1
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO
DALLAS • SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO
j a
ufr
A History of
A*'
The British ArrriWI
BY
The Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE
VOL. VII
1809-1810
£)##£ frf/v/ ora cruore nostro
*>. MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
£
19 I 2
fe
•" 1 It- 1*
COPYRIGHT
V'7 2-
PREFATORY NOTE
I wish to record my thanks to the Lords of the
Admiralty for permission to use an unpublished MS.
Chart of the Scheldt in the preparation of the map for
the campaign of Walcheren ; to the Duke of Wellington
for great kindness in giving me access to the Wellington
MSS. at Apsley House ; to Professor Oman for much
valuable help over and above that which I have con-
stantly derived from his History of the Peninsular War ;
and to Mr. H. W. Cribb for his continued good work
in the production of maps.
J. W. F.
CONTENTS
BOOK XIII— Continued
CHAPTER XXIV
The West Indies
Influence of West Indies on British policy
Power of France and Spain in the West Indies
Mortality of troops in Jamaica
British raid on Baracoa
St. Domingo surrendered to the British
Troubles in the Windward Islands
Hurricane at Dominica
Acquisition of the Danish West Indies
Admiral Cochrane occupies Mariegalante
Relaxation of the blockade of Martinique
The British capture Martinique
Capture of the Saints ....
Capture of Guadeloupe
And of the Dutch Islands
Summary of affairs in the West Indies until 1815
PAGE
I
2-3
3-+
5
6
7
8
9
9-10
1 1
12-17
17-19
20-24
• 25
25-7
CHAPTER XXV
England
Despondency in England in 1809
Criticism in Parliament of Moore's campaign
vii
28
29
Vlll
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Scandal concerning the Duke of York .
Negotiations between England and Austria .
Strength of the British Army, January 1809 .
Proposed military reforms of the Duke of York
The Regular Army recruited from the Militia
Relations of the Tsar with France and Austria
Further negotiations between England and Austria
War between France and Austria .
Feeling in Prussia .....
Irresolute policy of King Frederick William III.
Kleist's mission to England ....
Premature risings in Germany
The Cabinet's Portuguese policy .
Differences of Castlereagh and Canning
Question of an expedition to Walcheren
Suggested re-arrangements of the Cabinet
Expedition to the Scheldt decided upon
State of affairs in Prussia ....
Military opinion on the Scheldt expedition .
Report of General von der Decken
Reasons of the Cabinet for undertaking the expedition
Position of British Ministers ....
Canning's intrigues in the Cabinet
Lord Chatham appointed to command the Scheldt ex
pedition
Strength of the force despatched .
Naval difficulties of the expedition
PAGE
30-3I
• 32
33-4
34-5
• 35
• 36
36-7
37-8
• 38
39-4°
40-42
42"43
44
45
46
47
47
48
49
5°
51-2
52-3
53-4
54-5
56-7
58
CHAPTER XXVI
Expedition to the Scheldt
Description of the river Scheldt 60-61
The three divisions of the army and their respective tasks 61-3
Anxiety of the French 63-4
Strength of the French forces for the defence of the river . 65
First complications in the British forces .... 65-6
CONTENTS
Arrival of the troops in the Roompot .
Capture of Ten Haak
Unavoidable delay in the advance of the troops
Surrender of Veere ....
Advance of the troops towards Flushing
Hope's division in South Beveland
Failure of Huntly at Kadzand
Importance of Kadzand
Investment of Flushing
The French cut the sea-dykes
Bombardment and fall of Flushing
Casualties of both sides
Further advance of the British
Outbreak of fever ....
Disagreements of Chatham and Strachan
Chatham's difficulties over specie
His hopeless position ....
His further disagreement with Strachan
Evacuation of South Beveland
The fever at Walcheren
Evacuation of Walcheren .
Causes of the epidemic
Summary of the expedition
IX
PAGE
67
68
69
7°
7i
72-3
73-4
75
76-8
78
79
80
81
81-2
82
83-4
85
86-7
87-8
89-90
91
92
93-6
CHAPTER XXVII
The Peninsula
Condition of the Spanish Armies in 1808
Reille and Duhesme in Catalonia
Capture of Rosas by St. Cyr
March of St. Cyr to Barcelona
He defeats Reding and Castro
Second defeat of Reding near Tarragona
Napoleon's plans for the final conquest of Spain
Victor defeats Venegas at Ucles .
Siege of Zaragoza .....
VOL. VII
• 97
98-9
100
101-2
103
104
104-5
106
107
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Sebastiani's success at Ciudad Real
Cuesta's operations on the Tagus
His defeat at Medellin
Soult takes Coruna and Ferrol
Condition of Soult's army .
Romana retreats to the Portuguese frontier .
Cradock's preparations for the defence of Portuga
Wilson raises the Lusitanian Legion
Distribution of the troops in Portugal
Embarrassing situation of Cradock
Sir George Smith at Cadiz
Increasing difficulties of Cradock.
Negotiations for a British occupation of Cadiz
Mackenzie refused permission to land at Cadiz
Question of the defence of Portugal
Sir Arthur Wellesley's memorandum .
His views compared with those of Moore
Wellesley receives the command in Portugal
Soult's march to Oporto
Feeble opposition of the Portuguese forces
The French capture Chaves and advance on Braga
Defeat of the Portuguese under Eben .
The sack of Oporto ....
Wilson confronts the French at Almeida
Cradock prepares to defend Lisbon
He receives reinforcements
The difficulties of his position
PAGE
. 108
109
1 10
1 1 0- 1 1
1 1 1
1 12
112-13
1 14
• 115
1 16-17
1 17-18
1 18-19
120-21
122-3
124
125
126-8
128-9
129-31
• 131
. 132
• 133
• 134
135-6
• 136
137-8
I39-42
CHAPTER XXVIII
Lapisse joins Victor at Merida .
Silveira's operations on the Tamega
Disaffection in Soult's Army
Strength of Wellesley's army in Portugal
Question of transport
His choice of operations
.
• 143
•
143-4
•
144-5
.
. 145
.
146
.
• 147
CONTENTS
Situation of the French in Spain
The force for defence of Portugal on the Tagus
Organisation of the British Army in Portugal
Wellesley's tactics
His instructions to Beresford
His march upon Oporto
Retirement of the French .
Skirmish near Grijo .
Souk's preparations to hold Oporto
Wellesley's passage of the Douro
Stewart pursues the French
Summary of the action
Retreat of Soult
Ill-success of Loison about Amarante
He abandons Soult
Soult's march through the mountains
The British pursuit fails
Wellesley turns southward against Victor
XI
PAGE
. I48
• H9
149-50
151-2
i52-3
•53-4
• 155
155-6
• 157
158-61
162
. 163
164
. 165
165
166-70
• 171
171-2
CHAPTER XXIX
Operations of Mortier and Junot in Aragon .
Suchet replaces Junot in Aragon .
His operations against Blake
His success at Belchite ....
Ney's operations in Galicia
Romana's successes in Galicia and Asturias .
Movement of the French columns upon Asturias
Further successes of the Spanish .
Quarrels of Ney and Soult ....
Ney's advance to the Oitaber River
He is abandoned by Soult, and evacuates Galicia
Influence of the British forces upon the operations
Victor's operations about Alcantara
His difficulties of supply .
He evacuates Estremadura .
173-4
174
175
176
176
177
78-80
180
181
182
183
184-5
186
187
187
Xll
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Positions of the French corps, July 1809
Operations of Sebastiani
Wcllcsley receives reinforcements
Misconduct of his troops
The question of regimental courts-martial
Lack of military police in the British Army
Wellesley's financial difficulties .
Organisation of the transport
He receives further reinforcements
Cuesta's proposed plans of campaign
Wellesley's final arrangements with the Spaniards
. 188
. 189
190
191-2
193-5
• x95
196
197-8-9
200
201-2
for supplies 203
CHAPTER XXX
March of the British Army to Plasencia . . . 205-6
Character of Cuesta ........ 207
Intrigues of Frere ....... 207-8
Positions of the French corps ..... 208-9
Conference of Cuesta and Wellesley to plan their campaign 209-1 1
Wellesley's difficulties of supply and transport . . 211-12
He orders Beresford to watch the Pass of Banos . . .212
Advance of the British and Spaniards upon Talavera . .213
Joseph and Soult concert operations . 214-16
Cuesta delays the attack of the Allies upon Victor . .216
And pursues the French when too late . . . .217
The British halt for lack of supplies . . . . 217-18
Movements of the French corps . . . . . .219
Futile operations of Venegas ..... 219-20
Retreat of the Spaniards before Victor and Joseph . .221
Cuesta's troops join the British at Talavera .... 222
Description of the ground ...... 223-4-5
Positions of the British troops at Talavera . . . 224~5
The French surprise the British advanced division . 226-7
Resulting confusion and mistakes when the troops take up
their positions on the Cerro de Medellin . . 228-9
Battle of Talavera : Victor's first attack . . . 230-35
CONTENTS
The French Marshals discuss their plan of action
The second attack .....
Further discussions between the French Marshals
The third attack
Retirement of the French
Casualties of the British
And of the French
Summary of the action
Xlll
HAGE
236-7
237-43
H3-45
245-55
. 256
256-7
. 258
258-61
CHAPTER XXXI
Movements of the French after Talavera
Operations of Venegas about Madrid .
Craufurd's march to Talavera
Wellesley learns of Soult's march to Plasencia
And moves westward against him
The Spaniards retreat to Oropesa
Movements of Soult and Ney, July 23-Aug. 3
Disagreements of Wellesley and Cuesta
Retreat of the British to Deleitosa
Advance of Soult, Ney, and Mortier towards Arzobispo
The French discover the ford
And drive away the Spaniards from Arzobispo
Retreat of the Spaniards to Mesas de Ibor .
Reasons for Soult's delay in pursuing them
The French army goes into summer quarters
Operations of Wilson about Bahos
Quarrels of Wellesley with Cuesta
And with General Eguia ....
His lack of transport and supply .
Operations of Beresford ....
Wellesley's correct conception of the situation
The British retire south to Badajoz
Dissensions of the generals on both sides during
campaign ......
Criticism of the Talavera campaign
262-3
263-4
265
266
267
268
269
270
271-2
272-3
273
274
275
276
277
278
278-9
279
280
280-81
281
282
this
283-4
284-90
XIV
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
CHAPTER XXXII
The Mediterranean
Designs of Colli ngwood on the Ionian Isles
Austrian embassy to Stuart at Palermo
Choice of a field of operations
Stuart's irresolution and delay
Despatch of a force against Ischia
The British capture Procida
Successful naval action oft* Naples
Capture of Ischia
Failure of the expedition to Scilla
Indecision of Stuart as to further operations
The British evacuate Ischia and Procida
Stuart decides to attack the Ionian Isles
Capture of Cephallonia and Zante
The dangers of this policy
Attitude of Ministers towards Stuart .
Acquisitions of France in the Adriatic
The situation of Turkey
France and England pay court to AH Pasha of Janina
Turkey and the Septinsular Republic .
Domestic affairs in Sicily ....
Divorce and re-marriage of Napoleon .
Intrigues of Oueen Caroline of Naples
Relations of Stuart with the Court at Palermo
Oswald sails for Santa Maura
Capture of the island . ....
Stuart refuses to despatch troops to the Peninsula
Murat's preparations against Sicily
Attitude of the Sicilians ....
Murat's attack fails .....
The French troops retire to Naples
Stuart justifies his retention of the troops ordered to Spain
Difficulties of the British position in Sicily
Altered policy of the British Government
PAGE
291-2
292
293
293-4
295-7
297
298-9
299
300
30I
302
302
3°3
3°4
305
305
306
306-7
308
308
309
309
3IO
311
12-14
315
3l6
317
I8-I9
320
320
321
322-3
CONTENTS
xv
CHAPTER XXXIII
England
Relations of Canning and Perceval
Break-up of the Portland Cabinet
Duel of Castlereagh and Canning
Canning's theory of Ministerial responsibility
Perceval forms a new Ministry .
Situation of England in Europe .
Spencer Perceval .....
Parliamentary criticism of the Talavera campaign
Inquiry into the failure at Walcheren
Dislike of the Waggon-Train in Parliament .
Difficulties of recruiting for Regulars and Militia
PAGE
• 324
• 325
. 326
326-7
327-8
• 329
• 330
331-2
• 332
• 333
• 334
The Peninsula
Wellesley's opinion of the defence of Portugal
Operations of Suchet in Aragon .
And of St. Cyr in Catalonia
The siege of Gerona .
Blake's attempts to relieve the city
Fall of Gerona ....
Relations of Wellington and the Supreme Junta
Plans of the Junta for the Spanish forces
Success of del Parque at Tamames
His further operations about Salamanca
Condition of Eguia's army .
He is superseded by Areizaga
Who is utterly defeated by Soult at Ocana
Operations of Kellermann against del Parque
Del Parque appeals to Wellington for help
Folly of the Spanish Government
Wellington withdraws his troops to Portugal
335-6
• 337
338-9
339-4°
340-42
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
35o
35i
352
353
XVI
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
CHAPTER XXXIV
Dispositions of the Spanish armies
The Spanish guerillas and their deeds .
Soult resolves to invade Andalusia
Advance of the French to the Sierra Morena
Joseph enters Cordova ....
Failure of the Spanish Junta to defend Seville
Joseph enters Seville in peace
Mistake of Soult in ignoring Alburquerque .
Alburquerque marches to Cadiz .
Napoleon's criticism on the invasion of Andalusia
Description of Cadiz and its surroundings .
Reinforcements reach Cadiz from Wellington
Joseph's progress through Andalusia
Extortion of the French generals in Spain .
Napoleon sets up four military governments in Spain
He refrains from coming to Spain by reason of his marriage
He deprives Joseph of all power in the kingdom
The French reinforcements for the Peninsula
Formation of the Ninth or Reserve Corps
Distribution of the French troops in Spain
Operations of Augereau in Catalonia .
Successes of the Spanish under O'Donnell
Who is finally defeated by Souham
Augereau remains at Barcelona
Further successes of O'Donnell .
Augereau is superseded by Macdonald .
Operations of Suchet in Aragon .
He defeats O'Donnell and takes Lerida and
Suchet advances against Tortosa .
His insecure position ....
Macdonald moves southward to support him
Successes of O'Donnell in the north .
Activity of the guerillas upon the Frenc
munication ....
Mequinenza
h lines of com-
354
355-9
359
360
361
362
363
363-4
365
365-6
366-7
368
369
37o
37i
372
373
374
375
375-6
376-7
377-8
• 379
. 380
380-81
. 382
382-3
• 384
• 385
• 386
• 387
388
389-90
CONTENTS
XVll
CHAPTER XXXV
The British fortify Matagorda (Cadiz)
Graham takes command in Cadiz
Matagorda captured by the French
Reinforcements arrive at Cadiz .
Operations of Sebastiani in the Alpujarras
Lacy's expeditions to Ronda and Huelva
Defeat of Blake near Baza ....
Blayney's expedition to Fuengirola
Criticism of his failure ....
State of affairs in Cadiz ....
The Spanish Cortes .....
Positions of the corps of Soult, Ney, and Mortier
Operations of Bonnet in Asturias
Loison summons Astorga ....
Capture of the city by }unot
Operations of Mortier about Badajoz .
Ballesteros keeps him employed in Andalusia
PAGE
391"2
• 392
393-4
• 394
• 395
395-6
• 397
398-400
401-3
• 4° 3
. 404
• 4°5
406-8
. 408
• 4°9
. 410
. 41 1
CHAPTER XXXVI
The British headquarters' staff
And their relations with Wellington
The British spies and scouts
Relations of Wellington with the divisional generals
Misconduct of the troops .
Reason for such general misconduct
Failings of the British officers
The Medical Service and Commissariat
The Portuguese Army
Portuguese commissions for British officers
Establishment of the Portuguese Army
Its dependence on a British subsidy
The Portuguese Regency and its relations with Wellington
Difficulties of the British Government in obtaining specie
. 412
4!3-i4
415-16
417-21
421-2
423-4
424-6
426-7
427-8
. 429
• 43°
• 43i
gton 431-4
cie . 435
xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Wellington demands an increased subsidy .... 436
He is loyally supported by Perceval's Cabinet . . . 437
Wellington asks for reinforcements ..... 438
Liverpool despatches reinforcements to Portugal . . 439-42
Anxiety of Ministers for the safety of the army in Portugal 442-3
Liverpool's misgivings as to the embarkation of the troops 443~4
Wellington's choice of Sao Juliao as the place of embarkation . 444
Wellington's relations with Ministers .... 445"6
His lack of confidence in the Government .... 447
Liverpool's military policy ....... 448
Difficult position of Wellington 449"5°
CHAPTER XXXVII
Military geography of Portugal ....
Alternative routes for the French invasion .
Wellington's dispositions for the defence of Portugal
Stations of the troops ......
Career of Robert Craufurd .....
His training of light troops .....
His relations with Wellington ....
Wellington's instructions to Hill and Craufurd
Good work of the Light Brigade on the Agueda .
The skirmish at Barba del Puerco
First movement of the French upon Ciudad Rodrigo
Romana appeals for help to the British
Napoleon's instructions for the invasion of Portugal
Character of Massena .....
Arrival of Ney before Ciudad Rodrigo
Wellington refrains from attempting its relief
Cavalry skirmish near Fort Concepcion
Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo .....
Action of Craufurd's troops at Villa de Puerco
Wellington instructs Craufurd to retire
Description of the country about Almeida .
451-3
454
455-6
457-8
459
460
461
462-3
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
470-71
471-2
• 472
473-5
• 475
476-7
CONTENTS
Combat of the Coa ....
Craufurd's failure in action
Wellington refrains from any censure .
The French version of the action
XIX
PAGE
477-83
483-4
484-5
485-6
CHAPTER XXXVIII
Uncertainty of Wellington as to the French plans
Movements of Hill and Reynier .
Operations of the Spaniards against Mortier
And of the Portuguese against Seras
The new members of the Portuguese Regency
British reinforcements fail to arrive
Fall of Almeida ......
Massena enlists the captured Portuguese troops
Massena's advance delayed for lack of supplies
Movement of Reynier to join Massena
Defeat of Romana at Fuente Cantos
Foolish proposals of the Portuguese Regency
Wellington's complaints against British officers
Reinforcements arrive at Lisbon .
Advance of the French upon Coimbra .
Concentration of the British troops
Massena's march harassed by Trant
Wellington takes up a position at Bussaco
Skirmish of the Light Division about Sula
Description of the ground at Bussaco
Dispositions of the British troops
Ney's misconception of the situation
Conference of the French Marshals
Battle of Bussaco
British and French casualties
Massena's faulty directions for the fight
Reasons for the failure of the French attack
Gallantry of the British troops
Wellington's use of artillery at Bussaco
487
488
488-9
490
490
491
491-2
493
494
495
496
496-8
498-9
499-500
500-501
502-3
• 504
• 5o5
. 506
506-8
509-11
• 5ii
. 512
513-26
526-7
527-8
• 529
• 53°
53°-32
XX
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
CHAPTER XXXIX
Wellington gives orders for a retreat .
Trant's march upon Sardao
March of the French from Bussaco upon Coimbra
Sack of Coimbra by the French .
Masscna decides to pursue the British .
And abandons his wounded at Coimbra
Tram and his Portuguese retake Coimbra
Cavalry skirmish at Alcoentre
Mishaps of the Light Brigade at Alemquer .
Description of the Lines of Torres Vedras .
Skirmishes of British and French about Sobral
Massena encamps before the Lines
His difficulties in obtaining supplies
Wellington decides not to attack the French
Foy's mission to Napoleon ....
Retreat of the French to Santarem
Movements of the British divisions in pursuit
Sufferings of the retiring French troops
Further movements of Hill and Craufurd
Dispositions of the French at Santarem
Wellington attempts an attacking movement
But finally decides not to take the offensive .
Retreat of Gardanne's column to Ciudad Rodrigo
The British in winter quarters
Summary of the campaign of 18 io
The French difficulties of supply and transport
Good conduct of the British in the retreat to the Lines
Wellington's troubles with the Portuguese Regency
His lack of confidence in the British Ministers
533
534
535
536-7
537
538
538-9
539
540
54!-3
54+
545
546
547
547-8
548-9
549
55°
551
552
553
553-4
554
555
555-6
557
558
559
560-62
CHAPTER XL
East Indies
Changed policy of the East India Company.
Character of Sir George Barlow .
563
564
CONTENTS
And of Lord Minto ....
Barlow's ill-judged actions at Madras .
Status of officers in the East India Company
Their insubordination
Their grievances ....
War in Travancore ....
Macdowall's quarrel with the civil Governm
Barlow's treatment of the question
Lord Minto approves his conduct
The officers' memorial to Minto .
Barlow orders their suspension or dismissal
Minto's faulty judgment of the situation
Mutiny at Masulipatam
Barlow devises a "test" for all officers
Punishment of all who refuse to sign i
Mutiny at Hyderabad
Order restored at Masulipatam .
Mutiny at Mysore
Attitude of the officers in Travancore
Lord Minto arrives at Madras
His foolish General Order
Dangerous alienation of the Sepoys
The courts-martial at Bangalore .
Summary of the mutiny
Responsibility of Barlow and Minto
s Army
ent at
Mad
ras
XXI
PAGE
• 56+
• 565
565-6
• 567
568-9
• 57°
• 571
572-3
573-+
• 575
575-6
577-8
579-81
581-2
. 582
583-5
. 586
• 587
. 588
• 589
590-91
591-2
592-3
593-4
594-6
CHAPTER XLI
Mauritius
The British capture the island of Rodriguez . . . 597
Successful expedition against Bourbon .... 598-9
Naval mishaps at Port Bourbon on Mauritius . . . 600
Reinforcements arrive for the expedition to Mauritius . 601-2
The British capture Mauritius ..... 603-5
Capture of the minor Dutch settlements in the East Indies 605-6
xxn
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Napoleon's plans for the restoration of Dutch power in the
East Indies ........ 606
Relations of the Navy and Army in time of war . . . 607
Java
Preparations for an expedition to Java
Organisation of the force
The expedition reaches Java
The British occupy Chilingching
And advance to Batavia
Night skirmish at Batavia .
The British occupy Weltevreeden
The Dutch camp at Cornelis
Successful sortie of the enemy upon the British batteries
The British cannonade the camp
Attack and capture of the lines of Cornelis
Casualties in the action
Gallantry of the troops
Auchmuty's further operations
Successful action at Jattoo .
Surrender of Java to the British
Career and character of Auchmuty
Index .....
. 608
. 609
. 610
. 611
. 612
. 613
614-15
. 616
. 617
. 618
619-23
. 624
. 625
. 626
. 627
. 628
. 629
• 631
ERRATA
Page 167, line 6, for Serra da Cabreira read Serra da Cabrera.
Page 182, lines 8, 25, 33, for Oitlaben read Oitaber.
CHAPTER XXIV
So far our survey of the Spanish insurrection has been
confined to its effects in Europe only. It is now time
to glance at its influence in another sphere, which for
some time past has been left unconsidered, namely, the
West Indies. Little has been said of affairs in that
quarter since 1805 ; and yet, trifling though they may
now seem to be, they were never without importance a
century ago, owing, first, to the enormous value of the
West Indian trade, and, secondly, to the deadly nature
of the West Indian climate. Possessions which, even
in time of the profoundest peace, devoured at least two
thousand European soldiers every year, to say nothing
of seamen and marines, could not but exert a constant
pressure upon British military policy. The designs of
Pitt to reduce France to submission by the ruin of her
colonial trade had, it is true, been abandoned as pre-
posterous ; and the bitter experience of 1795 an<^ 1 79^
had produced a reform, which was little less than a
revolution, in the conduct of West Indian wars and the
maintenance of West Indian garrisons. By insensible
degrees the guardianship of the British islands had tended
to fall more and more into the hands of black troops and
of foreign mercenaries. The Sixtieth Regiment, having
begun life as Royal Americans, had become practically
Royal West Indians ; and its battalions had been in-
creased by the infusion of alien prisoners and deserters
of every kind, with a recklessness which, as we have
already seen in the account of Moore's expedition, had
produced most dangerous consequences. Now that
VOL. VII I B
2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
the War Office was governed by Castlereagh, the one
Minister who had the confidence and courage to favour
the employment of British troops acting together in large
numbers in Europe, the problem of the West Indian
garrisons called more loudly than ever for solution.
This problem, moreover, was one which touched
military policy at other points than that of mere recruit-
ing. The rivals of England in the West Indies were four :
to windward the French with their allies the Dutch,
and after 1807 the Danes; to leeward the French in
St. Domingo, and elsewhere the Spaniards only. The
latter being supine, disaffected towards the mother-
country, and unlikely to receive aid from her, could be
counted upon to abstain from offensive movements, and
were not therefore very formidable. France and her
allies also had been rendered more or less impotent for the
infliction of serious injury, by the capture of the Danish
colonies and the destruction of the French fleet. But
the maintenance of an effective blockade upon the French
coast was an impossibility ; and, with a man of such
restless activity as Napoleon at the head of the French
Government, there could be no security in the Antilles so
long as Martinique and Guadeloupe lay ready to his hand
as bases of operations. Again, even though the regular
forces of France and Spain might remain quiescent,
their West Indian possessions furnished nests for a host
of privateers, which preyed unceasingly upon British
commerce, and necessitated the employment of a vast
number of British cruisers in West Indian waters.
This in turn taxed heavily the resources of the British
fleet and, owing to the unhealthiness of the station,
made frightful drains upon the supply of British sea-
men. Hence arose the question whether it might not
be more profitable by a supreme effort to extinguish
French power in the West Indies altogether. To deal
in the like peremptory fashion with the Spaniards was
out of the question ; but the expulsion of the French
would enormously increase, if it did not absolutely
ensure, security to windward ; while, even to leeward,
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 3
it would sensibly lighten the burdens of Jamaica if
all danger from St. Domingo were banished. The
captured islands would of course require garrisons ;
but, on the other hand, the force in the British islands
could be so much reduced as to meet this call
without material difficulty, while the strain upon the
Navy would be greatly relieved. The peril of an
insurrection of negroes would, however, still remain ;
and it was not likely that Napoleon's agents would
permit this menace to be removed, more especially if
exceptional mortality among the European troops
should offer a favourable opportunity for a rising.
The question was one over which Ministers might
reasonably hesitate for long ; but such a change in the
situation as the conversion of the Spaniards from enemies
into allies, would suffice to turn the scale in favour of
the more decisive policy. A brief account must there-
fore be given of the sudden transition whereby the
Caribbean seas, being converted into an English lake,
ceased until the close of the war to be a scene of active
operations.
To deal first with the leeward sphere, it may
be said that, after the departure of Villeneuve's fleet
with Nelson in pursuit, Jamaica had been little troubled
except by disease. But the mortality among the troops
had been very formidable, though due in great measure
to bad barracks and other preventible causes. The
Assembly of Jamaica was still violently at feud with
the British Government over the formation of West
India regiments, and, being now threatened with the
abolition of the slave-trade, took its revenge by
refusing to provide decent quarters for the British
regiments. These captious legislators were, unfortun-
ately, strengthened in their prejudices by a mutiny of
some recruits of the Second West India regiment, who m '
murdered two of their officers before they were dis-
armed. Though the remaining men of the battalion
continued loyal, the crime was drastically dealt with,
sixteen out of the twenty-eight culprits being con-
4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1808. demned to death, and seven actually executed. The
planters, however, were not conciliated by this severity ;
and the General in command complained that their
hostility made it very difficult to take care of the health
of his soldiers. Bad housing and salt food heightened
the men's craving for drink, and excessive indulgence
in rum reduced the troops practically to uselessness.
The Eighteenth Royal Irish, for instance, were hope-
lessly broken down by a march of thirteen miles along
an easy road ; and the General in command reported
that, in case of active service in the West Indies, three-
quarters of the rank and file would succumb at once.
The Assembly, however, recked little of such matters
in its insane prejudice against black soldiers. The
members carried their animosity so far that they
demanded the minutes of the court-martial on the
negro mutineers, and, when the General declined to
supply them, summoned him to their bar to answer
for breach of privilege. Fortunately the Governor
upheld the General in his refusal to take notice of this
impertinence.
Thanks, therefore, to the stubbornness of the Jamaican
magnates, the death-rate among the British troops was
terribly high ; though the military authorities, by
moving part of the garrison to the deserted Maroon
towns in the mountains, succeeded in saving some
hundreds of lives. Fortunately there was no danger
from a foreign enemy to be dreaded, and the British
Government was too wise to undertake any aggressive
operations against the Spanish possessions.1
One place only, the port of Baracoa, at the north-
east corner of Cuba, had been pointed out as desirable
of capture since it was a hotbed of privateers ; but the
Governor of Jamaica had forborne to waste men even
over this trifling object. Love of prize-money, how-
ever, induced a British naval officer to step in where
the commanders of the army had feared to tread. In
1 General Carmichael to Sec. of State, 15th Oct., 19th Nov.,.
20th Dec. 1 808.
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 5
the summer of 1807 Captain Tait of the King's store- 1807.
ship Chichester received orders to convey the Ninety-
ninth Foot from the Bahamas to Bermuda. Since the
regiment was scattered among various islands of the
group, it could not for some days be assembled for
embarkation ; and Tait therefore took the opportunity
to ship four officers and eighty-seven convalescent men
from the hospital at New Providence, ostensibly with
the object of restoring their health by a cruise. This
done, he asked permission of the Governor at Nassau
to attack Baracoa, and, being refused, joined company
with a privateer and sailed straight to the prohibited
port. Arrived there, he set his convalescents on land,
together with a few marines, directed the officers to
capture a battery which prevented the ships from
closing in with the shore, and stood out again to sea.
The unhappy detachment strove to obey his orders, but,
being met by a heavy fire from nine guns and from
ten times its number of infantry, was driven back to
the beach, where, as Tait had withdrawn all his boats,
it was compelled to surrender. After a month's con-
finement the unlucky men were exchanged ; but two
officers and eleven men had been killed and more than
twice as many wounded, simply to gratify the cupidity
of Captain Tait. The incident was so trifling that it
would be unworthy of mention, except to show how
evil was the influence upon the naval service of
Popham's raid upon Rio de la Plata.1
A year later Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the 1808.
Spanish insurrection altered the whole course of British
policy to leeward. The Governor of Jamaica was
directed, instead of molesting the Spanish colonies, to
spare no efforts to save them from falling into the
hands of France. So anxious was the British Govern-
ment for the security of Cuba, that in August 1 808 six
hundred 2 British soldiers were actually embarked to
1 General Coote to Sec. of State, nth, 13th Sept. 1807 ; 13th
Jan. 1808.
2 Flank cos. i/i8th, 54th, 55th, i/6oth, 6/6oth, 2nd W.I.R.
6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
j 809. reinforce the Spanish garrison, though, as they were not
needed, they never sailed for the island. But there was
none the less work for this force, for at the end of
1808 the Spaniards besieged the French in the town of
St. Domingo; and early in 1809 General Carmichael
offered to bring a British detachment to their assistance.
The Spaniards, whose operations were not prospering,
June 7. welcomed the proposal, and on the 7th of June Car-
michael sailed with nine hundred men, followed three
days later by a second division of over five hundred
June 28. more.1 On the 28th he disembarked his force at
Palanque, the nearest landing-place to St. Domingo, and
June 30. thirty miles distant from the city. On the 30th, going
on in advance of his own troops, he met the Spanish
General Sanchez Ramirez, who, being unfit for duty
from disease and excessive fatigue, placed his forces
under Carmichael's command. Carmichael at once
ordered a forward movement, hoping that the British
would arrive before St. Domingo on that night, when
he intended to carry the place by assault. Heavy rain
and the fatigue of dragging guns over bad roads, how-
ever, delayed the arrival of the detachment for twenty-
four hours ; though no sooner did it appear than the
French commandant proposed a conference to treat for
the evacuation of the city. Carmichael insisted upon
absolute surrender ; and after some demur his terms
were accepted. The garrison having defended itself
bravely for eight months, was allowed to march out
with the honours of war, and was then shipped off to
Aug. 29. France to be regularly exchanged. By the 29th of
August the last of Carmichael's men had returned to
Jamaica ; and therewith active operations to leeward
came to a close, not only for the year 1 809, but for the
rest of the war. It is somewhat singular that they
should have ended at the very place which Cromwell
1 1st division: R.A. 100, i/i8th, 100; 54th, 200; 55th,
100 ; 2nd W.I.R. 300 = 800 rank and file.
2nd division : 6/6oth, 200 ; 2nd W.I.R. 100 ; 7th W.I.R. 200
= 500 rank and file.
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 7
had selected over one hundred and sixty years before 1806.
as the object of the first organised colonial expedition of
the British army.1
To windward, alarms were more frequent owing to
the proximity of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Both
islands were supposed to be blockaded with more or
less strictness by the British squadron ; but none the less
French ships contrived constantly to throw petty rein-
forcements into them, evading the vigilance of the
British men-of-war both on the coast of France and in
the West Indies. The mortality among the British
troops, again, was not less great than in Jamaica, and
from precisely the same causes. In Barbados, for in-
stance, which required a garrison of from three to four
thousand men, the officers were housed in small wooden
sheds no better than negroes' huts, while the barracks
throughout the islands were commonly situated in
swamps. The result was that in 1805 two thousand
men of the windward garrisons perished. At the same
time the colonial assemblies were quite as hostile as their
brethren in Jamaica to West India regiments, and threw
every difficulty in the way of their maintenance. Nor
was the alarm of the planters wholly groundless, for
conspiracies of negroes, hatched by black troops, were
discovered within the space of a few months in 1805
and 1806 at Surinam, Trinidad, and Tobago, the in-
surgents going the length of poisoning the water-tank
in the fort at the island last named. 1806, indeed, was
a year of troubles, for, apart from mutinies and much
sickness, a French squadron under Admiral Guillaume
and Jerome Bonaparte made a raid upon St. Kitts,
which caused much alarm, though the attack was suc-
cessfully foiled by the garrison 2 of the renowned
fortress on Brimstone Hill. Lastly, there was a terrific
hurricane at Dominica, which tore the barracks to
pieces and carried the timbers a mile away. The
1 Carmichael to Sec. of State, 12th Aug. 1808 ; 23rd Feb., 4th
June, 8th July, 8th Sept. 1809.
2 It consisted of the nth and 70th Foot and R.A.
8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. casualties in the Forty-sixth and Third West India
Regiment, which composed the garrison, amounted to
ten killed and over one hundred more or less severely-
wounded by this storm ; and the officers' mess of the
Forty-sixth, which had lost all its plate and linen during
the French raid of 1805, for the second time within
twelve months was stripped of everything that it pos-
sessed. In the course of the hurricane, however,
occurred an incident which must not be omitted. When
the terror and the devastation were at their height, the
sentry who guarded the colours of the Forty-sixth
remained unmoved, and refused to quit his post.
Though repeatedly warned of his danger, he stood firm
until at last he fell, buried, together with his precious
charge, under the ruins of an adjoining house. When
the hurricane had passed away, he was dug out still
alive, and was able to hear before he expired that the
colours were safe. He had distinguished himself by
his bravery during the French attack of the previous
year, and had been severely wounded ; and it cannot
be too much regretted that the name of so noble a
soldier should have perished.1
1807. It was with such troubles that General Bowyer, the
Commander-in-Chief to windward, was wrestling, when
in October 1807 there came to him the news that
Denmark had declared war, together with the Secretary
of State's commands to prepare for an attack upon the
Danish islands. Bowyer duly obeyed, but pointed out
that he could not find garrisons for the captured posses-
sions unless he were reinforced. However, he embarked
nearly twenty-five hundred men 2 from the various
1 Gen. Beckwith to Sec. of State, 21st Sept. 1805 ; 2nd Jan.,
2nd Feb. 1806. Gen. Bowyer to Sec. of State, 29th April, 16th
May, 25th July, 13th, 31st Oct. 1806.
2 From Barbados : R.A. 144 ; 3/6oth, 650 ; detach*. 1st W.I.R.
422 ; Milit. Artificers (negro) 53.
From Dominica : detach*. 46th, 177 ; flank cos. 3rd W.I.R. 218.
From Antigua: flank cos. 3rd W.I.R. 218.
From Grenada : detach*. 15th, 324.
From St. Kitts : flank cos. 70th. Total, 245 I of all ranks.
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 9
British islands, and on receiving definite orders to make 1807.
his attack, coupled with a promise of a reinforcement of
three battalions, he sailed from Barbados, and on the
2 1st of December assembled his force off St. Thomas. Dec. 21.
That island, St. John and its dependencies surrendered
at once, and Ste. Croix four days later ; and thus three
more sugar islands were taken over to enrich the British
nation and deplete the British army.1
These acquisitions of course greatly weakened the 1808.
resources and increased the anxieties of the General,
the more so since he was instructed to keep only one,
or at most two, of the three battalions promised to him
under his own command. But his cup was not yet full.
The naval officers, who were blockading Guadeloupe,
declared that they could not fulfil their duty while
Mariegalante and Deseada remained in French hands to
shelter French privateers ; and on the 2nd and 30th of March.
March 1808 they surprised and captured first the one
and then the other of those islands. Admiral Cochrane
decided to hold Mariegralante for its convenience in
0
supplying the blockading squadron with wood, water,
and fresh beef, and announced his intention to occupy it
with three hundred marines. After a few days, however,
he found, as invariably happens, that it would be far
more convenient for the Army to furnish the garrison ;
and he made application to Bowyer and to Castlereagh
accordingly. "I want no Commissaries, Quarter-
masters, Barrack-masters, nor any of the long list of
army- garrisons," he wrote, "only three hundred
soldiers." Bowyer demurred strongly to the Admiral's
request, being hard pressed for men, and doubtful as
to the advantages of holding Mariegalante ; and he
declined to do more than supply one hundred and fifty
soldiers to serve on board the fleet. He went home in
June before the matter had been finally settled, but his
successor, General George Beckwith, a brother of the
more famous Sidney Beckwith of the Ninety-fifth,
1 Sec. of State to Bowyer, 7th Sept., 3rd Nov. ; Bowyer to Sec.
of State, 14th Oct., 8th Nov., 27th Dec. 1807.
io HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1808. strongly agreed with his opinion. " If the Governor of
Guadeloupe does not attack and overwhelm that garrison
of marines," he wrote, " he is no soldier."
By the middle of August many of the marines had
perished, and Beckwith imparted to the War Office his great
anxiety for the safety of the survivors. Even while he was
writing, a French force was on its way to Mariegalante
from Guadeloupe ; and a few days later came a note from
the Admiral to say that his garrison was in great danger
and to beg for reinforcements. Beckwith at once sent
three hundred men of the Third West India Regiment,
Aug. 29- which rescued the unfortunate marines, and took more
Sept. 3. than one hundred and seventy of the enemy prisoners ;
but it was only by the General's promptitude and with
the help of an exceptionally favourable wind that this
happy result was substituted for the capture of every
one of the Admiral's men. Cochrane thereupon in-
creased the garrison of Mariegalante, and called upon
Beckwith to furnish six hundred soldiers to eke out the
crews of the blockading ships. The General loyally
complied, but did not fail to add criticism to compliance.
" There is a thing," he wrote to the Secretary of State,
" called prize afloat : searching for it on shore tends to
a different signification, though both words begin with
a P. We cannot keep the seas without six hundred
soldiers in the fleet, such has been the mortality. If
seamen occupy islands, the Army must be turned into
seamen and marines, but I cannot do this for long."
For the painful truth must be told, that the naval
occupation of Mariegalante was chiefly a question of
prize-money. The Admiral treated the island not as a
possession of King George, but partly as a man-of-war
and partly as private property. A post-captain was
placed in command of it, a native force was raised
by enlisting two hundred runaway negroes from
Guadeloupe ; and the produce of the island was shipped
by the captors to North America, a commerce which
was strictly forbidden to all other British islands.
Beckwith avoided the very name of Mariegalante, so
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 1 1
far as was possible, dreading friction between Army and 1808
Navy, but found it hard to submit to the depletion of
his battalions in order that naval officers might make a
handsome profit by trade.1
The most serious part of the affair was that the
blockade of Martinique was relaxed rather than straitened
by the Admiral's operations ashore. Early in 1808 the
island had been in a state of famine, and an intercepted
letter from one of the inhabitants gave a despairing
account of its condition. Ministers were inspired by
this document with such hopes of Martinique's speedy
fall, that they directed three West India Regiments to
be concentrated at Barbados and held ready for service,
ordering the Admiral at the same time to enforce the
blockade with the utmost rigour. These instructions
came too late. Corvettes from France, heavily laden with
flour, had contrived during the summer to elude Coch-
rane's cruisers, while salt fish, an essential article of food
for negroes, had been smuggled in, according to the usual
practice of the British planters, from some of the British
islands. After receipt of the new orders as to the
blockade, the squadron for a short time evinced great
activity, and the price of flour in Martinique was doubled
during the month of November ; but in December more
ships from France with men, stores, and provisions arrived
safely both at Martinique and at Guadeloupe, increasing
the garrison of the former island from two to three
thousand men, and banishing for the present all anxiety
as to supplies. The truth was, as Beckwith reported,
that the British fleet was too defective both in numbers
and in energy to make the blockade efficient, and could
not, without seven or eight hundred troops on board,
even pretend a fitness either to close the French ports
or to meet an enemy at sea.2
1 Bowyer to Sec. of State, 21st March 1808 ; Beckwith to Sec.
of State, nth June, 22nd Aug., 28th Aug., 14th, 15th Sept. 1808,
30th May, 1 6th July 1809; Admiral Sir Alex. Cochrane to Sec.
of State, 6th April 1808.
2 Sec. of State to Beckwith, 20th, 31st Aug.; Beckwith to
Sec. of State, 4th, 18th Oct., 5th Nov. 1808; 3rd Jan. 1809.
12
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1808. In the circumstances Cochrane earnestly pressed
Beckwith to attack Martinique in force. A battalion
of the Thirteenth had arrived at Barbados from Bermuda
early in December ; and on the 29th of the same month
General Prevost and four battalions from Halifax, which
had been temporarily lent for purposes of the expedition,
also sailed into Carlisle Bay. Beckwith, at first, hesi-
tated to commit himself to so important an enterprise.
The enemy had been lately reinforced ; the attitude of
the United States was most unfriendly to Spain,1 and
the British had undertaken to protect the Spanish colonies
against aggression. However, after consulting General
Prevost, he yielded, and, having organised ten thousand
1809. men into two divisions under that officer and General
Jan. 28. Maitland, he sailed with them on the 28th of January
1809 for Martinique.2
1 The officer commanding in Mexico in April 1809 actually-
requested arms from the Governor of Jamaica for defence of the
country against American aggression. Duke of Manchester to Sec.
of State, 2 1st May 1809.
- Beckwith to Sec. of State, 3rd, 4th, 28th Jan., 8th March
1809. The force was organised as follows : —
First Division. Prevost. 7071 of all ranks.
1st Brigade. Brig. Hoghton.
7th 981
23rd ..... 979
1st W.I.R 450
R.A. and Artificers ... 60
2470
2nd Brigade. Brig. Colville.
8th
• • 998
13th
833
1st W.I.R.
347
R.A.
43
2221
Reserve. Brig. Nicholson.
Flank cos. 25th
140
3 and 4/6oth .
700
4th W.I.R. .
850
Light Inf. Batt.
55o
2 brigades R.A.
140
2380
ch.xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 13
Beckwith's plan of campaign was nearly akin to 1809.
that of Grey in 1794, his principal object being first to
force an entrance into Fort Royal Bay, for the security
of the fleet, and, secondly, to seize the position of Morne
Bruneau to north of Fort Royal. Accordingly, on the
morning of the 30th Maitland disembarked at St. Luce, Jan. 30.
detaching the York Rangers to land at Anse d'Arlet,
take the battery at Cap Salomon in rear and seize the
heights which commanded Pigeon Island. Meeting
with no resistance at St. Luce, Maitland pushed rapidly
forward, reached Riviere Salee on the 31st, and after a Jan. 31.
day's halt for supplies, marched on to Lamentin on the
2nd of February. His advance was entirely unopposed, Feb. 2.
though a numerous militia was afoot ; but by the speed
of his movements he was able to intercept the main
body of these near Lamentin, when they readily sub-
mitted and agreed to return to their homes. Another
march brought him on the 3rd within gunshot of the Feb. 3.
principal fort, the name of which had been changed by
Napoleon from Fort Bourbon to Fort Desaix ; and
there he took up a position to cover the landing-place
of Cohe du Lamentin. Meanwhile the York Rangers
Second Division.
Maitland. 3710 of all ranks.
3rd Brigade.
Lt.-Col. Barnes (46th).
63rd
R. York Rangers
600
750
135°
\th Brigade.
Lt.-Col. Riall (15th).
Flank cos. 15th and 46th
Batt. cos. 1 5th
York L.I. Volunteers
3 cos. 8th W.I.R. .
Lt.-Col. McNair (90th).
230
190
35°
35°
1 120
$tk Brigade.
90th ....
3rd W.I.R. .
I brigade R.A.
460
700
80
1240
i4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. under Major Henderson had captured the battery at Cap
Salomon, and seized the heights above Pigeon Island
without molestation. Heavy guns were then landed in
an adjacent bay, and, by the time that the blue-jackets
of the Pompee with great labour had brought them up
to the heights, the engineers had constructed a battery
ready to receive them. On the 3rd this battery opened
Feb. 4. fire, and on the morning of the 4th Pigeon Island
surrendered, leaving the mouth of Fort Royal Bay clear
for the fleet.
Jan. 30. Meanwhile Prevost' s division, accompanied by Beck-
with in person and escorted by a detachment of the
fleet, had landed unopposed at Bay Robert, the inlet
next to southward of the Bay of Galion, on the wind-
ward coast. Starting late on the afternoon of the 30th,
and making a night march of seven miles southward
through most difficult country, the First Brigade arrived
Jan. 31. at Lezarde River before dawn of the 31st. Continuing
the advance with the Seventh and one company of
black troops only, Prevost found the enemy everywhere
Feb. 1. falling back before him, and on the 1st occupied Morne
Bruneau. Here he was joined by Hoghton with the
remainder of the brigade and the Light Infantry
Battalion from the Reserve, when a considerable force
of French regular troops with one or two guns was
seen strongly posted on the declivity of an adjacent hill,
in a good position covered by a river. Though his
guns had not yet come up, Prevost, after a short
reconnaissance, ordered Hoghton to attack. Detaching,
therefore, the flank companies of the Seventh and the
rifle company of the Twenty - third under Colonel
Pakenham to turn the enemy's right, and the Light
Infantry Battalion to do the same on their left, Hoghton
led the rest of the Seventh and one company of the
First West India against their front, and soon drove
them back with heavy loss. Pakenham then directed
his three companies, supported by the Twenty-third,
southward to the heights of Sourier, to which the French
had brought forward troops from the fort, and where
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
*5
they stood on advantageous ground with a few field- 1809.
guns. The enemy repelled more than one attack, but
were finally driven back to their entrenched camp ; and
Prevost, though still without a gun, boldly held the
captured position within three hundred yards of" the
enemy's cannon. The action had cost him just under
two hundred and fifty men killed, wounded, and
missing.1
On the following day Beckwith extended his position Feb. 2.
towards the west, and made an effort to carry the
advanced redoubt of the entrenched camp by assault.
He was met by a sharp resistance, and after losing
nearly two hundred men,2 abandoned the attack as
likely to prove too costly. The enemy, however,
deserted the redoubt, together with a work adjacent to
it, during the night, and Beckwith occupied both on
the night of the 5th. On the 5th likewise Maitland Feb. 5.
led his division round the north of the town by Morne
Bruneau to Negro Point, completing the investment of
Fort Royal from the western side. A few days later
a detachment of the Sixty-third under Colonel Barnes
sailed under convoy of the King's ships Pelorus and
Cherub up the leeward coast to Carbet, where the troops
landed, and, marching upon St. Pierre, received the
surrender of that town without firing a shot. Nothing
then remained but to raise batteries against Fort Desaix,
1
Regiment.
i/7th
i/23rd
Gren. co. ist W.I.R.
L.I. Batt.
2 Regiment.
Casualties, 2nd Feb. 1809
i/7th
i/8th
i/23rd
Gren. co. ist W.I.R.
Light Batt.
Totals
Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
i off. 9
men
59 men
4 men
15
V
81 „
5 v
1
5)
J9 >.
1 officer
1 1
»
f 33 »
\ 2 off.
3 men
Killed
Wounded.
Missing.
21
»
; 3 off-
\ 60 men
3 men
I off. 4
95
13 „
0 „
4
»
2 1 V
1 „
1
1 off. 15
0 „
/38 „
( 2 off.
0 „
0 ,,
2 off. 45
men
5 off. 131 men
4 men
1 6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. against which fire was opened from forty-two British
Feb. 19. mortars and cannon on the morning of the 19th. The
bombardment was continued without intermission until
Feb. 23. noon of the 23rd, when the French commandant sent out
a trumpet to propose terms. These being inadmissible
were rejected ; and the batteries continued their fire
Feb. 24. until in the morning of the 24th the white flag was
hoisted. It was then agreed that the garrison should
be embarked to Quiberon Bay as prisoners of war and
there exchanged ; but this arrangement was upset by
Napoleon, who, as was his practice, declined to release
any of his British captives ; and the unfortunate
troops, one hundred and fifty-five officers and over two
thousand men, were shipped to England. Over five
hundred more, being in hospital from wounds and sick-
ness, were unable to sail. Admiral Villaret Joyeuse,
the Governor, from the esteem in which he was held,
was allowed, together with his aide-de-camps, to depart
in peace.
The casualties of the British, including those of the
seamen, during the whole of the operations amounted
to something over five hundred and fifty of all ranks,
killed, wounded, and missing.1 The seamen, as usual,
rendered very conspicuous service in the arduous work
of dragging the heavy guns into position, and evidently
rejoiced in the change from the weary task of blockad-
ing. Their casualties did not exceed forty ; and the
heaviest of the fighting fell upon the Seventh, the
Twenty-third, and the Light Infantry Battalion, which
last appears to have been composed chiefly, if not entirely,
1 Casualties : —
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Navy . . 7 N.C.O.andmen 4 off. 19 N. CO. and men
Army 3 off. 116 „ „ 14 „ 393 „ „ 3 men.
Total 3 off. 123 „ „ 18 ,,412 „ „ 3 men.
Details of chief regimental casualties : —
7th . . 30N. CO. and men killed 3 ofF.and 143 men wounded.
23r<i • • 20 „ „ „ 2 „ 100 „
L.I.Batt.ioff.27 „ „ „ 6 „ 85 „
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 17
of black troops. The operations seem to have been 1809.
extremely well managed in every respect, for the deaths
from sickness did not exceed thirty-two, nor were there
at any time, apart from the wounded, many more than
four hundred men in hospital. Yet the marches at the
outset were extremely severe, and the troops were
exposed to great fatigue and hardship from incessant
rain. Beckwith indeed pointed with pride to the fact
that he could send back Prevost's division to Nova
Scotia with the smallest loss ever known upon such
service, sixty - one having been killed or died of
wounds, and twenty - five only having succumbed to
sickness.1
The departure of this division on the 9th of March March 9.
was, however, a heavy blow to the General, for the
operations were hardly concluded before the Admiral
again called upon him for soldiers to man the fleet.
This was especially hard upon Beckwith, since he could
not for the present leave Martinique with a smaller
garrison than three thousand men. A month later, at
the beginning of April, there came a new complication. April.
A French squadron of three line-of-battle ships and two
frigates arrived in the West Indies from L'Orient, and
took refuge in the islands called the Saints, where they
were promptly blockaded by Cochrane. Beckwith no
sooner learned of this than he sent a detachment of
twenty-eight hundred men 2 with ten pieces of artillery
under General Maitland to reduce the islands, and so to
ensure the capture of the squadron. Maitland sailed
from Martinique on the 12th of April, and, after a day April 12.
spent in reconnaissance, landed on the morning of the
14th upon an open beach on the leeward side of Terre
en Haut, the most easterly of the group, unmolested
except by a distant cannonade from the neighbour-
1 Beckwith to Sec. of State, ist, 5th, 10th, 1 5th, 28th Feb. 1809.
2 Detachment of R.A. Flank cos. R. York Rangers.
„ 15th. R. York Volunteers.
3/6oth. 3rd W.I.R.
Flank cos. 4/6oth. Detachment, 8th W.I.R.
VOL. VII C
1 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. ing island of Cabrit. The enemy was found to be
occupying the highest point of the island, a hill named
Mont Russel, one thousand feet above him ; the ascent
being at an angle of fifty degrees and the ground covered
with scrub and prickly pear. Maitland at once attacked
this body with two companies * of the Sixtieth, which
drove it off with great gallantry, inflicting heavy
loss. From the summit thus gained Maitland obtained
a sight of the enemy's camp, of the three forts on the
island, and of the enemy's fleet, but was prevented from
advancing further by the cannon of Cabrit on his left
flank. He therefore landed two heavy howitzers, and
by the indefatigable work of his gunners was able to
construct a battery and open fire upon the ships at six
o'clock on the same evening. Within an hour the
French squadron got under way, and Maitland at once
communicated the fact to the Admiral by signal, who
lost no time in giving chase.
April 15. Maitland then re-embarked the greater number of
his troops, leaving a detachment to dislodge the enemy
from a position near which he intended to land. This
was soon done ; the force on the ships was again set
on shore, and the construction of a mortar battery
was begun at a point which commanded at once
Fort Napoleon, above the principal anchorage, and
the fort on the island of Cabrit. Midway between
Fort Napoleon, and Fort Morel, at the northern point
of Terre en Haut, was a central ridge above the chief-
town, which was held by the enemy. After surprising
and destroying a French picquet of thirty men upon
this ridge on the night of the 15th, Maitland on the
April 16. night of the 16th occupied the position with three
companies of blacks. The French poured out of the
1 Maitland in his report says the rifle companies, from which
the inference would be that the entire regiment was not armed
with rifles ; but against this is the fact that Beckwith in a General
Order of 14th May 1809 directed the Fourth Battalion to apply for
new rifles of proper length and calibre, similar to those in the
hands of the Third Battalion. Two companies, however, only
were engaged, one of each battalion present.
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 19
forts and attacked this detachment at eight o'clock on 1809.
the morning of the 17th ; but the negroes,1 though under April 17.
fire of grape from two forts and of round shot from a
third, held their own most gallantly, and repulsed the
enemy with loss. About noon the French commandant
sent in a flag of truce ; and after a short negotiation the
garrison of the Saints, numbering from seven to eight
hundred men, surrendered as prisoners of war. It may
seem strange that so considerable a force should have
made so weak a resistance ; but the mystery is explained
by the fact that six hundred of them were recruits
sent out from France to reinforce Guadeloupe, and
only just landed from the ships of war. Almost certainly
they were refractory conscripts who had tried to evade
service, and on that account had been sent out to serve
in the West Indies. Small effort could be expected
from these wretched homesick lads, and we learn
without surprise that they made a poor figure in the
field.2
This little enterprise, so brilliantly conducted, cost
the British no more than six of all ranks killed and
seven wounded ; but it is significant of the dangers of
the work that, of the two officers who fell, one met his
death by falling from a precipice. Within a week of
his departure for the Saints, Maitland had returned to
Martinique, and Beckwith then bent his thoughts at
once to Guadeloupe. The Governor, M. Ernouf, was
arming and organising the negroes for its defence, and
therefore it could not be attacked too soon. Moreover,
the island was a centre for depredations against British
commerce ; and the Navy had shown itself impotent
to blockade it effectively, whether to prevent ships
from putting to sea or to exclude reinforcements from
France. It was the end of September before Beckwith Sept.
received the Secretary of State's sanction for the enter-
prise, and then only conditionally if it promised to
1 2 cos. 3rd W.I.R., 1 co. 8th W.I.R.
2 Maitland to Beckwith, 18th April, in Beckwith to Sec. of
State, 20th April 1809.
20 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. be easy of accomplishment. Meanwhile the sickly
season had been very fatal. Between the 1st of January
and the 1st of November 1809, close upon seventeen
hundred men had died, while desertion and discharge
of invalids increased the casualties to over two thousand ;
and, since only sixteen hundred men had arrived to
make good these losses, the force in the West Indies
had been seriously diminished. Moreover, Beckwith
reckoned that, for the safety of British commerce,
St. Eustatius and St. Martins must also be taken and
occupied ; to accomplish which he considered that he
would require a reinforcement of at least two thousand
men.1
Late in December the second battalion of the
Sixtieth returned to Barbados from England ; and,
IgIO-after waiting yet a few weeks for a draft of artillery-
Jan. 22. men, Beckwith on the 22nd of January 18 10 sailed
for Guadeloupe with something over seven thousand
men. The force was organised into two divisions,
under Generals Hislop and Harcourt, and a Reserve,
each of the two divisions comprehending two brigades,
and the Reserve one.2 After two days' detention at
1 Beckwith to Sec. of State, 28th June, 30th Sept., 22nd Oct.,
1 6th, 26th Dec. 1809. Sec. of State to Beckwith, 12th Aug.,
2nd Nov. 1809.
2 First Division. Maj.-Gen. Hislop.
ird Brigade : Brig.-Gen. Maclean. 2nd Batt. L.I. 500.
(Light cos. of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th W.I.R.) :
90th,* 500 ; 8th W.I.R., 500.*
\th Brigade: Brig.-Gen. Skinner. Det. 13th and 63rd,,
600 ; York L.I. Vols. 200 ; 4th W.I.R.
Second Division. Maj.-Gen. Harccurt.
1st Brigade : Brig. Gen. Harcourt. 1st L.I. Batt., 500 ;
15th, 300.* Batt. cos. 3rd W.I.R., 400.
2nd Brigade : Brig.-Gen. Barrow. Grenadiers, 300 ; 25th,
600 ;* 6th W.I.R., 350.*
Reserve : Brig.-Gen. Wale. 5th Brigade. Grenadiers, 300 ;
Royal York Rangers, 900 ; Royal Artillery, 300.
The corps marked thus (*) kept their flank companies with
them. The two battalions of Grenadiers and Light Infantry were
therefore probably made up from corps not otherwise represented
in the force.
ch.xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 21
Rupert's Bay in Dominica, because some of the trans- 1810.
ports had fallen to leeward, the First Division and
Reserve sailed on the afternoon of the 26th, anchored [an. 26.
on the next day at Islet du Gosier, off the south coast
of Grande Terre, and on the 28th made their way in Jan. 28.
flat boats and small craft south-westward across the
bay to Port Sainte Marie, where they landed unopposed.
On the same day the Third Brigade advanced south-
ward along the coast as far as Capesterre, with the
Fourth Brigade a little in rear of it ; and on the 30th Jan. 30.
the entire division reached Trois Rivieres, practically
unmolested. The enemy had prepared fortified positions
on the heights of Dole immediately to westward of
Trois Rivieres ; but these, together with the guns in
them, were abandoned upon the approach of the British
Light troops ; and the First Division was left untroubled
while it halted for two days to obtain supplies from the
fleet.
Meanwhile on the 29th the Second Division had Jan. 29.
sailed from the Saints and made a demonstration before
Trois Rivieres ; but in the night it passed on, rounded
the most southerly point of Guadeloupe, and anchored
off the village of Vieux Habitants. On the following Jan. 30.
morning the force landed unopposed ; and Harcourt,
atter moving a short distance down the coast to south-
ward, marched inland in two columns by two parallel
roads, which seemed to lead towards an entrenched
position upon the heights of Bellair, among the
mountains about three miles from the coast. The left
or more northerly of these columns became engaged with
the enemy's light troops above Vieux Habitants, and
after a sharp skirmish drove them back ; but no further
progress could be made on that day. The right-hand
column was obliged to return, finding that the road
which it had taken ran for little more than a mile and
a half, and to join the left-hand column on the road by
the coast. The entire division therefore bivouacked
together for the night, and on the following day Har- Jan. 31.
court succeeded in bringing it up, by a road still farther
22 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xrn
1 8 io. to the south, to a ridge parallel to Bellair and about
twelve hundred yards from it. From this point he
attempted to turn the position by the north, but found
the deep ravines and the extreme ruggedness of the
country insurmountable obstacles, and in the end was
fain to halt and send for his artillery.
The enemy's design now became manifest. Pos-
session of Guadeloupe turned mainly upon the possession
of the town of Basseterre and of the fort, known to us
in 1794 as Fort Matilda, which adjoined it. The
French commander, General Ernouf, having few troops
to his hand except militia and other raw levies, had
established them in two strong positions in the mountains
to north-east and north-west of the town, threatening
the flank of each British division, and compelling the
attacking force to turn aside and deal with him in the
mountains before they dared to approach Basseterre.
Beckwith's plan, on the other hand, was first to seal up
all egress to westward from the main stronghold at
Bellair by means of Harcourt's column, to drive Ernouf 's
eastern division into Bellair itself and, thus holding
the entire French force cooped up against the impassable
mountains on the north, either to carry their position
by storm or to force them to surrender.
To return now to Beckwith's column at Trois
Jan. 30. Rivieres, the General's first care on the 30th was to
drive the enemy from the batteries on the coast, and
thus enable the fleet to anchor in Anse des Trois Rivieres ;
his next to reconnoitre in force the ridge of Petrizel,
strongly fortified with redoubts and entrenchments,
which barred his further advance to westward. The
enemy thereupon opened a terrific fire, which caused
only two casualties among the British but apparently
brought about a panic among themselves, for on the
Jan. 31. following morning the entire ridge was found to be
deserted. There remained, however, yet another fortified
position, that of Palmiste, a little farther to the west-
ward, covering the only practicable passage over the
Feb. 2. river Galion. After a day's halt to obtain supplies from
ch. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
23
the fleet, Beckwith advanced upon this place in two 1810.
columns, the right column moving directly upon it, the
left column, led by Beckwith himself, marching farther
to the south over very high ground through the defile
of Walkannar, to turn the enemy by their right. The
movement was conducted with admirable precision.
The French gave way with little resistance ; and on the
following day Beckwith crossed the Galion, and posted Feb. 3.
his troops astride of all the roads leading northward
from Basseterre, so as to sever completelv Ernouf's
communications with the town.
This movement brought his division on to the
ridge immediately opposite to Ernouf's main position
on the eastern side ; and meanwhile Harcourt with the
Second Division had moved a little southward to the
ridge of Beaupaire, between the villages of Beaupaire
and St. Louis. With the assistance of the Navy he had
brought up two six-pounders, two howitzers and two
mortars with which he opened fire on the 3rd. The Feb. 3.
enemy attempted a sortie against him, which was re-
pulsed with loss ; but Harcourt, in obedience to Beck-
with's orders, forbore for the moment to assault until
his chief should have made the attempt from the
eastern side. Here the French position was covered by
a river called the Riviere Noire, an obstacle which had
been so carefully fortified by Ernouf that Beckwith,
doubting the success of a general assault, ordered
Colonel Wale to march with the Reserve far into the
mountains during the night, and to turn it by the
north.
Wale accordingly moved off", but presently met a
guide, who promised to lead his brigade across the river
at a much nearer point, stipulating only that the march
should be made by day owing to the difficulty of the
road. The Colonel therefore decided upon a direct
attack, and at four in the evening of the 3rd led the
York Rangers upon the appointed crossing - place,
leaving the rest of the brigade to make a demonstration
near the only bridge, that of Noziere, over the river.
24 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. The guide conducted him faithfully; but the passage of
Feb. 4. the stream required to be forced in the face of abatis
lined with troops, and of obstacles of every description.
His soldiers, however, soon accomplished this, and,
after a blind scramble through rocks and bushes, the
three leading companies of the Royal York Rangers
pushed forward in three columns, reserving their fire,
while the remainder of the battalion followed them more
slowly, directing their volleys upon the flanks of the
enemy. Near the summit of the hill the ascent became
more difficult, and a weak battalion of steady French
troops opened a most destructive fusillade from behind
abatis and stockaded redoubts ; but the three gallant
companies held their fire until within twenty - five
yards of the defenders, when after one volley they
charged with the bayonet and in a few minutes routed
the French completely.
This little action lasted for an hour and a half, and
cost the York Rangers nine officers and one hundred
and five men killed and wounded. Wale himself was
disabled by a bullet ; Major Henderson, who com-
manded the Rangers, and his two senior captains were
also struck down. The effect of the attack was, how-
ever, immediate. The French commandant, seeing his
flank turned, hoisted the white flag ; nor was he
without justification, for, though he had begun the
campaign with over three thousand men, chiefly
colonial troops, these had dwindled continually until
few were left to him except his single regiment of the
Line. Nevertheless it is remarkable that the First
Division and Reserve of the British conducted the
whole of their operations without a single gun, and that
the Second Division never fired a cannon-shot until the
day before the capitulation of the French.1 Altogether
the campaign was creditable to Beckwith and to
the troops. The casualties did not exceed fifty-two
killed and two hundred and fifty wounded, but such
1 Beckwith to Sec. of State, 9th Feb. 18 10, enclosing the
reports of the divisional generals.
ch.xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 25
operations in so rugged a country are necessarily most [810.
arduous.
Guadeloupe having been subdued, Beckwith without
delay sent General Harcourt with a small force 1 to
capture St. Martins and St. Eustatius. The former
island being shared by the French and Dutch, Harcourt
had to deal with two distinct garrisons, the one of
twenty-one and the other of eighty-eight men, both of
which at once surrendered to overwhelming force on
the 14th and 15th of February. St. Eustatius with apcb. 14, 15.
Dutch garrison of fifty-six men also yielded without
resistance on the 21st ; and the power of France in the Feb. 21.
West Indies was thus practically extinguished. On the
other hand, there were now no fewer than seventeen
different stations to be held by British garrisons ; ex-
clusive of the Saints and Mariegalante, both of which
the Admiral treated as an appanage of the Navy,
appointing Governors, raising taxes, and establishing
custom -dues with the freedom of an independent
sovereign. It is true that there could now be little fear
of a French attack upon any of the islands, from want
of a base of operations in the Archipelago ; but the
internal condition of the Antilles was by no means
satisfactory. The negroes, as we have seen, were still
restless, having not yet forgotten the insurrection ot
1795, and the revolutionary element was by no means
extinct in the French possessions. Guadeloupe in
particular was the refuge of the dregs of the West Indian
population, attracted thither from all parts by the
prospect of privateering. The French Governor had
only kept these vagabonds in order by the greatest
seventy, and they were now the more desperate from
nakedness and starvation. Moreover, dangerous
elements were not wanting in Beckwith's own regiments.
Out of a total of twenty battalions, ten only, many of
them miserably weak, were genuinely British. Of the
remaining ten, five were West India Regiments, among
1 9 cos. 25th ; 1 co. 4th W.I.R. ; dct. of R.A. with two 8-inch
howitzers.
26 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. which there had lately been many cases of mutiny ; two
belonged to the Sixtieth, and were composed very
largely of aliens; and the remaining three were
nondescripts, also containing a large proportion of
foreigners. Of these last the York Rangers were a
loyal and gallant body of men ; the York Light
Infantry Volunteers were made up chiefly of Dutchmen ;
and the West India Rangers were full of convicts, French
deserters, and French prisoners, who deserted so rapidly
that the corps was in daily danger of dissolution, and
at best was a source of as much anxiety as safety.
In the circumstances Beckwith pressed strongly for
two good British battalions, but was answered that the
calls for troops in Spain and the Mediterranean, added
to the unfortunate prevalence of Walcheren fever at
home, prevented the despatch of reinforcements to the
West Indies. "This is a perpetual Walcheren,"
answered Beckwith with much truth and force. " Our
annual loss may be taken at two thousand dead and
invalided." The argument was shrewd; but circum-
stances, which shall presently be narrated, prevented it
from carrying any weight ; and since affairs in the
West Indies have been anticipated so far, it may be
said once for all that Beckwith's British battalions were
allowed to dwindle steadily to the close of the war,
until at length he was left practically with little except
African negroes and foreigners, of which last an ever-
increasing proportion were French prisoners. French
intrigues found one centre in the Swedish island of St.
Bartholomew, and a second in the United States, from
which agents were dispersed all over the Archipelago.
There were disturbances in Martinique in 181 1, which
were rightly put down with extreme severity, and there
was a mutiny in a company of the Sixtieth at Tobago,
which, had it occurred at some place nearer the French
islands, might have led to incalculable mischief. Never-
theless, thanks in part to Beckwith's vigilance, but also
in great measure to good fortune, no serious harm
came of the Government's very questionable policy ;
ch.xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 27
though it must be remembered that, only by taking this 18 10.
tremendous risk, were Ministers able to prosecute serious
operations in Europe.1 Here, then, we take leave of
military affairs in the Carribean Sea until the year of
Waterloo.
1 Beckwith to Sec. of State, 24th, 25th Feb., 19th June 18 10 ;
4th Oct., 13th Nov. 181 1 ; 5th Nov. 18 1 2.
CHAPTER XXV
1809. To return now to England, the news of the battle of
Corufia came at a trying moment to a much harassed
Ministry. The agitation over the Convention of Cintra
had not yet subsided, and the vote of thanks to Sir
Arthur Wellesley was likely to be made an occasion for
unpleasantness on the part of the Opposition. Worse
than this, a great scandal was abroad concerning the
Duke of York's conduct as Commander-in-Chief.
Lastly, provision was needed for recruiting the Army
for another year, and, when this was done, there would
remain the difficult and delicate task of choosing for it
a fitting sphere for operations. For it must not be
forgotten that the first venture of the British in Spain
had closed in gloom, if not in disaster. To us who
know that by the opening of 1809 the Spanish ulcer,
which was destined to eat away Napoleon's power, had
fastened upon him beyond hope of eradication, Sir
John Moore's campaign seems but the prologue to the
greater drama of the five following years. The episode
wore no such comfortable appearance to our forefathers.
The curtain had fallen upon a scene of victory indeed,
but also of horror and distress. The Gazette might
proclaim loudly the success of the battle of Corufia,
but the text had its grim commentary in the twenty-six
thousand ragged, filthy, and exhausted soldiers who had
come home with the despatch. As to the Spanish
armies, the fair hopes raised by Baylen had been
shattered by defeat upon defeat. It was small wonder
28
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 29
that many in England conceived the play in Spain to be
played out.
Parliament met on the 19th of January, and within 1809.
less than a week Castlereagh's troubles began. On the
25th he rose to move the erection of a monument to Jan. 25
Moore in St. Paul's Cathedral. He admitted that the
expedition entrusted to Sir John had failed of its
ultimate object, but he declared emphatically that no
blame for the failure was attributable to the General,
and he claimed that the operations of the British Armv
had effected a complete diversion in favour of the
Spaniards. A roar of derisive cheers from the Opposi-
tion greeted Castlereagh's brave and chivalrous assump-
tion of all responsibility for the miscarriage of the
campaign, for an officious section of the press had
already endeavoured to shield the Government by
casting all blame upon Moore. The Minister retorted
with dignified contempt that he could defend the
Government as well as the General upon a fitting
occasion, but that at least he would not be guilty of
the indecency of fighting a party battle over a brave
soldier's grave. Lord Henry Petty, later Lord Lans-
downe, a prominent member of the Opposition, then
seconded the motion with due acknowledgment of
Castlereagh's championship of Moore, and the vote
was carried without a dissentient voice. When, how-
ever, immediately afterwards Castlereagh moved a vote
of thanks to Sir Arthur Wellesley for Vimeiro, there
was more than one carping spirit who took exception
to the proposal ; for Moore had been a Whig, whereas
Wellesley was actually a member of the Government.
Nevertheless, when the motion came to a division, its
opponents reduced themselves to a minority of one.
Two days later Colonel Wardle, late of the Fencible Jan. 27
Cavalry, brought forward in the Commons a series of
charges against the Duke of York for corrupt employ-
ment of his patronage in the grant of military appoint-
ments, commissions, and promotion. It was resolved
that the matter should be investigated by a committee
30 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. of the whole House. The inquiry began almost im-
Feb. 1. mediately, and was pursued for three weeks in the
discursive and casual fashion that was to be expected
from such a tribunal. The true story was simple and
unsavoury. For some years the Duke of York had
been intimate with a courtesan who bore the name of
Mrs. Mary Ann Clarke, until at length, in 1802, he
set her up as his kept mistress in a distinct establish-
ment, with an income of .£1000 a year. The woman
possessed, besides beauty and charm, no small share
of cleverness, great self-possession, and much readi-
ness of resource. Unfortunately she was also an
unmitigated rogue. Her extravagance was unspeak-
able. The Duke paid over ^16,000 for her in three
years ; but since she was, even so, in constant pecuniary
difficulties, she endeavoured to extricate herself by
trading upon his name, by swindling the unhappy
shop-keepers who had trusted her, and lastly, by
accepting bribes to use her influence with the Duke in
the distribution of military patronage. Becoming aware
in 1 805 of her malpractices towards her tradesmen, the
Duke resolved to cast her off, giving, however, a verbal
promise to pay her a pension of £400 a year, provided
that she conducted herself properly. The separation
finally took place in 1806 ; but after little more than a
year the pension was, with abundant reason, withdrawn.
Hard pressed by her creditors, and raging with anger,
the woman, in June 1808, wrote to let the Duke know
that, unless the arrears of her pension were paid, she
would publish all his letters and everything that had
come to her knowledge during her intimacy with him.
This was blackmail pure and simple, and the Duke
had the courage to defy it. Mrs. Clarke was as good
as her word. She found a willing instrument in Wardle,
who was the latest of her protectors ; and some evidence
exists that there was a regular band of conspirators, all
of whom hoped to make money out of her proceedings.
It was proved without difficulty that Mrs. Clarke had
received hundreds of letters and not a few bribes from
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 31
various individuals to induce her to forward their 1809.
interests, not only in the Army but in all branches of
the public service, through her influence with the Duke.
The woman was far too vain and far too shameless to
deny the fact ; but she wished the House to believe
that the Duke was aware that she took bribes, and
herein she failed utterly. It was shown that the Duke
from the first had fought manfully against all traffic in
commissions, and that Mrs. Clarke was always nervous
lest any report of her doings should come to his ears.
Moreover, the only proof of the Duke's privity to her
corrupt practices lay in a note which he declared to be
forged ; and it was shown that Mrs. Clarke, among
her various accomplishments, possessed that of imitat-
ing the Duke's hand-writing. The House, therefore,
by an overwhelming majority acquitted the Duke of
the abuses imputed to him ; and no one, I think, can
read the evidence without concluding that this was a
just verdict. The Duke, however, resigned the Com-
mandership-in-Chief immediately, which was the only March 17.
thing that he could do, but which none the less was
nothing short of a national disaster. Wardle and
Mrs. Clarke quarrelled before the year was out and
went to law ; but not all the sneers, and they were
many and bitter, over the collapse of the conspirators
could replace at the Horse Guards the best Commander-
in-Chief that has ever ruled the army.
Here, therefore, was one great blow to Castlereagh,
though incidentally the inquiry was not wholly of ill-
service to the Government. The petty sordid details
of the scandal — such is human nature — excluded all
other considerations from the minds of the Commons,
the press, and the public ; and there were many grave
questions of foreign and military policy, besides one
important military enactment, which pressed for the
immediate attention of the Ministry. For the British
was not the only Government which was beset with
difficulties at the opening of the year 1809. Napoleon
upon leaving Valladolid had journeyed night and day
32 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. with extraordinary speed to Paris, to find upon his
arrival that his enemies were conspiring against him on
every side ; Fouche and Talleyrand in his household,
the Royalists in La Vendee, Stein in Germany, and
above all, Metternich in Austria. The last-named had
realised early how serious were Napoleon's entangle-
1808. ments in Spain, and in October 1808 had sent a secret
°ct- note to London, warning England against the delusive
offers of peace forwarded by Napoleon and Alexander
from Erfurth. The note further stated that the
Austrian Government, feeling war to be inevitable,
would seize the first opportunity of beginning it, but
must await distinct provocation from France, in order
not so much to justify its action in the eyes of Europe
as to rouse the subjects of the Emperor Francis to
enthusiasm. Austria counted herself already sure of
the co-operation of the Porte, and reckoned that she
could put four hundred thousand men into the field
if assisted by England with money. She demanded,
therefore, a subsidy of five million a year for her four
hundred thousand men, besides half of that sum paid
down for purposes of equipment, part of which should
be immediately deposited at Malta in specie.1
Dec. 24. The British Ministers delayed all answer until the
24th December, when they cordially welcomed the
overture, but declared the amount of the subsidy to be
too great, especially in view of the quantity of specie
already despatched to Spain. They pointed out further
that the British military operations in the Peninsula
were in themselves of decided assistance to Austria,
and that it was impossible to submit a vote for a subsidy
to Parliament until war had actually broken out. How-
ever, they showed their sense of the importance of an
understanding with Austria by sending full powers to
Mr. Adair at Constantinople, so that negotiations might
be commenced without attracting the attention of
France.
1 Note of nth Oct., enclosed in instructions to Bathurst,
1 6th Feb. 1809.
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 33
Thus it was practically certain that at least one 1809.
power besides England would take advantage of
Napoleon's entanglements in Spain to strike at him.
It, therefore, behoved Castlereagh to take stock of the
British Army, of its strength and distribution, of the
resources for supporting and increasing it, and of the
duties and enterprises already committed to it; and, lastly,
to choose for it an effective field of operations. The
Army at the end of January 1809 numbered, as nearly
as can be calculated, about two hundred thousand effec-
tive rank and file, of whom at the moment rather more
than one half were abroad, and rather fewer than one half
at home. Of those abroad, the East Indies and Ceylon
claimed about twenty-five thousand, the West Indies
about twenty-one thousand, the Mediterranean twenty-
two thousand, North America eight thousand, the Cape
and minor garrisons together nine thousand. In addi-
tion to these, from eleven to twelve thousand men
(including those of the King's German Legion) of the
force originally sent to Portugal were still at Lisbon ;
and their numbers had been swelled by some three
thousand stragglers, invalids, and detachments from
Moore's army, who had drifted into the Portuguese
capital, and had there been organised into provisional
battalions.1 Of the foregoing it may be said that the
twelve thousand men in Lisbon and about the same
number in Sicily were alone fit for offensive purposes
in an European war, though these twenty-four thousand
could be increased to thirty thousand by the King's
German Legion and other foreign troops. Of the
regular force at home, the greater part of the infantry
consisted of second battalions, somewhat weak in
numbers, and inferior in efficiency to the first battalions.
There were, of course, also in England the regiments
which had retreated with Moore to Coruna, but these
could not for some time be fit to take the field.
The offensive force of Great Britain, therefore, was
both feeble and ill-distributed, being split up into small
1 Cradock to Sec. of State, 31st Jan., 8th Feb. 1809.
VOL. VII D
34 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. detachments between Sicily, Lisbon, and the British
Isles. Of the last named a considerable portion could
be spared for foreign service, owing to the success of
Castlereagh's Local Militia, which now numbered close
upon two hundred thousand men in Great Britain.
On the other hand, it was unsafe greatly to reduce
the garrisons in Ireland ; while among the troops at
home there were nearly twenty Garrison and Veteran
battalions, which were incapable of any but sedentary
duties ; and it must be remembered also that as yet
there was no efficient force of police in Great Britain or
in Ireland. Moreover, it was a disquieting fact that
the casualties for 1808 numbered seventeen thousand,
whereas ordinary recruiting had produced only thirteen
thousand recruits, including two thousand boys, to fill
the vacant places. The Army, therefore, entered upon
the new year with a net deficit of four thousand men ;
and, seeing that offensive operations had already been
sanctioned in the West Indies, it was not likely that
the casualties of 1 809 would show any diminution.
By this time it was recognised that the easiest and
swiftest way of increasing the Army was to draw men
from the Regular Militia ; and the military authorities
now came forward with a plan for absorbing that
Militia into the Regular Army. The plan was
exceedingly simple. Every regiment of the Line was
to be formed into two battalions, and to be affiliated to
some county. The first battalions, numbering in all
one hundred thousand men, were to be recruited by
voluntary enlistment for service all over the world ;
and the second battalions, numbering likewise one
hundred thousand men, were to be recruited by ballot
for home service only. Behind these was to come the
Local Militia, two hundred thousand strong, each
battalion affiliated to some county, and wearing the
same uniform as its county regiment of the Line. The
Local Militia was to be maintained by ballot, personal
service being enforced and substitutes forbidden.
Behind the Local Militia were to come one hundred
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 35
thousand Volunteers, receiving nothing from the State 1809.
but their arms, and twenty-two thousand Yeomanry.
The officers of the two regular battalions were to be
interchangeable, according to their rank ; the men of
the second battalions were to be encouraged to enter
the first, and the men of the Local Militia, in their
turn, to enter the second battalions. Thus the anomalv
of two descriptions of Militia would be avoided ; the
Regulars and the Local Militia would be based homo-
geneously upon a territorial organisation ; the old
Militia, now merged into the Army, would be twice as
efficient as before, being commanded by regular officers ;
the Local Militia would likewise gain by taking the
county gentlemen, heretofore absorbed by the Militia,
for their officers ; and the entire business of the
Military Forces and of recruiting would be facilitated
and simplified.
Castlereagh, however, shrank from so sweeping a
change ; and, inasmuch as the Duke of York's reforms
have waited until our own time for adoption, it is
possible that they would have been premature in 1809.
The Minister, therefore, simply brought in a bill to
permit rather more than twenty-eight thousand men
from the Militia to enlist into the Line,1 proposing,
in consideration of the harshness of the ballot of 1807,
to fill up the depleted Militia with voluntary recruits,
encouraged by a bounty of ten guineas. By the 1st ot
June sixteen thousand Militiamen had passed into the
Line ; and on the 25th of May the Regular Army was
returned at a strength, including foreign troops, of close
upon two hundred and twenty thousand rank and file,
or not far from two hundred and fifty thousand of all
ranks.
Meanwhile, events began to move rapidly in Europe.
Upon hearing of Austria's preparations, Napoleon at
once became anxious as to the attitude of the Tsar,
and wrote to him from Valladolid to use firm and
1 18,130 from the English Militia, 3654 from the Scottish,
and 6708 from the Irish. Total, 28,4.92.
36 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. energetic language to the Emperor Francis. He
mentioned at the same time that he had four hundred
thousand men ready to invade Austria, and that he
was perfectly able to deal with her himself; but the
urgency of his request belied his professions. More-
over, he did right to be anxious. Alexander was
by this time weary of the French alliance. He had
gained what he wanted — Finland and the Danubian
principalities — and wished now to revert to his former
friendships. However, he could not but make some
show of compliance with Napoleon's request ; and he
accordingly urged Austria, under threat of withdrawing
his ambassador from Vienna, not to attack France,
remembering that if Austria was the aggressor he was
bound to side against her, but not so if France took the
offensive. The Emperor Francis sent a special envoy,
Prince Schwarzenberg, to St. Petersburg ; but upon
him also the Tsar impressed the importance of caution,
assuring him that if Austria gave provocation, Russia
would fulfil her obligations to France. It was not
difficult, nevertheless, for Schwarzenberg to apprehend
the true direction of Alexander's sympathies.
More important, however, was the renewal of the
Austrian Emperor's demands upon England. He
professed disappointment with the answer to his
overture, but announced that he would send Count
Walmoden and Prince Starhemberg upon a special
mission to London to adjust matters, and that he
hoped the British Cabinet would honour his bills to the
amount of £150,000 a month from April onwards.
Early in March the preliminary proposals of these
envoys were laid in advance before Canning. They
were to the effect that Austria should receive two
millions down, and £400,000 monthly while the war
lasted ; and that England should second Austrian
operations with all her naval and military force. The
sphere for England's military action was left to her
own judgment, but Spain, Italy, and the mouth of
the Weser were indicated as promising points. As to
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 37
Austria's own plans, it was stated vaguely that she 1809.
would have two large armies in South Germany and in
Italy, and an auxiliary corps in North Germany.1 On
the 29th of March, Walmoden arrived, though with no
new suggestions to offer ; but the British Government
was already prepared to enter into a general engage-
ment of alliance against France ; and on the 24th of April April 24.
a treaty to that effect was signed in London.
Meanwhile, war had actually begun. In the south,
the Archduke John on the 12th of April invaded Italy
from Carinthia, and defeated the Viceroy Eugene
Beauharnais on the 16th at Sacile. A few days earlier
the Tyrolese rose against the Bavarians, and within a
week drove them from the province, capturing and
destroying over ten thousand of the enemy. But these
successes were checked by the misfortunes of the main
army under the Archduke Charles. On the 6th he April 6.
issued a general order to his troops that the liberties of
Europe had taken refuge under their banners ; and on
the 1 2th he crossed the Inn and invaded Bavaria. On April 12.
the 14th Napoleon quitted Paris, and on the 17th
reached Donauworth. Berthier had left the French
troops so dangerously dispersed along a wide front
from Ratisbon southward, that it needed all Napoleon's
skill and good fortune to withdraw and concentrate
them. He then took the offensive, and after five days'
fighting, wherein the most notable action was the battle
of Eckmuhl, he forced the Archduke back on both
banks of the Danube, stormed Ratisbon, and, following
up his advantage, entered Vienna on the 13th of May. May 13.
Here in the insolence of victory Napoleon issued on
the 17th a decree deposing the Pope and annexing the
Papal dominions to France. He had some reason
for exultation. The Archduke John, owing to the
disasters on the Danube, was compelled to fall back
from Italy towards Vienna, and, having sustained a
severe defeat on the Piave, to retire into Hungary, May S.
1 F.O. Austria, 90. Aug. Wagner to Canning, 12th March,
22nd March 1809.
38 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. leaving Tyrol to its own resources. The skill and
gallantry of the peasants enabled them, fortunately, still
to hold their own ; but, meanwhile, Eugene was able to
follow up the Archduke John, and, after inflicting
May 20. further losses upon him, to join Napoleon on the 20th
at a very critical time. For the Archduke Charles, in
spite of all reverses, had refused to relax his hold of
the northern bank of the Danube over against Vienna ;
and, in attempting to dislodge him on the 21st and
22nd, Napoleon met at Aspern and Essling with a
reverse so serious as narrowly to escape disaster. His
situation was the more perilous, inasmuch as the two
bridges by which he crossed the Danube were swept
away by a flood, leaving him no means of retreat.
Under cover of darkness he withdrew his troops into
the island of Lobau, and put forth all his energy to
retrieve his position. He had lost in the fight one of
his oldest comrades and ablest commanders, Lannes,
Duke of Montebello, and little short of twenty-five
thousand men. He now called to him every soldier
that could be spared from all quarters for a supreme
effort.
From the outset of the campaign the excitement in
Germany had been intense. Maddened by shame and
oppression, the Prussian people, under the leadership of
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, had devoted itself to the
foundation of patriotic clubs and the organisation of
schemes of insurrection. So far had these plans been
matured that in September 1808 the conspirators in
Silesia had only with difficulty been restrained from a
rising. Their ardour was, however, damped by the
treaty under which the French had agreed, in that very
month, to evacuate Prussia ; nor did their spirits revive
until December, when the preparations of Austria for
war seemed to be complete. The leaders then approached
King Frederick William, and for the moment prevailed
with him to take up arms in concert with the Emperor
Francis. One of the chiefs of the patriots was sent to
Vienna to come to an agreement with that Court, and
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
39
all seemed to be decided. At the end of December 1809.
1808, however, Frederick William went to St. Peters-
burg ; and, though he left orders with Gneisenau to
mobilise the army, that astute Minister was filled with
apprehension as to the possible influence of the Tsar
upon his King. His misgivings proved to be just.
Alexander received the King and Queen of Prussia
with every mark of attention, but advised them to
submit to France ; and this counsel was only too
welcome to Frederick William's natural timidity. He
suspended all warlike preparations, and, but for the
remonstrances of Goltz, would have retracted the
advances made to Austria. For the second time the
hopes of the patriots were disappointed.
Disgusted with the King's pusillanimity, Gneisenau
projected the formation of a Prussian Legion, composed
of good patriots, for the Austrian service, and addressed
himself to Hardenberg at Vienna in the hope of
obtaining money from England. But before his plans
could take definite shape, hostilities began, and all
Germany was in a ferment. Frederick William was
warned that, unless he went out to find war, war
would come and find him. His Ministers pressed him
urgently to take the final step, indeed strove desperately
to commit him to battle. The King went so far as
to summon Gneisenau to put the army in order for
hostilities, and in helpless irresolution turned again for
counsel to Alexander. But the Tsar himself was now
seriously embarrassed. On the side of Finland he was
distracted by a revolution in Sweden, which had driven
the mad King Gustavus from the throne, and in the March 29.
south by the rupture of his negotiations with the Porte,
and a renewal of war with Turkey. Moreover, since
Austria had been the aggressor, he was bound by his
engagements to take the side of France. He had
therefore given orders for the concentration of an army
upon the frontier of Galicia, though with secret assur-
ances to Schwarzenberg that he had no intention of
conquering the province, and had issued directions to
4o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 809. the Russian generals to avoid any combat. With his
hands so full it is hardly surprising that Alexander
should have given no encouragement to Frederick
William. He was willing, he said, to stand by Prussia
in case of an unprovoked attack upon her ; but, as
regards Austria, he must fulfil his obligations to
Napoleon. In blank dismay, Frederick William for
the third time went back upon his half-formed resolu-
tion, and decided to abstain from war.
Weary of waiting upon this feeble-spirited man,
the patriot leaders resolved to act without him. They
had long been in communication with England, in whom
lay their chief hope of support, and they determined
now to throw themselves upon her generosity.
Singularly enough, however, one of their agents, though
apparently without full authority, had already approached
the British Government. This agent was one Ludwig
Kleist, who, it seems, bore credentials from the central
insurrectionary Committee at Berlin, or at any rate from
Count Chazot, the commandant in that capital and one
of the chiefs of the insurrectionary organisation. It
does not appear, however, that his mission was sanctioned
by the real heads of the movement, such as Gneisenau
and Blilcher, the latter of whom knew Kleist to be an
untrustworthy man who had gambled away his own
and his wife's fortunes and was deeply in debt. Kleist
was none the less an admirable actor ; and it is evident
that his address, his activity, and his patriotic professions
imposed upon the Committee, which, with very in-
sufficient knowledge of his character, despatched him
on a mission to England. He arrived in London in
March, and made his way at once to the Foreign
Office. According to his report, the whole country
between the Rhine and the Elbe was prepared to rise
without waiting for Prussia to declare war ; fifty to
sixty thousand men were ready to take up arms upon
the first collision between the French and Austrians,
and, as they had already procured muskets, they required
from England only powder, cannon, and money.
* ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 41
Kleist then put forward the following proposals 1809.
upon behalf of his principals. They would engage, he
said, to raise ten thousand men between the Rhine and
Weser for the British service ; to occupy Hamburg,
Bremen, and East Friesland, so as to secure for England
ports of communication and bases of operations ; to
surprise Magdeburg, where they were in secret treaty
with the inhabitants ; and, with the help of a British
fleet, to capture Stralsund. He further promised
that Napoleon's Westphalian army would come over in
a body to the insurgents, as would also the Prussian
Army, unless Frederick William consented to declare
war ; and that, to encourage him to do so, the in-
surgents would hand over to him the port of Stettin.
In return, Kleist required that England should land
six thousand men in Hanover to support an insurrec-
tion, should despatch a fleet to the Baltic to watch the
mouths of the Ems, Weser, and Elbe, and should
establish depots of arms at Heligoland, as also in the
islands of Bornholm and Erdholm, which should be
seized for the purpose, so as to enable stores of war to
be thrown into Prussia.
There is something rather magnificent about these
proposals put forward by a mere adventurer who,
though incredibly vain, self-seeking, and ambitious, was
probably not wholly devoid of patriotic feeling. The
British Cabinet, looking to his credentials, not un-
reasonably took him very much at his own valuation ;
Canning, in particular, being favourably inclined to
the choice of North Germany as a sphere of opera-
tions. Kleist had more than one interview with
Ministers, with the result that by the 19th of April
they agreed to send arms, ammunition, and clothing in
large quantities to Heligoland ; and, without commit-
ting themselves to a disembarkation in Hanover or to
the seizure of Bornholm and Erdholm, they promised
further to send to the Baltic a sufficient squadron to
maintain communication between England and North
Germany. Kleist urgently demanded £50,000 in specie
42 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii '
1809. for the immediate requirements of the insurrection,
but Ministers were sufficiently cautious to reduce the
sum to £30,000, with which they despatched him upon
his way. They also sent with him an accredited com-
panion, Lieutenant Maimburg, with orders to ascertain
the preparations and needs of the insurgents, and to
give them every assurance of good-will if their plans
were countenanced by the King of Prussia, but other-
wise to hold out to them no encouragement whatever.1
So disjointed were the plans of the insurgents, or
so imperfect the discipline of their subordinate leaders,
that there were two sporadic risings even before Kleist
April 22. left England. On the 22nd of April the peasantry
of Westphalia began to assemble in arms, and presently
received a chief in Dornberg, a Colonel of Chasseurs
under Napoleon's Westphalian government, who led
them upon Cassel. His levies were met by the troops
of the Government not far from the city — the very
troops that, according to Kleist, were waiting to join
the patriots — and dispersed to the four winds by a
single volley. The insurrection instantly collapsed ;
and Dornberg fled for his life to Bohemia. The other
outbreak was more formidable. Among the Prussian
officers who had distinguished themselves in the disas-
trous campaign of 1 806 was a certain Major Schill, a man
of remarkable bravery, of great wealth in petty resource,
of surprising activity and much power of working on
the minds of private soldiers and of raw assemblies.
He possessed, in fact, all the gifts of a successful
partisan, and may be compared to such men as Peter-
borough, Tarlton, and Sir Robert Wilson in our own
service. But to these qualities were joined the defects
which too often beset his kind. He had mother-wit,
but neither knowledge nor education ; and his vanity
and jealousy were such that he could endure no rival
nor even a subordinate of superior talent. At this
time he commanded a regiment of hussars in Berlin.
1 For Kleist's relations with the Government, see Record Office,
F.O. 80.
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 43
Without disclosing his intention to a soul, he led his 1809.
men south-west to Wittenberg to promote an insurrec-
tion upon his own account. The power of his name
was such that all were eager to take service with him ;
but he rejected every offer to arm the population, and
would take no advantage of the preparations of the
patriots, being, in fact, quite incompetent for higher
command than that of a couple of thousand men, or
for greater operations than partisan warfare. Soon
after crossing the Elbe his courage failed him, and
but for the protests of his officers he would have
returned eastward, though all hope of success lay in
the provinces to the west. First directing his steps
towards Magdeburg, an immense depot of arms and
stores which was feebly garrisoned and would have
been a priceless acquisition, he turned from it at the
first sign of resistance, and retired north-eastward to
Mecklenburg, without an effort to prevent the assembling
of French troops against him. Being presently pressed
by two corps of Danes and Dutch, he retired to
Stralsund, where his men were overpowered by greatly
superior forces, and he paid for his mistakes with his May 31,
life.1
These two abortive attempts, however disquieting
for the moment to Napoleon, effectually closed all
hopes of such a spontaneous national rising in Germany
as had been seen in Spain. It does not appear, however,
that the British Government heard of their disastrous
issue before July ; and, meanwhile, the reports of their
agents in Prussia and of Kleist himself were hopeful,
and always urgent for British help with arms, ships,
and troops. Austria also, both through Mr. Bathurst,
the British envoy at Vienna, and through Count
Starhemberg, who arrived in London in May, pressed
hard for the disembarkation of a British army on the
Weser. At the same time, Count Stadion, who now
directed the councils of Austria, was equally anxious
1 This estimate of Schill and the account of his operations arc
taken from Gneisenau's Memorial to Canning, 20th Aug. 1809.
44 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. that the British force in Sicily should make a diversion
in favour of the Austrian force on the Adige ; and in
March he actually sent a messenger direct to Sir John
Stuart at Palermo to explain the plan of campaign in
Italy. It may easily be understood, therefore, that
Ministers were much embarrassed by the difficulty of
coming to a decision as to the sphere in which they
should employ the British Army.
Nevertheless, upon one point, which shall presently
be reviewed in greater detail, they took their resolution
early. On the 7th of March Sir Arthur Wellesley
drew up a memorandum, contending that Portugal
could be defended by a force of thirty thousand
British troops, in combination with the Portu-
guese ; and it was determined to make up the army
in the Peninsula at once to that number, and to
send him out to command it. But the question then
arose whether Wellesley's army should not be still
further increased ; whether, in fact, the whole strength
of England should not be turned against that single
point, for there could be no doubt of the effectiveness
of such a diversion. In opposition to such a policy,
however, stood the insuperable difficulty of finding
specie to pay the expenses of the campaign. The same
obstacle stood in the way of increasing the force in
Sicily, whether to act in Italy or in Catalonia, though,
in truth, the Cabinet seems never to have favoured the
despatch of troops to this quarter. So far, therefore,
the choice of Ministers was determined in great measure
by circumstances. More troops could not be sent to
Southern Europe ; wherefore any armament additional
to that which was designed for Spain must necessarily
look for its sphere of operations in the North.
Unfortunately, the difficulties of the Cabinet were
aggravated by its own divisions. Canning had already
quarrelled twice with his colleagues upon a great ques-
tion of principle, whether, namely, Ministers should
accept responsibility for the miscarriage of military
operations, or should throw the blame wholly upon the
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 45
military commanders. In the case both of the Con- 1809.
vention of Cintra and of Moore's campaign he had
been for casting all blame upon the Generals, and he
was the more urgent for this course in the latter case,
because he had been strongly opposed to the policy of
directing Moore to advance into Spain in the first
instance.1 These differences naturally set him at variance
with Castlereagh, and that variance was intensified by
the contrasted characters of the two men. Canning's
talents were brilliant, Castlereagh's were less conspicuous
but more solid ; Canning based his judgment chiefly
upon intuition, often, but not always, amazingly true,
Castlereagh upon laborious comparison of facts; Canning
was witty, fluent, and eloquent in speech and writ-
ing, Castlereagh ponderous, clumsy, and inarticulate ;
Canning was tricky, vain, and consumed by egoism,
Castlereagh was straightforward and thought first of his
country ; finally, Castlereagh was a gentleman and
Canning was not.
It does not appear that Canning was as adverse to
the defence of Portugal as he had been to Moore's
march into Spain ; but it is certain that on the 24th of
March, when Wellesley must already have received his
orders to take command in Portugal, Canning wrote to
the Duke of Portland to say that the Government, as
then constituted, was unequal to the great task imposed
upon it, and that unless this failing were remedied he
should resign. The date is worthy of remark upon
other grounds also. Kleist had arrived eleven days
before, and must already have laid his proposals before
Canning ; and on that very day, the 24th, the new
Commander-in-Chief, Sir David Dundas, had been
summoned to a Cabinet Council and asked if he could
furnish fifteen or sixteen thousand troops for an im-
mediate attack upon the island of Walcheren, and
particularly upon Flushing, where a French squadron
under Admiral Missiessy was moored at the moment.
There had more than once before been question of an
1 Walpole's Life of Spencer Perceval, i. 349.
46 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. attack upon Walcheren — an attack of which Napoleon's
correspondence shows that he was constantly appre-
hensive— but in the month of March 1809 there were
particular reasons for favouring such an enterprise.
The French squadron was actually within the port of
Flushing, from which, owing to the shallowness of the
water, the ships could only emerge one by one after
removing all their guns, and even then only by favour-
able conjunction of wind and tide. Thus they would
have needed a month to drop down to the mouth of
the Scheldt, where, being disarmed, they would have
fallen an easy prey to a British fleet ; while, if mewed up
in the harbour of Flushing, their surrender or destruc-
tion would equally have followed upon the capture of
that town, and, if divided between port and roadstead,
they could have offered less resistance than ever. The
project, therefore, was alike feasible and inviting, though
it would need to be executed with both speed and
secrecy lest the enemy, upon the first alarm, should
withdraw the ships up the river to Antwerp. There
was, as it happened, abundant naval force to hand for
the enterprise, but Dundas could not undertake to
furnish the troops required of him, for the men who
had fought at Coruna were still in weakly health, and
not yet reclothed or re-equipped. Moreover, twenty
thousand other troops were under orders for Portugal,
and the Act for enlisting men from the Militia had not
been law for a fortnight. The expedition was therefore
abandoned ; and it should seem that Canning at once
seized the opportunity to bring forward the question
of sending a force to North Germany, for on the
March 25. very next day Kleist, pursuant to the Minister's
request, formulated the whole of his proposals in
writing.1
Meanwhile, the Duke of Portland carried Canning's
letter to the King, who, shrewdly reading between the
lines, saw that Castlereagh was the cause of Canning's
1 Life of Spencer Perceval, i. 347-350 ; Enquiry ifito the Expedi-
tion to the Scheldt, p. 39 ; de Martel, Walkeren, pp. 147, 185.
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 47
discontent, and therefore suggested that he should be 1809.
moved from the War Office to some other post. The
Duke, never a strong man and now much shaken by
ill-health, willingly accepted the idea, but, as is the way
of his kind, strove to put off the evil day. He
recommended, accordingly, that the new arrangement
should be postponed until the prorogation of Parliament
in June, when Lord Wellesley should take over the
War Office, and that in the meantime not a word of
the proceeding should be breathed to Castlereagh. He
communicated it, however, to Lord Camden, who was
Castlereagh's uncle, to Lord Bathurst, and to Lord
Chancellor Eldon. To these confidants Canning
presently added George Rose, the Secretary to the
Treasury, and Mr. Speaker Abbott ; and it should seem
that the secret was ill-kept, for by the first week in
March it had reached certain English travellers in
Spain.1 Canning had at first expressed contentment
with the compromise, but in April he became impatient,
and declared that it was absurd to wait until the end of
the session for Castlereagh's resignation. Meanwhile,
Castlereagh had been pressing forward the re-equipment
of Moore's troops with all his energy, and on the 8 th of May 8.
May he required of the Commander-in-Chief a scheme
of organisation for a force of thirty thousand men, with
a reserve of twelve thousand more. By that time
Dundas was in a position to furnish the thirty thousand
troops, but not the reserve. This, however, was enough
for Castlereagh. The Admiralty, being responsible for
the protection of England against invasion, was urgent
for the attack upon Walcheren ; and on the 1 8th of May 18.
May Castlereagh wrote to offer the command of the
force above named to Lord Chatham. He had so far
consulted none of his colleagues except the Duke of
Portland upon this appointment, but he was able to
assure Chatham of the Duke's approval, and did not
doubt that of the rest of the Cabinet. Practically,
therefore, the despatch of the expedition to the Scheldt
1 Spanish Journal of Elizabeth, Lady Holland, p. 297.
48 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. was determined on, though not irrevocably, by the
beginning of May.1
It is very evident, therefore, that, notwithstanding
all the efforts of Kleist and of the Court of Vienna, the
British Ministers were not disposed to send a large force
to North Germany unless Prussia openly declared war
against France. I cannot myself believe that they were
wrong. Thrice had British troops been sent to the
Continent in reliance upon the support of Prussia, and
even with the hope of heartening her to action, and
thrice had the expectations of the British Government
been disappointed. It was true that circumstances were
now changed. Prussia had been humbled to the
dust ; but the temper of her people was rapidly rising,
and three great men — Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneise-
nau — had come forward to work out her salvation.
Still Stein had been banished since November 1808 by
Napoleon's order, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau only
with infinite difficulty held their own against treacher-
ous opponents at the Court of Frederick William. The
King, as we have seen, had so far shrunk from draw-
ing the sword ; and, looking to the early failures of
Austria in Bavaria, it was not likely that he would
forsake his attitude of quivering neutrality. The
success of the Archduke Charles at Aspern, how-
ever, promised to bring about a change, and the
Emperor Francis sent a special envoy to Konigsberg
to press Frederick William once more to take up arms.
The envoy, Count Steigentisch, arrived on the 15th of
June, and found the monarch much shaken by Schill's
escapade. At his first interview the King received him
coldly ; at the second he showed greater warmth
and pressed him to stay at Konigsberg ; at the third
he told him to be gone, because his presence gave
umbrage to the embassies of Russia and France
Prussian patriots were deeply disgusted, and deter-
mined that the only possible means of bringing their
1 Chatham MSS. Castlereagh to Chatham, 1 8th May 1809.
2 F.O. Prussia. Hahn to Sec. of State, 17th, 21st June 1809.
2
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 49
faint-hearted monarch to a decision was to kindle a 1809.
successful insurrection in North Germany with the
help of a British army. By the advice of Gneisenau,
Blucher resigned his commission in order to place him-
self at the head of the rising ; and Gneisenau himself
did likewise in order to be free to proceed on a mission
to England.
All this was, of course, unknown as yet to the
British Ministers ; but the behaviour of the Prussian King
shows that they had formed a correct judgment of him.
On the 29th of May Castlereagh again addressed the May 29.
Commander-in-Chief, representing that the naval estab-
lishments of Napoleon in the Scheldt had already twenty
line-of-battle ships under construction or completed,
and asking his opinion as to the feasibility of destroy-
ing them. He added that, according to all reports,
Northern France and Holland had never before been
left so naked of troops as at present. On the 3rd of June 3.
June Dundas replied at length that in a country so
difficult as Flanders rapid operations were nearly im-
possible, and that the proposed service was one of the
greatest risk. The Adjutant-general, Sir Harry Calvert,
and the Military Secretary, Colonel Gordon, handed in
opinions to the same effect, the latter characterising
the operation as a most desperate enterprise. General
Brownrigg, after premising that the force would require
nearly eight thousand horses for its transport, considered
that, in certain circumstances, it might succeed in taking
Antwerp by a coup de main ; and General Alexander
Hope likewise, while considering the operation unduly
hazardous, opined that if executed with decision, it
"might have some chance of success."
Altogether it would be difficult to find a stronger
consensus of discouragement than is to be found in
these five memoranda from the Horse Guards ; and
it is probable that Castlereagh reverted for a moment
to thoughts of North Germany. But two days later June 5.
General von der Decken, who had been despatched
thither to observe the actual state of things, returned
VOL. VII e
50 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. and made his report. There was, he confessed, general
discontent with French rule, especially in Hanover and
the kingdom of Westphalia. In East Friesland also
there was profound impatience of the sway of the
King of Holland, and both there and in Westphalia
there were organised systems of insurrection under
distinguished leaders. But, on the other hand, the
Low Countries appeared to be perfectly contented ; and
it was doubtful whether the Germans anywhere would
rise, unless encouraged by the presence of a British
army and by a succession of Austrian victories. The
Hessians were the most eager for an insurrection, in
spite of Dornberg's failure, which had been due to lack
of arms and to news of Austrian defeats. Von der
Decken concluded, therefore, that if a British force were
sent to the Continent, it should first occupy East Fries-
land and then operate up the Weser towards Hesse.
But, he added with strong emphasis, a British army
could have no success in Holland or North Germany
unless it received the support of the inhabitants,
united in a single political body and acting under the
orders of the British Cabinet and the British Govern-
ment. Unless such a system were pursued from the
very beginning, the French would in three months
assemble a force sufficient to compel the British to
re-embark.1
This intelligence Ministers naturally regarded as
conclusive. Time was pressing. The best part of the
campaigning season was already past ; the Archduke
Charles and Napoleon were both girding themselves
for a decisive battle on the Danube, and, if the weight of
England was to make itself felt on the main continent
of Europe, it must be thrown into the scale at once.
Happily the tidings that Sir Arthur Wellesley had on
the 1 2th of May defeated Soult at Oporto showed that
the British troops were not idle ; but this stroke was
not such as could be immediately felt at Vienna. On
the 10th of June the arrival of the news of Aspern
1 Memorandum of Decken in W.O. I. 11 19.
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 51
quickened the British Government to greater activity. 1809.
Fresh intelligence of the dearth of soldiers in Northern
France and the Netherlands confirmed their resolution ;
and the veteran Dumouriez declared that the moment for
the expedition was come. " It is," he wrote, " the greatest
service that you can render to Austria and to Europe.
It is the most useful, brilliant, and natural diversion that
you can make." After somewhat hasty consultation
of two naval officers, Sir Home Popham and Sir Richard
Strachan, the latter of whom had no knowledge of the
Scheldt,1 the Cabinet on the 21st of June finally decided
to throw the main strength of England upon that river.
This resolution was not taken without long and painful
deliberation, and was due chiefly, if not entirely, to the
unwillingness of Prussia to draw the sword. The
reasons put forward for their action by Ministers, and
fully accepted as valid by Starhemberg, were four in
number. First of them was the general exhaustion
of England's military and pecuniary resources, due
to the number of troops maintained by her in Sicily,
Portugal, and her colonial and Indian possessions, and
to the subsidies furnished to Austria and Spain. The
remaining reasons may be summed up as the dread
of seeing their expeditionary force isolated after dis-
embarkation and compelled either to fight its way to the
Allies at great sacrifice, or to melt away to no purpose,
being unable either to receive recruits or to re-embark
with safety ; and the apprehension lest they should find
Prussia turn upon the British troops as enemies, because
she had been too timid to declare herself in good time
as a friend. Moreover, Starhemberg could not but
admit that the sanguine hopes built by Austria upon
the political state of Germany had been belied. On
the other hand, the action of the force on the Scheldt,
though intended principally for England's own benefit,
would still be in the nature of a diversion, for it would
keep all French troops in Holland from marching to
1 Enquiry, pp. 132, 133, 178, 284. Chatham MSS., Dumouriez
to Castlereagh, 13th June 1809.
52 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. the Danube, and would be a distraction to Napoleon's
reserves at Strasburg. Lastly, the force might still
play its part on the Continent after the object of the
expedition had been effected. The operations were
designed to be of the nature of a surprise, and should
therefore be soon over. Ten thousand men would
indeed be required for the garrison of Walcheren, but
the remainder would be free for employment in any
part of Europe ; and Canning assured Starhemberg
that the Government would still be ready to send them
to Prussia, if the King should declare against France.
But unless there were a regular army to which the
British troops could join themselves upon disembarka-
tion, the British Ministers would not hazard their
landing in North Germany.
Looking to all the circumstances, as also to past
experience, I cannot but think that the Cabinet acted
herein with sense and prudence. It was by blind
reliance on reports of Dutch and German insurrec-
tionists that Pitt and Dundas had so often frittered away
the strength of England to no purpose. Moreover,
the name of Hanover still roused jealousy in the British
people. The idea of sacrificing British troops for the
reconquest of that province was in their eyes unpardon-
able ; and it was in this sense and no other that they
would have construed the disembarkation of forty
thousand men on the Weser. " It is sufficient to know
this country," wrote Starhemberg from London, " the
terrible responsibility of Ministers, the way in which
they dread it, the incessant attacks which they con-
stantly have to encounter in Parliament, the enormous
cost (double of ours) of maintaining the army, the
really embarrassed state in which they stand after
enormous efforts made in the matter both of men and
money, especially for Spain, to understand that the
Court of London could hardly gather resolution to
strike its first blow in North Germany, until assured
that it should find a considerable armv there, to which
it should be auxiliary, and in which it could find
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 53
support." l This strikingly sympathetic comment does 1S09.
not, however, excuse the real mistake of Ministers in
committing a considerable force to an operation of
extremely doubtful success when, by holding it in readi-
ness for a month or two, they could have improved its
quality, and probably have found a more profitable
object for its energy elsewhere. But from the beginning
to the end of this war Ministers, when they chanced to
have troops at their disposal, could never be easy until
they employed them somewhere, doubtless because
factious politicians were always demanding with clamour
and contumely for what purpose, if not for foreign
service, an army was maintained. The despatch of the
expedition to Walcheren is merely one of a hundred
examples of the hopeless inadaptability of the British
Constitution to war.
However, the decision was taken, and taken on the
very day of the prorogation of Parliament. On the June 21.
following day the Duke of Portland sent for Spencer
Perceval, told him of the agreement made with Canning
for the displacement of Castlereagh,and insisted that, after
the decision taken by the Cabinet on the previous day, the
agreement could not now be fulfilled. It was impossible,
as he justly said, that Castlereagh, who for weeks had
been toiling at preparations for this expedition and must
be held responsible for them, should be removed from
his office just when his plans were about to be executed.
Horrified that such an underhand intrigue should have
been going forward for so long unknown to him,
Perceval wrote to Canning to protest against the con-
cealment of the affair from Castlereagh. Canning
answered curtly disclaiming all responsibility for such
concealment ; and he and Perceval then agreed to refer
the matter to the Duke of Portland. Canning appears
to have proposed a kind of compromise, whereby the
management of the war in Spain should be committed
to himself while still retaining the portfolio of foreign
1 F.O. Austria. Starhemberg to Stadion, 20th July 1809,
enclosed in Starhemberg to Sec. of State, 26th July 1809.
54 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xih
1809. affairs. Perceval expressed decided objections to this
arrangement ; and it was agreed that things should
remain as they were until the issue of the enterprise
should be known, the whole affair being still concealed
from Castlereagh. Perceval chafed more and more
under the sense that he was playing a dishonourable part.
" This cursed business haunts me," he wrote, three
July 13. weeks later. The fact seems to have been that Can-
ning was playing for a higher stake than the mere
removal of Castlereagh. He perceived that the Duke
of Portland's health must before long compel him to
retire from office ; he was ambitious to take the Duke's
place in fact if not in name, and his design appears to
have been to place Lord Chatham at the Treasury, in
succession to the Duke, to use him as a puppet, and to
wield all power himself.1
It was with this object, according to one account,
that Lord Chatham was selected for the command of
the expedition. Canning had little doubt of its
success, and hoped that the fame of this achievement
would facilitate Chatham's elevation to the first place
in the Government.2 This theory is hardly confirmed
by the terms in which Castlereagh offered Chatham
the command, though not incompatible with them ;
but, on the other hand, contemporary gossip repre-
sented Canning as strongly opposed to the whole
enterprise.3 Another account ascribes Chatham's ap-
pointment to the direct influence of George the
Third, though apparently upon no higher authority
than the general prejudice which loves to lay all mis-
takes during his long reign upon the patient shoulders
of the King. More interesting is it to find that Sir
David Dundas, under whom Chatham had served as a
general both in peace and in war, considered him a very
excellent officer, and the choice of him a very proper
1 Walpole's Life of Spencer Perceval, i. 351-357, 362.
2 Stanhope, Conversations of the Duke of Wellington, p. 393.
Lord Ellesmere's Recollections confirm Stanhope.
3 Yonge's Life of Lord Liverpool, i. 280.
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 55
choice.1 In truth Pitt's brother was no ordinary man. 1809.
He was very clear-headed, possessed excellent judgment
and great firmness of character. In the Cabinet, where
he seldom spoke until others had finished speaking, his
counsel was sound, independent, and weighty to a remark-
able degree. At the Office of Ordnance his adminis-
tration brought the British Artillery up to a pitch of
excellence unknown until his day. His great fault was an
incurable indolence, and an unpunctuality which gained
for him the name of the late Lord Chatham — defects
which would seem to disqualify him for a charge which
demanded above all things rapidity of execution.
Meanwhile Castlereagh had been labouring inde-
fatigably over the work of equipping the troops and
hiring transports. One hundred thousand tons of
shipping were required, but no orders were given for
procuring them until the 20th of May, and even then
no indication was given of the amount that would be
needed. Freight was both scarce and dear, owing
partly to the demand for the army of Portugal ; and the
tonnage was not obtained except with difficulty and at
a considerable rise of price. The troops also were
unready, the re-equipment of several regiments being
still incomplete at the end of June.2 At last, in the
second week of July, the embarkation began at Ports-
mouth and Deal, and in the Downs, and Castlereagh
himself went down to Deal to witness it. There on
about the 22nd he received the long-expected news
from the Danube. Napoleon had extricated himself
with amazing skill from the island of Lobau, and the
decisive battle had been fought at Wagram on the 6th
of July, ending in no great advantage to either party,
but in the retreat of the Archduke and in the conclusion
of an armistice at Znaim on the 12th. There was,
however, yet hope that the armistice would not be con-
verted into a peace, especially if the British diversion
proved to be effective. On the afternoon of Wednes-
1 Enquiry into the Expedition, pp. 49, 50.
2 Ibid. pp. 1 07- 1 14, 122.
56
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. day the 26th of July Chatham and his staff embarked
July 26. on board the Venerable, and on the following day came
to anchor in the Downs. There the left wing of the
army joined him from Portsmouth ; Sir Richard
Strachan, the naval Commander-in-Chief, shifted his flag
to the Venerable, and at five on the morning of the
July 28. 28th the fleet sailed for the mouth of the Scheldt.
It was incomparably the greatest armament that had
ever left the shores of England. The troops of all
ranks numbered close upon forty thousand,1 of which
twenty-five thousand were embarked upon men-of-war,
and the remainder upon transports. In all, the infantry
numbered about thirty-three thousand, the cavalry rather
more than two thousand, and the artillery about three
thousand. The whole were organised, nominally, in
two wings, and actually in six divisions, the cavalry
being incorporated with the Light Infantry corps in each
wing.2 The battalions varied greatly in strength, some
1 1738 officers, 37,481 N.C.O. and men. Total, 39,219.
2 Left Wing.
„. . . (Mai.-gen. Graham's Brigade: 3/ist, 2/3 5th,
1 st Division. J 5,o , & J/ ' '"
. . c- J 2/8lSt.
i.ieut.-gen bir iM- Houston's Brigade: 2/14A, 51st,
• Cradock { 2/63rd.
Brig.-gen. Browne's Brigade : I /5th, 4 cos.
2/23rd, i/26th, i/32nd.
Maj.-gen. Picton's Brigade : i/36th, 2 cos.
2/8th, 77th, i/82nd.
'Brig.-gen. Mahon : 9th L.D.
Brig.-gen. de Rottenburg : 68th, i/7ist, 85th,
2 cos. 2/95th.
Right Wing.
'Maj.-gen. Hon. W. Stewart's Brigade : 2/43^,
2/521-id, 8 cos. 2/95th.
Maj.-gen. von Linsingen : 3rd Dragoons, 12th
L.D., 2nd Hussars, K.G.L.
Maj.-gen. von Alten : 1st and 2nd Light Batts.
K.G.L.
^th Division.
Lieut. -gen.
Mackenzie Fraser.
Light Troops
Light Division.
Lieut. -gen.
Earl of Rosslyn.
2nd Division.
Lieut. -gen.
Marquis of
Huntly.
'Maj.-gen. Dyott's Brigade : i/6th, i/5oth,
1 /91st.
Brig.-gen. Montresor's Brigade : i/9th, i/38th,
i/42nd.
ch.xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 57
of them barely exceeding four hundred bayonets, while 1809.
others reached one thousand, and the two battalions of
the First Guards counted together twenty-four hundred
men. Chatham's second-in-command was Sir Eyre
Coote, an officer of great experience ; and his chief staff
officer was Sir Robert Brownrigg, Quartermaster-general
at the Horse Guards, who apparently had been selected
because he had pronounced the surprise of Antwerp to
be a possibility.
The naval force was not less formidable — thirty-five
ships of the line, twenty-three frigates and larger vessels,
and over one hundred and eighty sloops, gun-boats, and
other smaller craft. The Commander-in-Chief was
Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Strachan, a brave and
energetic officer, but eccentric in his conduct, very
irregular in his hours on board ship, and of greater zeal
than ability. Under him were Rear-Admirals Keats,
Lord Gardner, and Otway, the first an excellent officer
and the two last respectable. The Captain of the Fleet
ird Division. [Maj.-gen. Leith's Brigade: 2/1 ith, 2/59^,
Lieut. -gen. Hon.-! i/7gth.
T. Grosvenor. [Brig.-gen. Acland's Brigade: 2nd, 76th, 2/84^.
Reserve.
^Brig.-gen. Disney's Brigade : 1 and 3/ist
Guards ; flank cos. 2/ Coldstream and
2/3rd Guards.
Maj.-gen. Sir W. Erskine's Brigade : 20th,
1 /92nd.
Maj.-gen. Earl of Dalhousie's Brigade : 1 and
*> 2 /4th, l/28th.
(A battalion of detachments, 800 strong, is not included in the
above distribution.)
Artillery. — 1 troop Horse Artillery, 16 cos. Foot Artillery,
Drivers, 1827 horses.
Siege Train. — 70 cannon, 74 mortars, Congreve rockets.
Staff Corps. — (Engineers) 2 companies.
Waggon Train. — 3 troops, 132 waggons, 238 carts of all
descriptions, including 50 S.A.A. carts.
Horses embarked for the whole expedition, over 6000 (Enquiry,
p. in).
C.C.L.B., 29th June 1809. Parliamentary Papers, pp. 23-25.
Duncan's History of the Royal Artillery, ii. 225-227. Record Office,
W.O. vi. 27.
Lieut. -gen.
Sir John Hope.
58 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. was Sir Home Popham, who, in spite of his recent gross
misconduct in the matter of Buenos Ayres, was, by reason
of his experience of Holland, very improperly employed
in this high and responsible position.
Upon the whole the leading officers of both services
were not without talent ; but the enterprise demanded
very exceptional gifts in both the Commanders, and very
perfect co-operation between them. The Admiral's
was infinitely the heavier charge. The number of sail
actually under his directions exceeded six hundred,
rather more than half of them transports, and the
remainder men-of-war.1 No such gigantic assembly of
vessels had ever been placed under any British Admiral ;
and, to make the responsibility still more formidable, the
armament was bound for a coast where shifting shoals,
wind, and tide made navigation more than ordinarily
difficult and dangerous. Moreover, to add to all the
unavoidable troubles, the expedition started late.
Popham, who was at any rate a good and skilful seaman,
had six weeks before urged upon Castlereagh the
importance of time. " I see the season advancing fast,"
he wrote, "and if we are imperceptibly led on until the
midsummer fine weather is past, we shall have the most
dreadful of all difficulties, the elements, to encounter."
" Every day lost is a loss of much valuable time," echoed
Chatham ; " I think we should get on faster." Even
when the coast should have been gained and a secure
anchorage found for the shipping, the subsequent opera-
tions promised to be very delicate. The Army must be
landed to capture the batteries on the banks before the
Navy could sail up the river ; and, after the fleet had so
sailed up, the question whether the destruction of the
French vessels should be compassed by the military or
the naval force demanded the most perfect understand-
ing between General and Admiral. The British Navy
has produced few officers who would have been equal to
such a responsibility as was laid upon Strachan ; and
1 The actual numbers were 264 ships of war, 352 transports.
Total, 616. Castlereagh Cor res. vi. 283.
ch. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 59
even they would have needed an ideal military colleague. 1809.
The task would have taxed the utmost powers and the
best good fortune of Saunders working with Wolfe, or
of St. Vincent working with Grey ; but the greatest
men of the Navy had passed away, and, setting Colling-
wood aside, the Government hardly knew where to look
for an Admiral. Keats and John Hope, both of them
subordinates in this expedition, were better fitted to
command it than Strachan and Chatham, though the
troops were ready to make unusual exertions for Chatham
for his great brother's sake. But no commanders could
have sailed to the Scheldt at that time with any great
confidence ; and old George the Third, when consenting
to the operation, added with his usual shrewdness a
telling word of criticism. " His Majesty could have
wished that the information upon which the practicability
of the expedition has been finally decided had not been
so imperfect." *
1 Castlereagh Corres. vi. 282 ; the King to Castlereagh, 22nd
June 1809.
CHAPTER XXVI
1809. The river Scheldt debouches into the sea by two main
channels, named the East and the West Scheldt, the
mouths of which are divided by the island of Walcheren.
It is this command of both entrances that gives
Walcheren its strategic importance. The East Scheldt
itself has two branches — the northern, which leads up to
Willemstadt, and with which we have no concern ; and
the southern, which, though navigable for over forty
- miles, ends to eastward in a huge shoal commanded by
the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom.
The West Scheldt or Honte lies between Walcheren
on the north and the island of Kadzand on the south.
It has two main channels — the northern, called the
Deurloo, which was commanded by the guns of Flush-
ing, a strongly fortified town ; and the southern, called
the Wielingen Channel, which was swept by the guns of
five or six open batteries, situated above the point of
Breskens, over against Flushing. In 1809 the two
channels met under the cannon of these defences on
the northern and southern shores, and formed a single
waterway for practically the entire distance to Antwerp.
Only opposite Ellewoutsdyk the single channel parted
again into two branches, of which the southern was
defended by the fort of Terneuse, the northern by a
chain of redoubts which had been thrown up on the
island of South Beveland from Borssele to Ellewoutsdyk.
These two channels again became one within three or
four miles, and led the navigator to the point of Bat,1
1 At that time generally called Bathz or Batz.
60
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 61
where stood a formidable battery of heavy guns. Above 1809.
Bat the next defences of the river were found at Fort
Lillo on the northern shore and Fort Liefkenshoek over
against it on the southern bank ; and here the French
had constructed also a boom to hinder the passage
of hostile warships. Above Lillo were more defences
on both banks, ending finally in the citadel and town of
Antwerp. From Flushing to Terneuse the distance
by water was twelve to fifteen miles, from Terneuse
to Bat some twenty to twenty- five miles, from Bat
to Lillo about eight or ten miles, and from Lillo to
Antwerp from ten to twelve miles.1
Since Flushing could not be taken without a regular
siege, the strength of Chatham's force had been fixed
with the idea that he should advance to Antwerp with
a part of his troops, while the remainder should hold
Flushing beleaguered ; rapidity of execution being of
the utmost importance to the success of the expedition.
The armament had accordingly been distributed into
three divisions.
The first, consisting of thirty-four vessels of all
descriptions, under Sir Richard Keats, and the Reserve
of the Army, about eight thousand strong, under Sir
John Hope, was designed first to seize some command-
ing points on the island of Schouwen, on the north shore
of the East Scheldt, so as to ensure the safety of the
anchorage, known as the Roompot, on the north shore
of Walcheren and North Beveland. The troops were
then either to land on North Beveland, or to descend
the Veere Gat,2 which divides North and South Beve-
land from Walcheren, disembark upon South Beveland,
capture the fortress of Goes, and take in rear the fort of
1 This description and these figures are taken from a MS. chart
made by the Commander of the Fisgard in 1809-12. I am indebted
to the courtesy of the Admiralty for permission to consult and
photograph this chart.
2 These directions were not really given as alternatives, the
order as to North Beveland being superseded by that as to the
Veere Gat, but, as shall be seen, resumed in consequence of experi-
ence gained on the spot.
62 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 809. Borssele and the other neighbouring defences on the
north bank of the western Scheldt. Hope was further
charged to collect transport and supplies, and to patrol
as far as possible towards the east end of the island.
The second division was made up of thirteen
vessels, mostly small craft, under Commodore Owen,
and Lord Huntly's division of about five thousand
soldiers. Its function was to disembark a sufficient force
upon Kadzand to overpower the riverward batteries
and to capture the island. Lord Gardner's squadron
was likewise told off for this service, which was of vital
importance ; for upon the possession of Kadzand
depended the mastery of the Wielingen Channel and
all chances of a speedy advance up the river upon
Antwerp.
The third division was composed of thirty-seven
vessels under Admiral Otway, with the left wing of the
army under Sir Eyre Coote. This force, about twelve
thousand men, was to disembark about Zoutelande on
the south-west coast of Walcheren, and to devote
itself wholly to the capture of Flushing and to the
subjection of the island.
The whole of the troops above named were em-
barked on board vessels of war. The remainder, that
is to say, Rosslyn's and Grosvenor's divisions, were to
be carried on transports, and were ordered to remain
in the Downs, under convoy of a squadron of four
ships, until summoned to the Scheldt.
Chatham's instructions prescribed to him at large
the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, built or
building, in the Scheldt ; the destruction of the arsenals
of Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing ; the reduction of
Walcheren ; and the " rendering the Scheldt, if possible,
no longer navigable by ships of war." If the whole of
these objects should prove to be unattainable, as many
of them as possible were to be compassed, and the
army was then to return to England, leaving a
sufficient garrison on Walcheren.
The general idea of the above dispositions was that,
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 63
as soon as the disembarkations had been effected, 1809.
Rosslyn's and Grosvenor's divisions should be sum-
moned ; and that, while Coote contained Flushing,
Chatham himself should advance with the whole of the
rest of the Army, land at Santvliet, a little to the north
of Lillo, and thence push forward upon Antwerp. But
all plans subsequent to the landing at Santvliet were of
the vaguest, because there was no information upon
which to base them.1
Turning now to the side of the French, it has
already been said that from the very first Napoleon had
shown peculiar jealousy for the safety of the Scheldt.
The vast preparation of armaments in England at the
beginning of 1809, and the incessant reconnaissance of
the river by British frigates and small craft, kept the
French commanders continually on the alert ; and twice
in the course of January special orders were sent to
them from Paris to look to the safety of Flushing.
French anxiety increased as Napoleon kept calling
troops out of France towards the Danube ; and in April
information seems to have reached Paris of Castlereagh's
first plan of the expedition, for Zoutelande was known
to be the chosen place of disembarkation in Walcheren.
The result was that all existing defences were repaired
and strengthened, that the boom was thrown across the
river at Lillo, and that a scheme for concentration of
such troops as were at disposal was most carefully
thought out. In the same month, however, a happy
diversion by the British Navy distracted French
attention to the Atlantic coast. On the 11th of April
Lord Cochrane executed a brilliant attack with fire-
ships upon the French fleet in Aix Roads, an exploit
which, if properly seconded by his chief, Lord Gambier,
would have resulted in the destruction of every French
vessel. The alarm in France was great. Napoleon's
1 Instructions to Keats, 24th July ; to Capt. Owen and York,
R.N., 2 1st July ; to Admiral Otway, 1 6th July ; to Lord Gardner,
10th July; to Hope and to Huntly, 25th July; to Coote, 17th
July 1809.
64 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. thoughts flew instantly to Brittany, and his officers
trembled at the prospect of a serious raid upon any
point between Flushing and Bordeaux. Admiral Decres
actually directed the fleet in the Scheldt to take refuge
in the basin of Flushing — the very device which, for
reasons that have already been explained, the British
Admiralty would most have desired — though after a
few hours of reflection he cancelled the order. The
Generals of all the districts on the coast reported, quite
truly, that they had not troops enough to make head
against a really formidable disembarkation.
The panic had the effect of quickening the repair
and extension of the defences on the Scheldt ; and when
on the 17th of May a British squadron was sighted off
Walcheren, General Clarke, the French Minister of
War, was able to report that all the batteries were in
order and fully manned, and that all the troops had
received their instructions to meet any contingency.
A month later than this Castlereagh sought the King's
permission to allow the British preparations to go
forward with all possible secrecy ; but there was
nothing in them that was not known to the French
commanders. The constant prying of British war-
vessels into the Scheldt alone sufficed to keep the
enemy on the alert ; and it so happened that at the end
of June a strike in the dockyards of Antwerp, the
garrison of which had been greatly weakened by drafts
for the Danube, called the particular attention of the
French authorities to the insecurity of that fortress.
By the beginning of July the French generals on
the Scheldt were looking daily for the arrival of the
July 2i. British expedition. On the 21st of July some escaped
prisoners from England gave the French War Office
accurate intelligence of the numbers of Chatham's force,
which, being communicated by semaphore to Flushing,
did not elate the spirits of those in charge of the
defences. Fresh information came in daily, always to
the effect that the immediate objects of the armament
were the islands of Flushing and Kadzand ; and, when
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 65
the appearance of the British fleet was signalled from 1809.
Flushing to Paris, Clarke could only write to his master
that after taking every possible measure of precaution
for three months, he could think of nothing further
to do.1
The actual garrison of Flushing at the end of July
was something over four thousand men, regular troops,
but chiefly foreign, provisional, and veteran battalions.
The standing garrison of Kadzand was nine hundred
and fifty effective men, a number which was raised just
before Chatham's arrival to about double that strength.
Rather more than two thousand regular troops could be
added to this number from Ecloo and Ghent within
thirty-six hours, and over two thousand more, besides
a battalion of drilled workmen from Antwerp, within
sixty hours. Besides these, there were six thousand
well-trained National Guards, four-fifths of them at
St. Omer, and the remainder at Boulogne, that is to
say within three to four days' march of Flushing.
Moreover, since two thousand of these National Guards
were about to be relieved on the 1st of August, it
chanced that that number of less-trained men was close
at hand to take their place, and could likewise be
directed to the Scheldt. Thus it may be said that the
French had six thousand troops ready to meet Chatham
at any moment, and could triple that number within
three days.
The first complication which disturbed Strachan's
plans occurred actually before the expedition sailed.
On the 24th, news reached the Admiralty that Admiral July 24
Missiessy's fleet had dropped down the river to
Flushing. Strachan, therefore, at first formed sanguine
and, seemingly, rather wild hopes that he would
encounter it in the open sea, and that Hope's division
would reach South Beveland in time to cut off its
retreat up the river.2 Subsiding, however, shortly into
soberness, and fearing that the French flotilla of gun-
1 de Martel, pp. 226-281.
2 Strachan to Chatham, 24th July 1809. Chatham MSS.
VOL. VII F
66 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. boats might be detached towards Kadzand, the Admiral
gave fresh instructions to Owen not to risk a landing
in the face of formidable naval opposition, but to await
a more favourable opportunity. He also changed the
landing-place which he had appointed upon Walcheren
from the south-west to the north-west coast, and
July 26. despatched Keats's squadron on the 26th to reinforce
Gardner's, which was already at the mouth of the
Scheldt ; though he could hardly hope that Missiessy
would expose his fleet to the attack of an over-
whelmingly superior force. These changes were serious
in one respect only, namely, that they showed no
adequate sense of the vital importance of the capture
of Kadzand to the success of the expedition. Un-
fortunately, moreover, there was an additional obstacle
in the way of the operation. Huntly was in trouble
over his instructions. These bade him land two
thousand men upon Kadzand, which phrase he inter-
preted to mean two thousand men in a single dis-
embarkation. In that interpretation he was strengthened
by words let fall by the Quartermaster-general, but,
on referring the matter to Owen, he discovered that the
Commodore had not boats enough to land more than
seven hundred men at a time. Much disturbed,
Huntly made a second effort to consult Chatham upon
the point, while the squadrons were getting under way,
but he was unsuccessful owing to the prevalence of a
fog, and was obliged to proceed to his destination with
this most important detail still unsettled.1
A fine breeze from the south-west carried Chatham
and the Reserve across the North Sea in fourteen hours ;
July 28. and on the evening of the 28th they anchored in the
Steen Deep, about nine miles north-west of Walcheren.
Owen weighed at the same time with them, and on the
same evening dropped anchor off Blankenberghe, a few
miles to the westward of Kadzand, at the mouth of
the Wielingen Channel. The wind freshened during
the night, with the result that one gun-boat foundered
1 Enquiry, pp. 150-152, 161, 226.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 67
and two more were dismasted ; and Strachan was 1 809.
obliged to dispatch officers after dark to sound the
channel to a safer anchorage, the Roompot. On the
morning of the 29th Keats joined Strachan with his July 29.
division ; and this squadron, together with Hope's
Reserve, was piloted by Sir Home Popham into the
Roompot, where the vessels anchored early in the
afternoon off Zieriksee. An hour or two later the
Left Wing under Sir Eyre Coote arrived from the
Downs in the Steen Deep ; but the wind had now
shifted to the westward and was blowing so hard that
the anchorage was no longer safe, while the surf upon
the west coast of Walcheren was so heavy as to prohibit
any attempt at a landing. In the evening, however,
Popham reported that there was space in the Roompot
for the entire armament. Hope also, after reconnais-
sance of the shore of Schouwen, announced that the
anchorage was out of range from thence ; and begged
permission, therefore, to land upon South Beveland and
to take the batteries on the north bank of the West
Scheldt in reverse, according to the original plan.
Orders were sent to him accordingly on the same night,
together with a sum of money for the purchase of
transport ; and at six o'clock on the following morning July 30.
Strachan's fleet weighed anchor and proceeded into the
Roompot. Within five hours the whole was lying
safely off Breezand, just to westward of the northern
mouth of the Veere Gat.
At eleven o'clock, signal was made for the troops
to get into the boats and assemble for disembarkation,
but the flood-tide, with a stiff south-westerly gale at its
back, was running so furiously that boats could make
no head against it. At four o'clock the tide slackened.
By half-past five the boats of the first division, contain-
ing Browne's brigade l on the right and Rottenburg's
1 The brigades had already been changed. Browne's brigade
consisted of 2/z3rd (400), i/26th (651), 1/8 1st (644); Rotten-
burg's of 2 cos. 95th (200), 68th (775), 1/7 1st (934), i/85th
<97°)-
The numbers indicate rank and file only.
68 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. on the left, and one light battery of artillery, the whole
July 30. under command of Lord Paget, were formed in line ;
and at six o'clock Chatham gave the order to pull for
the shore. His instructions to Coote were that the
left of the line should make for a beacon a mile to
westward of the fort of Ten Haak, on the Veere Gat,
so as to avoid its fire and, wheeling round, to take it in
reverse. This was effected without difficulty. The
fort fired a few useless shots at the ships which covered
the landing, but this was the only resistance that was
offered. The troops soon made their way through
three lines of sand-dunes into the interior, capturing a
few prisoners after a slight skirmish in a belt of wood ;
while Colonel Pack, on the left, wheeled the Seventy-
first round upon the rear of Ten Haak and found it
abandoned, with four heavy guns spiked but three more
undamaged. He took, however, a few prisoners and
two more field-guns, which had apparently been brought
forward to oppose the landing ; and, losing no time,
he advanced with five companies of his regiment along
the dyke by the Veere Gat to the fortified town of
Veere. Chatham made Ten Haak his headquarters
for the night.
Meanwhile, the boats had returned to the ships, and
had landed Graham's division x and another light
battery ; and all through the night the disembarkation
continued. By ten o'clock another light battery and
Picton's brigade 2 were on shore, and at half-past ten
that officer was despatched with the Thirty-sixth to
support Pack, who was meditating an attempt to carry
Veere by surprise. Pack delivered his attack shortly
afterwards, but was beaten back with a loss of five-
and-thirty men ; and Popham then ordered the gun-
1 Graham had taken over Cradock's division consisting of two
brigades: Houston's, 3/lst (944), l/32nd (565), 51st* (512);
i/82nd* (969); Hay's, i/sth (939), 2/35^ (739), 2/14^
(8i3).
* These battalions did not land till late at night.
2 Picton's brigade, l/36th (594), l/y/th (545), 2/63^ (555),
battalion of detachments (800).
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 69
boats to move up the Veere Gat as early as possible 1809.
next day in order to bombard Veere ; while at
half-past three on the morning of the 31st, General July 31.
Fraser advanced with the remainder of Picton's brigade
to invest the town. So far, therefore, there seems to
have been no lack of energy, though all circumstances
had conspired to throw obstacles in the way of the
expedition. Foul weather had delayed the disembarka-
tion for full thirty-six hours, and had then diverted it
to the quarter remotest from Flushing. From this
point the principal lines of advance were blocked by
the petty fort of Veere and by the town of Middelburg
which, though not coming within the description of a
fortress, was enclosed by bastioned lines and by a ditch.
One contemporary critic,1 so bitter and, indeed, scandal-
ous as to invite little credit, insinuated to Castlereagh
several weeks later that the army could have advanced
and surprised Flushing on the night of the 30th. This
contention is, I think, ridiculous. The troops had been
on board ship for at least five days, much crowded and,
since the 28 th, probably suffering much from sea-sickness.
It must have been fully seven o'clock before five thousand
men were ashore ; nor could these, after brushing aside
the first opposition, have settled down into column of
route in less than another hour. They would then
have had a march of at least fifteen miles over country
of which they knew nothing, without power to recon-
noitre it from want of light, and without the means of
reconnaissance from want of cavalry. The inhabitants,
having horses, could easily have given timely warning to
Flushing, itself a well-fortified town with a garrison of
five thousand men. If Chatham had attempted any
such foolhardy enterprise, he would rightly have been
condemned for ignorance of his business.
About dawn of the 31st, deputies came in from
Middelburg to negotiate for the surrender of the town,
1 An anonymous paper in the Londonderry MSS., described in
the index of the MSS. as by Anderson, a captious amateur soldier
so far as I can gather from his writings.
70 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xrn
1809. which was duly agreed upon. By eight o'clock the
investment of Veere was completed, and the gun-boats
opened fire upon the fort, which answered with vigour,
sinking two of them. The disembarkation of troops
and artillery continued, and Chatham, having redis-
tributed the battalions into a new organisation,1 advanced
at one o'clock in two columns. Of the first column
the Right Wing marched to Meliskerke, throwing out
patrols to Zoutelande ; and the Centre accompanied by
Chatham, to Grypskerke. The second column ad-
vanced by Serooskerke to St. Laurens, on the direct
road to Middelburg. Great exertions were made to
bring up heavy guns before Veere, but the bombard-
ment of the gun-boats had already laid the town in
ruins. Two hundred men, that is to say about half
of the garrison, escaped by water in the night to
Flushing, and the remainder, after a most gallant de-
fence, surrendered at four o'clock on the morning of
Aug. 1. the 1 st of August.
On the same day the army continued its advance,
the ground being perfectly flat but thickly wooded
with stunted coppice. Graham, on the right, moved
1 New organisation of the troops on Walcheren, 31st July 1809.
Right Wing. Maj.-Gen. Graham.
Artillery : five light 6-prs., one 5 J in. howitzer (1 battery).
Light Infantry : 2 cos. 68th L.I., 31 of 2/95th.
Infantry: Col. Day, 3/ist, i/5th, 2/35th, 30 men of Staff
Corps.
Centre. Lieut.-Gen. Lord Paget.
Artillery : five light 6-prs., one 5^ in. howitzer (1 battery).
Light Infantry : Brig.-Gen. Rottenburg, 8 cos. /68th, 85th,
120 of 2/95th.
Infantry: Brig.-Gen. Browne, z/z^rd, i/26th, i/32nd, i/8ist.
Left Wing. Lieut.-Gen. Mackenzie Fraser.
Artillery : five light 6 prs., one 5J in. howitzer (1 battery).
Infantry : Maj.-Gen. Picton, 50 men 2/95^, l/36th, 2/63^,
i/7lst, 77th, battalion of detachments, 20 men ot Staff
Corps.
Reserve.
Artillery : five 9-prs., one heavy 5^ in. howitzer (1 battery).
Infantry : Brig.-Gen. Houston, 2/ 14th, 51st, i/82nd.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 71
down the south-west coast of the island, by Zoutelande, 1809.
Dishoek, Vygeneter, and Nolle, upon the western front
of Flushing. There were seaward batteries at all of
these places, which were either deserted or evacuated
after a trifling resistance ; and Graham finally took up
a position, with his right resting on the dyke at Nolle,
and his left on the road to West Souburp-.
Paget, meanwhile, moved by Koudekerke, where his
advance parties met with some slight opposition, to
West Souburg. In front of this village a small body
of the enemy again made some resistance, but was soon
dispersed with loss by Rottenburg's brigade and pursued
to the very gates of Flushing by the Sixty-eighth and
Eighty-fifth, who paid for their rashness with somewhat
heavy loss. Four officers were wounded, and about
ninety men killed and wounded in this affair ; but, on
the other hand, the enemy suffered severely, losing two
hundred prisoners.1 Foolish gossip afterwards gave
out that the two British regiments would, if supported,
have carried Flushing there and then ; but a fortress
with a sufficient garrison of regular troops, fully prepared
against attack, is not to be taken in broad daylight by
an assault of a few hundred men.
The second column of the Reserve simultaneously
marched through Middelburg, and about two miles
beyond it, at Abeele, found the enemy established with
three guns behind a breast-work and abatis, and their
sharp-shooters lining the enclosures upon each flank.
The Light Infantry of the Reserve carried the village
smartly, captured the three guns, and continued the
advance towards East Souburg. Here again the French
offered resistance, but General Houston, turning the
village, forced them to retire with the loss of one gun
and several wounded and prisoners, after which he took
up his position a little in advance of East Souburg.
Fraser, likewise, having received the surrender of
Veere, marched forward with the Left Wing of the first
column by Middelburg to Ritthem, investing the fort
1 Chatham MSS. Paget to Chatham, 1st Aug. 1809.
72 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. of Rammekens on the Veere Gat, and completing the
Aug. 1. investment of Flushing from the east. It remained,
therefore, only to bring up heavy artillery to batter
Flushing from the land, while the fleet should close
its communications by water. The operations so far
had cost the British nearly three hundred killed, wounded,
and missing.1
On this same day, Hope's division, after being kept
idle by squally weather throughout the 31st, was moved
in small craft from the anchorage of Zieriksee up the
East Scheldt, as if making for Bergen-op-Zoom. About
noon, from two thousand to twenty-five hundred men 2
landed unopposed between Kattendyke and Wemeldinge
on the north-eastern shore of South Beveland. The
main body at once moved south-westward upon Goes,
which surrendered ; and Hope presently ascertained that
the enemy was retiring upon Bat, collecting the peasantry
as they went. He therefore marched eastward likewise,
and took up a position for the night in two lines,
extending Disney's brigade across the eastern tongue
of the island from Kattendyke through Kapelle to
Biezelinge, while Erskine's occupied Goes and the
Aug. 2. ground to southward of it. On the following day
Disney's brigade advanced towards Waarde, where there
was a battery which commanded the usual anchorage of
the French fleet. This work, however, was found to be
deserted and its guns to be spiked ; and a patrol, moving
upon Bat in the afternoon, discovered that this
important defence had likewise been abandoned, the am-
munition removed, and the cannon rendered unservice-
able. In the course of the day it was ascertained that
the whole of the batteries on the Western Scheldt had
been evacuated, and the guns spiked. Hope, therefore,
echeloned his three brigades along the eastern tongue
1 I officer, 45 men killed; 14 officers, 200 men wounded;
34 men missing. Nearly one-third of these casualties fell upon
the 3/lst.
2 The Light Infantry, 3/ist Guards, and part of the 92nd
could not be landed this day. The landed portion of the 92nd
occupied Goes.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 73
of South Beveland from Goes to Bat. He had ac- 1 809.
complished the work entrusted to him with unexpected
ease ; and, indeed, the evacuation of Bat, which was not
an open battery but a closed work requiring a regular
siege, was anything but creditable to General Bruce,
the Dutch commandant. Meanwhile, however, Missiessy
had on the 31st begun his retreat up the river,1 and
Hope reported that he could see the French vessels
safely lying about Antwerp.
The operations of Chatham and Hope were in
reality but secondary, for the truly important point of
attack was Kadzand. Commodore Owen with Huntly's
division had anchored, it will be remembered, off
Blankenberghe on the evening of the 28th. On the July 28.
29th the garrison of the island numbered, as we have July 29.
seen, from eighteen to nineteen hundred men ; but on
that day the wind was so strong, and the surf upon the
shore was so high, that a landing was impossible ; and
by the morning of the 30th the garrison had been
strengthened by close upon a thousand men. On the
evening of the 29th Owen represented to Strachan that
he had not the means of disembarking as many men
as Huntly desired, and begged that the boats of
Lord Gardner's squadron might be sent to him.
Strachan, however, who had originally ordered Gardner
to hold his boats at Owen's disposal, had desired that
Admiral at the same time to make a feint off the
south-west coast of Walcheren from the eastern corner
of the Steen Deep, so that Gardner was otherwise
employed. At the dawn of the 30th, dispositions were July 30.
again made for a landing, but the wind was still blow-
ing too hard to admit the debarkation of the troops
from the boats of the transports,2 and the boats of the
men-of-war would not carry more than seven hundred
soldiers. Huntly, therefore, though most anxious to do
1 dc Martel, p. 301.
2 Owen explained that the boats of the transports, being weakly
manned, could make little progress towing flat-boats against a head
wind, and that there was danger of their drifting under the enemy's
batteries. Enquiry, p. 154.
74 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. his duty, did not think himself justified in attempting to
July 30. land with so small a body of men, as he could not have
been reinforced in less than an hour and a half by a
second debarkation from the same boats.
July 31. The attack was therefore put off till the 31st ; but,
meanwhile, the garrison of Kadzand had risen in numbers
to four thousand men ; and Huntly, seeing that the
French were in considerable strength, declined to make
the attempt without the boats of Lord Gardner's
squadron, which would enable him to land a fairly strong
force at one and the same time. Gardner replied that
his instructions bade him remain where he was. In the
course of the day the numbers of the French on the
island increased to nearly six thousand men, including
three hundred cavalry, and before nightfall they had
risen to over six thousand. Huntly was not, of course,
aware of the exact numbers, but he had himself seen
two separate bodies of men, each eight hundred strong,
and he could not tell how many more might be con-
cealed behind the dykes. The whole project was
Aug. 2. therefore again postponed, and Strachan on the 2nd
of August wrote to Gardner : " Owen is right in not
attacking Kadzand. I never approved it, and Lord
Aug. 3. Chatham will be glad." On the 3rd of August Owen
received definite orders to make no further attempt
upon Kadzand, and to transport Huntly's division to
the Roompot. It was noticed that throughout these
days Huntly received no orders from Chatham, every
proceeding being under the direction of the Navy.1
From that moment — it would perhaps be more
accurate to say from the time when the first attack
on Kadzand was abandoned on the 30th — it may be
said that the failure of the whole enterprise was assured.
Unless the southern channel of the West Scheldt were
opened, the fleet, according to all reasonable calculation,
would have to wait until the fall of Flushing had cleared
the northern channel, and, meanwhile, the enemy would
1 Enquiry, pp. 150-166, 197-198, 200-205. Dyott's Diary, i.
279.
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 75
have abundant time to collect reinforcements for the 1809.
defence of Antwerp. Napoleon himself attached so
much importance to the possession of Kadzand that
his first and constant thought was for its safety and
defence.1 Castlereagh so little understood its signifi-
cance that he wrote to Chatham of the "great advantage"
arising from the " fortunate failure " in occupying
Kadzand, inasmuch as it liberated a larger force for
operations further up the river." It would be strange
if Strachan and Chatham had thus deceived themselves,
and, indeed, there is evidence that, in spite of their
brave words, thev realised the truth.3 Strachan was
fully aware that the French fleet could pass above
Antwerp, and that, therefore, it was extremely improbable
that he could ever overtake it ; and it is for this reason
likely that he was bent, at any rate, upon securing Wal-
cheren. At the same time, considering that the capture
of Kadzand was a definite part of the plan and im-
portant even for the subjection of Flushing, his orders
to Gardner seem to have been far too vague and
irresolute. But it is possible, again, that his intelligence
was too narrow to grasp the full purport of his task,
or to comprehend the multitude of complicated opera-
tions by which it was to be accomplished. His own
immediate business was the capture of Walcheren ; he
could not attend heartily to any other ; and he appears
not to have possessed the ability or the greatness to act
solely as director-in-chief, and to leave all details of
execution to his subordinates.
Meanwhile, Chatham was engaged in bringing up
his siege-artillery, which was landing at Veere. This
work was found to be too heavy for the artillery-horses,
the roads being so narrow and the ditches so numerous
that accidents were frequent ; and, accordingly, the whole
of the guns were hauled over a deep soil, soaked with
1 Corres.de Napoleon, 15,619, 15,650, 15,643, 15,650.
2 Chatham MSS. Castlereagh to Chatham, 21st Aug. 1809.
3 "I agree with you in regretting that we cannot take Kadzand,"
Strachan to Chatham, 8th August. Chatham MSS.
76 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. constant rains, by huge teams of men.1 Chatham had
early called upon Strachan to cut off communication
between Kadzand and Flushing, and it was time, for
Aug. 1. on the night of the 1st a strong reinforcement was
passed into the beleaguered city from Kadzand. But,
unfortunately, the weather made it impossible for ships
to anchor in the channel between the two. They could
only lie above it or below, and it was easy for the
enemy to pass troops across from Kadzand, for the
prevailing wind served their purpose exactly. Owen
strove to the utmost at considerable risk to intercept
Aug. 2. crossing boats, but with little success ; and on the 2nd
it was considered prudent to disembark Grosvenor's
division which, together with Rosslyn's, had arrived
on the 31st of July ; though these troops were held
ready for an immediate re-embarkation directly an
advance should become practicable. Meanwhile, heavy
Aug. 3. ordnance began to arrive from Veere, and on the 3rd
the erection of batteries against Flushing was begun.
Heavy guns were also brought up against Rammekens,
which was battered into surrender before evening. The
fall of this fortress opened the Veere Gat to the passage
of small craft, and Chatham wrote to Strachan to suggest
that the ships should be brought through that channel
and its continuation, known as the Sloe, to the West
Scheldt, thereby evading the guns of Kadzand and
Flushing. Moreover, expecting that the British flotilla
would now complete the investment of Flushing on
the side of the water, he wrote to Hope that he should
advance with every man that could be spared to the
ultimate destination of the armament.
Aug. 4. Nevertheless, in broad daylight of the following day,
a reinforcement was passed from Kadzand to Flushing
under the eyes of the British, consuming no more than
seventeen minutes from bank to bank. The same thing
Aug. 5, 6. happened on the following day, and on the day after,
by which time the garrison of Flushing had been raised
to between seven and eight thousand men. It was
1 Letters from Flushing, pp. 163-164.
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 77
necessary again to reinforce the besieging armv, and 1S09.
Von Alten's brigade of Rosslyn's division was accord- Aug. 5, 6.
ingly landed at Veere on the 5th. On the 6th Chatham
had a consultation with Strachan, urged the importance
of a speedy advance up the Scheldt, and pressed the
Admiral for answers to his questions as to the use of the
Sloe channel, and the possibility of completing the
naval blockade of Flushing. Strachan rightly declared
the passage of the Sloe to be so difficult that it would
cause much delay, and recommended that the whole
of the troops not employed before Flushing should be
landed on South Beveland, and marched overland to
Bat, whither a certain number of transports and store-
ships would follow them in a day or two. This,
however, would have made matters worse instead of
better, for the disembarkation and the re-embarkation
of the horses would have taken much time, while the
heavy guns could not by any possibility have been
dragged through the deep roads of South Beveland.
It is not, therefore, surprising that Chatham rejected
the proposal. As to severing communications between
Kadzand and Flushing, Strachan could give no answer ;
and Chatham wrote to Hope that, until this matter were
settled, an advance would be impossible.1 He arranged,
however, with Strachan that Huntly's and Rosslyn's
divisions, together with the transports of the cavalry and
artillery, should drop down from the Roompot into the
Sloe and there disembark upon South Beveland, so that
the main river should be as little embarrassed as possible
by transports.2
On the 7th once more French troops were able to Aug. 7.
cross over from Kadzand to Flushing, making over
three thousand men thrown into the place within a
week ; 3 and on the afternoon of the same day the
1 Chatham's letter to the King, 15th Oct. 1809; Strachan's
answer thereto, 5th March 18 10.
2 Chatham MSS. Memo, by Chatham, 6th Aug. 1809.
3 The numbers thrown into Flushing were : on 1st Aug. 660
men; 2nd, 1003 ; 4th, 320; 6th and 7th, 1160. Total, 3143 —
all of them French regular troops, de Martel, p. 403.
78 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. garrison of the town made a sortie in two columns
Aug. 7. upon Graham's division to westward of Flushing,
but was driven back after three hours' fighting with
Aug. 8. considerable loss.1 On the morrow Chatham at last
saw his desire fulfilled, for the wind permitted the
British flotilla to extend across to Kadzand, and cut
it off" completely from Flushing. Popham, therefore,
went up the West Scheldt to take soundings, and
Huntly's and Rosslyn's divisions moved to their place
Aug. 9. of disembarkation. On the 9th these two divisions
landed in South Beveland, and, more important still,
a British sloop moved up the West Scheldt, under the
full fire of the batteries of Kadzand and Flushing, and
returned under the same fire with little damage. On
the other hand, Chatham was much embarrassed by the
difficulty of obtaining correct information as to the
enemy's movements or numbers, though all intelligence
agreed that the forces of the enemy were rapidly
increasing, and would soon amount to forty thousand
men. Hope also reported that no supplies nor
resources for an army were to be found in South
Beveland.
Aug. 10. Then followed a new complication. On the 10th
the water in the ditches of Walcheren began to rise,
and a French officer, who had been taken prisoner
while trying to pass from Flushing to Kadzand, re-
ported truly 2 that the sea-dykes had been cut by
Napoleon's special order, though much against the will
of General Monnet, the commandant. The water did
not gain very rapidly, and the peasants, as was natural,
were very willing to show how the inundation could
be kept within bounds ; but, none the less, the troops
suffered severely. They were for hours together up
to their knees in water, and this hardship, combined
with constant rain, told heavily upon them. Besides
1 The British troops chiefly engaged were the Royal Scots, the
5th and 3 cos. of the 35th (Graham to Chatham, Chatham MSS.).
The British casualties were: 14 men killed, 8 officers, 133 men
wounded ; 1 officer, 4 men missing.
2 See Corres. de Napoleon, 15,620.
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 79
the inevitable rheumatism and dysentery, miasmatic 1 S09.
fever broke out among them, and before the 12th of
August it had become necessary to relieve the sentries
twice instead of once, and to order the dead to be
buried at night without torches or candles a lest the
survivors should see them and despair.
The batteries, however, were very near completion,
so that the inundation came too late to save Flushing.
On the evening of the 1 ith a division of frigates passed Aug. 11.
up the Scheldt under heavy fire from both Kadzand
and Flushing, but gained the reach above the town
safely with little damage or loss ; and on the same day
seven line-of-battle ships moved off Dishoek, so as to
be ready to take part in the coming bombardment.
Foul winds, prevented them from taking their right
place ; but none the less early in the afternoon of the
13th the besiegers' batteries opened fire from fifty-one Aug. 13.
heavy pieces, supported by the gun-boats of the flotilla.
The enemy replied vigorously, dismantling two guns, but
inflicting little loss ; and at sunset a lodgment was made
by the Royal Scots at the western corner of the works.
The fire slackened after dark, but the British continued
to discharge carcases and rockets into the town which,
already twice kindled during the afternoon, burst finally
at midnight into serious conflagration. Soon after
daylight, the British batteries again opened, and within Aug. 14.
three hours several of the enemy's guns, including the
most formidable of the seaward batteries, were silenced.
The seven line-of-battle ships then weighed anchor from
Dishoek and fired upon the town, with such effect that
after two o'clock the French hardly discharged a shot.
At six a flag was sent in to summon the garrison to
surrender ; but, the answer being unsatisfactory, fire was
reopened four hours later, and at eleven o'clock Colonel
Pack attacked and carried one of the enemy's advanced
works on the eastern side. Four hours later Monnet Aug. 15.
sent in an offer to surrender, and on the 1 6th British Aug. 16.
troops occupied the gates of the town.
1 Letters from Flushing, pp. 1 17-120.
80 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. The prisoners taken in Flushing numbered close upon
Aug. 16. fifty-eight hundred ; over eighteen hundred more had
been captured or had come over as deserters 1 since the
beginning of operations in Walcheren; over one thousand
sick and wounded 2 had been transported to Kadzand
before the river had been closed ; and several men, of
course, had been killed. Altogether the operations must
have cost the French at least eight thousand people ; and
it is probable that they had upon Walcheren, from first to
last, more nearly nine thousand than eight thousand, not
reckoning the burghers of Flushing, who were compelled
to serve in the batteries. Monnet was not considered to
have made a creditable defence,3 wherefore possibly he
may have sought to belittle the extent of his resources.
The casualties of the British Army from the 30th of
July to the 17th of August reached a total of seven
hundred and thirty-eight killed, wounded, and missing.
Meanwhile the preparations for the advance had
been pushed forward as far as possible. Hope, by
unspiking some of the guns captured at Bat, had
Aug. 1 1. repelled on the nth an attack of the French flotilla;
and Popham with the English flotilla had reached that
1 The deserters were chiefly Prussians, but many also were
Spaniards, the remains of Romana's army — Letters from Flushing,
Si-
2 Chatham (to Castlereagh, 16th Aug. 1809) says about a
thousand ; but the French figures do not support this (de Martel,
p. 403). The numbers of the garrison at the time of the British
disembarkation were about 4638 men. There were thrown in
from Kadzand 3143, making a total of 7781. The exact numbers
given by Chatham's returns are : taken at the surrender of Flushing,
5803, of whom 618 wounded, prisoners and deserters taken pre-
viously, 1 8 16. Total, 7619. This allows for only 162 killed
during the whole of the operations, which seems to be a very small
allowance. Our troops found more than one heap of dead loosely
buried under six inches of soil. But the French returns are very
mysterious, for actually two different returns were made by the
garrison upon its surrender, one showing it to be 4379, and the
other 5803. M. de Martel has evidently taken pains to arrive at the
truth, but probably he understates the total strength of the troops
upon Walcheren, which Chatham more correctly reckoned at 9000
men. '3 de Martel, pp. 403, 412, 431.
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 81
point of the river on the same day. Huntly's division 1809.
and the infantry of Rosslyn's had landed on South
Beveland on the 9th, and Rosslyn had taken over the
command upon the island. The transports of the
cavalry also, after long delay through foul winds, had
made their way through the Sloe Channel to the West
Scheldt ; Grosvenor's and Graham's divisions received
orders to embark at Rammekens, and to move likewise
up the river ; and Chatham announced that on the 20th
he should shift his headquarters to Goes. He was
delayed for twenty-four hours by a troublesome question,
which shall be considered later, respecting his supply of
specie, but on the 21st he duly set out, leaving General Aug. 21.
Fraser to hold Walcheren with Picton's and Browne's
brigades and the Seventy-first Regiment. Grosvenor's
division and the cavalry had already started up the
river on the 20th, and Graham followed them on the
2 1 st. By that day Rosslyn's, Hope's, and Huntly's
divisions, together with the Ninth Light Dragoons, the
Second Hussars of the German Legion, and the waggon-
train, were all cantoned towards the eastern end of
South Beveland, while some of the cavalry-transports
had reached Bat. But on the other side information
came in of constant reinforcements still reaching Ant-
werp, of the flooding of large tracts of country from
Liefkenshoek westward and from Bergen -op -Zoom
northward, and finally of the whole of the French fleet
having moved above Antwerp.
Now too came an entirely new complication, which
finally decided the fate of the campaign. The mias-
matic fever, which had already showed itself before
Flushing, broke out in South Beveland. On the 20th
there were nearly sixteen hundred men on the sick list,
and the number increased alarmingly on the three
following days. However, the divisions of Grosvenor
and Graham continued their voyage up the river, and
on the 23rd the former arrived at Bat. On that same Aug. 23.
day Strachan, with five ships of the line, came up the
river to Waarde, whither Chatham went to see him ;
vol. vii c
82 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. but the Admiral had discovered that the enemy were
constructing works higher up the Scheldt at Santvliet,
Doel, and Lillo, and could give his attention to nothing
Aug. 24. but the means of thwarting them.1 On the 24th
Graham's division arrived at Bat ; and Chatham, having
transferred his headquarters to that post, sent his chief
Aug. 25. staff officers next day with Popham to reconnoitre the
beach about Santvliet, which, on Sir Home's recommenda-
tion, had been selected for a landing-place. But sickness
was increasing among the troops every hour ; all infor-
mation agreed that Antwerp was in a good state of
defence, with all guns mounted and a strong garrison ;
and Chatham spent his day consulting with his generals
and the naval officers, for he apprehended that the time
was come to choose finally between an advance, wherein
success was, so far as he could judge, highly precarious,
and an immediate re-embarkation for England.
By this time Admiral and General were no longer
on friendly terms. The first trouble had begun on the
31st of July, when Strachan was much annoyed over
the employment of the gun-boats in bombarding Veere,
upon which matter Chatham had, it appears, not con-
sulted him.2 Next, Chatham had thought Strachan
negligent in the matters of blockading Flushing by
water, of passing transports through the very difficult
channel of the Sloe,8 of sending a flotilla up the river to
support Hope at Bat, and generally of failing to hasten
his ships of war up the Scheldt. Strachan, on the other
hand, conceived his colleague to be unpardonable for not
marching the army through South Beveland to Bat,
and was impatient because Chatham would not give
authority to Rosslyn, as he himself had given authority
to Keats, to advance with such troops as were already
1 Strachan to Chatham, 23rd Aug., Chatham MSS.
2 Strachan to Chatham, 31st July 1809, Chatham MSS.
3 Chatham had evidently formed his ideas of the Sloe from
obsolete maps. In the seventeenth century the Sloe channel was
perfectly open to the south, but in 1809 was obstructed by a bank
which had been thrown up in the course of years from the south-
western corner of South Beveland almost to Flushing.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 83
on South Beveland on the 17th of August.1 Each, of 1809.
course, thought the other unreasonable, and it seems
most likely that both were wrong. Foul weather,
difficulties of navigation, and the time needed for
arming transports and gun-boats accounted for the
delay imputed by Chatham to Strachan ; while Strachan
upon his side had not the slightest idea of the diffi-
culties which presented themselves to Chatham, par-
ticularly in the matter of finance, as to which a word
must now be said.
Upon the departure of the expedition the Commis-
sary-general received strict orders from the Treasury
to pay the inhabitants, for any articles supplied, no
more than the market price as it stood before the disem-
barkation of the army. The Treasury further expected
him to defray all expenses by bills upon London, and
even to obtain specie by the same means. The Com-
missary soon found that these instructions were wholly
inapplicable to the situation. Even if communication
with Rotterdam, Amsterdam, or Hamburg had been
open, the bills could not have been discounted except
at a loss of fifteen or twenty per cent ; while, as circum-
stances actually stood, they were mere valueless paper.
The Commissaries therefore pressed that allowance
might be made for these drawbacks in the prices paid
to the inhabitants. " We have not only drained them
of cattle," they wrote, " but have often taken their
cows, which were of greater value to them for the
support of their families than can be made good by
the highest price paid for beef. We have also taken
all their horses, waggons, and drivers, without further
remuneration than their rations, and this at harvest
time." Chatham, in forwarding this letter, heartily
supported the appeal, and begged also for a further
supply of specie. The result was not satisfactory.
Huskisson at the Treasury wrote a severe rebuke to
the Commissary, declined to furnish any additional
supply of specie, and stated simply that, if requisitions
1 Enquiry, Appendix, p. 89.
84 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. were not satisfied upon the terms laid down in his
instructions, they must be collected by force. The
explanation of this attitude was privately explained to
Chatham by Castlereagh. " When I inform you," he
wrote, " that we do not possess the power of sending
a single foreign coin from hence, and that in the last
extremity, rather than disband the army, British guineas
must be sent, you will not be surprised at receiving
peremptory orders to enforce the system agreed on
before you left London. ... I need not suggest what
would be the impression if guineas were going out to
pay our army abroad. Besides, it could not be done
without an Order in Council, and other proceedings
which might embarrass."
This was the letter which detained Chatham for
twenty-four hours at Middelburg when he was about
to move his headquarters to Goes ; and his answer
showed that he was the son of his father. He declined
flatly to carry Castlereagh's instructions into effect.
To issue bills at par would, he wrote, be a most rigor-
ous and unjust exaction of money ; and the case was
not one in which the extreme rights of war could be
exercised. Walcheren had surrendered upon terms
that private property should be respected ; and a forced
contribution would therefore be a breach of faith.
Either allowance must be made for discount, or guineas
must be sent to him. He was aware of the incon-
veniences of the latter course, but they would be
nothing to that which would attend the dishonour of
the British name. He ended his letter by defending
his Commissary against the censure of the Treasury,
bearing testimony to his efforts to keep the army
supplied.1
Nevertheless, as a Cabinet Minister, he knew the
difficulties of Cabinets and the practice of evading them,
1 W.O., i. 191, Chatham to Sec. of State, nth Aug. (enclosing
Com. -Gen. Robinson to Mil. Sec, 8th Aug.), 20th Aug. ; Castle-
reagh Corres. vi. 304; Huskisson to Com. -Gen. Robinson, 17th
Aug. ; Chatham MSS., Castlereagh to Chatham, 17th Aug. 1809.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 85
and no doubt he foresaw that he would not gain his 1809.
point without a struggle. In point of fact, Castlereagh
merely sent him the opinion of the King's Advocate in
support of the Treasury's contention, as if an academic
pronouncement could be of the slightest value in such
a case ; though he softened the blow by a remittance of
^40,000 in dollars.1 But this reply did not arrive
until September, and Chatham had to take account of
things as they stood. He had been sent out on the
hypothesis that Antwerp was insecurely fortified and
weakly held; and it was now ascertained that the fortifi-
cations were strong and in good order, and that the
garrison was powerful. The fleet had already retired
beyond Antwerp, and the city itself could not be taken
nor its arsenals destroyed except after a regular siege.
For this there were not sufficient heavy guns without
having resort to those of the fleet.2 Moreover, even
if guns had been forthcoming, it was more than doubt-
ful whether, in the most favourable circumstances,
Chatham had now troops enough for such an operation,
since his men were dropping down hourly both in
Walcheren and in South Beveland under the stroke of
miasmatic fever. Again, it was certain that, besides
Antwerp on his front, Bergen-op-Zoom upon his left
flank had been strongly reinforced, which made his
position, whether for advance or retreat, most perilous.
The enemy were assembling also in considerable numbers
in Kadzand, so that Flushing needed as vigilant watching
as a besieged city. If Chatham pushed farther up the
river, Flushing, with half of its garrison in hospital,
might fall, particularly if the inhabitants, enraged by
requisitions, should turn against the British ; and then his
retreat would be cut off. The hostility of the popula-
tion also would immensely enhance the danger of a
retirement through South Beveland. As to his generals,
Erskine and Lord Huntly, who had known Antwerp
in 1793, had never concealed their opinion as to the
impracticability of taking it without a regular siege ;
1 Chatham MSS. "-' Enquiry, p. 297.
86 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. while Hope, never sanguine of success, had been con-
vinced after a few days in South Beveland that the
objects of the expedition were unattainable. Sir Robert
Aug. 26. Brownrigg submitted a statement to the generals, setting
forth that by all intelligence the enemy had in Breda,
Bergen-op-Zoom, and Antwerp, thirty-three thousand
men, besides two or three thousand more on the left
bank of the Scheldt. He reckoned that Chatham, after
deducting detachments to hold Walcheren and South
Beveland, to observe Bergen-op-Zoom, to reduce Lief-
kenshoek, and occupy the left bank of the Scheldt,
would have but ten thousand men left for the attack
on Antwerp ; and the generals therefore unanimously
pronounced further operations to be unprofitable.
Strachan, however, while admitting that only the
capture of Antwerp could fulfil the purpose for which
the armament had been despatched, was eager for the
army to attack Lillo and Liefkenshoek, since the com-
mand of those fortresses might " open some further
field of enterprise." The fact was that some French
ships of the line had dropped down again below
Antwerp, and that he was longing to make an attempt
against them. Chatham rejoined very truly that the
reduction of Lillo and Liefkenshoek would not only be
difficult in itself, but would involve the very dangerous
necessity of dividing the army ; while, even if the opera-
tions were successful, they would in no way further
the object of the expedition. As a matter of fact
neither of these little strongholds could have been taken
without a regular siege, the preparations for which
would have consumed a week, nor could their com-
munications with Antwerp have been cut off" owing to
the inundation. Strachan then seems to have lost his
head, or, being unwell at the moment, to have given
way to an impulsive haste which was habitual to him.1
1 " He was intemperate at times on board ship and headstrong
in his zeal." Biographical Notes of Admiral Sir William Hotkam,
G.C.B. ; a very interesting MS. most kindly lent to me by his
great-nephew, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Charles Hotham. The
ch. xxvr HISTORY OF THE ARMY 87
He wrote a wild letter to Chatham, stating, quite un- 1809.
truly, that the army had only a week's provisions and
the navy only four days' left, and that the General
ought to report this to England at once ; hinting also
that he should in his own letter mention this dearth of
victuals as Chatham's sole reason for abandoning the
enterprise. He added, however, that, looking to the
state of the supplies, the increase of sickness, and the
growing power of the enemy, little success was to be
expected from any further operation. Altogether the
letter was not such as one gentleman should have
written to another. To make matters worse, though
Chatham, of course, was unaware of this last fact,
Strachan on the same day wrote to the Admiralty a
despatch which, by his own subsequent confession, con-
tained unjust reflections upon the military Commander-
in-Chief and his fellow-generals. This incident does
not throw a very pleasant light upon the character of
Chatham's naval colleague.1
Chatham, however, had other things to think about
than the Admiral's vagaries. On the 27th the sick in Aug. 27.
South Beveland numbered over thirty-four hundred ;
on the 28th they numbered four thousand, including Aug. 28.
several officers ; and on the latter day the General began
his arrangements for evacuating South Beveland and
sending the cavalry to England. Strachan was anxious
to detain the troops in South Beveland for ten days or
a fortnight, while he executed his instructions to destroy
the navigation of the river ; but Chatham firmly declined,
pointing out that there were no hostile troops on the
island, and that it lay with Strachan himself to prevent
the French from landing heavy cannon.2 On the 29th Aug. 29.
context does not lead me to suppose that the word intemperate has
any reference to the habit of drinking, otherwise I should have con-
jectured that Strachan was not sober when he wrotejthis letter.
1 Strachan to Sec. Admiralty, 26th Aug. (enclosing Chatham's
answer), 27th Aug. ; to Chatham (printed in the Enquiry, pp. 247-
248), 27th Aug. 1809.
2 Chatham MSS., Chatham to Strachan, 29th Aug., 6th Sept.
1809.
88 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. the captured works were demolished and the captured
guns embarked ; and it was arranged that the garrison
of Walcheren should consist of the brigades of Picton,
Browne, Dyott, Acland, Hay, Rottenburg, and Alten,
with detachments of cavalry, artillery, and engineers,
the whole amounting nominally to close upon nineteen
thousand rank and file. These troops commenced their
march to the island, taking their sick with them in
Sept. 1. waggons; and the embarkation began on the 1st of
September among endless difficulties, for the invalids
increased so rapidly as to overflow the hospital ships
and demand accommodation in other vessels. The
number of sick on the 1st of September was over four
Sept. 3. thousand ; by the 3rd it had risen to eight thousand ;
but in spite of the enormous difficulties thus brought
Sept. 5. about, South Beveland was finally evacuated on the 5th
of September. In Walcheren the fever was raging
with equal virulence. In the Sixth Regiment the invalids
numbered over five hundred, while the Twenty-third
could not furnish a man for duty.
Sept. 7. On the 7th of September the troops bound for
England sailed away, when it was reckoned that the
sick of the whole army, including those already sent
home, numbered nearly eleven thousand. Castlereagh
had already done what he could, though with indifferent
success, to furnish additional doctors, medical stores,
and hospital-ships ; but few of the practitioners in
London were willing to go to Holland. He strove
also to make arrangements for the invalids that were
arriving in England ; but the enormous number of them
made it necessary to improvise hospital tents and other
temporary accommodation in the coastal towns. Leith's
and Houston's brigades alone landed nearly eleven
hundred invalids,1 and the proportion was not smaller
in other battalions. But this was nothing to the
appalling state of things that prevailed in Walcheren
itself. In the week ending the 1 oth of September there
1 3658 fit for duty, 1078 sick. Mil. Sec. to Francis Moore,
9th Sept. 1809.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 89
were, out of nearly eighteen thousand non-commissioned 1809.
officers and men, close upon seven thousand in hospital ;
by the 17th the number of sick had risen to over eight
thousand ;a by the 24th to eight thousand seven hundred ;
and by the 1st of October to over nine thousand ; and
this though the deaths within four weeks amounted to
over one thousand. The condition of these poor
invalids was deplorable. Flushing had been so much
damaged by the bombardment that there was hardly a
roof that kept out the cold and rain, and owing to the
inundation the ground-floors were uninhabitable. In
Middelburg the buildings were sound, but so much
overcrowded that in many cases the sick were lying two
in a bed with quite insufficient ventilation ; while the
convalescents, from want of a separate hospital, relapsed
again into illness.2 The medical staff, wholly inadequate
and terribly overworked, was itself diminished by disease
and death. The distress of Sir Eyre Coote, who had
been left in command at Walcheren, was beyond
description ; and his military position, owing to the pros-
tration of half of his garrison, became most dangerous.
" Something must be done," he wrote to Chatham on
the 29th of September, "or the British nation will lose
the British army — far more valuable than the island of
Walcheren." 3
Some relief was obtained by shipping invalids to
England ; and at the beginning of October a very
efficient and energetic medical officer, Dr. M'Grigor,
the Inspector of Hospitals, was sent across to Walcheren.
He endeavoured to hire hospital-orderlies from among
the native Dutch, and to obtain men from the Veteran
Battalions at home, as attendants ; but the number of
the sick still increased, rising, in spite of deaths and
embarkations, to nine thousand five hundred on the 6th Oct. 6.
1 Dyott's Diary states the number of sick on the 17th at 8895,
on the 24th at 8526, the deaths in the previous week having been
287 (i. 287).
2 Dyott speaks of 15 men, 12 of them sick, in a room barely
12 feet square (i. 288).
3 Chatham MSS.
9o HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. of October. In despair the Government ordered the
Physician-general of the Army, Sir Lucas Pepys, to
proceed to Walcheren. He declined, upon the ground
that he knew nothing of the diseases of the soldier ; and
neither of his two colleagues volunteered to take his
place. This was very discreditable ; but two other
medical officers of high station went out in their stead,
and they had already been preceded by Dr. Gilbert
Blane, a London physician of great eminence. Yet in
spite of the removal of four thousand living patients to
England and of many hundreds of dead to their graves,
the number of the sick increased by three hundred in
the third week of October, and the deaths continued
to maintain the rate of twenty to thirty a day. The
plague was greater than could be stayed by doctors.
Oct. 27. On the 27th of October Coote handed over the com-
mand at Walcheren to General Don, whose first act was to
request transport to remove nearly six thousand invalids
to England, as the only chance of saving their lives.
Oct. 30. On the 30th he reported that the past week had pro-
duced nearly thirteen hundred fresh cases, though the
Nov. 12. deaths had fallen to ninety-nine. On the 12th of
November the returns of the garrison showed just
under forty-five hundred men nominally fit for duty,
and forty-nine hundred sick ; and there had for some
time past been intelligence of French preparations to
recapture Walcheren.1
As early as the 19th of September Castlereagh had
urged the importance of an early decision whether the
island should or should not be retained ; but owing to
confusion in the Ministry, due to reasons which shall
shortly be explained, such a decision was for some time
Oct. 24. impossible. It seems, however, that by the 24th of
October the Government had nearly made up its mind
to the evacuation, and only hesitated owing to un-
certainty whether Austria had or had not concluded a
Nov. 4. definite peace with France. On the 4th of November
1 Don to Sec. of State, 30th Oct., 17th Nov., Return of 12th
Nov. 1809 (none of them printed in Parliamentary Papers).
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 91
Lord Liverpool quietly ordered Don to destroy the 1809.
naval defences of Walcheren as far as possible, and to
embark the garrison. A brigade was sent over to
reinforce the troops during the work of destruction,
which took the best part of a fortnight ; and throughout
this time the French pushed forward their preparations
for an attack on the island with the greatest vigour.
On the 9th of December Don embarked the last of his Dec. 9.
men ; but even so the long agony of the expedition was
not ended. The sick continued to die rapidly and to
recover slowly. The number of those killed in action
during the campaign was one hundred and six ; the
number which died of disease up to .the 1st of February
1 8 1 o was four thousand. Of about thirty-five thousand
officers and men who survived, there were at the date
of the final evacuation of Walcheren over eleven thousand
five hundred in hospital.1
For the most distressing feature in this expedition,
namely, the great losses from fever, it does not appear
1 Return of 1st Feb. 1810, in Pari. Papers, p. 63. Return
showing the effective strength of the army which embarked for
service in the Scheldt in the month of July 1809 ; the casualties
which occurred ; the number of officers and men who returned to
England ; and the number reported sick according to the latest
returns (with the exception of the 59th Regiment, from which corps
a proper return has not yet been received).
Adjutant-General's Office,
1st Feb. 1810.
Officers.
N.C.O. and Men
Embarked for service
.
.
1738
37»4Sl
Officers.
R. and F.
Killed .
7
99 '
Died on service
40
204I
Died since sent home
20
1859
67
4,108
Deserted
—
8+
Discharged
—
25 J
Total officers and men who
returned,
who are now borne on the strength
of their respective
corps .
.
167I
33,373
Of which number are
reporte
d sick
217
1 1,296
(Signed)
Harry
Calvert,
Adjutant- Genera/.
92 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. to me that any man or group of men could be held
responsible. Walcheren and the neighbouring country,
flat plains reclaimed from the sea and intersected with
dykes of stagnant water, were known to be unhealthy ;
and the medical authorities declared that, if they had
been informed of the destination of the armament, they
could and would have taken extraordinary precautions
to meet this particular danger. But no one could have
foreseen such an appalling plague as fell upon the troops,
and no multiplication of doctors nor accumulation of
quinine could have sufficed to cope with it. It was
noticed that the British suffered far more than the
foreign troops, though no one could account for this
peculiarity. One of the physicians, however, ascribed
the prevalence of fever to four principal causes. In
the first place, the men were very frequently housed in
damp and ill-ventilated buildings to save the inhabitants
from quartering them ; secondly, the provisions given to
them consisted of exceedingly salt meat and hard and
indigestible biscuit ; thirdly, to allay the thirst and
discomfort caused by this diet, the soldiers resorted to
spirits ; and, lastly, to relieve the increased thirst induced
by the spirits, they filled themselves with fruit, which
was very abundant, and tank-water. It may be added
that the troops were insufficiently clad and unprovided
with flannel under-clothing or blankets. The maladies
from which they suffered were, apparently, of two
kinds : malarial fever, often degenerating (according
to the language of the time) into typhus ; and another
fever, which was from the first of the nature of typhus,
and was therefore called typhoid. This latter seems to
have become epidemic ; and the sufferers, as in the case
of cholera or yellow fever, abandoned themselves to
despair. It must, however, be said that there were no
precedents, as in the case of the West Indies, to lead
Ministers to expect such a visitation as fell upon the
army in Walcheren.1
1 Report of Asst.-Surgeon Renny, Castlercagh Desp. vi. 337 ;
Letters from Flushing, pp. 203-204, 232-234.
ch.xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 93
As to the responsibility for the failure of the 1809.
expedition on the military side, it is less difficult to
express an opinion. There can be little doubt, I think,
that the task set to Army and Navy was impossible.
In the first place, the despatch of the force was delayed
for too long. Popham had predicted that the elements
would prove to be its worst enemy, and so indeed they
were. From the moment when the fleet was driven
into the Roompot, that is to say, into the East Scheldt
instead of the West Scheldt, considerable delay became
inevitable ; and, as already remarked, from the moment
when the attack upon Kadzand became impossible on
the 29th of July, the failure of the attempt upon
Antwerp was assured. There remains the question
whether, if the weather had been favourable, the
expedition would have stood any chance of success.
The plan, it will be remembered, was that Sir Eyre
Coote with twelve thousand men should look to
Walcheren and the siege of Flushing, while Huntly's
division captured Kadzand and destroyed the batteries,
and Hope's division cleared the shore of South
Beveland as far as Bat. This done, the troops, with
the exception of Coote's, were to re-embark, move up
the river to Santvliet, land there, and march upon
Antwerp. Hope, by unexpected good fortune, was
in possession of Bat by the evening of the 2nd of
August ; and an earlier date could hardly have been
counted on by the most sanguine. But say that Hope
could have accomplished his work by the evening of
the 31st. Say also that Huntly had captured Kadzand
on the 29th and opened the southern channel to the
fleet. Though the Navy possessed excellent French
charts, it would have been necessary to sound and buoy
the passage up the river, to arm the gun-boats and small
craft, and to carry three to four hundred ships up with
the flood tide (for a light westerly wind would have
been of no avail against the ebb), over sixty or seventy
miles of difficult and tortuous navigation to Santvliet.
The earliest day upon which the most hopeful
94 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. calculators reckoned upon reaching Santvliet was the
3rd of August.1 Arrived there, about twenty-five
thousand men, and from three to four thousand horses
would have had to be disembarked, together with their
stores and artillery, heavy and light ; it would also
have been necessary to form depots, and to throw up
entrenchments for their defence. But say that the
army had marched from Santvliet on the 5th, with
intent to cover the fifteen miles of sandy road to
Antwerp in one day ; what force would it have found
to oppose it ? On the 2nd of August there were
between Lillo and Antwerp no more than twelve
hundred men, infantry, artillery, workmen, police, and
the like, besides seven thousand on the fleet and
flotilla, six thousand of whom could have been landed
to defend Antwerp against a surprise attack. On the
3rd arrived eight hundred cavalry and infantry from
Maestricht, and twenty-three hundred regular infantry
and ship's artificers, the last-named all drilled and
trained men. Besides these, the four thousand
National Guards and two thousand regular troops
which left Ghent for Kadzand on the 2nd, would, in
our hypothetical case, have moved direct upon Antwerp,
and would have reached it by the morning of the 5th.
Further, there were four to five thousand Dutch troops
placed between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, with
orders to co-operate in the defence of the former place.
Lastly, on the 5 th of August three hundred and fifty
cavalry marched into Antwerp, and on the 6th arrived
twenty-three hundred regular troops, infantry and
dismounted cavalry. If, therefore, Chatham had
appeared before the walls of the fortress on the 5th, he
would have found, on a moderate estimate, seventeen
to eighteen thousand men ready to defend it. If he
had been delayed for two days — and the Government
should have allowed at least so much margin for
unforeseen difficulties — he would have found the enemy
strengthened by over twenty-five hundred regular
1 Enquiry, Evidence of Sir Robert Brownrigg.
ch. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 95
troops, who marched into Antwerp on the 5th and 6th. 1S09.
Further, he must have detached men to capture or engage
Lillo and Liefkenshoek, in order to allow the fleet to
pass, more men to observe the garrison of Bergen-op-
Zoom, and yet more to hold South Beveland and his
depots at Santvliet, so that he could hardly have led
more than eighteen or nineteen thousand soldiers to
Antwerp. With such a force he could not have hoped
to carry the city by assault ; and, if he had been
obliged to bring up his heavy guns, he would have
needed the best part of a week more. But by the nth
five thousand additional regular troops had arrived at
Antwerp, making even a siege too dangerous an
operation to be practicable.1
Thus the British force was sent upon an errand in
which success was at best very precarious, and practic-
ally impossible. General Robert Craufurd devoted a
long speech in the House of Commons to prove the
contention that the weather was solely responsible for
the failure of the expedition ; and without doubt there
was some truth in this. The weather was most un-
favourable, and was unusually stormy for the time of
year ; but it may be questioned whether an enterprise
which could be wrecked, as this one was, by two con-
secutive windy days at the outset, should have been
undertaken upon so great a scale.
As to the manner in which the commanders
executed their duties it is difficult to speak, the
operations being in their nature essentially naval, and
full of such difficulties of seamanship, pilotage, and
navigation as only a highly trained seaman can appreciate.
But I cannot see that Chatham, in spite of his notorious
indolence, showed inactivity or want of judgment ;
nor do I believe that any man in his place would have
acted otherwise than he did. The instant that Bat was
secured he urged upon Strachan the imperative need
for an immediate advance ; and it was no fault of
Chatham's that the Admiral should have answered him
1 Martel, pp. 355-356.
96 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. with a foolish military proposal of his own. Chatham
showed also admirable temper in dealing with Strachan's
bad manners, and a praiseworthy firmness in his
decision to retreat. Strachan himself was evidently
overweighted by his charge ; but his difficulties and
trials, especially on account of weather, were very great,
and he must not be harshly judged. It may be objected
that, as results proved, he might have run the gauntlet
of the batteries of Flushing and Kadzand with little
danger ; but this is wisdom after the event, and no
Admiral can be condemned for refusing to take such a
risk, not only for his ships' companies, but for the
thousands of troops that were crowded on board his
vessels. A calmer and abler man might possibly
have accomplished more with rather less friction ; but
the task set to him was beyond the power of any mortal ;
and a few days saved would have made no difference to
the ultimate result. The expedition needed extra-
ordinarily good luck to attain success ; and it was
dogged not merely by misfortune, but by cruel, and it
may be said undeserved, adversity.
For the rest it must be added that the diversion in
the Scheldt threw Paris into a panic, and that, if success-
ful, it would have gone near to overthrow Napoleon's
Empire. Fouche, shrewdest of observers, called out
the whole of the National Guard and appointed officers
hostile to the Emperor, in order to be master of the
situation if the crash should come. Napoleon, after
Chatham had withdrawn, declared that Walcheren was
too small a matter to call for his own presence, and
that he should leave its recapture to Bessieres. None
the less, early in 18 10 he made further provision for
the defence of the Scheldt ; and it is probably true
to say that the expedition gave him some of the most
anxious and unpleasant moments of his life.1
1 Corres.de Napoleon, 159,17, 159,34' J59.67» 1 59»94» ^hl7*
163,35, 164,33, 164,60-164,64.
CHAPTER XXVII
Our last survey of the Peninsula closed with the dis- 1808.
appearance of the British army from the scene of action,
leaving the forces of Napoleon free to deal as they
would with the broken hosts of Spain. After the
disaster of Zornosa the Army of the Left had rallied
and, reinforced by Romana, retired, as we have seen,
into Galicia in utter demoralisation, having lost its main
support against Soult through the re-embarkation of
the British. The Army of the Centre, after the defeats
of Gamonal, Tudela, and Somosierra, had broken up
into three bodies, of which the Aragonese under Palafox
had withdrawn to Zaragoza, the Andalusians under
La Peiia to Cuenca, and the Estremadurans under
Galluzzo to the south bank of the Tagus opposite
Almaraz. The dislocation of the French Army for
the pursuit of Moore had paralysed its offensive powers
for the time, though not wholly, for Napoleon before
Christmas could still spare Lefebvre's corps and Lasalle's
division of cavalry to make an end of Galluzzo, and
that of Lannes to move against Zaragoza. Lastly, he
had in the autumn of 1808 collected reinforcements for
his army in Catalonia. The operations of all these
forces must be briefly sketched ; and it will be con-
venient first to deal with those in Catalonia.
It will be remembered that in August 1808 Reille
and Duhesme, after a futile attempt to capture Gerona
by siege, had retired, the one northward to Figueras, the
other southward to Barcelona, both in the extreme of
destitution and discomfiture. The Spaniards, on the
vol. vir 97 h
98 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 808. other hand, were stronger than ever. By the energy of
the provincial junta twenty thousand migueletes were
organised and ready for the field ; while, thanks to the
transfer of the Balearic garrisons to the mainland, there
were already twelve thousand regular troops in the
province, and twenty thousand more were on their way
from Granada, Aragon, and Valencia. With the French
force thus divided and outnumbered, there was a great
opportunity for a stroke upon one or the other of its
branches. Reille at Figueras was comparatively safe
from more than petty annoyance from irregular bands,
for his communication with Perpignan was open. Not
so fortunate was Duhesme. He was beleaguered by only
five thousand migueletes and two to three thousand regular
troops under General Caldagues ; but he was wholly
isolated, and his supplies were running short. He had
no difficulty in forcing his way through the weak cordon
of Caldagues to collect victuals in the neighbouring
villages ; but his columns could never return without a
fight, in which they were often roughly handled, and
could only escape by abandoning the food which they
had collected. No sooner were they again within the
lines than the migueletes likewise took up their former
positions, harassing the French unceasingly ; and in
fact Duhesme realised that, unless relieved, he could
not hold his own beyond the end of December.
A concentration of the Spanish regular troops,
therefore, against Figueras might have forced Reille
back into France, completing the isolation of Duhesme ;
or the like movement against Barcelona might have
turned the loose blockade into a siege. But un-
fortunately the Captain-General of the province, the
Marquis del Palacio, was both irresolute and slow.
Through the whole of September he lay motionless at
Tarragona, until at last, upon the complaint of the local
junta, he was superseded by General Vives. This,
however, was no change for the better, for Vives was
just such another as his predecessor. On taking over
the command at the end of October he found himself
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
99
at the head of twenty thousand troops ; and, having 1808.
arranged with secret friends in Barcelona that they
should raise the populace within the walls, while he
assaulted the place from without, he moved before
the city with nearly thirteen thousand men. After a
fortnight of feeble skirmishes he was joined by a first
reinforcement of Granadans, when by a general attack
upon Duhesme's advanced posts he drove every French- Nov. 26.
man within the city. But here his efforts ended,
and for all practical purposes he had accomplished
nothing.
Meanwhile, early in August Napoleon had called up
from Italy twenty-three battalions — ten of them French
under General Souham, and thirteen Italian under
General Pino, from the army of Italy — and had placed
at their head one of the very ablest of his commanders,
Gouvion St. Cyr. They took long to reach their base
at Perpignan, and it was not until the beginning of
November that St. Cyr was able to move with a field-
army of close upon twenty-four thousand men. His
task was no easy one. His way to Barcelona was barred
by the fortress of Gerona, but he dared not wait to
capture it by siege, lest Duhesme should in the mean-
while be starved ; and, since the main road was actually
swept by the guns of Gerona, he decided to take with
him no heavy guns or baggage, but only such light
artillery and such few stores as could be carried on
pack-mules, and thus to creep past the city along
by-ways. But first he came to the conclusion that he
must capture the petty fort of Rosas on the coast about
ten miles from Figueras, lest the Spaniards, with the
aid of the British, should land in the harbour, sever his
communications, and operate against his flank and rear.
When Rosas was in his power, and Gerona had been
safely passed, he had still to force his way through a
most difficult country to Barcelona. The road by the
eoast had been so much damaged both by the somatenes
and the British cruisers that St. Cyr judged it to be
impracticable ; and the remaining road by Hostalrich
ioo HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1808. offered many positions which, if held by steady and
well-disciplined troops, were to all intent impregnable.
Nov. 5 . On the 5th of November St. Cyr crossed the
Pyrenees, and by the 7th had invested Rosas. The
place, though important, was of trifling extent and in
bad repair, and was held by three thousand men, one-
third of whom only were regular troops, Irish, Swiss,
and Spanish, and the remainder migueletes, with a British
line-of-battle ship and two bomb-vessels to help them
in the harbour. After a fruitless attempt to carry the
fort by escalade, Reille, who was conducting the siege,
decided to send for his heavy artillery, and, upon its
arrival, began the construction of his batteries. But
Nov. 16. ten days later arrived Captain, Lord Cochrane of the
Imperieuse, who landed his own seamen and marines to
hold the tower, which was the most important of the
fortifications, and became the soul of the defence. By
his energy and resource1 the French army was held
Dec. 4. before this petty stronghold until the 4th of December,
when the Governor surrendered and Cochrane drew his
men off with little loss to the shore, and thence to their
ship. Had there been at this time in Sicily a com-
mander of less egoism and greater enterprise than Sir
John Stuart, the landing of five or six thousand British
at Tarragona during this siege might well have wrecked
St. Cyr's campaign.
Rosas having been taken, the French General
was at liberty to proceed to the relief of Barcelona ;
wherefore, leaving five thousand men with Reille to
watch Gerona and keep open his communications, he
led some sixteen thousand men on their perilous march
to the south. Meanwhile Vives had done nothing except
to push up the Marquis de Lazan's division of four
thousand Aragonese to Gerona, increasing the force
there to eight thousand men, a number far too small to
do anything towards the relief of Rosas. Desirous to
1 I refer the reader for all details to the fascinating narrative of
Cochrane himself in the Autobiography of a Seaman, and to that ot
Marryat in Frank Mildmay.
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 101
foster in Vives the delusion that the siege of Gerona 1808.
was the French object, St. Cyr manoeuvred for a day, Dec. 10.
and on the 1 ith of December sent his artillery back to
Figueras and turned eastward into the mountains. At
La Bisbal he gave his men four days' biscuit, warning
them that they would have no more till they reached
Barcelona ; and with this scanty provision and a bare
sixty rounds of ammunition for each musket, he
marched south-westward upon Vidreras. A paltry
force of four battalions, which had been detached by
Vives, tried to hold a defile against him, but was easily
brushed aside ; and on the 13th at Vidreras he struck Dec. 13.
the main road from Gerona to Malgrat. On the 12th
Vives, having full information of St. Cyr's movements,
sent five thousand men under General Reding northward
from Barcelona to Granollers, and three thousand more
under General Milans to watch the road on the coast ;
but, while thus frittering away his army, he himself
remained with sixteen thousand men useless before
Barcelona. However, Lazan had by this time moved
out from Gerona in pursuit of the French ; whereupon
St. Cyr, seeing camp-fires both to north and south of
him, turned again into the mountains by a path which
was known only by report, and on the afternoon of
the 15th brought his entire force to San Celoni on Dec. 15.
the main road between Barcelona and Gerona. Milans,
finding the road by the coast clear, had taken post here,
but was easily driven off ; and despite of the weariness
of his troops St. Cyr pushed on that same evening
through the pass of the Trentapassos, lest before morning
that very formidable position should be held by the
enemy. He had thus accomplished the worst part of
his march practically without opposition.
Vives now, instead of advancing with his whole
force, left Caldagues with twelve thousand men before
Barcelona, although the blockade might perfectly well
have been entrusted to the migueletes ; and on the night
of the 15th led four thousand only to join Reding at
Cardadeu, a little to south of San Celoni, where, arriving
102 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xrn
1808. early in the morning, he took up a position hastily with
Dec. 16. his nme thousand men. St. Cyr, having left three
battalions at the Trentapassos to hold Lazan in check,
had but thirteen thousand men ; and being unable,
owing to woods and broken ground, to make out the
strength of his enemy, he formed his infantry into a
single column, ordering them to pierce their way through
the Spaniards with the bayonet. His design was nearly
wrecked by General Pino, who, seeing his men fall fast,
deployed his division and was repulsed ; but St. Cyr
set matters right by launching Souham's division forward
in one mass, which broke through the right wing
of Vives and soon dispersed his army. The French
captured fifteen hundred men and five out of seven
guns ; about a thousand Spaniards were killed ; many
hundreds scattered to their homes, and the rest drifted
back to Barcelona. Milans, who was within five miles,
and Lazan, who was within four miles of the battle-
field, never came near it till all was over. Caldagues,
after repulsing a sortie of Duhesme, broke up from
before Barcelona, and retired westward to Molins de
Dec. ij.Rey; and on the 17th St. Cyr triumphantly entered
Barcelona with ammunition insufficient even for a small
action and without a crumb of provisions. The fight
at Cardadeu had cost him nearly seven hundred men,
a very small price to pay for a movement so hazardous
that only success could excuse it. Once again, had
Stuart's six thousand men been landed at Tarragona,
and had they repelled, as they probably would have
repelled, the attack of Souham, St. Cyr must have been
lost. But he dared everything for a great object ; he
conducted his march with admirable audacity, skill, and
perseverance, and, though his opponents played directly
into his hands, he thoroughly deserved his reward.
Reding now joined Caldagues, and took up a line of
entrenchments in rear of the Llobregat which had been
thrown up to contain Duhesme. The position was too
extensive for a force reduced to fourteen thousand
men, and both Reding and Caldagues were for falling
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 103
back. Vives, however, when consulted, sent an evasive 1808.
reply; and Reding, smarting under his first defeat,
resolved to stand his ground. On the morning of the
2 1 st of December St. Cyr attacked him, and routed him Dec. 21,
with the loss of twenty-five guns and twelve hundred
prisoners, among whom was Caldagues, the best of the
Spanish officers. The Spaniards escaped without very
serious losses ; but some thousand dispersed to their
homes, and the remainder, mutinous and demoralised,
did not rally until they reached Tarragona. St. Cyr,
however, did not think it advisable to take the road,
which now lay open, to that city, but halted for a
month to give his suffering troops rest, and to collect
supplies sufficient not only to feed the city of Barcelona
but also to provide for a further offensive movement.
The Catalans recovered from their panic ; Vives resigned
and gave place to Reding ; and by February 1809 this
officer, having rallied his migueletes, and received arms
from England besides further reinforcements from
Granada and the Balearic Isles, was once again ready
to take the field with thirty thousand men.
St. Cyr at this time had put his army into canton- 1809.
ments south of the Llobregat, some twenty to thirty
miles west of Barcelona, the length of his line being
about thirty miles, with a front to the northern coast.
Reding therefore divided the Spanish army into two
wings, one of which, under himself, remained about
Tarragona, while the other, under General Castro, was
extended from thence in a huge arc sixty miles long,
reaching to the Llobregat, as if to envelop the French.
It seems that he cherished some vague design of turning
their right with Castro's force, while he himself should
advance upon their left. St. Cyr quietly concentrated
three divisions, manoeuvred Castro out of his position
with the loss of all his magazines and of many prisoners,
and turned south upon Reding's troops, hoping to find
them still unconcentrated and to beat them in detail.
Reding, however, had collected his divisions, and, after
marching north to pick up the remnant of Castro's
io4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. force, left four thousand of them in observation, and
hastened back with some eleven thousand to guard
Tarragona. St. Cyr, therefore, to intercept him, placed
Pino's division, with which he himself remained, at
Pla de Cabra, and Souham's at Vails, upon each of the
two roads that led to the city, trusting that there would
be time for one of the two divisions to succour the
other, whichever might be attacked. But Reding,
having made a night march, fell upon Souham early on
Feb. 25. the morning of the 25th, some hours before St. Cyr had
expected, and after a sharp action forced the French
troops aside and opened the road to Tarragona. This
done, he halted, and, seeing St. Cyr arrive with two
regiments of cavalry, fell back away from Tarragona
and took up a defensive position. St. Cyr, whose
infantry had gone astray, watched him with great
relief, for with a little skill Reding might have over-
whelmed Souham's division. At last, after three hours'
delay, Pino came up with the infantry, and St. Cyr made
his attack in four massive columns with the bayonet.
The Spaniards stood firm till the French were within a
hundred yards of them, when they turned and ran.
Three thousand of them were killed, wounded, or taken;
the whole of their guns were captured, and the frag-
ments of the beaten force took refuge in Tarragona,
defeated, shaken, and demoralised. Poor Reding, after
cutting his way through the French dragoons, escaped
only to die of his wounds ; and for a time all organised
Spanish resistance came to an end in Catalonia.
Passing now to the Peninsula at large, Napoleon
had dictated the following plan to King Joseph on the
eve of his departure from Valladolid.1 Immediately
after driving the British to their ships Soult was to
advance upon Oporto and Lisbon, leaving to Ney the
pacification of Galicia ; and the Emperor reckoned that
Soult would reach the former city on the 1st, and the
latter on the 10th of February. Upon the fall of
1 Berthier to Joseph, 17th Jan. 1809 ; Mem. du Roi Joseph, v.
365 sq.
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 105
Oporto, Victor was to enter Estremadura, move upon 1809.
Merida and push a column towards Lisbon, while
Lapisse's division was simultaneously to march from
Salamanca upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes so as
to favour Soult's movements. After the fall of the
Portuguese capital, Victor was to borrow a division from
his brother Marshal, and invade Andalusia with forty
thousand men. Meanwhile Zaragoza would, as Napoleon
calculated, have fallen during the course of Februarv,1
and the troops employed in the siege could then com-
plete the subdual of Aragon and Valencia. Thus the
reduction of the Peninsula would be at an end. "The
business in Spain is done," he wrote to Jerome on the
1 6th of January, but he modified the expression a week
later into " The business in Spain is nearly at an end." 2
He had not yet learned that he was fighting against the
Spanish nation, not against a Spanish army.
Let us now notice the details of this plan as regards
the various spheres of operations ; and it will be con-
venient first to observe those which concern Estrema-
dura. In this quarter Napoleon's orders were that
Lefebvre should cross the Tagus, scatter Galluzzo's
troops and return to Talavera, leaving Lasalle's cavalry
in observation about Almaraz. Lefebvre advanced
accordingly, cleared the bridge of Almaraz at the first
rush, and drove the Estremadurans in confusion beyond
the mountains to the south. Then, however, instead of
obeying his orders he turned north, in spite of repeated
protests from King Joseph, as if to join the Emperor,
and on the 5th of January entered Avila. Napoleon
thereupon superseded him and sent him back to France,
appointing General Sebastiani to command the Fourth
Corps in his stead.
The wreck of the Spanish Army of the Centre had
meanwhile been undergoing re-equipment and reorganisa-
tion at the hands of the Duke of Infantado at Cuenca.
This officer, finding himself towards the end of December
1 Carres, de 'Napoleon, 14,716. T •
2 Corres. de Napoleon, 14,731, 14,734- .*' t ' k,
• fl
106 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1808. at the head of some twenty thousand men, sent General
Venegas with from five to six thousand troops to
surprise a brigade of Latour-Maubourg's dragoons
which lay at Tarancon, some fifty miles west of Cuenca ;
directing also another column of four thousand men
under General Senra to advance on Aranjuez. Venegas
Dec. 25. narrowly missed capturing the dragoons, but they
cut their way through his force and escaped ; while
Senra, finding a strong body of infantry as well as
cavalry at Aranjuez, did not venture to approach them.
These movements gave the alarm to King Joseph, who,
at the moment, could not have opposed more than nine
thousand to Infantado's twenty thousand in order to
fend the latter off from Madrid. But Infantado made
no attempt to support his two advanced detachments,
1809. and on the 8th to the 10th of January the arrival of
Dessolle's division and Sebastiani's corps set King Joseph
at his ease. The French chain of posts was re-estab-
Jan. 12. lished to southward, and on the 12th of January Victor
marched from Aranjuez with more than fifteen thousand
men upon Tarancon. Venegas, however, had called
Senra's corps to him, and retiring ten miles south-
eastward to Ucles, had taken up a strong defensive
position, apprising Infantado of Victor's advance and
asking for orders. Infantado replied only by sending
him a few more battalions and announcing that he
would himself move forward, upon some uncertain day,
with his reserves from Cuenca. Thus left to himself,
Venegas drew up his troops, about eleven thousand
men, with singularly little skill upon ground which was
too much extended for their number ; and here he was
Jan. 13. utterly routed by Marshal Victor on the 13th. One
thousand of his soldiers were killed and wounded ; nearly
six thousand prisoners and all of his few guns were taken,
at a loss to the French of fewer than two hundred men.
The fugitives ran into the vanguard of Infantado's main
body within five miles of the battle-field, whereupon
that General at once retreated by bad cross-roads to
Jan. 20. Chinchilla in Murcia, where he arrived on the 20th,
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 107
having lost fifteen guns to the French dragoons on the 1809.
way. Victor then entered La Mancha in search of a
force of Andalusians, under the Marquis del Palacio,
which was marching to Infantado's assistance, but
finding that it had already retreated, halted at Madri-
dejos, some seventy miles south of Madrid. For the
present he could do no more against the Spanish Army
of the Centre.
Meanwhile the great struggle in Aragon had begun, 1808.
when after a month's delay, owing to the summons of
Ney's corps to the pursuit of Moore, Marshals Moncey
and Mortier invested Zaragoza with twenty-eight Dec 20.
thousand men. Within the city General Palafox had
some forty thousand more or less organised soldiers,
besides peasants and citizens ; and he had used the four
weeks of respite afforded to him to improve the defences
beyond all recognition. This is not the place to tell
the story of that famous siege, under the direction first
of Moncey, next of Junot, and finally of Lannes ; of
the slow conquest by the French of outworks and
enceinte ; the desperate fighting from block to block of
houses ; and the final expedient of the French to force
their way in by undermining the buildings and shattering
them by explosions of gunpowder. By such means,
but far more by the pestilence that for weeks had raged
among them, the Zaragozans after two months of 1809.
heroic resistance were driven at last to surrender. The Feb. 20.
state of the town was then beyond description. One-
third of it was a heap of ruins. Over fifty thousand
persons had perished since the beginning of the siege,
and the bodies of thousands were heaped up before the
churches, or lay thinly covered beneath the surface ot
the streets. Ever since the street-fighting had begun,
the French themselves had been poisoned by the stench
from the doomed city ; while the Spaniards had lived
and died in the thick of all these horrors, and, dying,
had served to multiply them. The losses of the French,
once again rather through sickness than the sword,
amounted to full ten thousand ; and when the victors
108 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. at length gained their prize, they made haste to abandon
it, for Zaragoza had not been taken but slain.
With its fall perished for a time the army of
Aragon ; but meanwhile the routed Estremadurans had
rallied behind the Lower Guadiana under the command
of General Cuesta, and were being reduced to discipline
by him with merciless severity. The fragments of
Infantado's army, having likewise been collected and
strengthened with some of Palacio's levies, lay at La
Carolina, about one hundred and fifty miles due south
of Madrid, and this force was in process of reorganisa-
tion by General Cartaojal. Marshal Victor in the
interval had retired to the Tagus at Almaraz, pursuant
to Napoleon's orders that he should menace Lisbon by
the line of that river, while Soult moved down upon it
from the north. The two cavalry divisions of Milhaud
and Latour-Maubourg, with headquarters at Ocana and
Madridejos, watched the approaches to the capital from
the south, with two infantry divisions of Sebastiani's
Fourth Corps in support, the one at Aranjuez and the
other at Toledo. With the usual false confidence of
the Spanish generals Cartaojal must needs take the
Feb. 18. offensive ; and, after an unsuccessful raid upon the
French advanced posts, he led his army of about twelve
thousand men to Ciudad Real and Manzanares, in the
plains to north of the Sierra Morena. Here he
remained stationary for the first three weeks of March,
only making another raid upon the outlying French
March 27. cavalry ; until on the 27th he was surprised by Sebastiani
in force at Ciudad Real, when he gave the order for
instant retreat. A little pressure from the French
cavalry soon converted this retreat into a rout, which
cost the Spaniards five guns and two thousand prisoners.
Cartaojal's force reassembled at La Carolina, little
injured though much shaken ; but the General himself
was removed from the command and replaced by
General Venegas, who, with the help of new levies from
Granada, strove to prepare the army again for the field.
Cuesta likewise moved forward ; the excursion of
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 109
Lefebvre to northward having enabled him at the end 1809.
of January to reoccupy the positions formerly held by
Galluzzo about Almaraz. The French cavalry retired
before him to the north bank of the Tagus ; and Cuesta,
after breaking down the bridge of Almaraz, took up
his headquarters at Deleitosa to guard the passages at
Almaraz itself and at Puente del Conde, the bridge
next above it. King Joseph sent out Lasalle's cavalry
to force him back ; but, the ruggedness of the country
making it impossible for this arm to act, he ordered
Victor, who had over twenty thousand men concentrated
about Talavera, to proceed into Estremadura, without
waiting for the co-operation of Soult, and to open the
great invasion of southern Spain. After raising many
objections, Victor, on the 15th of March, threw his March 15.
infantry across the Tagus below Cuesta at the bridges of
Talavera and Arzobispo, and advanced full upon his
right or eastern flank, his object being thus to clear the
passage of Almaraz, towards which his cavalry and
artillery moved simultaneously, taking with them a raft-
bridge. Cuesta therefore changed the front of his right
wing towards the east, and ordered it to hold a very
strong position on the river Ibor, while at the same time
he reinforced his troops opposite Almaraz. The French,
however, forced the passage of the Ibor on the 17th, March 17.
at a cost of five hundred killed and wounded ; where-
upon Cuesta ordered the whole of his force to retreat
over the mountains upon Truxillo. The French
cavalry crossed the river on their raft-bridge on the
19th, and on the 20th overtook the Spanish rearguard March 19.
but could make no impression upon it, and indeed on
the following day was roughly handled at Miajadas, a March 21.
little to south of Truxillo.
Cuesta now retired due south upon Medellin in
order to pick up a detachment which had been sent to
him by Cartaojal, thereby leaving open the road to his
base, Badajoz, and to Seville ; but Victor, instead of
pressing the pursuit, sent detachments to Merida and
along the roads leading westward and southward. Mean-
no HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. while Cuesta, having picked up his detachment of
nearly five thousand men under the Duke of Albur-
March 27. querque on the 27th, determined to take the offensive ;
and Victor, being apprised of his movements, concen-
trated the French forces to encounter him at Medellin.
March 28. Upon the next day the two hosts met, and the action
opened with good promise for Cuesta, in spite of exceed-
ingly faulty dispositions ; for General Latour-Maubourg
launched his cavalry prematurely to the attack and was
beaten back with considerable loss. But at the crisis
of the battle the Spanish horse turned and fled with dis-
graceful precipitation, leaving their infantry exposed to the
joint attack of the French infantry and cavalry on front
and flank. Cuesta's line was broken to pieces and his
army hunted from the field. Of nearly twenty thousand
Spanish foot over seven thousand were killed, and nearly
two thousand more, together with twenty out of thirty
guns, were taken ; while Victor's loss did not exceed
one thousand killed and wounded. Not for many
days was Cuesta able to rally the fugitives of his army,
and then only at Monesterio, some sixty miles south-east
of Badajoz. For the moment, but, as shall be seen, only
for the moment, the army of Estremadura had ceased
to exist ; but still Victor remained halted at Medellin
and Merida. He had no recent intelligence of Soult's
movements, and without it he could not pursue the
combined operations prescribed to him by Napoleon.
Our last sight of the Duke of Dalmatia was on the
1 8th of January, when his guns opened fire upon the
transports that were bearing Moore's army back to
Jan. 19. England. On the 19th the town of Coruna, which had
faithfully covered the retreat of the British and might
have defied the French army for weeks until siege-
artillery should have been brought against it, was
yielded up to Soult by the weakness or worse of
the Governor. By this surrender the Marshal obtained
not only the command of the harbour, but victuals,
stores, and, above all, heavy guns. This enabled
him on the 23rd of January to march with a part
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY m
of his force against Ferrol, which he summoned to 1809.
surrender on the 25th. The place contained ten Jan. 25.
thousand militia, some four or five thousand sailors,
abundance of guns, and twenty thousand muskets
recently landed from England ; and thus provided, with
its communications by sea unclosed, it might have defied
Soult for months. But here again the Governor was
treacherous, and delivered over the place, together with
the squadron that lay in the harbour, after twenty-
four hours of the feeblest defence. Immediately before
this shameful event Soult received an intimation of
Napoleon's plans and orders for the invasion of
Portugal, with the dates so far modified that the 5th
instead of the 1st of February was assigned for the
capture of Oporto, and the 16th instead of the 10th
for the occupation of Lisbon.1 It behoved him,
therefore, to re-equip his army for a fresh offensive
campaign.
This was no easy matter, for Souk's troops had
suffered little less than Moore's from the terrible march
to Coruna. Ten thousand men, or one-fourth of the
whole, were in hospital ; half of the horses of the cavalry
had perished ; and the stragglers, from just dread of
the ferocity of the Spanish peasants, were afraid to
move onward except in large bodies. Moreover, the
clothing of the soldiers had all been worn out, and
could only be very imperfectly replaced by the exhausted
cities of Galicia, and by such small stores as were to be
found in the abandoned magazines of the British. Lastly,
there was always the difficult question of transport.
Soult was about to enter a country containing few roads
fit for wheeled traffic, so that large numbers of pack-
mules were absolutely necessary to the safety of his
force ; yet, owing to the continual demand for these
animals by the British and Spanish armies, very few
were now obtainable. Soult could only hope that he
would meet with no more resolute resistance than had
Junot.
1 Translation in Napier, ii. 157-158.
ii2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 809. There was, indeed, little force at the moment to oppose
him. Romana, after following the line of Craufurd's
retreat for some distance, had halted at Orense to rally
such men as he could collect of his army. Upon his first
arrival he found that less than one-third of his force was
with him ; but a certain number of stragglers kept
coming in, and he was able to organise two small bodies
which were posted to observe the roads from Lugo on
the north and Ponferrada on the east. The former was
presently threatened by Marchand's division of Ney's
corps, which was on its way to release Soult's garrisons
in Galicia, and Romana wisely withdrew his whole force
to the Portuguese frontier. Much straitened for
victuals, with his soldiers half-armed and half-clothed,
he wandered from town to town, wherever he could find
food, appealing to the Central Junta and to the British
General at Lisbon for money, muskets, and ammunition.1
The situation of that officer, meanwhile, had not
been enviable. Sir John Cradock had arrived at Lisbon
1808. to take over the command in Portugal on the 14th of
December, by which time the British Ministers were
already contemplating the possibility that the south of
Spain would soon be the only practicable sphere of
operations for a British army. Moore, as we have seen,
had always been of that opinion, and had not concealed
his hopes that he might shift his troops to a new base
at Cadiz. The news of the capture of Madrid con-
firmed Ministers in this view; and on the 10th of
December Colonel Sir George Smith was ordered to
proceed to Cadiz as British Agent, and to sound the
Spanish authorities as to their willingness to admit a
Dec. 15. British garrison to the city. On the day after his
arrival, however, Cradock received advice from Moore
that he had countermanded his retreat, and was about
to advance towards Burgos after all. Cradock there-
upon bestirred himself to push forward every man that
could possibly be spared to Moore's assistance, and with
Dec. 21. such effect that by the 21st of December he had retained
1 Oman, ii. 179-18 1.
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 113
little more than four thousand men in Portugal under 1809.
his own command.1
The loyal energy with which Cradock stripped him-
self of troops for the benefit of Moore was the more
praiseworthy inasmuch as he was aware that Sir John
had decided to retreat, if need were, to Galicia, so that
no help could be expected from him for the defence of
Portugal. Little more could be looked for from
Portugal itself ; for the Regency was at its wit's ends
for want of money and arms, and Cradock had no
authority to supply them with either. Happily on the
20th of December Mr. Villiers arrived at Lisbon as Dec. 20.
British Agent, with full powers to concert measures
with the Regency ; and Cradock at once addressed him
concerning the defence of the country. The reports as
to the Portuguese regular army were bad. The General
declared that it could not be taken into serious account
at such a crisis. " It will take time and labour," he
wrote, " to make a Portuguese army." Forjaz, the
Military Secretary to the Regency, and a really capable
man, declared that he could not produce nineteen
thousand serviceable arms ; z and the utmost that he
could hope to do, always supposing that the British
Government supplied the necessary funds, was to move
six thousand men as a corps of observation to Alcantara.
The only sign of an organised force, apart from the
British, was the Lusitanian Legion, a corps which Sir
Robert Wilson, upon the suggestion of the Portuguese
Minister in London, had been authorised to raise, in
1 Sec. of State to Sir G. Smith, 1 8th Dec; to Moore, ioth
Dec; Cradock to Sec of State, with enclosures, 14th, 15th, 21st
Dec, 1808. The troops detailed to remain in Portugal were the
20th L.D., 2/cjth, 3/2jth, 5/6oth (sent back by Moore) ; 1st and
2nd Line Batts. of K.G.L. ; 668 artillery British and German ; to
which perhaps should be added the 40th, who were at Elvas. The
returns sent by Cradock to Villiers on the 20th and to Castlereagli
on the 2 1 st of December do not quite agree. To Villiers he says
he kept the whole of the 1st Brigade K.G.L. at Lisbon, while to
Castlercagh he mentions two batts. only.
2 This is remarkable, for 32,000 muskets had been sent to
Portugal before September 1808. — Pari. Papers, 1809, p. 898.
VOL. VII I
ii4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1808. order to employ certain Portuguese officers who had
been detained in England on their way to Brazil. The
British Ministers had undertaken to clothe, equip, and
pay it until it was restored to its native country, when
they hoped that it would be incorporated in the Portu-
guese army ; but over this there was much difficulty.
Wilson had raised three thousand men without trouble,
thanks not a little to the activity of the Bishop of
Oporto, who hoped to make these troops his own body-
guard ; but he could arm only thirteen hundred of them ;
and the Regency at large viewed the corps with not
unnatural disfavour, because the commanding officers of
several regiments had allowed their men to volunteer
for service in it. Wilson, chafing under the attentions
of the Bishop of Oporto, withdrew as soon as possible
every man who was able to march from that city to
Al meida. From thence he could observe Lapisse's division
which, it will be remembered, was menacing the Portu-
guese frontier from its base at Salamanca. His work in
that quarter will before long come prominently before us.
Practically, therefore, Portugal was defenceless, and
the intelligence of Lefebvre's movement against Gal-
luzzo to south of the Tagus seemed to portend an early
invasion of the French on the side of Elvas. That
fortress, together with Almeida one hundred and fifty
miles from it, presented the only barriers against such
invasion ; and, since they were held each by a single
British battalion, they were rightly regarded by Cradock
as not worth the sacrifice even of these few troops.
Some means of defence needed to be improvised within
a few weeks ; and the General, being, as he said, devoid
of military resources of all kinds except pikes,1 could
think of no better expedient than to rouse the whole
population to turn out, like the Spaniards, with such
weapons as they could furnish for themselves. The
1 Once again the reader must be reminded that 32,000 muskets
had arrived in Portugal from England, so that it is difficult to
account for Cradock's statement, though beyond question he wrote
in good faith.
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
!15
Regency so far acted upon this suggestion as to organise 1808.
the population of Lisbon into sixteen legions, but under
limitations so absurd as to make them practically useless.
All was confusion owing to the impotence of the Portu-
guese authorities ; and Cradock, looking to the small
number of British troops under his command, could only
make every preparation to re-embark them, though with
full resolution to defend Lisbon until the last moment.
By the beginning of January, however, it became 1S09.
practically certain that the last reinforcements despatched
to Moore could never reach him ; and Cradock therefore
recalled them and fixed upon a position at Sacavem,
a few miles north of Lisbon, for his final point of con-
centration, resisting the importunity of the Regency
that he should advance to Abrantes or even farther
forward. He had now between eleven and twelve
thousand men, of whom he reckoned that about one-
half were at disposal for service in the field,1 but the
2/3ist;V
}
}
1 Distribution of the Troops in Portugal, Jan. 6, 1809 : —
R. & F
Santarem. Brig. -Gen. Stewart.
Det. R.A. ; det. 20th L.D. i/29th
5th & 7th line Batts. K.G.L.
Almeida. Brig.-Gen. Alan Cameron.
Det. R.A. ; i/45th ; I /97th.
Elvas. Colonel Kemmis.
Det. R.A. ; 1 /40th.
Sacavem. Maj.-Gen. Mackenzie.
Det. R.A. ; 2 troops 14th L.D. ; 2/9th ;
3/27th ; det. 5/6oth.
Lisbon and \Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Cradock.
Forts on lagus.J
Det. R.A. ; 6 troops 14th L.D. ; det. 20th
L.D. ; 1st & 2nd line Batts. K.G.L. ; det.
5/6oth; convalescents.
Oporto. \
5 cos. j/6oth. J
:f
2J51
1,478
712
1,707
3,201
379
Rank and file 10,228
All ranks, say 1 1,500
Of which number there were available for the field: —
n6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. difficulty of moving them was very great. The want
of cavalry upon the frontier was severely felt ; but it
was found impossible to bring the Fourteenth Light
Dragoons, which had landed from the Tagus about
Christmas time, up to Almeida, even in minute de-
tachments, from the difficulty of obtaining supplies.
Meanwhile, Cradock's communication with Moore was
entirely cut off, and he had no information of what
was going forward in Spain, except that the French
troops about Almaraz had inexplicably retreated, owing,
as we know but he did not, to the extraordinary move-
ment of Lefebvre upon Avila. Shortly afterwards,
however, intelligence reached Cradock that the French
had entered Salamanca, and that the British garrison of
that place, seven companies of the Buffs,1 was falling
back upon Oporto with the ordnance-stores which had
been deposited there. Then followed reports of the
successful engagement of Moore's cavalry at Benavente ;
and Cradock, once more bending all his energy to the
reinforcement of that General's army, actually embarked
Jan. 12 three regiments for Vigo.2 He had hardly done so
when fresh intelligence came in from Coruna that
Moore was retreating upon that port, and that General
Cameron, who had been trying to join Sir John with
two battalions from Almeida, had been compelled to fall
back, and was on his way to Oporto. At the same
time there reached Cradock despatches from England,
dated the 24th December, to the effect that, though a
certain number of troops were to be left in Portugal
to help the Portuguese Government in the defence of
the country, yet that the British field-army was to be
R. & P.
Dets. R.A. ; 14th L.D. ; 20th L.D. ; z/gth f|
3/27th; I /29th; 2/3 1st; det. 5/6oth; 5th &V 5221
7th Line Batts. K.G.L. J
Or of all ranks, say 5875
1 The grenadier company of this regiment, according to
Cameron's History of the Buffs, accompanied Moore.
2 14th L.D. ; 2/9th; 3/27th.
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 117
employed elsewhere in the Peninsula, "where most 1809.
advantageous to the common cause." While, therefore,
Portugal was to be held for as long as possible, the
troops were to be concentrated in positions from which
they could easily fall back upon Lisbon ; and, if the
enemy should approach the capital in overwhelming
force, they were to be re-embarked. Further despatches
hinted that the new sphere of operations would be
about Cadiz, for the defence of which five thousand
men would shortly be sent out from England ; and
Cradock was empowered to ship troops from his own
force to Cadiz without waiting for further orders.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation more em-
barrassing than that of Cradock during the first two
months of his command. He could obtain no informa-
tion as to Moore, though Frere kept urging him to
make a diversion in Spain, and he was obliged to make
preparations to meet all possible contingencies, whether
to reinforce Moore, advance, retreat, defend Portugal
to the last extremity, or re-embark. The Regency was
as yet inefficient ; the Portuguese army was worthless,
and the population of Lisbon in a state of nervous
excitement which vented itself in occasional murderous
attacks upon isolated British soldiers. The orders
which had just reached him were complicated by the
receipt of a message from Sir George Smith at Cadiz.
That officer, after inspecting the outworks, decided that
they would require a garrison of twenty thousand men,
and the city itself ten thousand. Since only five
thousand Spanish militia and volunteers were at hand,
Smith, knowing nothing of Moore's march to Sahagun,
asked Cradock if he could spare troops from Lisbon ;
and Cradock, reading the request by the light of his
last despatches from England, not unnaturally decided
to comply.1 Pursuant to his instructions he had already
1 Mr. Oman writes that Cradock " had chosen to fall in with
Sir George Smith's hasty and unauthorised scheme for the defence
of Cadiz." But Cradock had no means of knowing that it was
either hasty or unauthorised; it was quite in accordance with his
n8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. issued conditional orders for the evacuation of Elvas
and Almeida, and he therefore embarked some four
battalions for Cadiz under Major-General Mackenzie,1
at the same time directing the Fortieth to march to
the same destination by way of Seville. This signified
a serious diminution of Cradock's force, which, however,
was in some measure made good by the arrival from
Oporto and from other quarters of about three thousand
invalids and stragglers of Moore's army, many of whom
marched down with General Cameron's three battalions 2
from Oporto. These Cradock organised into two
battalions, which we shall know later on in the year
as the " battalions of detachments." But Cameron's
troops were worn down by fatigue, having, as Napier
says, marched eight hundred miles in continual rain.
Feb. In such circumstances Cradock's position became
more and more difficult, and matters were made worse
at the beginning of February by rumours of a great
reverse in the north about Coruna. Incessant gales
sealed up the ports to northward ; and until late in
February, try as he might, Cradock could obtain no
authentic information of what had actually occurred.
The Regency became steadily more troublesome, and
the populace of Lisbon more insulting and insubordinate,
being not a little encouraged by the wretched aspect of
the British troops, whose clothing was by this time in a
deplorable state. The continuance of stormy weather
in the Tagus was extremely disquieting in case of a
re-embarkation ; but none the less Cradock was bound
to make preparations for such an event, though he was
fully resolved to hold on to Lisbon till the last moment.
Fearful, however, of the results of a retreat through
the capital to the ships, he resolved to withdraw the
latest intelligence of the Cabinet's policy; and Castlereagh acknow-
ledged (to Cradock, 16th Feb., 1809) that his compliance with
Smith's request was fully justified by his instructions.
1 2/9th; 3/27th; i/29th; 2/3 1st ; l/40th; I co. R.A. 4271
of all ranks. A second company of artillery was embarked a few
days later.
2 Buffs, 45th and 97th.
ch. xxvir HISTORY OF THE ARMY 119
troops outside the city and to concentrate them near 1809.
the mouth of the Tagus ; while at the same time he Feb.
embarked all his superfluous stores and dismounted the
batteries that commanded the river. Looking to the
tenor of his instructions, which till the end of February
treated the evacuation of Portugal as inevitable sooner
or later, and to the general uncertainty of the situation,
Cradock can hardly be condemned for taking these
precautions ; but he committed the mistake of making
his intentions too obvious to all observers, with the
result that the mob of Lisbon became outrageously
violent, while the Regency attempted to curry favour
with it by throwing every obstacle and insult in the
way of British officers J
1 The authorities for the foregoing account of Cradock are Sec.
of State to Cradock : 1 8th, 20th, 27th Nov., 24th Dec, 1808, 6th,
28th Jan., 1809 ; Cradock to Sec. of State, 14th, 15th, 21st, 24th
Dec, 1808 ; 4th, 9th, 19th, 31st Jan., 2nd, 8th, 12th, 14th Feb.,
1S09. Mr. Oman (ii. 199) says that this portion of the correspond-
ence in the Record Office has been " mysteriously lost." It has,
however, been found and is numbered W.O. /. 232. The want of
these documents has concealed from him the fact that throughout
January Cradock was thinking far less of defending Portugal than
of pushing up reinforcements to Moore. This accounts for the
dispersion of his troops and for his unwillingness to undertake any
other forward movement. Again, Mr. Oman blames Cradock for
not making such forward movement, discredits his plea of want of
transport and supplies, and says that by "marching light" he could
have reached any goal that he chose. Cradock's commissaries,
however, as quoted by Napier, bear out his statements completely ;
and he himself complained that, from want of forage, some
dragoons whom he had sent up to the frontier returned half
starved. As Napier points out, much of the transport taken by
Moore had never been paid for, and the population was con-
sequently far from friendly. The unfortunate Cradock, who had
been told that the main body of the British army was to fight
elsewhere, and that only a small force was to be left, not to defend,
but to aid in the defence of Portugal, and to embark if the task
were found to be impossible, was in a very difficult position, and
one which cannot be compared with that of Wellesley a few
months later. When Wellesley, in the autumn of 1809, found
himself in much the same position as Cradock, he expressed
Cradock's opinion in his own terse language : "It is difficult if not
impossible to bring the contest for Lisbon to extremities, and
120 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. In the second week of February came a new com-
Feb. plication in the shape of a letter from Frere to Cradock,
deprecating the occupation of Cadiz by British troops
as unnecessary and likely to lead to the worst political
consequences, and forwarding a request of the Supreme
Junta that Mackenzie's troops should be sent round
to Tortosa to relieve Zaragoza. Now Canning had
written to Frere on the 9th of December 1808, urging
him to approach the Spanish Government as to the
admission of British troops to Cadiz as the new base of
their operations in Spain.1 He was aware, he said, of
the jealousy of the Spaniards upon this point — which
jealousy, it must be explained, was due to the fate of
Gibraltar — but the British Government abjured all
interested motives, and having made great sacrifices
expected Spain to meet them in the like spirit. After
many wanderings the Supreme Junta had finally drifted
into Seville on the 1 9th of December ; but it does not
appear that Frere ever broached this delicate question
to them, for Canning wrote again on the 14th of
January 1809, expressing much annoyance that he had
not done so. " The employment of the British army
in the south of Spain," he wrote in effect, " depends on
the admission of a British corps into Cadiz. Without
the security of that fortress we cannot, after Moore's
experience,2 again risk an army in the interior of Spain."
And he then announced that Ministers, without await-
ing the result of Frere's negotiations, had decided to
send four thousand men 3 direct to Cadiz under General
afterwards to embark the army." Napier is perfectly right in
saying that the constant changes in the plans of the Cabinet were
the true cause of Cradock's caution, though he makes no allowance
for the difficulties of the unfortunate Cabinet.
1 Castlereagh had written to Moore on the same subject on
10th Dec. 1808 ; but the passage referring to it is not printed in
the Papers presented to Parliament.
2 This of course refers to the first retreat of Moore before his
subsequent advance to Sahagun.
3 i/Coldstream Guards, l/3rd Guards, 2/87th, i/88th, 2 batts.
Light Artillery. The 83rd was to have accompanied them, and
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 121
Sherbrooke, with the expectation that they would be 1809.
admitted.
It is evident that this decision of the Cabinet was
arrived at long before it was communicated to Frere ;
but the original idea, as was intimated to Cradock in
December, was that Sherbrooke's force should go first
to the Tagus and there await orders. The destination
was, however, altered on the 12th of January to Cadiz
direct, though Sherbrooke was charged to keep the
change a profound secret. He was instructed not to
land his troops in Cadiz without Frere's sanction,
though he was given to understand that they were the
" advanced guard of the British army." The expedition
sailed early in January, but was dispersed by a storm,
nor were the transports reassembled at Cork until the
end of February ; and in the interval Frere found an
opportunity to sound the Junta as to the acceptability
of Canning's intentions. The occasion was the re-
embarkation of Moore's army, against which the Junta
cried out aloud, protesting that it was an abandonment
of the whole cause of Spain. Frere sought to reassure
them by averring that the red coats would shortly land
in Cadiz ; whereupon the Junta protested against any
such idea, unless Cadiz should prove to be the ultimate
point of refuge both for the Spaniards and their allies.
However, the re-shipping of Moore's people seemed
likely to bring matters to a crisis. Canning wrote
urgently that the admission of British troops to Cadiz had
now become an imperative necessity, and intimated that
Cradock had received orders to carry his force thither
if compelled to evacuate Portugal ; while Frere, long
before receiving these last letters from his chief, ex-
tracted from the Junta an expression of willingness to
receive a British army wherever disembarked. But the
bungling of Canning at the Foreign Office ruined
the entire force, by exaggeration of the strength of the 2 batts. of
Guards, was set down at 5100 r. and f. of infantry alone (Sec. of
State to Cradock, 24th Dec. 1808), but the infantry that actually
sailed with Sherbrooke numbered only 2897 rank and file.
122 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. everything. Smith himself, it is true, had been greatly
to blame, for he had been specially instructed not to
summon British troops except at the request of the
Spanish authorities. But, on the other hand, by a foolish
blunder, the mission of Smith was not confided to
Frere, and Smith had received no orders to com-
municate with him ; from which the Junta concluded
that Smith's business was of such an underhand nature
as could not be entrusted to the Ambassador, and set
their faces against it accordingly.
Jan. 29. Hence it came about that when, on the 29th of
January, the news of Mackenzie's coming reached
Cadiz, the Spaniards with ominously grave faces asked
Frere what it might portend. The Ambassador tried
to laugh the matter off as perfectly natural, but was
fain to add that he had no wish to see Cadiz occupied
by British soldiers except in case of extremity. The Junta
took him at his word, and sent down a member of its
own body, the Marquis Villel, to see that it was fulfilled.
Feb. 5. On the 5th of February Mackenzie arrived with a
part of his troops, and was told by Smith that Villel
had raised objections to his landing, though it was
hoped that those objections might be overcome. Mr.
Feb. 6. Charles Stuart appeared next day as the agent of Frere ;
and he, together with Smith and Mackenzie, waited upon
Villel, who lamented that he had no authority to permit
the British to disembark in Cadiz, but proposed that
they should do so at Puerto Santa Maria on the north side
of Cadiz Bay. This suggestion Mackenzie very properly
Feb. 8. declined to accept, and two days later he received from
Frere the final decision of the Supreme Junta that his
troops should not be admitted to Cadiz. Frere's first
and perfectly correct instinct was to send the force back
to Lisbon ; but, entertaining still some hope of bring-
ing the negotiation to a successful issue, he pressed
Mackenzie to land at Puerto Santa Maria in order to
humour the Spanish Government. Once again the
General resolutely and rightly refused ; but, as Smith
was still sanguine of gaining his point, he consented to
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 123
keep the transports on the spot. A few days later 1809.
Smith was taken ill and died; Stuart departed for Fcb- • v
Vienna on a secret and absolutely unauthorised mission,
and the whole conduct of the business fell into the
weak and unpractical hands of Frere.
He now suggested that, in order to bribe the
Spanish Government, Mackenzie should leave a frag-
ment of his force at Cadiz, and march with the rest
to join Cuesta in Estremadura, whither Sherbrooke's
detachment should in due time follow him. For the
third time the General rejected the proposal, knowing,
as Frere should have known, that it was contrary to
the main principle of the British Cabinet's policy ; but,
being aware that the population of Cadiz itself was
anxious to admit the British troops, he proposed as
a compromise to land only two of his battalions at
Cadiz and to send the other to join the Fortieth, which
had been enthusiastically received at Seville. Whether
Frere ever submitted this idea to the Junta is doubtful ;
the one thing certain is that, instead of attending to his
legitimate business of diplomacy, he still tried to play
the general. He now wrote to Mackenzie to say that
the French would soon be driven behind the Ebro, and
that he had better take his battalions to Tarragona to
liberate the Spanish garrison in that place for service
in the field. Mackenzie was upon the point of com-
plying with this request, as the last hope of persuading
the Junta to allow Sherbrooke to enter Cadiz, when he
received a letter from Cradock requiring his immediate
return for the defence of Portugal. He sailed, accord-
ingly, for Lisbon on the 6th of March and reached it
on the 1 2th, on which same day Sherbrooke's detachment, March 1 2.
having been recalled when off Cadiz by fresh orders from
England, cast anchor likewise in the Tagus.1
1 Mackenzie's narrative in Napier, ii., Appendix 9 ; Canning
to Frere, 9th, 10th Dec. 1808 ; 14th, 23rd Jan. 1809 ; Frere to
Canning, 1st, 29th Jan., 9th, 21st Feb., 4th, 14th March 1809;
Mackenzie to Sec. of State, 9th, 22nd Feb., 3rd March 1809;
Sherbrooke to Sec. of State, 6th Jan, 1st, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th
Feb., 9th, 1 2th March ; Sec. of State to Sherbrooke, 23rd Feb. 1809.
i24 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Such was the first attempt of the British Ministers
to obtain a footing in Cadiz, an attempt which failed
chiefly through the blunders of Canning and Frere.
The point is worth dwelling upon, for it led the Cabinet
to a momentous decision. Upon the first report of
Smith's premature action and its immediate conse-
quences, Canning, not knowing of his death, recalled
him, and intimated to Frere that the detachments both
of Mackenzie and Sherbrooke had been ordered to
return to the Tagus. " But," he added, " without a
fortress to fall back upon, we will not commit our
troops in the heart of Spain, nor will we fritter our
force away among the Spanish armies. If the Spaniards
do not desire our assistance we have no desire to press
it on them. We have therefore decided to reinforce
the army in Portugal to a strength equal to the defence
of that country. This will make a powerful diversion."
It was, therefore, sheer want of a sphere of operations
which induced Ministers to fall back upon Portugal ;
for such military opinions as they had taken upon the
subject, those, namely, of Moore and Cradock, were
adverse to such a course. " I am not prepared at this
moment to answer minutely your question as to the
defence of Portugal," Moore had written in one of the
busiest moments of his short campaign, "but I can say
generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible
against a superior force. It is an open frontier all
equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated. If the
French succeed in Spain, it will be vain to resist them
in Portugal. The Portuguese are without a military
force, and from the experience of their conduct under
Sir Arthur Wellesley no dependence is to be placed
on any aid they can give. The British must in that
event (the success of the French in Spain), I con-
ceive, immediately take steps to evacuate that country.
Lisbon is the only port, and therefore the only place
where the army with its stores can be embarked. . . .
We might check the progress of the enemy while the
stores are embarking and arrangements are being made
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 125
for taking off the army. Beyond this the defence of 1809.
Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of." '
" We must not be misled," wrote Cradock to Villiers
a month later, " by the supposed idea of a frontier of
Portugal. It is at present only a name. The rivers
running generally east and west present no line of
defence except Almeida and Elvas, which are one
hundred and fifty miles apart. There is no other
defence." 2
It so happened, however, that in February the
Portuguese Government had come to an agreement
with the British that their troops should be placed
under the command of a British officer, with power
to appoint additional officers of the same nation ; the
British Government, on its side, undertaking to provide
arms, ammunition, and pay. Such a hold upon the
military resources of Portugal materially altered the
situation ; and Castlereagh now turned to Sir Arthur
Wellesley and asked for his views upon the question.
" I have always been of opinion," wrote Wellesley, in
extremely clumsy language, on the 7th of March, March 7.
"that Portugal might be defended, whatever might
be the result of the contest in Spain ; and that in the
mean time the measures adopted for the defence of
Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their
contest with the French. My notion was that the
Portuguese military establishment of forty thousand
militia and thirty thousand regular troops ought to
be revived, and that in addition to these troops His
Majesty ought to employ an army in Portugal amount-
ing to about twenty thousand troops, including about
four thousand cavalry. My opinion was that, even if
Spain should have been conquered, the French would
not have been able to overrun Portugal with a smaller
force than one hundred thousand men ; and that, as
long as the contest should continue in Spain, this
1 Moore to Castlereagh, 25th Nov. 1808. Cradock to Villiers,
20th Dec, enclosed in Cradock to Sec. of State, 21st Dec.
1808.
126 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. force,1 if it could be put in a state of activity, would
be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might have
eventually decided the contest." Wellesley then pro-
ceeded to show that the Portuguese army could not
be revived except at British expense, and that, until
the work should have been accomplished, the British
force should consist of at least thirty thousand men.
A conflict of opinion, seemingly direct and irrecon-
cilable, between two such men as Moore and Welling-
ton, demands at least some brief examination ; when
it will appear that the points of difference between
the two generals were really very superficial. First
and foremost, Moore had found the Portuguese army
a mere name, and drew his conclusions accordingly.
Wellesley formulated his views upon the hypothesis
that the Portuguese forces should be restored to
efficiency. All that he affirmed in his memorandum,
so far as can be judged from the obscurity of the
wording, is that, if the Portuguese military establish-
ment were revived upon its old footing of seventy
thousand men, and if twenty thousand British were
added to these, then one hundred thousand French
troops would be needed to conquer Portugal ; and
that, if the struggle in Spain were continued, it would
be exceedingly improbable that so large a number of
French could be spared for the purpose.2 Thus, there-
1 Mr. Oman (ii. 287) construes this to mean the 20,000 British
only. I conceive it to mean 70,000 Portuguese in addition to
20,000 British, founding my opinion upon Wellesley's letter to
Castlereagh of 25th Aug. 1809. " My opinion is that we ought
to be able to hold Portugal [by which he meant Lisbon] if the
Portuguese army and militia are complete."
2 If I had not myself seen the original of Wellesley's memo-
randum of 7th March, in his own handwriting, I should strongly
suspect that the first three paragraphs had been drawn up from
memory of conversations with Wellesley by Castlereagh, to whom,
curiously enough, the entire document is ascribed in the Castlereagh
Corres. (vi. 39). The grammar of the first paragraph (which Mr.
Oman has changed in three places when quoting it) halts oddly
between the past and present tenses. " I have alway been of opinion.
. . . My notion was . . . my opinion was. . . . The Portuguese
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 127
fore, though Moore had no time to go into details, 1 S09.
he and Wellesley agreed that the defence of Portugal
must depend upon the maintenance of the struggle
in Spain. Wellesley himself in 1809 confirmed the
correctness of the views of Moore and Cradock con-
cerning the indefensibility of Portugal against a superior
force, and even as to the impossibility of protecting
Lisbon till the last moment without very grave risk.
" There are," he wrote, " so many entrances into
Portugal, the whole country being frontier, that it
would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from
penetrating ; and it is probable that we should be
obliged to confine ourselves to that which is most
important — the capital. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to bring the contest for the capital to extremities and
afterwards to embark the British army" ; and in proof
of this assertion he pointed out that the French could
manoeuvre the British out of Lisbon by occupying the
heights of Almada over against the city on the southern
bank of the Tagus.
Thus to all intent the two men were at one upon
establishment ought to be . . . even if Spain should have been con-
quered ... as long as the contest should continue . . . this force
would be highly useful, and might eventually have decided the contest."
The two next paragraphs are almost wholly in the past, and the
remainder in the present and future. Moreover, there is a contra-
diction in the first paragraph, for it begins by saying, " I have
always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever
the result of the contest in Spain " ; but a few lines later, " Mv
opinion was that, even if Spain should have been conquered, the
French would not have been able to overcome Portugal with a
smaller force than one hundred thousand men." From this last
sentence it is plain that Wellesley did not think Portugal defensible
against this number, even by 20,000 British and 70,000 Portuguese.
This halting and obscure language is so foreign, as a rule, to
Wellesley that I find it difficult to account for. He seems to have
wavered at first between antedatinghis opinion to the days of Vimciro,
and only after writing three paragraphs to have delivered it as his
present conviction. Beyond all doubt the memorandum was written
to Castlereagh's order, and possibly at first with some diffidence.
The original, as usual, shows very few corrections, and it is possible
that Castlereagh furnished a rough draft of the opening paragraphs.
128 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. all essential and unchangeable points of the question ;
and the variance between them turned entirely upon
the regeneration of the Portuguese army. The fact
is remarkable, inasmuch as Moore delivered his opinion
avowedly as a crude one, sketched under great pressure
of business, whereas Wellesley formulated his judgment
at his leisure and in totally different circumstances. "I
should mistrust my own judgment or opinion, if
opposed to Moore's," wrote Wellington, years later,
" in a case where he had an opportunity of knowing
and considering. But he positively knew nothing of
Portugal, and could know nothing of its existent state."
No criticism can make us the less admire Wellesley 's
astonishing insight in divining the impassable limits of
French power in the Peninsula ; but it is still possible
to praise it without belittling the just fame of another
great man. If Ministers, misreading Moore's letters,
treated Wellesley's contention as to the defensibility of
Portugal with excessive distrust, the blame should surely
not be ascribed to Moore.1
The precise date when Wellesley's appointment was
decided upon is uncertain ; but, though Castlereagh had
a desperate struggle to prevail with the Cabinet to
accept it, the day cannot have been later than the 28 th
of March.2 On the 30th, Castlereagh broke gently to
Cradock that he was to be superseded, and three days
1 " The greatest disadvantage under which I labour is that Sir
John Moore gave an opinion that that country could not be
defended by the force under his command " (Wellesley to Liver-
pool, 2nd April 18 10). Moore gave no such opinion. He said
that the Portuguese frontier was indefensible against a superior
force, which was true ; and that, if the French succeeded in Spain
it would be vain to resist them in Portugal — a condition which,
thanks not a little to Moore himself, was never fulfilled. Wellesley
evidently cannot have seen Moore's letter.
2 On the 24th, Col. Walker of the 50th wrote to Wellesley
to ask him to take the regiment in service to the Continent,
where operations were reported to be intended. Wellesley
answered on the same day that he had no reason to expect a
command on the Continent. On the 28th Wellesley reported
to the Duke of Richmond that he had accepted the command
in Portugal. Wellington MSS.
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 129
later he wrote to Wellesley his letter of service. The 1809.
troops ordered to embark for Portugal at the same A "ri; -
time numbered nearly five thousand rank and file of
infantry, and thirty-three hundred cavalry,1 or about
nine thousand of all ranks, making with the regiments
already in Portugal a force of over twenty-six thousand
of all ranks. In consequence of the refusal of the
Spaniards to admit the British to Cadiz, Wellesley was
instructed to make the defence of Portugal his first
object, and, v/hile undertaking it in concert with the
Spanish armies, to enter upon no general operations in
Spain without the authority of the Government. Foul
winds detained Wellesley for some days ; in the course
of which he heard that the French were advancing into
Portugal from the north and east. Thereupon he sent
Charles Stewart to Castlereagh to point out that, upon
arrival, he might find the army embarked or Cradock
already engaged in active operations, and to ask for
further orders to meet such a contingency. If Stewart
is to be believed, Wellesley at this moment was
most reluctant to proceed to his destination, and was
driven to do so by the peremptory decision of Castle-
reagh. However, on the 15th of April he sailed
from Portsmouth, and on the 22nd arrived in the April 22.
Tagus.2
Meanwhile, events had been moving rapidly in
Portugal. On the 30th of January Soult set his advanced Jan. 30.
cavalry in motion southward, which in a few days
received the surrender of Vigo and Tuy, and on the
2nd of February reached the River Minho and the Feb. 2.
frontier of Portugal unopposed. The French infantry
followed them at an interval of a week ; and by the
1 Infantry : z/jth, 576 ; 2/24th, 780 ; 2/30th, 630 ; 2/48^,
717 ; 2/53rd, 699 ; z/66th, 667 ; 2/83rd, 850. Total, 4919.
Cavalry: 3rd D.G. 672; 1st D. 672; 4th D. 672; 1 6th
L.D. 672 ; 1st L.D., K.G.L. 606. Total, 3294.
Total: Cavalry and Infantry, 8213 rank and file ; say, 9200 of
all ranks.
2 Londonderry MSS., C. Stewart to Castlereagh, 20th Oct.
1809.
VOL. VII K
i3o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. 13th Soult's entire army was in the vicinity of the
Feb. 1 3. river. The usual passage of the Minho being com-
manded by the guns of the fortress of Valency, the
Marshal moved down nearly to the mouth of the river
at Campos Saucos, and, having collected fishing-boats,
attempted to throw his troops across on the morning of
Feb. 16. the 1 6th. The effort failed owing to the difficulties of
a very heavy flood, added to the fire of hundreds of
Portuguese peasants from the southern bank ; and
Soult, much irritated, moved up the stream to the
bridge of Orense, abandoning the good road by the
coast for a rough track leading over the mountains to
Chaves on the upper Tamega. From the moment when
he turned north-eastward from Tuy, his columns were
incessantly harassed by bands of peasants which hung
about his flanks, taking advantage of every difficulty
of the road. Twice with excessive boldness they
attempted to bar the way, but were overthrown with
Feb. 1 8. severe loss ; yet, none the less, Soult decided to send
back his heavy artillery and wheeled vehicles to Tuy,
and to prosecute his march with pack-animals only,
carrying with him twenty light guns and a dangerously
small reserve of ammunition of any kind. On the 21st
he reached Orense and occupied it unopposed, Romana
making no attempt to second the peasants, but sitting
Feb. 22. idly twenty miles to southward. On the following day
Soult's rear divisions fought their way through the
insurgents to the main body, not without sharp en-
gagements and some loss ; and the Marshal then
halted for nine days to collect supplies, repair his gun-
carriages, and endeavour by pacific manifestos to reconcile
the inhabitants to French domination. During the
halt he received a message from Ney, which was brought
to him only with infinite difficulty, telling him that the
whole of Galicia was in revolt, and asking his assistance
in suppressing the insurgents. The news was of course
perfectly true, and signified that, if Soult continued to
move southward, all communication between the two
Marshals would be severed. Soult, however, decided
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 131
to obey the Emperor's orders, and on the 4th of March 1809.
continued his march upon Oporto. March 4.
Thereupon the military Governor of Traz-os-
Montes, General Francisco Silveira, gathered together
such rude levies as he could collect, and assembled at
Chaves, some fifty miles south-east of Orense, a mixed
mass of regular troops, militia and peasants, amounting
in all to some twelve thousand roughly armed men.
The neighbouring province of Entre-Douro-e-Minho,
under the impulse of the Bishop of Oporto, also sent
a large mob of men to guard its own frontier, supported
by a small body of regular troops, under General
Bernardino Freire, at Braga. But in Traz-os-Montes
Silveira was left to himself and to the co-operation of
Romana, with whom, so far as was possible between
chiefs and armies which detested each other, he had
concerted operations. Soult, knowing of Romana's
presence, had determined to attack him and drive him
south ; but the Marquis on the 5th decided to abandon March 5.
the Portuguese, and retreated eastward along the
Spanish frontier to Puebla de Sanabria. His rear-guard
was caught on the 6th by General Franceschi's cavalry, March 6.
and utterly dispersed with a loss of seven hundred
killed and taken ; but his main body made its escape
in safety. Silveira, meanwhile, lay in his position at
Villarelho on the right bank of the Tamega, and on the
5 th sent forward a detachment to Villaza, which was
rudely handled by the head of Soult's principal column,
and fell back to its main body. Hearing of Romana's
departure, Silveira on the 7th withdrew to the heights March 7.
of San Pedro, three miles to the south of Chaves,
where the ground offered a favourable position for
defence. Soult, after three days' halt at Monterrey in
order to close up his columns, continued his march on
the 10th along both banks of the Tamega, sweeping March 10.
away the feeble resistance of Silveira's advanced parties ;
and, upon the approach of the French to Chaves, the
Portuguese general prudently resolved to retire. His
troops thereupon broke out into mutiny ; and, with
i32 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. open threats that they would shoot him, a disorderly
party of over three thousand men threw themselves
into the town to defend it to the last. On the same
March 11. evening Soult invested the place, and during the 11th
advanced against Silveira, who retreated south-westward
to Villa Real ; after which for the second time Soult
summoned Chaves to surrender. Twenty-four hours
of vapouring and idle waste of ammunition had sufficed
to exhaust the courage of the garrison ; and on the
March 12. 1 2th the French occupied the place by capitulation.
Unable to spare troops to guard his prisoners, Soult
dismissed the irregulars to their homes, and offered the
regular troops, both Portuguese and Spanish, which he
had taken, the option between captivity and entry into
the French service. The majority preferred to change
sides ; and this fact, together with the mutinous
behaviour of the Portuguese levies at large, was not
lost upon Sir John Cradock. From Chaves to Oporto
there were two roads : the first following the Tamega
southward to Amarante, and thence making a bend
north-westward and south-westward to Penafiel ; the
second leading nearly due west over the Serra de
Cabrera upon Braga, and thence due south upon Oporto.
Soult chose the latter as being at once the better and
the more direct, and presenting further the chance of
dispersing Freire's levies at Braga ; though, on the other
hand, it passed through a succession of dangerous defiles
where a resolute enemy might offer formidable opposi-
March 14. tion. On the 14th, therefore, he moved off to westward,
making at the same time a feint movement towards
Villa Real to deceive Silveira. He was met by a
desperate resistance from the villagers, and from them
only, for Freire was neither a soldier nor a leader, and
could not station his troops skilfully nor control them
effectively. Three days' march amid incessant petty
attacks from the brave Portuguese peasants brought
March 1 7. the French cavalry on the 17th to Carvalho d'Este,
six miles from Braga, where it came upon the whole
of Freire's disorderly levies drawn up on a range of hills.
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 133
Freire himself, in mortal terror of his own followers, 1809.
tried to escape to Oporto, but was brought back and
murdered ; an officer of his staff shared the same
fate ; and the command was given by acclamation to
Baron Eben, a German officer of the Lusitanian Legion.
Eben seems to have done what he could to fortify
his position during the three days of grace allowed to
him while Soult's main body was coming up ; but on
the 20th the Marshal attacked him with sixteen March 20.
thousand men and shivered his wretched host to pieces.
Seventeen guns and four hundred prisoners only were
taken by the victors ; but no fewer than four thousand
of the Portuguese perished by the sword. Weeks of
harassing and a long tale of murdered stragglers had made
the French soldiers savage ; and, though not more than
two hundred of themselves had fallen in the action,
they had many injuries to avenge. The victory was
great, but very far from decisive. The majority of the
fugitives rallied within ten miles of the battle-field ;
General Botilho, with an armed band of militia and
regulars, moved down the Lower Minho to block the
road to Tuy ; and Silveira, on the very day of the
action, moved back and invested Chaves, where Soult
had left a garrison of only one hundred fighting men
and twelve hundred invalids. The spirit of the
Portuguese, as of the Spaniards, was not easily broken.
Soult now converted Braga into an advanced base
under the charge of one division, and moved on in
three columns along three parallel roads upon Oporto.
At the river Ave the Portuguese strove stubbornly to
check him ; and Jardon, the " voltigeur general," lost
his life in the fight ; but by patience and skill Soult
carried the passage with little loss, and on the 27th March 27.
was before Oporto. There all was confusion and
disorder ; a long period of anarchy, varied by
murderous outbreaks, having culminated since the
defeat of Braga in an orgy of riot and massacre. The
place had been formidably entrenched, and nearly two
hundred suns had been mounted: but the thirty thousand
134 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. men who formed the garrison were without leaders and
without discipline. After a fruitless summons to the
Bishop to surrender, Soult resolved to storm the city
March 29. on the morning of the 29th. Long before the French
columns appeared the Portuguese gunners, unnerved
by a thunderstorm, opened fire from every gun ; and
when the assault was finally delivered at seven o'clock,
the resistance of the garrison was soon overcome and
converted into a panic. Soldiers and civilians, men,
women, and children fled in frantic terror towards the
river, and were either pressed into the water directly,
or, making for the bridge of boats, found that the
drawbridge had been raised by the foremost of the
fugitives, and so were precipitated by thousands into
the stream. The French, too, did not spare the
combatants, and the number of the - Portuguese slain
and drowned cannot have fallen short of eight thousand.
The French soldiers, of whom not five hundred had
fallen, passed for a time completely out of control, and
indemnified themselves for past hardships, sufferings,
and humiliations by sacking the city from cellar to
garret, with the usual accompaniments of rape, drunken-
ness, and wanton destruction. Nevertheless they were
recalled to their duty within twenty-four hours, which
was in the circumstances creditable both to them and
to Soult ; and the Marshal might justly plume himself
upon a great victory. Yet, as has been well said,1 he
had really secured for himself no more than a new base
of operations. Even before he had stormed Oporto,
Silveira had received the surrender of Chaves with its
garrison of thirteen hundred efficient and invalid men ;
while on the 28th Vigo, having been beset for five days
by the British frigates at sea and by Galician insurgents
ashore, capitulated likewise, yielding some eight hundred
able prisoners to the British naval officers. Galicia, in
fact, so fully occupied the attention of Ney that he
could not spare a man to help the second corps. Soult
had ploughed his way successfully through the turbid
1 Oman, ii. 249.
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 135
flood of Portuguese insurrection, but the waters had 1809.
closed behind him.
According to Napoleon's design, it will be remem-
bered, Soult's advance upon Lisbon from the north was
to have been supported by a simultaneous advance of
Marshal Victor along the valley of the Guadiana, and
of General Lapisse from Salamanca by Ciudad Rodrigo
and Almeida, both of which fortresses he was instructed
to capture, upon Abrantes. Victor, as we have seen,
after the victory of Medellin, had halted at Merida,
thinking himself unable to move farther without rein-
forcements. Lapisse with his nine thousand men at
Salamanca fulfilled his duty very ill, and remained
practically inactive throughout January, February, and
March, though confronted at first with no more formid-
able force than a battalion of the Lusitanian Legion
under Sir Robert Wilson. Sir Robert, who was a
great partisan leader, with all the gifts and all the
defects of a Peterborough or a Cochrane, at once took
up a forward position near Almeida and declined to
leave it. When warned by Cradock that Almeida must
be evacuated by the British, and that the entire British
force would probably be re-embarked shortly,1 he merely
garrisoned that fortress with some of his own men, and
made so bold a display of his handful of troops that
Lapisse, overrating his strength, would not venture to
1 Mr. Oman (ii. 256) is very severe upon Cradock for advising
Wilson at the same time to bring off his British officers and embark
with the rest of the British army. Surely it is fair to remember that,
without such advice, Wilson would have felt bound to stay ; that if
the British evacuated Portugal (and there is no doubt that the
Cabinet was resigned to evacuation if not resolved upon it) the
Lusitanian Legion, as a corps in British pay, must have been
dissolved ; and that, in the same event, Portuguese resistance would
have been, as Cradock said, hopeless. What would have been said
of Cradock if he had evacuated Portugal and left these officers to
their fate ? They would have escaped to England with some
difficulty, and filled the country with their complaints against him.
Cradock' s advice was, in fact, simply a signal of recall, which
Wilson and his officers need not obey unless they wished, but might
plead in justification if compelled to abandon a hopeless task.
136 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. advance. Being later reinforced by Spanish levies to
a strength of over three thousand men, Wilson, per-
ceiving the timidity of his opponent, took the offensive,
beat up the quarters of Lapisse, and at last occupied the
pass of Banos, so as to cut off his communications
with Victor. Already completely isolated from Soult,
Lapisse became more than ever unwilling to go forward ;
and thus it was that until after the end of March his force
counted in the general operations for nothing, or even
for worse than nothing, since his inactivity encouraged
insurrection upon all sides. Thereby one of Napoleon's
principal combinations was wrecked ; and, though the
fact is most creditable to the boldness and resource of
Wilson, it is even more discreditable to the feebleness of
Lapisse.
To Cradock the movements of the enemy at the
beginning of March were still very obscure. They
seemed to him to be slow and unenterprising, and for
these peculiarities he was unable to account ; though he
did not accept the reports sent in from three different
quarters, by Romana in the north, Wilson at Ciudad
Rodrigo, and Captain Benjamin D'Urban at Cuesta's
headquarters, that there was every appearance of a French
evacuation of Spain.1 Owing to the absence of Mac-
kenzie's Brigade at Cadiz he was still very weak ; but
this did not prevent the Regency from pressing him to
lead some of his troops to the Zezere to command the
passages from Beira and Alemtejo, and to send others
to Alcantara to cover Cuesta's left flank. Cradock
declined to accept either of these proposals. His belief
was that Portugal without Lisbon was of little value to
the French, and that they would be less likely to move
upon it if the British force were kept compactly
together before the city, than if it were dispersed to
hold isolated positions in advance. He was also
persuaded that the slightest retrograde movement would
exert a disastrous moral influence upon the population,
1 Brotherton to Cradock, 13th March; Cradock to Sec. of
State, 6th March ; D'Urban to Cradock, 8th March, 1809.
ch. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 137
and that it was therefore better to stand back until he 1809.
could march forward, than to stand forward with every
prospect of being compelled to fall back. He consented,
however, in the first week of March to station his main
body at Lumiar, five miles north of Lisbon, with his
advanced posts at Bucellas and Montachique, and an
intermediate detachment at Loures to support them.
Beyond this he would not go ; nor can he, I think, be
blamed, for he was as yet quite uncertain whether the
British Ministers had decided to defend Portugal or not.
Very soon, however, Cradock's situation improved.
Two batteries of artillery arrived from England on the
2nd and 5th ; Beresford also presented himself to take March 25.
command of the Portuguese army ; and, most important
of all, despatches of the 27th of February came in from
England, promising reinforcements and giving definite
orders to recall all troops from Cadiz, to make every
effort to hold Portugal for as long as possible, and to
prepare the army for service in the field. Thus the
long period of doubt was ended at last ; and, to brighten
the prospect still further, the brigades ot Sherbrooke
and Mackenzie, the Fortieth Regiment excepted, arrived
from before Cadiz on the 11th. Cradock had now March 1 1 ,
nearly sixteen thousand sabres and bayonets,1 and
could reckon that, after providing for the safety of
Lisbon and of the maritime forts, he could spare twelve
thousand for service in the field. The companies of
the Fifth Battalion of the Sixtieth, after some wanderings
since their dismissal from the front by Moore and
Hope, had been collected, and bade fair, when a few bad
characters should have been weeded out, to re-establish
their former reputation as invaluable light troops — a
very necessary part of an army in a contest against
the French. Cavalry, however, which was even more
necessary than light infantry, was scarce, the entire
number of horses being fewer than nine hundred ; while
it was impossible to find horses or mules enough for the
1 15,842 rank and file — say 17,500 of all ranks. Return of
1 8th March 1809, in Cradock to Sec. of State of same date.
138 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. artillery, to say nothing of those required for transport.
It was only with great difficulty that two battalions were
equipped with very bad animals ; and Colonel Robe of
the artillery wrote that two hundred and seventy horses
and mules were urgently required for the remainder.
As a whole the commissariat and artillery together
needed some eight hundred mules in addition to the
few that they possessed, but were unable, in spite of all
efforts, to secure them. At his wits' end Cradock sent
officers to the coast of Barbary to endeavour to procure
animals there ; and he was early compelled to inform
Castlereagh that, for the artillery at any rate, horses
must be sent out from England. But even if horses
were procured, forage was almost unobtainable ; and the
troopers of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons, recently
arrived from home, were already falling off rapidly in
condition. The fact was that, owing to the demands of
Junot, Wellesley, Moore, and the Portuguese army in
the year 1808, the country was completely exhausted.1
Meanwhile the French designs began to grow
clearer. Soult's movement eastward towards Chaves
was somewhat obscure, and the object of a large detach-
ment of his army (for such Lapisse's division was
reported to be) at Salamanca was not quite obvious ;
but it was tolerably certain that if Soult crossed the
Minho, Lapisse would penetrate into Upper Beira.
Portugal might be considered safe from invasion by
Victor's army so long as Cuesta remained unbeaten;
and both Cuesta and the Supreme Junta pressed for a
detachment of Portuguese troops to move to Alcantara,
a request with which Beresford was ready to comply.
1 Cradock to Sec. of State, 6th, 20th, 30th March 1809 ; and
see authorities in Napier, ii. Appendix V. Mr. Oman (ii. 206) looks
upon Cradock's statements as to the dearth of horses and mules
as " astounding " and " incredible." Looking to the fact that
Moore had found equal difficulty in procuring transport-animals in
November 1808, and that his guns and their ammunition-waggons
were drawn by "a motley collection of mules, horses, and oxen"
(Duncan's History of the Royal Artillery, ii. 213-214), I confess that I
see nothing very astounding or incredible in it.
ch. xxvir HISTORY OF THE ARMY 139
But now Frere again came forward in the character of a 1809.
commander-in-chief. He had already tried to fritter
away part of the British force at Tarragona, and had
positively refused to allow the Fortieth Foot to be with-
drawn from Seville. He now assumed that Soult would
remain motionless in the north, and urged Cradock to
lead the British force up the Tagus to join Cuesta, and
with him to drive the French from Toledo and
Madrid. Simultaneously the Bishop of Oporto wrote
to Cradock that without British help Oporto would be
lost. The General honestly lamented that he could not
save the city ; but, while Victor lav upon his flank at
Merida, he judged it unsafe to expose Lisbon by an
advance to the north. Moreover, as he justly said,
the anarchy in Oporto must make all defence un-
availing ; and it was difficult to say what part the
mob might not take against the British troops if
the proceedings of the latter did not suit its views
at the moment. Then on the 1st of April came
the news, without any details, of the fall of Oporto,
and of Cuesta's defeat at Medellin. This last, as
Cradock said, laid Portugal open upon its most vulner-
able side, and forbade any advance to meet Soult. The
panic was great. Badajoz called out loudly for rein-
forcements ; and Beresford strongly urged Cradock to
make a short march northward to put some heart into
the country. The General, having received on the 4th April 4.
a consignment of artillery horses, and a reinforcement of
five battalions under Major-general Hill,1 moved forward
to Obidos, Caldas, and Rio Mayor, with an advanced April 8-14.
corps pushed still farther to the north. Now, however,
Cradock was informed that his efforts to obtain animals
in Barbary were fruitless ; and the problem of provid-
ing for the transport of ammunition and victuals seemed
hopeless of solution. It is true that about this same time April 18.
he received the news of his supersession by Wellesley in
1 2/7th, 30th, 48th, 53rd, 66th, 83rd. Total, 4139 rank and
file. But one transport with 300 men of the 30th did not come
in with the rest, reducing the total to 3839.
i4o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 809. the command of Portugal, and of his appointment to the
Governorship of Gibraltar ; but he did not consider
difficulties to be overcome by transferring them to the
shoulders of another, and he wrote home to represent
once more the exhausted state of Portugal and the
April 21. dearth of animals and supplies. On the 21st he moved
the army forward to Leiria, having on the previous day
written in his last despatch to Castlereagh, " As soon as
our equipment is complete, and our supplies assured, and
we have no anxiety about Marshal Victor, we shall
advance to dislodge Soult." On the 22nd Sir Arthur
April 24. Wellesley landed at Lisbon ; on the 24th he took over
command of the army, and Cradock's military career
was at an end.
Napier has recorded his opinion that Sir John was
unworthily used ; and, though undoubtedly Ministers
were right and wise to supersede him by Wellesley, it
seems to me that the opinion is justified. For months
Cradock had been placed in one of the most trying
positions which a commander can occupy ; set down,
that is to say, with a small force in a foreign country
disorganised by a hostile invasion, with a new and
inefficient Government, a bankrupt treasury, and a
suspicious and excited population ; and then bidden to
make preparations simultaneously for defence and for
re-embarkation. Napier long ago pointed out that such
orders were self-contradictory, and it is very certain
that Cradock felt them to be so. The first point
perfectly clear in Castlereagh's instructions was that
Cradock was upon no account to risk the loss of his
force ; the second was that Ministers were anxious to
find another base of operations in the Peninsula in lieu
of Lisbon, and were prepared to evacuate Portugal at
any moment. In such circumstances it was impossible
for Cradock to look upon the occupation of Portugal
as more than a temporary measure ; and this uncertainty
alone naturally sufficed to deter him from incurring
either risks or obligations.1 He could not be blind to
1 "The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has
ch. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 14 1
the obvious fact that Ministers were undecided as to 1809.
their own intentions ; and, just as a nervous hand
upon the reins will destroy the confidence of the
cleverest horse, so must indecision in Downing Street
impair the resolution of commanders in the remotest
field.
When at last at the end of February Ministers
definitely made up their minds to a real effort to save
Portugal, General, troops, and Portuguese alike had
been demoralised by three months of suspense. Cradock
had sent many of his soldiers to Cadiz under the impres-
sion— and it was a correct impression — that such was
the wish of the British Cabinet ; and it was not until
the 1 ith of March that he recovered them. On that
day for the first time he reckoned that he could spare
some thirteen thousand British for active service in the
field ; but he had only received orders to mobilise them
three or four days earlier ; and the Portuguese army,
which was supposed to assist him, had not yet been
under Beresford's command for a full week. Of his
dearth of cavalry and his difficulties in obtaining trans-
port, enough has already been said ; and it must be
added that directly he hinted at an intention to advance,
the Portuguese Regency begged him to leave in Lisbon
— a town which contained seventy thousand armed,
undisciplined, and turbulent men — a garrison sufficient
to preserve tranquillity- No reinforcements of men or
horses reached him until the 4th of April, and none of
cavalry until the 14th, by which later date he had already
been aware for a week that he was to be superseded.
In fact, from the day when he received orders to
mobilise until the day when he received the news of his
supersession, the time was just one month — a month
which brought him endless foolish entreaties from the
hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an advan-
tageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, might
necessarily be expected ; we have literally been supplied from
hand to mouth." — Commissary Rawlings to Cradock, March 1809.
Napier, ii. Appendix V.
i42 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Supreme Junta, Frere, and the Portuguese Regency;
while he received at the end the stunning news of the
fall of Oporto and of the defeat of Cuesta at Medellin.
Cradock may not have been, probably was not, a very
enterprising man ; but he showed at least firmness in
resisting all importunities that he should disperse his
force, and he handed it over to Wellesley united and
compact for service in the field. By the light of know-
ledge which he never possessed and would have paid
thousands to acquire, and by the issue of later events
which occurred in very different circumstances, it is
easy to condemn him for excessive timidity and prud-
ence. It is no less easy to throw the whole blame of
his caution upon Ministers, and to condemn them like-
wise without making allowance for their difficulties and
their divisions. Too much should not be made of the
shortcomings of either. Only a very few months had
passed since the Spanish armies had been scattered to
the winds, and Moore's troops had re-embarked after
a terrible retreat. It was not obvious at first sight
that there was still a chance of success in the Peninsula ;
and since Castlereagh, with Wellesley's help, realised
within six weeks of receiving the news of Coruna that
there was such a chance, and converted his colleagues
to his view within two weeks more, we have hardly the
right to criticise either his insight or his courage.
CHAPTER XXVIII
When Wellesley took over the command in Portugal, 1809.
the French were still showing the same inactivity that
had so much puzzled Cradock. In one respect only
had there been an important change. Upon the request
of Marshal Victor, King Joseph had directed that the
division of Lapisse at Salamanca, instead of advancing
upon Abrantes as Napoleon had designed, should move
to Alcantara and aid the operations of the First Corps.
The direct route by Bejar being blocked by Sir Robert
Wilson at the pass of Banos, Lapisse upon the 6th of April 6.
April marched upon Ciudad Rodrigo and sat down
before it, in the hope of attracting Wilson to the help
of the beleaguered city. Wilson at once fell into the
trap ; and Lapisse, making a forced march southward,
crossed the Sierra de Gata at the pass of Perales, took
his way safely to Alcantara, which he stormed and
sacked, and on the 19th joined Victor at Merida. The April 19.
effect of this movement was to isolate Sou It completely,
and to put an end for ever to Napoleon's projected
combination against Lisbon, while at the same time it
did not serve in the least to quicken the activity of
Victor, who remained stationary at Merida.
Soult likewise was prolonging his halt at Oporto.
After the capture of the city he had sent General
Loison eastwards into Traz-os-Montes to gain intelli-
gence of the movements of Lapisse ; but General
Silveira, after the capture of Chaves, had taken up a
position on the east bank of the Tamega, and defied
the efforts of Loison to force a passage. It was neces-
143
i44 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. sary for Soult to reinforce Loison to a strength of over
six thousand men ; and Silveira, emboldened by success,
was rash enough to offer battle to this force with his
April 18. half-trained levies before Amarante. He was defeated
with great loss ; but, by the gallantry of a British
officer, Colonel Patrick, the pursuit of the French was
arrested at the bridge, and Silveira was able to rally his
troops and to occupy an entrenched position beyond it,
which secured the passage over the river. Once again
Loison was brought to a stand and obliged to ask for
reinforcements, which raised his detachment to nearly
nine thousand men ; but mere increase of his numbers
was for the present of little profit to him, for the
river was impassable owing to floods. All bridges except
that of Amarante had been broken down, and that of
Amarante itself had been mined, so that it was neces-
sary not only to drive the Portuguese from it but to
prevent them from blowing it up when they retired.
By the ingenuity of a French officer this last difficulty
May 2. was overcome.1 On the 2nd of May the bridge was
carried, and the Portuguese, surprised in their entrench-
ments, fled without firing a shot, leaving ten guns and
some hundreds of prisoners behind them. Thus were
the forces of Silveira for a time dispersed, having kept
a large proportion of Soult's army fully employed for
the best part of a month.
Throughout this time Soult was busying himself
with foolish visions of assuming the crown of Northern
Lusitania, the chief result of which dreams was to stir
up a conspiracy in the army against the authority not
only of Soult but of the Emperor himself. The plans
of the conspirators were far advanced when Wellesley
landed, and one of the leaders, Argenton, having been
passed through the Portuguese lines to Coimbra, and
thence forwarded to Lisbon, was admitted to Wellesley's
presence on the evening of the 25 th of April. Argen-
ton's proposals were that the British General should
press hard upon the French army so as to force Soult
1 The story is well told by Mr. Oman, ii. 270.
ch. xxvur HISTORY OF THE ARMY 145
to concentrate it, when the disaffected would seize the 1809.
Marshal and his principal officers, and place them in
confinement. Wellesley, while careful not to discourage
the traitors, declined to commit himself until matters
should have gone further ; and there for the present
the affair ended. The British General had his own
designs upon Soult, and put more trust in them than in
those of a feather-brained French captain.
Welleslev had now actually under his command, or
on passage to join him, something over eight and
twenty thousand British and German troops of all ranks,
of which about five and twenty thousand were ready
for immediate service. In addition to these there were
some fifteen to sixteen thousand Portuguese, including
three weak regiments of cavalry, which Beresford had
for the last six weeks been licking into shape. For the
most part they were still raw and half-trained, though
improving ; but at least two battalions were remarked
by one of Wellesley's staff to be in the finest possible
order. Altogether, therefore, he had some fifty thousand
men of one kind and another to his hand, with thirty
guns, eighteen of them British and twelve German, for
it had been found impossible to provide teams for
more.1 Cradock had already established a depot at
1 Return in Wellington Supp. Desp. vi. 2II-2I2 ; Duncan,
History of the Royal Artillery, ii. 245.
Cavalry.
3rd D.G., 4th D., 14th L.D., 16th L.D., 20th L.D. (4 troops),
23rd L.D., 1st L.D.K.G.L., 4 troops Royal Waggon
Train. Total : 167 officers, 4691 N.C.O. and men.
Infantry.
1/ Coldstream Guards, i/3rd Guards, i/3rd, zjjth., 2Jgtb,
2/24th, 3/27th, 29th, 2/30th, 2/3 1st, i/4oth, i/45th,
2/48th, 2/53rd, 5/6oth, 2/66th, 2/83rd, 2/8;th, i/88th,-
97th, 2 cos. Royal Staff Corps.
K.G.L. 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th line batts., 1 garrison co.
559 officers, 20,406 N.C.O. and men.
2 batts. of detachments (900 and 980). All ranks, 1880.
Artillery.
British, 5 batteries, \ offi izqq NCQ ^ mgn_
German, 2 batteries, J '
Grand Total. 28,183.
VOL. VII L
146 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxtii
i 809. Santarem, with which there was communication by water
from Lisbon, so that it remained only for Wellesley to
settle the administrative details of transport and supply
before entering upon his campaign. A project for the
organisation of the Portuguese Commissariat was await-
ing his approval, and was criticised and amended by him
with his usual stern good sense. In the matter of trans-
port for his army he fell back upon ox-waggons, though
with every intention of replacing the waggons as soon as
possible by pack-mules or by horses, of which he was
expecting a supply from England.1 For, though he
came to Portugal with all the glory of former victories
about him, with reinforcements at his back, and in fact
with everything to commend him to the Portuguese
people, he was as little able as Cradock to perform the
miracle of finding mules where they did not exist.2 He
was also not a little hampered by want of money,3 the
British Treasury being still embarrassed in the highest
degree by the dearth of specie ; and he was obliged to
open his campaign amid much clamour of creditors,
with no more than £10,000 in the military chest.
Wellesley's determination to advance, however,
doubtless smoothed all ways for him. Shortly before
Of the above the 3rd D.G. landed on April 26-27, anc^ tne 4tn
D. probably about the same time ; the 23rd L.D. were still on
passage. As these could not be fit for hard work for three weeks or
a month, 2 100 must be deducted on their account. The i/40th also
were at Seville, some 900 strong. Altogether, therefore, 3000 must
be deducted from the grand total.
I take the figures from a return of 1st May in Military Transactions
of the British Empire, excepting the " battalions of detachments,"
the figures for which are based on Cradock's returns of 1 8th March.
This return of 18th March shows the regiments much weaker than
on 1st May.
1 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 24th April 1809. Memorandum
of an arrangement for the Commissariat, 2nd May 1809. Welling-
ton Desp. iv. 271, 294.
2 So precious were transport animals that he actually sent ships
round to Puerto Santa Maria to bring away 100 mules which had
been collected by the 40th Regiment at Seville for their own use.
Wellesley to Admiral Berkeley, 2nd May 1809.
3 Wellesley to Huskisson, 5th May 1809.
ch. xxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 147
his arrival intercepted letters had revealed that Soult, 1809.
while advancing upon Lisbon from the north, was
looking for the co-operation of French corps by way of
Salvaterra.1 At first there had been some doubt whether
this pointed to a movement by Lapisse upon Salvaterra
do Extremo, a little to north of Alcantara, or by Victor
upon Salvaterra de Magos, on the Tagus nearly due
east of Torres Vedras ; but the doubt was solved by
the intelligence that Lapisse had joined Victor at Merida,
and that in consequence communication between Soult
and Victor was impossible. It remained for Wellesley
to decide whether to drive Soult from Portugal or to
lead his army against Victor, in conjunction with Cuesta,
who was now at Llerena, midway between Merida and
Seville, nearly ready to take the field with some
twenty-five thousand men. Judged from a purely
military standpoint, the movement against Victor was
preferable, for the defeat of the First Corps would not
only relieve Seville and Lisbon, but remove all possi-
bility of Soult's further advance, and indeed tell greatly
in all quarters to the disadvantage of the French. But,
on the other hand, though the reason was not directly
put forward by Wellesley, the organisation of his
transport and supply service must still have been very
imperfect ; Cuesta was known to be a difficult colleague ;
Wellesley's instructions limited him strictly to the
defence of Portugal ; there was still some probability
that the British Government would make its principal
effort on behalf of Spain from Cadiz ; 2 and lastly, since
Soult was in possession of the city of Oporto and of
the most fertile province of Portugal, there were strong
political reasons in favour of expelling him. Within
forty-eight hours, therefore, Wellesley decided to
advance against Soult, and, having pushed him outside
the frontier, to stand on the defensive in that quarter,
and to return to the Tagus to deal with Victor. He
1 Cradock to Sec. of State, 12th April 1809.
2 That this was in Wellesley's mind is shown by his letter to
Frere of 24th April. Despatches, iv. 268.
148 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. did not expect Soult to await his coming, but, on the
other hand, he did not purpose to follow him into
Galicia ; and here must be noticed Wellesley's pene-
trating insight into the true conditions of the war.
To all intent the French held only so much of
Spanish territory as they could overawe by the shadow
of their bayonets. To use a homely simile, Spain was
like a sheet of parchment which has been kept perpetu-
ally rolled up, and the French army like a block of
metal made up of thin layers. To hold Spain down it
was necessary to spread out the whole of these layers ;
and, while they were so spread out, the peasantry acted,
so to speak, like an acid, perpetually worrying at their
edges, making a notch here and a notch there, but,
though slowly reducing their bulk and their weight,
unable wholly to remove them. The British army,
however, presented itself as a heavy instrument, to
resist the impact of whose blow it was necessary to
collect all the layers and to pile them anew one upon
another into a solid block. Where the block stood,
the parchment was held heavily down ; but everywhere
else it curled up again into its original form, refusing
to be flattened until the layers should be spread out
once more. Wellesley divined the situation exactly.
In Galicia, doubting lest he might break his hammer
upon the consolidated block of the French, he preferred
that the metal layers should remain dispersed and
exposed to the continual fretting of the acid. Yet he
saw that the contest must be ended not by the acid but
by the hammer. " I am convinced," he wrote two days
after his arrival in Lisbon, " that the French will be in
serious danger in Spain only when a great force shall be
assembled which will oblige them to collect their troops."1
Having then made up his mind that his first opera-
tions should be in the north, he gave orders on the
April 27. 27th for the concentration of one brigade of cavalry,
eight brigades of infantry, five batteries of artillery,
and some six thousand Portuguese at Coimbra, on suc-
1 To Frerc, 24th April 1809.
ch. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 149
cessive days from the 30th of April to the 4th of May. 1 809.
The next business was to detail a force to protect
Portugal against a possible incursion by Victor during
his absence ; an event which, looking to the revival
of Cuesta's army, Wellesley regarded as exceedingly
improbable. For this service he appointed seven bat-
talions, five squadrons and three batteries of the Portu-
guese army, three regiments of Portuguese militia, four
British battalions, two regiments of British cavalry and
one British battery,1 the whole amounting to some seven
thousand Portuguese and five thousand British of all
ranks. The entire force was under the orders of Major-
general Mackenzie, who was instructed to hold the
line of the Tagus if Victor advanced on the south of
that river, and the line of the Zezere if he advanced on
the north. The Tagus was in flood, and as Wellesley
had taken measures to collect all the boats upon alarm
of an invasion, he judged that it would be a full month
before Victor would be able to cross it. Thus lightly
did he conjure away the spectre of the First French
Corps, which had for so long daunted Cradock from
an advance against Soult. But it must be remembered
that the revival of Cuesta's army was not known, nor had
Mackenzie's two regiments of British cavalry arrived,
until after Wellesley had taken over the command.
On the 2nd of May Sir Arthur reached Coimbra,
and on the 4th he reorganised his force so as to include May 4.
five of the best Portuguese battalions in the British
brigades.2 He also introduced the innovation of attach-
1 3rd D.G., 4th D., Baynes's 6-pounder battery. 2/24th, ^/zjth,
2/3 1st, i/45th. The three battalions last named had formed
Mackenzie's brigade under Cradock's latest organisation of the army.
The 2/24th was one of the newly arrived regiments at Lisbon. It
is noteworthy that Wellesley left the two regiments of British cavalry
on the Tagus because he could not find forage for them on the road
to Coimbra. Wellesley to General Edward Paget, 4th May 1809.
2 Order of Battle :—
Cavalry Brigade. Maj.-gen. Cotton.
* 14th L.D. (1 troop 3rd Hussars K.G.L. attached),
1 6th L.D., 2 squadrons 20th L.D.
* 1 squadron detached to Beresford.
150 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. ing a company of the Fifth battalion of the Sixtieth to
five out of the seven British infantry brigades, leaving
the remaining five companies together in a sixth. The
remaining British brigade, Stewart's, was supplied with
light infantry by men of the Forty-third, Fifty-second,
and Ninety-fifth in the first battalion of detachments,1
who had formed part of Craufurd's brigade in Moore's
army. The line battalions of the German Legion had
in each company ten riflemen, who in action were
massed together and placed under independent com-
mand ; and, since detachments of two of the Light
battalions were also present, the Germans were well
Guards Brigade. Brig.-gen. F. Campbell.
1/ Coldstream Guards, i/3rd Guards, 1 co. 5/6oth.
\st Brigade. Maj.-gen. Hill.
i/3rd, 2/66th, 2/4_8th, 1 co. 5/6oth.
$rd Brigade. Maj.-gen. Tilson.
5 cos. 5/6oth, i/88th, 1st batt. Portuguese Grenadiers,
2/8 7th (detached to Beresford).
yh Brigade. Brig.-gen. A. Campbell.
2/7th, i/ioth Portuguese, 2/53rd, 1 co. 5/6oth.
fth Brigade. Brig.-gen. Cameron.
2/9th, 2/ioth Portuguese, 2/83rd, 1 co. 5/6oth.
6tli Brigade. Brig.-gen. R. Stewart.
1st batt. detachments, 1/1 6th Portuguese, 29th.
\th Brigade. Brig.-gen. Sontag.
2nd batt. detachments, 2/i6th Portuguese, 97th, 1 co.
5/6oth.
znd Brigade. Maj.-gen. Mackenzie.
3/27th, i/45th, 2/3 1st (detached to Tagus).
K.G.L. Maj.-gen. Murray.
von Langwerth's brigade, 1st and 2nd line batts. ; von
Low's brigade, 5th and 7th line batts.
Ri/iemen. Major von Wurmb. 10 men from each co.
of four line batts., detachment from 1st and 2nd
Light Batts.
Artillery.
British. Lawson's battery (light 3 prs.), Lane's battery
(light 6 prs.), Baynes's (light 6 prs., detached to
Tagus).
German. Rettberg's battery (light 6 prs.), Heise's
battery (long 6 prs.).
1 The first battalion of detachments was made up of the 28th,
38th, 43rd, 52nd, 92nd, and 95th.
ch. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 151
furnished with sharp-shooters. This novel distribution 1809.
of riflemen formed part of Wellesley's tactics for meet-
ing those of the French. From the first the revolu-
tionary armies had gained their victories by covering
their front with swarms of skirmishers, whose fire
shook the ranks of the opposing infantry and made
them yield readily to the subsequent assault of dense
columns with the bayonet. Napoleon applied the
principle for the express purpose of bewildering the
commander opposed to him. He would worry the
enemy's line from end to end with artillery and skir-
mishers until a weak point discovered itself, and then
launch his bayonets upon that point. This system
served very well against generals who allowed them-
selves to be flustered, but it had the great defect of
assigning too important a part to shock action, to the
neglect of missile action. Wellesley designed to match
skirmishers against skirmishers, so as to keep his main
line of infantry intact, and to meet the charge of the
bayonets with a volley of bullets.1 At Vimeiro, it will
be remembered, Fane's skirmishers cleared the front so
late as to mask the fire of the British guns at a moment
when the French columns were dangerously close to the
batteries ; but the result, far from being disadvantageous,
was to make the British volley the more deadly. Since
therefore Wellesley was resolved to use the musket
primarily as a missile weapon rather than merely as a
spear, which was the French practice, the formation of
his infantry into the accepted line, two deep, followed
as a matter of course, because thereby was gained the
greatest possible frontage of fire. There was nothing
quite new in the whole conception, except the par-
ticular employment of riflemen as skirmishers. The
light companies of battalions had long been employed
to engage hostile light infantry before the clash of the
main bodies on both sides, and the shock action of men
in column had been met and defeated by missile action
1 Mr. Oman was the first to discover and to point out this most
important feature in Wellington's tactics.
152 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. in line at Wandewash, at Maida, at Vimeiro, and at
Coruna. But Wellesley himself at Vimeiro had massed
the whole of his riflemen into a single brigade at a
single point of his position, and Moore at Coruna had
held his battalion of the Ninety-fifth at first in reserve.
Now, however, Wellesley was alive to the advantage of
the rifle in the skirmishing line, from its superiority
both in range and accuracy ; and therefore a peculiar
interest attaches to the order of battle issued at
Coimbra.
May 4. On the 4th Wellesley received the news of the
defeat of Silveira on the Tamega, and of his retire-
ment across the Douro to Lamego. This intelligence
compelled him to alter his plans. He had hoped,
while himself advancing upon Soult's front, to reinforce
Silveira with the Portuguese levies of Colonel Trant
and Robert Wilson, so as to cut off his enemy's
retreat into Traz-os-Montes and to drive him back to
the Minho, which at that season could hardly have been
passed in the presence of a pursuing army. The loss
of the bridge of Amarante put an end to any such
expectations ; and Wellesley was obliged to content
himself with ensuring that the French should at any
rate be prevented from crossing the Douro, and should
be compelled to retire northward. With this object
he entrusted to Beresford Tilson's brigade of British
infantry and a body of Portuguese, making in all some
six thousand men,1 with orders to move north-eastward
to Vizeu, pick up Wilson's detachment of Portuguese
there, and proceed northward to join Silveira at Lamego.
Arrived there, Beresford was to do his utmost to prevent
1 British. — 2/87th, 1 /88th, 5 cos. 5/6oth, 2 squadrons 14th L.D.
Portuguese. — 5 batts. infantry, 3 squadrons cavalry, 2 field
batteries.
Mr. Oman states rightly that one squadron only of the 14th L.D.
was with Beresford's force. Cannon's Record of the 14th L.D. says
that two were with him ; but the difference is more apparent than
real, for the 14th had 64 horses unserviceable within a fortnight of
landing, which weakened the regiment by the strength of over half
a squadron. Well. Desp. iv. 305.
ch. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 153
the French from passing the Douro ; and he was even 1809.
authorised to cross that river and to occupy Villa Real,
so as to cut off the French retreat to the east, if he
could find a very good position where he might be sure
of holding his own until Wellesley could join him.
But Sir Arthur deprecated any imprudent action. The
Portuguese troops were not yet to be trusted ; and he
did not wish to see a solitary British brigade exposed to
the attack of Soult's whole army. " Remember," he
wrote to Beresford in another letter of the same day,
" that you are a commander-in-chief, and must not be
beaten ; therefore do not undertake anything with your
troops unless you have some strong hope of success."
With these instructions following him, Beresford
marched on the 6th of May for Vizeu.
On that same night Wellesley rode out to Martede, May 6.
about ten miles north of Coimbra on the road to Aveiro,
to meet Argenton for the second time, having chosen
that particular spot in order to conceal from the
Frenchman as far as might be the number and movements
of the British troops.1 The conspirator had little of
real importance to say, and was sent away through
by-roads so that he should see as little as possible. On
the following day Wellesley 's advanced guard 2 marched
northward upon Oporto, and the campaign was fairly
begun. Soult's army at the moment was still widely
scattered. Delaborde's division was at Oporto ; Loison
with some seven thousand men was about Amarante ;
Lorge's dragoons were watching the Portuguese leader,
Botilho, on the Lima ; Mermet's division had been
pushed forward towards the Vouga, with Franceschi's
cavalry in advance. All were serenely unconscious of
the vicinity of the British. On the 8th Wellesley May 8.
halted the advanced guard for a day, so as to allow
1 Wellesley to Trant, 3rd May 1809.
2 3 squadrons 14th L.D., 1 battery R.A., Stewart's brigade.
Napier says that the cavalry and Paget's division marched on the
7th ; Wellesley himself says " the advanced guard," the composition
•of which is given in Leslie's Military Journal, p. 106.
154 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. Beresford's corps to get well forward with its turning
movement, and ordered the following dispositions.
Cotton with his cavalry was to march before dawn
of the 10th along the great road to Oporto and try
to surprise Franceschi's advanced posts at Albergaria
Nova ; * while Stewart's and Murray's brigades followed
by the same road in support. Meanwhile Hill's brigade
was to embark at Aveiro early on the 9th, and time its
movements so as to land at Ovar on the morning of the
10th, taking care not to show itself until Cotton
should have reached the French outposts. Hill was
then to join hands with Cotton at the junction of the
roads from Coimbra and Ovar, and to attempt to pass the
bridge at Oporto on the heels of the French rear-guard,
or at any rate to prevent the destruction of the bridge ;
and he was especially to make it his care to collect all
boats that were to be found on the left bank of the
river. Cameron's brigade was to follow Hill's by
water to Ovar, and the remainder of the force to
advance by the main road to Oporto.2 In all the troops
thus set in motion numbered some sixteen thousand
British and twenty-four hundred Portuguese, organised
for the time into three divisions of infantry and one of
cavalry, under Generals Sherbrooke, Paget, Hill and
Cotton.3
The British cavalrv reached the south bank of the
Vouga on the 9th, passed the bridge before midnight,
May 10. and at dawn came up with the French picquets before
Albergaria Nova. The enemy turned out hastily and
1 This stroke was attempted by the advice of Colonel Trant,
who had accidentally been admitted to Albergaria Nova under a
flag of truce. "They have no idea of the British being at hand,"
he wrote, " nor do they credit the report of reinforcements having
arrived at Lisbon." Trant to Wellesley, 1st May, Wellingto?i MS.
2 G.O. 8th May 1809.
3 Sherbrooke's Division. — Guards, Campbell's and Sontag's
brigades, 1 battery 6 prs.
Paget's Division. — Stewart's and Murray's brigades, 1 battery
3 prs., 1 battery 6 prs.
HilPs Division. — Hill's and Cameron's brigades, I battery 6 prs.
Cavalry : Lieut.-gen. Paget, Maj.-gen. Cotton.
ch. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 155
in some confusion ; but, Franceschi having with him a 1809.
regiment of infantry besides his twelve hundred cavalry May 10-
and a battery of horse-artillery, Cotton could not
venture to attack until the infantry should come up.
Meanwhile the infantry was behindhand. It had
been designed that Trant's Portuguese on the Vouga
should advance midway between the columns of Hill
and Paget ; but Trant, finding this impracticable, had
been obliged to pass the Vouga and the defiles beyond
it, in order to leave room for Stewart's brigade to
proceed. Stewart, however, was delayed by the
breaking of some of his gun-carriages, and thus it was
that Trant's troops were the first to join Cotton.
Franceschi no sooner perceived the infantry than he
drew off his troops, leaving a rear-guard of four
squadrons, which was charged by the Sixteenth Light
Dragoons, but escaped with trifling loss. The British
halted at Oliveira, and the French commander was thus
able to fall back almost unmolested upon Mermet's
division on the heights of Grijo.
Hill's movement on the enemy's right was equally
a failure. His brigade landed at Ovar precisely at the
appointed hour; but Franceschi, instead of retiring in
disorder across his front, as had been expected, was
holding Cotton at bay. Thereupon Hill, hearing that
three battalions of Mermet's division were at Feira, not
more than six miles distant, stood fast at Ovar, and sent
his boats back to fetch Cameron's brigade. Mermet
presently sent out the three battalions from Feira to
check any movements upon Hill's part ; and there was
some skirmishing between the two parties, until the
appearance of the British Dragoons, following Franceschi,
warned the French to retire lest they should be cut off ;
when they too withdrew with little loss to Grijo.
With Paget's division, Hill's brigade and Cotton's
cavalry, Wellesley could oppose fifteen hundred horse
to the French twelve hundred, and seven thousand
foot to the French four thousand. Early the next May n.
morning, therefore, he directed Hill to move along
156 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. the road to Oporto and cutoff the enemy's retreat,
May 1 1. while he himself with the remainder of the force
marched against the French front. Coming up to
their position in the afternoon, Wellesley at once
engaged them in front with the light companies of
Stewart's brigade ; but, meeting with a stubborn
resistance, he presently detached the 16th Portuguese
to engage the French right, and the King's German
Legion to turn their left,1 at the same time manoeuvring
with the remainder of Stewart's brigade and the
cavalry against their front. On becoming aware of
the turning movement Mermet at once retreated,
sending the cavalry on in advance, and using the 31st
Light Infantry for his rear-guard ; for the ground
was strongly enclosed. This regiment, however, was
unskilfully handled by its colonel ; and Charles
Stewart, Wellesley 's Adjutant-general, begged leave to
send the two squadrons of the advanced guard, one
from the Sixteenth and one from the Twentieth Light
Dragoons, to attack them. The dragoons accordingly
hastened down a narrow lane in single file, and
galloped straight at the French infantry, who, though
greatly superior in numbers, were so far demoralised by
their colonel's bad leadership that they turned and ran
away. About a hundred were taken prisoners, and, if
the swordsmanship of the British dragoons had been
better, the regiment would have been cut to pieces ;
but as usual the majority of the French escaped with a
few bruises. The enemy then drew off without making
further resistance than sufficed to assure their retreat.
But meanwhile Hill's movement on the western flank
had again miscarried ; for, through defective work on
the part of Wellesley's staff, Hill's column had crossed
Trant's on the road, and the time thus wasted could not
1 Mr. Oman (ii. 328) reverses the position of the two columns,
sending the Portuguese to the French left, and the K.G.L. to their
right ; but Napier, Londonderry, and Leslie agree that Wellesley
made his dispositions as I have set them down ; so I doubt not
that Mr. Oman's variation from these writers is merely a slip of
the pen.
ch. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 157
be made good. The loss of the British force in the 1809.
whole affair was something over one hundred men.lMa>'11,
That of the French can hardly have been less than twice
as many.J
On that night the British encamped in the French
tents at Grijo ; while Mermet and Franceschi continued
their retreat until they had crossed the Douro into
Oporto, when Soult broke down the bridge behind
them. The Marshal had been roused to a sense of
his danger on the 8th when Argenton, having been
denounced by a general whom he had tried to gain
over to the conspiracy, was arrested, and, upon the
promise of pardon, confessed all that he knew. Soult
made instant preparations for retreat through Traz-os-
Montes, warned JLoison to hold the bridge at Amarante
at all costs, directed his outlying detachments in the
north to march to that point, and, having collected all the
boats on the Douro, resolved to maintain Oporto until
the 1 2th in order to cover these various movements.
In the city itself he had between eleven and twelve
thousand men ; and his only fear was lest Wellesley
should gather together the boats which had brought
Hill's division from Aveiro to Ovar, and cross the
Douro near its mouth. He therefore instructed his
cavalry to patrol the lower part of the river most
carefully, and kept his infantry in good quarters
in the city ; feeling sure of several days' respite
before Wellesley could find means of passing the
river.
At two o'clock on the morning of the 12th the May 12.
1 2 officers and 19 men killed, 6 officers and 65 men wounded,
16 men missing.
2 Tomkinson {Diary of a Cavalry Officer, pp. 7-9) and Fantin
des Odoards (pp. 230-232) give an account of this attack of the
cavalry at Grijo from the points of view of the charger and the
charged. Londonderry in his account of the affair says that he led
the attack — "Two squadrons being entrusted to me, we galloped
forward in sections," etc. In the face of the details given by
Tomkinson this is incredible. Londonderry can have led only the
rear troops.
158 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 809. British troops were roused by the noise of a loud
May 12. eXpiosion, proceeding (though they knew it not) from
the destruction of the bridge of boats at Oporto. The
army at once got under arms and presently advanced
to Villa Nova, a suburb of Oporto on the south side of
the Douro. Here the heads of the columns filled the
steep narrow streets, while the remainder was massed in
rear behind a rocky hill, crowned by the convent of
Serra, which I shall call the Convent Hill. This hill
stands in a convex bend of the river, and, being
sufficiently high to mask all view of the upper waters
from Oporto, completely concealed the British army
from sight. Above this bend the Douro is shallow and
rippling, having a breadth of full five hundred yards,
and on the northern bank only is the shore steep and
forbidding ; but from the convent of Serra downwards
the stream, pent in between lofty cliffs on both sides,
flows deep and silent past the city.
Soult, looking only for the approach of ships from
the mouth of the river, had taken up his quarters in a
house to west of Oporto, from which he could watch
the lower reaches to the sea. Wellesley, from the
convent one hundred and fifty feet above the river,
could see columns of infantry forming up to the north-
east of the town, which after a time moved off* with a
convoy, being Mermet's division escorting the sick and
reserve of artillery towards Amarante ; but except down
the stream he could perceive few guards or patrols. Over
against him stood the bishop's Seminary, a large isolated
building, unfinished but rising to the height of two low
stories, and surrounded by a high wall 1 which extended
to the river on each side. The enclosure within the
walls was large enough to hold two battalions, and
was commanded by the Convent Hill, from which
guns could bring a flanking fire to bear upon every
part of it except the northern face, whence an iron
1 The remains of this wall may be still seen. The Seminary,
when I saw it, was under repair, and had been raised to the height
■of three or four stories.
ch. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 159
gate gave egress to a lane leading to the Vallongo road.1 1809.
Officers had already been despatched to search the banks May 12.
of the river, and Colonel Waters discovered a barber
who had crossed the water in a skiff that morning.
The barber pointed out four large barges unguarded
on the northern shore ; and Waters, with the help of
the Prior of Amarante, who had volunteered his
services, persuaded a few peasants to help him to
secure these barges. They crossed the river accord-
ingly, unperceived by any French patrol, and brought
back the barges, Waters having ascertained at the same
time that the Seminary was unoccupied by the French
troops. The fact was duly reported to Wellesley, who
answered briefly, " Well, let the men cross." At the
same time three batteries were brought up to the
Convent Hill, and Murray was detached with two
squadrons of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons, two guns,
the First Line Battalion, and the massed riflemen of the
German Legion to the ferry of Avintes, which though
scathed had not been damaged beyond repair.2
A company of the Buffs was the first to embark ;
and when the first barge reached the shore an officer
and twenty-five men hastened to occupy the Seminary
and to close the iron gate on the northern side. The
soldiers that followed lined the garden wall and prepared
a banquette from which to fire over it. The barges
returned and made a second trip unperceived ; nor
was it until they were taking over their third load,
among whom was General Edward Paget, that shots
were heard, when it became evident that the enemy had
taken the alarm. Several officers of Mermet's division,
it is said, observed red-coats on the southern bank
and vessels passing the river, and reported it to their
1 Napier represents the gate as actually abutting on the Vallongo
road, and the British as firing, later on in the day, upon the French
as they passed along that road. But so far as I can gather, the
Vallongo road was eight hundred yards from the wall of the
Seminary.
2 Wellesley's despatch would lead one to suppose that Murray's
detachment had been sent away much earlier.
160 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xrn
1809. commander ; but Mermet, scouting the idea as incredible,
May 12. refused to verify the fact by reconnaissance and marched
his divisions away. Soult himself, having sat up all
night at work and being, moreover, unwell, had retired
to bed rather before ten o'clock ; and his staff had just
finished breakfast when an aide-de-camp came bound-
ing up the stairs, four steps at a time, to report that
the English were in the town. The emissary came
from General Foy, who, while riding along the heights,
had been informed at half-past ten that boats full
of red-coats were passing the river. Foy at once
galloped off to order a battery to post itself on the
heights of the Chapel of Bom Fin, about seven hundred
yards north of the Seminary, and to fetch the nearest
regiment of French infantry, the 17th Light. Soult
then sent word to him to hold the north-eastern outlet
from the town at all costs until he himself could collect
the remainder of the French troops in Oporto, and
drive the British into the river.
It was, however, half-past eleven before the 17th
could open their attack upon the northern and western
sides of the Seminary, when some French guns also
came down to the edge of the river to fire upon the
barges. Then the British cannon opened fire, and the
first round, a shrapnel shell, burst over the leading
gun as it was in the act of unlimbering, dismounted
it, and disabled every man and horse. The French
gunners strove gallantly to stand by their pieces, but
both they and the infantry on the western front of
the Seminary were swept away by the terrific blast of
Wellesley's batteries, and sought shelter in the neighbour-
ing buildings. On the north front the attack was
similarly repelled by the musketry of the British, who,
under shelter of the wall, suffered little while punishing
the assailants very severely. Paget indeed was dis-
abled by a shot in the arm, but his place was taken by
Hill ; while at every passage of the barges the red-coats
gained an accession of strength from the remaining
regiments, the Forty-eighth and Sixty-sixth, of Hill's
ch. xxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 161
brigade. General Delaborde then came up with the 1809.
70th of the French Line, and opened a more for- Ma)r I2-
midable and persistent attack upon the building, but was
also beaten off with heavy loss ; and Soult now ordered
up Regnaud's brigade, which had been guarding the
quays of the city and overawing the population. No
sooner were these troops withdrawn than the people
hurried down to the water's edge, launched the boats
that had been secured on the northern bank, and paddled
them over to the other side. Stewart's brigade then
embarked, followed by the Guards ; and the Twenty-
ninth, being the first to land, hastened up into the town
through streets strewn with French baggage and lined
with cheering inhabitants, whence they turned eastwards
into the road which leads to Amarante.1 Before they
were clear of the houses they came upon the rear of
the main French column in full retreat, and opened fire
upon it, when the enemy made off in haste and con-
fusion, abandoning a battery of artillery and several
waggons. Their advance upon the flank of the French
who were attacking the Seminary, caused these also to
retire ; and Soult gave the word for a general retreat,
leaving, however, a party on the heights that bordered
the road in order to check pursuit. This rearguard was
soon driven off; and the British infantry, still led by
the Twenty-ninth, hastened forward to the chase, taking
scores of prisoners who were only too glad to surrender.
Murray meanwhile had passed his detachment slowly
across the ferry at Avintes and advanced to the head of
a ridge overlooking the road to Vallongo and Amarante.
The whole of the French army came streaming across
his front, a mere disorderly mob ; but the unhappy
man, as useless and inefficient in Portugal as in India,
simply stood and looked at them. It is true that his
force was not large ; but he had with him at any rate
from five to six hundred riflemen, for whom the wooded
1 Leslie says " the main street," but this is hardly likely, tor the
regiment landed at the eastern end of the town, at the foot of a
gully up which winds a road leading to the top of the town.
VOL. VII M
162 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. ground that sloped down towards the road to Vallongo
May 12. 0fferecl every advantage for an attack, even if the
French had not been hopelessly demoralised. The last
of the enemy had passed apparently two miles beyond
him,1 when General Charles Stewart, who had come to
him with a message from Wellesley, caught up Murray's
squadron of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons, and
galloped away with it. By his order the word was
passed forward for the British infantry to open out, and
Stewart with his handful of sabres in column of threes
dashed through them down the road in a cloud of dust
and came upon the rear of the enemy. Warned by the
dust and the clatter the French commander had faced
his rear-guard about in close order with bayonets fixed,
and lined the walls for some distance on each side with
sharp-shooters. Under the immediate command of
Generals Foy and Delaborde the troops on the road
stood firm until the horses were nearly upon them,
when they broke and fled, and the dragoons, plunging
into their midst, engaged them furiously with sword
against bayonet. Delaborde was unhorsed and for a
moment a prisoner ; Foy received a sabre cut in the
shoulder. But the Fourteenth had suffered heavily
from the sharp-shooters ; three out of four officers had
been wounded ; and out of fifty-two men in the leading
troop, ten had been killed and eleven severely hurt.
Hence it was only with difficulty that they could cut
off and secure about three hundred prisoners.
Murray has been blamed by Napier and others for
not supporting the dragoons, but he must have been
too far away to do so efficiently, even if he had not
received the order to halt. His chance had come
earlier and he had failed to take it. The behaviour of
the Fourteenth was most gallant, but the attack was
foolhardy ; and it may, I think, be asked, whether it was
the Adjutant-general's business to take the command
1 Colonel Hawker in his journal says that the squadron galloped
for nearly two miles through the British infantry before it overtook
the French.
ch. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 163
of a squadron into his own hands and lead it away to 1809.
fight upon his own account. Such interference is not May I2-
calculated to commend the staff to the good feeling of
regimental officers.
The loss of the French in the whole affair amounted
to about three hundred killed and wounded and as
many prisoners, irrespective of over a thousand men
captured in the hospitals of Oporto. That of the
British was trifling, twenty-three men killed, ninety-five
men and three officers wounded, and two missing ; and
the very cheap price at which the success was won has
tended, in spite of the praise of good soldiers, to be-
little the skill and hazard of the operation. To effect
a surprise in broad daylight ; to force the passage of a
deep and rapid river in the face of a veteran enemy
with, at the outset, no more than a single boat, is an
action that demands no ordinary measure of insight,
nerve, and audacity in a commander. It has long been
customary for the carpers at Wellesley's fame to
reproach him with excessive caution ; yet here in the
first week of a campaign, in which the slightest mishap
would have spelled professional ruin and evoked a
storm of national indignation, he bearded so formidable
an antagonist as Soult with the calm, phlegmatic order,
" Well, let the men cross." Incidentally should be
noticed one of Wellesley's most remarkable gifts — the
astonishing eye for ground, which enabled him to
realise in a moment that the passage, granted certain
conditions, was actually feasible. As to Soult and his
officers at large, it can only be said that their careless-
ness in the matter of watching the river and the boats
was extraordinary, though it can be matched by some
of the proceedings of the French army in Italy in 1806.
For the Marshal there is some excuse in so far as he
was in bad health ; but the truth was that he despised
his enemy, as indeed did every one of his brethren and
the great Emperor himself, until convinced by bitter
experience of the error. There is no greater danger
for an army than to be the spoiled children of victory.
164 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. The infantry continued the pursuit, after the
May 12. Fourteenth had passed them, until the leading regiment
was halted by Wellesley in person ; and indeed it should
seem that firing did not cease until evening.1 All
through the night troops, artillery, baggage, and stores
continued to pass the river, and what with these matters
and the fatigues undergone by his army in the march of
eighty miles from Coimbra, Wellesley could make no
attempt to follow up his enemy until the afternoon of
May 13. the 13th, when Murray's brigade was pushed out east-
ward as far as Vallongo,2 and the remainder of the
infantry was ordered to follow later. His purpose had
been only to drive Soult's army from Portugal, and he
could not divine that peculiar circumstances had given
him the opportunity to annihilate it. Late on the 13th
a report reached him that Soult had destroyed his
artillery and retired to the northward ; but Wellesley
was kept for twenty-four hours in suspense before he
could verify the intelligence and decide upon the
direction of his own march.3 Soult, as a matter of fact,
after dropping Franceschi's cavalry to protect his rear
at Vallongo, had halted at night-fall of the 12th at
Baltar, some twelve miles east of Oporto ; and there,
having found some of his detached troops, and know-
ing Mermet's division to be within four miles of him,
he judged himself to be safe from further molestation.
A bad fall from his horse just before reaching Baltar,
added to his previous illness, had so prostrated him
that he retired to bed immediately after arrival at his
quarters, only to be roused three hours before dawn by
intelligence of appalling gravity.
Beresford, it will be remembered, had marched
from Coimbra on the 6th of May, one day before the
main army under Wellesley. On the 8 th he had
picked up Wilson's detachment at Vizeu, and on the
1 Leslie, p. 114; Londonderry, p. 279.
2 Londonderry says that they were ready to march at dawn ;
but Beamish, following the journals of the officers of the Legion,
says that they marched in the afternoon.
3 Wellesley to Murray, 13th, 14th May 1809.
ch. xxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 165
10th he had joined Silveira at Lamego, thus increasing 1809.
his force to between ten and eleven thousand men,
Portuguese and British. Ascertaining at Lamego that
Loison had on the previous day been still in the neigh-
bourhood of Amarante, Beresford resolved to block his
path to eastward, and with that object ordered Silveira
on the same day to cross the Douro at the bridge of
Peso da Regoa about four miles to north. Silveira's
troops had hardly passed the river before they en-
countered Loison moving eastward upon them from
his last night's bivouac at Mezaofrio. Strong in the
possession of a bridge-head on the northern side of the
river, and in the assurance that Beresford was close at
hand, Silveira fell back to the entrenchments and
offered battle. Loison after some hesitation attacked
him on the same afternoon, but, being beaten off,
retired to Mezaofrio, and continued his retreat next
day to Amarante, with Silveira, followed by Beresford, May 1 1 .
in hot pursuit. On the 12th Silveira drove the French May 12.
rear-guard over the river, and the two forces took up
each a strong position, the one on the east, the other
on the west, of the Tamega, each of them being too
weak to chase the other away. Loison, however, who
had made no report to Soult for four days, resolved to
withdraw, and on the evening of the 12th marched off on
the road to Guimaraes and Braga, deliberately sacrificing
his chief's chosen line of retreat.
It was his messenger who came to Soult in the first
hours of the 13th to tell the Marshal, as though it were May 13.
of no great moment, that the road which he had pro-
posed to follow through Traz-os-Montes was barred
by the enemy at Amarante. The situation thus created
for Soult could hardly have been worsened. His force
was divided ; Loison with a full third of it being unable
to join him except either by marching to Oporto, which
was not to be thought of, or by retracing his steps
towards Amarante, leaving Soult himself to be crushed
between Wellesley on the west and Beresford on the
east. It was hopeless to attack Wellesley, whose force
166 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. was far superior in numbers ; little less hopeless to fall
May 1 3- upon Beresford in so strong a position as that of
Amarante, where Wellesley could come up upon the
French rear. To the south the way was blocked by the
Douro. Escape was possible only by retreat into the
bleak mountains to northward ; and that retreat must
be made speedily before his enemies had realised the
position. Ill and shaken though he was, Soult reviewed
his situation with perfect calmness, and took his decision.1
A guide was found who knew of a rough track that led
from the Souza over the mountains to the valley of the
Ave, near Guimaraes ; and by this track the Marshal
resolved to extricate his army. He therefore destroyed
his artillery, military chest, and baggage, loaded his
horses with musket-ammunition and sick men, and set
off on the 13th in pouring rain. On the following
May 14. morning he regained communication with Loison, who
was still at Guimaraes ; and by the arrival of his last
detachments from the north he saw his army once again
reunited and twenty thousand strong. But even so his
peril was still great. The only road northward which
would carry vehicles led to Braga ; and there was reason
to fear that Wellesley, on receiving information of his
movements, would have marched to Braga before him.
Soult therefore destroyed the guns, stores, and baggage
of Loison, as he had already destroyed those of his own
command, and plunging again into the mountains, made
for the valley of the Cavado.
On the same day Wellesley, being finally assured
that Soult had sacrificed his artillery and retreated
northward, but being still uncertain whether the
Marshal would go by Braga or by Chaves, ordered
Beresford to make for the latter place, and Murray to
move first to Penafiel and then either upon Braga or
Chaves, according to what he might learn of the enemy's
movements. He also marched himself in two columns
with the main army for Braga, which he reached on the
May 15. 15th. On the same day Murray reached Guimaraes,
1 S. Chamans, p. 147.
ch. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 167
having hurried on nearly all night from Penafiel in the 1809.
vain hope of surprising the French there. Beresford, MaX r5-
meanwhile, on finding that Amarante was abandoned,
had of his own initiative marched on the 13th for
Chaves, detaching Silveira due north to occupy the
defiles of the Serra da Cabreira at Salamonde and
Ruivaes, on the road from Braga to Chaves. Mean-
while Soult, on the evening of the 14th, after a wretched
march, had reached the village of Pavoa de Lanhoso,
about eight miles east of Braga. On the 15th he sent
patrols down the road to see whether or not the
British were in Braga; and, learning that his men had been
met by British dragoons, turned about to reascend the
valley of the Cavado, himself taking personal command
of the rear-guard. All day the rain poured down, and
at nightfall the weary French reached Salamonde. Here
the Marshal learned that his progress was barred by the
partial destruction of a bridge, known as the Ponte
Nova, which carried the road over a tributary of the
Cavado ; a body of Portuguese militia having torn up
the wooden floor and balustrades, and entrenched
themselves on the farther side. Soult thereupon sent for
a certain Major Dulong of the 31st Light, and entrusted
to him the duty of regaining the passage of the river.
Dulong called for volunteers from his own regiment,
crossed, in the darkness of night and in a heavy storm,
the two slippery beams on which the flooring had been
laid, surprised the Portuguese asleep in their shelters
beyond, and killed or dispersed the whole of them.
The bridge was then hastily repaired with such material
as could be found ; and at eight o'clock in the morning
of the 1 6th the army began with difficulty to file over May 16.
it. But so slow was its progress that Soult left a
brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry in a
strong position in his rear, with orders to maintain it at
all costs until the main body should have crossed the
Ponte Nova.
Some miles beyond this obstacle was another not less
formidable. From Ruivaes onward Soult had a choice
168 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. of two roads, the one leading east upon Chaves, the
May 1 6. other north-east to Montalegre. The former was the
easier ; but, in view of the danger that Beresford might
reach Chaves before him, Soult decided to take the
latter. The advanced guard, however, after following
it for some distance, found that the passage over the
river Misarella was also obstructed by armed peasants.
The torrent itself flows in a deep ravine, and was
crossed by a bridge of a single arch which, from its bold
leap from bank to bank, was known as the Saltador.
This bridge should have been broken down or held in real
force ; but Silveira had not appreciated the importance
of securing it, nor even of occupying the defile of
Ruivaes. It was, indeed, only through the energy of
Major Warre, of Beresford's staff, that the raw levies
had been collected at the Saltador, for he had not the
means to destroy the bridge, even if he could have per-
suaded the reluctant peasants to sacrifice it. The
Saltador, however, was covered by earth-works and
abatis ; and Loison saw that, if disaster were to be
averted, the passage must be carried at once. For the
second time Major Dulong was sent for, who, at the
head of eight or nine hundred men, formed in column
of fours, made a determined rush at the bridge, and,
bearing down all resistance by sheer weight and impetus,
sent the frightened peasants flying to the hills. Dulong
himself was wounded, but few of his men were injured,
and thus the way to Montalegre was cleared.
This deliverance was wrought none too soon. Since
half-past one the British dragoons had been exchanging
shots with Soult's rear-guard ; and at five o'clock Sir
Arthur Wellesley's main column, headed by the Guards,
came up to support them. Unlimbering two three-
pounders in the road, Wellesley opened fire upon the
French centre, sent the light companies of the Guards to
turn their left, and launched the rest against their front.
Instantly the whole mass of the French turned and ran
back, cavalry and infantry throwing down their arms
and struggling for the foremost place in the flight. So
ch. xxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 169
thoroughly were they demoralised by the hunger and 1809.
distress of the retreat that one of the best regiments Ma)' l6-
in their army, the 4th Light, broke as readily as the
rest. The direction taken by the fugitives not being at
once perceived, they had time to rally ; but upon the
approach of the Guards they again took to their heels,
and reached the bridge as a mere panic-stricken mob.
The parapets having been destroyed, scores of men,
horses, and mules were thrust over into the torrent,
which was presently choked with mangled corpses ;
while the British guns, which soon afterwards came up,
opened fire with ghastly effect upon the seething mass.
But for the early fall of night under the eternal clouds
of rain, this rear-guard could hardly have escaped
annihilation.
On the following night the French army reached May 1 7.
Montalegre, and found it deserted by the inhabitants.
Little food and shelter was to be obtained there ; and
on the 1 8th Soult, though now unpursued, still urged May 18.
his troops forward * through the desolate mountains,
till at last on the 19th he entered Orense. Here again May 19.
the inhabitants had fled, leaving few victuals behind
them ; but a day's halt in a safe refuge and the sight
of a fertile country did much to reinvigorate the army.
Finding that Lugo was still occupied by two regiments of
Ney's corps, Soult continued his march thither, and on
the 23rd entered the town, dispersing some thousands May 23.
of peasants who had long held Ney's helpless garrison
blockaded and in near peril of starvation. He brought
back with him not far short of twenty thousand men,
from which it would appear that his campaign in
1 Though the cases of Moore's and of Soult's retreats are not
exactly parallel, it is worth noting how both of them, good and
experienced soldiers, drove their men on by forced marches at times
when, to the critic in the arm-chair, there seems to be no reason
for haste. It may be questioned whether any man, soldier or
civilian, has the right to criticise the action of a general in such
circumstances, unless he has passed through the like experience.
The leadership of an army at such crises, turns less upon military
than upon psychological considerations.
170 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. Portugal had cost him in all close upon six thousand
dead or captured, of whom more than a third had been
lost in the retreat from Baltar to Orense,1 very many of
them massacred, after refinements of torture, by the
peasants. These twenty thousand men were without
guns, stores, ammunition, baggage, or treasure ; in
many cases they were without arms, without shoes, and
with clothing in tatters ; but still Soult had brought
them back, and this was no small credit to him.
Though the extreme peril from which he rescued his
army can only be ascribed to his blunders and omissions
in the previous weeks, yet he redeemed many short-
comings by the firmness and courage with which he
faced a desperate situation. Many comparisons have
been instituted between his retreat to Orense and that
of Moore to Coruna, which latter was held at the time
to be fully avenged by the Marshal's discomfiture. But
there was this broad difference between the two, that
the British were rather mutinous from disappointment
of their wish for a fight than demoralised by failure.
Soult's troops were disheartened and even cowed. Both
armies degenerated in great measure into mobs, but
Moore's was at least a fighting, whereas Soult's was a
flying mob.
On the whole the Marshal was lucky to escape as he
did. Wellesley had been delayed, as we have seen, by
the imperative need for transporting the immediate
necessities of his army across the Douro. Silveira had
lost his way, or neglected to obey his orders, for he did
not reach Ruivaes till the 17 th, and then only by way
of Montalegre ; arriving, moreover, too late to intercept
Soult at the latter place, and making no effort to pursue
him. Beresford, in spite ot the brilliant inspiration
which made him anticipate Wellesley's wishes, had
missed his prey chiefly through the exhaustion of his
troops by hunger and fatigue.2 His column reached
1 See Mr. Oman's calculations, ii. 361.
2 He blamed, in private, General Tilson, who was sulky at being
attached to his army instead of Wellesley's, for his failure to accom-
ch. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 171
Chaves late on the night of the 16th, but his men were 1809.
too weary to proceed over eighteen more mountainous
miles to Montalegre. The British cavalry of Wellesley 's
column did indeed follow up Soult's on the 17th and
1 8th; and on the latter day Wellesley's headquarters May 18.
were actually at Montalegre. Beresford also sent for-
ward some of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons as far as
Ginzo even on the 19th ; but none of these parties were May 19.
strong enough to break in upon Soult's rear-guard, and
they accomplished little beyond the capture of stragglers.
For the infantry to have attempted pursuit with any
hope of success would have been impossible except, as
Wellesley said,1 by making sacrifices as great as those of
the enemy. Already the men were on short rations of
bread ; 2 many of them were barefooted ; and sickness
was increasing among them from exposure to incessant
rain. He had no transport ; and, where Frenchmen
starved, it was not likely that British troops would find
food. He could hardly hope to overtake and destroy
the French army completely ; and, moreover, his original
plan had been more than accomplished by the expulsion
of the French with very heavy loss from the north of
Portugal.
There remained now the more important work of
dealing with Victor. On the 18th the English General
received intelligence that a strong body of French had
captured the bridge of Alcantara, and advanced into
Portugal as far as Castello Branco, an occurrence which
had reduced General Mackenzie to a state of extreme
nervousness. Wellesley set out forthwith for the Tagus,
leaving his men to follow. The march southward was
delayed by the want of shoes, but the head of the army
reached Oporto on the 22nd of May, and Coimbra on the May 22 .
plish more. " Had not Tilson lost me one day, I should have driven
Loison from Amarante on the 12th, and could then have been ahead
of Soult and separated him from Loison." Tilson on the I ith asked
to be relieved from his command (Beresford to Wellesley, I Ith,
17th May 1809, Wellington MSS.).
1 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 1 8th May 1809.
- Wellington Supplementary Despatches, vi. 262.
172 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. 27th ; and by the second week in June the whole was
assembled at Abrantes. Before pursuing Wellesley's
exploits further, however, it will be necessary to glance
again at the movements of the French armies at large
in the Peninsula.
CHAPTER XXIX
Zaragoza had fallen, it will be remembered, on the 20th 1809.
of February, and its fall signified not only the annihila-
tion for the time being of the Spanish army of Aragon,
but the release of the Third and Fifth French Corps,
under Junot and Mortier, for service in the field. The
two Marshals accordingly, as soon as their troops had
recovered from the hardships of the siege, began to
sweep the whole of Aragon with movable columns,
Mortier taking, roughly, the north and Junot the south
of the Ebro. Since the only Spanish force that survived
was a single division of about four thousand men under
the Marquis of Lazan, the French met at first with little
resistance. Even the inaccessible fortress of Jaca, com-
manding one of the passes into the Pyrenees, surrendered
without an attempt at defence. Farther to the south
Monzon and Fraga, in the valley of the Cinca, were
likewise occupied without the firing of a shot ; though
Mequinenza on the Segre, which was protected only by
antiquated and ruinous fortifications, resolutely rejected
Mortier's summons. When, however, the Marshal
detached a regiment of cavalry into Catalonia to open
communications with St. Cyr, the spirit of the Catalans
showed itself unmistakably. The regiment by great
good fortune made its way successfully to Chabot's
division of St. Cyr's army at Montblanch, a little to
north of Tarragona ; but, when it attempted to return to
Mortier, it was so resolutely attacked by the somatenes
that it was obliged to abandon the endeavour and attach
itself permanently to Chabot. Junot in like manner
173
174 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. encountered little opposition on the lower ground. One
of his columns occupied Caspe and Alcafiiz on the river
Guadelope without difficulty ; but those which entered
the mountains to southward, finding a deserted and
foodless country before them, and insurgents manoeuvr-
ing upon their flanks, were compelled to retire, not
without experiencing sundry little reverses.
April. So matters stood at the end of March, when Napoleon,
realising that war with Austria was inevitable, gave
orders on the 2nd of April that Mortier's corps should
be concentrated and drawn back to Burgos,1 in readiness
to march into France if required. Three days later he
also removed Junot from the command of the Third
Corps and appointed General Suchetto succeed him.2 By
the fourth week in April, therefore, Junot, who had not
yet been replaced by Suchet, was left alone to do with
his one corps the work which had already proved enough,
if not too much, for two. The Aragonese, noting the
weakness and dispersion of the Marshal's troops, took
advantage of it to inflict a number of petty defeats,
culminating in the capture of a small column of a
May 19. thousand men near Monzon on the 19th of May. At
the same time another of Junot's brigades was forced
back from its position at Alcafiiz by Lazan's division,
which had been increased to a strength of eight or nine
thousand men by levies from Valencia and placed under
the command of General Blake. Further recruits were
raising in Valencia, and altogether the prospect before
Suchet, when on the 19th of May he took over com-
mand of the Third Corps from Junot at Zaragoza, was
not exhilarating. His troops, nominally twenty thousand
strong, could muster little more than ten thousand
effective men. Their clothing was of all sorts and
kinds ; their pay was in arrear ; they had no magazines
nor depots ; they hardly knew whither to turn for
1 Corres. de Napoleon, 14,991. The story that Mortier went to
Burgos as a compromise between Napoleon's order to go to Logrono,
and Joseph's to go to Valladolid {Corres. du Roi Joseph, vi. 99),
would seem, therefore, to be doubtful.
2 Corres. de Napoleon, 1 5,009.
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 175
food ; and they were demoralised by failure and mis- 1809.
management.
However, Blake was advancing, and Suchet thought
it imperative to take the offensive at all costs. Marching,
therefore, on the 21st, he came on the 23rd upon Blake
drawn up in position at Alcafiiz with some nine thousand
men and eighteen guns, having the river Guadelope and May 23.
its one bridge in his rear. Though slightly weaker in
numbers, Suchet attacked and was repelled with a loss
of seven or eight hundred men ; his troops showing little
spirit, and indeed succumbing to a disgraceful panic in
the retreat which followed the action. By this defeat
the French were compelled to call in all their outlying
posts, while the insurgents, gathering courage, threatened
both Zaragoza and Tudela. Within three weeks Blake
had increased his force to twenty-five thousand men ; and
with these on the 12th of June he marched north-west- June 12.
ward through the mountains by Belchite to Villanueva
on the Huerba, thus threatening Suchet's line of com-
munication between Zaragoza and Tudela. Finally, he
moved down the valley of the Huerba in two columns,
pushing the right-hand column of six thousand men
under General Areizaga to Botorita, some twelve miles
from Zaragoza on the east bank of the river ; and
leading fourteen thousand under his own command to
Maria, some two miles nearer Zaragoza on the west
bank. Thus the two divisions lay about three miles
apart on opposite sides of the Huerba, with no bridge
to connect them. Accordingly, on the 15th, Suchet June 15.
marched out from Zaragoza, and leaving three thousand
men to check any movement by Areizaga, led the re-
mainder, numbering under nine thousand, against Blake.
Delaying his attack, however, until three thousand
men, whom he was expecting from Tudela, should have
come up, he reduced Blake to such impatience that the
Spanish General imprudently descended from his position
to take the offensive, and was defeated with the loss of
a full third of his force and of nearly all his guns. He
retired, however, in good order, joined Areizaga on the
176 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. same evening, and next day retreated along the road
June 16. by which he had advanced, to Belchite. Here with a
June 18. foolish temerity he again offered battle, though from
the desertion of his levies and his previous losses he
could now oppose only twelve thousand beaten men
to Suchet's thirteen thousand. The result was that
Blake's troops turned and ran at the first onset, and
that in an absurdly short time his whole army had been
dispersed. Thus, though the guerilla-bands still defied
them from the mountains both to north and south, the
French regained a firm hold upon the lowlands of
Aragon. Had Blake shown a little patience, or had
he for once resisted his overpowering mania for dividing
his force, he would have compelled Suchet's army to
evacuate Zaragoza in shame and discouragement ; and
might have wrecked the whole of the French campaign
of 1809.
Thus fared the war in the east of the Peninsula ;
let us now return to the west with which the British
army is more directly concerned. In Galicia, ever since
Soult started upon his march to Portugal, Marshal Ney
had been engaged in a hopeless attempt to suppress
the general insurrection of that province. He en-
deavoured to overawe the people by scouring the
country with small columns ; but he could effect little
beyond burning the villages, while the peasants took
their revenge by murdering every straggler, marauder
or forager whom they could cut off. And the number
of these unhappy victims was great ; for an army which
lives on the country must, when that country is poor,
disperse its small parties in all directions to find food
to eat. Nevertheless, Ney was faithfully obeying his
master's instructions, as conveyed to him from Paris,1
for Napoleon could not grasp the fact that every able-
bodied Galician was in arms against him. To the
Emperor the whole matter was simple enough. Ney
was to select and guard a few towns as bases of
1 Berthier to Ney, 18th Feb. 1809. Corres. du Rot Joseph,
vi. 56.
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 177
operations, send out flying columns from these, subdue 1809.
and disarm the northern half of the province first, hand
it over to the Spanish authorities to maintain order, and
proceed to deal with the southern half in like manner.
With forty or fifty thousand men this plan might have
succeeded, but Ney had only seventeen thousand, and
was helpless. Yet quite early in March the Emperor
was asking why Ney had not taken the province of
Asturias.1
In April the Galician insurgents were aided by a
semblance of a regular force, namely the remnant of
the army under Romana, which had retreated with
Moore. Starting with six thousand men from Puebla
de Senabria, he crossed the mountains to Ponferrada,
where he arrived on the 18th of March and found that
no French were nearer to him than at Villafranca and
Astorga, both of which were completely isolated. Fall-
ing, therefore, on the next day upon Villafranca by March 19.
surprise, he received the surrender of a battalion of six
hundred fighting men, and of some hundreds of invalids
and stragglers who had likewise drifted into the town.
Then taking only one regiment with him he pursued
his way to Oviedo, leaving General Mahy in charge
of the remainder, with orders to hold the upper valley
of the Sil for as long as possible, but, if seriously
threatened, to retire into Asturias. At Oviedo, Romana
bearded the Junta, which with the usual blindness and
selfishness had scattered the Asturian army along the
frontier of the province, without a thought of aid to
Galicia ; and after a stormy discussion he called in the
troops, swept the Junta out of existence, and installed
a new one of his own nomination. This done, he sent
clothing, ammunition, and stores from the resources of
Asturias to equip his army on the Sil.
Romana lingered on at Oviedo, however, till May ;
and meanwhile formidable preparations against Asturias
were going forward in Madrid. Much alarmed by the
1 Napoleon to Joseph, 6th March 1809. Corres. de Napoleon,
14,861.
VOL. VII N
178 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 809. cessation of all news from Ney, owing to the capture
May- of Villafranca, King Joseph and the chief of his staff
resolved that communication with him must be re-
established at all costs. There were few troops at hand
for the purpose except Mortier's corps, which had been
ordered by Napoleon to Burgos ; but by dint of much
entreaty Joseph obtained leave to move this corps as
far as Valladolid, to give a general support to the enter-
prise ; and a force of seven to eight thousand men was
further scraped together and placed under the command
of General Kellermann. Assembling these troops at
Astorga, Kellermann moved to Villafranca, unmolested
except by the harassing tactics of the peasants, and
thence to Lugo, where he found a division of Ney's
infantry and the chief of the Marshal's staff, who had
come to concert operations against Romana. It was
then agreed that Ney should concentrate the bulk of
his corps at Lugo and attack the Asturians from the
west ; while Kellermann, returning to Leon, should
enter the country by the pass of Pajares on the south,
and General Bonnet with his division at Santander should
close in upon them from the east.
Wholly unaware of this movement, Romana left his
troops dispersed ; he himself being with two regiments
at Oviedo ; Ballesteros in observation of Bonnet at Sant-
ander; Mahy, who had retreated before Kellermann, at
Navia de Suarna on the Ser ; and four thousand Asturians
under a Swiss general, Worster, some fifty miles north
of him at Castropol. The result could not fail to be
disastrous. Ney, after leaving garrisons at Santiago,
Corufia, Ferrol, Betanzos and Lugo, advanced nearly
due east through the heart of the mountains upon
Navia de Suarna, from which Mahy, unable to resist him,
retreated westward to the upper waters of the Minho.
Disdaining to follow him, the Marshal pressed on north-
May 18. eastward upon Oviedo, and on the 1 8th of May lay ten
miles north of that city on the river Nora. Romana
with his handful of men made a futile effort to defend
the passage of the stream, but being of course defeated,
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 179
fled to Gijon and took refuge in a Spanish ship-of- 1809.
war. On the 19th Ney occupied Oviedo; and on the
20th he entered Gijon, where he captured a quantity of May 20.
ammunition and stores lately landed from England ;
while simultaneously a detachment seized the port of
Aviles. On the 21st Kellermann, having forced the
pass of Pajares with little difficulty, joined hands with May 21.
him at Lena ; and Bonnet also presently appeared at
Oviedo, having followed the coast-road from the east,
but without encountering, much less overthrowing, Balle-
steros. For the latter, hearing of the successes of Ney
and Kellermann, had sought safety in the mountains at
Covadonga, from thirty to forty miles east of Oviedo.
But though the three French columns had duly con-
verged upon the Asturian capital, they had beaten but
two, and those the least important, out of the four
bodies of Spanish troops ; and the remainder speedily
made their presence felt. In Asturias itself, for it will
be convenient to finish what remains to be said of that
province, Ballesteros on the 24th started back by May 24.
mountainous paths for Santander, and surprised the place
on the morning of the 10th of June. The bulk of the June 10.
garrison escaped ; but Ballesteros captured two hundred
of them, besides four hundred invalids in the hospital,
the whole of Bonnet's stores and munitions, and
£10,000 in cash. Lingering, however, too long in
Santander, he was attacked in his turn on the 12th by
Bonnet, who had hastened back on hearing of his move- June 12.
ments, and was completely defeated. He himself
escaped by sea, but three thousand of his men were
taken and the remainder dispersed. None the less
he had forced Bonnet to quit Asturias, and Bonnet's
example was presently followed by the remainder of the
French forces. General Kellermann, who had been left
at Oviedo by Ney to complete the subjugation of the
province, was shortly afterwards commanded by King
Joseph to restore to Mortier a division which he had
borrowed from the Fifth Corps for the Asturian
expedition. He duly obeyed orders ; but feeling
180 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. rightly that his force, thus weakened, would lie in
dangerous isolation at Oviedo, he recrossed the pass of
Pajares, and by the third week in June had returned to
Leon. The combined movement of the French upon
Asturias had proved a complete failure.
Ney himself had left Oviedo on the 22nd of May
by the coast-road for Galicia, hoping to encounter
and defeat Worster on the way; but that cautious
commander withdrew into the mountains and lay still
while the French passed him by. On the 27th of May
Ney reached Castropol, where he received alarming
news from two quarters. Mahy, finding himself un-
watched, had marched with six thousand men against
Lugo, where he held the garrison so straitly confined
that he would probably have forced it to surrender, had
May 22. he not been driven off" on the 22nd by the unexpected
appearance of Soult's starving and demoralised army
from Orense. Worse than this, on the 22 nd of May
Brigadier Carrera had marched with ten thousand fairly
organised and disciplined insurgents upon Santiago,
totally defeated General Maucune's garrison, which
came out to meet them, with a loss of six hundred men
and two guns, and driven the French back in disorder
May 24. upon Coruna. Two days later Romana, who had landed
at Ribadeo, rejoined Mahy and his army at Villalba,
about twenty miles north of Lugo, and slipping past
Soult's corps made his way to Orense, from whence,
opening communication with Carrera, he was able to
present a front for the defence of Southern Galicia.
Leaving a part of his army to watch this force, Ney
May 30. betook himself with the rest on the 30th to Lugo, to
concert further operations with Soult. His arrival was
the signal for a bitter quarrel between the troops of the
two Marshals. Though he could hardly refuse to re-
equip Soult's corps for the field, so far as he was able,
Ney reserved all comforts for his own men. Cruel
taunts were levelled by Ney's more fortunate soldiers
against their humiliated and disreputable-seeming com-
rades from Portugal, with the result that bloody
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 181
encounters took place between parties of men, leading 1809.
to duels between their officers, until finally there was
great danger lest the two armies should engage in a
pitched battle.1 This enmity, whether originated or
only shared by their chiefs, was by none felt more
bitterly than by Ney and Soult ; for not only were they
furiously jealous of each other, but diametrically at
variance over their future plans. Ney, having received
orders to subjugate Galicia, considered not only that it
was his duty to obey them, but Soult's to help him to
do so. Soult, on the other hand, having had no very
pleasant experience of that mountainous province, was
anxious to move down into the plains. Nor were his
reasons without great force. In the first place, he was
anxious to proceed to Zamora to pick up a convoy of
clothing and other stores, which he had requested from
Madrid ; in the second, he held that the principal
business of the French armies was to drive the British
out of the Peninsula, and that all other operations should
be subordinated to this grand object. If the Second
and Sixth Corps were to devote themselves entirely to
Romana, as Ney suggested, Wellesley would be free to
march with superior forces either against Mortier at
Valladolid, or against Victor on the Tagus. But, by
joining Mortier on the Douro, Soult could at once pick
up his convoy and menace any advance of Wellesley,
whether along that river or along the Tagus. Still Ney
was stiff for his own opinion, and the contention
between the two Marshals grew so hot that Ney is said
to have drawn his sword upon Soult. At length, how-
ever, Soult yielded, with or without sincerity ; and it was
agreed that Ney should advance with his corps, about
fifteen thousand men, from Coruna upon Santiago and
push Romana southward, while Soult, descending from
Lugo to Orense and closing in upon him from the east,
should drive him into the sea.
Accordingly on the 1st of June Soult, having June 1,
previously sent from two to three thousand dismounted
1 St. Chamans, p. 150 ; Fantin des Odoards, pp. 240-241.
182 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. cavalry and isolated units into Astorga, marched with
about seventeen thousand men southward by Monforte,
where he halted for a week to bring up his stores and
scour the valleys on his flanks. Ney meanwhile arrived
June 5. before Santiago on the 5th. The Spanish commander,
General Norona, upon the news of his approach, fell
back some forty miles to southward and took post behind
the river Oitlaben, where his right flank was protected by
the Sierra de Suido, and his left by the sea. Over the
river on his front there were but four passages, namely,
a ford on the estuary, open only at low tide for three
hours, and both broad and difficult ; the bridge of San
Payo, just above the tidal water, of which the Spanish
general had broken four arches ; a second bridge — that
of Candelas — six miles higher up, which, though not
broken, had been barricaded and was further defended
by entrenchments and batteries ; and a second ford just
above the bridge, and commanded equally with it by
the Spanish cannon. To protect his left still further,
Norona had obtained seamen from the British frigates
at Vigo to man gunboats for the patrolling of the estuary,
while the marines of the British squadron and sixty
stragglers of Moore's army were set ashore to garrison
Vigo itself, which lies about eight miles down the bay from
the mouth of the Oitlaben. Such was the position in
which Norona with ten thousand men, three-fourths of
them peasants, faced Ney with about the same number
of veterans ; but the Spanish commander had not only
the wit to choose a good station and to make the most
of it, but also the far rarer gift of persuading his raw
and impetuous levies to retire patiently to it, without
risking defeat in the open field.
June 7. On the 7th of June Ney reached the Oitlaben, and
opened an aimless cannonade upon the Spaniards, while
his cavalry searched for the means of passing the river.
Failing to find any, but hoping that Soult's advance
from Orense would render the position untenable,
June 8. he, on the 8 th, attempted to force the passage of the
river at both fords, and was repulsed with some loss.
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 183
On that same evening he learned that Soult was still 1809.
halted at Monforte, whereupon, feeling convinced that
his brother Marshal had betrayed him, Ney on the
following day retreated upon Pontevedra and Santiago. June 9.
Soult's troops, meanwhile, who had not tasted a full
meal for months, continued to enjoy the abundant
supplies1 of Monforte until the 10th, when their com- June 10.
mander, protesting that Marshal Ney must have changed
his plans, marched away eastward along the valley of
the Sil, crossed that river at the natural bridge of
Montefurado, and on the 12th reached Larouco, a day's June 12.
journey to southward. Here he received a letter from
Nev, dated the 10th, recounting his failure at San Payo
and calling upon Soult to come to his aid. Soult's
answer, which did not reach Ney until the 21st, was to
the effect that he had fulfilled his part of the agreement,
that his troops were unfitted through fatigue and want
for any further operations, and that he would not turn
back. With that he continued his progress south to
Puebla de Senabria, and from thence to Benavente, July 1.
where he halted part of his force and proceeded with the
rest to his long-sought goal of Zamora.
It seems to be true that there was hardly a pair of
boots in his army during the march, some of the men
going barefoot, others swathing their feet with rags,
with bark, and finally, by the Marshal's own preaching
and example, with pieces of raw hide, the hair turned
outward. None the less it appears certain that Soult
broke his word to Ney, and, indeed, that he gave his
word without any intention of keeping it. Ney, bitterly
incensed at the reply sent to him from Larouco, evacuated
Ferrol and Coruna on the day following its receipt, and June 22.
assembled his army at Lugo, from which point he retired
by Villafranca to Astorga, sacking and burning in blind
fury as he passed through the country.
Thus was wrought the deliverance of Galicia from
the yoke of France. It is, I think, too much to say
with the Spanish historian that it was due wholly to the
1 Fan tin des Odoards, p. 242.
i84 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. patriotic feeling and religious fervour of the Galicians.1
Nothing of course is easier than to ascribe it to the
dissensions of Soult and Ney, and to maintain that, if
Napoleon had been in Joseph's place at Madrid, matters
would have gone very differently. But, on the other
hand, nothing can be more certain than that Napoleon
would have taken the view of Soult and made the
destruction, or expulsion, of the British army his chief
care. The British army, in fact, from its first landing
had been the disturbing factor in all of Napoleon's
calculations. At the outset, as has been well pointed
out,2 it was a strategical blunder in him to attempt to hold
Galicia at all, before Portugal, and in particular Lisbon,
had been conquered ; and this blunder was due wholly
to Moore's march upon Sahagun, without which the
corps of Soult and Ney would never have found them-
selves in so remote a corner of the Peninsula. And
here may be noticed the silent pressure of British naval
supremacy upon Napoleon's operations at large. Moore's
army had disembarked at two different ports three
hundred miles apart ; it had drawn the flower of
Napoleon's troops headlong to the sea, re-embarked at
two ports over eighty miles apart, and left the pursuers
chafing upon the strand. It is no wonder that, when an
unforeseen operation had brought a large proportion of
his army within easy reach of Corufia, Ferrol and Vigo,
Napoleon should have embraced the chance of closing
these ports to the British fleet. Thus insensibly he was
led to prescribe to Ney's corps the occupation of Galicia ;
and, through the wisdom that comes after the event, it
is manifest that this meant a fatal division of force ; for
if Ney's corps and Soult's had invaded Portugal together,
they must have compelled Cradock to embark, and
would have captured Lisbon.
It is of course true that, according to Napoleon's
1 See Arteche, vi. 198.
2 I would refer the reader to Mr. Oman, ii. pp. 390-404, and in
particular to the closing pages for an admirably lucid account of the
last campaign in Galicia, and of the influence of the British army
upon the course of events.
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 185
plan, Victor was to have advanced upon Lisbon from 1809.
the east, while Soult descended upon it from the north ;
but this eccentric combination was a very sorry
substitute for the advance of a single solid body in
overwhelming force whether from north or east. And,
in fact, before the combination could take effect, the
British army, which had vanished at Coruna, reappeared
at Lisbon and dealt the invaders from the north such a
buffet as sent them reeling back. Beyond doubt the
activity of the Galician insurgents, by keeping Ney
fully employed, facilitated Wellesley's task not a little ;
and, even if it had not done so, no Englishman will
withhold his homage from their noble and heroic spirit.
But the part played by the British troops cannot be
ignored. Soult may have been jealous, self-seeking,
disloyal to his great master ; but, in considering Galicia
as a trifling matter compared with Wellesley's army,
he was absolutely right. In the immediate future
there was the danger lest the British General might
defeat Victor and drive King Joseph from Madrid.
Looking farther forward, it was certain that, if Spain
were to be subjugated, the redcoats must not merely
be defeated, but crushed, overwhelmed, annihilated, in
such sort that no British Minister would dare to send
an army to the Peninsula again. Otherwise, as fast as
they were driven out by one port they would re-enter
by another, drawing away the French troops continually
to the greatest possible distance from headquarters at
Madrid, and giving the peasants free play against the
lines of communication.
It remains to tell the further proceedings of
Marshal Victor since we left him at Merida, victorious
over Cuesta at Medellin, but unwilling to move farther
until he should have received news of Soult. It should
seem that the Marshal was well content to wait, for he
remained perfectly inactive, while Cuesta, who had been
commended rather than the contrary by the Supreme
Junta for his defeat, collected, by the help of levies
from Granada and a division of Cartaojal's force, a new
1 86 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse.
Victor went so far as to summon Badajoz, but made no
attempt to besiege it ; and, even after the division of
April 19. Lapisse had joined him, he remained still perfectly
supine until the beginning of May. At that time there
appeared at Alcantara a battalion of the Loyal
Lusitanian Legion with another battalion of Portuguese
militia and a few cavalry and guns, in all about two
thousand men under Colonel Mayne, which had been
pushed forward by Wellesley in advance of Mackenzie's
corps of observation. Conceiving this to be the van-
guard of a Portuguese army marching to co-operate with
Cuesta, Victor on the nth of May marched against
Alcantara with a brigade of cavalry and a division of
May 14. infantry, and on the 14th made his attack. Mayne
had barricaded and mined the great Roman bridge,
and, having also constructed trenches on the northern
side, made a stout resistance for three hours, until his
militia were driven from their shelter by the fire of the
French artillery. He then sprang the mine, but the
charge was too small to destroy the Roman masonry,
and Victor succeeded in forcing the passage, when
Mayne retreated in good order, having lost close upon
three hundred killed, wounded and taken. After three
days' stay Victor retired, being unable to find victuals
for his detachment even for this short period in so
inhospitable a neighbourhood. His advance, as we
have seen, had profoundly disquieted Mackenzie ; but
Wellesley had divined the true purport of the
movement as a mere reconnaissance in force, designed
to obtain intelligence of Soult's movements.1 On
learning of Victor's retreat Mayne again marched for-
ward and reoccupied Alcantara.
During Victor's absence Cuesta had seized the
opportunity to make an attack upon Merida ; but
though this was easily repulsed, the Marshal was
growing exceedingly nervous as to his situation. The
country between the Guadiana and the Tagus was
1 Wellesley to Mackenzie, 21st May 1809.
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 187
exhausted ; his sick numbered two thousand and were 1809.
rapidly increasing ; the men were on half rations, and
demoralised by starvation and by their seemingly aimless
employment in a deserted district. Moreover, though
he did not mention this, his battalions were weakened
by the detachment of a number of men, whom some of
his generals had taken from their duty and were
employing as shepherds to drive merino sheep for their
private advantage.1 Victor therefore asked for leave to
retire northward across the Tagus to the region of
Plasencia, where his troops might be able at least to
subsist. He recognised that Cuesta would retake
Merida and Truxillo as soon as his back was turned ;
but, if the French army wheeled about to meet him,
Cuesta would at once retire, and the result would be
only useless fatigue and augmented demoralisation.
Yet, unless supplied with provisions, he would be
driven from his cantonments by sheer lack of food.
King Joseph answered these complaints by promising
to send a supply of biscuit, and urging Victor to
advance again to Alcantara in order to make a
diversion in favour of Soult. But to this the Marshal
replied on the 8 th of June that the bridge of Alcantara June 8.
had been destroyed, and that, unless he received orders
to withdraw his army within a week, he should be
compelled to lead it on some desperate service to save
it from total dissolution. Two days later Joseph June 10.
heard, not directly from Soult but through the
Minister of War at Paris, the intelligence of Wellesley's
passage of the Douro and of Soult's retreat. Alive to
the serious import of this news he at length yielded to
Victor's remonstrances, and authorised him to retire to
Almaraz and Plasencia. Accordingly after rendering
useless the bridges of Medellin and Merida over the
Guadiana, Victor evacuated Estremadura between the
14th and 19th of June, crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, June 19.
destroyed the bridge of boats at that place, and having
lingered for a few days by the river, withdrew, driven
1 Corres. du Roi Joseph, vi. 198.
188 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. by sheer starvation, on the 26th to the Alberche, where
June 26. ne posted his advanced guard at Talavera.1
This movement was part of a general plan of
concentration, in view of the serious tidings from the
Douro. Joseph naturally had expected Soult to retreat
through Traz-os-Montes, and therefore ordered Mortier
to move to Salamanca to support him ; but, on learning
later that Soult had joined Ney and would ultimately
appear at Zamora, he bade Mortier tarry at Valladolid,
and made his dispositions upon the assumption that
Ney would remain in Galicia. For the last fortnight
of June Joseph was absolutely without news either of
Soult or of Ney ; nor was it until the 3rd of July
that he learned what had become of them. By that
time, as we have seen, four of the French corps in the
Peninsula had drifted, rather by accident than by design,
into the following positions. Ney with the Sixth Corps
was at Astorga ; Soult with the Second at Benavente
and Zamora ; Mortier with the Fifth at Valladolid ;
and Victor with the First about Talavera. In other
words, the whole of these could be concentrated at
Salamanca within a week, three out of the four upon
the Tagus within the same time, and the whole upon
the Tagus within at most a fortnight. Singularly
July, enough, also, Joseph on the 1st of July received a letter
from Napoleon, dated at Schonbrunn on the 12th of
June, to the effect that the Second, Fifth, and Sixth
Corps were to be placed under Soult's command to
march against the British, pursue them without respite,
beat them and throw them into the sea. " If this
concentration takes place at once," wrote the Emperor,
"the English should be destroyed and the business of
Spain ended." 2
It remains to take notice of yet another corps, the
Fourth, commanded by Sebastiani, which, as will be
1 Victor to Joseph, 29th May, 8th June ; Jourdan to Victor,
1st June ; Joseph to Napoleon, 10th June 1809.
2 Joseph to Napoleon, 10th, 1 6th, 28th June, 3rd July 1809;
Clarke to Joseph (with Napoleon's orders of 12th June), 18th
June 1809.
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 189
remembered, had at the end of March utterly routed 1809.
the Spanish army of La Mancha at Ciudad Real. After
the action, Sebastiani had remained in observation of
the passes to the north of the Sierra Morena ; while
General Venegas busied himself in assembling another
army, which by the middle of June counted some
twenty thousand men with twenty-six guns. Upon the
retreat of Victor from the Guadiana, Joseph, judging that
the movement would uncover Sebastiani's western flank,
ordered the Fourth Corps to fall back to Madridejos,
whereupon Venegas promptly advanced ; and Sebastiani,
alarmed at exaggerated reports of his numbers, besought
Joseph urgently for reinforcements. The King ac-
cordingly hurried to his aid with five thousand men of June 22.
his central reserve from Madrid ; and Venegas im-
mediately retired once more to the Sierra. Joseph
followed him as far as Almagro, forty-five miles south-
west of Madridejos, when, upon the intelligence that
Victor was crossing the Tagus, he returned with his
reserve to Toledo, leaving Sebastiani with the Fourth
Corps to south of the Guadiana, full four days' march
from Toledo.
It will have been observed that, in following the
movements of the French armies during June, no
account has been taken of those of the British troops.
The narrative, however, has been all the truer for this
omission, because, owing to the faithful reticence of
all classes of the Spaniards and Portuguese, the French
commanders had no knowledge whatever of Wellesley's
proceedings. It is now time to return to Wellesley
himself, whom we left in the second week of June
assembling his army at Abrantes. On the 11th he June 11.
received from Castlereagh authority to extend his
operations in Spain beyond the provinces adjacent to
the Portuguese frontier, provided that his advance
would not endanger the safety of Portugal ; and to
enable him to do so Castlereagh agreed to send him,
in addition to Craufurd's light brigade and a battery
of horse-artillery, which had already been promised to
190 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. him, a second battery and seven more battalions of
infantry.1 It is somewhat curious that this last re-
inforcement was due chiefly, if not entirely, to the
exigencies of the expedition to Walcheren. It was
impossible to furnish shipping to convey the troops to
the Scheldt except by withdrawing transport - vessels
from the Tagus ; and this Ministers could not venture
to do, without augmenting Wellesley's army to a strength
which would banish any probability of its being driven
to re-embark at Lisbon. But Castlereagh must not
lose credit for devising every means to help the General
whose operations on the Douro had done so much to
justify his appointment. Since the whole of the seven
new battalions were second battalions, he authorised
Wellesley to send three of them to Gibraltar, and to
draw from that garrison three mature battalions2 in
their stead. Further, he promised Sir Arthur another
regiment of cavalry — the Royal Dragoons — " if he
wanted it very much," prepared for him three hundred
horses for his artillery, responded instantly to applica-
tions for flour and forage, and shipped off fifty thousand
pairs of boots when Wellesley had asked only for thirty
thousand. He even sent a consignment of money,
though he entreated the General to draw a bill whenever
there was a chance of obtaining cash for it, specie in
England being, as Castlereagh said, at the lowest
possible ebb. In short, he ministered to the wants of
Wellesley with a minute carefulness which, considering
the claims of the Walcheren expedition upon his time
and attention, is beyond all praise.3 All this was
encouraging, and in truth Sir Arthur needed encourage-
ment at the moment, for his short campaign had
revealed sad defects in his army.
In the first place, the behaviour of the men on the
march was exceedingly bad. " They are a rabble,"
1 2/5th, 2/z8th, 2/34th, 2/39^, 2/421^, 2/47^, 2/88th.
2 48th, 57th, 61st.
3 Corres. of Castlereagh, vii. 70-75, 82-84 '■> Castlereagh to the
King, 25th May; to Wellesley, 25th, 26th May; 6th, nth
June 1809.
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 191
wrote Wellesley in his sweeping way, " who cannot 1 809.
bear success any more than Sir John Moore's army
could bear failure." This misconduct does not appear
to have shown itself until the operations on the Douro
were over and the troops were on their way down
country to Abrantes ; but then their behaviour was
disgraceful. They plundered the Portuguese unmerci-
fully, seizing their horses and cattle in order to make
them buy the animals back again, and stealing even the
horses of the cavalry to sell them to the Commissariat.
It is most improbable that these practices extended to
the whole army ; indeed from Wellesley's own language
it should, seem that they were confined chiefly to strag-
glers and convalescent invalids, or in other words to the
skulkers and malingerers whom nothing could compel
to remain in the ranks on the march. Colborne, it will
be remembered, reckoned that there were from fifty to
a hundred such men in every battalion, and had ascribed
all the earlier trouble in Moore's army exclusively to
them. There were, however, instances in which
Wellesley accused complete corps as guilty of these
malpractices, and actually threatened to send them into
garrison and to report them as unfit for service in the
field. The offenders in question were the Eighty-
seventh and the Eighty-eighth,1 both of them of course
Irish regiments ; and it appears further that, generally
speaking, the men who came from the Irish militia were
especially troublesome. This, indeed, was to be expected.
The Irish Militia was notorious for indiscipline, and
Irish regiments, though unsurpassed on the battlefield,
1 Wellesley to Donkin, 16th June 1809. The numbers of the
regiments are left blank in the printed despatches, but the blanks
can be filled up by reading Wellesley to Mackenzie, 1 8th June 1809.
Mr. Oman includes the 5/6oth in Wellesley's censure ; but looking
to Wellesley's letters to Col. Gordon of 17th June and to Donkin
of 23rd June, this battalion seems to deserve exemption. It must
be said for the 88th that it had been hastily completed by drafts
from the 2nd battalion, and that its brigadier, Tilson, had not worked
well with his commander during the campaign ; but its behaviour
was acknowledged by one of its own officers to have been very bad
at this time. Grattan, Adventures of the Connaught Rangers, i. 56.
192 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. have never been famous for exemplary behaviour in
camp or in barracks. It is well known that they require
ruling with a stronger hand than do English or Scots.
If the strong hand be present, an Irish battalion can be
raised to the highest pitch of excellence ; if it be absent,
the men, though always ready to advance and to fight,
will be disorderly in quarters and very likely mutinous
in retreat.
Unfortunately the means for bringing English
skulkers and Irish ruffians to reason in 1 809 were
deficient. Wellesley made it a rule, so far as possible,
never to send out a detachment or to leave a party
of invalids behind, without placing an officer in charge
of them. But in the first place a great many of his
battalions were second battalions, which were short of
officers ; and in the next, a great many of the officers
were negligent of their duty. Wellesley complained
that this negligence was so common that an officer, if
tried for the offence, would probably be acquitted by
his fellows, who were equally guilty of it ; so that there
was no means of deterring the culprits through fear of
punishment. He complained, further, that a Com-
mander-in-Chief abroad was equally powerless to en-
courage the deserving by reward, since all patronage
had been lately withdrawn from him.1 This was an
evil from which the Navy suffered no less than the
Army ; and the question is too large to be discussed in
this place. But even if the Commander-in-Chief had
been endowed with the authority which he desired in
respect of officers, he was still fettered as to his powers
of enforcing discipline upon the men, for reasons which
require a moment's notice.
Regimental Courts Martial for the trial of the
lighter military offences had been instituted in 1762, in
order to protect soldiers from any possibility of oppres-
1 It may be presumed that Wellesley knew what he was saying;
but I doubt the accuracy of this statement. See, for instance,
Lord Stair's bitter comment in 1742, Vol. II. of this History,
p. 88.
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 193
sion on the part of commanding officers. The members 1809.
of the court were not sworn to do justice, the obligation
being considered entirely a matter of honour ; nor were
the witnesses placed upon their oath. A Regimental
Court Martial was, in fact, treated as a kind of family
tribunal, in which all parties knew and trusted each
other ; nor had the system worked amiss. The men
made no complaint ; and the only objection to it was
that, owing to the difficulty in many garrisons of
assembling a General Court Martial, Regimental Courts
Martial took cognizance of serious offences under
trivial names, and inflicted very severe sentences. The
obvious remedy was to establish an intermediate court
between the Regimental and the General, and to limit
the sentences which a Regimental Court Martial might
inflict. It occurred, however, to certain members of
the House of Commons, described by Sir John Moore
as " men who know little of soldiers, and have no
experience of regimental service," that abuses might be
corrected by causing the members of every court to be
sworn to do justice according to the evidence before
them, and the witnesses to be sworn to tell the truth.
The clauses to this effect appear to have been introduced
by General Richard Fitzpatrick, the friend of Fox,
better known as a politician than as a soldier, and as a
man of pleasure and fashion than as a politician. The
Duke of York at once protested against the innovation,
as likely to be noxious to discipline ; though he was
willing to establish an intermediate court, and to limit
the sentences of Regimental Courts Martial. The pro-
posed measure would, as he represented, cause the men
to believe that they could not trust their officers, and
the officers that they could not trust the men. The
Secretary at War, William Dundas, called for the opinion
of the leading military authorities, who almost without
exception strongly condemned Fitzpatrick's reforms.
Men so divergent in character as the Duke of York,
David Dundas, James Pulteney, James Craig, Harry
Burrard, John Whitelocke, John Moore, Robert Brown-
VOL. VII o
194 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 809. rigg, Harry Calvert, and Colonel Gordon, with one voice
denounced the change as uncalled for and likely to be
fatal to discipline. Of the two who supported it, one,
Lord Mulgrave, talked about the " awful impression
of an oath," an argument demolished by David Dundas,
who anticipated that " a military oath might become as
proverbial as a Custom-house oath ; " while the other,
Lord Chatham, shrewder and more practical, thought
that the swearing of officers might improve discipline
by checking the acquittal of prisoners in regiments where
a party existed adverse to the commanding officer.
The great majority of opinions, however, was over-
whelmingly against the change, more particularly in the
middle of a great war. Yet none the less William Dun-
das declared that the protestants had given no reasons
in support of their views. The Government, generally,
found it less troublesome to give way to Fitzpatrick
than to support the Horse Guards ; and the swearing
both of members and witnesses in Regimental Courts
Martial was enjoined by the Mutiny Act of 1805. 1
The results of this rejection of practical experience
in favour of sentimental speculation were speedily seen.
The solemnity of an oath had no efficacy to make
Moore's officers second him during his retreat ; and
Wellesley in 1809 declared it to be a positive hindrance
to discipline. Soldiers had as little conscience about
perjuring themselves as any other men ; but the officers
were more squeamish and, being sworn to do justice
" according to the evidence," found their verdict in
agreement with perjured testimony, with the result that
it was almost impossible to convict a prisoner before
a Regimental Court Martial. " It is no longer a court
of honour," wrote Wellesley, " at the hands of which
a soldier was certain of receiving punishment if he
deserved ; but it is a court of law, where decisions are
to be found according to the evidence principally of
those on whose actions it is constituted as a restraint."
1 See the opinions of the officers in Military Transactions, ii. 39-
58 ; H.D. iii. 695, 857, 4th, 12th March, 1805.
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
*95
It is extremely probable that the regimental officers, 1809.
disliking the new system, took no pains to make it
efficient ; and that, having the fear of Cobbett or of
the House of Commons before their eyes, they shrank
even in the necessary cases from inflicting punishment.1
Still, whatever the cause, the fact remains that Regimental
Courts Martial, which had maintained discipline admir-
ably until 1805, failed to do so after that year ; and the
inevitable inference is, not necessarily that the swearing
of members and witnesses was in itself wrong, but that
it was the height of folly in the War Office to introduce,
against all military advice, so great a change in the
middle of a war.
Apart from this, there was in the British army no
military police. There was a provost-marshal, with
deputies and officials of his own, who by custom had
the power to inflict summary punishment for breaches
of discipline in war, even to the extent of death, at the
Commander-in-Chief's order. Thus the Duke of York,
while in Flanders, had summarily hanged a marauding
dragoon ; but the chief of his staff in reporting the
fact had begged that it might not be mentioned, lest
members of Parliament should blaspheme; and Wel-
lesley, who knew the House of Commons, confessed to
Castlereagh that in his opinion custom would not
warrant the exercise of this power, or that, in plain
words, he was afraid to exercise it without legal sanction.
Yet he was fain to add that he did not know how the
army was to be commanded at all if the practice were
not continued, and even extended. The fact seems to
be that the discipline of British armies in the field had
hitherto been carried on in much the same way as that
of the Standing Army before the passing of the Mutiny
Act — that is to say, through methods sanctified by
custom. But now pamphleteers, newspapers, and
members of the House of Commons had by inquiry
and denunciation sapped the strength of that custom,
1 See the case reviewed in Wellesley to Brigadier Campbell,
June 21, 1809.
196 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. and had furnished no substitute to take its place. " Our
law," wrote Wellesley, " instead of being strong in
proportion to the temptation and means for indiscipline
and irregularity, has been weakened. We have not
adopted the additional means of restraint and punish-
ment practised by other nations and our enemies,
although we have imitated them in those particulars
which have increased and aggravated our irregularities."
Reformers seldom reflect that every abuse has its origin
in what was once an use, and that it is of little profit to
abolish the one without restoring the other. This
trouble with the discipline of the army will confront us
constantly during the Peninsular War.1
The next difficulty which Wellesley had to over-
come was want of money. He had only been able
to advance against Soult by obtaining a loan of £10,000,
not very willingly provided, from the city of Oporto.
The pay of the troops was two months in arrear ; the
army owed huge sums all over Portugal, and it was
impossible to equip it for a further campaign against
Victor without at least some ready cash, the lack of
which worried Sir Arthur terribly. " I cannot get
supplies, or boats, or carts to move supplies from Lisbon
without money," he wrote to Villiers on the 21st of
June ; but Castlereagh was in as great difficulties over
specie as himself. It was only with extreme labour
that £100,000 was obtained from Cadiz to answer the
most immediate and pressing necessities ; and, until
this arrived in the third week of June, Wellesley was
powerless to move. The Government in England could
not be blamed, for it was as much embarrassed as
the General ; and in fact, as shall be seen, the
Peninsular War was carried on from beginning to end
with the pay of both soldiers and hired transport in
constant arrear.2
1 Wellington Desp. : Wellesley to Villiers, 31st May ; to Castle-
reagh, 31st May, 17th June. Supp. Desp., CO., 19th, 20th, 24th,
26th, 29th May, 13th, 17th June, 1809.
2 Wellesley to Huskisson, 30th May; to Villiers 31st May,
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 197
The deficiency of cash, of course, affected chiefly 1809.
the service of transport and supply, which was already
in no very flourishing condition. Sir Arthur summed
it up in his usual terse style : " Our Commissariat is
very bad indeed, but it is new and will improve, I
hope." Horses and mules, as we have seen, were scarce
in Portugal, and Wellesley was dismayed to find that
the teams of the artillery which he had taken to the
Douro were nearly destroyed, partly, no doubt, owing
to the fact that the forage of the country was un-
familiar to them, but chiefly thanks to the neglect of
the Commissaries to provide any forage at all. The
horses of the cavalry had likewise suffered not a little ;
and Wellesley was compelled to make good the de-
ficiences of both services by handing over to them
horses which had been sent out for the waggon-train,
or in other words for the Commissariat. For this
cause, and also, no doubt, for the more important reason
that few roads in Portugal were fit for any but pack-
animals, Wellesley seems to have determined that mules
alone should be used for purposes of transport. The
Twenty -third Light Dragoons, recently arrived in
Portugal from brilliant service in India, assumed that
they would keep their two galloping guns, and askea
for mules to draw them. They were informed by the
Commander-in-Chief that he could find better employ-
ment for mules if they could be obtained, and that
he would provide horses for the guns if he thought it
necessary to retain them at all, since the demand for
mules was great and the supply extremely limited.
The allowance for regimental transport ] was one
mule to every troop of cavalry and to every company of
infantry to carry the camp-kettles, with five additional
mules to each battalion of infantry, and six to each
1st, 1 ith, 21st June ; to Castlereagh, iith, 22nd June; to Frerc,
14th June; to J. Murray, 16th June; to Lt.-Col. Burke, 18th June ;
Castlereagh to Wellesley, nth June, 11th July 1809.
1 I use the term for convenience, though not, of course, quite
in the modern sense.
198 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. regiment of cavalry to carry the pay-master's books,
the regimental surgeon's chest, the armourer's tools,
entrenching tools,1 and in the case of the cavalry, the
equipment of the saddler and the veterinary surgeon. It
must, however, be noted that the mules for the en-
trenching tools, armourer, saddler, and veterinary sur-
geon alone were the property of the public, the remainder
being supplied by the regimental officers concerned out
of the allowance called " bat, baggage, and forage allow-
ance." This arrangement gave rise to much friction,
for, if a regimental mule became useless, the officer
whose property it was, having no special allowance to
replace it, naturally tried to lay hands on a public, a
captured, or stolen mule, upon all of which the Com-
missary-general rightly possessed, under General Orders,
priority of claim. It will, however, be noticed that, as
at present, the regimental transport carried no pro-
visions ; the standing order being that, whenever the
Commissaries could issue the quantity, the infantry
must carry three days' bread and the cavalry three days'
forage. To all intent, therefore, there was no such
organisation as that which now goes by the name of
the supply-column ; all victuals being brought forward
by what would now be termed the supply-park or
mobile magazine, though they were distributed through
brigade or regimental stores.
These mobile magazines consisted, it seems, entirely
of pack-animals, though carts were used to bring forward
ammunition and treasure. Wellesley could not endure
the bullock-carts of the country, the extreme slowness
of which, on the hilly roads of Portugal, forbade them
to keep up with the main body.2 One such cart only
1 The allowance of entrenching tools was, for every battalion of
infantry, 5 spades, 5 shovels, 5 pick-axes, and 5 felling-axes ; for
every regiment of cavalry, 8 each of spades and shovels, 4 each of
pickaxes and felling-axes.
2 To this day the country bullock-carts of Portugal are of the
most primitive kind, the wheels not turning free on their axles,
but being made fast to the axle and turning with it, to an accom-
paniment of infinite groaning and creaking. It should seem from
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 199
was allowed to each regiment to carry men who fell 1809.
sick on the march, that is to say, to serve as an am-
bulance ; all others were strictly forbidden. General
Cotton, evidently from anxiety to deliver his underfed
and overburdened troop-horses from the weight of the
three days' forage, begged for carts to carry it, but
was peremptorily refused. Officers who, in defiance of
Wellesley's orders, took carts for their private baggage,
were sternly ordered to discard them as a public in-
convenience. " It is a determined measure that no
baggage is to be carried upon bullock-cars . . . those
who have baggage to carry must be provided with
mules or horses." This prohibition naturally brought
all kinds of forbidden burdens upon the backs of the
regimental mules, an abuse which called down renewed
regulations and sharp rebukes. The men, too, at first
neutralised the foresight which had given them three
days' rations by improvidence and wastefulness, being
helpless and breadless before the third day. The army,
in fact, was raw and inexperienced, and did not under-
stand that, for the first time since the war began, it
was entering upon a series of scientific campaigns of
such a kind as it had never known before. Wellesley's
own opinion of it was violently expressed : " We are
an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight,
but we are worse than any enemy in the country, and
take my word for it, that either defeat or success would
dissolve us." He might more truly have said of it what
he said of the Commissariat : " It is new and will im-
prove." 1
Meanwhile, though the want of money delayed
Wellesley's preparations for long, his reinforcements
also were slow to reach him. Sir David Dundas for
some reason was in no haste to set aside light infantry
G.O. of 13th May 1809, that Cradoclc had been the first to forbid
private wheeled transport.
1 Wellingto?! Supp. Desp., vi. 262-267, 270-271, 274-276, 284-
285 ; Wellesley to Cotton, 3rd June ; to Villiers, 27th May ; to
Gen. Mackenzie, 29th June, 1809.
200 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1 809. for the Peninsular army ; and it was not till the second
week in May that Craufurd's brigade 1 received its orders
May 24. to embark. On the 24th of that month it sailed from
the Downs, but was driven by a gale into Portsmouth,
where it was detained by foul winds until the middle of
June, and did not reach the Tagus till the end of the
month. The same cause kept back the two batteries of
Horse Artillery and the seven additional battalions
promised to Wellesley from Ireland. Of the artillery,
one battery, the famous " Chestnut Troop " under
Captain Ross, arrived with Craufurd, and the other some
time later .; while none of the infantry reached Portugal
before July. Yet another battalion, the first of the
Eleventh Foot, which was also ordered to the Tagus
from Madeira, did not come in until August. The
Twenty-third Light Dragoons appeared on the 1 1 th of
June, but the horses were, of course, unfit for immediate
work. Moreover, upon their coming, the two squadrons
of the Twentieth Light Dragoons and the troops of the
Third German Hussars were at once despatched, pursuant
to Castlereagh's orders, to join the remainder of their
regiments in Sicily. In fact, the reinforcements which
reached Wellesley before the opening of the campaign
were almost insignificant. He recovered the Fortieth
Foot from Seville, and he obtained two seasoned
battalions — the Forty-eighth and Sixty-first — from
Gibraltar in exchange for two raw battalions2 which had
formed part of his original army. But only two of
these joined him at Abrantes, though the Sixty-first and
the Twenty-third Light Dragoons overtook him on the
march to Talavera. Meanwhile he distributed his force,
such as it was, into four divisions under Generals
Sherbrooke, Hill, Mackenzie, and A. Campbell ; for
Paget had gone home on account of his wound ; while
Murray, whose departure Wellesley for some reason
1 1 /43rd, i/52nd, i/95th.
2 2/9th, 2/30th. But it seems that the 2/ 87th was in a worse
state than the 2/9th, and that Wellesley repented that he had not
sent it to Gibraltar. Wellesley to Donkin, 23rd June 1809.
ch.xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
201
deplored as a loss, had sailed to England in a fit of 1809.
temper over the grant of superior rank to Beresford.1
Thus was initiated the divisional organisation which
endured till the close of the war.2
It remains, lastly, to consider the plan of campaign
which Wellesley had concerted with Cuesta. He had
opened communication with the Spanish General in a
letter of the 22nd of May ; and on the 30th had
despatched to him two of his staff officers, Colonels
Bourke and Cadogan, both of whom we saw at Buenos
Ayres, to gain intelligence and to learn Cuesta's views.
At that time Victor's army was still in Estremadura ;
and Cuesta propounded three schemes. The first was
based on the traditions of Baylen, for surrounding the
enemy ; the second, equally absurd, was that the British
should cross the Tagus at Alcantara and assail Victor's
flank from the north, while the Spaniards fell upon his
1 Wellesley to Villiers, 30th May; to Castlereagh, 26th June
1809.
r
1st Division. T
Guards Brigade : 1/ Coldstream, I /3rd Guards
ameron's ,,
Sherbrooke.
Langwerth's „
2nd Division.
Hill.
3rd Division.
Mackenzie.
\th Division.
A. Campbell.
Low's
Tilson's *
Stewart's
5»
(Mackenzie's ,,
Cavalry Division.
Payne.
>onkin's
Campbell's ,,
Kemmis's f ,,
Fane's
Cotton's
Ansen's
1/6 1 st, 2/83rd.
1st and 2nd line batts. Light
Cos. K.G.L.
5 th and 7th line batts. K.G.L.
1 /3rd, 2/48th, 2/66th.
29th, i/48th, 1st batt. detach-
ments.
z/24th, 2/3 1st, 1 /45th.
5/6oth, 2/87th, i/88th.
2/7th, 2/53rd-
1 /40th, 97th, 2nd batt. detach-
ments.
3rd D.G., 4th D.
14th and 1 6th L.D.
istL.D., K.G.L. ; 23rd L.D.
* Tilson asked leave to resign his command if he was to be employed with the
Portuguese troops ; but being told bluntly that he might go ns soon as it pleased him,
repented and was reinstated. Wellesley to Beresford, 29th May ; to Castlereagh
1 6th, 23rd June 1809.
t At first Peacocks brigade, till Colonel Peacock went to assume command at
Lisbon about the 23rd of June.
202 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. front from the south-west ; and a third proposed that
the British, remaining to the north of the Tagus, should
advance by Castello Branco upon Plasencia so as to cut
off Victor's retreat by the bridge of Almaraz, and
possibly also by the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera.
Wellesley would accept only the third of these plans ;
whereupon Cuesta promptly evinced so decided a pre-
ference for the first that Sir Arthur very reluctantly
gave way. Then, fortunately, the withdrawal of Victor
across the Tagus changed the entire situation. Cuesta
followed up the Marshal as he retired ; but, mindful of
Wellesley 's repeated injunctions to caution, kept his main
body upon the southern bank of the Tagus, pushing
forward reconnoitring parties only over the bridge, which
he had repaired, at Almaraz. The route by Castello
Branco and Plasencia, therefore, was obviously that by
which Wellesley's army should advance ; and Cuesta at
once desired that he should take it.1 The British
commander, however, was still delayed by the lack of
treasure, which had only arrived at Lisbon on the 15 th,
and to Sir Arthur's disgust was not brought up to the
June 25. army until the 25th. "We have been obliged to halt
nearly three weeks for want of money. Our distress
for everything has been very great indeed, and has been
produced by the want of money." So wrote Wellesley
to Huskisson, evidently intending that, if the Treasury
failed to realise its shortcomings, it should not be for
want of reiterated statement.2
However, there was still plenty to employ him.
Though he looked forward to the retirement of the
enemy to the line of the Ebro, he was none the less
1 I cannot quite understand upon what authority Mr. Oman
asserts that Cuesta continued to raise difficulties against Wellesley's
movement by Plasencia. Wellesley only heard of Victor's retire-
ment from Merida on the 17th of June ; and on the same day, when
reporting the fact to Castlereagh, he stated in a postscript : "I have
received letters from General Cuesta of the 16th ... he now
wishes me to march by Plasencia."
2 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 17th June ; to Beresford, 23rd June ;
to Huskisson, 28th June, 1809.
ch. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 203
attentive to the defence of the Tagus, the difficulty of 1809.
which seems to have caused him some concern.
Measures had also to be taken for the establishment of
depots of stores, both at Santarem and at Almeida, for
Northern Portugal would require to be guarded during
his absence with Cuesta. Romana had asked for Silveira
to join him and prosecute offensive operations in Galicia,
but to this Wellesley strongly objected. Up to the
2 1 st of June he saw no reason why Ney should evacuate
Galicia, though he imagined that the retirement of
Victor and Sebastiani might bring it about ; but on the
27th he suspected that such evacuation had begun, and
gave Beresford definite orders, if he should hear of any
movement of Ney's from Galicia to Castile, to move
eastward upon a circle parallel to that described by the
enemy's march. Lastly, he had warned the Junta of
Badajoz betimes to accumulate supplies for his army in
the valley of the Tietar ; and, having received assurances
from the Supreme Junta that every needful article would
be forthcoming, he sent his Commissaries forward to
purchase mules and to arrange for the subsistence of the
troops,1 for in spite of all his efforts he was still very
imperfectly supplied with transport.2 He seems to
have had no misgivings, in spite of Moore's experience,
lest the authority alike of Supreme and of local Junta
should prove to be naught. He declined to believe the
very disquieting reports which he received from Colonel
Roche,3 at Cuesta's headquarters, of the state of the
1 Wellesley's special provision for himself was 2 lbs. of black tea.
Wellesley to Villiers, 27th June 1809.
2 Wellesley to Bourke, 21st June ; to Beresford, 3rd, 23rd, 27th
June ; to Junta of Badajoz, 17th June, 1809.
3 "In justice to Colonel Roche I must add that before I joined
General Cuesta's army he wrote me an account of its state, to which
I was not inclined and did not pay any attention at the time,
but which I afterwards found to be a true account in every
respect." — Wellington to Lord Wellesley, 17th Sept. 1809.
I have been unable to find any letter of Roche at Apsley House of
earlier date than 6th July 1809, but the following passage, written at
that date, shows that he had sent earlier reports of the same tenor : —
" I wish to God I could give you a favourable account of this
204 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 809. Spanish army. And so, sanguine and unsuspecting, he
went upon his way.
[Cuesta's] army ; but truth and my responsibility oblige me to say
that I see nothing to alter my former opinion on the subject.
Anything like order, system, or discipline is out of the question ;
and when one adds that, with few exceptions, the officers are more
ignorant than the men, it is impossible not to feel apprehensions for
the issue."
CHAPTER XXX
On the 27th of June Wellesley marched from Abrantes 1809.
with twenty-three thousand British and Germans of all
ranks and thirty guns,1 having made over the whole of
the Portuguese to Beresford. The army moved in two
columns : the northern, which proceeded by Corticada,
Sobreira, Formosa, and Sarzedas, and was accompanied by
Wellesley himself; and the southern, which following
a course parallel to the Tagus along its southern bank
to Villa Velha de Rodao, crossed the river at that point,
and united with the other column on the 30th of June June 30.
and 1 st of July at Castello Branco. Here Wellesley
heard of Victor's continued retreat towards Talavera,
and a vague report that Ney had evacuated Coruna,2
receiving at the same time the more welcome in-
telligence that Craufurd's brigade had reached Lisbon
on the 28th. On the 1st the army continued its July 1.
march eastward upon Zibreira and Zarza la Mayor,
the advanced guard passing the Spanish frontier on
the 3rd. At Zarza Wellesley was joined by Wilson July 3.
with his Portuguese ; and from this point he detached
Donkin's brigade to take the southern route by
Ceclavin and Torrejoncillo upon Coria, in order to clear
his right flank, leading the main body to the same
place by the northern road past Moraleja. At the
same time he requested Cuesta to secure his left flank
by occupying the pass of Banos with some Spanish
1 Six batteries without their howitzers. — Duncan, History of the
Royal Artillery, ii. 248-249.
2 Wellesley to Frere and Castlereagh, 1st July 1809.
205
206 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. infantry which lay at Plasencia.1 At Zarza la Mayor
also Wellesley saw the French General Franceschi,2
who, having been taken prisoner by Spanish guerillas
on his way from Zamora to Madrid, was now being
escorted to Seville ; and from him Sir Arthur learned
that Mortier's corps was at Valladolid. This im-
portant intelligence was supplemented, when the British
July 8. General arrived at Plasencia on the 8th, by an abstract
of two letters from Soult to Napoleon and to Joseph,
which had been found upon Franceschi. These gave a
full account of Souk's operations in Galicia, and of his
movement to Zamora in order to refit his army.
But they mentioned also Soult's new policy in regard
to Galicia and his orders to Ney for carrying it out ;
and from this Wellesley naturally concluded that Ney
must necessarily remain in that province. The general
report of Soult upon his situation was not cheerful ;
and an intercepted letter from Victor to Joseph of the
25 th of June represented the state of his army as
desperate, so that Sir Arthur might reasonably take a
hopeful view of his own prospects. On the other
hand the news of Blake's defeat at Belchite, which
arrived at the same time, was depressing ; and the
knowledge that there were two French corps only a
hundred miles to north of him made Wellesley doubly
anxious for the security of the passes of Banos and
Perales on his left flank.3
July 9, 10. On the 9th and 10th the entire army streamed into
Plasencia ; and on the latter day Wellesley rode away
with his staff to visit Cuesta in his camp at Casas del
Puerto, a little to the south of the Tagus, opposite
Almaraz. Owing to a mistake of their Spanish escort
they did not arrive until after dark, when they reviewed
1 Wellesley to Roche, 4th July 1809.
2 He was kept in close captivity until 181 1 when he died — a
melancholy end for a singularly brave and brilliant officer, who was
also an accomplished draughtsman and sculptor.
3 Wellesley to Roche 8th July; to C. Flint 17th July; to
Beresford 9th July 1809; and see the intercepted letters in Supp.
Desp. vi. 298, 307-314.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 207
the Spanish army, which had been under arms for 1809.
several hours, by torch-light. Upon the whole they
were not favourably impressed by what they saw. The
soldiers, though physically fine men, were obviously
untrained and undisciplined. The general officers were,
with a few exceptions, old and infirm, and Cuesta
himself, who had been overthrown and trampled on by
his fugitive cavalry at Medellin nearly three months
before, was still suffering so much from his injuries
that he could not sit on his horse without support.
The old man, now hard upon seventy years of age,
was silent and reserved. He ruled his army always
by mystery and terror, but now he was more than
ordinarily taciturn and unbending, partly, no doubt,
owing to physical exhaustion, but chiefly from intense
jealousy of his British coadjutor. The Supreme Junta
at Seville was torn by factions, each scheming desperately
to secure military commands for its own favourites and
to oust its rivals. Frere, whose mind always fastened
greedily upon small matters, entered with zest into these
intrigues. The Spanish candidate whom he preferred
was his personal friend the Duke of Alburquerque,
and the rival whom he most greatly feared was Cuesta
himself; for Cuesta's army was devoted to its chief,
and was suspected of a desire to make an end of the
Supreme Junta altogether. It therefore became an
object to the Ambassador to weaken the army of that
leader ; and with this view he suggested to Wellesley
that he should advise Cuesta to detach ten thousand
men towards Avila and Segovia.
Not content with this, Frere never ceased to work,
privately indeed but without tact and without discretion,
to secure the appointment of Sir Arthur himself as
Generalissimo of the Spanish forces. The British
Ministers would have welcomed such an arrange-
ment, but, owing to the natural jealousy of the Spanish
Government, conceived that the object was " more likely
to be attained by refraining from pressing it " ; and
Wellesley himself, hearing from Frere of his ill-timed
2o8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. activity, reminded the Ambassador of the Cabinet's
views, and told him plainly that his insinuations were
not likely to have any good effect. But the mischief
was done. Not satisfied with constant endeavours to
act as Commander-in-Chief of the British army, Frere
had attempted before Wellesley's arrival to direct the
armies of Spain also, and had written letters to Cuesta
in person which, from one in his position, were not
merely meddlesome but positively insulting.1 It was
quite possible to gather from Frere's own language
his designs as to Alburquerque, and Cuesta was perfectly
well informed as to his proceedings on behalf of Wellesley.
Cuesta's pride and self-esteem were great beyond all
proportion either to his intellect or to his ability, but
he may be excused if, in the circumstances, he regarded
Wellesley as a man who was plotting to displace him,
and if in consequence he received even the most innocent
of Sir Arthur's proposals with extremity of suspicion
and resentment.
July 11. On the 11th the two commanders sat in conference
for four hours over their plan of campaign. Cuesta
would not speak French ; Wellesley could not speak
Spanish ; and the interview was conducted through
Cuesta's Chief of the Staff, O'Donoju,2 of whom
Wellesley formed a high opinion. The information
of the two Generals respecting the enemy before them
was fairly good. It was to the effect that Victor lay
a little to the east of Talavera, behind the Alberche,
with about thirty-five thousand men, twenty-two thou-
sand of them being of his own corps and the remainder
from the reserve at Madrid ; and that Sebastiani was at
Madridejos with ten thousand men, observing Venegas,
who was advancing against him with nearly double that
number. As a matter of fact this estimate over-rated
the strength of Victor, and under-rated that of Sebastiani
1 See F.O. Spain. Frere to Sec. of State, 25th April 1S09,
and particularly his letter to Cuesta of 22nd April enclosed therein.
2 O'Donoju had so little forgotten his native tongue that he
wrote to Wellesley always in English.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 209
by seven thousand men ; but none the less Wellesley 1809.
and Cuesta were not unreasonable in assuming that the
forces of Venegas and Sebastiani were quantities that
would cancel each other, and might therefore be left out
of account. There remained the armies of Ney, Soult,
and Mortier. Of these the first was firmly believed to
be still in Galicia ; the second was known to be at
Zamora ; while it was reported truly that Joseph was
about to order the Fifth Corps to march upon Madrid
from Valladolid, wherefore Mortier might be expected
to be in the vicinity of Avila.1 As to Soult, Wellesley
considered him to be in no condition, without artillery
and with a beaten army, to undertake any more serious
operation than that which was revealed by the Marshal's
intercepted despatches — a raid to the north-westward
upon Braganca ; though none the less, as we have seen,
the British General never forgot the importance of se-
curing his left flank at the passes of Banos and Perales.
In this situation the first plan broached by Wellesley
to Cuesta was that suggested by Frere, that ten thou-
sand Spaniards should be detached under the Duke of
Alburquerque towards Avila and Segovia to turn the
French right ; 2 that the remaining force of the united
armies, forty-five thousand men, should attack Victor
on the Alberche in the centre ; and that Venegas, after
pushing Sebastiani back across the Tagus, should pass
that river himself at Aranjuez or Fuentiduena, and
threaten Madrid upon the enemy's left. Cuesta
answered by proposing that Wellesley should detach
the ten thousand men from his own army to Avila ; to
which the British Commander justly objected that, if
his troops were to act with advantage, they must act
1 As events turned out, no order was sent by Joseph to Mortier
until the 13th of July, and then only to concentrate his force at
Villacastin, about twenty miles north and east of Avila.
2 Mr. Oman says — " to look for Mortier, if he were to be found
in that direction, and, if not, to turn to the enemy's right and threaten
Madrid" (ii. 475-476). Wellesley's despatches say nothing about
observing Mortier, though of course it seems the obvious duty of
such a detachment.
VOL. VII P
2io HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. in one body, and that Cuesta could better afford the
detachment from his thirty thousand men than he him-
self from his twenty thousand. Cuesta still refused to
comply, and was indeed perfectly right ; for if this weak
corps had taken the direction put forward for it, it must
inevitably have marched into the jaws of Mortier's
superior force and have been destroyed. Wellesley
wrote to Frere that, though he agreed with him in
thinking that such a movement would be, from a
military point of view, really advantageous — no doubt
because it would prevent the reinforcement of Victor
from the garrison of Madrid — yet he did not consider
it necessary. But, unless Sir Arthur was altogether at
fault concerning the strength of Mortier's corps, it
is difficult to believe that he would have suggested
the plan except at Frere's instance ; and, since its
principal object was to give the Duke of Alburquerque
an independent command and to enable him to gain
distinction, the whole proceeding can hardly be called
by any other name than a political intrigue. It would
perhaps be too hard upon Wellesley to censure him for
lending himself to such a scheme at so early a moment
in his command ; for, apart from all patriotic obliga-
tion, it was his special duty to his patron Castlereagh
to work kindly with the intimate friend of Castlereagh's
disloyal colleague, Canning. At the same time it is to
be lamented that he should have done so, for Cuesta
did not fail to perceive the drift of the proposal, and
became more suspicious than ever.
Wellesley then suggested that this same Spanish
detachment should move north-eastward by the pass of
Banos, ostensibly, as it seems, still to make a demon-
stration towards Avila, but really, no doubt, to secure
the left flank of the main army of the Allies. Cuesta,
however, would not hear of this. He conceived any
plan of the kind to be designed simply to undermine
his authority ; and he declined to spare more than two
battalions and a squadron, or about two thousand men
in all, for this service. These, together with Wilson's
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 211
Portuguese, were ordered to move through the Vera de 1 809.
Plasencia up the right bank of the Tietar, and so by
Navamorcuende to the Alberche, occupying in succes-
sion all the villages on the right bank as far as Escalona,
so as to cover the flank of the British troops during
their advance eastward, and resuming touch with them
at San Roman. It remained to provide for the opera-
tions on the right, as to which Wellesley's first proposal
was accepted, namely, that Venegas with his twenty-
three thousand men should push Sebastiani back to the
Tagus, and endeavour to force the passage of that river,
so as to menace Madrid from the east. If Sebastiani
should decline to follow him eastward, Venegas was to
march upon Madrid and seize it. It is easy, by the
light of subsequent events, to see that this plan, being
based upon imperfect information, was altogether faulty ;
but the most remarkable point in it is that Wellesley
was anxious to make good the greatest fault of all,
namely, the omission to set a sufficient guard over the
pass of Banos. That he should have failed in his effort
was doubtless due ultimately to the obstinacy of Cuesta,
but primarily to the tactless meddling of Frere.
Meanwhile Wellesley's troubles were increasing
upon every side. The Twenty-third Light Dragoons
joined him at Plasencia on the 14th, and the Forty-
eighth and Sixty-first on the 16th ; but the most of
his reinforcements were detained at Lisbon for want
of twelve mules apiece for their regimental transport.
Moreover, the general question of transport was be-
coming very serious. His military chest and ammuni-
tion had been stopped at Abrantes for want of carts,
so that he was unable to pay ready money, as he
had promised, for his purchases. The Portuguese
authorities were most backward in furnishing either
animals or vehicles ; and the Spaniards, though ready
enough to produce victuals, were not more eager
than the Portuguese to provide transport. So serious
was the position that on the 16th Wellesley warned July 16.
Cuesta that he should undertake no new operations
212 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. until his wants were supplied. In justice to the
Supreme Junta it must be said that Commissioners
had been sent to collect the animals and victuals for
which Wellesley had asked ; but the people had driven
off all their mules lest they should be seized for the
public service,1 and the Junta's authority was too
weak to enforce its demands. " We have not pro-
cured a cart or a mule for the service of the army,"
wrote Wellesley to Frere ; "... we really should not
be worse off in an enemy's country, or indeed so ill,
as we should there take by force what we should
require.
These difficulties over transport kept Wellesley at
July 17. Plasencia until the 17th, when, in spite of his threats
to O'Donoju, he set his troops in motion eastward.
He sent orders to the reinforcements at Lisbon to join
him by way of Abrantes, with the exception of two
battalions 3 which he placed at the disposal of Beresford.
To Beresford also he despatched instructions to send an
officer to see how the pass of Baiios was occupied, and
to keep an eye upon it. Sir Arthur did not think that
the French would venture through it, because, owing
to the destruction of the bridges of Alcantara and
Almaraz, they would find themselves pent in between
the mountains and the Tagus ; but he was evidently
still uneasy about the pass, though ignorant of the
danger that menaced his left flank. The reports of
the evacuation of Ferrol and Coruna by the French
were now confirmed ; but Wellesley never dreamed
that Ney's corps was at Astorga. On the 17th he
advanced from Plasencia with something over twenty-
July 18. one thousand men; on the 18th the whole army
1 Leslie {Military Journal, p. 132), in descending the pass of
Tornevecas, within twenty-five miles of Plasencia, on the 17th of
July, met with vast herds of mules and cattle which were being
driven off".
2 Wellesley to the Coram. -General, 8th July ; to Beresford and
Villiers, 13th July ; to Castlereagh, 15th July; to O'Donoju and
Frere, 16th July ; to the Junta to Plasencia, 1 8th July 1809.
3 2/5th, z/58th.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 213
crossed the Tietar over a flying bridge at La Bazagona, 1809.
and headquarters reached Majadas ; on the 19th they July 19.
were at Centenillo ; and on the 20th the entire force July 20.
reached Oropesa. On that same night Cuesta, who
had moved from Almaraz by Naval Moral, bivouacked
five miles to the rear at La Calzada ; and on the
following day led his troops north-eastward upon July 21.
Velada, where he was joined by Del Parque's division
from Puente del Arzobispo. On that day the British
remained halted ; but the cavalry of the advanced
guard came into contact with the enemy and took a
few prisoners, while the Spaniards encountered a body
of French horse about Gamonal. On the 22nd both July 22.
armies proceeded in two columns,1 Spaniards on the left,
British on the right, upon Talavera ; and upon reach-
ing Gamonal the Spaniards again found themselves
confronted by French cavalry, but this time by the
whole division of Latour Maubourg's dragoons, who
awaited them with the utmost calmness, dismounted
and standing in the open plain. Nevertheless the Spanish
cavalry did not venture to attack ; and, even after the
arrival of a division of infantry, they contented them-
selves with hour after hour of feeble skirmishing, until
Anson's brigade of British dragoons came up, when the
French retired precipitately round the northern suburb
of the town and so across the Alberche. General
Charles Stewart tried to lead the Spanish troopers to
charge them as they retreated, but failed in three suc-
cessive efforts to make the men follow him. Anson's
brigade, attempting to charge the French, evidently
1 Londonderry says that the Spaniards took the high road and
the British a parallel road through the mountains upon the enemy's
left, in the direction of San Roman. There is such a road, but
San Roman would be on the enemy's right, being ten miles north
of Talavera. Possibly Stewart frisked away in that direction with
a few dragoons, as was his wont, and imagined that the whole army
had followed him. By Leslie's account the march lay for most
part through open plain ; and the Spanish army was presently seen
upon the British left. The British, therefore, must have followed
the present direct road to Talavera, which was the obvious thing
for them to do.
2i4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. without the use of ground-scouts, got into difficulties
July 22. and lost a few men and horses from the fire of the
enemy's horse- artillery. With this the day's work
ended, the chief result to the Allies being to inspire
the British with an immense contempt for the Spanish
troops at large and for their General in particular.
In truth it was not edifying for them to watch the
Spanish Commander-in-Chief go out to the battle-field
in a coach drawn by nine mules, and on his arrival
to see the poor feeble old man lifted rather than
supported from the coach to a carefully constructed
seat on the carriage-cushions.1
Much more important was the result of the day's
skirmish to the French, for Victor now ascertained for
the first time that there were British troops with
Cuesta, and at once imparted the intelligence to
Madrid. There, since the arrival of Napoleon's letter
of the 1 2th of June, Joseph had been corresponding
with Soult as to the means of executing the Emperor's
orders to concentrate the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps
and drive the British from the Peninsula. Meanwhile
on the 13th of July he had ordered Mortier's corps to
march to Villacastin, from which point it could move
with equal facility upon Salamanca and the Douro for
the invasion of Portugal, or upon Madrid, if, as
Joseph suspected, the British should require to be met
in that quarter. Soult, however, strong in the orders
of the Emperor, demanded that everything should be
subordinated to his projected enterprise. Not only was
every man of his three corps to be left free for his use,
and assembled at Salamanca by the end of the month
for active operations, but troops must be gathered in
from all parts of Spain in order to form a reserve about
the same town ; also a corps of observation in Leon ;
and, finally, a strong detachment to cover his left flank
at Salamanca. Further, money must be granted to him
to fortify certain places on the Douro, and two million
rations and a strong siege-train must be sent to Salamanca.
1 Munster, Campaign of 180Q.
ch. xxx HISTORY QF THE ARMY 215
When all these wants should have been supplied, he 1809.
thought that he might be able to open his campaign
with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and pursue it with
success. Joseph replied, accepting the plan in general
and consenting to leave the First Corps at Plasencia to
guard Soult's flank, but declaring his inability either
to draw from other quarters troops which should form
a reserve and protect his communications, or to spare
the Marshal more than £40,000 in money and six
hundred thousand rations. At the same time, however,
Joseph ordered Mortier's corps back to Valladolid, and
thus definitely removed it from the sphere in which,
though he knew it not, its services would have been
most valuable.1
Meanwhile Soult, having on the 18th received July 18.
information of the British advance up the Tagus,
directed Mortier to move his corps to Salamanca, and
Ney to push one of his divisions forward to Zamora
and to change his headquarters to Benavente. More-
over, on the 19th, he sent one of his best officers, July 19.
General Foy, to Madrid to report these dispositions
and to concert further operations with the King.
Soult conjectured that Wellesley must intend either to
march northward upon Salamanca, shifting his line
of operations to Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, or
to move forward by the valley of the Tagus upon
Madrid. To meet either contingency, he recommended
that the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps should be
concentrated at Salamanca, and that, in the event of
Wellesley's advancing up the Tagus, the whole should
march upon his flank and rear by Bejar and the pass of
Banos, and place him between two fires. The Marshal
insisted, however, that his field-artillery, in which the
losses during his late retreat had not yet been made good,
must first be completed. Foy duly arrived at Madrid
on the 22nd, on which same day, as we have seen, July 22.
Joseph received his first definite intelligence of the
1 Soult to Joseph, 13th July ; Jourdan to Soult in reply,
Mem. du Roi Joseph, vi. 217-229.
216 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. presence of the British in front of Marshal Victor.
July 22. Xhe King and Jourdan at once fell in with Souk's
plan, and sent Foy back with orders that Soult should
collect his three corps as soon as possible and move
upon Plasencia, where they hoped that he would arrive
within four or five days. At the same time Sebastiani
was directed to fall back upon Toledo ; and on that
very night Joseph, leaving only five thousand men to
hold Madrid, marched for the Alberche with the
remaining five thousand men of the garrison ; his
intention being that both these and Sebastiani's troops
should unite with Victor.
Such was the position when the Allies bivouacked
for the night : Mackenzie's division and Anson's cavalry
brigade in advance before the right of Victor's position,
the rest of the army in rear, and the Spaniards beyond
Talavera. Wellesley on that evening urged upon Cuesta
that the Allies should attack at the following dawn, the
British by the northern and the Spanish by the southern
fords and by the bridge ; and at midnight he received
July 23. the old man's tardy assent. At three o'clock, therefore,
the divisions of Sherbrooke and Mackenzie took up
their station over against the fords, and waited long
but vainly for the Spaniards to do their part likewise.
Wellesley at length rode off" to seek Cuesta, and found
him seated on his carriage-cushions on the bridge of
the Alberche, the picture of helplessness. He had not
risen until seven, and now poured forth feeble excuses for
delaying his movements. After a time the advanced
posts sent information that the French guns were with-
drawn and the troops evidently in retreat ; but Cuesta
remained obdurate, and the attack was deferred till
July 24. next day. Accordingly at dawn of the 24th the Allies
again marched down to the river in dead silence, to
find, as Wellesley had expected, that the enemy had
disappeared. Victor had already sent back his bag-
gage on the previous afternoon, and had followed it
with his entire army under cover of darkness ; and
having gained ten miles on the Allies, he was beyond
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 217
reach of any decisive stroke. But for the obstinacy 1809.
of Cuesta he would have paid dearly for his temerity July 2+"
in waiting with twenty -three thousand men in the
presence of twenty thousand British and more than
thirty thousand Spaniards ; and it seems only reasonable
to suppose that on the 23rd he had been forewarned by
some traitor on the Spanish staff that he need dread no
attack.1
Cuesta now became as eager and enterprising as on
the previous day he had been cautious and immovable ;
and dividing his army into two columns, he pressed on
after the retreating French as far as El Bravo on the
road to Madrid, and Cevolla on the road to Toledo.
Charles Stewart, with his usual busy restlessness, also led
two squadrons of German hussars forward without
orders as far as Santa Olalla, where he encountered
the enemy's rear-guard in force, and ascertained that
their main body had taken the road to Toledo. These
two squadrons were promptly withdrawn by Wellesley's
order ; and General Sherbrooke was directed to send
on no more troops, even if Cuesta should ask for them.
The British General thought it extremely probable
that the hasty advance of the Spaniards might lead
them into trouble, but he now put into execution the
threat written to O'Donoju on the 1 6th, and declined
to proceed farther until he should be furnished with
animals for his transport. He complained that for two
days his troops had been in want of victuals, whereas
the Spaniards had plenty and the French troops were
well-fed ; and it seems indubitable that the British
were in a state of starvation, whereas the French in
Talavera had been so wasteful that they had actually
built their huts of ripe wheat." But it seems also that
the inexperience of the British Commissaries was
responsible for at least a part of the difficulty, and
that those officers were indisposed rather than the
contrary to the zealous fulfilment of their duty, owing
to the violent language used to them by some of the
1 Napier, ii. 373. - Munster, p. 35.
218 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Generals, and notably by Sherbrooke.1 Moreover, the
July 24. Spanish army also was falling short of provisions, less
apparently owing to actual dearth than to the difficulty
of procuring animals to carry corn from the fertile
Vera de Plasencia. Cuesta's staff, meanwhile, seems
to have done its best, for O'Donoju made over to
Wellesley some captured biscuit ; and Wellesley, on
his side, very evidently did not make want of supplies
a mere pretext for not working with Cuesta, for
he professed himself ready to join the Spaniards
immediately upon receiving the biscuit aforesaid. It
should seem, therefore, that there was nothing under-
hand in the behaviour of the two Commanders towards
one another ; though there was something very
mysterious about Cuesta's unwillingness to fight on
the 23rd, and his sudden ardour in following up the
French after Victor's retreat. The latter point is,
however, explained by the fact that the Supreme Junta
had given secret orders to Venegas to assume the
Captainship-general of New Castile upon his entry into
Madrid, and to nominate the principal military and
civil officials from among his own officers. It is no
wonder that, having knowledge of this intrigue, Cuesta
was anxious to reach Madrid before Venegas.2
Meanwhile the French plans on the sides both
of Plasencia and Toledo were slowly accomplishing
1 It seems to have been in this campaign that Sherbrooke (not
Craufurd, as is frequently said) threatened to hang a Commissary,
who thereupon complained to Wellesley, and was duly informed
that he had better comply with Sherbrooke's requisitions, since, if
that General had threatened to hang him, he would certainly do
so. On the present occasion, however, Sherbrooke had gone no
further than to call Commissary Melville an impertinent scoun-
drel and threaten to knock him down. General Payne likewise
called Asst.- Commissary Moore "a d d scoundrel." Well-
ington MSS., Sherbrooke to Wellesley, 16th July ; Commissary
Melville to Wellesley, 14th July. The aggrieved Commissaries
appealed to Wellesley, but obtained little consolation. Yet see
Wellington Dcsp., Wellington to Sherbrooke, 15th July 1809.
2 Wellesley to Frere and Castlereagh, 24th July ; to O'Donoju
and Sherbrooke, 26th July 1809. Arteche, vi. 358-359.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 219
themselves. Mortier's corps had reached Salamanca 1809.
on the 23rd ; though Ney, thinking that Soult's orders July 23-
pointed to an invasion of Portugal, deferred obedience
to them until their true purport had been explained to
him. On the 24th Foy arrived at Soult's head-
quarters with Joseph's new commands ; whereupon the
Marshal directed the whole of Ney's corps to march to
Salamanca, and bade such troops of his own corps as
were not already there to move thither from Toro on
the 25th without a halt. On the side of the Tagus,
Joseph, while at Naval Carnero on his march
southward, was met on the 23rd by Victor's report of
his retreat, and at once turned the direction of his
march away from Talavera towards Toledo. On the
25th Sebastiani entered Toledo; Victor took up a July 25.
position on the east bank of the river Guadarrama,
about ten miles to west of that city ; and Joseph
reached Vargas about ten miles to north of it. Thus
the First and Fourth Corps, and the reserve from
Madrid, were successfully concentrated, with a total
strength of some forty-six thousand men.
What, then, had befallen Venegas that the French
should so completely have ignored his presence ? On
the 14th, while at Santa Cruz de Mudela, some ninety July 14.
miles south and east of Toledo, he had received commands
from the Supreme Junta at Seville to draw the enemy's
attention to his side, but without compromising himself.
On the 15th at the same place there reached him the July 15.
orders from Cuesta already mentioned, which bade him
concentrate his troops at Madridejos on the 17th and
1 8 th ; whence, if unopposed by a larger force than ten
thousand men, he was to advance by Tembleque, Ocana,
and Tarancon, so that by the 21st or 22nd his vanguard
should have reached Fuentiduena on the Upper Tagus,
or even Arganda, little more than twelve miles
south-east of Madrid ; the whole manoeuvre being
undertaken, of course, as part of the general operations
of the Allied army on the Tagus, which, as he was told,
would move on the 18th or 19th. Thus beset with
220 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. conflicting orders, Venegas on the 16th pushed his
July 16. troops forward from their cantonments along the
various roads to the north by Arenas, the pass of
Lapiche, Villarta, Villarrubia, and Herencia, only to
find the four last-named occupied by the enemy.
Since the two first of these four directly blocked the
road to Madridejos and the two others flanked it, he
decided, after consultation with a council of war, that
to proceed farther would be to compromise himself,
and sent a message to the Junta for instructions. Three
July 19. days were lost before on the 19th the Junta's answer
arrived, bidding him continue his advance, since the
armies on the Tagus were absolutely dependent upon
his co-operation ; but this he was to do only upon
receiving certain intelligence of their progress, and after
assuring himself that the enemy in his front had not
been reinforced to a dangerous strength. Venegas
thereupon cantoned his troops along the line Ciudad
Real, Daimiel, Manzanares, Membrilla, and La Solana,
with advanced posts across the Guadiana on his left
at^ Fuente el Fresno and Malagon ; and there he sat
still, listening gladly to exaggerated tales of Sebastiani's
strength, without an attempt to disturb him. At
July 24. length on the 24th, upon learning that the enemy
was disappearing from his front, he moved forward
irresolutely, hesitating whether to follow Sebastiani to
Toledo or to march upon Madrid. Some excuse may
be made for his previous inaction, looking to the
contradictory orders that he had received ; but even
the Junta had bidden him to distract Sebastiani's
attention to his own quarter, and this he absolutely
neglected to do.
July 25. In the meantime Wellesley on the 25th stationed
the divisions of Sherbrooke and Mackenzie with two
regiments of cavalry on the farther bank of the Alberche
about Cazalegas, in order to maintain communication
with ^ Wilson at Escalona, and with Cuesta. The
Spanish General, still full of ardour in the pursuit, had
pushed his army on to Torrijos within fifteen miles of
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 221
Toledo, when to his surprise he learned that over fortv 1809.
thousand French were in his front. Reluctantly enough
he resolved to retreat ; and Wellesley, who had ridden
forward to choose a new position in lieu of that of
Cazalegas, upon hearing of his determination, made
preparations to send Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's
divisions on to Cevolla in case the French should
advance. He hoped that the French would now take
the offensive, and he was not disappointed. Finding
that Cuesta only was opposed to them, King Joseph
and his Marshals resolved to attack at once ; and on
the morning of the 26th they marched upon Torrijos, July 26.
where Cuesta had left the division of Zayas and two
regiments of cavalry to cover his retreat.
Zayas seems to have begun his own retrograde
movement in fair order ; but the French cavalry,
following him up sharply, cut one of his two regiments
of horse to pieces. After this the infantry appear to
have run in disorder to Alcabon, where they rallied
under cover of Alburquerque's division of cavalry,
which had come forward to save them. Victor
thereupon halted his advanced guard, and the troops
composing it dispersed to gather forage. It is strange
that the Marshal did not show greater energy against
the retiring Spaniards, for they had been much shaken
by the first onset, and the retreat even of the main
body was conducted in such confusion as greatly to
resemble a flight.1 The French infantry, it is true, was
far in rear, but the cavalry numbered five thousand
sabres to Alburquerque's three thousand, to say
nothing of infinite superiority in quality. Had the
pursuit been pressed with ardour, there can be little doubt
that it would have met with but slight resistance until
checked by the British, and might have so scattered
Cuesta's army as to put it out of action for a month.
Victor's excuse was that the horses were tired. This
may have been true of Merlin's division, one thousand
1 There can, I think, be no doubt of this from the joint testi-
mony of Napier, Leslie, and Munster.
222 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. strong, which had marched up with Sebastiani, but can
July 26. hardly have been so of Latour Maubourg's, which of
itself outnumbered Alburquerque's. Be this as it may,
Victor halted for some hours at Alcabon, and moved no
farther that day than to Santa Olalla. Cuesta therefore
continued his disorderly retreat unmolested to the banks
of the Alberche, where Wellesley had brought forward
Sherbrooke's division to cover the passage over the
bridge. About five o'clock in the evening the British
General rode out and begged Cuesta to take his army
across the river while there was yet time, lest he should
be attacked in the morning with the stream in his rear.
Cuesta at the time was fast asleep in his tent on the left
bank of the Alberche, and it was only with the greatest
difficulty that Wellesley obtained access to him, to be
met by a resolute refusal.1 Some sympathy may
perhaps be felt with the proud old man in his un-
willingness to allow his demoralised troops to file to
the rear before the scornful eyes of the British.
During the hours that followed, Wellesley renewed
his entreaties to Cuesta, who, thinking to humiliate his
colleague, resisted until the British General indulged
him by beseeching consent upon his knees, after which
he gave the order to cross the Alberche. When the
July 27. British stood to their arms an hour before dawn the
movement had already begun ; and at a little past nine
Wellesley sent orders to Sherbrooke to withdraw his
division, leaving, however, Mackenzie's division and
Anson's cavalry still on the left bank of the river.
The Spaniards and the rest of the army were already
streaming away to a position which had caught the eye
of the British Commander, and of him alone, a little
farther to the west. The ground which Victor had
occupied on the Alberche, though strong for an army
facing west, was very much the reverse for one facing
east ; that which the British had taken up before
Victor's retreat was even worse, the right bank being
completely commanded by the left ; and Wellesley had
1 Life of Sir S. Whittirigham, p. 86.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 223
already condemned both as hopelessly bad.1 The new 1809.
position was so much better that even Cuesta was ready July 27-
to accept it.
The country between the Alberche and Talavera, a
distance of from three to four miles, is flat and covered
with crops of corn, interspersed with vines and olives
and studded with evergreen oaks ; but about a mile
and a quarter to north of the town the ground begins
to rise, slowly at first, and then more abruptly, into a
chain of hills which runs from east to west. The
western end of the range bears the name of the Cerro
de Medellin, and the eastern that of the Cerro de
Cascajal. The two ridges are divided by a brook called
the Portina, which rises some three miles and a half to
north-east of Talavera, and after running from two to
three miles in a general direction of east to west, turns
almost at a right angle to southward and bores its way,
as has been said, between the Cerros of Medellin and
Cascajal. The brook is generally dry in the summer
but for a few stagnant pools ; and its course over the
plain is so straight and shallow as to present no obstacle,
though it furnishes a useful natural entrenchment for
infantry. North of the Cerros an open plain,2 which I
shall call the northern plain, slopes gently upward for
half a mile to a chain of rugged mountains, called the
Sierra de Segurilla, where the Portina takes its rise,
1 Wellesley to O'Donoju, 25th, 26th July 1809.
2 This plain is described as a valley by all writers from Wellesley
to Mr. Oman, so I am aware of my temerity in calling it by any
other name. Nevertheless, a valley, as I conceive it, signifies
ground which is lowest towards its centre, which this most certainly
is not ; for it is lowest at its southern margin, from whence it
rises steadily to north. The Portina hugs the southern margin
aforesaid, where the Cerro de Cascajal checks its further progress
southward ; but two tiny tributaries, one of which played an
important part in the action, run into it with a course due north
and south straight across the so-called valley ; and indeed such is
the general and natural tendency of all the waters. Now waters do
not cross a valley ; they follow it. Therefore the space between
the Cerros de Medellin and Cascajal and the Sierra de Segurilla is
not a valley but a plain. The point may seem a small one ; but I
was greatly struck by it when I went over the ground.
224 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. mountains so steep and rocky that they may well have
July 27. been regarded as inaccessible.
Here was the position chosen by Wellesley in which
to receive the French attack. Its right rested upon
the Tagus and the town of Talavera, which, being
solidly built and in part enclosed by a stout wall,
almost served the purpose of a fortification. In advance
of the eastern front of the town was a chapel of good
construction upon a small knoll, where Spanish guns
had been placed in battery to command the road from
the bridge of the Alberche on the east, and to rake the
plain to the north. From the town northward for a
full mile the position was assigned to the Spaniards,
their extreme left being marked by a low eminence,1
called the Pajar de Vergara, about two hundred yards
ahead of the Portina. The ground, though level, was
extremely strong. The whole of the front was covered
by a tangle of small enclosures, mud-walls, vineyards,
and felled trees, so blind that in these days of dispersed
formation it would be advantageous to an attacking
force, but in those days of serried ranks made the
defence almost impregnable. In rear of this the
natural entrenchment of the Portina furnished shelter
for Cuesta's first line ; in rear of the Portina the road
from Segurilla, which runs parallel to it and was em-
banked, afforded cover for his second line ; and having
thirty-two thousand troops to man a mile of front, he
was able to hold a division of infantry, ten regiments of
cavalry, and several guns in reserve.
From the Pajar de Vergara northward the British
took up the line, the mound itself being strengthened
bv a low parapet, under shelter of which was installed
Lawson's battery of three-pounders. Behind and
beside the mound lay Campbell's division, with Camp-
bell's brigade 2 in first line, Kemmis's 3 in second line,
1 Arteche calls it "poco perceptible," but without being
conspicuous it is easily found and quite unmistakable.
2 z/7th, 2/53rd.
3 1 /40th, 97th, 2nd batt. detachments.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 225
and Cotton's brigade of dragoons in support.1 The 1809.
ground in front of this division was strong and enclosed ; Ju^y 27-
but from its left flank northward it was perfectly open
and covered with long grass. Here were stationed the
battalions of Sherbrooke's division, the Guards on the
right, Cameron's brigade next to them, and then a
vacant space for the four battalions of Germans, which,
owing to the mistake of a staff-officer, had been led for
a full hour's march beyond Talavera before they could
be recalled. The position of Sherbrooke's division was
wrong. Wellesley had evidently intended that Mac-
kenzie's division should stand next to the left of
Campbell's, and that Sherbrooke's division should form
the first line upon the Cerro de Medellin, with the
Germans on the right, the Guards in the post of danger
on the extreme left, and Hill's division in second line.
Sherbrooke, however, doubtless conceiving that he was
doing right, drew up his four battalions upon the left
of Campbell, with results that, as shall be seen, were
very nearly disastrous.
A word must now be said as to the Cerro de Medellin
itself. The general trend of the ridge, as we have seen,
is from east to west ; and, as the line of battle ran
from north to south, it follows that the British position
embraced only the eastern end of it. From the south
the ascent rises gradually for about a thousand yards
to a broad shoulder, leaps up suddenly and steeply for
another four hundred yards, descends rather more
steeply to another shoulder on the north side, and
from thence melts gradually down into the northern
plain. Thus a section taken across the eastern end
would present very much the appearance of a shamrock
without a stalk. On its eastern front, where it abuts
on the Portina, the hill grows steadily steeper as one
ascends the water ; and for about three-quarters of a
mile the front of the British position may be truly
described as a deep ravine, the ground plunging
abruptly for twenty or thirty yards down to the stream
1 14th and 1 6th L.D.
VOL. VII Q
226 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. in a declivity so steep that it would be imprudent for a
July 27. man t0 j-j^ down it except perfectly straight.1 The
opposite ascent to the Cerro de Cascajal is fully as
abrupt, but the Cerro de Cascajal itself is rather lower
than the Cerro de Medellin, and is therefore dominated
by it. Nevertheless, at its summit the Cerro de Cascajal
offers a broad plateau of little less elevation, where guns
could be massed not only to command the lower slopes
of the opposite hill, but even to enfilade troops upon the
lower features to the south. It is very obvious that the
Cerro de Medellin was the key of Wellesley's position,
and that its central peak was the key of the Medellin.
Returning now to the Alberche, the French columns
began to appear about noon, whereupon the British
cavalry and Mackenzie's division fell back from their
position at Cazalegas, setting fire to the French huts
before they moved. Crossing the river at a ford, the
British infantry made its way through a wood to an
old ruined house called the Casa de Salinas, which stood
in a cleared space by the road that leads from Talavera
north-eastward to the village of Cardiel. Here the
division halted, with Donkin's brigade in advance and
Mackenzie's in rear, but, as the sequel proved, without
taking any proper precautions for its security. The
men of Donkin's brigade were lying down comfortably
in the shade, when they were suddenly startled by a
volley which killed several before they could rise from
the ground ; Lapisse's division, which led the march of
Victor's corps, having passed the ford unobserved
under cover of the smoke from the burning huts, and
stolen in upon the British before their presence was
even suspected. For a time there was wild confusion
amounting to panic in part of the surprised brigade.
The Eighty-seventh and Eighty-eighth ran back, firing
wildly at each other ; though the Sixtieth, which seems
to have been a little isolated from them, stood firm.
1 I find that when I went over the ground in May 1903 I
compared the ravine to the head of a combe on Exmoor. This may
help to give the reader some idea of it.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 227
An aide-de-camp flew to Wellesley to report the 1809.
mishap ; and the General, galloping with all speed to July 27-
the spot, scrambled up the ruined walls of the Casa de
Salinas to see what was going forward. He had hardly
done so before the enemy's sharp-shooters came swarm-
ing round the building, and he barely escaped capture
by jumping down and remounting his horse in all haste.
He now made his way to Mackenzie's brigade, which
was standing firm, and addressed the Colonel of the
Forty - fifth ; but, even while he was speaking, two
musket-balls struck the Colonel's sword and another
passed through his cap. Wasting, therefore, no further
time, the General ordered the brigade to retire from the
right of companies through the wood in the rear, and
re-formed the ranks in the plain on the western side just
in time to meet the heads of the French columns, which
were pressing on fiercely in pursuit. A sharp action
ensued while the two broken battalions were rallying in
rear of Mackenzie's brigade, but the enemy was de-
cisively checked. The Thirty-first, though only a second
battalion, behaved remarkably well, bearing apparently
the brunt of the fight, for it lost over one hundred killed
and wounded. The Forty-fifth, a tough old regiment,
was never shaken for a moment. The Sixtieth also
was steadfast and formed a rallying-point for the rest
of Donkin's brigade. With some trouble order was
restored, the enemy was held back, the discomfited
battalions recovered themselves, and the whole then
retreated across the plain, covered by Anson's brigade
of cavalry, with Cotton's and Fane's brigades in support.
The casualties of the British in this affair were little
short of four hundred and fifty of all ranks, of whom
nearly one hundred were prisoners. The Eighty-
seventh lost nearly two hundred men, of whom thirty-
four were taken, and the Eighty-eighth sixty-four, of
whom thirty were taken. The French probably
suffered far less heavily ; and altogether the incident
made an unpleasant opening to the campaign.1
1 It is extremely difficult to discover how Mackenzie's division
228 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. As the division retreated, it was followed by a
July 27. constant fire from the French horse-artillery; and it
was past four o'clock before it reached Wellesley's
chosen position. Mackenzie's brigade formed up in
rear of the Guards, while Donkin's took up the ground
on the left of the Guards, which should have been
occupied by the Germans. By this time the British
troops, some of which had not moved from Talavera
until past four o'clock, were in their appointed stations,
and the artillery had been distributed along the line ;
Lawson's three-pounder battery on the knoll of Pajar
de Vergara ; Elliott's in front of the brigade of
Guards ; Heise's on the southern slopes of the Cerro
de Medellin ; Rettberg's heavy six-pounders on the
same hill ; and Sillery's behind the British centre. The
cavalry was massed likewise in rear of the centre.
Only on the extreme left, the most important point,
were the dispositions still incomplete and imperfect.
Wellesley had himself brought in Mackenzie's division,
but as soon as he had done so, he seems to have
betaken himself to the Spaniards on the right. He did
this not without good reason, for in virtue of a natural
ascendancy he had tacitly taken command of both
armies ; and General O'Donoju had ridden in from
the Alberche in a state of nervous excitement, which
could not have been reassuring to his men.1 The
was disposed at the time of the attack, but I have relied in this
account chiefly upon the narrative of Whittingham, who was
present at the time {Life of Sir S. Hrhittingham, p. 86). The
Eighty-eighth claims, in Cannon's record, to have earned the praise of
Donkin by its conduct on this occasion through the support which
it gave to the advanced troops, adding circumstantial details in
confirmation of the fact. Experience has taught me to receive
such statements of regimental histories with caution. Both Charles
Stewart and Lord Munster, eye-witnesses, speak highly of the be-
haviour of the Thirty-first, but the former mentions that the Eighty-
eighth, though its casualties were small, was disordered by the attack
{Londonderry MSS., C. Stewart to Castlereagh, 31st July 1809).
The Eighty-seventh was evidently the regiment upon which the
first French volley fell most heavily, for it lost over 150 killed and
wounded, including 11 officers. 1 Leith-Hay, p. 103.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 229
confusion must have been great, for Colonel 1809.
Whittingham, unable to find the commander of oneJub'27-
Spanish division, assumed the charge of it himself, and
was obeyed with a readiness which showed that no one
knew what to do.1 But for Wellesley's presence the
entire Spanish army would probably have taken to
its heels.
In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief there
appears to have been some uncertainty as to his wishes
among the British divisional generals, so much so that
Hill, late in the evening, rode off to Talavera to find
Wellesley ; and in the meantime the various brigades
on the left seem to have disposed themselves as follows.
Hill parked his one battery on the reverse side of the
Cerro de Medellin, with Tilson's brigade far back on
the northern slope, and Stewart's as far back on the
southern ; and, since he considered himself to be in
second line, he cannot be blamed. Donkin, seeing no
troops on the Cerro de Medellin, led his brigade
thither, and stationed it high up on the eastern slope.
Having been on foot for fifteen hours on an extremely
hot day, suffering heavy loss and undergoing a very
trying retreat in face of the enemy, the two younger
battalions of this brigade were probably not only
fatigued, but shaken, and Donkin might reasonably
have expected that no very severe duty would be
required of them. It does not appear, however, that
any staff-officer indicated to him the post selected for
his brigade, but that he simply occupied the only
vacant place that he could find. Finally, the Germans
came in at eight o'clock, and made their way to
Donkin's right, the First battalion being next to
Cameron's brigade, the Second on the left of the First,
and then in succession the Seventh and the Fifth. The
Germans must also have been weary, for they had been
hurried back to the position in hot haste ; and, being
under the delusion that Hill's division was in their
front, they lay down, and many of them went to
1 Life of Sir S. Whittingham, p. 88.
230 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. sleep. Thus there was hardly any first line at all
July 27. on the key 0f tne position, while the key of keys
on the summit was practically, if not actually, un-
occupied.1
Meanwhile, Victor, elated by his first success against
Mackenzie's division, had brought the rest of his corps
across the Alberche, and deployed it in the plain.
Ruffin's division of infantry was on the right, with
Villatte's in its rear ; that of Lapisse was on the \&ft,
following the track of Mackenzie, with Beaumont's
two regiments of cavalry in support ; while, to the left
of Lapisse, Latour-Maubourg's division of cavalry
extended across the plain nearly to the road from the
bridge of the Alberche, which was the place assigned
to the Fourth Corps. Sebastiani's troops, however,
were as yet far in rear, and only Merlin's cavalry had
crossed the river and was moving towards the Spaniards.
1 It is extremely difficult to discover exactly what happened on
the evening of the 27th. Napier and Mr. Oman, following
Wellesley's despatch, say that Donkin's brigade was drawn up in
rear of the Germans. But the Germans did not come into the
line until 8 p.m. and then formed, by their own account, upon
Donkin's right (Beamish, i. 207). It is absolutely certain that
they cannot have been in front of Donkin, or the French, in the
attack shortly to be described, must have passed through them to
get at the British. Moreover, Napier {Battles of the Peninsula) says
distinctly that Donkin took up his station on the hill, and "thus
accidentally filled the position." So in spite of the assertion in
Wellesley's memo, on the battle of Talavera, that " the German
Legion were on the left of the position " in the first line, it seems
that the order of the British first line from right to left was —
A. Campbell's brigade, Guard's brigade, Cameron's, Langwerth's,
Low's, Donkin's. That Hill's brigades considered themselves to
be in second line is shown by Leslie, p. 142. Mr. Oman places
Tilson's brigade on the right (southern) and Stewart's on the left
(northern) flank of the reverse slope, and half a mile in rear of
their place in the line of battle. But from the narrative of Leslie
they can hardly have been so far back, for they were within range
of round shot from the French field-guns; and it is evident from
the narratives both of Leslie and Leith-Hay that Stewart's brigade
was on the right and Tilson's on the left, which indeed would be
the place of precedence in the division of the extreme left. That
the Germans considered themselves to be in second line appears
from Munster's account, p. 38.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 231
It seems to have been at seven o'clock or rather later 1809.
that some of Ruffin's infantry seized on the Cerro Jul)r 27-
de Cascajal, and French batteries unlimbering upon
the height opened fire, while simultaneously Merlin's
dragoons rode up to the Spanish centre and discharged
their pistols to make the Spaniards show themselves.
The Spaniards thereupon fired a terrific volley of
musketry from end to end of the line ; after which
four battalions on Cuesta's extreme left raised the cry
of treason, threw down their arms, and rushed away
to the rear, stopping only to plunder the British camp
as they passed.1 Many of the commissaries and other
non-combatants of the British, with some few malinger-
ing soldiers and at least one combatant officer, joined
them in their flight ; but by a wholesome irony of fate
they encountered Craufurd's light brigade in full march
for Talavera, and did not enjoy the meeting. Happily
the panic spread no further, and Cuesta, having sent
out Alburquerque's cavalry to sweep the fugitives back,
announced his intention of decimating them, a sentence
which, at Wellesley's intervention, he reduced to the
execution of one man in twenty.
But meanwhile Victor had noticed that the Cerro
de Medellin was only weakly held by Donkin's brigade
and that its summit was not held at all ; and knowing
the ground weli, he determined, without consulting
Joseph, to endeavour to seize it by surprise as soon
as night should have fallen. Severe criticism has been
passed upon him for this resolution, and nothing is
more likely than that he wished to secure all credit of
a possible success for himself; but at the same time
1 This panic took place under Wellesley's eye, he being with
Campbell's brigade of the line. It is small wonder that he had
taken his station there instead of on the left (Wellesley to
Castlereagh, 25th August 1809). As the Spaniards began to fire
he said to Whittingham, " If they will but fire as well to-morrow,
the day is our own ; but as there seems to be nobody to fire at
just now, I wish you would stop it." . . . "Only look," he
added, after the flight of the four battalions, "at the ugly hole
those fellows have left. I wish you would go to the second line
and try to fill it up " {Life of Sir S. lfrfiittingham, p. 88).
232 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
i 809. it must be admitted that, looking to the recent panic
July 27. am0ng the Spaniards, the temptation was great. Yet
he can hardly have thought that the British would make
no attempt to recover such a position, and he must
have been aware that there was a chance of bringing on
a general action before the whole of the French army
had come up. However that may be, he withdrew
his guns shortly after eight o'clock, and ordered
Ruffin's division of three regiments, each of three
battalions, to advance to the attack at nine. Of these
regiments the 24th was to follow the northern plain
round the left flank of the British position and ascend
the height from the north ; the 9th Light was to cross
the Portina at its deepest point and deliver an assault
directly in front ; and the 96th was to pass the brook
farther to the south and envelop the hill on the
southern side.
The night was dark, and the 24th, going astray
on the northern plain, never came into action at all.
The 9th, more fortunate than its neighbour, managed
to cross the Portina 1 without mishap, ascended the
hill, stumbled upon a party of German riflemen who
were returning from outpost -duty on the summit,
drove them back upon the Seventh line battalion, which
promptly fired upon its comrades. The 9th then
plunged straight into the middle of Low's brigade,
surprising and for the time breaking both battalions.2
The Seventh lost more than a fourth of its feeble
strength, seventy men being killed and wounded, and
a rather greater number made prisoners ; while the
Fifth battalion, lying more out of the track of the
1 Mr. Oman says "chancing on the place where the ravine
was most easily negotiable " ; but I remember no such place till
one gets clear of the hills on the north. Possibly the 9th prudently
went round the head of the ravine, followed the road from Segurilla
round the eastern face of the hill, and then turned upward.
2 Mr. Oman puts the Seventh battalion on the left (north) or
Low's brigade. If it had been so it would have been out of its
place ; and as it was not so on the 28th, I do not think it can have
been so on the 27th.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 233
French column, escaped with forty casualties, but 1809.
could not for some time be rallied. The French Jul>' 2 7-
9th, therefore, pressing on, soon reached the summit,
swept from it the outlying picquet of Stewart's brigade,
and thus actually seized the key of Wellesley's position.
Meanwhile the first fusillade of the Germans had
alarmed the British generals ; and Sherbrooke, who
could see the flashes on the summit, divined what was
going forward. He therefore wheeled Cameron's
brigade into open column,1 and was about to order it to
storm the hill when he perceived that the work had
been already taken in hand by Hill.
Roused like Sherbrooke by the sound of the firing,
but judging from the sudden silence which followed
the dispersion of the Germans that it was only a false
alarm, Hill was giving orders to Stewart's brigade to
support Low's, when he observed men on the top of
the hill firing towards him. Imagining that " it was
the Old Buffs as usual making some blunder," he
galloped up the hill with his brigade-major, shouting to
the men to cease firing, and found himself in the midst of
the French. A voltigeur, laying hold of him, called on
him to surrender ; but Hill, spurring his horse, broke
away from the man, and galloped down again under a
volley which wounded the animal and killed his brigade-
major. Upon reaching Stewart's brigade he at once
formed it into open column of companies, left in front,
and led it to the attack ; the battalion of detachments
being at the head, and then in succession the Twenty-
ninth and Forty-eighth.2 The detachments came first
1 It is characteristic of the pedantry of the drill in those days
that this simple manoeuvre could not be executed without facing
the brigade in the wrong direction, so that Sherbrooke intended to
face about and assault with the rear rank in front. Munster, p. 38.
2 As Leslie points out, this was the wrong order (p. 145).
The Forty-eighth, being the left-hand battalion, should have led, the
detachments should have followed, and the Twenty-ninth brought up
the rear. Hill evidently handled his brigade better than Sherbrooke,
for apparently each battalion formed column of companies upon
the left flank company before it moved off.
l' - V !
8 M \
ft
'•
'.
234 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. into action, but were checked and, grumbling loudly, fell
July 27. back, less from want of good will to fight than from
lack of good leading and from the incoherence in-
separable from their composition.1 The Twenty-ninth
thereupon pushed their way through them, and charged
up the hill ; when the leading company, first pouring in
its volley at close range and then dashing in with the
bayonet, cleared the enemy off the summit and drove
them headlong down the slope. This done, the Twenty-
ninth wheeled into line, and advancing obliquely along
the eastern face of the hill, came upon the flank of
the reserve battalion of the 9th Light as it was
climbing to the top. Taken at hopeless disadvantage,
this unlucky column was utterly defeated in a few
minutes ; and it was driven down in disorder to the
Portina to join the two battalions which had already
been discomfited, and to retreat with them to the Cerro
de Cascajal.
This brought the action to an end. The 96th
regiment of the French Line only with difficulty and
delay made its way across the Portina, where it en-
countered Langwerth's brigade of the German Legion,
and after exchanging with it for some time a desultory
fire, with little harm to either party, retired upon
ascertaining the failure of the principal attack. The
whole affair, including losses from the French cannonade,
cost Wellesley's army rather fewer than four hundred
killed, wounded, and missing, more than half of whom
belonged to Low's brigade of the German Legion.
The loss of the French cannot be ascertained, but was
probably greater, for the 9th Light must have suffered
severely. No praise can be too high for the Twenty-
ninth, which practically defeated all three battalions of
1 "I wish these detachment battalions were replaced. I am
sure they are the cause of great disorder — no esprit de corps for their
interior economy among them, though they will all fight. They
are careless of all else, and the officers do not look to their
temporary field-officers and superiors under whom they are placed,
as in an established regiment. I see much of their indiscipline."
Ch. Stewart to Castlereagh, 15th June 1809, Londonderry MSS.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 235
the French 9th single-handed, and thus decisively 1809.
established the superiority of the British troops over Julv27-
their enemies. If the remainder of Ruffin's division
had fulfilled the duty assigned to them, the contest
would have been longer and sharper, but the result
could hardly have been different ; for Sherbrooke
might have reinforced Langwerth's brigade without
difficulty on the British right, and there were Tilson's
as well as Donkin's men at hand to deal with any attack
on the left. Moreover, Victor could not have thrown
in reinforcements as speedily as Wellesley, having so
troublesome an obstacle as the ravine of the Portina
in his way. For this reason the Marshal's attack must
stand condemned ; but it cannot be said that the
incident was in general creditable to the Allies, and least
of all to Wellesley's staff. It was not a good prepara-
tion for a battle that the key of the position should
have been occupied in so haphazard a fashion, and that
the brigadiers should not have known whether their
troops stood in first or second line.
The firing had brought Wellesley to the Cerro
de Medellin, when he at once ordered Rettberg's
battery to ascend the hill, and redistributed the troops
so far as the darkness would permit. The Twenty-
ninth, having flaunted its colours on the summit, was
allowed to remain in the position thus proudly won,
and formed the extreme left of the whole line, with
the First battalion of detachments and the Forty-eighth
in succession upon its right.1 On the right of Stewart's
brigade, Tilson's carried the front line over the highest
parts of the hill, from whence it was prolonged by the
two brigades of the German Legion, which now took
their correct place on the left of Sherbrooke's division,
with Donkin's brigade in their rear. Picquets and
sentries were pushed forward almost in excessive
numbers to the edge of the ravine, so close to the
1 Mr. Oman observes that this was not the proper order of the
brigade in respect of seniority. He maybe right, but in the left brigade
of a division the left was the place of honour. Leith-Hay, p. 104.
236 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. enemy that they could hear the French sentinels
Jub' 27- challenging their visiting rounds. The young soldiers,
shaken by the surprise of the first French advance,
were nervous and unsteady. The men in front
were constantly discharging their muskets ; and on at
least one occasion the troops in line fired upon their
own picquets, killing and wounding both officers and
men. At midnight the Spaniards on the right suddenly
opened a terrific fire upon an imaginary foe ; and it
is certain that Wellesley and others believed that at
about the same time the French attempted a second
attack on the Cerro de Medellin.1
July 28. While the darkness lasted, torches were observed to
be moving on the Cerro de Cascajal, where the noise of
wheels and the cracking of whips told that the enemy
was bringing guns into position. Between one and
two o'clock the moon rose, and by its rays black
masses could be distinguished moving into place.
Having failed in his attack upon the Cerro de
Medellin by night, Victor was determined to renew
it by day, and, in order to force the hands of his
superiors, was pushing his troops so far forward as
almost to compel an engagement. He persisted in
treating the capture of the hill as an isolated enterprise
which, when accomplished, might lead to more serious
things. Jourdan, with sounder understanding, con-
demned any such partial action, and both he and
Joseph were for waiting in their position on the
Alberche until Soult should have had time to march
1 Arteche, upon the evidence of various writers, decides that this
second attack must have been made. The French deny it, and Leslie
and Leith-Hay of the Twenty-ninth say nothing about it, though
the former speaks of picquets of French appearing at various places,
firing a volley, and disappearing. Possibly these were some stray
parties of the French 24th of the Line, which could not find their
corps. All English writers who passed the night before the
battle of Talavera upon the spot, agree that it was one of extreme
disquietude and unrest. Even Wellesley, who, with his staff around
him, was lying on the ground in rear of the British position, made
constant inquiries as to the hour, betraying his anxiety for the
coming of dawn.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 237
down upon Wellesley's rear. But Victor was urgent ; 1809.
and, fearing lest he should report them to Napoleon J1'1)' z8-
for neglecting to defeat the British, the King and the
chief of his staff yielded their own good judgment to
the bluster of their self-sufficient subordinate. Victor
thereupon gave his orders to his troops. Ignoring
with doubtful wisdom the fact that Ruffin's division had
failed during the night and that one of its regiments
had been very roughly handled, he again selected it to
execute the principal attack, directing that the divisions
of Villatte and Lapisse should not move until the Cerro
de Medellin had been won. Joseph, carrying on this
vicious principle of throwing troops into action piece-
meal, declared that the Fourth Corps should not move
until the operations of the First Corps should promise
success. Thus dissidence among commanders, as usual,
prepared defeat.
At length the dawn flushed up. Wellesley rode
out with his staff to the rear of the Twenty-ninth on
the summit of the Cerro de Medellin, and gazed long
and earnestly at the French array. To his left front,
extending to the southern margin of the northern plain,1
Ruffin's division stood on the brink of the ravine,
massed in heavy columns, with skirmishers out ready
for the attack which, according to the statement of
deserters from the French army, was to be delivered
at daybreak. On the summit of the Cerro de Cascajal
stood Villatte's division, with thirty guns massed before
it, and Beaumont's two divisions of cavalry in support.
On the left of Villatte lay the division of Lapisse, with
Latour-Maubourg's dragoons in their rear ; and next
to Lapisse, but not yet brought into the fighting line,
was the Fourth Corps. Far in rear by the Casa de
Salinas lay King Joseph with the reserve of his own
1 Rather to the left (i.e. to north) of the hill" (Munster, p. 43).
" On the brink of the ravine with reserves in its rear, with neld-
hatteries on both flanks" (Leslie, p. 146). "To the right of the
French cannon were perceived columns of infantry " (Leith-Hay,
p. 106). Such are the conflicting accounts of the French array
given by three observers on the Cerro de Medellin.
238 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Guard of cavalry and infantry, DessolJe's brigade of
July 28. infantry and two squadrons of mounted chasseurs.
Of the French artillery, thirty guns, as we have seen,
were massed before Villatte's division on the Cerro
de Cascajal, as many more were on the southern slopes
of the hill, and the remainder were distributed among
the Fourth Corps.1 Allowing for the losses in previous
engagements since the armies had been in contact, the
French had between forty-five and forty-six thousand
men on the field, including nearly five thousand cavalry,
with eighty guns ; the Spaniards about thirty-two
thousand with thirty guns ; and the British something
over twenty-two thousand of all ranks with thirty guns.
As compared with the Allies, therefore, the French
were forty-five thousand to fifty-five thousand, but as
compared with the British only, they were nearly two
to one ; while in artillery they were greatly superior
not only in number of guns but in weight of metal.
Moreover, it is beyond question that at least thirty
thousand French infantry were opposed to from sixteen
to seventeen thousand British, the remainder, with
the cavalry, being employed merely to contain the
Spaniards.
About five o'clock a single gun on the Cerro de
Cascajal gave the signal for the attack, whereupon the
French batteries on the height opened a tremendous
fire, both rapid and accurate, upon the opposite hill,
from which Rettberg's solitary battery made a very
1 There is some difficulty in arriving at the distribution of the
French guns. They had certainly eighty altogether. Leith-Hay
counted twenty-two on the crest of the Cerro de Cascajal, Munster
thirty. Napier says that the guns of the First Corps were formed
in one mass on the Cerro de Cascajal, but gives no number. Mr.
Oman (p. 521) gives four batteries (24 guns) on the Cerro de Cas-
cajal, and six more (36 guns) on the rolling ground to south, but
later (p. 523) he speaks of 24 guns on the Cerro, and 30 to the
south. I conceive myself that there were 30 guns on the Cerro
de Cascajal, 36 distributed among the Fourth Corps, i.e. 3 batteries
to each division of the first line, and 14, which number Joseph is
known to have brought with him, in the Reserve. Sebastiani had
left one battery at Toledo.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 239
inadequate reply. Wellesley, therefore, withdrew the 1809.
brigades of Stewart and Tilson behind the crest of the July 28-
slope and ordered them to lie down ; their front being
covered by the light companies, which had been sent
out as soon as dawn had broken. A light easterly
breeze carried the smoke of the French guns full into
the eyes of the British, effectually veiling the enemy's
columns from view ; but upon the first salvo the
French skirmishers had been seen to dash forward and
their columns to advance, so that Hill fully realised
what was coming. He therefore sounded the recall
to bring back his light troops ; and the men presentlv
appeared, filing slowly up the hill with all the regularity
of a parade movement. " Damn their filing," shouted
Hill, " let them come in anyhow " ; but whether the
words had any effect is not recorded.1 Meanwhile,
the cannonade from the Cerro de Cascajal continued,
the shot mostly passing over the heads of the Twenty-
ninth, until the assaulting infantry had advanced so far
up the hill that the French gunners, in order to spare
their own troops, were fain to train their guns more
to southward, tearing great gaps in the ranks of the
right of Stewart's brigade.2
Ruffin had formed the regiments of his division
in a different order from that observed on the previous
evening, placing the 9th Light on the right to attack
by way of the northern plain ; the 24th in the
centre ; and the 96th on his left ; the regiments
being drawn up in close column of divisions, with a
frontage of one hundred and fifty to one hundred and
eighty men, and a depth of nine ranks.3 Protected
1 This, as Mr. Oman most opportunely reminds us, was one
of the two occasions on which " Daddy " Hill was heard to swear.
The fact shows that every one on the field, excepting Wellesley, was
a little nervous.
2 Leslie says that it was the Forty-eighth, on the right of the
Twenty-ninth, which he observed suffering so heavily. He must have
meant the battalion of detachments, whose casualties were very
great.
3 The French battalions were organised at this time into six-
companies, the normal formation being in three ranks; and a division
24o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. almost to the last moment by the fire of their artillery,
July 28. tney suffered little during their advance up the slope,
and were within but a short distance of the summit
when the British were called to their feet to line the
crest of the height. It was claimed for the 24th of
the French Line that they actually carried the crown of
the hill, and were on the point of taking four guns ;
in which case it should seem that they made their way
towards the interval between the brigades of Stewart and
Tilson. It appears tolerably certain that the general
direction of the 24th and 96th was somewhat south
of west instead of due west, and it is doubtful whether
the 9th Light came into action at all. Having to pass
into the northern plain the 9th would naturally be
behind their fellows, and, moreover, they had been too
severely beaten seven hours before to be very willing
to come on.1 However, that may be, there can be no
doubt that the brunt of the assault fell on the centre
and right of Stewart's brigade, which stood coolly
until the French were within close range, and then
poured in a volley which sharply checked their advance.
Thereupon, as usual, a few brave Frenchmen continued
to dash forward with the bayonet, and for the moment
carried all before them, while the bulk of the columns
strove to answer the British fire with their own. But
a contest of musketry between a frontage of twelve
very weak companies in triple rank and the converging
fire of three battalions in line, only two ranks deep,
was a double company. We know for certain that each battalion
was in close column of double companies, and I have assumed that
each regiment was drawn up in line of battalion columns at close
interval (six paces), but it is impossible to say whether this was really
so. Taking the average strength of a battalion at 480, the front
of each rank would be one-ninth of 480, or from fifty to sixty men.
1 The casualties of the 9th in both attacks were less by over a
hundred than those either of the 24th or the 96th in one attack.
Moreover, Leith-Hay mentions that only the right wing of the
British Twenty-ninth charged, from which it is to be inferred that
the left wing was thrown back to watch the 9th Light. Lastly,
it is certain the Twenty-ninth charged down to the ravine, while the
9th as certainly retired by the northern plain.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 241
could have but one ending. Moreover, the 96th 1809.
was exposed not only to the volleys of Tilson's brigade, July z8-
but to a flanking attack of the riflemen and Fifth
battalion of the German Legion, which Sherbrooke had
detached to assail their left. With front and flanks
torn to tatters, the French wavered, and the British,
charging with the bayonet, swept them down to the
foot of the hill with frightful slaughter.
In the charge all order was lost. The British parted
into small groups, fighting furiously with like groups of
the enemy which still showed resistance ; and so eager
was the pursuit that many of the red-coats crossed the
ravine and hunted the fugitives back to their reserves.
At the height of the turmoil by the Portina a column
of French infantry appeared on the southern flank of
the confused masses of British, probably sent forward to
cover the retreat of Ruffin's troops ; but with great
exertions the pursuers were collected, a front was
formed, and this enemy too was driven back. Mean-
while the 9th Light, seeing the failure of its brother-
regiments, was retreating in disorder along the northern
plain, where cavalry might have destroyed it ; but the
British dragoons had been compelled to go far afield for
forage and had not yet returned.1 Unable to press the
pursuit further, the British infantry fell back once more
behind the crest of the Cerro de Medellin, not without
loss from the enemy's cannon as they toiled up the
ascent. The casualties of Hill's division numbered be-
tween seven and eight hundred, the battalion of detach-
ments alone losing two hundred men ; and Hill himself
was compelled by a wound in the head to leave the field
and resign his command to Tilson. The casualties of
Ruffin's division were very much heavier, those of the
1 Arteche says that the cavalry was on the spot and that
Wellesley ordered them to charge, but that they allowed the 9th
to escape. Apart from the fact that the cavalry had not yet been
moved up to the British left, the evidence of Munster (p. 45), of
Londonderry (.fto, p. 333), and of Napier {Battles of the Peninsula,
p. 35) is conclusive against this statement, which is, moreover, quite
unconfirmed.
VOL. VII R
242 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. 24th and 96th alone amounting to forty officers and
July 28. over eleven hundred men killed and wounded, the
whole of whom had fallen within the space of forty
minutes.
After the repulse of the French, their cannon on the
Cerro de Cascajal continued to play for a full hour, the
shot falling fast among the burying parties, which,
owing to the intense heat of the day, had been ordered
to inter the dead that lay thick on the Cerro de
Medellin. Gradually the fire slackened, and at about
half-past eight ceased altogether. The men of Victor's
corps were observed to be cooking their breakfasts ; and
an informal truce was established by tacit consent, dur-
ing which the officers and men of both armies wandered
down to the ravine to drink the filthy water that festered
in the pools of the Portina, and mixed with each other
in the most friendly way. Wellesley utilised this lull
to make some changes in his dispositions. The repeated
attack upon his left showed him that it was no longer
safe to leave the northern plain open ; and he therefore
moved Fane's and Anson's brigades of cavalry to the
west side of the Cerro de Medellin, forming them
with their front towards the plain ; l at the same time
1 There are great discrepancies between the various reports as
to the time when the Allied left was extended into and across the
northern plain. Arteche makes it happen before Ruffin's second
attack on the Cerro de Medellin, stating even that the Spanish
infantry was sent to occupy the Sierra de Segurilla to oppose the 9th
Light, some of whom were stationed there to aid in the attack on the
Cerro. But in such a position, half a mile away, the 9th could
have been of no possible service. Napier makes the movement follow
directly after the failure of the French attack above named ; but,
construing Wellesley's despatch unintelligently (as it seems to me),
also mentions the presence of French light troops on the Sierra.
Mr. Oman postpones the whole movement until Joseph had begun
to make his dispositions for the final attack, but none the less makes
Jourdan notice that it was in progress before Joseph had decided to
make the final attack at all. This is obviously self-contradictory.
Wellesley's despatch, though not so explicit as could be wished,
shows clearly (1) that he moved the British cavalry into the northern
plain after the repulse of Ruffin's second attack, and that it was
supported by the cavalry of Alburquerque ; (2) that " the enemy
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 243
shifting two guns to one of the northern spurs of the 1809.
hill to enfilade any enemy that might attempt to turn Ju,y z8-
his left. Nor was the crest of the hill itself neglected,
for Donkin's brigade was added to the two which had
borne the brunt of the previous attack.
Meanwhile Victor had reported the result of his
failure to Joseph ; and between nine and ten o'clock the
King, with the whole of his staff, appeared on the summit
of the Cerro de Cascajal to reconnoitre the position of
the Allies. After a time he turned to Jourdan and
asked his opinion as to the advisability of a general
attack. The Marshal was opposed to it. A frontal
assault (such is his account of his contention) could
have small chance of success against superior numbers
so strongly posted ; and Victor had let slip the oppor-
tunity of turning Wellesley's left. Had the Marshal
made a demonstration against the right of the Allies,
and massed a large force quietly under cover of night in
the northern plain, then the Cerro de Medellin might
then placed light infantry " on the Sierra de Segurilla, and that in
consequence a Spanish division of infantry was brought up to
oppose it. From this I infer that the British cavalry was moved to
the northern plain before Joseph made any disposition for the final
attack, but that the Spanish infantry, and indeed the Spanish troops
at large, were not called upon until Joseph's dispositions showed
what the nature of the final attack was likely to be.
Against this is to be set Jourdan's account, that, at the opening
of the discussion whether the final attack should be delivered or
not, not only could a mass of cavalry be easily seen in the plain,
but the Spanish infantry also was visible on the point of climbing
the Sierra de Segurilla. But I am bound to say that I have my
doubts as to Jourdan's accuracy, and that I suspect his Memoires to
contain not a little wisdom after the event. In the first place I do
not believe that he could have seen the British cavalry, because it
was concealed behind the Cerro de Medellin — Wellesley was not
a man to show troops without a reason, if he could hide them — and
in the second place I think it certain that Bassecourt's division ot
Spanish infantry, which ultimately occupied the Sierra de Segurilla,
was at the moment nowhere near it.
Similarly with regard to the guns borrowed from Cuesta, Napier
makes them come up before or during Ruffin's second attack. But
Leith-Hay shows that they did not come up before the general and
final attack.
244 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. have been carried ; but the repeated attacks upon the
July 28. hjjj haci opened the eyes of the British General, and such
a turning movement was now impossible. And, as he
spoke, Jourdan pointed to the mass of cavalry and the
Spanish infantry which (always according to his own
account) were visible in the northern plain. Continu-
ing his argument, he represented that in case of a
French reverse Cuesta might advance upon the left of
Joseph's army, throw it off the line of its retreat to
Madrid and force it to fall back by mountain paths
upon Avila, where no wheeled vehicles could accom-
pany it. He therefore urged strongly the expediency
of standing on the defensive until Soult's advance
should have made itself felt upon the rear of the
Allies.
Victor, irritated by his two repulses, took precisely
the opposite view. He ascribed the failure of his
previous attacks to the fact that the Fourth Corps had
stood aloof ; and he undertook, if the King would engage
the right and centre of the Allies, to storm the Cerro de
Medellin with his three divisions. If, he said in his
blustering fashion, such an attack did not succeed, it
was time to give up making war altogether — a phrase
which his colleagues did not allow him to forget. Joseph
hesitated between the two opinions, though with strong
inclination towards that of Jourdan ; and not the less so
because intelligence had just reached him that the van-
guard of Venegas was before Toledo, and that conse-
quently fifteen thousand men must shortly be sent away
from his own army to defend Madrid against the
Spaniard. At this critical moment, however, there came
in letters from Soult announcing that he could not
reach Plasencia before the 3rd of August at earliest, and
possibly not till the 5 th. This news effectually killed
the idea of standing on the defensive and waiting for
the arrival of Soult, for it would be impossible to de-
tach the required force to Madrid in the face of the
superior army of the Allies ; and meanwhile the capital
would probably fall. Joseph therefore decided to fight
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 245
a general action, hoping to defeat the Allies to-day and 1809.
the army of La Mancha to-morrow. JuJy z8-
It was then agreed that Victor should make a third
attempt upon the Cerro de Medellin, and that Joseph,
overawing the Spaniards with a division of cavalry,
should assail the British centre and right. Ruffin's
division, though much shaken by its losses, was once
again selected to turn the Cerro de Medellin by the
northern plain, its right-hand regiment, the 9th Light,
advancing on the Sierra de Segurilla, and its left being
covered on the plain itself by one brigade of Villatte's
division, which was to advance in line with it. Villatte's
remaining brigade, six battalions, was left on the Cerro
de Cascajal, ready to assault the key of Wellesley's
position at the right moment ; and on its left the division
of Lapisse was to assail the left of Sherbrooke's. Next
to Lapisse, Sebastiani's division, eight thousand strong,
and Leval's German division were to prolong the line
to a short distance beyond the Pajar de Vergara. From
that point southward the Spaniards were to be contained
by Milhaud's five regiments of dragoons ; but Leval's
division was to be formed in echelon, with its left
thrown back, in case of a Spanish advance. In rear of
Leval two Polish battalions were to stand in second line ;
and Joseph's Guards, together with Dessolles's brigade,
were to be kept in reserve. Of the cavalry the six
regiments of Latour-Maubourg's division were to be
drawn up in rear of Sebastiani and Lapisse ; Beaumont's
two regiments were to support Villatte, and Merlin's
four regiments were to follow Ruffin's advance along
the northern plain. In all, some thirty thousand
infantry were to take part in the attack; and the
British infantry was by this time reduced to little more
than seventeen thousand men.
Soon after eleven o'clock l a great cloud of dust
towards the Alberche indicated that Sebastiani's corps
was in motion ; while the appearance of French light
1 The time given is that mentioned by Charles Stewart, the
Adjutant-general; but all the narratives give a different hour.
246 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
t 809. troops on the Sierra de Segurilla a little later showed
July 28. that Wellesley must expect a further attempt upon his
left. He therefore applied to Cuesta for reinforcements ;
and it cannot be said that the old Spaniard was niggardly,
for he sent one division of cavalry, another of infantry,
and a battery of twelve-pounders. Of these Albur-
querque's division of horse, in six regiments, and a
battery of horse-artillery was formed up in rear of the
brigades of Fane and Anson; Bassecourt's division of
seven battalions crossed the northern plain to occupy
the Sierra de Segurilla; four guns were placed in the
redoubt of Pajar de Vergara, and two were stationed on
the northern spur of the Cerro de Medellin. There was
ample time for these movements, for the Fourth Corps
had not yet been deployed, and Joseph's dispositions
were not such as could be hastily completed. At length
all was ready, and between one and two o'clock the
French guns again opened fire from end to end of
the line, overwhelming, as before, the artillery of the
Allies by numbers and weight of metal, and working
serious havoc among the passive lines of the British
infantry.
About half an hour later the battle began opposite
the British right, where Leval's German division, being
entangled among vineyards and enclosures, blundered
prematurely against the advanced light companies of
Campbell's brigade.1 These companies were in a
measure surprised, and lost a few prisoners before they
could retire, the Germans following them up eagerly.
Leval's nine battalions had been formed, as usual, into
line of battalion-columns,2 but their array had been so
much broken by the obstacles through which they had
passed, that they surged upon Campbell's line and upon
the left of the Spaniards as a disordered mass of over
four thousand men. Campbell, with his right resting
on the redoubt, was ready for them, having called up
1 Desprez, on the contrary, says that the First Corps came into
action before the Fourth.
2 No doubt each battalion was in column of double companies.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 247
the Fortieth regiment from the second line into the 1809.
first ; and, as the Germans emerged into the compara-July 28,
tively open ground immediately in his front, he opened
fire at a range of about two hundred yards, while the
ten guns in the redoubt poured upon the attackers a
tempest of grape and cannister. From that moment
Leval's men gained little ground ; and presently the
regiment which faced the redoubt, scourged beyond
endurance by the blast of the artillery, gave way and
ran back. The regiments on their right wavered at the
sight, and Campbell ordered his brigade to advance.
The Seventh Fusiliers led the way, and their opponents
speedily vanished into the vineyards, abandoning a
battery of six guns. The three battalions of Leval's
left, which had engaged as many battalions of the
Spaniards, thereupon retired ; and the whole division
fell back upon the Poles in its second line. With
excellent judgment Campbell checked the pursuit
among the vineyards, and brought his troops back
to their first position after spiking the captured guns.
He had read Leval's division a lesson ; but the day's
work was not yet ended either for him or for his
adversary.
The contest between these two was not yet over
when the divisions of Lapisse and Sebastiani, each of
twelve battalions and together nearly fifteen thousand
strong, came down to the attack of Sherbrooke. Both
of the French generals had drawn up their troops in
two lines ; Lapisse placing his second brigade in rear
of the first, while Sebastiani drew up his two brigades
side by side ; x but in each case the first line consisted
of six battalions, each battalion in column of double
companies, and each group of three battalions closed
up to within six paces of interval, so as to present
a massive front of one hundred and fifty to one
1 The first line of Lapisse therefore consisted of the 1 6th Light
and 45th of the Line ; his second of the 8th and 54th of the
Line. Sebastiani's first line consisted of the 28th and 58th ; his
second of the 32nd and 75th. Each regiment had three battalions.
248 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. hundred and eighty men, nine ranks deep. The
July 28. second line was of even denser formation than the
first, each group of three battalions being drawn up
either in line of company-columns, with a front of
about one hundred men and a depth of eighteen ranks,
or in close column of double companies with a front
of fifty to sixty men and a depth of twenty-seven
ranks. Covered by a swarm of skirmishers, the French
crossed the Portiha and pressed on against Sherbrooke's
line, which awaited them with ported arms, the men
having orders to hold their fire until the enemy was
within fifty yards, and then to pour in their volley and
charge. The First Division had suffered heavily from
the shot of the French artillery, but it endured this and
the musketry of the advancing enemy without flinching,
until the moment at last came for them to act. They
then discharged a crashing volley which shattered the
front line of Lapisse and Sebastiani, and, overlapping
its flanks, shivered their whole array to pieces. The
French gave way in confusion, and Sherbrooke's entire
force followed them over the Portina with the bayonet,
pursuing in long straggling, disorderly lines. Cameron
prudently halted his brigade a short distance beyond
the brook ; but the Germans on his left and the Guards
on his right pressed on hotly, to find themselves
presently confronted, as two isolated and unformed
bodies, with the compact columns which composed the
second lines of Lapisse and Sebastiani. The French
guns on the Cerro de Cascajal were instantly turned
upon the Germans, and raked them through and
through ; while the untouched French infantry closed
eagerly upon the confused masses of red-coats, and bore
them back, in spite of a desperate resistance, with heavy
loss. In their retreat the Guards and Germans carried
Cameron's brigade away with them, and the whole
were driven over the brook in disorder, joyfully
chased by the victorious French.
The British centre seemed to be broken beyond
repair ; but Mackenzie brought his brigade forward
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 249
to meet the rush of the oncoming enemy,1 while Cotton's 1809.
brigade of light cavalry came up to fill the gaps upon Juh 2S-
his right flank, and the Forty-eighth, despatched by
Wellesley himself directly that he had perceived the
rash advance of the Guards, descended from the Cerro
de Medellin to cover the retirement of the Germans.
There followed the most critical moment of the day
as the Forty-eighth, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-first, and
Forty-fifth stepped in to close the breach made by the
dispersal of Sherbrooke's division. The Forty-eighth
was obliged to wheel aside to allow the stream of
fugitives to pass, but presently re-formed line, and
checked the advance of Lapisse's pursuing columns
by a vigorous counter - attack upon their flank.
Mackenzie's brigade likewise stood with admirable
steadfastness while the Guards and Cameron's men
ran through them, and then engaged Sebastiani's
troops in a savage duel of musketry. Before long
they found that they were not alone. The Guards
rallied instantly, and re-formed themselves with a cheer
which showed that their spirit was not broken.
Cameron's brigade also rallied ; and even the Germans,
who had not only suffered as heavily as the Guards
at the moment, but had been severely punished on the
previous day, recovered themselves with commendable
promptitude and came forward once more. Mean-
while Sebastiani and Lapisse had been successfully
held at bay ; and, as the rallied troops advanced
again to the front line, the French began to waver
under their fire. The death of Lapisse, who was
struck down while urging his men to a supreme effort,
finally destroyed the spirit of his division, which slowly
but surely gave way. The withdrawal of these troops
uncovered the right flank of Sebastiani, whose men,
already growing unsteady, were hastened towards their
final repulse by a charge of Cotton's dragoons upon
their left flank. Thus the contest in the centre came
' Mr. Oman was the first to do justice to Mackenzie's brigade
and to point out the excellence of its service in this action.
250 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1809. to an end, both sides having suffered appalling losses
July 28. in one 0f the stubbornest fights that occurred during
the whole course of the war.
Meanwhile Leval's Germans had again been thrown
into action to cover the left flank of Sebastiani. They
came on with little spirit, having not yet recovered
from their first repulse, and were driven back with
slight difficulty by two Spanish battalions and by the
two brigades of Campbell's division. But even so their
misfortunes were not ended ; for the King's regiment
of Spanish horse charged two of the retreating battalions
with great courage, cut down a large number of men,
and, following up its success, captured a battery of four
guns. Seven more cannon, which had been brought
forward by Leval, fell into the hands of the British,
who had pressed their advantage further than in the first
attack, making a total of seventeen guns altogether
taken from Leval's division. After such defeat and
disgrace the Poles and Germans finally retired, having
no stomach for further fighting.
During the earlier part of the assault upon the
centre of the Allies, the enemy had made no movement
against their left, though the fire of the guns on the
Cerro de Cascajal had wrought havoc among the British
on the opposite hill.1 But at the moment when the
struggle in the centre had reached its height, Victor
began his advance along the northern plain to turn the
Cerro de Medellin. His battalions proceeded slowly
and cautiously ; Ruffin's division on the right, with the
9th Light extended over the Sierra de Segurilla ; the
24th and 96th of the Line on their left, and next to
1 Especially Donkin's brigade, which lost over 150 men without
firing a shot. Mr. Oman quotes Grattan's Connaught Rangers, iii.
91, where it is stated that that regiment lost 136 officers and men
in the battle without firing a shot. Grattan was not present at the
action, and half of these casualties belong to the previous day,
when the regiment was surprised at Casa de Salinas and ran away.
Grattan steals whole passages from Napier without acknowledg-
ment, and his statements generally should not be accepted without
careful examination.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 251
them the three battalions of the 27th Light, under 1809.
Villatte in person, with two more regiments of his July 2<
division in support. They were harassed, as they
marched over the plain, by the enfilading fire of
Wellesley's guns on the Cerro de Medellin, an ordeal
especially trying to Ruffin's division, which had had
enough of fighting ; and their commanders were
evidently not exhilarated by the sight of the Spanish
troops which had been brought forward to meet them,
for their movements were hesitating and uncertain. As
they approached the base of the Cerro de Medellin, a
roar of cheering from the centre told Wellesley that all
was safe in that quarter ; whereupon, stepping rapidly
to the reverse side of the Cerro, the General sent orders
to Anson's brigade to charge the French infantry in
the plain, and to Fane's heavy cavalry to support the
attack.
Anson's brigade being upon the spot, whereas Fane's
was in rear of the centre, at once trotted out into the
plain, and wheeled to its right into two lines, the Twenty-
third on the right and the First Hussars of the Legion on
the left, each regiment, apparently, in column of wings.
The French infantry, which had by this time assumed
the formation of an echelon, with the right thrown back,
thereupon threw itself into squares ; and Anson then
directed the Twenty-third against the 27th Light,
which lay immediately to its front, while the Hussars
inclined to their left towards the 24th and 96th,
which lay to northward and somewhat in rear of the
27th. Far ahead of the men and conspicuous on a
white charger rode Colonel Elley, Adjutant-general of
the cavalry, to select the line of advance ; and the
brigade was moving at a trot, perfectly well in hand,
when the French gunners on the Cerro de Cascajal
trained their pieces upon the Twenty-third and opened
fire. Instinctively men and horses swerved away from
the shot to their left and, without any word of command,
increased their pace. The Hussars, conforming to the
movement, bore also to their left, and coming under a
252 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. galling fire from the French riflemen on the Sierra de
July 28. Segurilla, likewise hurried their pace, so that thus the
entire brigade, while still far from its objective, broke
into a canter. As the squadrons passed the base of the
Cerro de Medellin, Hill's division cheered them, and
the troopers answered their cheer, which doubtless
augmented the men's excitement and with it the speed
of the advance.
To the careless eye there seemed to be nothing but
an unbroken sheet of grass between them and the French
infantry ; but to the practised observer of rough
ground there were and are indications which rouse the
instinct of caution — patches of rushes showing the
presence of water, which can only run away down the
channel of the Portina, and must therefore have cut a
way to it. And in fact there was a water-course
running from the Sierra de Segurilla straight athwart
the line of Anson's advance, invisible at a distance owing
to the long waving grass, but none the less present,
with a width of ten or twelve feet, and a depth of six
or eight feet in the middle of the plain, shoaling to three
or four feet, though with a greater breadth, towards the
southern margin. Elley came upon it unexpectedly,
and, unable to check his horse, cleared it with an effort ;
which done, he pulled up to wave back the Twenty-
third. He was too late. Upon such ground the
troopers should in any circumstances have held their
horses well in hand, and, if they had done so, they would
have found many places where they could have crossed
the obstacle with perfect ease ; but they were already
in full career, and in a moment blundered full upon the
chasm. Some of them jumped over, some turned away,
some scrambled across by sheer good luck, but the mass
of the first line fell headlong down, men and horses, in
utter confusion. The second line, warned by what they
saw on their front, tried to rein up, but surged likewise
into the struggling crowd by the water-course, upon
which the French infantry of the 27th now opened a
biting fire. Farther to the north the German Hussars
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 253
came to the like disaster, though, being out of range of 1809.
the French artillery and musketry, they suffered less and July 28
were sooner able to regain some semblance of order.
Quite undismayed by the mishap, Major Ponsonby of
the Twenty-third and Major Arentschild of the Hussars
hastily rallied their men,1 and galloped on with them to
the attack. The Germans charged at the square of the
24th, some of them riding boldly up to the bayonets, but
were repulsed by the French fire, and retired with a loss
of no more than thirty-seven men and sixty-four horses.
Of the Twenty-third a part threw themselves against
a square of the 27th Light, and were beaten off with
severe punishment ; while another part, numbering
fewer than two hundred men, under Colonel Elley,
bore away to the left and rode past the French infantry
against the leading brigade of Merlin's cavalry division,
which was following in support of Villatte and Ruffin.
So impetuous was their onset that the first line of
French horse swerved away and would not meet them,
but swarmed in upon their rear as they closed with the
second line. Thus assailed by odds of five to one, Elley's
detachment was speedily overwhelmed. Elley himself
and a few more forced their way through the enemy
and escaped to the northward ; the remainder were killed
or captured, few of them being unhurt. This mad
exploit cost the Twenty-third two hundred and seven
of all ranks killed, wounded, and missing, and two
hundred and twenty-four horses, out, of a total of about
four hundred and eighty of all ranks.
Upon the failure of the attack of Anson's brigade,
Wellesley countermanded the advance of Fane's
squadrons ; and the battle on the northern plain, as
on all other points of the line, came to an end, saving
1 It is hardly possible that the advance could have continued
without some attempt to rally ; but Leith-Hav's account almost
forbids us to believe that there was a moment's halt, and Ponsonby
in his journal says that the Twenty-third lost 190 men and 200 horses
in the space of ten minutes. I owe the perusal ot this too scanty
journal to the kindness of the Hon. Lady Ponsonby, to whom I
wish to record my grateful thanks.
254 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. for the continual play of the French cannon. It seems
July 28. certain that Anson launched his men, or possibly that
they launched themselves, into action prematurely ; for
it can never have been Wellesley's intention that they
should dash themselves against unbroken infantry in
square. On the other hand, the menace of manoeuvr-
ing cavalry was sufficient to keep the French battalions
from deploying, if it did not actually compel them to
remain in square, in either of which cases they made an
admirable mark for the heavy guns of the German
Legion and of the Spaniards. Indeed, even as things
fell out, Villatte's two regiments suffered appreciable loss
while standing in square. It is true that Milhaud's
dragoons were following in support of Villatte, but they
numbered fewer than twelve hundred sabres, whereas
Fane and Anson together had nearly two thousand, to
say nothing of the three thousand cavalry of
Alburquerque's division. Properly handled, therefore,
Wellesley's counter-attack might have been most
effective, though hardly decisive ; and it is not surpris-
ing that, after the experience of Ponsonby's insane
onslaught and after contemplation of the mass of cavalry
and Spanish infantry in their front, the divisions of
Ruffin and Villatte should presently have abandoned
their advance and fallen back to their former positions.
An accident also intervened to check the engagement
towards the north of the battle-field. The long grass
in the northern plain had been kindled by the French
shells ; and, under the impulse of a north-easterly breeze,
the fire spread rapidly along the line by which the
Twenty-third had advanced and thence up the northern
face of the Cerro de Medellin, scorching the helpless
bodies of the wounded, and burning many to death.
Only by the bravery and resource of a German sergeant
of artillery was a great explosion of ammunition averted
near the battery on the hill ; and the whole of that part
of the position was veiled in a dense cloud of smoke.1
Before this time Joseph had been apprised of the
1 Leith-Hay, p. 114 ; Beamish, i. 217-218.
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 255
failure, of the grand attack upon the centre of the Allies, 1 809.
and had ordered his reserve of one French brigade andJu1)' 2i>.
his Spanish Guards, about five thousand men in all, to
move off to the Cerro de Cascajal. But soon General
Milhaud, who was observing the Spanish right, reported
that a strong column was moving out from Talavera
towards the Alberche. The information was untrue,
for the strong column consisted really of no more than
a few patrols ; but the prospect of an offensive move-
ment against the French left flank was so formidable
that Jourdan declared immediate retreat to be impera-
tive ; and orders to that effect were promptly despatched
to the various commanders. Victor protested to the
messenger that, from his own observation, he could
declare Milhaud's report to be false, that there were
signs of recession rather than advance on the part of the
Allies, that a fresh effort made by the reserve would be
decisive, and that, consequently, he would not quit his
position without further directions. His guns, as it
seems, were not yet silent, and even his skirmishers were
keeping up a desultory and distant fire against the Cerro
de Medellin ; indeed one of their spent bullets struck
Wellesley himself, who was seated on the hill, on the
breast, and inflicted a severe contusion, though without
piercing his clothes. Joseph's aide-de-camp galloped
back to his master, arresting as he went upon his own
responsibility the retirement of Leval's division, and
delivered Victor's answer. Joseph approved of his
action and asked Jourdan for his opinion. The Marshal
replied that, since the Allies remained stationary, there
was no occasion for a retreat, but that it was imprudent
to risk the reserve in an attack which, at best, was
doubtful of success. Other officers represented that
even success could not be made complete at so late an
hour, for it was now six o'clock. This prudent counsel
prevailed, and Joseph ordered the troops to withdraw
to their positions of the previous day, seemingly de-
termined to renew the attack on the morrow, or at any
rate not to recross the Alberche.
256 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. The Fourth Corps, therefore, turned about and
July 28. retired for a short distance to its bivouacking ground,
while the First remained, as on the night of the 27th,
upon the Cerro de Cascajal. Everywhere the two
armies were so close to each other that their sentries
were within hearing distance. In the course of the
night false information was brought to Victor that
troops were on the march opposite to his position on the
British left ; and it should seem that the Marshal's
spirits must have undergone rapid evaporation after the
close of the action, for he at once concluded that
Wellesley was about to turn his right flank. There-
upon, without waiting for Joseph's authority, he ordered
his troops to retreat, merely sending an aide-de-camp
to inform the King of what he had done. Sebastiani,
observing the movement, thought it his duty to conform
to it, and ordered the Fourth Corps also to fall back ;
and lastly, Joseph, upon the arrival of Victor's messenger,
obediently set the reserve in motion and followed the
others. By daybreak the entire army had passed the
Alberche, and a few hours later it halted near its old
ground about Cazalegas.
So ended the battle of Talavera, one of the severest
ever fought by the British army. Wellesley's losses
on the 27th and the 28th amounted in all to eight
hundred killed, nearly four thousand wounded, and
over six hundred missing, nearly half of these last
belonging to the German Legion.1 On the 28th alone,
the losses exceeded forty-five hundred,2 and several
1 Killed .... 34 officers, 767 men = 801
Wounded ... 196 „ 3719 „ =3915
Missing .... 8 „ 639 „ = 647
Total 5363
2 Killed .... 27 officers, 643 men = 670
Wounded . . . 171 „ 3235 „ =3406
Missing .... 6 „ 439 „ = 446
Total 4522
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 257
battalions were terribly punished. The Twenty-fourth 1809.
lost over three hundred and twenty killed and wounded Juty 2g-
out of a total of fewer than eight hundred ; and the
Thirty-first, which had been reduced from seven
hundred and thirty to six hundred on the 27th, was
further diminished to four hundred and seventy on the
the 28 th ; a most honourable record for two young
battalions which, together with the stout old Forty-
fifth — itself the loser of nearly one hundred and seventy
killed and wounded — saved the fortunes of the day.
Of the rash regiments of Sherbrooke's division, the
two battalions of Guards lost over six hundred men
out of something under two thousand, and not a
prisoner among them ; while the Eighty-third and the
First and Second battalions of the German Legion lost
more than half of their numbers hurt or slain, and the
Sixty-first little fewer. Among the killed were Generals
Mackenzie and Langwerth, and the Colonel of the
Eighty-third ; and among the wounded Generals Hill,
A. Campbell, and H. Campbell, Colonel Whittingham,
who was acting as brigadier in the Spanish army, four
officers commanding battalions, and two of Wellesley's
personal staff. Sherbrooke had two horses killed under
him ; Charles Stewart's hand was grazed by the splinters
of a shell ; every officer of the Guards was shot through
the hat or clothes ; in fact, to use the phrase of Charles
Stewart, there was scarcely an officer in the army who
could not show the marks of the enemy's fire about
him.1 The casualty list is further curious inasmuch as
it shows that the Royal Staff Corps, who may be
termed the Engineers of the Horse Guards as opposed
to those of the Ordnance, lost nine officers wounded,
and that the Fourteenth Light Dragoons, in its attack
upon Leval's German battalions, counted six officers
wounded out of a total of no more than fifteen
casualties. Cuesta stated his losses vaguely at twelve
hundred men, most of whom must have been deserters,
for the Spaniards were never severely engaged, and
1 Londonderry MSS., Ch. Stewart to Castlereagh, 31st July 1809.
VOL. VII S
258 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. only a few of them were engaged at all. It must,
July 28. however, be noticed that those few, whether infantry,
cavalry, or artillery, behaved exceedingly well.
The French suffered more severely, their casualties
in the two days being acknowledged to have exceeded
seven thousand ; 1 but this, after all, was less than a sixth
of their whole force, whereas the loss of the British was
over one fourth. Ruffin's unfortunate division was that
which was most heavily punished ; and among his
regiments, the 96th of the Line lost over six hundred
men, which cannot have been far from one half of its
strength. The 24th of the same division, and the 54th
of the division of Lapisse, also lost each of them over
five hundred, and the divisions of Sebastiani and
Leval were little less roughly handled than those of
their two colleagues. Among the dead were Generals
Lapisse and van Porbeck ; and among the hurt were
every colonel and seven out of twelve of the battalion-
commanders of Sebastiani's division. It is mentioned
that nearly all of the French wounded were the victims
of musketry only, who quickly recovered, whereas a
large proportion of the British were disabled by cannon-
shot and shell, and so grievously hurt that they died.2
In fact, the French ought to have won the battle ;
and if they had been properly handled they must have
won it, for their infantry counted nearly double that
of the British, their superiority both in number and
weight of guns was even greater, and their cavalry was
amply sufficient to hold the Spaniards motionless and in
1 Killed .... 45 officers, 716 men= 761
Wounded . . . 220 „ 6081 „ =6301
Missing .... 1 „ 205 „ = 206
Total 7268
Mr. Oman, to whom we are all indebted for this return, points
out that the missing does not include the French wounded who
were left on the field on the night of the 28th, and were recaptured
in the British hospital by Victor on the 6th of August.
2 Desprez in Memoires du Rot Joseph, vi. 492 ; Munster,
p. 52.
ch. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 259
awe. It is impossible to suppose that Wellesley would 1809.
ever have run the risk of such an action, and indeed of July 2i
such a campaign, had he realised for a moment how
poor was the quality of the Spanish troops. Even
this preponderance of men and artillery did not
represent the whole of the advantage enjoyed by the
French. By their successful surprise of Donkin's
brigade on the evening of the 27th they had not
only inflicted on the Allies a slight reverse, but had
detained their one able commander so long with the
rear-guard that he was unable to range his order of
battle before dark. Indeed, it is very plain that the
British troops were not in order of battle at all on the
evening of the 27th, and that Wellesley was totally
deceived as to their stations ; for he imagined that the
Guards were on the extreme left of the line, whereas
they were in the centre ; and he, in common with the
generals on the Cerro de Medellin, conceived that the
key of the position was held by two lines of infantry,
whereas it was not properly occupied even by one.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that, strong though the
Cerro de Medellin might be in itself, it was perfectly
accessible on its northern slope, thus leaving the British
left flank in the air. If, as Jourdan too late suggested,
a large body of troops had been massed quietly during
the night in the northern plain, and the British had at
dawn been assaulted simultaneously along their front
and on their left flank, while a demonstration was
made to keep the Spaniards occupied, matters must
have gone extremely hard with Wellesley. Joseph
had troops amply sufficient for such a manoeuvre ;
he would have caught the left of Wellesley's line of
battle in disorder, as has been seen ; and, the Cerro de
Medellin once won, he could have rolled up the
British array from end to end. The Spaniards would
certainly have taken to flight at the first sign of a
French victory ; and the French cavalry would as
certainly have galloped after them and cut Wellesley's
line of retreat upon Oropesa and the bridge of
260 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Arzobispo. In such an event it is hard to imagine
how the British could have escaped absolute de-
struction.
Such an issue, which would have been of untold
value to Napoleon and a frightful blow to the hopes
of Europe, was averted by the weakness of Joseph's
authority and the insubordination of his generals ;
and this weakness and insubordination were due
chiefly to Napoleon's contemptuous treatment of his
brother, and to his habit of issuing orders over Joseph's
head directly to the Marshals. Thus it was that the
self-willed and conceited Victor wasted hundreds of
his brave men in two isolated, ill-planned, and abortive
attacks upon the Cerro de Medellin, the first of which
only called Wellesley's attention to the defect in his
dispositions, and the second to the exposed situation
of his left flank. Joseph must share the blame for
the partial nature of the second attack, since he held
back the bulk of the army to await the result of Victor's
attempt. Lastly, when the general onset was finally
delivered, Victor, by employing beaten instead of fresh
battalions, made only the feeblest of demonstrations
against the British left, and reduced the assaults of
Lapisse and Sebastiani in the centre practically once
again to an isolated effort. In fact the French troops
were shamefully abused by their commanders, and if
Victor had met with his deserts, he would have been
sent straight back to France under arrest.
Nevertheless these considerations must not be
allowed to weigh too heavily against the British or
against their General. Wellesley, once baulked of his
intended spring upon Victor on the 23rd, found himself
in a most dangerous situation and was obliged to make
the best of it. But this was the least of his difficulties.
Cuesta appears to have been in a state of absolute
physical prostration after his retreat from Torrijos,
and there seems to be little doubt that his coach was
seen galloping ofF amid the mass of the fugitives, pre-
sumably with himself inside it, at the time of the panic
ch.xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 261
on the Spanish left.1 This can only have been the act 1809.
of his coachman, for the old General was brave enough ;
but, be that as it may, it is, I think, certain that on the
evening of the 27th the Spanish army was for a time
without a commander, otherwise Wellesley would never
have been with it instead of with his own troops. It
needed no small nerve to face a French army of nearly
fifty thousand men at such a crisis ; but Wellesley
trusted the British soldier and himself. His coolness
and presence of mind were unfailing, and he felt the
pulse of the struggle with that unerring sensitiveness
which stamped him as the first general of his time on
a field of battle. His men too — and with his men are
included the regimental officers, without whom the men
are nothing — seconded him with admirable steadfastness
and courage. Carping politicians at home, Lord Grey
and Samuel Whitbread, declared that Talavera was no
victory, and that the French had left seventeen guns
behind them on the field as a matter of convenience.
They might reasonably have maintained that the action
was very costly, and that Wellesley could show nothing in
return for the blood that had been spilled ; but Talavera
was a victory, and a great victory, for if it gained nothing,
at least it saved the British army. And it was won not
by the mere superiority of the line over the column as
a tactical formation, but by superiority of courage, steadi-
ness, and discipline ; for, nobly as the French fought in
their first great action against the red-coats in Spain,
the British soldiers proved themselves the better men.
1 Munster and Napier both tell this story.
CHAPTER XXXI
1809. After his retirement beyond the Alberche, Joseph
realised that his position was extremely critical. His
great stroke had failed. The honours of the fight had
rested with the British. He had hoped to crush them
first, and then to fall upon Venegas ; but now there
was actual danger lest he himself might be caught
between the fire of the two armies. Moreover, there
was no saying what might be the effect of later events
July 26. in Madrid. Already on the 26th a false report of the
approach of the British had brought the Spanish popula-
tion in joyous throngs to the southern gate of the city
to welcome their saviours. On the two following days
the agitation diminished ; but on the evening of the
29th the Governor, General Belliard, after receiving the
news of the battle, ordered the families of all Frenchmen
July 29. to withdraw with their property into the Retire1 Joseph
was somewhat relieved on the evening of the 29th by
the fact that, with the exception of a few Spanish
patrols, nothing had been seen of the Allied army during
the day ; and he now resolved to leave Victor in posi-
tion on the Alberche and to march with the Fourth
Corps against Venegas, whose advanced parties were
reported to have reached Valdemoro, not more than
July 30. nine miles south of Madrid. On the 30th, therefore,
the King shifted his headquarters eastward to Vargas,
and there held a council of war. Nothing had been
heard of Soult ; and it was generally agreed that for the
present it would be imprudent for the Fourth Corps to
1 Memoir es de Miot de Me lit 0, iii. 60-61.
262
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 263
move too far away from the First ; wherefore Joseph 1890.
took up a position at Ulescas, about twenty miles south
and west of Madrid, where, on the 1st, he heard that Aug. 1.
the main army of Venegas was at Aranjuez. Meanwhile
Victor, upon finding himself alone, grew nervous.
Robert Wilson's corps had reached Escalona ; and the
Marshal, receiving exaggerated reports of its numbers,
became apprehensive lest his own right might be turned,
and retired first to Maqueda and then to Santa Cruz de Aug. 1-3.
Retamar. Joseph thereupon fell back northward to
Mostoles, in order at once to draw nearer to Victor
and to overawe the agitated population of Madrid ;
and at Mostoles, Victor, upon a false report that the
British were advancing, was on the point of joining him,
when he learned by reconnaissance that Escalona had
been evacuated and that Cuesta and Wellesley were
in retreat. On the same day Joseph ascertained, to Aug. 5.
his immense relief, that Soult had at last arrived in
the valley of the Tagus, and that he could now devote
his entire attention to Venegas.
That general, of whom we last heard on the 24th,
had, as we have seen, allowed Sebastiani to slip away
from his front and join Victor, failing thereby most
flagrantly in his duty both to the Supreme Junta and
to Cuesta. He might have mended his fault somewhat
by a rapid advance upon Madrid, to which the way lay
absolutely open ; but, far from this, he moved forward so
slowly and timidly that his first division, under General
Lacy, did not arrive before Toledo till the 28th, nor July 28.
himself with his main army before Aranjuez until the
29th. Lacy made sufficient demonstration before
Toledo to induce Joseph to reinforce the garrison ; but
Venegas remained halted in irresolution at Aranjuez
from the 29th of July to the 5th of August without an
attempt to make his presence felt, except by pushing
weak patrols towards Madrid. On the 5th, Joseph Aug. 5.
ordered the Fourth Corps to march upon Aranjuez ;
and Sebastiani, coming before the town on the 7th,1
1 Artechc, Mr. Oman, and Napier say that Joseph came before
264 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. found the bridges broken down; whereupon, after a
Aug. 7- lively skirmish, he marched by Joseph's order for
Toledo, the King with the reserve moving meanwhile
Aug. 8. to Vargas. On the night of the 8th Sebastiani entered
Toledo, and, after giving his troops some hours of rest,
Aug. 9. crossed the river on the 9th. Here he met and drove
back General Zerain's Spanish division, which was
observing the bridge for Venegas, and, guessing the
direction of Joseph's march, had followed it by parallel
roads on the south side of the Tagus. Venegas had
received strict orders from Cuesta to retire ; but none
Aug. 10. the less, on the 10th of August, he assembled his whole
army at Almonacid, about twelve miles east and south
of Toledo, where, full of blind confidence, he decided to
give his men one day's rest and to attack the French,
who were little inferior to himself in strength, on the
1 2th. Sebastiani, however, was before him, and
without waiting for the reserve under King Joseph,
Aug. 1 1. fell upon him on the morning of the nth ; with the
result that he totally defeated the Spanish General with
a loss of over five thousand men and of twenty-one
guns. The Spaniards, though miserably handled by
their commander, fought well, for the victory cost
Sebastiani over two thousand killed and wounded,
and Venegas was able to retreat in fair order upon
Madrid ej os. But the steadfastness of the troops only
made the more regrettable the General's omission to
cling closely to Sebastiani's army, as he had been bidden,
in the critical third week of July ; and his final rash pre-
cipitation into a pitched battle stamps him irredeemably
as a general who was irresolute for any good purpose,
though unswerving in the pursuit of folly. He was
removed from his command a few weeks later by the
Supreme Junta, and replaced by General Areizaga.
The change signified no more than the substitution of
the town on the 5th. Desprez, Jourdan, and Ducasse all give the
day as the 7th ; and Miot de Melito confirms this date by
mentioning that he joined Joseph's headquarters at Valdemoro
on the 5th.
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 265
one incompetent man for another ; and meanwhile the 1809.
great opportunity of the army of La Mancha had
been lost.
Wellesley for his part had found himself quite
unable to move upon the 29th. His army had had July 29.
little to eat during the two days of severe fighting ; and
the number of his wounded was so great that fully two
thirds of his exhausted men were employed in bringing
them in. At about six o'clock in the morning
Craufurd's brigade and the Chestnut Troop of Horse
Artillery overtook the army. Craufurd's regiments
had been sent by water up the Tagus to Vallada,
and after waiting at Santarem till the 7th of July to
receive its transport, had followed the line of
Wellesley's advance by long stages, but with not
infrequent halts ; the men being much tried by the
difficulty of procuring food, and by the weight of their
kits in a season of extreme heat. On the evening of
the 27th at Naval Moral, rumours reached the July. 27.
brigadier that a general action was imminent, and the
march was resumed before dawn of the 28th. Ere
long was heard the sound of a distant cannonade, and,
upon reaching Oropesa at noon, Craufurd weeded out
a few sickly men, and pushed forward with the
remainder in all possible haste. The next halt was at
ten on the same night, when the three regiments, which
had not seen water during the day, reached a stagnant
pool used only by cattle, and drank the filthy water
greedily. From thence they marched without further
lingering straight on to the battle-field, having covered
between forty-five and fifty miles in about twenty-five
hours. They at once took up the line of outposts
towards the Alberche and supplied fatigue-parties to
collect the wounded of both sides, for the Spaniards
had already begun to massacre the helpless French who
were lying on the field. Still this reinforcement of
three thousand men was of course insufficient to make
good the losses which Wellesley had suffered in the
late action.
266 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. Throughout the 29th, therefore, the whole army
July 29. remained stationary ; but on that same day Wellesley
wrote that he should endeavour to persuade Cuesta to
follow up Joseph, who must certainly have detached a
corps to encounter Venegas, and that he had every
intention of advancing upon Madrid, unless interrupted
by some accident on his flank.1 But Cuesta's army
was in no condition to act alone on ground so blind
and difficult ; and on the 30th Wellesley received
Aug. 30. definite intelligence that Soult was threatening the pass
of Banos, the very point for which he had been most
apprehensive since the beginning of the campaign.
Though now aware, however, that Ney had joined
Soult, he did not estimate their combined forces at
more than twenty thousand men ; and he suggested
that Cuesta should parry the stroke by sending a
division of infantry, with its guns, to strengthen the
small force that already lay in the menaced quarter.
This Cuesta declined to do ; but none the less on the
Aug. 1. 1 st of August Wellesley was still confident that Soult
would not cross the mountains with a victorious army
in his front and Beresford in his rear. In the course of
the night, however, news came that Soult at the head
of fourteen thousand men had brushed away the feeble
force of the Marquis del Reino, which held the pass
of Banos, and was advancing straight upon the British
line of communications. Thereupon Cuesta, who had
hitherto refused to send a man in that direction,
ordered General Bassecourt's division to march with all
speed to del Reino's assistance. In the morning of the
Aug. 2. 2nd further information reached Cuesta that Soult had
arrived at Plasencia on the 1st ; and Wellesley then
met the Spanish General in conference. Relations
between the two commanders had not improved in the
course of the campaign, and Wellesley was full of
complaints of the impracticable temper of his colleague ;
but upon the principal measure to be adopted at the
moment they were agreed, namely, that a part of the
1 Wellesley to Beresford, 29th July 1809.
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 267
army must move westward to meet Soult, while the 1809.
remainder stood fast to check any offensive movement Au8- 2-
on the part of Victor, and to favour the operations of
Venegas. Cuesta proposed that for this purpose the
army should be separated into two halves, each
composed in due proportion of British and Spaniards.
Wellesley refused to divide his force, but offered either
to march against Soult with his whole army, or to
remain at Talavera with it, while Cuesta should lead his
entire host to Plasencia. Cuesta accepted the former
of these proposals, and accordingly on the 3rd Aug. 3.
Wellesley marched westward to Oropesa.1
On reaching that place at noon Sir Arthur could
perceive no sign and hear no intelligence of the enemy,
but he became apprehensive lest, upon the slightest
movement on the part of Victor, Cuesta might abandon
Talavera ; and he begged O'Donoju to procure carts
and to send westward as many of the British wounded
as could safely be moved. He was, however, still
intent upon attacking Soult, and even wrote instruc-
tions to Beresford to cut off the Marshal's retreat,2 if
he should retire by the passes of Perales or Banos.
Shortly afterwards a messenger came in from Cuesta,
bearing letters that had been intercepted from Jourdan
and Joseph to Soult. These instructed the Duke of
Dalmatia to press forward with all diligence upon the
flank and rear of the Allies ; assuring him that he
would be supported by Ney's corps, which would follow
in his rear, while that of Victor was prepared at the
same time to resume the offensive against the Allied
front. This letter revealed the startling facts that
Soult's force was, or would shortly be, of twice the
strength at which it had hitherto been estimated, and
that Venegas had failed utterly to execute his task of
1 Wellesley to Beresford, 29th July ; to Frere, 30th July ; to
O'Donoju, 31st July; to Castlereagh, 1st August 1809;
Londonderry, p. 340.
2 There was a general impression in the army that Soult would
be caught and crushed between Wellesley and Beresford. Boothby,
A Prisoner of France, p. 25.
268 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. making a diversion towards Madrid. Cuesta thereupon
^ug» 3- announced his intention of evacuating Talavera and
moving westward forthwith. Wellesley wrote a hasty
letter of protest to O'Donoju, striving to avert this
precipitate movement. " Depend upon it," he wrote,
" you are mistaken in Soult's strength, and that Victor,
without Sebastiani and the King, who cannot move
while Venegas is where he is, can do us no harm."
The effort was useless, and the reason soon became
apparent. Shortly afterwards there arrived full in-
formation that the French advanced guard had reached
Naval Moral, thus assuring themselves of the possession
of Almaraz ; and that del Reino, after retiring across
the river at that point, had destroyed the bridge. Yet
an hour or two passed, and a second letter came in
from O'Donoju to say that the whole of the French
troops which had been in the north of Spain — that is
to say, the corps of Soult, Mortier, and Ney — were
coming down by the pass of Banos, to the number of
fifty thousand men. Yet again a few hours, and the
entire Spanish army came surging into Oropesa like
a flock of sheep amid unspeakable noise and confusion.
Wellesley conceived that Cuesta was falling back in
panic ; and it is tolerably certain that O'Donoju, at any
rate, was thoroughly and not unjustifiably frightened.
But, as a matter of fact, Cuesta had left Zayas's division
of foot and Alburquerque's of horse at Talavera to
keep Victor amused until he should return victorious
after the defeat of Soult.1
It is now time to give the exact position of Soult's
force during these critical days, so that the true situation
on the 3rd of August may be realised. It has already
been told that Mortier's corps had arrived at Salamanca
July 23. on the 23rd of July ; that the greater part of Soult's
own corps was already there, awaiting only a new train
1 Wellesley to Beresford, 3rd Aug. ; to O'Donoju and Frere
(several letters), 3rd and 4th Aug. 1809; Arteche, vi. 341-342.
The sequence of events is difficult to follow in precise order, since
the hour when Wellesley's despatches were written is not stated by
him ; but it can be disentangled by comparison of the letters.
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 269
of artillery ; and that, upon the arrival of Foy with 1809.
Joseph's orders on the 24th, Soult had directed the
rest of the Second Corps and the whole of Ney's to
move forthwith to that same place. On the 27th July. 27.
Mortier's corps, followed by three brigades of Lorges's
and Lahoussaye's dragoons, was set in motion towards
Bejar, counting in all about seventeen thousand men,
and, after dispersing a small Spanish force at Bejar itself
and del Reino's battalions at the pass of Banos, entered
Plasencia on the 1st of August. On the 30th of July
Soult, having at last received his artillery, led the
Second Corps, eighteen thousand strong, forward from
Salamanca ; traversed the pass of Banos on the 1st of Aug. 1-2.
August ; and on the 2nd joined Mortier with a part
of his troops, the rest being at Oliva, nine or ten miles
in rear. Ney left Salamanca on the 31st of July, and
was thus only one day's march behind Soult. On the
3rd the whole of the cavalry of Soult and Mortier was Aug. 3.
pushed forward to Naval Moral, and Mortier's infantry
to Toril, while Ney's corps was but one day's march
from Plasencia. Moreover, on that same day an
intercepted letter, written by Wellesley to General
Erskine from Talavera on the 1st, fell into the hands of
Soult, and made him aware that the British commander
reckoned the French force which was advancing upon
Banos at no more than twelve thousand men. Thus
almost at the same moment both Wellesley and Soult
accidentally realised the truth that about twenty
thousand British were within an ace of walking into
the jaws of fifty thousand French.
It was plain that neither party could afford to lose
time, and Soult ordered his cavalry to push on, if
possible ; to the bridge of Arzobispo to gain news of
the enemy. Wellesley, less fortunate, was obliged to
consult his colleague ; and, as Cuesta had not arrived,
he at once suggested to the Chief of the Spanish staff
that the only thing to be done was to assemble the
whole army before the bridge of Arzobispo with a view
to an immediate crossing to the southern bank of the
270 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Tagus.1 On the morning of the 4th Cuesta appeared,
AuS- 4- and, as usual, fell violently at variance with Wellesley
over the operations to come. The foolish old man,
doubtless anxious to excuse his hasty departure from
Talavera, was eager to fight. In vain Wellesley pointed
out that his army was physically weakened by starvation,
the troops having received no complete ration for at
least a week ; that though Mortier's corps might be
alone in advance, Souk's was close behind it ; 2 that,
even if Almaraz were gained with or without an
action, a second battle must be fought against very
superior forces before the bridge could be re-established.
No argument could move Cuesta's obstinacy ; wherefore
at last Wellesley told him roundly that, let the Spanish
army do what it would, the British would cross the
river, and so left him. It was now six o'clock in the
morning ; the British baggage had already marched at
four, but the army still remained for a few hours in
position to cover the arrival of the wounded from
Talavera.
The sight of these wounded seems to have roused
the British resentment against Cuesta to its bitterest.
In the first place, he was blamed for deserting fifteen
hundred of them, whose hurts were too grave to
permit of their removal from the hospital at Tala-
vera. It is not, however, clear, why he, any more
than Wellesley, should have risked the safety of his
army to save the British wounded ; for he could not
possibly have remained at Talavera more than two or
three days, at the end of which time the men in
hospital must equally have been left to their fate. In
the second place, he is said, " though encumbered with
carts and waggons," to have refused to make over
more than seven for the service of the British wounded.
Be that as it may, it is certain that Wellesley was com-
pelled to sacrifice a quantity of baggage in order to
1 Wellesley to O'Donoju, 3rd Aug. 1809.
2 He misnamed the corps, thinking that Soult was in advance
and Ney close behind ; but this does not affect his reasoning.
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 271
procure carriage for two thousand men ; and that seven 1 809
hundred more were compelled to hobble miserably along Au8- 24-
on their own feet, weak, bleeding, and suffering, until
they fell from exhaustion and either died or, more
fortunate, fell into the hands of their generous and
compassionate enemies. Soult had already captured
over four hundred of Wellesley's sick at Plasencia ;
but whether there, at Talavera, or on the road, the
British invalids received none but the best and kindest
of treatment from the French.
At noon the British troops marched off to the
bridge, and by two o'clock were safely assembled on
the south side of the Tagus, Mortier's patrols coming
into sight just as the passage was completed. The
red-coats had the good fortune, too, to meet with some
herds of swine, upon which they fell " like men
possessed " in the passion of their hunger ; and it
perhaps was well that they could not see the Spanish
troops in Oropesa, for whom the inhabitants had opened
their stores in consequence of the approach of the
enemy, and who were now well supplied with food.1
At midnight the army resumed its retreat, the main Aug. 5.
body moving by a circuitous and very rough track to
Peraleda de Garbin, where it bivouacked for the night.
At the same time the Light Brigade, together with
Donkin's, was pushed forward under Craufurd through
the mountains upon Almaraz, which, after a very
severe march with no food except a little boiled wheat
and parched peas, these troops reached on the morning
of the 6th. Here Craufurd found del Reino's two Aug. 6.
weak battalions, and took over from them the defence
of the bridge and ford, occupying at the same time
the village of Casas del Puerto, which commands the
pass of Mirabete, and thereby securing the road against
any advance of the French. The main body, mean-
while, with great labour, advanced to Mesas de Ibor,
1 Leslie, p. 159. Yet Cuesta complained that about this time
his headquarters were for four or five days without rations of any
kind (Arteche, vi. 337).
272 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. the men, already weakened by starvation, being fatigued
Aug- 6- still further by the duty of repairing the road and
helping the exhausted horses of the artillery to drag
Aug. 7. the guns. On the 7th, two divisions and the artillery
reached Deleitosa, and Wellesley, though his position
was still far from enviable, could at least congratulate
himself that his army was safe from the enemy ; for, if
Craufurd were attacked, he could speedily reinforce
him. The remaining division of the army was left
at Mesas de Ibor to maintain communication with the
Spaniards.
Cuesta, for his part, remained on the 4th on the
right bank of the Tagus with his army divided between
Arzobispo and Oropesa ; and here he was rejoined by
Bassecourt, who had been recalled from Centinello, and
by his rear-guard under Zayas and Alburquerque from
Talavera. This foolhardiness was of a piece with
the general perversity of his conduct throughout the
campaign, and might have cost him dear, if Victor,
in his alarm over Wilson's movements, had not moved
so far to the east. In the afternoon, advanced parties
of Mortier's cavalry pushed down to the bridge, but,
finding a division of infantry and twelve hundred horse
before them, drew back, and were chased away by the
Spanish troopers. Extraordinary though it may seem,
it does not appear that the French were yet aware that
the British had crossed the river ; for Mortier, upon
hearing from his scouts that a strong hostile force was
at Oropesa, and that Talavera was still occupied by the
Spaniards, became alarmed and summoned Soult to his
assistance. Soult accordingly hurried his corps forward
Aug. 5. on the 5th to Casa Tejeda, a short distance to west
of Naval Moral, while Ney on the same day advanced
south-eastward from Plasencia to Malpartida. Through-
out the day Cuesta kept his army in order of battle
before the bridge ; but towards evening, as the enemy's
parties became more numerous on his front, he brought
the bulk of his force over the river, leaving only a
rear - guard on the northern bank, and took up a
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 273
strong position, which he entrenched, to contest the pass- 1809.
age. On the morning of the 6th, Mortier attacked the Aug. 6.
rear-guard and obliged it to retire with haste over the
bridge ; and on the same day the arrival of the Sixth Corps
at Naval Moral, and of the Second at El Gordo, brought
the whole of Soult's fifty thousand men within striking
distance of Arzobispo ; while Victor, having on the 5th
ascertained the retreat of the Allies, re-entered Talavera.1
Thus a force of nearly seventy thousand French was
now concentrated in the valley of the Tagus ; and
Victor needed only to cross the stream by the bridge
of Talavera in order to fall, within little more than
forty-eight hours, upon Cuesta's flank. This seemed
to be the most obvious way of clearing the passage
of the river, for Soult, upon reconnoitring Cuesta's
defences, realised that they could not be forced without
great loss, and sent out parties in all directions to find
a ford. As a matter of fact, there was a ford, that
of Azutan, about a quarter of a mile above the village
of Arzobispo, which was known to the Spaniards and
which they had been particularly charged to protect.
Its existence was revealed to the French by the care-
lessness of the Spanish troopers, who, while watering
their horses, allowed them to wander far out into the
stream, and so to betray the shallows on its southern
side. Careful search enabled the French engineers to
trace the line of the ford ; and Soult resolved to attack
on the following day. Cuesta, meanwhile, finding him- Aug. 7.
self straitened for supplies in his station before the
bridge, extended his army in the direction of Mesas
de Ibor, leaving Bassecourt's division of infantry and
Alburquerque's of cavalry, some eight thousand men
with sixteen guns, to hold the position which he had
fortified. It was with no small satisfaction that Soult,
on the morning of the 8th, observed that the force
opposed to him was considerably diminished.
Feeling evidently certain of success against the Aug. 8.
1 The details of the French advance are taken from Le Noble
and from Soult's letter to Clarke of 13th Aug. 1809.
VOL. VII T
274 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Spaniards, he sent Ney, at daybreak, a sketch of a ford
Aug- 8- below the bridge of Almaraz, with orders to march
thither with his corps and fall on Wellesley's rear.
Soult had already built epaulments in order to shelter
his gunners from the fire of the Spanish sharp-shooters
on the bridge, but he intended to make his principal
attack by the ford ; and, since the day was extremely
hot, he ordered the assault to be delivered at noon
when the Spaniards, as he knew, would be enjoying
their siesta. There seemed, indeed, to be no reason
why they should not enjoy it, for Alburquerque had
declared the ford to be impracticable.1 Accordingly,
at the appointed hour, Caulaincourt's brigade of French
horse, six hundred strong, trotted down to the stream,
crossed it before the Spaniards realised what they were
about, and cut a battalion and a regiment of cavalry to
pieces. The rest of Soult's cavalry, numbering over
three thousand, quickly followed Caulaincourt ; and the
Marshal then launched a battalion at the bridge, the
defenders of which, seeing their retreat endangered,
broke and fled almost immediately. Alburquerque
brought up his division of cavalry hastily and in
bad order to charge the French, but was out-manoeuvred
and driven off". The remainder of the Spanish infantry
made all haste to the mountains in their rear, where
they escaped with little loss ; but the rest of the fugitives
were hunted by the French dragoons for miles, until
checked by two divisions from Cuesta's main army.
The loss of the Spaniards was eight hundred killed and
wounded, six hundred men, four hundred horses, and
sixteen cannon captured. The French also recovered
fourteen of their guns, which had been taken at Talavera,
made over to Cuesta by Wellesley, and left on the
roadside by the Spanish General owing to the difficulties
of the march.2 The loss of the French little exceeded
one hundred killed and wounded.
1 Arteche, vi. 347.
2 This enabled Soult to report that he had captured 30 guns,
and Joseph to say that he had lost no guns at Talavera.
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 275
Just before opening the attack, Soult had received a 1809.
message from Victor to say that his army was crossing Aug- 8«
the bridge at Talavera, and would on the 8 th reach
Aldea Nueva de Barbarroya, about nine miles east of
the bridge of Arzobispo. Soult therefore wrote orders
to Victor to take up the pursuit of the Spaniards,
intending apparently that the Fifth Corps should support
him, while Ney simultaneously should break in upon
Deleitosa from Almaraz. His own purpose, announced
to Joseph before the action, was to move at once to the
frontiers of Portugal.1 It seems possible that if he had
followed up his success at once — and he had four
divisions of infantry which had not been engaged — he
might have broken up the Spanish army ; for Cuesta's
headquarters on the 8th were still at Peraleda de
Garbin, and, though the Spanish General moved to Mesas
de Ibor that night, his guns were all of them still on the
low ground by the river at four o'clock on the morning
of the 9th, with his advanced guard on the east bank of Aug. 9.
the stream and the main body on the west. Wellesley,
who was on the spot, judged that if the French drove in
the advanced guard, they would capture the whole of
this artillery, and that thereupon the Spanish army
would disband itself. If, therefore, Soult had pushed his
infantry only, without cannon, after the flying bands of
Bassecourt and Alburquerque, as Napoleon in his place
would probably have done, he would certainly have
fulfilled Sir Arthur's fears. But, on the other hand,
seeing that the British troops were not far distant from
the Spanish, that the position of Mesas de Ibor was one
1 Soult to Joseph, 6th Aug. 1809. In the same despatch he an-
nounces that Victor will take up the pursuit. Napier says that Soult
proposed to support Victor's movement with the Second and Fifth
Corps, which Soult plainly had no idea of doing. He says again,
in his review of the campaign, "If Soult had been permitted to
follow up the attack on Arzobispo on the 8th of August, what could
the 17,000 starving British troops, encumbered with the terror-
stricken Spaniards, have effected against the 70,000 French that
could have stormed their positions on three sides at once?" As Mr.
Oman has pointed out, Napier cannot be trusted when Soult is in
question.
276 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. of extraordinary strength, and that Soult could know
nothing of Cuesta's dispositions, it is not surprising that
the Marshal should have hesitated to advance without
his artillery.
Again, it must be remembered that the heat of the
weather was excessive, that the country was absolutely
bare of provisions, and that Soult's troops were as
much exhausted as those of his enemies by starvation.1
Moreover, their last experience of a march in the
mountains had not been pleasant either for themselves
or for their commander, so that, weakened as they were
by privation, they would hardly have entered upon it
with alacrity. Now, taking his artillery with him, Soult
could not have reached the position of Mesas de Ibor,
even if unopposed, before the morning of the 10th;
and, though Cuesta's guns were then still at the foot
of the hill, it is reasonable to suppose that the Spanish
General would have made some effort to impede the
French advance in the defiles farther to the west, in
Aug. 10. order to gain time. By the evening of the 10th
Wellesley had caused the guns to be dragged up to the
Aug. 1 1. top of the hill; and on the nth the Allies were
re-established in their position, the British on the left
extending from Jaraicejo to Almaraz, the Spaniards on
the right extending from Deleitosa to Mesas de Ibor.
Soult, all things considered, could hardly have been ready
to attack before the 1 ith, and Victor could not possibly
have reached the spot upon an earlier day. The ruling
fact in the whole situation was that the armies of both
sides were paralysed by lack of victuals.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that Soult's whole
scheme collapsed. Ney marched, as he had been bidden,
to Almaraz, but failed to find the ford, and brought
1 " La chaleur etait accablante ; la troupe depuis cinq jours
etait sans pain." Mortier to Soult, 9th Aug. 1809.
2 Wellesley to Craufurd, 9th Aug. ; to Cuesta and Lord Welles-
ley, 10th Aug. 1809. " Cette contree deja epuisee lorsque le due
de Bellune l'avait occupee, n'offrait plus aucune resource depuis le
sejour que venait d'y faire les Anglo-Espagnols " {Mem. de Jourdan,
p. 268).
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 277
back his entire corps to Naval Moral. The ford, which 1809.
was well known to the British, was at its best hardly
practicable for infantry, and Ney's corps could not have
hoped to force the passage in the presence of the red-
coats. Victor, having already orders from Joseph to join
the Fourth Corps,1 was in no humour to pursue Cuesta,
and in fact did not do so. But Soult evidently expected
little from his commands to Ney and Victor, for, before
he knew the result of them, he proposed to march with
the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps 2 to a position between
Plasencia and Coria. There it would be open to him to
besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, or to march by Salamanca to
the Douro, in order to suppress any hostile rising in that
quarter, or even to hasten to Lisbon before the British
army could reach it. Joseph, however, had already
made up his mind that he would have none of such
matters. Venegas had not yet been beaten at Almonacid,
and neither the King nor Jourdan had any idea of
exposing Madrid to danger. Moreover, the heat of a
summer campaign was telling upon the troops ; and,
curiously enough, orders were on their way from
Napoleon to Joseph forbidding all operations in Portugal
during the month of August, but directing preparations
to be made for them in February.3 The King therefore
issued directions for breaking up the army. Ney was
to return to Salamanca to drive back del Parque, who
had advanced thither from Ciudad Rodrigo, and to hold
down Leon, where Romana was making trouble ; Soult
was to remain at Plasencia to guard the lines of ingress
from Portugal, and Mortier to watch the Tagus from
Talavera to Almaraz.
Ney, who asked for nothing better than to escape
from Soult's command, set his corps in motion at once ;
reached Plasencia on the 1 ith ; and at the pass of Banos
had the good fortune to meet with Wilson's corps, which
1 Jourdan to Belliard, 8th Aug. 1809.
2 Ducasse prints, "le 3* Corps d'Armee," evidently by mistake
for " les trois corps d'armee."
3 Napoleon to Clarke, 29th July 1809.
278 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. for a week past had been hunted by three different
columns from the armies of Soult and Victor, and from
the garrison of Avila. Wilson had contrived to evade
all three, when he ran unexpectedly against Ney, and
after imprudently engaging him for the whole day,
escaped with the loss of four hundred men to the pass
Aug. 24. of Perales, by which on the 24th he brought his column
safely to Castello Branco. Ney then pursued his way
to Salamanca ; and Wilson shortly afterwards went home,
having quarrelled bitterly with Beresford, to return
to the Peninsula no more. His isolation from the rest
of the Allies was due entirely to neglect of Wellesley's
orders, who prefaced a final letter to him on the 5th of
August with the biting words, " It is difficult for me
to instruct you, when every letter I receive from you
informs me that you are farther from me, and are
carrying into execution some plan of your own." * And
this was the essence of Wilson, as of so many men who,
like him, are excellent partisan-leaders and nothing more.
He could not break himself of prosecuting his petty
operations for their own sake, instead of making them
subserve the general purpose of the Commander-in-
Chief. We shall, however, meet with him again.
Meanwhile, Wellesley, unable as yet to divine the
enemy's intentions, remained at Jaraicejo, widening daily
the breach between himself and Cuesta. The British
General was not best pleased at being kept absolutely
in the dark as to the movements of his colleague, and
he was particularly incensed at hearing nothing of the
rout of Alburquerque at Arzobispo, until Alburquerque
brought the news in person on the afternoon of the
9th. But the main battle between the two com-
manders raged over the question of supplies. Each
party accused the other of intercepting provisions
which were intended for his particular army ; each
denied the accusation ; and each, there seems good
1 Wellesley to Wilson, 5th Aug. 1809. Suppl. Desp. vi. 325.
But none the less Wellesley gave Wilson great praise in his
despatches. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 21st Aug. 1809.
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 279
reason to believe, was inaccurate in his denial,1 The 1809.
situation, however, was sufficiently serious. The men,
being half-starved, were losing discipline and spirit,
and the news of the defeat of the Austrians at Wagram
and of the armistice of Znaim had struck discourage-
ment into the officers. " With the army which a
fortnight ago beat double their numbers," wrote
Wellesley on the 8th of August, " I should now
hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength."
The mortality among the horses from want of forage
was another most formidable difficulty ; and Wellesley,
who had already been obliged to make over some of
his ammunition to the Spaniards from want of trans-
port to carry it, was fain to contemplate the necessity
of destroying some of his guns.
On the 11th the British Commander fairly warned Aug. 11.
Cuesta that, unless his wants were supplied, he should
withdraw from the country. On the 13th, Cuesta, Aug. 13.
having been stricken with paralysis on the previous
day, resigned his command, and was succeeded by
General Eguia. This was hardly a change for the
better. Before this General had been in his new
position three days Wellesley was obliged to renew to
him the threat which he had made to Cuesta on the
11th ; to which Eguia replied by issuing orders which
had a specious appearance of good-will, but still left
both troops and horses starving. Another protest
from Wellesley evoked from the Spanish Commander
an unfortunate insinuation that want of provisions was
not the true motive that prompted his British colleague's
anxiety to march to Portugal ; whereupon Sir Arthur
rejoined that, since his word was doubted, he should
write to Eguia no more. This correspondence passed
on the 19th; and on the next day Wellesley an- Aug. 20.
nounced that he should march for Portugal on the
morrow. The Spanish Commissary, seeking to conciliate
1 " So pressing were our wants that one of our commissaries took
from the Spaniards by force one hundred bullocks and one hundred
mule-loads of bread" (Munstcr, p. 57)
280 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. at once the British General and the populace of Seville,
declared privately to the one that he felt ashamed of
the privations to which the army had been subjected,
and publicly to the other that the army had received
double rations ever since it entered Spain. Such
subterfuge only confirmed Wellesley in his determina-
tion to withdraw. His patience was not unreasonably
exhausted. " We are starving," he wrote to Beresford
on the 19th, "our men falling sick, and we have
nothing to give them in the way of comforts ; and our
horses are dying by hundreds in the week. We have
not had a full ration of provisions ever since the 22nd
of last month ; and I am convinced that in that time
the men have not received ten days' bread, and the
horses not three regular deliveries of barley. We have
no means of transport, and I shall be obliged to leave
my ammunition on the ground on quitting this place.
We now want eighteen hundred horses to complete the
cavalry, and two or three hundred for the artillery." x
Nevertheless, throughout this harassing time Wel-
lesley's calm insight and perfect coolness never failed him.
He received his first intelligence of the return of
the French to Plasencia on the nth, and at once drew
up a plan of operations whereby Beresford's troops
together with the brigades of General Lightburne and
Catlin Craufurd, which had lately arrived in Lisbon,
might delay a French invasion of Portugal for a
sufficient time to enable the main British army to return
without a halt to Abrantes. Beresford, who had
remained about Ciudad Rodrigo until he heard of
Soult's march from Salamanca southward, had, pursuant
to his orders, followed that march in a parallel line to
westward, crossing the Sierra de Gata at the pass of
Perales. He reached Moralejaon the 12th of August ;
his cavalry lay ahead of him at Coria, and his right was
1 Wellesley to Cuesta, nth, 1 3th Aug.; to Lord Wellesley,
9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 21st Aug. ; to Beresford, 14th, 19th Aug.;
to Eguia, 14th, 15th, 19th Aug. ; to Don Luis de Calvo, 20th Aug.
1809.
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 281
in communication with the two British brigades above 1809.
mentioned, which had advanced as far as Zarza la
Mayor. But on the 15th, by Wellesley's command, he Aug. 15.
shifted his entire force to the place last named, so as
to be ready to fall back on Castello Branco ; and from
that point westward every position in which he could
delay a hostile march was indicated to him. As his
force amounted to eighteen thousand Portuguese and
over four thousand British, Beresford should have been
able to fulfil his duty with success.
Wellesley, however, from the first was sceptical as
to the present possibility of a French invasion of
Portugal. The movement upon Plasencia had been
too openly made under the eyes of the British ; the
troops seen on the road were too few — Ney's and Soult's
corps only — as he quite correctly guessed ; and the
forces of the contending parties in Estremadura were so
equally balanced that the French could not think of
solid offensive operations in that quarter. From all of
these facts Wellesley deduced the perfectly accurate
conclusion that Plasencia was simply the right of the
French line of cantonments on the Tagus. Gradually
the situation cleared itself up. On the 16th Wellesley
heard of the defeat of Venegas at Almonacid. By the
19th he was aware, through an intercepted letter from Aug. 19.
Jourdan to Soult, that the enemy had abandoned all
further offensive operations, and he had also obtained
accurate intelligence as to the stations of the various
French corps. The knowledge of these dispositions
made him reluctant to quit so commanding a post as
that which he occupied. With his army concentrated
over against the right centre of the long line of the
French cantonments, with a passage at Almaraz whereby
to burst suddenly into the middle of them, and with
Beresford's forces to his hand to threaten their right
flank, Wellesley saw visions of a brilliant stroke upon
Soult or Mortier. He acknowledged, however, that at
best it could be but a raid, for, unless there were an
effective force at Baiios to bar the return of Ney from
282 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Salamanca, or one to eastward to alarm Joseph for the
safety of Madrid, he must inevitably be forced to
retire before overwhelming numbers. But it was
useless to think even of raids when his men were
sinking from hunger, and his horses dying at the rate
of over one hundred a week.1
Aug. zi. Accordingly on the 21st he fell back southward
to Truxillo, and thence by Miajadas and Merida to
the valley of the Guadiana. It was evidently at the
outset his intention to retire to Elvas — indeed the two
brigades of light cavalry received their routes for the
march thither,2 and the cantonments for the whole of
the army were actually drawn up — but at Merida
Sir Arthur halted for some days upon the urgent
request of his brother Lord Wellesley, now ambassador
at Seville, that he should remain within the Spanish
frontier.3 By some blunder of the staff, however,
some of the troops, who had marched by way of
Caceres, received no orders to halt, and moved west-
ward as far as Portalegre before they were stopped and
turned south-eastward to Campo Mayor.4 On the
Sept. 3. 3rd of September, therefore, Wellesley shifted his
headquarters to Badajoz, and cantoned the troops
from Campo Mayor and Olivenza in the west to
Merida and Alemandrejo on the east. He was resolved
to hold no further communication with the Spaniards ;
but he saw no reason for hurrying to Portugal, and had
no intention of doing so. The Supreme Junta, in wild
alarm at his actual fulfilment of the threat which he
had so often repeated, and evidently dreading a French
irruption upon their own habitation of Seville, ordered
Eguia to retreat to Villa Nueva da Serena, a little to
east of Medellin, and entreated Wellesley to look to
1 Wellesley to Villiers, 12th Aug.; to Beresford, 12th, 14th,
19th Aug. ; to Lord Wellesley, 15th, 16th, 21st Aug. 1809.
2 Londonderry MSS. Charles Stewart to Castlereagh, 1 8th, 21st
Aug. 1809.
3 Wellesley to Lord Wellesley, 30th Aug. 1809.
4 Craufurd's division and five squadrons of cavalry. Wellesley
to Craufurd, 4th Sept. ; to Lord Wellesley, 7th Sept. 1809.
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 283
the defence of the Guadiana. But the British General 1809.
pointed out that the Spanish troops could not do better
than remain for the present where they were, only
breaking up the bridge of boats at Almaraz and
sending it down to Badajoz ; for, in their position
between Mesas de Ibor and Truxillo, they effectually
covered the passages of the Guadiana, and there was
no chance of their being attacked by superior numbers.
As to himself, he could serve the Junta quite as
effectually on the Portuguese frontier as elsewhere,
for no French force would dare to cross the Guadiana
leaving the British army on its flank and rear. His
reasoning did not convince the authorities at Seville,
but that was no affair of his, so long as he was quit
of co-operation with the Spanish armies.
So ended the campaign of Talavera, a campaign
of accidents if ever there were one, and more remark-
able for the internal quarrels of the generals upon each
side than for the actual contest in arms between the
opposing armies. The confusion among the French
was extraordinary. Joseph, with Jourdan for the chief
of his staff, was nominally Commander-in-Chief; but
Napoleon was equally trying to control the operations
from the Danube by sending orders direct to the
subordinate generals. Among those subordinates Soult
and Ney were at daggers drawn ; and all, especially
Victor, were resolute in ignoring Joseph's authority.
Among the Allies, the British Government had indeed
given Wellesley a reasonably free hand ; but the foolish
intrigues of Frere, who considered himself the repre-
sentative of the Cabinet in Spain, did much to embarrass
relations between the British and Spanish Generals ;
while the Supreme Junta undoubtedly promoted discord
among the Spanish leaders by giving orders to Venegas
behind the back of Cuesta. As to Cuesta himself, he was
so hopelessly foolish and impracticable that, looking
to his feeble state from the first and his final collapse
under a stroke of paralysis, it is not only charitable but
reasonable to regard him as having been of unsound
284 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
3809. mind ever since his injuries at the battle of Medellin.
His intellect was not great, nor his temper amiable
before that misfortune, but after it both may be said
to have been altogether warped for a time. The
primary result of all these quarrels was to initiate a
vigorous campaign of recrimination between the parties
concerned. The speakers of the Opposition in the
British Parliament, backed by William Cobbett, may
be said to have opened the controversy publicly by
their bitter attacks upon Wellesley, attacks of which
they lived to be heartily ashamed. Cuesta no sooner
recovered his health than he seized his pen and made
a furious onslaught upon Venegas, to which Venegas
did not fail to reply. The remaining disputants con-
ducted their contests more quietly, but with none the less
acrimony, as their letters show ; and their partisans do
not fall behind the principals in virulence. Wellington's
despatches depict with bitter irony his trials with Cuesta;
and General Arteche has stated, not without severity,
Cuesta's case against Wellington. The memoirs of
Ducasse and Jourdan have perpetuated the grievances
of Joseph against Napoleon, Soult, and Victor ; and
Le Noble has retorted the complaints of Soult against
Jourdan and Ney. Finally there are the terse and
terrible letters of the great Emperor himself, impartially
chastising the whole of his agents in Spain, but naturally
giving no hint of his own shortcomings.
In this cloud of controversy the various issues have
been still further obscured by the intrusion of wisdom
after the event, and by persistent ignoring of the fact
that armies, being composed of men, must eat to live.
There can be no doubt that by advancing eastward into
the valley of the Tagus, with forty thousand men ready to
oppose him in front and fifty thousand ready to descend
upon his flank, Wellesley, who had little more than
twenty thousand troops upon whom he could depend,
committed a grave mistake. The fact is so patent that
any child could see it. But, in the first place, he
expected nearly half of the force on his front to be
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 285
distracted by Venegas, as indeed it ought to have been ; 1809.
in the second, he would, but for Cuesta's obstinacy,
have had an opportunity on the 23rd of July of dealing
a heavy stroke at Victor before Sebastiani and Joseph
could join him ; and in the third, the rapid concentration
of the force upon his flank was very greatly due, as we
have seen, to accident. For by a curious coincidence the
quarrels of Soult and Ney had brought about precisely
the movement that Napoleon desired, at the exact
moment when his letter of instructions arrived. No
human prescience could have foreseen so singular a
development of affairs as this, which, in fact, was
extraordinarily lucky for the French. Yet it must
be repeated once more that, in spite of all favourable
appearances, Wellesley was always nervous about his
left flank, and did his best, though in vain, to make
Cuesta secure it.
But here there comes in the greatest of all his
errors and miscalculations, namely, his reliance upon
the Spanish armies. It is, of course, a question how
far the charging this error upon him may not also be
wisdom after the event. He had received ominous
warnings from Roche ; but that officer bore not the best
of characters, and Wellesley, as he frankly confessed,
disbelieved him. He had, again, the circumstances
of Moore's campaign before him ; but Moore was
always something of a pessimist, and Wellesley could
hardly have been ignorant of the fact. Again, he knew
that Spain is not one but many countries, and he might
reasonably hope that Estremadura might prove herself
a better Spain than Leon had done, particularly after
the installation of the Supreme Junta. Indeed it may be
doubted whether any power of divination could have
realised the true nature of the Spanish Government
and of its forces in the field without actual and painful
experience. Yet again, Moore was trying to contend
against the entire French army with Napoleon himself
at the head ; but in the summer of 1809 Napoleon was
in Germany, and many of his best troops with him..
286 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. The opportunity was a very great one, and, looking
to the disappointment excited in Spain by Moore's
retreat, it was a political as well as a military necessity
to take advantage of the occasion. But in spite of all
the difficulties of his position, it is not easy to acquit
Wellesley of temerity for entering upon this campaign
in complete dependence upon the Spaniards for his
transport and supplies. Moore's experience upon this
point at least might have been taken to heart ; but
it was not. The truth seems to be that Wellesley
was somewhat impetuous and over-confident, not yet
fully alive to the magnitude of the problem that had
been set him for solution, and perhaps just a little
anxious to prove himself in Castlereagh's eyes to be
a very different man from Moore.1
As regards his operations when once he had
committed himself to the campaign, there is little
more to be said except to glance at the possible con-
sequences if he had attacked Victor, as he had intended,
on the 23rd of July, and defeated him On that day
Sebastiani was still at Madridejos, and Joseph with the
Reserve was at Naval Carnero, some forty miles from
the scene of action ; so that Victor could have retreated
either upon Madrid to join the King, or upon Toledo
to join Sebastiani. But whichever alternative he might
have chosen, either the Reserve or the Fourth Corps
would have been left in isolation, and the Allies could
1 There is a curious passage in a letter written by Captain
(afterwards Sir William) Gomm from Holland after receiving the
news of Talavera. " I believe Sir Arthur possesses more military-
talent than any officer in our army, and much judgment ; but he is
impetuous, and I am afraid his ardent spirit has blinded him for the
moment to the consequences to which even brilliant victory must
expose an army situated as his is. After all that has passed before
his eyes he cannot surely place any reliance upon these degenerate
Spaniards ; and if the failure of Sir John Moore was insufficient to
prove to him how little was to be risked in their favour, the cir-
cumstances of his own march through the country and their
behaviour in the late battle, one would think, should be fully equal
to such a purpose." Life of Sir W. Gomm, p. 137. Gomm, it will
be remembered, had served through Moore's campaign.
ch.xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 287
hardly have failed to enter Madrid. They could not, 1809.
of course, have held it ; but the moral effect would
have been great, and they could have made such havoc
of the French stores and supplies in the capital as must
greatly have crippled the enemy. Of course, once
more, in this case Soult might equally have cut off
Wellesley's communications with Portugal ; but then,
as Napier points out, the British General could have
shifted his line of operations to La Mancha, where his
own army would have been united with those of Cuesta
and Venegas ; and in such circumstances the Supreme
Junta could hardly have refused the British Government
the fullest use of Cadiz as a new base. Moreover,
it should always be remembered that Wellesley had
a right to expect earlier information than he received
of the advance of Soult's corps upon Plasencia, and
that, even though these corps descended suddenly and
unexpectedly upon him, he was able to escape them
by crossing the Tagus and changing his line of operations
to Badajoz. In reading the French accounts any one
would suppose that Wellesley had been saved by a
miracle from Heaven, instead of by his own prompt-
ness and common sense ; whereas, on the contrary, the
miracle was on behalf of the French themselves,
inasmuch as at the beginning of July it was only
the merest chance that stationed Ney's corps at Astorga
instead of in the heart of Galicia.
As to the proceedings of the French, it is hard to
judge Joseph severely, because only in name was he
Commander-in-Chief. His great error, of course, was
in fighting at Talavera when he did ; though it is fair
to say that, but for Victor's insubordination, he might
have given a very good account of his enemies. He and
Jourdan, however, blamed Soult for the general failure
of the campaign, alleging that the Duke of Dalmatia
might have reached Plasencia long before he did, if
he had not waited for Ney ; while Soult's partisans
threw the entire responsibility for the delay upon
Ney himself. All such criticism is beside the point.
288 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Napoleon had given strict orders to Soult not to move
by small detachments, and he thoroughly approved
that Marshal's refusal to march until the three corps
were well closed up. But apart from this, it must be
noted that Soult declined, beyond doubt quite rightly,
to advance until he had received artillery for his corps
from Madrid. The cannon did not reach him until
the 29th of August, and he marched on the 30th.
Who, then, was really responsible for Soult's tardiness
in moving down upon Plasencia ? Wellesley, and no
one else ; for it was he who, by his campaign upon the
Douro, had brought about the destruction of Soult's
artillery.
Lastly, it must be observed that Napoleon later
on utterly condemned the entire plan of campaign
prescribed to Soult by Joseph, saying that the Marshal's
three corps should have been called from Salamanca to
Madrid, and that the decisive battle should have been
fought under the walls of the capital. The movement
upon Plasencia he declared to be both dangerous and
useless : dangerous because the French army at Talavera
might have been beaten before Soult co.uld have come
to its support ; useless because Wellesley could evade
the whole manoeuvre by the comparatively simple
measure to which he actually and successfully resorted.1
Regarding Soult's refusal to follow the Allies after the
rout of the Spaniards at Arzobispo, and his delegation
of the pursuit to Victor, Jourdan and Joseph did not
fail to use hard words. But the plain fact is that
the French armies were at the last gasp from fatigue
and privation ; and indeed the campaign of Talavera
came to an end simply and solely from want of food.
Both sides had started it badly by basing their move-
ments upon the false principle of double external
lines. Both had pursued it still worse by marching
a large force into an exhausted district without any
organised system of supplies. As a natural consequence
1 Napoleon to Clarke, 15th, 21st Aug. 1809. Corres. de
Napoleon, 15,661, 15,694.
ch. xxxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 289
the great stroke designed by each of them came to 1809.
naught, and they were obliged to disperse in opposite
directions to avoid death through starvation.
One more point, of which the Spaniards have made
very much, remains still to be considered, namely, the
effect which might have been produced if the forty
thousand troops which were sent to Walcheren had been
despatched to the Peninsula. This can fortunately be
answered in Wellesley's own words : " I do not think,"
he wrote to Castlereagh on the 25th of August, "that
matters would have been much better if you had sent
your large expedition to Spain instead of to the Scheldt.
You could not have equipped it in Galicia or anywhere
in the north of Spain." Nor, it may be added, could
it have been equipped anywhere in the Peninsula unless
Cadiz had been granted to it as a base, a measure
against which the Spaniards were resolutely determined.
" If," continued Wellesley, " we had had sixty thousand
men instead of twenty thousand, we should not have
got to Talavera to fight the battle for want of means
and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we
could not have gone farther, and the armies would
probably have separated for want of means of subsistence,
probably without a battle, but certainly afterwards."
Add to this difficulty the still more formidable one
arising from the dearth of specie in England, and it
becomes manifest that, without Cadiz, the army of
Walcheren would have been powerless in Spain. The
great military question in the Peninsula — a question
always ignored by Spanish writers — was that of feeding
the troops ; and final victory was practically assured
to that army which should first vanquish the difficulties
of transport and supply. Wellesley, as we shall see,
perceived this truth after Talavera, and by recognising
it forthwith assured himself of ultimate success.
For the rest the general results of the campaign
were entirely negative. The British failed to do any
serious mischief to the French, and the French failed
to drive the British into the sea. Upon the operations
VOL. vii u
290 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. of the whole summer, the Allies had gained ground, for
they had driven the French from Galicia, Asturias, and
Northern Portugal ; but, on the other hand, the French
had, on the whole, held their own in other quarters
despite the absence of Napoleon and his best troops
on the Danube ; and the next campaign was likely to
be very different from that of 1809. Wellesley warned
Ministers to send back the transports to Lisbon as soon
as they should receive positive intelligence that Napoleon
was reinforcing his army in Spain. " You may depend
upon it," he wrote, " that he and his marshals must be
desirous of revenging upon us the different blows we
have given them, and that, when they come into the
Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get
the English out." 1
1 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25 th Aug. 1809
CHAPTER XXXII
A narrative of the events of 1809 has already been 1809.
given in three different spheres of operations — the West
Indies, the Scheldt, and the Peninsula. It now remains
to consider those in a fourth sphere, which has for long
been unnoticed, namely the Mediterranean, where Sir
John Stuart still held command of some fifteen thou-
sand men. In a previous chapter l we followed the
ignoble course of his career in 1808 — the loss of Capri,
the triumphant advance of Murat into Calabria, and
his ostentatious preparations for an invasion of Sicily,
with Stuart's consequent refusal, despite the urgency of
Castlereagh, to detach any portion of his troops to
Catalonia. In February Admiral Collingwood again
pressed upon Sir John the advantages of despatching a
force to that province ;2 but, since St. Cyr's brilliant cam-
paign, circumstances in that quarter had changed ; while
Murat's menaces still kept Stuart in nervous anxiety.
Collingwood therefore proposed to him the occupation
of Cephallonia and Zante, which was invited by the
1 Hist, of the Brit. Army, Vol. VI. p. 137 seq.
2 " In Catalonia they want money, arms, and ammunition, of
which no use appears to be made when they get them. . . . The
Somatenes range the hills in a disorderly way, and fire at a distance,
but retire on being approached. This state of things made me
anxious that a body of English, however small, conducted by in-
telligent and temperate officers, should have been sent, in hopes
that their presence and example might have animated the country.
It was an experiment, in my own view of it — for even of the
success of that I was not sanguine" (Collingwood to Mulgrave,
22nd March 1809).
291
292 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. inhabitants, and was favoured by the Admiral as a means
Feb. for establishing a right of interference in the future of
the Ionian Islands. Stuart welcomed the idea warmly.
The French garrisons in the aforesaid islands were so
weak that five hundred men would suffice to overpower
them. Thus there would be little risk in such an expedi-
tion, the garrison of Sicily itself would not be appreciably
lessened, the Ionian Islands would serve as a partial
cover to Sicily, and there would be a neat little exploit
to the credit of the victor of Maida in the Gazette.
Whether Collingwood's diplomatic designs against the
day of a general peace might be worth the immediate
multiplication of small posts, such as could easily be
overwhelmed by a vigilant enemy, was a question which
did not occur to him.1
April. At the beginning of April, however, Stuart was
diverted from this project by the arrival of an Austrian
officer, Count de la Tour, at Palermo to explain to him,
as we have already seen, the plan of the Austrian cam-
paign in Italy. The general idea was that early in
April the Archduke John should cross the Isonzo and
march rapidly upon the Adige, while a detachment,
embarking at the head of the Adriatic under the pro-
tection of the British squadron, should menace the coast
between Venice and Rimini. But besides this the Austrian
Government, astounding as it may seem, was, according
to this officer, in correspondence with the Italian patriots
for the expulsion of the French, and for setting up a
constitutional and independent kingdom in Italy with
an Austrian Archduke for King. As to the part to be
played by the British, de la Tour said nothing definite,
only hoping that they would strike at the same time
with the Austrians, and as near to their army as possible ;
but the closing words of his memorandum were : " Any
diversion will be useful ; time presses, and this chance
will be the last." The choice of a sphere of operations
was not easy, for Murat had thirty thousand men, most
1 Stuart to Sec. of State, 6th, 15th Feb. 1809. Corres. of
Lord Collingzoood, ii. 317-319.
ch.xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 293
of them Italians, in the Neapolitan dominions, and a 1809.
weak division in the Roman States. Collingwood was APnl-
for a descent upon the coast of Tuscany ; but to such a
distance Stuart dared not carry more than seven or eight
thousand troops ; whereas to a point nearer Sicily he
might adventure twelve thousand beside six thousand
Neapolitans. In any case the British were hampered by
lack, of cavalry. Upon the whole Stuart inclined towards
a disembarkation in Calabria. There were garrisons in
Reggio and Scilla, and a chain of posts leading up to
the familiar ground of Mileto and Monteleone, where
there were believed to be three or four thousand men,
with five or six thousand more in the neighbouring pro-
vinces of Upper Calabria, Basilicata, and the Principato.
But everywhere the insurgent patriots were growing
bolder, encouraged not a little by the raids of the
British frigates, whose officers believed the attack of
no fortified post to be beyond their powers, and
acted upon the belief with astonishing audacity and
success.1
The one thing needful, therefore, was prompt action.
The difficulties of a right choice might excuse a com-
mander if he selected the wrong field of operations ;
but Count de la Tour had said that any diversion would
be useful, and beyond doubt he spoke truth. Prompti-
tude, however, was a quality in which Stuart was wholly
lacking. The transports were equipped for sea with all
stores on board, and the battalions were so distributed
as to be ready for rapid embarkation ; but Stuart, lost
in irresolution, did nothing. " He dawdled and fretted
in his quarters, issued no orders, nor even looked at the
troops." 2 So the precious month of April passed away in
inaction, enlivened towards its close by jubilant salutes
from the guns of Reggio and Scilla for the victories of
Eckmuhl and Ratisbon. These demonstrations did not
hearten Stuart to any enterprise ; but, according to his
1 " All our frigate captains are great generals and some in the
brigs are good brigadiers " (Collingwood to Admiral Sotheby,
30th June 1809). 2 Bunbury.
294 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. own account, he had just completed the embarkation
May- of ten thousand men for a descent upon Calabria, when
there arrived the news of the Archduke John's retreat
from Italy, and of Napoleon's entry into Vienna
on the 13th of May. Once again the General was
thrown back into his former state of indecision, if
indeed he had ever emerged from it ; and he was only
roused by an extremely discreditable and unpleasant
occurrence.
Stuart's course of behaviour had already driven the
best of his general officers to leave him and seek em-
ployment elsewhere ; and those that remained conceived
a contempt for him which speedily propagated itself
throughout the army. After the abandonment of his
design upon Calabria, he suggested to Collingwood that
a force should sail to Ischia, take possession of the
island, and from thence threaten Naples. The operation
would be showy, not very hazardous, and might make
a brave figure in the Gazette, which was reason enough
to commend it to Stuart ; but Collingwood said plainly
that he failed to see what advantage could accrue from
the occupation of Ischia or of any other island in the bay
of Naples, and urged the despatch of troops to the
Roman or Tuscan coasts. Stuart, however, thoroughly
enamoured of his petty expedition, pressed forward the
preparations, until one day a general officer waited upon
him as the spokesman of the malcontents in the army,
and remonstrated with him in language so insubordinate
as practically to threaten a mutiny if the order were
given to embark. Much agitated, Sir John sent for his
Quartermaster-general, Colonel Henry Bunbury, whose
company he had for some time sedulously avoided, and
poured his tale of woe into the latter's ears. Bunbury
speedily ascertained that, though a bad spirit was abroad,
the mischief was less serious than Stuart had appre-
hended ; and it was decided that the best thing to do
was to put the troops aboard ship at once, distributing
them in such sort that the band of discontented officers
should be broken up.
CH. XXXII
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
295
Accordingly the embarkation proceeded, and on the 1809.
nth of June the armament sailed out of Milazzo, in June 11,
all thirteen thousand men, including about a thousand
cavalry, seven hundred of them Neapolitans, and a
brigade of Neapolitan infantry — fair soldiers under a
good officer.1 Six battalions remained behind to guard
The embarkation return of 9th June is as
follows : —
Rank and File.
20th L.D. and Mounted Infantry 284
R.A. .
■
432
R.E. .
■
48
Staff Corps
.
35
Grenadier Battalion
.
906
1st L.I. Battalion
.
908
2nd L.I. Battalion
.
362
1 and 2/27th
.
1253
44th .
.
616
58th .
<
639
62nd .
. ,
580
81st .
.
656
3rd, 4th, 6th Batts.
K.G.L.
2005
Watteville's
.
606
Corsican Rangers
•
442
9772
Add one-eighth for
officers and sergeants
1230
11,002
But Stuart later forwarded another return as follows
Advance —
Advanced Corps. Brig. Lumley.
Cavalry, 1st L.I., 81st
Advanced Brigade. Maj.-Gen. Macfarlane.
2nd L.I., Corsican Rangers, Cala-
brians
Reserve Brigade. Brig. Oswald.
Grenadier Batt. i/27th, 6 cos./44th
1st Brigade. Lt.-Col. Smith.
10th, zjzjxh. .....
znd Brigade. Col. Airey.
58th, 62nd ....
yd Brigade. Col. Hinuber.
3rd and 4th K.G.L. . . .1337
3078
2194
1181
1222
296 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 809. Sicily, and to lend assistance to offensive operations
June 12. nearer home. On the morning of the 12th the Tenth
and the Chasseurs Britanniques parted company under
Colonel Haviland Smith,1 and sailed through the straits
of Messina for an attack upon Scilla. Stuart was
strangely confident as to the effect to be produced by
this detachment. Indeed, before hearing anything of its
doings, he reported that upon its appearance the enemy
had abandoned the greater part of their posts by the
shore, and that the works upon the straits opposite to
Messina had been seized and disarmed by Smith's corps.
This, as shall presently be seen, was pure imagination,
and the event proved that the General was equally
incompetent whether as seer or commander.
The wind was very light, and the progress of the
fleet very slow. Off Amantea it was joined by one
hundred additional transports carrying the Neapolitan
contingent under General Bourcard and Prince Leopold
of Naples, who came nominally as a volunteer, but in
reality to represent his august parents. Bourcard was
instructed to make a demonstration off Policastro ; and
the main body proceeded on its weary way. Calms
\th 1
R.A.
R.E.
Staff
brigade.
6th K.G.L., Watteville's, Chasseurs
Britanniques ....
• •••••••
• •••••••
Corps ......
one-eighth for officers, sergeants, etc.
1778
432
48
35
Add
11,305
Hx3
12,718
Neither of these quite tally with the return given by Bunbury,
p. 461, which gives a total of British and Neapolitans of 14,250 rank
and file.
1 It will thus be seen that Stuart did not stick to his distribution
of brigades, but broke up two of them to put together Smith's
detachment. I take the composition of Smith's force from Stuart's
own despatch, which is confirmed by Bunbury, p. 364, and by
Smith's casualty list ; but Bunbury in his appendix, p. 461, sends
the whole of Smith's brigade to Messina.
ch. xxxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 297
and light airs continued ; the horses began to suffer 1 809.
severely ; and water was running dangerously short
when the armament at last anchored on the 24th off June 24.
Cape Martino in the neighbourhood of Baia, having
taken thirteen days to traverse two hundred miles.
The landing-places upon Ischia and Procida were at
once reconnoitred, when the batteries appeared more
formidable than had been expected ; but the lack of
water on the transports compelled an immediate attack,
and orders were issued accordingly to land at daybreak
upon the eastern shore of Ischia. A line-of-battle ship,
a frigate, and a swarm of gunboats, British and Sicilian,
were told off to cover the disembarkation ; and the two
battalions of Light Infantry, the Eighty-first and the
Corsican Rangers,1 together with a few Calabrians and
six pieces of cannon, under General Macfarlane and
Brigadier Lumley, were appointed to force a landing.
Owing to the difficulty of marshalling boats in the
darkness and to the weight of the launches in which the
troops were embarked, it was broad daylight long
before the latter were even near the island ; but the
enemy's batteries made a poor reply to the fire of the
British ships, and their troops turned and ran, hardly
attempting to engage the British light infantry. One
hundred and eighty were captured on the spot, and the
rest retreated into the castle, whither a summons was
at once sent to the Governor to surrender. Meanwhile
a like summons had been sent to Procida, where great
good luck had befallen Stuart. Murat, upon hearing
of the arrival of the armament, had come down in
person during the night to Cape Miseno to superintend
the despatch of reinforcements to that island, and had
actually succeeded in passing over a hundred men into
it ; but the remainder were intercepted and captured,
and among them the colonel selected by King Joachim
to take charge of the citadel. A miserable old
Neapolitan Governor, therefore, was still in command,
with few troops but one of those heterogeneous
1 2380 men.
*
••— ft
■P-
1 , < "
298 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. battalions, composed of deserters and prisoners of all
June 24. nations, which Napoleon was in the habit of scraping
together for his minor garrisons. A few cannon-shot
sufficed to frighten the Governor ; his regiment of
ruffians mutinied and prepared to sack the island ; the
inhabitants turned out to plunder the stores ; and
Procida was on the point of becoming a pandemonium,
when General Oswald, without waiting for a formal
capitulation, landed his grenadier - battalion, restored
order, and took possession of the island.
But Murat's resources were not yet exhausted.
Remembering what a thorn Gaeta had been in Joseph's
side two years before, he had become apprehensive of a
British attack on that fortress and had moved thither
half of his flotilla of gunboats. These seemed likely
to be cut off from Naples by the British fleet ; and
therefore, before Procida fell, he had sent orders to
them to creep along the shore with all possible silence
and secrecy, and to double Cape Miseno before day-
break, when there would be no wind to enable the British
frigates to stop them. Early in the morning of the
June 26. 26th this flotilla was discovered by a Neapolitan boat-
man. There was a dead calm, and only six British
gunboats were at hand ; but these six under Lieutenant
Cameron of the Twenty-first boldly attacked the thirty-
four of the enemy, and clung to them with such
persistent daring that time was gained for the main
body of the British and Sicilian flotillas, under Captain
Read of the Twenty-seventh, to come up to their
assistance. A light breeze presently enabled one of the
frigates to stand across the van of the enemy and cut
them off, when some of the rearmost took refuge under
the guns of a coast-battery. A small party of Marines,
one company of the German Legion, and a few
Calabrians thereupon landed, attacked and routed a
party of infantry which protected the battery, and
captured thirty-seven prisoners, while the seamen
destroyed the vessels. In this brilliant little affair
twenty-four gunboats were taken, five were destroyed,
ch. xxxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 299
and five only, much damaged by the shot of the frigates, 1809.
contrived to escape. The casualties of the British were
trifling, but the dead unfortunately included young
Cameron, whose gallantry in the action had been most
conspicuous.
These successes, won under the very eyes of Murat,
were continued on the 27th by the Navy, when the June 27.
Cyane of twenty-four guns under Captain Staines, aided
by the Espoir brig, attacked a forty-gun frigate, a
corvette and ten gunboats which were stealing down
the coast under the protection of the shore-batteries.
Such a sight can seldom have been seen since the
Athenian and Syracusan armies watched the final combat
of their fleets in the great harbour of Syracuse. The
hills and the house-tops were crowded with people in
a fever of excitement, and Murat himself came raging
into the batteries to stimulate the efforts of his gunners,
as the audacious British frigate, heedless of the fire from
ships afloat and forts ashore, fastened on to her huge
quarry and never quitted her until she reached the very
molehead of Naples and staggered, almost a wreck,
into the harbour. Unfortunately Staines was grievously
wounded ; but his bravery so stirred the Neapolitans
that Murat took the severest measures to repress any
attempt at insurrection.
It remained only to reduce the castle of Ischia,
which, though perched upon an isolated rock, was
commanded by the adjacent hills. A few days sufficed
to drag up some heavy guns, and the garrison of
three hundred men was compelled on the 30th of June June 30.
to surrender. Altogether fifteen hundred prisoners and
one hundred guns were taken, at a cost of fewer than
twenty killed and wounded, so that Stuart's exploits
were sufficient to fill a good despatch.
But meanwhile the detachment under Colonel
Haviland Smith had not prospered in like manner.
His instructions bade him to wait a few days for
General Partonneaux to withdraw his troops northward,
and then to besiege Scilla. Smith duly waited for the
300 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. few days, and then, being informed from Messina that
he might safely do so, invested Scilla. Somewhat
mistrusting his intelligence, nevertheless, he took the
precaution to push two companies of the Twenty-first
fifteen miles northward to Palmi, in order to watch the
road from Monteleone. On the following night the
advanced guard of Partonneaux's division surprised the
picquet of the Twenty-first, broke straight into Palmi,
captured most of the two companies, and pressed on
with all speed to Scilla.1 Fortunately Smith, who was
an excellent officer, was warned in time to embark his
men and take them across the straits, abandoning his
guns and stores. Scarcely had he done so when
Partonneaux was recalled with every man that he
could raise to the defence of Naples ; whereupon on
July 2. the night of the 2nd of July he blew up the castle of
Scilla, threw into the sea the guns collected by Murat
for the invasion of Sicily, left his British trophies to be
recovered by their owners, and hastened away to the
north.
Then came the question what should be done next ;
and this was not easy to answer. The presence of the
British at Ischia kept Naples in a ferment, compelling
Murat to assemble all his troops there, and to govern
as in a state of siege ; but the concentration of
twenty-five thousand men made any attempt upon
the city impossible to Stuart. Ischia, again, was an
embarrassing possession, for it contained no supplies,
little water, and abundance of nothing except wine ;
while Prince Leopold, who had now entered the island
with the Neapolitan contingent, was inclined to give
himself the airs of sovereignty. Stuart, who could be
both strong and firm where his own dignity was con-
cerned, peremptorily suppressed this usurpation of
authority ; but there his energies ended, though by
this time work had arisen for him in other quarters.
1 The casualties of the force were, I officer and I man killed,
9 wounded, 24 missing ; 4 officers and 82 men (of the Twenty-
first) prisoners.
cH.xxxrr HISTORY OF THE ARMY 301
The Austrian success at Aspern had given a new turn 1^09.
to the war on the Danube, which had not been wholly
undone by Napoleon's costly and indecisive victory at
Wagram ; and on the very day of Wagram Italy had July 6.
been roused and shocked by the news that General
Miollis had seized the Pope by Napoleon's order, and
had carried him off with the utmost haste to the Alps.
Colonel Bunbury urged Stuart to attack Civita Vecchia
or Leghorn, or at least to make a demonstration on
the north coast. The King of Sardinia asked him to
co-operate in an attack on the Genoese Riviera. Stuart
would not move. Neapolitan gentlemen came to Ischia
to treat with him on behalf of the patriots of Italy,
saying that if he would favour Italian independence,
they would join him to a man to expel the French, but
that if he came to restore Ferdinand, they would join
the French and take arms against him. Stuart declined
to see them or to send them any reply ; whereupon,
observing Prince Leopold to be on the spot, they con-
cluded that Stuart's object was to re-establish the hated
King. It was very evident that the General in planning
his expedition had entertained no idea beyond making
a military promenade.
In the second week of July came news of Smith's
failure at Scilla, and of a panic which had arisen
in Messina in consequence. Though he knew that
every one of Murat's soldiers had been withdrawn from
Calabria, Stuart at once ordered the Neapolitan troops
to return to Sicily, and two days later sent Airey's
brigade to join them. Yet a few days afterwards came
a letter from Collingwood, recommending the evacua-
tion of Ischia and Procida, as they were likely to prove
a greater evil than even Capri had been. He also
reported great activity in the naval yards at Toulon,
and added a warning that, if the British squadron were
blown away from the mouth of the port, as had
recently happened, the Toulon fleet might very well
make its way to Ischia and thence to Palermo. This
came as a revelation to Stuart, for it had never
3o2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. occurred to him that a fleet of transports at anchor
must offer a surer mark than the same fleet cruising
at sea. He waited only to disarm and dismantle the
two captured islands, after which, embarking his whole
force, he sailed on the 26 th of July, and arrived on the
July 29. 29th at Milazzo. According to his own account, he
was on the point of sending a detachment to Civita
Vecchia when Collingwood's letter arrived ; but Stuart
always contrived to delay his enterprises until something
occurred to prevent them.
After this ridiculous waste of men, money, and time,
Stuart subsided for two months into quiescence. In
letters previous to his despatch concerning the Toulon
fleet, Collingwood had renewed his proposal that an attack
should be made upon Zante and Cephallonia ; but the
General, on hearing of the armistice of Znaim, rejected
the overtures for such an expedition, which were made
at his chief's request by Admiral Martin. It was
necessary for Collingwood, overworked though he was,1
to write again and say that he could not see how any
events in Austria could interrupt the project, and that
the acquisitions obtained by the French in the Adriatic
made the possession of a port at the entrance of that
sea very desirable for England. Most reluctantly
Sept. 23. Stuart yielded, and on the 23rd of September sent off
eighteen hundred men, with Brigadier Oswald in com-
mand,2 under convoy of a line-of-battle ship and two
1 "I am an unhappy creature, old and worn-out. I wish to
come to England, but some objection is ever made to it " (Colling-
wood to Mrs. Hall, 7th Oct. 1809). Two weeks later he rendered
his last great service in the destruction of a small French squadron
and convoy in the Gulf of Lyons, and died on his homeward
voyage on the 7th of March 1810, aged fifty-nine. His death was
due to overwork and prolonged confinement on board ship ; in
short, he was simply killed by the Admiralty, which kept him at his
post in spite of his entreaties to be relieved, because there was no
man to replace him.
~a. N.C.O. and
Officers. ..
Men.
2 20th L.D. . . i 26 (without horses).
R.A 3 96 (with horses).
R.E 3 H
ch. xxxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 303
smaller vessels. Making first for Zante, Oswald 1809.
anchored in a convenient bay three miles from the
town on the 1st of October, and on the following day Oct. 1.
landed six hundred men under the command of Colonel
Hudson Lowe.1 The little force advanced in two
columns, one of which turned the defences of the town,
while the other invested the castle ; and the garrison,
which numbered just under four hundred men of an
Italian regiment, thereupon surrendered. The expedi-
tion then repaired to Cephallonia which, owing to the
ability of the naval dispositions, yielded without resist-
ance, and gave Oswald another two hundred prisoners,
Italians and Albanians. Captain Richard Church was
next detached with some of the Thirty-fifth and
Corsicans to Ithaca, and Major Clarke with two
companies of the Thirty-fifth to Cerigo ; both of which
islands, thanks to the good management of the two
commanders, capitulated without firing a shot, and
added nearly two hundred more to the tale of the
captured.
The islanders welcomed the British ; and Oswald
incited them to make preparations for their own
defence, laying the foundation of a local force and
encouraging them by hoisting the Septinsular flag
together with the Union Jack, as a symbol at once of
their independence and of British protection. But he
declared that for the present it would be impossible to
withdraw the British troops altogether. The garrison
of Corfu numbered over four thousand men, three-
fourths of them French ; and, though the island was
at the time straitly blockaded, the advent even of a
weak French squadron from Toulon would suffice to
35th .... 35 919
44th .... 9 209
Corsican Rangers 32 620
Guns : two 12-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 5J in. howitzers,
four mountain guns.
1 4 cos. /35th, 2 cos. /44th, 2 cos. Corsican Rangers, 2 mountain
guns.
3o4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. raise the blockade and to expose the garrisons of the
newly occupied islands to capture. It may be questioned,
indeed, whether Collingwood was right, as a matter of
general policy, in urging the occupation of Zante and
Cephallonia. He stated the case against such occupa-
tion when combating the suggestion of Mr. Adair, the
British Ambassador at Constantinople, that Cerigo
should be captured. " I cannot form," he wrote, " the
smallest idea of the utility that could be derived from
the occupation of Cerigo or of any of the little islands
in the Archipelago. It would require a certain number
of troops, who must be fed by provisions brought to
them. . . . The garrison would require a squadron to
protect them, and the services of garrison and squadron
would be limited to taking care of each other." : It was
only the possession of an anchorage which differentiated
Zante and Cephallonia from Cerigo. On the other
hand, from a purely naval point of view, the garrison
of Corfu needed constant watching ; and the calls upon
the commander-in-chief for ships were so multitudinous
that a harassed admiral might well seek to relieve his
officers and crews by making the army furnish new naval
stations for them. This is a point which is too much
neglected in all of our naval and military plans. A
vast deal of watching and scouting is expected from
the Navy, but, with the exception of holding certain
definite bases for the fleet, the duties of the Army are
held to be offensive ; and no account is taken of the
new naval stations which admirals will inevitably
require to be held for them, and of the consequent
weakening of the offensive military force.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that on receiving
Stuart's report respecting the occupation of Zante and
1 Collingwood to Adair, 25th April 1809.
2 The authority for the preceding pages of this chapter will be
found in Corres. of Lord Collingwood, ii. 317-394. Bunbury, Great
War with France, 359-382. Record Office, W.O. Mediterranean.
Stuart to Sec. of State, 6th, 15th Feb., 14th, 17th, 26th April ; 5th,
24th May, 9th June, 5th, 9th, 16th July, 2nd Aug., 25th, 26th
Sept., 5th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd Oct. 1809.
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 305
Cephallonia the Cabinet sent him no very encouraging '809.
reply. If (such was the purport of the despatch) the
measure tended to the security of Sicily, without
diminishing British strength in the Mediterranean, then
it might be considered not inexpedient ; but no offensive
operations must be undertaken in reliance upon rein-
forcements from home, for circumstances were more
likely to dictate a reduction than an increase of the
army in that quarter ; and, if Stuart were really
looking for a field of operations, he might remember
his instructions to make a diversion upon the east
coast of Spain.1 So far Ministers had uniformly
accepted Stuart's statements and approved his actions ,•
but their despatches now showed a change of tone,
which was doubtless due to information received from
Colonel Bunbury, his ablest staff-officer, who had left
him and returned to England in disgust. Hence-
forward they took a truer measure of the General's
incompetence.
Meanwhile the signature of peace between Austria
and France on the 13th of October had altered the
entire situation in the Mediterranean. For in the
first place the French army was free to reoccupy
Italy and to menace Sicily ; and in the second, the
treaty itself contained provisions directly calculated
to extend French influence in the Adriatic, in the
Levant and generally in the east of Europe. Austria
had yielded up to France the whole of her maritime
provinces — Trieste, Carniola, parts of Carinthia and
Croatia, Fiume and Austrian Istria, which joined to
French Istria, Dalmatia and Ragusa formed the Seven
Provinces of Napoleon's new government of Illyria.
Thus the French Empire had stretched its borders to
the Balkan Peninsula ; while simultaneously the occupa-
tion of some of the Ionian Islands renewed the active
competition of England with Napoleon for influence
in those parts. In brief, the Eastern Question entered
upon a new and acute phase for both powers ; and for
1 Sec. of State to Stuart, 29th Nov. 1809.
VOL. VII X
3o6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 809. the next two years the British forces in the Medi-
terranean, so far as they were concerned with other
matters than the supremely important duty of holding
their own in Sicily, turned their face towards the East
rather than to the West, towards the Levant rather
than the Iberian Peninsula. It will be convenient,
therefore, to follow the progress of Mediterranean
affairs to the point at which the garrison of Sicily once
more faced about, and devoted its superfluous energy
to the east coast of Spain.
First, it will be necessary to look a little more
thoroughly into the situation of Turkey. The partition
of the Ottoman Empire, as we have seen, was the project
which Napoleon constantly dangled before the eyes of
Alexander in order to keep him firm to the alliance of
Tilsit. So long, however, as the Porte was friendly to
France and observed the Continental System, it suited
Napoleon far better to uphold the effete Turkish govern-
ment than to admit Russia to the Mediterranean. In
1 807, after the British failures in the Dardanelles and in
Egypt, French influence was supreme in Constantinople
itself, and the Sultan Mustapha willingly closed his
ports to the British ; but in reality the centre of
Turkish power lay not at Constantinople but at Janina.
Ali Pasha, who had originally raised himself by per-
sistent opposition to the Ottoman Government, was
now become the chief support of the Ottoman Empire.
It was he who by force and fraud had checked the
advance of the French in the east after the fall of
Venice in 1797 ; and, though Napoleon had tried to
make good the ground lost on that occasion by the
clauses in the Treaties of Pressburg and Tilsit, which
gave him Dalmatia, Cattaro, and the Ionian Islands,
yet the gains of Ali were coextensive with those of
the French. His authority now reached over all
Greece, Morea, and part of Albania ; and though
approaching sixty years of age, he was as active and
ambitious as ever. Both sides paid court to him.
Major William Leake of the Artillery — a name still
ch.xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 307
honoured by Hellenic students — at a secret meeting 1809.
held in November 1807 had induced him to bring
about a reconciliation between the Porte and England,
which finally issued in a treaty of peace signed on
the 5th of January 1809. A few weeks later Leake
had returned with presents of stores and ammunition
to be used against the French, and had remained as
resident at Janina and Prevesa. Napoleon likewise
had sent a consul-general, and a colonel of engineers to
fortify both towns. But, though thus complaisant to
both parties, Ali seems to have made up his mind that
he had more to dread from the French than from the
British. He divined that it was not for nothing that
the Emperor had seized the island of Santa Maura and
the town of Parga on the mainland before his very
doors. From thence the French could open a route
to Janina by the Gulf of Arta, seize the Pasha's
treasures, and rally to their flag the entire population
of northern Greece ; or, if baulked of that object by
the British fleet, they could at any rate make such a
demonstration upon the vulnerable side of Greece as
would favour an irruption upon northern Albania from
Dalmatia and Cattaro. In fact, Ali's northern frontier
was never safe, so long as French menaces compelled
him to devote his chief attention to his capital.
The ousting of the French from four islands within
a fortnight, however, altered the Pasha's opinion not
a little. He now realised that the British possessed an
army as well as a fleet ; not a great army which could
march to Janina, yet still sufficient to deliver him in
one quarter from far more formidable neighbours.
From the moment when General Oswald established
himself in Zante and Cephallonia, French influence
began to wane at Janina ; and Leake pressed Stuart
to secure the Pasha finally by the capture of Corfu.
Nor was it only for the sake of gaining Ali that this
stroke was desirable ; the reduction of the whole of
the Seven Islands by England would strengthen her
also at Constantinople. During the quarrel of Britain
308 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. with Turkey in 1807 Sebastiani had obtained the
Porte's acknowledgment of the annexation of the
Seven Islands to France, although by the Treaty of
Amiens they had been erected into a Septinsular
Republic. Oswald, it will be remembered, had hoisted
the flag of the Septinsular Republic over the captured
islands ; but now France declared that she would treat
Turkish recognition of that Republic as a declaration
of war. In abject terror the Porte bowed to the
will of Napoleon ; intimating, however, to Adair that
England might deal with the islands as she would,
unembarrassed by any claims of Turkish sovereignty.
If Corfu were captured by the British, then the Sultan
would recognise the Septinsular Republic ; but until
then, from fear of France, he must disavow its exist-
ence. Such a situation, urged Adair, could not last
long. Either Corfu must fall ; or before many months
Turkey must quarrel with England or with France.1
Stuart felt the force of these arguments, but for the
present found himself, not without justification, unable
to attend to them. Not only were hostile preparations
again visible on the Calabrian side of the Straits of
Messina, but a succession of events had tended to stir
the mischievous activity of the Court of Palermo.
After many wanderings in foreign lands, Louis Philippe
of Orleans had drifted to Sicily for the second time in
October 1809 ; and, being thought by Queen Caroline
to be a fit instrument for her own tortuous purposes,
had received her consent and that of her consort to
his marriage with their amiable daughter Marie Amelie.
Nov. 25. The ceremony took place on the 25th of November,
and very soon afterwards it was reported that Louis
Philippe was to become Commander-in-Chief of the
Sicilian forces. The Queen for some time past had
been intent upon sending a small expedition to the
1 8 10. coast of Calabria ; and in February it was announced
Feb. that the force would be increased to five thousand men
1 Leake to Stuart, 19th Nov. 1809 ; and Adair to Stuart, 28th
Jan. 1810, in Stuart to Sec. of State, 24th March 1810.
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 309
with Louis Philippe at its head. Stuart, rightly thinking 18 10.
that nothing but harm could come of this folly, strongly
protested against it. His eyes were now fully opened
as to the character of the Queen, and he did not hesitate
to report to Downing Street that the chief use of the
British army in Sicily was to guard against the in-
sincerity of the Neapolitan Court.
But, meanwhile, another and even more important
marriage suddenly altered the policy of Caroline, that
namely of Napoleon himself. Childless, yet anxious to
found a dynasty, the Emperor had divorced Josephine ;
and, after a vain attempt to gain a Grand Duchess of
Russia for his bride, had secured without difficulty the
daughter of the Emperor of Austria, the Archduchess
Marie Louise. The nuptial contract was signed on the
7 th of February ; the marriage was celebrated by proxy
on the 2nd of March ; and thereupon the conduct of the
Neapolitan Queen became so suspicious that Stuart could
only conclude that she had some secret understanding
with Napoleon. French reinforcements were streaming
into Italy, yet she now declared that the British army
was a useless burden. Considering that the British
Government was maintaining some fifteen thousand of
its own soldiers, which was five thousand more than
were required by treaty,1 and paying in addition a
subsidy of £300,000 a year for the Sicilian troops, all
solely for the defence of Sicily, such a comment was
irritating enough. But the Queen did not stop at
words. She began to fit out, for no ostensible reason,
a number of transports, which might well serve to bring
over French battalions ; and she strove to withdraw
from the Straits of Messina the Sicilian gunboats which
formed an essential part of the British scheme of
defence. To add to Stuart's difficulties, she sent Louis
Philippe, nominally to concert with him plans for the
security of the island, but really, it seems, to extort
from Sir John a recognition of the Prince's status as
Commander-in-Chief of the Sicilian forces. This was
1 The treaty signed on 30th March 1808.
3io HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
i 8 10. particularly insulting, for negotiations had long been
afoot between the British and Neapolitan Courts for
vesting the British General with the command of the
Sicilian troops ; and there naturally ensued a lively
passage of arms between Stuart and the ministers of
Queen Caroline.
Sir John declared at once that he would feel
honoured to receive a visit from the Duke of Orleans,
but could not accept him as a military colleague without
instructions from London. Louis Philippe then an-
nounced that he would come to Messina as a private
individual, though still with special authority from
King Ferdinand to discuss the business of the war.
" If the Duke of Orleans does not offer himself in a
military character," retorted Stuartly curtly, " in what
light does he present himself as a concerter of opera-
tions ? " Somewhat disturbed by the extreme bluntness
of the General's replies, Lord Amherst, the British
Minister at Palermo, answered that he did not see his
way to oppose Louis Philippe's journey to Messina ;
weakly hinting that, after all, the Duke's appointment
to be Commander-in-Chief was a question quite distinct
from his proposed conference with Stuart. " If Their
Sicilian Majesties press for the conference," wrote the
General, " I must ask you, in accordance with my
instructions, to press that I be made Commander-in-
Chief of the Sicilian forces, which being granted, I shall
be happy to meet His Sicilian Majesty's officers." At
this juncture Amherst received a despatch from the
Foreign Office, informing him that a treaty, which had
recently been negotiated between the Courts of Naples
and London, had been ratified without any stipulation
that the command of the Sicilian troops should be given
to the British General. Armed with this knowledge,
the Minister fired his last shot triumphantly at Stuart.
The General coolly replied that the omission of the
stipulation by no means signified that the British
Government had given way upon the point, and ad-
hered to his refusal to meet the Duke of Orleans.
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
311
Throughout this affair Stuart appeared at his very 1810.
best, clear-headed, sensible, and resolute ; and his firm-
ness prevailed. The expedition to Calabria was tacitly
dropped, and Queen Caroline, for the present at any
rate, was thwarted.
This wrangle — so perverse is human nature — had
the rather singular effect of reviving Stuart's interest
in the Ionian Islands ; possibly because he foresaw that,
unless he seized the moment for further enterprise at
once, he might not have another opportunity of dis-
tinguishing himself. Certain it is that, when Oswald
announced his intention of making an attack upon Santa
Maura, Stuart, far from discouraging him, promised
him reinforcements. Accordingly, on the 21st of March 21
March, Oswald sailed from Zante with three ships of
war and an extremely heterogeneous force of twenty-
five hundred men,1 and anchored south of the town
of Amaxichi on the same evening. On the following March
day the army disembarked early ; and the enemy, being
driven from their coast batteries by the fire of the
ships, evacuated the town and retired to the fortress.
In all, the French had some sixteen hundred regular
and irregular troops on the island under General
Camus ; but by display of the Greek national flag
nearly half of these were drawn over to the English
side, and Camus had not more than a thousand
men at most with whom to hold the fortress and the
defensive works adjacent to it.
The conformation of the northern coast of Santa
Maura is peculiar. The island is, roughly speaking, of
8
22.
zulu ju.u. i^a.11 iduis.3 111
R.A
l-IUUtk
1t
61
R.E. .
16
35th .
602
Marines
225
Calabrian Free Corps
289
Corsican Rangers .
551
De Roll's .
224
Greek L.T. .
• 548
Total 2533
3i2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. oblong shape, measuring about twenty miles from
March 22. north to south, and seven from east to west.
Amaxichi lies at the north-eastern angle ; but about
two miles to west of it a headland runs out for a mile to
the northward in a narrow isthmus, then turns abruptly
to the east in a low sandy spit for another mile to the
port of Santa Maura, and thence slants as abruptly to
the north-east to die away as a mere bank into the
sea. Thus there is formed a quadrilateral lagoon,
bounded on the south by the mainland, on the west by
the headland, and on the north by the spit of sand, the
fort occupying the north-eastern and Amaxichi the
south-eastern angle; and the quadrilateral is closed
on the eastern side by an aqueduct, thirteen hundred
yards long and very narrow at the summit, which
carries water from the town to the fort. The regular
approach to the fort, therefore, was by way of the spit
of sand, which was nowhere over thirteen hundred yards
broad, and was contracted in more than one place to no
more than three hundred ; and the enemy had fortified
this narrow pass by two redoubts and an entrenchment,
regularly constructed and capable of offering such
resistance that the French counted upon its delaying an
enemy for a month.1 Oswald divided his men into
two columns, and leaving one of these, consisting of
two battalions under Hudson Lowe, to watch the town
and the southern end of the aqueduct, went in person
with the other to reconnoitre the spit. Here, however,
he found that Captain Church with his Greek, infantry
had already advanced and carried the first redoubt,
driving the enemy back to their next entrenchment,
where they could be seen in force busily engaged in
strengthening their defences. This entrenchment,
which extended from sea to sea, had a wet ditch and an
abatis in front, mounted four guns, well flanked, and
was occupied by about five hundred men. Towards
the sea it was so skilfully designed as to be almost
1 I gather these details from Leake's IraveU in Norther?:
Greece, iii. 10-12.
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 313
secure from the fire of ships. Seeing that no time was 1810.
to be lost, Oswald asked that the frigate Leonidas March 22
might stand in so as to second an assault, as far as was
possible, by water ; and, summoning a mixed battalion l
under Major Clarke to the support of the Greeks,
formed the whole force into columns, and directed
Church to lead the attack.
The Greeks accordingly moved forward, but after the
manner of a skirmishing rather than a storming party,
taking shrewd advantage of all shelter from the ground,
until they were fairly face to face with the enemy and
exposed to a heavy fire. No efforts of their officers
could then induce them to go farther ; and Oswald
was obliged to order up Clarke's battalion to take their
place. The Marines led the way, broke through the
abatis at once, and, with the remainder of the battalion
at their back, charged so fiercely with the bayonet that
the enemy fled at all points. Observing the rout,
Lowe with great readiness led his Corsican riflemen and
one company of the Thirty-fifth along the aqueduct to
come in upon the rear of the fugitives. His column
filed onward under an angry fire, and some of his
Corsicans, shrinking before the storm of shot, fell from
the narrow pathway into the sea and were drowned.
The remainder pressed on, and so demoralised the flying
enemy that they abandoned their remaining strong
position in the isthmus and took refuge in the fort.
Altogether this was a brilliant little affair, and, except in
one respect, not very costly. The casualties did not
exceed thirteen killed, ninety-four wounded, and seven-
teen drowned ; but this number included no fewer
than seventeen officers, of whom one was killed, and the
remainder, among whom was Church, were wounded.
It remained now to batter the fortress into submission;
which proved to be a more difficult matter than
Oswald had anticipated, for the works were casemated,
and the besiegers were obliged to operate upon a narrow
and exposed front. Oswald therefore asked reinforce-
1 2 cos. Marines, 2 cos. Dc Roll's, 2 cos. Corsican Rangers.
3i4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. ments of Stuart, who sent him some six hundred and
fifty men and twelve heavy guns. Constructing his
batteries at extreme range from the fort, for the sake
April 9. of the inhabitants, Oswald opened fire on the 9th of
April, and after a week of bombardment assaulted and
carried one of the enemy's outworks within three
hundred yards of the rampart. From thence his rifle-
men, though exposed to a very heavy fire, made such
April 16. havoc among the French artillerymen that on the 16th
Camus surrendered. The total number of prisoners
captured was just eight hundred, over eighty of whom
were sick or wounded ; while the British casualties did
not exceed forty - four killed and wounded. Among
these, however, was Major Clarke, a most brilliant
officer, who was slain by a casual cannon-shot.
Oswald then sent back his borrowed men to Sicily ;
April 23. and on the 23rd, at the urgent request of Ali Pasha,
betook himself to Prevesa. The old chieftain received
him cordially, and declared that the French had tendered
to him every kind of bribe, even to the cession of Santa
Maura itself, if he would grant free passage for their
soldiers to reinforce the island. Meanwhile he asked
for nothing but marks of amity, though he expressed a
hope that Corfu would soon be in British hands ; and
he even offered ten or twenty thousand men for the
defence of Sicily if the British required them.
Altogether he was effusively friendly ; and, as Corfu
was still blockaded by the British frigates, it is possible
that his professions were sincere.1
To eastward, therefore, the situation of Sicily was
greatly improved ; and this was well, for the menace
May. from the north was becoming decidedly serious.
Murat had passed and was already enforcing a law of
conscription ; columns of French troops were arriving
at Naples, and large bodies of them were moving down
into Calabria. The attitude of the Neapolitan Court
was more than ever suspicious. It had prohibited
1 Stuart to Sec. or State, 24th, 26th April ; 7th May ;
enclosing Oswald to Stuart, 24th March, 17th, 25th April 1809.
ch. xxxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 315
the export of corn to Malta, and there was almost 18 10.
positive proof that it was in correspondence with
Napoleon ; for a boat, bearing a French flag of truce,
being intercepted in the Straits, was found to contain
a French aide-de-camp and an official messenger from
Vienna carrying despatches for Palermo. The latter
of these further gave information that he had been
detained for five weeks at Naples, to await, as he
believed, despatches, before he was sent on his way.
Stuart became increasingly anxious ; and just at this
time he received an unexpected shock from England.
The British Ministers, as shall in due time be told,
had after many searchings of heart determined to trust
Wellington to defend Portugal ; and, to strengthen
his force as much as possible, they now directed Stuart
to send to the Peninsula four of his old regiments,1 in
exchange for three raw and sickly second battalions ;
adding a few weeks later that he must embark two of
these battalions for Gibraltar at once, without waiting
for them to be relieved. The General looked about
him at the proved treachery of the Court of Palermo,
at the increasing disaffection of the larger towns
towards the British owing to the helplessness of their
commander, at the gathering masses of troops on
the north side of the Straits, and flatly declined to
obey. He had now but fourteen thousand men, half
of them foreigners ; the Sicilian army, unpaid and
unfed, was useless and disgusted with the service ; the
Sicilian Militia did not exist except in name. To
weaken his force still further would be to invite
disaster. To evacuate Sicily and withdraw the whole
of his force to Portugal was an intelligible policy, but
to withdraw a part of it and expose the remainder to
capture or destruction was folly. So Stuart appears to
have argued ; nor does it seem to me that he argued
amiss.2
1 l/2lst, 1/3 1st, i/39th, 1/ Chasseurs Britanniqucs.
2 Stuart to Sec. of State, 30th April {Castlereagh Corres. viii. 2 1 3),
1st May, 9th June 18 10.
3i6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. By June Murat's preparations were nearly corn-
June, pleted. Twenty to twenty-five thousand men, French
and Italian, were assembled at the extremity of Lower
Calabria, and more were collected behind them. Their
only weakness, which was of course unknown to Stuart,
was that Napoleon had placed General Grenier in com-
mand of the French divisions, with secret authority to
decline, at his discretion, to obey Murat's orders
concerning them. All that King Joachim now needed
was gun-boats, transports, and small craft ; and these,
in mortal dread of the British cruisers, were creeping
cautiously along the coast towards the northern shore
of the Straits. Meanwhile, as Stuart still pressed for
the command of the Sicilian army, the Queen sent
emissary after emissary to desire him to name the
number of troops that he wanted, and having received
his answer refused to send them. Only with the
July, greatest difficulty did the General in July at last extort
from King Ferdinand an order, which even so was
never duly proclaimed or circulated, that the Sicilian
General at Messina and the Sicilians at large should
co-operate with the British in defence of their country ;
but by that time Murat had assembled nearly five
hundred vessels under a chain of batteries which
extended from Scilla to Reggio. It is true that he
had not accomplished this without mishaps. In June
the British military flotilla under Captain Read of the
Twenty-seventh had made a dash upon one convoy,
and had captured fourteen of the vessels. In July
again the King's frigate Thames with two brigs in
company attacked a flotilla of fifty small craft, and
captured or destroyed twelve gun-boats and thirty-one
transports. But against this was to be set the fact
that the Sicilian flotilla, once so efficient and active,
was almost in a state of mutiny from want of pay ;
and that one boat had actually deserted in the course
of Read's action mentioned above. Such disaffection,
shared equally by the Sicilian army, was the only result
of the subsidy, now increased to ^400,000 annually,
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 317
which was paid by Great Britain to the worthless Court 18 10
of Naples. Finally, to gall Stuart still further, Murat
had come down in person to the scene of action, and
set up a magnificent pavilion and a gigantic banner on
the heights of Pezzo, in full view of every British post
on the Straits, with flaunting and ostentatious defiance.
Some comfort, however, came to Sir John in the
arrival of reinforcements from Malta, namely the
Thirty-ninth Foot in July, and the Thirty-first in
August, together with drafts to fill up the gaps in the August,
battalions which were already in his garrison. The
despatch of these regiments to Sicily was quite contrary
to the intentions of the Secretary for War, who had
sent out two second battalions ! from England on
purpose to release them for service in Portugal.
Stuart, however, for the present appropriated them ;
and their appearance had a very good effect in improv-
ing the bad spirit of the inhabitants. At the same
time the officers of Stuart's staff laboured indefatigably
to strengthen the defences of the Straits, while the
military flotilla and the frigates of the Navy were
sleepless in their vigilance. The Sicilian peasantry soon
came down voluntarily to work at the entrenchments
with excellent good will and with reassuring cries of
" Long live King George." Towards their own King
they felt neither loyalty nor respect ; nor was this
surprising, for, while his subjects and his Allies toiled
to protect his dominions against invasion, the monarch
employed himself chiefly in tunny -fishing, and his
consort wove plots to betray Sicily to the French.
The zeal of the peasantry was actually rebuked by the
Neapolitan Court ; and, when the wealthier classes
offered their horses to draw the British guns, the
Governor of Messina was instructed to use all his
efforts to prevent them from fulfilling this service.
It was becoming increasingly evident that either the
government of Ferdinand or the British occupation of
Sicily must come to an end.
1 2/ 1 4th, 2/ioth.
3i8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. For over two months the two armies glared at each
other across the Straits ; and the British were beginning
to dread the coming of the long nights and to doubt the
possibility of maintaining always the same standard of
watchfulness, when at last the day of trial came. On
Sept. 17. the night of the 17th of September two battalions of
Corsicans and four of Neapolitans, in all between three
and four thousand men, under General Cavaignac,
crossed the Straits and reached the shore about seven
miles to the south of Messina. The landing was in-
stantly detected by the patrols of the Twentieth Light
Dragoons ; the news reached headquarters at a quarter
Sept. 18. past four on the morning of the 18th ; and Major-
general Campbell, the adjutant-general, at once galloped
down to assume the command of the troops in that
quarter. The coming of dawn also revealed the em-
barkation of Murat's soldiers along the whole length of
the narrow part of the Straits from Pezzo to Scilla.
It was therefore evident that Cavaignac's landing was a
diversion to distract attention to the British right.
Guided by the sound of musketry Campbell galloped
towards Mili, where he found two companies of German
riflemen skirmishing briskly with the enemy's boats,
while the Twenty-first, the Third Battalion of the
German Legion and two guns stood at hand to give
support, the whole being very judiciously disposed
under the command of Colonel Adam of the Twenty-
first. When daylight came Campbell perceived further
to the south forty large vessels, from which infantry
were landing between San Stefano and Gelati. As soon
as a complete battalion had been disembarked, these
troops pushed on to the lowest spur of the mountains
adjoining their landing-place ; and, as their object
seemed to be to gain the heights above, and from thence
to fall upon the rear of Stuart's main body between
Messina and the Faro, Campbell hastened to occupy the
passes above Mili.
Meanwhile a battalion composed of light companies
under Colonel Fischer hastened up from Placido upon
ch. xxxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 319
the enemy's flank ; and the peasants, summoned by the 1810.
bells of every village-church, came swarming out with
such arms as they could find to crown the summits of
the mountains, exhibiting unexpected enthusiasm for the
British and hostility towards the invaders. Fischer,
dividing his men into two bodies, sent one to harass
the enemy's parties as they disembarked, and the other
to assail the left flank of those who were already moving
inland. These last, a Corsican battalion, halted as if
waiting for support ; but Cavaignac's main body, galled
by Fischer's riflemen, showed less and less disposition to
quit their boats or to advance from the shore ; and
Campbell, observing their hesitation, ordered Adam to
march with his whole force along the strand upon
their right flank. Thereupon the enemy made a rush
for their boats, and shoved off, under a heavy fire from
Adam's musketry and artillery, with such precipitation
that they left over two hundred scattered men upon the
beach, who at once threw down their arms and cried for
quarter. Campbell then turned Fischer's corps and the
Twenty-first against the isolated Corsican battalion on
the hill, which, after some demur, surrendered, to the
number of eight hundred and fifty of all ranks. The
military flotilla pursued the flying boats of the enemy
and captured four ; and altogether the venture can
hardly have cost Murat fewer than twelve hundred men
in killed, wounded and prisoners, whereas the loss of the
British did not exceed three men wounded. Meanwhile
the main body of the enemy between Pezzo and Scilla
made no attempt to cross the Straits, principally, it
seems, because General Grenier refused to risk the French
divisions under his command in such an attack. Thus
Murat's great venture came to a ridiculous conclusion ;
thanks, less to the energy of Stuart, who did not even
know the stations of the various corps under his com-
mand, than to the zeal and readiness of his staff.1
1 For an account of the action see Stuart to Sec. of State, 22nd
Sept., enclosing Campbell's report ; and Bunbury, pp. 400-403,
466-471.
32o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. A few days later Murat set out for Naples, leaving
orders for the gradual withdrawal of his forces, both
naval and military ; which, if his operations had really
been ruined, as has been stated, by Grenier, was no
very unnatural nor unreasonable action. One division
of the flotilla was met by a British squadron of frigates
and brigs, who took or destroyed sixty transports and
two gun-boats ; but the remainder were safely brought
into Naples. Of the troops eight thousand only were
left under General Lamarque about Scilla ; but, as the
whole of the siege-artillery was also stored in that
fortress, Stuart and his staff counted upon an early re-
newal of the attempt to invade Sicily. Meanwhile the
General received a stinging reproof from the Secretary
of State for War, who was furious at his refusal to send
four of his battalions, as he had been ordered, to Spain.
Sir John, however, stood up boldly for his own conduct,
and still declined to part with more than one battalion,1
asking leave to resign his command in view of the re-
duction of his force. After Murat's whole flotilla had
returned to Naples he did indeed prepare, according
to his own statement, to send the three remaining
battalions to Spain as soon as shipping should arrive ;
but when transports at last came in from Lisbon
18 1 1. in February 181 1, Stuart adhered to his refusal to
Fcb- despatch the men. The orders from England respecting
them were still conditional upon the removal of all
danger to Sicily, either through the retreat of the
French forces, the improved state of the Island's de-
fences, or a successful action. Sir John maintained that
the conditions had not been fulfilled. Murat's flotilla
was, it was true, no longer at Reggio and Scilla, but it
was still assembled at Naples, and, if it could retire safely
from the straits to the capital, it could also return
from the capital to the straits. Two-thirds of the
troops had marched northward, and had been employed
by Murat in savage repression of the Calabrian insur-
gents and banditti. But that repression was accom-
1 The Chasseurs Britanniques.
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 321
plished before the end of the year, and the army was 181 1.
then at liberty to return. Above all, so long as King
Ferdinand and Queen Caroline were allowed to carry on
the government of Sicily, there was and there could be
no safety, much less any power of offence, for the
British garrison.
It was long since John Moore, with his usual keen
insight, had urged this point upon the British Govern-
ment ; and the time was now come when it could no
longer be ignored. Throughout the autumn and winter
of 1 8 10-18 1 1 the Neapolitan Court continued to broach
specious proposals for joint operations, and ridiculous
plans for taking the offensive ; but there was no over-
looking the fact that when Murat made his attack on
the 1 8th of September, not a Sicilian soldier had been
moved to assist in the defence. On the other hand, the
feeling of the Sicilian peasantry towards the British had
shown itself to be surprisingly friendly ; while Murat's
bloodthirsty reprisals on the Calabrian Masse had
estranged every class of Italian from the French. But
in the spring of 1 8 1 1 the Court of Palermo set all
Sicily in a ferment by the arbitrary levy and exaction of
a new tax ; and then more than ever was seen the false
position of the British garrison. On the one hand, the
British were the only bulwark against the hated French ;
and this was felt so strongly by the people that the
mere appearance of the troop-ships from Lisbon had
sufficed to throw them into agitation.1 On the other,
the red-coats, being equally the only support of the
wretched King and of the profligate Queen, were
actually upholding the very parties who were in
league with France, and who, by their miserable and
oppressive misgovernment, were driving the Sicilians to
desperation. Yet the British were expecting both Court
and people to join with them in holding the French
at bay. The unhappy Sicilians, thus lying between
hammer and anvil, were at once ready to turn against
both parties ; while Ferdinand and Caroline, comfort-
1 Stuart to Sec. of State, 24th Feb. 181 1.
VOL. VII Y
322 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1811. ably nurtured by British subsidies, conspired alike
against their subjects and their Allies.
The time was now arrived when this situation, one
of the many evil legacies bequeathed by Pitt, must
come to an end. Under Pitt's system of squandering
troops in small detachments upon all quarters, an
isolated force was perhaps less useless in Sicily than
elsewhere ; but, now that the British army had been com-
mitted in appreciable strength to serious and continuous
operations in the Peninsula, the case was altered. It
was indeed practically impossible to evacuate the island
abruptly and completely after an occupation of six years,
the more so as it would signify not only the abandon-
ment of the people to the French, but also the aliena-
tion of Ali Pasha. But it was perfectly possible to
strengthen the British military commander by making
him chief diplomatic agent, and, by establishing such a
government as would encourage the Sicilians to work
heartily for their own salvation, to enable some thou-
sands of British troops to be safely withdrawn to the
Peninsula. And such was the policy which the British
Cabinet was now inclined to adopt. At the end of
March 18 1 1, Stuart left the command in Sicily to Lord
Forbes and retired to Malta, where in the following
month he learned that his resignation had been accepted,
and that Lord William Bentinck was not only to
succeed him as Commander-in-Chief, but to combine
with his military duties those of Minister at the Court
of Palermo.
Here, therefore, we take leave for ever of Sir John
Stuart, who did no further work that is worthy of
mention, and died in 1815. Considering that he was
neither a weak nor an incapable man, his career was
singularly disappointing, and his shortcomings in the
Mediterranean were more serious than they should have
been. It is true that his position was extremely difficult,
for he was the instrument of a Government which did
not know its own mind ; and the policy which he was
expected to carry out was, so far as the Cabinet
ch. xxxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 323
attempted to define it, impracticable. But, on the other 181 1.
hand, it is not only the opportunity but the duty of a
man in such a case to think out a policy for himself
and to execute it unflinchingly ; and if Stuart had only
reflected a little more upon that which he could do, and
a little less upon that which he was ordered to do, he
might have rendered essential service and gained a great
reputation. The British Ministry never recognised the
possibilities of successful and systematic offence which
were offered by the Mediterranean ; but no man ever
had such a chance of realising those possibilities by
practical demonstration as had Stuart. Yet he took no
advantage of it ; not because he was afraid of respon-
sibility, but because his energy and intelligence were
sapped by intense egoism. He had once accidentally
blundered upon a brilliant success, and, had he been a
stupider man, he would have felt encouraged to try his
fortune again, and might have blundered into a second.
But, like many others before and after him, he was too
shrewd to risk an undeserved reputation, and the evil
result is that he is still remembered with some honour
as the victor of Maida. The greater, therefore, is the
need to record his true demerit, without malice but
without mercy, as a corrupter of discipline, an undoer
of good spirit, and a betrayer, not the less dangerous
because unwitting, of the honourable trust of a soldier.1
1 Stuart to Sec. of State, 9th, 15th, 16th, 25th, 26th Oct., 16th,
20th Dec. 1810; 24th Feb., 25th March, 17th April 1811.
Bunbury's narrative unfortunately closes with the year 18 10.
CHAPTER XXXIII
1809. Parliament was prorogued on the iothof June 1809 ;
and many important events had occurred at home as
well as abroad before it reassembled on the 23rd of
January 18 10. In August the Duke of Portland was
struck down by a fit while in his carriage ; and, though
he rallied for the moment, was obviously no longer in
a condition to remain at the head of the Government.
At that time both the war in Spain and the expedition
to Walcheren seemed still to be in a prosperous way ;
so that to all appearance there was no reason why the
existing Ministry should not continue in power under
a new chief, advantage being taken of the change to
transfer Castlereagh from the War Office to some
other department. In this sense Perceval wrote to
Canning on the 28th of August ; and was answered
on the 31st that a chief Minister, as contrasted with
a mere figure-head, and that Minister in the House
of Commons, was essential to the satisfactory conduct
of Government at such a time. Canning then frankly
avowed that such a Minister could be found in the
person either of himself or of Perceval, that he did
not expect Perceval to serve under him, and would
not himself serve under Perceval. This was a blow
to the members of the administration, for Canning
had so far expressed his readiness to take office under
Lord Chatham,1 and there was as yet no news from the
Scheldt which could make such an arrangement impos-
sible. After some hesitation Perceval replied that,
1 Memoirs of Plumer Ward, i. 215.
324
ch. xxxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 325
while regretting greatly that Canning would not consent 1809.
to serve together with himself under some third person,
he must himself decline to be subordinate to Canning.
So matters stood, when in the first days of September Sept.
there came the evil tidings that Wellesley had retreated
from Talavera, abandoning a large number of his
wounded ; and that Chatham, having decided to give up
further operations on the Scheldt, was bringing his army
back to England, — in brief, that all the military
enterprises of the Government had miscarried.
Thereupon Canning wrote to the Duke of Portland,
claiming it as due to himself and to the country that
Castlereagh should be removed from the War Office,
and replaced, as had been previously suggested, by
Lord Wellesley. In great agitation, for Canning's most
recent words and actions had led him to expect no
such sudden and uncompromising demand, the Duke
consulted Perceval, and on the 6th of September in-
formed Canning that, if Castlereagh's withdrawal were
insisted upon, other members of the Cabinet would with-
draw with him. He offered, however, to retire himself
at once, and so to enable the various departments to be
redistributed without scandal or unpleasantness ; to which
Canning replied that, if the Duke left office, he would
do likewise. Canning's next step was to request that a
particular subject might be discussed in Cabinet on the
7 th during his absence, for he considered his resignation Sept. 7.
to be in the King's hands ; and on that day Castlereagh
drew from Lord Camden the whole story of Canning's
machinations against himself. Little less incensed
against Camden for concealing the matter from him
for so long, than against Canning himself, Castlereagh
resigned ; whereupon the Duke of Portland resigned
also. Thus the Government was broken up ; though
Perceval, as it seems, did not immediately despair of
finding a third person under whom both Canning and
himself could hold office together. Canning, however,
ended all such hopes by writing to the Duke of Portland
that the best arrangement would be for Perceval to
326 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. become First Lord of the Treasury, and that for his
own part he, though unable to take office under the
new Prime Minister, would accept the position without
the smallest dissatisfaction or regret. Having done so,
he proceeded by discreditable intrigues to endeavour
to set Perceval aside and to secure the chief place for
himself. These treacherous shifts met with no success;
Sept. 20. and on the 20th Canning was reminded by a challenge
from Castlereagh that his conduct towards that Minister
had not been satisfactorily explained. The two states-
Sept. 22. men met with pistols on the 22nd ; Canning was
carried off the field with a wound, troublesome but
not dangerous, in his thigh ; and the immediate per-
sonal quarrel between the two for the present subsided.
It is impossible to doubt that the misunderstanding
between them was due very greatly to the feebleness of
the Duke of Portland, whose only excuse was his age
and infirmity ; but the true reason for it lay in the
natural antipathy of the two men towards each other.
The main difference between them turned, as we have
seen, upon the question of responsibility. Canning's
theory, to put it in its most dignified form, was that
the maintenance of the Government was the first great
object, to which all others must be subordinated.
Hence he had been for sacrificing every one of the
generals concerned in the Convention of Cintra, not
excepting Arthur Wellesley, and for saddling Moore
with the entire blame for the failure of the campaign
of Coruna. Nevertheless he had presently taken the
Wellesleys as a family to his bosom, blamed Castle-
reagh for not sending out Arthur Wellesley earlier to
Portugal, and accepted from Lord Wellesley what may
be called a dormant resignation of the embassy in Spain,
to be presented in the event of his own resignation
of office. Moreover he had, with extremely questionable
taste, invited Henry Wellesley, though unsuccessfully,
to be his second in the duel against Castlereagh. In
Canning's opinion a Government was lowered when it
stooped to save a public servant ; and his object in
ch. xxxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 327
turning against Castlereagh seems to have been to show 1809.
the latter that, if a Minister took upon himself the
failings of a subordinate, that Minister must be content
to accept the scapegoat's lot and to be driven into the
wilderness. Canning's theory is intelligible, and may
be supported by abundance of specious argument ; but
experience has shown, most notably in the case of
Palmerston, that no Minister is so well served as one
who, even when disapproving of the action of an
underling, stands up for him loyally so long as he has
acted honestly and with good intent. Many indeed
put the assumption of responsibility by Ministers for
the acts of their instruments upon a higher plane than
that of expediency, and pronounce it a matter of
honour ; though Canning, not being an honourable
man, would have been unable to seize this point of
view. And if it were inevitable that either Canning or
Castlereagh must be excluded from office until the end
of the war, it was better that Canning, the crooked,
should stand aside.
Meanwhile, his resignation carried with it that of his
friend Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, the Secretary-at-
War, making, with the retirement of the Duke of Port-
land and of Castlereagh, no fewer than four places vacant
in the Cabinet. The survivors, headed by Perceval,
informed the King that they could not form a new
Government without help from the Opposition, and
obtained his leave to negotiate with Lords Grey and
Grenville. These noblemen, however, rejected even
the hint of an overture ; and it was then decided that it
would be best to make Perceval First Lord of the
Treasury, and to give him a free hand to gather support
wherever he might choose to seek it. Perceval, ac-
cordingly, accepted the office on the 4th of October, Oct. 4.
and turned to the three leaders from whom he hoped
to gain an accession of strength, Lord Melville, Lord
Sidmouth, and Lord Wellesley. The two first declined
to aid him, and Canning did his best to make the third
do likewise. By the 2nd of October he had recovered
328 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiif
1809. sufficiently from his wound to ask an audience of the
King, when he took the opportunity to present Lord
Wellesley's dormant resignation, and to obtain the
appointment of Bartholomew Frere in his stead. In
strictness, of course, Canning was within his rights,
for his successor at the Foreign Office had not yet been
appointed, and Perceval was not yet Prime Minister ;
moreover, he may have thought himself bound to do
what he did for Lord Wellesley, though it can hardly
have been without hope of embarrassing Perceval.
Fortunately, the new Prime Minister heard what had
been done before the packet started for Spain, and was able
to write to Wellesley explaining the whole matter. In
due time Wellesley replied, readily accepting the Foreign
Office ; and in the interval Perceval, though unable to
persuade any of the Opposition to join him, completed
the construction of his Ministry. Being unable to find
a Chancellor of the Exchequer, he himself took that
post, without salary, together with the First Lordship
of the Treasury ; Lord Liverpool gave up the Home
Office to Mr. Richard Ryder, and took over the
departments of War and Colonies ; Lord Mulgrave
remained at the Admiralty ; Lord Palmerston, a rising
young man of five-and-twenty, became Secretary-at-
War ; and Mr. Robert Peel Under-Secretary of State
for the Colonies.
It was a weak administration, though it contained
three future Prime Ministers, and it took office at a
moment of intense discouragement. The retreat of
Arthur Wellesley and the return of Chatham had been
two heavy blows ; yet they might have been endured
with hopefulness but for the fact that Austria also had
been forced to make a humiliating peace. She had not
only ceded, as we have seen, all her maritime provinces
on the Adriatic to France, but she had further yielded
the district of the Inn and Salzburg to Bavaria ; she had
recognised the French conquest, not yet accomplished,
of Portugal, and the kingship of Joseph and Murat in
Spain and Naples ; and she had bound herself to break
ch. xxxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 329
with England, to accept the Continental System, and to 1 809.
pay an indemnity of nearly three and a half millions
sterling. The rupture with England was in itself
nothing very formidable in the matter of actual
aggression, being understood on both sides to be
merely formal ; but, on the other hand, the marriage
of Napoleon with an Austrian Archduchess seemed to
portend at least the elimination of Austria, as an active
helper against France, from any future coalition. From
Prussia less than ever was now to be expected ; from
Russia, bound as she was by the Treaty of Tilsit, there
was as yet equally no hope ; so that England was left
without an ally in Europe except the formless and
inefficient governments of Spain and Portugal. And
the hardest part of the trouble was that all the mis-
carried enterprises of the past year had only narrowly
missed brilliant success. The Austrians had won a
victory at Aspern and had only just been beaten at
Wagram. Wellesley's campaign had been wrecked
rather by Cuesta and Venegas than by Soult ; while,
though he had retreated from Talavera, he had at least
delivered Portugal and helped the Spanish insurgents
to deliver Galicia. Even the landing in the Scheldt
had, as we know, caused a panic in Paris and treachery
in Fouche. Could British Ministers have seen the
Emperor's letters to Clarke during the month of August,
his reiterated statements that Flushing was impregnable,
the violent reproaches over his subordinate's slowness
in enrolling troops, and his pungent criticism of his
generals in Spain, they would have perceived that their
perseverance was beginning to tell. Their great enemy
was slowly losing his sense of reality and his hold upon
facts, owing to the vast extension of the business, both
civil and military, which he was attempting in his own
person both to survey and to direct.
These things, however, were of course almost en-
tirely hidden from the Cabinet and were totally invisible
to the nation. The people could see nothing but
armies squandered by generals, and Ministers, who
N
* .
f v-
33Q HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. tried to dress up defeat as victory. Party spirit, as usual,
was active to distort facts and to embitter discontent.
The city of London, in particular, distinguished itself by
the violent tone of the address in which it demanded
inquiry into the causes of the national misfortunes.
The general temper in Britain was such that it would
have welcomed the impeachment and execution of a
Minister. All this was natural enough, and for that
reason easily to be foreseen. Yet not the less did
Spencer Perceval come forward with undaunted spirit
to face the storm ; and for this he has never received
sufficient credit. Perceval was minute in stature, the
father of a large family, a successful advocate, a strong
evangelical Churchman, and therefore a consistent
opponent of Roman Catholic claims ; one and all of
which peculiarities brought upon him some of the
vulgarest of Sydney Smith's humour. Even in our own
time an eminent historian has summed him up as " an
industrious mediocrity of the narrow type." Not a
word is said as to the talent in debate, which made Pitt
designate him as his successor ; not a word as to the
uprightness and integrity which attached his followers
to him ; 1 not a word as to the public spirit which made
him, a poorer man than Pitt, and with many children to
support, first sacrifice a large professional income, and
then refuse a sinecure with as haughty indifference as
Pitt himself; not a word, finally, as to the courage
which of itself sufficed to raise him above mediocrity.
His career was cut short by the hand of an assassin
before he could share in the credit of having carried the
war to a successful issue ; but in this place at least his
service must not remain uncommemorated, because he
endured the dust and heat of the race without gaining
the immortal garland.
1 8 10. On the 23rd of January Parliament met ; and, after
Jan.
1 We must fix this honest little fellow firmly in his seat," wrote
Robert Milnes (who had refused office under Perceval) to Palmerston,
"for it is a struggle of principle on the one hand against trimming
and political intrigue on the other."
ch. xxxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 331
a preliminary skirmish over the King's speech, the 18 10.
parties closed in a desperate struggle over a vote of
thanks to the General who, in reward for the victory
of Talavera, had been created Viscount Wellington.
There was, undoubtedly, much in the late campaign that
laid it open to fair attack ; and there was a general
consensus of opinion among the critics that a General
who could not divine that fifty thousand of the enemy
were marching upon his flank could know nothing of
his business. But they were not content with this. In
the Lords, Earl Grey, out of the fulness of his military
knowledge, and such intimate acquaintance with the
campaign as he had gathered from the newspapers,
added unfavourable comment upon Wellington, both as
a strategist and as a tactician. In the Commons Lord
Milton, after declaring with singular delicacy of taste
that Wellington had fought merely for a peerage,
moved an amendment to omit his name from the vote
of thanks, and to add the regrets of the House that
after the battle the officers and men " had suffered the
enemy to pass two days in inactivity without attacking
them, and also for having allowed themselves to be cut
off" at the bridge of Arzobispo." Mr. Vernon passed
the just criticism that Wellington should have learned
more from the experience of Moore, but added a
suggestion that his march to Talavera had been under-
taken only to shelter Ministers from the charge of
inactivity. This he followed up by saying that he was
for sending the Spaniards everything that would assist
them, except a British army. General Tarleton contended
that Wellington's despatches were vainglorious, partial,
and incorrect. Whitbread " could not agree to give a
premium to rashness." The Spanish cause, he said, was
now more hopeless than ever.
The controversy was renewed upon the bill to grant
Wellington an annuity of £2000, against which the
city of London presented a singlarly offensive petition.
Mr. Calcraft declared that Talavera was no victory.
" It had been swelled into a victory only by the
332 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. influence of political connection in order to get Lord
Wellington advanced to the peerage." He then
indulged in prophecy. " All he knew was that, if the
French were in earnest in their designs on Portugal,
before three months Lord Wellington and his army
would be in England." However, in spite of these
amenities the bill was carried, not indeed without a
division, as was the vote of thanks, but by a substantial
majority.1
The question of Walcheren was rightly not allowed
Jan. 26. to be so easily set aside. On the 26th of January Lord
Porchester moved that a committee of the whole House
should inquire into the causes of the failure of the
expedition, and carried his motion by a majority of nine
in a House of three hundred and eighty-one. The
inquiry accordingly was conducted in extreme detail,
and at its conclusion was debated at equal length, no
man distinguishing hirrnelf more by prolixity than
General Robert Craufurd, who had returned home,
together with General Charles Stewart, to attend to his
Parliamentary duties. Divisions were taken upon four
March 30. separate issues on the 30th of March, and in every one
the Government had a majority, the lowest being
twenty-three and the highest fifty-one. In the course
of the inquiry, however, an adverse motion was carried
in censure of Lord Chatham for submitting a secret
narrative of the expedition to the King ; and he was
compelled to resign the office of Master-General of the
Ordnance.
As regards future policy, the question of continuing
the fight for Portugal was raised by a Royal message,
inviting the Commons to provide for taking the
increased number of thirty thousand Portuguese troops
into British pay. Lord Grenville opposed the project
bitterly in the Lords, declaring the defence of Portugal to
be hopeless, even if the thirty thousand men were not raw
Portuguese, but seasoned British troops ; and Lord Moira
took up much the same line. Lord Liverpool, however,
1 H.D. xv. 130-154, 277-302, 440-467, 605-606.
ch. xxxrii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 333
withstood them manfully, laying particular stress upon 18 10
the fact that in the Peninsula the French were opposed,
not by armies, but by whole nations ; and the Govern-
ment carried their point by a sufficient majority.
Still, in the prevailing temper of the Opposition,
the Army estimates were not allowed to pass without
an outcry for petty economies ; and Palmerston, knowing
the favourite butt of his critics, was obliged to humour
them by reducing the Royal Waggon-Train from twelve
troops to seven, that is to say, to five troops actually
serving in the Peninsula, and two at home to furnish
them with recruits. It is really astonishing to observe
how vindictive was the feeling of the Commons towards
this unfortunate corps, which represented the one little
effort of the Horse-Guards towards putting the service
of transport on a military footing. " Let the British
Army go where it may," said General Tarleton, who
ought to have known better, " it will always get waggons
enough." " The Waggon-Train is an annoyance on
foreign service and useless at home," echoed Huskisson,
who, having been connected with the Treasury, in
which department the business of transport had for
generations been mismanaged, was of course jealous of
encroachments upon its importance. Windham lamented
that he had not had time when at the War Office to
destroy the Waggon-Train altogether, though he had
done his best. In vain Perceval represented that
Wellington had reported the corps to be of material
service in Portugal ; such testimony carried little
weight ; and in fact, to anticipate the sequel, the General
was obliged to take the matter into his own hands.
Two troops were sent out in the course of 18 10 to
the Peninsula with orders that he should send back
two in their stead to be disbanded ; whereupon
Wellington replied that they were so useful that he
would keep all four, and so saved them. Thus the
Opposition did its best to cause the British army to
be withdrawn from the Peninsula, or at least to cripple
its mobility if it were left there ; two facts which
334 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 809. enable us to take the measure of their intelligence
concerning military affairs.
There remained the question of providing soldiers
for another campaign. The casualties in the Regular
Army in 1809 amounted to nearly ten thousand men,
no surprising figure, considering that the army had been
engaged in active operations in such unhealthy climates
as those of Martinique, the Lower Scheldt, and the
Guadiana. Under Castlereagh's Militia Enlistment Act
of March 1 809, fifteen thousand recruits had been
drawn from the Militia by March 18 10 ; but a quota
of about six thousand men was due from the Irish
Militia, and nearly ten thousand had been raised during
1809 by ordinary recruiting. There was thus material
enough for the Regular Army ; but it must be remarked
that Castlereagh's system of voluntary enlistment had
not proved very successful in the Militia. Of the
number required to make good the drain of Militiamen
into the Army, hardly one-fourth had been obtained
in eight months ; and the arrangements for the ballot,
which was to supplement the voluntary system after
a given time, were so faulty that even by the end of
1 8 10 the gaps in the Regular Militia had not been
replenished. The Local Militia, again, was hardly
fulfilling its early promise, and was beginning to prove
itself a very costly force. Both of these matters
furnished cause for anxiety, for if the army drew the bulk
of its recruits from the Regular Militia, and the Regular
Militia could not replace them, then obviously such
a system of recruiting must die a natural death. And
if the Local Militia, which was supposed to defend the
country when the Regular Militia was depleted, was
not regularly called out and drilled, it was equally
obvious that it could not be trusted as an organisation
for home-defence.
Having now traced the effect of the campaigns of
1809, and the general trend of affairs at home during
the first months of 18 10, let us turn to the minuter
details concerning the war in the Peninsula. Upon
ch. xxxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 335
returning to his cantonment on the Guadiana, Welling- 1809.
ton had written very fully to Castlereagh on the general
state of affairs. He began by a description of the
Spanish armies, unfavourable, but not more so than
was warranted by facts ; and by deducing that no good
could come of further co-operation with them in Spain.
Having thus eliminated this matter, he passed to con-
sideration of Portugal and of the reforms that were
necessary in the Portuguese army, and offered a definite
conclusion. " My opinion is that we ought to be
able to hold Portugal if the Portuguese army and
Militia are complete." Having laid this down, he
pointed out that, the whole country being frontier,
" he could not hope to preserve much more than the
capital, and that it would be difficult, so far as he
could then judge, to ensure the re-embarkation of the
troops if the defence of Lisbon were carried to
extremities." None the less, he recommended that the
transports should be sent to Lisbon as soon as the
Government should receive positive intelligence that
Napoleon was reinforcing his armies in Spain. Such
reinforcement he looked upon as certain, for it would
be now more than ever the object of Napoleon to drive
the British from the Peninsula. He granted that Cadiz
might be substituted for Lisbon as a base, but depre-
cated the change : first, because the Spaniards would
be unwilling to cede the place ; and, secondly, because
the city would require, if it were to be safe, a garrison
of fifteen or twenty thousand British over and above
the field army. Upon the whole, he pronounced de-
cidedly in favour of defending Portugal.1
In sending this information thus early, Wellington
only anticipated the wishes of the Government. Can-
ning, with his usual busy restlessness, had sought for
the General's opinion upon these very points in August
through the Ambassador at Seville ; and Castlereagh's
request for the same, despatched a month later, crossed
Wellington's answer at the end of September. Never-
1 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25th August 1809.
336 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. theless, the General's opinion was still only provisional ;
for, as he had written to Castlereagh, he had not yet
made up his mind as to the possibility of a safe evacua-
tion of Portugal after fighting to the last to retain
Lisbon. To come to a decision upon this point, he
paid a visit of sixteen days to the Portuguese capital
Oct. 10-26. in October; and there, after examining the ground,
he on the 20th addressed a memorandum to Colonel
Fletcher of the Engineers, directing him to fortify two
lines of defence from the sea to the Tagus between
Torres Vedras and Castanheira. This done, he sought
the Admiral's advice as to four different points of
embarkation — Peniche on the Atlantic, Paoo d'Arcos,
San Juliao and Bugio on the Tagus, and Setubal on
the next inlet to south of that river — pending the
receipt of which he was unable to proceed farther.
Meanwhile, as we have seen, Lord Liverpool had
succeeded Castlereagh at the War Office, and had
scarcely been sworn in before he wrote Wellington a
private letter on the 20th of October. Herein he
declared that it must be the Government's policy to
remain in Portugal so long as the country could be held
without risk of losing the army ; he asked once more
Wellington's views as to the possibilities of defending
Portugal against a French invasion, and of embarkation
if resistance proved to be fruitless ; and he put forward
sagacious reasons for hope that, while Spain was un-
subdued, Napoleon could not spare a sufficient force
to drive the British from the Peninsula. On the 14th
of November Wellington gave his final opinion. " If
the Spaniards are commonly prudent ... it must be
a very large reinforcement indeed which would give
the enemy military possession of the country. . . .
Unless the Spanish armies should meet with some great
misfortune, the enemy could not make an attack upon
Portugal ; and, if events in Spain should enable the
enemy to make such an attack, the force at present
in Portugal is able to defend the country. ... I am
convinced we could embark after defeat." Thus
ch. xxxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 337
Ministers and General were at one, independently of 1809.
each other, as to the policy of defending Portugal, if
it could be carried out ; while the General was now
positive that such a defence could be, and should be,
accomplished.1
" If the Spaniards are commonly prudent." This
was a condition whose fulfilment was hardly warranted
by past experience ; but, before going farther, the
state of the Spanish forces throughout the Peninsula
must be reviewed ; and it is necessary to turn for a
moment to eastern and north-eastern Spain, or more
precisely to Aragon and Catalonia. The subjection of
the former, it will be remembered, had been entrusted
to General Suchet with the Third Corps ; and an
account has already been given of the manner in
which he defeated Blake at Maria and Belchite. This
victory, however, gave him control of little more than
the plain of the Ebro ; for the Aragonese, following
the example of the Galicians, now abandoned regular
warfare, and confined themselves to guerilla operations
in the mountains both north and south of the province,
in four separate bands, each under its own chief. The
suppression of these parties and the capture of their
fastnesses kept Suchet's troops busy during the last six
months of 1809 ; and his columns met with considerable
success, for in the south the two principal strongholds
of the guerillas were stormed and destroyed, and their
garrisons driven far back into the mountains.
Other bands, however, of which more shall presently
be said, were still in full activity ; and there could
be no security while they remained so. For any
weakening of the French garrisons near the mountains
was sure to bring the guerillas down upon them ; and
it was therefore necessary for Suchet to occupy a vast
number of places, and to occupy them in some force.
1 Canning to Lord Wellcsley, 1 2th Aug. ; Wellington to Villiers,
1 2th Sept. ; to Colonel Fletcher, 20th Oct. ; to Admiral Berkeley,
26th Oct. ; to Lord Liverpool (2 letters), 14th Nov. ; Liverpool to
Wellington, 20th Oct. 1809.
VOL. VII Z
338 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Though he had accomplished much in 1809, he still
held little more of Aragon than was overshadowed by
French bayonets.
In Catalonia, St. Cyr and the Seventh Corps were
absolutely isolated from their colleagues in Aragon.
Our last sight of St. Cyr was on his adventurous march
through the mountains to Barcelona, his victory at
Cardadeu, his subsequent advance towards Tarragona,
and his second victory of Vails, followed by his with-
drawal, owing to lack of supplies, once more to the
Catalonian capital. Barcelona, however, was still
greatly straitened. It was strictly blockaded to
seaward by the British fleet ; the migueletes still
hovered about it on the north and west ; and lastly,
the fortress of Gerona still barred its direct com-
munication with France. Perceiving that Gerona must
be taken at all costs, Napoleon prepared to reinforce
St. Cyr strongly during the spring of 1 809 ; and he was
aided by a lucky storm at the end of April, which
enabled a fleet of storeships from Toulon to evade the
blockading squadron and to revictual Barcelona. At
this time St. Cyr lay with some twenty thousand men
at Vich to cover the siege of Gerona from any attack
from the south, a superfluous precaution, as the event
proved ; for Blake, who held supreme command in
Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, had, as we have seen,
preferred Zaragoza for his object and Suchet for his
adversary, with results disastrous to himself. The only
troops opposed to St. Cyr, therefore, were six thousand
men at Tarragona under the Marquis of Coupigny,
who had been well beaten under Reding, and were
therefore formidable neither in numbers, quality, nor
leadership.
May 4. Early in May, General Reille moved down from
the north with a siege-train and a reinforcement of
thirteen German battalions, which brought his force up
to between eleven and twelve thousand men ; and
St. Cyr sent up a complete division to open
communication with him. The division, having
ch. xxxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 339
fulfilled its function, returned with the Emperor's 1809.
orders that St. Cyr himself should be superseded by
Marshal Augereau, and Reille by General Verdier.
The column brought with it also a letter from Verdier,
saying that he could not undertake the siege of Gerona
without reinforcements, that he had reported as much
to Paris, and that, if reinforcements were denied him,
he should not attempt the operation, but should leave
St. Cyr himself to answer to the Emperor for the
consequences. St. Cyr was not the most complaisant
of men ; he had already been irritated by a pre-
posterous order from Napoleon to begin the sieges of
Gerona, Tarragona, and Tortosa simultaneously ; he
was naturally not well pleased at his supersession ; and
yet he was obliged for the present to continue in
command, for Augereau had been detained at Perpignan
by sickness. With no very good grace he sent Verdier
four thousand men ; and on the 24th of May the siege May 24.
began.
The defence of Gerona is the grandest of all the
achievements of the Spaniards during the war ; but
only the barest outline of the story can be given in this
place. The fortress itself was of no great size, nor
of the most modern construction. The garrison
numbered something under six thousand more or less
well-trained troops, of which seven battalions were
regulars ; but the artillerymen were very few. The
Commander-in-Chief was the Governor, Don Mariano
Alvarez de Castro, who, as a soldier, seems to have
been of the austere type of Carnot, but with resolution
heightened by deep religious faith. He was, however,
no mere fanatic, but a strong man and skilful officer.
The French broke ground on the 6th of June, and on June 6.
the 20th St. Cyr brought his army up to within nine
miles of Gerona, but refused to take any share in the
direction of the siege. On the 7th of July, after a July 7.
heavy cannonade and many sharply -fought petty
engagements, Verdier launched between two and three
thousand men at one of the principal outworks, and
34o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. was beaten back in three separate attacks with a loss of
nearly eleven hundred killed and wounded. So greatly
disheartened were his troops, who were chiefly
foreigners, by this defeat, that the General would not
trust them for a farther assault, but simply battered the
Aug. 11. work until, on the 11th of August, Alvarez coolly
evacuated it and blew it up. Six days later, Coupigny
succeeded after two failures in throwing a battalion into
the beleaguered city ; but Verdier, having now secured
commanding ground for his batteries, redoubled his
efforts, and by the 30th of August had established four
breaches in the main wall. Nevertheless during the
month sickness had played havoc with the besiegers,
and Verdier was not yet in a position to storm.
Meanwhile, in consequence of the constant appeals
of Alvarez for help, the Supreme Junta had ordered
Blake to collect such men as he could, and to advance
to the relief of Gerona. Blake could raise no more
than fourteen thousand troops, very many of them raw
recruits, and the remainder beaten men ; but he obeyed
orders and marched northward from Tortosa, though
determined, after his disaster at Belchite, not to risk
a pitched battle. St. Cyr, for his part, leaving fewer
than seven thousand men to surround the city, con-
centrated the rest to meet Blake's relieving column in
the hope of inflicting on it a crushing defeat. Blake,
Sept. 1. however, was not to be caught. On the 1st of
September he flaunted his troops ostentatiously before
St. Cyr's position as if about to attack ; but meanwhile
he had in the night sent a column of four thousand
men under General Garcia Conde far round the French
flank towards the city. This column came upon the
rear of part of the investing force, routed it completely,
and led a convoy triumphantly into Gerona. St. Cyr,
on discovering what had happened, at once reinforced
the investing lines, and, in spite of the depletion of the
covering army by this cause, advanced with the hope
of bringing Blake to action. But the Spanish General
prudently fell back ; and St. Cyr, having no provisions,
ch. xxxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 341
was unable to follow him. Garcia Conde, meanwhile, 1809.
with excellent judgment, made over troops enough to
complete the garrison to five thousand men, and retired
with the rest and with the animals of the convoy, so
as not to encumber Alvarez with more mouths than
could be fed.
It cost Verdier some days and many soldiers to drive
the Spaniards from the posts which they had reoccupied,
and he was further delayed by a vigorous sally on the
part of Alvarez; but on the 19th of September he Sept. 19.
thought himself again in a position to assault, and
asked St. Cyr to lend him a brigade of fresh troops
to take the place of his own sickly and disheartened
infantry. St. Cyr refused to do more than provide
men to guard the camp while Verdier's troops were
engaged in the sterner work ; and the storming columns
were again beaten back with the loss of over six hundred
men. This failure consummated the demoralisation of
the beleaguering army. Verdier returned in dudgeon
to France ; the rank and file succumbed by hundreds
to sickness ; and St. Cyr determined to waste no more
lives, but to reduce the city by starvation. Food and
fuel were already scarce, and the garrison cried out
loudly for Blake to come to its relief. He accord-
ingly concentrated about twelve thousand men between
Gerona and the sea, and on the 26th essayed by a Sept. 26.
swift and sudden movement to pass a convoy through
the lines of the besiegers. The operations were ill-
planned, and the attempt was foiled with heavy loss to
the escorting columns.
After this success St. Cyr made a pretext for a
visit to Perpignan ; where, discovering that Augereau
was in perfect health, he coolly resigned the command
to him, and returned to Paris. Augereau came before
Gerona on the 12th of October, and, finding the troops Oct. 12.
greatly diminished by sickness and utterly weary of
their task, continued St. Cyr's policy of blockade,
varied only by fitful bombardment. Meanwhile,
Blake had collected another store of victuals at
342 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Hostalrich, and on the 1 8th moved forward with about
Oct. 1 8. ten thousand men, for the purpose, apparently, of
discovering the safest point for the passage of a convoy.
For a fortnight he skirmished round the French lines,
baffling all Augereau's efforts to bring him to a general
Nov. 7. action, until at last the Marshal on the 7th of
November concluded the matter by sending three
brigades to storm Hostalrich and destroy the magazines
in the place. The task was accomplished at the trifling
cost of one hundred killed and wounded, and this
final failure of Blake sealed the fate of Gerona.
Alvarez, though weakened to a shadow by
dysentery and fatigue, preserved always his indomit-
able spirit ; but some of his officers were less staunch,
and conspired to undermine his authority. The fact
came to the knowledge of Alvarez, and he was on the
point of arresting and shooting the ringleaders when
Nov. 19. they evaded him on the 19th of November by deserting
to Augereau's camp. Thanks to their information,
Dec. 6. Augereau was able on the 6th of December to surprise
two redoubts, the possession of which by the French
cut off* the city from its principal outlying defences.
Alvarez, to recover the lost works, ordered a last
sortie, which after hard fighting was disastrously
repulsed ; and the shock of this blow prostrated the
heroic governor to unconsciousness. His successor,
therefore, made overtures for a capitulation ; but
Augereau would grant no terms beyond simple
Dec. 1 1. surrender ; and on the 1 ith of December three thousand
pallid, gaunt, dishevelled men staggered out of the
city, and laid down their arms. Twelve hundred more
were in hospital ; and these were all that remained of
the nine thousand men of the garrison. Of the
inhabitants six thousand out of fourteen thousand had
perished. The brave Spanish soldiers were treated
with ungenerous harshness by Augereau ; and Alvarez
himself, after recovering his health in France, was sent
back to Spain by Napoleon's orders and bandied from
prison to prison. At length at Figueras he succumbed
ch. xxxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 343
to cruel usage and hardship, being found dead upon 1809.
a barrow, the only semblance of a bed that was allowed
to him in the miserable dungeon where he had been
confined. The siege of this petty Catalonian fortress
had cost Napoleon fourteen thousand men and nine
months of time ; and it was doubtless sheer vindictive-
ness which prompted this mean and barbarous mal-
treatment of a most valiant enemy.
It may easily be imagined that the heroic defence
of Gerona caused great excitement in Spain, evoking
many appeals to the Supreme Junta for its relief ; and,
quite apart from this, that very inefficient body was
anxious to vindicate its existence by a military success.
Hardly, therefore, had Wellington reached his canton- Aug.
ments on the Guadiana, when the Junta began to ply
both him and his brother, the British ambassador at
Seville, with plans for a new offensive campaign on the
Tagus ; the reason alleged for this insane proposal being
an imaginary retreat of the corps of Victor, Mortier,
and Soult. Wellington was at the pains to show by
reasoned argument that the French were in far superior
numbers to any force that the Allies could assemble
against them ; but he stated to Wellesley his conviction
that the Junta's action was dictated rather by " trifling
political considerations " than by any prospect of military
advantage. Holding these views, he declined absolutely
to take part in the projected movement ; and, though the
Junta returned to the charge with tempting offers of
supplies and transport, and even of the command of
twelve thousand Spanish troops, he remained, and
rightly remained, steadfast in his determination. The
one criticism which he permitted himself upon the
scheme of operations was terse and decisive : " General
Eguia's plan is rank nonsense."1
Nevertheless, undeterred by these rebuffs, the Junta
persisted in the resumption of the offensive. Finally
they decided to withdraw two-thirds of the army of
1 Wellington to Wellesley, 1st Sept.; to Castlereagh, 4th Sept.;
to Roche, 14th Sept. 1809.
344 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. Estremadura to eastward, so as to amalgamate it with
the remains of Venegas's army of La Mancha, for
the present under the orders of Eguia ; placing the
rest under the Duke of Alburquerque, who had recently
taken over the command of Romana's corps. Eguia's
army was then to advance direct upon Madrid, while
Alburquerque in company with the British, if Welling-
ton could be persuaded to join him, was to make a
demonstration about Talavera ; or in other words,
Eguia was to engage Victor and Sebastiani, while
Alburquerque distracted Soult and Mortier. There
remained the weak corps of Ney at Salamanca, and
of Kellermann in the north of Leon and of Old Castile,
which were to be held in check by the Army of the
Left, formerly Blake's, next Romana's, and now, owing
to Romana's appointment to a seat on the Supreme
Junta, transferred to the Duke del Parque. In all,
Eguia's force numbered about fifty thousand ; Albur-
querque's, after deduction of a garrison for Badajoz,
about eight thousand ; and del Parque's, to which
reinforcements were coming from Asturias and levies
from Leon, about forty thousand disposable for service
in the field. These last, however, were so much scattered,
from Oviedo to Ciudad Rodrigo, that it would have
been imprudent to count upon the concentration of
more than thirty thousand. The first of these armies
was to start from La Carolina, the second from Truxillo,
and the third from Ciudad Rodrigo ; which is to say,
that with a joint nominal strength of ninety-six
thousand men, probably amounting in fact to no
more than eighty thousand, bad troops under bad
officers, they were to act upon external lines against
an enemy not inferior numerically, and incomparably
their superior in quality and direction.
Eguia had marched eastwards to join Venegas in
La Mancha on the 21st of September ; and, since the
distance from Truxillo to the General's headquarters
was about one hundred and forty miles as the crow
flies, it was reasonable to suppose that his final advance
ch. xxxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 345
upon Madrid could hardly begin before the first 1809.
week in October. But even before Eguia was upon
his way, del Parque had begun to advance, and had Sept. iS.
moreover called upon Beresford to help him to
maintain his forward position. Wellington declining
to allow the Portuguese troops to be moved to his
assistance, del Parque fortunately retreated before any Sept. 23.
harm had been done.1 On the 5th of October,
however, he advanced again with something over twenty
thousand men to Tamames, at which village lay the
junction of the roads from Salamanca and from the
pass of Banos to Ciudad Rodrigo. Here he took up
a very strong position, and decided to await attack.
It seems, however, that some days elapsed before
General Marchand, who was in temporary command
of Ney's corps, discovered del Parque's force ; for it
was not until the 17th that he marched from Salamanca Oct. 17.
with about thirteen thousand men, resolved, as was
natural, to attack him at once. Arriving before the
Spanish lines on the afternoon of the 18th, he assaulted Oct. 18.
the position immediately and was repulsed with the
loss of at least fourteen hundred men, being twice as
many as the casualties of the Spaniards. Had not the
Spanish cavalry, as usual, disgraced itself by running
away early in the action, the defeat might have turned
into a rout ; for Marchand's retreat was so precipitate
and disorderly that, according to information sent by
a British officer, who was present, to Wellington, five
hundred good horse would have destroyed the French
army.2
This was a genuine and, so far as it went, a solid
Spanish success ; and del Parque, moving due north,
so as at once to threaten Marchand's communications
with Zamora and to meet reinforcements which were
on their way to him, was heartened by the junction on
1 Wellington to Brigadier Cox, 25th Sept. ; to Castlereagh,
29th Sept. 1809.
2 Capt. Carroll to Lord Wellesley, 19th Oct. 1809. Wellington
MSS.
346 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. the 19th of General Ballesteros's l division of Asturians,
Oct. 19. about a thousand of whom, being unarmed, were equipped
with muskets captured from the French. Marchand
for his part retired hastily to Salamanca, where he
waited until he heard that del Parque had crossed the
Tormes at Ledesma. He then evacuated the place,
Oct. 24. abandoning a considerable quantity of stores, and fell
back to Toro, so as to secure his connection with
Kellermann's force at Valladolid.
Oct. 25. On the 25th del Parque occupied Salamanca ; and
a day or two later the Supreme Junta, after first re-
porting the losses of the French to be nearly five
thousand, proposed that the entire Spanish army, the
British, and the Portuguese should advance and drive
the enemy over the Pyrenees. Del Parque himself
was so much elated that Beresford grew extremely
nervous as to his future proceedings, and Wellington
wrote to him earnest warning and advice ; but the
Spanish General fortunately retained sufficient prudence
to remain halted at Salamanca, only summoning yet
another division to join him from Ciudad Rodrigo.2
Marchand meanwhile retired across the Douro, where,
Nov. 1. on the 1st of November, Kellermann joined his army
with three thousand cavalry and half that number of
infantry, and took the command out of his hands.
Concentrating the whole force at Tordesillas and wait-
ing only for the arrival of a brigade from Madrid, he
marched straight upon Salamanca with about twenty-
three thousand men, intent upon bringing del Parque
to action. The duke, however, overrating his adver-
sary's numbers by one -half, and being, moreover, a
sensible man, had no wish to fight. Obeying, there-
fore, a hint from Wellington, he retired southward to
Bejar and the pass of Baiios, whither Kellermann
1 This officer always signed his name Vallesteros ; but since,
in Spanish, the letters B and V are interchangeable, I have adhered
to the more familiar form.
2 Beresford to Wellington, 31st Oct. ; Wellesley to Welling-
ton, 29th Oct. Wellington MSS. Wellington to Castlereagh, 31st
Oct. 1809.
ch. xxxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 347
could not follow him without leaving Leon and Castile 1809.
open to irruptions from the Galicians, the Asturians,
and the guerilla-bands, which just at this time were
extremely active. Kellermann accordingly left the
Sixth Corps about Salamanca to observe del Parque,
and withdrew with his own troops to his former
position about Valladolid. It must be admitted that del
Parque's share of the combined movements was con-
ducted in a manner decidedly to his credit.
Far otherwise fared it with his colleague of the
Army of the Centre. By the 3rd of October Eguia Oct. 3.
had completed his march, and established his head-
quarters at Daimiel, when he received information that
twenty-five thousand French were assembling between
Toledo and Ocaiia. The report was true, for rumours
of his eastward movement had reached Joseph's head-
quarters and dictated a corresponding disposition of the
French army ; Mortier and the Fifth Corps ascending
the Tagus to Toledo, while Soult's corps came down
from Plasencia to take Mortier's place about Talavera.
On the 4th, therefore, Eguia fell back with the whole
army, and on the 5th fixed his headquarters at Santa Oct. 5.
Cruz de Mudela at the foot of the Sierra Morena.
His was no enviable position. The troops which he
had taken over from Venegas were indeed far superior
to those which he had brought with him from Estrema-
dura ; but everywhere were the same elements ot
weakness. The army and the people had no confidence
in the Government ; the Junta had no confidence in
the officers ; and the vilest intrigues sapped the
strength of every department. Colonel Roche, whom
long experience had necessarily hardened to this state
of things, reported the condition of the army to
Wellington with cynical indifference, and added, " As
to Eguia's plans I know nothing — probably a general
action with the usual result, defeat and dispersion."
It is not, therefore, surprising that when Marshal Victor,
having finally assembled twenty-five thousand men,
marched on the 15th of October to Daimiel, Eguia
348 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. should have fallen back still farther to La Carolina.
This movement brought to a head the demoralisation
of his army, for, apart from the invariable repugnance
of undisciplined men to a retrograde march, the retreat
signified the abandonment of a fertile district to the
French, and consequent failure of supplies. Eguia, in
his bitter resentment against Wellington, was striving
hard to keep from him all information both as to his
own movements and the enemy's ; but the general
discontent was such that no secret could be kept for
twenty - four hours. Roche declared himself fully
satisfied that the men would not fight to defend the
passes of the Sierra Morena ; but not a soldier from
the commander-in-chief downwards had thought of a
rallying-point in case these passes should be carried. In
fact, the whole state of affairs in La Mancha was as
bad as it could be.1
In the third week ot October Eguia was superseded
in command of his rabble by General Areizaga, a man
of no great reputation, who had received positive orders
not to move without the leave of the Supreme Junta.
He was, however, bound to advance, for his army could
not be fed on the mountains, nor stay there for another
month without perishing from cold. " There seems,"
wrote Roche, " to be a kind of fate driving every
Spanish General to a general action. They know of
nothing between this and total inactivity." Accord-
ingly, with the Junta's permission, Areizaga began his
march from La Carolina with fifty-six thousand men,
Nov. 8. and on the 8 th of November encountered the van
of the French cavalry at La Guardia, a little to the
south-east of Ocaiia.
This movement took the French by surprise.
Victor, after Eguia's hasty withdrawal from Daimiel,
had assumed that nothing more was to be feared from
the army of La Mancha, and had distributed his troops
into cantonments along a front of sixty miles from
1 Roche to Wellington, 3rd, 5th; to Lord Wellesley, 17th Oct.
1809. Wellington MSS.
ch. xxxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 349
Toledo eastward to Tarancon. Soult so little expected 1809.
danger that he was on the point of sending a flying-
column northward to clear guerilla-bands off the line of
communication. Areizaga, therefore, had little difficulty
in driving back the French horse, and, had he pushed
on, would have found few troops between himself and
Madrid. He halted, however, for three days, during
which Soult lost no time in assembling troops from all
quarters. On the 12th, Areizaga moved forward his Nov. 12.
cavalry to Aranjuez ; but finding Sebastiani ready to
defend the bridge with two divisions, and being nervous
over the presence of Victor on his left flank, struck
eastwards by cross-roads to the fords of Villamanrique,
five-and-twenty miles up the river. Bad weather,
however, delayed the passage of the stream by the
army at large, though the cavalry advanced as far as
Arganda, causing Soult to make dispositions for a
general action in that quarter. But now Areizaga
again changed his mind, and repassing the Tagus fell
back upon his first line of advance. Soult hurried
troops after him with all speed ; and on the 19th rather Nov. 19.
over thirty thousand men of the Fourth and Fifth Corps
and Central Reserve closed with Areizaga's fifty thou-
sand at Ocana, and inflicted on them a crushing defeat.
About four thousand of the Spaniards were killed and
wounded, and fourteen thousand taken, besides fifty
guns. The army of La Mancha for the time ceased
to exist. However, the Junta thanked Areizaga and
sent him a present ; which was very fitting, for his
incapacity in the field had very nearly eclipsed their
imbecility in the closet.
The result came as no surprise to Wellington ; but
on the first news of Areizaga's peril the Junta had
outdone itself in folly. They had ordered del Parque
to move down to Talavera, and Alburquerque, who
had remained in observation at Almaraz, to cross the
Tagus and join him there ; all for the sake of making
a diversion, which could not fail to come a week too
late, in Areizaga's favour. There was therefore always
350 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1809. a chance that the situation of August might be repeated,
namely, that Kellermann should cross the pass of Banos
in rear of the Spaniards, while Soult's victorious army
should fall on their front.1 Fortunately the two
Spanish commanders did not execute their orders.
Alburquerque did indeed cross the Tagus, but hastily
repassed it on hearing the news of Ocana, and resumed
his former position in safety-
Del Parque disobeyed from a less sensible motive.
Learning that the reinforcements sent to Marchand
after Tamames had been recalled to the main army, he
aspired to consummate the expected victory of Areizaga
by throwing himself on the line of the French retreat.
Nov. 18. He accordingly advanced on the 18th, whereupon
Marchand fell back as before to Toro, sending urgent
messages for reinforcements. Kellermann at once
directed his colleague to Medina del Campo to guard
the communication with Madrid ; but del Parque's
Nov. 23. troops reached the place as soon as Marchand's, and
the French retired northward upon Valladolid. On
Nov. 24. the 24th the Sixth Corps and Kellermann were
assembled at Valladolid sixteen thousand strong ; but
on the same day del Parque received information of the
disaster at Ocana, and, turning about, fell back upon
Alba de Tormes. On the 26th Kellermann sent his
Nov. 28. cavalry in pursuit, and on the 28 th he came upon del
Parque's army encamped near Alba de Tormes, with
three divisions on one side of the river, two on the
other, and all in disorder. Though his infantry was
still ten miles in rear, Kellermann attacked at once with
three thousand horsemen only. The first charge
scattered the Spanish cavalry and one division of foot ;
but the second was checked by the steadiness of the
remaining battalions ; and, though the action did
not close until the French infantry had come up
and stormed Alba de Tormes, del Parque escaped with
the loss of about three thousand men and nine guns.
1 Wellington to Bart. Frere, 19th, 26th Nov. ; to Beresford,
20th Nov. 1809.
ch. xxxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 351
On the same night he gave orders for the retreat 1809.
to be continued, apparently in several directions ; but
whether from this cause, or from a false alarm in the
course of the 29th, it is certain that within thirty-six Nov. 29.
hours his army was dispersed. Three weeks later the
defeated General sent a piteous appeal to Almeida for
one hundred and fifty thousand rations of biscuit. He
had rallied some twenty thousand men in the Sierra de
Gata ; and, though these were again melting away fast
through disease and desertion owing to scarcity of food,
yet with true Spanish pride he based his request upon
the possibility that his army might be called upon to
make some forward movement. Wellington answered
that for such a purpose he certainly would not give
away an ounce of his supplies ; but that to keep a
Spanish army from starvation he would relent. He
added, however, that if these troops were in want of
supplies so early in the winter, they would be in serious
distress before the end of that season, and that the
Spanish Government should look to the matter. As
usual his divination was but too true. Before the
middle of January, del Parque's army had lost through
sickness and privation no fewer than nine thousand
men.1
Thus the Spanish winter campaign had gone utterly
to wreck, as Wellington and every sensible man had
foreseen ; and its immediate consequences were that
Andalusia was thrown open to French invasion and
that the fall of the Supreme Junta was made absolutely
certain. It had already been decided that the Cortes
should be convoked on the 1st of March 18 10 ; but
the distribution of constituencies and the election of
representatives were matters which were still unsettled,
and for which all precedents were either obsolete
through long disuse, or valueless when so much of the
country was in the enemy's occupation. Meanwhile,
on the 1 st of November, an Executive Committee had
1 Brigadier Cox to Wellington, 20th Dec, Wellington MSS. ;
Wellington to Bart. Frere, 28th Dec. 1809.
352 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. taken over supreme authority in virtue of the Junta's
decree of the 19th of September, and had made vigorous
efforts, so far as edicts might avail, to raise men and
money and to reorganise the Spanish armies. But the
catastrophe of Ocana had been too complete to be easily
repaired, and the Committee had no idea how to make
the most of its existing resources. Wellington had
strongly advised that Alburquerque's army should be
reinforced at the expense of del Parque's, and stationed
in the impregnable position of Mesas de Ibor, so as to
cover the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and Arzo-
bispo, and thus to protect the province of Estremadura.
The Spanish Government, on the contrary, directed
Alburquerque to fall back to the Guadiana to a position
which he could not defend ; whereupon the duke, of
course, appealed to Wellington for assistance. The
British General returned a peremptory refusal, and
from that moment forward declined to be further con-
cerned with the Spanish operations.
In truth, he had some reason to be annoyed, for,
over and above all past troubles with the Spanish
authorities, both civil and military, the Junta, in the
teeth of Wellington's remonstrances against Areizaga's
whole campaign, had given that General to understand
that the British troops would co - operate with him.
Wellington had long ago made up his mind to cross
the Tagus, and station his army on the eastern frontier
of Portugal, feeling confident that, even after their
victory, the French could not venture to penetrate into
Andalusia, but would endeavour to capture Ciudad
Rodrigo and to establish themselves in Old Castile.
He had, none the less, been reluctant to move from his
cantonments about Badajoz until he had some assurance
of the safety of Seville ; but upon the last orders of the
Executive Committee to Alburquerque he hesitated no
longer. On the 9th of December the British began
their march northward, and their General, three days
earlier, allowed his indignation full vent in a letter to
Mr. Frere. "I declare that if the Spaniards had
ch. xxxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 353
preserved their two armies, or even one of them, the 1809.
cause was safe. The French could have sent no rein-
forcements which would have been of any use ; time
would have been gained ; the state of affairs would
have improved daily ; all the chances were in our
favour. . . . But no ! nothing will answer excepting
to fight great battles in the plains, in which their defeat
is as certain as the commencement of the battle." By
the end of December the bulk of the British army was
in cantonments on the Mondego, Hill with the second
division being left at Abrantes to parry any attempted
invasion of Portugal by the south of the Tagus.
Wellington himself remained at Badajoz until Christmas
Day, and journeying by Elvas, Abrantes, Thomar, and
Leiria so as to inspect the Portuguese troops, established
his headquarters on the 12th of January at Vizeu.1
1 Wellington to Roche, 19th, 26th Nov. ; to Frere, 26th Nov.,
6th Dec. ; to Beresford, 27th Nov., to Alburquerque, 27th Nov. ;
to Liverpool, 30th Nov., 7th Dec. 1809.
VOL. VII 2 A
CHAPTER XXXIV
1809. The Spaniards, now left alone, betrayed deplorable
helplessness in the disposition of their forces. Del
Parque with some twenty thousand starving men
remained about Ciudad Rodrigo to watch the French in
Old Castile, not, however, without dreaming of offensive
operations, and applying, of course in vain, for British
cavalry to second them. Alburquerque's headquarters
were at Don Benito on the Guadiana, a little to east-
ward of Merida, where he had about eight thousand
troops ; the remainder being taken away for the garrison
of Badajoz and for an advanced detachment on the
Tagus. About fifty miles east and south of Don Benito,
at Almaden, was posted the first of Areizaga's detach-
ments for the defence of the Sierra Morena, about four
thousand strong. The next lay over sixty miles to
south and east at La Carolina, where were Areizaga's
headquarters and about thirteen thousand men, guarding
the passes near the road from Madrid to Andalusia.
The third post covered the easternmost defiles of
Aldeaquemada and Villamanrique, the one seventeen,
the other forty-five miles north and east of La Carolina,
and was held by five to six thousand men. The disposi-
tion was admirably designed to enable the French to
overpower any one of the detachments singly, and to
force the passes with the least possible difficulty and
danger to themselves.1
Soult's first impulse immediately after Ocana was
not to follow up his routed Spaniards. The enemy's
1 Oman, iii. 1 1 1-1 12.
354
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 35$
army, he reported, was too much dispersed to allow of 1809.
effective pursuit ; and, apart from this, it was necessary
to restore order in the provinces held by the French,
and to re-establish the security of his communications.
As usual, no sooner had the scattered garrisons of the
French been withdrawn from their stations and con-
centrated to do duty as an army, than the population,
liberated from their control, had become actively and
venomously hostile. And such hostility had by this
time found effective organisation, for the year 1809
was that which saw the Spanish guerilla-bands definitely
formed under capable leaders for incessant petty warfare.
The subject is one which may rightly detain us for a
few moments.
The causes which gave birth to this movement were
principally two — despair at the inefficiency of the
regular armies, and vengeance for wrongs inflicted upon
individuals by the French ; and the quality of the
leaders varied greatly in consequence. Some were
gentlemen, some of the humblest origin, more than one
were priests, some were old and skilful soldiers, others
took command of their fellows from natural aptitude
for this particular description of operations, some were
stern disciplinarians, orderly and humane, others were
ferocious even to savagery. All practically pursued the
same methods. A stronghold on some almost im-
pregnable position in the mountains was chosen for a base,
from which the bands sallied forth to cut up convoys,
messengers, stragglers, and weak detachments of the
enemy, returning instantly to their fastnesses at the
first menace of danger. With such objects they
naturally stationed themselves near the principal lines
of the enemy's communications, and, having the whole
of the people upon their side, they were of course
furnished with the best of intelligence.
The most remarkable of these leaders, Martin Diez,
better known as ElEmpecinado} was the son of a common
1 " Pitchy-face." He was born at Castro de Duero, where it
appears that the inhabitants are of dark complexion.
356 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. labourer on the upper Douro. As a trooper in the
regular cavalry he had fought in the campaign of 1793 ;
and had first formed his band after the rising of the 2nd
of May 1808, when he at once became troublesome on
the road between Valladolid and Burgos. He, then, for
a short time worked with General Cuesta ; but soon left
that personage in disgust to conduct operations for
himself, and, joined by his three brothers, went back
to his old quarters and his old work. He furnished
valuable information to Moore when at Salamanca.
He did no less good service in following close on the
heels of Soult and Ney, when they marched through
the pass of Banos upon Talavera ; and, finally, he returned
once more to his old haunts at Aranda de Duero on the
main road from Burgos to Madrid, where he soon
became the terror of all marauding French columns.
Thanks to his activity, and to that of another leader, the
priest Merino, who frequented the same district, no
French messenger after the first six months of 1809
could pass between Burgos or Valladolid and Madrid
without a really strong escort.
Somewhat farther to the eastward was the field of
operations chosen by the greatest of the guerilla chiefs,
the two Minas, uncle and nephew, who worked over
the district to south of Pamplona, from Logrofio on
the south-west almost to Jaca on the south-east ; while
minor bands devoted themselves to particular portions
of the road from Vitoria to Burgos, and extended them-
selves south-westward towards Zamora and Salamanca.
Most prominent among these last was Don Julian
Sanchez, who took a broader view of patriotic duty
than most of his peers, and worked always in con-
junction with the organised armies in the field.
Beginning with a party of no more than eight or ten
comrades, he presently raised a body of two hundred
horse, with which he did most admirable work in
watching the enemy's movements and obtaining informa-
tion. As an old soldier he understood to the full the
value of discipline, and thus enjoyed an ascendancy not
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 357
only over his own troops but over the peasantry at 1809.
large, which vastly increased his powers of good service.
Scores of his letters of intelligence to Wellington are
still preserved, brief, terse, and pointed, sometimes a
little exultant over a well-earned success, but maintain-
ing always the fitting tone of an able subordinate
towards an able chief.
On the more easterly line of communications, from
Pamplona into Aragon, the work of harrying the French
was undertaken by Renovales, one of the heroes of the
second siege of Zaragoza. He had contrived to escape
from his escort while marching into France, and had
taken refuge in the rugged valley of the Roncal, in
which he defeated a French column of six hundred men
with a loss of four-fifths of their number. Two more
bands under two leaders little less noted, Sarasa and
Perena, worked to eastward of Renovales ; the former
from the stronghold of San Juan de la Pena a little to
south of Jaca, the latter from the valley of the Cinca,
from thirty to forty miles east of the same town. Yet
farther eastward, in Catalonia, the existing organisation
of the somatenes and migueletes offered abundance of
excellent material to an enterprising commander. Such
an one was found in Don Jose Manso y Sola, a miller
of Barcelona. He had begun his military career with
great distinction in 1808 when, at the age of twenty-
three, he had already made for himself a name by cool
bravery and skill. In 1809, being chosen by acclama-
tion chief of some eight hundred peasants, he re-estab-
lished himself at Vallirana, about fourteen miles west of
Barcelona, from which at once he disputed the passage
of the Llobregat, threatened Barcelona, and harried the
French communications between that town and Tarra-
gona. Active and enterprising, he was none the less
humane, treating the vanquished with a lenity which
sometimes provoked the wrath of his more ferocious
companions.
Farther south, on the right bank of the Ebro, the
roads leading southward from Zaragoza were threatened
358 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. by the band of Don Pedro Villacampa, a distinguished
officer of high rank who, in consequence of wrangles
between different aspirants to the command, had been
appointed by General Blake to supersede all others.
His stronghold, when threatened by overwhelming
force, was at Muela de San Juan in the heart of the
Sierra de Albarracin, over eighty miles south of Zaragoza.
To west and yet farther to south, in Toledo and La
Mancha, Mir and Jimenes were the most prominent
leaders ; while between Madrid and Talavera one
Camilo, a prosperous husbandman whose wife and
daughters had been outraged by the French, collected
a party of followers to take vengeance, and spared no
soldier of the enemy who fell into his hands.
It must not be supposed that the guerilla-bands were
mere skulkers, who contented themselves only with the
destruction of the French by ones and twos from some
point of vantage. They never made an attack, it is
true, unless the odds were enormously in their favour ;
but that was the essence of their real function, and it is
to their credit rather than the contrary that they were
faithful to this principle. Nevertheless, they would
undertake operations which, considering the strength of
their forces, were considerable in scale ; and they struck
with true instinct at strategic points. Thus Sarasa
surprised the garrison of Sanguesa, and Mina that of
Tudela, on the main roads from Pamplona to Zaragoza ;
and, though, of course, they were unable to hold these
places, the French commanders were none the less
obliged to send a superior force to drive them out.
Before long the guerilla-bands were to become formid-
able enough to capture whole French battalions, and
already they were constantly picking up French prisoners
by fifty and sixty at a time. In truth, if the Spaniards
had been at liberty to dictate the methods which they
would choose their enemy to pursue, they could have
found none more advantageous to themselves than
Napoleon's practice of living on the country and of
making war support war. How many unfortunate
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 359
French soldiers were sacrificed to this system will prob- 1809.
ably never be known. If a man does not feed his dog,
he must not be surprised if the animal becomes a sheep-
killer, with every man's hand against him. Yet the
French commanders had left their troops to feed them-
selves ever since the Revolution, and a starving man
differs little from a hungry dog. The Spanish peasants
from the first had not been slow to stab and to cut
throats ; and now, with armed parties of their country-
men everywhere within reach to back them, they became
bolder to attack and more cunning to entrap their
victims. A single guerilla chief, a Franciscan friar
who had been roused to vengeance by the execution
of his father for fidelity to King Ferdinand, reported
at the end of 1809 that he had done six hundred
Frenchmen to death.1
With enemies so numerous and so formidable in his
rear, it is not surprising that Soult at first doubted the
expediency of following up the vanquished of Ocana.
It should seem that his hesitation was due in part to a
false report that the British army had advanced to
Truxillo ; for, within a few days after he had assured
himself of Wellington's retreat into Portugal, he re-
solved to continue his advance into Andalusia. It is
not, perhaps, difficult to account for his change of mind.
It is true that a few short months earlier he had urged
that Lisbon, as the base of the British army, was the
real objective for the French force rather than Seville
as the seat of the Junta or of the Cortes. But King
Joseph was naturally anxious to banish a rival govern-
ment, and to master the richest and most populous pro-
vince in Spain. Reinforcements were beginning to
stream over the Pyrenees, and it was expected that the
Emperor would follow them in person. There would,
therefore, be plenty of troops to restore order on the
lines of communication ; and it might well suit the
private convenience both of Joseph and Soult to subdue
Andalusia and to obtain possession of its wealthy cities,
1 For the preceding paragraphs see Arteche, vii. chap. i.
360 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. before their jealous and imperious master should come
upon the scene. Napoleon never trusted his subordin-
ates, and they never trusted him. They spent a great
deal of time in writing lies to each other, which probably
were believed by neither party ; consequently, in any
matter of doubt, each, as a rule, chose the line which best
favoured his individual interest.1
Preparations for the advance, therefore, went for-
ward during the first weeks in December ; and on the
14th Soult wrote that circumstances had never been so
propitious for an invasion of Andalusia, and that he
awaited only the Emperor's signification of his pleasure.
Dec. 19. Five days later Joseph likewise addressed his brother
in a feeble imitation of Napoleon's style. " The
government of Seville is at the last gasp ; the hour
is upon us ; and I mean to profit by it." But no
1 8 10. answer came; and on the 1st of January Soult
Jan. 1. announced that, after a month's waiting in vain for the
Emperor's orders, Joseph was about to set his troops
Jan. 7. in motion. On the 7th the King left Madrid for the
south, and on the nth fixed his headquarters at
Almagro. Here, after consultation with Victor, it was
agreed that the army should attack the Sierra Morena
in two columns. The right or western column, consist-
ing of the First Corps, about twenty thousand men,
under Victor, was to move some seventy miles westward
to Almaden, cross the Sierra Morena by that rugged
pass, with or without its artillery, and thence strike
due south upon Cordova. Meanwhile, the left column
would attack Areizaga's positions in front and, it
was hoped, would drive his army into Victor's
arms.
Jan. 1 2. Victor marched, accordingly, on the 1 2th ; and Joseph,
after allowing six days for him to make his long turning
movement, resumed his advance on the 1 8th with forty
Jan. 20. thousand men. On the 20th he delivered an attack
by four columns simultaneously upon the passes of
1 Soult to Clarke, 21st Nov., 8th Dec; Joseph to Napoleon,
3rd Dec; Napoleon to Berthier, 9th Dec 1809.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 361
Villamanrique, Despena Perros, and two others farther 18 10.
to the eastward. Though, by spreading his troops
along a front of some forty miles, Joseph had emulated
the mistake of Areizaga, the assault was perfectly suc-
cessful. The passes were carried with trifling loss to
the assailants, and one Spanish division of four thousand
men was captured ; though the main body, by retreating
due south upon Jaen, did not fall, as had been hoped,
into the hands of Victor. Sebastiani was then detached
with ten thousand men to Jaen, while Joseph and Soult
pursued their way by Andujar upon Cordova. In Jaen,
Sebastiani on the 23rd came upon Areizaga with some Jan. 23.
eight thousand men which remained of the wreck of
his army ; but these demoralised troops offered little or
no resistance, and the town threw open its gates. On
the 22nd Joseph regained touch with Victor at Andujar,
and on the 24th the First Corps entered Cordova, Jan. 24.
which surrendered without any attempt at defence.
All, in fact, had gone perfectly well for the French
arms ; and the Spanish army of La Mancha had practi-
cally ceased to exist.
Accordingly, at Andujar on the 25th, Joseph and Soult Jan. 25.
laid their plans for the future. Sebastiani was sent
with ten thousand men to Granada ; Dessolles with the
reserve of six to seven thousand men was left to guard
the communications ; Reynier with the Second Corps,
who had been stationed about Almaraz, was directed to
extend his troops south-westward to Truxillo and to
push out parties to watch the valley of the Tagus ;
while Joseph with the First and Fifth Corps, numbering
together about thirty- two thousand men, marched
straight upon Seville. On the 27th Joseph wrote from Jan. 27.
Cordova to Napoleon that the pacification of Andalusia
would soon be accomplished. " All the towns are
sending me deputations ; Seville is following this ex-
ample. The Junta has retired to the Isle of Leon.
I am about to enter Cadiz without firing a shot."
The statements concerning Seville and Cadiz were not
true, but Joseph had a better excuse than usual for
362 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
i 8 io. dressing expectations in the guise of facts, for it really
seemed likely that his hopes would be fulfilled.
Jan. 29. On the 29th Victor's advanced horsemen came before
the walls of Seville, and were received with musket shots
at every point. There was, however, little to be appre-
hended in the way of resistance, for the city was given
over to panic and disorder. The Junta, which for
months past had been so unpopular as to provoke con-
spiracies for its overthrow, had tried to reassure the
population, on the first news of Joseph's proximity,
by sending wild and impracticable orders to del Parque
and Alburquerque to fall on the flank and rear of the
French. This foolish farce deceived none. On the
22nd riots began, and the members of the Junta began
to slink away, ostensibly for the purpose of preparing for
the Cortes which had been appointed to assemble on
the 1 st of February at Cadiz. By the evening of the
23rd all were gone, and the Central Junta had passed
away for ever. The mob then appointed a new Junta of
five, including Romana, Eguia, and two of the leading
conspirators against the late Junta. This usurping body
issued decrees and nominated leaders with great vigour,
but to no purpose except to supersede del Parque by
Romana, who, like a wise man, at once rode off* to
Castile to take command of his army. The remaining
members then found themselves face to face with the
problem of organising the defence of Seville. The mob,
with its usual unthinking energy, had thrown up earth-
works on a vast scale, without an idea as to where troops
should be found to man them. The new Junta had
counted upon Alburquerque, but there was no sign of
his coming ; and without his force there were only from
three to four thousand regular soldiers at their disposal.
On the 28th the members of the new Junta dispersed
with the same alacrity as their predecessors, leaving
Seville in the charge of the populace.
The result was not difficult to foresee. There was at
first tremendous firing on the French vedettes, till on
Jan. 31. the 30th and 31st the rest of the French army came up ;
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 363
but on the evening of the latter day the corporation of 18 10.
Seville sent out emissaries to negotiate for a surrender,
while the regular troops in the city retreated hastily
to the westward during the parley. Joseph, burning
to pose as a benevolent conqueror, joyfully accepted
the terms proposed to him, and on the 1st of February Feb. 1.
rode triumphant into Seville. He was received with a
warmth which was not ungenuine, the people having
had more than enough of inefficient Juntas ; and he
gave vent to his exultation by issuing a singularly
ridiculous parody of his great brother's bulletins.
However, he had some cause to be satisfied, for in
Seville he took not only the chief arsenal of Spain, with
all appliances in admirable order, but vast quantities
of tobacco, quicksilver, and other monopolies of the
Spanish Government, and even some gold and silver
from the mines of South America. In fact, he had at
last found what he had hitherto sought in vain in his
new kingdom, some approach to a popular welcome and
a small store of ready money.
None the less had Joseph been guilty of a great
and fatal military blunder. Alburquerque, whose nine
thousand men were quartered about Medellin, had, as
we have seen, received impracticable orders from the
Central Junta as to his operations. Ignoring these, he
marched straight upon Seville, and on the 23rd of
January reached the Guadalquivir, about fifteen miles
north of the town, where fresh commands reached him
to march on Cordova. Accordingly, crossing the river
he turned south-eastward upon Carmona, where he was
joined by about two thousand troops which had retreated
from the Sierra Morena. From thence he pushed out
patrols to eastward, which came into contact with
Victor's cavalry, and reported truly that the French
were advancing in great force. Having already in-
telligence of the flight of the Central Junta, Albur-
querque hesitated no longer, but resolved to hasten
direct to Cadiz, which, as he was aware, possessed
no garrison. His movements were no secret. Soult
364 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. knew on the 23rd of January that Alburquerque's army
had been summoned to Seville ; he knew on the 28th
that it was in front of Victor, not far from Carmona,
and by report eighteen to twenty thousand strong ; he
knew certainly on the 31st — most probably, indeed,
on the 30th — that this same army was heading
for Cadiz ; * he could hardly have been ignorant
that Cadiz, impregnable in those days if sufficiently
garrisoned, was at the moment unguarded. Yet he
deliberately allowed Alburquerque to go on his way,
sending no more than a brigade of cavalry to watch
him.
The story is a strange one, and all the stranger
seeing that Soult judged Alburquerque's army to be
nearly twice as strong as it really was. Several
authorities agree that Joseph, in the course of his
stay at Carmona on the 30th and 31st, brought up
the question of marching straight upon Cadiz instead
of upon Seville, and that he was silenced by Soult with
the words, " If any one will answer to me for Seville, I
will answer for Cadiz."2 The Marshal and not the
King, therefore, must take the responsibility for the
error of neglecting this force ; and it should seem that
he was soon touched by misgivings, for on the 2nd of
February he despatched Victor's corps to pursue
Alburquerque and occupy Cadiz. On the 8th Joseph
wrote airily that he hoped that the city would open her
gates,3 but he was doomed to disappointment. Victor,
with sound instinct, quickened his march ; but, when he
Feb. 5. came before the place on the evening of the 5th,
he found the only bridge of access broken down,
and batteries erected on all commanding points.
Alburquerque, who had started at least four days
earlier, had arrived only two days before the French.
From beginning to end of the march his cavalry had
been constantly engaged against the enemy, only with the
1 Corres. du Roi Joseph, vii. 235, 246-247.
2 These authorities are quoted by Mr. Oman, iii. 135 n.
3 To Napoleon, 8th Feb. 18 10.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 365
greatest difficulty covering the retreat of the infantry ; 1810.
and his troops generally, being denied food and forage
by their countrymen both at Xeres and at Santa Maria,
had dragged themselves into Cadiz utterly exhausted.1
Had they been followed by no more than a division
instead of a brigade of French cavalry, it seems highly
probable that they might have been dispersed. Now,
however, they had not only arrived safely, but had
brought with them some half-formed battalions, which
o m m ...
were in process of organisation at various points on the
road ; and the most famous port of Spain was no
longer to be taken without a siege in form.
It is difficult to exaggerate the good service
rendered by Alburquerque in thus marching upon his
own responsibility to Cadiz. Joseph's original in-
vasion of Andalusia had been, if not certainly a mistake,
at all events of extremely doubtful policy. Even upon
the first news of Ocana Wellington questioned whether
the movement would be practicable, and four weeks
later he expressed himself with yet greater decision.
" The first effort of the enemy, when he shall receive
his reinforcements, must be to possess himself of the
course of the Tagus, and he can never venture to push
himself into the south of Spain until that object shall
be accomplished."2 On the 31st of January he was
still of opinion that the operation was hazardous, and
on the same day Napoleon at last spoke out his mind
upon the invasion of Andalusia, and expressed his dis-
satisfaction with it. "The English," he wrote, "are
the only danger in Spain. The rest are only partisans
who can never keep the field." This was sound truth,
and there had been a time when Soult was as fully alive
to it as the Emperor. But he had taken the risk of
ignoring the British army, and, even while Napoleon
was writing, he had taken the further risk of ignoring
Alburquerque's army also. Fortune rarely permits two
1 Arteche, viii. appendix 2.
2 Wellington to Beresford, 27th Nov.; to Lt.-Col. Roche, 19th
Dec. 1809.
366 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. consecutive fundamental blunders to go unpunished.
Henceforward the operations of the French were per-
manently distracted and weakened by the detention
before Cadiz of a considerable force, which could not
without peril be withdrawn. " The slightest retro-
grade movement of any corps in the Andalusian
expedition," wrote Napoleon in the letter already
quoted, " will be contrary to all military ideas, will
embolden the insurrection, and will discourage the
French Army." The saying was true, not of Andalusia
only but of the whole of Spain, and sums up in itself
the reasons for the fall of Napoleon's empire.
The city of Cadiz is by nature one of the most
inaccessible that is to be found in the world to a hostile
force advancing by land only. It lies at the extreme
tip of a long sandy spit, which runs out for a length of
five miles to the north from the island of Leon, and in
many places does not exceed two hundred yards in
breadth. The defences of the spit, which I shall call
the isthmus of Cadiz, were an entrenchment called the
battery of San Ferdinando, extending from sea to sea
some two miles south of the town ; and the outer
bulwarks were pushed far out to southward of Cadiz
itself. The island of Leon, which is of irregular shape,
measures in extreme length from north-east to south-
west about seven miles, and in extreme width from east
to west about four miles. It is cut off from the main-
land by a channel of salt water, called the Rio de Santi
Petri, which varies in width from eighty to one hundred
and fifty yards, and is bordered by salt marshes. The
only passage over these obstacles was by a single bridge
opposite nearly the broadest part of the island, named
the Ponte Zuazo, and this had been broken down by
Alburquerque upon his arrival. General Venegas, the
military governor, had removed all boats which might
be serviceable to an enemy ; but, over and above this
precaution, batteries had been thrown up along the
whole length of the channel, and there was a swarm of
gunboats to hand, which would have made any attempt
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 367
at a passage in small craft something worse than 18 10.
hazardous. So far, therefore, as access by the island
of Leon was concerned, Victor was unable to approach
even within seven or eight miles of Cadiz.
There is, however, another sandy peninsula, called
the Trocadero, immediately to north of the island of
Leon, which forms, together with the isthmus already
mentioned, the gate of the inner harbour. At the
narrowest point in the channel between the two the water
is less than a mile broad ; and the passage was defended
by the forts of Puntales on the western side, and of
Matagorda and San Luis upon the Trocadero. From
Matagorda, Puntales lay within a range of thirteen
hundred yards, and the southern defences of Cadiz
within a range of something under four thousand yards,
the latter distance being too great for effective fire
from any artillery then existing. The approach to the
Trocadero from the land, however, was by no means so
thoroughly protected as that to the Isle de Leon ; and,
accordingly, Venegas had blown up the whole of the
works upon that peninsula, leaving the French to recon-
struct them, if they dared, under the fire of Fort Puntales
and of the joint fleets of Spain and England.
Victor, having sent into Cadiz a summons, which was
defiantly rejected, and taken stock of the fortifications,
sat down and reported that without boats and heavy
artillery he could do nothing. Joseph came up to
inspect the city in person on the 1 8th, and informed his Feb. 18.
brother that Cadiz showed symptoms of defending
itself. " But," added this hardened warrior, "we shall
see in a day or two what she will do when we have
raised a few batteries. If Your Majesty could spare the
Toulon fleet, it might be usefully employed here." *
Herein Joseph spoke the truth. Naval assistance was
essential to the capture of Cadiz, but, unfortunately,
naval supremacy lay on the side of the British ; and the
last experience of the Toulon fleet, which had cheered
the weary heart of the dying Collingwood, did not
1 Joseph to Napoleon, 18th Feb. 1810.
368 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 io. promise that it should be easily wrested from them.
Victor might cover the approach to the city by land, but
the sea lay open, and already advantage had been taken
of it. The small corps of regular troops, which had
slipped out of Seville after the surrender of that town,
had first retreated to Ayamonte, and had then taken
ship and returned to Cadiz. Moreover, on the 30th of
January the Spanish Government, forgetting former
scruples in its panic, had begged through Mr. Frere for
aid from the British, and Wellington had immediately
Jan. 31. complied. It so happened that on the 31st of January
Major-General William Stewart had arrived from
Portsmouth with the Seventy-ninth, Ninety-fourth, and
drafts ; and these two battalions, together with the second
battalion of the Eighty-seventh and two companies of
artillery, were selected, with Stewart for their commander,
for employment at Cadiz. The Portuguese Regency a
few days later offered a Portuguese regiment, thirteen
hundred strong, for the same service, which was likewise
embarked ; and thus a force of between three and four
thousand men was subtracted from the defensive army
of Portugal. Wellington made no conditions as to
their service, except that on points of discipline they
should be subject to their own officers only, that they
should not be detached from Cadiz, and that they should
receive British rations from the Spanish stores. These
terms were accepted by the Regency with perfect con-
tentment, and by the 14th of February Frere was
able to report that their commander had gained the
esteem and good-will of all in the city.1 Thus it was
that the redcoats were already visible in Matagorda and
in Alburquerque's new earthworks when Joseph came
before the isle of Leon.
1 The Portuguese regiment reached Cadiz on the 1 7th of February.
The British 2/88th seems to have arrived from Gibraltar about the
same time. Stewart and his troops arrived on the nth of February.
Wellington MSS., Stewart to Wellington, 31st Jan. ; Frere to
Wellington, 14th Feb.; Villiers to Wellington, 5th Feb. 18 10. The
Seventy-ninth were from 900 to 1000 strong ; the Ninety-fourth
were 670.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 369
Nevertheless Cadiz had a very weak point in that 18 10.
the authority of the Spanish Regency was disputed by
the local Junta, a pretentious and unpatriotic body, which,
by aspiring to powers which it was incompetent to wield,
and neglecting the simpler duties that it might usefully
have performed, was laying up material for bitter and
dangerous division in the future. It may possibly have
been the knowledge of the friction between Junta and
Regency which prompted Joseph to send secret emis-
saries to every man of high station in Cadiz, exhorting
them to throw themselves upon his clemency. His
overtures being everywhere rejected with contumely, he
decided at last to make a royal progress through his
newly won kingdom of Andalusia. It was indeed but
little exaggeration to call it his kingdom. Sebastiani,
after dispersing such demoralised bodies of Spaniards as
attempted to arrest him, received the surrender of
Granada on the 29th of January, and marching thence
south-westward stormed and sacked Malaga with little
trouble or loss. He then distributed his troops along
the coast, there being nothing further to oppose him
except guerilla-bands ; for the remnants of the Spanish
armies had all taken refuge in Murcia. Joseph there-
fore visited Ronda, Malaga, Granada, Jaen, and Cordova,
receiving deputations, reviewing civic guards, and
lavishing smiles and promises. His reception was
sufficiently hearty to encourage him to believe in his
own popularity ; indeed, it should seem that the
Andalusians were really less hostile to him than many
of their compatriots, and that not a few were sincerely
friendly. The intrusive King lacked neither intelligence
nor tact. He displayed interest, which need not have
been feigned, in the historical antiquities of every city
through which he passed ; he was gracious, accessible,
and kindly ; in fact he delighted to appear in the
character of a benevolent despot, and it is quite possible
that, in happier circumstances, he might have filled such
a position worthily.
Such a policy was, however, diametrically opposed
VOL. VII 2 B
370 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. to that which Napoleon had ordained for him. The
Emperor, to uphold his sovereignty in France and in
Europe, was obliged to maintain a far larger army than
he could afford to pay ; and he was resolute that Joseph
should, from his Spanish revenues, discharge the bulk
of the expenses of the army in Spain. " Levy contribu-
tions," was his constant injunction, which was implicitly
obeyed by his generals ; Sebastiani and Soult being little
less alert as extortioners than three other generals who
were an abomination to Joseph. " In the name of
French blood and Spanish blood, Sire," wrote the un-
happy King, "recall Loison, Kellermann, and Thouvenot.
These men cost us very dear." Yet almost at the same
moment Napoleon was holding up Loison to other
generals as a pattern. " Write to General Solignac
that Loison has done well in levying a contribution of
a million and a half of reals," was his instruction to
Berthier ; " but," he added, " this money must all be
paid into the military chest." * This last order was
one which had never been very religiously observed
by French generals since the Revolution. The situation,
indeed, presented some aspects that were intensely
ludicrous. On one side, Joseph, the titular King, was
endeavouring to raise revenue to satisfy his brother's
demands ; on the other, the French generals were inter-
cepting all income, with Napoleon's approval, by
arbitrary seizures ; and, finally, great part of the
proceeds were paid neither to Joseph nor to Napoleon,
but simply poured into the generals' pockets for their
private emolument.
By the beginning of 18 10 Napoleon's patience with
his brother's squeamishness in the matter of exaction
Jan. 28. was worn out, and on the 28th of January he delivered
his final decision. He himself would in future furnish
only ^80,000 a month towards the expenses of the
army in Spain, and the whole of the balance must be
supplied by Joseph ; otherwise, there was only one
1 Joseph to Napoleon, 25th Jan.; Napoleon to Berthier, 27th
Tan. 1 8 10.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 371
thing to be done — the Spanish provinces must be 1810.
administered in the interests of France. The threat
was executed almost as soon as written. Within eleven Feb. 8.
days an imperial decree distributed the provinces of
Spain into four military governments, and appointed
as many military governors to rule over them ; namely,
Augereau, or the commandant of the Seventh Corps, to
Catalonia, Suchet to Aragon, General Dufour to
Navarre, and General Thouvenot to Biscay. It was
expressly ordered that no one of the three last provinces
should receive any further funds from France for the
payment of troops, and that the governors of all four
should correspond direct with Berthier upon all military
subjects, acting upon no commands except from him as
to civil administration. Further, Marshal Ney and
Generals Bonnet, Thiebault and Kellermann were
directed to collect the revenues of the provinces of
Salamanca, Toro, and Zamora ; of Santander and
Asturias ; of Burgos ; and of Valladolid and Palencia
respectively ; and they likewise were to correspond with
Berthier upon all financial details. Practically this
decree deprived Joseph of any authority, civil or
military, over all but a very small portion of Spain ; and
it was certainly intended to do so. Not many days
after the date of this decree, Napoleon sent explicit
commands to Suchet that no attention was to be paid
to directions from Madrid, if they should clash with
those from Paris, and to Augereau that he was to
accept no orders from any one except the Emperor.1
It may be said that these decrees and orders of
Napoleon only confirmed the existing state of affairs ;
for, while the Emperor was dictating them, Joseph on
his side was complaining that the generals were already
raising taxes, issuing proclamations, and promulgating
laws in a fashion which brought him into contempt
with his new subjects.2 But this cannot lessen our
1 Decree of 8th Feb. 1810 in Mem. du Roi Joseph, viii. 439 ;
Napoleon to Berthier, 17th Feb. ; to Clarke, 21st Feb. 18 10.
2 Joseph to Napoleon, 1 8th Feb. 18 10.
372 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 8 10. amazement that so great a man as Napoleon, after
deliberately countenancing insubordination, should still
have expected matters to proceed well and smoothly
in Spain, with half a dozen generals each going his
own way, and no commander-in-chief to control them.
It is true that after the conclusion of peace with
Austria he had announced that he should take personal
command in the Peninsula.1 Late in November 1809,
he had appointed Berthier to be Chief of the Staff of
the army in Spain, and had dictated measures which
would enable himself to take the reins immediately into
his own hands. There is more than one allusion in his
correspondence during December to his arrival in
Spain ; on the nth of January 18 10 he gave directions
for sending some of his horses over the frontier, and
on the 1 2th of February he bade Berthier spread a report
in Portugal that the Emperor was coming with eighty
thousand men.2 This last, however, was almost certainly
a blind, for, having divorced Josephine in December, he
was by the second week of February on the eve of
signing his marriage contract with the Archduchess
Marie Louise. Whatever might be the calls of Spain
upon him, he could not respond to them while so
weighty a business was in hand ; and after the 2nd of
April he was entitled to say that he had married a
wife and therefore he could not come. Possibly he
thought that the matrimonial alliance in itself was a
stroke which would dismay his enemies ; and he was so
far right that Wellington described it in all seriousness
as a terrible thing. But the decree of the 8 th of
February was only the beginning of his insane policy of
divided rule in Spain, and the inference to be drawn
from it is inevitable. The Emperor was already suc-
cumbing to the defect which eventually brought him to
ruin, namely, a tendency to confound assumptions with
facts. He assumed that he could direct operations in
1 Cor res. de Napoleon, 16,132.
2 Napoleon to Berthier, 28th Nov. 1809 ; Uth Jan., 12th Feb.
1810.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 373
Spain as well from Paris as on the spot, and that there- 18 10.
fore they were bound to succeed. Probably, such is
poor human nature, he derived considerable satisfaction
from annoying Joseph, who was by no means in favour
with him at the time.
Joseph received the news of his degradation at
Malaga, and answered it on the 2nd of March with a March 2.
piteous but helpless protest. To his wife he wrote
that unless the Emperor changed his conduct he should
resign, a threat which he repeated more than once in
the course of the year, but never fulfilled.1 The
Emperor continued to heap petty vexations upon him.
Together with the decree he sent Joseph a furious
letter of reproach for not being at Salamanca and
Valladolid to menace Portugal and prevent the English
from making a descent upon France, although the
miserable King had for months been asking in vain for
instructions. A few weeks later, to anticipate this
detail of the narrative, Napoleon interposed to prevent
his brother from sharing in the proceeds of English
goods confiscated in Andalusia. " He is only the
commander of my army," he wrote, with seemingly
unconscious irony. In April he entrusted Massena with
independent command of the Second, Sixth, and Eighth
Corps, as the army of Portugal. In July he gave
Soult independent command of the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Corps as the army of Andalusia. Not till
October did he grant to Joseph himself an army of the
Centre. The generals, of course, took their cue from
their master. Ney made a military incursion into the
province of Avila, which was within Joseph's district,
and laid violent hands upon the public money collected
by the King's receiver. Kellermann forbade Joseph's
underlings in the provinces to correspond with their
.superior at Madrid. Soult ordered Joseph's troops
from La Mancha to Andalusia and Joseph ordered them
back ; after which both represented to the Emperor
1 Joseph to Napoleon, 2nd March; to his wife, 12th April,
1 6th July, 8th, 2 1 st Aug. 18 10.
374 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 10. that this kind of thing could not continue. Every-
where there was friction, and everywhere downright
roguery in the malversation of the funds collected for
the army.1
Such, made and in the making, was the condition
of the higher command of the French troops in Spain
when Napoleon girded himself for his great effort in
1810. We have now to consider the reinforcements
by means of which he hoped to achieve the final
conquest of the Peninsula. Early in October 1809,
when peace with Austria was on the point of being
concluded, he laid his plans to place one hundred
thousand men between Orleans and Bayonne in
December, ready to cross the Pyrenees. He intended
that nearly half of this number should be supplied by
depots, provisional corps, and other unorganised units,
and four thousand men more by foreign corps, so as to
leave the army of Germany practically untouched ;
and he compassed this object with singular success.
From Germany he took only a corps of reserve, called
the Eighth Corps, which he eked out with a few
battalions from Paris, and turned over bodily to the
Peninsula with the same title as before. Together
with its cavalry, which was composed of thirty-two
depot-squadrons of sixteen regiments of dragoons, and
about sixteen hundred artillery, the Eighth Corps
numbered thirty-seven thousand of all ranks, of which
about thirty-three thousand were effective. The troops
next in importance to the Eighth Corps were the
Young Guard, consisting of eight battalions of infantry,
three provisional regiments of cavalry, and artillery,
with an effective total of sixteen to seventeen thousand
men. Besides these, there was a great number of
drafts, and of fourth battalions of the regiments serving
in Spain, some of which last were sooner or later joined
1 Napoleon to Clarke, 10th Feb. (Lecestre, ii. 10.) ; to Berthier,
17th April ; Decree of 17th April ; to Soult, 14th July ; to Berthier,
29th Sept., 4th Oct. ; Joseph to Napoleon, 30th April ; to Napoleon
and Berthier, 25th Aug. ; to Napoleon, 31st Aug. ; Soult to Berthier,
18th, 29th Aug. ; Circular of Berthier, 15th Sept. 18 10.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 375
to their own corps, while others remained isolated. 18 10.
There were further a few thousand foreign troops, and
four thousand gendarmerie to patrol the main lines of
communication. But as Napoleon looked more closely
into the work of the guerillas and realised how enormously
they complicated his task, he added to the foregoing a
reserve, made up of more fourth battalions, which was
called the Ninth Corps, and was assigned to General
Drouet. Altogether the full total of the reinforcements
poured into Spain by September 18 10 was one hundred
and thirty-eight thousand men. Of these by far the
greater number had crossed the frontier by May ; and
about sixty thousand, comprising the Eighth Corps and
Young Guard, were actually in Spain by the middle of
January, with nearly forty thousand more at Bayonne
or elsewhere close to the frontier. Including these last
the French army of Spain at the beginning of
February counted two hundred and ninety-seven
thousand men.
The distribution of these corps was as follows.1 The
First, Fifth, and part of the Fourth Corps were, as we
have seen, fully employed in Andalusia. The Second
Corps was in the valley of the Tagus about Talavera,
protecting the rear of the army of Andalusia and
observing the frontier of Portugal. The Sixth Corps
was likewise watching the frontier of Portugal farther
north, with its headquarters at Salamanca. The
Eighth Corps was about Burgos, having only just
entered Spain. The Third Corps formed the army of
1 It may be convenient to enumerate again the French army-
corps and their commanders : —
1st Corps : Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno.
2nd Corps : General Heudelet, presently succeeded by Reynier.
3rd Corps : General Suchet.
4th Corps : General Sebastiani.
5th Corps : Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso.
6th Corps : Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen.
7th Corps : Marshal Augereau, Duke of Castiglione ; presently
succeeded by Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarento.
8th Corps : Marshal Junot, Duke of Abrantes.
9th Corps : General Drouet.
376 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. Aragon, and was stationed chiefly about the Lower
Ebro ; and the Seventh composed the army of Catalonia.
Besides these there were about eight thousand men in
the garrisons of Navarre ; fifteen thousand in the
garrisons of Biscay ; five thousand in the provinces of
Valladolid and Palencia ; nearly as many in Segovia ; 1
about twelve thousand in Madrid 2 and New Castile ;
and seven thousand, exclusive of the two divisions of
the Young Guard, in Santander. Since the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Corps under Soult, and the Second,
Sixth, and Eighth under Massena were the two armies
— the one of Andalusia and the other of Portugal — with
which the British were to be chiefly concerned, it will
be convenient to clear the ground by relating first the
operations of the rest.
To begin, then, with the isolated sphere of Catalonia,
it must be remembered that the year 1 809 had closed
with the fall of Gerona, which had swept away the
most dangerous obstacle on the road between the
French frontier and Barcelona, and had liberated
Augereau's army for service in the field. The
Marshal's muster-rolls in January showed a nominal
total of fifty-one thousand men, including a batch of
six thousand drafts at Perpignan ; but in Verdier's
division alone seven thousand out of thirteen thousand
men were on the sick-list, and the full total of effective
combatants fell below thirty-five thousand. Of these,
again, nearly six thousand under General Duhesme were
in Barcelona, strictly blockaded by the British frigates
at sea, almost as straitly confined by guerillas ashore,
and therefore always half-starved. Napoleon's orders
to Augereau were that he should advance to Barcelona
at once, in order to raise the blockade, revictual the
city, and make the presence of his army felt. This
done, he was to assure safe communication between
Barcelona and France by taking the castle of
Hostalrich, which, though not so formidable an
1 Including Laval's division of the 4th Corps.
2 Including the 1st division of the 4th Corps.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 377
obstruction as Gerona, was an eternal menace to the 18 10.
safety of the main road.1
To bring a convoy into Barcelona was, as the
Marshal knew, no very easy task ; wherefore, to simplify
it, he began by setting several columns in motion against
the somatenes of the mountains about Gerona, in the
hope of dispersing if not of exterminating them. As
was to be expected from such a man, he tried to over-
come all difficulties by violence, treating the Spanish
irregulars as mere banditti, and hanging such as he
caught without trial and without mercy, a policy which
did not fail to provoke savage reprisals from his enemies.
These preliminaries completed, he sent Souham's division
and two Italian brigades along the western road, which
leads by way of Vich upon Barcelona, to clear his
right flank ; ordered Mazzuchelli's Italian brigade to
advance upon Hostalrich ; and summoned Duhesme
to meet him, with such troops as he could spare, at
Granollers, where the two roads meet about twenty
miles north of Barcelona. The only regular force
which he had to dread was the remnant of the Spanish
army of Catalonia, about seven thousand raw and
discouraged men, but now under a young and active
commander, Henry O'Donnell. Upon reaching Vich
on the 1 2th of January Souham found that this body Jan. 12.
had just withdrawn before him into the mountains, where-
upon he pressed on in pursuit of it with an advanced
guard only. O'Donnell continued his retreat for a
time until, on reaching an advantageous position, he
suddenly faced about and handled Souham's small
column so roughly that the latter was fain to fall back on
the main body with the loss of over three hundred killed,
wounded, and prisoners. O'Donnell, however, was too
prudent to await an attack of the French in strength, and
retired after this success towards Manresa ; whereupon
Souham likewise retreated to Vich, from which place Jan. 14.
two days later he was directed to detach his two Italian
brigades to Augereau. Jan. 16.
1 Napoleon to Clarke, 19th Dec. 1809.
378 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Mazzuchelli, in the meanwhile, had come before
Hostalrich on the 13 th and had detailed an Italian
brigade to invest it ; but, finding the place determined
upon resistance, he summoned two more brigades from
Jan. 18. Souham, and on the 18th assaulted and carried the town
with little difficulty. Thinking that the garrison of
the castle would be overawed by this success, Augereau
Jan. 21. on the 21st addressed an insolent summons to the
garrison, which was defiantly rejected. The French
Marshals at this period appear to have thought it
discourteous, if not immoral, for any hostile fortress
to defend itself, and Augereau was no exception to the
rule. Beside himself with rage, he sent for heavy guns
from Gerona, and, leaving the besieging force behind
him, continued his march with his convoy and some
nine thousand men upon Granollers. He had not
proceeded far when he was met by bad news. Duhesme,
obedient to orders, had on the 16th marched out to
Granollers with about two thousand men, of whom two
hundred and fifty were cavalry ; but, after waiting four
days, had been recalled to Barcelona by an alarm of an
attack from the south. He had therefore turned over
the command to Colonel Guetry, who, in order to
shelter the men from the bitter cold, had cantoned
them in three different villages some miles apart.
O'Donnell, hearing of this, and learning further that
Augereau was still twenty miles away from them, sent
four thousand men by a forced march across the
mountains ; who fell upon the scattered French parties
at dawn of the 21st. The surprise was complete.
One battalion was cut off" almost to a man ; another,
together with the cavalry, escaped to Barcelona, much
maltreated ; and the third only saved itself by holding
a fortified convent at Granollers, from which it was
released after two days' siege by the advance of
Augereau. This affair cost the French a thousand
men ; and the blame for the mishap must fall upon
Augereau himself for keeping so small a detachment
so long exposed in isolation. Moreover, since the
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 379
Spaniards retired immediately upon his coming, he had 18 10.
no opportunity of avenging the insult.
On the 24th the Marshal entered Barcelona, where Jan. 24.
he was joined by Souham's division ; stopped there for
one week, during which he deprived Duhesme of his
command and sent him back to France ; and on the
1st of February marched out again. He could not, Feb. 1.
in fact, have waited longer without consuming the
greater part of the supplies that he had brought with
him. His troops, therefore, returned to their former
stations, Souham to Vich with his French division of
five thousand men, Pino and his Italians to Hostalrich,
while the Marshal betook himself to Gerona to await
the assembling of yet another convoy. The isolation
of Souham was not lost upon O'Donnell, who contrived
to collect about twelve thousand men about Moya, some
ten or twelve miles south-west of Vich. Then, sending
part of the force to descend upon Souham's quarters
from the rear, he boldly marched with the main body,
between seven and eight thousand men, into the plain
in front and offered battle. The action was hard Feb. 20.
fought, and the issue was for long in doubt until it was
finally decided by the superiority of the French cavalry.
O'Donnell then withdrew with a loss of eighteen
hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners. He had no
doubt sinned through over-confidence, but he had gone
near to gain a victory. The French loss was about
six hundred killed and wounded, Souham himself being
so severely hurt that he was obliged to give up his
command to Augereau's brother, and to seek re-
covery in France.
Three weeks later Augereau marched once more March 13.
from Gerona with a huge convoy, himself escorting it
with Italians and with a division of German troops
which had recently joined him, while his brother's
division moved parallel with him to westward by Vich
and Manresa. On his way he relieved the force which
was blockading Hostalrich by a new detachment. No
mishap befell the convoy, its escort numbering in all
380 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. nearly twenty thousand men; and after arriving at
Barcelona, Augereau installed himself as governor
under Napoleon's decree and turned over the business
of the campaign to his brother. The Marshal's orders
from Napoleon were that he should at once join Suchet,
whose army was expected to arrive before Lerida on
the 1 st of March, and carry the war boldly forward in
conjunction with the Third Corps. As shall presently
be seen, Suchet was nowhere near Lerida on the ap-
pointed day ; and the fact is sufficient to show the
futility of the Emperor's attempt to direct operations
in Spain from Paris. Nevertheless, Napoleon's vagaries
can hardly excuse Augereau's actions. Himself remain-
ing comfortably in Barcelona, he sent his brother with
two divisions to Reuss, about twelve miles north and
west of Tarragona, as an advanced base from which to
attack the latter fortress ; stationing eight or nine
hundred men at Villafranca on the road between
Barcelona and Reuss, and a brigade under General
Schwarz at Manresa, presumably to parry any attack
from the north. Such dispersion of force positively
invited attack, and it can only be said for Augereau
that he was now fifty-three years old, that he had lived
a very hard life, and that his health had never recovered
the toils, sickness, and wounds of the campaign of
Eylau.
O'Donnell, meanwhile, had retired into Tarragona
March 27. with six thousand men, in time to reject Augereau's
summons to surrender on the 27th of March. No
sooner did he realise the situation than he sent out a
March 30. force of six thousand men under General Juan Caro,
which fell upon Villafranca at dawn of the 30th, and
after two hours' fighting killed or captured every French
soldier in the place. Though wounded in the action,
Caro at once moved towards Manresa, met a reinforce-
ment of twelve hundred men on its way to the garrison,
killed or took eight hundred of them, and drove the
remainder back to Barcelona. He then blockaded
Manresa itself, with the help of a number of the
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 381
inhabitants; whereupon Schwarz, despairing of succour, 1810.
endeavoured to steal away on the night of the 4th ot
April ; but was overtaken and his troops so roughly
handled that only a third of them escaped to Barcelona,
with Schwarz himself wounded and all baggage and
artillery lost. Communication between Reuss and
Barcelona was now completely cut off; and Augereau,
fearing lest O'Donnell might turn his arms next against
the isolated force before Hostalrich, sent an aide-de-
camp by sea to recall the two divisions from Reuss.
The vessel through good luck escaped capture by the
British cruisers ; and on the 7th General Augereau April 7.
marched for Barcelona, which his men reached safely,
though much harassed by the way, on the 9th. The April 9.
only point gained by all these movements of troops was,
that by the merest chance a detachment of the force at
Reuss met another detachment from Suchet's army, and
ascertained that Suchet was at last before Lerida.
But Marshal Augereau was now thoroughly
frightened. He ordered Verdier to push forward as
many troops of his division as he could spare to
Granollers, so as to protect the blockading force before
Hostalrich ; and on the 1 ith he sent his Italian division to April 1 1.
relieve that blockading force, while he himself retreated
to Gerona with an immense train of vehicles, partly filled
with the plunder of Barcelona. His excuse was that
there were only ten days' supplies for his army if he
kept it concentrated in the Catalonian capital, and that
provisions could not be obtained elsewhere owing to the
activity of the somatenes. Nor was the plea an empty
one, for the only means of furnishing victuals to
Barcelona, whether for the garrison or the civil
population, was by dragging them overland from
France. This necessitated large convoys ; and large
convoys demand large escorts, which likewise must be
fed on the march. The result naturally followed that
the escort consumed an appreciable part of the convoy's
load on the way, and was obliged to return with the
empty waggons as soon as possible, lest it should
382 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. devour all the supplies which it had brought for the
garrison. The vicious circle in which the service of
supply must move in such circumstances cannot be
escaped, and has been the despair of many officers.
Napoleon, however, was not the man to allow the
question of victuals to excuse a series of ill-planned
operations which had issued in ignominious failure. If
the Marshal had gone, as he had been bidden, to the
plains between Lerida and Tarragona, he would, in
the Emperor's judgment, have found abundance of
April 24. provisions.1 On the 24th of April orders were
despatched to Marshal Macdonald to proceed to Cata-
lonia and there take command of the Seventh Corps ;
and it cannot be denied that Augereau fully deserved his
supersession. He had lost from three to four thousand
men, and had accomplished less than nothing. Even
the petty stronghold of Hostalrich held out for four
months until, provisions being absolutely exhausted, the
May 12. garrison sallied out on the night of the 12th of May,
and succeeded in escaping, though with the loss of its
commander and one-third of its number taken prisoners.
Decidedly O'Donnell and not Augereau was the hero of
this campaign.
In Aragon,as has been already mentioned, Napoleon's
orders to Suchet that the Third Corps, now amounting
to nearly twenty-four thousand effective men, should be
before Lerida by the 1st of March, had not been carried
out. Still earlier directions had prescribed to that
General the siege either of Lerida or of Tortosa ; the
Emperor being particularly anxious that the Third and
Seventh Corps should join hands, while Lerida was of
special importance as the post which guarded the main
gate from Aragon into Catalonia. But in the exaltation
of his success in the Sierra Morena, Joseph had on the
27th of January already bidden Suchet to move rapidly
upon Valencia, in the mistaken assurance that the
Spaniards at large were now too much disheartened to
resist him. The General, therefore, marched down with
1 Napoleon to Clarke, 24th April 18 10.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 383
eleven to twelve thousand men, came before Valencia 1810.
on the 6th of March, summoned it, was answered with March 6.
defiance, and, having no heavy guns, was fain to go back
again. He retreated accordingly on the night of the 10th, March 10.
to find that the guerillas were already busy on his lines
of communication, and had cut off" sundry small parties ;
and it cost Suchet a fortnight's work to drive them back
again to their fastnesses. On his march southward he
had received Napoleon's letter, already quoted, bidding
him take no notice of orders from Madrid, but had
thought it too late to turn back. Soon after his return
to Zaragoza he received two letters of strong rebuke
from the Emperor, which effectually cured him of all
regard for the commands of Joseph.1
Having thus wasted two months, Suchet at the
beginning of April left one division, a very inadequate
force, to hold Aragon during his absence, and, marching
with thirteen thousand men in two isolated columns
upon Lerida, arrived before the fortress on the 1 3th. His
troops were insufficient to invest the place thoroughly; and
he found it so difficult to obtain intelligence of the Spanish
movements about him that on the 19th he led a strong March 19.
column of some five thousand men, including the greater
part of his cavalry, on a reconnoitring expedition to east-
ward. The governor, General Garcia Conde, had already
informed O'Donnell of the weakness of the besieging
army ; and on the 20th the eager young commander March 20.
started from Tarragona with about nine thousand men,
of whom seven thousand were regular infantry and four
hundred cavalry. Most unfortunately for him, Suchet
obtained information of his coming, brought back his
column within three miles of Lerida, and disposed it on
the evening of the 22nd so that O'Donnell should find April 22.
on his front a weak detachment to engage him, while a
formidable force, unseen but within striking distance,
lay upon his flank. O'Donnell, encouraged by further
news from Garcia Conde that a large portion of the
French force had marched away, approached Lerida on
1 Napoleon to Bcrthier, 9th, 20th April 18 10.
384 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. the 23rd in two detached bodies without any military
April 23. precautions whatever ; and that although his march lay
over an open plain, which afforded no shelter of any sort
from an attack of cavalry. The result was that his
advanced division was hopelessly routed by a single
charge of the French horse, and that he was compelled
to retreat with a loss of from three to four thousand
men, at a cost to the French of little more than one
hundred killed and wounded. Suchet then undertook
the siege in earnest, and after one failure successfully
May 1 3. stormed the defences of the town on the 13th of May.
There still remained the castle or citadel, which in former
sieges had made a prolonged resistance ; but Suchet met
the difficulty by setting converging columns to drive
the whole of the civil population up to this point, and
by playing upon the unhappy people with his artillery as
soon as he had penned them close into the castle-yard.
Unable to endure this slaughter of women and children
May 14. Garcia Conde on the 14th hoisted the white flag, and
the conquest of Lerida was thus barbarously accom-
plished.
The next task prescribed to Suchet by Napoleon
was the capture of Mequinenza, a small place but
important from its situation at the confluence of the
Segre and the Ebro. The fortifications were weak and
old-fashioned, but the castle, which dominated them,
was perched upon a height so lofty and rocky that it was
out of range of artillery from any accessible spot ; and
it was necessary for the French engineers to build a
road, by which guns could be brought up to the
May 15. summit. Suchet sent troops to invest Mequinenza
on the day following the surrender of Lerida ; the
June 8. road was taken in hand at once; and on the 8th of
June the French batteries opened fire with such terrible
effect that on the same evening the garrison surrendered.
Thus yet another refuge of the Spaniards on the north
bank of the Ebro was taken, and the central district
of that river was entirely subjected to the French arms.
Suchet profited by the general dismay of his enemies
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 385
to seize the fort of Morella, which commands the 18 10.
mountain road from Aragon into Valencia ; but, as
usual, the guerillas had risen in his rear while his army
was engaged before Lerida, and had greatly maltreated
some small bodies of French soldiers. Returning with his
full strength, the General speedily chased his tormentors
back to the mountains ; and there now remained for
him the final task of taking Tortosa, which would
sever the principal communications between Valencia
and Catalonia, and isolate the latter province completely.
The success of this enterprise depended mainly
upon the distraction of O'Donnell's troops by the
Seventh Corps, a duty which Augereau had failed to
fulfil ; not without peril, as we have seen, to Suchet's
operations at Lerida. But on the 27 th of May
Napoleon gave orders 1 which were designed to set
Suchet at his ease respecting O'Donnell, for they
directed that Marshal Macdonald should march upon
Tarragona, while the Third Corps besieged Tortosa,
and that the latter force should be ready to move
down upon Valencia as soon as both towns had fallen.
Napoleon, since the catastrophe of Baylen, had learned
wisdom ; and there was to be no more rushing of
armies blindfold into the heart of Spain, but steady
progress and no second step until the foothold of the
first had been assured.
Suchet accordingly pushed forward his preparations,
organised a transport-service of mules, set over ten
thousand men to work, amid stifling heat and clouds
of mosquitoes, at the construction of fifty miles of road
over the mountains from Mequinenza to Tortosa,
fortified over twenty posts in Aragon upon the lines
of communication, told ofT" nine thousand men to hold
the province in awe, and with the remaining seventeen
thousand marched for the mouth of the Ebro. The
advance was made in two columns, one on either bank
of the river ; whereof the right column, under General
Laval, invested Tortosa on the right bank on the 4th
1 Napoleon to Berthier, 27th, 29th May 18 10.
VOL. VII 2 C
386 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1810. of July ; while the left column, under General Habert,
July 4. took up a position about twenty-five miles north of
the town, where two flying bridges ensured its com-
munication with Laval. With this division Suchet
established his headquarters at Mora, holding it ready
to complete the investment, but prepared also to deal
with a hostile army if one should present itself. On
the 9th of July, however, Suchet ascertained that
Macdonald was still at Gerona, and became seriously
alarmed. O'Donnell had not been idle since his last
defeat, but on the contrary had increased his force to
over twenty thousand men, in five detachments, which
he had so distributed as to give the greatest possible
amount of trouble. One of these bodies lay far to
north, between Figueras and Gerona, waiting to harass
Macdonald's rear whenever he should move southward ;
a second observed Barcelona ; two more lay, one a little
to the west of Reuss and the other to the east of
Lerida, watching the movements of Suchet ; and the
fifth was in reserve near Tarragona ready to reinforce
any one of the rest.1 Moreover, besides this army of
Catalonia there was that of Valencia, commanded, it is
true, by an incomparably feeble General, Don Jose
Caro, but still a power that must be reckoned with.
In fact, until Macdonald should come before Tarragona,
Suchet's position was radically insecure.
Macdonald, meanwhile, was engaged in more
prosaic work, namely, the revictualling of Barcelona,
and he did not enjoy it. He was without experience
of such an undertaking as was expected of him in
Catalonia, and abominated it. None the less was
he compelled to escort three several convoys into
Barcelona in June, July, and August ; nor was it
until the end of July that he was able to give serious
attention to the true object of the campaign. During
this time the garrison of Tortosa made several sorties ;
Caro sent a division forward against Morella ; and on
July 29. the 29th of July O'Donnell, after a demonstration
1 Mem. de Suchet, i. 357.
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 387
before Suchet's lines, threw into Tortosa three regiments, 18 10.
with which, added to the existing garrison, he made
a determined sally upon the besiegers. All of these
attempts were failures, though combined action be-
tween the Spanish armies of Catalonia and Valencia
might have been successful. O'Donnell then retired
to Tarragona. A few days later Caro marched up
with ten thousand men, but, having retreated immedi-
ately when six thousand French came out to meet him,
was thereupon hounded from the command by his
soldiers, and compelled to seek safety in flight. On this
occasion at least the Spanish troops were justified in
their mutinous deposition of a general.
Thus the precious weeks while Macdonald was
still far away in the north were wasted by the Spaniards ;
and on the 20th of August Suchet received intelligence Aug. 20.
that the Marshal was moving southward with fifteen
thousand men. Macdonald, however, had found it
useless to attempt the siege of Tarragona owing to
want of provisions ; for O'Donnell had taken care to
remove all the corn from round the city and so to
station his troops as to intercept all supplies and
menace all victualling parties. O'Donnell, further,
had harassed the Marshal through every mile of his
march, and claimed to have inflicted on him a loss of
three thousand men since he left Barcelona.1 How-
ever, the French commanders met at Lerida on the
29th of August, and discussed their last instructions Aug. 29.
from Paris, which were to the effect that Tortosa and
Tarragona should be besieged simultaneously, and that,
when both had fallen, Suchet should hold his corps in
readiness to second the army of Portugal.2 They
judged, however, that they were not strong enough
to prosecute more than one siege at a time, and agreed
that Suchet, with the help of a Neapolitan division
from the Seventh Corps, should proceed with the
1 Arteche, ix. 271.
2 Berthier to Suchet, 14th July 1 8 10; Corres. de Napoleon,
16,651.
388 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. operations against Tortosa; while Macdonald, extending
his troops eastward from Lerida through Tarrega and
Cervera, should protect him from the interference of
O'Donnell. Thus Suchet made over to his colleague
the fertile plain of Urgel for the subsistence of the
Seventh Corps, drawing his own supplies with difficulty
from points so distant as Zaragoza to north-west and
Teruel to south-west. But he was at any rate shielded
from interference at Tortosa ; wherefore, taking ad-
vantage of high water on the Ebro, he brought his
heavy artillery down from Mequinenza, under pro-
Sept. 5-tection of the Neapolitan division, and by the 5th of
September was ready to begin the siege in earnest.
The concentration of the greater part of two French
corps in Southern Catalonia gave the Spaniards precisely
the opportunity that they desired. Communication
between Barcelona and Lerida was at once cut off, as
a matter of course ; and O'Donnell perceived that the
moment was come for a stroke in the north. Leaving,
therefore, two divisions to block the road between
Sept. 6. Cervera and Barcelona, he on the 6th of September
embarked a few troops with artillery and stores at
Tarragona, sent them off by sea under convoy of a
British and a Spanish frigate, and himself marched north-
ward with Campoverde's division. Threading his way
with great skill through the stations occupied by the
Sept. 13. French, he on the 13th arrived with rather over six
thousand men at Vidreras, a few miles due north of
Gerona ; from whence he pounced upon a brigade of
nearly thirteen hundred Germans, which was scattered
in small bodies at La Bisbal and neighbouring places
on the coast, and captured it almost to a man.
O'Donnell being wounded then returned to Tarragona
by sea, while Campoverde made a hasty raid northwards
to Puigcerda, raised contributions on the French side
of the Pyrenees, and was back again at Cardona, five
and twenty miles north-east of Cervera, almost before
Macdonald had heard of the mishap at La Bisbal.
Learning, however, of Campoverde's approach, though
ch. xxxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 389
quite unaware that he had marched to the Pyrenees 18 10.
and back, Macdonald on the 18th of October led four Oct. 18.
brigades upon Cardona, and on the 21st encountered his
adversary in a strong position near the town. His
leading troops engaged the Spaniards prematurely ;
and, after losing about a hundred men, the Marshal
abandoned the attack and retreated, much harassed by
the somatenes. Such caution naturally seemed to the
Spaniards to be fear ; and they were heartened accord-
ingly.
But in truth the old trouble of supplies was now
enough to set Macdonald thinking of more serious
matters than a doubtful action with Campoverde. The
indefatigable partisan Villacampa had shifted his quarters
to the district where the frontiers of Aragon, Castile,
and Valencia meet, and had no intention of allowing
convoys to pass to Suchet from Teruel. On the 6th Sept. 6.
of September he captured six hundred head of cattle,
killing or making prisoners the escort of two hundred
men ; and on the 7th he took six thousand more Sept. 7.
cattle, and drove the escort of a thousand soldiers with
heavy loss into Alcaniz. Suchet, of course, sent out
detachments against this troublesome adversary ; but
the wily chief was not easily to be caught. Indeed it
was not until the 12th of November that he was at last Nov. 12.
overtaken, and after a stubborn resistance compelled to
withdraw, even so in good order, and with little greater
loss than his assailants. But in the north the question
of victuals was still more pressing. Those which
Macdonald had already thrown into Barcelona were
nearly exhausted. A large convoy had been attacked
on the southern declivity of the Pyrenees, within a mile
or two of the French frontier, by Baron de Eroles, one
of O'Donnell's divisional generals, and captured with Oct. 17.
a loss to the escort of two hundred and fifty men.
More than that, Eroles four days later had defeated Oct. 21.
a punitive column of two thousand men, and chased it
into Figueras ; while a still more formidable expedition
of five thousand men, despatched against him later by
390 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
i 8 io. the Emperor's special order, was after many small
affrays finally hunted into Gerona, weaker by one
thousand men than when it set out.
Another convoy was halted at Gerona, unable to
proceed further ; and a third was destined to start
from Perpignan on the 2nd of November ; but the
General at Gerona felt so little confidence in the safety
of either that he adjured Macdonald to protect them in
person. To this appeal the Marshal could make but
one answer. " If this convoy is taken or dispersed,"
he wrote to Suchet, " Barcelona will be lost, and there
is no doubt that the enemy will do their utmost to
intercept it. Only my presence can save it." There
Nov. 4. was nothing more to be said ; and on the 4th of
November Macdonald marched northward for Gerona,
leaving Suchet powerless to continue the siege of
Tortosa. For two full months the Third and Seventh
Corps had remained paralysed on the Lower Ebro.
For nine full months, with an effective strength of
nearly sixty thousand men, and against no force that
could dare to meet even fifteen thousand of them in
the field, they had accomplished nothing but the
capture of three weak, almost petty, fortresses. In
fact, so far from helping the Army of Portugal, as
Napoleon had intended, they had wasted almost the
entire campaign. The result was due to the admirable
energy and enterprise of O'Donnell and of Villacampa ;
yet their efforts would have been vain but for the
English fleet ; and it is not too much to say that the
fate of Catalonia hung upon England's command of
the sea.
CHAPTER XXXV
From the east of Spain it is now necessary to move 1810.
southward, and to observe the progress of the French
army in Andalusia in 18 10. On the 3rd of February,
as has been related, Alburquerque led his division on
to Cadiz, just two days before Victor arrived before it ;
and by the 17th the garrison had been strengthened by
Wellington's reinforcement from Portugal.1
Meanwhile Victor had by no means realised the
strength of Cadiz. He tried at first to approach the
place along the high road to the bridge of Zuazo, but,
finding the defences too strong, retired to Chiclana,
and sought out a position from which to reduce the
fort of Puntales. The nearest point was the fort of
Matagorda, which, as we have seen, had been blown up
by the Spaniards on the first coming of the French ;
but the British and Spanish engineers, growing nervous
over the possible consequences if the place should pass
into the enemy's hands, decided to restore the ruined
works, remount six guns and two mortars, and station
a naval force at hand to support it. Victor thereupon
concluded that Matagorda must be worth taking, and
threw up batteries, containing in all forty guns, to play
upon it. The fort was little more than one hundred
yards square, and the garrison, which consisted of a
company of the old Ninety-fourth and a few gunners,
1 Wellington MSS. Stewart to Wellington, 31st Jan.; Frere
to Wellington, 14th Feb. The Seventy-ninth were between 900
and 1000 strong, the Ninety-fourth 670. Villiers to Wellington,
5th Feb. 1 8 10.
39i
392 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. did not exceed one hundred and fifty men, so that it
is difficult to understand how General Stewart should
have expected any great help from it ; and yet ^t
seems certain that Henry Wellesley, who on the 6th
of April replaced Frere as British diplomatic agent at
Cadiz, attached importance to it, even if Stewart did
not. Meanwhile for three days all operations were
suspended by a furious south - westerly gale, which
drove ashore two line-of-battle ships, the one Spanish
and the other Portuguese, and over thirty British
merchant vessels. Among these last was a transport
containing three hundred men of the Fourth Foot, all
of whom became prisoners.
March 26. On the 26th of March General Thomas Graham
arrived to take over the command from Stewart, the
British Government having decided to reinforce the
garrison of Cadiz to a total strength of eight thousand
men. Graham inspected Matagorda, and at once
doubted the expediency of proceeding further with
the defence, but allowed the work to continue. On
April 3. the 3rd of April the reinforcements1 began to arrive
to the number of about three thousand of all ranks,
which were very welcome to the General. Matters
were not going happily in Cadiz at the time ; the local
Junta of defence, under the presidency of General
Venegas, not only contesting the authority of the
Regency, but striving to arrogate its powers. Venegas
presently departed as Viceroy to Mexico ; but none the
less Graham was met at the outset by an intimation
from Alburquerque that he had resigned his command
owing to the proceedings of the Junta, and was going
as Ambassador to England. This in itself was dis-
couraging, for Alburquerque was one of the few
Spaniards who would work kindly with the British ;
but Graham was even more disquieted when he had
examined the state of the defences. The works at the
point of Santi Petri were, in his view, contemptible,
1 3 cos. R.A. ; 6 cos. 2/lst Guards ; 3 cos. 2/Coldstreams ;
3 cos. 2/3rd Guards; 2/44.1!! ; 5 cos. 2 and 3/95th.
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 393
and those at the all- important bridge of Zuazo so 18 10.
defective that he was unable to comprehend how the
French could have been stopped by them. It was
difficult to count upon any improvement of these
fortifications by the Spaniards ; while, even if all
failings should be made good, the British General
did not think that the whole of the reinforcements
promised by Liverpool were sufficient for the security
of the island of Leon. The loss of the island of course
by no means signified the loss of Cadiz as a necessary
military consequence ; but it was extremely doubtful
whether the perseverance of the inhabitants would
survive such a misfortune.1
Graham set himself earnestly to remedy these short-
comings, in spite of every possible obstruction from
the Regency, and was in course of preparing a general
scheme of defence when, on the 21st of April, the April 21.
French unmasked several batteries on the Trocadero,
and, after driving off all ships within range by red-hot
shot, turned the whole of their fire upon Matagorda.
The little garrison answered gallantly, though they had
but eight pieces against forty, and though the Spaniards
at Fort Puntales refused to supply them with am-
munition until a British naval officer seized it by force.
Within eight hours after the firing began, Matagorda
was reduced to a heap of ruins, and at ten on the
morning of the 22nd it was evacuated by Graham's April 22.
order. The little garrison of one hundred and forty-
seven men 2 by that time had suffered sixty-four casual-
ties, and Graham held up their conduct to the emulation
of their comrades in a general order. The fall of the
miserable little fort served the useful purpose of
frightening the Spaniards into a spasmodic activity ;
but within less than a week their ardour cooled, and
the only good work done was by the disciplined men
of Alburquerque's army.
1 Delavoye, Life of Lord Lynedoch, pp. 302-318.
2 1 officer, 25 men, R.A. ; 25 Marines ; 1 officer, 25 seamen ;
3 officers, 6j men of the 94th. Total, 5 officers, 14.2 men.
394 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. The French then busied themselves with restoring
and re-arming Matagorda, together with Fort San
Jose to the north and San Luis to the east of it, all
for the purpose of bringing guns to bear upon Fort
Puntales. The possession of these points enabled them
to drive the shipping of the Allies to more distant
positions in the inner and outer harbour, but gave them
no further advantage. A great deal of ammunition
was wasted on both sides between Puntales and the
French batteries ; and there was some alarm in Cadiz
lest the city could be bombarded from Matagorda,
till Graham banished all panic by firing a mortar with
a heavy charge from the landward front of Cadiz, and
showing by practical demonstration that the shells could
not reach Matagorda. In truth, Victor was as intent
upon fortifying his own position at Chiclana as upon
any offensive action.
Meanwhile, the Regency had appointed Blake to
be Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces in Cadiz,
as well as in Murcia ; and additional troops began
gradually to accumulate in the city. At the end of
April arrived a squadron of the Thirteenth Light
Dragoons, giving Graham a small force of cavalry
which he sorely needed ; and at the end of May and
June, beginning of June these were followed by two squadrons
of the Second Hussars of the German Legion from
England, the Thirtieth Foot1 from Gibraltar, and
between three and four thousand of Blake's army from
Alicante. Altogether the British contingent, including
the Portuguese regiment, numbered well over nine
thousand of all ranks,2 while the Spanish regular troops
exceeded eighteen thousand. Such a force, of course,
tempted Blake to advocate an attack upon Chiclana,
much to the dismay of Graham, who foresaw that such
an enterprise would probably mean the matching of
his own few troops unaided against twice their number
of French. Wellington, being consulted, gave his
opinion strongly against any such plan, urging, appar-
1 2/30th. 2 Return of 30th July. Delavoye, p. 397.
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 395
ently with selfishness but really with sound judgment, 18 10.
that Victor was much better employed in the useless
blockade of Cadiz than in operations against Portugal
through Estremadura. Fortunately the project was
dropped, for Wellington's arguments, as Graham justly
hinted, were not likely to commend themselves to
Blake ; and, at Graham's own suggestion, another and
more effective diversion was undertaken by the
Spaniards.1
Sebastiani, it will be remembered, had not accom-
panied Victor to Cadiz, but had marched eastward
against Malaga. After the storming of that town, he
had been engaged for several weeks with guerilla-bands
and other insurgents in the Alpuj arras, immediately to
the south of the Sierra Nevada. Having succeeded
in subduing them for the moment, he assembled the
greater part of his corps and marched eastward upon
Lorca, entering that city on the 23rd of April, and April 23.
setting a shameless and scandalous example of plunder,
which was only too faithfully followed by his troops.
He was apparently hoping for prosperous times, when
on the 25th he was recalled to westward by the in- April 25.
telligence that the insurgents in the Alpujarras were
active once again. Moreover, other bands were equally
aggressive in the mountains to south of Ronda, giving
full employment to Girard's division of the Fifth
Corps, which had been sent apart by Soult to hold
them in check. Graham's plan was that a Spanish de-
tachment should land at Algeciras, and with the help
of the mountaineers overwhelm Girard. The enter-
prise was entrusted to the Spanish General Lacy, who
duly sailed from Cadiz on the 19th of July with three July 19.
thousand men. This force, already too small by one-
half, was still further weakened by the accidental separa-
tion of eight hundred men ; and finally, with little more
than two thousand soldiers, Lacy, who was not a great
commander, marched up to Ronda, quarrelled with ihe
insurgents and marched back again, upon the news that
1 Dclavoye, pp. 379, 383, 387.
396 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1810. Girard and Sebastiani were both closing upon him.
The whole operation was inexpressibly feeble, and yet
it served some purpose. In the first place, Lacy left
a garrison in the port of Marbella ; and in the second,
despite of his unconciliatory bearing, his appearance
heartened the insurgents, and diverted Girard and
Sebastiani from more profitable objects.
The next undertaking of the Regency was to
despatch this same Lacy with three thousand men by
sea to Huelva, in the hope of gaining the district from
which Cadiz drew most of its supplies. There was
already a small Spanish force in the vicinity under
General Copons, while the French, under General
Remond and the Duke of Arenberg, were truly
reported to be in very inferior strength. The landing
Aug. 23. was successfully accomplished on the 23rd of August.
Two small detachments of the enemy were met and de-
feated ; Arenberg called in the rest and retired in haste
towards Seville ; and all seemed to be going well, when
Lacy decided that the purport of his expedition was
accomplished and, to the huge disgust of the inhabitants,
re-embarked for Cadiz. None the less Soult, whose
operations shall presently be narrated, had on the first
alarm of this raid detached Gazan's division of the Fifth
Corps to suppress it, and had thereby crippled himself
at a critical moment. But this was due to a fortunate
coincidence rather than to the skill of Lacy or the fore-
sight of the Regency.
Another diversion in Andalusia, almost simultaneous
with that just narrated, was more serious. In August
Blake returned on a visit of inspection to Murcia, from
which he pushed reconnaissances into the province of
Granada and sent help to the insurgents in the Alpu-
j arras. Sebastiani at once concentrated his corps and
marched against him ; whereupon Blake, with excellent
judgment, retired upon Murcia itself, before which he
took up a position so strong that Sebastiani dared not
attack it. The French general therefore turned back,
to find that the insurgents had risen instantly in his
ch. xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 397
absence, and among other mischief had captured the 18 10.
seaports of Almunecar and Motril, together with their
garrisons. This was a good example of the right way
in which to use the few regular troops which the
Spanish possessed, namely, as decoys to draw the French
into long marches to no purpose, thus enabling the
guerilla-bands to destroy the enemy's outlying posts.
Under two skilful leaders the guerillas and the regulars
could continue to keep the French perpetually moving,
with one elusive enemy in their front and another in their
rear — the kind of work which will wear out the best of
soldiers with sheer exhaustion and disgust. Blake,
however, like most of his peers, could not resist the
temptation to fight a great action ; and accordingly
some weeks after Sebastiani's retreat he left his old
position on the borders of Murcia and marched upon Nov. 2.
Baza, which was occupied by four French battalions.
Unluckily for him, General Milhaud came up with
thirteen hundred cavalry, caught Blake's army on the
march with a wide gap between his two divisions of
infantry, and charging the foremost, together with the
cavalry that covered it, routed it completely in a few
minutes, with a loss to the Spaniards of fifteen hundred
killed and wounded.1 Blake then retired once again
into Murcia with the wreck of his force, not yet, in
spite of many defeats, an enlightened man.
Lastly, a brief account must be given of a diversion
attempted in Andalusia by General Campbell, the
governor of Gibraltar, with about three hundred and
forty of the Eighty-ninth,2 five hundred German,
Polish, and Italian deserters from the French army,
and a Spanish regiment from Ceuta. The whole force,
numbering fourteen hundred men and speaking five
different languages, was placed under command
1 Lord Blayney, who saw the prisoners, says that one third of
them were half-starved boys, and another third infirm old men.
i. 124-125.
2 Four companies, 300 rank and file, not a battalion, as stated by
Napier, Arteche, and Mr. Oman. The last named omits all mention
of the 500 deserters.
398 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. of Major-general Lord Blayney, a veteran who since
the beginning of the war had served with distinction
in Flanders, the West Indies, Egypt, the Cape, and
North America. The object of the expedition appears
to have been, generally, to hamper the siege of Cadiz
by distracting the attention and interrupting the com-
munications of the besiegers. Victor drew his provisions
almost exclusively from Seville ; and it was therefore
important to encourage the insurgents about Ronda,
Mijas, and Fuengirola, which lay upon the eastern
flank of the line of supply.1 The garrisons of all three
of these places were reported to be weak ; and hopes
were held out that the population of Malaga itself might
rise and overpower the French within the city, if
countenanced by a force from without. Moreover,
there was a vague and not wholly unsound idea that the
possession of a fortified port in the south might be of
service for the purpose of diversions and raids upon the
French posts at large in Andalusia. Accordingly, on
Oct. 10. the 10th of October Blayney embarked on the King's
frigate Topaze, and sailed round to Ceuta, where he
found the Spanish regiment embarked, and, according to
its Colonel's report, ready for immediate service. Know-
ing, however, something of the Spanish character, the
General looked into matters for himself, and discovered
1 Mr. Oman, following Napier and Arteche, says that the plan
was for the force to make a descent upon Fuengirola, so as to call
Sebastiani out of Malaga with the bulk of his force ; and when the
French were approaching Fuengirola, to embark and make a dash
for Malaga, thus weakened by the withdrawal of Sebastiani's troops,
secret partisans being ready within the city to second the movement.
Mr. Oman rightly condemns such a pla¥i, which, looking to the un-
certainty of the sea, was simply insane ; but it does not appear
from Blayney's own account that he knew anything of it. On the
contrary, it seems from his letter to the Governor of Gibraltar that
he counted upon Blake's keeping Sebastiani fully occupied in
Granada. Lastly, he absolutely refused to adopt the plan for a
dash upon Malaga, suggested by a naval officer in reliance upon
Spanish reports that the cannon upon the Mole had been removed
— which reports he afterwards ascertained to be false. See Blayney's
Narrative of a Journey through Spain and France, i. 2-4, 52, 118 ;
ii. 488-489.
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 399
that one hundred and fifty of the men were without 18 10.
firelocks, and that not one of the entire regiment had a
single round of ammunition. Having rectified these
little omissions, Blayney sailed from Ceuta, picked up
a detachment of gun-boats from Gibraltar, and, after
a long passage under light winds, landed unopposed
on the morning of the 14th in a bay two leagues west
of Fuengirola.
Here he was met by a British officer, who had been Oct. 14.
appointed to organise the Spanish peasants, and who
now informed him that arms and ammunition had been
distributed among them, and that a considerable number
might be expected to join him immediately. Only a
dozen peasants, however, made their appearance ; but
none the less Blayney, having trained his polyglot de-
tachment to obey a few bugle-calls, in default of a
common language, marched over the mountains to
Fuengirola, and coming before it at two o'clock in the
afternoon, summoned it to surrender. The commandant
refused ; and the fort, which proved to be far more
formidable than had been represented, opened a heavy
fire which did some damage both to the troops
ashore and to the gun - boats at sea. This was
disquieting ; and not less so was a report that a large
force of the enemy was approaching. This was plain
proof that the object of the expedition had either
been divined by the French during its slow passage
from Ceuta, or revealed by some traitor at Cadiz or
Gibraltar. Two courses lay open to Blayney — to attack
the fort without delay by escalade, or to re-embark.
The former he rejected at once ; and wisely, for he had
only three hundred men upon whom he could depend,
and the strength of the place forbade all hope of success.
The second he rejected likewise, from natural though
blameworthy unwillingness to appear unenterprising in
the presence of foreign troops. He therefore waited
until night so that the darkness might protect the disem-
barkation of his artillery from the guns of the fort ; and,
by astonishing exertions of the seamen and troops, two
4oo HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. batteries, the one of three light ordnance and the other
of a thirty-two pounder carronade, were completed
before dawn.
Oct. 15. With the coming of light both sides opened fire,
but Blayney's guns were of too small calibre to make a
practicable breach ; and the General, who had counted
upon the moral effect of a bombardment to overawe
a weak and insufficient garrison, now learned that
Fuengirola had been reinforced before his arrival. At
the same time former reports were confirmed by the
certain intelligence that Sebastiani was advancing with
over five thousand men. It was now manifest that
Blayney could re-embark only at the sacrifice of his
artillery ; but, observing H.M.S. Rodney in the offing
with the Eighty-second regiment, which had been sent
to reinforce him, he decided to stand his ground, chose
a strong position with its rear to the sea, and hastened
down to the gun-boats so as to arrange for the protec-
tion of each flank by two of them. During his absence
the garrison made a sortie upon the battery, whereupon
the foreign troops, who were at the moment in sole
charge of it, gave way and fled almost without resistance.
Relanding, Blayney at once caught up the Eighty-ninth,
which was employed in bringing up supplies, charged
the enemy, and retook the cannon. The head of
Sebastiani's column now came up, and Blayney, whose
horse had been killed under him, being uncertain
whether they were Spanish or French, ordered the firing
to cease. When he discovered his error he again
charged, but was cut off arid captured, together with
every man of the Eighty-ninth. It appears that at the
critical moment the Germans deserted to the enemy,1
while the remainder of the troops ran to the boats, where
two companies of the Eighty-second, which had landed
from the Rodney, covered their re-embarkation.
All authors so far have ascribed the failure of the
enterprise to the faults of the commander, Napier in
particular speaking of the expedition as well contrived
1 Blayney, i. 42.
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 401
and adequate to its purpose, but ruined by mis- 18 10.
conduct.1 The whole of this criticism is based on
the assumption that it would have been possible for
Blayney to draw Sebastiani and the mass of his force
from Malaga to Fuengirola by a feint attack, re-embark,
sail to Malaga, disembark, and capture the city by a
coup de main before Sebastiani should have time to
return. This, of course, ignores the whole question
whether there was any wind at all, or, if there were
a wind, whether it was fair or foul. But it is to
be noticed that Sebastiani's leading troops arrived
from Malaga in less than twenty -four hours from
the time of Blayney's appearance before Fuengirola.
Hence, if Blayney had re-embarked before they came up
and sailed for Malaga, the French cavalry would have
seen the ship at sea, and Sebastiani would have been
1 Napier's account of the affair occupies a page and a half, and
contains the following blunders. He gives Blayney a whole
battalion of the Eighty-ninth, whereas the General had only four
weak companies. He gives no date for the landing, but states that
Blayney remained for two days cannonading the castle. As a
matter of fact, Blayney was before Fuengirola for less than twenty-
four hours altogether, and could not have cannonaded it for more
than four hours at the most. He says that the garrison, not exceed-
ing two hundred, made a sortie, took the battery, and drove the
British part of the investing force headlong towards the boats.
Blayney estimated the sallying party at six hundred and fifty foot
and sixty horse ; and, though he may have been mistaken as to the
actual number, it is hardly likely that he would have made so gross
a miscalculation as is implied. Moreover, Blayney says distinctly
that his foreign troops were in charge of the battery, and that the
Eighty-ninth were procuring provisions, when he reformed them
and retook the battery, wherefore they could not have been driven
to the boats. Lastly, Napier asserts that after the recapture of the
guns, two French squadrons came up, that Blayney, mistaking them
for Spaniards, ceased firing, advanced towards them, and was
immediately taken prisoner. Blayney, on the other hand, asserts
that the troops which captured him were infantry, and names the
regiment — the Fourth Polish — which, as a matter of fact, formed
part of Sebastiani's corps. Moreover, he was taken after a sharp
fight with the bayonet. Mr. Oman asserts that Blayney was short-
sighted, and that he rode by mistake into the middle of the French.
Blayney himself is most careful to say that he was on foot because
his horse had been killed.
VOL. VII 2 D
4o2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 i o. able to countermarch the rear of his column some miles
short of Fuengirola. Moreover, the landing-place
proposed by the naval officers was on the river Guadal-
horce, four to five miles from Malaga and running
through an extensive plain, where the French cavalry
would have had every advantage. Lastly, even if the
cavalry had been absent, the citadel of Malaga was
advantageously situated and in perfect order, mounting
fifty guns ; and this stronghold must have been carried
by escalade within twelve hours of disembarkation under
pain of certain disaster. Taking all these facts into
consideration, it seems to me absurd to say that the
enterprise was well contrived and adequate to its
purpose. On the contrary, it would appear as foolish a
project as ever was devised by sanguine men upon
imperfect information.
As to the misconduct of the commander it is not
more easy to speak, for it is evident, in the first place,
that he and those who sent him differed greatly in their
ideas of what he was intended to do. But it is certain
that to send him away upon any mission with a force
of fifteen to sixteen hundred troops speaking five
different languages, and with only three hundred men
among them upon whom the slightest reliance could be
placed, was to invite failure. It is stated that Blayney
was surprised at Fuengirola because he omitted to take
reasonable military precautions. Against this it must
be said that he sent four companies of Spaniards to a
defile within half a mile of Mijas, by which the French
were bound to pass, and» where they could have been
checked for any time ; but that these troops insisted,
against Blayney's orders, on attacking Mijas itself, and
were repulsed with such vigour that they fell back to
the main body. This certainly was not the act of a
man who neglects precautions ; and it must be added
that it is not very easy for a force to protect itself
against surprise when it possesses not a single mounted
man, when three-fourths of its numbers are not to be
trusted to await the approach of an enemy, and when,
ch. xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 403
even if they could be so trusted, their reports from the 18 10.
front are unintelligible to the commander-in-chief. It
may freely be conceded that Blayney was more than
foolish to attempt anything until the Eighty-second
joined him, but something harder must be said of the
General who sent him away with his original force. It
is said that Blayney tormented Campbell into despatch-
ing this miserable expedition to Fuengirola. If so, it
must be confessed that he thoroughly deserved his
misfortune.
The result of all these petty operations in Andalusia
was that the contending forces found themselves at the
end of 1 8 10 very much where they had been at the
beginning. The troops in the field made no progress
upon either side, and the siege, or rather the blockade,
of Cadiz remained stationary. Within the city itself
there were evening parties, love-making, and swaggering,
as if no such thing as a French army were within a
thousand miles ; and the improvement of the defences,
though occasionally quickened for a brief moment by
some scare, went forward very languidly. In August,
as shall be told in place, Wellington withdrew two
British battalions from the Isle of Leon to Portugal ;
but the event caused little emotion. Strange visitors
appeared at times ; Lucien Bonaparte flying from the
wrath of his brother ; Louis Philippe of Orleans
intriguing to be made Regent, and struggling against
the rival pretensions of Carlotta, wife of the Regent
of Portugal and Brazil, who was the eldest daughter
of the deposed King Charles the Fourth. Neither of
these claimants succeeded in their ambitious efforts ;
and in September they were finally extinguished by the
meeting of the Cortes, which, from the moment of its
assembling on the 24th, aspired to the absolute control Sept. 24.
of Spain.
This remarkable body was nominally composed of
elected representatives of Spain and her Colonies ; but
since no elections at all were held in the Colonies, and
such as were held in Spain were, owing to the presence
4o4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. of the French, very irregular, the majority of the
members were chosen as best they might be. Very
many were elected by obscure cliques of politicians who
represented nothing but their own fanciful ideas, with
the result that Spain, the most conservative of countries,
found herself governed by a liberal assembly, modelled
in many respects upon the Convention of Revolutionary
France. The Cortes abjured all claims to any but
legislative functions, leaving judicial matters to the
Courts of Law, and executive to the Regency ; yet
they arrogated to themselves the style of Majesty,
vouchsafed to the Regency the lower rank of Highness
only, and required the Regents to take an oath of allegi-
ance to them. This act they followed up in a few
weeks by dismissing the existing Regency, and appoint-
ing a new one consisting of Blake, the always unsuccess-
ful general, Admiral Cisgar, who commanded the
squadron at Carthagena, and an unknown naval officer,
Pedro Agar, who being of Colonial birth was held to re-
present the Colonies. As to the constitutional debates
of the Cortes, and the flood of their eloquence upon
various subjects, this is no place to speak. The point for
us is that the new government of Spain was no better
than the old. By some strain upon the imagination it
might be considered to enjoy a better legal title than its
predecessor ; but for purposes of administration, and in
particular for the conduct of the war, it was no more
efficient, for, while nominally confining itself only to
talk, it would not permit any executive to act. Once
more, then, it must be *said that in every respect the
situation in Andalusia remained practically unchanged
during 18 10.
So far, then, the exploits of four of Napoleon's eight
corps have been surveyed, and it has been shown that
they had to all intent no effect upon the more vital
operations in the west of the Peninsula. It is now
time to pass to the doings of the four remaining corps
and of the French troops in the extreme north, who
were not attached to any one of them. The positions of
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 405
these, when we last saw them, were as follows : 18 10.
Mortier's corps, the Fifth, had taken part in the
Andalusian campaign, but, when Victor marched on
to Cadiz, had halted at Seville. Soult's corps, the
Second, under the temporary command of General
Heudelet, had been left on the Tagus about Oropesa
to protect the rear of Joseph during the invasion of
Andalusia. Ney's corps, the Sixth, was at Salamanca.
General Bonnet, whose troops were engaged in holding
down Asturias, had his headquarters at Santander.
Napoleon, as we know, intended that the Second and
Sixth Corps, with an Eighth Corps under Junot
which formed part of the reinforcements from France,
should compose the Army of Portugal ; but the
experience of Baylen had taught him wisdom, and he
was desirous of making the ground safe behind him
before advancing in earnest.1 The idea took immediate
shape in December, through an order, already mentioned,
for the formation of a Ninth Corps, whose special
function it should be to protect the rear of the Army ; 2
but, until the time should be ripe for the final invasion
of Portugal, the Emperor determined to employ his
troops in the work of reducing the insurgents and
peasantry in the provinces which he already occupied.
As its drafts and reinforcements joined it, therefore,
Loison's division of Ney's corps received instructions
to move first to Valladolid, and thence to Benavente Dec. 17.
and Astorga, so as to repress Leon and to check
any Spanish incursions from Galicia, while Bonnet
should act either in concert with Loison or inde-
pendently for the subjugation of Asturias.3 Activity
against the guerilla-bands was enjoined also upon the
two infantry divisions of Junot's corps at Logrono
and Burgos, in combination with Loison and Bonnet.
Upon paper the entire scheme appeared exceedingly
1 Napoleon to Clarke, 30th Oct. 1809; Corres, de Napoleon,
i5>987-
2 Napoleon to Clarke, 15th Dec. 1809.
3 Corres. de Napoleon, 16,131, 16,132, 16,245.
406 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. promising : it did not proceed so smoothly into
execution.
Taking Asturias first, it must be remembered that
Del Parque had stripped the province of most of its
regular troops, and notably of the division of Balles-
teros, for the campaign of Tamames. There remained
only a weak division of about four thousand men,
which lay behind the river Deva at Colombres, from
thirty to forty miles west of Santander ; and two
thousand more, under a new commander-in-chief,
General Arce, at Oviedo. By the end of January the
French troops at Santander, having been reinforced
to a strength of seven thousand men, drove the
Asturians with little difficulty from their lines to a
Jan. 3i.strong^ position behind the Nalon. On the 31st,
accordingly, Bonnet entered Oviedo ; but, alarmed
by a movement of the partisan Porlier round his rear
and northern flank, he evacuated the city on the 12th
of February, and, falling back a few miles eastward,
stood on the defensive. The Asturians thereupon,
with the usual blind confidence of their race, hurried
after him in defiance of the orders of their General,
Feb. 14. suffered a severe defeat, and once again took
refuge behind the Nalon. Passing at once from
sanguine hope to abject despair, the Asturians looked
for nothing but the invasion of Galicia, which, being
threatened also by Loison from the side of Astorga,
seemed to be defenceless. However, Bonnet did not
follow up his advantage further than by a second
occupation of Oviedo ; and the Asturians, having been
joined by two thousand Galicians, regained strength
and hope.
A new Junta now took over the affairs of the
province, superseded Arce by General Cienfuegos, and
resolved to signalise its accession to power and the
arrival of the Galician troops by taking the offensive.
The aforesaid Galician troops were of inferior com-
position and quality, and were destitute of clothing,
appointments, and even bayonets ; but their reputation
ch. xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 407
was great, and Bonnet, hearing that they were on the 18 10.
right of the Spanish line, strengthened his left to meet
them. Hence, when the Spaniards attacked on the
19th of March, the Asturians were able to break March 19.
through the French centre ; and Bonnet, evacuating
Oviedo for the second time, fell back some forty
miles eastward to Cangas de Onis to await reinforce-
ments. Having received them, he advanced again on
the 28th with his whole division, whereupon the March 28.
Spaniards retired hurriedly before him to their old
position on the Nalon. Here they remained until April 1.
the 27th, making constant attacks upon the French
in front, while the guerilla-bands harassed their enemy
in rear ; but the Junta was too inept to reinforce the
army, which steadily diminished through losses and
desertion; and on the 27th, Bonnet, having been April 27.
apprised of the fall of Astorga, assailed and carried
the lines of the Nalon and drove the Spaniards west-
ward to the left bank of the Navia. This stroke,
however, exhausted his strength, for the occupation
of the conquered territory absorbed almost his entire
force. Here, as elsewhere, the withdrawal of troops
from any place for concentration in another spot
signified the unchaining of the guerilla -bands and
dangerous mischief let loose. Bonnet's division, there-
fore, remained for the present victorious indeed, but
weakened by heavy losses, and paralysed for any
efficient share in the general operations.
In June, however, he was again provoked into June,
taking the offensive. Early in that month General
Mahy with the Galicians made a threatening movement
upon Astorga, attracting the attention of the French
troops in Leon to that quarter, while the Asturian
bands, eluding Bonnet, slipped down the pass of
Pajares and surprised the town of Leon. They were
driven from it in two days by the arrival of the French June 9.
from before Astorga ; and Bonnet then marched again
westward in force, to make an end of these troublesome
enemies. He chased them over the Narcea and the
4o8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Navia; but on reaching Castropol on the Galician
frontier he discovered that the Asturians had doubled
back behind him, some by land and some by sea, had
severed his communications and were threatening his
base at Oviedo. Perforce he countermarched in pursuit
of them, and continued to hunt them without success
through the summer and autumn. It is impossible not
to feel compassion for a general employed in so hopeless
a task.1
Meanwhile, Loison had advanced, pursuant to his
orders, with a force of about twelve thousand men and
eight field-guns, and had arrived before Astorga on
Feb. 11. the nth of February. The mediaeval walls of the
place had been repaired and strengthened with more
modern works by Romana ; fourteen guns, nearly all
of light calibre, had been mounted on them ; and there
was a garrison of twenty- seven hundred Galicians under
a resolute Governor, Don Jose Santocildes. All this
was a disagreeable surprise to Loison, who had expected
to find no such powers of resistance. Had he known
that there were only twenty days' supplies in the place
he might have acted differently ; but, as things were,
he fell back south-eastward to La Bafieza, sent a
summons to Santocildes, and, on receiving a defiant
answer, reported that he was helpless for want of siege-
artillery. His attempts to communicate with Bonnet
by the pass of Pajares had proved futile, owing to
the depth of the snow on the mountains ; and
altogether his marA, directed by Napoleon himself,
had turned out absolutely unprofitable.
A few days later, Loison's place at La Bafieza was
taken by Clausel's division of the Eighth Corps ; and
the former received orders to join his own corps, that
of Ney, at Salamanca. Clausel likewise sent on the
Feb. 26. 26th a summons to Santocildes ; but such an answer as
had been sent to Loison was returned again, and he
was fain to possess his soul in patience. Owing to the
vast demand for horses, and the crowded state of the
1 Arteche, viii. 120-144; Oman, iii. 270-271.
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 409
roads, consequent upon the gigantic movement ofi.Sio.
troops into Spain, Junot's siege-train was still far
away ; and without it, no matter how unreasonable
the behaviour of Santocildes might appear, there could
be no attack on Astorga. In high impatience, Junot
begged for Spanish heavy guns from Segovia and
Burgos, and sent his own teams to draw them ; which
done, he, on the 1 5th of March, ordered the whole of
his corps to Astorga. On the 21st the place was March 21.
invested, and the works were begun ; on the 15th of
April the cannon arrived ; and by the 21st an easy
breach had been made, which was assaulted on the
same day. The assailants carried the breach, but were
unable to penetrate into the retrenchments ; and indeed
Santocildes might have held out for some time longer
but for the exhaustion of his ammunition. Owing to
this cause he surrendered at daybreak of the 22nd, April 22.
having made a very skilful and gallant defence which
cost the besiegers nearly six hundred casualties. Junot
then left two battalions as a garrison in Astorga,
besides a regiment to open communications with
Bonnet, and led the bulk of the Eighth Corps back to
Valladolid and Toro, to abide the opening of the
campaign in Portugal.
Passing next to the Sixth Corps under Ney, there
is little at present to be said except that, by Joseph's
orders, it marched to Ciudad Rodrigo simultaneously
with the movement of Loison to Astorga ; summoned
that city on the 12th of February ; and, being defied,
returned to Salamanca to await the coming of siege-
artillery and a general advance under Massena.
The Second and the Fifth Corps were more actively
engaged. Upon reaching Seville, Mortier was directed
by Joseph to leave one division in that town and in the
district to east of it, and to march with the other
division and with his cavalry to Badajoz. He reached
that city on the 12th of February with about nine Feb. 12.
thousand men, but found himself in the vicinity of
forces too formidable to allow him to blockade the
4io HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. place. Romana had arrived thereon the 5 th to take
over the command of Del Parque's army, and the bulk
of that army itself had crossed the Tagus on the 10th
and reached Alburquerque, only a day's march north of
Badajoz. More Spanish troops, detachments which
had been left behind by the Duke of Alburquerque,
were on the Ibor watching the Second Corps ; and
Romana, perceiving the danger to them of Mortier's
march upon their western flank, was about to draw
them likewise towards the Guadiana. Mortier, there-
fore, drew back to Olivenza and Valverde, where his
Feb. 19. cavalry was surprised on the 19th by the Estremaduran
partisan Morillo, and the French commander, General
Beauregard, was killed. Meanwhile, on hearing of the
check to the Fifth Corps before Badajoz, Heudelet
Feb. 23. advanced with two brigades of infantry and one of
cavalry towards Alburquerque ; but, not venturing to
risk an action, turned south-eastward to Merida, where
Reynier arrived to supersede him. Mortier's corps
opened communications with Reynier from Zafra by
way of Almendralejo ; and we shall see that this
junction of the two corps on the Guadiana led
Wellington to move Hill's corps forward for a time
from Abrantes to Portalegre, in order to second
Romana. But such concentration did not last long.
An insurrection in the Sierra de Ronda obliged Joseph
to recall Mortier with most of his troops to Seville,
and, at the same time, to direct Reynier to move his
headquarters to Truxillo. By the 18th of March,
the two corps had gone their different ways, and the
French semblance of the offensive on the Guadiana
came to an end.
Romana, meanwhile, having collected the whole of
his forces, some twenty- six thousand men in all,
extended them in a long line facing eastward, from
Alburquerque on the north to Olivenza on the south ;
his second division under Carlos O'Donnell being
about Alburquerque, his first about Badajoz and
Campo Mayor, and the third under Ballesteros at
ch.xxxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 411
Olivenza. This done, he prepared to act upon the 18 10.
French communications. Carlos O'Donnell made the
first movement upon Caceres on the 12th of March, March 12.
and on the 14th encountered a force of half his
numbers under General Foy, which was only saved
from destruction by the utmost skill and exertion on
the part of the commander.1 Ballesteros then struck
south against a detachment of Gazan's division, which March 26.
Mortier had left at Santa Olalla, attacked it as it was
retiring at Ronquillo, and drove it still farther back.
He then turned westward against another French
detachment at Moguer, a movement which drew
Mortier with every man that he could spare from
Seville to chase the Spaniards away. The Marshal
caught Ballesteros at Zalamea la Real, and after a sharp April 15.
action drove him northward into the Sierra de Aracena.
There the Spanish chief remained, perpetually descend-
ing to distract Mortier from other operations, while
O'Donnell, by constant menaces, contrived to keep
Reynier equally inactive. Had either of the two
French corps been able to join the other, they might
have accomplished something. Singly, they were
powerless. The Second Corps, as we shall see,
presently took its appointed place in the Army of
Portugal ; not so the Fifth, whose co-operation with
that army would seriously have increased Wellington's
difficulties. Mortier's corps was, in fact, the unknown
quantity which threatened Portugal from the south
and east. If it could be spared from Andalusia, its
intrusion was bound to be of some moment, though
not necessarily fatal, to Portugal. If not, Wellington
could confront the future with patience and hope.
Having dealt with all movements which lay outside the
sphere of its operations in the Peninsula during 18 10,
let us now return to the British Army.
1 Foy was prouder of this clay's work than of any other in his
military career, and with good reason. Fie Militaire du General
Foy, pp. 88-91.
CHAPTER XXXVI
Our last sight of Wellington was on the 12th of
1 8 10. January, upon which day he established his headquarters
at Vizeu. He had then completed one full and event-
ful campaign in the Peninsula ; and it will be well
before going farther to take stock of his army and of
the system upon which he commanded it.
First, therefore, let us look at the staff at head-
quarters. The chief was his Quartermaster-general,
George Murray, who had served in the like capacity
with Moore in Sweden and in Spain, and with
Wellington himself from his first coming to the
Peninsula. He was an able and trustworthy soldier of
whom Wellington thought highly, yet he was not by
any means admitted to the secrets of the Commander-
in-Chief. Even less so was the Adjutant-general,
Charles Stewart, Castlereagh's brother, who had been
accepted for that post by Wellington principally in
order to keep him quiet, and who in his self-importance
chafed not a little at the restraint which limited his
functions to the preparation of field-states. Stewart
poured out his afflicted soul to his brother in words
which are among the most valuable which we possess
for the understanding of Wellington's methods.1 %The
Quartermaster and Adjutant-general were, he com-
1 I transcribe the entire passage as being of no ordinary interest.
C. Stewart to Castlereagh, 24th Aug. 1809, Londonderry MSS. "In
the first place, I think both the situations of Adjt. Genl. and Or.
Mr. Genl. are not understood in our Army, nor is the business
conducted through them in such a manner as to render the offices
as interesting or as important as they are in most of the other Army's
in Europe. I think this has grown up with us from the system at
412
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 413
plained, subordinate to the Military Secretary in all 18 10.
secret communications and important business, and
were left to pick up information, even on the most
essential changes, from that officer. He added that
this system had grown up owing to the example set at
the Horse Guards by the Commander-in-Chief.
Stewart was right in declaring that he and Murray
were reduced very much to the status of clerks, but he
was wrong in assuming that the Military Secretary was
more favoured than they. In 1809 and 18 10, the
officer who held the appointment last named was
Colonel Bathurst, a brother of the hapless envoy
Benjamin Bathurst, who disappeared mysteriously from
human ken when on his way home from Vienna
with despatches in 1 809 ; but the Military Secretary
never for a moment acted upon his own initiative.
Wellington was in fact his own chief of the staff,
and directed the movements of the army principally
through the private letters to his generals which
are printed in his correspondence. Sometimes these
the Horse Guards, which, by throwing every matter of interest or
moment into the hands of the Military Secretary (an inferior
officer as to rank), places both the Adjt. & Or. Mr. Genl. in a
great measure under him, and after him in all confidential &
secret communications, and all important business of the Army. I
know this is felt by Murray here as well as myself, and I have no
doubt it is also felt, though submitted to, in England. It is
needless to point out the numerous instances where this becomes
unpleasant in an Army on Service. Perhaps this arrangement is
one which on some occasions may have its advantages, but it must
ever be a drawback in my mind against the offices above mentioned.
With an irregular mode of getting through business the Adjt. Genl.
and Or. Mr. Genl. may pick up at one moment every information
and intelligence ; at another they may know nothing and be
ignorant of the most essential changes that have been directed
(without reference) through the channell of the Milly. Secry. In
short, it is difficult, where there is great quickness and where you
cannot be always at hand, to be as au fait as if there was more
system and arrangement. You can not in a moving army have the
clock-work of clerks, etc., (as) at the Horse Guards, and if every
order and arrangement is not made through the Hds. of Depts.,
they being privy to everything, the machine will not work as it
ought. I state this with confidence. The situation and business
4i4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. were copied fair by his staff from his drafts and
signed by him ; more often the originals in his own
hand were sent off, and a copy only was taken by his staff
for record. Possibly a great many were never recorded
at all. The letters of his generals in turn were like-
wise addressed directly to him ; his personal friends
writing with some degree of familiarity, but the rest
with as rigid formality as in a purely official correspond-
ence. On very rare occasions Murray would, during
any short absence of Wellington, give some very
obvious order to one body or another of troops ; but
this was a most unusual occurrence, for the Commander-
in-Chief was very jealous of his own authority. This
jealousy no doubt had much to do with the faultiness
of his dispositions at Talavera ; no man daring to
correct them without his express command.
Even less had the staff at large to do with the
matter of intelligence, which Wellington appears to have
kept very much in his own hands. His intelligencers
of Adjt. Genl., deprived of close communication with the Head
of the Army, is reduced to keeping accurately the Returns of all
descriptions of Regts., making General Returns from these for the
offices in England or for the Commr of the Forces, corresponding
with all the detached officers of the Army and Officers commg Corps
on all casualties that occur, making arrangements for the sick,
convalescents, etc., of the Army. Having all this correspondence
regularly and accurately kept, managing all Genl. Ct. Martials,
preparing the evidences, crimes, etc., fixing all details of duty with
the different Divisions of the Army, etc. — this is all most essential
in the existence o& the Army, but you will admit it does not
carry with it interesting or pleasing occupation. To many
Officers, who have been brought up in the School of an orderly-
room, it is not disagreeable ; but to others who have been more
constantly employ'd in the field, it becomes irksome, and though in
point of emolument, consequence, and what many would call ease,
the office is one many would covet, I think I have said enough to
show you (after six months' tryal) that it is not an employment I
should remain in for pleasure. By what I have said I do not
mean to infer that I have ever been shut out from W6 (Wellesley's)
confidence ; on the contrary, he is as kind to me at times as ever,
and no one is always equal. Indeed, I should be in the highest
degree unjust did I not declare that I believe his friendship,
attachment, and confidence in me most sincere."
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 415
were as usual divided into two classes, scouts and 18 10.
spies ; but both stood upon rather an unusual footing
towards the Commander-in-Chief. Spanish spies were,
of course, scattered in all quarters ; but the most
important of them, alike for regularity, minuteness, and
accuracy of information, dated his letters always from
Salamanca, with agents apparently at Valladolid and
Burgos. Of the British spies the most celebrated was
John Grant, who began life first in the Fourth Foot,
then went on half-pay and served seven years in the
Caithness Militia as a captain, rejoined the army in
1 809, and meanwhile obtained a lieutenant-colonelcy in
the Portuguese service. He generally haunted the
valley of the Tagus, and was both indefatigable and
efficient. Once, in January 18 10, he succeeded in
intercepting Napoleon's private letters to Joseph, and
sent them to Wellington with an intimation that he
had obtained them by " great labour, much risk and
considerable expense," but would give no further
details.1 He is frequently confounded with Colquhoun
Grant of the Eleventh Foot, who, like him, was con-
stantly in the enemy's lines, though, unlike him, always
in uniform. Colquhoun Grant's gifts as a linguist and
his talent for making friends with the peasants rendered
him invaluable ; but he narrowly missed capture by
General Foy in Caceres in March 18 10, escaping half-
dressed and leaving his horse and his papers behind
him.2 Equally enterprising and not less useful was
Waters of the Eleventh Foot ; while Mellish of the
Tenth Hussars, a dandy, a gambler, a fine draughtsman
and a magnificent rider across country, distinguished
himself by extreme daring of reconnaissance.3 Hardly
less important in this same province was Captain
Somers Cocks of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who,
1 Grant to Milit. Sec, 20th April 18 10 ; Grant to Wellington,
27th Jan. 1 8 10. Wellington MSS.
2 Girod de l'Ain, Vie du General Foy, p. 88.
3 Mellish was sent home before the end of the war, apparently,
because he could not keep himself from gambling, a vice which
Wellington could not endure.
4i6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 10. working generally with an escort and troopers of his
own regiment, was unmatched in vigilance and sagacity
of observation, and unwearied in the search for in-
telligence. Last, but by no means least, there was a
certain mysterious Captain Rumann, a German, of
the old Ninety-seventh Foot, who wandered about
chiefly between the Douro and Salamanca, and contrived
to send excellent information to headquarters.
Every one of these gentlemen corresponded immedi-
ately with Wellington ; and, though Cocks sometimes
sent in his reports to the Quartermaster-general or to the
General commanding the cavalry division, he generally
addressed and despatched them, no doubt by order,
direct to the Commander-in-Chief. It is probable that
these officers enjoyed more of Wellington's confidence
than any others ; certainly far more than the very able
men, chiefly Engineers such as John Burgoyne, who
were employed in the work of examining the country.
These made their reports through their chiefs to the
Quartermaster-general ; and, though that officer issued
the orders for every march, yet it is evident that
topography was the chief business of his department.
It is very remarkable that not one of the thousands of
letters sent in to Wellington during his campaigns bears
on it the day, much less the hour, of receipt.
As regards the divisional generals, Wellington com-
plained, not without good reason, in December 1809
that no army% had ever been so ill -provided as his.
Sherbrooke was incapacitated for further work by ill-
health ; Mackenzie had been killed at Talavera ;
Alexander Campbell had been disabled for the time at
the same action ; Cotton had very reluctantly been
obliged to go home on leave to look after his private
affairs upon the death of his father.1 Thus of the
divisional generals there remained only Hill and
1 Cotton to Wellington, 29th Nov. 1809. Wellington MSS.
Cotton explained that most of his father's estate had dropped out
of lease through his death and could not be released without the
arrival of the heir in England.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 417
Craufurd. Of the Brigadiers, Langwerth had been 1810.
killed and Henry Campbell disabled by wounds, while
Tilson's health was so much impaired by fever that in
April he too was obliged to ask for leave of absence.1
Altogether, out of fifteen generals of brigade and
division seven had been slain or disabled ; for whom
Wellington had received in return but three generals,
one of them being Lowry Cole, who was very good,
and another General Slade, a cavalry officer, who
cannot be described in terms so flattering. Wellington
therefore asked for more, naming Generals Dyott,
Leith, Picton, Meade, Houston and Nightingall as
those whom he should select. One and all of them
had seen much service ; and two of them, Leith and
Nightingall, will be remembered as having already
made some mark in the Peninsula. But Meade was
already employed ; and Wellington, for some reason,
doubted whether Houston and Nightingall would con-
sent to come. As a matter of fact both were appointed
to join him in the course of 18 10, though Dyott
refused. A principal difficulty in the choice of generals
was that Beresford, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Portuguese forces and as local Lieutenant-general,
claimed, not unreasonably, seniority over all British
Major-generals whose troops might be attached to his
army. Now Sherbrooke, Cotton, Hill and John
Murray were all senior to Beresford in the British
service ; and Murray, as we have seen, had gone home
sooner than submit to serve under him, with the object
of representing, not on his own behalf only, but on
behalf of Hill and Cotton also, the grievance under
which they conceived themselves to suffer. The whole
question was one of great difficulty, and it is not
surprising to find that all the generals named by
Wellington were junior to Beresford. As an after-
thought he added a request that no violent party men
might be sent to him. "We must keep the spirit of
1 Tilson to Milit. Sec, 7th April, 18 10. Wellington
MSS.
VOL. VII 2 E
4i8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. party out of the Army," he wrote, " or we shall be in a
bad way indeed." 1
It will be convenient to depart from strict chrono-
logical order and to state that the difficulty was finally
solved by the despatch to Portugal from England in
the course of the year 18 10 of Lieutenant-general
Sir Brent Spencer ; Major-generals Leith, Sir William
Erskine, Picton and Houston ; and Brigadiers Andrew
Hay, Lumley, Colville and Dunlop, the last-named to
supersede Lightburne. Of these, Sir Brent Spencer
was appointed expressly to be Wellington's second in
command, being one of three officers suggested by him
for the post. Of the other two, Graham had already
been sent to Cadiz ; while Lord William Bentinck, who
was senior to Spencer, was actually selected by the
Horse Guards for employment with the army of
Portugal in August 1809, but declined, fearing not
without reason that Graham might come to Portugal
from Cadiz and supersede him. Edward Paget, who was
also approached by Government, refused on account of
the state of his health.2 Spencer, therefore, was sent
out in default of any better man, and was welcomed
as highly acceptable by Wellington, who had written
in commendation of his behaviour during the campaign
of 1808, and had actually invited him to serve with
his army at the beginning of 1809. Spencer had re-
gretfully declined the offer at the time, upon the
ground of illrhealth ; and it may be that his sickness
had impaired his ability, for Wellington, as we shall
see, later declared him to be quite unfit for his situation.
Leith was named by Wellington from actual experience
of his efficiency. Picton he chose, curiously enough,
upon a recommendation which the Venezuelan adven-
1 Wellington to Liverpool, 21st Dec. 1809, 2nd Jan. 18 10.
Charles Stewart to Castlereagh, 29th May 1809. Londonderry MSS.
2 Dilkes's appointment was reported to Wellington by the A.G.
on 24th Feb. 1810. He went to Cadiz. Lumley and Hay arrived
in Lisbon on 17th of September [Wellington MSS.), Leith some
time earlier. Lightburne was recalled, after a good many complaints
from Wellington, on 19th Sept. 18 10.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 419
turer, Francisco Miranda,1 had made to him when Chief 18 10.
Secretary for Ireland ; and it needed some courage in
Wellington to give a chance to Picton, who was still
mercilessly persecuted by his enemies on account of the
old scandal at Trinidad. Houston, who had seen a
great many campaigns in the West Indies, in Egypt, and
finally at Walcheren, was probably known to Wellington
by report only ; but it should seem that he was not
very anxious to join the army in the Peninsula, for he
did not come out until early in 181 1. Colville was
seized upon by Torrens, the Adjutant-general at the
Horse Guards, within a fortnight after his return from
the West Indies, as an officer of good reputation.
Dunlop had much experience of war in India and had led
one of the assaulting columns at Seringapatam in 1799,
so that he was no stranger to Wellington. Erskine
was selected by Sir David Dundas, who had formed a
high opinion of him during his service in Germany.
" No doubt," wrote Torrens, " he is sometimes a little
mad, but in his lucid intervals he is an uncommonly
clever fellow ; and I trust he may have no fit during
the campaign, though he looked a little wild before
he embarked. Sir David Dundas . . . thinks that
some of our Generals would not be the worse for a
little of his madness." Unfortunately, as shall be seen,
Erskine's insanity proved to be only too real. Lastly,
we come to Lumley, who once again had been chosen
by the Horse Guards, chiefly upon the recommendation
of Colonel Henry Bunbury, who had given an excellent
account of his services in the Mediterranean. Wellington
had set his face so strongly against Lumley as a man
of no intellect that Torrens was fain to apologise for
the appointment. " I never thought him a clever
man," wrote the Adjutant-general, "but he is zealous,
active, obedient, and as brave as a lion. He is not
intended by nature for anything bigger than a brigade ;
but that, it is generally thought, he will do well." The
1 Miranda had met Picton in Trinidad when filibustering on
the coast of Venezuela.
420 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. truth is that the Horse Guards was at its wits' end
to find efficient officers for the higher commands, and
Torrens was fain to make excuses for the fact. " Re-
member," he wrote to Wellington, " that we have not
the most choice set to select Lieutenant-generals
from." 1
The relations upon which Wellington stood with
his Generals seem to have been governed mainly by
social considerations. Old friends, like Beresford, Hill,
Cotton and Mackenzie,2 he addressed always by their
surnames, " My dear Beresford," and so forth ; but
Beresford alone addressed him as " My dear Wellesley."
After Wellington had been raised to the peerage, no
one used a more familiar address to him than " My
dear Lord ; "3 and from the end of 1809 onwards he
appears to have held the whole of his subordinates at
rather greater distance than before. Possibly the reason
for this was a very sharp passage of arms with Beresford,
which took place in December 1809, and in which
Wellington used language so severe that his colleague
threatened to resign. The subject at issue is obscure,
for only Beresford's side of the correspondence seems
to exist, and the quarrel was speedily composed ; but
there are indications that the Marshal in some way
called Wellington's authority in question. However
that may be, Wellington never wrote to Craufurd or
Picton with such freedom as to Cotton or Hill, or
even as to Cole. He never addressed them more
1 Liverpool to Wellington, 4th May ; Wellington to Liverpool,
23rd May 1810. Wellington MSS. Brent Spencer to Wellington,
30th March 1809; Milit. Sec. Horse Guards to Wellington, 18th
Aug. 1809. Torrens to Wellington (private) nth, 19th Sept. 1810.
Stanhope's Conversations of the Duke of Wellington, p. 68. Royai
Military Calendar. Leveson-Gower, of unenviable notoriety since
the failure at Buenos Ayres, wrote to Wellington on 20th July
1 8 10, expressing anxiety to serve under him. I can find no answer
to this application, but ir one were sent, its purport is not difficult
to conjecture.
2 The Mackenzie who was killed at Talavera.
5 I find that on one occasion General Stopford of the Guards
used the form "Dear Lord Wellington."
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 421
familiarly than as " My dear General," nor did they 1810.
presume to address him except as " My Lord." In
the case of Picton, his aloofness is easily explained by
the fact that the leader of the Third Division was a
rough, coarse, foul-mouthed man, who was apparently
inclined to treat his chief with familiarity. The case
of Robert Craufurd was less simple than that of Picton.
Knowing his value for certain purposes, which shall
presently be specified, Wellington always humoured
him and treated him with exceptional consideration, as
a man five years older than himself ; but none the less,
kept him always at arm's length. Craufurd's temper
was fiendish and his instincts tyrannical. Before he
had been with the army six months complaint reached
the Horse Guards of his unusual severity to the men ;
and looking to the accounts which we possess of some
of his outbursts of rage, the fact is hardly surprising.1
A man who in every fit of passion forgot that he was
a gentleman, who was always trying to push himself
forward, who to that end would disobey any order,
and who needed constant watching lest from pure
egoism he should lead his troops into peril, was
not one whom Wellington was likely to admit to
intimacy.
As to the army at large, Wellington at the end of
1809 declared it to be better than it had been, but still
stigmatised the behaviour of the men as infamous.
WThen with their regiments they conducted themselves
well, but when detached or on their way to rejoin their
corps from hospital 2 they committed every description of
1 Wellington MSS. Calvert (Horse Guards) to Wellington, 5th
Jan. 1 8 10. Sir David Dundas gave Wellington very properly to
understand that he received any such reports with great caution,
and merely passed them on for his information without prejudice
to Craufurd. For one of Craufurd's outbursts, see the account of
his behaviour when his baggage-cart was accidently lost on the
retreat from the Tagus. Sept. 1809. British Rifleman, p. 26.
2 The base hospital was at Belem, just outside Lisbon, and the
number of skulkers and marauders that issued from it gave rise to
a generic term in the army, " the Belem Rangers."
422 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. outrage. They would rob the British convoys or the
Portuguese peasants with absolute impartiality, and
did not stick at murder from mere lust of destruction.
The country people occasionally avenged themselves
with the knife, but more often forgot their grievance
in a day or two, and would not give evidence against
the men who had come to defend their fatherland.
Hence the offenders, if tried, were acquitted ; their
comrades perjured themselves to save them ; and
Wellington renewed his complaints of the reforms
which had ruined the efficiency of regimental courts-
martial. Concurrently arose a crime, which hitherto
had been almost unknown in the army, namely deser-
tion to the enemy in the field. These deserters were
principally Irishmen ; and Wellington ascribed the
prevalence of this offence in great measure to the bad
character of the men drafted into the army from the
Irish Militia, and to the example of certain stragglers
from Moore's force, who had deserted to the French
and deserted back to the British after an interval spent
in brigandage.1 It is certain that Irish soldiers, if taken
prisoners, needed little persuasion to accept service with
the French, unless by chance there were a compatriot at
hand to warn them that the hardship and suffering in
the French army far exceeded that in the British.2
The inferior quality of the recruits from the Militia
was accounted for in turn by the fact that, whereas
the wives of^militiamen received an allowance for the
support of themselves and their children, no such
allowance was granted to the wives of regular soldiers ;
so that militiamen of good character were averse
from enlisting in the army. Wellington had much
correspondence with Torrens as to the expediency of
continuing this grant to soldiers enlisted from the
Militia, though Torrens had little faith in it ; and, as
1 Morvan (Le Soldat Imperial, i. 94.) says that more than a
thousand British prisoners, who had entered the French service,
deserted in 18 10.
2 See Blayney's Narrative, etc., i. 238-239.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 423
we shall see, the difficulty was met in 181 1 by abolish- 1810.
ing, except in rare instances, the allowance to the wives
and families of militiamen. But this, after all, was a
matter which affected the quality of the troops, not the
discipline of the army ; and, though Wellington
complained that in the second battalions, which were
under his command, the non - commissioned officers
were bad, and the subalterns not much better, the
peculiar failings of the British troops in the Peninsula
have never been satisfactorily explained.
As to desertion, it was common enough in the
wars of William the Third and of Marlborough, but
we hear nothing of such general misconduct as that
described by Wellington. There is no parallel to it
in the long wars in North America nor in the more
recent campaigns — the only ones of any continuity
since 1793 — of the Duke of York in Flanders. There
is but one way, that I can think of, in which it can be
accounted for, namely that the British soldier, then an
exceedingly drunken creature, found himself for the
first time in a land flowing with wine.1 It will be
objected that he had visited it before in Queen Anne's
time ; but it must be remembered on the other hand
that in the War of the Spanish Succession the population
was hostile to him. Now it was friendly ; and liquor
was to be bought or stolen everywhere. Hence an
eternal craving for the means to procure wine, which
was satisfied by every description of robbery, plunder,
and intimidation, and when sated was frequently followed
by the wanton violence and brutality of the drunkard.
No doubt the example of Moore's stragglers encouraged
others to take the evil way ; and the powerlessness of
courts - martial made that example doubly tempting.
In the West Indies new rum offered probably even
1 " No soldier can withstand the temptation of wine. This
is constantly before their eyes in this country, and they are
constantly intoxicated when absent from their regiments, and there
is no crime which they do not commit to obtain money to purchase
it, or, if they cannot get money, to obtain it by force." Wellington
to Torrens, 2nd Nov. 18 10.
424 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 8 10. greater attractions than the wine of Spain or Portugal ;
but marauding is a severe exertion in a tropical climate,
and new rum with yellow fever at its back kills men
before they can do much mischief ; otherwise perhaps
British troops there might have been as ungovernable as
those of Moore and Wellington. But in the Peninsula
men could drink and live to drink more ; and when
wine was stored in vast quantities, as at Bembibre, it was
impossible to maintain control of the soldiers. In 1 8 1 2
the Light Division was quartered near large wine-vaults,
and every man, from the divisional general downwards,
was drunk for twenty-four hours and more.1 It seems
to me, therefore, that liquor lay at the root of the
army's indiscipline ; and the danger was the more
formidable inasmuch as it could be neither banished
nor evaded. It haunted Wellington night and day.
" These terrible continued outrages," he wrote, " give
me reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding all the
precautions I have taken and shall take, the men will
slip through my fingers, as they did through Sir John
Moore's, when I shall be involved in any nice operation
with a powerful enemy in my front." 2
As regards the officers at large, Wellington's main
complaint was that the power of reward, granted
hitherto to every Commander-in-Chief in the field,
was denied to him ; wherefore it was impossible for
him to stimulate their zeal and energy. Strong though
were his remonstrances upon this point, Sir David
Dundas was so jealous of his patronage at the Horse
Guards that he would make no concession ; and, as
shall in due time be seen, it was left to the Duke of
York under the impulse of Torrens to set matters
right. It may be said generally that, though Torrens
always worked strenuously to ease Wellington's task,
old Sir David was uniformly obstructive. It was vain
for Wellington to plead on behalf of a deserving old
1 Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith, i. 79-S0.
2 Wellington to Liverpool, 24th Jan. ; to Torrens, 2nd
Nov. 1 8 10.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 425
officer, such as Alexander Campbell, and for Torrens '8 10.
to second him with all his power : " Old Pivot " was
inexorable. He based his opinion rigidly upon the
letter of the regulations and would not be moved ;
and Wellington complained that he invariably dealt
with men as if they were stocks or stones.1 Another
difficulty was that the senior regimental officers of all
grades were constantly passing, upon promotion, from
battalions abroad to battalions at home, so that there
was a continual tendency towards the supplant-
ing of experienced by inexperienced men. Again,
many officers — and the generals were among the worst
offenders — seemed to think that they were entitled,
after the fashion of Marlborough's day, to go home
on leave at the close of the autumn, to abandon their
men to take care of themselves during the winter, and
to reappear at the opening of the next campaign. It
cost Wellington some sharp language to check this
practice until public opinion in England came to his
rescue.
All these evils, however, were remediable and, in
due course, remedied. Not so was another more signal
defect, which apparently was treated by Wellington as
beyond hope. Craufurd, judging from the quality of
his own excellent Light Brigade, had recommended the
substitution of light tin camp-kettles for the heavy iron
ones that were actually used. " In a regiment well
looked after," answered Wellington, " it is certain that
the tin kettles would answer best, as the officers would
oblige the soldiers to take care of them. . . . But in
two-thirds of the regiments of the Army such care
would not be taken ; and whether the regiments would
have kettles or not would depend upon that most
thoughtless of animals, the soldier himself, and I should
very soon hear that there were none." This is plain
testimony to the fact that two-thirds of the officers
1 Wellington to Castlereagh, 25th Aug. ; to Brig.-Gen. Alex.
Campbell, 4th Sept. 1809 ; Torrens to Wellington, 20th Jan.
1 8 10. Wellington MSS.
426 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. could not be trusted to discharge one of their commonest
and most important duties. Add to this failing a
pernicious habit of writing home criticism of their
commanders, and exact details of military preparations
to their friends, which the said friends frequently sent
to the newspapers, and it will be seen that the British
officers, taken as a body, had yet much to learn about
their profession.
Turning next to the medical service, we find
reiterated complaints of the lack of surgeons ; the
dearth of medical men being such that the sick could
only with difficulty be moved from the Guadiana into
Portugal. The head of the medical department, how-
ever, Dr. Frank, was so highly zealous and efficient
that Wellington could thoroughly trust him ; though
he was hardly of the calibre of the true father of the
Army Medical Corps, Dr. M'Grigor, who joined the
Peninsular army in 1 8 1 1 .
In the matter of the Commissariat, things were not
yet in a thoroughly satisfactory condition. The service,
as we have seen, had not worked smoothly during the
past campaign, and friction between generals and com-
missaries had been frequent. Undoubtedly many of
the latter had been extremely incapable, but on the
contrary one, Mr. Ogilvie, had been discovered, who
possessed a perfect genius for his business ; while
beyond all question the difficulties of the department
were enormous. It was Wellington's strict rule that
no corps should join the army until first equipped with
regimental transport ; and it was the habit of the Com-
mandant at Lisbon first to warn the officers that they
must not depend upon the Commissariat for mules,
and next to stimulate them by promising that the
battalion soonest equipped with transport should be
the first to march to the front. But mules were scarce,
and the local dealers were greedy ; and matters generally
ended by the officers throwing themselves upon the
Commissariat — a call which could not easily be ignored
when a man of peremptory disposition, such as
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 427
Craufurd, was in question.1 The Horse Guards did 18 10.
their best to help matters by sending out continually
men and waggons of the Waggon-train ; but, though
the men were most serviceable, there were very few
roads in Portugal which were not too narrow for the
vehicles, so that it was necessary to send them home
again. In Portugal the authorities were averse from
permitting even waggons to leave their districts ; and
the Commissary in despair was fain to send to Tangier
both for mules and oxen. Happily this resource proved
to be successful in the matter of mules,2 but the anxiety
in the meanwhile must have been very serious. By
November 1809 that much-tried man, Commissary-
general Murray, was quite broken down, his staff
being reduced to one-half by sickness ; and he was
obliged to ask for leave of absence, finally departing
in June 18 10, with a very handsome tribute from
Wellington to his good service. He was succeeded
by Commissary-general Kennedy, who likewise earned
high encomiums from his chief; but it should seem
that the organisation of the service of transport and
supply had not reached in 18 10 the perfection to which
it attained a year later.
From the British I pass to the Portuguese forces,
the remaking of which had been entrusted to Beresford
in 1809. The old Portuguese army had been virtually
dissolved after Junot's invasion of 1808, and was no
great loss, since the officers for the most part were
absolutely incompetent, and the men in consequence
ill- trained and undisciplined. Could Beresford have
begun his work with a free hand and, so to speak, with
a clean sheet before him, his task would have been
1 Wellington MSS. Col. Peacocke to Wellington, 5th July
1809. Craufurd only succeeded in bringing his brigade up to
Talavera by taking commissariat- mules for his officers, whereas
those officers ought by right to have supplied themselves. Doubt-
less he was wise in his generation ; but it was not fair to the Com-
missaries, who had more work than they could do.
2 Wellington to Murray, 7th Sept. ; to Admiral Berkeley, 28th
Sept. 1809 ; 22nd Jan., 6th March 1810.
428 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 8 10. infinitely easier; but unfortunately the Regency had
anticipated him by restoring the old corps and pouring
thousands of conscripts into them. In this way many
of the old school of useless officers were recalled to
service, who naturally obstructed active reforms and
yet prevented the rise of younger and more competent
men. As raw material for soldiers the Portuguese
peasants are excellent, fine sturdy men in body, orderly
and docile in character ; l but they, equally with all
classes of the population, are prone to indolence, and
the traditions of the old army were in this respect as
bad as they could be. Moreover, in the army, and
indeed in every branch of the administration, there was
an extreme reluctance in all men of lower than noble
rank to displease their social superiors, the fidalgos.
A single lazy noble in a battalion almost sufficed, there-
fore, to injure the efficiency of the whole of it. More-
over, even the younger and more promising officers
required teaching, as well as constant spurring to do
their duty ; and altogether Beresford deemed it im-
possible to make anything of the Portuguese army
unless every regiment possessed an English field-officer
and at least two English captains.
Such a decision, though doubtless wise, could not
but cause jealousy directly in the Portuguese, and in-
directly in the British service. There was little tempta-
tion to British officers to enter the Portuguese army.
Beresford himself received the command chiefly because
no general officer of higher rank would accept it ; and,
accordingly, it was necessary to offer to every British
officer a step of promotion in the British army, and a
further step in the Portuguese army upon his joining
the latter. In plain words a British captain became at
a bound a British major and a Portuguese lieutenant-
colonel, with the natural result that other British majors,
1 I have never encountered people more civil, obliging, and
well-mannered than the Portuguese in the country districts. I
found them far more so than any Spaniards with whom I had to do
when wandering over the battlefields of the Peninsula.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 429
his seniors in King George's service, resented the possi- 18 10.
bility of having to serve under his orders. The point
was extremely difficult, for Portuguese commissions had
been served out to British officers in the most capricious
manner, juniors being placed arbitrarily over the heads
of seniors in a fashion which disgusted and dissatisfied
all. Moreover, though Wellington freely recognised
the right of the Portuguese Regency to be jealous of
the honour of its commissions, he was keenly alive to
the injustice of placing British officers, who were only
temporarily attached to the Portuguese army, in per-
manent authority over their superiors in the British
service, whenever the two armies should act together
in the field. The question gave rise to much anxious
correspondence between Wellington, the British Minister
at Lisbon, Beresford, and the Horse Guards ; but after
a few months the excitement over it died away, and the
British officers in both services settled down to live
together in peace. Beresford, with great tact, made it
a rule that no British subaltern should serve in the
Portuguese army, so as to encourage young gentlemen
of the country to seek commissions. He also contrived
that a certain number of Portuguese officers should
retain high command, placing British officers immedi-
ately under them, in case they should need guidance,
and generally arranging that whenever an officer of the
one nation stood first, his second should be of the other.
Finally Wellington, after many struggles, succeeded in
raising the status and quality of the Portuguese officers
by obtaining for them an increase of pay.
The next question was to decide as to the training
of the Portuguese, and this was solved at once by the
introduction of the British discipline. British drill-
sergeants were employed ; Dundas's drill -book was
translated, and British words of command and bugle-
calls were introduced ; l and it need hardly be added
1 The British bugle-calls are retained in the Portuguese army
to this day ; a fact which was practically brought home to me in my
stay at Guarda, which I entered late in the evening to the sound of
43o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 10. that this uniformity of system and of movement
contributed greatly towards the facility of handling
the troops of the two armies. All these changes
necessarily were not made nor perfected in a day nor
in a year ; but none the less Wellington, after inspect-
ing fifteen Portuguese regiments in the first week of
January 1810, reported very favourably as to their
progress and condition, though the numbers in the
ranks at large left much to be desired.1 The nominal
establishment of the Portuguese army was fifty-six
thousand men, but Wellington stated it at forty-five
thousand ; namely, thirty-six thousand infantry, three
thousand cacadores, or light infantry, as many cavalry,
and as many artillery ; and of this total in February 1 8 10
not above twenty thousand were fit and ready for
the field. In addition to these there was the militia,
nominally seventy thousand strong, and organised into
forty-eight regiments, but at the same date counting
little more than fifty thousand men, three-fifths of them
unarmed. The value of this militia was very uncertain,
for it depended for its numbers upon magistrates who
were frequently unwilling and incapable, and for its
training upon officers who were for the most part
ignorant and perfunctory. None the less it could
serve to hold fortified places against sudden attack, and
to harass small parties and convoys of the enemy.
Lastly there was the ordenanga, or statutory levy en
masse, including ostensibly every able-bodied peasant
between the ages of sixteen and sixty, who were sup-
posed to be enrolled, according to local grouping, into
companies of two hundred and fifty, and were armed
with such weapons as they could produce. This
ordenanca was a survival of mediaeval times, and for
fighting purposes was useless ; but it was an invariable
custom that, when called out, it should devastate the
country, so that an invading enemy should find in it no
the British " First Post," played, however, at Portuguese speed,
kntissimo.
1 Wellington to Liverpool, 4 Jan., 22nd Feb. 18 10.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 431
supplies and be compelled to fall back. In fact it was 18 10.
an organisation for the process known as "driving the
country," which had been prescribed by the military
authorities for England both in 1780 and in 1803, but
had been abandoned. For this reason, apparently,
Wellington decided that this levy also should be
summoned for the final defence of Portugal.1
It must, however, be observed that the chief diffi-
culty in the Portuguese army, and indeed in Portugal
at large, was that of money. The British Government
had early decided to take first ten and then twenty
thousand Portuguese soldiers into its pay ; but their
wants could not be satisfied with mere wages. They
needed to be fed, clothed and armed ; and, even if food
were forthcoming at the hands of the Portuguese
authorities, which, as shall be seen, was by no means
always the case, arms, equipment and clothing could
only be obtained from England, and, in the disorganised
state of the country, paid for by English money. To
all intent this signified that the war could not be carried
on by the Portuguese at all except by the help of an
English subsidy ; and this, in its turn, meant that the
British Government, through its military and civil
agents, not unreasonably demanded, in virtue of such
subsidy, a dominant voice in the direction of Portuguese
affairs at large. It becomes necessary, therefore, at
this point to examine the relations of Wellington both
with the Portuguese Government and with his own.
The Portuguese Regency until 18 10 continued to
include the same members as had been appointed by
Sir Hew Dalrymple, but was now reduced by various
causes to three persons, the Patriarch of Oporto, the
Marquis de Olhao and the Marquis das Minas, men
with little ability or inclination to end existing abuses.
Their secretary, however, Dom Miguel Forjaz, was
steadily on the other side, working in concert with the
British with a heartiness and intelligence which, con-
1 Liverpool to Wellington, 15th Dec. 1809 ; Wellington to
Liverpool, 14th Nov. 1809,22nd Feb. 1S10. Oman iii. 171-184.
432 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. sidering his nationality, his difficulties, and the times in
which he lived, were beyond all praise. The British
nation has never, I think, fairly acknowledged the help
which she received, in spite of occasional shortcomings,
from the loyalty and the indefatigable industry of Dom
Miguel. His superiors, however, were jealous of the
British, jealous of each other, and, not without excuse,
afraid of the Regency in Brazil. The energetic pro-
ceedings of Beresford in respect of the army, of Mr.
Villiers in regard to the administration, and above all,
of Wellington in stirring up everybody and everything,
were extremely distasteful to them ; and they met all
representations and remonstrances with active intrigue
in private, and in public with passive but embarrassing
obstruction. They must not be too harshly judged.
They were men of high position, who had no quarrel
with the old order of inefficiency and corruption, and
had probably never dreamed of anything different from
it ; wherefore it is easy to understand how, with their
narrow views, limited intelligence, deep-seated prejudices
and meridional indolence, they resented bitterly the
intrusion of cold, strenuous and peremptory foreigners.
Nor, as has been hinted, did the Prince Regent in
Brazil help matters. The chief minister there was
Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Count of Linhares, one of
whose brothers, Domingos, was Portuguese minister in
London, and another, Jose, known as the Principal de
Sousa, a leader of the opponents of the French in Lisbon.
The three brothers were one and all ambitious of power ;
and at the end of September 1809 a letter arrived in
Lisbon from Rio de Janeiro which hinted at a change
of government, obviously, as the sequel showed, in the
direction of adding new members to the Regency,
among whom the Principal was to be included.1 This
letter arrived at a bad moment. Mr. Villiers had just
been recalled, to Wellington's great regret, to England ;
though as a matter of fact he did not depart until some
months later. Beresford and Wellington were just be-
1 Wellington to Beresford, 5th Oct. 1809.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 433
coming very urgent over the condition and subsistence of 18 10
the Portuguese army ; Portugal at large was threatened
with scarcity of provisions ; her soldiers were starving ;
and the English subsidy had been found to be utterly in-
sufficient for its purpose. Not unnaturally the Regency
ascribed the letter from Rio to the intrigues of the
British and Forjaz, and became sulkier and more help-
less than ever. Thus, for instance, Wellington pointed
out a favourable opportunity for the cheap purchase of
wheat. The Regency rejected his advice, and proposed
instead that the burden of feeding the Portuguese army
should be transferred from the Junta de Viveres, or
Portuguese Commissariat, to Beresford. Wellington,
after a few words of scornful comment, bought the
wheat, and some weeks later, when the Regency was at
its wits' end, threw his purchase contemptuously to them
as though to a parcel of naughty but repentant children.
It must be confessed that the behaviour of the Regency,
judged by the standard of British administration, might
be called childish ; but it cannot be said that the tone
and method of Wellington were conciliatory. Still, the
times were full of difficulty ; the weight of responsibility
which lay upon the Commander-in-Chief was very
heavy, and large allowance must be made for him, as for
all parties.1
In January 18 10 Mr. Villiers left Lisbon, and was
succeeded as minister by Mr. Charles Stuart, whom
we have already seen in Spain during the operations
of Sir John Moore. He was an able and resolute man,
whose good service during the Peninsular War is not
easily overrated. At the outset he was confronted with
an incident which, in the hands of an unwise diplomatist,
might have led to serious consequences. The Marquis
das Minas after some weeks of secession resigned his
O
place in the Regency ; and it became a question whether
a new member or members should be appointed by the
survivors in his place. Wellington was firmly against
1 Wellington to Beresford, 5th Oct. 1809; to Forjaz, 27th Dec.
1809 ; to Villiers, 25th Jan., 30th Jan., 7th Feb. 1810.
VOL. VII 2 F
434 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i Sio. anything of the kind. The Regency, he contended,
derived all its authority from the Prince Regent in
Brazil, and any effort to set up a government indepen-
dently of that authority would be fatal ; therefore,
though the Patriarch might devote all his powers of
folly and mischief to the thwarting of Forjaz and of the
British, the evil must be borne with. The opinion was
thoroughly characteristic of Wellington, who preferred a
legitimately constituted government, however obstructive,
to the most able and complaisant that might be set up
by revolutionary methods. We shall see that the Prince
Regent within a few months added members to the
Regency whose appointment was in the highest degree
displeasing to the British General; but Wellington was
consistent to his principle. The true sovereign of
Portugal had chosen them, and therefore they must
be accepted. He and Stuart thus resigned themselves
to make the best of a bad state of things. It is true
that they put every description of legitimate pressure
upon the Regency, not sparing plain words, and exerting
every lawful effort to bring about useful changes in its
constitution. But, no matter how great the provocation,
beyond this they would not go ; and the fact must be
recorded to the credit of their patience in action, if not
of their moderation in language. After all, they were
fortunate at least in having a coadjutor so loyal and
able as Forjaz. " I am quite convinced," wrote Well-
ington, " that he is the only man in Portugal fit for the
situation which he fills." It was well both for England
and for Portugal not only that such a man was at hand,
but that he possessed the courage to hold his place and
to work with the British, undaunted by the intrigues
and the hostility of his more jealous and less capable
countrymen.1
Let us now turn to the question of the Portuguese
subsidy, which will lead us to the still larger matter
of Wellington's relations with his own Government.
1 Wellington to Stuart, 17th March, 8th, 28th April, 24th June
1810.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 435
Originally, as has been told, the British Ministers had 18 10.
agreed to take first ten thousand and later twenty
thousand Portuguese troops into their pay ; but, for
reasons that have been already stated, it was very soon
found that the estimate of £50,000 a month, which
had been put forward by Wellington as late as at the
end of September 1809, was quite insufficient. The
resources of Portugal being hopelessly unequal to the
demands of her military force, it was necessary that
the funds should be supplied by England, and more-
over, supplied for the most part in specie, which
was hardly obtainable. Wellington was extremely
exacting upon this point, and appeared to think that the
failure of the British Government to furnish coin was
due in great measure to its own perversity. In vain
Huskisson, the greatest living authority upon the subject
in England, represented that he and his colleagues were
utterly at a loss to find gold or silver without help
from the Spanish treasure-ships. " How," he wrote
privately with some temper, " can you expect us to buy
specie here with the exchange thirty per cent against us,
and guineas selling at twenty-four shillings ? " 1 The
General was not to be pacified. He had observed that
coin was always obtainable for bills in Lisbon after the
arrival of the English packet ; from which he drew the
perfectlv correct inference that there was a regular
traffic in specie between England and Portugal. The
coin made its way, in fact, to the place where there was
the most profitable market for it, and would not be
diverted by all the efforts of the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer and the Bank of England. Wellington apparently
declined to accept this fact, and vented his vexation in
contemptuous observations, constantly repeated, that
the Government had undertaken in the Peninsula a
task which was beyond its means to execute. " It will,"
he wrote, at the close of one of his early appeals for
money, " be better for Government in every view of
the subject to relinquish their operations in Portugal
1 Wellington MSS. Huskisson to Wellington, 19th July 1809.
436 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. and Spain, if the country cannot afford to carry
them on." *
None the less did he strenuously urge Ministers
to increasing expenditure, first for raising the pay of the
Portuguese officers ; next for taking additional Portu-
guese soldiers into British pay, making thirty thousand
in all ; and finally for their subsistence and equipment
during the coming campaigns. In November he
announced a deficit of £900,000 in the Portuguese
accounts, towards the relief of which he proposed that
Government should grant £300,000. " If I had asked
for the £900,000, I should not have got a shilling," he
wrote to Villiers in defence of this proceeding, " and
I think it more than probable that I shall get the
£300,000, besides the pay for the officers." Pursuant
to his expectations, Ministers agreed to increase the
Portuguese subsidy to £980,000 annually, as he had
recommended, declining to be responsible for the
deficit ; and Wellington urged the Portuguese Regency
to make the most of this concession. " I am positively
certain," he wrote to Charles Stuart in March 18 10,
" that the Ministers will be unwilling to go to Parlia-
ment to ask for more money for Portugal, and that
Parliament will not grant a larger sum even if Ministers
should ask for it. ... I am positively certain, as above
stated, that Government will not give them another
shilling ; and I think you will do well to discourage
the notion that the Portuguese should get more."
None the less additional demands were put forward on
behalf of Portugal ; and the British Ministry, so far from
refusing to entertain them, agreed in April 1810 to
increase the subsidy to a million and a half, giving
notice, however, that they could not send much of it
in the form of specie from England.2
1 Wellington to Huskisson, 28th March, 22nd June; to Villiers,
2 1st June, 2 1st Aug. 1809 ; 6th, 14th Jan. I 8 10.
2 Wellington to Liverpool, 14th Nov. ; to Villiers, 6th Dec. ;
Liverpool to Wellington, 15th Dec. 1809; Wellington to Stuart,
3rd March 1810; Liverpool to Wellington, 24th April 18 10
This last letter is among the Wellington MSS., unprinted.
ch. xxxvr HISTORY OF THE ARMY 437
So far, therefore, as financial support is concerned, 18 ic.
it does not appear that Wellington's complaints against
Ministers were well founded. Nor, it must be added,
does he seem rightly to have appreciated their difficulties.
Whether through some pardonable omissions on the
part of Villiers, or to such misunderstanding as is almost
inevitable in the like circumstances, the Cabinet was
unquestionably taken by surprise at the enormous cost
of the war in the Peninsula. It did not realise —
nor, I think, can any one realise who has not seen the
country — the stupendous difficulty and consequently the
abnormal expense, of the service of transport and supply.
Wellington continually complained, and with truth, that
everybody came to him for everything ; but he omitted
to mention that most of these requirements reduced
themselves to a question of money, and were practically
thrown by him in his turn upon Ministers. Perceval
admitted frankly that if he had foreseen in the winter
of 1809 the demands that would be made upon the
Treasury in 18 10, he would never have dared to
sanction the continuance of the war upon the scale which
it actually attained, from sheer inability to supply funds
to support it. He acquitted Wellington, however, of
all blame, and confessed to him in private that he
rejoiced in his own blindness, for he had since been
convinced that the expenditure was necessary and
unavoidable. None the less, with Wellington's letters
before us, it is difficult to see how Perceval could have
conjectured that the annual cost of the war in the
Peninsula would spring at one bound from three to five
millions. That the Chancellor of the Exchequer should
have accepted such an increase, not indeed without some
inward dismay, but without repining and with emphatic
declaration of his confidence in the General upon the
spot, seems to me no common example of a Minister's
loyalty towards his subordinate.1
But when we turn to Wellington's relations with
Government upon the question of reinforcements, we
1 Walpole's Life of Spencer Perceval, ii. 129-133.
438 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. perceive how admirably deserving he was of such loyalty.
We have seen l that Wellington on the 14th of November
had undertaken to defend Portugal in any event with
his existing force, and declared his conviction that even
after defeat he could safely embark his troops. He
pointed out, however, that by his existing force he
meant " an efficient operating army " of thirty thousand
men, or, making allowance for the sick, who had been
numerous in the unhealthy cantonments of the Guadiana,2
and for the garrison for the Castle of Lisbon, thirty-
five thousand men in all. By thirty-five thousand men
he signified, what is too often forgotten, thirty-five
thousand rank and file, exclusive of artillery, or roughly
forty thousand of all ranks of infantry and cavalry,
besides two to three thousand gunners. Mr. Villiers,
to whom he had communicated the purport of his
despatch, took him to task for not demanding ten
thousand men more. Wellington freely admitted that
forty thousand men were better than thirty thousand,
but reminded Villiers of the enormous difficulties of
Ministers in furnishing men and money. " With the
knowledge of these facts," he added, " would it be fair,
or indeed honest, in me to ask for a man more than I
thought absolutely necessary for my purpose ? ' There
spoke the ideal public servant, who remembers that he is
only one out of many who are working for their country.3
Liverpool, it is satisfactory to note, met Wellington
in a like spirit. The General had asked for five thou-
sand men : the Minister undertook to send them, and
one regiment of dragoons in addition to them.4 By
1 Ante, pp. 336-337.
2 The returns of the 8th November showed 9100 sick and
wounded out of 33,000 rank and file, exclusive of 2 16 1 artillery.
3 Wellington to Villiers, 6th Dec. 1809, 14th Jan. 1810.
Wellington MSS. Villiers to Wellington, 3rd Dec. 1809, 9th
Jan. 18 10.
4 The first instalment of these reinforcements consisted of —
74th, 650 ; l/79th, 900 ; 94th, 650 . = 2200
Drafts of nth, 40th, 57th, 61st . . = 1200
3400
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 439
the 1 st of January the greater part of these troops 18 10.
were embarked ; and the remainder, together with
twelve hundred remounts, were only awaiting their
transports. But, as we have seen, the first reinforce-
ment upon its arrival at the end of January was at once
sent on to Cadiz ; and it was necessary for Liverpool to
make good immediately the loss to the army in Portu-
gal. Owing to the ravages of Walcheren fever this was
a matter of great difficulty ; but none the less Liver-
pool scraped together three more battalions, which, with
the addition of drafts, made up a total of some twenty-
four hundred men sent from England to Portugal in
February.1 This reinforcement was in great part of
inferior quality ; but though, owing to the demands
of Cadiz already mentioned, Liverpool could furnish
nothing better, he by no means thought that he had
fulfilled his duty when he had despatched it. On the
24th of April he reviewed the whole situation in a
letter to Wellington, with a breadth of vision and a
Liverpool promised two more battalions, 2000 strong, in a few
weeks ; and the 13th L.D., 750 strong.
At the same time the Office of Ordnance announced the em-
barkation of one troop of Horse Artillery to relieve Ross's ; and of
two additional companies of Field Artillery.
Wellington MSS. Liverpool to Wellington, 15th Dec. 1809
(omitted for some inscrutable reason from the extract printed in
Supp. Desp. vi. 441). Office of Ordnance to Wellington, 19th Dec.
1809 ; Liverpool to Wellington, 1st Jan. 1 8 10.
1 The battalions were 3/lst, l/9th, 2/38th. Peacocke's report
of them was to the following purport : —
1 /9th, a very fine battalion, but had better not undertake a long
march yet, as many of the men are only just out of hospital [after
Walcheren] ; 72 sick ; only 3 too young to march.
3/ 1st was intended for Gibraltar, and only at the last moment
diverted to Lisbon. " The period will be very remote when they
will be fit for active service." Many men under the influence
of langour from former disease [Walcheren] ; 200 men too old
or too young to march ; 90 returned sick, of whom 25 with
ophthalmia.
2/38th. " 599 effective rank and file ; 469 paraded for me ;
many very young men ; only 300-320 fit for active service."
Wellington MSS. Peacocke to Wellington, 2nd March, 6th
April 1 8 10.
440 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1 8 io. foresight such as I have encountered in no previous
British Minister for War. "Your latest returns,"
such was the purport of his letter, " added to your
latest reinforcements show a total of thirty-five thousand
rank and file in Portugal. Making allowance for
sick and casualties, let us call it thirty thousand
effective, which is the number that we agreed to
give you. Now, as to reinforcements, we can send
you at least two thousand five hundred drafts
and recruits, and have ordered to Portugal two
battalions from Sicily, two more from Malta, and two
more from Halifax, in all eight thousand men ; in
addition to which we are increasing the garrison of
Cadiz likewise to eight thousand men, including the
Portuguese regiment already there. The whole of
these are under your command, and you are at liberty
to add to, or draw from the troops at Cadiz, though we
hope that it will not be necessary to take away the
whole of them. The army at home is so sickly that I
see no hope of reinforcing Cadiz beyond a number of
four or five hundred men ; but it will be for you to
determine whether to increase or diminish the force
there, and we have every confidence in your discretion." 1
After this it can hardly be said that Ministers neg-
lected the army in Portugal. They were hampered by
the action of their predecessors, who had sent the first
battalions of the army to the Scheldt, from whence only
a wreck of them had returned, and who had poured the
1 The reinforcements were estimated as follows : —
From England, recruits and drafts . . 1500
From Malta, 1/3 1st, 750; 39th, 960 . . 1710
From Sicily, ijzut, 1000 ; Chasseurs Britan-
niques, 920 ..... 1920
From Halifax, i/7th, 940 ; 23rd, 1000 . 1940
■
!
807O
For Cadiz, R.A., 500 ; Foot Guards, 1200; 2/30th, 600;
2/44th, 610 ; i/79th, 1000; 2/Syth, 700; 2/88th, 680; 94th,
700 ; 5 cos. 95th, 500; 1 Portuguese regiment, 12 10. Total, 8000.
Wellington MSS. Liverpool to Wellington, 24th April 1 8 10.
$ ■
ch. xxxvt HISTORY OF THE ARMY 441
second battalions into the Peninsula. This had been in 1810.
accordance with Pitt's favoured policy of great spas-
modic efforts, and had been followed by the inevitable
result of temporary paralysis in the army. The
careful organisation of the Horse Guards, which
provided for the feeding of first battalions in the field
by second battalions at home, had been upset ; and it
was difficult to see how it could be speedily re-established.
Only by recalling the fact that the last of the troops
were not withdrawn from Walcheren until December,
and that in February eleven thousand of those who had
taken part in the expedition were still on the sick list,
can we realise the extraordinary and courageous efforts
of the Government to maintain the army in the Peninsula.
Nevertheless, their good intentions towards Wellington
were unexpectedly baulked. Stuart, as we have seen,
for long declined to part with his four battalions
from the Mediterranean, the command to send them to
Portugal being conditional only. Wellington evidently
held that these orders should have been unconditional ; l
his opinion is supported by that of Nelson in a parallel
case ; and in the abstract the proposition may be
granted. But in the concrete instance that is before us,
the withdrawal of four battalions from Sicily could not
have been safely accomplished without the total evacua-
tion of the island, or, in other words, without breach of
1 "In my opinion ... it has been left to Sir J. Stuart's dis-
cretion whether to send the reinforcements or not. . . . When
responsibility for the safety of the territory under their charge is thus
placed upon the officers commanding in them, it cannot be expected
that they would detach their troops ; more particularly as, at the
very moment, the enemy may threaten an attack upon the very
point from which the troops are to be drawn." Wellington to
Graham, 10th Aug. 1810. Cf. Nelson to Addington, 28th June
1803, when General Villettes had received discretionary orders to
give him two thousand men from the weak garrison of Malta for
service in Sicily. " My dear Sir, these sort of orders should never
be discretionary. You make an officer responsible for the safety of
a place, and tell him in the same breath to send away so many men
if he can safely do so. An officer cannot but secure himself from
such great responsibility."
442 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. treaties and complete recasting of British policy in the
Mediterranean. Such a step might quite possibly have
been advantageous, but it was not one to be hastily
taken ; and Ministers can hardly be blamed if in the
first feverish and uncertain weeks of their accession to
office they did not consider it. However, the upshot
of the whole matter was that Wellington at the most
critical period of the war was weaker by four battalions
than the Government intended him to be, though the
total number of British troops under his command, in
Spain and in Portugal, exceeded forty thousand men.
Lastly, we come to Wellington's instructions
from the Government. The General had fairly told
Ministers that the coming campaign must necessarily
be defensive ; that if successful he could expect no
credit, and that if he failed he should lose all reputa-
tion ; but that none the less they would betray the
honour and interests of their country if they did not
pursue the contest in the Peninsula, since, in his
opinion, Portugal could be defended. Ministers took
him at his word, and provided him with troops, as
we have seen ; but they were naturally extremely anxious
for positive assurances that the British army could
in any event be safely embarked. These assurances
Wellington did not hesitate to give repeatedly ; but he
was too prudent to reveal to Liverpool the whole of
his plans ; and the Minister accordingly was inclined to
ply him with questions as to the advantages of different
points of embarkation, the possibility of saving the
Portuguese army without embarking it, and even as to
the expediency of preferring Cadiz and Andalusia as a
base and theatre of operations to Lisbon and Portugal.
Wellington answered him with patience. As to the
advantages of Lisbon over Cadiz, he was firm and
immovable ; as to the point of embarkation he declared
that he had already secured it by fortifying the heights
of Sao Juliao ; as to the Portuguese army he could only
say that he would do his best to carry it away with him,
but that, until the time came, he could not answer for
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 443
embarking a single man. But he on his side pro- 1810.
pounded questions for the Government to answer.
The destruction of Areizaga's army had ruined all
hopes of help from Spain. The Portuguese troops had
greatly improved, but it was impossible to calculate
with any exactitude upon the degree of assistance to be
expected from them. Was it the Government's wish
that he should defend Portugal to the last ; or that,
upon the cessation of organised resistance in Spain, he
should look. seriously to the evacuation of the country
and to the embarkation of as many of the Portuguese,
military and civil, as he could ? He pleaded with
justice that the best way in which his question could be
answered would be for the Government to explain its
intentions in continuing the contest, and to leave the
time of evacuation to the General on the spot.
Liverpool replied in a public despatch, which
Wellington admitted to be clear and distinct ; but he
supplemented this by a private letter,1 in which he
threw doubt, though with many apologies, upon the
correctness of Wellington's preference for Sao Juliao as
the place of embarkation, and put forward Peniche as
an alternative. " I should apprise you," he wrote,
" that a very considerable degree of alarm exists in this
country respecting the safety of the British army in
Portugal. ... I have no difficulty in stating that you
would rather be excused for bringing the army away a
little too soon than by remaining in Portugal a little
too long. ... I do not mean by this observation that
you would be justified in evacuating Portugal before
the country was attacked in force by the enemy ;
but, whenever this event shall occur, the chances of
successful defence are considered here by all persons,
military as well as civil, so improbable that I could not
recommend any attempt at what may be called desperate
resistance."
It is difficult to identify exactly the misguided
person who prompted Liverpool to write these uti-
1 Liverpool to Wellington. 13th March 1810.
444 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. fortunate words. I strongly suspect from the close
collocation of his name that it was that interfering busy-
body, Charles Stewart, who even in August, 1809, had
advised Castlereagh that it would be his wisest plan to
embark the greater part of the Peninsular army for
employment elsewhere. " If you cannot send a much
greater force than Wellesley talked of defending
Portugal with," so this great General had written, " I
am certain you will not effect it." l From a scornful
reference to " persons who have never seen either
Peniche or Sao Juliao," Wellington's suspicions, as I
certainly think, had fastened upon this same individual.
However, he kept his temper, and having, apparently
from politeness, ascribed Liverpool's misgivings to Sir
John Moore's opinions, he delivered his counterblast.
" From your public letter," he wrote in effect, " I
understand that, if there exists a military necessity for
it, I am to evacuate the country ; if not, I am not to
evacuate the country ; which means that I am not to
be frightened away by a force which I do not consider
superior to my own. This means again, that I may
have to bring matters not to desperation, but to ex-
tremities. But in this case Sao Juliao must be the
right place for embarkation, for I cannot embark at
Peniche without uncovering Lisbon ; and since posses-
sion of Lisbon is the main object, it is useless to
empower me to proceed to extremities unless I embark
at Sao Juliao." From this severe reasoning he drew
the logical conclusion, not for Liverpool's benefit, but
for his own and for that of some of his correspondents,
that the Minister's public and private instructions were
self-contradictory. However, he continued his letter
to Liverpool respecting the port of embarkation with a
jest. " When we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go
like gentlemen out of the hall-door, particularly after
the preparations which 1 had made to enable us to do
so, and not out of the back door or by the area."
1 Londonderry MSS. Charles Stewart to Castlereagh, 18th Aug.
1809.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 445
Finally he concluded with a manly and dignified appeal, J 8 10.
" I am perfectly aware of the risks that I run personally,
whatever may be the result of the operations in the
Peninsula. All I beg is that, if I am to be held
responsible, I may be left to the exercise of my own
judgment ; and I ask for the fair confidence of Govern-
ment upon the measures which I am to adopt." x
In all this there was nothing very new or extra-
ordinary. It is common enough, as Wellington must
have known, for Cabinet Ministers to be plied with
unofficial comment upon technical matters which, if
urged by men of reputation for knowledge, they may
be unable, from their own unfamiliarity with the
subject, to reject at once as useless. In such cases they
not unfrequently convey this counsel privately to a
General in the field, with the idea, not of guiding or
embarrassing him, but of apprising him of the kind of
criticism that is passed upon his operations at home ;
of acquitting their conscience towards their country in
case the criticism should by chance be sound ; or, if not,
of obtaining from him information that will rebut it.
Such certainly was Liverpool's intention, nor had he the
slightest wish to trouble Wellington with interference,
or to fail towards him in loyalty. Wellington,
however, unfortunately, took a different view. The
truth is that he did not feel sure of his position, and
chafed over the foolish and carping comment of the
press and of the Opposition in Parliament. Even
when still flushed bv his successes on the Douro
his tone was sometimes in private despondent. " In
the present state of the public mind," he wrote to
Villiers in June 1809, "I believe that it will be very
difficult to satisfy the people with anything ; and the
Government are so weak that they are afraid to take
the lead and to guide public opinion upon any subject." 2
1 Wellington to Liverpool, 31st Jan. (2 letters), 9th Feb., 1st
March, 2nd April; Liverpool to Wellington, 27th Feb., 13th
March; 18 10.
2 Wellington to Villiers, 21st June 1809. This passage, which
is suppressed in the printed despatches, continues thus : — "I am
446 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. At that time the Government included Canning and
Castlereagh ; now the Cabinet, of whose weakness he
complained, had given place to the apparently still feebler
administration of Perceval and Liverpool. Since then
the Common Council of London had, to use his own
words, made a dash at him ; and he had concluded that,
whether he succeeded or failed, he could expect no
mercy from that body. Against such attacks the
Government alone could protect him ; and he had so
little confidence in its strength and its stability that he
was always girding at it. " I am convinced that the
Government cannot last," he wrote to Liverpool in
March 1810; and he went on to hint that Ministers
would do well to invoke the aid of Lord Grenville.
" The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get
them and myself into a scrape," he wrote to Admiral
Berkeley a month later ; " but what can be expected
from men who are beaten in the House of Commons
three times a week ? " Even after Perceval had fought
his way through the session of 1 8 1 o, Wellington com-
plained to his brother Wellesley Pole that it was not
fair for a Government to make a man Commander-in-
Chief, unless they were certain of a majority in
Parliament to support him in case of accidents ; and he
added that he had pressed for the strengthening of
the administration much against the inclination of
Ministers.1
If this had been all, there would be little worth
noticing in such remarks. It is nothing very extra-
ordinary that a General over a thousand miles from
home should go astray in his political predictions,
though it was rather ridiculous of him to have supposed
that a weak Government needed his advice to strengthen
itself. Perceval and Liverpool, as shall be seen, did
very indifferent what the opinion is of our operations. I shall do
the best I can with the force given me ; and if the people of
England are not satisfied, they must send somebody else who will
do better."
1 Wellington to Liverpool, 1st March ; to Admiral Berkeley,
7th April 1 8 io; to Wellesley Pole, iith January 1811.
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 447
their utmost, though in vain, to persuade the leading 18 10.
men of all parties to join them ; but it was not their
business to apprise Wellington of these negotiations,
any more than it was Wellington's to give them
prematurely a plan of the lines of Torres Vedras.
But Wellington chose to draw the conclusion that,
because the Government was weak, it was therefore
disloyal to him. When the supply of specie or the
numbers of his reinforcements did not come up to his
expectation, he assumed instantly that Ministers might
have sent him more of both, but were deliberately
withholding them. When Liverpool gave him exactly
the instructions that he wanted in public despatches,
but askeH in private to have the misgivings, instilled
by others, set at rest, Wellington jumped to the opinion
that the Minister was taking underhand steps to set
himself right with the public in any event ; so that, in
case of success, he could point to his public instructions,
or, in case of failure, to his private letters. Reasoning
from all these superficial and uncertain signs, Wellington
deduced that Ministers were not sturdily at his back,
nor heartily wedded to the policy of carrying on the
war in the Peninsula — in fact, that they would stick to
him only so long as he was successful, and throw him
and his policy over at the first mishap. Nor was it
possible for a long time to purge these ideas from his
head. In vain Perceval, Liverpool, and Wellesley Pole
assured him, and indeed by their actions proved to him,
that even though their supporters hung back, they
themselves were strenuously upholding him, and would
uphold him ; the General, being tenacious of his opinions,
remained for long unsatisfied. Throughout 18 10
nothing that Liverpool did was right ; and even in
January 1 8 1 1 Wellington wrote to Pole that the War
Minister had been dabbling in a game separate from
that to be played in Portugal ever since he came into
office, and had never acted with himself on any broad
or liberal system of confidence.
Now nothing can be more certain than that, if
448 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Liverpool believed in any military principle, it
was that of employing the British army, so far as
possible, as a single compact body and not in small
powerless detachments. He was furious, until due
explanation was made to him, with Sir John Stuart for
refusing to part with his battalions from Sicily ; and
he condemned, as we have seen, Stuart's raids upon
the Ionian Islands. Castlereagh had not been able
wholly to free himself from the traditions of Pitt,
but Liverpool cast them away altogether. Ministers
were undoubtedly weak at the outset in the country,
and anxious as to the fate of the British army in the
Peninsula. It would have been strange if they had
not been so, for they had accepted their military policy
from a General who was none of their choosing ; whose
family, from the wealth of good posts allotted to it,
was regarded very jealously ; and whose last campaign
could not be reckoned at best as more than a negative
success.1 It must be remarked also that these Ministers
were patriotic men, who dreaded misfortune to them-
selves less than misfortune to their country from their
fall from office. Yet, upon a few hasty and mistaken
letters of Wellington, malignant political partisans,
such as Napier, have founded and published the libel,
too often repeated, that the Government wilfully
starved and crippled Wellington and his army, and
never in their hearts supported him. This is utterly
1 The ubiquity of the Wellesleys at this time is hardly realised.
Lord Wellesley was first ambassador in Spain, and then Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs ; William Wellesley Pole was Chief
Secretary for Ireland ; Henry Wellesley, Minister to the Spanish
Government at Cadiz ; and Arthur Wellesley was Commander-in-
Chief in the Peninsula. And as though three Wellesleys were not
enough in Spain at one time, Richard Wellesley, the natural son of
Lord Wellesley, and an extremely amiable and accomplished man,
for some time made a fourth at Cadiz. As to the campaign of 1809,
the sentiments of the Opposition may be judged from an article on
the " Conduct of the War," in the Edinburgh Review of Oct. 1809.
Among some just criticism of the campaign of Talavera, the
campaign of the Douro is summed up as a "preliminary weakening
of the army by detachments and skirmishes in Portugal."
ch. xxxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 449
false; and if the steadfastness and courage of 18 10.
Wellington in undertaking a task apparently so des-
perate as the defence of Portugal be commended, not
less praise must be found for the men who, in the face
of three military failures, on the Scheldt, on the Tagus,
and in the Bay of Naples, had boldly taken up the
reins of government and speeded him to the accomplish-
ment of his task.
Lastly, let it not be thought that the preceding
paragraphs have been written from any desire to be-
little the greatness of Wellington. It is certain that
he mistrusted the Government in 18 10 and 181 1,
although it did not merit his mistrust ; and that fact,
having left its mark upon his operations, is one that
must be borne in mind. But he could show some
ground for his opinions, perhaps more in the shape
of letters from private persons than now appears in
his correspondence ; and he was not without experience
of British politicians. Nor is it easy to conceive of
anything that could disquiet him more than a haunting
dread lest his employers might be untrue to him. He
was responsible for the military policy of the Govern-
ment, but he too was in the highest degree a patriot ;
and he clung to it, not for the sake of his own
military reputation, but chiefly because, being a man
of genius, he had divined that it was the policy that
would save Europe. Small blame to him if at times of
embarrassment and stress — and the early years of the
Peninsular War were one long, arduous, continued
strain — his heart misgave him lest the Government
from sheer weakness should abandon the great enter-
prise, or yield place to an Opposition which would
renounce it with ostentation. Then there would follow
something worse than a defeat. Wellington had com-
mitted himself deeply to many parties in Portugal and
to some even in Spain ; he had promised to save them
if they would bestir themselves, and had forced them
by sheer energy and strength of will to make large
sacrifices. These allies, if his worst expectations were
VOL. VII 2 G
450 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. verified, he would have to desert with shame and dis-
honour, making way for the insolent oppression of the
most rapacious of French Marshals ; he would have to
march his army to the sea amid such a scene of disgrace
as that which in Flanders resulted from the advent of
the Tories to office in 1 7 1 3 ; and, worst of all, the cause
of Europe would be lost. Happily no such evil results
were to come about, thanks to the loyalty and persever-
ance not of Wellington only, but of the Ministers who
employed him. And if any one feels disposed to cen-
sure either him or them, because both occasionally
sought with almost feverish eagerness for grounds of
confidence in each other, then let the critic reflect not
upon the men but upon the nature of British Parlia-
mentary government ; and let him ponder over the
undoubted fact that such a Government is the worst
that can possibly be devised for the conduct of war,
because the governing people holds that some one must
always be blamed for defeat, whereas no General, not
even a Napoleon, can promise in a pitched battle the
certainty of victory.
CHAPTER XXXVII
I come now to the actual doings and movements of 1810.
the British army in Portugal during the year 18 10.
Wellington, it will be remembered, after more than
a week's stay at Coimbra, fixed his headquarters at
Vizeu on the 12th of January to make his dispositions
for the defence of Portugal. First, therefore, let us
consider the possible lines for invasion of the country.
A glance at the map would seem to indicate them
instantly in the course of the two great rivers, the
Douro and the Tagus, which, rising on the east of
Spain, flow steadily westward through Portugal to the
sea. But, as has been well observed, the rivers of the
Iberian Peninsula are not lines of communication but
barriers, so deeply are they sunk through long sections
of their course in tremendous rocky gorges ; and yet
they are untrustworthy barriers, owing to the rapidity
with which they change from impassable floods to a
mere alternation of deep pools and shallows, such as
are fordable even by armies. In fact, they are mostly
typical mountain streams of the kind that make the
angler long to throw a fly into them, but not such as to
gladden the heart of general, engineer, or statesman.
It need hardly be added that, this being their character,
they are navigable even by small boats only for com-
paratively short distances from their entry into the sea.
For this reason the roads in Portugal for the most
part avoid the rivers rather than the contrary ; and it
is now necessary to look a little closer to their direction.
Since Galicia had been evacuated by the French, an
451
452 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. invasion of Portugal from the north, as for instance
by the line that Soult had taken in 1809, was im-
practicable to them ; and we may therefore confine
ourselves to the eastern frontier, from the line of the
Douro on the north to the sea on the south. But
this distance may be at once abridged for all prac-
tical purposes to the space between the Douro and
the Guadiana ; for, though it was perfectly feasible
for the French to traverse the marches south of the
Tagus, it was impossible for them, in face of a superior
naval force, to cross from two to six miles of tidal
water in order to reach Lisbon. Even after the width
of the estuary contracts, the river is rendered impass-
able and indeed unapproachable for six or eight miles
owing to swamps, until at Salvaterra de Magos it
becomes simply a broad stream, presenting no greater
difficulties than its breadth and extreme inconstancy in
the variations between high and low water. There
was, however, no bridge lower than Abrantes, so that
the passage would need to be accomplished in boats
or rafts, which would be no easy task in the face of
an enemy ; while, even if the invading army were to
be safely transferred to the northern bank, it would
find itself still with thirty miles of difficult and highly
defensible country between it and Lisbon. Moreover,
an advance of the French from the Guadiana was to
some extent checked by the fortresses of Badajoz on
the Spanish and of Elvas on the Portuguese side.
Still, these might be masked ; and, if the Allied army
were fully occupied with other French forces in the
north, the movement, though subsidiary, would yet
be disquieting, since it would threaten, and, if successful,
would turn the right flank and rear of the Allied line.
Wellington from the first assumed that the French
would attack in two distinct lines, to north and south
of the Tagus ; * and it will be seen that he laid his
plans accordingly.
1 Wellington to Col. Fletcher, 20th Oct. ; to Admiral Berkeley,
26th Oct. 1809.
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 453
Such being the difficulties of reaching Lisbon 18 10.
through the province of Alemtejo, it was obvious that
the main stream of the invasion must enter Portugal
through the province of Beira at some point on the
hundred miles of frontier between the Douro and the
Tagus. But this space in its turn is bisected by a
prolongation of the central mountain range, which
runs from east to west across the Iberian Peninsula.
It is here called the Serra da Estrella, and, though of
no extraordinary • height, is so steep and rugged and
so much seamed by ravines as to be for military purposes
an unsurmountable obstacle. This great block of hills
produces another effect which is worthy of notice, in that
it compels all the waters to north-east and south-east
of it to flow northward or southward to the Douro or
Tagus, instead of turning their course westward as
the shortest way to the sea ; hence the series of
rivers which run parallel to the frontier, the Agueda,
the Coa, and their tributaries on the north, the Ponsul,
the Ocreza, and the Zezere on the south of the Serra ;
whereas the Mondego drains a comparatively small
area in its course from east to west. An invading
army, unless it be of enormous strength, must there-
fore choose between advance to north or to south
of the Serra da Estrella, communication between two
columns on either side of it being impossible. To the
south it may take in the reverse direction the road
used by Wellington for his movement upon Talavera,
by Zarza la Mayor and Castello Branco ; but this,
though practicable for an army proceeding eastward,
based on Lisbon and possessing magazines at Abrantes,
was far less promising for troops, and especially for
French troops, entering from Spain. Apart from the
fact that water was frequently not to be found near the
road for considerable distances, the way itself was so
steep as to be untraversable by artillery without extreme
exertion ; while the country was so inhospitable and
so thinly populated as to be practically destitute of
supplies. Junot had taken the route, though by a
454 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. worse road, to the south of the Serra da Estrella in
the winter of 1807 ; but his experience was not such
as to encourage a repetition of the experiment.
It was, therefore, almost certain that the main
French advance must be made between the Douro and
the Serra, along the line made familiar by former
contests between Portugal and Spain, by Ciudad Rodrigo
upon Almeida. This latter fortress was in itself
nothing very formidable, and was, moreover, wrongly
placed, being on the edge of the great plain of Leon
instead of on the west side of the Coa at the entrance
to the mountainous country. From it four roads led
by devious routes towards Lisbon. The first, to north
of the Mondego, wound by Pinhel, Trancoso, and Vizeu
to Coimbra ; the second, parallel to it but to south
of the same river, ran equally to Coimbra ; the third
struck more directly southward by Celorico, Belmonte,
and Castello Branco upon Abrantes ; and the fourth,
called the Estrada Nova, cut off the angle between
Fundao and Castello Branco, debouching upon the third
road above mentioned at Corticada, close to Sobreira
Formosa. One and all of these roads traversed ex-
tremely difficult country ; but the fourth passed through
what was to all intent a wilderness, and Wellington
gave orders for it to be destroyed — though, feeling
somewhat doubtful whether the work had been effectu-
ally done, he could not altogether neglect it.1 There
were, of course, countless other paths and tracks by
which infantry and cavalry could pass ; but no roads
except those above mentioned were possible for
artillery. No one who has not seen the country
can conceive how rough, steep, and mountainous these
Portuguese Highlands are. The highways are now
greatly improved, but still not very numerous ; and, to
1 The order for its destruction was given in January 18 10
(Wellington to Beresford, 23rd Jan. 1 8 10), but on the 2nd of July-
he wrote to Hill, "The Estrada Nova has been destroyed, but I
understand not very effectually "; and he proceeds to give orders
for the road to be watched. But by February 181 1, as Mr. Oman
points out (iii. 161 ».), it was practically impassable.
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 455
judge by the old tracks that passed for roads a century 18 10.
ago, a campaign in Eastern Beira must have been
nearly as difficult, climate apart, as a campaign in the
West Indies.1
Such being the nature of the country, it remains
to describe Wellington's dispositions for repelling an
invasion. The length of frontier which he was
required to guard measured, roughly speaking, two
hundred miles from the fortress of Almeida on the
north to that of Setubal on the south. Between these
two lay the regular fortresses of Elvas and Abrantes ;
the former having further an outlying post in Campo
Mayor, a small and obsolete stronghold from twelve
to fifteen miles north-eastward of it. Almeida, Elvas,
and Abrantes were early taken in hand by British
engineers, repaired, and, in the case of Abrantes,
almost reconstructed. Almeida was garrisoned by one
regiment of Portuguese regulars and three of militia,
in all five thousand men, under the English General
William Cox. Elvas was entrusted to the Portuguese
General Leite, a vigilant and capable officer, with two
regiments of Portuguese regulars and five of militia,
making a total of eight thousand men. Campo Mayor
was held by a single Portuguese battalion of militia.
Abrantes, being small, was garrisoned by two militia
regiments only, under the Portuguese Colonel Lobo ;
but the importance of the place must not be estimated
by the strength of its guard. Not only did it command
the one permanent bridge of boats over the Tagus and
thus form the connecting link between Alemtejo and
Beira, but it marked approximately the point at which
the river, turning definitely from a westerly to a
southerly course, begins to narrow the peninsula of
Lisbon (if I may so term it) from a width of sixty
miles to its final point of fifteen miles. Hence it lay
1 I should judge that a march from Exeter to the Land's End
over Dartmoor and the Cornish moors, as they were four generations
ago, would have been easier than a march from Ciudad Rodrigo to
Coimbra.
456 HISTORY OF THE ARMY boorxiii
1810. upon the flank of all roads leading to the capital,
whether from the north or from the west. Wellington's
orders to Lobo were to resist to the very end, and to
burn the bridge of boats to the last plank before sur-
rendering. There remained yet another fortress on
the west, Peniche, which, lying at the extremity of an
isthmus which is covered at high water, could be
rendered impregnable. Many considered it, and would
have had the British Government consider it, the best
port of embarkation for the British army in case of defeat;
but Wellington valued it only as a post that might
be held by the British after all else had been abandoned,
for purposes of raids or of a second landing. It stood,
therefore, alone, and formed no part of the scheme of
defence.
It remains to mention the new works constructed by
Wellington. First and foremost come the lines of
Torres Vedras, of which detailed mention must be
deferred to a later period. But apart from them he
threw up a line of redoubts on the Alva at its junction
with the Mondego about Ponte da Murcella, to block
the road which runs from Celorico to Coimbra on the
north side of that river ; every consideration leading
him to suppose that this would be the route taken by
Massena. He also made an entrenched camp on the
Zezere near its junction with the Tagus, extending it
from Tancos on the south-west to Martinhel on the
north-east, so as to bar the way to any force which,
masking the fortress, might invade by way of Castello
Branco. As shall in due time be seen, it chanced that
no enemy ever came near either of these positions,
because Massena, contrary to all reasonable expectation,
chose the worst road in Portugal for his advance ; and
Wellington has therefore received no credit for his
efforts to arrest invasion at points considerably more
remote from Lisbon than Torres Vedras.
So much for what may be called stationary
defences ; the troops from south to north were
disposed as follows. In the extreme south the strong
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 457
places of Algarve, besides Setubal in Alemtejo, were 18 10.
held by Portuguese troops. Farther north, at the
southern edge of the possible theatre of operations,
the roads from the Guadiana were guarded by the
Portuguese garrisons in Elvas and Campo Mayor,
supported by the British Second Division under
General Hill, and by the bulk of the Portuguese regulars
under Beresford at Abrantes and Thomar. How-
ever unlikely an irruption from this side might be,
Wellington was bound to take full precautions against
it, and therefore to divide his British troops between
Hill and himself. From the Tagus to the Serra da
Estrella, an unlikely point of entrance, the line was
taken up by ten regiments of Portuguese militia and
one of cavalry under the Portuguese Colonel Lecor,
with the English Colonel John Wilson for his second.
Next, at the extreme easterly point of the Serra, in the
commanding position of Guarda, lay the Fourth British
Division under General Cole ; and next to north of
Cole, the Light Brigade under Craufurd with head-
quarters at Pinhel. In support of these the Third
Division was stationed at Celorico, with the First
Division in reserve about Vizeu ; and the Cavalry
Division, excepting one regiment attached to the
infantry, was cantoned for convenience of forage in
the valley of the Tagus. Beyond the Douro General
Bacellar, having under his orders the British Colonels
Trant and Miller, and nominally also his compatriot
Silveira, guarded the extreme northern flank of the
army with twenty-one regiments of militia.
Thus, in the event of an invasion from the north,
the British troops could rapidly and without difficulty
be concentrated in the valley of the Mondego, to fall
back upon Hill and Beresford at their leisure. In the
event of an invasion from the Guadiana, Hill and
Beresford could defend the passage of the Tagus until
reinforced from the north. Lastly, if the enemy
should choose the road of Castello Branco, Hill and
Beresford could advance to the strong position of
458 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1S10. Sobreira Formosa to back the retreating Lecor ; the
means of turning that position having been abolished
by the destruction of the Estrada Nova. Furthermore,
in order to better his means of movement north and
south, Wellington improved and widened the road
northward from Thomar to Espinhal, which, as he said,
was one of the most important for his line of com-
munications, and — a rare thing in Portugal — had not a
hill on it.1 He had established a flying bridge at Villa
Velha whereby Hill and Beresford, first crossing to the
south bank of the Tagus at Abrantes, and taking the
road parallel to the river as far as Niza, could turn
north, recross the river, and reach either Castello
Branco or Sobreira Formosa by an improved and
much less arduous route.
Altogether, so long as the enemy confined
themselves to one line of invasion only, the British
Commander could hope to check them at some
distance from the capital ; but if they should advance
in great force from north and east simultaneously, the
situation could not fail to be critical. This latter was
the movement which Wellington especially dreaded ;
but the French siege of Cadiz had lessened its
probability ; and the General therefore was urgent
for leaving Victor undisturbed before that city, so as
to encourage him to remain there. Meanwhile he
could only mature betimes his plans for destroying all
bridges and removing all means of transport and
subsistence from before the enemy, in case the British
should be driven within their final refuge in the lines
round Lisbon.2 For the rest it was his strength to
be cool, patient, and vigilant.
In some quarters watchfulness was made easy by
the fortresses on the roads ; while to the south of the
Sierra de Gata the security of the British and
Portuguese was further assured by the spreading of
1 Wellington to Beresford, 19th Feb. 18 10.
2 This he did as early as in February 18 10. Wellington to
Generals Leite and Bacellar, 28th Feb., 1st March 1810.
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 459
Romana's army in a long line from the pass of Perales 18 10.
southward to Zafra. But in the north about Almeida
and Ciudad Rodrigo, where the passage of the main
French force must certainly be looked for, Wellington
depended principally, and rightly, upon Robert Craufurd.
This officer was now forty-six years of age, and soured
by disappointed ambition. An ardent soldier, who had
studied his profession in Prussia at the time when that
country was held to be the centre of all military
knowledge, he had forsaken the army for three years
in the hope of making a fortune in India, and had
never recovered the ground lost in the interval.
Windham, by flagrant jobbing, had, as we have seen,
endeavoured to give him an independent command in
South America ; and Craufurd, upon finding that
independence threatened, had at once asked leave to
come home, though he had in the end proceeded to Rio
de la Plata, and had been compelled to surrender his
brigade at the storm of Buenos Ayres. In Moore's
campaign he had missed the battle of Coruna ; in the
late campaign of 1 809 he had missed, some said through
his own fault, the battle of Talavera. In the mean-
while the Duke of York, his kindly patron, had left
the Horse Guards, and the Duke's successor was by
no means so well disposed towards him. And now he
was once again on active service, a mere colonel with
local rank as brigadier, though senior in years to every
Lieutenant - general in the Peninsula, burning for
distinction, and craving for higher command.
He was certainly the best officer in the matter of
outpost-duty, and one of the best trainers of troops in the
army. He retained command of the Light Brigade,1
which had originally been taught by Moore, and he
now added to its efficiency by drawing up a code of
regulations which would enable him to reckon exactly
the time that would be required for the accomplish-
ment of any given march or other operation. Several
of these regulations seemed at first vexatious and trivial
1 Forty-third, Fifty-second, Ninety-fifth.
460 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. both to men and officers — as, for instance, the rule that
no man on the march was to step a foot out of his
way to avoid a pool of water or other such unpleasant
obstacle — but they soon perceived that their Brigadier
was working for one object only, that every movement
of his brigade should be so punctually performed as to
enable its duration to be calculated with certainty before-
hand. He enforced his code with merciless severity,
and the results which he obtained were extraordinary.
" Seven minutes sufficed for his division to get under
arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an
hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to
its alarm post, with the baggage loaded and assembled
at a convenient spot in the rear." Nevertheless he was
not one of those ideal teachers who can by sheer
ascendancy kindle men to surpass themselves. He
could take pride in his troops, and make them take
pride in themselves, but he was a driver rather than a
leader of men.1 Craufurd's great defect, as has already
been told, was a violent temper ; and hence, though he
had not a few sincere admirers, he was generally and
not undeservedly unpopular.
Apart from his temper, too, the man was jealous,
sensitive, and incurably self-important and egoistic. So
far as I have been able to follow his career, he seems
to have been always anxious to thrust himself to the
front, whether by letters to Generals and Ministers,2 by
interminable speeches in the House of Commons, or, as
shall in due time be seen, by rash engagement of the
enemy. At such times he would forget every one except
Robert Craufurd ; and this tendency, coupled with a dis-
position to overvalue his own talents, made him a most
disobedient and insubordinate officer. The failing was
the more dangerous inasmuch as he did not, as a rule,
1 For this reason I should be disposed to rank him below the
great trainers of troops of our own time, Hawley of the Sixtieth,
and his pupil Redvers Buller.
2 He sent long memoranda to Lord Grenville about the re-
organisation of the army, and to Wellington about points of
departmental organisation.
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 461
shine in action. This was probably due to his excitable 18 10.
temperament, for so accomplished a master of outpost-
duties must certainly have possessed no common eye for
ground. Wellington, who may have known him ever
since the campaign of Seringapatam in 1799, appreciated
his good side most thoroughly, and did not fail to let
him know it. It would not be easy to find a more
flattering letter than that with which he placed the
command of the outposts in Craufurd's hands. Not less
conciliatory are the letters in which he promises to keep
his command distinct, adds three foreign regiments to it,
and apologises because, owing to the arrival of Generals
of high seniority, he can throw no more British troops
into his division.1 In fact, it was only with considerable
difficulty that Wellington kept him in command of a
division at all, owing to the number of officers senior
to Craufurd in the Army. But, on the other hand,
Wellington was careful rarely to trust him alone before
an enemy in force, nor, as I have said, would ever admit
him to intimacy ; and he was right, for, though Craufurd
felt both gratitude and respect towards his Commander,
his egoism was too intense to allow him to abate his
pretensions to unique ability and importance, while at
the same time he was strangely deficient in the matter
of tact.2 However, upon the north-east frontier of
1 Wellington to Craufurd, 18th Feb.; 5th, 8th, nth March;
9th, 15th, 20th April ; 9th Dec. 1 8 10.
2 In proof of my assertion I print a letter from Craufurd to
Wellington of 17th Dec. 18 10 {Wellington MSS.). Craufurd had
asked for leave to go home, in itself a tactless proceeding, for he
knew that Wellington was strongly opposed on principle to granting
leave to officers except on grounds of ill - health. Wellington
answered with singular moderation, hinting that if Craufurd did
go away on leave, it would be difficult for him to keep the com-
mand of the division. Craufurd's answer, slightly abridged, ran
as follows : —
"The objection to my availing myself of your indulgence was
not wholly unexpected, but I had got into the habit of allowing
my hopes to coincide with my wishes on the subject, and of flattering
myself that the objection might be overcome ; and if you honour
me with your confidence sufficiently to wish me to keep command
of the Light Division, I beg you to consider whether that may not
462 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Portugal in the winter of 1809-10 Craufurd was most
emphatically the right man in the right place.
Until February all was quiet on the frontier, and
Wellington remained untroubled except by a request
of the Spaniards that he should advance into Castile, in
order to relieve the pressure of Soult's army upon
Andalusia ; a movement which, though not without
the scope of his intentions, he thought it unprofitable
at the moment to execute. He instructed Craufurd,
however, not lightly to abandon the line of the Coa,
since it was possible that the army might take the
offensive ; 1 though the despatch of the detachment to
Cadiz under General Stewart soon banished any such
ideas. Presently, however, came the news that Mortier
Feb. 12. had summoned Badajoz on the 12th of February, and
Wellington at once ordered Hill to lead his division
be done without making me pay too dearly for it. No sacrifice that
I may have to make can diminish the gratitude which I shall ever
feel to you for your conduct to me since I had the good fortune
to join your army ; and, if the alternative is to resign my command
or to abandon the hopes which I have entertained and encouraged
others to entertain, of my being allowed to pass a few weeks of the
winter with my family, I must submit to the latter, for it would
be impossible for me not to return to the army ; and to serve in
command of a brigade next campaign after commanding a division
in this, is more than I could make up my mind to. But I should
certainly feel that I was paying dearly for this honour if, besides
incurring the ill will of many of my seniors, to say nothing of the
increased responsibility of my command, I should find myself
prevented for an indefinite time from seeing my family and looking
to private affairs which, if not urgent, are important enough to make
my presence desirable. It would not become me to suggest the
means of obviating the difficulty, but ... as, after all that you
have done, I cannot think that any Minister would feel the in-
clination, or that any home Commander-in-Chief would have the
power to interfere with your wishes, I should flatter myself that
some arrangement with respect to the rank of the officers who came
out with the reinforcements will enable you to satisfy the claims
of my seniors, without reducing me to the painful alternative which
I have at present to contemplate." In other words, everybodv was
to be inconvenienced in order that Robert Craufurd might see his
wife and children.
1 Wellington to Frere, 30th Jan., 9th Feb. ; to Sherbrooke,
31st Jan. ; to Craufurd, 4th Feb. 18 10.
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 463
forward to Portalegre. Immediately afterwards in- 18 10.
telligence arrived that on the same day Ney had sum-
moned Ciudad Rodrigo, and that Heudelet with the
Second Corps had moved to Plasencia. Wellington
at once decided that the French could not possibly
undertake two sieges simultaneously, but conjectured
rightly that Heudelet would probably cross the Tagus
and join Mortier. He therefore directed Hill to be
on his guard and to hold on to Portalegre for as long
as possible ; but refrained, in spite of Romana's
entreaties, from any concentration for the relief of
Badajoz, lest the French should concentrate likewise by
drawing troops from the south, and force him to retire.
So delicate was the tact with which Wellington en-
couraged the French to pursue their unseasonable
operations before Cadiz.1
In March Junot's corps moved, as we have seen, to
the siege of Astorga, while Ney's corps marched west-
ward into Leon, pushing Loison's division forward to
the Agueda. Ferey's brigade of this division lay at San
Felices, not more than four miles from the nearest
British station at Barba del Puerco ; and Ferey's ad-
vanced parties naturally soon came into contact with
Craufurd's. It was at this moment that Wellington
committed the whole of the British outposts to Craufurd's
care, directing Picton and Cole to support him, if need
were, without further orders from headquarters. Already
in February he had ordered Craufurd to be reinforced
by two battalions of Portuguese Cacadores, and had
honoured his command with the name of the Light
Division ; and he now sent him up the First Hussars
of the King's German Legion, an admirable regiment,
far better skilled than the British in the work of recon-
naissance, and specially well placed with Craufurd, who
spoke German fluently. With these and with the Light
Brigade to support them, Craufurd watched the line or
the Agueda from Escalhao on the north to Ciudad
1 Wellington to Beresford, 15th Feb. ; to Craufurd, 1 8th Feb. ;
to Hill, 1 2th, 20th, 27th Feb. 18 10.
464 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Rodrigo on the south, a distance of some thirty miles as
the crow flies. Craufurd was now in his element, and
gave striking evidence of his very remarkable ability.
Four companies of Rifles were posted at Villar de
Ciervos, as many more at Barba del Puerco, one com-
pany at Almogala, and one at Escalhao, the river being
always passable by the bridge at Barba del Puerco and
by fords at the three remaining places.1 But with these
exceptions the infantry was kept in the background, and
the work of observation in the front was committed
wholly to the German Hussars and to a few intelligent
officers. The Agueda was sounded daily, and careful
note was taken of the rise and fall of the water. A
special department was organised for receiving and com-
paring the reports of deserters, who came in frequently
from the German and Italian troops on the French side.
Lastly, a system of signal-stations was devised for the
instant transmission of intelligence of the enemy's move-
ments to all parts of the line ; and, from the perfection
of the discipline inculcated by Craufurd, he could
reckon exactly the time which any fraction of his
troops would take to reach any given point. "The
whole web of communication," as has been most happily
written, " quivered at the slightest touch." 2 Yet these
results were obtained with astonishing economy of
strength and of labour. The soldiers were never
harassed, whatever may have been the case with the
officers,3 and were subjected neither to strain nor to
fatigue. Not a man was employed more than was
absolutely necessary, and thus was attained the ideal
of good outpost-duty, vigilance maintained, energy
husbanded, and repose assured.
Once only the French ventured to test the merit of
1 Leach's Rough Sketches, p. 125. - Oman, iii. 238.
3 Kincaid reports a conversation between Beckwith and Arent-
schild, the colonel of the First Hussars. " Well, Colonel," said the
German in broken English, "how you do?" — "Oh, tolerably well,
thank you, considering that I am obliged to sleep with one eye
open." — " Bei Gott," said the other, "I never sleeps at all"
{Random Shots, p. 51).
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 465
Craufurd's dispositions; and their experience did not 18 10.
encourage them to repeat the trial. On the night of
the 19th of March six companies of voltigeurs, leaving March 19.
a reserve of fifteen hundred men upon the eastern bank
of the river, stole upon the bridge of Barba del Puerco,
bayoneted the sentries before they could fire, and began
rapidly to ascend the defile towards the village. The
alarm was at once given by the sergeant's picquet. The
outlying picquet came down instantly to meet the enemy,
and holding its fire till the French were within fifteen
yards, gave them a staggering volley. Then, seeking
shelter behind the rocks, this little body of riflemen,
though counting fewer than fifty soldiers, contrived by
sheer skill and courage to check the advance of the
French for half an hour, till Colonel Sidney Beckwith
came up at the head of two more companies, and drove
the French headlong down the defile and over the
bridge. The loss of the Rifles in this little affair did
not exceed twenty-three killed and wounded ; * that of
the French was at least twice as great.
Early in April, Craufurd having reported unfavour- April,
ably of the two battalions of Portuguese Cacadores,
Wellington promised him a third, Colonel Elder's, of
acknowledged excellence ; but the captious Robert was
by no means satisfied. He wished to take the offensive
for one thing, and he thought himself entitled to more
British troops for another ; and he was so importunate
upon this latter point that he actually talked of resigning
his command. With great patience and tact Wellington
soothed the feeling of his sensitive subordinate, at the
same time setting his foot firmly upon Craufurd's
ambitious projects. He had himself some idea, if a
favourable opportunity should occur, of a raid for the
destruction of the French magazines at Salamanca ; but
on the 26th intelligence came in that the French were April 26.
moving upon Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington was at first
1 These are the figures given by Simmons, who was present.
The number of casualties usually given is thirteen, which was the
loss of the advanced company only.
VOL. VII 2 H
466 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. a little puzzled by their march, for he had not heard of
the fall of Astorga upon the 22nd of April, and could
not understand this preparation for a second siege ; but,
April 27. none the less, on the 27th he advanced Spencer's division
and his own headquarters to Celorico, and directed Hill
to send Slade's cavalry brigade1 by way of Villa Velha and
Castello Branco to Guarda. In a few days the situation
became clearer. The news of the surrender of Astorga
April 30. arrived on the 30th, and together with it came a letter
from the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, stating that the
French arrived before that city did not exceed four
thousand, and appealing for help to drive them away.
Craufurd, always eager for action without regard for
ulterior consequences, advocated this course ; but Wel-
lington knew better. It would be perfectly easy to
push back a small hostile force from Ciudad Rodrigo ;
but, unless the material collected at Salamanca for the
siege could be destroyed, no advantage could possibly
follow ; and the French, now that Astorga had fallen,
were certainly far too strong to permit of the attempt.
The movements of the enemy were still doubtful, but
Wellington could make a shrewd guess at them and at
their consequences. " I do not think," he wrote to
Beresford, " that Junot will push into Galicia. If he
does, they are not equal to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo ;
if he does not, we are not equal to its relief."2
In truth the movement of the French upon Ciudad
Rodrigo was premature ; the force which actually closed
upon the city consisting of no more than two brigades
of Ney's corps, which sufficed to blockade it upon the
east side of the Agueda only, and therefore left its
communications with Portugal practically uninterrupted.
Junot's corps was not yet upon the spot, and the
material for a siege was still at Salamanca. In a few
days the two brigades drew a few miles to northward,
May 12. whence General Mermet on the 12th of May sent in a
1 First Royals, Fourteenth Light Dragoons.
2 Wellington to Craufurd, 9th, 15th, 20th, 27th April, 2nd
May ; to C. Stuart, 21st April ; to Beresford, 1st May, 1810.
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 467
fruitless summons to Ciudad Rodrigo. Continuous 18 10.
rain not only rendered the Agueda impassable, but
prevented the transport of heavy guns, and so kept all
operations at a standstill throughout the month of May.
Nevertheless, the situation was anxious. Reynier on
the 2 1 st of April had attacked and destroyed an
advanced party of Rom ana's army at La Roca, a few
miles to the north-east of Badajoz ; and, though the
offensive movement had at once been arrested by the
march of Hill's corps eastward over the Serra de San
Mamede, yet Romana was thoroughly frightened. The
arrival of a French detachment in Estremadura from
Andalusia — a force which had hardly arrived before
it was obliged to return — heightened his fears for
himself and for Badajoz. He wrote frantic appeals
to Wellington for the help of the Second Division, and
even succeeded in somewhat unnerving its commander.
Wellington reluctantly permitted Hill to move forward
a second time to extricate Romana, but he was careful to
caution his subordinate against too ready credence of
Spanish reports. " It is obvious," he wrote, " that there
is nothing the Spaniards wish for so much as to involve
our troops in their operations, which could lead to no
advantage, and might end in the loss of everything."
The Spanish generals might grumble — indeed they did
grumble freely — but Wellington was not to be induced
to act with them again.1
Before May was ended, however, the prospects for
the future became clearer. On the 16th a report
became current that Massena was expected at Valladolid
to take command of the army in that quarter ; and
two days later this was confirmed by a French officer, May 18.
who had deserted in consequence of a duel with one
of his superiors, and who gave the additional intelligence
that the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Corps, eighty thousand
1 Wellington to Liverpool, 9th, 23rd May; to H. Wellesley,
14th May; to Hill, 17th, 28th May. Romana and Hill to
Wellington, 29th April, Wellington MSS. Wellington to Hill,
17th, 28th May, 18 10.
468 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. men strong, were to be placed under the Marshal's
orders as the army of Portugal.1 This was of course true,
the decree to that effect having been signed by Napoleon
on the 1 7th of April ; but the Emperor's later orders
respecting the campaign were somewhat singular. His
first design was that Massena with the Sixth and Eighth
Corps, reckoned at fifty thousand men, should advance
and besiege Ciudad Rodrigo ; that Reynier, acting
under Massena's orders, should move to Abrantes and
manoeuvre on the north bank of the Tagus ; and that
the Fifth Corps should do likewise on the south side
of the river about Badajoz. But he supplemented this
May 1 8. two days later by a second instruction, wherein he
declared that the invasion of Portugal must be con-
ducted methodically and without haste, after preliminary
capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida ; and that, in
fact, the regular entry into the country must be deferred
till September, when the extreme heat was over and the
harvest gathered in. In these amended orders also he
omitted all reference to the Fifth Corps ; changed
Reynier's centre of operations from Abrantes to Alcan-
tara ; and assigned to another body of ten thousand men
under General Seras the duty of manoeuvring between
Astorga and Zamora, so as at once to maintain com-
munication with Bonnet in Asturias, contain the Spanish
army of Galicia, and threaten the frontier of Portugal
about Braganga. According to these dispositions the
force of Seras would form the right wing, the two corps
of Massena the centre, and Reynier's troops the left wing.
May 15. Massena himself arrived at Salamanca on the 15th
of May. He was now fifty-two years of age, still
incomparably the best general in the French Army,
Napoleon only excepted, although he was beginning to
fail. He had served fourteen years as private and non-
commissioned officer in the French Royal army, before
the outbreak of the Revolution, and since 1792 had
been almost continually on active service. His last
1 Lieut. Shaw (A.D.C. to Craufurd) to Wellington, 1 8th May
1810. Wellington MSS.
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 469
campaign had been that of Wagram, in the course of 18 10.
which he had been much shaken by a bad fall from his
horse ; and he had returned from the fatigue and hard-
ships of the war in great need of repose. But it was
one of Napoleon's defects that, needing no rest himself,
he could not understand that others might require it ;
nor did he realise that, unless men are indulged with
seasons of comfort and even luxury after toil and
privation, they will indemnify themselves by considerable
latitude of conduct in the field. When, therefore,
Massena, yielding very reluctantly to Napoleon's wish,
accepted command of the army of Portugal, he took
his mistress with him into the field. Underbred and
untrustworthy himself he was, as happens so frequently
in men who have risen from low to high estate,
intensely suspicious of the same failings in others. Ney
and he were old enemies ; Junot was furiously jealous
at being superseded in command of the army of
Portugal ; Reynier, with or without reason, he disliked ;
and his relations with these subordinates were not made
easier by the presence of the lady above mentioned at
headquarters. For the rest, Massena was in the matter
of money the most rapacious and dishonest of all the
French commanders, which is not to say a little ; indeed,
to put matters briefly, he was, albeit a great military
genius, neither more nor less than a blackguard. Yet
it is impossible not to pity a man of so well-deserved
reputation as a soldier, set down to such a task as was
assigned to him by Napoleon. " Gentlemen," he said
to his staff, when he met them at Salamanca, " I am here
against my own wish ; I begin to find myself too old
and too weary for active service." 1
Meanwhile, Wellington had completed the con-
centration begun on the 27th of April by ordering five
brigades of Portuguese infantry to Celorico ; and by
the second week of May he had assembled eighteen
thousand British troops and fourteen thousand Portu-
guese in the quadrilateral formed by Pinhel, Almeida
1 Authorities in Oman. iii. 208.
470 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
i 8 io. Guarda, and Celorico. In this bleak, barren, and desolate
country, all of it over twelve hundred feet, and Guarda
over three thousand feet above the sea, they waited
through day after day of continuous rain for the enemy
to make the first movement, every division having clear
orders as to its duty in case the enemy should pass the
Agueda in force. As a further precaution, Wellington
had given instructions for the repair and armament of
Fort Concepcion, a small Spanish work which faces
Almeida on the eastern bank of the Turones.1 At last
May 30. on the 30th Ney arrived before Ciudad Rodrigo with
his whole Corps and a reserve division of cavalry ;
while Junot, after leaving detachments at Zamora,
Toro, and the pass of Bafios, stationed one division of
infantry and another of dragoons at San Felices, with a
second division of infantry at Ledesma in support of
June 1. the Sixth Corps. On the 1st of June Ney threw a
bridge across the Agueda a mile and a half above
June 5. Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th a second bridge below
it. By this last he sent a division and a half of
infantry and a brigade of light cavalry over the river,
June 11. which thrust back Craufurd's outposts and by the nth
had cut off communications with the garrison.
Heavy rains still kept the waters so high in flood
that Wellington harboured some hope of destroying the
bridges by floating felled trees upon them, and possibly
of cutting off the French detachment upon the western
bank. He was not however disposed, as were many
of his subordinates, to make any stroke for the relief
of Ciudad Rodrigo until he knew the full resources of
the enemy and was assured that his efforts might be
successful ; and so he informed the Governor. He
reckoned the force before him at fifty thousand men,
which was very little above its real strength ; 2 whereas
he could collect only thirty-six thousand, of whom
1 Wellington's memos, of 27th and 28th May.
2 Ney's troops numbered about thirty thousand men, and
Junot's about seventeen thousand, of which about nine thousand
were within one day's, and the remainder within two days' march.
ch. xxxvir HISTORY OF THE ARMY 471
fifteen thousand were Portuguese and three thousand 18 10.
Spaniards of Romana's army under Don Martin Carrera,
which last lay high up towards the sources of the
Agueda. Moreover, to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo it was
necessary to quit the mountains and enter the plains,
where the numerical superiority of the French cavalry
would place them at great advantage. Lastly, time
was more valuable to both parties than was Ciudad
Rodrigo, though Wellington knew it, and Massena
did not. The slowness of the French in opening the
siege amazed the British Commander. " This is not
the way," he wrote, " in which they have conquered
Europe." *
At last on the 15 th of June the French broke
ground, and on the 25th opened fire from forty-eight June 25.
pieces. The Spaniards defended themselves gallantly
and effectively, blowing up one of the French magazines
and dismounting several of their guns ; but nevertheless
the balance of the fight was on the whole against them.
On the same day Wellington advanced his headquarters
to Alverca, still keeping a garrison in Fort Concepcion,
and maintaining Craufurd's outposts on the Azava in
almost dangerous proximity to the enemy with the hope
of finding some chance to relieve the beleaguered city ;
but he gave the Governor clearly to understand that
he would take no great risks for him. Nevertheless, the
audacity of the Light Division made Massena appre-
hensive of some attempt ; and on the 4th of July he July 4.
sent a division of dragoons and a brigade of infantry to
make a reconnaissance in force. An hour before daylight
they drove in the picquet of the Sixteenth Light
Dragoons, two squadrons of which had recently relieved
as many of the German Hussars ; but every dragoon
was brought safely into Gallegos, where the infantry of
the Light Division was already assembled. The whole
then fell back, covered by the guns of Ross's troop of
1 Wellington to Craufurd, 6th, 8th, loth June ; to Herrasti,
Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, 6th June ; to Hill, 9th June ; to
H. Wellesley, 11th, 20th June 1810.
472 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Horse Artillery,1 towards Fort Concepcion ; the German
Hussars checking the French by a timely charge at the
foot of the first ravine that lay on the road, and en-
abling the infantry and guns to form on the ridge above.
The French pressed on close enough to the infantry to
draw from them a volley, which arrested their further
progress ; and the Division then withdrew quietly
across the Dos Casas and Turones, leaving the cavalry
between the two rivers to cover a line from Fuentes de
Onoro to Aldea del Obispo. The whole affair was
admirably managed ; the British cavalry, though opposed
throughout by five times its numbers, losing only five
men and four horses killed and wounded, whereas the
French suffered heavily both from the charges and from
the fire of Ross's guns. Captain Krauchenberg of the
German Hussars was the guiding spirit, proving him-
self not for the first time to be an admirable officer ;
and he with his brave squadron received the special
thanks of Wellington for their good service.2
The thrusting back of the British advanced posts
practically sealed the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo, which,
after a most gallant defence, surrendered on the evening
July 10. of the 10th. Wellington, meanwhile, had on the
evening of the 4th reinforced Craufurd with the Four-
teenth Light Dragoons; and Craufurd, observing French
patrols and foraging parties among the villages to the
east of the Dos Casas, resolved to read them a lesson.
Accordingly, on the night of the 10th, while still
unaware of the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo, he led out one
squadron of German Hussars and five of British Light
Cavalry,3 seven companies of infantry, and two guns,
1 The Chestnut troop had joined the Light Division at the end
of June.
2 Tomkinson, pp. 28-29 5 Beamish, i. 274.-278.
3 Krauchenberg's of 1st Hussars, K.G.L ; 2 squadrons 1 6th
L.D., 3 squadrons 14th L.D., 2 cos. /52nd, 7 cos. /95th. Mr.
Oman states the infantry as the whole of the 43rd and 95th,
besides a battalion of Cacadores. All the accounts except two —
those of Leach and Simmons — vary as to the infantry that was
present on this occasion. I have followed these two.
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 473
with all possible silence and secrecy, across the Dos Casas 18 10.
towards Villa de Puerco, near which he left the infantry
and guns hidden in high standing corn, and concealed
the cavalry half a mile from them. At daylight a party
of thirty or forty horsemen was seen moving towards
Barquilla ; and Craufurd, fearful lest they should escape,
formed the cavalry into column of half-troops and led
them forward at the trot. In his eagerness to take the
shortest way he guided the squadrons into a narrow
stony defile, which of course broke up their formation ;
and as they emerged from it, Krauchenberg, who was
leading the column, perceived the glimmer of bayonets
upon some rising ground in the growing rye ahead.
He at once informed the General of the fact. " Charge
them," answered Craufurd, and hurried the squadron
on without giving the disordered men time to form line.
Krauchenberg accordingly advanced, whereupon the
bayonets suddenly disappeared, the French having
evidently received the order to lie down. They rose, how-
ever, when the hussars were within fifty yards, revealing a
square of from two to three hundred men, and fired a
volley which killed or wounded ten horses and eleven
men. Only half of the squadron had charged, however,
and Krauchenberg was about to attack with the other
half while the French were reloading, when Craufurd
ordered him to leave the infantry and fall on the
cavalry beyond them. The Germans therefore opened
out right and left and rode on. The Sixteenth, who
were following next to them, appear to have seen the
French cavalry but not the infantry, and, passing wide
of the square, they received, together with the Germans,
the surrender of thirty-five French dragoons. The
Fourteenth then came up, when Craufurd halted the
leading squadron, and, without waiting for the rest,
ordered it to charge the French square. The Colonel,
Talbot, an excellent officer, accordingly led it forward ;
the French received the attack with admirable steadi-
ness, and Talbot fell dead among the French bayonets
together with eight of his men. Twenty-three more of
474 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. the troopers were wounded, many of them by the steel ;
and the survivors, heavily repulsed in spite of a gallant
onset, passed on into the already disordered ranks of
the Germans and Sixteenth. The two remaining
squadrons of the Fourteenth were forming to attack
when yet another party of horse was seen galloping up
in a cloud of dust from Barquilla, and was, from the
appearance of other French parties in the same quarter,
judged to be French. As a matter of fact, it was a
detachment of German Hussars which had been posted
in a farmhouse to cut off the retreat of the French, and
was hurrying up, pursuant to its orders, at the sound of
the firing. However, the two squadrons which had
not been engaged were moved off to meet them, where-
upon the commander of the French infantry, Captain
Gouache, seized the moment to run with his men into
an adjacent wood, whence he withdrew them safely
over the river to his own people. He was very de-
servedly promoted by Massena for his conduct.
On the English side the whole affair was abominably
mishandled, entirely through the fault of Craufurd.
He had not the slightest idea of the strength of the
French infantry when he ordered Krauchenberg to
attack, though he could have ascertained it approxi-
mately in a few minutes ; and instead of forming the
whole of his squadrons for a simultaneous onslaught, he
launched them into action piecemeal upon one face only
of the square, and even then so hurriedly that he
allowed no time for the rear files to take their places in
the line. The troopers had to ascend the hill to the
charge ; no disadvantage in an attack on infantry, if
properly utilised ; and the corn was a heavy crop reach-
ing almost to the knees of the men.1 It was impossible,
therefore, that horses should go through it at high
speed, and this was the greater reason for careful though
rapid arrangement of the method of attack. If Crau-
furd had even shown the whole of his force of cavalry,
the French would probably have surrendered. If he
1 Tomkinson, p. 30.
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 475
had brought up part of his infantry or his guns — and 18 10.
they could have joined him in twenty minutes — the
enemy would hardly have thought of resistance. The
fact of the matter is that Craufurd lost his head, and it
should seem that he made the rest of his people
lose theirs also. The losses did not exceed thirty-two
of all ranks, and as many horses killed and wounded ;
but the affair was discreditable and led to bad feeling
between regiments, which it needed all Wellington's
firmness to compose.1
Meanwhile the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo had, as Wel-
lington put it, placed the British army in a new situation.
Martin Carrera in deep disgust announced that he
should draw off his Spanish troops, and Wellington
warned Craufurd that, as soon as they should be gone,
there would no longer be any occasion for the Light
Division to remain far to the front of Almeida. He
therefore particularly desired him to fall back behind
the Coa in the event of the French advancing in force.
"I do not wish to risk anything on the Coa," he wrote
on the 1 ith. " I do not wish to risk anything in order
to remain on the other side of the river or retain Fort
Concepcion," he repeated on the 1 6th. "I am not
desirous of engaging in an affair beyond the Coa," he
wrote for the third time on the 19th ; " if you are not
covered from the sun, would it not be better that you
should come to this side with your infantry at least ? '
However, Massena was to Wellington's mind strangely
slow in moving, and it was not until the 21st of July July 21.
that, having replenished his supplies and stores, he pushed
Ney's corps forward against Craufurd's line of posts.
Craufurd thereupon reluctantly retired, blowing up Fort
Concepcion, obedient to Wellington's orders, and fell
back to Jun^a, about three miles to south of Almeida
and on the same ridge with it ; while Ney halted at Val
1 Accounts of this affair are to be found in Tomkinson, pp. 30-3 1 ;
Leach, pp. 140-141 ; Costello, pp. 34-35 ; Simmons, pp. 73-74 ;
Napier's Life of Sir C. Napier, i. 132 ; Beamish, i. 279-281 ;
Wellington's Despatches (ed. 1852), iv. 164-167, 179.
476 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810.de Mula between three and four miles to Craufurd's
left front. For two days the Light Division remained
thus in face of an entire French corps ; but Craufurd,
in the teeth of Wellington's orders, made no attempt
to cross the Coa, and on the third day Ney resolved to
chastise him for his temerity.
The ridge upon which Almeida stands forms the
western boundary of the great upraised plain of Leon,
the altitude of the town above the sea exceeding two
thousand feet. The summit is broad, flat, and sound,
an ideal country for cavalry, and to eastward the
upland rolls away in broad billows which are furrowed
by little rapid streams. But on the westward side
of the fortress the ground plunges down rapidly to
the gorge of the Coa ; the distance from the walls to
the river in a direct line being almost three thousand
yards, and the difference in height over three hundred
feet. The whole of this hillside is seamed by hollows,
about three in every mile of ground, each carrying its
trickle of water to the sea. From the southern face
of the fortification there descends to the Coa a road,
narrow and fairly steep indeed, but by no means bad,
being for the most part paved and enclosed between fairly
high stone walls. It would, however, be too slippery
for horses to descend it safely at high speed, particularly
after rain. This road follows a leading spur 1 very nearly
to its foot ; and the final descent to the bridge, upon
which Craufurd's salvation depended, is a comparatively
1 As this very useful colonial expression may be unknown to
English readers, I should perhaps explain it. Any range of hills
running say from north to south, such as the ridge of Almeida,
pours off its liquid or frozen waters to east and west. These
tributary waters dig furrows on their way to some central channel —
in this instance the Coa — which generally runs parallel to the
ridge. The spaces between these furrows are termed spurs, and
a leading spur is one which runs directly into the main channel
uninterrupted by any cross tributary, or by the junction of two
tributaries. It descends, that is to say, in an unbroken slope,
whereas a spur that is not a leading spur may lead one across a
labyrinth of waters, each one of these involving steep ascent or
descent.
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 477
easy slope. The ridges immediately to right and left 18 10.
of the leading spur both tend to converge upon the
bridge. The ground along the upper part of the
declivity is broken by countless vineyards, high walls,
and little enclosures, but the soil steadily becomes
poorer as the water is approached. The rock crops up
more and more thickly through the heather and broom,
the enclosures become less frequent, and for the last
few hundred yards the ground is open and the rock is
everywhere. At a short distance from the water the
road for wheeled traffic is forced aside by many
obstacles, and after turning for a little way up-stream,
doubles back to its final access to the bridge. But for
men and pack-animals the track leads perfectly straight
down, and upon each flank of this final descent to the
bridge rise two rocky knolls, covered with heather and
broom. The Coa itself is a boiling torrent which, at
the point where the road touches it, has cleft its way
through the rock and turned the valley into a chasm.
The bridge consists of two lofty arches, and the road-
way runs nearly forty feet above the highest flood
mark. The left or western bank offers above the
bridge a fairly easy slope, which becomes far steeper
below ; immediately opposite to the bridge itself it
presents a sheer cliff over one hundred feet high.
The night of the 23rd was stormy and wet, but the July 23.
enemy early showed themselves in great strength above
Fort Concepcion and San Pedro ; and the fact was faith-
fully reported by Craufurd's vedettes. Wellington's
orders were that, even upon the threat of the enemy's
advance in force, Craufurd was to retire across the Coa ;
and, when the alarm was first given, there was still plenty
of time to draw off the cavalry and send them over the
river. But it was not to be. Robert Craufurd must
needs play what he conceived to be the part of a great
commander. Ney, observing his false dispositions, had
turned out the whole of his corps to overwhelm him,
and twenty-five thousand men were advancing upon
the Light Division. Still Craufurd kept his cavalry
478 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. out, and formed his line of battle athwart the slope
July 23. of the hill, with his left from five to seven hundred
yards south of Almeida, resting on the tower of a
ruined windmill, which was held by half a company
of the Fifty-second. Here also were stationed two of
Ross's guns. Next to them were the Forty-third, and
then in succession the Ninety-fifth, the 1st Cacadores,
3rd Cacadores and Fifty-second,1 the whole line
covering a front of above a mile and a half in a
convex form, with its right not far from the river.
From two to three hours, if not more, seem to
have passed before Ney's corps was finally deployed for
action, ample time for Craufurd to have sent at any
rate his baggage, artillery, and most of his cavalry across
the river. But when the Marshal at length advanced to
the attack he did so rapidly. The cavalry, showing a
line of fifteen squadrons irrespective of skirmishers,
sent the British horse and Ross's advanced guns flying
back over the plain for shelter,2 where Craufurd caught
them up, and with singular fatuity formed them in rear
of the windmill. The French infantry were now seen
moving onward with astonishing speed, and Craufurd
began to lose his head. He pulled his troops about,
ordering some forward and others back, and finally
penned half of the Forty-third into an enclosure near
the road, within walls considerably higher than their
heads, and with only one narrow outlet. Presently the
first of the French skirmishers came up and fell upon
an advanced post of the Ninety-fifth among the en-
closures ; whereupon O'Hara's company of the same
regiment, supported by a wing of the Fifty-second,
was sent forward to bring the forlorn riflemen in.
While these two companies were hotly engaged with the
infantry in front, a squadron of the French hussars,
1 This is the order given by Moorhouse in the History of the Fifty-
second, and was probably correct at one moment of the day, though
not for long. Possibly only one wing of the 52nd was on the right
flank from the beginning.
2 Some of Krauchenberg's hussars were cut off from Almeida, but
found their way down to the river and swam their horses over it.
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 479
disdaining the fire from the guns of Almeida, swept 18 10.
down upon their flank and nearly made an end of July 23.
O'Hara's.1 Craufurd now recalled the wing of the
Fifty-second into the enclosures, and the whole of
Loison's thirteen battalions came gradually into action,
striking first and hardest against the British left, which,
being nearest to the top of the hill, was the earliest to
be encountered. The engagement became fierce and
general, and very soon the British commander perceived
how great was his peril. He therefore ordered his
three British battalions to hold fast to their positions,
till he could pass the remainder of the force across the
bridge, and then to retire in echelon from the left.
Orders appear to have been sent at the same time to
the Fifty-second to stick obstinately to their ground on
the right flank.
From that moment the regimental officers took
matters into their own hands. With a numerical
superiority of four or five to one, the French pressed
the attack with extreme vigour, while the British
troops, using every opportunity which the ground
afforded, opposed them with rare tenacity. The
latter, however, were at a disadvantage, for in order
to retire they had to throw down the dry stone walls
of the enclosures, while the French could make use
of these openings to follow them rapidly. Moreover,
the British companies dared not stand for too long in
any one position, lest their flank should be turned and
their retreat to the bridge cut off; for already the
French hussars were hurrying down the road and
sabring every man that they met. Meanwhile the guns
and cavalry had passed the pinfold where the wing
of the Forty-third was herded, and the Cacadores
were likewise tramping down the road, when the officers
of the Forty-third within, losing patience, called upon
their men with a great effort to heave down the wall,
1 This is what I make of this incident, putting together the
accounts of Costello, Kincaid, Simmons, and Charles Napier, but I
am aware that it differs from Mr. Oman's account.
480 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. and having thus freed themselves, threw their corn-
July 23. panies mto the fight. Thus the contest was maintained,
a battle of skirmishers, not of ranked lines, but none
the less of the hottest, and made the more trying for
the British as the French guns unlimbered on the crest
of the hill and poured shot down upon them. Gradually
the left of Craufurd's line was forced back to the
bridge, while the passage was still choked by cavalry
and artillery ; and the confusion was increased by the
upsetting of an ammunition- waggon. The French
were speeding swiftly on, but the British General gave
no orders. Major McLeod of the Forty-third, how-
ever, rallied four companies to hold one of the knolls
which commanded the passage, while Brigade-Major
Rowan of the Ninety-fifth posted two companies of
Rifles on the other. Other troops formed upon these,
and, the river being in heavy flood, the passage was
thus kept open for the men of the left wing. They
had no sooner crossed the river than Craufurd ordered
the troops posted by Rowan on the southern knoll
to withdraw ; forgetting half a battalion of the Fifty-
second which was still holding its ground nearly a
mile up the river, and had never been recalled.
Happily, Colonel Beckwith of the Rifles kept his wits
about him and sent Charles Napier in search of these ;
but in the interval the French assembled in great
numbers, made a rush at McLeod's post and drove
his men back. The danger was extreme, for the
bridge was still encumbered by troops ; but McLeod,
instantly rallying his men, led them forward to a
counter-attack. Fired by his example, the Forty-third
and Riflemen sprang to the onset as if a whole army
were at their backs, recovered the hill and dislodged
the French from a wall beyond it with such spirit as
to daunt them from any further attempt. The Fifty-
second at length appeared and crossed the bridge ; the
rear-guard followed them at the top of their speed ; and
Craufurd's division, thanks not to him but to his
officers and men, passed safely to the western bank,
ch. xxxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 481
having left not even the overturned ammunition-waggon 18 10.
behind them.1 Iul^ 23-
Even then the General appears not immediately
to have realised that the bridge must be defended
still, for the first and most urgent dispositions for
securing it were left to Charles Napier, with such
mixed men of all regiments as he could collect. But
presently Craufurd recovered himself. Ross's guns
were already unlimbered on the upper slopes of the
hill. The infantry was soon scattered in loose order
along the lower slopes ; a company of Rifles was posted
by its captain in a ruined house which commanded the
bridge ; and the cavalry was sent off to watch the fords
of Castello Bom, six miles to south, lest the enemy
should cross the river there and cut off the Light
Division from the main army. And now arrived the
time for the French in their turn to make mistakes.
Very shortly after the British had accomplished
their retreat, the French skirmishers came down to
the water's edge, taking cover behind the rocks, and
engaged in a duel with their rivals on the opposite bank,
while the guns thundered at each other across the
valley. Ney, however, after trying in vain to find a
ford in the still rising stream, ordered the Grenadiers
of the 66th to carry the bridge. The column
was quickly formed, and rushed gallantly forward.
Correct judgment of distance from the top of a sheer
height to the plain below is proverbially difficult, and
the French traversed two-thirds of the passage unhurt
before the British marksmen found the range. Then
the leaders fell as one man ; the rear sections, as fast
as they came up, were mown down in masses, till their
prostrate bodies rose almost to the height of the
parapet, and the attack was repulsed with very heavy
loss. Ney's blood, however, was up. He now directed 2
1 The half company of the Fifty-second was indeed cut off and
left behind in the windmill ; but the officer, Lieut. Dawson, very
cunningly waited till night, when he drew off his men unobserved
and brought them safely to Pinhel.
2 Mr. Oman, iii. 263, shows that Ney himself was responsible.
VOL. VII 2 I
482 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. a battalion of picked marksmen, three hundred strong,
July 23- to take the place of the 66th ; and the same scene
was repeated. The French dashed forward with
unsurpassable bravery, only to be shot down in heaps.
Ten or a dozen men actually succeeded in reaching
the farther bank, where they found safety without
difficulty in dead ground ; but four-fifths of the re-
mainder were killed and wounded, a pitiful sacrifice
of heroic and devoted soldiers. Still not contented,
Ney essayed yet a third attempt with more men of
the 66th, which could not but be half-hearted ; and
then the fight reduced itself once more to a duel
of cannon and muskets across the valley. At last,
at four o'clock the rain fell in torrents, effectually
forbidding any further fire ; the French who had
passed the river hurried back to their comrades ; and
the combat of the Coa, as sharp a fight, on its own
scale, as was seen in the course of the war, came to
an end.
The loss of the French amounted to five hundred
and twenty killed and wounded, the greater part of them
thrown wantonly away in the reckless assaults on the
bridge. That of the British was three hundred and
thirty-three killed, wounded, and missing, two-thirds
of whom belonged to the Forty-third and Ninety-fifth,
the Fifty-second escaping very lightly ; * and among
the wounded were two men who were later to become
famous, William Napier of the Forty-third, and Harry
Smith of the Rifles. Though the surviving accounts
of the action on the British side are many, there is
1 Casualties —
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
i/43rd 3 15 10 86 o 15=129
i/52nd o 1 2 16 o 3= 22
i/95th 1 11 8 55 1 53=129
Portuguese (2 batts.) .0 4 1 24 o 2 = 45
Cavalry (2 regts.) . . o 1 1 3 o 2 = 7
Total 333
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 483
much about it that remains difficult of explanation ; 18 10.
and it should seem that the French officers were slow Ju^>' 23-
to apprehend the true state of affairs, otherwise Ney
should entirely have annihilated Craufurd's division.
For this, however, they had every excuse ; since, until
they actually arrived at the brow of the hill and looked
down over it, they could not see how the British were
disposed ; and by that time the atmosphere must have
been thick with smoke. It is probable that at the
outset Craufurd formed his line upon the plain, showing
a front, roughly speaking, towards the east, and that
the French accordingly marched westward straight upon
it. Hence, when the British General changed front
more or less to the south, the French, unable to see
the movement, preserved the same direction and so
struck the British line obliquely, grazing it rather than
striking a full blow. Had they closed with Craufurd's
right at the same time as with his left, they must have
overwhelmed the Fifty-second and reached the bridge
before the British main body ; whereas the Fifty-second
actually came off with only twenty-two casualties.
From Val de Mula, which was the line of Ney's
advance, there is a rough road leading straight to
Junca and from thence to the bridge of Almeida, the
track following the river downward for the last mile.
The entire distance does not exceed seven or eight
miles ; and it is therefore evident that if Ney had
chosen to send a column by this road — and the ground
would have served well to screen the manoeuvre — he
could have thrown it into action as soon as the main
body. In such a case it is hard to say how Craufurd
could have escaped disaster.
As to the General himself it is sufficient to say that,
over and above his disobedience to orders in fighting
at all, he made every mistake that a commander could
make ; perhaps the worst of all being that he omitted
at the first to send some of his guns across the water
to secure his retreat. They would have been for long
out of range of the French artillery and might have
484 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. wrought havoc among the enemy's infantry. But
Craufurd had evidently no idea of retiring. He seems
to have kept his advanced posts out far too long ; and,
when his cavalry and artillery were driven from the
plain, he packed them away where they could be of
no service, finally hurrying them over the bridge so
late that, before they could cross it, the infantry fell
back upon them. Beyond any question he lost all
control of the fight very early, and was saved from
disaster only by his regimental officers. It was a pity,
for while holding the line of outposts he had done
superlative service ; but there is no contesting the fact
that Craufurd was rarely at his best in action.1
Wellington was extremely and rightly annoyed at his
subordinate's escapade, but he accepted his report of it
and transmitted it to England without comment. Only
to his brother, Wellesley Pole, did he reveal the full
measure of his vexation not only over the combat of
the Coa but over the other " foolish affairs in which
Craufurd had involved his outposts." Yet he added,
" If I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man
who, I believe, has meant well, and whose error is one
of judgment and not of intention ; and indeed I must
add that, although my errors and those of others also
are visited heavily upon me, that is not the way in
which any, much less a British, army can be com-
manded." There spoke a true ruler of men, who
knows — what representative assemblies can rarely
1 Careful accounts, more or less detailed, of the combat of the
Coa will be found in William Napier's Battles and Sieges of the
Peninsula, Life of Sir C. Napier ; Harry Smith's Autobiography ;
Kincaid's Random Shots from a Rifleman, Leach's Rough Sketches ;
Verner's A British Rifleman ; Sir G. Napier's Early Military Life ;
Costello's Adventures of a Soldier ; Levinge's Historical Records
of the 43rd ; Moorhouse's History of the 52nd. A great many of
these witnesses were hostile to Craufurd, with whom Mr. Oman
deals very gently. What I find unpardonable in him is that, offering
battle against orders, he had evidently not in the slightest degree
thought out how he was to receive it. It is certain that there was
unnecessary and avoidable confusion ; and all the troops were sore
at being mishandled, cavalry as well as infantry.
ch. xxxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 485
grasp — that a chief must not be extreme to mark 1810.
what is done amiss by an honest and zealous subordinate.
With all his faults Craufurd was a really good soldier ;
and it behoved a wise commander to make the best of
him. Moreover, Craufurd had not been the only
officer to misbehave himself on this occasion. Before
the action was ended Picton rode up alone, attracted
by the sound of firing, and was asked by Craufurd for
the assistance of his division. The said division ought
to have been already nearing the spot, for it had been
stationed where it was for the express purpose of
supporting Craufurd if the latter were hard beset ; and
the situation of the Light Division at the moment was
undoubtedly perilous. Yet Picton, greatly to his
dishonour, refused the request ; and after an exchange
of sharp words, for both men had bad tempers and
neither refinement, the two Generals parted. Had
Wellington, therefore, censured Craufurd's disobedience,
he must also have noticed Picton's ; each would have
defended himself and incriminated the other ; there
would have been a Picton's party and a Craufurd's
party in the army, and consequently bad feeling
and division. Wellington, therefore, wisely let the
matter rest. Be the discipline of an army never so
stern, men and officers are flesh and blood, and need
tact as well as firmness for their right government.1
In the French army the affair was handled accord-
ing to the methods of the Bonapartist Empire. Ney,
who was fully as insubordinate as Craufurd without the
latter's undoubted reverence for his Chief, wrote as true
an account of the engagement as his rival, and returned
a correct statement of his losses. Massena thereupon
garbled the report, multiplying the British prisoners
taken by four, adding to this the capture of a colour,
and reducing the French casualties from five hundred
to three hundred. To this he appended some inven-
tions, purporting to be taken from intercepted despatches,
1 Wellington to Liverpool, 25th July ; to Wellesley Pole, 31st
July 1810.
486 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. which stated the British losses at sixty officers and
eleven hundred killed and wounded. His despatch
was duly printed in the Moniteur, and, having thus
received the stamp of certain untruth, passed presently
over to England to be accepted as gospel by the
leaders of the Opposition. After several weeks it found
its way into the hands of Craufurd, who at once wrote
an indignant vindication of his conduct, asserting that
the Light Division had, in face of six times its numbers,
performed one of the most difficult operations of war.
This was true ; but the writer did not add that if the
orders of the Commander-in-Chief had been obeyed, no
such operation would have been necessary ; and the
inference to be drawn was, therefore, that Wellington
was to blame for the mishap. To do him justice,
Craufurd probably never dreamed of dragging his Chief
into the affair ; but it was the misfortune of this quick-
tempered, " black-muzzled " x little man that he could
never think of any one but himself.
1 No portrait of Craufurd exists, nor any physical description
of him except a few words of Harry Smith which depict him as he
appeared in a high-peaked saddle. " Over this peak Craufurd's black
muzzle could hardly be discovered (he was a short man) so
entrenched was he" {Autobiography, i. 177).
CHAPTER XXXVIII
On the night of the 24th the Light Division continued 18 10.
its retreat to Pinhel, from which quarter Picton's July 24~
division retired on the 26th. Craufurd then established
his advanced guard at Freixedas and Vendada on the
direct road from Almeida to the Mondego, and Cotton
with the cavalry division took general charge of the
line of outposts. Massena, however, showed no sign
of undertaking the siege of Almeida ; and Wellington,
deprived of Spanish intelligence since the fall of Ciudad
Rodrigo, was left in painful suspense as to the enemy's
intentions. General Reynier had passed the Tagus at
the ferry of Alconetar, and on the 20th was at Plasencia.
Hill, pursuant to his orders, had likewise crossed the
river at Villa Velha, arriving on the 20th at Castello
Branco and on the 23rd at Atalaia, within two marches
of Wellington's right. But here Wellington halted
him ; for on the 27th Reynier's vanguard came July 27.
through the pass of Perales, as if heading straight upon
Ciudad Rodrigo ; and the British Commander, consider-
ing this fact in conjunction with an advance of Junot's
corps to the Agueda and Massena's inexplicable apathy
as to Almeida, concluded that the Marshal intended to
mask that fortress and make a sudden dash upon the
Allies with the bulk of his force, so as to render their
retreat as difficult as possible. On the 27 th he therefore
withdrew the whole of his army to the valley of the
Mondego, with headquarters at Celorico, leaving Cole's
division only in observation at Guarda, and warning
Hill to be ready to retire independently.1
1 Wellington to H. Wellcsley, 19th July ; to Hill, 20th, 27th
July ; to C. Stuart, 23rd, 29th July ; to Liverpool, 1st Aug. 1 8 10.
487
488 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. The alarm proved to be false. Reynier's excursion
through the pass of Perales has been made simply for
purposes of foraging and reconnaissance. The next ap-
pearance of his troops was at Salvaterra on the west bank
of the Elja, and actually within Portuguese territory; and
July 31. again, a few days later, a detachment entered Penamacor.
The fact was that Reynier had received orders from
Massena to keep Hill occupied in the south and to
prevent him from joining Wellington ; and most
effectually he fulfilled these commands. However, the
interception of Napoleon's despatches gave Wellington
the clue to all these manoeuvres ; and, after not a little
marching and counter - marching before Atalaia and
Aug. 3. Sarzedas, Hill finally fixed his headquarters on the 3rd
of August at the latter place, pushing his cavalry, under
General Fane, well forward to watch the Second Corps.
More than once the Portuguese horse came into collision
with the French during August, twice gaining credit-
Aug. 13. able little successes ; and by the 13th Wellington had
made up his mind that Reynier's movement to north
of the Tagus, though ordered by Napoleon himself,
was a false one, and that the sooner he recrossed the
river, the better for the French.1
But while passing this criticism the British General
could not find in it comfort against another danger, which
now threatened him from the south-east. Napoleon's
commands, it will be remembered, had also directed
Mortier to move up to Estremadura and to take
Reynier's place south of the Tagus. Wellington had
long ago divined that some such design was probable ;
but, at the moment when the Emperor's plans were re-
vealed to him, he did not think that it would be executed,
knowing that General Lacy was at the time engaged in
the raid upon Ronda already narrated. When, however,
he learned of Lacy's feeble abandonment of the expedi-
tion, Wellington made up his mind to Mortier's im-
mediate advance ; and in fact the Duke of Treviso had,
by Soult's orders, detached Girard's division at the be-
1 Wellington to Hill, 13th August 1810.
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 489
ginning of August to manoeuvre along the whole length 1810.
of the Portuguese frontier from the Sierra Morena to
the Guadiana. Girard accordingly marched against
Ballesteros, his most formidable enemy in that quarter,
who led him a weary zig-zag chase ; retiring first to
Fregenal, then north-west to Jerez de los Caballeros,
thence north-east to Burguillos, north-westward again
to Salvatierra, and finally doubling back south-eastward
to Zafra. At this point on the 8 th, Girard gave up his
task in despair, left his adversary to pursue his way to
Olivenza, and himself fell back on the 9th to Llerena. Aug. 9.
No tactics could have been better fitted to meet the
case than those of Ballesteros, for they wore out the
French troops with hard marching to no purpose. But
unfortunately on reaching Olivenza he met Romana,
who, in the teeth of Wellington's warnings and
entreaties, had insisted upon sallying from Badajoz
to take the offensive in Andalusia. On the 10th the
Marquis reached Bienvenida ; but on the following
day Girard marched out to attack him, and, catching Aug. u.
his advanced guard unsupported, completely defeated it
with a loss of six hundred men. Romana thereupon
retreated hurriedly towards Merida ; and Soult, rein-
forcing Girard, was urgent for an attempt upon Badajoz.
But before the movement could take place, the Duke of
Dalmatia was alarmed by Lacy's descent upon Huelva,
which compelled him to weaken Girard by recalling
troops of the Fifth Corps to meet the diversion. The
danger of a French advance through Estremadura upon
the Allies, therefore, vanished for the present, greatly
to the relief of Wellington. He had sent a brigade of
Portuguese cavalry to reinforce Romana, but it arrived
too late to be of service ; and he was thankful that the
Marquis had escaped with comparatively slight loss,
particularly as there might now be some chance of his
learning the elements of prudence.1
Simultaneously with this distraction in the south
Wellington learned that the detachment of General
1 Wellington to Hill, 9th Aug. ; to C. Stuart, 12th Aug. 18 10.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
~>eras, as Napoleon ': recte embling be-
tween the c -. - Leon and the Donro to threaten
Port _ 'rom the north-east. fact set out
89- on the 27th of [ from B the 29th he
drove a feeh 1 force from Puebla de Sanabria,
where he left a garrison r ,-ed men, and a
iter returned to Zamora. General S
promptly coOecte Port g e e I to guard the
tror.-:r- ; and, or. the retreat f Seras, joined his
troops to a pa- :h he
garr n at Puebla ~ xi the 4th of Angnst,
ar t to surrende-.
Sera narchc : to the town on hear \
it- ger, b^- ur _ too late, fou tl I :>oth fa
gar ■ re Iter wfak
being .mmoned to A - net, he
toe k -incipal ci
But gt ■ this per ere not
operatic r the field. It ws t at
ent that 1 f the a] tment of
thre to the
the Count of Redondo, and Dr.
Raymonds Nog sua, a professor at the Un ex ty at
Cc f these pen were distasl
to 5 foresaw, not incorn
wc trig I to
sd for the " fPortnga
be _ " " ' •-• F _" I .--"..- and
Amba t 1 court for 1 iking h
However, he bowri
*
to I e corr." rt the
that a seat on t I Regenci ■ ;.; ----- also
to Mr. Zhzrlc - -_ the --_-_:
: e w i th the
La . er the policy of - g for Brit
Ege :f trading Bred I Braz
-.proved the Brit si l re re that
■ ■ (tug .turd :
xxxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 491
brought not a link unpopularity at a very critical 1*10,
time upon the British authorities in Lisbon. Last!
the General had been disappointed in the matter
reinforcements x- » troops, as we have seen, could be
spared from Sadly ; and besides this, only one of the two
battalions promised from Ha.
other having been detained until it could be relieved
by a third battalion from England.1 verpool.
however, though as yet Wellington knew it not, had
already remedied this by ordering Graham to send him
two battalions and a squadron from Cadiz -'xtovc
unexpected help had come from Spain in the shape of
lian Sanchez's body of cavalry, which had slipped
out of Ciudad Rodngo when the fall of that town
became imminent, and had been taken into British pa
Still, in spite of all such consolations, the first fortnight
of August was a most trying time for Wellington all*.
:. r ■. • . -
The suspense was ended with the investment of
T>eida by corps on the 1 5th, after long delay Aug. 1
in the arrival or" the siege-train. The place was
small extent, nearly circular, with a diameter of abc
seven hundred yards; a neat little fortress of six
bastions, a covered may, a dry ditch cut out of the
solid rock, and six lunettes. Its strong point was that
the earth lay so thin on the rock all round to
make the construction of approachc • dimcuk :
its weak points were that the glacis, owing k
povei tv of earth, was too low, leaving the walls
much exposed, and that the magazine was inadequate!
Tbe commandant, Brigadier Cox, was a
capable and resolute man ; the garrison numbered
dose upon five thousand Portuguese, nearly half of
71k arrrred from Halifax at the end of July ; tie 13rd
awaiting the arriral of 2 /8th before *ail:zi trpooJ 00 tbe
3rd of Aagast ordered Graham to tend Wellicgton tbe 791b, 94th,
and one sqaadroo 131b LD. mthoat watting for Welbngtoo't
* Weffiagtoa to tiierpool, 1st, 8tk. to C. Sroart, | -
4th Ang. j io H. WeHealey, iccb Ang. 1 1
492 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 10. them regular troops, and the remainder militia; the
fortifications mounted over one hundred guns, and
there was abundance of supplies and stores. A sema-
phore signal-post enabled communications to be main-
tained with the Allied army ; and altogether Almeida
seemed likely to detain Massena for a couple of months.
In order to force the Marshal to keep his troops
together, and so to make the feeding of them the
more difficult, Wellington moved the divisions of
Aug. 20. Picton and Craufurd slightly forward and advanced
his headquarters again to Alverca. The progress of
the French approaches was not rapid ; but the first
parallel and eleven batteries upon it were completed
Aug. 26. within ten days ; and fire was opened on the 26th.
No very serious damage had been done after twelve
hours' cannonade, when at seven o'clock in the evening
a lucky shell kindled a train of powder which had
leaked from a barrel in its passage from the stores,
and blew up the magazine. In a few seconds the town
was practically destroyed, though the circle of defences
remained unharmed. The loss of life among the
garrison was not great, considering the circumstances,
five hundred men only having perished ; but these
included half of the gunners in the fortress, while the
explosion had deprived the place of all ammunition
Aug. 27. for the guns. On the following morning Massena
sent in an officer to demand surrender of the fortress.
Cox put a bold face on matters and tried to gain
time ; but, during the parley, Portuguese officers on
Massena's staff came to the foot of the walls adjuring
their compatriots within to accept the French proposals ;
and that evening a deputation of Cox's officers informed
him that, unless he capitulated at once, they would open
the gates. The unhappy Cox was forced to yield,
Aug. 28. and on the 28th he and his garrison marched out and
laid down their arms ; having, however, obtained from
Massena the condition that the regular troops should
be sent prisoners to France, and that the militia
regiments should be allowed to go to their homes,
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 493
upon giving their parole not to serve again throughout 1810.
the duration of the war. Aug. 28.
No sooner had the articles been signed than
Massena, after the fashion of his compatriots at
Capri, proceeded to violate them. His Portuguese
officers were sent among the captives to persuade
them to take service under the eagles, and almost the
whole of the regulars, both officers and men, besides a
large number of the militia, accepted the offer. This
event caused Wellington the gravest anxiety. The
fall of Almeida through an accident was in itself a
disaster which threatened to make havoc of his plans ;
and now it seemed doubtful whether even the fidelity
of the Portuguese army could be counted upon.
Happily upon this latter point he was speedily re-
assured. The prisoners had enlisted in the French
service only to escape imprisonment in France, and
with every intention of deserting to their own side.
They streamed back at once by hundreds at a time
to their old colours, and Massena was fain to disarm
such few as were left in his camp and send them off
to France. The Portuguese Regency approved the
conduct of the deserters and reinstated them in the
army ; whereupon Wellington, after many searchings
of heart, decided that Massena's action had nullified
the capitulation. He therefore compromised matters
by dismissing the escaped militiamen to their homes,
and re-forming the regular regiments.
After such a stroke of luck for the French as was
the capture of Almeida, Wellington looked for an
immediate advance of Massena, and withdrew his
headquarters to Celorico ; moving the infantry, with
the exception of Cole's light companies which remained
always at Guarda, into the valley of the Mondego.
" Observe Reynier well," he wrote to Hill on the 28 th ;
" his movements will be the clue to everything else."
On the 29th Cotton's outposts were driven in from Aug. 29.
Freixedas, and Reynier's corps was reported to be
actually in Sabugal, threatening to advance upon Guarda;
494 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. whereupon, Wellington ordered Hill to be ready to
Sept. 2. fall back upon Thomar. On the 2nd of September
Cotton's picquets were again thrust back, and Wellington
withdrew yet another march to the rear, fixing his
headquarters at Gouvea and leaving only Somers-
Cocks with a handful of men at Guarda. Twenty-four
hours more, however, sufficed to set his mind at rest.
The French made no further reconnaissances ; Reynier's
troops, having made their feint, retired from Sabugal
to Zarza ; and though for a moment Wellington
conjectured that the Second Corps was designed
to enter Estremadura and besiege Badajoz, his mis-
givings were of short duration.1 The truth is that
the French were in no condition for an immediate
advance. As usual Massena had depended upon the
country for supplies, and he now found that, poverty-
stricken as it was at the best, it was by this time, thanks
to Wellington's foresight, absolutely laid bare.2 Several
of his convoys from Valladolid had been destroyed by
guerilla-bands ; and he was therefore imperatively com-
pelled to collect at least a fortnight's provisions before
he could move. But to carry these supplies he needed
draught-animals, which he did not possess ; and he was
actually obliged to reduce his guns and ammunition-
waggons by one-third and to turn over the horses to the
commissariat-train. Another trouble was the scarcity
of cartridges for the infantry, owing in great measure
to the incredible wastefulness of the men ; 3 which
1 Wellington to Cotton and Cole, 29th Aug.; to Hill, 31st
Aug., 4th Sept. ; to Romana, 6th Sept. 18 10. Hill to Wellington,
3rd Sept. 1810. Wellingtori MSS.
2 Even the British horses had nothing but rye to eat, and were
beginning to suffer from it. Cotton to Wellington, 2nd Sept. 1810.
Wellington MSS.
3 An intercepted letter dated July from General Eble to the
Minister for War states that the consumption of ammunition was
incredible owing to the carelessness of the officers, the inexperience
of the men, and the endless demands for escorts for convoys. The
infantry expended 900,000 rounds over the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo,
though no sortie was made by the garrison. As to horses, Eble
complained that the siege-train had over 2000 horses but wanted
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 495
deficiency was only made good by manufacturing as 1810.
many as possible from the scanty store of powder that
was taken at Almeida. Lastly, what with sickness, the
losses in two sieges, and garrisons for a pair of captured
fortresses, his two corps were reduced to forty-five
thousand men ; and he was therefore obliged to summon
Reynier's corps to him and incorporate it with the
main army.1
The first symptoms of this last arrangement were Sept. 9.
seen on the 9th, when some of Massena's cavalry ap-
peared at Alfaiates, and felt their way to Sabugal, always
keenly watched by Somers-Cocks. On the same day
a force of over three thousand men occupied Guarda,
but was rightly divined by Wellington to be only a
strong reconnoitring party. Reynier began his march
from Zarza and Penamacor on the 10th, and entered
Alfaiates on the 12 th. Hill marked his movements
intently, and on the same day retired from Sarzedas to Sept. 12.
Sobreira Formosa where, finding that Reynier remained
stationary, he halted, being ready to cross the Zezere
and turn northward upon the Alva when commanded.
On the 1 2th, likewise, General Leith, who was lying
at Thomar with two Portuguese brigades and the
latest arrived brigade of British, began his journey
northward, and by the 15th had set the last of his
battalions in motion for the Alva. The whole situation
was simplifying itself. Even in Estremadura the
troops of the Fifth Corps retired from Llerena, as if to
leave Wellington without an enemy except in his front,
when the foolish impatience of Romana again threw
everything into peril. Unable to resist the temptation
4000. He added that the battalions of the train had not received
their allowance for shoeing and forage, and that the officers had
been obliged to use the shirt and shoe allowance of the men to
make it good. According to the examination of a French deserter,
a sergeant of the 17th Light, Reynier's corps on its march to
Sabugal carried every man ten days' biscuit and four days' bread
having no transport for victuals except eighty mules for th
headquarters staff. Hill to Wellington, 6th Sept. 18 10. JJ'e/litig-
ton MSS. * Oman, iii. 342-343.
496 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xnr
1810. of a second advance upon Seville, he once more hastened
southward, sending out parties in all directions against
the isolated French posts, and even capturing one or
two of them. In this rash fashion he had penetrated as
far as Santa Olalla, not more than forty miles north-
west of Seville, when he found himself confronted by
a column of the Fifth Corps, which had been sent up
by Soult to check him. He fell back at once ; but his
Sept. 15. cavalry was overtaken by that of Mortier on the 15th
at Fuente Cantos, and instantly routed. The entire body
would probably have become prisoners but for the arrival
of Madden's Portuguese cavalry, which by a brilliant
charge was able to extricate them. Romana in his
letter to Wellington tried to make light of the whole
affair ; l but none the less, leaving behind him six guns
and five hundred killed and wounded, he hurried back
to Merida, where he crossed the Tagus, reinforced the
garrison of Badajoz, and left Estremadura to take care
of itself. Mortier pursued with his main body as far
as Zafra ; and there was once more every appearance of
an embarrassing movement against Wellington's right
flank and rear. Happily, the absence of Sebastiani's
corps in Murcia, and an advance of General Copons
about Huelva, left Soult few troops to spare for such
a manoeuvre, and he was fain to recall the greater
part of the Fifth Corps for the protection of Seville.
But misfortunes seldom come singly, and at this
time Wellington was even more hampered by his allies
than by the French armies. The fall of Almeida had
produced a great sensation in Lisbon ; and the
Regency, choosing to think that the fortress had, as
in the case of Ciudad Rodrigo, been deliberately
abandoned to its fate, imagined that this was the right
moment to assume the management of the operations.
The Principal de Souza therefore called a meeting of
the Regency, and put forward a variety of projects
for reducing the Portuguese Militia, disbanding the
corps at Lisbon, and garrisoning Oporto with some of
1 Romana to Wellington, 16th Sept. 1 8 10. Wellington MSS.
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 497
Wellington's troops. He also proposed to obtain an 18 10.
order from the British Government that the British Sept.
General should take the offensive, maintain the war on
the frontier, and consult the Regency as to the dis-
position of the forces. All this was done behind Stuart's
back ; and de Souza's letter to London had actually
been written, when Forjaz loyally brought the matter
to the knowledge of the British envoy. Stuart detained
the ship for three days in order to compose a
counterblast to the Principal's absurdities, and then took
him and his fellow-mischief-maker, the Patriarch, to
task in conversation. De Souza thereupon repeated
his plea in favour of an offensive campaign, and went
so far as to recommend that the British fleet and
transports should quit the Tagus, that Beresford's
chief staff- officers should be dismissed, of course in
order to give place to creatures of his own, and that
assistants should be appointed to watch Forjaz and
Wellington's Portuguese Secretary. Stuart was so
much incensed by these monstrous propositions that he
answered hotly ; whereupon, to use his own expression,
the conversation became boisterous. Yet it would be
unjust to suppose that the Principal had any idea of
treachery. He was simply an extremely conceited and
ambitious man, who wanted to control everything in
Portugal, and fondly imagined that it was his mission
to save his country.
Wellington's answer was short. He would leave
the country, he said, and advise the British Govern-
ment to withdraw its forces, should there be the
slightest interference with Beresford's staff, or with
the operations of the troops ; and he hinted that, if
necessary, he would rid himself of de Souza by summary
methods. Further, since the mob of Lisbon seemed
likely to abet their foolish leaders in the Regency, he
directed the most important of the fortifications to be
occupied by British soldiers, and declared that, unless
the capital were kept in order, he should embark the
army. De Souza, however, had by no means shot
VOL. VII 2 K.
498 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. his last bolt. He now instituted a system of
Sept. domiciliary visits and arrests of suspected persons in
Lisbon, which roused Wellington to great indignation ;
while, at the same time, he and the Patriarch obstructed
every design of the British Commander, whether for
depriving the French of the resources of the country,
or for saving the Portuguese forces by embarkation in
case of mishap. " Principal Souza," wrote Stuart,
" is a mountebank with whom, notwithstanding every
attempt, I find it impossible to converse reasonably.
I have therefore been compelled to frighten him,
which is not very difficult, by talking of the general
despondency in your army." Thus, by one shift
and another, Stuart contrived to impose his will upon
the Regency, and to keep the invaluable Forjaz, who
was threatening to resign, in his place of Secretary.
It is, however, humiliating to confess that the de-
spondency among the British troops was no fond thing
invented by the envoy for his own purposes, but a real
and deplorable fact. " There is," wrote Wellington,
" a system of croaking in the army, which is highly
injurious to the public service, and which I must
devise some means of putting an end to, or it will
put an end to us." This severe criticism was wrung
from Wellington by a letter which an officer of the
Guards had sent to a friend in Oporto, giving so terrific
an account of the numbers and movements of the
French as to throw the whole town into a panic. Yet
this offender did but imitate the example set by Generals
in the British service, who doubtless thought to magnify
their own importance by differing from their chief, but
succeeded only in branding themselves as short-sighted
and unintelligent.1
The accumulation of these annoyances weighed
heavily upon the General ; and while groaning under
them he poured out his afflicted soul to his brother
1 Stuart to Wellington, 3rd, 8th, 15th Sept. {Wellington MSS.) ;
Wellington to Stuart, nth, 1 8th Sept.; to Beresford, 8th Sept.;
to Trant, nth Aug. 1810.
ch. xxxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 499
William. His army was, he said, the worst British 18 10.
army that ever was sent from England ; and his second- ^cPl-
in-command, whom he had welcomed a few months
before, was very unfit for his situation. " He is a
good executive officer," Wellington continued, " but
has no mind and is incapable of forming any opinions
of his own ; and he is the centre of all the vulgar and
foolish opinions of the day. ... I cannot depend upon
him for anything. He gives his opinion upon every
subject, changes it with the wind, and if any misfortune
occurs or the act recommended by him is disapproved
of, there is no effort to be looked for from him. . . .
With the exception of Beresford I have no assistance.
... I am left to myself, to my own exertions, to my
own execution, the mode of execution, and even the
superintendence of that mode, but still I don't despair.
. . . Government have behaved with their usual weak-
ness and folly about reinforcements, and I shall get none
of those which have been promised to me, but the Duke
of Brunswick's infantry instead." l
This last complaint was true, for Liverpool's latest
letters from England had confirmed the previous dis-
appointments in the matter of reinforcements. The
curse of Walcheren still lay heavy upon the battalions
at home, and not one of them was fit for active service.
Liverpool, therefore, could only authorise the with-
drawal of further troops from Cadiz, and send out the
infantry of the Duke of Brunswick's corps — the regi-
ment of Brunswick-Oels as it was called, which had been
rescued from Germany in 1 809 — and a batch of drafts.
Hence, notwithstanding all untoward appearances, troops
poured into Lisbon during September. The Eighty-
eighth,2 sent by mistake from Cadiz but retained by
Wellington, was the first to arrive, and enabled the
Eighty-third to march northward from Lisbon on the 4th
of September. The Seventy-ninth, " a noble battalion,"
was, as we have seen, actually at Thomar by the 12 th ;
1 Wellington to Wellesley Pole, 5th Sept. 1 8 10. Supp. Desp.
vi. 588. Wellington MSS. - 2/88th.
500 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. and the squadron of the Thirteenth Light Dragoons,
Sept. which came with it, marched to join the rest of the
regiment on the 19th. The Brunswick regiment and
five hundred drafts reached Lisbon on the 17th, and
the Ninety-fourth and a company of the Ninety-fifth,
from Cadiz, on the 20th. And this was not all, for on
the 10th of September Liverpool wrote to announce
that, in view of the importance of securing Portugal,
four more battalions,1 though fever-stricken, should
leave England at once ; and he was as good as his word.
The Fiftieth, veterans of Vimeiro and Coruna, sailed
into the Tagus on the 24th, and the Seventy-first on
the 26th ; and although the Thirtieth and Forty-fourth 2
from Cadiz, and the Fourth and Ninety-second from
England, as well as two additional companies of artillery,
did not come until October, yet Wellington knew that
they were on their way. Lastly, by good fortune the
remounts of the British cavalry arrived in the nick of
time, just as the serious work of the campaign was
beginning, and were pronounced by Cotton to be very
good. Altogether, great though were Wellington's
trials and difficulties at this critical moment, he had also
his consolations.3
Sept. 15. On the 15th Massena, after leaving some thirty-five
hundred men at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, began
his advance with sixty-five thousand men of all ranks, at
about the time which Napoleon had prescribed for him.
His first movements were puzzling, as was to be expected
from so great a master of his art. On the evening of
the 15th the Second Corps lay at Guarda, the Sixth at
Freixedas, and the Eighth, with the reserve cavalry and
artillery behind it, towards Pinhel, giving no clue to
Sept. 16. their ultimate route. On the 16th part of the Second
1 i/4th, i/5oth, i/7ist, i/92nd. 2 2/30th, 2/44^.
3 Peacocke to Wellington, 3rd, 17th, 20th, 24th, 26th Sept. ;
Graham to Wellington, 24th Sept. ; Liverpool to Wellington,
10th Sept.; Torrens to Wellington, 11th Sept.; Cotton to Well-
ington, 19th Sept. 1 8 10 {Wellington MSS.). Wellington to Graham,
15th Sept. 1810; Liverpool to Wellington, 2nd Aug. 1810 (Supp.
Desp. vi. 567).
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 501
Corps remained at Guarda, while the rest made for 1810.
Celorico, where the Sixth Corps had already arrived, and
whence it had sent its cavalry out along several roads ;
and the Eighth Corps closed up its rear to Pinhel.
Still, there was nothing to show whether the advance
was to be north or south of the Serra da Estrella ; but
on the 17th Ney struck westward, and crossed the Sept. 1
Mondego by the bridge of Fornos ; the whole of
Reynier's corps came up to Celorico ; and Junot marched
due west along a bad cross-road upon Trancoso. From
the first Wellington thought it certain that at least one
column would go by way of Vizeu ; but the reports of
Somers-Cocks and Waters on the 17 th had left little
doubt that the whole of the army would move by that
route, Junot from Trancoso along the northern track,
and the remaining corps by the southern and parallel
road from Fornos. Massena had decided to reach
Coimbra by way of Vizeu, on the north of the Serra
da Estrella, and in doing so he had chosen the worst
highway in Portugal. It is not difficult to understand
why he had made this blunder. He knew that Well-
ington had thrown up entrenchments on the Alva to
bar his advance by the paved road, and his only map was
miserably faulty.1 Portuguese renegades informed him
that this paved road, from the multitude of its steep
inclines, offered no advantage over any other in the
matter of transit, whereas the northern route would
not only be easy, but would lead straight to Coimbra,
unobstructed by any important position. Wellington
on his side surveyed the movement with grim satisfaction.
His fortified lines on the Alva were now useless, but
he had greater knowledge than Massena's Portuguese
officers of the country to north of Coimbra. A party
of cavalry was left on the high ground about Gouvea,
to make sure that Reynier should not even now take
1 I have seen the actual maps used by Massena, and can vouch
for all the defects which Mr. Oman describes in them (iii. 347-348).
I have tried to use them in writing this history in all parts of the
Peninsula, and have found them nowhere to be trusted.
502 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. the paved road; and the First, Third, and Fourth
Divisions fell back along the way towards Ponte da
Murcella, while the Light Division remained about Cea
to cover the British headquarters. At the same time
Wellington ordered Leith and Hill to move at once
northward upon Espinhal ; the latter to wait further
orders there, and the former, after the head of Hill's
column should have reached Espinhal, to halt at Miranda
do Corvo. He had already summoned Trant to close
in with his militia from Moimenta da Beira upon
Massena's right flank.
Sept. 18. On the 18th Spencer with the First Division reached
Foz d'Arouce, about nine miles east and south of Coim-
bra, and sent one brigade into the town to secure it
against surprise ; while Pack's Portuguese brigade
crossed the Mondego at Foz Dao, eighteen or twenty
miles up the river from Coimbra. The British head-
quarters on this day were at Cortica, some four miles
south-east of Foz Dao. On this day, likewise, Ney's
advanced guard entered Vizeu, to find it empty, deserted,
and resourceless, while the main body of his infantry
halted at Mangualde, and his artillery, hopelessly delayed
by the badness of the roads, bivouacked a few miles
beyond Fornos. Reynier's foremost troops moved
along the left bank of the Mondego as far as San Paio,
as though to follow the route taken by Wellington ; but
the British Commander was not deceived by this feint,
though a part of the Second Corps, owing to the block-
ing of the road, still remained on the south bank of the
Mondego.
Sept. 19. On the 19th Spencer's Division entered Coimbra,
and Pack's brigade was sent on to Santa Comba Dao
with orders to push its advanced guard well towards
Tondella and, if pressed by a superior force, to retire
behind the Criz. Headquarters remained at Cortica, and
the whole of the British cavalry was brought forward
about Moita, with the exception of a few German
hussars, who remained around Cea to watch the move-
ments of the French, and of Somers -Cocks, who,
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 503
following for some distance upon the enemy's track, 18 10.
ascertained that Massena had abandoned his communica- ^>cPt-
tions and was carrying with him everything, even to his
sick men. On this same day, Hill passed the Zezere ;
and Leith, arriving at Espinhal, received commands to
move on to Foz d'Arouce. Trant also was summoned
to cross the Vouga at Pedro do Sul, and hasten south-
westward to Agueda and Sardao, so as to cover the road
which leads over the Serra de Caramullo to Oporto,
and to protect the left flank of the army. This last
order was due to an excursion of the French to
westward, rendering it uncertain whether they might
not follow that direction as far as Agueda, and then
turn south over the plain upon Coimbra. At the
same time instructions were issued that on the following
day Spencer should lead the First Division, a British
brigade,1 and two Portuguese brigades of infantry due
north to Mealhada ; that Craufurd should move the
Light Division over the river to Mortagoa to support
Pack ; and that the Fourth Division should march to
Penacova on the western bank of the Mondego. The
cavalry division, together with Picton's, was left about
Ponte da Murcella to maintain communications with
Leith and Hill. Thus Wellington was in a position to
bar the way to the French by whatever route they might
advance. If they took the southern road, he could form
his line on the ridge of Bussaco, which lies only four miles
east of Mealhada ; if they took the western road, it may
be presumed that he had chosen an advantageous site
for battle on the ridge of the Serra de Caramullo."2
Meanwhile, on the 19th, Junot's infantry had joined
1 1 /7th, 1 /79th, which had lately arrived at Lisbon.
2 Napier and Mr. Oman both treat the forces of Trant and
Spencer as designed to observe the great road from Oporto to
Coimbra. This would imply that they were facing north. But
Trant was told that at Agueda, the most northerly point occupied
by any part of Wellington's army, he would form the left flank;
therefore the front, both of Trant and Spencer, must have been
towards the east, observing the road that leads from the east into
the great road from Oporto aforesaid.
5o4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Ney's at Vizeu; but his cannon had not come up, and
the reserve artillery and transport of the army at large
Sept. 20. had lagged far behind. On the 20th Junot's guns, after
enormous exertion, reached Vizeu, the gunners having
been obliged practically to reconstruct the roadway ;
and on the same day Trant, coming down from
Moimenta da Beira with a brigade of militia and two
squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, attacked the column
of reserve-artillery when drawn out along three miles
of narrow and precipitous road. He succeeded in
destroying some carriages and in capturing a few
prisoners, and with better troops could hardly have
failed to destroy the entire convoy. His raw levies,
however, would not stand against the regular soldiers
of the escort, though the latter were but one to four
against them ; and Massena thus escaped a disaster which
must almost certainly have forced him to renounce his
campaign. The convoy, however, dared not proceed
further until the next day, nor could the Marshal resume
his advance in force until it should come up. How-
Sept. 21. ever, on the 2 1 st Ney's vanguard, which on the
20th had already been moved southward from Vizeu
as far as Tondella, continued its march in the same
direction upon Santa Comba Dao, while the whole of
the Sixth and Second Corps followed in the rear. On
Sept. 22. the 22nd the Second Corps took the lead of the Sixth,
and in the afternoon the advanced guard crossed the
Criz, driving back the British outposts, which withdrew
to Mortagoa; but Ney's corps remained halted on the
road, and Reynier's motionless at Vizeu. The French
train of artillery and supplies was still far in rear,
and in need of rest and repair ; while the aspect of
the country, stripped carefully to nakedness, showed
Massena that he could count upon no provisions except
those which he carried with him.
On the 20th Leith's brigade came up to Foz
d'Arouce ; while Hill on the same evening reached
Espinhal, and found there the Portuguese division of
Colonel Le Cor, who had hastened thither from Fundao.
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 505
Wellington therefore on that day gave the following 1810.
orders for the morrow. The Fourth Division was to
move up from Penacova to the convent of Bussaco ;
Picton's was to cross the Mondego at Penacova and
take its place ; Leith's was to march from Foz d'Arouce
and take the place of Picton's at Ponte da Murcella ;
and the cavalry was to pass the river and occupy
the villages between Mortagoa and Bussaco. On the
2 1 st, therefore, the entire army, Hill's division excepted, Sept. 21.
was within a few hours' march of the ridge of Bussaco ;
and Wellington on that day transferred his headquarters
to the convent upon that ridge. " We have a most
excellent position here," he wrote, " where I am strongly
tempted to give battle. Unfortunately, Hill is one
day later than I expected, and there is a road upon
our left by which we may be turned and cut off from
Coimbra. But I do not yet give up hopes of dis-
covering a remedy for this last misfortune ; and, as
for the other, the enemy will afford it to us if they
do not cross the Criz to-morrow." The enemy did Sept. 22.
not cross the Criz on the morrow ; wherefore Hill
was enabled to reach the Alva in plenty of time, and
Wellington to send a message to Trant, bidding him
once again to take post at Sardao and so to block the
road which, leading upon that point from Mortagoa
by Avelleira and Boialvo, turns the position of Bussaco
by the north. On the 23rd, the situation remained Sept. 23.
unchanged, the British advanced guard lying still before
Mortagoa, Hill opposite Penacova, Spencer at Meal-
hada, Leith's, Picton's, and Cole's divisions on the
Serra do Bussaco.1 In the afternoon, however, Reynier's
1 That the three divisions were all on the Serra do Bussaco
by the evening of the 22nd is shown by Wellington to Hill, 22nd
Sept. 1 810. It is evident from the orders of the O.M.G. of the
same date {Desp. iv. 296) that Hill was opposite Penacova on the
23rd. I give these details because Mr. Oman (iii. 356) says on
the authority of Leith - Hay that Leith's division crossed the
Mondego on the 23rd, whereas Wellington, whom Mr. Oman also
quotes, says that Leith's division was on the Serra on the evening
of the 22nd (to Hill, 22nd Sept., 8.30 p.m.).
506 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. corps drove in the British picquets, and Wellington
ordered the Light Division to retire, covering the
movement with three regiments of light cavalry. But
the French advanced no further than to the heights
above Mortagoa ; and in the evening Wellington with-
drew the whole of the cavalry, three squadrons excepted,
to the Serra, leaving the Light Division strongly posted
near the foot of the hill.
Sept. 25. On the 25th Craufurd led the Light Division down
into the plain, where it found itself presently in face
of the whole of Reynier's corps. Panting, as usual,
to distinguish himself, he kept his troops far too long
on the lower ground ; and all Wellington's skill was
needed to bring off the infantry without a serious en-
gagement.1 The action of the rear-guard was prolonged
until five o'clock, when the French were finally checked
before the village of Sula, on the lower slopes of the Serra
do Bussaco, and at six o'clock the firing ceased. The
Light Division then ascended the heights, and Loison's
division, which formed the French vanguard, bivouacked
at their base. On that evening Wellington summoned
Spencer and his troops from Mealhada and Hill's divi-
sion from the south of the Mondego, ordering the latter
to leave Fane's Portuguese horse and Le Cor's infantry
in position at Ponte da Murcella. Both divisions were in
Sept. 26. their places by nine o'clock on the morning of the 26th.
The Serra do Bussaco consists of a single un-
interrupted ridge covered with heather and gorse,
which rises abruptly from the broken country around,
and overtops the whole of it by from three to five
hundred feet, presenting from the summit one of the
most glorious views to be found in Portugal. From
the Mondego, which forms its southern boundary, this
ridge has a total length of about nine miles, and runs
in a general direction nearly due south and north.
1 Napier, iii. 324. Mr. Oman throws doubt on Napier's state-
ment that Craufurd imperilled his division on this occasion ; but
Napier is confirmed by Kincaid {Random Shots, p. 83), and Leach
confesses that the rear-guard was very hard pressed.
ch. xxxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 507
Its highest point is nearly eighteen hundred feet ' above 18 10.
the level of the sea, and lies near the Mondego, from Sept. 26.
which summit it tends gradually to fall on its progress
northward ; but it does so in long waves, which flow
up to a succession of peaks, each crowned by masses
of grey boulders. The sides of the hill are seamed
with ravines, most of which carry a tiny tributary
to the stream below ; but the water gushes from the
rock, not from bogs at the summit, and this peculiarity
distinguishes the ridge from one to which it bears, in
character, a singular resemblance, namely, Dunkery Hill
on Exmoor.2 For not only is the top of the hill sound,
firm ground, but the ravines, or combes, to use the
good old English word, are shallower, less steep, and less
narrow than their counterparts in Somerset. They are,
however, strewn with great stones, through which troops
could indeed pass, but very slowly, so that for practical
purposes they cut up the hill into vertical sections.
Near the northern extremity of the hill, and upon the
reverse or western slope, stood the convent of Bussaco,
now in ruins, surrounded by a wood and enclosed by
a wall, making convenient headquarters for Wellington.
The surface of the summit, outside this enclosure and
for some distance to southward, is broad, flat, and fairly
well fitted for cavalry, though always encumbered with
stones among the heather ; and the same characteristic
is to be observed towards the centre of the position,
though the southern half of the ridge has a saddle-back.
Speaking generally, the chasm which parts the Serra
from the lower hills on the east is, as Napier says, so
profound that from the top the naked eye can hardly
distinguish the movement of troops at the bottom.3
1 Mr. Oman says 1200 feet, but the ordnance map marks the
highest point at 547 metres.
2 I speak of the eastern front of Bussaco and the northern front ot
Dunkery, but the ridge of Bussaco is fully twice as long as Dunkery.
3 Mr. Oman (iii. 363 n.) takes exception to this statement of
Napier, applying it to the combe which seams the side of the hill
between Moura and Sula, instead of to the main valley, as I think
that Napier intended.
508
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Three principal roads cross the Serra do Bussaco ;
Sept. 26. tne first running from San Paulo to Palmases about three
miles north of the Mondego ; the second still further to
north, leading from San Antonio de Cantara to Pal-
heiros ; and the third, which is the paved road from Mor-
tagoa to Coimbra, towards the northern extremity near
the convent. Besides these there were two bad tracks,
which traversed the lower shoulders of the extreme south
of the hill. It was tolerably certain that an enemy
which contemplated an assault of the position would, if
only to avoid blunders of direction, advance near one or
more of these roads ; and Wellington had drawn up his
line accordingly. Having somewhat fewer than fifty
thousand infantry,1 he could not, of course, hold a front
1 First Division. Spencer.
Stopford's Brigade. 1 /Coldstream, i/3rd Guards,
1 co. 5/6oth ....... 1684
Blantyre's Brigade. zjz^th., 2/42nd, i/6lst, 1 co.
5/6oth . . . . . . . .1516
Lowe's Brigade. 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th Line batts.,
detachment L.I., K.G.L. ..... 2061
Pakenham's Brigade. i/7th, i/79th . . . 1792
Total .
Second Division. Hill.
W. Stewart's Brigade (Colborne in command). i/3rd,
2/3 1st, 2/48th, 2/66th, 1 co. 5/6oth .
Inglis's Brigade. 29th, i/48th, 1 /57th, 1 co
5/6oth
Wilson's Brigade. 2/28th, 2/34^, 2/39th, 1 co
5/6oth
Total .
70 53
2247
1818
1672
5737
Hamilton's Portuguese Division (attached to Hill's).
Archibald Campbell's Brigade. 4th, 10th Line
(each 2 batts.) ....... 2250
Fonseca's Brigade. 2nd and 14th Line (each 2
batts.) ........ 2690
Total
4940
ch. xxxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 509
of nine miles effectively at every point; but neither 18 10.
could the enemy attack it at every point. He had SePt- a6-
caused a road to be constructed from end to end of the
ridge along the western, or reverse, side ; and he trusted,
therefore, to be able to reinforce any threatened quarter
not only with ease, but unseen by the enemy. On his
right, therefore, he stationed Hill's division of ten
British battalions ; with five companies of the Lusi-
tanian Legion at Nossa Senhora do Monte, far forward
on the lower slopes to Hill's right front, and two
Portuguese brigades on his right. Then came the right
wing of Leith's brigade, three British and two Por-
Tkird Division. Picton.
Mackinnon's Brigade. i/45th, l/74-th, l/88th . 1808
Lightburne's Brigade. 2/5 th, 2/8 3rd, 3 cos. 5/6oth . 1 160
de Champalimaud's Portuguese Brigade. 9th Line
(2 batts.), 21st Line (1 batt.) .... 1775
Total . . 4743
Fourth Division. Cole.
Alex. Campbell's Brigade. z/7th, i/nth, 2/53^,
1 co. 5/6oth ....... 2109
Kemmis's Brigade. 3/27th, i/40th, old 97th, 1 co.
5/6oth ........ 2448
Collins's Portuguese Brigade. 1 1 th and 23rd Line
(each 2 batts.) 2843
Total .... 7400
Fifth Division. Leith.
Barnes's Brigade. 3/ist, I /9th, 2/38th . . . 1879
Spry's Portuguese. 3rd and 15th Line (each 2
batts.), Thomar Militia, 1 batt 2619
Eben's Portuguese. 3 batts. Lusitanian Legion . 1646
Douglas's Portuguese. 8th Line (2 batts.) . . 1161
Total .... 7305
Light Division. Craufurd.
Beckwith's Brigade. i/43rd, 4 cos. i/95th, 3rd
Port. Cacadores ...... 1896
Barclay's Brigade. i/52nd, 4 cos. i/95th, 1st Port.
Cacadores . . . . . . .1891
Total .... 3787
510 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1810. tuguese battalions, astride of the San Paulo road ; next,
Sept. 26. a gap of two miles, and then Leith's five remaining
Portuguese battalions. On the left of these, at the head
of the Palheiros road, stood Picton's division ; and
on the left of Picton the three brigades of Spencer's
division, the Guards on the right, Cameron's brigade in the
centre, and Pakenham's on the left. To the left of these
again, Pack's Portuguese covered the southern angle and
eastern front of the convent's enclosure; and on Pack's
left the Light Division took up the line, which was pro-
longed by Campbell's brigade of Portuguese, and finally
ended by Cole's division, which occupied two parallel
ridges on the extreme north of the Serra. Coleman's
Portuguese and the King's German Legion were drawn
up in rear of Craufurd, the former in column on the
Independent Portuguese Brigades.
Pack. 1st and 16th Line (each 2 batts.), 4th batt.
Cacadores ....... 2769
H. Campbell. 6th and 1 8th Line (each 2 batts.),
6th batt. Cacadores ...... 3249
Coleman. 7th and 19th Line (each 2 batts.), 2nd
batt. Cacadores ....... 2345
Cavalry. 2 squadrons 4th Dragoons . . . . 210
Artillery.
British. Horse, 332 ; Field, 700 .... 1032
K.G.L. Field 318
Portuguese ....... (say) 600
Total.
Infantry. British, 24,777 ; Portuguese, 24,549 49,326
Cavalry. „ 210 ; „ nil. 210
Artillery. „ 135°; •>■> 600 I»95°
Total of all ranks . . . 51,486
British Cavalry (near Mealhada).
De Grey's Brigade. 3rd D.G., 2 sq. 4th D. . . 620
Slade's Brigade. 1st D., 14th L.D. . . . 967
Anson's Brigade. 16th L.D., 1st Hussars K.G.L. . 902
Total .... 2489
Troops left on the Alva.
Cavalry. Fane's Brigade. 13th L.D., 430, 4 Por-
tuguese regiments, 1450 ..... 1880
Infantry. Lecor's Portuguese Division . . .4811
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 511
right, the latter in line on the left. The enclosure of 18 10.
the convent had been fully prepared for defence. Of
the cavalry, two squadrons of the Fourth Dragoons only
were stationed behind the Guards on the summit of the
hill. The remainder were kept on the lower ground in
rear of the position, about Mealhada, from whence they
sent patrols out to the northern flank of the ridge,
and in particular to the road from Mortagoa to Sardao,1
though with every precaution to avoid calling the
enemy's attention to the existence of this route.
On the evening of the 25th Ney's corps came up to Sept. 25.
the station occupied by Reynier's corps before the Serra,
and the latter took ground farther to the south about
San Antonio de Cantaro. On the following morning Sept. 26.
Ney reconnoitred Wellington's position ; and at half-
past ten he wrote to Reynier that the British were
movinsf the bulk of their force to the north, towards
the Oporto road ; though the ground to the right, that
is to say, to the north,2 of the convent seemed to be held
in some strength and showed twelve guns. He added
that, if he were in command, he should attack at once,
and that in any case Reynier could not go wrong in
driving in the British outposts and preparing to turn
the British right. This letter betrays not only an utter
misconception of the situation, but contentment with very
imperfect reconnaissance. The highest point from which
Ney could have surveyed the Serra was from two to four
hundred feet below its summit ; hence it was impossible
for him to see if the position were occupied, unless the
troops had been brought forward beyond the crest,
which was the last mistake that Wellington was likely to
make.3 The battalions which the Marshal saw marching
1 Memoirs of Viscount Combermere, i. 158.
2 So at least I understand it ; and the guns which he saw were,
I take it, those of Ross's battery with Craufurd, and of the K.G.L.'s
battery before the enclosure.
3 "When upon the Serra, the troops are to be kept a little
behind the ridge, so that they may not be seen by the enemy until
it becomes necessary to move them up on the ridge to repel an
attack." O.M.G. to Hill, 25th Sept. 1810.
5i2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. northward can only have been Cole's division, shifting to
Sept. 26. their left in order to make room for Spencer ; and, all
troops to the south of the convent being invisible to
him, he drew the hasty conclusion that the British were
retreating upon Mealhada, and that a direct attack by
his own corps, combined with a turning movement by
Reynier's, would suffice to clear the Serra. French
officers at the foot of the heights were by no means so
confident. It seemed to them that it was no light
matter to order their infantry even to climb the ascent,
without fighting an enemy at the top.1
Meanwhile Massena was not at the front, and
Junot's corps was still far in the rear, so that Ney
could only send his report to his chief at Mortagoa.
At two o'clock in the afternoon Massena appeared,
and reconnoitred the Serra as closely as circumstances
permitted. Accounts vary greatly as to the opinions
of his generals concerning the course that should be
pursued. Some say that Junot, Reynier, and Ney were
unanimous for an immediate attack ; others that they
were unanimous against it ; others again that Junot and
Reynier were for it and Ney against it.2 It seems most
probable that the first of these three accounts is the
true one ; but that the regimental officers were of one
mind in the contrary view. Finally Massena issued his
orders for the morrow. Reynier's corps, nearly fifteen
thousand infantry, was to assail the British right in
one or two columns, covered by skirmishers, at such
points as seemed to him most accessible ; and, having
gained the summit, to form close column and turn
north to the convent at Bussaco. The Sixth Corps,
nearly twenty-two thousand infantry, was to attack by
the two roads that led to Coimbra, that is to say, by the
paved road and by a rough track that runs parallel to
it on the north side, through the village of Sula ; but it
was not to move until Reynier was seen to be master
1 Guingret, Relation . . . de la Campagne de Portugal, p. 53.
2 See authorities in Oman, iii. 368-369 ; and compare Aperi;u
Nouveau sur les Campagnes des Francais en Portugal with Guingret.
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 513
of the heights, unless to foil any menace of the 18 10.
British against the Second Corps. Lastly, the Eighth ScPc- z6-
Corps, about sixteen thousand infantry, was to remain
in reserve at Moura, with its artillery disposed so as to
check any forward movement of the British. The entire
force of the French infantry thus numbered something
over fifty thousand of all ranks, and there was little
hope of effective help for them from their artillery,
since the summit of the Serra was for the most part
out of range from any possible position of the French
guns. From the tenor of these directions it is plain
that Massena had no inkling of the presence of Hill's
corps, nor, probably, even of Leith's. However, having
made these very crude arrangements, he returned to
Mortagoa for the night.
The dawn of the 27th broke misty on the Serra do Sept. 27.
Bussaco, when Reynier began to array his soldiers for
action. The point of attack selected by him was the
leading spur traversed by the road to Palheiros, which
crosses the ridge in a depression between two of the
tallest peaks ; but, sharing Massena's idea that there were
no British troops to the south of Picton, he arranged his
advance accordingly. Merle's division of eleven bat-
talions, each about six hundred strong, took the right
and began the ascent to north of the road ; Heudelet's
division of fifteen battalions took the left, following
the line of the road itself; and to south of them
there was nothing.1 Each regiment, whether consisting
of three or four battalions, was formed into a single
column of companies, which would give a front of
about fifty men to a regiment ; and the whole appear
to have moved off in echelon from their right,
1 Merle's Division :
Brigade Sarrut. 2nd Light, ?6th Line ) „ , , .
B ■* , P • - fi t • 1,- Total, 1 1 battal
.Brigade (jraindorge. 4th Light J
ions.
Heudelet's Division
Brigade Fov. 17th Light, 70th Line ) _, , ,
Brigade Arnaud. 3 1st Light, 47th Line f Totai' ' 5 battalions.
VOL. VII 2 L
5 H HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. covered by a cloud of light troops. The 36th of the
Sept. 27. Line led Merle's division, followed in succession by
the 2nd and 4th Light ; while of Heudelet's division
the 31st Light took the lead, always in rear of Merle's
troops, along the line of the road itself, with Foy's
brigade in support, and the 47th of the Line held in
reserve.
It was apparently at about half- past five that
Merle's division, having been massed about a mile to
the north of the road from San Antonio, threw out its
skirmishers and began to toil up the acclivity of the
Serra. Neither man nor horse will climb straight up
a steep hill if they can ascend it slanting ; and, since
the upper slopes of the hill were shrouded in mist, the
heads of the columns, except the 31st Regiment, which
was guided by the road, seem to have inclined with
one accord to the north, that is to say, to the French
right. The rear of the columns, perceiving the tendency,
conformed to it ; and the bulk of the force streamed
slowly in diagonal lines towards the high and command-
ing ground occupied by the right of Spencer's division.
Wellington, having observed on the previous evening
the movement of French troops up the valley opposite
to this point, had summoned Lightburne's brigade to
close up to the right of Spencer's division, and had
ordered Leith to detach Spry's brigade and the 8 th
Regiment of Portuguese to reinforce Picton ; from which
it would appear that, contrary to the generally accepted
notion, he was prepared to let the enemy gain the summit
of the hill in his centre.1 Nor is this surprising, for
the French were bound to reach the top breathless and
in disorder ; they would have no guns with them ; they
would take some time to deploy to their front, in which
case Spencer could fall upon their flank ; and still
longer to change front to the right, in order to attack
Spencer, in which case Hill would not be slow to come
up in their rear. Picton, however, feeling nervous about
the gap between his own division and Lightburne's
1 Wrottesley's Life of Burgoyne, i. 112.
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 515
brigade, sent off the Eighty-eighth under Colonel 18 10.
Wallace on the same evening to the head of a combe Sept- 2-
about a mile to his left, by which the French might
ascend the height unperceived.
Before a shot had been fired on the morning of the
27th, Mackinnon, after visiting Wallace's post, reported
that the enemy was assembling over against it ; where-
upon Picton reinforced the Eighty-eighth with four
companies of the Forty-fifth under Major Gwynne.
Then the battle began, as Merle's skirmishers came up
and opened fire upon Lightburne's brigade. Light-
burne's light companies l swarmed out to meet them ;
and presently Wellington galloped up, and having
ordered the battalion -companies of the Fifth, whose
men were beginning to fall, to retire beyond the crest,
directed two of Thompson's guns, under Captain Lane,
to unlimber on a knoll below and play with grape upon
the French. Upon this Merle's column swerved to
its left, though some of his skirmishers stood for some
time in front of Lightburne until finally repulsed ; and
the British sharp-shooters, who had been strengthened
by Wallace, moved along the side of the hill parallel
with them, until they passed out of sight both of
Lightburne and of the Eighty-eighth. Wellington
then rode away, and Lightburne's brigade stood with
ordered arms, awaiting what might come.
Meanwhile Reynier's fourteen guns, posted upon
such points of vantage as he could find, opened a heavy
but ineffective fire upon Picton's main position at the
pass of San Antonio; and presently the French 31st
came up by the road along the easiest slope on the
whole of the Serra. The single Portuguese battery at
the head of the pass had been reinforced by a second
early in the morning ; and their twelve guns ploughed
bloody furrows through the serried columns ; but still
the gallant Frenchmen pressed on, driving the British
skirmishers aside till they were stopped by the fire
of the British Seventy-fourth, and of two Portuguese
1 Those of the Eighty-third and Fifth only, so far as I can gather.
516 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. regiments aligned upon either flank of it. The light
Sept. 27. companies of Picton's division, owing to the inclusion
of three odd companies of the Sixtieth, made up so
numerous a body that they had been combined into
a light corps, under Lieutenant -colonel Williams ;
and that officer, with excellent judgment, ranged his
men along the left flank of the 31st, while three
companies of the Seventy -fourth came forward to
straiten it on the right flank. The unfortunate regi-
ment was brought to a standstill. In vain it strove to
deploy ; it was always scourged back into a formless
mass by the rain of grape and musketry in front
and flanks. Very soon Picton was satisfied that
nothing was to be feared in this quarter, and hastened
off to his left to see how things fared with Wallace ;
giving orders for the remaining companies of the Forty-
fifth and a battalion of the 8 th Portuguese to follow
him.
Wallace, for his part, had stationed the four companies
of the Forty-fifth at some distance to his right, evidently
in order that they might watch the head of another
cleft in the hillside ; but on seeing the French masses
swerve away in that direction he sent his Major, Dunne,
to follow its progress and report to him. Dunne
returned instantly with the news that the French
sharp-shooters had ensconced themselves in a ledge of
rocks near the crest, beyond which the main body was
advancing full upon the four companies of the Forty-
fifth. Wallace without hesitation formed his battalion
into column, and moved rapidly to the support of
Gwynne. As he drew near the rocks, his force was
raked from end to end by the fire of the French,
who were hidden there ; but calmly drawing out three
companies to sweep the enemy from their shelter, he
led the remaining six to the help of the Forty-fifth.
Gwynne's men had already opened fire upon the principal
French column with no appreciable effect, when Wallace
came up on their right, and after a volley at close range
gave the word to charge. The odds were heavy, but the
ch. xxxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 517
French were breathless and disordered, as well thev 18 10.
might be after so arduous a climb over ground so rough ; Sept. 27-
and it should seem that their regiments had become
mingled together,1 so that it was not easy for them to
correct their formation. In any case, such was the impetu-
osity of the onslaught upon their flank that they recoiled
and became crowded together, while the British bayonets
played fearful havoc among them. Wellington, who
was watching near at hand, brought up a couple of
guns 2 to ply the flank and rear of the column with
grape. The 36th then gave way, and surging back
laterally upon the 2nd, carried them in turn back upon
the 4th. Douglas's battalion of the 8th Portuguese,
which, with a hesitation pardonable in young troops,
had at first shrunk from closing with numbers so
superior, struck in at once when the French began to
waver, and presently the whole of Merle's division
turned and ran down the slope with British, Irish,
and Portuguese hard at their heels. Nor did the
pursuers abandon the slaughter until the fire of Reynier's
guns compelled them to regain their own position.
This struggle was still in progress when Picton,
riding towards the sound of the firing, came upon the
light companies of the Seventy-fourth and Eighty-eighth,
which had apparently been separated from Williams and
were falling back in disorder before a column of French ;
while a shower of bullets coming from above showed
1 Grattan of the Connaught Rangers mentions that the French
who fell opposite Lightburne's brigade were of the 2nd Light,
that some who were killed on the rocks were of the 4th Light,
and Irish brigade, and that the main attack of the Eighty-eighth
fell on the 36th.
: Mr. Chambers (Bussaco, p. 87) thinks that the two guns
mentioned by Napier were those of Captain Lane, already referred
to. But if it be a fact (as undoubtedly it seems to be) that these
two guns caused Merle's columns to swerve away to southward out
of range, it is not clear how, unless they were moved, they could
have contributed to their defeat at another point. On the other
hand, it is quite intelligible that Wellington should have called up
two more of Thompson's guns from their place with Lightburne's
brigade. Still, Mr. Chambers may be right.
51 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
iSio. him that the French sharp-shooters were in actual
Sept. 27. occupation of one of the rocky peaks on the very
summit of the hill. Rallying the light companies, he
placed them under the command of Major Smith of
the Forty-fifth, who speedily drove the French from
the peak, though he fell in the onset ; and Birming-
ham's battalion of the 8th Portuguese, coming up at
the critical moment, checked the French column by
an attack on its flank. This body can have been of
no great strength, and was probably only some fraction
of Merle's force which, having no enemy immediately
on its front, had outstripped the rest in gaining the
crest of the hill.1 The Portuguese seem only to have
brought them to a standstill ; and it was the onslaught
of the Eighty-eighth, dashing the whole of the main
attack aside from flank to flank, which accomplished
the final defeat of this as of every part of Merle's
division.2
As the fugitives of the beaten battalions came pour-
ing down the hill, General Foy had begun the ascent
to support with his brigade the attack of the 31st.
Dreading the influence of the example upon his men,
he halted them for a few minutes, when Reynier came
up to him raging. " Why don't you go on ? ' he
snouted. "You can get your men on if you choose,
instead of doing nothing." Furious with indignation,
1 Such is the construction which I place on Picton's account of
his own proceedings in two letters to Wellington and to a friend
(Robinson's Memoirs of Picton, i. 317-324, 331-338), read in con-
junction with Burgoyne's account (Wrottesley's Life of Burgoyne, i.
1 1 2-1 1 3). Mr. Oman conjectures that Picton merely took part in
the general repulse of the main column by Wallace, striking in
rather late ; and he may be right. But the impression given to
me by the various accounts is that which I have written down ;
and I find, after writing it, that it is confirmed by the observations
of Mr. Chambers.
2 Mr. Chambers in his book, Bussaco, conjectures, not un-
reasonably, that this column was Graindorge's brigade, i.e. the 4th
of the Line ; but I have already given my reasons for assuming
that Merle's division was all mixed together, and I do not think
that any very powerful column could have been so easily turned
back by raw troops.
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 519
Foy galloped to the head of his right-hand regiment, 18 10.
the 17th, and led it up the hill, bidding the 70th ScPr- 27-
follow it in echelon on the left. The direction which
he took seems to have been upon the pass of St.
Antonio, in fulfilment of his orders to support the
31st,1 but whether from accident or design, both of
his columns inclined, like their predecessors, to north-
ward. He therefore came under the full fire of the
guns at the head of the aforesaid pass. At this
juncture, however, General Leith came upon the scene,
having received a message from Wellington bidding
him move to his left and support Picton, if his own
front were not threatened. His movements had
further been quickened by a panic-stricken message
from a staff-officer, to the effect that the French had
severed the British line. The comb of the hill being
too rough for rapid advance of his troops, he formed
them into column of route and brought them on by
the road which had been cut on the reverse side of
the Serra, and, of course, out of sight of the enemy.
Riding forward to look into matters for himself, he
came upon Arentschild's Portuguese battery, on the
south side of the San Antonio road, which had ex-
hausted its ammunition. Spry's brigade together with
Douglas's battalion of the 8 th Portuguese, which last had
rallied after the pursuit of Merle's division, were drawn
up in a second line near these guns, the first line
consisting as before of the Seventy-fourth flanked by
Champalimaud's 21st and 9th Portuguese, so that the
pass was safe enough. But Foy could be seen gaining
1 Mr. Oman says that he directed his column to " the first and
lowest hill-top to the French right (north) of the San Antonio pass."
He certainly brought it ultimately to that point, but Leith's account
{Wellington Suppl. Desp. vi. 637) says that part of his column at
one time turned to its left, and only swerved to the right when the
rest of the column had succeeded in reaching the plateau. More-
over, the Adjutant of the Seventy-fourth (Cannon's Hist, of the 74th)
states that one column threatened to force the position by the road
at this time, and that, owing to the removal of the Portuguese
regiment from its left flank, the situation of the Seventy- fourth
seemed at one moment desperate.
52o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. ground farther to the north ; wherefore Leith ordered
Sept. 27. njs own battery of six-pounders to take the place of
Arentschild's, leaving the Lusitanian Legion massed on
the reverse slope to protect Arentschild's guns, and
directed the 9th Portuguese regiment from the first
line and Douglas's battalion of the 8 th from the
second line to take ground to their left towards the
threatened point. This done, he galloped off to his
British brigade, which he had halted on the other side
of the hill by the San Antonio road.
Meanwhile Foy pursued his way under a fire which,
signally brave man though he was, he described as
terrible, for the sharp-shooters of the Allies harried his
column incessantly, and the French could make no
reply. He could see that his task was hopeless, and
that over ground so difficult it was impossible to
maintain his troops in any formation, or to keep them
under any control. Still his valiant men pressed on to
the crest of the hill, encountered the two battalions of
the 9th Portuguese and Birmingham's battalion of the
8th, which seems to have resumed its former place,
drove back all three of them in disorder, and advanced
diagonally over the plateau towards the summit. The
leading soldiers gained a rocky peak in rear of Picton's
station, and stood there cheering and waving their caps,
while their comrades swarmed up, with such speed as
their exhaustion would permit, to second them.
There is no more dangerous moment for troops than
when they think that they have carried a position, and
that their work is done. At this instant Leith came up
with Barnes's brigade, and led the foremost regiment,
the Ninth, obliquely against the rocky knoll, with the
Thirty-eighth following in support. It should seem
that Douglas's battalion of the 8th Portuguese and
Meade's five companies of the Forty-fifth came up at
the same time and opened fire upon the left flank of the
French column farther down the hill.1 But be that as
1 This is Picton's account, which is borne out by Douglas's.
Leith and Gomm both claim that the Ninth Foot did the whole
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 521
it may, the Ninth attacked the knoll in line with the 18 10.
bayonet,1 and the French, apparently stupefied by the Sept. 2;
counter-assault, gave way instantly. They were still in
heavy masses, Foy having tried in vain to deploy them ;
and not all his efforts could prevent the leading troops
from shrinking towards their right away from the
attack. The Ninth poured in a volley, one bullet of
which wounded Foy in the arm ; and the entire French
brigade took to its heels, carrying their Brigadier away
with them in their flight, while the Ninth and Thirty-
eighth dashed after them and hunted them headlong to
the bottom of the hill. Never, to all superficial appear-
ance, was there a stranger rout of good French troops.
Foy's seven battalions went into action between four
and five thousand strong ; their total losses in the action
did not exceed six hundred and seventy, of which it is
fair to assume that fully one-half were incurred during
the pursuit ; and yet, after driving the Portuguese with
ease before them, they gave way before the onslaught
of a single British battalion. Nevertheless, their
Brigadier presaged the disaster from the moment when
Reynier hurried him into action before his troops were
properly formed. The men followed him with all
possible bravery ; but they followed him as a flock of
sheep, not as a body of disciplined soldiers, and as a flock
of sheep they were driven away. From the fact that
the Ninth and Thirty-eighth suffered fewer than fifty
casualties between them, it is evident that they met only
with the feeblest of resistance.2
The repulse of Foy's brigade following on the
defeat of Merle's division exhausted the powers of
of the work alone ; but with all respect to the Ninth, I fear that
they were prejudiced.
1 Leith says expressly zuithout firing a shot. Leith Hay says
that they fired a volley at ioo yards.
2 Mr. Oman is undoubtedly right in holding, in contradiction
to Napier, that the attack repulsed by Wallace with the Eighty-
eighth and that repelled by Leith with the Ninth were totally
distinct, and separated probably by at least an hour. But the
various accounts are difficult to reconcile in point of time.
522 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. Reynier. He had still one brigade in hand, but the
Sept. 27. remaining three had been so roughly handled,
having lost over two thousand killed, wounded, and
prisoners, that he could not hope to bring them up
again to the attack. Even if he had attempted it, he
would have found the whole of Hill's division to oppose
him. These troops had been hastily summoned from
the right upon the alarm that Foy had broken the
British line ; and for some distance the whole of the
eleven thousand men had moved in one column at the
double. The battle, therefore, in this quarter came to
an end.
On the British left Ney threw his corps into
action, as he had been ordered, when he thought that he
saw Merle's division reach the crest of the hill. It is
probable, however, that he mistook one of the lower
slopes for the summit and advanced his corps pre-
maturely. The ground before him was more difficult
than that before Reynier, and Craufurd had taken
masterly advantage of it. Over against the convent of
Bussaco the ground sinks at first gently, then drops
abruptly in a steep descent to a kind of little plateau,
which stands out from the hill like a bracket from a
wall ; and on this bracket Craufurd had posted the
Forty-third on the right, the Fifty-second on the left,
and the 1st Ca^adores in reserve, bidding them lie down
so that they might be concealed from view. From
this plateau the hill again falls sharply to a second of
the same kind, whereon stands the village of Sula, a
typical tiny Portuguese hamlet of red roofs and white
walls, which still bear marks of the fight. Through
the middle of the position runs a shallow combe filled
with great boulders, ideal shelter for sharp-shooters ;
and on its right lies the deepest and most impracticable
ravine on the hillside. The high road passes on
the right, or south, of this last combe, curving round
its head in a huge bend before finally striking to the
west past the convent. The ascent followed by the
road, being a leading spur, is easier than that just
ch. xxxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 523
described, which lies immediately to north of it ; and at 18 10.
one point, considerably lower than Sula, it is covered by SePc- z7-
the hamlet of Moura. To sweep this access Wellington
had stationed two if not three batteries at the head of
the deep ravine, while Ross's battery of Craufurd's
division, ensconced in a natural shelter near his infantry,
was likewise within easy range of the road. But the
ravine itself was an obstacle which effectually isolated
the infantry on its north from that on its south side, so
that Ney's onset resolved itself practically into two
distinct assaults, which will demand separate description.
The French troops that were first to move were
Loison's division, which was destined for the attack
upon Craufurd's position. It consisted of two brigades,1
each of two battalions, General Simon's, led by the
26th regiment on the right, and General Ferey's, led
by the 66th, on the left. Each of these brigades was
formed apparently into a single deep column,2 probably
of double companies, covered as usual by a swarm
of skirmishers. On beginning the ascent, however,
through a belt of pines, they found themselves from
the first stiffly resisted ; for Craufurd had thrown into
the skirmishing line the whole of the Ninety-fifth
and 3rd Cacadores, who contested every step. With
great difficulty the allied sharp-shooters were thrust back
and driven from the village of Sula, which was occupied
by the French. The enemy, however, now came under
the fire of Ross's battery, which, served with great swift-
ness and admirable accuracy, plied them with shrapnel-
shell. Craufurd then reinforced his skirmishing line
with the 1st Cacadores, and the combat was renewed
on the steep slope above the village. Still the French
pressed on undauntedly. The British sharp-shooters
came running in over the lip of the ascent to the main
body ; Ross drew back his guns ; and the head of the
1 Simon's Brigade : 26th Line, 3 batts. ; Legion du Midi ;
Leg. Hanovrienne, 2.
2 Ferey's Brigade : 2/3 2nd Leger, 1 batt. ; 66th Line, 3 ;
Eighty-second Line, 2.
524 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 8 10. French column could be heard, though still unseen,
Sept. 27. not many yards away. Then Craufurd, who was watching
solitary on the top of a boulder, in a shrill voice gave
the word to his British battalions to charge ; and nearly
eighteen hundred bayonets plunged with a mighty
shout over the edge of the slope. Four companies
only, the two on the extreme left of the Forty-third
and on the extreme right of the Fifty-second, found
any but skirmishers before them, and these four dashed
headlong into the mass of the French.1 The head of
the column stood for a moment, and the front ranks
fired a volley which knocked down a few of the British ;
but the nearest companies of the Forty-third and Fifty-
second wheeled up upon the flanks of the enemy, and
gave them in quick succession three volleys so terrible
1 Mr. Oman in his plan and in his text (iii. 380-381) shows each
regiment, whatever the number of its battalions, in column of
companies ; but he says that the 26th and 66th led the way,
which is no doubt correct. This rather points to two columns
only, which is the number given by Booth in Levinge's Historical
Records of the Forty - third. Napier speaks of one column
only, but he was on the right of the Forty-third in the action,
whereas Booth was in the left wing of the Fifty-second. The
inference is that the two columns advanced in echelon, with the
left, or Ferey's, leading. From Booth's account the front of the
two French columns was equal to that of the two right-hand
companies of the Fifty-second and the two left-hand companies of
the Forty-third. These four companies jointly numbered about
350 men, and in double rank give a frontage of 175 men. The
French 26th and 66th each in column of double companies
would have presented each a front of about 68 men (200 men
in triple rank) with some interval between them, which would
make the front almost the same as that of the four British com-
panies— 68x2 + 34 (?-e- tne fr°nt of one company) = 170 men.
Assuming, as I think Mr. Oman rightly does, that the single
battalion on the extreme left of the French was the 32nd
Light, there would remain, according to him, five columns of
regiments in front of the Forty-third and Fifty-second. Their
front in column of companies would be 34 x 5 = 170 men ; without
allowing for intervals. Assuming that there was only one interval
— that between the two brigades — and taking the interval as the
width of one company, we get 170+ 34 = 204. No certain result
can be deduced from these calculations ; but I give them to show
the base upon which I found my narrative.
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 525
that the whole turned and ran; the four British com- 18 10.
panies plying the bayonet with fearful slaughter in ^P1- z7-
the thick of them, and overthrowing, apparently, even
more than they killed or wounded. The remaining
companies of both British regiments aligned themselves,
as the first had done, along both flanks of the fugitives ;
but the four pursuing companies were too closely
mingled with the enemy to allow their comrades to
fire, otherwise the French would have been almost
annihilated. Even as things were, the rout of the enemy
was complete. One French battalion only, which had
strayed into the deep combe, escaped the fate of the
main column and came up in front of Coleman's
brigade, where it was charged by the 19th Portu-
guese and driven down to the bottom to rejoin its
comrades. Within five minutes of the beginning of
Craufurd's counter-attack the Forty-third and Fifty-
second were at the foot of the hill. It took them
half an hour to climb back to their position, and they
returned with a loss of only twenty-four men. Loison's
division on the other hand had lost over twelve hundred
killed and wounded.1
Farther to the south, across the deep combe,
Marchand's division came into action rather later than
Loison's. Upon emerging from Moura, the leading
brigade, that of Maucune, came under a destructive
1 Mr. Oman says that the counter-attack opened with a volley
of the British at ten paces distance. Craufurd undoubtedly gave
the order not to fire but to charge. The two Napiers and Booth
(Levinge's Historic^/ Records of the Forty-third) all three speak of a
charge, followed by subsequent volleys when the leading companies
of the two regiments had wheeled upon the flank of the French
column. George Napier, who was in one of the pursuing companies,
mentions expressly that he formed his men into column, but,
naturally in the circumstances, says nothing at all of their firing,
though he does speak of volleys of other companies ; and, con-
sidering the ground, I believe that the counter-attack was opened
with the bayonet only. To call men up to the brink of a very
steep descent, and order them to fire, would certainly mean that
most of the bullets would fly over the heads of the attacking
column.
526 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 10. fire, first from the three batteries at the head of the
Sept. 27. combe, and farther on from a battalion of Cacadores in
a wood on their left flank. Maucune's men, however,
cleared the wood and pushed on till they met Pack's
five Portuguese battalions, whom they engaged bravely
enough, but with no result. The second brigade, that
of Marcognet, finding itself under heavy fire of shrapnel-
shell from Ross's guns as well as from the remaining three
batteries, halted on the road ; and Ney, seeing that the
French attack had failed at all points, recalled Marchand's
division. Massena had still Junot's division and
Mermet's division of the Sixth Corps, twenty thousand
fresh men, to throw into the fight ; but besides Hill's
troops on the right and Cole's on the left, both of
which had by this time closed in towards the centre,
Wellington had also Spencer's entire division, which,
except for some skirmishing of the light companies
against a feint attack, had not fired a shot. Massena
therefore gave up the attempt to carry the position,
and by two o'clock both armies were mingling amicably
over the stream at the foot of the hill, and ministering
to the wounded. A small party of French later in
the day occupied Sula from mere bravado, but was
quickly turned out by a company of the Forty-third ;
and these were the last shots fired at the battle of
Bussaco.
The losses of the French amounted to at least four
thousand six hundred killed, wounded, and taken ; over
nine hundred officers and men being killed outright.
The casualties of the officers alone amounted to over
three hundred, and among them Generals Merle, Foy,
Simon, and Maucune were wounded, and General
Graindorge killed. The loss of the British did not
exceed six hundred and thirty-one, and, that of the
Portuguese being nearly the same, the total reached
twelve hundred and fifty-one. Few officers, even of
field rank, were hurt ; and the most interesting of those
who suffered were the three brothers Napier, George
and William wounded in neighbouring companies of
ch. xxxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 527
the Fifty-second and Forty-third, and Charles maimed 18 10.
and disfigured for life by a bullet which shattered his Sept. 27
jaw when riding on Wellington's staff in rear of the
Eighty-eighth, shortly before Wallace's charge. The
British regiments which suffered most severely were
the Forty-fifth and Eighty-eighth, the first with one
hundred and fifty, the second with one hundred and
thirty-four casualties, representing in the former case
a loss of one man in four, and in the latter of one man
in five. Among the Portuguese, in the two battalions
of the 8th there fell about one man in eight ; and in
the single battalion of the 4th, about one man in six.
With his usual good sense, Wellington gave the Portu-
guese their baptism of fire on very advantageous ground,
and they acquitted themselves upon the whole with
great credit. From that day their value was quadrupled,
for they had gained confidence in themselves and in
their leaders, and lost faith in the invincibility of the
French.
Beyond all question the result of the action was a
very unpleasant surprise for Massena, yet it is not
extraordinary that he should have attempted the attack.
His own army mustered sixty thousand men ; he was
aware that the British consisted of less than half that
number, and that the British and Portuguese jointly did
not exceed fifty thousand. Knowing little or nothing
of the resuscitation of the Portuguese troops, he left
them wholly out of account, assuming not unreasonably
in the circumstances that, at best, they were of no finer
quality than the Spaniards. Premising, therefore, that
the Portuguese would run away at once, he was not
unduly sanguine in expecting that with a superiority
of two to one he might overcome the resistance of the
British. On the other hand, the facts that he could
make little effective use of his artillery nor any close
reconnaissance of his adversary's position might well
have made him pause ; but, against this, his imperfect
information led him to understand that every day's
delay signified an increase of the Allied forces. The
528 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. accomplishment of Wellington's concentration in ample
Sept. 27. time to meet him was in fact a great surprise, which he
had not in the least foreseen.
Working, therefore, in the dark, as Massena did,
his orders were dictated under misapprehension, and
so were faulty. He assumed Picton's division to be
the right of the Allied line, and that Reynier's columns
on striking the array at that point would practically turn
Wellington's right. This is evident by his instruction
that, on gaining the summit, Reynier was to form
close column and follow the crest of the hill to the
convent of Bussaco,1 which is to say that Reynier
was to turn to his right and begin to roll up the
British array. When this movement had begun, Ney
was to start on his attack, and not before, unless he
should observe that Wellington was weakening his
left to support his right against Reynier. Now, no
sane General would have ordered Reynier to execute
such a movement if he had been aware that, on wheel-
ing towards the convent, the Second Corps would have
left fifteen thousand hostile infantry close in the rear.
Nor could the Eighth Corps have helped Reynier out
of his difficulty, for it was massed in rear of Ney's corps
three miles away, and could only have reached the Second
Corps by a march along a bad road over steep wooded
hills. The whole plan of Massena's attack was there-
fore absurd, though of that he could not be aware.
Lastly, the French leaders were unfair to their
1 Mr. Oman construes Massena's orders to mean that Reynier,
after piercing the British line, was to "re-form his men and drop
down the reverse slope of the heights on to the Coimbra road, along
which he was to pass in the direction of the convent of Bussaco
towards the rear of Wellington's centre." But Massena's words
are : " II (Reynier) descendra par la crete de la montagne sur le
chemin de Coimbre. Le point oh il devra farreter est le couvent
de Bussaco. . . . Le Marechal Ney disposera ses deux colonnes
d'attaque de maniere a donner quand le General Reynier sera
maitre des hauteurs, et au'il marchera sur le couvent de Bussaco^
Therefore Reynier's march upon the convent was meant to be
in sight of Ney, that is to say, the comb, not on the reverse side
of the hill.
ch. xxxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 529
troops. There can be no doubt that they hurried 18 10.
their men far too fast up the ascent. Napier says that SePc- 27-
Reynier's first attacking columns were close to the
summit of the hill within half an hour after they started.
This is almost incredible,1 yet it is certain that the French
infantry scaled the height with great rapidity, probably
for two reasons. First, the men were mostly young
soldiers,2 eager to show themselves worthy of the
famous names of their regiments ; and secondly, the
sharp-shooters of the Allies, pursuant to Wellington's
practice,3 were in great strength, overmastering the
French skirmishers and galling the advancing columns
severely. The officers naturally hastened the men
forward to end this annoyance the more quickly ;
and, being themselves encumbered with no heavy
weights, probably set an example of speed which the
men strained themselves to follow.4 No doubt the
mounted officers, until their horses were shot — and
only one horse on the French side reached the
plateau 5 — aggravated the evil. Lastly, the hill of
Bussaco, even as other hills, rises in tiers. Each slope
seems to be the last, and each when surmounted is
found to lead to another, a deception very well
calculated to make ardent young soldiers exhaust
themselves in a series of supreme efforts. The result
1 I speak with some confidence, having climbed the hill of
Bussaco myself, over rock and heather, as did the French troops.
I am not a slow mover, and I was not carrying a heavy musket,
ammunition, and pack, but I should have been sorry to undertake
to accomplish the ascent in much less than forty-five minutes.
2 Foy wrote a fortnight before the battle, " Before the Revolu-
tion our armies were composed of men commanded by children ;
now they are composed of children commanded by men." Girod
de l'Ain, Vie du General Foy, p. 95.
3 I must remind the reader that we owe the elucidation of this
most important point wholly to Mr. Oman.
4 The head of Ney's column, according to Booth (Levinge's
Hist. Records of the 43rd), consisted at the moment of Craufurd's
counter-attack chiefly of officers.
5 This animal belonged to Foy's aide-de-camp and was mounted
by him after his own had been killed. He was struck by two
bullets near the summit. Girod de l'Ain, p. 102.
VOL. VII 2 M
53o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. was that columns, battalions, and regiments became
Sept. 27. disordered and intermixed, and that the men came up
to the English line so breathless and spent that they
had no physical or moral force left in them. They
melted away before a counter-attack as do snow-
flakes in May beneath the first touch of the sun. It
was greatly to their honour that they ever reached
the Allied line at all.
None the less, full credit must be given to the
British troops who did the decisive work of the day.
Massena threw twenty-six thousand men into the
fighting line ; they were repulsed by little more than
half their numbers, perhaps fifteen thousand men, all
skirmishers included. When taking the offensive the
British battalions faced enormous odds without hesita-
tion, particularly the Forty-fifth and Eighty-eighth,
which at the moment of their charge did not exceed ten
companies jointly. The performance of these two
regiments indeed bears comparison with that of any
of the British corps engaged at Inkermann ; and
Wellington in his public despatch stated that he had
never witnessed a more gallant attack. It is to be noted
that the charges of the British infantry with the bayonet
were delivered in line, not in column, which is the
normal formation for shock-action. George Napier,
however, records that he formed his company of the
Fifty-second into column while advancing with the
bayonet, so that the principle at any rate was
recognised.
It remains only to notice the criticism which has
been levelled by British artillery-men against Welling-
ton's handling of his guns at Bussaco. It is contended
by the historian of the Royal Regiment that, instead of
massing his cannon in reserve until the attack should
develop itself, the General distributed his pieces on the
" easiest parts of the position," where it was supposed
that the French would attack, and that in these stations
they were so placed as to offer an excellent mark for
the enemy's fire. This was especially true, it was said,
ch. xxxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 531
of Arentschild's two Portuguese batteries on the San 18 10.
Antonio road. Now Wellington's relations with his
gunners were not of the happiest, chiefly because they,
as the children of the Master of the Ordnance, were
less immediately under his control than the rest of the
army ; and it must be admitted that, taking the
Peninsular War from beginning to end, the artillery
had some cause of complaint against the General. But
on this occasion the prejudice of the gunners in
favour of their own arm has carried them too far. It
may be questioned, in the first place, whether it would
have been prudent to mass the batteries at all when a
position nine miles long was in question. In the second
place, it is certain that the guns were not arbitrarily set
down upon mere conjecture of Massena's movements,
but that they were disposed at the threatened points as
the enemy's intentions revealed themselves. Arent-
schild's battery, in particular, was not brought up to the
pass of San Antonio until it was certain that Reynier's
column was advancing upon it ; x nor does it appear that
this battery suffered any great loss until Foy's brigade
began to move up the hill. It is therefore evident that,
however good the mark that they presented, Reynier's
guns must have fired at them for two or three hours
before doing any damage. It is, indeed, more than
probable that the part played by the Allied artillery at
Bussaco has been undervalued. Without absolutely
accepting the statement of the brother of Ross, of the
Chestnut Troop, that the greatest loss sustained by the
French was through the fire of cannon, it is certain that
the Allied batteries did admirable work and that, in
Craufurd's position in particular, the shrapnel-shell of
1 Grattan of the Eighty-eighth saw it moving thither at the trot.
Adventures in the Connaught Rangers, i. 49. As to the damage done
by Reynier's guns, see Leith's narrative in Wellington's Suppt. Desp.
vi. 637. The French gunners must latterly have trained their guns,
possibly only their howitzers, at a great elevation, or possibly they
may have brought up pieces of larger calibre, for Leith speaks of
the 3/ 1 st of Barnes's brigade coming under artillery fire on the
plateau, though the regiment suffered no casualties.
532 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 10. Ross's guns wrought terrible havoc among the masses
of Ney's division.
For the rest, all arms did their duty well at Bussaco.
The two principal attacks of the French being delivered
at points far apart and hidden from each other by the
projecting spurs of the hill, each of the British divisions
engaged thought that it had borne the brunt of the
action, and was disinclined to allow much credit to
the other. Hence the great historian of the war,
being of the Light Division, believed readily that
Picton's division had been broken by the first onset
and only rescued by Leith ; and has thus involved one
portion of his narrative in hopeless confusion. Picton,
in his turn, thought that Leith's share in the action was
a mere shadow of his own ; whereas Leith was persuaded
that he and no one else had repelled Reynier's attack.
As a matter of fact all three did excellent service,
though on this particular occasion Craufurd's merit
shone brightest. But, above all things, Bussaco estab-
lished the moral superiority of the British over the
French soldier.
Authorities. — For Reynier's attack : Cannon's Record of the
74th ; Leith Hay's Narrative ; Grattan's Adventures in the
Connaught Rangers ; Sherer's Recollections of the Peninsula ; Vie
Militaire du General Foy ; Narraetivs of Leith and Picton, Well-
ington, Suppl. Desp. vi. 633-639 ; Gomme's Life of Sir William
Gomme ; Wrottesley's Life of Sir J. Burgoyne. For Ney's attack :
Charles Napier's Early Military Life ; Napier's History, v. vi.
Appendices. I must acknowledge to the full my obligations to
the researches of Mr. Oman, who has repeatedly visited the ground,
whereas my own study of it was confined to two full days only ; and
to those of Mr. Chambers, whose little monograph, though in need
of correction on sundry small points, I have found very useful.
CHAPTER XXXIX
Though reeling for the moment under his repulse, 1810.
Massena was not the man lightly to abandon the
object prescribed to him by his master. He could
hardly hope, after the experience of the 27th, to force
the position of Bussaco ; but his cavalry might yet find
him a route, even though none were shown on the map,
by which he might turn it. Accordingly, early on the
28th he sent out his troopers to explore the country Sept. 28.
north and south, and soon after noon became aware
that the road by Boialvo to Sardao existed and was
practicable for artillery. Thereupon he made a
succession of feints, as if about to renew his
attack ; though the corps of Ney and Reynier could
be seen throwing up entrenchments, which contradicted
all idea of an offensive movement. Wellington,
undeceived by these appearances, enjoined vigilance at
all points ; and before nightfall the sight of French
infantry retiring eastward, and of French cavalry riding
over the Serra do Caramullo northward, made it certain
that Massena's whole army was or would soon be in
motion. Wellington watched them intently for a time,
and then riding to the convent, ordered that the
retreat from Bussaco, for which he had already given
provisional directions, should begin forthwith with all
possible silence and secrecy ; the camp-fires being kept
up to give the appearance of continued occupation of
the Serra. Hill accordingly passed the Mondego,
followed by Lecor and Fane, and marched on Thomar,
while the bulk of the army retired during the night by
533
534 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. various cross-roads upon Fornos and Coimbra, leaving
Sept. 28. only the Light Division and Anson's brigade of Light
Cavalry on the ridge of Bussaco.
There can be no doubt that at the moment and for
some weeks later Wellington was much vexed and
disturbed by Massena's movement, which he at once
divined to be upon Sardao. He had, it will be
remembered, summoned Trant with his Portuguese
militia to that place ; and, counting upon his arrival
there on the 27th, he had reckoned upon barring the
way permanently to the French at Bussaco. " I
should have stopped the enemy entirely," he wrote
to his brother on the 4th of October, " if it had not
been for the blunders of the Portuguese General
commanding in the north, who was prevented by a
small French patrol from sending Trant on the road
by which he was ordered to march. If he had come
by that road, the French could not have turned our
position and they must have attacked it again ; they
could not have carried it and must have retired." x
It is perfectly true that General Bacellar, frightened by
the presence of a French patrol at San Pedro do Sul,
had ordered Trant to fetch a compass by way of
Oporto instead of taking the direct route, and that
consequently Trant did not arrive at Sardao till the
evening of the 28th, "after," to use Wellington's
words, " the enemy was in possession of the ground."
What ground is here referred to it is not easy to say,
for Trant was still at Sardao on the 30th, though with
the main body of the French cavalry close to him ;
but presumably it was some defile where Trant, given
sufficient time, might either have destroyed the road or
held it, even with his two or three thousand raw levies,
against the French army. Wellington had, of course,
ample time to detach a force to Sardao before the
French could reach it ; but, as he pointed out later,
if this detachment were hard pressed and obliged to
retire, it could only move northward and so be lost
1 Suppl. Desp. vi. 606.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 535
for ever from the defence of Lisbon. To Trant this 18 10.
was a matter of no moment, for his base was in the
north, so that to him such a retreat would simply
mean a march home ; 1 but the essence of Wellington's
campaign was to preserve the capital. He had made
the place safe, as he thought, by the fortified lines of
Torres Vedras ; and, with a certain refuge behind him,
it was not worth his while to risk anything till he
reached it. In such a case, it will be asked, why did
he fight at Bussaco ? All histories agree in calling
it a political battle, fought to reassure the British
Parliament and the Portuguese Regency ; and all
histories admit that it had its effect. But this seems
to be not quite the whole truth. Unless Wellington
deliberately lied to his brother and to Liverpool, he
reckoned upon checking Massena for good at Bussaco,
and was not a little disappointed at his failure to do so.
Meanwhile, the French army drew off* by divisions
in succession, Sainte-Croix's dragoons leading the way,
with the infantry of Junot's corps next after them.
Ney did not march until the night of the 28th, nor did
Reynier follow until the 29th. About four hundred Sept. 29.
unhappy Frenchmen, too severely injured to be
moved, were left behind and were taken by the
German Hussars to the convent. The rest were
carried off", a great many of them on stretchers ; and
an officer of Ney's corps has recorded that the night-
march of the 28 th was the most distressing that he
ever made, the corpses of the wounded who died and
were left by the roadside being sufficient to guide the
rear columns through the darkness.2 The British
cavalry watched the decampment by patrols from
Mealhada ; but until late on the 29th Wellington
was still without certain reports as to Massena's
ultimate direction, though the foremost of the enemy's
vanguard on that day reached Avellao de Cima, less
than twenty miles north of Coimbra, and a little to
1 Memorandum on the campaign of 1810, 23rd Feb. 181 1.
2 Guingret, p. 70.
536 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
t8io. east of the direct road leading southward to that city
from Sardao. These horsemen, by using a cross-road,
Sept. 30. had evaded Trant, who on the following day
attempted to hold back the main body of the French
force, but was obliged to make a hurried retreat. On
the same night Anson's brigade, which now formed
the extreme rear -guard of the British cavalry,
bivouacked near Fornos in the presence of the
Oct. 1 enemy's advanced parties, and early on the morrow
was driven back by infantry in some disorder to the
plain of Coimbra, where it found the brigades of De
Grey and Slade. After a serious skirmish, in which
the German Hussars suffered some loss, the whole
passed the Mondego by a ford and fell back safely to
Soure.
So far, the army had retreated in at least three
columns ; Hill upon Thomar, as we have seen ; Spencer,
by the same ford as the cavalry, to west of Coimbra
upon Soure ; and the remainder by the great road.
On the 30th the last of the troops left Coimbra amid
a scene of wild confusion. In spite of Wellington's
warnings, only the rich had had the prudence to with-
draw to Lisbon ; and three-fourths of the population
were streaming along the road with such property as
they could carry in bundles upon their heads, filling
the air with wails and lamentations. But this was not
the worst ; for, over and above many valuable goods,
they had left abundance of provisions in their houses,
which could not fail to be of great assistance to the
French. Massena, it appears, foreseeing that this would
be so,1 forbade the entrance of his troops into the city,
and sent a commandant and Taupin's brigade forward
to guard the gates ; but Junot and his staff forced
the sentries, and, with this example before them, the
soldiery could not be kept out. The city was sacked
from roof to cellar, with much wanton damage and
destruction of sacred and beautiful objects and buildings.
1 So says the renegade Pamplona in Jper^u Nouveau, p. 155,
which is confirmed by A. D. L. G., Campagne de Portugal, p. 70.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 537
The Eighth Corps, being the first on the spot, enjoyed 18 10.
the first of the plunder, but the Sixth, which was marched
in next day to restore order, took its share. The Oct. 2.
officers were as rapacious as the men ; and Massena
himself is said finally to have countenanced the pillage
by taking telescopes from the observatory. Ney alone
seems to have held aloof from the disgraceful scene,
refusing even to accept a field-glass which was offered
to him by his less scrupulous chief.1
For two days, therefore, on the 1st and 2nd of
October, the French army was practically out of action ;
and Wellington pursued his retreat unharassed, head-
quarters being on the 2nd at Pombal, and on the 3rd Oct. 2-4.
and 4th at Leiria. He too had his troubles with
plunderers, but met the danger vigorously, hanging on
one day two British soldiers and as many Portuguese,
whom he had caught red-handed. Meanwhile Massena,
knowing nothing of the lines of Torres Vedras, was not
a little puzzled by the continued retirement of an army
which had buffeted him so heavily at Bussaco ; and there
was some debate between him and his generals as to
whether he ought to halt at Coimbra, convert it into an
advanced base, and await the arrival of the Ninth Corps
before going farther ; or whether he should prosecute
his advance with all speed so as to overtake the British
before they could re-embark. He decided upon the
latter course ; and accordingly Montbrun's cavalry, the
Eighth Corps, and one division of Ney's crossed the
Mondego on the 3rd. Oct. 3.
There remained the question of the garrison that
should be left at Coimbra, where Massena had de-
cided to deposit his sick and wounded, amounting to
over four thousand men, and the more cumbrous
part of his baggage - train ; and on this point the
Marshal came to a resolution so hardy that he
dared not reveal it to his army. Every commanding
officer was asking what the strength of the garrison
would be, and the answer was vaguely given as several
1 Authorities in Oman, iii. 403-404.
538 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. battalions. Many colonels therefore decided to leave
even the slightly wounded and footsore behind ; though
Marchand's division, upon a hint from its General,
brought on every man or officer who could crawl or
Oct. 4. ride. On the 4th the entire army quitted Coimbra,
leaving for the protection of the invalids only one
hundred and forty seamen,1 who had accompanied the
army to do duty in the tidal waters of Lisbon, with
thirty-five hundred muskets to arm the convalescents
as they came out of hospital. So agitated were the
unfortunate patients that their comrades were obliged
to calm them with a story that the battalions of the
garrison had gone out to find oxen for the sick.2
Massena's excuse was that, with a decisive battle in
immediate prospect, he could not afford to weaken
his army by three or four thousand men ; and, con-
sidering that he expected to end the campaign within
a week, such an excuse cannot be called unreasonable.
Oct. 5. On the morning of the 5 th the French advanced
cavalry regained touch with the British near Pombal,
and gradually drove them back after some sharp skir-
mishing which cost each side from forty to fifty men ;
and it was from the British prisoners taken in these
affairs that Massena, so it is said, first heard vaguely
Oct. 6. of the existence of "the Lines." On the following day
the extreme rear of the British rear-guard fell back to
Cavalhaes, a little to east of the main road, and on the
Oct. 7. 7th beyond Rio Mayor. On that day the whole body
of the French infantry reached Leiria, where Massena
learned that his sin had found him out. Trant, pursuant
to Wellington's orders, had come down from the Vouga
and followed up the march of the enemy to gather in
Oct. 6. stragglers, arriving at Mealhada on the 6th. Hearing
there of the defenceless state of Coimbra, he advanced
rapidly with about four thousand militia and a few
dragoons, captured the French post at Fornos to a
man, and charging into Coimbra by two parallel streets,
1 Aper$u Nouveau says that there were only sixty-one.
2 Guingret, pp. 85-86.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 539
overpowered all opposition. His cavalry then seized the 18 10.
bridge, cutting off all communication between the French
in the town and those in the hospital, which had been
formed in a huge convent in a suburb to south of the
Mondego ; and, after a short resistance from some of
the convalescents, the whole surrendered. Colonels
Wilson and Miller joined him on the 8th with three Oct. 8.
hundred stragglers, whom they had captured on their
way down from Celorico ; and Trant, leaving Coimbra to
them, took the whole body of his prisoners, four thousand
five hundred in all, in carts and on foot to Oporto.
The Portuguese militia massacred a very few of the
French before they could be checked, but, speaking
generally, the unfortunate men were treated well. The
most important effect of this stroke was that it not
only embittered Massena's men against their commander,
but impaired their confidence in him.
On the 8th the fine weather broke, and the British
rear-guard fell back to Alcoentre, where, by extraordinary
folly on the part of Cotton's staff, Bull's troop of horse-
artillery was left, contrary to orders, in the village, and
the drivers were allowed to take their harness to pieces,
while Anson's and Slade's brigades of cavalry were
planted down a mile in the rear. One squadron of the
Sixteenth, which had been left to watch the enemy, was
driven in during the afternoon by two regiments of French
horse ; and the guns were then obliged to retreat in the
greatest confusion. Somers-Cocks of the Sixteenth,
however, hastily collected his squadron, and, riding into
the village, charged the French, who retired hurriedly
with a loss of eighteen killed and taken.1 On the
following day the Sixteenth and German Hussars were Oct. 9.
constantly in action with the enemy's dragoons, always
in pouring rain ; and, as usual, in every conflict of the
small bodies engaged the Allies had the better. The
casualties numbered about fifty on each side, and this
day brought the arduous work of Anson's brigade to an
1 Tomkinson, pp. 50-51. Memoirs of Viscount Combermere,\.
164-165.
540 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1810. end, for on the 10th the whole of the British horse
°ct- IO- entered the lines of Torres Vedras. "On every
occasion," wrote Wellington, " their superiority has
been so great that the enemy does not use his cavalry
except when supported and protected by his infantry."
Under the shelter of the British squadrons, the foot
had retreated at their leisure into the chosen refuge ; but
Craufurd's division, which was the only infantry in the
rear-guard, for some reason best known to its com-
mander, was still outside the lines at Alemquer on the
afternoon of the 10th. The troops were under shelter
cooking their dinners, when the alarm was given that
the enemy was at hand with both sabres and bayonets.
The division was quickly under arms, and there was
nothing to prevent an unhurried and orderly retreat. As
at the Coa, however, Craufurd lost his head. The road
which he must take lay through a narrow archway, a
circumstance which in itself demanded above all things
coolness and regularity ; but, on the contrary, he com-
manded his men to break their ranks, and to re-form
when they had passed through it. Naturally there was a
rush of soldiers, followers, and baggage-animals for the
archway; many were injured in the crush, and had not
the soldiers been of the best quality, there would have
been a general panic. Happily the great majority of
the officers and men disobeyed the order and stood
firm, and the immediate evil extended no further than
to the loss of a little baggage.
Then followed a singular chain of accidents. The
station of the Light Division was at Arruda ; but Crau-
furd in the dark took the wrong road and found himself
at Sobral, some ten miles too far to the west, from
whence he was obliged to march along the foot of the
lines to his true destination. Cavalry patrols, meeting
stragglers from his battalions, were told by them that
the Light Division was cut off, which news seemed to
be confirmed by the unoccupied state of Arruda ; and
General Hill, reeling anxious for the safety of the
second line of defence, fell back from Alhandra, on the
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 541
right flank of the first line, to Alverca, in order to be 1810.
sure of holding, at any rate, the third line. Thus for °ct- IO-
some hours the entire front of the works from Alhandra
to Sobral, a distance of nine miles, was unmanned, until
in the course of the night the mistake was discovered,
and the former positions reoccupied. There was, how-
ever, little danger, for the mass of the French infantry
was still far in rear.
It is now time to say something of the lines them-
selves. First, it must be premised that the country from
Torres Vedras to Lisbon resembles nothing so much as
a gigantic mountain-torrent instantaneously converted
into solid earth. The ground flows down from north
to south in great undulations, which now and again throw
up abrupt peaks ending in a knob of bare rock, only to
plunge down again into deep gullies and ravines; the
character of the whole being rugged and inhospitable,
and suggesting even at first sight innumerable facilities
for a stubborn rear-guard fight. Wellington's earliest
idea had been to construct his first line from Alhandra
on the east to Rio Sao Lourenco on the west, with
advanced works at Torres Vedras, Monte de Agraca, and
other commanding points. The tardiness of Massena's
movements, however, had enabled him to strengthen
the first line sufficiently to warrant his holding it in
permanence. Surveying this line from east to west, the
first section from Alhandra almost to Arruda was about
five miles long, of which one mile, towards the Tagus,
had been inundated; more than another mile had been
scarped into a precipice, and the most vulnerable point
had been obstructed by a huge abatis. The additional
defences included twenty -three redoubts mounting
ninety-six guns, besides a flotilla of gunboats to guard
the right flank on the Tagus ; and this portion of the
ground was occupied by Hill's division.
The second section extended from Arruda to the west
of Monte Agraca, which last was crowned by a very
large redoubt mounting twenty-five guns, with three
smaller works to supplement it. Monte Agraca itself
542 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. was held by Pack's brigade with Leith's division in
reserve behind it, while the strong but less completely
fortified country to eastward was entrusted to the Light
Division.
The third section stretched from the west of Monte
Agraca for nearly eight miles to the gorge of the
Zizandre, a little to south of Torres Vedras. This was
by nature very advantageous ground, but from want of
time had been no further strengthened than by two
redoubts which commanded the road from Sobral to
Montachique. Here, therefore, were concentrated the
First, Fourth, and Sixth Divisions, under the eye of
Wellington himself, who had established his head-
quarters at Pero Negro.
The last and most westerly section of the first line
ran from the gorge of the Zizandre to the sea, a distance
of nearly twelve miles, more than half of which, how-
ever, on the western side had been rendered impassable
by the damming of the Zizandre and by the conversion
of its lower reaches into one huge inundation. The
chief defence consisted of the entrenched camp of
Sao Vincente, a little to the north of Torres Vedras,
which dominated the paved road leading from Leiria to
Lisbon ; and the force assigned to this portion of the
ground was Picton's division.
The second line of defence was still more for-
midable, but, since the enemy was never able to force
the first line, it must suffice to say that along all three
of its sections from Quintella on the Tagus to Bucellas,
from Bucellas to Mafra, and from Mafra to the sea — a
total distance of twenty-two miles — the British engineers
had lavished every resource of construction and de-
struction to close all possible points of access to an
enemy.
Lastly, in the event of failure even in the face of
all these precautions, very powerful lines, two miles
long, had been thrown up round Sao Juliao to cover an
embarkation.
The total number of troops to Wellington's hand
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 543
for the defence of the entire position amounted, 1810.
exclusive of two battalions of marines in the lines
round S2o Juliao, to forty-two thousand British, of
whom thirty-five thousand were effective ; in addition
to which he had over twenty-seven thousand Portuguese
regulars, of whom twenty-four thousand were effective ;
about twelve thousand Portuguese militia ; and twenty
or thirty thousand of the ordenanfa, which last were
of little value except for guerilla warfare. Lastly,
Romana with great generosity brought eight thousand
Spaniards of his division likewise within the lines
about Mafra. Altogether, therefore, Wellington had
some sixty thousand regular troops whom he could
depend upon, and twenty thousand more who could
be trusted at least to fight behind earthworks. The
redoubts of the first line did not require more than
twenty thousand men to defend them, which left the
whole of the true field-army free not only to rein-
force any threatened point but also to make a counter-
attack. To facilitate such movements a chain of
signal-stations had been formed from end to end of
the lines, and lateral roads of communication had been
made so as to enable the troops to pass rapidly along
their entire length. Finally, as has been well pointed
out, Wellington did not abuse his fortified position by
distributing his troops, according to the vicious cordon-
system, in small fractions along the entire front, but kept
his field-army for the most part in two masses on the
centre and right, so that the whole could be assembled in
a few hours. It is too often assumed that the success
of the lines of Torres Vedras was due to mere skilful
use of the spade. Colonel Fletcher, who was entrusted
with the execution of Wellington's broad designs, de-
serves, together with his subordinates of the engineers,
all credit for his ingenuity and thoroughness ; but,
given time, labour, and favourable ground, it does not
need a great general to construct a formidable line of
entrenchments. On the other hand, it does require a
great general so to use such a line that it shall always
544 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1810.be a source of strength and not of weakness. Villars
at La Bassee flattered himself to his cost that he had
found Marlborough's ne plus ultra ; but to check great
leaders such as Marlborough and Massena there must
be not only lines but a man.
Oct. ii. On the nth of October Montbrun, through his
cavalry, ascertained that there was a continuous range
of entrenchments from the Tagus to the gorge of the
Zizandre, and reported accordingly ; but the French
infantry, Taupin's brigade excepted, was still far in rear,
much distressed by the incessant rain ; and the day
passed without any serious incident. On the afternoon
Oct. 12. of the 1 2th the Eighth Corps came up to Sobral and
pushed back the British outposts from the village
after a small skirmish ; whereupon Wellington, not
knowing what force might be behind Junot, con-
centrated in the night five British divisions and three
Portuguese brigades along the front of the Serra de
Oct. 13. Agraca. On the 13th there was more skirmishing,
which cost each side about one hundred and fifty killed
and wounded, with no further result than to press the
British back somewhat from their advanced positions
Oct. 14. beyond the lines; and on the 14th there was a rather
sharper affair, when Junot attempted, though without
success, to dislodge a picquet of the Seventy-first from
its station behind Sobral and Monte de Agraca. In
the middle of this engagement Massena at last came up
to the front, and reconnoitred the ground for himself.
The renegade Portuguese on his staff had told him
that he would find nothing but undulating accessible
plateaux before him ; and they now excused themselves
for their misinformation by saying that the Allies had
thrown up the various obstructions that barred the
way of the French Army. " Hang it all, they did
not throw up these mountains," answered the Marshal
bitterly, and continued his reconnaissance. It is said
that Junot advocated a bold onslaught upon the British
army before Sobral ; and the British themselves looked
forward with jubilant confidence to a speedy attack.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 545
But Massena had not forgotten Bussaco ; he would 18 10.
commit himself to nothing rash or foolish ; and he
soon came to the conclusion that the lines were im-
pregnable.
On the following day Wellington was startled out Sept. 15.
of his usual tranquillity and composure by a false report
that the enemy had contrived to seize forty boats at
Santarem. Such a misfortune, as he rightly said,
would have been most serious, for the boats might have
been used either for a bridge to an island in the Tagus,
where the French could have established themselves across
Hill's right flank, or to establish communication with
Mortier and lay open Alemtejo to invasion. Another
twenty-four hours, however, showed him that the report
was without foundation, and he was able to write once
more, " I am firmly of opinion that the enemy cannot
succeed." 1 Meanwhile Massena calmly sat down in
front of the lines, bidding the Eighth Corps to entrench
itself before Sobral ; the Second Corps being stationed
at Carregado, with advanced troops at Villa Franca ;
the Sixth at Otta, with a detachment at Alemquer ; and
Treilhard's division of dragoons at Alcoentre. But
this was mere bravado, for the Marshal was bound to
retreat sooner or later from want of supplies ; and,
indeed, if Wellington's injunctions for clearing the
country had been enforced by the Portuguese Govern-
ment, the French could not have remained where they
were for more than a few days. Massena, indeed, did
talk of holding his position until the Ninth Corps, under
Drouet, should have reached him from France, and
Mortier's corps from Andalusia should have invaded
Alemtejo ; but this was probably mere verbiage, intended
to tickle the ear of Napoleon. Drouet's corps had
reached Valladolid and there had stuck ; Mortier,
as we have seen, had retired towards Seville ; but
Massena had not the slightest information concerning
either of them. The Portuguese militia and ordenanga
1 Berkeley to Wellington, 14th, 1 6th Oct. {Wellington MSS.) ;
Wellington to Admiral Berkeley, 16th, 17th Oct. 18 10.
VOL. VII 2 N
546 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 8 10. under Trant, Wilson, and other leaders had closed in
everywhere upon the French communications ; Almeida
and Ciudad Rodrigo were straitly blockaded, and not
a message could pass through them inwards or outwards.
Massena's true intentions were shown by his withdrawing
his reserves of cavalry and artillery, together with his
hospital, to Santarem, and by an order to send to the
same place every artificer to be found in the ranks of
the army. It was necessary, as he said, to have the
means of passing the Zezere in the direction of Castello
Branco, and of crossing the Tagus into Alemtejo ; and
these means were to be created at Santarem. Mean-
while the Marshal nourished faint hopes either that the
Portuguese refugees in Lisbon would rise against the
British, or that Wellington would move out of his
lines for a general action.1
Wellington apprehended the situation at once, and
called upon the Portuguese Government to take
measures for the removal of all supplies of food and
valuable property from Alemtejo, and for enabling the
Allies to follow the enemy thither.2 But he was fairly
confident that no materials for a bridge would be
obtained easily by the French, since he had been careful
to collect or destroy all boats. Meanwhile deserters
came over in large numbers from the French army with
stories of privation, sickness, and want ; and the British
commander was satisfied that his adversary's force was
silently but surely melting away. His one doubt was
whether he ought not to attack. Massena's army was
weakened by the absence of marauding parties, and also
by the despatch of a detachment to Thomar and of
Loison's division towards Santarem ; while Junot's corps,
little more than ten thousand strong, lay in dangerous
isolation about Sobral. The temptation was very great,
but Wellington withstood it ; first, because it was quite
1 Vie Militaire du General Foy, pp. 340-347 ; Massena to Fririon,
25th Oct., to Berthier, 29th Oct. 18 10 (printed in Wellington Desp.
iv. 814-816).
2 Wellington to C. Stuart, 23rd Oct. 1810.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 547
evident that Massena wanted him to come out and 18 10.
fight ; secondly, because he could not have delivered
any but a frontal attack without opening the road to
Lisbon, and he could not afford to lose many men ; ! and,
thirdly and chiefly, because his success would probably
bring about the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and the
transfer of Soult's army to Portugal. These would have
been the most undesirable of results. It was very much
better that the French should waste their strength over
Cadiz and other " unattainable objects " than that they
should turn the whole of their force towards Lisbon.
Wellington could not at best hope for more than a
partial victory, the gain of which would be wholly
neutralised by the rectification of a great French
blunder. The General spoke of his policy as the " safe
game " ; it was really a very deep game, the game of
encouraging his enemy to persist in his mistakes.2
None the less, looking to the French preparations
at Santarem, Wellington was bound to watch the left
bank of the Tagus carefully ; and, accordingly, on the
1 st of November he ordered Fane to take a brigade of Nov. 1.
Portuguese cavalry and a battalion of Cacadores across
the river, in order to observe the enemy's movements
on the right bank, to prevent them from crossing to
the left bank, and to destroy, if possible, their store of
boats and timber at Santarem. The attention of this
force, and indeed of Wellington himself, was distracted
for a ftw days by a curious circumstance. Realising
the extreme awkwardness of his position, Massena had
resolved to despatch an officer of trust to Napoleon to
lay the whole situation before him, and to obtain
instructions and reinforcements. General Foy was the
man selected for this mission ; and, with the object of
1 "Lord Wellington said in the lines one day while looking
from Sobral fort at the French encampments, ' I could lick those
fellows any day, but it would cost me 10,000 men, and, as this
is the last army England has, we must take care of it.' " MS.
Journal of Col. James Stanhope, for the perusal of which I am
indebted to the most kindly courtesy of the Hon. Richard Stanhope.
2 Wellington to Liverpool, 27th Oct., 3rd Nov. 18 10.
548 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. ensuring his safe arrival, not only was he provided
with an escort of a strong squadron of horse and a bat-
talion of infantry, but a feint advance was made by
Montbrun with a small mixed force against Abrantes.
The diversion was perfectly successful. Montbrun
forced the passage of the Zezere at Punhete after a
sharp skirmish, drawing upon himself all the attention
of Colonel Lobo at Abrantes ; and Foy, passing the
river by a ford, took the road to Castello Branco. His
strength was so much magnified by report that Don
Carlos d'Espana burned the bridge at Villa Velha lest
it should fall into his hands, and Lobo took up the
bridge at Abrantes. Wellington himself was quite
prepared for an attack upon that fortress, and had
made up his mind to succour it. For the best
part of a fortnight he remained in uncertainty, until,
Nov. ii. on the nth, Fane reported that the enemy was re-
Nov. 13. passing the Zezere. Two days later Fane attempted,
though without success, to burn the enemy's stores at
Santarem by means of Congreve rockets, a weapon
of which Wellington was not enamoured ; but on
Nov. 14. the morrow the French made the movement which
Wellington had been long expecting ; and the situation
was changed.
For some days the greater part of Massena's army
had been dispersed in all directions to seek food, with
no greater success than to avert actual starvation ; x and
Nov. 10. on the 10th the Marshal gave the order for a general
retreat upon Santarem. The sick were taken away first,
Nov. 13. and then the transport; on the 13th the reserves of
Nov. 14. stores followed, and on the evening of the 14th the
infantry silently marched off*. Ney's corps, being out of
sight of the British, was the first to retire ; then came
the task of withdrawing the Eighth Corps, with Ferey's
brigade attached to it, a most delicate matter, for the
narrow defile of Alemquer lay on its road, and unless
Hill were kept in check, he might reach Alemquer
1 Fririon to Massena, 8th Nov. 18 10 (intercepted), in
Wellington Desp. iv. 817.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 549
before Junot and cut him off. Reynier was therefore 18 10.
instructed to remain at Villafranca and Carregado, so as
to hold Hill at bay until Junot should be safe. The
operation was seconded by fortune, for from midnight
until ten o'clock on the morning of the 15th a dense Nov. 15.
fog concealed everything from the British ; and by that
time both Junot and Ney were in surety, while even
Reynier was two hours forward in his march to Cartaxo.
The enemy's departure was first discovered by the
Sixth Division ; and by twenty minutes past ten
Wellington had set Spencer's division in motion
towards Alemquer, ordering Craufurd to feel his way
upon the same point with the Light Division, and
directing Hill to advance on Carregado. He had
heard on the previous evening that a considerable
French reinforcement had reached the frontier of
Upper Beira on the 9th, and he was therefore disposed
to act with caution. Moreover, Massena's intentions
were necessarily a matter of conjecture. Wellington
hoped that he might retire into Spain, either across the
Zezere, over which he had built a bridge, or across
the Tagus ; but he might also pass the Tagus with a
view to an attack on Abrantes ; or, lastly, he might
take up a position at Santarem and try to open com-
munications with Ciudad Rodrigo across the Zezere.
Of these four courses, Wellington considered the
attack on Abrantes to be the likeliest. He therefore
directed Fane to move his force over against that
fortress on the south bank of the Tagus, and sent to
Admiral Berkeley for boats to enable him to throw
Hill's division across the river. Fane and Hill would
then be well placed either to succour Abrantes or,
if Massena should retreat, to recross the river by the
bridge at that place and follow him through Upper
Beira. In the general uncertainty, however, Welling-
ton refrained for the present from drawing more troops
out of the lines.
Meanwhile Spencer and Craufurd, as they ad-
vanced, found many evidences of the sufferings of
55o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. the French army. The road was covered with the
Nov. 15. carcases of draught-animals which had perished for
want of forage, while ghastly emaciated corpses of
French soldiers showed that it was not mules and horses
only that had fallen from starvation. Still more terrible
were the tokens of deadly strife between French and
Portuguese. Every village and town on the road had
been sacked from cellar to garret, and the contents of
the houses battered to pieces ; the bodies of peasants
who had been murdered by soldiers, and of soldiers
who had been murdered by peasants, were mingled
together ; and every sick Frenchman who had the
misfortune to remain undiscovered by the British was
slaughtered without mercy by their enraged allies. On
Nov. 16. the 1 6th Wellington ordered Slade's cavalry and Pack's
Portuguese brigade out of the lines to support the
advancing force ; and on the next day were shown the
defects of an army which lives by marauding. The
country was full of small French parties which had
been absent for days in search of food, and in
consequence had received no notice of their com-
mander's retirement. When overtaken they surrendered
themselves and their booty with little or no resistance ;
and a sergeant of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, Baxter
by name, with a patrol of four men, by sheer daring
and audacity captured a French officer and forty-one
soldiers. On that evening Craufurd came up near
Cartaxo with a division of Reynier's corps, which was
covering the withdrawal of the baggage over the
river Azambuja. Seeing only a small body before
him, he at once deployed for attack ; but, fortun-
ately, Wellington interposed before he could commit
himself to a contest with superior forces. Massena
now halted, having reached the position which he had
decided not to abandon without a battle ; and at
Santarem, therefore, the first stage of the retreat from
the lines of Torres Vedras came to an end. It was the
first stage also of a longer retreat, which was ultimately
to close at Toulouse in 18 14.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 551
At the moment Wellington did not realise the 18 10.
situation. Fane from the left bank of the Tagus had
observed French troops and waggons going east-
wards ; and, since Massena was reported to have thrown
two bridges over the Zezere, the British Commander
concluded, not unnaturally, that the entire French
army was moving upon Abrantes, and that the force
at Santarem was no more than a rear-guard. Deceived
by this report, Wellington ordered Hill to cross the
Tagus at Vallada with his own division, Hamilton's
Portuguese and the Thirteenth Light Dragoons, so as
either to succour Abrantes or to tall upon the enemy's
flank on their march thither. Hill accordingly passed
the river on the 1 8th ; and on the same day Nov. 18.
Wellington called up the divisions of Leith and Cole
from the lines, himself spending the day in reconnais-
sance of the French position. On that night Craufurd,
having been a second time restrained by Wellington from
an intended attack at dawn,1 took it into his head that
the enemy were decamping, and must needs go forward
in person with three light infantry-men to assure
himself of the fact. The result was that he blundered
full upon a French sentry ; the man naturally fired at
him ; Craufurd ordered his men to fire back ; and
thereupon Reynier's division flew to arms and, as is not
uncommon upon such occasions, poured a terrific fire
in every direction upon an imaginary foe. This
convinced Craufurd that the enemy had at any rate
1 Colonel James Stanhope in his journal gives the follow-
ing account of Craufurd on the 17th and 1 8th : "As Lord
Wellington was riding forward near Cartaxo, he met an officer
galloping to the rear, who said that Craufurd had found the enemy-
posted beyond the village, was going to attack them, and had sent
for General Grey's cavalry. Lord Wellington rode forward and
found apparently two French battalions and a few squadrons at the
top of a gentle slope, but presently also the bayonets of a column
which was meant to be concealed. He countermanded the attack.
Next morning he said, 'We must be off early or Craufurd will be
at them '; and true enough he came just in time to prevent Craufurd
from attacking, with his division, a position which the whole army
could not have carried."
552 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. not retired ; and when morning broke, it was seen
Nov. 19. that during the night the French had been felling trees
on all sides to form abatis, which was at least an
indication that they contemplated a lengthened stay-
about Santarem.
Their position was in truth exceedingly strong. The
approach to it lay across a plain, seamed by the two
parallel channels of the Rio Mayor, over which the
paved road from Lisbon is carried for half a mile upon a
raised causeway. On both sides of this causeway the
ground was so swampy as to be practically if not actually
impassable by formed troops, so that the only access
was by the road, which was commanded by a line of low
heights whereon Reynier had been careful to establish a
battery of sixteen guns. In rear of this line were the
lower spurs of the height upon which Santarem stands,
ending in a very steep ascent to the mediaeval wall which
enclosed the town. As regards men to defend this
triple line, Reynier's corps, thirteen thousand strong,
was the only one actually on the spot ; Junot's corps
being stationed at Alcanhede and Pernes, ten to thirteen
miles to the north-west, and the main body of Ney's
corps at Thomar, with Loison's division in advance on
the fertile plain between Santarem and the Zezere.
These dispositions were evidently designed prin-
cipally to secure a base of supplies in the rich country
above mentioned, and at the same time to menace
Wellington with a renewal of the offensive, either on the
south bank of the Tagus or by a second march south-
ward ; but they left Reynier in apparently perilous
isolation, and Reynier was keenly alive to the fact. He
sent all encumbrances to the rear, detached a regiment
to watch a bridge on the upper reaches of the Rio
Mayor, by which his right might be turned, and even
pressed for permission to evacuate Santarem. He was
answered that he must hold the position to the last, and
came to the conclusion that his corps was to be sacrificed
to save the other two. Wellington on his side judged
himself too weak to attack on the 1 8th ; but on the
j
■ t
>\
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 553
following day, when the First Division had come up, 18 10.
he ordered the Light Division to attempt to pass the Nov- 19-
morass near the Tagus on the enemy's left, sent
Pack's brigade to the upper waters of the Rio Mayor
to turn the French right, and drew up Spencer's
division at the end of the causeway to assail the centre,
as soon as the flanking divisions should have made their
presence felt. It is pretty clear that he intended to
attack in earnest, believing that Massena's main body
was still in retreat ; but the day's operations came to
nothing. Some of Craufurd's skirmishers contrived to
reach and to engage the French picquets, but the bulk of
his division was stopped by the depth of the swamp.
On the opposite flank Pack's infantry was able to cross
the river without much difficulty, but the state of the
roads was such that the guns could not be brought for-
ward ; and the entire attempt was therefore abandoned.
To judge by results, it should seem that Massena ran
no undue risks when he left Reynier's corps in advance
and beyond reach of immediate support, counting upon
the incessant rain to protect him. By the evening
Wellington came to the conclusion that he had been
fortunate in the failure of his movements, and that he
had made a mistake when he sent Hill across the Tagus.
He therefore directed that General to ascend the river
no higher than to Chamusca, though he still talked of an
attack upon the morrow, when Leith and Cole should
have come up to the front.1
On the 20th and 21st, however, the continuance of
rain made all movement impossible ; and on the 22nd, Nov. 22.
when Wellington had intended to reconnoitre the French
right with Anson's cavalry, he found that Massena had
anticipated him and was reconnoitring the British left in
considerable force. The Marshal had, in fact, brought
forward more than a division of infantry and a formid-
able body of cavalry to close the gap between Reynier
and Junot. His action decided Wellington against
further attempt at the offensive. By the 25th he had Nov. 25.
1 Wellington to Hill, 18th, 19th Nov. 18 10.
.
tm\
554 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. ascertained definitely that the entire French army was
Nov. 25. collected between Thomar and Santarem, with a detach-
ment at Punhete on the eastern bank of the Zezere.
For a moment the British General contemplated a stroke
against this detachment, but he speedily decided that it
would not only be difficult, owing to the bad state of the
roads, but unduly hazardous. Moreover, on the night of
the 25th he received intelligence of the advance of five
or six thousand French troops, which had already been
reported to be on the frontier, through Lower Beira.
Wellington rightly judged this column to be composed
chiefly of convalescents, and to include no part of the
Ninth Corps ; but, none the less, the force was one which
must be reckoned with. He traced the movements of
this body from Ciudad Rodrigo by Sabugal to Car-
digos, less than twenty miles from its destination at
Punhete, when he heard to his astonishment that it had
retired.
The truth was that this column, composed in
great measure of skulkers and malingerers collected
around the nucleus of Foy's escort and of two battalions
from Ciudad Rodrigo, had suffered terribly alike from
the weather and the attacks of the peasantry. Encum-
bered by an unwieldy train of munitions, General
Gardanne, who was in command, had made his way
southward with infinite difficulty to Cardigos, when he
learned through Portuguese deserters from Abrantes,
who had been sent out on purpose to deceive him, that
Massena was retreating upon Spain by the Mondego,
and that Hill was marching from Abrantes with ten
thousand men to attack Gardanne's own detachment.
Thereupon the French General turned about, and
hastened back with all speed to Ciudad Rodrigo.
Wellington could not believe that any French officer
would behave so strangely, but the fact of Gardanne's
retreat relieved him of any further anxiety.1 On the
1 Wellington to Berkeley, 26th Nov. ; to Craufurd, 1st Dec. ;
to Gen. W. Stewart, 4th Dec. 18 10. According to Thiebauk
(iv. 430) Gardanne was insane at this time.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 555
24th of November he had already begun to withdraw his 18 10.
troops to winter-quarters, and by the 1st of December Dec. 1
they were all established. The cavalry was extended
along the Rio Mayor from Cartaxo to Rio Mayor
village ; the Light Division was at Valle de Santarem
overlooking the marsh which separated them from
Reynier ; the First Division was about Cartaxo ; the
Fifth about Alcoentre ; the Fourth about Azambuja ;
the Sixth at Alemquer ; the Third at the west end, and
the Portuguese at the eastern end of the lines ; and
Hill's on the south bank of the Tagus at Chamusca and
Almeirim. Thus all the roads leading to the lines were
covered, and the position made secure.
So ended the campaign of 18 10, in a deadlock.
Wellington has been blamed because he did not earlier
draw the bulk of his forces from the lines, so that he
might have overwhelmed Reynier on the 1 8th ; but
against this it must be remembered that his object was
not so much to beat Massena as to force him to leave
Portugal. At one moment he doubted whether he had
not made the retreat through Lower Beira too difficult
and dangerous for the French, and he was not a little
surprised when the Marshal clung to his cantonments
about Santarem ; indeed, it had hardly occurred to
Wellington that Massena might not retire. " I am
convinced," he wrote to Lord Liverpool, " there is no
man in his senses who has ever passed a winter in
Portugal, who would not recommend them to go, rather
than endeavour to maintain themselves upon the Zezere
for the winter, or than attack our position, whatever may
be the strength of their reinforcements." Massena had
never seen a Portuguese winter, but if he chose, great
commander though he was, to play the part of a senseless
man and attempt the impossible, Wellington could not
help it. The great object of the British General was to
gain a year of time. If the first flood of French soldiers
from Austria were checked for twelve months, a breath-
ing space would be won not only for Spain but for the
rest of Europe. It was a matter of comparatively small
556 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. importance to Wellington when Massena should retreat.
The instant withdrawal of the French army might be
desirable as furnishing a more dazzling close to the
operations ; but, if it should come later instead of
sooner, the moral effect would not be the less great,
while the actual damage to the material resources of the
enemy would be incomparably more serious.1
Upon the whole, therefore, the campaign was
decidedly favourable to the British. Wellington had
had his disappointments in the premature fall of
Almeida and the failure to arrest Massena's progress
at Bussaco ; but he had had also his consolations in
the long initial delay of the Marshal's advance, his
adversary's selection of the wrong road from Almeida
to Coimbra, and the bloody repulse of the French
columns in a general action. The first great English
historian of the war has summed up Massena's mistakes,
but he has added a definite assertion that his march
was successful, and has pointed out the means by which
he might have turned it to greater account. He
suggests, for instance, that on the 30th of September
the Marshal might, by a rapid advance to Leiria, have
cut Wellington's communications with Lisbon ; and
that, even after the Allies had gained Leiria and secured
their retreat, " he might have established a fresh base
at Coimbra, employed the Ninth Corps to seize Oporto,
secured his line of communication with that city and
Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards, extending
his position by the left, attacked Abrantes and given
his hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south."
Lastly, Napier dwells with emphasis upon the fact
that the French carried and husbanded fourteen days'
bread, thus rendering the army in great measure in-
dependent of commissariat-trains.
Taking the last point first, it is an undoubted fact
1 The authorities for the last three paragraphs will be found in
Wellington to Hill, 18th, 19th, 22nd, 24th, 26th Nov.; to Liver-
pool, 2 1st, 24th Nov., 1st, 7th Dec. ; to General W. Stewart, 4th,
8th Dec. ; to Admiral Berkeley, 26th Nov. ; to Craufurd, 1st Dec.
1 8 10.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 557
that fourteen days' bread was served out to the French 18 10.
troops ; but it is equally certain that the weight broke
the men down,1 and that the majority of them
treated the ration as do young soldiers of all nations —
consumed as much as they could on the first day, and
then threw away the rest. All calculations based
upon this method of feeding the French army must
therefore be dismissed as worthless ; and in dictating
the movements which Massena should have made, we
are, as usual, brought face to face with the old questions
of transport and supply. It is easy to speak of bringing
Drouet's corps to Oporto, but the question is whether
it could have marched thither without starving. Drouet
could hardly have made his way through Traz-os-
Montes, so presumably he must have come by Ciudad
Rodrigo, where Massena had complained, as long ago
as in July, that neither horses nor carriage were
obtainable. Moreover, the French military-waggons
were, like the English, unfit for mountain roads.2
British, Spaniards, and French had, in fact, been draining
animals out of Northern Spain for two years, and the
consumption and waste had been enormous. Again, a
line of fortified posts to keep up communications with
Almeida on one side and Oporto on the other would
have meant the locking up of a vast number of men.
The ordenanra and armed peasantry were everywhere,
and would have made the collection of victuals difficult
if not impossible. Convoys could not have moved
without large escorts ; and altogether Massena's field-
army must have been dangerously weakened. In fact,
it was the impossibility of maintaining a line of fortified
posts on the road to Almeida, without disabling his
force for active operations, which compelled Massena
to abandon his communications altogether. Napier's
criticism, therefore, is at least doubtful ; and it was
evidently inserted for the glorification of his idol
Napoleon.
1 Vie Militaire du General Foy, pp. 94-95.
2 Campagne de Portugal, 1810-11, par A. D. L. G., p. 48.
558 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810.
On the whole, the Marshal, in spite of all mistakes,
really accomplished more than could reasonably have
been expected from any man, situated as he was ; and
Wellington deserves the more credit for the courage
and constancy with which he confronted him. It is
not sufficiently appreciated that the campaign of 18 10
was a campaign of retreat, that is to say, of thankless-
ness, depression, and discouragement to regimental
officers and to rank and file. For all that they knew,
the operations were likely to close with a re-embarka-
tion, that end which from the beginning of the war
Pitt's mismanagement had made too common for British
expeditions ; and not a few officers complained that they
saw no great difference between walking away and run-
ning away. The last days of the long backward move-
ment just before the army entered the lines were a time
of great hardship, for the rain was incessant, and the
clothing of many of the men in rags. Craufurd, indeed,
reported that the Light Division was more miserably
clad than any but the very lowest description of
beggars.1 Yet the army's moral force was never
shaken, and the conduct of the British cavalry, in spite
of some mistakes, was admirable ; for a mere handful
of men never hesitated to charge, not once but re-
peatedly, greatly superior numbers of the enemy's
horse.2 There was, it is true, gross misconduct in
some regiments on the line of march, notably among
the Irish regiments of Picton's division ; but the
mischief was checked and discipline restored by summary
executions. To have guided a mixed host of British,
Germans, and Portuguese back from Almeida to Bussaco
and from thence to Torres Vedras, a distance of about
1 Wellington MSS. Craufurd to Wellington, 19th Oct. 18 10.
2 Cotton to Wellington, 6th Oct. {Wellington MSS.), reports
that on the evening of the 5th Oct. he charged two regiments of
cavalry with one squadron of the Sixteenth L.D., and the picquets
of the Royals, Fourteenth and Sixteenth L.D. The enemy came on
again supported by five more regiments and a battery, and were charged
eight times by the above force, strengthened by one squadron of the
First Hussars, K.G.L., and two more squadrons of Sixteenth L.D.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
559
two hundred and fifty miles, and to have brought it 1810.
into the lines still a highly effective and spirited army,
was in itself a feat that marked a great commander.
It is easy to move troops forward : the final test of
a general and of his soldiers is the power to move back.
Nor must it be forgotten that the military operations
were not Wellington's only, nor even his greatest,
difficulty. The members of the Portuguese Regency
had marred his plans by refusing to lay bare the country
south of Coimbra ; and, when the Allied army ap-
proached the lines of Torres Vedras, the Patriarch
and the Principal protested against the retreat of the
Portuguese, and obstructed all measures of security so
persistently that Stuart besought Wellington to remove
them from Lisbon by some means and at any cost.
Wellington answered in his usual trenchant style that
either he or de Souza must leave the country, though
he was prepared to allow the Patriarch to remain " as
a necessary evil " ; and finally he addressed a letter to
Stuart, which was read by the envoy to the Regency,
stating bluntly that unless the members mended their
ways, he must believe that " they looked to a little
dirtv popularity instead of to save their country."
Once again a plea must be put in for lenient judg-
ment of these two Portuguese gentlemen who irritated
Wellington so much. It was necessary that Portugal
should suffer terribly for the cause of Europe ; but
they may be pardoned if they thought that too great
sacrifices were demanded of their unfortunate country.1
Lastly, Wellington still chafed under the thought
that he did not possess the confidence of the British
Government. Liverpool, on the 10th of September,
had assured him that the Cabinet was cordially unanimous
on the subject of prosecuting the war, and that the
unwillingness of the House of Commons to vote supplies
for it was due chiefly to the croaking of officers who
had returned on leave. " The contest," he said, " could
1 Wellington MSS. Stuart to Wellington, 5th, 26th, 29th Oct. ;
Wellington Desp. to Stuart, 6th, 25th, 26th, 28th Oct. 18 10.
560 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 10. never have been maintained in Portugal through the
winter and spring if it had not been for the deter-
mination of Government to persevere in it at all risks
to themselves, against not only the declared opinion
of their opponents but the private remonstrances of
many of their friends." " I shall be very desirous of
hearing from you privately and fully," he wrote a
month later, evidently in the hope of allaying Welling-
ton's distrust. " I say privately , because you may rely
upon not being committed by anything that you write
in that manner." "I am anxious," he wrote yet again,
" to assure you that we are most fully and completely
satisfied with all that you have done and all that you
are doing. With respect to the expediency of attacking
Massena ... we wish you to be governed entirely
by your own discretion. . . . Stuart knows our objects
to be the defence of Portugal and the support of the
cause of the Peninsula, as long as they are practicable ;
and I trust you feel that you possess the confidence
of Government with respect to the measures that it
may be desirable to adopt for these purposes." 1
The Minister's afforts to conciliate the General
were useless. The Government in Wellington's opinion
was weak in the House of Commons, and must there-
fore be subject to the vices of such weakness. " Depend
upon it," he wrote to Mr. Arbuthnot, " that you have
no legitimate majority in the House of Commons,
and the occurrences of last session show how little
dependence can be placed upon the casual support of
one or other of the loose parties which are floating
about." Wellington had not a word of approval for the
dauntless courage and the remarkable ability with which
Perceval had steered the ship of administration through
a very stormy session, no sympathy with the Govern-
ment's financial difficulties, though he knew them to
be enormous. Perceval had warned him that England
could make no more strenuous exertions than she was
1 Liverpool to Wellington, loth Sept., 17th Oct., 19th Nov.,
1810; Supp. Desp. vi. 591, 618, 641.
ch. xxxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 561
making, and had assured him that Ministers were far 18 10.
from starving the great cause by any mistaken economy ;
but Wellington turned a deaf ear. The slightest hint
at a possible reduction of expense was ruthlessly distorted
by him into niggardly withdrawal of supplies. Liverpool
had proposed that if Wellington felt himself quite secure
(emphasising the word quite) for the next six months, it
would be desirable to make as large a saving as was
feasible during that period under the head of transports.
Wellington reported the circumstance to Charles Stuart
in the following words : " It is useless to expect more
money from England, as the desire of economy has
overcome even the fears of Ministers, and they have
gone so far as to desire me to send home the transports
in order to save money ! ' One is led to wonder (for
Wellington's papers throw no light upon the subject)
whether there was some persistent mischief-maker in
England, who neutralised all the loyal assurances of
the Cabinet, and encouraged the General to torment
himself, and to add to his own difficulties by nourishing
an invincible distrust of his employers.1
Nevertheless, Ministers did not confine themselves to
mere soothing words ; upon occasion they showed that
they had not only a policy but a will of their own. Liver-
pool did his utmost to supply Wellington liberally both
with men and money ; but he gave him clearly to under-
stand that he would be no party to a revival of Pitt's
system of great spasmodic endeavour, followed by two
or three years of impotence. " We must make our
option," wrote Liverpool at the close of one of his most
conciliatory letters, " between a steady and continued
exertion upon a moderate scale, and a great and
extraordinary effort for a limited time, which neither
our military nor financial means will enable us to main-
tain permanently. If it could be hoped that the latter
1 Wellington to Arbuthnot, 5th Oct. {Supp. Desp. vi. 611) ; to
Stuart, 22nd Dec. 1810. Napier has of" course accepted Welling-
ton's distortion of Liverpool's words from sheer violence of party
hatred.
VOL. VII 2 O
562 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
*8io. would bring the contest to a speedy and successful
conclusion, it would certainly be the wisest course ; but
unfortunately the experience of the last fifteen years is
not encouraging in this respect." This was sound
sense, and a timely reminder that Wellington, in his
constant demands for increased forces and increased
subsidies, was really discrediting the "waiting game"
which he had himself advocated, and was tending to
revert to the false methods of Pitt. Let it not be
reckoned to the fault of Wellington if, in the stress of
anxiety and the overwhelming burden of work, he
occasionally forgot that the war in the Peninsula was
but a part of the task which occupied the attention
of Ministers; and let it be counted to the praise
rather than the blame of Ministers if at the right
moment they asserted, with gentleness, indeed, but with
firmness, that the supreme conduct of the great struggle
Jay not in his hands but in theirs.
And so let us leave Wellington and Massena face
to face ; for, though the story of the operations in the
West Indies and in the Mediterranean has already been
told, we have not yet exhausted our survey of the
British armies in the field during 1810.
CHAPTER XL
Our last narrative of events in India ended with the
close of the Mahratta War in December 1805, and with
the accession of Sir George Barlow to the Governorship-
General. The appointment, first of Cornwallis and then
of this gentleman to succeed him for a time, marked
one of those reactions in which the Directors of the
East India Company faithfully represented the feeling
of commonplace Englishmen. Lord Wellesley had
made it his governing principle that British power and
influence must be paramount in India, and he had done
his best to enforce it. The Directors, thinking chiefly
of dividends, denounced such a policy as ruinous ;
Cornwallis had shrunk from it as embarrassing ; Bar-
low abjured it as an accursed thing. There could be
no doubt but that Wellesley 's energetic interference in
the affairs of his neighbours had involved India in
financial difficulties, and that a reduction of expenditure
was in itself desirable ; but with Barlow economy was
almost a mania. He was a man who formulated theories
and acted upon them with invincible courage, but he
had no knowledge of the world nor of men. It was
useless to represent to him that Rajpootana, which
Wellesley had saved from destruction by the Mahrattas,
was still at the mercy of predatory bands, acting
not without encouragement from Scindia, and that
Central India was consequently in a dangerous state of
unrest. The East India Company in his view had no
concern with the Rajpoots. It was futile to point out
that the wholesale and rapid disbandment of troops
threw penniless upon the world a mass of men,
563
564 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 806. accustomed to live by the sword, a fact which must
surely raise up trouble in the near future. It was
enough for Barlow that disbanded soldiers for the present
cost nothing ; and he left the future to take care of itself.
For the rest, he was a man of repellent manners and
unconciliatory, address which, added to extreme tenacity
of his own opinion, led him into innumerable quarrels.
He claimed that he was guided always by principle ;
and, so far as narrowness of view and rigidity of action
are concerned, he was justified in the claim ; but it
should seem that he held himself absolved by these lofty
professions from the obligation to treat either opponents
with fairness, or any description of men with common
sense. In one respect, however, he outshone the vast
majority of Englishmen, namely, in courage and strength
of will ; and it was these fine qualities, underlying a
superstructure of littleness, which made him mistake
resolute stupidity for firm administration.
His reign as Governor-General was fortunately
short, for, albeit nominated as of right by the Directors,
he was superseded owing to the pressure of the Imperial
Government by Lord Minto, who arrived at Calcutta
1807. at the end of July 1807. Of this gentleman, whom we
have already known in Corsica as Gilbert Elliot, it
must suffice to say that he was a sentimental Whig,
unalterably devoted to the British Constitution and to
the glorious Revolution of 1688. Despite, however,
of the doctrine of non-interference which had been
preached to him by the Directors, and which had been
carried to extravagant lengths by Barlow, Lord Minto
refused to allow anarchy to prevail unchecked among his
neighbours ; and he intervened effectively not only to
put down predatory leaders both in Bundelcund and
Berar, but even to constrain the formidable Runjeet Sing
by threat of arms, when he presumed to cross the Sutlej
on a career of conquest. In another very serious crisis,
however, which called for high qualities of insight and
administration, Lord Minto, as shall be seen, was found
wanting.
ch. xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 565
To indemnify Sir George Barlow for the loss of the 1807.
chief place in India, he was appointed to be Governor
of Madras, and took up the duties of his office in
December 1 807. In the isolation which the several
presidencies in those days affected, his advent as a
stranger from Bengal was not welcome ; while his zeal
for economy, even where it might be most laudable and
right, naturally did not commend him to the many who
were likely to lose by it. Barlow began by suspending
without trial a civil servant who was charged with pecula-
tion, with the result that, upon the acquittal of the
accused by the Supreme Court, the Board of Directors
were obliged to pay him a large sum in compensation.
Sir George continued by punishing, again without trial,
two civil servants who had committed a native to
custody for fraud ; and was for the second time
proved to be in the wrong by the conviction of the
native before the Supreme Court of a long course of
systematic forgery. Having thus caused general irritation
by a display of arbitrary temper, Barlow next turned
to the reduction of expenditure in the army.
Now it must be premised that the armies of all
three Presidencies, and the army of Madras in particular,
were in no very good state. The officers were, gener-
ally speaking, superior in intelligence and education to
those of the King's Army ; and this was not unnatural,
for they had more interesting duties, greater responsi-
bility, and infinitely better chances of rising in their
world. It was upon their knowledge of native lan-
guages and their influence with native soldiers that
British rule in India depended, and, knowing this, they
could not fail also to know their own importance.
They thus acquired a sense of their dignity, which
was enhanced by their many opportunities, legitimate
and otherwise, for enriching themselves. Political and
diplomatic missions of the greatest gravity were en-
trusted then, even more often than now, to military
officers, and carried with them enormous power and
great emoluments ; while services of a less ambitious
566 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 807. kind often served to gain the favour, which took a
substantial form, of native magnates. But in compensa-
tion for exile under the Eastern sun they did expect
at all times to make money. The traditions of Clive,
Admiral Hughes, and others who had returned home
rich, and had been execrated in England as " nabobs,"
were not yet extinct ; and every man in India counted
upon amassing a fortune for himself.
Nor was this altogether unreasonable ; for were they
not servants of a commercial company which had re-
warded the deeds of such men as Lord Wellesley and
his brother Arthur with studied neglect? It was true
that in rare cases servants of the Company, as such,
had received red ribands and even peerages, but as a
rule the only recompense that their masters could
confer on them was money. Hence, whereas the King's
officers regarded the performance of military duty as
an end that was honourable in itself, the Company's
officers treated it as a burden worth bearing only for
the attainment of their ultimate object, wealth and
its advantages. But the Company's officers must not be
judged harshly ; for they could not but be alive to the
inferiority of their position. They were not of the
sacred band who wore the King's uniform and fought
under the King's colours ; who could receive His
Majesty's thanks for their conduct in the field ; who,
after good service done, could attend the levee of the
Commander-in-Chief and hear from the mouth of the
King's son — possibly from the lips of the King himself
— that they had deserved well of their Sovereign and of
their country. They could not look up through rank
after rank of the great military hierarchy, and feel that
the highest chief of all was proud to wear the same red coat
as themselves. They could but look to the Directors,
and then only for profit and applause ; for who could
derive honour from merchants in Leadenhall Street ?
The result was that there had grown up among the
officers of the Presidential armies a practice of expressing
corporate approbation of each other's merits and services
ch. xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 567
by means of votes and addresses. " If an officer," wrote 1807.
Thomas Maitland from Ceylon, " does his duty in the
field, he is 'addressed' by his subordinates. The common
execution of his duty approved by his commanding
officer goes for nothing ; the officers under him must
state their opinion of his merits from end to end ot
India. There is nothing but addresses and answers on
the most trivial occasions." We have seen something
of the same spirit in the British Army when Sir Arthur
Wellesley's officers, perceiving that he was slighted by
Sir Hew Dalrymple, sent him flattering letters and a
piece of plate ; but in India it is evident that such
occurrences were not only ludicrously but dangerously
frequent. For it is obvious that if officers are allowed
to signify approval of the merits of a superior, they
have an equal right to criticise and even to censure his
shortcomings. The whole system was in fact utterly
subversive of discipline.
The subordination of the officers was further injured
by the fact that they knew not to whom to look for
advancement. The provinces of the civil and military
authorities had never been accurately defined, and
there had for a long time been disputes between the
two, occasionally culminating, as in the case of Lord
Pigot, in actual violence. The chief cause of quarrel
between them was competition for pecuniary patronage.
The Commander-in-Chief, having a seat on the Council,
thought himself entitled to a voice in the distribution
of civil appointments ; the civilian element, being in the
ultimate resort supreme, claimed a share in the nomina-
tion to military posts. The contention over military
patronage in particular often grew so sharp that
questions were referred to England for decision, and
were there generally determined, according to the
spirit of the British constitution, in favour of the
civilian. This only made the Commander-in-Chief the
more anxious to indemnify himself by interference with
civil patronage, and the civilians the more eager to
defend their right against encroachment. The struggle
568 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. between the two was often decided by the personal
characteristics of the chief actors. If the Commander-
in-Chief were the stronger man, he usurped the Governor's
place ; if the converse were the case, the Governor
arrogated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
Not unfrequently differences were settled by a com-
promise, with the result that both patrons were indeed
satisfied, but that the patronage was wrongly conferred,
with much damage to the public service. The greatest
evil of all was that officers, instead of looking to their
legitimate chief for support, made interest with the
party which for the time being was preponderant in
the Council, whereby there was generated a spirit of
intrigue most noxious to military subordination.
1808. Thus the discipline of the Madras army had been
steadily corrupted ; and, to add to this evil, there was
already among the officers a general feeling of discontent.
The principal causes of this feeling were two. In the
first place, some particular allowances granted to officers
of a certain standing were lower in Madras than in
Bengal ; and, although the authorities might claim that
there was no valid reason for the equalisation of allow-
ances in the various presidencies, nevertheless the fact
remained that such equalisation had been recommended
not only by a previous Governor and Commander-in-
Chief of Madras, but by Lord Cornwallis himself.
Here, therefore, was a grievance which might be called
legitimate, though its continuance was due to the Court
of Directors and in no way to Barlow. A second measure,
which caused great dissatisfaction, was the abolition of
an allowance, called the Tent -allowance, which was
granted to commanding officers of regiments in 1802,
and which made it obligatory upon them to provide
camp-equipage, transport, and hutting accommodation
for their men whether in peace or war. This change was
suggested before Barlow's arrival, of course in the in-
terests of economy ; and there was very much to be said
in its favour, for undoubtedly officers looked upon the
allowance as a means of making money. But on the
ch. xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 569
other hand, like the clothing-allowance of colonels in 1808.
the British Army, it might prove to be a source of
heavy expense instead of gain to the recipients ; for,
while the sum granted was more than enough in time
of peace, it might very well be found inadequate during
a long war. As it chanced, also, the original regulation
had hardly been made before the Madras Army had
been plunged into the lengthy and exhausting war with
the Mahrattas ; wherefore the colonels looked for the
enjoyment of the allowance during a few years of peace
in order to recoup themselves for money actually out
of pocket owing to the cost of the campaigns.
Moreover, as a saving, the abolition of the allowance
was unimportant, for the Madras Army was incessantly
employed in petty expeditions, and must therefore be
provided in some way with transport and camp-equipage.
Barlow, however, not only swept away the allowance,
but contrived to do it in a fashion which made the
reform as unpalatable as possible. The fact was that
he hated soldiers, and appears to have made no secret
of his satisfaction in mortifying them.
A third and really substantial grievance was the
bestowal upon King's officers instead of upon Company's
officers of a great many of the most lucrative places on
the staff. This was not the work of Barlow but of
Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock, both of
them of the King's army, Bentinck in particular having the
true Whig passion for a job. The Court of Directors
admitted and censured the injustice of these appoint-
ments ; and, whether to put a stop to the practice or
for some better reason, they decided that in future the
Commander-in-Chief should not have a seat on the
Council. Cradock was succeeded in September 1807
by General Macdowall. This officer we have already
seen commanding in Ceylon, and have characterised as
not the wisest of men ; but he can hardly be blamed if
he resented his exclusion from a place which had been
enjoyed by all of his predecessors, to the prejudice alike
of his dignity and of his emoluments. Being a King's
57o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1808. officer, he was not naturally in sympathy with the
Company's army ; but his grievance inspired him with
fellow-feeling for all other sufferers of his profession,
and it will presently be seen that he did not fail to give
it utterance.
The general discontent was becoming acute at the
end of 1808, when a disturbance in Travancore suddenly
called for the services of an armed force. The Rajah
had fallen in arrear with the payment of his subsidy ;
and his chief Minister, who was responsible for his
recalcitrance, had been dismissed upon the demand of
the British resident. To revenge himself he organised
an insurrection for the murder of that gentleman, and
induced the Rajah of Cochin to join in it. The trouble
was so far serious that Barlow applied even to Maitland
in Ceylon for help ; and the rising was not put down
without the employment of the whole or parts of four
of the King's regiments,1 and of twelve native battalions ;
but, thanks to the energy of the commanders of the
various columns, all resistance was overcome by the end
1809. of February 1809. The severest day's fighting cost
more than one hundred and forty casualties, and Sir
George Barlow and his Council did not fail to tender
public thanks to the principal officers concerned.
Such an incident should have helped to improve
the relations between the army and the Madras Govern-
ment ; but unfortunately the breach between the two
had already been widened by a series of foolish actions
upon both sides. The report upon which the Govern-
ment had decided to abolish the tent-allowance had
been drawn up by the Quartermaster -general, Lieu-
tenant-colonel Munro of the Company's service, and
had been, of course, of a confidential nature. In the
course of that report Munro had said quite legitimately
that " the grant of the same allowances in peace and war
placed the interests and duties of commanding officers
at variance with each other " ; and either by accident or
through mischief a copy of the document was circulated
1 Twelfth, Nineteenth, Sixty-ninth, Eightieth.
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 571
to all the commanding officers in the Madras Presidency. 1809.
Thereupon, twenty -eight of them preferred against
Munro a charge of injuring their character by infamous
accusations, and demanded his trial by court-martial.
The matter was, however, kept in abeyance for three
months, and might well have come to nothing but for
tactlessness and folly in another quarter. An officer
being required for special duty in Travancore, the civil
government selected Major Blacker, the Deputy
Quartermaster-general, and on the 15th of January
informed Macdowall of the fact. Macdowall begged
that the subject might be reconsidered, saying, very
reasonably, that the choice of an officer for the general
staff ought to have been left to the Commander-in-Chief,
and recommending another officer, of equal ability and
greater knowledge of Travancore, for the post. The
Governor declined to accept his nomination ; and
Macdowall then took the childish step of arresting
Munro upon the accusation of the officers above
mentioned, apparently with the idea that, if the
Ouartermaster-general were disabled from employment,
his deputy could not go to Travancore. Munro
appealed to the Government through the Military
Department for his release, pleading justly that his
report had been prepared in obedience to orders ; and
Macdowall very wrongly declined to forward the appeal,
with the natural result that Munro then addressed the
Government direct. The Government thereupon re-
quested Macdowall to release the arrested officer ; but
this the General declined to do without a positive
command. He had already announced his intention
to resign and to sail for England ; and on the 25th
of January, the day after Munro's release, he vented
his vexation in a general order, wherein he publicly
reprimanded that officer for seeking the protection
of the civil power, and added that, but for his own
departure from India, he would have tried him by
court-martial. Thereupon the Governor and Council,
without waiting for Macdowall's resignation, publicly
572 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 809. dismissed him from his post for conduct which they
truly described as " grossly derogatory to the char-
acter of the Government, and subversive of military
discipline."
So far there was nothing that could be censured in
Barlow's conduct. It was indeed quite unnecessary to
irritate the Commander-in-Chief by giving orders to
his staff-officer without consulting him, but it was not
beyond the legitimate powers of the Governor ; and
dismissal was no excessive punishment for Macdowall's
insubordinate manifesto. Now, however, Barlow put
himself in the wrong by suspending Major Boles, the
Deputy Adjutant-general, for countersigning Macdowall's
general order above mentioned, upon the ground that
Boles knew such signature to be a direct violation of
his duty to the Government. Moreover, Major-general
Gowdie, who had succeeded Macdowall as next senior,
caused Boles to be informed that, if he expressed regret
for what he had done, he should be reinstated. Boles
very rightly refused to do anything of the kind. He
had signed the obnoxious document by order of his
senior officer, and was not responsible for it. Obviously,
if every officer on the staff were to judge for himself
whether the orders of his chief were or were not in
accordance with that chief's duty to the Government
before he executed them, there would be an end of all
military discipline. Barlow had rightly upheld the
principle that subordinates were not answerable for
acts committed by a superior's command, when he
protected Munro against persecution for drawing up
his report upon the tent- allowance. Yet, now, he
stultified himself and outraged that same principle by
persecuting Boles for the sins of Macdowall. More
than this, he aggravated his criminal folly by repeating
it. Colonel Capper, who had been temporarily absent
from his office, represented that he, rather than Boles,
was, as chief staff-officer, responsible for the circula-
tion of the order, whereupon Barlow suspended him
likewise from his appointment. Yet these two were
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 573
acknowledged to be the best officers in the Madras 1809.
Army.
But the Governor did not stop here. Macdowall
and Capper both sailed for England on the 30th of
January ; and Boles, being impoverished by the loss
of his allowances, purposed to follow them at the end
of February in the last ship of the season. Barlow,
however, upon a trivial pretext, refused him permission
to take his passage in this ship, having already arranged
to send the Chief Secretary of the Government to
England in order to lay his version of the whole matter
first before the Court of Directors. This was mean,
cowardly, and unjust ; and, indeed, the Court later
on went so far as to condemn the prohibition of
Boles's departure from India as an unnecessary hard-
ship to that officer. Macdowall and Capper shortly
afterwards passed beyond reach alike of Barlow's
vindictiveness and of the Company's censure, for their
ship was lost at sea, and both of them perished.
The next proceeding of the Government of Madras
was to report the entire affair to the Governor-General,
forwarding at the same time a memorial from the
officers to the Court of Directors on the question of
the equalisation of the allowances. This memorial the
Government had declined to receive ; and Lord Minto
approved of their decision, declaring that the tenor
of the document was disrespectful. The Supreme
Government likewise applauded every one of Barlow's
proceedings, and encouraged him to persevere in his
repression of the insubordinate spirit in the army, with
promise of full support from Calcutta. In the main
Lord Minto was undoubtedly right. Macdowall's con-
duct had been indefensible, and the officers generally
needed to be reduced to obedience. But the suspension
of Boles and Capper was a matter which should not
have been passed over ; and the Governor-General's
treatment of this incident was singularly inept. He
confessed that " he had heard of that most unfortunate
and impolitic measure with the greatest possible regret,"
574 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
j 809. and foresaw the consequences which would flow from
it ; but he abstained from reversing it, partly because he
did not wish to put Sir George in the wrong on any
point, and partly because he thought the suspension
"justifiable in a legal point of view." Upon this it
may be observed, first, that Sir Thomas Maitland,
sternest of disciplinarians, and all sober-thinking men
were of opinion that the suspension was illegal ; and,
secondly, that if Barlow had been wrong, the support
of the Governor-General certainly could not make him
right. To any practical statesman the suspension of
the Commander-in-Chief and of most of his staff
would have signified that the trouble was one which
required the immediate presence and personal interven-
tion of the supreme head of India. But, instead of
sailing at once to Madras, Lord Minto wrote a
despatch which encouraged the officers on the one
side to question the commands of their superiors,
and stimulated Barlow on the other side to repress
their insubordinate spirit. Such a method was ad-
mirably calculated to spur both parties to interminable
conflict.
As a matter of fact, the officers required no
quickening to mischief, Barlow's behaviour to Boles and
Capper having exasperated them as a body to the bitterest
individual hatred of Sir George the man. The latter,
in fact, spared no pains to keep them in a constant state
of irritation. To use Sir Thomas Maitland's words :
" The commonest forms of military duty were turned
into punishments. If a regiment was marched away,
it was said to be a punishment for the misconduct of an
officer. If any expression was dropped at mess, the
officer was removed from his battalion or situation."
The malcontents, therefore, began by sending to Boles
addresses of sympathy, with assurances that a fund
would be organised for his maintenance ; they de-
nounced his punishment as severe and unmerited ; and
they ended by saying that such mutual support and
encouragement must be expected and welcomed by all
ch. xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 575
others who, like himself, might suffer from the ex- 1809.
ceptionable measures of the Government. All this,
though not in the circumstances unnatural, was as
s .
wrong as it could be ; but the officers did not stop
there. Early in February they prepared a secret Feb.
memorial to the Governor-General in Council, com-
plaining of the exclusion of the Commander-in-
Chief from the Council of Madras, of the release of
Munro from arrest, and of the suspension of Capper
and Boles. This memorial deprecated any misin-
terpretation of their discontent as disaffection, talked
of the " violation of the exclusive rights of the army,"
and, finally, besought the Supreme Government to
" release them from a ruler whose measures, guided by
the councils of their implacable enemies, are equally
detrimental to the interests of the State as they are
repulsive to the feelings of a loyal and patriotic army."
The pompous and inflated style of this document
shows that literary vanity had blinded the writers to
the hollowness of the sophism, that loyalty to the Com-
pany at large could be compatible with disloyalty to its
government on the spot. The petitioners, however,
after brief reflection decided that they had gone too
far. The paper, indeed, was hardly circulated beyond
Travancore and the extreme south of the Presidency ;
and by the middle of March the agitation had subsided, March,
and all idea of presenting the memorial had been aban-
doned. A little tact and common sense might well
have ended the quarrel at this point ; and a little con-
sideration, combined with a great deal of firmness, would
probably have alienated the body of the malcontents
from the few really troublesome officers, and begun the
restoration of discipline.
But such were not the methods of Barlow. He
had obtained a copy of the memorial from a source
which he declined to reveal ; and, though fully aware
that all intention of handing it in had been given
up, he on the 1st of May issued a general order May 1.
suspending or dismissing fourteen officers, all of whom
576 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. held high command, while many had just earned the
Government's thanks for their conduct in Travancore.
Not one was apprised of the crime that he had com-
mitted ; not one was permitted to say a word in his
own defence. Some of them denied, possibly with
untruth, that they knew anything about the document.
One of them, a most respectable officer, brought the
testimony of twenty-nine brother-officers to prove that
he had had nothing whatever to do with the matter.
It was useless. The whole of them were punished upon
private information, without trial and without hope of
redress. Moreover, this procedure was and is perfectly
legal. A British officer has no right to claim either
court-martial or court of inquiry : in a word, there is
no justice for him. But though isolated individuals
must and do bear with this rule in silence, its applica-
tion to a number of officers at one time is no ill-chosen
method of driving them and their comrades to mutiny.
Some time was needed for the news of the General
Order of the 1st of May to spread to all the canton-
ments in the south, so that no immediate effect followed
upon it. The agitation among the officers was, more-
over, in many respects a remarkable one. Committees
of correspondence had been formed in all the important
military stations ; but there were no leaders. Barlow
and his Council insisted that the discontent was due to
a few mischievous men ; but these men could not be
named, and therefore could not be arrested. The
Governor probably thought that he had selected them
in his General Order, but he was absolutely mistaken.
The movement was universal, and carried with it
spontaneously every officer in the service, old and
young, field-officer and subaltern — a very significant
fact, which Barlow, either through blindness or from
sheer falsehood, omitted to represent to the Governor-
General. There can be no question but that the officers
looked to Lord Minto to act as mediator between them
and the man whom they regarded, not wholly without
reason in spite of their culpable insubordination, as
ch. xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 577
their oppressor. With singular fatuity Minto carefully 1809.
debarred himself from playing this honourable part.
Barlow had, of course, forwarded to him the mutinous
memorial, of which he had surreptitiously obtained a
copy ; and in a despatch of the 27th of May the May 27.
Governor-General delivered his judgment upon the
whole matter. A document more absurd, and more
typical of the sentimental Whig, was never penned,
being, in fact, neither more nor less than a long, prosing,
pedantic treatise l upon the relations of the Army with
the State, all leading up to justification and support of
every act of Barlow's government, and containing very
doubtful and dangerous doctrine.
First, Lord Minto dwelt at length upon the danger
of an army's becoming a deliberative body — a peril
which no one doubted — and laid down, rightly enough,
the rule that passive obedience is the duty of a soldier.
Then, passing to the case of Major Boles, he declared
with perfect correctness that the treatment of that
officer, whatever it had been, was not the affair of the
army. But, leaving this strong ground, he next
discovered that passive obedience to a criminal order
was not the duty of a soldier. Herein he took, it upon
himself to supersede the Articles of War, which enacted
that a soldier was justified in disobeying an illegal order
— not at all the same thing as a criminal one ; and, in
fact, he substituted for a rule which was more or less
clear and definite, another which was both vague and
indefinable. Moreover, by leaving it to the judgment
of military men to decide whether an order were
criminal or otherwise, he gave an opening to the army
to become a deliberative body, which was the very
thing that he had just condemned. All this he had done
already by implication in his original approval of every
action of Barlow ; but he now promulgated his ridiculous
doctrine in black and white, so that every disaffected
officer could appeal to the Governor-General's dictum
in support of his action.
1 I reckon its length at nearly 10,000 words.
VOL. VII 2 P
578 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. Turning then to the cause of all the trouble,
Lord Minto rightly traced it to the abolition of the
tent-allowance. But, as this would have conceded the
point that there might be a reason, albeit a bad one,
for general discontent in the army, and as the authorities
were unwilling upon any account to admit that the
mutinous spirit pervaded the whole body of the officers,
Lord Minto seized the opportunity to visit all blame
upon the head of Macdowall. That General had, he
averred, been guilty of sowing sedition in the army.
Now Macdowall had beyond doubt acted foolishly and
wrongly ; but to attach to his deeds intentions which
were not borne out by substantive facts, and indeed
were practically contradicted by Macdowall's resignation
of his command, was both cruel and cowardly. And
there was calculation in this cowardice. The people of
England would have found it comforting to believe
that the trouble in Madras was due to the folly and
crime of one man, rather than to the revolt of the whole
body of the East India Company's officers. The
knowledge of such a revolt would have led the public
to suspect with justice that there must have been
gross mismanagement in high places ; and Barlow was
therefore naturally anxious to lead it off on a false scent.
Upon the whole matter it is impossible to condemn
Lord Minto's attitude too strongly. Had he come at
once to Madras and taken the whole affair into his own
hands, the agitation would have subsided instantly.
Instead of this he promulgated, as an eirenicon, a tedious
pamphlet, which, from its portentous literary vanity, its
sophistical arguments, its blindness to facts, and its
resolute defence of the wrong, was calculated to destroy
all confidence alike in his good sense and in his
impartiality.
The first overt act of defiance came from the officers
May 7. in garrison at Masulipatam. On the 7th of May, upon
the arrival of a new commanding officer, Colonel Innes,
for the Madras European Regiment,1 two foolish young
1 The Hundred and Second.
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 579
subalterns proposed as a toast "The Friends of the 1809.
Army," with preliminary speeches reflecting upon the late
proceedings of Government. Innes gave the hot heads a
hint which ought to have checked this unseemly display ;
but it was not taken ; and, knowing that the regiment
was in bad order, he reported the circumstance to the
Government semi-officially, begging that the matter
might not for the present be noticed, as he hoped to
bring the officers to a sense of their duty without
severity. This counsel was far too wise to weigh with
Barlow and his advisers, who promptly removed one of
the two offenders, Lieutenant Maitland, from his post
of Quartermaster, and sent the other to an unhealthy
outlying station, far away from his regiment, with orders
not to leave it until sickness should compel him. At the
same time a letter from the Government intimated that
a repetition of such conduct would " involve the whole
corps of the Madras European Regiment in the severest
penalties." These words startled all ranks of the
regiment into belief that it was about to be disbanded ;
and a deputation of the officers waited upon Innes to
ask him for a copy of the information which he had
furnished to Barlow. " We have the right," they said,
"to ask whether the Madras Government has the power
to inflict such a punishment upon the report of a single
individual, without a fair trial." Innes, of course,
refused to comply ; and the officers then, on the 27th May 27.
of May, addressed the same question to the Adjutant-
general, and again properly received no answer. Their
behaviour had been shameful, and their clamour as to
their rights was preposterous. A British military officer,
it must be repeated, has no right either to trial or to
justice ; that privilege is reserved for non-commissioned
officers, privates, and civilians.
Soon afterwards, orders came for a party of the
Madras Europeans to be embarked on board two men-
of-war as marines, the naval Commander-in-Chief being
in want of a supplement for his crews. Such service
was extremely distasteful to all ranks ; and indeed the
580 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. instruction to embark the men against their own wish
was of doubtful legality. Moreover, it was pretty evident
that the work on board ship was intended to be penal,
inasmuch as the officer appointed to command the
party was Lieutenant Maitland. The officers therefore
decided that they would not obey in this matter ; and,
when the vessels came in, they asked Innes to suspend
the order for embarkation until they had received an
answer from the Governor and Council to a memorial
begging for redress of their grievances. Innes sharply
declined, and threatened to enforce obedience by
landing a naval brigade; whereupon the officers called
the Europeans and the Nineteenth Native Infantry
to arms, and placed Innes in close arrest under
custody of four European sentries. "The Govern-
ment's unjust treatment," they said, " the rumours of
disbandment, and the order to embark as marines have
determined us to resist such dangerous acts until a fair
investigation has been held. This is not the first time
that the Government has punished the most capable
officers without trial. At the same time we are still the
supporters of the British interests in India, and loyal
subjects of the King."
Here, therefore, was open and audacious mutiny,
and that not only of a native but of an European
regiment, whose men might be expected to follow their
officers. The Government met the danger by appointing
Lieutenant-colonel John Malcolm to take command of
the Madras Europeans, and nominating a committee of
three officers to inquire and report upon the matter.
The committee, however, reduced itself, by reason of
the sickness of his colleagues, to the solitary person of
Malcolm, who set out at once for Masulipatam, and
July 4. arrived there on the 4th of July. The officers had
fully made up their minds to march towards Hydera-
bad and join the garrison of that place ; but, overcome
by the genial personality of Malcolm, they met him
frankly, and, so to speak, placed their cards upon the
table. He perused the papers which they laid before
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 581
him, and, reporting to Barlow that the movement in the 1809.
army was general, and not partial, urged the necessity
for making concessions. Barlow, always rigid and
unreasonable, persisted in his opinion that the agitation
was only partial, and disapproved Malcolm's conciliatory
attitude. He empowered the Colonel to assure the
Madras Europeans that there was no intention of dis-
banding them ; but, far from authorising him to nego-
tiate with the officers, allowed him at his discretion to
offer a pardon to the non-commissioned officers and men
only. Malcolm, however, declined to take advantage
of this permission for fear of driving the officers to
despair ; and a few days later he returned to Madras
to confer personally with Barlow. It may be added
that Sir George and his Council, after due consideration,
finally condemned Malcolm's policy, and attributed his
failure to re-establish efficient control at Masulipatam
to his " unreasonable forbearance."
Such being the attitude of Barlow and his advisers,
it is not surprising that on the 15th of July they wrote July 15.
to Sir Thomas Maitland at Ceylon to send to Madras
immediately all the troops that could be spared from
his garrison, having, as they said, no doubt of the
intention of the officers to subvert the Government.
This was a grim comment on their own statement that
the insurrection was not general but partial. At the
same time they committed themselves definitely to the
policy of alienating the Sepoys from their officers, and
obtained for it the support of the Governor-General,
who, in a proclamation of the 20th of July, offered July 20.
pardon to non-commissioned officers and men only, upon
submission. Lastly, they devised a cunning instrument
for driving as many officers as possible to at least a
semblance of insubordination. A "test" or declaration
was framed, whereby the signatories bound themselves
to obey the orders and uphold the authority of the
Government of Madras, agreeably to the tenor of their
commissions ; and this was circulated to the com-
manding officers of stations, with instructions that all who
582 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 809. declined to sign it should cease to do duty, and with-
draw to the coast between Sadras and Negapatam, where
they should remain, receiving their ordinary allowances
until they could be re-employed. It may be observed
that the legality of this last measure was extremely
doubtful, while its expediency was more doubtful still.
Sir Thomas Maitland wrote plainly to Castlereagh,1 that
if the test had been tendered to him by any delegated
authority he should have refused to sign it. " Soldiers,"
he said, " are bound as much by the code of honour as
by codes of rules and laws. To force such a pledge
on a man is an imputation on his honour. It was a
sure means of confounding the innocent with the guilty,
for any honourable man would refuse to sign it." It
may be added that to send agents to seduce soldiers
from their officers, or, in other words, to presume the
disloyalty of the officers, and to demand from them,
under penalties, a pledge of loyalty afterwards, was
neither logical, sensible, nor straightforward.
Barlow, however, troubled himself little about such
refinements. The test was offered first to the General
Staff at Madras, who signed it ; next to the officers of
the regiments at Fort St. George, most of whom rejected
it ; and then to those of the field-force encamped near the
city, who almost to a man refused to subscribe it. The
whole of the recalcitrants were despatched to the coast,
some of them in circumstances of great hardship and
degradation, owing to the severity of a King's officer
who was placed in charge of them. These last expressed
themselves as much hurt that the fidelity of some
among them, who had served for thirty years, should be
called in question ; and they avowed that the ground
of their refusal to sign the test was a conviction that it
would militate against the interests of their service. At
Vellore not an officer would sign. At Trichinopoly,
Tanjore, Dindigul, and Palamcottah several officers
accepted the test, but even more declined it, and these
last were at once sent to the coast by Colonel Wilkinson
1 CO., Ceylon. Maitland to Castlereagh, 1st Oct. 1809.
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 583
of the King's Thirtieth Foot. In Travancore and the 1809.
stations on the coast east and west of Cape Comorin the
case was the same. Altogether, out of thirteen hundred
officers, little more than one-tenth consented to sign the
declaration ; this minority, however, including the ablest
men in the army ; and the chief effect of the measure
was to goad the malcontents to desperation.
Though the organisation of the mutineers (for such
they must be termed) was so defective as hardly to
merit the name, yet its centre lay at Hyderabad ; and
it will be convenient first to follow the course of events
there. The first outward symptom of mutiny was an
intimation from the officers to the commandant, Colonel
Montresor, on the 17th of July, that they would not July 17.
permit a native battalion, which he had ordered to
march to Goa, to proceed on its way. Four days later
they presented Montresor with what they termed an
ultimatum, wherein they set forth five specific demands :
first, for the repeal of the General Order of the 1st of
May ; second, for the restoration of every officer who
had been suspended or removed ; third, for the trial of
Colonel Innes for his conduct at Masulipatam ; fourth,
for the removal of every officer of the general staff
supposed to have influenced the Government in its
late measures ; and fifth, for a general amnesty. It is
unnecessary to comment upon the extreme of in-
subordination manifested in this document ; and yet
it must be pointed out that the third demand alone was
really of unreasonable insolence. The fourth, on the
testimony of Sir Thomas Maitland, was not without
justification. " I apprehend," he wrote to Castlereagh,
" that Sir George Barlow's military advisers are men
whose characters are not generally respected ; and, if
I could enter into detail, I think there is great room for
considerable censure." Lastly, the first, second, and
fifth articles of the " ultimatum " were simply parts of
a single protest against arbitrary punishment without
accusation and without trial.
Upon receipt of this document the Madras Govern-
584 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. ment decided to appoint Colonel Barry Close, an officer
of rare ability and great influence in the army, and at
that time resident in Poonah, to take command at
Aug. 3. Hyderabad. On approaching the city on the 3rd of
August he was met by Colonel Montresor and the
officer commanding the King's Thirty-third Regiment,
who, as loyal servants of the Government, warned him
that the Company's officers would not allow him to
take up his post until their memorial had been answered.
Close, a strong and fearless man, declined to listen to
their fears, and was for calling out the Thirty-third to
overawe the malcontents ; but being told that in this
case the regiment would certainly be attacked by the
mutinous battalions, he desisted. A deputation from
the insubordinate officers then approached him ; but
he declined to hear them, and rode straight into camp,
where the entire force was forming on parade. Halting
there before the Sixteenth Native Infantry, he summoned
the field-officers of the Hyderabad force to come to
him. Only two obeyed, and to them he produced the
" test," requiring the signature of all officers to it, and
expatiating earnestly on the awful consequences of
mutiny. His auditors were much impressed by his
language, but asked time for consideration. Close
peremptorily refused ; and, riding up to the cavalry,
he first called upon the sowars in their own language
to abandon their officers. He then summoned the
native officers of the infantry to come to him ; but the
British officers would not permit them to advance,
whereupon he shouted to them also the same appeal
which he had made to the troopers. Great confusion
ensued, but the mutinous party prevailed. They
ordered the men to prime and load, which order was
obeyed ; and finally they gave the command for the
battalion to march off. Close tried in vain to stop
them, appealing to the Native Cavalry for help, and
shaking hands with the native officers, but to no purpose.
His attempt to seduce the men from their leaders had
failed ; and, a company of artillery having come on to
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 585
the ground, Close dismounted and surrendered to the 1809.
senior officer, who declined to take charge of him.
Some altercation ensued, after which Close quitted the
parade ; but it should seem that a few hours later the
field-officers waited upon him to beg his mediation on
their behalf, and to express their readiness to agree to
anything that might be approved by himself and
Malcolm.1 Close, however, must have been obdurate,
for on the morrow he received an intimation from the
officers that he must leave the cantonments in the
course of the day. Accordingly he returned to Poonah.
A few days later the mutineers, with many expressions
of respect for Montresor's conduct and character, re-
quested him to resign his command, since, in consequence
of the harsh treatment of their comrades at Madras,
they intended to withdraw the troops from Hyderabad
and to encamp in the neighbourhood. Montresor
thereupon remonstrated once more very solemnly with
the senior officers ; and his representations deepened the
impression made by those of Close. It was now known
that the Governor-General was expected shortly to arrive
at Madras; and to him accordingly on the 1 ith of August
the disaffected officers addressed a letter, stating that,
relying on his justice, clemency, and wisdom, they would
abide by his decision whatever it might be, and in token
of their good faith had signed the test. They added
that, had Close's presentation of the document been
less sudden, his mission would not have been a failure.
It must be noticed that they made their surrender to
Lord Minto, not to Barlow, and as the result of friendly
counsel, not of violence. From this it is clear that, if
the Government had attempted to come to an explana-
tion with the officers instead of treating them as stocks
and stones, the entire agitation could have been quelled
without difficulty.
The surrender of the mutineers at Hyderabad had an
immediate effect upon the remainder of the army. The
1 Such is Malcolm's account, enclosed in Maitland to Castle-
reagh, ist Oct. 1809.
586 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. brigade at Jalna had marched on the 13th of August
Aug- !3- after issuing a manifesto to the effect that, but for the
uncompromising attitude of the Government of Madras,
they would have awaited the arrival of Lord Minto ;
but on hearing the news from Hyderabad they marched
back and signed the test. At Masulipatam Major-
general Pater, who had succeeded Malcolm in com-
mand, withheld the test until the 9th of August, when
he produced it on parade, and at the same time offered
a pardon to all except the European officers. The
men, both native and European, were clamorous that
they would accept no pardon which was not extended
to their superiors ; but there were divisions among the
leaders themselves ; the men naturally became divided
Aug. 15. also, and on the night of the 15th there was a serious
affray between the two parties. The officers promptly
interposed to quell the disturbance ; and then, realising
the consequences of their conduct, and being, moreover,
apprised of what had happened at Hyderabad, they con-
sented on the 1 6th to sign the test. The men of the
Hundred and Second, thereupon, suspecting that they
were to be sacrificed to the safety of their superiors, turned
out with their arms and threatened to shoot any officer
who should sign. In alarm Pater promised a general
pardon to all ranks ; but many of the men, being still
suspicious, insisted upon proceeding to Madras. Finally,
with Pater's permission, the officers ordered the entire
regiment to march, and it moved off accordingly on the
Aug. 17. evening of the 17th in military array. The mass of the
privates was persuaded to return on the morrow, but
over one hundred and fifty pursued their way under
command of their own officers. Thus order was re-
stored at Masulipatam.
The surrender of the mutineers in this place reacted
likewise upon the neighbouring garrisons. A battalion
at Samulcottah had deposed its commander, and, having
seized both mails and treasure upon its march, was
Aug. 20. nearing Masulipatam when, on the 20th, it was met
by an express with intelligence of the submission of
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 587
the officers; whereupon it restored the treasure and 1809.
returned to its station. At Ellore and Chicacole the
sume thing happened with superficial differences, and
in many cases the officers signed the test, receiving
from Pater a pardon for themselves and for their men.
In Mysore, under the evil influence of Colonel John
Bell of the Company's artillery, matters took a far more
serious turn. That officer, who was in command at
Seringapatam, defied the commandant of the division,
seized the treasure in the fort, and persuaded the officers
of two native battalions at Chitteldroog to lead their
men under false pretences to Seringapatam. These
latter were on their march when they were attacked by Aug. 1 1.
a body of Mysorean horse and the King's Twenty-fifth
Dragoons, who had been collected by the Resident to
intercept them. The unfortunate Sepoys skirmished
for some time with the Mysoreans, and killed and
wounded over one hundred of them ; but they did not
resist the British, whom they believed to be their
friends, and lost nearly four hundred and fifty killed,
wounded, and missing, including one British officer.
The remainder, with twenty British and nineteen native
officers, and about eight hundred men, made their way
to Seringapatam. Meanwhile, the Government had
collected a large force to besiege that fortress ; and,
blood having been spilled, the mutineers opened fire
upon the besiegers and made a few sallies before they
surrendered on the 23rd of August. The whole affair Aug. 23.
was unfortunate, for had not a warning from the
Resident to the two battalions from Chitteldroog
miscarried, the officers would have been aware that they
must fight or surrender, and would have yielded.
They had no intention of proceeding to extremities,
though they had pushed the game of brag to a most
dangerous and unwarrantable length. Still, the fact
remains that the shedding of blood was really an
accident ; and it is impossible not to think that it could
have been averted by reasonable precautions, though
the mutineers cannot be acquitted of the consequences.
588 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1809. The mutiny was now practically at an end, but
nothing could keep Barlow from worrying his victims
unceasingly. In the first place he declined to recognise
the pardons granted by General Pater to the garrisons
of Masulipatam, Ellore, Samulcottah, and Chicacole ;
while in the south he pursued a still more exasperating
policy. At Quilon, the scene of the recent hostilities
in Travancore, Colonel Stuart of the King's Nine-
teenth Foot had for some time been in a most dangerous
situation, being threatened by the disaffected regiments
on one side, and by the natives, whose insurrection had
only recently been quelled, on the other. While doing
his duty faithfully and loyally he deplored Barlow's
measures, which he described confidentially to Maitland
as very violent and likely to lead to civil war. He
had therefore behaved with studious moderation, in
order not to excite men who were already in a highly
inflammable state of mind ; and hence, when the
surrender of Hyderabad became known, his malcontent
officers had easily been persuaded to return to their
duty. It so happened, however, that these officers in
Travancore had made a very telling rejoinder to the
demand that they should sign the test. They had
drawn up and signed a test of their own, declaring
their loyalty to the King and their support of the
authority of the Government of Madras according to
the tenor of their commissions as explained in certain
paragraphs of Lord Minto's despatch of the 27th of
May. This was a palpable hit, for hereby they took
advantage of the Governor - General's doctrine that
officers had the right to disobey an order if they judged
it to be criminal. Colonel Stuart, however, by gentle-
ness and conciliation had overcome this insubordinate
spirit, his arguments being much fortified by the
successive submissions of the garrisons in the north, all
of which had been regularly reported to him by the
Military Secretary at Madras. All the officers had
signed the Government's test unconditionally, and the
trouble was subsiding in Travancore, when Barlow
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 589
issued an order to Stuart that the signatures of those 1809.
who had accepted the test in consequence of the
surrender of Hyderabad were not to be admitted. He
even went the length of superseding Stuart in his in-
dependent command for the obvious, though unstated,
reason that the Colonel had shown undue leniency.
The inevitable result was that the old sore was re-
opened, and the unhappy culprits driven again to
desperation. Small wonder that, even before this
occurrence, Stuart had written, " God send Lord
Minto soon to Madras."
At length, on the nth of September, Lord Minto Sept. 11
arrived at Madras after a bad passage of thirty-seven days
from Calcutta. For nearly a fortnight he remained
silent, not giving a sign of his intentions ; but at last, on
the 25th of September, he issued a second wordy and Sept. 25.
pedantic pamphlet which he called a General Order.
The purport of it was that amnesty was granted to the
whole body of officers, with the exception of twenty-one,
three of whom, namely, the commandants at Seringa-
patam, Jalna, and Masulipatam, were reserved for trial
by court-martial, while the remaining eighteen received
the option of a trial or dismissal from the service. But
throughout the whole Order there was no mention of
the Commander-in-Chief; and the Governor-General
seemed to assume that the charge of disciplining armies
lay with himself, whereas the warrant for holding
courts-martial was entrusted not to him but to the
Commander-in-Chief. That functionary was of course
under the orders of the Governor-General ; but if he had
refused to hold a court-martial, the Governor-General
had no further power than to displace him, and to find
another Commander-in-Chief more obedient to himself.
Nevertheless, Lord Minto, with singular blindness,
never thought of bringing his own Commander-in-Chief
from Calcutta to advise him. The result was that his
General Order was not only wholly unmilitary, but
actually subversive of every military principle.
He began by affirming that " it was not without the
590 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. most afflicting agitation that he had affixed his final
signature to the General Order " respecting the twenty-
one officers above named, " and that it was with corre-
sponding satisfaction that he performed the more grateful
task of announcing a general and unconditional amnesty."
There was really no occasion to weep over the necessity
of bringing some mutineers to trial, or to rejoice over the
pleasure of extending pardon to others. But Minto
seemed to treat the whole affair not as a rebellion against
the authority of the Company and the King, but as a
mere local ferment ; and he made no attempt whatever
to bring home to the officers at large the heinousness of
their crime. He used the words mutiny, rebellion, and
sedition as synonymous, never pointing out that the
offenders had been guilty of rebellion superadded to
mutiny. But indeed he dwelt chiefly on the motives
which dictated his actions, as though he were accountable
to the army for them, and on his unwillingness to make
examples of any kind ; as if to encourage the officers to
contrast his mildness with Barlow's severity, and make
them once again a deliberative instead of an obedient
body. Many thought that he should not have granted
an absolute amnesty at all, but that he should have per-
mitted the guilty parties to return to their duty pending
signification of the King's pleasure, which would have
showed them how serious had been their misconduct, and
would have kept all in unpleasant but merited suspense
for six months.
Again, it was quite wrong to give any officers the
option of trial or dismissal. Minto excused it by saying
that " the Court Martial might of necessity feel bound
to pass sentences of greater severity than it was in con-
templation to extend without distinction to the whole
number of those committed for trial." But in this case
he might have reduced the number of those to be tried,
or exerted the prerogative of mercy in favour of some of
the condemned ; for it was a strange way to re-establish
discipline by proclaiming that the laws against mutiny
and rebellion were too severe to be enforced. Again, the
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 591
option of dismissal, that is to say of punishment, or trial, 1809.
prejudged the guilt of those to whom it was offered ;
and if any of those concerned had claimed the alterna-
tive of trial, it would have been impossible for a court-
martial to acquit them, even if innocent, without flying in
the face of the Governor-General. This was of a piece
with Minto's previous assumption that Macdowall had
been guilty of sedition ; and it was difficult not to
recall that Macdowall, Boles, and Capper, three of the
best officers in the army, had been suspended for a minor
offence, but that after open mutiny and rebellion on
the part of hundreds of officers, no more than three
of them had been selected for trial. Moreover,
Minto's ignorant trifling with military matters did not
end there. Two subalterns had been tried by court-
martial for gross insubordination and sentenced to
be cashiered. The Governor-General, in a long prosing
order, approved the sentence but remitted the penalty,
on the ground that the culprits should not be deprived
of the benefit of the general amnesty. And this he
did without a word to the Commander-in-Chief, to
whom in right, in law and in common sense, the
question should first have been referred.
The result was that the discipline of the army went
from bad to worse. Barlow, in the first insolence of his
triumph, declared that it had been "re-established on a
solid basis " — an absolute absurdity, seeing that Lord
Minto had laid down the doctrine that officers might use
their private judgment as to obedience to orders, and
Barlow had sent emissaries among the Sepoys to teach
them to disobey their superiors. Barlow's conception of
discipline may be gauged by the fact that he considered
it safe when officers and men had been turned into two
separate deliberative bodies. But, apart from this, he
further laid down the proposition that the Sepoys were
now held together no longer by their allegiance to
their officers, but by their attachment to the State
irrespective of any mediate commander. Moreover,
having by wholesale suspensions stripped the native
592 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. regiments altogether of officers, he made good the loss
by wholesale introduction of raw and inexperienced lads
from the King's regiments, who knew nothing of native
ways nor of native languages. Thus the native army
was left under no proper control at all, and the Sepoys
had already begun to say, " Before long all white face
gone. This Governor very fine Governor ; he tell
black men that they better than white men, and that
Sepoy never mind again what they say." It need
hardly be added that the Company's officers were set
at bitter feud with the King's ; and that the ill-feeling
between the two was not softened by an address to
Barlow from three commanding officers of the King's
regiments, expressive of their obedience and steady de-
termination to protect the Government. This effusion
was offered in all loyalty and good faith, and was accepted
by Sir George, who apparently did not perceive that, if
it were a matter of choice and not of duty for officers
to support the Government, they might equally at their
will overthrow it. Such was Barlow's idea of discipline
established on a solid basis.
Lord Minto's measures did nothing to better this
state of affairs. The essence of the mutiny, as we have
seen, lay in personal hatred of Barlow ; and Minto's
General Order was construed as a rebuff to the detested
Governor. The courts-martial took place at Bangalore
among most disgraceful scenes. Colonel John Bell, the
worst offender of all, was escorted to court by every
officer of the Company's service in the cantonments,
who moved insolently in military array, and nearly rode
down the president. His defence was drawn up by a
lawyer ; the Company's officers almost without ex-
ception committed perjury to save him ; and there
was much talk among his friends that they would
not allow the extreme penalty to be enforced. At last,
in March, the verdict was pronounced, and Bell was
adjudged to be cashiered. The sentence should cer-
tainly have been death, whether it were executed or
not ; and the Commander-in-Chief returned it to the
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 593
court-martial for revision, but consented to confirm 1809.
the penalty of cashierment when the members declined
to alter their judgment. The same thing happened in
the case of Major Storey, the leader of the mutiny at
Masulipatam, while Colonel Doveton, who commanded
at Jalna, was actually acquitted. This last verdict the
Commander-in-Chief declined to accept ; and in April
the court was dissolved and a new court formed under
the presidency of Colonel Wilkinson, who had shown,
as was thought, unnecessary severity at Trichinopoly.
Judging that under his direction the new tribunal would
be as severe as the former one had been lenient, the
remaining officers accepted their dismissal without trial ;
and the punitive proceedings came to an end. But all
was still violence and discontent, for the Company's
officers were unchangeably sulky, rancorous, and insub-
ordinate. Nearly everywhere they abjured all commerce
with the King's officers ; while quarrelling not less
bitterly with each other upon the ground that this
regiment or that " had deserted the cause." In
February 18 10 a correspondent at Madras wrote to
Wellington in Portugal that only his coming as
Governor - General and Commander-in-Chief could
restore things to their proper order ; * and the ill-
feeling was not wholly quenched even so late as 1835.
Looking back to the whole affair over the distance
of a century, one is irresistibly forced to the conclusion
that, with better management at headquarters, matters
would never have come to the very dangerous point
which they finally attained. It may be fairly granted
that the spirit of the Madras army was bad, and that
the officers had worked themselves up to a ridiculous
pitch of arrogance over their grievances, real or supposed.
Yet they knew as well as possible that even a successful
rebellion against the Government would mean only the
cutting of their own throats, sooner rather than later,
by their own Sepoys. It is incredible that they should
have seriously contemplated armed revolt ; and indeed,
1 Wellington MSS. Sir R. Farquhar to Wellington, 6th Feb. 1810.
VOL. VII 2 Q
594 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
^ 809. when once they had committed themselves to resistance,
the crudeness of their organisation and the weakness
and hesitation of their methods showed clearly that they
had taken no thought and prepared no measures for
decisive action. They had, as I have already said, no
leaders, and therefore no settled policy ; but this makes
their unanimity in proceeding to extremes of reckless-
ness the more remarkable. How then was it that a
body of public servants, who had in the past deserved
nobly of the State, threw all principle, conduct, and
prudence to the winds, and, while professing unchanged
loyalty to the King, risked certain massacre for themselves
and chaos and ruin for British India rather than submit
to the authority of the Government of Madras ?
" There must be some deep error in any Govern-
ment," wrote Maitland, "when the whole of its army,
headed by its officers, directly disobeys and defies it."
The truth is that the officers were simply goaded to
desperation by the arbitrary methods of Barlow. In
truth he never ceased to worry, bully, and degrade them.
His spies and agents must have been everywhere,
tampering with the Sepoys, and listening for every
careless word of an officer ; and upon their report
followed punishment, which fell as a bolt from the blue
upon the chosen victims, who asked in vain to be told
who was their accuser and what was his charge against
them. No one could feel safe ; and it was of no
advantage for any to behave themselves well, since
innocent and guilty alike were debarred from making
a defence. Barlow has generally been written down
as a strict but mistaken man. Had this been all he
might be pardoned, but he was more ; he was an
unscrupulous and a deceitful man. He initiated, in fact,
a reign of terror, such a reign as has in all countries
invariably brought about either revolution or systematic
assassination. It is not therefore surprising that in
Madras he kindled a mutiny. The most charitable
name by which to call him would be that of a fanatic.
A little tact, a little reasonableness, and a little con-
ch.xl HISTORY OF THE ARMY 595
sideration — in fact, a little inclination to treat men as 1809.
human creatures instead of as senseless machines — would
have sufficed to rally the officers to the Government, and
prepared them to receive with a good grace some school-
ing in discipline. But to Barlow concession was an
abominable thing ; and rather than grant one tittle, he
preferred to launch the British of Southern India into
civil war. There is nothing more to be said of such a
man than that he was absolutely unfit to be placed in
any position of authority whatever. It is sometimes
said that the best procedure in case of a mutiny is to
hang the ringleaders and the commanding officer. The
saying is amply justified by the case of Barlow at
Madras.
Nevertheless, Sir George's powers of mischief might
have been greatly reduced had Lord Minto realised
earlier how serious was the state of affairs in Madras.
The Governor-General had indeed some excuse for his
long inaction in the fact that Barlow persistently de-
ceived him, by representing the mutiny as the work or
a few discontented individuals only and not of the whole
body of officers. Nevertheless, Minto must bear a
very great share of the responsibility for the ultimate
disaster, since by his inconsiderate support of Barlow he
put himself out of court as a mediator, and deprived
the officers of their last hope of a hearing. To do him
justice, he seems to have realised that Barlow was
greatly to blame, but in his efforts to please both sides
he cut a deplorable figure. It is difficult to say which
is the more pitiable, the conceit with which he en-
deavoured to deal with military men without military
advice, or the childish literary vanity which deceived
him into the belief that angry feelings can be soothed
and discipline restored by an avalanche of pretentious
wordiness. Never has man taken greater and more
successful pains to stamp himself with an indelible brand
of mediocrity.
For the rest, it must be recorded that the principal
demands of the mutineers were all conceded in the
596 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1809. course of the next few years. Not only was a general
amnesty proclaimed at once, as we have seen, but before
1 8 14 every officer, except two, who had been suspended,
dismissed or cashiered, was restored to the service ; of
the remaining two, one was reinstated in 18 14, and only
one, Lieutenant-colonel John Bell, was, with good
reason, left an outcast for ever. Nor did the arch-
offender escape. Sir George Barlow's fate hung for
long in the balance at the India House, but at last,
in 18 12, after three years of angry debate, he was
recalled and never employed again. His name should
be remembered as that of the man who pushed to its
logical extreme the principle that a British officer has
no title to justice, and so brought about the illogical
but inevitable result — a mutiny.
The authorities used for this narrative of the mutiny are Recora
Office; CO. Ceylon; Maitland to Castlereagh, 26th, 28th, 31st
July, 5th, 13th, 1 8th, 19th, 20th Aug., 1st Oct. 1809 ; to Cooke, 7th
Aug. 1809 ; to Castlereagh, 25th Jan., 20th, 21st Feb., 25th March
18 10. The enclosures contain all the most essential documents.
Wilson's History oj the Madras Army, iii. 285-295 ; Kaye's Life of
Sir John Malcolm ; Minto's Life of Lord Minto.
CHAPTER XLI
Scarcely had Maitland recovered the troops which
he had sent to India for suppression of the mutiny,
when he was called upon to furnish another contingent
of Europeans for an attack upon Mauritius. Since the
renewal of the war in 1803, French cruisers and
privateers from that island had played havoc with
British commerce, and in 1807 the port of Calcutta
alone had suffered a loss of ^200,000 within six weeks.
It had therefore been decided to check this evil by
strict blockade of Mauritius ; and, as a preliminary
measure, a small force had been sent from Bombay
early in 1809, under the command of Colonel Keating 1809.
of the Fifty-sixth, to seize the island of Rodriguez,
and to convert it into an advanced base for both army
and navy. This was easily accomplished ; but in
September Keating, not content with a passive attitude, Sept.
made a raid upon the neighbouring island of Bourbon
with about four hundred men, captured the port of St.
Paul with all its defences and shipping, and recovered
several British vessels. Encouraged by this success, the
Government of India resolved to equip an expedition
for the complete reduction of the French islands ; and
accordingly in the spring of 18 10 a force of some 18 10.
thirty-five hundred men 2 was embarked from Madras,
arriving safely on the 20th of June at Rodriguez. June 20.
1 Madras Artillery . . . . . 100
Flank cos. H.M. 12th and 33rd . . 400
H.M. 69th 730
H.M. 86th 420
1650
597
598 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. There Colonel Keating took over the command ot
the whole, and, to make his four thousand men as
imposing as possible on paper, organised them into
four brigades.1 On the 3rd of July he sailed for St.
Denis, the capital of Bourbon, and arriving before it on
July 7. the 7th, began the disembarkation according to the
plan which he had designed ; namely, that the First
Brigade should land at Grand Chaloupe, about six
miles west of the town, and the remainder near the
Riviere des Pluies, about three miles east of it. Colonel
Fraser with the First Brigade accomplished his task
without loss, and at once advanced to St. Denis, where
he took up a position to intercept any reinforce-
ments that might arrive from St. Paul. Keating,
however, was less fortunate. About one hundred and
fifty men had been landed, not without loss of several
soldiers drowned, when the surf forbade any more
boats to approach the shore ; and this little party was
left stranded with all its ammunition wet and half of its
arms lost. Several bands of the enemy approached,
and opened a timid and straggling fire upon them ;
whereupon Commodore Rowley, as a last resource,
ordered one of the transports to run ashore, hoping
that this would serve as a breakwater to the boats.
Another hundred or two of men were thus set on land
before dark, and Keating then directed them to attack
I /6th Madras N.I. ....
2/1 2th Madras N.I
Detachment 2nd batt. Pioneers
850
850
200
1900
355°
Total
1st Brigade. Col. Fraser (H.M. 86th).
H.M. 86th, 1 /6th M.N.I.
2nd Brigade. Lt.-col. Drummond (H.M. 86th).
Marines, 2/ 12th M.N.I.
3rd Brigade. Lt.-col. M'Leod (H.M. 69th).
69th, detachment Bombay N.I.
4th Brigade. Lt.-col. Campbell (H.M. 33rd).
Flank cos. H.M. 12th and 33rd, detachment H.M. 56th,
Pioneers.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 599
and capture a small fort about three miles distant, while 18 10.
he sailed with the remainder of the troops to Grand
Chaloupe.
Meanwhile, Fraser, finding himself unsupported, had
bivouacked for the night on a height about a mile and
a half from St. Denis. On the following morning he July 8.
advanced and found the enemy's regular troops, some
three hundred strong, awaiting him in the plain, with
one flank resting on a redoubt and the other on a river.
Fraser at once carried the redoubt with the bayonet in
spite of a brave resistance, and, finding that the enemy
was opening fire upon the work from field-guns near
the town, returned the fire from two cannon which had
been left unspiked. He was presently reinforced by a
part of Drummond's brigade ; and in the evening the
Governor sent out a flag of truce to propose a cessation
of arms. A British officer was accordingly sent into
the town to negotiate, when Keating suddenly appeared
on the scene, having galloped all the way from Grand
Chaloupe, and in some mysterious fashion penetrated the
enemy's outposts. In a few minutes he had hectored
the unfortunate Governor into surrender ; and the
French regular troops, to the number of five hundred,
became prisoners of war, while the militia were allowed
to disperse to their homes. St. Paul capitulated on the
10th, and therewith the island passed into Keating's July 10.
hands. The casualties of the British were ninety-seven
killed and wounded, of whom sixty-nine belonged to
the Eighty-sixth. As this regiment took only about
four hundred men into the field, its losses cannot be
considered trifling.
The next enterprise, after a month's interval, was
an attack on Isle de la Passe, an islet at the mouth of
the south-eastern harbour of Port Bourbon on Mauritius
itself. This was successfully carried out by the boats
of the King's frigates Sirius and Iphigenia ; a small
garrison was furnished to hold the new capture ; and
an officer of engineers took in hand the work of forti-
fication. The command of the island was entrusted
600 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1810. to Captain Willoughby of the Nereide, the most in-
satiable fire-eater in the King's Navy ; and he a few
days later attacked and carried the fort upon Pointe du
Diable, which commanded the north-eastern entrance
into the Great Harbour. Thus all the French vessels
in the haven were successfully sealed up by the
skill and daring of the British seamen ; and nothing
more was necessary than to await the coming of the
expedition which was known to be preparing in India.
The devil, however, now entered into the naval officers,
and persuaded them to attack the French vessels in the
port single-handed. It is to be feared that their motive
was the old one which had been responsible for so
many mishaps, at Teneriffe under Nelson, at Curacoa
under Duckworth, and at hundreds of places under
unknown and forgotten captains — prize-money. The
Sirius and Nereide made the first attempt, which failed
owing to the grounding of the former vessel. On the
Aug. 23. following day the Iphigenia and Magicienne joined
them, and the attack was renewed. The Sirius and the
Magicienne both took the ground at the entrance to
the harbour, and the Nereide stranded herself within it.
After losing two hundred and thirty out of two hundred
and eighty men from the fire of ships and batteries,
Willoughby was obliged to haul down his flag ; the
Magicienne was abandoned and blown up on the 24th ;
the Sirius shared the same fate on the 25 th ; and only
with great difficulty was the Iphigenia warped back to
Aug. 26. her station at Isle de la Passe on the night of the 26th.
Here, being in isolation and surrounded by four French
frigates which had been summoned from Port Louis on
the other side of the island, and being also short of
Aug. 28. food and water, the Iphigenia surrendered, on condition
that her crew and the garrison of Isle de la Passe should
be sent to the Cape of Good Hope.
Thus the fruits of previous operations were lost,
and, more serious still, the superiority at sea passed
to the French, who proceeded to blockade Bourbon. On
Sept. 13. the 13th of September the British fleet suffered another
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 601
reverse through the capture of the frigate Africaine 1810.
by two French men-of-war, though she was immedi-
ately retaken by Commodore Rowley's flag-ship, the
Boadicea. On the 17th yet another frigate, the Ceylon? Sept. 17.
with Sir John Abercromby, the Commander-in-Chief
of the expedition, and his staff* on board, sailed by
Port Louis, knowing nothing of the disaster at Isle de
la Passe, and was captured after a smart action by two
French frigates, the Venus and Victor. She was, how-
ever, recovered on the next day by the Boadicea, to Sept. 18.
whom the Venus, crippled in the action of the preceding
day, fell an easy victim. Thus the balance of naval power
began once more to readjust itself, and the Commo-
dore strained every nerve to fit out his damaged vessels
for service again. On the 10th of October Admiral Oct. 10.
Bertie in the Nisus arrived at Bourbon from the Cape
of Good Hope, and on the 15th sailed with five frigates
for Mauritius. From thence, as the French squadron
showed no willingness to come out and fight them, the
Admiral and General passed on in the Africaine to
Rodriguez, leaving the rest of the squadron to continue
the blockade.
On the 22nd of October the first contingent of Oct. 22.
troops arrived from Bombay under convoy of Admiral
Drury with one line-of-battle ship and six frigates.
On the 6th of November the contingent from Madras Nov. 6.
likewise came in, and three weeks later that from
Bengal, which was so tardy that Abercromby had half
decided to begin operations without it. The entire
force now numbered about ten thousand men, of whom
some three-fifths were Europeans and the remainder
Sepoys ; 2 and this total could be augmented, if need
1 One hundred of her complement were men of the Sixty-ninth
and Eighty-sixth regiments.
2 1st Brigade. Lt.-col. Picton (H.M. 12th).
H.M. 1 2th and 22nd, \ batt. Madras Volunteers.*
2nd Brigade. Lt.-col. Gibbs (H.M. 59th).
H.M. 59th, 300 H.M. 89th, 1 co. H.M. 87th, \ batt.
Madras Volunteers.
* Volunteers signifies, of course, only regular Sepoys who had volunteered for
service across the sea.
602 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i8ic. were, by a naval brigade of fifteen to seventeen hundred
Nov- sailors. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Abercromby,
was a son of old Sir Ralph, and had served with him in
all the campaigns of the war of the Revolution. In
1803 he had been among the travellers in France who
were taken prisoners by Napoleon, but after Vimeiro
he had been exchanged for General Brennier, and had
been appointed Commander-in-Chief in Bombay.
Curiously enough, the naval officer, Beaver by name,
who had conducted the famous debarkation in Aboukir
Bay was present with the fleet as captain of the Nisus,
and was charged with the arrangements for the land-
ing. The French Commander-in-Chief was General
Decaen, to whom, it will be remembered, Napoleon had
in 1803 entrusted the most important of his com-
missions in the East. The regular troops at his dis-
posal did not exceed thirteen hundred, of whom about
five hundred were Irish, for the most part recruited
from among prisoners taken in captured East India-
men. Besides these he had a National Guard, nominally
ten thousand strong, but of doubtful value.
It had always been believed that a descent upon
Mauritius by any considerable force was impossible, the
coast being surrounded by a reef which, as was sup-
posed, forbade the anchorage of any great number of
transports. But, during the long interval between the
capture of Bourbon and the arrival of the expedition,
careful reconnaissance and soundings had proved this
belief to be fallacious ; and when the armament finally
3rd Brigade. Lt.-col. Kelso.
H.M. 14th, 2nd Bengal Volunteers batt.
4th Brigade. Lt.-col. M'Leod (H.M. 69th).
H.M. 69th, 300 Royal Marines, flank cos. 6th and 12th
Madras N.I.
5th Brigade. Lt.-col. Smith (H.M. 65th).
1 troop 25th L.D., H.M. 65th, 1st Bengal Volunteers
batt.
Reserve Brigade. Lt.-col. Keating.
Flank cos. H.M. 12th and 33rd, H.M. 84th, 2 cos. H.M.
56th, 1 co. H.M. 14th and 89th, detachment of Bombay
N.I.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 603
sailed from Rodriguez on the 22nd of November, every 1810.
detail was known as to the proposed place of ^ov- zz-
disembarkation. The first attack was to be delivered
on Port Louis, where the enemy's squadron of six
frigates was blockaded ; and the British armament,
altogether about seventy sail, steered for Grande Baie,
a little to westward \ of Cape Malheureux, the most
northerly point of the island. To gain the anchorage
the fleet had to pass through a channel never before
attempted by any British vessel, and never used by the
French except in cases of extreme need. Yet this feat
of pilotage was boldly undertaken and successfully
accomplished ; the entire armament coming to an anchor
on the 29th less than a mile from the shore without Nov. 29.
the slightest mishap. The disembarkation followed
with all the formalities that had been observed at
Aboukir, though the approach lay not to an open
beach occupied by a powerful force, but through narrow
channels between coral reefs, where no enemy was to
be found for many miles. The stafF-officer who was
responsible for the advance of the force chafed over the
delay thus caused ; but Beaver was inexorable.
By two o'clock in the afternoon the greater part
of the army had been landed ; the Fifth Brigade was
left to secure the landing-place and bring up the
ammunition and stores, while the remainder marched
for Port Louis, a distance of about twelve miles as the
crow flies. The way lay first along the beach, and then
for three or four miles through dense forest, impene-
trable on both sides, at the outlet of which a small
party of National Guards fired a few shots, but was
speedily brushed away. Emerging into the plain, the
column took the road which followed the coast, and
after traversing another mile halted for the night, the
men suffering much from thirst and from fatigue after
long confinement on the transports. At daybreak the Nov. 30.
force set out once more, and at about eight o'clock
reached some powder-mills situated on a headland
from four to five miles north of Port Louis ; where, a
6o4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i'Pio. strong position being found and water being abundant,
Abercromby decided to give his exhausted soldiers a
day's rest. At noon Decaen in person reconnoitred
the British line with a party of horse and foot, but was
driven back after a sharp skirmish wherein several men
fell on both sides. Supplies were landed from the
fleet in the course of the day, and by the next morning
the troops had recovered themselves.
Dec. i. The march was therefore resumed at daybreak in
an easterly direction ; and at the first obstacle, the
River des Pamplemousses,1 a party of the enemy was
encountered drawn up with artillery to hinder the
passage. These were speedily dispersed, upon the
arrival of a couple of guns, with slight loss to the
British ; but a little farther on near Riviere Seche 2 the
enemy's sharp-shooters, having ground favourable to
their operations, opened a harassing fire and kept the
British skirmishers fully employed. When the stream
was finally reached the French were found to be arrayed
in force on the opposite bank, from whence they
opened a very heavy fire of grape and round shot on
the British columns. Abercromby therefore wheeled
his men to the right, and after deploying three or four
corps to his left, fell upon the enemy's flank, routed
them, and captured three guns. The British followed in
pursuit until they came within range of the cannon of
Port Louis ; and there Abercromby halted, resting his
left on the Montagne Longue, an eminence which rises
abruptly from the plain about two miles and a half
north-east of the town, and posting one battalion on the
Dec. 2. summit. On the following day Decaen sent in a flag of
truce, and before nightfall a treaty was concluded for the
surrender of the island, upon the condition that the
French soldiers and seamen should be sent back to France.
The capitulation was by some considered too lenient, for
Decaen had not troops enough to man his fortifications,
which could therefore have been stormed with little
1 On' modern maps River des Citrons.
2 Now the southern branch of River des Citrons.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 605
delay. However, the immediate acquisition of Mauritius 1 8 10.
itself was, perhaps rightly, considered to be the main
point, including as it did over two hundred guns
mounted in the forts, thirty-six ships of all descriptions,
and the liberation of two thousand British prisoners.
The casualties in the operations did not exceed twenty-
eight killed, ninety -four wounded, and forty -five
missing ; but it is to be noticed that the flank companies
of the Twelfth, which bore the brunt of the action on
the Riviere Seche, lost two officers and thirty men
killed and wounded, deservedly earning Abercromby's
special thanks for their conduct.1
Meanwhile the Government of India had already
turned its attention to the minor Dutch settlements in
the east, and first of all to the Moluccas. In October
1809 three ships of war, carrying one company of the
Hundred and Second and a detachment of Madras
Artillery, sailed for Amboyna, and with trifling loss ,gIO>
accomplished the reduction of that island. The fortifica- Feb. 1 7.
tions mounted over two hundred guns, and the garrison
exceeded thirteen hundred men, European and native,
so that this success would seem to be remarkable, were
it not that the Dutch commander was subsequently
tried at Java and shot for treachery. In May 18 10 May.
three more ships with two companies of the Hundred
and Second sailed for Banda Neira ; and on the 9th of Aug. 9.
August the principal fort, which mounted over fifty
guns, was surprised and carried by escalade in the face of
a garrison of seven hundred regular troops. This daring
feat of arms, concerted by Captain Cole of the King's
ship Caroline, was among the most brilliant little exploits
of the war, but belongs more strictly to the history of
the Navy than to that of the Army. Lastly, in August
1 8 10 a detachment of the Hundred and Second under
Captain Forbes sailed in the King's ship Dover for
1 The best account of the Mauritius and Bourbon expeditions
is in Twelve Tears' Military Adve?iture, i. 339-403. Other details
are in Abercromby's despatches printed in Wilson's History of the
Madras Army, iii. 300-313.
606 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1810. Ternate ; where the troops, landing on the 28th, stormed
Aug. 28. a detached work and, turning its guns upon the principal
fort, succeeded, with the help of the Dover, in reducing
the place to submission. Here again the garrison of
five hundred European regular troops, besides as many-
natives, far exceeded the attacking force in numbers, so
that the capture of Ternate must likewise be accounted
highly creditable to the officers and men who accom-
plished it.
The Government of India now braced itself for a
more formidable task, the conquest of Java, the chief
seat of the Dutch Empire in the east. That Empire
had indeed suffered much at English hands since the
beginning of the Great War, and its trade had been
almost annihilated by the overpowering superiority of
the British at sea ; but Napoleon had not given up
hope of restoring both, principally by making Java a
military centre for attack upon the British settlements.
With this idea he had in 1808 sent out General
Daendels, the brave and able soldier whom we saw
in North Holland in 1799, to place the colony in a
thorough state of defence, and to organise its resources
upon a military basis. Daendels accordingly con-
structed roads throughout the island ; l erected a fort
named Fort Ludowyk to command the passage between
the islands of Java and Madura ; and removed the seat
of government and chief military station from the
pestilential flats of Batavia to a healthier site, which he
fortified so elaborately as to render it apparently impreg-
nable. Having thus secured his base, Daendels
contemplated taking the offensive, for which, owing
to the capture of every other Dutch settlement by the
British, he had ample opportunity. Above all, the
recently captured Molucca Islands were simply hostages
to fortune while the French remained unharmed in
1 Daendels expended six thousand Javanese lives in cutting one
of these roads through a morass. He seems to have been a brute
in every way, corrupt, greedy, and oppressive, but an able man.
Lord Minto in India, p. 302.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 607
Java ; and hence the acquisition of the one Jed almost 18 10.
irresistibly to the need for mastering the other.
In fact, we are now observing in the East the forces
which we have already noticed at work in the West
Indies and in the Levant. The Navy, overburdened
with the task of protecting commerce, called loudly
first for fresh naval bases of its own to enable it to
maintain effective blockades, and next for destruction of
naval bases of the enemy so as to obviate the necessity
of any blockade at all. It is not, therefore, superfluous
to insist again on the fact that a powerful army is
no less important for the conservation of trade in war
than is a strong navy ; for every hostile base captured
means the allotment of a military garrison to hold it, or
in other words the paralysis of a portion of the military
force for offensive purposes. It is conceivable that the
principle of seizing an enemy's bases may be carried so
far as to render a country with a small army powerless
for aggression, and therefore to compel it to submit
to an enemy's initiative. Indeed, we have seen that
this was the practical result of Pitt's policy from 1793 to
1798, a policy which virtually resolved itself into the
employment of England's military resources to collect
the money for payment of subsidies to foreign powers.
There was, however, at this time no reason to dread
such danger in India as could make an enterprise
beyond seas a perilous venture. The British and
Indian Governments had taken measures to counteract
Napoleon's vague menaces of invasion in concert with
Russia by sending missions to Teheran, to Cabul, and
to the Ameers of Scinde ; while, so far as concerned the
most formidable of recent mischiefs — the mutiny of
the Madras army — no better remedy could be found
than to employ the troops on active service. It must
be added that both Navy and Army loved beyond all
things an attack upon a rich commercial settlement,
owing to the prospect of gaining prize-money. Hence,
probably both Generals and Admirals urged the expedi-
tion to Java earnestly upon the Governor-General, who,
608 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 io. on his side, was not loth to associate his name with a
great and important conquest. But though such minor
considerations may have exerted some unconscious
influence upon the parties, the decision of the Govern-
ment of India was doubtless prompted in the main by
sound reasoning.
Nevertheless, the enterprise was a serious one, for
the voyage was long ; the navigation was intricate and
little explored ; Daendels was known to be a capable
and energetic officer ; and his force was reputed to
amount to twenty thousand men. The expeditions to
Bourbon and Mauritius, committed chiefly to European
battalions, had swallowed up not a few of them through
sickness and garrisons ; and it would therefore be
necessary to send over sea a larger number of native
troops than had ever been despatched before. The
Sepoys of the Bengal Army were called upon to
volunteer for the service, to which they were not bound
by the terms of their enlistment. They were splendid
men, surpassing the majority of British battalions in size
of body, and incomparably finer than the Sepoys of
Madras ; but, more than this, they were Rajpoots, men
of high caste, to whom the crossing of the sea and the
hardships of the voyage were a strain alike upon their
religious convictions and their self-respect. Yet they
came forward nobly to the number of over five thousand.
The chief command was entrusted to Sir Samuel
Auchmuty, who had been appointed to succeed Mac-
dowall at Madras ; and, in honour of so great an
occasion, the Governor-General accompanied the expedi-
tion in person.
The armament, which included four line-of-battle
ships and forty smaller vessels of war, sailed in three
divisions j1 two from Madras on the 18th and 29th of
1 1st Madras Division : Horse Artillery (152), 22nd Dragoons
(260), H.M. 14th (926), 59th (476), 89th (549), 102nd as
pioneers (37), gun-lascars (105), tent-lascars (122), dooly-
corps (97), artificers (45), puckallies (55). Total with
officers, 2926.
2nd Madras Division : Horse Artillery (7), 22nd Dragoons (154),
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 609
April 181 1 ; and one, apparently from the Hooghly, 181 1.
several weeks earlier. The second Madras division
just escaped a violent storm, which played havoc among
the shipping in the harbour, but did little damage to the
vessels at sea beyond causing the suffocation of forty-
three out of sixty horses on one transport. Both of
the Madras divisions reached Penang by the 2 1 st of Ma>' 2 ' ■
May ; and from thence proceeded to Malacca, whither
Auchmuty had already gone forward to join the Bengal
division which, having arrived some weeks before, had
been landed and encamped near the town. On the 1st June 1.
of June the whole force was assembled at Malacca, and
Auchmuty proceeded to distribute it into three divisions,
which he called by the old-fashioned names of the
Advance, under Colonel Gillespie ; the Line under
Major-general Wetherall; and the Reserve under Colonel
Wood ; appellations for which I shall substitute those
of Gillespie's division, Wetherall's division, and Wood's
division, though in truth the first and third were no
more than brigades.1 After much debate as to the
course to be taken by the fleet, owing to imperfect
Royal Artillery (94), H.M. 14th (10), 59th (530), 69th
(858), 78th (1054), 1st batt. pioneers (144), 2nd batt.
pioneers (165), gun-lascars (99), tent-lascars (210). Total
with officers, 3325.
Bengal Division : Gov.-Gen.'s bodyguard (107), 2 cos. Bengal
Artillery (150), 1st batt. 20th (afterwards 25th) Bengal N.I.
(1501), 4 batts. volunteers Bengal N.I. (3592), 1 light
infantry batt. Bengal N.I. (576), pioneers (361). Total,
6029. Grand Total, 12,280.
Gillespie's Division — (Advance) :
Cavalry : Gov.-Gen.'s bodyguard, detachment 22nd L.D.
Artillery : 2 troops Horse Artillery.
Infantry : detachment 22nd L.D. (dismounted), batt.
of Grenadier cos., batt. of Light cos., detachment of
H.M. 89th, detachment of Marines, Bengal N.I. light
infantry batt., Pioneers.
WetheralVs Division — (Line) :
Right Brigade. Col. Gibbs.
H.M. 14th and 59th, 5th batt. Bengal N.I.
Left Brigade. Lt.-Col. Adams.
H.M. 69th and 78th, 6th batt. Bengal N.I.
VOL. VII 2 R
610 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
i 8 i i . knowledge of the prevailing winds and currents, the
Admiral was persuaded by the opportune arrival of a
surveying vessel to proceed through the straits of
Singapore to Cape Sambar, the extreme south-westerly
point of Borneo, and thence to stretch across the sea
of Java towards Batavia. Accordingly, the armament
July 8-1 1. again sailed in three divisions between the 8th and I ith
of July, two officers being sent in advance to choose
July 20. a convenient point for disembarkation. On the 20th
the whole arrived off Cape Sambar, where intelligence
reached Auchmuty that General Daendels had left Java,
and that General Janssens, whom the British had already
met at the Cape of Good Hope, had come to take his
place. Advice was also received that a small detach-
ment of the Fourteenth, Marines, and Eighty-ninth,
which had been landed at Bantam by a cruising squadron,
had completely defeated five hundred troops sent from
Batavia to attack them. This was of good augury ;
and further information, that Janssens was undoubtedly
collecting the mass of his troops at Batavia, confirmed
Auchmuty in his resolution to land as close to that
capital as possible.
Meanwhile, his reconnoitring officers had struck the
coast of Java at Cheribon, whence after coasting westward
July 14. for fifty leagues they anchored on the 14th of July in
Batavia roads. On the 15 th they made closer ex-
ploration eastward in boats, and landing at a village
named Chilingching about twelve miles from the capital,
found there what they wanted. From sheer carelessness,
their escort of thirty men was captured on this occasion,
and the two officers narrowly missed the same fate ;
but, having escaped to their ship, they continued their
investigations, and on the 1st of August rej'oined the
fleet in the nick of time a little to the east of Batavia.
Aug. 4. Three days later the armament anchored off Chiling-
WoocPs Division — (Reserve) :
Flank batt. Bengal N.I.
i/20th batt. Bengal N.I.
3rd and 4th batts. Bengal N.I.
Field Artillery (Royal & E.I. Company's).
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 611
ching, which was found to be unguarded, the difficulties 1811.
of navigation being supposed by the enemy to afford
sufficient protection ; and at two o'clock in the after-
noon the disembarkation began. The country was a
dead flat, but the chosen position combined several
advantages. In the first place the village was situated
on an island about nine miles long by one mile broad,
formed by a canal running to Batavia on the north,
by the river Anjole on the south and west, and by the
river Maronde on the east ; so that it was effectually
shielded against surprise. Secondly, there issued from
it two good roads, one leading to the capital, the other
to Cornelis, about seven miles south of the capital,
where Daendels had formed the entrenched camp,
which, as he hoped, was to be the salvation of Java.
Thus Auchmuty was able to choose his own point for
attack, keeping his enemy in doubt as to his intentions.
In half an hour Gillespie's division was landed, the
Governor-General himself being one of the first ashore ; l
and the Colonel at once seized the bridge over the canal
which led to Chilingching, besides another beyond it over
the Anjole, occupying the village, and pushing his
advanced parties to the Cornelis road. Wetherall's
division took up a line a little farther forward with
its right resting on the sea, and its left on the canal ;
while the Reserve, most of which was disembarked
before nightfall, guarded the landing-place. During
the night the enemy sent a patrol along the Batavia
road, which retired hastily on being greeted with two
rounds of canister shot ; and on the following day, Aug. 5.
upon information that a hostile column was approaching
from the south, Gillespie marched out six miles to attack
it, but soon ascertained that it had retreated. This
day's work proved, however, that the long voyage had
1 He jumped into the water waist-deep ; whereas Auchmuty,
who was five years younger (55 against Lord Minto's 60) was
carried ashore on a seaman's back. An officer who saw them made
the unspoken criticism, "This is the difference between an old
soldier and an old fool." Twelve Tears'1 Military Adventure, ii. 30.
612 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
i8n.told heavily upon the British troops, for not only
Aug. 5. Were there several deaths from sunstroke, but those
who escaped this evil were utterly exhausted. Partly
for this reason, partly in the hope of finding ample
resources for his campaign, Auchmuty had resolved
to occupy Batavia before he went farther. But the
General had no means of transport, for all cattle had
been driven away by order of the Governor, and
communication with the sea was precarious. He
therefore organised the followers of the army into a
corps of bearers, calculating that with five days' pro-
visions carried in this way, and as many more carried
by the men themselves, he could leave his base for at
any rate ten days. The inhabitants at Chilingching
had fortunately proved amicable and brought in
abundance cf supplies, being encouraged thereto by
the excellent behaviour of the troops. Though acres
of fresh vegetables and swarms of poultry tempted the
men on every side, not one thing was taken by them,
but all was honestly bought and paid for. Nevertheless
it was evident that a wary and enterprising General,
if he used the resources open to him, might give
Auchmuty a great deal of trouble.
Aug. 6. On the 6th Gillespie and his staff reconnoitred the
road and country towards Batavia as far as Anjole Pont,
two miles from the town, when the bridge over the
river was discovered to have been destroyed. Not the
slightest opposition to this party was attempted, though
the ground was most intricate and apt for defence.
" The country," wrote Lord Minto, " is like Chinese
paper on a wall — canals, tanks, and narrow ways between
— here and there a little dry ground, and these spaces
in a high state of cultivation." Gillespie's division on
this day marched down to the Batavia road at Tanjong
Priok, some six miles from the town ; and on the
Aug. 7. evening of the 7th passed the Anjole on a rough
temporary bridge of boats, which had been brought
up from the sea. Once again no resistance was offered
to this movement, though the men had been obliged to
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 613
pass from boat to boat in single file; and by dawn 181 1.
Gillespie's division was quartered in the suburbs, while AuS* 7-
Wetherall's division moved up to the Anjole in support
of it ; the Reserve remaining at Chilingching. On the Aug. 8.
8th the Mayor, in response to a summons, surrendered
Batavia ; but no information could be obtained as to
the enemy. Large quarters of the city were deserted,
Janssens having compelled all the wealthier inhabitants
to retire into the interior ; the conduits of drinking
water had been cut ; some of the stores of produce had
been burned and others thrown open to the rabble, so
that the streets were littered with sugar and coffee.
This last measure greatly exasperated the British, who
had framed high hopes of prize-money.
In the circumstances only a small force was for the
present pushed into the town ; and Lord Minto sent
his aide-de-camp to General Janssens at Cornells to
summon him to surrender the island. This officer was
allowed to proceed as far as Weltevreeden unmolested,
and was free to observe for himself that there was no
obstacle to the advance of the troops. From that
point he was driven blind-folded in a carriage, but was
able from its motion to ascertain that the road had not
been cut up, and that the bridges were still standing.
Moreover, the sound of horses and guns moving about
him showed pretty plainly that the principal force of
the enemy had not retreated into the lines of Cornells.
The utmost vigilance was therefore observed by the
British in the town on that night ; and at eleven o'clock
the troops were marched quietly into the great square
and bidden to lie on their arms. Hardly had they
reached the appointed place when a hostile column
came down upon the picquet at the drawbridge leading
to the Weltevreeden road. The British advanced
sentry fired and killed the foremost man ; the draw-
bridge was raised ; and Gillespie instantly sallied out
by the western side of the town to take the enemy in
flank. They did not, however, await his coming.
They had expected to find only a small isolated party
6 14 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1811. in the town and to overwhelm it ; but retired at once
upon finding themselves deceived.
Aug. 9. On the 9th a proper bridge of boats was thrown
over the Anjole ; and early on the morning of the
Aug. 10. 10th Wetherall's division crossed the river, while
Gillespie's moved southward upon Weltevreeden.
Just before starting Gillespie and the whole of his
staff were poisoned by some drugged coffee which
had been prepared for them by a former servant of
Daendels. Happily they were not disabled, and, after
pouring what remained of the coffee down the rascal's
throat, pursued their way. A short march brought the
division to Weltevreeden, which was found to be deserted,
the enemy having withdrawn to a strong position
a mile farther to the south ; and Gillespie, having
permission to attack, continued his advance in two
columns, the left or eastern column following the high-
way to Cornelis, the right column a smaller parallel
road a little to west of it. The enemy's array was
concealed by large pepper-plantations except upon their
right, which rested on a rivulet called the Slokan,
immediately to east of the road to Cornelis. They
had blockaded the road itself by abatis, and unlimbered
four guns in rear of it ; and from thence their line was
extended upon high ground parallel with a cross-road
which ran from east to west towards the village of
Tanabang. From the nature of the position, as it is
described, it must have been impossible to ascertain the
enemy's numbers ; but to judge from the fact that a
general, Jumelle, was in command, and three more
generals engaged, the force was probably at least
double in numerical strength of the British.
Gillespie's first idea had been to hold the enemy's
right with his left-hand column, while his right-hand
column turned the enemy's left flank ; but presently
he realised that the track taken by the latter column
went no farther than to the cross-road to Tanabang,
and that he must seek another point of attack. Accord-
ingly he brought up two of the four guns of his horse-
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 615
artillery to answer the enemy's cannon; sent his 18 n.
skirmishers forward into the pepper-plantations ; and Aug- IO-
deployed both columns on the cross-road aforesaid.
This evolution called down a tremendous fire from the
whole length of the enemy's array ; and Gillespie,
realising that on ground so intricate he could not
advance in line, ordered Major Butler of the Eighty-
ninth to enter the enclosures on the west of the enemy's
guns, and to take the battery in flank. The order was
most gallantly executed ; the cannon were captured, the
escort, both infantry and cavalry, was driven off", and
was pursued up the road to Cornells, by the Eighty-ninth
with the whole of Gillespie's division at their backs.
The single troop of the Twenty-second Dragoons by
some accident did not come up in time to cut the
fugitives off ; but Gillespie was for chasing them
actually into the entrenched camp, and did in fact
bring his men under fire of its guns. Happily
Auchmuty interposed to prevent any such folly, for
strong reinforcements of the enemy had already moved
out of the camp, and were only checked by the arrival of
Wetherall's division. Gillespie's troops, therefore, were
drawn off before they could suffer from the artillery in
the hostile redoubts. Their entire loss did not exceed
ninety-one killed and wounded, more than half of which
fell upon the Eighty-ninth. That of the enemy was
reckoned to have exceeded three hundred, the wounded
including General Alberti, Chief of Janssens's Staff,
who had recently arrived in Java after three campaigns
in Spain.
This was an important success, for it gave the British
possession of Weltevreeden, a salubrious cantonment
with every possible accommodation for the army in the
way of barracks, of three hundred guns, large quantities
of stores, and a certain number of horses and native
labourers attached to the Dutch army. It had been
Daendels's policy, faithfully imitated by Janssens, to
tempt an invader to occupy the pestilential city of
Batavia, where his army would melt away from sickness
616 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 i i . under the eyes of the healthy garrison at Weltevreeden ;
but this cunning device had been overthrown. More-
over, the facility of water-transport made the carriage
of supplies and stores from the fleet a simple matter ;
and the capture of the arsenal had furnished plenty of
heavy guns and ammunition, so that the siege of the
lines of Cornells would present no difficulties.
The entrenched camp consisted of a parallelogram
about a mile and a half from north to south, by half a
mile east and west. On the western side it was bounded
by the great Batavia river, and on the eastern by the
Slokan rivulet, the two being connected at each end
by a deep ditch. In rear of these two ditches were
regular entrenchments extending likewise from river
to river, the defences being completed by strong
redoubts on the Slokan and at the two ends of the
position, and by batteries upon various points of vantage.
Such a stronghold was not to be lightly assaulted ; and
though, after the action of the ioth, one Sepoy and
two British battalions were pushed forward to within
a mile of the lines, and their picquets to within half
of that distance, Auchmuty resolved to proceed by
the regular method of a siege. He therefore shifted
his base from Chilingching to Batavia ; moved up
the reserve to rejoin the rest of the army at Welte-
vreeden, and began to land and bring forward his heavy
Aug. 14. artillery. On the 14th ground was broken by the
conversion of a ditch on the north face of the lines into
a parallel ; and at the same time a road was cut through
the pepper-plantations in order that the material for
a siege might be brought forward unobserved by the
Aug. 20. enemy. On the 20th the construction of batteries was
begun six hundred yards from the hostile entrench-
ments ; namely, one battery of twelve guns to play upon
the redoubt at the north-western angle, a second of
eight cannon, and a third of nine mortars and howitzers
to batter the works farther to the east.
Aug. 21. On the 2 1 st the enemy for the first time discovered
the working parties, and annoyed them greatly by a
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 617
destructive fire. However, by the morning of the 1 81 1.
22nd the batteries were completed and the guns Aug. 22.
brought up, when just before dawn the enemy made a
sortie, directing one column straight upon the British
cannon, while another party turned the parallels by the
east. For the moment the attack was successful. The
turning column seized the second and third batteries,
and held them for a short time, until driven out by
the Sixty-ninth and some Bengal Sepoys ; while the
body which advanced against the twelve-gun battery had
the good luck to come upon a large number of seamen
and gunners, when they were wholly engrossed in the
business of mounting the guns. These last instantly
ran back to the trenches, causing such confusion that it
was difficult to collect any troops for an advance ; but
a small party of the Fifty-ninth was luckily got together
just in time to prevent the battery from being occupied
and the pieces from being spiked. The whole affair was
somewhat discreditable to the British, for, had proper
precautions been taken and proper vigilance been
observed, the enemy's turning party ought never to
have reached the second and third batteries at all ;
while the attack upon the twelve-gun battery caused
something greatly resembling a panic, which was not
allayed until six British officers had been killed and
three others wounded.
After the failure of the sortie the enemy poured in
a tremendous fire from over forty heavy guns, which
caused some loss,1 but called forth no reply from
Auchmuty ; and on the 23rd the cannon on both sides
were silent, both parties being engaged in the task of
strengthening their works. At length, on the 24th, the Aug. 24.
British batteries, now increased to five, opened fire in
earnest, greatly damaging the enemy's redoubts and
dismounting many of his guns. The majority of
Auchmuty 's gunners were seamen, who doubtless en-
joyed the novelty of a fixed target and stable platform ;
1 The losses on the 22nd were 6j Europeans and 29 Sepoys killed
and wounded.
618 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1 8 1 1 . and it was noticed that, whereas the French fire was
Aug- 24- the more rapid, that of the British was the better
directed. Nevertheless, the casualties of the British
were not light, though they were not heeded. Indeed it
is recorded that a Royal Artilleryman, who was walking
to the rear after losing one arm by a round shot in the
trenches, halted and saluted the General with his
remaining arm as he passed him. With such men in the
besieging force the result of the duel was certain. On
Aug. 25. the 25th the assailants' batteries renewed their fire, and
before dark those of the enemy were silenced. Every
gun appeared to be dismounted or disabled ; and the
merlons which had been constructed during the siege —
for the redoubts had been designed en barbette — were
all knocked away. But apart from this, great fatigue
under a tropical sun had told heavily upon the British ;
the enemy by discovering and enfilading the road cut
through the pepper - plantations had hampered the
operations and inflicted heavy loss ; the hospitals were
full ; and Auchmuty saw that the time was come for an
assault.
The task was a formidable one, for it had not yet
been found possible to ascertain the enemy's numbers
or his dispositions. The northern face of the entrench-
ment was evidently too strong for a frontal attack, and
the southern presented every appearance of being, as in
fact it was, even stronger. The western face was covered
by an unfordable river, the only bridge over which, at
Campong Malayo by the south-eastern angle of the
lines, was covered by powerful works and prepared with
combustibles for instant destruction. There remained
the eastern face, which was undoubtedly the weakest ;
and it was believed that one of the redoubts, Number
Three, being on the eastern bank of the Slokan, might
be surprised. By great good fortune an intelligent
deserter came in from that very post on the 24th, and
gave the requisite information respecting this redoubt.
Another deserter had already betrayed the existence
of a narrow path between the Great River and the
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 619
entrenchments at the north-western angle; and with 1 81 1.
these facts before him Auchmuty laid his plans to
storm an entrenched camp held, so far as he could
ascertain, by at least ten thousand native and European
soldiers.
To Colonel Gillespie, as was the case with most of
the hard work in this campaign, was committed the
principal attack. His force was composed of his own
division, strengthened by the flank companies of
Wetherall's division ; and its function was to proceed
by a road which led to the eastern face of the lines,
seize the outlying redoubt, Number Three, together
with the bridge over the Slokan which connected it with
the main position, and so to plunge into the heart of
the enemy's defences. Colonel Gibbs, with the Fifty-
ninth and the Fourth Bengal battalion, was directed
to support him ; and these two parties, under Gillespie
and Gibbs, formed the first column of attack.1
The second column, under Colonel M'Leod, con-
sisted of six companies of the Sixty-ninth and the Sixth
Bengal battalion. It was ordered to follow the course
of the Great River, and to endeavour to force the
entrenchments on their western face, and near the north-
western angle by Redoubt Number One.
The third column, made up of the Seventy-eighth
and the Fifth Bengal battalion, under Colonel Wood, was
to advance along the western bank of the Slokan and
1 The column advanced in the following order : —
Gillespie's command. Rifle co. H.M. 14th ; Madras Pioneers ;
Grenadier co. H.M. 78th.
Right flank battalion, viz. : Light cos. H.M. 14th and 59th ;
Grenadier co. 5th Bengal battalion ; Rifle co. 59th.
Left flank battalion, viz. : Light cos. H.M. 69th and 78th ;
Grenadier co. 6th Bengal ; Rifle co. 78th ; 5 cos. H.M.
89th ; detachment Royal Marines ; detachments 22nd
Dragoons (dismounted) ; bodyguard (dismounted) ; detach
ment Bengal L.I. ; detachment 4th Bengal.
Gibbs's command. Grenadier cos. 14th, 59th, 69th ; H.M.
59th ; detachment Bengal L.I. ; detachment 4th Bengal.
The reader will take note of the extraordinary jumble of corps in
the two columns.
620 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 i i . attempt to penetrate the lines about the north-eastern
angle.
The fourth column, under Major Yule, was grouped
round the flank battalion of the Reserve,1 which had
been placed under his orders to sever communications
between the enemy's army and the country to westward
by the bridge of Campong Malayo. To this corps was
now added two companies of the Sixty-ninth, a squadron
of the Twenty-second Light Dragoons, and four horse-
artillery guns, with orders to attack and, if possible, to
carry the bridge aforesaid.
The remainder of the force, namely, the Fourteenth,
two Bengal battalions, two squadrons of Dragoons, and
four horse-artillery guns were formed in the trenches
as a reserve under Wetherall ; and Auchmuty himself
took up his station in the same spot.
Gillespie's and Yule's columns, having the longest
distance to traverse, moved off at about midnight, the
Aug. 26. former under the guidance of a deserter. The route was
extremely intricate, passing through difficult country so
much broken by ravines, enclosures, and plantations that
frequently the troops could advance only in single file.
The night also was excessively dark ; and once, at a point
where several paths met, the guide was so much per-
plexed that he was only set right by the help of
Auchmuty's aide-de-camp, Major Dickson, who had
fortunately made reconnaissances in the same direction.
At length the head of Gillespie's column drew near the
enemy's works, when word was brought to the Colonel
that the rear of the column under Gibbs had gone astray.
He at once halted ; but, dreading the approach of dawn,
decided after a short pause to open the attack with his
own troops only, trusting to the sound of the firing to
guide Gibbs to the right quarter. A deep cut across the
road close to the enemy's lines caused some delay ; but
the obstacle was surmounted, and the men were formed
up before the first gleam of light revealed a sentry between
1 This would, I suppose, mean a battalion composed of the
flank companies of the three Bengal battalions of Wood's division.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 621
Redoubts Three and Four. This man challenged the 181 1.
British twice, but receiving the answer " Patrol " allowed
them to pass on. Just outside Number Three Redoubt
a second challenge came from an officer's picquet, and
this Gillespie answered by the word " Charge." The
British sprang forward, and, before the picquet could
fire more than a few straggling shots, had swept it away
and passed towards the entrenchments in unbroken good
order. Blue lights and rockets now flared up in every
direction, and the two redoubts opened a terrific but
ill-aimed fire of round shot and grape ; but, without
giving the gunners of Number Three Redoubt time to
reload their pieces, the British swarmed into it, and plied
their bayonets among the panic-stricken garrison with
frightful havoc. Within a few minutes the redoubt was
won ; and a second body of the enemy, which had been
drawn up by its southern face, was dispersed. Still
keeping his men together, Gillespie pressed forward
without delay to the most important point of all, the
bridge over the Slokan. The passage was defended in
front by four field-guns, and flanked by the batteries of
Redoubts Two and Four ; but, despite of a tremendous
fire of grape and musketry, it was carried after a sharp
struggle, and Gillespie now led his column southward
upon Redoubt Number Four. The enemy being by
this time fully on their guard, the resistance to his onset
was more formidable ; but none the less it was overcome,
and this stronghold likewise was stormed and taken,
though not without heavy loss.
The capture of Number Two Redoubt was still
necessary to complete the work of the main attack ; and
Gillespie accordingly advanced against it. Finding,
however, that he had outstripped the bulk of his column,
he resolved to await the arrival of fresh troops for the
assault. In a few minutes the three leading companies
of Gibbs's column came up, and falling upon the rear face
of the redoubt soon dashed the enemy out of it; Gillespie
in person taking the commandant, Brigadier-general
Jauffret, his prisoner. The assailants were in the act of
622 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 1 1. congratulating each other on their success when the
magazine of the redoubt was blown up by two French
officers, and the greater part of the attacking force,
together with many of the enemy, were killed or
disabled by the explosion. Indeed, for some minutes
every man was paralysed by the shock, and, if the
enemy had then attempted to recapture the redoubt, the
survivors would have been powerless to prevent them.
Happily no such effort was made ; and before long the
arrival of the Fifty-ninth, under Lieutenant-colonel
Alexander M'Leod, set the misgivings of Gillespie at
rest.
Meanwhile the remaining columns had been hardly
less successful at other points than that of Gillespie.
Colonel Wood had indeed failed to force the passage of
the ditch on the northern face of the lines, but a few of
his men succeeded in scrambling over the obstacle and
in clearing the entrenchments in front of Number Two
Redoubt. Colonel William M'Leod of the Sixty-ninth
was more fortunate at the north-western angle ; for he
not only took his column over the ditch but stormed
Number One Redoubt out of hand. Thus the lines had
been forced in three different places, and the distraction
of the defenders had throughout been increased by a
feint attack which Auchmuty had directed, with the
reserve, against the whole of the northern face. Now,
therefore, Gillespie led the Fifty-ninth against the
enemy's reserve and park of artillery, which was drawn
up in a strong position between the barracks and Fort
Cornells. The onset was ill-managed, the troops
being thrown into action piecemeal ; and the Fifty-ninth
suffered severely until the various columns gradually
closed up from all quarters upon Fort Cornells. Then
the enemy hastily abandoned all the remaining defences,
and retreated southward upon Buitenzorg, much har-
assed by the guns of Yule's party which, though it
had failed to pass the river at Campong Malayo owing
to the burning of the bridge, was able to keep up a
heavy fire upon the retiring columns.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 623
But the amazing energy of Gillespie was not yet ex- 1 8 1 1
hausted. He had started for the day's work with fever
upon him ; he had covered every inch of ground both
in the march and in the attack upon his own feet, the
ground forbidding him to use a horse ; and having
received a severe contusion during the engagement with
the enemy's reserve, he had fainted at its close in the
arms of two of his staff. But presently the British
dragoons came up ; and the indomitable man, having
caused a passage to be made across the ditch, cut a
horse loose from a captured limber, mounted it, and
placed himself at their head for the pursuit. Within a
mile he overtook the tail of the enemy's column,
charged and dispersed it, and hastened on in chase of
the remainder. The fugitives took refuge in the
jungle, but were hunted back into the road by the
British infantry, where the dragoons flew at them once
more. The French and Dutch officers strove nobly to
rally their men and to check the rout ; and at Campong
Macassar, about five miles south of the lines, they made
some semblance of a stand, unlimbering four horse-
artillery guns, which they had saved from the wreck,
behind the shelter of thick hedges and overturned
waggons. It was useless. The dragoons, heedless of
the fire, charged straight down upon the guns, and the
enemy's troops, flinging away their arms, fled in all
directions. For nearly three miles more Gillespie
pressed the pursuit ; and, when at last he halted at
Tanjong, he could say with truth that the army of
Janssens had ceased to exist.
The prisoners taken in this action numbered six
thousand, including two generals, the whole of the
headquarters staff, thirty field-officers, and over two
hundred other officers. One fine body of Voltigeurs,
recently arrived from France, was captured entire, and
but a single small body of horse succeeded in escaping ;
while General Janssens and Jumelle only evaded the
British dragoons by mingling with the flying infantry
in the jungle. Among the European officers of the
624 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i8n.enemy the killed numbered forty and the wounded
sixty-three, from which it is reasonable to conclude
that the killed and wounded of the rank and file
exceeded two thousand.1 The casualties of the British
amounted to six hundred and thirty-three, of which
number five hundred and fifty were Europeans ; eleven
European officers and fifty-three men being killed,
forty-four officers and four hundred and forty-two men
wounded and missing.2
The Fifty-ninth suffered most heavily of all in point
of numbers, having lost five officers and twelve men
killed, ten officers and one hundred and ten men
wounded out of a total of about four hundred of all
ranks. The losses of the Fourteenth were perhaps
relatively higher, amounting to five officers and one
hundred and one men killed and wounded out of three
companies. The most distinguished of the officers who
fell was Lieutenant-colonel William McLeod of the
Sixty-ninth who, as a Major, had commanded the
Seventy-sixth throughout Lord Lake's campaign. Yet,
the sacrifice of life was not great, considering the
magnitude of the advantage gained. In truth, the
storm of the lines of Cornells, though utterly forgotten
both by the army and the nation, is none the less one
of the great exploits of the Napoleonic war. The odds
were against the British in point of numbers, while the
strength of the enemy's position was enough to daunt
the boldest general. Not only were the fortifications
themselves most formidable, but the approaches to them
had been sown with every kind of obstruction from
trous de hup to abatis. The guns actually mounted in
the batteries numbered two hundred and eighty, and,
even after these had been captured, the enemy retained
fifty-eight pieces for combat in the open field. More-
over, though Janssens's contingent of European soldiers
1 Judging from Auchmuty's despatch the killed alone must
have exceeded one thousand.
2 The lists of officers killed and wounded as given by Thorn
and by the Gazette do not tally. I have taken the numbers given
in the Gazette.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 625
appears not to have exceeded sixteen hundred, yet these 181 1.
had been carefully distributed, so many to a company,
among the native troops, which counted over ten thou-
sand effective men, all trained, disciplined, and led by
European officers.1 The strength of the main British
attacking column, European and natives, can hardly
have been greater than three thousand men, looking
to previous losses from wounds and sickness ; and the
entire force at Auchmuty's disposal for the assault can
have been but little more than five thousand. More-
over, the operations were conducted in a hot and
unhealthy climate, only six degrees south of the equator.
Yet by consummate skill and daring not only were the
lines of Cornells stormed, but the defending army was
utterly routed and dispersed ; while the pursuit with a
handful of horse — perhaps two hundred troopers —
aided by a battery of horse-artillery, was one of the
most remarkable to be found in the history of the
British cavalry. Gillespie was of course the hero of
the day, combining the leadership both of the attack
and of the pursuit with extraordinary personal prowess ;
for he individually captured two generals and one
colonel, and killed another colonel in single combat.
Yet he had entered the action quaking with fever, and
at its close was overcome by a virulent attack which
brought him to the brink of the grave. It may well
be doubted whether, in the whole story of the Army,
any man has ever distinguished himself so signally in
any one engagement as did Rollo Gillespie at the lines
of Cornells.
Janssens, meanwhile, fled to Buitenzorg, whence,
finding himself without an army, he turned eastward
on the 27th. On the following day Gibbs took Aug. 27.
possession of that place, which, though fortified and
mounting forty-three guns, offered no resistance. On
the 31st Auchmuty, upon hearing of Janssens's dis- Aug. 31.
appearance, sent a battalion of Sepoys by sea under
1 These numbers are taken from the returns captured by
Auchmuty and printed in the Gazette.
VOL. VII 2 S
626 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 1 1. convoy of a squadron of frigates to Cheribon, which
fortress capitulated at the first summons. It was
ascertained that Janssens had passed through the place
two days earlier ; but General Jumelle, whom he had
left at Buitenzorg, rode into the town unwittingly after
its surrender to the British, and was of course taken.
A small body of some seven hundred native and
European troops, who were on their way eastward to
join Janssens, were also cut off from him by the capture
of this post on the road, and became prisoners of war.
A short march westward from Cheribon gave a party
of marines and seamen possession of Carang Sambong,
whereby other parties of stragglers were secured, and
Sept. 6. the entire country west of Cheribon was subdued.
Meanwhile, on the 5th of September Auchmuty
sailed from Batavia with a small force l for Zedayo,
expecting that Janssens would have made for Sourabaya,
the possession of which harbour Admiral Stopford
considered essential to the safety of the fleet during
the monsoon. Ascertaining, however, from inter-
cepted letters, that Janssens had gone to Samarang, Sir
Samuel, after a vain attempt to induce the Dutch
general to come to terms, proceeded to that place,
Sept. 12. which he occupied on the 12th without resistance.
Here he learned that Janssens, having been joined by
a regular battalion from Sourabaya and by raw levies
of the native princes, had taken up a strong position
about six miles inland at Jattoo ; where Auchmuty
determined to attack him before going any further.
The change of plans had, however, brought about
confusion in the orders for the movements of the
troops ; and, after waiting four days in vain for re-
Sept. 16. inforcements, Auchmuty on the 16th advanced towards
Jattoo with such men as he had on the spot, about
sixteen hundred of all ranks.2 After six miles of
1 1 troop Twenty-second L.D., H.M. Fourteenth and Seventy-
eighth, 4th batt. Bengal sepoys, Madras pioneers, detachment of
Royal and Bengal artillery.
2 Fourteenth Foot 630, Seventy-eighth 420, Bengal Sepoys 6c,
Pioneers 200, Lascars 180, Artillery 110 with 6 guns.
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 627
march over a difficult and hilly country, the enemy 181 1.
was discovered on some lofty and rugged heights
astride of the main road which led from Samarang
southward, the road itself being blocked by chevaux
de /rise, and the front of the position covered by some
thirty guns regularly disposed upon platforms. The
strength of Janssens's force was about eight thousand,
of whom less than one-tenth were regular troops and
equipped with firearms ; but, as the only access to the
heights lay over an open valley, twelve hundred yards
broad and fully exposed to the enemy's artillery, the
officers of Auchmuty's staff were opposed to the idea
of a frontal attack. The General, however, had de-
termined otherwise ; first, because he could see that
the enemy's flanks were not to be turned ; and, secondly,
because he had no idea of being daunted by so con-
temptible a foe. Accordingly, he opened fire at long
range and great elevation with his guns ; while Colonel
Gibbs with a few light infantry made a rush across
the valley, and established himself under shelter near
the summit of the heights, before the astonished defenders
could discharge a shot. The main body then crossed
the valley under a heavy but harmless fire which cost
it but two men killed and a few more wounded, where-
upon the raw levies abandoned their artillery and ran
away. One large body of native cavalry with huge
cocked hats and long spears was checked bv one of
Auchmuty's aides-de-camp single-handed, and was
hunted for some miles by him and another of the
General's staff without attempting resistance.1
With the rout of this rabble Janssens's last hope
vanished, and on the same evening he sent a flag to
Auchmuty to suggest a capitulation. He was anxious
to treat with Lord Minto, who was at Batavia, but
Auchmuty would not hear of such a thing. Though
the force at Batavia had been destroyed, there were
1 Auchmuty ordered a party of light infantry to open fire upon
this cavalry, but the sergeant in charge said that he could not, " for
there was the aide-de-camp a-licking of them."
628 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 8 1 1. still troops enough, both European and native, at
Sourabaya to make a formidable opposition ; and Sir
Samuel had not nearly sufficient men with him to
follow Janssens into the interior. The British General,
therefore, took a high tone and insisted upon practically
unconditional surrender of Java and all its dependencies
within twenty-four hours. Janssens raised feeble protests,
which Auchmuty answered by advancing for some miles
into the interior. A few hours later the capitulation
was signed, and the last of the Dutch East Indian
possessions passed into English hands.
1812. These acquisitions were no sinecure, and twice
during 1 8 1 2 Gillespie was obliged to lead punitive
expeditions against native chiefs, to Palembang in
Sumatra, and immediately afterwards to Dyodyocarta
in Java. In the first instance he boldly walked into a
fort with seventeen grenadiers only, overcoming all
resistance by sheer ascendancy of courage. In the
second, the storming of a huge fortified enclosure, with
a perimeter of three miles and defended by seventeen
thousand men, cost him over one hundred killed and
wounded out of twelve hundred soldiers. In both
instances the brunt of the work fell upon detachments
of the regiments which had subdued Janssens, most
notably upon the Fourteenth, Fifty-ninth, and Seventy-
eighth, three noble battalions which no hardship of a
tropical campaign could discourage, no sickness of a
pestilent climate could dismay, and no wiles nor numbers
of a teeming and treacherous enemy could daunt for
one moment.
A word remains to be said of Auchmuty, of whom
we shall see no more. The son of a loyal American
colonist, he had received his commission at New York
in 1777 at the age of twenty-one, but, through poverty,
had been obliged to exchange to a regiment quartered
in India. There he had served against Hyder Ali in
1788, and against Tippoo Sahib from 1790 to 1792 ;
and thence he had sailed with Baird's force to Egypt,
from which he returned to England a colonel and
ch.xli HISTORY OF THE ARMY 629
knight. We can now form some judgment of what he 1 8 1 2.
might have accomplished had he been left in command
of the British at Rio de la Plata. For this campaign in
Java was no easy one. The preliminary voyage to the
scene of action was long and through tropical seas, so
that the soldiers must inevitably disembark weak and ex-
hausted; the country was unreconnoitred and unknown,
and the enemy's force unascertained but believed to
be superior. Auchmuty was probably fortunate in en-
countering Janssens rather than Daendels ; but Janssens,
as we have seen, had faithfully pursued Daendels's
military policy in evacuating Batavia, though Auchmuty
had cleverly turned this against him by his enter-
prising seizure of a healthy base at Weltevreeden,
having communication by water with Batavia. Then
came the formidable task of dealing with the entrenched
camp at Cornells. There is no need to dwell again on
the skill and daring of the attack of the 26th of August,
but it must be noted that Auchmuty laid his plans for
the assault in such sort as not only to drive the enemy
from their stronghold, but to annihilate the hostile army
and practically to close the war. Many generals would
have been content with a victory against such odds ;
Auchmuty boldly attempted and actually achieved a
conquest. Such commanders are not common in any
country ; and it may be safely asserted that, if Napoleon
had conducted the campaign of Java exactly as did
Auchmuty, whole libraries would have been written in
laudation of it. Yet this brilliant and sterling soldier
has been forgotten, and his greatest exploit survives as
a mere name upon certain colours. Possibly after the
lapse of a hundred years our military instructors may
bethink them to examine it, and decide whether it be
not worthy of inclusion as a classic among the lesser
campaigns of the British Army.
Note. — The authorities for the Java expedition are Thorn's
Conquest of Java ; Twelve Years' Military Adventure, vol. ii. ;
Minto's Life of Lord Minto ; Wilson's History of the Madras Army.
INDEX
Abbott, Charles, Speaker of the House of
Commons, 4-
Abeele, skirmish at, 71
Abercromby, Sir John, commands expedi-
tion to Mauritius, 601-5
Abercromby, Sir Ralph, mentioned, 602
Aboukir Bay, mentioned, 602-3
Abrantes, French troops at, 105, 548 ;
British troops at, 172, 189, 200, 205,
211-12, 353, 410, 455, 457-8 ; men-
tioned, 115, 135, 143, 191, 280, 452-4,
468, 549, 551, 554, 556
Abrantes, Duke of. See under Junot,
Marshal
Acland, Brigadier-general W. P., in the
Walcheren expedition, 57 »., 88
Adair, Mr., as British envoy, 32, 304, 308
Adam, Colonel Frederick, in Sicily, 318-19
Adams, Lieutenant-colonel Alexander, in
the expedition to Java, 609 n.
Adige R., mentioned, 292
Adriatic Sea, French influence in, 302,
305
AJricaine, H.M.S., mentioned, 601
Agar, Pedro, mentioned, 404
Agueda R., mentioned, 453 ; French
troops on the, 463, 466-7, 470-7 1, 487 ;
British on, 463-4
Agueda (town), mentioned, 503
Airey, Colonel George, in the expedition
to Ischia, 295 »., 301
Aix Roads, British naval success in, 63
Alba de Tormes, action at, 350
Albania, mentioned, 306-7
Alberche R., French troops on the, 188,
208-9, 2I3> 2I6, 262 ; British on the,
211, 220, 222, 265; battle on the,
see Talavera
Albergaria Nova, mentioned, 154
Alberti, General, in Java, 615
Alburquerque, Duke of, in the campaign
of Talavera, 209-10, 221 ; at Talavera,
231, 242 «. , 246, 254; defeated at
Arzobispo, 273-5, 27^ > m command
against Soult, 344, 349-50, 352, 354,
362 ; march to Cadiz, 363-5 ; at Cadiz,
391-2 j goes to England, 392 ; men-
tioned, 110, 207-8, 268, 272-5, 410
Alburquerque (town), mentioned, 410
Alcabon, Spanish troops at, 221 ; French
at, 222
Alcanhede, French troops at, 552
Alcaiiiz, French troops at, 174; their
defeat at, 175, 389
Alcantara, captured by the French, 143,
171, 186-7 j mentioned, 113, 136, 138,
201, 212, 468
Alcoentre, skirmish at, 539
Alconetar, mentioned, 487
Aldea del Obispo, mentioned, 472
Aldea Nueva de Barbarroya, mentioned,
*75
Aldeaquemada, Spanish troops at, 354
Alemquer, British troops at, 540, 549,
555 ; French at, 545, 548
Alemtejo, mentioned, 453, 455, 457,
545-6
Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, relations
with Napoleon, 35-6, 39, 306, 309 ;
with Fred. Will. III. of Prussia, 39-
40 ; with Austria, 36, 39 ; with Turkey,
39
Alfaiates, French troops at, 495
Algarve, mentioned, 457
Algeciras, Spanish troops at, 395
Alhandra, British troops at, 540-41
Ali Pasha of Janina, relations with
British, 306-7, 314, 322; with Napo-
leon, 307
Alicante, mentioned, 394
Almaden, Spanish troops at, 354 ; French
at, 360
Almagro, French troops at, 189, 360
Almandrejo, British troops at, 282
Almaraz, Spanish troops at, 97, 109, 213,
283, 349, 352 ; fight at, 105 ; French
at, 108, 116, 187, 268, 275, 277, 361 ;
British at, 271, 276 ; mentioned, 202,
206, 212, 270, 274
Almeida, Portuguese troops at, 114, 135,
631
632
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
455, 546 ; British at, 115 »., 116, 118,
203, 469 ; fight at, 478-83 ; taken by
the French, 491-2, 495-6, 500, 556;
mentioned, 125, 135, 215, 351, 454,
459, 468, 470, 475-6, 487, 557
Almeirim, British troops at, 555
Almendalejo, mentioned, 410
Almogala, British troops at, 464
Almonacid, Spanish defeat at, 264, 277,
281
Almufiecar, taken by the Spanish, 397
Alpujarras Mts., rising in, 395-6
Alten, Major-general Charles von, in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 »., 77, 88
Alva R., mentioned, 456, 495, 501, 505
Alvarez de Castro, Don Mariano, at
Gerona, 339-43 ; death of, 343
Alverca, British troops at, 471, 492,
541
Amantea, mentioned, 296
Amarante, French success at, 144, 152-3 ;
French troops at, 157-8, 165, 167 ;
British at, 1665 mentioned, 132, 161
Amaxichi, British troops at, 311-12
Amboyna, taken by the British, 605
America, North, 33 ; South, 459. And
see under Buenos Ayres
Amherst, Lord, as Minister Palermo,
310
Amiens, Treaty of, mentioned, 308
Amsterdam, mentioned, 83
Andalusia, French invasion of, 359-66,
391-4, 462 ; Spanish and British diver-
sions in, 395-403, 489 ; French Army
°f, 373, 375"6> 545 > mentioned, 105,
351-2, 354, 442. See also under names
of various towns in
Anderson, Mr., mentioned, 69 n.
Andujar, French troops at, 361
Anjole R., mentioned, 611-14
Anse d'Arlet (Martinique), mentioned, 13
Anson, Colonel George, in the Talavera
campaign, 201 «., 213, 216, 222; at
Talavera, 227, 242, 246, 251-4; at
Bussaco, 510 »., 534 ; in the retreat to
the Lines, 536, 539 ; mentioned, 553
Antigua, mentioned, 8 n.
Antilles. See under Indies, the West
Antwerp, weakness of, 64, 85 ; reinforce-
ments for, 75, 81-2, 94; siege of,
impossible, 85-6, 93-5 ; mentioned, 46,
49. 57, 60-62, 65
Aragon, French operations in, 173-6,
337-8, 382-5 5 French in, 107, 371,
376, 383 5 guerilla war in, 337, 357;
mentioned, 98, 105
Aranda de Duero, mentioned, 356
Aranjuez, French troops at, 106, 108 ;
Spanish at, 349 ; skirmish at, 264 ;
mentioned, 209, 263
Arbuthnot, Mr., mentioned, 560
Arce, General Antonio, in Asturias, 406
Areizaga, General Carlos, in Aragon, 175 ;
in La Mancha, 264, 348-50 ; defeat of,
349, 36°-61 5 mentioned, 352, 354, 443
Aremberg, Duke of, in Andalusia, 396
Arenas, mentioned, 220
Arentschild, Lieutenant-colonel Frederick
de, at Talavera, 253 ; at Bussaco, 519-
20, 530-32 ; mentioned, 464 n.
Arganda, mentioned, 219, 349
Argenton, Captain, treachery of, 144-5,
*53» :57
Army, the British, strength in 1809, 33-
35; casualties in 1808, 34; in 1809,
334; proposed reforms in, 34-5;
Chatham's reforms, 55 ; question of
patronage, 29-31, 192, 424; defects of
discipline, 190-96, 421-2, 537, 558 ;
desertion, 423-4 ; drunkenness, 423-4;
courts-martial, 192-5, 422-3 ; failings
of officers, 192, 199, 235, 424-6, 498,
558-9 ; lack of officers, 419-20; diffi-
culties over Portuguese commissions,
201, 417, 428-9; medical service, 426;
commissariat, 426-7 ; military police,
195; cavalry swordsmanship, 156;
second battalions, 33-4, 441 ; battalion
of detachments in Peninsula, 118,
150, 201 »., 224 «., 233-5, 241 ;
no justice for officers, 576, 579, 596 ;
relations with Navy in time of war,
304, 607 ; the waggon train, 333 ; bad
influence of the House of Commons,
105-6, 333,417-18, 445, 450; organiza-
tion of troops for expedition to Scheldt,
56-7 n. ; for the Oporto campaign,
149-50 n. ; for Talavera, 201 ; for
Bussaco, 508-10 n. ; recruiting in 1808,
34; in 1809, 334; from the Militia,
34-5, 334. See also under Regiments,
and under Wellington
Arnaud, Brigadier, at Bussaco, 513 n.
Arruda, British troops at, 540-41
Arta, Gulf of, mentioned, 307
Arzobispo, fighting at, 272-3, 331 ;
French troops at, 109, 269 ; Spanish
at, 272, 352; mentioned, 202, 213,
260
Astorga, taken by the French, 408-9,
466 ; French troops in, 177-8, 182-3,
188, 212, 287, 406-7, 468
Asturias, Romana's reforms in, 177 ;
fighting in, 178-80; evacuated by the
French, 290 ; French operations in
1810 in, 406-9, 468 ; mentioned, 344,
346, 371* 4°5, 49°
Atalaia, British troops at, 487-8
Auchmuty, Sir Samuel, commands Java
expedition, 608-9, 611-12, 615; besieges
INDEX
633
Cornelia, 616-18 ; assaults the camp,
618, 620, 622, 624, 629 ; further suc-
cesses, 625-8 ; character of, 628-9
Augereau, General Jean, in Catalonia,
379-81
Augereau, Pierre Francois, Marshal (Duke
of Castiglione), in Catalonia, 1809,
339-42. 371. 375 "• 5 in l8l°. 376"82>
385 ; takes Gerona, 342 ; superseded,
382
Austria, negotiations with England, 1809,
32, 36-7, 43 5 war with France, 32,
36-40, 50, 55, 301 ; makes peace, 55,
90, 305, 328-9 ; relations with Russia,
36, 39 ; with Prussia, 38-40, 48 ;
plans for Italian campaign, 292-3 ;
mentioned, 555
Ave R., skirmish at, 133; mentioned, 166
Aveiro, mentioned, 153-4, I57
Avellao de Cima, French troops at, 535
Avelleira, mentioned, 505
Avila, French troops at, 105, 116, 209,
278 ; mentioned, 207, 209-10, 244,
273
Aviles, French troops at, 179
Avintes, British troops at, 159, 161
Ayamonte, Spanish troops at, 368
Azambuja R., mentioned, 550, 555
Azava R., skirmish on the, 471-2 ; men-
tioned, 471
Azutan, skirmish at, 273-4
Bacellar, General, mentioned, 457, 534
Badajoz, British troops at, 282-3, 287,
352-3 ; Spanish at, 354,410, 467, 489,
496; French before, 186, 409-10,
462-3 ; mentioned, 109, 139, 203,344,
452, 468, 494
Bahama Islands, mentioned, 5
Baia, mentioned, 297
Baird, Sir David, mentioned, 628
Balearic Islands, mentioned, 98, 103
Ballesteros, General Francisco, in N. Spain,
178-9 ; with del Parque, 346, 406 ; in
S, Spain, 410-11 ; operations against
Girard, 489
Ballot, for the Militia, 34-5, 334
Baltar, French troops at, 164, 170
Baltic Sea, mentioned, 41
Banda Neira, taken by the British, 605
Bangalore, court-martial at, 592
Baflos, Pass of, importance in Talavera
campaign, 205-6, 209-12, 215, 281;
Wilson at, 136, 143 ; Soult at, 266-9,
356; skirmish at, 277-8; mentioned,
345-6> 35°>.47°
Bantam, fighting at, 610
Baracoa, British raid on, 4-5
Barba del Puerco, British troops at, 463-4 ;
skirmish at, 465
Barbados, mortality in, 7 ; mentioned, 8 n.,
9, 11, 12, 20
Barbary, mentioned, 138-9
Barcelona, French troops in, 97-104, 338,
357, 376, 378, 380-81 ; difficulties of
provisioning, 98, 381-2, 386-7, 389-90;
mentioned, 357, 376-7, 3S6, 388
Barclay, Lieutenant-colonel Robert, at
Bussaco, 509 n.
Barlow, Sir George, Governor-general in
India, 563-5 ; Gov. of Madras, 565-
96 ; character of, 563-4, 594 ; attitude
towards the army, 569, 594 ; high-
handed actions, 570-79 ; policy towards
mutineers, 580-81, 583-4; 588-9; to-
wards Sepoys, 5S1, 584, 591-2; his
test, 581-9 ; recall of, 596
Barnes, Lieutenant-colonel Edward, in the
W. Indies, 13 «., 15
Barnes, Lieutenant -colonel James S., at
Bussaco, 509 «., 520
Barquilla, mentioned, 473-4
Barrow, Colonel Thomas, in the W.
Indies, 20 n.
Basilicata, French troops at, 293
Bassecourt, General, in Spain, 243 n., 246,
266, 272-3, 275
Basseterre (Guadeloupe), mentioned, 22-3
Bat, mentioned, 60, 72-3, 77, 80-82, 93.
95
Batavia, its unhealthiness, 605, 615, 629 ;
taken by the British, 613, 616, 627;
mentioned, 610, 612, 626
Bathurst, Mr. Benjamin, as envoy, 32 «.,
43.413
Bathurst, Henry, 3rd Earl, mentioned, 47
Bathurst, Lieutenant -colonel James, as
Military Secretary, 413
Battles, combats, and sieges : —
Alba de Tormes, 350
Alcafiiz, 175
Almeida, 491-2
Almonacid, 264
Amarante, 144
Arzobispo, 273-4, 288
Aspern, 38, 48, 50, 301, 329
Baylen, 28, 201, 385, 405
Baza, 397
Belchite, 175-6
Bussaco, 513-32, 534-5- 537. 556
Cardadeu, 102, 338
Carvalho d'Este, 133
Ciudad Real, 108, 189
Ciudad Rodrigo, 465-7, 4-0-72
Coa, the, 476-86
Cornelis, 616-25
Coruna, 1 10-1 1. And see under Moore
Eckmuhl, 37, 293
Essling, 38
Fuente Cantos, 496
634
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Battles, combats, and sieges : —
Gamonal, 97
Gerona, 338-43
Hostalric/j, 378-92
Lerida, 384
Maida, 152, 292, 323
Maria, 175, 337
Medellin, 1 10, 135, 139, 185, 284
Ocana, 349-50, 352, 354, 365
Oporto, 158-63
Piwve, the, 37
Sacile, 37
Somosierra, 97
Talavera, 226-61, 331, 459
Tamames, 345
Tudela, 97
Ucles, 106
falls, 104, 338
Villa de Puerco, 472-5
Villafranca, 380
Vimeiro, 29, 151, 500, 602
Wagram, 55, 279, 301, 329, 469
Wandewash, 152
Zaragoza, 1 07-8
Zornosa, 97
Bavaria, fighting in, 37, 48 ; acquisitions
of, 328
Baxter, Sergeant, gallantry of, 550
Baynes, Captain (R.A.), in Portugal,
150 n.
Bayonne, mentioned, 374-5
Baza, Spanish defeat at, 397
Beauharnais, Eugene, mentioned, 37-8
Beaumont, General, at Talavera, 230, 237,
245 _
Beaupaire St. Louis, British troops at,
23
Beauregard, General, death of, 410
Beaver, Captain, R.N., at Mauritius,
602-3
Beckwith, General Sir George, in the W.
Indies, S »., 9-12, 26 ; attacks Mar-
tinique, 13-17; and Guadeloupe, 19-24
Beckwith, Colonel Sidney, in the Penin-
sula, 464 «., 465 ; in combat of Coa,
480 ; at Bussaco, 509 n. ; mentioned, 9
Beira, French troops in, 549, 554 ;
mentioned, 136, 138,453, 455, 555
Bejar, mentioned, 143, 215, 269, 346
Belchite, Spanish troops at, 175-6, 206,
337, 34° _
Belem, hospital at, 421 n.
Bell, Lieutenant-colonel John (E.I.C.), in
the mutiny at Seringapatam, 587 ; trial
of, 592-3 ; mentioned, 596
Bellair, French troops at, 21-2
Belliard, General, at Madrid, 262
Belluno, Duke of. See under Victor,
Marshal
Belmonte, mentioned, 454
Bembibre, British troops at, 424
Benavente, skirmish at, 116; French
troops at, 183, i!;8, 215, 405, 490
Bengal, troops from, 601, 608-9, 617;
mentioned, 565, 568
Bentinck, Lord William, in Sicily, 322 ;
in India, 569 ; mentioned, 418
Berar, mentioned, 564
Beresford, William Carr, Marshal, com-
mands Portuguese army, 137-8, 145 ;
his reforms, 427-9, 432 ; difficulties as
to rank, 201, 417, 428-9 ; operations
against Soult, 152-4, 164-8, 170-71 ;
and Ney, 203, 212, 266-7; in defence
of Portugal, 280-81; at Thomar, 457-8 ;
relations with Wellington, 420, 499 ;
mentioned, 139, 141, 205, 278, 280,
345-6, 433- 497
Bergen-op-Zoom, mentioned, 60, 72, 81,
85-6, 94-5
Berkeley, Admiral, mentioned, 336, 446,
549
Bermuda, mentioned, 5, 12
Berthier, Marshal, mentioned, 37, 370-72
Bertie, Admiral, mentioned, 601
Bessieres, Marshal, mentioned, 96
Betanzos, French troops at, 178
Beveland, North, mentioned, 61
Beveland, South, mentioned, 60-61, 65 ;
British troops at, 67, 72, 77-8, 81-3, 86,
95; fever at, 81, 85, 87-8; evacua-
tion of, 87-8
Bienvenida, Spanish defeat near, 489
Biezelinge, British troops at, 72
Birmingham, Lieutenant-colonel William,
at Bussaco, 518, 520
Biscay, French troops in, 371, 376
Blacker, Major (E.I.C.), at Madras, 571
Blake, General Joachim, operations in
Aragon, 174-6, 206, 338, 340-42 ; at
Cadiz, 394-5 ; defeated in Murcia,
396-7 ; mentioned, 344, 358,404
Blane, Dr. Gilbert, at Walcheren, 90
Blankenberghe, British troops at, 66, 73
Blantyre, Lieutenant-colonel Robert, Lord,
at Bussaco, 508 n.
Blayney, Major-general Andrew, Lord,
expedition to Fuengirola, 398-403;
mentioned, 397 n.
Bliicher, Marshal, mentioned, 40, 49
Boadlcea, H.M.S., mentioned, 601
Bohemia, mentioned, 42
Boialvo, mentioned, 505, 533
Boles, Major (E.I.C.), at Madras, 572-5,
577, 591
Bombay, mentioned, 597, 601-2
Bonaparte, Jerome, in the W. Indies, 7 ;
mentioned, 105
Bonaparte, Joseph. See under Joseph, King
of Spain
INDEX
635
Bonaparte, Louis, mentioned, 50
Bonaparte, Lucien, mentioned, 403
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See under Napoleon,
the Emperor
Bonnet, General, in N. Spain, 178-9,
371, 40S-7. 4°9> 468, 49°
Bordeaux, mentioned, 63
Borneo, mentioned, 610
Bornholm, Island of, mentioned, 41
Borssele, mentioned, 60, 62
Botilho, General, mentioned, 133, 153
Botorita, Spanish troops at, 175
Boulogne, mentioned, 65
Bourbon, Island of, taken by the British,
597-9, 608
Bourcard, General, mentioned, 296
Bourke, Colonel Richard, mentioned, 201
Bowyer, General Henry, in the W. Indies,
8, 9, 11 n.
Braga, French troops at, 132-3, 165 ;
British at, 166-7 j Portuguese at, 131
Braganca, French troops at, 209, 468
Brazil, Regency in, 432-4 j mentioned,
114,490
Breda, mentioned, 86
Breezand, mentioned, 67
Bremen, mentioned, 41
Brennier, General, mentioned, 602
Brimstone Hill (S. Kitts), mentioned, 7
Brittany, mentioned, 63
Browne, Brigadier-general, in the expedi-
tion to Walcheren, 56W., 67,70 n., 81, 88
Brovvnrigg, General Sir Robert, opinion of
the expedition to the Scheldt, 49 ; in
the expedition, 57, 86 ; mentioned, 193
Bruce, General, mentioned, 73
Brunswick, William, Duke of, his infantry
in the Peninsula, 499
Bucellas, British troops at, 137, 542
Buenos Ayres, mentioned, 58, 201, 459,
629
Bugio, mentioned, 336
Buitenzorg, mentioned, 622, 625-6
Bull, Captain Robert, mentioned, 539
Buller, General Sir Redvers, mentioned,
460 n.
Bun bury, Colonel Henry, in Sicily, 294,
301; mentioned, 305, 419
Bundelcund, mentioned, 564
Burgos, mentioned, 112, 356,409, 4155
French troops at, 174, 178, 371, 375,
405
Burgoyne, Captain John, mentioned, 416
Burguillos, mentioned, 489
Burrard, Lieutenant - general Sir Harry,
mentioned, 193
Bussaco, description of ground, 506-H;
battle of, 513-32 ; mentioned, 503,
505-6
Butler, Major Richard, mentioned, 615
Cabrit Island, mentioned, 18
Cabul, British mission to, 607
Ca9eres, British troops at, 282, 415;
skirmish at, 41 1
Cadiz, proposed British base at, 112, 117,
120, 147, 287, 289, 335, 442 ; British
troops at, 1 17, 120-23, I4I> 3*>8, 39I_4>
439-40, 462, 491, 499, 500; Spanish
jealousy for, 120-23, I29i 335' 3°^ >
Alburquerque at, 363-5 ; internal dis-
sension in, 369, 392 ; condition of
defences, 392-3, 403 ; Victor before,
367-8, 391-5, 398, 403, 458, 5475
description of, 366-7 j mentioned, 136-
37, 196, 361-2, 396, 398
Cadogan, Colonel Hon. H., in Spain,
201
Calabria, French troops in, 291, 301, 314,
316-17, 320-215 proposed British ex-
pedition to, 293-4 ; Neapolitan ex-
pedition to, 308-9, 311
Calcraft, Mr., mentioned, 331
Calcutta, mentioned, 564, 573, 597
Caldagues, General, in Catalonia, 98,
101-3 ; taken prisoner, 103
Caldas, British troops at, 139
Calvert, Sir Harry, mentioned, 49, 194
Camden, John Jeffreys Pratt, 2nd Earl,
mentioned, 47, 325
Cameron, Brigadier-general Alan, in Portu-
gal, 115 ti., 116 n., 118, 1 50 n., 1 54 ; in
the Talavera campaign, 201 ».; at Tala-
vera, 225, 230 »., 233, 248-9 ; at Bus-
saco, 510
Cameron, Lieutenant, at Procida, 298-9
Camilo, as guerilla, 358
Campbell, Brigadier-general Alexander, in
Portugal, 150 n., 154 n. ; in the Tala-
vera campaign, 200, 201 n. ; at Talavera,
224, 230 «., 246-7, 250, 257, 416 ; at
Bussaco, 509 n. ; mentioned, 425
Campbell, Colonel Archibald, at Bussaco,
508 n.
Campbell, Brigadier-general Henry Fred.,
in Portugal, 150 n. ; at Talavera, 257,
417
Campbell, Brigadier H., at Bussaco, 510
Campbell, Major-general James, in Sicily,
318-19
Campbell, Lieutenant-colonel John, in the
attack on Bourbon, 598 n.
Campbell, General Colin, governor of
Gibraltar, 397, 403
Campo Mayor, British troops at, 282 j
Spanish at, 410 ; garrison of, 455,
457
Campong Macassar, mentioned, 623
Campong Malayo, mentioned, 618, 620,
622
Campos Saucos, French troops at, 130
636
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Campoverde, General, Marquis of, in
Catalonia, 388-9
Camus, General, at Santa Maura, 311, 314
Cangas de Onis, French troops at, 407
Canning, George, as Foreign Sec, 36, 45,
120-21, 124 ; his N. German policy, 41,
46, 52 ; quarrel with Castlereagh, 45,
47, 53-4i 325"6 5 resignation of, 45,
325 ; intrigues for premiership, 54,
324-8 ; relations with Perceval, 324,
326, 328 ; refuses ministerial respon-
sibility, 326-7 ; character of, 45, 326-7 ;
mentioned, 210, 335, 446
Cape of Good Hope, mentioned, 33, 600-
601, 610
Capesterre (Guadeloupe), mentioned, 21
Capper, Colonel (E.I.C.), at Madras, 572-
75; 591
Capri, mentioned, 291, 301, 493
Carang Sambong, mentioned, 626
Carbet, British troops at, 15
Cardadeu, skirmish at, 101-2
Cardiel, mentioned, 226
Cardigos, French troops at, 554
Cardona, Spanish troops at, 388 ; skirmish
at, 389
Carinthia, mentioned, 37, 305
Carlotta of Spain, Princess, mentioned,
403
Carmichael, Major-general Hugh Lyle, in
the W. Indies, 4 «., 7 n. ; attacks S.
Domingo, 6
Carmona, Spanish troops at, 363-4 ;
French at, 364
Carniola, mentioned, 305
Carnot, Lazare Nicolas, mentioned, 339
Caro, Don Jose, with army of Valencia,
386-7
Caro, General Juan, in skirmish at Villa-
franca, 380
Caroline, Queen of Naples, intrigues of,
308-9, 316-17, 321
Caroline, H.M.S., mentioned, 601
Carregado, French troops at, 545, 549
Carrera, Don Martin, success at Santiago,
180 ; mentioned, 471, 475
Cartaojal, General, mentioned, 108-9, l85
Cartaxo, mentioned, 549, 551 n., 555
Carthagena, mentioned, 404
Carvalho d'Este, French troops at, 132 ;
fight at, 133
Casa de Salinas (Talavera), mentioned,
226-7, 237> 25° "•
Casa Tejeda, French troops at, 272
Casas del Puerto, mentioned, 206, 271
Caspe, French troops at, 174
Cassel, skirmish at, 42
Castanheira, mentioned, 336
Castello Bom, mentioned, 481
Castello Branco, British troops at, 205,
278, 281, 453, 487 ; French at, 171,
548 ; mentioned, 202, 454, 456-8,466,
546
Castiglione, Duke of. See under Augereau,
Marshal
Castile, French troops in, 344, 347, 352,
354, 376 ; mentioned, 362, 462
Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount,
preparations for Walcheren expedition,
47, 49, 53, 5> 64, 69, 75, 88, 90;
Portuguese policy, 125, 189 ; financial
difficulties, 32, 44, 190, 196 ; quarrel
with Canning, 45, 47, 53-4, 325-6;
defends Moore, 29, 45 ; relations with
Chatham, 47, 84-5 ; and with Welling-
ton, 128-9, 189-90, 195, 210, 286, 289,
335 5 question of his removal, 324-5 ;
character of, 45 ; mentioned, 2, 9, 31,
33, 58, 63, J38, H0, H2, 2°°, 29x»
335, 4 12, 444,. 446, 448, 582-3
Castro, General, in Catalonia, 103
Castro de Duero, mentioned, 355 n.
Castropol, Spanish troops at, 178 ; French
at, 180, 408
Catalonia, French operations in, in 1808,
97-104; in 1809, 173, 338-43; in
1810, 376-82, 386-90; mentioned, 44,
29J, 357, 37i
Cattaro, French troops in, 306-7
Caulaincourt, General Auguste, skirmish
on the Tagus, 274
Cavado R., French troops on, 166-7;
skirmish on, 167
Cavaignac, General, in attack on Sicily,
318-19
Cavalhaes, British troops at, 538
Cazalegas, British troops at, 220-21, 226 ;
French at, 256
Cea, British troops at, 502
Ceclavin, mentioned, 205
Celorico, British troops at, 457, 466, 469-
70, 487, 493, 539; French at, 501;
mentioned, 454, 456, 469
Centenillo, British troops at, 213 ; Spanish
at, 272
Cephallonia, British troops in, 291, 302-4,
3°7
Cerigo, taken by the British, 303 ; men-
tioned, 304
Cerro de Cascajal, French troops on, 23 1,
234, 236-9, 242"3, 245> 248, 250-51,
255-6 ; description of, 223, 226
Cerro de Medellin, British troops on,
225-6, 228-9, 235, 259 5 Ist Frencri
attack, 231-4; 2nd attack, 236-43;
3rd attack, 244-54 ; description of, 223,
225
Cervera, French troops at, 38S
Ceuta, mentioned, 397-9
Cevolla, mentioned, 217, 221
INDEX
637
Ceylon, mentioned, 33, 567, 569-70, 581
Ceylon, H.M.&., mentioned, 601
Chabot, General, in Catalonia, 173
Champalimaud, Brigadier de, at Bussaco,
509 n.
Chamusca, British troops at, 553, 555
Charles IV., King of Spain, mentioned,
Charles, Archduke of Austria, defeat of,
37> 55 5 mentioned, 48, 50
Chatham, John Pitt, 2nd Earl of, com-
mands Walcheren expedition, 47, 54,
56-96 ; his instructions, 62 ; relations
with Strachan, 77, 82-3, 86-7, 96 ;
financial difficulties, 83-5 ; decides to
retreat, 85-S ; character of, 55, 95-6 ;
opinion on courts-martial, 194 ; resigna-
tion of, 332 ; mentioned, 54, 324-5, 328
Chaves, Portuguese troops at, 131, 133-4,
143 ; British at, 166-8, 171 ; taken by
French, 132, 138; mentioned, 130
Chazot, Count, mentioned, 40
Cheribon, mentioned, 610, 626
Cherub, H.M.S., mentioned, 15
Chicacole, mutiny at, 5S7-8
Chichester, H.M.S., mentioned, 5
Chiclana, French troops at, 391, 394
Chilingching, British troops at, 610-13,
616
Chinchilla, Spanish troops at, 106
Chitteldroog, mutiny at, 587
Church, Captain Richard, in Ithaca, 303 ;
at Santa Maura, 312-13
Cienfuegos, General, in N. Spain, 406
Cinca R., mentioned, 173, 357
Cintra, Convention of, mentioned, 28, 45,
326
Cisgar, Admiral, mentioned, 404
Ciudad Real, Spanish troops at, 108, 189,
220
Ciudad Rodrigo, French troops at, 105,
i35» J43> 352. +°9» 500 > British at,
280; Spanish at, 344, 346, 354, 546;
Ney before, 463 ; siege of, 465-7, 470-
72, 475, 487, 491, 494 n., 496 ; men-
tioned, 136, 215, 277, 345, 454-5, 459,
464,468, 549, 554, 557
Civita Vecchia, mentioned, 301-2
Clarke, Major Charles Will., in Cerigo,
303 ; at Santa Maura, 313 ; death of, 314
Clarke, General, mentioned, 64-5, 329
Clarke, Mrs. Mary Ann, mentioned, 30-3 1
Clausel, General, in N. Spain, 408
Close, Colonel Barry, at Hyderabad, 584-5
Coa R., fight on the, 476-86 ; mentioned,
453-4, 462, 475
Cobbett, William, mentioned, 195, 284
Cochin, Rajah of, mentioned, 570
Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, in the
W. Indies, 9-12, 17, 25 5 success in Aix
Roads, 63 ; at Rosas, 100; mentioned,
135
Cocks, Captain Hon. John Somers, as
scout, 415-16; operations against Mas-
sena, 495-6, 501-2 ; in the retreat to the
Lino, 539
Coimbra, British troops at, 148-9, 164,
171, 45 1, 536 ; sacked by French, 536-
38 ; Trant retakes, 538-9 ; mentioned,
144, 164, 454-6, 501, 505, 508, 534-6,
556> 559
Colborne (afterwards Lord Seaton), Major
John, at Bussaco, 508 n. ; mentioned,
191
Cole, Major-general Hon. George Lowry,
in Portugal, 417, 420, 551, 553; at
Guarda, 457, 463, 487, 493 ; at Bus-
saco, 505, 509 «., 510, 512, 526
Cole, Captain, R.N., at Banda Neira, 605
Coleman, Brigadier, at Bussaco, 510
Collingwood, Admiral Cuthbert, Lord, in
the Mediterranean, 291-4, 301-2, 304;
death of, 302 n. ; mentioned, 59, 367
Collins, Brigadier, at Bussaco, 509 n.
Colombres, Spanish troops at, 406
Colville, Colonel Hon. Charles, in the W.
Indies, 12 n. ; in the Peninsula, 418-19
Comorin, Cape, mentioned, 583
Concepcion, Fort, mentioned, 470-72,475,
477
Conde, General Garcia, in Catalonia, 340-
41 ; at Lerida, 383-4
Congreve rockets, mentioned, 548
Constantinople, mentioned, 304, 306-7
Coote, Lieutenant-general Sir Eyre, in the
Walcheren expedition, 57, 62-3, 67-8,
89-90, 93 ; mentioned, 5 n.
Copons, General Francisco, in Andalusia,
396, 496
Cordova, taken by the French, 361 ; men-
tioned, 360-61, 363, 369
Corfu, French in, 303-4 ; proposed attack
on, 307-8, 314
Coria, mentioned, 205, 277, 280
Cork, transports at, 121
Cornelis, camp at, 611, 613-16; descrip-
tion of the Lines, 616, 624; assault on,
616-25, 629
Cornwallis, Charles, 1st Marquis, men-
tioned, 563, 568
Cortina, mentioned, 502
Corti^ada, British troops at, 205 ; men-
tioned, 454
Corufia, taken by the French, 1 10-1 1, 184 ;
French troops at, 178, 180-81 ; evacua-
tion of, 183, 205, 212 ; mentioned, 28,
^ 33. 46» "6. Il8> '42, '52
Cotton, Major-general Sir Stapleton, in
Portugal, 149 n., 154-5, 199 ; in the
Talavera campaign, 201 «.; at Talavera,
638
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
225, 227, 249 ; returns to England,
416 ; in the defence of Portugal, 18 10,
487, 493-4; in the retreat to the
Lines, 539 ; mentioned, 417, 420, 500
Coupigny, Marquis of, mentioned, 338,
34°
Covadonga, Spanish troops at, 179
Cox, Lieutenant-colonel William, at Al-
meida, 455, 491-2
Cradock, Lieutenant-general Sir John, in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 n., 68 n. ; at
Lisbon, 112-42 ; relations with Moore,
1 12-13, ll& i and with Frere, 117, 139,
142; his opinion on the defence of
Portugal, 125, 127, 132, 136; on
question of re-embarkation, 115, 117-
19, 121, 135 ; uncertainty of his plans,
116-18, 119 «., 136, 140; superseded,
129, 139 ; as Gov. of Gibraltar, 140 ;
character of, 140-42; mentioned, 114,
132, 145, 149, 184, 569
Craig, Lieutenant-general Sir James, men-
tioned, 193
Craufurd, Brigadier-general James Catlin,
in Portugal, 280
Craufurd, Brigadier-general Robert, goes to
the Peninsula, 200, 205 ; march to Tala-
vera, 231, 265, 427 n.; in retreat from
Talavera, 271-2 ; in defence of Portugal,
1810, 457, 461-4, 466, 470-71, 475,
492, 502 ; skirmish at Villa de Puerco,
472-5 ; fight on the Coa, 476-86 ; in
Bussaco campaign, 503 ; at Bussaco,
506, 509 »., 510, 522-5, 529 »., 532,
534 ; in the retreat to the Lines, 540,
558 ; in the Lines, 542 ; pursues
Massena, 549-51, 553 ; character of,
421, 427, 459-61 ; his defects inaction,
461, 474-5, 478, 483-4, 5°6, 54o;
his training of light troops, 459-60,
464 ; relations with Wellington, 421,
461, 465,475 ; in Parliament, 95, 332,
460 ; mentioned, 1 12, 189, 218 «., 417,
425
Criz R., mentioned, 502, 504-5
Croatia, acquired by France, 305
Cromwell, Oliver, mentioned, 6
Cuba, British raid on, 4-5 ; British help
offered to, 5-6
Cuenca, Spanish troops at, 105-6 ; men-
tioned, 97
Cuesta, General Don Gregorio de la, in
Estremadura, 108-10, 123, 147, 185-7 ;
defeat at Medellin, 110, 185 ; plans for
Talavera campaign, 201-2, 208-11 ; in
the Talavera campaign, 205-9 ; at
Talavera, 231, 243 n., 244, 246, 257,
260 ; retreat from Talavera, 263, 266-8,
270, 272-6; relations with Wellington,
201-2, 206-11, 217, 222, 266, 276,
278, 283-4; and with Venegas, 211,
219, 263-4 > character of, 207-8, 222,
283-4 ; his bodily ills, 207, 214, 216,
260,279; mentioned, 136, 138, 139,
i49» 2J4» 329> 356
Curacoa, mentioned, 600
Cyane, H.M.S., mentioned, 299
Daendels, General Hermann Willem, in
Java, 606, 608, 610-11, 615; men-
tioned, 614, 629
Dalhousie, Major-general George, Earl of,
in the Walcheren expedition, 57 n.
Dalmatia, the French in, 305-7
Dalmatia, Duke of. See under Soult,
Marshal
Dalrymple, Lieutenant-general Sir Hew,
mentioned, 431, 567
Damiel, Spanish troops at, 220, 347-8
Danube R., fighting on the, 37-8, 50-52,
55, 63-4 ....
Danubian principalities, mentioned, 36
Dardanelles, the, British in, 306
Dartmoor, mentioned, 455 n.
Dawson, Lieutenant Henry, in the fight
on the Coa, 48 1 n.
Day, Colonel, in the Walcheren expedi-
tion, 70 n.
Deal, mentioned, 55
Decaen, General Charles Mathieu, at
Mauritius, 602, 604
Decken, General von der, reports on N.
German affairs, 49-50
Decres, Admiral, mentioned, 64
De Grey, Colonel Hon. George, at Bussaco,
510 a.; in retreat to Lines, 536 ; men-
tioned, 551 n.
Delaborde, General Henri Francois, at
Oporto, 153, 161-2
De la Tour, Count, mission to Sicily,
292-3
Deleitosa, Spanish troops at, 109, 276 ;
British at, 272 ; mentioned, 275
Del Parque, Duke of, in the Talavera
campaign, 213, 277; operations with
Army of Left, 344-7, 349-51, 354,
362, 405 ; repulses Marchand, 345 ;
defeated, 350 ; mentioned, 352, 410
Del Reino, Marquis, at the Pass of Bafios,
266, 268-9 '•> mentioned, 271
Denmark, possessions in W. Indies, 2, 8
Desaix, Fort, taken by the British, 16 ;
mentioned, 13
Deseada, taken by the British, 9
Despefia Perros, French troops at, 361
Dessolles, General Jean Joseph, at Tala-
vera, 238, 245 ; in Andalusia, 361 ;
mentioned, 106
Detachments, Battalions of, in the Penin-
sula, 118, 150, 201 «., 224 »., 233-5, 241
INDEX
639
Deva R., mentioned, 406
Dickson, Major, in Java, 620
Diez, Martin, as guerilla, 355-6
Dilkes, Colonel, at Cadiz, 418 n.
Dindigul, mentioned, 582
Dishoek, British troops at, 71, 79
Disney, Brigadier-general Sir Moore, in the
Walcheren expedition, 57 n., 72
Doel, mentioned, 82
Dole, British troops at, 21
Dominica, hurricane at, 7 ; mentioned,
8n., 21
Don, Lieutenant -colonel Sir George, at
Walcheren, 90-91
Donauworth, French troops at, 37
Don Benito, Spanish troops at, 354
Donkin, Colonel R. S., in the Talavera
campaign, 201 »., 205 ; at Talavera,
226-9, 230 «., 235, 243, 250 «., 259 ;
in the retreat, 271 ; mentioned, 191 n.
Dornberg, Colonel, mentioned, 42, 50
Dos Casas R., skirmish at, 472-3
Douglas, Sir James Dawes, at Bussaco,
509 «., 517, 519-20
Douro R., British passage of, at Oporto,
158-605 mentioned, 152, 157-8, 165,
181, 214, 277, 416, 451-2
Dover, H.M.S., mentioned, 605-6
Doveton, Colonel (E.I.C.), tried for
mutiny, 593
Downs, the, ships in, 55, 62, 67, 200
Drouet, General Jean Baptiste, with the
Reserve in Spain, 375, 545, 557
Drummond, Lieutenant-colonel Edward,
in attack on Bourbon, 598 «., 599
Drury, Admiral, mentioned, 601
Duckworth, Admiral Sir John, mentioned,
600
Dufour, General, in Spain, 371
Duhesme, General Philippe, in Barcelona,
97-102, 376-8 ; dismissal of, 379
Dulong, Major, in the French retreat from
Oporto, 167-8
Dumouriez, General Philippe Guillaume,
Comte, mentioned, 51
Dundas, Sir David, in connection with
the Walcheren expedition, 45-7, 49, 54 ;
the question of courts-martial, 193-4 ;
relations with Wellington, 199, 421 «.,
424 ; mentioned, 419, 425, 429, 459
Dundas, William, on question of courts-
martial, 193-4
Dunkery Hill, mentioned, 507
Dunlop, Brigadier James, with Wellington,
418-19
Dunne, Major, at Bussaco, 516
D'Urban, Captain Benjamin, mentioned,
136
Dyodyocarta, British troops at, 628
Dyott, Major-general William, in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 «., 88 ; men-
tioned, 417
East India Company, mutiny in their
army, 563-96 ; relations with their
officers, 566, 569
Eben, Baron, defeated by Soult, 133; at
Bussaco, 509 n.
Eble, General Jean Baptiste, mentioned,
494-5 «.
Ebro R., French on the, 385, 388, 390 ;
mentioned, 173, 202, 357, 376, 384
Ecloo, mentioned, 65
Eguia, General Francisco Ramon, succeeds
Cuesta, 279, 282 ; relations with
Wellington, 279 ; with Army of
Centre, 344, 347-8 ; at Seville, 362 ;
mentioned, 343
Egypt, mentioned, 306
El Bravo, mentioned, 217
Elchingen, Duke of. See under Ney,
Marshal
Elder, Colonel George, mentioned, 465
Eldon, John Scott, Earl of, mentioned,
47
El Gordo, French troops at, 273
Elja R., mentioned, 488
Ellewoutsdyk, mentioned, 60
Elley, Lieutenant-colonel John, at Tala-
vera, 251-3
Elliot, Gilbert. See under Minto, Earl of
Elliott, Captain W. G., at Talavera, 228
Ellore, mutiny at, 587-8
Elvas, British troops at, 115 «., 118, 282 ;
garrison of, 455, 457 ; mentioned, 114,
i25>. 353. 452
Empecinado, El. See under Diez, Martin
England, relations, with Austria, 32, 36-7,
43 j with Prussia, 39-43, 48, 51 ; with
Turkey, 306-Sj Portuguese policy, 44-5,
113-14, 116-19, I24"5> l36, H°-4-i,
3*5i 431. 435"6> 438-4i, 44^-4, 5°°.
560 j Spanish policy, 112, 120, 124;
N. German policy, 44, 48, 51-2;
Mediterranean policy, 305, 309-10, 315,
320, 321-3, 441-2
new Eastern
question, 305-6 5 isolation of, 329 ;
difficulties of British Ministers, 52-3,
445, 449 ; readjustment of Cabinet,
324-8 ; financial troubles, 32, 44, 83,
146, 190, 196, 202, 289, 435-6, 560 ;
feeling in the country, 329-30. See
also Army, Wellington, and the
names of the various Ministers
Entre-Douro-e-Minho, mentioned, 131
Erdholm, mentioned, 41
Ernouf, Monsieur, governor of Guade-
loupe, 19, 22-3
Eroles, Baron de, in Catalonia, 389-90
Erskine, Major-general Sir William, in the
640
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Walcheren expedition, 57 «., 72, 85 ; in
the Peninsula, 269, 418-19 ; his insanity,
419
Escalhao, British troops at, 463-4
Escalona, Portuguese troops at, 211, 220,
263
Espana, Don Carlos d', mentioned, 548
Espinhal, mentioned, 458, 502-4
Espoir, H.M.S., mentioned, 299
Estrada Nova, mentioned, 454, 458
Estremadura, French troops in, 105, 108-
10, 281, 467 ; mentioned, 285, 343,
347> 352> 395> 494-6
Exeter, mentioned, 455 n.
Exmoor, mentioned, 226 h., 507
Eylau, mentioned, 380
Fane, Brigadier-general Sir Henry, in the
Talavera campaign, 291 n. ; at Talavera,
227, 242, 246, 251-4; with Hill in
Portugal, 488, 506, 510 n., 533 ; watch-
ing the Tagus, 547-9, 551 ; mentioned,
151
Faro, the, mentioned, 318
Feira, French troops at, 155
Ferdinand IV., King of Naples and Sicily,
mentioned, 301, 310, 316-17, 321
Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, mentioned,
359
Ferey, General, at Bussaco, 523 ; in re-
treat to Santarem, 548 ; mentioned,
463
Ferrol, taken by the French, ill, 178,
184; evacuation of, 183, 212
Figueras, French troops in, 97-101, 389 ;
mentioned, 342, 386
Finance, British troubles over specie, 32,
44, 190, 560 ; in the Walcheren ex-
pedition, 83-4; in the Peninsula, 146,
196, 202, 289, 435-6
Finland, mentioned, 36, 39
Fischer, Colonel, in Sicily, 318-19
Fitzpatrick, General Richard, mentioned,
193-4
Fiume, acquired by France, 305
Flanders, mentioned, 49, 423, 450. See
also under Scheldt and Walcheren
Fletcher, Lieutenant-colonel Richard, de-
signs the Lines of Torres Vedras, 336,
Flushing, proposed attack on, 45-6 ; British
troops before, 61-3, 69, 71-2, 74 ; bom-
bardment of, 76, 79-80, 89 ; garrison
of, 65, 69-71, 76 ; sortie from, 78 ;
reinforced, 76-7 ; prisoners taken at,
80 ; mentioned, 60, 63-4, 69, 82, 85,
Fonseca, Brigadier, at Bussaco, 508 n.
Forbes, James, 17th Lord, in Sicily, 322
Forbes, Captain, at Ternate, 605-6
Forjaz, Dom Miguel, works with the
British, 113, 431-4, 49°. 497"8
Fornos, British troops at, 534, 536, 538 ;
French at, 501-2
Fort Royal Bay, Martinique, 13-15
Fort St. George (Madras), mentioned,
582 .
Fouch6, Joseph (Duke of Otranto), men-
tioned, 32, 96, 329
Fox, Charles James, mentioned, 193
Foy, General Maximilian, at Oporto, 160,
162; mission to Madrid, 215-16, 219,
269; skirmish at Cajeres, 411; at
Bussaco, 513-14, 518-22, 526, 531 ;
mission to Napoleon, 547-8, 554 ; men-
tioned, 415, 529 n.
Foz Dao, British troops at, 502
Foz d'Arouce, British troops at, 502-5
Fraga, taken by the French, 173
France, in the W. Indies, 2, 5-7, 17-18 ;
loss of islands, 16, 19, 24 ; power ex-
tinguished in W. Indies, 25 ; loss of
Bourbon, 599 ; and of Mauritius,
604-5 5 annexation of papal dominions,
37 ; acquisitions in Mediterranean,
305, 308 ; British naval attack on, 63 ;
lack of troops in, 49, 51, 63 ; fleet in
the Scheldt, 46, 49, 58, 64-5, 73, 75,
81, 85-6
The Army in Spain : operations against
Spaniards only, 97-142, 173-89, 262-
78, 337-53. 376-4"j list of army
corps, 375 n. ; sufferings of troops.
in, 275, 288-9, 4"> 546, 549-5° i
greed of the generals, 187, 370-71,
381, 395, 536-7; their insubordina-
tion, 371-4; and inaccurate de-
spatches, 274 n„ 485-6 ; casualties at
Oporto, 163 ; at Talavera, 258 ; at
Bussaco, 526 ; at the Coa, 482 ;
treatment of British wounded, 270-7 1 ;
lack of intelligence, 189, 272, 537,
544 ; consumption of ammunition,
494-5 n. See also under Napoleon,
and for movements of corps under
names of marshals and generals
Franceschi, General, defeats Romana, 131 ;
skirmish at Albergaria Nova, 154-5 ;
retreats to Oporto, 155-7; and from
Oporto, 164 ; taken prisoner, 206 ; men-
tioned, 153
Francis I., Emperor of Austria, mentioned,
32, 36, 38, 45
Frank, Dr., in the Peninsula, 426
Fraser, Lieutenant-general Mackenzie, in
the expedition to Walcheren, 56 «., 69,
70 «., 71,81
Fraser, Lieutenant-colonel Hastings, in
the attack on Bourbon, 598-9
Frederick William III., King of Prussia,
INDEX
641
his vacillation, 38-40, 48-9, 52 ; rela-
tions with the Tsar, 39
Fregenal, Spanish troops at, 489
Freire, General Bernardino, operations
against Soult, 13 1-3 ; murder of, 133
Freixedas, British troops at, 487, 493 ;
French at, 500
Frere, Bartholomew, in Spain as envoy,
328, 368
Frere, John Hookham, in Spain, 117,
120, 212, 335, 352, 368, 392; his
foolish interference, 120-24, 1 39-, 142,
208-9 > h's intrigues, 207-11, 283
Friesland, East, mentioned, 41, 50
Fuengirola, expedition to, 398-403
Fuente Cantos, Spanish defeat at, 496
Fu?nteduena, mentioned, 209, 219
Fuente el Fresno, mentioned, 220
Fuentes de Oiioro, mentioned, 472
Fundao, mentioned, 454, 504
Gaeta, mentioned, 29S
Galicia, Spanish troops in, 97, 468 ; rising
in, 130, 134, 176-7, 185 ; British in,
113; French in, 104, 1 10-1 1, 148, 176-
85, 203, 287, 405-6, 466 ; evacuation
of, 183, 203, 212, 290, 329, 451
Galion R., mentioned, 21-2
Gallegos, British troops at, 471
Gallicia, Russian troops in, 39
Galluzzo, General, mentioned, 97, 105,
„ I09.' "4
Gambier, Admiral James, Lord, mentioned,
Gamonal, fighting at, 213
Gardanne, General Claude, in Beira, 554
Gardner, Rear-Admiral Alan, Lord, in the
Walcheren expedition, 57, 62, 66, 73-5
Gazan, General Honore, in Andalusia,
396, 411
Gelati, mentioned, 318
George III., King of Gt. Britain, men-
tioned, 46-7, 54, 59, 317, 327, 332 _
Germany, N., proposed British expedition
to, 36, 41, 43-4, 48-52 ; French troops
■ i^ 374
Gerona, French attack on, 97, 99-101,
386, 390 ; siege of, 338-43, 376 ; men-
tioned, 377-9, 381
Ghent, mentioned, 65, 94
Gibbs, Lieutenant-colonel Samuel, in at-
tack on Mauritius, 60 1 n. ; in expedi-
tion to Java, 609 ;;., 619-21, 625, 627
Gibraltar, British troops at, 190, 200 «.,
315, 368 n., 394, 439 n. ; mentioned,
120, 140, 397-9
Gijon, Spanish troops at, 179 ; French at,
.'79 .
Gillespie, Colonel Rollo, in the expedition
to Java, 609, 611-13 ; in skirmish at
VOL. VII
Weltevreeden, 614-15 ; in the fight at
Cornell's, 619-25; gallantry r>r'. 623,
625 ; later service, 628
Ginzo, British troops at, 171
Girard, General Jean Baptiste, in Anda-
lusia, 395 ; on the frontier, 488-9 ;
defeats Romana, 489
Gneisenau, August, Count of, mentioned,
38, 40, 48-9
Goa, mentioned, 583
Goes, British troops at, 61, 72-3, 81, 84
Goltz, Aug. Fried., Count von der, men-
tioned, 39
Gomm, Sir W. M., mentioned, 286 /:.,
520 n.
Gordon, Colonel Sir James W., mentioned,
49, x9r «•> J?4
Gouache, Captain, in the fight at Villa de
Puerco, 474
Gouvea, British troops at, 494, 501
Gowdie, Major-general Francis, at Madra-.
572
Graham, Major-general Thomas, in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 «., 68, 70-71,
78, 81 ; at Cadiz, 392-5, 418, 491
Graindorge, General, at Bussaco, 513 «..
518 a. ; death of, 526
Granada, French troops in, 361, 369;
mentioned, 98, 103, 185, 396
Grand Chaloupe (Bourbon), mentioned,
598-9
Grande Terre (Guadeloupe), British troops
in, 21
Granollers, Spanish troops at, 10 1 ; men-
tioned, 377-8, 381
Grant, Captain Colquhoun, as spy, 415
Grant, Lieutenant-colonel John, as spy,
415
Greece, mentioned, 306. And see under
Ionian Islands
Grenada, mentioned, S n.
Grenier, General, in Italy, 3:6, 319
Grenville, William Wymtham, Baron,
mentioned, 327, 332, 446, 460 r..
Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl, mentioned, 261,
327, 331
Grey, General Charles, afterwards 1st
Earl, mentioned, 13, 59
Grijo, skirmish at, 156 ; French at, 155 ;
British at, 157
Grosvenor, Lieutenant-general Hon.
Thomas, in the Walcheren expedition,
57 »., 62-3, 76, 81
Grypskerke, British troops at, 70
Guadalhorce R., mentioned, 402
Guadalquivir R., mentioned, 363
Guadarrama R., French troo' >s on, 210
Guadelope R., mentioned, i~4->
Guadeloupe, blockade of, 2, 7, 9-1 1, 19, 25 ;
attack on, 19-24
2 T
642
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Guadiana R., defence of, 283, 352, 354,
410, 457 j French troops on, 186-7,
189 ; British on, 282, 334-5, 343, 438 ;
mentioned, 220, 452, 489
Guarda, British troops at, 457, 466, 470,
487, 493-5 ; French at, 495, 500
Guetry, Colonel, in Catalonia, 378
Guillaume, Admiral, in the W. Indies, 7
Guimaraes, French troops at, 165-6
Gustavus Adolphus III., King of Sweden,
mentioned, 39
Gwynne, Major William, at Bussaco,
515-16
Habert, General Pierre, in Aragon, 386
Halifax, mentioned, 12, 440, 491
Hamburg, mentioned, 41, 83
Hamilton, Sir John, at Bussaco, 508 n. 5
in pursuit of Massena, 551
Hanover, mentioned, 40, 50, 52
Harcourt, Major-general, in attack on
Guadeloupe, 20-23 3 further operations,
25
Hardenberg, Karl August, Prince von,
mentioned, 39
Hawker, Lieutenant-colonel Samuel, men-
tioned, 162 n.
Hawley, Major-general, mentioned, 460 n.
Hay, Brigadier-general Sir Andrew, in the
Walcheren expedition, 68 »., 88 ; in
the Peninsula, 418
Heise, Captain Ludwig, in the Peninsula,
150 n. j at Talavera, 228
Heligoland, mentioned, 41
Henderson, Major Patrick, in the W.
Indies, 14, 24
Herencia, mentioned, 220
Hesse, mentioned, 50
Heudelet, General, in Spain, 375 n., 405,
410, 463 ; at Bussaco, 513-14
Hill, Major-general Rowland, in Portugal,
139, 150 «., 154-6 ; at Oporto, 160;
in the Talavera campaign, 200, 201 n. ;
at Talavera, 225, 229, 233, 239, 241,
257 ; at Abrantes, 353, 410, 457-8 ; at
Portalegre, 462-3 ; operations against
Reynier, 487-8, 493-5 $ on march to
Bussaco, 502-6 ; at Bussaco, 508 ».,
509, 513-14, 522, 526; in the retreat
to the Lines, 533, 536; in the Lines,
540-41, 545, 548 ; pursuit of Massena,
549-51' 553, 555 5 mentioned, 416-17,
420, 466-7, 554
Hinuber, Colonel Adolphus, in expedition
to Ischia, 295 n.
Hislop, Major-general Thomas, at Guade-
loupe, 20
Hoghton, Colonel Daniel, in the W.
Indies, 12 «., 14
Holland, possessions in W. Indies, 2, 25 ;
Dutch in British service, 26 ; loss of
E. Indian settlements, 605-6 \ and of
Java, 628 j Dutch trade in E. Indies,
606 ; lack of troops in, 49, 51 5 men-
tioned, 501. See also under Scheldt and
Walcheren
Holland, Elizabeth, Lad)', mentioned, 47 n.
Hope, Major-general Hon. Alexander,
mentioned, 49
Hope, Lieutenant-general Hon. Sir John,
in the Walcheren expedition, 57 »., 59,
61-2,65, 67, 72~3, 7b-7-> 80-82, 86, 93 ;
mentioned, 137
Hostalrich, taken by the French, 342 5
siege of, 378-9, 581-2 ; mentioned, 100,
342, 376-7
Hotham, Admiral Sir William, mentioned,
86 n.
Houston, Major-general William, in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 »., 68 n..
70 «., 71, 88 ; in the Peninsula, 417-19
Huelva, Spanish troops at, 396, 489, 496
Huerba R., mentioned, 175
Huntly, George Gordon, Marquis of, in
the Walcheren expedition, 56 «., 62,
66, 73-4, 77-8, 81, 85, 93
Huskisson, Rt. Hon. William, relations
with Chatham, 83-4; with Wellington,
202, 435 ; mentioned, 333
Hyderabad, mutiny at, 580, 583-6, 588
Hyder Ali, mentioned, 628
Ibor R., Spanish troops on, 109, 410
Illescas, mentioned, 263
Illyria, mentioned, 305
Impe'rieuse, H.M.S., mentioned, 100
India, mutiny in, 563-96 ; security of,
607-8 ; mentioned, 33, 197, 459
Indies, the West, history of, 1805-1814,
1-27 5 mortality in, 1-4, 7, 20, 26 ;
black troops in, 1, 4, 7, 26 ; negro
insurrections in, 3, 7, 25 ; poor quality
of troops in, 26; mentioned, 33, 92,
423-4, 455, 607. See also under names
of various islands
Infantado, Duke of, in Castile, 105-6 ;
mentioned, 108
Inglis, Lieutenant -colonel William, at
Bussaco, 508 n.
Inkermann, mentioned, 530
Inn R., Bavarian acquisitions on, 328
Innes, Colonel, at Masulipatam, 578-80,
5.83
Ionian Isles, British operations among,
292, 302-4, 311-14, 4485 French in,
305-6 ; Septinsular Republic, 303,
308
Iphigenia, H.M.S., at Mauritius, 599-600
Ireland, militia of, 191-2, 334, 422 ;
British troops in, 34, 200 j character of
INDEX
643
Irish troops, 191-2, 422, 558 ; Irish in
Spanish service, 1 00 ; and in French
service, 602
Ischia, British expedition to, 294-302 ;
capture of, 297-9 ; evacuated, 301-2
Isle de la Passe, taken by the British,
599 ; recaptured, 600
Islet du Gosier (Guadeloupe), British
troops at, 21
Isonzo R., mentioned, 292
Istria, acquired by France, 305
Italy, Austrian operations in, 36-7, 44 ;
Italian troops in French service, 99,
377-9, 3S1, 3S7. See also under Naples,
Ischia, Sicily, Calabria
Ithaca, taken by the British, 303
Jaca, taken by the French, 173 ; guerillas
at, 356
Jaen, taken by the French, 361, 369
falna, mutiny at, 586, 589, 593
Jamaica, misgovernment in, 3 ; mutiny
in, 3"+
Janina, mentioned, 306-7
[anssens. General, in Java, 610, 613-15,
623, 625-9
Jaraicejo, British troops at, 276, 278
[ardon, General, death of, 133
fattoo, fight at, 626-7
Jauffret, Brigadier-general, taken prisoner
at Cornelis, 621
Java, British conquest of, 606 - 29 ;
Daendels' reforms in, 606 ; surrender
of, 628
Jerez de los Caballeros, mentioned, 489
Jimenes, as guerilla, 358
John, Prince Regent of Portugal and
Brazil, mentioned, 403, 432-4, 49c
John, Archduke of Austria, in Italy, 37-8,
292, 294
Joseph (Bonaparte), titular King of Spain,
character of, 363, 369 ; arrangements
with Ney, 178; with Soult, 214-15,
219, 267, 269, 288, 364 ; with Victor,
187, 206, 215, 277 ; with Mortier, 209,
214-15, 409-10; with Sebastiani, 189 ;
pursuit of Venegas, 189 ; in the Tala-
vera campaign, 216, 221, 286-8 ; at
Talavera, 231, 236-7, 242 if., 243-6,
254-6, 259, 285 ; retires from Talavera,
262-4, 2°6 ; breaks up army, 277 ;
in Andalusia, 359-74 ; relations with
Napoleon, 260, 283-4, 370-73 ; and
with the generals in Spain, 105, 174 if.,
236-7, 256, 260, 283, 287-8, 370-73,
383 ; mentioned, 104-6, 109, 143, 179,
184-5, l88> 268. z82' 298' 328> 38z>
405,415
Josephine, the Empress, divorce of, 309,
372
Jourdan, Marshal Jean Baptiste, with
Joseph in Spain, 216, 283 ; at Talavera,
236-7, 242 »., 243-5, 255>259 5 men-
tioned, 267, 277, z8i, 2.S4, 287-8
Joyeuse, Admiral Villaret, mentioned, 16
Jumelle, General, in Java, 614, 623, 626
Junca, British troops at, 475, 483
Junot, General Andoche, at Zaragoza,
107 ; operations in Aragon, 173-4 ;
superseded, 174, 469; in N. Spain,
405, 409, 463, 470 ; in the campaign
of 1810,487, 501-4; at Bussaco, 512,
526; in invasion of Portugal, 535-6,
544, 546 ; in retreat to Santarem, 549,
552-3; mentioned, 1 1 1, 138, 375 /; ,
427, 453- 466, 469
Junta, the Central, jealousy for Cadiz,
120-23, 287 j at Seville, 120, 359-60 ;
foolish plans of, 142, 219-20, 343-4,
346. 349-S°» 352> 354, 362 5 failings
of, 203, 207, 212, 283, 285 ; relations
with Wellington, 207-8, 282-3, 343,
352 ; and with Spanish generals, 185,
349; fall of, 351, 362; mentioned,
112, 1
!5i 263-4, 34°, 344, 361
Kadzand, Island of, its importance in the
Walcheren expedition, 62, 64, 66, 73-6,
77-%, 93 5 garrison of, 65, 73-4, 85, 94 ;
failure of British at, 74-5 ; mentioned,
r 60, 62, 77, 79, 80
Kapelle, British troops at, 72
Kattendyke, British troops at, 72
Keating, Lieutenant-colonel Samuel, takes
Bourbon and Rodriguez, 597-9 ; at
Mauritius, 602 if.
Keats, Rear-admiral Sir Richard, in the
Walcheren expedition, 57, 59, 61, 66--,
82
Kcllermann, General Francois Christophe,
in N. Spain, 178-80; recaptures Sala-
manca, 346-7 ; operations against del
Parque, 346-7, 350-51 ; mentioned, 344,
346, 370-71, 373
Kelso, Lieutenant - colonel Robert, at
Mauritius, 602 if.
Kemmis, Col. James, in Portugal, 1 1 5 n. ;
in the Talavera campaign, 201 11., 224 ;
at Bussaco, 509 11.
Kennedy, Commissary - general, in the
Peninsula, 427
Kleist, Ludwig, mission to England, 40-
43. 45-6, 48
Koudekerke, British troops at, 71
Krauchenberg, Captain Georg, in skirmish
on Azava, 472 ; at Villa de Puerco,
473-5 ; on the Coa, 478 if.
La Bafleza, French troops at, 408
La Bassce, mentioned, 544
644
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
La Bazagona, British troops at, 213
La Bisbal, French troops at, 101 ; skirmish
at, 388
La Calzada, mentioned, 213
La Carolina, Spanish troops at, 108, 344,
348, 354
Lacy, General, with Venegas, 263 ; in
Andalusia, 395-6, 488-9
La Guardia, Spanish troops at, 347
Lahoussaye, General, in Spain, 269
Lake, Gerard, Lord, mentioned, 624
La Mancha, French troops in, 107, 189,
373 ; mentioned, 287, 344, 358. For
the Army of, see under Spain
Lamarque, General, at Scilla, 320
Lamego, Portuguese troops at, 1525
British at, 165
Lamentin, British troops at, 13
Lane, Captain Henry B., in Portugal, 150 «.;
at Bussaco, 515, 517 n.
Langwerth, Colonel Ernst E. K. von, in
the Peninsula, 150 »., 201 n. ; at Tala-
vera, 23b »., 234-5 j death of, 257, 417
Lannes, Duke of Montebello, Marshal, in
Spain, 97, 107 ; death of, 38
Lansdowne, Marquis of. See under Petty
La Pena, General, mentioned, 97
Lapiche, mentioned, 220
Lapisse, General Pierre Belon, in Spain,
105, 114, i35"6> *38, J43 5 feeble
operations, 135-6 ; joins Victor, 143,
147, 186; at Talavera, 226, 230, 237,
245, 247, 249, 260 j death of, 249, 258
La Roca, skirmish at, 467
Larouco, French troops at, 183
Lasalle, General, in Spain, 97, 105, 109
La Solana, mentioned, 220
Latour-Maubourg, General Marie Charles,
Comte de, at Medellin, no; at
Gamonal, 213 ; at Talavera, 230, 237,
245 ; mentioned, 106, 108, 222
Laval, General, at Tortosa, 385-6
La Vendee, mentioned, 32
Lawson, Captain Robert, in Portugal,
150 n. ; at Talavera, 224, 228
Lazan, Marquis de, in Catalonia, 100-102 ;
in Aragon, 173-4
Leake, Major William, at Janinn, 306-7
Lecor, Colonel, in the defence of Portugal,
457-8, 504, 506, 510 n. ; in the retreat
to the Lines, 533
Ledesma, Spanish troops at, 346 ; French
at, 470
Leeward Islands. See under Indies, the W.
Lefebvre, Francois Joseph, Marshal, in
Spain, 97, 105, 109, 114, 116 ; super-
seded, 105
Leghorn, mentioned, 301
Leiria, British troops at, 140, 353, 537 ;
French at, 538 ; mentioned, 542, 556
Leite, General Francisco, at Eh as, 455
Leith, Major-general Sir James, in the
Walcheren expedition, 57 »., 88 ; in the
Peninsula, 417-18, 495; in the campaign
of 1810, 502, 504-5 ; at Bussaco, 509 n.,
510, 513-14, 519-20, 531 »., 532; in
the Lines, 542 ; pursuit of Massena,
55i» 553
Lena, French troops at, 179
Leon, French troops in, 178-80, 214, 277,
344, 347, 4°5, 4°7, 4^3, 49° ; taken
by Spanish, 407 ; mentioned, 285, 454
Leon, Island of (Cadiz), mentioned, 361,
366, 393, 403
Leonidas, H.M.S., mentioned, 313
Leopold of Naples, Prince, in the ex-
pedition to Ischia, 296, 300-301
Lerida, taken by Suchet, 383-4; French
troops at, 387-8 ; mentioned, 380-82
Leval, General Jean Francois, at Talavera,
245-7, 250, 255, 257-8
Levant, the, French influence in, 305-6 ;
mentioned, 607
Leveson - Gower, Granville, 1st Earl
Granville, mentioned, 327
Leveson - Gower, Major-general John,
mentioned, 420 n.
Lezarde R., British troops at, 14
Liefkenshoek, Fort, mentioned, 61, 81,
86, 95
Lightburne, Major-general Stafford, in the
Peninsula, 2.80, 418 ; at Bussaco, 509 ;:.,
.5H-I5, Sl7 »• .
Lillo, Fort, mentioned, 61, 63, 82, 86,
.94-5
Lima R., mentioned, 153
Linhares, Count of. See under Sousa
Linsingen, Major-general Charles von, in
the Walcheren expedition, 56 n.
Lisbon, British troops at, 33-4, 112, 1 1 5 n.,
190, 280, 290, 335, 426, 438, 499-500 ;
Cradock at, 115, 117; defence of,
137-9, 185, 335, 444, 535, 547 ; Well-
ington at, 336 ; its turbulent populace,
1 17-19, 141, 496-8, 546 ; as place of
embarkation, 442 ; geographical posi-
tion, 452 ; mentioned, 104-5, I08, I27,
135, H7, 184, 202, 205, 277, 359,
435, 536, 556
Liverpool, Robert Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of,
becomes Secretary for War, 328, 332-3;
his war policy, 336-7, 438-42, 448,
560-62; relations with Wellington, 336,
438, 442-9, 499-5oo, 559"6°5 men-
tioned, 91, 393,49!, 555
Llerena, Portuguese troops at, 147 ;
French at, 489, 495
Llobregat R., Spanish troops at, 102, 357 ;
French at, 103
Lobau, French troops at, 38, 55
INDEX
645
Lobo, Colonel Joao, at Abrantes, 455-6,
548
Logrono, French troops at, 405 ; men-
tioned, 356
Loison, General Louis Henri, Comte, in
Portugal, 143-4, i53» [S7 i in the
retreat from Portugal, 165-6, 168,
171 n. ; in N. Spain, 405-6, 408-9,
463 ; in right on the Coa, 479 ; at
Bussaco, 506, 523-5 ; before the Lines,
546; in retreat to Santarem, 552;
mentioned, 370
London, City of, political discontent,
330-31 ; attack on Wellington, 446
Lorca, taken by the French, 395
Lorge, General Jean Thomas, baron de,
in the Peninsula, 153, 269
L'Orient, mentioned, 17
Louis Philippe, due d'Orleans (afterwards
King of the French), in Sicily, 308-
10 ; at Cadiz, 403
Loures, British troops at, 137
Low, Colonel Sigismund, Baron von, in the
Peninsula, 150 »., 201 u. ; at Talavera,
230 ?;., 232-4 ; at Bussaco, 508 n.
Lowe, Colonel Hudson, at Zante, 303 ; at
Santa Maura, 312-3
Lugo, French troops at, 169, 178, 180-81,
183 ; siege of, 180; mentioned, 112
Lumiar, British troops at, 137
Lumley, Brigadier-general Sir William, in
the expedition to Ischia, 295 «., 297 ; in
the Peninsula, 418-19
Macdonald, Marshal Etienne, Duke of
Tarento, in Catalonia, 375 »., 382,
385-7 ; operations with Suchet, 387-90
Macdowall, General Hay, at Madras,
569; relations with Barlow, 571-3;
death of, 573 ; mentioned, 578, 591,
608
Macfarlane, Major-general Robert, in ex-
pedition to Ischia, 295 «., 297
M'Gregor, Dr., at Walcheren, 89 ; in the
Peninsula, 426
Mackenzie, Major-general Alexander, in
Portugal, 115 «., 118, 124, 137; at
Cadiz, 118, 120, 122-3, I3^> on tne
Tagus, 149, 150 n., 171, 186; in the
Talavera campaign, 200, 201 n., 216,
220-22; at Talavera, 225-8, 230,248-9 ;
death of, 257, 416 ; mentioned, 420
Mackinnon, Colonel Henry, at Bussaco,
509 »., 515
Maclean, Brigadier -general, in the W.
Indies, 20 n.
M'Leod, Lieutenant-colonel Alexander, in
expedition to Java, 622
McLeod, Major Charles, in fight on the
Coa, 480
McLeod, Lieutenant-colonel William, in
attack on Bourbon, 598 n. ; and
Mauritius, 602 n. ; in expedition to
Java, 619, 622 ; death of, 624
McNair, Lieutenant-colonel John, in the
W. Indies, 13 «.
Madden, Sir George Allan, with Portu-
guese troops, 496
Madeira, mentioned, 200
Madras, state of army, 565-8, 591-3 ;
discontent of officers, 568-70; mutiny
in, 578-88 ; officers' memorials, 573,
575, 580 ; their relations with Barlow,
571-6, 579-80, and with Minto, 575-7,
585, 590 ; the discontent general, 576,
581, 593-4; question of test, 581-3,
588-9 ; collapse of mutiny, 586-8 ;
Auchmuty at, 608 ; mentioned, 597,
601, 608-9
Madrid, lack of troops in, 106 ; march of
Venegas on, 209, 211, 218-20, 244,
262, 268, and of Eguia, 344-5, and of
Areizaga, 349 ; disaffection in, 262-3 ;
French garrison in, 216, 376; men-
tioned, 112, 139, 181, 185, 206, 208-9,
214, 266, 277, 282, 287-8, 350, 356,
360
Madridejos, French troops at, 107-8, 189,
208, 286 ; mentioned, 219-20, 264
Madura, mentioned, 606
Maestricht, mentioned, 94
Mafra, mentioned, 542
Magdeburg, mentioned, 41, 43
Magicienne, H.M.S., at Mauritius, 600
Mahon, Lieutenant-colonel Hon. Thomas,
in the Walcheren expedition, 56 n.
Mahrattas, the, mentioned, 563, 569
Mahy, General Nicolas, in Galicia, 177-8,
180, 407
Maimburg, Lieutenant Augustus, men-
tioned, 42
Maitland, General Thomas, in the attack
on Martinique, 12-17 ; and on the
Saints, 17-19; in Ceylon, 567, 570,
581, 597 ; opinions on Madras mutiny,
574, 582-3, 588, 594
Maitland, Lieutenant (E.I.C), at Masuli-
patam, 579-80
Majadas, British troops at, 213
Malacca, British troops at, 609
Malaga, taken by the French, 369, 373,
395 ; mentioned, 398, 401-2
Malagon, mentioned, 220
Malcolm, Lieutenant-colonel John, at
Masulipatam, 580-81, 585
Malpartida, French troops at, 272
Malta, mentioned, 32, 315, 317, 322, 440
Manchester, William, 5th Duke of, men-
tioned, 1 2 >:.
Mangualde, French troops at, 502
646
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Manresa, skirmish at, 381 ; Spanish
troops at, 377 ; French at, 379-80
Manzanares, Spanish troops at, 108, 220
Maqueda, mentioned, 263
Marbella, Spanish troops at, 396
Marchand, General Jean Gabriel, Comte,
in Spain, 112 ; repulse of, 345-6, 350 ;
at Bussaco, 525-6 ; in invasion of
Portugal, 538
Marcognet, General, at Bussaco, 526
Maria, Spanish defeat at, 175, 337
Marie Amelie of Naples, Princess (after-
wards Queen of the French), mentioned,
308
Mariegalante, captured by British, 9, 10,
2*
Marie Louise, Archduchess of Austria,
Empress of French, marriage of, 309,
372
Marlborough, John, 1st Duke of, men-
tioned, 423, 425, 544
Maronde R., mentioned, 611
Martede, British troops at, 153
Martin, Admiral, in the Mediterranean,
302
Martinhel, mentioned, 456
Martinique, British attack on, 12-17 5
troubles in, 26 ; mentioned, 2, 7, 1 1,
334
Martino, Cape, British troops at, 297
Massena, Andre, Marshal, Prince of
Essling, command in Portugal, 373,
376, 467 ; instructions to, 468 ; dilatory
movements, 471, 475, 487, 541, 556 ;
before Almeida, 492-3 ; advance to
Bussaco, 500-5065 at Bussaco, 512-13,
526-8 ; invades Portugal, 533-9, 544"5 ;
sacks Coimbra, 536-7 ; deserts his
wounded, 537-9 ; before the Lines,
544-8 ; retreat to Santarem, 548-55 ;
summary of his campaign, 555-8 ;
character of, 468-9 ; his difficulties of
supply, 494, 505, 545, 548, 550, 557 ;
mentioned, 456, 474, 485-6, 488, 554-5,
560
Masulipatam, mutiny at, 578-81, 586,
588-9
Matagorda (Cadiz), taken by the French,
391-45 mentioned, 367-8
Maucune, General, defeat of, 180; at
Bussaco, 525-6
Mauritius, Island of, captured by the
British, 602-5, 608 ; its privateers, 597
Mayne, Colonel, skirmish at Alcantara,
186
Mazzuchelli, General, in Catalonia, 377-8
Meade, Lieutenant-colonel Hon. John, at
Bussaco, 520
Meade, Major-general Hon. Robert, men-
tioned, 417
Mealhada, British troops at, 503, 505-6,
511-12, 535 ; Trant at, 538
Mecklenburg, mentioned, 43
Medellin, Spanish defeat at, 110, 135,
139, 185 ; Spanish troops at, 109, 363 ;
French at, 187
Medina del Campo, French troops at, 350
Mediterranean, garrisons in, 33 ; opera-
tions in, 291-323. See also under Sicily,
Naples, Ionian Islands, and Stuart, Sir
John
Meliskerke, British troops at, 70
Mellish, as scout, 415
Melville, Henry Dundas, Viscount, men-
tioned, 327
Melville, Commissary, mentioned, 218 n.
Membrilla, mentioned, 220
Mequinenza, taken by Suchet, 384-5 ;
mentioned, 173
Merida, French troops at, 105, 109-10,
135- *39> H3> H7, 185, ig7< 4'° 5
Spanish at, 186-7, 4&9> 496 ; British
at, 282
Merino, Geronimo, as guerilla, 356
Merle, General Pierre Hugues, Comte, at
Bussaco, 513-19, 521-2, 526
Merlin, General Antoine Francois, Comte,
in the Talavera campaign, 221-2, 230-
31. 245> 253
Mermet, General Julien Augustin, in the
Oporto campaign, 153, 155-8, 159-60,
164; at Ciudad Rodrigo, 466-7; at
Bussaco, 526
Mesas de Ibor, British troops at, 271-2 ;
Spanish at, 275, 283, 352 ; mentioned,
273, 276
Messina, mentioned, 296, 300-301, 309-
10, 316-18
Metternich, Clement, Count von, men-
tioned, 32
Mexico, mentioned, 12 n.
Mezaofrio, French troops at, 165
Miajadas, skirmish at, 109 ; British at,
282
Middelbur?, British troops at, 69-71, S4.
Migueletcs, the, in Catalonia, 98, 100-101,
103. 338>.357
Mijas, mentioned, 398, 402
Milans, General Francisco, in Catalonia,
101-2
Milazzo, mentioned, 295, 302
Mileto, mentioned, 293
Milhaud, General, in Spain, 108; at Tala-
vera, 245, 254-5 ; in Andalusia, 39-
Mili, mentioned, 318
Militia, the Regular, recruits the Army,
34-5, 334, 422 ; allowances in, 422-3 ;
lack of recruits for, 334 ; Caithness
Militia, 415
INDEX
647
Militia, the Local, strength in 1809, 34;
new proposals for, 34 ; falling off in,
.334
Miller, Colonel, mentioned, 457, 539
Milnes, Robert Pemberton (M.P.), men-
tioned, 330 n.
Milton, Lord, mentioned, 331
Mina, Francisco and Xavier, as guerillas,
356, 358
Minas, Marquis das, mentioned, 431, 433
Minho R., French troops on, 129-30,
138, 152; mentioned, 178
Minto, Gilbert Elliot, Earl of, governor-
general of India, 5645 relations with
Barlow, 573-4, 590-92, 595 ; and with
mutineers, 575-7, 585, 595 ; his de-
spatches, 574, 577-8, 588-91 ; at
Madras, 589 ; unsuccessful interven-
tion, 590-92 ; in the expedition to Java,
608, 61 1-13, 627
Miollis, General Sextius Alexandre, men-
tioned, 301
Mir, as guerilla, 358
Mirabete, Pass of, mentioned, 271
Miranda, Francesco, mentioned, 419
Miranda do Corvo, British troops at, 502
Misarella R., skirmish at, 168
Miseno, Cape, mentioned, 297-8
Missiessy, Admiral, in the Scheldt, 45,
65"6, 73
Moguer, French troops at, 411
Moimenta da Beira, mentioned, 502, 504
Moira, Francis Rawdon Hastings, Earl of,
mentioned, 332
Moita, British troops at, 502
Molins de Rey, Spanish troops at, 102
Molucca Islands, captured by the British,
605-6
Moncey, Marshal Bon Adrien de, Duke
of Conegliano, at Zaragoza, 107
Mondego R., British troops on, 353,
456-7, 493, 502-3, 505, 533, 536 5
mentioned, 453, 487, 501, 506-7, 554
Monesterio, Spanish troops at, 1 10
Monforte, French troops at, 182-3
Moniteur, Le, mentioned, 486
Monnet, General Louis Claude, Baron, at
Flushing, 78-80
Montachique, mentioned, 542
Montagne Longue (Mauritius), mentioned,
604
Montalegre, French troops at, 168-70 ;
British at, 171
Montblanch, French troops at, 173
Montbnin, General Louis Pierre, in in-
vasion of Portugal, 537, 544, 548
Monte de Agraca, mentioned, 541-2, 544
Montefurado, French troops at, 183
Monteleone, mentioned, 293, 300
Monterrey, French troops at, 131
Montresor, Colonel Henry T., in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 k.
Montresor, Colonel (E.I.C.), at Hyderabad,
583-5
Monzon, taken by French, 173 ; French
defeat at, 174
Moore, General Sir John, opinion on
Spanish war, 112; and on defence of
Portugal, 124, 126-8, 444 ; his cam-
paign in Spain mentioned, 28-9, 33, 45,
97, I07, "3, '!5-18, 120-21, 137-8,
142, 152, 169 >:., 170, 177, 184, 191,
203, 285-6, 331, 356, 422-4, 433;
mentioned, 193, 321, 326, 412, 459
Moore, Commissary, mentioned, 218 n.
Mora, French troops at, 386
Moraleja, mentioned, 205, 280
Morea, mentioned, 306
Morella, taken by the French, 385 ; men-
tioned, 386
Morillo, mentioned, 410
Morne Bruneau (Martinique), action at,
14; mentioned, 13, 15
Mortagoa, British troops at, 503-6, 508,
51 1 j French at, 512-13
Mortier, Edouard, Marshal, Duke of
Treviso, at Zaragoza, 107 ; in Aragon,
173-4; at Valladolid, 188, 206; in-
fluence on Talavcra campaign, 209,
214-15, 219; on the Tagus, 26S-73,
277; in Andalusia, 405, 409-11,488,
545 ; defeats Romana, 496 ; at Bada-
joz, 410, 462 ; mentioned, 178-9, 181,
210, 281, 343, 344, 347, 375 ?!., 463
Mostoles, mentioned, 263
Motril, taken by the Spanish, 397
Moura, mentioned, 507 n., 513, 523, 525
Moya, mentioned, 379
Muela de San Juan, mentioned, 358
Mulgrave, Henry Phipps, Earl of, men-
tioned, 194, 328
Munro, Lieutenant-colonel (E.I.C.), at
Madras, 570-72, 575
Murat, Joachim, King of Naples, prepara-
tions against Sicily, 291, 300, 314-17;
attacks Sicily, 318-21; relations with
Napoleon, 316 ; at Naples, 297-9, 314,
320 ; mentioned, 292, 301, 328
Murcia, Spanish troops in, 369, 394-6 ;
defeat of Blake in, 397
Murray, George, Colonel, Q.M.G. in the
Peninsula, 412, 413-14
Murray, Commissary -general, in the
Peninsula, 427
Murray, Major-general John, in Portugal,
150 «., 154; at Oporto, 159, 161-2, 164;
pursues Soult, 166 ; his inefficiency,
161 ; returns home, 200-201, 417
Mustapha, Sultan, mentioned, 306
Mysore, mutiny in, 587
648
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Nalon R., mentioned, 406-7
Napier, Major Charles, in the fight on the
Coa, 480-81 ; at Bussaco, 527
Napier, Captain George, at Bussaco, 525 ;;.,
526,530
Napier, Captain William, at the Coa, 482 ;
at Bussaco, 526
Naples, British expedition against, 294-
302 ; ferment in, 299-300 ; Neapolitan
troops with the British, 295-6. See also
under Murat, and under Sicily.
Napoleon I., Emperor of the French, war
with Austria, 32, 36-8, 50, 55, 174, 285,
290, 294, 301 ; relations with Tsar,
35-6, 306, 309, 607 ; with Papacy, 37,
301 ; with Turkey, 306-8 ; acquisitions
from Austria, 305, 328 ; new Mediter-
ranean policy, 305-6; intrigues with
Queen of Naples, 309, 315 ; his divorce
and re-marriage, 309, 329, 372; failure
of powers, 329 ; anxiety for Walcheren,
46, 49, 63, 75, 96; E. Indian plans,
606 ; his plans of campaign for Spain,
104-5, !o8, in, 134, 143, 176-7, 188,
214, 277, 285, 288, 338-9, 380, 382,
385, 387, 405, 468, 488 ; movement of
troops in Spain, 97, 99, 374-6 ; mis-
comprehension of Spanish feeling, 105,
148, 176, 188 ; plans for expulsion of
British, 184, 188, 290, 335, 365 ;
criticism of operations in Spain, 288,
365-6; Spanish financial policy, 370-71 ;
plans for 1810, 374-6; his increased
caution, 335, 405, 468 ; forms a reserve
corps, 375, 405 ; proposed journey to
Spain, 359, 372 ; disaffection in army,
144 ; relations with Joseph, 260, 284,
288, 360, 367, 370-73 ; and with the
marshals, 105, 174 «., 184, 237, 260,
283, 316, 360, 370-71, 382-3,469, 545 ;
Foy's mission to, 547 ; his tactics, 151 ;
his mistakes, 184, 372, 380,469 ; con-
tempt of transport and supply, 358-9,
382 ; treatment of prisoners, 16, 343,
493 ; mentioned, 2, 5, 13, 28, 43, 48,
52, 63, 163, 184, 206, 284, 290, 336,
361, 415, 45°. 468, 488, 557, 602, 629
Narcea R., mentioned, 407
Nassau (Bahama Islands), mentioned, 5
Naval Carnero, French troops at, 219,
286
Naval Moral, Spanish troops at, 213 ;
French at, 273, 277 ; mentioned, 265,
268-9, 272
Navamorcuende, British at, 211
Navarre, mentioned, 371, 376
Navia R., mentioned, 407-8
Navia de Suarna, mentioned, 178
Navy, the British, in the W. Indies, 2, 9,
11, 19 ; in the expedition to Wal-
cheren, 55, 57-8, 74, 85-6, 93, 95 ; off
French coast, 63 ; in the Mediter-
ranean, 293, 316, 320; off Naples,
208-9 > at Cadiz, 367 ; at Barcelona,
376 ; at Mauritius, 599-603 ; in the
Dutch E. Indies, 605-6 ; in expedition
to Java, 610-11, 617, 626; influence on
Spanish War, 99-100, 182, 184, 390 ;
relations with Army in time of war,
304, 607 ; thirst for prize-money, 10,
25, 600, 607 ; mentioned, 192
Negapatam, mentioned, 582
Nelson, Horatio, Viscount, mentioned, 3,
441, 600
Nereide, H.M.S., at Mauritius, 600
New Providence, mentioned, 5
Ney, Michel, Marshal, Duke of Elchingen,
in Galicia, 104, 107, 112, 130, 134,
169, 203, 205, 287; operations in N.
Spain, 176-83, 188, 206 ; quarrel with
Soult, 180-81, 183, 277,283-5; evacu-
ates Galicia, 183, 203, 212 ; influence
on Talavera campaign, 209, 212, 215,
219, 287 ; operations with Soult on the
Tagus, 266-9, 272, 274-7, 356; end
of campaign, 277-8, 281 ; at Ciudad
Rodrigo, 409, 463, 466, 470 ; operations
against Craufurd, 475-6; fight on the
Coa, 476-86 ; at Almeida, 491 ; advance
to Bussaco, 501-4; at Bussaco, 511-12,
522-6, 528-9 n. ; in invasion of Portugal,
533> 535? 537 5 in retreat to Santarem,
548-9, 552 ; mentioned, 344-5, 371,
373, 375 *•> 405, 469, 475
Nicholson, Colonel Robert, mentioned,
12 n.
Nightingall, Colonel Miles, mentioned,
417
Nisus, H.M.S., at Mauritius, 601-2
Niza, mentioned, 458
Nogueira, Dr. Raymundo, mentioned, 490
Nolle, British troops at, 71
Nora R., mentioned, 178
Norofia, General, in N. Spain, 182
Nossa Senhora do Monte, mentioned, 509
Obidos, British troops at, 139
Ocafia, fighting at, 349-50; French
troops at, 108, 347; mentioned, 219,
348
Ocreza R., mentioned, 453
O'Donnell, General Carlos, in Estre-
madura, 410-1 1
O'Donnell, General Henry, operations in
Catalonia, 377-82, 386-90 ; defeated at
Lerida, 383-4 ; mentioned, 385
O'Donoju, General, in the Talavera cam-
paign, 208, 212, 217-18, 228, 267-8
Ogilvie, Mr., Commissary, in the Penin-
sula, 426
INDEX
649
O'Hara, Captain Peter, in the fight on the
Coa, 478-9
Oitaber R., skirmish on, 182
Olhao, Marquis de, mentioned, 431
Oliva, French troops at, 269
Oliveira, British troops at, 155
Oiivenza, British troops at, 282 ; French
at, 410 ; Spanish at, 410-11, 489
Oporto, French advance on, 132-4 5 sack
of, 134; anarchy in, 133-4, 1395
French troops in, 143-4, J47> J53>
157-8 j British advance on, 147-57 ;
taken by British, 50, 158-63 ; retreat of
French from, 164-71 ; British troops
in, 115 s., 118 ; British loan from, 196;
mentioned, 104-5, m, 116, 132, 496-
98, 5<>3> 5"; 534. 539, 556-7
Oporto, Antonio de Castro, Patriarch of,
in defence of Oporto, 114, 131, 134,
139 j as member of the Regency, 431,
434. 497, 498, 559
Orense, Spanish troops at, 112; French
at, 130, 169-70, 180-81
Orleans, mentioned, 374
Orleans, Duke of. See under Louis
Philippe
Oropesa, British troops at, 213, 259, 265,
267 ; Spanish at, 268, 271-2 ; French
at, 405
Oswald, Colonel John, in expedition to
Ischia, 295 n., 298 ; takes Zante and
Cephallonia, 302-3, 307-8 j and Santa
Maura, 311-14
Otta, French troops at, 545
Otway, Rear-admiral Sir R. W., in Wal-
cheren expedition, 57, 62
Ovar, British troops at, 154-5, J57
Oviedo, taken by French, 179-80, 406,
408 ; Spanish at, 177-8, 344, 406-7
Owen, Commodore, in Walcheren ex-
pedition, 62, 65 73-4, 76
Pack, Lieutenant -colonel Denis, in the
Walcheren expedition, 68, 79 ; in the
Peninsula, 502-3 ; at Bussaco, 510, 526 ;
in the Lines, 542 ; pursuit of Massena,
55°, 553
Paco d'Arcos, mentioned, 336
Paget, Major-general Hon. Edward, in
Portugal, 149 »., 153 «., 154-55 at
Oporto, 159-60; mentioned, 200,
418
Paget, Lieutenant-general Henry, Lord, in
the Walcheren expedition, 68, 70 «., 71
Pajar de Vergara, mentioned, 224, 228,
245-6
Pajares, Pass of, mentioned, 178-80, 407-S
Pakenham, Colonel, at Martinique, 14
Pakenham, Lieutenant -colonel Hon. E.
M., at Bussaco, 508 «., 510
Palacio, Marquis del, in Catalonia, 98 ;
La Mancha, 107 ; mentioned, 108
Palafox, General Don Joseph, at Zara-
goza, 107 ; mentioned, 97
Palamcottah, mentioned, 582
Palanque, British troops at, 6
Palembang, British troops at, 628
Palencia, French troops in, 371, 376
Palermo, British troops at, 44, 310 ; men-
tioned, 292, 301, 308, 315
Palheiros, mentioned, 508, 510, 513
Palmases, mentioned, 508
Palmerston, Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount,
Secretary at War, 328, 333 ; mentioned,
327, 330 n.
Palmi, French attack on, 300
Palmiste, mentioned, 22
Pamplona, mentioned, 356-S
Parga, taken by the French, 307
Partonneaux, General, at Scilla, 299-300
Pater, Major-general John, at Masuli-
patam, 586-8
Patrick, Colonel, mentioned, 144
Pavoa de Lanhoso, French troops at, 167
Payne, Major-general William, in Tala-
vera campaign, 201 n., 218 n.
Peacock, Colonel, mentioned, 201 «.,
427 n., 439 n., 500 n.
Pedro do Sul, mentioned, 503
Peel, Robert, mentioned, 328
Pelorus, H.M.S., mentioned, I 5
Penacova, mentioned, 503, 505
Penafiel, British troops at, 166; men-
tioned, 132
Penamacor, French troops at, 488, 495
Ptnang, mentioned, 609
Peniche, mentioned, 336, 443-4, 456
Pepys, Sir Lucas, misconduct of, 90
Peraleda de Garbin, British troops at, 271,
275
Perales, French troops at, 143, 487-8 ;
Wilson at, 278 ; British at, 280 ; men-
tioned, 206, 209, 267, 459
Perceval, Spencer, becomes premier, 326-8,
446 ; supports the war, 437, 447 ; re-
lations with Canning, 53-4, 324-5,
and with Wellington, 437, 560 ;
character of, 330, 560 ; mentioned,
333
Perena, as guerilla leader, 357
Pernes, French troops at, 552
Pero Negro, British at, 542
Perpignan, mentioned, 98-9, 341, 376,
390
Peso da Regoa, skirmish at, 165
Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt, 3rd
Earl, mentioned, 42, 135
Petrizcl, mentioned, 22
Petty, Lord Henry (afterwards Marquis
of Lansdowne), mentioned, 29
650
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Pezzo, Murat at, 317-19
Picton, Major-general Thomas, in the Wal-
cheren expedition, 56 »., 68 n., 70 ».,
81, 88 ; in the Peninsula, 417-19 • in
defence of Portugal, 463, 487, 492,
558 ; in the Bussaco campaign, 503,
505 ; at Bussaco, 509 n., 510, 513-16,
518 »., 519-20, 528, 532; in the
Lines, 542 ; relations with Wellington,
420-21, and with Craufurd, 485
Picton, Lieutenant-colonel William, at
Maurtius, 601 n.
Pigeon Island, British troops at, 13-14
Pigot, Lord, mentioned, 567
Pinhel, British troops at, 457, 469, 481 ».,
487 ; French at, 500-501 ; mentioned,
454, 500
Pino, General, in Spain, 99, 102, 104,
.379
Piracy, in the W. Indies, 2, 19, 25 ; in
Mauritius, 597
Pitt, William, military policy, 1, 52, 322,
441, 448, 558, 561-2, 607 ; mentioned,
5S» 59. 330
Placido, mentioned, 318
Pla de Cabra, French troops at, 104
Plasencia, French troops at, 187, 215-16,
244, 266, 269, 272, 277, 280-81, 287,
463, 487 ; British at, 206, 212, 271 ;
mentioned, 202, 206, 211, 277
Ponferrada, mentioned, 112, 177
Policastro, mentioned, 296
Pombal, British at, 537 ; skirmish at, 538
Pompee, H.M.S., mentioned, 14
Ponsonby, Major Hon. F. C, at Talavera,
253"4
Ponsul R., mentioned, 453
Ponte de Murcella, mentioned, 456, 502-3,
505-6
Ponte Nova, skirmish at, 167-9
Pontevedra, French at, 183
Ponte Zuazo (Cadiz), mentioned, 366,
391* 393
Poonah, mentioned, 584-5
Pope, the, Pius VII., deposed by Napoleon,
37, 3°i
Popham, Captain Sir Home (R.N.), in the
Walcheren expedition, 58, 67-8, 78, 80,
82, 93 ; mentioned, 5, 51
Porbeck, General van, death of, 258
Porchester, Henry George, Viscount,
afterwards 3rd Earl of Carnarvon, in
Parliament, 332
Porlier, Juan Diaz, in Asturias, 406
Port Louis (Mauritius), mentioned, .600-
601 ■ attack on, 603-4
Port Ste. Marie (Guadeloupe), mentioned,
21
Portalegre, British troops at, 282, 410,
463
Portifia R., battle on, 223-5, 232> 234"5>
241-2, 248, 252
Portland, William Henry, 3rd Duke of,
troubles in his Cabinet, 45-7, 53-4,
325 ; illness of, 324, 326 ; resignation,
325
Portsmouth, mentioned, 55, 200, 368
Portugal, defence of, 44, 113, 124-9, !49>
189, 203, 315, 329, 332, 335-7, 443,
455-7, 555 ; French invasions of, 104-5,
in, 129-36, 214, 219, 280-81, 328,
454, 468, 500-506, 533-55 ; British
troops for, 46, 51, 129, 145, 439-40;
distribution of British troops in, 115 n.,
457 j regular army of, 1 13-14, 124-5,
131-2, 153, 430, 465, 504, 527 ; army
reforms, 125-6, 145, 332, 335, 427-31,
443 ; numbers of army in 18 10, 430 ;
troops change sides, 132, 493 ; Portu-
guese troops in Cadiz, 368, and in the
Lines, 543 ; militia of, 430, 545 ; the
levy, 430-31 ; military geography of
Portugal, 451-5 ; bad roads, 197, 453,
501, 557 ; difficulties of supply and
transport, 116, 137, 146, 197, 211,
427, 545 ; exhaustion of country, 138,
140, 433; financial difficulties, 431 ;
peasant warfare, 130, 170, 550, 557;
treatment of French wounded, 539,
550 ; attitude to British, 422 ; weak-
ness and folly of Regency, 1 13-15, 117-
19, 136, 428, 432; and its relations
with Wellington, 431-4, 490, 493,
496-8, 535, 559; the Prince Regent,
432-4; interference from Brazil, 432-4,
490; British subsidy, 431, 433-6;
French Army of, 373, 376, 405,
467-8
Pressburg, Treaty of, mentioned, 306
Prevesa, mentioned, 307, 314
Prevost, Major-general Sir George, in
Martinique, 12-17
Procida, taken by British, 297-8 ; evacu-
ated, 301-2
Prussia, relations with France, 38-41 ;
with Austria, 38-40, 48 ; with England,
39-43, 52 ; risings in, 42-3 ; unstable
policy, 48, 51, 329 ; mentioned, 459.
See also under Frederick William III.
Puebla de Sanabria, Spanish troops at,
'31) I77, 49°5 French at, 183, 490
Puente del Conde, mentioned, 109
Puerto Santa Maria, mentioned, 122,
146 n.
Puigcerda, mentioned, 388
Pulteney, General Sir James, mentioned,
*93
Punhete, French troops at, 548, 554
Puntales (Cadiz), mentioned, 367, 391,
393-4
INDEX
6ji
Quiberon Bay,. mentioned, 16
Quilon, mentioned, 588
Ouintella, mentioned, 542
Ragusa, French troops at, 305
Rajpootana, mentioned, 563, 608
Ramirez, General Sanchez, in the W.
Indies, 6
Rammekens, British troops at, 72, 76, 81
Ratisbon, taken by the French, 37, 293
Rawlings, Commissary, mentioned, 140 n.
Read, Captain Thomas, in the Mediter-
ranean, 298, 316
Recruiting. See under Army, the Regular
Reding, General Teodoro, in Catalonia,
101-4; death of, 104; mentioned,
338-9
Redondo, Count of, mentioned, 490
Reggio, French troops in, 293, 316, 320
Regiments, British : —
Cavalry —
Third Dragoon Guards (Prince of
Wales's Regt.), 129 »., 145;;., 149 n.,
201 »., 510 ».
First or Royal Dragoons, 129 n., 190,
510 n.
Third or King's Own Dragoons, 56 n.
Fourth or Queen's Own Dragoons, 129;;.,
145 n., 149 n., 201 >:., 5 IO «., 511
Ninth Light Dragoons, 56 «., 8i
Tenth Hussars, 415
Twelfth Light Dragoons, 56 n.
Thirteenth Light Dragoons, 394, 439 ».,
491 »., 500, 510 «., 551
Fourteenth Light Dragoons, 115 n.,
116 «., 137, 145 »., 149 »., 152 ft.,
153 «., 159, 162, 164, 171, 201 «.,
225 n., 257, 472 ;;., 473, 510 n.
Sixteenth Light Dragoon*, 129 n., 145 «.,
149 n., 155-6, 201 ;:., 225 ti., 415,
471, 472 »., 473-4, 510 »., 539, 550
Twentieth Light Dragoons, 113 «.,
115 »., 145 n., 149 n., 156, 200,
295 «., 302 «., 311 »., 318
Twenty-second Light Dragoons, 608 «.,
609 »., 615, 619 «., 620, 623, 625,
626 n.
Twenty-third Light Dragoons. 145 ».,
197, 200, 201 11., 211, 251-4
Twenty -fifth Light Dragoons, 5875
602 71.
Royal Engineers, 295 «., 302 r.., 311 ».,
336> 543
Artillery —
Royal Horse Artillery (general), 200,
439 n., 510 «., 539, 608 k., 620,
625
The Chestnut Troop, 200, 265, 471,
478, 481, 511 «., 523, 526, 532
Royal Artillery (general), 6-S /;., 12 ..
17 /;., 20 «., 25 n., 57 »., 70 n., 115 rc.,
118 «., 137, 145 n., 150 »., 200, 205,
295 »., 302 »., 311 »., 368, 392-3 ».,
440 »., 500, 509 «., 530-2, 609 «.,
618, 626 n.
Royal Waggon Train, 145 «., 333
Infantry —
First (or Grenadier) Guards, 57 «.,
72 »., 392 ».
Second (or Coldstream) Guards, 57 ».,
120 »., 145 ».'., 150 «., 161, 168,
201 n., 225, 228, 248-9, 257, 259,
392 n., 508 «.
Third (or Scots) Guards, 57 n., 120 «.,
145 »., 150 n., 201 »., 225, 228,
248-9, 257, 259, 392 «., 50S «.
L/'«f Regiments —
First Foot (Royal Scots), 56 n., 68 «.,
70 71., 78 »., 79 «., 439 »., 509 «.,
531 K.
Second Foot (Queen's), 57 n.
Third Foot (Buffs), 116, 118 n., 145 «.,
150 7i., 159, 201 «., 233, 508 71.
Fourth Foot, 57 «., 392, 415, 500
Fifth Foot, 56 71., 68 /;., 70 «., 78 ;..,
190 »., 212 *., 232-3, 509 »., 515
Sixth Foot, 56 n., 88
Seventh Foot, 12 n., 14, 15 »., 16,
129 «., 139 «., 145 n., 150 >:., 201 /:.,
224 n., 232, 247, 440 n., 491 K.,
503 »., 508 n., 509 ».
Eighth Foot, 12 ti., 15 «., 56 n., 491 ;;.
Ninth Foot, 56 n., 1 1 3 «., 1 1 5 «., 1 1 6 «.,
118 «., 145 »., 150 71., 200 «., 439 «.,
509 71., 520-21
Tenth Foot, 295 «., 296, 317 ft.
Eleventh Foot, 7 n., 57 n., 200, 415,
438 »., 509 «.
Twelfth Foot, 570 »., 597-8 »., 601-2 «.,
605
Thirteenth Foot, 12, 20 «.
Fourteenth Foot, 56 11., 68 r.., 70 r..,
317 »., 602 »., 608-9 "•> 610, 619 «•,
620, 624, 626 71., 628
Fifteenth Foot, 8 n., 13 »., 20 «.
Eighteenth Foot (Royal Irish), 4, 5 «.,
6».
Nineteenth Foot, 570 «., 588
Twentieth Foot, 57 n.
Twenty-first Foot, 298, 300, 315 7:.,
318-19, 440 71., 519
Twenty-second Foot, 601 n.
Twenty-third Foot, 12 »., 14. 15 ..
16, 56 ;/., 67 n., 70 /!., 88, 440 ;:.,
491 11.
Twenty- fourth Foot, 129 n., 145 ;;.,
149 n., 201 »., 249, 257, 508 n.
Twenty-fifth Foot, 12 n., 20 /:., 25 n.
Twenty-sixth Foot, 56 «., 67 n., 70 «.
652
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Line Regiments —
Twenty-seventh Foot, 113 «., 115-167;.,
1 18 n., 145-6 n., 149 »., 150 »., 295 n.,
298, 316, 509 n.
Twenty - eighth Foot, 57 «., 150 w.,
190 »., 508 n.
Twenty-ninth Foot, 115 n., 118 «.,
145 *., 150 «., 161, 201 «., 233-5,
236 «., 237, 239, 240 «., 508 «.
Thirtieth Foot, 129 «., 139 »., 145 ».,
200 »., 394, 440 «., 500, 583
Thirty-first Foot, 115 n., 118 «., 145 «.,
149 »., 150 «., 201 «., 227, 249, 257,
315 n., 317,440 »., 508 «.
Thirty-second Foot, 56 ;;., 68 n., 70 «.
Thirty-third Foot, 584, 597-8 n., 602 n.
Thirty-fourth Foot, 190 «., 508 n.
Thirty-fifth Foot, 56 n., 68 ;;., 70 «.,
78 a, 303 «., 311 ".,313
Thirty-sixth Foot, 56 »., 68 n., 70 n.
Thirty-eighth, 56 ;;., 150 ;:., 439 ».,
509 »., 520-21
Thirty-ninth Foot, 190 »., 315 «., 317,
44O «., 508 77.
Fortieth Foot, 115 »., 118, 123, 137, 139,
145 n., 200, 201 n., 224, 247,438 tz.,
509 n.
Forty-second Foot, 56 «., 190 77., 508 ».
Forty-third Foot, 56 n., 150, 200 «.,
459 "•> 472 "-, 478-80, 482, 509 n.,
522, 524-7
Forty -fourth Foot, 295 ?z., 303 n.,
392 «., 440 n., 500
Forty-fifth Foot, 115 «., 118 «., 145 ».,
149 77., 150 tz., 201 »., 227, 249, 257,
509 »., 515-16, 518, 520, 527, 530
Forty-sixth Foot, 8, 13 n.
Forty-seventh Foot, 190 n.
Forty-eighth Foot, 129 «., 139 «., 145 77.,
150 ;;., 160, 190 n., 200, 201 «., 211,
.233, 235, 239 n., 249, 508 n.
Fiftieth Foot, 56 «., 500
Fifty-first Foot, 56 n., 68 «., 70 n.
Fifty-second Foot, 56 n., 150, 200 «.,
459 "•» 472 «•, 478"83» 5°9 »•» 522>
524-5, 527, 530
Fifty-third Foot, 129 a., 139 »., 145 «.,
150 «., 201 n., 224 «., 509 n.
Fifty-fourth Foot, 5«., 6 ».
Fifty-fifth Foot, 5 n., 6 n.
Fifty-sixth Foot, 597, 598, 602 n.
Fifty-seventh Foot, 190 «., 438 n., 508 n.
Fifty-eighth Foot, 212 n., 295 «.
Fifty-ninth Foot, 57 n., 601 n., 608-9 ;;.,
617, 619, 622, 624, 628
Sixtieth (Royal Americans) battalions
1st, 4th, and 6th, 1, 5/2., 6 n., 8 ».,
12 «., 17 «., 18, 20, 26
Sixtieth Foot, 5th battalion, 113 n.,
"5 »•> 137, H5 "•. 15° »■> JS2 "•>
191 n., 201 ??., 226-7, 46° n., 508-9 k. ,
516
Sixty-first Foot, 190 n., 200, 201 n.,
211, 257, 438 n., 508 «.
Sixty-second Foot, 295 n.
Sixty-third Foot, 13 «., 15, 20 »., 56 n.,
68 »., 70 n.
Sixty-fifth Foot, 602 n.
Sixty-sixth Foot, 129 n., 139 n., 145 ».,
150 n., 160, 201 n., 508 ».
Sixty-eighth Foot, 56 »., 67 n., 70 ».,
7i
Sixty-ninth Foot, 570 n., 597-8 «., 601,
602 n., 609 k., 617, 619-20, 622,
624
Seventieth Foot, 7 »., 8 w.
Seventy-first Foot, 56 »., 67 »., 68,
70 »., 81, 500, 544
Seventy-fourth Foot, 438 «., 509 «.,
d^-^, 5!9
Seventy-sixth Foot, 57 ??., 624
Seventy-seventh Foot, 56 n., 68 n.,
70 «.
Seventy-eighth Foot, 609 «., 619, 626 a.,
628
Seventy-ninth Foot, 57 n., 368, 391 ;:.,
438 n., 440 n., 491 «., 499, 503 n.,
508 ».
Eightieth Foot, 570 n.
Eighty-first Foot, 56 n., 67 n., 70 n.,
295 «., 297
Eighty-second Foot, 56 n., 68 «., 70 11.,
400, 403
Eighty-third Foot, 120 n., 129 «., 139 n.,
145 «., 150 >:., 201 «., 257, 499,
509 «., 515 ».
Eighty-fourth Foot, 57 n., 602 «.
Eighty-fifth Foot, 56 n., 67 »., 70 n.,
7i
Eighty-sixth Foot, 597-8 «., 599, 601
Eighty-seventh Foot, 120 «., 145 n.,
150 n., 152 »., 191, 200 n., 201 «.,
226-7, 368, 440 «., 601 n.
Eighty-eighth Foot, 120 n., 145 «.,
150 ?z., 152 n., 190 ?;., 191, 201 n.,
226-7, 368, 440 ?;., 499, 5097;., 515,
517-18, 521 n., 527, 530
Eighty-ninth Foot, 397, 400, 401 ».,
601 n., 608 «., 610, 615, 619 n.
Ninetieth Foot, 13, 20 n.
Ninety-first Foot, 56 n.
Ninety-second Foot, 57 n. ,72 »., 150 «.,
500
Old Ninety-fourth Foot, 36S, 391 n.,
393 »■> 438 "■> 44° «••. 491 »•> 5°°
Ninety-fifth Foot. See Rifle Brigade
Old Ninety-seventh Foot, 115 n., 118 >:.,
145 »., 150 n. , 201 n., 224 n., 416,
509 K.
Old Ninety-ninth Foot, 5
INDEX
653
Line Regiments —
One Hundred and Second Foot, 578,
586, 605, 608 n.
Rifle Brigade (Old Ninety-fifth Foot), 9,
56 n., 67 «., 70 n., 150, 152, 200 n.,
392 n., 440 n., 459 n., 464-5, 472 «., I
478, 480-82, 500, 509 n., 523
Royal Staff' Corps, 57 «., 70 «., 145 «.,
257, 295 n.
Regiments [Native), In,li.i
Bengal Artillery, 609 v., 626 n.
Madras Artillery, 597, 605
Infantry —
Twentieth (afterwards Twenty -fifth)
Bengal Native Infantry, 609-10 n.
Sixth Madras Native Infantry, 598 n.,
602 n.
Twelfth Madras Native Infantry, 598 ».,
602 n.
Sixteenth Madras Native Infantry, 584
Nineteenth Madras Native Infantry,
580
Regiments (Native), W. Indies
First West India Regiment, 8 >;., 12 r..,
14, 15 n., 20 n.
Second West India Regiment, 3, 5 n.,
6 «., 20 n.
Third West India Regiment, 8, 10, 13,
17 «., 19-20 n.
Fourth West India Regiment, 12 n.,
20 71., 25 «.
Sixth West India Regiment, 20 n.
Seventh West India Regiment, 6 n.
Eighth West India Regiment, 13 «.,
17 n., 19-20 n.
Regiments [Foreign, in British Service)
Watteville's, 295 n.
York Light Infantry Volunteers, 1 3 ».,
20 n., 26
Royal York Rangers, 13, 13 n., 17 «.,
20 n., 23-4, 26,
West India Rangers, 26
Corsican Rangers, 295 »., 297, 303 «.,
311 »., 313
Chasseurs Britanniques, 296, 315 n.,
320 «., 440 n.
De Roll's, 311 n., 313 n.
Calabrian Free Corps, 3 1 1 ;:.
Greek Light Infantry, 311 >:., 312
Brunswick-Oels Infantry, 499-500
Lusitanian Legion, 113-14, 133, 135,
186, 509 n., 510, 520
King's German Legion
Artillery, 145 n., 1 50 n., 254, 5 10 >:.,
51 1 n.
Cavalry —
First Light Dragoons, 129 «., 145 >;.,
201 n., 251-4, 463-4, 471-2, 510 n.,
535-6, 539
Second Light Dragoons, 56 n., 81,
394
Third Light Dragoons, 149 ,:., 200
Infantry —
First Light Battalion, 56 ;;., 150 n.
Second Light Battalion, 56 »., 150 n.
First Line Battalion, 113 r.., 115 n.,
145 n., 150 »., 159, 201 *., 229. 257,
508 n.
Second Line Battalion, 113 n., 1 1 5 .,
145 n., 150 «., 201 n., 229, 257,
508 n.
Third Line Battalion, 295 «., 318
Fourth Line Battalion, 295 n.
Fifth Line Battalion, 115 r.., 145 n.,
150 «., 201 n., 229, 241, 508 n. '
Sixth Line Battalion, 295 «.
Seventh Line Battalion, 115 »., 1^5 ?;.,
150 n., 201 »., 229, 508 >:.
(General References), 33, 156, 225, 229,
230 n., 232-4, 248-9, 256, 298, 510
Regiments (Portuguese)
1st Cacadores, 47S-9, 482 n., 509 n.,
522-3
2nd Cacadores, 510 11.
3rd Cacadores, 478-9, 4S2 >;., 509 n.,
523
4th Cacadores, 510 n.
6th Cacadores, 510 n.
1st Line Regiment, 510 n.
2nd Line Regiment, 508 n.
3rd Line Regiment, 509 n.
4th Line Regiment, 508 n., 527
6th Line Regiment, 510 ;;.
7th Line Regiment, 510 n.
8th Line Regiment, 509 r.., 514, 516-20,
527
9th Line Regiment, 509 ;;., 519-20
10th Line Regiment, 508 n.
nth Line Regiment, 509 ;:.
14th Line Regiment, 508 n.
15th Line Regiment, 509 n.
1 6th Line Regiment, 510 n.
18th Line Regiment, 510 n.
19th Line Regiment, 510 n., 524
21st Line Regiment, 509 n., 519
23rd Line Regiment, 509 n.
Regiments (Frenc/i\
Artillery, 237-8, 513, 5 1 5, 5 1-
Joseph's Guards, 238, 245, 255
2nd Light Infantry, 513 n., 514, 517
4th Light Infantry, 169, 513 >:., 514,
5'7
654
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Regiments {French)
9th Light Infantry, 232-5, 239-41,
242 «., 245, 250
16th Light Infantry, 247 n.
17th Light Infantry, 160,495//., 5*3 "■»
519
27th Light Infantry, 251-3
31st Light Infantry, 156, 167, 513 ».,
514-16, 518-19
8th of the Line, 247 n.
24th of the Line, 232, 236 »., 239-40,
242, 250-51, 253, 258
26th of the Line, 523, 524 n.
28th of the Line, 247 n.
32nd of the Line, 247 «., 523 n.
36th of the Line, 513 «., 514, 517
45th of the Line, 247 n.
47th of the Line, 513 «., 514
54th of the Line, 247 »., 258
58th of the Line, 247 n.
66th of the Line, 481-2, 523, 524 n.
70th of the Line, 161, 513 n., 519
75th of the Line, 247 ;:.
82nd of the Line, 523 n.
96th of the Line, 232, 234, 239-42,
250-51, 258
Legion du Midi, 523 n.
Legion Hanovrienne, 523 n.
Regnaud, General, at Oporto, 161
Reilie, General Honore Charles, in Cata-
lonia, 97-100, 338-9
Remond, General, in Andalusia, 396
Renny, Assistant-surgeon, at Walcheren.
92 K.
Renovales, Colonel, as guerilla, 357
Rettberg, Captain Charles von, in Portu-
gal, 150 n. ; at Talavera, 228, 235,
238
Reuss, French troops at, 380-81 ; men-
tioned, 386
Reynier, General Jean Louis, in Estre-
madura, 361, 410-11, 467, 487-8 ;
operations against Hill, 488, 493"5 5
joins Massena, 495, 501-6 ; at Bussaco,
511-13, 518, 521-2, 528-9, 531-25 in
invasion of Portugal, 533, 535 ; in the
retreat to Santarem, 549-52 ; at San-
tarem, 552-3, 555 ; mentioned, 375 n.,
468-9
Riall, Lieutenant-colonel Phineas, in the
W. Indies, 13 n.
Ribadeo, mentioned, 180
Richmond, Charles Lennox, 4th Duke of,
mentioned, 128 n.
Rimini, mentioned, 292
Rio de Janeiro, mentioned, 432
Rio de la Plata, expedition to. See under
Buenos Ayres
Rio di Santi Pedri (Cadiz), mentioned,
366, 392
Rio Mayor, British troops at, 139, 538,
555 ; mentioned, 552-3
Rio Sao Lourenco, mentioned, 541
Ritthem, British troops at, 71
Riviere des Pamplemousses (now des
Citrous), skirmish at, 604
Riviere des Pluies (Bourbon), mentioned,
598
Riviere Salee, mentioned, 13
Riviere Seche, skirmish at, 604-5
Robe, Lieutenant-colonel William, men-
tioned, 138
Robert, Bay, British troops at, 14
Robinson, Commissary-general, at Wal-
cheren, 83-4
Roche, Colonel Philip Keating, reports to
Wellington, 203, 285, 347-8
Rodney, H.M.S., mentioned, 400
Rodriguez, Island of, taken by British,
597, 601, 603
Romana, Marquis de la, in Galicia, 112,
130-31, 177-81, 203 ; at Seville, 362 ;
at Badajoz, 410 5 in defence of Portugal,
459, 463, 467 ; defeats of, 489, 496 ;
in the Lines, 543 ; mentioned, 80 «., 97,
*36, 277, 344, 408, 471
Roncal R., mentioned, 357
Ronda, French troops at, 3695 mentioned,
395, 398,488
Ronquillo, mentioned, 411
Roompot, The, British ships in, 61, 67,
74, 77, 93
Rosas, siege of, 99-100
Rose, George, mentioned, 47
Ross, Captain Hew D., in the Peninsula,
200, 471 ; at the Coa, 478, 481 j at
Bussaco, 511 «., 523, 526, 532
Rosslyn, James, Lieutenant-general, Earl
of, in the Walcheren expedition, 56 «.,
62-3, 6-8, 81-2
Rottenburg, Colonel Franz, Baron, in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 n., 67, 70 «.,
71,88
Rotterdam, mentioned, 83
Rowan, Brigade-major, in the combat on
the Coa, 480
Rowley, Commodore, mentioned, 598. 601
Ruffin, General, at Talavera, 230-32, 235,
237, 239, 241, 245, 250-51, 253-4, 258
Ruivaes, mentioned, 167-8, 170
Rumann, Captain Ludwig, as scout, 416
Runjeet Singh, mentioned, 564
Rupert's Bay, British troops at, 21
Russel, Mont, British at, 18
Russia, mentioned, 329, 609. See also
under Alexander, Tsar of Russia
Ryder, Richard, mentioned, 328
Sabugal, French troops at, 493-5
Sacavem, British troops at, 115
INDEX
655
Sadras, mentioned, 582
Sahagun, mentioned, 117, 120 ;;.
St. Bartholomew, mentioned, 26
St. Cyr, General Gouvion, in Catalonia,
99-104, 173, 291, 338-41
St. Denis, British troops at, 598-9
St. Domingo, mentioned, 2, 3, 6
Ste. Croix, General, in invasion of Por-
tugal, 535
Ste. Croix (W. Indies), taken by British, 9
St. Eustatius, taken by British, 25 ; men-
tioned, 20
St. John, taken by British, 9
St. Kitts, mentioned, 7, 8 n.
St. Laurens, British troops at, 70
St. Luce (Martinique), British at, 13
St. Martins, taken by British, 25 ; men-
tioned, 20
St. Omer, mentioned, 65
St. Paul, taken by British, 597, 599
St. Pierre, taken by British, 15
Saints, The, British attack on, 17-19, 25
St. Thomas, taken by British, 9
St. Vincent, John Jervis, Earl of, men-
tioned, 59
Salamanca, French troops at, 105, 114,
116, 135, 138, 143, 188, 214-15, 219,
268, 277, 281, 288, 344-7, 371, 375,
405, 408, 465-6, 468-9 ; Spanish at,
346 ; mentioned, 277, 356, 373, 415
Salamonde, mentioned, 167
Salomon, Cape, mentioned, 13-14
Saltador Bridge, skirmish at, 168
Salvaterra, mentioned, 147, 452, 488-9
Salzburg, acquired by Bavaria, 328
Samarang, mentioned, 626-7
Sambar, Cape, mentioned, 610
Samulcottah, mutiny at, 586-8
San Antonio de Cantara, mentioned, 508,
511, 514-15. 5'9-2°> 530-32
San Celoni, French troops at, 10 1
Sanchez, Don Julian, as guerilla, 356-7 ;
in British pay, 491
San Felices, French troops at, 463, 470
San Ferdinando (Cadiz), mentioned, 366
Sanguesa, taken by guerillas, 358
San Jose (Cadiz), mentioned, 394
San Juliao, mentioned, 336, 542-3
San Juan de la Peiia, mentioned, 357
San Luis (Cadiz), mentioned, 367, 394
San Payo, skirmish at, 182-3 ; mentioned,
502
San Paulo, mentioned, 50S, 510
San Pedro, Portuguese troops at, 131;
French at, 477, 534
San Roman, British at, 211, 213 n.
San Stefano, mentioned, 318
Santa Comba Dao, mentioned, 502, 504
Santa Cruz de Mudela, Spanish troops at,
= 19, 347
Santa Cruz de Retamar, mentioned, 263
Santa Maria, Spanish troops at, 365
Santa Maura, taken by British, 311-14;
French at, 307, 311 ; description of,
312
Santander, French troops at, 178-9, 371,
376, 4°5-° 5 fighting at, 179
Santa Olalla, mentioned, 217, 222, 411,
496
S.mtarem, British troops at, 115 «., 146,
203, 265 ; French at, 546-54 ; de-
scription of Massena's position at, 552 ;
mentioned, 545
Santiago, Spanish success at, 180 ; French
at, 178, 182-3 > mentioned, 181
Santi Petri (Cadiz), mentioned, 367, 392
Santocildes, Don Jose, at Astorga, 408-9
Santvliet, British troops at, 63, 93-5 ;
mentioned, 82
Sao juliao, mentioned, 442-4
Sao Vincente, British at, 542
Sarasa, Miguel, as guerilla, 357-8
Sardao, mentioned, 503, 505, 511, 533-5
Sardinia, mentioned, 301
Sarrut, Brigadier, at Bussaco, 513 n.
Sarzedas, British troops at, 205, 488, 495
Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, mentioned,
59
Scharnhorst, General Gerard, mentioned,
38»48
Scheldt R., proposed operations on, 46-7,
49; expedition decided upon, 51-3;
history of the expedition, 56-86 ; de-
tails of troops sent, 55-8 ; description of
country, 60, 92 ; objects of expedition,
62, 93 ; defences of river, 60-6 1, 64, 82 ;
French anxiety for, 63-4, 96 ; misfor-
tunes of expedition, 67, 69, 73, 75,
77-8, 81, 83, 93-6 ; organisation of
troops, 57 fi., 67 «., 70 n. ; British casual-
ties, 72, 78 »., 80, 91 ; fall of Flush-
ing, 80; expedition abandoned, 86-8;
reasons for failure, 93-6 ; Parliamentary
committee on, 332; mentioned, 190,
289, 440. See also awi/erWalcheren
Schill, Major, rising led by, 42-3, 48
Schonbrunn, Napoleon at, 18S
Schouwen, Island of, British at, 61, 67
Schvvarz, General, in Catalonia, 380-81
Schvvarzenberg, Charles Philip, Prince,
mentioned, 36, 39
Scilla, British attack on, 296, 299-301 ;
French in, 293, 316, 318-20
Scinde, British mission to, 60-
Scindia, mentioned, 563
Sebastiani, General Horace, in Central
Spain, 105-6, 108, 1S8-9, 203 ; in the
Talavera campaign, 208-9, 211, 216,
219-20, 222, 286 ; at Talavera, 230,
245. 247-5°. 256, 258, 260, 263, 285 ;
656
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
operations against Venegas, 263-4 ; in
Andalusia, 361, 369, 395, 396, 400-402 ;
mentioned, 268, 308, 344, 349, 370,
375 »•■> 39s *•, 496
Segovia, mentioned, 207, 209, 376, 409
Segre R., mentioned, 384
Senra, General, in Castile, 106
Septinsular Republic, the, mentioned, 303,
308
Seras, General, in Leon, 468, 490
Seringapatam, mutiny at, 587, 589 ; men-
tioned, 419, 461
Serooskerke, British troops at, 70
Serra, Convent of (Oporto), mentioned,
158
Sena da Cabrera, mentioned, 132, 167
Serra da Estrella, mentioned, 453, 457,
501
Serra de San Mamede, mentioned, 467
Serra do Bussaco, 1st attack on, 514-22 ;
2nd attack, 523-6; mentioned, 505,
506-8, 511-13, 534
Serra do Caramullo, mentioned, 503, 532
Setubal, mentioned, 336, 455, 457
Seville, British troops at, 123, 139, 146 «.,
200, 364 ; taken by Joseph, 361-3, 368,
405, 411 ; Junta at, 120, 359-60 ;
mentioned, 109, 118, 147, 206-7, 2^2,
352> 359> 396^ 545
Sherbrooke, Major-general John Cope, pro-
posed expedition to Cadiz, 120-21 ; in
Portugal, 123-4, 137, 154; in the
Talavera campaign, 200, 201 »., 216-18,
220-22 ; at Talavera, 225, 233, 235,
241, 245, 247-9, 257 5 character, 218 ;
mentioned, 416-17
Shaw, Lieutenant, mentioned, 468 n.
Sicily, British troops in, 33-4, 44, 51,
100, 200, 309, 315, 317, 440, 491 ;
safety of, 305, 314 ; French invasion
of, 291, 308, 316-20 j disaffection in,
315-16, 321 ; peasant co-operation in,
317, 319, 321 ; treacherous Court of,
308-9, 314-17* 329 5 mutiny in, 294 ;
changed British policy towards, 322-3,
441-2. See also under Stuart, Sir
John
Sidmouth, Henry Addington, Lord, men-
tioned, 327
Sierra de Albarracin, mentioned, 358
Sierra de Aracena, mentioned, 411
Sierra de Gata, mentioned, 280, 351,
.458
Sierra de Ronda, rising in, 410
Sierra de Segurilla, mentioned, 223-4,
_ 242 «., 245-6, 250, 252
Sierra de Suido, mentioned, 182
Sierra Morena, mentioned, 108, 189,
. 347-8, 354, 360, 363, 382, 488
Sierra Nevada, mentioned, 395
Si 1 R., Spanish troops on, 177 j French
on, 183
Silesia, unrest in, 38
Sillery, Captain C. D., at Talavera, 228
Silveira, General Francisco, operations
against Soult, 131-4, 143-4, 152, 165,
167, 170 ; and against Seras, 490 ;
mentioned, 203, 457
Simon, General, at Bussaco, 523, 526
Singapore, mentioned, 610
Sirius, H.M.S., at Mauritius, 599-600
Skinner, Colonel John, in the W. Indies,
20 n.
Slade, Major-general John, in the Penin-
sula, 417, 466 ; at Bussaco, 510 n. • in
the retreat to Lines, 536, 539 ; pursuit
of Massena, 550
Sloe, mentioned, 76-7, 81-2
Slokan R., skirmish on, 614-15 ; men-
tioned, 616, 618-21
Smith, Colonel Sir George, mission to
Cadiz, 112, 117, 122-4 ; death of, 123
Smith, Sir Harry, mentioned, 482, 486 n.
Smith, Lieutenant-colonel Haviland, in
expedition to Ischia, 295 n. ; to Scilla,
296, 299-301
Smith, Lieutenant - colonel Lionel, in
Mauritius, 602 n.
Smith, Major William, at Bussaco, 518
Sobral, British troops at, 540-41, 544;
French at, 545-6 ; mentioned, 542
Sobreira Formosa, British troops at, 205,
458, 495 ; mentioned, 454
Sola, Don Jose Manso y, mentioned, 357
Solignac, General, in Spain, 370
Somatenes, in Catalonia, 99, 173, 357, 377,
381,389
Somers Cocks, Captain Hon. John. See
under Cocks
Sontag, Colonel John, in Portugal, 150 «.,
154 ».
Souburg, British troops at, 71
Souham, General Joseph, in Catalonia, 99,
102, 104, 377-9 ; returns to France,
379
Soult, Nicolas, Marshal, Duke of Dalmatia,
Napoleon's plans for, 104, 108, 11 1 ;
takes Corufia and Ferrol, 1 10-12 5 in-
vades Portugal, 129-36, 138, 144, 153,
452 ; conspiracy against, 144-5, 153,
157; British advance against, 147-57;
defeated at Oporto, 50, 158-63 ; his
retreat to Spain, 164-71, 187 ; operations
in Galicia, 180-85, 188,206; abandons
Ney, 183 ; influence on Talavera cam-
paign, 209, 214-16, 219, 236, 244,
262-3, 287-8 ; his march to the Tagus,
263, 266-72, 280, 356; operations -v.
Cuesta, 273-7 ; end of campaign, 277,
281,288; operations against Areiza^a,
INDEX
657
349, 35475 j invades Andalusia, 359-66 ;
commands in Andalusia, 373, 376,
395-6, 462, 488-9, 496, 547, 5565
state of his army, 1809, ill, 170, 180,
183, 206; his plans for invasion of
Portugal, 214-15, 2775 relations with
Ney, 180-84, 283-5 j ms failings, 163,
364-6 ; character of, 370 ; mentioned,
97, no, 112, 143, 147, 186, 196, 329,
343-4. 347. 488-9
Sourabaya, mentioned, 626, 628
Soure, British at, 536
Sourier, skirmish at, 14
Sousa Coutinho, Count of Linhares,
Rodrigo de, mentioned, 432
Sousa, Domingos de, in London, 432
Sousa, Jose de (the Principal), in the
Regency, 490 ; his folly, 496-8, 559 ;
mentioned, 432
Souza R., mentioned, 166
Spain, power in the W. Indies, 2, 5, 6 ;
operations of the French in (exclusive
of campaigns against British troops),
97-142, 173-89, 262-78, 337-53, 376-
411 j relations with England as to
Cadiz, 124, 129 ; character of the
war, 148, 185, 333, 407 j exhaustion
of the country, 187, 276, 494; ques-
tion of transport in, in, 211, 218,
278-80, 2<c6 ; the Cortes, 351-2, 362,
403-4 ; guerilla bands in, 355-9, 375,
383, 385, 389-90, 397, 407-8, 411,
494 ; treatment of French wounded,
265
The Spanish Army, its condition, 207,
214, 259. 347-S. 35", 399 5 Well-
ington's criticism of, 335, and
Roche's, 203, 2S5, 347-8 ; cowardice
of cavalry, 213-14, 345, 350 ; be-
haviour of Spanish troops at Talavera,
231, 236, 238, 245-6, 250-51, 254,
257-8, 286 ; irregular troops, see
under Somatenes and Migueletes
Operations of the Spanish Armies, ex-
clusive of campaigns with the British :
Army of the Left (Asturias and
Galicia), in 1808, 97 ; in 1809,
177-85, 344-7. 35Q-51 i in l8 10,
406-9
Army of Centre (La Mancha), in
1808-9, 97. 105-10 j under
Venegas, 263-5 j unc'er Eguia,
344, 347-8 ; under Areizaga,
348-9, 360-61
Army of Catalonia, in 1808-9,
97-104, 338-43 5 in l8io, 376-
82, 386
Army of Aragon in 1809, 173-6,
337-8 ; in 1810, 382-5
See also under Wellington, and under
VOL. VII
names of various Spanish, English,
and French generals
Specie, difficulties as to. See under England
(finance)
Spencer, Lieutenant-general Sir Brent, in
defence of Portugal, 466 ; in Bussaco
campaign, 502-3, 505-6 ; at Bussaco,
508 «., 510, 512, 514, 526 ; in retreat
to Lines, 536 j pursues Massena, 549,
553 ; relations with Wellington, 418,
499
Spry, Brigadier, at Bussaco, 509 n., 514,
519
Stadion, Count, mentioned, 43, 53 n.
Staines, Captain (R.N.), off Naples, 299
Stair, John, Earl of, mentioned, 192
Stanhope, Colonel James, mentioned,
547 "•. 551 "-.
Starhemberg, Prince, mentioned, 36, 43,
51-2
Steen Deep, the, British in, 66-7, 73
Steigentisch, Count, mentioned, 48
Stein, Henry P'rederick, Baron, mentioned,
, 32.48
Stettin, mentioned, 41
Stewart, Colonel Hon. Charles Wm., skir-
mish at Grijo, 156 ; at Oporto, 162-3 ,
in Talavera campaign, 213, 217, 257 ;
relations with Wellington, 41 2- 14, 444 j
his interference, 162-3, 2I7. 444 j
criticism of batt. of detachments, 234 n. ;
his letter to Castlereagh, 412-14 n.
Stewart, Colonel Richard, in Portugal,
1 1 5 >!., 1 50 n., 153 n., 1 54-6 ; at Oporto,
161; in Talavera campaign, 201 n. ;
at Talavera, 229, 230 n., 233, 235,
239-40
Stewart, Major-general Hon. W., in the
Walcheren expedition, 56 n. ; at Cadiz,
368, 392, 462 ; mentioned, 508 ».
Stopford, Colonel Hon. Edward, at Bus-
saco, 508 n. ; mentioned, 420
Stopford, Admiral, mentioned, 626
Storey, Major (E.I.C.), tried for mutiny,
Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, commands
fleet at Walcheren, 56-86 j relations
with Chatham, 77, 82-3, 86-7 j char-
acter of, 57, 75, 96 ; mentioned, 51
Stralsund, mentioned, 41, 43
Strasburg, mentioned, 52
Stuart, Mr. Charles, at Cadiz, 122-3 j at
Lisbon, 433-4, 436, 490,497-8, 559-61
Stuart, Lieutenant-general Sir John, opera-
tions in the Mediterranean, 291-323 ;
negotiations with Austria, 44, 292-3 ; ex-
pedition to Ischia, 295-302 ; policy for
Ionian Islands, 292, 302, 307-8, and
at Naples, 301 ; relations with Ministers,
305, 310, 320, and with Neapolitan
2 U
658
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Court, 309-10, 316 ; refuses to send
away regiments, 315, 320, 441, 448 ;
threatened mutiny against, 294 ; good
work of his staff, 317, 319 ; resignation
of, 322 ; character of, 293-4, 300, 311,
322-3 ; mentioned, 100, 102
Stuart, Lieutenant-colonel Hon. Patrick, at
Quilon, 588-9
Suchet, General Louis Gabriel, operations
in Aragon, 174-6, 337-8, 371, 375 ».,
380-85; takes Lerida, 383-4; before
Tortosa, 385-8, 390; difficulties of
supply, 389
Sula, fighting at, 506, 522-3, 526; men-
tioned, 512
Sumatra, mentioned, 628
Surinam, negro troubles in, 7
Sutlej R., mentioned, 564
Sweden, power in W. Indies, 26 ; revolu-
tion in, 39
Switzerland, troops in Spanish service,
100
Syracuse, mentioned, 299
Tagus R., defences of, 336, 541-2, 545 ;
campaign on, 1809, 201-90 ; British on,
149, 190, 200, 415, 457, 551-5;
French on, 181, 187, 189, 468,549;
mentioned, 451, 455, 549
Tait, Captain (R.N.), raid on Baracoa, 5
Talavera, Wellington's advance to, 206-
14; description of ground, 223-6;
battle of, 226-61 ; Cuesta abandons,
267-8, 270 ; British wounded at, 270 ;
summary of campaign of, 283-4, 288,
its results, 289-90 ; French at, 109,
188, 208, 273, 275 ; Spanish at, 344,
349 ; mentioned, 325, 347, 356, 358, 375
Talbot, Lieutenant-colonel Neil, death of,
473
Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince de Benevent,
Charles Maurice, mentioned, 32
Tamames, Spanish success at, 345, 350,
406
TamegaR., mentioned, 130-31, 143-4, 152,
165
Tanabang, mentioned, 614
Tancos, mentioned, 456
Tangier, mules from, 427
Tanjong Priok, mentioned, 612, 623
Tanjore, mentioned, 582
Tarancon, French at, 106, 349 ; men-
tioned, 219
Tarento, Duke of. See under Macdonald,
Marshal
Tarlton, Lieutenant-general Banastre, men-
tioned, 42, 331, 333
Tarragona, Spanish troops at, 98, 103-4,
383, 386-8; mentioned, 100, 102, 123,
»39> '73, 338-9» 357, 38°> 385
Tarrega, French troops at, 388
Taupin, Brigadier, in invasion of Portugal,
536, 544
Teheran, British mission to, 607
Tembleque, mentioned, 219
Ten Haak, British at, 68
Teneriffe, mentioned, 600
Tent-allowance, in Madras army, 568-70,
578
Terneuse, mentioned, 60
Terre en Haut, British at, 17-18
Teruel, mentioned, 388-9
Thames, H.M.S., mentioned, 316
Thiebault, General Paul Charles, in Spain,
371
Thomar, Portuguese troops at, 457, 495 ;
British at, 499, 533, 536; French at,
546, 552, 554; mentioned, 353, 458,
494
Thompson, Captain George, at Bussaco,
515, 517 n.
Thouvenot, General, in Spain, 370-71
Tietar R., mentioned, 203, 211-13
Tilsit, Treaty of, mentioned, 306, 329
Tilson, Major-general Christopher, in Por-
tugal, I50«., 152, 170 «., 191 n. ; in the
Talavera campaign, 201 n. ; at Talavera,
229, 230 1:., 235, 239-41 ; relations with
Beresford, 170 «., 191 »., 201 n. ; ill-
health of, 417
Tippoo Sahib, mentioned, 628
Tobago, troubles in, 7, 26
Toledo, French troops at, 108, 139, 189,
216, 218-20, 264, 286, 347, 349;
Spanish at, 244, 263-4 ; mentioned,
358
Tondella, mentioned, 502, 504
Topaze, H.M.S., mentioned, 398
Tordesillas, French at, 346
Toril, French at, 269
Tormes R., mentioned, 346
Tornevecas, Pass of, mentioned, 212 n.
Toro, French troops at, 219, 346, 350,
3 7 1; 40.9, 47°
Torrejoncillo, mentioned, 205
Torrens, Lieutenant-colonel Henry, re-
lations with Wellington, 419, 422, 424
Torres Vedras, description of the Lines,
541-4 ; the British in, 540-41, 558-9 ;
unknown to French, 537, 544 ; men-
tioned, 336, 447, 456, 535, 555
Torrijos, mentioned, 220-21, 261
Tortosa, siege of, 385-90 ; mentioned, 120,
339-4°, 382
Toulon, French fleet at, 301, 303, 338,
367
Toulouse, mentioned, 550
Trancoso, French at, 501 ; mentioned,
454
Trant, Colonel Sir Nicholas, operations
INDEX
659
against Soult, 155-6; in Bussaco cam-
paign, 502-5, 534-6, 546 ; takes Coim-
bra, 538-9 ; mentioned, 152, 154"., 457
Travancore, war in, 570, 576, 5S8 ; men-
tioned, 571, 575, 583
Traz-os-Montes, French in, 131-4, 143-41
152, 157, 165, 188; mentioned, 557
Treilhard, Colonel, mentioned, 545
Trentapassos, Pass of, French troops at,
101-2
Treviso, Duke of. See under Mortier,
Marshal
Trichinopoly, mentioned, 582, 593
Trieste, acquired by France, 305
Trinidad, negro rising in, 7 ; mentioned,
419 n.
Trocadero (Cadiz), mentioned, 367, 393
Trois Rivieres, British at, 21-2
Truxillo, Spanish troops at, 109, 187, 283,
344 ; French at, 410 ; mentioned, 359,
361
Tudela, mentioned, 175, 358
Turkey, war with Russia, 39 ; situation of
in 1809, 306-8 ; mentioned, 32
Turones R., mentioned, 470, 472
Tuscany, mentioned, 293-4
Tuy, French at, 129-30 ; mentioned, 133
Tyrol, fighting in, 37-8
Ucles, Spanish defeat at, 106
United States, mentioned, 12, 26
Urgel, mentioned, 388
Val de Mula, French troops at, 476, 483
Valdemoro, mentioned, 262
Valenca, mentioned, 130
Valencia, Spanish troops in, 98 ; Suchet's
attempt on, 383 ; mentioned, 105, 174,
382,385
Vallada, British troops at, 265, 551
Valladolid, French troops at, 178, 181,
188,209, 215, 346-7, 350, 371, 376,
405, 409, 467, 545 ; mentioned, 35,
I°4> 356> 373- 4i5>494
Valle de Santarem, British at, 555
Vallirana, mentioned, 357
Vallongo, mentioned, 159, 161, 164
Vails, French at, 104, 338
Valverde, French at, 410
Vargas, French troops at, 219, 262
Veere, British troops at, 68-71, 75-77, 82
Veere Gat, British fleet in, 61, 67-9, 72,
76
Velada, Spanish troops at, 213
Vendada, British at, 487
Venegas, General Francisco, defeats of, 106,
264, 277, 281 ; influence on Talavera
campaign, 208-9, 211, 218-21, 285;
advance on Madrid, 244, 263-4 ; with
Eguia, 344, 347 ; at Cadiz, 366-7, 392;
sent to Mexico, 392; character of, 264;
mentioned, 108, 189, 262, 266-7, 268,
283-7, 329
Venerable, II. M.S., mentioned, 56
Venezuela, mentioned, 419 «.
Venice, mentioned, 292, 306
Venus, the, captured by British, 601
Verdier, General, in Catalonia, 339-41
376, 381
Vernon, Mr. (M.P.), mentioned, 331
Vich, French troops at, 338, 377, 379
Victor, Claude Pcrrin, Marshal (Duke of
Belluno), success at Ucles, 106 ; and at
Medellin, no, 135 ; operations in Cas-
tile, 106-7 j m Estremadura, 108-10 ;
advance into Portugal, 171, 185-6;
retires to Plasencia, 187-8, 189, 202-3,
205 ; in the Talavera campaign, 208-9,
214-16, 219,221-2 ; at Talavera, 230-32,
23S-7. 243-5> 25°, 2-55-6, 260, 285-7 ;
operations after the battle, 262-3, 267,
272-3, 275, 277, 288; and against
Eguia, 347-9 ; in Andalusia, 360-64,
405 ; before Cadiz, 367-8, 391-5, 398,
458 ; his difficulties of supply, 186-8 ;
his delay, 185-6, 201 ; state of his
troops, 187, 206 ; mentioned, 105,
135-6, 138-40, 143, 147, 149, 171,
181, 196, 276 »., 283, 288, 343-4, 375 n.
Vidreras, French at, 101 ; mentioned,
388
Vienna, taken by French, 37, 294 ; men-
tioned, 315, 413
Vieux Habitants, skirmish at, 21
Vigo, French at, 129, 184; British at,
134, 182; mentioned, 116
Villacampa, Don Pedro, in Aragon, 358,
389-90
Villacastin, French at, 209 n., 214
Villa de Puerco, fighting at, 473-5
Villafranca, taken by Romana, 177-8 ;
French at, 183, 380, 545, 549 ; fight-
ing at, 380
Villalba, Spanish troops at, 180
Villamanrique, mentioned, 340, 354, 361
Villa Nova (Oporto), mentioned, 158
Villanueva, Spanish troops at, 175
Villanueva da Serena, Spanish at, 282
Villar de Ciervos, British at, 464
Villa Real, Portuguese troops at, 132-3,
153
Villarelho, Portuguese at, 131
Villarrubia, mentioned, 220
Villars, Marshal, mentioned, 544
Villarta, mentioned, 220
Villatte, General, at Talavera, 230, 237-8,
245, 251, 253-4
Villa Velha de Rodao, British at, 205,
458, 466, 487, 548
Villaza, skirmish at, 131
66o
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Villel, Marquis, at Cadiz, 122
Villeneuve, Admiral, mentioned, 3
Villettes, General, mentioned, 441 n.
Villiers, Mr., at Lisbon, 113, 125, 196,
432, 437"8> 445 > recalled, 432-3
Vitoria, mentioned, 356
Vives, General, in Catalonia, 98-103
Vizeu, British at, 152-3, 164, 353, 412,
451, 457; French at, 501-2, 504;
mentioned, 454
Volunteers, proposed force of, 34-5
Vouga R., French on, 153-4 ; British on,
154-5. 5°3» 538
Vygeneter, British at, 71
Waarde, British troops at, 72, 81
Wagner, August, mentioned, 37 n.
Walcheren, proposed attack on, 45-7;
history of the expedition, 56-86 ; ob-
jects of expedition, 62, 93 ; floods in,
78-9, 81; fall of Flushing, 79-80;
fever in, 79, 81, 85,
-92
tion of, 91 ; French preparations against,
90-91, 96 ; influence of fever on other
operations, 26, 439-41, 499, 500 ; garri-
son in, 88 ; mentioned, 190, 289, 324,
329. See also under Scheldt
Wale, Colonel Charles, in the W. Indies,
20 !?., 23-4
Walker, Lieutenant-colonel Geo. Town-
shend, mentioned, 128 n.
Wallace, Lieutenant-colonel Alexander,
at Bussaco, 515-17, 518 «., 521 «.
Walmoden, Count, mentioned, 36-7
Wardle, Colonel, mentioned, 29
Warre, Major, mentioned, 168
Waters, Colonel John, at Oportc, 159 ; as
scout, 415, 501
Wellesley, Lord Cowley, Henry, men-
tioned, 326, 392, 448 n.
Wellesley, Richard, Marquess, in Spain,
282, 326, 343, 448 n. ; takes office under
Perceval, 327-8, 448 n. ; relations with
Canning, 326, 328 ; in India, 563, 566 ;
mentioned, 47, 325
Wellesley, Mr. Richard, mentioned, 448 n.
Wellesley-Pole, William, mentioned, 446-
47, 448 «., 484, 499
Wellington, Sir Arthur Wellesley, Vis-
count, accepts Peninsular command, 44,
128-9, I4° > plans f°r Oporto cam-
paign, 147-8 ; march to Oporto, 149-
57 ; success at Oporto, 50, 158-63,
187 ; pursues Soult, 164-72 ; summary
of campaign, 163, 190 ; preparations for
Talavera campaign, 180-204, 208-11;
march to Talavera, 205-14 ; organisa-
tion of his army, 201 n. ; victory at
Talavera, 224-61 ; mistakes of his
officers at Talavera, 225, 228-9, 235>
259, 414; commands Spanish army
during the battle, 228-9, 23: "•> 2&l j
criticism of the action, 259-61 ; number
of troops at Talavera, 238, 245 ; lack
of cavalry, 241 ; delay after the battle,
263, 265-6 ; march against Soult, 267-
68 ; miscalculation of French force, 266,
268-9, 284-5 i separates from Spaniards,
270-72 ; rejoined by Cuesta, 275-6, 278-
79 ; withdraws towards Portugal, 279,
281-3, 288, 352-3 ; refuses further co-
operation with Spanish armies, 282-3,
343, 345, 352, 467 ; summary of Tala-
vera campaign, 284-7 5 his forecast for
1810, 335, 442 ; plans the Lines, 336 ;
retreat to Portugal, 353, 359 ; detaches
troops to Cadiz, 368, 391 ; encourages
detention of Victor before that city,
395, 458, 463, 547 ; influence of
Mortier's corps on his arrangements,
410-11; dispositions for defence of
Portugal, 1810,455-57,469-70; further
relations with Spanish armies, 462, 466-
67, 470-71, 487, 489, 496 ; retires before
French, 472, 475, 487-8, 493-5, 502-5 ;
preparations for Bussaco, 505-6, 508-11 ;
battle of Bussaco, 513-32; retreat
towards Lisbon, 533-40; his anxiety
over Massena's march, 534-5 j good
work of cavalry, 539-40, 558 ; in the
Lines, 542-3, 545 ; number of troops,
543 ; resolves not to fight, 546-7, 553 5
pursues Massena, 549 - 54 ; winter
quarters, 1810-11, 555; summary of
campaign, 555-8 ; his relations with
Ministers, 436-40, 445-7, 49°> 499>
559-62 ; with Liverpool, 442-9, 559-
60 ; lack of confidence in Government,
445-7, 449-50; relations with Beres-
ford, 153, 420; with Craufurd, 421,
461, 463, 465, 475, 484-6; with his
staff and generals, 412-21 ; with his
scouts, 415 ; with the artillery, 530-32 ;
relations with Portuguese Regency,
432-4, 490-91, 496-8, 545-6, 559 ; with
Spanish Junta, 282-3, 343, 352; with
Cuesta, 201-2, 206-11, 217, 222, 266,
270, 275-6, 278, 283, 329 ; with Eguia,
279, 348 ; with del Parque, 351 ; with
Frere, 207-8, 283 ; with guerillas, 357 ;
his difficulties of transport and supply,
146-7, 171, 197-9* 203, 211-12, 217,
270, 278-80, 282, 286, 288-9, 333,
426-7 ; difficulties of forage, 149 «.,
197, 241, 279-80, 282, 457; and of
finance, 196, 202, 435-7 ; character of
his army, 190-92, 194-6, 199, 279, 421-
25, 499, 537, 558 ; his reforms in the
Portuguese army, 429-31 ; his criticism
of Spanish generals, 353 ; his lack of
INDEX
661
patronage, 192, 424 ; intercourse with
French conspirators, 144-5, 1 5 3 i his
instructions, 129, 147, 442-5 ; his
tactics, 150-52 ; his memorandum on
defence of Portugal, 44, 125-8, 335-7,
438 ; his troops in 1809, 129, 145 ;
reinforcements, 1809, 189-90, 200, 211,
317, and in 1810, 438-40, 491, 499-
500 ; attacked in Parliament, 28-9,
284,331-25 influenced by politics, 210,
286, 535; made viscount, 331; his
character and gifts, 128, 148, 222, 261,
280, 286, 289, 365, 414, 432, 438,
449, 484, 558-9 ; mentioned, 124, 138,
142, 181, 185, 195, 278, 288, 315,
325-6, 328, 333, 346, 349, 365, 372,
403, 498-9, 566-7, 593
Weltevreeden, fight at, 614-15 ; taken by
British, 615-16, 629 ; mentioned, 613
Wemeldinge, British at, 72
Weser R., proposed expedition to, 36, 41,
+3- 5°, 52
Westphalia, rising in, 42 ; hatred of
France in, 41, 50
Wetherall, Major-general Fred. Aug.,. in
Java expedition, 609, 611, 613-15,
619-20
Whitbread, Samuel (M.P.), mentioned,
261, 331
Whitelocke, Lieutenant-general Sir John,
mentioned, 193
Whittingham, Colonel Sir Samuel, at Tala-
vera, 229, 231 n., 257
Wielingen Channel, mentioned, 60, 62, 66
Wilkinson, Lieutenant-colonel William,
mentioned, 582, 593
William III., King of England, mentioned,
423
Williams, Lieutenant-colonel William, at
Bussaco, 516-17
Willoughby, Captain (R.N.), at Mauritius,
600
Wilson, Lieutenant-colonel George, at
Bussaco, 508 n.
Wilson, Colonel John, with Portuguese
troops, 457, 539, 546
Wilson, Sir Robert, raises Lusitanian
Legion, 113-14; operations on frontier,
135-6, 143; in Talavera campaign,
205,210-11,220,263, 272; skirmish
with Ney, 277-8 ; character of, 278 ;
returns home, 278 ; mentioned, 42,
152, 164
Windham, William (M.P.), mentioned,
333. +59
Wittenberg, mentioned, 43
Wolfe, James, Major-general, mentioned,
59
Wood, Colonel, in Java expedition, 609,
610 «., 619, 620 n., 622
Worster, General, in N. Spain, 178, 180
Wurmb, Adolph, Major von, in Portugal,
150 n.
Xeres, Spanish troops at, 365
Yeomanry, proposed force of, 35
York, H.R.H. Frederick, Duke of, dis-
grace of, 28-31; his reforms in the
army, 34-5, 424 ; on question of courts-
martial, 193 ; mentioned, 195, 423-4,
+59
Yule, Major, in the Java expedition, 620,
622
Zafra, mentioned, 410, 459, 489, 496
Zalamea la Real, fighting at, 411
Zamora, French troops at, 183, 188, 206,
2°9» 2I5. 345. 37i» 468, 47°> 49° >
mentioned, 181, 356
Zante, British in, 291, 302-4, 307
Zaragoza, siege of, 107-8, 120, 173, 357 ;
French in, 383 ; mentioned, 97, 105,
174-5. 338. 358. 388
Zarza la Mayor, British at, 205-6, 281,
453. 494. 495
Zayas, General Jose, in Talavera cam-
paign, 221, 268, 272
Zedayo, mentioned, 626
Zerain, General T., mentioned, 264
Zezere R., mentioned, 136, 149, 453,456,
.495. 503.. 546, 548-9. 55 x
Zibreira, British at, 205
Zierikzee, British at, 67, 72
Zizandre R., mentioned, 542-4
Znaim, Armistice of, 55, 279, 302
Zouteland, British troops at, 62-3, 70-71
Zuazo (Cadiz), mentioned, 366, 391, 393
END OF VOL. VII
Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.
*>
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
DA Fortescue, (Sir) John William
50 A history of the British
F65 army
v.7
cop. 2
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11