Handbook
OF TI1K
History of Philosophy
BY
DR. ALBERT STOCKL
VOL. I.
PRE-SCHOLASTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY
SECOND EDITION (1903)
TRANSLATED BY THE
REV. T. A. FINLAY, S.J., MJV.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DUBININ
REISSUE i £> °
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA
1914
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
IN offering to the public this Second Edition of the Handbook
of the History of Philosophy, I have not to announce any
change in the arrangement of the work. Here and there some
slight omissions have been supplied, and certain needful expla
nations added. The literature of the subject has, however, been
noticed more fully, and the developments of recent philosophy
have been accorded more attention than in the First Edition.
These changes have added somewhat to the size of the volume.
History, it is said, is a good teacher. This is specially
true of the History of Philosophy. It teaches us that anarchy
has invaded the realm of mind whenever and wherever
Revelation, and the depository of revelation— the Church— have
been discarded; wherever the peoples " have risen up against
the Lord and against His Christ " ; and it shows that anarchy
has subsided only when men have returned to God and to His
Church. The History of Philosophy thus throws light upon
our present surroundings. If the men who now "have risen
up against the Lord and against His Christ " were capable of
instruction, they would learn from history that they are draw
ing society in Europe to the verge of an abyss. We have no hope
that they will learn any such lesson. But for those who « have
not bowed the knee to Baal," who have not sacrificed their in
dependence of thought to the prejudices of party, the History of
Philosophy will serve as an incitement to hold fast to truth,
though it be persecuted and despised, certain that now, as ever,
it must triumph in the end.
Eichstdtt, 21 st June, 1875.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
THIS translation of a work, well-known and largely used in
the Catholic Schools of Germany, has been made with a view to
provide for Catholic students of philosophy in our English
speaking Colleges, a trustworthy manual of the History of
Philosophy. Students will find in this work a fulness of infor
mation unusual in a handbook. And they will further find that the
Schools of Philosophy which have grown up within the Church,
or have stood in close relation with her teaching, here receive
explicit and adequate notice. In this respect the work offers an
advantage not provided by the text-books on which our Catholic
Schools have hitherto been forced to rely. Perhaps the manual
hitherto most largely used by our Catholic students, in their
study of the History of Philosophy, has been Schwegler's Hand
book, translated by Dr. Stirling. How far such a work falls short
of the requirements of Catholic students is shown by the fact that
the author omits from his history all treatment of Scholastic
Philosophy. His reasons for this omission are thus set forth :
" We exclude also Scholasticism, or the Philosophy of the
Christian middle ages ; which belongs (being not so much
philosophy as rather a reflecting or a philosophizing within the
pre-suppositions of a positive religion, and therefore essentially
theology) to the historical science of the Christian dogmas."
Philosophy within the limits of a positive religion is of prime im_
portance to the Catholic student, and a work from whic|i the
history of this portion of philosophy is excluded, must be a
defective aid in the studies he is supposed to prosecute. Another
advantage which the history here offered possesses over most Ger
man works on the same subject, is its clearness of statement, and
11 TRANSLATOR 8 PREFACE.
general intelligibility of language. For the beginner at all events,
such phrases as Schwegler s definition of philosophy : " the thought
totality of the empirical finite,'7 are neither very definite nor
very luminous. The simple phraseology and definite conceptions
of Dr. Stockl's work contrast strongly with this vagueness of ex
pression and mistiness of thought. Readers of Ueberweg's His
tory of Philosophy will notice that in many parts of his work
Dr. Stockl has followed not only the thought but the very words
of that writer. In the German text of his book. Dr. Stockl is
careful to acknowledge by italics what he borrows from Ueber-
weg. In the translation these italics are not always inserted ; it
was not considered that the quotation marks would be of import
ance to our students. The Translator acknowledges gratefully
the courtesy of Dr. Stockl and of his German publisher, Herr
Kirchheim, in authorising this translation.
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,
June, 1887.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
IN this Edition the Translation of Dr Stockl's work has been
carried down to the end of the Scholastic period. In this
form it will, we may hope, serve more largely tbe purpose
with which it was undertaken.
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,
January, 1 903.
Al TilOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
IT is not without cause that in the modern teaching of philosophy
great importance is attached to the History of Philosophy. In
itself it is a deeply interesting study to follow the progress of
philosophical thought through the course of its development.
But our interest in the study increases when we observe that
the History of Philosophy teaches us into what by-paths the
human mind wanders when it abjures the guidance of Christi
anity, and that it indicates to us the safe route to follow if we
would arrive at the true term of speculative inquiry.
A " Handbook of the History of Philosophy " which sketches
the course philosophy has followed in its development, and
the leading philosophical systems through which that progress
had been effected, cannot fail to have its use for the student
who seeks a safe way through this vast and varied field of study.
In the present Handbook I have endeavoured to provide
for the student a help of this sort. There are, indeed, many
Handbooks already in existence. But these, for the most part,
do not view the subject from the Catholic standpoint, and are
not sufficiently safe guides for Catholic students. In this re
spect, the present work, will, it is hoped, meet a want not
hitherto satisfied. In composing this Handbook, I have fol
lowed the plan of my larger work on the History of Philosophy.
I have also largely made use of the well-known works of Eittcr,
Sigwart, Nixner, Zeller, Uschold, Erdmann, and Ueberweg.
I am specially indebted to Ueberweg's work, which is very com
plete in its account of the literature of this subjoot, mull havr
largely drawn on it in this respect.
iv AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
In the case of each philosopher, I have cited, as far as pos
sible, the original works in which his opinions are contained,
and have indicated with regard to the more important, the
modern works in which their systems are discussed. To enter
at further length into the literature connected with their systems,
or to cite from their works in greater detail was not permitted
by the character of the manual on which I was engaged.
The present work will serve as a sort of complement to my
Handbook of Philosophy (2nd Edit., Kirchheim, Mainz). In every
science the complement of scientific theory is the history of the
science, that is of the actual process of development through
which the science has passed. The rule holds good for
Philosophy.
May this work, by the blessing of God, be found of avail
to promote the study of philosophy in union with the spirit of
Christianity, and to advance the philosophical education of our
Catholic youth.
Minister, 8th September, 1870.
INTRODUCTION,
I. LOOKKD at from the subjective standpoint, Philosophy is nothing-more
than the effort of discursive thought K, 7-each the highest and ultimate
reasons of all things that are, in the measure in which this end is
attainable by mere reason. The task which the human mind undertakes
in tins study is very vast and very difficult. For this reason it lay in the
nature of things that Philosophy should not reach its perfect development
at a bound— that in the course of centuries many thinkers should set
themselves to the solution of the great problem, and should devote the
pmver of intellect allotted them to attain, as best they could, the end of
philosophical inquiry. In this way the course of time has brought forth
many philosophical systems. Each of these represents the labour which
its author has expended in the investigation of the ultimate reasons of
things that are, and the results he has attained by this inquiry.
2. The philosophical systems with which the history of the human race
confronts us are not only many in number; they f urthermore differ from
one another as well in Matter as in Form. The sum of truth is o^ater
m one than in another; and some seem in this respect to have
iiled altogether ; some systems are of wider comprehensive ran«-e
"king m the whole domain of speculative thought ; others are devoted
i special field of philosophical inquiry : some are, in their arranoe-
iiH'iit, rigidly systematic— in others tin- several parts seem looselv
bound together, the effort after system is not prominently apparent If
we seek the reasons of this diversity, we shall find them, partly in the
great range and difficulty of the task whirl. Philosophy sets the human
iinml, partly in the different points of view adopted by the several
nkers, and partly in extrinsic conditions— in the influences exercised
upoi the several thinkers by the circumstances in which they lived.
d. In mite, however, of tto diversity we fi^d a certain inner connection
betweenthe several philosophical systems which succeed one another in
I he results attained by earlier philosophers were not lost upon
those who succeeded them. The latter made the theories of their
predecessors part of thrir own syMoms. when thcv held them to 1,,-
satisfactorily established. If they considered then, insufficiently proved
01- Wholly false, they set up in opposition to them other principles which
appeared to them more tenable. Thus there came to be established ;
INTRODUCTION.
certain intrinsic order of connection between the successive systems,
corresponding to the extrinsic order of succession in time. One philo
sophic- system refers us to another, and each can be understood in its
full significance only in connection with others to which it stands
immediately related.
4. This inner connection between the successive systems o± Philosophy
gives a reason why, with the progress of time, a continuous development
of Philosophy and philosophic thought is observable. Each succeeding
thinker had before him, in the systems of his predecessors, the result;
hitherto achieved by philosophical inquiry. These were in part available
for the construction of his own system. In part they had to be refuted,
and the philosopher, in order to* set right the teaching in question, was
led to a deeper study of the subject matter concerned. His system would
naturally be more highly perfected than those of his predecessors-
a distinct advance upon them. The succession of philosophical systems
in time is thus seen to involve a progressive development of Philosophy
itself, a constant advance towards the perfection of philosophic know
ledge.
5. It must, indeed, be admitted that this advance has not always been
uninterrupted. The human race does not advance to the goal of per
fection fixed for it by God in undisturbed progress. It passes through
periods of storm and profound disturbance, though these, in their
measure, seem ultimately to purify and perfect it. So it is with the
progress of Philosophy. Periods of difficulty and danger arise, which
sometimes interrupt for centuries the progress of philosophical thought.
Systems imposing in their grandeur, and rich in the possession of truth,
are abandoned for others that are at once poor and pretentious ; and
these failing to satisfy the human mind, a moment comes when philo
sophical inquiry is thrown aside as without utility and without fruit,
and Scepticism or Materialism reigns instead. These, however, are but
moments of crisis. They do not last for ever. They even serve to
impel the human mind "to higher efforts of inquiry when the crisis is
past. For the errors which come to the surface in these periods of
stormy confusion call for repression and competent refutation, and
thus oblige the philosopher to make deeper the foundations, and
more extended the range of his philosophic knowledge.
(i. It will appear from what we have been saying that it is a profitable
study to make acquaintance with the successive philosophical systems,
as well in themselves as in their mutual connection, and in this way
to follow step by step the development of philosophic knowledge as it
manifests itself in the series. "The mind is roused and strengthened
by observing how injiuy highly-gifted men have, out of mere love of
truth, laboured with untiring' zeal to build up the great structure of
philosophical science, and have- furthered by their efforts the har
monious development of man's spiritual life ; while at the same time
it is protected against pride and self-deception by learning how weak it is,
notwithstanding the great thoughts with which it teems. Furthermore,
he who will achieve any thing like a higher philosophical knowledge must
INTRODUCTION. ;}
make acquaintance with the opinions and methods which philosophical
investigation has already culled into existence, that he may estimate the
problems hei'orc him aright, and avoid every one-sidedm 'ss from which
others have already escaped." \Ve cannot, however, be required to
study all philosophical systems with the same attention. We must
chiefly occupy ourselves with those which stand out prominently abo\r
the rest, and round which the others group themselves as round so
many centres.
7. We are now in a position to form a right notion of the historv of
Philosophy. Objectively considered, it is nothing more than the series
of philosophical systems which have appeared in time, and the de
velopment of philosophical knowledge as manifested in them. In the
subjective sense — with which we are now concerned — the history ot
Philosophy is an exposition of the successive s\ stems of Philosophy,
setting forth their contents, their mutual connection, and the pro-'
gressive development of philosophical knowledge represented in them.
8. A history of Philosophy thus involves three requirements :
The contents of the several philosophical systems must be set
forth with the greatest attainable clearness, and with all possible com
pleteness. The historian must address himself to his task cautiously,
thoughtfully, dispassionately and impartially. It must be his first
effort to set forth each philosophical system exactly according to the
mind of its author, to omit nothing which is essential, and to add
nothing.
In the second place, the history of Philosophy has to make
clear the relation in which each system stands to those which preceded
it, what elements it has borrowed from them, or in what antagonism it
stands to them. And again, it has to show what influence each system
has exercised upon those that followed, how its principles have" been
subsequently expanded, transformed, or otherwise modified, that its
hearing and significance may be fully understood.
In the third place, the' history of Philosophy must indicate how
far a given system has been an advance or a falling back in philo
sophical knowledge, that we may be able to fix its place in the order of
development which philosophy has followed.
9. As regards the method to be applied by the historian of Philosophy
in the execution of his task, the question arises, which of the two
methods, the a priori or the a posteriori, meets the requirements of a
history of Philosophy such as we have described? To this we replv :
The a priori method lays down a pre-established principle as the
foundation of the whole historical system, and from this derives all the
systems which have appeared in time, showing their contents and tin-
order of succession in which they have appeared to he alike necessary
results of the development of the principle assumed. It is thus that
Eegel, in his " History of Philosophy," has endeavoured to establish,
on a priori grounds, that the several philosophical systems which the
course of time has brought forth are no more than isolated, imperfect
elements of the Absolute 1'hilosophy — the Hegelian. This successive
INTRODUCTION.
realisation of the several elements of the Absolute Philosophy was
required, in order that the gradual synthesis of contradictions might at
last give rise to the perfect Philosophy, that is to say, that God might
attain to perfect consciousness in the mind of man. This a priori
method of Hegel has found many imitators, though the pantheistic
principle has not in all cases been an assumption in these methods.
But a priori constructions of history after this fashion must be
peremptorily rejected as unjustifiable and mistaken. In the first place,
an exact knowledge of the various systems, as their authors framed
them, is not possible if we view their development in the light of a
philosophical theory of our own, and study them only as seen through
this medium. Under such circumstances the several systems will be
judged according to the standard and the requirements of our own.
The tendencies and opinions of the historian himself will be apparent at
every turn, but what the authors of the systems under discussion thought,
and aimed at, will not be put before us. In the second place — and this
argument is decisive — systems of Philosophy come before us as facts of
history, and as such they are contingent, not necessary. The contingent
cannot be proved a necessity ; he who undertakes such a proof is
forced to deny the contingent character of all historical facts — a pro
ceeding which involves assumptions that belong cither to Pantheism or
Materialism.
The a posteriori method is the only method which accords with the notion
of a history of Philosophy. In this matter, as in history generally, we have
to do with questions of fact ; we have first to make acquaintance with the
several systems of Philosophy, as with so many facts, before we proceed
to seek the reasons of these facts, that is, before we inquire how
they have come to be, in what relations of dependence they stand to
other systems, and what progress of philosophical thought is manifested
in them. Nor shall we proceed further in this latter direction than the
sense attributed by the authors to the systems which they actually framed
will warrant. The historian must, therefore, make his own philoso
phical system subserve the purposes of history. He must not make of it
the criterion or the measure of others. Only in this way can he present
us with a history of Philosophy true in its details and faithful to facts.
10. Again, " the development of Philosophy is, in many respects,
dependent upon the development of other sciences (of the empirical sciences
more particularly), and upon the religious convictions and opinions as well
of the individual philosopher as of the people to which he belongs. Its
progress or decline is influenced by the intercourse of nations with one
another, by the conditions of social life peculiar to the several peoples,
by the family organisation as maintained among them, by their political
institutions, by the state of art among them, and, lastly it is affected by
the peculiar circumstances which have shaped the lives of the individuals
win i have specially contributed to its development. It is true a history
of Philosophy cannot enter minutely into all these details. They are the
material for other departments of history. But it cannot avoid occasional
allusions to them, since they have exercised an important influence on
INTRODUCTION.
the progress of Philosophy. For the same mis,,,,, it cannot omit fn,,n
view flu- outward lives of the several philosophers. On 1],is point, too,
it must furnish adequate information."
11. The sources from which a history of Philosophy must be drawn
are: —
Primarily, such works of the philosophers as have readied us,
or such fragments of their writings as are still preserved. But, before
using- such works or fragments of works for the purposes of history we
must first be assured of their authenticity and integrity. Historical
criticism, by which this assurance is given' us, must, therefore, prepare
the way for a history of Philosophy.
In ^ dealing with philosophical theories and systems where the
author's own exposition is not accessible to us, we must, of course, con
tent ourselves with the statements of others. In such cases these state
ments are most reliable which, are based immediately on the writings of
the philosophers ; and next to these, the statements of disciples as to
the oral teachings of their masters. If the purpose of the writer whose
statements are our source of information be not so much historical nar
ration as proof of the doctrines he is stating, we must, in order to make
his utterances available for purposes of history, discover from them the
exact thoughts of the author of the theories in question, and we must
test each statement made by its bearing on this issue. The source from
which the writer drew, and the purpose of his writings, are of first im
portance ; next in importance, as a criterion of his trustworthiness, is his
own education in Philosophy, his capacity to understand the doctrines
with which he is dealing.
12. In seeking a division of the history of Philosophy, we find two great
divisions obviously suggested — the history of the pre-Christian (ancient)
Philosophy, and the history of Philosophy since Christ, Christ is the
central point for all history. His coming 'into the world has been called
by the Apostle " the fulness of time " (pknitudo tempo r is). He was the
scope and the consummation of the times that preceded Him, He was
the point of departure for the time that followed ; for the events that
have filled it have all been hallowed by the Redemption he effected.
For the Christian all history is thus divided into two great periods, and
with the rest, the history of Philosophy. This view is in strict accord
ance with the facts of the case. The Philosophy which preceded, and
that which followed Christ, differ more widely in character than the
philosophies of any of the several periods subordinate to these. Tin-
world has never witnessed such a revolution in human thought, such an
enlargement of the range of human knowledge as that effected by the
introduction of Christianity. We cannot, therefore, find elsewhere a
more appropriate point at which to divide the history of Philosophy
into its main divisions than at the point where Christianity appear > in
the world.
13. If we inquire what are the characteristic features of these two chief
eras^of Philosophy, we find them in their respective relations to Chri-
tianity which we have indicated above.
6 INTRODUCTION.
To speak first of pre-Christian Philosophy.
Pre-Christian Philosophy is characterised generally by persistent
vigorous efforts to attain a purer knowledge of that truth which was em
bodied in the religious tenets and traditions of the several ancient
peoples. Religious traditions, though derived from an untainted source
(the primary tradition), had undergone so many transformations among
various nations, and had been so thickly overlaid with errors, that
in the state they had reached they could no longer satisfy the longing
of the human mind for truth. The mind of man set itself, therefore, to
reach by rational investigation what it no longer possessed in the tradi
tions of religion. Its innate desire of knowledge was the force which
impelled it to consecrate its energies to the search after truth.
This effort of the human mind was, it must be admitted, in many
respects successful. The philosophers of antiquity arrived at the know
ledge of many important and lofty truths. But the path they had
entered on did* not lead them to the whole truth, and of this the "ablest
thinkers amongst them were only too well aware. Manifold errors, too,
found entrance into and disfigured their systems. No one of the ancient
philosophies stated the whole truth, and all contained many errors.
1 Mrilosophy could not maintain itself at the level reached in these systems;
it sank after a time into Materialism and Scepticism.
From this point of view Philosophy, in its earlier development,
appears as a preparation of the human mind for the Christian Revelation
which was made to the world in the fulness of time. This preparation
was accomplished in three ways :
In the first place, the great thinkers of antiquity, having attained
a knowledge of many important truths, but not of the whole truth, had
roused that longing after the fulness of truth, to which, as we know,
Plato gave such striking expression. .By exciting this desire for truth
in its fulness, and thus rendering the human mind more ready to
receive it, ancient Philosophy did its most important work in pre
paration for Christian Revelation.
Furthermore, Philosophy, having failed to maintain itself at
the level reached in the more celebrated systems, had fallen into
Materialism and Scepticism. And these had called forth in the human
mind the feeling of need for higher assistance, for some divine revela
tion which should help man to a fuller knowledge of the truth. This
feeling of the need of a revelation further contributed to dispose the
human mind for the due reception of revealed teaching.
A third service, important to be remembered, was rendered by
the ancient Philosophy to Christianity. On the one hand it thoroughly
investigated the conditions and laws of scientific thought ; and on the
other, by its efforts of speculation, it amassed a considerable body of
truths of the natural order. In both these ways it prepared materials
for the fabric of speculative Philosophy, which, after the time of Christ,
was raised in connection with Christian Revelation. Thinkers of the
Christian schools found abundant materials ready to hand, and these, as
we shall see, they used in the fullest measure.
14. We come now to the Philosophy of the newer or Christian
period.
The Philosophy of this period is characterised in general by the
efVort to reach a profounder understanding of truth, to dig deeper the
Foundations of knowledge. But the founders of tin4 newer systems have
pursued tin's effort on widely different lines.
Some have fallen in with the ordinances of God, have submitted
to divine revelation, and, in submission to it as the guiding principle <>f
their inquiries, have sought to penetrate the truth more profoundly, and
to establish it on a more unassailable foundation. Following this path,
they have achieved most brilliant successes, the systems which such
thinkers have built up being amongst the most imposing with which the
history of Philosophy presents us.
Others again have followed a course at variance with the
divinely-established order They have adopted a false and perverted
attitude towards divine revelation, have even rejected Christianity
altogether, and by a method thus opposed to the order established by
God, have sought to discover the truth and to demonstrate it. Thinkers
of this class have never attained satisfactory results. The philosophic
movements begun by them have led always, in course of due develop
ment, to far-reaching errors, and have at length lost themselves in
Scepticism and Materialism.
But whatever road philosophers may have followed, whatever
results they may have produced, the final outcome has ever been to place
the truth of Christian revelation in clearer light before the scientific mind.
To this end one set of philosophers have directly contributed by
systems developed in harmony with, and in support of revelation.
( ) t h ers have contributed to the same effect indirectly. By the very errors
into which they have fallen in consequence of their perverseness of
thought they furnish proof that it is only when in accord with divine
revelation, and when unreservedly obedient to its teachings, that the human
mind can know the truth profoundly, and vindicate it successfully.
If, then, we regard pre-Christian Philosophy as a preparation
tor the Christian revelation, we must recognise in the newer Philosophy
a continued confirmation of the same revelation, a power which has
served to bring out more clearly, more comprehensively, and more
forcibly the truth of Christianity.
PART FIRST.
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
GENERAL VIEW. DIVISION.
1. In any general view of the history of the pre- Christian period,
our attention is first drawn to the East, the cradle of human civilization
The history of Philosophy will therefore begin with an exposition of the
Philosophy of the Eastern nations. Generally speaking, however, Phi
losophy, among these nations, is not met with as an independent science,
standing apart from systems of religious teaching. Among them, philo
sophical theories are, as a rule, identified with doctrines of religion. In
India alone dp we find a system of strictly philosophical doctrines ; but
even here Philosophy stands in close relation to Religion. It is either
a speculative development of religious doctrines, or it is framed in
antagonism to a religious system whose principles it directly or indirectly
combats. The history of Eastern Philosophy will, therefore, do no
more than, firstly, bring into prominence the philosophical elements of
the several Oriental religions ; and secondly, give an account of those
more strictly philosophical systems which,' in India, took their place
beside the doctrines of Religion. Oriental Philosophy, as we have said,
does not exhibit the characteristics of a philosophy in the strict sense
of the term ; but it cannot, for this reason, be left out of sight altogether.
As we shall show further on, an attempt was made at a later date to blend
together certain notions derived from the East, with certain conceptions
of the Greek mind, and the attempt gave rise to peculiar svstenis of
Philosophy.
2. From the East we turn to the West, and first of all to Greece.
Here we come upon the birthplace of Philosophy strictly so called -
Philosophy which is no longer a body of religious doctrines. The
Eastern mind, with its innate tendency to inactive Quietism, did not
possess that mobility and energy which the construction of strictly
philosophical systems demanded. But these gifts were abundantly
possessed by the Greeks. To them genuine Philosophy owes its origin.
The history of ancient Philosophy is, therefore, mainly concerned with
the creations of the Greek mind." To the Greeks we 'are indebted for
10 HISTORY OF ANCIKXT PHILOSOPHY.
those great and strikingly original systems which mark the highest level
of philosophic thought 'in antiquity, and which, for this reason, have
exercised an incalculable influence upon succeeding ages. The Philo
sophy of the Romans was an offshoot from the Greek, not a development
of it. The Eomans adopted the ideas and systems current in Greece,
explaining or modifying them after their fashion. But they have given
us no philosophical system of their own creation.
3. Later, about the time when the Christian Revelation was first
preached to the world, in the city of Alexandria, which under the
Ptolemies and the Romans had become a great centre of intellectual
activity, there arose a philosophical school which strove to unite the
religious doctrines of the East with the teachings of Greek Philosophy.
" From the philosophical systems of the Greeks and the religious doc
trines which had obtained currency chiefly in the East it chose out what
seemed likely to meet the moral and intellectual needs of mankind.''
Its procedure was purely eclectic — a method by which it hoped to reach
the goal of perfect knowledge. The movement lasted far into the
Christian period ; not before the sixth century of our era did it come
finally to an end. It is, nevertheless, to be treated as belonging to
ancient Philosophy. It lay without the sphere of Christianity ; the
Christian doctrines seem to have exerted no influence on the authors of
the systems that belong to it.
4. We thus perceive that the ancient Philosophy did not at once
make way for the Christian Revelation. Just as Paganism did not
disappear as soon as Christianity was preached, but yielded slowly
before it ; so was it with the ancient Philosophy. Though it had fallen
from its high estate, and had degenerated partly into Scepticism, partly
into Materialism, it gathered all its remaining energies together in the
effort to make head against the might of Christianity, and to maintain
its hold on the minds of men. The effort, it is true, ended in failure ;
the old Philosophy paled before the light of the Gospel, and perished
at last from the sheer weakness of age. But, for all this, it played an
important part in the history of the early ages of Christianity, and the
writer of a History of Philosophy must not omit to take notice of it as it
appeared in its latest phases.
5. The history of ancient Philosophy, then, may be divided into
three sections : —
The first section deals with Oriental Philosophy, whether em
bodied in religious systems or developed in close relation with them.
The second section comprises the history of Greek Philosophy
and of the Roman Philosophy which arose out of it, and follows both
as far as they extend into the Christian period.
The third section embraces the GraBCO- Oriental Philosophy, its
rise in Alexandria out of the blending of Oriental religion with Greek
Philosophy, and its course through the ages that followed till its final
extinction in the sixth centurv.
I'HII.nsoi'Iiy OF THE EAST.
SKCTION i.
Y OF THE EAST.
Ix this section we shall treat first of Philosoph}' among the Chinese •
thru of the philosophical systems of India; next of the Philosophy
embodied in the Medo-Persiaii religions ; and lastly of the Philosophy
embodied in the religions of the other nations of Western Asia.
1. PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE CHINESE.
§3.
1. The sacred books of the Chinese are called Kings (y-King and
Chou-King). Fohi is regarded as the founder of a religious civilization
among them. To him the authorship of the y-King is ascribed. The
precise period at which he lived has not been determined. He is credited
with having discovered the eight primordial kua—sit once elements of
written language and symbols of the primary agents which are at work
in all the transformations of nature. In their first significance they
give rise, by transposition and multiplication, to the 40,000 characters
of the Chinese syllabic alphabet ; in their second significance they
contain the elements of all physical science, as their combinations repre
sent the processes by which material bodies are formed. " This com
bination takes place in four figures, the complete symbols in which
represent perfect and active being ; the incomplete symbols, imperfect
and passive being. As three lines are united to form each figure, we
have eight figures in all, four with a preponderance of the perfect,
representing aether, pure fire, pure water, and thunder ; four with a
preponderance of the imperfect, the expressions for wind, water,
mountains, earth."
2. Turning now to the religious notions of the Chinese, we find that
they regard Heaven and Earth as the primary powers. "The thing of
greatest excellence in the universe is Heaven — the object, consequently,
of divine homage. Next in excellence comes the centre of the earth
China), for here the opposing principles are maintained in that equi
librium on which the existence of the world depends. Man is the link
that binds Heaven and Earth together. His duty is to preserve har
mony in the world. The fixed, unbending law, according to which the
life of man must be fashioned in the fulfilment of this duty, emanates
from the Sovereign, who, in the ' Empire of the Centre/ is the « centre'
in the strict sense, and who, as ' Son of Heaven/ is in immediate relation
with the celestial order. The law thus given is a rule of domestic or
family life. The Emperor is the father of his people. In union with
him they form one great family, which is subdivided into smaller family
groups/ Obedience to domestic law, the thorough observance of the
family ordinances, whether general or particular, is the fundamental
12 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
obligation of all members of the " Empire of the Centre." On this
obedience depends the maintenance of harmony and equilibrium in the
world. Violations of this obedience must be rigorously punished by
the Emperor, that order may be restored.
3. It is clear that these religious notions contain no element of
speculation. We have in this circumstance an explanation of the fact
that there is no genuine speculative Philosophy of Chinese origin.
There was no basis for such a Philosophy in the religion of the people.
Wherever we discover products of abstract thought among the Chinese,
we shall find, on inquiry, that these have been received from without.
The Chinese seem to have been incapable of an independent effort of
speculation. This is evident even in the man whom they regard as their
greatest sage, the reputed author of the lesser Kings — Confucius.
4. Confucius (Kuiig-f u-dsu) , who lived about five hundred years before
Christ, turned his whole attention to the principles of moral law. II is
career was that of a great reformer of the moral life of his nation. His
teaching was wholly practical. It exhibited no tendency to abstract
speculation. Even in his practical theories he was not original. His
merit is that he collected and reduced to orderly arrangement the prin
ciples of morality which already governed the popular mind. His
teaching was, in brief — self-restraint and moderation. " Harmony and
concord among reasoning beings is the primary requirement of reason.
This concord is possible only when each man restricts himself to a
determined sphere of action, and in all his actions maintains a fixed
standard, beyond which he will not pass, and short of which he will not
fall. Only that which is done in this wise is good and just ; what
departs from this rule, on the one side or the other, is ever and always
bad. The wise man is a man of action, but always within his own
determined sphere, always observing that law of moderation which
secures him against any violation of the general harmony."
5. About the time of Confucius, Lao t see promulgated a peculiar
teaching at variance with the popular religion. The tenets of his
system, however, point to India as the place of its origin. His doctrine,
the exposition of which is contained in the book Taokinc/, assumes the
existence of one primary being, infinite and unchangeable, which he
names Tao — Reason. In itself this being is an indeterminate unity ;
but it is, nevertheless, the primary source of all determinate being.
From it the latter, in all its forms, emanates, but only to return to it
again. " The end of all human effort is the supremacy of the spiritual
in man's nature, freedom from passion, the undisturbed contemplation
of the Eternal Reason, and ultimate union with the Primary Being in
untroubled rest and deliverance from all corporeal motion." The
votaries of this doctrine form the sect of the Taosce.
6. Last in order comes the teaching of Fo, or Foo. This doctrine is
nothing more than a degenerate form of Buddhism, and is supposed to
have reached China from India (according to others, from Japan) about
the sixty-fifth year of the Christian era. The leading principle of this
system of doctrine may be stated thus : " Strive to annihilate self. In
I'll M. OSUI'I I V <iF INDIA 1-)
:h« measure in which you cease to exist for self, you begin to be one
wiili (Jod, and to enter again into his being. All activity is evil ; com
plete inactivity — absolute rest — is the only supreme perfect ion. The
nearer the sage approaches the state of the plant or the stone, by closing
the avenues of sen^-, the higher is his perfection." This, it is manifest,
is a theory of absolute Quietism.
S 4.
1. It is usual to distinguish four periods in Indian literature; the
period of the Vedas, or sacred writings of the Brahmins ; the period of
the Kpic Poems or Iti/iasa* ; the period of the more refined poetry of
the Court of the Rajah Vikramaditja ; and, lastly, the period of the
Commentaries on the earlier writings — a period which falls within the
Christian era.
(a.) The Vedas, which some writers make as old as the fourteenth or sixteenth
century before Christ, are four in number : the Rig-Veda, the yajur — Sama — and
Atharva-Veda. They are the work of different authors, and consist partly of prayers,
partly of religious ordinances, and partly of theological doctrines — the parts standing in
no definite relation to one another. In these writings we find certain elements of a
distinctly speculative character, chiefly in the so-called Upanishads, or extracts from
the Brahmanaa (Commentaries), which make the second part of every Veda. It is usual
to connect with the Vedas the Book of Laws of Menu, which is assigned to a period
mid-way between the time of the Vedas and the time of the Itihasas— though some
writers assign it a far later date.
(b.) The Itihasas (Heroic poems) are two in number — the Ramajana, and the Mahab-
hnrnta.. The Ramajana is attributed to an ancient sage, Valmiki. There is little
reference in it to speculative doctrines. The Mahabharata is of more importance in
this respect, chiefly because of the episode it contains, on which the name Bhagavad-
JJitu has been bestowed, and which is of distinctly philosophical character. This poem
is attributed to the mythical Vyasa, — who is also credited with having collected the
Vedas. The composition of the eighteen Puranas — likewise attributed to Vyasa — has
al>o been said to belong to this period ; but it has been shown that these are of much
more recent date. They may be compared to our encyclopedias, as they embrace the
whole range of science known to the Hindus. This characteristic seems of itself to
indicate a comparatively modern origin.
(c.) In the third period we find the ( iita-( iovinda, a lyrical poem, the author of which
is named Dsliayaveda, and the Sakuntala, the most celebrated of the Hindu dramas, the
work of Kalidasa. There are grounds for believing that Kalidasa lived in the century
immediately preceding the Christian era.
(d.) Last in order comes the age of the Commentaries on the earlier writings. There
is little doubt that this period gave birth to a considerable philosophical literature.
Certain mythical beings, belonging to a remote antiquity, are named as the authors of
these, writings. Judged by internal evidence, however, these writings are not of very
ancient origin ; it has been surmised that they do not date from a period more remote
than tin: last century before Christ.
2. Philosophy among the Hindus lias been developed in intimate con
nection with Religion. Even in its most modern form, this Philosophy
hears traces of its origin, since it professes to be still an exposition of
the Vedas. To understand it aright we must, therefore, east a glance
at the religious system of the Hindus.
3. In the earliest form of the Hindu Religion with which the
1 4 HISTORY OF AXCIEXT PHILOSOPHY.
Vedas make us acquainted, we find three supreme elemental divinities —
ludra, Vanini and Agni — the God of the Firmament, the God of Night,
and the God of Fire. This doctrine was succeeded later by that of the
Trimurti. In the latter system the supreme object of all religions is
the Deity — the absolute unity which exists in all things, but is not
represented by any notion we can form — Brahma. Buried in deep
repose, this being is absorbed in self-contemplation. His awakening
from this slumber gives existence to concrete and individual objects, all
of which come forth from him. In this process he becomes the creator,
and it is as creator that he, properly speaking, is called by the name
Brahma ; as the Sustaining Power in nature he is called Vishnu ;
as Destroying Power, effecting constant changes in the forms of things,
he is called Shiva. These three divinities form together the Hindu
Trimurti, and to these divine worship is rendered. The metamorphoses
of Vischnu, or the Incarnations of the Divinity, are the main subject of
the sacred books. Every thing roturns again to Brahma, the absolute unity.
It is the duty of man to strive after union with Brahma. This 'is
attainable by sacrifice and penance, and these presupposed, by the effort
to rise to undisturbed contemplation of the Supreme Unity/ The man
who cannot reach this perfection has still to undergo a transmigration
of soul, with the miseries and sufferings attending it.
4. In the later Itihasas we find these religious doctrines so far
modified that heroes and penitents are honoured as gods. Even hen*,
however, it is not deeds of heroism which win divine honours, but
rather sacrifices of special worth (sacrifices of horses), or extraordinary
practices of penance— the stifling of all sense of earthly pleasure and
pain. " When a king offers steeds in sacrifice, or betakes himself to
the desert to practise superhuman penance, or devotes himself to
superhuman contemplation, then do Indrn and the gods of heaven
tremble lest he should push them from their thrones, for in this way
they, too, have reached their dignities." This, it will be perceived, is
no more than a polytheism of the anthropomorphic kind.
5. Buddhism had its rise about the fifth or sixth century before Christ.
The author of this religious system is said to have been 'Sakja Muni—
the first Buddha. The Buddhist doctrines are nihilistic. Sakja Muni
had no God but nothingness. Nothingness, so runs the first of the
four
tin
or
source of suffering. It is, therefore, man's duty to shake himself free
from this vain semblance of existence, or rather from his attachment
to it. His end is to attain to the primary, the only true state-
non-existence, to the extinction of his personal being and personal
consciousness — " Nirvana."
(>. A system of mystical asceticism is the appointed way by which
man must reach this end. He must pass through a course of frightful
penance, in order to extinguish individual consciousness in himself, and
thus lose himself in Nirvana. Should he achieve this, he becomes one
rmr.osoi'HY OF INDIA. 1">
with God, and in his knowledge of the nothingness of all
becomes lord of all. He is raised above all moral law, he cannot sin
any more, he has freed himself from the trammels of nature, and
becomes the benefactor and redeemer of his kind. The ideal of
Buddhism the Buddhists naturally find to have been realised in the
founder of their sect. " Master of self- forgetting contemplation, In TO
of self-annihilating asceticism, Sakja Muni, — Buddha is the ideal and
the refuge of his disciples. He lives in those who imitate his per
fection. Whoever resembles the first Buddha shares in the divine
honours which are his due. In the holy disciples of Buddha the deity
is ever generated anew, to vanish anew into Nothing ; is in fact nothing
else than man delivering himself from existence." Whosoever fails to
reach the perfection of Buddhist mysticism is not permitted after death
to enter into Nirvana, but is condemned to wander over the earth in
some spectral form. To avoid this fate the Buddhist must not shrink
from penance, be it ever so appalling.
7. The Buddhists became divided into several sects. Their resist
ance to the authority of the Brahmins, and their opposition to the
system of castes, provoked sanguinary religious wars. During these
struggles large numbers of them were forced into exile, and in this
way Buddhism was propagated in many countries of Eastern Asia.
8. With this general outline of the religions of India before us, we
may now pass to the systems of Hindu Philosophy. These we may
divide into the Philosophy of Mimansa and Yedanta, of Sankhya and
Yoga, of Nyaya and Yaiseshika. We may further add the doctrines
of the Dshainas, of the Tscherwakas, and of the Lokayatikas, but of
these enough is not yet known to allow us to give an account of them
in detail.
PHILOSOPHY OF M1MAXSA AND VE DANTA.
§5.
1. The Mimansa-Darcanam (system of investigation) is divided into
two closely related parts: the Karamimansa (investigation of actions) —
the practical, and the Brahmaminiansa (investigation of Brahma), or
Yedanta — the speculative. This system of doctrines is looked upon as
the most ancient form of Hindu Philosophy, though some authors, like
Colebrooke, are of opinion that it is of later origin than the other
systems, since it deals polemically with them. Be this as it may, it
is certain that this system professes to be the orthodox Philo
sophy of the Brahminical religion, that it constantly appeals t<» passages
of the Yedas in proof of its theories, and refers to a certain number
of the Upanishads as the source from which it is derived. For this
reason we give it the first place in our exposition.
'J. The object of the Karamimansa (of which Gaimini is said to be
the author) is to interpret rightly the maxims of the sacred books, to
explain the contradictions that appear in them, and by careful inquiry
16 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
I <> determine exactly what are the religious obligations really imposed
by the Vedas. At the same time it sets forth the motives and the
purpose of these obligations, namely, the deliverance from sin, and the
attainment of blessing and proportionate happiness through the fulfil
ment of duty. It is thus no more than an exegesis of the sacred books,
and possesses but little interest for the philosopher. It is otherwise with
the Brahmamimansa or Vcdanta Philosophy ; in this the speculative
element is predominant.
3. The Vedanta is a fully developed system of Pantheism at once
mystical and idealistic. " What is, is Brahma (God) ; what is not Brahma
is nothing ;" such is the fundamental teaching of the Yedantists.
Brahma is the Infinite, and as such he alone has being. The multi
tudinous objects of the universe, inasmuch as multitudinous, are non
existent — mere non-being. The objects seen by us in their individuality
and in their multiplicity appear to us different from Brahma and from
one another, but this is a mere deception — we are still far from real
knowledge. Brahma alone has being, he is One without another, un
changeable, eternal, unspeakable, Lord, Spirit, Truth, Wisdom, Bliss.
As Spirit, he is the inclivisible unity of all being, the whole, but not
anything of the whole. To admit that Brahma could produce anything
distinct from himself would be to admit in him a principle of finiteness
and limitation, since what is distinct from him must be finite ; and
thus he would cease to be infinite. Brahma is Being, and being out of
him there is none.
4. What is called the created universe is 110 more than an unfold
ing of the divine being, or rather a transformation of Brahma in
varying forms. Brahma is at once the efficient and the material
cause of the world. lie is at once that which is changed and that by
which change is effected. As milk is transformed into curds, and water
into ice, so does Brahma transform himself variously. As the spider
.spins her web from out herself, as the sea sends forth its foam, so does
Brahma produce all things from himself, and transforms himself in
them. This transformation is effected by successive processes. First
comes aether ; out of this is formed the air ; out of air water ; out of
water the earth. In this wise the Universe comes to be.
o. Although Brahma is the being of all things, the subject in every
change, yet in himself he is not affected \)y change or transformation.
In his own being he is infinitely raised above all things. He takes every
form, biit his own being has 110 determined form, nor does it occupy any
determined place. He is like pure space ; all things exist and move in
him, but he is not himself changed thereby. Arid as his being enters
into all things without undergoing change in those transformations, so
does he take all things again into himself without any accession to his
being. The elements come forth from God in determined order ; in the
same order do they return to him. But no increase of perfection
thereby accrues to Brahma, for this return to him is merely the undoing
of his previous transformations.
6. In this theory creation is merely a sport of Brahma with him-
1'im.OSOl'IlY OF I.\i)!\. 17
self; our notion of all matter rests upon a delusion — in fact, matter is
itself deception (Maya). The conservation and duration of the universe
is no more than the sheen and shadow of Brahma's eternal existence.
Nothing of it all has real existence or continuance. It is a mere
appearance which soon vanishes in the abyss of the Divine unity.
Brahma is at once the generating and the destroying power. There is
no essential difference between things in the world. All are forms of
Brahma transformations. Our sense cognition is but a delusion ; it has
no truth, no reality.
7. To the human soul, however, the Vedantists allot a special place
in their system. The soul is indeed one in being with Brahma, but it is
not a transformation of Brahma, it is a part of him. The soul is a spark
si iot forth from the eternal spirit, it is therefore of immortal nature like
Brahma himself. Birth and death affect it not ; it is not born, neither
does it die. It is not immediately united with the body. The
Vedantists seek to remove the soul as far as possible from contact with
the body, and for this reason they will not admit an immediate union
between them.
8. They therefore distinguish between the subtle invisible body—
J,it>f/a$(iru'(t, and the material body — Hthulasarira. The soul is 'im
mediately invested by the invisible body, and through this is united to the
material body. In the body immediately investing it the soul is enclosed
as in a sheath, but this sheath is itself formed of three successive
envelopes. The inmost is the rational, then follows the imaginative,
and lastly the vital part. This triple envelope is in time enveloped by
the material body.
9. This union with a material bocty is an evil for the soul, not an
advantage ; for by this connection it is held fast in the domain of
delusion, it is deprived of the repose towards which it naturally aspires,
and is made to act and to suffer. Brahma reposes eternally in himself,
and finds bliss in this repose. The soul is destined to a like repose and
a like bliss ; but of this it is deprived by its union with the body, and
is forced into action and to suffering. The action and the sufferings of
this life are not, then, to be attributed to the soul's own nature — they
an* occasioned by the body and its organs. Thus the material body is
like a chain which confines the soul to a state wholly at variance with
its nature.
10. Since the soul is one in being with Brahma, in fact only a part
of Brahma, there can be no question of independent action, nor con
sequently of free self-determination. Brahma is the principle of being
in the soul, he is the one principle of its action also. " Brahma alone
works in me. 1 myself am without will or act/1 Brahma is not, how
ever, for this reason the author of evil. The transmigrations of the soul
have been going on throughout eternity. Hach new life of the soul is
determined in all respects, even to its moral condition, by that which
immediately preceded. Every soul brings with it into thi> life special
predispositions, and according to these predispositions the moral
character of its activity during its earthly career is determined. Brahma
18 HISTOHY OF rim.osorHY.
can act in each individual man only after the manner which the moral
predispositions received from an antecedent life require. This being so,
it is evident that guilt for evil deeds lies on man alone. Brahma has no
part therein.
11. To turn again to the consideration of the relations between soul
and body : since the union of the soul with the material body is not a
natural condition of the soul, it follows that the task devolving upon the
soul in life is to free itself from the burden of the body, and again
become one with Brahma. This brings us to the practical part of the
Vedantist theories. Deliverance is the highest object after which the
soul can strive and must strive — this is the fundamental principle of
the practical teaching of the Yedanta. Deliverance is the highest moral
duty ; the question next arises how this deliverance is to be attained.
*12. The deliverance of the soul is attained by " knowledge," i.e., by
the perfect comprehension of Brahma, which involves an apprehension
of the truth that the soul is one with Brahma, and with all that emanates
from him or has part in his being. This knowledge, according to the
Yedantists, is of the mystical not of the rational order. It is reached
bv immediate intuition. In immediate mystical contemplation of
Brahma, and in the consciousness thence arising of the soul's oneness
with him, and of the oneness with him of all other things, consists the
deliverance of the soiil — the highest end of the soul's life here below.
In this deliverance by mystical contemplation the soul attains that
quietude and bliss to which it naturally tends. In its union with the
body it has lost its repose and thereby lost the happiness to which it
naturally aspires, but it recovers both when, in mystical contemplation,
it emancipates itself from the bu»den of the body and again unites itself
to Brahma.
.115. In accordance with these theories the Vedantists teach that the
supreme end of man is to be attained by the practices of a mystical
asceticism. The process of the deliverance of the soul through
" knowledge " must begin with works of penance and sacrifice. Without
these the first step in this deliverance is impossible. In the next place,
the soul must withdraw from the world of sense — the domain of illusion,
and become concentrated within itself. As long as it expends itself on
the phantoms of sense*, deliverance is out of the question ; it must turn
from these and fix its gaze upon itself. Through this concentration of
the soul within itself we reach the third stage in the process of deliver
ance — repose in God. In this state the soul maintains itself entirely
passive and merely permits God to work in it. It " leaves itself " to
God. This condition ol' soul is described by the Vedantists as tranquil
bearing, self-control, endurance, special sitting and standing attitude,
holding of the breath, focussing of thought, faith.
14. This, ihen, is the mystical process of deliverance. When this
has been completed, final deliverance in the knowledge of Brahma
follows of itself. When the soul has succeeded in giving itself wholly
to God, the light of contemplation dawns upon it, the spirit shines
within it in its native brilliancy, the soul recognises itself as the immacu-
rilll.OSoi'HY 01 INDIA. J!)
Into Brahma; it perceives all oilier things to be one with Brahma ; it i>
united with God ; it knows no longer, it is itself knowledge. Like the
river which loses itself in the sea the soul loses itself in God. Knowing
Brahma it becomes Brahma, himself. "All illusion is at an end, the
soul in all things sees only Brahma/1 In this wise has it reached quietude
and hliss. The deliverance of the soul through contemplation of God
means, then, complete identification with the God-head, absorption into
the Divine Being. Individual personality is something to be got rid of,
it must be sacrificed in order that man may come forth from the flame
of the holocaust a part of the Universal Divine Spirit.
I"). The man who has reached this condition of complete emanci
pation has become, by the fact, cleansed of all sin and made independent
of all moral law. As soon as he reaches " knowledge " his past sins are
wiped out, and future misdeeds are not admissible. Water does not
moisten the leaf of the lotus, neither does sin touch the soul that knows
God. It is sinless and cannot sin. There is no vice left nor any virtue.
For virtue too is a fetter, and it matters not that the fetter should be of
gold rather than of iron; eternal liberty admits of neither. Evil
disappears and so also does every virtue with the activity corresponding
to it ; the soul is raised above both alike, it has entered into rest. The
Yogi (perfect contemplative) has therefore no account to render ; he is
as independent as the Divine nature itself.
Hi. The eschatology of the Vedaiitists is in keeping with these
principles. Entire deliverance, complete absorption of the soul in
Brahma, is impossible here below. Perfect Emancipation, complete
quietude and bliss in God, is attainable only after the death of the body.
But different souls enter into different states after death. The Yogi
properly so-called, i. c., the man who has reached such perfection of
knowledge as is possible on earth, enters immediately into the Divine
Being, is absorbed into it, and is not subject to further change. But
the soul whose "knowledge" has been impei'fect, which can reach only
Brahma's home, but is not prepared for absorption into his being,
remains invested after death with its invisible body, is not, indeed,
subject to further change during the duration of the world now
existing, but may be subject to it in the new worlds that are to follow,
unless exempted by special favour of Brahma.
17. As to other souls, those, to wit, which have not followed the ways
<>f mystical asceticism — they too, invested with the inner or invisible
body, enter, after death, into other spheres, to receive the reward of
their good or evil deeds. Sinners are condemned to various regions of
punishment where Tschitragupta, and other mythological personages hold
rule in the realms of Yama (Death). The virtuous, on the other hand,
ascend into the moon, and there enjov the reward of their good deeds.
But they have yet to return to this world, and to enter again into new
bodies. They are still subject to the conditions involved in the trans
migration of souls. Tin- cycle of change from one body to another
must last till they enter at length upon the path of mystical asceticism.
and by the process of self-deliverance enter into eternal rest.
20 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
18. Such, in outline, arc the doctrines of the Vedanta. They are,
in truth, what the}' purport to be — the speculative development of the
religious notions of the Yedas. They are, in their entirety, a
characteristic product of the Eastern Mind. This indolent quietism,
this merging of the personal spirit in the universal divinity, this
contempt of activity, this emancipation of the sage from the require
ments of the moral law — all these things bear upon them the stamp
of Oriental thought. They mark, as we shall see later, the characteristic
difference between the Oriental and the Greek Philosophy.
THE SAXKHYA AND YOGA PHILOSOPHY.
1. The Vedantist Philosophy may be described as a mystico-
idealistic Monism ; the Sankhya on the other hand (of which Capila is
said to be author) is a well-marked Dualism. According to the
Sankhya, all that exists is either producing and not produced, or at
once produced and producing, or produced and not producing, or finally
neither produced nor producing.
(a.) What produces without being produced is Mature (Prakriti)
tif/titra naturans, — the ultimate basis of all material things, a subtle
but yet a corporeal substance.
(ft.) "What produces and is produced is Reason (Buddhi), the Reason
of nature, its rational condition.
(c.) What is produced without producing is Self -consciousness
(Ahankara), the basis of the Ego.
(d.) What is neither producing nor produced, is the Soul, the spirit
(Puruscha).
2. Of the four members of this division, the first and last, Mature
and Spirit — stand farthest apart, while the intermediate members form
a connecting link between them, and are dependent on them.
Nature — Prakriti, is uncreated, eternal, but wholly blind, working
without consciousness and without knowledge. It is a single principle,
by the forces inherent in which is evolved everything that we find in
the material world.
Next comes Reason — Buddhi. This reason is not something
raised above nature; it is something indwelling in it. It manifests
itself in the purpose visible in all nature's works. It is the rational
element in nature, nature itself being merely matter.
From Nature and Reason is further evolved Consciousness (Ahan
kara). By this is not meant the pure Ego, eternally self-knowing —
the spirit in itself, but rather that Ego which is always studiously
asserting itself, that more or less empty consciousness, that spon
taneity in which the wavering reason seeks to establish for itself a
centre for the relations created by its activity. Ahankara is the
groundwork of Avarice and Pride; through it all evil comes into the
world. Ahankara is furthermore the principle in man on which depend
the- internal Sense, the understanding (Manas), the organs of sensation
1'im.OSOl'llY OF INDIA. 21
nnd movement, and the bodily condition in general. By the term
Ahankuru, Sankliya would seem to signify a kind of brute soul.
Above Nature thus developed, and essentially differing from it
stands the Soul — Puruscha. Sankhya proves the existence of a soul
distinct from nature in this wise: —
(a.) 'We find an organic formation existing in blind material
nature, such a formation as we may compare to a workman's instru
ment. This implies the existence of something else for whose benefit
the instrument exists. This something else must be a being of know
ledge — a soul. As there exists an object to be made use of, there
must exist a being to use it; this being is the soul.
(/3.) Again, the effort after supreme happiness supposes an abstrac
tion which rises above the passing world, the world of sense. This
effort, which we recognise in ourselves, is proof of the existence of a
soul, for the soul alone is capable of such abstraction.
(7.) Lastly, the members of an antithesis mutually suppose one
another. From the existence of a force in nature exercised in blind,
unreasoning outward action, we may argue the existence of an in
telligent self-contained soul.
3. From what has been said, it is now apparent in what relation
the two members of the antithesis — Nature and Soul — stand to one
another. The principle of all activity and all motion is Nature, and
Nature alone. The Soul is neither active nor productive, it is merely a
tranquil spectator of what goes on in Nature. There are, however,
mutual dependences between them. Nature, as a blind principle of
action, can have no purpose in itself, it can exist only for something
else, for something which is intelligent ; Nature, then, exists for the Soul.
On the other hand, the Soul cannot, apart from Nature, attain to know
ledge, especially to the knowledge of itself as of something distinct
from Nature. They are to one another as the blind and the lame ; the
Soul has no power of movement or action, Nature cannot see the way
before it ; the one supplies what is wanting to the other, and from both
together arises the whole order of spiritual and material phenomena.
4. Sankhya does not make the Soul a single principle as it makes
Nature; it admits a plurality of souls. "This it takes to be proved by
the fact, that different destinies befall souls; that different pains and
pleasures are experienced by them; that they are engaged in different
occupations." We have also to distinguish in man between the subtle
body — Linga, and the gross material body by which the former is
enveloped. The former consists of Buddhi (Reason), Ahankara, Manas,
the ten senses, and the five subtle elements. The Linga has not in
itself a personal character, it attains this perfection in virtue of its
union with the Soul, to which it is united until the latter is finally
emancipated.
5. With regard to the duty of man in life, Sankhya makes the
deliverance of the Soul (from the trammels of Nature) the highest end
of all human effort. And here, too, "knowledge" is the means by which
-deliverance is accomplished. Human works avail nothing. The
*2'2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
required knowledge1 consists in this, that the Soul apprehends the
essential difference between itself and Nature. "Deliverance" is no
more than the divesting of the Soul, by right knowledge, of that which
belongs to it in appearance only, and which hides it from the eye of
sense. All that happens in Nature, happens that the Soul may attain
this self-knowledge, this view of its own being.
6. When the Soul has reached this term ; when it has attained the
conviction that nothing of all that happens in the world is its work, or
its concern, it is freed thereby from earthly disquiet, from all the
influences, and hampering forces of Nature. It may still remain in
union with the body, just as the potter's wheel continues to revolve,
though it is no longer in use; but the movements of the body no longer
trouble the Soul, they can be of no further use to it. Prakriti, like a
dancing girl, presents itself before Puruscha to lead it to knowledge,
and then modestly withdraws when the task is finished. If deliverance
is not complete in this life, it Avill be perfected after death, and the
man who has attained it, is exempted from those transmigrations to
which other souls are subject.
7. Connected with Sankhya, and probably an offshoot from it, is
the philosophical system of Yoga. Respecting this system, we have
little detailed knowledge. It is to a great extent in accord with
Sankhya, but it differs from it in this, "that it admits a supreme God,
ruler of all things, who is a Spirit or Soul, distinct from other souls,
untroubled by the evils to which they are subject, free from good and
free from evil deeds and their consequences, infinite, eternal, omnis
cient." What relations Yoga established between this God and the
world we do not know. It may have been the object of the teaching
of Yoga to set up a Divinity which should unite in one being the
elements Nature and Soul, so sharply contrasted in Sankhya.
PHILOSOPHY OF NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA.
1. The Philosophy of Nyaya, of which Gotama is said to be the
author, is a system of Logic. But this Logic is the path of " deliverance "
for the Soul — not a mere means to deliverance, but in itself actual
deliverance, and thus a certain way to bliss. Logic, to wit, leads to
true knowledge (the knowledge of the essences of things), and in this
precisely consists the emancipation of the Soul.
2. The further development of Nyaya is effected in the Philosophy
of Vaiseshika, of which Kanada is reputed the founder. This system
may be said to be a Philosophy of Nature, as it deals chiefly Avifh the
corporeal world. Yaiseshika advocates the atomic theory. All bodies,,
according to the disciples of this Philosophy, are formed from homo
geneous, minute, indivisible atoms. In dividing bodies we must ulti
mately reach parts that are no longer divisible ; otherwise corporeal
substances would contain parts infinite in number, and everything in
nature would thus be infinite, and the least equal to the greatest.
3. The combinations of atoms form bodies. " The first combination
PHILOSOPHY OK INDIA. '2'-'>
of two atoms is the simplest. The bipartite elements thus formed com-
bine in threes; the tripartite elements thus arising-, in fours; and so on
in every increasing number. Only those elements can unite to form a
perceptible substance between which there is mutual adaptability. The
smallest perceptible^ magnitude is that of the mote of the sunbeam. This
is :t combination of the second order, and consists, accordingly, of six
atoms. The si/e of the ultimate atom is, therefore, one-sixth that of the
mote of the sunbeam/3
4. The combination of atoms to form perceptible bodies is governed,
according to Vaiseshika, by a fixed law. The chance combinations of
the Greek atomistic doctrines are therefore excluded. Vaiseshika also
a vsiimes the existence of a higher force which controls the combinations
of the atoms. It will not admit the possibility of spontaneous combi
nations among them; the action of God must intervene to determine
them to union.
•V Vaiseshika furthermore undertakes an explanation of man's nature:
there is a soul in man distinct from the body, for he possesses attributes
different from the attributes of other things ; to wit, intelligence, desire,
aversion, will, pleasure, and pain. In the body, on the other hand, are
located action and the effort after that which gives pleasure, the organs
of sense, and the feeling of sensuous pleasure and pain. Intermediary
between soul and body is Ahankara (self-consciousness), which, although
united to each individual soul, is yet wholly distinct from it. But'
everything which in this life is united to the soul is an evil for the
soul : " the body is evil, the senses are evil, the objects of sense, the
elements, consciousness of the external world, consciousness of self,
action, pleasure, and pain."
G. And thus we are again conducted to the term in which all Hindu
systems eventually end — the Deliverance of the Soul. It is the task of
the Soul to free itself from the evils of the body, by means of that sacred
knowledge in which it contemplates itself as a thing distinct from the
body and independent of it. Through this realization of its own essence
the Soul rises above the sphere of action, above merit and responsibility,
and attains to perfect quietude and bliss.
7. To the systems hitherto set forth we must add three others,
with the details of which, however, we are but imperfectly acquainted.
They have this in common, that they are materialistic in character, and
are therefore at variance with the religious doctrines of the Hindus.
The first system is that of the Dschainas. In this system a distinction
is allowed between the animate and the inanimate, but both, it is con
tended, are constituted by atoms only. It admits no supramundane
existence, and will not acknowledge a Providence. Closely connected
with this system is that of the Tschcrwakas, which maintains that the
corporeal alone is real; that spirit is merely an empty word. Last in
order comes the system of the Lokayatikas, an offshoot of the previous
school. Here, too, the body is the only reality ; spirit is mere nothing.
Sensation, consciousness, intelligence, though they do not formally exist
in the several elements, exist potentially in them, subject to the COM-
24 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
dition that these elements combine to form organic bodies. Thought
has, therefore, no other cause than a certain definite combination of the
elements ; it is merely a mode of their co-existence, in the same way as
the fermenting together of several substances produces an exciting
beverage, which could not be procured from each substance taken sepa
rately, nor from all taken together, unless when mixed in the required
manner. As long, therefore, as the body exists a fully constituted
organism, so long will thought and feeling, joy and suffering, endure ;
but these cease to exist when the body ceases to be.
8. We may notice that Hindu Philosophy has covered a tolerably
wide field during its development. From the loftiest Idealism it descends
by many stages to Materialism, and — if we take the Buddhist doctrines
into our reckoning — even to Nihilism. Many of the notions which we
have met with here will confront us again in various guises during the
further course of the History of Philosophy. To this extent the Phi
losophy of India cannot be devoid of special interest for us.
EELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEDO-PERSIANS.
§8.
1. Turning westward from India, we encounter the Persians, a people
which holds a prominent place in ancient history. A Philosophy, in the
strict sense of the term, we do not find amongst them. But their system
of religion has many elements of a philosophical character, and, besides,
has exercised an important influence on the doctrinal systems of sub
sequent ages, notably on the heretical theories current in the early
Christian times. For both reasons it deserves careful notice. Zoroaster,
who is said to have lived in the sixth century before Christ, was, if not
the founder, at least the reformer of the religion of the Medo-Persians.
To him is ascribed the Zendavesta, an exposition of their religious
doctrines.
2. The Zendavesta assumes two ultimate principles of all things —
Ormu/d and Ahriman. The synthesis of these two principles in a higher
Zeruarie-Akerene (Infinite Time), from which both are derived, is a
doctrine of later origin. These two principles, Ormuzd and Ahriimm,
are mutually antagonistic. Ormuzd is the unclouded infinite light, the
being of supreme wisdom and perfection, and, as such, the author of nil
good. Ahriman, on the other hand, is a being of defilement and gloom,
and, as such, the principle of darkness and author of all evil. He is,
therefore, the enemy of Ormuzd. Ahriman was originally a being of
light, but he envied Ormuzd, thereby lost his brightness, and became
the antagonist of Ormuzd. The dualism involved in these two principles
is not, therefore, a primary, eternal state ; it arose in consequence of the
falling away of the one principle from the other.
3. Ormuzd uttered his " Jtonover" (I am), and thereby created the
good spirits and all that is good in the visible world. Ahriman, on the
other hand, brought forth the spirits of evil (Dews), and, in alliance
PHILOSOPHY OF 1'KKSIA. 'J~>
with these, perverted the creation of Ormuzd by opposing to its bright
ness and its blessings destroying activities and works of evil. Thi<
explains why good and evil are blended in the world, and why the
course of the universe puts before us a constant struggle1 between good
and evil.
4. The spirits created by Ormuzd are ranged in a certain hierarchical
order. The Amshaspands occupy the first rank ; the Izeds the second.
Last in order come the Fervers — protecting spirits, and archetypes whose
perfection men must strive to reproduce. In the same way, the JJc\\ s
created by Ahriman have their differences of rank.
o. The souls of men were created by Ormuzd, and dwelt originally
in heaven. But their union with material bodies has involved them in the
struggle between good and evil that fills the world. It is, therefore,
the duty of man to serve Ormuzd, and to combat Ahriman and his
works. * The latter obligation is fulfilled by benevolence towards others,
by cultivating the soil, by exterminating the living things that have
been created by Ahriman, &c. ; the former by sacrifice and the worship
of fire, the symbol of Ormuzd. If man fulfils these duties here below,
his soul is admitted to the presence of Ormuzd on the second day after
the death of the body. Should he offend against these obligations — i.e.,
should he serve Ahriman in life — his soul is condemned after death to
companionship with Ahriman in hell.
6. The antagonism and strife between Ormuzd and Ahriman are not
however to last for ever. Ahriman will eventually be overcome, will
then reconcile himself with Ormuzd, will enter with all his following
into the kingdom, of the latter, and eternal peace shall ensue. The
resurrection of the body will be part of this restitution of all things.
In this wise is the final triumph of good over evil announced.
7. There is, it is clear, a distinctly ethical principle involved in this
system, inasmuch as it binds man to resist evil. But this resistance is
something altogether external. Man is bound to combat evil in the
outer world, and in the corporeal part of his own being ; further than
this his obligation does not go. The perfecting of the inner self is not
insisted upon nor suggested. Good and evil are both extrinsic to man.
Of an interior moral perfection the Zendavesta knows nothing.
8. It is further deserving of remark that the religious system of the
Persians speaks of a Mediator between the two antagonistic principles
to whom it gives the name Mithras. Mithras stands between Ormu/d
and Ahriman to aid the former in his struggle with the principle of evil,
and to lead the latter to final transfiguration in Ormuzd. Through
Mithras light and life flow out upon creation, in the strength of which
evil is combated in the world and everything at last brought to union
with Ormuzd. He it is who introduces to Ormuzd the souls which,
after the death of the body, are found fully purified.
9. The religious worship of the Persians was concerned chiefly with
fire — the symbol of Ormuzd ; their priests were for this reason styled
Athrava (provided with fire), and bore different names according to
their sacrificial functions. The Athrava were replaced in later times by
~ HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
the Magi — at once a caste of priests charged with, the functions of
religious worship, and a caste of sages in exclusive possession of the
wisdom of the nation. They were particularly devoted to Theology
and Astronomy, to Physics and to Medicine. Beyond this we know
little of the wisdom of the Magi.
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES EMBODIED ix THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
OF EGYPT AND WESTERN ASIA.
1. The religions of the peoples of Kgypt and Western Asia are,
throughout, forms of nature-worship, and contain few speculative
Clements. A short outline of them will be sufficient.
2. The religion of Egypt was a system of nature-worship, inclining,
however, to Dualism. In it primeval night (Athor) is Primary Matter.
This Matter is not itself endowed with any formative power, but within
it there is lodged an active principle of generation. In consequence,
there comes forth from it, self -genera ted, self -delivered from the maternal
womb, the divinity of action — the sun, from which in turn all life and
plastic energy in nature is derived. This active principle of generation
appears in Egyptian mythology under the name Osiris, the passive or
maternal principle under the name Isis. Those are the two prominent
Egyptian divinities ; around these and subordinate to the relations they
bear to one another are ranged the other mythical divinities of the
Egyptians. The worship of animals was part of this system of nature-
worship. We also find among the Egyptians the doctrine of the trans
migration of souls, and belief in a judgment after death.
3. The Egyptian priests seem to have been adepts in a 'higher
knowledge. The ancients were at one in ascribing a higher wisdom to
them. What their esoteric doctrines wore we cannot determine with
exactness. They loved to shroud their philosophic teaching in a veil of
mystery ; and the hieroglyphics of their monuments have not yet been
interpreted with sufficient accuracy to enable us to build any trustworthy
theory upon them. They seem to have devoted themselves specially to
Mathematics and Astronomy. That they exercised an influence on the
course of thought in Greece is proved *by the journeys of the Greek
Philosophers to Egypt to make acquaintance with the wisdom of its
priests. We have, however, no means of determining the extent of this
influence.
4. A system of nature-worship, much resembling the Egyptian, is
found amongst the peoples of Western Asia — the Babylonians, Assy
rians, Phu-mcians, &c., and here again we find particular prominence
given to the sexual differentiation of the powers of Nature (the active
and passive). The Sun-God is the active principle, the Ruler of
Heaven, the great fecundating power. By his side is the Moon-Goddess
—the passive, fecundated principle in generation, a deity who sometimes
seems to stand also for the fecundated Earth. All things in nature
LOSOPHY OF Tin; (.KKKKS.
owe their origin to the fecundation <>i' the passive dement bv the active;
all came forth from the womb of the Great Mother, images of tlie
generating parent, to be destroyed by him again, and to return to the
womb whence they have issued. The two powers of nature, thus
personified, take different names with different peoples. The Baby
Ionia us name them Baal and Mylitta, the Syrians Baal and Astarte, tliA
Phoenicians Moloch (Melkarth) and Astarte, &c.
5. Among the Babylonians, the order of the learned — on whom the
name Chaldeans was bestowed — were, like the Persian Magi, devoted
to star- worship, astrology, and magic. They specially cultivated the
science of Mathematics and Astronomy. The Cosmogony of the
Chaldean Berosus dates from the time of Alexander the Great. In
tin's system, Baal (the supreme divinity) creates Heaven and Earth by
dismemberment of the goddess Omorka (the Sea), man himself being
produced from drops of the blood of Baal. Differing from this is the
Cosmogony of the Ph<jonician Sanchuniaton, who is said to have lived
about 1,200 K.C. He assumes a primeval Chaos, which, by the breath of
( J od brooding over it, is divided into Heaven and Earth. Only fragments
of these systems have reached us ; and the true date of the latter system
is a matter of complete uncertainty.
6. Thus much for the wisdom of the East. What has been said will
suffice to make known the speculative ideas of the Oriental peoples, and
the essential character of these ideas. Any closer examination of them,
especially as regards their connection with forms of religious worship,
belongs to the history of Religion. We leave them, therefore, to turn
our attention to the true home of Philosophy — to Greece.
SECTION II.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.
Outline and Dicitsion.
§ 1^.
1. It is undeniable that the Greeks leceived from the East many of
!he elements of their civilisation. Colonists from Egypt, Phoenicia, and
Phrygia carried with them into Greece their arts and inventions, their
knowledge of agriculture and of music, their religious hymns, their
poetry, and their mysteries. There can be no doubt that philosophical
notions also, those especially which were connected with religious
beliefs, were introduced into Greece in the same fashion. This is clearly
indicated by the close resemblance which we observe to exist between
the secret dogmas of the oldest Greek mysteries, and the earliest teach
ings of the East. But we should not be warranted in concluding from
1his that the Greeks owe their civilisation wholly to the East, that the
28 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
philosophy of Greece was drawn entirely from foreign sources, and was
no more than a special development of Oriental notions. The Greek
mind was stimulated b}>- influences that reached it from the East, but it
was independent in its growth ; the philosophy of Greece, in its entirety,
is a product of the Greek mind, though certain Oriental notions are
unmistakably embodied in it.
2. With all peoples religion has been the basis and first beginning of
civilisation. The Greeks are no exception to the rule. Their poetry
and their philosophy alike grew out of their religion. Their poetry was
first in its growth ; for the effort of the poetic imagination to picture
to itself the being and evolution of things human and divine precedes
and prepares the way for genuine philosophical investigation. In the
case of the nation, as in the case of the individual, activity of the
imagination comes before activity of the intellect, the inquiries of the
philosopher come after the efforts of the poet. It happened so in
Greece. We may see in this truth an explanation of the fact that the
poetic genius of Greece had reached its highest expression in the Drama
of Athens, long before Attic philosophy had taken full possession of the
riches of thought amassed by earlier thinkers, as of the further fact that
the golden age of Attic philosophy outlasted, by a considerable time,
the golden age of Attic poetry.
3. There are two sides to the religion of the Greeks, an internal and
an external one. We notice among the Greeks what we may style
an esoteric religion, embodied in the so-called mysteries, which, under
sense-images and allegories, propagated certain higher religious notions,
and an exoteric, or popular, religion, wholly concerned with these grace
ful outer forms, and with no thought for their primary meaning. Both
the.se aspects of the religion of the Greeks found early expression in
their poetry. The poems of Hesiod and Homer reproduce in many
forms the myths of the popular religion, while the esoteric religion
found expression in the so-called songs of Orpheus, a species of poetry
much more speculative in character, and manifesting a much higher
development of religious feeling.
4. Historians and poets alike inform us that Orpheus (as well as
Linus and Musacus) lived in the thirteenth century before Christ, and
that he was the founder of the Thracian system of Bacchus-wor
ship. They furthermore tell us that these men were not mere singers
or poets, but that they were sages as well, who could tell of the birth of
the gods and the origin of the universe. Orpheus cannot, however, be
credited with all the songs which bear his name. At an early period,
metrical compositions on Cosmogony — the work of Onomacritus, who
lived about the time of the Pisistratidce, in the sixth century before
Christ, and of other authors — were falsely attributed to him. For the
most part, the songs of Orpheus, of which we have accurate knowledge,
belong to a comparatively recent period. But the matter they contain
comes down from a distant antiquity, for the later poets either reproduce
the Orphic songs and legends, or model their own upon them. This
observation applies also to Pherecydes, Epimenides, Antiphanes and
PHILOSOPHY OF TIIK (illKKKS. 29
.\cnsilaus, who, in the sixtli century before Christ, imitated the Orphic
lays in their poems on the origin pi the world.
5. If we inquire what influence.' the religion of the Greeks exercised
upon the visc« and the structure of Greek philosophy, we shall find that
ill.- popular religion, with its merely external forms, was of little avail
in giving a positive stimulus to philosophic thought. The gods of the
(I reek Olympus are no more than men, of ideal beauty it is true, but
moving, nevertheless, in the same sphere of thought, will, feeling, and
passion as other men. Some of the many myths connected with the
several divinities seem to have a deeper meaning, to give a glimpse
occasionally of an ancient faith of higher purity; but there are many
other legends of the gods which have no such higher meaning, which
belong purely and simply to the region of human passions, vices, and
hateful animosities.
6. The popular religion contributed negatively rather than positively
to rouse philosophic thought. The myths in which a deeper thought
lav concealed might, perhaps, do positive service to the philosopher in
his inquiry ; and we notice that Plato has embodied many such in his
philosophic writings, in order to bring higher truths within the reach
of sense. But the other legends of the gods, provoked philosophic
thought to antagonism by the palpable errors and absurdities which they
contained, and in this way impelled philosophy to seek, by reason, a
higher theological knowledge. In this negative way, principally, did
the popular religion of Greece contribute to stimulate philosophic inves
tigation. And to this we may attribute the fact that philosophy in
Greece, at an early stage, set itself to combat the popular faith, with its
polytheistic doctrines and its theological myths. We remember Plato's
censures of the popular religious legends, and his efforts to exclude them
from the education of the young, and to replace them by higher notions
of God and things divine (cfr. de Kep. Lib. 2 and 3).
7. The esoteric religion, on the other hand, and principally those
notions which were embodied in the so-called Orphic hymns, must have
exercised a positive influence on the early course of philosophy in Greece.
This appears from the fact that these songs are already highly philosophic
in character. The philosophic notions contained in them are no doubt still
shrouded under a mythical veil, but they show clearly through the en
veloping myth, and must naturally have stirred the thinking mind to a
further advance on the road of philosophic research. We may, indeed,
assert that the Orphic songs were themselves the first beginnings of
philosophy among the Greeks, that in them the spirit of philosophy in
Greece first warmed into life.
8. These songs deal for the most part with principles of Cosmogony
andTheogony — they contain indeed little more than theories of the land.
The fundamental notion in all these theories is the same — that all things
were originally contained in one being, one primal matter, out of which
• •\erything (heaven and earth') was formed by plastic forces, ill accord
ance' with the principle of dualism which divided the universe from the
beginning. We have many accounts as to the form in which this
30 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
of Rhodes, Heaven, Earth, Sea; while Athenagoras understands the
primeval ehaos to have signified a kind of ovum from which the universe
grew. However this may be, we are warranted in attributing to the
influence of these theories the fact that the earliest philosophers of
Greece devoted themselves to the search after a single principle from
which the cosmical order was evolved, and strove to trace back the
origin of all things to primary matter.
9. In the maxims of the "Seven Sages" of Greece, we have the
transition from the philosophy of religious belief to rational philosophy
proper. The Seven Sages were — Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene,
Bias of Priene, Solon of Athens, Cleobulus of Lindus, Chylon of Sparta,
and Periander of Corinth. It was not philosophic principles scientifi
cally evolved and combined which formed the subject of their brief and
pithy maxims, but certain laws of human life and human society appre
hended with precision, and enunciated with simplicity. We find in them,
besides rules of prudent action, special commendation of self-knowledge,
sagacity, control of the passions, abstinence and temperance. We have
here a practical wisdom — not yet philosophy strictly so-called, for it
does not rest on a strictly philosophic basis ; but an advance from the
obscurity of the myth, a creation of the reflecting mind. These maxims
could not fail to affect the development of the practical side of the
philosophy of Greece.
10. The history of Greek philosophy may be divided into three
periods — the period of its rise and early development, the period of its
maturity and its perfection, and the period of its decline and decay. In
its highest development Greek philosophy did not compass the whole
truth — the light of a higher revelation was wanting to it. It could not,
therefore, maintain itself at the height it reached at the period of its
greatest glory. Notwithstanding its extraordinary friiitfiilness at this
time, it bore within it the seeds of dissolution ; the point which marked
its highest development marked also the beginning of its decline. It
was during the epoch of its decline that the philosophy of Greece found
its way to Home.
11. We divide, then, the history of Greek Philosophy into three periods.
The first period, embracing the rise and gradual development of philo
sophy among the Greeks, extends from Thales to Socrates. The second,
the period of its highest perfection, extends from Socrates to Aristotle.
The third, the period of its decline and decay, extends from Aristotle
(end of the fourth century, B.C.) to the close of its history. This
period falls partly within the Christian era. To this period belongs
the Philosophy of Rome, which was, as we have already remarked, in
contents and in general character, a mere offshoot of the Philosophy of
Greece.
* Kpimenides, Antiphanes, and Auusilaus likewise represent all things as coining forth
from " Night."
IMIILOSOIMIY 01 I UK (JKKKKS. .°>1
12. On the plan of this division, we sluill set forth the history <>!'
Greek and Roman Philosophy. Tn the first period we shall observt ;.
n umber of different philosophic schools — the Ionic, Pythagorean,Eleatic
grow up, side by side, with little interchange of influence during their
"•rowth, but towards the close of this period, mutually acting upon OIK
another, and tending thereby to union. In the second period, the in
dependent existence of the several schools comes virtually to an end,
and there ensues a common movement of philosophic progress, i-epn
sented in the three greatest philosophers of Greece — Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle At first, indeed, several Soeratic schools came into exist
ence ; but this was owing to the fact that the pupils of Socrates had
not all been able to comprehend the spirit of his philosophy. The true
development of Greek Philosophy, subsequently to Socrates, is repre
sented in Plato and Aristotle. In the third period, Greek Philosophy
was again divided into a number of independent schools. Union in
progress was lost, and the decline of Philosophy among the Greeks was
thereby assured.
13. *The sources from which the history of Greek Philosophy may be drawn are im
mediate or mediate. Among the former are to be reckoned the writings of the philo
sophers themselves, which have been preserved to us sometimes in their entirety,
sometimes only in a fragmentary state. The latter include the accounts which con
temporary or subsequent writers give us of the doctrines of the several philosophers.
Of special importance in this respect are the writings of Plato and Aristotle, in which
frequent allusion is made to the opinions of earlier philosophers. " Plato indicajtes in
cussion of every problem with a review of the tenable theories of earlier philosophers,
and in this way he gives us — particularly in the introduction to his Metaphysics — a
critical examination of the principles of his predecessors from Thales to Plato." The
writings of Plato and Aristotle are thus important sources from which the historian of
Greek Philosophy must draw. The writings of Xenophon, more particularly his
M< iiHH-ahifia, are of special importance for the history of Soeratic Philosophy.
14. Amonw the Platonists, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides ot Sinope in Pontu.s,
and at a later date Clitomachus, have, in their writings, either treated expressly of the
earlier philosophers, or otherwise furnished data for a history of philosophy. Like ser
vice has been rendered by the Aristotelians, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Aristoxenus, De-
caearchus, Phanias of Lesbos, Clearchus, Strato, and others. The same may be said of
a few of the Stoics and Epicureans. But the works of these writers, of which later
philosophers made use, are no longer extant. The schools of Alexandria took up the
work which the earlier philosophers had carried on. Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 284-
247), established the library of Alexandria, in which the works of the philosophers were
collected. Callimachus of Gyrene (B.C. 260), Superintendent of this library, drew up a cata-
-
reviewed the various schools of philosophic thought (Hfpt TOJV Kara 0tXo<ro0mi' alpicrnov),
and his writings Apollodorus made the basis of his metrical chronicle, which he com
posed about B.C. 140. The lives, the disciples, and the doctrines of the philosophers,
also furnished a theme to Duris of Samos (about B.C. 270), to Neanthes of Cyzicus (about
B.C. 240, rifpi ivSofav avdptir), to the Peripatetic Hermippus of Smyrna (B.C. 220), from
whom Diogenes Laertius draws largely (Ufpi rub' <r<>0wi', irfpi /tayu/r, Ilepi
irf.pl 'Apiffrort\o?>e, "re/oi Ofo^paffrou /3ioi), to the Peripatetic Sotion (B.C.
200— Ilepi &a
.
UV (j>i\oa6(f>Mv), to Sosicrates (about B.C. 180— ±utfo\ai)t Satyrus (B.C. 160— /Sioi), Apol
lodorus (B.C. 140 — Xpovc/ca and ]]f.pi TMV 0iXo<Ti>0wy a'tpiatiav), and Alexander Pofjf&utor
(in the time of Sylla— Aim-<>x"»< T&V <j>i\ono<f>Mv}, Heraclides Lembus, son of Serapioii,
made a compilation of extracts from the &iaoo\ai of Sotion, and the Biot of Satyn:-
32 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
which Diogenes Laertius makes frequent allusion. Demetrius Magnes, one of Cicero's
teachers, was the author of a critical work on the earlier philosophers, and from this also
Diogenes Laertius borrows largely.
15. Of the later writers whose works have come down to us, and who furnish us
Philosophy — the treatise Iltpi QiXovoQiov laropia^ which has been attributed to him is not
genuine; (d) Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 200, Pyrrhoniarum Institutionum LI. 3, and Adv.
Mathematicos LI. 11) ; (e) Diogenes Laertius (A.D. 230, of Laerte in Cilicia, De vitis,
dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophoruin LI. 10) ; (/) Flavius Philos-
tratus (Vitse sophistarum) ; (g) Euuapius of Sardis (A.D. 400, Vitae philosophoruin et
sophistarum). Further materials for a history of Greek Philosophy are supplied by (h)
Justin Martyr ; (i) by Clement, of Alexandria, in his works : Cohortatio ad Gra?cos,
Pii'dagogus, and Stromata ; (k) by Origen, chiefly in his ^iXoffotpovfieva ; (I) by Hippo-
lytus in hi.s treatise : Refutationes omnium heresium, LI. 10 ; (m) by Eusebius in his
Pra-paratio Evangelica; (n) by the Neo-Platonists and the Commentators of Aristotle,
notably by Simplicms, Comm. ad Arist. physicas auscultationes ; also (o) by Gellius
(A.D. 150) in his Noctes Attics ; (p) by Athenaeus (A.D. 200) in his Deipnosophistae ;
(q) by Joannes Stobseus (A.D. 500) in his Florilegium, and Eclogce physics et Ethicse ;
(r) by Hesychius of Melitus (A.D. 520) in the treatise \\fpi T&V iv iratoEf? ^laXa^avroiv
ootyuv ; (s) by Photius (A.D. 880) in his Lexicon and Bibliotheca ; (t) and by Suidas
(A.D. 1000) in his Lexicon.
16. Of modern writers on the history of Greek Philosophy, it will be enough to
mention (a) W. Traugott Krug, Geschichte der Philosophic alter Zeit, vornehmlich unter
Griechen und Rcmiern, Leipzig, 1815 ; (b) Christ. Aug. Brandis. Handbuch der
Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1835 ; and Geschichte der Entwickelung
der griechischen Philosophie und ihrer Nachwirkungen im romischen Reiche 1862-64 ;
(c) Aug. Bernh. Krische, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, Bd. I. ;
Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker, 1840 ; (d) Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie
tier Griechen. Eine Untersuchung iiber Charakter, Gang, und Hauptmomente ihrer
Kntwickelung, 3 Title. ; Aufl. 1, 1844-46-52. Aufl. 2, under the title: Die Philosophie
der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung, 3 Thle. ; (e) Historia philosophise
Gneco-Romanffi, ex fontium locis contexta. Locos collegerunt, disposuerunt, notis
auxerunt H. Ritter et L. Preller., Ed. 3 ; Goth. 1864 ; (_/) Ludw. Striimpell, Die Ges
chichte der griechischen 1
eigenen studien entworfen,
der griechischen Philosoph
Manuel de 1'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Liege, 1842 ; (i) Ch. Leveque, Etude de
pari Die Irrthiimer der altclassischen Philosophen in ihi-er Bedeutung fiir das philoso-
phische Princip., Heidelberg, 1868.
Among the writers on the Greek and Roman systems of Jurisprudence and Political
Philosophy may be mentioned : K. Hildenbrand, Geschichte und System der Rechts-
ni id Staatsphilosophie, Leipzig, 1860 ; A. Veder, Historia philosophise juris apud veteres,
Lugd. Batav. 1832 ; H. Henkel, Lineamenta artis grsecorum politicae, Berol. 1847 ; M.
Yoigt, Die Lehre vom jus naturale, aequum et bonum und jus gentium der Romer,
Leipzig, 1856. On the history of Philology among the Ancients we have the work of
H. Steinthal, Geschichte der sprachwissenschaft bei der. Griechen und Romern, Berl.
1S63-64. We may add to the list of authors here given : Grote, Plato, and other Com
panions of Socrates ; London, 1865 ; G. H. Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy.
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. I. and II. ; London, 1845. W. H. Butler : Lectures on the
History of Ancient Philosophy, 2 Vols. ; Cambridge, 1866. Cfr. Ueberweg.
PHILOSOPHY 01 THE GREEKS. 33
FIRST PKIIIOD.
PRE-SocRATic PHILOSOPHY.
1. In the pre-Socratic period of Greek Philosophy, we can distinguish
three well-marked currents of thought. The first is that of the Ionic
School — of the philosophers of external nature, who, true to the character
of the lonians, devoted themselves to the study of the world accessihle to
sense, and sought to discover an ultimate principle of all things in
nature, and to explain their origin and their dissolution. The second is
that of the Pythagoreans, whose investigations were more speculative in
character, but who embodied their speculative notions in mathematical
formulae, and, in general, made mathematics the basis of their speculative
structure. The third is that of the Eleatics, who, passing beyond the
sphere of mathematical conceptions into the realm of pure thought,
aimed at building up a science of Metaphysics, strictly so called. The
doctrines of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics spread chiefly among the
Greeks of the Doric race, especially among the Greeks of Southern
Italy. In this way the lonians and the Dorians — the most remarkable
of the Hellenic races throughout the historic period — were also the re
presentatives of the earliest forms of Greek Philosophy. But the pre-
Socratic philosophy was, in every school, merely a one-sided effort;
the truth after which it aspired could not be reached by its methods ;
scepticism, as an ultimate result, was unavoidable. This stage of ulti
mate scepticism was reached in the teachings of the Sophists.*
2. We shall therefore treat first of the Ionic Philosophy, or Philosophy
of Nature ; then of the doctrines of the Pythagoreans ; next of the
Eleatic Philosophy ; and finally, of the teaching of the Sophists.
IONIC PHILOSOPHY— PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
1. When \ve speak of the Ionic Philosophy of Nature we do not mean
to imply that the representatives of this Philosophy form what is called
a " Philosophic School " in the strict sense of this term. There was no
centre among lliem from which a common movement of thought spread
abroad. We have to do only with a number of Philosophers who had a
common subject of investigation — Nature, and whose philosophic views
had certain common characters. These Philosophers do not even
belong without exception to the Ionian race. They do not form a sect
acknowledging one founder whose doctrines they uphold, and therefore
it is only by a somewhat strained use of the term that we can speak of
an " Ionic School."
* The fragments of the \\ritingsof the I'n Son-atic philosophers that still remain
have been pnlilishc-l l»y (lull. Aug. Mullarh ( Fratrmeiita philoaophonun gnivormn.
Paris, 1880-1887.)
34 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
2 We can, however, divide these Philosophers of Nature into two
classes— the earlier and the later. The earlier (Ionic " Physiologists,
tvatoXAyoi) are the representatives of the Greek Philosophy of Nature in
its rudimentary stage; while the later, having before them the works as
well of the earlier Ionic Philosophers as of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics,
were enabled to give this Philosophy a wider development It is, how
ever, worth noticing that the earlier Ionic Philosophers for the most
part adopted a dynamical principle to explain the origin of things, while
the later as generally incline to mechanical conceptions. <
3. We shall treat, in order, first the earlier, and then the later Ionic
Philosophers.
THE EARLIER IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.
The earlier Ionic Philosophers had this in common, that in their
inquiry as to how things in nature come into being and cease to be, they
identified the active and the passive principles, the cama cffidem and the
cama material* (apx* w <r™XeTov), and strove to explain the rise of the
order of nature by a dynamical process from this principle. Ineir
doctrines are thus fundamentally forms of Hylozoism (Doctrine of
Animated Matter). Amongst the earlier Ionic Philosophers are to be
numbered Thales of Miletus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Diogenes
of Apollonia, whose theories bear chiefly on the primal material basis oi
all things; and Heraclitus who concerned himself mainly with the
processes of origin and decay.
THALES OF MILETUS.
1. Thales of Miletus, of Phoenician extraction, born B.C. 640, is
described by Aristotle (Met 1. 3.) as the founder of the Ionic Philosophy,
and so the founder of Greek Philosophy as a whole. He is said to have
studied Geometry in Greece ; at least Proclus makes this statement
regarding him (on Euclid, p. 19). He is furthermore credited with
having foretold an eclipse of the sun which occurred during the reign of
the Lydian King, Alyattes.
2. The fundamental theory of his Philosophy of Nature may be thus
stated : — Out of water all things are made. Water is the primal matter,
and with this primal matter, the force which is active in nature is
identified. From this primal matter, probably by a process of rarefaction
or condensation, he derives the origin of all things. According to
Aristotle (Met. 1. 3.) " Thales was perhaps led to this opinion by
observing that the nutriment of all things is moist, that heat itself, by
which living things are maintained in life, is educed from moisture,—
but that from which another thing is derived is a principle of that
other thing — and further by observing that the seed (from which living
organisms spring) is of its nature moist, But the principle making
moiat objects moist is water." In consequence of this view Thales could
PHILOSOPHY OF THK (JHKKKs. ;}-
all thin-sas penetrated and vivified by the Divine IM,U,T and in llii,
861186 could say that the gods filled all thin- vt\VTa ^^ 9^ *W
(Anst. de amm. 1. 0.) He held the magnet to be animated because of
its attraction of iron. He was of opinion that the earth floated upon water.
3. In later times Hippo of Samoa or of Rhegium— a Physicist of the time of Pericles
Wbo seemi t<> have lived for a considerable time at Athens, adopted the theory of Thai
He discovers m water, or the moist element, the ultimate principle of all thin.'* ' HP
• lors not seem to have attracted much attention. Aristotle mentions him but seldom
and not always in terms of praise. (De anim. 1. 2. Met. 1. 3.)
ANAXIMANUER, ANAXIMENES, DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
1. Anaximander of Miletus (born about B.C. 611), was the first of
the Greeks to compose a treatise " On Nature." The primal basis of all
being (apY^and out of which all things came forth is, in his view, the
Unlimited (TO aweipov). From this aireipov all things derive their
origin At first it differentiates itself into the opposing elements, hot
and cold, moist and dry— kindred elements standing in antithesis. " As
a result of a perpetual movement of revolution, condensations of the air
are effected, and in this way numberless worlds come into beino-—
heavenly divinities— in the midst of which the earth, cylindrical in form
maintains itself at rest owing to its being equally distant from all points
Of the heavenly sphere." The earth was evolved from the primeval
moisture under the influence of heat emanating from the sun, and
fecundated by heat, it gave birth to living beings. The latter thus derive
their being from the element of moisture, and this explains why the
creatures now living on the land were originally of the fish kind, and
acquired their present form only as the surface of the earth became dry
It is said that Anaximander described the soul as of gaseous nature
All things come forth from the amipov, and all things are fated to re
turn to it again.
2. With regard to the question, what Anaximander really meant by
the uTTupov , opinions are divided. Some (Ritter) maintain that he
understood by the term a congeries of the primary elements; that the
igm of things from the faupov is nothing more than a separation of
elements, and that thus the evolution of the order of nature is, in his
beory, a purely mechanical process. Others (Herbart) are of opinion
ft Anaximander meant by the avsipov a primary matter indeterminate
m quality and unlimited in quantity, and that he thus conceived the
evolution of the natural order to be a dynamical process. Aristotle, it
must be admitted, speaks of a fu7fM ' AvaZifi&vSpov (Met. 12. 2.), but he
also mentions (Phys. 3. 4.) that Anaximander taught that the &Vflpov
was divine embracing all and controlling all— a notion which best
ccords with a dynamical theory. The latter was more probably the
theory of llns Philosopher. It would, however, appear that Arum-
mander was not very explicit in his teaching as to the nature of the
avupov, and that Aristotle was thus unable to set forth his doctrines
with assured accuracy.
36 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
3. Anaximenes of Miletus, a successor of Anaximander, perhaps his
pupil (about B.C. 528), held air to be the primary principle of all things.
" As the soul within us," he says, " which is air, holds our being to
gether, so does the breath and the air embrace the world." — (Stob. Eclog.
Phys. p. 296). This air, infinite in extension, is instinct with life, i.e.,
it is not merely the material, it is also the efficient cause of all things.
Out of this primary being, by the process of condensation (-rrvKv^ai^)
and rarefaction (/xavwcr/c or apaiwcrig) are derived all other things —
fire, wind, clouds, water, earth. The earth — a smooth mass of circular
outline, and the earliest of the formations of the Universe — is supported
by the air. Anaximines describes this infinite primal principle of
things as the Deity, though he also speaks of other gods who have
derived their being from it.
4. This view of Anaximenes, with regard to the first principle of all things, was
also held by Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher who lived in the fifth century before
Christ. He holds the air to be the primary principle and permanent basis of all things.
He discovers a proof that all substance is one in the fact of the assimilation by plants
of the various elements of the earth's crust, and of the elements of the vegetable world
by animal organisms (Simpl. in Phys. fol. 32 B). The same theories were held by an
other philosopher, Idieus of Himera, of whom nothing further is known.
HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS.
§ 13.
Keraclitus, surnamed "The Obscure" (6 o-Koravoc), the most brilliant
portion of whose career extended from B.C. 504 to B.C. 500, was a
member of a noble family of Ephesus. His theory is hylozoistic, but
his doctrine of the continual flux of all things gives special prominence
to the restless activity of nature. We possess only fragmentary remains
of his treatise, llepi <pv<T£<oc.
2. Heraclitus holds Fire to be the ultimate principle of all things,
but understands by the term an ethereal fire. This ether he, at the
same time, regards as a divine spirit, which has knowledge of all things,
and directs all things. In his view, therefore, the activity of the
primal principle of all things is not a blind exercise of force, it is
guided by reason, for he considers the eternal Fire-Spirit to be .Reason,
Xrvyoc- He seems to have reached this conception from a consideration
of the order and regularity prevailing throughout the universe. Reason
is not, however, with him a transcendental entity ; it is merely a deter
mining attribute of the eternal material basis of things — of Fire. On
this point he is distinctly at variance with the later philosopher of
nature — Anaxagoras.
3. With regard to the origin of the world, Heraclitus teaches that
by condensation all things are produced from Fire, and that by rare
faction all things return to it again. The process of condensation he
describes as the way downwards (6&>c KOTW), the process of rarefaction
as the way upwards (6Soe avw). The way downwards leads to Water
and Earth, and so to Death ; the way upwards leads to Air and Fire, and
rmi.nsnniv OF THK <;KI:I:KS. ;J7
finis to Life. On the way downwards, loo, lies Kvil, and hence all
things in the region of the earth are filled with evils ; on the way up
wards lies Good. Both sides of the dual process are, however, every
where found in conjunction.
4. The forces at play in this dual process, and which initiate and
maintain it, are, on the one hand, Strife and Hatred, on the other, Con
cord and Peace. By Strife and Hatred things come forth from the
Primal Fire ; by Harmony and Concord they return thither, Strife, or
Enmity is, thus, the parent of all things (TroX^oc ira-rrip Trdrruv) ; the
power of Peace and Concord, on the other hand, brings things into
union, and guides them back to the principle from which they emanated.
Both forces must, therefore, be regarded as cosmical powers, indwelling
in the Primal Fire. The world itself is nothing more than the Deity
differentiated.
5. In this theory, the whole course of nature is merely a continuous
movement in a circle ; the cosmical force Strife, brings things forth from
the Primal Fire by the downward way ; and then the cosmical force, Con
cord, restores them to the Ethereal Fire again. From such assumptions
these conclusions are deduced : —
(a.) All things in the world are in perpetual flux ; there is nothing
permanent, nothing persistent. Everything is moving in a current
(iravTa pti). We cannot step twice into the same stream, says Heracli-
tus. No thing is at any one moment exactly the same thing that it was
the moment before. The rotation of beginning to be and perishing is
uninterrupted ; — All things pass.
(b.) The world has come forth from the Primal Fire because of the
preponderance of Strife over Concord ; but the time will come in which
Concord shall gain the ascendency, and then the world shall be absorbed
again into the fiery Ether. Not that the process will then be at an end :
Strife will again become predominant, and a new world will arise, to be
consumed again as before. And so the round of changes goes on for
ever. The Deity, in sport, is ever constructing worlds, which it permits,
in due time, to end in fire, only, however, to renew them again.
6. The Soul of man is of the nature of fire ; the driest element is the
wisest and the best ; it shoots through the body as the lightning through
the cloud. The Soul is, as it were, a wandering spark shot forth from
that Universal Fire or Universal Reason, which encompasses heaven and
rules all things, and it is maintained only by constant accessions from
the source whence it came. It derives no advantage from its union with
the material body ; the birth of man is a misfortune, inasmuch as he is
born only to die. It is only when the soul returns again to the Primal
Fire that its true life begins.
7. Man. is possessed of the gift of Reason only in as tar as he is
united with the Universal (Divine) Reason, and shares therein. Hence
it is only in his waking hours that he is really a rational being ; during
sleep he is an irrational being, for his share in the Universal Reason is
then limited to the mere function of respiration. These notions lead
Heraclitus to these further conclusions : —
38 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(a.) The senses are deceptive, they are worthless for the attainment
of truth ; truth is in the reason alone. Hence the estimate of the indi
vidual is not the standard of truth ; that alone is true which all acknow
ledge as such, for that alone is an object of knowledge to the Universal
(Divine) Reason. Herein lies the criterion of truth. Divergence of
one's own opinion from the universal reason is to be avoided, for in this
is the source of error.
(b.) The Divine Reason is the universal immutable law as well of
the physical as of the moral world. ^AtrTimn^n^aws are upheld by the
Divine law, " for this can do all that it wills, and it satisfies all and over
comes all" (Stob. Serin. 3. 84). The people should, therefore, defend
the law as the wall of a fortress, and stifle self -asserting arrogance as
they would a conflagration.
(c.) The summum lonum of man is Contentment (tvaptfrrriaic;) or
Equanimity, a condition of mind arising fronTthe conviction that events
happen precisely as they have been predetermined by the supreme law.
For " it is not best for men that what they wish should come to pass.
Sickness makes health a pleasure and an advantage ; hunger, in like
manner, prepares for satiety, and labour for rest " (Stob. Serin. 3. 83,
84). Contented resignation to the universal and necessary course of
events is the secret of human happiness.
LATER PHILOSOPHERS OF NATURE.
1. The later philosophers of nature substituted for the dynamical
principle, which had been invoked to explain the origin of the physical
world, a principle of the mechanical order. The hylozoism of the earlier
philosophers entirely disappeared. But though some of the later
philosophers contented themselves with a mere cosmical mechanism,
others postulated, besides this, a higher co-operating cause, and this
admission of a dual principle in their cosmogony indicates an important
advance in philosophic thought.
2. Amongst the later philosophers of nature are to be reckoned Empe-
docles of Agrigentum, Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, and
Anaxagoras of Clazomence, with whom also we must connect Arcesilaus.
EMPEDOCLES OF AGRIGENTUM.
§ 14.
1. Empedocles was born at Agrigentum (about the year B.C. 500;.
His family belonged to the democratic party in the state, and for this
party Empedocles, like his father, Meton, exerted himself successfully.
He wandered through the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy in the several
characters of physician, priest, orator, and worker of miracles. He pro
claimed himself possessed of magical powers. Of his writings we know
PHILOSOPHY OF THE (iKKKKS.
the names of only two, which can, with certainty, be ascribed to him,
0uo-£we and KctOap/noi (Diog. Laert. 7, 77). Fragments of the first of these
are still preserved,
2. Empedocles did not, like the older loiiians, assume a single primal
matter from which all things are produced. According to him all things
come from a mingling of the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire.
This mingling or mixture he views in the light of the cauw nintcrialia
of all things in nature. He does not explain the origin and dissolution
of things by a process of condensation and rarefaction such as was
adopted by the older lonians. His process is purely mechanical — a
mere separation and subsequent commingling of the primary elements
or " Radical Principles " of all things. To account adequately for this
separation and commingling, he assumes, in addition to the causa
materialis already described, two active forces which he names, in sym
bolical language, Love and Hatred (0tXori)£ KOI veticog). Hate he makes
the dissociating separating principle ; Love the principle of mixture
and of union.
3. This being premised, he explains as follows the origin of the
world : —
(a.) At first the four elements all mixed together formed a great
globe or 20a7poc (eySeu/uovlaroTOC &oe Arist. Met. 3.) which held all
things within itself, in which Love was predominant and Hate without
power. But Hate forced its way from the periphery to the centre of
the S^atjuo?, it gained the mastery over Love ; the elements were sundered
and stood apart in separate existence.
(b.) It is clear that the undisputed supremacy of Hate would have
entailed absolute separation of the elements which would have rendered
it impossible for individual objects to come into being. But in the
process of the world's formation Love strove against Hate and succeeded
in uniting again the elements which had been separated. And so the
several objects in this world were brought into existence.
(c.) It thus appears that the world can exist only as long as equi
librium is preserved between the rival cosmical forces. In the end,
however, Love will gain the upper hand, the individual objects in the
world will lose their individuality, and return to their first union. But
at this stage Hate will again rise in its might to bring about the
formation of another world — and so on through endless periodic changes.
Of the whole cycle of changes Necessity is the only law.
4. The first outcome of the formative process above described i&
Heaven with its luminous bodies, the formation of which is followed by
that of the earth, and finally by that of the animal kingdom. " Amongst
organic beings, plants first germinated from the earth while it was yet
in process of formation ; animals followed, but their several parts wen-
first separately formed and then united by Love. There have been
beings which were all eyes, others which were all arms, and so forth ;
from the union of these resulted many monsters which perished. But
there also resulted some other organisms lit ted to live, and these main
tained themselves in existence and propagated their kind" (Arist. dt
40 IIISTOllY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
coelo, 3. 2). "The influence of distant bodies upon one another as well
as the possibility of mixture, Ernpedocles explains by admitting
effluences (airoppoal) from all things, and pores (wop i) into which these
effluences enter/' All things are animated.
5. The human soul, like other things, is a mixture of the four
elements, with Love and Hate as moving forces. For as like alone knows
like, it follows that the soul, which knows all the elements, must contain
within its own being the " radical principles " of all things — the four
elements — otherwise, not resembling them in nature, it could possess no
knowledge of them. Perception by the senses is explained by the theory
of " effluences " already described. In the act of vision, e.g., two
currents flow in different directions, there is an efflux from the visible
objects to the eye, and an efflux through the pores of the eye of the
internal elements, fire and water, and in the encounter of these currents
the sense-image is generated. In analogous fashion the perceptions of
the other senses are effected (Arist. de sensu, c., 2, 4. Theophr. de
sensu, 9.) Empedocles ascribed Feeling and Desire to plants as well as
to animals.
6. Empedocles describes the Deity as the self -satisfying, blissful
Spirit. Its relation to the world is that of the One to the Many, of Love
to Disunion. As a consequeiice of this view he frequently describes the
cosmical force of unifying Love as God— the two notions seem to be
identified in his theory. " In the doctrine of Empedocles God knows
Himself alone as Union and Love, the opposite He knows not at all.
Having his being and habitation outside the sphere of strife he cannot
be troubled by aught unlike himself, by life in contention, by evil, by the
plurality and differences of things." Since like can alone know like, it
follows that the soul can know God only on condition of its possessing,
besides the four elements, some element of the divinity. This element
is Reason.
7. The ethical principles involved in the teaching of Empedocles are
no more than a tracing of the moral notions, Good and Evil, back to
the contrast between the cosmical forces. " As in the physical order the
individual comes forth by separation from the unity of the S^atpoe, so
in the moral order Evil is that which has fallen away from God, which
has been separated from His friendship, and from harmony with His
being." From this doctrine to the doctrine of Metempsychosis the
transition was easy. " The souls that have fallen away from God are
relegated to the earth where they pass through various corporeal forms till
at last they are purged from Evil and return to the Divine Being again."
THE ATOMISTS. »
LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS.
§15.
1. In the teaching of Empedocles we have had the first distinct out
lines of a doctrine of Dualism. Not only does he assume, over and above
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREKKS. 41
the CHUM inittt'rialiK of Nature, certain motive and formative forces, but
he further sets the One, the force of Love, above Matter, since he assigns
to it ^the attributes of the Deity. In contrast with Empedode*, the
Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, denied all immaterial force; they
admitted matter and nothing more. Moreover, their notion of matter was
not that of the earlier lonians, who represented it as a principle at once
material and dynamical ; to them it was material in the strictest sena
of the term. Their attempt to explain the origin of things from such a
principle necessarily brought them to a lower system than hylozoism, tc
pure Materialism and Casualism (i.e., the doctrine which attributes the
origin of things to chance, casus).
2. Little is known as to the time at which Leucippus lived, and as to
the incidents of his life. It is not even known with certainty whether
he was ^ an inhabitant of Abdera, of Miletus, or of Elea. His pupil
Democritus was born ('about B.C. 400) at Abdera. The desire for
knowledge, it is said, led Democritus to make long journeys into Egypt
and the East. He was the author of many works, among which the
Mlyac AiaKo<r/uo£ was the most celebrated.
3. According to Aristotle (Met. 1, 4) the Atomists assumed as the
fundamental principle of all things the Empty («vov) and the Full
(vXijpcc); characterising the former as 11011- being (^>) ov), the latter as
being (ov), whence their dictum that non-being exists as well as being.
Closer inquiry into the nature of these conceptions shows us that the
Empty is another expression for the notion of boundless space, the Full
another expression for an infinite number of atoms contained within it.
These two principles of things the Atomists held to be sufficient for the
explanation of the origin of the Universe.
To establish the existence of empty space Democritus adduced the following proofs
(Arist. Phys., 4, 6) : — 1st. Motion requires a vacuum, for what is full cannot receive any
thing into itself. 2nd. Rarefaction and condensation are possible only on the supposition
that empty interstices exist in bodies. 3rd. Growth depends on the penetration of
nutriment into the empty spaces of the organic body. 4th. A vessel containing ashes
does not admit a quantity of water less by a volume equal to the space occupied by the
ashes, the one must therefore in part enter into the empty interstices of the other.
4. The Atomists understand by atoms minute indivisible particles
out of which all things corporeal are made. The atoms are all alike in
specific character, but they differ in shape or conformation (<r\f^a).
They differ also in size ; the weight of each atom corresponds to its si/e.
t is useless to ask any question as to the origin of the atoms — they are
eternal and therefore are not dependent on a cause.
5. In explaining the origin of corporeal things from these atoms,
the Atomists suppose them endowed with a primordial eternal motion.
If we ask what is the cause of this motion we are answered that we must
not look for any cause above themselves. Like the atoms themschex,
their movement has no cause, their motion is a necessary condition of
their existence, and for this necessity no ulterior reason can be assigned.
6. This movement it is which determines the existence of the world.
Owing to the difference in weight the heavier atoms fall, and the lighter
atoms rise, and t.he collisions of the atoms also give rise to lateral move-
42 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
ments. In this way ail eddying motion (Sfvrj) is produced, which, extend
ing ever further and further, brings about the formation of worlds. In
the revolution many atoms unite permanently together, and in such wise
too, that like is joined to like, a vacuum is created in the interstices of
the aggregate thus formed, and so larger composite bodies, and finally
whole worlds come to exist. In all this process there is neither Purpose
nor Law, mere Chance governs the whole (Casualism). Worlds without
number come into being in this fashion.
7. The differences between things in nature are explained by the
Atomists on the same principles. In the countless worlds which come
into existence, different combinations of atoms are formed, and these
assume different shapes ; the round, the angular, the hook-shaped atoms
arrange themselves in combination to form various kinds of surfaces.
These surfaces, affecting our organs of sense, occasion perceptions,
which we style sensible qualities of things, but which in reality are
nothing more than an arrangement of figures. The qualities of a given
body are merely something corresponding to the figures which go to
make up their surfaces.
8. " The earth was at first in motion, and so continued as long as it
was small and light; gradually, however, it was brought to rest.
Organic structures were evolved from the moistened earth, and are all
alike animated. The soul consists of subtle, smooth, round atoms, which
are also the atoms that constitute fire. Atoms of this kind are scattered
through the whole body, but they exercise different functions in different
organs. The brain is the region of thought, the heart of anger, the
liver of desire. At every inhalation we draw in physical atoms out of the
air, at every exhalation we give them out again; and life lasts as long as
this process continues." The soul is not immortal. But it is, never
theless, the noblest part of man ; he who seeks the good of the soul seeks
what is divine ; who seeks the good of the body — the covering or tent of
the soul, seeks what is human.
9. The perceptions of sense are due to an efflux of atoms from the
objects perceived. These atoms form themselves into images (eiSwXo),
which strike the organs of sense, and find entrance through them. The
knowledge which rests on sense-perception alone is an obscure know
ledge (o-Korfrj), from which we must carefully distinguish genuine know
ledge (-yvotfuj), which is the fruit of inquiry by the understanding.
10. The supreme good is Happiness. "This is attained by the
avoidance of extremes, and the observance of moderation, not by any
external good." A necessary means to the same end is a right insight
into the nature of things. Knowledge seems the highest contentment.
Our dispositions, not our acts, determine our moral character.
11. Among the many supporters of the atomist theories of Leucippus and Democri-
tus, Metrodorus of Chios and his pupils, Anaxarchus and Hippocrates, are specially
worthy of mention. These philosophers seem to have emphasised and developed the
elements of scepticism involved in Democritus' theory of sensuous perception.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE (iRKKKS. 43
ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENJE.
§ 16.
1. While the Atomists, in their purely mechanical theory of external
nature, were constructing a system of thorough- going materialism,
Anaxagoras, adopting the notion of a mechanism in nature, was develop
ing upon this basis the Dualism already outlined by Empedocles, and
was thereby bringing about the transition from the mere philosophy
of nature to the higher Ideal Philosophy of the Attic school.
2. Anaxagoras was born of a distinguished family of Clazomenao, in
Asia Minor, about B.C. 500. In his later life he removed to Athens,
where he lived in intimacy with Euripedes and Pericles, till the political
rivals of the latter made the opinions of the philosopher the ground of
a charge of impiety against him. To escape the results of the prosecu
tion, Anaxagoras retired to Lampsacus, where he soon after died. He
is the author of a treatise, irtpi tyvvtws, of which Plato (Phaedo, p. 97)
makes mention.
3. The theory of Anaxagoras regarding external nature rests upon
five main principles : —
There is no beginning of things and no dissolution, in the strict
sense of these terms. Nothing comes out of nothing. All that begins
to be must come from something already existing. What we call the
origin of things and their dissolution depends entirely upon a conjunc
tion (ffvyKpHns) and a separation (SiaKpiaig) of parts previously exiiting.
There are bodies which consist of homogeneous parts, and bodies of
which the parts are heterogeneous. The constituent parts which unite
to form bodies are not all of the same nature ; a radical difference exists
between them, and this difference is primary, original, not secondary
or derivative.
Again, each of the various constituent parts of which bodies consist
is itself constituted by smaller homogeneous parts, so minute as to be
indivisible. These minute parts differ from the whole into which they
enter, in quantity only, not in quality.
Hence it follows that primary matter, the causa matcriaUs from
which all things come, is an infinite multitude of injinite&imally small
particles, not specifically alike, but distinguished by essential differences
of nature. These primary particles, thus distinguished (^>i/juara), must
be regarded as the ultimate constituents, the " seeds " (airipnaTa) of all
t hings.
From these ultimate constituents material bodies are thus formed :
Homogeneously constituted bodies, i.e., those whose constituent parts
are all of like nature, as for example, Flesh, Blood, Bone, Gold, Silver, &e.
are composed of primitive particles, like in kind to one another, homoe-
omerifie (6fcoio/i^>iai) ; heterogeneously constituted bodies, on the other
hand, i.e., those whose parts differ in kind from one another, as, for
44 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
example, organic structures, are composed of primary particles differing
in kind.*
4. This being premised, Anaxagoras proceeds to explain the process
of the world's formation : —
At first the primary particles, or " seeds," of things were promis
cuously mixed together in one common mass, and as a consequence of
this mixture, no one of them could exhibit itself in its proper specific
character. Before the world could be formed, a separation of the pri
mitive particles — homo3omeriae — had to be effected. On no other con
dition could they unite for the formation of the bodies which now
actually exist.
The cause of this separation, and of the various subsequent combina
tions of primitive particles/was not in the primary matter itself, for
material particles do not, of their own accord, separate or enter into
union. We are therefore forced to admit a cause higher than matter,
but exerting an inluence upon it, and by this influence effecting the
separation of the primary particles and their subsequent combina
tions. And since everything in the world is formed and arranged in
accordance with a definite plan, and plan and order suppose Reason,
it follows that the efficient cause which presides over matter must be
Mind (vov^).
We have here two distinct principles contributing to the formation
of the world, the material — a medley of all the " seeds " of things, and the
efficient — the spirit or mind (vovg). This is the dualistic doctrine in all
plainness. According to the teaching of Anaxagoras, Mind is dis
tinguished from Matter by its simplicity, its independence, its know
ledge, and its control over matter. All things else have some admixture
of the particles of all other things ; the mind alone is pure, unmixed,
subject only to itself, the most subtle of all things.
The formation of the world was brought about by motion. After
the primary matter had rested in its inertness through countless ages,
it was at last set in motion by the Divine Mind, and by this motion the
world was evolved from chaos. This movement was a movement of
rotation, established by the Mind at a single point, but gradually taking
in further and further masses, and extending its range through the in
finitude of matter. Everywhere, however, this movement follows a
definite plan, everything in the world is formed and disposed for a pur
pose, there is no Fate (a^ua/o/ucvrj), no Chance
Homogeneously constituted bodies were called by Aristotle u^ioio^prj, in contra
distinction to the heterogeneously constituted, iivopoiopfpii. These terms, originally
applied to fully constituted bodies, were transferred to the constituent elements of the
bodies. In this way the elements, or " seeds," of the homogeneous bodies of Anaxagoras
came to be designated o/*o«o/i€p/} by Aristotle. Anaxagoras himself does not appear to
have used the term.
t It is, however, worthy of remark that Anaxagoras avoids the application of this
principle of design in nature to particular cases. Individual phenomena he almost
always tries to explain by purely physical causes, without recurrence to the plan of the
Divine Mind— a procedure on which Plato and Aristotle comment unfavourably. Aris
totle (Met. 1. 4.) reproaches him with making the voi>£ a Deus ex machina, which he
calls upon only when he is at a loss to find the natural cause of some phenomenon.
PHILOSOPHY OF TUT. MILKKS. 45
In conseq uence of the revolving motion, "Air and Ether were
separated from the primary mass, and filled all space — there is no such
thin»- as a vacuum — contrary elements, the rarefied and the dense, the
lmt and the cold, the bright and the gloomy, the moist and the dry,
were .severally separated from each other; the dense, the cold, the
Bloomy, and the damp sank to the region now occupied by the earth,
while the others mounted to the sphere of the ether. Here they formed
hard stony masses, which, set in due order, and raised by the revolving
movement to a white heat, became stars; while, far below, the elements
that had fallen downwards became solidified into earth and stones."
The earth rests in the middle of the world. It is shaped like a short
cylinder, and is borne up by the air. Plants and animals owe their
being to the germs which the earth, while yet moist and slimy, received
from the air, and which were developed in the bosom of the earth under
the influence of celestial heat. Once brought into being they continued
to propagate themselves.
5. Kverywhere in his Cosmogony, Anaxagoras is careful to make the
Mind pre-eminent, to keep it aloof from the processes of nature ; the
latter he strives to account for solely by that movement originally im
pressed upon things by the VOVQ. In his psychology, on the other hand,
he shows no disposition of this kind. On the contrary, in his explana
tion of the psychical element in living beings, he feels driven to assume
the indwelling in them of the (Divine) Mind, and so to make Mind the
psychical principle of all living things. Whilst then the vouc in its
relation to the Makrokosmos is merely an external motive force, in rela
tion to organic beings it assumes the character of an intrinsic psychical
principle. Moreover, its functions in the latter respect are not confined
to men and animals, they extend to plants also ; for they too, in the opi
nion of Anaxagoras, are animated, and have their joys and their sorrows.
The " Soul " of the living thing is perfect in proportion to the perfection
of the corporeal organism with which it is associated, or, to express the
same tiling in the language of Anaxagoras, the Divine Spirit manifests
itself in the living thing in proportion as the organism is perfect. It
follows that the most perfect (" greatest ") soul is possessed by man ;
that in him God manifests himself most fully.
6. The sense-faculties of man are too weak to attain to truth ; they
are unable to distinguish sufficiently between the constituent elements of
things. It is Mind that attains knowledge of things. All things are
known to the Divine Reason; the mind of man, being a factor of the
Divine Mind, can therefore attain to knowledge. The highest content
ment is to be found in the knowledge of the uiiiverse-elbtamed by
thought. Whatever is good, just, or beautiful, is to be ascribed to the
Spirit 01- Mind; evil, moral and physical, is from matter.
7. Along with Anaxagoras, we may include among the philosophers of Nature,
Hennotimna of Claaomen» (whom some writers make the teacher- of Anaxagoras), who
is said to have held similar views regarding the world-ordering mind ; and Archelaus,
the physicist (of Miletus, or, according to others, of Athens) a pupil of Anaxagoras, who
seems to have held the primary mixture of all things to be equivalent to Air, and who
also scons to have laid less stress on the contrasts between mind and matter, and thus
to hav. again approached the teaching of the older lonians. He is credited with the
46 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
doctrine that the distinction between Right and Wrong is not founded on the nature of
things (<j>v(Tft), but is of human institution (ro/iy). Metrodorus, of Lampsacus, was also
a disciple of Anaxagoras. He is known by his allegorical interpretation of the Homeric
Myths.
PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY.
PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS.
§17.
op-
1. About the time that Ionic Philosophy attained its highest devel
ment in Asia Minor, another phase of philosophical thought had its rise
in the Greek Colonies of Italy. Here the inquiries of philosophers
were no longer directed to the origin of things from Primary Matter,
they turned rather on the Being or Essence of things in themselves.
The Pythagorean school was the first to give this direction to philoso
phical investigation, but it made mathematics the basis of all its inquiries,
and thus was led to certain mathematico-philosophical conceptions of the
nature of things, which are altogether peculiar to the Pythagoreans.
2. Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, was born at Samos about the year B.C. 582. So
many legends have become associated with his name that it is difficult to obtain a trust
worthy account of his life and labours. Legends and traditions are, however, at one in
representing him as a man of extraordinary knowledge. He is reckoned amongst the
most remarkable of the founders of mathematical science. It is recorded of him that
he succeeded in measuring the pitch of musical notes, and that he also made many dis
coveries in Astronomy. Some accounts make him the disciple of Pherecydes and
Anaximander. It is probable that he travelled into Egypt, and there made acquaint
ance with the lore of the priests. About the year B.C. 529 lie settled in Crotona, in
Southern Italy, and there established a society whose aims were at once ethical, reli
gious, and political.
In this Pythagorean association a rigid ethico-religious rule of life was enjoined.
times of the sect among the people." The members of the society were divided into
classes, according to the extent of their initiation into the Pythagorean "orgies."
Nothing certain is known regarding the names given to these classes, the terms P]so-
;enc, and Exoteric, are usually employed to distinguish them.* They exercised them
selves m gymnastics and music. They had their meals in common (ffvaaina), and they
were subject to certain rules as to diet ; for example, they were forbidden to eat beans,
hsh, or flesh. Hunting was not allowed amongst them.
4. In politics the Pythagorean sect belonged to the aristocratic party. Hence the
Pythagorean doctrines gained supporters among the aristocratic classes in many Italian
;ities, and secured for the aristocratic party a certain intellectual standing. But these
stpcratic leanings excited the opposition of the democratic party, and brought about
• tmal extinction of the sect. Pythagoras himself, it is said, after twenty years' resi
dence at Crotona, was expelled by a rival party under Cylon, and forced to retire to
Letapontnm, where he died soon after. The attacks of the democratic party 011 the
^According to lamblichus the Esoterics were further divided into the class of the strivers (T&V
t/aiwv), the class of the spiritualized (TWV tawoviuv), and the class of the divinized (TWV 0aW.)
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GKKKKS. 47
Pythagoreans were renewed in subsequent times. A century after tin- death of Pytha
goras, the Pythagoreans of Crotona were attacked by the "Cylonitea" during a con
ference in the "house of Milo ;" the house was set on fire, and all perished, with the
exception of Archippus of Tarentum and Lysis. Soon after this the political import
ance and power of the Pythagoreans in Italy came to an end ; in the time of Plato,
however, the Pythagorean Archytas was at the head of the administration in Turentum.
5. The following are named as the most distinguished of the ancient Pythagoreans :
Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, the first to make public in a written work the
system of the school ; Simmias and Cebes, who, according to Plato's " Phstdo," were
friends of Socrates ; Ocellus, the Lucanian ; Tinueus, of Locri ; Ecchecrates and Acrio ;
Archytas, of Tarentum ; Lysis and Eurytus ; Alcmseon, of Crotona, a youthful contem
porary of Pythagoras, who held the doctrine of contraries, of which he enumerated ten ;
Hippasus, of Metapontum, who held Fire to be the material principle of all tilings ;
Ecphantus, who combined the atomistic theory with that of the world-guiding Spirit,
and who taught the revolution of the earth on its axis ; Hippodamus, of Miletus, archi
tect and politician. Epicharmus, the comic poet, and others, are stated to have held
doctrines akin to those of the Pythagoreans.— (Cfr. Ueberweg.)
6. As for the sources from which our knowledge of the Pythagorean doctrines is
derived, we have to rely chiefly on Aristotle. Pythagoras himself left no written
work (the " Carmen Aureum " attributed to him is undoubtedly spurious). Nor has any
work of the older Pythagoreans come down to us which we can trust as genuine.
Bockh has collected fragments of a work by Philolaus. They would help us to a know
ledge of the early Pythagorean teaching if we could be certain they were genuine ; but
they have been subjected to damaging criticism, and have been finally assigned to the
last century before Christ. In the same way the fragments of Archytas of Tarentum,
collected by Orelli, have been disparaged. The same may be said of the treatise of
Ocellus Lucanus : De rerum natura, and of Timaeus Lucanus. We have, therefore, to
recur to Aristotle for our knowledge of the older Pythagorean system. Other accounts
of the system we can accept only in so far as they are in accord with his.
7. All that we can with certainty trace back to Pythagoras himself
are the doctrine of Metempsychosis, the system of Mathematico-theo-
logical speculation, and the fixing of certain ethical and religious rules
of conduct. When, then, we speak of Pythagorean doctrines, we mean
no more than the teaching of Pythagoras as developed by his disciples
and followers. We have here" to do not so much with the personal
opinions of the philosopher himself, as with the tenets of the Pytha
gorean school.
8. According to Aristotle (Met. 1, 2, 5), the Pythagoreans contem
plating the order of nature, and the regularity of natural formations,
with minds formed to mathematical conceptions, were led to make num
bers the essential constituents of things. It was the fundamental
principle of their teaching that Number is the essence (ova to) or ulti
mate basis (apxn) of all things. Every individual thing is a number,
and the aggregate of all things is a vast system of numbers (Arist. Met.
1, 5., 6-12, 6., 8-13, 6). According to this view, all things are not only
arranged in numerical order, numbers are not merely symbols of the
cosmical system, they constitute the substantial essence of all things.
Aristotle states expressly that the Pythagoreans did not conceive num
bers to be actually distinct from things (Met. 1, 6-13, 6) :
9. "Everything which is the object of knowledge includes Number;
without this element it could not possibly be the object of thought or
knowledge. Now truth is a peculiar innate attribute of Number ; it is of
the very nature of Number or Harmony to reject deception as inimical
and antagonistic. It is its function to rule and regulate, and to teadi
the hitherto unknown. Hence the conclusion that what is the most
48
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
fixed and indefectible in our knowledge must also be the unchangeable
essence of things in themselves." Things are therefore to be regarded
as copies of numbers, because in them the universal nature of Number is
reduced to individual existence.
10. The originating principles of Number are Indefiniteness and
Limit. The union of both constitute Number, as well of the " monadic "
(mathematical) order, as of the "geometrical ; " in each case, Number is
the outcome of the combination in harmony of the two principles.
Number is either odd or even ; the former is the symbol of the Perfect,
the latter of the Imperfect. The Pythagoreans assigned specially pro
minent functions in their system to the numbers four (rcrpaKruc) and
11. If it be true that Number constitutes the essential being of all
things, it follows that the generating principles of Number — Indefinite-
ness and Limit — are the ultimate principles of all things. Everything
consists of an unlimited and a limited (limiting) element, whereby its
being is constituted. The unlimited is the indeterminate basis of being
(in Aristotelian phraseology, the Matter) ; the limit is the determining
principle by which the indeterminate is reduced to definite being (in
Aristotelian phraseology, the Form). These two elements when "com
bined constitute the essence of the determinate object.
12. AVe have now to consider in what fashion the Pythagoreans ap
plied these general principles to explain the actual being of things in
themselves, and in their relation to one another. Here we come upon
their teaching regarding the nature of bodies. Having assumed that
the ultimate elements of all things are the Undefined, and the Defining
or Limiting, the Pythagoreans, when investigating corporeal nature,
seem to have regarded the Undefined as vacuum, the Limit or defining
element as a multitude of points fixed in some way or other in this
empty space. So that their general principle : "All things are either
numbers, or consist of numbers that are contained in them," is in this con
nection transformed into the other: "All bodies consist of points or
units in space, which when taken together constitute a number/' This
is an assertion of the theory that the constituent parts of the corporeal
substance are themselves simple elements, and on this theory only can
their nature be explained.
13. True to their mathematical conceptions the Pythagoreans
regarded material bodies as proximatcly formed of super-imposed surfaces ;
these surfaces as formed of lines, and the lines formed of points. These
purely mathematical conceptions they transferred to the real order, and
taught accordingly that the single constituent elements of the mathe
matical body were also the real constituent elements, or, to use the words
ot Aristotle, the substance of the body in nature (Met. 7. 2.) By the
juxtaposition of several points a line is generated, not merely in the
scientific imagination of the mathematician but in external reality also-
in the same way the surface is generated by the juxtaposition of several
lines, and finally the body by the combination of several surfaces.
1 omts, lines, and surfaces are therefore the real units which compose all
rmi.osopin OF TIIK C;KKEKS.
bodies in nature, and in this sense all bodies must be regarded Bfl
numbers. In fact every material body is an expression of the number
Four (riTpaKTyt;) since it results, as a fourth term, from three constituent
elements (Points, Lines, Surfaces).
14. Simple points are not, however, enough of themselves to explain
the nature of material bodies ; we must also call to our aid the notion of
vacuum, for it is by this that intervals of space are interposed
between the points, without which they could not form lines, surfaces
and bodies. If wo suppose two points to co-exist without an interposed
.-pace, they coalesce and become one, and the formation of a line or body
becomes impossible. ( 1<>nibinations of the unextended cannot produce
extension unless we suppose intervals of space interposed, and this
supposition becomes possible only when we assume the existence of a
vacuum in which the points are distributed.
15. This vacuum is the Undefined which we must assume as the
substratum of the defining element— the points. This vacuum affording
intervals of empty space between the points, they are able to arrange
themselves in juxtaposition and so to form bodies. In this way then
do the Undefined and Defining constitute the very being of material
bodies. Vacuum, the Undefined, is, however, something negative in
character, it does not contribute positively to the formation of bodies, it
is merely a condition pre-supposed in order to make it possible for the
positive unextended units to combine, in a natural formation and
constitute a body. The positive elements in the body are these units _
their ^ number ; " they are the " substance " of all things corporeal.
16. It is thus that the Pythagoreans developed their principle that
everything is Number in its application to material things, arriving in
this fashion at a purely idealistic conception of the material world.
Matter, as such, disappears, and there remain only ideal elements and
ideal relations. The differences between bodies are explained by assuming
different modes of combination on the part of the units, i.e., different
intervals of separation between them. In the same way are explained
the several mathematical forms with which the Pythagoreans invested
the several bodies, the Cube— the form of the Earth, the Icosahedron—
the form of the Air, the Sphere — the form of Water, the Pyramid _ the
form of Fire.
17. It would also appear that the Pythagoreans not only regarded
each individual body as a number, but furthermore regarded the entire
world as a vast arrangement of numbers. This numerical system of tho
Universe was framed upon the number ten. As the number ten is the
most prominent in the system of numbers, so the whole Universe consists
of ten bodies, namely— the heaven of the fixed stars, the five planets,
the sun, the moon, the earth, and the counter-earth.* The wholly
unchangeable portion of the Unhorse is that which stretches from the
heaven of the fixed stars to the mooii.f A less perfect part of the
* By Counter-earth the Pythagoreans meant a hemisphere detached from that which
we inhabit, and moving parallel to it.
* In-yond tlu- sphere of the fixed .stars lies the encompassing fire (irtpi'txov irvp}
5
50 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Universe extends from the moon to the earth; here again we meet
with defect and change in individuals, immutability only in genera and
species.
18. In the centre of the Universe is the Middle Fire. This is the
animating principle of the whole. It diffuses light and heat through
the Universe and is the source of life to all things. The great bodies
composing the world revolve round this Middle Fire. Their motion is
not purely natural, i.e., determined by a blind necessity of nature ; the
evidences* which it gives of Reason and Purpose force us to attribute it
to self-impulsion, and lead us to the conclusion that these bodies are
endowed with Reason. In accordance with this reasoning the Pytha
goreans reverenced the stars as gods.
19. An all-embracing harmony prevails throughout the Universe.
For as the numerical system, reducing to unity a number of constituent
parts, is harmony in itself, so must the Universe, ^ which is the
numerical system actualized, be regarded as a harmoniously arranged
whole, and be described as the Koajuos in the veritable sense of the word.
Admitting that the heavenly bodies are arranged in an order determined
by mathematical relations it follows that their movements must con
tribute to this general harmony, that from their movements a musical
harmony must result — the music of the spheres.
20. This peculiar notion of a music of the spheres was thus set forth
in more detailed explanation by the Pythagoreans. The velocity of the
celestial bodies in their motion round the Middle Fire must be propor
tioned to their distance from one another, and as every regularly
vibrating body emits a note, it follows that harmony must result from
the simultaneous movements of the heavenly bodies ; that the sphere of
the fixed stars must emit the deepest note, the sphere of the moon the
highest, while the intermediate spheres will emit intermediate notes.
Our ears are not sensible to the music of the spheres. But this arises
either from the circumstance that we have been hearing it from our
birth, and we distinguish a note only when we can contrast it with a
previous silence, or because the harmony of the universe is a combina
tion of sounds too intense to affect our sense of hearing.
21. Above the Universe, which is thus disposed in whole and in part
according to number and measure, stands the Divine Monad, the Divine
Spirit. As the unit is above all numbers, and is yet the basis of all
numbers, so the Divine Being, though raised above all things which
are numbered and measured, is yet the source of the being of all. Grod
is the one, eternal, enduring, unchangeable Being, resembling only
Himself, different from all other things, the one cause of all corporeal
reality, who from eternity determines and upholds the universal order.
Under the rule of this Divine Being, the world has subsisted from eter
nity, and will so subsist without end, for neither within it nor without
it is there any other cause which can affect it. God is the ruler and
guide of all things. He alone is wise. Nearest to Him in the perfec
tion of its nature is that Fire which occupies the centre of the world.
There is a sense, therefore, in which it may be said that the Middle Fire
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 51
is the home of God. Hence the Pythagoreans sometimes named it the
Watch-station, or Citadel of Jove (Atoc 0vAa»o'/, zWc Tru/o-yoc). The
demons occupy an intermediate position between God and man.
22. In their view of the human soul the Pythagoreans are also in
fluenced by their mathematical speculations. The Soul, too, is a number ;
it moves itself (Arist. de anim. 1, 2). They hold it to be an efflux from
the Middle Fire, and to share in the divine nature in the same way as
the source from which it comes. By number and harmony it is bound
to the body, which is at once its instrument and its prison. A distinc
tion must be made between what is rational and what is irrational in
the soul. The latter alone is possessed by brutes, man possesses both.
23. The soul is indestructible ; it outlives the body. The present
life must be regarded as a process of purification for the soul. This
process is continued after death, the soul is fated to inhabit other bodies,
animal or human (metempsychosis). With this theory is associated the
doctrine of retribution. The souls that are incurable are at last flung
into Tartarus, while those which purify themselves rise higher and
higher in the scale of life, and at last attain to life incorporeal.
24. The Pythagoreans seem to have held the view that the supreme
good for man was assimilation with God, and the bliss thence resulting.
The means to reach this end is Virtue. Virtue is essentially Harmony.
It consists in the harmonious equilibrium of the faculties of the soul, by
which the tendencies of the irrational part of the soul are subordinated to
Reason. To establish this interior harmony in himself is the task of
man in life. He can effect it by striving after true knowledge
(philosophy), and by ascetic exercises. To this end the ordinances and
the rule of life of the Pythagoreans were directed. They all aimed at
repressing the tendencies of the irrational soul, and bringing them under
the control of Reason. The moral maxims which were expressed in the
symbolical language of the Pythagoreans were no more than the com
mendations of virtue as the harmony of man's inner nature. The Pytha
goreans also employed music to charm the passions to rest, and to excite
healthy energy. Gymnastics served the same purpose. The essence of
justice consists in retribution (TO avrnrtTrovOos). Justice is a number
which taken an equal number of times is equal (apiO/moe ladu^ to-oc —
square number).
3. THE ELEATICS.
1. The Eleatics resembled the Pythagoreans in this, that they applied
themselves to investigating the being, or essence of things, rather than
their origin. They differed from the Pythagoreans in abandoning mathe
matical formulae, and conducting their speculations on lines more strictly
metaphysical. They made no attempt to explain the being of things by
speculations on their origin, they left the beginning of things completely
out of sight, and by this method arrived at a theory of inert abstract
Monism. The lonians had fixed their thought exclusively upon the
origin of things, and this exclusiveness had led them to deny all endur-
52 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
in* unchanging being; the Eleatics, on the other hand gave such
prominence to the enduring, unchanging being of things, that a begin
ning of things came to appear to them impossible, a view which they
distinctly asserted, at least as a speculative truth.
2 To understand aright the Monism of the Eleatics, we must, how
ever remark that the representatives of that philosophy, while asserting
as a speculative principle the oneness of all things added to this a
physical theory which was at variance with the metaphysical principle,
and which expired the origin of things from a i certain primary
matter. TVTiile the metaphysical speculation of the Eleatics denied a
becnnning of things their physical theories re-asserted it and Bought to
explain it. This inconsistency the Eleatics endeavoured to justify bv
maintaining that physical science is concerned only with the world oi
appearances, that its task is to explain things as they appear, and so far
as they appear in the world of phenomena. Pure speculation on tl
other hand, is concerned with real being which lies behind these
appearances ; it takes no heed of mere phenomena, and may thus deny
a be-innin-of things, since this belongs to the world of appearances
not to the sphere of real being. It is not necessary to point out that
the inconsistency cannot be got rid of in this way.
3 The leadino- representatives of Eleatic Monism are Xenophanes,
who 'formed the doctrines of the school into a theological system;
Parmenides, by whom they are expounded in metaphysical form as a
theory of being; Zeno, whose exposition is chiefly dialectic-a defence
of the teaching of the school against the vulgar belief in the plurality
of thino-s, and in their origin and dissolution ; and Melissus, who in his
teaching approached again to the views of the early Philosophers of ^ ature
XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON.
§18.
1 Xenophanes was born at Colophon in Asia Minor about B.C. 569.
As a wandering rhapsodist he visited many of the Hellenic cities but
finally settled at Elea in Lower Italy, where he founded the Lleatu
School Fragments of his poetical compositions have come down to us,
but hardly anything of his philosophical writings has been preserved.
What remains* of his works has been collected and edited by Fulleborn
(Fnunnente aus den Gedichten des Xenophanes, und Pannemdes, in
den Beitragen zur Gesch. der Phil., Stiicke 6 and 7, Jena, 1795), by
Karsten (Philosophorum Graecorum Veterum operum reliquiae, vol. 1,1.
Xenophanis Colophonii Canninum reliquiae, Amsterd. 1835), and by
Mullach (Arist. de Melisso, Xenoph. et Gorgia disputationes cum Eleati-
corum philos. fragmentis, Berol. 1845.) The principal philosophical
didactic poem of Xenophanes bears the title Trtpi tyvawQ. „
2 Startin^ with the principle that " nothing comes from nothing,
Xenophanes Arrives at the conclusion that things cannot begin to be,
for if we suppose a thing to come into existence we must suppose it
come either from nothing or from something else. It cannot come from
I'HILOSOPHY OF THE GREKKs.
nothing; ex niltUo nlldl ; it must therefore come from something t-l>< •
Hut if it comes from something else there is no need why it should
begin to be since it already existed. An origin of things is therefore
unnecessary and inadmissible. It is wholly unthinkable. There is
Being, but no Becoming.
3. The plurality of things depends upon a beginning of things. If
there is no beginning there are no different things which begin to be.
It follows, since existences do not begin, that no plurality of things
exists. As there is a Being of things, but no origin of things, so there
is but one Being of things, not a multiplicity. Hence the dictum of
Xenophanes " All is One, One is All." This universal One is in itself
undivided and indivisible, eternal and unchangeable, like to itself
throughout, as a globe.
4. This One Being Xenophanes describes as rational, and names God.
God is the One Only Being, existing tranquilly in himself, always like
himself, excluding all new existence, multiplicity and change, perfect
in himself ; he is hearing, sight, thought, all eye, all ear, all intellect,
On the strength of this theory Xenophanes assails Polytheism, as well as
the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic conceptions of the deity
adopted by Hoiner and Hesiod, and maintains the doctrine of one
all-ruling God.
5. In the science of Physics, Xenophanes advocates empirical
knowledge, which, however, he holds to be merely opinion, and to be
unworthy of entire confidence. He believes Water and Earth to be the
primary elements from which corporeal things have been evolved by a
purely natural process. The principal of life in living things is a breath
of ethereal fire. The Earth extends downwards and the Air upwards
without limit. The stars are fiery clouds. The sea at one time covered
what is at present the dry land. This is proved by the petrified remains
of marine animals found on high mountains. We must, therefore, admit
alternating conditions of mixture and separation between Earth and
Water.
PARMENIDES OF ELEA.
§19.
1. Parmenides, whom Aristotle (Met. 1, 5.) makes a pupil of Xeno
phanes, was born at Elea about B.C., 515, or 510, and was therefore a
younger contemporary of Xenophanes. Following in the wake of this
philosopher he formulated in its fulness the metaphysical principle of
the Eleatic doctrine, and in such fashion that the Monistic theory in his
hands attained a thoroughly idealistic development. He appears to have
exercised an influence for good on the legislation and on the morals of
his native city. Plato pays the highest tribute to his moral character
s well^astohis philosophy. His principal work was a didactic poem
Trtpl QiHTtus, of which fragments have been preserved by Sextus
Empiricus (adv. Math. 7, 111.), by Diogenes Laertius (9, 22), by Proclus
(on the Tunaeus of Plato), and by Simplicius (on Aristotle's Physics).
54 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
2. The speculative doctrines of Parmenides may be summed up
in the following propositions : —
Being alone exists ; Non-being is nothing. Hence there is no be
ginning of Being. How could that which exists begin to be ? It could
not come from the non-existent, for this is nothing ; it could not come
from the existent, for it is itself the existent.
Being is absolutely one ; outside the unit of Being there is nothing,
consequently the supposed plurality of things, and the changes of things
dependent on this plurality are mere appearances.
Being is eternal and unchangeable, without birth or beginning, im
mutable, limited only by itself. In form it is a beautifully rounded sphere,
one and eternal, the space within which is occupied without any vacuum.
Being is, furthermore, nothing else than the thought in which it is
known. The thought itself is Being. Being and the concept of Being
are one. In this sense all Being is pregnant with reason, and reason
permeates all things.
Truth belongs entirely to thought. As Being alone is thinkable, so
also that alone which is thinkable and thought is Being. The senses do
not bring us truth. They only deceive us, and it is precisely this
deception of the senses which seduces men into the belief in, and the
graceful tricks of speech about the multiplicity and the changes of things.
3. In his physical theories Parmenides endeavours to explain (hypo-
thetically) that phenomenal world which the operations of thought show
to be unreal. In this explanation he sets out from two opposing
principles which bear to one another in the sphere of appearances the
same relation that exists between Being and Non-being. These principles
are Light and Night, with which the antithesis of Warm and Cold, Fire
and Earth, is connected. On the proportions in which these principles
or elements are mingled depend the plurality and differences of things
in the world of phenomena. The force at wrork in these processes is
Eros, the oldest of the gods. The soul is a mixture of the four elements.
ZENO OF ELEA.
§20.
1. Zeno was born about B.C. 490-485, and was the friend and pupil
of Parmenides. It is said that he took part in the efforts of this
philosopher for the ethical and political amelioration of his fellow-
citizens, but that having failed in an enterprise against the tyrant
Nearchus, he was taken prisoner, and died under tortures heroically
endured. In his philosophy he aimed at developing in dialectic form
the idealistic Monism of Parmenides. He brought forward a number
of "proofs" to show that the admission of plurality and change, as of
motion or space, leads to inexplicable self-contradiction.*
In the Parmenides of Plato mention is made of a prose work (ffuyypa/ijua) by Zeno,
tyled
dialectic-
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 55
2. The principal proofs adduced by Zeno in his attempt to give in
dialectic form an indirect demonstration of the Monism of Parmenides
are the following : —
Against the reality of motion he argues ( Arist. Phys. 6, 2-9. ) : —
(a. ) Motion cannot begin, for a body cannot reach a new position without passing
through innumerable intervening positions. The moving body must first pass through
half the intervening space, and then again through half this space, and so on indefinitely.
(b.) Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise, for, no matter what the position he reaches,
he will find that the tortoise has advanced still further.
(c. ) The arrow, though flying through the air, is, nevertheless, at rest, for at every
moment it is in some one place, now here, now there, but always, as long as it is in any
one place, it is at rest.
((/. ) The half of a given period of time is equal to the whole, for the same point
moving with different velocities in passing through the same space will at one time
occupy half the period, at another the whole.
As these contradictions cannot be explained away it follows that there can be no
motion at all, and that what we call movement is merely an appearance.
Against the reality of space Zeno argued thus (Arist. Phys. 4, 3) : —
If .Being exists in space this space itself should exist in another space, and so on with
out end. As this is impossible, it follows that there is no such thing as space.
Against the plurality of things Zeno adduces the following arguments (Simplicius in
Phys. Arist. fol. 30, 6) :—
(a.) If a plurality of things exist the number of these things is either determinate
or infinite. " These things are as many as they are, neither more nor less ; but if they
are as many as they are, they exist in determinate number." On the other hand "if a
plurality of things exist they must be infinite in number ; for between things that are
different other things must be interposed, and between these again others, and so on
till the number becomes infinite." The admission of a plurality of things thus involves
a contradiction which it is impossible to solve.
(b.) Again if a plurality of objects existed, the aggregate should be at once infinitely
great and infinitesimally small. Each object must have some magnitude. But magni
tude is only possible when the component parts of the object are separated by an interval.
The interval which must thus be admitted has itself a magnitude, and must therefore be
separated by another interval from the things which it separates, and so on without
end. It follows from this that every object must be infinitely great since it is composed
of an infinitude of parts each of which has some magnitude. On the other hand, from
the same premises we must conclude that every object must be infinitesimally small.
For if the parts of a thing are infinite in number, eo ipso they must be infinitesimally
small. But an aggregate of infinitesimally small magnitudes must be infinitesimally
small In this way the admission of a plurality of things again leads us to a con
tradiction.
Against the truth of sensuous preceptions Zeno argties as follows : —
If a measure of corn in falling produces a sound, then each single grain, and eacli
part of a grain, must also produce a sound. If this be not the case, then the whole measure,
the action of which is only the sum of the action of its parts, cannot produce a sound.
Here again we have a contradiction from which we cannot escape as long as we admit
the truth of sensuous perceptions.
8. In his theory of physical nature Zeno is in accord with the other
Eleatics. He admits four elements, the Warm, the Cold, the Dry, and
the Moist — in which we recognise the familiar four elements. He
furthermore admits a moving force which controls everything — Necessity,
of which there are two species, Discord and Love. With regard to the
soul he holds with Parmenides, that it is a mixture of the four elements.
In this compound some elements may predominate, but none can be
entirely absent. He seems to have made the purity and godliness of the
soul consist in the preponderance of the purer elements over the impure.
56 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
MELISSUS OF SAMOS.
§21.
1. Melissus, a native of the island of Samos, took an important part
in the political concerns of his country. He was commander in a naval
battle in which the Athenian fleet was defeated (B.C. 440). Simplicius
has preserved several fragments of a work of Melissus Trtpl rov ovroe. or
TTC/CH 0uo-£we- Its purpose is to establish the principle of Eleatic Monism
by direct demonstration. " Oneness seems, however, to him to consist
rather in the continuity of substance than in the notional unity of
being."
2. Being exists, says Melissus, for if there were no being it would
be impossible to speak of it. It cannot have become what it is, for it
could only have arisen out of Non-being or out of Being. From Non-
being nothing can arise, and it cannot have come from Being, for thus
it would already have existed, and would not have arisen. Nor can
Being perish ; for it cannot become Non-being ; and if it again become
Being it has not ceased to be. Being is therefore eternal. From this
we may deduce the following essential attributes of Being : —
Being is infinite. Since it is eternal it has neither beginning nor end. And what is
without beginning or end is infinite. (Observe this transition from infinitude of time to
infinitude of extension).
Being is one. If there were two existent beings the one would limit the other, and
Being, it has been shown, is without end or limit.
Being is immovable and immutable. It is immovable, for motion supposes a vacuum,
and vacuum there is none, since vacuum is Non-being and Non-being has no existence.
It is immutable for (a.) change would involve plurality. Suppose for example, from
rarefied it became dense, or from dense rarefied, the first would involve its becoming
more, the second its becoming less, (b.) In case of change the actually existent should
pass away, and, in part at least, become non-existent. If in the course of thirty
thousand years this happened to the whole, the whole would in that time have passed
away.
Being is furthermore indivisible. This follows from its unity and its immutability.
Since it is indivisible it has no parts, and consequently is not a body — a body without
parts is unthinkable. It is, therefore, incorporeal.
3. What we see, hear and feel, is not true Being ; otherwise it
should have the attributes enumerated above. The multiplicity of
things, motion and change are, therefore, appearances, not realities. ' In
his physical theories Melissus does not differ materially from his pre
decessors of the same school.
THE SOPHISTS.
§22.
1. Jhe perio4j)f pre-Socratic Philosophy en/M with tfrf> ..Sophists.
Neither the Philosophy of Nature nor the Idealism of the Eleatics
could satisfy the human intellect ; both would appear to have helped it
along the way to Scepticism. The seeds of the sceptical doctrines were
sown in the earlier philosophies. The teaching of Heraclitus which
denied persistent, enduring being — in which alone knowledge can find its
object, the Eleatic theory that everything represented in experience is
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 57
only delusive appearance, and the fallacies employed to combat the
truths irresistibly forced upon our natural consciousness : all this must
have misled the human mind with regard to truth, must have suggested
the view that there is no knowledge of truth, and consequently no truth
at all, and that the sceptical attitude of mind towards what claims to be
such is alone reasonable and safe.
2. This was the view professed by the Sophists. Their philosophical
teaching is nothing else than a Scepticism which at first hesitates to
believe in the possibility of truth, and at length boldly denies it. Under
the influence of this Scepticism the Sophists not only made profession of
not having attained to knowledge themselves, but furthermore denied
to the human mind the power to attain to it. The difference between
them and the later Sceptics seems to lie chiefly in this — that they selected
their formulae with less caution, and were not careful to hide their real
assumptions behind a pretence of speaking only for themselves. They
boldly proclaimed that there is no such thing as truth, and they
endeavoured to impart this conviction to others to save them a useless
expenditure of labour in the search after it. When truth ceases to be a
reality, Morality, Justice and Religion must lose their objective value ;
they too must perish in the abyss of doubt.
3. In an inquiry into the causes which gave rise to the peculiar
teaching of the Sophists, we must not omit from view the social and
political condition of Greece at the time. The unphilosophical and
frivolous temper of mind of the Sophists could find favour only in an
age when men had ceased to take a serious view of life, and to pursue
serious aims. This was certainly the case in Greece at the time when
the Sophists came into prominence. At the close of the struggle with
Persia Athens found herself in a position of pre-eminence and power.
A rapid advance in art and science followed upon this increase of her
political importance. But avarice and sensuality were also stimulated
into activity, and in proportion as these passions extended their ravages,
morals became corrupt, the sense of religion became enfeebled, and the
attitude of mind towards objective truth more sceptical. Such a spirit
found its natural expression in a system of empty Sophistry which
lightly set aside all Truth, Religion, Morality and Justice.
4. The causes which more immediately and directly contributed to
create the system of the Sophists were connected with the rise and steadily
growing power of the Athenian democracy — a movement which favoured
the development of Rhetoric as the art of speaking. Oratory ceased to
be the mere expression of the speaker's mind, seeking to convince by
the substance rather than the form ; it became an art of language
designed to impress the listeners by the sound and pomp of mere words,
aad it encouraged the effort after captious devices of speech calculated
merely for passing effect. In this field the labours of the Sophists were
expended. They were the founders of the Schools of Rhetoric, in which
young men were instructed in the Arts of Oratory. In this way they
largely influenced education. Speech was for them only a means to
gain over an audience by skilful exposition of the subject of discourse,
58 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
apart altogether from any consideration for the truth or falsehood,
rightness or wrongness of the matter advocated. Their skill in oratory
was mere deftness in defending or refuting any position whatever.
This was expressed in the well-known saying : " They understood how
to make the weaker reason (the worse cause) the stronger (the better),
and contrariwise. ... . They were skilled to assert and to
dispute everything, and to represent things the most widely different as
identical."
5. It was to be expected that the Sophists would make philosophical
inquiry, which had hitherto sought objective truth, subserve the pur
poses of empty rhetoric, and use knowledge merely as a means to success
in oratory. Objective truth, as such, was of no importance in their
eyes. They were concerned to put forward as true or false that which
it was their interest for the moment that their audience should accept as
true or false. What more natural than to maintain as a theoretical
axiom what was tacitly assumed in practice, and to assert that there is
no objective truth at all, that everything is true which the individual,
for the moment, takes to be true ; that objectively there is neither
Goodness nor Justice, that everything is good and right which the in
dividual, for the time, holds to be such ? In these principles the main
doctrine of the Sophists was enunciated ; it remained only to embody
this doctrine in appropriate formulas and give it further development.
To do this was the whole effort of the Sophists in the field of Philosophy.
6. The teaching of the Sophists was destructive of that Philosophy
which consists in the knowledge of objective truth. The Sophists went
about from city to city advertising themselves as professional thinkers,
and offering their knowledge for sale. Such a procedure could only be
fatal to science. We must not, however, deny them all scientific merit.
Their efforts after success in oratory naturally led them to the study of
Language and of Logic, for readiness in exposition and in argumentative
development and proof were indispensable for their purposes. That
they did something to promote a study of the forms of speech and to
establish a Scientific Method is not to be denied.
7. We may add that the Sophists helped also to further the progress
of the empirical sciences. They were not mere talkers ; they could
boast, or at least the more distinguished could boast, attainments of a
high order. Professing to be politicians they were obliged to have at
command a store of historical knowledge, and to be acquainted with the
various forms of government. In the case of many of the Sophists we
are further told that they held an acquaintance with the ancient poets
and a knowledge of the art of exposition to be essential to a man of
cultivated mind. Many of them applied themselves to physical science.
Arithmetic, Geometry and Astronomy, and Music were also in favour
with individuals amongst them. They were the first to devise a system
of Mnemonics or Art of Memory, and to fix the forms of expression
adapted to the investigation and discussion of a given subject. But all
these services rendered in other departments of knowledge cannot atone
for the destructive influence which they exercised upon Philosophy proper.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 59
8. The most remarkable amongst the Sophists are Protagoras of
Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos.
Protagoras was born at Abdera about B.C. 486, and exercised his
calling as teacher of oratory chiefly in Sicily, in Italy, and in Athens.
He styled himself a Sophist (2o^«rrfa), «.«•> a teacher of wisdom.* He
did not undertake to teach any special science, he professed to instruct
youth in the virtues becoming citizens and statesmen, eliminating
from their education all useless learning. He was accused of impiety at
Athens on account of a treatise which began with the words " Regarding
the gods I have no knowledge whether they exist or exist not. There
is much to prevent our attaining this knowledge — the obscurity of the
subject and the shortness of human life." His treatise was burnt, he
himself escaped on board a ship, but perished, it is said, in the wreck of
the vessel (B.C. 416). The principal points of his teaching may be thus
stated : —
Starting with the notion of a flux in all things, as asserted by
Heraclitus, and applying this to the thinking subject as such, he arrived
at the principle : " Man is the measure of all things, of the existent as
it is, and of the non-existent as it is not," by which formula he merely
stated that for each individual things are what they appear to be, in
other words truth is for each individual that which he holds to be true.
Subjective truth is the only truth.
Even the axioms of geometry have no objective worth, for in the
world which we perceive there are no straight and curved lines such as
are assumed in these axioms.
No object has a fixed determinate nature ; contradictory attributes
may be predicated of everything ; we can make no statement about
anything which shall have objective value, nor on the other hand
can any statement made be validly contradicted. All propositions are
alike true, and alike false ; one and the same thing can be true to one
mind and false to another, or even to the same mind true at one time
and false at another, for truth and falsehood are relative and subjective.f
Gorgias, who was born in Leontini, in Sicily, was an elder con
temporary. of Socrates, whom, however, he outlived. About the year
B.C. 427, he came to Athens as Ambassador from his native city to
obtain assistance from the Athenians against Syracuse. In later years
he taught the art of oratory in various places with great success. But
oratory was to him no more than the art of persuasion — the arts which
undertook to teach virtue he laughed to scorn ; he despised a virtue
which he took no pains to cultivate in himself. The chief contents of
his work, Trtpl TOV ui) OVTOC ?} ntpl <f>v(rtw£ are to be found in the treatise
* The word Sophist acquired its meaning as a term of reproach owing to its use by
Aristophanes, and after him by the Socratic Philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle,
who styled themselves " Philosophers" in contrast with the "Sophists." Sophists like
Protagoras were held in high esteem, although a respectable and well-to-do Athenian
citizen would not become a Sophist himself, and earn money by public lessons.
| According to Diogenes Laertius (1, 3, 37 and 57) Protagoras composed a treatise on
the State ('AvriXoyucd, 'A\y9tta or Ka7-a/3<i\X.oJT6£) from which Plato borrowed many of
the notions embodied in his scheme of an ideal state.
60 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
"DeMelisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia" (Aristotle). His teaching is
nihilistic; it may be summed up in the following propositions :
(a.) There is 110 Being at all. For if anything existed its being
should be derived, or it should be eternal. Being cannot be derived
either from the existent or the non-existent (as the Eleatics prove). Nor
can it be eternal, for the eternal is infinite, and the infinite cannot be
anywhere since it cannot be in itself, nor in anything else — and what is
nowhere does not exist.
(b.) Even if anything existed, it could not be known. For if a
knowledge of any being were possible, the thought should resemble this
being, nay, should be the existent thing itself, otherwise the existent
thing would not be known. Hence the non-existent could not be known.
This being so, there could be no error ; there could be no error, e.g., in
the assertion that a battle of chariots took place on the ocean — con
clusions which are clearly absurd.
(c.) Lastly, even granting that being exists, and is the object of
knowledge, this knowledge is incommunicable. For a symbol is some
thing different from the thing symbolized. How can anyone by a word
communicate his mental image of a colour — the ear does not hear colour,
but sounds ? And how can the same mental image be in two persons
who are different from one another ?
Hippias of Elis, a younger contemporary of Protagoras, was renowned
for his Mathematical, Astronomical and Archaeological knowledge. He
was also remarkable for his ready eloquence ; he boasted that he was able
to say something new on any subject whatever, as often as he discussed
it. Plato has ascribed to him a saying which exhibits distinctly the
ethical standpoint of the Sophists, " The law is the tyrant of men, since
it forces them to act against their nature." This is clearly an antinomy.
Hippias does not appear to have insisted upon the application of the
principle in detail.
Prodicus of Ceos was an eminent master in the art of dialectics.
He applied himself to fixing the distinction between words allied in
meaning, and herein he was the predecessor of Socrates who acknow
ledged him as his master. He was held in high esteem by the ancients
for his hortatory discourses on moral subjects, e.g., on the choice of a
career in life (" Hercules at the cross-roads ") ; on External Goods and
their use ; on Life and Death, and on other such themes. In these dis
courses he exhibits a refined moral sense and muchacutenessof observation.
Besides those whom we have here mentioned we have further to include among the
Sophists : the dialectical jugglers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, the Rhetorician
Polus, a pupil of Gorgias, Caliicles, Thrasymachus, and Critias. These far surpassed
the other Sophists in the boldness of their assertions. Caliicles and Thrasymachus
openly maintained that reckless gratification of passion is the law of nature. They
proclaimed that right is on the side of the stronger, and that prohibitory laws are but
a cunning device of those in power for the oppression of the weak. In a poem by
Critias, the ablest, but at the same time the most unscrupulous of the Thirty Tyrants,
belief in the gods is represented as the invention of crafty statesmen who have en
deavoured to secure an easy obedience from the citizens by imposing on them this
deception. He held the blood to be the seat of the soul. Lycophron, Antiphon,
Hippodamus of Miletus, and Phaleas of Chalcedon are also named* among the Sophists
who propounded political theories.
I'HILOSOl'lIV OF THE GREEKS. 61
SECOND PERIOD.
SOCK A TIC PHILOSOPHY.
§23.
1. We have now made acquaintance with the purely negative
tendency of the teachings of the Sophists, and the destroying influence
which they exercised on Philosophy. But their teachings were not
without their positive effect on the progress of Philosophy in Greece.
This positive service they rendered by provoking a reaction which
not only brought about the downfall of their own system but initiated
a new progressive movement which carried Philosophy in Greece to its
highest stage of development. Out of the reaction against the procedure
of the Sophists came the Socratic Philosophy, represented in its three
masters, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who have won for themselves
undying fame in the history of Philosophy.
2. Anaxagoras had, as we know, carried the Ionic Philosophy to
Athens, Parmeiiides and Zeno had there represented the Eleatic School,
while Ileraclitus and the Pythagoreans were known at Athens by their
writings, or it may be that some of the latter visited the city in person.
In this way Athens became the centre in which the various schools of
Greek Philosophy were brought into contact, and were enabled to in
fluence one another. A first consequence of this conflux of philosophical
doctrines was the breaking up of the several philosophical systems — a
result which we observe in the teaching of the Sophists. But this
disaster was soon followed by a new development of philosophic thought.
The new movement was favoured by the circumstance that its leaders
had before them philosophical systems whose defects and onesidedness
they were warned to avoid, and were thereby incited to seek a new point
of departure4 for philosophic inquiry. Athens thus became not only the
central scat of Art in Greece, but also the home of Greek Philosophy in
the period of its greatest glory.
3. If we inquire what was the new point of departure which Greek
Philosophy adopted at this period we shall find that philosophic thought,
instead of making external nature the only subject, of investigation,
turned back upon itself, and proclaimed that self-knowledge, theoretical
and practical (ethical), was of more importance for the attainment of
truth than the knowledge of Nature. Self-knowledge, the investigation
of the moral order, had hitherto been neglected in favour of the study of
the physical world ; it was now accorded the first place in the estimation
of the philosopher. Hereby a purer knowledge of the Divine Nature
became attainable. And Attic Philosophy thus rose to a Theology that
stands high above the opinions regarding God and things divine offered
by the earlier philosophical systems of Greece. Theology now became
the centre and the crown of philosophical science.
62 HISTORY OF AXCIKNT PHILOSOPHY.
4. Socrates was the founder of Attic Philosophy, or, better, his
labours may be said to have prepared the way for it. He did not aim at
constructing a complete system of Philosophy. The instruction, to
which he applied himself exclusively, was directed to incite his pupils
to a deeper study of things, and to guide them in the right path of in
vestigation. All his pupils did not, however, apprehend rightly the
mind of their master ; many of them fastened upon some one or other of
the special points in his teaching, and devoted themselves to the develop
ment of the point so selected. These philosophers are said to have been
"imperfectly Socratic." Plato, on the other hand, gave compre
hensive development to the principles of his master, and, with his clear
idealistic mind, brought to its fullest perfection the germs contained in
the instructions of Socrates.* Plato was succeeded by his pupil Aristotle,
who on many points is at variance with his master. But Socrates by
his wonderful acuteness and penetration of mind, his quick power of
observation, his vast knowledge, and his methodical procedure, was
enabled to build up a system which is worthy to take an independent
place by the side of Plato's.
Following the order here indicated,
5. We shall first treat of Socrates and the "imperfectly Socratic
Philosophers," and then we shall set forth the Philosophical systems of
Plato and Aristotle.
SOCRATES.
§24.
1. In their sketches of the life of Socrates, Xenophon (Socr.
Memorabilia) and Plato (Apolog.) are at one on all essential points.
Socrates was born at Athens about the year B.C. 471. His father,
Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and his mother, Phanaenarcte, a midwife.
In youth he was trained to his father's calling, and he is said to have
shown some skill in the practice of it. It is probable, however, that he
gave himself early in life to philosophical investigations. The story
that he was a pupil either of Anaxagoras or of Archelaus rests upon no
good authority. He seems however, to have been well acquainted with
the earlier philosophical systems of the Greeks. The meeting between
Socrates and Parmenides mentioned by Plato may be accepted as
historically true.
2. Socrates served as a soldier in the military expeditions of Potidaea,
of Delium, and of Amphipolis, but he declined to take any further part
in political affairs. His mission he believed to be the education of youth,
and this duty he believed to have been assigned him by an oracle.
(Plato, Apol. p. 21.) He did not invite pupils, but allowed any one who
* Among the immediate disciples of Socrates we may further mention Aeschines an
Athenian, Cebes a Theban, Simon a shoemaker of Athens, Xenophon an Athenian
general and writer. The latter wrote a life of Socrates and contributed to the Philosophy
of Education the well-known Cyropaedia.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKo. (Pi
chose to listen to his instructions. His personal demeanour and his
mode of life were calculated to attract attention, and to win favour.
His external appearance bespoke his poverty and simple habits,
while his peculiarities of face and manner, his practice of staring about
him, and of halting suddenly as he walked, could not fail to attract
notice. He esteemed it a desirable thing to have few necessities. By
the dignity and the gentleness of his disposition he drew to himself a
large number of youths and men, many of whom he formed to higher
aims, and trained to become distinguished citizens. To the boastful
Sophists he opposed his plain common sense, his "irony," and his
strength of character ; but for all this he was himself represented on
the stage as a Sophist, He believed that he had by him a " Demon "
whose warning voice directed him what to do and what to avoid.
3. In his old age, shortly after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants,
the democratic party, represented by Miletus, brought a charge against
him which was supported by the democratic politician Anytus, and the
orator Lycon. The charge was to the effect that Socrates had offended
by rejecting the gods recognised by the state, and by introducing a new
and strange Demon, and that he had furthermore offended by corrupting
the young men. The charge was, therefore, the same as had been made
at an earlier period by Aristophanes, in the Clouds. After a bold and
somewhat haughty defence of himself, Socrates was declared guilty by
the judges and condemned to die by poison. He submitted his conduct
but not his convictions to the sentence of the tribunal. He refused the
means of escape provided for him by Crito, and in the presence of his
disciples, and friends who had assembled in his prison, he drank the
poisoned draught (B.C. 399). His death, justly glorified by his followers,
secured for his teaching an universal and enduring recognition.
4. Socrates pursued in his instructions a double purpose. His first
object was to form his disciples to a higher morality, and to save them
from the libertinism to which they were led by the teaching of the
Sophists. For this end he insisted specially on self-knowledge, for he
saw clearly that the man who knows himself is the only man who can bridle
and control his appetites and passions. Hence the well-known maxim
" Fvw0t atavTov," know thyself. Socrates was not blind to the necessity
of self-knowledge as a means to the attainment of truth, but in framing
this maxim he had in view primarily ethical considerations.
5. The second object of Socrates was to lead his disciples to a clear
and certain knowledge of truth. In pursuance of this purpose he
invented a peculiar method of instruction which has been called by his
name, and the essential character of which is implied in the name Enrixtic
(method of discovery) which is sometimes given to it. He did not lay
down fully formulated principles, but endeavoured by continued
questioning to lead his hearers to discover for themselves the principles
he had in view. The tendency of the Socratic method was at once
positive and negative.
Beginning with commonplace things and every day events, he inter
rogated his pupil regarding them, and out of every answer given drew
64 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
material for a new question, till he at last obliged him to confess that
what he had taken for truth was not really true. Throughout the
interrogatory, however, he was careful to express deference for the
superior intelligence and wisdom of his pupil, till they finally gave way
under the dialectical test applied to them. In this negative process
consisted the Socratic "Irony" (tlpwvua). But his method led to
positive results also. Socrates endeavoured by the same plan of con
tinued questioning to lead his disciples to the discovery of positive truth.
He named his method Maieutic, or intellectual midwifery, as it aimed at
bringing truth into life in the minds of his pupils, and in this respect
he found an analogy between his task and the duties undertaken by his
mother.
6. We may observe that the method of Socrates is wholly inductive.
In his questioning he endeavours to pass by induction from the par
ticular to the general. The object of the entire method, as far as it aims
at a positive result, is to gain clear and accurate notions of things as
they exist, in order to attain thereby to objective truth — to universal
Erinciples. Aristotle has justly observed (Met. 13, 4) that we owe to
ocrates the method of Induction and Definition (TOVC, r'tTraicrtKove
Xoyouc KOL TO bpi&vOai KaOoXov). Induction from the particular to the
general, and the clear definition of general notions to which this process
leads, was established by the Socratic method, and in this consists its
lasting importance to philosophical science.
7. With regard to the peculiar philosophical tenets of Socrates, we
know only what his disciples have told us ; he was not, as we know, a
writer. As far as his teaching regarding the Divine Nature can be
gathered from these accounts, he seems to have held with Anaxagoras
that God is a spirit who rules the world. He grounds his belief in the
gods on the teleological argument furnished by the structure of living
organisms in which the parts serve the requirements of the whole, taking
as the basis of his reasoning the principle that whatever exists for a
useful end must be the work of intelligence Trpiirti fj.lv ra CTT' o^
. I
yiyvd/u^va -yuw/uijc fpyo. slvat. (Xenoph. Memorab. I. 4, 4 sqq. IY. 3,
3 sqq.) Just as in our own actions we are ourselves guided by reason,
so the entire world is guided by the Divine Reason. The Wisdom
(^povrjTtc) which rules in all that exists determines everything according
to its good pleasure, it frames and upholds the universal order : rbv
oXov KOGT/ULOV GWT TTWV T£ KOI <Tvv£\wv» Socrates combats the belief
which attributes human passions to the gods, but he does not seek to
destroy the old mythology, or even to explain it allegorically. The gods,
like the human soul, are invisible, but their operations give unmistakable
evidence of their existence. The gods are omniscient and omnipresent,
they govern all things according to the rules of righteousness, and have
their sufficiency in themselves. (Xen. Mem. I. 3, 3. IY. 3, 13.)
8. Regarding the immortality of the soul, Socrates expresses himself
doubtfully, in the Apology of Plato. But his conviction that the
present life would be little worth, and not at all preferable to death, if
the life to follow did not furnish more favourable conditions for human
IMIll.OSOPin OF TI1K (iKKEKS. 65
effort is proof of Ins leanings on this question. His own boundless trust in
the care of the gods for tile just man, and the unanimity among his
followers on the point (Plato Pined. ; Xenoph. Cyrop. VIII., 7, 3 sqq.)
sufficiently confirm the view that Socrates held the soul to be immortal.
He expressed no definite view regarding the soul's condition after death ;
he was satisfied to maintain that the soul of the just man is set free by
death from the embarrassments of the body and enters into the fuller
enjoyment of truth.
9. The Supreme Good of man is happiness. Not a happiness that
depends on some accident of fortune (ewrux^a) but the happiness attained
by action and knowledge (tinrpa^ta). This happiness is attained through
assimilation with the Divinity. External goods avail nothing; to have
no need of anything is a divine attribute, to want as little as possible is
the nearest approach to the Divinity. Scientific knowledge is a further
condition of this assimilation with the Divine Nature. Practical excel
lence is identified with this knowledge. Both in one make Wisdom.
AVisdom must therefore be the ultimate end of man's moral action. In
his moral life he must strive after knowledge, and true knowledge is
the knowledge of the Good — the knowledge of that Divine Reason which
governs all things. This leads immediately to moral goodness, for
theoretical knowledge and practical excellence are ethically one. What
is good is at the same time useful.
10. In the light of these principles, the further ethical teaching
of Socrates, especially his theory of Virtue, becomes easily intelligible.
Virtue and Knowledge are one. The knowledge of what is right, and
the doing of it, are inseparable, because they are identical. It follows
that no man can knowingly do wrong ; for if he knows what is good,
he also chooses it. The man who acts wrongly does not act so with
deliberation, but in ignorance : he is deficient in perfect knowledge of
what is good. The evil doer is only involuntarily (&KWV) wicked. It
may even be said that the man who knowingly is guilty of lying, or
other misdeeds, is better than the man who unwittingly lies, or other
wise does wrong (Xen. Mem. III. 9, 4 ; IV. 2, 20. Plat, Gorg., p. 461.
Apol. p. 20. Prot. p. 345. Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. 3, &c.) * As a con
sequence of its identity with the knowledge of what is good, Virtue is one,
and is a matter of instruction.
11. The State is of divine institution. The true rulers are those
whose rule is guided by understanding. The laws are either written
or unwritten. The latter are the rule and standard of the former ; their
divine origin is manifested by the fact that any violation of them en
tails a punishment determined by Nature itself.
" IMPERFECTLY SOCRATIC" PHILOSOPHERS.
1. By the "imperfect" or " partial" followers of Socrates we mean
those of his disciples who, failing to comprehend the whole mind of their
* The man who knowingly does wrong is in a better position than the man who
does it unwittingly, for the reason that ignorance and neglect of knowledge are the
greatest of all sins, and the source of all moral evil.
6
66 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
mast CM-, addressed themselves to one or other of the specie points of his
teaching, which they developed to the exclusion of the others. Two
characteristics, we have observed, were strongly marked in the teaching
of Socrates, the dialectical and the ethical. The former we may call
the operative element in the instructions of Socrates, the latter the re
sult in which his instructions culminated. These two elements became
separated in the teaching of the " imperfectly Socratic " philosophers.
One class devoted themselves mainly to the development of the dialec
tical side of the teaching of Socrates, the other gave exclusive) prominence
to the ethical, which they strove to develop in conjunction with certain
principles borrowed from the pre-Socratic schools. To the first class
belong the Megaric or Eristic, and the Elian or Eretrian Schools ; to
the second, the School of the Cynics, and the Cyrenaic or Hedonist
School.
THE MEGARIC AND THE ELIAN (ERETRIAN) SCHOOLS.
The founder of the Megaric or Eristic School was Euclid of
Megara, who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathema
tician of the same name, who lived a century later. The story is told
of him that in order to enjoy the society of Socrates he often came to
Athens in the gloom of the evening, at the time when the Athenians
had forbidden the Megarians, under pain of death, to enter Athens.
He was present at the death of Socrates (Phaxl. p. 59, C). Soon after,
the greater number of the disciples of Socrates quitted Athens to join him
at Megara. He appears to have lived for several decades after the
death of Socrates at the head of the school which he had founded.
2. The main end of the teaching of Euclid seems to have been to
combine the ethical views of Socrates with the Eleatic theory of the One.
Adopting unreservedly the principle of Parmenides, he represents the
One, not under the concept of Being, but under the Socratic concept of
the Good. Socrates had made the knowledge of the Good the basis and
the principle of our moral life ; Euclid gave an objective subsistence to
this concept of the Good, and made the Good the only thing existent.
He, accordingly, lays down the principle : The Good is One, though it is
called by many names, such as Intelligence, God, Keason. Whatever
is opposed to the Good, is non-existent. The Good is unchangeable.
3. This fundamental principle the Megarians tried, after flic manner
of the Elcatics, to establish by indirect demonstration. Dialectic best
served their purposes in such an attempt. Hence they were led to give
it special prominence in their teaching. They endeavoured, by dia
lectical devices, to show that merely empirical knowledge abounds in
real or apparent contradictions, and that our notions of things, derived
from mere experience, are wholly untenable. They thus sought to estab
lish the Oneness of all Being in 'the Good by a method wholly similar
to that of the Kleatics. This sophistical procedure procured for their
PHILOSOPHY OF TIIK (JHKKKS.
teaching the name " Kristie" (doctrine which contends against current
opinion^. The denial of the M;my led them to tlie further view thai
there is no diversity between concepts ; thnt the -o-c;illed difference he-
tween concepts is only a difference hetween the names of tlic One, or
the (iood, and tliat we have, consequently, no right to speak of one
g as differing from anollier.
4. Tin1 most remarkable of the followers of Euclid wen: Kubulides tlie Milesian, and
Alfximis, noted for their invention of the sophistical arguments kno\\n as "the Liar,''
"the Concealed," "the Heap of Corn," " the Horned Alan," "the IJjild-lii-a.d" (Diog.
Lint. II. 10S), and Dio<loi-ns Cronus, \\lio brought forward new arguments against
motion, and who also maintained the view that the necessary alone is real, and the real
alone is possible. Stilpo of Megara combined the Alegarie doctrines, with those of the
Cynics, lie combated the doctrine of Ideas. To him is ascribed the dialectical theory
that a thing can be predicated only of itself, and the ethical principle that the wise man is
superior to pain, and that the goal of all moral effort i.s Insensibility (aira^tta}. Stilpo
is the most famous of the Megarians ; he won reno.wn not alone by his philosophy, but
also by his firmness of character, his indifference to worldly possessions, his moderation,
liis evenness of temper, and his activity in public life.
5. Tlie Klian or Eretrian School is another branch of the Megarie
Philosophy. This school was founded by Phnedo of Elis, a favourite
disciple of Socrates — the same whom Plato, in the dialogue named after
him, introduces as communicating to his friend Eehecrates the last dis
courses of Socrates. After the death of his master he founded in his
native city a school of philosophy, which seems to have had much
in common with the Megarians. Menedemus, the Eretrian, a pupil of
Ph;edo (o.VJ-278) transferred this school to Eretria, whence its later
name. Soon after his death this school, like the Megarie, was absorbed
by the Stoa.
6. We have little information regarding Phaxlo's doctrines. Of
Menedemus, we are told by Diogenes Laertius (II. 13o), that he shared
the views of Plato, but that he employed Dialectic only to play with it.
Like the Megarians, the Eretrians declared Intelligence to be* the only
good. This is virtue also. Virtue, therefore, is one, as the Good is
one.
Tin: CYNICS.
1. The founder of the ( Ynics was Antisthenes, an Athenian, a pupil
first of d'orgias, and then of Socrates. After the death of the latter
philosopher, he taught in tlie gymnasium, called Cynosarges (whence the
name of his school), to which he was restricted, as not being of purelv
Atlirnian extraction.* The influence of the teachings of Gorgias was
manifested in the rhetorical form of his dialogues. He resembled
Socrates in external appearance, and he was hound to his master l>v
the ties of an intimate friendship.
2. Anti>thenes brought, into special prominence the ethical element
in the teaching of Socrates, lie inserted that Virtue is the only, as it
is the higheM gn,»d for man ; it is all-MiHieient, it alone can give happi-
* He was the son of an Athenian lather, but of a Tliraci;m mother.
68 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
ness. Virtue is, therefore, in the theory of Antisthenes, the highest
purpose of human life, and sufficient of itself to create perfect happiness*
What is intermediate between Virtue and Wickedness is indifferent
(aSifityopov). The good is congenial to us (otjcaov), the bad is some
thing foreign (aXXorpiov). Pleasure, sought as an end, is evil.
3. According to Antisthenes the essence of Virtue consists in Self-
Control, and this is dependent on right understanding. It is, therefore,
one in itself, and it can be imparted by instruction. The strongest bul
wark is that knowledge which is founded on safe conclusions. The Self-
Control, in which consists the essence of Virtue, is nothing more than
independence of all casual needs, that sufficiency in self, which manifests
itself in a contempt for conventional customs, as well as in the renun
ciation of every calling and pursuit in life. Once acquired, Virtue
cannot be lost ; the man who has once become virtuous can never cease
to possess this perfection.
4. The virtuous man is wise, and he only is wise. Virtue and wis
dom are to some extent identical. The wise man despises everything —
noble birth, riches, fame, &c. ; he has all he wants in himself. With
regard to marriage, family, and the social life of the State, he is in
different. No form of government existing, or possible, is suitable to
him. He restricts himself to the inner consciousness of his own virtue,,
and withdraws from existing society, but only to become a citizen of
the world. The faith of the multitude has as little binding force for
the wise man as its laws. There is but one God (Cic de JNTat, deor. 1,
13, 32). He cannot be known by images. Virtue is the only true
worship.
5. Antisthenes was not wholly a stranger to dialectical investiga
tions, though they seem to have chiefly furnished him with matter for
sportive sophistries. He explains Definition to be an exposition of the
essence of a thing (Ao'yoe \(TT\V 6 TO ri r> ?) tern etyAwv). He admits as
valid only identical judgments. He maintains, furthermore, that self-
contradiction is impossible : " for in the propositions supposed contra
dictory, we either speak of the same subject, or we do not; if we are
6. To the School of the Cynics belong " Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes, with
his wife Hipparchia, and her brother Metrocles, Menippus, a pupil of Crates, and
others." Diogenes made himself ridiculous by his extravagance in applying the prin
ciples of his master. He is said to have accepted without protest the name "Dog
(KVIHV) bestowed upon him. He was also called "Socrates gone mad" (ZunpaTtic
jiau O^EVOC). He rejected the immorality of his age ; but he, at the same time, rejected
its morality and its refinement. In its later development, Cynicism, so far as it was not
lost in Stoicism, degenerated into mere insolence and indecency.
1'lllI.OSOIMIY OF THE GKKKKS. (JQ
TIIK CYKKXAICS.
§27.
i . The founder of the Cyrenaic or Hedonist School was Aristippus
(the Elder), described by Aristotle as a Sophist. He was a native of
Gyrene (whence the name Cyrenaic given to his philosophy). The fame
of Socrates attracted him to Athens, where he joined the circle of the
philosopher's disciples. He would seem to have been acquainted, pre
viously, with the philosophy of Protagoras, traces of which appear in
his own teaching. The manners which prevailed in the wealthy and
luxuriously where he was born, were not without influence in deter
mining his love for pleasure. He is said to have been a frequent guest
at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii of Sicily, and to have
made there the acquaintance of Plato.
2. Aristippus gave special prominence to the theory of Happiness
propounded by Socrates, but he interpreted it in a fashion which
accorded with the peculiarities of his own disposition, and his own ten
dencies. He makes Happiness the supreme good of man, and the
supreme^end of human life. But Happiness, according to Aristippus,
consists in the pleasure of the moment, and this pleasure is the sensation
of gentle motion. ^ The motion of which we have sensation is of three
kinds ^feeble motion, to which we remain indifferent; violent motion,
which is in disaccord with nature, and which we describe as pain or
suffering ; and lastly, motion of the easy and gentle kind, which is con
genial to^ nature, and which we describe as a movement of pleasure.
Pleasure is, therefore, not merely the absence of pain, it consists in an
active movement ; it is the pleasure that passes — the pleasure of the
moment. This alone can make us happy ; it is the highest good of
man. Our true duty is to enjoy the present, for that alone is in our
power.
_ 3. The details of this theory are in accord with these fundamental
principles. The primary form of pleasure, according to Aristippus, is
bodily pleasure, and every pleasure is accompanied by an affection of
the bodily organism. Pleasure, as such, is never bad, though some
pleasures are derived from causes which are evil. One pleasure does
not differ from another in quality, nor is one superior to another, their
intensity and their duration alone determine their worth. The differ
ence between good and evil pleasures is therefore a question of custom ;
there is no intrinsic distinction in the things themselves.
4. But to enjoy aright the pleasure of the moment, we require In
telligence and Virtue. Intelligence must subdue the passions and pre
judices which disturb enjoyment, and prevent men from giving them
selves to pleasure at every moment, and at the same time it must enable
the individual so to take advantage of passing circumstances, and so to
direct them, that he shall be able to derive enjoyment from every situa
tion in life. Virtue, on the other hand, being the same thing as Self-
Control, must enable man to enjoy pleasure without becoming a slave
70 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
to it, must enable him to give himself to pleasure in such a way as not
to bring upon himself suffering, sickness, or disease. Control of plea
sure, in the midst of pleasure, must be secured by Virtue. Intelligence
and Virtue are, therefore, valuable as means to pleasure. The man
who possesses them for this end is truly wise.
5. In keeping with the Hedonistic ethics of Aristippus is his theoi y
of cognition, which restricts all our knowledge to sensation. The
Cyrenaics distinguish between subjective affection (TO iraOog) and the
external object which produces this affection (TO tKrog vTroKti/u^vo^ KOI
TOV TraOovc TroirjTiKov). The former belongs to the sphere of our own
consciousness ; the latter exists, but more than this we do not know re
garding it. Whether the sensations of other men correspond with our
own we have no means of knowing ; the application of the same names
to the same objects proves nothing. This, it is clear, is no more than
a further development of the subjectivism propounded in the Proti>
gorean theory of cognition.
6. To the Cyrenaic School belong Arete, daughter of Aristippus, and her son Aris
tippus the Younger, surnamed " the mother-taught " (/i7jrpo£ida»crog), who was probably
the first to give systematic form to the hedonistic doctrines, and to whom we owe the
comparison of the three conditions of sensation — trouble, pleasure, indifference, to the
tempest, the gentle wind, and the tranquil sea ; Theodoras, who was surnamed " the
Atheist " because of his denying the existence of the gods and of moral law, and who
held that a particular momentary pleasure was indifferent, that enduring joy (Cheerful
ness) was the end to be sought by the truly wise ; the pupils of Theodorus, Bio and
Evemerus, who explained the belief in the gods to have arisen out of the custom of
honouring men ; Hegesias, surnamed the "death-adviser," who, despairing of positive
happiness, taught that true wisdom consisted in indifference to pleasure and pain, and
even, to life itself, which he held to be valueless ; finally, Anniceris (the younger) who
endeavoured to give a higher interpretation to the theory of pleasure by making friend
ship, gratitude, love of parents and country, social intercourse, and the pursuit of honour,
means to happiness ; he is, however, careful to remark that every effort on behalf of
others has its cause, and its purpose in the pleasure procured to ourselves by this
benevolence ; he thus continues to maintain the egoistic principles of Hedonism.
PLATO.
PLATO'S LIFE AND WRITINGS — GENERAL CHARACTER OF HIS
PHILOSOPHY.
§28.
1. We come now to the greatest and most renowned of the pupils
of Socrates, for whom it was reserved to complete the work planned and
begun by the master. We speak of Plato. The Socratic doctrines
formed the basis of his philosophic system ; but he did not confine him
self to these ; he borrowed also from Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras,
and Parmenides, such notions as he found suitable to his purpose. But
Plato did not merely collect and reproduce for us the opinions of these
philosophers, he constructed for himself an original philosophy. The
final results of the philosophical investigations of others he took only as
the materials for the structure which he had planned in his own mind.
PHILOSOPHY OF HIM GKKKKS. il
The prominent feature of his philosophy is its thoroughly ideal character.
"As the blood," says u modern writer, " flows from the heart to all
parts of the body, and returns to the heart again, so in the Platonic
philosophy everything proceeds from the Idea as from a centre, and
everything returns thither again." Hence the great wealth of material
which we observe in the Platonic Philosophy. With this wealth of
material is united a grace of style and of exposition which has never
been surpassed.
2. Plato was born at Athens, B.C. 428. He was originally named Aristocles. He
was the son of Aristo, a descendant of Codrus, and of Perictone, who was a descendant
of Dropides— a near relative of Solon, and who was also a cousin of Cretias, one of the
Thirty Tyrants. He is said to have devoted himself to poetry in his youth, a statement
which the graceful style of his later writings renders probable. The weakness of his
voice rendered him unfit for the duties of the public speaker. The stories regarding his
military service rest on slender foundation. He appears to have pursued philosophical
investigations at the same time that he was cultivating the poetic art, for he made
acquaintance with Cratylus while still a youth, and learned from him the doctrines of
Heraclitus. But Socrates seems to have been the first to give an entirely new direction
to his efforts. He was twenty years old when he attached himself to Socrates, and he
continued till the death of his master to enjoy the benefit of his teaching, and to be
ranked among the most faithful and most esteemed of the philosopher's disciples.
.3. After the death of Socrates, Plato, with some other disciples of the philosopher,
joined Euclid at Megara. His intimacy with Euclid must have exercised considerable in
fluence on the system formed by Plato. After his stay at Megara he undertook his first
great journey (probably not before returning to Athens and sojourning for some timeinthat
city). He visited Cyrene in Africa, and there made acquaintance with the mathemati
cian Theodoras. He next proceeded to Egypt to pursue the study of Mathematics and
Astronomy under its priests, and thence he continued his journey to Asia Minor. After
another sojourn at Athens, he undertook, at the age of forty, a journey into Italy, to
make acquaintance with the Pythagoreans. Thence he travelled to Sicily, where he
formed a close intimacy with Dion, brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius the Elder.
His moral admonitions are said to have provoked the tyrant himself to such a degree
that he induced the Spartan envoy, Pollis, to sell the philosopher into slavery in /Egina,
as a prisoner of war. He was ransomed by Anniceris, and returned to Athens, where
he founded, B.C. 387, his school of philosophy in the garden of Academus (Academy).
His teaching, as we observe in his writings, and as we learn from an express statement
in the Phaedrus (p. 275), took the form of dialogue ; though he seems, at a later period,
especially for his more advanced pupils, to have delivered sustained discourses.
4. In the year B.C. 367, after the death of Dionysius the elder, Plato undertook
another journey to Sicily. He did so at the suggestion of Dion, who hoped that the
teaching of Plato would influence the new ruler of Syracuse, Dionysius the Younger,
and would help to induce a change in the government of Sicily to the aristocratic form.
The plan failed owing to the weak and sensual temperament of Dionysius ; he suspected
Dion of aiming at the sovereign power, and he condemned him to exile. In these cir
cumstances Plato could no longer maintain his position, and he therefore returned once
more to Athens. He visited Sicily a third time in B.C 361, in the hope of effecting a re
conciliation between Dionysius and Dion. But he failed in his purpose. His own life
was in peril from the suspicions of the tyrant, and he owed his safety to the interposi
tion of the Pythagorean, Archytas of Tan-ntum. Returning to Athens he again began
to teach by writings and oral instruction, and to this task he devoted the remainder of
his life. He died at the age of eighty-one in the year B.C. 348 (or 347).
5. " The works of Plato, which have come down to us, consist of thirty-six treatises,
(the letters being counted as one), besides which others, pronounced spurious by the
ancients, bear his name. Aristophanes of Byzantium, a grammarian of Alexandria,
divided a certain number of the treatises of Plato into five trilogies, and the neo-Pytha-
gorean Thrasyllus (of the time of the Emperor Tiberius), divided the treatises which ht
accepted as genuine into nine trilogies." In recent times many hypotheses have been
framed regarding the order, and the succession in time of the dialogues of Plato The
most important theories on this point are those of Schleiermacher, Hermann, and Munk.
(a) Schleiermacher assumes that Plato had a definite plan of instruction before him
when composing his several works (his occasional treatises excepted), and that they were
72 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
menides; subsidiary dialogues, Lysis, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro ; occasional trea
tises, the Apology of Socrates and Crito ; partly or wholly spurious, lo, Hippia* II.,
Hipparchus, Minos, Alcibiades II. To the second group he assigns as the leading dia
logues : Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicals, Phado, Philebus ; subsidiary dialogues : Gory tax,
Meno, Euthydemus, Cratylus, the Banquet ; partly or wholly spurious, Theages, Erast<e,
Alcibiades I., Menexenus, Hippias I., Clitopho. To the third group belong as leading
dialogues : The Republic, Timceus, Critias, and, as subsidiary dialogue, the Laws.
(b.) On the other hand, K. F. Hermann maintains that there is no single plan trace
able in Plato's works, that they are merely the expression of the philosophical develop
ment of his own mind. He fixes, therefore, in the literary career of Plato three periods,
each of which has its distinguishing characteristics. The first period extends to the
death of Socrdttes ; the second covers the time of Plato's stay at Megara, and includes his
subsequent travels in Egypt and Asia Minor ; the third begins with Plato's return from
his first visit to Sicily, and ends with his death. He assigns to the first period the dia
logues : Hippias II., lo, Alcibiades I., Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Euthy
demus ; and to the " transition stage " between the first and second periods : the Apology,
Crito, Gorgias, Euthyphro, Meno, Hippias I. To the second period he assigns the dia
logues : Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Parmenides ; to the third : Phtvdrus,
Menexejius, the Banquet, Pho2do, Philebus, the Republic, Timceus, Critias, and the Laws.
(c). Munk is of opinion that Plato in his writings followed an order ideally repre
senting the life of Socrates, the genuine philosopher, and that this order portrayed the
several stages of the life of Socrates. Accordingly he distinguishes three series of trea
tises : (a) corresponding to Socrates' devoting himself to philosophy, and his attacks
upon the current false teaching (B.C. 389-384) ; Parmenides, Protagoras, Charmides,
Laches, Gorgias, Hippias /., Cratylus, Euthydemus, the Banquet ; (/3) corresponding to
Socrates' teaching of true wisdom (B.C. 383-370) : Pha'drus, Philebus, Republic, Timceus,
Critias ; (y) corresponding to Socrates' defence of his own teaching by criticism of rival
schools, and to his death (after B.C. 370) : Meno, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Euthyphro,
Apology, Crito, Phfedo. Cfr. Ueberweg, Vol. L, p. 95.
6. The controversy regarding the arrangement and succession in time of Plato's dia
logues is not yet ended ; no certain result has yet been obtained. It seems to us that
the hypothesis of Hermann is the simplest and most natural ; all the more that there is
observable in the dialogues of Plato an unmistakable development of philosophic thought.
Whether the classification given by Hermann is perfect in all its details, may be left an
open question. Without attempting to discuss it, we shall indicate briefly the substance
of the several dialogues, adopting the order suggested by Hermann.
First series : Hippias II. treats of Free Will in Wrong-doing ; lo, of Inspiration
and Reflection ; Alcibiades I., of Human Nature ; Charmides, of the virtue of Temper
ance ; Lysis, of Friendship ; Laches, of Courage ; Protagoras, of Virtue — it is directed
against the Sophists ; Euthydemus, is a treatise on the same subject ; the Apology of
Socrates is a defence of that philosopher against his accusers ; Crito treats of Right
Action ; Gorgias is a discussion upon Rhetoric, and a condemnation of the abuse of it by
the Sophists ; Euthyphro treats of Holiness ; Meno of Virtue, and the possibility of its
being taught ; Hippias I. is directed against the Sophists.
In the second series : Cratylus contains philosophical investigations on Language ;
Theaetetus is an inquiry into the nature of Knowledge ; it is chiefly a refutation of the
Sophists, and contains little positive teaching ; Sophistes is a treatise on the concept of
Being ; Politicus on the Statesman, what he should know, and how he should act ; Par
menides treats of Ideas, and the notion of the One.
In the third series : Phaedrus treats of Love, and the Beautiful as the object of
love ; Menexenus of the Useful ; the Banquet again of Love ; Phaedo of the Soul and Im
mortality ; Philebus of the Good, more particularly of the Supreme Good ; the Republic is
a treatise on Political Philosophy, but the ten books of which it is composed contain
many important questions of large philosophic interest ; Timceus is a treatise on
Cosmogony ; Critias is a pretended history of primeval political institutions ; the Law*, a
treatise, in twelve books, on the State ; not an inquiry as to the best possible (ideal)
state, like the Republic (iroXirtla) but a discussion as to that State which will best suit
certain given conditions. (The genuineness of the Meno and Epinomis, which treat of
Laws, is disputed.)
7. The writings of Plato were first published in a Latin translation in 1483-84 ; the
translation was the work of Marsilius Ficinus. A Greek edition was published at Venice
in 1583 by Aldus Manutius, aided by Marcus Musurus.
OK THK (.IIKKK^. 73
The edition of Oporinua and Gryiiaeus was published at Basle in I.VU. followed by
another edition in the same city in 1556. Then came the edition of Henricua Stephanua,
accompanied by the translation of Serranus, Paris, 1578, the paging of this edition is
inserted in the more recent editions, and is usually cited in quotations. Of the com
plete editions which have been published in recent times we have : the Editta B\pont\na
( 1781-87) by Croll, Exter, and Embser ; the Tauchnitz edition (1813-19) by Beck; the
edition of Immanuel Bekker (Berlin, 1816-23) ; the editions of Ast, of StaUbaum, of
Baiter, Orelli, and Winkelman (Zurich), of Schneider, arid of Hermann.
Philosophy, according to Plato, is the science of the Unconditioned
and the Unchangeable— of that which is the basis of all phenomena.
The Unconditioned and the Unchangeable are for him the ideas of
things, for these he holds to be really existent (OVTWQ &v), and thus to
stand in contrast with the changeable fleeting things of the phenomenal
world. Accordingly he holds Philosophy, rightly defined, to be the
science of Ideas, the science of the really existent. ^ But Philosophy is
not mere theory, in Plato's estimate, it essentially includes a practical
element also ; it directs the whole man, Reason and Will alike, towards
the Ideal, and is thus the complement of man's intellectual and moral
life. Perfect wisdom belongs to God alone ; man can only be a striver
after wisdom (0<Ao<ro<£oe), his business is to approach ever nearer and
nearer to the perfect wisdom of God. This effort must spring from a
love of the Good and the Beautiful, and from wonder at the great
phenomena which the objective order of things sets before the mind as
so many problems to solve. These feelings give rise to a desire for a
certain knowledge of the ultimate reasons of all things, and all phenomena,
and thus the efforts of the philosopher are called forth.
9. Plato distinguishes between Philosophy and the preparatory
sciences. Among the latter he reckons Mathematics. The science of
Mathematics is not a part of philosophy ; for it assumes certain notions
and certain principles without giving any account of them, taking them
as if they were evident to all — a proceeding which philosophy as a pure
science cannot admit. Furthermore it makes use, in its demonstrations,
of visible images, though it does not treat of these, but of something
which the mind alone perceives. It stands, therefore, midway between
mere correct opinion and science ; clearer than the one, more obscure
than the other. But though Mathematics is not philosophy, it is never
theless an indispensable means for training the mind to philosophical
thought, a necessary step to knowledge, without which no one can be
come a philosopher. It is, in a certain sense, the vestibule of
philosophy.
10. The organon proper of philosophical knowledge is Dialectic.
Dialectic is the art of reducing what is multiple and manifold in our
experience to unity in one concept, and of establishing an organic order
and interdependence among the concepts so acquired. The dialectician is
skilled to discover the several single concepts which underlie the many
and varying objects of our cognition, and to arrange and classify these
concepts according to their mutual relations. In the latter process the
method he follows will be either the analytical method — proceeding
from below upwards, or the synthetical — proceeding from above down-
74 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
wards. Dialectic will thus include the twofold process — ascent from
the particular to the general, and descent from the general to the
particular.* B
11. How and to what extent this Dialectic is the orgaiion — the
operative factor in philosophical knowledge — we find indicated in the
relations which, according to Plato, subsist between the concepts to
which it leads, and Ideas — the really existent entities, which are the
proper object of philosophy. Ideas are the objects of these concepts ;
in forming these concepts we are apprehending in them the ideas of
things — we are apprehending the really existent, and are arriving at
the knowledge which is the ultimate end of all the efforts of the
philosopher. Dialectic is thus the real organon, the vivifying centre of
all philosophy. Hence it is that Plato not unfrequently uses Dialectic
and Philosophy as synonymous terms.
12. Mythical notions prepare the way for dialectical knowledge,
and, where it fails, come in to supplement it. The myth is an aid to
the mind in its efforts to form right conceptions, but it is, in itself, an
imperfect way of representing things ; the dialectical method is the only
method which leads to philosophical knowledge. The myth must,
however, be appealed to when dialectical knowledge is either* unattain
able, or very difficult of attainment. Plato himself makes use largely
of the mythical form in his expositions ; he very frequently introduces
the ancient myths and legends in order to state his theories through
them. To this circumstance the charm of his writings is largely due.
13. With regard to the division of the Platonic philosophy/ we find
that Cicero (Acad. post, L, 5, 19) ascribes to Plato himself the division
into Dialectics, Physics, and Ethics. According to Sextus Empiricus
(adv. Math. VII., 16), this division was formally made by Plato's dis
ciple Xenocrates, though Plato may be considered to have virtually
(Sui/a/K«) established it himself. If this division is not expressly
mentioned in Plato's writings, it is nevertheless practically adopted in
his exposition of his theories. It will, therefore, be the most suitable
for us to follow in setting forth Plato's doctrines. As, however, we have
already indicated the general character of the Platonic Dialectic, it only
remains for us to set forth, under the first head, Plato's theory of Ideas—
the central doctrine of the Dialectic, and indeed of the entire Platonic
philosophy, and his theory of Knowledge. We shall therefore treat in
order, first, Plato's theory of Ideas, in conjunction with his theory of
Knowledge, which arises out of it, and depends on it ; next, his Physics ;
and finally his Ethics, in which we shall include his Political Philosophy.
* Plato himself describes these two methods, which together constitute the whole
dialectical process (Phaedr. 205), as, on the one hand, the union in intuition of several
individuals, and their reduction by this means to unity of essence ; and on the other
the division of unity into plurality, in accordance with natural classifications. The first
thod leads to Definition- -the knowledge of the essence of things ; the second is the
J)ivision of the generic notion into the subordinate specific concepts.
OF Till-; (iUKEKS. 70
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF IDEAS AND THEORY OF KNOWI.KIH.I;.
§29.
1. It is, as we have seen, the function of Dialetic to form general
(or universal) Notions, arid to reduce them, when formed, to organic
arrangement, in accordance with their mutual relations. The objects
corresponding to these general notions are Ideas. By immediate appre
hension we have knowledge of the individual object ; by the concept
we have knowledge of the Idea. The question naturally presents
itself, — how are we to conceive of these Ideas in their objective state,
and what relations are we to conceive them as holding to individual
objects, and to God ? Plato's manner of answering these questions
determines the fundamental character of his whole philosophy.
2. To the first question : How we are to conceive of the Ideas in
thrir objective existence? Plato replies:
(a) The objective correlatives of the Universal Concepts given in
our thought, are Universal Ideas. The Universal, as such, is not there
fore a mere product of dialectical thought ; as Universal, it is objectively
real. To the Universal in thought corresponds an Universal in objec
tive reality, and this objective Universal is the Idea. In this wise
Plato gives objective existence to the Idea not only as regards the
things it represents, but also as regards the form of universality which
belongs to our thought of these things — to our concept.
(b) This being so, Universal Ideas are not something indwelling in
individual objects, i.e., an Idea is not the csscntia which enters into the
being of the several individuals of the same species ; since it is Uni
versal, it must be held to transcend all merely individual objects.
Universal Ideas, as such, have therefore an independent existence apart
from the world of phenomena ; the true essences of things represented
in these Ideas have being above and apart from things as they exist in
dividually. In a word, we must admit a world of Ideas, distinguished
from and transcending the world of phenomena.*
* Plato discovers a proof of this (Tim. p. 51) in the difference between scientific
knowledge and mere right opinion (roSf and &>£« a
"If they are," he says,
" two different kinds of knowledge, there must exist an order of Ideas having distinct
existence, of which we have knowledge not by sense-perception, but by thought (tlcii
v ovfjiEva) ; on the other hand, if they are one and the same, as some have thought, ideas
cease to have objective existence, and become mere subjective concepts. In point of
fact, however, they are two different kinds of knowledge, and the difference is one of
origin (the one being induced by conviction, the other by persuasion), as well as of
nature (the one being certain and immutable, the other untrustworthy and changeable.)
It follows that there are two classes of objects ; the one class including all that is
unchangeable, that does not come into being, and does not cease to be, that does not
receive anything of alien nature into its being, nor pass itself into anything else, i.e., all
Transcendental Universal Ideas ; the other class includes those individual objects which
bi-ar the same name and belong to the same species as the Ideas, which exist in a deter
minate place, which come into existence and cease to be, and are unceasingly in
motion."
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(c) .The mutual relations subsisting between these transcendental Uni
versal Ideas are the same as the relations subsisting between the corres
ponding general notions in our thought. As general notions form, in
thought, a logical unity, so do the Ideas corresponding to them enter
into union in the objective order. But this union is not, like the One
Being of Parmenides, a lifeless, motionless thing ; it involves a dialec
tical movement towards plurality. As in the process of our thought
our concepts are differentiated, and thereby pass from the universal to
the particular, so in the objective order of Ideas there is a differentia
tion of the Universal and the One into the Many. To every Idea be
longs " identity with another thing " (ravrav), i.e., it is a member in one
Unity of Ideal Being ; to every Idea belongs also " difference from other
things" (Barepov), it carries within it a determinate character which
distinguishes it from other Ideas, and by which it becomes other than
these. The world of Ideas must therefore be regarded as unity in
plurality, and plurality in unity. To admit unity without plurality
would be to involve ourselves inextricably in contradiction ; to admit
plurality without unity would lead to a like result. Reason requires
that we should assume both. (Parmenides, p. 137, s. 99 • Sophist
p. 254, s. 99).
3. Turning now to the second question : How Plato understands
the individual objects of the phenomenal world to be related to the
Ideas, we find his teaching to be as follows :
(a) Ideas alone have real being ; they alone are perfect, unchange
able, enduring, eternal, imperishable. Unchanging in itself, the ideal
world moves in viewless majesty above the world of phenomena, repre
senting within itself the full perfection of Being. The phenomenal
world, on the other hand, is the sphere of imperfection, of change, of
transition, the region where things exist in time, and begin to be. The
existence of material things is a perpetual flux, there is nothing fixed
or permanent in them ; they are always passing out of existence. In
the material world all things oscillate between Being and Non-being.
Nothing ever attains perfection, for at each moment things cease to be
what they were a moment before. All things are at the transition
point from Being to Non-being, and from Non-being to Being ; they
are, and are not, at the same time. It follows that there can be no
question here of Being in its perfection.*
* We may observe that Plato here endeavours to combine the principles set in con
trast by the pre-Socratic philosophy— the principle of continual change or unceasing
x held by the lonians, and the principle of unchanging Being held by the Eleatics
He adopts at once a sphere of immutable being, and another of continuous change, but
nmkes the one distinct from the other, in order to preserve to each its characteristic
attributes. Aristotle (Met L, 6 and XIII. 4. 9.) describes Plato's doctrine of Ideas as the
common product of Herachtus' theory of constant flux, and the Socratic tendency to
concepts The view that the world of sense is subject to ceaseless change was
borrowed by Plato from Cratylus, a disciple of Hernclitus, and was thenceforth main-
tamed by him Accordingly, when Socrates made him acquainted with these concepts
;s which once formed, can be held without change, he was precluded from referring
these to sensible objects, and was thus forced to assume the existence of things of
another order— special objects of conceptual knowledge— and those he named Ideas "
PHILOSOPHY OF 'I UK (JltKKKS. 77
(b) Ideas, and the objects of the phenomenal world, arc here .set in
contrast ; they have, however, contact with one another (tcoiiwvfa). The
individual objects of the phenomenal order have part in the Ideas
(n*ri \ovfft), each individual object has part in the Idea corresponding
to it, and this participation makes it to be what it is (Pha3d., p. 101).
The Idea is as the real essence of the object ; it follows that the object
becomes the thing it is only by participating in the Idea corresponding
to it. Thus it is that participation in these Ideas determines the proper
being of individual objects, as well as the characteristics which distin
guish them from one another. In this way things are good in the
visible world by participation in the self-subsistent Good, beautiful by
participation in self-subsistent Beauty, wise, holy, just, by participation
in self-subsistent Wisdom, Holiness, Justice. (Phaxl. 100, 6. sqq. ;
Meno. p. 73, &c.)
(c) But in what consists this participation (/i«-f\«v) ? According
to Plato it consists in "imitation" (/u/jurjtnc, ofjioiwm^) by the pheno
menal objects of the corresponding Ideas. The Ideas are the models,
the prototypes (irapaSsLy/uiaTa) ; phenomenal objects are the copies,
ectypes (a'So>Aa o/noito/uaTa) of these models. The Ideas reflect them
selves in the objects as in so many mirrors, and by this reflection of
themselves manifest their existence. But this reflection of the Ideas is
all the while very imperfect. Sensible objects reproduce but imper
fectly the models they represent. Ideas are reflected in them as in a
dimmed mirror. For, in the first place, Matter is not in itself capable
of reflecting the Idea in its fulness ; and in the second place, the process
of continual change which involves all things of the phenomenal world
in a constant movement of generation and decay, disturbs the clearness
of the representation. There is, therefore, no comparison possible be
tween the lustre and grandeur of the Idea in itself, and the copy of
it which appears in the world of phenomena. In the supersensible
world all is pure and unclouded ; in the sensible world, all is dimness
and confusion. In the one we have completeness and perfection, in the
other incompleteness and imperfection. Phenomenal objects hold,
therefore, an intermediate position between Being and Non-being.
They are inasmuch as they participate in real Being ; they are not inas
much as they participate in it imperfectly. They do not, however,
stand without the realm of Being, for Being is present to them (irapovaia)
as their true essence, even though it be not indwelling (immanent) in
them.
4. To our third question : What are the relations of these Ideas to
God, Plato's writings furnish this answer :
(ft) The Idea of God seems in the mind of Plato — as far at least as
his doctrine rests on mere Dialectic — to have been one with the Idea of
the Good. To the Idea of the Good, as to every other Idea, he attri
butes real being, but he does not identify it with the other Ideas. It
is not a logico-metaphysical unit including all Ideas; no trace of
such a conception is to be found in the teachings of Plato. On the con
trary, he assigns to the Idea of the Good a transcendental position above
78 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
ull other Ideas. The oneness of an Idea Plato describes as overt' a,
meaning thereby that the Idea is the true essence (ovaia) of the objects
of sense ; but he states expressly that the Idea of the Good is not the
avert ft itself, but is of a higher order. (I)e Rep. VI. p. 508, VII. p.
517). lie makes the Idea of the Good the sun of his world of Ideas.
As the sun in this visible1 world not only renders things visible, but
furthermore causes their generation, growth, and continued existence,
without however being generated itself, so the Idea of the Good not
only makes knowable all things that are known, but gives them also
Being and Essence, not however becoming itself this Being or Essence,
but surpassing them immeasurably in dignity and power. (Dc Rep.
VI. 000-510, VII. p. 517, p. 540, p. 532.)
(7>) Respecting the relations established by Plato between the Ideas
of mundane things and the Idea of the Good, i.e., the Idea of God,
two distinct views have prevailed. Aristotle asserts that Plato estab
lished a difference between the Ideas of things and the things themselves,
and then attributed to the Ideas, thus isolated, independent existence ;
and on the strength of this interpretation he sets himself to combat this
theory of separation (xtopi&iv). According to this interpretation, Plato
not only assigns to Ideas an existence transcending all individual objects,
but he gives them furthermore subsistence apart from the being of God.
The later scholastic philosophers have, as a rule, adopted this interpreta
tion. On the other hand, hardly any of the earlier Christian exponent s
of Plato's philosophy, hardly any of the Fathers of the Church, ascribe
to Plato this doctrine of an order of Ideas subsisting apart from the
Divine Mind. They assert, almost unanimously, that Plato located his
world of Ideas wholly in the Divine Intellect, and regarded the so-called
Koerjuoe vorjroc as a system of Divine Conceptions.
(c) For ourselves, we will not venture to take sides in the contro
versy. It seems to us highly probable that Plato regarded the Divine
Intellect as the source, and if we may so say, the halitat of Ideas. For
he employs, to^ describe the oneness of the Ideas, the terms voue, aotyia,
Ao'yoe, and this he regards not as a lifeless thing, but as a living and
moving being. (Phileb. p. 30, 'De Rep. VII., p. 517, Soph. p. 248).
Moreover, he states expressly regarding the vov? that it can exist only in
a tout, i.e., in a spiritual being. Again Plato distinctly asserts that God
the First Author, the (jwrovpyoQ of all Ideas (De Rep. X., p. 597),
and teaches that the vouc and aXr'ifaut are brought forth by that cause
which is the cause of all things (Phileb. p. 30). These assertions seem
to warrant the view that Plato did not attribute to Ideas independent
subsistence apart from God, but rather regarded them as conceptions of
the Divine Intellect. However, the authority of Aristotle in the matter
cannot be lightly set aside, as is sometimes done ; for he was the imme
diate disciple of Plato. It is not to be assumed that a man of Aristotle's
wonderful acuteness of intellect failed to understand his master, and
lere does not seem to be any reason to believe that he wilfully mis
represented his teaching. It has indeed been asserted that Aristotle,
'('mining Ideas into his own system, deliberately misrepresented
PHILOSOPHY OF TI1K (iKl.KKS. 70
Plato's theory of Ideas in order the more easily to refute it. But tin's
is an accusation for which no positive proof's can be adduced. AVe
therefore hold as more probable the opinion that Plato regarded Trie -us
as conceptions of the Divine Mind; but, for the reasons assigned, we
re I'm in from stating this opinion as absolutely certain.*
5. Plato's Theory of Knowledge is intimately connected with his
doctrine of Ideas. Considering knowledge in its subjective aspect, we
find that Plato distinguishes various kinds of knowledge according to
the various objects. The prominent difference established in this con
nection is the difference between sensible and supersensible objects
(bpa-rov Kal VOIITOV ylvoc). Sensible objects are of two kinds — real
bodies and the semblances of these bodies, such as are produced by art
(owjLcara and aico^ec;). Supersensible objects are also of two kinds ; they
are either mathematical entities or Ideas proper (fiaB^fiaruca and Ictai).
6. Accordingly, we must first of all distinguish in human cognition
between £o£« and VOVI&IQ. The S6£a is concerned with sensible objects ;
the voi]ai£ with supersensible. Our sensuous perception must be de
scribed as £o£a, because sensuous perception can do no more than enable
us to form an opinion ; it does not issue in complete certainty. Opinion
is not indeed absolute uncertainty, but neither is it complete certainty ;
it is something intermediate between both, partaking of the character of
each, just as the sensible order with which it has to do is intermediate
between Being and Non-being, and has something of the nature of
each. On the other hand, i/drjo-fc, which is concerned with the super
sensible, attains to absolute certainty of cognition ; the mind in this
stage passes out of the vacillating state of mere opinion, and reaches the
light of true yvwat^ ; v6i\aig is therefore the form of cognitive action
which leads to scientific knowledge — «nor>//u»j- There is, therefore, an
essential difference between the two kinds of knowledge, the sensuous
and the intellectual, a difference due as well to the essential difference
between the objects of cognition as to the nature of the cognitive act itself
7. We must make a further distinction still in the case both of &£a
and i/di/(r«£. As has already been observed, £o£« may be concerned
* In his old age Plato is said to have occupied himself in resolving Ideas into Ideal
numbers. Aristotle is our authority for this. "In point of fact we find certain traces
of notions of this kind in some of the dialogues, as for example in the Phih'bii*, where
Ideas are described as ivactq or /novae)*?, and (in Pythagorean fashion) Trfpaftuul an-gipoi/
appear as their elementary constituents. According to Aristotle's account (Met. I. 6. 14,
1) Plato held that there were two elements (<rro/.xe<<i) of Ideas, as of all other things, a
form-giving element (irepctg) and an element formless in itself, but receptive of a form
(dTreipov). He appears to have assumed for every class of objects (Ideas, mathematical
entities, sensible objects) trroi^tJa of this kind, and to have considered every object as a
third term formed out of the two combined (pticTov). In sensible objects the antipov is
matter, as described in '/-hint'itx, and the Trepat; is Form and Quality; whereas in the
I'oiirii. tin- TTf'jmr is Unity (kv), and the a-rrnpor is the More and the Less, the Great and
the Little. From these elements, says Aristotle fMet. I. (5) number arises naturally
(tvQvtae). ^Ve can derive Ideas from them only when we reduce them to numbers.
Plato distinguishes between those numbers which constitute Ideas, and Mathematical
numbers. To the latter he assigns a place intermediate between Jdeas and sensible
objects. The one (eV) he identities with the Idea of the CJood." Cf. Ueberw.-;.
$0 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
either with bodies or with the semblances of bodies. In the first case
it becomes TT^TIQ ; in the latter it is mere dKa<ria. To ir«me a real
something corresponds objectively; to *lKa*ia only a picture of fancy—
the one is Perception, the other Imagination. On the other hand,
voVic deals either with mathematical entities or with Ideas ; in the
former case it becomes Stdvoia (ratio) ; in the latter, vovg (mtelkctm}
8. In accordance with these notions, Plato sketches (De Ivep. V 11.
p. 534) the following scheme of human cognition :—
OBJECTS.
Oparbv ytvoc-
ra. 'EtKOf£C'
MODE OF COGNITION.
9 These distinctions having been established with regard to human
cognition viewed from its subjective side, Plato's Theory of Knowledge
is further developed as follows :—
(a.) From our sensuous experience we cannot derive a knowledge o
the supersensible. As long as our knowledge has to do with the phe
nomena manifested through the senses, so long are we like to men in a
dream ; like men inebriated or insane, we drift upon the current ol
mere phenomena, without light from any ray of higher knowledge. ^ If
we wish to rise to knowledge of true Being— of Ideas— we must with
draw from the sphere of mere sense ; we must .retire within ourselves,
and there, with the pure, untroubled gaze of reason, contemplate the
Ideal and the Divine. Sensible objects can help us to knowledge ol the
Ideal only in so far as the blurred reflection of the Ideas which manifest
themselves in the world of sense move us to turn from these things and
fix our ga/e upon the objects of which they are the reflection. And
this being so, sensible objects not being for us a means of reaching the
Supersensible and the Ideal, the question at once arises, How is the
chasm bridged over which separates us from the world of Ideas r In
other words, How is contact of the human mind with Ideas— which, as
such, are wholly transcendental entities — possible and conceivable ?
(b.) To this question Plato cannot obtain from mere science an
adequate answer. He is, therefore, obliged to recur to an hypothesis.
This hypothesis he offers us in his doctrine of the antecedent existence
of the* soul. The soul, he teaches, has lived an extra-corporeal, purely
spiritual life before its union with the body, and lived this life in the
sphere of the ideal, not of the phenomenal world. In this state, Ideas
were the immediate objects of its contemplation, and in this contem
plation it found its happiness. But in consequence of its union with
the body (how it came to be united to a body will be explained further
on), it has forgotten the objects presented to its contemplation in that
extra-corporeal existence. Yet it has not lost the faculty of recalling
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 81
them to memory. It is stimulated to remembrance of them when it is
confronted by the dim and confused pictures of Ideas presented by the
objects of the sensible world. The picture awakes in it the remem
brance of the prototype, and thus revives the knowledge of the Idea
which had been forgotten. The acquisition of knowledge by man is
thus no more than a process of memory — a recollection (avdpvwis)
" Discere est reminisci." (Phocdo, p. 72. Meno, p. 81. Phaedr., p. 249.)
Plato endeavours to support this hypothesis by certain scientific
arguments. He adduces in its favour two principal proofs :
1. When we perceive objects in the world of sense, we form judg
ments regarding them, we judge them, e.g., to be more or less like, or
more or less good, or beautiful, and where there is question of human
actions we judge them to be more or less just, holy, and so forth. But
this clearly supposes that the notion of Likeness in itself, of Goodness,
Beauty, Justice, Holiness, in w, existed antecedently in our minds ; for
we can judge of the more and less of Likeness, Goodness, Beauty, &c., in
things only in so far as we compare them with Likeness, Goodness,
Beauty, &c., in themselves, and determine whether they approach to or
recede from the latter. Now man forms judgments of this kind at the
moment that he first begins to use his reason ; these notions must, there
fore, have existed in his mind antecedently to all experience. It follows
necessarily that the soul must have made acquaintance with the Ideas
in question before its union with the body, that it has brought these
notions with it into its present condition, and that the renewed know
ledge of them in its present life is no more than mere remembrance.
(Phaedo, p. 74.)
2. The same conclusion is suggested by the Heuristic Method of in
struction. In this method the learner is led by a series of questions,
arranged in logical sequence, to the knowledge of a given truth. In
this process the truth is not given him from without ; he is led to find it in
himself. The questioning is merely an aid to a discovery which he
makes in his own mind, it is merely a condition of the re-awakening of
knowledge in the mind of the learner. This being so, it follows that
the truths which the mind thus draws out of itself must have been pre
sent within it antecedently to all teaching and to all experience, that the
mind must have acquired them before its present life began, that it
must, consequently, have brought them with it into this terrestrial exist
ence, and that the renewed knowledge of them is no more than a recol
lection of what, at some previous time, was the object of the mind's
contemplation. (Phaedo, p. 73, Men. p. 82.)
10. Thus much with regard to Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Theory
of Knowledge. We pass now to his Physics, in which are included his
Theology, his Cosmogony, and his Psychology.
82 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
PHYSICS OF PLATO.
THEOLOGY, COSMOGONY, AND PSYCHOLOGY.
1. To begin with the Theological system of Plato; we find a three
fold proof for the existence of Good :
(a) The older Philosophy of Nature took irrational Matter as the
basis of all things, and held Reason, i.e, the rational soul of man, to be
evolved from it. Against this assumption Plato protests. We must
begin, not with inert Matter, but with the Rational Soul. Matter is not
the cause of its own motion ; its motion supposes a moving cause different
from itself. This moving cause cannot itself be of such kind that^ it
also requires to be moved from without ; such an hypothesis would in
volve us in an endless series. It must, therefore, be of that kind
which is self -moving. This self -movement is the essential charac
teristic of the spiritual or psychical being, as contrasted with the
material. Matter, according to this reasoning, necessarily postulates the
existence of a " Soul." This Soul is the Divine Spirit, or Divine " Soul."
Atheism, as a theory, is therefore absolutely irrational. (De Leg. X.,
p. 893 ; Phsedr. p. 240.)
(b) In the world ( )rder and Design are everywhere manifest ; they
are observable in the lower regions of the universe, but more notably
still in the regions of the stars. Order and Design, however, are not
possible unless we suppose a Reason, and Reason (vovc) can exist only
in a soul (T/<UX»J) or Personal Spirit. We are thus forced to admit a
Personal Divine Spirit, which presides over the universe, and is the
cause of the Order and Design which prevail in it. (Phtcdr. p. 30.)
(c) The ultimate elements of things are the Unlimited and the
Limit, for it is only by limitation of the Indefinite that a determinate
definite object is possible. But the determination of the Undefined by
limitation supposes a determining cause, which, as such, is above the
thing determined. This determining cause must be some supra-
mundane divine principle. (Phileb. p. 23.)
2. We have next to inquire what are the attributes which Plato
assigns to the Divine Being. We may sum up his teaching on the
point as follows :
(a) The Divine nature is supremely perfect ; it is endowed with
3very conceivable attribute ; no perfection (apern) is wanting to it. God
is, therefore, the Absolute Good — by no other notion is his nature more
perfectly represented than by the notion of the Good, for this notion
combines in itself all the perfections with which the Divine Nature is
endowed. For this reason God is the cause of all that is good, and of
that only which is good ; wickedness, evil, cannot be attributed to Him
as to its cause ; He is the Author of good, and of good only. When
the poets describe the gods as doing wicked deeds, they are dishonouring
PHILOSOPHY OF THK (JKKKKS. 83
the Divine Nature. God is, furthermore, the Absolute Truth ; it is im
possible that He should deceive men, or lead them astray ; the mytho
logical stories of deceptions practised on mm by tin- gods are absurd.
(b) God, being supremely perfect in his Nature, is immutable. If
God could undergo any change, the cause of that change would be
within His own Being, or without Him. The latter alternative is not ad
missible, for the nature which is supremely perfect cannot be changed
by another. The former is also inconceivable, for if God could change
Himself, He should change cither to a more perfect or to a less perfect
state : the former Tie cannot do, since He is already absolutely perfect ;
nor can He effect the latter, for no being, and least of all the most per
fect, changes of its own accord from a more perfect to a less perfect
condition. God is, therefore, unchangeable ; He does not take one form
at one time, another at another, as the poets tells us ; He retains
throughout eternity one simple, immutable form. (De Rep. II., p. 380.)
(c) God is a Personal Spirit, and, as such, is transcendently raised
above the world. As Personal Spirit, He rules all things, and directs
and guides all according to Reason and Providence. He is a supra-
mundane being, and is therefore above the temporal order. Time
affects only things of earth ; God is above Time ; He is the beginning,
the middle, and the end of all things ; the Absolute Present. (Tim p
37 ; De Leg. IV., p. 715.)
(d) In addition to the sovereign Divinity, Plato admits the existence
of subordinate gods, to whom he assigns an. intermediate rank be
tween the Supreme God and the world, i.e., man. He teaches that
these subordinate divinities are ministers through whom God exercises
His providence and His guiding influence upon earthly things, and that
through them also the prayers and sacrifices of men are transmitted to
God — for which reasons men owe them reverence. The highest rank
among the subordinate gods is held by the star- gods — the souls of the
stars ; next come the demons, amongst whom the aether demons, «>.,
those whose bodies are formed of aether, hold the first place ; below
these are the Air and Water demons, with bodies formed of air or
water. (Tonviv., p. 202 ; De Leg. X., p. 895 ; Tim. p. 39.)
3. We pass now to Plato's theory of Cosmogony. He assumes three
principles as necessary to explain the origin and present existence of the
world: Matter, the underlying basis of the physical world (cauxa
materialis) ; God, the Demiurgos, or efficient cause (causa efficiens) ; and
Ideas, the models or prototypes of things (causa exemplaris). Assuming
the existence of these ultimate causes, Plato, in Thnacus, explains the
process of the formation of the world.
(a) Matter existed, and exists eternally, side by side with God. It
was not produced by Him; it exists apart from Him, though side 1>\
side with Him. At first it was purely indeterminate, and therefore
without any definite qualities. In this original condition it was without
order — a wild, fluctuating mass, a chaotic thing, assuming, without
rule or law, ever-changing forms. It was blind Necessity (avayKvi), tin-
antithesis of Mind acting by a plan
84 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(I) But God was good, and free from jealousy ; He resolved that
Matter should not be abandoned to this disorder. He fixed His gaze
upon the eternal, unchangeable prototype (Ideas), and after this model
fashioned Matter into a well-ordered world. Being Himself the
Supreme Good, He made all things to be good, and to be like Himself.
The formation of the world was accomplished in this order :
First God, as Demiurgos, created the Soul of the World. Combining
two elements, one of which was indivisible and immutable, the other
divisible and changeable, He formed a third or intermediary substance.
In this way the World-Soul came into existence.* The Soul thus
formed was' placed by God in the middle of the world, and extended in
the form of a cross through the entire universe.
The Demiurgos next invested the World-Soul with a body of spherical
form, this form being the most perfect. This body is composed of
the four elements, each of which has a mathematical figure peculiar to
itself. The elements of cubical form made the Earth, the pyramidal
formed Fire, while midway between these, in the order of geometrical
figures, came Water, composed of icosahedral elements, and Air com
posed of octahedral.
The Architect of the Universe has distributed the nobler, the un
changeable element of the World-Soul along the line of the Celestial
Equator ; the less noble, the changeable element, along the line of the
Ecliptic. The inclination of the Ecliptic is a consequence of the less
perfect nature of the spheres beneath the heaven of the fixed stars. The
intervals that separate the celestial spheres are proportional to the lengths
of a vibrating string which emit harmonizing tones. The Earth is
placed in the middle of the universe ; it forms a sphere through which
passes the axis of the world.
From these fundamental premises Plato deduces the following con
clusions regarding the world :
The world, as such, is not eternal. It had a beginning, at the
moment when God began to impress order upon Matter. Time began
with the beginning of the world ; it is, however, the image of eternity.
The world, once formed, cannot come to an end.
The world, as at present constituted, is the only possible world ; any
other is wholly inconceivable. The whole system of Ideas, forming the
KO(T[JI<)£ vorrroc, and serving as the model or prototype of the material
world, reveals itself in the world actually existent. There is no Idea of
the KoajjiOQ vorj7-o£ which has not its corresponding species existent in the
world of phenomena. There is only one prototype, there is only one
eetype.
The world, as it exists, is the most perfect world possible. A more
perfect could not be. God, who is all goodness, and free from all
* Plato, in Tinucus, describes the former element as TOVTOV, the latter as Qanpov.
As we have noticed above, he introduces these two elements into the world of Ideas, in
order to make possible the transition from unity to plurality in the ideal order ; here he
seems to separate them, making ravrov the Idea, and Ba.Tf.pov Matter. In this explana
tion the World-Soul is not purely spiritual, it includes a material element as well.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GRKKKS. <S.>
jealousy, has made the world as like the ideal prototype as possible. lie
has made it to resemble Himself as closely as the nature of Matter per
mitted. Being the most perfect, and the most beautiful of all the things
which have come into existence, the world must be endowed with life
and reason, and this perfection is given it by the World-Soul ; its
motion is the most perfect, and the most constant —motion' in a circle ;
it is in truth a second God.
4. Admitting that this world is the most perfect world possible, we
are at once confronted with the question : How is it possible that evil
can exist in the world, and what are the causes of this evil ? In his
answer to this question Plato has recourse to the nature of Matter,
(rood alone can come from God. But Matter is not only incapable of
receiving to the full the action of the Divine, world-forming Goodness,
it further withstands the formative and co-ordinating action of God
upon it. In virtue of this resistance it becomes the principle of all dis
order, wickedness, and evil in this world. It stands, to a certain extent,
in opposition to God, and its activity in this opposition generates evil.
The world, as the work of God, is perfect in good ; but inasmuch as
Matter withstands the action of God, evil must necessarily exist in the
world. God cannot vanquish evil.
5. We pass now to Plato's Psychology. Plato discusses, in great
detail, the problems of psychology, and endeavours, at all points, to find
solutions in harmony with his theological and cosmologies! theories. He
condemns emphatically the doctrine that the Soul is nothing more than
a harmonious arrangement of the constituents of the body. For in such
an hypothesis the strivings of the Soul against the tendencies of Sense
would be impossible ; and furthermore, since every harmony admits of
increase and diminution, one soul would be more a soul than another —
an assertion which is clearly absurd. Again, harmony is incompatible
with its antithesis — discord ; if then the Soul were merely harmony, it
i could not admit into itself the discord of evil or of vice. It follows that
; we must hold the Soul to be a spiritual substance, simple in its nature, and
. distinct from the body. The further. argument used by Plato to establish
this doctrine is analogous to the proof adduced above to prove the existence
of God. Psychical, or spiritual being, is of its nature prior to the ma
terial and corporeal, for the latter can receive its motion only from the
former. This principle must apply to the relations between Soul and
Body. The psychical element in man's nature cannot be a product of
the corporeal ; on the contrary, the psychical element must exist as a
cama movens antecedently to the body, for without a Soul as causa moccnn
a living body capable of movement would be impossible. The Body
being a composite substance, belongs to the same order of being as the
things of Sense, whereas the Soul is a simple substance, allied in nature
to that unchanging, simple Being which exists above the world of pheno
mena. The Body we know through the senses, the Soul through reason.
6. What are the relations subsisting between Soul and Body ? This
question Plato answers~a§r follows :'The Soul stands to the Body in the
relation of a causa movens, and in this relation only. The Soul dwells
86 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
within the Body somewhat as the charioteer in the chariot ; the Body is
merely the organ which it uses to exert an external activity. The real
man is the Soul only ; in the concept " man," the notion " body " does
not enter as a constituent element in the same way as the notion " Soul."
Man is, properly speaking-, a Soul, which uses a body as the instrument
by which it exercises an activity on things without itself (amma utcns
corpore).
7. In accordance with this view of the relations between Soul and
Bod\r is the further opinion of Plato, that along with the_rational Soul
there also exists in man an.irratioiial Soul, which is made up of two dis
tinct parts ; thus giving us, ultimately, three Souls in man.
The rational Soul, the Aoyoc, is the Soul proper of man. It is like
to God, it may be called the Divine element in man ; it has its seat in
the head. To this Soul belongs all rational knowledge. Subordinate to
this are two other Souls, dependent on the body, and subject to death
(according to the Timaeus), the one is called by Plato the irascible (TO
Ov/uoet&g, Ov/aoz}, and this he locates within the breast ; the other he
calls the appetitive (TO bnflu/^jrtKov, Eirt0u/u/a), and locates in the abdo
men. The functions of these two Souls are purely sensuous ; on them
the life of sense in man is dependent. The appetitive Soul is found in
plants, the irascible Soul is possessed by brutes.
The method which Plato adopts to establish the existence of this
threefold psychical element in man is interesting. We notice, in man,
he says, a conflict of opposing tendencies ; the appetite strives after
something which the reason forbids, and anger rises up in opposition to
reason. No being which is really one can come into contradiction with
itself; to explain the internal conflict of these opposing tendencies
which clash within us, we are forced to admit internal principles of
action really different from one another. And as these conflicting
movements are of three different kinds, we are obliged to admit a triple
Soul in man — the appetitive, the irascible, and the rational. ' De Rep. IV.
p. 456).
In what relation do these three Souls stand to one another ? Plato is
of opinion that the rational Soul and the appetitive are, as it were, two
extremes, between which the irascible Soul takes its place as a sort of
middle term. Plato compares the QVJJLOQ to a lion, the eiriOvfjita to a
many-headed hydra, and also to a perforated or bottomless vessel. Of
its nature the 9v/uo^ is on the side of reason, and supports the reason
against the many -headed hydra which is always in rebellion against it.
8. Regarding the origin of the human Soul, Plato, in Timccm,
teaches that it is produced by God — in the same way as the World-Soul
— by a mixture of those elements which he calls the " identical " and
the " different." * This, however, applies only to the rational Soul.
The irrational Soul is produced by the subordinate gods. It would be
* This seems to indicate that Plato did hold the human Soul, as well as the World-
Soul, to be a being not purely spiritual, but containing some admixture of matter. How
this can be reconciled with his distinct assertion of the immaterial nature of the human
Soul, is not easy to understand.
'HILO8OPHY OK THE GREEKS.
87
on worthy of the Supreme God to create a merely mortal thing, so II.-
entrusted to the subordinate divinities the task of forming the mortal
Soul, and uniting it to the immortal. In P/ucdrus, p. 2^, Plato seems to
represent the Soul as not produced (aytvrjToe). We have already
learned that the Soul is not united to the body in the first moment of its
existence, that it has already existed in an incorporeal condition. We
have now to inquire why it is united to a body with which it is not by
nature destined to enter into union.
!). In PJut'f/rus, Plato furnishes an answer to this question under the
form of an allegory. The Soul, before its imprisonment in the body,
lived an incorporeal life among the gods. Mounted upon heavenly
chariots the gods career through that ultra- celestial region whose beauty
no poet has ever worthily sung ; in the midst of the gods, the Soul
equipped with heavenly wings, and guiding a chariot drawn by two
steeds, held its course through the ultra -celestial sphere, enjoying the
vision of truth. But one of the steeds was restive and ungovernable,
and it happened that many souls could not control this steed. In con
sequence confusion was created in their ranks ; in the tumult the wings
of many were injured, and they fell ever lower and lower, till at last
they fell to the earth to the region of material substance, i.e., to the cor
poreal condition. The Soul that in its previous state had enjoyed most
fully the vision of Being, became the Soul of a philosopher ; the Soul
that stood next in rank became the Soul of a king, and so on through a
graduated series of human conditions down to the tyrants and sophists
who hold the lowest places of all. In this first generation Souls do not
enter into the bodies of brutes.
10. The meaning of this myth seems to be that the Soul in its incor
poreal state had committed some offence for which it was punished by
imprisonment in the body. Hence it is that Plato everywhere speaks of
its union with the body not as an advantage, but as an evil. He calls
the body the grave in which the Soul is shut in as a corpse ; he calls it
a prison, in which the Soul is confined like a captive ; a heavy chain
which binds the Soul, and hinders the free expansion of its energy and
its activity. The culpability which has been punished by the imprison
ment of the Soul within the body must have consisted, as indicated by
the myth we have quoted, in the tendency towards the objects of sense ;
for we can hardly understand the restive steed to signify other than the
iwtQvfua which we have seen to be that part of our nature which is in
continual revolt against the law of reason.
11. The immortality of the (rational) Soul is emphatically asserted
by Plato, and in Phcedo the theory is supported by several arguments.
These arguments may be briefly stated thus :
(a) Everywhere opposites generate opposites. Death follows life,
and out of death life is again generated. Man cannot form an exception
to this universal law. As man, therefore, passes from life to death, so
must he again awake from death to life. This would be impossible if the
Soul, the principle of life, came to an end in death. It must, therefore,
live on, that in its re union with a body man may wake to life again.
88 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(b) Being a simple substance, the Soul is kindred in nature to that
which is absolutely simple and immutable (the Idea) ; in the same way
as the body, be^ng a composite substance, is kindred in nature to things
sensible and changeable. As then the body, because of this affinity with
that which is destructible, is itself destructible, so must the Soul, because
of its affinity with the indestructible, be itself indestructible.
(c) If the Soul has existed by itself before its union with the body, it
follows that it must exist after separation from it. Now it is proved
from the peculiar character of our cognitions that the Soul existed be
fore its union with the body, it follows then that it will outlive its
separation from the body.
(d) Furthermore, nothing can be at once itself, and the opposite of
itself ; it is impossible that the same object should have a share in two
contradictory Ideas at the same time. Now the Soul is essentially life,
for life is self -movement, and self -movement is the very essence of the
Soul. But if the Soul participates in the Idea of " life," and is a Soul
only in so far as it participates in this Idea, it follows that it cannot ad
mit into itself the opposite of life, i.e., death. A dead Soul is a contra
diction in terms. The Soul is, therefore, not merely immortal, its life is
absolutely eternal, essentially excluding every possibility of dissolution.
(e) Again, the dissolution of any being whatever can be accom
plished only by some evil antagonistic to the nature of that being. The
one evil which is antagonistic to the nature of the Soul is vice, i.e., moral
evil. But this is clearly not capable of destroying the being of the
Soul, consequently the Soul cannot be destroyed ; it is therefore in
corruptible, immortal (De Rep. X., p. 608). This argument gains ad
ditional force if we consider that the destruction of the Soul by moral
evil would mean that the wicked have no punishment to expect — a con
sequence which is wholly at variance with the Moral Order. (Phaedo,
p. 107.)
(/) Lastly, Plato, in Timaus, appeals in proof of the Soul's immor
tality to the goodness of God, who could not destroy a creature of
beauty, even though it were a thing destructible by nature. In Phwdo
he appeals to the conduct of the philosopher whose effort after knowledge
is a constant effort after incorporeal existence, a striving to die.
12. Plato always connects the notion of immortality with the notion
of retribution after death. The latter principle he holds as firmly as
the immortality of the Soul. The good are rewarded after death, the
wicked punished according to their deserts. In his exposition of this
doctrine, Plato frequently introduces the ancient myths ; for, according
to him, nothing truer or better can be said on this theme than what is
contained in these myths. The several myths which he introduces are
not, however, always consistent with one another, and it would hardly
be possible to explain away their differences. The fundamental notions
which are put forth in these several myths may be stated as follows :
(a) The man whose life has been good and pleasing to God, and has
been purified by philosophic effort, enters immediately after death into
a condition of bliss ; those who have cultivated the merely social virtues
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 89
must pass through a previous process of purification ; those who pass
out of life answerable for some misdeeds, but only for such as can still
be cured, have a temporary punishment to suif er ; those whose misdeeds
are incurable, are doomed to eternal reprobation. These who are not
fully purified, retain after death something of corporeal being, which
forms a shroud in which they hover restlessly over the graves of their
bodies till their tutelary demons conduct them to the nether world.
(b) Souls, after death, do not remain permanently in the disembodied
state, they enter into other bodies (metempsychosis), but into such as cor
respond to the moral condition in which they have quitted life. The good
enter into the bodies of men ; the less perfect into the bodies of women ;
the wicked into the bodies of beasts ; the species of brute body into
which each soul enters is determined by the species of vice or passion
to which it was addicted in life.
(c) All these processes are accomplished within a period of ten
thousand years. When this term has been completed, all souls return
to the condition out of which they passed in their first process of genera
tion, and a new cosmical period begins. Plato sometimes speaks of an
earlier period, which may be described as a golden age. There was then
no evil, and no death ; the earth spontaneously brought forth food in
abundance ; man and beast lived together in friendly concord ; there was
no distinction of sexes ; men were produced from the earth by spontaneous
generation. All this came to an end at the beginning of the next great
period — a period which was introduced by a great cosmical revolution.
.t was then that the world, as we know it now, first came into existence
(Polit. p. 296.) It was then that the distinction of the sexes was first
established, and that the human species was reproduced by carnal gene
ration. We have here distorted traditions of a happier and more highly
privileged condition of existence enjoyed by the first men.
PLATO'S ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
§31.
1. We begin our account of Plato's ethical system with his inquiries
into the nature of pleasure, and into its bearing upon man's moral life.
In this connection Plato endeavours to establish a mean between the
Hedonism of the Cyrenaic school and the doctrines of the Cynics. He
distinguishes between true and false pleasures. The first are those
which arise from virtue, and, in a special manner, from the knowledge of
truth. False pleasures, on the other hand, are those which have not
their source in virtue, and are, moreover, antagonistic to virtue, and de
structive of it. True enjoyment, real pleasure, is pure, and does not
affect the purity of the Soul ; false pleasure is impure, and defiles the
Soul.
2. It follows from this that all pleasures are not evil, nor to be
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
avoided as evil. The Cynics are not justified in their absolute condemna
tion of pleasure. But neither is it true that every pleasure is good, and
a thing to be striven for. Hedonism with its unqualified exaltation of
pleasure is as one-sided as Cynicism. The truth lies between the two
theories. To secure the pure and real pleasure which springs from
virtue must be the object of human endeavour ; such pleasure is the
true good for man ; but he must fly the impure and false pleasures
which the senses supply, and which are at variance with virtue ; they
are an evil for him.
3. The relations which Plato further establishes between pleasure
and virtue are analogous to those which he establishes between Matter
and Ideas. Matter, by participating in the ideal order, takes form and
orderly arrangement ; analogously, pleasure receives from virtue its true
significance and its rightful limitation. Pleasure is further like matter in
this that it exists in a condition of continual change, that it is unstable
and transient, and by virtue only is made to share in the good — i.e., in
the enduring. Not pleasure by itself, nor virtue by itself, is the true
good of men, but only the combination of both — the union of virtue as the
formal, determining element, with pleasure as the material and determined.
4. So much being premised, we are now in a position to deal with
the further question — What, according to Plato, is the Supreme Good
for man ? To understand rightly Plato's teaching on this point, we
must distinguish between the Supreme Good in the objective sense of
the term and the Supreme Good in the subjective sense. This distinction
being drawn, we find that Plato teaches : —
(a.) Man's Supreme Good, in the objective order, is the " Idea of the
Good;" and as this is one with God, it follows that man must find his
Supreme Good in God. Goods are either goods of the soul, or goods of
the body, or external goods of fortune ; the goods of the soul surpass
all the others, but amongst these the Idea of the Good — God, holds the
highest place. Man must, therefore, endeavour to rise to God, and find
his Chief Good in Him.
(b.) Subjectively considered, the Chief Good of man is Happiness.
The basis of Happiness is the assimilation of man with God. (De Rep.
X., p. 613 ; Theact. p. 176.) The assimilation with God is effected by
knowledge and by enthusiastic love of God as the Supreme Good. In
the knowledge and love of God as the Supreme Good consists, then, the
supremo happiness of man.
5. The means by which man must reach his highest happiness in
God is virtue. Plato's description of virtue resembles that of the
Pythagoreans : virtue is Harmony, vice is Discord ; man is virtuous if
his inner nature is rightly ordered, if the parts of his Soul hold their
natural relations to one another ; man is wicked if this interior order is
\vanting, if the parts of his Soul are unnaturally at variance with one
another. Virtue is, therefore, the health of the Soul ; vice is its disease ;
in virtue consists its beauty and its strength ; vice makes its weakness
and deformity. Virtue must be loved for its own sake, not for sake of
external goods.
rmi.oSOl'IIY OK THK C.KKKKs. <)]
6. Virtue, being the inner harmony of the Soul, is essentially one;
it admits, hoAvever, of a division into four cardinal virtues, a division
which is based 011 the distinction between the three parts of the Soul.
The four cardinal virtues are Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, and
Justice. Wisdom (cro0<a) belongs to the rational Soul, and consists in
true knowledge. Fortitude or courage (avSottb) is a virtue of the 0u/xoc,
and is exercised in resolute striving after the Good, without any regard
for the attendant difficulties. Temperance (awtypoavvi}) belongs to the
appetitive Soul (firtBvfjLta), and manifests itself in the control of the
desires and their restraint within proper limits. Justice ($IK(IIO<TVVYI)
belongs at once to all three parts of the Soul, and consists in this, that
each part of the Soul, occupying the position assigned it by nature,
discharges its proper functions, without passing beyond its own sphere.
Justice is thus the bond and union of the other virtues, the principle of
order within the Soul. Justice, as applied to the relations of man and
the gods, is called Piety (fxriOT-rie).
7. The principal among the four cardinal virtues is Wisdom. The
other virtues can be acquired by practice and habitual exercise ; but if
they are not associated with Wisdom, they are mere shadows of true
virtue, and they must degenerate — Temperance into stupidity, and Forti
tude into brutish impulse. Plato goes so far in his commendation of
the virtue of Wisdom as to assert that the man who possesses this
virtue possesses all the other virtues, and has no further need to
acquire them by practice. He is thus led at last to the Socratic theory
that the man who possesses true knowledge cannot do wrong. No one
does wrong knowingly; the evil- doer acts in ignorance; ignorance is
the real evil, and the source of all evil. We can now understand why
and to what extent Plato holds that virtue can be imparted by
instruction.
8. From these doctrines the conclusion follows that the effort to
gain. Wisdom (Philosophy) is the highest ethical duty of human life.
This effort after Wisdom, sustained by the love of the good and the
beautiful, has two aspects, a theoretical and a practical.
(a.) In its practical aspect it consists in the emancipation of the
rational Soul from the body; for the body is only a hindrance to the
Soul ?n its effort to attain true knowledge. The philosopher must give
his first attention to the Soul ; he must give thought to the body only
in so far as extreme necessity requires. The life of the philosopher
must be a continual effort to rid himself of the body, a constant prepa
ration for death ; nay, it should be, in a certain sense, a continual death.
(5.) In its theoretical aspect this striving after Wisdom consists in
the constant endeavour of man to extend and to perfect his knowledge
<>t truth. He must ever increase in the knowledge of things divine,
until he at length attains to that contemplation of the divinity of which
the Soul is deprived at its first entrance into the body. In this way
man reaches assimilation with God, the Supreme Good, and becomes
possessed of the bliss which it confers. In the present life he can never
reach this goal ; his perfection is to be attained in the life to follow.
02 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
9. The man who by virtue, and chiefly by the virtue of Wisdom,
makes himself like to " God, becomes thereby the friend of the gods.
The gods love the virtuous man, and bestow favours upon him ; the
evils that overtake him are no more than punishments of previous faults.
Virtue brings man into relation with the Divinity ; and man is, there
fore, not virtuous if he does not honour the gods. Irreligion is not
only the most egregious folly, it is also the grossest immorality.
Moreover, the attainment of virtue is a task of much difficulty ; the aid
of the gods is absolutely necessary in accomplishing it ; virtue may, in
fact, be regarded as a gift of the gods.
10. We pass now to the political philosophy of Plato. Here we
notice that Plato emphatically rejects the notion of the Sophists that all
right and all law are derived from the State, and exist only within it.
He holds that there exist a natural right and a natural law, which have
their validity without the concurrence of the State, and independently
of the State. Nevertheless, he follows his leaning towards the abso
lutism of civil authority so far, that in his theory the rights of ^ indi
viduals are practically effaced by the rights of the State. In his opinion,
the State, as the totality, has absolute power over individuals. The
well-being of the whole is first in importance ; the prosperity of indi
viduals is admissible only as far as it comports with the well-being of
the whole. Individuals are, therefore, bound to render to the State
entire submission and unconditional obedience ; private interests must
be sacrificed to the public good, and nothing can be permitted which
does not serve the common interests. In this portion of his system
Plato has not succeeded in rising above that absolutism of civil authority
which was recognised in practice by almost all ancient States.*
11. Beginning with these principles, Plato, in his work "De Repub-
lica," constructs his ideal State — i.e., he sketches a State which would
correspond perfectly to the Idea of the State. In this sketch we find he
borrows many details from the Hellenic polities, in particular from the
Doric system of legislation. After sketching the "perfect State" in the
Republic, he proceeds, in the Laws, to describe the "second-best ;" for
he is aware that, in view of the actual circumstances of society, the
"perfect" State can be realised only with great difficulty, if at all.
12. In his sketch of the Ideal State, we observe that Plato looks on
the State as but the human individual magnified, and that he models his
sketch on the nature of man. As the inner nature of man, the Soul, has
three parts, so the State consists of three orders : the order of husband
men, artisans, and traders (productive class), corresponding to the appe
titive soul (iTriOvjun'o) ; the order of guardians or warriors (defensive
class), corresponding to the Ov/mo^ ; and the order of rulers, corresponding
to the rational soul, Xoyog. And as the perfection of the individual
depends on virtue, the divisions of which correspond to the several parts
of the Soul, so the perfection of the State consists in this, that the
* Plato exempts religion from this absolute jurisdiction of the State ; it belongs to
God only (i.e., to the Apollo of Delphi) to regulate religious practices and concerns.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREI.KS. 93
producing class is guided by temperance, the defensive class by valour,
the ruling class by wisdom, arid that, finally, the entire body politic
should be controlled by justice — i.e., that each order, according to its
rank in the State, should faithfully and fully discharge its own functions,
without passing out of its own sphere. In order that the State may
reach this perfection, it must engage its citizens to the practice of the
virtues becoming their position. This is the primary duty which self-
interest imposes upon it.
13. Plato bestows little attention on the productive order, which he
places lowest in the State ; he assigns to its members little more than
the duties of slaves. But he occupies himself at length with the defen
sive order, for from this order the rulers come. In this portion of his
system he is an advocate of the principle of absolutism in government,
and of absolutism of the socialistic type. He insists on a community of
goods in the order of guardians ; no individual shall possess property.
All shall eat and lodge together. Money shall not be allowed. In the
order of guardians Plato also requires community of wives ; there shall
be no marriage, no family. The rulers shall assign certain women to
certain men ; these shall cohabit for a period to be determined by law ;
the children generated must not know their parents ; they shall be taken
from them immediately after birth, and shall be brought up in common
in a separate place, under the care of the State. Cohabitation may be
allowed beyond the period fixed by the law, but any fruit of this inter
course must be destroyed in embryo.
14. The public education of children shall be continued till their
twentieth year. In the first stage of this education, the development of
the body must be the chief object of the educator ; then follows the
learning of myths ; and then, in succession, gymnastics, reading and
writing, poetry, music, mathematics, and finally military exercises. At
this point a division of the pupils must be made : those who are less apt
for knowledge, but adapted for deeds of valour, remain warriors ; the
others study the sciences till their thirtieth year. Then conies a second
division. The less capable are devoted forthwith to the less important
public offices ; the more distinguished pursue the study of Dialectic from
their thirtieth to their thirty-fifth year, and are then appointed to posts
of command till their fiftieth. After this they finally reach the per
fection of philosophy — the contemplation of the idea of the Good ; they
become philosophers in the true sense of the word, and as such are ad
mitted into the number of the rulers, and undertake the highest offices
of State functions. The course of education is the same for boys and girls
alike. It has been seen that poetry forms part of this system of educa
tion, but this must be understood of that species of poetry which is an
imitation of the Good— i.e., of religious hymns; the art which imitates
only the world of phenomena in which good and evil are mingled
together must be excluded, for it serves only to excite the passions.
I 'nets who cultivate this species of art are to be banished from the
State. This kind of imitative poetry is not real art, for the Good alone
is really beautiful.
94 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
10. "We see that Plato's Ideal State can be realised only when philo
sophers become rulers of the State or the rulers are guided by a sound
philosophy. This requirement Plato abandons in the "second-best"
State. Here the theory of Ideas is npt introduced as the basis of the
scheme for the rulers' education ; stress is chiefly laid on training in
mathematics ; the mode of divine worship is more nearly in accord with
the notions prevalent in Hellas ; private property and marriage remain
untouched.
THE PLATONIC SCHOOL.
1. It is customary to distinguish among the followers of Plato three,
or in more detailed division five, successive phases or schools of thought :
the Old Academy, the Middle, and the New. The ( )ld Academy includes
the first of the five schools ; the Middle, the second and third ; the New
Academy, the fourth and fifth.
2. By the representatives of the Old Academy the central doctrine
of Plato's system, his theory of Ideas, was interpreted, under the
influence of Pythagorean notions, in combination with a theory of
numbers. With this was associated a theology partly mystical, and
partly popular, in which, at a later period, demonology occupied an
important place. To the Old Academy belong :—
(«.) Speusippus, a son of Plato's sister, and his successor in his teaching functions
(head of the Academy, 347-339). Speusippus is said to have maintained the doctrine
that to define anything we must know everything, for in definition we must state the
differences between things, and to do this we must discover all the resemblances and
differences of things. (Speusippus himself is said to have attempted this in a work
containing ten books). He asserted further that the Good and the Perfect in 8f cannot
be the first basis of things or the One ; that which is best and most beautiful does not
exist at the beginning, it is the ultimate term of evolution from the beginning. His
fundamental ethical principle is happiness, obtained by acting as nature directs.
(/>.) Xenocrates of Chalcedon, successor of Speusippus as leader of the Academy
(339-314), " endeavoured to reduce philosophical concepts to mathematical formula?. In
the effort to express, in all clearness, by numerical notation the manner in which God,
by many intermediate stages and processes, enters into and manifests Himself in the
world of phenomena, he was led into all kinds of sensuous, fantastic, and superstitious
notions."
(c.) Heraclides of Pontus — ''a distinguished astronomer, who discovered the diurnal
revolution of the earth on its axis from west to east, and the immobility of the heaven
of the fixed stars" — Philip the Opuntian — the reputed author of the Eptnomis — Polemo,
Grantor, and Crates, who devoted themselves mainly to ethical studies, and abandoned
more and more completely the speculative or dialectical elements of the Platonic
philosophy.
3. The Middle Academy is characterized by an ever-increasing
tendency to scepticism. To it belong : —
(a.) Arcesilaus (315-241), a pupil of Grantor and Polemo, the founder of the so-called
Second Academy. He combated the dogmatism of the Stoics, and professed the opinion
that certain knowledge is not possible, and that the wise man should never give assent
to any assertion. This attitude of mind he calls Forbearance (dirox'n)> *•£•> forbearance
PHILOSOPHY OF Tin-: GKKKKS. <).">
from the exercise of judgment. PJqually valid reasons can always be adduced in favour
of either of two contradictory propositions. We cannot, therefore, know anything, not
even the fact that we know nothing. Accordingly, Arcesilaus himself did not advance
any proposition whatever, but permitted his disciples to dispute amongst themselves or
with him. Certain knowledge is impossible, but probable opinion is attainable, and this
is sufficient in order to act rationally. Arcesilaus was followed by Lacydes, Telecles,
and Evander.
(6.) Carneades of Gyrene (214-129), the founder of the Third Academy, who, in the
year B. c. loo, was sent as ambassador to Rome, in company with Diogenes the Stoic and
Critolaus the Peripatetic. He advanced still further in the path marked out by
A i vesilaus. If, he says, we wish to decide whether a given perception be true or false,
we must have some certain standard to judge by ; this can be no other than the true
perception ; with this we must compare the perception of whose truth or falsity we
wish to judge. But the true perception is precisely what we are seeking to find ;
sensuous perception cannot, therefore, be a criterion of truth. Neither can the concept
of the intellect ; for our concepts are derived from the perceptions of sense. There is,
therefore, no criterion of truth. What we take to be truth is only the appearance of
truth, is only a ^atvo/jievov dArj0«f, -jriOavr} tyavraaia, probabile vitiirm (Cic.). We can
attain no more than probability. We experience certain perceptions repeated fre
quently, occurring in the same way, and in accord with one another. In consequence,
a certain feeling of complacency or approval arises within us, and on this ground we
hold them to be true, and we assert them (t nfyaoiQ] ; the perceptions of a different kind
we hold to be false, and we deny them (cnrsuQaaig). In this probability there are,
however, different degrees. We must distinguish three degrees of probability : tho
perception is either probable in itself only ; or, when taken in relation to other percep
tions, it is found uncontradicted and probable ; or lastly, it is not only probable and
oncontradicted, but is confirmed in all respects (Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 166). We
have further to mention that Carneades was celebrated as an orator. Clitomachus was
a pupil of Carneades.
4. The New Academy returned again to dogmatism. It includes :—
(a.) Philo of Larissa, the founder of the Fourth Academy, a pupil of Clitomachus,
who lived in the time of the first Mithridatic war. He seems to have reverted to the
older Platonic teaching, and to have given his attention chiefly to ethics, inclining in
his views to the system of the Stoics.
(b.) Antiochus of Ascalon, a pupil of Philo, and founder of the Fifth Academy, who,
in the effort to combine the theories of Plato with certain Aristotelian principles, and
still more largely with principles adopted from the Stoics, prepared the way for the
Neo-Platonists. He endeavoured to show that the scepticism of the later Academy was
not justified by the Platonic doctrine, and that the chief points of the doctrine of the
Stoics are to be found in Plato. He differed from the Stoics by denying the equality of
vices, as well as by asserting that virtue, though it leads to a happy life, does not of
itself produce the happiest life. Otherwise he is almost entirely in accord with them.
(Cic. Acad. Part II. 43.)
4. ARISTOTLE.
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE. GENERAL CHARACTER OF HIS
PHILOSOPHY.
§ 33.
1. " With Aristotle the philosophy of Greece, which in the hands
of Plato was in form and outline the philosophy of a particular people,
becomes universal ; it loses its special Hellenistic character ; the Platonic
dialogue is changed to a sober prose, and, instead of myths and poetic
imagery, we have a fixed, unimpassioncd, scientific language." A new
96 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
tendency of thought, radically different from the Platonic, enters the
sphere of philosophy with Aristotle. Aristotle does not, like Plato,
begin with the Idea, and from the standpoint thus assumed proceed to
study the data of experience. He begins with the data of experience,
the empirical, the actual, and thence rises to universal, ultimate reasons.
He does not proceed synthetically and progressively, like Plato, but for
'the most part analytically and regressively ; his method is not of the
a priori, or deductive kind ; it is rather a posteriori, or inductive.
" Hence his deliberate examination of facts, phenomena, circumstances,
and possibilities as a means of rising to universal truths; hence his
marked predilection for physical science, for nature is that which is
nearest to us, and most actual in our experience ; hence, too, his tendency
to push scientific investigation in every direction, for in his mind all
facts have equal claims to consideration. This tendency led him to
become the founder of sciences which were either unknown till his time,
or had previously received little attention, such as Logic, Empirical
Psychology, Natural History, Jus Naturce"
Aristotle was born in the year B.C. 384 in Stagira, a Greek Colony of Thrace. His
father, Nicomachus, was a physician, and was a friend of Amyntas, King of Macedonia.
The former circumstance may have had some influence in determining Aristotle's love of
natural science ; the latter may have had something to do with his subsequent invitation
to the Macedonian Court. He lost his parents while still young, and in his eighteenth
year he came to Athens, where he followed for twenty years the instructions of Plato.
Many stories are told of his intercourse with Plato. In one anecdote Plato is made to
say of him that he needed the rein ; that he was like a colt which kicks at its mother.
He is charged with envy and ingratitude towards his teacher. What truth there is in
the accusation we have no means of knowing. After the death of Plato (347), Aristotle,
accompanied by Xenocrates, repaired to the Court of Hermias, Ruler of Atarneus, in
Mysia, where he resided for three years, after which he went to Mitylene. In the
year 343 he was invited by Philip, King of Macedonia, to undertake the education of
his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. He was held in high honour by both
princes, and Alexander subsequently assisted him in his studies with princely generosity.
Soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, Aristotle returned to Athens, where he
founded his school in the gymnasium, called the Lyceum (because dedicated to Apollo
AvKtioc). Walking up and down in the shaded valleys (TreptTrarot) of the Lyceum,
Aristotle discoursed on philosophy with his disciples. His school was hence called the
"Peripatetic." He presided over it for twelve years. In the morning he taught his
more advanced pupils the more recondite truths of science (acroamatic investigations) ;
in the evening he discoursed to a large crowd (exoteric discoiirses) on the sciences which
belong to general culture (Gellius.) After the death of Alexander he was accused of
impiety (daifieia) by the Macedonian party at Athens. He withdrew from the prosecu
tion, and sought refuge at Chalcis, in Euboea, where he died soon after, B.C. 322.
3. The writings of Aristotle were composed partly in popular, and partly in scientific
(acroamatic) form. The latter have, in large part, come down to us ; of the former only
fragments survive. The strictly scientific works of Aristotle, which were, with scarce
an exception, composed during his stay at Athens, are divided, according to the nature
of the subject-matter, into logical, metaphysical, physical, and ethical ; in addition to
which we have an incomplete treatise on Poetry, and a treatise on Rhetoric.
(a) The whole of the logical treatises of Aristotle are included under the title
"Orgarion." To the Organon belong : — (1) the Kcmjyop/ai, a treatise on the highest or
fundamental concepts ; (2) JItpi £p/it)veta£ (de interpretatione) a treatise on Judgments
and Propositions ; (3) 'AvaXimicd Trpuripa, on Inference, and 'AvaXiTiied vortpa on
Proof, Definition, Division, and the Knowledge of Principles ; (4) ToTrtied treating of
"dialectical" or probable conclusions ; and (5) ITepi (To0i<m/cwj/ iXcy^1' on Fallacies, and
the means of detecting them.
(b) The works called the "Metaphysics" of Aristotle received this name from the
circumstance that in the arrangement of the writings of Aristotle one of the editors of
PHlLOSOl'm OF THE GREEKS. 97
his works (most likely Audronicus of Rhodes), in view of the distinction drawn li\
Aristotle between the Trportpov irpbij »//ia£ and the -rrporfpov <jtixrei, placed these books
next in order to the Physics, and included them all under the title rd perd QvaiKa.
Aristotle himself gave the name Trpwrr] <f>i\oau<pia to what we now call Metaphysics. The
Metaphysics consist of fourteen books, which, however, do not stand in any strictly logical
relations to one another ; the second book is said to be spurious. We shall see later
what, according to Aristotle, is the scope and subject-matter of Metaphysics.
(c) Of the works relating to Physics or Natural Science, the following are of special
importance to philosophy: — (1) The 4>c<7i/c// cucpbaaiq (de physica auscultatkme, also
called <f>voiKci or ra irtpi Qvotug) in eight books — a treatise on physical nature ; (2) TTepi
ovpavov (de ccelo), on the heavens, in four books ; (3) Tlipl ytvtaeiDg KOI QQopag (de genera-
tione et corruptione) in five books — an exposition of the principles of generation and
dissolution in nature ; (4) MgrtwpoXoytKa or Trepi utTtupw (de meteoris) in four books ;
(5) II*pt TO. £ya IffTopiai (de historia animalium) in ten books, of which, however, the
tenth is said to be spurious — a natural history and comparative physiology of animals ;
to which are to be added (6) Uepi Wuvpopiuv (de partibus animalium) in four books, and
(7) Ilgpi £ywv ytviae UJQ (de generatione animalium) in five books. *
(d) The psychological treatises of Aristotle are usually included in the list of his
treatises on physical nature. (1) First in this section comes his treatise TIepi ^v\r]Q in
three books, in which Aristotle develops his theory of psychology. We have, in addi
tion, a number of smaller treatises, dealing with special psychological questions ; (2)
Hep? aiaOrjaewt; icai a!at)j]Tov (de sensu et sensili) ; (3) Tlepl fivrjfjiriG icai dva^vi]ont>g (de
memoria et reminiscentia) ; (4) lltpi iwrrviuv (de insomniis) ; (5) Ilepi virvov cat
iyprjy6p<rett>£ (de somno et vigilia); (6) Hepi [lavriKriQ rrjc tv TO~(Q VTTVOIQ (de divinatione per
somnium) ; (7) TTtpi /ua^o/Storr/rot; KO.I /fy>a%u/fc&i?r0£ (de longitudine et brevitate vitse) ;
(8) Utpi £w»}c <rat Qardrov (de vita et morte) ; (9) Tlepl VIOTTJTO^ icai yijpwc (de juventute
et senectute).
(«) In the list of Aristotle's ethical and political writings we find : (1) The 'Htiiicd
NiKn/iagtia, in ten books ; (2) the 'HOiKit Ev<%ma, in seven books ; and (3) the HOticd
Hf-yriXa in two books. The Nicomachean Ethics is undoubtedly the work of Aristotle
himself ; the Eudemian Ethics is regarded as the work of his pupil Eudemus— not how
ever an original work, but merely the lectures of Aristotle preserved and reproduced ;
the "greater ethics " — Magna Moralia — appears to be an extract from the two former
works. We have furthermore (3) the IIoAirjKra, a political philosophy based on the ethics,
in eight books ; the (4) OHCOI/O//KC«, and (5) the treatise Tltpi aptr&v Kai KOKIWV (de
virtutibus et vitiis), judged by many critics to be spurious — an opinion which cannot be
received without question. The treatise HoXireTm, an account of the Constitutions of 158
States, is lost. Lastly, we may class with the ethical writings the treatise IT pi
7T<>(fjrnc?;g ; the treatise llgpt pi]ropiKijf in three books : the Ilpo/3'\///<aror, a collection
made on the basis of Aristotle's notes ; and the M^aviica.
4. The writings here enumerated were not, it would appear, published by Aristotle
at the time his lectures on the several subjects were delivered. This work of publication
seems to have been done by his pupils. In some cases, as already noticed with regard
to the Eudemian Ethics, the treatise would appear to have been written or compiled by
the pupils on the basis of a written treatise or lecture by Aristotle. This may account
for the fact that in many instances the exposition is interrupted or defective, and that
we frequently meet with mutilated sentences. The chronological order of the several
treatises cannot be determined with certainty. The earliest were doubtless the logical
treatises, then followed in all probability the ethical, and after these the physical, the
psychological, and the metaphysical.
5. According to Strabo (xiii. 1, 54), and Plutarch (Vit. Sull. c. 26) a strange fortune
befell the works of Aristotle after the death of Theophrastus. " The library of Aristotle
came first into the possession of Theophrastus, who bequeathed it to Neleus of Scepsis
in Troas. After the death of the latter it passed into the hands of his relatives
in his own country, and they out of fear lest the princes of Pergamus should take the
books for their own library, concealed them in a cellar or pit (tiu>pv£), where they suf
fered considerable injury. At last (about F..C. 100) Apellicon, of Tros, a rich bibliophile,
discovered the manuscripts, purchased them, and carried them to Athens. He endea
voured, as best he could, to fill up the gaps, and then publish the works. The difficulty
of tilling up the hiatuses in the much disfigured manuscripts accounts for the defective
* The Treatises Til pi Koapov, TTipl 0yrwi', Trept c^'wv Kivijatia^i 0u<T(oyvw^nca und Tripl
ffav/iaariwy OKot><r/mr<«>i>, are declared spurious by the critics, the genuineness of the Ktpi drofjHuv
v is also a matter of doubt.
8
98 HISTOltY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
condition of the text of Aristotle's works in subsequent times. Soon after this, on the
taking of Athens by the Romans (B.C. 87), the manuscripts fell into the hands of Sylla.
A grammarian named Tyrannion had access to them, and from him the Peripatetic An-
dronicus of Rhodes received copies, upon which he based a new edition of the works o'
Aristotle, arranging them in suitable order."
6. A Latin translation of the works of Aristotle, accompanied by the Commentaries
of the Arabian philosopher Averroes (written about A.D. 1180), was printed at Venice in
1489 ; and again in the same city in 1496, 1507, 1538 ; and at Basle in 1538 ; the Greek
text was printed for the first time at Venice, apiul Aldum Manutium, in 1495-98, and
then under the supervision of Erasmus and Simon Grynams, Basileae 1531 ; again at
Basle in 1539 and 1550 ; and then in many various editions, among which we may note as
specially important the editions of Fried. Sylburg, Francof. 1584-87 ; of Isaac Casaubon
(with a Latin translation) Ludg. 1590 ; of Du Val (Greek and Latin) Par. 1629 and 1639.
Many of the special treatises, especially the Nicomachean Ethics, were published in
repeated editions up to the middle of the seventh century. After this, editions of the
special treatises rarely appear, and no edition of the complete works is published till the
close of the eighteenth century, when Buhle published a new edition (Greek and Latin),
1831, Vols. 4 ; Scholia in Arist. Coll. Christ. Aug. Brandis, Ib. 1836. We have further
a valuable Parisian edition, Didot 1848-1857, and a stereotyped Tauchnitz edition, 1831-32,
and 1843 (Cfr Ueberweg.)
7. Aristotle, like Plato, makes no rigid distinction between philosophy
and the other sciences. With him the notion of philosophy is one with
the notion of science in general He regards philosophy as the know
ledge of facts and phenomena in their causes. But this definition refers
only to such facts and phenomena as are unchangeably the same, or at
least such as constitute the usual order of things. With the merely
casual, the casus fortuitus, science is not concerned The complete
definition of philosophy, as understood by Aristotle, has been expressed
by the later exponents of his teaching in the formula : Cognitio rerum
necessariarum et immutabilium per veras et proprias causas."
8. But Aristotle goes further. He distinguishes between " First "
and "Second" philosophy. Under the notion " Second " philosophy,
he includes all the sciences which deal with special branches of know
ledge ; the " First " philosophy is the universal science, and, as such, is
the only philosophy, in the stricter sense of the word. Each science
selects for investigation a special province, a special department of
Being, but there is none which deals with Being in general. We
want, therefore, a science which shall take as the subject of its investi
gations that which the others assume. This science is the " First"
philosophy It deals with all Being, which it studies in its ultimate
causes and principles. This is the ultimate basis of all the other
sciences, inasmuch as it traces the principles peculiar to them back to
the ultimate principles from which they are derived, and thus lays the
ultimate foundation which all must rest on.
9. Philosophy is not pursued because of any advantage or utility
external to itself. It is its own object ; it is of such a nature that it
can and must be sought for itself alone. It is rightly called divine
i wisdom, partly because God alone can possess it in perfection, partly
because the highest point which philosophical knowledge strives to
reach is God - -the first and fundamental cause of all things. Philosophy
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. Oil
is the Ixs and must excellent science. Other systems of mental dis
cipline may be more necessary for certain special purposes, but then- i-
none of greater worth or excellence ; for philosophy has knowledge for
its aim, and is no mere means to particular practical ends. It is th<
queen of sciences ; all others are to it as hand-maidens.
10. Aristotle has not given us a complete division of philosophy, at
least he has not established any such division as the basis of his system.
He speaks indeed of different parts of philosophy, but he does not
always enumerate the same parts, and he has not followed in practice
any one of the divisions he indicates. He distinguishes between theo
retical, practical, and poetical philosophy ; and he includes in the first
division Mathematics, Physics, and the "First" Philosophy — the
logical studies of the Organon he appears to have regarded merely as a
science of method preparatory to philosophy. Again, he speaks of
philosophy as consisting of three parts : Logic, Physics, Ethics. But
he does not follow either of these divisions in his exposition ; he sets
little store by such divisions.
11. In separating the several parts of philosophy in our exposition
of Aristotle's teaching, we are not following any order traced by
Aristotle himself. We are making our own division. We select, as
the most appropriate order of treatment, first Logic and Theory of
Knowledge, then Metaphysics, then Psychology, and finally Ethics* and
Political Philosophy.
LOGIC AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
§34.
Ml;
on
1. Plato dissociated intellectual knowledge from experience, and
ade the latter the occasion which gave rise to knowledge. Aristotle,
-i the other hand, makes experience the foundation of all intellectual
knowledge, and lays it down as a principle that intellectual cognition
has its source exclusively in experience. " Nihil in intellects quod
prius non fuerit in sensu"— this is the fundamental principle of the
Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge, as it is also the point at which the
fundamental difference between the views of Plato and Aristotle begins.
Without sense, intellectual knowledge is impossible. Experience is,
therefore, the basis and source of all intellectual cognition, i.e., of all
science.
2. In experience, however, we have to do only with individual ob
jects. The world of sense, which is the world of experience, consist>
wholly of single objects or individuals (t£ aSiaipirwv fya TO W, Eth.
Nie. VI. c. 12.) It follows that the individual is that which com.-
first in our knowledge, and that it is only in a second stai>-e we pa»
from the individual to the general. Intellectual kno\\ led»v,' knowlcd-.
properly so called, is concerned only with the general, and this know
ledge has its source in experience; experience, however, brings us info
100 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
contact only with the individual ; it follows that what in our knowledge
is general, must be evolved from the individual. Of its nature, then,
the universal takes precedence of the individual, and is more an object
of knowledge ; but for us the individual comes first, is more immediately
the object of knowledge, and from it we must set out in order to reach
the universal. Plato takes the universal, the Idea, as the point of depar
ture in his attempllb explain by an a priori method the existence of
individual things, and to form a philosophical conception of the world
as a whole. Aristotle, on the contrary, begins with the individual, and
endeavours by a posteriori methods to derive from this the universal, and
thus to arrive at a philosophical comprehension of the universe. Herein we
have a second fundamental difference between the systems of Plato and
Aristotle.
| 3. It follows from the principles thus laid down by Aristotle that the
I universal is not something standing apart from the individual ; in other
words, the universal cannot be regarded as having being of its own
really distinct from the being of the several individual objects. In such
a supposition it would be impossible to derive the universal from the
individual. The universal must be immanent in the individual ; this is
the only supposition oil which a progress in thought from the individual
) to the universal becomes possible. Whilst, then, Plato separates the
universal from the individual, and establishes a real distinction between
them, Aristotle emphatically asserts the doctrine that the universal is in
the individual, not without it. This constitutes the third fundamental
difference between 'Plato's Theory of Knowledge and that of Aristotle.
4. The universal existing in the individual, not apart from it, it
follows, according to the reasoning of Aristotle, that, as invested with
the formal character of universality which it possesses in our thought, it
\cannotbeobjectivclyreal. The universal is that which is common to
the several individual objects, viz., that which can be predicated of all
(alike. It is not a single entity in itself, it is merely a " prcdicabile de
multis." What we find existing in a number of different objects, what
these objects all alike possess, and what we can, in consequence, predi
cate of them all, is an universal. If, then, we wish to define the uni
versal, we must describe it as that which of its nature is such that it
can be predicated of many individual things. We see then that
whereas Plato holds the universal, taken formally in its universality, to
be objectively real, Aristotle will admit the material entity represented
under this form of universality, to be objectively real, but will by no
means admit this objective reality to be a single universal being. And
here we have the fourth essential difference between the Platonic and
Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge.
5. On the principles here set forth rest the whole Logic and Noetic
of Aristotle. We proceed to the exposition of his logical and noetical
system, as based upon these principles. It will be made clear to us as
we advance, that Aristotle does not understand the principles quoted, in
the sense of the empiricist or nominalist, though this might appear at
first sight to be the case. It will be seen that his theory of knowledge
1'IIILOSOPHY OF Til 1-1 'iKKI.ks. 101
avoids Empiricism and Idealism alike, and finds a middle course between!
the two extremes, which secures at once the rights of Reason and ofl
Experience.
6. The psychological assumption underlying Aristotle's Theory of
Knowledge is the essential difference between Sense and Intellect, be
tween sensuous perception and thought (our (forte and vcfofcric.) Sense
and Intellect, sensuous perception and thought, are not to be made one ;
they must be taken as essentially different functions ; Sense is concerned
with the sensible (r6 aicrftqroi/), Intellect has to do with the supersensible
(TO vorirov) ; Sense has for its object the individual, Intellect, the uni
versal. The two classes of objects being essentially different, the cor
responding faculties must be regarded as essentially different sources of
knowledge.
7. This being premised, the question arises : In what way does the
Intellect pass from the individual object which appears in the sensuous
perception to the universal ? To answer this question Aristotle has re
course to the distinction between the ovvia Trpwrrj and the ovaia StvTtpa,
and with the help of this distinction he unfolds his theory as follows :
(a) First in order, says Aristotle, we have substance (ovata TT/OWTJJ) —
that which does not exist in anything else, and which cannot be predi
cated of anything else, but in which all else exists, and of which all
else can be predicated. This notion, it is clear, can be applied only to
the individual object, for the individual is not a predicament, but is
rather the subject in which the predicaments have existence ; what does
not exist in the individual has no existence at all. The individual must
therefore be described as the ovaia Tr/Kurrj (substantia prima.)
(b) Examining more closely this oi»<rm 7r/ot6rrj, we distinguish in each
individual two constituent elements — a real substratum (viroKti/bievov) of
being, and another element by which it is made Ijto be that individual
which is actually presented to us (a&oc). The former is the determined
element, the latter the determining. The former is the substratum of
the Idea, the latter is the Idea itself as realized in the individual. The
former is Matter (uArj), the latter is Form (juo/o^r/). United they form
the constituent principles of individual being, of the ov<rta TT/OWTI?
Without these two principles the ovvia Trpwrri is unthinkable.*
(c) Keeping in view the distinction here laid down, we are led at
once to the notion of the ouo-m SeuTtpa. The Form, being that by which
the individual is made to be what it is, is the thing which we call the
Essence of the individual. This essence is something more than the
permanent unchanging element in the being of the individual ; it is, at
the same time, the basis of all its attributes ; it is of the essence that all
the properties or attributes which in any way belong to the individual
* It is clear that Aristotle understands by juop0r; or f-lSoQ when he uses the term to sig
nify constituent principles of individual objects,, not the outward form or species of the
individual which manifests itself to the senses, but the inner form or species which the
intellect alone can perceive. Aristotle is, however, careful to make his meaning unmis
takable, for when he uses a<v>f and fjmp^i'i in the sense of their inner forms or species, he
adds the epithet " Kara Xoyov."
102 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
are predicated. It thus becomes identified with the Substance of the
Individual. This Substance of individual being, which is identic .il with
its Essence, is the oi/crta cteurf/oa.
(d) The notions outrm irpwri) and ovaia foirrtpa being thus denned,
the question next arises : What are the relations of the one to the other r
If the oMa &i>Ttpa be no more than the determining principle in the
individual being, it follows that the question what the individual is can
be answered only by assigning its ovata Seurspa. The latter, in the
words of Aristotle, is therefore the TO ri fa tlvat of the former, or its
quiddity (quid est). Hence the notions pop^'i, tiSoe, owrfo tovrepa, TO rl
fa iivai, as applied to the individual, represent, according to Aristotle,
one and the same thing.
(e) Comparing several individuals, in point of quiddity or TO ™ r)i/
avat, we find several individuals to have the same quiddity— to be such
that the same TO n' fa ttvai must be asserted of all of them. Thus, for
example, all human individuals, when compared together, are found to
have the same quiddity, the same TO r? fa tlvat, the same ova'ia ctvrtpa,
for each man stands on the same level of nature with all other men,
possesses a being determined by the same essential characteristics.
From this it follows that the same quiddity or ovaia Sevr^a oan be
common to several individuals in this sense that each of these individuals
has a like quiddity or ovaia Stvrtpa with the rest.
(/) On the other hand, the second constituent principle of the ovala
irpuTii, Matter, is of such a nature that it can never, in any way, be
common to several individuals. Matter, as the substratum of the
quiddity or determinate being of a given individual, belongs exclusively
to the individual in question ; it can in no wise be shared with another,
and precisely for the reason that the Matter belonging to the individual
is exclusively its own, is the individual distinct from all other indi
viduals, and possessed of completed being in itself. ^ f
(g) From this it follows that in the individual Form (the owffia
&uT£joa or TO TI fa tlvai) is the principle of Specification ; Matter, or the
vvoKtinevov, the principle of Individuation. The Form or quiddity
being the same in several individuals, unites these individuals into one
species : Matter being different in each individual, determines the in
dividuality of each to the exclusion of all the others. On the Form or
quiddity— the principle of specification, depends the unity of several
individuals in one species ; on the Matter— the principle of individuation,
depends the plurality of individuals within the same species.
(h) We are now in a position to give an answer to the question :
How does thought rise from the particular to the Universal ? The faculty
of sense puts before us the individual object as it appears individually in
the world of phenomena; thought penetrates to the Form, ovaia or
quiddity, underlying the individual, abstracts this from the individual,
and makes it the object of its thinking activity. The ovaia thus ap
prehended as an abstraction, we again predicate of the individual,
attributing it to the individual as its proper quiddity. We next come
to perceive that this quiddity belongs not to one individual merely
TMULosoiMiy OF THE GREEKS. 103
— that a number of individuals possess a quiddity like the first ; this
quiddity, which our thought thus represents as common to many in
dividuals, we naturally conceive of as predicable of many individuals,
/>., we conceive of it as niiirrtwrf, and we unite under this common con
cept all the individuals of which the ovaia in question is predicable. By
this perfectly natural process are we led from the individual to the
universal.
S. In this process three further points are worthy of note :
(a) In the first place it is clear that according to the mind of Aristotle the universal
is not merely an ens rationis, a purely notional entity ; the thing represented in the con
cept is objectively yp.a.1 jj^ thft-sqyfira,1 imlivirfaajgj for it is nothing else than the ovaia or
quiddity of these individuals. It is only in so far as this ovaia is thought as universal,
th.it it can be called a product of thought, and even in this respect the procedure of
thought cannot be said to bo arbitrary, for it rests upon that likeness of the ovaia in the
several individuals which exists as an objective fact.
(6) In the second place it becomes evident how and in what sense Aristotle was led
to assert that the universal is inseparable from the individual ; that it is indwelling
(immanent) (ivvTrdpxov) in the individual. For the ovaia Stvrtpa has not independent
existence, it exists in the individual or ovaia npuTii as the quiddity of the latter ; and
this ovaia StvTtpa is the thing represented in the universal notion.
(c) In the third place it becomes apparent why and in what sense Aristotle asserted
that the universal, taken objectively, is not one single being, that in the objective order
it manifests itself only in different individuals. For every individual, owing to the material
element included in it, is a being completed in itself, and the common possession of the
ovaia by several individuals, is not to be regarded as constituting oneness in being, but
only as implying a likeness of ovaia between many individuals.
9. Having now set forth the fundamental principles of Aristotle's
theory of Knowledge, we pass on to his Logic. What we have first to
notice here is the place assigned to the Drmoept. The Concept (Aoyoe),
according to Aristotle, has to do with the Essence (ov<r/a) of things.
When our thought represents the Essence of things in abstracto, it repre
sents it in the form of a Concept. It follows that the universal, as such,
exists only as an universal Concept in the thinking mind. The deter-
\minatiou and exposition of the Concept (opi(r^6g) is effected by Definition.
] )efinition is, therefore, nothing more than the exposition of the Essence
of a thing.
10. If we consider closely any concept which represents the Essence
of certain things to the exclusion of all others, we shall distinguish in it
two elements, a general and a special. The general is possessed by the
individuals included under the given concept in common with certain
other individuals, the special element is peculiar to the former indi
viduals and serves to distinguish them from the latter. The general
element is the common element, the special is the differentiating element
(Difference). The general is the indeterminate, the special is the deter
mining element ; and they may, therefore, be regarded as standing to
one another in the relation of Matter and Form.
11. It is owing to this distinction between the elements of our con
cepts that our conceptual knowledge does not stop at the first specific
differences of things ; we are led to subordinate particular concepts to
more general concepts. For the characteristics which are common to
several concepts can be conceived, per absfractionem, only as themselves
forming a concept, and thus we have a higher concept under which the
104 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
first are subsumed. In this way we proceed from the Specific to the
Generic concept, from the Species to the Genus. If we push this pro
cess of abstraction to the utmost limit permitted by our concepts, we
arrive at ultimate generic notions which cannot be subordinated to (sub
sumed under) any others : i.e.; we arrive at the so-called Categories.
12. Aristotle enumerates ten categories, or ultimate generic notions
(suprema genera) : Substance (ova/a), Quantity (iroaov), Quality (Trotov),
Relation (TT/OOC ri), Place (irov), Time (Vore), Position (Ket<r0at), Posses
sion (e^etv), Action (TTCMECV), and Passion (Tracrvetv). Everything that
can be predicated of the objects of cognition falls under one or other of
these concepts, and for this reason Aristotle regards them as the mo§t
universal or highest generic notions, and describes them as the Cate
gories of things. It is, however, only in the book " On the Categories "
(Kariryo/oi'at) that they are distinctly set forth to the number of ten. In
other places Aristotle reduces the Categories to a smaller number. For
example, in the Analyt. Post. I. 22, we find the ova/a contrasted with
the remaining Categories as with so many accidents, auju/SfjSrjKora
(accidentia), And in Met. XIY. 2 only three are mentioned: TO. /utv
yap ova cat, ra & Traflrj, ra Se TT/OOC TZ (substances, attributes, relations).
13. From the Concept our thought proceeds to the Judgment. In
a judgment we effect the union or the separation of two concepts by
affirming or denying the one or the other (icora^aortc and airofyaatc). It
is in judgment that truth or falsity in our knowledge first appears ;
we can predicate neither truth nor falsity of the unconnected concepts.
The truth of our knowledge consists in the accord of our judgment with
the objective order of things, in the fact that things are in objective
reality as we judge them to be. The falsity of our knowledge consists
in the contradiction between our judgment and the objective order, in
our judging things to be what in reality they are not.
14. When a judgment has once been formed, another judgment
may be derived from it — this is the process of Inference. From judg
ment, then, we proceed to inference. Inference is defined by Aristotle
(Top. I. 1) as Xd-voc ev w rtOlvrtov riviov ere/oov rl TIOV Kttfievwv f£
averyiojc av/x/3aivet eta rwv Kti/uivuv — a discourse in which from certain
premises, and by means of these premises, something different from the
premises necessarily follows. We must, however, distinguish between
Syllogistic and Inductive Inference.
(a) The Syllogism draws a particular conclusion from an universal
major premise by means of a third proposition (minor premise), evolving
in this process a proposition which was already virtually contained in
the universal. In other words, by means of the Middle Term it con
nects the Major Term as predicate, with the Minor as subject. In his
teaching regarding the syllogism, Aristotle has in view only the cate
gorical syllogism. He distinguishes three syllogistic Figures (tr^fjutra)
according as the Middle Term (o/ooc /xetroe) is subject in one premise
and predicate in the other, or as it is predicate in both premises, or as it
is subject in both premises. (The Fourth Figure was introduced at a
much later period.)
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 105
(b) Inductive inference, on the other hand, follows an opposite
direction; it proceeds from particular to general propositions; it con
cludes from the fact that a certain concept belongs to all those members
of a class of which we have experience that it belongs to the entire
class, and is an essential attribute of the class. In other words, Induc
tion (sTTcryoryfj, 3 E£ tTrcrywyfic av\\oji(rfj6^) concludes " that a concept
of greater extension is predicate of a concept of smaller extension, from
the fact that it is predicated of several or of all of the objects included
under the latter." (Anal. Prior. III. 23.)
(c) The syllogism is, of Us nature, antecedent to the Inductive pro
cess, for it proceeds from that which is first in order of nature (the
Universal) to that which is subsequent in nature (the particular). But
for m the Inductive Inference comes first, since it proceeds from what
is first in our experience (the individual) to that which we attain to sub
sequently (the universal). In itself the syllogism is a more rigorous
and a clearer form of inference ; for us Induction is the form more im
mediately within reach, and it is therefore the clearer and more con
vincing.
15. The syllogism, in its turn, is the means of Proof. Proof con
sists in the demonstration of the truth of one proposition from the truth
of another ; and as this can be effected only by deducing the one from
the other, it follows that Proof is not possible without this syllogism.
The syllogism, regarded as the means of Proof, is of different kinds :
(a) The Apodictical (Demonstrative) Syllogism, when our conclusion is drawn from
true, certain, and indisputable premises.
(/;) The Dialectical Syllogism, which draws its conclusion from merely probable pre
mises, t£ ivlo^wv, ex probabilibus.
(c) The Eristic Syllogism draws its conclusion from premises which have only an
alleged or apparent probability (ix Qaivonsvwv ivdo&v). (Top. I. 1.) *
16. Proof, as obtained by the syllogism, cannot be carried back in
definitely. It must ultimately arrive at the undemonstrable, and here
come to an end. For if proof were to continue indefinitely, it could
never be completed — the endless can never be traversed - and we should
thus have no proof at all. In such a supposition proof would become
wholly an impossibility. The undemonstrable, which fixes the limit of
the process of proof, must, therefore, consist of certain propositions
which do not admit of proof, and which, moreover, do not need it, their
truth being self-evident to the intellect. These propositions are, in the
first place, the truths of Immediate Experience ; and, in the second, the
First Principles of Reason (up^ai). Without these no proof is possible,
they are the basis of all demonstration.
17. The First Principles of Reason belong to the vovg. The mind
arrives immediately at the knowledge of them on comparing together
the highest or most general concepts, which it obtains by the process of
abstraction, from the individual objects presented to it. They differ in
• The Sophistical Syllogism is a fallacy, a conclusion obtained from false piemises, or by means of an
Illegitimate combination of the members of the syll .-i>m.
106 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
kind, just as the ultimate concepts from which they are formed differ in
kind. The highest of these principles is the Principle of Contradiction :
TO avro u/iia vTrdp^ttv re KOI fjirj VTrap^etv acvvarov TL^ avrty KOL Kara TO
avTd (Met. IV. 3) : at the same time, and under the same respect, a
thing cannot at once be and not be. Next in order comes the principle
of Excluded Middle. These principles are not only the first or highest
in the order of thought, they are also the highest in the order of Real
Being. Thought follows Being, and what is first in order of thought
must be first also in the order of Being. These principles, then, control
not only the whole domain of Logic, but also the whole domain of
Metaphysics.
18. The syllogism being the means of proof is also the instrument
or operative element in science. Knowledge is acquaintance with the
causes from which phenomena necessarily result ; we have knowledge
of an object only when we understand why it is thus, and not otherwise.
It is the task of science to penetrate to the ultimate causes and reasons
i of phenomena, to deduce and explain phenomena from these causes.
This task can be accomplished only by the use of the rational syllogism,
which reasons from the result to the cause, or from the cause to the re
sult. The syllogism is, therefore, the indispensable instrument of
science. Hence three important consequences : —
(a) In the first place, science, considered in its subjective aspect, holds a middle
place between immediate experience and the first principles of Reason — these being the
opposite extremes in human knowledge. Neither mere experience, nor a knowledge of
first principles, can be called science. Scientific knowledge is intermediary between
both, it is established by the rational syllogism, on the basis furnished, to which Expe
rience and the principles of Reason alike contribute.
(b) Scientific knowledge, properly so called, is attainable only in the case of those
phenomena which are of constant, or at least usual occurrence, not in the case of those
which appear only occasionally or accidentally ; for the former permit us to argue the
existence of a cause uniformly effective ; the latter warrant no such conclusion.
(c) Lastly, since the truths reached by the scientific syllogism are necessary truths,
it follows that not only has science to deal with the unchangeable and necessary elements
of things, but further that its aim is to obtain knowledge of that which is necessary.
Hence the general maxim : Scientia est de necessariis.
19. We may sum up our exposition of this part of Aristotle's
philosophy in the words of the philosopher himself (Anal. post. I. 18) :
There are two means to intellectual .^knowledge — Induction, or rather
the abstraction obtained through Induction, and the rationallSlllogism.
Everything that we know scientifically we know by the one means or
by the other. Induction — which enables us to reach general notions
by a process of abstraction — conducts us immediately to the concepts of
widest universality, and mediately to the First Principles which result
from comparing these concepts together. The rational Syllogism, on the
other hand, adopting as its basis both Experience and the First Prin
ciples of Reason, conducts us to the causes of phenomena, and aiding us
to reach the ultimate and highest causes of all Being, lifts us at last to
Philosophy — the crown of intellectual knowledge, the queen of all the
sciences.
OK Till-; i.RKKKS. l()i
METAPHYSICS.
§35.
1. We have already indicated what Aristotle conceives to be the
province of Metaphysics, or the First Philosophy. It deals with lira I
Being as such ; it investigates the principles or ultimate causes of Being.
The first question which Metaphysics has to answer is this : What are
the common principles of all Being. In answering this question,
Aristotle first replies indirectly, examining and refuting the opinions of
earlier philosophers. He then replies directly, setting forth his own
teaching on the subject.
2. With regard to his refutation of other philosophers, we shall here
confine ourselves to his arguments against Plato's theory of Ideas.
Ideas, in Plato's sense of the w^ord, he says, are not the principles of
Being ; nay, such Ideas arc not admissible at all ; and this for the
following reasons : —
(a.) In the first place, the Platonic Theory of Ideas is wholly barren : " These ideas
are only a meaningless duplication of sensible objects (a kind of afoAfra ciicKt, eternal
Bensibles)," and do not in anywise help to explain the existence of individual objects.
They contain only the forms of things, and these must be combined with Matter in order
to give the things actual existence. This combination can only be effected through
motion ; and Ideas are not the moving principles of things. (Met. I. 7, 9 ; XII. 6 ;
XIII. 5.)
(b.) Ideas are said to represent and to contain the essences of things. Now, it is
altogether impossible that the essence of a thing and the thing itself should exist apart
from one another. This the more, that such an admission leads to manifest contradiction.
For "if an universal idea, v.g., 'animal' exists apart from the 'man' and 'horse' con
tained under this universal idea, we may ask whether this idea as it is in the latter is
numerically one and the same in all, or are there different ideas in the different objects?
The first alternative cannot be admitted, for a notion cannot remain numerically one in
things that are different, otherwise the generic concept would be simultaneously deter
mined by the specific differences of several species, i.e., by opposite attributes — an evident
contradiction. Nor can the second alternative be accepted, for in this case the genus
would be really multiplied in the species, and thereby the unity of the concept would be
destroyed — and it is Plato's aim to maintain the unity of the concept." (Met. VII. 14.)
(c.) "Again, these Ideas, described as distinct from the objects which participate
in them, either have nothing in common with these objects beyond the name, or they have
a certain community of nature with them. In the first case, they are entirely without
effect for the knowledge of the objects in question ; in the second, the community of
nature supposes participation in a third entity common to both" — i.e. the Ideas and the
corresponding individual objects require a third common prototype, on which both shall
be modelled ; v.y. the individual man and the Idea of man require a "third man" (rpiroz
dvOpwTTos), Met. I. 9; VII. 13. (This argument of the "third man" seems to have
become proverbial among the opponents of the Platonic theory.)
(d.) Plato calls the Ideas "prototypes" of the objects of sense, and describes the
relation in which the latter stand to them as a " participation." But these care empty
\\<>nls, mere poetical metaphor, which explains nothing, and, besides, entails absurd
' MM sequences. For, since one and the same object is frequently included under several
different concepts — v.y. Socrates is included not only under the concept ' man,' but also
under the concepts ' animal' and ' biped' — it follows that for one and the same object we
must have several prototypes, and that Ideas are not prototypes of sensible objects, but
arc derived from them in the same way as the generic concepts are derived from the
species. Met. I. 9 ; XIII. 5.
(e.) The fact that there is such a thing as scientific knowledge is no argument in
favour of this theory ; " we may, indeed, conclude from this fact that the universal lias
a real existence, but not that it has a separate existence. If the latter consequence fol
lowed, other consequences would follow which the Platonists would not and could not
108 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
admit. For example, it would follow that there exist Ideas corresponding to works of
art, and even to things which have no substantial beinsf, such as attributes and relations,
for we have single concepts of each of these things (TO vorj^a ev).*
3. From the negative side of Aristotle's teaching we pass to the
positive. The principles of all Being, as given by Aristotle, are four :
Matter (vAij), Form (nopfyn or ti§og), Efficient or Moving Cause (TO
KivijTtKOv), and Final Cause or End (TO ov tWica). These are the neces
sary assumptions, the ultimate basis of all Being, and are not themselves
derived from anything else ; they are, therefore, Principles (apxai) of
things (Phys. I. c. 6, 2) ; they are also Causes (atria), inasmuch as the
Existence as well as the Being of things is dependent on them (Met. I. 3 ;
Phys. II. c. 3, 1, seq.). "The earlier Greek philosophers," remarks
Aristotle (Met. I. 3, seq.), "investigated only the Material Principles of
things ; Empedocles and Anaxagoras inquire into the Cause of motion ;
the Formal Principle has not been clearly indicated by any of the earlier
philosophers, the nearest approach to it has been made by the authors
of the Theory of Ideas ; lastly, the Principle of Final Causes has been
understood and recognized by the older philosophers only in a relative,
not in an absolute sense."
4. The first of the four principles of Being is Matter. Matter is
that which is indeterminate in itself, but capable of determination. As
such, it is the substratum of all that comes to be — that out of which all
things are made. Everything that comes into being arises out of a
condition the opposite of that on which it enters, and everything that
perishes passes into a condition the opposite of that in which it existed.
Out of Non-being arises Being ; the Existent passes in turn into the
Non-existent. This process is impossible unless we suppose an under
lying substratum in which the origin and the dissolution of things are
accomplished; this substratum is Matter. Matter is not, therefore, a
determinate Being ; it is merely the indeterminate substratum of all
determinate Being.
5. The second principle of Being is Form, a principle in immediate
relation with Matter. Matter is the indeterminate but determinable
element ; Form is the determining element — i.e. it is a principle, within
the object, giving it determinate character. Matter is that out of which
a thing is made ; Form is that into which it is made. What comes to
be comes to be something, and the element by which it comes to be this
determinate something is its Form. Form, as conceived by Aristotle, is
not merely external shape or conformation, it is an intrinsic principle of
Being, by which the inner nature of the object becomes what it is.
6. The union of Matter and Form constitutes the Substance— the
concrete Being of the object. Neither Matter by itself nor Form by
itself is, properly speaking, a being ; it is only the union of both that
can be so designated. Matter and Form united constitute the specific
nature, which, being realized in the individual, comes before us as
* It is observable that, in his refutation of the Platonic theory, Aristotle assumes throughout that Plato
regarded Ideas as possessed of independent existence, apart from sensible things, and apart also from the
Being of God. this assumption being granted, his arguments are conclusive. But this could not be said of
f h 1^e-assume the ri8ht explanation of Plato's theory to be that he regarded Ideas only as conceptions
I'lIII.OSOl'HY UK THE GREEKS. 109
Substance or determinate being. Considering Matter and Form in their
relations to the determinate being that results from their union, we are
able to fix still more distinctly their relations to one another.
(a.) Matter is naturally destined to receive a Form ; hence its ten
dency towards Form resembles the tendency of the female to the male.
This lack of Form in Matter does not mean mere negation ; it is the
want of something which should be present, it is Privation (orlpixric).
Privation (<rrlpi}<ric) is the peculiar characteristic of Matter considered
in itself, apart from Form. Taken thus by itself, it appears to possess
merely negative characteristics. There is, however, a positive charac
teristic involved in the notion before us; namely, its disposition to
become determinate by means of a Form ; without this disposition the
lack of the Form could not be called Privation.
(b.) The privation of Form as applied to Matter cin be understood
in two senses — absolutely and relatively. A substance which already
possesses definite Form may stand in the relation of Matter to a higher
substance, inasmuch as it may receive a higher Form, and thus become
a higher substance. In this case, the privation which affects the Matter
in question is merely relative, involving only the want of that higher
Form to which the Matter can and should attain. We can, however, in
thought, separate Matter from any and every Form, and consider it as
entirely formless. In this case the privation is absolute. Matter con
sidered as subject to this absolute privation, represented in thought as
deprived of all Form, is called " Primal Matter" (vAij 7171 wr»j), Matcria
Prim a. This is Matter WT' E£O\//I; ; whenever we speak of Matter without
qualification we must be understood to speak of " PrhW Matter."
(c.) That Form maybe realized in fact, Matter must be presupposed ;
the actual reality, however, depends upon the union of Form with
Matter. In a substance composed of Matter and Form, Matter may
thus be regarded as the Potentiality (Svva/af), Form as the Actuality
(cvrcAl^fca). The element which constitutes the possibility of the sub
stance is Matter ; the element constituting its actuality is Form. Matter
apart from Form, in the order of actual existence, is therefore wholly
unthinkable. We must, indeed, suppose a Matter without any Form what
ever, as the basis of all existent substances, but, as such, it is itself never
actually existent, and can never so exist, for the reason that it is in itself
mere potentiality. The predicate of Being can be attributed to it only if
we understand it to be in the order of possibility, not in the actual order.
(d.) Form, or EvrtAl^eta, is the actuality of things ; but we must
draw a distinction between tvTt\i\tia TrpwTij and ivipytta. The tvTtXf^tu
Tr/owrrj is the actuality of the object, the complement or completion of
the substance in the order of actual being ; the Ivipytia, on the other
hand, is its Activity, of which the actual substance is the principle and
the source. Form, it will be observed, can be called Entelechy only
when understood to be one with the ti/rcAe'^aa TT/OWTJJ ; iv&pytta, on the
other hand, is dependent on the Form, for Form is the principle of
actuality. Aristotle does not, however, maintain strictly this distinction
between the two concepts; he not unfrequently describes Form as
110 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
7. The third principle of Being is Efficient (or Moving) Cause. It
is a fact of experience that there is movement in the world about us.
Movement supposes a moving cause ; without this it is unthinkable,
The moving cause, whatever be its nature, cannot be conceived as mere
potentiality, it must always be an actual being; for only the actual
being can exert an evljo-yem, or, in the present instance, actively produce
movement. Every movement, then, supposes an actual cause, an ente-
lechy proper, froni which the movement proceeds.
8. With reard to motion itself (^I'ljmc), the following are the chief
points of Aristotle's teaching :—
(a.) Motion, in general, is the actualization of the possible, ?j row
Svvarov, % Suva-row £VTlXex«o (Phys. III. 1). It is, therefore, the
transition from the possible to the actual. Wherever a process of transi
tion from possibility to actuality is in progress, we can say of the thing
involved in the process that it is in motion.
(b.) There are, however, different kinds of motion. We must distin«
guish between the motions which suppose a fully constituted, determinate
object, and are accomplished in this object, and the motions which affect
the existence or non-existence of the object. To the former class belong
quantitative, qualitative, and local motions ; that is to sav, increase and
diminution (au£rj<rie KCU $0/<r<c), change or alteration (aXXoiwo-fe), and
locomotion (</>opa). To the second class belong origin or generation
(yevwte) and dissolution or corruption (tyBopa)*
(c.) Quantitative, qualitative, and local motions differ from generation
and corruption in this, that they involve only a transition from one
condition of the subject to another, whereas in generation and corruption
we have a transition from non-existence to existence, or conversely. In
generation the terminus a quo is non-existence, the terminus ad qucm is
existence. In corruption we have the converse process. Matter, however,
cannot, as wre have already seen, exist without some form or other. Non-
existence, therefore, can apply to the two cases we have been considering
only in a relative sense; i.e. the terminus a quo in generation is not
absolute non-existence, but only the non-existence of that which is
generated. The same, in its measure, holds good with regard to cor
ruption. There is not, then, any absolute origin of things, nor any
absolute destruction. Everything that begins to be comes into existence
by the corruption of something else, and everything that perishes passes
into another being — " Generatio unius est corruptio altering, et corruptio
unius est generatio alterius."
(d.) The first and most excellent form of motion is locomotion. On
this all the others depend. But locomotion introduces two further
notions, Spice and Time.
* The word /ctnjTu; is sometimes employed by Aristotle (v.fj. Phys. III. 1) as equi
valent to jU£rrt/3oX?/ (change), since every movement involves a change. He says, however
(Phys. V. 1;, that, although every Kivi](nc is a /iirn/3oAiy, every //tru/SoXi? is not, conversely,
; for example, such as affects the very existence of the object, i.e. ytviaic <r
<ft9nf)'i. Accordingly, ykvt nu; and 00opa should, properly speaking, be included, not under
the notion Kivijaic, but under the notion /xercr/3oAi?. This has not been noticed above, i 8
Aristotle does not uniformly maintain the distinction.
PHILOSOPHY OF TI1K (.KKKKS. HI
(a.) Place (locus, TOTTOC) is defined ^ by Aristotle as the iirst immovable limit of the
enclosing body (TO TIW irepuxovroij Trlpac CLKIV^TOV Trpwrov, Phys. IV. c. 6. 15, 24)- _ a
definition which makes an empty place impossible. Enlarging this notion of the T/.TTOC,
and extending it to the great bodies of the universe, we obtain by this means the notion of
universal space. The universe, taken as a whole, cannot, it is evident, exist in space (or
in a place), for there is no enclosing body by which it could be surrounded. Space «•••
only within the world ; outside it there is no space. Space extends only to the outer
limits of the world.
(b.) Time is defined by Aristotle as the measure of motion in order of antecedence
and consequence (apiQfioQ Ktv^9€uf Kara TO irpoTtpov KO.I vartpov, Phys. IV. c. 10, 7).
The unit of time is the present, and from the motion of this unit time is produced. Time
has neither beginning nor end ; it is eternal hi both directions, for every present supposes
a past and a future, and thus no point can be found at which time could arrest its course.
Time is measured by uniform movement ; to this purpose circular movement is particu
larly adapted.
9. Lastly, the fourth principle is the End or Final Cause, The End
is that to which the motion issuing from the Efficient Cause is directed.
Movement without this term to which it is directed is inconceivable ; the
End must, therefore, be one of the necessary principles of actual Being.
It is, indeed, possible that in a given movement a result may ensue
which was not intended, which is the effect of some collateral cause
attaching to the means employed to attain a certain end — this is ru\>/,
chance, ccrnts fortuitun. But this does not in any way prejudice the
notion of purpose as belonging to motion ; on the contrary, chance, ™\rj,
necessarily presupposes this notion. The End is always a Good, to be
obtained by the motion ; the Ratio Ion I cannot be dissociated from the
notion of End.
10. Having laid down these general principles regarding the notion
of the Final Cause, we may now proceed to exnmine the notion in its
special applications : —
(a.) When we apply the notion of End to that movement which we
have called generation, we observe at once that the End to which this
movement tends and the Form are one and the same thing; in other
words, the Form is not only the result, it is also the end or purpose of
the generative process. The realization of the Form in Matter is the
scope of the process. Thus, the Form is not only the principle of
determinateness and actuality in the substance, which consists of Matter
and Form, it is further the end or purpose intrinsic to the substance.
(b.) The relation already pointed out between Matter and Form leads
us further to observe that, in substances of the kind under consideration,
Matter is the irrational element, whereas Form, being the element on
which plan or purpose is based, betokens Reason, and is the object of
b mental concept. Matter is, therefore, the avajKii, or blind necessity
Form is the end or purpose, the rational element in the thing (\6yoz).
(c.) In the generation of things Form and Final Cause are one ; it
may also happen that the Moving Cause and the Final Cause become
identical. This occurs when the Moving Cause occasions movement,
and the same.
112 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
11. Thus much regarding the principles of Being. On the basis thus
established, Aristotle proceeds to construct his theory regarding the World
and God. A prominent point in his teaching on the first of these points
is his doctrine of the eternity of the world, which he strives to establish
by the aid of the foregoing metaphysical principles. In his reasoning
he proceeds as follows : —
(a.) Matter cannot have had a beginning. For Matter, as we are
aware, is the basis of all things, necessarily antecedent to the origin of
all other things. It is the potentiality of everything having actual
existence ; what comes into being must come from Matter. If we suppose
Matter to have itself come into being, we are driven to assume another
Matter, which shall be the basis or potentiality out of which it shall
arise ; in other words, Matter must be supposed to exist before it existed.
This is self-contradiction. Matter, then, has not begun to be ; that is to
say, it is eternal.
(b.) Again, we know Matter cannot exist without Form. If, then,
we admit that Matter is eternal, we must admit that Form also is
eternal. We cannot, in consequence, allow that Matter was at first
shapeless and formless, and has gradually assumed its present form and
condition, as Plato thinks ; we must, on the contrary, assume that, as
regards both Matter and Form, all things have been without beginning ;
in other words, that the world, as it is, is eternal.
(c.) We are led to the same conclusion when we consider the nature
of Motion : —
(1.) If Motion had a beginning, there could have existed previously
to this beginning only the possibility of Motion. To account for the
beginning of Motion, we must suppose this possibility to have been ren
dered actual. But this could be effected only by Motion. Motion must,
therefore, have existed before its beginning — an evident contradiction.
(2.) Furthermore, Time, as has been shown, has had no beginning.
But Time is inseparably identified with Motion, for it is nothing more
than the measure of Motion in the succession of 'before' and 'after/
It follows that, if Time is eternal, Motion is also eternal.
Now, if Motion is eternal, so also is that which is moved. As the
thing moved is the world, the world, like Motion, must be without
beginning ; it also must be eternal.
(d.) The world is thus proved eternal a parte ante. That it is eternal
in this sense is proof that it is also eternal a parte post. For, in the first
place, Time, as it is without beginning, is also without end ; it follows
that Motion and the thing moved, both of which the notion of Time
supposes, must be without end. In the second place, all corruption is
transition from one Form to another, since the corruption of one thing
is the generation of another, Matter the while, not being liable to change,
as it is wholly incorruptible. This being so, it is impossible that the
Forms existent in the world, taken in their totality, should be subject
to corruption. Matter cannot exist without Form ; the corruption of all
existing Forms would, therefore, involve the corruption of Matter —
which has already been shown to be impossible. The world, being one
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 1 1 .'i
aggregate of things which consist of Matter and Form, is thus shown to
bo without end ; the notion of generation is inapplicable to the world,
so also is the notion of corruption.
(e) Generation and corruption take place only within the world.
And even here, generation and corruption only affect the individual,
they do not reach the species or the genus. Individuals alone come
and go; species and genera are eternal. If a species were to perish,
then would one determinate Form disappear from the world — a con
sequence which is inadmissible, since it has been proved that existing
Forms, taken as a whole, are incorruptible. As regards individuals,
the succession of generation and dissolution is from eternity like the
world itself. Within the world, the process of the rise, origin, and de
struction of individuals, has not had a beginning, nor will it have an end.
12. Aristotle further seeks to prove that the world is one — that there
can exist only one world. This he proves from the principle already
laid down, that the basis of all plurality in things within any one
species is Matter. If there were more worlds than one, each should
have Matter peculiar to itself. But Matter, as the substratum of all
generation and corruption, is absolutely one ; if this were not the case,
there would be no one substratum in which the origin and dissolution of
things could be effected. There can, then, be only one Matter ; and
this being so, there cannot be several worlds, with several different
material substrata. There is, therefore, only one world, and beyond
this no other world is possible.
13. Thirdly, the world is limited or finite. We must distinguish
two kinds of infinitude. A thing may be either potentially or actually
infinite. It is potentially infinite when it is capable of indefinite in
crease ; actually infinite when it excludes all augmentation, and all
capability of increase. Now it is clear that the world cannot be actually
infinite, for let us imagine its extent to be as great as we will, it is
always possible to suppose it still greater. The world can therefore be
only potentially infinite. But what is potentially infinite —for the reason
that its infinitude is only potential- must always be actually finite, be
its actual extension what it may. It follows that the actual world must
always be finite or limited. The same holds good of space ; for space,
as we have already seen, extends only to the outside limit of the world.
14. In his teaching regarding God, Aristotle is guided by the meta
physical principles here set forth. His proofs for the existence of God
first claim our attention. These proofs are as follows :
(a) It has been shown that motion is eternal. Now every motion
supposes a moving cause. If this cause derives its motion from some
thing else, this something else must in its turn have a moving cause,
and so on successively. But the series of moving causes cannot be in -
finite, for the infinite cannot be traversed, and besides, what is actual is
always finite. We must, therefore, assume a Primal Motor, which does
not receive motion from anything else, and from which, in the last
resort, all motion proceeds. This Prime Motor (irpurov KIVOVV
is God.
9
114 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(b) Furthermore, the actual is, of its nature, antecedent to the
potential. For the potential supposes a cause which can give it actua
lity, and this cause must itself be actual, otherwise it could not be
productive. Potentiality is, therefore, not conceivable apart from an
antecedent actuality. Now, Matter is eternal, but Matter is mere poten
tiality ; we must therefore admit an eternal actuality, an eternal ente-
lechy, which, as such, is antecedent to Matter, and which we name
God.
15. It is now easy to determine what are the attributes of God. As
to the Being of God, Aristotle teaches :
(a) God is pure actuality, pure entelechy. He excludes all com
position of Matter and Form. If the Divine Being were a compound
of Matter and Form, it should have had a beginning of existence, and
it could begin to exist only by the action of a higher cause moving the
Matter to union with the Form. In this supposition God would cease
to be the Prime Mover. God is, therefore, pure Form, pure Quiddity,
pure Energy.
(b) God is further an absolutely Simple Being, essentially excluding
all plurality of parts. For if the Being of God were composed of parts,
it would have magnitude. This magnitude would be either finite or
infinite. It could not be infinite, for an infinite magnitude actually
existent is an impossibility. Nor could it be finite, for in that case the
might of God would be finite, and He would be unable to furnish
motion through unending time, i.e., keep in motion an eternal world.
It follows that the Divine Being excludes all plurality, all parts ; it is
absolutely simple, and therefore immutable.
(c) Finally, God must be One. For the principle of plurality is
Matter — the basis of individuality within the same species. But Matter
is wholly foreign to the Being of God. Hence there can be no question
of a plurality of gods. In the same way we may show that to the Divine
Being there is no opposite term. For opposition can occur only in the
case of two beings having a common Matter, within which opposite
Forms exist. To admit that anything could stand in opposition to God
would be to admit Matter in the Being of God — an admission we have
seen to be unwarrantable.
16. With reference to the activity of God, we must hold as a primary
truth that God, as absolute actuality, is also absolute life. As absolute
life, He is all-sufficient in Himself, and possesses in Himself perfect bliss.
For His happiness He needs not any external goods ; He is Himself the
Highest Good, and is therefore happy in Himself. But the further
question arises : What are the definite characteristics of this absolute
life of God ? Aristotle answers :
(a) The life of God is not an operative life. We cannot admit in
Him activity of Will, productive of effects external to Himself. If we
admitted such an activity of Will in God, we should then be forced to
admit that God has need of goods external to Himself, and that He seeks
to obtain these goods by the activity in question. This admission is
incompatible with the principle that God is absolutely sufficient to
Himself.
IM1II.OSOIMIY OF THE GREEKS. 115
(/>) The life of God is a life of contemplation, and of contemplation
only: God lives by thought, and by thought alone. God is reason
(i'o DC), and only reason. He is a purely contemplative spirit; and, as
such, excludes all volitional action.
(c) But what is the object of this contemplative action ? Aristotle's
answer to this question is as follows :
(1) The object of the Divine Thought is not anything external to
the Divine Being. For the thing known is to this extent superior to
the knowing subject, that the latter is dependent on it. If, then, God
were to have knowledge of things external to Himself, He would bo
dependent on these things, and there would exist something superior to
God. This conclusion is inadmissible. To which we may add that
there are many things apart from God which it is better not to know-
things so base that they are not worthy objects of knowledge.
(2) Hence it follows that the sole object of the knowledge of God
is God Himself. God is the only worthy object of the Divine know
ledge ; it is, therefore, restricted to Him. Man attains his happiness
by attaining knowledge of other things ; God is made happy only by the
knowledge of Himself. In the vision of His own Being, then, consists
that contemplation which makes the absolute immanent life of God.
(3) This Divine self-knowledge is not of the same kind as our
knowledge of ourselves. In us being and knowledge of the being are
different things. In God the knowledge and the thing known are
absolutely one and the same. God's self-knowledge is not merely
voj/<Tt£, it is vorjtKe i/oijfffcijc — absolute identity of thinking and object
thought, (Met. XII. 9.)
17. The relations of God to the world can be deduced from what
has here been laid down. Aristotle's doctrine on this point may be
summarised as follows :
(ft) God is not indwelling (immanent) in the world ; He exists above
it — the Absolute Substance, the Absolute Archetype. His relation to
the world is that of the general to his army. As Prime Mover he is not
at the centre of the world, but without its utmost boundary. For the
more rapidly a thing moves the nearer must it be to the Prime Mover.
The motion of the heaven of the fixed stars is the most rapid ; it follows
that this heaven is nearest to God, and since this heaven forms the
uttermost limit of the world, God must be beyond this extreme limit.
Aristotle, it thus appears, had no knowledge of the omnipresence of God.
(b) God, as the Prime Mover, communicates motion necessarily and
eternally. The motion which proceeds immediately from God must,
therefore, be necessary and eternally continuous. It must further be
one, for on the oneness of the motion which proceeds from God
depends the oneness of the world. This motion must be locomotive,
for it is only a motion of this sort which can be continuous and one.
Not all locomotion, however, has these properties; but only the motion
which proceeds indefinitely in a straight line, or motion in a circle.
The former of these cannot exist, for it supposes an infinite spare.
There remains only motion in a circle. We thus conclude that the
motion proceeding immediately from God is motion in a circle.
110 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(c) Action upon things external to Himself cannot be attributed to
God ; it follows that He cannot communicate motion to the world by
physical impulse. He can excite motion only as an object of desire. He
is at once the archetype and the ultimate end, ^and chief good of all
things in the world ;*He is, consequently, an object of desire to these
things, and, as such, He gives the world its motion. God being the
supreme good, and the object of desire, standing above all things, all
things move towards Him, and by their motion seek to share in His
eternity and immortality. According to the different position held by
each object in the mundane order, is the mode of its motion towards
this end. Hence the differences of motion.
((I) Athough God's relation to the world is that of Prime Mover, yet
there cannot be question of a Divine Providence, in the sense that God
provides immediately for each and every thing in the world. Such a
Providence supposes that God knows all things in the world. But we
already have .,een that this is not the case ; God does not, therefore,
exercise a providence over the world. The motion which God commu
nicates to the world assures the existence and the order of the universe,
the permanence of the celestial spheres, and of the genera and species
of things on the earth. Individuals, as such, are merely transient pheno
mena, which appear on the stream of time only to sink into it again.
They are not subject to any higher guiding providence.
18. His teaching with regard to God is undoubtedly the weakest
point in the system of Aristotle. He regards God merely as the Prime
Mover of the world, and assigns Him no other relations to the world
than those which depend on the motion he communicates. As this
motion is necessarily communicated by God, it is clear that Aristotle
makes Necessity control all things. He knows nothing of Ideas within
the Divine Mind, which are the archetypes of created things ; he recog-
. nises no Divine Providence which guides the universe, no Divine Will,
which, of its free accord, gave origin to the world. Under the stern
law of Necessity nature runs its eternal course, and individual things
are but products of the necessary evolution of nature, appearing for a
moment, and then disappearing again. Motionless, though communi
cating movement, God is separated from the world. What occurs in the
world, takes place without concurrence from Him ; He does not even
know what is taking place. In his theological notions, Plato is clearly
far in advance of Aristotle ; his teaching regarding God is nearer the
truth than Aristotle's theory of the " Prime Mover."
PHYSICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.
§36.
1. In his physics Aristotle distinguishes between simple and com
posite bodies. He reckons as simple the four elements, Earth,
Water, Air, .Fire. Fire has a natural tendency upwards ; the Earth
PHILOSOPHY OF THE (JRKMKS. ]J7
naturally tends downwards, i.e. towards the centre of the world. Water
and Air are intermediate between these extremes. The Earth occupies
the lowest position ; above it is Water ; above Water, Air; and above
Air, the sphere of Fire. In addition to these four simple elements, we
have a fifth — the ^Ether, extending from the heaven of the fixed stars
to the moon, out of which the celestial spheres and heavenly bodies are
formed. Composite or natural bodies are formed from the four first
simple substances, and every composite body contains all four elements
combining in different proportions. Aristotle rejects the World-Soul.
2. The Earth is at rest, and occupies the centre of the world. Beyond
the sphere of Fire, which forms the extreme limit of the terrestrial region,
the celestial spheres begin. The lowest of these is the sphere of the
moon ; then follow the spheres of the sun and of the planets ; and
lastly, forming the boundary of the celestial region, comes the sphere of
the fixed stars. These celestial spheres revolve eternally round the
Earth. The most rapid in its movement of revolution is the sphere of
the fixed stars. As we descend the revolving movement becomes
slower, and the lower spheres revolve in a direction contrary to the
higher. The sphere of the fixed stars alone receives its motion imme
diately from the Prime Mover. The lower spheres have each its own
mover, who, analogously to the Prime Mover, must be a pure entelechy,
and therefore a vovg, or Intelligence.
3. The celestial spheres are not subject to any process of generation
or corruption, to any increase or diminution, or alteration. For the
heavens are formed of the fifth element, and so do not contain any
opposing elements which could render change possible ; all change must
therefore be excluded from them. It follows that what we style increase
and diminution, alteration, generation and corruption, is wholly confined
to the terrestrial or sublunary region. Nevertheless, the movements of
the several parts of the universe affect one another. The motion of +hc
lower celestial spheres depends upon that of the higher, and all genera
tion, corruption, alteration, increase or diminution occurring in the
sublunary region is dependent on the determining influence of the
lowest of the celestial spheres, i.e. on its motion. The end of this
common movement throughout the universe is to bring all things, each
according to its position in the whole, to likeness with the Eternal
Archetype. The heavens, by their eternal movement, most nearly
attain to this perfection ; it is attained in the lowest degree by sub
lunary things, the movements of which are imperfect and limited.
The sublunary region is the domain of what we call Mature. In
all the changes which take place within it, Nature is working with a
plan ; it strives in every case after a determined end, and at all times
aims at what is best For this reason there is in its products a continuous
gradation. Lowest in its scale are the inorganic, inanimate bodies ; then
follow organic beings with merely vegetable life (plants) ; next come
organic beings with animal life (brutes) ; at the top of the scale stands
man, superior to all other beings by his gift of reason, and by his reason
sharing in the attributes of God. He is the ultimate end and purpose
118 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
of Nature. The principle of life in organic beings Aristotle calls the
Soul. The question naturally arises, What is the nature of the Soul in
general, and what, especially, is the nature of the human Soul ? Here
we arrive at the Psychology of Aristotle.
5. In his treatise Ilt/ot faxnCi Aristotle, according to his custom, first
refutes the opinions of earlier philosophers regarding the nature of the
Soul.
(a. ) He refutes the opinion that the Soul is merely a Harmony between the parts of
the body ; his principal argument being that, in this case, the Soul could not be the
principle of movement.
(6.) He refutes the opinion that the Soul is formed from one of the four natural
elements, or by a combination of all four ; his chief argument being that, in this case, the
Soul would be capable only of those modifications which are characteristic of the four
elements, whereas the activity and modifications of the Soul are of a wholly different
kind.
(c.) He combats Plato's view that self-movement constitutes the essential being of
the Soul, and this chiefly on the ground that, in this case, the Soul would occupy space>
and would, therefore, be a corporeal being, and free to quit the body at pleasure.
6. So much being premised, Aristotle proceeds to give in positive
terms his own notion of the Soul. He begins with the principle th; t
every being of specifically determinate nature consists of Matter ai:d
Form. Accordingly, he holds that, in the case of the living being, the
principle of life, or Soul, is the Form ; the Body is the Matter. Fonr,
as we have seen, is the entelechy — the first, not the second, entelechy.
The Soul, being the Form, is, therefore, the first entelechy of the Body.
Not every body, however, can become the Matter in which a Soul is
received, but only a physical body, and among physical bodies only such
as are capable of sustaining life. To this class belong only organized
bodies, for the unorganized, as such, exclude vitality. The Soul must,
therefore, be defined as the first entelechy of a physical body, having life
potentially, or briefly, the first entelechy of a physical organized bodt>
(ivrtXi^tia TT/OWT?) aw/maTOQ QVCTIKOV £WT?V fyovrog Svva/im ; or, ivreXe^eia
TTfjwTt] ffcu/iaroc tyvcriKov opyaviKOv. De Anim. II. c. 1.)
7. The Soul, being the Form or first entelechy of a physical organic
body, it follows that it is also the end, as well as the moving principle,
of the latter. It is the end ; for, as has been remarked, the Form, in the
case of individual things, is always the end of their being, their ou IWa ;
it is the moving principle ; for, as has been shown, the first entelechy is,
in every case, the principle of energy or activity in the individual, and
therefore, in the case of the living being, the vital energy is dependent
on and arises from the first entelechy or Soul. The Soul, being on the/
one hand the end of the body, and on the other its moving principle, it'
becomes apparent that the body is the organ or instrument of the
Soul ; hence the thorough adaptation of parts observed in the bodily
organism.
8. Having determined thus the general characteristics of the Soul as
such, we must distinguish the various kinds of souls. There are as
many different kinds of souls as there are different kinds of organized,
living, animated beings. Lowest in this scale is the Soul of the plant.
The functions of this Soul are purely vegetative. A degree higher is
I'HILOSOPHY OF THM CJRKKKS. 119
the brute Soul. This is the immediate principle of the animal functions
in brutes. And, since it is the general law that the higher power vir
tually includes the lower, the brute Soul includes the virtue of the
vegetative Soul, and is, therefore, the principle of the vegetative or
organic functions of brute life. Highest in order comes the Soul of
man, with which we have chiefly to concern ourselves.
9. Aristotle assigns five principal faculties to the human Soul :
Vegetative Power (TO dprn-TiKov), on which the maintenance of the cor
poreal organism depends ; Appetitive Faculty (TO optK-nKOv), which is
exerted in striving after what is good and agreeable, and in repelling
what is disagreeable (&o>£<e KOI fyvyii) ; the faculty of Sensuous Percep
tion (TO aiaOriTiKov), by which the objects perceptible by sense are
represented in our cognition ; the Locomotive Faculty (TO Kivr]TiK.6v)y by
which we are enabled to move the body and its members, and make use
of them for external action ; and lastly, the Reason (TO SLUVO^TIKOV) .
10. The four faculties first named belong to brutes as well as to man.
Reason, on the other hand, is the characteristic which distinguishes man
from the brutes. The Vegetative Power is not subject to the control of
the Reason. The Appetitive Faculty is so connected with Reason, that
its tendencies can and must be brought into accord with the requirements
of Reason. This Appetitive Power is of two kinds — the Concupiscible
(TO t7riOv[jiririK.6v) and the Irascible (TO OU/UL^TIKOV), according as it merely
strives for what is good, or rises in opposition to the hindrances which
stand between it and the attainment of the good it is seeking. External
movement is dependent on the Locomotive Power of the Soul, though it
is executed by the bodily organs in which the Soul has its seat. In
man this faculty also is subject to the controlling influence of Reason.
11. With regard to the faculty of Sensuous Perception (TO alfrOnriKov),
we must ^ distinguish between Simple ataOriais (Perception by sense),
Imagination (QavTacria), and Memory, including Reminiscence (fivi'iftri
KOI ava/ULvrjcric).
(a.) In Sensuous Perception (ai'<r6h/<n<,0 we must suppose the existence of a perceptib e
object, which exerts its influence on the Sense. In this process Sense is passive. Under
the influence exerted by the object on Sense, there arises in Sense a sensuous image (ei&oe
a'urQiiTvv} of the object, which represents the sensible Form of the object, without the
Matter ; and through the Form thus presented the faculty of Sense has cognisance of
the object. Each sense has its proper (formal) object, but the same (concrete) thing may
be perceived by several senses. The sense of Touch is the fundamental and most import
ant sense ; it is much more perfect in man than in brutes. Besides the External Senses,
there is an Internal or Common Sense, underlying the former, and forming a common
centre in which they all unite. Each of the several senses judges of the objects corre
sponding to itself ; the Common Sense distinguishes between the objects of the several
senses, and passes judgments regarding them.
(6.) By the faculty of Imagination man is enabled to retain and reproduce the tiSrj
a!a9t]Ta. of sensible objects without the immediate presence of these objects. The action
of the Imagination is necessary for intellectual cognition, inasmuch as we must keep the
object of intelligence before us under a sensuous image, and this sensuous image (Aavraaua)
is presented by the Imagination.
(c.) The Memory (/xj^/oj) preserves the sensuous forms as the wax preserves the
impression of the seal ; and this is necessary to make possible the recollection of an
object previously perceived. This recollection may be either involuntary, as in brutes ;
or it may be voluntary, i.e. the representations of things may be deliberately recalled to
consciousness. The latter process is Reminiscence (ara^i^m^), and is peculiar to man.
120
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
The primary function of Memory is to preserve the sensible forms of things ; but inasmuch
as tlie objects of intelligence are presented under sensuous images, it happens that intel
lectual concepts also may be stored up in the memory.
12. To make possible the action of the Intellect (vouc), a previous
sensuous perception is necessary. The intellectual operation consists in
this, that it divests the objects presented in sense of their material
adjuncts, and apprehends the intelligible forms which attain actual
existence under sensible conditions. As a result of this operation,
there is generated in the Intellect an intellectual form (t780ff VOIJTOI,),
which represents the intelligible being of the object, and by means of
which the Intellect knows the object, and knows it, moreover, in its
inner nature. It is evident that, in this process, the Intellect is not,
like Sense, altogether passive, that we must distinguish in this connec
tion its active from its passive (receptive) functions. We are thus led
to distinguish between the Active Intellect and the Passive (intellcctm
a yens and possibilis).
(a.) The Active Intellect (V»VQ 7rotrj™oe) renders actually intelligible
the objects of sense, which, in themselves, are only potentially intelligible ;
and this it effects by a process of abstraction, which divests these objects
Of their material envelopment, and thus renders knowable the intelligible
being of the object. It is a light rendering cognizable the intelligible
being of things, in the same way that light in external nature renders
sensible objects visible. The Active Intellect is pure energy without
any potentiality ; its activity is continuous.
(b.) The Passive Intellect (vovg 7ra0r,7Wc), on the other hand
receives the intelligible forms evolved by the abstractive process of the
Active Intellect, and through these apprehends the intelligible being- Of
the sensible objects. The Passive Intellect is thus, in a certain seSse
moved to action by the Active Intellect, and holds towards the latter the
relation of potency to activity. It is, so to speak, the locus of the intel
ligible process—of the £?§„ roriTA. And, inasmuch as it receives into
itself the intelligible form of the object, it becomes, ideally, the thino-
which it apprehends, for it takes into itself the form of the object
apprehended, and is put in action by it.
13. In this way the Intellect arrives at Concepts, and through these
attains to the knowledge of First Principles, which are involved in the
ultimate or highest concepts. The foundation is thus laid for the process
terence, by which the mind, from knowledge possessed, advances to
further knowledge Inference is the function of the Smvom or Reason.
ine biavoia differs from the vovg only in a relative sense. One and the
same faculty is Intellect in one respect, Reason in another.
14. All the faculties of the Soul, other than the vovc, are essentially
connected with the bodily organism, and their functions can be exercised
only by means of the organs in which they are located. It is otherwise
with the vouc- This power does not act in combination with the bodilv
organism ; it is a free faculty, and exercises activity without a corporeal
organ. The reasons for this view are evident :
(a.) If the VOVQ, like Sense, acted in combination with a bodily organ, the vovc, like
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 12]
Sense, wcmld be impaired and corrupted by too strong an impression of its proper object.
The contrary, however, is found to be the case : the more intelligible the object repre
sented in its cognition, the more fully and more perfectly is it able to apprehend the
object.
(6.) If the i/ovj;, as such, were immanent in the bodily organism, and could not act
independently of the body, it would be touched by the affections of Sense, such as heat,
cold— an evident absurdity.
(c.) The functions which are exercised in combination with the body become im
paired in proportion as the body grows weaker and more enfeebled. The vovc, on the
other hand, is neither altered nor enfeebled. If age and sickness sometimes exert a
disturbing influence on the vovc, this arises from the circumstance that the powers of
sense on which it depends for its knowledge are yielding to progressive decay ; in itseli
the voinj is not affected by suffering, it is incapable of pain.
15. This is Aristotle's account of the psychical faculties in man.
The results of his inquiry into the nature of the Soul's faculties enable
him to determine with greater exactness the relations of the Soul to the
Body. The following are the propositions which he lays down in this
connection : —
(a.) The Soul (^v^), regarded merely as the principle of vegetative
and sensitive life, abstracting from the VOVQ, is inseparable from the
body. For, apart from the circumstance that it can exercise no function
without the body, it is the entelechy of an organized body, and cannot,
therefore, have actual existence apart from the body, of which it is the
entelechy. It is separable from the body in our concept, but not in
reality ; it is not the body itself, but is cfw/maroQ TL, i.e., it belongs neces
sarily to the body. The vow?, on the other hand, is wparatus et immixtus ;
as it possesses an activity of its own distinct from the activity of the
body, so does it possess actual being distinct from, and independent of,
the body.
(b.) The Soul (^/u^), as the principle of vegetative and sensitive life,
is produced by generation. In generation the male communicates the
Kivr]TiKov, the female gives the Materia. The body is thus derived from
the female parent, the soul from the male, the element derived from the
male parent being the entelechy of the element derived from the female.
But the VOVQ is not produced by generation, it comes to man from with
out, and unites itself with him (AaVmu Se, TOV vovv OvpaOtv circurtEi'ac,
De Anim. II., c. 3.)
(c.) The Soul, as the principle of vegetative and sensitive life, is
mortal; it comes into existence with the body, and it decays with the body.
But the vouc is incorruptible and immortal. Not having its origin with
the body, and in the body, it cannot be dissolved with the body ; it has
actual being independent of the body.
16. These principles at once suggest a question as to the relations
subsisting between the ^vyi'i and the vov£. The views of Aristotle on
this point are not expressed with clearness, and in consequence two
different interpretations of his teaching have been given by his later
interpreters.
(a) One section— the earlier interpreters of Aristotle, who in this matter are fol
lowed by the Arabian philosophers of the Middle Ages— assume that Aristotle makes
the vovc something distinct from the individual soul, that he regards it as a principle
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
distinct in being tiom the individual, a thing universal in nature, communicating itself
to individual men, and thereby rendering them rational, without, however, losing its
own essential unity. The reasons adduced in support of this interpretation of Aristotle
are :
(1) Aristotle describes the VOVQ as 'irtpov ykvoQ \l/vxnQ, and teaches that it is not in
trinsic to the soul, but conies to it from without, that it is in a certain sense implanted in
the soul (eyyiveaQai). (De Anim. II., c. 2. 11, I. c. 5. 5.)
(2) This is the only interpretation which gives the OvpaBtv elaitvai of Aristotle in
telligible meaning.
(3.) Aristotle holds the lower faculty to be included in the higher, and hence will
have the virtue of the vegetative soul to be included in the sensitive ; but this principle
lie will not allow to have any application in the case of the VOVQ and sensitive soul. (De
Anim. II., c. 3, 9. 10.)
the
this
_ _ ... .,
a faculty of the individual ^v^n- They base this view on the fact that Aristotle asserts
(De Anim. III., c. 6, 5), that the VOVQ TTO^TIKOQ is corruptible (^Oaprot;), whereas he
asserts of the VOVQ TTOI^TIKOQ (De Anim. III., c. 6, 4), that it alone is x^pt'crOat; (separate),
and, as such, is aOavaroQ ttai CLIOIOQ (immortal and everlasting). Later interpreters, as
for example, Averroes, separate both VOVQ TTOI^TIKOQ and VOVQ TraOrjriKOQ from the indi
vidual soul, and consider both to form one universal being, transcending all individual
souls.
(c) The Christian Scholastics of the Middle Ages, on the other, unanimously adopt
the view that Aristotle understood the VOVQ to be a faculty of the individual soul ; and
that when he describes it as separatus et immixtus, he only means to signify that it is
riot essentially dependent on the corporeal organism. His statements regarding the cor
ruptibility, generation, &c., of the soul, they held only to apply to the sensitive soul, as
such, not to the rational human soul ; to the latter they considered his doctrines of the
vov<- to refer. In support of this interpretation they point out that Aristotle describes
the intellect as a part of the soul, by which the soul thinks and becomes wise, that he
asserts the soul reasons by means of the intellect— a thing which would be impossible if
the intellect were not an essential faculty of the soul.
17. We will not undertake to decide between these two views of
Aristotle's teaching ; they can each claim reasons in their favour. We
may, however, point out, as somewhat remarkable, the circumstance
that Aristotle, in his psychology, nowhere speaks of a personal immor
tality of the Soul ; nay, the denial of such immortality appears to be
involved in his assertion that the (active) Intellect, although immortal,
preserves no memory of former events, i.e., individual thought and con
sciousness cannot be ascribed to it. (De Anim, III., c. 6, 5.) Even in
his Ethics, where the doctrine of a personal immortality of the Soul
would be of peculiar importance, no passage is to be found in which the
doctrine is unequivocally laid down. On the contrary, we find it
stated there (Eth. Nic. III., c. 9), that death is terrible, because it is the
end of all, and because neither good nor evil awaits the dead beyond the
grave. It is therefore, at best, highly doubtful whether Aristotle held
the Soul to be personally immortal. On this point, again, he falls far
behind Plato. If we hold that Aristotle does not teach a personal im
mortality, we must accept the view of his teaching taken by the older
interpreters.
18. In conclusion, we must add a few words as to Aristotle's doc
trine regarding the seat of the Soul. He is of opinion that the Soul is
placed in the heart, for this, he thinks, is the centre of the body, and to
this all the organs of sense converge. The Soul animates the body by
PHILOSOPHY
THK (iKKKKS.
123
means of the vital warmth, which has its source in the heart, and is
maintained by the process of breathing. The more intense the animal
heat in the living being, the more excellent is the Soul by which it is
animated. Death is the extinction of this animal heat.
ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. In his Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between the two parts of the
l — the rational part and the irrational — of which, however, the latter
participates in the former. The rational part is the Reason (Suivota) ;
the irrational the Appetitive Faculty (op£ig). He further distinguishes
the Speculative from Practical Eeason ; the former is concerned with
truth in itself and for its own sake ; the object and end of the latter is
the guidance of human actions. He also distinguishes between
/3ouAw*e and irpodipuiig. The /BouXrjo-^ is directed towards the (essen
tial) end. In this respect man is not free ; the end, which is one with
the good, is necessarily desired by man, for the reason that man cannot
strive for anything but the good. The Trpouiptcnz, on the other hand,
is concerned with the means to the end. With regard to the means of
attaining the end man is free ; between the several means he can exer
cise a choice. In the TrpoaiptaiQ, or Election, the two faculties, the
& avoia. and ope^tc always co-operate with one another; the former exer
cises consideration and deliberation, the latter the act of choice. There
are thus two causes, under the influence of which an act may cease to be
free — Ignorance and Violence.
2. The goods which are the object of desire Aristotle divides into
three classes — the morally good, the useful, and the agreeable (jcaXois
av/ntytpov KOI -h$v), according as a good is desirable for its own sake, or
merely for sake of another good, or lastly for sake of pleasure. He
further distinguishes between goods of the soul, goods of the body, and
external goods, according as they benefit the soul, or the body, or en
hance our external condition. Lastly, he distinguishes between the
highest good and subordinate goods, understanding by the highest
good that which is desired for its own sake, and for sake of which all
other things are desired, and by subordinate goods all those which are
desired as means to the attainment of the highest.
3. These preliminary notions being defined, Aristotle sets himself to
determine wherein the highest good consists. He observes, at the out
set, that he does not, like Plato, understand by this term that good
which is absolutely the highest, but only the good, which relatively to
Hifin, is the highest ; that good, to wit, which it is possible for man to
reach by his efforts in this life. Now it is evident that the highest
good, in this sense of the word, is happiness (fv&ftyiovfa), for experience
teaches us that in all that we do, and leave undone, we are ever striving
124 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
to attain this object. But in a discussion of this question, the important
point is to define happiness, to determine what is involved in this
notion — What is the nature of happiness ?
4. The teaching of Aristotle on this question is directed to show that
the happiness of man does not consist in mere passive enjoyment — for
this the brute possesses — but rather in action (tvtpjEia), and m action of
that kind which is peculiar to man, as contrasted with other living
beings — intellectual action. It is not, however, intellectual action of
any kind whatever which constitutes happiness, but only virtuous action,
that action which springs from virtue, and is in accordance with its
laws (Eth. Nic. X. c. 6), for this alone is appropriate to the nature of
man. It follows that the highest happiness corresponds to the highest
virtue. Though happiness does not consist in pleasure, but in virtuous
action, we are not to conclude that pleasure is altogether excluded from
happiness. Virtuous action gives rise to the highest form of pleasure,
and to the keenest enjoyment. We must, therefore, include pleasure in
our concept of happiness, in so far as it is a result of virtuous action,
and is thus, in a certain sense, the ultimate complement of our notion
of happiness.
5. This analysis of the notion of happiness indicates only the essen
tial elements of the concept ; happiness, to be complete, requires further :
(a) That it be enjoyed not merely for a short time, but through a life-time, which
shall reach at least the average length ; "one swallow does not make a summer, "neither
does the bliss of one day make happiness.
(b) That man shall be provided with the goods of the body, and with external
goods ; for it can hardly be said of a man whom fortune has entirely deserted, and who
is the victim of bodily pain, that he is truly happy.
(c) Lastly, that man shall have friends ; for intercourse with friends effectually en
courages and promotes virtuous action, and thus leads to a happy life.
6. Since happiness consists in virtuous action, it is evident that
virtue is a necessary means to attainment. We are thus led to seek a
definition of the notion of virtue. Virtue, says Aristotle, may be
defined as a habit (habitus, 2£<c)» by which man exercises the proper
functions of his nature with ease, with promptness, and with steadfast
ness. ^ It follows that virtue cannot be learned, but must be acquired by
practice. Virtue is not one ; there arc as many kinds of virtue as there
are different ends to which the rational activity of man can be directed.
7. In classifying the virtues, Aristotle bases his classification on the
distinction already indicated between the rational part of the soul and
that part which is irrational, though participating in reason. He distin
guishes two kinds of virtue — the ethical and the dianoetical ; the former
belong to the appetitive faculty (fy>e&e), the part of the soul which is
itself irrational, though participating in reason ; the latter belongs to
the rational part of the soul.
8. The ethical virtues are, in part, concerned with the TraOrj, Passions,
or sensuous affections, in so far as these are governed and guided by
reason ; in part they have to do immediately with external action, in so
far as it is controlled by reason. It is characteristic of all ethical vir-
PHILOSOPHY OK Till-: GREEKS. 125
tues that they maintain a just moan between two opposing vices, one of
which denotes excess (virtpfioXi'i), the other defect (cAAcn//^). This just
mean is that which each man fixes for himself by rational deliberation
(medium rationis). It is only in the case of Justice that the medium
rutionis (the mean of reason) is the medium rei (the objective mean.j
9. According to Aristotle, the ethical virtues can be reduced to the
following cardinal virtues : Fortitude (avSpeia) maintains the mean be
tween fear and rashness (^uto-orr/c; irtpl 0oj3ouc KOL Oappri) ; Temperance
(<jb)<j)po<Tvvi)) guards the mean between pleasures and pains (yuto-orqr
TTtpl rjSovac KUI AuTrac;), but refers to pleasure rather than to pain, and
chiefly to those pleasures which are lowest in kind, and which are com
mon to men and to brutes ; Liberality (sXtvOtpionqs) and Magnificence
(fjiiyaXoirptirtia) preserve the mean in giving and receiving (juecnmji
irepl Soaiv KOI Afji//tv), avoiding the extremes of prodigality and niggard
liness. Liberality is concerned with small values, magnificence with
great. Highmindedness and Ambition (fuyaXo^v\(a KOI (j>i\oTi/utia) ob
serve the proper mean in matters respecting honour and dishonour
(/U£<Tori|c wtpl TI/UI]V KOL arijuiav) ; Mildness preserves the proper mean in
the seeking of revenge (/uE<rort)c xtpl 6/oy/jv) ; Truthfulness, Readiness
in social intercourse, and Friendliness (oAq&ta, tvTpairiXtia, <j>i\ia) pre-
serve the mean in the use of words and actions in society (/i€<ror»jr££
Trtpl Xoy(*>v KOI Trpn^iov KOivwiav). The first of these three virtues re
gards veracity (nAiffllc) in words and actions, the two others are con
cerned with the agreeable (?/Su) — the one tvTpcnrtXtia having its place in
social pastimes (tv raft; vratS/au;), the other QiXta, in all other social re
lations (iv ratg Kara TOV a'AAoi» fiiov b/mXtaig). A further virtue is
Shame.
10. But the most important and the most excellent of the ethical
virtues is Justice (ofKaioaum/). In the widest sense Justice is the prac
tice of all the ethical virtues towards our fellow-men, in which sense it
is equivalent to the observance of law. In a narrower sense, as a special
virtue, it is concerned with equality (to-ov) in the matter of gain or dis
advantage. In this sense it is of two kinds : either it deals with the
distribution (tv rait,' Smvo/iaTc) of honours or possessions among the
members of a community (justitia distributiva), or it deals with the
transactions of men inter 86 (iv rmq avva\\ayfj.aaiv}. This equalising
process is partly voluntary, partly involuntary ; to the first kind belongs
justice in contracts (justitia comnmtativa) ; to the second belongs justice
in inflicting punishment (justitia vindicativa.*) Equity (ivitiKua) is
" Distributive Justice (TO iv rmr ciavo^diQ CIKCIIOV) rests upon a geometrical pro
portion : As the several persons in question are to one another in moral worth (d£j'u),
so must be that which is allotted to each. Commutative Justice (ro iv ro7f o-yvaXXdy
paai Siicawv, or ro &op0wrur£y, <> yivtrni iv TOI£ (Tj;j'aXXdy/uam KO.I rote iicovoioic, Kai roTf
uKovnioic] is also an equalising principle (i<iov), but rests on an arithmetical rather
than on a geometrical proportion ; for the moral worth of the several persons is not, in
this case, taken into consideration, but only the gain secured, or the loss suffered.
Commutative justice removes the difference between the original possession and the
diminished (or increased) possession which results from loss (or gain), by causing a gain
(or loss) equal to the diminution (or the increase). The original condition thus re-estab
lished is a mean between the less ami {hrgira;er, according to arithmetical proportion."
120 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
connected with Justice. Rights are of two kinds, natural and positive
(Siieaiov QvaiKov KOI VOJMKOV) . Equity applies to positive rights established
by legal enactments, and is an emanation from or complement of legal
justice to meet the needs of individual cases. The provisions of the
law must be general and applicable to the normal condition of things ;
individual cases do not always accord with this common standard ; in
such cases equity makes good the defects of the law, it prescribes a
course of action conformable to the intention of the law- giver, such a
course as he would require were he present himself.
11. The Dianoetic Virtues are of two kinds, those which belong to
the Practical Reason, and those which belong to the Speculative Reason.
In the first class are included Art (ri\yi)) and Practical Wisdom (^povrjo-tc),
of which the former regulates the action directed to produce some ex
trinsic result (iroitiv) ; the latter fixes the right method in attaining the
goodness intrinsic to actions in themselves (TrparTtiv). To the second
class belong Understanding (i/oue), Science i tTnar^ui?) , and "Wisdom
(<ro0/a). Of these Understanding has to do with the knowledge of
first principles, Science with the demonstration of truth, and Wisdom
with speculative inquiry into the ultimate causes of all being.
12. In order of importance these virtues are related to one another
as the faculties of the Soul to which they respectively belong. Lowest
in the scale are the ethical virtues. Above these are the virtues of the
Practical Reason, and highest in order the virtues of the Speculative
Reason. Among the virtues of the Speculative Reason, Wisdom holds
the first place. We have seen that happiness consists in virtuous
action, and that in the highest virtue is found the highest happiness.
This being so, it is clear that it is not in the active life, in which the
ethical virtues are exercised, that the highest happiness is attained, but
in the contemplative life, in which the dianoetic virtues, Understanding,
Science, and Wisdom, are practised.
13. From this it follows that it is in pure speculation, Otwpia, that
the highest degree of happiness is reached. Thought of this kind
springs from the highest virtue ; it is furthermore concerned with the
highest object of our knowledge, and thus results in the highest kind of
pleasure. The happiness which this Otupia brings with it does not sup
pose any busy activity, it can be enjoyed in rest and retirement. More
over it does not require to be supplemented by external goods so largely
as the happiness of the active life. By the Oewpia man approaches the
divinity ; for since the happiness of the gods consists in Oeiopia, i.e., the
knowledge of themselves, man's happiness attained by Qtwpta is of the
divine order. In this condition of happiness man lives, in a certain
sense, a divine life. Everything that goes to make up the notion of
supreme happiness is found in this Otwpta. All men, however, cannot
attain to it ; the bulk of mankind must content themselves with the
happiness of the active life.
14. In the attainment of that happiness which is the end of life,
the individual man is forced to depend on his fellow-men. Man
is, of his nature, destined for society. The social bond begins in
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 127
the family, and is perfected in the State. It is only m the State that
man's moral duty can be adequately fulfilled. This brings us to Aris
totle's political philosophy.
15. Aristotle teaches that the State is above the individual in the
same sense in which the whole is above the part, or the end above the
means. But for this very reason it is only in the State that the indi
vidual attains his true worth, his true importance. The individual
thing, in so far as it is a member of the whole, has its work and its im
portance only in the whole and by the whole ; and the principle holds
as applied to the individual in his relation to the State. The State is
its own end ; the individual exists for the State. The whole worth, and
whole destiny of the individual is attained if he is a good citizen, a
worthy member of the body politic. (State Absolutism.)
16. The duties of the individual towards the State, and of the State
towards the individual, can now be easily determined :
(a) It is the duty of the individual to make himself a capable and
useful citizen. The means by which he may attain this end are in
dicated by Ethics. Ethical Science is, therefore, a department of Poli
tical Philosophy. The happiness which it proposes to man as the object
of his efforts can be attained only in civil society. It /is only the good
citizen who can be a happy man. Hence the notion of virtue in general,
and of civic virtue, are one and the same.
(b) It is the duty of the State, on the other hand, to lead the citizen
to that happiness which Ethical Science sets before him as the object of
his efforts. It has to take thought for the well-being of all. There is,
however, only one way of discharging this duty, and that is by edu
cating all who belong to the State, so as to make them good and virtuous
citizens ; for in virtuous action primarily consists the happiness of men.
As, however, material goods and the external goods of fortune are re
quisite to the perfection of this happiness, the State must, further, pro
vide for the external well-being of its citizens. The question how the
State must be constituted, and after what manner it must direct its
action in order to secure the ends here specified, it is the province of the
Science of Politics to determine.
17. In dealing with the first part of the question — how the State
should be constituted in order to secure its end — we must distinguish
its social from its political constitution.
(a) In the social constitution, Aristotle does not, like Plato, propose
the abolition of the family or of private property. Both must be upheld
and protected in the State. According to Aristotle the family is, of its
nature, antecedent to the State ; the State, must, therefore, maintain it
intact. Liberty of marriage should, however, be restricted by law.
More than this : children of defective bodily formation should not be
reared, a maximum number of births should be fixed by la\v, any ex
cess beyond this number should be destroyed in embryo* Private pro
perty, which, of its nature, is likewise antecedent to the State, must also
be in violate; the State, should, however, reserve a certain amount of
public property for public uses.
128 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(b) It is specially worthy of remark, in connection with the social
philosophy of Aristotle, that he is distinctly an advocate of slavery.
According to him the individual who is formed for obedience, not for
intelligence, is by nature destined to be a slave. The slave is merely
an animated instrument ; a sort of detached portion of the body of his
master, and has no rights whatever as against his master. He should,
of course, be treated with humanity, but the master who fails so to treat
him does him no injustice.
(<?) With regard to the political constitution of the State, Aristotle
distinguishes three usual forms of government : Monarchy, Aristocracy,
and Timocracy (TroXtraa). Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy (in the
sense of ochlocracy, or as it is sometimes styled, mobocracy), are the re
spective corruptions of these forms. Of these corruptions, tyranny is the
worst, as being the corruption of the form which is the best — the
monarchical. The characteristic difference between the good and the
bad form of government is found in the end which the governing
authority pursues ; the good government seeks the common weal, the
evil seeks private interests. The constitution which embraces elements
of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, is the most enduring, but in
particular cases the form of government must conform to particular
needs.
18. In reference to the second question — what must be the action of
the State, in order to attain its end ? — the general good, as far as it
depends on the action of the State, must be secured by the law and by the
administration of the law. The law, as the expression of reason, must
be supreme in the State ; the ruler is merely a living law. A special
object of the legislator's attention must be the education of the young.
The final purpose of all education is, of course, virtue. Things which
subserve external ends can, however, be subject of instruction, but only
in so far as they do not render the learner vulgar (i.e., a pursuer of ex
ternal gain for its own sake.) Grammar, Gymnastics, Music, and
Arithmetic are the subjects of an elementary general education.
19. The political philosophy of Aristotle is an advance on that of
Plato, inasmuch as it does not pu>h the theory of State Absolutism to
the length of Socialism. On the other hand, the ethical teaching of
Aristotle is inferior to that of Plato, for it does not fix any higher end
to which the moral action of man is to be directed, but confines man's
destiny wholly within earthly life, and the sphere of earthly aims.
There is no prospect put before him of a higher retribution after
death.
20. If, in conclusion, we glance at Aristotle's teaching on the sub
ject of Art, we find that he holds it to consist in the imitation (]u{)uifa>cc)
of nature. This imitation " is not, however, a mere copying of indi
vidual objects in nature, with their manifold defects, it looks rather to
their essential being, and the perfection to which nature tended in their
formation, so that while preserving likeness, it is the function of Art to
idealise ; it imitates, but it improves in the imitation/' The purpose
of Art is threefold — delight and recreation ; the calming, purifying,
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 129
and ennobling of the affections (KaOapviz TMV iraOri/naruv), and ultimately
ethical culture. Tragedy, a special form of Art, is the artistic dramatic
representation of some incident which excites pity and fear.
THE CHIEF PERIPATETICS.
§38.
1. The discipk's of Aristotle, during the two or three centuries
following his death, for the most part abandoned metaphysical specu
lation, and devoted themselves, some to physical science, and others to
the popular treatment of Ethics, from the naturalistic standpoint. The
later Peripatetics, on the other hand, returned again to the genuine
views of Aristotle, and rendered service chiefly by their interpretation of
his writings.
2. Prominent among the older Peripatetics are :
(a) Eudemus of Rhodes, and Theophrastus of Lesbos, the latter of whom is said to
have been appointed by Aristotle himself as his successor, and for thirty-five years
presided over the Peripatetic School. Eudemus seems to have followed Aristotle with
fidelity : Theophrastus exercised more independence in his teaching. In the details in
which they differ from Aristotle, it will be observed that Eudemus shows a tendency to
be theological, Theophrastus to be naturalistic. In Logic, Eudemus and Theophrastus
gave fuller development to the doctrine of Problematical Judgments and the Syllogism.
(6) The chief merit of Theophrastus lies in the extension he gave to natural science
especially to botany (phytology), and in his life-like delineation of human character!
is chief work : 'HVticol xapaKT^pec, is on the latter subject. In metaphysics and
psychology he shows a disposition to adopt a theory of immanence, in the solution of
problems to which Aristotle had applied the notion of transcendence. But he remains
faithful, in the main, to the Aristotelian views. He holds the VOVQ to be the better and
more divine part of man, and to come from an external source ; he asserts it possesses a
certain separateness in existence (Xwp«r^c), and yet he will have it to be in some way
or other congenital with man's nature (OV^VTOQ). It is not clear what is the precise
. e precse
dritt of his i teaching on this point. The activity of thought he describes as motion
(ini'i/Tiff),. but not a motion in space. In his ethics he lays special stress on the
horegia secured to virtue by the possession of external goods, without which, he
thinks, happiness is not attainable.*
Praxiphanes, a pupil of Theophrastus (B.C. 300), gave special attention to the study
01 Grammar.
(c) Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the "Musician," and Dicsearchus of Messene. The
former held the soul to be the Harmony of the body. The latter assumes that in-
dividual substantial souls do not exist, but that a single living sensitive force is diffused
through all organic beings, which is transiently individualized in corporeal forms (Cic
f*«C. I. 10.) He exalts practice over theory, and holds speculation to be of little
moment. Phanias, Clearchus, and Demetrius follow him.
(d) Strato of Lampsacus, the "Physicist," who succeeded Theophrastus in his
teaching functions about B.C. 288 or 287, and presided over the school for eighteen
years. Me transformed the teaching of Aristotle into a consistent system of Naturalism
Me abandons the Aristotelian notion of a vovg distinct from Matter, and he asserts that
in everything which is produced, we have no more than the mere natural effects of
*• miT C" l "'/'"''''"-"i-inn rminsnphin nwralh secundum Stob
&2^S2HsS^S^^»K»^ia=!i2laffl
SSSS^.«»»rf4s^A*«^atB?S
when it is necessary to aid a friend, to avoid some great evil,
10
130 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
gravity and motion. Nature is merely the comprehensive concept of the divine powers,
which work unconsciously in the physical world. There is no difference between Per
ception and Thought ; the seat of Thought is in the head, between the eyebrows ; there
the (material) traces (viroftovrj) of the images of perception persist -to revive again when
memory is exercised.
A similar line of speculation seems to have been followed by Plato's successors : —
Lyco, his pupil, Aristo, Critolaus, Diodorus, Staseas, and Cratippus.
3. The most remarkable of the later Peripatetics are :
(a) Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor of the writings of Aristotle (B.C. 70) ; Boethus
of Sidon (about the time of Julius Caesar) ; Nicolas of Damascus (under Augustus and
Tiberius). These writers rendered important service in promoting the study of Aristotle's
writings, and helping to make them understood. Andronicus, in his exposition of
Aristotle's teaching, began with Logic. His pupil, Boethus, was of opinion that Physics
is the science which first presents itself to us, which is more intelligible to us, and with
which, therefore, philosophy should begin. The followers of these philosophers include
Alexander of ^Egse, Nero's tutor (A.D. 50) ; Adrastus of Aphrodisias (A.D. 100); Aspasias
(A.D. 150), and Herminus.
(&) Aristocles of Messene, and his pupil Alexander of Aphrodisias, the "Exegete"
(A.D. 200). In Aristocles we find a tendency to Stoicism — an eclecticism which prepared
the way for the fusion of the chief philosophical systems in Neo-Platonism. Alexander
of Aphrodisias, was the most famous of the interpreters of Aristotle ; he is the Exegete
Kar1 i%ox>']V' He distinguishes in man a i>ow<; vXucog, a vovc 7roir]-u*6g, and a VOVQ tTriKTrjTog
or VHVQ *c«0' f|ii', but identifies the VOVQ TTOITJTDCOC with the Godhead, as already
indicated.
(c) From the Neo-Platonist school came also some distinguished interpreters of
Aristotle, e.g., Porphyry (in the third century); Philoponus and Simplicius (sixth
century.)
The celebrated physician, Galenus (born about A.D. 131), may be included amongst
the interpreters of Aristotle. He was indeed an Eclectic, but his views are, on the
whole, in accord with the Peripatetic teaching. We shall, however, have to notice him
again when we speak of the Eclectics.
THIRD PERIOD.
DECAY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
§39.
1. The golden age of Greek Philosophy closes with Aristotle. The
freedom of Greece was lost in the battle of Chaoronea (B.C. 338). The
military power which rose on the northern frontier of the Peninsula, laid
its iron hand upon the free land of Greece, and stifled the life which
had hitherto pulsated within it. It was in vain that the great orator,
Demosthenes, a " particularist " in the best sense of the term, strove to
rouse the Greeks by his potent eloquence to watchfulness and to union
against the danger. Philip of Macedon was able to paralyse his efforts.
He was able to form in Greece itself a party which withstood the
efforts of the great Demosthenes, dissolved the bonds of union among
the Greeks, and so prepared the way for the final blow at Chacronea.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREKKS.
The party of Aesehines triuinplicd over the patriotism of Demosthenes,
and made Greece a prey to the Northern State.
2. The loss of liberty and independence was followed by its natural
result — the torpor of the creative powers of the Greek mind. Under a
military tyranny Art and Science cannot flourish. This was signally
exemplified in the philosophy of Greece. The Greek mind, held in
thrall by the Macedonian power, could no longer attempt an indepen
dent solution of speculative problems. It contented itself with returning
upon the results attained by earlier thinkers, and reproducing these in
new guise for philosophic study. In executing this task the philoso
phers of this perfod were not so much guided by love of pure specula
tion as by practical aims. To discover the conditions and methods by
which the individual may reach happiness here below, was the chief
end they proposed to themselves. The theoretic elements which the
philosophers of this period adopted from earlier systems were utilised
chiefly to establish and to justify the practical doctrines regarding sub
jective happiness on earth, which the several philosophers professed.
The lofty mystical flights of Plato, the preference for the Otwpia over
practical philosophy, which we observe in Aristotle, are not to be found
in this period ; the Greek mind was no longer capable of this elevation
of thought.
3. We cannot be surprised to find that the sum of truth contained
in the systems of Greek Philosophy subsequently to the time of Aristotle
is reduced to a small compass, and to observe that the ideal or super-
sensuous element finds no place in the philosophy of this period. The
lofty speculative ideas of Plato and the sharply- defined metaphysical
conceptions of Aristotle are succeeded by the realistic pantheism of the
Stoics and the dull materialism of the Epicureans. Plato's mystical
view of the nature of knowledge and Aristotle's well-marked distinction
between intellectual and sensuous cognition disappear, and we have
instead Empiricism and Sensualism. Virtue is no longer connected
with a higher spiritual destiny of man, as in the Platonic system ; it is
either made its own end, as in the system of the Stoics, or regarded
merely as a means to pleasure, as in the view of the Epicureans. The
primitive philosophical notions, beyond which the Socratic systems had
advanced, were again brought into prominence, and thus a retrograde
movement began, which must be described as a decline of philosophy.
In due course the scepticism which this relaxation of the earnest philo
sophical spirit was sure to call forth, made its appearance, and its wasting
action utterly destroyed the diminished sum of truth still remaining.
This scepticism was the expression of the utter impotence of the philo
sophical spirit, the death of philosophy, the quagmire in which the
current of Greek philosophy was lost.
4. The old spirit of Greek independence and liberty seemed to revive
for a time in Sparta when Cleomenes restored the constitution of
Lycurgus, and again in the jEtolian and Achaian Leagues, under
Aratus and Philopremen (B.C. 210). But soon another military power-
that of the Romans, took the place of Macedon. By the fall of Corinth
132 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(B.C. 145) Greece became subject to Rome, and was reduced to the con
dition of a Roman province. A consequence of its subjugation was that
the language, literature, and refinement of Greece were introduced into
Rome. At an earlier period (B.C. 155), three Greek philosophers,
Critolaus (a Peripatetic), Carneades (an Academic), and Diogenes (a
Stoic), had visited Rome as ambassadors of Athens, and had taken
advantage of their visit to recommend by their discourses the philo
sophy and science of Greece to the Roman youth. After the conquest
of Greece, this kind of intercourse between Greeks and Romans was
more actively carried on. But no higher development of philosophical
speculation was attained by the Greeks, nor did the leaven of Greek
civilization introduced at Rome give rise to an original Roman phi
losophy.
5. The Romans were a people of a practical turn, devoted to practical
political aims, and took little pleasure in philosophical speculations.
Such mental occupations they held to be useless, aimless, and undig
nified. The concerns of his country, the promoting of its prosperity at-
home and of its glory and power abroad, were the only objects which
the Roman thought worthy of his efforts. Moreover, he had an interest
in preserving Roman principles and Roman morals from the corrupting
influences of the later philosophy of Greece. His national pride, too,
disdained to imitate the despised Grceculi in their scientific labours. All
these causes combined to prevent the growth of an independent philo
sophy in Rome. The philosophy of the Romans is merely a more or
less modified reproduction of the philosophical theories of Greece ; and
in their choice of systems the Romans confined themselves almost exclu
sively to those of later origin, chiefly to those of the Stoics and Epicu
reans. The systems of Plato and Aristotle, which involved profound
and far-reaching speculation, were not to their taste. We find in much
favour amongst them a certain Eclecticism, which borrowed from the
different systems what appeared to be most probable in each.
What is called the philosophy of Rome is merely an offshoot of
Greek philosophy transplanted to a foreign soil, which occasionally
assumes a somewhat peculiar character, but which cannot be regarded
as a creation of the Roman mind. In the time of the Cocsars, Epicurean
nations affected more and more profoundly the life of the Roman people ;
but this is to be attributed to the profound moral corruption which grew
and spread abroad under the Empire.
6. In accordance with the general outlines which we have here
traced, we proceed to treat first of Stoicism, then of Epicureanism, and
lastly of Scepticism and Eclecticism. Roman philosophy we shall not
treat apart ; we shall refer to the several Roman philosophers when
dealing with the school of Greek philosophy to which they happen to
belong. For since Roman philosophy is no more than an offshoot from
the Greek, it can be rightly treated only in connection with the latter.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 133
THE STOICS.
ZENO, CLEANTHES, AND CHRYSIPPUS.
GENERAL REMARKS.
§40.
1. The School of the Stoics was founded by Zeno of Cittium (in Cyprus), a pupil
of Crates the Cynic, of Stilpo the Megarian, and of the Academics Xenocrates and
Polemon. He lived between B.C. 350 and B.C. 258. Zeno was the son of a merchant, and
was himself, for a time, engaged in trade. It is said that he was compelled to take up
his residence in Athens in consequence of a shipwreck. At Athens he attached himself
successively to the philosophers named above. Shortly after the year B.C. 310, he founded
his own school in the aroa iroiKiXr} — a portico adorned with the paintings of Polygnotus,
whence the title "Stoic," bestowed on his school. He is said to have taught for fifty-
eight years. The Athenians held him in high esteem. His writings (on the State, on
Life in accordance with Nature, &c.) have all been lost. His pupils were : Persasus oi
Cittium, Aristo of Chios, Herillus of Carchedon (Carthage), and, most remarkable of all,
Cleanthes.
2. Cleanthes of Assus, in Troas, the successor of Zeno in his teaching functions, was
originally a pugilist, and during the period of his instruction by Zeno earned his liveli
hood by working during the night, carrying water and kneading dough. ' ' It was only
slowly and with difficulty that he mastered philosophical theories, but when he had once
mastered them, he held them tenaciously, for which reason Zeno compared him to a hard
slab, on which it is difficult to make an impression, but which preserves indelibly the
lines traced on it." Cleanthes has left us a "Hymn to the Most High God." His other
writings have perished. Sphaerus of Bosphorus, Boethus, and Chrysippus were his
pupils.
3. Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus, in Cilicia (B.C. 282-209), was the successor of
Cleanthes in his school. By his thoroughly systematic development of the doctrines of
Stoicism, he deserved to be reckoned the second founder of the Stoic school. He was a
very prolific writer. He is said to have written 500 lines daily, and to have composed
750 books. These works contained many quotations from other writers, specially from
the poets, and contained also many repetitions and corrections (Diog. Laert. VII. 180).
The successors of Chrysippus were Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes of Babylon — the same
who has been mentioned in connection with the embassy to Rome. After these the next
head of the school was Antipater of Tarsus.
Thus much with reference to the "older" Stoics, who founded and developed the
system of the school. The " later" Stoics we shall have occasion to notice further on.
We shall occupy ourselves for the present with the doctrines of Stoicism.
4. The Stoics regarded philosophy as primarily a practical concern.
Regarded in this light, it was for them a striving after virtue, after that
which is alone worthy of our desires, and on which the whole happiness
of man is based. In a secondary sense, it had a theoretical character.
Considered from the theoretical point of view, they regarded it as
right insight, depending on a knowledge of things divine and human.
The theoretical aspect was, however, subordinate to the practical and
found in the latter its end and purpose. For right insight must teach
us that Virtue is the highest good, and must show us the way by which
we can and must attain to Virtue.
5. These principles being premised, the Stoics divided philosophy
into three parts : Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Theology is included in
Physics. For this reason Physics would, of itself, take precedence 0f
134 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Ethics. As a matter of fact, however, it is subservient to the latter.
The Logic of the Stoics is their theory of the Xoyot, i.e. of thoughts and
language ; and they therefore divide it into Dialectic and Rhetoric.
Dialectic includes the Theory of Knowledge, ^Logic (in the Aristotelian
sense), and Grammar. To Grammatical Science the Stoics rendered
important services, but it would be beyond the scope of our present
work to follow them into this field of study. We shall confine ourselves
to an exposition, first, of their Logic and Theory of Knowledge ; then,
of their Physics ; and lastly, of their Ethics.
LOGIC AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE STOICS
§ 41.
1. The Stoics teach that all intellectual knowledge takes rise in
sensuous perception. The soul, at first, is like a sheet of blank paper,
on which representations of things are afterwards delineated by the
senses. The beginning of all knowledge is, therefore, the mo-flqo-fc
(perception of sense). This, as soon as we are conscious of it, becomes
a Representation (fyavraaia) or mental image. During the formation of
this Representation the Soul is purely passive, the Representation is
like the impression of a seal on wax (ruTruxrte \v "^vyij, for which
Chrysippus, to modify the doctrine, substituted ert/ootwo-tc ^vvijc, an
alteration in the Soul). According to this view, the object of itself
produces its Representation on the subject, and this Representation
manifests itself, and in itself the corresponding object, to the subject.
When we have apprehended an object, the remembrance of this object
remains after the object has been removed. A large number of memo
ries of this kind constitute experience (t/nretpta).
2. In the further progress of the process of thought, Concepts are
formed from these Representations. The formation of Concepts is
effected in two ways. Some are formed spontaneously and without con
scious co-operation on our part (aveiriTe\in)T(jjg). Others are the outcome
of a deliberate and methodical process of thought. A number of similar
Representations having been produced within us, there arise, ^ spon
taneously and without any reflex thought on our part, certain universal
notions, which form a basis for the reflex and methodical formation of
Concepts. These notions are called by the Stoics irpoXitytie or jcoivai
twoiai. In a second stage, the reflex activity of thought is exercised.
It detects resemblances and analogies, transforms and combines notions,
and so forms artificially reflex Concepts, called by the Stoics tvvotat. For
the ten categories of Aristotle the Stoics substitute, as ultimate universal
concepts (ytviKwraTa), Substance (or Substratum), Essential Quality,
Accidental State or Condition, and Relation.
3. Judgment and Inference depend upon Concepts. The Stoics
added to the theory of inference their doctrine regarding the hypo-
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 1 '55
thetical syllogism — a form of reasoning which Aristotle did not specially
investigate. By inference, say the Stoics, we are able to advance from
one truth to another, and thus are in a position to investigate the causes
of phenomena. In this way Science («n<rrij/ii|) is created — the highest
form of human knowledge. The right formation both of Concepts and
of Judgments and Inferences is regulated by certain rules, which it is
the province of Dialectic to lay down.
4. With regard to the relation subsisting between Concept and
Being, the Stoics seem to have adopted the view which, in the Middle?
Ages, was known as that of the Nominalists. They combat alike the
Platonic and the Aristotelian doctrine of the objective reality of Con
cepts ; they assert that the Concept is something purely subjective,
formed by a process of abstraction, to which, however, no real being
corresponds in the objective order. The individual, as such, is the only
thing which has real existence ; the universal concept is a purely sub
jective product of the process of thought, whether we consider the form
of the thought, or the thing given in the thought. In this doctrine we
have distinctly brought before us the purely empirical character of the
Stoic Theory of Knowledge. For in this theory Concepts are deprived
of all relation to the essential being of things, and are thus reduced to
mere generalized sensuous perceptions.
5. The Stoics, in their Theory of Knowledge, occupy themselves
largely with the question of a criterion of truth. They find this cri
terion in the Ko.Ta\nifrie (Apprehension), This KaraAr^te is attained
when the object is represented in the mind with such clearness, force,
and energy of conviction, that the truth of the representation cannot be
denied. In such circumstances, the representation, and in the represen
tation the object, is grasped or apprehended (icaraAa^ai/tTcu) with
absolute certainty. A representation thus clear, and thus forcing
conviction (<J>avTaaia Kara ArjTrr tier)), is necessarily recognised as indubi
tably true, while the representation which does not exhibit this clearness
or carry this force of conviction (favraata oKaraAijTrroe) does not give
the same certainty, and must, therefore, be regarded only as more or
less probable.
6. In accordance with these principles, the Stoics define Knowledge
as (Stob. Eel. Eth. II. 128) KaraXrji^i^ a<T0aAr7£ icai a/itraTrrwroe VTTO
Aoyou — certain and indisputable apprehension by means of a concept,
and define Science as a system from such apprehensions. According
to Cicero (Acad. II. 47), Zeno compared Perception to the extension of
the fingers, Assent ((rvyKaraBeffi^) to the hand half-closed, the Appre
hension of the object (KaraArj;//fe) to the hand fully closed (the fist), and
Knowledge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it is
more strongly and securely closed. Knowledge, according to this
account of the theory, is KaraArp//tc, perfected. It is, however, to be
remarked that on the point here in question the several Stoics differ
widely from one another.
136 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
PHYSICS OF THE STOICS.
1. Empiricists in their logical teaching, the Stoics are realists in
their views regarding physical nature ; that is to say, they maintain that
all real being is corporeal, that there is no incorporeal existence. In
their physics they do no more than largely develop the doctrine of
Heraclitus that Fire is the ultimate principle of all things, and the
further doctrine of the perpetual flux of generation and decay.
2. For the four Aristotelian principles of things the Stoics substitute
two — TO TTOIOVV and ro ira<r\ov, the active principle and the passive,
Matter and Force. In order that a thing may come to exist, there must
be a Matter, CArj, out of which the thing is formed, and a Force, which
communicates to it the form it receives. Matter is, in itself, without
motion and without form, but capable of receiving any motion and any
form. Force, on the other hand, is the active, moving, formative prin
ciple. It is inseparably united with Matter.
3. On these notions are constructed the theological and cosmological
systems of the Stoics. To explain the origin of the world, two principles,
they think, must be assumed — Matter, out of which the world is formed,
and a formative principle. The latter is God. These two principles,
God and Matter, must not, however, be regarded as substantially differ
ent from one another. God, being the active force, is substantially one
with the passive principle — Matter. The relation of God to the world
is the relation of soul to body. The world is the body of God. This
pantheistical view, which unites God and the world in one being, is
resolutely maintained by the Stoics.
4. But, we may ask, what is the nature of this God, who is the
active formative force of the universe ? To this question the Stoics
reply : —
(a) God, as the Efficient Cause in the Universe, must be conceived
as of the nature of Fire or ^Ether, who under the form of heat pervades
the universe, and thereby gives it actual existence (TO irvp TE\VIKOV, the
creative or forming fire). For experience shows us that being and life
in nature are dependent upon internal vital heat. Under this aspect,
God appears as universal energy in nature (<£w<ne), pervading, animating,
and vivifying the world ; hence we sometimes find that the Stoics use
interchangeably the notions " Nature " and " God."
(b) God, as the formative principle of the world, is to be regarded
as an universal cosmical Reason, which forms the universe, and estab
lishes it in order, in obedience to the inherent law of His being, which
obliges Him to act according to plan and purpose. That the divine
nature must be regarded as a Living Reason, is evident from the facts «.
(1) That beauty, order, and purpose, prevail throughout the uni
verse, and these suppose a reasoning cause ;
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 137
(2) That certain parts of the universe of things are possessed of con
sciousness, an impossibility, if the universe, as a whole, were not con
scious ; for the whole, as such, must always be more perfect than any
of its parts.
(c) The divine nature is, therefore, to be conceived as a rational,
artistically working Fire, which is at once the Soul and the Reason of
the universe. As Universal Reason, God contains within Himself, in the
rational state, the germs of the objects which constitute the world
(Aoyoe cTTTfjO^artKue, " seminal reason ") ; these germs receive actuality,
and become manifest in the individual objects of the real world by the
action of God as the Soul of the Universe.
5. After this statement of general principles, the Stoics further dis
tinguish two aspects of the divine nature. The Divine Fire manifests
itself, on the one hand, as vital heat ; as such it is wholly sunk in ma
terial nature ; in another of its manifestations it is, to a certain extent,
liberated and independent. This nobler portion of the Divine Being is
the pure luminous JEther, the proper region of which is the higher parts
of the universe. This luminous aether is, therefore, the rjjE/moviKov ntpo£,
or governing part of the Godhead, the Zeus of mythology, the proper
principle of universal Reason, the highest wisdom, and the supreme law
of all things.
6. Having thus explained the nature of God — the creative and for
mative principle in the universe — the Stoics next describe the process by
which the universe was formed. The Divine Primal Fire was first con
densed into Air and Water; the Water in part turned into Earth, in part
remained Water, and in part was rarefied into Air, which again returned
to the state of Fire. The two more condensed elements, Earth and Water,
are chiefly passive, the two more rarefied, Air and Fire, are chiefly active.
This theory, like that of Heraclitus, involves the universe in a cycle of
perpetual changes. By continual condensation, the elements are ever
coming forth from the Primal Fire, and by continual rarefactions they
are returning to it again. The denser elements give rise to individual
objects, in which the \6yoi (rn-tppariKoi attain actual existence.
7. From the principles here laid down are readily deduced the attri
butes which the Stoics assigned to the world. Considered as forming
one being :
(a) The visible, or, as we may say, corporeal world, is indeed the
body of God ; but the world, taken in its entirety, is God himself. In
essential intrinsic nature, it is nothing more than the Being of God,
evolving itself into a visible world.
(b) The world being, in a certain sense, God rendered concrete, is
furthermore the best and most excellent world conceivable. All the
predicates which express the highest perfection, may therefore be attri
buted to it. It is rational, wise, provident, and the fulness of beauty.
How could rational beings form part of it, if it were not rational itself?
(c) The world, as a whole, is God ; its parts considered as forming
subordinate wholes, in which the Divine Force manifests itself, must bo
regarded as subordinate gods. This is more especially true of the Stur>
138 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
and the Elements. By the aid of this principle the Stoics endeavour tc
explain the whole mythological system.
8. In its material aspect, i.e.t viewed as it manifests itself to our
experience, the world, according to the Stoics, is a well-ordered unity,
limited in extent, and spherical in shape. Beyond the world there is
only an endless vacuum. Time is the range of the world's motion ; it
is without limit in the past, and without limit in the future. Indi
vidual objects in the universe are all different from one another. No
two leaves, no two living things, are perfectly alike.
9. Turning from the consideration of the constitution of the universe
as a whole, and directing our attention to the course of its existence, i.e.,
to the succession in time of the events that are accomplished in the
world, we meet with another notion, to which special prominence is
given in the system of the Stoics — the notion of Providence (wpovota.)
Since God is the Reason of the universe, it follows that the whole series
of events accomplished in the world is controlled and guided by the
Divine Reason. Here we arrive at the notion of a Providence. This
Reason acts according to plan and purpose, and guides all things with
intelligence and wisdom.
10. Owing to their pantheistical conceptions, the Stoics could not
admit a theory of Providence which would leave room for liberty, and
for the occurrence of merely casual incidents in the world. Their
notion of Providence led immediately to the notion of Destiny or Fate
(iifjLapnivii).) They taught that all things happen from necessity, and
this necessity, they explained, rests upon an inexorable Fate. God
Himself is not free. He must act according to the necessities of His
nature ; the same necessity must control the course of events in the
world, for the world is nothing more than the evolution of the Divine
Nature. This necessity is called Fate. To the dominion of Fate all
things are subject.
11. It is clear that the liberty of the human will could not be recon
ciled with these fatalistic notions. Hence we find that it was peremp
torily denied by the older Stoics. Chrysippus, however, endeavoured to
assert it in a modified form. He distinguished between a man's indi
vidual acts, and his general inner character, from which these individual
acts proceed. The general inner character, according to which a man is
obliged to act, is, in every case, determined by Fate, and to this extent is
pre-determined, but in individual actions man determines himself, and
in this sense acts with freedom.
12. Man must, therefore, be compared to a stone rolling down a
mountain. The stone, once set in motion, rolls downwards of itself
without a further impulse ; so the human will, once determined by Fate,
accomplishes the individual acts in which its general character manifests
itself, without need of a further impulse from Fate. This is sufficient
for freedom. If we fancy at times that we are acting with absolute
freedom, i.e., without any pre- determination whatever, this is because,
in certain cases, we are not conscious of the motives which influence
our will.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 139
13. The course of events in the world comes to an end when, aftor u
certain period, the Godhead absorbs all things into itself. This is
accomplished by a general conflagration, in which all things perish in
fire. But after every such catastrophe a new world is again evolved,
which in all its parts resembles the old — the all- controlling Necessity
not permitting a difference. These successive processes of the destruc
tion and renewed creation of the world continue without end.
14. The human soul is a part of the Deity, an emanation from God,
between whom and the soul there is mutual action and re- action. The
soul, like God, is of the nature of fire ; it is the warm breath within us ;
the heart is the centre from which its influence radiates. It is generated
at the same time as the body. It consists of eight parts — one principal
part irytjuovficov juc/ooe, to which Reason belongs, located in the heart ;
five Senses ; the Faculty of Speech ; and the Reproductive Faculty.
The last-named parts may be described, in contrast with the first or
rational part, as the irrational parts of the soul. These extend like so
many polyps from the central part, and ramify through their respective
organs.
15. The soul is, of its nature, destructible ; it can, however, survive
the body. Whether the soul does actually outlive the body, is a point
on which the Stoics are divided. Cleanthes asserted that all souls sur
vive till the conflagration of the world ; Chrysippus allowed this privi
lege only to the souls of the wise. Panaetius (Cic. Tusc. I. 32), appears
to have denied all immortality to the soul. He would, however, seem
to have been alone in this opinion. Those who held that all souls exist
till the conflagration of the world, taught further chat only the souls of
the wise lived after this life in the condition of pure fire ; the souls of
fools, they held, retained a kind of body after death.
16. Man is the most perfect product of nature. He stands at the
top of the scale of natural beings ; the gods alone are above him. All
things else exist for the gods and for man ; man's destiny is to contem
plate and admire the universe. The human race, in conjunction with
the gods, forms a sort of divine polity, the fundamental law of which is
that Natural Law which reveals itself on all sides in the world. This
leads us to the Ethical System of the Stoics.
ETHICAL SYSTEM OF THE STOICS.
§43.
1. In accordance with the fundamental principles of their physical
theories, the Stoics taught that the supreme duty and highest purpose
of man's life is "to live according to Nature." By Nature they did not
here understand the individual nature of man ; they used the term in its
wide and universal sense. In Nature the eternal and divine law mani
fests itself, and as this law is the measure to which all things in thn
140 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
universe must conform in their action, it is the standard to which
human action must conform, the standard according to which man must
live if he would fulfil the purpose of his existence. The expression,
"to live according to Nature" (6/joAoyov^t'vwc ry <£U(TH Zfiv) means no
more than the accord of man's conduct with the sovereign law of Nature,
or the accord of man's will with the Divine Will. The fundamental
law of human conduct may therefore be expressed in the formula :
" Thou shalt live according to Nature, i.e., according to the Divine Law
which manifests itself in Nature."
2. The highest purpose of human life is not, then, to be found in
Bewpla (contemplation), but in action, and in that action which is
according to Nature. Virtue consists in thus living according to Nature.
The man who acts in accordance with right understanding is the only
man who acts virtuously, and the man who acts according to the natural
law, as manifested to reason, is the only man who follows right under
standing. We have found it to be the ultimate destiny of man that he
should live according to Nature ; we may now substitute the notion of
Yirtue in the formula, and say that to strive after virtue, or to be vir
tuous, is the highest duty of man.
3. If Virtue is the ultimate destiny of man, it follows that Virtue is
to be sought not for sake of anything apart from itself, but for its own
sake only. Virtue is its own end. If it were directed to a higher pur
pose, it would, by the fact, cease to be the ultimate destiny and the
highest purpose of human life. Man must be virtuous for Virtue's sake.
4. We must not, then, make Pleasure or Self -gratification the end of
our actions. Pleasure is merely an accessory of our action — not the end
after which we must strive. The instinctive impulse of nature is not
directed to gratification or pleasure as to its end, but to self-preservation,
to integrity and health of body, to true knowledge and science, &c. ; in
all these cases pleasure accompanies the satisfaction of nature's ten
dency, but is not the end at which nature aims. Much more should
this be the case when there is question of a rational action. Virtue is
here the only end.
5. This being so, it follows further that Virtue is the supreme good
of man, ^ as well as his highest end. The supreme good must be that
good which is sought purely for its own sake, which cannot serve as a
means for the obtaining of something else. From what we have said,
it is manifest that Virtue is an ultimate good of this kind, for it is essen
tially its own end. Virtue is, then, the highest good of man, and the
true and highest happiness of man can only be found in Virtue.
6. More than this : Virtue is not only the highest good, it is the
only true good of man. There is, in fact, only one good, the KaXov, i.e.,
that good which is desirable for its own sake, not for sake of the advan
tage which it confers, and this good is Virtue, and Virtue only. Every
thing other than Virtue which men regard as good, is merely an
acu'ifyopov — something- indifferent, not a good in the proper sense of the
term. Such things cannot contribute to happiness. Virtue alone is the
measure of happiness.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 141
7. We must, however, make a distinction between various kinds of
indifferent objects. Some are to be preferred (irpoTiyptva), others not
to be preferred (airowponyfilva) ; others again not worthy of prefer
ence or rejection, indifferent in the strictest sense of the word. There
are, therefore, certain things of value (a^lav tyovTa), and certain things
of no value, and worthy rather of contempt (ava&av e'xovra), and lastly,
things that are not of the one class or the other. Things in the
first of these categories are to be preferred, things in the second to be
rejected, things in the third are absolutely indifferent.
8. The Trporiy/utva accord with the natural desires of man, and can,
therefore, be the aim of his efforts ; but they do not contribute to real
happiness, and must, therefore, be included in the category of things
indifferent. On the other hand, the aTroTrporjjjuiva have no power to dis
turb or diminish the happiness of the virtuous man. This, with greater
reason, is true of things which are absolutely indifferent. The true and
highest good is, therefore, Virtue. Virtue alone is not subject to abuse ;
everything besides can be abused.
9. Virtue is essentially one. If a distinction is drawn between
virtues, the difference is a difference of relation — that is, it is a question
of one and the same virtue manifesting itself in different ways. In this
sense we may distinguish between cardinal and secondary or derivative
virtues. In the first class are included Prudence or Practical Wisdom
(4/Dovt}<rtc), Courage, Temperance, and Justice. In their definition of
these several virtues the Stoics follow the teaching of Aristotle. In
the second category are included Magnanimity, Continence, Patience,
Diligence, Deliberation. All these virtues depend upon right under
standing, and can, therefore, be communicated by teaching.
10. The principles here established as to the nature of Virtue lead
to the following conclusions :
(a) The person who possesses one virtue possesses all ; for virtue being essentially
one, each single virtue includes in itself all the others.
(b) There is no difference of degree in virtue, i.e., virtue cannot be attained in a
higher or lower degree. The nature of virtue does not admit of a more and a less. A
man cannot live according to nature in a greater or less degree — and the essence of virtue
consists in living thus. The good actions of virtuous men are, therefore, all equally good ;
in the goodness of actions more and le»x are not admissible.
11. The opposite of Virtue is Vice. A man is vicious who lives not
in harmony with the law of nature, but at variance with it. What is
true of virtue is true analogously of vice.
(a) The man who is stained with one vice is stained with all vices. As a man cannot
be virtuous in one respect, without being virtuous in every respect, so he cannot be
wicked in one respect without being wicked in every respect.
(b) In the same way, there cannot be a distinction of degree in vice any more than
in virtue. A man cannot be wicked in a higher or lower degree ; as all virtuous men
are equally virtuous, so all wicked men are equally wicked. And for this reason all
evil deeds are equally evil (omnia peccata paria), there is not in this matter a more and
a less.
12. Furthermore, the Stoics teach that there is no mean between
142 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Virtue and Vice (aptTri KOI KaKta). There is indeed such a thing as an
approximation to virtue. But the individual who only approaches
virtue, is still without virtue quite as much as the absolutely wicked.
A middle state does not exist. Man either possesses virtue, or does not
possess it. In the former case he is virtuous, in the latter wicked ; he
is not, and can never be, neither virtuous nor wicked.
13. In human actions, considered in themselves, the Stoics distin
guish between jcaropflw/za, or complete fulfilment of duty, and KaOriKov,
or mere right action. A rightful, befitting action is, no doubt, con
formable to nature, and is therefore justifiable ; it is not, however, per
formed from a purely virtuous motive, but for the attainment of some
ulterior end to which it leads. An action is the perfect fulfilment of duty
KdTopOufjia, when it is performed purely out of a virtuous disposition,
and for sake of the good done. The KaropOwfjia alone fulfils the require
ments of virtue, for virtue essentially excludes the notion of a further
end.
14. No act is, in itself, praiseworthy or reprehensible ; all acts, even
those which are accounted wicked, are good if performed with a right
eous, virtuous disposition. With a contrary disposition every action is
evil, even though, in outward appearance, it seem good. The wicked
man sins in every action ; the virtuous man in every action is doing
good. " Unnatural love, prostitution, violation of tombs, and the like
deeds, are no longer immoral in themselves ; it is no longer forbidden to
eat the flesh of men ; the deeds of Oedipus and Jocasta become indifferent
in character." The virtuous man, as such, is incapable of wickedness ;
the wicked man, as such, is incapable of good.
15. The emotions (Traflrj), be they of what kind they may, are aber
rations from the right practical judgment as to what is good and evil.
The principal forms of emotion are Fear and Anxiety, resulting from the
apprehension of a future or present evil ; Desire and Delectation, which
result from the apprehension of a future or present good. The emotions
proceed from a false practical judgment ; they are not, therefore, in any
case, in accordance with nature, and thus they cannot be reconciled
with virtue. The virtuous man must yield to no emotion or iraOog, he
must be raised above them all.
16. In keeping with these ethical principles is the Ideal of the Sage
which the Stoics put before us. The true sage is the man who possesses
virtue. As such he is indifferent to everything except virtue, for he
understands that other things are not truly and really good. He is
indifferent to pleasures and desires, for he knows that neither any plea
sure nor any desire is in accordance with nature and with virtue. He
is indifferent to all pain, to all fear, and to all anxiety, for he knows
that these things cannot trouble the happiness which he possesses in
virtue. He frees himself from all passions ; and if, in certain cases, he
cannot help feeling pain or pleasure, he does not permit himself to be
influenced by these feelings, but remains always unmoved and immov
able. In every gratification and success, in every misfortune and
accident of life, he maintains imperturbable equanimity ; no sickness
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.
can trouble this evenness of mind, no fear can disturb him, no fate,
however hard, affect him — in a word, he is a-raOfe (without feeling). In
this OTTO 0cm consists the ideal perfection of the sage.
17. The sage is thus the really free man, the really rich man, the
true king and ruler, the true priest, prophet, and poet ; he unites in
himself all perfection ; in intrinsic dignity he is second to no rational
being, not even to Zeus himself, except that he is not, like Zeus,
immortal. He is a god after his fashion. All that he does is good, he
cannot lose his virtue. " Notwithstanding this moral independence, he
is yet in practical communion with other rational beings. -He has his
part in the affairs of the State, and this part is the larger the nearer the
State approaches the perfection of that one ideal State in which all men
are embraced. But he exercises towards other men, as towards himself,
not forbearance, but justice. He is permitted community of wives. He
is master of his own life, and of his own choice can put an end to it ;
suicide is allowed him."
18. The fool is, in all respects, the contrary of the sage. We may
assert of him the contrary of all that we have attributed to the wise
man. The fool, not possessing virtue, is subject to the influence of every
emotion and every passion ; he is a slave in the true sense ; a godless
being, who sins in every action that he performs. Between the sage
and the fool a chasm intervenes, so wide that we can institute no com
parison between them. As there is no middle state between the con
dition of virtue and the condition of vice, it follows that all men are
either sages or fools, either perfect in goodness ((TTrouScuot) or thoroughly
wicked (<^av\oi).
19. It must be allowed that the later Stoics abandoned to some ex
tent this extravagant exaltation of the wise man, and this exaggerated
contrast between the condition of the sage and of other men. They
taught that no individual attains to the ideal state of the wise man, that
in actual fact the only distinction existing is the distinction between
the state of fools and the state of those who are advancing to wisdom
20. Such, in brief, is the ethical system of the Stoics. It is notice
able that this system, though it denies the very basis of moral life —
liberty, immortality, &c., — increases nevertheless the measure of man's
moral obligations exorbitantly. Herein it is unreasonable and un
natural, and leads finally to excesses, with which its first principles are
in glaring contradiction. The demands made upon the Stoic sage be
come wholly unnatural in their extent, and are wholly irreconcilable
with the needs of practical life. Yet the only ultimate result is that the
sago proudly exalts himself to an equality with the gods, and looks down
with contempt on all men who have not reached the level he has attained;
thut he is permitted every licence, even the most shameful, and that
rthical antinomies are made the laws of morals. The principles which
underlay the system of the Stoics, notably their thoroughly pantheistical
doctrine of Necessity, and denial of Immortality, could lead to 110 more
than a caricature of ethical science, and it was in the nature of things
144 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
that such a system should at last degenerate into unrestrained im
morality.
21. We have now to notice briefly the " later " Stoics, followers of
the older school, who either maintained its principles intact, or accepted
them with some modification. To the later Stoics belong :
(a) Pansetius of Rhodes (B.C. 180-111), a pupil of Diogenes. He modified somewhat
the rigid character of the Stoic teaching (Cic. De Fin, IV., 28), and gave it that special
form which secured it favour among the Romans. He himself won for the Stoic school
such Roman nobles as Laelius and Scipio. " He aimed at a less rugged, and a more
brilliant exposition of the Stoic philosophy ; and in his exposition he appealed not only
to the older Stoics, but also to Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and Dicaearchus,
and by this method prepared the way for Eclecticism." He rejected the astrological
soothsaying and divination whi^h had been in favour with the older Stoics, in consequence
of their fatalistic notions ; he abandoned the doctrine of a conflagration of the world,
and with Socratic modesty disclaimed all title to perfect wisdom. His work (Trepi TOV
KaQijKovTOQ) is the foundation of Cicero's work, Z>e Officiis. (Cic. Z)e Off. III. 2.)
(b) Posidonius of Apamea, in Syria (B.C. 90), held his school at Ehodes, where,
amongst others, Cicero and Pompey attended his lectures. He was esteemed the most
learned (7ro\vp.aQtGTaTOQ KOI sTrior^oi/iKwrarof ) of the Stoics. He inclined to Eclecticism,
blended Platonic and Aristotelian with Stoic doctrines, and delighted in a lofty rhetorical
style.
We may further mention : Apollodorus of Athens (B.C. 144) ; Athenodorus of
Tarsus, President of the Library of Pergamus, and, at a later period, friend and com
panion of Cato the Younger (Uticensis), who strove to confirm the Stoic doctrines by the
example of his own life ; Antipater of Tyre (B.C. 45), a teacher of Cato the Younger ;
Apollonides, a friend of Cato ; Diodotus (B.C. 85), one of Cicero's instructors, later a
member of his household, and his friend ; and lastly, Athenodorus, the teacher of
Octavianus Augustus. Cfr. Ueberweg.
(c) Under the Roman Empire immorality and corruption were ever on the increase.
The men who set themselves to struggle against the prevailing evils, turned for the most
part to Stoicism, seeking from the calmer study of this philosophy consolation and tran
quillity of mind, or borrowing from it a haughty virtue to resist the masters of the State.
It thus came to pass that, at this period, the philosophy of the Stoics began to assume a
political character, to render those who professed it objects of suspicion, and even to
expose them to persecution. The most remarkable amongst the Stoics of this period
are :
(a) L. Annaeus Seneca, a native of Cordova, in Spain (B.C. 3 to A.D. 63), the tutor of
Nero. He directed his attention to Ethics rather than to Physics, and he was more con
cerned to exhort to the practice of virtue than to inquire into its nature. His views on the
latter point do not differ materially from those of the older Stoics. Of his philosophical writ
ings the following have been preserved: Qua'stionum NaturaUum, Libri VII., and a number
of religious and moral treatises : Z)e Providentia ; De Brevitate Vit-fR ; De Otio aut Seeessu
Sap itntis ; De Animi TranquilUtate ; De Constantia ; De Ira; De Clementia ; De Bene-
ficiis ; and the Epp. ad Lucilium. He exalted the Stoic Sage above the gods ; for the in
dependence of the Sage, he holds, is the work of his own will, and this is not the case with
the gods. Nevertheless he is profuse in despairing lamentations over the corruption and
misery of human life, and he makes large concessions indeed to human weakness. The
same contradiction he exhibited in his private life. In theory a gloomy Stoic, looking
down with contempt on all things human, he was in practice a dainty courtier, by no
means averse to the pleasures of the table and other like indulgences.
(/3) Following Seneca, we have L. Anuaeus Cornutus (B.C. 20 to A.D. 66), the Satirist
A. Persius Flaccus (B.C. 34 to A.D. 62) a pupil and friend of Cornutus, and C. Musonius
Rufus of Yolsinium, a Stoic whose views corresponded with those of Seneca. Musonius
Rufus was banished from Rome by Nero at the same time as the other philosophers
(A.D. 65) ; he was recalled at a later period, probably by Galba ; he was exempted from
the order of banishment issued against the philosophers by Vespasian, and was personally
acquainted with Titus. His pupil, Pollio, composed the aTro^rrj^tovevfiaTa Novamviov
(Memoirs of Musonius), from which Stobaeus has probably derived what he tells us of
the life of Musonius. To him is attributed the maxim: "If thou doest good under
difficulty, the difficulty will pass, but the good will endure ; if thou doest evil with
pleasure, the pleasure will pass, but the evil will endure."
LOSOPHY OF 'I I IF. (JKEEKS.
145
(y) Kpictctus, a native of Hierapolis, in Phrypa, was first the slave, and afterwards
the freednuui of a wldier of Nero's body-guard. ll«- we* a pupil of Musonius Rufus, and
subsequently taught philosophy in Rome till the philosophers were banished from Italy
by Domitian (A.D. 94.) He then retired to Nicopolis, in Epirus, where Arrian became his
pupil, and wrote down his lectures. According to Epictetus, the whole duty of man
consists in living entirely for God, in reverencing God, and being obedient to Him rather
than to man. The god within us (0eof or Saipiai') we should reverence most. The
effort! of the .Sage are directed to make himself independent of all external goods which
are not under his own control ; man must endeavour to have all his fortune in himself
He will attain this perfection by self-denial and patience. Hence the rule of life : " Bear
and forbear." (avk\ov Kni inri-^av.)
(fl) Lastly, we must mention here the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Stoicism
had hitherto been only on the side of those who were discontented with the circumstances
of the time, and the general condition of society; but with Marcus Aurelius it took
possession of the imperial throne. The treatise of this prince (TO. tiq iavTov\ the last
remarkable outcome of Stoic philosophy, contains short proverbs and aphorisms, in which
the doctrines of philosophy are applied to the concerns of practical life. In this teaching
a certain tendency to mysticism betrays itself, revealing an affirity between this form of
the Stoic doctrines and the Neo-Platonism, which was soon to succeed them. Theoretical
views are adopted by the Emperor merely as a basis for some religious or moral pre
cept. We also notice that concentration in self, and an abandonment to the will of the
Deity, are the dispositions of mind which his moral teaching requires from man.
EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY.
1. Epicurua the founder of the Epicurean school, was born at Gar-
fettus, near Athens, in the year B.C. 341. He passed his youth at
amos, whither an Athenian colony had been sent, to which his father,
a schoolmaster, was attached. Epicurus is said to have turned his
attention to philosophy at the age of fourteen. The story goes that he
gave himself to this study on finding that the teacher who was instruct
ing him in grammar and literature, not being able to give him a satis
factory account of the Chaos of Hesiod, referred him to philosophy foi
an explanation. He began his new studies with the works of Demo-
critus, and these works made such an impression on him that he never
afterwards abandoned the principles of the system of Democritus.
Nausiphanes, a philosopher of Democritus' school, whose lectures he
attended, may also have helped to this result. At the age of thirty-two
he appeared as a teacher of philosophy in Mitylene. Thence he passed
to Lampsacus, and finally to Athens, where 'he founded in a garden
(whence his pupils were called ol a-rrb TIUI, K//TTWV) the school over which
he presided till his death (B.C. 270). His doctrines may be broadly
described as a modified form of the Hedonism of Aristippus, combined
with the Atomistic theory of Democritus.
2. In the school of Epicurus a cheerful, social tone prevailed. He
reduced the fundamental principles of his philosophy to short formula)
(Kvpiai $ogoi) which he gave to his pupils to learn 'by heart. In the
composition of his exceedingly numerous works he showed great care
lessness, thus proving in practice the truth of his own maxim: "It
costs no trouble to write." The one merit allowed his writings is, that
they are easily understood ; in other respects their form is generally
condemned— notably by Cicero (Dc Nat. Deo., I. 26). He is said to
11
146 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
have composed, in all, 300 volumes. Diogenes Laertius gives a list of his
works (X. 27.) Of these a few fragments, collected by Orelli (Leipzig,
1868) remain.
3. Epicurus defines philosophy, considered from its practical side, as
" the art of securing a happy life." It follows that philosophy, con
sidered in its theoretical aspect, must also be directed to this end. The
scope of theoretical philosophy is to procure that understanding of
things which will enable man TO secure for himself a happy life. Epi
curus divides philosophy into Canonic (Logic), Physics, and ^Ethics.
Canonic is subservient to Physics, and Physics to Ethics. We shall
treat the philosophy of Epicurus in the order indicated in this division.
CANONIC OF EPICTJRUS.
§44.
1. Canonic lays down the laws (canons) according to which know
ledge is acquired,' and assigns the criteria of truth. This science, then,
holds in the Epicurean system the place assigned in other philosophies
to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. Epicurus rejected Dialectic in
the strict sense. His Canonic, too, is restricted to a very few principles,
which he holds to be enough for the attainment of truth.
2. In his theory of human cognition, Epicurus is thoroughly sensual-
istic. Sensuous perception is produced by certain material images
(tYSwXa) detached from corporeal objects (airoppoal), and penetrating the
channels of the senses. These images are detached from the outer sur
faces of bodies, and make their way through the intervening air to our
eye ; they pass in through the eye, and so occasion Perception (m<r0n<rcc)-
3. But it is not Perception alone which depends on these material
images ; they, furthermore, give rise to Thought in the understanding.
These images penetrate through the senses to the understanding, and
excite in it the thought corresponding to their nature. Not only are
our perceptions effected by means of these images, it is by them also
that we think (Cic. De Fin., I. 6.) What we call our faculty of
thought is passively recipient of these images, quite as much as our
faculty of perception. This theory, it will be observed, is wholly sen-
sualistic.
4. Out of the individual perceptions there arises gradually in the
understanding a persistent universal thought- image, due to our memory
of several similar perceptions of external things. It comes into con
sciousness at the mention of the word by which the object in question is
designated. These universal thought-images (or, better, representative
images) are the so-called ir/ooXi/^Hc. The TrpoAr^e, in the Epicurean
theory, is no more than that one common image, under which the
imagination subsumes a number of similar perceptions. This notion is
in keeping with the general sensualistic character of the Epicurean
teaching.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREKKS. 147
and 7r/oo/\rji/^e form the basis of the {moA^y or
Judgment. In a judgment something is always assumed ; a judgment,
therefore, always expresses an opinion (So|a), hence the uTroA^tc and
£o£« are identical with one another. But an opinion of this kind may
be either true or false. The question then arises : What is the criterion
by which we distinguish the true from the false ?
6. Epicurus holds that the criterion of first importance is the
alaOriaiz, or immediate perception. Perception, as such, is always true.
There is nothing which can disprove a perception. For neither other
perceptions, nor reason, which has its rise in perception, have any higher
authority. It follows that the only opinion to be esteemed true, is that
opinion which is corroborated by the testimony of the senses, or at least
not disproved by them, and that those opinions are to be held false,
against which the senses give testimony. Second in order, as a criterion
of truth, is the TrpoArj^e- This is to be regarded as a criterion of truth,
for the reason that it is a product of sensuous perception. What has a
common image of this kind as evidence in its favour is true. What has
evidence of this kind against it is false. In the category of criteria we
must also include the feelings (iraO*)}. The feelings of pleasure and of
pain are the criteria of practical action, i.e., they indicate what is to be
sought and what to be avoided.
7. It may be objected that all perceptions are not true ; for instance,
a tower in the distance appears to us round and small, while, in reality, it
is angular and large. To this Epicurus replies, that in our perceptions
we, strictly speaking, perceive not the objects themselves, but the ma
terial images that are detached from them. An image of this sort, in
its passage through the air, may lose its first outlines and dimensions,
and this actually takes place in the case of the tower referred to. As it
penetrates our senses In this altered form, our perception exactly cor
responds to the image, and is therefore true. The false opinion arises
from the circumstance that we do not restrict our judgment to the
image, but extend it to the object.
8. Epicurus dispenses himself from stating any theory regarding
Judgment and Inference ; he considers that artificial definitions, divi
sions, and syllogisms cannot take the place of perceptions.
EPICUREAN PHYSICS.
§45.
1. In his physical theories, Epicurus is, in the main, at one with
Democritus. He admits no transcendental Divine cause to account for
the origin and dissolution of things. In Matter he finds the adequate
cause of all things. Everything that comes into existence has its
physical cause ; there is no need of any higher agent to explain the
phenomena of our experience. We may not, in each case, be able to
148 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
assign the physical cause with complete certainty, but this is not a
reason why we should recur to the notion of a higher Divine Cause.
This side of the Epicurean theory is distinctly Atheistical.
2. Starting with the general principle that nothing is produced
from nothing, and that no being of any kind can be reduced to nothing,
Epicurus assumes as the primary principles of things vacuum and atoms.
We must assume a vacuum, or space ; for the bodies, of whose existence
sensuous perception assures us, must have being and motion somevvlure.
Atoms, too, we must assume, since bodies are composite, and therefore
divisible. Continuing the division of the composite mass, we must at
last come to parts which are indivisible and unchangeable, unless things
be said to be reducible to absolute nothing. These ultimate indivisible
corpuscles are atoms (o'ro,ua). Space and atoms exist from eternity.
3. These atoms are of different dimensions, but they are all, alike, too
minute to be visible. Size, form, and weight are their only attributes
Other qualities, such as heat, colour, &c., are produced by the union oi
the atoms. The number of these atoms is infinite. But how are bodies
formed from these atoms ? To this question Epicurus answers :
4 The atoms move in space, with a downward vertical movement,
determined by their weight, all moving with the same velocity. In this
movement a certain number of atoms deviate from the perpendicular line
of descent, This deviation brings about collisions with the other atoms.
These collisions sometimes lead to permanent combinations of the atoms,
sometimes, by the rebound of the atoms from one another, they produce
upward or lateral movements, which uniting to form rotatory motion
produce, in turn, new combinations of atoms. In this wise are formed
bodies, which, it will be seen, are no more than complex arrangements
of atoms.* « .
5. The aggregate of the bodies thus formed, united into a dcnmt<
whole, constitute a world. The number of such worlds is infinite, for
the number of atoms is without limit, The earth, and the stars visible
from the earth, form one world. But an infinite number of other worlds
also exist. These worlds are involved in a continuous process of forma-
•tion and dissolution. But among the many worlds some are found
which are possessed of life, and these endure for a longer time ; the
others pass quickly away. .
6 The stars are not animated. Their real size is the same as thei
apparent : "for if their (real) magnitude were (apparently) diminished
by distance, the same diminution should be effected in their brilliancy,
which is, evidently, not the case. Animals and men are produced from
the earth ; man has been evolved, by successive stages, from a lower
7. The movement of the atoms, and the origin of the world thereby
brouo-ht about, is, as has been said, a result of mere chance (Theory of
Casualism). There is, therefore, in nature, neither final cause, nor any
* Tho explanation of the collision of the atoms by their deviation from the perpjn-
dicular line of descent is peculiar to Kpicurus ; Democritus does not make
assumption.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 14! I
or Fate, resulting from a fixed necessity. Chance alone rules
everything.
8. The existence of the gods is not to be denied ; for we have a clear
evidence of their existence in the fact that they frequently appear to
men in dreams, and leave representative images of themselves (7r/ooX?r^£tc)
behind in the mind. Moreover, since there are so many finite and
mortal things in existence, the law of contraries requires that there
should also exist beings which are eternal and blissful. Men are, how
ever, in error when they picture to themselves the gods as supremely
happy, and nevertheless assign to them the task of governing the world,
and endow them with human feelings. These things are perfectly
irreconcilable. It is only the ignorance which fails to find an explana
tion of natural phenomena in the forces and laws of nature itself which
has recourse to the gods. The gods inhabit the spaces interposed be
tween the stars, and lead there a happy life, not troubling themselves
about the world, or the concerns of men. The wise man does not
reverence them out of fear, but out of admiration for their excellence.
As for their nature : they are compacted of the finest atoms.
9. The human soul is a corporeal substance ; for if it were incorporeal
it could neither act on the body, nor be acted on. Moreover, it is in
contact with the body ; but it is only the corporeal which can maintain
contact with the corporeal. But the soul is a very refined, subtle body,
composed of very minute smooth and rounded atoms, otherwise it could
not permeate the entire body. Besides, if the soul were not so con
stituted, the body would lose something of its weight after death. The
psychical atoms are of various kinds : some are of the nature of fire,
others of the nature of air, others of the nature of wind or breath ;
according to the preponderance of one or the other kind, is the tempera
ment of the human individual.
10. There are, however, in the soul atoms of an unknown and un
named fourth quality, in virtue of which man is capable of feeling ana
thought. ^ These atoms constitute the XOJIKOV (rational element; which
is located in the breast, whereas the other atoms form the aAoyoi/, which
is distributed through the whole body, and is the medium through which
the mutual action of the \OJIKOV and the body is maintained. At death
the atoms of the soul are dispersed ; and since sensation becomes im
possible when the combination of atoms is dissolved, it follows that the
immortality of the soul is a mere chimera. But we have no need of im
mortality ; for when death has come we are not present, and as long as
we are here death has not come, so that death does not at all affect us.
" Tota rczficta t>*t pucriliter." Cic.
11. The Will is stimulated by the images in the mind, but it is not
necessarily ^ determined. As there is no tipapnivi\, we are not controlled
in our actions by an extrinsic force, our acts are our own, i.e., we are
free. Without this liberty, praise and blame would have no meaning.
Freedom of will is nothing more than chance applied to human actions.
In the world everything is subject to chance, i.e., uncontrolled by neces
sity. The acts of human beings are like other things in this respect.
150 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
EPICUREAN ETHICS.
§46.
1. In his Ethics, Epicurus follows, in the main, the teaching of the
Cyrenaic school. He holds Self -gratification, Pleasure, to be the Supreme
Good of man, and Pain to be the Supreme Evil. In proof of this doc
trine he appeals to our own consciousness, which informs us that pleasure
is what man is seeking, and that pain is what he avoids. He deduces
the same conclusion from the fact that all living things, from the first
moment of their existence, seek sensuous pleasure, and find enjoyment
in it, while they strive as far as possible to escape from pain. The
contrast between this teaching and Stoicism, both in method of argument
and ultimate conclusion, need hardly be pointed out.
2. In the detailed exposition of this fundamental principle of his
system, Epicurus distinguishes the Pleasure of Motion (17 Kara Ktvrjo-tv
fl$ovn) and the Pleasure of Rest (icaTao-rrj^aarticTj rjSovfi — between Voluptas
in Motu and Stabilitas Voluptatis (Cic. De Fin., II., c. 3). In the first
division are included all the pleasures which are accompanied by a
stimulus of sense ; in the second is signified that condition which is free
from all pain or unpleasant feeling.
3. Epicurus teaches that the highest happiness cannot be obtained
by the pleasure of motion. In this view he is at variance with the
Cyrenaics, who, as we know, regarded the pleasure of motion as the
highest good. According to the opinion of Epicurus, the highest hap
piness is attained in that condition which is called the "Pleasure of
Rest " — in freedom from all pain or unpleasant feeling — in a word, in
the condition of painlessness (arapa^ia KOL euro via). When man has
attained this summit of happiness, he experiences, indeed, a variety and
a succession of pleasurable feelings, but the measure of his happiness is
not increased thereby.
4. We have now to inquire how this condition of painlessness may
be arrived at. Epicurus, on this point, gives us the following answer :
" Pain is the disagreeable feeling experienced under the pressure of
some need or some desire ; pain is absent either when we can satisfy
the needs or desires we have, or when we have no needs or desires which
call for satisfaction. We can, therefore, attain to painlessness either by
satisfying all the needs and desires we have, or by restricting our needs
and desires to that measure which it is in our power to satisfy."
5. " The first means here suggested is not possible to man ; firstly,
because he has not at his disposal the means to satisfy all his needs and
desires ; and, secondly and chiefly, because his needs and desires are, in
themselves, unlimited and insatiable. There is, then, nothing left for
those who would attain to the state of freedom from pain, except to
restrict their needs and desires to that measure which it is possible to
satisfy. Considered from the point of view we have n( w reached, Pain-
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 101
lessness may be said to be the absence of all needs or desires which we
are not in a position to satisfy."
6. From this exposition it appears that the highest good of the
Epicureans is not something wholly negative (Painlessness), but that it
has its positive side also ; for this Painlessness is attained by satisfying
the desires, that is to say, by positive pleasure. It is true this positive
factor must be restricted within certain limits ; i.e., the satisfying of the
desires must be effected in determined measure, otherwise the state of
Painlessness cannot be reached. In the light of this conclusion, we
may state the fundamental law of life, according to the Epicurean
Philosophy, in the following formula : " Restrain your needs and desires
within the measure in which you will be able to satisfy them/'
7. This principle furnishes an explanation of the further tenets of
the Epicurean Ethics, such as the following :
(a) We must distinguish between those desires which are natural and necessary»
those which are natural but not necessary, and those which are neither natural nor neces"
sary. Due moderation in the satisfying of our desires demand that we should refuse
satisfaction to the desires of the last class, and restrict ourselves to desires of the first and
second kind only.
(6) There are cases in which pleasure arises from pain, and other cases in which
pain follows from pleasure. "We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to be carried
away by the excitement of present pleasure, nor permit ourselves to be blinded and
misled by the desire of the moment ; we must renounce pleasure when it would be fol
lowed by a greater pain, and accept pain when it would be followed by a greater
pleasure." Moderation in satisfying our desires requires that we should act thus.
(c) There is a spiritual pleasure as well as a bodily pleasure, just as there is pain of
mind as well as pain of body. For the purposes of human life spiritual pleasures are ot
far higher worth than bodily. The body experiences only the pleasure which is actually
present ; the soul has the gratifying remembrance of its pleasures past, and the enticing
prospect of pleasure to come. Spiritual is, therefore, to be preferred to bodily pleasure.
Spiritual pleasure, however, has its ultimate cause in the pleasures of sense, for it consists
in the remembrance or anticipation of the pleasures of sense. Epicurus was, therefore,
warranted by his own theory in saying (Diog. Laert. X. 0) that he had no notion of any
good apart from the pleasures derivable from taste, hearing, sight, and the gratification
of sexual tendencies.
(d) But he is willing to admit that bodily pain is assuaged by the psychical pleasure
derivable from pleasant memories and from hope, in the same way that sensuous pleasure
is diminished by unpleasant memories and by fear. And thus we again find indicated
the rule already laid down, that the one class of feelings must be moderated by the other,
in order to secure complete absence of pain.
8. On these doctrines is based the fundamental law of Epicurean
Ethics. " Calculate the pleasure and pain that are so closely linked in
human life, so that you may procure from your life the greatest possible
sum of pleasure, and the smallest possible amount of pain." To this end
Epicurus particularly recommends frugality, the cultivation of simple
habits, abstinence from costly and extravagant enjoyments, or at least a
sparing participation in them, in order that health may be preserved,
and the relish for enjoyment may remain unimpaired. He also specially
recommends intercourse with friends ; friendship, according to Epi
curus, being the best means of assuring every pleasure of life.
9. The function which Epicurus assigns to virtue in man's moral life
is now apparent. Virtue is not good or praiseworthy in itself, as tin
152
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Stoics maintained. It is good and estimable merely because it is useful
in securing the happiness of life. It is, therefore, essentially directed
to pleasure as a means to an end, and it is of importance only in so far
as it subserves this purpose. The virtues, according to the reckoning
of Epicurus are four in number : Prudence, Temperance, Courage, and
Justice.
(a.) Prudence (<j>poinj(n£) is the chief of the virtues. It has a theoretical as well as a
practical side. In the first sense, it is that knowledge of the true causes of things which
delivers men from foolish fear of the gods, and of their judgments, and of death, and which
thus makes possible a happy life. In the second sense, it enables us so to regulate our
pleasures that one pleasure shall not hinder another, nor any pleasure be so intensified
that it shall pass into the opposite pain, and it furthermore enables us to maintain
our enjoyments at suitable intensity, contrives that they shall mutually enhance one
another, and brings within our reach not only the pleasures actually present, but also
past pleasures which we remember and future pleasures to which we look forward.
(6.) To Temperance it belongs to keep our enjoyments within due bounds, and to
exercise self-control in the enjoyment of the several pleasures. Courage consists in
"excluding the disturbing and distressing emotions which Prudence perceives to be
unwarranted, in foregoing pleasure and accepting suffering as often as prudence warns
us that this will contribute to happiness, and finally in putting an end to life when it
can afford no more pleasure, but has only pain in store for us."
(c.) As regards Justice, Epicurus holds that all right is based upon a compact or
engagement existing between men not to hinder one another. Justice consists in ob
serving the law of the general safety founded on this compact. Justice contributes to a
happy life, inasmuch as the just man has no punishment to dread, can count upon the
protection of the law, can acquire property, and gains the good will and confidence of
his fellow-citizens ; all which give earnest of a happy life.
10. The virtuous man is the true sage. He alone reaches the goul
of perfect happiness, and he alone cannot miss it. Virtue is the only
way to happiness, it is also the certain way. The sage is, therefore,
always happy. The duration of existence does not in any way affect
the measure of happiness.
11. The Epicurean doctrines present us with a system of Materialistic
Hedonism, which, however, full of contradictions, flatters and favours
the sensual tendencies of man. We cannot, in consequence, be surprised
to find that this doctrine was in high favour under the Roman Empire,
when the stern morality of the older Romans was perishing under
despotic rule. It contained no principles of morality strictly so-called.
If there is nothing intrinsically good or bad in our actions, no immut
able objective law according to which the morality of our actions is de
termined ; if pleasure and profit are the only standard according to
which we are to act ; if pleasure of every kind is good in itself and be
comes an evil only in the injury it may possibly entail upon the indi
vidual ; then is there an end of everything which .could give a moral
character to our acts. The Epicurean Philosophy is a theory of
effeminate ethics, wholly incompatible with an earnest morality. Cicero
calls special attention to the fact that the notion of honour finds no place
in the Epicurean teaching. The reproach is deserved. But it is by no
means the most serious objection which can be urged against the
system.
12. The doctrines of Epicurus received little development from subsequent
philosophers. The most remarkable of his followers were : Metrodorus of Lampsacus,
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. L>i
Polyaenus the Mathematician, Hermarchus of Mytilene, who succeeded Epicurus in his
school, Polystratus the successor of Hermarchus, Timocrates, Leonteus, Colotes,
Idomeneus, Apollodorus, the author of four hundred volumes, Zeno of Sidon the pupil
of Apollodorus (born B.C. 150), who was the teacher of Cicero and Atticus, and whom
Cicero distinguishes among the Epicureans for his logical, dignified, and ornate style, and
on whose lectures were based the works of his pupil Philodemus, the two Ptolemies
of Alexandria, Demetrius of Lacon, Diogenes of Tarsus, Orion, Phaedrus an earlier con
temporary of Cicero, and lastly Titus Lucretius Carus (B.C. 95-52) who in his didactic
poem, De Rerum Natura, gave a complete exposition of the Epicurean system with the
purpose of convincing his readers of the truth, and delivering them from fear of the
gods and of death. — Cfr. Ueberweg.
SCEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM.
§47.
1. The Stoics and Epicureans had endeavoured to secure a scientific
basis for their theory of happiness by assuming certain fundamental
theoretical principles. Scepticism abandoned this method, asserting
that the supreme good and highest happiness could be attained by man
only under condition of foregoing all dogmatical principles, and with
holding all definitive judgment as to the nature of existent things. To
disclaim all knowledge was therefore a first principle with the Sceptics.
2. There were three successive schools of Sceptics, or three sections
of philosophers whose teaching was sceptical in its tendency : (a.)
Pyrrho of Elis and his early followers; (b.) the so-called Middle Academy,
i.e., fhe Second and Third Academic Schools; and lastly (c.) the later
Sceptics, subsequent to ^Snesidemus, who again reverted to the teachings
of ryrrho. We shall notice the representatives of these three schools
of Scepticism in order.
3. Pyrrho of Elis, who lived about the time of Alexander the Great
(B.C. 330), followed the teaching of Democritus, and despised the other
philosophers as Sophists. He held the view that speculative thought
cannot lead to any result. " In reality," he said, "there is nothing
beautiful and nothing hateful ; in itself everything is just as much the
one as it is the other, everything depends on human institution and
custom." (Dic-g. Laert., IX. 61.) This is the celebrated ou£ci> juaAAoi',
which became a shibboleth among the Sceptics. According to Pyrrho's
teaching, " things are inaccessible to our faculties of knowledge, inap
prehensible (aKCLToX^ia) and it is our duty to abstain from all judg
ment regarding them (ETTO^//). This CTTOY// is the first condition of happi
ness, for happiness consists in imperturbable peace of soul (aTupa^ia).
" All the external circumstances of human life are of their nature in
different (d^/ci^ojoov), it becomes the wise man to preserve in every
event complete tranquillity of mind and to permit nothing to disturb his
equanimity."
4. Among the friends and pupils of Pyrrho were Philo of Athens
and Nausiphanes of Teos, and, more remarkable than the others, Timon
of Phlius (B.C. 325-335). He was the author of certain satirical poems
154
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(aiXXoi) in three books, in which he treated the Dogmatic Philosophers
as sophists and babblers. His own peculiar views may be thus stated :
(a.) Perception and mental apprehension give us no certain know
ledge of things. For in order to decide conclusively with regard to
objects apprehended by our minds we must not only perceive what
things are and how they exist, but we must also know what is their
relation to us and what their influence upon us. But neither knowledge
is possible to us. Not the former, for there are no fixed differences be
tween existing things, they are unstable, and therefore beyond the reach
of knowledge. Not the latter, for the senses themselves are deceptive.
We have therefore no means of deciding whether an object possesses
the properties which are manifested to us or not. We cannot, in con
sequence, trust either our perceptions or mental apprehensions of
things.
(b.) Nor is any certain judgment regarding things possible. For
in favour of every proposition which we enunciate, and in favour of its
contradictory, the grounds are equally cogent, i.e., there are as many
reasons against the proposition as for it. Certain knowledge is there
fore, unattainable, we cannot even know with certainty that we have no
certain knowledge of things.
(c.) Nothing then remains but to refrain from all judgment, to take
up a position of non-decision (a$a<ria). This is the position assumed by
the wise man. By this means, and by this means only, he secures that
tranquillity of soul (arapa^ia), which is the highest good. This state
follows the suspension of judgment (e.rox*/) as the shadow follows the
body. We must renounce the craze of knowledge, and spare ourselves
the futile labour of inquiring into the nature of things ; it is only by
acting in this wise that we shall attain to tranquillity of soul, and the
true happiness which it involves.
5. We have already spoken of the Scepticism of the Middle Academy
(p. 94). It will be observed that the Scepticism of this school is not so
radical as that of Pyrrho. The Academics acknowledged at least an
Stoic Catalcpsis as the criterion of truth, but it set up no other criterion
instead; it renounced certainty altogether, and acknowledged only
probable opinion.
6. The Scepticism of Pyrrho was revived at a later date by
^nesidemus of Gnossus, who, as it appears, taught at Alexandria to
wards the end of the last century before Christ, or in the beginning of
the first century of the new era. He composed the UuppuvtitDv Xoyw
OKTV ptfiXta (Diog. Laert,, IX. 116). His theory is not a thorough
scepticism. The purpose of his sceptical teaching was to establish the
Philosophy of Heraclitus. Scepticism was, in his view, not a system in
itself but the introduction to a system (crywyij). The distinctive
character of Scepticism consists, according to ^Enesidemus, in this, that
whereas the Dogmatists maintain that they have found truth, and the
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 155
Academics assert that it is impossible to find it, the genuine Sceptic d
not assert the one or the other ; he refrains from judgment on this
question.
7. To justify this Scepticism JEnesidemus invented the ten " groin id<
for doubt " (r/ooTTouc rf/c tTKityeatg). They are the following :—
(a.) The first ground for doubt is found in the general differences existing between
animated beings and more especially in the structural differences in their organs of sense.
The same object must appear differently to these different beings according as their
organs are differently formed, and there is no means of determining which of them
perceives the object aright or whether it is manifested to any one of them all as it really
exists*
(b. ) The second reason for doubt is furnished by the differences between men both
as to body and as to soul. As a result of these differences sensation and mental
apprehensions are different in different men, and we can never decide in which case they
represent things as they really are.
(c.) The third reason for doubt is given us by the differences of sense in the same
subject. The different senses perceive one and the same object differently, or perceive
different qualities in the same object, and we have no means of determining which is the
true sensation, or whether the object really possesses the qualities which we perceive.
((/.) The fourth reason for doubt is taken from the differences ^ caused by passing
changes taking place in the knowing subject, owing to which a certain knowledge of the
object is impossible.
(e.) The fifth consists in this that the objects according to their different position
and distance present to us wholly different appearances, and thus the conclusion is again
arrived at that a certain judgment is impossible.
(/. ) The sixth reason for doubt is supplied by the circumstance that with all our
sensations is mingled some element derived either from other objects or from the
sensitive subject itself.
(g.) The seventh consists in this that objects excite different sensations and mental
apprehensions according as their quantity and structure change.
(h.) The eighth is given in the fact that we perceive things as they are related
either to the subject knowing, or to other things, and that all our knowledge is thus
relative.
(i.) The ninth is drawn from the circumstance that things appear differently to us
according as the sensation and the object are something habitual or something unusual.
(k.) The tenth reason for doubt is furnished by the opposition prevailing amongst
human opinions as to justice and injustice, good and evil, religion and law, &c., as well
as by the opposition between philosophers in their opinions. By this, as by the other
reasons, the conclusion is warranted that there is nothing certain in our knowledge.
8. In addition to these general reasons for Scepticism ^Enesidemus
(according to Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IX. 207) adduces special reasons
against the principle of Causality. " Cause," he says, " belongs to the
category of Relation, and relation is not anything real, it is something
created by our thought. Furthermore, the cause must be synchronous
with the effect, or it must precede the effect, or follow it. It cannot be
synchronous with it, otherwise both would exist together, and there
would be no reason why one should be called the producer and the other
the product. The cause cannot precede the effect, for it is not a cause
so long as its effect does not exist. It is clear that it cannot follow it.
The notion of causality is thus wholly meaningless."
9. To the later Sceptics belong Agrippa, Mcnodotus of Nioomedia,
and notably Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 200). Saturninus was the pupil of
Sextus. The grammarian and antiquarian Favorinus of Aries (under
Hadrian) belongs to the same school. The later Sceptics reduced the
" reasons for doubt " laid down by ^Enesidemus to five : —
156
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(a.) The differences of opinion among philosophers.
(ft.) The necessity of a regressus in injinitum in every demonstration, since every
proposition has to be proved from another proposition.
(c. ) The relativity of all our notions, since the object appears different, according to
the constitution of the individual perceiving it, and according to its relations to other
objects.
(d.) The tirbitrary character of the assumption by the dogmatists of certain first
principles^, which they assume in order to escape from the regressus in infinitum.
(e.) The circle which is unavoidable in every demonstration since the proposition on
which the proof rests (major) requires for its truth the truth of the proposition to be
established (conclusion).
The later Sceptics directed their attacks in a special manner against
the teaching of the Stoics regarding God and Providence. The existence
of Evil, which God either will not remove or cannot remove, they held
to be at variance with the very notion of God.
10. With regard to Sextus Empiricus, two works are still extant in
which he has expounded his Sceptical theory : Pyrrhon. Institut., Libri.
3. ; and Adv. Mathematicos., Libri. 11. He examines critically the
dogmatic systems of Greek Philosophy, and endeavours to show that all
their principles are untenable. He makes a large use of sophisms in
this criticism. These works of Sextus Empiricus are, however, of much
importance for the student of the history of Greek Philosophy.
11. Along with Scepticism we find in this period of the decline of
Greek Philosophy an Eclecticism which borrowed from the several
systems what seemed most probable in each. We have called attention
to the eclectic tendency manifested by many of the philosophers we have
noticed, notably by some of the Stoics. But the most distinguished re
presentative of this phase of thought was Cicero.
12. M. Tullius Cicero (B.C. 106-43) had pursued the study of philo
sophy at Athens and at Rhodes. In his early youth he attended the lec
tures of Phaedrus the Epicurean, and of Philo the Academician, and was
intimate with Diodotus the Stoic ; subsequently he followed the teaching
of the _ Academician, Antiochus of Ascalon, of Zeno the Epicurean, and
of Posidonius the Stoic. We are not concerned with his career as an
orator and a statesman. In his old age he again devoted himself to philo
sophy ; it was the chief occupation of the last three years of his life.
13. Of the philosophical writings of Cicero the following have come down to us : (a.)
Academicarum Qmestionum, Libri 4, of which, however, only the first and fourth books
are extant; (b.) De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Libri 5 ; (c.) Tusculanarum Quces-
tionum, Libri 5 ; (d. ) De Natura Deorum, Libri 3 ; (e.) De Divinatione, Libri 2 • (/.) De
Fato, of which only a part is preserved ; (.7.) De Legibus, an unfinished treatise of which
only fragments, in three books, are preserved; (h.) De Officiis, Libri 3; (».) Cato
Major seu De Senectute ; (£.) Laelius sive De Amicitia, and Paradoxa Stoicorum sex •
(I.) Consolatio, of which only fragments ate extant ; fragments of the Hortensius • (m )
and lastly De Republica, Libri 6, of which only a third part has come down to us
first published by A. Mai from a palimpsest in the Vatican Library. We may add to
this list the rhetorical works : De Oratore, Libri 3 ; Brutus sive De Claris Oratoribus
Liber 1 ; and Orator, Liber 1.
14. Cicero's services to philosophy consist less in original inquiry
than in the zeal and ability which he exhibited in rendering Greek
Philosophy, especially the Stoic doctrines, acceptable to his countrymen,
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 157
and introducing it among the cultured classes at Rome. To effect
this he modified Greek theories in many material points, softened down
some of their more repulsive tenets especially those regarding the
Highest Good, and the character of the Sage, and in his exposition was
at once easily intelligible and attractive. He admits that knowledge
is MI! uable for its own sake, and that it confers genuine pleasure on its
possessor, but he is at the same time convinced that the end to which it
leads is action, and that action is therefore of more importance than
theory.
15. In his theory of cognition Cicero follows the Middle Academy.
The differences between philosophers on the most essential points lead
him to despair of certainty in knowledge, and to content himself with
probability. According to his view, probability is enough for the pur
poses of practical life. Probability, he holds, may be best attained by a
comparison and criticism of different views. Hence his Eclectical Method,
his comparison of the opinions of the several philosophers, and his
a 1 option of the view which seems to him most probable. He is not,
however, without certain guiding principles in his choice of opinions.
He holds fast by the evidence of the senses and of consciousness, and in
the domain of higher rational knowledge he appeals to the immediate
evidence furnished by the moral faculty, to the consensus gentium, and
to certain fundamental principles which, according to his view, are
innate in man (notiones innatse, natura nobis insitse).
16. In Physics, Cicero's attitude is one of doubt ; he admits, how
ever, that investigation on this subject is an agreeable and worthy field
of exercise for the human mind. He asserts the existence ^ and the
spiritual nature of God, and insists that everything unworthy of the
gods shall be excluded from mythology. He esteems highly the belief
in the providence of God and in His government of the world. He sets
forth, indeed, the grounds on which the Academy rejected the belief,
as well as the grounds on which the Stoics adopted it, but he is distinctly
in favour of the latter. Pie regards the human soul as a being of supra-
mundane origin, and enters at length into the proofs of its immortality.
17. In his Ethics Cicero is a Stoic, but he blends the rigid theories of
Stoicism with Platonic and Peripatetic elements after the fashion of the
later Stoics, and thus mitigates their severity. The question whether
virtue is of itself sufficient for happiness he is inclined to answer af
firmatively, but remembering his own weakness and that of mankind
generally he hesitates, and seems to look with favour on the distinction
made by Antiochus of Ascalon between the n't a Icata assured by virtue
in all circumstances, and the rifti /W//W/y//7 which is enhanced by the
enjoyment of external goods (Do Fin., V. c. 26). Virtue, however, he
holds to be the good compared to which all others are only of secondary
worth. " He combats the Peripatetic doctrine that virtue is nothing
more than the reducing of the -n-dOii to due order ; he holds with the
Stoics that the wise man has no 7rafl>/." In political philosophy his
ideal of government is a constitution which combines monarchical,
aristocrat?'1, and democratic elements — an ideal which he finds to
158 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
have been approximately realised in the Roman State (De Rep., I. 29 ;
II. 23).
18. He also asserts the freedom of the human will. He would
rather admit that a proposition may be neither true nor false, than
admit that everything happens by Fate. Without liberty there could
be no room for praise or blame, for reward or punishment. If you
object that the freedom of the will contradicts the principle that nothing
happens without a cause, he answers that the freedom of the will only
excludes an external antecedent cause of our actions, but not all cause,
for the will is itself the cause of our actions. Cicero will, however,
permit such concessions to popular superstition as auguries and the
like.
19. An Eclecticism of the same kind as Cicero's was adopted by the Sextian School
founded by Q. Sextius (born about B.C. 70). Amongst the followers of Sextius were his
son Sextius, Sotion of Alexandria the teacher of Seneca, Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius
of Tarentum, and Papirius Fabianus. This school seems to have held an intermediate
Eosition between Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism. Abstinence from animal
esh, daily self-examination, metempsychosis, exhortation to moral excellence, to forti
tude of soul, and to independence of all external things seems to have been the chief
points in their teaching. The school had only a short existence. Cfr. Ueberweg and
Sigwart.
THIRD SECTION.
GRAECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THIS PHILOSOPHY,
§48.
1. Greek Philosophy found its way, at an early period, into the East.
The immediate causes of its extension in this direction were the con
quests of Alexander the Great. In consequence of his intercourse with
Aristotle, Alexander took a personal interest in the encouragement and
the spread of philosophical knowledge. This interest passed to the men
who divided his kingdom after his death. The rulers of the several
states which were created by the partition of the Macedonian Empire
protected and favoured Greek learning and Greek art, and endeavoured
to make them known and appreciated by the peoples they governed.
This remark applies equally to the Seleucidae in Syria, to the Attali of
Pergamus, and the Ptolemies of Egypt. Institutions for the advance of
science and learning were founded in Syria, the most noteworthy being
those of Antioch and Tarsus, and also in Pergamus ; but these cities
were all surpassed in scientific renown by the Alexandria of the
Ptolemies. Under the reign of these monarchs Alexandria became not
only the mercantile centre of the civilized world, but the centre also of
the science and art of the age.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 159
2. Ptolemy Lagus (Soter) invited learned Greeks to Alexandria, and
collected works of science from Greece, Italy, Asia, and Africa. His
most important service to learning was, however, the founding of the
so-called museum. This museum was a portion of the royal palace pro
vided with gardens and porticoes, where men of learning lived together,
forming a sort of community. A special fund was devoted to the main
tenance of the museum ; it had its own president, appointed by the kings
of Egypt, and at a later period by the Roman Emperors. The various
departments of learning were there represented ; it included philo
sophers, grammarians, critics, poets, mathematicians, astronomers, geo
graphers, physicians, naturalists, of whom all, with few exceptions, were
Greeks or the descendants of Greeks.
3. The museum also contained a library of Greek, Roman, Jewish,
Persian, ^Ethiopian, Babylonian, Phoenician, and Indian literature, which
increased to such proportions that the temple of Serapis — Serapeum —
was assigned to it. When Julius Caesar burned the Egyptian fleet, the
museum and the portion of the library contained within it were destroyed
by fire, but the library of the Serapeum was preserved, and Marcus
Antonius endeavoured to repair the loss by purchasing the library of
the Kings of Pergamus. At a later time the Emperor Claudius founded
a new museum. Alexandria thus possessed all the conditions which
favoured a new development of science in general, and of philosophy
more especially.
4. At an earlier period a society of learned men, of Jewish race, ap
peared in Alexandria side by side with the learned Greeks. Judea was
a part of the Egyptian kingdom, and it was to be expected that close
relations should be established between the home of the Jewish race and
Alexandria. Under Ptolemy Philadelphia (B.C. 280), the Greek trans
lation of the Old Testament, which is known as the " Septuagint," was
made by certain learned Jews in Alexandria. The Ptolemies were
favourably disposed towards the Jews, and, in consequence, Alexandria
became a favourite resort of Jewish savants, and a centre of Jewish
learning.
5. The course of events led to a revival of the ancient philosophy in
the East, and more especially in Alexandria. If we examine the char
acter of this revival we shall find that it is essentially a syncretism
(blending) of the philosophical conceptions of Greece with the tenets of
the oriental religions. In the East, and especially in Alexandria, Greek
philosophy was brought into contact with the oriental religions, and the
form in which it now appeared was largely determined by this contact.
The attempt was made to blend philosophy and religion, to embrace in
a higher unity the mind of Greece and the mind of the East.
6. In making this effort it was assumed that the religious notions of
the East and the philosophy of Greece were derived from a common
source — from a primeval religious tradition, which had its origin in a
divine revelation. The founders of the Alexandrine philosophy set
themselves to determine exactly what was contained in this tradition, in
order to make this the basis of their philosophical teaching. The entire
lf)0 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Graeco- Oriental philosophy thus came to be essentially a philosophy of
religion, for it made use of philosophical concepts and principles only
for the purpose of giving philosophic form, and establishing, by philoso
phic proof, what it rightly or wrongly regarded as primeval religious
tradition.
7. This philosophy of religion had a practical as well as theoretic
aim. Its disciples used it to prepare the way for, and to effect, a reform
of the popular religion. In the heathen world, corruption of the gross
est kind had undermined the religious and moral life of society. The
public religion commanded no faith, and inspired no reverence ; the
public worship was neglected, religious doctrines and ritual were often
the objects of contempt and mockery, and frivolity and vice prevailed
as perhaps they have never prevailed at any other period.
8. To counteract these evils, the religious philosophers of the period
endeavoured to recover the teachings of the primitive tradition, and
uniting these with the notions of Greek philosophy to bring about a re
ligious reform, by which the contradictions of the popular religion
might be reconciled, and a broad and comprehensive system established,
which should include in it all the elements of truth within the popular
creed. In this wise they hoped to check the spreading corruption, and
at the same time to oppose to Christianity, which was already growing
into prominence, a power which would dispute its empire over the minds
of men.
9. The strain of mysticism and theosophism which pervades this
philosophy and forms one of its characteristic features, is in keeping
with this design. Apart from the natural tendency to mysticism of the
Eastern mind, the effort after religious reform by the religious philosophy
of Alexandria was calculated to develop this characteristic. To reform
religion, man, it was believed, should be again brought into close com
munion with God. But this, it was thought, could only be achieved by
making mystical union with God, in contemplation, the aim of human
life, and this union was in turn made possible by a system, of mystical
asceticism. Mystical contemplation was at once the beginning and the
end of human knowledge, the source whence light was diffused over
every region of human thought. In this doctrine we have the principles
and the germs of mystical theosophy.
10. The religious and mystical character of the Pythagorean and
Platonic philosophies adapted them specially to the aims of this move
ment. We must, therefore, be prepared to find the philosophers of this
period devote themselves chiefly to the philosophy of Pythagoras and
Plato. The idealism of Plato was specially congenial to the imaginative
Eastern mind. But the Alexandrian philosophers did not confine them
selves to the school of Plato. They borrowed from other systems, from
the Aristotelian, and even the Stoic, what they found suited to their pur
pose, and embodied all in their own teaching. The Alexandrians ex
tended very widely this eclecticism.
11. Thus much as to the general character of this philosophical
movement. In the broad stream we have, however, to distinguish dif-
PHILOSOPHY OF T11K GREEKS. 161
ferent currents. In the first place we find a combination of Greek philo
sophy with Jewish religious doctrines, which had its rise in Alexandria,
the scientific metropolis of the age, and which attained to a very wide
development. Of the Graeco-Jewish religious philosophy, Philo is the
chief representative. In conjunction with this school we find another
— that of the Neo-Pythagoreans and Pythagorean Platonists — who held
to the old beliefs of heathenism, but who, following the method of the
Graeco-Jewish school, strove to combine into one system the teachings of
Pythagoras and Plato, and the doctrines of the heathen faith. This
system, likewise, had its origin in Alexandria. It reached its perfection,
as a system of heathen philosophy, in Xeo-Platonism, the principal non-
Christian system of this period.
12. We shall, in our treatment of this subject, deal first with the
Graeco-Jewish philosophy, then with the Neo-Pythagorean doctrines
and Pythagorean Platonism, and lastly with Neo-Platonism.
GRAECO-JEWISH PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
PHILO THE JEW.
§ 49.
1. We observed above that under the Ptolemies not only the Jewish
element of the population secured a footing and obtained protection, in
Alexandria, but also that Jewish men of learning settled in the city, and
cultivated there the sacred lore of their nation. Here they made acquaint
ance with the philosophers of Greece, and this circumstance could not
but affect their system of thought. They had, indeed, too high an
esteem for their ancient traditions, and were too firmly persuaded of the
divine origin of these traditions, not to believe them the ultimate source
of all wisdom. But they could not refuse their admiration to the great
works of Greek philosophy which confronted them. They were obliged
to seek out a method which would permit them to maintain the supe
riority of their sacred books to all philosophy, and, at the same time, to
secure for philosophy its rightful place in the realm of knowledge.
2. As a first step in furtherance of this object, the following prin
ciples were laid down :
(a). Revelation is the highest philosophy and, as such, include?
within itself all the tenets of Greek philosophy, and this with a per
fection and a fulness of truth not found in the Greek systems them
selves.
(b). The Greek philosophers have derived their wisdom from the
revealed doctrines of the Jews, that is, from the sacred books. The
ultimate source of their lofty doctrines is, therefore, not human reason
but Jewish tradition.
(c). The difference between the revealed doctrines of the Jews and
the philosophy of the Greeks consists chiefly in this, that in the sacred
12
162 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
books of the Jews truth is expressed by symbols and figures, whereas
Greek philosophy puts the figure aside and sets before us the thought
which was expressed under the figure.
3. These assumptions formed the basis of the whole Grncco- Jewish
philosophy. It was the aim of this philosophy to develop these notions
in every sphere of philosophical knowledge. It strove to show that re
velation and Greek philosophy corresponded, part for part — that revelation
contained all that was found in Greek philosophy, though' in more perfect
form. In this wise the Jewish religion, it was presumed, would maintain
itself in the face of Greek philosophy ; and at the same time a deeper in
sight into its teaching, and a reform of the Jewish religion (meaning
thereby a more spiritual and more ideal view of its tenets), would be
brought about.
4. It is clear that this end could be attained only by accommodating
the doctrines of the Jewish faith to the principles of Greek philosophy,
that is to say, by interpreting these doctrines in accordance with the
philosophical notions of the Greeks. This was essentially the method
pursued by the Grooco- Jewish philosophers of this period. They endea
voured to adapt the Scriptures to the doctrines of Greek philosophy, and
by the light of this philosophy to determine their meaning. Looked at
from the standpoint of revelation this method was rationalistic.
5. Another aspect of this philosophy remains to be noticed. On the
supposition that it is characteristic of the Sacred Scriptures to present us
with truth in images or figures, it would follow that the only method of
arriving at the truth they contain is to seek the meaning that lies
hidden under images, to strip the truth of the figures which envelop it.
This must be effected by determining the allegorical sense of the Sacred
Scriptures. Hence it is that we find the allegorical sense of Scripture
occupying so prominent a place in the Graeco-Jewish philosophy. The
literal meaning of the text was abandoned, and the allegorical substi
tuted, not only in cases where this was required by the subject-matter,
but frequently also even in cases where the subject-matter demanded
that the literal sense should be maintained. On other occasions literal
and allegorical meanings were simultaneously maintained. In a word
there was no limit to the liberties which interpreters permitted them
selves.
6. In this way it came to be assumed that under the sensits obvius of
the Sacred Scriptures a deeper meaning was concealed, and that this
deeper meaning alone was the genuine sense of the Scripture. Thinkers
who held to the mere letter (the sensus obvius) were of no account ; only
those were credited with wisdom and knowledge who were privileged to
penetrate the hidden meaning of the Books of Revelation. This was the
method adopted to bring about a reform of the Jewish faith in accord
ance with the requirements of the times.
7. As early as the second century B.C., the way had been prepared
for the combination of Jewish theology with the doctrines of Greek
philosophy. In this century arose the three Jewish sects — the Essenes,
the Therapeutae, and the Sadducees. The Sadducees were a school of
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 163
materialistic free-thinkers, while the Essenes and the Therapeutaj
adopted a course of mystical asceticism. Among the Therapeute certain
Pythagorean notions seem to have found favour, and it is among them
perhaps, we are to seek the first beginnings of the Graco-Jewish philo
sophy.
^8, In Aristobulus (about B.C. 160) we have distinct evidence of an
union already effected between Jewish theology and Greek philosophy.
" He appealed to certain (spurious) Orphic lays, into which he had intro
duced certain points of Jewish doctrine, in proof of his contention that the
Greek philosophers and poets had derived their wisdom from an early
translation of the Pentateuch." He composed a commentary on the
Pentateuch, fragments of which are preserved by Clement of Alexandria
Stromata L, VI. ; and by Eusebius, Prcepar. Emng. VII., VIII., IX.'
XIII. He asserts the inspiration of Scripture, but he adopts the alle
gorical meaning. God, he teaches, is invisible, His throne is in
heaven. He is not in contact with the earth, He influences it only by His
power (Svvafjiie)' He created the world out of pre-existent matter. To
justify the keeping of the Sabbath, Aristobulus appeals to the Pythago
rean argument from the symbolism of numbers. After Aristobulus *we
may mention Aristeas, to whom is ascribed a (spurious) letter to Philo-
crates, in which is told the story of the translation of the Sacred Scrip
tures by the seventy interpreters.
9. The chief representative of the Graeco- Jewish philosophy is, how
ever, Philo, who was the first to give it completeness as a system. He
lived in Alexandria, and was descended from one of the most distin
guished families of the country. According to Eusebius and Jerome,
his family was of priestly rank. In the year B.C. 40 he was sent to
Home as delegate from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor. He was
equally conversant with the various systems of Greek philosophy and
with the ancient traditions of his own people.
10. His writings .are very numerous. The names of his works are as follows :-(a.)
TOM^opi/cw;(b.)I^M^tfei/oriari»m,ii&. 2; (c.) DeChcrubim ; (d.) De Sacrifices
J^am\i(^Qy dc7teriusP°tiori ™sidiari soleat ; (f.) De Agricultura ; (g.) De Plan-
ne Noe ; (h.) De Temulentm ; (i.) De his verbis : 'XeripuitNoe'? (k.)Zfc Giganttou ; (1.)
881^ 'T / ( (n° ' ConfwA°M Linguarnm ; (n.) De Abrahamo ; (o.) De
Abrakami ; (p.) De congressu quaerendce eruditionis gratia; (a } De Profuqis •
n ln dlrvin"™m*aeres f ( (^** J™ph° t (t.) De Swniis; (^)De Vita *££
nLlL( ]Ae£a* lfateM°™> (^DeCreationePrincipis; (x.) De Fortitudine ; (y.) De
Decalogo; (zJDeSpcciahbusLegibus; (aa.) De Circumfusione ; (bb.) De Monarchia; (cc.)
DeSacerdotumHononbus; dd.) De Victim!*; fee.) De Victims Of erentibus ; (ff.)M«i
»/f/LWgr-7Cn no\™*™cW'nd™; (S8-) Quod omnisprobus liber ;(hh.)De vita cantem-
plativa ; n ) De nobihtate ; (kk.) De Prcemiis et Pcenis ; (11.) De Execratione • (mm ) Quod
^M^^!^^^ maCCUm; (oa) De
num. Mutatione; (qq.) Quod a Deo immittantur somnia.
11. Adopting the principle that the prophets were merely the instru
ment^ through which the Spirit of God spoke, Philo makes free use of
the allegorical sen-se. To hold to the mere literal meaning of Sacred
Scripture he considers undignified, unbecoming, and superstitious, and
he stigmatises his opponents as "infected with an incurable passion for
164 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
logomachy, and blinded by the delusions of custom." "God cannot,
in the strict sense, go hither and thither, nor has He feet to walk with.
These anthromorphic methods of expression are used by Sacred Scrip
ture for the advantage of the sensual man ; at the same time it explains
to the spiritual man that God is not like man, nor like heaven, nor like
earth." This, no doubt, is undeniable. But Philo goes further, and
applies his allegorical interpretation to other things, especially to histo
rical incidents which are narrated in the Scriptures. We must, how
ever, allow that he does not always reject the literal meaning. In the
case of many historical narratives he admits a literal as well as an alle
gorical meaning ; but he will never allow that the latter is absent.
12. But Philo's censure is not reserved for the •" liter alists " only.
He is equally severe upon the " symbolists," whose teaching threatened
Judaism as a system of positive religion. The symbolists attributed a
figurative meaning not only to the teachings of the Law, but also to the
ordinances of the Jewish ceremonial, and held that the observance of
these ordinances according to the letter was superfluous, that no more
was necessary than to observe the moral precepts which they typified.
Philo is ready to acknowledge that even in these ordinances there is a
recondite and higher sense as well as a literal sense, but the precepts
must be observed in accordance with the latter sense, since the two are
united as soul and body. Allowing that circumcision signifies restraint
upon passion and the renunciation of luxury and impious thoughts, we
must not for this interfere with the established practice ; otherwise we
should have to give up the worship of the Temple and a thousand other
necessary solemnities.
13. After this exposition of fundamental principles, we may now
proceed to examine Philo's system of doctrine We must observe, at
the outset, that in this system there is scarcely any trace of unity of
plan and harmony of principles. Philo's aim is to bring the revealed
doctrines of the Jews into accord with the teachings of Greek philosophy,
in other words to make the latter supply the interpretation of the former.
In doing this, his eclecticism reaches to every system of Greek philo
sophy, and he uses them all for his purpose. He incorporated the
Platonic doctrines in his system, side by side with the Aristotelian or
the Stoic, as the one or the other seemed to serve for the interpretation of
a given passage. In this way the several systems are introduced to
gether in all parts of his writings, and unity and harmony thus rendered
impossible.
14. God, the First Cause of all things, is above everything created.
We argue His existence from a consideration of His works and by a
conclusion, thence warranted, to the author of these works. But it is
not given us to comprehend His Being, or express determiiiately what
He is. God is above our comprehension, and above our powers of ex
pression. He alone has comprehensive knowledge of Himself. For
our part, we describe Him but by that name which He bestowed upon
Himself, when He said, "I am who am" (6 &v). No attribute, no
perfection can be predicated of God in the proper sense of the term.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 165
He is above everything. He is not Wisdom, nor Virtue, nor the Good,
nor the One ; He is more than all these.
15. However we are not debarred from speaking of God after our
own manner. In the order of our conceptions God comes before us as
the Unbegotten (a-ylvvifroc), a Being who contains within Himself the
ultimate cause of His own existence — the fulness of perfection and
bliss, the Eternal, the Unchangeable, the Imperishable. In Him there
is no before and no hereafter, no past and no future, all things are pre
sent to Him. He is simple in His nature, not restricted to any part of
space, and is, therefore, at once everywhere and nowhere. He is all-
sufficient in Himself, and has no need of anything outside Himself.
God alone is free, i.e. independent of everything not Himself.
16. The world is the work of God, but the world is not God. To
identify the world with God is to commit the error and the wickedness
of maintaining that God has created all things out of nothing (k JJLT)
OVTWV). It follows from this that the world is not eternal. It has had
a beginning. The reason for the Creation was the goodness of God, the
ultimate purpose of the Creation the manifestation of this divine good
ness. The duration of the world is dependent on the exercise of God's
conserving power. It is everlasting, God's goodness having assigned it
an unending duration. But God did not Himself directly create matter
and reduce it to form and order ; it was not fitting that He, the
supremely Pure, should come into immediate contact with matter. The
world comes mediately from God. He created it by His Logos (Word).
We have now to examine Philo's doctrine of the Logos.
17. The Logos of Plato is the aggregate in which all Ideas are com
prehended — the intelligible world which, in this respect, Philo describes
as the region of Ideas. Before the creation of the world God formed
in His intellect its ideal prototype. This prototype of the world is the
Logos, created things are the ectypes of this Logos. As the seal is im
pressed upon the wax and is represented in it, so the Logos is the
original mould or stamp of created things and is represented in all their
various forms. And here it is to be remarked that all the ideas con
tained in the Logos find actual expression in the world, the most perfect
expression, too, of which they are capable. It follows that the world is
the only world possible, and also the best possible.
18. Philo goes still further. He distinguishes between the Xoyoc
£v$td9iTO£ and the Xo-yoe TrpotyopiKoc,, and this distinction he borrows from
the Xoyoc in man. In man we distinguish between the indwelling
reason, which is the active faculty of thought, and the extrinsic word, in
which the thought finds expression. We may describe the former as
the Xo-yoc IvSm force, an(l the latter as the Xd^oc TT/OO^O/^KOC- An
analogous distinction must be applied to the divine Logos. It is a Xoyoc
iv&aforoe, inasmuch as it is constituted by the aggregate of all ideas in
dwelling in the mind of God ; it is a Xoyoe Trpo^o/oucoe, as expressed in
things created — the ectypes and outward expression of the ideas con
tained in the divine mind.
19. The Xoyoc TTfjotyoptKoc of Philo appears to be a divine power or
166 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
force which pervades all things, giving them life and form. The
fvSto&roc he seems to regard merely as the ideal conception of the
world ; but the Xo-yoc TT/OO^O/HKOC is the creative, formative power by
which God produces and forms the universe. Under the influence of
this notion he makes the several ideas contained in the Logos so many
distinct forces, which proceed like rays of light from God, but in such
wise that they are all united in the Logos. In this way the Logos, with
its various distinct forces, becomes the organ or instrument by means of
which God, who cannot Himself come into immediate contact with the
defilements of matter, creates and fashions the world.
20. This theory enables Philo to assert that God is present in all
things, not by His Being, but by His power. Philo, is in the same way
led to regard the Logos as the differentiating element in the universe,
as the power which gives to matter its different forms, as the architect
of the universe, working from within outwards, effecting the formation
of the world : as the Xoyoc o-Trf/o^utmicoe, inasmuch as the ideas it con
tains manifest themselves in the several objects by its formative energy ;
as the bond which unites all things in the universe ; as the universal
and unchanging cosmical law ; as the universal World-Reason or Pro
vidence which pervades and governs all things, guiding and controlling
the course of the universe. The universe is, so to speak, the garment
by which the Logos is enveloped.
21. This, however, is not the whole of Philo's doctrine regarding
the divine Logos. With him the \6yos irpo^opiKog is not merely a
divine power, it appears ultimately in his teaching, as a personal being.
Thus conceived it becomes a kind of intermediate nature between God
and the world, separating the one from the other, but at the same time
bringing them both into relation with one another. The Logos, in this
capacity, is neither a thing ungenerated and without a beginning, nor
yet is it generated and produced as all other things. It is the Son of
God — the eldest, first-begotten Son, the world being the younger Son
of God. The Divine Wisdom (the Xoyog hSiaOeTog) is the Mother of
this Word, God is his Father. He may be called God, not in the strict
sense of the term, but only in so far as in his action he appears as the
representative of God. He is intermediary between God and man, he
conveys the commands and ordinances of God to men, and is on the
other hand intercessor with God for man. In the former character he
is the " Angel of God," in the latter " the High Priest."
22. But the Logos is not, according to Philo, the only power by
which God creates, fashions, and maintains the world. Philo speaks of
other Divine Powers distinct from the Logos, though subordinate to it.
He does not appear to have formed a definite opinion as to the number
of these powers. At one place he speaks of two powers — the creative
and the controlling; at another he mentions five such powers — the
creative, the ruling, the commanding, the forbidding, and the forgiving.
Furthermore, Philo's conception of these powers or potencies is some
what undetermined. At one time he seems to conceive of them as attri
butes of God, or modes in which the divine power manifests itself, as, for
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 167
example, when he identifies the creative and ruling powers with the
omnipotence and goodness of God, and says that God, in virtue of the
one attribute, is called Lord, in virtue of the other God. Again, how
ever, he seems to represent them as personal beings ; for example, when
he describes them as ministers of God in the creation, preservation, and
government of the universe, and puts them under the control of the
Logos, as steeds under the guidance of a charioteer.
23. In accordance with the latter conception is his further assump
tion of the existence of other beings intermediate between God and the
world. In this category he reckons the stars, which, after the Platonic
fashion, he endows with reason, and makes akin to the Divinity, and
the angels, to whom he assigns the atmospheric region as an abode.
These beings also fulfil, after their manner, the functions of interme
diaries between God and man ; they execute the Divine commands, and
intercede with God on man's behalf. The series of beings is thus brought
down without interruption from the highest to the lowest, from God to
man, and the universe thus resembles a great state in which the supreme
authority is held by God, but exercised through subordinate powers.
24. In his physical theories, Philo for the most part follows Aristotle.
The six days in which, according to Sacred Scripture, the world was
created, must not be regarded as actual periods of time ; they merely
mark the order in which things followed one another in the Divine con
ceptions. This order is based upon the number six, for this is the most
perfect number. The cause of the imperfections, of the evil, and the
wickedness which prevail in these sublunary regions is to be found in
matter, which opposes itself to the formative energy of the Logos. It
would be blasphemy to assert that God was Himself the author of evil
or wickedness.
25. In his doctrine regarding man, Philo draws, at the outset, a dis
tinction between the ideal man and the man of our experience. Ho
endeavours to justify this distinction by an appeal to the Scripture. In
the first chapter of Genesis it is said that God created man to His own
image and likeness. According to Philo, it is the ideal man of whom
there is question in this passage. The second chapter recounts that
God created man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed into him a
living soul ; here thore is question of the man of our actual experience,
the earthly man. Phil) describes the ideal man as the primal man, and
this concept he ultimately identifies with that of the Logos.
26. In man as actually known to experience, Philo, like Plato, dis
tinguishes the rational soul — a simple, indivisible, immortal essence —
from the irrational soul, which he locates in the blood. The former he
describes as the true man within man, the ego proper in man. In the
irrational soul he, at one time, distinguishes with Aristotle between the
vegetative, the concupiscible, and the irascible parts ; at another time
he inclines to the Stoic doctrines, and distinguishes in the soul (the
rational soul included) eight parts. He adopts now one of these dis
tinctions, now another, according to the requirements of the subject he
is treating
168 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
27. Explaining in further detail the nature of the rational soul,
Philo, adopting the Stoic notions, regards the soul as an aTroo-Traa/ia (a
shred) of the Divinity, and accordingly describes it as a Divine spirit.
When God breathed into man a living soul, something of the Divine
Being was in the act, transfused into man, and this something is the
rational soul. This is the Divine impression which stamps man as the
image of God. The body, with its irrational soul, is the creation of in
ferior powers. It would be unworthy of God to give existence to the
body, for it is the seat of concupiscence, and concupiscence is the source
of all evil, vice, and unrighteousness.
28. The souls of men do not differ specifically from the angelic
nature. Before their union with human bodies they lived an angelic
life among the angels, and it is in consequence of their own faults that
they are degraded to union with matter. Some angels always hold
themselves aloof from contact with corporeal nature ; others on the con
trary inclining to contact with it, sink down into the corporeal element,
and become human souls. The Platonic theory of pre- existence of the
soul could hardly fail in a theory such as Philo's.
29. With regard to the human faculties of cognition, Philo dis
tinguishes between the ai(T0»j<Tt£, Xoyoe and VOVQ. The cutrflrjo-fe is con
cerned with sensible objects, the \OJOQ is the reasoning faculty ; the
roue is the faculty of immediate intellectual contemplation. The VOVQ
is the eye of the soul in the strict sense, it is to the Xo-yoe what the
Divine vovg is to the Divine Xoyoc. The knowledge which the Xo-yoe
obtains discursively or by reasoning, is uncertain and unstable ; perfect
certainty is attainable only by intellectual contemplation as accomplished
by the VOVQ. This contemplation, however, is dependent on the irradia
tion of the vowc by the Divine light. God alone can bestow the kno .v-
ledge of contemplation, and He bestows it when we pray for it, through
the Logos. God is thus the sun of our souls ; the Logos is the dispenser
of wisdom, the food of the soul, the manna on which it subsists.
30. In this contemplation of the Divinity consists, moreover, the
supreme happiness of man ; it is the highest purpose of his life. To at
tain to it, the soul must detach itself from the body and withdraw within
itself; for the operations of sense are a hindrance to the soul in its up
ward flight towards this highest end of life. But this is not enough.
The Reason must not only abandon the ai<r6r](Ti£, but it must renounce the
Xoyoc also, and reduce it to silence, ii it will attain to the height of its
destiny. Nay, more, the Reason must, to a certain extent, renounce it
self, must go out of itself to become wholly one with the Divine Wisdom,
if its contemplation is to be perfect. In a word, the highest attainment
of man is only possible in mystical ecstasy. By this means alone does
man become really divine. Sense must be absorbed in the Xoyoe, the
Xoyoc in the vovg, and this in its turn in God, if man is to attain that
bliss which is the highest end of life.
31. In accordance with this teaching, Philo distinguishes the active
from the contemplative life. The active life has, no doubt, its justifica
tion in the fact that it is a necessary condition of human society ; the
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 169
contemplative life, however, is of a much higher order. The latter is
the true priesthood ; contemplation is the true and proper sacrifice, for
it is possible only when man renounces his individuality, and offers it in
sacrifice to God. The active life is human, the contemplative life is
divine. From the eminence of mystical contemplation, the spirit looks
forth as from a watch-tower upon the universe, viewing it not from the
periphery inwards, but from the centre outwards.
32. Virtue is the path which leads to the highest end of life. We
must, however, distinguish between the virtues which belong to the
active and those which belong to the contemplative life. To the former
class belong the four cardinal virtues : prudence, fortitude, temperance,
and justice. In defining these virtues, Philo at one time adopts the
notions of Plato, at another those of Aristotle. The virtues which be
long to the contemplative life either prepare and purify, or confer per
fection. To the former belong faith, hope, piety, penance ; the virtue
conferring perfection is wisdom — that virtue which is founded on the
contemplation of the Divinity. All virtues exist in ideal fashion in the
Divine Logos. He is, therefore, the dispenser of all virtues, He bestows
them by His grace.
33. The true sage is he who, devoting himself to the contemplative
life, attains to mystical contemplation. All other men are fools. Sen-
suality has no power over the true sage. He cannot be drawn to evil
by the solicitations of concupiscence ; for the Divine Logos dwells within
him, and so long as he is the dwelling-place of the Logos, so long is he
protected against the contamination of matter. The sage is not only
the truly wise, he is also the truly free, for the possession of wisdom
rescues him from the dominion of matter. The fool, on the other hand,
is the victim of ignorance, and is, by this fact, the slave of sensuality
and passion.
34. The character of Philo's system being thus purely mystical, we
naturally expect to encounter in it the principle of (Oriental) Quietism.
This principle has, as a matter of fact, its place in the system. Philo
teaches expressly that whereas the active life demands man's own ener
gies, in the contemplative life everything depends exclusively on the
action of God — on the Divine grace. Man's will has no part in the
mystical elevation of human nature ; it is not our work, it is wholly the
work of God. Nay, it is a fundamental requirement in the elevation
of man to mystical contemplation that he should cease to act himself
and permit God to act in him. This absolute Quietism is essential to
the attainment of man's highest end.
35. The history of man's first state and subsequent fall, as narrated in Scripture,
Philo reduces to an allegory. The first man, whom God created "after his own image
and likeness," is, according to the explanation already given, the ideal man. The differ
ence between this first man and man as he is now created is infinite. Man, as now
created, is a being of sense, possessed of different qualities, composed of body and soul,
is either male or female, and is of his nature mortal. The first man, on the other hand,
was a pure spirit, without a body, sexless, immortal by nature. This was the heavenly
man, as distinguished from the earthly man, or " Adam." Paradise, in which man was
placed by God, was not a part of space allotted to man ; by the term we must under
170 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
stand the VOVQ, that is to say we must understand the term to signify that God in giving
Reason to man, bestowed upon him, at the same time, dominion over all subordinate crea
tures. The Tree of Life was the Wisdom bestowed upon man, and the Four Rivers were
the four Virtues which flow from Wisdom.
36. As for the Fall, the narrative of Scripture is thus explained as an allegory.
Woman is .Sense, man is Reason, the Tree of Knowledge is the good of Sense, which con
ceals evil under a fair exterior. The serpent which approached the woman to deceive
her, and through her to seduce the man, is sensual pleasure, arising out of the faculties
of sense, and seducing Reason itself. In this way sin was committed, and in
this way the sin of the first man furnished the prototype, and tells the story of every sin
which man has since committed. Philo gives also another interpretation of the Scripture
narrative. As soon, he says, as the woman was created and presented to the man, mutual
love was enkindled in both. Evil desires grew up within them, they were drawn towards
one another like separated parts of a single whole, and at last their desires found satisfac
tion in carnal intercourse. Thus sensual desire, consummated in carnal intercourse, was
the first sin, and as it was the first sin, so it has been through all time the source of all
unrighteousness and of all evil.
37. But Philo does not regard the fall of man as something wholly abnormal or excep
tional. He is of opinion that there is nothing fixed or stable in the universe, that every
thing is subject to change and transformation, and thus that the natural course of things
required that man should meet with opposing influences, and that he should, in conse
quence, fall from a higher to a lower grade of existence. Everything loses its perfection
in proportion as it recedes from its prototype. So it is with man. Philo assumes, as a
consequence of this view, an ever increasing degeneracy of the human race in body and
spirit. In reference to the doctrine of the Messiah, Philo is satisfied with the view cur
rent among his contemporaries, he expresses a hope that the Jewish laws and constitutions
will one day be adopted by all nations, and that thus a sort of universal Jewish kingdom
will be established.
38 This system, it will be observed, covers a very wide field of theory,
but the notions which are here blended together are very diverse in
character. It is not, therefore, surprising that in subsequent times
the system of Philo failed to exercise any far-reaching influence. We
shall see later how the heretics of the first centuries of Christianity, as well
as the Fathers of the Church, borrowed from Philo, though with different
meanings and with different purposes. Perhaps we should also take
into account, in this connection, the attractive and pleasing form in
which Philo expresses himself in his writings. The undoubted ingenuity
shown in many of his allegories had certainly its effect.
2. NEO-PYTHAGOREANS, AND ECLECTIC PLATONISTS.
1. Cicero mentions, as the restorer of the Pythagorean teaching, P.
Nigidius Figulus, who lived in Alexandria during the latter half of the
century preceding the birth of Christ. Many works, written in the time
of Augustus, and ascribed to the older Pythagoreans, contain Neo-
Pythagorean ideas. About the same period, Sotion, pupil of the Pytha
gorean Eclectic, Sextius, flourished in Alexandria. But the principal
representatives of the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy were Apollonius, of
Tyana (in the time of Nero) Moderatus of Gades (also in the time of
Nero), and Nicomachus, of Gerasa, who lived before the age of the
Antonines. Secundus of Athens (under Hadrian) would also appear to
deserve a place among the philosophers of this school.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 171
(a.) Apollonius of Tyana, in his travels through the Roman Empire, and especially
through the East, appeared in the character of a worker of miracles. He was a man of action
rather than of systematic thought. His chief purpose was to revive the doctrines
of Pythagoras in their purity, and to blend the lore of the East with the theories.
of the West. Eusebius (Pnep. Ev. 13) has preserved a fragment from a treatise of
Apollonius on sacrifice : "Apollonius here distinguishes between the one God, who is
separated from all else, and other gods. No sacrifice should be offered to the former.
He should not even be mentioned by name, but only thought of by the VOVQ. All
things of earth, because of their material state, are unclean, and unfit to come in contact
witli the supreme God. To the subordinate gods Apollonius seems to have assigned
bloodless sacrifices ! " *
(b.) Moderatus of Gades, who lived about the same time as Apollonius, endeavoured
to justify the introduction of Platonic and new theological notions into the Pythagorean
teaching, by contending that the older Pythagoreans had purposely expressed the highest
truths in symbols, and had for this purpose made use of numbers. The number One was
the symbol of unity and similarity, the principle of harmony and of the constitution of
all things; the number Two, on the other hand, was the symbol of diversity, of dissimi
larity, of separation, and of change.
(c.) Nicomachus of Gerasa, in Arabia, appears to have lived about 150 B.C. In his
work Arithmetics, Lilri II., he taught the existence of numbers in the mind of the
Creator antecedently to the formation of the universe ; these numbers gave the plan after
which all things were fashioned. In this wise Nicomachus makes the numbers of Pytha
goras what Philo had made his Ideas — conceptions of the Divine mind. Furthermore, he
hokls the number One to be itself the Divinity, Keason, the Principle of form and good
ness ; the number Two is the Principle of dissimilarity, of change, of matter, arid of evil.
The ethical duty of man is to withdraw from contact with the impure, and to attain again
to union with God ! t
2. Eclectic Platonism had its rise in the first century of our era, and
attained a considerable diffusion in the second. Its aim was to combine
in one system the Ideas of Plato and the Categories of Aristotle, and
further to establish a harmonious accord between the philosophy of
Greece and the religious and mythical notions of the East. It strove,
in particular, to renew and propagate the transcendentalism of Plato in
opposition to the pantheism of the Stoics and the naturalism of the
Epicureans. This system was the forerunner of Neo-Platonism, and
led up to it.
* A century later Philostratus. at the instigation of the Empress Julia, wife of Alexander Severus, com
posed a treatise on Apollonius, which purports to be a biography. This work is a romance at once philoso
phical and religious in character, and written for a purpose . In the person of Apollonius the Neo-Py thagorean
ideal is sketched with the design of setting another ideal and wonder-working personage in opposition to the
person of Christ, and of thus maintaining the repute of the heathen religion againstthe advance of Christianity.
In this work we are told of the wonders which befel at the birth of Apollonius ; for example, a streak of
lightning which sank into the earth, rose again into the air, and there disappeared. We are told of the
great piety of Apollonius, and of the higher knowledge he possessed, and by which, he was enabled to read the
future, and to speak in tongues which he had never learned. We are told now he journeyed to India to con
verse with the Brahmins, and to interchange knowledge with them. His miracles are described at length.
He is said to have cast out devils, to have raised a dead girl to life, and to have learned from the whining of
a tame lion that it possessed a human soul — the soul of Amasis, King of Egypt, and so forth. We are also
told that he travelled into Egypt and there confounded the wisdom of the Gymnosophists. Apollonius
enjoyed the personal acquaintance of Vespasian and Titus. Under Domitian he suffered imprisonment in
consequence of an unguarded prophecy regarding Nerva's succession to the Empire. But he escaped miracu
lously from prison, and announced at Ephesus the death of Domitian at the moment that the Emperor died in
Rome. His own death was accompanied by miracles. Some say he entered the temple of Athene, in Lindus,
and there disappeared ; others assert that he went into the temple of Athene, in Crete, and thence raised himself
into heaven, an unseen choir of maidens singing the while : " Rise up from earth ; ascend to heaven." Philos-
tratus relates these and other fantastic stories, professing to found his narrative on a written document left
by a certain Damis, a pupil and companion of Apollonius; but of this document there is no furthei
trace. The design to raise Apollonius to the position of a heathen saint and worker of miracles, and to set
him against Christ, in order to drive Christianity from the field, is unmistakable.
t To Secundus, of Athens, the " silent philosopher," who lived under Adrian, are attributed certain
answers to philosophical questions put by the Emperor, which are in accord with the notions of the Neo-
Pythagoreans. These answers are found in the philosopher's " Life" — a work which dates from the second
century .
172 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
3. Among the Eclectic Platonists, the most renowned are Arius,
Didymus, and Eudorus (in the time of Augustus) ; Dercyllides and
Thrasyllus (under Tiberius, A.D. 30) ; Theon of Smyrna, Plutarch of
Chaeronea (under Trajan, A.D. 100) ; Maximus of Tyre (under the Anto-
nines, A.D. 170) ; Apuleius of Madaura in Numidia ; Alcinous, Albinus,
and Severus (about the same period) ; Calvisius Taurus (A.D. 150), and
Atticus (A.D. 174), the physician Galen (A.D. 175) ; Celsus, the antagonist
of Christianity (A.D. 200), and Numenius of Apamea (A.D. 170).
(a). Eudorus of Alexandria wrote a commentary upon the Timceus of Plato, as well
as upon the works of Aristotle, and composed a treatise on the Divisions of Philosophy.
Arius Didymus, a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon, wrote a work, irepi
L, and others besides. Thrasyllus of Egypt (A.D. 30), to whom we owe an arrange
ment of the Platonic dialogues, combined with his Platonism Pythagorean speculations
about numbers, and Chaldean doctrines regarding magic. Dercyllides was the first to
divide the Platonic dialogues into tetralogies. Theon of Smyrna composed a work on the
mathematical principles involved in the Platonic theories.
(6). Plutarch of Chaeronea regarded it as the chief end of philosophy to instruct men
in their moral and religious obligations, and so came to consider as chief in importance
the doctrines which affect the character and temperament of the learner. In the exposi
tion of his views he professes to follow Plato, even where he is very distinctly at variance
with Plato's teaching. He combats the Monism of the Stoics, and returns to Plato's
assumption of two cosmical principles, God (the Monas). the author of good, and matter
(the Duas), on which depends the existence of evil. God is in Himself, unknowable, it
is only His creative action which comes within reach of our knowledge. Intermediate
between God and matter, Plutarch places Ideas. This lower world, the soul of man in
cluded, appears to him a being debased by the disturbing influences of matter. He holds
the existence of an evil World-Soul, as well as a good. His ethical doctrines are lofty,
temperate, and pure.
Maximus of Tyre, who lived about half a century later than Plutarch, followed the
same lines, but shows himself more inclined to religious syncretism and a superstitious
demonology.
(c). Apuleius of Madaura holds God, Ideas, and Matter to be the primary principles
of all things. He distinguishes between the sensible and super-sensible world. The
latter includes God, Reason, or the Unity of Ideas, and the Soul ; the former rests upon
matter as its basis. Alcinous likewise holds God, Ideas, and Matter to be the ultimate
principles of being ; but he confounds in one system the notions of Plato, of Aristotle, and
of the Stoics. Severus denies that the world had a beginning. Atticus protests against
the combination of Aristotelian and Platonic theories, and is a vigorous opponent of
Aristotle ; that the world had its beginning in time he holds to be established.
(d). Claudius Galen, the celebrated teacher of the medical art, who first traced the
connection between the nerves and the brain, devoted much attention to philosophy, and
occupied himself with the exposition of the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus,
and Chrysippus. He esteems philosophy, which for him is the same thing as religion, as
the greatest of the benefits conferred by the gods. To him we owe the Fourth syllogistic
Figure. He inclines to the Platonic notion of an immortal soul, but he is unable to
conquer his doubts upon this point as upon all others where experience is not available.
He lays special stress on the general religious belief in the existence of the gods, and the
rule of a Providence. Celsus, the opponent of Christianity, is known to us by the refuta
tion with which Origen met the arguments against Christianity which he had put for
ward in his X6yo£ aXtjOijy.*
* As to the substance of Celsus' work — it is remarkable that his first objection to Christianity is, that it
aims at becoming not a national religion, but a universal religion. All the heathen creeds were national,
the claim of Christianity to be a universal faith was unintelligible to the pagan world. Celsus despised the
Jews as heartily as he despised the Christians, but he held that the Jews had an advantage over the
Christians in this, that they possessed a national religion. He furthermore reproached the Christians with
insisting always on blind faith, and refusing all rational inquiry into their articles of belief. He failed to
understand the nature of Christian faith and its relation to reason. He denied the supernatural manner of
the birth of Christ. The Jewish fable of the Roman soldier Pantheus and his relations with Mary he accepts
without question. The whole life of Christ seems to him to be a refutation of the Christian belief in His
divinity. He cannot reconcile the lowliness and poverty of the Saviour with his own epicurean conceptions of
the happiness and immunity from suffering enjoyed by the gods. He makes mockery of the god who hid
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 173
(e). The most unmistakable forerunner of Neo-Platouism is, however, Numenius of
Apamea. He traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the lore of the East, and
speaks of Plato as the Attic Moses. There can be no doubt that he was well acquainted
with Philo. and with the Jewish theosophy of Alexandria. He formulated a distinct
system of Tritheism. He distingushes the Platonic Demiurgos from the Supreme Deity,
making the former subject to the latter, and thus proceeds : The first God is goodness
in itself and of itself, ^he is pure activity of thought (vovc*), and the ultimate reason for
all existence (otxriac apxty- The second god (6 Ctvrtpoc fcoe), the Demiurgos, is good by
participation in the being of the first, he contemplates the super-sensible archetypes of
tilings, and so acquires knowledge ; he exerts his activity upon matter, fashions it after
the archetypes he has beheld, and thus becomes the creator of the world. The world,
the creation of the Demiurgos, is the third god. This doctrine Numenius ascribes
to Plato, and even to Socrates. He holds that the soul has been degraded from a pre
vious incorporeal state of existence in punishment of a fault. Harpocration and Cronius
seem to have held similar views.
3. NEO-FLATONISM.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.
§51.
1. It has already been made clear that ancient philosophy in the first
centuries of our era had altogether ceased to receive original develop
ment. Nothing new was added. The great conceptions of earlier times
were discussed and modified with, perhaps, more erudition than insight.
This was the whole work of the philosophers of the time.
2. One system only could claim to form an exception to this rule— the
system of Neo-Platonism. It might have seemed that the brilliant
epoch of Greek phiJosophy was to be revived in Neo-Platonism. But
it was only an appearance ; for at bottom Neo-Platonism was no more
than a system in which the religious notions of the East were blended
with the conceptions and doctrines of the older Greek philosophers,
though it differed from the other eclectic systems in this — that the fusion
was more intimate and complete. For this reason Neo-Platonism could
not maintain its position against the rising sun of Christianity. It com
bated Christianity, but in so doing it was working its own overthrow.
Neo-Platonism was merely the last violent flickering of the light of
ancient philosophy which immediately preceded total extinction.
3. Neo-Platonism, described by its fundamental characteristic, may
be called a theory of emanation. This notion of emanation is essentially
an Oriental concept. We find no trace of it in the history of Greek
philosophy. There is no room, therefore, to doubt that Neo-
hirnself when the Jews accused him, who wandered about the country, was betrayed by one of his disciples,
taken prisoner, and crucified. He altogether denies the resurrection of Christ. He laughs at the evidence
in favour of the resurrection. If Jesus really meant to display his divine power, he would have revealed
hiin-i It to his torturers and executioners; but he did not appear to them: he showed himself to a foolish
woman, and then to his own companions. Moreover, how could the Son of God descend from heaven? Such
a thing: could not be accomplished without effecting a change in God himself from a better state to a worse.
And if he came to bring the true religion into the world, why did he not come sooner? In a word, Celsus
maintains that the whole teaching regarding the person of Christ is no more than an attempt to deify a dead
man ; it is no better than any othor heathen apotheosis. Finally, what do the Christians mean by the resur
rection of the body .' Such a belief is wholly irrational ; for the body is altogether unclean, and subject to
ev.-ry kind of misery, &c., &c.
174 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Platonism borrowed it from the East. But the scientific form in which
this notion was put forward was drawn from the Greek systems, es-
specially the Platonic. They furnished the scientific principles which
helped out in detailed development the system of emanation. In this
respect Neo-Platonism is the most remarkable representation of that
union of Eastern and Greek thought, which is the characteristic of this
period of ancient philosophy.
4. A further characteristic feature of Neo-Platonism, and one which
stands in close relation to the former, is its mysticism — a mysticism of the
extreme type. This again is of Oriental origin. Its combination with Greek
philosophy was made all the more easy by the fact that Plato's writings
had already given evidence of a mystical tendency. In Neo- Platonism
mysticism was pushed to the extreme limit. A consequence of this
exaggerated mysticism was that the superstitions of theurgy ; magic, and
necromancy found their way into the system, and were there established
and justified by scientific methods.
5. Neo- Platonism has three representative schools — the Alexandrino-
Rornan, to which the system owes its origin and thorough development ;
the Syrian, which was chiefly occupied with a fantastic theurgy, and
lastly, the Athenian, which returned again to saner methods. With the
last-named school we may associate the Neo-Platonist commentators of
later times. We proceed to take a survey of these three schools in
order.
NEO-PLATONISM IN ITS EARLIEST FORM.
PLOTINUS.
§52.
1 . The founder of Neo- Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, of Alexandria
(A.D. 176-250). He is said to have been brought up as a Christian by
his parents, but to have returned to paganism in maturer life. The
nickname, Saccas, refers to the trade by which Ammonius at first pro
cured a livelihood. His teaching was all delivered orally. We have no
further account of him. He is said to have maintained that there was no
essential difference between the doctrines of Plato and of Aristotle. This,
however, is not beyond doubt.
2. The most remarkable of his disciples were Origen,* Errenius,
Longinus the physiologist, and, most famous of all, Plotinus. We have
no precise account of Origen and Erennius. Longinus is rather a
grammarian than a philosopher ; he has, however secured a place among
philosophers by his treatise " On the Sublime," (Uepi {tyouc)» which
abounds in acute and striking observations, He, moreover, maintained,
* We must distinguish this Neo-Platonist from the early ecclesiastical writer, Origen.
The latter was, however, a pupil of Ammonius, as will be seen later.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 175
in opposition to the other Neo-Platoiiists, the doctrine that ideas exist
apart from the voue- But the chief disciple of Ammonius was, as we
have stated, Plotinus — the philosopher who gave to Neo-Platonism its
scientific form and scientific basis.
3. Plotinus (A.D. 205-270) always declined to state where he was born or to give any
information regarding his parents or the date of his birth ; these things he despised as mere
earthly matters ; according to his pupil, Porphyrius, he felt it a humiliation to be bur
dened with a body. (He was born in Lycopolis, in Egypt.) When twenty-eight years
old he turned his attention to philosophy, but he could not satisfy himself with any of the
then celebrated teachers in Alexandria, until at length he found in Ammonius the teacher
he sought for. At the age of forty-eight he arrived in Rome. Here he began to teach,
and soon secured pupils. He even carried his success so far as to win to belief in his
theories the Emperor Gallienus, and his wife, Salonina. His writings show that he had
made acquaintance with all the schools of Greek philosophy by a study of the chief works
of each. The writings of Numenius exercised much influence upon him.
4. It was not until his fiftieth year that Plotinus set himself to commit his teaching
to writing. According to the statement of Porphyrius, Origen. Erennius, and Plotinus
entered into a compact not to publish the doctrines of Ammonius. But Erennius having
broken the engagement, the others held themselves released from their promise. The
manuscripts of Plotinus were revised after his death by his pupil, Porphyrius, the style
amended and the whole published in six enneads. These six enneads are the source from
which we draw our knowledge of the teaching of Plotinus. In his exposition, Plotinus
lacks the aesthetic grace of the Platonic dialogues, and still more their dialectical power,
but he appeals to us by his earnest trust in his own thoughts and the enthusiasm with
which he expresses them.
5. As the starting point of his system, Plotinus takes the One, which
he also describes as the Good. We cannot begin with the vovt;. For in
knowledge we always have duality — the act of cognition and the object
known (vovg KOL i/orjrov). This duality is inseparable from the vov^,
for if we separate the VOTJTOV from the voue, there is no voOe left us, there
being no object of knowledge. We cannot, however, start with duality,
for duality presupposes unity. The vouc is, consequently, not the
primary element. For this element we must look higher than the VOVQ.
We must not then begin with reason or with the voue, but with the
One or the Good, which, as such, is above the Reason. This is the
first or ultimate principle of all things.
6. The primal One (primal Good) is absolute unity, simplicity, and
infinity. In itself it is absolutely devoid of definite form. No attribute,
in the proper sense of the term, can be predicated of it. It is above all
attributes and all designations : there is no expression for it in language.
It is only by denying all forms and attributes in regard to it that we can
bring it in any degree within reach of our intelligence. It is not that
which is (ro 61;), not ovaia, not life, not beauty, not VOVQ ; it is above
being, existence, life, beauty, reason, &c. Even the predicates of unity
and goodness are not applicable to this first principle in their strict
sense. It transcends even these, it is the One and the Good in a tran
scendent sense.
7. From this primal One, as from an ultimate first principle, is
evolved the multiple. This evolution is not to be understood in the
sense that the primal One loses its transcendent unity while the many
are evolved, and becomes a 2v KOL irav. Plotinus energetically rejects
such a notion. The One does not become All, it ever remains above all
176 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
(irpo TravTutv). The One may be said to be All, in the sense that all
things proceed from it, but it 'is not one out of the number of all things ;
because all things exist subsequently to it, and after their existence it
continues to transcend all. Still less can the multiple be formed from
the One by a process of division, for in this the unity of the One would
be wholly destroyed.
8. The evolution of the multiple from the One must be regarded as a
process of emanation, of such a nature that the One, while permitting
the multiple to emanate from it, loses nothing of what is its own in the
process. The possibility of this emanation is given "in the transcendent
virtue of the One, which as a being of supreme excellence admits the
evolution of a lower excellence from the fulness of its perfection, without
Containing this lower excellence formally within itself." That this ema
nation is actually effected is due to the fact that this first principle is not
only the primal One — it is also the primal Good. Now, it is the nature
of the good to diffuse itself. The good would not be the good if it did not
bestow itself on something other than itself. The primal One, as being
the primal Good, must, therefore, bring forth something other than
itself ; that is, cause something else to emanate from itself. This act is
neither a free act nor a necessary act ; such terms have no application to
the primal One. The something else thus produced is not unity — it
must be plurality — for it is not the first principle, it is a consequence of
the existence of the first principle.
9. The immediate emanation from the primal One is the VOVQ — the
image (HKWV) of the One. It is diffused around the One, like an ocean
of light. In itself it is essential being (ovaia), but this essence produced
by the One, turns itself to the One from which it derives its origin, and
in the act attains knowledge, that is to say, becomes the VOVG- This
roue, therefore, as such, has knowledge of itself. In this vovg we find
a duality already established. For, although in its self-knowledge the
subject knowing and object known are one in fact, they are yet distin
guished in thought. A principle of differentiation (IrEjoorrje) is thus
inherent in the vovc? for in it there is at least an ideal distinction between
the knowing subject and the thing known. If then the primal One be
the first or Supreme God, the vovq is a second divinity — the Son of
the Supreme God.
10. If we inquire, in what relation this voue stands to the world of
Ideas, Plotinus, in distinct opposition to Longinus, tells us that Ideas do
not lie without the voue, but rather are implanted in it. When Plato
in the Tiniaeus asserts that Ideas are objects of contemplation to the vovs,
it might be supposed that Plato held Ideas to exist without the vowc ;
but, remarks Plotinus, " If this were the case then the vovg would have
within it merely a perception of that which really is, not the reality
itself, and thus would not possess the truth which, as such, would be
beyond its reach. This, however, cannot be admitted. The Divine
vovz cannot err. But if it possessed within it, not the genuine being
(a\r]9iv6v)i but only images (tt'SwXa) of this being, it would err, for it
would deem itself to possess the truth, and yet would not possess it.'
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 177
Ideas, then — the vorjrov in this strict sense — must be indwelling
(immanent) in the vov$ ; this, it cannot be doubted, is the genuine
teaching of Plato.
11. Accordingly, the vovg as ov<ria, is to be regarded as the union
of all i/orjra — of all intelligible essences, that is, of all Ideas. This vof^-
turns its thought upon itself, and in this act of thought the unity is
differentiated and a plurality of Ideas arises. Thus, then, the oixr/'a,
taken in its original unity and as known immediately in itself, is the
Indeterminate— intelligible matter — but by thought the indeterminate
becomes determinate, that is to say, reduced to a plurality or difference
of Ideas. These Ideas are, therefore, in respect of the intelligible
matter which underlies them, so many intelligible forms. The intelli
gible matter is thus seen to be that element which Plato styles " the one
and the same," for it is contained in every particular idea ; whereas the
intelligible forms, by means of which the one ovaia is differentiated and
a plurality of ideas created, is that element which Plato names " the
other." But this development of the one into the many does not pro
ceed beyond the sphere of Universals, for the universal alone is really
existent, and this, therefore, can alone find place in the vovg.
12. But although plurality, as has been explained, is given in the
roue, there is not any dissociation of the things so differentiated. For
as the voi>£ is not itself separated into parts, so the elements which
differ from one another within it are inseparable. The vovq is the one
Universal Reason, and, as such, is an indivisible entelechy. The separa
tion of the differentiated elements can be accomplished only in the world
of phenomena, and in this sphere such separation must be accomplished,
for matter can exhibit and manifest ideas only in a state of separation
from one another. In this severance, the ideas manifest themselves not
only as archetypal causes, but also as efficient and formative forces. For
as the vove is itself an active vital principle, so also must the ideas it
contains be vital principles which exhibit their activity as soon as they
appear in matter.
13. Nevertheless, ideas cannot become immediately active in matter
as operative and formative principles ; an intermediate element must be
interposed. This element is the soul. The soul is, therefore, the third
principle, following the primal One and the vovc,-.* It is an emanation
from the vovg, as the latter is an emanation from the One ; and as the
vovg is an image of the One, so is the soul an image of the VOVQ. The
soul, therefore, is not a body, nor the inseparable entelechy of a body ;
it is an immaterial substance, distinct from everything corporeal. The
product of the voue, in one aspect of its being it communicates with the
voue, in another aspect it communicates with that product which em
anates from itself — with matter. In this wise it possesses an ideal indivi
sible element within it, as well as a divisible element which enters into
matter, for it may be said to pervade the material world. In this sense,
* These three principles, the One, the vov,-t and the Soul, constitute the threefold
divinity of the Neo-Platonists.
13
178 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Plato might with truth assert that the soul is made up of an indivisible
and a divisible element.
14. There is a real plurality of souls. But all stand in close relation
to the supreme soul — the universal soul, or the world-soul. The relation
of the latter to the former is not that of a whole to its parts. The
world- soul is a sort of universal entity which includes in itself the
several individual souls, undistinguished from one another, and which
brings these souls forth from itself by emanation, in the same way as the
One produces the vovg, and the vovg produces the world-soul itself.
The world- soul is no more separated from the vov^ than the vowe
ls separated from the One. It exists in the vovg as the latter exists in
the One. But it at the same time exists in the world, for it is the soul
of the world. The One and the soul form the extreme limits of the
divine or super- sensible world ; beneath this we have the sensible or
material world.
15. Below the state of existence represented by the soul the process
of emanation issues in the corporeal order. The substratum of all cor
poreal things is matter. Matter must therefore stand last in the series
of emanations. In the process of emanation, says Plotinus, there must
be a last member as well as a first. This last which produces nothing
below itself, but in which the productive force is wholly exhausted —
this ultimate member of the series — is matter. Matter is, in a certain
sense, the dregs or precipitate of the process of emanation ; it represents
the ultimate enervation of the Ideal, in which, so to speak, the Ideal
becomes extinct and issues in its contrary. It is no more than the
shadow which the light of the higher emanations flings back to its utter
most boundary.
16. Accordingly, Plotinus describes matter as absolutely indetermi
nate and unlimited, as wanting in form, quality, and quantity. It is
being without essential character, non-being (TO ^17 o v) in contradistinc
tion to that which really is (the Idea) ; avajKrj (necessity) in contra
distinction to the Xoyoc (rational energy) ; privation in contradistinction
to reality ; darkness as opposed to the light of the Aoyoe. Matter is
- not corporeal substance, but the unseen substratum, the shadowy f3aOot;
(deep-lying element) of the corporeal. Thus, matter at every point
stands in distir.ct contrast to the ideal.
17. The ideal is not only the really existent, it is furthermore
that which alone is good. Into this sphere, too, its contrast with
matter is carried. Matter is evil and the source of evil. It is, no
doubt, receptive of the Form communicated to it, and, to this extent,
it may be called good, but in itself it is absolutely evil (KUKOV). Hence,
all evil, in the last resort, comes from matter. Matter is evil itself, and
defiles everything with which it comes in contact.
18. Between matter, which thus forms the utmost limit of the pro
cess of emanation, and the cosmic soul, there is interposed, as a sort of
fliird principle, the sensible world. Its constituent principles are matter
and the cosmic soul 5Tso far as by the latter, ideas, which, are the deter
minative principles, are infused into matter. The world-soul has, so
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 179
to speak, one aspect of its being turned towards the vof>e, from, which it.
receives ideas (Xoyouc) ; while, in another direction, it is in contact with
matter, and, in this direction, becomes the universal world-soul, the
universal principle of life and nature. Plotinus also styles this soul of
Nature the layarov ^v\riQ. It is in thiswise that the forming of matter
into the sensible world becomes possible.
If). The soul being identified with the vovg receives ideas from the
latter, and by its formative activity as cosmical soul gives them existence
in matter. By this formative action of the world- soul the ideas become
forms (a'Srj) realised in matter, and manifest themselves in the entelechiea
of individual objects. These individual objects are the things perceptible
to sense, of which the sensible world is made up. This explains the
origin of the sensible as contradistinguished from the intelligible world.
20. The world of sense is thus a universal likeness of the super
sensible world or VOVQ. But this likeness, it must be allowed, is very
imperfect. For, apart from the circumstance that the vov$ is not repre
sented as that unit of being which it is, but by the plurality of ideas
which it contains and which manifest themselves in the world of pheno
mena, representing only the \oyoi cfir^p^ariKoi of the voDe, it is further
to be noted that matter is, in itself, but little adapted to represent the
ideal, partly because, at every point, it is opposed to the ideal, and
partly because it is in a state of constant flux.
21. This being so, the further question arises : What of the reality
of the world of sense ? The answer to this question reveals to us the
essential character of the Neo-Platonic Philosophy. It is clear that, at
this point, matter can no longer be regarded as a real substratum of the
objects of sense — the conception under which it was represented in the
Platonic system proper. For here matter is no longer something apart
from, though co-existent with, the ideal ; it is itself made part of the
process of emanation, described as its last product — a notion which leads
to the conclusion that its attributes are all of the negative kind. But
if matter is not the real substratum of the sensible world, then the sen
sible world itself ceases to be intelligible as a reality. The reality of the
phenomenal world disappears, and objects of sense are reduced to mere
appearances.
22. How just these deductions are, appears from the manner in
which Plotinus explains the nature of corporeal substance. On this
point, he asserts that, taken in the entirety of their being, bodies consist
of qualities which are of the intelligible not of the sensible order. The
accidents which are peculiar to bodies, as such, for example, quantity,
density, shape, &c., &c., are, in themselves, purely concepts of the in
telligence. Now, if we take away from a body all these accidents, there
is nothing left which we can call a body ; the whole body, as such, dis
appears. It follows, therefore, that what we call a body is nothing more
than the result of the combination of certain accidents, which, in them
selves, are purely of the intelligible order. From the combination
of these accidents arises the appearance of corporeal nature, which, how
ever, disappears as soon as thought comes to bear upon it, and the pro-
180 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
cess of abstraction dissolves the combination in which those accidents
are held together. We may say, then, that corporeal things are no
more than appearances ; that there is, in fact, nothing corporeal ; what
is, is ideal only.
23. In tins theory, we find it clearly intimated that the ideal, as far
as it appears in the world of sense under corporeal appearances, is in a
state at variance with its true nature. The ideal is here found in a
condition of degradation from its higher nature — in a condition of
alienation from its transcendental origin. The existence of the world of
sense supposes, therefore, a degradation or fall of the ideas from the
world of intelligence. This downfall of ideas to the material order is,
at the same time, their fall from the unity and perfection which belonged
to them in the vove. This downfall can alone explain the fact that the
sensible world, though it mirrors in itself the ideal, is, nevertheless, in
itself, unreality and nothingness, and cannot bear comparison with ita
prototype.
24. Hitherto we have been considering merely the general principles
of Neo-Platomsrn. Let us now glance at its system of psychology.
Plotinus adduces many arguments to establish the incorporeal and 'im
material nature of the soul — following Plato for the most part and
reproducing his reasonings. The soul, he says, is the principle of life ;
it cannot, therefore, be an outcome of the action of the body, it must
come before the body, and, therefore, it must be something incorporeal.
Furthermore, the soul has cognizance of the intelligible and immaterial,
but this it could not have if it were not itself of the intelligible and
immaterial order. The soul perceives an impression made upon the
body at the point where the impression is made. It must, therefore, be
present in all parts of the body at once, but this, again it could not be
if it were not immaterial, &c.
25. The individuality of the soul depends upon its union with the
body. This is the principle of individuation. The soul permeates the
body as fire permeates the air. It is whole in the entire body, and
whole in every part. It is the soul which binds the body together and
holds its parts united ; it would, therefore, be more appropriate to speak
of the body as being in the soul than to speak of the soul as being in
the body. The soul is united to the body in one respect only ; in
another respect it is free. It is free so far as it is active in thought,
for this function not only has no need of a sensible organ, it wholly
excludes it. The soul is in union with the body in so far as it is the
principle of vitality and sensation ; for in these functions the organs of
is required for their several functions.
26. The soul is not, of its nature, destined to union with the body.
This union is merely the consequence of its downfall from the super
sensible world. The soul, in its original state, was above the corporeal
state, but inclining downwards towards matter it forgot its higher
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 181
dignity, and fell, in consequence, to the state of union with the body.
The body is, therefore, an outward adjunct of the soul — a mere acci
dental accretion— it is no more than the instrument of the soul. But the
soul has not lost its freedom of action in its fall, and hence its return to
the Absolute is possible.
27. The universal world-soul is intimately united to the vou?, from
which it derives its origin, and through this union is endowed with
reason ; this being so, the divine vouc must be immanent in human souls
which ^have their being in the universal soul, and to this indwelling of
the i/ovc, they, too, owe their possession of reason. The vouc is thus the
centre of the soul— the basis of its personality. But the VOVQ in its
turn is derived from the One, and maintains its existence in the One as
the source of its being; through the voi>£, therefore, the soul is brought
into contact with the ultimate first principle — the One — and is inti
mately united to it in vital union.
28. These principles determine the theory of cognition held by
Plotinus. Plotinus, like Plato, makes no account of sensuous cognition
as a means of attaining truth. Sense perception is no more than a
dream of the soul. To attain the cognition of intelligible truth, the
-soul must retire from the avenues of sense and fall back upon its own
centre— the voyg. Here it already possesses truth a priori, and it needs
only to call this truth into consciousness and to develop it there. This,
as has been said, it can do only when it withdraws from sense and con
centrates itselHn the voig, as in the central point of its being.
29. Cognition, in this theory, is not an appropriation of objective
truth by the mind, it is the drawing out of truth by the mind from
within itself. The whole process of cognition is accomplished by a
certain self -contemplation of the vouc within the soul, and involves a
consciousness of the identity of subject knowing and object known.
But as the soul rises to the sphere of intellectual knowledge, it enters
upon a path which leads to a still higher order of knowledge, namely the
contemplation of the One. For the vovc— the universal reason— being
in union with the source of its being— the primal One— and contemplat
ing the One, is enabled to rise from its act of self -contemplation in man
to the contemplation of the One. And this explains how it is that man,
through the vovz that dwells within him, can attain to the contempla
tion of the Supreme Being.
m 30 This perfection, however, is not attainable unless the One sheds
into the soul of man a special light, and thereby opens his eyes to higher
contemplation. This light man cannot secure by any dialectical efforts ;
it must come to him suddenly. But when it shines within him, then
apprehension, self-consciousness and thought disappear : in a word, all
the lower degrees of knowledge are absorbed into this contemplation of
the One, aud man is raised to the state of ecstasy. It is only in this
ecstatic condition that contemplation of the primal One is possible ; this
ecstatic contemplation is thus the highest stage of human cognition.
dl. Tne basis is here laid for the teleological doctrine regarding
man. Everything comes from the primal One, or primal Good, and
182 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
everything must return to it again. Hence, we observe that all things —
and "men more especially — necessarily strive after good. The highest
good is the primal Good or first principle ; the highest good of man is,
therefore, attained in the knowledge of the primal Good. Now, this
knowledge is attainable only in the state of ecstasy. Hence, the ecstatic
contemplation of the primal Good is not only the highest degree of
man's knowledge, it is also the highest form of his happiness. Plotinus
is at a loss for words in which to depict the bliss which is secured by
this ecstatic contemplation.
32. Ecstatic contemplation, as we have seen, can be reached only by
I withdrawing the soul from the things of sense. This principle leads us
at once to the ethical duty of man. Mystical asceticism must be prac
tised if man is to attain to the height of his destiny. By this asceticism
the soul must combat the bodily nature with its sensual impulses and
tendencies, and so deliver itself from the body and sensuality. The
body hangs round the soul like a heavy burden, which weighs it down ;
iiv fact the soul has found its way into the body only in consequence of
a fault committed— an all-sufficient reason why it should crush more
and more completely the energies and tendencies of sense, in order to
rise again into the pure atmosphere of the intelligible world. The man
who gives himself effectually to this asceticism, and, as far as may be,
delivers his soul from the body, not only attains to mystical contempla
tion, he furthermore enters into a higher relation with the gods and
with the super- sensible forces that are at work in nature, and is enabled
by this communication to perform miracles and to read the future. He
becomes a thaumaturgus and a prophet.
33. From the same principles Plotinus deduces his theory of ^ moral
evil. As has been observed, evil, generally speaking, has its origin in
matter ; it is, therefore, in tlfe strict sense, a cosmical force. Now,
man's body is composed of matter ; in man, therefore, the source of evil
is the body. It thus appears that moral evil consists in this : lhat the
soul follows the impulses and tendencies of the body, surrenders itself
to their control ; whereas moral goodness, on the other hand, is founded
on the deliverance of the soul, by ascetical practices, from the dominion
of the body.
34. Connected with these notions of moral good and moral evil, we
find another, which, however, is in the last analysis, identical with the
former. The soul we have been told, is individualized by its union with
the body, and this union with the body not being the connatural state of
the soul, the same may also be said of its individuality. We may,
therefore, describe the essence of moral evil as the assertion of its indi
viduality by the soul. The soul becomes wicked by its effort to assert
f its own individuality and its own will, in contradistinction to the uni
versal existence within which it has its being. It becomes good when
it raises itself above this individuality and merges itself in the universal.
35. In these theories we notice an unmistakable effort after a
genuine morality, and to this extent Neo-Platonism may be regarded as
a protest against the moral depravity of the paganism of the age. But
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 183
the asceticism which Neo-PJatonism sought to promote rested upon an
entirely false principle and was, in consequence, powerless to effect any
great moral reformation. This principle was that the body is the source
of all evil. Based upon this notion, Neo-Platonic asceticism could not
fail to assume a stern and hostile attitude towards the body and the
outer world, and the earnestness of character which it was calculated to
develop tended to become exaggerated beyond what a right conception
of the natural order would warrant, The Neo-Platonic asceticism
being directed against corporeal nature as evil and antagonistic in itself,
was liable to degenerate into a wholly unnatural system, and so to lose
all power for the regeneration of paganism. And further, it was the
distinct scope of this Neo-Platonic asceticism to attain union in contem
plation with the primal One, and by this means to become capable of
working wonders. So far as this end was assumed to be attained, the
system could lead only to arrogance and folly — a result largely produced
among the Neo-Platonists. But arrogance and folly are opposed to
morality.
36. Plotinus gives various definitions of virtue. Looking to the end
attained by it, he defines it as " likeness to God" ; considering the
character of virtuous conduct in itself, he holds it to be " action in ac
cordance with the nature of things " (tvtpytiv Kara TIJV ovatav), or
"obedience to reason." He distinguishes between social, purifying and
deifying virtues. The first class are concerned with external social
relations, and in this class are included the four cardinal virtues : prudence,
fortitude, justice, and temperance, v The purifying virtues (KaQapaug)
are concerned with the freeing of the soul from sin (a/napria), by divorc
ing it from the things of sense ; the deifying virtues are those by which
men return again to the Absolute, and, in a certain sense, become one
with God.
37. There are three classes of men. One class are held captive by
sense, they esteem pleasure good and pain evil, they strive to attain the
one and avoid the other, and herein is their wisdom expended. Another
class — capable indeed of a certain elevation, but unable to see what
belongs to higher spheres — give themselves to the practice of social
virtues, devote themselves to practical pursuits, and strive to make a
right choice among these lower objects. But there is a tjiird class of
men of diviner sort, endowed with higher energy and keener vision, who
turn to the light that shines from on high, and rising towards the source
of that light, are lifted above the regions of gloom, men who despise
the things of earth and make their dwelling-place in that region where
they may participate in true joy. They cannot, indeed, remain always
in this state. ^Not having freed themselves wholly from the earth, they^
easily turn to it again. And thus it happens that it is but seldom even
the wisest, best, and most virtuous men, enjoy the contemplation of the
supreme God. (Plotinus himself, during the six years in which
Porphyry, his disciple, was his associate, succeeded in reaching this
height of contemplation on four occasions only.)
184 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
38. Plotinus uses the same arguments as Plato in proof of the immor
tality of the soul. The Platonic notion, that souls which quit the body,
imperfectly purified, take with them a kind of corporeal vesture, in
which they afterwards appear, is found among the doctrines of Plotinus.
So, too, the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, the theory of suc
cessive generations, and the doctrine of demons. The demons are to
he reverenced as well as the gods. With their aid, too, wonders may be
worked. The same may also be effected by magic.
39. The most remarkable of the disciples of Plotinus were Amelius and Porphyry.
Little is known regarding Amelius, but Porphyry holds an important place among the
Neo-Platonists. He lived from A.D. 233 to 304, and from the year 263 onwards was a pupil
of Plotinus in Rome. He professes to explain and defend the teaching of Plotinus, not
to develop it. This teaching he holds to coincide with that of Plato, and to be the same
in substance with that of Aristotle also. He composed a great many works. Of these
the euraywyj) elg rag (' ApioTortXow?) icarijyopiaf, is usually prefixed to editions of
Aristotle's Organon. His sketch of the system of Plotinus is set forth in a series of
Latin aphorisms. We have already mentioned his arrangement of the treatises of
Plotinus in six Enneads. In all these undertakings, his extensive learning and his subtle
intelligence, which enabled him to enter into views the most divergent, as well as his
readiness and grace of exposition, stood him in good stead.
40. The doctrine of Porphyry is distinguished from that of Plotinus by possessing a
practical rather than a religious character. Porphyry defended necromancy, theurgy, and
the worship of demons, but he advised caution in the use of them. He maintains that
the world has not had a beginning, and he appears to have taught the emanation of matter
and of the world-soul more distinctly than Plotinus himself. He combated the doctrines
of the Christians, in particular the Divinity of Christ, in fifteen books Kara
many refutations of which were written by the Fathers of the Church.*
SYRIAN SCHOOL OF NEO-PLATONISM.
IAMBLICHUS AND HIS DISCIPLES.
§ 53.
1. lamblichus of Chalcis, in Coele-Syria, was a pupil of Porphyry
and died in the reign of Constantine (A.I). 330.) By his disciples he \vas
credited with the power of working miracles, and was by them named
" the divine " 6 Otios. They narrate that in prayer he was raised into
the air ten ells high ; that his garments shone with golden light, and
his face assumed an expression of celestial beauty. He was the author
of several works, the most remarkable of which, in point of philosophical
* Porphyry held Christ in contempt because He was born of a woman, and in the end crucified. Like
the other pagans, he laid the blame of all public calamities upon the Christians. They were ruled, he
said, by an assembly of aged matrons, and the priestly dignity among them was conferred by the favour of
women. lie was particularly offended by the doctrine of the resurrection of the body — a doctrine wholly
incompatible with the Neo-Platonist view that the body is essentially evil and impure. lie attacks the
sacred writings of the Christians, and decries and discredits the exegesis then in^vogue.
We may her^mention another controversial work against Christianity — the Aoyoi <f>i\a\T)9uc irpbg rin't;
Xpioriavowf published A.D. 303, by Hierocles, governor of Bithynia, one of the most cruel of the persecutors
under Diocletian. The polemical portion of this work, so far as we can gather from Eusebius' "Book"
against Philostrates, is a tissue of falsehoods and calumnies directed against Christianity. Even these are
not original, bv* <or the most part copied word for word from Celsus. Every effort is made to exalt Apollonius.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 185
interest, are tlie treatises, Hepl TOV irvOayopiKov /3tou, \oyot Trpor/jHrnk-og
tit; 0f Ao<ro0tai>, and the GaoAoyoujueva rr\^ apiOfj.riTiKii)£.
2. In the system of lamblichus, philosophy, as a science, loses its
place, and becomes a mere device for the support of polytheism. He
devotes his chief inquiries to the details of an elaborate demonology,
in which all the gods of Greece and the East (the Christian God ex-
cepted), as well as the gods of Plotinus and many others, find a place.
He also treats of theurgy, by which he understands the procuring of
mysterious effects which God is pleased to accomplish, as also the power
of bringing down the gods into communication with men by means of
certain ineffable symbols, known only to God. In this connection we find
certain Pythagorean mystic numbers play an important part. Plotinus
taught that the soul could lift itself to that eminence of wisdom and
virtue where it might be united with God. lamblichus taught that this
union might be accomplished by a contrary method — that man, by
means of mystical practices, ceremonies, and words (o-i»^j3oAa, frwOfmara)
could draw down the gods to himself (SpaortKj? ivwais). In the mind
of lamblichus, theurgy is the complement of philosophy.
3. Above the One (tv) of Plotinus, lamblichus sets another — the
Absolutely First — in which there are no contrary elements of any kind,
which is not the Good, but something which, being absolutely without
distinctive characteristics, is higher than the Good. Under 'this One
comes the One of Plotinus. The latter produces the intelligible world
(icooyioc vorjroe) and this in turn produces the intellectual world (icooyioc
vofjooc). The former includes the objects of thought (Ideas), the latter
all thinking essences. The elements of the former are Trtpae, iiirttpov
and /ULKTOV, the elements of the latter are voue, $vva/ui£ and Sitfjiiovpyog.
Next in succession comes the psychical world, which is again divided
into three orders — the world-soul, and, produced from it, two other souls.
To this world belong the gods of the popular polytheism, angels, demons,
and heroes, a whole host of whom lamblichus makes us acquainted
with, and whom he arranges according to certain numerical combina
tions derived from Pythagorean sources. Last, in the order of existence,
stands the sensible world.
4. It is worth noting that lamblichus endeavoured to introduce a
formal worship of Pythagoras, the religious reverence for Apollonius
being already antiquated. His work, Uepl TOV UvOayopiKov fiiov, is
written after the manner of the " Apollonius " of Philostrates, only that
Pythagoras is put in the place of Apollonius. lamblichus endeavours
to show that the contemporaries of Pythagoras, with whom he came in
contact, esteemed him a god who had come from heaven to teach men
wisdom. He narrates a number of prodigies regarding him, and exalts
his piety, which was set as an example to all men. That in this teach
ing lamblichus had in view the doctrine of the Incarnation of God,
which is the basis of Christianity, appears evident. Paganism also
wanted its heaven-sent Messiah, and since Apollonius would not serve
the purpose any longer, Pythagoras was substituted.
5. lamblichus is probably the author of the work DC Mt/sfcrfis
186 HISTORY OF A1XCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
tiorum. The mention of this work gives us occasion to call attention to
another characteristic of Neo-Platonism, especially of the Syrian School
of that Philosophy. Since the time of Porphyry, Neo-Platonism had
progressively assumed an attitude of greater hostility to Christianity.
It had set up in Pythagoras a Messiah in opposition to the Messiah of
the Christians, and it then endeavoured to secure divine authority for
his teaching. The Christians had their Scriptures which they attri
buted to Divine revelation and Divine inspiration, the reformed Paganism
of the Neo-Platonist school would have its Scriptures also, to be on
a level with Christianity. These Scriptures were actually produced.
Such were the " Chaldaic Oracles," the "Orphic Poems" and the
" Works of Hermes" to which appeal was made and which, it was
contended, were inspired by the gods.
6. The Chaldaic Oracles seem to have been a selection from the maxims of the different
Chaldaic seers and astrologists, who were very numerous at this time. The Neo-
Platonists of the fifth century made great account of this fund of Chaldaic wisdom. The
Orphic Songs, which had already been known at an earlier period of Grecian history in
connection with the Orphic religion (see above p. 29.) were also included in the category of
sacred writings. The Writings of Hermes (Mysteria ^Egyptiorurn) received their name
from Hermes — the Egyptian god, Thot or Taut — and were supposed to contain the secret
lore of the Egyptians. They were ascribed to Hermes in the sense that the doctrines
they contained purported to rest on the authority of the Egyptian priests, who had
received them from the god, Thot. There exists a considerable number of these writings,
and the number was still greater in earlier times. They treated of questions of medicine,
and chemistry, as well as of religious and philosophical subjects. They enjoyed a high
reputation. For Egypt was regarded as a holy land, which the gods had chosen for their
abode, when they descended in visible form to impart divine wisdom to men. It was,
therefore, to be expected that the writings of Hermes would become the sacred book or
Bible of the heathens.
7. The most important of these writings— so far as religious and philosophical questions are
concerned — are the Poemander and the Dialogue, of Asclepius. The latter is an epitome of
the notions current during the rise of Neo-Platonism, a medley of Platonic, Neo-Platonic,
and mythical doctrines, reduced to one system, and set forth, not in the form of philoso
phical investigation, but in authoritative dogmatic fashion. These dogmas are put into
the mouth of Hermes Trismegistos. The Poemander has not any consecutive order in its
parts. It consists of fourteen treatises in which widely different and unconnected ele
ments of doctrine are laid down.
8. Among the immediate disciples of lamblichus was Theodorus of Asine, who
sketched the system of Triads in greater detail than lamblichus, and thus prepared the
way for Proclus. Between the (One) Primal Being and the psychical he interposes a
triad of beings— the intelligible, the intellectual, the demiurgical. We may also name
among the disciples of lamblichus, Sopater of Apamea whom Constantino put to death
on suspicion of his having used magical arts to deprive the Corn-fleet of a favourable wind ;
Dexippus, Aedesius of Cappadocia, successor of lamblichus, and teacher of Chrysanthus
of Sardis, of Maximus of Ephesus, of Priscus of Molossus, and of Eusebius of Myndus
who were the instructors of the Emperor Julian the Apostate,* Sallust, the companion
* Julian the Apostate, is known as the last persecutor of the Christians. This is not the place to dwell
upon his efforts in the cause of persecution. He composed a work " Against the Christians," which is not
now extant, but the leading ideas of which have been preserved to us by Cyril, in his reply Contra Julianum.
Julian holds the view that there is one supreme God, but that under him, there are a number of inferior
divinities, who rule the several parts of the created world. On this principle he explains the diversity of nations.
The differences between nations, he thinks, are accounted for by the differences between the gods who preside
over these nations. As a consequence of this view, he recognises only national gods and national religions.
He has no sympathy with the notion of one universal religion exhibited in Christianity. It is on this ground
that he combats Christianity and justifies polytheism. The God of the Jews is, in Julian's view, a merely
national God, end if the Jews were wrong in recognising only their own God, and denying those of other
nations the same charge is doub'y true of the Christians. Christianity, in Julian's estimate, is not only a
false — it is also a pitiful religion, which cannot sustain comparison with the glory and greatness of the
paganism of the past. The doctrine of the Divinity of Christ he considers a mere invention of Christ's
followers. He exalts the civilisation of the pagans, contrasting it with the ignorance of the Christians, and
taunts them with having produced from their schools no man of enlightened or vigorous character.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 187
of Julian in his youth, and author of a compendium of Neo-Platonic Philosophy ; also
Kustachius, of Cappadocia. These men devoted themselves, for the most part, rather
of the older philosophers were the principal works of the period. In this connection
Themistius, of Paphlagonia, surnamed Kuphrades, rendered considerable service to
philosophy. We may further mention, as connected with the school, Aurelius Macrobus,
author of the Saturnalia, the elder Olympiodorus, and the lady -philosopher, Hyp»ti»
(murdered A.D. 415).
ATHENIAN SCHOOL or NEO-PLATONISM.
PROCLUS.
§ 54.
1. The efforts of the ISTeo-Platonists to reform the religion of
Paganism and to hold in check the growth of Christianity, had not the
effect which was expected. The pagan religion had had its day, it could not
be upheld, it fell before the Divine power of the Christian faith which was
everywhere extending its sway. Its hour was come. Even the Neo-
Platonists were at last forced to recognise this. Having failed ^ to
effect their aims against Christianity by material methods, and having
failed to revive the old worship and the old beliefs, the representatives
of Neo-Platonism addressed themselves with renewed zeal to scientific
expedients, among which the study and exposition of the writings of
Plato and Aristotle were of chief importance. This pilan was followed
in a marked way by the Athenian School. To this school belong
Plutarch, son of Nestorius (died A.D. 433) ; his pupil, Syrianus, who ex
pounded the writings of Plato and Aristotle ; Hierocles of Alexandria,
who devoted himself to the exposition of the Pythagorean writings ; his
pupil, Syrianus, of Alexandria ; and, most remarkable of all, Proclus
(A.D. 411-485), the pupil of Olympiodorus (the elder), of Plutarch, and
of Syrianus. He was the most renowned of the later Neo-Platonists
—the " scholastic of the Greek philosophers." He collected and ar
ranged and gave dialectical form to the philosophy which had come
down from the past, adding to it from his own resources, and reducing
the whole to a kind of system which presented the appearance of
strictly scientific method. *He taught at Athens. Among his writings
are found '.—Prodi in Plat. Tim&um Comment., Bas. 1534 ; In theologian*
Platonis libri &ex una cum Marini vita Prodi et Prodi inxfit. t/iColoy.,H'dmb.
1618 ; Excerpta ex Prodi Scholiis in Plat. CratyL, Lips. 1820 ; Li Plat.
Alcib. cd. Crcuzcr, Francof. 1820-1825 ; In Plat. Parmenidem. cd. Stall-
baum, Lips. 1839. Opp. omnia. Ed. Cousin, Paris 1820-25.
2. According to Proclus, the One is the absolute first principle.
From this everything comes forth, and to this everything is striving to
18& HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
return. The thing produced is at once like the producing cause and
unlike it. In virtue of its likeness it remains in its cause, in virtue
of its unlikeness it is separated from it. By establishing in itself a resem
blance with its first principle, the separated product returns to that prin
ciple again, and the return has the same number of stages as the preceding
evolution. The One is also the Ineffable ; it is above all affirmation and
negation. Even the notion of Oneness describes it inadequately, for it
is higher than this notion also. But everything coming forth from this
one principle is differentiated in a series of successive triads. The of tener
this process is repeated the more differentiated and imperfect is the result
— that is to say, the farther things recede from the first principle, the
more complicated in their structure and restricted in their sphere of
action do they become.
3. The first emanation from the Primal One are the Henades (eva&e)-
The absolutely first being has no relation with the world, but the Henades
—their number is not definitely fixed by Proclus — exercise an influence
upon the world ; they are the gods in the highest sense of the term ; to
them belong the functions of Providence. They are elevated above
being, life, reason, and knowledge, but among themselves they have a
certain order of rank, some being nearer the primal entity, some further
removed.
4. Next in order after the Henades comes the Trias of intelligible,
intelligible-intellectual, and intellectual being (TO VOYJTOV, TO vorjrdv a^a
KOL votpov, TO votpov). The vorjrov is represented by the notion
Being (ouo-ta), the vorjrov a/u,a KOI votjoov, by the notion Life (£w//), the
votpov by the notion Thought (vovc;). The first and second of
these orders of being are again divided in triadic fashion ; the division
of the third order, which responds to the vouc is sevenfold. Proclus
divides each member of this sevenfold division into seven members,
and thus obtains seven intellectual Hebdomades (sevenfold orders), to
the several members of which he refers a number of the divinities
of the popular creed, and many of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic
fictions.
5. From the Intellectual order emanates the Psychical. Every soul
is, in its essence, eternal, but in its action existing in time. The world-
soul is composed of divisible, indivisible, and intermediate substances,
combined in harmonious proportions. There are divine and demoniacal
as well as human souls. Situated midway between the sensible order and
the divine order, the soul is endowed with liberty. It is responsible
for its own evils. It is capable of turning again to the divine, but its
contemplation can reach no higher than the vovg. Every man has his
special demon, and it is only through this demon that he can hold
communication with the gods. Man must surrender himself blindly to
the demon, in order to attain his highest end. (Cfr. Ueberweg.)
6. Among the disciples of Proclus the following deserve special mention : — Marinus,
the successor of Proclus in the presidency of the school at Athens ; the physician,
Asclepiodotus of Alexandria ; Ainmonius the son of Hermeas ; Zenodotus ; Isidorus,
the successor of Marinus in the headship of the school ; Hegias, another successor of
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.
189
Mfuinaf ; and Damascius, who presided over the school in Athens about A.D. 520. With
him the school came to an end. It was closed by the Emperor Justinian in the year
A.D. 529. This emperor forbade the teaching of the Neo-Platonic philosophy at Athens,
and appointed Christian teachers to take the place of the Platonists. The Neo-Platonista
betook themselves to Persia, where they hoped to find a patron for their philosophy in
tlu- king, Chosroes. But experience dispelled this hope, and after the peace between
IVrsia and the Empire, A.D. 533. they returned home. But they were not permitted to
reopen their schools. Neo-Platonism thus came to an end. But the commentaries on
the writings of Aristotle and Plato, which at this and later periods were composed by
the Neo- Platonists, enabled some of them, and notably Simplicius of Cilicia (A.D. 520) and
the younger Olympiodorus, to take- an important part in the work of transmitting to
later generations the philosophy of dreeec.
PART SECOND.
HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
GENERAL VIEW. — DIVISION.
§ 55.
1. The Divine Revelation accomplished in Christ, together with the
Redemption achieved through Him, forms the turning point of all history.
It is the end of the pre-Christian order of things and the beginning of the
new. The pre-Christian period prepared the way for the redemption to
come. In the moment when the Son of God became man its purpose
was accomplished and its duration at an end. A neAv era began. The
fulness of grace which flowed from the sacrifice of redemption infused a
new life into humanity, and this newness of life affected not merely the
practical side of human existence, it had its influence also on the domain
of knowledge.
2. In pre-Christian times, virtue was recognised by the philosophers
as a thing of worth, but it did not enter into the life of the people. In
the new order of things, virtue found its place in practical life to an
extent unknown before. The ideal of supernatural perfection, through
the grace of the Holy Spirit, which the Saviour had bidden His followers
to strive after, was realised in the actual lives of men, and brought forth a
heroism of virtue such as the world had not yet witnessed. Through
the revelation made by the Son of God a fulness of truth was brought
within reach of the human mind of which men had previously no notion.
And if it be true, as the ancients had it, that truth is the food of the
mind, on which it lives and thrives, the revelation through the Redeemer
formed an inexhaustible store from which the human mind might ever
more draw new increase of the knowledge which is its life.
3. At the same time the way was prepared for speculation of an
entirely new order. The older philosophy had striven to break through
the barriers of error which shut out the gaze of the mind from the sun
of truth, and had expended much energy in the effort. Its endeavours
were not wholly without result, but it had failed to reach the fulness
of truth. By this fact it furnished proof that after the fall of man the
human mind, left to its own resources, without any revelation, was
incapable of attaining to truth in its fulness. But in the Logos made
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 191
man the fulness of truth was manifested in the body : what the ancients
had longingly sought for was now granted to men through the mercy
of God. The human mind was now fully irradiated by the light of
truth ; it had no need to strive against the obstacles that shut out the
light, and in this way the standpoint and the purpose of its speculations
were made other than they had been.
4. The human mind could adopt either of two attitudes towards
revelation. It might accept revelation as truth communicated by God,
and make this truth the criterion and guiding principle of its specula
tions. If it did this, revelation became an end to which natural know
ledge was to be subservient. Natural knowledge became the means to
penetrate the n^steries of Christianity, and to acquire a speculative
knowledge of them, so far, at least, as supernatural truths are accessible
to speculation. Speculative philosophy could only culminate in a specu
lative theology, which, without denying the incomprehensible nature of
the Christian mysteries, would strive after a deeper knowledge of their
meaning.
5. Again, the human mind, in virtue of its natural freedom of
election, might abandon the objective standpoint and fall back upon its
own subjective resources. It might permit its own reason to deal with
revelation in a more unseemly fashion ; it might give reason the first
place and revelation the second, so that instead of reason being subject
to revelation, revelation should be accommodated to the subjective
opinions of the individual ; or, on occasion, entirely denied. This
would, no doubt, be a perversion of right order, but just as man can set
himself against the divinely- established order in the sphere of morals,
so can he set himself in opposition to the divine order in the sphere of
knowledge.
6. These divergent lines have both been followed in the philosophy
of the newer era. Side by side with the representatives of the objective
or Christian view, we find everywhere the representatives of the rational
istic or subjective. The opposition between these opposing forces of
thought proceeds to open conflict, as often as the one endeavours by the
arms of science to overcome the other. In this way is maintained a sort
of intellectual conflict between truth and error, between the Christian
and un- Christian view, which runs through the whole history of the
newer philosophy. This conflict has not been without its advantages to
the cause of truth, for it has put upon the combatants the necessity of
studying more deeply, and thus establishing more securely the truth
which was assailed.
7. These divergent currents of thought, it has been said, run through
the entire philosophy of the later era. But we are not, for this, to assume
that at every period of that time they were both equally powerful. So
far is it otherwise, that the entire time may be divided into two periods,~\
in one of which the objective or Christian view was predominant, while (
in the other the subjective or rationalistic view obtained the mastery. (
The first period lasted till the fifteenth century, the second extends from /
the fifteenth century to our own time. We do not mean that in either
192 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
period one current of thought prevailed to the exclusion of the other :
we mean that in each period one current of thought was distinctly pre
dominant.
8. In this way we obtain two great divisions of the newer philosophy,
each marked by its distinctive characteristic. The first of these periods
we again divide on another basis of division. In the early Christian
centuries, and in the hands of the Fathers of the Church, Christian
philosophy was in the first stage of its creation : the stones out of which
the structure was to be built were being collected and prepared. In the
period following, which we speak of as the Middle Ages, the structure
itself was raised. The great systems of philosophy and speculative
theology, which are characteristic of the Middle Ages, were then elabo
rated, and remain, like our mediaeval cathedrals, monuments to later
times of Christian faith and Christian intellect. In this period the
elements of Christian speculation contained in the writings of the
Fathers were reduced to systematic form and received considerable
development in the process.
9. We may, therefore, most appropriately divide the philosophy of
the Christian era into three main periods :
(a.) The Patristic Philosophy, extending to the period of the invasion
of the barbarians ;
^ (b.) Philosophy of the Middle Ages, extending to the fifteenth
century ;
(c.) Modern Philosophy, from the fifteenth century to our own
times.
We shall treat of the philosophy of the new era in the order of this
threefold division.
FIRST SECTION.
PATRISTIC IJuLtosopiiY.
••"v^"^ • " W*^
GENERAL VIEW AND DIVISION.
§56.
1. The age of the Fathers was the age which gave birth to Christian
philosophy. When we speak of the birth of Christian philosophy we
do not mean to imply that this philosophy was in its origin wholly
i independent of the philosophy which had preceded it. The life of
(humanity is continuous. A complete break with the past is impossible.
|The human mind cannot, even if it \Vould, withdraw itself from the
influence of the past. Christian philosophy, in its origin, was connected
with the older philosophy ; whatever of truth the latter contained was
adopted by the Christian thinkers, made subservient to, and given a
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 193
place in, the body of their teaching ; they rejected only that which
could not stand the light of Christian truth, or bear the scrutiny of the
reason which that truth had enlightened.
2. We notice, however, even in the first beginnings of Christian
philosophy, the appearance of those two divergent lines of thought to
which we have called attention above. Some thinkers in the construc
tion of their systems gave the first place to the older philosophy, made it
their rule of guidance, and interpreted the doctrines of Christianity in
accordance with its requirements. This method gave rise to the heretical
systems which encounter us in the history of the first centuries of
Christianity. An analogous method had already been followed by Philo
the Jew, in his attempt to reconcile the religion of the Jews with Greek
philosophy. What Philo had done in the case of Judaism, the heretics
did in the case of Christianity. A distinctively rationalistic character
was thus the essential feature of the heretical systems of early Christian
times, the feature in which they contrasted most strongly with positive
Christianity.
^ 3. Other thinkers, again — and these represented the true Christian
philosophy— accepted the ancient philosophy as an aid to Christian
speculation, but they made the positive truths of Christianity their
highest and guiding principles, and utilised the ideas and doctrines of
the ancient philosophy in their speculations only so far as these were
found in accord with Christian truth. In this method the positive
faith of the Christian became the criterion of speculative knowledge ;
philosophical opinions were net the standard which determined the
articles of faith, that is to say, fixed their meaning. This was the
position taken up by ail the Fathers oi the Church, and to this method
we owe those brilliant speculations in which their works abound.
4. Holding these principles, the Fathers of the Church, never
theless, acknowledged the worth and the importance of the pre- Christian)
philosophy, and recognised the utility of the study of the philosophy oA
the Greeks. They had, it is true, no 'hesitation in exposing the errors of
Greek philosophy, and the mutual contradiction of its various systems,
and some thinkers— Tertullian, for example -did much to effect this.
But this was not done with the purpose of entirely discrediting the
ancient philosophy, or of denying its claim to the possession of a certain
sum of truth ; the design of the writers was to prove that philosophy, of
itself, is not all-sufficient, that only the Incarnate Son of God' and
His Church are in possession of the fulness of truth.
5. The chief aim of the Fathers and writers of the Church in their
scientific labours was, on the one hand, to defend the Christian doctrines
against attacks and misconceptions, and on the other to develop and
support as far as possible, on speculative grounds, the truths of revela
tion, t was for this purpose only that they made use of the annVnt
philosophy: it was to defend and 'establish by speculative theories the
articles of the Christian faith that they employed it. In its characteristic
features the patristic philosophy is a philosophy of religion. Tin-
heretical systems were not purely philosophical,' thev claimed to be
14
194 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
philosophies of religion : in the same way, the speculations of the Fathers
of the Church have in every case a scope which is religious as well as
philosophical.
6. The central jjoctrine of this religious philosophy was, as might
have been expected, the doctrine of the divine Logos : what He is in
Himself, how He became man, and how He redeemed mankind. The
notion of a divine Logos we have met with frequently in the pre-
Christian philosophy. But philosophy was incompetent to give definite-
ness and completeness to this notion ; for in its completeness this notion
supposes the idea of the Trinity. Philo, who wrote under the influence
of the revealed doctrines of the Old Testament, makes the Logos a kind
of personality ; but in his theory this personality is not something within
the Godhead, it is something extraneous to it.
7. In the great dictum: 'Ev ap%P %v ® Ao-yoc, KOI 6 \oyog fivTrpbg TOV
Otov, KIU 0toe r\v 6 Ao7<>e. Christianity on the one hand confirmed the
truth of the notion, and on the other gave completeness and defmiteness
to the conception. It asserted the personality of the Logos, and at the
same time declared this personality to be intrinsic to the Godhead. This
was a great step in advance. The idea of a personal Logos — the Son of
God identical in nature with the Father — spread light where darkness
had hitherto prevailed ; and the doctrine that the Logos had become
man in order to bring mankind from darkness into light and from
death to salvation, made the Incarnate Logos the centre of human
history and the spring of life to humanity. It is not then to be wondered
at that the whole religious philosophy of the Fathers seems concentrated
upon this central point of doctrine.
8. Thus much may be stated regarding the patristic philosophy in
general. We may, however, distinguish in the creation of Christian
philosophy during the patristic age two well-marked periods. We
have remarked that a twofold purpose is observable in the Fathers and
Christian writers of the first centuries — one to defend the doctrines of
Christianity from assaults and misconceptions, another to develop and
establish the Christian truths by speculative inquiries, conducted under
the guidance and control of the Christian revelation. This twofold
purpose is manifest in all the representatives of patristic philosophy, but
in the earlier centuries, that is, up to the Council of Nicaea, the former
purpose — the defensive — is the more prominent, whilst in the post-
Nicene period the effort to give speculative development to Christian
truth becomes the primary end aimed at. We may thus describe the
ante-Nicene period as the Age of the Apologists, the post-Nicene as the
Age of Positive Speculation.
9. Following the lines here indicated, we will treat the history of
patristic philosophy on which we are about to enter in the following order :
(a.) The heretical systems of the period; after which we will proceed
to the patristic philosophy proper, which we may divide into :
(6.) The ante-Nicene philosophy, which is chiefly apologetic in
character, and
(c.) The post-Nicene philosophy, in which positive speculation is
predominant.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN Ell A. 195
HERETICAL SYSTEMS OF THE FIRST CENTURIES.
1. We do not undertake the task of giving a detailed account of all
the heretical systems which appeared during the patristic age ; we
confine our attention to those which were philosophical in character ;
others, which were exclusively dogmatic, belong to the history of
religious dogmas. Among the heresies of more or less philosophical
character, the first to claim our notice are Gnosticism and Manicheism,
systems which, under the influence of Hellenic, Philonic, and Parsee
notions, established a dualism between God and Matter, and which, carry
ing this antithesis out of the sphere of metaphysics into the domain of
ethics, gave this notion its most exaggerated development.
2. Gnosticism called forth as an opposite extreme the system of
Monarchianism. The teaching of the Gnostics involved a sort of poly
theism. To bridge over the chasm between God and Matter, and thus
to account for the existence of the world, they assumed the existence oi
a number of intermediate beings, which emanated from the Supreme
God, and to which, therefore, a certain divine character was to be attri
buted. The reaction against this polytheism took the form of Monar
chianism — an extreme theory in the opposite sense. Monarchianism
denied the existence of any distinctions whatever in the Divinity, even
the existence of those distinctions which the doctrine of the Trinity
involves, and held fast the doctrine of fixed abstract unity.
3. Last in order came Arianism, with its offshoot, Apollinarism,
theories which embodied elements of Gnosticism and Monarchianism,
and in which the doctrines of the two opposing heresies were blended.
In historical order, Arianism follows the two other heresies ; it follows
them also in the order of theoretical development.
4. We will treat, then, in the first place, of Gnosticism, in the next,
of Manicheism, then of Monarchianism, and lastly of Arianism and
Apollinarism.
GNOSTICISM.
§ 57.
1. Contemporary accounts inform us that Gnosticism had its rise in
the question: What is the origin of evil? (YloOtv TO KOKOV,). It was
natural that such a question should occur to thinking minds at that
period. The circumstances of the time suggested it. According to
contemporary records, the religious and moral degeneracy of the age
had become appalling. The deification of vice had been fatal to morality.
The Christians had been subjected to fierce and cruel persecution both
from Jews and pagans, and wore the objects of general contempt. The
sight of all the evil which surrounded them must have suggested to many
196 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
of them to ask, whence this evil came, and urged them to seek a solution
of the problem.
2. But this question, by itself, was not enough to account for the
origin of Gnosticism. For the question as to the origin of evil had
already been answered by Christianity ; and to have the problem solved
it was only necessary to appeal to positive Christian teaching. The
chief cause to which the rise of Gnosticism was attributable lay in the
fact that the Gnostics, as well in the question of the origin of evil as
in those which regarded the nature of God's relation to the world,
the nature of man, and other questions were not content with the
positive doctrines of Christianity as expounded by the Church, but
sought a solution of these problems in non- Christian philosophy, outside
the region of revelation. They did not, however, for this, separate
themselves from Christianity. The result could only be the introduction
into the Christian teaching of notions borrowed from the 11011- Christian
philosophy, and the attempt to adapt the doctrine of Christianity to
these preconceived philosophical opinions.
3. That this result actually occurred is shown both by the method
which the Gnostics adopted in the exposition and development of their
doctrines, and by their peculiar conception of the Giiosis. With regard
to their method, St. Irenaous tells us that with them, reason, that is to
i say, their preconceived philosophical opinions, was the standard and
I criterion of all truth ; that to meet the requirements of their system,
they carried their arbitrary treatment of the Scriptures so far as to
reject some parts of them altogether, and to mutilate and falsify past
> recognition the portions they retained. Philosophy was to them of much
.greater authority than the positive teaching of the Church, and conse
quently the portions of Scripture which established the teaching of the
Church had to be put aside.
4. In the characteristics which they assign to their Gnosis, they
follow in the footsteps of Philo. Philo had appealed in support of
his opinions to a secret lore which had reached him by oral tradition ;
the Gnostics put forward pretensions of the same kind. Christ, the}'
maintained, in His exot§ric teaching had accommodated Himself to the
views of his contemporaries ; but in private He had imparted to His
apostles a higher (esoteric) teaching, which constitutes the essence of
Christian truth, and which, to a large extent, is contradictory of the
exoteric doctrines. This teaching the apostles had promulgated among
the initiated ; for the mere people the exoteric doctrines were sufficient.
5. The teaching of the Church is nothing more than the exoteric
doctrines ; it does not contain the pure truth, but only the truth as
adapted to the capacit}^ of the people, and it contains, besides, an ad
mixture of many errors. To learn the pure and perfect truth, we must-
seek it in that secret lore, acquaintance with which is the true Gnosis.
The faith of the Church is merely a grade of knowledge. The Gnostics
claimed to be alone in the possession of the true and genuine Gnosis
which they endeavoured to expound in their works — hence the name
Gnosticism. The Fathers of the Church, on the other hand, described
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 197
this Gnosis as false and delusive, and on this ground set themselves
to combat it.
6. On the lines we have described, Gnosticism endeavoured at once
to accomplish and to justify the overthrow of Christianity by the aid of
non-Christian philosophy. Pursuing this design the Gnostics, in re
ference to the special question of the origin of evil, arrived at the gloomy
dualistic notion which represents man as surrounded on all sides by
hostile powers, the external world as wholly evil, matter as not created
by God, spirit and body as ethically opposed to one another. The
Paganism of an earlier period had deified nature ; the Gnostics regarded
nature as the principle of evil, and thus changed the distinction between
nature and spirit into an absolute opposition.
7. The Gnostic systems were, as a rule, specially antagonistic
to Judaism. The Church, in its explanation of the relation borne by
the old dispensation to the new, asserted that the former was a pre
paratory dispensation, the latter the consummation for which the way
had been prepared. But the Gnostics explained the relation to consist in
& distinct opposition of the one dispensation to the other. They held
that the older dispensation was under the control of a principle which
was not only distinct from the supreme God who had revealed Himself
in Christianity, but (in greater or less degree), opposed and even hostile
to that God. The ethical dualism which they had set up in the sphere
of being, they here endeavoured to introduce into history, and the con
trast which thev found to exist between the external and rigid character
of the Jewish law and the internal gracious Christian dispensation
gave encouragement to the attempt.
8. The sources from which our knowledge of Gnosticism is drawn, apart from the
Gnostic work, Pistis Sopfiia (Berlin, 1851), and a few fragments, are the writings of the
opponents of Gnosticism; notably, Irenseus (adv. Hareses), the Pseudo Origen (Hip-
poly tus) (f'Xeyxof icard -jraouiv aipeafwv), as well as the writings of Justin, Tertullian,
Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Theodoretus and Augustine. We
may add to these the treatise of the Neo-Platonist Plotinus against the Gnostics.
Enn. 2.
We may mention among the more recent writers who have treated of
Gnosticism : Neander, Genetische Enticickehmrj der vornehmMen gnostischen Systcmc,
Berlin, 1818; F. A. Lewald, Commentatio de doctrina gnostica, Heidelb., 1818; J. Matter,
Hist. Crit. du Gnosticisme, 1828 ; Mohler, Ursprung des Gnosticismus, Tubing, 1831,
Ac.
THE SEVERAL GNOSTIC SYSTEMS.
1. The earliest Gnostic teachings are ascribed by Irenanis to Simon
Magus, to his pupil Menander, and to Cerinthus, the last of whom St.
John the Evangelist had it in his mind to refute, when he wrote his
Gospel. Cerinthus is said to have taught that the world was not made
by God, but by an inferior power which had no knowledge of the true
God. The true God caused the ^Eon Christ to descend upon Jesus the
Son of Joseph and Mary, at his baptism, fitting Him thereby to preach
the unknown Father, and to work miracles. This ^Eon separated him-
198 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
self from Jesus before the death of the latter, and had no share in His
sufferings.
2. But the chief representatives of Gnosticism were Saturninus,
Valentinus, Carpocrates, and Marcion, with a few others of less note.
In the teaching of these Gnostics, more especially of those first men
tioned, the conceptions of the thinkers are so shrouded in a cloud of
fantastic conceits, that it is difficult to penetrate these extravagances of
a deranged imagination, and discern the rational thought which under
lies them. We must, however, try to find a path through their laby
rinth of fantastic trifles.
SATURN INUS.
3. Saturninus, a pupil of Menander, was born at Antioch, and
spent his life there. The most brilliant portion of his career corres
ponds with the reign of Hadrian (A.D. 125). He taught the existence
of an unknown God — the Father. This God created a number of spirits
— archangels, powers, principalities, and angels — which succeed one
another, in descending order. The last seven angels, who close the
series, created the world. To them also is due the creation of man, but
only the creation of the animal portion of his nature.
4. From the Supreme Power, a luminous image issued, which reached
the angels charged with the creation of the world. To retain this image
they resolved to create man after its likeness. But the likeness which
they succeeded in producing could not be other than imperfect, owing
to the imperfection of the beings producing it. It could not lift itself
up, it sank to the earth and crawled like a worm. The Supreme
Power took pity on its condition, and as man had been created after its
likeness, this Power shot a spark of its own spiritual nature into the image.
Man then, for the first time, became man in the true sense, became a
being at once spiritual and corporeal. That divine spirit returns after
death to the source whence it came, all that then remains of man
undergoes dissolution.
5. In hostile opposition to the dominion of the unknown Father is
the Kingdom of Satan. The evil principle works upon man ^through
sensuality, and endeavours by this means to bring him under its sway.
Everything is evil which tends to draw men down towards material or
sensible things, and to involve him more deeply in matter. On this
ground, Saturninus condemned marriage and the carnal generation of
children. Both he held to be derived from Satan. For similar reasons,
there can be no resurrection of the body, for the body is derived from
the principle of evil — matter — and could not, therefore, have any share
in the glorified state.
6. Men were at first ruled by the Jewish God — one of those inferior
angels who created the world. But this deity was too weak to shield
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 199
them from the attacks of Satan, and, besides, it was not fitting that men,
in whom a spark of the Divine nature was burning, should be ruled
over by a power of such a low order. Therefore, the unknown Father
sent His Son Christ into the world, to overthrow the reign of the
Jewish God, to save the good and the believing, and to condemn the
wicked and the incredulous. But since the flesh is from the principle of
evil, the Son did not assume a real body, but only the semblance of a
human body. (Docetism.) *
7. In this teaching on the subject of man's creation we recognise
the Platonic notions of Philo ; the dualism between the Kingdom of
God and the Kingdom of Satan, the rejection of marriage, and other
such theories, are clearly borrowed from the East. The more fantasti
cal elements of Gnosticism do not yet appear prominently.
BASILIDES.
§59.
8. Basilides, also a native of Antioch, lived, like Saturninus, under
the Emperor Hadrian. Towards the close of his life (A.D. 130) he
taught in Egypt and chiefly in Alexandria. We have two accounts of
his system differing widely from one another ; the one furnished by
Irenaeus, the other by Hippolytus. We give first the account of
Irenaeus.
9. According to Irenaeus, Basilides held the Unbegotten and Un-
nameable to be first in the scale of being ; from him proceeded the Nous,
from this again the Logos, from the Logos the Phronesis, from the
Phronesis the Sophia and Dynamis, from these the Virtues and the chief
angels. By these angels the first or highest heaven was formed.
From the highest angels proceeded other angels who formed the second
heaven (or sphere), and thus the process continued, until 365 orders
of angels had been successively produced, and as many celestial spheres
successively formed. The ruler of the celestial spheres is Abraxas,
whose name contains the number 365 (1 + 2+100 + 1 + 604-14-200
according to the numerical significance of the Greek letters). The
angels who formed the lowest sphere, fashioned our world also, and are
its rulers.
10. The interposing of so many intermediate beings between God
and the world indicates the dualistic character of the entire system. This
feature becomes still more marked in the doctrines regarding physical
nature and the origin of man. The body of man was given him by
the lower or world-creating powers, his soul comes from a higher realm.
* The prophecies of the Old Testament were declared to have been inspired, partly
by the world-creating angels, and partly by Satan, who contended against all those
augels, but chiefly against the god of the Jews.
200 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
The soul lias had its origin in the realm of light, and therefore it lives
here below in a strange land. It has been degraded to life within the
body in punishment of a fault. All the evil that man has to endure in
this life is, consequently, the punishment of guilt which his soul has
contracted, either in the present life or in a prior state. Martyrdom
itself Basilides holds to be a punishment of this kind. These chastise
ments may, however, be means of purification for the soul.
11. It is the duty of the soul to free itself from the material element
with which, contrary to the requirements of its nature, it is invested.
This deliverance is to be accomplished by subduing sensuality and
sensual appetite, and by rising through faith to the consciousness of
the soul's higher nature. Basilides does not condemn marriage ; he
would retain it as a means of resisting the persistent assaults of sensual
passion. The . complete purification of the soul is also helped by the
process of transmigration. There cannot be a resurrection of the body,
for the body is derived from matter, it is of its nature antagonistic to
the soul, and its reunion with the soul would be a misfortune for the
latter, not an advantage.
12. The human race was originally placed under the rule of the
angels who created this world. These angels divided among themselves
the government of the peoples of the earth, their Archon or chief ruler
reserved to himself the government of the Jewish people. He then
strove to subject all other peoples to his own chosen nation. But he
was opposed by the other nations and their ruling angels, and thus conflict
and confusion arose. In pity, the Supreme God sent His own Son
amongst men to free them from the control of the powers which rule
the world, to make known to them their own higher nature, and to point
out to them the way in which they could and should rise above the
angels who formed the world, and even above the Archon himself.
13. The Nous, thereupon took the semblance of man, in order to
manifest himself to mankind. He was not himself crucified. He sub
stituted Simon of Gyrene for himself, by exchanging outward appear
ance with the latter. Whoever believes in the individual who was
crucified, is still under the dominion of the world- ruling angels. We
must believe in the eternal Nous, who underwent the death of the cross
in appearance only. The real believers are the elect, the men of real
knowledge, the Gnostics. These are above the law ; nothing can defile
them, not even the offering of sacrifice to the heathen gods ; the difference
between good and evil is no longer of importance to them.
14. The account of Hippolytus agrees with that of Irenaeus in this,
that in it Basilides assigns the god of the Jews (as well as the gods of
the heathen) a limited power, and ascribes the redemption accomplished
through Christ to the Supreme God. But Hippolytus differs from Irenaeus
in this, that he represents as interposed between God and the angels
not the Nous, Phronesis, &c., but three worrjrce (sonships), produced by
the Supreme God — the Non-existent. The mutual relations which his
arrangement of these three worj/rtc involves, and the various functions
which they discharge belong to the domain of fable. We give some
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 201
details below.* Which of these two accounts represents the genuine
teaching of Basilides, and which represents merely the teachings of his
followers is a question still undecided. The teaching of Basilides was
continued by his son Isidorus.
YALENTINUS AND THE OPHITES.
§60.
15. The most comprehensive of the Gnostic systems is that of
Yalentinus, among whose followers may be reckoned Heracleon and
Ptolemy, Secundus and Marcus, and many others. Valeitinus was by
birth an Egyptian. He taught in Alexandria about A.I). 140, and
subsequently in Rome, and died, about A. D. 160, in Cyprus. He sets up
as that which is the highest in existence, the incomprehensible, un-
nameable, eternal, and unbegotten God, to whom he gives the name
Bythos, and sometimes the name Tlarrip or YlpoTrarwp. From him
proceed, as from a first cause, a series of supernatural powers or JEoiis,
who together constitute the Pleroma.
16. Associated with the Bythos was a sexually different principle,
Sige (<Tiyri or tvvoia), from whom the primal Father, under the influence
of Love, begat the two highest .ZEons, Nous and Alctheia. The Nous is
called also the /tovoycvi/c (only-begotten), and also irarrip *ai o/)\i?
* According to Hippolytus, Basilides taught that, originally there was absolute
nothing. From this nothing came forth the germ of the world, the non-existent god
having produced by an act of will (not by emanation), that original unity which carried
within it the iruvaTrtpua (or, according to Clement of Alexandria, the avyxvaig apxiKi]) of
the universe. In this germ was contained a threefold sonship (IM'OTJJC) ; the first raised
itself at once to the non-existent god, the second, less subtle and less pure, was raised
aloft by the first, who bestowed the holy spirit upon it ; the third, which remains
unpurified, was detained in the mass of the irdroTrtpna. The non-existent God and the
two first vioTriTfQ inhabit the supramundane space which surrounds the world, but is
separated from it by a fixed sphere (ffrfpuofia). The holy spirit having risen with the
second sonship to the supramundane region, returned subsequently to the middle sphere,
and thus became the in'tipa pfQopiot' Within this nether world dwells the world-ruler,
unable to rise above the oreptwjua, but fondly imagining that he is the supreme god. that
there is nothing above him. The law-giving god occupies a position below him. Each of
these divinities has genera ted a son. The first of these dp^ovre^ dwells in the ethereal
region ; his is the Ogdoas who ruled the earth from Adam to Moses. The second — the
Hebdomadas, dwells in the region beneath the moon ; he ruled from Moses to Christ. As
soon as the gospel or knowledge of the supramundane world (»/ TU>V ?'7r£/oK»i7/"t'"'
yvoiffic) was proclaimed, and the son of the world-ruler, through the medium of the
spirit, received the light of the supramundane v\6r^gt the World-ruler came to
have knowledge of the supreme God, and was seized with fear. But this fear was the
beginning of wisdom. He repented of his arrogance, in common with the god who
is subordinate to him ; and all the principalities and powers of the 365 heavens, received
the preaching of the gospel. The light which proceeded from the 8uprammi<l;uie
sonship enlightened Jesus. The third V'IUTTJC; was now purified, and rose to the sphere
already inhabited by the beatified sonship — to the non-existent God. As soon as these
several essences reach their proper sphere, each becomes ignorant of the degrees above
itself, that there may be no jealousy. Cfr. Ueberweg.
202 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
7TavT<*)v. Bythos, Sige, Nous, and Aletheia produced in turn the Logos
and the Zoc, and these in their turn the Anthropos and the Ecclesia,
The last four form in conjunction with the first four (rerpaKrvQ) the
system of eight (Ogdoas). The Logos in union with Zoe begets ten
(Sc»cac) ^Eons, and Anthropos in union with Ecclesia begets twelve
fSbf&eac) -ZEons. This generation is effected by successive stages ; in each
stage a male and female JEon being produced, who then unite to continue
the generative process. These thirty -ZEons form, as has been said, the
Pleroma-y or Fulness of Divine Life. The last of the twelve JEons
which stand at the end of the series — and, consequently, the last of the
entire thirty ^Eons — is Sophia a female JEon.
17. The inborn Nous alone has knowledge of the unbegotten Father.
This knowledge is not vouchsafed the other ^Eons. But their desire to
behold the Father is excited by this privation ; and this desire becomes
so powerful in Sophia that it almost leads to her dissolution. In the
effort, however, this female ^Eon gives birth to a formless substance.
But Horos is sent to her by the Father, and he succeeds with much
difficulty in persuading her that the Supreme God is unknowable
(oKaraXijTrroc^ and thus preserves her from destruction and restores her
to her first estate. The abortion she has brought forth — that formless
substance to which she has given birth — is expelled by Horos from the
Pleroma, and sinks into the Kenoma or empty space. By command of
the Father, Nous and Aletheia hereupon bring forth by emanation two
new ^Eons— Christ and the Holy Ghost; these enlighten the other
.ZEons as to their relation with Bythos, and order is again restored
among them. In the joy that follows, all the other ^Eons produce in
common a new ^Eon of higher excellence, who is known by the several
names— Jesus, Logos, Soter, or Christ, and him they offer as a sacrifice
of thanksgiving to the Father.
18. All this takes place within the Pleroma. But the Christ who
has been generated by Nous and Aletheia takes pity on that formless
substance named Achamoth, the offspring of Sophia, which Horos has
relegated to the Kenoma, and having given it essence and form, retires
again within the Pleroma. As soon as Achamoth becomes sensible of
the light which Christ has imparted to it, the desire springs up within
it to enter into the Pleroma, but being hindered by Horos, it becomes
the victim of fear, and sorrow, and want.* In response to its petitions,
the Pleroma sends the ^Eon, Jesus, to deliver it from suffering, to rescue
it from the UaOri (Fear, Sorrow, Want, Supplication), and to reconcile
it with God. But for all this, it does not succeed in attaining to the
Pleroma ; it reaches no further than a sphere bordering on the Pleroma,
separated from the latter by Horos and the Cross, and called the lower
Ogdoas. Achamoth generates the Demiurgus. The latter is a purely
physical being, and has therefore no knowledge of his parent. The
Demiurgus in his turn produces the sensible world, the matter of which
* In the book Pistin Sophia, we have the romance of the sufferings of this Achamoth —
i.e., of this Sophia excluded from the divinity— written in detail, with full account of its
penitential hymns and lamentations.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 203
is const ilutorl by the HaOi) which Jesus separated from Achamoth. The
Pleroma forms the archetype for the Demiurgus in his labours ; the
sensible world is, accordingly, modelled after the Pleroma. But in this
imitation the Demiurgus is an imitator unconsciously ; he does not know
the Pleroma, and cannot know it, for he is a purely physical being.
The place of the Demiurgus is in heaven, below Achamoth ; the earth is
the habitation of the Demon.
19. Man is a creation of the Demiurgus. He is formed from matter
(vAi)), receives a soul (^v\i}) from the Demiurgus, and a spirit (Trvtv/ma)
from Achamoth. The nature of man is thus a compound formed of
three elements, Body, Soul, and Spirit. The body of man was at first
an ethereal nature, immaterial, and without difference of sex. It was
only when man fell into sin that he was invested with a coarse material
body. The spirit which Achamoth had implanted in him without know
ledge of the Demiurgus impelled man to raise himself above the latter.
The Demiurgus, with his angels, took alarm, and to keep man in subjec
tion forbade him to eat of the tree of knowledge. Man disobeyed the
command, and thereupon was driven from the ethereal region of
Paradise into the coarse material sphere of this nether earth. Here he
was invested with a material body. In this condition he is saved from
complete subjection to matter only by the aid of Achamoth.
20. The Law and the Prophets are from the Demiurgus. He had
promised a Messiah — but a Messiah of a psychical nature only. Man,
endowed as he was with a spiritual nature, was not, however, to remain
for ever under the dominion of the Demiurgus. The Saviour, Jesus,
descended from the Pleroma to make known to men the mysteries of
the life of God, and to free them from the dominion of the Demiurgus.
For this end the man Jesus was formed from the three elements of
human nature, Spirit, Soul, and Body, but in such wise that his bod}
was not of coarse material constitution, but of ethereal form. This man
came into the world, passing through the body of Mary as through a
channel. In the ceremony of Baptism he united himself with the
^Eon, Jesus, and remained in union with him till the trial before Pilate.
At this point he abandoned him and returned into the Pleroma. (Other
Valentinians taught that the^Eon, Jesus, was united with the man Jesus
from the time of the conception of the latter).
21. Jesus came into the world to redeem men; that is to say, to
reveal to them the divine mysteries, and to free them from subjection to
the Demiurgus ; but all men do not participate in this redemption. The
Valentinians distinguish three classes of men, the Hylicists, the Psychi-
cists, and the Pneumatists. The Hylicists (heathens) are wholly outside
the region of the higher life, the spirit is not imparted to them in any
degree, they have, therefore, no existence after death. The Psychicists,
on the other hand (i.e., the members of the Church who are content
with mere faith), although they do not participate in the spirit, ami aiv
subject to the dominion and to the law of the Demiurgus, yet if they
fulfil this law, and wage the fight against matter, and practise good
works, may after death attain to the kingdom of the Demiurgus. But
204 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
the Pneumatists, i.e., the Gnostics, have been made partakers of the
spirit by Jesus ; they rise above faith to the Gnosis ; in the Gnosis they
have knowledge of the mysteries of the Pleroma, and the knowledge
leads to supreme happiness. They are not subject to the law of the
Demiurgus ; the difference between good and evil is of no moment to
them. Marriage is not only permitted them, it is a matter of obligation.
They cannot be deprived of the salvation they have attained. After
death they return to Achamoth their mother. There is no resurrection
of the body.
22. When the course of this world is run, Achamoth and all the spirits
of the Pneumatists that are associated with her, return again to the
Pleroma ; the spirits mingle with the angels, to whom they are united
connubially, and with whom their existence is thenceforward continued.
The Demiurgus, with the souls that belong to him, ascends to the realm
previously inhabited by Achamoth. As for the nether material world,
the fire which was latent in matter bursts forth and entirely con
sumes it, and nothing is left but the Pleroma and the kingdom of the
Demiurgus.
23. There are, no doubt, elements of sane philosophy in all this.
The three constituent elements of human nature — body, soul, spirit —
recall the Platonic theories. So, too, the ^Eons of the Pleroma are no
more than personifications of the ideas of the Platonists, as is apparent
from the circumstance that they are made the archetypes of creation. But
these philosophical elements are lost in a chaos of fantastic images, the
product of a disordered and unrestrained imagination. For this reason
the Valentinian, like the other Gnostic systems, is of small scientific
value. The sexual excesses which the Valentinians permitted them
selves, as a consequence of their doctrines, deprived their system of
ethical value. In every respect it remains a melancholy monument of
the aberrations of human intelligence.
24. Akin to the Valentinians were the Ophites (Naassenes). Both sects may have
been derived from a common origin, for the principles of the Ophites are, throughout, in
accord with those of the Valentinians, the differences are merely accidental. The Ophites
owe their name to a party amongst them — the Perates — in whose system the serpent of
the Book of Genesis plays a prominent part. They go so far as to identify the serpent
with Christ, the mediator between God and the world, and accordingly assign it divine
honour.
CARPOCRATES, MARCION, AND OTHER GNOSTICS,
§ 61.
25. Carpocrates of Alexandria, who lived about the year A.D. 130,
taught a kind of universalistic rationalism. According to him tho
Monas is the first parent, or ultimate source of all things. From this
being proceeded a series of spirits, who rebelled against him, and created
the world. The true Gnosis consists in the contemplation which lifts
rilll.OSOlMlY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
205
us above this created world to the primal Monas, and by which we
acquire dominion over nature and the spirits. This degree of elevation
was attained by Pythagoras and Plato, and in more especial manner by
Jesus, the son of Joseph and Mary — the perfect man. It was only iii
virtue of his union with the Monas that Jesus was enabled to work
miracles. We ourselves can attain to the same state, and thus acquire
dominion over the powers that govern the world.
20. Carpocrates further taught the pre-existence of souls, and this
in thoroughly Platonic fashion. The same may be said of his teaching
regarding the transmigration of souls. The souls that have not lived
entirely free from fault must, in punishment, enter successively into
various bodies, until at length, having done sufficient penance, they are
set free, and live in communion with God and those angels who * have
formed the world. Furthermore, Carpocrates teaches contempt for the
moral law. He does not attribute any efficacy to prayer. Man is saved by
faith and love. Every work is of itself indifferent, and becomes goo'd
or bad merely by the intention of the individual who performs it. All
that the earth brings forth, everything that conduces to human enjoy
ment must be held in common. This communism was further developed
by Epiphanes, the son and disciple of Carpocrates. The religious wor
ship of the followers of Carpocrates was a kind of demoniacal magic.
27. Marcion of Pontus was a pupil of Cerdo — a Syrian, who taught in
Home about A.D. 140, and whose doctrines resembled those of Cerinthus.
Marcion taught at Kome, in succession to Cerdo, about A.D. 160, after
he had been excommunicated at Sinope (A.D. 140) by his father, the
Bishop of that city, in punishment of a heinous crime. Marcion, like
the other Gnostics, distinguishes between the Demiurgus and the
Supreme God, but he does not derive the Demiurgus by emanation
tVnm the Supreme God, or by a fall from some higher state. He makes
him equal to God, and eternal like God, but establishes an antagonism
between him and God.
28. The consideration of the evil which exists in the world leads
Marcion to deny that a God of goodness could have created such a world.
He, therefore, supposes a God higher than the Creator of the world.
The difference between the Supreme God and the Creator consists in
this, that the Supreme God is good, the Demiurgus is not good, but only
just, lie is not good, for, as he is the Creator of the world, he is the
author of the evil and the wickedness of the world, and is besides, a
lover of war, is of changeable mood, self-contradictory — such, in fact,
as he appears to us in the Old Testament. He is merely just, that is
to say, he executes the law he has laid down relentlessly, without
mercy, and without compassion ; of this we have evidence in the Old
Testament.
29. The whole of the Old Testament must be ascribed to the Demi
urgus. All the books it contains refer to his doctrines and his legisla
tion. He ruled the Jews with a sceptre of iron, and carried out all his
designs with unbending rigour (Justice). Up to the time of Christ's
appearance in the world the God of goodness was unknown in this world.
206 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Even the Dcmiurgus had no knowledge of Him. He had not been re
vealed in nature nor in reason ; not in the former, for nature was full of
evils which could not exist in an order of things which was to stand as
a manifestation of God's goodness ; nor was God manifested to reason :
on this point the contradictory doctrines of philosophers are evident
proof. Nor had He revealed Himself in the Old Testament ; this is
evident from the contradiction between the Old Testament and the New.
The God of goodness was, therefore, unknown. Christ was the first to
reveal His existence.
30. To destroy the work of the Demiurgus or World-Creator, his
ordinances, and everything connected therewith, and to deliver men
from his oppressive yoke, the God of goodness revealed Himself in
Jesus, who appeared as Man in Judaea. In Him was manifested the
fulness of love and mercy, as rigour had been manifested in the
God of the Old Testament. Matter, being the work of the Demiurgus,
is essentially evil ; Christ, the Son of the Father, could not, therefore,
assume a real body, nor be born in the usual way. He appeared in the
semblance merely of a body (Docetism). For reasons similar to those here
adduced there can be no question of the resurrection of the body.
31. Christ revealed the God of goodness to men, and made known to
them also the nature of the Demiurgus, and thus delivered them from
the dominion of this latter. He promulgated no new Law ; it was His
mission to deliver men from the Law, not to subject them to a new Law.
Christ is a Saviour only ; He is not a law- giver. In rescuing mankind
from the dominion of the Demiurgus He roused against Himself the
hatred of the latter, and the Demiurgus in consequence excited his fol
lowers to put Christ to death. The sufferings of Christ were, however,
merely apparent, for His body was no more than an appearance. The
Jews still expect the Messiah promised them by the Demiurgus to gather
them together out of the Dispersion.
32. The ethical principles of Marcion are of the most rigid kind. He
forbade his followers the use of flesh and wine ; bound them to rigorous
fasts, especially on the Sabbath, as on this day the Creator rested, and
fasting is a symbol of sorrow. All this was contrived in opposition to
the Demiurgus. Marriage and the procreation of children are contri
vances of the Demiurgus, who, in the Old Testament, made marriage
obligatory ; both were forbidden by Marcion. He admitted to baptism
only persons who were unmarried and continent. One of his followers,
however, deduced from his principles entirely opposite rules of conduct.
Opposition to the Demiurgus was adduced by them as justification of
prostitution, adultery, and other vices, for by indulging in these vices
they considered they were resisting the World- Creator, who had for
bidden these offences in the Old Testament. In this way the system of
Marcion led to the same excesses as that of Carpocrates. Apelles was
the most remarkable of his disciples.
33. We have yet to mention the two Gnostics, Bardesanes and Hermogenes. Bar-
desane,-}, a native of Edessa, lived towards the close of the second century, and taught
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN KKA. 207
doctrines analogous to those of Valentinus. Ue assumes two essential principles, the
unknown Father, and Matter, from which Satan was produced. From the form, r
emanated seven /Eons, who, in conjunction with the Father, constitute the Pleroma.
The soul of man is derived from the Pleroma, but it has been relegated to this lower
world in punishment of its faults. To redeem it Christ appeared in the world. He was
born of Mary, but His body was formed of celestial elements.
34. Hermogenes lived at the beginning of the second century, and was, probably, an
inhabitant of Carthage. According to Tertullian, he supposed God and Matter to be the
primary dual elements- God could not produce the world from His own substance, for
He is indivisible and unchangeable. He could not produce it from nothing, for in this
case His infinite goodness would have forced him to make all things good ; whereas, in
actual fact, there is much wickedness and evil in the world. We must, therefore, assume
an eternal Matter, out of which God formed the world. This is the only assumption
which enables us to explain the existence of evil. This assumption gives us an element
which is antagonistic to the action of God, and this element is Kvil. According to Her-
mogeues, the soul of man is formed from Matter.
MANICHEISM.
1. The dualistic theory which we observe to be a part of all the
Gnostic systems in greater or less degree, reached its extreme develop
ment in Manicheism. This doctrine is nothing more than the Parsee
system in Christian garb. According to the most trustworthy accounts,
Manes, the founder of the system, was a member of a family distin
guished amongst the Magi, and was well versed in the lore of the
Persians. He became a Christian, but his false opinions soon brought about
his excommunication from the Church. In the year A.D. 238, he began
to teach publicly. He lived at the court of the Persian king, Sapor.
In consequence of a quarrel with the Magi he was obliged to fly from
the court, and ultimately (about A.D. 277) he was executed. We are
indebted chiefly to the controversial writings of Saint Augustine for
our knowledge of the Manichean theories. Manicheism, like Gnosti
cism, was the creation of an exuberant fancy rather than of speculative
thought, and its attitude towards Christianity was almost identical
with that of the Gnostics. We may, therefore, content ourselves with a
brief sketch of its leading outlines. In the one system, as in the other,
the appeal to hidden or esoteric doctrine is a prominent characteristic.
2. The Manicheans, in answering the question : What is the origin
of evil ? assume the existence of two eternal principles ethically opposed
to each other — a principle essentially good, and a principle essentially
evil. The good principle is the God of Light, who dwells in the region
of pure light, surrounded by an infinite number of the Spirits of Light.
The evil principle is the Prince of Darkness, who is surrounded by the
Spirits of Darkness, and dwells in darkness, i.e., in the region of chaotic
Matter. The Spirits of Darkness live in a state of perpetual conflict ; but
at length they come to have knowledge of the Kingdom of Light, where
upon they conclude a peace among themselves, and agree to attack the
Kingdom of Light, and to destroy it.
208 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
3. To defend Himself against this attack the God of Light causes a
force to emanate from Himself, which He opposes to the onset of the
Powers of Darkness. This force is primeval man, the parent of the
Living. This being enters into the struggle, but is unable long to main
tain it; whereupon God causes a new force, the Spirit of Life, to
emanate from Himself, which conies to the aid of primeval man. This
Spirit of Life rescues primeval man from the grasp of the Powers of
Darkness. But in the conflict primeval man had been deprived by these
Powers of many of the rays of light which belonged to his being.
These rays remain behind in chaotic matter, and thus become the World-
soul. This World-soul is Christ, the Son of primeval man.
4. This does not, however, bring the strange drama to a close. The
Spirit of Life which delivered man becomes, in its turn, the author of a
%new world. It gathers whatever of light is left in matter, or at least
whatever has not been lost in chaotic matter, and this it concentrates in
the sun and moon ; the demons it fixes in the firmament as stars. We
must, therefore make a distinction between the suffering Jesus — the
light which matter has absorbed, and the Jesus whose throne is in the
sun and moon. The latter seeks to deliver the former from his subjec
tion to matter. For this purpose he causes the forces of light in the
sun to assume the forms of beautiful maidens, to excite in this way the
desires of the Powers of Darkness, and thus to produce a condition of
disorder which shall permit the imprisoned light to escape. The flesh,
or animal nature, is produced by the female demons that are fixed in the
firmament.
5. Man, too, is the offspring of the demons. The Prince of Darkness,
observing that the World- soul might soon be set free, persuaded his com
panions to resign their light to him, and then begot Adam, and subse
quently Eve, that Adam's sensual passion might be excited, and the
process of generation continued. In this way he sought to individualise
more and more this World- soul or light, and by imprisoning it thus
repeatedly to weaken its power to rise.
6. We must distinguish in man two souls — the soul which animates
the body, and the soul of Light, which is a part of the universal World-
soul. The animal soul is derived from the principle of evil, and is,
therefore, evil by nature ; the soul of light on the other hand, coming
from the principle of goodness, is good of its nature. These two
souls are perpetually in conflict ; the antagonism which divides the world
is renewed in man. The evil soul manifests itself in concupiscence, and
concupiscence is, therefore, essentially evil. Every wicked deed is the
outcome of this concupiscence ; the soul of light commits no sin, nothing
but good can proceed from it ; its share in sin is not active volition, but
merely weakness yielding to concupiscence. But, for this weakness,
jstrictly speaking, it is not responsible, for man is at all times under the
icontrol of cosmical forces ; there can be no question of the freedom of
i will in his regard.
7. In the Old Covenant the Prince of Darkness was supreme ; the
Old Testament is wholly his work. The God of goodness would not,
PHILOSOPHY OF Tin: CHRISTIAN ERA. 209
however, leave the world- soul in everlasting captivity, He sent Christ,
His Son, into the world to set it free. Christ came into the world a
man in appearance only ; He instructed human souls as to their true
nature, and taught them the way of deliverance. To reveal to them
the deeper meaning of His doctrines He sent them the spirit of life,
which appeared in Manes.
8. The members of the Manichean sect were divided into three classes.
On the lowest class was imposed merely the sign m-uhun oris, that is to
say, they were forbidden to partake of flesh, eggs, milk or fish ; they
were also forbidden the use of wine, and, more stringently still, of pni-
fane language. On the second class was imposed the signaculummanmu,,,
/>., they could not possess property, were not permitted to labour, and
we iv bound to give themselves exclusively to contemplation. They
were forbidden to destroy plants or animals. On the highest class, that
is to say, on the class of the elect, was imposed the signaculam sinus,
i.e., they were forbidden to marry, or indulge in sexual intercourse.
Despite this unnatural rigour, the grossest excesses were committed by
the Manicheans, excesses to which they were encouraged by their belief
that nothing could deprive the elect of 'their sanctification.
9. The souls of the^elect return, immediately after the death of the body,
into the kingdom of light ; other souls, according to their moral character
in this life, pass after death into various bodies, until they are at leno-th
purified. The world is finally consumed by fire. The souls which, by
reason of their profound corruption, are incapable of purification, are
condemned to eternal fire.
MoNARCHIANISM.
63.
1. The reaction against the polytheism of the Gnostics, and par
ticularly against the antagonism established in their doctrine between
the Supreme God and the Creator of the world, led to another extreme
vie\y, in which the Unity of God was so strongly insisted on that the
distinctions involved in the Trinity disappeared, and the divine persons
became so many different relations or modes of the one divine substance.
This doctrine was known as Monarchianism, or the Antitrinitarian doctrine.
In this, the teaching regarding the person of Christ was necessarily
reduced to the Ebionite theory, more or less modified. We proceed to
notice the most remarkable of the Monarchianists or Antitrinitarian s,
and to give some outline of their teaching.
2. First, amongst them are the so-called Patripassiani, amongst
whom are Praxeas, Noetus and P>eryllus. Praxeas lived towards the
close of the second century. He taught that the Father became man
in Christ; that He was born of the Virgin Mar v ; that He died and
15
210 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN KRA.
rose from the dead. Praxeas distinguished the divine from the human
element in Christ ; the one, he called Spirit and the other Flesh. Christ
suffered only as man ; to the Father he ascribed a sort of co-passion
(compati). Somewhat later (about A.P. 230), Noetus taught the same
doctrine at Smyrna. In God, he held, there is but one person. This
person existing from eternity was begotten of Mary in time. In His
eternal existence He is named Father, as existing in time He is named
Son. Beryllus of Bostra, a contemporary of Noetus, taught that Christ,
before His birth, had no personal existence ; that during His earthly life
He was not God, that the divinity of the Father only dwelt in Him.
3. A second class of Monarchianists is formed by Sabellius and
Paul of Samosata. Sabellius, a native of Libya, and Presbyter of
Ptolemais in the Pentapolis of Africa, taught his peculiar doctrines
publicly under Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, and at Rome, under Pope
Sixtus II. (A.D. 257-8). The gist of his teaching was embodied in the
formulas : t} /movag TrAaruvfoTo-a yfyovt rpia^ — the monas ^expanded,
becomes a trinity : and 6 Trarrjp 6 avroc jjiiv tori, TrXarvvtrai 6e £/e viov
Kai TrvtvfjLa — as Father He is one and the same, but He is expanded into
the Son and Holy Ghost (Athan. Or. IV., Contra Arianos, 3). ^ He thus
admits only one Hypostasis or Person in God. This Hypostasis, accord
ing to the several relations it assumes, becomes Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost. These three terms express no more than names for various
relations of the one monas. Sabellius compares the Divine Trinity to the
triple principle — soul, spirit, and body in man; which, although different
one from another, unite, nevertheless, to form one person ; and again,
to the sun which, although one in itself, unites the three elements —
power to illumine, power to heat, and rotundity of form.
4. In accordance with these views is the further opinion attributed to
Sabellius, that for the creation of the world, and more particularly of
man, the Logos came forth from the Father — not as a Divine Person,
but merely as a power emanating from God. The Logos assumed a
personal character in Christ, but this only for a time. As the sun sends
forth its rays, and receives them again within itself, so did the Logos
enter into Christ, and there assume personal existence, to return again
to the Father later as an impersonal power.
5. Paul of Samosata became Bishop of Antioch A.D. 260. He was a
man of considerable dialectical skill, but filled with vanity. He taught
that Christ had no existence previous to His conception, that the Divine
Ij0gOS — which is not itself a person — descended upon Him when He was
conceived, and remained with Him till his Passion. Hence, Jesus,
though begotten in a supernatural manner, is no more than man. But
the moral perfection He attained, rendered Him God. It is true that
He was endowed with intellectual power of a Divine order, but this was
not because of a substantial union between God and man, but merely
in consequence of a special divine influence exerted upon a human
intellect and human will.
6. A third class of Monarchianists is formed by the Antitrinitarians
of the Ebionite school. To this class belong the two Theodoti (tho
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 21]
older and younger), who taught that Christ was no more than man ; and
Artemon, who held like opinions, but admitted a certain influence
exerted upon Jesus by the Supreme God, which raised Him above all ot lid-
men, and made Him the Son of God. The notion of the Logos does not
form part of this phase of Monarchianism.
ARIANISM AND APOLLINARISM.
§64.
1. Arianism unites in one system the prominent points of doctrine
peculiar both to Gnosticism and to Monarchianism. The Gnostic teach
ing is represented in the principle that God cannot enter into immediate
contact with matter, that He can work upon it only through the agency
of intermediate beings. The Monarchian teaching is represented in the
doctrine that the Logos, as a person, is extraneous to the Divinity, not
intrinsic to it — a proposition equivalent to a denial of the distinctions
involved in the notion of the Trinity. But the construction of the
Arian system indicates, at every point, the influence of the notions of
Philo — a source from which, at an early period, the Gnostics had
borrowed.
2. Arius, the founder of the system called by his name, was probably
•a native of Libva. He was a man of considerable exegetical knowledge,
eloquent and skilled in dialectics, but he was remarkable for his vanity
and his desire of renown. He was a presbyter of Alexandria, and
subsequently to the year A.D. 313, when he failed in an attempt to secure
for himself the episcopal soe of that city, he publicly taught his
peculiar theories. He died A.D. 336. We may reduce his doctrines to
the following heads : —
3. God is the Unbegotten (aya/vrjroe), and as such He must be one
— two unbegotten beings are inconceivable. This principle, which, as
applied to the Divine Nature, is unimpeachable, was applied by Arius
to the Divine Persons, and he was in consequence led to such conclu
sions as these : The Son of God, the Logos, is begotten ; He cannot,
therefore, be God ; He must be regarded merely as a creature. From
this it follows that He cannot be eternal, like God ; He must have had
a beginning ; there must have been a time when He did not exist
(f|i/ TTorc, ore OVK rji>). We are thus forced to admit a dual Logos — one
intrinsic to the Divinity, which is not a personal entity, and another
extrinsic to the Divinity, which possesses the character of personality ;
but the latter is only a creature, and can be called Wisdom or Logos only
in so far as it participates in that uncreated divine wisdom which is an in
trinsic but impersonal attribute of God. This is clearly Philo's teach
ing reproduced.
4. The Logos, being a creature, was endowed wit li ;i five will, which
He could use for good or for evil. God foresaw that lie would use His
liberty aright, and as a reward He bestowed upon Him, at His creation,
212 PHILOSOPHY OF TUB CHRISTIAN ERA.
a glory which gave Him a title to be called God. But He is not God
in the strict sense of the term, and therefore He is not omniscient ; He
has not a perfect knowledge of the Father, nor even of His own nature.
God enjoyed the title of Father from the moment that He gave being
to the Logos as His Son.
5. The Logos is the instrument by means of which God created the
world. God could not create the world immediately — He, the absolutely
Pure, could not produce matter which is impure and unholy.
He had need of an instrument to create the world, and this instrument
was furnished in the Logos. The Logos was formed at the moment
when God resolved to create the world. The world, then, does not exist
for sake of the Logos ; the Logos exists for sake of the world.
6. The Logos is, furthermore, the instrument by which God rules the
world. God cannot dispense with an instrument of this kind, for He is
no more able to come into immediate contact with the defilements of
matter than He is able to create matter. Accordingly, a series of beings.
are interposed between God and the world — these supernatural powers
(angels) being made subordinate to the Logos. The incarnation of the
Logos is explained to signify that the Logos assumed flesh, i.e., a human
body, but not a human soul ; and in this way actually underwent the
sufferings of the Passion.
7. Apollinarism was an offshoot of Arianism ; it owes its origin to
Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea in Syria (about A.D., 375.) The
Apollinarists, like the Manicheans, recognise three constituent elements
in man, the body, the carnal soul ($vxh <rapK»c7/), and the spirit. The
relation between the carnal soul and the spirit resembles that established
by the Manicheans, for the Apollinarists find the source of evil in the
$v\ri aapKiK-n- As to the origin of the soul, they are in favour of the
theory of generation. They object to the doctrine of creation on the
ground that such a doctrine involves the co-operation of God in fornica
tion, adultery, and other such crimes, and they further maintain that
the doctrine is opposed to Sacred Scripture which teaches that God
ceased to create on the sixth day.
8. Regarding Christ, they taught that the Logos had not assumed
an nature in its entirety, but only a body and \f^vxn aapKiKi'i—to the
exclusion of the vovt;. In Christ the functions of the VOVQ were dis
charged by the Logoc. It is only in this hypothesis that the conflict
between spirit and flesh in Christ becomes intelligible. A section of the
Apollinarists went still further, and taught that the body of Christ was
not formed from terrestrial matter, but was consubstautial with the
Logos. They ascribed to this body qualities of the immaterial order, and
asserted that the Logos had brought it with Him from heaven, not
received it from Mary.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN Kll.V. 213
PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANTE-NKKNK PKRIOP.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
1. The attacks and misrepresentations to which the faith was sub
jected by pagans and heretics made it incumbent upon the Christians
to adopt the weapons of science in defence of their belief. But to
undertake a defence of the faith, they were first obliged adequately to
penetrate its meaning, and to attain such speculative knowledge of its
truths as the human reason could obtain. Thus much they were obliged
to by the needs of the defence they were forced to undertake. A further
incentive to this study was supplied by the character of the truths of
faith themselves, so comprehensive and so lofty ; for the human mind is
formed for truth, and the more truth manifests itself in its brightness,
the more strenuous will be the effort of the mind to enter into
its light.
2. It was to be expected, then, that the Christian speculation of the
Ante-Nicene period, which at first was apologetic and controversial,
should, as time went by, become more and more a study of Christian
truth for its own sake. At a comparatively early period we find
Christian schools cultivating science after the Christian fashion, as a
means to a deeper knowledge of the truths of faith, and this in the service
of the Church. The most remarkable of the Christian teachers and
writers of the Ante-Nicene period belong to the schools of Edessa, of
Antioch, and more especially of Alexandria. These schools were
modelled upon the imperial schools of Rome, and in them were taught
scientific theology, scriptural exegesis, philosophy, rhetoric, physics,
astronomy, &c. Philosophy was made the basis of speculative theology ;
it was not employed in the hope of adding to the sum of revealed truth,
but only to aid towards its speculative development.
3. Christian philosophy, being employed as an aid to Christian faith,
was permeated throughout by a spirit of lofty morality. The Christian
teachers were deeply imbued with the spirit of Christianity, and the
earnest Christian spirit of their lives reflected itself in their scientific
teaching. Before the tribunals of the pagan magistrates and in presence
of the horrors of the gibbet they gave evidence of the supernatural
energy of Christian faith and Christian morality by which they were
animated ; the same spirit of faith and moral rectitude was manifested no
less unequivocally in the monuments of Christian thought which they
reared.
4. We begin our sketch of the period with the Apologists who de
fended Christianity against paganism ; we shall then notice the
opponents of Gnosticism and Monarchianism, and lastly we shall pass in
review the thinkers who cultivated Christian speculation for its own
sake, apart from the needs of controversy.
2 14 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
THE APOLOGISTS.
JUSTIN, TATIAN, ATHENAGORAS, AND THEOPHILUS.
§65.
1. In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers — the Fathers who were
the immediate disciples of the Apostles — we find no traces of a philo
sophy, in the strict sense of the term. These writings are valuable
chiefly as evidence of the early Christian traditions, and belong, there
fore, to the history of religious dogmas rather than to the history of
philosophy.* But in the writings of the Apologists philosophy is a pro
minent feature. It is, no doubt, employed chiefly for the purpose of
Controversy against the pagans, but it is employed in all thoroughness.
The first of the Apologists was :
2. Flavius Justinus, a native of Flavia Neapolis (Sichem) in Pales
tine. (A.D., 100-160.) While yet a youth, he occupied himself with
the great problems regarding God, the immortality of the soul, &c., and,
as he tells us himself (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 2, 8) turned to the schools of the
philosophers in the hope of finding a solution of them. He first tried a
Stoic, then a Peripatetic, next a Pythagorean, lastly a Platonist — the
last of whom afforded him, he thought, the satisfaction he desired.
\Vhile he was in the midst of his speculation, he one day, during a walk
by the sea-shore, encountered an old man, with whom he entered into
conversation. The old man, by his arguments, made a speedy end of the
hopes Justin had conceived, and then advised him to address himself to
Christianity for the solution of his difficulties. Justin followed the ad
vice, and found at length what he had been seeking — the only true
philosophy. He became a convert to Christianity, and defended his new
faith against Jews, pagans, and heretics. He died a martyr's death at
Home. Of the treatises composed by Justin, the principal which have
reached us are the Dialogue tcith the Jew Tryplio, and the Greater and
Lesser Apologies.^ The genuineness of the Coliortatio ad Grcecos has
been called in question in modern times, but only on intrinsic grounds
which are by no means decisive.
3. Justin will not exclude the ancient philosophy from the economy
of Redemption. In the Christian system the Divine Logos has mani
fested Himself in the flesh, and, therefore, we possess in Christianity the
fulness of truth. But even in pre-Christian times the Logos was not
* The Apostolic Fathers are St. Barnabas, one of whose letters is preserved ; Hernias
who has left us a treatise with the title Pastor ; Clement of Rome, the author of two
letters to the Corinthians ; St. Ignatius, several of whose letters are extant ; St. Polycarp,
one of whose letters (to the Philippians) is preserved. We may also include in the
number the unknown author of the Letter to Diognetus (which is sometimes attributed
to Justin).
t The First or Greater Apology is addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, his two
sons Lucius and Verus, the Senate and the Roman people, A.D., 139 ; the Second or Lesser
to the Emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus, and the Roman Senate, A.D. 162.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 215
wholly unrevealed. He was revealed as the omnipresent Ao-yoe ff
as well in the works of creation as in human reason, which is reason
only in so far as it participates in the Divine Logos. This Logos enabled j .
the philosophers and poets of antiquity to attain knowledge of the truth. 1 '
Whatever of truth they possessed and set forth in their writings they
owed to the Logos. The measure of their knowledge was determined by
the measure of their participation in the Logos ; hence their knowledge
of truth was only partial, and they were frequently involved in self-con
tradictions. The fulness of truth was revealed only in the Incarnate
Logos.
4. The truth which was taught by the ancient philosophers and
poets is to be ascribed to that Logos who was manifested in the flesh in
the fulness of time. If this be so, then the truth taught by the philo
sophers and poets of paganism is essentially Christian, and, as such,
belongs to Christianity. It follows also that those who, before the
Incarnation of the Logos, lived according to reason, i.e., according to
the law of the Logos, which manifests itself in reason, were Christians,
even though they may have been esteemed atheists by their contem
poraries. Such were Socrates, Heraclitus, and others among the Greeks,
and Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias, and others among the
outer nations. But these were only privileged individuals : the know
ledge of God and of His law was first made general by the Incarnate
Logos.
5. Besides the inner connection thus established between Greek
philosophy and Christianity, Justin holds that there existed also an ex
ternal bond of union. He" maintains that the Greek philosophers for
the most part had knowledge of the teaching of Moses and of his
writings, and that they drew from this source. " The doctrine of free
will," says Justin, " Plato borrowed from Moses, and he was further
more acquainted with the whole of the Old Testament. Moreover, all
that the philosophers and poets have taught regarding the immortality
of the soul, punishment after death, the contemplation of things divine
and kindred subjects, was derived, in the first instance, from the
Jewish prophets ; from this one source the seeds of truth (cnrfpfiaTa
rijc aArj0£/ac) have been sent forth in all directions, though at times
being wrongly apprehended by men they have given rise to differences
of opinion." (Apol. I. 44.)
6. God is the Eternal, the Unbegotten, the Unnameable. The idea
of God is implanted by nature in the mind, in the same way as the^idea
of the moral law. But along with (rrapa}, though subordinate to (VTTO;,
God the Creator, we must admit another God (trtpos 0toe), through
whom God the Creator reveals Himself, and who became man in Christ.
This is the Son of God. In proof of this, Justin, in his controversy with
the Jew Trypho, who insisted on the doctrine of the unity of God, appeals
to the Old testament. He cites as establishing the existence of " another
God," the divine apparitions (theophanies) of the Old Testament.
cannot, he holds, be God theCreator who is referred to in these scenes, for
it would be a contradiction to admit that the Creator of heaven and earth
216 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA,
should quit the super-celestial region, and manifest Himself on a small
point of the earth's surface. Justin also appeals to those passages of
Scripture, in which "Lord" is opposed to " Lord" and " God" to "God."
7. The question now suggests itself: In what relation does this
" other God " stand to God the Creator ? Justin answers this question
as follows : As a beginning (or first principle), God, before things created
began to exist, produced from Himself an intellectual power (Swa/mtv
riva XoyiKr'iv), which in the Scripture is variously named "Glory of the
Father," "Son," "Wisdom," "Angel," "God," "Lord," and "Word."
This Logos is that "other God" who must be assumed to exist as a being
different from the Creator. This Logos had existence with the Father
antecedently to the existence of created things, and as Son of God was
eternal and without beginning. When God wished to create the world,
He, by a new generation, made the Son in a certain way extrinsic
to Himself, that the Son might act as an instrument and servant of the
Father in the creation of the world. Justin then assumes a twofold
generation of the Logos, an intrinsic and an extrinsic ; the former occurs
within the Godhead, and is properly the eternal generation of the Son by
the Father ; the latter is connected with the revelation of the Son of God
as the Logos in the creation of the world.
8. The generation of the Logos by the Father, whether intrinsic or
extrinsic, does not mean that the Logos acquired an existence apart
from the Father. This generation must be understood in a sense
analogous to the production of the spoken word by man, or of the light
by the sun. In these cases the thing generated does not separate itself
from the generating principle, but remains intimately identified with it.
In the same way the Logos was not, in the act of generation, separated
from the Father, He continued still to be one with Him (in being.)
Thus the generation of the Logos has not any parallel in the procreation
of created things ; it is essentially different in kind. When, then,
Justin asserts that the Logos is subject (UTTO) to the Father, he must be
understood to mean a subordination of a personal (hypostatical) kind,
not of being or nature. The same is true of the Holy Ghost, who is
described by Justin as the third member of the Divine Trinity.
9. God, as has been said, created the world through the Logos. He
has furnished man with a free will, which enables him to decide for good
and for evil. The same Logos, by which the universe was created, be
came man for the salvation of the world. He abrogated the Old Law,
and proclaimed a New Law. He is then the New Lawgiver (6 Kati'6?
The soul of man does not perish at death, it enters on a
new life where eternal happiness or eternal punishment awaits it. The
dead rise again to life. The first resurrection is for the just only, and
occurs at the second coming of Christ. Thereupon, follows the reign of
Christ on earth with His elect, for a thousand years (Chiliasm.) At the
termination of this period, the general resurrection takes place, and the
Last Judgment is held ; after which each man receives, according to his
works, eternal reward or eternal punishment.
10. With Justin we must associate his pupil Tatian. An Assyrian
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA- '
by birth, Tatian made acquaintance with every branch of Greek litera
ture, and studied the wisdom of paganism in all its forms. But his
inquiries left him unsatisfied. The corruption of the pagan world
inspired him with horror ; even the morals of the philosophers them
selves he regarded as degenerate, and he is severe in his reprobation of
their shortcomings. At length he found in the Christian system the
satisfaction he sought. Under the instruction of Justin he became
a convert to Christianity (A.D. 162.) His excessive rigorism involved
him later in error, and he became the head of a Gnostic sect — the
Encratites, who condemned marriage and the use of flesh and wine as
sinful. He has left a work with the title Omtio contra (ad) Grcecos.
11. In his teaching regarding the Divine Logos, Tatian follows
Justin. Before creation God existed alone, but with Him and in Him,
in virtue of His attribute of intelligence, subsisted (i/Trt'tmjtrt) the Logos.
This Logos proceeded from the Father, not by separation, but by partici
pation, and in thus proceeding from the Father became the Creator of
the world. Here again, we have the distinction between the intrinsic
generation of the Logos and the extrinsic. In his further exposition of
this view, Tatian adduces the analogy of the internal and external word
in man, and remarks at the same time, that the Logos, while proceeding
from God like light from light, becomes the first-begotten work of God
(TTJOWTOTOKOV tpyov Otov), but is not, for this reason, a creature, inasmuch
as He is not separated from God. God is not only the cause, He is also
the hypostasis of the universe — that by which the continued existence of
the universe is conditioned.
12. The entire universe is animated by one vital spirit, which manifests
itself in the several beings in a manner peculiar to each. We must dis
tinguish in man the soul from the spirit (\pv\fi KOI wiv/ua) ; the latter is
the image and likeness of God. He who possesses this spirit is the true
pneumatist, the mere psychicist is distinguished from the brute by the
faculty of speech only. The soul is mortal ; it is the spirit alone that
can make it immortal. Man lost the irviv^a by sin ; only a glimmering
of the divine light is left in him ; he is the slave of matter. To rise to
spiritual life he must despise matter, and free himself from its dominion ;
he will thus conquer the demon who makes use of matter to seduce
the soul.
13. Athenagoras of Athens, an adept in Greek and more especially in
Platonic philosophy, was at first a supporter of paganism. He is said to have
read the Scriptures for the purpose of making an attack on Christianity,
but to have been himself converted to Christianity in consequence of this
study. His work as a Christian writer is said to have been carried out
between A.D. 177 and A.D. 180. He has left two treatises : an apology
addressed to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius under the title Leyatio pro
Christiunis, and a treatise De Resurrcctione Mortuonun. In the former
work he defends the Christians against the triple charge of atheism, of
k-wdness, and of feasting on the flesh of children. In the latter he en
deavours to prove the resurrection of the dead from reason.
14. In his defence of Monotheism, Athenagoras introduces an argu
218 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
ment which we meet here for the first time in Christian literature. If
there be several Gods, he says (Leg. c. 8), they must either be all like
to one another, or they must be different. Neither alternative is
admissible. Not the former, for, as uncreated beings, these Gods could
not be subordinated to the higher archetype to which all should conform.
Not the latter, for in this case they should exist in different places, and
there is no place for a second God, since the space without the boundary
of the world is occupied by that one God who is a supramundane being.*
For this reason the Greek poets and philosophers taught the unity of
God, but a clear and certain knowledge on the point was not attained
till God's revelation was made to the prophets.
15. We hold, then, continues Athenagoras, the unity of God, but
admit also the existence of the Son of God. This Son of God is, accord
ing to us, the Logos of the Father in thought and actuality (lv t&a KOL
tvtpytlq) inasmuch as everything has been created after Him as arche
type, and through Him as instrument. Father and Son are, however,
one. The Son is indeed the first offspring (irpwrov yevi'^/ua) of the Father,
but not in the sense that He ever began to be, for God possessed the
Logos within Him from eternity, God being \oytKog from eternity. The
term only means that the Logos came forth from God to be the ideal
element and the source of energy for all material things (Leg. c. 10.)
Further, we have the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from God like a ray of
light from the sun. Who then would not wonder to hear those described
as atheists who acknowledge God the Father, God the Son, and God the
Holy Ghost, who assert their power by maintaining their unity, and
maintain a distinction by establishing an order of procession !
16. The proofs adduced by Athenagoras to establish the resurrection
of the body are as follows :
(a) Man is one being composed of soul and body. As such he is destined by God to
a fixed end, which end is attained beyond the grave. It follows that he must attain that
end as man, and this can be secured only by supposing the body to be united to the soul
after death. Furthermore, (b) eternal life in God, eternal contemplation of divine truth,
is the supreme good of man. In this supreme good, precisely because it is the supreme
good of man, the body must have its share, and this again, is impossible without a resur
rection of the body. Lastly, (c) it is not the soul only, but the man, as such, who does
the good and the evil of this life ; it must therefore be the man who receives reward or
punishment in the life to come, and this again necessarily supposes the resurrection of
the body. To assert that the resurrection is impossible, we must deny to God the will or
the power to raise men from death to life. Such a denial is absurd. If God has power
t<» create man, He has also the power to raise him from death; nor can He be wanting in
the will to do so, for the resurrection of the dead is neither unrighteous in itself nor
unworthy of God.
17. Theophilus of Antioch, was, according to his own account, con
verted to Christianity by the study of the Sacred Scriptures. In his
treatise, Ad Autolycum, composed soon after A.D. 180, he advises
Autolycus to believe, in order to escape the eternal punishment of hell.
In reply to the challenge of Autolycus : " Show me thy God," Theo
philus writes (I. 1) : " Show me thy man ;" that is to say, Prove to me
* It is possible indeed to suppose the second God existing in another world or beyond
Its periphery, but such a God would have no concern with us, and, moreover, being
restricted as to the sphere of his existence and his action, he would not be really God at all.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
that you are free from sin, for it is only the pure can see God. To the
challenge, " Describe your God for me," he replies (I. 3) : " The being
of God is not describable ; His dignity, greatness, sublimity, power,
wisdom, goodness and mercy, surpass human conception/' He is the
absolute, the ungenerated, the immutable, the immortal. He is known
from His works, just as the orderly movement of a ship argues the pre
sence of the pilot. He has called all things forth from non-being to
being (eg-ouic OVTWV £tc TO tlvai) in order that His greatness might be
manifested by the things which He created.
18. It was by means of the Logos that He created all things. An
tecedently to all other existence, God had with Him the Logos;
for the Logos is His Intelligence and His Wisdom. The Logos had an
eternal existence (as Xoyoc ev&a&rbc) within the being — in the heart of
God (tv KapS'tu Otov.) But when God wished to give existence to the
things which He had determined to create, He brought forth the Logos
from Himself — Xoyoc irpoQopiKog, as the first-born of all creatures, but
not in such wise that He separated Himself from the Logos ; the Logos
though begotten remained still united to Him. Through the Xoyoc 77/00-
0optk-oc He created the world. The three days which preceded the
creation of light typify the Trinity which consists of God, his Word, and
his Wisdom (Holy Ghost).
19. God who has created us can and will create us again at the
resurrection. The titles of the gods of the Greeks are the names of
deified mortals. The worship of the images of the gods is wholly irra
tional. The teachings of the heathen poets and philosophers are folly.
The sacred writings of Moses and the Prophets are the most ancient of
all, and contain the truth which the Greeks forgot or neglected.
20. Examining the teaching of the Apologists, regarding the Divine
Logos, we notice that all of them distinguish a triple generation of the
Word — His generation within the divinity as a Divine Person, an
extrinsic generation in order to the creation of the world, and lastly,
His generation in the flesh or Incarnation. In their teaching regarding
the intrinsic and extrinsic generations of the Logos, they adopt the dis
tinction established by Philo between the Xoyoe !v8wi0eroc and the Xifyoc
7r0o0o0(Koc — expression? which we find in Justin as well as in Theo-
philus. Their modes of expression might at times appear to suggest
the notion that they made the personal existence of the Logos to begin
with His extrinsic generation. But this is not their meaning. The pre
dicates which they attribute to the Xoyoc IvSiaOtToz prove convincingly,
as we have seen, that they were far from ascribing to the Xoyoc IvStatftTos
a merely impersonal existence, or from reducing the Xoyoc to a mere
modality, or form of Divine power.*
* In addition to the Apologists named above, we may further mention : Quadratus,
Aristides, Mileto of Sardis, who addressed an Apology to the fhnperor Marcus Aurelius
(about A.D. 170) ; Apollinaris of Hierapolis, who also addressed a Aoyof to the same
Emperor in favour of the Christians, and who wrote Ilpof "E\\i}vai; avyypa^^ara
•jrtvTf. ; Miltiades, a Christian rhetorician, who composed an Apology as well as \6yovg
Trpot,* "KXXrjj'ac &nd irput; 'lovcaiuvg (none of these writings are extant), and Hermias,
whose work Irrixio PhUofOphontm Gentilium, is still preserved. Aristo of Pella in Pales
tine, a Jew by birth, like Justin in his Dialogue Cum Try phone, composed a treatise
against Jud.-tism (about A.D. 140).
220 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
THE ANTI-GNOSTICS AND ANTI-MONARCHIANISTS.
IllKN^EUS, HlPPOLYTUS, TERTULLIAN.
S66
1. We have now arrived at those ecclesiastical writers of the Ante-
Nicene period, whose efforts were chiefly directed to defend Christianity
against the misrepresentations of the Gnostic and Monarchianist heretics.
These writers did not, indeed, omit to defend Christianity against the
pagans, but their immediate concern wras the confutation of the Gnostic
and Monarchianist errors, and this was also the chief part of their work.
The most remarkable of these Apologists are Irenseus, Hippolytus and
Tertullian.
2. Irenaeus, born in Asia Minor, A.D. 140, a disciple of the martyr
Polycarp, was, at a later period, presbyter of the church of Lyons, and
ultimately bishop of that city. He died a martyr in the persecution of
Severus, A.D. 202. His chief work, " Exposure and Refutation of the
False Gnosis " (IXey^oc K.OL avaTpoTri) rrjc ^//cvSovu/^ov yviovtwc) has come
down to us in an ancient Latin translation (Ach\ Hcercs. II. 5). Several
fragments of the original text, notably a large portion of the first book,
have also been preserved.
3. The Gnostics had appealed in support of their system to certain
secret doctrines supposed to have been communicated by Jesus. Against
this assumption Irenaous emphatically protests. The true doctrine, the
real Gnosis, is the teaching of the Church, the doctrine handed down in
the Church from the Apostles. Whoever departs from this teaching
departs from truth. It must not be supposed that the human mind can
comprehend all things. Whoever thinks to understand everything — to
leave no secret to God — falls into error. God is incomprehensible, and
cannot be measured by man's power of thought. Our concepts of Him
are all imperfect. "It is better, knowing nothing, to believe in God,
and to persevere in His love, than to pursue subtle inquiries which end
in atheism/'
4. The Gnostics further distinguished between God and the
Demiurgos, assigning to the latter a subordinate rank. Here again
Ireiiicus meets them with denial. God is Himself the Creator of the
world. He has created all things by Himself, that is, by His Word
and His Wisdom. In the work of creation He had no need of angels
or other powers different from Himself. He could Himself execute
PHILOSOPHY 01- THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 221
whatever He proposed. For this purpose, the Logos, with the Spirit,
\\-us always with Him, and through the so and in. these He created the
world.
5. In opposition to the Gnostic view, representing Christ as a sub
ordinate ^Eon, Irenfcus maintains that the Logos (as well as the Spirit)
is eternal, like the Father, and one with Him in being. The Son of God,
he asserts, has not had a beginning, He is co-existent with the Father
from eternity. The heretics find an analogy between the spoken word
of man (Ao-yoe Trpo^opiKog) and the Eternal Word of God, and argue
that the latter has had a beginning and has been produced, just as the
spoken word begins to exist and is produced, when it is uttered. But
how, then, does the Word of God, who is Himself God, differ from the
word of man, if both came into existence after the same fashion ? No,
the Word of God is co-existent with the Father from eternity, nor has
He ever passed through any process of production, but has ever been a
perfect Word. The same is true of the Spirit.
6. We must also acknowledge not only an equality in eternity but
also a likeness of being between the Logos and the Father. The T)ivine
Being is absolutely simple ; the emanation of a world of -ZEonsfrom God
is absurd ; the possibility of a partition of the Divine Being among a
world of JEoiis is wholly impossible. The "emission" of the Logos by
the Father is, therefore, not to be understood as a separation from the
Father's being ; for the Divine being does not admit of such partition ;
the Son, proceeding from His Father, remains one with Him in being.
In this unity of being with the Father, the Son becomes, so to speak, the
organ of divine revelation, the minister of the divine decrees, the dis
penser of divine grace, the delegate of the Father. It is only in so far
as the Father is the origin of the being and activity of the Son that the
Sou can be said to be subordinated to Him. In essence and being, the
Son is His equal.
7. The Valentinians had maintained that the Demiurgus created the
world, according to a plan given him from above ; Irenocus, on the other
hand, asserts that God Himself created the world, and in his work fol
lowed a plan not derived from other sources, but contained within His
own mind. The Marcionites tad asserted that the true God was unknown
till the coining of Christ. Irenacus teaches that the true God could not
remain unknown, for He had manifested Himself in creation, and men
could rise from this creation to the knowledge of God. If, as a fact,
they had not knowledge of Him, the fault was their own. God, it is
true, is invisible and incomprehensible, but He is not so completely hid
den that man could have no knowledge of Him without the Incarnation
of the Logos. The better minds of paganism had actually attained
knowledge of Him through His works.
8. Irenocus is equally emphatic in his rejection of the doctrine of
the Marcionites that the Old and the New Testament are derived from
two different sources — the Demiurgus and the " good " God. The Old
Testament and the New, he holds, are the same in nature, and are both
derived from the one true God. The natural law of morals God has
222 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
written in the heart of man, the ceremonial law, in which Christianity
was typified, was given to the Jews because of their tendency to fall away
from God. Christ fulfilled the type, and by the fact, the ceremonial
law was fulfilled and abrogated, but the moral law remains. The Old
Law was thus merely the forerunner of the New, and is, therefore, of
the same nature.
9. The Gnostics had taught that man was formed of body, soul, and
spirit. Irenaeus teaches that man is composed of body and soul ; the
Soul being the vital principle of the compound. The (Divine) Spirit is
not an attribute of man's nature, it is given only that man may become
perfect. Man, by his soul, is the image of God (imago Dei), by the
Spirit he is raised to likeness with God (ad similitudinem Dei). Man
participates in the (Divine) Spirit by grace only. This Spirit is bestowed
on those who restrain and control their passions. Such men become
Pneumatists ; other men are merely Psychicists. As for the body or
flesh, it is not at all the source of evil, as the Gnostics asserted ; it is,
like everything else, created by God. The source of evil is the abuse of
free will, the deliberate surrender of man to his sensual appetites.
There is no such thing as immediate contemplation (Gnosis) of truth in
its fulness, such as the Gnostics lay claim to. Man must learn; his
knowledge is only a partial knowledge, which grows in proportion as
man learns.
10. The soul of man is immortal. But it cannot lift itself to God
immediately after death. It must first enter into Hades, and there
remain till "the resurrection. The doctrine of the heretics regarding the
resurrection of the body, as well as regarding the human nature of
Christ, must be met with a peremptory denial. The reign of Antichrist,
that is of Satan incarnate, precedes the resurrection by a short period.
Christ, then, comes again, destroys the Kingdom of Antichrist, and
restores the just to life. Thereupon begins the reign of Christ with His
elect on earth — a reign which lasts a thousand years, after which follows
the General Judgment. The just enter, with Christ, into the Kingdom
of the Father, the wicked are condemned to eternal reprobation.
11. With Irenaeus is associated his pupil, Hippolytus, a presbyter of
Home, who was banished to Sicily about A.D. 235. We possess a treatise
written by him with the title, Kara Traawv at/oEaiwv eAfyxo^, of which,
till a late period, only the first book was known to the learned, under the
name Origen-es Philosophoumena. In this work Hippolytus sets himself
to prove that " the Gnostic errors have been derived, not from Sacred
Scripture, nor from Christian Tradition, but from the lore of the Greeks,
the teachings of philosophers, the mysteries, and astrology," an opinion
to which Irenscus had already given expression. For the rest, Hippolytus
deals with the teaching of the Gnostics in much the same way as his
master, Irenanis.
12. His polemical work. Contra Hcprcsitn Noeti, is of more importance.
Hippolytus here attacks the system of the Monarchianists, and maintains,
in opposition to their teaching, the Trinity of God. The Lord, he points
out, does not say, "I and the Father am one," but, "I and the Father
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
are one '' — an expression which indicates that Father and Son are two
persons (irpoaMTra) whose power is one and the same. " And, therefore,
must Noetus, whether he will or no, confess God the Almighty Father,
and Jesus Christ, the Son of God, God who has become man, and to
whom the Father has subjected all things — Himself and the Holy Ghost
excepted — and he must further acknowledge that these (the Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost) are really three.'' God is, therefore, one in power ;
but as regards the Economy of the Godhead (intrinsic relations), He is
threefold. " We do not admit two Gods but only one, but we admit
two Persons, with a third intrinsic relation (Economy) which we name
the grace of the Holy Ghost. The Father is one, but there are two
Persons, for there is also the Son ; a third Person also is the Holy Ghost:
waTrip fULtvyap etc, Trpoffwrra £f Suo, ort KCU 6 uto^, TO Strpirov (Trporrwirov)
TO ayiov nv£v/ma.
13. The world has been created by the Logos, at the command of the
Father, and has been created from nothing. The world, therefore, is
not God, and may cease to be, if the Creator so wills it. Man has been
created a dependent being, but endowed with freedom of will ; it is in
the misuse of this free will that evil has its origin. God imposed the
Law upon man as upon a free being ; the beast is ruled by the whip and
the bridle, man by law, reward and punishment. The Law was promul
gated from the beginning through just men, notably through Moses ;
the Logos, who at all times had been active impelling and exhorting men
to its observance, at last appeared on earth as the Son of the Virgin.
Man is not God ; " but if you wish to become divine (d & 0lAae. icat 0eo£
ytviaOat), obey the Creator and do not transgress His law, so that, being
found faithful in a few things, you may be placed over many."
14. We pass now to Tertullian. Tertullian was born at Carthage,
A.D. 160, of heathen parents. Nature had endowed him with a quick
and penetrating intellect, and a vivid imagination. He studied phil
osophy and the fine arts, and adopted the law as a profession. The
circumstances which led to his conversion to Christianity — an event
which happened in his thirtieth year — have not been recorded. After
his conversion, he entered the ranks of the priesthood, and devoted him
self to the defence of Christianity with voice and pen. Unf< >rtunately,
the rigorism of his views led him ultimately to join the Montanists
(A.D. 203.) Whether he again returned to the Catholic Church is un
certain. He died A.D. 240.
15. The writings of Tertullian are, some of them apologies on behalf of the Christian
teaching, and of the conduct of the Christians under persecution ; some of them dogmatic
and polemical treatises against the heretics (Gnostics and Monarchianists) ; and some of
them treatises on ethical questions. To the first class belong : the Apologcticm, De
Idololalria, Ad Natiojies, Ad Marti/res, De Spectaculi*, DC Testimonio aninur, De Corona
Militis, Defwja in Persecutions, Contra Gnosticos Scorpiace, Ad Scapulam. To the second
class belong: De Prcuoriptiontim* Hcereticorum, Adr. Mardonem, Adv. Hernwyenem,
Adv. Valeniinianos, A<h\ Praxeam, De Came Chriali, De Rwtrrectione Carni*, DeAnima.
so are the last two of the first class, and all in the second, with the exception of that
first named.
224 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
16. Tertullian is not so great an admirer of Greek philosophy as
Justin. He takes pleasure in exposing the errors of the Greek philo
sophers, in order to exalt Christianity by comparison with them. But
this antipathy is not directed against Greek philosophy for its own
sake ; Tertullian's zeal is aroused chiefly by the misuse which the heretics
had made of the philosophy of the Greeks to establish their own systems,
and to misrepresent Christianity. It is against the heretics his con
demnation is primarily directed. His constant complaint is, that the
philosophers have been the patriarchs of heresy. Yalentinus, he says,
was equipped by the Platonists, Marcion by the Stoics ; from the
Epicureans comes the denial of the immortality of the soul, and from
every school of philosophy the denial of the resurrection of the dead.
17. In his apologetic writings, Tertullian directs his very sharp con
troversial weapons against the polytheism of paganism and the super
stitions connected with it. He asks the advocates of polytheism to hear
the voice of nature in themselves. If they will but listen to this voice,
they will be forced to acknowledge the unity of God. The soul, in a
moment of sudden fright, or under the influence of any eager desire,
turns involuntarily to the one true God, and not to an idol. This is
shown by the exclamations which are used involuntarily on such
occasions, v.g., "God grant it," " if God wills it," or, "please God,"
&c. In this way the soul of itself gives testimony to the one true God,
nature itself is the teacher, through whom God instructs us regarding
Himself. The Soul is, by nature, Christian. (De Test. Animce.)
18. In his celebrated work, De Prcexcriptionibus Hcereticonim, Tertullian
maintains the prescriptive right of the Church against all heretics. The
Church is antecedent to all heresies. Her teaching is thus the original,
and therefore the only true teaching. Whatever has separated itself
from her at a later period, and set itself up in opposition to her, is eo
ipso false ; the Church's teaching has a prescriptive right as opposed to
these innovations. We can receive as truth only that which comes to
us by ecclesiastical tradition. The tradition transmitted to us by the
Apostles is the tradition transmitted by the Church, and conversely.
The traditional teaching of the Church must not be abandoned under
pretext of following the tradition received from the Apostles, as the
heretics make profession of doing. " If thou art a Christian," says
Tertullian, " believe what has been handed down."
19. In his controversies with the Marcionites, Tertullian, like Justin,
endeavours to prove that knowledge of the true God does not come
exclusively from the revelation made through Christ ; that there is a
twofold knowledge of God, a natural knowledge which begins with the
works of creation, and thence ascends to the Creator, and a knowledge
bestowed through prophecy (revelation). The first knowledge pre
cedes the second. The soul exists first, prophecy comes after. But, as
we have seen, the soul, of its nature, gives testimony to the true God.
The consciousness of God's existence is one of its natural endowments.
The true God cannot be entirely beyond its knowledge, as the Marcionites
hold. He is knowable without the aid of prophecy (revelation).
PHILOSOPHY OF TIM- MIKISTIAN ERA. 225
20. The Marcionites are equally in error when they assume the
existence of two Gods— the God of Goodness and the God of Justice
(the Supreme God, and the Demiurgus.) God is the Summurn Moffnvm
the highest and greatest being of whom we can have conception If
this is so, God must be one. If there were another like Himself He
would cease to be the Sammiun Ifaffnum, for a still higher beW would
be conceivable, namely, the being who would have no other like him
self. It follows that if God is not one, He does not exist at all • it is
easier to believe that a thing does not exist at all, than to believe that
t exists otherwise than is required by its nature. The heretics are in
error when they assert goodness and justice to be incompatible with
one another, and ascribe them in consequence to two different Gods •
so far is it from the truth that goodness and justice exclude one
another, that it may be said of either that it includes the other ; for the
man who is not just, cannot be good, and rice versa. (Adv. Marc' I c 3 )
21 The heretics had represented the being of God as purely'ideal
and had pushed this conception so far that the belief in the reality of
the Divine Being was endangered. Tertullian protests emphatically
against this view. He goes so far in the contrary direction, that while
ho ding God to be spiritual in his nature, he ascribes to Him a body also
All reality, he says, is corporeal ; it is only the non-existent which can
be described as incorporeal. Tertullian cannot conceive of a substance
which is not of the corporeal order. « Ipsa substantia corpus est rei
cujusque ; such is his formula. (Adv. Hermog., c. 35.) Following the
analogy of man s nature, he distinguishes in God the body from the
spirit, and understands the expressions of Scripture regarding the eves
hands, feet, &c., of God in a strictly literal sense. This is certainly a
peculiar view \Ve must, however, allow that he does not attribute to
God a material body ; such a doctrine would be in absolute contradiction
with other points of his teaching regarding the nature of God He
attributes a corporeal being to God in the same sense in which he 'attri
butes a corporeal element to the human soul, a peculiarity of his system
which we shall presently examine.
22 In opposition to the Monarchianists, Tertullian upholds the one
ness of God ma Trinity of intrinsic Divine relations (Economy)
Praxeas and his followers, he says, assert that we cannot maintain the
iity of God, if we do not regard the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as
one and the same thing. -Just as if all were not one, when all came
rom one in virtue, that is to say, of the oneness of substance, while at
the same time the mystery of the Economy (system of intrinsic relations)
» maintained which determines this unity to threefold Being, distin
guishing from one another the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost
not indeed separating them in rank, but establishing a gradation (order)
among them; not differentiating them in substance but in form
person) ; not 111 power but in character (species). They are one in
substance, in rank, and in power, for there is only one God, from whom
arise these gradations forms, or characters, which bear the names
bather, Son, and Holy Ghost." (Aftr. Prat., c. 2.)
16
226 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
23. Eternal matter, according to the conception of ITerraogenes, can
not exist. " Before all things God existed alone, constituting in Himself
His own universe, place of abode, and all the rest. And yet, even then,
He was not wholly alone, for He had by Him that Reason (ratio) which
the Holy Scripture names Sophia. With this Sophia, which He estab
lished in Himself as a Second Person, He deliberated, so to say, on all
which He had determined to produce extrinsically to Himself. When
He began the creation of the world He sent forth this Sophia as His
Word, in order to create all things through it. It was thus the world
came into existence. In this procession of the Word from God at the
creation, the perfect generation of the Word is, furthermore, accom
plished. For thenceforward the Word takes a position of perfect equa
lity with Him from whom He issues and whose Son He becomes — the
First-born Son, because generated before all other things — the Only-
begotten, because He alone is generated by God, generated from the
very depth of the Divine Being, from the generative centre of the heart
of God." (Adv. Prax., c. 6).
24. Here we encounter again the notion of a twofold generation of
the Logos, an intrinsic, and an extrinsic, which we have already found
set forth by the Apologists. Tertullian, however, expressly repudiates
the notion of an extrinsic generation in the sense of the Yalentinian
7TjOoj3oA)y. " We do not hold the Son to be a being separated from the
Father, as Yalentinus does ; according to our teaching this Word
remains ever in the Father ; and with the Father, He is never separated
from the Father nor becomes other (in essence) than the Father ; f or ' I
and the Father are one.' '' Tertullian is equally emphatic in asserting
that the intrinsic generation precedes the extrinsic, that the Sophia,
before it issued forth to create the world, had previously existed in God
as " Secunda Persona condita." The peculiar point of his doctrine is
that in which he maintains that the Sophia was fully generated, and could
properly be named " Son/' only when it issued forth for the creation of
the world.
25. The world has been created from nothing, not formed from a
pre-existent matter, as the heretics suppose ; it follows that the world
has not existed from eternity. God was God before the creation ; sub
sequently to creation He was Lord ; the former is a term which designates
His Being, the latter designates His Power. (Adv. Hcrmog., c. 3.)
Man has been created to the image of God, for, in forming the first
man, God took as model the manhood of the future Christ. (I)c Remrr.
Carn.i c. 6.) The gods of the heathens are fallen angels, who were
seduced from allegiance to God by love of mortal women. (De Cult.
Fern., I. 2.)
26. In his teaching regarding the nature of the human soul,
Tertullian meets his heretical opponents with arguments similar to those
which led him to attribute a body to God. The soul, according to him,
is not an incorporeal essence. Just as in the whole man we distinguish
two constituent parts — soul and body— so in the soul we must make a
distinction between the spiritual and corporeal elements. These elements
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN KRA. 227
are, no doubt, bound together in essential unity, and are inseparable
from one another ; the former, however, may, in a certain sense, be styled
the soul of the soul, and the latter its body. To establish this view of
the corporeal nature of the soul, Tertullian has recourse to the argu
ments of the Stoics. If the soul were not corporeal, it could not be
affected by the action of the body, nor would it be capable of suffering.
No union could be effected between the corporeal and the incorporeal,
for there could be no contact between them. Children resemble their
parents in mind as well as in body — a phenomena which is inexplicable
if we do not suppose the soul to be corporeal. (De Aninia, c, 5.)
27. In our concept of the soul, we must represent to ourselves a
subtle, luminous, ethereal essence. It is possessed of the same form and
the same organs as the body, inasmuch as it is diffused through every
part of the body. It grows with the growth of the body ; not by any
addition to its substance, but rather by a development of its faculties
and organs. Its growth may be compared to the gradual expansion of
&, plate of gold under the hammer ; the metal does not increase in sub
stance, but grows in extent and in brilliancy. Though the soul is cor
poreal, its substance cannot be increased or diminished ; it is indivisible
and indissoluble. (De Anim. c. 37.)
28. With regard to the origin of the soul, Tertullian is in favour of
the theory of generation (Traducianism) . The soul is generated by
the parents at the same time as the body and in the same way. In
generation a twofold germ is produced, a psychical and a bodily ; and
just as the latter is detached from the bodies of the parents, so is the
former from their souls. These two elements are at first blended
together, but they gradually separate, and the soul of the child is formed
from the one, its body from the other. In accordance with this view it
may be said that Adam's soul was the parent of all other souls. (D<
Anima, c. 19, 20, 29.)
29. Tertullian rejects the Gnostic view regarding the three consti
tuents of man's nature — body, soul, and spirit. According to him,
man is made up of body and soul, he is one being composed of soul and
flesh. What we call reason (VOVQ, mens, animus), is merely a faculty
of the soul — that faculty by which it thinks and wills. Tertullian,
furthermore, establishes the closest relations between intellect and sense.
Intellect is indebted to sense for all its cognitions, the latter is the guide,
the author, and the foundation of all. intellectual activity; it is not
second in rank to intellect, it rather takes rank above it.
30. The degradation and condemnation of the flesh, which formed a
leading heretical tenet, receives no support from Tertullian. Soul and
body are, according to his view, intimately bound together, are the com
plements of one another. The soul is the vital principle of the body,
and the body, in its turn, is an organ for the accomplishment of the
special functions of the soul. Without the soul the flesh could not
live; without the flesh the soul could not act. There is no activity of
the soul which is not dependent on the body and effected by means of it.
So closely are soul and body united, that we might well be in doubt
228 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
whether the soul sustains the body or the body the soul, whether the
soul obeys the body or the body obeys the soul. Following this line of
thought, Tertullian was able at length to propose the question : TV hat
is man other than flesh ? " (De Rcsurr. Carnis, c. 15.)
•31 This reasoning disposed of the heretical notion that the body
is the source of evil. Evil, according to Tertullian, has its source
exclusively in the abuse of human liberty. It is not the flesh as such,
which stands in the way of man's salvation, but the works of the flesh,
which the soul accomplishes in the body, and with its co-operation
The first man sinned by an abuse of his free will, and the souls ot all
other men being derived from the soul of the first man, his sin has been
transmitted to his posterity. From the same source has come what we
term the irrational part of the soul— that element within it which rebels
ao-aiiist reason. Sin was implanted in the soul, and grew with i
development, till at last it seemed a part of its very nature. This is the
irrational element within the soul, which may rightly be said to come
from the devil. There remains in us, however, a remnant of good,
something of the divine image ; what comes from God may be obscured,
it cannot be extinguished. (De Anima, c. 16.)
32 The heretics had taught that the flesh had not shared m the
BcdeinptioD effected by Christ, that it had been the scope of the
Redemption to deliver the soul from the body. This doctrine rerlulkan
combats with all his dialectical resources. So little is .it true that the
flesh is excluded from the benefits of the Redemption, that the redemp
tion and sanctification of the soul is dependent upon the body. Redemp
tion first affects the body, and through the body reaches the soul.
Baptism the flesh is first washed and then the soul thereby purified.
In Penance the body is subjected to the imposition of hands, in order
that the soul may be enlightened and purified by the fire of the Spirit.
The body is refreshed with the Body and Blood of Christ, that the soul
may be nurtured by God. The flesh is, therefore, the corner-stone of
salvation "Be comforted, flesh and blood," cries Tertullian, "you
have won the kingdom of Christ," (De Rcsurr. Carnis, c. 51.)
33 Tertullian maintains the immortality of the soul against pagans
and heretics. Here again he appeals to the voice of nature An
instinct of our nature forces us to wish well to the dead, to bewail them
or to account them happy. If the soul is not immortal, this voice of
nature has no meaning. Moreover, we have a natural fear of death.
Now if the soul is mortal, why should we fear death which is a deliver
ance from the ills of life ? Finally, we ambition lasting renown among
men. To what purpose this ambition if the soul be not immortal :
(De Test. Animce, c. 4.; De Came Christi, c. 12.)
34 Tertullian is not content with the immortality ot the soul. M
teaching, regarding the nature and destiny of the body, furnishes him
with arguments by which to maintain, against the heretics, the resur
rection of the dead. There is no transmigration of souls. ^ No souls,
with the exception of the souls of martyrs, enter heaven immediately
after death; but neither do they enter into otber bodies; they are all
PHILOSOPHY 01' THE CHRISTIAN EK \. 220
kept in Hades till the Day of Judgment. When that time comes, the
bodies of men will be raised from the dead and united again to their
souls. Man, in his composite nature of soul and body, has done the
good and the evil of life ; soul and body must, therefore, each have a
share in the final retribution. Moreover, the resurrection of the dead
is typified in nature, and, in a certain sense, assured, by the fact that
in every sphere of nature new life springs from things inanimate. (De
Jtrttiirr. CarniSy c. 14.)
35. It is hardly necessary, after this exposition of Tertullian's teach
ing, to mention that he was strongly adverse to the Docetism of the
Gnostics. In his treatise, De Came Christi, he sets himself to establish
irrefragably the reality of the human nature of Christ. The Chiliasm,
which we have seen to be a part of the doctrines of Irenocus, we find in
favour with Tertullian also. On the whole, the writings of Tertullian
furnish evidence of his acuteness of intellect, his zeal for the truth, and
his strong moral sense. The errors which we meet in his works may
impair our admiration for his intellectual greatness, but cannot wholly
destroy it. Heresy found in him a dauntless and powerful opponent.
TlIE BEGINNING OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.
1. As Christianity spread, and its influence in stimulating the moral
and religious sense of mankind became more widely felt, the tendency
to study it, not merely for purposes of defence, but with a view to the
establishment of an independent system of Christian speculation, was
gradually evoked. Apology was not, indeed, wholly laid aside. The
defence of Christianity against the attacks of heathen philosophers
and heretics was still recognised as an essential part of the work of the
Christian scholar. But the Christian controversialists now aimed at
achieving this result by the construction of a system of positive Christian
science. This was all the more desirable now that the training of the
members of the Christian priesthood called for the foundation of higher
Christian schools, and the instruction which it was necessary to impart
to these schools made an advance upon mere apology indispensable.
2. The earliest beginnings of this independent Christian speculation
belong to the ante-Nicene period, and are due to the so-called Cateche
tical Schools which flourished in the second century, chiefly at Alexan
dria. The Catechetical Schools of Alexandria may have been founded
in imitation of the schools of Greek learning, for Athenagoras is said to
have helped in their establishment. In the year A.D. 180, we find them
under the control of Panta3nus, who had been a Stoic before his conver
sion to Christianity. His colleague and (subsequently to A.D. 189) his
successor, Titus Flavius Clement, of Alexandria, taught there also, and
after Clement, his pupil, Origen. Under the two last-named teachers
these schools attained their highest renown, and it is to these men
230 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
Christianity is indebted for the first beginnings of an independent body
of speculative science.
8 During the third century the effort to replace the earlier apology
bv a positive Christian philosophy, which should supplement and perfect
if was exhibited in the west as well as in the east. In the west, how
ever there were no remarkable Christian schools to form a centre for
this movement. But the desire for a more prof ound insight into revealed
truth impelled certain eminent men to do for the west what the teachers
of the Catechetical Schools were doing for the east. Amongst these
men we may mention Minutius Felix, Arnobms, and Lactantius, all
whom lived and laboured in the ante-Nicene period.
4. We shall notice in order Clement of Alexandria and Ongen, and
then Minutius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius.
CLEMENT or ALEXANDRIA.
§ 67.
1. Clement was born about the middle of the second century, at
Alexandria, as some maintain— at Athens, as it is asserted by others.
Gifted with extraordinary powers of intellect, he applied himself
study of the various systems of Greek philosophy, and acquired in the
study a knowledge which was at once comprehensive and profound.
Under the influence of divine grace he became a Christian. But the
character of his labours did not change with his conversion.
was to acquire a prof ounder knowledge of truth, and his ambition to lead
others to share his knowledge. After many wanderings he settled at Alex
andria, became a member of the Catechetical School, and after the death
of its president, Pantrenus, succeeded to his office. In this capacity n
laboured with unceasing energy in the cause of science and education
When the persecution of Septimus Severus began (A.D. 202), he retired
to Cappadocia. It is not known whether he again returned to Alexan
dria. He died A.D. 217.
2 The writings of Clement which have come down to us, are : (a) The Cohortatjoad
Gentts (Xoyoe rp1rp£irrUc6C Wp6C 'EX\hva,), in which he cites the extravagances and im-
propr etie-s of the heathen mythology and mysteries as arguments against paganism and
Shorts all to come to Christ . (b) The Pafdagogus an exposition of the moml law of the
Christian system, (c) The Stromata, in eight books, scientific studies of Cnnst.an tii
and discuss ions on the Christian Gnosis, not arranged in any systematic order (a. Clement
himself declares, and as the title of the work, which implies its resemblance to a ^negated
carpet signifies), but expressed in the form of aphorisms ; and lastly (d) A treatise under
the title *Quis Dives Salvetur (riQ 6 eutfpivoc ir\o*«oc), with fragmentary remains
of other works.
3 With regard to the position providentially assigned to Greek
philosophy, as preparatory to Christianity, Clement is at one with Justin.
He draws a distinction between the sum of truth that philosophy contan
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 231
and its errors. The former he attributes to the Divine Logos, as its
ultimate source, the latter he ascribes to man. In a twofold sense the
Divine Logos is, for him, the author of the truth contained in Greek
philosophy. In the first place, he maintains, the Greek philosophers
learnt from the Jews, and were then so far wanting in honesty as to
claim as their own discovery what the Jews had taught them, and what
they had themselves only falsified and perverted. In the second place,
he appeals to the saying of Sacred Scripture that the Divine Logos has
enlightened all men, and he holds that the Greek philosophers were
themselves led to the discovery of certain truths in virtue of the germs
of the Divine Logos implanted in the faculty of reason.
4. From this point of view, Greek philosophy — so far as its sum of
truth is concerned, appears to Clement to be a gift of God, bestowed
through the Logos ; as Revelation was given through Moses and the
Prophets, and designed, like Revelation, to prepare the way for Christ.
It was given to the heathens to lead them to righteousness, and hence,
they who, in pre-christian times, lived according to the law of reason,
were justified before God, inasmuch as their lives were in accord with
the laws of the Divine Logos revealed in their own reason. The heathen
philosophers had, however, but a partial knowledge of the truth,
the fulness of truth was revealed for the first time in Christ.
Plato is the most excellent of the Greek philosophers ; in the system of
the others there are seeds of truth, but the difficulty is to find these out
and separate them from the errors.
5. This estimate of the essential character of the Greek philosophy
leads up to Clement's theory regarding the Christian Gnosis. In his
view, faith m the Christian teaching, as maintained in the Church, is the
starting point and the basis of the Christian Griosis. Whoever aban
dons ecclesiastical traditions, ceases, by the fact, to be of God. Faith,
then, in its relation to the Christian Gnosis holds a position analogous to
that of the Trp6\r)\pt£ of the Stoics. According to these philosophers the
TTftoX^tc; is a condition pre-requisite to the iirKm'^ ; such too is the re
lation, of faith to the Gnosis. Faith is a Tr/ooA^c IKOVVIOZ, a free assent
to the unseen ; without which a Gnosis is impossible (Strom. II., 2, 4, 5).
6. The mere TTIOTI^ (faith) is not JVOKTI^. The Christian Gnostic
in comparison with him who believes, without deeper knowledge, is what
the man is compared with the child. To advance from Tt'iariq to yvuais
the aid of philosophy is necessary. Philosophy alone can help us to pass
from mere belief to profounder speculative knowledge. The man who
seeks to^ reach the Gnosis without philosophy, dialectic, and the study of
nature, is like the man who would gather grapes without rearing the vine.
(Strom. I., 9.) Philosophy is essentially a gift of the Divine Logos;
the character of a means to the attainment of the Christian Gnosis can
and must be accorded to it ; in a right view of Christianity it cannot be
set aside.
7. Philosophy is, however, only a theoretical requirement of the
Christian Gnosis ; there is a practical requirement also. The man
who passes from Faith to Gnosis must repent of his^sins, and enter
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
upon the path of moral improvement. He must fight against the
desires and appetites of his own heart, and overcome them effectually.
He must strive to cultivate in himself all kinds of virtue, and put forth
every energy to attain personal sanctity. It is only where this previous
purification and perfection of self has been accomplished, that philosophic
effort, based upon Faith, can lead to the Gnosis.
8. With regard to the Gnosis itself, it essentially includes two factors.
The first concerns the intelligence. In the Gnosis, the Gnostic attains
to the understanding of that which before had been obscure and unin
telligible. He has knowledge of everything that is, that has been, and
that will be, in their ultimate causes. Christian truth stands clear and
luminous before his eyes. The second factor concerns the will It is the
perfection of love. Knowledge without love is nothing ; mTove know
ledge attains its final perfection. Love must therefore be united with
knowledge, if the Gnosis is perfect. And since love in its turn, is
nothing without the good works in which it reveals itself, it follows that
good works must attend upon the Gnosis as the shadow upon the body.
(Strom. VII., 10, 12.)
9. This doctrine of the Christian Gnosis furnishes Clement with the
outlines of that picture of the Christian Gnostic which he presents as the
ideal of Christian perfection. In setting up this ideal he is imitating
the Stoics, substituting his " Christian Gnostic" for their " Sage." We
even find the fundamental outlines of the "Stoic Sage'' reproduced in
the "Christian Gnostic." The chief characteristic of the Christian
Gnostic is, as in the Stoic ideal, the airaOtia or complete absence from
the soul of all affections and excitements of passion (iraOrj}, and the tran
quillity of mind thence resulting in every situation and vicissitude of life.
(Strom. IV., 22.'.
10. The following is the description of the Christian Gnostic pre
sented to us by Clement : The Gnostic is united in perfect and immediate
love with Infinite Beauty, and beyond this he desires nothing. He does
not do good from fear of any punishment, nor from hope of any reward,
but merely for God's sake, and for sake of the good done. Even if he
were assured that he would not be punished for evil deeds, he would not
perform such actions, and this for the sole reason that they are against
right reason, that they are evil. He is not mastered by any inclination
or any appetite ; only those appetites are admitted in his nature which
are indispensable for the support of bodily life, and they are satisfied only
RO far as the support of life requires. Affections and passions do not
disturb his lofty calm of mind ; to such influences he is inaccessible.
This airaQua. of the Gnostic raises him to a certain divine condition, for
in it he attains to likeness with God who is essentially a7ra#rj£. In this
state his works are wholly perfect (jcaro/oflwjuara), for they are performed
purely for righteousness' sake.
11. It will be seen that Clement makes very exorbitant demands on the
Christian Gnostic. The ideal "Stoic Sage " is not in keeping with the
nature of man as it exists : the same may perhaps be said of the ideal set
up by Clement. He makes practically the same demands upon the
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN Ki: \. 233
" Gnostic " that the Stoics made upon the " Sage." He does not, indeed,
impose it as a duty upon every Christian to attain to this height of per
fection, he restricts this obligation to the chosen few, but it is somewhat
ominous to find him characterising the knowledge reached in the Gnosis
as a kind of Jiiildi'n lore, which has come down by oral tradition from the
Apostles (Strom. L. 6. c. 7, p. 246. Edit., Oberthiir). At this point,
Clement, it is clear, yields too much to the false theory of the Gnosis.
12. According to Clement, God, in his proper being, is incompre
hensible to human understanding. We do not so much understand what
He is, as what He is not. We call Him the Good, the One, the
Existent, or Spirit, God, Father, Lord, but these terms do not express
what He is in Himself. We use these excellent names merely that the
understanding may have whereon to support itself in its contemplation
of the Divinity. God is infinitely exalted above all things created ;
they have all their being from Him, for they are the work of His infinite
goodness, but their being is not the same as His being, they are merely
created by Him.
13. There exists a " Sacred Trias" of which the Father is the first
member, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third (Strom. L.v.,
c. 14, p. 255). There is a Father of all things, says Clement, a Logos
of all things, and a Holy Ghost, the same everywhere (Pcedagog, L. c. 6,
p. 45, Ed. Oxon.) The Father is Being, unqualifiable, incompre
hensible, and ineffable ; the Son is Wisdom, Knowledge, Truth, and all
that is akin to these attributes. To Him predicates may be attributed,
and to Him positive attributes assigned; all powers of the spiritual order
brought together in unity are concentrated in the Son. The Son is not
the same unity (as the Father), nor one with the same oneness of being as the
Father, but yet He is not many, divided by difference and contrast ; He
is the All-one, from whom all things come. In Him, as in a common
centre all perfections meet, whence he is styled the A and Q of all things
(Strom., L. iv., c. 25, p. 230). Finally, the Holy Ghost is the light of
truth, the true light without shadow or obscurity, the Spirit of the Lord,
which, without division in Itself bestows Itself on all who are sanctified
by truth (Ib. L. vi., c. 16).
14. It has been asserted that in his teaching on the subject of the Divine Logos,
Clement displayed something of the hesitation of Philoas to whether he should assign the
Logos a subordinate position or give Him merely a modal existence. In the first place,
Clement most decidedly does not favour the notion of modal existence, for the Son of God
is, in his teaching, always a personal being. He is our instructor, says Clement, the Holy
God, Jesus, the Logos, the leader of the human kind, the merciful, lovable, but just God.
(Pad. L. vii., p. 48, 2, 8, p. 79). " We offer praise and thanksgiving, "he says again (/'<"/.
L. iii., p. 14), "to the Father and Son, to the Son and the Father, to the Son as to our
Instructor and Master, and to the Holy Ghost ; to the one God in whom are all things,
in whom all tilings are one. and through whom eternity exists." Here we have Father,
Son and Holy Ghost set on the same level of perfection ; as, therefore, the Father is a Per
son, so also must it be with the Son and the Holy Ghost.
15. Clement must also be absolved from the charge of assigning to the Son a subordinate
position. He attributes to the Son not only the same eternity as the Father, but he fur
ther asserts with special emphasis the oneness of essence in Father and Son, u doctrine
with which the theory of subordination is wholly incompatible. God, says Clement,
234 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
does not hate anything, neither does His Logos, for both are One — God (tv yap
o tfeof, Peed, i, 8, p. 50). Moreover, Clement expressly teaches the equality of the Son
with the Father, for he asserts that the Divine Logos, as true God, is in every respect equal
to the Lord of all things, and we are therefore bound to love Him equally with the Father
(Quit DID Sah}., c. 29). When, therefore, Clement describes the Son as a nature "which
stands next in order to the One Supreme Ruler " (Strom, vii., c. 2, p. 298), we must, in
order to save him from self-contradiction, understand him to speak of a subordination, not
of the substantial, but of an hypostatical or personal kind.
16. The Logos is, then, an image of the Father, equal in all respects
to the Father, and He is, moreover, the archetype of the universe. In Him
are all ideas united. But not only is He the archetype of creation, He is
furthermore its efficient cause, inasmuch as the Father has created the
world through Him. It is the nature of God to do good, He has, therefore,
created the world by means of the Logos, in order to display His goodness
in it. In the world we have an immediate manifestation of the Logos,
through the Logos we attain to the knowledge of the Father. Everything
created is good, evil is not a substantial entity, it has its source only in
the misuse of human liberty.
17. According to Clement, the human soul is an incorporeal, simple,
and invisible substance. He distinguishes, however, after the fashion of
the Stoics tftb parts in the soul — the iiyt/moviKov fj.ipo^ — reason, and the
iiXoyov fAtpog, which he also styles Trvciym aapKitcov or ^v\i) aapKiKii. The
iijc/uoviKov fj.ipog comprehends intelligence and will, and to it nature has as
signed dominion over the faculties of sense, inasmuch as the functions of the
latter are dependent upon the will, and must be brought into subjection
to it under the guidance of reason. The divine law may be divided
according to its reference to the different parts of the soul ; the laws of the
Second Table concern the irvtv^a aapKiKov, those of the First Table
the
OlUGEN.
§ 68.
1. Still more renowned than Clement is his pupil, Origen. Origen was born in the year
A.D. 185, most probably in Alexandria. His parents were Christians, and Origen received
from them a Christian education. At an early age he attended the lectures of the Cathe-
chists Pan tarn us and Clement, and laid the foundation of that erudition for which he
was, later, so remarkable. His father, Leonidas, suffered martyrdom in the persecution
of Septimius Severus, and thenceforward Origen devoted himself with new ardour to his
studies. In these he made such progress that, at the age of eighteen, and \vhile still a lay
man, he became the head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. With his assumption of
this office began his marvellous literary activity. His position as teacher required from him an
accurate knowledge of the systems of philosophy ; he therefore read the works of the Greek
philosophers, and in his twenty-first year attended the school of Ammonius Saccas, the
founder of Neo-Platonism, and in this way made acquaintance with Neo-Platonism itself, as
well as with the doctrines of Philo. At a later period, he came into conflict with his bishop,
because of his having delivered public discourses in churches, at the solicitation of his
friends, Alexander, Bishop of Jerusalem, and Theoctistus, Bishop of Caesarea, and
* Elsewhere Clement, following the Stoics, assigns ten faculties to the soul , the five senses, the faculty of
speech, the procreative faculty, the vital principle of the flesh, reason (nytnoviKov) and lastly the Divine
Spirit, infused into the soul by faith, and impressing on it a higher character.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 235
obtained priestly ordination in spite of the opposition of his bishop, who probably resented
some erroneous opinions which he held. He was deprived of his position as teacher by a
synodical decree, and by the decree of another synod expelled from the ranks of
the clergy. But he found a new home in Palestine with the friends already
named, and there established a new school, from which many famous men went forth.
He was imprisoned in the persecution of Decius, A.D. 249, and after his liberation died in
consequence of the hardships he had endured during his captivity, A.D. 254.
2. Origen's chief work wras his interpretation of Holy Scripture. He composed Com
mentaries on many Books, the most important of which are his Commentaries on
Matthew and John. He exhibits a marked liking for allegorical interpretation, without,
however, sacrificing the literal. We have further, his work Contra Celsum, in eight books,
a defence of Christianity against that Philosopher. In this work Origen gives proof, in an
extraordinary degree, of intellectual subtlety and erudition. The work of chief importance
in determining the special character of his scientific views is his De Principals (irepi iipxuii'),
a treatise on the fundamental truths of Christianity, in four books. This work may be
regarded as at least a first attempt at scientific exposition and justification of the doctrines
of Christianity in systematic order.1 Clement had sketched the Gnostic ideal in its
several outlines, Origen set himself to determine in greater minuteness the knowledg
possessed by the Gnostic. In doing this he expounded the rational grounds which confirmed
the teachings of the Faith, and endeavoured to reduce them to a well-ordered system of con
nected truths. In the latter part of his task, his success was only partial, and as to the
first, the attempts at a development of the Christian teaching which he here offers us are
not at any point very successful.
3. Origeii recognises the fact that it is only from the standpoint fixed
by Christain Faith that a right comprehension of things human and
divine is attainable. To avoid error it is essential that there should be
no departure from ecclesiastical tradition. In spite of these salutary
principles Origen did not succeed in avoiding the danger he was providing
against. The philosophical opinions which he had borrowed from the
Greek philosophers, and chiefly from the followers of Philo and from
the Neo-Platonists, became blended in his mind with the dogmas of
Faith and affected his appreciation of Christian truth. The errors
thence arising became distinctly manifest in his work De Principiis.
In his translation of this work, Rufirms has toned down or wholly
changed many of the more objectionable passages ; but even with this
improvement the errors are not wholly put out of sight. Origen himself
seems to have felt at times that his assertions were at variance with
truth, for he desired that this work — one of the earliest he composed —
should not be published ; many propositions contained in it he reprobated
later, and many he put forward as mere surmises — mere opinions, about
which every one may form what estimate he will. This, however, is not
sufficient excuse for erroneous assertions, the more so that we find him
speaking of an esoteric teaching not intended for the people, but only
for the wise and the initiated.
4. According to Origen, God is exalted in nature above all things,
ineffable, and incomprehensible, He is above truth, wisdom, being.
He is not fire, nor light, nor air, but an absolute incorporeal unity
(/novae; or ivag). He is neither part, nor a totality, He does not admit in
Himself a greater and a less, He is unchangeable and without limit,
space and time are excluded from His Being. He is omnipotent, but
His omnipotence is qualified by His wisdom and His goodness ; He
'. The greater part of this work has been preserved to us in a Latin translation executed by Rufinus, the
{'ri.'ii'l ami di.M -ij'lc of Origen.
236 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN KRA.
cannot act in opposition to these attributes. We cannot contemplate God
immediately in His own being. How could our weak vision bear the
effulgence of His light ? We have knowledge of Him only from His
works.
5. There is but one God ; plurality in God is a contradiction in
terms. The one plan which we observe in the world is inconceivable,
unless we assume it to have been planned by one mind. Heresy asserts
that goodness and justice are incompatible, and for this reason holds
the existence of two Gods, the one good and the other just. This, how
ever, is absurd. Goodness and justice are so far from being incompatible
that the one perfection supposes the other. God would not be good if
He were not just, and would not be just if He were not good. The two
perfections are inseparable.
6. Origen's teaching on the subject of the Divine Trinity was, even
in the days of the Fathers, differently viewed by different critics. Some
Fathers, as Epiphanius, Jerome, and Augustine, regarded him as the fore
runner of Arianism, and reproached him with anticipating in his
writings the teachings of that heresy. Others, as Gregory Thaumaturgus,
Dionysius of Alexandria, Pamphilus Martyr, and even Athanasius himself,
did not question the orthodoxy of Origen's teaching regarding the Trinity.
The last named writer did not scruple to quote arguments from the works
of Origen, in his controversy with the Arians. Our own opinion is that
Origen's doctrine regarding the Trinity is, in substance, orthodox ; but
we admit that in the scientific exposition of his opinions, he makes use of
formulas and phrases which might easily give rise to misconceptions.
It is not necessary to enter deeply into this question. We may dismiss
it with the following remarks : —
7. In expounding the allegorical sense of the Scriptural saying, "Drink water from
the fountain of three springs " (Prov. v. 15), Origen remarks : " To the inquiry, What is
the one source of these several streams? I would answer : the knowledge of the unbegotten
Father is one stream, the knowledge of the Son another, and finally, the knowledge of
the Holy Ghost a third. For the Son is different from the Father, and the Broly Ghost
different from the Father and the Son. The plurality of streams refers to the difference
in person between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. But these several streams
have one single source — in other words, the Divine Trinity is one in substance and in
nature " (In Num. Horn. xii. 1). " We must, therefore, acknowledge one God, but admit
in this confession of Faith, the Father,' the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Herein consists
the rpide; tipxtKJ?« the rpiaQ TrpoaKvvrjTr'j to which everything that is is subject " (In Math.
t. 15, n. 31).
8. The Son is begotten from the substance of the Father, not created from nothing.
But our notion of this conception must exclude every corporeal imagination ; we must
not, therefore, allow that in this generation the Son is separated from the Father's sub
stance. His personal character is not something extrinsic to the Godhead, it exists
within the Divinity. As light goes forth from light, and the will proceeds from the
spirit without separation from the source, so does the Son proceed from the Father, for
the Divine nature is indivisible. This generation is from eternity. The Son exists from
eternity as well as the Father. The generative act is not transient, it is eternally per
sistent, without any order of sequence, accomplished slmul et semet. All that is in the
Father is in the Son also (In Jerem. Horn. 8, n. 2). " The God of all things is not
alone in His greatness ; He shares His greatness with His Son, the First-born of creatures.
This Son is the image of the invisible God, and represents in image the greatness of the
Father " (C. Gels. vi. 69).
9. The meaning of these assertions regarding the Trinity, or rather, regarding the
Son of God, is unmistakable. But there are other propositions laid down by Origen, on
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 237
this point of Christian belief, which arc not so irreproachable. For example, he states
in one place (In. Joan. t. 2, n. 2.) that " He who is avroQioq, that is to say, God of His
own nature, is called in the Gospel o Oeog ; whereas everything other than the a»ro0fd(,-,
all that becomes God by virtue of participation in the Godhead of the latter, (Qtoiroiovfifi-ot'),
is, if we speak accurately, not o OEOQ, but merely 0t6f. This latter appellation must be
bestowed first of all on the Frst-born of creatures, for He, being TT^UQ rot- 9f6v, is the first to
receive divinity from God, and is, therefore, superior to, and more excellent than, the
other "gods," to whom He (the 0eoe) is, as it were, a o 0£<>c. They owe it to Him and to
His goodness that they are gods, for He derives ano TOV Oeov the fulness of the nature
which renders them gods. The true God is, therefore, o QtoQ ; the beings who receive
the form of God are images of this divine archetype. But of these images the first and
primal image is that Logos which is Trpuc TUV 0t6v, that Logos which has been from the
'iririnning and ever remains irpbc TOV 9env, which would not, however, possess Divine
Being were He not IT put; TOV Oenv, and would not remain God did He not eternally con
tinue to contemplate the depth of the Father's being."
10. Another passage (In. Joan. t. 13, n. 25) seems to be still more explicitly in favour
of the subordination of the Son: " Although the Son of God," says Origen, " surpasses
all (created natures) in essence, dignity, power, and divinity, inasmuch as He is the living
Word and the living Wisdom, yet He is in no wise the equal of the Father. For He is
(merely) the image of the Father's goodness, the reflection, not of God, but of God's glory
and eternal radiance— a pure emanation from His glory— the untarnished mirror of His
action." The Son and the Holy Ghost surpass all created things, but they are them
selves surpassed by the Father, of whom the Kedeemer says: " The Father who hath
sent Me is greater than I." In accordance with this teaching is the view put forward by
Origen (In. Joan. 32, 449), that the knowledge possessed by the Son is lower in kind
than that possessed by the Father. The Son, he says, has knowledge of the Father, but
a less perfect knowledge than the Father has of Himself.
11. These expressions, to which many others of the same kind might be added, do not
affect the general orthodoxy of Origen's opinions regarding the Trinity, for Origen in
numberless other passages expresses himself with unequivocal correctness on the subject,
and the doubtful passages must be interpreted in the light of the others, as meaning not
a subordination of essence or nature but of person. Origen would appear to signify by
these phrases that the Father is the primum principium, from whom the Son receives
the Divine nature, being generated by Him. He attributes to the Father merely the
auctoritait primi principii in the Divine Trinity, and, in this respect only, puts Him above
the Son and the Holy Ghost, without establishing in the latter a subordination of essence
or nature to the Father. This becomes still more evident from the passages in which he
expressly describes the Son as cwrd/Xoyoc, aiiroZti-afjuc, avroSiKaioavvr], ai>Toa\i'i9na, etc.,
and teaches that the Sou does not participate in Wisdom, Justice, etc.. but that He w
these things (in essence). (G. Ctl*. vi., c. <U.) But it is not to be denied that the ex
pressions we have quoted are not above reproach as they stand, and might easily give
occasion o misunderstanding. It is hardly surprising that, at a later period, the Arians
appealed to the writings of Origen in support of their doctrines, and that many of the
Fathers expressed themselves dissatisfied with Origeu's views regarding the Trinity.
12. To proceed in our exposition. The Logos is the hypostatical
Wisdom of God, and is, by the fact, the Archetype of all things, the
l$ia l&'wv. Through the Logos which thus, in archetypal fashion, con
tains all things in Himself, are all things created. By His power the
universe exists. He penetrates and permeates the entire creation, giving
being to and maintaining everything. He is the comprehensive force
which embraces and upholds all things. He is, as it were, the soul of
the universe. To Him is every revelation due. He is the source of
reason in man ; all knowledge of truth is, in the last analysis, attribu
table to Him. The motive which led to the creation of the world by
the Logos is the Divine Goodness. God created the world out of love.
He did not find matter already existent and fashion it into the universe ;
He is the author of matter also. " Otherwise some providence older
'J v PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
than His must have be< a at work to give thought expression in matter,
or some happy chance must have played the part of providence/'
13. Creation has, however, had no beginning ; it is eternal. The
Divine omnipotence and goodness require that it should be so. God's
omnipotence and goodness are eternal as God Himself. But God could
not be eternally omnipotent if there were not from eternity something
on which He could exert His power and His sovereignty ; nor could He
be eternally good if there were not from eternity creatures towards
which His goodness might be exercised. Created being must, therefore,
have existed from eternity. This the more, that to admit a beginning
in time of this created world would suppose a change to have taken
place in God at the moment when He began to create. Furthermore,
since God could not have a foreknowledge of everything, if the duration
of the world were without limit, we must assume an endless series of
trorhk, or cosmical aeons, in which the end of one period is the beginning
of the next. There has been no cosmical period in which a world did
not exist. These numberless worlds are all different from one another ;
no one of them is wholly like another DC Princ. I. '2, 10. ; III. 5, 3. ;
II. 5; 3. ; II. 3, 4).
14. The created universe consists of two component parts — the world
of spirits and the material world. Matter is only notionally different
from the qualities that modify it ; it cannot exist without these qualities.
Therefore, in determining the nature of corporeal things as such, the
Xeo-Platonists are not far from the truth when they assert that a body
is nothing more than a sum of qualities ; for, if we separate the qualities
from it, there is absolutely nothing left of the body. (De Princ. II. 1,
4. : IV. 34). With regard to spiritual beings, they are not distin
guished by specific differences. God has made them all alike. If any
differences are observed in them, these are to be attributed, not to their
natural constitution, but to the free determining of their own condition.
Created spirits are not, like God, essentially good ; they can choose
good or evil of their own free will, and, accenting to their choice, and
their consequent merit or culpability, is their place in the universe
assigned them. Xo being is of itself evil ; its own action makes it what
ever it is. All rational creatures resemble, at the outset, a homogeneous
mass, from which God forms vessels for honour or dishonour, according
to their several deserts (De Princ. III. 1, 21. ; III. 5, 4. ; II. 9, 6).
15. From these principles important consequences are deducible.
In the first place, Origen finds in them a proof of the pre- existence of
souls. Rational beings were, he holds, all created at once by God, alike
in nature and alike in perfection. Of these many remained faithful to
God, and by their faithful service preserved their original union with
God. These are the angels. Others were too indolent to make the
effort of will necessary to maintain their union with good, and in
this way have separated themselves more or less from God. This sepa
ration, being a deliberate act on their part, and being a violation of the
divine law, was an abandonment of God, and, as such, implied guilt in
them. In punishment of this fault, the fallen spirits were repellecl from
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHU1»TI\N KRA. 239
God, and became reduced to a condition out of accord with their ideal
state and destiny. Those that had separated themselves from God by
the longest interval became demons ; those whose fault was less were
imprisoned in human bodies, and became human souls. It is, therefore,
to this separation from God that we must attribute the origin of the
demon world and of the human race. And to this separation must be
attributed not only the origin of the human race, but also the differences
which exist between men, as well in their individual qualities us in the
external conditions of their existence — these differences being de
termined by the various degrees of the guilt which occasioned their
entrance into the life of earth.
16. The consequences of this fall extend yet further. To it is al<o
to be traced the origin of the material world of our experience. God
created at once not only all spirits but all matter also, and, foreseeing
the fall of the spirits, He created it in quantity sufficient for the forma
tion of the world. Matter, however, existed at the outset, in a higher,
supersensuous state, not exhibiting those rude sensible qualities under
which it presents itself now. The possibility of such a higher state is
intelligible from the fact that matter is, in its essence, merely an aggre
gate of intelligible qualities, which only in combination become sensible
and corporeal. But when the spirits fell away from God, and in
punishment of their offence were invested with bodies of flesh, all matter
was reduced to a condition perceptible by sense ; and out of this matter
God formed the various objects of the sensible world for the use of man,
and for the fulfilment of His plan of the universe. This is the " vanity "
to which, according to the words of the apostle, even irrational things are
made subject in consequence of the fall (De Princip. III. 5. ; IV. 5).
17. These are the general principles of Origen's system. Let us
now examine the details of his teaching : Origen asserts the human
soul to be of a spiritual nature, and endeavours to establish the same truth
by demonstration. For this purpose he appeals to the essential qualities
of the human faculty of cognition, urging that the range of human
cognition, as well as the supersensuous character of the object with
which it is concerned, are inexplicable unless we admit the spiritual
nature of the principle at work. Further, if real objects respond to the
perceptions of sense, so also must a real object respond to that intellec
tual cognition which has for its object the ego itself, and this proves the
soul to be no mere accident of the body. Lastly, if man were merely a
body, God should also be regarded as a corporeal being, for man has
knowledge of God, and the corporeal can have knowledge only of the
corporeal (De Prine., I. 1, 7).
18. Distinctly as Origen asserts the immaterial and spiritual nature
of the soul, he, nevertheless, will not admit it to be possible that a
created spiritual substance could exist without a body. This pre
rogative, he holds to belong exclusively to God. He, therefore, main
tains that all created spirits — human souls included — are, in their extra-
mundane state, invested with a glorified body, and that this bodily
adjunct is separate from them in thought only — not in fact. On these
240 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
principles is based his teaching regarding the immortality of the soul.
He holds it for indisputable that the soul is, of its nature, immortal ;
for, being a spiritual essence, it is, in a certain sense, like God, and
must, therefore, be immortal like Him. A further argument is found
in the fact that there would not be a perfect manifestation of the divine
goodness if God did not bestow His benefits on rational creatures
throughout eternity. Lastly, man could not be said to be made to the
image of God, if the immortality of that image — i.e., of the Logos — had
not its counterpart in man. But the soul, on quitting its earthly body,
does not enter into a purely incorporeal state ; it still preserves that
ethereal body which is essential to it, and which, during this life, is
hidden under the veil of the flesh (Ib. II., 2, 2).
19. Regarding the relations which subsist between soul and body,
Origen teaches expressly that the body of flesh has life, sense, and
movement from the soul. He cites the arguments currently used in
support of the theory of three constituent elements in man's nature, but
he sets forth the reasons which prove them ineffectual. As for the
conflict between " the spirit and the flesh/' which was a favourite
argument with the supporters of that theory, he observes that " the
flesh " denotes merely the sensual tendencies and appetites, and that
the conflict between " spirit and flesh " refers merely to the antagon
ism between these desires and reason. Origen, indeed, distinguishes
between vovz and T//UX*?, but the distinction is a distinction of relations,
and is explained by Origen in a peculiar fashion. In the Greek language,
the term ^vyji is connected with the idea of cold, and Origen is of
opinion that the spirit (vovz) becomes \l>v\ri or vital principle of the
body, because of its having grown cold in the love of God. It is,
therefore, the present duty of the soul so to advance in the love of God,
that it may divest itself of this character, and thus at length become
the spirit again (Ib. II., 8, 3).
20. Origen holds the freedom of the will to be undeniable. The
voice of consciousness, he says, speaks decisively on the point. Virtue
without freedom is impossible. A being which can distinguish between
different actions, which can approve of one and reprobate another, must
necessarily be in a position to elect between them. Good and evil are
founded on liberty. Evil is a turning away from the fulness of true
being to emptiness and nothingness, and is therefore a privation ; life in
sin is a life of death. Evil has not its source in matter, it has its cause
in the abuse of human liberty.
21. We have, in the last place, to examine the eschatology of Origen:
The human soul has been condemned to imprisonment in the body,
because of its sin in a previous state. This punishment is, however, a
saving punishment. Healed of sin, the soul is destined to return to its
first state. This return is, in the present soon of the universe, depen
dent on the Redemption. Here we have the explanation of the Re
deemer's mission. The Logos assumed human nature, and died for us,
in order to obtain pardon and grace from God. The soul of Christ^
like all other souls, existed antecedently to its union with the Logos ; but
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 241
by the unchanging, enduring love with which it remained faithful to
God, this soul merited union with t>he Logos. In this sense, the union
may be said to be the work of this soul itself.
22. The Redemption from sin is not efficacious for this life only, it
ex I ends its influence into the life to come. In that further life too, the
punishment suffered is a saving punishment. Purified souls pass into
glory immediately after the death of the body ; for the others, the process
of salvation through suffering is continued after death. This suffering is
inflicted by fire, inasmuch as the consciousness of sin, and the stings of
conscience resemble the torment caused by fire. This fire will purify the
soul ; and, the purification accomplished, the soul sooner or later enters
into glory. The process of the purification of souls will extend over
many centuries, and evil will thus gradually diminish, until at last it dis
appears wholly, and the mercy of God reaches down to him who has
sunk lowest — to Satan. Accordingly, the final restoration will extend
to all the spirits which have fallen away from God ; to all human souls
and to all the demons. The Apocatastasis will be universal (Ib. L, 6, 3.)
23. The Apocatastasis culminates in the resurrection of the body.
AVhen, at length, all souls have been purified, the bodies will be raised
from the dead, and united to the souls in a glorified state. When all
this has been accomplished, the material world returns again to its higher
condition ; the differences between material beings cease to exist, and
the original unity and perfection of the entire creation is re-established.
God will then be all in all. Then begins a new cosmical period, a new
falling off takes place, and a new world appears in place of the old.
And so the series of never-ending changes proceeds.*
24. Origen left behind him many famous disciples, from whose ranks came the most
remarkable ecclesiastical teachers of the third century. We may mention, as specially
worthy of note, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Dionysius the Great. There were not wanting
also many able writers to oppose what they regarded as the errors of his system. To
the number of his opponents belongs Methodius, Bishop, first of Olympus, and subsequently
of Tyre, who suffered martyrdom, probably, under Diocletian (A.D. 290.) Methodius
attacked the theories of Origen regarding the likeness of nature in rational beings and the
pie-existence of souls, as also his theory regarding the eternity of creation. Methodius
composed two treatises (lit pi yFi'jjrwv and ITepi avaGTuatuQ), in which he puts forward his
refutation of these theories in the form of dialogues.
25. The specific and generic differences between things, Methodius holds, cannot be
the consequence of the fall of the spirits ; they are, on the contrary, the original condi
tions of existence, beginning with the beginning of the world ; they are wholly natural,
and, therefore, preconceived in the divine idea of things. In his opinion, the human soul
cannot be regarded as like in nature to the angels, for the soul is destined to be united to
the body, whilst the angelical nature excludes the notion of a body of flesh. Man is not
* In his treatise Contra Cefsum, composed at the request of his friend Ambrosius,
Origen maintain* the accord between Christianity and reason, and the demonstrability
of the Christian Faith. His proofs are, the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Old Testa
ment : tin* miracles daily worked on behalf of the sick and the possessed by the reading
<>t tin- ( Mispel : the triumphant spread of the (Jospel, and its purifying effect, and the
conspicuous purity of life in the Christian communities in the midst of the general
corruption. Origen then proceeds to establish the several dogmas by appropriate
argumi-nt*. as in the tivatise l\mi a<>x*v. He maintains the right of the Christian com
munities t«i establish themselves against the will of the state, in the name of the natural
law. whirli i-- derived from (lod and siiijeiior to written law.
17
242 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
soul alone ; he consists of soul and body ; both unite to constitute one form of
beauty. The soul, therefore, cannot exist before the body ; it must, as the form of the body,
be created at the moment the body is created. Man exists from the beginning, as man,
in the same way as all other things. Origen's arguments for the eternity of creation are
worthless. God would possess His entire perfection, without a created world ; no neces
sity whatever constrained Him to create the universe. If we admitted that the begin
ning of creation in time would imply a change in God, we should also be obliged to admit
that the same would be implied in His ceasing to create. Whatever is created supposes
a pre-existent cause of its being, is produced by this cause, and must, as thus produced,
have had a beginning.
26. It is evident that Methodius had detected the errors in the teaching of Origen ;
nor was he deterred by the great reputation which Origen enjoyed from vigorously attack-
in o, in the name of science, what he conceived to be the defects of his system. In this
he rendered to Christian science, which was not yet established on a solid basis, a service
which it is impossible to estimate too highly.
MINUTIUS FELIX, ARNOBIDS AND LACTANTIUS.
§69.
1. While the Hellenistic theologians were developing a scientific
theology, chiefly with regard to the nature of Christ, the ecclesiastical
writers of the West were giving special prominence to the points of
Christian teaching which regarded belief in God and the immortality
of the soul, as well as the anthropological and ethical elements ^ of
Christian belief. Amongst these writers, a foremost place is occupied
by Minutius Felix, a Roman lawyer, who lived probably towards the
close of the second century. In his work Octavius, he describes the
conversion of the heathen Cecilius, by Octavius, a Christian. He de
fends the belief in the unity of God — a truth which he finds received
by philosophers of the greatest renown ; he condemns the polytheism
of popular superstition as contrary to reason and to the moral sense,
and defends against all objectors the Christian doctrine regarding the
mutability of the world, the immortality of the soul, and the resurrec
tion of the body.
2. Cecilius maintains that, in our present uncertainty regarding all
that transcends experience, we ought not, with vain self-confidence, to
trust to our own judgment ; that we ought to remain true to the traditions
that have come down to us ; that if we will play the philosopher we must
be content to deal with human things only ; and for the rest be satisfied
that our best knowledge is to know that we are ignorant. Against this
scepticism Octavius protests. Our knowledge of God is not uncertain ;
on the contrary, nothing is so evident to the human mind as the existence
of God, if we but consider the order established in nature, and in par
ticular, the purposed structure of living organisms, more especially of
the human body. There must be a Divine Being who rules and governs
the world as well in its totality as in its various parts. The unity of
plan in nature is proof of the unity of this God. To this unity of God
the consciousness of man spontaneously bears testimony (Si Dens dederit,
8fc.)t and it is distinctly acknowledged by almost all philosophers.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE (HKIMIAX I-K \. 243
*}. God is infinite, omnipotent, eternal ; before the world He was u
world to Himself — ante Mtntthun, Sibi Ipse fit-it pro Mundo — He alone has
adequate knowledge of Himself; He is beyond the comprehension of
our understanding. The gods of the popular superstition are deified
kings or discoverers. Impure demons also are worshipped as gods. The
true God is not in one place or another, He is omnipresent. The world
] KISSOS : man is immortal. The immortality of the soul is only half the
truth, the body also will rise again, and everything in nature will be
renewed. It is just that Christians should 'enjoy a better fate in
the future life than the pagans; for ignorance of God is in itself
culpable, and knowledge of God is a claim on forgiveness. Moreover,
the lives of the Christians are morally much better than those of the
pagans. The sufferings of the Christians serve to test and preserve
them in their conflict with hostile powers. They are fully justified in
abstaining from worldly pleasures, for these are dangerous in their effect
upon the moral and religious character. The doctrine of Divine Pre
destination does not conflict with the justice of Grod ; God foresees the
dispositions of men, and determines their lot according to this foreknow
ledge. Fate is nothing more than the decree of God.
4. The lines of discussion traced by Minutius Felix were followed
by Arnobius in his treatise Achersus Gcntcs, published soon after A.D.
300. Arnobius, while a pagan, had been a stubborn opponent of
Christianity, and, in his profession of teacher of rhetoric, had ample op
portunity of expressing this hostility. After his conversion to the
Christian Faith, the Bishop of Sicca required him to publish a treatise
in defence of Christianity, as proof of the genuineness of his conversion.
In compliance with this requirement, he published the treatise Adrcrsns
Gcntes. In this work, he follows Minutius in his attack upon polythe
ism, but treats the question with greater fulness of detail. The popular
superstition he reprobates as absurd and immoral, and defends the
doctrine of one eternal God. He summarily rejects the allegorical
significance attributed to the myths of polytheism. Doubt as to the
existence of God he does not regard as deserving of serious refutation •
for belief in God is inborn in every man ; nay, the very beasts and
plants, if they could only speak, would proclaim 'God to be the ruler of
the universe. God is infinite and eternal— the place and space in which
all things are.
5. Arnobius proves the Divinity of Christ chiefly from the change
wrought by Christ in the opinions and manners of mankind, and from
His miracles. On the last argument he lays the chief weight. The
philosophers, he says, in whom the pagans put their trust, were, for the
most part men of pure lives and were versed in science, but they could
not like Christ, work a miracle. Wherefore we must hold Christ in
higher esteem than the philosophers, and set Him above them all. As
to the human soul— Arnobius assigns it a condition of being intermediate
between the divine and material, and on this ground controverts the
Platonic view that the soul is, of its nature, immortal. The immortality
the soul, he holds, is not a consequence of the nature of the soul but
244 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHKlbTIAN ERA.
is a gracious gift of God. This, however, should not make men doubt
of the soul's immortality ; for, if the soul were mortal, it would not
only he a great error, hut also a great folly, to control passion, since no
reward in a future life would await so difficult a struggle. But the
existence of the soul before the body is not to be admitted. The Platonic
argument founded on our recollection of things is futile ; the correct
answers which we return to questions regarding geometrical figures
are not derived from knowledge previously acquired, but from present
consideration under the guidance of skilful questioning.
6. About the same time as Arnobius, lived and laboured the Khe-
torician, Lactaiitius.
Lactantius was appointed teacher of Rhetoric, at Nicomedia, by the Emperor
Diocletian. He became a Christian, probably about A.D. 303, and forthwith undertook
the scientific defence of Christianity against his former associates. Ihis defence he con
ducted by positive exposition of doctrine, as well as by refutation of objections. He
endeavoured to render the truth of Christianity intelligible to his adversaries by setting
forth the philosophical reasons which justified the Christian teaching. At a later period
he became tutor to Crispus, son of the Emperor Coiistaiitme. He died about A.D d25.
His principal work is the Institutiones Divines, in which he maintains the right of
Christianity to recognition as a religious system, and, at the same time, gives an exposi
tion of many points of Christian doctrine. He also published a compendium of the Inttitu-
tiones under the title Epitome Divinarum Intiitutionum, ad Pentadium Fratrem. We have
also from his pen: Liber de Opificlo Dei, ad Demetrianum ; Liber de Ira Dei; DeMortibus 1 er-
secutorwn • Fragmenta et Carmina. In these writings he unites to a pleasing manner of
presenting his subject a purity of style worthy of Cicero, and a tolerably comprehensive
and exact knowledge of his subject. It must, however, be allowed that at times his clear
and graci-ful exposition is not accompanied by thoroughness of treatment and depth ol
thought.
7. To refute polytheism and demonstrate the unity of God, is a
primary task with Lactantius. That there is a God who rules the world
with foreknowledge and controlling power cannot be denied in view of
the marvellous order which reigns on all sides of the universe. It is
equally evident that this God is one. For unity is clearly deducible
from the notion of God as an infinitely perfect being. If there were
several gods, there would be a division of perfections, and so no one
of them would be God any longer. Moreover, the one plan of order
established in the world supposes one ordaining power and one pro
vidence. If there were several gods, a conflict of wills would be pos
sible, and contentions between them would follow, which must disturb
the general order. As one spirit rules the body of man, so one God
rules the world. Polytheism has its origin only in aberrations of the
human mind; in their misfortunes men call instinctively on the one God,
it is only when fortunate and happy that they turn to gods and to
idols.
8. The world has been created by God. If matter were eternal it would
be unchangeable, and the formation of the world would be, by the fact,
impossible. The human soul is a luminous or fiery essence, so delicate
and subtle that it escapes not merely the eye of the body, but even the
glance of the mind. It is not propagated by procreation, each soul is
created immediately by God. In the soul, we must distinguish between
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 245
flip animus (mens) by which we think, and the aiiima by which we live.
It is only in a relative sense, however, that the one can be said to be
different from the other. Reason has its seat in the head, it is this
faculty which perceives by means of the senses ; the senses may be said
to be the windows through which it beholds the external world. The
body has life from the soul, and from the soul only.
9. The highest good attainable by man must be of such a kind that
it is not shared with other living things, and that it is adapted not to
the body but to the nobler element in human nature. It must also be
of a kind which is incapable of increase or diminution ; otherwise it
would not be the highest good. This character of the good in question
requires that it should be eternal. It follows that the highest good
cannot be sensual pleasure, for this the beasts also enjoy ; nor can it be
virtue, for virtue requires a courageous endurance of the sufferings and
burdens of this life, and sometimes even demands the sacrifice of life
itself — all which is incompatible with the notion of supreme happiness.
The highest good cannot, therefore, be anything of the mere temporal
order ; it awaits us in a future life— it is nothing else than immortality,
that is, a life of eternal happiness in God.
10. This being so, the supreme good is attainable only through the
knowledge and worship of God, that is, through religion. Religion, not
philosophy, leads to happiness. Man differs from the beasts essentially
in this that he is an animal religiosum. This is his chief excellence.
Furthermore, without religion there is no virtue. If there is no im
mortality, that is to say, no future life, in which reward and punishment
are bestowed on the deeds of this life, virtue has no longer any meaning.
Since virtue, then, is a thing worth striving for, only in the hypothesis
of a future immortality, it is evident there can be no true virtue without
religion. Religion is the mother, the soul of all virtues. But virtue
must be united to religion, if religion is to lead man to the goal of life.
Religion and virtue are the pathway to the sovereign good. Virtue
does not consist in an entire suppression of the passions (irdOii), such a
course would be unnatural, and only a fool would enter upon it ; noi
does virtue consist in the weakening of the passions, it is rather to be
found in a right use of the irdOn, i.e., in directing them to the attain
ment of the supreme good.
11. Lactantius having asserted that the sovereign good of man is
immortality, it might have been expected that he would have demon
strated scientifically the immortality of the soul, and proofs to this effect
are not wanting in his works ; but he holds, like Arnobius, that this immor
tality does not result from the nature of the soul, but is to be accounted
for by the conserving power of God. This being premised, he infers the
immortality of the soul from its capacity to know and love God and from
its natural destination to these acts. God, the object of its knowledge
and love, is eternal ; it follows that the soul which is created to know
and love Him must also be eternal, i.e., immortal. An analogous argu
ment may be drawn from the notion of virtue : virtue being, in its essence,
enduring and eternal, it follows that the soul, which is capable of virtue,
246 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
must share in these attributes. Finally, the immortality of the soul may
be demonstrated from its Divine origin, and from this, further, that its
works, in contrast with those of the body, are destined to endure
eternally.
12. Into his teaching regarding the resurrection of the body Lac-
tantius introduces the fantastic notions of the Chiliasts. The souls of
men, after death, are retained together in one place, till the resurrec
tion. The resurrection of all the dead does not take place at once. The
resurrection of the just takes place first, after which follows the reign
of a thousand years. Then comes the second resurrection — that of the
just and the unjust, and, after this, the Last Judgment.
PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE POST-NICENE PERIOD.
GENERAL REMARKS.
1. The Council of Nicsea (A.D. 325) forms one of the most re
markable events in the history of the Christian Church. At the
moment when the Church, after long and sanguinary persecu
tion, had at length obtained liberty, a heresy, springing from within
the body of the Church itself, denying the fundamental truths of
Christianity — the Divinity of Christ, and the Incarnation of God
— threatened to destroy that Church which the rude methods of the
persecutors had not been able to shake. This heresy was known as
Animism. It had already worked great confusion in Christendom when
the bishops of the Church met at Nicaea, and in a solemn confession of
faith proclaimed the divinity of the Logos, and His oneness in sub
stance with the Father. This definition of the Church's faith stayed
the progress of the heresy, and though the controversy with the Arians
was not at an end, this solemn declaration formed a bulwark against
which heresy was destined to expend itself in' vain.
2. The Council of Niccea formed a turning-point for Christian philo
sophy, as well as for the history of the Christian Church. The dogmatic
definition of this unity in substance of the Son and the Father, became
a centre of truth, from which the defenders of Christianity proceeded in
giving scientific development to the dogmas of Faith. The freedom
secured to the Church, under Constantine, contributed not a little to
an enlarged activity of thought, and increased, in considerable measure,
the fruitfulness of scientific investigation. In this wise, Christian
philosophy attained a remarkable development in the Post-Nicene period,
and produced results which were destined to influence profoundly the
course of thought in the ages that followed. What had been begun
in the period preceding was now progressively developed. Still main
taining its conflict with heresy, Christian philosophy was growing into
a structure which could defy attack.
3. In the Patristic philosophy of this period, we have to notice two
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHI61STTAN KRA.
distinct currents of thought. The one is represented by the Greek, the
other by the Lajin, Fathers. In the speculative opinions of the former,
the influence of Origen, and even of the Neo-Platonists, is much more
marked than in those of the latter. The Platonic philosophy was, indeed,
the philosophy which the Latin Fathers pressed into the service oj
Christian speculation, but the distinctively Neo-Pl atonic views, and the
allied opinions of Origen, find no favour with them, whereas these views
occupy a foremost place in the speculations of many of the Greek
Fathers. In both alike, orthodoxy of Faith is a guiding principle, but
the philosophic differences we have noticed are so evident in their works
that they cannot fail to force themselves on the attentive student.
4. In oui* exposition we will treat first of the Greek, and then of the
Latin, Fathers and ecclesiastical writers.
GREEK FATHERS AND ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS
ATHANASIUS, BASIL TH* GREAT, AND GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS.
§ 70.
1. It does not fall within the scope of our undertaking to trace in
detail the chequered life of Athanasius, on whom posterity has rightfully
bestowed the title of " Great." This task belongs to the writer of ec
clesiastical history. Athanasius was born between A.D. 296 and A.D. 298,
in the neighbourhood of Alexandria. He assisted, with his bishop
Alexander, at the Council of Nicaea, and on the death of that prelate
succeeded to his See, A.D. 326. At this point began the long struggle of
his life. He stands in the midst of the fierce conflict which the Arian
heresy had roused, like a rock in the midst of the sea, and the genius
as well as the unshaken firmness with which he upheld the fundamental
dogma of Christianity have made his name imperishable through all time.
He was expelled four times from his See, by violence and calumny ; but
his courage could not be shaken, and he was at length permitted to end
his days in comparative peace. He died A.D. 373.
ation
2. The writings of Athanasius are, for the most part, devoted to the proof and explan
ion of the dogma of Christ's Divinity, and His Unity in Substance with the Father.
They belong, therefore, rather to the history of dogmas, than to the history of philosophy.
Two only of his treatises have special interest for the philosopher, the work Contra Gentesl
.in apology for Christianity against the pagans, and the work De Incamatione Verbi, in
which Athanasius set forth his psychological theories. It will be enough to notice these
two works.
3. Athanasius, in his work Contra Gentes, begins, like other Apologists,
with a demonstration of the unity of God. He appeals to the universal
order and harmony which prevail in the universe, and argues that this
order, being one in itself, proves the ordaining intelligence to be one.
248 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
From the organic unity which binds the members of the body together
we argue the existence of one soul, the principle of this unity ; so from the
unity of the world our reason is forced to infer the existence of one God.
There can be but one God. A plurality of gods are not gods at all.
Polytheism is Atheism.
4. This proof seems to Athanasius so evident, that he holds it must
compel the reason even of the pagan who is the slave of sensual passion.
But it is only sensual men who need the aid of such proofs as this; the man
whose soul is lifted above the desires of sense and the sensuous pictures
of imagination which they provoke, and whose heart is purified from sin
and from all attachment to sin, has no need of such arguments. He can
see within himself , as in an image, the Logos, and, through the Logos, the
Father ; for man is created to the image of God. To know the one
God we need only know ourselves, need only know our own soul. This
explains why the denial of God is followed by the denial of the soul,
and conversely. The pagans denied the one God, and they also denied
the existence of a soul.
5. This one God is infinitely perfect, and cannot be comprehended by
human thought. He is incomprehensible and inscrutable. We can
obtain an imperfect knowledge of Him from His works. Creation gives
a knowledge of the Logos, through whom God has made the world ; and
through the Logos — the channel of revelation, we have knowledge of
the Father. But from the works of God we know what God is not,
rather than what He is. He is incorporeal, immutable, all-sufficient.
He is the Good, and more than the Good. He transcends being itself.
It is supreme folly to identify Him with the created world, or with any
part of it. The gods of the heathens are phantoms conjured up by the
diseased imaginations of men.
6. The soul of man is a spiritual substance, essentially distinct from
the body. The irrational beast concerns itself only with things present
to its senses, and has neither the power to pass beyond these, nor even
to render an account to itself of that which it perceives. But man's
thought not only reaches to things other than those present to his senses,
but furthermore judges of the things presented to sense, and decides
that one object is to be preferred to another. There must, therefore,
exist in him some higher principle to which belong the functions thus
distinguished from the functions of sense. Again, man's faculty of
thought can rise to a sphere which transcends all experiences. He can
contemplate and can love things perish able and mortal, but he can under
stand and love the imperishable and the immortal as well. How could
this be, if he had not in himself some element of being which does not
pass and is not doomed to die?
7. Again, it is a law of the senses that, when they are directed to their
proper object, and this object is within their reach, they cannot cease to
act upon the object in question. This being so, how shall we explain
the phenomenon that man not unfrequently diverts his senses from the
proper object and forbids them to enjoy it, unless we assume that there
exists in him some principle of action different from the body, and hold-
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN Kl! \.
ing control over the senses ? It is only because he is possessed of a
spiritual soul that man becomes capable of receiving the law which
commands good and forbids evil. Suppose him deprived of this
spiritual soul, and he can no more distinguish good from evil, and
elect between both, than can the beast.
8. The human will is free, and this freedom is the root of the good and
the evil in man. Evil is not a positive entity ; it is merely a privation.
Man is bound to use his liberty to know and love God : this is goodness ;
should he turn from God and to the things of sense, this want of the
knowledge and love of God is evil. For this lie is responsible to God, fur
he has not been overborne by any external force, but has deliberately
incurred the guilt himself.
9. With Athanasius are connected two remarkable men, who. from
their early youth, were bound together by the closest ties of friendship,
Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nazianzus. Basil was born in Cacsarea of
Cappadocia, about A.D. 330, he received his education first at Constanti
nople and then at Athens, and subsequently became Archbishop of
Cacsarea, where he was a foremost champion of the Church in her
struggle with Arianism (379). Gregory, on the other hand, was born
at Nazianzus, in the south-west of Cappadocia, about the same year, A.D.
330. He too received his education at Athens ; while here he formed the
acquaintance of Basil, and a friendship was cemented which united
them closely for the remainder of their lives. Gregory became, at a
later period, Bishop of Constantinople, and in this capacity laboured
strenuously in the cause of Faith. The intrigues of the Arians ulti
mately forced him to resign his See, and he thereupon withdrew into
retirement (390).
10. To the works of both these writers the remark made with reference to Athanasius
will apply. The defence of the dogma of the Trinity and a fuller study of its signifi
cance was their chief task, though they sometimes discussed other theological themes.
Both held Origen in profound veneration. Of Basil's writings the most important for the
history of philosophy are the Hexcemeron, his Homilies, and the treatise Contra Eunondum.
Gregory was an orator ; his so-called theological discourses are amongst the best examples?
of oratory that have come to us from the age in which he lived..
11. The contest with Eunomius in which these two Fathers (as well
as Gregory of Nyssa) engaged, is particularly worthy of notice. Eunomius,
with Aetius, belonged to the sect known as Anomians — a sect which dis
sented from the more extreme forms of Arianism. To maintain the
fundamental Arian doctrine, and to combat the unity of essence (6uoov<r/a)
in the Trinity, Eunomius, with Aetius, maintained two singular pro
positions with regard to our knowledge of God :
(a) In the first place he rejected wholly the notion of a knowledge of God derived
from created things, i.e., through the Logos. He held the Logos to be a mere creature,
and he could not, in consecpaence, allow the world, which the Logos had created, to be a
revelation of God, or a means of attaining knowledge of Him. Accordingly he assumed
our knowledge of God to be direct and immediate, and asserted that to know (jlod we
have no need of created things or other medium. Pursuing this idea, he maintained that
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
this immediate knowledge of God is an exhaustive knowledge, and he consequently
denied that God is incomprehensible. He knew God, he asserted, as well as he knew
himself, or even better.
(b) But this was not all. He further held that between the attributes we assign in
thought to God there is no difference whatever — not even a difference nar kTrivomv (vir
tual distinction). The assumption that the Divine Being is known directly and imme
diately in all His fulness led him logically to the conclusion that no distinction is admissible
between the essential attributes of God. If we admit the simplicity of the Divine Being,
we are forced to admit that all the names applied to God are alike in significance, that
they all designate directly and immediately the Divine Being in His completeness. Nor
can it be asserted that God's attributes are distinguishable KUT' tirn>oiav. For what is
merely notional (KOT' iirivoiav) has no existence except in terms or words, and vanishes
with the utterance of the words. Our language is true only when it responds to existent
objects. When one and the same object is designated by several names, either these names
have no difference of meaning, or the differences exist in the object as well as in the names.
The latter alternative is inadmissible with reference to God, because of His absolute sim
plicity of being ; the former only can be allowed : that is to say, all names applied to the
attributes of God are of equal significance ; between these attributes no differences
exist.
12. The orthodox teachers strenuously combated these opinions.
Basil and the two Gregories insisted strongly on the principle that the
Divine Being exceeds our comprehension, and that we have not an im
mediate knowledge of God, but know Him only from His works. This
contention involved the denial of the other assertion that between the
terms applied to God, i.e., between the Divine attributes, no distinction is
allowable. "In point of fact," says Basil, (Cont. Eunom. I. 2.) " if what
Eunomius asserts were true, it would follow that we might at will substi
tute one of the Divine Names for another, just as we name the same
apostle Peter or Cephas or Simon indifferently. Thus if I were asked
what I mean by Supreme Judge I might answer, the Increated, and if
asked what is signified by the term Justice, I might answer, Incorporeal
Being. This is evidently absurd."
13. We must, therefore, allow a distinction of meaning (at least
KaTtTTivoiav] between the terms we apply to God. If it is true that we
have not an immediate knowledge of God, nor comprehend Him in all
the infinitude of His Being, but only obtain a practical knowledge of
Him from his works, it must follow that we contemplate the being oi
God from various points of view, according to the various ways in which
He reveals Himself in created things. And this being so, there must
thence result different concepts by which we represent God to ourselves,
and different names by which we designate Him ; and these different con
cepts and different names, because of the distinction thus established
between them, must not be exchanged with one another. We might
assert as much as this with reference to objects of the least importance ;
for example, we conceive differently the grain of corn as product of a
vegetable growth, and as seed, and again as an article of food, and we
apply different names to it accordingly. No one will, however, contend
that these concepts and these names express one and the same thing,
though they are applied to one and the same object.
14. The absolute oneness of the Divine Being is not denied or even
imperilled by this doctrine. Light, Vine, Way, Life, Shepherd, etc., do
not signify the same thing, and yet one and the same Christ is designated
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 251
by all these terms. "The Divine Nature," says Basil, (C. Eunoin. I. 12.)
""is one, simple, formally indivisible (/iovoetofc), and without constituent
parts ; but the human mind, attached to the earth and enclosed within
an earthly body, being unable to attain the clear conception after which
it strives, must represent to itself the Ineffable Being partially, and under
various forms in a multiplicity of concepts ; it cannot succeed in com
prehending in one conception the object of its thought/' " They think
unworthily of the Divine Being," says Gregory of Nazianzus (Or. 45, <td
Evagr.), "who hold that, as the names applied to God are many, so the
things signified by these names are manifold also. We know that the
Being signified is absolutely indivisible, absolutely simple, though, for
our advantage He submits Himself to a certain division in our thoughts."
Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophic der Vorzeit. Vol. L, p. 309.
GREGORY OF NYSSA, SYNESIUS, AND NEMESIUS.
§71.
1. Gregory of Nyssa is the third member of that remarkable group
— " the three great Cappadocians " (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and
Gregory of Nyssa). He deserves from us a notice apart, because his
place in the history of philosophy is much more important than that of
the other two, whose renown was achieved principally in the field of
theology and rhetoric. His philosophy is characterised by a strong
leaning* to the views of Origen and the Neo-Platonists, a tendency
which led him to introduce into his writings many opinions which do
not merit unqualified approval. It has, no doubt, been contended by
many critics, that Gregory's writings have been largely interpolated by
the Origenists ; but many opinions derived from Origen are so closely
identified with his whole line of thought that their introduction cannot
be accounted for by any theory of interpolation.
2. Gregory of Nyssa, born A.D. 331, was a younger brother of St. Basil. At the close
of his school career he adopted the teaching of rhetoric as a profession. Later on, he
became Bishop of Nyssa. He was one of the ablest supporters of the Church against
Arianism, and maintained strenuously the struggle for the Faith during the lifetime of his
brother Basil, and more strenuously still after his death. It was his endeavour to prove
by philosophic arguments, to believers and unbelievers alike, the truth of the Christian
religion and its divine origin, and then to make it acceptable to all. He took a prominent
part in the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381). He died A.D. 394.
3. The writings of Gregory of Nyssa are very numerous. We shall mention only those
that are of special interest to the philosopher. To this class belong : (a) The Dialogue
De Anima et ejus Hesurrectione ; (b) the treatise Contra Eunomium ; (c) the Hcxameron ;
(d) De Homuti» OpfyMo ; (e) the Oratio Catechetica (Xuyog Kar/jx'/ri/cu.s) ; (/) I>eeo,qnid
sit Ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei ; (g) De, Anima ; (h) Deiis qui pratmature abrljriuntur ;
(/) De j\Iortuls ; (k) Contra Fatnm ; (1) In dictum Apostoli, Tune etiam ipse Filitts subji-
cietur, etc.; (ro) De vita Mosiv ; (n] In Christi lieeurrectionem j (o) In verba, Faciamm
Jtominem, etc. ; Ofatt., etc.
252 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
4. Like Basil, Gregory of Nyssa controverts at every point the preten
sions of the Anomians, who claimed to have comprehensive know
ledge of the being of God. He calls constant attention to the
limits imposed on human knowledge. It is certain that sensible objects
exist : ^it is equally certain that we have not an exhaustive knowledge
of their being. Nay, we do not even possess perfect knowledge of our
own being ; we cannot, for example, understand fully the mode in which
our soul is united with our body. How much farther are we from posses
sing a comprehensive knowledge of God ! The incomprehensibility of
God is a point which must be unequivocally maintained.
5.^ While thus restricting the compass of human knowledge within
due limits, Gregory is far from denying to man all power of attaining
truth. He holds, on the contrary, that man's knowledge is his highest
privilege — that gift in which the lofty nature of man's soul and its re
semblance to God is made manifest. He dwells at length on the proofs
which establish the existence and unity of God. The leading proof for
God's existence appears to him to be the skilful and wise disposition of
things in the universe ; his proof for the unity of God is founded on the
' Supreme perfection of God in power, goodness, wisdom, eternity and
every Bother attribute — a perfection which vanishes if we suppose the
Divinity divided among a plurality of gods."
6. But in combating the polytheism of the heathens we must not
be betrayed into the abstract monotheism of the Jews. Christianity holds
an intermediate position between these two extremes, teaching as it does
the triple personality of God. " God possesses a Logos," says Gregory.
" He cannot be without reason. This Logos cannot be a mere attribute
of ^ God ; it must form a second Person in God. God is infinitely perfect,
His Logos must be infinitely more perfect than the logos in man. It
cannot, as in man, be something limited, nor can it, like speech in man,
possess only transient existence ; it must be an eternal and living Hypos-
tasis (Person), endowed with the same power and the same will as the
Father." We may reason in like manner with regard to the Holy Ghost.
Instituting a comparison with the breath we draw — which, however, is
merely a current of air, an object quite different from ourselves — Gregory
endeavours to prove the identity of substance between the Holy Ghost
and God. In this way he establishes his contention that Christianity
occupies an intermediate position between Judaism and paganism — hold
ing with the Jews as to the unity of nature, holding with the pagans as
to the plurality of persons. The question why the three Divine Persons
are not three Gods, is answered by the statement that these three are not
individuals of one species, but different Ilypost ases of one and the same
Divine Essence.
7. Creation is a work of Divine power, wisdom and love. The world
was created by the Divine Logos, not from necessity, but from an excess
of love. God wished to share the riches of the Divinity with other beings.
Participation in these riches only rational beings are capable of ; it follows
that ^ the whole visible world is destined for the service of man. For
man's sake the world was created — to enable man to know God through
PHILOSOPHY OF Tin; CUUISTIAN KIIA. 253
the work of creation, and, ultimately, to share in God's eternal happi
ness.
8. The question here arises : how composite, changeable, in a word,
corporeal beings could be produced by a Being who is Himself absolutely
simple, incorporeal, and immutable ? We may not be able to say how
all this has been effected , but we can give a sufficient answer to ihe
question proposed if we consider the nature of the body. The body is
composed of constituent elements which, considered in themselves, are
purely of the ideal order, mere potencies, such as quality, quantity,
figure, size, colour, etc. If, in thought, we abstract these elements from
the body, nothing whatever remains. The body is, therefore, constituted
by the combination of these qualities which, in themselves, are incor
poreal. Fundamentally, therefore, and considered in its elements, it is
something incorporeal. If this is so, the problem is solved ; it becomes
intelligible that the body, being in its essence something incorporeal,
can have been created by an incorporeal being. This explanation, it is
evident, rests wholly on notions derived from Origen and the Neo-
Platonists.
9. Gregory holds the soul of man to be an incorporeal, spiritual
essence. In proof of this he appeals to the function of intelligence, to
the faculty of speech, to the erect posture of the human body, to the
conformation of the bodily organs, especially of the hand which is cleanly
destined to serve the needs of a rational being, and lastly to the fact
that the soul does not subsist by material food, that it feeds on what is
incorporeal — on ideal truth. If the soul were a composite being there
would exist some principle of unity within it. And were this principle
composite, a further principle of union would have to be supposed, and
the hypothesis before made would have to be repeated. The process can
not be prolonged into infinity, and we must, therefore, ultimately arrive
at a principle which is simple and immaterial.
10. There is but one soul in man. Man consists of body and soul.
Gregory knows nothing of a third constituent element. The body has
life from the soul, and from the soul only ; the soul is its principle of
vitality, and this one soul possesses at once the vegetative, sensitive, and
intellectual powers. As regards the vegetative and sensitive faculties,
the soul is dependent upon the body, and can exercise these faculties
only in and through the body ; in its intellectual functions it is superior
to the body, and is unaided by corporeal organs. Man is thus the J//V-
rocoxnt — he represents in himself the being of inanimate things, the life
of plants, the sensitive nature of animals, and the intelligence of the
angels. Furthermore, ho is created to the image of God, inasmuch us
the unbegotten Psyche gives birth to the votpoc Atryoe, and the rout-
issues from both. We cannot fully comprehend the mode of union
between soul and body, but this at least is certain that the soul is sub
stantially present in every portion of the body. The body is the mirror
of the suit!, and the soul being the mirror of God, the body is the mir
ror o? this mirror.
11 It is not by mere chance that the soul is united to the body ; it
254 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
is of its nature destined to this union. The doctrine of the pro- exist
ence of souls ^is, therefore, absurd. A further argument for this view
appears in this, that the hypothesis of pre-existence makes sin the sole
explanation of man's origin — an explanation which is not only ahsurd in
itself, but, furthermore, makes it impossible that man should be delivered
from sin, for it makes sin the very condition of his existence. The soul
came into existence with the body ; living things generate only living
things : it follows that the human embryo must be animated from the
beginning. The origin of the soul must not, however, be accounted for
by generation, the soul is created immediately by God.
12. Gregory maintains the freedom of the human will. Reason es
sentially implies liberty, for the power to distinguish good from evil
would be meaningless unless the will could elect between the good and
the evil. Moreover, without liberty, all virtue, foresight, merit and culpa
bility would be impossible. In liberty we have, therefore, the source
of evil. The body is not evil in itself, and is not the cause of evil ; for
it is God's creation. Evil is not a positive entity. It is the absence of
good, the deflection of the will from the good which is positive being —
that which ought to exist.
13. Up to this point Gregory's psychological views are above re
proach. But other opinions follow which cannot receive the same com
mendation. Gregory distinguishes between the true nature of man, and
other elements which may be regarded as a supemdditum. The true being
of man consists in his reason, which is created like to God ; what is ir
rational in man, v.g., the material body with its sexual differences, and
the faculties of sense, are extraneous to the reason or true nature of
man, an adjunct of it, something superadded to it. Gregory compares
the irrational faculties, with their appetites, tendencies and passions
to ulcers which have fastened on the original nature of man, and which
are, therefore, opposed to reason. In accordance with these notions he
interprets the double narrative of the creation of man which we find in
Genesis. He holds that the "man created after the image and likeness of
God " is the true man, the ideal man whose being is reason ; whereas
the " Adam " whom God formed from the earth, and into whom he
breathed the soul, is the man of our experience, the man who is burdened
with a material body and unreasoning faculties. But the question im
mediately presents itself : Why is the true nature of man burdened with
these additions ? This question Gregory answers as follows : —
14. The first man was placed by God in a state resembling that of
the angels. His nature was pure and was not disfigured by union
with elements extraneous to itself. He had not a material body, nor
was there in him any mark of sexual difference ; he was free from un
reasoning passions, not subject to suffering and death. In a word he
was the perfect, the ideal man. If he had not sinned he would have
continued to live in this state. Mankind would not have been propagated
by the sexual reproduction of individuals, the existence of individual
men would have been effected as the angelic nature is multiplied ; they
would have been produced at once as a large but numerically definite
multitude of individuals.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 255
15. But as God foresaw that man would sin, Ho invested the purer
nature of man with a body of flesh. This was a new act on the part of
the Creator, distinct from that act by which He created (the ideal) man
after His image and likeness, and therefore it is related apart in the sacred
narrative. The origin of man, as we now know him, is to be traced to sin,
inasmuch as man's sin was foreseen by God, and God's action was deter
mined in accordance with the prevision. In consequence of his descent
to the level of the beast, man assumed the peculiarities of the brute.
Unreasoning appetites and passions asserted themselves in him ; he be
came subject to pain and death, and the human species became sexually
differentiated. Human nature could no longer be multiplied in indivi
duals after the manner of the angels, its increase would have to be accom-
tree of the knowledge of good and evil is sensuality, under the
influence of which evil appears as good to the unreasoning appetites ;
the skins with which God clothed the first man after the fall are nothing
else than the body of flesh ; and so of the rest.
16. But though the material body with which man is invested and the
unreasoning appetites that prevail in it are the consequence of sin, thev,
nevertheless, are not an unmixed evil for man. In God's design they
are given as a means to moral perfection— to virtue. The appetites of
sense are not wicked in themselves, they become wicked only by the im
proper use made of them by the will. If reason asserts its authority
over them, if it does not permit them unwarranted excesses, but uses
them for purposes of good, they become the means and instruments of
virtue. And such, in the plan of God, they should be. The grace of the
Redeemer, is, however, necessary to enable man to carry out God's de
sign in this respect. This leads us to Gregory's doctrine on the subject
of Redemption :
17. It was intended that man should return to his original condition,
and again attain supreme happiness in God. To make this possible for
him, the Logos came down to earth, assumed human nature, and accom
plished the work of redemption. He undertook to deliver man from the do-
nion of Satan, and to lead him back to God. But it was not by putting
forth His power that the Redeemer set Himself to conquer Satan. By
atoning for the sin of ma«n, He would acquire a right over man, a right
which would abrogate the power which Satan had acquired over man in
consequence of his sin. For this purpose He gave His life as a ransom
for us. By taking upon Himself human nature, and shrouding therein
His Godhead, He outwitted Satan, for Satan was thus led to incite his
followers to bring about the Redeemer's death, and in this way co-operated
in effecting the saving atonement.
18. That man may participate in the Redemption, he must, as a
primary requirement, possess the grace that admits him to its benefits.
When he has been sanctified by Faith and the Sacraments, it is then his
duty to renounce the lusts of flesh, and to live for virtue. Christ has
crushed the head of the serpent, but He has left the tail, that we may be
256 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
confirmed in goodness by the struggle against passion. Mail in liis
creation, was made the image of God ; it lies within his own power to
make the likeness perfect ; to do this is the essential task set him in
life. He will attain this end if he strives at all times, and according to
the measure of his powers, to imitate Christ, the ideal and perfect model
of Christian life.
19. Gregory's teaching closes in his eschatology : Christ having
risen from the dend, and entered into glory, has in His own person
restored human nature to that original ideal condition from which it fell
through sin. But t>hat nature, as individualised in the multitude of
men, has not yet been restored to its primal state. Nor can it be thus
restored till the number of the human race is numerically complete.
Ultimately this race must attain numerical completeness — this the law
of human nature demands, for the number of individuals in whom
this nature must attain actual existence is definitely fixed. It is only,
when, by the process of carnal procreation, man's nature has attained
existence in all the individuals who are destined to possess it, that it can
return thus individualised to its formal condition. When this has been
accomplished, the Apocatastasis (Restoration) will be universal, and will
embrace all human creatures without exception.
20. It follows that the punishment inflicted an the wicked in the life
to come, will be merely purificatory. After death they are subjected to
the pain of fire, in the measure deserved by their misdeeds. This fire
will gradually consume what is carnal and suxful in the souls of the
wicked, at their departure out of this life, so that after a longer or
shorter period of punishment these souls will be thoroughly purified, and
delivered from everything that offends reason or partakes of sin. The
cleansing pain to which the wicked are subjected in the life to come
may be compared to the purifying of gold by fire. Fire separates the
dross from the gold and restores the metal to its pure state : of like effect
will be the process which the souls of the wicked are destined to
undergo.
21 . When the human race has finally reached numerical completeness,
the Resurrection will follow. As to the possibility of a Resurrection no
doubt is possible. For, though the elements of the body are scattered to
all the winds after death, the soul, in virtue of its natural love for the
body, in a certain sense remains united to them still. And this union is
possible to the soul, because, being a simple substance, it has no need of
actual extension to maintain union with these elements, wherever they
may be. This union being maintained, the soul is enabled to draw to
itself the scattered elements with which it is united. In this way we
may assure ourselves of 'the possibility of the Resurrection. The body
will, however, rise in the glorified state, and will not, therefore, exhibit
difference of sex, nor any of the characteristics of irrational nature.
22. The Resurrection is followed by the Last Judgment. Those who
are then found entirely pure will enter forthwith into glory — the rest are
gain consigned to the punishment of fire. But their punishment will
not be eternal. A time must come when evil will be utterly extirpated
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 257
from the realm of being, for as evil has not been from eternity, so will it
not exist for eternity. Those therefore who, after the Last Judgment, are
consigned to further punishment, will, sooner or later, be wholly purified
and enter into glory. And man's nature in every individual in whom it
is represented will finally be glorified to the measure of the glory of
Christ. Even the demons themselves will at length acknowledge the
sovereignty of Christ, and the Apocatastasis will be universal, without
any exception whatever. When this consummation has been achieved,
then will God be all in all, for all will be in God, and God will
be in all.
23. We have here set forth the doctrines of Gregory of Nyssa as we
find them in his works. Whether we take these doctrines as his own
throughout, or whether we hold that much has been interpolated by the
Origenists, we cannot but allow that the general tone of his philoso
phical opinions indicates the influence upon his mind of the doctrines of
Origeii and the Neo-Platonists. Wherever he deals with purely dog
matic questions we find him entirely in harmony with the sense of the
Church ; where he enters upon the field of philosophic speculation, the
peculiar opinions of Origen and the Neo-Platonists appear prominently
in his teaching. The peculiar views which he was thus led to form
seem to have been regarded as mere eccentricities of private opinion.
This is proved by the high reputation for orthodoxy which he has
always enjoyed in the Church. His faith in the dogmas of Christianity
being above suspicion, the Church did not make much account of the
peculiarities of his philosophical opinions.
24. The same cannot be said of Synesius of Cyrene, for this philoso
pher set his own opinions above Christian truth. He was born in the
year 375, was first a Neo-Platonist, then became a Christian, a priest,
and finally a bishop. The lady- philosopher, Hypatia, was his teacher,
and throughout his after-career he maintained a friendly intercourse with
her. He did not believe in the ultimate destruction of the world, was inclined
to a belief in the pre-existence of souls, admitted the immortality of the
soul, but held the doctrine of the Resurrection to be merely a sacred
allegory. In his public teaching he taught the current dogmas of
belief, on the ground that myths are necessary for the crowd ; the pure
unimaginative truth is accessible only to a few, and would only blind the
weak eyes of the multitude. His notion of God is more Neo-Platonic
than Christian. He represents God as " the unit of unities, the monad
of monads, undifferentiated in contrarieties, which, issuing forth in inef
fable fashion in the forms first-born from it, receives a three-fold shape —
the transcendent source of Being crowned by the beauty of its children,
which come forth from its centre, and stand in order around that centre.
This eternal spirit, divided without division, entered into matter, and
the world received form and motion, and in those who have fallen to this
iK'thcr world it became a force to raise them again to heaven."
25. The same Neo-Platonic views are shared by Nemesius, bishop of
Emcsa, in Phoenicia, who lived, it is probable, towards the end of the
fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. In his work 7>" Natunt
18
258 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
Hominis, he combats the doctrine of the creation of souls on the ground
that everything which has a beginning in time must be perishable and
mortal, and that the created world must be supposed imperfect if souls
are constantly being created. He, therefore, declares himself in favour
of the doctrine of pre-existence. Everything supersensuous is eternal,
the soul as well as other things. The corporeal and the incorporeal alike
have been created from nothing, but the former has a beginning and an
end, the latter has neither. The corporeal world will not, however, perish,
for God will not destroy what rightly fulfils its end.
26
. Origen's theory of the pre-existeuce of souls had, as we have seen, many sup
porters, but it had also many antagonists. Foremost amongst these was ^Eneas of Gaza, a
teacher of rhetoric in Egypt (about A.D. 487). He contends, in his work 7 heophrastus
delinquent hc-~ — — - . -
for the differences of external fortune, to which appeal is made, are not evidence of good
or evil ; free will explains everything. Furthermore, the life of the soul before its union
with the body would have been useless and superfluous, since the soul is of its nature pre
pared for union with the body. ^Eneas also combats the doctrine of the eternity of the
world. To the objection that in the supposition of a beginning of the world, God must
previously have been inactive, he replies by reminding us of the life in the Trinity of
Divine Persons— which God has lived eternally, and in which He is eternally active.
27. Following in the line of argument indicated by .Eneas, in his attack upon the
theory of an eternal world and of the pre-existence of souls, we find Zacharias Scholasti-
cus, bishop of Mytilene (about A.D. 536), and Joannes Philoponus of Alexandria, a
Monophysite (about the middle of the sixth century) and a commentator of Aristotle.
The last mentioned writer incurred the accusation of teaching Tritheism, from the man
ner in which he applied to the Trinity the Aristotelian doctrine, that "substantial
existence in the fullest sense of the word belongs to all individuals." He also adopts the
theory of a triple soul in man— the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational ; and holds
that they are described as one soul because all these are mutually interdependent, and
united by mutual sympathy. He explains the Resurrection, not by the restoration of
life to the bodies formerly possessed by men, but by the creation of bodies entirely new.
PsEUDO-DlONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE, MAXIMTJS CONFESSOR, AND
JOHN OF DAMASCUS.
§ 72.
1. The blending of Neo-Platonic with Christian notions is carried to
the highest point in the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite.
The works of this author which have come down to us are a treatise De
Dmnis Nominibus, the Theologia Mystica, and the books De Coelesti ct
Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, as well as ten " Letters." Other writings of the
same author, to which allusion is made in the works we have quoted,
amongst which is a Theologia Symbolica, have been lost. Critics are now
agreed that these writings are not the work of the St. Dionysius the Areopa
gite, of whom mention is made in the Acts of the Apostles, but of an
anonymous writer who lived, most probably, in the latter decades of the
fifth century, and who published his writings under the name of St.
Dionysius, in order to secure them a greater notoriety.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 25!)
2. The writings in question are mentioned for the first time in the Mononhvsite con
troversy. The Severians a moderate section of the Monophysites, had, by command of
the hmperor Justinian, held a conference with certain Catholic bishops at Constantinople
and in the conference they made appeal to the writings of Dionysius the Areopa«ite in
defence of their peculiar Monophysite doctrines. But the spokesman of the Catholic
bishops, Hypatius, at once questioned their genuineness. No further dispute was for a
tune raised on this subject, and the works in question came eventually to be held in hich
estimation. This was particularly the case when the Popes Gregory, Martin, and \gatho
quoted them in their writings. A commentary on these writings, composed by Manama
Confessor, a man of approved orthodoxy, contributed still more to establish' them as
authoritative. ^ In the middle ages they were translated by Scotus Erigena. and thence
forward their influence was still further enhanced. The Scholastics as well as the Mystics
dmw largely upon them, and the most remarkable of the Scholastic writers W& only
lem freely, but even wrote lengthened commentaries upon them.
3. The influence of Neo-Platonism is specially prominent in these treatises For
the most part they follow Plotinus, but there also appears in them evidence of the influence
later members of the same school, such as lamblichus and Proclus. with both of whom
they concur in exalting the One, not merely above the Existent, but also above the Good
Regarded from the standpoint of orthodox Faith, they are capable of an interpretation
winch is compatible with orthodox belief, and in this sense they were interpreted bv the
Christian teachers who undertook to explain them. But if the Neo-Platonic views con
tamed in them were strongly insisted on, they might easily give occasion to many errors—
a result to which, in later times they did, in fact, lead.
^ 4. According to the teaching of " Dionysius," God is exalted above all
being, and above all qualifications of being, infinite in his self-existence. No
predicates, therefore, can be attributed to Him, in the sense in which
they are attributed to created objects. For God there is no name, no
concept ; His inaccessible Being is lifted above all names and above all
concepts ; the notion of the Good itself is not one with the notion of the
Godhead, the latter transcends the notion of the Good as all others. God is
transcendent being, transcendently good, transcendently perfect. lie is
therefore, in the strict sense of the word, the Ineffable. Transcending as
he does, all being and all perfection, He is beyond the range of every
intellect, and every faculty of knowledge*
Though God is exalted above all being and above all qualities of
being, He is, nevertheless, the cause of all being ; and since the cause
must include in itself a priori whatever is in the effect, He must include
in Himself all the perfections that belong to existent being. But we
must not predicate these perfections of Him in the sense in which we
predicate them of created objects, but in a far higher meaning. All the
while, we must remember these predicates do not give us knowledge of
(rod as He is in Himself ; in this respect He is above all predicates. In using
terms ol this kind, we are merely endeavouring to bring God nearer to
ourselves we employ them to gain some glimpse of the transcendent
being oi (rod, and to state in some way our knowledge.
• j' 7t mUSt' in accordance with these principles, distinguish two
kinds ot theology—a positive and a negative. The positive or affirmative
theology attributes all perfections to God, represents Him as infinite lv
wise, just, good, etc. The negative theology, on the other hand, demVs
According to" Dionysiua," the following are the degrees of the ascending scale which
kada to God I< u -st we have the spirit or reason, more°«eneral than reason's sensation
me e genera than sensation is life, more general than life is being, more eneral than
being is the Good, and lastly, above the Good is the Divine.
260 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
all suet perfections in God, and aims at comprehending that being which
absolutely transcends predicates of all and every kind. If we compare
together these two kinds of theology, we shall find the negative to be
unquestionably the more excellent ; for by this method we make the
nearest approach to understanding God in His exaltation above all
other things. But negative theology itself is not the highest ; for the
exalted being of God not only transcends positive predicates, it trans
cends negative predicates also ; they do not give us knowledge of God
as He is in Himself. The highest theology of all, as we shall presently
see, is mystical theology. .
7. All created things have ideal existence in Grod. Ine Holy Scrip
ture styles ideas, as they exist in God, w poop iff f^ov^. These ideas are
not merely archetypes of things, they are formative forces as well. By
means of these ideas, created things come forth from God in their actual
reality. This issuing of all things from God is thus explained : God in
His transcendent elevation cannot allow His goodness to be unproductive ;
the infinite goodness of God overflowed, as it were, and God, without
losing His transcendental state and His absolute unity, diffused Himself
through the universe of things, all of which, in their fashion, were thus
made to partake of the Divine Being. A voice is heard by many ears
and a light is seen by many eyes,but, though thus diffused, the light and
voice do not lose themselves while thus spread : so it is with the diffusion
of the Divine Being in things created.
8. The further doctrines which " Dionysius" lays down with regard
to creation are in accordance with these views. He asserts that, in
creation, God multiplied Himself, in a certain sense, without however
losing His unity ; that, without ceasing to exist in Himself, He went out of
Himself, as it were, and diffused Himself through the multitudinous
objects of creation ; that God is the universal being, that He exists in
everything, and comes into being in everything. " Dionysius" even asserts
that the being of all things is no other than the transcendental being of
God. This notwithstanding, God, according to his view, is not a portion
of the universe, nor anything existing in the universe ; admitting no ad
mixture of any extraneous element, God stands aloof from the universe,
and maintains Himself eternally in this transcendental state. Just as the
sun sheds its light over everything outside itself, so does God diffuse His
goodness through all things, without prejudice to His unity or His tran
scendent elevation.
9 And as all things issue from God, so do all things tend to return
to Him again. The reason of this, too, is to be found in His goodness.
In virtue of His infinite goodness all things go forth from God ; in
virtue of this same goodness He attracts them to Himself again,
goodness diffuses itself in all things, but in thus diffusing itself it forms
a bond which attaches all things to God— a chain which binds them ail
to Him. God is at once the first cause and final end of all things, and
He is the one and the other because of His infinite goodness.
10. It will be observed that this doctrine, which makes all
issue from God, borders very closely on the Emanation theory of the
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN KK\. 2G1
jSTeo-Platonists. It is true that "Dionysius" holds fast to the principle that
things did not exist before they issued from God, and thus distinctly
asserts that Creation had a beginning. We are, therefore, justified in
giving a favourable interpretation to the formulas of Neo-Platonism in
which he has embodied the Christian notions ; and we may regard the
principle that the being of things is the transcendental being of God, as
applied only to the ideal being of things. But it is clear that doctrines
thus formulated may give rise to very serious misconceptions, and may
lead to very dangerous consequences. Of this we shall have proof
later.
11. In consonance with these, the fundamental principles of his system,
— "Dionysius," in his work De Coelesti et Ecclesiastica Hicrarchia, makes
God the centre of the spheres which are formed by the orders of created
things. Around the Divine centre creatures arrange themselves, so to
speak, in concentric circles ; in such fashion, however, that these circles
represent ever diminishing grades of perfection, the diminution in per
fection being proportioned to the distance from the common centre.
This gradually descending scheme of concentric orders of being is so
bound together that each degree exerts a purifying, illuminating, and
perfecting influence on that which stands immediately beneath it, and in
this way unites it with one common centre. This arrangement of the
orders of being, the vital relation thus established between them, is
styled by " Dionysius," the Hierarchy of Things."
12. " Dionysius" further distinguishes between the celestial and the
ecclesiastical hierarchies. The former is constituted by the three orders of
angels — the first consisting of the Thrones, the Seraphim, and the Cheru
bim; the second of the Dominations, the Virtues, the Powers; and the third
of the Principalities, the Archangels, and the Angels. The ecclesiastical
hierarchy, on the other hand, consists of Priests and People, each division
being sub-divided into three orders. The former is divided into Bishops,
Priests, and Ceremonial Ministers, of which the last is the purifying, the
second the illuminating, and the third the perfecting order. The
hierarchy, of the Laics consists of the perfect (the Monks), the sanctified
laity, and the people unsanctified. In this way is constituted the scheme
of hierarchical life — a scheme which is founded upon and determined by
the Sacraments. Highest in the hierarchical system, and centre of the
whole, is Christ. The ultimate purpose of this hierarchical arrangement
is the deification or divinisation of man — a purpose which is achieved by
mystical elevation.
13. To raise himself to this mystical eminence, in other words, to
attain to immediate contemplation of God, man must rise above all things
sensuous and super sensuous, above the existent and the non-existent ;
must reduce all his cognitive faculties, whether of sense or intellect, to
absolute inaction, and, in this sacred silence, immerse himself in the
primal Divine Unity, and bury hims( If in the gloom of the Divine
Being. This is that " Sacred Ignorance" which is the highest form of
knowledge. It is by not knowing God, that is, by making abstraction
from all attributes whether positive or negative, and by thus representing
262 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
God to ourselves in His absolute incomprehensibility, that we attain the
highest knowledge granted to the human mind : God as He is in His
transcendental being, as He is in Himself. The divine light has shrouded
itself with the creatures that have proceeded from it, as with a veil, but
in this mystical process we penetrate the veil and approach the eternal
light in which God dwells. In this state man is deified. The whole
teaching of "Dionysius" culminates in mysticism.
14. Maximus Confessor (580-662), followed the teachingof "Dionysius"
on the one hand, and of Gregory of Nyssa on the other. He was one of
the most learned and subtle theologians of his time, and defended the
orthodox faith against the Monothelites as well as against the so-called
Ecthesis of the Emperor Heraclius. Under Constans II. he suffered
cruel tortures for his faith, and was then sent into exile, where he died
at an advanced age. He was the author of several works, of a Com
mentary on the writings of "Dionysius Areopagita," Quoestiones in Scrip-
turam, a Mystagogia, and others. The greater part of his works were
published by Combefisius (Paris, 1675).
15. The opinions of Maximus, with regard to the mystical life,
deserve special mention. In order to rise to the mystical state, the soul
must free itself wholly from the things of sense, it must then " pass
beyond all thought of the existent and the non-existent ; detach itself
wholly from its own faculties, and from the supersensuous faculty of
thought ; then may it become united with God who is above all rational
thought." This union is not so much an activity of soul as a passivity, for
it is caused entirely by the action of divine grace — a notion which was put
already forward by "Dionysius the Areopagite." In the present life this
union is not attainable in its perfection, it can be consummated only in the
life to come. With this doctrine Maximus connects the theory of the final
restitution of all souls, with regard to which he adopts the peculiar views
of Gregory of JSTyssa. The means of accomplishing this end are furnished
by the Incarnation of Christ ; the Incarnation is the climax of divine
revelation, and would therefore, have taken place had there been no fall
of man by sin.
16. The last of the Greek Ecclesiastical writers who claims a place
in the history of Philosophy is the monk Joannes Damascenus. He was
born at Damascus in Syria, towards the close of the seventh century, was
a strenuous opponent of the iconoclasm of Leo the Isaurian, and suffered
grievous persecution in consequence. He composed a work which he
entitled the Fount of Knowledge, (77-1771? yvwo-twe). He begins with a
short exposition of (Aristotelian) Ontology, connects with this his re
futation of heresy, and concludes with a systematic exposition of the
orthodox teaching, under the title De Fide Orthodoxa. In this work he
declares he will not set down anything of his own, but will merely bring
together, and arrange systematically, what has been the teaching of holy
and learned men. In this undertaking Philosophy, and more especially
Logic and Ontology, will give efficient aid, for which reason, he styles
Philosophy the Ancilla theologice. This work has been held in high
esteem in the East, even to our day ; the scholastics of the West, too, have
been largety influenced by it in the exposition of their theological doctrines.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 263
LATIN FATHERS AND ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS.
HILARY, AMBROSE, JEROME.
§ 73.
1. The three names we have set at the head of this section belong
properly to the history of Dogma, but the history of Philosophy must
not pass them wholly by. Philosophy, however, holds only a secondary
place in their writings, and therefore we may be brief in our notice of
them. We shall do no more than concisely indicate the general character
of their teaching, dwelling chiefly upon those points which are of special
philosophic interest.
2. Hilary was born at Poitiers, and about the middle of the fourth
century was raised to the episcopal See of that city, at the time when
Arianism, under the favour of the Emperor Constantius, was gaining the
mastery everywhere. He opposed an energetic resistance to the Arians,
and was, in consequence, banished to Phrygia by Constantius. There he
composed his chief work, De Trinitate. At a later period he was re
called from banishment, and died A.». 368.
3. A glance at the work De Trinitate shows us that Hilary was averse
to unrestrained license of investigation in Divine things, and that he re
quired such inquiries to be based on Faith. The first thing necessary is
to believe whatever God has revealed. It is only when this point is
secured that we can go on to investigate what we believe, in order to be
able to render an account of the grounds of our Faith.
4. With these principles in view, Hilary sets himself to combat the
tortuous reasonings of the Arians. He reviews all their arguments, com
bats each of them in turn, and exposes the sophistries that underlie them.
His logic is inexorable, his demonstrations convincing, his language is
sometimes obscure, but the thoughts expressed are always striking.
He is the enemy of sophistry of all kinds, and his reasoning is always
bold and honest.
5. It is somewhat strange to find him asserting that the human soul
is a corporeal substance. There is not, he maintains, anything created
which is not of corporeal nature. The different kinds of souls, whether
they be united to bodies, or whether they be free from bodies, receive
from nature a corporeal substance, for everything that has been created
must exist in something ( Comment, in Matth., c. 5, 8). But he does not
understand by this corporeal " substance "of the soul a terrestrial, material,
perishable body, and he is thus enabled elsewhere (Tract, in Ps. 52, 7 ;
in Ps. 118, litt. 10, 7,) to speak of the soul as a simple substance. In this
teaching he seems to follow Tertullian's views on the subject of the
" spiritual body."
6. But in his theory regarding the origin of the soul, he is not in
favour of Tertullian's Traducianism ; he supports the theory of creation.
In his view, the soul cannot receive its being in the same way as the
body. The body alone is produced by carnal generation ; the soul is
264 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
created immediately by God, to^ God's image and likeness, and at the
moment of its creation is united with the body.
7. Ambrose next claims our notice. He was born in Treves, A.D.
340, and was the son of the governor of that city. He betook himself
\o Rome for the study of law, and there became remarkable as an
orator. Subsequently he was appointed governor of Milan, and while
holding this office was elected Archbishop of the city by the clergy and
people. He discharged his episcopal duties with apostolic zeal ; his faith
was unwavering, his life peace, and his devotion to the interests of his
flock unremitting. He died A.D. 397.
8. In his literary labours St. Ambrose occupied himself chiefly with
the explanation of the Scriptures. He adopted, throughout, the allegorical
method, after the manner of Philo, and many of Philo's notions are found in
his explanations. Among the works which exhibit this tendency, are the
Hexaemeron, the treatises De Isaac et Anima, De Abraham, De Bono
Mortis, De Noe et Area, De Pamdiso, De Cain et Abel, De Jacob et Vita
Beata, etc. Of special interest to the philosopher is his work De Officiis
Ministrorum, a treatise of Christian ethics modelled on the work of
Cicero.
9. The ethical system of St. Ambrose differs from that of the pagan
philosopher primarily in this, that it makes eternal life beyond the grave
the ultimate end of all morality and virtue. Eternal happiness in God
is the high destiny of man, and virtue must be practised only for the sake of
this end. Apart from this purpose, virtue has no value. Whatever is
ethically good is also useful for the attainment of man's final end, and
conversely whatever is really useful is also morally good.
10. Virtue and morality having immediate reference to God, that
is to happiness in God, it follows that piety (pietas), as manifested in the
religious worship of God, is the foundation of all virtues. It is the im
mediate basis of the four Cardinal Virtues— Prudence, Fortitude,
Temperance, and Justice, in which the moral life of man reveals itself
and takes shape. Deflection from virtue is evil ; and the evil has its
source, not in the body, not in some substance other than our own per
sonality, but solely in our own free will, which turns away from the
path of righteousness.
11. Jerome was a contemporary of Ambrose. He was born A.D. 346,
completed his education at Rome, and, after receiving Baptism, retired to
the desert of Chalcis, where he lived the life of a hermit. Subsequently,
he quitted the desert, and betook himself to Antioch, where he was
ordained priest, and thence travelled to Constantinople and to Rome.
After the death of Pope Damasus, he returned to the East, and selected
Bethlehem as his place of abode. At this time began the most remark
able period of his literary activity. He died A.D. 420.
12. We need not mention that Jerome occupied himself principally
with the translation and interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, and
that his fame rests chiefly on the important services he rendered on this
subject. Philosophical disquisitions are to be found here and there in
his work. He describes the human soul as an invisible incorporeal being
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 265
(Com. in Ev. Matth., iv., c. 27,) but adds the restriction, "secundum
crassiorem dico nostri corporis substantiam." It would appear from this
that he shared the views of Hilary regarding the nature of the soul. He
does not seem to have formed any definite opinion as to the origin of the
soul, but he distinctly rejects the theory of pre-existence, for in this
hypothesis, he holds, the union of the soul with the body and, con
sequently the Resurrection, would be contrary to nature.
AUGUSTINE.
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. *•
8 74.
1 . We have now reached the remarkable man in whom the philosophy
of the Patristic period attained its highest development. We refer to St.
Augustine. He is the great luminary of the period to which he belongs.
His great mind gathered together all the elements of Christian philosophy
hitherto called into existence, reduced them to systematic unity, and left
them to succeeding ages as a systematic whole, for further study and
investigation. The world does not often bring forth a genius like that
of Augustine. Such depth of thought, such delicacy of discrimination,
a spirit of inquiry so fruitful in results, such a genuine appreciation of
the ideal, such conclusive reasoning, are not often found in one man to
the same degree. God and the soul — these were the objects to which his
investigations were mainly directed ; the whole effort of his mind found
expression in the pregnant words: Noverim Te (Deus), noverim me !
2. Aurelius Angustinus was born at Tagaste in Numidia, A.D. 353. His father
Patricius was a pagan, his mother Monica a Christian of exemplary piety. The extra
ordinary intellectual gifts of the boy manifested themselves at an early age, but passion
awoke in him at the same time in all its energy, a circumstance which caused much sor
row to his mother. He received his education successively at Tagaste, Madaura, and
Carthage. The vice and the excesses with which he was brought in contact in Madaura
and Carthage affected his moral character most perniciously. All the while his great mind
was not idle, it was restlessly seeking a solution for the great problems of life. He
believed such a solution was offered by the Manicheans. and he accordingly joined their
Beet. When his education was finished, he adopted the profession of teacher of rhetoric,
nnd in this capacity taught at Carthage, at Rome, and at Milan. During his stay at Milan
the turning point of his life was reached.
3. The contradictions involved in the Manicheau doctrines had bewildered him, and
he had in consequence adopted the scepticism of the Academy, when his study of the
writings of Plato at last roused him from his sensual degradation and awoke in him the love
of the ideal. The preaching of St. Ambrose exercised a still more powerful influence on the
mind of the young man. Augustine had gone to hear the discourses of the bishop for the
sake of the graces of his oratory, buthesoon went for the sake of the exalted teaching which
was clothed in these charms of eloquence. A further influence was that of his mother,
who had followed him from Rome, and whose prayers and counsels were added to the
other gracious impulses brought to hear on him. The decisive moment came, and after a
struggle the grace of God triumphed.
4. After his conversion, Augustine, with several of his friends, retired to the country
seat of Cassiciacum, near Milan, and in the year 387 he received Baptism. At this date
began his great literary activity in the service of the Church. In the year 391 circum
stances arose which obliged him to make a journey to Hippo. There he was forced by
266 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
the people to receive priest's orders, and to act as assistant to the aged bishop of that See.
On the death of the bishop, Augustine was unanimously elected to succeed him (395). In
his new office he laboured iiidefatigably for the establishment of the Catholic Faith and
Christian morality, and defended the doctrines of the Church with signal energy against
the Manicheans, Donatists and Pelagians. He died A.D. 430.
5. Of the writings of St. Augustine, those are of special interest for the history of philo
sophy which were written in the first years after his conversion. In the later years of his
life he was occupied mainly with questions affecting religious dogmas, as during that period
he was engrossed by his struggle with the Donatists, Manicheans, and Pelagians. To the
earlier writings belong :— (a) The treatise Contra Academicos ; (b), De Vita Beata ; (c), De
Ordine; and (d), the Soliloquia. These works were composed previous to his baptism at
Cassiciacum. Before his baptism also, but after his return to Milan, were composed (e),
the treatise De Immortalitate Animce; (/), the work, De Grammatica ; (g), the treatises
De Magistro; and(A), the Principia Dialectices. During his journey from Milan to Africa, he
composed at Rome, (j), the treatise De Quantitate Animce; (k), the three books De Libero
Arbitrio; (I), the books De Moribus Ecdesice ; and (m), De Moribus Manichceorum. At
Tagaste he composed the treatises (n), De Musica; (o), De Genesi contra Manichcvos ;aud '
(p), DeVera Reliyione.
6. The works which he wrote as a priest and a bishop, and which are of chief interest to
the philosopher are :— (a), De Doctrina Christiana, Libri iv. ; (b), De Fide etSymbolo ; (c),
Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Caritate ; (d), De Utilitate Credendi ; (e), De Agone Christiana ;
(/), De Genesi ad Litteram, Libri xii. ; De Fide contra Manichceos ; (h), De Duabus
Animis contra Manichceos ; (i), Contra Fortunatum Manich. ; (k) Contra Adimantum
Manichcei D'tscipulum ; (1), Contra Faustum Manichceum ; (m) De Spiritu et Littera ; (n)
DeAnimaet ejus Origine; (o), De Actis cum Felice Manichceo ; (p), De Natura Boni
contra Manichceos ; (q,) Contra Epistolam Maniclw&i quam vocant Fundamenti ; (r), Contra
Secundinum Manichoium ; (s), Contra Adversarium Leg is et Prophetarum, etc.
7. But the works of St. Augustine which are the most important of all, both to the
theologian and to the philosopher, are his great works De Civitate Dei in 22 books, and his
work De Trinitate in 15 books. The latter of these was composed between A.D. 400 and
410 ; the former was begun A.D. 413 and completed A.D. 426. Of importance also to the
philosopher are his Confessions which he wrote about A.D. 400. His letters, sermons, and
commentaries on the Scripture also contain much that throws light upon his philosophical
opinions. Of his writings against the Pelagians we may mention : — (a), Contra Julianum
Pelagianum ; (b), De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia ; (c), De Peccatorum Mentis et Remissione ;
(d) Opus imperjectum contra Julianum Pelag. ; (e) Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum; (/)
De Correptione et Gratia ; (g), De Natura et Gratia; (h), De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ; (i),
De Prcedestinatione Sanctorum; (k), De Dono Per sever antice; (I), De Peccato Originali ; etc.
The Retractationes were composed by Augustine a few years before his death ; in this work
he reviews his entire system and corrects many points of his earlier teaching.
8. We have mentioned that Augustine, after his conversion, devoted
his scientific inquiries chiefly to two subjects — God and the soul. For
the conduct of his inquiries it was necessary that he should
lay down a definite theory of knowledge which should serve as a
basis on which to establish his system of investigation. In order to set
forth clearly the philosophy of St. Augustine, it will be necessary to ex
plain first the principles of his theory of knowledge; we shall then
proceed to his teaching regarding God and the creation of the world ;
and lastly we shall deal with his doctrine regarding man, and the ethical
theories which are connected with this portion of his system.
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
§ 75.
1. At this point of our exposition, it is of chief importance to
set forth the relation which Augustine conceives to exist between reason
PHILOSOPHY OK THE CHRISTIAN KKA. 267
and authority. All that we learn, he says, we learn either from
authority or from reason. Faith is the result of the former process,
knowledge is the result of the latter. In the order of time authority
comes first, in the order of the nature of things, reason is the first and
most excellent. The usual course when we learn a thing is that
authority comes before reason. Authority offers the truth which faith
thereupon accepts, but this process leads on to scientific knowledge. For
reason is thus enabled to direct its attention to the truth given by
authority, to acquire scientific knowledge of it, and to establish it on a
scientific basis. The latter kind of knowledge is of its nature higher
than a mere knowledge of faith. In this wise does faith become the
basis, the condition, and the first beginning of scientific knowledge
(I)c Ord., Lib. 2, c. 9.)
2. These general principles Augustine applies to determine the
relation between Divine Revelation and human reason. In any
scientific investigation of revealed truth, faith must precede knowledge,
it must be the basis and antecedent condition of knowledge. In
other words, the truths of divine revelation must be received by faith
before we can attain a scientific or a speculative knowledge of them.
Faith is therefore indispensable for man. This the more that sin has
entangled man in the love 01 things of earth, and diverted him
from the eternal ; and in consequence, faith has become necessary to
man as a means of salvation, as the means by which he must reach
truth, and thus attain salvation (De Vera Relig., c. 24).
3. This being premised, we may now take up the theory of know
ledge, strictly so called, which Augustine offers us. To every act of
knowledge, he teaches, two factors concur — an object known, and a sub
ject knowing. Of its nature, the object is antecedent to the subject-
without an object no knowledge is possible. This principle is of uni
versal application. Now, the objects of knowledge are of two kinds, the
sensible and the supersensuous ; we may, therefore, distinguish in man
two kinds of knowledge — experience and reason. Sense, or experience,
is concerned with the sensible ; reason deals with the supersensuous or
intelligible. These two kinds of knowledge are essentially distinct from
one another.
4. But the question arises: Is certainty possible in knowledge?
The Academics deny this, inasmuch as Tney teach that mere probability
is all that we can attain. But, in the first place, such probability could
not be had unless we suppose the knowledge of truth possible, for the
probable is probable only because it is like truth ; and it is measured
by comparison with truth. In the next place, probability would not, by
any means, suffice to make us happy, whatever the Academics may say
to the contrary. For, no one can be happy who does not possess that
which he desires to possess, and no one searches who does not wish to
find. He, therefore, who seeks truth without finding it, does not pos
sess that which he wishes to possess, and cannot, consequently, be
happy. Nor can such an one be said to be really wise ; for the sage, as such,
must be happy ; certainty in knowledge must, therefore, be attainable.
268 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
5. The same principle can further be established by positive argument.
We cannot doubt that we are thinking, willing, and living. Conscious
ness gives such indisputable evidence on this point that doubt or denial
is impossible. If a person were to doubt whether he thinks or exists,
he would, by his very doubt itself, admit that he thinks and exists ; if
he did not exist, he could not doubt. Furthermore, the man who
knows that he doubts, has, by the fact, knowledge of a truth ; is certain
of this truth, that he is doubting. The man who doubts whether there
is any truth, acknowledges one proposition to be true ; and, as all
things are true only because truth exists, he, by the fact, acknowledges
the existence of truth and his own certainty with regard to it (De Lib.
Arb., Lib. 2, c. 3. Soliloq., Lib. 2, c. 1, etc.)
6. Again, the truth of our sensuous knowledge is also beyond doubt.
We may, indeed, be deceived in the use of our senses ; but the fault is
not to be attributed to the senses, for these always represent the object,
according to the impressions which they actually receive. It is not b}'
our senses we are deceived, but by the judgment we form with regard
to their perceptions. We form our judgment hastily on our present
impressions, without closer inquiry into the relations which may pos
sibly exist between these and external objects. As for the existence of
an objective material world, sense renders us so certain that doubt is
wholly impossible.
7. The truth of sensuous knowledge cannot be doubted ; the truth
of knowledge gained by intellect is no less above suspicion. Nothing
can be more absurd than to assert that what we see with our eyes exists,
but what we perceive with our intellect does not exist ; for it would be
irrational to suppose that reason or intelligence is not incomparably
higher than bodily sense (De Immort. Anim., c. 10). Dialectical
truths are, therefore, indisputable. No one, for instance, can doubt
that the truth of the antecedent of an hypothetical proposition involves
the truth of the consequent, or that, in a disjunctive proposition, the
denial of all the members, except one, involves the truth of the member
remaining. And so of other truths.
8. As to the possibility of attaining certain knowledge, there can,
then, be no doubt. A further question now arises as to the conditions
of intellectual knowledge ; and, first, as to the way in which intellectual
knowledge is acquired. Augustine distinguishes two methods by which
the ^ knowledge of intelligible objects is attained. The first method
begins^with the faculties of sense. The intellect directs its attention to
the objects perceived by the senses, inquires into their causes, and thus
endeavours to reach the knowledge of the Ultimate, or First Cause, a
process described in the words of the Apostle : " Invisibilia Dei per ea
quae facta sunt intellects conspiciuntur" (De Gen. adlitt., iv., c. 32j.
9. The second method begins with what is within man himself.
Man must withdraw from sense, and retire within himself, if he would
contemplate truth in all its purity. Augustine reminds us of this prin
ciple at every turn. " Noli foras ire/' he repeats, " in te redi ; in in-
teriori homine habitat veritas " (De Vera Relig., c. 39). The consider-
PHILOSOPHY OK TI1K CHRISTIAN ERA. 269
ation of himself and of the processes of his intellectual life is, for man,
the second means to the knowledge of higher truth. And this way N
the more excellent, for it is more within man's reach, and therefore
leads more perfectly to the end pursued than the other, which begins
with sense and leads to the supersensuous.
10. To enable man by these means successfully to reach intelligible
truth another condition is necessary. This condition is virtue and
purity of heart. Truth can find place only in a pure heart. The man
who would successfully prosecute the search after truth must, therefore,
purify his soul from all defilement, and the purer his heart is from sin,
and the more it is adorned with virtue and holiness, the more clearly and
more perfectly will truth be communicated to him.
11. This being premised, we may now penetrate more deeply into
the nature of intellectual knowledge. The question which first arises
concerns the ultimate or highest ground of all knowledge. Augustine
answers that the ultimate ground or reason of all intellectual knowledge
is the Absolute Truth — God. This principle Augustine proves after the
fashion of Plato :
(a.) That we may have knowledge of anything as true, or good, or
beautiful, and distinguish it from what is not true, or good, or beautiful,
it is necessary to have a rule or standard, according to which the judg
ment regarding the object is determined. This standard, according to
which we estimate the truth, or goodness, or beauty of an object, must
be absolutely immutable, otherwise it could not be a trustworthy stand
ard of judgment. The standard of judgment must be present to our
minds ; but, it is not the mind itself, for the mind is changeable, and,
besides, we judge ourselves and our own actions by this standard, and
must so judge ourselves. That immutable, invariable standard must,
therefore, be something higher than our own minds ; and, since there
is nothing immutable and invariable but God, this standard must be God
Himself, in so far as He is absolute truth, goodness, and beauty (Le
Lib. Arl., II, c. 12, 16).
(b.) If a human teacher states any principle to us, we do not imme
diately perceive the truth of the principle. We must have within our
selves a criterion by which we test the truth of the proposition stated.
And this criterion can, for the reason already given, be no other than the
absolute truth itself. It appears, then, that the immutable, eternal Word
of God is the teacher of the soul ; we consult this Word when we endea
vour to assure ourselve? of the truth of a proposition laid down by a
human teacher ; and this truth the Word reveals to us with as much
clearness and evidence as our moral condition permits. Instruction
from without only leads us to consult the instructor within ourselves, to
receive from Him an insight into the truth (De Magistro, c. 11).
(c.} When two individuals understand and acknowledge as true an
assertion advanced by one or the other, the question presents itself :
How and by what means have both alike knowledge of the truth in
question ? The one does not read it in the other ; there must be some
common ground in which and by which both alike obtain knowledge of
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
it. This ground can, again, be no other than the absolute, immutable
truth, which is above both, and in accordance with which both alike
form their judgment (Conf. XII, c. 25).
12. It follows from these considerations that our minds are, in some
mysterious way, united to the eternal unchanging truth. Without
this union they would be incapable of attaining knowledge of truth. God
is the Sun which illumines human minds. In His light we perceive
truth. As we can observe nothing with the eye of the body, when the
sun does not shed its light over the objects of vision ; so we cannot have
knowledge of intellectual truth except in the light of God — the Sun
of our faculty of intelligence. And, as the sun sheds its light upon all
men, so that, in its light, all may be able to see, so does God give His
light to all minds to make truth accessible to all. This gift is, how
ever, bestowed upon different men in different decrees, as their apti
tudes are differently determined by their moral condition.
13. The knowledge of the essences of created things depends upon
the intellectual light thus furnished by the absolute divine truth. With
out this light such knowledge would be impossible. The Divine Word
includes within Himself the ultimate reasons (rationes) or archetypal forms,
after which all things are created and of which all things are ectypes.
God, as absolute truth, is thus the ultimate cause of all our knowledge
of truth, and the Word of God is the ultimate cause which renders in
telligible to us the essences of things, inasmuch as He includes within
Himself the archetypal forms of all existence. It follows that we may
assert, and must assert, that we have knowledge of the essences of things
in their ultimate eternal causes (in ratioiiibus aeternis) which exist in
Gbd.
14. In this way the origin of our intellectual knowledge must be
explained. It now becomes manifest how the consideration of our own
activity of intellect leads us at once to the knowledge of God. When
we see that all intellectual knowledge is dependent upon the absolute
truth, which is the sun of our intelligence, we need only turn our gaze
from the object illumined by that sun to the sun itself, and we, at
once, have knowledge of God, the ultimate and supreme cause of all
our knowledge.
15. If we consider the theory of knowledge here set forth, we
shall observe that Augustine follows unmistakably the Platonic line of
thought. But we should not be warranted in concluding, at once, from
this, that his views are identical with those of the Ontologists. Augustine
nowhere asserts that we have immediate intuition of God and of all
truth in Him — the position maintained by the Ontologists. Nay, such
a thing would be in flat contradiction with his subsequent teaching
regarding God and created things. The later scholastics, it may be
assumed, interprethim correctly, when they understand Augustine's theory,
which holds that God is the sun of the mind, and that we have know
ledge of truth only in the light which He diffuses, to mean that God is the
ultimate principle, not of all being only, but of all knowledge as well ;
that the intellect, by which we attain the truth, is a participation of
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 271
the Divine intelligence ; that, moreover, the principles of reason which
guide our judgments have their ultimate and highest source in God (in
the Divine Word), and that, when we judge in accordance with these
principles, we are judging according to the standard fixed by the Ab
solute Truth. We may also assume the Scholastics to be warranted in
maintaining that Augustine's proposition as to our knowing the essences
of things in rationibus ceternis does not imply an immediate contempla
tion of the Divine Ideas, but merely signifies that the essences of things
could neither be nor be known, unless they were antecedently formed ?ii
the Divine Ideas, as in their highest cause. The thoroughly Platonic
character of Augustine's theory of knowledge lent favour, however, to
the interpretation put upon it by the Ontologist school at a later period.
TEACHING REGARDING GOD AND CREATION.
§ 76.
1. Augustine's chief proof for the existence of God is derived from
3ur notion of the True and the Good. It is a fact that we know truth.
Now, irrespective of the principle that an absolute truth must be sup
posed, to enable us to know any truth whatever, it is to be noted that
whatever is true is so only because of the absolute truth, that is, because
it participates in that truth. There must, therefore, exist an absolute
truth : this truth is God. God, therefore, exists. Again, it is undenia
ble that we all strive after what is good, for we all seek to be happy.
There are many kinds of changeable good after whicli we may strive.
But, nothing changeable is good of itself ; it is good only because it
participates in the good which is absolute and unchangeable. It fol
lows that there must exist a good which is, in itself, absolute and un
changeable. This good is God. God, therefore, exists (De Lib Arb
II, c. 3, 15 ; De Trin., VIII, c. 3).
2. God, as He is in Himself, is above all predicates. No one of the
categories can be applied to Him in the sense in which it is applicable
to creatures. Even the category of Substance cannot be applied to Him
in its proper sense ; if it were so, then it would follow that He could be
the subject of accidents. In regard to God, it is better to employ the
notion Essence (Essentia) than the notion Substance. From this it
follows that God, as He is in Himself, is incomprehensible and ineffable ;
there exists no term which is worthy of Him or which rightly signifies
His Being. In the right understanding of this truth consists the right
knowledge of God. 7Aw im-liii* ,sr/>V/- nexcicndo. If, however, we speak
of Him in human language, we must attribute to Him all that our
thoughts can conceive of what is loftiest and most excellent.
3. God is absolute simplicity. He is not only free from every ad
mixture of material element — an eternal immutable Form— but, further
more, every attribute which belongs to Him is one and the same thing
272 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
with His Essence. In God, being, life, wisdom, goodness, etc., are
not different things ; all these are, in Him, one and the same thing—
His absolute infinite Essence. God is^not good or just because of par
ticipated justice or goodness ; He is His own justice and goodness. The
same holds of His other attributes. God is, therefore, absolutely immut
able and imperishable ; no shadow of change can affect Him.
4. God is eternal. His existence is an unchanging present, without
a past and without a future. God is immeasurable and omnipresent ;
limitation and extension in space have no application to Him. He is
above space and above time ; and yet He is in every space and at all
times, whole in the whole, and whole in every part.
5. God is absolute intelligence and absolute will, and is, therefore,
the absolute spirit. As spirit, God is Divine. Conceiving in thought
His own Essence, He generates within Himself the Eternal, Personal
Word, in whom the whole infinitude of His Being is expressed. The
Divine Word is thus the Son of God, the Personal Image of the Father.
Again, the Father loves Himself in the Son, and the Son loves Himself
in the Father, and in this love there proceeds from both Love rendered
personal— the Holy Ghost. In the Divine Word, moreover, the Father
expresses not merely Himself, He expresses all other things likewise.
The Divine Word includes within Himself the ideas or primal causes of all
things ; these ideas may even be said to be the Logos Himself, for nothing
can exist in Him which is not His Being itself.
6. God is omniscient. Nothing is hidden from His gaze. His
knowledge is antecedent to the existence of things which are. We have
knowledge of things because they are, and in so far forth as they are ;
but things are for the reason that God knows them, and after the manner
that God knows them. God is absolutely free. He is sufficient for His
own happiness. He has no need of any other thing. All His actions,
therefore, producing effects extrinsic to Himself are absolutely free. No
shadow of necessity can affect His will. Whatever He determines on,
He chooses freely ;" but His choice once made, He cannot change His
decision ; such a change would imply imperfection of knowledge or im
perfection of will.
7. God is omnipotent. Whatever He wills He can effect, and He can
effect it by His mere will, without need of the concurrence of any other
cause. God's will is co-extensive with God's power. Whatever is ^in
contradiction with His essence or His attributes, that God cannot will,
and, consequently, cannot effect. It would be weakness in Him to will
or to effect anything of this kind. God is absolutely holy ; He can will
nothing except what is good ; evil He can neither desire nor do. It is,
therefore, impossible that He should be the author of evil in the world.
God is infinitely good; what He wills, He wills for the good of His
creatures. He is, however, absolutely just ; He must therefore reward
or punish each man according to his deserts.
8. There does not exist any eternal matter, apart from God, out of
which He fashioned the created world ; for God, being omnipotent, has
no need of a material substrate on which to exercise His productive
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 273
power ; His omnipotence is competent to give things their total being.
Nor has God produced the world from out His own being ; in such a
supposition the world would be like to Him in nature. The origin of
the world can, therefore, be explained only by creation from nothing.
God created the world from nothing. But He did not effect this creation
unconsciously. He reproduced in creation the eternal ideas of the Divine
Word. Every species of being has its proper idea in the Divine Word,
and is created to the likeness of that idea.
9. The creation of the world is the revelation of the Divine goodness.
God was not, however, so moved by His goodness to create, that creation
was for Him a necessity. On the contrary, the ultimate and highest
reason for creation was the absolute and free choice of God. He has
created the world because He willed so to do. To seek a higher reason
for this Divine resolve would be to set above God a higher power on
which He would be dependent, and so to deny His supremacy. The
perfection and happiness of God have received no increase from creation ;
the creative activity of God has been a benefit to creatures only.
10. Created things are not without beginning, and they are not
eternal, for they are changeable and perishable, and what is changeable
and perishable cannot be eternal. Whatever is created is limited in time
and space. Time is the measure of movement ; it can begin only with
the beginning of motion. Hence the world is not in time ; contrariwise
time was created in and with the world. Before the creation of the
world there was no time. The same holds good of space, for without an
extended world space is inconceivable.
11. God created all things simultaneously — the world of spirits and
the world of matter. Creavit omnia simiil. In the Scriptural express-
sion : " God created the heavens and the earth," we are to understand
by the term "heaven" the world of spirits, and by the term " earth "
corporeal nature. Matter without form was the direct product of the
Divine act of creation. This formless matter had no determinate — no
actual character ; it was " almost nothing." It could not, therefore,
exist for an instant in the formless condition ; it must have been clothed
in some form or other from the beginning. Matter, then, does not come
before form, in the order of time ; it takes precedence in the order of
nature — that is to say, matter must be presupposed as the substrate of
form ; it is only in this sense that matter can be said to have been created
first. We must, further, distinguish between spiritual and corporeal
matter, of which one is the substrate of the corporeal, the other of
the spiritual world.
12. All things having been simultaneously created, we cannot under
stand by the " six days" of the Mosaic narrative six successive periods
of time. The six days represent no more than the order in which things
follow one another in the gradations of being. The six days were con
sequently only one day, or, more properly, one instant, which is men
tioned six times, because the Scripture, at each mention of the term, in
troduces a new order of being, which, of its nature, is next to that
immediately preceding, its existence being dependent on the existence
19
274 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
of the preceding order. By the six days is meant no more than
that the universe of things is divided into six gradations of being ; and
as the number six is the most perfect number, the phrase may be under
stood to signify the perfection of the world which God has created.
13. The duration of the created world depends upon God's conser
vation of its existence. If the sustaining power of God were for a
moment withdrawn, the world would sink back into nothingness.
The Divine wisdom has furthermore established all things in a compre
hensive order, and assigned to each being its determined place in this
order ; and as He has made all things in order, so does He govern all
things and guide them all by His providence to their appointed end.
Evil itself is not excluded from this providence, for evil may be made
to serve purposes of good.
14. God is not, indeed, the author of evil ; but evil could not exist
in the world unless by permission of God, since nothing exists contrary
to His will. Evil is opposed to the will of God in so far as He abhors
it, but it is not opposed to the will of God in the sense that it exists in
spite of Him. Consequently, though evil, in itself, is not good, yet it
may be said that it is well it should exist, since it does not exist without
God's (permissive) will. But it is well that it should only exist in so
far as it is subservient to good. God can draw good out of evil. Evil,
then, is against established order, in so far as it disturbs that order, but itis
not for this reason extrinsic to established order, for when the evil exists
it is made subject to that order, and hence subservient to good. God might,
indeed, have prevented evil, but He preferred to draw good from evil,
rather than not permit evil at all. The magnificence of the universal
order is rendered more imposing by the presence of evil and by its sub
ordination to good.
15. In the order of the universe there must be little things as well as
great. We mustnot measure things by their usefulness to us ; we must not
account evil whatever injures us; we must judge each thing according
to its own nature ; each has its own standard of perfection — its own
form — its own harmony in itself. All creatures praise and glorify God,
and this in such wise that they invite man to praise and glorify Him.
Man stands at the summit of the visible world ; he is the microcosmos,
for he has within himself the being of inanimate bodies, the vegetative
life of the plant, the sensuous faculties of the brute, and, over and above
this, is possessed of reason, which last attribute brings him into kinship
with the angels. Thus, he forms the link of union between the world of
spirit and the world of matter.
PSYCHOLOGY.
§77.
1. The human soul is a substance essentially different from the body
immaterial, simple, and spiritual. The category of Quantity cannot
be applied to it ; it has not extension in space. The proofs adduced by
Augustine for this doctrine are, briefly, the following :
PHILOSOPHY OK TIIK CHRISTIAN KllA. 275
(a.) If the soul were corporeal, it would be a body of determined
quality. It would, in consequence, have knowledge of itself as being of
this quality. This, however, is not the case. (De Trin., X. c. 7.)
(b.) Even the faculty of sensuous perception is inexplicable, if sup
posed to belong to a principle wholly material. If the soul were cor
poreal it could not contain at once within itself the vast number of sensuous
images with which our memory is stored. Still less can our intellectual
knowledge be attributed to a corporeal principle, for this knowledge is
concerned with the immaterial and superscnsuous, whereas the corporeal
deals only with the corporeal and sensible ; to this only is its power
proportioned. (De Anima et cjm Orig., c. 17. De Quant. Anim.y c. 13.)
(c.) When we reflect upon a truth, we penetrate and understand it
more perfectly the more we withdraw from sense and retire within our
selves, and so become immersed in the truth. Now, if the soul were
merely the harmony of the body, and not a substance distinct from it,
this divorce from the body and concentration of the soul within itself
would be impossible. {De Immort. Anim., c. 10.)
(d.) The soul perceives at every point of the body the impressions
made at that point, and perceives them not by a portion of its being, but
by the entire ego. It must, therefore, be whole in every part of the
body. This is possible only if the soul is of simple incorporeal nature,
for a body, being an extended entity, can be present simultaneously at
several points only by means of the several parts of which it is composed.
(Ep. 166, ad Ilieron., p. 4.)
2. From the immaterial and simple nature of the soul we may argue
to its further characteristics. In the first place it is essentially indivi
dual. There is no such thing as an universal soul — each man has his
own individual soul. In the second place, the soul of man, being
essentially spiritual and rational, cannot be degraded to the condition of
an irrational soul ; the doctrine of the migration of souls is, therefore,
an absurdity. In the third place, the human soul is like in nature to
the pure spirits or angels. Its nature, no doubt, disposes it to union
with the body, but this does not make it specifically distinct from the
angels, for the angels, too, have bodies, though these are more perfect
in kind than the bodies of men, and are immortal. It follows that man
being distinguished from the brutes, on the one side, and from the
angels, on the other, may be rightly defined an animal rationale mor tale.
3. The soul is not, as the Manicheans say, an emanation from God. If
it were, it ought either to share in all the divine perfections, being of like
nature with God, or the Divine substance ought to be capable of all
those imperfections which we perceive in ourselves. The one alternative
is as absurd as the other. The soul must, therefore, like other beings,
have been originally created by God.
4. As to the point of time at which the soul of the first man was
created, Augustine is led by his principle that God created all things at
once, to the view that Adam's soul was created at the same time as all other
spiritual beings, and was subsequently united to the body. That union,
however, was not the punishment of any offence ; the nature of the soul
276 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
required its union with the body, the union was not unnatural, nor was it
for the soul a condition of misfortune.
5. Augustine rejects the notion that all human souls have been created
simultaneously and are united successively to the several bodies which they
animate. The individual soul comes into existence with the individual
body to which it belongs. But Augustine is unable to arrive at a definite
opinion as to the manner in which these souls come into being. Their
origin by a generative process would seem to him to afford the best ex
planation of the transmission of original sin ; but, on the other hand, it
is inconceivable to him how one soul can be generated by another, if the
soul be an immaterial and simple essence. The theory of generation de
generates easily into Traducianism — a doctrine which must be totally
rejected, for it has meaning only in the hypothesis that the soul is of a
corporeal nature.
6. But the theory of creation is, according to Augustine, surrounded
with insoluble difficulties. If God daily creates new souls, these souls
as they come forth from His hand must be good in themselves. Now,
in their union with the body they are made subject to original sin ; and as
this union is not of their choice, but accomplished wholly by God, it is
difficult to explain on what grounds those souls can be eternally repro
bated which could not by any possibility be purified by baptism, such
souls, for instance, as those of children who die unbaptized. God would
be obliged to secure baptism for such children ; for if, by uniting their
souls to their bodies, He makes them subject to original sin, He is bound
to make provision for their deliverance from this sin. But, on the other
hand, God cannot be held to owe anything to anyone.
7. In this way, Augustine sees difficulties on both sides, to which he
can find no answer. He, therefore, holds it to be the more prudent, and the
safer, course to suspend his judgment — and this all the more that Sacred
Scripture does not lay down any definite teaching on the point. The
passages which are cited in favour of the one theory or the other are
not conclusive, because any one of them can be interpreted in the sense
of either theory. This he undertakes to prove in regard to a number of
such passages.
8. Augustine asserts emphatically the oneness of the soul in man.
The essential constituent parts of man are soul and body, and nothing
more. If an argument be built on the words of the Apostle, " the flesh wars
against the spirit," to show that there are in man two souls substantially
different from one another, each having a will of its own, it might
be argued with equal force, that there is no reason why we should stop
at a duality of wills ; we should admit as many wills as there are opposing
tendencies in man, and these tendencies are numberless.
9. In one aspect of its being the soul of man is in close relation with
the body, in another it is superior to the body. We may distinguish in
the soul a pars inferior and a pars superior, according to the different
characters of the faculties with which it is endowed. By the lower part
of the soul we mean the vegetative and sensitive faculties, in virtue of
which the soul is the principle of corporeal life, as well as of sensuous
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 277
perception and locomotion. The functions of these faculties are essen
tially dependent upon the bodily organs. The higher part of the soul,
on the other hand, signifies the intellectual faculties — reason and will
— faculties whose functions are not dependent on the bodily organism.
Herein lies the difference between " spirit " and " soul." The terms
are altogether relative : In so far forth as the soul stands in immediate
relation with the body by its sensitive and vegetative faculties, it may
be called " soul " in the stricter sense of the term ; in so far as it is exalted
above thebodyin its functions of thought and will, it may be called "spirit."
10. The soul in its union with the body is the element which
determines the nature or specific character of the composite entity : " Tradit
speciem anima corpori, ut sit corpus, in quantum est." (Do Immort.
Anim., c. 15.) And hence, man, as man, is something different from either
of the component elements of his being. The body is not man, neither
is the soul ; man is the unit formed by both (DeMor. EccL, I., c. 4). Body
and soul in conjunction form a single nature different from both consti
tuents — this nature is man.
11. The relations which subsist between the body and the soul in
man render it impossible for the body to exercise independently any in
fluence upon the soul. This becomes more evident if we observe that to
admit the opposite would be to give the soul the character of matter which
receives in itself the action of the body —a supposition which is incom
patible with the spiritual nature of the soul, and its superiority to the
body. The body, then, does not act upon the soul, but the soul acts in
and through the body. If the soul suffers, it is not that it is so affected
by the body ; the affection comes from itself in so far as it has become
capable of suffering by its union with the body, arid by its activity in
the organism.
12. The action of the soul in the body and on the body is not, how
ever, immediate. Between the active soul and the organs of the body
there is interposed a subtle element of a somewhat spiritual nature by
means of which the action of the soul reaches the organs of the body.
This element Augustine designates " Light " or " Air ; " that is, he
atrributes to it a nature analogous to that of light and air. In this way
he tries to bridge over the chasm that separates the spiritual soul from
matter. He is, however, ready to admit that it remains a mystery im
possible of adequate comprehension how the soul is united to a material
body.
13. The human soul, in so far as it is a sensitive soul, shows its ac
tivity in the functions of sensuous knowledge and sensuous appetite.
To the faculty of sensuous knowledge belong the external senses,
the Sensus Gommunis or General Sense in which the external senses are
united, the Imagination (vis spiritalis) and the Sensuous Memory. The
Sensuous Appetite is the faculty of sensuous pleasure. To the soul, as
spirit, Augustine assigns three fundamental faculties : — Intellectual
Memory (memoria), Intelligence (intelligentia), and Will (voluntas).
Furthermore, Intelligence is either intuitive or discursive, and we must,
therefore distinguish between Intellect (mens) and Reason (ratio). In
other parts of his work, (De Quant. Anim. c. 27), Augustine substitutes,
278 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
for the last two terms, the expressions Ratio and Ratiocinatio. The
distinction here laid down is, it must be remembered, only relative.
14. The soul, being spirit, is created after the image of the Triune
God. All other things exhibit the imprint (vestigia) of the Trinity in
their unity, form, and order ; but in the soul we have the image (imago)
of God. Augustine explains variously wherein the image of God con
sists. He finds it in the trinity of elements — Being, Knowledge, Will ;
in the three fundamental faculties — Memory, Intelligence, Will ; and
lastly in the action of these three fundamental faculties when they are
concerned with God. When the soul remembers God, the thought of God
proceeds from this recollection, and with this thought is conjoined the
love of God, which serves as it were to bind together the recollection and
the thought. In this threefold action is reflected, in clear outline, the
triune life of God.
15. The soul is, of its nature, immortal. For this proposition Augus
tine adduces many proofs, akin, for the most part, to the Platonist
reasoning ; of this kind are the following : —
(a) That thing in which the imperishable exists is itself imperishable.
Now truth exists in the soul, inasmuch as the soul possesses it by know
ledge. Truth is imperishable. Therefore, the soul must be imperishable
also.
(b) The soul is identified with Reason. Now Reason, as such, is im
mortal, for the principles of Reason are immortal. It follows that the
soul is imperishable, if the soul be inseparable from Reason. That it is
inseparable is proved by the fact that the union of the soul with Reason
is not an union in space, and the one, by consequence, cannot be separated
from the other. The soul, accordingly, is imperishable ; and, since Reason
can exist only in a living subject, the union of Reason with the soul implies
not only the indefectibility of the latter, but also the perpetuity of its
life — namely, its immortality, in the true sense of the term.
(c) The essential distinction between soul and body consists in this,
that the soul is life, whilst the body is merely animated. If the soul,
like the body, could be deprived of life, it would cease to be a soul, it would
be like the body, merely a something animated (animatum). The soul,
therefore, cannot lose its life ; that is, it is immortal.
(d) Being has no contrary principle which can destroy it fessentias
nihil contrarium). The body though dissolved after death does not lose
its being, for its elements remain ; so the soul also must endure, that is,
it is imperishable. Nor is there any principle contrary to the life of the
soul which can destroy it. The life of the soul is truth, and the con
trary of truth is error ; but error, it is clear, cannot destroy the life of
the soul. It follows that not only in its being, but also in its life, the
soul is imperishable ; that is to say, it is immortal.
rmi.osoi'HY OK THK CHRISTIAN i-;i;\. 279
ETHICS.
§ 78.
1. The subjective basis of moral life is free will. Augustine uses
the term liberty in a twofold sense : the one liberty of choice, the other
freedom from evil, and freedom for (supernatural) good.
Free will, as a faculty of choice, is, according to Augustine, an essen
tial attribute of man, for
(a) Will is will precisely because it is exempted from physical neces
sity and determines itself to act or to forbear. Freedom is involved in
this essential notion of will ; a will without freedom is inconceivable. (De
Lib. Arb., III. c. 3.)
(b) Furthermore, consciousness testifies clearly to the freedom of the
will. Of what are we more keenly conscious than of the fact that we
have a will, and that we act by our will, unconstrained by any necessity ?
(De Lib. Arb., III. c. 1.)
(c) Without free will, the distinction between good and evil becomes
unintelligible. If we were not free we could not be bound by any moral
law : merit and demerit, reward and punishment, praise and blame, ,
would be wholly meaningless. The very remorse which we experience
in reference to certain actions is evident proof of free will, for we could
not feel remorse for an act the performance or omission of which was
not in our power. (De Act. cont. Felic. Man., II. c. 8.)
2. Freedom from evil and freedom for (supernatural) good is not, according
to Augustine, an essential attribute of thehuman will, it depends on the grace
of God. This grace alone can free us from evil and bestow the capability
for (supernatural) good, as well as the desire of attaining it. Free will,
as a faculty of choice, the liberum arbitrium, cannot be lost, but the free
dom from evil and the freedom for (supernatural) good may be forfeited,
though not otherwise than by our own fault.
Free will, as a faculty of choice, is not destroyed or impaired by God's
providence. God foresees the actions of men as they are, namely, as free
acts, which we are at liberty to perform or to omit. The foreknowledge
of God does not deprive free acts of their character of freedom. Man's
act is not what it is, because God foresees it thus, but rather God foresees
it thus, because it is what it is. If man's act were other than it is, God
would have foreseen it to be otherwise.
3. With this teaching regarding free will we may associate Augus
tine's doctrine regarding the Sovereign Good. He distinguishes two
kinds of good, the enjoyable and the useful. The enjoyable is that
which, when possessed, makes us happy, and which, therefore, we desire
for its own sake ; the useful is that which is merely a means to the at
tainment of another good, and which, therefore, we desire and strive
after for sake of something else.
4. This being premised, it becomes clear that the Sovereign Good
280 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
must have the following characteristics : — It must be an enjoyable good,
which being possessed makes us completely happy. It must be inalien
able ; a happiness which could be lost would not be true or perfect happi
ness at all. Lastly, it must be the source not only of our highest happiness,
but also of our supreme perfection, for good, of its own nature, is calculated
not only to make us happy but also to make us perfect.
5. If this be so, it follows that the Sovereign Good cannot consist
either in sensual pleasure, or in virtue, for neither of these exhibits the
characteristics which belong to the Sovereign Good. The Sovereign Good
must be something higher than man ; it can be no other than God— the
Infinite Good. The supreme happiness of man must, therefore, consist
in the eternal contemplation and love of God, the Sovereign Good. It
follows that for man God is the only enjoyable good, and that every other
good is merely a useful good, that is to say, it should be used only for
the attainment of eternal happiness in God.
6. It follows, further, that supreme happiness is not attainable in
this life, and that it is reserved for us in the life to come. The ultimate end
of man is to attain eternal happiness in God ; his ultimate end is, there
fore, not attainable in this life, it must be secured hereafter. This leads
at once to the rule of life for man. Man's duty here below is to strive
after the Sovereign Good, that is, to live so as to attain to the Sovereign
Good in the life to come.
7. The path of duty, in this respect, is marked for us by the Divine
Law. We must act according to this law in order to fulfil the duty set
us in life, and it is precisely in living and acting according to this law
that moral goodness consists. But to fulfil this law in every respect, it is
necessary to strive after virtue ; in virtue consists our moral perfection.
Moral goodness is essentially connected with the final destiny of man ;
so too, is virtue. Virtue is essentially the means to the attainment of
the Sovereign Good ; this relation apart, virtue ceases to be virtue ; it
becomes a mere form of self -deification which is vice, not virtue.
8. Virtue is defined by Augustine " Animi habitus, naturae modo et
rationi consentaneus " (Cont. Jul. Pelag., IV., c. 3) ; or, as " Ars bene
recteque vivendi" (De Civit. Dei, XIV., c. 9). It is, therefore, a capabi
lity or tendency of the will for good, acquired by the practice of what
is good, and which implies strength and firmness of will in well-doing.
Virtue does not require that man should be wholly inaccessible to the
movements of passion ; the so-called cnraOtia is unnatural and contrary
to virtue ; virtue requires only that the TrdOr) should be kept under
control, that they should be restrained within the limits prescribed by
the moral law, and thus made subservient to Tightness of life.
9. The Divine Law being the rule and standard of moral action, the
point or precept of this law which is the basis of the whole and which
includes within it all other precepts, is the Law of Love. First in this
order is the love of God ; the love of God is our first and highest duty.
This love leads us to refer to God all that we are, all that we have, and
all that we do, and thus to make of ourselves an offering to Him. From
the love of God is derived the true love of self, in virtue of which we
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 281
seek what is best for us, our Supreme Good, God Himself. With this
is united the love of our neighbour, which consists in this, that we desire
for our neighbour as for ourselves his highest good, and, as far as in us
lies, assist him to attain it.
10. As the law of love is the fundamental law of our moral life, so
love is the fundamental virtue. It is the basis of all other virtues ; all
other virtues are only special aspects of the virtue of love. In the first
place, this holds good with regard to the Cardinal Virtues — Prudence,
Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice. Prudence is love, in so far as it
discriminates clearly between what is a help to it and what is a hinde-
rance. Fortitude is love, in so far as it boldly and readily undergoes all
things for sake of the object it loves. Temperance is love, in so far as
it maintains itself inviolate and undefiled for sake of what it loves.
Finally, Justice is love, in so far as its service is wholly for the object
loved, and it thus acquires dominion over all things else. (Dc MOT.
JEccl., I., c. 15.) Love is, thus, the source of all that is morally good,
and no work has worth or merit before God if it be not done for love.
11. Evil is not a real substantial entity ; everything that is, in so
far as it is, is both true and good. Evil is merely negation — negation
of the good which ought to exist — that is to say, it is a privation of
good. Evil is, therefore, possible only through good ; if there were no
good, a privation of good or loss of good would not be possible. A being
absolutely evil, in which no good whatever exists, is an impossibility ;
be it ever so evil, inasmuch as it is or has being, it is to that extent good.
Absolute evil is absolute negation — mere nothing.
12. These considerations exhibit to us the relation which subsists
between evil and the natural order. Evil is contrary to nature, since it
deprives nature of its befitting good. In this sense it may be described
as a deterioration or corruption of nature. But evil cannot destroy
nature, for the corruption induced by evil supposes a nature or substance
corrupted, and the destruction of this would involve the disappearance
of the evil.
13. With regard to the cause of evil, we must distinguish between
the remote and the proximate cause. The remote cause is the finiteness
and mutability of created things. It is only a being which is finite and
changeable which can be subject to evil. God, the absolutely immu
table, is beyond the reach of evil ; for the immutable, as such, cannot
undergo a privation of good. The proximate source of evil is the free
will of man. Free will alone can effect evil, as it alone can effect
good. But beyond its freedom no further reason can be assigned why the
free will does evil rather than good. The Manicheans are absurd, when
they assign man's bodily nature as a reason to explain why he does evil.
14. We must distinguish two kinds of evil (mahun) : the malum
culpcp., and the tnahun pcence. The former is moral evil — evil in the strict
sense of the term : the latter is a consequence of the former, and is
occasioned by it. To begin with moral evil : it must consist in the
privation of moral good, in man's turning away from his Sovereign
Good, and giving himself to good that is changeable. Good that is
282 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
changeable is not, indeed, evil in itself ; but when man prefers it to the
Sovereign Good, and sets it above the Sovereign Good, he perverts and
disturbs right order, and precisely in this perversion of order lies the
evil of his action. This turning away from the Sovereign Good, and
turning to evil, takes place when man violates the Divine law, which
marks for him the path to the Sovereign Good. Hence moral evil-
sin — may be defined " Dictum, factum vel concupitum contra legem
Dei." (Contra Famt. Manich., XXII., c. 27.)
15. The malum pcBtidB is the actual loss of the Sovereign Good, in
curred as the punishment of moral evil. This last constitutes unhap-
piness, for happiness can consist only in the possession of the Supreme
Good. In the present life, this unhappiness is not felt in its full force,
for the good of the mutable and created order goes some way to com
pensate for the loss ; but in the life to come such compensation is not
admissible, and the fulness of misery must then be experienced. Such
is the punishment of moral evil. That it should be inflicted is a require
ment of God's justice, and from this point of view it may be called good,
since it is an effect of God's justice. It is, therefore, an eyil only for the
man on whom it falls ; and in so far as it is thus an evil it is caused by
man himself, for he has provoked it by his sin. As a requirement of
justice it is good, for it is a restoration of the order that had been dis
turbed ; viewed in this light, it has God for its author.
16. We see, then, that a good action implies an approach to God,
the Supreme Being ; whereas an evil action implies a separation from
the Supreme Being — a movement towards nothingness. Hence, it is
only the good action which is a positive entity in every respect ; the
evil act is positive only as an act ; the direction in which it tends is to
non-being, it is in this regard something merely negative. This analysis
warranted Augustine in asserting that evil may be said to have, not a causa
efficiem but a causa deficiens, for it is essentially a defection from the
highest perfection — a retrogression towards imperfection and nothing
ness. (De Civ. Dei, XII., c. 7.)
17 . So much with regard to the general lines of Augustine's Ethics.
His teaching on the subject of Grace and Redemption falls, no doubt,
under this section ; but we cannot follow him into these questions ; they
belong to the history of dogma, not to the history of philosophy. We
content ourselves with noticing a few points :
(a.) The first man, says Augustine, enjoyed freedom from evil and freedom for good,
he consequently had power not to sin — " posse non peccare." He needed, it is true, for
this the assistance of God, but this assistance was merely an adjiitorium sine quo non,
that is, an aid without which he could not succeed in avoiding evil and doing good ; but
not a grace by means of which he did good.
(b.) But when the first man sinned, the guilt and the punishment of his sin descended
upon all his posterity, for the reason that they were all contained seminaliter in him. In
consequence of this inherited sin, man can no longer do that which is connected with his
supernatural destiny, and he is thus made subject to evil. To the " posse non peccare "
has succeeded the " non posse non peccare." Not that man is forced to evil by any
intrinsic necessity, but that man is so hampered by sensual desires, that he can no longer
shake himself free from evil, for sensuality is ever dragging him down to it again.
(c.) The human race was delivered from sin and its punishments by Christ. By His
PHILOSOPHY OK TI1K CHRISTIAN ERA. 285
Passion and Death, Christ lias mci itcd for us the grace which destroys evil within us,
and makes us again capable of good. This grace, by which we do good, is not a mere
adjntorium nine, quo non, it is an adjutorinm quo, that is, it not only makes the good
possible for us, it also effects the good within us, although not without our will, or
further than our will co-operates. This grace restores the "posse non peccare," it leads
us to the condition of eternal perfection, where the " posse non peccare" is replaced by
the " non posse peccare."
(d. ) .Redemption is, on the part of God, a free act. He would not have acted unjustly
had He left all men in original sin and under the condemnation which follows it. But Hi:
was pleased to show, on the one hand, what the offence of man deserved, and on the
other what His own mercy could effect. He, therefore, elected from the manna damna
tionis a portion of the human race to be saved by His gratuitous grace, while He left the
rest in the massa damnation i*.
(e. ) This election is called in Scripture Predestination. The non-predestined are not
altogether excluded from God's grace ; but it is only in the elect that grace produces its
full effect, leading them effectually to their destined end. To the non-predestined it is
not an injustice that they are not elected ; they have deserved condemnation : God does
not predestine them to evil ; it is only because of His knowledge of the evil which they do
that they are condemned. This is what the Scripture signifies by the term Reprobation.
(/.) From the outset. God's grace delivered a certain number of human beings from
perdition, and this number constituted the kingdom of God, as opposed to the kingdom
of the world. The entire time covered by the existence of the human race is 110 more
than the period of development for these two kingdoms. In the end will come the com
plete separation of the elect from the reprobate. After the general resurrection, the
former will receive eternal reward, the latter eternal punishment. There is no restora
tion of the reprobate, as imagined by Origen.
18. The vastness of the doctrinal system of Augustine is apparent
from even this brief sketch. His inquiries covered the whole range of
speculative knowledge, and his clear and penetrating mind diffused
light in every region of its investigations. It is not a matter of surprise
that Augustine's teaching should have exercised a larger influence on
the development of Christian philosophy than that of any other thinker.
CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS, BOETHIUS, CASSIODORUS.
§ 79.
1. With Augustine, the development of Christian philosophy in the
West came for a time to an end. It was not, however, that the intel
lects of the Christian Church had lost their power, or that the ardour
for scientific investigation had grown cold. The cause was wholly
external in character; it is to be sought in the disturbances pro
duced by the barbarian invasion. This migration of nations brought
about the overthrow of existing social conditions ; and the long wars and
turmoils which succeeded it rendered impossible the peaceful develop
ment of intellectual life, and gave little leisure for philosophic thought.
It was only in the retirement of the monasteries that Christian science
could still find an asylum. Here it took refuge, and here it continued
to exist through the long period of general catastrophe, waiting for
times more favourable to its progress. It is noticeable that, after the
time of Augustine, the labours of the men who concerned themselves
284 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.
with science were directed chiefly to collecting and preserving what had
already been created. They laboured to preserve and transmit to better
times the results already achieved by Christian science. To this their
efforts were directed and in this consisted their chief merit.
2. Of importance as a philosopher is the priest Claudianus Mamertus, of Vienne, in
Gaul (about the middle of the 5th century), because of his defence of the doctrine of the
spirituality of the soul, contained in his work De Statu Animce. The Semi-Pelagians,
Cassian, Faustus, and Gennadius (of the 5th century), following Tertullian and Hilary,
had taught that the soul is of corporeal nature. God alone, they had held, is incorporeal;
all created things are corporeal, the human soul with the rest. Everything created, they
argued, is limited, has consequently its place in space, and is therefore corporeal ; every
thing created has quality and quantity ; God alone is above and beyond the Categories ;
quality implies extension, and extension, without corporeal substance, is inconceivable.
Furthermore, the soul dwells within the body, and for this reason is of limited extension,
and is, consequently, a corporeal substance. In point of quality, it is of a nature resem
bling light or air, but is, nevertheless, corporeal.
3. Against this doctrine Claudianus protests. The world, to be perfect, he argues,
must contain in itself beings of all kinds ; hence God must have created incorporeal
beings, and to this class belong the souls of men. A further reason for holding human
souls to be incorporeal is the teaching of Scripture that they are made after the likeness of
the incorporeal God. The soul cannot be brought under the category of quantity, for its
faculties of memory, reason, will, have no extension ; and since these faculties are one with
the substance of the soul, the soul also must be without extension or quantity. The in
corporeal nature of the soul is further shown in the soul's intellectual activity. Sensible
objects are perceived by it in unsensuous fashion, and besides, it is capable of compre
hending thesapersensuous and incorporeal. From this we are forced to conclude that the
soul is itself supersensuous and incorporeal, for it could not, otherwise, have knowledge
of objects of this kind. Finally, the soul is present in every part of the body, for it has
perception of the impressions made on the different parts of the body. But it could not
be present simultaneously in these several parts if it were not incorporeal.
4. Boethius Senator of Rome, who flourished under Theodoric, King of the
Ostrogoths (A.D. 470-526), and whom the accusations of his enemies consigned to long
captivity and finally to death, did much to preserve the learning of the ancients and of
earlier Christianity. He translated the logical works of Aristotle, with the Isagoge of
Porphyry, on which he wrote a commentary. He also wrote a commentary on Cicero's
Topica. The aim of Boethius in these writings was purely didactic. He endeavoured to
transmit the achievements of earlier philosophers, in the form most easy of under
standing. The genuineness of the treatise De, Trlnitate is disputed.
5. But his most remarkable work is the book De Consolatione Philosophic, composed
by him while in prison. It is classical in style, and is written partly in prose and partly
in verse ; its contents may be described as a kind of Theodicea or Natural Theology. He
endeavours to prove that the supreme good for man does not consist in riches or other
possessions ; not in power or glory ; not in posts of honour or pleasure ; in a word not in finite
good : that it lies beyond time, and can be no other than God. God, as the fulness'of good
ness, is the sovereign good for man. In the possession of God consists the happiness after
which all are striving. To strive for this supreme good is the duty set us in life- The
purpose of God's providence is to lead us to this end. In furtherance of this purpose, God
makes use of the most varied means, some pleasing to man, other some an affliction to
him. The good and the evil which happen to man in life are, in God's design, alike con
trived for his salvation. The conviction that happiness awaits us beyond the grave, and
that the good and the evil of life are means to attain it, is the firmest support of man in
the vicissitudes of life ; as long as he holds fast by this truth he cannot be dismayed.
6. The Senator Cassiodorus was a contemporary of Boethius (A.D. 468-575), and, like
him, held important public offices under Theodoric. But he ultimately retired into the
convent of Vivarium, near Squillace in Bruttii, and there, with his monks, devoted himself
exclusively to study and education. He composed a treatise on theological education, and
on the liberal arts(Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric — the Trivium; Arithmetic, Geometry,
Music, Astronomy — the Quadrivium.) These arts he held to be of much utility, as they aid us
to acquire an understanding of Scripture and a knowledge of God. His treatise De
Artibw ac Discipline Artium Liberalium was much used as a text-book in succeeding
centuries.
rHILOSOl'HY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 285
7. In Ids work DP Anima, Cassiodorus cites for the spirituality of the soul the same
proofs as Claudianus. The human soul is not a part of God, for it is mutable ; but it i.s
created after the image of God, and is therefore incorporeal. The category of Quantity
cannot be applied to the soul, for the reason that it is present in every part of
the body. As to the soul's Quality, it is of the nature of light. And, since it is created
to the image of the immortal Creator, the soul, too, is immortal.
8. In the first half of the seventh century lived Isidore, Bishop of Seville, who did
much for the spread of learning among the Visigoths. His chief work is the treatise
Originum sive Etymologiarum, a work of encyclopaedic character, which embraces all
the knowledge of the time, sacred and profane. He was also the author of three books of
Sentence*, a Handbook of Christian Doctrine, much prized in later times and largely used
as a text-book in schools, and finally of the books De Online Creaturarum and DC Natura
Rerum.
9. Venerable Bede (A.D. 674-735), was the first to spread instruction and to diffuse
knowledge among the Anglo-Saxons. His works are numerous and very varied in
character, but they consist more of extracts and collections than original products
of thought. He composed some excellent summaries for use in teaching. Most important
in connection with philosophy is his work De Natura Rerum, which followed the lines of
the work bearing the same name by Isidore.
These were the men who handed down the inheritance of learning
and prepared the way for the new era — the middle ages.
SECOND PERIOD.
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
GENERAL SURVEY.
§80.
1. The invasion of the barbarians laid the Empire of Rome in
ruins. The Christian Church had her share in the disasters which
overwhelmed the empire; her institutions suffered sadly in the
turmoil. Wherever the barbarians established a footing they over
turned and destroyed what she had created at infinite cost of
self-sacrifice.
2. But the catastrophe which wrought this evil created conditions
in which the Church was enabled to exercise her influence effectively
on the social life of the new nations. The civilisation of Rome had
passed away. Within the empire the Church had been able to
establish flourishing Christian communities, in which the virtues of
Christianity were carried to their fullest development. But she had
not been able to effect a general reform of national and social life,
nor to infuse the spirit of Christian life into the people as a whole.
3. The new nations offered a more favourable field for her regener
ating activity. They were not enervated by an obsolete and^tfete
civilisation. They were full of the vigour of healthy life ; they were
much more amenable to the vivifying influence of the Christian
spirit; and under the influence of this spirit they built up their
national and social institutions.
4. The task before the Church was not an easy one. She had to
put forth all the strength within her, in her conflict witli the bar
barians. Again and again the fierce instincts of barbarism broke
forth in wild revolt against her teaching. But she carried on her
work undaunted. Relying on the Divine authority with which she
was invested she firmly confronted the inrushing hordes, coinpn'ivl
their savage ferocity, and brought them at length under the rule
and discipline of Christian civilisation.
5. The way was now cleared for the development of civilised life
on new lines ; and this development was effected in all directions,
1
288 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
notably in the sphere of science. The obstacles which the confusion
of the times had put in the way of scientific studies had been
removed, and the spirit of scientific investigation started on its
path with renewed life and energy. Theology and philosophy were
the first to enter upon the path of progress ; their developments
were remarkable, and the results obtained of signal and lasting
value.
6. Side by side with Christianity another power enters into the
history of the Middle Ages. In the beginning of the ^ seventh
century (610) Mohammed founded in Arabia a new r3ligion — the
religion of Islam. Force was the means on which the prophet
relied for the establishment of his system ; he imposed it as a
religious duty upon his followers to propagate Islam with fire and
sword. The fierce fanaticism thus evoked bore down all before it.
Mohammed's successors, the Khalifs, added conquest to conquest.
Persia, Syria, Phoenicia, Palestine, the islands of Cyprus and
Rhodes, Egypt, and Northern Africa were overrun and subdued in
fifteen years. From Africa the tide of invasion poured into Spain,
and thence the Moors pushed their conquests into France, where
their course was at last arrested by Charles Martel on the field of
Poitiers (732).
7. When the first ardour of fanaticism had subsided, and orderly
government had been introduced into the dominions of the Khalifs,
culture of a certain kind found a place in Islam. The desire for
knowledge grew out of these beginnings. A movement of thought
was created, which gave rise in the course of the Middle Ages to an
" Arabian" theology and philosophy, which engaged the energies of
notable men of learning, and which were taught in schools founded
by the Khalifs. These schools, and the learned men attached to
them, enjoyed a wide reputation, not merely among the followers
of Islam, but among Christian scholars also; and the Arabian
philosophers exercised an important influence in the development
of Christian philosophy among the people of the West.
8. Judaism entered as another factor into mediaeval civilisation.
After the destruction of their city by the Romans the Jews were
dispersed among the nations. But they remained united by racial
bonds, and continued to retain some of the characteristics of a
nation. Their distinctive peculiarities found expression in the
domain of learning. Among the Jews of the Middle Ages there
arose many distinguished scholars, who devoted themselves to
theological and philosophical studies, and who caried into the field
of science the characteristics of Judaism. In many respects they
stood in close relation with the Arabians, but, on the whole, they
have a character distinctively their own.
9. We have, therefore, to distinguish in the history of mediaeval
philosophy three well marked lines of development — the Christian,
the Arabian, and the Jewish. Such movements in the field of
philosophy as are presented to us by the Byzantine Empire during
BRIEF NOTICE OF MEDIAEVAL GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 289
the Middle Ages are isolated and unconnected : no genuine deve
lopment of philosophic thought is discernible in them. We shall,
therefore, bestow only a brief notice on them. We shall then follow
the development of mediaeval philosophy in its three main lines,
treating first of Arabian and Jewish philosophy — the latter in close
connection with the former — and ending with a review of the
progress and development of Christian philosophy.
BRIEF NOTICE OF MEDLEVAL GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
§81.
1. Among the Greeks and Syrians, after Neo-Platonism declined, and particularly,
after it had been formally prohibited by a decree of the Emperor Justinian (529. ) the
SMlosophy of Aristotle came to be held more and more in esteem— the Aristotelian
ialectic being largely employed in theological controversies, first by the heretics and
then by the teachers of orthodoxy. So early as the fifth century the school of the
Syrian Nestorians at Edessa had beccme a chief seat of the Aristotelian philosophy.
The most ancient work on this philosophy which we owe to the Syrians is a commentary
on Aristotle's De Interpretations by Probus, a contemporary of Bishop Ibas of Edessa.
Probus also wrote commentaries on the A nal. Prior and the Soph. Elench.
2. When the School of Edessa was broken up by command of the Emperor Zeno,
(489) owing to its support of Nestorianism, its members fled in large numbers to Persia,
and there, under the protection of the Sassanidse, disseminated their philosophical as well
as their religious doctrines. Out of the remains of the School of Edessa grew up the
schools of Nisibis and Gandispora — the latter a school of medicine as well as of philosophy;
and in both the philosophy of Aristotle was cultivated.
3. Later, though with less zeal than the Nestorians, the Syrian Monophysites and
Jacobites gave themselves to the study of Aristotle. Schools of Aristotelian philosophy
arose at Resaina and Kinnesrin. The first to promote these studies was Sergius of Resaina,
who, in the sixth century, translated Aristotle into Syriac. Of the scholars of Kinnesrin
the most remarkable is James of Edessa, who translated various theological and philo
sophical treatises into Syriac ; his translation of the Categories of Aristotle is extant in
manuscript. We may further mention Abulfaragius (in the 13th century) who compiled a
compendium of Peripatetic Philosophy. (Butyrum Sapientia.)
4. Among the Greeks proper, we have already made acquaintance
with John of Damascus (about A.D. 700,) whose sympathy with
Aristotle we have indicated, (cf. p. 262.) In the second half of the
ninth century Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, became dis
tinguished for his great learning ; his Bibliotheca contains extracts
from a large number of philosophical treatises. His work on the
Aristotelian Categories exists in manuscript.
5. In the eleventh century we find Michael Psellus distinguished
as a logician. Besides an Introduction to Philosophy which includes
an account of the opinions of philosophers regarding the soul, com-
mentaries on the Quinque voces of Porphyry, and on Aristotle's
Categories and De Interpretation, he wrote a Compendium of
Aristotelian Logic with the title ~vvo\//ic «*c T^V 'Aptorort'Xovc Xoyt»:f)»/
liriffT^fiiji', in five books, the fifth of which contains the Topics
according to Themistius.
6. In reference to this Compendium it is specially worthy of notice
that here for the first time appear the mnemonics which have since
been used in the logical treatises on the Syllogism; a is employed
290 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
to signify the universal affirmative, « the universal negative, t the
particular affirmative, and o the particular negative. The mnemonic
words which Psellus employed to signify the moods of the first
tigure are: ypa/uftara, eypai//£, ypa^/£c, TE^V.KOQ • for the moods of the
second figures: fypo^c, nart^t, ^cYpiov, a\oXor; for those of the third:
aTraai, ffdtvapuc, iffaKig, uffTridt, opaXoc;, ^e'pioroe ', for those of the fourth :
•ypappatrty, tra£e, -^apian, TrapOevog, iepov. In the Latin translation of the
Commentary of Psellus by William Shyreswood, Lambert of Auxerre,
and Petrus Hispanus, the Greek words were replaced by the familiar
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, etc. In the last chapter of the Topics
we find a chapter upon the force of the various parts of speech under
the title; De Terminorum Proprietatibus ; this has been repro
duced in the Latin treatises on Logic.
7. A contemporary and rival of Psellus, and later, his successor in
the dignity of virarog 0t\o<7<tywv, was Joannes Italicus, who wrote
commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle. To this period
belongs also Michael Ephesius, and to the twelfth-century Eustratius,
Metropolitan of Nicsea, both of whom wrote commentaries on
different parts of Aristotle's Organon. About the middle of the
thirteenth century we find Nicephorus Blemmides composing an
iirironri \oyt*.%, and Georgius Aneponymus compiling a compendium
of the Logic of Aristotle. In the fourteenth century Georgius
Pachymeres appeared as the author of a Compendium of the
Aristotelian Logic, and Theodorus Metochita wrote paraphrases of
the physiological and psychological writings of Aristotle, as well as
treatises upon Plato and other philosophers. Cfr. Ueberweg, vol. I.,
s. 150 sqq.
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION I.
THE ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY.
INTRODUCTION.
§ 82.
1. The Arabs, formed by Mohammed into a warlike people and
entrusted with the duty of propagating Islam by the sword, exer
cised a destroying influence on scientific culture wherever they
established themselves — and this for about a century after the death
of the Prophet. The destruction of the Library of Alexandria by
Amru, the General of the Khalif Omar (640), is a fact for which
history vouches. But when the first fervour of fanaticism had passed,
and the Mohammedan sovereignty settled down into an established
form of government, there arose among the Arabs a scientific move
ment which was not without its useful results.
THE ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY. 291
2. The first scientific efforts were, as might have been expected,
directed to explain the Koran and the doctrines it propounded. The
theology thus created was at first mainly critical, but theological
differences soon arose, sects were formed, and, as a consequence,
theology assumed a certain dogmatic character. The teachers of
theology were named Motekdllemin — teachers of the Kelam — i.e., of
the Word, or revealed faith. An offshoot of this school of teachers,
at a later time, were known as Motazalen, a sect who rejected the
blind faith in the Koran prescribed by the Motekallemin, and adopted
a rationalistic attitude towards its doctrines.
3. From the time of the establishment of the dynasty of the
Abassidae (750) Aristotelian philosophy was received with favour
among the Arabs. This was specially the case under the Khalif Al
Mamum (813-833). The Arabs owed their first acquaintance with
Aristotle's writings to the Syrian Christians. These Syrian Christ
ians took service as physicians among the Arabs ; they translated at
first treatises on medicine, and then philosophical writings ; and as
the philosophy of Aristotle, because of the importance which it at
tached to the observation of nature, had a special affinity with the
medical sciences, this philosophy first engaged the attention of the
translators. These translations of Aristotle were made first into
Syriac and then into Arabic. It thus happened that Aristotelian
Philosophy was received among the Arabs associated with medicine.
This association was, to a large extent, enduring ; the most cele
brated Arabian philosophers were, as a rule, celebrated physicians.
4. By direction of Al Mamum translations of Aristotelian writings were made under the
guidance of John Ibn-al-Batuk. The work was continued under Motawakkel by Honeiu
Ibn Ishak (Johannitius), a Nestorian ( + 876), who presided over a school of translators at
Bagdad, which included his son Ishak ben Honein, and his nephew Hobeisch-al-Asam. In
the tenth century new translations were undertaken by Syrian Christians, the most notable
of whom were the Nestorians Abu Baschar Mata and Fahja ben Adi, the Tagritan, as also
Isa ben Zaraa. We may also mention among these scholars: John Messuah, a learned Greet.
The translations of these writers included, not merely the works of Aristotle, but those also
of many Aristotelians (of Alexander Ephrodisius and Themistius, asd of the Neo-Platonist
interpreters, such as Porphyry, Ainmonius, and Galen), the Republic, Timceus, and Laws of
Plato, as well as selections from trie Neo-Platonists, particularly from Proclus.
5. The translators became interpreters also, in order to make
intelligible to the Arabs doctrines so foreign to their ways of thought
as were the physical science and philosophy of the Greeks. The
traditions of Greek philosophy which still survived were a remnant
of that combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism which had been
taught by the last philsophers of antiquity, and hence it was that the
Aristotelian philosophy which the Arabs received through the
Greco-Syrian translators and interpreters bore the imprint of Neo-
Platonism. This explains the prevalence among the early Arab
Aristotelians of Neo-Platonist notions; it was only by degrees they
emancipated themselves from this influence, and attained to a truer
understanding of the philosophy of Aristotle.
6. In this way there was formed among the Arabs, from the time
292 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
of the Abassidse, a genuine Arabico- Aristotelian philosophy, which
took its place side by side with Arab theology. The Khalifs
protected and encouraged it by founding libraries and schools ; of
which the most celebrated in the East were those of Bagdad. The
zeal for philosophy was carried by the Ommaiads and Moors into
Spain, but the Spanish schools flourished at a later period than those
of the East. The most remarkable of the Spanish schools was that
of Cordova.
7. This Aristotelian philosophy among the Arabs was not,
however, in perfect accord with the Koran. We shall see that on
many points, v.g., the eternity of the world, the Providence of God,
etc., it differed essentially from the teaching of the Koran. The
Arabian Aristotelians were fully aware of this, and endeavoured
accordingly, to set themselves right, as far as they could, with the
doctrines of their religion. This accord between Science and
Religion they sought to establish in one of two ways :—
(a) They admitted that Religion contained the genuine truth,
but that it exhibited the truth only in symbols, for the reason that
the common people can be reached by the truth only when it is
symbolically expressed. Religion, as it stands, is intended for the
people, and for the people alone; to them knowledge can come only
through Religion. It is the task of philosophy to remove from the
truth &the veil of symbolism, and, by methods of rational inquiry,
to rise to the knowledge of truth in its purity. In this process it
must not disparage Religion, but neithei must Religion be made a
rule and criterion of knowledge for the learned. The wise ^man
listens only to the voice of Reason. But the influence of Religion
upon the people must not be impaired ; and to avoid this philosophy
must be confined to the circle of the wise ; it would be poison for
the multitude.
(6) This manner of determining the relations between Science and
Religion was not, however, wholly satisfactory ; for the philosophers
put Forward points of doctrine which were distinctly contradictory of
the teachings of the Koran. In cases of this kind they endeav
oured to save themselves by appeal to the principle that scientific
opinions of this sort were justifiable and true in the domain of
Reason and Philosophy, but in this domain only— they were false in
the sphere of Religion and of Faith. It was the business of the
philosophers to teach what was true according to Reason and
Philosophy; they did not assert that these doctrines were true
according to Religion and to Faith ; on the contrary, they were
bound to hold, and did hold, that from this point of view they were false.
This distinction, which we shall find maintained both by Avicenna
and Averroes, establishes as a principle the contradiction between
Reason and Religion ; but this was only to enable philosophy to
maintain itself against the requirements of the Koran.
8. This was not, however, enough to satisfy the Motekallemin,
the uncompromising advocates of the Koran. In their eyes the
THE ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS. 293
Aristotelians were heretics, and they accordingly treated them as an
heretical sect in Islam. But they were led further, in consequence
of the divergence of the Aristotelians from the orthodox doctrine.
The Motekallemin could no longer rest satisfied with a mere
explanation of the Koran ; they were constrained to offer rational
arguments in favour of its chief tenets, especially of those with which
the philosophers were at variance, and to refute by the same method
the opposing doctrines. In this way the dogmatic teaching of the
Arabs came to acquire a certain ph ilosophic character ; and a certain
kind of religious philosophy was created which played a not unim
portant part in the history of Arabian thought.
9. Following the division of our subject indicated in this brief
survey of the Arabian philosophy, we will treat first of the Arabian
Aristotelians — the " philosophers" proper ; and then we will notice
that Philosophy of Religion which, among the Arabs, was opposed
to the " philosophy" of the Aristotelians.
THE ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS.
I.— IN THE EAST.
ALKENDI, ALFARABI, AND AVICENNA.
§ 83.
1. It is usual to regard Alkendi as the founder of the Arabico-
Aristotelian philosophy. Alkendi was a native of Basra, on the
Gulf of Persia ; he lived in the reign of Al Mamum during the first
half of the ninth century, and died about the year 870. He was
skilled alike in Astronomy, Mathematics, and Medicine, and won
for himself the honourable title of " Philosopher of the Arabs.'' He
wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle — on the metaphysical
treatises as on the others. " His system of Astrology was founded
on the assumption of a general causal connection between all things,
in consequence of which each object contemplated in the totality of
its relations, became as it were a mirror of the universe." The
rigid followers of the Koran regarded him as a heretic.
2. Of still greater fame was Alfarabi, a philosopher of the tenth
century. He was born towards the end of the ninth century at
Balak, in the province of Farab, was educated at Bagdad, and began
his career as a teacher in that city. At a later period he proceeded
to Aleppo, and thence to Damascus, where he joined the mystical
sect of the Sufites, without, however, abandoning his work as a
teacher of philosophy ( + 950). His writings consist of short essays,
in which he follows closely the methods of the Greek Neo-Platonists.
Two of his treatises, De Scientiis and De Intellect u et Intellecto,
were published at Paris in 1638 in a Latin translation. Schmdlders
294
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
(Dpcumenta Phil. Arab., Bonn 1836), adds two others : Comment-
atio de Rebus Studio Arist. Philosophic prcemittendis and Fontex
Qucestionum.
3. Alfarabi was followed by the most celebrated of all the
Arabian Aristotelians of the East — Avicenna (Ibn Sina). He was
born at Affena, in the province of Bokhara, in 980. At an early
age he studied Philosophy and Medicine at Bagdad; and this with such
happy results, that at the age of twenty-one, he wrote works on
philosophical and medical subjects. He subsequently laboured as a
teacher of philosophy and medicine at Ispahan. His moral short-
coinings were notorious; he was addicted to wine and sensual
indulgence, and thereby hastened his death. He died in the year
1037. His works most deserving of notice are his Logic, Physics,
and Metaphysics, his shorter treatises : De Divisione Scientiarum,
De Dejinitis et Qucesitis, De Almahad, De Anima, Aphorismata
de Anima, and lastly, his celebrated Canon Medicince, which for
centuries was in high repute, and ranked as a standard authority in
medical science.
4. As regards the relations of Avicenna to his predecessors, it may be stated that on
all points of teaching he follows closely the views of Alfarabi. If we compare the systems
of the two men we find no essential difference between them, we notice only that Avicemia
gives fuller development to the fundamental doctrines laid down by Alfarabi. In order,
therefore, to avoid needless repetition, we will here sketch merely the main points of
Avicenna's teaching, premising that in these we shall find expressed the broad lines of
Alfarabi's also.
5. In the Logic of Avicenna, special stress is laid upon the
principle : Intellectus in formis agit universalitatem ; that is to
say, the essential forms of things are, in themselves, neither
universal nor individual; that they may become the one or the
other, the intervention of a cause is necessary. The cause of their
individuality is matter; for only in so far as they are actualized in
matter do they become individual. The cause of their universality,
on the other hand, is Intellect ; for only in so far as they are appre
hended by Intellect, apart from the matter in which they are
actualized, and by Intellect referred to individual objects as a Predi-
cabile de Omnibus, do they become universal.
6. Hence Matter is the principle of the plurality of objects within
the same species; Intellect, on the other hand, is the principle of the
unity of these several objects in the species. And here we have to
understand Intellect in a double sense— the Divine and Human. Of
these the former is antecedent to things, the latter follows them.
The universal exists ante rem, in the Divine Intellect ; then in re
in so far as its content constitutes the Essence or Quiddity of the
individual objects; and lastly, post rem in the Human Intellect,
which abstracts it from these individual objects, and represents it in
thought as a Predicabile de multis.
7. In his Metaphysics, Avicenna (with Alfarabi) offers the following
proof for the existence of God : The world is a composite thing,
THE ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS. 295
and therefore does not exist of necessity. It is, therefore, in itself
something merely possible, something which may exist or not exist.
Its actual existence implies a cause which has given existence to
what was in itself a mere possibility. This cause cannot itself have
been of the merely possible order. In this hypothesis, it would pre
suppose an ulterior cause from which to receive its actual being,
and this cause again another, and so backwards, the series of causes
either reaching back into the infinite or returning upon itself to
form a circle; both of which consequences are absurd. The cause,
then, which the world postulates exists of necessity. And the
necessary cause is God.
8. Now if God is the primary, necessarily existing cause of all
things, He is, as such, the absolutely perfect, the sovereignly perfect
being. He is eternal, to Himself sufficient, immutable. He is
Wisdom, Life, Knowledge, Power, Will ; He is the highest Good,
Beauty, and Excellence. He enjoys in Himself the highest happi
ness. But no one of the attributes which we may thus assign Him
is in any way different from His Being. In Him there is nothing
composite in any sense whatever of that term ; God is absolute sim
plicity ; there is nothing in Him which is not Himself. Intellect,
the Intelligible, and the Act of Intelligence (intelligere) are in Him
one and the same thing.
, 9. From these principles, on which rests the proof of God's
existence, further consequences follow. The world does not exist of
necessity, and, consequently, its possibility must be taken as ante
cedent to its actual existence. Here two alternatives are offered us.
This possibility which precedes the actuality is something inherent
in a subject or it is not. If it is not, then this possibility is a sub
stance — a consequence which is inadmissible. The former alternative
must, therefore, be accepted ; we must suppose a subject in which the
possibility of the existent world is contained. This subject or
underlying basis of possibility is Matter. Hence Matter is the basis
of possibility, the pre-requirement of all actuality ; and since possi
bility is eternal, so also is Matter.
10. In proving this we have proved at the same time the eternity
of the world. For, in the first place, Matter as mere possibility can
never actually exist, such existence contradicts its very concept ;
it can, therefore, exist only in the actually existing objects of the
world, of which, as possibility, it is the underlying basis. In the
second place, cause and effect are necessarily co-related ; the one
cannot exist without the other. If God and the world are to one
another as cause to effect, as the world is inconceivable without God,
so God is inconceivable without the world. If, then, God is eternal,
so also is the world.
11. God is eternal of Himself and by Himself; the world on the
other hand is eternal, because eternally caused by God. God is
eternal without time ; the world is eternally existing in time. As
the world could not come into actual being without God, so neither
296
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
could it continue actually to exist without Him. The world does not
of itself maintain itself in existence, when once it has received
existence ; its continuance is essentially dependent on the causal
influence of God. God is not transiently, but permanently, the cause
of the world's existence.
12. The question may now be asked : by what means has God
become the cause of the world's existence ? In replying, we must,
before all else, assure ourselves that we cannot attribute to God a
Will by which He could act for a determinate end, desire anything
outside Himself (voluntas ad extra.) A will of this kind would
connote in God a desire for something which He did not already
possess, and which He might obtain ; such a notion is at variance
with the infinite perfection of God. This being so, God must have
been the cause of the world's existence, not by His Will, but by His
Knowledge.
13. God is the Absolute Good, and, as such, is the source of all
good and of all order. God knows Himself as the Absolute Good,
as the source of all good ; and, as a result of this knowledge, all
things proceed from Him, which are a consequence of His nature,
the whole order of being, the entire system of actuality. God, it is
true, loves Himself as the Absolute Good, and, because of His love
for Himself, loves everything which proceeds from Him ; but His
Love follows upon the Thought which is the efficient cause of things,
it is not itself the efficient cause.
14. Here we find Avicenna following in the footsteps of the Neo-
Platonists ; for it is distinctly the teaching of Neo-Platonism that
God's knowing Himself is the condition on which depends the
coming forth from the eternal source of being, of all that comes from
God. And precisely for this reason, Avicenna, like the Neo-Platonists,
can regard the causal action of God merely as a kind of emanation.
For if the Thought, not the Will, of God is the source of all things
that lie outside God's Being, it must follow that everything which
comes from God is merely an ideal emanation from the Divine
Intellect. And the philosophy of the Arabs becomes a doctrine of
emanation.
15. But how and in what manner do all things proceed from
God ? To this question Avicenna (with Alfarabi) gives the following
answer: God is absolute unity and simplicity. From unity only
unity can proceed ; ab uno non est nisi unum. Hence what
immediately proceeds from God can be only a second unity. The
plurality of things, as it is found in the world, must be referred
mediately to God. Hence to explain how the world proceeded from
God we must assume a descending series of emanations, which
proceeding from one unity, developes by successive steps into
plurality, until at the point of greatest distance from God, it attains
the greatest multiplicity of things.
16. The order of these emanations is thus laid down : God by knowing Himself
causes to proceed from Him the Second Unity, that is, the First Intelligence. This is in
Till: ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS.
297
itself an unity ; but it already involves plurality ; for we must distinguish in it possibility
aiii I <«'1 n«lit\jt inasmuch as it is in itself only possible, hut receives actuality from the
First Unity. And for the reason that plurality is already involved in its unity it is pos
sible for it to give rise to a further plurality. The relation of the " First Intelligence "
to the Platonist vov is unmistakable.
17. It is by this act of Knowledge, and by this only, that God causes further being
to proceed from Himself, the same holds good of the subsequent evolution of the Divine
Emanations. The First Intelligence has knowledge of God on the one side, and on the
other has knowledge of itself both as to its potentiality and actuality. In virtue of its
knowledge of God there proceeds from it the Second Intelligence ; in virtue of its knowledge
of its own actuality there proceeds from it the World-soul which corresponds to the
Second Intelligence ; in virtue of its knowledge of its potentiality there proceeds from it
the highest sphere^ animated and kept in movement by the world-soul.
18. And thus onward : As the First Intelligence, by its act of Knowledge, produces
the Second Intelligence, with the corresponding soul, and the sphere corresponding to this
soul, so the Second Intelligence produces a Third Intelligence with a corresponding soul
and a cosmic sphere corresponding to this soul. And thus proceed successive emanations of
Intelligence, Soul, and Cosmic Sphere, down through the spheres of all the planets till we
arrive at the Active Intellect, the moving principle of the Lunar Sphere. And as the
series of emanations proceeds, imperfection and multiplicity appear more distinctly at
each stage.
19 The last member in the series of purely spiritual emanations is, we have seen,
the Active Intellect. To this principle is immediately due the sublunary elemental
world. No further Intelligence emanates from this Active Intellect. In the act by
which it knows itself in potentiality there emanate from it the Souls of men and the
Forms of corporeal things ; and in the act by which it knows itself in its actuality it gives
rise to the Matter of the elemental world.
20. Hence the Active Intellect bears within itself all the forms of corporeal things ;
by it they are infused into the Matter which it generates, and thus, compacted of Matter
and Form, arise the several objects of the sublunary elemental world. The Active
Intellect does not, however, merely produce those forms from out itself ; they come
ultimately from God, passing into theFirst Intelligence,and from this through the succeeding
intelligences down to the Active Intellect ; from which proceed immediately the forms
that, in combination with Matter, constitute individual objects.
21. These Forms can, however, be infused into matter only on condition that the
latter is first duly disposed to receive them. This disposition is accomplished by genera
tion. The end to which generation tends is, therefore, not the production of a complete
being, specifically resembling the parent, but only to the due preparation and disposition of
matter for the reception of the substantial form from the Active Intellect ; it is only when
the matter duly disposed has received the form from this source that the being exists in
completeness.
22. In this wise, then, by the agency of the Active Intellect, the
several different objects of the sublunary elemental world arise.
And so it happens that at the greatest distance from God, the mul
tiplicity of things is greatest, their imperfections being in direct
proportion to their multiplicity. Hence, too, it is only in this region
of being that evil can be found. But this evil is not an end in itself,
it is only a necessary condition of good in the nether world.
23. And as God is the primal source of being from which the
cosmic system proceeds, so also is He the last end towards which all
things tend. God is the supreme object of desire, and, as such, is
the last end of all things. All things strive to assimilate themselves
with God, and the effort after this assimilation is the cause of motion.
The celestial spheres strive, by their eternal movement of rotation, to
attain this assimilation with the Intelligence which presides over them,
and thus assimilation with God Himself ; the same object is pursued by
the elemental world in its movements, that is, in the activities peculiar
298
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
to it. In this way is established the truth of the sa^nng of Aristotle,
God causes motion "as the object of desire."
24. We must not, however, believe that, because God is the primal
source and ultimate end of all being, His knowledge is of such kind
that it extends to individual objects. This is not the case. Avicenna
will have it that if we ascribe to God a knowledge of things which
are subject to generation and corruption, or indeed of things which
are contingent in any sense, we thereby introduce a temporal and
contingent element into God's knowledge — and this we must not do.
Moreover, the individual object in its individuality, and the contingent
object as contingent, are perceptible only by means of the senses ; and
we cannot ascribe to God sensuous knowledge or faculty of imagina
tion.
25. Hence the direct object of the Divine knowledge is the universal.
God, as the ultimate principle of all things, has immediate knowledge
only of the universal, of the universal forms and laws of being. The
individual he does not know in its individuality, but only in the
universal as in the cause which contains it. If we object that this
theory sets limits to the Divine knowledge, we are answered that by
asserting God's knowledge of all things in their causes, we are safe
guarding the perfection of God's knowledge ; that to extend further
the Divine knowledge would be to impair its perfection.
26. This limiting of the Divine knowledge to the universal leads
on to the further principle that the Providence of God, also, is con
fined to the universal and necessary laws which control the actual
world ; that the individual and the casual, as such, are not included
under it. We can speak of the individual being subject to the
providence of God, only in the sense that the individual is controlled
by the necessary laws of the universe. A providence on the part
of God which should guide the individual as such to its proper end
is inadmissible.
27. Avicenna, like Aristotle, regards the human soul as the
essential form of the body. He distinguishes between the faculties
of soul which are united with the body and dependent upon it, and
the Intellect which is a power transcending the bodily organism, and
which exercises its activity without aid from any organ. His proof
for the supra-organic immaterial nature of the soul is borrowed from
Aristotle. From the principle that the soul has an immaterial power
and activity, exercised without the body, he argues that the being
of the soul is independent of the body, and so immaterial.
28. On the subject of the intellect, Avicenna having adopted the
distinction between the Active and Passive Intellect, lays it down
that it is only the Passive Intellect which is an essential faculty of
the individual soul. The Active Intellect is something distinct
from the individual soul, a principle which has its own separate
existence. As such, it is universal ; one and the same in all men.
If we inquire further into the nature of this one universal intellect, we
are told that it is nothing else than that universal Active Intellect,
THE ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS. 299
which closes the series of Cosmic Intelligences at its lowest extremity,
and from which the Forms are derived which are infused into
matter
29. The process by which human knowledge is acquired assumes,
according to this theory, an analogy with the process which gives
rise to the objects of the elemental world. The Passive Intellect may
be compared with Matter. Into this the Active Intellect infuses a
form of knowledge, what it infuses into Matter as forms of actual
being, and thus the mere potency passes into actual knowledge
The outcome of this process is the Intellectus in actu or effeotu—
knowledge in act. What we call the act of knowing is, therefore,
the turning of the Passive Intellect to the Active, to receive from
it the intelligible species of the object of knowledge.
30. For this, however, a previous preparation or disposition is
necessary. This preparation is effected by means of the sensuous
image (phantasma.) As, in the process of generation, matter must
be disposed by natural agents to receive its appropriate forms from
the Active Intellect, so must the Passive Intellect be disposed by
the sensuous image to receive from the same source the correspond
ing intelligible species.
31. A further distinction has, however, to be made between the Intellectus Infusm, and
the Intellectus Adeptns. All intellectual knowledge does not rest on a basis of sense-
experience or presuppose it ; there is a certain knowledge which, without previous dis
position or preparation is imparted by this Active Intellect to the soul, and which is itself
the basis and antecedent condition of that knowledge which the reasoning faculty founds
upon sense-experience. Of this kind are the first principles of the Reason. These
must, therefore, be described as Intellectus Infusus, while the rest of our knowledge, which we
build upon these principles out of material supplied by the senses, is included under the
notion Intcttectus Adcptus.
32. We must not, however, so conceive the " Acquired Intellect " as to attribute to
it a power of preserving in itself the knowledge it has once attained. The so-called
Intellectual Memory has no existence ; for memory is essentially associated with a bodily
organ. All learning of things consists in this that the Passive Intellect is rendered more
and more expeditious in turning itself at any moment to the Active Intellect, to receive
from this latter the intelligible species.
33. The theory of human knowledge, as here set forth, involves the doctrine that the
Intellect knows the inmost nature of things, for the Passive Intellect derives from the Active
those very forms which are realised in nature, and which constitute the very essences of
existing things. Hence we can say with justice that the thing actually understood, the
intcllectum, in actu, is one and the same with the faculty actually understanding — the
intt tiectiu in actu, and that the Intellect in its acts of knowledge, apprehends, not something
outside itself, but only itself — that which is really contained within it.
34. Over and above the natural knowledge, of which the process
is here explained, Avicenna admits a higher mystical knowledge.
The soul communicates immediately with that Active Intellect
which controls all things, and thus it is in a position to receive
knowledge of an unwonted kind from this higher source without any
use of the ordinary means by which knowledge is acquired. Such
knowledge is due to an extraordinary illuminating efficacy of the
Active Intellect, and is, therefore, of a mystical rather than a rational
nature.
300 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
35. To this mystical kind of knowledge belongs Prophecy. Pro
phetic knowledge follows an order the reverse of that observed in
the ordinary intellectual processes. The latter begin with the sense-
images of Imagination, and then advance upwards to the intelligible ;
the former begins with the intelligible, received into the soul with
out help of Sense or Imagination, and thence descends through the
Imagination to the images of sense, shrouding in these the intelli
gible truths, so as to adapt them to popular comprehension.
36. Mystical knowledge is the highest that man can attain. In
this knowledge man finds his highest happiness. But it can be
attained only when the soul is prepared for it by a pure and holy
life. The mystical light requires a pure and holy receptacle in
which its revelations shall be received. Given this condition, the
soul may not only be raised by the Active Intellect to preternatural
knowledge, it may also be endowed with preternatural active
virtue, the prophet may become a worker of miracles.
37. Avicenna maintains the immortality of the soul. He proves
its destiny in this respect through its immaterial nature. The
Resurrection of the body, as taught by the Koran, is to be accepted
as a point of religious belief; philosophically, however, the doctrine
is false. Philosophically it can be regarded only as a sensuous
expression of the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, which the
prophet employs to adapt this doctrine to the understanding of the
people.
ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS.
II. — IN SPAIN.
AVEMPACE, AVERROES, AND ABUBACER.
§ 84.
1. The Arabian philosophy attained development at a later period
in Spain, than in the East. It is, indeed, stated that there were
celebrated philosophers in Spain under the Ommaiads, particularly
under Hakem II. in the tenth century. But we know nothing of
their doctrines, no mention is made of them by the later Arabian
philosophers. It was only towards the close of the eleventh century,
when the Moors had established themselves in Spain, that a
philosopher appeared of whom the Christian Scholastics take
frequent note. He was known to them under the name Avempace.
2. Avempace (Ibn Badscheh) was born at Saragossa, and obtained celebrity as a
physician, a poet, and a philosopher. He resided at the Moorish Court, and died, it is
said in 1138, from poison administered by a rival. He wrote short treatises (most of
them now lost) of which Munk (Melanges etc., p. 386) gives the following titles : " Logical
Treatises," "A Treatise on the Soul," another on the "Hermit's Guide," ( Regime du solitaire,)
another on the union of the Intellect with Man, and lastly a valedictory epistle (Epistola
Expeditions. )
THE AUAHIAN ARISTOTELIANS. 301
3. The treatise " The Hermit's Guide/' the chief contents of which are set forth by
Munk, discusses the various degrees by which the soul rises from the merely instinctive
processes which it shares with the brute, and delivering itself more and more from Matter
and Potentiality, attains at length to the knowledge of the separated form of things, and
in this knowledge finds its beatitude. Avempace is said to have identified the Intellects
Materialis with the Virtus Imaginativa.
4s. Averroes (Ibn. Roschd) occupies a much more important place
in the History of Philosophy than does Avempace.
Averroes was born in 1126 at Cordova, in which town his father was Chief Magistrate
and Chief Priest. He first studied Theology and Jurisprudence, later he gave himself to
Medicine, Mathematics and Philosophy. After his father's death he succeeded to his
various offices, and whilst thus employed in important public duties, he composed (at
Seville) the greater portion of those remarkable treatises which made his name famous in
after ages. It is said that in his old age he was appointed regent of Spain by the
Khalif Jussuf el Mansur, but that, soon after, having been accused of atheism and contempt
of religion, he was excluded from the Mosque and sent into exile. He was, however, rein
stated in his dignities after a brief interval, and was then summoned to Morocco to act as
physician to the Court. He died there in 1198.
5. Averroes is chiefly remarkable for his commentaries on the writings of Aristotle;
they^have secured him the title of " the Commentator." On some of the Aristotelian
treatises he has written as many as three commentaries — the first in the form of a brief
paraphrase, the second in somewhat greater minuteness, and the third in all fulness of
detail. We have a three-fold commentary of this kind on the Posterior Analytics, the
Physics, the treatise De Ccelo, the De Anima, and the Metaphysics. In the case of other
works only the short paraphrase and commentary remain to us. " Averroes did not possess
the Greek original of the works of Aristotle ; he understood neither Greek nor Syriac ;
wherever the Arabian translation was obscure or incorrect he was obliged to conjecture
the true sense from the general context of the Aristotelian teaching."
6. Besides his commentaries Averroes composed many other treatises. Of these the
most important are: a) " Tehafot al Tehafot" (Destruction of destructions.) a reply to
Algazel's Refutation of the Philosophers which we shall notice later ; b) " Qusesita in libros
logicro Aristotelis ; " c) " Treatises on Physics " (on the Problems of Aristotle's Physics) ;
d) "Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum hornine " ; e) "De animrc beatitu-
dine " ; /) " De Intellectu possibili vel materiali " (preserved to us only in a Hebrew transla
tion) ; g) on "the harmony of Religion and Philosophy" (a Hebrew text) ; h) " on the
true meaning of Religious Dogmas, or the way of proving the same," &c.
7. Averroes entertained the most profound admiration for
Aristotle ; his veneration went almost the length of worship. He
held that the teachings of Aristotle were the most luminous and
the most trustworthy which had come down to the Arabs from the
older ^ philosophers; Aristotle had pushed thought as far as it is
permitted to man, and should therefore be regarded as the one safe
guide in philosophical speculation. The doctrines of Aristotle are
for Averroes the supreme wisdom; his intellect represents the
highest development of the human understanding ; he was given to
mankind by Providence to show in one example what is the highest
human perfection; his writings contain no error whatever.
8. Accordingly, in his own teaching, Averroes always faithfully
follows Aristotle. In his interpretation and exposition of the
Aristotelian Logic, Physic, and Metaphysic, he does not differ widely
from Avicenna. It is only in Psychology that the two philosophers
follow widely different paths. "To avoid repetition, we will not
touch upon those points on which Averroes and Avicenna are in
agreement, as, for example, the eternity of the world, the existence
of spirits which hold a middle place between God and the world, etc.;
302 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
we will merely direct attention to the points on which Averroes is
at variance with his predecessor.
9. In the first place, Averroes differs from Avicenna in his con
ception of the process by which the elementary substances of the
physical world came into being. The latter, as we have seen, held
that the individual entities of the elemental world derive their
being from the Active Intellect which impresses the forms of things
on Matter. Averroes, on the other hand, asserts that the forms of
natural objects are contained potentially in matter, and that these
objects come into being by the action of efficient causes which educe
the forms from matter, and so effect the transition from potentiality to
actuality. The assumption that the forms are introduced into matter
from without is equivalent to the doctrine of a creation from
nothing — a wholly untenable theory.
10. With regard to God's knowledge of things, Averroes is at
one with Avicenna in asserting that God has no knowledge of indi
viduals as such; but Averroes does not establish any analogy
between God's knowledge and the knowledge obtained by means of
universal ideas ; he holds it to be of a kind far transcending this.
God's knowledge is, to speak accurately, only of Himself, as He
actually exists ; Avhat is inferior to Himself He knows, not as it
actually is, but only as it exists in Himself — in so far as it has in
Him the principle of its being. As a consequence of this theory, he
maintains that God's providence has to do with the general order of
the universe, not with individual things.
11. In Psychology, Averroes makes a distinct advance upon the
position of Avicenna. He separates not merely the Intellectus Agens,
but the Intellectus Possibilis as well, from the individual soul, and
holds the latter to be a wholly distinct principle. In accordance
with this view, he teaches that not only the Active Intellect, but the
Possible Intellect also, is one in all men; and that individual
men are rational and capable of knowledge, whether actually or
potentially, only in so far as they participate in that one universal
intellect.
12.. In the series of Intelligences which extend from God downwards to the world,
the Universal Active Intellect occupies the lowest rank. It communicates itself to the
individual man, and it is in virtue of this communication that he attains to intellectual
knowledge. To account for this communication, we are not to assume the existence of
a Possible Intellect in the individual soul ; rather, it is the Universal Active Intellect
which, communicating itself to man, becomes in him a Possible Intellect ; so that both the
Active and the Possible Intellect of the individual are to be traced back to the Universal
Active Intellect.
13. Avicenna had ascribed the Possible Intellect to the human soul as an essential
constituent faculty, and had thus been able to establish an essential difference between the
soul of man and the soul of the brute. Averroes denies to the individual soul every native
intellectual faculty, and is thus unable to make the difference between the human and the
brute soul more than a difference of degree. According to Averroes, the human soul
differs from that of the brute only by its possession of what he calls the Passive Intellect —
a faculty which enables it to compare and to distinguish individual representations (the
vis cogitativa of the Scholastics). This Passive Intellect is, however, merely a factor of
the sense faculty, and its action is dependent upon the brain. With him, therefore, there
is no essential distinction between the human and the purely animal soul.
THE ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS. 303
14. If we ask in what manner the extrinsic activity of the Active Intellect com
municates itself to man, and causes knowledge in him, Averroes answers : — The Forms of
things are not induced into Matter by the Active Intellect, but existing potentially in
Matter, are evolved from it by the Action of the Int« Meet ; in like manner, human know-
le l'/e is not cine to tho transfer of intelligible species from the Active Intellect to the soul;
it. is to be explained by the operation of the Active Intellect contracting from the sense
presentations the intelligible species which are contained in them potentially, and which
are, we may say, educed by the Intellect.
15. This being so, the genesis of intellectual knowledge postulates, in the first place,
the existence of sensuous presentation-, and, in the next, the due elaboration of the«e l>v
the so-called Passive Intellect, so that they may be prepared for the operation of the A
Intellect. Given the phantasm, the Active Intellect present in man generates out of it, by
it- abstractive power, the intelligible spoc.i s. The substratum, or subject, of these
Intellectual forms of knowledge cannot be other than the Active Intellect itself. In so far
as it is the substratum, or subject, of the intelligible species, it becomes the Possible, or
as Averroes expresses it, the Material Intellect. When, therefore, an intelligible species
is generated in man by the operation of the Active Intellect, by the fact the Intellect
unites itself with the individual in question as Passive Intellect, according to the special
form which it assumes in the intelligible species generated. In this way man attains to a
participation in the one Universal Intellect, and in this way does he attain actual
knowledge.
16. From the doctrine thus stated, the following inferences are
derivable : —
a) In the first place, in the process of knowledge, man is himself active only in so far
as his Passive Intellect prepares the phantasms for the operations of the Active Intellect
\\ hat follows after this preparation, and demands it as a condition, is a natural process
to which the Passive Intellect contributes nothing.
b) In the second place, it is evident that the differences which separate men in point
of mental capacity and intellectual acquirements cannot in any way affect the Intellect
itself. These differences are to be ascribed rather to the greater or less perfection of the
faculty of Passive Intellect in the several individuals. It is only the operation of the
Passive Intellect which belongs to the individual, the act of intellectual knowledge is a
purely natural process which is carried out in accord with the character of the activity put
forth by the Passive Intellect.
c) In the third place, the individual attains to participation in the Possible Intellect
only to the extent of the special form of knowledge, which is generated by the abstractive
operation of the Active Intellect. It can, therefore, be said, in different senses, that
Possible Intellect is one in all men, and that it is different in each. It is one in intrinsic
being in all of them, it differs inform in different individuals.
17. The product of the development of human knowledge is the Accpaired Intellect
(ititdlectus adcptus}. This development is different in different individuals; hence there
are corresponding differences in the Acquired Intellect. This intellect is, furthermore,
perishable, like the individuals themselves. It is only in the aggregate of the human race
that it becomes eternal and immutable, for in the aggregate of mankind knowledge and
science are always living actualities.
18. The knowledge acquired by the Intellect deals immediately
with the intelligible as embodied in the objects of sense ; it is this
object of knowledge which is derived from the phantasm by the
abstractive operation of the Active Intellect. But inasmuch as the
Active Intellect is essentially associated with the higher immaterial
intelligence, it becomes possible for man to attain by means of this
Intellect to knowledge of this higher mind. This is the highest
degree of human knowledge. In this knowledge, according to
Averroes, consists man's supreme happiness. When he has reached
this degree man becomes like to God ; he knows all things as they
are ; he has reached the highest perfection, and, consequently, the
most perfect happiness.
2
304 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY,
19. The path which leads to this perfection is the study of the
speculative sciences ; and, in the first place, of philosophy.
Averroes has no sympathy with mysticism ; science is for him the
only means to this end. The use of this means involves the labour of
continuous study, and is, therefore, reserved exclusively for the
more gifted minds ; and even to these it is only in old age that it is
given to reach the goal ; if the supreme perfection were accessible
to all men it would cease to be supreme. It follows that Philosophy
is the noblest pursuit to which man can devote himself.
20. Discussing the relations between religion and philosophy, Averroes holds that
religion is a pre-requirement of philosophy; the man who does not first submit himself
to law and religion cannot attain to insight into truth. Religion, however, contains the
truth hidden under images ; it is for the philosopher to penetrate beneath the veil, and
reach truth in its purity. This advance of knowledge to pure truth constitutes the religion
peculiar to the philosopher ; man can offer God no worthier homage than the knowledge of
His works, which leads to the knowledge of Himself in the fulness of His being.
21. According to Averroes the immortality of the soul is, from
the philosopher's point of view, a delusion. As we have seen, the
individual human soul is not essentially different in nature from
the soul of the brute ; it is dependent on the organism in all its
functions ; it cannot therefore be regarded as an immaterial entity ;
it cannot, accordingly, lay claim to a personal immortality. That
Universal Intellect, which is one in all men, is immortal in its
objective unity ; but not the individual soul. The human race, as
such, is eternal and imperishable, not individual men. What is
told us of a future life, and of the fate awaiting us there, is mere
fable.
22. This outcome of philosophical speculation is, it must be
admitted, at variance with religious teaching. But this result is to
be maintained only as philosophical truth; in the domain of religious
faith the opposite doctrine is to be accepted as true. The Unity of
Intellect in all men is the necessary conclusion of philosophical
inquiry ; as such, and only as such, will Averroes accept it ; in
religious belief he assents to the contrary doctrine. This rulemust
be observed in all cases where philosophy is at variance with
religion; the former must never take up a position of hostility to
the latter.
23. Thus far Averroes. We must now cast a glance at one of
his older contemporaries — Abubacer (Ibn Tofeil), who is said to
have been the friend of Averroes. He was born in Andalusia about
A.D. 1100, and was renowned as a physician, a mathematician, a
philosopher and a poet. He died in Morocco A.D. 1185. He is the
author of a work which bears the title Haji Ibn Jokdahn, i.e., The
Living One, the Son of the Watcher. Eichhorn published this work
in a German translation in 1783, under the title The Natural Man
(it had been published in a Latin translation with the title
Philosophus Autodidactus by Pococke ; Oxford, 1671). This work
is a philosophical romance, which tells how a man (Ibn Jokdahn),
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARAl'.S. 305
who lived from his youth upwards on a desert island, evolved from
within himself a whole system of knowledge, until at last he raised
himself to that highest grade of knowledge which consists in
contemplation.
24. It is interesting to observe how this isolated man at first attained to a
knowledge of the intelligible forms of corporeal things, and thence to the knowledge of
<!od and the soul. Curious, too, are the means he makes use of —as, for example, turning
round and round in a circle, sitting the whole day long with drooping head and closed
eyes — in order to promote in himself a certain condition of ecstasy which would raise him
to the immediate contemplation of God. We cannot here follow the story in its details ;
we can only mention that Jokdahn reaches happily the highest degree of knowledge, and
that he can, thenceforth, enter at pleasure the ecstatic condition.
25. The general tendency of the story goes to show that the natural progressive
unfolding of human cognition leads to those same results which we find put before us by
religioii ; with this difference, that religion presents these truths under the veil of images,
whereas, at the highest stage of human knowledge, they are laid before us in their
undimmed purity. Accordingly the tale concludes with an episode in which a stranger
(Asal), having come to the island by accident, has the teaching of the Koran unfolded to
him by Jokdahn, to whom he in turn relates his experiences in Mysticism. To the
surprise of both their doctrines are found to correspond exactly. Accordingly Jokdahn,
after his return to social life, perceives that the reason why the Prophet has spoken in
metaphor is because the mere people is incapable of understanding truth unless it is
expressed in imagery.
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARABS.
THE TEACHING OF THE MOTEKALLEMIN AND MOTAZALEN.
85.
1. We have already seen in what way the positive dogmatism
of the Arabs gradually assumed the character of a philosophy of
religion, in the struggle with the heretical " philosophers," and how
.a philosophic basis was thus provided for the chief doctrines of the
Koran. These doctrines are : the creation and inception of the
world ; the unity and immateriality of God ; the multiplicity of the
Divine attributes; providence in the shape of inexorable fate; and the
resurrection of the body.
2. This basis to religion was not furnished by the Metaphysic
of Aristotle ; it was precisely by means of the Aristotelian Meta
physic that the " philosophers" had arrived at those conclusions so
much at variance with the Koran — the eternity of the world, the
limitation of God's providence, the denial of the multiplicity of
attributes in God, etc. The end was attained by laying down a netf
set of metaphysical principles. Let us now see what were tha
metaphysical principles of the Motekallemin. Of these Moses
Maimontdes gives us, in his More Nevochim (ps. I., c. 73, 74), the
following account :
3. The ultimate constituent elements of. bodies are not Matter and Form, but Atoms.
A body is in its essence nothing more than an aggregate and combination of atoms. What
we call generation is merely the combination of atoms ; corruption is merely their separa
tion. Hence a body, as such, is not a substance, it is merely a combination of substances ;
306
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
the true substances are the atoms. The atoms, being indivisible, have no quantity.
Quantity belongs to them only when they combine to form a body. For the same reason
accidents do not belong to a body, as such, for it is not a substance ; they belong to its
atoms. As snow is white only because all its parts are white, so a body is, for example,
living only because all its atoms are such ; it is sensitive only because all its atoms
are so, etc.
4. All atoms are of the same kind ; there is no specific difference between them. The
same, is, therefore, true of the bodies which they form. There are no determinate specific
differences of nature which distinguish corporeal things inter se. Between the indivi
duals of different species there is, in reality, no greater difference than between individuals
of the same species. All differences between corporeal things are merely accidental ; acci
dents are the only differentiating elements. From this we infer that there are no natural
or specific accidents which essentially belong to certain atoms, not to others ; every atom
is capable of combining with every accident.
5. A substance cannot, however, exist without some accident. Just as accident is
unthinkable without substance, so is substance unthinkable without accident. If a posi
tive accident is not attributable to it, eo ipso the privation of the accident belongs to it,
ami the privation is itself an accident. For instance, if the positive accent of life is not
attributable to a substance, by the fact the negative accident of death becomes attribu
table to it. Accident is thus a necessary condition of the existence of substance, just as
substance is a necessary condition of the existence of accident.
6. Every accident is, however, of its nature transient, no accident can ever endure
for two successive instants, though two " nows " immediately follow one another in
time. In the moment which immediately succeeds its coming into being, the acci
dent passes away. It follows that to enable an accident to endure it must be created
afresh in every successive moment. And as substance cannot exist apart from its accident,
the same is true of substance ; that a substance may endure it is necessary that it should
be created afresh in each successive moment of its existence.
7. From this we are forced to conclude that in mundane things there is no principle
or power of action. If an atom possessed a power of this kind, the power would endure
as long as the activity lasted. But this cannot be since the power is an accident, and as
such, is transient. It follows that all action and all movement which we perceive in the
\rorld mnst be attributed immediately to God. It is God, and God alone, who creates the
accidents of activity and movement, and imparts them to substance.
8. It follows further that the combination of cause and effect which we observe in
the world io not based on a really existing relation, but arises from the fact that God
habitually joins certain activities which He Himself produces with certain corresponding
effects which He also evokes. No accident can pass from one subject to another, since it
has, of its nature, only a transient existence — is the thing of a moment. Hence, when a
piece of cloth is dipped in a black dye, the black colour does not pass into the cloth; it ia
God who produces the dark colour in the immersed cloth, and this because it is His habit
to produce this colour in these circumstances.
9. Man is not excepted from the universal law here laid down. His activities are not
from himself, all his actions are effected by God, and this in conformity with an habitual
practice of joining determined effects to determined activities. For example, when a man
is writing, four accidents are produced by God, accidents whose only relation consists in
their simultaneous existence : the will to set the pen in motion ; the power to carry ^out
this determination ; the movement of the hand ; and the movement of the pen. The
actions of men are thus results of God's action, which he is constantly producing and impart
ing to man. In anything which man effects he is merely the blind passive instrument of
God.
10. It is a further metaphysical principle adopted by the Motekallemin that the
possibility of things does not postulate matter as its subject or substratum ; it consists
in this, that a thing can be or not be inasmuch as our intelligence perceives that no
contradiction is implied either in its existence or non-existence. Matter as the substratum
of the possible, occupying a middle position between the existent and the non-existent, is
absurdity. As soon as it is regarded as something objective, it is actually existent, not
merely possible. The notion of the possible is thus made one with the notion of the
thinkable.
11. On the other hand, everything which imagination can picture, intellect must
recognise as possible. Since the differences of things are merely accidental, and since God
c'an join to any atom any accident whatever, it follows that whatever our imagination can
picture may actually exist as it is pictured. For example, a man might be as large as. a.
mountain, might have several heads, might fly through the air. etc. All this can be repre-
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF TIIK AKAI'.S. 307
sen ted in imagination, and must therefore* lie rationally held to IK* jm->ilile.
!•_'. An inliiiitc .luantity is an impossibility. An intinite number, whether in succes
sion Or co-existent, cannot exist. Every actual quantity, and every actual number is, as .such,
determined and, being determined, is limited. To assume an infinite quantity or an infinite
number is to assume what is self-contradictory. We cannot, therefore, speak of infinite spaco,
or infinite time. Bodies consist of atoms, the number of these atoms is limited, the corporeal
world must therefore be limited in extent. In the same way, time consists of successive
moments, which we may style time-atoms, and as an infinite number of these atoms is
impossible, time must be limited. The so-called Infinite, in so far as it applies to
Number and Quantity, to Time and Space, must be excluded from the language of science.
13. Such are the fundamental principles of the Motekallemin.
On these principles they establish their proofs of the chief dogmas
of Islam. The main lines of their reasoning in this connexion are as
follows : —
'«.) Whoever admits the eternity of the world must admit an endless series of gene
rations, since each individual coming into existence is generated by another. The gene
rating and generated individuals must, therefore, form an endless series, and so there must
be an endless time-series. Again, whoever admits that substance has an eternal existence,
and that only accidents are continuously created afresh, must carry this creation of
accidents backwards in an endless line, and thus admitting an infinite series of creations,
must admit an infinite time-series. But an endless series, an infinite time, is an impossi
bility. The world, therefore, and the substances of which it is constituted must have had
a beginning, must have been created. And this the more that the atoms composing the
world are combined in a certain determined order, whereas, of themselves, they are not
determined to any definite order or arrangement at all. We are, therefore, forced to con
clude that the existing combination has been accomplished by God, and this being so, the
world cannot be eternal, it must have come into being at the moment when God combined
its atoms in a fixed order.
(6) Furthermore, every portion of the world, every body within it, might exist otherwise
than it actually does exist, for, as has been shown, what Imagination can picture, Intellect
must recognise as possible. Every body has a definite size and a definite shape, occupies a
definite place, and exists at a definite time ; but no one of these conditions is necessary ; it
might just as well have another size and another shape, occupy a different space, and exist
at a different time. We must, therefore, suppose a cause which has brought it about that
the body has precisely this size and shape, and exists in this place and at this time; this
appropriation supposes an appropriator. This being granted, it follows that the world
has received its existence, and its conformation from the appropriator in question ; and if
this is the case, the world cannot have endured from eternity, it must have had a beginning.
(c) Every one must admit that, so far as its own nature is concerned, the world might
exist or not exist. As a matter of fact it actually exists ; in the case of the world,
existence pre- ponder cites over non existence. This preponderance postulates a cause acting
in favour of existence as against non-existence. This being so, it follows that the
existence of the world is cn'ised by God, who effects the preponderance. Consequently, the
world does not exist of itseu, it cannot, therefore, be eternal, it must have had a beginning
of existence ; it began to exist at the moment when the cause in quo* .ion gave the prepon
derance to existence over non-existence.
14. Amongst other proofs for the oneness of God the Motekallemin
offer the following : — If there were several gods, it would be possible
that one of them should produce a given accident in a given sub
stance, while another produced a contrary accident in the same sub
stance. Either these accidents would simultaneously inhere in the
same substance, or they would each negative the other. In the first
case, we should have the truth of contradictories ; in the second, we
should have a substance without any accident ; both consequences
are alike impossible. That God is not a corporeal substance they
prove by this, among other arguments : — If God were corporeal he
would have a determinate shape, and since a body of itself has no
308 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
tendency to one shape rather than another, a higher determining
power (appropriatoT) should be assumed to give him determinate
form ; he would, in this assumption, cease to be God, that is, the first
and highest Cause as represented by the very notion of His being.
15. The relation of the Divine Attributes to the Substance of the
Divine Being is conceived by the Motekallemin after the analogy of
the relation of accidents to substance, although they do not hold
these attributes to be accidents in the strict sense. They regard
them rather as adjuncts of the Divine Substance — as superadditum
substantice — and, therefore, as something really distinct from the
latter ; from which conception it follows they are distinct from one
another. They believe they have thus reconciled the plurality of the
Divine Attributes laid down in the Koran, with the unity of the
Divine Substance, without losing the plurality of attributes in the
unity of the Divine Being, as did the "philosophers," and without,
on the other hand, losing the unity of the Divine Essence in the
plurality of attributes.
16. Their conception of Providence accords wholly with that of the
Koran. Providence is an inexorable Fate. Everything that happens
in the world is not only foreknown by God, it is absolutely deter,
mined ; everything that happens happens of necessity ; there is
neither chance nor liberty. Every action of man, whether good or
bad, is pre-determined ; it is not in his power to choose between
alternative courses of action. Nor is the pre-determining will of God
guided by wisdom and justice, His action is wholly arbitrary, and
what he does is right because He does it ; He cannot do wrong. What
ever may happen to man he can never have a right to complain of
God's ordinance ; no wrong can be done him. God works in man the
evil as well as the good ; and although man cannot avoid the evil,
God can, without injustice, punish him for it. Nay, God might con
ceivably punish the good and reward the wicked, and man would
have no just ground for complaining of this dispensation. " God
wills it" ; this is the ultimate and absolute explanation of human
conduct.
17. The grounds on which the Motekallemin establish this conception of Providence are
furnished by that metaphysical theory which denies all active power to secondary causes,
and assigns all the movements and actions of created things to G-od. In this theory created
things are merely lifeless instruments in the hand of God, He can use them in any way,
and lor any purpose that He chooses- In His action He is not bound to follow any eternal
laws of wisdom and justice ; He can work in His creatures what He wills, dispose of them
as He wills ; He does them no injustice in this ; created beings are subject to the Divine
Will as to absolute Fate, nothing is left to their self-determination, for they possess no
such power ; everything is pre-ordained by the Divine Will ; this is the only principle
which acts in, and through created being. (Mos. Maim. Doct. Perplex., ps. 3, c. 17.)
18. Such is the doctrine of the Orthodox Motekallemin. The
Motazalen were at one with them in fundamental metaphysical
principles ; the points of difference are unessential. On the question
of the Divine Attributes, however, the teaching of the Motazalen
has much affinity with that of the " Philosophers." They deny that
the Divine Attributes are a superadditum quid substantice ; such a
ALGAZEL. 309
conception, they maintain, opens the way to a denial of the oneness
of God; for every distinct Attribute would be infinite, and being infinite
would itself be *God. Accordingly, they teach that the Attributes are
potentially in God, that on occasion of any effect being produced by
God, they pass from potency to act, and, as it were, emerge from the
Divine Essence. To this extent they may be distinguished from the
Divine Substance; but they are not anything added to that Substance,
but rather something emerging from it (aliquid ex substantia
divina eg red i e n s).
19. In their Doctrine of Providence also the Motazalen endeavoured to soften the
hard lines of the orthodox teaching. Denying the limitations imposed by the theories of
the "philosophers," they attributed universal control to Divine Providence, but they
denied that God acts in blind unreason. They held that all His actions are directed by
Wisdom and Justice, and that it is, consequently, impossible He should punish righteous
conduct. When therefore evil befalls the righteous, the reason is not to be sought in the
arbitrary action of God, but in His design to promote thereby the welfare of the just
man, and to increase his reward in a future life (Id,, ps. 1, c. 75 — -ps. 3, c. 17),
ALGAZEL.
§. 86.
1. Before concluding this sketch of religious philosophy amono-
the Arabs, we must give an account of a remarkable thinker, who
was largely in accord with that philosophy, but who in many im
portant points held doctrines peculiarly his own. We refer to Algazel
(Al-Gazzali).
He was born at Gazzalah, in Khorosan. In his youth he acquired great renown for
learning, and while yet a young man, was invited to Bagdad to teach philosophy, Soon
he came to lose hope of reaching truth on the lines followed by the philosophers. He
turned from them, resigned his office of teacher, and retired into Syria, in order to give
himself to mystical contemplation as a Sufite (solitary). He spent eleven years in the
practices of Sufite lif«, and during this period, it is alleged, received revelations of the
highest importance. He conceived himself bound to impart to others the knowledge he
had thus received, and felt called to work for the spread of truth and the extirpation of
error. Accordingly he left his solitude, and began to teach again. He changed the
sphere of his teaching activity from time to time. Towards the end of his life he retired
again into solitude, and died at Tus, in 1111.
2. During the period of his life as a Sufite, he wrote his three best known works.
The first of these is his treatise Makacid al faldsifa (The Efforts of the Philosophers).
In this work he expounded the whole system of the Arabian Aristotelians, taking
Avicenna as their typical representive (*). Next followed the treatise : Tehdfot al
fii/.axifa (Destructio Philosophorum), in which the whole system expounded in the
Makacid is subjected to a destructive criticism. Lastly came the work, " Rehabilitation
of Religious Knowledge," in which the author lays down his own system. This
work has not yet been edited. But its fame in ancient times may be judged from the
saying then current, that if the whole system of Islam perished, it could be restored from
the pages of this work. We may mention here the title of a treatise in which Algazel deals
with certain points of Mystical Doctrine. The title is "O Child." It has been translated
by Hammer-Purgstall.
3. Algazel, as has been said, shares the hostile attitude of the
(*). The Logic, Physic, and Metaphysic of the Makacid were largely studied in the
Middle Ages-, about the middle of the twelfth century they were translated by Domincus
Gondisalvi, with the assistance of a Jewish scholar.
310 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
Motekallemin towards philosophy, and he, like them, is led to adopt
this attitude in the interests of Religion. The doctrines of the
" Philosophers " are at variance with religious teaching ; they are
therefore false ; and must, accordingly, be controverted and refuted.
But he is prejudiced against philosophy on other grounds also.
Philosophy, with its logical methods of proof, cannot reveal to us the
inner treasures of truth. It opens to us only a very limited sphere
of knowledge, and even here its guidance is not wholly trustworthy.
To attain truth in its fulness we must seek a higher source of
knowledge. This higher source is the immediate illumination of the
mind ^ by ^God. Immediate spiritual experience, direct mystical
intuition is the only means of reaching truth in its totality and
securing absolute certainty. The path of mysticism, not philosophy
with its limited and untrustworthy methods of proof, leads to fulness
of knowledge.
£}
4. From the point of view of Religion and the point of view of
Mysticism, Algazel directs the shafts of his criticism against the
" Philosophers " in his Destructio Philosophorum. He controverts
and refutes the theory of an eternal world, and upholds the theory
of creation ; he maintains the reality of the Divine Attributes in the
Divine Substance, arid the distinction of attribute from attribute,
the universality of Divine Providence, the resurrection of the body,
and the exercise of miraculous power by God. It would lead us too
far to follow him into his discussion of these several points. We
must content ourselves with stating that his attacks upon the
philosophers exhibited extraordinary acuteness, and that his criticism
of their reasoning is always searching, and at times absolutely
destructive.
By way of example of Algazel's method we may take his criticism of the "philosophic"
theory that God has no knowledge of individual objects. Leaving out of consideration,
he says that this doctrine strikes at the root of all law, turns the utterances of the prophets and
the words of the Sacred Scripture into untruth and unreality, cuts away the ground on
which the hopes of the believer rest, let us examine the reasons on which the doctrine is
professedly based. They are absolutely and utterly futile. The " philosophers" tell us
that if we admit in God a knowledge of individual objects we are bound to allow the Divine
knowledge to be in itself as mutable as the objects and phenomena with which it deals. But this
is obviously a false reasoning. It does not hold even in the case of human knowledge. It
may happen that we have knowledge of an event before it actually occurs. When it
actually occurs, in the moment in which it takes place, is our knowledge of the event in ques
tion different from what it was before ? Assuredly not. It remains the same ; the change
affects not the knowledge, but the object of knowledge. So is it with God's knowledge of
things. His knowledge of things and of phenomena remains ever the same, whatever be
the changes to which they are subject. The limitations of God's knowledge are, indeed,
necessary if we adopt the theory of the " philosophers " concerning an eternal world. It is
only when we start from the principle that the world has been created by God, by a free
act of will, that we are forced to infer that God knows everything He has created, and
guides it to its end. If we assert that the world has not been called into being by God,
that it has eternal being of itself, there is then no reason why we should attribute to that
principle which merely gives movement to an already existent world, a knowledge of all
objects and all phenomena, and a Providential control over them. In the interests of the
theory we are led to deny to the principle of movement knowledge of, and control over,
the things of the world, for in this way we exclude all interference with the eternal and
necessary course of nature. Nature, and Nature's course, will not then depend for their
being on the knowledge and free will of God ; neither will they depend on them for their
duration or their development, etc.
JEWISH PHILOSOPHY. 311
5. We have here only the negative side of Algazel's teaching ; in
his mysticism he gives his positive doctrines. To rise to the heights
of mysticism, he tells us, a man must renounce sensuality, must slay
his passions with the sword of temperance, and resign his will wholly
to God. The true realities of things will then be manifested to him.
Neither thought nor word can express what the soul contemplates in
this ecstasy, and while man gazes in rapture on the vision he will be
enchanted by the fulness of knowledge revealed to him. To attempt
to utter what is thus unspeakable would be mere blasphemy. In
the highest stage of this rapture the soul is absorbed in God, and
loses itself in the infinitude of the Divine Essence.
6. With Algazel we close our account of Arabian philosophy.
Taking into account the source of its development and the divergent
paths along which it advanced, we must recognise that a vigorous in
tellectual life prevailed among the Arabs. But it was not given them
to reconcile Philosophy with Religion. The antagonism between
speculation and dogmatic teaching found marked expression among
them. Nor was the antagonism a mere accident of their intellectual
history ; it grew out of the essential characteristics of both depart
ments of knowledge as they possessed them. The genuine reconcilia
tion of Philosophy with Religion can be effected only on a Christian
basis.
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION II.
JEWISH PHILOSOPHY.
§87.
1. The religious belief of the Jews of the Middle Ages was based,
generally speaking, on the Talmud. Besides the Sacred Scriptures,
the Jews recognised as authoritative the traditions of the ancient
Rabbis. At first these traditions had been handed down orally, but
later they were reduced to writing, and under the name Talmud,
formed, for the Jews, a kind of second volume of the Law. About
the middle of the eighth century a revolt against the authority of
the Talmud was provoked by the Jew Anan ; the supporters of this
movement separated from the Talmudists proper, or Rablinites.
They received the name Karaites. Their characteristic doctrine
was the rejection of tradition and the Talmud.
2. In the domain of Philosophy three principal schools of thought
arose among the mediaeval Jews — the Cabbalistic, the Nee-Platonic,
and the Aristotelian. The Cabbalistic philosophy is expounded in
the two books Jezirah and Sohar, the first of which was attributed
to Rabbi Akiba (about 135 A.D.) ; the second to his son, Simeon ben
Jochai. The Neo-Platonic school is represented by Ibn Gebirol,
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
called by the scholastics Avicebron. The Arabico-Aristotelian
school was founded by Saadiah Fajjumi, and had as its chief
representative Moses Maimonides.
3. The Cabbalah purports to be a system of esoteric doctrine
handed down by tradition. The Cabbalists assume that behind the
literal and obvious meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, there is
concealed another and a deeper meaning in which the full and
genuine truth is expressed. This deeper meaning was revealed by
God to Moses; it was handed on by oral tradition, and was recorded
at a later period in the Cabbalistic books. This assumption found
a place in the early Greco-Jewish philosophy, and was prevalent
among the Gnostics of the first centuries of the Christian era. We
might, in fact, describe the Cabbalists as Jewish Gnostics. The
Cabbalists professed to read the hidden meaning out of the text of
the Scriptures ; — or, better, to read it into them, by a system of inter
pretation which discovered in each letter of the Law the symbol
of a Divine mystery, and which made large use of an involved theory
of symbolical numbers.
4. Neo-Platonic speculation in the Middle Ages, as represented
by Ibn Gebirol, exercised considerable influence on the development
of the Cabbalah. But speculation among the Jews soon took another
turn. The attempt was made to furnish a philosophic justification
of the doctrines of the Law ; a philosophical theology sprang up in
which the teachings of Aristotle were applied to establish the
dogmas of the Jewish faith. This development became specially
remarkable in Spain after the Jewish school had been founded at
Cordova. The Jews translated into Hebrew the works of ^ the
Arabian Aristotelians, and adopted their fundamental doctrines,
so far as these could be applied, for the end they had in view.
5. Gradually this Jewish philosophy assumed a more and more
rationalistic character. The Jewish Aristotelians, like the Arabians,
based their speculations on the assumption that it is the task of the
philosopher, not merely to support the traditional teachings of religion
by adducing rational grounds in support of them, but, also, to set
forth fully unveiled that truth which religion so frequently expresses
in symbols. The strictly orthodox Jews resented this intrusion of
philosophy into the domain of Jewish theology, and became strongly
hostile to the " philosophers." The ensuing antagonism between
the liberal and the rigidly orthodox schools continued throughout
the Middle Ages.
6. With these introductory remarks we pass to an examination
of the Cabbalah ; we shall then take up the teachings of Avicebron
and close our account of this philosophy with Moses Maimonides.
THE CI.BBALAH.
§88.
1. There is no general agreement as to the origin of the Cabbalah.
Some authors claim for it a pre-Christian origin, others ascribe it to
THE CABBALAH. 313
the first centuries of the Christian era, others again are of opinion
that it is a product of the Middle Ages — of that period when the Jews
became acquainted with Neo-Platonism through the Arabs, and
followed the latter in the paths of mysticism. Nor are the critics
agreed as to the date at which the books Jezirah and Sokar were
compiled. Some will have it that they date from the time to
which legend ascribes their origin. Others contend that the book
Jezirah is not older than the middle of the ninth century, and that
the Sokar is not older than the thirteenth. We need not here enter
into this question of dates, as we are concerned merely with the
contents of the Cabbalah. We may state, however, that it was only
in the Middle Ages that the Cabbalistic traditions were reduced to
a systematic theory.
2. The Cabbalists held the Divine First Principle to be in itself
an undifferentiated, indeterminate, simple unity. In his absolutely
transcendental being, God is not in the strict sense any thing. This
concept of God was expressed by the term En Soph. But just
because God is not any thing, He is at the same time every thing,
because all things proceed from Him as their ultimate cause. In the
order of actuality God is, therefore, not any being ; in the order of
possibility He is all beings, because all proceed from Him.
3. En Soph is the Primal Light. In the beginning this light
filled all space, nay, it was cosmic space itself. In order to give
existence to something other than itself, it contracted its being and
thereby formed vacuum. This vacuum it filled with a dimmed and
gradually fading light, which it gave forth from itself. Thus things
had their origin from God. When, therefore, it is said that God
created the world " out of nothing'' we are to understand this
"nothing" to mean the incomprehensible "No-Thing'' represented
iii our concept of God as He is in Himself. What we call " the
creation of the world" is nothing more than the emanation of things
from that Divine " No-Thing," which is expressed by the term En
Soph.
4. What first came forth in this wise from God, the Primal Light,
was the Archetypal Man — Adam Kadmon. In him the indeter
minate attained determination. Archetypal Man was the prototype
of all creation, the comprehensive concept of all things, the eternal
wisdom, the true son of God. Archetypal Man is so named because
man as the microcosmos concentrates in himself all created being.
5. Through Adam Kadmon there further emanated from God
the ten Sephiroth. These we may regard from two points of view —
in their relation to God and in their relation to the world. Under
the first aspect they are the creative attributes of God, modes in
which the existence of God becomes manifest. Hence, they are
called, by the Cabbalists, faces of God or Divine Persons. Through
these, God reveals Himself and becomes a possible object of know
ledge. In Adam Kadmon they have their centre, and this being
j therefore, be styled their unity. In their relation to the world
314
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
the ten Sephiroth are represented by the Cabbalists as ten concentric
circles of light coming from God and giving existence to the world.
6. Considered as attributes or manifestations of God, the ten
Sephiroth arrange themselves in trinal combinations producing a
system of three triads, to which the tenth Sephiroth attaches as a
common resultant.
(a.) The first and highest Triad consists of the Crown (Cether), Wisdom, (Cochmah),
Understanding (Binah.)
(6.) The second Triad includes Beauty, Grace, Rir/hteoutness (Tipheret, Chesed, Din.)
(c.) The third Triad includes Rational Ground, Triumph, Glory (Jesod, Nezaeh, Hod.)
The tenth and last Sephira is the Kingdom (Malkuth). This, however, expresses
nothing more than the harmony between the other Sephiroth, and their dominion over
the world.
7. These ten Sephiroth are the limits within which the Divine Being encloses itself,
the different degrees of darkness in which it shrouds its light, to render itself knowable
and a possible object of contemplation ; in its infinite effulgence it would blind our
powers of vision.
8. Turning to the consideration of the Sephiroth in their relation
to the world, we learn that they are emanations from the Divine
Being, which give the world existence. Here, too, we have a three
fold distribution, and in accordance with this a threefold creation.
Corresponding to the three triads of the Sephiroth there are three
created worlds : —
(a.) The world Beriah. This is the uppermost of the created worlds, here the three
highest Sephiroth reign. This is the " inner" heaven, the immediate dwelling-place of
God ; it is inhabited by pure spirits.
(?>.) The world Jezirah. This comes next in order to the world Beriah ; in it the
middle order of Sephiroth reign ; it forms the " outer " world, and is composed of the
celestial spheres. It is the dwelling-place of the angels, beings invested with rarified
bodies. Metatronus stands at the head of the angelic hierarchy.
(c.) The World Asiah. This is the lowest world, it is ruled over by the lowest order of
Sephiroth. It is the elemental world, or world of Nature, the region of our earth. Here
is the home of man.
9. Above these three worlds stands another, the archetypal world Aziluth, the
exemplar after which the others are modelled. This world is merely the archetypal man
—Adam Kadmon, for he it is who contains all ideas in himself. As" the type and exemp
lar of created things this world stands mid-way between God and Creation. To distin
guish it from the created order it is called the " divine " heaven ; no merely created thing
has abode within it.
10. The three created worlds are modelled on the type of the
world Aziluth ; between these worlds, themselves, the relation of type
and ectype is maintained. The higher world is, in each case, the typo
of the world next below it in rank. Everything contained in a
lower world is contained also in that immediately above it, but in
higher typical form. The higher world also exercises an active
influence upon the lower. In this way the created system forms a
"Kingdom, ''divided into three parts, with the stamp of the supreme
world Aziluth impressed upon the whole.
11. In its lowest stage the process of emanation issues in Matter.
Matter is produced by the extinction of the light which emanates
from God, on the ultimate verge of its range ; it is in fact nothing
more than light thus extinguished. It occupies the lowest region
315
in the world Asiah, it constitutes the sphere of darkness — i.e., of
extinguished light. And since Darkness is the antithesis, of Light,
and Lio-ht is one with the Good, Matter is at once the principle and
the honie of Evil. In the Darkness of Matter the spirits of evil
with their chief Samuel, have their dwelling-place.
I? The Cabbalists tell us of a world which preceded that now existing, but which
wa* destroyed before the present system of things began its course. The cause of its
destruction was the fall of the angels. The angels were the princes of that earlier world,
but they sinned and were cast forth from heaven ; their fall involved the destruction of
the world over which they ruled; the ruins of that world became the place of their
punishment. Out of those ruins was fashioned a new world of which man was appointed
the ruler,
13. Man is formed of a body and a soul. His soul is constituted
by three principles— Nephesch, Ruach, Neschamak. Nephesch
corresponds to the world Asiah, Ruach to the world Jezirah, and
Neschamah to the world Beriah. Nephesch is the principle of
animal (sensuous) life in man ; Neschamah the principle of pure
intelligence, the spirit, incapable of evil ; Ruach stands mid- way
between these ; it is the moral principle. Man is good when this
principle follows the guidance of Neschamah, evil when it follows
Nephesch — i.e., the sensuous appetite,
14 With this theory of three constituent elements in the human soul, the Cabbalists
combined a doctrine of the soul's pre-existence. They did not, indeed, maintain that
the soul's union with the body was a punishment for sin committed in a previous state ;
thev held that the soul was naturally pro-determined to an union with the body in ordi
that it micrht fulfil the task of its life in the visible world. But they laid it down that
the soul which here below makes evil use of its liberty began, in its pre- corporeal existence,
to separate itself from God, and there entered upon its course of evil. The last soul i
enter earthly life will be the soul of the Messiah
15 The transmigration of souls was finally adopted by the Cabbalists. All souls are
destined to return at length to the bosom of the Absolute Being ; but to reach this end
1 hev must develop all their powers, and by a course of probation attain to consciousness
of themselves and their origin. If they have not accomplished this task in the space of
one life they are obliged to enter another body. Ultimately, however, they return to
( i«,d again, and, united with him in perfect contemplation and love, enjoy a divine c
of existence.
2. AVICEBRON.
§89.
1. Ibn Gebirol, called by the scholastics Avicebron, and regarded
by them as an Arab philosopher, belongs to the Nec-Platonist school.
He was the earliest representative of philosophy among the Spanish
Jews. Born at Malaga in 1020, and educated at Saragossa, he en
joyed till his death, in 1070, the reputation of a poet, a moralist, and
philosopher. His chief work is the'treatise Fons Vita. In the 13th
century, portion of this work was translated into Hebrew from the
original Arabic by the Jewish philosopher Schem Tob ibn Falaquera,
with the title Mekor Chadjim. It has been issued in a French trans
lation by M unk in his Melanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe.
This work was well known to the Christian scholastics of the middle
ages, and is often cited by thrm.
316 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. The fundamental principle of Avicebron's teaching, a principle frequently referred
to by the Christian Scholastics, is this : — All things of earth, without exception, corporeal
and spiritual alike, are composed of Matter and Form, for all are first possible and then
actual, and therefore presuppose a subject of possibility, that is, Matter. To God alone
this conception is inapplicable, for God is a necessary being, and therefore immaterial.
Nor are we so to understand the principle as if there were one kind of Matter for material
things, another for things spiritual ; one and the same universal Matter is the basis of the
corporeal and the incorporeal alike ; they differ only in this, that in the one case this
Matter is determined by corporeal Form, in the other by spiritual Form.
3. This being established, Avicebron proceeds to trace the origin of the world to the
operation of the Divine Will. The Divine Will is the creative Word of God, in which lies
the ultimate ground of all being and of all movement. In this teaching Avicebron is at
variance with the Arabian Aristotelians, who traced the origin of the world back to
Thought in God as to its ultimate cause. And just because he held the world to owe its
being to Will rather than to Thought in God, he was led to hold that the world is not an
emanation from the Divine Being, but a product of God's creative act.
4. But in the construction of his Cosmic system, Avicebron was not hindered by this
reasoning from introducing the Neo-Platonist notion of emanation, and so impairing the
value of his doctrine of creation. In his view, God and the corporeal world are separated
by such a distance that it is impossible the world could have been produced immediately
by God. He therefore interposed some connecting links between God and the material
world. From God immediately proceeds the Universal Intelligence ; from this emanates
the World-Soul, and from this again Nature, i.e., the force which generates, animates and
controls the material world.
5. The Universal Intelligence is composed of Matter and Form. From this source the
material element, passing down through the World-Soul and Nature, takes corporeal form
in the bodies of the material world and there becomes visible. The Universal Intelligence
contains also all forms of material things, and their forces are imparted to things through
the creative action of the Word. They, too, pa»s through the World-Soul and Nature, are
realised in material objects, and there manifest themselves. The lower world is thus the
ectype of the higher. And as Form and Matter reach the lower world from the higher, so
too do action and movement ; bodies have no movement of their own.
6. We have here, it is obvious, a system wholly Neo-Platonist,
but for the principle of creation which is introduced at the outset.
It must, however, be admitted that the notion of creation is out of
place in the theory. For, if all being is accounted for by a con
tinuous emanation of lower from higher being, it is difficult to
understand why the Universal Intelligence should not be produced
in the same way, but must be created by God. It was his acceptance
of Revelation that prevented Avicebron from applying the principles
of his system to the Universal Intelligence.
7. Avicebron vras not acquainted with the original worka of Plotinus, but he had
before him some of the Neo-Platonist treatises of later date. These treatises, for the most
part apocryphal, on the Latin translations of which the Scholastics, towards the close of
the twelfth century, drew freely, were, according to Munk (M 'Manges p. 240), the following : —
Proklus' Element a Theologia ; Pseudo-Empedocles, On the Five Elements ; Pseudo-
Pythagoras ; the Theologia of Pseudo-Aristotle (a Neo-Platonist treatise on God and His
Emanations, on the Intellect, and the World-Soul), and lastly the treatise " De Causis,"
which contains Neo-Platonist doctrines taken, for the most part, textually from Proklus'
Institutio Theologica.
3. MOSES MAIMONIDES.
1. We come now to the third school of mediaeval Jewish philoso
phy. Its distinctive characteristic is its adoption of Aristotelian
philosophy as the basis of its rational defence of the Jewish faith.
MOSES MAIMONIDES. 317
The founder of this schtol of thought was, as already mentioned, Saadiah Fujjumi—
born in Egypt A.D. 892, in later life a teacher in the Academy of Sora, near Babylon, died
942. In the year 933 he composed his most important work, Emutiot We Deot (Faith and
Philosophy). Following, as it appears, in the footsteps of an earlier contemporary, David
ben Merwau al Makammez, he endeavours, in this treatise, to establish the accord between
reason and the dogmas of the Jewish faith, and to demonstrate the vmtenability of such
dogmas and philosophic principles as are in contradiction with them. The cardinal points
of his teaching are : the unity of God, the plurality of Divine Attributes, the creation of
the world from nothing, the absolute perfection of the Revealed Law, the freedom of the
will, retribution in a world to come, the resurrection of the body.
2. Saadiah was followed, in the middle of the eleventh century, by Rabbi Bechai, who
in his treatise, The Heart's Duties^ sketches out a complete system of Jewish ethics ; after
R. Bechai came Juda Hallevi, of Andalusia (1080-1150), author of the book Khosari, which
narrates the conversion of the King of Khosra by a Jew, and which, rejecting the aid of
(Aristotelian) philosophy, exhorts to faith and piety ; and lastly Abraham ben David, who
in his work The Higher Faith, written in 1160, appears as a champion of Aristotelian
philosophy, and a vigorous opponent of the Neo-Platonist teaching of Avicebron.
3. But by far the most famous among the Jewish philosophers of
this school is Moses Maimonides. He was the first to introduce
among the Jews the Aristotelian philosophy in its completeness, and
to utilise this system as a whole in support of the Jewish dogmas.
He was born at Cordova in Spain in 1135. He gave himself to the
study of Aristotle under the guidance of Averroes or one of his
disciples. Persecuted as a heretic by his fellow Jews, he withdrew
to Fez, and subsequently to Cairo, where he was appointed physician
to the Sultan Saladin. He founded a school in Alexandria, but was
driven from this city also by the persecutions of his co-religionists.
He died in 1204.
4. Maimonides is the author of several works treating of Jewish Theology and Ethics.
His chief work is the More Nevochim or Doctor Perplexorum (The Guide of the Erring).1
In this work he has a two-fold aim : to furnish a philosophic basis for the dogmas of the
Jewish faith, and to set forth the true meaning which the Holy Scriptures conceal under
images, similes, and parables. He adopts the axiom of the Arabian Aristotelians that the
teaching of the prophets was expressed mainly in images because in this way only could it
be conveyed to the people, but that it is the duty of the scholar to strip it of this veil with
the aid of philosophy and to lay bare the hidden truth. For Maimonides, however,
philosophy in the true sense is the philosophy of Aristotle.
5. In the More Nevochim, Maimonides treats first of the Divine
Attributes. He lays down the principle that we must not ascribe
any positive attributes to God. For, such attributes should either
be distinct from the Divine Substance or one with it. In the first
case, they would be related to the Divine Substance as accidents,
and accidents cannot be ascribed to God. In the second case, they
would not be distinct from one another, for they would be one with
the Divine Essence, which is in itself absolutely undifFerentiated.
Hence all the positive attributes which men ascribe to God are
merely different names, which do not stand for different elements
in the Divine Being, but all signify one and the same thing.
1 The original of this work was written in Arabic with the title Dalalat al Ha'irin
(Guidance for Doubters). It was translated into Hebrew by Samuel ibu Tibbon about
A.D. 1200 with th« title More Nebuchim. Many Hebrew editions were issued. The first
Latin translation was published in Paris A.D. 1520.
318 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
6. It is true that " the Law " ascribes different positive perfections to God. But this
is because the Law accommodates itself to the common methods of human thought ; man
cannot conceive the absolute perfection of God otherwise than by attributing to Him the
perfections which he perceives in himself or in other objects. We must explain the forms of
expression used in "the Law" by assuming that the different attributes ascribed to God
are denominations by which are signified the different kinds of effects which His action
produces in the world. According to its mode of operation, we describe fire as a dissolving
and combining, a cooking and consuming, a blackening and whitening force, without thereby
implying a plurality of forces ; in the same way the Law designates God by different
names according to the different effects He produces, without any implication of a difference
between the attributes which correspond to these different names.
7. If we admitted the Positive Attributes assigned to God to be anything more than
different denominations of God corresponding to His different works, we should be forced to
admit a likeness or analogy between God and created things, on the basis of which the perfec
tions of created objects might be predicated of God. But no such analogy exists ; God and
a created object cannot be represented by a common concept, even by a concept based on
mere resemblance. When, therefore, we use the same term to designate God and a created
thing, we are using the term eqidvocally ; the term is one, but there is nothing in common
between the objects signified.
8. It follows from this that negative attributes alone can be pre
dicated of God. In no other way can we have determinate concepts
of the Divine Essence. We can determine what God is not, not
what He is. In this sense are to be understood all the designations
applied to God ; it is only when thus understood that they retain
their meaning if applied to the Divine Being. When, for example,
we speak of God as wise, we must understand by the term that he
is not subject to ignorance, when we speak of Him as powerful, we
must mean that He is not liable to weakness or fatigue, &c. And
let us not believe that this negative knowledge is insufficient and
futile. The more we deny of God the more perfect is our knowledge
of Him.
9. A further question treated of by Mairnonides in the More
Nevochim is that of the eternity of the world. On this question,
says Maimonides, " the Law " asserts that the world has been created
by God out of nothing, and has, therefore, had a beginning ; the
Aristotelian philosophy, on the other hand, maintains that the world
is, and must be, eternal. The Medabberim among the Ishmaelites
(i.e., the Mohammedan theologians) are of opinion that it can be
demonstrated by reason that the world had a beginning and was
created, and they adduce arguments which, they allege, prove this
proposition. But all these proofs rest on unproved assumptions.
Instead of the true principles of Aristotle, they construct meta
physical principles of their own, and on this foundation build their
argument for the world's beginning. Proofs of this kind have abso
lutely no validity. Maimonides accordingly adopts the view that it
cannot be demonstratively established by reason that the world has
had a beginning.
10. But neither can it be demonstrated that the world is necessarily eternal, i.e.
that it cannot have had a beginning. Aristotle's arguments in this respect are not con
clusive. Maimonides endeavours to prove his point, and follows here the line of
reasoning traced by Algazel. Thus : —
(a) The Aristotelians assert, that if we admit God to have created the world, wo
must also admit that in the creating, he passed from the condition of potency to the con-
MOSES MAIMONIDES. ;j j |)
dition of act, and this involves change in God. Hut, replies Alaimonides, there can be
no question of potentiality in God, in Him the material element does not exist, and
consequently there cannot in Him be a transition from potency to act.
(b) Again, it is urged that if the world were created, and so had a beginning, it
would follow that before Creation there must have been some hindrance which prevented
< ;«)d from creating, or that when He created, some entirely new reason occurred to Him to
urge Him to create. But, answers Maimonides, it is only a will, acting because of extrinsic
motives, which acts for a determinate motive, and is restrained from action by interposed
hindrances. Here we have to do with the Absolute Will, the end of whose action was
wholly within itself.
(c) Aristotle's argument that matter must be eternal, because otherwise an
antecedent matter must be supposed to account for its coming into existence, is valid
only when we are dealing with causes in the order of nature ; the action of natural
causes supposes pre-existent matter. But the reasoning is not applicable to the Absolute
Cause ; an absolute cause has the power not only to form things from pre-existent
matter, but also to give being to matter itself. We may deal in analogous fashion with
the argument in reference to the eternity of motion.1
11. The eternity of the world cannot be proved from reason ;
reason must therefore recognise that it is at least possible the world
may have been created and have had a beginning, as taught by the
" Law." The creation of the world and its beginning in time, is,
consequently, an article of faith, not a truth of philosophy, it is not
a truth that can be proved, but neither is there proof of its
contradictory. This is sufficient to safeguard the " Law," and to
justify it, so far as philosophy is concerned.2
12. These are the chief points of teaching in the More Nevochirn
which are of importance for the history of philosophy. In reference
to its further teaching a few remarks will suffice.
(«) Prophecy, according to Maimonides, is to be explained by an influence exerted
by God through the Active Intellect (a principle which Maimonides, like Avicenna, holds
to be distinct from the individual mind) on the intellect of the individual, and through
this channel, on his imagination. By this means the prophet is enabled to have know
ledge of hidden things, and to express that knowledge in appropriate images. This
conception of the gift of prophecy is, it will be observed, in keeping with the doctrines of
the Arabians.
(b) Evil, Maimonides teaches, has its origin in Matter. This applies to moral and
physical evil alike. All disorder, corruption an 1 imperfection of things come from matter;
moral evil is due to the fact that man permits himself to be dominated by matter, in
other words, that he obeys his sensuous appetites and passions. The task of man's life
in the sphere of moral effort, is to control his sensuous appetites, to subdue matter in him
self. For this end he has been endowed with freedom of will.
(c) On the question of Divine Providence, Maimonides Hgrees with the Arabian
Aristotelians, so far as all things of earth, man excepted, are concerned. The Providence
of God takes account of the Universal only, that is, provides only for the maintenance of
genera and species; it does not extend to the individual. This dispensation does not
apply to man ; in his case, Divine Providence has care of each and every individual.
(d) But though man is thus privileged in the system of Maimonides, the philosopher
will not allow that all other things of earth are designed to subserve the purposes of
1 According to Aristotle motion cannot have had a beginning, for the beginning of
a movement supposes an antecedent movement by which it is effected, and this another
antecedent movement, and so backwards in infinite n-u'n>ssion. But all this holds good only
within the sphere of natural causation. It does not follow that a cause above nature may
not have given existence to the thing moved as well as to its movement — an hypotl
which involves beginning of motion.
-The same holds in reference to the resurrection of the body. It cannot be proved
or disproved by reason. It is, therefore, stri< tlv an article of faith.
3
320 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
human life, that they have been created for man's sake. Everything, he maintains, has
ita end in itself, and is created by God for its own sake. God brought forth every
creature by an act of will, and fixed for each the special end of its existence.
(e) The end of the " Law" is to lead man to perfection, first to perfection of his
physical being, then to moral, and finally to intellectual perfection. This last is the
ultimate end of man. By the practice of social and moral virtues man must strive to
attain the virtues of Intellect. He must turn all his thoughts towards the highest
concept — God, and must devote himself with all his energies to the investigation of the
highest truth. Herein consists the true worship of God, the worship of the heart. Not
because of reward or punishment, but for its own sake alone, must we love and do the
good.
13. The influence exercised by the teaching of Maimonides was great and wide
spread, but it did not make way unchallenged. The Jews of the stricter orthodox
school set themselves to oppose it. They described it as "a selling of Sacred Scripture to
the Greeks," and as "an undermining of the solid foundation of the Law." But the opposi
tion was ineffectual. The doctrines of Maimonides, and indeed Aristotelianism as a
whole, secured a crowd of supporters all through the course of the Middle Ages. Among
the many commentators of Maimonides we may mention Palquera (in the 13th century),
Joseph Caspi (f 1350), Levi ben Gerson (i 288-1370), Moses ben Josua of Narbonne (in
the 14th century), J. Abravanel (in the 15th century). These were not in agreement with
Maimonides on all points ; for example, B. Levi ben Gerson, in his work Milkamoth
Adonai, rejects altogether the doctrine of creation out of nothing.
14. Here too we may make mention of Ahron ben Elias of Nicomedia, the author of
a work published in 1346 with the title Ez-Chaim (Arbor Vitae), which attained great
celebrity. He is a vigorous opponent of Maimonides. A disciple of the Karaitic
dogmatic school, he censures Maimonides for perverting religion by means of philosophy.
The professed purpose of his work (Ez-Chaim) is to secure the doctrines of faith, under
stood in their true sense, from the dangerous influences of philosophy. Though thus
antagonistic to Maimonides, the general philosophic character of the work Ez-Chaim is,
in general, the same as that of the More Nevochim.
15. Of the later Jewish philosophers the best deserving of
mention are Albo, Schem Tow, Elias del Medigo, Abravanel, whom
we have already noticed, and his son Leo — all in the 15th century.
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION III.
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.
GENERAL SURVEY.
§ 90.
1. The Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages is continuous
with the Patristic. It builds upon the foundations which the earlier
philosophy had laid. It is not, however, a mere reproduction of
the teaching of the Fathers. The great thinkers of the Middle Ages
were men of original thought ; they availed themselves of the fruit
ful germs which lay ready to hand in the Patristic philosophy, but
they aimed at developing these into the fulness and ripeness of
knowledge. They were not mere imitators, their philosophy was
an organic development of that which had preceded it.
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 321
2. Prominent in the new philosophic movement is a tendency
which shows itself but faintly in the earlier — the tendency to be
systematic. What the Fathers had worked out in fragmentary
fashion, and, for the most part in casual treatises meant to satisfy a
casual need, the great Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages
gathered into one united whole, and built into imposing systems.
The systematic structure which the Fathers failed to give to their
teaching was supplied by their mediaeval successors. But this
perfection was not reached by a single effort, it was pursued through
a long process of construction till it was attained at last, in the
golden age of Mediaeval Christian philosophy.
3. In this process of development, continued through the Middle
Ages, two distinct currents of thought present themselves to our
notice — the Scholastic and the Mystical. Indications of the diverg
ence of these two lines of speculation may be observed in the
Patristic period ; in the Middle Ages the distinction became broadly
and deeply marked. Scholasticism represents the rational or
speculative side of human thought, Mysticism the contemplative.
The subject-matter with which both professed to occupy themselves
was the same, but each dealt with this subject-matter in its own
fashion. Scholasticism sought to comprehend and to demonstrate
truth by the investigations of reason ; Mysticism by the methods of
contemplation, by the sympathies of the heart and the emotions.
The divergence between Scholasticism and Mysticism had its
salutary influence on the development of mediaeval philosophy. The
two schools of thought were at one in their reverence for the truths
•of Christianity; but, in their differences on other points, they
mutually supplemented each other's teaching, and so counterbalanced
one another as to prevent either from pushing its doctrines to
dangerous extremes.
4. The name " Scholastic '' was originally bestowed on the
liberal arts (Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dialectic, constituting the
Trivium ; with Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music con
stituting the Quadrivium). The name was subsequently given to
all who, in the schools, devoted themselves to the sciences, especially
to philosophy and theology. The philosophy and theology of these
teachers came, in this way, to be known as the " scholastic." And
this designation, borrowed from the dominant school of thought in
the period, came at last to be applied to the whole philosophy of the
Middle Ages.
5. Scholastic philosophy received a powerful impulse from the
adoption of the Aristotelian philosophy in the Christian schools.
Up to the twelfth century the logical treatises of Aristotle were the
only works of the philosopher known to the Schools of the West.
But in the course of the twelfth century the whole body of Aristotle's
works was brought within reach of the Christian scholars — thanks
to the Arab and Jewish followers of the Stagyrite. In the first use
3*22 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
of this acquisition mistakes and errors were committed, but these
were speedly repaired, and a method of philosophic investigation
was devised, which made the philosophy of Aristotle subservient to
the development of Christian Scholasticism.
6. In the history of the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages
we may distinguish three periods or stages — the period of its rise
and early development ; the period of its greatest splendour, in the
thirteenth century ; the period of stagnation following the
thirteenth century, when it ceases to advance, or at least makes no
advance comparable to what had gone before. This season of
arrested progress was a critical period for Scholastic philosophy.
For during this time many defects crept into its methods ; and these
defects were, in part, the cause of the attacks, which assailed it in
the fifteenth century, and which aimed at its total subversion.
7. We will divide our sketch of Mediaeval Christian philosophy
into three sections corresponding to the three periods indicated above
— the period of the rise and first development of that philosophy, the
period of its maturity and prime, and lastly the period of its,
decline.
FIRST PERIOD.
THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.
FIRST ATTEMPTS AT PHILOSOPHIC SPECULATION BY THE NATIONS.
OF THE WEST.
§ 91.
1. The history of the philosophy of the Middle Ages begins with-
the reign of Charlemagne. The rule of this monarch was made
famous by triumphs in the field of knowledge, as well as by feats of
arms. How much he did for the cause of education in France is
known to all students of history. He invited to his realm the most
learned men of the age, commissioned them to organise and to
direct the system of education, and himself, at the age of forty, sat
at their feet to receive the instruction which had not been given
him in his youth.
2. The most remarkable of the men who devoted themselves to
science and to education under Charlemagne was the Englishman
Alcuin, Charlemagne invited him (A.D. 781), to his Court, and
appointed him head of the Palace School (Schola Palatina). Alcuin
is the thinker of the Middle Ages with whom the history of
Scholastic Philosophy must begin. He has left us several treatises
which give evidence of rare gifts, and of great erudition. Apart
from his theological works — the most remarkable of which is his
treatise De Fide Trinitatis — we are indebted to him for works
THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY,
which belong to the domain of philosophy proper. Such, for
instance, is his dialogue De Grammatica, as well as those De
Rhetorica et Virtutibus and De Dialectics ; so also his Disputatio
Pippini cum Albino Scholastico on the subject of natural history,
and, lastly, his work De Animce Ratione, written for the use of the
maiden Eulalia.
8. In his philosophical opinions Alcuin always faithfully follows
St. Augustine. This is specially noticeable in the last of the above-
named treatises, that De Animce ^ Ratione ; the Psychology of St.
Augustine is here expounded and developed. Nor are ethical
doctrines overlooked. God, says Alcuin, is man's highest good.
The tendency towards the highest good is implanted in man's
nature; it is natural to man to love God. Virtue is the path which
leads to the Good. In virtue, furthermore, consists the whole
beauty of the soul. True morality is exhibited in the harmonious
activity of the four cardinal virtues, the crown and perfection of
which is found in Love.
4. In his later years Alcuin became Abbot of Tours. Here he
founded a school which was soon famous throughout Europe, and
which sent forth many learned men. After his death, A.D. 804, his
work was continued by his disciples. Amongst these disciples we
may name Fredegisus, who succeeded him as Abbot of Tours, to
whom we owe a long treatise with the title De Nihilo et Tenebris,
in which the author endeavours to prove that " Nothingness/' as
well as " Darkness," is not a pure negation, that it is in itself some
thing real and positive. It does not appear what object is aimed at
in this disquisition. Another disciple of Alcuin was Rhabanus
Maurus, Abbot of Fulda, and subsequently Archbishop of Mayence
(A.D. 776-856), who founded the School of Fulda, the parent insti
tution of the Schools of Germany. He was the 'author of a great
work in twenty-two books, which bore the title De Universo an
encyclopaedia of the knowledge of the age. Yet another disciple
was Paschasius, Abbot of Corbie (f851), who, in his work De Fide,
Spe, et Caritate, discussed minutely, and with much ability, the
doctrines of the Christian Faith.
5. In the ninth century the monk Gottschalk originated the so-called Predestination
controversy which occasioned much disturbance in the Church of France. He taught
that Predestination was twofold— Predestination to grace and glory, and Predestination
to wickedness and damnation. He was opposed by Rhabanus Maurus and Hincmar of
Rheims, who upheld the doctrine of one Predestination, and taught that God predes
tines only to grace and glory, not to wickedness and damnation. Evil God merely permits,
ind, foreseeing the evil, condemns man to punishment. We make mention of the Predes
tination controversy chiefly because Scotus Erigena, of whom we have now to speak,
took part in it, at the request of Hincmar of Rheims, and discussed the doctrine of
Predestination from the standpoint of philosophy.
324 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. JOANNES SCOTUS ERIGENA.
§. 92.
1. The first completely developed system of Philosophy which
the middle ages offer us bears the name of Scotus Erigena. It is a
remarkable fact that his system has much in common with the
doctrines of the Neo-Platonists, that he carries on their teaching
into the Middle Ages. His guides are, first of all the supposititious
" Denis the Areopagite," whose works he translated at the request
of Charles the Bald ; then Maximus Confessor, the commentator of
" Denis "; Basil and Gregory of Nazianza ; Gregory of Nyssa and
Origen. The Latin Fathers, notably St. Augustine, hold a second
ary place in his esteem. From these teachers, and particularly from
the Greek Fathers we have mentioned, he adopted such points of
Neo-Platonist doctrine as their writings contained. With the
theories thus obtained, he combined the conceptions peculiar to
Christianity, and thus succeeded in forming an Idealistic theory of
Emanation, which he sought to establish on a Christian basis, but
in which the distinctively Christian notions are refined and per
verted until they are made to fit into the formulas of Neo-Platon-
ism where they lose their genuine meaning and significance.
2. The personal history of Scotus Erigena is involved in much obscurity; what
tradition has preserved regarding him is evidently in great part fabulous. We only know
with certainty that about the year 843 he was invited to the Palaoe School (Schola
Palatina) at Paris by Charles the Bald, and that he lived and laboured at the Court of
Charles. He was probably an Irishman by birth. He appears to have received his
education at the famous schools of Ireland. He was familiar with the Greek as well as
the Latin tongue. Of the ancient philosophers he held Plato in highest esteem, though
he also appreciated Aristotle. He knew the Timceus of Plato in the translation by
Chalcidius, he was acquainted with the first parts of the Oryanon of Aristotle, and with
the Isayoye, of Porphyry. It is said that in his old age he was invited by Alfred the
Great to the newly founded University of Oxford, and that he was subsequently appointed
Abbot of Malmesbury, where he was murdered by the monks.
3. As regards the works of Scotus Erigena, it has been already said that he trans
lated the writings of the supposed " Denis the Areopagite ; " he also translated a work
of Maximus Confessor. The works of which he was himself the author are a short
treatise, De Predestinatione ; the great work De Divisione Natures, in five books, com
posed in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his pupils, and containing a
complete statement of the writer's system of philosophy ; lastly a Homilia in Prolog.
Evany, sec. Joannem, with a few minor treatises of little importance.
4. In his treatise De Predestinatione Erigena defends the doc
trine of one predestination ; but he does this in a fashion peculiar
to himself. The three chief grounds which he assigns for the
doctrine of one predestination are these : —
(a). All that is in God is God himself ; hence the Will by which He predestines is
identical with the Divine Being. Now the Being ot God is absolutely simple ; it follows
that the predestinating Will of God is absolutely simple, and so there can be only one
kind of predestination.
(6). Opposite effects suppose opposite causes, one and the same cause cannot produce
effects of opposite natures. Now good and evil, bliss and misery are opposed to one
JOANNES SCOTUS ERIGENA. 325
another ; hence one God cannot be the cause of botli ; it follows there can be only one
kind of predestination.
(c). God can predestine only that which He knows. God does not know evil, for
knowledge attains only that which is ; what is not cannot be the object of knowledge.
Evil is nothing real, nothing that is. It follows that God cannot know it. If He knew
it, it would be something positive, something real ; and, moreover, God Himself would
be the author of it, and so it would have necessary existence in the world. But this is
clearly absurd. It remains then that God does not know evil, and cannot, therefore,
predestine evil. Accordingly there can be only one kind of predestination, a predestina
tion to good and to happiness.
5. We turn now from this remarkable course of argument to con-
wider the philosophical system of Erigena. Regarded as a philosopher,
he may be described as at once theosophist and gnostic. The Chris
tian Faith is for him the basis and the condition of all and every form
of knowledge. The starting point of all rational investigation must
be the divine Truth as set forth in the Sacred Scriptures. Hence
in the rational creature, faith is the principle with which the know
ledge of the Creator begins (De Div. Nat. 1,71 Ed. Migne).
6. It is the business of reason to discover by thought the mean
ing of the Divine utterances — a manifold meaning, and of changing
aspect like the feathers of the peacock ; and chiefly is it the
business of reason to reduce the figurative expressions so largely
employed in Sacred Scripture, to their genuine sense. It is thus
the task of reason to unfold the mysterious hidden meaning of the
Divine utterances; that is, by rational investigation, to render
intelligible the truths contained in Holy Writ. This holds good of
all kinds of truth, of all the " Divine Deliverances." Erigena makes
no distinction between truths of reason and mysteries ; he aims at
demonstrating and developing all the truths of Revelation by the
same rational methods. Philosophy, according to this view, is co
extensive with Revelation, and it is in this sense he adopts the
saying of St. Augustine that true philosophy and true religion are
one and the same thing (De Freed., Procem.).
7. In our efforts to penetrate the hidden meaning of the Sacred
Scriptures, to discover the secrets of Revelation, we must not treat
lightly the authority of the Fathers ; it would be unseemly in us to
sit in judgment upon their opinions; we must receive their teaching
devoutly and respectfully. But it is permitted us, in the first
place, to select from their writings what, in our judgment, is most
in accord with the Divine utterances — and, in this respect, the
(Jreek Fathers are, as a rule, to be preferred to the Latin, for the
latter, in their interpretation, lean too much to popular modes of
apprehension. In the second place, reason stands, in the last
issue, above the authority of the Church Fathers, and, accord
ingly, when it has reached an assured conclusion, it must hold fast
by it in spite of the authority of the Fathers. Nay, the case is
contemplated in which a philosophical conclusion of the kind may
seem to conflict with the sayings of Scripture itself. And Erigena
lays it down (De Div. Nat., Lib. 1, C. H3), that even in this case
326 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
reason is to be our guide, for reason cannot be crushed by any
authority whatever.
8. To these doctrines, characteristic at once of the theosophist
and the gnostic, Erigena adds an element of mysticism also.
Reason, he says, is in itself darkness ; it cannot penetrate the
Divine mysteries unless it be illuminated by the sun of the Divine
Word. Enlightened by the Divine light it triumphs over every
form of darkness, and is enabled to behold directly and immediately
the Supreme Truth itself. In this state it is not so much Reason
which contemplates the Supreme Truth as the Supreme Truth
which contemplates itself in man. It is not man who finds God,
but God who finds Himself in man.
9. Having premised these general notions, we have now to enter
into the details of Erigena's system. Erigena begins by distinguish
ing Four Natures : —
(a) The First Nature is that which creates, but is not created
(natura, quse non creatur et creat) — this is God, in so far as He is
the sovereign efficient Cause of all things.
(6) The Second Nature is that which creates and is created
(natura, qure creatur et creat) — this is the aggregate of Ideas in the
Divine Word in so far as these ideas are not merely divine concep
tions but creative potencies also — Primordial causes.
(c) The Third Nature is that which is created but does not
create (natura, quse creatur et non creat) — this is the world perceived
by sense with the individual objects which it includes.
(d) Finally, the Fourth Nature is that which is not created and
does not create (natura, quse non creatur nee creat) — this, again, is
God, but God in so far as He is the final end of all things, and leads
all things back to Himself. (De Div. Nat., Lib. I, c. 1.)
With the subject matter indicated in this fourfold division the
whole^ system of Erigena is concerned ; it is nothing more than an
exposition of the theories regarding these Four Natures. He begins
with the First : —
THE FIRST NATURE.
§ 93.
1. God as the First Nature transcends, in His own being, all
Categories and Predicates. In His own being He transcends all
created objects ; in the same way He transcends the Categories and
Predicates which are properly applied to these objects. No one of
them can be applied to Him in its proper sense — not even the
Category ovcrla ; he is not ova/a. He is something more. In His own
being God is without definite form, and is therefore beyond the
reach of our faculty of understanding. He cannot be apprehended
by thought or described in language. As being absolutely formless
and incomprehensible, He might rightly be called " Nothing/1
THE FIRST NATURE. 327
(Nihilum). He is, in truth nothing of the sum of things; He is
raised above all things. He is not a determined " Quid," or nature
as contrasted with any other " Quid," or nature ; He is without
" quiddity," i.e, Nothing. In reference to Himself He knows that
He is, not what He is, for He is not any " what," not any " Quid."
And precisely because He does not know what He is, does He know
Himself as truly God.
2. We must, indeed, attribute all perfections to God ; these
perfections must be in Him, since He communicates them to created
things. But this attribution is figurative merely ; such perfections
cannot be attributed to God in any strict use of the terms employed
(proprie). We are thus led to distinguish two kinds of Theology —
one affirmative Kara<pariKrj} and a negative fano^arur^. Affirma
tive Theology asserts all perfections of God, inasmuch as He is
the ultimate cause of those perfections in created things. But as
such affirmation is possible only in an improper sense, Negative
Theology again denies these perfections of God. The latter is the
more perfect form of science. It uses words in their proper
meaning ; whereas the former uses them in a translated sense. God
is best known by want of knowledge ; ignorance in reference to God
is the true knowledge. When, therefore, we make any assertion
regarding God, it is best so to express ourselves, that the negative
as well as the positive element of our knowledge shall appear in our
words. This can be done by sc tting the prefix supra before any
predicate we may apply to God. God is the supra-existent, the
supra-potent, the supra-sapient, etc.
3. Although God is the supra-existent, and, therefore, to us
incomprehensible, yet is He not for this wholly hidden from us. He
reveals Himself to our intelligence in the Divine Manifestations
(Theophanies). By Divine Manifestations are to be understood, on
the one hand, the phenomena of that created world which our senses
perceive ; on the other, the inner illumination of Divine Grace.
4. In these manifestations is revealed not merely the Divine
Nature, but the Trinity of Persons in God as well. The
Theophanies lead to a knowledge of the Trinity. From the knowledge
that things are, Theologians advance to the knowledge that
God is; from the orderly distribution of things in genera and
species, they learn that God is ivise ; from their settled movements,
they infer that God lives. In this way they come to a knowledge of
the Trinity. By the term " Being," is to be understood the Father ;
by "Wisdom," the Son; by "Life," the Holy Ghost. The Father
has established all things in the Son, founded in Him the whole
created order; His generation by the Father constitutes the entire
order of Primal Causes. The Holy Ghost, on the other hand, is the
differentiating and co-ordinating Cause acting upon those things
which the Father has established as a unity in the Son. This
development of the theory brings us to the Second Nature.
328 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
THE SECOND NATURE.
§94.
1. The Second Nature, as we have seen, is the aggregate of all
those ultimate reasons or primal forms of things, which serve at once
as prototypes and as creative agencies (Primal Causes) for the
objects of the sensible world.1 They are, as we have said, produced
by God in the Divine Word, and are, therefore, one with this Word,
not something distinct from it. Hence the three points of doctrine
regarding them : —
(a) Things, as they exist ideally in the Divine Word, do not
exhibit, in this condition, plurality or difference ; they exist in the
Divine Word as an undifferentiated unity.
(6) The creation of the Ideal World in the Divine Word is
eternal, without beginning; for, if God created it in time, the
creation would constitute an accidental modification of the sub
stance of His divinity, and God is not the subject of accidental
modifications.
(c) The eternity of the Primal Causes is not, however, quite the
same as the eternity of God. God is eternal because He is
uncreated ; the ultimate principles of things are eternal, because
they are eternally created by God.
2. It is thus true to say that God did not exist before He created
this (Ideal) world; for this world is posterior to Him in nature
only, not in time. If we ask how the creation of the Ideal World
was effected, Erigena answers that God created it out of nothing.
But this term " nothing " here signifies the Being of God Himself
regarded as " supra-existent " ; for, as we have already seen,
considered as "supra-existent," it must be designated "nothing"
Hence the creation of the order of Primal Causes is nothing more
than their emanation from the " supra-existent " Divine Being, by the
exercise of God's living power.
3. God. says Erigena, has made all things out of Nothing — that
is, out of Himself; for by the term " Nothing" is to be understood
God, who does not exist as a determinate being, and who from the
negation of all being has proceeded to the affirmation of all being,
proceeding from Himself to Himself, from Nothing to Something.
God thus assumes being in the Primal causes of things ; in them He
creates Himself ; in them He comes forth from the hidden depths of
His nature, in which He is hidden even irom Himself. He descends
into the First Principles of things, and, creating Himself, begins to
be something, having previously been, as it were, shut up in the
" Supra-existent Nothing."
1 Erigena calls them not merely irporori/ffa, Trpoop/er/uara, but also Otia fait) para.
THIRD NATURE.
4>. As the Ideal World proceeds from God as its creating Cause, so
the Sensible World proceeds from the Ideal. The Sensible World is
the product of the activity of the Ideal ; for the Primary Principles
are not mere archetypes, they are Primary Causes as well ; that is to
say, creative powers producing sensible objects. Hence it is
affirmed of the Second Nature that it is created, and creates in its
turn. This aspect of the Second Nature leads us to the considera
tion of the Third Nature.
THIRD NATURE.
§95.
1. The Third Nature is the totality of the objects which are
perceptible by the Senses. The question at once arises: What
conception are we to form as to the intrinsic nature of the world
which the senses perceive ? In his answer to this question Erigena
starts with the assumption that the Universal Concept, taken in
its universality, has objective reality : he would even maintain that
the Universal, as such, is the only objective reality, individual
objects being merely passing manifestations of the Universal,
which alone has real existence. In accordance with these notions,
he lays down the following points of doctrine regarding the Third
Nature : —
(a) The common substratum of all phenomena is one entity or
being which is in itself undifferentiated and indeterminate — the
olaia. In this ovffia all things are one, in fact as well as in concept,
for it is the one sole substance of all things.
(b) This one universal ovaia, divides, within itself, into genera and
species, without however, losing its substantial unity. It is only
in this^ self-division into genera and species that the cvo-m attains
actuality.
Jc) The species thus generated manifest themselves in individual
objects. Hence a species is whole in all, and whole in each of the
individuals contained under it. The species is the element of true
being in the individual, it is by it that the individual subsists.
And as species and genus are one in the ovala, so also are individuals
when reduced to the same ultimate term.
(2.) The character of individuality is primarily manifested in the
corporeal world, But how, we may ask, do the individual objects
proceed from the universal ? In dealing with this problem, Erigena
adopts the Neo-Platonist view as to the nature of material bodies
His teaching on this subject is as follows :
(a) Every material body can be ultimately analysed into separate elements, which are
in themselves purely intelligible, that is, mere qualities. Without size, hgure, position,
density, colour, etc., a body is unthinkable. If, therefore, we separate these purely intel
ligible elements from the body, there is not left anything which can be called a body.
330 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
(6.) Hence it follows that a body is merely the result of the concurrence and combina
tion of these purely intelligible elements. A body is, therefore, in its component parts, of
the purely intelligible and immaterial order ; the outward corporeal semblance is due to
the combination of intelligible accidents ; it is merely the product of the conjunction of
these accidental qualities.
(c) Individual corporeal objects come into being by the fact that the ovtria, in its
ultimate «pecies, becomes invested with accidental qualities, and so assumes corporeal
appearance. The ovffia as such, could not be the subject of accidental qualities, it is only
in its lowest species that it can assume them ; hence the fact that we have only (specifically,
determined bodies. The accidents with which the ovffia in its ultimate species, is invested
are involved in constant transition and change — contrasting in this respect with the
ovffia itself which is immutable and enduring ; this is the explanation of the changeable-
ness and instability of the phenomenal world. The accidents, furthermore, are that in
which individual objects differ from one another ; generically and specifically, they are
all one.
(3.) This explanation, it is evident, reduces the visible world to
something purely ideal. Everything that meets us in the visible
world is, in its real being, something merely ideal or intelligible,
the corporeal character of things is merely a matter of appearance.
Furthermore, the visible world is reduced to one only being, the
ovffia. The unity which exists in the world is not a mere unitas
ordinis, it is an unity of being. The world is not a well-ordered
aggregate of many substantially different things; it is one being
and one substance.
(4.) In the light of these doctrines, we are enabled to determine
the relations which subsist between the Second Nature and the
Third. These relations are thus set forth by Erigena :
(a) The Second Nature and the Third are not distinct in actual
being. The Third Nature, as opposed to the Second, does not possess
in itself any independent reality. They are one in being and essence,
the difference between them is a difference of states or condi
tions.
(6) In the Divine Word the overia exists in absolute unity and
wholly without differentiation ; in the phenomenal world it is differ
entiated into genera and species, and, in the lowest stages of its
differentiation, is invested with those Accidents, to which the
appearance of a phenomenal world seeming to possess independent
existence is due.
(c). When, then, it is asserted that the Primal Principles con
tained in the Divine Word are the efficient causes of the phenomenal
world, this must be understood to mean that these Primal Principles
themselves appear in the effects of which they are the causes. They
do not produce their effects as something different from themselves,
they appear themselves in their effect, and take existence in them ;
and taking existence in them, they manifest themselves in these
effects, multiplied and differentiated.
(d) But though manifesting themselves thus in their effects,
those Primal Principles maintain themselves, all the while, in the
Divine Word, and in that unity which they enjoy within it. They
descend, indeed, into the multiplicity and differentiation of their
Till UD NATURE. 331
effects, but preserve, nevertheless, their transcendent unity and
supra-mundane state in the Divine Word.
(e) The first manifestation of the Primal Principles in their effects
is the beginning of Time. Immanent in the Divine Word, they are
above Time, they are eternal ; but as soon as they manifest them
selves in their effects, the course of Time begins in the sphere of
these effects, for these effects can be of the temporal order only.
5. These being the relations between the Second Nature and the
Third, it becomes manifest what are the relations between the First
Nature and the Third, that is, between God and the world. And
here we reach the cardinal point of Erigena's system. Erigena
admits, it is true, a creation from nothing ; but he expressly warns
us that this is not to be understood in the ordinary theological meaning
of the terms employed. We have seen that, according to Erigena's
view, the " Nothing '' from which the Primal Principles of things
have been created is the Divine Being itself, in its supra-essential
state, and that, furthermore, the phenomenal world is not, in actual
reality, different from the Primal Principles ; it follows necessarily
that the " Nothing '' out of which God has created the phenomenal
world is the Divine Being in its supra-essential state. This is, in
fact, Erigena's express teaching.
6- Coming down from that transcendent fulness of being in which God is described
as Non-Being, God creates Himself in the Primal Principles. Next (when the Primal
Principles manifest themselves in their effects), He descends from these Primal Principles
to their effects, takes existence in the latter, and reveals Himself in His Theophanies.
Thus does He proceed, through the manifold forms of these effects to the ultimate order
in the whole system of Nature — to material bodies. In this way, advancing in determined
order through" all things, He makes all things, and becomes all in all things, without,
however, ceasing to be above and beyond all things. In this way He produces all things
from nothing — the essence of things, out of His supra-essential being : the life of things,
out of His supra-vital being ; <fec., in a word, out of the negation of all that is and that is
not, He brings forth all that is and that is not (III. 20).
7. Mere then we have the Emanation Theory of Pantheism,
in that form which it received in Neo-Platonism. From the
Nothingness of God's supra-essential being come forth the Primal
Principles of all things, and then through these Primal Principles
God descends to their effects, and in these becomes all things that
are. The ovaia which, as a unit of being, is the ultimate basis of
all things, is, in the last analysis, the oinria of God Himself. God,
says Erigena, is the essence of all things (I. 3). The effect is no
more than the cause taking new existence. Hence God, in so far as
He is a Cause, takes existence in the effects He produces (III. 22).
Creation is His advance to a new existence out of the depths of His
supra-essential being. "God and the creature," says Erigena, "HI
not two beings distinct from one another; they are one and the
same." (III. 17).
8. Though God exists in all things, and takes being in them,
He does not, however, lose Himself in them ; He remains all the
while in His own being, always indivisible, always an unity which
^ HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
transcends the world. In His relation to the world, He at once
dwells in, and transcends, it. He is, and He i* not, the
universal ovaia of all things. In the outpouring of Himself in the
things of the world, He is their oinria ; in His own being He is not
this ovrrta. In His own being He is the unity of all antitheses;
descending into the things of the world, He enters into these
antitheses. The Emanation theory of pantheism could hardly be
more distinctly formulated.
9. Analogous to the First, Second, and Third Nature, we have in man Intellect
(Intettectug), Reason (Ratio), and the Inner Sense (Sensus Interior). The Intellect,
the voi/c °f the Greeks, is the intuitive faculty ; the proper object of its knowledge is
God as He is in Himself, that is as He in His own nature transcends being and non-being
alike. Reason — the Xoyot of the Greeks — has for its object the Second Nature, that
is, the eternal principles of things as they exist in God. The Inner Sense — the fiiarota
of the Greeks — has for its proper object the Third Nature, inasmuch as its task is to
reduce the perceptions of sense back to their proper mental concepts, and to investigate
the reasons of sensible phenomena.
10. As regards the course followed by man in the acquisition of knowledge, it may
be described as, in its first stage, a progress upwards. The Interior Sense abstracts the
universal concept from the perceptions of sense ; these concepts are reduced by the Reason
to the unity which they possess in the Divine Word ; lastly, the Intellect reduces all
objects of knowledge back to God, inasmuch as it apprehends Him as the Supra-existent,
and perceives how all genera and species proceed from God and return to Him again. In
its second stage, human knowledge is a movement downwards. It begins with the
"gnostic intuition" of God by the Intellect, descends by the Reason to the Primal
Principles evolving these from the being of God, and ends with the Interior Sense, which
evolves the genera and species of the sensible world out of the unity of the Primal
Principles.
In man all things have been created — and this in a twofold sense.
In the first place, we find united in man the elements which appear
differentiated and opposed in the rest of the created world. Man
apprehends as does the angel, infers as does man, feels as does the
irrational brute, lives as does the plant, and is in body and soul as
are all things else. In the second place, all things have been created
in man inasmuch as the concept of all created things has been im
planted in him by God. All our concepts of things are indwelling,
innate within us ; that we have no consciousness of these concepts,
and than our knowledge is, in general, so defective, is due to original
sin. These concepts of things, moreover, are nothing else than the
essences of things themselves which are thought in the concepts.
As the Divine ideas of things which the Father creates in the Son
are the very essences of things, and the basis of all accidental attri
butes, so the concepts of things which the Son creates in man are the
essences of things and the basis of all their accidental attributes.
Hence the essences of things subsist in the human soul after
the same fashion in which they subsist in the Divine Word ; with
this difference only that in the latter they exist as causative virtues,
in the former they exist in the condition of effects produced. In
this further sense then, all things, as has been said, are created in
man.
THE FOURTH NATURE. 333
12. On the lines of the distinction here established between the Second Nature and
the Third, Erigena distinguishes two meanings of the term man — the ideal man in the
Divine Word, and the man of our experience, in the phenomenal world. The former
is the universal man ; the multiplicity of individual men exists in the phenomenal
world only. It is only in this region, therefore, that individual consciousness exists ;
in the Divine Word no man knows himself as an individual, there exists only
the general consciousness of the universal man.
13. If we ask for an account of the translation of man from the ideal state to the
plurality of individuals given in our actual experience, Erigena tells us that it is to be
explained by original sin. The first man was created after the image and likeness of
God ; this was the ideal man in the Divine Word — the latter was signified by the Paradise
in which the first man was placed. The first man was not invested with a material body,
and was without difference of sex. If he had not sinned he would have remained in this
condition. But as soon as he sinned he was clothed with a material body, and dissolved
into a plurality of individuals — the differentiation of sexes being involved in the latter
consequence of sin.
14. In the further development of this point of his teaching Erigena follows Gregory
of Nyssa. The elaborate details into which he here enters are merely a reproduction of
the views of Gregory in reference to original sin and its consequences. The allegorical
interpretation of the Scriptural narrative of the fall, which is a necessity of this theory,
is reproduced in the form in which Gregory borrowed it from Philo. We may, there
fore, pass it over without further notice here.
15. This theory of Erigena in reference to original ein, furnishes an answer to the
question, why the Third Nature proceeded from the Second. If the Third Nature is in
its intrinsic being one with the Second, except in so far as we find what is above Time and
Sense in the latter dissolved into plurality and become accessible to sense in the former,
what, we are led to ask, is the reason for this process of depreciation ? The answer
to this question is furnished by the doctrine enunciated regarding original sin.
16. Erigena says: — " Mundus iste in varias sensibilesque species, diverasque partium
suarum multiplicitates non erumperet, si Deus casum primi homiuis, unitatem suae naturas
deserentis, non prsevideret " (ii. 12). The reason, then, for the existence of the world
of sense, or Third Nature, is man's falling away from God. It is not due to a free act of
creation on God's part ; it would not have come into being if man had not sinned.
17. The world of sense, should not, properly speaking have existed at all : it cannot,
for this reason, exist eternally. The consequences of original sin must be obliterated ;
the sensible world must return again to God in order that He may be all in all things.
This leads us to the Fourth Nature, that is to God, as he is the ultimate end of all things
to whom all things must return in order that He may be all in all things. Here He
presents Himself to us as not created and not creating.
THE FOURTH NATURE.
§97.
1. This return of all things to God is accomplished by certain
decrees, or in certain stages. The natural objects of sense return
to their Primal Principles ; they are divested of their outward sensible
appearances and are glorified in the Divine Word. As regards man
\ve must distinguish between the universal and the individual
return. All men, without exception, return to Paradise, that is, to
the Primal Principles in the Divine Word. But the elect rise still
higher, they not only return to Paradise, but they eat also of the
Tree of Life, that is to say, they become one with God ; they are
deified.
2. This doctrine does not, however, mean that things — man in
particular — on their return to God, lose their own nature and
substance. When things of lower condition pass into a higher,
they do not for this lose their proper being, they are merely raised
334 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
to a higher and more perfect state. As the air does not lose its own
nature when it is illuminated by light, but merely assumes the appear
ance of light, or, as iron does not lose its own nature when it is glowing
with heat, but merely assumes the appearance of fire, so the proper
nature or substantial being of the deified man does not cease to
exist when it is wholly united to God, and God lives and moves in
it. The same may be said of other things.
3. The essential condition on which the return of all things to God depends is the
Redemption. The Divine Word descended into the sphere of the things produced by
the Eternal Causes, when He took upon Himself that human nature in which are con
tained all things visible and invisible. It was necessary that He should thus descend,
in order that the effect of those causes, and so, those causes themselves, should be saved.
For if the effects perished, so also should the causes. According to this theory, the
Incarnation and Redemption are essential factors in that process of theogony which ends
with the return of all things to God.
4. In Christ human nature is already deified, inasmuch as in Him human nature
has become one with the glorified Divine nature. What has thus been effected in Christ
can be accomplished in the case of other men and of the sensible world in general, only
when the predestined number of mankind has been attained. Then the Resurrection
will take place; the material body will become spiritualised ; the difference of sex will
cease to exist ; and everything will return thither whence it came.
5. But, though human nature in its entirety, that is in all the individuals in whom
it is represented, shall return to Paradise, that is, to the Primal Principles, eternal punish
ment shall nevertheless be the condition of the wicked. Punishment falls, not upon
human nature, but upon human will, for the latter alone is the cause of evil. Hence
human nature will be glorified even in the wicked ; but they will, none the less, be
punished in their faculty of will. This punishment will consist in this, that the objects
of sense with which they gratified their desires in this life shall be withdrawn from
them and thev shall thus be left to emptiness of heart, and to the tumult of passion
which can never more be satisfied. This is the torment which consumes them, the fire
which rages within them.
6. The system of Erigena may, perhaps, bear the impress of
genius, but it is not Christian. He tries, no doubt, to make room
for the Christian dogmas at every point, even where accord with
Christianity is impossible. We have an example in his doctrine of
the eternity of punishment. But the Christian dogma must accom
modate itself to the requirements of the Neo-Platonic doctrine, into
which it is made to fit, and loses by the fact its genuine significance.
It is, therefore, not a matter of wonder that the Church emphatically
protested against the system of Erigena, and that his work, De
Divisione Naturce, was condemned as well by Leo IX. (1050) as by
Honorius III. (1225).
7. Contemporary with Scotus Erigena was the monk Fl eiricus of
Auxerre (834-881), who studied first under Haimon, a pupil of
Alcuin, and afterwards at Ferrieres, and founded a school in the
monastery of Auxerre. Recent investigations have proved him to
have been the author of a treatise, " Glosses on the Ten Categories."
He does not follow in the path of mysticism traced by Erigena, but
holds to the explanation of universal notions given by Aristotle and
Boethius. The same maybe said of Remigius of Auxerre ( + 904), a
pupil of Heiricus, and of Jepa, the author of " Glosses on the Isagoge
of Porphyry."
HKTHKR DEVELOI'.MKNTS OF I'll 1 L< >S< )]'H V.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY.
§9*
L In the tenth century we meet with the commanding figure of
the monk Gerbert, who later ascended the Papal throne as Pope
Sylvester II. (1003). He began his studies in the convent of Aurillac
in Auvergne, continued them in other schools of France, and even
travelled into Spain to seek learning among the Arabs. He
possessed a wide knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, and
was regarded by his contemporaries as a prodigy of learning. Two
short treatises of his have come down to us. One treats of the
Eucharist; the other bears the title, De rationali et ratione uti.
2. In the latter treatise the question is discus^d — How can we say of the intelligent
being that it uses reason ? To answer the question we must distinguish between two
intelligences— the eternal divine intelligence and the intelligence which has existence in
time. The first must be conceived as essentially active, and in reference to it intelligence and
the use of intelligence are equivalent terms. The second possesses in itself merely the
capacity for intelligence and must, therefore, pass from the state of potency to that of act.
The act of intelligence can be assigned to it merely as an accident.
3. In the period succeeding the ninth century Dialectics was the
first part of philosophy to be studied and developed. Dialectics was
accounted a necessary preparation for the study of Theology. In
studying it, the works generally used were the writings of Boethius
on Logic. Up to the eleventh century the only works of Aristotle
known to the scholars of the west were the Categories and the
treatise De Interpretation, as they had been translated by Boethius.
The Isagoge of Porphyry, as translated by Boethius and Victorinus,
was also in their hands, as well as the Manuals of Cassiodorus.
4. This eager study of Dialectics led men to exaggerate its
importance and to hold that by Dialectics alone the most profound
problems could be solved; even the mysteries of the Christian faith
were not beyond its reach. In discussing these the Dialecticians
came to exalt the principles of their own science above the authority
of the Scriptures and the definitions of the Church, and to claim the
right of deciding these questions by their own methods. The true
conception of these mysteries was, they held, that which was reached
by dialectical study.
5. A type of the overbearing dialectician is to be found in Berengarius of Tours
(999-1088), a pupil of Fulbert, who made his name famous by his denial of the dogma of
Transubstantiation. In his treatise, De Sacra Ccena he sets the authority of Dialectical
Science above the dogmatic definitions of the Church. In support of his contention he
invokes the authority of St. Augustine, who described Dialectic as the " Art of Arts"
and " the Science of Sciences," and who taught that we must in all matters appeal to
Dialectic, for this appeal is the appeal to reason— to the image of God within ourselves.
In many things, no doubt, we must be guided by authority, but it is much better to arrive
at the knowledge of truth by the use of our own reason.
6. Against the extravagant pretensions of the Dialecticians and their abuse of their
science, protest was raised from many sides. Fulbert, the disciple of Gerbert, and the
founder of a school at Chartres (A.D. 990), of which See he became Bishop, warned his pupils
4
336 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
against them. Peter Damian, too, strongly censured their arrogance, and insisted that
Dialectic is not the arbiter of truth, but its servant. In the same strain the monk Otho
( + 1083) complained in his treatise, De tribus Qwestionibus, that certain Dialecticians were
so prejudiced in favour of their science that they made Scripture itself subject to its
authority, and had more faith in Boethius than in the inspired writers. So, too, Lanfrauc,
a monk of the Abbey of Bee, in Normandy (1005-1089), later Archbishop of Canterbury —
the great opponent of Berengarius. The same attitude towards the Dialecticians was
adopted by Abbot William of Hirschau (1026-1091).
7. The studies of the Dialecticians led them, as might have been
expected, to a discussion of the question of universal notions. In
the Introduction (Isagoge) of Porphyry the question had been raised
but left unanswered. The science of Dialectic calls for its solution ;
the attempt to solve it gave rise to two opposing schools — that of
the Nominalists and of the Rigid Realists.
NOMINALISM AND REALISM.
ROSCELLIN OF CoMPIEGNE ; AND WlLLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX.
§99.
1. The passage in the Introduction of Porphyry, to which we have
alluded, ran as follows in the translation of Boethius: — "De generibus
et speciebus illud quidein, sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intel-
lectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia, efc
utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa hsec
consistentia sint, dicere recusabo ; altissimum enim negotium est
hujusmodi et majoris egens inquisitionis." It was to be expected
that the Christian schools would not leave the question in suspense,
as it is left here. Philosophy had been challenged to offer a definite
solution of the problem, and the problem was of such a kind that
each system of philosophy would be affected in its whole extent by
the solution which it offered.1
2. The question proposed might be answered in any of three
ways. Porphyry had indicated this in the passage we have quoted.
In the first place it might be assumed that to the universal notion
corresponds an object which is at once real and universal. In this
case the universal is the only genuine reality ; for individuals, as
such, have no substantial being in the proper sense of the term.
They are merely phenomenal manifestations of the universal, i.e.^vi
the true reality : the universal does not pre-suppose the in
dividual, but conversely; it is antecedent to the individual, and
merely manifests itself in the latter — " Universalia ante rein." This
i And so it happened that in the schools of this period the central point of dispute was
whether the objects represented by the five concepts enumerated in the Introduction of
Porphyry qenus, differentia, species, proprium, and accidens— are five realities (quinque
res) or merely five words (quinque voces).
NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 337
method of solution was proposed in the system of Erigena ; we have
seen that this was the conception which lay at the basis of, and
dominated, the whole system of that philosopher.
3. Again, an answer, the direct contrary of this, might be given
to the question proposed. It might be assumed that the universal
concept has no objective reality at all ; that it is a mere product of
our process of thought. We are forced to embrace a plurality of things
under one name, simply because we find it impossible mentally to
represent each individual by itself. In this explanation the universal
being merely notional, " in nudo intellectu," necessarily pre supposes
the individual, for the inclusion of a number of individuals under
one common name is impossible, unless these individuals be supposed
given. Here we have the " Universalia post rem."
4 Lastly, a third answer might be given to the question. Dis
tinguishing between the thing represented by the universal, and the
character of universality which this object presents, as it appears
in our thought, we might assert that what the universal concept
represents is really found in every individual for which it can stand,
but that the formal character of universality is due to the abstractive
process of our thought, which draws forth the conceptual elements
of the universal notion from the individual objects, and then regards
this abstract notion as applicable to all the individuals in turn, as
predicable of all of them (prosdicabile de omnibus). In this expla
nation it is only the matter (content) of the universal notion which
has objective reality, and this objective reality it possesses only in
the individual ; the individual is the substantial being in the strict
sense of the term. Here we have the universalia in re. This was the
solution of the problem offered by Aristotle, and to this Boethius
adhered in his text books.
5. Each of these three solutions of the famous problem has had its
advocates. On this point we find three distinct schools of opinion
in the history of philosophy. The Extreme Realists adopt the first
solution, the Nominalists the second, and the Qualified (Aristotelian)
Realists the third. By Extreme Realism then, we understand the
theory which assigns objective reality to the universal, and makes
this reality itself universal ; by Nominalism we mean the theory
which denies all objective reality to the universal, and makes it a
mere name, by Qualified Realism we understand that theory which
holds the universal to be objectively real, but finds that the reality
is objective in the individual only, that it is the tiling expressed by
the concept which is actual, not the (universal) form of the concept.
In their earlier historical development these several opinions were
not sharply distinguished from one another. In the ninth and
tenth centuries, the opposition between them only began to make
itself felt ; at this period the Realism of Aristotle was the dominant
opinion in the schools. It was in the eleventh century that tha
antithesis was fully established, and that a conflict betweeen the
338 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
rival schools began — a conflict which was conducted with great
acuteness of reasoning by the several disputants, and which was not
always free from rancour and bitterness.
6. Roscellin of Compiegne is usually accounted the founder of
the Nominalist School. He cannot, however, be strictly said to have
founded the school; the distinction between Nominalism and
Realism was established before his time. But it was he who most
definitely and most forcibly stated the Nominalist position, and he
may thus be regarded as the chief representative of Nominalism.
He was born in Armorica, in Southern Brittany, studied at Soissons
and at Rheims, taught publicly at Tours and Locmenach, and was
subsequently appointed Canon of Compiegne, where, however, he still
devoted himself to teaching. It does nob appear that he wrote any
treatises ; he delivered his views in spoken discourses. Only one
letter, written to his pupil, Abelard, dealing chiefly with the
doctrine of the Trinity, has come down to us. Our knowledge of
his peculiar views is derived mainly from Anselm, Abelard, and
John of Salisbury.
7. According to Anselm, Roscellin taught that universal notions
are merely general names which serve to designate an aggregate of
individuals. Anselm in this connexion makes use of the phrase,
flatus vocis ; he reproves the Nominalists for describing our general
notions as merely flatus vocis. Whether Roscellin himself made
use of this phrase we are not told. Intrepreting thus the doctrine
of the Nominalists, Anselm censures them for losing themselves in
the things of sense and the pictures of imagination, and for
failing to discern that which may be separated from the perceptions
of sense to become an object of intuition to the reason. We cannot
know the nature of man so long as we deal only with the individual,
and fail to understand how several men may be specifically one. It
would appear from this that the Nominalists adhered to the strict
letter of the formula which summarised their philosophy.
8. A passage occurs in the writings of Abelard (Ep. 21, ad
Episc. Paris.) in which Roscellin is said to have maintained that
nothing could be composed of parts ; that only the words by which
things are named are divisible. For, if a thing had parts, then any
given part would be part of the whole ; but the whole is made up
of all its parts. The given part would, therefore, be part of itself
and of all the other parts — a conclusion which is wholly inadmiss
ible. In this reasoning it is evidently implied that the differences
which we perceive between things are only in our thought; that
they do not affect the objective reality of things ; that in the
objective order we have nothing but undifferentiated unities — a
proposition which accords fully with the denial of objective reality
to our general notions.
9. So much for the theoretical part of Roscellin's system. The
theory thus formulated he applied to the Christian dogma of theTrinity,.
NOMINALISM AND REALISM. 339
and the result was a doctrine of Trithoism. His course of argu
ment ^ appears to have been as follows: — If if it be true that
individuals are the only real entities, it must follow that the Three
Persons of the Godhead are in reality three individual substances.
This assertion he seems to have formally made. According to the
statement of Anselm (De Fide Trin., c. 2. 3), he taught that the
three Divine Persons are only one in power and in will, but, for the
rest, they are three entities, three essences, three substances. If
this be not our conception of the distinction between the Persons of
the Divine Trinity, if we make the Trinity one essence, one res, we
shall then be forced to admit that the Father and the Holy Ghost
have become man with the Son. If the usage of language permitted
it, the Three Persons might, therefore, be called " Three Gods."
10. In Roscellin'a letter to Abelard the same doctrine is set forth.
The Three Divine Persons, he asserts, are three substances, the
unity of which consists in the fact that they are equal to one
another. The heresy of Arius, therefore, consisted in this, that he
maintained a subordination of one Person to another ; and assigned
to the Second and Third Persons a beginning in time. The Divine
Persons are one in virtue of their common possession of Divine
Majesty, not because this Majesty is individualised; for what is
individualised cannot be common, and conversely what is common to
several individuals cannot itself be individual. If, then, it be said that
the Father has begotten the Son, this is the same thing as to say :
the substance of the Father has brought forth the substance of the
Son. This tritheistical doctrine brought Roscellin into conflict
with the Church, and the Council of Soissons (1002) obliged him to
abjure it.
11. In extreme antagonism to this nominalistic teaching came
the doctrine of exaggerated realism, which boldly asserted the
objective reality of the universal as such. The leading represen
tative of this teaching was William of Champeaux (1070-1121). He
studied at Paris under Manegold of Lutenbach; then under the
renowned scholastic, Anselm of Laon ; he is said to have also been
a pupil of Roscellin. He became a teacher at the Cathedral School
of Notre Dame in Paris ; and, later on, taught at the Monastery of
St. Victor, in the same city, where he established the School of St.
Victor, which subsequently attained a wide celebrit}^ He was
an intimate friend of St. Bernard. Of his works we possess only a
short treatise, De Origine Animce, and some fragmentary remains.
With regard to his doctrine on the subject of Universals, we know
only what his contemporaries — notably Abelard — have told us.
12. Abelard in his Historia Calamitatum (c. 2) attributes to
William of Champeaux the teaching that every Universal Concept
exists essentially (essentialiter) in its totality in each individual
included under it; that in essence and being there is not, therefore,
any distinction between individuals of the same species ; that the
340 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
difference between them is a difference of the accidents of each.
Thus interpreted, William of Champeaux, like Scotus Erigena,
would maintain the objective reality of Universals as such, and
assert that every concept, considered as an universal entity, has
objective as well as subjective existence. In accordance with this
notion, the specific differences by which genera are differentiated
jvould be mere accidents in relation to the latter, but they would be
substantial elements of the species — a doctrine which led Abelard to
assert that William held these differences to be the species.
According to the account of Abelard, the objections which he made
to this theory had the effect of inducing William so far to modify it as
to allow that -the same thing — that is to say, the same species —
could not be attributed to different individuals essentially (essen-
tialiter), but only individually (individualiter). It is not clear
what this formula means ; but at leasts it indicates a disposition on
the part of William of Champeaux so to adapt his theory as to
leave to the individual a real substantive being.
1 3. Against the extreme realistic position taken up by William of Champeaux, the
objection was even then put forward (especially in the treatise, De Generibus et
Speciebus, of which we shall have have more to say presently) that in this hypothesis
one and the same substance would possess contradictory attributes, and that the same
body would be in different places at the same time. ' ' If the essential nature of man
exists wholly in Socrates, it cannot exist at all in what is not Socrates. Now, if it at
the same time exists in Plato, it follows that Socrates and Plato must be one, and that
Socrates must exist as well where Plato is, as where he is himself." The objection is, in
truth, insoluble if we grant the assumption of the extreme realistic theory.
14. A less extreme form of the nominalistic theory is the so-called
doctrine of Conceptualism, which also had its origin in the eleventh
century. This theory denies the objective reality of Universals as
such, but will not allow that they are mere names. It asserts
that they are at least universal conceptions, universal intellectual
representations, under which we include a multitude of objects
because of their resemblance to one another. This seems to be the view
advocated in the treatise, De Generibus et Speciebus, already referred
to, which Cousin assigns to Abelard, but which others assign to
Joscelin of Soissons (Bitter), or some other author.
15. In this treatise the universal concept is said to represent
an aggregate (collectio) of individuals, which although they really
constitute a plurality, may, nevertheless, be regarded as one species,
one universal, one nature ; in the same way as a nation or an army,
though composed of many persons, can be thought of, and be
designated, as one. With this difference, however, that the indivi
duals which comprise the universal aggregate cannot be taken at
random ; the individuals included under the universal concepts
must resemble one another in the matter of which they are
composed, though they differ in form', they must be "created
alike."
16. This is explained by an example : Socrates, as an individual, is made up of the
"human element" (humanitas) which constitutes a sort of material substratum, and of
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. 34-1
the " Socratic element " (socratitas), which is the form that consitutes that human indivi
dual, Socrates, and distinguishes him from all other human individuals. The same is
true in the case of Plato, of the "human element" and the "Platonic element"
(Platonitas). We observe that the material element is the same in both, for in both it is
the " human element ;" whereas the form is different in each, and they are thus distinct
individuals. It is because the matter, as explained, is alike in both, that both are and
must be included under the universal concept " man."
17. What has here been laid down in reference to the individual is true, in its
measure, of the species ; for in species also we have like matter and differing forms.
For example, in the case of " man " and " beast," the matter " animal" is alike in both,
while the forms " rational " and " irrational " differ. Hence the two species can,
because of the likeness of the material element in each, be included under the same
common concept "animal." From this it follows that the universal is not an element
which exists in its entirety in a plurality of individuals. When we predicate of the
individual a generic or specific notion, we only assert thereby that the individual is one
of those things which is included under a determined genus or species ; our predication
has an adjectival, not a substantive significance.
18. The antagonism between Nominalism and extreme Realism
found full expression in the controversies of the eleventh century.
All the while the more moderate form of Realism, which had been
represented earlier by Boethius, was not lost sight of. It asserted
itself side by side with the extreme theories, and ultimately, in the
thirteenth century, triumphed over both. Its representative and
advocate in the eleventh century, and the man who prepared the
way for its ultimate triumph was
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY.
§100.
1. Anselm was born at Aosta, in Piedmont, in the year 1033 ;
was brought up in Christian piety by his mother Ermenberg ;
entered the monastery of Bee in Normandy, in 1060, at the invita
tion of Lanfranc ; and became prior, and ultimately abbot of the
monastery. Here his time was divided between the duties of his
office, and the literary work which had become a necessity of his
life. It was at this period that he composed his best works. In
1093 he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, and from this
time forward devoted himself, very often in conflict with the
English Kings, William Rufus and Henry II., to the reform of the
Church in England on the lines laid down by Gregory VII. He
died in 1109.
2. The writings of Anselm were, for the most part, composed to
meet the needs of special occasions, and they deal therefore, as a
rule, with special points of Faith and Philosophy. Nevertheless we
can observe in them a distinct effort to secure system in their teach
ings. The most remarkable of these works are : (a) the Dialogue de
Grammatico, the earliest of the author's treatises, a discussion be
tween a teacher and his pupil on the question then frequently treated
by the grammarians — whetner "grammarian" should be classed under
342 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
the category of Substance or Quality ; (6) the Dialogus de Veritaie,
in which the Concept of Truth is examined and discussed ; (c) the
Monologium, an outline of the foundations of Theology ; (d) the
Prosologium, in which the so-called Ontologicr.l Argument for God's
existence is set forth ; (e) the Liber Apologeticus contra Insipientem,
a defence of the Ontological Argument against the attack which
the monk Gaunilo had made on it in his Liber pro Insipiente ; (f)
the work De Fide Trinitatis ; (g) De Processione spiritus sancti ;
(h) De Casu Diaboli; (i) De Concepts Virginali\ (K) Cur Deas
Homo ; (I) De Libero Arbitrio ; (in) De Concordia Prcescientiw
eum Libero Arbitrio, etc.
3. Anselm, as a philosopher, assumes towards the Christian Faith
the attitude defined by St. Augustine. He holds that, when there
is question of Christian truth, faith must form the prelude and the
basis of scientific knowledge. He lays down the principle in the
celebrated formula : " Non quasro intelligere, ut credam, sed credo
ut intelligam " (Prosl. c. i.). Knowledge, as given in the subject
knowing, holds, no doubt, a place above faith ; it stands midway
between faith and intuition ; but it stands above faith only in
the sense that it affords an insight into the articles of faith, not at
all in the sense that knowledge constitutes a rule of faith. The
contrary indeed is the case. The mind must first be securely
established in faith before it can proceed to a scientific knowledge
of what it believes. This knowledge, it can and must obtain, to
neglect it is culpable negligence. (De Fid. Trin.y Prwf. ; Cur Deus
Homo, lib. i, c. ii.)
4. While asserting this relation between Knowledge and Faith,
Anselm does not depreciate the natural powers of reason. He lays it
down distinctly^ that man, without any aid from Faith, by reason
merely, can attain to the knowledge of many truths; in particular,
to the knowledge of God. He even appears at first sight to extend
unduly the possibilities of scientific knowledge ; he appears
disposed to ask from mere reason a knowledge of the Christian
Mysteries. For example, in the preface to his Cur Deus Homo, he
states that he proposes to make complete abstraction from Christ and
from Divine Revelation, and by Reason alone, and by arguments
furnished wholly by Reason, to prove that the Redemption in all
its incidents necessarily occurred as history recounts it to have
happened. And again in the Monologium he endeavours to prove
from reason the Doctrine of the Trinity.
5. What might seem exaggerated in these statements is modified by what he lays
down elsewhere. He expressly states that the results of our rational inquiries must be
tested by Sacred Scripture, and must be rejected when condemned by Scripture even when
they appear to us irrefragable ; but that they are to be maintained when found in
conformity with Scripture. When therefore, he makes an assertion which is not
confirmed by the higher authority (of Faith), it is to be understood that the proposition,
though proved on rational grounds, is certain in this sense only that it is assumed as true
and demonstrated, provisionally, as long as God does not make known the truth of the
contradictory (Cur Deus Homo, lib. i., c. ii., c. xxxviii. De Cone. Prcesc., etc., qu. iii., c. vi.)
ON (ion 343
Anselm here takes up a position wholly different from that of Scotus Erigena. The latter
would maintain that even in the case of ft conflict between the condusion* of reason tuicj
the authority of Holy Scripture we are to abide by the verdict of reason.
6. In his analysis of the notion of Truth, Anselm distinguishes
between the truth of knowledge, the truth of the will, and the truth
of things. In each case his analysis leads him ultimately to
identify the notion of truth with the notion of " Tightness "
(rectitudo). The truth of knowledge consists in the conformity of
our knowledge with the thing, in the rectitudo cognitionis ', the
truth of the will consists in the conformity of the will with the
Law, in the rectitudo voluntatis ; and the truth of things in the
conformity of the thing with the Divine Idea, in the rectitudo rei.
Hence, absolute truth is absolute rectitude.
ON GOD.
§ 101.
To prove the existence of God, Anselm, in his Monplogium,
adduces three arguments, a posteriori. They are the following : —
(a) In the objective world we have an infinitude of things that are good, but which
differ widely from one another in respect of their goodness. Now, this is possible only
in so far as they are not good in themselves, but participate in some common —
' ielf. There must, therefore, t '
which is good in itself and by itself. There must, therefore, exist a good, which is such
of itself and by itself ; this must be the supreme good, for nothing which owes its good
ness to another can be placed above that which is good of itself. Now, the supreme good
(b) The second proof is derived from the existence of things that have come into
being. Such things postulate a first and highest cause to account for their existence.
This cause must be one and one only. If there were several such causes, each would
exist of itself and by itself, and would postulate further a single common nature, through
which each existed of itself and by itself. We should thus be again forced to recur to
an ultimate unity. The one self-existent cause of all things we call God.
(c) The third proof is derived from the different degrees of goodness and perfection
which the objects of your knowledge present. These gradations cannot be endless in
their progression upwards, they must ultimately terminate in a being who stands
above all grades, who is infinitely perfect. This must be one and one only. If there
were several infinitely perfect beings they would postulate an ulterior individual nature
through which they would be infinitely perfect ; and so we should at last be compelk
to admit an ultimate unity. Now the infinitely perfect being is God.
2. But Anselm is not content with these proofs a posteriori. He
looks for a proof which shall dispense with and replace them all.
This proof, he thinks, is furnished by that argument which infers
the existence of God from the very notion of His being. The
argument is stated at length in the Proslogium ; it may be thus
put in brief : —
(a) When we think of God we think of Him as the highest being, than whom no
higher being can be conceived. The atheist may deny that such a being exists, but he
can at least comprehend what is meant by "a being than whom no higher can be con
ceived." And when he understands this and perceives it, it has existence in his intellect,
even though he does not as yet perceive that it has actual objective existence also. He
cannot therefore, deny that " the highest being than whom no higher can be conceive.!.
344
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
inasmuch as he can think such a being, and actually does think it, has existence in his
intellect.
(6) Now, this being cannot exist in the intellect only; it must also exist in actual
reality. For, let us suppose it to exist only in the intellect, then it is something which
at least can have objective actuality, and this latter notion adds something to the
former ; to be actually existent is more than to be merely an object of thought. If, then,
the being than which a higher cannot be conceived exists only in the intellect, it
becomes by the fact a being than which a higher can be conceived — for a higher is that
being having actual existence. Hence, an evident contradiction. We conclude, there
fore, that the being than which a higher cannot be conceived exists not in the intellect
only, but in actual reality as well.
(c) Nay, its actual existence is so necessary that it is impossible
it should be non-existent. For we can form the concept of a being
whose non-existence is inconceivable, and this being is evidently
higher and more perfect than the being which can be thought of as
non-existent. If then the being, than which no higher is con
ceivable, could be non-existent, this being would, according to the
principle just laid down, be a being than which a still higher would
be conceivable. Hence, a manifest contradiction. It follows that
the being in question exists necessarily, that its non-existence is
impossible.
3. Anselm, as we have said, laid great stress on this argument,
which he believed could replace all the others. His reasoning was,
however, called in question, during his lifetime, by the Monk
Gaunilo, in his "Liber pro Insipiente." Gaunilo points out the
defect in the argument, and proves that it is inconclusive.
(a) In the first place, he says, " from the fact that we form a notion of God it does
not follow that God has being in our intellect ; the being in the intellect of that quo
majus cogitari nequit is to be understood in the same sense as the being in the intellect
of anything else of which we think ; if we take in any more extended sense the " intel-
ligere rem esse " — an assumption which Anselm does not make — we should be assuming
what we have to prove.
(6) In the second place, although we perceive that the being, than whom a higher
cannot be conceived, necessarily includes real existence, we cannot, from the circum
stance that we perceive this to be the case, conclude that such a being
actually exists. We must first prove its existence by other means ; it is only when this
is done that by speculative study of it we can advance to the further knowledge, that
the being exists of itself and by itself, that it has necessary existence. " Prius enim
certum mihi necesse est fiat, revera esse alicubi majus ipsum, et turn demum ex eo, quod
majus est omnibus, in se ipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum."
(c) If we admit the validity of Anselm's argument, we might, with equal reason,
infer from our notion of a perfect island, its actual existence. The ancients tell us of a
lost island to which they attributed every kind of perfection. Now, we might reason
thus : this island has every possible perfection, but a chief perfection is existence ;
hence, if it does not exist, it has not every possible perfection. This reasoning is clearly
absurd ; but its defect attaches to Anselm's reasoning from the notion of the most
perfect being to the actual existence of such a being.
4. Anselm defended his argument in his " Liber Apologeticus
Contra Gaunilonem " ; but he was unable to meet satisfactorily
the difficulties which must always beset the attempt to reason from
the mere conception of a thing to its actual existence. This argu
ment of Anselm was rejected by the whole body of the scholastic
writers who followed him. And their reasons for rejecting it were
always those which had been urged by Gaunilo. In spite of
ox GOD. 345
Anselm's confidence in it, the argument must be held to be really of
no worth.
5. Having laid down the proofs of God's existence, Anselm pro
ceeds, in the Monologium, to develop that notion by which God is
represented to the mind. In the first place, he thus endeavours to
establish the truth that God exists of Himself and by Himself :
God does not receive existence from any higher cause, for in this case
He would no longer be the highest being. Nor did He receive it from
Himself : He did not produce Himself from nothing, for in this
hypothesis He must have had existence before He existed.
Neither did He evolve Himself out of some pre-existing matter; for
in this hypothesis His existence would have depended on an ulterior
cause (material cause), which we have seen to be impossible. God,
therefore exists purely of Himself and by Himself, and what He is
that He is of Himself, and by Himself.
6. Furthermore, if God is the highest being, than whom no
higher is conceivable, He must, necessarily, be the fulness of all
perfection. We must, therefore, attribute to Him every perfection
the attribution of which involves a higher excellence than would^ be
involved in its negation. Accordingly, we must hold that the Divine
Nature is not corporeal ; for an incorporeal, spiritual being is more
excellent than a corporeal. On the other hand God is living, wise,
almighty, truthful, just, happy, etc., for it is more excellent to
be such than not so to be.
7. Moreover, all these perfections must be predicated of God,
not qualitative, but quidditative. For example, if God is just, He
is so through justice. Now, if this justice is anything other than
Himself, His being just would be attributed to Him merely as a
quality. But this justice cannot be anything other than God Him
self ; for, whatever God is, that He is of Himself and by Himself.
Hence to be just belongs to Him quidditative. And so of His other
perfections. God, therefore, does not possess justice ; rather He is
justice ; He has not life ; He is life. He does not possess wisdom ;
He is wisdom ; and so of other attributes.
8. Again, the being of God is in no sense composite. Whatever
is composite owes to the parts of which it is composed whatever it is
and has, and to this extent the composing parts are higher than
the being which they form, for the latter exists only through
them, not they through it. If, therefore, the Divine Being were
composite, by the fact it would cease to be the highest being. Hence
God is absolutely simple, and, though different attributes are
ascribed to Him, these do not indicate different elements in the Divine
Nature. Each of them expresses the totality of the Divine Beinur.
9. God is eternal, without beginning and without end. If he
had a beginning He would have been created, and could not be self-
existent. If the Divine Nature could perish it would not be the
highest immortality, and, consequently, would not be the highest
346 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
nature conceivable. Truth, moreover, is eternal, and Truth is God.
God does not exist in space; there are no spatial dimensions in Him;
He is unextended, immeasurable. Hence, God is exalted above all
Time and all Space. And yet, He is in all space and in all time ;
whole in the whole, and whole in every portion of space, and pre
sent with all His Eternity in every moment of Time.
10. God is absolutely immutable. For, in the perfect life of God,
there is no succession ; what He is, that He is once for all, in one
indivisible act. His life does not evolve itself in a series of successive
processes ; His being is completed once and for ever in its absolute
totality, without increase and without diminution. Hence we
cannot ascribe to God any accidental attributes ; such attributes
would involve mutability of being. God is without accident of any
kind. And for this reason the category of substance can be applied
to Him only in the sense that He exists by Himself and for Himself,
not in that sense in which substance is regarded as the permanent
substratum of accidental qualities.
THEORY OF IDEAS. — CREATION.
§102.
1. God is the self-existent being, and as such must, according to
the proofs just given, be One,andOne only; itfollows that all else which
has existence derives its origin from Him, has been produced by Him.
If now we are asked in what manner God has produced these other
things, we must answer, in the first place, that the being of God
cannot itself be the material substratum which underlies these
things. If this were the case, the highest nature would be subject
to change and corruption in lower things, and would thus deny its
own character of the highest good, which is clearly absurd. This
being so, we are led to the conclusion that God can have produced
things in no other way than by creating them.
2. We are not, however, to understand this creation out of
nothing as if the " nothing " were a sort of matter out of which
things were evolved. Such a notion is absurd ; what is " nothing "
cannot be the material cause of anything. The expression
" nothing " signifies merely that there was not anything from which
the world could be produced. Things had, before their creation,
no real being in any sense, this being they obtained only by
creation.
3. Created things have, however, an ideal existence eternally in
the Divine Mind. For, the creative action of God is intelligent, not
blind ; and it pre-supposes accordingly a knowledge of the thing to
be created. God has, therefore, an eternal conception of created
things; and this conception is the ideal or archetype after which
they are created. In this respect, the creative action of God may be
THEORY OF IDEAS. — CREATION'. ',} 11
compared with the action of the artist, which supposes the idea of
the work of art previously existing in the artist's mind. In their
ideal being in the Divine Mind all things are eternal ; they exist
in time in their actual being outside the Divine Intellect.
4. The divine ideas are a sort of inner language in God ; they
are the Word by which God expresses things ; just as a notion in
man is the internal word by which he expresses an object in his
thought. In this way we are led to the knowledge of an indwelling
Word in God, which He expresses in Himself, and by which He
expresses all things. Substantially this Word is not distinct from
the substance of the Divinity. Everything which God produces He
produces by Himself, and as by His indwelling Word He generates
things ideally, this Word must be one with Himself.
5. This, however, is not yet a full account of the notion of the
Divine Word. If the content of the Divine Word were no more than
the aggregate of the ideas of created things, it would follow that
God's knowledge would be exclusively confined to these objects :
and, in the supposition that no created world was destined to exist,
God's knowledge would have no content at all, that is, He would
have no knowledge. This conclusion is clearly inadmissible. Hence
there must be another object of knowledge, an object which would be
always present to the mind of God, even in the supposition that no
created world was called into being. This object is God Himself.
God has eternal knowledge of Himself in all His infinitude : and
having eternal knowledge of Himself He expresses that knowledge
eternally. Hence we have in God an Eternal Word, independently
of things created.
6. We must not, however, because of this, assert the existence in
God of a twofold Word — one in which He expresses Himself, the other
in which He expresses the objects of creation. The former, like the
latter, is in essence one with the substance of the Divinity ; and as
this is absolutely incomposite (simple), the Word in both cases must
be one and the same. God thinks and expresses by one and the
same Word Himself and the objects of creation, or rather He
expresses in the Word which expresses Himself, the objects of
creation also. As they exist in the Divine Word the ideas of things
are this Divine Word itself, in so far as it is the archetype of the
created order.
7. On this foundation Anselm constructs his philosophical doctrine regarding the
Trinity. According to the Christian dogma the Son of God is the Personal Word of
God. Keeping this dogma in view Anselm endeavours to prove by purely speculative
methods that we must conceive the Son of God as one in essence with the Father, as
distinct from Him in Person, but, in consequence of their oneness of essence, as equal to
Him in every respect. The Holy Ghost, in Anselm's teaching, is the Personal Divine Love
proceeding from the Father and the Son, and, — since God loves Himself in all His
infinitude, — one in essence with them as they are one with one another. We will not
enter further into these doctrines ; we may, however, add the remark that Anselm,
like Augustine, in his speculations on the subject of the Trinity, is fond of invoking the
analogy furnished by the three fundamental faculties of the human soul — the memory,
understanding and will.
348
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. — EVIL.
§ 103.
1. Regarding the Freedom of the Will, Anselm holds most peculiar
views. He starts from the principle that Free Will cannot be defined
as the faculty of choosing between good and evil, between sinning
and not sinning. If such were the definition we should be obliged
to deny Free Will to God and the good angels. The liberty to choose
evil cannot be admitted into our notion of Free Will. The power to
do evil is neither Free Will, nor an element of Free Will (De Lib.
Arb. c. 1.).
2. In defining the notion of Free Will, we must distinguish
between two kinds of volition — the volition of the rightful (voluntas
justi), and the volition of the convenient, voluntas commodi. The
latter is exercised of necessity ; for, in general, we necessarily desire
what is suitable to us. But it is not of necessity that we desire what
is right. Hence freedom does not belong to the volitions of the con
venient, but rather to the volitions of the rightful.
3. Now the Will can desire what is right only in case it is itself
righteous. The Will is not right and good because it desires what
is right and good, but contrariwise, it desires what is right and good
because it is itself right and good. The Will cannot, therefore,
acquire righteousness (rectitudo voluntatis) by its own volitions,
this quality must be conferred upon it by God, and only when it
has been so conferred can the Will desire what is rightful.
4. On the other hand man is capable of preserving this righteous
ness when he has once obtained it. And this precisely it is his task
to do. He can and ought to preserve it, and that for its own sake,
not for any ulterior advantage ; for only then is he righteous, and
preserves his righteousness, when he desires what is rightful for its
own sake. The man who does good for sake of some external
advantage, does not act rightfully in the strict sense of the word,
and does not, therefore, preserve his righteousness.
5. These notions furnish us at once with the concept of Free
Will. Freedom is nothing more than the power of the Will to
preserve righteousnesss (rectitudo voluntatis) for its own sake
(De Lib. Arb. c. 3). Understanding the notion of Freedom in this
wise we may assert that Freedom is invincible. No power other
than the Will itself can deprive the Will of righteousness ; it is only
by its own act of self-determination that the Will abandons its
righteousness. Temptation, be it never so great, has no power over
the Will unless the Will resolves to follow it, and so to abandon
righteousness.
6. Replying to the objection that this definition of Free Will involves the consequence
that man by committing sir has lost his liberty, Anselm answers in the negative. Although
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. — EVIL.
man has lost righteousness by sin, he, nevertheless, always possesses the power to retain
it in case it is bestowed upon him ; just as a man, who has not actual vision of an object
which is removed from his sight, possesses, nevertheless, the capacity to see it should it
be placed before his eyes. Man has become the slave of sin to this extent only that he
cannot of his own strength again attain to the righteousness which he has lost.
7. We cannot subscribe to these views of Anselm regarding the
nature of Free Will — at least not to the theory as a whole. For if
Free Will in general is the faculty of preserving righteousness for its
own sake, then man in his fallen state is only potentially free. The
actual exercise of the faculty is impossible to him — a consequence
which is wholly inadmissible. It is only when the notion of Free
Will is referred exclusively to things of the supernatural order,
that Anselm's definition can be safely admitted ; in this sphere
man, since the fall, has only a possible or potential exercise of
liberty.
8. Connected with and dependent on Anselm's doctrine of Free
Will is his theory regarding Evil. As we distinguish two kinds of
good, so we must distinguish two kinds of evil — the malum injus-
titice and the malum incommodi, the evil of unrighteousness, and
the evil of unhappiness. The former is moral evil. The notion of
moral evil is thus identical with the notion of unrighteousness ; it is
not, therefore, anything positive ; it is merely the negation of that
which ought to be, the privation of good, that is, of righteousness.
The malum incommodi is a consequence of malum injustitice, and
is itself primarily a negative conception, the privation of the suitable
or convenient, that is, of happiness. However, from this privation
of the suitable, other evils ensue, which are more than mere nega
tives, evils which have a positive character, such as sorrow, pain, etc.
Hence the malum incommodi is not, like moral evil, negative in
every respect ; in some respects it is negative, in others positive.
(De Casu Diab., c. 26).
9. Moral evil, or unrighteousness, being a privation of the good
which should exist, can be accomplished only by an act of the Will
desiring something which it should not desire. If we ask what it
is the Will should not desire, we are answered : Every rational being
is destined to eternal happiness ; it will attain this happiness by
preserving righteousness, that is, by submitting its Will to the Will
of God, and so giving Him the honour which is His due. If, how
ever, it withdraws its Will from the control of the Divine Will, and
thus in a certain degree makes its own will autonomous, it is striving
by this act — for the Will of God alone is autonomous — to make
itself, per rapinam, equal to God, and so robbing Him of the honour
it owes Him. Thus it is unrighteous towards God, and this un
righteousness constitutes moral evil.
10. From this, it further follows that evil can have its origin only
in Free Will. The reason why the Will abandons righteousness,
that is, does evil, is to be found in the Will itself and not elsewhere.
In this matter the Willis at once cause and effect, in ite own regard.
350
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
The Will can abandon righteousness by desiring what it ought not
to desire ; but this power is not the cause of the evil ; for the Will
does not abandon righteousness because it can abandon it, but
because it ivills to abandon it. The Will acts wrongly because it
wills so to act. In this matter there is no mere remote cause.
Least of all can the evil be traced back to God ; from God no evii
can come.
11. Furthermore, it follows that evil actions are not evil in their merely physical
character ; they are such only in consequence of the wickedness of the Will to which they
are attributable. It may, therefore, happen that one and the same action done by one man
may be good, done by another may be evil, according to the different purposes of Will with
which it is done. There are, however, some actions which cannot be good under any cir-
the sensual appetites were evil in themselves they would be wholly obliterated by Baptism
— a result which we know does not happen.
12. We will not enter here into Anselm's application of this theory
of evil to the Fall of the Angels ; this is a matter which belongs
rather to the history of Theology than to the history of Philosophy.
The proof of man's Immortality Anselm finds in man's destiny to
know and love God. If the soul is created for the knowledge and
love of God, it is created to know God, and love Him eternally ; for,
it is then inconceivable that it should also be destined to be one
day deprived of the love of God, whether through some deficiency in
itself or by the interposition of another power. Hence the soul must
be immortal. The same holds good of the souls which, through their
own fault, fail to reach their destined end ; for the divine justice
requires the punishment of those souls, and there would 'be no
punishment for them if they were deprived of existence. So they,
too, must be immortal. (Hanoi., c. 70-71).
5. — PETER ABELARD.
§104.
1. From the path which the speculations of Anselm had indi
cated another celebrated thinker, who rose to great eminence at the
beginning of the twelfth century, diverged widely in many respects.
We allude to Peter Abelard, Abelard was born about the year 1079,
in the village of Palais, in Bretagne (whence his nickname Peri-
pateticus Palatinus). He studied under Roscellin, William of Champ-
eaux, and Anselm of Laon, and distinguished himself by his
remarkable dialectical acuteness and readiness. At an early age he
began to teach at Paris, where, in a short time, his fame became so
great that men flocked from all parts of Europe to become his pupils.
His pride grew with his greatness, to such extent that, as he admits
himself, he regarded himself as the only philosopher of his day. But
PETER AHELAltJ).
this pride was followed by a fall. His immoral relations with the
niece of Canon Fulbert — the celebrated Heloise — and the vengeance
which her relative took upon him for the injury done her are well
known matters of history.
2. After his mishap, Abelard retired to the Abbey of St. Denis,
and began a course of theological lectures. His success was as great
as before. But his excessive rigorism made him enemies, and when,
further, in 1121, his Introductio ad Theoloyiam, was condemned by
a synod at Soissons, he was obliged to quit St Denis. He withdrew to
the neighbourhood of Nogent-sur-Seine, where he erected an oratory,
which he called Paraclete. Here, again, a large number of pupils
gathered round him, and he continued to lecture as before. A little
later (1126) he was elected abbot of St. Gildes de Ruys, in his native
province, but he did not long occupy this dignity. In 1136 he
returned to Paris, and resumed his functions as teacher. The
erroneous doctrines which he continued to propound at last roused St.
Bernard against him. His cause was judged at the Synod of Sens
(1140), and judgment pronounced against his unorthodox theories.
He resolved to go to Rome to defend himself there, but on his way
he was induced by Peter the Venerable to stop at Cluny. Here he
died in the year 1142.
3. The most important of Abelard's writings are his Introductio ad Theologian, his
Theolcgia Christiana, both following the same lines, and both incomplete. Further, we
have from him a Commentary on St. Paul's letter to the Romans, the Ethica, which bears
also the title Scito te ipsum, the Historia Calamitafxm, an Autobiography, his letters
to Heloise, a Treatise on Dialectic, an Apology, the book Sic et Non, in which, for each
dogmatic thesis cited, the grounds for and against are stated without any decision ; and a
number of less important writings.
4. On the vexed question of Universals, Abelard declares against
exaggerated Realism. He will not admit that the universal Exists
antecedently to the individual. But he has nowhere expressly
attempted an exact solution of the problem as to the nature of
Universals. He discusses it incidentally and polemically, but
does not take it up ex professo. This explains how it is that
different writers attribute different opinions to him in this connexion.
He is usually accounted a Nominalist ; but Ritter holds that the
Introd. ad Theol., II. 13, shows him to be a moderate Realist.
5. John of Salisbury states (Metal. //., 17) that Abelard and his followers charac
terised Universals as " sermones," whereas Roscellin and his school described them a?
" voces." According to Abelard, a Res (thing) cannot be predicated of a Res, and since
Universals, as a matter of fact, are predicated of individuals, they cannot be Jte*. and
consequently cannot have any objective reality. The character of Universality, therefore,
can only belong to the word, but it " belongs not to the word as such, as if the word were
something universal (for each word is itself only a single word), but to the word as applied
to a class of objects, to the word in so far as it is predicated of these objects, that is, to the
enunciation, to the " sermo de pluribus praedicabilis." If, now, we ask how this Universal is
obtained, we are told that it is by grouping a plurality of like objects under a common
notion in virtue of their likeness, and by expressing this common notion in the sermo
vradicabilis. This, it would appear, is the conceptualistic formula.
6. As for the attitude towards the Christian Faith assumed by
Abelard in his speculations, we may assert it to be rationalistic. We
352
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
lind him, indeed, laying distinct stress on the necessity for faith in
revealed truth. But against expressions of this kind we can set
others from his writings which are unmistakably rationalistic. In
his Historia Calamitatum (c. 9) he tells us that he was requested
by his pupils to furnish them with some rational arguments for the
doctrine of the Trinity, " on the ground that one cannot believe
what one has not first understood." He makes no protest against
the position here assumed by his pupils, and proceeds to discuss the
dogma of the Trinity in the spirit indicated by their appeal.
7. Nay, he expressly adopts and supports the principle in
question. He rejects the notion that we must begin by believing,
and thence advance to knowledge, and lays it down that we must
not at once believe, but first inquire by reason whether we can and
ought to believe, appealing in support of this view to the Scrip
tural text: Qui cito credit, levis est corde. And his meaning is, not
merely that we should assure ourselves by scientific knowledge of
the fact of a revelation, but that we should also examine rationally
the content of the revelation to determine whether it be worthy of
belief. For, he observes, that man believes in haste who, without
discrimination and prudence, contents himself with what is told him,
without examining, as far as possible, what is suggested to him in
order to determine whether it is worthy of faith. The objection
that a faith which is the outcome of scientific investigation is without
merit, he puts aside on the ground that faith becomes meritorious
when charitv is subsequently united with and perfects it (Lntr. ad
TheoL, Lib. II. c. 3, p. 1060, Ed. Migne).
8. In consequence of this rationalistic attitude, Abelard is led to
deny the supra-rational character of the Christian mysteries, and to
hold the view that they can be known, proved, and explained by
reason. To what purpose, he asks, would God reveal mysteries to us
if we could not understand them ? He applies this teaching, in the
first place, to the mystery of the Trinity. Adopting the saying of
Scripture that what is invisible in Him God has revealed to the
heathen in His works, Abelard argues that from the revelation made
of God in the world, the heathen could attain knowledge not only of
the being of God, but also of His triune life. As a matter of fact,
some of the ancient philosophers — Plato amongst others — did attain
to a knowledge of the Trinity. And as they did, so can we also by
reason alone establish the doctrine of the Divine Trinity. (Ib. p
1065. Theol Christ., p. 1313, sq.).
THE TRINITY AND CREATION.
§105
1. In establishing by mere speculation the doctrine of the Trinity,
Abelard begins with the concept of the Supreme Good. God is the
THE TRINITY AND CREATION. 358
supreme, the most perfect good. But He can be such only if, firstly,
He is able to do all things ; secondly, if He cannot deceive or be
deceived; and thirdly, if He wills to accomplish and to ordain all
things for the best. In other words, God can be the highest and
most perfect good only if He is almighty, all wise, and all powerful.
And it is precisely these three attributes of His being which are
designated by the terms : Father. Son, and Holy Ghost. By the term
" Father," His omnipotence is designated ; by the term " Son," His
wisdom; and by the term "Holy Ghost," His goodness. Hence when
we acknowledge God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we are equiva-
lently acknowledging Him as the highest and most perfect good.
In those three denominations we are merely expressing separately
what we combine in the phrase " highest and most perfect good."
(Intr. ad. Theol, Lib. I., c. 7, sqq.)
2. This conception of the Divine Trinity would convert the Divine Persona into
mere modes, for it would make them merely different aspects of the Divine Essence.
No doubt Abelard endeavours to secure himself against this difficulty by insisting that
he assigns these three divine attributes to the three several persons only per appropria-
tionemi.e., assigns to each that attribute which, though an attribute of the Divine
Being, is specially in harmony with the special character of the Person to whom it is
assigned. But, apart from the circumstance that this explanation destroys the
scientific value of the previous reasoning, it is to be noted that Abelard's further
development of his notion of appropriation, if it no longer makes the Persons mere
modes of the Divine Being, introduces the conception of their subordination one to
another.
3. In this development Abelard assigns Omnipotence to the Father absolutely.
The Son, on the other hand, as the Divine Wisdom, is in a certain sense a part of this
omnipotence, for wisdom is the power to discern the true from the false. The Holy
Ghost, as the Divine Goodness, in no way includes any element of omnipotence, for the
notion of goodness does not at all involve the notion of power. Hence the Son, as
partial power, proceeds from the substance of the Father, who is absolute omnipotence ;
but of the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as his character excludes the notion of power, it cannot
be asserted that He proceeds from the substance of the Father and the Son. Here we
have distinctly introduced the conception of a subordination among the Persons of the
Trinity, in the order fixed by St. Bernard : Omnipotentia, aliqua potcntia, nulla potentia.
4. We have further to observe that in the Holy Ghost — the Divine Goodness — there
is involved, according to Abelard, a necessary relation to the created order. For, he
argues, if the Holy Ghost, as the Divine Love, proceeds from the Father and the Son,
this love cannot have God Himself for its object ; for no one is said, in strict propriety of
language, to love himself. Love must always be directed towards another. Hence the
Holy Ghost is, from the very nature of the concept, the Divine Love or Goodness for
creatures — ^ot the personal love of God for Himself.
5. Having given this rational explanation of the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity, Abelard proceeds to establish and defend
the doctrine itself. He draws his arguments from three sources
—Scripture, the authority of the ancient philosophers, and reason.
The witness of the ancient philosophers in favour of the doctrine of
the Trinity he finds chiefly among the Platonists. These
philosophers, he contends, following the prophets, taught distinctly
the doctrine of the Trinity. They held that the vovg was born
of God, and was, like God, eternal. They appear also to have had
before them the Person of the Holy Ghost when they taught that
the World-Soul was a third person proceeding from God (a Deo)t
354
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
and was the life and saving of the world. Thus Abelard discovers
in the World-Soul the person of the Holy Ghost. He believes that
Plato named the Holy Ghost World-Soul; inasmuch as through
the goodness of God everything has life in His presence; nothing is
dead, that is, without its proper utility.
6. In his rational arguments in favour of the doctrine of the
Trinity, Abelard contents himself with adducing a few comparisons
and analogies, but here again his reasoning points to a conception of
the Trinity which reduces the Divine Persons to mere modes of
being, and establishes a subordination between them. The most
important of his comparisons is that of the seal. The seal, he says,
is an unit, but we nevertheless distinguish three elements in it — the
brass of which it is composed ; the form by which the brass becomes
a seal ; and, lastly, the whole which actually seals — i.e., impresses
its form upon the wax (ces ipsum, sigillabile, et sigillans). In
analogous fashion we must form our conception of the Divine
Trinity. The seal is of brass, but is not brass simply ; it is some
brass determined by the form. In the same way the Son is of the
Father, but is not, like the Father, Omnipotence simply, but a
determined power — namely, the power to discern between the true
and the false — which involves the concept wisdom. And, again, as
the seal, through the union of matter and form, acts as a seal and
impresses its image upon wax, so does the Holy Ghost proceed
from the Father and the Son, and, as the Divine Goodness, restores
in us the lost image of God, so that we put on the likeness of the
Son of God — that is, we become like to Christ (Intr. ad TkeoL, Lib.
//, c. 14, p. 1,087.)
7. Having thus established the doctrine of the Trinity, Abelard
proceeds to examine more closely the three divine attributes: Omni
potence, Wisdom, Goodness, with which he identifies the Three
Divine Persons. In reference to this portion of his speculations we
have to note that he is led to maintain on the one hand the necessity
of creation, and on the other a theory of optimism in reference to the
created world. These views he expresses in the formula: God could
not leave undone that which He is doing, and He could not do
anything more or anything better than what He is actually doing.
The following are his reasons for this opinion :
(a) God can only do what is good : now, if He did not do the good which he was able
to do, He would be either niggardly or unjust, inasmuch as the doing of good costs Him
no trouble. It is furthermore evident that in all that He does or omits God has a just
cause for His proceedings, so that He does or omits only that which must be done or
omitted, and which befits him to do or to omit. Hence, all that He does He must do ; for
if it is right that anything be done, it would be wrong if it should remain undone. For
this reason everything done by Him ia always the best. For if that which He leaves
undone were as good as that which He does there would be no reason to do the one and
leave the other undone, and without a reason God cannot act.
(6) We might object to this theory that, on the one hand, it does away with the con
tingent character of created things, and on the other is irreconcilable with the Free Will of
God. But this objection, we are told, doe? not hold. For, in the first place, created
things are of their own nature so constituted that of themselves they may be or not be —
ETHICS. ;$-,5
though in find the will to create them is eternal and necessary. Hence, in themselves
they are, and always remain, contingent entities. In the second place, Free Will does
not consist in this, that we have to make a choice and determine ourselves for one course
and against another, but in this that we are not constrained to do a thing against our will
Freedom means merely freedom from constraint. And this freedom can be attributed to
x*7e-nin e hyP°thesis that He necessarily created the world, for He created of His
Will not constrained to do so (Intr. ad. Tkcol., Lib. 3, c. 5, p. 1112, s. 99, Theol
God
own
Christ, p. 1323, s. 99.)
ETHICS.
§106.
1. In bis ethical teaching Abelard starts with the principle that
Christian law of morality is merely the natural moral law re
formed. The Christian law, therefore, adds nothing to the natural
moral law, which was known and followed by the ancient philoso
phers. In keeping with this notion is Abelard's assiduous laudation
of the virtue and moral perfection of the ancient philosophers.
Not alone the doctrine, he says, but the moral life as well, of those
old philosophers, was a thorough expression of the evangelical and
apostolic laws of perfection. As their teaching was in many respects
superior to that of Moses, so did their moral lives rise also to the
Uhristian level. It was by their moral purity that they merited that
lotty knowledge of theirs which so much excites our admiration.
2. Abelard distinguishes, in his teaching, between Vitium,
Pcccatum, and Actio Mala (vice, sin, and evil deed), Vitium is the
inclination of the Will to evil; this is not in itself sinful, it is merely
a weakness, a moral deficiency. Sin proper consists in the consent
of the Will to the evil inclination or appetite ; for this involves an
injury to, and a contempt of, God. The Actio Mala, that is, the
external exercise of the evil Will, does not add to the sin. No doubt
the Actio Mala, is accompanied by pleasure, but this pleasure is not,
in itself, sinful, and, cannot, therefore, add to the sin. (Ethic., cc.
2, 3.)
3. Furthermore, all actions are, in themselves, indifferent as
regards moral character. Their moral character depends exclusively
on the subjective intention of the individual who performs them.
Lf this intention is good the action is good, if it is evil, the action is
evil. Hence, the same action may be good when done by one indi
vidual, and evil when done by another, according to the different
intentions by which it is accompanied. Hence, also, an action done
in ignorance or in unbelief, cannot be sinful. For when there is
no trespass against conscience there can be no question of sin in the
proper sense, and when the agent acts in ignorance or unbelief
he does^not offend against his conscience (76., c. 37.)
4. Evil, it may be stated in general terms, is necessary in the
world ; in the sense, however, that God could not prevent it. For, as a
fact, evil exists in the world ; and since God could not create another
35 G HISTOitY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
and a better world, it follows that when God creates He must at the
same time permit evil. It is, however, to be noted that only grievous
sins are sins in the strict sense of the word ; the so-called venial
sins are not, strictly speaking, sinful. Hence, God can forbid all sin
without imposing an intolerable yoke, for we can, though with trouble
and effort, avoid through our whole lives sin properly so-called, that
is grievous sin. (Ib. c. 15.)
5. Abelard's teaching is proof how surely a rationalistic dialectic
applied to the Christian mysteries will result in a complete per
version of their import. Abelard complains of the pride and per
versity of the rationalistic dialecticians of his age. There is much
reason to regret that he did not escape what he censures in others.
St. Bernard had good cause for the opposition he offered him ; and
to St. Bernard's opposition we owe it that Abelard was not able to
secure a following, and that his teaching remained without notable
influence in the development of Christian philosophy.
CONTEMPORARIES AND SUCCESSORS OF ABELARD.
§107.
Abelard held the Philosophy of Plato in high esteem. In the
same period we meet with several other notable teachers who
exhibited strong leanings towards Platonism. They did not, how
ever, wholly reject the teaching of Aristotle, but sought to bring it
into harmony with Plato's doctrine. It is usual to describe these
philosophers by the general epithet " Platonists." Amongst them
are reckoned Adelard of Bath, Bernard of Chartres, ^ William of
Conches, and Walter of Mortagne. They all taught in the first
half of the twelfth century.
(a) We have from Adelard two philosophical treatises : — De Eodem et Diverso, and
Qucestiones Naturales, from which Jourdain (History of the Aristotelian Writings of the
Middle Ages] gives extracts. The treatises are thoroughly Platonist in tone. It is
species as existing _
species and genera, according as we regard in them their individual existence, or in the
common elements in which they resemble one another. At the same time Plato was
right in his teaching that these Universals in their absolute purity have existence only
apart from the objects of sense, that is, in the Divine mind."
(6) Bernard of Chartres, a teacher in the town from which he took his name, is
mentioned, by John of Salisbury as the most remarkable Platonist of his age. Cousin
(CEuvres inedits d' Abelard) has published some extracts from his principal work, a cosmo
graphy divided into two parts with the titles Megacosmos and Microcosmos . He holds
by the three principles of the Platonists— God, the vovg and the world-soul. The VO'VQ
is born of God, is one in substance with Him, and holds in Himself the ideas, the eternal
archetypes of all genera, species, and individuals. From this Divine Reason the world-soul
proceeds, by a process of emanation, and then, in virtue of its participation in the Divine
ideas, brings forth, in the progress of time, all things that exist in the world in an
unchangeable order. Maiter is the cause of the imperfection and evil which exist in
GILBEIVT DE LA PORREE. 357
the world. In addition to these points of Platonist doctrine, Bernard further admit:- \ h :
pre-existence of souls.
(c) The same theories appear in the teaching of William of Conches, who taught in
Paris till late in the twelfth century. Like Abelard he identifies the world-soul with
the person of the Holy Ghost, and he insists strongly on the doctrine of creation. He
preferred to be a follower of Christ rather than of the Academy.
(d) Walter of Mortagne, teacher in Paris, and subsequently Bishop of Laon ( + 1174),
taogfct, according to John Salisbury (Met. ii., 17), in reference to Universals, that "the
same objects according to the different states (status) in which they «re considered, i.e.
according as attention is directed to their difference or to their non-difference (indifffreng
or consimile), are individuals, or genera and species." Thus Plato, as Plato, is an indivi
dual ; as man, a species ; as living being, a genus ; as substance, an ultimate genus.
GILBERT DE LA PQRBEE.
§ 108.
1. A more important philosophical figure of this period
than any of the Platonists we have named is Gilbert de la Porree.
He was born at Poitiers, studied under Bernard of Chartres and
others, became professor at Churtres, and subsequently at Paris, was
appointed Bishop of Poitiers, and died there in 1159. His most
important writings are commentaries upon the works attributed to
Boethius : De Trinitate ; De Prcedicatione Trium Per sonar um ;
Quod substantial bonce sint; and De Duabus Naturis et una Per
sona in Christo. In addition we have a work De sex Principiis,
treating of the six last categories of Aristotle. These writings are,
for the most part, very obscure in style, but they exhibit an extensive
acquaintance with the dialectical studies of the age.
2. According to Gilbert the laws which obtain in the natural
acquisition of knowledge cannot be applied straightway in dealing
with theological doctrines. In matters theological, which transcend
our natural faculties, principles find place which differ widely from
the principles of merely natural knowledge, though they do not
contradict the latter. He adds that the neglect of this important
truth gave rise to the heresies of Sabellius and Arius.
3. Dealing with Universals, Gilbert holds that they are founded
on the conformity (resemblance) between the essential forms of
certain things, which forms have their archetypes in the Divine idea.
The whole of those objects whose formes nativce resemble one
another, can, in virtue of this resemblance, be embraced under one
notion which is applicable to each. The Universal, therefore, is the
result of a process of abstraction applied to a number of individuals.
These are represented as a unit in the Universal concept, not as if
they all possessed one and the same individual nature, but only
inasmuch as their resemblance to one another allows them to be
358
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
reduced to unity in thought. It is not, then, the multiplicity and
diversity of accidental qualities which effects the multiplicity and
diversity of individuals, but rather the former is the consequence
and the token of the latter: things are in themselves multiple and
diverse.
4. That by which a given individual is what it is, is its avvla.
This ovtrla (essence) is also called subsistence, ovtrtWtc, in so far as it
does not require any ulterior entity in which it should exist as in
its subject. The essence or subsistence is, therefore, that by which
the individual has being — id quo est. The individual itself is that
entity which has being by such essence or subsistence — id quod est,
and is, accordingly, styled a subsistent being. This subsistent being
is denominated substance (v* 6070.0-10) in so far as it is the sustain
ing substratum of accidental qualities ; it receives the name person
(TTPOO-WTTOV) when it is of a rational nature.
5. This fundamental conception enables him to fix the dif
ference between Matter and Form. Form is that element by which
the specific being of an object is determined ; matter is the deter-
minable substratum of this form. In the case of the individual, Form
and Subsistence are one and the same thing. All forms of things
have their highest and ultimate cause in the Primal Form, that is,
in God ; in the world of created realities, however, forms do not exist
apart from matter.
6. The Aristotelian categories cannot, in strict accuracy ,be applied
to God, for God is the Absolute Primal Form, wholly dissociated from
matter. God is not, in the proper sense, what is expressed by those
concepts ; they are applied to Him only in an analogous sense. This
holds good even for the concept of substance, for substance implies
accidents, and there are none such in God. Further, it is to be
observed that when we apply these concepts in an analogous sense
to God, we express by each of them only the incomposite (simple)
essence of the Divine Being. In God there is nothing which is not
His Divinity, nothing which is not His Essence. In God it is not
one thing to be, another to be just, that by whicn He is, is that also
by which He is just. And so of the other notions.
7. And yet when Gilbert is treating of the Trinity he introduces into the Divine
Being the distinction between quo est and quod est, and so is led to admit a real distinc
tion between the Divine Essence, and the three Divine Persons. The Divine Essence,
he says, cannot, as such, be denominated God; it is only that by which God is God.
Just as every thing is what it is because of its form — this form being different from that
which is by means of it — so also we must admit some such form in God by which Ke is,
but which is not God ; this is the Divine Essence. We can call " God" only that which
is by means of the Divine Essence (id quod est) ; and what so exists is threefold, Father
Son and Holy Ghost.
8. Gilbert's conception of the relation existing between the Divine Essence and the
Three Divine Persons would make the three Persons units capable of forming a number,
which are, however, what they are through onn Divine Essence. This oneness of Essence
or Form, is the cause why, though differing from one another, they cannot be called
three Gods. But, neither taken singly, nor taken together, are they the Divine Essence ;
there is an Essence, says Gilbert, by which these three Persons are, but which they are
AMALRIC OF CHARTRES ; DAVID OF DINANT. 359
not. This doctrino introduces a real distinction between the Divine Essence, and the
Divine Persons, and makes of the Trinity a Qiiaterwty. St. Bernard combated this
false teaching : it was condemned in a Synod at Rhcims (1149) and was, in consequence,
abandoned by Gilbert.
AMALRIC OF CHARTRES. DAVID OF DINANT.
§109.
1. IN the second half of the twelfth century, and the beginning
of the thirteenth, we meet with two teachers whose errors of
doctrine were still more dangerous than those of Gilbert. The
first of them is Amalric of Chartres (more properly of Bene in the
district of Chartres) a professor at Paris. In his philosophical
doctrines he adopted Scotus Erigena as his guide, aud gave full
development to the pantheistical principles embodied in that philo
sopher's system. According to Gerson, he taught that Ideas are
created, and create in their turn. Through them things come forth
from God in their multiplicity and diversity. But God is the
ultimate end of all things, and therefore all things return to Him
again and become in Him one undivided being — become what they
were before they went forth from Him. This is clearly pantheis
tical. Still more distinctly so are the following principles which
Gerson quotes : " As Abraham and Isaac were of one and the same
nature, so are all things one, and that one being is God : God is the
essence of all things : In love human nature ceases to be a created
thing ; it becomes one with God and is absorbed into His being.
(Gers., Concord. Met. cum Log.; and-De Myst.Theol. $pecuZ.,Cons.41. J
2. The second of the teachers we have mentioned is David or
Dinant, a pupil of Amalric, and, like him, a professor at Paris. He
lays it down in his work, De Tomis, i.e., De Divisionibus, cited by
Albert the Great, that God is the Primal Matter, which forms the
one substratum of all things corporeal and spiritual. He distin
guishes three kinds of objects: bodies, souls, and separated sub
stances. Bodies have their oneness in Matter ; souls in the vcvc ;
separated substances in God. But, in the last analysis, the three
principles, Matter, vovg and God cannot be different from one
another. If they differed, they should differ by their specific forms,
and we should, therefore, have to assume a universal principle
which could be reduced to these three species of being. But a
higher genus of this sort is inadmissible. In such an assumption
we conceive an ulterior Matter to account for the Primal Matter
there is the same reason to conceive another to account for this, and
so backwards without end. There is, therefore, nothing left us but
to assert that Primal Matter, Spirit, and God, are one and the same
thing.
3. It appears certain that in these strange opinions we may
trace the influence of the Arabian Philosophy with which, at this
360 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
period, the West was beginning to make acquaintance. The doct
rines of Amalric and of David of Dinant were condemned in a Synod
at Paris (1209), in the Lateran Council under Innocent III. (1215);
and their writings, as well as the works of Erigena, and the writings
of Aristotle, to which they had appealed, were prohibited.
THE MYSTICS.
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX.
§ no.
1. In studying the history of Mediaeval Mysticism, we must keep
before us two important facts : In the first place, the Christian
Mystics were far from regarding mystical contemplation as the
ordinary path to intellectual knowledge ; they rather held it to be
something supernatural, dependent on an extraordinary gift of God's
illuminating grace. The ordinary method of attaining knowledge
wns for them what it was for the other Scholastics.
2. In the second place, they never devoted themselves exclusively
to the investigation and exposition of the processes of the ascetico-
contemplative life ; they always gave considerable attention to the
work of speculation proper. Their speculative works, however,
differ in this from those of other thinkers, that in them the products
of abstract thought are exhibited against a back-ground of ideas
furnished by the contemplative life. In this way their speculations
come to us <vith a certain tinge of mysticism, and are, besides, set
forth with a certain unction which renders them apt for purposes of
edification as well as of instruction.
3. The founder of the Christian Mysticism of the Middle Ages
was Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153), on whom his contemporaries
conferred the title of Doctor MelUfluus. The vigorous and far-
reaching activity which this man displayed, and the profound
influence which he exercised, as well on the ecclesiastical spirit as
on the historical events of his time, have made his name immortal
in the history of the Church.1 But it is not with this aspect of his
1 He was brought up by his pious mother, Alctha, in the fear of God, and at the
age of twenty-three retired into the monastery of Citeaux. Three years later he was
elected Abbot of the newly-founded abbey of 'Clairvaux. Soon he was called from his
retirement into public life. He induced the anti-pope Anacletus to yield to the claims of
the rightful Pope, Innocent II, and so averted a threatened schism. He combated the
teaching of Abelard, and secured his condemnation in the Synod of Sens (1140). With
equal energy he opposed Gilbert and the Cathari. Arnold of Brescia in his attempts at
rebellion found in him his most formidable opponent. With outspoken boldness he condemned
tlie abuses which had crept into the Church, and in this sense addrsssed his exhortations
to the Pope himself, Eugene III., and called for reform. The second crusade, undertaken
in 1147, was due wholly to him. In this fashion, strong in spirit, though wsak in borly,
he worked on with untiring energy untD his death.
HUGH OF ST. VICTOR. 361
life we have to do ; we arc concerned only with the doctrines ^vhich
he set forth in his writings in reference to the life o£ mystical
contemplation.
4. In the writings which treat of this life of mystical contemplation are included not
only his sermons, but in particular the three treatises : De Gradibus Humilitatis ; DC Dili-
yendo Deo ; and De Consider -atione. In his teaching, the basis of all mystical elevation is
Humility, the virtue which renders man lowly and of small account in his own eye*.
Through twelve stages or degrees this virtue rises to its highest perfection. Humility
must chen develop into thelovo of God ; the flower of love must spring from the root of
humility. This love will then bear the spirit aloft into the region of higher
enlightenment.
5. When man, by humility and love, has attained to the higher life of the spirit,
then it is given him to contemplate truth, and in prayer and reverence, to penetrate into
its depths. And the deeper he enters, by contemplation, into the eternal truth, the
more does his astonishment increase. It may happen, as a consequence of this bewilder
ing astonishment, that the mind passes wholly out of itself, and in this state of rapture
loses itself in the ocean of infinite truth. This condition is called Ecstasy.
6. In this state of ecstasy the soul enjoys, for a moment a foretaste of that con
dition into which it will enter after the deatli of the body. For, in that life to come this
hard will of ours will become liquefied, and all our volitions will unite with and mingle
with the will of God. As the drop of water falling into a vessel o* wine passes wholly
into the wine, so the soul, in that future life, will retain nothing of itself, but pass
wholly into God. Not that its essence or substance will perish; these remain for ever.
But they will assume a form wholly d' vino ; the soul will be deified.
HUGH OF ST. VICTOR.
§ 111.
1. With St. Bernard we associate his contemporary and friend,
Hugh of St. Victor (1037-1141). According to some authorities, he
was born at Ypres, in Flanders; according to others, in Lower
Saxony. His education was begun in the monastery of Hammers-
leben, near Halberstadt, continued and completed in the monastery
of St. Victor, near Paris. He was soon appointed to preside over
the school of the latter monastery, and in this post he laboured till
his death. He was not a mystic merely — he was an earnest and
profound thinker as well. Of this he gives evidence in his com
prehensive work De Sacramentis, in which he sketches a fairly
complete theological system, and this on the lines indicated by
Anselm.
2. What we have observed above, regarding the intellectual
labours of the mediaeval mystics is specially applicable to Hugh's
work, De Sacramentis. Through all the intricate speculations of
the author, there runs a strain of the element of mystical contempla
tion which lends a peculiar charm to the work, that appeals alike to
the intellect and to the emotions. As well in matter as in style, this
treatise belongs to the most beautiful and most excellent which the
Christian spirit of the Middle Ages has produced. We have in it a
grace of thought and a refinement of sentiment, which are want-
362
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
ing in the writings of Anselm, and which remind us, in some way,
of the works of Plato.
3. God, says Hugh, has from the beginning so ordained things that
man could never know God fully, i.e., in all His perfection, but in
such wise also that he could never be wholly ignorant of God. If
God had permitted man to know Him in the fulness of His perfec
tion, there would have been no merit in faith, unbelief would have
been impossible. If, on the other hand, God had hidden Himself
wholly from man, faith would have been wholly unsupported by
reason, and so unbelief would have found excuse. (De Sacram., Lib.
I, part 3, c. 2.)
4. If we ask : In what way has God made Himself known to man ?
we are answered that He has done so in two ways : through Reason
and by Revelation. And in each of these ways of reaching the
knowledge of God we must distinguish two methods. As for
rational knowledge, man derives the knowledge partly from the con
templation of his own inner nature, and partly from the contempla
tion of visible nature. In the sphere of revelation, God either
makes Himself known by divine inspiration, or man receives
knowledge of Him by the teaching of others, the truth of which is
confirmed by miracles. (De Sacram. Lib., L, p. 3, c. 3.)
5. Referring to the proofs for God's existence, Hugh lays special stress on the proof
derived from the nature of mind. The mind knows itself as an existent something, and,
in this self-knowledge, discriminates and distinguishes between itself and the body and
from all else that surrounds it. At the same time that it apprehends itself as really exist
ing, it also understands that it has not always existed, that it has, therefore, had a
beginning, and that the cause of this beginning cannot have been itself. And thus it is
inevitably led to recognise the action of a a creative power, which, as such, has been the
cause of its existence. This power cannot have had a beginning, otherwise the same
argument could be applied to it, and, thus, an endless series would be postulated. This
power, therefore, exists of itself, and is eternal, that is, it is God. (Lib. I., 1. 28).
6. The unity of God is demonstrated, in the first place, by the harmony of all things
among themselves ; for such a far extending harmony cannot be accounted for unless we
assume a single ordaining mind. If we suppose a number of First Causes, which merely
resemble one another, we have, indeeed, a kind of unity, an unity of resemblance to wit ;
but such an unity is not perfect, it only approximates to perfect unity, God, however,
is the highest and most perfect bein^r, and to Him every attribute must be assigned in
its perfection. He is, therefore, a perfect unity, and this He can be only if He stands
alone, having beside Him no being which resembles Him.
7. In God we must recognise a two-fold power : the power to do, and the power
which makes God incapable of suffering. Under both respects God must be regarded
as omnipotent. On the one hand, He can do whatsoever He wills, and on the other
nothing can so act upon Him that He could be regarded as passive under its influence.
God cannot, however, do anything which would conflict with His being, or His attri
butes, but that is no evidence of defective power ; it rather proves His omnipotence, for
if He could do such acts He would not any longer be omnipotent. And since God is
omnipotent, there is no ground for the assertion that God could do anything but that
which He has done, or make things better than He has actually made them. Such
notions set bounds to the infinite power of God — they are self-contradictory and unwar
rantable. (De Sacra., L. 1, p. 2, c. 22).
8. We will not here enter further into Hugh's theoretical reason
ings ; we pass on to notice his mystical doctrines, which we find
contained partly in the great work we have been noticing, and
HUGH OF ST. VICTOR. 3G3
partly in smaller treatises, such as De Area Noe mystica, De Area
Noe mo rail, De Arrha Anima>, De Vanitaie Mundi, De Modo
Dicendi et Meditandi', &c. Here too, we may call attention to
another of his remarkable works, the Eruditio Didascalorum,
which contains a plan for a scientific encyclopedia, sketching the
matter and the scope of the several sciences.
9. Hugh distinguishes three faculties in man's capacity for
cognition : Imagination, Reason, Intelligence. To these three forms
of the cognitive power in man correspond three forms of activity,
Cogitatio, belonging to Imagination, Meditatio to Reason, and
Contemplatio to Intelligence. Cogitatio deals with objects of sense,
and is nothing more than the act of sensuous perception. Meditatio
is the act of discursive thoughts, the persistent effort of inquiry into
the inner nature and relation of things, which seeks to discover the
•what, and hoiu, and wherefore of them. Finally, Contemplatio is
the clear, unimpeded intuition of the mind in which, without any
aid from processes of reasoning, it immediately beholds, and repre
sents in consciousness, ideal objects.
10. Having given this explanation, Hugh proceeds to show that
man is able, and is bound, to raise himself through the lower stages
to the contemplative state. The fundamental requirement of this
self-elevation is, in the first place, moral perfection in Christian
charity, and in the second, the withdrawal of the soul within itself,
and its renunciation of the things of sense. When the soul has thus
fitted itself for mystical contemplation, its vision ranges without
hindrance through the infinite sphere of Divine truth ;"the soul is
lifted above itself, and is immersed in the ocean of the Divine light.
^ 11. But Hugh will not admit, anymore than does St. Bernard, that
this mystical elevation is wholly the work of man ; he regards it as
a matter which is essentially dependent on God's illuminating grace.
Man, he says, was originally endowed by God with a three-fold
faculty of vision: the eye of the flesh (Imagination), the eye of
Reason, and the eye of Contemplation. But owing to the darkness
which fell upon his soul in consequence of sin, the eye of contempla
tion became wholly darkened ; and the vision of reason also was
troubled, so that it could no longer discern the truth clearly and
distinctly. But the grace of Redemption has not only restored its
clearness and brightness to the eye of Reason, it has also again
opened the eye of Contemplation, so that man, thanks to illumina
ting grace, is again enabled to climb the heights of mystical
contemplation.
12. This however, he can do only when the whole process of
Contemplation is founded upon Faith. Faith must come to the aid
of Reason, which sin has obscured, if man's efforts are to reach the
result desired ; and in the same way Faith must furnish the immu
table basis of Contemplation. For Faith reveals to us what is hidden,
and besides, presents those natural truths which would otherwise
4d64 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
remain unknown to the mind — forms of truth which its own unaided
cowers would never have enabled it to reach.
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR.
§112.
1. Hugh's pupil and successor, Richard of St. Victor (fl!73),
a Scotchman by birth, followed in the footsteps of his master. Like
Hugh, he combines the speculative and the contemplative elements
in his system of doctrine, and in both departments his work is of
singular excellence. As an example of his efforts in the field of
pure speculation we may cite his work De Trinitate, which con
tains a fairly complete body of speculative doctrine regarding God,
and the triune life of God. Of the works he has given to the
literature of mystical contemplation we may mention De Prcepara-
tione ad Contemplationem (Benjamin minor), and De Contempla
tions (Benjamin major). Of importance, also, are his treatises
De statu interior is hominis, and De Exterminatione Mali.
2. As the basis of Richard's teaching in the sphere of mystical
contemplation we find Hugh's threefold division of the cognitive
faculties (Imagination, Reason, Intelligence), and of the cognitive
functions (Cogitatio, Meditatio, Contemplatio). Like his master,
he regards moral perfection and the retirement of the soul within
itself as the necessary conditions of a life of mystical contemplation.
Riciiard compares Will and Reason with Jacob's two wives, Leah
and Rachel. Jacob was first united with Leah, and by her he became
the father of sons and daughters ; subsequently Rachel became his
wife, and bore to him Joseph and then Benjamin. In the same way
the Will must first be impregnated by God's grace, so that it may
bring forth virtues from itself and in itself; the soul must then
retire within itself, and contemplate itself as the image of God, so
that self knowledge, the "Joseph" of spiritual life, may be generated
within it. Only in this wise can it raise itself to the functions of
contemplation, only thus can " this Benjamin" of the spiritual state
attain life aud form within it.
3. These principles being established, Richard proceeds to
classify the objects with which contemplation has to do. He finds
of these six orders or degrees :
(a) The first order is, "in imaginations et secundum iuiaginationem." Here contempla
tion turns to the sensible world to behold in its beauty the beauty of God.
(b) The second order is, " in imaginatione et secundum rationem." Here contem-
I'latiou goes back to the causes of visible things, in order to observe aud admire iu them
tho power and wisdom of God.
(c) The third order is, " in ratione et secundum imaginationem." Here contem
plation is directed to the supra-sensible manifested in sensible things, i.e.t to the ideas of
these things in so far as they exhibit a reflex of the Divine essence.
(d) The fourth order is, " in ratione et secundum rationem." Here contemplation
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR. 305
takes as its object purely spiritual beings such as the human soul and the angels, ami, in
these beings, God in His " image," for spiritual beings exhibit the " image" (imago) of
God.
(e) The tifth order is, " supra rationem sed non prreter rationem." Here contempla
tion rises to the consideration of God Himself, but of God only in so far as He can be
known by Reason, that is to say, as He is represented by the concept of essence and attri
butes.
(/) Finally, the sixth order is, " supra rationem et prater rationem." Here con
templation is directed to those impenetrable Divine mysteries which transcend all our
powers of knowledge, that is, in the first place, to the Divine Trinity, and then to the
mysteries of Revelation.
4. But it is not merely the differences between the objects con
templated which enable him to establish different degrees of contem
plation ; he also enumerates varying degrees in which the difference
is one of intensity in the act of contemplation itself. In this respect
there are three degrees.
(a) In the first degree we have an expansion of the mind (mentis dilatatio), that is to
say, the range of contemplative vision is extended, in consequence of which the hardness
and dryness of the affections disappear, and the mind becomes, after a fashion, dissolved,
like wax.
(6) In the second degree we have an elevation of the mind (mentis sublevatio), a condi
tion in which, in consequence of the influx of divine light, contemplation transcends the
limits within which the ordinary operations of the human mind are confined.
(c) The third degree is a state of rapture (mentis alienatio) ; the mind attains to a con
dition in which all the lower mental faculties are reduced to silence, individual consciousness
is suspended, and the mind in its act of contemplation sinks wholly into the ocean of divine
light, BO that it is lost in the intuition permitted it.
5. This transport of mind, or Ecstasy, is the highest point to
which man can reach. Here Rachel dies in giving birth to Benjamin ;
that is to say, the birth of the higher life of ecstasy is possible only
on condition that Sense and Reason are rendered inactive, and the
eye of Intelligence alone remains open to the light. But this degree
of mystical elevation cannot be attained by man's unaided efforts.
His powers are of no avail here ; everything must be done by God's
illuminating grace. Man may, indeed, prepare and dispose himself
for this stage of the mystical life, but he lijust wait for the coming of
the light. Furthermore, what he has seen in his condition of ecstasy
must subsequently be tested by comparison with Sacred Scripture ;
if it is contradicted by Scripture it is illusion ; if it is rot confirmed
by Scripture it is to be suspected, or, at least, held uncertain.
6. Of the school of writers here under notice there remains to be mentioned Walter of
St. Victor, Richard's successor in the office of Prior. Wit.h him mere speculation is much
less in favour than with his predecessors. The overweening pretensions of the " modern
Dialecticians " of the period led him to adopt this attitude. In matters theological he will
not take his stand upon merely rational grounds ; above and beyond all he relies on the
authority of the Fathers. He composed a work " Against the four Labyrinths of France "
(Abelard, Gilbert, Peter Lombard and Peter of Poitiers). He cites various propositions
from the works of these writers, which he declares to be heretical, and sets in contrast
with these views what h<> re.^irds as the genuine Catholic doctrines. There can be no doubt
that he went too far in his condemnation of scientific speculation.
7. We have now to notice three men with whom we may fitly
close our account of the Theological and Philosophical movement of
the first mediaeval period, inasmuch as they brought together and
366
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
reduced to orderly arrangement the results obtained during the
entire period. These writers are :
8. PETER LOMBARD, ALANUS OF RYSSEL AND JOHN OF SALISBURY.
113.
1. It is customary to regard HiLlebert of Lavardin. Archbishop ot
Tours, as the writer who, in the beginning of the twelfth century, in
his Tractat2i$ Theologicus, first gave a general account of the dogmas of
religion. But this merit does not belong to Hildebert ; it belongs of
right to Hugh of St. Victor. The proper systematic treatment of
religious dogmas was the work of a later period of the twelfth cen
tury. We lind it accomplished in certain collected theological
treatises known as Libri Sententiarum. Works of this kind are
ascribed to Robert Pulley n ( + 1150), Robert of Melun, Hugh of Rouen
( + 1164), and Peter of Poitiers, Chancellor of the University of
Paris ( + 1205). The most remarkable work of this description is,
however, the Quatuor Libri Sententiarum, by Peter Lombard,
Professor at the Paris University (+ 1164).
2. The Libri Sententiarum of Peter Lombard are nothing
more than a compendious, systematically arranged catalogue of the
Christian dogmas and the principles immediately derived from them.
In carrying out his plan the author first states the dogma or the
derived truth, then adds the proofs from Scripture or the Fathers,
or from reason, which go to support it ; after which he refutes the
arguments urged against it, or endeavours to reconcile with his
teaching the passages from the Fathers which might be cited against
it. A work carried out according to this plan is specially suited for
theological teaching ; hence the general adoption of Lombard's work
as a text-book in the theological schools of the middle ages ; hence
also the numerous commentaries on the Sentences which we owe t >
the Schoolmen.
3. In the arrangement of the material with which he dealt,
Lombard's plan is in many respects defective ; but it had at least
this merit, that it prepared the way for the more perfect systems
produced at a later period in those works which bore the title
Summa. Lombard divided the entire subject matter which he
undertook to treat into two broad divisions — the doctrine of things
and the doctrine of signs. By thing he understood that which is
not employed to signify or symbolize something else ; by signs lie
understood the Sacraments, for these are the effective signs or tokens
of grace. In the doctrine of things he makes, further, a fourfold
division. He distinguishes between those things which are objects
of enjoyment, those which are objects of use, those which are at once
objects of enjoyment and use, and lastly, those things which use and
enjoy. The object of enjoyment is God ; the object of use, the
ALANUS OF RYSSEL.
things of the created world ; the objects of enjoyment and use, the
virtues ; the objects which use and enjoy, men and the angels.
Lombard treats first of God and of the Divine Trinity, then of
created things in general, next of the angels and of man ; lastly, he
has a treatise on the Sacraments.
4. In Lombard's Sentences, positive theology is assigned the first
and principal place ; speculation is admitted only in subordinate
measure. In the works of Alanus of Ryssel, on the other hand, the
philosophical element is in the ascendant. Alanus was a native of
Lille (Ryssel, ab insulis), in Flanders, entered the Cistercian order
at tlairvaux, and becaine a pupil of St. Bernard. He subsequently
became professor at Paris, where he won for himself the honourable
title of Doctor Universalis. He died Bishop of Auxerre in 1202. His
chief work bears the title: J)e arte sive de articulisjidei Catholics
ad Clementem III. In addition, we have from him the treatise,
Regular Theologies, and five books against heretics.
5. In the first of the works here named, Alanus enunciates the
dogmas of Catholic teaching in brief epigrammatic propositions,
adding to each, in the same concise fashion, the arguments from
Reason which the schools had hitherto employed to support them.
The order followed in the arrangement of the propositions cited is,
in general, the same as that adopted by Lombard. His reasons for
insisting mainly on the philosophical proofs for these propositions
(at least in his principal work) are stated in his dedication of
the work to Clement III.
6. The attacks upon the Faith by Mohammedans, Jews, and
heretics furnished, he says, the occasion for his work. His purpose
is to defend the doctrine of the Church against these opponents.
He will not, therefore, appeal to miracles or to the authority of the
Fathers, for such sources of argument would not be recognised by
his antagonists. He will abide by the arguments furnished by mere
Reason, to which no exception can be taken. Hence, his work is
an apology rather than a treatise of dogmatic theology. Alanus is,
however careful to point out that rational arguments on the subject
of the Mysteries are not strictly demonstrative in their force. They
are merely probable reasons, though, as such, very convincing (pro-
babiles rationes, quibus perspicax ingcnium vix possit resistere).
7. We come now to John of Salisbury. He was born about 1110
(according to some authorities in 1120) at Salisbury, in England;
passed over to France in 1136 to give himself to the study of the
sciences, and had the advantage there of the teaching of the ablest
men of the period (Abelard, Albericli, Robert of Melun, William of
Conches, Gilbert, Robert Pulleyn, etc.). Like Abelard and Bernard
of Chartres, he embraced within the range of his studies the classical
authors of antiquity as well as the sciences of Logic and Theology.
In the year 1151 he returned to England, where he became chaplain
to the Primate, Theobald of Canterbury, and after the death of the
6
368 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
latter was appointed secretary to the new Archbishop, Thomas
Beckett, to whom he remained, during the whole of his administra
tion . a staunch friend and supporter. Subsequently he was appointed
Bishop of Chartres. He died in the year 1180.
8. The most remarkable works of John of Salisbury are the
Polycraticus, sen de Nugis Curialium, in which he describes and
strongly censures the Court manners of the period; the Entheticus,
and, lastly, the Metalogicus, in which he discusses the merits of
Logic, and undertakes its defence. For our special purpose the last
work is alone of importance. While undertaking the defence of
Logic, the author of the Metalogicus does not omit to condemn
emphatically the abuse of it by the "Modern Dialecticians " of his
time. He rebukes them for making Dialectics the one source of
argument in every question, and disregarding the authority of the
Fathers, a method which leads them to the wildest assertions. In
this respect these " Modern Dialecticians " are far from being
followers of the ancient philosophers. The latter have, no doubt,
fallen into grievous errors, but their method was much better than
that of the Cornuficii (a nickname for the sophistical logicians).
9. Applying these principles, John of Salisbury recommends
caution and a wise scepticism in scientific matters. Truths
immediately evident to the mind, and the propositions which follow
of necessity from them, must not be questioned ; neither can the facts
of experience, nor the principles of the Faith ; all these truths are
lifted out of the region of doubt. But in matters in which we have
not the guarantee of Faith, nor the sure testimony of our senses, nor
an inference from the evident principles of Reason to guide us, we
must not assert boldly and recklessly ; but, after the manner of the
Academicians, withhold our judgment, and thus avoid adopting as
certain what is not certain in reality. Again, we must not spend
overmuch time upon useless problems, lest we lose sight of those which
are of real importance ; we must not act as, e.g., the Dialecticians
do in reference to the theory of universals, ft^on which each author
sets up an opinion for himself (he enumerates eight of those which
were current at the time) for which he endeavours by every means to
secure favour. This advice notwithstanding, the author himself
gives us his views on this question, which, however, do not materially
differ from those of Boethius and Gilbert.
10. Abandoning the arena of the useless controversies of the
schools, John of Salisbury aims at giving philosophy a higher ethical
tendency. Philosophy, he holds, must proceed from love of truth
and love of God, and must have both these objects for its ultimate
end. Just as the Law and the Prophets stimulate love for God, so
must philosophical knowledge strengthen and develop that love, and
by that means strengthen and promote virtue. Whatever in the
doctrines and labours of the philosopher is not directed to this end
is mere empty chatter, mere idle figments.
SECOND PERIOD.
THE GOLDEN AGE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
§ 114.
1. It has been stated in an earlier part of this work that, apart
from the growth of the university system in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, the extraordinary advance of Scholastic
Philosophy in the thirteenth century was due chiefly to the fact
that the whole body of Aristotle's writings was then made accessible
to the scholars of the West. Their first knowledge of them was
obtained through the Arabians and Jews, but shortly afterwards
the original Greek text was brought into Western Europe — from
Constantinople for the most part — and was translated directly into
Latin.
2. Previous to this, the Arabian philosophy had exercised an occasional influence on
Christian Scholastics. About 1150, at the request of Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo,
Johannes Hispalensis and Dominions Gundisalvi translated into Latin, from a Castilian
version of the Arabian text, the principal works of Aristotle, together with the physical
and metapli3Tsical writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel, and Avicebron's treatise,
" Fons Vitae." Soon after 1150 a Latin translation of the book, " De Causis," had been
circulated as a work of Aristotle, and was, as we have seen, quoted by Alanus. A little
later the so-called " Theologia Aristotelis " became known in a Latin version, and it
cannot be disputed that this treatise, as well as the " Fons Vitae " of Avicebron, and the
book, "De Causis," influenced the writings of Arnalrich and David of Dinant. In the
early part of the thirteenth century the knowledge of the writings of Aristotle became
general.
3. As a result, the Aristotelian philosophy in its entirety was
adopted in the schools of Christendom. Just as the " Sentences"
of Peter Lombard formed the groundwork of theological instruction,
so the writings of Aristotle became the basis of all philosophical
teaching. The Peripatetic philosophy was regarded as the
philosophy KCLT' i^iv : the explanation and development of it was
considered the chief, nay, almost the sole, task of the professors of
philosophy; Aristotle was alluded to simply as " the philosopher.'1
Hence the numerous commentaries on the works of Aristotle,
written by the Schoolmen of this and the following period,
370
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
commentaries not less brilliant and copious than those dealing with
the " Sentences " of Peter Lombard.
4. The form of theology could not remain unaffected by thia
adoption of the Peripatetic philosophy. The theologians appro
priated from Aristotle's works the philosophic principles necessary
for the speculative development and proof of the truths of revelation,
and employed them in what they conceived to be the correct
manner. Consequently the entire theological speculation of this
and the succeding mediaeval period is permeated by the philosophy
of Aristotle. The speculative element in it is thoroughly Aristotelian
in form. The most complete expression of this fusion of the Peripa
tetic philosophy with Christian theology are the great " Summae
Theologiae/' which were begun in the thirteenth century, and in
which the tendency of the age to reduce everything to a system
culminated.
5. In fact, owing to the adoption of Aristotle's philosophy,
mediaeval speculation underwent a complete transformation. The
form in which it was cast shared in the change. Hitherto teachers
had not reduced their teaching to any fixed invariable form ; now
the Aristotelian method became general. In this method the thesis
(quaestio) is first proposed, and is followed by the arguments, for
and against, in a continuous series. Then comes the solution
(solutio) which is first asserted and explained categorically, and
then established by a syllogism. The refutation of the arguments
which seem to invalidate the " Solutio/' closes the discussion.
Every thesis was separately treated in this manner. This rigid
logical method had a most favourable influence. It promoted exact
definition and an accurate determination of the limits of each thesis,
and close reasoning in establishing its truth. In these respects,
scholastic philosophy will always enjoy an undisputed pre-eminence.
6. The adoption of the Peripatetic system was not without
danger for Christian philosophy. Aristotle's works had been
obtained at first through the Arabians, and with the works came
the commentaries written by the Arabians on Aristotle, together
with all the errors that had accumulated in these commentaries.
There was, therefore, good reason to fear that with Aristotle's.
philosophy would also be accepted the erroneous doctrines which
the Arabian commentators had developed in discussing it. Indeed,
there were many teachers who did not escape this pitfall.
7. The errors of Amalrich and David of Dinant arose, at least
in part, from Arabian influence. In the year 1209 an assembly of
the professors of Paris University, under the presidency of Bishop
Stephen, condemned several propositions taken wholly from the
writings of the Arabian philosopher, Averroes, — e.g., the doctrine
of the eternity of the world, of the unity of intellect in all men, of
the mortality of the soul, of the limitation of the divine knowledge
and providence to the universal, &c. Not long after, in 1277, a
similar fate befell several other theories received from the Arabians.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON GREEK SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. 371
8. There was evident danger that the errors of the Arabian
philosophers would gain a footing in the Christian schools, side by
side with the writings of Aristotle. This explains why the ecclesi
astical authorities looked at first with suspicion on the adoption of
Peripatetic philosophy in the schools of Christendom, and even
frequently prohibited the teaching of it. In 1210 a synod held in
Paris forbade the expounding of Aristotle's " Physics " for three
years. In 1215 the Papal legate, Robert de Courson, directed
Aristotle's works on Dialectics to be studied, but prohibited the
teaching of his metaphysical and physical treatises. In 1231, the
" libri naturales '' of Aristotle having been condemned by a pro
vincial synod, Pope Gregory IX. commanded that they should not
be used in the University of Paris until they had been examined
and purged of every suspicion of heresy. The Church was entirely
justified in these measures by the manner in which the principles
of Aristotle's philosophy were misapplied by many of its disciples.
9. A further circumstance must be noted. Those who accepted
the erroneous doctrines of the Arabian followers of Aristotle adopted
also the theory that philosophy and religion are independent
provinces of knowledge. They asserted that a proposition might be
at once true in philosophy and false in theology. In this way they
attempted to protect doctrines entirely opposed to theological
teaching, to justify themselves in maintaining such opinions as
philosophical truths, though they rejected them in the domain of
faith. On this point the Church had to speak plainly. The
proposition that " something may be true in philosophy and at the
same time false in theology" is to be found among the doctrines
which the ecclesiastical authorities condemned in the middle of the
thirteenth century.
10. The misuse of Aristotle's philosophy, due to the influence of
the Arabian thinkers, was, however, merely sporadic. Only at first
does it appear to have prevailed to any large extent. More correct
views soon obtained a decisive mastery, and the most renowned
ecclesiastical teachers began to comment on all the writings of
Aristotle, including the "Physics." In 1254, without opposition
from the Church, the exposition of the Aristotelian physics and
metaphysics was sanctioned by the University of Paris, and the
sway of Aristotle over the Christian schools was finally established.
But the great thinkers of the thirteenth century took up an attitude
towards Aristotle quite different from that of the Arabian
philosophers.
11. In the first place, they were far from imitating the slavish admiration bestowed
on Aristotle by his Arabian followers. The latter, including Averroes, had completely
sacrificed their own freedom of opinion, and proclaimed that Aristotle should not or
contradicted in any single particular. This was not the view of the Christian scholastic
They esteemed Aristotle very highly, and regarded him as the " Precursor I'hrusti in
naturalibus," as St. John the Baptist was the " Pnecursor Christ! in gratuitis." But
they dissented from him, and refuted his teaching, on all points where they were convinced
of his errors. Aristotle was not a Deity. He could be, and had been, in error on many
points, more especially where he treated of the more sublime truths. This was the
372
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
principle which guided the Scholastics in their explanation of Aristotle. They had no
desire to detract from his greatness ; the excuse for his defects was evident : Aristotle
had not been blessed with the light of Divine revelation.
12. The intellectual independence which the Christian Scholastics thus maintained
against Aristotle they also maintained against the Arabian philosophers. The commentaries
of Averroes were highly esteemed, but the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century
resolutely rejected the neo-Platonic tendency that appeared to prevail in these works.
They even defended Aristotle on some points against such an interpretation of his
teaching. To accuse the Scholastics of the thirteenth century of imparting a neo-Platonic
colouring to Arist<-tle, as has been done recently, is to reverse the facts of history.
13. The leading Scholastics of the Middle Ages rejected vehemently the Arabian
theory that ' a doctrine might be true in philosophy and false in theology, and vice versa.'
That theory was maintained only by individuals ; it never found general acceptance
among the Scholastics. On the contrary, they opposed it most energetically. What is
true in theology is also true in philosophy, — no contradiction can arise between Reason
and Revelation, — this was the universal teaching of the Schoolmen. It is absurd to
attribute the contrary Arabian theory to the Scholastics, or to assert that they originated
it. The truth is wholly the other way ; there were none so resolute as the Scholastics
in opposing this doctrine.
14. On this account they regarded as both theologically and philosophically false every
speculative proposition that was in conflict with the teaching of religion. They did not
rest satisfied with a mere assertion in the matter ; they always tried to demonstrate clearly
on rational grounds that the propositions in question were false from the standpoint
of philosophy. While revelation was regarded as absolute, indisputable truth,
human reason was held to be open to error. Whenever, therefore, reason and revelation
were in disagreement, the error lay on the side of reason, and it was not allowable to
maintain this error in opposition to revelation. The duty and mission of philosophy was
rather to exhibit the error in its true colours, and to refute it by philosophical means.
15. The relation between philosophy and theology was thereby established. Theology,
as the science of revealed truth, should be placed in a higher rank than philosophy, the
science of speculative truth. But the latter must be employed in theology for the
speculative development and proof, as well as for the systematic exposition, of revealed
dogmas. From this point of view philosophy was regarded as the *• Ancilla Theologiae."
Aristotle had described all the other parts of philosophy as the " hand-maidens " of
" Philosophia prima." Following the example of Johannes Damascenus, the Scholastics
transferred this epithet to the relation of philosophy to theology. They had no intention,
of depreciating philosophy, just as Aristotle was far from wishing to express any
contempt for the other parts of philosophy, as distinct from the " Philosophia prima ;"
they merely desired to indicate the natural relation between them.
16. With these general observations we now proceed to an
account of the chief Scholastics of the thirteenth century. The
first in point of time are :
ALEXANDER OF HALES, WILLIAM OF
BEAUVAIS.
AUVERGNE, VINCENT OF
§ 115.
1. Alexander of Hales was the first who, being acquainted with
the whole of Aristotle's philosophy and with a part of the Arabian
commentaries, made extensive use of both in theology. He was a
native of Gloucestershire, in England, and derived his surname from
the abbey of Hales, in which he had been educated. He studied at
Paris, joined the Franciscan Order, and subsequently became a
professor of repute in Paris. He received the title of " Doctor
irrefragabilis et theologorum monarcha " (11245).
SCHOLASTICS OF THE THIRTKKMII CENTURY. 373
2. By command of Innocent IV., Alexander wrote a " Suuiina Universae Theolo-. '
In this he attempted, with the help of Aristotle's collected works, to develop and set forth
in one comprehensive plan an entire system of theological science, bas'ed on the writings of
Hugh of St. Victor, and the " Sentences " of Peter Lombard. Innocent IV. had this work
examined by seventy theologians, and, after they had approved of it, recommended it to all
professors of theology. This was not the first " Summa ; " Robert of Melun and Stephen
Langton had previously written " Suinmae ; " but it was, as yet, the most important work
of its class.
3. It would be out of place to give here an exhaustive summary of the contents of
this work, which properly belongs to the history of theology. The following brief remarks
will suffice. According to Alexander, God is at once the archetypal, the efficient, and the
final cause of all things. The ideas of things are not entities existing outside God ; they
exist in the divine intellect. They are in fact nothing but the Divine Essence itself, in so
far as it is recognised by God as the prototype, the " causa exemplaris " of all things.
Consequently the ideas are, in objective reality, one, and only relatively different, because
God perceives in His essence the types of many different things. God has created all
things out of nothing, in conformity with the prototypal ideas. The divine ideas are,
therefore, manifest in things, and in the imitation of them the form of things consists.
As the universal is reduced to this form it cannot exist per se, but only in individual
things.
4. God is the " summum bonum," and, as such, the highest end to which all things
converge. From this results the universal harmony which is not destroyed by the evil
existing in the world, since this evil must contribute indirectly to the harmony of the
whole. In this universal harmony consists the beauty of the world, which must be regarded
as a revelation of God's majesty to his creatures.
5. About the same time that the lectures of Alexander of Hales
collected round his chair students eager for knowledge, another
scholar, belonging to the secular clergy, was working with no less
success in the University of Paris. This was William of Auvergne,
also called William of Paris : he was born at Aurillac, became Bishop
of Paris, and died in 1249. Besides several dissertations on practical
theology, he wrote a philosophical work, entitled " De Universe,"
to which are appended two smaller treatises, " De Anima," and " De
Trinitate."2
6. These writings display not merely a penetrating and subtle
intellect, but also a vast erudition. Besides a thorough acquaintance
with the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, William had completely
mastered the Arabian philosophy. The positions he regards as
unsound, he attacks and refutes, especially in his great work " De
Universo." He follows the Arabian theories step by step ; disproves
them with a copious display of dialectical resources, and strives at
the same time to establish the truth of the opposite doctrine.
7. William teaches that there is a double predication— a " Prsedicatio secundum
essentiam," and a "Praedicatio secundum participationem." But the former is antecedent
to the latter. If we assert, for instance, that a being is good through participation in
the goodness of another, and that the latter ia good through participation in the good
ness of a third, and so on, then this participation either extends to infinity or terminates
finally in a being that is good ; not " per participationem." but, " per essentiam." The
former alternative is absurd : the latter must be accepted.
8. Applying this principle to existence, we are inevitably led to God as the Being
existing "per se " and "a se." There are things which attain to existence only by
participation, because, considered in themselves, they can either exist or not exist. This
1 Originally printed at Venice, 1475, again at Nuremberg, 1482, and Venice, 1576.
The glosses to Aristotle's Metaphysics, printed at Venice, 1572, have also been ascribed to
Alexander of Hales. They were not, however, written by him, but by Alexander of
Alexandria, who was also a Franciscan.
rPub. at Venice 1591. There is a more exact and complete edition by Leferon, 1674.
374
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
Deing the fact, if we wish to avoid an absurd series extending to infinity, we must postu
late a Being to whom existence belongs not " per participationem," but " peressentiam" •
such a Being exists necessarily and from itself, for otherwise we could not possibly
predicate existence " per participationem." The Being existing necessarily and from
18 (jrOCl •
9. It immediately follows from this that all things outside God exist only through
participation in the divine existence. Therefore they are the works of God. Their
sibihty is to be traced back to the Divine Omnipotence that brings them into
existence. A philosopher has no justification for assuming a foundation for possibili
outside God. [f matter is posited as the basis of possibility, an existence is therel
ity
thereby
Divine Omnipotence, which gives existence to things, must be conceived as
the highest and most perfect power. God, as the absolutely perfect Being, excludes every
limitation, and, consequently, all limit to His power. But His would not be the highest and
most perfect power if it were determined merely to one course of action, it must rather
be indifferent in regard to several. If so, it can be put iu motion and determined to a
definite action only by a will. Therefore, we must ascribe to God a will, and, indeed, a
free will, and since a free will is not conceivable without intelligence by which it can be
guided, we must conceive God as an intelligent Being.
11. From this it follows that the existence of things is to be immediately referred to
prototypal ideas or things : the JDivme Will resolves to create after the types of eternal
wisdom, and the Divine Omnipotence executes this resolution.
12. The doctrine of the Arabian Philosophers that God produces everything outside
Himself by means of His thought alone is entirely false. No creation is possible without
the Divine Will. It is just as absurd to maintain, with the same philosophy that
only the First Intelligence proceeds immediately from God, whilst the multitude of
™ is derived only mediately through this Intelligence. The Divine Intelligence
thin
stands in the same relation to all that "is knowable ; "one object is not more"*ck>seiy
related to it than another. All ideas of things are similarly contained in tiie Divine
Wisdom, therefore God creates everything immediately. The proposition " Ab uno non
estnisi unum" is true only of natural, not of free causes, and God must be conceived as a
free cause.
13. Furthermore, the world cannot be eternal, as some philosophers assert : it
must have had a beginning. William tries to establish this proposition by various
arguments. Of these we may quote two : —
(a.) As the world does not exist necessarily, it is in itself only possible. But the
relation between potentiality and actuality is the same as between non-existence and
existence. Consequently the world of itself is non-existent, and only receives existence
from without, through the Divine Cause. But what a thing is of itself, is always prior
to what it receives from without. Therefore the world must have been non-existent
before it became actual : it received existence after a period of non-existence, i.e., there
was a beginning to its existence.
(b.) Again, on the supposition that the world received its existence from God, it
necessarily follows that there was a first moment of possessing this existence, after God's
gift of it. This first moment is simply the world's beginning.
14. William also attacked the theory put forward by the
Arabian Philosophers, regarding the limitation of the Divine
Providence to the universal. If God, he says, has created things
with intelligence and freedom, nothing, not even the smallest object,
can possibly have escaped His knowledge and foresight. As 'God
has created all things with free self-determination, He had an end
in view for each one of them. He must, moreover, guide it to this
end, as far as it is in His power, because He must, as far as possible,
accomplish all His designs. The evil in the world is no argument
SCHOLASTICS OF THE THIRTEENTH CENT TRY. 375
against the Divine Providence, since this evil is finally made
serviceable to the good.
15. Some philosophers had separated the " Intellectus agens "
from the soul, and described it as being one for all men. In
William's opinion, this is a groundless assumption. Knowledge is
not conditioned by the irradiation of the soul by an unknown
intelligence, but rather by those evident first principles of
knowledge which the soul naturally possesses. The soul recognises
these pnnciples in the Divine Word which is ever present to it.
The Word resembles a mirror in which the soul can contemplate,
according to its capabilities, the eternal laws of truth and goodness.
The " intellectus agens," and " intellectus possibilis," are not
distinguishable, since the faculties of the soul have no real
distinction from one another.
16. William of Auvergne was succeeded somewhat later by
Vincent of Beauvais,1 a Dominican monk, who filled the position of
tutor to the sons of St. Louis (f 1264). He composed a large
comprehensive work under the title of " Speculum," in whicli
he compiled, from all the writers known to him, an encyclopedia
of human knowledge embracing speculative philosophy, natural
science, and history. From this work he received the title of
" Speculator." The work is divided into three parts : — " Speculum
" doctrinale," " historical, " and " naturale." To these he intended
adding a " Speculum Morale," but death prevented him from com
pleting his design.2 The " Speculum Naturale," he tells us, was to
contain Nature and its properties; the "Speculum Doctrinale,"
the matter and form of all Science ; the " Speculum Morale,"
the virtues and vices ; and the " Speculum Historicale," the events
of all ages in their proper order. The work is, however, of small
importance for the development of philosophy.
17. Mention must also be made of Robert Grosseteste (Robertas
Capito), Bishop of Lincoln (t 1253), who wrote a commentary on the
mystical theology of the Areopagite and on the second " Analytic,"
and Physics of Aristotle. He adopted a very hostile attitude
towards the Holy See, in consequence of which he died under excom
munication.3 Michael Scott, born in Scotland, 1 190, devoted himself
largely to Natural Science, and obtained in this way a reputation
for sorcery. At the request of Frederick II., who invited him
from Paris to his dominions, he translate^ several of Aristotle's
writings, together with the accompanying commentary of Averroes ;
he also compiled some original works that are extant mostly in
manuscript.4 The last to be noticed is John of Rochelle, a Franciscan
^omp. upon Vincent Schlosser : "Vincent of Beuuvais," 1819. The " Speculum "
was first printed in full at Venice, 1494.
-The portion we possess was compiled by later writers.
3 Couip. regarding him, J. Pauli : " Bishop Grossteste and Ad. v. Marsh." Tubingen,
1 Vi* i
4 Three of these works have, however, been printed,— ' Sup«-r Auri..iviii .v;>
Bologna, 1495, and Venice, 1631; " De Sole et Luna," BtnasbtUg, IG'Jii ; and " De
Chironiantia," frequently reprinted during the fifteenth century.
376
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
and a pupil of Alexander of Hales, who wrote a work " De Anima "
(1271).
ALBERTUS MAGNUS.
§ 116.
1. Alexander of Hales had employed the Peripatetic philosophy
merely for the construction of a systematic theology. Albertus
Magnus was the first Christian Scholastic to write formal commen
taries on the writings of Aristotle. His aim was two-fold : in the first
place, he desired to introduce the Aristotelian philosophy into the
domain of Christian thought : in the second place, he wished to turn
this philosophy to account in the construction of a system of Christian
theology. We see him exerting himself in a double direction, corres
ponding to this two-fold design. He is active in the domain of
philosophy, as well as in that of theology. He appears before us
as the critic of the Peripatetic philosophy, and as the expounder of
the Divine Word, but he regards these offices as entirely distinct.
If he is explaining the Peripatetic philosophy, he follows exclusively
the course of Aristotle's mind, without referring at all to theology,
and without putting forward his own philosophical views. But if he
approaches the explanation of the Divine Word, or the speculative
development and proof of the dogmas of faith, then he regards these
as absolute truth, and rejects and philosophically refutes every
tenet of the Peripatetic philosophy which is at variance with the
teaching of faith. We can learn the peculiar philosophical views
of Albertus only from those works in which he writes as a
theologian rather than as an expounder of the Peripatetic philosophy,
and from some others in which he presents " ex-prof esso" his own
opinion. We will enumerate these later on.
2. Albertus Magnus was born at Lauingen, in Suabia, in 1193,
and belonged to the noble house of Bollstadt. He studied at Padua,
where Jordanus, the famous Provincial of the Dominican Order,
persuaded him to join that body. As soon as he had completed his
theological studies at Bologna, he was sent to Cologne to teach the
natural and sacred sciences in that city. He was summoned thence to
Paris, in order to continue his lectures in the Abbey of St. James,
but soon returned to Cologne for a similar purpose. His fame as a
teacher increased day by day, and thousands of students assembled
round his professorial chair. In 1254 he became Provincial of his
Order in Germany, and his activity in this capacity was far-reaching
and successful. He was appointed Bishop of Regensburg in 1260,
but soon resigned this position, and, returning to Cologne, continued
his scientific and professorial labours until his death (fl280). He
received the title of " Doctor Universalis."
3. His works were published in 1651, in twenty-one folio volumes,
by the Dominican friar, Jammy. In accordance with the two-fold
character of Albertus' labours, alluded to above, his works may be
ALBERTUS MAGNUS. 377
divided into two classes. The first contains those in which he
comments upon the writings of Aristotle, and these have been
arranged by Jammy in the same order as Aristotle's works. The
most important are the treatises " De Anima," II. 3. " Metaphysi-
corum," II. 12, and " De causis et processu universitatis." Among
these writings are also to be found several original philosophical
essays, viz : " De natura et origine animse," " De unitate intellectus
contra' Averroem,"(which Albertus wrote at the request of Alexander
IV. to refute the doctrine of Averroes), and "Tractatus de Intel-
lectu et intelligibili." To the second class belong the theological
treatises, of which the most important are— the Commentary on
the Areopao-ite ; the great commentary on the " Sentences " of Peter
Lombard ; the "Summa Theologise," and the " Summa de Creaturis."
4 The whole of Aristotle's works were accessible to Albertus,
partly in Latin translations from the Arabic, and partly in Latin trans
lations from the Greek. He compared these with one another, in
order to ascertain the genuine text, and every means at his disposal
was directed to this same purpose. In his explanation of Aristotle
he relies chiefly on Avicenna. His familiarity with the Peripatetic
doctrines was equalled only by his ignorance of the historical
development of Greek Philosophy. He had no means of acquiring
a knowledge of it, and therefore fell into some amusing mistakes,
as when he describes Plato as " Princeps Stoicorum/' and Zeno
the Eleatic as the founder of Stoicism. Albertus distinguished
himself above all his contemporaries by his knowledge of natural
science. He has been unjustly styled the "Ape of Aristotle '
for no one criticises Aristotle's opinions more freely and impartially
than he does.1 ,
5. Albertus draws a clear distinction between theology and pbii
sophy. Theology rests on faith, philosophy on the understanding;
the first takes its proofs from revealed authority, the latter from
reason. Theology treats of God, inasmuch as He is the ultimate
object of our enjoyment and happiness, and of God's works as far as
they are related to this end, i.e., to our salvation. On the other hand,
philosophy deals with being as such, and, therefore, with the First
Beino- God only as far as He is the First Being, and of the attributes
that°belong to Him as the First Being. Theology is primarily
intended to lead us to piety, and through this to salvation ; it is,
therefore essentially a practical scieoce ; it strives after knowledge,
not for its own sake, but as a means to salvation. Philosophy has
knowledge as its immediate object, and is, therefore, not a practical,
but a speculative science.
6. In questions which involve the scientific mvestigatioi
iThe fole may be consulted regarding Albertus Magnus-Rudolf Noviomagensis, De
Vita Alb M£T Cologne, 1499; Sighart, " Albertus Magnus, his life an.l dojtrinaj"
Vita Alb. •M'l-;_ H fb' «0n the theory "f knowledge of Aviceuna and Albertus
^InusrMunich/lSGo ; M. Joel, " The Relation of Albertus Mag. to Moses Maimuuides,"
Breslau,' 1803, &c.
378
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
revealed truths, faith takes precedence of knowledge ; only through
faith can we arrive at certain knowledge. The knowledge thus
obtained is useful for three purposes: first, the articles of faith are thus
more thoroughly known ; then men are more easily led to believe
these articles ; and, lastly, the enemies of faith are refuted by reason.
7. The principles of the being of corporeal things are Matter and
Form. Matter is the substratum, indeterminate in itself, and as
such merely the possibility of a determined thing ; Form is the
determining principle, and as such the actuality of the thing
determined. From the union of Form and Matter results the
" Compositum " — the determinate and real substance. In the case
of spiritual beings, which are immaterial, the composition of the
"quo est" and the "quod est/' i.e., of essence and " suppositum,"
takes the place of the union of Matter and Form.
8. The Form is already potentially contained in the matter, and
the production of a thing consists merely in this, that its Form is
educed from the Matter by an efficient cause. The forms of things
differ inter se, and on this difference rests the specific distinction
between things. The individual distinction between the single
members of a species is, however, conditioned by the matter, not
inasmuch as it is matter, but only because in corporeal things it
is the first subject or the " suppositum " of their nature. The
"principle of individuation " is, therefore, generally speaking, the
" quod est " or " suppositum " ; in corporeal things it is moie especi
ally the matter, because this is the " quod est " in them.
9. Form is the rational idea which is realised in Matter
as the substratum. The form is everywhere the work and the
revelation of intelligence. Consequently, every work of nature,
since a form is realised in it, is also, directly or indirectly, a work of
intelligence. And as the form is the work and revelation of
intelligence, the intelligibility of things is conditioned by their form.
10. Universality is a property of form, not of matter — " esse
universale est fonnae, non materise." For the universal is a
form or essence which can be realised in several individuals: —
•" essentia seu forma apta dare multis esse." In this sense, the
universal is objectively real, but not in the sense that it is something
real in its universality. If the universal as such were objectively
real in things, then it must be one with the things of which it is
predicated. From this it would follow that the individuals of which
one and the same universal concept is predicated would be no longer
different from one another, but would be one thing. The universal
as such exists only in the intellect — " ante rem " in the Divine
Intellect, and "post remain the human intellect. In these it is
actual ; in things it is, properly speaking, only potential. For the
form of the individual members of the same species can be
apprehended by the intellect without the matter, and can be thus
conceived as something which is predicable of each and every
individual member.
A.LBERTU8 MAI.NTS. 379
GOD AND CREATION.
§ 117.
1. Our natural knowledge of God is mediate only, acquired
through created things, since the latter, as effects of the creating'
Cause, point back to, and give us knowledge of, this Cause. Only
through a process of reasoning can we ascend from created things to
God. The reason can know God only in as far as the first principles,
from which it starts in its chain of arguments, render such a
knowledge possible. And this possibility does not permit of the
reason attaining by its own unaided efforts to a knowledge of the
triple personality of God. Reason left to itself would hold to the
principle, that a simple and indivisible nature cannot subsist in three
persons distinct from one another. It, therefore, requires the light of
taith in order to arrive at a knowledge of the Divine Trinity.
By reason alone we can know only the essence and the essential
attributes of God.
2. The proposition " God exists " is not self-evident in the sense
that no medium is necessary whereby to attain a knowledge of God.
Created things are the first objects of our knowledge, and lead us
to a knowledge of God. It is only when we understand by " self-
evident " that the truth of a proposition is immediately apparent
as soon as the subject and predicate are known and compared that
we can assert the proposition "God exists " to be self-evident.
Even then it is only such for the learned who have a clear and
intelligent idea of God as the most perfect being, and of the
predicate of existence.
3. Consequently, proofs of God's existence are necessary. They
cannot, however, be of a direct (ostensive) character, because God
has no cause above Himself, nor does He display Himself completely
in His work, nor has He given any signs which fully express His
Being. But, indirectly, proofs of God's existence can be given by
showing that absurdities and impossibilities result from denying
His existence. Albertus borrows nearly all his proofs from his
predecessors, and places in the forefront the cosmological proof.
4. The proof which Albertus, following St. Augustine, draws from
the necessity of assuming a First Being is interesting. Since the
things in this world follow one another causally, and, therefore, are
related to one another as subordinate to superior, we must necessarily
suppose a First Being, with which the series begins. Now, everything
in the world is either material or immaterial. The First Being cannot
be material, for the material is composite, and pre-supposes the exis
tence of its simple elements. The First Being must, therefore, be
immaterial or spiritual. Furthermore, everything is either mutable
or immutable. But what is mutable is mere potentiality in regard
to a higher being that exercises a motive influence on it, and is the
cause of its actual change. Consequently, the First Being cannot be
mutable. Now, the souls both of men and angels, though immaterial,
380 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
are still mutable ; therefore, none of these can be the First Being.
There must still be a higher nature, not merely immaterial, but
also immutable, and this must be the First Being. This nature, at
once immaterial, immutable, and raised above all things, we call
God.
5. God, as the infinite, is incomprehensible, but not unknowable by
our intellect. As our knowledge of the existence of God is obtained
from His creatures, so also our knowledge of His being and of His
attributes is derived from the same source. But it is imperfect
knowledge, because created things, although God reveals His attri
butes in them, do not resemble Him fully, are but a very inadequate
reflection of the Divine glory.
6. Taking God to be the first principle of things, we must
conceive Him as existing independently and necessarily, and also as
absolutely simple, both physically and metaphysically. Physically
simple, for, did God consist of parts, the latter would be prior in
existence to Him, and He would no longer be the absolutely First
Being. Metaphysically simple, for if there were a perfection in
God, really distinct from His essence, it must be regarded as a
" superadditum'' to the essence, and must have either a cause distinct
from God, or God Himself as its cause. In the first case the
independence of God would be destroyed ; in the second, God would
be at once active and passive, which can only occur with physically
compounded beings. Therefore, whatever is in God is Himself
each of His perfections expresses His entire being.
7. This admitted, it follows at once that God must necessarily be
apprehended as Intelligence ; for what is distinct from matter and
exists independently in the separated state, can only be conceived
as intelligence. But God must not be regarded as an " intellectus
possibilis," for this becomes all that it is by the act of knowledge.
Now God cannot become anything, since He is actu all that He is°or
can be. God must, therefore, be conceived as " Intellectus Agens,"
and as He is the first cause of everything, he must be thought of as
the " universally active intellect " (" intellectus universaliter agens.")
From Him proceed all intelligences and all forms, and thus He is
the highest principle of all created intelligence as well as of all
intelligibility.
8. God is also the Absolute Will. It is an error to deprive God of
all will, as many Peripatetics do. The notion of Will can be under
stood in three ways : — first, as a rationally-founded craving after
something which one does not previously possess but aims at
possessing ; next, as an unchanging satisfaction in a " summum
bonum " that one possesses ; and lastly, as a freely-acting power of
the soul, whereby it determines itself in all its actions. In the first
meaning, a will can in no way be attributed to God, but that it can
in the second and third meanings is self-evident.
9. Finally, we must ascribe to God, as the First Principle, the
power of producing things external to Himself, because without
ALBERTUS MAGNUS. 381
this power He cannot be conceived as the First Cause. By means of
this power, so far as it is determined by his His free will to activity,
God produces things not merely as to their form, but also as to their
matter, that is, He creates them out of nothing. Matter cannot be
eternal and uncreated : for were it such, the First Principle would
cease to be the universal cause of all existence, the existence of
matter would not then be dependent on Him. This would simply
destroy the entire idea of God. God created at the beginning and
all at once the four " Coaequaeva " : — Matter, Time, Heaven, and
the Angels.
10. The world being created, it follows that it cannot be eternal,
that it must have had a beginning. If, writes Albertus, the Peripa
tetic arguments for the eternity of the world are closely examined,
they will be found to prove nothing more than that the world and
motion cannot have originated through natural generation, and
cannot end by natural corruption. This everyone will readily grant.
But there is another kind of origin, — viz., the origin through creation.
The old philosophers could never rise to the idea of creation, because
they always remained content with the mere natural principles of
things. They inquired into the immediate, not the ultimate causes of
things, and therefore did not go beyond the proposition " nothing
comes of nothing,'' which is universally valid in the domain of nature.
Thus they could not arrive at a beginning for time and motion ; nay,
more, they were directly obliged to exclude it, if they restricted
themselves, as they did, to the mode of production peculiar to nature.
11. It being demonstrated that the world was created, it is proved
that it had a beginning, for it began with the creation. In the con
cept of " creation from nothing," the " from nothing " means that
not only was there no " substratum " present from which the world
was formed, but it also implies that before the creation there was
nothing — no being, no duration, no time ; the notion contains, there
fore, in itself the idea of " post nihilum." This being so, we cannot
get rid of the notion of a beginning for time, for the world and for
motion ; and reason thus forces us to admit a beginning of the world
in time.
12. The multitude and variety of things in the world are not to
be explained, with some philosophers, as a progressive descent of the
creature from God, they have their foundation immediately in the
divine essence itself. The artist forms his masterpiece out of several
different parts which he joins into a whole, for in this way alone
can a work of art be produced. So God in his Wisdom constructed
the great universe out of many different parts that He might thereby
reveal His wisdom, His goodness, and His power.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.
§ 118.
1. Albertus proves the spirituality of the human soul thus : —
382
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
Intellectual activity cannot proceed from a bodily (material) organ :
it is, therefore, of an immaterial nature ; whence it follows that the
principle from which it arises must be an immaterial, spiritual being.
While he appeals to the essential character of thought, which, being
simple in its nature, cannot have its source in a composite material
principle, he relies also on the freedom of the will, which cannot
possibly be explained on the assumption that man is a purely material
being.
2. Hereby is also proved the immortality of the soul. For if the
soul has a being and substantiality of its own, distinct from the body,
and if it is of a simple and immaterial nature, it is impossible for it,
being without parts, to dissolve and perish with the body ; it must
rather survive it. And since its intellectual activity is not united
to any material organ, it must also continue to exercise its intelligence
after the death of the body ; that is, it must be immortal. All the
more so because the soul bears in itself the likeness of the Trinity;
and it would be inconceivable that this image of the Godhead should
be so immersed in matter as not to be able to exist without the body;
seeing that God, in whose likeness it is made, has no body.
3. The soul is related to the body as its essential form. Man is
differentiated from the animal by possessing a rational soul. But
the differentiating element is in all cases the form. The " intellectus
agens" and " intellectus possibilis" are not principles separate from
the individual soul, but only essential powers of it. The " intellectus
agens'' abstracts the intelligible forms from sense-objects, and
thereby makes the latter intelligible " in actu." The " intellectus
possibilis" is modified by these intelligible forms, and attains
thereby to a knowledge of things according to their intelligible being
or essence.
4. The freedom of the will consists in this, that the individual
is under no external or internal constraint, and is, therefore, able to
choose. The possibility of a moral life rests on the freedom of the
will and on conscience, by which the known law is applied to our
actions. Man is destined for eternal happiness in the intuition
and love of God. The means of reaching this state is virtue ; the
moral duty of man is to strive after virtue. Virtues are partly
acquired, partly infused.
5. Here we must stop. What we have selected from the teachings
of Albertus is, indeed, but a small part of the rich store of thought
contained in his works ; it must, however, suffice as a specimen of
the manner in which he employed the Peripatetic philosophy, cor
recting it where necessary, in order to make it conform to Christian
beliefs. We now turn to one who, though a pupil of Albertus, was
greater than his master, the thinker in whom Christian scholasticism
reached its perfection.
SCHOLASTICS OF Till-; THIRTEENTH CKNTI i:V.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.
§ 110.
His LIFE AND WRITINGS— His PHILOSOPHICAL STANDPOINT
1. Thomas Aquinas was born at Rocca Sicca, near Monte Cassino
in 1225. He was a younger son of a Count Landolf of Aquino, who
was related to the family of the H oh enstautfen Emperors. He received
his education at Monte Cassino and Naples. Overcoming the opposition
of his parents and family, he joined the Dominican Order at Naples
He continued his studies at Cologne and Paris, under the guidance of
Albertus Magnus, and, after completing them, he filled the professorial
chair at Cologne, Paris, Bologna, and Naples. He lectured on
philosophy and theology, and his renown soon eclipsed that of his
master. Crowds of youthful students came from every country in
Christendom to hear from his mouth the teachings of wisdom.
Finally, he was summoned from Naples by Gregory X. to attend the
Council of Lyons, but died on the way, at the Abbey of Fossa Nuova
in the year 1274. He was canonized in 1323 by Pope John XXII., and
is known to scholastic philosophers as the " Doctor Angelicus."
2. In the Roman edition of 1570, the works of St. Thomas fill
seventeen folio volumes.1 Like his teacher, Albertus, St. Thomas
devoted himself to the exposition of Aristotle's Philosophy, as well
as to Theology.
The order in which his writings are published exhibits their double
purpose. The first five volumes contain the commentaries of St.
Thomas on Aristotle's writings, including the " Tractatus de Ente et
Lssentia," and the commentary on the " Liber de Causis." Then
follow independent philosophical and theological writings, viz.:
—the great commentary on the " Sentences " of Peter Lombard ;
the " Quoestiones Disputato (de potentia Dei, de malo, de spiritualibus
creaturis, de anima, de virtutibus, de veritate; and " quaastiones
quodlibetales") ; the "Summa Contra Gentiles," and the " Summa
Theologize." Next are arranged the explanatory commentaries on
several books of the Holy Scriptures, and the sermons ; then the
" Opuscula," which treat of various philosophical and theological
subjects, including " De aeternitate Mundi," " De principiis nature,"
" De natura materiae/ " De principio individuationis," "De natura
generis," "De natura accidentis," " De intellect!! et intelligibili,"&c.;
and last of all, the " Compendium Theologiae," and the commentary
on Boethius' work, " De Trinitate."
3. The most important of these works are undoubtedly the
' Summa contra Gentiles," and the " Summa Theologian'' The latt.-r
was left in an unfinished condition, and was completed by the pupils
/They were published later at Venice, 1594, at Antwerp 1612, at Paris 1660, at
Venice 1787, at Parma 185-2, &c. The editions of individual works are very numerous
especially of the "Sunnna Theologize. "
7
384* HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
of St. Thomas. The " Summa contra Gentiles " is a kind of
" Apologia " for Christianity. In it the truths of Christianity are
proved on rational grounds, in opposition to unbelievers and heretics,
and the opposing theories of heathen, Arabian, and schismatical
philosophy are logically refuted. In the " Summa Theologise,"
his latest and most matured work, St. Thomas sets to work con
structively. He endeavours to develop speculatively the manifold
meaning of the truths of Christianity, and to reduce this speculative
development to one great system of doctrine. His other works were
merely intended to fill up any gaps in these two great designs. Of
these the only works of importance for understanding the Thomistic
teaching are the " Qu&stiones Disputatse," and the commentary on
the " Sentences." *
4. First of all, St. Thomas distinguishes truths of two kinds —
viz., rational and super-rational truths. Rational truths are those
which the reason, by its own powers alone, can discover and prove
to demonstration. Super-rational truths are those which lie beyond
the natural powers of man's intellect, and which can only be known
to us by revelation. The distinction is, therefore, not grounded in
the essence of these truths, but on the different relations in which our
intellect stands to them.
5. Though these two kinds of truths are different, they are not
however, contradictory. For the rational as well as the super-rational
truths have their ultimate and highest foundation in the Divine
wisdom, which cannot contradict itself. A contradiction can never
exist between reason and revelation. All the rational arguments
which have been urged against the truths of faith are either not
convincing — mere probable reasonings — or they are simple fallacies.
•If reason starts from true principles, and draws its conclusions
rigorously, it cannot possibly arrive at a result contradictory to the
teachings of faith.
6. Consequently, though reason cannot demonstrate the super-
rational truths or mysteries of Christianity, it is able to refute all
the objections that have been made against these truths, and to
1 Among modern works upon St. Thomas Aquinas \ve may mention, — Hu'rtel,
44 Thomas Aquinas and his Age," Augsburg, 1846 ; Carle, " Histoire de la vie et des
ouvrages de St. Thomas," 1846 ; Ch. Jourdain, " De la Philosophic de St. Thomas,"
Paris, 1858 ; Cacheux, " De la Philosophic de St. Thorn." Paris, 1858 ; Liberatore,
" The Theory of Knowledge of St. Thorn. Aquin.," transl. by Franz Mainz, 1861 ;
Werner, " Thoma Aquinas," Regensburg, 1858 ; E. Plaazmann, " The School of St.
Thomas Aquinas," Soest. 1857-62; Anton Rietter, "The Ethics of St. Thomas
Aquinas," Munich, 1858 ; Morgott, " Spirit and Nature in Man according to St. Thomas'
Teaching," Eichstatt, 1860 ; and " The Theory of Feeling in St. Thomas' System,"
Eichstatt, 1864 ; Gaudin, "Philosophia Juxta D. Thomae Dogmata," new edition, by
Roux Lavergne, Paris, 1861 ; Oischinger, " The Speculative Theology of St. Thomas
Aquinas," Landshut, 1858 ; Al. Schmid, " The Thomistic and Scotist Theories of
Certitude," Dillingen, 1859 ; H. Conzen, " Thomas Aquinas as a Politico- Economic
Writer," Leipsig, 186i ; Jacob Merlen, " On the Importance of the Theories of Know-
lege of St. Augustine and St. Thomas for the Historical Development of Philosophy,
etc.," Treves, 18(55, etc. Compare also the essay on St. 7'homas Aquinas in Dr. Stockl's
" History of Mediaeval Philosophy," Vol. II.
ST. THOMAS A^C IX AS.
prove to demonstration that the latter are in no sense irrational.
In this consists its first duty in regard to the Christian mysteries.
But this is not its whole task. Created things do not, it is truo,
afford us grounds for a demonstrative proof of these mysteries, but
they present certain analogies on which to base arguments ex
congruentia, and thereby render possible a speculative knowledge
of these mysteries, thus bringing them, to some extent, within the
range of human reason. To strive after this speculative knowledge
is the second duty which reason has to perform in reference to
the mysteries of religion (Contra Gent., L. 1, c. 8 & c. 9).
7. Rational truths, considered in themselves, do not need
revelation to make them known, but truths of this kind are also
found among the truths contained in revelation. The question
therefore arises why God should reveal these at all. According
to St. Thomas, the explanation lies in the fact that without revelation
very few persons, and even these only after a long interval and with
the admixture of many errors, could arrive at a knowledge of
such rational truths, if they depended on the resources of reason
alone.
8. The mental research which must be expended on such truths
is very laborious, presupposes a large store of knowledge, and demands
a long training in the exercise of thought. Most men are incapable
of undertaking so long and tedious an intellectual labour, partly
from lack of talent, partly through preoccupation with material
concerns. Even those who attempt the task usually arrive at the
goal only in later life, and even then they are uncertain whether
the result of their labours can claim to be true in every respect,
since reason, in consequence of its limitation, is liable to error.
Hence it follows that certain rational truths were revealed by God
in order that all men might share in the knowledge of them, at
least through faith, since such a knowledge is indispensable to men
if they are to fulfil their destiny (Contra Gent., L. 1, c. 4).
9. The truths cognisable by the natural light of reason are the
"pneambula fidei;" for, in general, nature is the forerunner of
grace, is not destroyed but perfected by it (gratia naturam non
tollit sed perficit). Natural truths must therefore be known
through demonstration, or at least through faith, before faith in the
mysteries of Christianity becomes possible. Besides these
" prseambula fidei," proofs of the trustworthiness of revelation are
also a priori conditions of faith. Divine revelation has established
its claim on human reason by miracles, fulfilment of prophecies,
etc. These miracles, fulfilments of prophecies, etc., are proofs of
the trustworthiness of revelation, and, as such, naturally precede
faith (Ibid. L. 1, c. 6).
10. The distinction between philosophy and theology follows at
once from those premises. The subject matter of philosophy is
rational truth. The subject matter of theology is revealed truth.
If a truth is at the same time a truth of reason and of revelation,
386
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
philosophy treats it in its former character, theology in the latter.
Philosophy takes the principles of reason as the basis for its
arguments — theology, the principles of revelation. Philosophy
ascends from created things to God ; theology, on the contrary,
begins with God and then descends to His works. Philosophy
endeavours to discover the essence of created things ; theology
considers the latter only in so far as they stand related to God and
have their purpose in Him.
11. Theology agrees with philosophy in this, that, like the latter,
it is of a pre-eminently speculative nature. But it stands higher in
rank than philosophy; on the one hand, because of the greater
certitude that it possesses, since it rests upon the infallible light of
the Divine Wisdom; while philosophy is restricted to the fallible
light of reason : on the other hand, because of the sublimity and
wealth of its subject, since it treats for the most part of those truths
which transcend the natural powers of reason. And since theology
employs the truths of philosophy in order to rise to a speculative
knowledge of the mysteries of faith, philosophy may be called the
handmaid of theology.
12. From this account of the general principles of St. Thomas,
we turn to give a brief outline, first of his Metaphysics and Theory
of Knowledge. We shall then treat of his Theology and Theory of
Creation, and finally of his Psychology and Ethics.
METAPHYSICS.
§120.
1. Like Aristotle, St. Thomas starts from the concept of " first
substance," i.e., of the individual. To confine our attention to
material objects : in these the principles of the " first substance ''
are Matter and Form. In the concept of Matter, a double aspect
must be distinguished — a negative and a positive. According to
the former it is "the negation of all determinateness ; according to the
latter, it is potentiality to be determined. The potentiality for
determination is the same thing as potentiality for becoming actual;
for only what is determinate is actual. Form is, in the first place,
the principle of determination ; and, in the second place, the principle
of the actuality of the " first substance."
2. But there are different kinds of forms. We must first
distinguish between essential (substantial) form and accidental
form. The former is that by which the substance is constituted
as such in its being, and becomes actualised. The latter is that
which is added to the substance thus constituted, and imparts to it
an extrinsic determination. (De Anim., qu. unica, art. 9, c.) A
further distinction must be drawn between material or inherent
forms, and subsistent forms. The former have their existence only
in matter, and therefore cannot be actual or active without matter :
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.
the latter have a proper existence of their own, and can, therefore,
be actual and active apart from matter.
;>. The subsistent forms, as such, exclude all matter, and are
therefore, of a spiritual and immaterial nature. Consequently all
spiritual beings are to be regarded as subsistent forms, while the
objects of the physical world are informed and actuated only by
material forms. The subsistent forms, however, are also of two
kinds: they either exist as complete substances, and cannot, in this
case, communicate their existence to any matter ; or they exist in
such a way that, though not requiring matter for their existence,
they require it for the completion of the specific nature to which
they belong. The former are the pure spiritual beings, such as the
angels ; the latter are the souls of men.
4. We must further distinguish in things between essence and ex
istence. A determinate essence (substance) is not actual because it is
an essence ; to become actual it must receive existence from some
efficient cause. Existence is, therefore, really distinct from essence
and is related to the latter as actuality to potentiality. This com
position of essence and existence is to be applied to all created
beings without exception — even to spiritual beings. These latter
only exclude the composition of matter and form, but not the
composition of essence and existence. (Contra Gent, I, c. 53-54.)
5. With regard to essence in particular, it is, according to its
concept, nothing but the determinate being of the thing. In
spiritual beings the essence coincides with the form, they are
pure forms. In material beings on the contrary, the essence is
always constituted by matter and form. Since many things actually
exist which have the same matter and the same form, the essence in
relation to these things is common : the question, therefore, arises,
What is the principle of individuality ?
6. According to St. Thomas, this principle is the " materia
signata," or " materia individuals," as opposed to the " materia com-
munis." By this " materia signata," is to be understood merely the
determinate, quantitatively defined matter which belongs ^ to a
certain individual, together with all those individual accidents
with which this matter is united " in concrete." By this, and by
this alone, the essence — which in itself is common — becomes indi
vidualised. While, therefore, spiritual beings, as not consisling of
matter and form, are individualised by their very essence, material
objects are individualised, not by their essence, but by the " materia
signata." (Contra Gent. L. 1, c. 21 ; Sum. Theol., L, qu. 3, Art. 3).
7. From this results the distinction between " quiddity*
(essence) and " suppositum." The essence is related to the indi
vidual being as its " quiddity," because, through it the individual
is what it is. The individual itself, determined as to its nature
through this quiddity (its form), is the " suppositum" of this
" quiddity." It is the " quod est," in opposition to the quiddity, <>r
" quo est." In material things, therefore, the " suppositum" is not
388
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
the same as the "materia signata." The latter forms an element in
the " suppositum," since the " suppositum," according to its
definition, is not the principle of individuation, but, rather,
the individual itself determined by the " quiddity." In spiritual
beings, however, the " suppositum" is one and the same with the
quiddity, because these have no principle of individuation different
from the essence, but are individualised of themselves. (76., 1, c.
Quodl. 2., qu. 2., Art. 4).
8. The essence common to several individuals has actuality
only in these individuals, in so far as it constitutes their " quiddity"
or form. This does not prevent us from abstracting in thought from
the individuality, as it is conditioned by the principle of individua
tion, and thinking only of the common essence as such. When we
do this the result in our thought is the Universal Concept. Conse
quently, the latter presupposes a plurality of individuals with the
same essence. As this occurs only with beings composed of matter
and form, only such beings can be classified under a general concept
as species and genus. Spiritual beings do not come under any
general concept ; each single being among them is at the same time
a species in itself.
9. These notions enable us to determine how the Universal is to be
conceived in its relation to things. The Universal, as such, is merely a
mental product, and can therefore exist only in an intellect. There is no
Universal, as such, in the objective order; the Universal exists there
actualised in individuals. In the objective order, there are only
individuals with the same or a common essence, but not a common
essence by itself apart from the individuals. Accordingly, the
Universal, from its meaning, is objectively real in all the individuals
of which it can be predicated, and is inseparable from these individuals,
except in thought. It receives the form or " intention " of univer
sality only through the intellect which thinks the essences of things,
apart from the individuals in which they are realised, as common
essences, and therefore as universal. (S. TheoL, I, qu. 85, art. 2, c.)
10. As there are two intellects which think the essences of
things, as common essences, viz. : — the divine, and the human — the
Universal, as such, exists in the divine, as well as in the human
intellect. In the former the Universal precedes the existence of
the individual and is its prototypal idea ; in the latter it follows it,
being merely the representative thought, obtained by the intellect
through abstraction from the individual. Consequently there are
"Universalia ante rem" in the divine Intellect; " Universalia in re,"
the common essences of things in so far as they exist individually
in several individuals ; and " Universalia post rem " in the human
intellect.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 389
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
§121.
1. The theory of knowledge of St. Thomas is based on the fore
going metaphysical principles. The fundamental proposition in this
theory maintains that knowledge can only arise if a likeness of the
object known is produced in the knowing subject by the combined
action of the known and the knowing. A likeness is generated in
the subject knowing, when the cognitive faculty assimilates itself
in some way to the object. "Omnis cognitio fit per assimilati-
onem cognoscentis et cogniti." (Contra Gent., L. 2, c. 77). This
likeness is called the "species," or mental form. The "species,"
however, is not that which is known, but rather that by which the
object is known. It is the informing principle of knowledge, inas
much as through it the faculty of cognition becomes active, and
actual knowledge of the object corresponding to it is produced.
The result of the act of knowledge is the " intention/' or internal
" Word," by which the soul expresses the object in and to itself.
(C. G., L. 3, c. 53).
2. Sense and Intellect(or understanding) are essentially different
from one another ; and we must therefore distinguish between
" species sensibilis " and " species intelligibilis." The first is the
formal principle of sense-cognition, the second of intellectual know-
ledge. The first presents the object according to its sensuous
appearance, the second according to its intelligible being, according
to its essence. Notwithstanding the difference between intellect
and sense, the former is still so far dependent on the latter that all
our intellectual knowledge begins from sense-experience and has
its basis in it. " Omnis nostra cognitio intellectualis incipit a
sensu." There are no innate ideas. The intellect in itself is like a
" tabula rasa ;" if its original emptiness is to be filled up by know
ledge, it must start from experience.
3. The reason of this is that the intellectual principle in man
is united with the body, and that to this union it is destined by
nature. If this union were unnatural, as it is in Plato's view, it
would be quite consistent to attribute innate knowledge to the
soul. But as it is natural, and not forced, it follows that it must
be in the nature of intellectual knowledge to rise from the sensible
to the suprasensible.
4. The primary and direct object of our intellectual knowledge
is the intelligible in sense-objects. Intellectual knowledge in man
is concerned directly and immediately with the essences of material
things. And these become known to the intellect by the
phenomena which are reproduced in the sense-image, (ti. Theol., I,
qu. 84, art.7). The soul knows itself only secondarily and indirectly,
when it reflects upon itself in its act of thought. Last of all, the
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HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY,
intellect rises to a knowledge of God by the use of reasoning, so tbat
the knowledge of God is indirect and mediate.
5. If it be further asked how and in what way the intellect
cognizes its immediate object — the intelligible in sense-objects —
the answer is that the " species sensibilis " by itself does not suffice
for this knowledge. The intellect possesses, besides, an activity by
which the object, presenting itself under a phenomenal aspect in
the sense-image, is stripped of its phenomenal characteristics, and
is then placed before the intellect in its purely intelligible being.
The senses, therefore, are merely receptive ; the " species sensibilis"
results immediately from the apprehension of the object by the
sense-faculties. But the first stage of the intellectual process is an
active process ; it must generate or abstract the "species intelligi-
bilis '' from the sense-phantasm, before it can receive the abstracted
" species " in itself.
6. A distinction must, therefore, be established between the
" intellectus agens," and the " intellectus possibilis." The
"intellectus agens'' makes the sense-objects, which in themselves
are merely potentially intelligible — actually intelligible ; it
produces the " species intelligibilis " by abstraction ; the " intellectus
possibilis" then receives this " species intelligibilis," is informed by
it, and through it, as the informing principle of knowledge, cognizes
what is intelligible in the object. As the result of sense-cognition is
the " sense-image," so that of intellectual cognition is the " concept"
of the object. This concept belongs to the " intellectus possibilis,"
not to the "intellectus agens." By means of concepts the
" intellectus possibilis " forms judgments, and thus attains to a
knowledge of the truth.
7. Intellectual knowledge proceeds from universals to particulars.
The most general and therefore the most indeterminate notions are
first formed in the intellect ; only through these is it possible to
proceed to particular and determinate concepts. A natural
disposition must be ascribed to the intellect, in virtue of which it at
once forms these most general notions as soon as it begins to
exercise its powers, and thus obtains a foundation for the formation
of other concepts.
8. In possessing itself of these ultimate general notions the
intellect at the same time possesses itself of the first principles of
ail reasoning. First principles are as necessary for the reasoning
processes as general notions for the formation of particular notions.
They must, therefore, be apprehended by the intellect before it can
proceed further in the process of knowledge. It follows that the
intellect must be so constituted by nature that it forms not only
fundamental concepts, but also fundamental propositions from
these concepts, as soon as it begins to exercise its functions.
9. This "habit of principles" is what conditions and renders
possible the advance from intuitional to discursive knowledge. The
capacity to attain further knowledge by inference formed on these
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 391
principles is called Reason. Reason is thus, in a certain sense, the
complement of intellect (of the intuitive or apprehensive faculty). By
far the larger part of the truths within our reach are attainable only
by the discursive or inferential processes of Reason. Reason is the
faculty of scientific knowledge ; the intellect, with its " habit of first
principles," is the basis or pre-required condition ; the principles
themselves are, as it were, its germs or seeds. Reason and intellect
or understanding are not, however, two really distinct faculties ; they
are the same faculty differently applied.
10. These are the mental processes by which knowledge is
attained. We have no intuition of the truth immediately in God.
God is not the first object of knowledge ; He is rather the last known.
We attain knowledge of truth by the light of our own reason : that
is, by the first principles of knowledge which the intellect by means
of its " habit of first principles " generates naturally in itself. God
is the first principle of our knowledge only inasmuch as the light
of reason is a participation in the Divine light, and this in a two
fold sense : first, the human mind is created after the likeness of
the Divine mind ; and secondly, the first principles of our knowledge
have their ultimate ground in God. In this sense it can be said
that we know all truth in the light of God ; but not in the sense that
God is directly the medium through which we know everything.
THEOLOGY.
§122.
1. We must distinguish a three-fold knowledge of God — the
" cognitio intuitiva," the " cognitio per fidem," and the " co^nitio per
rationem naturalem." JChe intuitive knowledge is essentially super
natural, and is reserved for us in a future life. In this life we know
God by faith and also by natural reason. It is an error to ascribe
all our knowledge of God to faith alone. The saying of the Apostle,
" Invisibilia Dei, per ea quse facta sunt intellecta, conspiciuntur," is
proof to the contrary. If we can reason generally from effects to
their causes, why not from the works of God to God Himself ? (('.
Gent, L. 1, c. 12 ; De verit., qu. 10, art 12, c.)
2. Taken objectively ("quoad se"), the proposition, " God exists,"
is, of course, self-evident (" propositio per se nota''), because the
predicate "existing" is essentially contained in the subject — is^evn
identical with it. But for us (" quoad nos") it is not a self-evident-
proposition (" propositio per se nota"). It could only be such if wo
had a direct, clear, and evident idea of God— if we knew God "per
speciem propriam" — for then we should know immediately that tin-
predicate "existing" was contained in the idea of God. But a direct
knowledge of God " per speciem propriam" is essentially an intuitive
392
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
knowledge ; and, as has been already stated, we do not possess such
knowledge in our present life. Consequently, the proposition, " God
exists," can never be a " propositio per se nota" to us in this life.
If, then, we are to attain to an evident knowledge of: the truth of
this proposition, its truth must be proved. Proofs of the existence
of God are thus necessary (8. TheoL, I, qu. 2, art. 1).
3. The argument of St. Anselm, based upon the mere idea of God,
is not a valid demonstration of the existence of God. For, in the first
place, all who believe in a God do not conceive Him as the highest
being beyond Whom a higher is not conceivable ; many of the ancient
thinkers regarded the world as God. Secondly, even if it be granted
that all have this idea of God, His objective existence is by no means
proved thereby. For what is true of a term holds good of the
definition, which is its equivalent. Now, if I think " God" in my
mind, it does not therefore follow that this " God" is also actual. As
little does it follow, if I define the name " God" and understand by it
a being above whom there is none greater, that the being thus
defined is actually existent. From the mere thought of an object we
cannot argue to its existence. It is, however, true, that whoever
knows there exists objectively a highest being can infer from this that
the being"Jin question exists of necessity (C. Gent, L. 1, c. II). The
proofs of God's existence can, therefore, be only " a posteriori," and
we must argue from the works of God to His existence as their
cause.
4. This being premised, St. Thomas offers five principal proofs by
which the existence of God is demonstrated. The first argues from
motion to a first moving cause ; the second from the dependent
existence of things to a cause existing independently ; the third from
the contingency of things to a necessary being ; the fourth from the
grades of perfection in the things of this world to a supremely perfect
being ; and the fifth from the universal order in nature and natural
beings to a regulating, and therefore intelligent and volitional, cause.
(S. tlteol, p. 1, qu. 2, art. 3.)
5. As First Cause, God is pure actuality (actus purus) — all
potentiality is excluded from His being. In the most general sense,
actuality is prior to potentiality, because potentiality presupposes an
actual being by whose activity it is made actual. Therefore, if God
admitted an element of potentiality in Himself, eo ipso, He would
no longer be the First Being nor the First Cause, because He would
then presuppose a higher cause to which His actuality should be
referred.
6. But, if God is pure actuality, He is also an absolutely simple
being. God's being must not only exclude all matter, because matter is
essentially potential, but in God's being there can be no metaphysical
composition of essence and existence. If, in God, existence were as
really distinct from essence as it is in created things, then the
essence would be merely potential in reference to existence, and
would require to be brought into existence either by itself or by an
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.
external cause. But, in the first place, all potentiality is excluded from
God ; and, secondly, He cannot be brought into existence by an
extraneous cause, since He is Himself the first cause. Neither can He
produce Himself, for he would then need to be active before being
actual, which is absurd (& Theol, 1., qu. 3, Art. 4, c. ; C.G., L. 1, c. 22).
7. In God, therefore, essence and existence are not really differ
entiated. His existence is His very essence; He exists in virtue of his
essence. As there is in God no composition of essence and existence, so
is there no composition of substance and accidents, for the substance
would be potentially related to the accidents. Similarly, genus and
species are not to be distinguished in God. For, the difference by
which the genus is reduced to the species stands in the same relation
to the genus as actuality to potentiality; God stands, therefore,
above and outside of every genus.
8. God is not alone the absolutely incomposite (simple), but also
the infinitely perfect Being. As First Cause, God is pure actuality.
But every being is perfect according as it is actual (in actu), since
potency as such, is the same thing as defect. Consequently, God, as
pure actuality, must be absolutely perfect ; every defect, every
deficiency, is excluded from Him. God is being simply; being sub
sisting of itself and by itself. He must, therefore, contain in Himself
the entire fulness and perfection of being. No non-existence, no
imperfection, can be attributed to Him.
9. This being so, all perfections which we recognise in created
things are primarily contained in Him as in the First Cause. Were
they not in Him as the cause they could not be in the effect of that
cause. Nor are they contained in Him with the limitations which
they present in created things, but in that far higher and more per
fect manner which the infinite perfection of God requires ; and since
God is the absolutely Simple Being His perfections are contained in
Him, " unite et indivisim," i.e., there is no real distinction between
them as they exist in God.
10. There is not a real distinction between the perfections of the
Divine being, but a virtual distinction is necessitated by our mode
of thought. All perfections are, in fact, one in God, yet we cannot
conceive God by our powers of thought in the absolutely simple
fulness of His perfection. We cm only think of Him by making
distinctions in what is one in Him, and regarding Him, now
according to one perfection, now according to another. Having to
do this we consider God under different aspects. We cannot place
His various perfections before our mind as identical or synonymous,
but must then keep them distinct from one another. This is the
virtual distinction as opposed to the real. (S. Theol., 1, qu. 13, a. 4, c. ;
In lib. sent., 1, dist. 22, qu. 1, art. 3).
11. This doctrine of a virtual distinction between the Divine attri
butes is a just mean between the opposing conceptions that we have
observed in the Arabian and Hebrew philosophy. The real distinction
between the Divine attributes which the Arabian " Motekallemin"
394
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
accepted is entirely rejected. But the other extreme adopted by the
Arabian Aristotelians and by Moses Maimonides is also done away
with. According to the view of the latter there was no distinction
between the Divine attributes ; they were purely synonymous, and
the entire distinction was reduced to one of words or names.
12. As the absolutely Perfect Being, God is also the Absolute
Intelligence ; the former is inconceivable apart from the latter. On
the immateriality of a being depends its capacity for knowledge.
God is absolutely immaterial ; He must, therefore, be conceived °as
the Absolute Intelligence. Again, the " species intelligibilis " of His
knowledge can only be His own essence, for we cannot conceive
God's knowledge as dependent on any other being. (C. G., L. 1, c. 46).
Hence the primary object of God's knowledge is Himself; what is
known " per speciem propriam " is first in the order of knowledge,
and God's essence is manifestly the " species propria " for the
knowledge of God Himself. God is therefore, Absolute Self-
consciousness : He knows Himself according to the entire fulness of
His perfection.
13. God knows things that are objectively different from Him
only secondarily, and of course, only through His own essence. As
He knows himself perfectly, He must know Himself perfectly as the
First Cause. But that could not be unless He knew everything that
He, as cause, could produce. Consequently God's knowledge must
extend to everything that is in any way possible or actual. And
this the more that effects must pre-exist in their cause in an intelli
gible manner; and nothing can exist in God without His actually
knowing it. God's knowledge is, therefore, in no sense confined to
the universal, but includes every individual. (De Verit., qu. 2, art
5, c.)
14. Here we have the basis of the doctrine of ideas. If by idea
is understood the type after which things are created, then the Divine
Essence is itself the Idea of things. Not indeed the idea of things
as ^they are in themselves, but only as that Being is capable of being
imitated outside itself by created things. Knowledge of things is
essentially involved in the idea of things, but the Divine Essence is
to be regarded as the Idea of them only in so far as it is conceived
by God as the type of created things. God, contemplating His own
essence, knows it not merely as it is in itself, but also as it is capable
of being imitated outside Himself by created things. Inasmuch as
He conceives it in this way it is the idea of things. There is, in
reality, only one idea ; the Divine Essence, as well as the Divine
Thought, is one. The term plurality of ideas can be employed only
in a relative sense, inasmuch, that is, as the Divine Essence may be
imitated in many various way, and God conceives it as the type of
many different things. (S. TheoL, 1, qu. 15, art. 2, c.)
^ 15. Not only isGod Absolute Intelligence, He is also Absolute Will.
Will naturally follows upon intelligence. No natural being can be
conceived without a tendency towards the good corresponding to it ;
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 395
hence no intelligent being isconceivable without will. If God is Absolute
Will, then He is Himself the first object of His will, as well as of His
knowledge. Only secondarily does God will anything other than
Himself. And there is this further difference, that God wills Him
self necessarily, while He wills other things freely. It is impossible
for Him not to desire Himself the infinite good. On the other hand
He freely chooses other things because they are in no way necessary
to His absolute perfection and happiness. (S. TkeoL, 1, qu. 19, art.
3, c.) As God freely wills other things, He must also have the power
to produce them. Therefore God cannot be conceived as Absolute
Will without being also conceived as Absolute Omnipotence.
16. St. Thomas includes the Trinity of God among those truths
which the reason by itself without faith, is unable to discover, or even
to completely understand. Creative power and activity do not belong
specially to one of the three Persons; they are the essential power
and activity of God as God. It follows that the effects of this
creative power and activity of God cannot lead us further than to a
knowledge of the unity of God according to His essential attributes.
However, with the help of faith we can penetrate to some extent into
the mystery of the Trinity, and attain to a speculative knowledge of it.
The two attributes of the Divine Intelligence and the Divine Will aftbrd
us a basis for this. Since God knows Himself, the adequate thought of
Himself is brought forth from Him, and this is the Personal Word
of God — the Son. Similarly by the action of His will, whereby God
loves Himself, love proceeds from Father and Son, and this love is
also personal — the Person of the Holy Ghost. (S. TheoL, 1, qu. 27.
art. 3, c.)
THEORY OF CREATION
§123.
1. The idea of Creation, as it is represented in Holy Scripture,
involves three elements : — First, it denies all pre-existent matter
from which God might have formed the world. Secondly, it
implies that non-existence is primarily the state of the created
being rather than existence ; that is, the created being of itself is
non-existent, but receives existence from God and is therefore
distinct from God. Lastly, the idea of creation implies that the
created being is subsequent, not merely in the order of nature but
also of time, to nothing, and consequently, that there has beeii a
beginning to its existence. (In lib. Sent., 2, dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 1, c. —
S. Theol., qu. 45, art. 1, c.)
2. So much being premised, St. Thomas teaches that creation
from nothing can be proved by natural reason as regards the two
first-named elements of its concept, but not as regards the last-
mentioned. In other words, it can be demonstrated by reason that
396
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
the world could have coine into existence only by the creative
agency of God. But not that its existence had a beginning. While,
therefore, creation out of nothing, in the sense that created
things have been formed neither from a pre-existent matter nor
from the substance of God Himself, is a rational truth, the beginning
of the world is purely an article of faith that cannot be deinonstia-
tively established by reason. (Ibid., loc. cit.)
3. The proof which St. Thomas brings forward for the first part
of the thesis, i.e., for the existence of the world by creation, is based
essentially on the fact that God must be conceived as the First
Cause of all existence. As God is the First Cause of all being, created
things cannot derive their existence merely in part, e.g., as to their
form, from Him ; their entire being, their matter as well as their
form must be produced by God. And since there is no matter in God
Himself, the matter of created things cannot emanate from God.
The matter and form must both be brought into existence out of
nothing by God, i.e., they must be created.
4. As regards the second part of the thesis, i.e., that the beginning
of the world is not demonstrable by reason, St. Thomas sets about
establishing this proposition in the same manner as Moses Maim-
onides. The rational prooi's which are adduced for the beginning of the
world are, he says, inconclusive. It is asserted that the " ex nihilo "
involves at the same time the " post nihilum." But this inference
is not justifiable. The idea of creation out of nothing merely
implies that nothing precedes being in nature, but not that it is
prior in time. A further assertion is that on the supposition of the
non-beginning of the world, the antecedent series of generations
must be infinite, and that a " regressus in infinitum " is not
admissible. St. Thomas replies that such a " regressus in infinitum"
is non-admissible only in the case of causes acting simultaneously, but
the reasoning does not apply to causes acting in a successive series.
If it be further urged that, on the supposition of the eternity of the
world, an infinite number of human souls must now exist, the
answer is that it is not at all necessary to assume that the human
race had no beginning. We may allow that it had a beginning
without asserting the same of the rest of the universe.
5. If it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world
necessarily had a beginning, then we must acknowledge that the
eternity of the world is, from the standpoint of reason, at least,
possible. But we must stop there. We cannot prove that the
world necessarily had a beginning, but neither can we demonstra
tively establish that it must necessarily be eternal. If it were
assumed that a creature must necessarily have had no beginning, then
this creature must exist necessarily. But on what is this necessity
based ? It cannot have a foundation in the creature itself, because
every creature, as such, is contingent. Neither can it have any
foundation in God — first, because God does not act necessarily but
freely with regard to external things ; and, secondly, because
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 31)7
created things are not necessary for God Himself. Consequently,
there can be no question of a necessity attaching to the existence of
a creature, and, therefore, it cannot be asserted that the world must
necessarily be eternal.
6. Accordingly, the non-beginning, as well as the beginning, of
the world must be admitted as possible. The world can just as well
have had a beginning as not. Which of the two possible alternatives
has actually occurred cannot be decided by unaided reason. It
follows that in order to be enlightened on this point we must have
recourse to revelation, and that the proposition, the world has had
a beginning, is wholly an article of faith (De cetern. mundi, opusc.,
37.)
7. The end for which the world was created is the manifestation
of God's perfection and goodness in created beings. Everything in
the world is directed towards this end in the most perfect manner.
This is the doctrine of Optimism in reference to the created world.
And as everything is directed towards one end, so everything is
arranged and guided towards this end by God. This is God's
Providence. It extends not merely to the universal but also to the
individual. The presence of evil in the world is no contradiction of
it. A prudent government implies that the governor permits a
partial defect to exist here and there, if the perfection of the whole
is thereby increased. And such is actually the case in our universe,
for evil must work for good in the end. (C. Gent., L. 3, c. 71.)
PSYCHOLOGY.
8 124.
1. Man stands midway between the spiritual world of the angels
and the material world, inasmuch as he unites in himself both the
spiritual and tlie material. The angels are pure spirits, subsistent
forms which are separated from all matter (forma3 separate) ; the
things of nature are purely material ; in them the forms are wholly
immersed in matter, and have no existence apart from it.
Finally, man is at once spirit and body, and, therefore, the
connecting link between the two opposite poles of creation.
2. By the general term, Soul, is to be understood the primary
principle of life in the living beings of the sublunary world. As
such, it is the " actus primus,1 the first " cntelechy " of the physico-
organic body. Souls are of different kinds ; souls are, therefore, to
be distinguished according to the differences of living beings; the
vegetable soul, the animal soul, the human soul, are different kinds
of souls. The two first-named are purely material forms or.
" entelechies" ; the human soul, on the other hand, is a subsisteut
form, a spiritual being. This requires proof.
398
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
3. St. Thomas demonstrates the immateriality of the human
soul in the same way as his teacher, Albertus Magnus. He first
proves that the operation of thought cannot be the function
of a bodily organ, because a knowledge of the intellectual, of
the universal, of the spiritual, would be rendered impossible in
that supposition. From the inorganic and immaterial nature of
thought he concludes that the principle and agent of thought must
be also an immaterial substance essentially distinct from the bodily
organism. St. Thomas adduces another proof from self-conscious-
This involves a turning back of the mind upon itself in
ness.
thought, but it is impossible for a material agent to reflect upon
itself. Consequently, thought must necessarily be regarded as a
spiritual operation, and the soul, as the principle of thought, is a
spiritual being.
4. In reply to the objection taken from the fact that sickness ana
infirmity of body impede thought, St. Thomas says that we are not
justified in arguing from this that thought is an organic activity,
and therefore it proves nothing regarding the immateriality of the soul.
The cause of the phenomenon in question lies in the fact that thought
is dependent on the faculty of sense-cognition. Thought pre
supposes the phantasms of the imagination, and the latter can be
presented to, and suitably prepared for thought only by, the sense-
faculty of knowledge. If this is so, any derangement of the faculty
of sense-cognition must result in a derangement of thought. Since
the former result is brought about by a morbid affection or weak
ness of the organs to which it is essentially united, such a morbid
affection of the body must eventually constitute an impediment to
thought (Cfr. 8. TheoL, I, qu. 75, art. 3, ad 2.)
5. As the soul is an immaterial spiritual being, and, as such, a
subsistent form, its incorruptibility is thereby assured. All corrup
tion consists in the separation of the form from the matter ; where
there is no matter there can be no question of corruption. Further
more, the form is the reason of the existence of a thing ; the thing is
actualised by its form ; so long, therefore, as the form subsists, the
beincj to which it belongs is existent. If the form itself is the being
(i.e., if the form is subsistent), such a being cannot lose existence.
But the soul is a subsistent form, consequently it is essentially
incorruptible. If to this is added the natural longing of the soul for
an eternal continuance in existence — which longing, since it is
natural, cannot be unavailing — it is impossible to doubt of the
incorruptibility of the soul.
6. The soul is not only incorruptible, it is also immortal — that is,
it continues to exist after its separation from the body, as a being
possessed of intelligence and will. The intellectual activities oi the
soul are not exercised through any bodily organ, and can, therefore, be
exercised by the soul apart from the body. That this will actually
be the case is evident from the fact that we cannot conceive the soul
— a spiritual being— devoid of all vital activity. The soul apart
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.
from the body does not, it is true, exercise its intelligence in the
mode natural to it while it is dependent on the senses. It knows in
the same way as purely spiritual beings — a mode of knowledge
which is, indeed, "praeter naturam," but not " contra naturam."
7. The soul is related to the body, in the first place, as its
essential form. The nature of every being is manifested by its
activity ; as a thing acts, so it is. But the activity peculiar to man,
as such, is thought, for by this he is distinguished from all other
animal beings. Consequently, the specific nature of man must be
determined by the principle from which this activity proceeds.
But what determines the species of a thing is its essential form.
Therefore, the principle of the thinking power in man, or the
intellectual soul, must be held to be the essential form of man.
(,S. Theol., 1, qu. 76, art. 1.)
8. The soul is, in the second place, the moving principle of the
body, that is, it is the principle of all the bodily activities of man ;
for, as every being becomes actual through its form, the human body
is active through its form, and through this alone. Therefore, there
cannot be in man any activity of which the soul is not the principle ;
it is thus the " primus motor " in the body. It is, however, to be
noted that the soul is the form of the body by reason of its essence,
and the principle of movement in the body through its faculties.
9. It follows from this that a special soul, distinct from the
intellectual soul, cannot be postulated for the vegetative and sensitive
functions in man. The same soul is vegetative, sensitive, and
intellectual — this, of course, by means of and according to, distinct
faculties. In fact, the unity of being in man can be maintained
intact only on this condition. Were two or more souls (forms) to
be assumed in man he would possess as many essences as he possessed
souls, and he would then be only an aggregate of several essences,
not an individual nature.
10. A pre-existence of the soul cannot be accepted. As the soul
is the essential form of the body it is natural to it to be united with
the body ; its separation from the latter is not, indeed, " contra
naturam," but still " prater naturam." Now, what is natural is
always first in order of time, because what is " prater naturam" for
a being can only belong to it " per accidens." Therefore, the soul
cannot have previously existed in a state of separation from the
body ; in the moment when it becomes actualised, existent, it is
united with the body. But it? origin cannot be reduced to a mere
generation, for generation is a material, corporeal operation, and this
cannot produce an immaterial spiritual being ; otherwise the effect
would transcend the cause ; souls are produced, therefore, by divine
creation. They are infused by God into the body when the embryo,
after passing through the vegetative and sensitive stages, has attained
to the maturity and disposition suitable for receiving the intellectual
soul as form. Displaced by this latter, tho vegetative-sensitive form
parishes (is corrupted). (C. (t< /•'., L. '2. « . ST . Quodl. 1, art (j.)
o
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HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
11. The " intellectus agens " and " intellectus possibilis" are not
things separate from the individual soul, they are its essential
faculties. On any other assumption, man would no longer be
specifically distinct from the brute, which is absurd. The intellectual
soul is the substantial form of the body, but it would not be such if
one intellect were common to all men, The doctrine of a universal
intellect is unjustly ascribed to Aristotle. He calls^ the intellect
expressly a " pars animse, qua anima cognoscit et sapit." When he
speaks of the intellect as " separatum et immixtum," his meaning is
that the intellect is not an organic faculty, but a supra-organic power,
not necessarily dependent on matter.
12. The " root" of the freedom of the will lies in the iact that the
will as an immaterial power, determines itself to act, or not to act.
Inasmuch as it is the power of self-determination, it is in a state of
indifference to various courses of action, and can, therefore, make a
choice between them. This " facultas eligendi" is its freedom The
will is indeed, necessarily impelled towards good in general, and
towards happiness. But it is able to choose between the various
means of attaining happiness so long as they are of such a nature as
not to be necessarily connected with perfect happiness, or so long as
this necessary connection is not fully recognised by the intellect.
Knowledge is pre-supposed for the exercise of free will, for we
cannot will what we do not know ; but the intellect influences the
will not "per modum agentis," but only "per modum finis."
Corresponding to the division of the appetitive faculties of sense, the
passions are distinguished as " passiones concupiscibiles and
" passiones irascibiles."
ETHICS.
§125.
1 The faculty of sensuous appetite is subordinated to the will in
the same manner as sense to intellect. This faculty contains in itself
two elements, concupiscibility and irascibility. The " bonum sim-
pliciter" good as such, is the object of the former, the "bonum
arduum " good as difficult of attainment, of the latter. The " passiones
animates " play a part in the sphere of the sensuous appetitive faculty.
They are merely a vigorous excitation of that faculty occasioned by
the presentation of some particular good or evil.
2 The highest end of all beings is perfection, and this consists in
likeness with God. This principle holds good when applied to man.
But in the case of man, perfection is also the highest happiness ; both
alike consist in the possession of the good corresponding to his
nature The highest end of man, as being his highest perfection, is
also his greatest happiness. Hence the desire for happiness is
implanted as an ineradicable impulse in the nature of man.
what does this highest happiness of man consist ?
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 401
3. In answering this question St. Thomas follows Aristotle in
every particular. Pleasure cannot constitute the highest happiness
of man ; that happiness lies in action. For according to the plan of
nature action is not for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse is
true, i.e. pleasure is for sake of action. The activity upon which
human happiness is based must on the one hand be the noblest and
highest for which man is qualified by his nature, and on the other
hand it must be directed towards the noblest and highest object.
4. But the noblest and highest activity of man is not the will,
because this merely follows upon and is conditioned by knowledge.
It must rather be knowledge itself. The noblest and highest object is
God. Consequently the highest happiness of man consists in the
knowledge of God. With the knowledge of God must of course be
joined the love of God ; but the latter is not the essential element of
perfect happiness ; it is merely a necessary complement of it. (S.
TheoL, 1, 2, qu. 3, art. 2, c— C. Gent.. L. 3,c. 25, 26.)
5. It has been said that the knowledge of God can be attained in
three ways : — by demonstration, by faith, and by intuition ; the
further question now arises : which of these three kinds of knowledge
is the foundation of man's highest happiness ? It cannot be
knowledge by demonstration, for happiness must be something
universal and attainable by all men, but only very few succeed in
arriving at a knowledge of God by demonstration. Just as little can
knowledge by faith be a basis for perfect happiness. The latter
consists " principaliter '' in the activity of the intellect, but in faith the
will claims for itself the principal part, for here the will must
determine the intellect to give its assent. Consequently happiness
can only consist in the intuitive knowledge of God ; and since this
is attainable only in the next life, it follows that the ultimate destiny
of man extends beyond this temporal world into eternity. Finally,
this happiness must be everlasting, because it would not be perfect
if it did not endure for all eternity. (C. Gent., L. 3, c. 38, sqq.)
6. The law of God, in so far as it is known by the reason, forms
the rule of human conduct. The act by which the law of God is
applied to individual actions is Conscience. Accordingly, moral
goodness consists in the harmony of our will and actions with the
law of God, and, therefore, in their conformity with the moral order.
Further, that an action may be morally good, a triple harmony with
the law is requisite, viz. : — a harmony of the object, of the intention,
and of the accompanying circumstances. Only when an action
harmonises with the law in this threefold relation, is it, in the true
sense of the word, morally good.
7. Moral evil is nothing but the privation of this harmony of
an action with the law of God — the transgression of the law on the
part of the will. From this definition of moral evil it is evident
that the cause of evil is, not so much a "causa etficiens" as a M causa
deficiens." The act of the will is evil when it deflects from the line
of conduct indicated by the law, and, therefore, " ab ordine doik-it."
402
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
Evil is, consequently, a negation : it is nothing positive ; not a
positive entity, but only a privation of the positive — of that which
ought to exist.
8. Moral Virtue is a habit by means of which the human will
acquires a facility for, and is inclined to, moral good. There
are, indeed, intellectual virtues which, being habits of the
intellect, determine it to its proper activity. These are, how
ever, only "virtutes secundum quid"; they condition merely the
possibility, not the actuality, of the corresponding activities. The
moral virtues alone are virtues in the strict sense (virtutes simpliciter);
under their influence man not only can act rightly ; he actually does
so. The cardinal virtues are Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and
Justice. To these may be added the infused virtues — Faith, Hope,
and Charity.
9. Here we will conclude our analysis of the system of St.
Thomas. We have been able only to sketch its most general
characteristics ; the wealth and variety of matter which it contains
cannot be even approximately indicated in the summary to which
we are obliged to confine ourselves. But, from the few points to which
prominence has been given, it can be gathered how wonderfully the
entire edifice of his philosophy is constructed, and how its author
has concentrated in it all the previous developments of philosophy
and theology, and reduced them into a mighty and admirable
system of doctrine.1
ST. BONAYENTURE.
§126-
1. We come now to another distinguished light of the thirteenth
century — one scarcely inferior to his contemporary, St. Thomas, in
depth of thought, breadth of view, and acuteness of insight. John
Fidanza, known in religion as Bonaventure, was born in 1221 at
Bagnarea, in the Papal States. He entered the Franciscan Order,
and studied at Paris, where he is said to have been the pupil of
Alexander of Hales. Soon after he undertook the duties of Professor
of Theology at Paris. He became General of his Order, and was
created a Cardinal by Gregory X. Having been summoned to the
Council of Lyons, he died during its progress in the year 1274. He
received the honourable appellation of " Doctor Seraphicus."
2. In the Lyons edition of 1668 the works of St. Bonaventure
occupy seven folio volumes. The first two volumes contain exegetical
1 What St. Thomas Aquinas was in the domain of science Dante Alighieri (1265-
1321) was in the region of poetry. His immortal " Divina Commedia" exhibits the same
weaving together of Peripatetic philosophy and Christian theology as the " Sumnia
Theologioe" of St. Thomas. The history of philosophy has not to deal ex professo with
him, but it must at least mention his name with honour.
ST. BONA VENTURE. .}().",
treatises, among them the " Hexaerneron ; " the third volume contains
the sermons; the fourth and tifth the great commentary on tin-
" Sentences" of Peter Lombard ; the sixth and seventh the " Opus-
cula/' of which the most important are the " Reductio Artium ad
Theologiam," the " Breviloquium," the " Centilogium," "Meditationes
vitas Christi," " Formula Aurea de Gradibus Virtutum," " Speculum
Anima3," " De septem gradibus Contemplationis," " Soliloquium," the
" Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum," " De septem itineribus eternitatis,"
" De sex alis Seraphim," " Incendium Amoris," etc., etc.
3. From the titles of these works it is evident that St. Bonaventure
did not confine himself to scholastic speculation, but cultivated also
the field of mysticism. It is especially in the latter sphere that St.
Bonaventure has gained his laurels ; he is pre-eminently a mystic.
It must not be supposed, however, that his labours in the field of
scholasticism were of little importance ; his great commentary on
Peter Lombard is scarcely surpassed by that of St. Thomas ; still
he is chiefly famous as a mystic. This does not imply that he
constructed his mysticism on new foundations ; on the contrary, he
attached himself closely to the St. Victors; his entire mystical
doctrine is only the continuation and development of what they
had already laid down. The fact that St. Bonaventure is pre
eminently a mystic justifies us in regarding him chiefly from that
point of view. We will select from his strictly scholastic works
only a few points of teaching, on which, as representing the
Franciscan School, he is at variance with St. Thomas.
4. First in order we take his doctrine of Matter. Alexander of
Hales, the founder of the Franciscan School, had adopted the theory
of Avicebron that matter is a constituent element of even spiritual
beings. Bonaventure followed him in this. Matter, he says, must
be assigned as a constituent element to corporeal and spiritual beings
alike. A spiritual being is a created being, and as such, is not
absolutely incomposite (simple), it includes in itself a potential and
an actual element (potentia et actus). Now, the notions Potency and
Act may be connected with the notions Matter and Form ; it follows
that spiritual beings are compacted of Matter and Form. Form is
that which gives determination and actuality to a thing ; but
determination and actuality suppose a substratum which they affect ;
this substratum is Matter. If, then, a spiritual being is a determined,
actual being, it cannot be devoid of Matter.
5. The Matter which goes to constitute spiritual beings is not,
however, subject to the processes of generation and dissolution, nor,
does it fall under the category of Quantity. But, in the last analysis
it does not differ from the Matter of corporeal things ; one and the
same kind of Matter is the substratum of spiritual and corporeal
beings alike. Matter is one in all beings, though not in all the
same. When a number of vessels are fashioned out of one piece of
gold, we say that all the vessels are made from one metal, though
the gold which forms one is not the same gold which forms another.
404
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
In the same way the Matter which goes to constitute all spiritual
and corporeal things is one, though we cannot say that the Matter
of spiritual beings is the same as the Matter of the corporeal.
6. Again, Bonaventure denies that the duration of the world
could be eternal and without a beginning. If we assumed that the
Matter of which the world is formed had eternal existence apart from
God and His action, it would be consistent to hold that the world
was eternal and had no beginning. But this assumption is inadmiss-
able; Matter is not eternal ; both the Matter and Form of the world
have been created by God. The higher and more perfect the cause,
the more completely the effect is due to its influence. Where the
highest and most perfect cause is operative, everything in the effect
is due to its action ; it produces in the effect both Matter and Form,
that is, it creates the effect.
7. If we admit this, the assertion that the world is eternal, or
rather that it is produced from all eternity, is at variance with truth
and with reason. It is self-contradictory. It is a self-contradiction
to assert that a thing whose existence was preceded by its non-
existence exists from eternity. The existence of the world was
preceded by its non-existence, for God created the world " out of
nothing." Manifestly, the "nothing" in question cannot be conceived
as Matter out of which God created the world. The expression
" out of nothing " connotes an order of antecedence and sequence ;
it can mean only that at first nothing existed, and then, by the
creative action of God, something came to exist. As a fact, then,
the existence of the world followed its non-existence, and, this being
so, it is a contradiction to speak of it as eternal and without
beginning.
8. So much for St. Bonaventure the Scholastic. Let us now turn
our attention to St Bonaventure the Mystic. He has given us the
shortest and most complete summary of his mystical teaching in
his " Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum." Starting from the distinction
of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor between " Cogitatio " correspond
ing to the Imagination, " Meditatio '' corresponding to the Reason,
and " Contemplatio " corresponding to the Intelligence, he attempts
in the " Itinerarium " to point out the path along which Contem
plation proceeds ; or, in other words, to represent the progress of
Contemplation from its lowest to its highest stage. The conditions
necessary for contemplation are grace from above, a pious life and
fervent prayer on the part of man. On this soil and on this alone
does Contemplation flourish.
9. Contemplation must puruse the same course as our rational
knowledge. It must begin with created things, so as to rise by their
help to God Himself. In the world of creatures we have two great
divisions — the corporeal and the spiritual. The former displays
the footprints of God, the latter reveals His very image. Conse
quently, the first step in the ascent to the knowledge of God is by
the corporeal world ; the second by the spiritual ; in the third and
ST. BONAVENTUHE. 405
last stage we attain immediately to God Himself. Contemplation
has in Tike manner to pass through three mam stages. We must
first apply ourselves to the material world in order to contemplate
God in it, so far as His footprints are revealed in corporeal thn
Then we must turn our gaze in upon ourselves that we may regard
God in ourselves, so far as He displays Himself in our soul as in a
mirror. Finally, we must fix our gaze directly on God m order t
contemplate Him in Himself.
10 Each of these three principal stages is again divided into
two minor ones, and thus we obtain in the end six stages of
contemplation, which are, however, always connected, two and two,
with each other. _ ,
a In the first stage of contemplation, the soul contemplates G
per vestigium. It observes everywhere in external things weight
number, measure, and a continuous gradation in the order ot
perfection. The contemplative is thus led to understand the power,
wisdom and goodness of God, therein displayed.
b In the second stage of contemplation, the mind contemplate
God in vestigio. The mind observes how the " species sensibilis '
of external objects is produced in the imagination and now we
thereby derive a certain pleasure from the object This leads to t]
contemplation of the eternal generation of the Son of God as the
perfect ima^e of the Father, and of the infinite happiness which the
Father enjoys in the Son, and the Son in the Father.
c In the third stage of contemplation, the mind regards God per
imaginem. When we observe our soul, and direct our attention t-
its faculties, our contemplation is necessarily extended to God.
a If we examine the intellect closely, we find that it is specially
engaged in the formation of ideas Now, in the idea we apprehend the
bemff of a thing. Consequently, in order to be able to thftik a
thin- through an idea, and to define it, the intellect must previously
possess the fdea of being in general But it knows being as perfect
and imperfect, as complete and incomplete, as mutable and
immutable ; in short, it knows not merely the positive but al*
Dative aspects of being. But the negative is only knowable
thrS the positive. The intellect must therefore possess
previously in itself the idea of the most perfect and most real being
L the idea of God, so as to be able to think and define .the being
of things The consideration of the other operation of the intellect
-the judgment-leads to the same results. We become acquainted
in the judgment with necessary and immutable truths. We canno
however, if am these from ourselves alone, because we are contingent
and mutable beings. We must, therefore, perceive them by the
necessary and immutable light of the Divine Word,
in every case, led to the contemplation ot God,
Q The same holds good in relation to the activity of the will
If we make a choice, this choice always presupposes a judgmen
whereby we determine which of several goods is the better and more
406
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
preferable. Now, as one good is better or more preferable than
another, only m so far as it approaches more closely to the best and
most perfect being, we must of necessity possess in ourselves the
idea of the best and most perfect being in order to be capable of
forming the judgment in question, and of choosing in accordance
with it. In this way the consideration of the activity of will leads
to the contemplation of God.1
m d. In^the fourth stage of contemplation, the mind beholds God
in ^mag^ne. Here the gaze of contemplation is turned upon the
supernatural life of the soul, in so far as it is equipped with and
perfected by, the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Here the
mind is raised to the contemplation of God as the author of the soul's
supernatural life.
e. Finally, in the fifth and sixth stages, the mind contemplates
God as existing above and beyond itself. Here it abandons footprint
and image, and fixes its gaze directly upon God Himself. In the
ilth stage contemplation is still directed only to the beino- and
ssential attributes of God. In the sixth it rises yet higher and
penetrates even to the triple personality of God.
11. The progress of contemplation unfolds itself in this way from
the lowest to the highest stage. But in degree of intensity contem
plation can reach a higher or lower pitch. The highest decree of
contemplation is ecstasy. In this the mind passes out of itself It
lays aside all natural cognitive activity, both of sense and intellect
Lt is elevated above everything sensible and supra-sensible; above all
existence and non-existence. And while it enters into this state of
sacred non-cognition it is entirely lost in the contemplation of that
divine unity which stands above all being and all knowledge Then is
kindled that flame of love, which, as it were, destroys all individuality
and makes the soul, through its emotion, to be one with the Divine
Will. But no one knows this state unless he has experienced it
Jlimself, and no one experiences it except through divine grace.
Ecstasy is something entirely supernatural.
12. Having made acquaintance with the two great representatives
cholasticism and mysticism in the thirteenth century— St. Thomas
and St. Bonaventure— we must now turn our attention to their less
ramous contemporaries.
HENRY OF GHENT, ROGER BACON, RAYMUND LTJLLY, AND OTHERS.
§127.
1. Among the contemporaries of St. Thomas may be mentioned
Lambert of Auxerre, Robert Kilwardeby, .Egidius Lessinensis,
nnfolnT!l!nPr0Tf08iti0!!? laid duWn in ^foregoing proofs are apparently favourable to
Ontologism. It would be rash to conclude from this, without further inquiry that St
•e was an Ontologist since there is no trace of Ontological leanings in his
rely philosophical works. The above reasoning is essentially that of St. Augustine it
with hTmself!^ ^ otherwise we should bring St. Bonareuture into contradiction
CONTEMPORARIES OF AQUINAS. 407
Bernard de Trilia, JSgidius Aurelianensis, Peter of Auvergne, etc.
More important than any of these was Henry of Ghent (Henry
Gothals). Born at Muda, near Ghent, about 1217, he .studied at
Cologne under Albertus Magnus, and was afterwards professor at
Ghent and Paris. He received the surname of " Doctor Solemnis."
He died in the year 1293. His most important works are the
"Quodlibeta Theologica," the "Summa quaestionum ordinarijirum,"
a commentary on the " Sentences," and a " Summa Theologiae."
2. Henry reproduces in his theory of Universals the teaching of
Avicenna. Essence, as such, is indifferent both to particularity and
to universality. It is particularised in objective reality ; it is
universal in the intellect. Henry would admit no real distinction
between essence and existence. He does not hold matter opposed
to form as pure potentiality to actuality. According to his view,
an existence of its own must be assigned to matter, by means of
which it is " in actu," even when separated from the form. Matter
does not receive existence or mere actuality from the form, but only
a determinate existence, a determinate actuality.
3. Henry diverges still further from St. Thomas in this, that,
unlike the latter, he will not admit a distinct idea in God for every
individual. On the contrary, he teaches that the " species
specialissimge" alone are pre-exiatent as ideas in God. As many ideas
must, therefore, be admitted to be in God as there are species of
things possible, but no more. Individuals pre-exist in God as ideas
only inasmuch as the ideas of them are contained in the idea of the
species. For, on the one hand, the divine idea represents the essence,
in itself indifferent to particularity and universality ; on the other,
it represents the same essence in its relation to the individuals, in so
far as it contains in itself the possibility of being realised in the
individuals. Involving this relation, the idea of the species includes
within it the idea of the individuals.
4. According to Henry, God is the first object of our knowledge,
since He is included in the idea of indeterminate being. Henry
identifies the idea of indeterminate being, which is undoubtedly the
first known to us, with the Divine Being, and thus arrives at the
opinion that God is the object first known in our natural knowledge.
This is true, of course, only of our natural knowledge ; we do not
acquire a reasoned knowledge of God until later on ; but we could
not acquire the reasoned knowledge if this first natural knowledge
of God did not precede it.
5. Henry of Ghent was followed by Richard of Middleton
(Ricardus de Media Villa), a Franciscan, who taught at Paris and
Oxford ( + 1300). According to him, the Universal has no objective
reality, whether in things or apart from them. It cannot, indeed,
be doubted that the Essence which forms the content of the
Universal is real in the individuals, but it is not real in them in the
sense in which it is real when conceived in thought, apart from the
individuals. Still less is it real in them with the universality which
408 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
it receives from thought. An Universal with these characteristics
cannot exist apart from thought. The principal writings of Richard
are a commentary on the " Sentences " and " Quodlibeta."
6. Still later flourished Aegidius of Colonna ( + 1316), a member of
the Order of Augustinian Friars, ''Doctor Fundatissimus," professor
of theology at Paris. He defended St. Thomas against the attacks
of the Oxford Minorite, De Lamarre, and replied to his " Reprehen-
sorium," or '' Correctorium Fratris Thomae," by a refutation entitled
" Correctorium Corruptorii." He also wrote " Quodlibeta," a tract
" De ente et essentia,'' " Quaestiones metaphysicales," etc. He held
no peculiar philosophical opinions.
The same may be said of Godfrey of Fontaines (Godefredus de
Fontibus), who also wrote " Quodlibeta." Mention must also be
made of Petrn.s Hispanus, who died in 1277, as Pope John XXI., and
who by his " Summulae logicales," extracted from the " Synopsis " of
Michael Psellus, exercised considerable influence on the school study
of logic. The " Summulae " contain in their first form the well-
known mnemonic lines, " Barbara," " Celarent," etc.
7. In Roger Bacon (1214 to 1294), a native of England, we meet
with a thinker of a new type. He devoted himself, while at Paris
and Oxford, to the study of the natural sciences ; joined the Franciscan
order, and became a professor of repute in the University of Oxford.
The numerous errors into which he was led by his astrological
speculations brought him into conflict with the General of his Order,
and he was thrown into confinement; but he was set at liberty
again by Pope Nicholas IV. His great work is the "Opus Majus ad
Clementem IV." In addition to this he wrote " Epistolae de secretis
artis et naturae operibus atque nullitate inagise," fragments of an
" Opus Minus," an extract from the " Opus Majus," together with
an introductory tract, " Opus Tertium."
8. In his scientific studies, Bacon occupied himself chiefly with
the natural sciences. He was emphatic in censuring the neglect into
which the study of natural science, of mathematics, and even of
grammar, had fallen. These sciences, he held, are of the greatest
importance for theology. Accordingly, in his "Opus Majus" he
sketches a complete outline of optics, astronomy, and mathematics.
In this direction he was only following in the wake of Albertus
Magnus, who, as is well known, had set a brilliant exampie in
encouraging the natural sciences. What Bacon accomplished for
natural science was of great importance for his age, and deserves our
fullest approbation.
9. Following his predilection for natural science, Bacon, in his
theory of knowledge, lays great stress on experience. Without
experience, he says, there is no perfect knowledge. He who discovers
by experience the cause of a phenomenon, alone possesses perfect
wisdom. Demonstrative knowledge deduces the truth of a proposition
from given premises, but it does not remove all doubt. The mind
can be certain of this truth only when it re-discovers it by way of
HAYMUND LULLY. 409
experience. Bacon understands, however, by experience, not merely
sense-experience ; he admits also an internal intellectual experience
resting on the divine enlightenment and inspiration. In his view,
natural science is based upon the experience of our senses, while all
the higher sciences, which deal with the supersensible, have their
ultimate foundation in this internal intellectual experience. This
explains how Bacon, following Avicenna, separates the " intellectus
agens" from the individual soul, and regards it as a transcendental
principle to which is due the divine enlightenment whereon this
internal experience rests.
10. Bacon was an ardent student of Astrology. In his opinion,
the stars exercise a determining influence on the destiny of man,
and on the events occurring amongst men. No important work
should, therefore, be undertaken without consulting astrology, for
the work can be accomplished only at the suitable time. By the aid of
astrology we can also show the necessity for, and the difference
between, the six religions and cast a horoscope for them. These
are plainly doctrines which cannot be pronounced free from the taint
of superstition.
11. The philospher who next claims our notice is Raymund Lully.
He was born about 1235 in the island of Majorca. After having led
a very worldly life at the court of King James of Aragon, he withdrew
into solitude with the intention of renouncing the world, and devoting
himself to the study of the sciences. Scientific knowledge he
proposed to use as a means for the conversion of the unbelievers.
During the ten years which he devoted to solitary study he invented
a new method, — which he believed he owed to special divine
enlightenment. This was the " Great Art " by which he thought
himself in a position " to give an answer to all scientific question?
without any effort of study or reflection." Having made this discovery
he came forth from his solitude, and endeavoured to turn his " Great
Art " to practical account. He made a tour of all the chief cities of
Europe with the twofold purpose of teaching his " method "
and of arousing the zeal of the ecclesiastical and temporal princes
for the conversion of the Mohammedans. He made three journeys to
Africa in order to labour in person for the conversion of the
unbelievers. On each occasion he was made prisoner and cruelly
ill-treated. He obtained his freedom through the intervention
of Christian merchants. On his return from his third voyage to
Africa, he died from the effects of the treatment he had suffered
during his last captivity ( + 1315).
12. In the Mainz edition (1721-42), compiled by Salzinger, Lully's
works fill ten folio volumes. The writings which refer to the " (I :
Art" were issued separately at Strassburg, in 1598, under the title
"Opera ea quae ad inventam a Lullo artem universalem pertinent."
This collection includes the " Ars brevis," the treatise " De
auditu cabbalistico " ; also, " Duodecim principia philosphiffi sen
Lamentatio philosophise contra Averroistas," the " Logica nova," the
410
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
tract "De venatione medii " and ".De Conversione subject! et
praedicati per medium" ; the " Rhetoriea," the " Ars Magna"; and
the "Articuli fidei sacrosanctae." These are the most important
of Lully's works.
13. The " Great Art " of Lully is nothing but a logico-mathematical
method of arranging certain class-notions in various combinations,
and solving by these combinations all scientific problems. It was to
be " a universal key ^ to the discovery of whatever can be made
known, Determined, differentiated, or proved, regarding each object."
The entire ^ method is constructed on purely mechanical principles.
Lully distinguishes nine subjects, nine absolute and nine relative
predicates, nine virtues, nine vices, and nine questions. He places
these beside one another in a definite order, arranged in seven
concentric circles on revolving wheels. These may be moved in such
a manner that each of the notions marked on the figure comes, as a
result of the rotation, under all the other notions, either by itself, or
in union with any ^ other that may be selected. When the machine
is set in motion, different combinations of these ideas result. From
these manifold combinations all the questions that can arise, in
reference to one or other of these ideas, can easily be solved.
14. From this description it is evident that no true scientific
value can be attributed to this method. It is, therefore, all the
more remarkable that, not only did Lully himself believe that he
had discovered in his " Great Art " the key to all science and all
wisdom, but that he found many enthusiastic adherents in this
belief. The latter were known as Lullists. As late as the 16th and
17th centuries, men were to be met with who believed they had
discovered great secrets by Lully's "Art," and who busied them
selves with an explanation of its secrets.
15. Lully's further literary activity was devoted to combating
the followers of Averroes in the Christian Schools. The doctrine
that philosophy can lead to results which are opposed to Christian
faith, and that philosophy is justified in maintaining them as
philosophical truths was absolutely rejected by him. In his
" Duodecim Principia Philosophise " he sets himself to show that
philosophy of its nature must fail to prove the articles of faith
to be rationally false and erroneous ; that, on the contrary, it is in
agreement with them in every respect.
16. Lully was, of course, right in this, but, in the ardour of the
controversy, he allowed himself to be hurried into the other extreme.
Instead of contenting himself with showing that reason cannot
establish anything which is opposed to faith, and that, therefore, the
mysteries of faith cannot be contrary to reason, he went so far as to
ussert that reason, of itself, can establish, by a perfect demonstration,
all the mysteries of Christianity, even those which refer to mere
matters of fact. He will have it that not merely probable, but
absolutely demonstrative, proofs can be brought forward for all the
Christian mysteries. In his work, « Articuli fidei sacrosanct^," he
DUNS SCOTUS. 411
attempts to establish, by rational demonstration, the Trinity, the
Incarnation, the Redemption, etc., in all their bearings. We
cannot follow him further in these speculations. But, it is
evident that he has here reached the standpoint of Theosophy, and,
that, in this respect, Lully was in complete opposition to the
scientific views of his contemporaries.
6. — JOHN DUNS SCOTUS.
§12cS.
1. Although the teaching of St. Thomas was held in the highest
favour during the thirteenth century, it did not secure undisputed
sway. While the religious brethren of St. Thomas, the Dominicans,
supported his philosophical system, an opposing school was formed
in the second of the two great mendicant Orders, the
Franciscans. The system of St. Thomas, as such, was not openly
attacked, but exception was taken to many of its most important
doctrines. The Franciscans sided with the leaders of their own
order, with Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure. Laying great
stress on those points, in which the teaching of their own
philosophers diverged from that of St. Thomas, they were
naturally led to oppose and attack the contrary Thomist doctrines.
2. A distinguished leader of this opposition was William De
Lamarre, of Oxford, who, in the year 1285, published a work
directed against the Thomist position, which was couched in the
most violent language. He gave it the title of " Reprehensoriurn
sen Correctoriuin fratris Thomae." It is a summary of all the
objections that had been made by the Franciscans to the doctrine
of St. Thomas. Lamarre is convinced that the teaching of
St. Thomas is injurious to faith, and leads to heresy ; to this view
his countryman, William Varron, also assents. It has been
already mentioned that Aegidius of Colonna wrote a reply
to the " Reprehensorium.''
3. The principal opponent of St. Thomas, among the Franciscans,
was John Duns Scotus. He it was who collected all the objections
that had been urged by the Franciscans against the Thomist
doctrine, and reduced them, together with the positive teachings of
the Franciscans, to a complete system. This system was adopted hy
the Franciscans as their own, and upheld by them in opposition
to the Thomistic School of the Dominicans. In this way the
Franciscan School exalted Duns Scotus above their founder,
Alexander of Hales, and acknowledged him as their chief.
4. Duns Scotus was born about 1266, according to others in 1:274,
entered the Franciscan Order at an early a^e, and made his studies
at Oxford. He is said to have displayed, at tirst. a great i
412
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
dilection for Mathematics. At the age of twenty-three he became
Professor of Theology at Oxford. He was afterwards transferred
to Paris, and, finally, to Cologne, where he died in the year 1308.
In the Lyons edition of 1639, his works occupy twelve folio
volumes.1 The first four volumes contain commentaries on
Aristotle's works; on Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics, and also on
the book, " De Anima." The third volume includes the " Tractatus
de rerum principio," the Tractatus de primo principle," the
" Theoremata subtilissima.5'
5. The great commentary on the " Sentences " of Peter Lombard
(Opus Oxoniense) the principal work of Duns Scotus, and the one
in which his philosophical system is expressly set forth — extends
from the fifth to the tenth volume. In the eleventh volume is
contained the Reportatorum Parisiensium L1.4 (Opus Parisiense),
a further Commentary on the " Sentences," formed of notes taken
by his hearers in Paris, and having the same subject matter as the
Oxford commentary. In the twelfth and last volume are to be
found the " Quaestiones quodlibetales." It it truly amazing how
Duns Scotus could complete so many and such comprehensive
works in so short a lifetime.
6. Duns Scotus is remarkable for his subtlety, and his acute
power of drawing fine distinctions. By these he was frequently
betrayed into mere hair-splitting, and on this account received from
his contemporaries the epithet, " Doctor Subtilis." His gifts fitted
him pre-eminently for the task of clearing away what seemed to
him the defects of the doctrines of his scholastic predecessors, and
thoroughly sifting the entire traditional subject-matter of
philosophy and theology. Herein lay his chief merit. He succeeds
better in refutation than in positive argument, in destructive
criticism of the theories of others than in the construction of his own.
But, just for this reason, his philosophy is not such a well organised
system of doctrine as St. Thomas's. The long-winded refutations
with which each of the " Quaestiones " is crowded render it
extremely difficult to follow him, and the rough uncultured
language in which he clothes his thoughts does not contribute to
making the perusal of his works a pleasure.
7. As regards the general principles of the Scotist system of
philosophy, they deviate only in some points from the Thomist
doctrine. Duns Scotus establishes the necessity of revelation on
the ground that reason does not teach us, clearly and plainly, the
highest end of our existence — the intuition of God. In addition to
natural knowledge, or philosophy, a still higher and inspired teach,
ing is necessary to enable man to know the fulness of truth and, on
the basis of this knowledge, to fulfil his eternal destiny. Revelation
1 This edition was prepared by the Irish fathers of the College of Isidore in
Koine ; it is usual to name Luke Wadding, the annalist of the Franciscan order, as the
itor, owing to the prominent part he took in the matter.
DUNS SCOTUS. 413
is, therefore, a supplement to, and a perfecting of, rational know
ledge ; and, consequently, no contradiction can exist between them.
8. The object of theology is God, as God, " sub ratione deitatis ;"
while philosophy only treats of God in as far as He is the First
Cause of things. Theology is essentially a practical science; its
teachings are directed not so much to the removal of ignorance and
the extension of our knowledge as towards the furtherance of our
salvation. The contrary is true of philosophy. Theology is not
subordinated to any other science ; nor is philosophy subordinated
to theology, since it has its own principles, and does not borrow them
from theology.
DOCTRINE OF MATTER AND UNIVERSALS.
§ 129.
1. In his theory of matter, Duns Scotus follows Henry of Ghent.
An existence, or actuality of its own, must be ascribed to Matter,
apart from Form. As it is the product of divine creation, it cannot
be conceived as non-existent ; otherwise the divine creation would
have no real efficacy. Of course, Matter is not created without
Form; but in the order of nature Matter is prior to Form, and
existence must, according to this priority, belong to it before it
belongs to the Form. Matter does not, therefore, receive simple
actuality from the Form, but merely a determinate actuality, which
the Form brings with it. As Matter, it possesses actuality without
the Form, through divine creation. (De rer. princ., qu. 7, art 1, 2.)
2. Matter is not confined merely to corporeal beings ; all
even those that are spiritual, are compounded of Matter and Form;
God alone is Pure Form. In every created being we have a com
position of potentiality and actuality ; God alone is Pure Actuality.
In relation to actuality, potentiality is the indeterminate, wh
becomes determinate only through the actuality. But the inde
minate is Matter; the determining principle is Form
quently, every created being must be composed of Matter and
Form There remains the question: Is Matter umtorm :
beings, material as well as spiritual ? Scotus answers the question
in the affirmative ; on this point he is, as he expresses it, alt«
in agreement with the opinionsof Avicebron. (Ib., qu. 8, art. 4, 24, sq )
3. He distinguishes three meanings of the term Matt
"materia primo prima," the " materia secundo prima," and the
"materia tertio prima." By the first, he understands the purely
formless Matter; by the second, the Matter which is the subject oi
veneration and corruption ; and by the last, the Matter which i
the substratum for external plastic forces acting on it by exte
formative influences. Having premised so much, Duns :
teaches that the " materia primo prima" is umtorm in all
414 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
beings, material as well as spiritual, and, therefore, that it
must be regarded as the universal and uniform basis of all created
existence.
4. If the " materia primo prima " were manifold, this plurality
would require an antecedent unity, wherein the plurality has its
origin, and, consequently, no one of these different kinds of Matter
would be the first. Again, these kinds of Matter should be differ
entiated from one another ; but they could be differentiated only by
a Form; they should, therefore, already possess some Form, and
they would thereby cease to be the "materia prima." Moreover,
development always proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.
This must be the case in the world, taken as a whole. We cannot
conceive the creation of the world otherwise than as a progress,
under the influence of divine power, from that which was undeter-
minate in itself to a determinate order of things, that is, as a
progress from the " materia primo prima." If this be so, then the
primal Matter was the same in all things.
5. We may represent the world as a noble tree, of which the
" materia prima " is the seed and root ; the accidents are its leaves ;
corruptible creatures its twigs and branches ; the rational soul its
blossom ; and, finally, the pure spirits or the angels its fruit. As
the parts of a plant or an animal form an organic whole simply
because they have all grown out of a common germ, so the unity of
the world can result only from an analogous connection of its parts
with a common basis. This common basis is not the Form, for this
is the differentiating element ; therefore, it can be nothing but one
and the same Matter. (Ib. n. 30.)
6. Closely connected with the preceding is the theory of Duns
Scotus regarding Universals. The universal natures of things
constitute the content of universal ideas. These universal natures
cannot be conceived as the mere products of thought, they
must be acknowledged as objectively real. For if there were no
universal natures in the objective order, but simply individual
things, then we could, in truth, assert regarding each individual
merely that it was that individual. There would be no common
measure by which particular things might be judged ; one indivi
dual would not be more or less different from another, because
numerical distinction would alone possess any meaning. But the
question now arises: How are these universal natures to be conceived
as existing in the objective order ?
7. In the individual object we must distinguish between indivi
dual and specific (formal) unity. Every individual, as an individual,
is an absolute unity in itself ; but in so far as it belongs to a definite
species opposed to other species, it is in this respect also a unity
undivided in itself and is distinct from every other species. The
individual unity is absolutely incommunicable, while the specific or
formal unity is communicable ; the specific nature of the indivi
dual is such that it can be actualised in other individuals. The
DUNS SCOTUS. 415
specific or formal unity is consequently less a unity than the indivi
dual unity.
8. Hence it follows that universal natures cannot be con
ceived as "actu universales" in the objective order, for in that case the
specific unity would no longer be a lower order than the individual
unity. In fact the two unities would merge in each other ; a sub
stantial distinction would no longer exist between the individuals.
One and the same nature would be predicated numerically of several
individuals, which is inadmissible. Consequently the universality
attributable to universal natures in objective reality must be regarded
as potential, and may be described as follows : —
9. The universal nature is prior in objective reality to the indivi
duals. In this priority it is in a state of indifference towards
individuality and (actual) universality. In itself it is neither one
nor the other : it is only what it is and nothing more. But there is
contained in it the possibility, on the one hand of being realised in
a plurality of individuals, and on the other of being conceived by
the intellect as " actu " universal. In this way it is potentially
universal, and this in a two-fold sense : it is potentially universal
first, in so far as it can be realised in a plurality of individuals, and
secondly, in so far as it can be apprehended by the intellect as
universal. (In 1. sent., 2, dist. 3, qu. 1, n. 7).
10. It may be asked how the universal nature is individualised
in the individuals ; or in other words : What is the principle of
individuation ? First of all, it is clear that Matter cannot be this
principle, for it is essentially universal. The principle of individuation
must therefore lie in the Form. It cannot however be sought for
in the universal nature, just because this is universal ; the principle
of individuation must therefore be a form which is added to the
universal nature. This form is given in the individual difference.
For the " genus " is determined to the " species " by the specific
difference; consequently in reference to the "genus,'' the specific
difference is a form. The "species" is again determined to the
individual by the individual difference : as before, the individual
difference is a form in reference to the species. This is the last
form, to which no other can be joined, and this last form is the
principle of individuation. The Scotist school designates this form
by the technical term " Haecceity/' (/&., 1. c., qu. 6, 11).
11. From this it is also evident how far a distinction must be
drawn between the universal nature and the individuality of a
thing. A distinction must exist in every case between them, and
not merely a distinction which is drawn by the intellect (distinctio
raiionis) but an objective distinction a parte rei. The universal
nature is in itself prior to the individual, and is then reduced to
individual being by the individual difference added to it as final
form.
12. The distinction is not, however, strictly speaking, a real, dis
tinction such as subsists between " res " and "res," for the ultimate
9
416
HISTORY OF MEDLEY AL PHILOSOPHY.
form which is tlie principle of individuality cannot be conceived as a
thing (res) which is added to the species as to another thing, but
only as a reality which is joined to the reality of the species. It is
merely the last formal reality of the thing giving it its individual
determinateness. The distinction is therefore one between reality
and reality, and this cannot be described as actual, nor yet as merely
conceptual. It occupies a position midway between the two, and as
being distinct from both, must be called a formal distinction. Hence
the doctrine of Formalism. (76., 1. c., n. 15).
13. Diverging again from the teaching of St. Thomas, Scotus
answers in his own way the question as to the " primum cognitum,"
the first principle of knowledge. He distinguishes between clear and
confused knowledge. As regards confused, ill-defined knowledge, what
is first known are the "Species specialissimae.'' For every natural cause
produces, as far as in it lies, the most perfect effect. The most perfect
knowledge is not the knowledge of the most general species, but
rather the knowledge of the "species specialissimae." If it is a ques
tion of clear knowledge, then in this, the most universal ideas are
those " first known." For an object cannot be clearly known, unless
the idea of being which recurs in all ideas, as well as the other
universal ideas that are included as elements in the concept of a
definite object, are known.
THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY.
§ 130.
1. In reference to the proofs of God's existence, Duns Scotus
establishes the existence of God by means of the concept of highest
Efficient Cause; next by that of the highest Final Cause and lastly
by that of the most Perfect Being. He names these the three
" primaries.'' They mutually involve one another, since the first
efficient cause must necessarily be the last final cause — for it cannot
act on account of an end lying outside itself — and further, as " causa
aequivoca," it necessarily contains in itself all the perfections of
actual and possible things. The Being of whom these three primary
notions are to be predicated is God.
2. God is the infinitely Perfect Being, and, as such, is also the
absolutely incomposite (simple) Being. Every composition is ex
cluded from Him. But now the question arises : If we attribute
distinct perfections to God, how is this distinction in God to be
conceived ? Duns Scotns answers this question by applying here
the idea of formal distinction, drawn above, between the universal
and individual in things.
3. The distinction between the divine attributes is, in his
view, not a " real " distinction, as between " res " and " res " ;
neither is it a mere virtual distinction — that, as such, would simply
DUNS SCOTUS. 417
have its foundation in God, but would be constituted by the
intellect. ^ It must be described as occupying an intermediate
position, i.e., as a formal distinction. It is a distinction between
realities, one of which, according to its formal idea, is not the same
as another. " Divinro perfectiones distinguuntur a parte rei, u»n
realiter quidem, sed forrnaliter," — such is the formula in which
Duns Scotus expresses his doctrine. (In 1. sent., i., dist. 8, qu. 4,
n. 17, sqq).
4. According to Duns Scotus, the Divine Essence is not the
" ratio idealis " of things. This doctrine would require the Divine
Essence to contain, in itself, a real relation to things, which is
inadmissible. The "ratio idealis" of things is, therefore, to be
placed solely and entirely in the divine intellect. Of course, since
God knows His essence, as capable of being imitated outside
Himself, He thinks things on the basis of this knowledge, and thus
possesses the ideas of them in His intellect. But " the Divine
Essence is related to the thought by which God conceives things,
not as " species informans," but only as the sufficient reason for the
thought by which the Divine Intellect thinks things outside God,
and produces ideas of them.
5. As to the Divine Omnipotence, if by this is meant the power
of God to produce every possible thing immediately, that is,
without the concurrence of any other efficient cause, then God's
omnipotence, in this sense, cannot be known and demonstrated
by reason alone — it is made known to us only through faith.
Although it is true that the First Cause possesses a higher power
than all subordinate causes, that it contains," in itself, " eminenter,"
the power of all subordinate causes, yet it does not follow from this
that it can produce, immediately, the effects of these secondary
causes. The sun has a much higher causal efficacy than any animal
being, still it cannot immediately generate an animal being. No
philosopher has attributed such a meaning to the term,
Divine Omnipotence. (In 1. sent., 1., dist. 42., qu. unica).
6. The human soul is related to the body as its essential form,
and is, therefore, both the principle of intellectual, and of sensitive
and vegetative life in man. Still, it is not the only form in man
a " forma corporeitatis," by which the body is constituted, as such,
must also be accepted. The plurality of spiritual beings, within
the same species, is not dependent on their union with a body.
Every nature, as such, is already communicable to several
individuals. We cannot say that each angel forms a species of its
OAvn. Neither can we assert that human souls are classed under
one and the same species, simply because they are joined to the
body.
7. Scotus holds the incorruptibility and immortality of the human
soul to be a truth of faith, one which cannot be demonstratively
proved by reason. Apart from the fact that Aristotle was not at all
clear about it, all rational proofs that have been adduced for the
418
HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
immortality of the soul are inconclusive. It is argued that the soul
has a "per se esse,'' does not, therefore, depend for its existence
on the body, and, consequently, cannot lose its existence through the
death of the body. If, by this " per se esse," is meant an existence,
such as belongs to a " Compositum in genere substantise," it is false
to attribute this property to the soul. If such a " per se esse "
belonged to the soul it could not share its existence with the body.
If, on the other hand, we mean by " per se esse," the condition of
substantial being, which is opposed to the accidental " in esse," then
we cannot from this infer the immortality of the soul, because other
forms also possess a similar " per se esse." In like manner, all the
other rational proofs of the immortality of the soul may be refuted.
8. The freedom of the will is steadfastly maintained by Duns
Scotus, and this in the sense of absolute indifferentism. The will
determines itself according to its own choice ; to it alone is to be
ascribed the determination to any action : it is the entire cause of
its volition. The object of will, in so far as it is known by the
intellect, is, therefore, not the determining cause of the will's act.
The object is a " naturaliter agens." If the will is moved by the
object as actuating cause, it no longer lies in its power to will or not
toVill, for the " naturaliter agens " acts necessarily, and the freedom
of the will is thus annulled.
9. The intellect does not take precedence of the will: the
contrary is true. The intellect exercises no actuating influence on
the will ; its entire function is limited to representing to the will the
object of its desire, and it is thus merely the attendant of the will.
On the other hand, the will governs the Intellect, inasmuch as it lies
in the power of the former to direct the intellect towards the objects of
its knowledge, or to withdraw it from them. If the will takes pre
cedence of the intellect, it follows, of course, that the highest happiness
of man must consist formally not in the act of knowledge, but in the
act of willing — not in the intuition, but in the love of God.
10. We will not pursue the Scotist system further, as we have
now called attention to the chief points in which Duns Scotus differs
from St. Thomas. Among the immediate pupils and successors of
Duns Scotus, mention must specially be made of Franciscus de May ronis
( + 1325) the "Doctor illuminatissimus." He instituted the famous
Sorbonne disputations, which were held every Friday, and in which
a disputant had to defend his thesis without intermission from six
o'clock in the morning till six in the evening against all comers.
He wrote a commentary on the " Sentences '' and "Quodlibeta." We
may also mention Joannes Jandunus, Antonius Andrea, the " Doctor
dulcifluus" ( + 1320), Joannes Bassolius, and Peter of Aquila.
Prominent among the opponents of Duns Scotus were Gerard of
Bologna, Radulphus Brito, Hervseus Natalis (-(-1323), who wrote
a commentary on the " Sentences," and " Quodlibeta," in which he
boldly attacked the Scotist doctrines from the Thomist point of
view; lastly Thomas Bradwardine ( + 1349).
THIRD PERIOD.
DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM.
PREFATORY REMARKS.
§131.
1. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Scholasticism
made no substantial progress. The two great Scholastic systems of
the thirteenth century — the Thomist and the Scotist — were followed
by the two main schools which held this field till the end of the
Middle Ages, and in which the scientific activity of the last two
centuries of the period was especially concentrated. The members
of the Thomist School are also called Realists ; those of the Scotist,
Formalists; not as if the Scotists were not also favourable to
Realism ; we have, in fact, seen that Duns Scotus held much more
advanced opinions on the reality of Universals than St. Thomas ;
but because the Scotists, following Duns Scotus, inserted between
the real and virtual distinctions the formal distinction, which the
Thomists did not recognize.
2. To these two great schools a third, the Nominalist, was added
in the early part of the fourteenth century. Nominalism had been
completely overcome in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, and had disappeared from history; but it suddenty reappeared
in the beginning of the fourteenth century and attained such
importance that it formed the chief doctrine of a school which lasted
to the close of the Middle Ages. This school was never, indeed,
accorded a commanding position ; the Thomist and Scotist schools,
with their Realism, always occupied the forefront of the scientific
movement. Still, Nominalism was able to acquire a much gr-
importance at the close than in the beginning of the Middle A
3. There arose, besides, a fourth school, if we may so call it, the
school of the German Mystics. The rise of this school dates
from the end of the thirteenth century, and it continued during the
last centuries of the Middle Ages. This mystical school is only
little less important than the great Scholastic schools. Its
supporters were, for the most part, preachers, who expounded their
mystical doctrines, not in the Latin of the schools, but in the
language of the common people. They endeavoured to lead the
people, through mysticism, to a more perfect Christian life. They
420 HISTOllY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
appealed in their sermons, not only to the Fathers of the Church,
but also to the " Masters of the Schools," and to Aristotle himself,
and sought to borrow from them proofs for their teachings. German
Mysticism does not, therefore, owe its origin to a direct opposition
to Scholasticism, though in its development it arrived at results at
variance with Scholastic ideas.
4. It is usual to describe the last centuries of the Middle Ages as
the period of the decay of Scholastic philosophy. This is only partly
true. In the strict sense of the word, it is allowable to speak of the
" decay" of a philosophic movement only when philosophy has fallen
into decay in point of matter — that is, when the fund of genuine
speculative truth is gradually diminished and a false philosophic
view of the world takes its place. This was certainly not the case
with the Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
It remained faithful to the principles of the great thinkers of the
thirteenth century, and the changes in its teaching never touched
the foundations of Christian speculation. Nominalism alone would
have been likely to lead philosophy into the paths of empiricism and
scepticism ; but, on the one hand, the Nominalists never pursued
their system to its final consequences, and, on the other, as has been
already said, the Nominalist school never attained a commanding
influence, but held throughout a subordinate position.
5. If we speak, therefore, of a decay of Scholasticism it can only
be in reference to its form ; and we will not deny that in this sense a
change for the worse took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. In the first place, the language of Scholasticism became
more and more uncouth and barbarous, and its mode of expression
harsher and less ornate. The fluent, pleasing style of writing
which prevailed in the earlier Middle Ages was almost entirely
lost. The form of expression became so utterly neglected that
one might believe that thought was everything to these writers
and language nothing.
6. Secondly, the method, modelled on Aristotle's, which had
been introduced during the thirteenth century, was carried
to an extravagant excess. In discussing a question, the later
Scholastics state all the possible opinions on the point, to
gether with the arguments supporting them ; then they refute the
arguments adduced for the opinions which they consider false;
next, they bring forward the objections which might be urged
against the refutations, and refute these objections in their turn;
and so onward, with the result that it is very difficult to follow a
long-winded " qusestio " of this kind without losing the connecting
threads. This was plainly a grievous defect which could not but
prove detrimental to Scholasticism.
7. In the third place, as an unfortunate result of the division into
the various schools enumerated above, many Scholastics thought
they had done all that was necessary, if they adhered rigidly to the
doctrines of their own school, and defended them against all others.
THE NOMINALISTS. 421
In consequence, no genuine originality of thought appears amongst
them; the further development of philosophy and theology was
arrested. Questions, which had been already sufficiently discussed,
were argued in an unchanging round. In the treatment of these
questions, acuteness degenerated into hair-splitting. Scientific
xeal was thus lost, and barren ostentation took its place. The
public disputations dwindled into passionate wrangles; propriety
and dignity were outraged to such an extent that stern commands
had to be issued by Popes and Bishops to bring the disputing
parties to peace and order.
8. These are improprieties that call for the censure of the
historian. Still, they indicate merely a decay in the form, not in
the subject matter of Scholastic philosophy. The kernel of
Scholastic doctrine remained sound, though incrusted with a hard
and bitter rind.
The opinion, so often expressed now-a-days, that a separation was
effected in the later Scholastic philosophy between philosophy and
theology, in the sense that the possibility of a contradiction arising
between them was admitted, is entirely false. The later Scholastics
maintained Just as resolutely as their predecessors, that a proposition
could not at the same time be true in philosophy and false in
theology, and vice versa. At most, the opposite view made its
appearance sporadically. The separation of philosophy from
theology, in the sense that the former was looked upon and treated
as a science in itself, distinct from the latter, was, of course, adhered
to by the later Scholastics. This was, however, no new doctrine ;
it had been taught and acted on by the great Scholastics of the
thirteenth century.
9. These general remarks being premised, we will treat first of
the most prominent Nominalists of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, then of the most important Realists (among whom the
Formalists will be included). We shall conclude with a notice of the
" German mystics."
L— THE NOMINALISTS.
PETRUS AUREOLUS, WILLIAM DURAND, WILLIAM OF OCCAM,
JOHN BUUIDAN, PIERRE D'AILLY, ETC.
§ 132.
1. Nominalism at this period came from both Scotist and
Thomist schools. The first Scotist, who paved the way for
(Nominalism, was Petrus Aureolus, a Franciscan professor at Paris
( + 1321). He wrote a Commentary on the "Sentences" and
" Quodlibeta." He taught that universal ideas are purely the
422
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY,
creation of the intellect ; in reality, there are only individual things,
The universal has, therefore, merely an "intentional" existence; it
is only a concept (conceptus), nothing more. Consequently, the
dispute about the principle of individuation is entirely superfluous.
Every reality is, as such, individual. If we speak of a principle
of individuation, we can only allude to the efficient cause which
gives existence to the thing. No " species," in the sense of " forma
specularis,'' is to be assumed as an explanation of intellectual know
ledge.
2. On the Thomist side, William Durand de St. Pourcain led
the way towards Nominalism ; he was a Dominican ; lectured (in
1313) at Paris, and died, Bishop of Meaux, in the year 1332. His
principal work was a Commentary on the " Sentences " of Peter
Lombard. His conception of the Universal is the same as that of
Aureolus. The Universal does not exist independently in things,
but is merely a creation of the intellect, based on the fact
that we compare things together, and think those things which we
recognise as similar, apart from the differences which distinguish
each from the others. Universal and particular, in our knowledge,
denote one and the same thing, only the former denotes it in an
indeterminate, the latter in a determinate, manner. Universal
knowledge is, therefore, indeterminate and confused. No "species"
are necessary to explain our knowledge, and consequently the
distinction between the " intellectus agens " and " possibilis " is ot
no value.
3. We will not pursue the teachings of these thinkers further,
but pass on at once to the proper founder of Nominalism, because
in his system all the Nominalist doctrines and their consequences
are fully represented. In his system we can follow most readily the
Nominalist course of thought, as it appeared in the last half of the
Middle Ages, This philosopher to whom we allude is
WILLIAM OF OCCAM.
§133.
1. Born in the village of Occam, in Surrey, England, he joined
the Franciscan Order, and was a pupil of Duns Scotus both at Oxford
and Paris. He became subsequently professor at Paris, where he
acquired considerable renown by his Nominalist innovations, and
collected a host of. students round his chair. He received from his
followers the title of " Doctor Singularis " and " Venerabilis
Inceptor," (i.e. Nominalium).
2. Occam gained for himself a by no means brilliant name in
ecclesiastico-political affairs. In the quarrel between Boniface VIII.
and Philip the Fair, he took the side of the latter and defended him
WILLIAM OF OCCAM. 423
against the Pope. He joined afterwards the fanatical "Spiritualist "
party in his Order, and revolted with them against the decrees of
rope John XXII. He issued a manifesto against the latter, entitled
" Defensorium," which was full of bitter invectives against the
Pope and the ecclesiastical dignitaries. Called on for an explana
tion, he fled with his companions to Louis, the Bavarian, and
supported the latter in his opposition to the Papacy. " Defend me
with the sword," he said, " and I will defend you with the pen."
He died at Munich about the year 1347.
3. The following are the most important philosophical works
that he has left us : (a) " Super libros sententiarum subtilissimae
quaestiones " ; (6) " Quodlibeta Septem " ; (c) " Summa Logices" and
" Major Summa Logices " ; (d) " Quaestiones in libros Physicorum " ;
(e) Expositio aurea in Porphyrii praedicabilia et Aristotelis prcedi-
camenta " ; and (/) " Centilogium Theologicum."
4. According to Occam knowledge begins with intuition by the
senses, and progresses from this to intellectual knowledge. Again,
intellectual knowledge is primarily intuitive and only secondarily
abstractive. In intuitive knowledge the intellect thinks the thing
AS existing, and according to its properties as made known through
experience. In abstractive knowledge, on the contrary, the intellect
abstracts from the existence and empirical properties of the object,
and thinks of it merely in an indeterminate manner. If the ques
tion is asked : Which is first known to us, the Universal or the
Particular ? The answer is plain : If the question refers to intellec
tual knowledge in general, the individual is first known because
intuitive knowledge precedes abstractive. If it refers to abstractive
knowledge the reverse is true, for here the first-known is the most
universal and most indeterminate ; only from this can we advance
to the " species specialissima."
5. This being established, a further problem remains for solution :
How is knowledge itself to be explained? Like Aureolus and
Durandus, Occam rejects the theory of " specios " in regard ^to
this question. In explaining sense-knowledge especially, no " species
sensibilis" ought, in his opinion, to be postulated. "Frustra fit per
plura quod fieri potest per pauciora." The object and the faculty of
perception are sufficient by themselves to explain the phenomenon
of perception. An additional element ought not to be dragged into
the explanation, it is altogether useless, We have as little ground
for speaking of a " species intelligibilis." The reason for assuming
the existence of the latter is that the material object, as, such,
cannot immediately produce knowledge in an immaterial intellect.
But is not the " species intelligibilis " also immaterial ? How, ti
can a material object produce it? The theory of the " species "
is thus untenable in every respect. And with it disappears the
necessity for distinguishing between an "active'' and a "possible"
intellect, since this distinction was introduced merely ^f or ^the pur-
pose of explaining the origin of the " Species intelligibilis."
424- HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
6. Occam, however, assumes a certain similarity between
knowledge and the objects of knowledge in order to account for the
former. But in his opinion, this similarity is no other than that
which exists between the thing and its symbol. Consequently,
image and idea are for him mere signs of whatever they are referred
to as their object. Of course, they are not arbitrary, but natural
signs of their objects. Occam does not base knowledge on that
self -assimilation of the knowing subject to the object known,
which is postulated in the theory of the " species/' but founds it
merely on that similarity which exists between the idea as sign and
the object as the thing signified. He conceives the idea to be
merely a " term; " whence the Nominalists are also called " terrnin-
ists." But, taken subjectively, the idea is for him nothing more
than the act of thought in so far as it is directed towards the object.
7. This being so, the immediate and direct object of our
knowledge is not the thing itself, but rather its sign in our mind ;
and only through this sign do we know the object which is denoted
by it. But how, and to what extent, do we, by means of the idea as
sign of the thing, know the thing itself? In this way, replies
Occam : the idea is thought of as the sign of the thing which it
denotes. A twofold distinction must be here established. The idea
can either be thought by itself, that is, be conceived purely as an
idea ; when this occurs, our knowledge does not concern itself with
the object. Or the idea, inasmuch as it is the sign of a thing, can
be thought of as that thing, and thus be apprehended in its relation
to the thing. In this event, our knowledge is relative to the thing
itself, and the latter becomes known to us through the idea.
8. In accordance with this distinction a difference between
rational and real knowledge is established. Both have for their
object ideas as signs of things, but the former considers them by
themselves, while the latter regards them as standing for things.
The distinction between " first and second intention " follows from
this. An idea is called " first intention," when it refers to a thing,
and can therefore be thought of as the sign of that thing — e.g. man.
An idea is called " second intention/' when it refers noc to a thing
but to another idea, that is, to a first intention, and, therefore, can
only represent the latter — e.g. genus, species, individual.
9. Occam's doctrine regarding Universals is based on the fore
going principles. Answering the question : How does the universal
concept arise in the mind ? Occam refers us to the distinction
between intuitive and abstractive knowledge. If in intuitive
knowledge the intellect thinks of the object as that individual thing
which represents itself to the mind, it has determinate knowledge
of the object. But if in abstractive knowledge, it disregards the
individual determinateness of the object then it thinks of the latter
as indeterminate ; it does not distinguish the object, and the other
individual objects that are similar to it. This indeterminate know
ledge of the object is the Universal.
WILLIAM OF OCCAM. 425
10. It follows that the Universal, as such, has not objective
reality; nor has it any foundation in the objective world'; it is
wholly a product of the intellect, resulting from the abstractive
knowledge of the latter. It is merely indeterminate thought produced
by abstractive knowledge, as opposed to determinate thought which
results from intuitive knowledge.
How we are to regard the Universal in its relation to the things
themselves is now easily seen. The Universal is nothing but au
idea which is capable of being used as the sign for a plurality of
things. Considered as a concept, the Universal is altogether
singular, like every other thought ; it is only universal in so far as it
can stand as the sign for many things. Consequently the division
of things into " genera " and " species " does not rest upon a
relation having its foundation in the objects themselves, but on the
fact that one idea can stand as the sign for more things than
another idea. There can be no question of a principle of indi-
viduation, simply because the Universal has no reality whatever.
The discussions on this point are wholly nugatory.
11. These are the fundamental principles of Occam's Nominalism.
We will now consider briefly the consequences that he deduces from
them.
a. It is self-evident that in assuming ideas to be mere symbols,
in denying the objective reality of Universals, the connection of
thought with the objective world is seriously imperilled. It is not,
therefore, surprising to notice certain sceptical tendencies in Occam's
writings. These are manifest at once in his theory that the
proofs, adduced by reason for God's existence, are in no way demon
strative and conclusive. It cannot, he holds, be proved that there is
anything created except those bodies of the sublunary world which
admit of generation and corruption. As regards the heavenly
bodies, substances existing apart from matter, and the souls of men,
it cannot be established with demonstrative certainty that they are
created and not eternal. The causality of the heavenly bodies and
of natural causes in this world is sufficient for the production of
those bodies which admit of generation and corruption ; no further
causality need be sought for. Consequently, we cannot, from the
existence of the things of this world, argue with certainty to the
existence of a God, standing above the world, as its Cause.
6. The unity and infinitude of God, like His existence, cannot be
proved conclusively by reason. As regards the unity of God, wo
can conceive several worlds with several rulers, or even one
world with several rulers, acting in harmony. As to the infinite 1«>
of God, every effect of the divine causality is finite, and, this
being so, no one of these effects, nor even all these effects taken
together, justify us in concluding anything as to the infinitude of
their cause. By faith alone can we attain to complete certainty as
to all these truths. The same holds good for the question as to
whether the world is eternal or has had a beginning.
426 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
c. From his nominalist premises Occam draws the further con
clusion that no distinction exists between the divine perfections.
He teaches that all the perfections which we attribute to God are
only mental designations (conceptus vel signa), by which, and in
which, we conceive God. The distinction between them is not
founded at all on the Divine Essence, but only on the fact that
we apprehend God now under one concept, now under another.
Stricty speaking, they ought not to be called perfections or attri
butes, because perfection or attribute involves existence, while we
have to deal here merely with different mental designations. The
Ancients were more accurate when they spoke of the different
names of God, not of His different attributes.
d. Again, human thought is not a subjective modification of the
soul, but possesses an objective existence of its own; that is, it is
not based on any " species intelligibilis," but is a mere sign for the
thing. The same holds true of the Divine Ideas. God does riot
think of things through His Essence as " species intelligibilis " ;
the idea is in God nothing more than the creature itself, as it is
conceived by God. An objective and not a subjective existence
belongs to the idea in the divine intellect. The idea is, in fact,
nothing else than the act of divine thought, in so far as it has for
its object something outside God. In no way can the "ratio
idealis " of things find place in the Divine Essence itself.
e. What follows is a matter of easy inference. There are as
many ideas in God as there are individual things, actual or possible.
This is the whole account of the matter. Only the individual, as
such, has an idea in God, not the Universal. The Universal, as shown
possesses no _ reality; it is merely a subjective product of our
intellect, an indeterminate thought, which, as such, is much more
incomplete than determinate knowledge. On this account it cannot
be pre-existent in the divine mind ; God knows the Universal only
in our soul. Since He knows our soul, He knows also the opera
tion by which we form Universal ideas, and therein He knows these
ideas. But it is absurd to speak of an ideal prototypal existence of
the Universal in the divine Intellect.
/.As regards the human soul, it can in no way be proved con
clusively to be an immaterial spiritual substance. Certainty on
this point is^obtained through faith. The soul is related to the body
as its essential form, because man is distinguished from the brute
precisely _by possessing a rational soul, and the differentiating
element is, in general, the form. But the soul is not the only
essential form of the body. Besides the soul, the "Forrna cor-
poreitatis " belongs to the body as such ; and, further, the sensitive
soul in man is also really distinct from the intellectual soul. One
and the same form cannot at the same time be material and im
material, extended and unextended. But ; the sensitive soul is
material and extended, the rational soul immaterial and unex
tended ; they must consequently be really distinct from each other.
JOHN BURIDAN, PIERRE D'AILLY. 427
g. The faculties of the soul are neither " realiter " nor " for-
nialiter," distinct from the substance of the soul or from one
another. The soul doos not act through faculties distinct from its
own substance, it acts directly by itself. " Frustra fit per plura
quod fieri potest per pauciora." Why, then, assume distinct faculties
for the operations of the soul when we can explain these operations
by the substance of the soul itself?
h. It cannot be proved by reason that no good other than God
can satisfy the will. It is, therefore, impossible to show that God
is the highest good of man. Apart from other reasons, it cannot
even be demonstrated that a created will is capable of obtaining an
infinite good, since the latter is not anything natural, but belongs
to the region of the supernatural. Just as little does it admit
of proof that a supernatural grace is necessary as an habitual
Form in man, in order that God may bestow eternal (supernatural)
bliss on him, or that God cannot abandon a man to guilt and
punishment, without having bestowed on him the gift of grace.
i. On all these points we must distinguish between the "
Dei absoluta " and the " Potentia Dei ordinata." According to His
" Potentia ordinata" God cannot bring anyone to salvation without
the "caritas creata," cannot impute guilt to and punish anyone
without having imparted grace. But He can do all this according
to His "Potentia absoluta." Which order the divine power follows
in its works, is determined solely by the free will of God. Reason
has no oround for inference as to God's actual methods.
12. So much for the Nominalism of Occam. He drew to himself
numerous supporters. His bold demeanour, his open opposition to
the existing schools and their adherents, as well as his violent
quarrel with the Pope, brought to his side all who were discontented
with the current teaching and eager for novelty.
disciples were Adam Goddam, a Minorite and professor at
Armand de Beauvoir, and Robert Holcot ( + 1349), two Dominicans,
the latter of whom is represented as favourable to the doctrine that
a proposition can be true in philosophy and false in theology, and
vice versa ; Gregory of Rimini ( + 1358), General of the Augustmians ;
Richard Suinshead or Suisset (about 1350) ; John of Mencurui, who
embraced the theory of determinism,and asserted accordingly that sin
is willed by God, and is, therefore, more good than evil ; and Nicholas
of Ultricuria, also a teacher of erroneous and heterodox doctrines.
13. Among the supporters of Occam's teaching, special mention
must be made of
JOHN BURIDAN AND PIERRE D'AILLY.
1 Buridan was a pupil of Occam, and a famous profess.. r at
Paris, whence, later, he betook himself to Vienna.
428 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
have brought about the founding of the University in this latter
city (1356), but the matter is by no means certain. He wrote a
"SummadeDialectica," a "Compendium Logicae," and "Quaestiones"
on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and Physics. In his
" Logic " he undertakes to propound a method for discovering the
" middle term," which serves as a bridge between the major and
minor terms. According to Aristotle, acuteness of rnind is shown in
quickly finding the middle term ; Buridan's method, which was to
benefit the stupid in particular, was, therefore, called the " pons
asinorum."
2. His view of the freedom of the will is interesting. In this
connection he adopts a theory of intellectual determinism. He
teaches that the will is subject to the determining influence of the
intellect. The former acts according as the latter judges. If the
intellect judges with full certainty that a good presented to it is
perfect and good under every aspect, and that every " Ratio mali "
is absent from it, the will must certainly strive after this good.
Hence, it follows, that if the intellect apprehends one good as
higher, another as lower, other circumstances being the same, the
will cannot but select the higher good. If the intellect judges the
two goods to be exactly equivalent, the will cannot exercise its
activity at all. (From this may have arisen the theory of "Buridan's
Ass," the theory that an ass would starve if placed mid-way
between two exactly similar bundles of hay.)
3. In answer to the question : How, on the assumption of this
intellectual determinism, can free self-determination be attributed
to the will? Buridan replies as follows: — "In the moment when
the intellect pronounces the judgment, that one good is higher
than another, the will cannot, of course, choose the lower
good. But, it can choose it at another time when this judgment
is not present ; it can divert the intellect from the higher^ and
direct its attention to the lower good ; then the comparison
ceases, and the will can devote itself to the lesser good. Lastly,
in certain cases the will can defer its decision, and when this
occurs, the judgment of the intellect may be altered by a further
examination of the circumstances, and that good appear to it as the
higher, which it previously regarded as the lower. A sufficient field
of action thus remains for the free self-determination of the will."
4. The University of Paris vigorously opposed the spread of
Nominalism among its students. A decree was issued in the year
1339, forbidding the expounding of Occam's doctrines. A second
decree, to the same effect, was issued in the following year, 1340. In
the year 1347, the doctrines of John of Mericuria were condemned,
and in 1348, Nicholas of Ultricuria had to make a recantation of
his attacks on Aristotle's philosophy, and of his erroneous opinions,
particularly in regard to the eternity of the world. In the year 1473
all professors at Paris were obliged to teach Realism, and the statute
imposing this obligation remained in force till the year 1481.
THE REALISTS. 4 '2 9
But Nominalism still held its ground. Among its chief pro
fessors in the later half of the fourteenth, and the beginning of the
fifteenth century, was Pierre d'Ailly, (Petrus de Alliaco), professor
of philosophy, Chancellor of the University of Paris, and, later.
Bishop of Cambrai, and Cardinal (1350-1425). His most important
philosophical writings are a Commentary on the " Sentences," and
a "Tractatus de Anima." He adopted all the theories of his master,
Occam, and endeavoured to elucidate and establish them by fresh
explanations and arguments.
5. It is to be noted that Pierre d'Ailly does not ascribe the samo
certainty to sense-cognition as to self-consciousness or to the first
principles of reason and the necessary deductions from them. He
holds self-consciousness and pure rational knowledge to possess
absolute certainty, but sense-knowledge to be only conditionally
certain. It is not absolutely certain, because God could annihilate all
external objects, and still allow their representations to persist in our
senses, and, because He can, by miraculous interposition, produce
changes in the effects which furnish the phenomena of experience.
The certainty of empirical knowledge is, therefore, subject to the
condition that the usual course of nature and the usual Providence
of God remain constant " hie et nunc."
6. We may mention, among later disciples of Occam, Nicholas
Amati, Henry of Oyta and Henry of Hesse, both Germans, and
professors at the University of Vienna (the latter died 1397) ;
Matthias of Cracow, a Pomeranian ( + 1410), Nicholas Orasmu.s
( + 1382), Nicholas of Clemenge (+1440), and lastly, Gabriel Biel
( + 1485), Professor of Theology at Tubingen, and usually called "the
last of the Scholastics." In his " Collectorium " on the four books
of the " Sentences," he again expounds the doctrines of Occam,
and compares them with the opposing teachings of other
philosophers. In 1473, under Louis XL, a royal decree was issued
at Paris against the Nominalists, forbidding the teaching of
Nominalism, and binding under oath all Professors to teach
Realism. This decree was repealed in 1481, but Nominalism was
not helped thereby, since it had already died a natural death.
2. THE REALISTS.
WALTER BURLEIGH, THOMAS OF STRASSBUIIG, MARSIUUS OF INGHEN,
RAYMUND OF SABUNDE, JOHN GERSON, ETC.
§ 135.
1. Nominalism, though it made a gallant show in the fourteenth
century, was unable to supplant Realism; tht> latter remained on
the whole the dominant doctrine of the Schools at the close of the
430 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
Middle Ages. We meet in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
with many prominent teachers who resolutely upheld the Realist
doctrines in opposition to Nominalism.
2. First among them in point of time is Walter Burleigh (1275
-1337). Like Occam, he was a pupil of Duns Scotus ; he lectured
first at Paris and then at Oxford. He wrote commentaries on the
Logic, Ethics, Physics, Methaphysics, and Politics of Aristotle, and
a work " De vita et moribus philosophorum." He maintains firmly
the reality of the Universal, but explains it in the Thomist, not ID
the Scotist manner.
3. The way in which he tries to establish this reality is interesting.
The immediate and most important purpose of nature, he says, is
something extrinsic to our being. Now, nature directs its energies
in the first place not to the individual but to the universal, the
species. Consequently, the latter must be something existing apart
from us, and cannot be a mere creation of our intellect. Again,
our natural desires are directed towards something existing outside
ourselves. They, too, are directed towards the universal. If we
hunger or thirst, we look for food or drink in general, not for any
particular food or drink. Therefore, the universal must be real ;
etc.
4. John Baconthorp (+1346) followed the same line of thought
as Walter ; Averroes, however, is his principal guide. The so-called
" great Commentary " of Averroes on Aristotle was held in the
highest esteem during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and
was considered by many to be the most genuine, the best, nay, even
the only correct exposition of Aristotle. Baconthorp contradicts St.
Thomas on many points.
5. Thomas of Strasburg (Thomas de Argentina + 1357), General
of the Augustinian Order^ is another champion of Realism. In his
earlier years he taught theology at Paris. He wrote a commentary
on the " Sentences/' which was long held in high repute. Generally
speaking, he follows closely Aegidius of Colorma, the most renowned
teacher of his Order. He rejects the formal distinction between
the divine attributes as being inconsistent with the simplicity of
the Divine Being. He admits a merely virtual distinction, but
asserts that even this distinction can only be made, when we think
of the Divine Essence in relation to created things, in which it reveals
itself in manifold shapes.
6. Marsilius of Inghen must be named among the other Realists.
He was a secular priest, lectured at Paris, and was transferred in
1346 to the newly-founded University at Heidelberg. He wrote
glosses on Aristotle, a "Dialectic," and a Commentary on the
" Sentences." The reason why he is sometimes included among the
Nominalists can only be that he is confounded with Marsilius of
Padua, the companion of Occam. His writings have a realist tone
throughout, and though he diverges from St. Thomas on some points,
he adopts, on the whole, the views of the " Angelic Doctor." There
KAYMUND OF SAlil'NDE. 431
are no ^original opinions in his writings, but tlu-y are distiiiguishr.l
by their clearness and perspicacity.
7. The Realism of St. Thomas as might be expected, WHS
preserved purest and most persistently in the Dominican School
We may mention, as members of this School, Bernard of Auvergne,
Petrus Paludanus, and especially Johannes Capreolus ( + 144h
surnamed <c Princeps Thomistarum," who, in his work, "L
Defensionum," has given the most faithful summary of St.' Thomas
teaching. To these may be added Dominic of Flanders, Sylvester
of Ferrara, and Cardinal Cajetan, who has written a famous com
mentary on the " Summa Theologiae " of St. Thomas.
RAYMUND OF SABUNDE.
§ 130.
1. A peculiar standpoint was adopted by the Spanish physician,
Raymund of Sabunde, Professor of Medicine and Philosophy at
Toulouse (about 1437). He acquired great renown by his work on
the Philosophy of Religion, " Theologia Naturalis." This book is
remarkable from the fact that Raymund employs the method of
Raymund Lully, which he consistently follows throughout the whole
treatise.
2. There are two books, he says, from which we can learn truth
—the Hook of Nature, and the Book of Holy Writ. There is no
difference in their contents ; they are alike in range and subject-
matter. The only difference between them is that we can acquire
truth from the Book of Nature merely through research and
demonstration, while the Book of Holy Writ teaches us the truth
itself categorically and by precept ; it does not address us by way
of proof, but pronounces its teaching authoritatively. As regards
the mutual relation between the two books, the Book of Nature is
prior in our knowledge to the Book of Holy Writ, and is the path
and portal by which we penetrate into the sanctuary of the Holy
Scriptures.
3. Accordingly, Raymund, in his " Theologia Naturalis,'' endea
vours to deduce all the doctrines of Christianity, including the
Mysteries, from the Book of Nature alone. His avowed purpose is
to establish demonstratively the truth of the teachings of Holy
Writ, and thereby render them secure against all attack. He bases
his argument throughout on nature and reason, and attempts by
purely rational methods to determine and prove a priori the
entire body of Christian doctrines. Only when he has determined
and proved in this way the truths of Christianity in all their
bearings, does he conclude that Christianity, as it actually exists,
is the true religion. His reason is that it contains exactly all that
10
432 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
sum of truth, which has been discovered and demonstratively
established from nature and reason.
4. Raymund tries to modify the rationalism which this line of
thought involves by admitting that reason could not possibly discover
the mysteries of Christianity without the help of Revelation, at least
in the first instance (primo). But he asserts that when they have
been revealed, reason of itself can conclusively establish the truth
of the mysteries. All that is thus gained is that pure rationalism
is converted into theosophical rationalism. The point of view
adopted by Raymund is essentially similar in character to that of his
predecessor Lully.
5. Man, says Raymund, is a stranger to himself; his first task
is, therefore, to become acquainted with himself. The means to be
employed for this purpose is Nature. Through the knowledge of
Nature man may attain to a knowledge of himself. Only from a
knowledge of himself can he rise to the knowledge of God. For the
things of Nature gradually increase in perfection, some have mere
existence, others exist and live, a third class exist, live, and feel ;
lastly, man possesses thought in addition to existence, life, and
feeling. Thus man recognises himself as the Microcosm — as the
being which unites in himself all that lies dispersed in Nature. But
if man recognises himself as an unity of this kind then he must
postulate a cause which has produced this union of perfections in
him, and this cause is God.
6. A two-fold production is to be distinguished — a "Productio
per inodum artis," and a " Productio per moclum naturae."
A " Productio per modum artis " is to be attributed to God
inasmuch as He has produced the world in a certain definite
manner. But if this is so, then a " Productio per modum
naturae" must also of necessity belong to Him, For, as the
last-named production is essentially much higher in character and
more excellent than the first, it cannot be denied of God, since all
perfections must be attributed to God, as the most perfect Being.
In God self-satisfaction must exist in its highest form. But God
must take far more pleasure in what He produces from His nature
than in that which He merely fashions after the manner of an artist.
For this reason also a " Productio per modum naturae " must be
ascribed to God. And here we have a ground for ascribing life in a
Trinity to God. The " Productio per modum naturae '* is the pro
duction of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost.
7. God has created the world out of love. On that account man
is bound to love Him in return. But on the other hand God, when
He creates a world, must seek His own honour and glory in His
work. Therefore man is also under an obligation to^ adore God.
Since he loves God he must embody in his love the tribute of adora
tion. As men are not actually what they ought to be, and as they
very often do not fulfil their duties towards God as they ought to
fulfil them, we must conclude that some crime has previously occurred
JO JIN GERSON. 433
through which the human race has fallen into this condit Tn
rtTof £} ETt ^ ar° "nable t0 °ffer this «atisfaction to God
the Son of God had to become man in order to atone to God for the
guilt ot men and to redeem them from it
8. This is enough to indicate how' Raymund sets about hi<
rational deduction and proof of the Christian mysteries We pass on to
one who belonged to the latter part of the 14th century Td the
early portion of the 15th century" and who ained for himJel
as
JOHN GERSON.
§137.
Born in 1363, at the village of Gerson, in the diocese of Rheims
John was eaucated at Paris under Pierre d'Ailly, and became after
It1hea f*morus.,Pro/e°S0'', «>d chancellor of the'tlniversity of Paris.
Council of Constance he did much towards settling the
deputes which were then distracting the Church. Esiled by the
DuLe of Burgundy for having publicly accused the latter at
Sivedl 1 V'^plann1d ^e mUrder °f the I>"ke of Orleans,
he lived for a long time in the Bavarian Alps. The last years of his
ite were spent in the Celestine monaster/of Lyons, where he died
Ihe works of Gerson are very numerous and varied The
most important for the history of philosophy are:— the "Theolo-na
mystica speculativa et practica," the » Eluoidatio mysticue
theologian the treatise "Be monte contemplationis," the''Con-
Cipr5la mcfitaPhysicae c.um f°PJ»." the "Centilogium de causa finali,
de simplificatione cord1S, de illuminatione cordis, et de consolatione
tneoiogisB."
2. In his theory of knowledge, Gerson tries to effect a compromise
stween the mutually opposing schools of the Terminists and
He distinguishes between the real existence of
things and their ideal or objectival existence in the intellect
Ine objectival existence of course coincides with the real existence
but we Cannot assert that what we abstract from tiling exists in
things in exactly the same manner as it exists in our intellect
Universality receives existence only in the intellect. The Universal
has actual existence only in individuals. On this point the
lermimsts are in the right as opposed to the Formalists
3. On the other hand, the Terminists are in the wroncr when
they deny that there is an intrinsic relation between thought and
existence, or, m other words, when they refuse to admit that th-
434
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
Universal has a foundation in objective reality. They are thus led
to deny all objectivity to the Universal and to regard it merely as a
fiction of the intellect. From this it would follow that, since the
Universal is also eternal and necessary, the eternal being of things
is called in question.
4. A " golden mean " must be found between the two extremes.
The Universal, as such, is not objectively real, but it has its
foundation in reality, inasmuch as it is formed by the intellect on
the basis of real being. The intellect strips off, as it were, what is
individual in things, and only retains the being that is common to
a plurality of individuals. For this reason, there are in God not
merely ideas of the individual but also ideas of the Universal.
5. But the labours of Gerson were chiefly directed to turning the
attention of men's minds from pure speculation to mysticism. He
inveighs against the learned of his time for being filled with a vain
craze for curious knowledge, and for being absorbed in barren
disputes over philosophic opinions, while entirely neglecting the
practices of the mystical life. For his own part he endeavours to
imitate the example of the St. Victors and St. Bonaventure, and to
bring their mystical doctrines into favour with his contemporaries.
6. To give the necessary psychological basis to his mysticism,
Gerson distinguishes between two fundamental faculties of the
soul, the cognitive and the appetitive ; on these rest the two direc
tions of the spiritual life, the theoretical and the practical. Each of
these faculties contains within it three distinct elements. The
cognitive faculty includes Imagination, Reason, and Intelligence.
" Cogitation " has its root in the Imagination, " Meditation " corres
ponds to the Reason, while the Intelligence is the organ of
" Contemplation." " Cogitation," which is directed towards sense-
objects, is controlled by the appetitive faculty of passion or desire.
To " Meditation," which raises itself, by the operations of reason, from
the sensible to the supra-sensible, corresponds in the soul a pious
emotion which shows itself in the love of, and longing for, Truth.
Finally, to "Contemplation," which is engaged in the consideration
of the Divinity, corresponds the love of God.
7. The mystical life evolves itself in this way. Tbe soul separa
ting itself from the world and concentrating its attention upon itself,
raises itself through the intervening grades of spiritual life to the
contemplation and love of God. A triple result is thus achieved. In
the first place, the soul is filled with rapture by the contemplation
and love of God. The ecstasy thus produced causes all the activity
of the soul to be absorbed in the contemplation and love of God,
and suspends the operations of the other faculties. Secondly, the
soul attains to an union with God in love, so much so that it is, as it
were, transformed into God. Lastly, the soul obtains rest in God,
i.e. complete contentment and satisfaction of all its desires. What
it beholds in this state cannot be described in words. The infinite
light of God, which illumines it, is also infinite darkness, because
THE GERMAN MYSTICS. 435
what is seen is incomprehensible to the soul. The higher wisdom
begins with darkness, i.e. with separation from all knowledge of
creatures, and ends in darkness, in the darkness of the infinite light
of God.
8. Gerson is very diffuse in his description of the mystical life.
He opposes that pantheistic conception of mysticism which represents
the mystic as turning his thought in on that idea of himself
which is in God, in such wise that the loving and the loved
are identified and the human soul lost in the divine Essence
Moreover, he warns us against the extravagances of love which may
lead to sensuous images, and against the phantoms of imagination
which induce man to believe that his external senses perceive
what mere fancy has depicted to him in a state of morbid excite
ment. Mystical ecstasies and visions are to be clearly distinguished
from the illusions of the imagination. Whoever, in a state of
contemplation, beholds things similar in any respect to an earthly
object, may rest assured that he does not behold God. God is seen
only by the pure of heart, and by these in a way which cannot be
described in words,
THE GERMAN MYSTICS.
MEISTER ECKHARDT.
§138.
1. The founder of German Mysticism was Meister Eckhardt. Born
in the second half of the Thirteenth Century, probably in Saxony,
he was for some time a professor at Paris, and later became Pro
vincial of the Saxon Province of the Dominican Order. He resided
first at Cologne, subsequently at Strassburg. As a preacher he
addressed himself to the people, and endeavoured to make intelli
gible to them the recondite doctrines of Christian Mysticism. The
orthodoxy of his teaching was, however, impugned. He was cited
before an Ecclesiastical court held in Cologne, and there made a
conditional recantation, withdrawing whatever might be proved
to be erroneous in his sermons. Later on, when a specific
recantation was required from him, he appealed to the Pope, and a
special Congregation was appointed to examine his teaching.
This tribunal selected twenty-eight propositions from his sermons,
and declared them erroneous. The Bull in which these proposi
tions were condemned by the Pope was not published until after
Eckhardt's death (1329).
2. According to Eckhardt's teaching, God is the most absolutely
Simple Being, and this in such wise that all and every distinction
however conceived, is excluded from Him ; distinct predicates
are wholly inapplicable to Him ; so long as man applies distinctions
in his concept of God, so long does he fail to apprehend God Him-
436 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
self ; so long as he ascribes distinct attributes to God in his thought,
he has not yet acquired a true knowledge of God. In God all dis
tinctions disappear ; in Him " is " and " is not," are identical.
3. This notwithstanding, Eckhardt distinguishes between the
" Godhead " and the Divine Persons. By " Godhead " he under
stands the simple pure being of God. This being of God, in itself
undifferentiated, he calls the basis, the ground, the root, the inner
source or fountainhead of God. He represents it as an ^ eternal
immutable calm, wherein there is no activity, in which, as it were,
God slumbers, an eternal darkness in which He is concealed from,
and unknown to, Himself. The li^ht of the Father now appears in
this eternal darkness, and the Father knowing His own being, in
this knowledge of himself, generates the Son. And further, the
Father loves Himself in the Son ; from Him, together with the Son,
proceeds in this act of love the Holy Spirit. Thus does the eternally
hidden principle of the Divinity emerge into light : the " Godhead "
becomes " God/' — God in three Persons
4. Leaving the doctrine of the Divine Persons, we return to the
eternal simple principle of the Godhead. This contains all beings in
itself. In His own being God is all beings ; and all beings, in so far
as they are in God, are God. In Himself He is being, but not
determinate being, and He is at the same time the ^being of all
determinate beings. As they are in Him, however all beings are one :
there is, as yet, no distinction between them, no being is yet anything
''perse." When, however, the Father, knowing Himself, utters the
Eternal Word, that is, generates the Son, in this Word He utters
all things. The Divine Word is the comprehensive " Idea " of all
things.
6. According to Eckhardt, the creation of the world is an^ effect
of the Divine Goodness, and this in the sense that the creation of
the world was necessarily required by God's goodness. " What is
good," says Eckhardt, " must diffuse itself," that is, must bestow
itself upon others. God is the Absolute Goodness, the axiom is
therefore applicable with peculiar force to Him. God must " diffuse
Himself" : " His intrinsic Goodness forces Him in a certain sense to
this." "His Godhead depends on this, that He impart Himself
to whatever is capable of participating in His goodness ; if He did
not so impart Himself, He would not be God." Hence " God effects
necessarily all that He effects."
6. Reasoning thus we prove the eternity of creation as well as
its necessity. " God is ceaselessly active," says Eckhardt, " active
in an eternal present, and this action is the generation of the Son.
From this generative act all things come, and in it God takes
such complacence, that He expends in it all His power." The light
which is the Son, and the manifestation of this light in the created
world cannot, therefore, be distinguished from one another. The
" birth " of the Son and the creation of the world are one and the
same thing.
THEORY OF MYSTICAL ELEVATION. 437
7. If it be asked : How then is the " creation " of the world to be
conceived ? Eckbardt replies with the formula that God has created
the world " out of nothing." " Creation in time," he tells us, " is
different from eternal creation in God ; just as the work of art differs
from its ideal in the mind of the artist." But other expressions of
Eckhardt's are to be met with which ascribe to the formula, " created
out of nothing," a sense altogether different from the Christian
acceptation, and which indicate distinctly a theory of emanation.
For example : —
8. " The Divine Being," Eckhardt teaches, " flows out upon all
creatures, in so far as each creature can contain this being, and,
consequently, whatever is created is God. If things were not filled
with the Godhead they would become nothing." Taken by them-
selve, all beings are mere nothing, inasmuch as they have
" emanated" from, and, in a certain degree, " dissolved out " of God;
they possess no being by themselves, apart from God ; God alone is
all in all. "Creatures," he writes, "are mere nothing. What
possesses no being is nothing, and creatures have no being, for they
exist only in so far as God is present in them. Were He to turn from
them for a moment they would cease to exist."
9. This notwithstanding, " God is external to all nature, and is
not nature itself. Much as God is in all creatures, He is still as
much above them ; for what is one in many things, must necessarily
be above these things. God exerts his influence in all creatures: and
yet remains uninfluenced by them, just as the heavens move all things
and remain unmoved themselves."
10. From this summary of Eckhardt's teaching it is obvious
that, often as he appeals to the " Masters of the School," he,
nevertheless, differs essentially from them in the fundamental
character of his doctrine. He follows in the track of the Areo-
pagite as expounded by Scotus Erigeca, and loses himself in a
maze of Neo-Platonic speculation. The principles of emanation
and pantheism break through at every point. That Eckhardt
did not deviate consciously and intentionally from the lines of
the common teaching, may be admitted ; but it must be held
proved that there are unmistakable Neo-Platonic elements in his
system, which essentially influence his conception of the relation
between the world and God. Like every Neo-Platonist, he tries,
unsuccessfully, to reconcile the notion of a God whose Being tran
scends the world with that of a God whose Being is immanent in
the world.
THEORY OF MYSTICAL ELEVATION.
§ 139.
1. According to Eckhardt, the human soul is a " unifold," that
is, a simple being. It is the Form of the body, and, as such, per
vades the whole body. Two elements have, however, to be dis-
438 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
tinguished in the soul, viz., the "vital spark* and the " faculties"
of the soul. That so-called " spark of the soul," "inner kernel,"
which is named soul, spirit, or mind (mens), is not so much a faculty
as the fundamental basis of the soul's being : " it is so pure, so
elevated, so noble, that nothing created can have part in it ; only
God in His pure divine nature dwells therein. It is the basis of
the soul's being, analogous to the basis of the Divine Being in God.
It is the true interior man who is hidden within the external
individual. It is here the image of God is found.
2. This "spark," or image of God, in the soul is not, strictly
speaking, a created entity ; it is something uncreated and divine.
" It is something in the soul," says Eckhardt, " that is so kindred
with God that it is one with Him; not a thing united to Him.
If man's entire being was of this kind, he would be at once
uncreated and uncreatable." This something is the spirit, the
" spark," the ultimate basis of the soul's existence. " Here God's
primal being is my primal being, and my primal being is God's
primal being. Here I live outside my individuality, and God lives
outside His individuality." For this reason this " basis of the soul
can be designated by no name;" it is free from all names,
untrammelled by any forms, as God is untrammelled and free in
Himself.
3. This Divine element in the soul is, according to Eckhardt,
the organ of mystical contemplation, Man cannot attain to the
contemplation of God by natural knowledge ; natural knowledge
belongs to the " faculties " of the soul, which cannot be brought
into immediate contact with God. If man is to contemplate God,
he must do so by means of the light, which is God Himself. This
light irradiates the " basis " of the soul, for here God is immediately
in the soul. With the eye of the spirit the soul beholds God's pure
being as it is in itself, not as it is imparted to creatures. The
"principle" or "spirit" of the soul penetrates to that basal ele
ment of the Divine Being, in which the latter is a mere un-
differentiated unity, neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit.
There, in His first being, the soul searches for God in order to know
Him and to love Him without intermediary or veil. There f( my
eye and God's eye are one eye and one countenance, and one con
fession and one love." "The eye by which I see God is the self
same eye by which God sees me," To see God and to be seen by
Him are one and the same thing.
4. If we ask: What are the conditions required for man to
attain to this mystical contemplation ? we are told that the first
condition is that man shall be freed from sin by an adequate and
true repentance. Next, the individual must detach himself from
all external things, and withdraw entirely within himself. He must
separate himself even from himself, i.e., from his own faculties, and
concentrate himself in the very centre of his soul. When these
conditions have been fulfilled, the most important still remains :
THEORY OF MYSTICAL ELEVATION. 4:j .»
Man must abandon himself entirely to God ; he must not act himself ;
he must throw himself completely upon God, and allow God alone to
work in him ; he must be quite dead, his own will must be entirely
quiescent ; he must surrender himself to God in a state of absolute
passivity. This is the state of " self-abandonment."
5. If the individual holds himself still and motionless in this
abandonment to God, a heavenly light will arise in the depths of his
soul ; the light of God will begin to shine in the very core of his
being. In this light God reveals to man the very basis of liis
divinity ; the whole being of God is laid bare to him. The soul is
merged into God ; its being and life passes into His being and life ;
man becomes one with God, he passes into a state of deification. In
this transition man is born as the Son of God, and this birth of
man as the Son of God is the goal of all mystical life.
6. It is to be noted, however, that when man is said to be born
as the Son of God in mystical contemplation, this expression is not to
be understood in the sense of an adoption, as if man became merely
the "films Dei adoptivus." Rather, man becomes, because of this
" birth," the films Dei naturalis," and in fact he becomes that same
" filius Dei naturalis" which is the eternal Divine "Logos."
Eckhardt never tires of repeating that man becomes by this second
birth that same Son of God which is the Eternal Word. " We are
transmuted into the Son, and become one Son," he writes : " Between
the soul of man and the Son of God, there is and remains no
distinction, as there is none between the nature of the Father and
the Son. As the bread in the Eucharist is changed into the body
of the Lord, in exactly the same manner is man in this birth
transformed into the Son of God."
7. This birth of man as the Son of God is likewise the birth of the
Son of God in man. A distinction must therefore be made between
a two-fold birth of the Son of God — " an immanent " birth in God
Himself, and an cc emanent " in the human soul. And the element of
the human soul in which this generation takes place is the " basis or
vital spark " of the soul. Here, as Eckhardt expresses it, is the
cradle of the Godhead. And as God brings forth his Son in the soul,
the latter, in return, reproduces the Son. " As God generates His
Son in me/' says Eckhardt, " so do I generate Him in turn in the
Father. To Him from whom I am born I again give birth."
8. This bringing forth of the Son of God in man, effected in the
mystical exaltation of the Soul, is not to be regarded as a free act on
the part of God any more than the immanent birth of the Son in
God. In the last analysis the two generative acts are one and the
same ; "by the same utterance in which God Himself speaks within
Himself, He also speaks in the Soul." Accordingly, Eckhardt
teaches that if a man with true self-abandonment to God, duly
prepares himself, God must execute His work in Him, "whether
He wishes it or not, for His very being compels Him to do it."
is an assured truth that it is necessary for God to seek us, just as if
44-0 HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
His entire divinity depended thereon ; God can no more dispense
with us than we can dispense with Him. Nay, it is more necessary
for Him to give to us than for us to receive from him/'
9. Thus man appears to us as the organ of the perfect self -birth
of God. Man must be born as the Son of God, for no other purpose
than that the Son of God may thus be born in human shape in him.
Man is to become God in order that in him God may become man.
Here we have the pantheistic idea of emanation which lies at the
root of all this mysticism. In this theory the essential difference
between the incarnation of God in Christ and His incarnation in all
other men disappears. If, by the birth of the Son of God in us, we
become sons of God, not by adoption but by nature, it is not easy to
understand what prerogative Christ enjoys beyond ourselves. The
Christ of history can, at best, be regarded as an ideal for men about
to be deified.
10. Eckhardt further teaches that we possess everything, without
exception, that God imparted to Christ, the Man-God. We are, if
we strive after true sanctity, just as much Man-God as He. "W hat
the Holy Scripture says of Christ may be said of every saintly man.
Christ is therefore only a type. God would have become man just
the same if Adam had not sinned. For, even without sin, man
would have been destined to be deified, and would have had in the
incarnate God, in the historical Christ, an ideal for his struggle
towards that deification.
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS THEORY.
§ 140.
1. Exalting himself to the stage of mystical life thus far
described, man attains to true freedom, which consists in this, that
he can only will the good, since God alone is now acting in him.
" God does not constrain the will," says Eckhardt, " on the contrary
He sets it at liberty, so that it wishes nothing but what God Him-
self wishes. The soul can desire nothing, save what God desires;
but this is not slavery, it is true freedom. For it is freedom to be
under no compulsion, to be free and pure and unsullied, as we were
at our first entry into existence, and were made free in the Holy
Spirit." By reason of this freedom " it is as impossible for a man
to leave undone what God wishes to have accomplished as it is to do
what is opposed to God's will." " It is just as impossible for him to
turn away from God as it is for God to be false to His own divinity."
2. A further result of man's entrance into the mystical life is
that he is delivered entirely from sin. In proportion, says Eckhardt,
as man approximates in likeness to God, as he becomes devoted to
God, renounces himself, and seeks neither temporal nor eternal
THEORY OF MYSTICAL ELEVATION : ITS CONSEQUENCES. 411
benefit for himself, in the same proportion does he become exempt
from sin and purgatory, and this even if he had committed the sins
of all mankind. For as a single drop is to the great ocean, so is the
guilt of mankind compared with the fathomless goodness of God.
3. In relation to the mystical life sin is not a thing to be wholly
eliminated ; it has its purpose. All things turn to the good of
those who are themselves good, even sin. God inflicts sin on men,
more especially on those whom He has chosen for the greatest deeds.
Man should be grateful on this account. He should not wish never
to have sinned. He is humiliated by sin and all the more closely
united with God by forgiveness. Nor should he desire that tempta
tion to sin should cease, for in that event the merit of the struggle
against temptation, and virtue itself, would perish. Regarded from
a higher point of view, there is properly no evil, since evil is itself
only°a means towards the realisation of the divine purposes.
4. External works serve only to prepare the soul for contem
plation of itself and of God, and to withdraw it from earthly things ;
beyond this they have no value. It is false to assert that eternal
happiness depends on them ; they are a hindrance to it, if man
becomes too much attached to them. It is on the inner working of
the soul that everything turns. God does not require external work.
The true work is purely internal, the working of the soul upon
itself, i.e., of the soul in "God or through God. With this, and this
alone, is eternal bliss connected. The repose of the just is better
than all the works that have ever been accomplished.
5. On the other hand, Eckhardt will not dispense the perfect
man from all endeavour. " The Apostles," he says, " as soon as they
received the Holy Spirit, began to labour. Similarly, the saints,
when they become saints, perform acts of virtue." But if these works
are to possess any value they must be expressions of the interior
life in God, and 'must therefore be done without any regard for self.
As man must love God for His own sake, he must likewise seek no
benefit for himself through his work ; he must perform the good
because it is good, and without any other intention, even without
any thought of heaven and eternal happiness. He who works for
reward commits a sin. Even if God were not just, man should sti
love justice; nay, even if God commanded a life of wickedness, man
should still be virtuous. ,
6. Finally, in the mystical life man is raised above the mora*
law. Law and order in themselves are intended only for those win
have not attained the heights of a mystical life— not for the perleci
man. Not as if it were permitted to the latter to do what
pleases— good or evil; Eckhardt does not adopt the antinomy of
Bernard. Man has to fulfil the law, but this merely for the sake
external order. He has no need of it in his interior life, becaus
without it he is confirmed by God in goodness and true freedom,
Virtue has become of the essence of his being through his interior
life in God ; he not only possesses virtue, he is virtue hnnselt.
442
HISTORY OF MEDLEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
7. Such are the consequences of the birth of man as the Son of
God, and of the Son of God in man. If we ask : what is the ultimate
purpose of this birth of God in man? we are told that by the
deification of man all creatures are again led back into God, as they
emanated from Him, and thereby God attains to His highest per
fection and His highest happiness. In this sense Eckhardt teaches
that the ultimate purpose of God in all he does is "rest " in man, and
the final goal of man is " rest " in God. Both ends are attained in that
birth of the Son^of God in the soul, in which mystical life essentially
consists. In this birth man is blessed and God is rendered happy,
perfectly happy. God is happy in man, and man is happy in God!
and the two constitute one happiness. Yet this happiness is only
complete for man in a future life. The soul is not annihilated in
God, it lives on after the death of the body. But it is not the soul
as endowed with faculties that is immortal in us: it is only the
" basis " of the soul that is divine. This element of the soul casts
itself into the " basis '' of God's being to subsist eternally therein, and
to be eternally blessed. This is immortality.
JOHN TAULER, HENRY Suso, JOHN RUYSBROEK.
§ 141.
1. John Tauler (1290-1361) born, it is said, at Strassburg, became
a member of the Dominican Order, studied at Paris, and then
returned to Strassburg, where he appears to have maintained an
intimacy with Meister Eckhardt. He probably belonged to the
association founded by Nicolas of Basle, which was known as " the
Friends of God." They remained within the Church, but they had
little esteem for obedience to ecclesiastical authority, and made light
of law and interdict. In this they were imitated by Tauler. He
was, like Eckhardt, a preacher, and the writings which he has left
us consist, for the most part, of sermons. In addition to these we
have his book " On the following of the poor life of Christ."
2. In these writings Tauler follows the same line of thought as
Eckhardt. The distinction between the basis of God's Being and
God himself, between the basis or vital spark of the soul and its
faculties, the notion of the birth of man as the son of God, and of
the Son of God in man — all this forms the frame-work on which his
system of mystical doctrine is elaborated. Like Eckhardt, he also
holds that mystical knowledge can be attained only by closing the
mind to natural knowledge. Rational knowledge, he says, is ignorance
rather than knowledge. To rise to mystical knowledge man must
renounce the knowledge acquired by natural reasoning. "The
natural light of reason must be wholly extinguished if God would
enter with His light."
JOHN TAULER, HEXRV Suso, JOHN RUYSBROEK. 443
God, says Tauler, turns his gaze in upon the abyss of His own
Being, and thus gives birth to the Son ; in the same way, to effect
in the'soul the birth of the Son, the soul must first retire withir
itself, withdrawing from everything external to itself; if God is to
enter in, everything created must be driven out. The soul mu>t
then abandon itself also, must rise above all its faculties, and putting
away all knowledge, not only of other objects but of its own being
as well, it must descend into the ultimate basis of its life, in which i-
found the image of God. In this way it attains to true knowledge ;
in this way the Son of God is born in the soul. On God's entering into
Himself there is a going out from Him, i.e., when the Father turns
His gaze unio the " basis " of the Godhead, the Son is generated by
Him ; so also the soul, when it wiihdraws into the basal element of
its own being, goes out from itself, or, rather, rises above itself, and
is born the Son of God.
4 Henrv Suso is said to have been born at Constance, A.D. 1600,
and to have died at Ulm A.D. 1365. He, too, was a Dominican.
His works have been published by Diepenbrock of Ratisbon
(1837). Prefixed to this edition of his works is an autobiography of
the writer for which we are indebted to his spiritual daughter,
Elsbet Staglin. According to the judgment of this critic, "
was of a loving and lovable nature, a profound thinker, a man oi
many acquirements, and of a poetic temperament,
writings we can discern that equanimity which was the rich truit o
a perfectly formed character, the immediate outcome of
harmony of the faculties to which he had attained. He was able to
win all men to himself by his genial cheerfulness, to open cloi
hearts by the power of love, and without sacrifice of his profound
earnestness to lead and guide others by the path of kindliness.
5 The man who desires to tread the path of mysticism, busc
tells us, must first of all renounce the body and all animal
tendencies and hold fast by the Eternal Spirit. He must then turn
away from himself, and putting aside whatever is sensuous, i
forgetfulness and absolute self-surrender, abandoning the use ot
owS powers, yield himself wholly to the Divine influence.
the self-abandonment which is the first condition of all mystical
life Starting from this self-abandonment or self-negation t
spirit the ima-e of God in the soul, lifts itself to the Divine
&e and descending from the infinite heights or soarin,
upwards from the infinite abyss, unhindered by the clouds and veils
of created things, contemplates the marvels ot the Div u ty ^
are in themselves but in a silent darkness and an absolute rep os,.
fi «fikp a beino- which loses itself in an indescribable mtoxi-
IISSlv£^£ S3SE fH
444 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
them no longer, divested of self, they are absorbed in the Divine
Will, mingle with the Divine Nature and become one with it."
7. John Ruysbroek was a contemporary of Suso. Born in the
village of Ruysbroek, in the Low Countries, A.D. 1293, he was, in
his early life, a secular priest, and at the age of 60 became Canon of
the church of Griinthal near Brussels. He was regarded as a
model of sanctity, and Ids reputation drew many visitors to
Griinthal, men of every age and rank, dignitaries, noblemen, men of
learning, ecclesiastics. Among the rest came Tauler, and the
celebrated founder of the " Brothers of Common Life," Gerhard
Groot. To the latter Ruysbroek expressed the conviction that he
had written nothing except by impulse of the Holy Ghost, and
under the special influence of the Holy Trinity. He died in the
year 1381.
8. The works of Ruysbroek have been printed in a Latin
translation by Surius. This is the only complete printed edition of
his works. In this translation the several works have the following
titles : (a) " Speculum geternse salutis " ; (b) " Commentaria in
tabernaculum fosderis "; (c) " De proecipuis quibusdam virtutibus " ;
(d) " De septem custodiis"; (e) " De septem gradibus amoris";
(/) "De ornatu spiritualium nuptiaruin " ; (g) " De calculo";
(Ji) " Regnum Dei amantium"; (i) "De vera contemplatione," with
others of less importance. In these works Ruysbroek handles the
same themes again and again. The most important of the treatises
named above is that " De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum."
9. According to Ruysbroek, God is the super-essential essence of
all things ; His Godhead is the unfathomable abyss in which man
loses himself in blissful unreason. The Divine Essence, as essence,
is in eternal repose, and is at the same time the first beginning, the
ultimate end, and the living principle of conservation in created
things. In the human soul we must distinguish three elements —
the sensitive, the intellectual, and the spiritual. Through the
sensitive element the soul lives in the body, and, by the body, in the
external world ; through the intellectual element it lives within
itself apart from the external world ; by means of the spiritual
element it lives above itself, in God. .By the " spirit " the soul is
the living mirror of God's being ; here He has implanted His image.
This image — the Son of God — exists essentially and personally in all
men, each one possesses it whole and undivided ; in it all men are
one.
10. We have three degrees of the mystical life corresponding to
the three elements of the soul — the active, the interior, and the
contemplative. The active life is realised in the moral virtues,
which are reducible to three chief virtues — humility, love, and
justice. The interior life consists in this, that man withdraws from
the external world, and retires within himself; that he there holds
devout communion with God, offering to Him the homage which is
His due; and that he orders all his actions in conformity with
THEOLOGIA DEUTSCH.
justice. The contemplative life begins when we wholly renounce
self, and die to ourselves in God. At this stage we pass out of
ourselves and become one with God. God unites us with Himself
in that eternal love which is His very being. The "spirit" becomes
one with God by immersion in, and fusion with, the essence or
"basis" of God's Being. By an effect of grace the "spirit" is
merged in the unity constituted by the Divine Essence, without,
however, losing its created nature.
THEOLOGIA DEUTSCH.
§ 142.
1. Before concluding this portion of our work we must give a
short notice of a booklet which bears the title "Theolpgia Deutsch."
It has not yet been ascertained who was its author. We may, how
ever, take it as certain that he was one of the " Friends of God."
The treatise belongs to the 14th or loth century. The first printed
edition was prepared by Luther (1516 or 1518) who set great store
by its teaching. An edition printed from a manuscript, dated 1427,
was issued by Pfeiffer of Stuttgart in 1851.
2. All things, the author of the tract tells us, have emanated
from God. " Now an emananation is not a real being, it has no
existence except in the source from which it emanates ; it is an
accessory, a ray, a light ; it is not being and has not being, otherwise
than in the fire from which it emanates, in the sun, or in the blaze."
God would not be God if there were no created things. " In such
case there would not be a this and a that, there "would not be either
act or activity, and so forth. What would or could God then be, or of
what would He be the God ? " The distinction of Persons in God
is not sufficient to permit of perfect action in Him, if He is to bo
truly God He must diffuse Himself in creatures.
3. We must distinguish in man a twofold light — the light of
grace and the light of nature. The light of grace is, as such, the
true light ; the light of nature is false and deceptive. " Hence the
light of nature can never be turned to good, or guided along the
path of right ; in this respect it resembles the spirit of evil, nay, it
is itself the evil spirit." Corresponding to the twofold light there is
a twofold love — love of God, and the love of self founded upon
nature. And as the light of nature is opposed to the Divine light,
so is the one love opposed to the other. The love of God is the iru<
love, self-love the false ; the former is good, the latter evil. Hence
everything that has its source in the love of God is good ; everything
springing from the love of self is evil. All self-will is sin ; nay, it is
original sin ; without self-will there would be no sin, no ln-11.
4. The love of God shows itself in obedience to God. The
4,46 HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
obedience does not consist in this, that man conforms his will to the
Divine Will, but in this, that all self-will, all " self ness," is
annihilated, 'so that God alone wills and works^in man. "The
creature " so runs the theory, " must not use his own will, bod
alone must will, acting through the will which is in man, but which
in reality is God's." " Hence the more ' selfness ' the more Bin."
And, on the other hand, the less "I," "my," "mine/' '.' me"
assert themselves in man the more does the self of God, that is bod
Himself, grow in him.
5 These principles form the foundation on which the author
builds his theory of the mystical life. The first requirement of that
life is that man shall give himself to deep contrition for his sins.
But the sorrow must not be because of the punishment which he
has thereby deserved, but solely because his sins are an offence to
God In the next place, man must abandon himself without reserve
to the Divine influence. He must renounce all " selfness," forbear
all action, so that God alone may exercise His power and activity in
him If the soul is to have a glimpse into eternity, it must with
draw from all created things, itself included; "the eye which is
open to the light of nature must become blind, self-will must die.
The Divine light then flashes forth in man, he gains an insight into
the mysteries of the Godhead, and with this vision there grows
within him a love of God, pure, unselfish, one with that love which
God bears Himself. He has now reached the stage of true
mysticism, the state of oneness with God.
6 As this union requires that " selfness shall be annihilated
in man and that God alone shall dwell in him, and act in him, it
follows that the union is a deification of man. God becomes human
in man ; man becomes divine in God. As man puts off self and
croes out of himself God enters into him in His proper being, in His
own " selfness." God becomes man, and man becomes God. Man
is then raised above law, order, commandment and reason. Not^that
he can henceforth despise order and law— that would be spiritual
pride— but that he has henceforth no need of anyone to teach him
the law ; the spirit of God teaches him what to do and what to omit.
In themselves order and law are " guides for men who understand
nothing other and better, and do not perceive why law and ord<
have been framed."
END OF VOL. I.
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