friends. In Wloclavek, for instance, they have
been received with salt and bread.

' The feeling of America is friendly to Germany.
American public opinion is indignant at the shame-
ful procedure adopted against us. It behoves us
to exploit this feeling to the utmost. Influential
personages in the German colony must be invited
to continue to influence the Press in our favour.
Perhaps the United States may be persuaded to a
naval demonstration against England, for which,
as the reward of victory, Canada beckons.

"As I already stated in my communication of
the 2nd inst., No. i, P., the revolt of India and
Egypt, and also in the Caucasus, is a matter of the
highest importance. Through the treaty with
Turkey, the Foreign Office will be in a position to
realize this idea and to excite the fanaticism of
Islam.

" (Signed) v. MOLTKE."

We see from this that von Moltke even expected the
Imperial Chancellor to accept as gospel, without any
proof, and on the mere allegation of " reliable informa-
tion," such an assertion as that " England's declaration
of war was intended from the outset of the conflict."

It is more terrible that the General Staff did not, at
the very beginning of the war, deduce from the desperate
situation to which it had, by its own policy, reduced
Germany, the conclusion that any reasonable civilian
would have drawn, at least so long as he himself was not
infected by the military war fever, viz., that one must
strive to rescue the Empire as speedily as possible from
this dangerous situation by a policy of conciliation and

The World Revolution 258

of explicit renouncement of all manner of conquest.
On the contrary, it decided it was now a question of
employing every means that might injure the enemy,
whatever the consequences, and of sticking at nothing.
So it took that path of well-considered frightfulness
which was of no use strategically, as it could be imitated
by the enemy and then often recoiled with augmented
violence upon the Army and the people of Germany,
but which had the supreme effect of completely ruining
Germany's prestige in the world. The invasion of Bel-
gium had deprived Germany of her last friends. The
atrocities of the German war methods were immediately
set on foot (in Belgium, of all places !), and even among
neutrals these methods transformed into raging hatred
and scorn the admiration which even her enemies had
previously felt for the achievements of Germany. They
engendered also that feeling which ultimately made it
possible not only for America to enter the war, but for
the victors finally to dare to impose peace terms of the
most extreme severity without meeting adequate resist-
ance on the part of their peoples.

Born of a self-created necessity that believed it
need recognize no law, it was this method of waging war
that brought the German necessities to a climax.

Yet another thing is worthy of note in Moltke's
statements. They spin out further a thought that had
already dawned upon William in his first consternation
at England's warning on July 30th. Even at that hour
he had in mind the instigation of a rising of Moham-
medans and Indians, if not for Germany's salvation,
then for England's ruin. Moltke added the revolt of
Poland. And he hoped to win over the United States
by the promise of Canada !

This ingenious policy was pushed farther and farther

254 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

during the war. As the United States were not to be
won over, Mexico was now promised a few States of
the Union. Simultaneously, however, salvation was
sought with the rebels of Ireland, the anarchists of
Italy, the dynamiters in America, and, finally, with the
Bolshevists of Russia, all of whom were encouraged
with might and main by the German General Staff.

We see that Lenin and Trotsky were not the first who
saw deliverance from an impossible situation in the
world-revolution stirred up by their emissaries. William
and Moltke had anticipated them.

Like every scheme connected with their world-policy,
this too was executed without any kind of deeper know-
ledge of the world they desired to dominate or to influence.
They employed the most unsuitable means, they sum-
moned the most unsuitable elements to their aid, they
let themselves be guided by the most impossible
expectations.

A sample of the way in which they attempted to stir
up the Mohammedan world to revolt is given by Bernard
Shaw in his " Peace Conference Hints " (London, 1919,
page 90) :

" Early in the war the German Government,
wishing to stir up a rebellion against the French
in Morocco and Algeria, circulated a document
written in very choice Arabic to the effect that I
am a great prophet, and that I once told an American
Senator that the violation of Belgian neutrality
was an incident of the war, and not the cause of it.
I am quite unable to follow that operation of the
German mind which led to the conclusion that any
Moorish sheikh could be induced to rush to arms
because some dog of an unbeliever had made a

The World Revolution 255

statement that was neither interesting nor even
intelligible in Morocco to some other dog of an
unbeliever ; but the Germans formed that con-
clusion and spent money on it."

Unfortunately, they lost thereby not only money,
but also their good name, for they did not confine them-
selves to circulating leaflets among the enemy ; they also
utilized the protection of the ex-territorial privilege of
their diplomatic and consular representatives with the
neutrals, to instigate outrages of the most varied descrip-
tion on the lives and property of the enemy civilian
population.

Success they had none, except in the East. As the
German policy of involving her adversaries in her own
ruin attained the desired aim only in Russia, so it was
there alone they attained their purpose of bringing about
a revolution. Both aims were very closely connected,
and the downfall of Tsarism would have followed the
Russian military collapse even without the promotion of
Bolshevism by the German Government.

The narrowness of the German policy again appears
in this, that in the endeavour to burn down its neigh-
bour's house it did not observe that it was setting fire
to its own.

It cherished the superstition which, to be sure, it
had in common with many adherents of world-revolution,
that revolutions could be called forth, as desired, by
skilful and stirring emissaries who had the necessary
funds at disposal. To this it added the further super-
stition that the spirits one invoked might be commanded
at pleasure, and put back in the corner after they had
done their duty.

It was incredibly shortsighted of a German capitalistic-

256 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

agrarian military Monarchy, which hated anti-militarism
and the proletarian revolution like poison, to encourage
the keenest champions of proletarian revolution and of
the dissolution of military subordination, as the Bol-
shevists were during the stage of their struggle for poli-
tical power. The Russian Revolution, and especially
its second act, the victory of Bolshevism, had made the
most profound impression upon the German proletariate,
and also upon the German Army, and had enormously
increased their revolutionary determination. The fact
that the German General Staff's previous love for the
Bolshevists was then transformed into the grimmest
hatred did not diminish the revolutionary effect of Bol-
shevism upon Germany, but rather enhanced it.

Thus, the potentates who instigated the world-war
were finally hoisted with their own petard. To this
extent world-history showed itself once more as the
world's Judgment Day,* a thing which does not often
happen, for the world is by no means ordered on teieo-
logical principles. Already, on July 30 th, William had
had a presentiment of the collapse, even before he had
declared war. If the Pompadour is supposed to have
originated the expression, " After us the deluge," in
William's case one may use the variation, " Hold out
until the deluge."

* Alluding to Schiller's famous line, " Die Weltgeschichte ist das Welt-
gericht." (Translator's note.)

CHAPTER XXI

THE-WORLD WAR AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE

SINCE the publication of the Austrian documents
the whole world is agreed that the action of the
potentates of Germany who launched the war was un-
speakably wanton, short-sighted and reckless. Only
the moral qualities of the guilty parties are still in dis-
pute. This question is important in judging of the
persons, not of the institutions. Whatever the moral
verdict may be — after taking cognizance of the German
documents, there should not be much dispute about it —
it has long been possible to find a political verdict. It
condemns the subjection of civil authority to military
force and passes sentence on the Monarchy.

We have already remarked in dealing with the
Szogyeny case that an idiot as leading statesman is
more dangerous for the community than a scoundrel.

No constitution, however elaborately devised, no
democracy, no Soviet system, nor any aristocracy, not
even one of philosophers on the Platonic model, can
prevent scoundrels from getting to the head of the
State. But with every kind of constitution, whether
of a State, of a political party, a commune, a church,
or other organization the leadership of which is en-
trusted only to men who have won the general confidence
of those concerned, a rascal can only get to the top
through great services rendered to the community,

257 i7

258 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

through the impression he has made by a superior intelli-
gence. It is only in the hereditary Monarchy, which
makes the personality of the Supreme Head of the
State dependent, not upon the services he renders to
the State, but upon the chance accident of birth, that
occasionally not only rascals but also dullards or lunatics
govern the State.

The Government that brought the war upon us did
not, however, act entirely without judgment. How-
ever incompetent and ignorant the Imperial Govern-
ment proved to be in its foreign policy, it showed itself,
in the decisive days, master of the art of winning the
increasing confidence of the people at home, in the
same measure as it lost that of the other nations.

We have seen how determinedly the German Social
Democracy stood out against the frivolous challenge
of the world-war that lay in the Austrian Ultimatum to
Serbia, and how William looked askance at the " Sozis "
demonstrations for peace, and promised violent measures
against them.

Had the German Social Democracy known that the
Austrian Ultimatum had not taken the German Govern-
ment by surprise, that the latter undoubtedly knew its
actual trend, although, perhaps, not its wording, even
before its delivery in Belgrade, and that Germany was
not the peaceable third party endeavouring to intervene
between the ally and her opponents, but the fellow-
conspirator of Austria, then our Party — as might have
been expected with certainty in view of its attitude at
that time — would have turned as sharply against the
German Government as it did against the Austrian.
Then William would have had either to forgo war or
to begin it by locking up every leader of the Social
Democracy, i.e., by declaring war simultaneously on

The World-War and the German People 259

the Entente and on the German proletariat. The
ruling system would then have been doomed from the
outset, while the German nation would have been saved.
This menace to the reigning sovereigns of the Empire
was recognized by Bethmann-Hollweg from the start,
and his efforts were directed much less to the prevention
of the war than to the creation of a favourable moral basis
for it in Germany. To this he devoted his best atten-
tion, his entire acumen. And he succeeded in this task.
For this purpose the German people had to be kept in
ignorance of all that had actually taken place between
Austria and Germany since the Serajevo outrage. It
was, indeed, impossible to prevent the growth of a strong
indignation against Austria's aggression ; but they knew
how to preserve their own halo as the peace-lover whose
task was handicapped only by a second peculiarity of the
German mind, a peculiarity no less laudable than its
pacific temper — namely, its unwavering fidelity to a
friend even when he has stumbled.

Foreign countries were, of course, mistrustful from
the beginning. We have already seen examples of this
in the case of French and English statesmen. The
Belgian Baron Beyens wrote from Berlin to Brussels
on July 26th :

" The existence of a preconcerted plan between
Berlin and Vienna is proved in the eyes of my
colleagues and myself by the persistence with which
the Wilhelmstrasse denies that it had cognizance
of the contents of the Austrian Note before Thursday
last (July 23rd)."

Even the mistrustful elements, however, had no idea
how far this " preconcerted plan " went. The Germar

17*

260 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

people themselves were still less critical. Doubt, indeed,
arose among their ranks, but, in general, even those who
considered William's Government capable of any mischief
did not believe it could be so boundlessly stupid as to
risk the peace of the world and Germany's future for
the sake of Austria's grievances against Serbia.

And whilst, abroad, mistrust against Germany in-
creased in view of her amazing attitude, there arose
among the German people a rapidly-growing anger
against Russia. For the German Government mani-
pulated most skilfully its intelligence apparatus, which
in those days, when Germany was beginning to be cut
off from foreign countries, was for the masses in Germany
the only source of information regarding foreign policy.
A German with no other source of information could
not but believe firmly that Germany was working fever-
ishly for peace ; that she would succeed in winning over
Austria to this view, but that Russia was determined
to seize the opportunity to go to war. Thus, in the
eyes of the German people Russia finally stood forth
as the disturber of peace, the assailant, and France,
and ultimately also England, as her criminal accom-
plices.

How deep this view had taken root is evidenced by
the fact that on June 7th, 1915, the King of Bavaria
could venture^to make the pronouncement already
quoted :

" Upon Russia's declaration of war followed that
of France ! "

And even in our days, in the White Book of June,
1919, thejfour '^independent Germans," after completing
their inspection of the documents, have testified that the
war was, for^Germany, an " unavoidable war of defence "

The World -War and the German People 261

against Russia (page 44). Now the moment appeared
to have arrived, which the German Social Democracy
had already had, not infrequently, under consideration,
and which (as even the most international of its members
unequivocally declared) made it imperative on them
to turn against Russia, and, if Russia were supported by
France, also against the latter.

About the year 1900 Bebel declared that if it came
to war with Russia, " the enemy of all culture and of all
the oppressed, not only in her own country, but also the
most dangerous enemy of Europe, and especially for us
Germans," he would " shoulder his gun." He quoted
and confirmed this declaration in 1907 at the Party
Congress in Essen (Protocol, page 255).

Long before this Frederick Engels had given his
views on this question when, in 1891, " the champagne
orgy of Kronstadt had gone to the heads of the French
bourgeoisie" the Franco-Russian Alliance was initiated,
and France appeared to him " ripe for rather excessive
follies in Russia's service." At that time he considered
it necessary lest, in case of a war, " any misunderstanding
should arise at the last moment between the French
and German Socialists," to make clear to the former
" what, according to my conviction, would be the neces-
sary attitude of the latter in face of such a war."

An article which he published in the " Almanach
du parti ouvrier pour 1892 " served this purpose.

It was based on the view that neither Germany nor
France would provoke the war, for it would devastate
both, without any gain whatsoever.

" Russia, on the other hand, protected by her geo-
graphical and economic position against the anni-
hilating consequences of a defeat, Russia, official

262 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Russia alone can serve her interests in so terrible
a war and work directly to that end. . . . But,
in any case, as political affairs stand to-day, the
chances are ten to one that at the first cannon
shot on the Vistula the French armies march on
the Rhine.

" And then Germany fights for her bare existence.
... In such circumstances (if Germany were
beaten), what would become of the German Social-
Democratic party ? So much is certain : neither
the Tsar, nor the French bourgeois-republicans,
nor the German Government itself, would let slip
such a fine opportunity for the crushing of the
only Party that is * the enemy ' for all three. . . .

" But if the victory of the Russians over Germany
means the crushing of German Socialism, what then
becomes the duty of the German Socialists in regard
to such a prospect ? Are they to remain passive in
view of events that threaten their destruction ? . . .

" By no means. In the interests of European
revolution they are bound to maintain all the
positions they have conquered, and not to capitulate
either to the external or to the internal enemy.
And that can only be done by fighting to the death
Russia and all her allies, whoever they may be.
Should the French Republic place itself in the service
of His Majesty the Tsar and Autocrat of all the
Russias, the German Socialists would fight it with
grief, but fight it we would." (Published in German
under the title, " Der Sozialismus in Deutschland,"
Neue Zeity X. 2, pages 585, 586.)

These currents of thought were still active in the
German Social Democracy in 1914. They were based on

The World -War and the German People 263

the view that the impulse to war could come only from
Russia, not from Germany. Ten years after Engels'
article I had still named Russia among the European
peace-breakers, not Germany. At a later date I would
certainly not have repeated this remark. Since then
there had taken place, on the one hand, Russia's defeat
in the war against Japan, and the Russian Revolution,
while, on the other, Germany had started her naval arma-
ments and her active policy in the Mohammedan world.

Russia, with revolution in her midst, had now become
less dangerous to the democracy of Europe than the still
unshakable, all-powerful German military Monarchy.

And it was no longer ' at all possible to regard the
German or the Austrian Government, the latter of
which was ruling without a parliament in 1914, as cham-
pions against the Tsarist autocracy.

A revolutionary Russia would have appeared far
more dangerous to them than a Tsarist Russia, just as
a free Serbia was considered by them as their worst
enemy.

Characteristic in this respect are William's marginal
notes to a report sent by Pourtales from Petrograd on
July 25th, concerning an interview with Sasonow.
Pourtales writes :

" My reference to the monarchical principle
[supposed to be violated by the Serbs. — K.] made
little impression upon the Minister. Russia knew,
he said, what she owed to the monarchical prin-
ciple."

To which William adds :

" No longer, after her fraternization with the
French Social-Republic."

264 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Besides this severe censure, pronounced by the Kaiser
on the Russian Tsar for excessive Republican and even
"Social-Republican" sympathies, the marginal notes
to the Pourtales' report contain another noteworthy
remark, which proves with what levity William still,
on July 25th, viewed the war with Russia. Pourtales
reports :

" Sasonow exclaimed : f If Austria-Hungary devours
Serbia we shall go to war with her.' '

To which William retorted :
"Well, go ahead!"

The situation created by the Revolution in Russia
and by Germany's world-policy was totally different to
that existing in 1891. But the old belief that the war
against Russia was the " holy war " of the German
Social Democracy was still quick among its ranks, and
this belief, in conjunction with the German method of
doctoring news, impelled many a good Socialist and
Internationalist to vote for the war credits on August 4th,
not because he disavowed his principles, but because
he believed that this was the best way to apply them.

It would, of course, be an exaggeration to suppose
that all in the ranks of the Social Democrats had been
actuated by such considerations. Many a one among
them had already held strong nationalistic views before
the war — nationalistic in contradistinction to national.
Under the latter may be understood a championship of
the self-determination of one's own people, which
respects the self-determination of every other people,
and which subordinates national as well as private
interests to the common interests of the international

The World-War and the German People 265

proletariat and of humanity. A Nationalist, on the
contrary, is one for whom his own nation stands higher
than others, who cares more for the enemies of his class
among his own countrymen than for his own class
among others.

Before the war such elements already existed in the
German Social Democracy as, no doubt, in almost every
Socialistic party. The war, and before that the inci-
pient bellicose temper of the people, gave at one blow
an enormous impetus to nationalism among the Socialist
ranks — and that not in Germany alone.

TheTmore a Socialist party becomes a party of the
masses, the stronger becomes its nationalism ; the more
rapid its growth before the war, the less opportunity it
had to educate its followers.

Nowhere had it grown by such leaps and bounds
as in Germany, where the number of Social Democrat
voters increased by a million between 1907 and 1912.
How strong the national idea everywhere is the war and
its consequences have most clearly shown. For the
great untrained masses, however, it easily degenerates
into the nationalistic idea, especially when the country
is in great danger, unless this idea is paralysed by other
closely-connected and powerful factors, e.g., a ruthless
policy of Socialist persecution by their own Government.

William had willed such a policy. The fact that the
will did not become the deed is, no doubt, to be attributed
to Bethmann. It was probably the one sensible thing
he did in that time.

In addition to all this, the mass of the thoughtless —
and these were recruited from all circles and not least
from among the writers and thinkers — welcomed the
war with jubilation, because they expected it would be
short, and was already as good as won, whilst from

266 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

Petrograd, on the outbreak of the war, a " morning-after "
feeling was reported, and the French took the field in
gloomy silence and with clenched teeth.

In a single night the temper of the German people
blazed into warlike enthusiasm for the repulse of the
national enemy, by whom, they imagined, they were
basely attacked and threatened with annihilation.

To all these influences the majority of the German
Social Democracy succumbed, and, to a still higher degree,
the rest of the people. Had William threatened the
" Sozis " with arrest as recently as July 28th, he was
able to proclaim on August ist that he " knew no more
parties " — i.e., that they, one and all, had capitulated
to him.

So by Bethmann's tactics the great task was accom-
plished, and the German people were made accomplices
in his war-policy, in the sense that they sanctioned it
and supported it, up to the military collapse.

It was not, however, the actual policy of William and
his Government for which the German people enthu-
siastically staked life and property, but a policy which
in fact did not exist at all, a mere mirage, made plausible
by every fraudulent means available down to the igno-
minious end.

And this is precisely what we most clearly gather
from the Foreign Office documents. These show that
among the peoples who were sacrificed to William's war-
policy the German nation heads the list. The more
they incriminate the Hohenzollern regime, the more they
exculpate the German people, for they testify most dis-
tinctly that the latter had no notion of the actual course
of the events that led to war — far less than the other
nations — while those politicians who from scattered

The World-War and the German People 267

indications had guessed the truth were cut off during the
war from every possibility of criticizing events and
of enlightening the masses.

But have no other Governments prepared misleading
statements concerning the outbreak of the war ?

It is not impossible that they have. In Bismarck's
well-known phrase, never are so many lies told as before
a war, during an election, and after a shoot. And the
Tsarist regime has never been exactly regarded as
fanatically devoted to the truth. But in 1914 the
Governments of the Entente had no reason so to dupe
the nations as had those of the Central Powers. For
neither France, England, or Russia at that time wanted
war, but dreaded it, and justly so, in view of their
internal difficulties and inadequate armaments.

In addition, the period of war preparation, which
might necessitate untruths and concealment, did not
begin for Germany's opponents until July 24th, when
they learned of the Austrian Ultimatum, which was the
first indication of the danger of war. For the Central
Powers the period of concealment, silence, misrepre-
sentation, began already on July 5th. In the period
from July 5th to July 23rd, they created, completely
undisturbed by foreign countries and without any im-
pelling reason, that groundwork of mendacity upon
which the whole conduct of the war was built up.

One can render no greater service to the German
people than to expose the lies that led them astray. By
this means they are morally exculpated in every respect
in the eyes of all the world.

The moral exculpation is, however, counterbalanced
by political incrimination.

Misled by the statesmen of the Hohenzollerns and
the Habsburgs, the German people were made the

268 The Guilt of William Hohenzollern

willing instrument of their plans, and were thereby
placed in a false position. The great majority of the
German people felt their solidarity, almost up to the
very end of the war, and in many cases down to our
days, with those who duped them and led them and all
Europe to destruction. The nation was blind to their
crimes and misdeeds ; it screened them, and it pas-
sionately championed their innocence.

So, in spite of its moral blamelessness, it was bur-
dened with the political guilt of the dynasty and its
henchmen, and became the object of the fiercest hate and
loathing to the whole world, a hatred that imposed upon
it, after its defeat, the most terrible of peace terms and
treated it as a race of lepers.

He who loves the German people, not only the
national German but also the international Socialist and
Democrat, to whom every nation is equally dear, must
endeavour to deliver it from this terrible ban, to free
it from the awful burden laid upon it by the old regime.

This process of the rehabilitation of the German
people in international esteem is continually hampered,
not only by those who still adhere to the fallen regime,
or were even its actual accomplices, but also by politi-
cians who, although they have now recognized how
pernicious it was, still cannot make up their minds to
see things as they really were.

They believe they are serving the German people by
proving its innocence through the exculpation of its
former masters. But all they are doing is merely to keep
alive the appearance of its guilt, as that of its former
rulers becomes more and more notorious from day to day.
It is to be hoped that the German and Austrian docu-
ments now communicated will make the continuance of
this perverse policy as impossible as they must make

The World -War and the German People 269

the return of the military Monarchies of the Hohen-
zollerns and Habsburgs.

What individual brave and perspicacious German
Socialists and pacifists already recognized and openly
proclaimed during the war (that the German people
was most shamefully duped and deceived by its Govern-
ment, and that only in this way could it be driven to
war) should now at last be acknowledged, unreservedly,
without any " if " or " but," or palliative seeking for
guilty parties abroad. This is incumbent on every
honest citizen in Germany, who does not swear by the
divinity of the Hohenzollerns.

This will be the best means of winning back the trust
of the peoples for Germany, and thereby of repressing
on the side of the victors that military policy of force,
which has become the greatest menace to the peace and
freedom of the world.

APPENDIX

THE present work was already in print when I learned
the results of the investigations which were undertaken
by the Foreign Office during the month of October, at
the instance of Herren Montgelas and Schiicking, in con-
nection with Bussche's notes on the events of July 5th
and 6th in Potsdam.

Although I could no further deal with them in the
text, I consider it necessary to state that they do not
alter my views of those events.

They show that the Kaiser, on the morning of July
6th, sent for Admiral von Capelle, who was acting as
deputy in Tirpitz's absence from Berlin, to come to
Potsdam, and informed him of " the strained situation
so that he might deliberate on what was to be done."

In addition, William sent at the same time for a
representative of the General Staff. He came in the
person of General von Bertrab, who in his communica-
tion to the Foreign Office still speaks of the Kaiser as
" H.M." According to a report of Count Waldersee,
the Kaiser informed the General, for communication to
the Chief of the General Staff — General von Moltke was
then at Karlsbad — that he, the Kaiser, had promised
the Emperor Francis Joseph " to back him with the Ger-
man forces, should complications arise out of Austria-
Hungary's proposed action against Serbia."

270

Appendix 271

Count Waldersee adds :

" General von BertraVs audience in Potsdam did
not place me, General von Moltke's representative in
all matters pertaining to war, under the necessity of
giving any orders. The regulation mobilization-
operations were concluded on March 3is£, 1914. The
Army was, as ever, prepared"

This is surely a very interesting communication from
the purely military standpoint. The political signifi-
cance of these interviews is as little diminished thereby
as it is by insisting on styling them " audiences "
instead of " conferences with military authorities."

It is also not quite clear why such violent efforts are
being made to disavow those conferences. It would
have been nothing short of the height of folly had
William not held them, having once promised Francis
Joseph " to back him with the German forces," what-
ever the Serbian adventure might entail.

Having given this pledge, and having immediately
afterwards started on his northern cruise, a conference
with the chiefs of the Army and the Navy was the least
to which William, as Supreme War Lord, was then
bound. It was in this pledge, not in the military con-
ferences, that William's guilt lay. The conferences were
only the consequences of the pledge, which is confirmed
anew by Count Waldersee' s evidence.

Moreover, the statements of Herren Capelle, Bertrab
and Waldersee confirm the secrecy in which the military
conferences were wrapped. Both Capelle and Bertrab
were received by the Kaiser in the park " personally
and without witnesses." Each spoke separately with
him, face to face. This was certainly a council of war

272 Appendix

of no ordinary kind. All the more does it remind one
of a conspiracy.

It is to be hoped that the Investigation Committee
will throw full light upon this dark affair.

But enough is already known to enable us to
pass a 'political judgment on the proceedings of that
time.

THE END

Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey.

The personality and
position of Karl Kautsky
puts his unique book in
the front rank of authori-
tative records, and settles,
once for all, the question
<>! the personal respon-
sibility of William Hohen-
xollern for the outbreak of
the Great War. Appointed
by the German Republican
Government to examine
the secret archives of the
German Foreign Office,
Kautsky was able to study
the documents which
passed between the Ger-
man authorities and the
other parties to the great
conspiracy, documents
which passed through the
hands of the ex- Kaiser and
bear his notes and com-
ments IN HIS OWN
HAND ! Those notes and
comments show William
Hohenzollern as the driving
force behind the war-party
in Germany, as a man
determined not to let slip
what seemed so favourable
an opportunity of settling
accounts with Russia -
and, if necessary, the
world.

UCLA-College Library

D 515 K16g

L 005 712 122 0

College
Library

51$

Kl6g

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

A 001 002 049 3

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "The guilt of William Hohenzollern"

See other formats